THE MEDIA AND CULTURAL PRODUCTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE "THIRD CHIMURENGA" IN ZIMBABWE, 2000 to 2005

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By

Phillip Pasirayi

St Antony's College

Michaelmas Term 2016

DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

Name: PHILLIP PASIRAYI **Candidate number**: 409640

College: ST ANTONY'S COLLEGE **Supervisor(s) of thesis/essay**: Prof J. Alexander

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THESIS ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the role of the media in a "hybrid regime". Taking post-2000 Zimbabwe as a "hybrid regime" in flux over time, the thesis explores the media policies and strategies deployed by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party in the context of the "revolutionary" seizure of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s, what became known as the "Third Chimurenga". I examine how the ZANU (PF) media strategy was developed under the newly created Ministry/Department of Information and Publicity in line with the hegemonic ambitions and legitimation needs of the hybrid system that the party built during this period. Through this, the thesis exposes the shortcomings in the literature on hybrid regimes and a Zimbabweanist scholarly literature on the media and 'patriotic history', which both overly emphasise the formal media, and argues for a much deeper understanding of the role of the 'non-traditional' media and political practices that are historically and culturally constituted in the survival or persistence of these regimes. By showing the importance of history and culture in practices of regime legitimation and survival, the thesis challenges much of the assumptions within the literature on hybrid regimes which is largely quantitative and electoralist in approach. This thesis explores: i) the means and mechanisms of media control in a hybrid regime; ii) the tensions and contradictions that characterise a hybrid media system; iii) the role of the media in legitimacy construction, specifically how journalists framed events, and; iv) the role of the 'non-traditional' media or the forms of media drawn from history and culture in regime legitimation and survival. The thesis is based on interviews with ZANU (PF) elites, senior government officials, journalists, artists and a media content analysis as well as a variety of political actors in Murewa, a particularly violent and contested district in Zimbabwe.

ACRONYMS

ANZ	Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe
AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
BAZ	Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe
BSA	Broadcasting Services Act
CAZ	Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
CCDZ	Centre for Community Development in Zimbabwe
CRC	Constitutional Review Committee
CZC	Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition
CNN	Cable News Network
DLIC	District Lands and Identification Committee
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FTLRP	Fast-Track Land Reform Programme
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
GAPWUZ	General Agricultural Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe
LOMA	Law and Order Maintenance Act
RBC	Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation
RF	Rhodesian Front
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MIC	Media and Information Commission
MMPZ	Media Monitoring Project in Zimbabwe
PLC	Parliamentary Legal Committee
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UZ	University of Zimbabwe
VOZ	Voice of Zimbabwe
ZANU (PF)	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZNLWA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZMC	Zimbabwe Media Commission
ZMMT	Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust
ZTV	Zimbabwe Television
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis explores the Zimbabwean media policies and institutional changes during the "Third Chimurenga" - the revolutionary seizure of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe starting from 2000. The media was central in the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party's efforts to 'renew' itself in the wake of a popular electoral challenge from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a new vibrant opposition party that had been launched in September 1999. For the first time since independence in 1980, there had emerged a nationally unified opposition party with a broad social base that presented a formidable threat to ZANU (PF)'s two decades rule. Starting from 2000, ZANU (PF) and its allies, the veterans of the 1970s *Chimurenga* (liberation) war, the youth militia and others, embarked on a violent campaign for the seizure of white-owned farms which were distributed mainly to party supporters. This controversial exercise was called the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (FTRLP) to denote the pace and targets that government set. Ideologically, the land redistribution exercise was called the "Third Chimurenga", meaning a 'revolution', to accomplish the 'unfinished business' of the liberation struggle of the 1970s during which land was a central grievance.

The thesis draws on ZANU (PF) media policies and institutional practices during the "Third Chimurenga" to give insight into the role of the media and state practices in what I argue should be seen or conceptualised as a hybrid regime. Hybrid regimes refer to the regimes that emerged in the post-Cold War era in Africa that blend authoritarianism with democratic practice (Diamond, 2002). Diamond argues that "in the contemporary era, in which democracy is the only broadly legitimate regime form, … regimes have felt unprecedented pressure (international and domestic) to adopt – or at least to mimic – the democratic form" (Ibid:24). Hybrid regimes are *pseudo-democratic* in that, though they are characterised by multi-party electoral competition and functioning legislatures, judiciaries, a strong civil society and a critical media, these mask the reality of

authoritarian domination and are intended to legitimate power (Ibid.). Andreas Schedler (2010:70) notes that hybrid regimes "have set up the full panoply of liberal-democratic institutions" but specialize in their manipulation to consolidate power and achieve undemocratic objectives. However, for some hybrid regimes there is also a genuine concern for legitimacy that influences their strategic approach or intervention including in the media as I demonstrate in this thesis.

Levitsky and Way (2002:54) note that the media is a key arena of political contestation in a hybrid regime alongside the electoral arena, the legislative arena and the judicial arena. However, the literature on hybrid regimes is overly biased towards elections and other political institutions such as legislatures and the judiciary. Due to this bias, it does not look at the media or the production of its content in detail, beyond seeing it as a key site of contestation. To the extent that the literature on hybrid regimes acknowledges that the media is a key arena of political contestation, it remains problematic because it is biased towards formal media policies and practices and not the role of the 'non-traditional' media or the forms of media that are rooted in specific histories and culture. These forms of media play an important role in regime legitimation and survival in some hybrid contexts as I show in subsequent chapters.

This study takes the fascinating case of the Zimbabwean media policies and state practices under ZANU (PF) during the "Third Chimurenga" from 2000 to 2005 to explore the role of the media in sustaining a hybrid regime that is under pressure from its opponents and is seeking new ways to legitimize its rule. Whilst several studies have looked at the ZANU (PF) media policies and institutional changes during this period to good effect, these studies do not acknowledge that ZANU (PF) was running a "hybrid regime" which influenced the party's strategic approach and intervention in the media. The thesis understands ZANU (PF) as a hybrid regime in flux over time from the outset, and homes in on the changes in the party's media strategy from 2000. I closely examine the 're-gearing' of media policy in response to political pressure and the ruling party's hegemonic ambitions and legitimation needs of the new "hybrid regime" that it built post-2000. I reflect on how innovations in the party's media strategy were made largely under the newly created Department of Information and Publicity in the Office of the President and Cabinet headed by Professor Jonathan Moyo.

The notion of "hybrid regime" is central to this study. I apply this concept to interrogate the ambitions of the ZANU (PF) media agenda post-2000, the media policies and institutional changes, the divisions among key party and state actors in the formulation and implementation of media policies and how these were overcome. The divisions among the key political actors who were responsible for the media during the "Third Chimurenga" are underexplored in existing studies and yet they may provide us a window through which we can better understand the contradictions that characterised the hybrid media system that ZANU (PF) built during this period. I explore these divisions among the party and state actors in their approaches towards the media and how to handle the critical press. The notion of "hybrid regime" allows us to go beyond the narrow focus on political repression to consider ZANU (PF)'s concerns for legitimacy. The emphasis on repression creates the impression of a monolithic ZANU (PF) and a state that did not care about its legitimacy and the sustainability of its authoritarian modes of rule. The notion of "hybrid regime" is therefore expedient in interrogating how the ZANU (PF) media strategy was carefully designed institutionally and ideologically to balance the party's repressive and legitimation agendas during the "Third Chimurenga" in the early 2000s.

1.2 The Focus and Rationale of the Study

This study thus seeks to explore the role of the media in sustaining a hybrid regime that is under pressure from its opponents and faces the risk of being turned out of power. The media was one of the key arenas of political contestation in Zimbabwe during the "Third Chimurenga" from 2000 to 2005. The specific objectives of this study are: i) to explore the broad range of legal, institutional and ideological means and mechanisms of media control that were deployed by the Information and Publicity Ministry under Jonathan Moyo; ii) to explore the divisions among key party and state elites over their approaches to the media and in handling the critical press; iii) to analyse the framing of content and the themes covered in 'patriotic journalism' in the state-controlled press and the contestations over the notion of 'journalistic professionalism' and, finally; iv) to explore the role of the 'non-traditional' media or the forms of media embedded in history and culture such as *Chimurenga* songs, musical galas and *pungwes* (all-night gatherings) in ZANU (PF)'s legitimation and survival efforts in the early 2000s.

The thesis provides an 'in-depth' analysis of the ZANU (PF) media strategies during the "Third Chimurenga". I argue that the party's media policies and strategies were influenced by its hegemonic ambitions as a hybrid regime. I discuss in detail ZANU (PF)'s ambitious media agenda during the "Third Chimurenga"- the revolutionary seizure of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe starting from 2000. This study contributes to the literature on hybrid regimes. This literature ignores other ways that regimes could use to cultivate legitimacy outside elections or formal political institutions. The literature also has a pronounced quantitative approach, in which 'in-depth' analyses that might increase our understanding of how stability and persistence are achieved in hybrid regimes through everyday governance practices are rare. The study also contributes to a Zimbabweanist literature on the media and 'patriotic history'. This literature is overly biased towards the traditional media (radio, television and newspapers) and does not look at the role of the 'non-traditional' media or forms of media drawn from history and culture in regime legitimation and survival.

I examine ZANU (PF)'s hybrid politics in the media. I explore how the ZANU (PF) media system during the "Third Chimurenga" was carefully and deliberately designed institutionally and ideologically to suit the legitimation needs of a new hybrid regime that the party built during this period. One important aspect of hybrid media systems is that they are carefully designed to balance repressive and legitimation goals or agendas. These dual strategies can cause divisions within the state. Whilst ZANU (PF) used heavy-handed means to silence the critical press such as newspaper shutdowns and incarcerating journalists, some state officials preferred what they called 'smart' ways of handling the critical press which included strengthening the state-controlled newspapers editorially and improving content so as to render the critical press less effective. The emphasis on media repression alone creates the impression of a homogeneous party that entirely relied on the truncheon and cared little about its legitimacy or the sustainability of its repressive actions.

I explore the circulation in the state press of immaculately framed narratives designed to legitimise ZANU (PF) claims to power and authority and to discredit opponents. Whilst the studies on 'patriotic history' have made a huge contribution towards our

understanding of ZANU (PF)'s partisan uses of the state media in propagating its exclusive nationalist discourses, these studies do not explore the political and ideological means of media control that were developed by Minister Moyo and how these shaped the framing of news. These studies do not, for example, explore the conditions under which the journalists operated which put them under pressure to exercise self-censorship, resulting in a pliant press, issues that are covered in this study. This thesis gives insight into the production and development of the themes that were covered in 'patriotic journalism', and shows how journalists and editors from the state press defended them on the grounds that they were appropriate to Africa, the nation and the struggle.

I extend my analysis of the media to look at the role of the 'non-traditional' media in ZANU (PF)'s legitimation and survival efforts post-2000. The literature on the Zimbabwean media and 'patriotic history' as well as that on hybrid regimes is overly biased towards the traditional media (radio, television and newspapers) and neglects the role of the 'non-traditional' media or the forms of 'media' drawn from history and culture in regime legitimation and persistence. Whereas journalists, editors and party intellectuals were key authors of 'patriotic history' in the state-controlled media, ZANU (PF) also revived its forms of 'media' and political mobilisation strategies drawn from the 1970s *Chimurenga* (liberation) war against colonial rule. The analysis of these sources provides new insights into 'patriotic history' and the centrality of history and culture in the ZANU (PF) media strategy during the "Third Chimurenga". I demonstrate that the analysis of these sources is crucial, particularly in an African context where the penetration of the formal media and Internet is relatively low. Willems (2011:51) notes that: "A focus beyond formal media such as television, radio, and the press- traditionally the focus of scholars examining media and democracy in the field of political communication- is even more crucial in Africa where media density is generally relatively low". She adds that: "Many Africans, particularly those resident in the rural areas, might not have regular access to formal mass media but instead rely upon more informal means of communication to obtain information about or to comment upon the affairs of the state" (Ibid).

The studies on hybrid regimes and the media are overly biased towards the traditional media and miss this important point.

The thesis thus makes a new contribution to the approach of the study of the media in Zimbabwe. It does so by elaborating on how the media policies and institutions were designed, the role of key political figures and differences in their approaches to the media and how to handle the critical press. In addition, it explores the legal, institutional and ideological means and mechanisms of media control and the party's concerns for legitimacy and sustainability of its repressive actions. And it elaborates on the themes covered in 'patriotic history' in the state press and ZANU (PF) cultural productions in line with the party's legitimation agendas during the "Third Chimurenga".

1.3 The Structure of the Thesis

In Chapter Two, I explore the relationship between the media and the state in liberal, authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Many scholars have pointed out the hazards of transplanting normative media theories that are Western-oriented and applying them to non-Western contexts such as in Africa where they may not easily fit (Berger, 2002; Hadland, 2012; Nyamnjoh, 2005, 2011; Voltmer, 2011, 2013; Willems, 2011). I posit that different kinds of regimes produce different relations with the media. As such, we need an approach to the media and communications that takes into account the social, political and ideological factors that shape media norms and practices within non-Western contexts such as in Africa. In this study, I draw on the literature on "hybrid regimes" to interrogate the role of the state and the social, political and ideological factors that shape media norms and practice in post-Cold war regimes that proliferated in the 1990s which blend democratic practices and authoritarian rule. I conclude that analysis of the media and communications must be context specific. That is to say, media scholars should take into consideration the socio-cultural, political and ideological factors that shape media policy in specific contexts instead of adopting normative values which may not speak to these contexts. The adoption of ideal types is even more problematic in hybrid regimes because of the impermanence of the political rules in these regimes. The political rules in hybrid regimes are in constant flux and always being negotiated.

Chapter Three focuses on research design and methodology. It clarifies the research agenda of the thesis and the tools used to answer the questions that follow from my consideration of the literature. This thesis is primarily based on elite and in-depth

interviews and a media content analysis. I needed to talk to the elites in Zimbabwe such as Cabinet Ministers and other senior government officials regarding their choices and strategies in the media. The interviews with the elites were crucial in tracing the origins of ideas and the divisions among them regarding their approaches to the media and handling the critical press. Most studies on the Zimbabwean media context post-2000 rely on secondary literature and not the voices of ZANU (PF) elites, Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and Directors who were responsible for media policy formulation and implementation. This study is also based on in-depth interviews with journalists and artists and a content analysis of the state press. In addition, I conducted field-based research in Murewa, a particularly violent and contested district in the period under review. The interviews in Murewa with a variety of ZANU (PF) actors sought to explore the *pungwes* (all-night vigils). I also conducted interviews with MDC activists to understand *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies and opposition responses to them. The thesis is also based on media content analysis focusing on the themes that were selected and given salience (framing) in the coverage of the land issue in the state-controlled newspapers, *The Sunday Mail* and *The Herald*. I collated a sample of hard news, editorial comments and op-eds in the state press to analyse the media coverage of land issue in the state press. The land issue was the primary theme in the 'patriotic journalism' that was practised by the state-controlled media in Zimbabwe during the "Third Chimurenga". A combination of these sources and methods allowed me to interrogate ZANU (PF) media strategies during the "Third Chimurenga", explore the divisions among party and state elites regarding their approaches in the media, analyse the themes covered in 'patriotic history' and the framing of content in the state press and the party's cultural productions.

In Chapter Four, I trace the historical trajectory of the media in Rhodesia in the 1960s and 1970s and the changes and continuities in media policy and state practice(s) from 1980 under the new ZANU (PF) government. I also explore the origins of the 'alternative' media of *Chimurenga* (liberation) songs, *pungwes* (all-night gatherings), nationalist publications and clandestine radio that were in effect the liberation movements' media, designed to advance the goals of the liberation struggle. The Rhodesian Front (RF) regime's monopoly over airwaves and political control of independent media outlets through censorship and draconian laws, through which the

regime banned nationalist and liberal publications, led to the emergence of the alternative media. I also discuss the transition from colonial rule to independence in Zimbabwe in 1980 and the changes and continuities in media policy and state practices under the new ZANU (PF) government. This chapter thus gives insight into the origins of hybrid media policies and state institutions and the historical roots of *Chimurenga* media strategies, some of which were revived in the 1980s and then much more prominently during the "Third Chimurenga" in the early 2000s.

In Chapter Five, I discuss how ZANU (PF) innovated its media strategy within the realm of the law in response to political challenges and the legitimation needs of the new "hybrid regime" that the party built post-2000. I note ZANU (PF)'s abandonment of its earlier plans to 'democratise' the media and 'liberalise' the airwaves. I discuss the shift in the political context, and explore how the ZANU (PF) media strategy was 're-geared' accordingly. The ruling party introduced new media laws and institutions to shut down the critical press and close democratic space. I reflect on how the new media policies and institutions were carefully designed and how this reflected ZANU (PF)'s concerns for legitimacy. This chapter also looks at the divisions among key political actors who were responsible for state media policy in Zimbabwe during this period. These divisions give insight into the contradictions that characterise hybrid media systems. I also discuss the rise of 'oppositional' or 'activist' journalism and alternative media platforms such as web-based journalism, the growing use of the Internet, artistic productions such as music and other platforms through which the opposition and pro-democracy activists disseminated 'counter-hegemonic' discourses to challenge ZANU (PF) rule and the party's ultra-nationalist discourse.

In Chapter Six, I discuss how ZANU (PF) developed its media system, outside the realm of law discussed in the previous chapter. I explore how Professor Jonathan Moyo, the Minister of State for Information and Publicity managed to manipulate journalists from the state press through meetings, money, threats to jobs and creating and disseminating content via routine briefings which resulted in a committed, self-policing journalistic team and a pliant state press. I discuss the media briefings that were held by Moyo with journalists and editors from the state press which were a kind of political 're-education' on what constituted the 'national interest' and how this was supposed to be framed in the

news. I show how Moyo established a hardworking and hands on style of management, and considered history and culture to be an important part of what he was addressing in the media. The second part of this chapter explores how the means of pressure and political control that were deployed by Moyo influenced the framing of content in the state press. I collated a sample of hard news stories, op eds and editorials to analyse the framing of the land issue in the two main state-run newspapers, *The Herald* and *Sunday Mail*. The land issue was the major theme of 'patriotic journalism' in the state press. This chapter demonstrates the sophisticated means by which the media and framing are used in legitimacy construction in hybrid regimes.

In Chapter Seven, I discuss the production and circulation of Third *Chimurenga* songs which were an integral part of the ZANU (PF) media strategy and a crucial means for the party's legitimation post-2000. The songs were coordinated and supported by the Ministry of Information and Publicity under Moyo. The songs build on the songs and demands of the 1970s liberation struggle and were used to propagate the ruling party's monolithic land-centric nationalist discourses. These songs were widely circulated on radio, television and through state-sponsored musical galas. The state's deep support and involvement in the production and circulation of these songs and the co-ordination of efforts among state elites, artists and public institutions, testifies to the importance of the 'non-traditional' media in ZANU (PF)'s survival and legitimation efforts post-2000. I demonstrate how the music strategy was carefully designed institutionally (in terms of state patronage) and ideologically (in terms of the careful framing of lyrics) and the selection of issues or themes that resonated with particular constituencies. This chapter contributes to our understanding of the role of the forms of media with particular historical and cultural resonance in producing legitimacy and discrediting alternative political discourses, a topic that is neglected in the wider literature on hybrid regimes.

The discussion in Chapter Eight on *pungwes* (all-night vigils) that were held by ZANU (PF) and its allies- veterans of the 1970s *Chimurenga* (liberation) war, youth militia and others provides further insight into the role of the 'non-traditional' media or political practices embedded in history in hybrid regime legitimation and persistence. The discussion of *pungwes* is based on my interviews with a variety of ZANU (PF) actors in Murewa, a particularly violent and contested district in the period under study. I also

conducted interviews with MDC activists in Murewa district. The views of the MDC sources add to our understandings of *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies and responses to them. The *pungwe* was perhaps the most explicitly hybrid form of media during the "Third Chimurenga". It was a space for the transmission of the messages of 'patriotic history' through songs and political speeches. However, the *pungwe* was also a space for the performance of ZANU (PF)'s coercion of those that the party labelled 'sell-outs' under the rubric of 'patriotic history'. The *pungwes* combined discourse, coercion and patronage of war veterans, youth militia and others through which 'patriotic history' was promulgated. The discussion on *pungwes* shed light into the inner workings of ZANU (PF) and the party's hybrid politics and strategies during the "Third Chimurenga". The discussion on *pungwes* also allows us to go beyond the narrow focus on the formal media (radio, television and newspapers) to look at the role of the 'non-traditional' media or political practices drawn from history and culture in regime legitimization and survival.

Chapter Nine is a summary of the key arguments of the thesis and its contribution to the literature on "hybrid regimes" and a Zimbabweanist scholarly literature on the media and 'patriotic history'. The thesis contributes to this literature as follows: i) it sheds light on the legal, institutional and ideological means and mechanisms of media control in a hybrid system; ii) it explores tensions and contradictions that characterize hybrid media systems and how these are overcome; iii) the thesis explores the role of the media in legitimacy construction focusing on the framing technique as deployed by the authors of 'patriotic history' in Zimbabwe, emphasizing its intellectual and institutional aspects, and finally; iv) the study also shows the importance of the forms of 'media' and political practices drawn from history and culture in regime legitimation and persistence. This study critiques the literature on hybrid regimes which is overly biased elections and ignores other ways of regime legitimation such as the media and other everyday governance practices. The study also offers a critique of the studies of the media in Zimbabwe that miss out the importance of hybridity itself. I argue that the ZANU (PF) interventions in the media were motivated by its hegemonic ambitions and legitimation needs as a hybrid regime. In the next chapter I explore the differences in patterns of media regulation, ownership and content in authoritarian, liberal and hybrid regimes.

Chapter 2

The Media, Politics and the State in Comparative Perspective

2.1 Introduction

Several works have explained that the challenge with normative media theories is that they are Western-oriented and difficult to transplant and apply to non-Western contexts such as Africa without reworking them (Berger, 2002; Hadland, 2012; Nyamnjoh, 2005, 2011; Voltmer, 2011, 2012; Willems, 2011). Wasserman (2011:8) argues that: "Media theory as developed in the Global North habitually masks its own situatedness, often laying claim to universal pronouncements with very little cognizance of media developments elsewhere". Others have made the case for "an African-based model of media and state" (Hadland, 2012). This model would be based on the experiences in African states rather than those of a few rich nations that do not speak to the historical and cultural idiosyncrasies of the continent. Guy Berger (2002) notes that the 'reworking' of normative theories can help provide some useful insights about media processes on the continent. This chapter contends that the media takes the coloration of the societies in which they exist. In other words, different kinds of regimes produce different relationships with the media. We thus need an approach that looks at the media and communications in their political, cultural and historical contexts if we are to understand these media policies better (Christians et al, 2009). In the section below, I discuss the media and the role of the state in liberal-democratic systems and contrast it with the media and the role of the state in colonial and post-colonial one-party states in Africa as well as in hybrid regimes that emerged on the continent in the 1990s that blend democratic practice with authoritarianism.

2.2 The Media in Liberal Systems

In liberal systems, the media is viewed not as an instrument of government but rather as a device to check government. The liberal perspective on the role of the media and relationship with the state can be traced back to the 19th century with the proliferation of ideas on the notion of limited government and greater individual freedom. These ideas gained widespread acceptance and inspired the struggle for press freedom in Western Europe and were influential in defining the role of the press and its relationship with the state. The press was "charged with the duty of keeping government from overstepping its

bounds" (Siebert et al, 1956:51). The role of the press, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, was "to provide that check on government which no other institution could provide" (Ibid.). According to the liberal ideal, the media is viewed as the "Fourth Estate", that is, as a counterpower that is part of the checks and balances which prevent any single power- the executive, parliament or judiciary from dominating.

The media plays an important role in 'ideal-type' democratic societies that draw on these older ideas about media. McNair (2011) distinguishes between five key roles of the media in liberal systems as follows. First, the media in liberal systems *informs* citizens on what is happening around them. McNair argues that: "The importance of an informed, knowledgeable electorate dictates that democratic politics must be pursued in the public arena (as distinct from the secrecy characteristic of autocratic regimes). The knowledge and information on the basis of which citizens will make their political choices must circulate freely and be available to all" (Ibid: 17). In liberal democracies the media are expected to provide information to enable the public to participate freely in the political process and to do so from an informed perspective.

The second function of the media in liberal systems is that they *educate* the public by providing them with information which is 'factual' and 'objective'. This perspective "assumes that democracies need informed and participant citizens to manage their common affairs. It also believes that public debate is more likely to produce rational and just outcomes if it takes account of different views and interests" (Curran, 2002:225). The third function of the media, according to the liberal perspective, is to provide a *platform* for public political discourses. The media should, in this view, have a provision for expression of dissent and mechanisms for the exchange of a plurality of ideas or viewpoints. The media acts as a discursive realm which allows for the free exchange of ideas among citizens. The media is held to be an important institution in the making of the public sphere. According to the German Sociologist Jurgen Habermas the public sphere refers to "a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed… Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion - that is, within the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions" (Habermas cited in McNair (1995:19). According to the liberal ideal, the public sphere is "a "space" where

access to information affecting the public good is widely available, where discussion is free of domination and where all those participating in public debate do so on an equal basis" (Curran, 2000:233). Curran further notes that "the media facilitate this process by providing an arena of public debate, and by reconstituting private citizens as a public body in the form of public opinion" (Ibid.). The press played an important role in developing the public sphere- newspapers in Britain in the eighteenth century had begun to perform the modern function of supplying information, opinion and criticism as well as facilitating debate amongst the bourgeois and educated class (McNair, 2011). During this period, debate in Britain and France in the coffee-houses and salons began to flourish. The public sphere therefore was made up of a set of institutions which acted as a buffer between the state and private citizens.

However, the notion of the public sphere as originally formulated by Habermas is problematic. First, and as argued by Curran (2002), it fails to recognize that in modern democracies people are represented primarily by political parties, interest groups and civil society organizations and not simply as private citizens. These partisan groups pursue their interests or their partisan agendas at the expense of the common good. He adds that "the democratic role of the media needs to be related, in other words, to the collective and institutional forms of the modern political system" (Curran 2002:233). Secondly, people's access to the public sphere is not equal. Several scholars have problematized the normative connotations of the Habermasian 'public sphere'. Wendy Willems (2012) notes that the Habermasian notion of the public sphere has predominantly been criticized on the following basis: its bourgeois character, Habermas's assumption of a unitary public sphere, and his neglect of power relations within the public sphere. Contrary to Habermas's view of a unitary public sphere, there are competing 'spheres' and public sphericules (Gitlin, 1998). The modern political system in liberal democracies is populated by diverse and unequal political actors with diverse agendas. The idea of rational political discourse in the notion of public sphere as originally formulated by Habermas is also problematic. The notion of the public sphere implies rationality but there is evidence that even in 'ideal' Western democracies political discourse is often guided by narrow sectional interests. Nancy Fraser (1992) also criticized Habermas's notion of the public sphere on the basis that it does not account for non-liberal, non-bourgeois and competing public spheres. The notion of the public sphere

implies a plurality of voices but in most cases it is only the views of the powerful that prevail whilst those of the less powerful are silenced. In contexts that were not 'ideal' these problems were more pronounced.

The media's fourth function according to the liberal ideal is to act as a 'watchdog' by scrutinizing public policy and actions of government. The press should be allowed as much freedom as practically possible to promote public debate. This is linked to the idea of the media as the "Fourth Estate" explained above. The 'watchdog' role of journalism entails exposing government malfeasance. The media acts as "a check on the state" and they "monitor the full range of state activity, and fearlessly expose abuses of official authority" (Curran, 2002:217). For them to play an effective role as watchdogs, the media should be insulated from partisan control. Curran notes that: "Once the media becomes subject to state regulation, they may lose their bite as watchdogs. Worse still, they may be transformed into snarling Rottweillers in the service of the state" (Ibid).

The fifth function of the media in liberal systems is to serve as channels for the advocacy of diverse political viewpoints. In liberal theory, the media is portrayed as a key actor in the political process. McNair (1995:67) notes that "not only do the media *report* politics; they are a crucial part of the environment in which politics is pursued". He adds that the media "contribute to policy discussion and resolution, not only in so far as they set public agendas, or provide platforms for politicians to make their views known to the public, but also in judging and critiquing the variety of political viewpoints in circulation" (Ibid.). In liberal democracies, the media is expected to provide citizens with information about the political system, how the system works and the views of all political actors and not just the views of certain groups whilst excluding other viewpoints. In practice, this means that especially but not only during elections, all political parties should be given equal access to the media to articulate their policies so that voters can form independent opinions.

The notion of 'professional journalism' is closely associated with the liberal paradigm. It is characterized by three underlying principles: neutrality, autonomy and detachment from power (Mancini, 2002). The notion of professional journalism has been promoted and "raised to the point of becoming the unique, universal model of journalism practice"

that all media practitioners should strive to achieve. However, there are contestations regarding what constitutes professional journalism. In his analysis of journalistic norms and practices in Italy, Paolo Mancini (2002) concludes that journalism or media structures "are born and develop within a network of interactions and negotiations with a number of other social systems and factors" (Ibid: 265.). In Italy, for example, Mancini noted that there is a mismatch between theory (journalism that is neutral and detached from power) and practice; Italian journalists "are advocates, linked to political parties and very close to being active politicians themselves" (Ibid: 266). He concluded that the 'professional model' of journalism "is not applicable in all parts of the world, because journalism does not grow in a vacuum: it is the fruit of the interaction between different actors and systems and such differences in social structure and context have to be taken into account even when theorizing models of journalism" (Ibid: 267). It is therefore important to note that journalism norms and practices are context specific, informed by different social, political and economic pressures exerted on the media, and far from always realized even in liberal democratic regimes. I shall return to this point later in my analysis of the Zimbabwean media policies.

How applicable is the liberal model of the media to journalistic norms and values in democratic African contexts? There is an upsurge in literature on the limitations of the existing models of the media to analyse media and communications in non-Western contexts. In *De-westernizing Media Studies,* Curran and Park (2000) note that there is need to 'de-Westernise' media studies and draw on the experiences of specific countries rather than generalisations based on the experiences of a few Western nations. They argue that:

> In making the case for de-Westernizing media studies, we are not suggesting that normative values have only a zonal application. On the contrary, the values of liberty, equality, and solidarity seem to us to have a universal validity. Our argument is that media studies will benefit from developing a wider comparative perspective. At the moment, ways of understanding the world's media system are unduly influenced by the experience of a few, untypical countries. These distort understanding not only of non-Western countries but also of a large part of the West as well (Curran and Park, 2000:15).

The liberal perspective has been criticised on several fronts in general as we have seen in the previous few paragraphs and it can be criticised specifically as applied to the African

context too. First, the concept of democracy that lies at the core of the liberal perspective is contested. Democracy means different things to different people and in different contexts. Broadly, the literature distinguishes between *procedural* (minimalist) and *substantive* definitions of democracy. The *procedural* definition emphasizes participation and competition. It sees democracy "generally as an extension of a process of political liberalization" (Zuern, 2009:586). The notion of liberal democracy has been criticized for being too narrow and incompatible with the historical experiences and culture in non-Western contexts. Nyamnjoh (2005:21) notes that it could be worthwhile to "marry liberal democracy with other models of democracy informed by historical experiences and cultural, economic and indigenous political realities". He adds that: "On its own, liberal democracy is much too parochial for Africa's sociality, negotiability, conviviality and dynamic sense of community" (Ibid.). Berger (2002:22) notes that it is problematic to apply the liberal model to non-Western contexts without modifying it. He adds that: "Not only is this paradigm itself under challenge on its own western home turf, its suitability to Africa is questionable" (Ibid: 23). He adds that the liberal perspective is 'too narrow to be a universal analytical framework' and criticized by many for "overlooking monopolization and elite congruence" (Ibid.). An unreflective application of the liberal model to the African context is problematic due to the preponderance of circumscribed politics on the continent. The media did not contribute to rationale discourse as envisaged in the liberal ideal due to circumscribed politics in colonial and the post-colonial one-party states in Africa. The state's capture and colonization of the public sphere in colonial and post-colonial one-party states in Africa resulted in tight media regulatory frameworks.

Suffice to say that the liberal model is also under challenge in its Western home turf due to the rise of undemocratic media or information laws and practices that governments justify in terms of national security. We therefore need an approach to the media that takes into consideration the context (social, cultural, economic and political) within which the media is produced and functions.

Another criticism of the liberal model is that it is state-centric. The liberal perspective dismisses the possibility that the state can play a positive role in the democratization of the media. As several studies of the media in the West have demonstrated, the state is not

the only threat to media freedom but business can also be a major threat. Curran (2000:122) notes that "The media [in liberal theory] are assumed to be independent and to owe allegiance only to the public, if they are funded by the public and organized through a competitive market". The influence of big business over the media in a context characterized by weak government systems results in what McChesney (1999) calls "rich media, poor democracy". In his analysis of the British media, the Marxist scholar, Ralph Miliband concludes that the media in liberal systems are shaped by a number of economic and political influences which merge together thereby rendering the media "weapons in the arsenal of class domination" (Miliband, 1973 cited in Curran, 2000:137).

Third, even in liberal democracies the media can be used as instruments of propaganda "to manufacture consent". According to radical functionalism "the media actively produce - rather than passively reflect - the consensus of society" (Curran, 2002:138). The media is held to play "a central role in engineering consent for the social order" (Ibid). Whilst the media in liberal contexts allow some degree of debate, the debate must take place within defined bounds that do not challenge the social order (Curran, 2002; Downing, 1980). Curran notes that: "Whereas liberal functionalism assumes that power is widely diffused, radical functionalism assumes that it is highly concentrated. Indeed, one reason why the media are "powerful", in this view, is because they operate in a dominated society where other socializing agencies like the family, educational system and churches buttress media propaganda" (Ibid:139).

Herman and Chomsky (1988) offer a radical analysis of the media. They note that systems of control within media organizations mesh with wider controls in society to render the media "effective" and "powerful" ideological institutions. They argue that: "The raw material of the news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print. They fix the premises of discourse and interpretation, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place…The elite domination of the media and marginalization of dissent …results from the operation of these filters" (Herman and Chomsky, 1988:2).They further note that the media are "effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system–supportive propaganda function" (Ibid: 306).

We can conclude that the normative claims of the liberal-media theory are much complicated in practice in Africa and also in their Western home turf. To start with, the public sphere that lies at the core of the liberal paradigm is not unitary and access to it is not equal even in Western democracies as implied in liberal theory. Furthermore, there is no consensus on the concept of democracy and its relationship to the role of the media. There are contestations over the meaning of democracy between substantivists and proceduralists. In addition, the media does not always play the watchdog role that it is assigned in liberal theory. As argued by Herman and Chomsky, the media can be used as propaganda tools for the reproduction of political and economic power and for "engineering consent for the social order". We can see that even in an 'ideal' context of liberal democracy in practice the media is much compromised by power relations and inequality. The challenges of applying the liberal media model to non-Western democratic contexts is a point to which I will return below focusing on my analysis of the media and role of the state in authoritarian regimes in Africa's post-colonial one-party states.

2.3 The Media in Authoritarian Systems

The media systems in authoritarian regimes are different from those founded on the Western liberal paradigm in terms of relations with the state, ownership and regulation. However, there are variations even amongst authoritarian regimes and their relations with the media. Katrin Voltmer (2013) distinguishes between military dictatorships, communist one-party rule, one-party rule in contexts of statism and personalised one-party rule in contexts of weak state institutions. She notes that: "Surely, they all used the media as propaganda tools and imposed censorship and controls on what could be reported and what not. But the degree and nature of the media's entrenchment in the regime differed considerably" (Voltmer, 2013:121). Authoritarian regimes are primarily concerned with repression of opponents and imposing their social and political order to maintain power. Authoritarian states are generally said to be characterised by the following broad features: i) the state is dominant and prevails over society; ii) the state rules by coercion rather than consensus; iii) the organs of the state are structured according to the principle of concentration instead of separation of powers; v) dissenting voices are suppressed or coercively co-opted; and vi) the media are largely government controlled and they serve as instruments of propaganda (Ronning, 2009).

One variant of the authoritarian model emerged in post-colonial Africa. It is worthy discussing the media systems that were designed in post-independent one-party states in Africa because they were built on the authoritarian and developmental model and they give insight into the means and mechanisms of media control in this kind of authoritarian regimes. The role of the media that was prescribed in the one-party states in Africa tended to promote 'national' unity and development. According to Claude Ake (1996:9), "African leaders insisted that development needs unity of purpose and the utmost discipline and that the common interest is not served by oppositional attitudes". The nationalist leaders argued that centralism was necessary to promote nation-building. Nyamnjoh (2005: 48-49) argues that:

> Under the single-party and military-regime era, it was subversive to question government policies, outlooks or options by suggesting alternative ways of going about nation-building and national development. There was room only for 'constructive criticism', and criticisms were thus considered only when made by those who had accepted the system, not by those who did not belong to the ruling party

The opposition and the private media were said not to be necessary because they promoted disunity and disharmony in the nascent states. The media was thus a casualty of the personalisation of power and lack of political tolerance by the nationalist leaders in the one-party states.

Bratton and van de Walle (1997) note that the one-party states were often characterised by the concentration of power (presidentialism), patronage and clientilistic practices. They argue that: "Political life was structured around dyadic exchanges between strongmen and their acolytes, which together comprised clientilistic pyramids and factional networks" (Ibid: 63-4). The independence of institutions such as legislatures and the judiciaries was severely curtailed. Bratton and de Walle characterise the one-party states as neo-patrimonial systems where the leaders "dominated the national media, which described their every public action with gushing enthusiasm; and [in some cases] their likenesses graced the currency, their portraits hung in every public building, and the national printing press periodically published collections of their speeches and writings" (Ibid:64).

In the post-colonial one-party states in Africa, the media thus tended to be controlled by the state and political leaders. The role that the media played in one-party regimes was in line with McQuail's 'Development Media Theory' whereby emphasis was placed on the 'social responsibilities' of the press rather than on rights and freedoms (Ocitti, 1999). The leaders viewed the media as a tool for social and political mobilization that was supposed to be centrally controlled by the ruling party. The role of the media in this regard was supposed to rally the 'masses' behind the ruling party's goals of 'national' unity and development. The role of journalists in this regard was to act as 'social activists' whose role was to promote government policies and programmes. In most cases, journalists were part of the civil service and guided by government policies and codes of conduct. The journalists simply regurgitated government policies in their news coverage.

The post-colonial state also retained some of the authoritarian media laws and institutions of its colonial predecessor. Just as was the case with the colonial authorities, the broadcast media in the post-colonial state was usually monopolized by the state. In instances where the private media was allowed, its effectiveness was curtailed through censorship and other extra-legal measures. There were variations in the media control strategies from one country to the other. These were largely determined by the nature of the transition and the media policies or instruments of control that were inherited from the previous colonial administrations. Guy Berger (2006:14) notes that: "As is well known, the instruments deployed against journalism in particular [in the one-party states] included the self-same laws and institutions that the erstwhile colonial authorities had used for their political domination". The nationalist leaders kept on the statute books the various censorship and defamation laws of their colonial predecessors which they used to muzzle the independent press. It was often considered subversive to question government in the post-colonial one-party states. Only constructive criticism of government was tolerated (Nyamnjoh, 2005).

In post-colonial one-party states, as in the colonial era, the state monopolised broadcasting. The nationalist leaders considered radio as the most influential mass medium because of its levels of penetration in rural areas. Hyden and Okigbo (2002:39) note that: "Taking over the state monopoly on the use of the radio, nationalists made

maximum use of it to promote their own causes. Radio broadcasts were devoted to reporting everything that the top political leaders did. In a simplistic fashion, the radio became an instrument of propaganda aimed at serving the interest of the incumbent elite". Some nationalist leaders' orientation on radio was also informed by the extensive use of radio in popular mobilization during the anti-colonial struggles (van der Veur, 2002). Hyden and Okigbo (2002:39) argue that: "While they had played a role in promoting democratization in the years before independence, it did not take long thereafter for the same media to become strangled by the very masters they had helped to power".

