Journal article
Shopping malls, platforms and consumer search
- Abstract:
- We consider a model of a market for differentiated goods in which firms are located in marketplaces e.g., shopping malls or platforms. There are search frictions between marketplaces, but not within. Marketplaces differ in size. We show that an equilibrium in which consumers start their search at the largest marketplace and continue in the descending order of size, always exists. Despite charging lower prices, firms in larger marketplaces earn higher profits. Under free entry, all firms cluster in one marketplace provided that search frictions are large enough. If a marketplace determines the price of entry, then the equilibrium marketplace size is a single-peaked function of search costs and is decreasing for most of the search cost range.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 409.1KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.004
Authors
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- International Journal of Industrial Organization More from this journal
- Volume:
- 58
- Pages:
- 183-213
- Publication date:
- 2018-02-27
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-02-12
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1873-7986
- ISSN:
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0167-7187
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:827401
- UUID:
-
uuid:48b09887-3a7d-4d20-bf57-848d26156888
- Local pid:
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pubs:827401
- Source identifiers:
-
827401
- Deposit date:
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2018-03-02
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Rights statement:
- © 2018 Elsevier BV All rights reserved.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.004
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