State control and dominance over broadcasting was replicated in the print media. In some cases, ownership of newspapers was nationalised whilst others were outright closed down using draconian laws and censorship. For instance, in Ghana, *The Daily* and *Sunday Graphic*, the most popular independent newspapers, were bought by the government right after independence and turned into government mouthpieces (Ocitti, 1999). In Tanzania, the *Tanganyika Standard* was acquired by government and used to promote government policies. In Zambia, the *Central African Mail* and *Times of Zambia* were acquired by the government to centralise information dissemination. In Mobutu's Zaire, the press was nationalised, newspaper titles 'indigenised' and journalists faced restrictions (Nyamnjoh, 2005). In most cases, the new governments changed the editorial policies and personnel, who were mostly white, but the organisation and structures of the media remained largely as they were under colonialism (Ronning and Kupe, 2000). The fragile situation that existed in some post-colonial states provided grounds for on-going state control of the media while the use of a variety of state-sponsored repressive policies compromised the quality of journalism in the nascent states.

State control of the media and repression of the critical press in colonial and post-colonial Africa led to the emergence of alternative forms of communication. The African nationalists adopted various strategies to communicate their liberation agenda and challenge colonial rule. Nyamnjoh (2005:42) acknowledges the importance of clandestine radio and word of mouth and "alternative forms of communication such as the grapevine, political rumour, humour, parody, irony and derision - known under various names in different regions (e.g *radio trottoir* in francophone Africa, *radio boca a*

boca in lusophone Africa, radio one battery, bush telegraph, pavement/sidewalk radio or radio mall in anglophone Africa); and use of indigenous media as substitute or supplement to the shackled press". However, *radio trottoir* or "pavement radio" has not been given adequate scholarly attention due to the bias towards formal or professionally run media such as radio, television and newspapers in existing scholarly works. According to Louise Bourgault (1995) *radio troittor* has long been overlooked and not given attention in studies on mass media (that are mostly Western-oriented) because of its roots in African myth, folklore, and oral history. Therefore, it is important to broaden the definition of the media to include forms of media drawn from indigenous culture especially in contexts such as Africa where press freedom is curtailed and formal media struggle to operate (Willems, 2013). *Radio trottoir* and other forms of communication such as rumour, political humour and jokes are mostly directed against those in power and they play an important role in mediating politics and acting as "an alternative to the official media which is tedious, censored, uninformative, and often unintelligible" (Bourgault, 1995:202). These forms of media played an important role in transmitting 'counter-hegemonic' discourses and challenging those in power in colonial and post-colonial Africa.

In the section below, I discuss the regulation of the media and the role of the state in the hybrid regimes that emerged in Africa in the post-Cold War period in the 1990s. This analysis allows us to go beyond the stereotypes of the liberal and authoritarian models on the role of the media and patterns of state regulation. I discuss the problem of defining hybrid regimes, the narrow focus on elections in the literature and neglect of other ways of regime legitimation outside of elections and the importance of the media as a legitimizing tool in a hybrid regime.

2.4 Hybrid Regimes and the Media

There is an upsurge of literature in political science on hybrid regimes and their origins (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Ottaway, 2003; Schedler, 2002). Scholars have used a variety of labels to describe hybrid regimes. These include: "pseudo-democratic", "illiberal democracies", "electoral democracies", "electoral authoritarian regimes", "competitive authoritarian regimes", "semi-democratic" or simply "hybrid regimes". Robertson (2007:781) notes that:

> With the end of the Cold War, and the preeminence of democracy as a

> regime legitimation strategy, the number of regimes that are no longer explicit or closed authoritarian regimes, but neither are full-blown liberal democracies, has increased dramatically. Unlike closed authoritarian regimes, these regimes exhibit elements of open political competition. However, unlike liberal democracies, this competition is heavily skewed by authoritarian social relations, the rule of law is often very weak, and the independent organizational and civic infrastructure we normally associate with liberal democracy is absent. Such political systems are given various names in the literature: hybrid, competitive authoritarian, electoral authoritarian or partially liberalized regimes.

Whilst hybrid regimes have increasingly attracted scholarly attention, there are differences on how they should be defined. Cassani (2014:542) notes that the identity of these regimes "is hampered by sharp disagreements" among scholars. These regimes are difficult to classify because they are characterized by a mixture of institutional traits typical of democratic and autocratic regimes (Ibid.). Whilst research on hybrid regimes is booming, most of the work focuses on elections. The literature on hybrid regimes is also largely quantitative. Graeme Robertson (2007:781) argues that: "Though research on hybrid regimes is booming, most of this work, unsurprisingly, focuses on electoral politics and the ways in which elites continue to influence elections… As a result [of this electoralist approach] we still understand little about how the combination of open political competition and authoritarian social relations affects politics outside of elections themselves". Besides its focus on elections, the other weakness of the literature on hybrid regimes is its predominant application of quantitative methods. Due to the quantitative approach in this literature, 'in-depth' analyses such as suggested in this thesis that might increase our understanding of how stability and persistence are achieved in hybrid regimes through everyday governance practices are rare. This study contributes to our understanding of how hybrid regimes cultivate legitimacy outside elections and the importance of everyday governance practices in regime survival or persistence.

Despite the differences in views and labels applied to hybrid regimes, there is some common ground. Natalia Roudakova (2012:247) notes that "there seems to be consensus now in comparative politics that hybrid regimes have become the most common form of political organization around the world". Several scholars point to the tensions and ambiguities that underlie hybrid regimes (Diamond , 2002 ; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2012; Roudakova, 2012). These tensions and contradictions are a result of the

mix of institutions and agendas in hybrid regimes. Roudakova (2012:250) notes that "the dynamic tension between order maintenance and order erosion is particularly useful in theorizing about hybrid regimes and their prospects". The political incumbents in hybrid regimes "choose between egregiously violating democratic rules, at the cost of international isolation and domestic conflict, and allowing the challenge [from opponents] to proceed, at the cost of possible defeat" (Levitsky and Way, 2002:59). The exercise of power in hybrid regimes is therefore a careful balancing act between autocracy and democratisation. According to Gerschewski (2013) hybrid regimes rely on repression, legitimation and co-optation to achieve stability and persistence. He argues that: "Today's autocracies cannot rely (at least in the long term) entirely on their abuse of power in a strictly hierarchical, pyramid-shaped political order as the unconstrained tyrants of the past – from whom all power was derived- might have done" (Ibid:18). These regimes realise that "repression is too costly as a way to maintain stability in the long run" (Ibid: 21).

The media is identified as one of the key arenas of political contestation in hybrid regimes, in addition to the electoral, legislative and judicial arenas (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 2010). However, the normative media theories that we have discussed so far are hardly adequate by themselves to explain the complex media systems that have developed in post-Cold war hybrid regimes. Katrin Voltmer (2012:244) notes, "neither the political systems nor the media systems that emerged during the recent wave of democratization fit easily into the concepts and models that have been developed for Western contexts". The diversity of hybrid regimes and the complex nature of their political and media systems make the construction of ideal types an ambitious objective

Whilst the independent media is allowed to flourish and expose government malfeasance in a hybrid system, incumbents devise sophisticated strategies to control those media outlets to limit their impact. This is unlike the situation in authoritarian systems where incumbents control the media mainly through heavy-handed means such as censorship and libel and sedition laws that they use to muzzle the media. Some of the media control strategies in hybrid regimes include: bribery, the selective allocation of state advertising, the manipulation of debts and taxes owed by media outlets, the fomentation of conflicts among stockholders, and restrictive press laws that facilitate the prosecution of

journalists (Levitsky and Way, 2002:58).

Hybrid regimes also use economic strangulation to curtail the independent press. In his study of the media and the survival strategies deployed by the Rafael Correa administration in Ecuador, de la Torre (2013) notes that 'the government uses its tax collecting agency to monitor the private media'. He adds that: "These tactics [of economic strangulation] are suffocating the private media economically. Many outlets will have to go easy on the administration both editorially and investigatively or risk being forced out of business" (de la Torre, 2013:44). In some instances governments withhold advertisements from newspapers as a way to force them to conform. Newspapers are forced to go easy on the incumbent regime so that they can also get advertisements from government agencies. These strategies are effective in creating pliable media in hybrid systems.

Hybrid regimes also control major media outlets in the country which they deploy as their propaganda mouthpieces. Walker and Orttung (2014) note that hybrid regimes "are finding surprising (and alarmingly effective) ways to use the media to help themselves stay in power". In hybrid regimes, the state monopolizes major media outlets with a national audience. State monopoly over broadcasting is also a common feature in authoritarian systems as we have seen. However, in hybrid states the government can come up with broadcasting regulations that create the illusion of a liberalised media environment. These regulations often spell out the procedures that prospective broadcasters could use to apply for broadcasting licenses but still the government may come up with additional measures to ensure that the area of broadcasting is impenetrable. In cases where the prospective broadcasting players are successful in getting their licences these are in most cases for broadcasting on less controversial topics and they are forced to go easy on the government for fear of losing their licences. A few licenses may be issued to independent players but these are normally for broadcasting that is confined to limited and largely urban areas. These regimes also use the major media outlets they control to puff up political discourses that cover up their repression and discredit alternative viewpoints.

With respect to African media, there is a dearth of scholarly analysis on the relationship

between the media and state in the hybrid contexts that emerged on the continent from the failed 'third wave' transitions in the 1990s. The literature on the 'third wave' transitions and democratic consolidation mainly looks at political institutions and elections and not the media. Voltmer (2013:6) notes that: "Empirical democratization literature which is concerned with developing measurements of democracy and democratization frequently includes 'press freedom' and 'pluralism of the media' as indicators for the degree to which a country has adopted democratic institutions and procedures. But there is no further analysis of the processes by which these standards are implemented in the course of institutional reforms, the relationship of the media with the post-authoritarian elites, or the way in which the media actually perform their new democratic roles as watchdogs and forums for political debate". As a result, "the notion of hybridity is a useful analytical tool in understanding the unique nature of media systems that have emerged in the context of the 'third wave' of democratization" (Voltmer, Ibid: 239). When applied to the media, the notion of hybridity is useful in that it allows researchers to go beyond the stereotypes of the normative media models.

Writing about media policy in Southern Africa, Chuma and Moyo (2010) suggest that "the superficial nature of democracy in most countries in the region has meant that media policy reforms–supposedly meant to strengthen the democratic process-have been equally superficial" (Ibid: 5). They add: "Just as most of the countries have embraced electoral democracy as some form of window dressing to hide dictatorial tendencies, so too has a tendency developed of imitating media policies and regulations that are perceived as acceptable to Western donor countries. Thus while freedom-of-information laws and laws purportedly establishing public service broadcasters and even independent regulatory authorities have been introduced, little has been done to implement them" (Ibid.). Chuma and Moyo are right in their observation that the regimes that emerged in the wake of the "third wave" process of democratization embrace democratic formalisms but they do this "to placate vocal critics and donors, and not for the expansion of the public sphere" (Ibid.). They further argue that at times some of the media reforms that these regimes introduce may have far-reaching unintended consequences in opening up closed communicative spaces. This shows the utility of the conceptual 'tool' of "hybrid regime" in understanding the role of the media in political legitimation by underlining the tensions and contradictions in the practices of these states.

This section explored the role of the media and its relationship with the state in hybrid regimes. We have seen that when the stakes are high, hybrid regimes can use repressive strategies to muzzle the press through newspaper bans and jailing journalists. We have also seen that strategies such as economic strangulation as opposed to censorship or outright banning of newspapers are preferred in order to create the impression of media systems that are based on liberal democratic standards. With respect to broadcasting, these regimes in most cases control and monopolize the major broadcast stations just like authoritarians but they still promulgate laws and establish institutions which give the impression of a liberalised broadcast environment. However, they can liberalise broadcast media but still make it impenetrable by private players through demanding exorbitant fees for radio and television licenses and making it illegal for foreign funding or ownership of broadcast media. Nonetheless, these regimes are significantly different from both liberal and authoritarian regimes because of the contradictions and tensions that are inherent to their agendas and institutional make up and this poses particular challenges to strategies of legitimation that require close study.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have pointed out that normative media theories are Western-oriented and cannot just be transplanted and applied to non-Western contexts such as Africa without 'reworking' them given the history of circumscribed politics and the cultural idiosyncrasies on the continent. In particular, there is need to 'rework' normative media theory to understand the complex and contradictory media systems that exist in hybrid regimes that emerged in the post-Cold war period. The normative theories are too narrow to explain the complex media systems built in hybrid regimes. As we have seen, these media systems draw on both democratic and authoritarian practices, leading to a distinct public sphere. The complex nature of "hybrid media systems" makes the construction of ideal types an ambitious objective. The concept of "hybrid regimes" is a useful conceptual tool to analyse the media in hybrid states that allows researchers to go beyond the stereotypes of 'democratic' versus 'authoritarian' media that characterized media analysis during the Cold War period. The notion of "hybrid regime" is therefore an important 'tool' to understand the role of the state, the patterns of regulation, media content and the tensions and contradictions that characterise the media in these regimes.

Whilst the literature on hybrid regimes is useful in understanding the role of the state,

media policy and institutional design, it generally pays insufficient attention to the legitimating function of the media. The literature on hybrid regimes is also biased towards the traditional media (radio, television and newspapers) and neglects other forms of media that are embedded in historical and cultural contexts. In the following chapters, I argue that the media strategies in some hybrid contexts are historically and culturally specific and they reside within institutions and in practices that need careful study that go beyond, but include, traditional media, and which go beyond but include repression, notably in terms of creating institutional power via patronage, self-censorship and a compelling ideological and intellectual case for the regime. This thesis identifies different media control strategies and the legitimating function of the media in a hybrid system. Hybrid regimes build a different kind of legitimacy than either liberal or authoritarian regimes. The media plays an important role in legitimizing hybrid regimes and sustaining their rule. We therefore need to interrogate the contradictions and tensions that characterise the media and state practices in hybrid regimes and how incumbents manage to overcome these tensions and produce consensus which allow them to deploy the media effectively as a tool for legitimation and survival.

Chapter 3

Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The main goal of this research is to explore the role of the media and the state in a hybrid context. This chapter provides an outline of the sources and methods of the study. The study is principally based on interviews with a variety of actors in Zimbabwe as follows: i) the political elites such as Cabinet Ministers, Deputies, Permanent Secretaries and Directors who were responsible for media policy design and implementation in Zimbabwe post-2000, ii) journalists and editors from the state-controlled press, and iii) artists who produced songs ZANU (PF) songs called *Hondo yeMinda* (Struggle for land) during the "Third Chimurenga". I also conducted interviews with a variety of ZANU (PF) actors in Murewa, a highly politicised and contested district in the period under study. These interviews sought to explore *pungwes* (all-night vigils) and other strategies deployed by ZANU (PF) and its allies- war veterans, youth militia and others during the "Third Chimurenga". The thesis is also based on interviews with members of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Murewa. These interviews add to our understandings of *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies in rural areas and responses to them. I provide a full list of interviewees as **annex 1** on page 197.

The thesis is, in addition, based on a media content analysis. I collated a sample of hard news, editorials and op-eds in *The Herald* and *The Sunday Mail*, the two main state-controlled newspapers to understand the themes that were selected and given salience in the coverage of the land issue in the state press. The land issue was the primary theme in ZANU (PF)'s 'patriotic history' during the "Third Chimurenga". I also extended my analysis of framing to ZANU (PF) songs called *Hondo yeMinda* (Struggle for Land) that were produced in support of the violent seizure of white-owned farms. I collated a sample of the most prominent songs and videos to analyse the lyrics, the themes selected and how they were framed to compliment the interviews with artists. Finally, I used a wide range of 'grey' sources such as media publications and NGO reports on ZANU (PF) strategies during the period under study. The thesis is based on a combination of these sources and qualitative methodologies.

The advantage of using qualitative methods is that they generate a wealth of data of an exploratory nature that allows the researcher to go deeply into and to unpack the topic under investigation. The sources and methods used in this study were important in exploring fully the diverse strategies that were deployed by ZANU (PF) in the mainstream media and the institutional practices (at the national level), the relations between journalists, artists and state officials, and the content circulated in the state-controlled press and ZANU (PF)'s cultural productions. However, data generated through qualitative procedures is not necessarily generalisable. To address questions of validity and reliability of data in qualitative research, it is crucial for researchers to use multiple sources and methods which allow them to address the gaps or inconsistences in their data. Triangulation is often cited as one of the central ways of 'validating' qualitative research evidence (Ritchie, 2003:43). Triangulation gives "a fuller picture of phenomena" (Ibid: 44). Creswell (2013:302) notes that: "researchers make use of multiple and different sources, methods, investigators, and theories to provide corroborating evidence for validating the accuracy of their study". With triangulation, I managed to cover some of the gaps identified in any one source. For instance, in some cases the party and state elites whom I interviewed were evasive and unwilling to reveal details about their media policies or strategies particularly on patronage and the more subtle strategies of media control. However, I was able to get these details through my interviews with journalists and artists who worked closely with these elites.

The methods employed in this study thus allowed me to interrogate the origins of ideas regarding ZANU (PF) media strategies, the divisions among party and state elites over their approaches in the media, the role of bureaucratic and political institutions, the framing of content of the state press and the role of the 'non-traditional' media and patronage in the party's legitimation and survival efforts post-2000. This analysis is important in that it contributes to our understanding of how the hybrid regime built by ZANU (PF) post-2000 used the media to legitimise its policies and discredit alternative viewpoints. In the section below, I elaborate on the sources and methods of the study, issues of positionality and reflexivity and my field work experiences, and challenges and how they were mitigated.

3.2 Researcher Positionality and Reflexivity

Sultana (2007:382) notes that researchers should "pay attention to positionality, reflexivity, the production of knowledge and power relations" during a qualitative research process. Researchers ought to be reflexive regarding their own positionality, pay attention to the subject being studied, the research context, the respondents, their values and way of life. She adds that "reflexivity involves reflection on self, process, and representation, and critically examining power relations and politics in the research process, and researcher accountability in data collection and interpretation" (Ibid: 376). The importance of reflexive research is that it allows researchers to think about their own positionality and how this might affect the way they see things and how they are perceived by respondents.

There were a number of barriers in my research that needed to be overcome. The major challenge was to do with 'positionality'. My work in Zimbabwe as a civic activist, journalist and former student leader prior to my studies at the University of Oxford affected the way that I was perceived by respondents. I had served as Spokesperson for the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, a vocal human rights watchdog in Zimbabwe. I had also worked as the director for the Centre for Community Development in Zimbabwe (CCDZ), another non-governmental organisation working in the areas of human rights and governance in Zimbabwe. The relations between the ZANU (PF) government and human rights organisations NGOs are characterised by deep animosity. There have been several attempts by the ZANU (PF) government to proscribe human rights NGOs whom it has accused of being agents of regime change and of working with the opposition. This work shaped my own views, prejudices and biases about ZANU (PF).

My background of having worked as a civic activist prior to my studies at Oxford meant that I was going to encounter problems of access particularly in Murewa district where I needed to talk to local ZANU (PF) leaders, war veterans and others who led the 'fast-track' process there. Generally, it is difficult for researchers to conduct ethnographic research on 'fast-track' due to problems of access. The few studies that have been conducted were often made possible through the support that researchers received from family or professional networks. For instance, Wilbert Sadomba (2008) carried out a study on Fast-Track Land Reform in Goromonzi and Mazowe districts for his doctorate

at Wageningen University. The research was successful because Sadomba is a war veteran who participated in the land occupations in the areas that he studied. Another study that was done by Nelson Marongwe (2008), also for his doctorate, was possible because he had previously worked in government. Marongwe used his contacts in government to get access to policy documents on the land issue. He also chose to conduct fieldwork in his home area for easy access. The research by Phillan Zamchiya for his doctorate at Oxford focused on Chipinge District, which is his home area. This study relied largely on family networks and the local officials with whom Zamchiya had struck up a good rapport. He explained: "Fast Track land reform was carried out in a violent manner and open access to farms has been limited. One has to negotiate the various layers of authority to gain access to resettlement farms and to official statistical data. Family, historical, social, bureaucratic and traditional networks aided my negotiation" (Zamchiya, 2012:65). I therefore chose to work in Murewa in order to build on my family networks and professional contacts for easy access.

Even though I had family connections in Murewa, there was still a danger of being perceived as a civic activist and not as a student doing scholarly research. It was difficult to convince some ZANU (PF) leaders and war veterans that my interviews were part of an academic research and had nothing to do with politics. Establishing rapport from the outset was important as some of the ZANU (PF) elites and war veterans whom I targeted for interviewing were sceptical about my professional background. The interviews were possible because I had thoroughly prepared and thought through the ways of gaining access in the district. I knew some of the people who had played a key role during the 'fast-track' process. I targeted for interviewing some of my relatives who held positions in ZANU (PF) at district and provincial level. I also decided to conduct my research in Murewa because of the good rapport that I had established with the District Administrator, Councillors and Council staff in the district.

Conducting my research in my home area of Murewa district thus had advantages. It was relatively easy to negotiate entry because I had good rapport with the officials. I had deep knowledge of people and places. I did not have any challenges with language, culture, etiquette and traditional practices. However, my experience in Murewa shows that there is a downside to conducting research in your home area. One of the challenges is that you

can assume that you know everything about the subject or topic under investigation and you tend to take many things for granted. The other problem of conducting research in your home area is being viewed as an 'insider' by respondents. When the researcher is regarded as an 'insider', the danger is that respondents may feel uncomfortable to express their views on sensitive topics such as politics and violence for fear that this information will be used against them in future. Most people in Murewa also associated me with the opposition because of my human rights activism and views about ZANU (PF) widely publicised in the media.

Whilst I managed to reach a good number of ZANU (PF) leaders, war veterans and party youths who spearheaded "fast-track" occupations in Murewa, I had problems in organizing interviews with some hard-core party activists and war veterans. Although I had struck up good rapport with local officials such as Maxwell Mabhuro, the District Administrator (DA) for Murewa who cleared my interviews on the farms, the ZANU (PF) politicians and war veterans still wanted to scuttle my research. Whilst I had been cleared by the District Administrator to visit the farms, the partisan/political structures on the ground denied me access. It is a challenge gaining access in the 'fast-track' areas due to existence of highly politicised gatekeepers. To make it worse, my interviews coincided with ZANU (PF)'s electioneering ahead of the harmonised elections scheduled to take place in July 2013. When I visited Murewa in October 2012, ZANU (PF) had already activated its electoral machinery ahead of these elections. The party and war veterans politicised my research and accused me of "visiting the farms to campaign for the opposition" (Conversations with members of ZANU (PF)'s Nyamhita branch, April 2013). Some local ZANU (PF) leaders and war veterans demanded to be present during my interviews "to see whether or not you are politicizing our people" (Ibid).

Despite these challenges, that were also revealing in terms of ZANU (PF) strategies, I managed to conduct interviews with key party elites and war veterans who were involved in fast-track mobilisation I had managed to conduct interviews that gave me a good sense of what happened during the "fast track" process in Murewa district. The material gathered through these interviews and observations allowed a new elaboration of ZANU (PF) strategies and the role of *pungwes* in the transmission and performance of 'patriotic history' in rural areas. However, I did not manage to fully explore the reception or

interpretation of 'patriotic history' mainly due to the politicised context in Murewa and the sensitive nature of my topic.

My positionality also affected the way that I was perceived by some ZANU (PF) and state elites whom I targeted for interviewing at the national level. However, I managed to talk to the key political figures that were responsible for media policy in Zimbabwe post-2000. It was possible to talk to these state actors due to the following factors. First, most of the officials who were responsible for state media policies hold doctorates. As such, these officials easily understood when I explained to them that my interviews were part of my doctoral research and had nothing to do with politics. Second, it was easy for me to arrange interviews with these elites because some had worked as university or college lecturers prior to joining government and hence they understood the imperatives of graduate research. For instance, Professor Jonathan Moyo, who served as the Minister of Information and Publicity between 2000 and 2005, is a professor of political science who had worked as a lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe prior to joining government. I also interviewed Tafataona Mahoso, the inaugural Chairperson of the media regulatory body, the Media and Information Commission (now Zimbabwe Media Commission). Mahoso holds a doctorate from Ohio (USA); he had also worked as a lecturer and head of the Mass Communications Department at the Harare Polytechnic before he joined the government's media regulatory body. It was easy for me to arrange an interview with Mahoso because he taught me at the Harare Polytechnic from 1999 to 2000. I also managed to interview George Charamba, the Presidential Spokesperson and Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity. The interview with Charamba was possible due to relations built when I worked as a trainee journalist at *The Sunday Mail* and *The Daily News* in 1999 and 2000 respectively.

Third, my interviews widely, with party and state officials, war veterans, journalists and artists, were possible owing to a wider respect for education and studying in Zimbabwe. Some ZANU (PF) leaders and state elites agreed to talk to me on the basis of my affiliation with a prestigious university. These elites saw my research as an opportunity for them to participate and contribute to academic debate. There are instances where Moyo and Charamba, the key architects of the ZANU (PF) media and propaganda strategies post-2000 made references to the literature and the wider academic debates to

demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of the issues that I was studying. Jonathan Moyo saw my research as an opportunity to correct 'misrepresentations' regarding the ZANU (PF) media strategies and to respond to the works on 'patriotic history'. He said:

> This nonsense [patriotic history] by these Oxford graduates, who are products of a tired historian [Terence Ranger], is not useful my friend… I am showing you that I am familiar with what you are talking about. I am very familiar with the academic enterprise and I don't accept having somebody who creates their terms and then imposes those terms on everybody else. This concept of patriotic history propounded by Terence Ranger and his students is propaganda. It's a bastardisation of a concept that would otherwise carry meaning but it is put in a historical context and stripped of substance and ends up being a newspaper issue. It is not historically grounded. I mean, why is patriotic history only applying to Zimbabwe? You come up with a concept which is unique to Zimbabwe. Why are you not using patriotic history to describe South Africa? Why are you not using patriotic history to describe England itself? Why are you not, if it is a meaningful concept, why must we invent a concept which has these words to describe Mugabe and ZANU (PF), why? What is the scholarly merit of such a thing? If you say the State and Politics in Zimbabwe, you can do the State and Politics in Kenya, the State and Politics in Malaysia. Why don't you do patriotic history in Malaysia, why hasn't it been applied there? What is the comparative value of this thing? You know in Social Science, a concept must withstand a number of tests including its comparative value. Why are there no daughters of the revolution in America? I mean why are we the only ones subject to these binaries? (Interview with Jonathan Moyo, April 2013, Harare).

There are contestations over the notion of 'patriotic history' just like any other academic concept. However, various works on 'patriotic history' have ably demonstrated how ZANU (PF) propagated a highly selective/exclusivist nationalist discourses called 'patriotic history' to legitimise its claims to power and authority post-2000. Moyo's dismissal of critical analysis of 'patriotic history' is not surprising considering that he was its main author in the state media and through various propaganda programmes such as *Hondo yeMinda* (Struggle for Land) or *Chave Chimurenga* (It's Now War) songs and musical galas as I demonstrate in the subsequent chapters. But Moyo is making references to the literature to demonstrate his knowledge and at the same time proffer his critique of 'patriotic history'. This shows that some political elites participate in academic research because they see it as an opportunity to advance their arguments. It required skill and adequate preparation on the part of the researcher to manage

sophisticated interviewees such as Professor Jonathan Moyo, George Charamba and Tafataona Mahoso because of their deep knowledge and understanding of theoretical debates on the media, politics and the state.

Some of my interviewees who had worked as college and university lecturers prior to joining government were interested in discussing theoretical issues to assert their authority over the interview process. These elites also wanted to show their understanding of theoretical debates in the media. There is a tendency by respondents in elite interviews to want to control the research agenda (Morris, 2009). It therefore required skill on my part to 'manage' these respondents and ensure that the interview process remained focused on the study objectives. These responses were revealing as they showed me the intellectual self-confidence of these elites.

I managed to conduct interviews with journalists and editors from the state-controlled press despite my positionality. These interviews were possible due to the professional relations that I had built with these journalists in my earlier career. Interviews with Caesar Zvayi, Munyaradzi Huni, Lovemore Mataire, Pikirayi Deketeke, William Chikoto and others were possible because we knew each other from journalistic circles. I had worked with Deketeke, Mataire, Chikoto and Huni when I did my internship at *The Sunday Mail* in 1999/2000. As such, these journalists saw me as a professional colleague. I also did an internship at the Media Monitoring Project in Zimbabwe (MMPZ), a media watchdog that monitors news coverage in both the private and public media in Zimbabwe. I therefore knew people in the media sector which made it easier for me to arrange interviews with journalists and editors as well getting media reports and other documents for my research.

The interviews with the opposition MDC leaders were easy to organise as compared to those with ZANU (PF) and state elites. The interviews were possible because I had worked closely with MDC leaders when I served as the Secretary for Information and Publicity for the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), the umbrella body that represents college and university students in Zimbabwe. The MDC was formed by a broad alliance comprising labour, students, farmers, human rights organisations, the academia and others. In February 1999, I represented ZINASU at the party's All

Working National People's Convention. As such, I was known to most MDC leaders whom I targeted for interviewing. The interviews with the MDC leaders were crucial in exploring the opposition party's response to 'patriotic history' as explained in Chapter Six.

In the section below, I elaborate on the methods and sources of the study.

3.3 Sources and Methods of the Study

3.3.1 Interviews with Zimbabwean elites

Lilleker (2003:207) defines political elites as "those with close proximity to power or policymaking". The nature of my study required that I interviewed ZANU (PF) and state elites to understand their approaches to the media. Most studies on the Zimbabwean media policies post-2000 are based on secondary sources such as government policy briefs, press statements and newspaper reports. Whilst these sources are important, they do not bring out details about the debates that took place within the state and party or the divisions among the key players who were responsible for the media. The process of public policy-making including the formulation of media policies is a preserve of a few elites. As such, it is important to talk to these elites to understand their motives, the nature of debate within the state and the tensions and contradictions in the formulation and implementation of media policies and institutional design particularly in a hybrid system. It is not possible to get this information in newspaper reports or even policy briefs that are in most cases carefully packaged by government spin doctors.

Lilleker (2003:208) notes that elite interviews "provide insights into events about which we know little: the activities that take place out of the public or media gaze, behind closed doors. We can learn more about the inner workings of the political process, the machinations between influential actors and how a sequence of events was viewed and responded to within the political machine". One of the main objectives of this study was to explore the inner workings of ZANU (PF) and the decisions that party elites took regarding the media in the early 2000s and interviews were key in doing that. With respect to the ZANU (PF) media 'machine' after 2000, we know that the party introduced a battery of laws to regulate the media and control the flow of information. But another level of the debate is to interrogate the origins of these laws, ZANU (PF)'s

motives, the nature of the debate and the divisions among the key actors. Such an analysis helps us to understand the political dynamics within ZANU (PF) and government so we can draw some conclusions on how hybrid regimes function, the tensions and divisions that characterise them and how they manage to overcome these and become successful.

A number of authors have written about the challenges of conducting interviews with elites generally (Lilleker, 2003; Thomas, 1993; Ostrander, 1993, Mickecz, 2012). These challenges range from problems of access, dealing with perceived power distance and the role reversal of "who is the expert". Elite interviews on their own are not sufficient to ensure the validity and reliability of data. There is need to balance the official perspective with other viewpoints and also to be aware that elites are generally evasive in their responses to researchers especially on sensitive or controversial issues. Researchers using elite interviewing should make sure that they use other methods to corroborate the information they get from officials. Researchers should also read between the lines because the elites are not obliged "to be objective and to tell us the truth" (Berry, 2002:680). Gaining access to elites is also problematic. Mickecz (2012:483) notes that: "Gaining access to elites has to be carefully negotiated, which can take much longer time and higher costs than non-elite studies. They purposefully erect barriers, which set them apart from the rest of society". He further notes that: "Elites can command significant resources and exert influence over others. As such, they are hard to reach and are surrounded by numerous gatekeepers. Elites are visible but not necessarily accessible" (Ibid.).

In elite interviewing, power and status imbalance between respondents and the researcher can affect the smooth flow of the interview process if not properly handled. In my research, it was not easy to overcome these inequalities. As I have alluded to above, my affiliation with the prestigious Oxford University assisted me in both gaining access to interviewees and reducing the power and status distance with ZANU (PF) and state elites such as such as Cabinet ministers, the President's Spokesperson and Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity and other senior government officials. As Mickecz (2012:485) notes, "To gain credibility and reduce the status imbalance, it is important for the researcher to emphasize his or her academic and professional

credentials and institutional affiliations". I was also very well prepared for the interviews and well informed on the political playing field.

Lancaster (2016) highlights some of the challenges of using elite interviews in highly politicised and contested policy domains. In these contexts, respondents pay attention to personal, political and professional sensitivities and do not want to disclose full information or provide full narratives for fear of consequences such as potential job losses, damage to organisational reputation or fear of retaliation from colleagues (Ibid). Researchers need to understand that due to these 'sensitivities' elites find "politically correct" ways of responding to interview questions. They can make false or disputable claims or withhold some critical information. Elites are less willing to disclose certain types of information to protect their political and professional interests. In my interviews with Zimbabwean political elites who were responsible for government media policy post-2000, I noted that some of my respondents made self-protective and false claims. The views of these elites should be treated explicitly as claims, narratives and assertions and not as straightforward fact.

The other lesson from my interviews with ZANU (PF) and state elites and the opposition leaders in Zimbabwe is that timing is of the essence. My field visit to Zimbabwe coincided with general elections and it was difficult to get hold of some political leaders because they were busy with election campaigns in their respective constituencies. It was not easy to arrange interviews with these political leaders and convincing them to take time off their busy schedules. It took a lot of prodding for them to agree to my interview requests. Although I managed to talk to some of the key government officials who were responsible for the media, some declined my interview requests on this basis. Some officials never responded despite my several phone calls. Only a few had the courtesy to return my calls but still told me they did not have time as they were busy with the elections. I did not manage to interview other key ZANU (PF) officials who told me that they were busy with the election campaigns.

3.3.2 Interviews with Zimbabwean journalists

As noted above, I conducted interviews with journalists and editors from the state press. These interviews were crucial in exploring the political and ideological pressures which

shaped ‘patriotic journalism’ that was practiced by the Zimbabwean state press post-2000. I reveal the identity of journalists such as Pikirayi Deketeke, William Chikoto, Caesar Zvayi, Munyaradzi Huni and Lovemore Mataire because they played a prominent role in the ideological justification of the land issue in the state press. The interviews with the journalists and editors from the state press also focused on the conditions under which they operated, their relations with the officials such as Minister Jonathan Moyo and the Permanent Secretary, George Charamba. The interviews also sought to find out the themes that were selected in the coverage of the land issue, how these were framed and why. In addition, the interviews were also crucial in understanding the contestations over the notion of ‘journalistic professionalism’ among the journalists and editors.

3.3.3 Interviews with Zimbabwean artists

The interviews with the Zimbabwean artists who produced *Hondo yeMinda* songs focused on the origins of ideas or lyrics, the themes of the songs and the different layers of state patronage in the production and marketing of the songs. The interviews also sought to understand the background of artists and how they became involved in producing the songs. The music project was co-ordinated by the Ministry of Information and Publicity starting from 2000. I conducted interviews with prominent artists such as ‘Cde Chinx’ and ‘Tambaoga’ who produced *Hondo yeMinda* songs to understand more about the origins of the lyrics and how they were framed and their relations with state elites. In Chapter Seven, I analyse in detail the contents of the songs that were produced by these artists. I only managed to talk to ‘Cde Chinx’ and ‘Tambaoga’ because some of the artists who produced “Third Chimurenga” songs such as Andy Brown, Simon Chimbetu and Marko Sibanda had died. The interviews with artists were necessary to clarify key aspects of the study, such as the origins of ideas and how framing, state patronage and institutional design worked in practice. I also downloaded from the Internet the lyrics and videos of *Hondo yeMinda* songs that were sung by ‘Cde Chinx’ and ‘Tambaoga’. I analysed the themes that were selected in these songs, the lyrics and how these were framed.

3.3.4 A Media Content Analysis

The most commonly used method in media and communications research is content analysis (Weerakkody, 2009). For this thesis, I also conducted a media content analysis

to understand the themes that were selected and given salience in the state-controlled press. I collated a sample of hard news stories, op-eds and editorial comments that were published in *The Herald* and *Sunday Mail* newspapers for further analysis. I limited my analysis to the articles that I assessed as representative. There is a lot that has been published on the land issue in the state press but I only selected a few articles and editorial comments that were relevant to my research. These stories gave me a good sense of the themes that were selected and given prominence in the state press's coverage of the land which was ZANU (PF)'s major rallying point during the "Third Chimurenga". I used editorial comments because these reflect the editorial position of the newspaper. I did not encounter any problems in accessing the press archives at Zimpapers because of my journalism background.

3.3.5 Grey Sources

'Grey' sources such as NGO publications were useful in the process of 'triangulation' with other sources. I collated reports that were produced by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, General Agricultural Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), and others on the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme. These were very helpful in my analysis of ZANU (PF) strategies during 'fast-track' land occupations. I also collated publications by the Media Monitoring Project in Zimbabwe (MMPZ) on various aspects of the media policy and regulatory framework in Zimbabwe. The MMPZ is a media watchdog that monitors news coverage in the Zimbabwean media. I had easy access to the archives of the MMPZ because I once worked there as an intern in the organisation's Advocacy and Research Unit.

3.3.6 Field-based studies in Murewa District

In addition, as discussed in detail above, this study is based on interviews with a variety of ZANU (PF) actors in Murewa district. These interviews focused on *pungwes* (all-night vigils) that were held on the occupied farms and communal areas. The *pungwe* was a key space for the transmission of 'patriotic history' and violent 'disciplining' of ZANU (PF) opponents who were labelled 'sell-outs' in the rubric of 'patriotic history'. In my interviews, I sought to understand how the *pungwes* were organised, the role of different actors and the complexities of their effects. I also conducted interviews with MDC activists in Murewa. The views of the MDC sources add to understandings of ZANU

(PF)'s use of *pungwes* as a strategy and their responses to them. I talked to MDC activists about their experiences and responses to *pungwes.* The studies on 'patriotic history' acknowledge ZANU (PF)'s use of *pungwes* and other war-time strategies during the "Third Chimurenga". However, these studies do not look in detail at how the *pungwes* were organised, the role of different actors and the complexities of their effects and opposition responses to them, a gap which this study seeks to address.

In the field, I used semi-structured interviews to develop a much deeper understanding of *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies. Researchers conducting semi-structured interviews should plan adequately before going to the field. This planning entails undertaking a thorough literature review and developing research questions. I had spent a year of my studies in Oxford where I had done a thorough literature review of the "Third Chimurenga". As such, I knew the key actors and the themes or issues that I wanted to explore in my interviews. The next step in semi-structured interviews is identifying the research participants. For short term projects, it is recommended to use purposive sampling. My research questions guided me in deciding who to talk to. When in the field, researchers are recommended to tell participants from the onset the purpose of their study to enable them to provide informed consent. As we have seen, the context of the research in Murewa was heavily politicised. Fear pervades rural communities in Zimbabwe especially during election time. Most people do not want to openly express their views on politics and other sensitive topics for fear of victimisation. It was therefore important for me to allay these fears and assure my respondents that my research was for academic purposes and not related to my previous work. I explained the purpose of my study to respondents as a way to re-assure them that indeed my study was for academic purposes, but this did not succeed in many cases and I was forced to rely on other sources as a result.

3.4 Some Ethical Considerations

A key aspect of any academic research is paying attention to ethical issues. According to sociologist Cavan Sherri: "Ethics is a matter of principled sensitivity to the rights of others. Being ethical limits the choices we can make in pursuit of the truth. Ethics say that while the truth is good, respect for human dignity is better, even if, in the extreme case, the respect of human dignity leaves one ignorant of human nature" (cited in Bulmer, 1982). The decision to anonymise my respondents was meant to protect them

from possible victimisation owing to the highly politicised context in Murewa. The possibility of some of my respondents, particularly ZANU (PF) members and war veterans in Murewa, being victimised was real. This is because ZANU (PF) is a hierarchical party where matters of procedure and discipline are highly regarded and even talking to me could be seen as 'undisciplined'. Some of my respondents requested anonymity because they were not authorised to talk to me by the senior party officials. Some requested anonymity for fear of reprisals from party and state agents. I also withhold the names of MDC activists whom I interviewed in Murewa to protect them from political victimisation by state agents.

The state and party elites whom I interviewed agreed to have their names used in the study. This is one of a few studies that are based on interviews with the key actors who were responsible for media policy in Zimbabwe post-2000. As noted above, I interviewed key figures such as Professor Jonathan Moyo, George Charamba, Bright Matonga, Dr Tafataona Mahoso, Dr Sikhanyiso Ndlovu and others. These officials are highly recognisable and outspoken characters whose views are crucial and offer a new perspective to our understanding of ZANU (PF) media policies and institutional practices during the period under study. These elites played a prominent role and they were happy to be identified. Moreover, withholding their identity would have weakened my argument regarding the origins of ideas, the political and institutional dynamics and the nature of debate within ZANU (PF) and the state regarding the media policies or strategies and the divisions among these key actors. The interviews with these elites were crucial in bringing out the divisions within ZANU (PF) and government regarding the media strategies which are underexplored in existing studies. I decided to anonymise some of my respondents even in instances where they had not asked for anonymity because there was a high possibility of retribution from ZANU (PF) and state agents.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined the sources and methods used in this study and discussed my experiences in the field. As I have shown, this study is mainly based on interviews with ZANU (PF) and state elites who were responsible for media policy post-2000. This thesis is one of a few studies that are based on interviews with these key officials who were responsible for media policy telling their stories and thereby giving insight into

what choices and decisions they took regarding the media and why. The study is also based on interviews with journalists, artists and a range of political actors. In addition, I conducted a media content analysis focusing on the themes that were selected in the coverage of the land issue in the state press and how these were framed. This study is also based on my analysis of ZANU (PF) songs and *pungwes* during the "Third Chimurenga". These sources are neglected in many studies and yet they provide useful insights into the content of 'patriotic history' and the role of history and culture in the ZANU (PF) media agenda after 2000. Finally, I collated 'grey' sources or materials such as media publications and NGO reports in order to verify accounts and provide a rich description of events. The sources and means of procedure outlined here were the most appropriate in unpacking the ZANU (PF) media policies and institutional practices during the "Third Chimurenga". In the next chapter, I trace the media policies and state practices in Rhodesia in the 1960s and 1970s and the shifts and continuities under the ZANU (PF) government from 1980 up to the 1990s.

Chapter 4

The Media in Rhodesia and the Changes and Continuities in State Practice (s) after Independence

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the historical trajectory of the media in Zimbabwe and the shifts and continuities in state practices post-independence. I discuss the role of the media and the state in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front (RF) party and the emergence of 'alternative' media to advance the goals of the Second *Chimurenga* (liberation) war against colonial rule in the 1960s and '70s. I discuss the emergence of 'alternative' media such as *Chimurenga* (revolutionary) songs, *pungwes* (all-night gatherings) and clandestine radio which the nationalists used to undermine colonial rule and politicise the masses in Rhodesia during the liberation struggle. I trace the historical roots of *Chimurenga* songs and *pungwes* because these forms of 'media' and political mobilisation were again revived during the "Third Chimurenga". These forms of 'media' are part of my argument regarding the importance of the 'non-traditional' media and the forms of media drawn from history and culture, in regime legitimation and survival. These forms of media provide the basis of my argument regarding the importance of history and culture in regime legitimation and survival. I also discuss the media policies as well as the shifts and continuities in media policies and state practices under the new ZANU (PF) government in Zimbabwe from 1980 to the 1990s. This discussion gives insight into the role of the media and the state in shifting hybrid contexts in Zimbabwe.

4.2 The Media, State and Political Control in Rhodesia

The Rhodesian Front (RF) came to power in 1962 after defeating the United Federal Party. The RF immediately politicised the state bureaucracy by appointing loyalists to strategic positions in the civil service. Saunders (1991:25) argues that: "The process of RF infiltration into the state went far beyond the norms of political patronage. Rather, it was part of a hegemonic project which included the reform and repackaging of the entire national cultural and social agenda - an agenda which was revised in all its forms, from school textbooks and television programmes, to town-hall meetings and national

economic planning. To enact this reform, the RF employed an expanded, increasingly interventionist state to penetrate deeply into the interstices of the economy and civic life". The conflation of the state and the party was a key strategy that the RF deployed to ensure control. Saunders further notes that: "at the level of the state apparatus itself, the ingrained presence of the RF in the personnel, policies and concrete structures of government by the end of the 1970s often rendered the state indistinguishable from the minority ruling party and its government" (Ibid.). But was Rhodesia under the RF a hybrid regime? Some scholars have classified the Rhodesian state as a hybrid system. Diamond (2002:23) explains that in the 1960s and 1970s, "there existed multi-party, electoral, but undemocratic regimes" including Rhodesia and South Africa which combined democratic and authoritarian elements. Although the RF built a repressive state apparatus for the repression of opponents, this was accompanied by a deliberate policy 'to win the hearts and minds' of the Rhodesian people.

I argue that whilst RF deployed strategies such as institutional re-configuration, of media institutions, patronage and the appointment of propaganda experts to be in charge of what the regime called the 'creative side' of the media are consistent with a hybrid regime's desire to appear democratic, we need to note that this was within the strictures of white minority rule in which the majority did not enjoy equal rights and could not vote. Although colonial rule under the RF was an authoritarian system of governance, there was an attempt by the regime to appear democratic. The RF built a repressive apparatus which it used to control the media in line with its hegemonic ambitions. However, the RF also used strategies such as institutional re-configuration, patronage and appointment of key personnel to be in charge of the media. These strategies are consistent with media control in a hybrid regime. The regime re-organised the Information department (later the Ministry of Information) and appointed its loyalists to be in charge. The party hired Pieter Van der Byl, a South African right-wing extremist, as the Secretary for Information to devise and direct government information policy (Windrich 1979:525). The regime hired Ivor Benson, South African propaganda expert, as government information advisor to be in charge of the 'creative side' of the media. The regime also controlled the broadcast media through appointing its loyalists to key positions at the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation (RBC). The broadcasting policy centred on the regime's control over broadcasting content, particularly news and current affairs. The

broadcast media was crucial to counter criticism by the Argus press which published *The Rhodesia Herald* and *The Chronicle* which were perceived as anti-establishment.

Following Benson's arrival, several radical changes were introduced in the media, including the retirement, dismissal or transfer of career public servants who had worked in government for years but whose views were no longer considered compatible with the RF's political project. Elaine Windrich notes that:

> What was really at stake for the opposition, other than the offensive character of the appointee [Benson], was the violation of a number of principles on which the whole white Rhodesian political system had been based, including a competitive public service, a parliamentary opposition functioning within certain well-defined and agreed limits and a media which, also within prescribed limits, was entitled to question the policies of the government-of-the-day" (Ibid: 526).

When the RF came in, it sought to dismantle the democratic aspects of the political regime that applied to the white minority rule that it had inherited. The RF perceived the free flow of information as a threat to its survival. As a result, the nationalist publications, *Zimbabwe News* and *Zimbabwe Review*, produced by ZANU and ZAPU respectively, were outlawed. In 1964, the only publication which expressed African views, *The Daily News* was banned under the draconian Law and Order Maintenance Act (1960) for spreading "alarm and despondency" (Windrich, 1981). The other publications that were banned included a liberal publication, *The Central African Examiner* and *Moto* magazine, which was produced by the Catholic Church, was banned in 1976, and *Umbowo* (Witness), which was produced by the United Methodist Church, was banned in January 1977. The regime also went after the Argus press. The Argus press was accused of being 'disloyal' to the regime's interests. Soon after the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in Rhodesia in 1965, regime censors assumed the authority of approving all final copy and galley sheets of the mainstream print media, including *The Rhodesia Herald* and *The Chronicle*. In protest at this heavy-handed action, the Argus press editors published newspapers with blank spaces to show that the stories for those publications had been removed by the censors. Windrich (1981:58) notes that:

> At virtually every congress of the party, resolutions were proposed deploring the existence of a monopoly press and urging the government to impose some form of controls, varying from licenses for individual editors and journalists to a press council with wide powers of intervention. In the

> same manner, Rhodesia Front members of parliament would repeatedly introduce petty or baseless complaints about press coverage of their speeches, alleging inadequacy or distortion or, in some cases, both. Under the cover of parliamentary privilege, they would level unsubstantiated charges against individual journalists, often accusing them of engaging in treasonable and subversive activities.

The regime came up with strategies to silence the critical Argus press. The Argus press was accused of conspiracy against the state, and journalists who wrote stories that were critical of the regime were accused of conduct likely to cause "alarm and despondency" or that their stories were "likely to cause the breach of law and order" or "calculated to bring [the Rhodesian] authority into disrepute", crimes that were punishable with prison sentences or deportations (Windrich, 1979:532). The Argus press was accused of being "disloyal to Rhodesia" and being treasonous (Ibid.). The regime's Information advisor, Benson, made clear the conduct that the RF expected of the press:

> The Press must be free - no one denies that - but it must be OUR Press, promoting OUR values and OUR interests. Only such a press has any claim to the freedom to govern itself in OUR society. Who are the owners of the Press? Who are the individuals who ultimately control it? What are their real motives? Whose interests do they promote? What is the source of the values and the criteria which regulate their policies and their behaviour? (Ivor Benson, *The Opinion Makers*, cited in Saunders 1991: 51).

With UDI, a set of institutional and personnel changes were made. RF censors led by Benson and the chief censor, a D.C Dendy from the ministry's "research and propaganda'' section, immediately moved into the newsrooms of the Argus press at *The Rhodesia Herald* (Harare) and *The Chronicle* (Bulawayo) (Windrich, 1981). The Information Department was re-organised shortly before UDI and re-named the Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism. P.K Van der Byl was retained as deputy to the newly appointed minister, John Howman. The priorities of the Information ministry during UDI were: i) to mount a full-scale media campaign to project Rhodesia's image abroad in Western Europe, North America and the 'old Dominions', ii) to provide Africans with "suitable propaganda'' to fill the void created by the banning of nationalist and other independent publications and iii) the Information ministry was tasked to concentrate its media efforts to recruit support from the outside world generally and iv) "winning the hearts and minds" of the African people (Windrich, 1981).

The RF established censorship offices in Salisbury (Harare), Umtali (Mutare), Bulawayo and Gwelo (Gweru). The powers of the censors were derived from the Emergency Regulations. The Information secretary, P.K van der Byl justified media control thus:

> I tried to get as much control of the media as was possible. I believed that the media should be brought under control because it's largely inhabited by people of the Left, the sort of liberal-leaning or socialist philosophy which is the forerunner of Soviet expansionism. You get the liberal, and behind the liberal comes the communist. Therefore I did what I could to try and discipline the thing.
> What about freedom of the press?
> I'm not remotely concerned with freedom of the press when it degenerates into total, biased licence. The protection of the people is more important than so-called freedom of the press (P.K van der Byl cited in Frederikse, 1982).

The RF justified its encroachments in the media in terms of what it called 'national' or 'majority' interests (Saunders, 1991). As the battle between the party and the press raged on, RF spokesmen Benson and van der Byl directed the editor of the *Rhodesia Herald*, Malcom Smith to reserve space on the front page of the paper to allow the Prime Minister "to respond to press distortions of the truth" (Windrich, 1979:529). Whilst addressing parliament in 1966, van der Byl had made clear the role of the ministry. He stated: "The task of an information department is not merely to disseminate information from an interest point of view, but to play its part in fighting the propaganda battle on behalf of this country. The word 'propaganda' is by no means the dirty word it is made out to be, but is in fact simply the propagation of the faith and the belief in any particular ideology or thing and if the Information Department (is) to improve and strengthen the national ideology then indeed it is doing a worthwhile task" (Frederikse, 1982:116).

The conduct of journalists was closely monitored by members of the regime's Special Branch through tapping their telephones, opening correspondence and searching press offices for any subversive materials. Windrich (1981:60) notes that: "For those who openly refused to conform, the regime had organized a system of withholding rewards and meting out punishment, ranging from the refusal of routine facilities like government press conferences to the institution of court proceedings and, in appropriate cases, deportation". One example was the conviction of freelance journalist, Peter Niesewand,

for exposing the Rhodesian military operations against the ZANLA guerrillas based in Mozambique in 1972. Niesewand was given the choice of staying in jail or leaving the country (Frederikse, 1982). Asked why so many journalists were deported from Rhodesia, van der Byl, who was now Rhodesian Minister of Information, said: "You should have asked why more journalists were not deported; there were far too few. I don't believe you can defend Western Christian civilization against Soviet expansionism with liberal laissez-faire policies. We were actually far too tolerant and acquiescent about the whole thing" (Ibid: 140).

The RF promoted its own nationalist discourse to legitimise its actions and displace competing discourses. The regime produced *The African Times* which targeted Africans in the rural areas (Windrich, 1981). This was a fortnightly publication which was written by the officials in the "internal services" department of the ministry. The objective of this department, according to the Secretary for Information was "to keep the Africans informed of every step taken by the government in its progress as an independent nation; to counteract subversive propaganda and to expose the false policies of so-called African nationalism" (Report of the Secretary for Information, Immigration and Tourism for 1966, CSR 21-1967 cited in Windrich, 1981). The *African Times* extolled the blessings of white minority rule and excoriated the nationalists as terrorists. Some of the stories were intended to generate public resentment towards nationalists who were portrayed as communists and terrorists in the regime's media. Some of its headlines captured by Julie Frederikse, included: "Children forced from their homes by terrorists'', "Terrorists force wife to eat husband's flesh", "Terrorists murder baby", "Tell the tribes about the terrorists" and "White man is essential for the development of Rhodesia" (Frederikse, 1982). The RF defended *The African Times* newspaper arguing that it was popular among Africans because it gave coverage to "their" issues. In an editorial titled: "Why The African Times is called 'The People's Paper'", which the paper published on 17th May 1978, it sought to dispel criticism that "The African Times is a Government 'hand-out' and a Rhodesian Front document" (*The African Times,* 17 May 1978 cited in Frederikse, 1982:251).

The RF also produced a range of its own propaganda publications to articulate "real facts about brave white Rhodesia" (Saunders, 1991). These publications ran side by side with

a massive "white grassroots" campaign, overseen by RF activists (Msindo, 2009). Some of the publications included: *News and Newspapers, Know Your Enemy*, *The Problem of Unfree Press* and *The Opinion Makers* and booklets such as *Come with Rhodesia in the Future, Opportunity in Rhodesia, Farming in Rhodesia, Rhodesia in Brief, Investment Picture* and *Rhodesia's Case* (1970) (Msindo, 2009). *Red for Danger* targeted nationalists who were portrayed as 'terrs' ('terrorists'), 'gooks' or 'communists'. The regime also published *Anatomy of Terror* and *Harvest of Fear,* which contained gruesome pictures of people who were killed and maimed ostensibly by the 'terrorists'. The preamble to *Anatomy of Terror* stated that: "This is not a pretty book. The pictures inside depict a few of the many atrocities perpetrated by the so-called Freedom Fighters in Rhodesia. Outright torture has long been a weapon of the Communist-trained thugs who, for the past 15 years, have been trying to force their philosophies on an unwilling and peace-loving, indigenous, population. The incidents and pictures in this book record the wave of atrocities –murder, rape, abduction, torture, beatings, robberies and cattle maimings, over the last 18 months" ('*Anatomy of Terror*' cited in Frederikse 1982:123).

For those Africans who could not read, the RF produced films which were distributed in the rural areas. The rural propaganda campaign was implemented through the Ministry of Information's Branch of Internal Services. The films stressed the rewards for African obedience to the regime and its Chiefly allies and the punishment awaiting those who consorted with nationalists. Some of the films featured the achievements of the RF government, the Chiefs and the Security forces. In these films, the African populace was warned of the dire consequences of collaborating with nationalists and the liberation forces (Windrich, 1981). The regime also came up with songs to counter *Chimurenga* (revolutionary) songs that were produced by nationalists. Some of the songs that the regime produced include "Rhodesians never die", produced by Clem Tholet, which was played on the "Forces Requests Programme" (Frederikse, 1982). The regime also produced pamphlets which it distributed in the rural areas to counter what it called a terrorist insurgency. These productions emphasized the atrocities of the guerrillas, the Security forces victories against 'terrorists' and called on the Rhodesian people to rally behind the government. The radio broadcasts also targeted Africans to counter nationalist propaganda, deflate the independence promises and to remind the population of the dire consequences of consorting with the nationalists. In addition, the regime used radio to

create animosity between the major nationalist parties, ZANU and ZAPU, by creating the impression of ethnic animosities and rivalry between the two main ethnic groups, the Ndebele and Shona (Mosia et al., 1994).

As we have seen, the RF deployed a broad range of strategies from repressive and censorship laws to institutional re-configuration and patronage to control the media. We have also seen that the regime disseminated self-interested propaganda to promote what it called white civilisation. The recruitment of propaganda 'experts' van der Byl and Ivor Benson to spearhead the party's propaganda demonstrates the centrality of the media to the regime's legitimation and survival. As we will see in subsequent chapters, there are parallels between RF strategies and ZANU (PF)'s own conduct towards the media in some respects, though ZANU (PF) sought at the same time to appear to offer democratic opportunities for all. These similarities in media policies and strategies are much more evident in the policies that were adopted by ZANU (PF) to control the flow of information and silence the oppositional press post-2000. I elaborate further on the ZANU (PF) media strategies during this period in subsequent chapters.

In the section below, I analyse the role of the 'alternative media' that was used by nationalists to undermine the white settler government in Rhodesia. The monopolisation of the broadcast media and vilification of nationalists resulted in the emergence of alternative communicative spaces that nationalists and liberal whites used to challenge dominant political discourses. The alternative media was crucial in advancing the war effort and ventilating anti-government viewpoints. In the section below, I explore the media that nationalists used to politicize the 'masses' and mobilise support for the liberation struggle in the 1970s.

4.3 The 'Alternative' Media and Struggle Against Colonial Rule in Rhodesia

Political repression and propaganda against nationalists in Rhodesia led to the emergence of alternative communicative spaces and clandestine media to counter colonial rule. As we have already noted, access to the mainstream media for nationalists and liberal whites was severely curtailed by the RF government. The nationalists turned to the 'alternative' media of clandestine radio, *Chimurenga* songs, *pungwes* and publications to counter Rhodesian government and advance the war effort. The work by Julie Frederikse (1982)

demonstrates the centrality of the clandestine media during the Second *Chimurenga* (liberation) war in the 1970s. Likewise, Turino (2000:203) notes that, "two avenues were central to ZANU's efforts to educate, mobilise and recruit the masses: the radio and the all-night *pungwes*; in both contexts *Chimurenga* songs had a prominent role". The nationalists also relied on their propaganda publications, the *Zimbabwe News* (ZANU) and the *Zimbabwe Review* (ZAPU). These publications ventilated anti-colonial discourses. Turino argues that music occupied a key part in ZANU's mobilization strategy in the "moment of manoeuvre", that is, during the militant period of the struggle for independence in the 1970s. ZANLA broadcast its revolutionary messages, party slogans and liberation songs on the "*Chimurenga* Requests Programme". The clandestine radio broadcasts into Rhodesia played a crucial role in the politicisation of the rural 'masses' during the Second *Chimurenga* war (Frederikse 1982; Mosia et al, 1994; Pongweni, 1997; Turino, 2000). The nationalist parties, ZANU and ZAPU, received support from countries such as Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique to broadcast their revolutionary messages. ZANU established the *Voice of Zimbabwe* (VOZ) with the support of FRELIMO in Mozambique whilst ZAPU set up the *Voice of the Revolution*, which broadcast nationalist propaganda from Zambia. According to Edison Zvobgo, ZANU's Deputy Secretary of Information and Publicity in the 1970s, radio was a major medium in mobilizing support for the war. He stated that:

> We recognized the importance of radio in the liberation struggle, and we therefore negotiated with the frontline countries for free radio time. We had every evening an hour at our disposal, beamed on Zimbabwe, and we used those radio broadcasts to politicize the masses here at home, to show them that this was their war. Our media department maintained a very elaborate field unit of correspondents who accompanied the comrades all over the country, making reports of battles, doing interviews. Then all this material was brought to the rear and we would use it on the radio. Our most powerful programme was broadcast on Radio Mozambique from Maputo (Edison Zvobgo cited in Frederikse, 1982:100).

Mosia et al (1994:12) note that: "*VOZ* relayed news bulletins on the struggle, war communiqués, speeches by nationalist leaders, and revolutionary songs" to mobilise people and articulate the goals of the liberation struggle. The clandestine radio broadcasts were a main source of news for ordinary people on what was happening on the war front. Their effectiveness in the eyes of the Rhodesian government is seen in the "periodic jamming of the nationalist shortwave frequencies, prohibition of all but FM receivers in

the rural areas, regulation of battery sales, and prohibition of listening to any station but RBC" (Ibid:16). The attempts by the RF to block clandestine radio were not however successful.

The most popular programme on *Voice of Zimbabwe* radio was "Chimurenga Request Programme" that was broadcast on radio every Tuesday and Saturday. On this programme, ZANU played 'Nziyo DzeChimurenga/Ingoma Zempi Yenkululeko (Revolutionary Songs)'. These songs addressed various aspects of the war. The radio broadcasts were important in mobilizing support for the war as stated by Edison Zvobgo: "We had the masses every night, crouching in the dark, listening to the Voice of Zimbabwe, refusing to listen to the RBC. The regime lost that one fairly and squarely" (Interview with Edison Zvobgo cited in Frederikse 1982:105). According to David Brooks, who served in the Rhodesian Special Air Services, 'Chimurenga Requests Programme' was "effective propaganda, because of the songs and emotion put into it" (Ibid). ZANU introduced another radio programme called 'Tiri Muvanhu/Sisebantwini' which was aired every Friday from 8.15 to 8.30 pm. This programme featured the views of Zimbabwean 'masses' and the nationalists, the issues and events that were taking place during the liberation struggle.

Alex Pongweni (1982), in *The Songs that Won the Liberation Struggle,* also shows the centrality of 'revolutionary' songs in the struggle against colonial rule in Rhodesia. Pongweni argues that *Chimurenga* music articulated "the pressing issues of the day more eloquently than any political speech or historical treatise" (Pongweni 1982: 63-4). The revolutionary songs were a call to arms urging Zimbabweans to defend the country against colonial incursion. The song lyrics touched on grievances such as land alienation, economic injustices, resources exploitation, labour exploitation, racism and other colonial injustices. The revolutionary songs promised a new Zimbabwe characterised by economic prosperity where Zimbabweans owned their land and mineral resources. Some of the songs touched on colonial brutalities against blacks. *Chimurenga* songs also urged resilience on the part of the guerrillas who had decided to take up arms "to free the country from white racists" (Interview with 'Cde Chinx', April 2013, Harare). I interviewed Dickson Chingaira, or 'Cde Chinx', who led the ZANLA (ZANU's) choir during the liberation struggle in the 1970s. He said that *Chimurenga* songs were meant

to instil the war spirit in people and urge them to rise against colonial rule. 'Cde Chinx' explained:

> The purpose of these songs was to convey our grievances and mobilize the masses. Some of the songs were actually lectures for the freedom fighters to explain to them the reasons why we were fighting, urging them to be resolute. I sang *Hondo yeMinda* (Struggle for land) in 1979; it was like I was prophesying about the Third *Chimurenga*. We are not prophets but we knew what our revolution meant. The songs were also meant to boost morale of the freedom fighters, to endure the challenges of the war such as diseases, lack of food, death, injuries at the hands of the enemy …these were the challenges that we endured during the war. So the racist white settlers did not take blacks as people. The songs meant a lot to us, they were a carrier of information, carrier of education to teach people about the war, carrier of political messages to gain people's trust about what we wanted to achieve, carrier of information to point out to the masses that these people [whites] were racists and that they were our enemies (Interview with 'Cde Chinx', April 2013, Harare).

The *Chimurenga* songs written and performed by nationalists were thus key mobilisation means during the liberation struggle. As we have seen, the media and cultural terrains in Rhodesia were key sites of struggle between the minority white settler regime and nationalists. Whilst nationalists produced songs to advance the war effort, the settler regime also produced its own songs, which legitimized the status quo, and tried to put in place mechanisms to proscribe the production and circulation of the African 'revolutionary' songs. It is therefore crucial to look beyond the traditional media and analyse these cultural productions because they play an important role in spreading messages that legitimate power or undermine it, as the Rhodesian situation exemplifies.

Music was also a core aspect of the *pungwes* (all-night gatherings), another form of 'media' and mobilisation strategy that was deployed by ZANLA forces to mobilise support during the liberation struggle. Turino (2000:204) notes that the *pungwes* were "one of the most important means for politicizing the masses and gaining peasant support". He further notes that "in addition to political speeches and education, the *pungwes* also centrally involved music and dance" (Ibid: 205). They were modelled on the *bira* (the traditional night time ceremonies) that are used to call the ancestral spirits by the Shona people in their indigenous religion. They taught villagers about the guerrillas, that is, "who we are, what we are going to do and why" (Lan, 1985: 127). The

pungwes allowed the guerrillas to have direct communication with the people and for them to explain the goals of the liberation struggle and what the future under a black majority government would look like. Edison Zvobgo, ZANU's deputy secretary for information and publicity during the liberation war, said:

> One of the methods we used very efficiently was the night meeting. We called it *pungwe*. *Pungwe*- in Shona it means something that keeps going all through the night. The Commissariat Department in Maputo would prepare lecture materials and they would bring these over to my Department of Publicity and Information. We would then print the lecture series into pamphlets and in our magazine, *Zimbabwe News*, and flood the country so that at every meeting at every village in a particular war zone they'd be doing Lecture One. We structured the lectures well: they were short, in the vernacular and to the point. So this intensive political campaign, this ideological campaign, helped make people understand what the war was about (Interview with Edison Zvobgo cited in Frederikse 1982:60).

Tom Hama, who served as a ZANLA political commissar during the Second *Chimurenga*, said:

> You see, these *pungwes* were intended to really politicize the masses. We used to take these lectures and teach them, explaining to the masses stage by stage during the night, whereas this could not be done during the day. With all the regime's soldiers around, if it was done during the day that could mean disaster. All the while, some of our comrades would be at observation points for security. Vigilance had to be maintained at all times, for we did not want to risk the lives of hundreds. We would let them go home before darkness had gone, to avoid interception by the enemy (Tom Hama interview cited in Frederikse 1982:60).

Frederikse's account of *pungwes* is largely based on interviews with ex-ZANLA guerrillas. In her account, she emphasizes the mobilisational effects of *pungwes* but not guerrilla violence against the 'sell-outs', that is those civilians who were accused of collaborating with the Rhodesian Forces or engaging in witchcraft and sorcery. In her critique of Frederikse's account, Kriger (1992:124) notes that: "She is clearly aware of problems arising from guerrilla coercion, to which several of her informants allude, but her main purpose appears to be to highlight security force brutality. Consequently, she fails to explicitly take into account what impact guerrilla coercion might have had on popular support". As Kriger shows, the *pungwes* were a major contributing factor to the strained relations between guerrillas and civilians, which affected guerrilla legitimacy among civilians in some areas. Kriger notes that: "Parents were often afraid to go to

moraris [*pungwes*] as they disliked watching 'sell-outs' killed or beaten and they feared that the singing might attract [Rhodesian] soldiers. Especially after military contacts, neither youth nor parents were interested in attending *moraris.* To get parents to attend often required guerrilla coercion" (Kriger 1992:155).The villagers whom Kriger interviewed said that although they enjoyed the singing, dancing and drumming at *pungwes*, they resented the beatings and arbitrary killings of civilians who were branded 'sell-outs'. The branding of 'sell-outs' was not based on any agreed criteria nor was the punishment that was meted out against those identified as such always considered legitimate. In *Guns and Rain,* David Lan (1985) notes that the category of 'sell-outs' did not only mean those who were suspected of 'selling-out' to the Rhodesian forces but also those accused of witchcraft and sorcery. The 'sell-outs' ranged from those who refused to co-operate with the freedom fighters, civilians accused of leaking information to Rhodesian security forces and those who held divergent political views as well as people accused for reasons of personal differences. Thus whilst *pungwes* were used for the politicisation of the rural 'masses', they were also a key tool in ZANU's coercive politics in the 1970s.

The attempt by the Rhodesian government to ban the media used by nationalists was futile as much of it was underground or in areas they did not control such as the semi-liberated areas or Mozambique. The alternative media of *Chimurenga* songs, clandestine radio broadcasts and nationalist publications was effective in mobilizing support and evading the Rhodesian authorities. They underline the importance of looking at 'non-traditional' media and performances. These forms of media and mobilization strategies, especially *Chimurenga* songs and *pungwes,* would be used once more during the "Third Chimurenga" in the early 2000s. In the section below, I look closely at the transition from colonial rule to independence and the shifts and continuities in media policy and state practices under the new ZANU (PF) government in the 1980s.

4.4 From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Change or Continuity in the Media?

When ZANU came to power in 1980, it inherited a "remarkably efficient and brutal state" (Herbst, 2000:17). The Rhodesian settler state was among the strongest in Africa. The new ZANU (PF) government preserved the coercive apparatus of the state that had been built by the Rhodesian predecessors. The new government spread its influence in

the public service where it appointed its cadres from the war to key positions, taking advantage of the departing whites. The Lancaster House Agreement between nationalists and Rhodesian settlers which was brokered by Britain in 1979 to end the war in Rhodesia imposed legal constraints which made it difficult for the new government to pursue radical policies especially in the land and agrarian sector. The Lancaster Agreement included the 'willing buyer, willing seller' provision which prohibited any radical land reforms in the first 10 years after independence. The agreement also prohibited change of the constitution for seven years after independence and twenty per cent of the seats in Parliament were reserved for whites. Herbst (1990:30) notes that:

> In 1980, ZANU (PF) did not gain control over a weak colonial state that had been hurriedly improved for Independence and on which they could quickly put their imprimatur (the typical scenario for countries that gained their independence in the 1960s). Nor did the guerrillas win an outright victory as Frelimo had done in Mozambique, where the old state collapsed creating a vacuum into which new government structures and practices could be placed. Instead, the Black government took over a bruised, but not defeated, settler state which contained powerful anachronistic elements that were hostile to the political project of the new regime.

Levitsky and Way (2010:240) note that "Zimbabwe's competitive authoritarian regime emerged" out of the Lancaster House Agreement. They add: "Zimbabwe thus entered the post-Cold War era with a competitive authoritarian regime" (Ibid.). This point is often overlooked in studies on the Zimbabwean media and state practices in the 1980s and 1990s. I argue that Zimbabwe was running "a competitive authoritarian" or "hybrid regime" from the beginning [from independence in 1980] which influenced the party's strategic approach including in the media. The retention by the new ZANU (PF) government of some the authoritarian laws and practices of its Rhodesian predecessors and introduction of elections in which all parties could participate in line with the importance placed on democracy for regime legitimation consolidated Zimbabwe's hybrid state.

In the media, whilst ZANU (PF) introduced new media policies in line with its goals to 'decolonise', 'nationalise' and 'democratise' the media, it retained some of the authoritarian media policies and institutions that it inherited from its Rhodesian predecessors. The retention by the new government of some colonial media policies and institutional arrangements and their fusion with new policies produced contradictory

media policies characterised by authoritarian and democratic impulses. This has been called "a double-edged [media] policy approach" (Chuma, 2007:84) that embodied the "dual legacy of democracy and authoritarianism" in the making of the state (Ronning and Kupe, 2000).

The media policies and institutions that ZANU (PF) inherited in 1980 had largely been designed to promote the interests of the RF, as we have seen. In the sphere of broadcasting, ZANU (PF) inherited the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation (RBC), which it renamed Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), but, still maintained the same philosophy that had guided broadcasting in Rhodesia. Zaffiro (1992:5) notes that: "ZANU (PF) broadcast policy remained, to a large extent, the maintenance of the status quo, albeit in new ideological clothes". The party appointed its cadres "who were in many cases former managers of revolutionary nationalist broadcasting from the days of the liberation war" (Zaffiro, 1986:130). Most African nationalist parties who had used radio during the liberation struggle, ZANU (PF) included, knew that it was an important tool for political and social mobilization. The importance of radio broadcasting often emanated from Zimbabwean nationalists' pervasive use of clandestine radio for 'mass' mobilization during the 1970s liberation struggle, as we saw in the previous section. Political control over broadcasting was achieved mainly through partisan staffing and directing content. In terms of appointments, ex-ZIPRA cadres from the *Voice of the Revolution* were side-lined whilst most of the positions at the state broadcaster were given to ZANLA cadres who had operated *Voice of Zimbabwe*. Mosia et al, (1994:19) note that: "In the end, ZBC content, management, and the uses it was put to by the Mugabe regime came to resemble those of its Rhodesian predecessor in certain basic respects. State control of radio and television was to serve the legitimization needs of the regime and its policies became the hallmark of the new ZBC, as the revolutionary infusion was diluted by the stresses and temptations of politics and corruption".

The ruling party's dominance in broadcasting was replicated in the print media where it took over the main newspaper chain, the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing (RPP) company, which it renamed Zimbabwe Newspapers (Zimpapers) Limited in 1980. Zimpapers, like its predecessor, RPP, remained the dominant player in the print media because of its robust network of regional papers: *The Manica Post* in Mutare, *The*

Chronicle and *Sunday News* in Bulawayo, and *The Herald* and *The Sunday Mail* based in Harare. In January 1981, the government bought 43.2 per cent of shares in the Argus press held by South African investors using a loan it had secured from the Nigerian government. The government also created the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) in 1981, to act as a buffer between the government and the press. The trust deed which established the ZMMT vested power in the Ministry of Information, including the power to amend the trust deed. Although ZMMT was in theory created to ensure an autonomous public press, the body faced a number of challenges. First, it was not able to operate independently as envisaged because ZANU (PF) through the Ministry of Information was responsible for the appointment of the body's chief executive officer and its board (Saunders, 1991). Secondly, the government through the Ministry of Information controlled the operations of the trust including its funding. Ronning and Kupe (2000:160) note that: "Very early in its existence, the Trust was to encounter problems on several fronts because of its internal financial and political weaknesses, which were linked to the growing presence of the Ministry of Information in the direct supervision of the public media and the Trust itself". They add that: "The effective subjugation of the ZMMT to the state and ruling party must be seen as perhaps the most important casualty of the ruling party's invasion of nominally autonomous public institutions" (Ibid). The setting up of the Mass Media Trust was motivated by the desire to insulate the media from political control but the body's dependence on the public purse and approval of its programmes by the Ministry of Information compromised its autonomy. The Trust thus did not have the final say over Zimpapers, which was ostensibly under its control. The government also controlled the Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News Agency (ZIANA), established in 1981.

The attempt by editors from Zimpapers to assert editorial independence through providing coverage to ZAPU and exposing corruption involving senior party and government officials was not well received by the authorities. Despite the ruling party's overtures, the public press demonstrated a commitment to professional journalism.
However, the editors and journalists from the state press who did so were pushed out or transferred to non-journalistic jobs. In 1983, Willie Musarurwa, a veteran journalist and editor of *The Sunday Mail* was sacked after he gave prominent coverage to the ZAPU party. In 1987, Henry Muradzikwa, who was the editor of the same paper, was

'promoted' to group projects manager after he published a story critical of the appalling conditions of Zimbabwean students who were studying in Cuba on government scholarships. In 1988, Geoffrey Nyarota, was 'promoted' to an administrative position at the head office in Harare. This was after *The Chronicle* broke the famous 'Willowgate' scandal which involved politicians' and state officials' illegal acquisition and resale of cars. The story of the Willowgate scandal led to the resignation of Cabinet ministers. Ronning and Kupe (2000:164) argue that:

> The first important contribution to the opening up of the Zimbabwean media after independence was the so-called "Willowgate" scandal in 1988. This exposure of corruption may serve as an exemplary tale of how professional journalism may contribute both to the democratic process and to an increased awareness of professional standards among journalists. First it is a case of how one courageous editor, Geoffrey Nyarota, and his colleagues, partly through having good contacts with, and legitimacy within, a number of circles with access to information on corrupt practices, managed through professional journalistic work to expose serious corruption high up in government. Secondly it is an indication of how dissatisfaction with such practices created an alliance between the press, honest civil servants, and the public, which may be seen as an example of how this in itself may serve as a safeguard against governmental malpractice. Furthermore the case is interesting because the newspaper of which Geoffrey Nyarota was then editor, the *Chronicle* in Bulawayo, belongs to the government-controlled part of the Zimbabwean press, and it is thus also a case that illustrates what limits exist to independent and professional journalism in a press that is part of an authoritarian political culture.

Public newspapers such as *The Chronicle* served as critical voices against corruption and abuse of public office because of a powerful commitment to 'professionalism' among some editors and journalists. The investigative journalism that was practiced by state-controlled papers such as *The Chronicle* was crucial to the democratic side of the hybrid system. However, the idea of an autonomous public press was at variance with the thinking of some ZANU (PF) officials who flirted with Marxist-Leninist and nationalist ideologies in the 1980s. The new Minister of Information and Tourism, Nathan Shamuyarira said that the role of his ministry was to promote a nationally 'responsible' and 'mass-oriented' media system that would work as a channel which government uses to communicate with the people and to receive their feedback. The role of journalists in this media system would be to act as "social activists" to rally the nation behind the party leadership and its 'development' programmes. In his address to journalists in July 1981,

Shamuyarira stated that: "Before any journalist picks up his or her pen to write he or she should be committed to the ideology of liberating the masses and exposing the machinations of imperialism. Commitment is absolutely necessary, if not mandatory, if one's pen is to play a positive role in society…Journalists and writers should be in the forefront of the continuing struggle for total liberation" (N. Shamuyarira cited in Saunders 1991:61). Shamuyarira's views testify to the fact that the media was seen by some key ZANU (PF) figures as a tool of the state to be centrally controlled and deployed for propaganda purposes disguised as "development journalism". The references by these ZANU (PF) figures to the "masses" and "national interests" echo those in the one-party states established after independence in Africa, as discussed earlier.

The fragile security situation in Zimbabwe soon after independence was used to justify ZANU (PF)'s partisan encroachments in the media. Alexander and McGregor (2006:261-2) note that: "The burgeoning insecurity and violence of the immediate post-independence period subsequently legitimated an expansion of state intervention in the media". There were genuine security concerns within government over the 'destabilisation' strategies of the South African apartheid regime inside Zimbabwe. Furthermore, there was fear within ZANU (PF) that the media, particularly the Argus press, which was connected to the apartheid system in South Africa, would be used by the apartheid regime to destabilise the country. However, there is new evidence which suggests that the Minister of State Security, Emmerson Mnangagwa co-operated with the same apartheid government on security matters (Scarnecchia, 2011). However, these dealings were not widely known at the time, including in elite circles.

In the early '80s, the state-controlled media was used as a propaganda tool by ZANU (PF) to vilify ZAPU during the *Gukurahundi* conflict. The conflict between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU became known as *Gukurahundi*, a Shona word which refers to the early rains that wash away the chaff at the beginning of the rain season. The chaff was a reference to ZAPU supporters. The state media was used to vilify ZAPU and trivialise the party's contribution to the liberation struggle. ZAPU leaders were framed as "dissidents" and "tribalists" and Joshua Nkomo, the ZAPU leader and liberation war icon, was branded "leader of dissidents" in the state media. On the state broadcaster, only ZANLA songs,

slogans and symbols were acknowledged whilst the war contributions of ZAPU and Joshua Nkomo, were marginalized and silenced (Kriger, 2003). In a programme that was aired on radio every Sunday morning called "Dzimbo dzeChimurenga Dzakasunungura Zimbabwe" (*Chimurenga* songs that liberated Zimbabwe) only ZANU songs were played, thereby reinforcing the impression that ZAPU's contribution to the liberation struggle was trivial. Even when ZAPU cadres protested about the state broadcaster's biased news coverage and exclusion of their voices at ZBC's Bulawayo studios, nothing changed (Zaffiro, 2002).

In their repression of ZAPU supporters and civilians in Matabeleland and Midlands regions during *Gukurahundi*, the state agents revived ZANLA war-time strategies such as *pungwes* (all-night gatherings) and ZANLA war songs. ZAPU supporters were forced to attend *pungwes* and sing ZANLA songs and chant slogans which were mostly in the Shona language, which they did not know. Richard Werbner (1996:198-9) notes that:

> In their revival of the *pungwe,* or rather their introduction of it to people who had not known it before, soldiers of the Fifth Brigade acted as if they were the true makers of Zimbabwe as a nation. They were the heroes about whom and for whom were sung the popular Shona songs of *Chimurenga,* as the liberation war is known in Shona. In accord with that, the people they came to discipline were compelled to re-enact the parts of choruses supporting the freedom fighters-they had to learn the Shona songs, although few spoke Shona, and they had to clap while singing them in rallies that lasted the whole day. For the sake of making the people submit to their discipline, which also entertained the soldiers as something of a sport to watch, they pitted women from the chorus against each other as if they were gladiators.

Unlike those held in the 1970s, *pungwes* during *Gukurahundi* were an "instrument of meting out arbitrary punishment to those who were perceived as enemies of the party and the state" (Sachikonye, 2011:16). Alexander et al (2002:221-2) note that: "The Fifth Brigade forced people to attend ZANU (PF) meetings, and held ZANLA-style *pungwes* at which people were made to sing ZANU (PF) songs and chant ZANU (PF) slogans in Shona, to denounce ZAPU, and to engage in a kind of forced revelry of dance and music". They add that these *pungwes* followed "a similar pattern of forced singing, dancing and sloganeering, often accompanied by grotesque forms of violence, as well as lesser humiliations – old men and women whose dancing did not appeal to soldiers, or who could not sing Shona songs, were forced to dance for hours as they were beaten or

were held up for ridicule and special punishment" (Ibid: 222). The *pungwes* were accompanied by the propagation of an exclusive nationalist discourse which criminalised ZAPU and legitimised violence against the party's supporters. We can see that ZANU (PF) deployed the state media alongside the 'alternative media' to de-legitimize ZAPU and trivialise the opposition party's contribution to the liberation struggle.

We can draw the following conclusions regarding the media and politics in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Firstly, the Zimbabwean media policy framework after independence was consistent with a 'hybrid media system' as it was characterised by the dual faces of democracy and authoritarianism. As we have seen, the new government introduced new policies in the media to 'decolonise' and democratise the media but also retained some of the media policies of its Rhodesian predecessors. This resulted in the "dual legacy of democracy and authoritarianism" in the media. The establishment of the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) by the government exemplifies the contradictions and inconsistencies that characterised this media system. When ZMMT was established in 1981, it was supposed to act as a buffer between the state and the press. Whilst the establishment of this body was consistent with an autonomous and professional media, ZANU (PF)'s control of this body through the Ministry of Information compromised its neutrality and effectiveness. Secondly, there was some semblance of professional and investigative journalism which would fit the liberal notion of a watchdog press that speaks truth to power and holds public officials accountable. Some of the editors from the state press were committed to professional and investigative journalism and exposing corruption in government and human rights abuses. However, these editors were often removed from their positions and appointed to non-journalistic jobs as some ZANU (PF) officials believed that the media should be under state and party control to promote the party's interests. Thirdly, the Zimbabwean media context post-independence shows the importance of the 'non-traditional' media in the political ambitions of the hybrid regime in consolidating power and de-legitimizing political opponents. As we have seen, ZANU (PF) revived its war-time media such as *pungwes* and *Chimurenga* songs to marginalise and discredit ZAPU. The *pungwes* were used during *Gukurahundi* to decimate ZAPU structures in the Midlands and Matabeleland regions. The appropriation of these forms of media further demonstrates that we need to go beyond the mainstream media and also look at the role of the 'non-traditional' media if we are to fully understand the role of the

media in regime legitimation or survival in particular hybrid contexts.

4.5 The Media and Politics in Zimbabwe in the 1990s

In 1990, the governing ZANU (PF) party was confronted by new challenges. The party was riven by serious divisions among party leaders. These divisions within ZANU (PF) were over the political direction of the country and the declining economy. Some party leaders were opposed to the idea of a legislated one-party state that President Robert Mugabe and other party officials supported. These leaders argued that a one-party state was tantamount to a betrayal of the party's promises of democracy to the Zimbabwean people during the liberation war. Although ZANU (PF) failed in its bid to establish a one- party state, the party still retained a firm grip over the levers of the state. To add to this control, the main opposition party, ZAPU, was no longer a threat as it had merged with ZANU (PF) as a result of the Unity Accord signed between leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe in 1987.

However, the threat to ZANU (PF)'s hold on power came from new sources. Edgar Tekere, the former Secretary-General of ZANU (PF) joined forces with other disgruntled party members to form their own political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), in 1990. Tekere was expelled from ZANU (PF) in 1989 over differences with Mugabe and other party leaders mainly over the idea of the one-party state. (Further details on the complex reasons for Tekere's expulsion from ZANU (PF) are discussed in Tekere's autobiography). Norma Kriger (2005) details the strategies that ZANU (PF) deployed to weaken and de-legitimise ZUM in the 1990 general elections. She notes that ZUM's alliance with the Conservative Alliance for Zimbabwe (CAZ), a descendant of Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party, in the 1990 elections gave ammunition to ZANU (PF) to claim that the party was a stooge of white racists who were 'anti-reconciliation'. In the ZANU (PF) manifesto, ZUM was branded "a hotch-potch of drunkards, embezzlers and lunatics", (Sylvester, (1990:116) citing ZANU (PF) election manifesto, 1990). ZANU (PF) also threatened to deny or withdraw patronage from civil servants who supported ZUM (Kriger, 2005). In the run up to the elections, Mugabe was quoted as saying: "If you are in the Mugabe government you must serve that government and implement its policies …. You cannot have the luxury of serving ZUM while you are in government. That we cannot allow" (Andrew Saxon, 1990:43, cited in Kriger, 2005:16). ZUM did not

have access to state resources such as the media and funding and this hampered the opposition party's campaign. Waldahl (2004:26) notes that: "ZUM largely failed to reach the voters. Without access to the media, with limited financial resources, and with no electoral machinery in the constituencies, the party remained an unknown quantity to most people".

The state media was used as a propaganda tool to de-legitimize ZUM, the same way it had been used against ZAPU in the 1980s. For instance, a ZANU (PF) advert that was beamed on *Zimbabwe Television* (ZTV) in the run up to the 1990 elections likened ZUM to HIV/AIDS, and sternly warned Zimbabweans against voting for the opposition party. Jonathan Moyo (1992:75) stated that: "One advertisement which was watched by many viewers in disbelief and astonishment, featured the screech of tyres and the crushing of glass and metal in a motor car accident, followed by a voice warning coldly: "This is one way to die. Another is to vote ZUM. Don't commit suicide, Vote ZANU (PF)". Moyo was an outspoken critic of ZANU (PF) in the 1990s before becoming its chief propagandist post-2000. In subsequent chapters, I examine closely the media policies that were introduced by Moyo when he served as the Minister of State for Information and Publicity from 2000 to 2005.

The government introduced some changes in the media mainly due to external pressure from donor agencies and the role of democracy promotion agencies that proliferated in the wake of the "third wave" process of democratisation in the 1990s. From the mid-1990s, the government indicated its plans to liberalise the airwaves. Dumisani Moyo (2004) attributes this to the pressure on government from the World Bank/IMF for economic and political reforms. In 1997, the then Minister of Information, Joice Mujuru, expressed government's commitment to liberalising the airwaves saying that "my ministry is now working to resolve the issues related to the coming in of other players into broadcasting" (*The Herald*, 20 February 1997, cited in Moyo 2004:20). During the same year, the government engaged a British consultant, Peter Ibbottson, to assess the commercialisation of ZBC in the wake of the planned liberalisation of broadcasting. The Ibbottson report made several recommendations including ending the ZBC monopoly over the airwaves (Ibid.). The recommendations of the Ibbottson inquiry were ignored. Instead of liberalising the airwaves as recommend, the state broadcaster allowed two

private players, Joy TV and Munhumutapa African Broadcasting Corporation (MABC), to buy air time from it and air its programmes without giving up its monopoly. The contracts with these private broadcasters were not clear. Moyo (2004:21) notes that: "The fact that these private broadcasters did not have full licences, and were dependent on the goodwill of the ZBC and those who controlled it was in itself a hindrance to their freedom of operation". In 1998, MABC was taken off air because of its programming, which included documentaries and interviews with people who were seen as anti-government.

ZANU (PF)'s rhetorical commitment to liberalise the airwaves was not followed by any concrete policy to change the status quo. However, it was strategic for the party to signal its intentions to liberalise the broadcast media in the wake of the liberalisation discourses that swept across the continent in the 1990s. There was increased pressure for economic and political reforms in Africa in the wake of the "third wave" process of democratisation during this period. One of the key demands was media pluralism. In Southern Africa, organisations such as the Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA) which had local chapters in all SADC countries, demanded media pluralism. In Zimbabwe, there was an increase in the number of vocal civil society organisations that demanded constitutional reforms including liberalisation of the airwaves. This pressure on ZANU (PF) required new modes of legitimation. Consistent with a hybrid regime, it was crucial for ZANU (PF) to signal an intention to liberalise the airwaves and express its commitment to ending ZBC monopoly to placate domestic audiences such as civil society, opposition parties and the independent press as well as international actors who were demanding media freedom and democratisation. These strategies are crucial for legitimation of hybrid regimes.

Whilst broadcasting remained firmly under state control, there were some major changes in the print media sector. In hybrid regimes, the independent press is allowed to flourish but the government always keeps tabs to check to ensure that the private press stays within acceptable boundaries. The circulation of independent newspapers such as *The Financial Gazette* and *The Daily Gazette*, published by Modus publications, and the weekly independent papers, *The Zimbabwe Independent* (1996), *The Standard* (1997) and *The Zimbabwe Mirror* (1997), alongside magazines such as *Moto*, *Parade* and

Horizon, was critical to the democratic side of Zimbabwe's 'hybrid media system' in the 1990s. The independent press played an important role in exposing corruption in government, economic mismanagement and the abuses of the *Gukurahundi* period. Ronning and Kupe (2000) write about 'the changing styles and content of the monthly magazines *Parade* and *Horizon*' under the editorship of Andy Moyse. These magazines developed a hard-hitting investigative political style of journalism which exposed government malfeasance.

These liberal changes in the media were in part allowed owing to the lack of a powerful opposition. However, one was soon to emerge which forced ZANU (PF) to change its tack more broadly and including in the media. Contrary to what was expected, the adoption of the World Bank/IMF prescribed Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) by the Zimbabwean government in 1991 had resulted in high interest rates and inflation, company closures and massive job cuts as well as a decline in overall living standards (Hammar and Raftopolous, 2003). The Structural Adjustment Programmes also eroded government gains in health and education (Mlambo, 1997). The workers, civil servants and students struck repeatedly against these challenges induced by the structural adjustment programme. In 1995, the workers led by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the umbrella national workers' body, organised mass protests against the deteriorating economic situation. The ZCTU forged an alliance with the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a broad coalition of Zimbabwean civil society groups that was formed in 1997 and extended its demands from economic issues to broader issues of public accountability. Alexander (2009:188) notes that: "The independent press was blossoming and grew increasingly outspoken and critical students protested time and again not least over corruption, intellectuals vocally expressed their disenchantment, and civic groups were formed to demand political rights, state accountability and constitutional rights". Although ZANU (PF) remained in charge it was left shaken by these protests.

The pressure on the ruling party also came from within its own ranks, mainly from the disgruntled veterans of the 1970s *Chimurenga* (liberation) war who demanded a stake and decried their marginalisation in the political and economic affairs of the country. Hammar and Raftopolous (2003:7) note that: "Aware of the veterans' political capital in

relation to their primacy in Zimbabwe's liberation history, and reluctant to face losing their support or the prospect of an even more violent challenge from them as threatened, he [President Mugabe] yielded to their demands. He awarded all war veterans a once-off cash payment and an on-going monthly pension, as well as a significant percentage of all newly-acquired land for resettlement". The payment of large sums of unbudgeted funds to the war veterans precipitated a decisive crash in the Zimbabwean dollar. This, coupled with President Mugabe's unilateral intervention in the DRC in 1998, to prop up Laurent Desire Kabila plunged the ailing economy into further turmoil triggering what has become known as 'the Zimbabwean Crisis' whose effects are still being felt today.

The embattled ZANU (PF) government increasingly resorted to authoritarian tactics to quell dissent as pressure mounted in the late 1990s. For instance, in 1999 journalists from *The Standard* newspaper, Mark Chavunduka and Ray Choto, were arrested after they published a story in which they claimed that there had been an attempted coup in the army and that 23 army officers had been arrested. Ronning and Kupe (2000:172) note that: "Some days after the publication of the story [on January 10, 1999], military police stormed the offices of the *Standard*, and subsequently arrested the editor - Mark Chavunduka - and the reporter Raymond Choto who had written the story. They were tortured during the nine days they were in military detention". The journalists were charged with behaviour intended to cause "alarm, despondency and public disorder" under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (LOMA), introduced in Rhodesia by the Ian Smith regime but kept on the statute books by ZANU (PF) when it took over in 1980. Another high profile case was the arrest of the editor of the *Zimbabwe Mirror*, Ibbo Mandaza, and journalist Grace Kwinjeh in 1999. Mandaza and Kwinjeh were accused of "publishing false information likely to cause alarm, fear and despondency" after the *Zimbabwe Mirror* had published a story about the dissatisfaction within the army regarding the DRC adventure.

These cases are instructive to our understanding of media control strategies in shifting hybrid contexts. First, we can see that whilst the government allowed the independent press to exist, it intervened in a more direct and overt way when it felt that the press was going beyond its limits. Secondly, whilst overt strategies of media control such as arrest and torture of journalists (by the military) is behaviour consistent with authoritarian

regimes, we can also see that 'hybrid regimes' can deploy these strategies particularly when the political stakes are high and the incumbents want to ensure complete control. As we will see in subsequent chapters, the arrest and torture of Chavunduka and Choto in 1999 was a harbinger of what was to come in terms of ZANU (PF)'s repression of the critical press in the early 2000s.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter looked at media policy and state practices in Rhodesia and the shifts and continuities in state practices under the ZANU (PF) government in the 1980s and 1990s. The focus on the media policies in Rhodesia was crucial in understanding the contestations over the media in an authoritarian system. The discussion of the media in Rhodesia was also important in tracing the origins of hybrid media policies and institutions in Zimbabwe. I also discussed the emergence of clandestine media and political mobilisation strategies such as *Chimurenga* songs and *pungwes* that were deployed by nationalists to counter Rhodesian propaganda and advance the goals of the liberation struggle. It was important to trace the historical origins of these forms of media and political mobilisation strategies because they constitute a key part of my argument regarding the importance of the 'non-traditional' media in ZANU (PF)'s survival and legitimation efforts post-2000.

Secondly, this chapter examined the Rhodesian inheritances and the shifts and continuities in media policies and state practices under the new ZANU (PF) government. I demonstrated that when it came to power in 1980, ZANU (PF) introduced new democratic media policies but still retained some of the authoritarian laws and institutions which were used by its Rhodesian predecessors to regulate the media. The retention of these laws and institutions alongside the new reforms that the government introduced in line with its goals to 'decolonise', 'democratise' and 'indigenise' the media resulted in a double-edged media policy approach. The need to balance different goals and agendas after independence resulted in media policy hybridity. The media policy incongruence was best exemplified in the establishment of the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust in 1981, to act as a buffer between the state and the media. Whilst the establishment of the Mass Media Trust was consistent with the 'professional model' of the media, some ZANU (PF) leaders with Marxist-Leninist ideological leanings preferred

centrally controlled media which defended the party interests. ZANU (PF) also took advantage of the fragile political situation in Zimbabwe after independence to justify its partisan encroachments in the media. The state media was deployed against ZAPU in a bid to trivialise the opposition party's contribution to the liberation struggle and repress the party's supporters during *Gukurahundi*. However, some editors and journalists from the state press showed commitment to investigative and professional journalism which exposed corruption and called for state accountability despite pressure from the politicians. A case in point was the Willowgate scandal uncovered by the state-owned newspaper, *The Chronicle,* which exposed massive corruption involving government ministers. However, this did not go down well with some senior party leaders resulting in the demotion of the editors or their re-assignment to non-journalistic jobs. These dynamics within ZANU (PF) showed the tensions and contradictions that characterise the media in hybrid contexts.

Thirdly, this chapter explored the media and the role of the state in Zimbabwe within the context of the neo-liberal discourses in the 1990s. We have seen that ZANU (PF) adopted new modes of legitimation in line with the neo-liberal discourses that accompanied the "third wave" process of democratisation in the post-Cold war period. In response to the demands for press freedom, ZANU (PF) allowed the circulation of a number of private newspapers which were key voices in exposing corruption and government malfeasance. The liberalisation of the press in the 1990s demonstrates the 'democratic' side of a hybrid media system. The ruling party allowed the critical press to flourish because this was crucial means for its legitimation. However, the private newspapers were weeklies and confined to the urban metropolis leaving the state-controlled newspapers under Zimpapers as well as ZBC radio and television with the widest reach including in the rural areas. From mid to the late 1990s, ZANU (PF) increasingly adopted authoritarian modes of rule to quell growing dissent. The private press was a casualty of the party's intolerant attitude. We can see that hybrid regimes tend to gravitate towards authoritarianism and compromise their commitment to democratic rule if they are under pressure from opponents. In the next chapter, I demonstrate how ZANU (PF) abruptly changed its tack and introduced radical measures in the media in response to political pressure and in line with the legitimation needs of the new "hybrid regime" the party built after 2000.

Chapter 5

Media Policies and State Practices in Zimbabwe during the "Third Chimurenga"

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the media policies and institutional changes that were introduced by the ZANU (PF) government from 2000 to 2005. I discuss how the party's media strategy during this period innovated within the realm of the law. I posit that the media policies and institutional changes that were introduced by the newly created Department of Information and Publicity headed by Professor Jonathan Moyo were in response to political pressure and the legitimation needs of the new version of a hybrid system that the party built post-2000. This chapter contributes to our understanding of how a hybrid regime that is under pressure 're-gears' its media strategies to sustain its rule. In the section below, I look briefly at the political context in Zimbabwe which necessitated these radical media changes before turning to a more detailed discussion of the specific media policies and practices that were introduced by ZANU (PF) to re-assert its hegemony and de-legitimise opponents in the early 2000s. I discuss the origins of ideas regarding the media policies, the divisions among party and state elites which gives insight into what I call "hybrid media systems" and the inherent tensions and contractions that underlie them.

5.2 The State, Politics and the "Third Chimurenga" in Zimbabwe: Context

There exists a vast corpus of literature on the dramatic shifts in state policies and practices in Zimbabwe starting from 2000. The ruling ZANU (PF) party was under pressure to 'renew' itself and re-assert its hegemony in the wake of a dying economy and a popular electoral challenge from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a new vibrant opposition party that had been launched in September 1999. There had been opposition parties in Zimbabwe prior to the formation of the MDC that had contributed significantly to the democratic struggle. However, the MDC had a broad social base in urban areas among workers, big business, civic organisations, students and intellectuals as well in the rural areas among white commercial farmers, farm workers and civil servants. The "formerly strong nationalist party with a broad political mandate derived from the liberation struggle, had to confront a growing loss of legitimacy and face the

possibility of electoral defeat in parliamentary (2000), presidential (2002) and local government (2002) elections" (Raftopolous, 2003:219-20).

Chiumbu and Moyo (2009:182) note that: "The arrival of the MDC [in September 1999], which was largely a creation of the NCA and Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), vastly altered the political landscape, as the new party began to make inroads into rural areas through trade union and NCA structures, in the process eroding ZANU (PF)'s traditional stronghold". The MDC together with the NCA, white farmers and farm workers campaigned vigorously for the rejection of the government-sponsored draft constitution in a national referendum held in February 2000. The rejected constitutional draft had a controversial provision, Clause 57, which would allow the government to compulsorily acquire land from large scale commercial farmers without paying for the land itself but only for improvements made on the land. The triumph of the 'No Vote' in the constitutional referendum meant that ZANU (PF) had to act decisively "to reclaim its lost political ground" (Hammar and Raftopolous, 2003:10). The party had to find ways of re-asserting its hegemony which had seriously been challenged. Hammar and Raftopolous (2003:30) note that: "losing the constitutional vote just months before the parliamentary elections in June 2000 represented a threat too overwhelming to ignore: a threat not only to its authority and its persistent one-party state project, but to its control over the very terms and mechanisms of governance that could revive it and its fortunes".

Following the announcement of the referendum results on the draft Constitution in February 2000, sporadic occupations of white-owned farms led by ruling ZANU (PF) party supporters, war veterans and youth militia were reported in Masvingo province before they spread across the country, marking the beginning of what became known as the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). Ideologically, the 'fast-track' policy was called the "Third Chimurenga", that is the third and final phase to accomplish the 'unfinished business' of the *Chimurenga*s, the wars against colonial rule during which land was a central grievance. It was strategic for the embattled ZANU (PF) party to return to the unresolved land issue to win back lost support and legitimise its rule (Alexander, 2009). The land issue was also a tangible patronage resource that the ruling party could distribute to its disillusioned constituencies such as the war veterans and rural voters (Ibid).

Several studies have demonstrated the importance of institutions, patronage and political ideas to ZANU (PF) rule post-2000 (Hammar and Raftopolous, 2003, Hammar, 2003, Alexander and McGregor, 2013, Alexander, 2009, Tendi, 2010). Hammar and Raftopolous (2003:31) have written about the "shifts in state practices and in various modes of rule". Alexander (2003) acknowledges the "unravelling" by ZANU (PF) of the state and the process whereby bureaucratic state institutions were deliberately weakened or side-lined through the party's system of patronage. McGregor (2002) wrote about "the politics of disruption" that was deployed by ZANU (PF) and its allies, the veterans of the 1970s liberation struggle against colonial rule, the youth militia and others leading to the conflation of the party and state at district and provincial levels. Hammar (2003) wrote about the attacks on bureaucratic institutions at local government level. The studies on 'patriotic history' have ably explained the circulation of immaculately framed political ideas which tapped into history to legitimise the party's claims to power and authority (Ranger, 2004, Alexander, 2009, Tendi, 2010). Historian, Terence Ranger (2004:215), notes that: "Over the past two or three years there has emerged in Zimbabwe a sustained attempt by the Mugabe regime to propagate what is called 'patriotic history'. 'Patriotic history' is intended to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition". It was propagated at many levels – the state-controlled media, youth militia camps, in schools and tertiary colleges and in speeches by Mugabe and his ministers (Ibid.). The work by Miles Tendi (2010) elaborates on the themes covered in 'patriotic history' in the state-controlled media.

In the media, the government introduced radical changes to entrench its control over the flow of information and silence the critical press. Although there had been threats and violence against journalists in the late 1990s as we saw in the previous chapter, there was a new intensity starting from 2000 in the state's repressive actions towards journalists and the independent press. The major target of the state's onslaught was *The Daily News*, a hard-hitting independent newspaper that had been founded in March 1999. Several studies have looked at the radical changes that were introduced by the ZANU (PF) government post-2000 (Melber, 2004, Chiumbu, 2004; Chiumbu and Moyo, 2009; Chuma and Moyo, 2010, Mano, 2009). Whilst these studies have adequately looked at the new media policies and institutional changes introduced by the government during

this period, they do not acknowledge that ZANU (PF) was running a hybrid regime. I argue that these media policies and institutional practices were in line with the hegemonic and legitimation ambitions of the new hybrid regime that ZANU (PF) built during this period. Whilst the party's repressive and propaganda strategies are adequately explained, the tensions and contradictions that characterised the media strategies are underexplored. Furthermore, the careful drafting of the media laws and subtle strategies of media control are neglected. I argue that ZANU (PF) was running a hybrid regime which influenced its strategic choices and reflected its concern for legitimacy including in the media. In the section below, I discuss the media policies and institutional practices of the newly created Department of Information and Publicity in the Office of the President and Cabinet from 2000. I reflect on the media policy and institutional changes and the divisions among party and state elites in their approaches to the media and handling of the critical press.

5.3 Media Policy 'Re-gearing' in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2005

From 2000, the newly created Department of Information and Publicity in the Office of the President and Cabinet, headed by Professor Jonathan Moyo, introduced new and radical measures to entrench control over the state media and muzzle the critical press. Chiumbu & Moyo (2009:191) note that: "The restructuring of the state media institutions needs to be understood in the context of the controversial [Fast-Track] land reform programme, the challenge from the new opposition, growing criticism from abroad and also the perceived threat to national sovereignty". The state media was reformed "to be effectively used as tools for legitimizing the land reform programme and effectively defending the government position on this controversial subject" (Ibid.). Various scholarly works have explained the partisan role of the state-controlled media in Zimbabwe during the "Third Chimurenga" to good effect. Furthermore, the works on 'patriotic history' have explained how ZANU (PF) legitimized its claims to power and authority with references to history and political ideas (Ranger, 2005, Alexander, 2009, Tendi, 2010). A prominent historian, Terence Ranger (2005) called this 'patriotic journalism' and showed how it was promoted in the state media and the various cultural productions sponsored by the Information and Publicity ministry. The work by Miles Tendi (2010) emphasizes how public intellectuals aligned to ZANU (PF) played a key role in their use of history in the media to legitimise the party's claims to power and

authority. However, these studies do not adequately explore ZANU (PF)'s ambitious media agenda, which included strategies outside the realm of law and the formal media such as ideological means and mechanisms of media control and the revival of war-time forms of media and historical narratives to legitimise the party's claims to power and authority. I argue that the ZANU (PF) strategies in the media were far too ambitious. Whilst the party formulated media laws which it used for repression, I argue that these media laws were also carefully drafted in line with the party's legitimation goals. I reflect on the concerns for legitimacy among some party and state elites. I argue that hybrid regimes have a special relationship with the media. As such, it is important to interrogate how media policies and institutions are carefully designed to balance the hegemonic and legitimation pretensions of hybrid regimes. This chapter also sheds light into the means and mechanisms of media control in a hybrid regime and the contradictions which make hybrid media systems highly adaptable.

The appointment of Professor Jonathan Moyo as Minister of State for Information and Publicity in 2000 came as a surprise to many given his history of criticising ZANU (PF) and recent arrival in the party. Moyo joined government in 1999 when he was included in the 300-member Constitutional Commission (CC) to spearhead the writing of a new Zimbabwean constitution. He played a prominent role in the commission as head of its media and publicity unit. As a reward for the role that he had played in the commission and subsequently as the ZANU (PF) campaign manager in the controversial parliamentary elections held in June 2000, Moyo was appointed to the position of Minister of State for Information and Publicity in the Office of the President and Cabinet. Prior to joining government, Moyo was a highly regarded academic who was well-known for his incisive political analysis and criticism of ZANU (PF) during his days at the University of Zimbabwe where he worked as a professor of political science. Melber (2004:9) notes that: "While a lecturer at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies of the University of Zimbabwe, he frequently presented thought-provoking and painful analyses offering remarkable insights with regard to the values of the liberation war (*chimurenga*) perpetuated in all their dubious ambiguity". Moyo's appointment as Information minister was strategic. President Mugabe had calculated Moyo's utility in the party's new media strategy. Chiumbu and Moyo (2009:193) note that:

> The power that once rested with the Ministry of Information was now located in the President's office. Jonathan Moyo became a powerful figure, not only in the President's office, but also within the ruling party. His personal attributes of a highly articulate and accomplished rhetorician supported by formidable academic training put him in such a position of power that he successfully pushed through some of the media law and policy reforms that came about after 2000. Under him, the Department of Information became an efficient rapid reaction force, fighting international criticism [of ZANU (PF) and its leader Robert Mugabe] abroad and, at the same time, churning out propaganda to pacify growing disenchantment over shortages of essential commodities such as fuel, electricity and money.

Jonathan Moyo became a prominent figure in Zimbabwe's politics owing to his ambitious media strategies. His oratory skills distinguished him from his predecessors in the Ministry of Information and his peers in government. Moyo's appointment saw the emergence of a new brand of 'patriotic journalism' that was practiced in the state media. But Moyo was also resented by a significant constituency within ZANU (PF) and government due to his recent arrival and history of criticizing the party. In an article titled, "Jonathan Moyo's many lives" in the *Weekend Post* (17-23/07/15), journalist Tendai Kamhungira stated that Moyo's "history is mired in controversy":

> Having started off as a serious Mugabe critic, during his days as a University of Zimbabwe lecturer [in the 1990s], Moyo has been in and out of the Mugabe-led government. He later found a place in government and served as an Information minister between 2000 and 2005. Moyo's stance had changed, from being a fierce Mugabe critic to his greatest defender. The transition got the professor several names, with others claiming he was an opportunist. Very few manage to understand Moyo, considering these political stances that he has exhibited over the years.

Moyo designed a complex, sophisticated and multi-purpose media strategy which sought to balance the hegemonic and legitimation goals of the new hybrid regime that ZANU (PF) built post-2000. The government's repression of the private media under Moyo was new in its intensity and strategies. The other indicator of the party's media strategy during this period was its interference in the editorial content and politically-motivated appointments of editors and journalists in the state media (Chiumbu and Moyo, 2009; Mano, 2009). These appointees demonstrated loyalty to ZANU (PF) and towed the party line. However, this study shows that the journalists also retained an ambiguous commitment to professionalism as we shall see in the next chapter.

Some of the controversial laws that originated from the Ministry of Information and Publicity included: the Broadcasting Regulations produced under the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act in 2000, the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) in 2001 and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) in 2002. While these laws have been portrayed as crudely repressive and undemocratic, in fact they were carefully drafted for legitimation purposes.

Besides Moyo, another key figure who played a prominent role in the formulation and implementation of the ZANU (PF) media strategy was George Charamba, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity and Presidential Spokesperson or Press Secretary. Moyo and Charamba were the key architects of the ZANU (PF) media strategies in the early 2000s. I talked to both Moyo and Charamba about their agendas or interventions in the media. This study is one of a few that carry the voices of these key officials and not based on secondary literature. The views of these key figures provide useful insights into the origins of ideas regarding the ZANU (PF) media strategies post-2000. The views of key political players such as Cabinet Ministers, Deputies and Permanent Secretaries and senior party officials adds to understandings of how the ZANU (PF) media system functioned, the nature of debate within the party and state and the tensions and contradictions that characterised the regime's media system post-2000. As explained in Chapter Three, the views of elites in highly politicised and contested policy domains should be carefully treated. In these contexts, elites tend to be guided by their personal, professional and political interests which affect how they respond to interview questions. The elites in politicised and contested contexts tend to be self-censoring and find "politically correct" ways to respond to interview questions (Lancaster, 2016).

Whilst the media laws and the regime's heavy-handed strategies against the private press have been extensively covered in the existing literature, there are still gaps with regards to the origins of ideas and the care in drafting these media laws in line with ZANU (PF)'s hybrid politics post-2000 is missing. Whilst the laws were crafted to control the flow of information and muzzle the critical press, they were also a crucial means for ZANU (PF) legitimation. The media laws were crafted after the recommendations of a Media Ethics

Committee whose task was to assess the media situation and advise government on the required media reforms. The recommendations of this committee were never made public. However, following the committee's submissions, the Ministry of Information and Publicity enacted a battery of laws to control the flow of information and muzzle the critical press. The care in drafting these media laws is underexplored in existing studies. Media laws and institutions in hybrid regimes are carefully designed to create the illusion of 'legality' and mask authoritarian domination.

In 'compliance' with a Supreme Court judgement that had declared state monopoly over airwaves unconstitutional, the government introduced new broadcasting regulations under the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act in 2000. These broadcasting regulations had a lifespan of six months after which they were supposed to be replaced by substantive broadcasting legislation. The government enacted the Broadcasting Services Act to replace the broadcast regulations in 2001. Instead of liberalising the airwaves, the Broadcasting Services Act sought to entrench ZBC monopoly and make the arena of broadcasting impenetrable for private players. The Permanent Secretary, George Charamba explained the government strategy thus:

> This was the time [early 2000s] of intense challenge to the government and to Zimbabwean sovereignty. We had to make sure that we had absolute control over the airwaves. Through the new broadcasting regulation, we had to re-assert our mastery, re-assert our hegemony. That hegemony had been challenged by a white-dominated Supreme Court bench in 2000 [which had declared state monopoly over airwaves unconstitutional] which knew, by the way, that the white community was going to be in for a big fight in a bid to keep their land and needed all the instruments [including the media] to defend it. So we had to re-assert our hegemony and we crafted broadcasting regulations which then became the law in such a way that we gave away the airwaves without losing a single frequency. That was the intention. It was to give you an illusion of a liberalised media, broadcasting media environment without yielding an inch. So what did we do? We created an authority [the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe] whose express purpose was to deregulate the airwaves but we made sure that we put in place conditions for eligibility for broadcasting licenses which were not possible to meet for any new private players (Interview with Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

The new broadcasting regulations had a provision for public hearings to be conducted for potential broadcasters. This provision was designed to create the impression that the application process for new broadcasting licenses was professional and non-partisan

when in actual fact it was biased. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity, George Charamba explained that the process was only cosmetic as the real intention was to retain the status of state monopoly. He explained: "Notice between 2002 and 2008, no licenses were issued and the status quo prevailed. But there were hearings, you see the difference? There were hearings [for processing of licenses]. The process allowed the state to say hey we want to give licenses but you guys are failing to qualify, it can't be my problem. BSA did exactly what it was intended to do, namely to freeze, to create a monopoly without the law and we achieved that" (Interview with Charamba, March 2013).

We can see that the repressive media policies by the Zimbabwean government were implemented with the appearance of a liberal regime. The real intention of the Broadcasting Services Act was to maintain state monopoly over the airwaves. The architects of the government media strategy made the calculation that this was to be achieved through a carefully drafted piece of legislation which served to create the impression of a liberalised broadcast environment when the government's real intention was to maintain the status quo. The new broadcasting regulations provided a 'legal' mechanism for those individuals interested in broadcasting to submit their applications and convening of public hearings for those interested in broadcasting. These mechanisms sought to create the impression of the existence of an open, transparent, professional and non-partisan process for the consideration of new broadcast players, which was not the case. These considerations were crucial to ZANU (PF)'s legitimation needs in the early 2000s.

The state and party officials justified the repressive media laws in terms of what they called the 'national' interest. Jonathan Moyo, the then Minister of Information and Publicity said that the media laws were a necessary tool to protect the 'national' interest which was under attack from the West. Moyo justified the media regulations thus:

> One day in 2002, I travelled and failed to come back over the weekend and got back on Monday night and woke up on Tuesday to go to the traditional Cabinet meeting without having gone through my office. And before the meeting started, the President, as he usually does, greets the ministers and so forth and because I had been away, he greets me and says 'What are you going to do about [Walter] Karnsteiner [the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs]?' I didn't know what he was

> talking about. He looked very surprised, if not disappointed. So the Cabinet meeting started and I quickly sent a message to my PA [Personal Assistant] to check for me what this Karnsteiner was about and referred to the Parliament Secretary to bring me some information because the President has raised an issue he seemed very interested in, only to be disappointed that I didn't know anything about it. So they brought it and I found out that Karnsteiner had been widely quoted saying that the American government was going to work with NGOs and the private media in Zimbabwe to effect regime change and that they were going to also try and persuade foreign governments. So that was the position, Karnsteiner was speaking before a Congressional Committee which was holding hearings about the US foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. He was telling the legislators that they had developed a policy to work with the media, private media and NGOs to effect regime change. So apparently the President was asking me: "Did you see it and what are you going to do about it?" Well if you have a foreign country like America announcing to everybody that they have come up with a programme to work with the private media and NGOs to effect regime change outside the democratic process which is electoral but political and partisan then you have a ball game. So I decided that in terms of a modern state which has a functioning constitution, the only acceptable, defensible, plausible and sustainable response to that must be a legal one (Interview with Jonathan Moyo, April 2013, Harare).

The real intention of the media laws was to silence the critical press and control the flow of information. However, Moyo and Charamba are invoking the question of sovereignty in line with 'patriotic history' and to justify the repressive policies and institutional arrangements that they put in place to regulate the media industry in Zimbabwe post-2000. This is not surprising considering the prominent role that these key figures played in crafting and implementing the repressive media laws. The views expressed by Moyo and Charamba regarding the media laws and strategies should not be taken straightforwardly as fact but assertions, claims and justifications. We need to acknowledge these officials' penchant for self-serving revisionism because they are so keenly aware of their place in history which informs the way they respond to interview questions. By invoking the question of sovereignty to justify the repressive media laws, the state and party officials are trying to be 'politically' correct and align their views with the ZANU (PF) ideology.

Some state officials claimed that their interventions in the media were necessary to address the lapse in journalistic professionalism. The former chairperson of the Media

and Information Commission (MIC), Tafataona Mahoso, justified the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy (AIPPA) thus:

> Journalists don't want to discipline each other unlike lawyers, unlike engineers, unlike doctors and that's where they fail to build their profession. Government has never been opposed to media self-regulation nor is media self-regulation incompatible with statutory regulation. So the journalists are not honest when they talk about wanting to self-regulate because it can't be meaningful regulation if the profession is unwilling to impose penalties on journalists. The lawyers regulate themselves; they have the Legal Practitioners Act which is administered by the Minister of Justice but he rarely has to intervene because those guys are willing to punish each other when there are gross violations of the rules. Journalists are not willing to do that hence the doubts about self-regulation (Interview with Tafataona Mahoso, April 2013, Harare).

To justify his claims, Mahoso cites the examples of countries where the media had been used as part of the strategy to dislodge governments. It was strategic for the state and party officials to invoke the sovereignty question. The reference to sovereignty and 'national' interests was designed to placate domestic constituencies and justify the ruling party's repression of critical media. These strategies worked to legitimise the media regulations developed by ZANU (PF) in the early 2000s. Mahoso justified the repressive media laws thus:

> It is absolutely essential that within our society, journalism as a profession is distinct from anyone else who is using information for purposes other than journalism and the only way that you can do that is by licensing. As I speak now, the editor is a threatened species in Zimbabwe. There are quite a number of NGOs now who are operating media houses illegally. There is no editorial control, no chief news reporter, nothing, and the only way you can try to protect the journalists is by licensing them and then arresting those who are masquerading as journalists or who are destroying journalism. The other way of looking at it is to look at the destabilisation of Venezuela, Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Libya; in all those cases, we always find out 6 months or a year later that the whole thing began with a media project. So how is a small government [such as ours] supposed to distinguish between people who are part of the American, British, EU information operations and people who are genuinely practising journalism? (Interview with Tafataona Mahoso, April 2013, Harare).

The admission by the UK and US governments that they were working closely with civil society, the private media and the opposition in Zimbabwe to promote democracy played into ZANU (PF) claims that these Western powers were supporting clandestine operations in the country.

The Zimbabwean media policies during the period under study were carefully drafted to create the impression of a regime whose legal architecture was based on internationally accepted legal norms and standards. The Permanent Secretary in the Information ministry, George Charamba said that government 'plagiarised' media laws that existed in Western jurisdictions "avoid a further fall-out with the West". We can see that the government was genuinely worried about government relations with the West regarding its media policies and practices. The laws were therefore important in achieving international acceptance and to pre-empt Western criticism of the regime's media laws and practices. Charamba clarified the government's strategy thus:

> I will tell you how we went about formulating AIPPA. This was at a time when the discourse on [good] governance was at its highest point and the media was a key test of the permissiveness of the government's system. We sat down and said for both the Broadcasting Services Act and AIPPA we must be very circumspect. We are already in this nasty fall-out with the West; we don't want to worsen things for the government, how do we do it? And we agreed that we were going to do extensive research on media-related pieces of legislation in existence in Western jurisdictions and I can tell you the names of the countries whose pieces of legislation were made use of; it was America, it was Australia, it was Ireland, it was Canada especially Canada, it was Sweden, it was Denmark and it was Britain. Basically what we wanted was to make sure we build a law that extracted from pieces of legislation from the Western world to pre-empt any attacks on AIPPA because they would not attack their laws and you notice the British, the Australians, the Americans, the Danes, the Swedes, the Irish never spoke against AIPPA, instead they sponsored a movement here that derided AIPPA because every clause was a case of their own statutory environments. Especially the Australians, they would not touch BSA or AIPPA because we stand heavily indebted to them; so it was the Zimbabwean strategy. If you want the most un-original piece of legislation, it is AIPPA, it is BSA. If there is something called plagiarism, we are very guilty of it but we had a very tactical reason for doing so. We wanted to make sure we crafted a law that would not be attacked by the West. What we didn't want was for Europe to gang up against us or to use that as further evidence of the absence of poor human rights and the rule of law standards in Zimbabwe. Then we pushed it [the Bill] through Parliament which was then another thing; Parliament was made up of different political parties, then that gave legitimacy to that Act (Interview with George Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

I quote Charamba extensively here to show that the government was also concerned about legitimacy, not just control hence the need for care in drafting the media laws. The government borrowed media policies and institutional arrangements existing in some

Western jurisdictions to achieve international acceptance and create the impression of a regime whose conduct in the media was based on internationally recognized legal norms and standards. This was a crucial legitimation means for the government. As revealed by Charamba, the media laws were debated in parliament before they were adopted. The involvement of opposition parliamentarians in debating these media laws was meant to create the impression that the media laws were the result of wide consultation and consensus among the major political players and therefore legitimate.

Whilst the Ministry of Information and Publicity introduced new media laws which borrowed from those that existed in Western jurisdictions, it at the same time manipulated these policies and institutions to preserve its partisan interests. In hybrid regimes, democratic laws and institutions exist but these are manipulated systematically to achieve undemocratic objectives. As we have seen, the broadcasting laws in Zimbabwe were explicitly meant to create the illusion of liberalized airwaves but the government introduced conditions for eligibility for broadcasting licenses which were difficult to meet for interested players. Media scholar, Dumisani Moyo (2004) argues that the broadcasting regulations restricted investment in the sector through creating unrealistic licensing conditions, prohibition of foreign funding, restriction of licensees from possessing both a broadcasting license and a signal carrier and the requirement that all licensees should make available one hour per week to the government.

The ZANU (PF) strategies did not always succeed abroad or locally, or even within the party. There were divisions among ZANU (PF) and state elites in the formulation of the media laws and repression of the critical press. These divisions are underexplored in existing studies and yet they may provide a window through we can better understand some of the tensions and contractions that characterised the party's hybrid media system. The divisions were more pronounced in the crafting of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) in 2002. Some ZANU (PF) officials such as Edison Zvobgo were opposed to AIPPA and questioned government intentions. The Zvobgo-led Parliamentary Legal Committee (PLC), opposed the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Bill on the grounds that it violated constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms. When the Bill was presented to Parliament for debate, Zvobgo described it as "the most calculated and determined assault on our (constitutional)

liberties, in the 20 years I served as Cabinet Minister" (*Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates*, 28 (46), Republic of Zimbabwe, 29th January, 2002, Government Printer, Harare). The parliamentary committee argued:

> Why does the Minister [of Information] or any Minister seek such overwhelming power from this parliament? He would have a Commission, if the Bill passed, which could be empowered to take legal or other lawful action. All news agencies would live *in terrorem* of the Minister if this provision passes because the penalties he can impose are devastating. Should the Minister of Commerce and International Trade, or Finance be given the same powers in relation to their portfolios? They would all go around 'with certificates' in their briefcases looking for businesses to shut down 'if the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe' that such businesses are operating in contravention of some Act. These provisions are arbitrary, dictatorial and unconstitutional (Ibid.).

The Zvobgo-led committee proposed amendments to the Bill which Minister Moyo said were "disappointing" and "regrettable" ('Information Bill: Committee Requests more time' *The Herald*, 24 January 2002). It could be that Zvobgo was trying to settle personal scores with Mugabe and other ZANU (PF) leaders. Zvobgo had fallen out of favour with Mugabe despite having earlier been a close ally of the president. Zvobgo had been Mugabe's legal adviser at Lancaster House negotiations. He had crafted the "executive presidency" amendment to the constitution in 1987 which was designed to pave way for the establishment of the one-party state though critics said that he was creating powers that he hoped to enjoy once Mugabe retired. He had shown his ambition to succeed Mugabe and because of that he was perpetually side-lined. In 1992, he was given the less influential position of Minister without Portfolio before he was dropped from Cabinet in 2000. He refused to endorse Mugabe in the 2002 presidential elections. In 2003, he became the subject of a ZANU (PF) disciplinary inquiry "for his refusal to campaign for Mugabe and his attack on the media laws as a weapon to stifle opposition" (Andrew Meldrum, "Edison Zvobgo: Controversial Zimbabwean politician side-lined for his ambitions to succeed Robert Mugabe", *The Guardian*, 24 August, 2004). The divisions in ZANU (PF) regarding the media laws and their purpose shed light into some of the tensions and contradictions that characterise hybrid media systems.

The divisions among ZANU (PF) elites were also over how to handle the critical press. Whilst Moyo justified the heavy-handed means of media control as we have seen, the

Permanent Secretary, George Charamba claimed that he was opposed to these heavy-handed means. Charamba argued that this was not how "a modern state dealt with an errant press" (Interview, March 2013). He said that he preferred "professional" or "smart" ways of handling the private press such as building a powerful public press through improving its content to render the critical press ineffective. Charamba elaborated this strategy thus:

> We had the *Herald*, we had the *Sunday Mail*, we had *Chronicle;* in fact the state had the largest control of the media. I trace repression of the press to a very primitive strategy by the state which therefore uses the weapon of last resort as the weapon of first instance. It is far more effective to control the private press by a strong *Herald* and *Sunday Mail* [public press]. This is important because it makes money for Zimpapers [public press], it pushes my propaganda and it builds an audience. That's a more sustainable way of doing it rather than jailing journalists. This is why we told the editors that we need a strong paper that will be able to attract advertisers and readers. It doesn't make sense to push propaganda through a media outlet long deserted by readers. (Interview with George Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

The state used the new media laws to silence the critical press. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information, George Charamba claimed that he did not agree with the heavy-handed means that were deployed by the state to silence the critical press. He explained:

> There were scenes of arrests of journalists [from the critical press]; I will tell you my gut feeling about that. If there is one matter, where I disagreed with my colleagues [in the Department of Information and Publicity in the President's Office], where I disagreed with the state and vocally so, it was the imprisonment of journalists. You talk to Augustine Chihuri [the Police Commissioner], he will tell you that is my view, which I also expressed to him. You ask Jonathan [Moyo] he will tell you that I had reservations. Picture this, you have a President armed with a Spokesperson who is also the Permanent Secretary for Information superintending over a media industry where the most educated editor has a single degree acquired through correspondence; you have a President with 7 degrees and God knows how many honorary ones; you have a Cabinet with PhDs and 2-3 Masters degrees - such a literate edifice choosing the gaol as a way of handling an errant media. That is wrong, that is wrong and I will say it loudly. If the state has money to build a machinery to defend itself against a hostile media, why does it use the prison? Why does it use a policeman? So I am saying it in black and white and very boldly, that there is a phase where we were needlessly high-handed, we could have won that argument through persuasion, we had instruments to counter the bad press (Interview with George Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

But the views expressed by Charamba regarding the state's heavy-handed means of control should not be taken at face value. He claims that he did not agree to the incarceration of journalists but he has on several occasions threatened journalists from the private press who criticising government. As I have alluded to already, elites in highly politicised and contested policy domains are difficult to handle. They calculate their personal, political and professional interests and think of "politically correct" ways of responding to interview questions. Some of the elites whom I interviewed such as Moyo, Charamba and Mahoso are highly trained people who are well versed with how not to answer interview questions. Such respondents are difficult to handle and what they tell us should not be taken at face-value. Harvey (2011: 438) notes that: "many political and business executives receive extensive media training about how to avoid answering questions".

Kari Lancaster (2016) notes that elites in highly politicised and contested policy domains sometimes do not provide full disclosure of information because they fear that they could potentially expose themselves to retaliation from others in the policy sphere, embarrassment, potential job losses or compromise professional or organisational integrity and damage relationships. She further notes that elites in these contexts engage in a kind of self-censoring and are careful with their expression as they find politically correct way of responding to questions. We therefore need to understand the responses, claims and justifications by Jonathan Moyo, George Charamba and other key figures whom I interviewed in this light. It is also important to note that when they are still serving or holding public office, elites are evasive and they at times do not provide fuller details about their role in certain policy decisions for personal or professional reasons stated above.

As I have shown, Jonathan Moyo (Information minister) and George Charamba (Permanent Secretary) are the two prominent figures who spearheaded the ZANU (PF) media agenda during the period under study. In addition to his role as Permanent Secretary, Charamba doubled as President Mugabe's Spokesperson. There were personal differences between Moyo and Charamba which led to their public fallout from 2004 onwards. I was aware of these personal differences and how they could have influenced

the way they responded to interview questions about the role that they played in the formulation and implementation of the media policies. Moyo revealed that he clashed several times with Charamba when they worked together in the Information ministry from 2000 to 2004.

5.4 State Repression and Critical Journalism in Zimbabwe post-2000

The new media laws that were enacted by the ZANU (PF) government such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) were applied selectively to silence the critical press. The major victim of the government's heavy-handedness was the vocal oppositional private newspaper, *The Daily News*, which was produced by the Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ). The paper had adopted a hard-hitting investigative style of journalism. With its masthead "Telling it like it Is", the newspaper exposed human rights abuses and corruption in government. The paper posed a serious threat to the status quo and gave opposition parties a platform to air their views. The government not only used this law to silence the paper, it also adopted extra-legal means to limit the paper's influence. Moyo explained at length with regard to *The Daily News*:

> When we came up with AIPPA, we were subjected to a lot of falsehoods by the so-called independent media, outright falsehoods – "A woman has been beheaded [by ZANU (PF)] in front of her 5 kids" was a major outright falsehood in *The Daily News* and we discovered that these people didn't believe that if we were to just go at the level of truth, rationality and persuasion they would win. So they had to introduce falsehoods and this is why falsehood was a major aspect of AIPPA and in the first instance we dealt with falsehoods by going to court. If somebody lies in a manner that was criminally defamatory or libellous, we would seek recourse in the court. Then we dealt with it in the law, requiring registration of the media and as you know all the media outlets registered except *The Daily News* which after taking a decision that it was going to register, it decided not to do so and it took that decision not to register in December 2002 and the law said registration will be effective in January 2003 and came January, 1, 2003 everybody had been registered except *The Daily News*. We didn't go and muzzle or shut them down. We just ignored them and at the end of January they took us to court. They were surprised by the fact that we had done nothing. We decided to let the law take its course. So I think it's sad to say our attitude was that we did not want the independent media to exist. It is the falsehoods that annoyed us and if I were to be the Minister of Information today and I find these falsehoods I would pounce on them with the same, if not more and better vigour because now I'm even wiser (Interview with Jonathan Moyo, April 2013, Harare).

The journalists from *The Daily News* were arrested for peddling "falsehoods" and causing "alarm and despondency". The paper was shut down in 2003, after Moyo had warned it over its criticism of government. Bright Matonga, who served as Moyo's deputy, justified the heavy-handed strategies deployed to silence *The Daily News*, thus:

> It [*The Daily News*] was very poisonous; it was anti-land reform, it was anti-Zimbabwean, it was totally against everything that we wanted to achieve as government so we used all the power that we had to shut it down, including the courts. They went to court and they lost. They appealed and by the time the appeal was heard things had changed. We didn't think that we wanted that kind of voice in Zimbabwe (Interview with Bright Matonga, April 2013, Harare).

Ruhanya (2016) notes that *The Daily News* was targeted by the state because of its "investigative'', "oppositional" and "activist" brand of journalism. He argues that: "Through its alternative journalism, the paper provided oppressed voices and ordinary people a platform from which to articulate their issues and challenge abuse of power. *The Daily News* positioned itself as the alternative thought leader, organiser and mobiliser against state forces, with the intention of rejuvenating the emerging democracy. Unprecedented, though, was its sustained alternative journalism approach, which relied not only on experts as sources in its news coverage, but on systematically and deliberately focusing on, and telling the stories of, the ordinary victims of political repression" (Ruhanya, 2016:131). The paper's printing press was bombed by 'unknown' assailants in 2003.

The case of *The Daily News* shows that the independent press in hybrid regimes is tolerated as long as it stays within what the authorities consider to be acceptable limits. We can also see that whilst the independent press may be allowed to operate and challenge government in a hybrid system, the authorities are quick to dispense of any pretence to democracy, the rule of law and tolerance when the independent press becomes a threat.

The tight regulation of the public sphere and control of the major media outlets by the state also led to the emergence of "alternative communicative spaces" which the opposition and civil society used to counter ZANU (PF) propaganda. Hammar and Raftopolous (2003:29) note that "despite the regime's best efforts to suffocate alternative

knowledges and discourses, contested histories and versions of the nation [were] consistently being produced". State repression of the independent press and control of the nominally public-owned media "generated an array of alternative media and alternative public spheres- Internet, ICTs- especially the Internet and radio stations hosted in foreign countries for remedies, while some communities [were] riveted to indigenous communication systems especially the word of mouth, oral literature, theatre, festivals, and metaphysical forms in their endeavour to air their views – not without risks, though" (Ndlela, 2010:91). These platforms were crucial discursive sites to challenge the state and circulate alternative views on the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. Willems (2011:55) notes that:

> In a context in which Zimbabweans had restricted access to alternative views of the crisis due to the high costs and lack of availability of print media and alternative broadcasters, they began to express themselves through a range of popular and informal media. New technologies such as Internet and mobile phones played an important role in enabling the spread of dissenting voices. A rising number of websites began to challenge official views of the crisis, often set up by exiled Zimbabwean journalists in the growing 'diaspora'. As a result of the spiralling economic and political crisis, many Zimbabweans decided to leave the country in search of greener pastures in the United Kingdom, the United States and South Africa. New websites such as *NewZimbabwe*, *ZWNews*, *ZimDaily* and *ZimOnline* carried their own news stories and opinion articles on the crisis, or brought existing news stories about Zimbabwe from different news sources together on one webpage. However, these websites were mostly available to the growing number of diasporic Zimbabweans and for economic reasons were only accessible to a minority of Zimbabweans within Zimbabwe.

Although Internet penetration in Zimbabwe especially in the rural areas is limited, the news websites played an important role in circulating 'counter-hegemonic' discourses which challenged the state. Besides web-based journalism, there also emerged a number of radio stations that were based overseas such as SW Radio Africa and the Voice of America "Studio Seven" which broadcasted their programmes to Zimbabweans via the shortwave. The radio stations were jammed by government to limit their reach.

State control and tight regulation of the public sphere and the media led to the emergence of other forms of resistance such as rumour and political humour. A media scholar Wendy Willems (2010, 2011) provides a detailed account on the importance of political

humour and rumour in mediating politics in Zimbabwe post-2000. She argues that in the context of the constraints imposed on public communication, rumour and political humour became important sources of information. She argues that:

> In the numerous queues that rapidly appeared and grew in length since 2000, Zimbabweans actively debated politics irrespective of their fears. In commuter omnibuses, hair salons and beer halls, Zimbabweans shared jokes mocking the ZANU (PF) regime. Jokes and gossip did not only circulate in Harare but they reached both the rural areas of Zimbabwe and the growing Zimbabwean diaspora in the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa. Rumours and jokes were not only transmitted orally but were increasingly mediated via SMS messages and emails (Willems, 2010).

She adds that: "The practice of joking in itself and the distribution of jokes via SMS and e-mail defied government's attempts to monopolise the public sphere and its efforts to dominate the public sphere" (Willems, 2011:56). The increase in mobile phone usage further enhanced the circulation of jokes which mocked the state and government officials. We have seen in Chapter Two, how these forms of media constitute what is referred to as *radio trottoir* or 'pavement radio', defined as "the popular and unofficial discussion of current affairs" in Africa (Ellis, 1989:321). We cannot therefore neglect these forms of media if we are to fully account for and understand the role of the media in legitimising or subverting power and authority in Africa.

Music also played a key role in mediating politics in the context of the "Third Chimurenga". The work by Mano (2011) acknowledges "the journalistic function" of music in situations where public communications are constrained. He argues that: "It [music] is journalism in the way it sets the agenda or what to talk about among the people and in the way the music texts meet with and generate new forms of knowledge among members of the audience" (Ibid:93). Music was an important vehicle to transmit anti-government messages in Zimbabwe post-2000. Prominent musicians such as Thomas Mapfumo and Oliver Mtukudzi produced songs which were critical of ZANU (PF) and President Mugabe. However, this was not without risks. Mapfumo was viewed as a threat by the government and his songs were excluded from the state broadcaster. Another veteran singer, Oliver Mtukudzi, was targeted after he produced the song *Wasakara* (You are Worn Out) from his album *Bvuma* (Accept It). This song was interpreted as a call for aging Mugabe to resign (Banning, 2003). However, ZANU (PF)

devised a number of strategies to suppress and curtail free expression by musicians. The strategies deployed by the regime ranged from physical threats against artists to exclusion of their music from airplay on state radio and television. The regime also produced its own songs called *Hondo yeMinda* (Struggle for Land) which propagated a land-centric nationalist discourse. It commissioned artists to produce 'patriotic' songs and attempted to co-opt popular Zimbabwean musicians to promote its cultural project of the "Third Chimurenga". Music was a crucial tool for the regime's legitimation post-2000. In Chapter Seven, I provide a detailed discussion of the party's music strategies during the "Third Chimurenga" paying closer attention to the origins of ideas, the content of the songs, state patronage in the production and circulation of the party's songs and the decisions taken by the state and party officials who were responsible for the media in regard to the music strategy and what they sought to achieve.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored how the ZANU (PF) media strategy innovated under the newly created Department/Ministry of Information and Publicity, headed by Minister Jonathan Moyo. I have argued that ZANU (PF) adopted a new media strategy in response to political pressure from opponents and the legitimation needs of the new hybrid regime that the party built post-2000. This chapter makes an important contribution to our understanding of the legal and institutional means and mechanisms of media control in a hybrid regime. Whilst the repressive effects of these media laws and institutional practices are widely acknowledged, this chapter sought to explore further the care in drafting the media laws, the divisions among party and state elites in the formulation and implementation of the media policies and the ruling party's concerns for legitimacy. I have demonstrated that ZANU (PF)'s concerns for legitimacy and international acceptance led the architects of the party's media strategies to carefully draft the media laws for legitimation purposes. As we have seen, the officials drafted media laws which mirrored those existing in Western jurisdictions to pre-empt any criticism of these laws and to achieve international legitimacy. The state and party elites also justified the media laws in terms of the 'national' interest to placate domestic constituencies and attain legitimacy. We have seen that political executives in hybrid regimes are concerned about legitimacy which leads them to interrogate and test their own media 'machines' to ensure that they are suited to achieve this overarching goal.

Secondly, this chapter discussed the divisions among ZANU (PF) elites regarding the media strategy during the "Third Chimurenga". I have argued that these divisions are underexplored in existing studies and yet they may give us insight into the contradictions and tensions that characterise the hybrid media system that ZANU (PF) built during this period. The divisions among party and state elites were more pronounced in the formulation of media laws and their implementation particularly on how to handle the critical press. I have demonstrated that hybrid media systems are complex and sophisticated; rarely are they defined by repression alone. The emphasis on the repressive effects of the ZANU (PF) media strategies post-2000 gives the impression of a monolithic and seamless party and a state that did not care about its legitimacy or sustainability of its repressive actions. Whilst ZANU (PF) hardliners such as Information and Publicity minister, Jonathan Moyo and others succeeded in repressing the critical press and incarcerating journalists who were critical of the regime, the soft-liners were opposed to these heavy-handed means. These officials preferred what they called 'smart' ways of handling the critical press instead of resorting 'to the measures of last resort'. These officials reasoned that some of the 'smart' ways of handling the critical press included strengthening the state-controlled newspapers through improving their content as a way to retain advertisers and audiences thereby rendering the private press less effective. The divisions among the party and state elites show the contradictory nature of hybrid media systems such as the one that ZANU (PF) built post-2000. In the next chapter, I elaborate on subtle strategies that were deployed by the Ministry of Information and Publicity to control the state press and the effects of these means of pressure and control on the framing of media content.

Thirdly, this chapter discussed the emergence of alternative media to counter ZANU (PF) ultra-nationalist discourses during the "Third Chimurenga". State repression and monopoly of the nominally public-owned state media led to the emergence of alternative communicative spaces which pro-democracy groups and the opposition used as platforms to challenge ZANU (PF)'s 'patriotic history'. The various alternative media platforms that emerged during this period played an important role in challenging the regime's ultra-nationalist discourses.

Chapter 6

Media Control and 'Patriotic Journalism' in the Zimbabwean State Press

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the ways in which the ZANU (PF) government's media strategy innovated outside the realm of law, largely under Professor Jonathan Moyo, the Minister of State for Information and Publicity, from 2000 to 2005. I examine closely how and why the ZANU (PF) media strategies worked so well in terms of the production of legitimacy for the particular kind of hybrid regime that the party built during this period. I make the following key observations regarding these media strategies: i) Minister Moyo purged uncooperative journalists and appointed his loyalists who were ready to toe the party line; ii) he established a hands-on style of management, and considered culture and history to be an important part of what he was addressing in the media; iii) he developed a number of means of manipulating journalists via meetings, by using money and threatening jobs, and by creating and disseminating content via briefings. I demonstrate how ZANU (PF) after 2000, and specifically Moyo's Ministry, effectively created both a self-disciplining journalistic machine and a compelling set of narratives (or frames) able to create legitimacy.

This chapter draws on interviews with key party and state actors as well as journalists and editors from the state press. These interviews provide interesting insights into the conditions under the journalists operated and their coverage (framing) of the land issue, their portrayal of the MDC position and its division on matters of land reform and ideology and the contestations over the idea of journalistic professionalism. In addition, I draw on a sample of news articles, editorial comments and op-eds that were published on the land issue in *The Herald* (daily) and *The Sunday Mail* (weekly) newspapers. I chose *The Herald* and *The Sunday Mail* newspapers to compare the themes that were selected and given prominence on the land issue. These newspapers are the major state-controlled newspapers with a national circulation. I focus my analysis on the land issue because it was the primary theme in ZANU (PF)'s 'patriotic history' post-2000.

6.2 The State Press and Political Control in Zimbabwe from 2000

In the previous chapter, we have seen how the ZANU (PF) government through the Ministry of Information and Publicity under Jonathan Moyo introduced a battery of laws to control the flow of information and entrench its control over the state media. We have also seen that these media laws were carefully designed for legitimation purposes. Although ZANU (PF)'s interference in the operations of the state media started from the 1980s and 1990s, the new measures that were introduced by the Ministry of Information and Publicity in 2000 were designed to entrench the party's control over the state media in new ways. Chiumbu and Moyo (2009:194) note that "the restructuring of Zimpapers [state press] that took place after 2000 was a well-planned and deliberate policy co-ordinated by the Department of Information". They add that: "The reforms included changes in editorial staff whereby young journalists loyal to ZANU (PF) were rewarded with influential editorial positions. Hence this loyalty was cultivated through a system of threats, incentives and disincentives for journalists" (Ibid.).

Whilst Chiumbu and Moyo (2009) acknowledge ZANU (PF)'s media strategies such as institutional're-gearing', the use of incentives and cultivation of loyalty to control the 'public' media, they do not provide details of how this was achieved. I build on this and other works and my interviews with state and party elites and journalists to interrogate the relationships between state and party elites and journalists, the political and ideological means of political control focusing on the institutional arrangements, media briefings that were conducted by the Department of Information and Publicity with journalists and editors which amounted to political 're-education' on what constituted the 'national interest' and the payment of money to a cabal of journalists that was assigned to do clandestine media work in support of the regime. I discuss the heavy-handed means of pressure and political control as well as the 'hidden' strategies that were deployed by the government because they are part of how 'hybrid media systems' function.

Whilst ZANU (PF) still used heavy-handed means to control the media as we have seen in the previous chapter, the party also devised 'hidden' ways of controlling the press. Whilst hybrid regimes use coercion particularly when their hold on power is threatened, it is also crucial to explore the non-coercive strategies of media control, as opposed to censorship, newspaper shutdowns and incarcerating critical journalists. The political

executives in hybrid regimes prefer strategies such as institutional re-configuration, patronage and forging manipulative ties with journalists because they may be more effective in creating and sustaining legitimacy.

The strategies of the Ministry of Information and Publicity under Moyo demonstrate a new media regime with its own style of management different from the earlier period. There emerged a highly complex politics that shaped media practice which involved material incentives and threats but also the committed participation of journalists from the state-controlled media in defending the "Third Chimurenga". The lesson that we can draw from these shifts in state media policy and practice is that hybrid regimes cannot afford to be rigid: they have to be continuously introspective and devise new strategies for prolongation of their rule. If they do not do that, that is, re-invent themselves, they run the risk of crumbling. This study therefore adds to our understandings of hybrid regime renewal and persistence. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the shifting politics in Zimbabwe and the new pressure on ZANU (PF) required new responses. Let us now consider some of the strategies that ZANU (PF) implemented in the media. As we have seen in Chapter Two, the media is a key arena of contestation in a hybrid regime alongside the electoral, judiciary and legislative arenas.

We saw in the previous chapter that Moyo was appointed to Cabinet despite his recent arrival in ZANU (PF) and his history of criticising the party. Moyo was considered to be key in the ruling party's new media strategy. The journalists and editors from the state-controlled media described him as a 'hands-on', 'hard-working' and 'articulate' minister in contrast to his predecessors. Moyo embarked on a number of media which propagated patriotic history. He wrote articles under different pseudonyms such as Mzala Joe in *The Sunday News*, Nathaniel Manheru in *The Herald*, and Lowani Ndlovu in *The Sunday Mail.*When asked about his approach towards the media and his work ethic and philosophy, this is what Minister Moyo said:

> I believe modestly that what I did have [when I was the Minister of Information and Publicity from 2000 to 2004], as I still do, is that, if you make me the minister responsible for cleaning your toilets, I make sure that I keep them clean all the time. I also think that there are people, when they have their jobs they try to discharge those jobs to the best of their ability. I did not take through the Ministry of Information and Publicity

> and my position as Minister as a status position. I took it as a job. When I was appointed to this position, I rolled up my sleeves and got down to some serious work. I worked for 17 hours a day and slept only for 4 hours and you would come to *Munhumutapa* [the government building] at 2 am and find us there. With that sort of commitment and dedication, when it shows results people then start saying you are getting too powerful but I will be trying to do my job. I will be trying to make sure that whatever I do, I get results. If I needed assistance of the police to get something done, I would do that. If I needed the Ministry of Finance to support us, I would go. If I needed Air Zimbabwe to give us Boeing 767 to go and pick up our stranded Warriors [the Zimbabwe national football team] at Johannesburg airport in South Africa to take them to Seychelles, I would organize that. That's what information is all about; it's not just about press conferences. (Interview with Jonathan Moyo, April 2013, Harare).

The new hybrid media system that ZANU (PF) was designing required a new set of ideas, policies and institutions in response to the shifting politics. But whilst the new political context required new approaches, it must be emphasized that the strategies that were deployed by ZANU (PF) in the media were also informed by the past, including some of the strategies that were used by the colonial authorities in Rhodesia to control the media and justify authoritarian practices. This chapter gives insight into some of the characteristics of the new hybrid media system. I reflect on some of the media control strategies that were deployed by the Ministry of Information consistent with this hybrid media system.

Moyo devised a range of strategies to control the state press. Following his appointment as the Minister of Information and Publicity in 2000, Moyo immediately purged senior journalists and editors in the state media on the pretext that they had 'overstayed'. He considered these editors irrelevant to the new ZANU (PF) media agenda and the party's legitimation needs. Moyo appointed loyalists who were ready to toe his line. The appointment of loyalists to key positions was crucial in safeguarding ZANU (PF) interests. A senior journalist who had worked for the main state-controlled daily newspaper, *The Herald,* in the early 2000s had this to say: "Journalists working for the state media who did not toe the party line [ZANU (PF)] were either purged or demoted whilst young journalists with little experience in the newsroom were promoted to editors. This was meant to ensure a pliant media that was always ready to defend and regurgitate the ZANU (PF) ideological position" (Interview, 13th March 2013, Harare). Bright Matonga, who was Moyo's deputy at the Information and Publicity ministry said:

> When Moyo came in [as Minister of Information and Publicity] in 2000, some of the journalists in the state media had "overstayed", they didn't toe the line so you wanted people that you could tell what to do. Editors were removed from the state media then we brought in a young crop of journalists that was hungry for success, hungry for promotion, hungry for identification and journalists we could tell what to do. We basically told them that we were in a war zone and you follow the fight. We were defending the country and the media is the first and last line (Interview with Bright Matonga, April, 2013, Harare).

Moyo forged manipulative ties with journalists from the state media whom he asked to carry out clandestine media work. These journalists were part of Moyo's core team; they were proud to be associated with the minister. Moyo created commitment among journalists via his own work ethic and an elaborate project that involved incentives and threats. Forging close ties with journalists was a form of political control. The journalists testified to these Machiavellian strategies. A senior journalist from *The Herald* who was part of Moyo's team stated that:

> We worked closely with Prof Moyo on a number of media projects which had nothing to do with our daily newsroom work. But he contacted us directly and by-passed the editors. We could meet during odd hours to work on different media projects that he gave us. We were paid handsomely for doing this work. We don't know where he was getting the money but I can tell you that we were paid good money. You need to understand that this is the time that Moyo came in as Minister of Information and unlike previous ministers such as Mai [Mrs] Mujuru and Chen Chimutengwende, who, if I may say, took a bystander role in terms of being active and manipulating the media or in being interested in the actual content of the newspaper. Moyo came with a different approach. As an intellectual and a political scientist, Moyo had a certain way of influencing the ideological direction of the paper without physically being present at *The Herald*. For example, he is the only minister if my memory serves me well, who held, on a weekly basis no less than 7 press briefings. Naturally if you are a journalist and your own minister is having such kind of press briefings, it means he will dominate the content of the media. Moyo was interested in having people that he could control. You had to align yourself with him and his views. I think this had nothing to do with patriotism. You had to protect your job; you had to dance according to the Minister's tune (Interview with informant, March 2013).

Minister Moyo managed to create an ethos where journalists wanted to please him and to be on his team (patronage) when he served as Minister of Information and Publicity. He managed to build a committed team of journalists whose responsibility was to ensure that

the regime's new media agenda was successful. A senior journalist from *The Herald* who worked closely with Minister Moyo stated:

> I would pride myself as one of the few journalists that Moyo started having an interest in working with when he became minister. He approached PD [Pikirayi Deketeke] who was the news editor of *The Sunday Mail* then with a view of recruiting journalists that were to work for a website that was called *zimday.com* and I am one of the journalists that were recruited and given the task of recruiting the other 3 journalists, Munyaradzi Huni, Innocent Gore and Itai Musengeyi. We then held meetings with Moyo sometimes going into the wee hours. What was the strategy we were going to take? We said we were not going to rely on *The Herald* and *The Sunday Mail* but also rely on the Internet and we had to establish multi-dimensional internet sites where we could write stories that were positive about the government without revealing our identity. Where he [Moyo] got the funding I don't know but I can tell you confidently that we were paid handsomely and there were some stories that were plucked from our website that got published in *The Herald* but very few people knew that we were the ones who wrote those stories. There were other stories that were also quoted outside the country. So that was one area where Moyo would work directly with journalists without involving the editors. He would also sometimes call a journalist directly and say that he wants a particular story to come out and how he wanted it written. It was then the duty of the journalist to go and brief the editor to say that the Minister has called me and said that this story must find its way in the paper or give it prominence. I think the problem that Ray Mungoshi [who was the editor of *The Herald*] faced is that he sought to challenge this interference. Moyo was not amused by that and Mungoshi was sacked (Interview with senior journalist at *The Herald*, Harare, March 2013).

Moyo's ministry also held media briefings with journalists and editors where he 'lectured' them on what constituted the 'national' interest and how this was to be framed and reflected in the news. Whilst media briefings are standard procedure that underline state-media relations in most countries, Moyo's routine meetings with journalists and editors from the state media constituted political 're-education' sessions. The journalists were told to be 'patriotic' and this meant defending the ruling party's interests. George Charamba, who served as the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity as well as Presidential Spokesperson, said that the media briefings were intended to orientate journalists "on the subconscious side of the state" and what constituted 'national interests' (Interview with Charamba, March 2013). He also revealed that the media briefing meetings were also about material that was not for publishing. Charamba stated that:

> The briefings with journalists were meant to keep the media in touch with the state and decisions of the state. They were an outreach by government to media houses. *But briefings are not just about material that is publishable* (my emphasis). They are also a way of anticipating policies. This is why the Americans have got what they call the deep backgrounder, when you are taken in for a briefing session which doesn't originate any copy. *The idea is to put you in touch with the sub-conscious side of the state* (my emphasis) so that when policies eventually begin to unfold you are informed of these policies so that you know how you can use your journalism to promote them (Interview with Charamba, March 2013).

The media briefings that were organised by the Department of Information and Publicity were thus critical platforms that state officials used to develop a clear media agenda. What we learn from these media briefings is that media control in hybrid contexts is not always direct. The media briefings that were organised by the Department of Information and Publicity were a 'hidden' way of controlling media content in the state press.

The media briefings were an instrument of political control that shaped the framing of news by journalists in the state press. A senior journalist from *The Herald* who participated in the media briefings stated that: "You could easily tell the importance of certain issues or topics with the emphasis that Prof Moyo or Charamba placed on these issues during the briefings. As a journalist your work was simple; to go back to the newsroom and try as much as possible to reflect these views in your story. You were always under pressure to reflect these views and making sure that you do not distort or misrepresent the Minister's views" (Interview with senior reporter from *The Herald*, 23 March 2014). A senior journalist from *The Herald* who also took part in the media briefing meetings confirmed this view:

> Moyo would talk directly to journalists and he would also give us the background as to why some of the decisions in government were taken and why certain policies were adopted and from that perspective they were some kind of re-education for journalists especially those from the state media as to what were the real national interests of our country. Most journalists that were working for the state media felt that they really should defend government policy. There are so many things that we discussed during the media briefings but you must also understand that some of the issues, in my view, were conspiracies. The Minister [Moyo] gave us background on a number of government policies and the reasons why certain decisions were taken. We were told what was going on in ZANU (PF) and government, the issues that were being debated and as a paper we then took decisions based on this as to how we should frame our

> news stories in *The Herald*. They [ministry officials] had a certain way of explaining things to us which informed us how they wanted these issues to be covered. After these media briefings it was clear how the officials wanted us [at *The Herald*], to write our stories and represent certain issues. When you are addressed by George Charamba, the Permanent Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson, you would assume that what he was saying was a reflection of President Mugabe's views. So you would try as much as possible to reflect these views in your story (Interview with informant, March 2013).

The lectures to journalists and editors on the 'national' interest were a subtle way of political control.

Moyo's ministry also developed a number of means of manipulating journalists via meetings, by using money and threatening jobs. These strategies exerted pressure on journalists to exercise self-censorship. Some editors from the state press said they were worried about what would happen to them "the morning after publishing of the newspaper" if they had misrepresented or distorted the government position (Interview with a reporter from *The Sunday Mail*, Harare, March 2013). The journalists said that they knew what was permissible or publishable in the political environment in which they operated which meant they exercised self-censorship with little direct interference from the state officials. The former editor of *The Sunday Mail* newspaper, William Chikoto, explained:

> People say all sorts of things about how the two [Professor Jonathan Moyo and George Charamba] edited the papers, about this and that; there was nothing like that. You made the decisions yourselves; what to run, what not to run but what then happens is when you published a story, the feedback comes the next moment, the morning after publication of the newspaper, isn't it? So there was no instruction to editors. I remembered during my editorship, Jonathan Moyo only came once into *The Sunday Mail* newsroom when he was on a tour to familiarize himself with our work as the minister responsible. He would not come into the newsroom [and] neither would Charamba. There was nothing like that. Much of our contact with them was during the media briefings but when the story comes you would have to make the decision as the editor on what comes out and what doesn't. There was a lot of self-censorship but for us what made it easy was that there was a lot of conviction about the ideological position that we were supporting. So when you are editing, you are doing your best to be as professional as you can in defending that position. There was also an attempt [by journalists] to bring in some things that are not true, that could not be substantiated, so your job as the editor was to fight as much as possible to remove that. I remember one encounter that I

> had with a Minister then, he had given a story to a journalist which I edited in line with our editorial policy. When the story came out, the Minister confronted me. He said I was not editing the story but that I was editing him. You know those kinds of things. But the point is who are you editing, the story or the source? We were editing the story and not people and really the relationship sometimes would get nasty but we were doing our best. But the point is, if you did not have an ideological conviction of the whole question of land reform and the way it was carried out you would not survive. I think this is why we had some journalists leaving because they could not withstand the pressure (Interview with William Chikoto, March, 2013, Harare).

The editor of *The Herald*, Pikirayi Deketeke, drew a distinction between Moyo's regime of media control and that of the Rhodesians. He explained:

> This whole issue of saying government-controlled media… [is misplaced]. During the Rhodesian era you would see the *Rhodesia Herald* with blank pages where stories would have been pulled out because they had to go to the Ministry of Information somewhere in the Prime Minister's office and censored. This is what we call control. Government is the main source of the information that happens in the country. The purpose of the Minister of Information is to meet the media to get an understanding of what is going on in government and you find this even when Tony Blair [former UK Prime Minister] was at the war front, he would move with journalists and brief those journalists about British foreign policy towards Iraq and to date it still happens. So it does not denote control (Interview with Deketeke, March 2013, Harare).

Deketeke misses the point that there are variations in patterns of media regulation in authoritarian and hybrid regimes. The Rhodesian state was authoritarian and as such it built a repressive apparatus to silence the media through direct censorship, deportations and incarceration of journalists as we saw in Chapter Four. In Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front, media control was achieved through outright censorship whereby regime censors were dispatched to the newsrooms to pull out stories deemed unpalatable from the newspapers before they were published. Whilst authoritarian rulers can afford to act in this way, the situation is different in hybrid regimes where legitimacy is desired. Authoritarian rulers do not greatly care about legitimacy; they do care about holding on to power. Their main goal is to retain power regardless of what means or methods they use to do so.

To return to our case study, whilst politics and institutional pressures produced a loyal and self-censoring body of editors and journalists, they were not the only factors that

shaped news framing in the state press in Zimbabwe post-2000. Journalists and editors had agency and often shared the ideological views of the state and party officials. As noted above, some journalists said that they defended land reform out of ideological conviction and real belief in the political project not only due to political pressure exerted by Moyo and Charamba and other state officials. One of the journalists, Lovemore Mataire said: "Look, my mother and father met in Mozambique [during the liberation war in the 1970s]. They were ZANLA cadres. I was born in Mozambique during the liberation war. I consider myself a product of *Chimurenga* for which land was a central grievance. How else was I supposed to interpret 'Fast-Track' Land Reform? I played my part to defend the revolution [land reform] through writing" (Interview with Lovemore Mataire, April 2013, Harare). We can see in this case that it was not only political pressure that influenced the journalist's framing of the land issue, family experiences and ideological understanding mattered too. This was thus a highly complex politics that shaped media practice, involving material incentives and threats but also the committed participation of journalists for whom ZANU (PF)'s "Third Chimurenga" was a valuable extension of the struggle launched in the 1970s.

The journalists and editors often defended the land issue on ideological grounds. William Chikoto, who served as editor of *The Sunday Mail* from 2001 stated that: "Yes there was a lot of self-censorship but for me and Pikirayi [editor of the state-run weekly newspaper *The Herald*] what made it easy for us was that ideological conviction about land reform. If you did not have an ideological conviction of the whole question of land reform and so on you would not survive. I think this is why you had some journalists leaving. For us the advantage was that we had worked with editors such as Charles Chikerema whose ideological position on the whole thing [of land reform] was clear" (Interview with William Chikoto, April 2013, Harare). Chikerema was a former editor of *The Sunday Mail* and *The Herald*, an avowed communist who was well-known for his criticism of ZANU (PF) for abandoning the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The editor of *The Herald*, Pikirayi Deketeke also stated that ideology was important in the interpretation of the land issue in the state-controlled press. He explained that:

> The public [state-controlled] media's interpretation of Fast-Track land reform was driven by the ambitions of the liberation struggle and the expectations of the majority of our people. I remember as a young journalist, being labelled all sorts of names working with Charles

> Chikerema, who was the editor then, and he was being labelled as a socialist who was out of his time and so on, because he had been defending certain values that he thought were important and others were trying to adopt Western liberal ideology and values. So interpretation of land reform was guided by patriotism and the national interests. What does my mother expect? What does a villager in Murewa expect? What does a worker in Highfield expect? What are people's expectations? Is it access to good health, housing, a better wage, a better income and how do you juxtapose those interests with the interests of foreign capital especially Western capital that was responsible for colonialism. So we took a position, we have always been aligned with the majority views (Interview with Deketeke, March 2013, Harare).

The journalists and editors from the state press said that 'patriotic journalism' was guided by their own understanding of professional interests as well as the interests of their audiences. They questioned the notion of 'professional journalism' which they equated to 'European' or 'Western' standards which were at odds with 'African' values. They argued that journalism "does not exist in a vacuum" but that it needs to serve the communities where it operates. They argued that the 'patriotic journalism' that they practiced was 'responsible' because it spoke to "the ideals and aspirations of Africans", according to Deketeke. When probed further to clarify what he understood by 'professional journalism', Deketeke said that:

> A journalist does not exist in a vacuum. The views of a European journalist towards land reform [in Zimbabwe] would be different from the view of an African journalist because we all belong to different families, our communities, and our culture; there is an ideological setting to what we do as professionals. There was an element of pure reportage- what was going on which we can probably classify as professional but there was a second role which was the ideological inclination of this whole issue. As professional journalists, we owe it to our readers not just to write stories that do not address their concerns or those of the communities that we belong to. Journalism is not just like pumping water (…) but even with water you will have to treat it first before giving it to people and that is where the ideology comes in. Some might see it as subjective and so on but in our view it was really a question of interpreting what was going on and what it meant to ordinary people. Professionalism does not exist in a vacuum. The question of land reform was bigger than ZANU (PF); it was bigger than sloganeering for ZANU (PF). It is only that ZANU (PF) was the Party that championed land reform, but it is a question that was there long before people were segmented into either ZANU (PF), MDC and so on. My own mother will tell you stories about how black people watched helplessly when white people took their land. So those are issues that are at the core of families and our people and absolutely have nothing to do with sloganeering for ZANU (PF). If we identified with a patriotic cause

> that was being championed by ZANU (PF), yes, there is that coincidence but what guided us was the national interest which should be the case with any professional journalist (Interview with Deketeke, March 2013, Harare).

The views by Deketeke demonstrate the use of the ideas of the 'national interest' in justifying the framing of the land issue in the state press. But added to that is a kind of specific culturalist (or Africanist) argument and the influences of the specific history of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle in justifying 'patriotic journalism'. We can see the echoes of these practices in the post-independent one-party states where partisan or biased media coverage that was in favour of the nationalist leaders in these regimes was justified in terms of 'national' interests.

Unlike in authoritarian regimes where media control is achieved through direct censorship and other repressive strategies, hybrid regimes prefer 'hidden' strategies of control to evade criticism and achieve legitimacy. In this section, I discussed the political and institutional means and mechanisms of media control that were deployed by the Information and Publicity ministry in Zimbabwe post-2000. I demonstrated that Minister Jonathan Moyo developed a highly complex and sophisticated set of rules and politics that guided the party's new media strategy. As we have seen, Moyo developed a sophisticated mechanism to control the state media which blended coercive and 'hidden' strategies. I have demonstrated that media control was not achieved entirely through heavy-handed means. Whilst he purged journalists who did not toe his line, Moyo also developed a number of means of manipulating journalists via meetings, using money and threatening jobs and by creating and disseminating content via briefings with journalists and editors. He developed a hands-on style of management and managed to build a self-policing journalistic team that was proud of and endeavoured to reflect his and other ZANU (PF) officials' views in the news. As we have seen, the media briefings organised by Moyo's ministry were a kind of political re-education that created a shared ideology between the officials and the journalists. These strategies were effective in shaping 'patriotic journalism' which was justified by its authors (the journalists and editors) in terms of the 'national interest' and Africanist arguments. In the section below, I look in detail at the themes that were selected and given salience in the state press focusing on

the land issue which was the primary theme in ZANU (PF)'s 'patriotic history' post-2000.

6.3 The Framing of Fast-Track Land Reform in the State Press

In this section, I analyse the framing of the land question in the state press. Entman (1993:52) defines framing as selecting "some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described". By selecting certain topics over others and providing coverage to people or events, the media set an agenda on issues that they want the public to debate and consider the most salient. Scheufele (2000:307) distinguishes five factors that influence the frames of journalists, namely social norms and values, organisational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines and ideological or political orientations of journalists. The media "provide cognitive knowledge informing us about what is happening, but they also order and structure political reality, allotting events greater or lesser significance according to their presence or absence on the media agenda" (McNair,1995:49). Journalists and editors work to "contain political debate within a more or less tightly drawn consensus, which admits only an established political class (or group) and marginalizes or excludes others" (Ibid: 58). In political communication, parties and governments rely on framing to promote their policies. They also use framing to discredit alternative or competing discourses.

I analyse the framing of 'Fast-Track' land reform in the state-controlled press in Zimbabwe focusing on the two major newspapers, *The Herald* (daily) and *The Sunday Mail* (weekly). I chose these newspapers because of their national circulation. I make the following key arguments regarding the coverage and framing of the land issue in the state press: i) there was a careful construction of a narrative to legitimise land occupations that selectively invoked history and blamed the British in particular, which served ZANU (PF)'s electoral needs of mobilising a large rural constituency; ii) there was an emphasis on how unequal ownership of land was in 2000; iii) there was an attempt to frame the land issue in terms of 'us' versus 'them' in which the white farmers are cast as archaic, racist, exploitative landlords who have not changed since colonial times and; iv) there was an effort to portray the opposition MDC party as anti-land reform and pro-white and

British, which has some truth to it, but is also a distortion of particularly the role of race, and also sets up an (unnecessary) incompatibility between redistribution and respect for rights. I look at the framing of content and the decisions regarding how to frame the land issue taken by key figures such as Presidential Spokesperson and Permanent Secretary, George Charamba and Minister Jonathan Moyo. I argue that the strategy of framing works very well as a legitimating tool for Fast-Track Land Reform because of its uses of a recognisable (if selective) history, real grievances, and an only partially distorted picture of the MDC.

This analysis builds on existing work on framing in the Zimbabwean press. Media scholar, Wendy Willems (2004), conducted a study on the framing of 'fast-track' land occupations in the Zimbabwean press. Her account is based on *The Daily News* (a privately owned newspaper) and *The Herald* (a state-controlled newspaper) and notes how the debate regarding occupations of white-owned farms was polarised. However, Willems' analysis does not include the voices of the state and party elites and the journalists. She also does not explore the media control strategies that were deployed by the Ministry of Information and Publicity and how these influenced framing in the state press. This chapter also provide an elaboration of what Terence Ranger (2005) defined as 'patriotic journalism'. Whilst Ranger's article provides useful insights into the content of 'patriotic journalism', his account is based on newspaper reports and news stories but not the primary sources, that is the voices of the authors of 'patriotic history' in the media, that is the state and party elites and journalists. I shed additional light on 'patriotic journalism' and how it was organised institutionally (through the analysis of relations between state elites and journalists as we saw in the previous section) and ideologically, in terms of how the narratives that were circulated in the state press were carefully constructed in line with new legitimation needs for the ZANU (PF) government post-2000.

In Chapter Five, we saw that the land issue played a central role in ZANU (PF)'s attempts to re-invent itself and legitimise its rule post-2000. In the party's authoritarian nationalism, the land issue was cast "as part of a longer and broader history of anti-imperialist and pan-Africanist struggles, casting the opposition and civil society groups as Western surrogates in them" (Raftopolous, 2009: 213). The ruling party stressed its

pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist credentials and vilified ideas about democracy and individual rights that were associated with the MDC, labour and civic movements. The ruling party stressed the importance of African communalism, ruralism and nationalist histories whilst ideas about "democracy and civil rights were cast as un-African and inauthentic element of an alien and imperial agenda" (Alexander 2009:193). The party ideologues articulated a Pan-Africanist agenda that rejected neo-liberal discourses of human rights and good governance which were said to be "the terrain of hypocritical former colonial powers who had never genuinely cared for the rights of black men, and of their local stooges – whites and the forces of the opposition" (Ibid). The state-controlled media played a key role in framing the 'fast-track' land redistribution exercise as a struggle spearheaded by ZANU (PF), a party that was said to be the embodiment of African 'nationalism' against Western 'imperialism' and its local stooges.

Journalists from the state press invoked history and culture in justifying the contentious 'fast-track' land redistribution policy. The narratives that were circulated in the state press regarding the land issue were carefully constructed to coincide with the interests of particular sections of the Zimbabwean populace. A senior journalist at *The Herald*, Lovemore Mataire, confirmed the importance of history and what he called an 'African perspective' in journalists' framing of the land issue. He explained:

> It is not true that the state media was biased in its coverage of Fast-Track land reform. I think we did our work responsibly. We offered an African perspective to the land issue because we knew this subject was important to our people. We wanted the general public to know the facts, the statistics of how many white farmers at that time owned land. How many blacks owned fertile land? If some 4,500 white people own fertile land, is that a normal situation? If the majority of people were chased away from their original lands and are trying to reclaim back their land what's wrong with that? We [state media] needed to bring out these facts to show the number of black people who were tilling barren land and compare that with the whites who owned fertile land. We also needed to bring the fact that this was a major issue of the liberation struggle in the 1970s and still the most outstanding issue of that struggle. There was no way we were going to write about land without a historical reference, there is no way. You really needed to have a historical reference about the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979, about the liberation war and about some of the promises that were yet to be fulfilled and the argument was that the government delayed to implement these reforms because it was hamstrung by the Lancaster House constitution (Interview with Mataire, April 2013, Harare).

This was in fact a highly selective narrative, showing careful framing of the land issue. Contrary to Mataire's views, the delay in land reform was not just caused by the legal constraints imposed by the Lancaster House Agreement negotiated in 1979 to end the war in Rhodesia. The Lancaster House Agreement contained the "willing buyer willing seller" provision which made it difficult for government to initiate any radical land redistribution in the first 10 years of independence up to 1990. But as several studies have shown, the slow pace of land reform in the 1980s and 1990s was also caused by other factors such as corruption and government lethargy as well as the transition in South Africa. However, it was strategic for the state press to emphasize the legal constraints imposed by the 'willing-buyer willing-seller' market framework of the '80s and '90s as this would absolve ZANU (PF) of any wrongdoing. It was also strategic to emphasize the legal constraints imposed by the Lancaster House Constitution because this would put the blame for the slow pace of land reform in Zimbabwe squarely on the UK government and justify ZANU (PF)'s new radical approach to address this problem. The state press thus traced a selective historical origin of the land issue to justify the necessity of a radical approach to address the problem.

Land under 'Fast-track' was an important political resource to entrench and legitimise ZANU (PF) rule. President Mugabe had made clear the political benefits that his party sought to reap from the 'fast-track' exercise. Whilst addressing the ZANU (PF) National People's Congress in December 2000, Mugabe stated that:

> Comrades, the land issue should provide a good backdrop for rejuvenating our Party. It is a solution to bread and butter questions exercising our people. Is the Party ready to translate the gains of the Fast- Track approach into mobilisation and greater membership? It is important that our structures move in tandem or even ahead of the land redistribution exercise so that our people can properly contextuate where this huge benefit is coming from. Have we told them that the land is being brought to them by a ZANU (PF) government? Have we told them who it is that opposes land reforms, who is it that is fighting for the continued occupation of our land by a mere 4 000 white commercial farmers? (Mugabe, 2000:120).

The state press duly highlighted the skewed land ownership patterns as Mugabe advised. Journalists emphasized that whites owned 70 per cent of the best farming land whilst

blacks were overcrowded in marginal agro-ecological zones. It was strategic for the state press to highlight the disparities in land ownership. These disparities were real and had inspired the liberation struggle. They gave credence to ZANU (PF) claims that whites were still illegitimately in charge of the economy 20 years into independence and thus worked to legitimate Fast-Track land occupations. The editor of *The Herald*, Caesar Zvayi stated that:

> The public press played an important role in linking 'Fast-Track' to the struggle for liberation. Land was an overriding theme in that struggle. So we had the duty to link the land reform exercise to the liberation struggle and to tell ordinary people that they had a right to their land. We wanted to deal with the perceptions that only whites were capable farmers. So our role was to assure our people that they too had the capacity to run those farms productively. Our duty was basically about portraying the land reform in the context of liberation, of moving our independence from the political dimension to the economic dimension (Interview with Zvayi, February 2013, Harare).

Patriotic history distinguished 'patriots' from 'sell-outs' (Ranger, 2004; Alexander, 2009; Raftopolous, 2009; Tendi, 2010). The state press played a central role in defining 'sell-outs' and distinguishing them from 'patriotic' citizens in reference to Zimbabweans who supported the ZANU (PF) ideology. The land occupiers - ZANU (PF), war veterans, youths and others who led the 'fast-track' process were exalted as 'patriotic', 'revolutionaries', 'sons of the soil' and 'freedom fighters' whilst MDC supporters and others who opposed the 'fast-track' policy were branded 'sell-outs', 'stooges', 'counter-revolutionaries' or 'enemies of the state'. In journalism, the use of such labels is not neutral but offers a frame to the story. The nature of these labels and titles sets the tone of the story and influences how readers view the news story and the individuals or organizations that are the focus of the news item. The branding of MDC supporters, white farmers and others as 'sell-outs' or 'stooges' made them legitimate targets of violence. Distinguishing between 'sell-outs' and 'patriots' was an important part of 'patriotic history' broadly and was linked to mobilisation strategies used in the 1970s liberation war.

In another historically linked effort to frame, the state press used racism and labour exploitation, which was still practiced by some white farmers, to justify Fast-Track Land reform. To validate these claims, the journalists highlighted the poor working conditions

for black farm workers and juxtaposed this with the lifestyles of whites. The poor working conditions for blacks on white-owned farms served to buttress ZANU (PF) claims that whites were racist and exploitative. In Chapter Eight, I will demonstrate how the land occupiers (ZANU (PF), war veterans and others) seized on grievances such as racism and labour exploitation to mobilise farm workers to join 'fast-track' occupations. In a story in *The Herald* (18/06/04), titled "Commercial farmers slow down pace: many riled by prospects of having black peasants as neighbours", it was reported that white farmers who lost part of their farms did not want to share land with the new black settlers. The article stated that:

> Most commercial farmers are riled by the prospect of having black peasant neighbours, which they feel is a devaluation of their status. Their revulsion at being equated with black peasants has been so deep that most of them have sought to carry out violent attacks against the farm occupiers or new settlers to illegally drive them off their properties. Before the introduction of fast track land reform, white commercial farmers had been protected from the reality of poverty that existed within the congested communal farming areas, which they saw from a distance in their luxury cars or private planes. The location of their vast farms was such that they did not have to pass through any communal area to and from their farms and as such some never came into contact with their poor black neighbours except for their workers.

Journalists thus worked to highlight the abuses by white farmers and violence towards their workers in order to legitimate the occupation of farms. In doing so, they invoked a lengthy history of white discrimination on the land that had produced deep and on-going grievances.

The article in *The Herald* (27/09/01), titled "Land: why racial inequality? Harare streets are as white as if you were in England", also shows the importance of history, specifically of race in justifying the new radical approach to the land issue in the state press. The article states that:

> Walking in Harare and touring Zimbabwe, one gets a frustrated feeling of being an African by the dominant presence of the white people. This dominance is nowhere better reflected than in the national economy. And this fact is nowhere more demonstrated than in land ownership. Forget the fact that the whites illegally dispossessed Africans of their land as far back as the 1880s, and as recent as 1971. What irks a sensible human being is the brazen racism against the natives in a country which claims to be African and independent. How can one start to understand how a minority

> white population can own 70 per cent of the most fertile and arable land? Leaving the remaining 30 per cent for the 15 million Africans! (…) On my drive to Kariba, one comes across big farms and large silos for storing produce. One also sees the structures of discrimination and marginalization of the Zimbabwe people. The big farms have the African workers huddled in small hovels squeezed in an acre or two of land while the "owners" live in sprawling big houses. You experience a time warp and you wouldn't be wrong to think that you are seeing a European feudalism prior to industrialization. The African serfs working for their white landlords.

The framing technique was not only used to legitimise land redistribution but also to de-legitimise the MDC and portray the opposition party as 'anti-land reform' and a 'stooge' of the British and the West. Whilst the MDC criticized the 'fast-track' approach as violent and chaotic, its position was distorted in the state press. The state press highlighted the prominent role that white Zimbabweans and white farmers played in the MDC and the opposition party's courtship with the West to reinforce its claims. The policy contradictions and strategic blunders by MDC leaders provided journalists with ammunition to further discredit the party. William Chikoto, who was the editor of *The Sunday Mail* during this period, said that:

> Mind you, we were going towards elections and for them [ZANU (PF)] to win the elections, they had to find something that would appeal to the majority. When ZANU (PF) started talking about land redistribution, the MDC came out in full support of the white commercial farmers even on CNN and BBC. That was the greatest mistake that Morgan Tsvangirai [MDC leader] made at that particular time because it then galvanized ZANU (PF) message that the MDC was a puppet party. The MDC was funded by white farmers and the West when it was formed in 1999 so we made a linkage of all this. If you remember when the MDC was formed, Tsvangirai went on a sojourn of mainly European countries to canvass support and to make them understand what he was trying to achieve. That was a mistake because he should have identified more with African leaders. A re-branding of the MDC would have worked and up to this day I'm still not convinced that the MDC has adequately removed that tag as a puppet party, they have not and this is not propaganda (Interview with Chikoto, March 2013, Harare).

In 2000, Fidelis Mhashu an MDC national executive member told his host on the BBC *Hard Talk* programme that if elected into power the MDC would return all the acquired land to white farmers because "they are the ones who know how to farm" (Fidelis

Mhashu, BBC *Hard Talk* Interview, 11 January 2000). The state press seized on this statement to reinforce the view that the MDC was 'anti-land reform' and a 'stooge' of whites. Mhashu's remarks were given prominence in the state press and used to reinforce the narrative that the opposition party was not a 'home-grown' party but a front for whites.

The MDC also did not hide its sources of funding which included white farmers and the Westminster Foundation, a British democracy promotion agency. This gave credence to the ZANU (PF) claims that the MDC was not a home-grown party but a front for whites and the British. The editor of *The Herald*, Caesar Zvayi, explained that:

> We simply told our readers the truth that the MDC is a sell-out project that was formed as a Trojan horse by whites to unseat ZANU (PF) and stop it in its tracks. The MDC was being dishonest in saying that it only supported the principle of land redistribution but not the way in which government implemented land reform under "Fast-Track". Remember the CNN footage of Morgan Tsvangirai taken at a farm in 2000 when he was receiving cheque donations from white farmers. One of the farmers stood up and said: 'I am investing in the MDC'. When you invest in something, you expect returns at some point. The party [MDC] was financed by white commercial farmers who were assured that they would keep their farms under an MDC government. A senior MDC executive confirmed this on *BBC Hard Talk* saying if the MDC came to power, the party would return land to white commercial farmers. So it was very easy to see where the MDC stood in relation to the land redistribution exercise. The party opposed the transfer of land from white commercial farmers who were bankrolling it. So naturally, we had to portray the MDC as selling out the cause of independence because land was at the core of the liberation struggle. Again, Tsvangirai held a rally in Manicaland where he compared resettled farmers under the "Fast-Track" programme to mushrooms that were sprouting everywhere. This disdain for land reform and the empowerment of black people by Tsvangirai was unbelievable. So it was very clear for us to see where the MDC stood in terms of the land issue and we simply put that in the public domain (Interview with Zvayi, February 2013, Harare).

The MDC position was not helped by the fact that it was divided on the question of land reform. Some MDC leaders advocated for radical land redistribution and seemed to endorse ZANU (PF)'s 'fast-track' policy. Others rejected the 'fast-track' approach and advocated for a 'transparent' process of land redistribution. These policy contradictions provided ammunition which the state press used to show that there was no consensus in the MDC regarding the land issue. In 2002, Munyaradzi Gwisai, a vocal MDC legislator

was dismissed after contradicting the party's neo-liberal position on the land issue. I spoke to Gwisai about these contradictions in the MDC approach to land and agrarian reform. He explained:

> The MDC and its ideology were contested right from the start. It was a party that was inspired by working class struggles, youth and student struggles, and the urban poor but there was also a very strong middle class component. In terms of ideological articulation we [workers] lost because the balance of class interests had moved decisively in favour of the neo-liberals. Some of our early demands were: "We want 7 million hectares of land, we support land reform"; "Land to the poor and not to the politicians" but we lost to the powerful influence of white bourgeois farmers in the party. So the message in the elections was essentially around "Mugabe must go'' and not about articulating the substantive socio-economic issues anymore because that could split the broad-based alliance once you start raising those issues. So the message [on the land issue] was vague. The MDC had come up with a fairly radical message at the All Working National People's Convention [in 1999] which was underplayed in our [electoral] campaigns for fear of upsetting the party's funders (Interview with Munyaradzi Gwisai, June 2013, Harare).

The MDC party's response to 'fast-track' was compromised because white commercial farmers "played a key role in the establishment of the party structures and financing the party's activities and its candidates in the June 2000 parliamentary elections" (Interview with Munyaradzi Gwisai, June 2013, Harare). The opposition party's composition, its selection of allies and the policy contradictions particularly on the land issue provided ammunition to its foes to discredit it further. Gwisai also stated that: "Almost every MDC candidate in the parliamentary election was given a white farmer to work with. This is the extent to which whites were involved in the party's activities'' (Ibid.). The state press seized upon the radical views of MDC leaders like Munyaradzi Gwisai to expose the policy contradictions and divisions within the opposition ranks. Munyaradzi Gwisai's views were corroborated by Eddie Cross, the MDC policy advisor, who explained:

> In the beginning, the white commercial farmers were incredibly important to us; I mean if you visited our offices in 2000, you would have seen a majority of white people; if you have visited our offices at Eastgate where we ran our whole campaign in 2000, the majority of volunteers there were white and the white farmers provided us with money, they provided us with vehicles, they provided us with logistics in rural areas then they provided us with intelligence and ZANU (PF) knows that; that's why we were targeted (Interview with Eddie Cross, MDC policy advisor, July 2013, Harare).

Whilst the MDC insisted that it was committed to an orderly land reform that was transparent and done within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human and property rights, its views were thus easily distorted in the state press, particularly with regard to race. In an article titled "MDC's dirty tricks deplorable", which appeared in *The Herald* (27/12/2001), it was reported that MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, was opposed to the distribution of land to blacks because he was protecting the interests of "his white friends". An editorial in *The Sunday Mail* (11/06/00), titled, "Of colonialists and assimilados," stated that:

> These [MDC] are the detribalized Africans who now feel more at home in the company of condescending whites than their fellow blacks. From this group has sprung political parties like the MDC, whom the whites have seen as a convenient front in their bid to recolonize us. This is the group that sees whites as their trusted "cousins", while war veterans and villagers are dismissed as terrorists or squatters. Hence we witness this close relationship between the local whites and the British on one hand and the MDC on the other…..In the unlikely event of the white-backed MDC winning the impending polls, whites and not blacks will genuinely celebrate as this will be a victory of imperialism over African nationalism. To the whites, defeat of ZANU (PF) is defeat of the indigenous people.

We can see the importance of framing in de-legitimising the opposition in the 2000 parliamentary elections. The article cited above portrays the MDC as a front for the British that did not have the interests of blacks, particularly war veterans and rural voters at heart. On the other hand, ZANU (PF) was framed as the embodiment of African nationalism that championed the rights of the indigenous people. There were limits to what the MDC could do in response, considering their lack of access to the state media which ZANU (PF) monopolised. The MDC also lacked access to most rural areas which were sealed off and declared 'no-goes' by ZANU (PF) and war veterans, as we will see in Chapter 8. However, the MDC also failed to provide a robust and convincing response to the 'fast-track' policy. Miles Tendi (2010:9) aptly notes that: "It is incomplete to see the MDC simply as a victim of ZANU (PF)'s uses of history. The MDC had the agency to prevent itself from falling into ZANU (PF)'s constructions and also to make use of the country's past". The MDC's neo-liberal response to 'fast-track' policy was de-legitimised through invoking history but it was also de-legitimised in terms of its failure to address issues of economic and social justice.

Gwisai argues that the prominent role played by white commercial farmers in the MDC during the opposition party's formative years made it difficult for it to formulate a robust response to 'fast-track'. However, other MDC officials expressed contrary views, insisting the MDC articulated its position on the land issue and it was clear that the 'fast-track' exercise was a political project orchestrated by ZANU (PF) to retain power. A senior MDC official, James Makore, who worked in the party's organising department in 1999/2000 said: "It was late when we realised that there is something brewing in 2000. We thought it was a joke and by the time we responded to the situation [of fast-track], it had gotten out of hand, the damage had already been done. We tried our level best as a party even to influence laws in parliament but the situation that was unfolding in the country was untenable. It was *jambanja* (chaos) and it was clear that ZANU (PF) had declared war against the people. We told our supporters not to be involved in this chaotic and violent process" (Interview with James Makore, MDC official, Harare, April 2013). Makore's sentiments were also echoed by MDC Secretary-General, Tendai Biti who said:

> Yeah that's what I'm saying that in the 2000 election, we fought the election on the basis of land. You were around yourself, you remember the t-shirts which we had which were blue and green and which we wrote "land to the people and not to the *chefs*; land to the povo and so forth." We had 5 key issues in 2000. One of them was the economy; one of them was the constitution; one of them was land; one of them was social services delivery and the other one was cultural upliftment of our people. If you go to our adverts and our manifesto, it was anchored on those 5 issues. So land was a clear burning issue and I remember we used to go to rallies where [MDC] President Tsvangirai will be there and I will be asked to speak on both land and the constitution. So you know to submit that the MDC did not have a land policy and did not respond adequately [to fast-track], it's an elitist argument itself which tries to create a framework, a template for us; [to say] this is an elitist party. You give a bad name to a dog then you hang it, which is the disease of academics. Look and you know this again illustrates my point about the fact that this was not a revolution but a planned assault on people's rights by a decapitated state. Just like *Gukurahundi*, many people in Zimbabwe actually didn't know what was happening because it was led from the top. The land revolution… it caught us unawares you know; it was not a revolution, we all knew what was happening. So it caught us unawares. If you go on *www.zimbabwesituation.com*, they have kept their archives. They started keeping archives in March of 2000. You will see sporadic MDC statements. If you go to *Hansard* [parliamentary publications] you will find that there is hardly any debate in 2000 on what was happening. The real debate starts around 2001/2; that's when people actually realize that

> something is happening and has actually happened. People knew that there were problems but white farmers were still there and so forth. So it kind of took Zimbabwe by surprise because it wasn't a revolution. If it was a revolution, we will all have been involved in it but because it was elitist executed, executed by the state, people actually half-knew what was happening; so there was a knowledge gap (Interview with Tendai Biti, April 2013, Harare).

When the MDC did respond to 'fast-track' land reform, it deplored the manner in which it was executed and the violations of human and property rights. However, this response was compromised by policy contradictions in the party and the failure to balance the interests of the white farmers and industrialists who financed the party and those of the majority of its members who wanted land. The views cited above show that there were policy differences within the MDC hierarchy regarding the land issue. These contradictions played squarely into ZANU (PF)'s framing of the party as 'anti-land reform' and that the MDC opposed land reform to appease white farmers who were its financiers and its Western donors.

The neo-liberal ideas of democracy and human rights that the MDC articulated appealed to a number of significant constituencies. However, these ideas played squarely into ZANU (PF)'s framing that the opposition party was a 'stooge' of the British and Western 'imperialists'. The Permanent Secretary in the Information and Publicity ministry, George Charamba, explained how the land issue was framed as an either/or choice between ZANU (PF) which represented "a nationalistic thrust" and the MDC which was framed as an appendage of Britain and the West. Charamba explained:

> The conflict over the land issue was characterised by one side [ZANU (PF)] which represented a nationalistic thrust, pro-poor land reform, very aggressive and interpreting the land question as a continuation of the liberation struggle. On the other hand, you had the so-called mother country [Britain] adopting a pro-white landlord stance and then seeking to cover that up by raising issues of governance so that there is a face of acceptability to its altercation with its former colony. And then internally, you have a party which is also throwing its lot with that anti-land reform programme, the party we call the MDC, right, which we saw as an extension, as an appendage of that British quest for the retention of the land system as we would receive it from the colonial set up. But also internally you have the rise of a very robust civic movement, right and I am using the word civic in quotes because when you interrogate the content, the ideological content of that civic movement, you discover that there is no Chinese wall between it and the MDC as a party. Of course the

> ‘civic’ groups then become the pulpit around which the whole discourse of governance, human rights, rule of law, transparency unfold to try and give it a sense of a movement that is located organically within the politics of the country, a movement that is pre-occupied with concerns which are genuine and which are pro-people. Now if you look at the content of that ‘civic’ movement and the MDC, you discover that its pre-occupations are very elitist and this is made more prominent by the fact that when you are talking about land, you are talking about a very grassroots, peasant-oriented grievance. What is the counter balance? The counter-balance is this, very elitist, cerebral philosophy which is driving the ‘civic’ movement. So in a way, you are looking at an African petty bourgeoisie, literate class which is in fact affiliated to the West parading as ‘civic’ movement and fundamentally opposed to the land reform which is peasant-based. The MDC and its civic allies pre-occupied themselves with the abstract values of democracy, rule of law, governance and so forth. Of course these notions were very fashionable but also the weakness was that they were trying to minister them to a people who were grappling with a very concrete grievance-land (Interview with Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

Charamba’s framing of human rights placed them as part of a Western, bourgeois and ‘cerebral’ project that had nothing to do with the ‘concrete’ concerns of peasants whose interests ZANU (PF) was supposedly concerned about. We have seen that in ‘patriotic history’ the neo-liberal discourses of human rights and good governance were considered as alien and part of the new ‘imperialism’ of the West. To this end, ZANU (PF) ideologues framed the controversial “fast-track” land reform exercise as a redistributive programme to address historical injustices.

In this chapter, I have demonstrated the importance of framing in ZANU (PF)’s legitimation efforts after 2000. We have seen that the narratives that were circulated in the state press were carefully constructed. Even the propaganda that targeted the MDC was based on the opposition party’s miscalculations or blunders such as the policy contradictions on the land issue, the party’s close ties with white farmers and its courtship with the West. This analysis shows the importance of the media in legitimacy construction in a hybrid regime. We need to go beyond the fact of bias and explore how the narratives that were circulated in the state press in Zimbabwe were carefully framed and not just crudely propagandist. We can see that the media is a key legitimation tool used in legitimising power and displacing alternative viewpoints in a hybrid regime when

it is able to achieve a high degree of plausibility by playing on history, real grievances, ideas about race, and the weaknesses of the opposition.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter makes two critical contributions to the overall thesis argument regarding the role of the media in a hybrid regime. First, the chapter gives insight into the means and mechanisms of media control in a hybrid regime. Whilst ZANU (PF) and state elites purged uncooperative journalists and editors who did not tow the party line, they also used non-coercive strategies to control the state press. These hidden strategies of media are preferred in hybrid regimes to create the illusion of media systems that are democratic to evade criticism from opponents and to create legitimacy. As we have seen, the Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, forged close ties with journalists and editors and convened routine media briefings which served as political 're-education' sessions for journalists from the state media on what constituted the 'national' interest and how this was supposed to be reflected in the news. We have also seen that he established a hardworking and hands on style of management and considered history and culture to be at the core of what he was trying to address in the media. Moyo worked to create a committed, self-policing journalistic team that was proud to be associated with him. These strategies were effective means of political control to create a pliant state press. Some journalists and editors whom I interviewed said that they feared "the forces behind the media" and what would happen to them "the morning after publishing the newspaper" if they had distorted or misinterpreted the government position. This chapter also shows that whilst political pressure certainly mattered in shaping 'patriotic journalism', the framing of the land issue in the state press was also informed by journalists' personal experiences and ideological conviction. Just like the state and party officials, the journalists reasoned that "journalism does not exist in a vacuum" but ought to be battened to the people and communities that it serves. They argued that the views of an African journalist are different from a European journalist and this meant they had different standards of what constituted journalistic professionalism. The journalists rejected the liberal notion of professionalism journalism which they said was Western oriented and incompatible with 'African' values.

Secondly, this chapter underscores the centrality of the media and framing as tools for political legitimation in a hybrid system. The narratives that were circulated in the Zimbabwean state press during the "Third Chimurenga" were immaculately framed as we have seen. These narratives tapped into history and culture and addressed real grievances such as the iniquitous nature of land distribution and on-going concerns about race, which resonated with the Zimbabwean populace. We have also seen that even the propaganda that targeted the MDC was based on the opposition party's weaknesses and blunders. The careful construction of content in the state press thus shows the importance of the media and framing in legitimacy construction. However, as noted in the previous chapter, there was continuation of critical journalism in the country and on-going active and vocal opposition. State control of the nominally autonomous public media led to the emergence of alternative media platforms which circulated 'counter-hegemonic' discourses that challenged ZANU (PF) rule as we saw in the previous chapter.

Whilst this and the previous chapter were based on an analysis of ZANU (PF) media policies and content in the state press, I now discuss the role of the 'non-traditional' media or the forms of media drawn from history and culture in the ruling party's survival and legitimation efforts post-2000 focusing on *Chimurenga* (revolutionary) songs and *pungwes* (all-night vigils). These were key sites for propagation and performance of ZANU (PF) 'patriotic history' during the "Third Chimurenga".

Chapter 7

Music, Politics and 'Patriotic History' in Zimbabwe during the "Third Chimurenga"

7.1 Introduction

This chapter contributes to a Zimbabweanist scholarly literature on the media and 'patriotic history'. It explores ZANU (PF)'s creation of artistic work and media platforms such as the musical galas through which 'patriotic history' was disseminated and performed with great creativity and appeal, far beyond the reach of newspapers. The literature on hybrid regimes neglects entirely this very influential branch of media due to a narrow focus on the traditional media (radio, television and newspapers). In this chapter, I discuss *Hondo yeMinda* (Struggle for Land) songs that were produced by the ZANU (PF) government during the "Third Chimurenga". These songs were a key means for disseminating ZANU (PF)'s exclusive nationalist discourses. The songs often featured themes regarding the land issue, patriotism, sovereignty, racism and Pan-Africanism. I discuss the origins of ideas regarding these songs and unpack the different layers of state patronage in their production and circulation. I argue that the ZANU (PF) music strategy was carefully designed institutionally in terms of state patronage and ideologically (in terms of selection of lyrics and framing of themes), which further testifies to the workings of a carefully designed (and historically informed) media strategy. This chapter is based on interviews with Zimbabwean state and party elites and artists and a content analysis of the most prominent songs that were played on national radio, television and at the televised state-sponsored musical galas.

7.2 Music, Politics and the "Third Chimurenga" in Zimbabwe

Several studies acknowledge the importance of music in ZANU (PF) rule post-2000 (Cheater, 2011; Ndlovu-Gathseni and Willems, 2009; Chikowero, 2009, 2011; Thram, 2006; Palmberg, 2004; Eyre, 2001; Sibanda, 2004). Ndlovu-Gathseni and Willems (2009:953) note that there was a flurry of cultural activities such as bashes, musical galas and commemorations that were organised by the ZANU (PF) party "to forge a national consciousness" based on its narrow version of nationalism. The work by Moses Chikowero (2011) acknowledges the centrality of music in ZANU (PF)'s legitimation efforts post-2000. Chikowero argues that music was a crucial ideological instrument "to

articulate and propagate the *Third Chimurenga*" (Chikowero, 2011:292). He argues that the government's music strategy was two-pronged. First, it entailed promoting popular musicians who identified with the ZANU (PF) ideology through providing them with funding to record their songs and giving them unlimited airplay on the state broadcaster under the newly introduced 'local content' policy. Second, the music strategy sought to repress those musicians who held alternative views and exclude their music from airplay on state radio and television (Ibid.). However, Chikowero's narrative does not include the voices of key state and party officials such as Professor Jonathan Moyo (Information minister), George Charamba (Permanent Secretary), Bright Matonga (Deputy Minister in the Information ministry), and others who were responsible for co-ordinating the music project. Chikowero's account lacks the voices of the state and party officials who designed and implemented the *Third Chimurenga* music strategy. This chapter builds on Chikowero's work to shed additional light into the centrality of the music strategy to ZANU (PF)'s survival and legitimation efforts post-2000. I have already made the argument that the ZANU (PF) media strategy during the *Third Chimurenga* was carefully designed institutionally and ideologically and in terms of state patronage. Music was an integral part of the regime's media strategy. I explore the choices made regarding the music strategy by the government officials, state patronage and the selection/framing of song lyrics. This chapter demonstrate the importance of the media and political practices drawn from history and culture in regime legitimation and survival.

The music strategy was spearheaded by the Ministry of Information and Publicity under Jonathan Moyo. The ministry commissioned artists to produce songs and created musical galas at which the artists were invited to perform. The music strategy was also merged with re-branding of state media institutions such as radio and television. In 2004, an unnamed "Features Reporter" with the state-controlled *Sunday Mail* newspaper proclaimed that Moyo's ministry had lived up to the mandate for which it was established. With specific reference to the music strategy, the article reads:

> Instead of announcing the advent of a Third *Chimurenga*, a new war by issuing a Press release, the department demystified the bureaucratic "Press statement regime", unbundled it and started speaking to the people through song–the result was the mother of catalogues, the landmark first step in the on-going new phenomenon of music with a purpose. That result was aptly entitled *Hondo yeminda* (Struggle for land) 1 and 2. The album subtly announced the advent of a fresh war aimed at flushing out

> the remnants of the old neo-colonial order…It was the time of *ivhu kuvanhu* [land to the people] and the Department had scored a double by issuing out a "Press Statement" [on land reform]…reminiscent indeed of the days of the old when the message was sent to the people in song via the *Voice of Zimbabwe* in Lourenco Marques, now Maputo, and Tanzania in the days of the Second *Chimurenga* as the comrades and villagers huddled around the wireless, so too was the department sending to its people, the public through the *Voice of Zimbabwe* but this time in Harare ('Information Department Lives Up to Its Mandate', *The Sunday Mail*, 2004).

The reporter added: "The Department has not only done its job for Zimbabwe, but for Africa and the world. In effect they are now a Department of Information and Publicity in the Office of the President, Cabinet, Continent and the World!" The most prominent songs that were produced during the period and disseminated by Moyo's ministry included: *Chave Chimurenga* (It's now War), *Rambai Makashinga* (Be Resilient), *Sisonke* (Together), "Our Future", *Siyalima* (We are Going to Farm), *Mombe Mbiri Nemadhongi Mashanu* (Two Oxen and Five Donkeys), *Huya Uone Kutapira Kunoita Kurima* (Come and See How Sweet Farming Is) and *Sendekera Mwana Wevhu* (Keep Pushing Child of the Soil). The song *Nhaka Yedu* (Our Heritage) was produced by the Air Force of Zimbabwe, and an 18-track album, *Hondo Yeminda* was produced by 'Cde Chinx', Minister Moyo and the Zimbabwe Police Band. These songs were an important medium in disseminating 'patriotic history'. The primary theme for these songs was the land issue, as the titles indicate. The Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo also wrote some of the songs that he gave to artists to sing. Chikowero (2011:295) argues that:

> Clearly, Moyo and his team of government propagandists were not policy blunderers, as some charged; they knew exactly what they were doing. They initiated a well calculated strategy that involved purging the airwaves of critical songs and independent live discussion forums before flooding them with a particular, monologic state-sponsored musical discourse that applauded land repossession and exalted the selected heroes of the nation, particularly war veterans and Mugabe. The new discourse, reinforced through songs and jingles, exhorted the populace to remain resilient in the face of 'externally-induced economic challenges' caused by Britain and her imperialist allies in an alleged bid to stymie Zimbabwe's revolutionary land reform. The emerging monologic discourse projected Zimbabwean whites and the opposition MDC party as *zvimbwasungata* (sell-outs) conniving with the imperialist Western powers to re-colonise Zimbabwe.

The Third *Chimurenga* songs were a key vehicle for the transmission of 'patriotic history'. The then Minister of Information, Jonathan Moyo justified the music strategy and the role that he played, emphasizing his own credentials as an artist and the centrality of music to Zimbabwean history and culture and denying that the music that was produced by the Information and Publicity ministry was for propaganda purposes:

> If your question is specifically about whether I started making music only this time because of the propaganda purpose, no. I actually took classes in music composition when I was at university. I am a trained song-writer. I can compose a song in minutes. I actually write two or three songs a day and I have done so since I was in high school. When I was in primary school at Magwegwe I was in the school choir and when I went to Mpopoma first, then Kamwala in Zambia and California [USA], I was always interested in music. I completed my school in California and took guitar lessons and decided to take university level courses using the guitar as my instrument of choice to compose music and I have not composed songs of *Chimurenga* kind only. I have composed all kinds of songs, including love songs. The effect of music was profound, it was profound beyond description and that's why I was amused but not surprised that "Rambai Makashinga" had a powerful resonation especially because it was based on the legacy of the liberation struggle. Even those songs that came from the legacy of our culture like "Kutapira kunoita kurima" [a very folk song, you know we were trying to use the fountain of our folk culture. The song, "Mombe mbiri nemadhongi mashanu", a very folk song, the message is about self-reliance and the dangers of having things done for you. So we were turning around music that had its roots in our cultural experience and arranging and presenting it in a manner that spoke to the Third *Chimurenga.* As you know the Second *Chimurenga* had powerful songs which drew from our religious faiths and from our culture. They were very powerful those songs [from the liberation war] and some of them crossed to the Third *Chimurenga* like "Sendekera mwana wevhu", it was a very powerful song from "Sendekera Mukoma Chakanyuka" during the Second *Chimurenga* and we found a way of expressing it for the Third *Chimurenga* (Interview with Jonathan Moyo, April 2013, Harare).

I have argued that the ZANU (PF) media strategy during the "Third Chimurenga" was ambitious looking at the role of state institutions and patronage as well as the careful selection of narratives that were circulated in the state-controlled media and the party's cultural productions. Music was an integral part of the regime's media agenda and also a key means of legitimation. The Department of Information and Publicity also came up with songs such as *Sisonke, Malaika, Come to Victoria Falls* and *Score Warriors* which sought to project a positive image for the country. The then Minister of Information and Publicity, Professor Jonathan Moyo added that:

> But we did other songs like *Malaika*, *Sisonke* etc. The Ruvhuvhuto Sisters did a wonderful song "Come to Victoria Falls down in Zimbabwe". I did a song: "Score Warriors, Go Go Warriors, Score Warriors oooh yeah" which coincided with the first qualification of our Zimbabwe national soccer team for the African Cup of Nations. So there may be a tendency [by some people] there to say *Hondo yeMinda*, yes there was *Hondo yeMinda* with Comrade Chinx and so forth but if you go back we even produced love songs. And if anyone were to look objectively today they will see that contrary to some stuff that we have heard from some misinformed quarters, the music was not propaganda unless if you subscribe to the view that by definition music is propaganda. Well, I think it is the best way of propagating ideas obviously if the view of propaganda is about propagation and then music is a very good way but it's not a way to deaden people's brains so that they become thoughtless and so forth. It was there to motivate, excite and celebrate. That's what information is about; it is not only about press conferences or statements. Information is multi-dimensional. Some of it speaks through the symbols of culture. When the Warriors [national football team] succeed, our information also succeeds because they are projecting our country. When we have a good artist, whether it's Oliver Mtukudzi or Andy Brown or Mbira Dzenharira, if they are doing well, we are speaking through what they do, through their music. So we had a very nuanced but broad-based understanding of information and we were plugged in all those times and we would not miss an opportunity to communicate. The ministry [Department of Information and Publicity] was the barometer of the entire government, so when a Minister of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture is sleeping [on his job] we would not sleep with him (Interview with Jonathan Moyo, April 2013, Harare).

Local history and culture were central to the ZANU (PF) media agenda post-2000. The Third *Chimurenga* songs often invoked history and culture for legitimation. Some of the songs were re-worked versions of the *Chimurenga* (liberation) war songs of the 1970s. The appropriation of these songs was meant to raise ZANU (PF)'s political profile and underscore the party's struggle credentials for legitimation purposes. The revival of *Chimurenga* war songs during the implementation of the Fast-Track Land Reform was intended to draw a historical connection between this controversial exercise and the liberation struggle during which land issue was a major grievance. The manner in which ZANU (PF) creatively re-worked the revolutionary tunes of the hugely legitimate *Chimurenga* war of the 1970s to justify the violent seizure of white-owned land in the early 2000s further demonstrates the importance of history in regime legitimation. We therefore cannot afford to ignore media forms and practices born out of history and culture to fully understand the importance of the media in regime legitimation and

persistence.

The state patronage for musicians like Dickson Chingaira, popularly known as 'Cde Chinx', who was at the forefront of producing some of the songs as the leader of the ZANLA Choir, the Light Machine Gun (LMG), in the 1970s, shows the centrality of history in ZANU (PF)'s legitimation efforts. The state patronized *Chimurenga* artists such as 'Cde Chinx' who genuinely believed in the "Third Chimurenga". The state also patronized novices to promote the "Third Chimurenga" and to be orientated, mainly during galas, by the more accomplished artists such as 'Cde Chinx'. We can see that the patronage strategy was expansive: it entailed working with and supporting accomplished artists like 'Cde Chinx' and other established musicians like Simon Chimbetu, Marko Sibanda, Andy Brown and others but also propping up novices like Last Chiyangwa, popularly known as 'Tambaoga'. In defending his pro-government songs, Andy Brown said that:

> I took a stand on the land reform programme. You cannot have 4,000 people owning 80 percent of the land that is arable, and then have 13 million people scrapping around that…that is a serious injustice. As a musician, and not as a politician, I felt that was seriously unfair, this is the reason why there was a war, and this is the reason why this country had been colonized in the first place. I wanted us to address these injustices, it was not about Mugabe (Andy Brown quoted in 'Singer Andy Brown Dies', *New Zimbabwe News*, accessed online 22 October 2014).

The views expressed by Brown demonstrate that some artists who produced these songs strongly believed in the "Third Chimurenga" and were not cajoled by government as is popularly believed. Whilst ZANU (PF) patronage mattered, some artists felt that they had a moral responsibility to highlight the injustices that the fast-track policy sought to address.

This study also sought to explore the origins of ideas and sources of the songs. The permanent secretary in the Ministry of Information, George Charamba, elaborated on the sources of the songs. He again emphasized the importance of history and culture to what the Ministry of Information and Publicity sought to achieve through the music strategy. As the permanent secretary in the Information ministry, George Charamba worked closely with Moyo in co-ordinating the music strategy. He stated that:

> Well, you see the song form is a key element of the Zimbabwean cultural terrain. When you are looking at that phase [early 2000s], you have three possible sources of the songs: you have the historical source, by way of songs from the liberation struggle which then get re-worked to reflect the pre-occupations of the day. That makes the song form very dynamic and responsive to the ever changing situations. Isn't it interesting that one of the key players is Cde Chinx who is coming from the liberation struggle but who also understands the new struggles and puts on his old garb to yield new tunes that speak to the land issue? But not that alone, he augments himself by bringing in people like the late Andy Brown, Sister Flame and others (Interview with George Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

The Ministry of Information and Publicity also provided support to youths who did not have any connection with the liberation war to produce Third *Chimurenga* songs. We have already seen that the youths shunned patriotic history. As a way to lure these youths, the architects of the music strategy identified youths whom they supported to produce political songs. But not all the youths who produced Third *Chimurenga* songs were supported by the state. Some youths produced political songs because they wanted to be associated with the "Third Chimurenga" for fame and monetary benefits. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity, George Charamba explained:

> Then you also had new singers who, challenged by this tradition, decided to emerge as their own masters. So you have singers who had nothing to do with the liberation struggle, who were not motivated but who literally came to the department to say "I have a song that I have done for land reform programme. I have a song that I have done for the elections. I have a song that I have done for the President. Can I be published?" (Interview with George Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

The other important source of the Third *Chimurenga* songs was the government officials such as Cabinet Ministers Jonathan Moyo and Elliot Manyika and securocrats. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity, George Charamba further explained:

> The third level has to do with compositions by officials and I think the person who ranks foremost is Jonathan Moyo; he was a minister-artist. That phenomenon was key but you also had quite a number of securocrats who were coming in with their war-time songs that they had adapted. I remember the late Menard Muzariri [Director-General of the Central Intelligence Organization], we were flying I think from Dar es Salaam to Harare then he walks to my seat and says (…) I notice you are doing lots

> of songs, can I sell to you this particular song that we used to sing in the early phase of the liberation struggle and the song was "Comrade vane mweya vane mweya wekuda kusunungura Zimbabwe. Hameno zvavo vasina mweya wekuda kusunungura Zimbabwe"/ 'Comrade' has courage to liberate Zimbabwe. Sorry to those who do not have the spirit to liberate Zimbabwe? We then bought that song, gave it to Chinx who then processes it and now it's a recorded song; one of the popular ones actually (Interview with George Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

The ideas or lyrics for some of the songs were written by Minister Jonathan Moyo and passed them on to artists to sing. Moyo also supported independent artists who originated their songs but wanted to promote them on radio, television and the galas. The state supported circulation of these songs on radio, television and the galas. I asked Jonathan Moyo to clarify the purpose of the galas and the role played by his ministry. He said:

> The role of the Ministry of Information was more like a facilitator. After we created the galas and they became an opportunity not only for the artists to create new things but to showcase their old things apart from the songs of the moment along the *Hondo Yeminda* lines. And the public received the galas with amazing spirit of excitement and similarly the artists found that to be an opportunity to showcase their talent and we used the same opportunity to promote content, new content and show that it was possible for our artists to come up with this content for the broadcasting platform and promote professional standards in the industry and a lot of good came out of it because we also insisted that artists who were performing in these galas or recording this music are rewarded properly and treated with respect as professionals through the galas which required state of the art public address systems that were not available in the country at the time and which required music instruments that the artists did not have at the time for a number of reasons including prohibitive duties and so forth. We prevailed on treasury to introduce duty-free importation for music equipment across the industry for the artists, for those who imported public address systems for churches, for those who were running studios and it's a facility that is still there up to this day and to show our commitment, the facility was initiated by us in the Ministry but we housed it in the National Arts Council which is under the Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture and so there was a tremendous development. Right now Zimbabwe has diverse music equipment across the board. It's because of us and the artists continued to import the equipment duty-free, thanks to the Ministry of Information under Professor Moyo. They know that the 75 % local content requirement on ZBC radio channels and TV as well as on the new stations and they have an instrument [the Broadcasting Services Act] to hold them accountable if they don't do that and thanks to Prof Moyo. This period [of the Third *Chimurenga*], was revolutionary from a media point of view and for artists or cultural industry. I see my colleagues in [economic]

> indigenisation struggling with 51 % [local ownership], but we got away with 75 % local content in the media (Interview with Jonathan Moyo, April 2013, Harare).

Moyo's views give insight into a number of key issues regarding the music strategy and how it was institutionally organised, the prominent role played by the Ministry of Information and other state institutions and the different layers of state patronage. The state patronage of music was not just limited to providing monetary benefits to artists or inviting them to sing at the musical galas that were organised by the Ministry of Information but it also entailed coming up with incentives that allowed artists to import musical equipment without paying import duty.

The artists who were commissioned to produce *Hondo Yeminda* songs praised the support that they received from the state. The artists were happy to work with Minister Moyo. I asked a prominent artist 'Cde Chinx' to elaborate further on the nature of the support that he and others received from the Ministry of Information. He explained:

> The Ministry of Information gave us a lot of support in recording and practising the songs. They had seen what we were doing [taking farms as war veterans] and it was a big move, it was really a conquering move that they also wanted to support. All words, all lyrics…there was a lot of drafting with assistance from ministry officials. So everyone had to come in and put his effort; by then it was Professor Moyo. He was very helpful; he made us do it. He even composed 2 songs of *Hondo yeMinda*; we had 13 tracks, 2 albums Volume 1 and 2. All had one message: that we were never going back on taking our land. In doing all this we were inspired by President Mugabe who always said: *Zimbabwe will never be a colony again!* For government's policies to be well received by the people there is need for music. The Minister [Moyo] realised this and he supported the cause. We had a good relationship with him. We were invited to play at the galas that were organized by his ministry and as you can see there are now many *Chimurenga* choirs that have sprouted and we thank the ministry for this (Interview with 'Cde Chinx', March 2013, Harare).

Another artist who produced *Hondo yeMinda* songs, Last Chiyangwa, popularly known as 'Tambaoga' also acknowledged the support from the Minister Moyo. I asked 'Tambaoga' to clarify on the nature of support that he received from Moyo's ministry. This is what he said:

> Yes we worked closely with Professor Moyo to produce *Hondo yeMinda* songs. The Minister was very supportive. He has a strong passion for music. He produced his own songs. The Ministry provided us with the facilities to record the songs and invited us to perform at national events. We were paid good money for recording the songs and the performances. I won't tell you how much we were paid because that's my secret. But it was not money that motivated me

> to sing. I played my part in the 'revolution' (Interview with 'Tambaoga', March 2013, Harare).

Moyo's ministry played an important role in co-ordinating the production and circulation of *Hondo yeMinda* songs. The artists were invited to perform at state-sponsored national events such as musical galas. However, the artists were not just lured by monetary benefits but they genuinely believed in the political project.

In this section, I sought to disentangle the layers of state patronage and support for the production and circulation of *Third Chimurenga* music. Whilst the songs were sung by artists such as 'Tambaoga' and 'Cde Chinx', some of the lyrics originated from the Information and Publicity ministry. The Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, was personally involved in the writing of lyrics for some of the songs. The state also provided financial support to some artists to record their music which they promoted on radio, television and televised galas. State patronage was a key strategy to influence the work of artists to ensure that they produced songs that were acceptable to the establishment. But as we have seen, state patronage was not just limited to funding, it also involved coming up with ideas for the songs and promoting the songs on radio, television and the galas. We have also seen that the music strategy was merged with re-branding of state media after the introduction of the 75 per cent local content policy in the media as part of the broadcasting regulations introduced in 2000. The local content policy created a vehicle for the circulation of ZANU (PF) songs on national radio, television and the galas. In the section below, I discuss the music strategy and local content policy that was introduced by the Ministry of Information and Publicity in 2001.

7.3 The Music Strategy and the Local Content Policy

The local content policy that was introduced by the ZANU (PF) government in the media as part of the broadcasting law in 2001 was part of a more sophisticated strategy of media control. This strategy was targeted at achieving legitimation through an emphasis on local history and culture. The introduction of the 75 per cent local content policy in the media (aiming for 100 per cent) saw the removal of programmes from CNN, BBC, Sky News and other foreign media outlets from the state broadcaster, ZBC. Jonathan Moyo, who as we have seen was in charge of the Ministry of Information and Publicity, justified the move thus:

> The major policy thrust was getting people and in the first place the media practitioners in the public media to understand that the media is about the community in question and less about the perceived notions or ideas of celebrating other people's achievements or history but about projecting and celebrating and defending our own culture and so forth. Therefore the issue that is fundamental in the media is not what microphones you are using, what transmitter you are using, important as that may but what content do we have and that for the activity of the media or the enterprise thereof to be meaningful, the content must be local. Probably 100 per cent content but if for colonial reasons and whatever structural problems of the past we were not able to do that and if there are some among us who are so fanciful to say, "Well we belong to the global village, let's have that … [foreign content]", then we must make sure that at least 75 per cent of that content in the media is Zimbabwean. So, clearly as the Minister [responsible] and the colleagues I was working with in the Ministry led by the Permanent Secretary who was George Charamba who certainly made those policies to direct that we have local content. It was to me quite absurd and unacceptable that 20 years after independence our public media in the form of radio, television and so forth was dominated by foreign content and we discovered that when we have foreign content then we have a historical challenge such as was presented by the land reform programme then you have discord influence. The time I became Minister of State for Information and Publicity in 2000, I was shocked by the fact that the absence/lack of content conveniently got ZBC to automatically switch to CNN for free and CNN was allowing them to carry their signals for free until such time when they were able to have their own content and on a 24-hour cycle. There were more hours for CNN to pass its signals via ZBC for free. So we were getting on CNN attacks on the land reform programme saying "these people [land occupiers] are too young to be war veterans, these invaders, what, what" and they were saying on CNN an imperialistic narrative that was being channelled via our own national broadcaster which was using frequency spectrum allocated to Zimbabwe under the ITU regulation and that was, I actually thought, that was criminal you see and I believe it was even as I reflect now about it. So, we realised that we needed to change and deal with this from a policy point of view as decision-makers. We needed to teach these people that broadcasting is not about signal and so forth, it's content. If there is no content, there is no broadcasting (Interview with Jonathan Moyo, April 2013, Harare).

The local content policy paved way for the introduction of ZANU (PF) propaganda programmes on the state broadcaster as 'local' content. These programmes included liberation war documentaries, songs and current affairs programmes such as *Nhaka Yedu* (Our Heritage), *Talking Farming, Living Traditions* and *National Ethos* which were centred on the liberation struggle and the land issue. A ZANU (PF) media strategist, Tafataona Mahoso who anchored some of the current affairs programmes on Zimbabwe Television (ZTV), said that the local content policy was part of a broader strategy to reorient the media towards culture and history:

> The media had to be re-positioned and it was really the cultural element which re-positioned the media. When Professor Moyo came up with the local content policy what was funny to me, because I sat in that conference when the policy was announced, was that journalists opposed it but cultural workers-film makers, dancers, musicians, theatre people, novelists and so forth embraced the new policy. That really struck me to say aah so this is the nature of our media in Zimbabwe. Our understanding was that cultural workers are also communicators, they are also part of media but they are not treated as part of media by journalists. We saw communication in a much broader sense than journalism. When the local content policy was introduced, almost all journalists opposed it but the rival parties praised it: sculptors, dancers, they were impressed. I think that dichotomy poses a question about the nature of journalism and the training in our country [which is Western oriented]. (Interview with Tafataona Mahoso, April 2013, Harare).

The architects of the ZANU (PF) media strategies considered history and culture to be an important part of what they were trying to achieve in the media. The state officials said that they considered media or information to be multi-dimensional and that history and culture were part of it. Mahoso's views on the importance of local history and culture were also corroborated by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information, George Charamba, who was directly responsible for this policy. Charamba said:

> The 75 per cent local was something which had its own basis in our politics. We wanted to have a voice and I remember I kept adverting the Minister's attention to a quote from Chinua Achebe which says, 'let's go to the world cultural festival but with a dish of our own'. That was key; that was key to my own sensibility as the head of the Ministry. Secondly, I used to derisively refer to the ZBC that, look at them, they look like hands, pleading hands accosting the world for content. I did not want Zimbabwe to be a receiver nation of foreign programmes. I wanted it to be a speaking nation, a broadcasting nation not a relay nation. So the whole notion of triggering a whole movement around creation of local content, around putting onto the world screen our own cultural productions and contribute to the world culture has always been upper most in my mind but I earned difficulties. One key casualty of the altercation between us and the West was the funding of the Film School. Remember we had created a school under UNESCO, much of it donor-driven. The West decided they were not going to fund the project. They said they wanted to move it to Namibia. We were still waiting for donor money until we took a decision as a Ministry to say, if they won't fund it that's our greatest opportunity of creating a national institution. We are going to fund it and the monies were small but slowly we started crawling onto the pedestal until we made it; why? Because we had 75 per cent local content as a legislative fate [as part of the Broadcasting Services Act] but we did not have the industrial voice for it. So we had a declaration of law minus the infrastructure to validate it and skills were key. So you notice, we have been very benign in our enforcement of the 75 per cent local content for the

> simple reason that we are waiting for the infrastructure and the skills to be in place (Interview with George Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

The 75 per cent 'local' content in the state media paved way for the introduction of ZANU (PF) propaganda programmes on the state broadcaster. Taking advantage of the 'local' content policy, ZANU (PF) introduced *Hondo yeMinda* songs alongside other propaganda programmes on ZBC radio and television. The music strategy was also merged with re-branding of state media institutions. For instance ZBC *Radio 3* was changed to *Power FM*. A major goal was to lure youth through introducing programmes and music that suited their tastes on the newly created *Power FM*. The Permanent Secretary in the Information ministry, George Charamba, said that youths were targeted through the music for political re-orientation. Charamba stated that:

> The problematic stratum in terms of our politics at the time [early 2000s] was the youths. They had been battened on to the MDC politics. They were a very difficult constituency to satisfy; they had been de-linked from the politics of the liberation struggle. So we said, what do we do with this problematic stratum? I said to the Minister [Moyo]: "You know what, this has been a pop station meant for the youths and this is the very difficult stratum for us politically. We want it socialised [according to the ideology of ZANU (PF)] but it's a stratum whose attention span is very short; it's a stratum which is always looking for trendy things. There is this RnB, this hip hop movement in Europe which they are keen on. Now let's do like the Australians did best, namely to take formats like 'Neighbours' and then fill them with Australian content. So let them do their hip-hop but let us give them a tool called [Radio] *Power FM*. The station must dedicate itself to simply get in these boys and girls to play their songs; never mind the quality level by way of recording, by way of lyrics and by way of everything just let them get used to playing here rather than play outside. I remember we took a decision in that seminar that this station must re-brand and the first to be digitalised. So I then said to the Minister in that seminar that this is one station which is going to sell its own sound; it must have power, it must be explosive but, you know, which is the beauty about Jonathan [Moyo], he quickly picked a good idea and he said why don't we re-brand it 'Power FM'? That is how the station came to be known as *Power FM*. That is how we created *Power FM* and delivered it to the youths. But we also said now that the youths are on the grid, they are on board; let's nudge them towards more creative work. Of course for them to be associated with *Power FM*, the lyrics had to be either playful or political. This was not a requirement but there is something that an environment does to an artist by way of trimming their messages that are not compliant (Interview with Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2009) make the observation that there was a deliberate effort to incorporate youths into the ruling party's nationalist project through a combination of coercion

and consent. They note that: "The toughest job for ZANU (PF) at the beginning of 2000 was to foster 'patriotism', as founded on memories of the liberation struggle, among youth who had not experienced the war. Coercion alone was proving inadequate as a political survival strategy" (Ibid: 954). *Power FM* was meant to provide the youths with a platform to play and listen to their preferred music. The introduction of the local content policy saw the growth of the music genre called 'urban grooves' whereby Zimbabwean youths produced songs that mimicked Western RnB and hip-hop music. The state-controlled newspaper, *The Herald*, stated that:

> Among policies and legislation that have been proposed and enacted to protect and promote local artists since independence, the 75 per-cent local content regulation remains a cut above the rest following the rise of youthful generations of talented musicians with different flairs since the early 2000s. While the regulation was met with criticism when it was proposed, its results are now written on the wall for all to see. It gives local filmmakers and musicians a platform for exposure. The legislation has mainly given youthful artists a platform to showcase their talent in an industry that previously posed stiff competition for upcoming musicians as they battled for airplay with established local musicians and international stars. The local content provision is in the Broadcasting Services Act and stipulates that local television and radio stations should give at least 75 per cent of airplay to Zimbabwean artists and productions. Since it came into effect, Zimbabwe has witnessed a massive rise of talent and many young musicians have made it into the mainstream sector. In the early 2000s, an army of young musicians pursuing various urban genres that became classified under the Urban Grooves umbrella invaded the music industry. So powerful was the invasion that established musicians of that time felt the pressure from the youngsters. Besides claiming a good share of airplay, the youthful musicians also resultantly pocketed handsome royalties (Godwin Muzari, 'From Urban Grooves to Zimdancehall…75 per cent local content nurtures young talent', *The Herald*, 16 April 2015).

The then Deputy Minister of Information and Publicity, Bright Matonga, spoke about the benefits that ZANU (PF) sought to reap from the "Third Chimurenga" music and the targeting of youths:

> The *Chimurenga* songs played a very important role to motivate people during the liberation struggle. When you knew you were down but if you sing the revolutionary songs you would be motivated to continue the struggle. So we used the same *Chimurenga* songs that we used in the 1970s to motivate the people, to bring back the memories. We also wanted to instil that in young people to say that we are here because of the people who died during the war defending our freedoms. So we wanted to bring them [youths] on board through music and dancing. The videos played a very important role. The *born frees* [people born after independence in 1980] who couldn't even speak a word of Shona but preferred English, they were there dancing on that music. They

> wanted to listen to American music, RnB and we encouraged them to produce the local version of that music. We encouraged the youths to be creative and to sing proudly about their country. You know when you are young and never thought that you could hear your voice on radio or TV, it was something that the youths were excited about (Interview with Bright Matonga, April, 2013 Harare).

State patronage of youths was also achieved through seasoned artists. 'Cde Chinx' said: "We targeted the youths because they are the future of our country. They are the ones who were being misled by the MDC to resist land reform. So we wanted the youths to know about the importance of land. They were being told lies by their leaders that they should worry about jobs and not land. We were also targeting their leaders who misled them that land was not important. Through our music we managed to show people the light so that they support land reform because it was one of the main reasons we took up arms against colonial rule in Rhodesia" (Interview with 'Cde Chinx', March 2013, Harare).

State patronage was also achieved through provision of financial support to youths to produce songs which supported land reform. Most of the artists were novices who could not survive outside of state patronage partly due to the harsh economic situation that was prevailing in the country during this period. Music was one of the strategies through which ZANU (PF) sought to re-orientate youths to 'patriotic history'. But it was crucial for some of the music which propagated 'patriotic history' to be produced by the youth themselves. The support from the state was therefore important. Below, I discuss the role musical galas that were sponsored by the Ministry of Information and Publicity at which the artists were invited to perform. The musical galas were important platforms for the dissemination of 'patriotic history'.

7.4 The Musical Galas and the "Third Chimurenga" in Zimbabwe

The musical galas that were organised by the Ministry of Information and Publicity were crucial platforms for the dissemination of 'patriotic history'. The galas were normally held over-night to mirror the *pungwes* (all-night gatherings) that were held by nationalists during the 1970s liberation struggle. The galas were also modelled along the *biras* (traditional night gatherings) practiced by the Shona people and characterised by drumming, music and beer drinking. The artists were attracted to these galas because they were broadcast live on television and they wanted to get fame. The artists also performed at state functions because "the government was paying good money" (Interview with 'Cde Chinx', 14th March 2013, Harare). Some artists who produced 'urban grooves' music were later invited to perform at state-

sponsored galas. The politically-charged environment of the galas forced these youths to produce tunes that were in support of ZANU (PF) policies. The Permanent Secretary in the Information ministry, George Charamba, said that the musical galas were an important platform to promote the political songs. He said:

> When the Ministry assisted in the composition of the songs we moved a step further to provide a platform for that artistic expression. The notion of galas came into being precisely as a culmination point, as a high point of the Ministry's involvement in creative work. We had several artists who we had published and whose lyrics were heavily political. Now, yes, you could provide airplay on radio and television but that was not enough. We wanted to introduce the artists so that the artists could actually develop and derive some livelihood out of their own creative work. So I remember one evening we sat down with the Professor [Moyo] and I said to him, "Well, Comrade Minister you have done wonderfully well, you have all these albums that we have published and note there are quite a number of albums which were accredited to the Ministry of Information except these artists are not making money, these artists are struggling and will keep coming back to us for more funding and we will not be able to fund them all the time". But two things happened in our favour. We had Murerwa as Finance Minister who himself is an artist and the Governor of the Reserve Bank who grasped the value of the song form in mobilising the country for resistance that we were mounting; remember that we were under a real withering attack from the British. So we sat down and I said well these people can't keep coming back to us. In any case we are out, yes, to defend the revolution but most importantly to launch an industry. *But much more, the initial reaction of the music industry was to shun all singers who had something to do with the state, who had something to do with the politics of the state. We had some artists who didn't think it was healthy for them to be close to power* [my emphasis]. Secondly, you had music publishers who didn't know how to relate to this new type of music; never mind that historically the political songs have always been a key component of their own productions. But also the MDC had grounding in white industrialists and good grounding in labour. So in a way, the music industry which was a sprout of the larger industry assumed a certain negative attitude to what was happening in the country. So the publishers were not very sure in terms of how to respond. The third factor was the media and you know, the media is the oxygen to any artist. So you had a very vocal private media which gave names against any artist who was associated with the state (Interview with Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

The ZANU (PF) propaganda songs were shunned by some producers. Some artists who produced *Third Chimurenga* songs were shunned by producers as revealed by Charamba. To address this problem, the architects of the ZANU (PF) media strategy devised ways of promoting these songs through galas. Charamba explained the importance of the musical galas to promote the songs. He said:

> The political song came into being in a very hostile environment [due to political polarisation and shunning of the political songs by recording companies and some music promoters] which led the state to not just create the artist but also defend his platform. How were you going to do that? Well, we said let's start musical festivals but musical festivals that would go inside with major calendar events of the country and you notice tactically we started on Independence Day because we knew there was general consensus that the 18th of April is a significant day. Then we moved further and said now we have Heroes Day, we could afford controversy around that one because then we would challenge anyone who opposes any commemoration of heroes to say what are your politics if you are against the founding process of this nation, how do you claim membership to it? So we did a second gala and with each gala which was televised and therefore which ensured that the artists became a household name overnight. You found that new artists who had nothing to do with the politics of the country started signing on. They [youths] were a very difficult constituency to satisfy; they had been de-linked from the politics of the liberation struggle. In fact, these were the *born-frees* who had not been socialised by the liberation struggle. So we said what can we do with this problematic stratum? That's how we created *Power FM*; we then delivered it to the youths who started playing [their music]. A lot of these young artists are a product of that initiative but we also said, now we have them on the grid, they're now on the rail, let's nudge them towards more creative work. How do we do it? Place them on the galas. So we would put them on galas and they would get booed and slowly they realised that they needed to improve their rating as artists (Interview with Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

The architects of the ZANU (PF) music strategy also sought to project the songs as nationalistic and non-partisan for legitimation. The remarks by Charamba show that the music strategy was carefully designed in terms of state patronage of musicians, publicising the songs and targeting of particular demographics such as the youths. The music strategy again testifies to the workings of well-calculated strategy.

However, the ZANU (PF) songs were not always well received. Musicians who associated with the regime such as Simon Chimbetu and Andy Brown alienated their supporters. Those who did were booed at the galas and their music was shunned. The popularity of Simon Chimbetu waned after he supported the controversial "fast-track" policy. In 2002, Chimbetu produced *Hoko* (Land Peg) in support of 'fast-track' land redistribution. He was also given a farm under the 'fast-track' programme. Andy Brown also alienated his fans when he produced pro-regime songs. He was bashed and stoned by fans when he turned up for shows whilst others tried to burn down his house (Chikowero, 2011). Some musicians were booed at the musical galas.

This resentment towards artists shows that the "Third Chimurenga" songs were not always well received.

The themes of the musical galas were carefully selected in line with ZANU (PF)'s political goals as revealed by but some of the events were not couched in political terms but rather as national events to appeal to all Zimbabweans regardless of political affiliation. Bright Matonga, the then Deputy Minister of Information and Publicity said that the galas were an important platform for the patronage of artists. He said:

> You go into the studio and pay for recording, quickly you make a video and we have it on air, so these were the benefits. So that's what made a lot of musicians come on board because they were promoted financially and had easy access to the studios. We even bought time for the studio for them to record and we supported them with creativity and that was very key. On radio and television music was nearly 90 per cent foreign; it was dominated by South African and Western music. So we removed all the foreign music. It was now Zimbabwean music through and through. At first people didn't appreciate but with propaganda you have to keep on repeating until its gets into people's heads. Those whose music did not support our cause were ignored. If you're a rebel, that's how you will be treated. No one would care about you, you become history like Thomas Mapfumo, he left the country. If you look at the generation now, they don't know who he is. You were just left like that because you can't invite your enemy to your wedding, so they were left out. We can't say they were victimised, no one would play your music (Interview with Matonga, April 2013, Harare).

The musical galas further demonstrate that the ZANU (PF) media strategy during the "Third Chimurenga" was carefully designed. We have seen the different layers of state patronage in the production and circulation of the political songs. The musical galas were organised around iconic nationalists such as Vice-Presidents Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda and around key national days such as Independence and Heroes Days. These galas were broadcast live on *Zimbabwe Television* (ZTV).

Whilst some artists who produced the political songs and performed at the galas were only reluctantly political, others were passionate ZANU (PF) supporters. It was also strategic for ZANU (PF) to use famous artists such as 'Cde Chinx' in its propaganda. 'Cde Chinx' is a ZANU (PF) cadre and former ZANLA freedom fighter who is proud of the role that he played in both the 1970s liberation struggle and during the 'fast-track' process. State patronage of *Chimurenga* artists such as 'Cde Chinx' served to justify the claims that Fast Track Land

Reform constituted the "Third Chimurenga' that is to say, the third and final phase of the liberation struggle which required the same veterans of the 1970s to play the same role as they did then. It was also strategic to patronise prominent artists such as 'Cde Chinx' to 'orientate' novice artists to produce songs which supported the status quo. The then Deputy Minister of Information and Publicity, Bright Matonga said:

> We also invited them to play at the music galas and the whole country was watching. Now there you are playing in front of 50 000 people in the stadium, being watched all over the country and then people will start talking about you. So if you are a musician out there who hasn't been active you also want to invite your colleagues and show off. So those guys became famous overnight and also made a lot of money because we paid them handsomely (Interview with Matonga, April 2013, Harare).

Former Minister of Information and Publicity, Sikhanyiso Ndlovu said that the musical galas were important platforms to lure young artists and give them exposure. He stated that:

> The galas were important platforms for upcoming artists. There were so many artists who were not known and who would have never been known if the galas had not happened. They were meant to give exposure to budding artists to be recognised. The galas were going from province to province and we had some in memory of our nationalist leaders like Dr Joshua Nkomo. About the themes of the songs, we made sure that the composers or the singers should adhere to the theme of the gala. The theme of the gala was always guided by patriotism. We told the artists to aim at being successful. From one gala to the next and you find that artists would continue until some are picked by sponsors (Interview with Sikhanyiso Ndlovu, April, 2013, Harare).

As the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity, George Charamba, played a prominent role in designing and co-ordinating the music strategy. He gave insight into how he and others behind the music strategy slowly introduced a more partisan agenda in the galas without needing to impose it coercively. He stated:

> Then we built more galas around Joshua Nkomo [the late Vice President and ZAPU leader] and we knew where the appeal of Dr Nkomo was. Apart from being national, it was also more intense in Matabeleland and no one would attack any hand which was in honour of the old man. Then we had to balance it off, we then had to do another one for Mzee [in honour of the late Vice President Simon Muzenda], after all Muzenda was addressed as 'the soul of the nation' so what more appropriate form to celebrate his greatness than the song form. So Independence, Heroes, *Umdala Wethu* [Nkomo] and *Mzee* [Muzenda] Galas and with each event we were now facing a problem of new artists wanting to join but for you to join, we didn't ask for a political song, we knew the environment was going to do the rest for us. You are in a gala which is heavily political and where the leading artists are political artists that will force you to want to compose

> something which is appropriate for the day. The last gala to be introduced was the President's 21st February Movement Gala [to commemorate President Mugabe's birthday]. Deliberately we had to get the concept of the gala accepted around fixtures which had little controversy and then after that introduce the old man who was himself, by the way, a living politician, his opponents were there and therefore anything that we would do in honour of him would be viewed as partisan. So sell the idea, build acceptance around it and then slowly nudge it towards embracing the number one icon, the President of Zimbabwe-Mugabe. It doesn't matter what your politics are, that guy has earned his place in history. You might divide him now but the point is you can't take away what he has done in history. So there we were, we introduced the gala about the President and it was a big hit. So now the music form became not just important but it had also assumed a platform, then we lent it to ZBC because the state broadcaster was having content problems (Interview with Charamba, March 2013, Harare).

We can see that the music strategy was carefully designed. Charamba and others who were behind this strategy thought through their decisions regarding the galas, patronage of artists and when to introduce ZANU (PF) propaganda. They politicised the galas subtly through the songs and patronage of political artists such as 'Cde Chinx' to orientate the young artists to produce "Third Chimurenga" songs, and by slowly creating increasingly partisan platforms, culminating a celebration of Mugabe himself.

The state also put in place measures to exclude music produced by independent artists such as Thomas Mapfumo, Oliver Mtukudzi, Leonard Zhakata and others which they deemed politically unpalatable. The music which challenged ZANU (PF) and Mugabe and exposed corruption and misrule was not played on radio and television. Those artists who were critical of the government were simply not invited to the galas. The music that was considered 'politically incorrect' did not receive airplay on radio or television either. Speaking at a seminar on music censorship held in Harare in 2005, Leonard Zhakata, a prominent Zimbabwean musician said:

> If I sing about holding on to power, people think that I am singing about President Mugabe. But there are many people holding on to power in companies etc. If I sing about change, people think that I want the ruling party to be replaced. The real sad thing is that our sole broadcaster, ZBC, has also fallen into this mischief. The station has misinterpreted several of my songs and classified them as politically incorrect. I have several new music videos which I have prepared and given to ZBC for aerial promotion but they have never been played. In making follow ups, I have received conflicting statements as to why my music is not being played [on radio and television].But I have high hopes that art stays longer and that with time my music will be played. I am eagerly waiting that time when the airwaves will be free to play my music and hopefully

> that of other musicians who have been affected by this informal censorship… My situation and that of other musicians has been made worse by the fact that we do not have independent radio and television stations that can offer alternatives. This has left ZBC with a monopoly to blacklist songs it sees as politically incorrect (Zhakata, L. "Personal Experience", Six Articles on Music Censorship in Zimbabwe, Mannenberg Jazz Club, Harare, 28 April, 2005).

We can thus see that the Ministry's strategy was to politicise all music and close down other spaces completely. This was to be achieved through what Zhakata calls 'informal censorship' that was practiced by the state broadcaster. This was achieved through side-lining music that was considered politically incorrect on the state broadcaster and non-selection of artists to perform at the state-sponsored galas. The protest music by a *Chimurenga* artist, Thomas Mapfumo, was also side-lined on ZBC for being critical of ZANU (PF) policies. Mapfumo's music was explicitly anti-ZANU (PF) and thus it was treated with greater hostility. In his song 'Marima Nzara', Mapfumo criticised the controversial seizure of white-owned farms as ill-conceived. The lyrics ran: "You [government] have lost the plot by expelling the farmers who provide food. You are inviting poverty". Mapfumo was forced into exile in 2005 after allegedly receiving threats from government agents.

There was no official ban of protest music produced by Mapfumo and other artists but the government put mechanisms on the state broadcaster not to play the music. The managers at ZBC issued continuity sheets which specified the music those presenters were supposed to play. The journalists and disc jockeys at ZBC exercised self-censorship which largely emanated from the working conditions that the government created at the state broadcaster. A disc jockey who worked at the state broadcaster explained:

> Self-censoring is huge here, and huge on radio. It's very hard to describe that unless you've been involved in it. As you drive in ZBC, there are guys with guns at the gate. And you walk through and the receptionist just looks at you, and you go in and there is this sort of deathly silence, and you open the mic, there's this like fog that envelopes you and you just know what you can't say. No one has to tell you (Banning Eyre's interview with ZBC DJ-1, Harare, March 2001).

In this section, I have discussed how the ZANU (PF) music strategy during the "Third Chimurenga" was institutionally organised, the different levels of state patronage and how the music strategy was merged with the re-branding of state media institutions such as ZBC radio and television through which the songs were promoted in order to appeal to youth. The

government also organised musical galas at which the music was promoted. As we have seen, these galas were organised around key nationalist figures such as Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda to pave the way for the explicitly partisan celebration of Mugabe. The use of more neutral and popular figures such as Joshua Nkomo in the music strategy was a critical means for ZANU (PF) legitimation. The galas were also organised around national days such as Independence Day and Heroes Day to highlight the importance of the liberation struggle and the sacrifices made during the liberation struggle for legitimation purposes. Equally, the use of seasoned artists with unquestioned liberation credentials such as 'Cde Chinx' was also strategic. These liberation war artists were important in orientating the young artists to produce songs which promoted 'patriotic history'. The use of seasoned artists such as Cde Chinx was also intended to elevate the "Third Chimurenga" to the same status as the 1970s liberation struggle against colonial rule during which he had played a similar role. We saw in Chapter Four that 'Cde Chinx' led the ZANLA Choir in the 1970s which produced *Chimurenga* (revolutionary) songs that 'won the war' against colonial rule. We can thus see that the music strategy was multi-layered and carefully designed institutionally and in terms of its uses of history, culture and the state as the patron.

In the section below, I analyse the framing of content of *Hondo Yeminda* (Struggle for land) songs to understand the themes that were selected and given salience.

7.5 The Content of *Third Chimurenga* Songs

In this section, I analyse the content of *Third Chimurenga* songs. This analysis contributes to our understanding of the themes that were selected in 'patriotic history' and how they were framed. The studies on 'patriotic history' are overly biased towards ZANU (PF) strategies in the mainstream media (radio, television and newspapers). These studies neglect the role of the 'non-traditional' media such as songs in ZANU (PF) legitimation and survival efforts post-2000. Music was a key medium in the transmission of 'patriotic history'. I analyse the lyrics of *Third Chimurenga* songs to understand the themes that were selected and why. For purposes of brevity, I limit my analysis to the following prominent songs: *Rambai Makashinga* (Continue to Endure), *Kuminda* (To the Fields), *Agirimende* (Agreement), "Zimbabwe" and *Hondo yeMinda* (Struggle for Land). I chose these songs because they were the ones that prominently featured on ZBC and the galas. I also selected these songs because they were sung by artists whom I interviewed such as 'Cde Chinx' and 'Tambaoga' during my field trip to Zimbabwe in 2013.

This analysis is also based on my interviews with these artists to trace the origins of ideas, the selection of themes for the songs, and relations of patronage with state and party actors. This section shows that the lyrics of the "Third Chimurenga" songs were carefully constructed to address historical and current grievances of particular constituencies. These songs confirm what studies in 'patriotic history' have explained, that the political ideas that were circulated by ZANU (PF) tapped into real grievances such as unequal land distribution, racism and labour exploitation.

Song 1: *Rambai Makashinga* (Remain Steadfast), 2000

The song 'Rambai Makashinga' (Remain Steadfast) is arguably the most prominent song that was aired on ZBC after 2000. A survey that was carried out in 2003 showed that the song was played approximately 288 times a day on ZBC radio stations while the video was played approximately up to 72 times a day on Zimbabwe television (Sibanda, 2004). The lyrics of "Rambai Makashinga" were written by Minister Moyo as revealed by Last Chiyangwa, the artist who sang it. Popularly known as 'Tambaoga', Last Chiyangwa only rose to fame during the "Third Chimurenga" when he was engaged by Minister Moyo to produce music in support of the 'fast-track' land reform programme. Tambaoga says that he had always been a musician but that he had struggled to produce his music due to lack of funding until he received support from Moyo's ministry. The relationship between 'Tambaoga' and Moyo's ministry is a clear case of patronage. In an interview, 'Tambaoga' explained:

> The lyrics of *Rambai Makashinga* came from government. I am not the one who wrote the song. It was written by the Professor [Minister Jonathan Moyo] and he gave us the lyrics. He was very supportive and made us realise our dreams. So he had more understanding of where most of us [artists] were coming from and the challenges that we were facing. As a Zimbabwean and a patriot, I deserve all the support that I got from government. I was given enough space and each time I wanted to see the minister it was possible to get an appointment with him. If I had my song the minister assisted in producing the album. That's how I used to get assistance and it is still happening (Interview with 'Tambaoga', March 2013, Harare).

Again, we can see that the state's patronage of artists was not limited to provision of financial support for the production and circulation of these songs. As we have already established, the state patronage also entailed provision of the ideas and lyrics for the songs, as confirmed by Tambaoga.

The central theme of this song is the land issue which was framed in historical terms as the outstanding goal of the liberation struggle. Each time the song was played on television and radio it was signed off with the words, *"Rambai Makashinga,* Our Land is Our Prosperity". The song makes reference to the war of liberation: "This land, we fought for it, we took it by force". The video of the song depicts an agricultural boom as a result of 'fast-track' land reform. The lyrics "*Rambai Makashinga* born frees" (Remain Steadfast born frees) remind Zimbabwean youths about the centrality of the land question during the liberation struggle. The song equates land with sovereignty and urges Zimbabweans to "till the land with determination". The song urges people to "remain steadfast", "work the land" and "build our nation". Part of the lyrics of 'Rambai Makashinga', translated into English, are as follows:

Now we have the Land let us remain steadfast
Remain steadfast now that the Land is yours
Remain Steadfast Land is now ours
Remain steadfast Now that we have the land
We are now ruling our country
Remain steadfast
We took the Land through war
We shall till the land with determination

Remain Steadfast
Always remain steadfast
Have a bumper harvest Zimbabwe
Have a bumper harvest Zimbabwe

Take the hoe and till the land
Work with determination
Harvest with this harvester
Plough with this plough
Harvest with this harvester
We took the land through war
Have a bumper harvest father and mother
Have a bumper harvest Zimbabwe
Remain steadfast the youths
Remain steadfast born frees
Remain steadfast mothers

Rambai Makashinga thus appeals to Zimbabwean men, women and youths to work with determination on the plots that they were allocated by government to realise bumper harvests. The repetition of the lyrics "We took the land through war" served to remind Zimbabweans about the sacrifices made during the liberation struggle where the land issue was a central grievance. This message was intended to mobilise ordinary people to support the land redistribution exercise. I asked 'Tambaoga' to clarify on the origins of the song and its content. This is what he said:

> As artists, we are mirrors of society, we reflect on what is happening in society as messengers sent to deliver a true picture of what is happening. When I sang *Rambai Makashinga*, I wanted to deliver a message to the people that they should remain steadfast in light of the problems that we were facing in the country such as food shortages. I wanted to keep people motivated and urge them to stay strong because *muhondo zvinoitika kuti mumwe munhu anoneta, mumwe munhu anoyeverwa, munhu anoremerwa, mumwe munhu anonyengwa… ehe varipo vakawanda vakadaro. Zvakaitika nguva iyoyo yehondo iyi yeThird Chimurenga* (In a war situation some people get tired, complacent or co-opted by the enemy. A lot of things happened during the Third Chimurenga), (Interview with Last Chiyangwa *aka* Tambaoga, March 2013, Harare).

The content of *Rambai Makashinga* was meant to motivate people, revealed by Tambaoga. It applied to ordinary people who were urged to endure the economic hardships and rally behind the government. The song also targeted those who had doubts about the "Third Chimurenga". Tambaoga's message to people was thus that they should 'remain steadfast' and support the 'revolution' and not to be co-opted by the 'enemy'.

Song 2: *Kuminda* (To the Fields), 2001

The song *Kuminda* (To the fields), was also sung by 'Tambaoga' with the support of the Ministry of Information and Publicity. This song received generous airplay on radio and television and was also promoted at state-sponsored musical galas. The song tackles a wide range of themes such as colonial injustices, labour, race and national heritage. It calls on Zimbabweans to take back the farms still owned by white farmers. *Kuminda* frames the land issue in historical terms and dwells on the segregationist policies of the white settler regime in Rhodesia.

Part of the lyrics of this song, translated into English, are as follows:

> *They [whites] were used to enjoying what they did not labour for*
> *They [whites] shared large portions of land amongst themselves*
> *While we blacks would farm along river banks*
> *They were used to enjoying what they did not labour for*
> *They irrigated their crops*
> *They were used to enjoying what they did not labour for*
> *While we waited for the rainy season*
> *They were used to enjoying what they did not labour for*
> *They irrigated their crops*

The lyrics highlight the iniquitous land distribution inherited from the colonial era. The lyrics: "They shared large portions of land amongst themselves" as whites "while blacks would farm along river banks" are meant to remind people of colonial injustices and why the continued

ownership of the best farming land by some 4,500 white farmers two decades after independence was unjustified. The song also portrays all whites as exploitative: they were successful because of labour exploitation in colonial Rhodesia. They did not 'labour for' what they enjoyed as it was a result of exploitation of black workers.

The ability of artists to articulate these historical grievances and to link them to the politics of 'Fast-Track' Land Reform showed a detailed knowledge of past injustices that gave their political message authenticity and appeal.

Song 3: *Agirimende* (Agreement), 2002

The song *Agirimende* (Agreement) by 'Tambaoga' was produced ahead of the hotly contested 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe which pitted President Mugabe against the main opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC. Tambaoga claims that he is the one who wrote the song but that he got support from the Ministry of Information for its production and circulation. The song was directed at the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair whose Labour government was accused of interfering in Zimbabwe's domestic affairs and supporting the opposition. The title "Agreement'' refers to the Lancaster House Agreement under which majority rule was negotiated with Britain. By targeting Blair, the intention was to create the impression that the land question was a bilateral issue between Zimbabwe and Britain. In the song, the artist likens the ex-British PM to a 'blair' (a pit latrine found mostly in rural areas in Zimbabwe). The song vows that Zimbabwe will go ahead with the seizure of white land "whether you [the British, derisively referred to as Bri-shit] like it or not". Part of the lyrics of this song, translated into English are as follows:

We agreed to sign an agreement
When we voted we signed an agreement
That the leader of Zimbabwe is [Robert] Gabhuriero [Mugabe]
Don't irritate us; do not harass us, you 'Bri-shit'
The Bhureya [Blair] that I know is a Toilet
That the leader of Zimbabwe is Bob [Mugabe]
Don't trouble us you the British
We shall take the land whether you like it or not
We shall take the land whether you like it or not
The Blair that I know is a Toilet

In this song, Tambaoga accuses the British government of meddling in Zimbabwe's internal affairs. The lyrics: "musatinetse musatishupe maBri-shit [British]" (don't trouble us, don't bother us, you the British), sends a message to the British not to meddle in Zimbabwe's internal

affairs. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the British government was targeted in ZANU (PF)'s 'patriotic history'. The British were accused of funding their MDC 'stooges' to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. The song goes on: "We agreed [as Zimbabweans] that the leader of Zimbabwe is Bob [Mugabe]". Tambaoga asserts Zimbabwe's right to "take the land whether you [British] like it or not".

I asked Tambaoga to clarify the lyrics of *Agirimende* and whom he targeted. He explained:

> We know that the Portuguese, Germans and the British came and siphoned our minerals and plundered our treasures. We [as Africans] did not go to Europe to do the same. We have not forgotten [about these injustices during the colonial era]. So the British have continued to meddle in our politics. So in that song, when we said: "Musatinetse musatishupe maBritish", we knew very well and everyone knows that the British are domineering. They even want to decide our leaders. We are trying to fight by all means possible…by singing, by crying, by anything (Interview with Last Chiyangwa *aka* Tambaoga, March 2013, Harare).

We can see again that the content of the music highlighted colonial injustices such as the exploitation of mineral resources and plundering of treasures in Africa. The selection of these grievances was an important means of legitimation for ZANU (PF). Tambaoga accuses the British government of meddling in Zimbabwe's internal affairs to unseat the ZANU (PF) government and install their 'puppet' government. The then British PM, Tony Blair, seemed to play squarely into this depiction of a meddler when he admitted in the House of Commons that his government was working closely with the opposition MDC and civic society groups in Zimbabwe to promote human rights and democracy (Tendi, 2010), thereby giving these lyrics credibility among a wide audience.

Song 4: "Zimbabwe Ishumba" by 'Cde Chinx'

The song "Zimbabwe Ishumba" is a revolutionary song by 'Cde Chinx'. 'Cde Chinx' sings that 'Zimbabwe is like a lion whilst Britain is the prey'. Like 'Agirimende', the song targets Britain. In the song, 'Cde Chinx' calls upon the Zimbabwean 'masses' to stand up against the British. He mocks the British way of life, including gay rights. The song blends crude propaganda directed against the British with some lines adapted from revolutionary songs from the 1970s liberation struggle. The targeting of the British in the song was once again meant to create the impression that the land issue was a bilateral dispute between Zimbabwe and Britain. In the

song, ‘Cde Chinx’ urges Zimbabweans to work hard and not to act “like the indolent British” who thrive on labour exploitation. The song uses derogatory terms such as “mabhunu” to depict racist, abusive and exploitative white colonialists. Labour exploitation and racism were major grievances during the colonial period not only in Rhodesia but elsewhere in Africa. The grievances articulated in this song such as the land imbalances, labour exploitation, racism and economic marginalisation, thus resonated with particular sections of the Zimbabwean populace.

Part of the lyrics of the song, translated into English, are as follows:

You are possessed you the British
Zimbabwe is like a lion
Whilst you the British are prey
You are possessed you the British
Britain is a Blair [Toilet] like their leader
You’re looking for Trouble here in Zimbabwe
You British people
You are looking for trouble

The lyrics: “Don’t trouble us you the British” and “We shall take the land whether you like it or not” demonstrate government’s resolve in pursuing a radical land reform despite criticism by Britain and other Western powers. ‘Cde Chinx’ warns the British and Blair that they are “looking for trouble” if they continued ‘meddling’ in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs.

The song also derides the British on gay rights and says such behaviour would never be tolerated by Zimbabweans. The song brands Tony Blair as “the leader of gays” who “dreamt of removing Mugabe” from power. The song also mocks Peter Gary Tatchell, a well-known British gay rights activist, who had attempted to effect a citizen’s arrest on Robert Mugabe in London in 1999. In 2001, Tatchell was bashed by Mugabe’s aides in Brussels when he attempted to effect a citizen’s arrest for the second time. The highlighting of gay rights in the song was meant to mobilise Christians and traditionalists in Zimbabwe who do not subscribe to gay rights. In doing so it reinforces a discourse widely used by Mugabe himself that condemns homosexuality as ‘Western’ and ‘unAfrican’.

Song 5: *Hondo Yeminda* (Struggle for land), 2001

The song *Hondo Yeminda* is part of an 18-track album that was co-ordinated by Minister Moyo who teamed up with former liberation fighters ‘Cde Chinx’ and Marko Sibanda and the Zimbabwean police band to drum up support for ‘Fast-Track’ Land Reform. Most of the songs

of this album focus on the theme of land and the liberation struggle. The song *Hondo yeMinda*, itself is a re-working of the song "Hondo Yakura MuZimbabwe" (War Has Intensified in Zimbabwe) that 'Cde Chinx' sang during the liberation war in the 1970s. The song calls upon Zimbabweans to join the 'war for land' in reference to 'Fast-Track' Land Reform. As we have already seen, 'Cde Chinx' played a prominent role in the 1970s as leader of the ZANLA choir that produced *Chimurenga* songs to mobilise support during the war. The land grievance was prominent in these songs, making it appropriate for ZANU (PF) to deploy 'Cde Chinx' to deliver the same message once more as he did in the 1970s.

In this song, it was only time that had changed but the 'enemy' of Zimbabwe remained the same 'imperialist' Britain working with her Western allies and the 'enemies from within', now a reference to the MDC and white farmers, to scuttle land redistribution and effect regime change in Zimbabwe. The song is a rallying cry to all Zimbabweans to join the 'war' of taking back the land which was still in the hands of whites. The song called on Zimbabwean youths, the 'born frees' to have a 'proper' understanding of the liberation history. Part of the lyrics of *Hondo yeMinda* song translated to English are as follows:

> *Can you give advice to this young generation?*
> *For they have not experienced*
> *The liberation struggle*
> *Let me give this young generation some advice*
> *Here in Zimbabwe,*
> *You young people might call yourselves born frees, If you are born frees*
> *What does it make us older people?*
> *You call yourselves born what?*
> *The new age boys and girls,*
> *You entertain these White people*
> *Thinking they love you*
> *They are nothing but devils*
> *They are like Satan, whom the Roman Catholics preach about*
> *Satan with a tail of barbed wire*
> *A metal tail*

These lyrics reflected the wider ZANU (PF) strategy of targeting youths in its 'patriotic history'. The lyrics: "Can you give advice to this young generation? For they have not experienced the liberation struggle. Let me give this young generation some advice" were intended to chastise and win the support of the youths. The lyrics suggest that the youths were ignorant and needed to be 're-educated' about the liberation struggle. The youths were urged not to 'entertain' whites because "they are nothing but devils", thereby lumping all whites into one demonised category and suggesting that all relations with them were potentially dangerous.

Reference has already been made in this study to cases where ZANU (PF) youths perpetrated violence against whites on the farms believing that they were fighting a genuine war against 'unrepentant' white colonialists. Songs such as this paved the way for such actions.

The ZANU (PF) songs were not crudely propagandist. The lyrics were carefully selected to address historical and current grievances such as the land issue, racism, labour exploitation and economic marginalisation. These themes struck a chord with large sections of the Zimbabwean populace. The framing of the lyrics testify to the centrality of music to ZANU (PF)'s legitimation. The ZANU (PF) music strategy during the "Third Chimurenga" also shows us the importance of history and culture in regime legitimation and survival, further buttressing the argument that we need to go beyond the narrow focus on the traditional media, if we are to fully understand the role of the media in some hybrid regimes.

7.6 Conclusion

Building on existing works that acknowledge the centrality of music to ZANU (PF)'s legitimation and survival strategies, this chapter sought to interrogate further the institutional and ideological design of the ZANU (PF) music strategy during the *Third Chimurenga*. The chapter looked at the origins of ideas regarding *Third Chimurenga* songs, the choices made by key state actors regarding the music strategy and the selection and framing of song lyrics in line with ZANU (PF)'s 'patriotic history'. The ZANU (PF) music strategy during the *Third Chimurenga* testifies to the workings of a carefully designed and historically informed media strategy post-2000. The regime's media strategy was two-pronged. Firstly, it entailed commissioning artists to produce songs which propagated the regime's monologic land-centric nationalist discourse. These songs were disguised as 'local content' and promoted through radio, television and televised state-sponsored galas. Secondly, the regime put in place mechanisms to displace or silence competing narratives. As we have seen, the songs that were produced by independent artists and considered politically unpalatable were denied airplay on the state broadcaster. The artists were also not invited to perform at the state-sponsored musical galas. The regime's music project was co-ordinated by the Ministry of Information under Minister Moyo. The level of state support, the re-branding or re-organisation of state media institutions including radio and television, the role of state actors in writing songs, organising the musical galas and the framing of lyrics, shows the centrality of music to ZANU (PF)'s

survival and legitimation efforts post-2000. State patronage of the music extended to originating the ideas or lyrics for some of the songs by the Ministry of Information.

What is the importance of this chapter to the broader thesis argument? This discussion highlighted a weakness in the literature on hybrid regimes, which is overly biased towards the traditional media (radio, television and newspapers) and does not explore the role of the 'non-traditional' media in regime legitimation and survival. This chapter is also an important contribution to the Zimbabweanist literature on the media and 'patriotic history'. This literature is also biased towards the formal media and neglects the forms of media drawn from history and culture in ZANU (PF)'s legitimation and survival efforts post-2000. We therefore need to broaden our analysis if we are to fully understand how the ZANU (PF) media system was designed institutionally and ideologically and its ambitions and effectiveness. The state and party actors who were responsible for the media during the period under study confirmed during interviews that they had "broad" and "nuanced understanding" of what the media or communications entail and that they considered history and culture to be an important part of what they wanted to achieve. We cannot therefore afford to neglect music and local history which were central to the regime's media agenda post-2000. Although the existing studies have explained the role of music in ZANU (PF)'s legitimation and survival efforts during the *Third Chimurenga* to good effect, these studies are largely based on secondary sources but not the views of key state and party actors who designed and implemented the music strategies. This study is one of a few studies that are based on the views of the architects (Cabinet Ministers and senior government officials) who were responsible for ZANU (PF) media strategies during the *Third Chimurenga*. In the next chapter, I explore further the role of the 'non-traditional' media and everyday governance practices in hybrid regime legitimisation and survival through my analysis of *pungwes* (all-night gatherings) that were held by ZANU (PF) and its allies- the veterans of the 1970s *Chimurenga* (liberation) war, youth militia and others during the *Third Chimurenga*. The *pungwes* were key platforms for transmitting the messages of 'patriotic history' through song and dance, just like during the galas but they were also key sites for ZANU (PF) coercion of political opponents in rural areas.

Chapter 8

The "pungwes" and ZANU (PF) Strategies during the "Third Chimurenga"

8.1 Introduction `

This chapter explores *pungwes* (all-night vigils), a form of media and political mobilization strategy that the ruling ZANU (PF) party deployed during the "Third Chimurenga". In Chapter Four, I traced the historical roots of *pungwes* when they were used by ZANLA guerrillas (ZANU's military wing) during the 1970s *Chimurenga* (liberation) war to politicise the masses and disciplining of 'sell-outs', that is civilians who were accused of working with the Rhodesian forces and those accused of practicing witchcraft and sorcery. The *pungwes* were again revived by ZANU (PF) soon after independence in the early 1980s to repress ZAPU supporters as previously discussed. This chapter is concerned about the *pungwes* that were deployed by ZANU (PF) and veterans of the liberation struggle, party militia and others during the "Third Chimurenga" - the revolutionary seizure of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe starting from 2000. These *pungwes* were crucial sites to propagate and perform the messages of 'patriotic history' through song and speeches (like the galas), but they were also spaces in which ZANU (PF) demonstrated its coercive power by literally beating up, torturing and even killing those designated as 'sell-outs' under the rubric of 'patriotic history' in reference to white farmers, farm workers and opposition MDC supporters.

This chapter makes two key contributions to the overall thesis argument. First, it contributes to the Zimbabweanist literature on the media and 'patriotic history' through exploring the role of the 'non-traditional media - embodied in the *pungwe*, in hybrid regime legitimisation and persistence. Second, this chapter sheds additional light into ZANU (PF)'s hybrid politics during the "Third Chimurenga". Although *pungwes* were sites for extreme violence against 'sell-outs', they were also crucial platforms for transmitting the messages of 'patriotic history' and ZANU (PF) patronage of the key constituencies of war veterans, youth militias and others in rural areas. The notion of "hybrid regime" used in this thesis provides an important analytic tool to interrogate the inner workings in ZANU (PF) and broad range of strategies that the party deployed to

mobilise support and repress the opposition during the "Third Chimurenga". We saw in Chapter Two that autocratic regimes do not solely rely on terror, but that they also use ideology and distribute patronage benefits for legitimation purposes. This chapter discusses in detail ZANU (PF)'s hybrid politics embodied in the *pungwes* and opposition responses to them.

I look at a wider literature that explores the uses of the *pungwe* during the "Third Chimurenga". My analysis of *pungwes* also draws on my interviews with a variety of ZANU (PF) actors in Murewa, a highly politicised district during the period under study. The interviews in Murewa were not easy to organise due to the sensitive nature of my topic, as I discussed in Chapter Three. It is difficult to conduct research on a sensitive topic in such a highly politicised context. However, I chose to study *pungwes* in my home district of Murewa for easy access and personal safety. I received support from my family networks and relatives who held positions in ZANU (PF) and war veterans' structures in the district. I also held interviews with MDC activists in the district. The views of the MDC sources add to our understandings of *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies and the responses to them. In the section below, I discuss briefly the political context in Murewa before turning to a more detailed discussion of the repressive and legitimation effects of *pungwes* held by ZANU (PF) and its allies- war veterans, youth militia and others during the 'fast-track' process and electoral mobilisation in the early 2000s.

8.2 Political Context and "Fast-Track" Land Reform in Murewa From 2000

There is a great deal of scholarly attention devoted to both the process and outcome of the 'fast-track' occupations. Some studies have endeavoured to understand how 'fast-track' occupations differ from previous land occupations, the role of different actors and whether the seizures of white-owned land in Zimbabwe were indeed a 'revolution' led from below by war veterans and peasants, as some scholars have argued, or whether they were a political project engineered from above by the ZANU (PF) government to maintain power as some scholars on the other hand have argued. This chapter reflects on some of these issues but looks specifically at *pungwes* and other strategies that were deployed by ZANU (PF) and its allies during the 'fast-track' land occupations in Murewa, a highly politicised and contested district during the period under study. This

analysis seeks to understand the role of history (and culture) in ZANU (PF)'s survival and legitimation efforts post-2000. Broadly, the discussion of *pungwes* adds to understandings of ZANU (PF)'s hybrid politics with specific reference to rural areas. I discuss *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies deployed in Murewa in the early 2000s to contribute to debates on hybrid regime survival and or persistence. I discuss ZANU (PF)'s hybrid politics embodied in the *pungwes* to give additional insight into how hybrid regimes function and the ambivalence of their politics. I discuss the complexities of the effects of *pungwes* and other aspects of ZANU (PF) strategies that split families, produced critical thinkers as well as compliant advocates and supporters of the regime.

The 'fast-track' occupations in Murewa district were similar to those held in other districts in terms of the strategies that were deployed by the land occupiers - ZANU (PF) war veterans, youth militia and others. Whilst local actions differed there was a general pattern in the strategies that were deployed by the land occupiers during the seizure of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe starting from 2000. The main 'base' from which the farm seizures were co-ordinated in Murewa was established at ZexCom (the war veterans' district offices) at Murewa Business Centre. This base was responsible for co-ordinating not just the land occupations within the district but for the broader region. The land occupiers also established subsidiary "bases" on occupied farms which were manned by Base Commanders who were in most cases war veterans or senior party officials. The land occupiers deployed the same strategies from the liberation war such as a strict timetable with morning and evening roll-calls for the land occupiers, deferring to the orders of the base commander, attending briefings and *pungwes* and military drills for the youths among other strategies or tactics. These strategies were meant to invoke the war spirit and justify the ruling party's claims that the land seizures were a "Third Chimurenga" or 'revolution' similar to the 1970s *Chimurenga* (liberation) war against colonial rule.

There was increased violence in Murewa unlike neighbouring districts such as Mutoko, Mudzi and Uzumba that did not have farms. Murewa district was strategic because of its proximity to the capital Harare and as such the land occupations were easy to co-ordinate for the party and war veterans. Some party members and war veterans who took part in the farm seizures came from other districts that did not have farms. The national leaders

were also actively involved because they wanted plots in the Macheke area in the district which is well known for its good climate suitable for tobacco farming. Like in other districts, the land occupiers revived war-time strategies and narratives to justify the farm seizures. The revival of war-time strategies such as *pungwes* during the 'fast-track' process sought to justify ZANU (PF) claims that the controversial seizure of white-owned farms was a 'revolution' similar to the 1970s *Chimurenga* (liberation) war during which these strategies had been used to mobilise support and politicise the masses against colonial rule. This exploitation of history together with its symbols and narratives was a key legitimation strategy for ZANU (PF) during the "Third Chimurenga" as several studies on 'patriotic history' have demonstrated (Kriger, 2006; Alexander, 2009; Tendi, 2010).

There was increased violence against white farmers and farm workers during the initial years of fast-track occupations. The *pungwes* were the main locus of this violence. The *pungwes* held on the occupied farms were meant to subdue farmers and break their resistance. Farmers whose properties were occupied were coerced to attend *pungwes*. Murewa was one of the districts where violence against farmers and farm workers was elevated due to the strategic location of the district and other reasons cited above. In April 2000, David Stevens of Arizona Farm in the district was murdered by war veterans and party militia who had invaded his farm. Police did not intervene in Stevens' and several other cases to restore the rule of law citing 'political reasons'. Stevens was targeted because he was an active MDC supporter. Several studies have argued that it is the farms whose owners were known MDC supporters that were initially targeted for seizure.

The farm workers who took sides with their employer and refused to join 'fast-track' or support ZANU (PF) were forced to attend *pungwes*. They were accused of working for *varungu* (whites). In its report on 'fast-track' occupations, the General Agricultural Plantation Workers' Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), a trade union for farm workers, stated that: "Compulsory late night meetings, "pungwe" would be called by the farm's resident war veterans and ZANU (PF) youth militia. Failure to attend would result in severe punishment. At the meeting, farm workers would be forced to sing songs in support of ZANU (PF), dance and chant slogans and affirm their loyalty to the party.

Scapegoats, often branded as MDC supporters, would be chosen to receive public beatings. Sometimes fellow workers were forced to beat each other to demonstrate their loyalty to the ZANU (PF) cause" (GAPWUZ, 2009:15).

The *pungwe* was also a key site to transmit 'patriotic history' to farm workers, youths and others in rural areas. In Murewa, the war veterans whom I interviewed said that *pungwes* were meant to re-orient farm workers who had been 'brainwashed' by whites. War Veteran X who was allocated an A1 (small-scale) farm at Glen Somerset Farm explained thus:

> We had problems here because some farm workers attacked us when we tried to settle. The farm workers defended the white farmer and said that they were not going to support us because we didn't know how to use land productively. They also said that we wouldn't be able to pay them if we take the farms. We told them that we were for black empowerment and that they [farm workers] should also own land instead of continuing to work for whites. This misunderstanding is what caused *jambanja* [violence] on the farms because the farm workers were resisting, they took sides with white farmers. *Jambanja* started when the farm workers resisted the farm occupations. This is what also happened [at Arizona farm] when [David] Stevens was murdered, it all started with farm workers who came in truckloads from the neighbouring farms to attack the occupiers. They were saying that war veterans have no capacity to utilise the land productively and pay the workers. They said *kana mukatora purazi rino munogona kurima here, anogona kurima murungu, ko isu tinoenda kupi kana matora purazi rino?* (If you take the farm will you be able to use it productively? Where do you want us to go if you take the farm from him?) It was difficult because most workers took the side of white farmers. Only a few co-operated with us but still they didn't want to come out in the open for fear of reprisals from their employers. So we used *pungwes* to deal with those 'sell-outs', I mean *vatengesi vanodyidzana nevarungu* [sell-outs who collaborated with whites]. The form of discipline was determined by the base commander. Some people were only interrogated and given a couple of lashes whilst those who were accused of committing more serious offences could even be killed. This is what happened because we were in a war situation. That is why it was called the 'Third Chimurenga' because it meant that we were fighting a struggle similar to the Second *Chimurenga.* So the tactics that we used during the liberation struggle are the same that we had to use during the 'Third Chimurenga' to deal with *vatengesi*. We wanted to stop the enemy from poisoning the minds of our people particularly the younger generation who were moving around our villages introducing the MDC (Interview with War Veteran X, April, 2013, Murewa).

The *pungwes* targeted farm workers for political 're-education'. The farm workers who took sides with their employers were coerced to attend *pungwes* and violently 'disciplined'. Some farm workers who had grievances against their white farmer employers joined the land occupiers. These workers collaborated with the occupiers and participated in the *pungwes* voluntarily. An ex-farm worker at Glen Somerset Farm stated that:

> There were clashes here when the war veterans came. They attacked John Melrose [farm owner] and left him for dead. He had to be rushed to Borradaile hospital in Marondera for treatment. They wanted to kill him like they did to his friend David Stevens. The war veterans also attacked us when we wanted to assist Mr Melrose. They accused us of being sell-outs and working for *murungu* (white person) instead of being owners of the land and be the employers. They managed to occupy the farm despite our initial resistance and they barricaded the farm entrance to ensure that no one came in or went out without being accounted for. They held *pungwes* where all farm workers were told to attend. But it would appear that some of our colleagues co-operated with the farm occupiers because they seemed to know a lot about what was happening on the farm and the grievances that we had against our employer. I say so because they were raising some of these issues during speeches at the *pungwes*. They said whites are bad people who exploit blacks. They even talked about the working conditions saying that we should support the "Third Chimurenga" because they were doing it for us (Interview with a former farm worker at Glen Somerset, April 2013, Murewa).

The *pungwes* were also sites for political orientation of youths to 'patriotic history'. We saw in the previous chapter that the youths were referred to as the *born frees* who ZANU (PF) believed needed to be educated on the history of the country because they were born after independence and as such did not appreciate the sacrifices made during the liberation struggle. We have also seen that the ruling party and war veterans deliberately targeted the youths because they said the youths were attracted to the MDC and shunned ZANU (PF)'s 'patriotic history'. War Veteran Z in Murewa said that the youths were taught to be 'patriotic'. He said that 'patriotism' meant "supporting the party that brought independence, ZANU (PF), and rejection of the party of 'sell-outs' who wanted to undo that independence and give back land to whites" (Interview with War Veteran Z, April 2013, Murewa). The War Veteran stated that:

> We organised *pungwes* to teach youths about the liberation war. We wanted the youths or the *born frees* who didn't experience the war to know and appreciate our history and where the country came from. It was important for youths to know the role that nationalists played in freeing us

> from the yoke of colonialism and that people suffered at the hands of the enemy [the Rhodesian Forces]. We reminded them about the colonial injustices and the brutalities that people experienced at the hands of the Rhodesian Forces. We told them that many people died during the war and the main reason was that they were defending their land. We also taught the *born frees Chimurenga* war and the revolutionary songs and slogans. Some of the songs were directed at the MDC. The *pungwes* were an effective strategy because it is the same strategy that we used during the liberation war to mobilise the masses against the Smith regime. Our people in the rural areas knew what the *pungwes* meant; they were an appropriate strategy to achieve our objectives. We also targeted the people who did not support us. We just wanted to enlighten them that the land is theirs and did not belong to the white people (Interview with War Veteran Z, April, 2013, Murewa).

The youths who were indoctrinated at *pungwes* went on to engage in violence and intimidation which targeted suspected and known MDC supporters, not just white farmers and farm workers in both the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections. The violence that was instigated against the MDC supporters by the war veterans and youth militia was justified in terms of the 'revolution'.

There was an intensification of violence which made it difficult for the MDC to penetrate rural areas. The party's electoral campaign in the June 2000 parliamentary elections was severely curtailed. The violence against MDC supporters increased in the 2002 parliamentary elections. The objective of the violence was to decimate MDC structures and make it difficult for the party to campaign in rural areas. The war veterans and youth militia manned roadblocks and demanded party cards and confiscated opposition regalia and campaign materials. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum produced a report on political violence in which it acknowledged the widespread use of *pungwes* in the June 2000 parliamentary election. The report stated that the war veterans held nightly political meetings in the style of "pungwes" that were drawn from or based upon traditional Shona rituals and the 1970s liberation war (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2000). Despite the violence instigated against its supporters in the June 2000 parliamentary elections, the party won 57 of the 120 contested seats whilst ZANU (PF) won 63 seats. The MDC won in urban constituencies whilst ZANU (PF) dominated in rural constituencies. In Murewa North, the ZANU (PF) candidate Victor Chitongo polled 13 694 votes whilst the MDC's Alois Mudzingwa polled 4 104 votes. In Murewa South, ZANU (PF) candidate Joel Biggie Matiza polled 13 895 votes whilst the MDC's Ward

Nezi polled 4 426 votes. Most areas were declared "no-goes" and MDC supporters were forced to flee from their homes and did not vote. The same strategies were repeated in the crunch 2002 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections which were again won by ZANU (PF). In the 2005 parliamentary elections, ZANU (PF) won with an increased majority against the MDC. The ruling party won 78 seats to the MDC's 41 seats. In Murewa, the ZANU (PF) candidate for Murewa South constituency, Joel Biggie Matiza polled 19, 200 votes whilst Alaska Kumirai of MDC polled 4 586. In Murewa North, the ZANU (PF) candidate, David Parirenyatwa polled 17, 677 whilst Alois Mudzingwa of the MDC polled 4,137 votes. The MDC party attributed its loss in the 2005 parliamentary elections to violence and voter intimidation, media restrictions and lack of equal access to the state-controlled media which ZANU (PF) monopolised and used as its propaganda mouthpieces, manipulation of the voters' roll, gerrymandering, the use of food as a political weapon and the partisan role of traditional leaders in rural areas (Preliminary MDC Report on March 2005 Parliamentary elections, Harare, 31st March 2005, available online at *www.mdczimbabwe.org*).

There has been debate as to why violence was so intense in districts in the Mashonaland provinces where ZANU (PF) enjoyed some of its greatest support. Charles Laurie (2016) argues that violence was concentrated in the 'Mashonalands' because ZANU (PF) had realised that support for the opposition in this region was growing steadily. This region has greater concentration of commercial farms and the MDC derived much of its support mainly from white farmers and farm workers. The districts in Mashonaland provinces had a large number of commercial farms. The presence of farmers and farm workers who supported the opposition was a threat to the ruling party's hegemony. However, despite the strong violence and farm seizures in Mashonaland East province, there is evidence that the province by far protected the highest number of white commercial farmers compared to other provinces. President Mugabe confirmed this and threatened to kick out the remaining white farmers. Mugabe said:

> I was talking to the Minister of Lands and I think it was the day before yesterday and we were looking at each and every province and we started with Mashonaland East. In Goromonzi, they (white farmers) are 40. From Goromonzi, we moved to Mutoko and Murewa and they are 123. Mind you this is Mashonaland East. Then I said so some of our leaders had been hiding them (white farmers) in farms and saying the farms had been given [redistributed]. So I said let's stop here" (Edgar Gweshe, "Mugabe

Threatens to Kick out 163+ White Farmers out of Zim", *The Zimbabwean*, 1st March 2015).

In the section below, I discuss ZANU (PF)'s hybrid politics broadly, looking closely at the party's strategies of discourse, coercion and patronage within the context of the *pungwes*. Towards the end of the section, I return to a more elaborate discussion of *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies and MDC resistance and counter-strategies in Murewa district. The views of the MDC sources included in the discussion add to understandings of the effects of *pungwes* and ZANU (PF) strategies and the opposition resistance or responses to them.

8.3 "Pungwes" and ZANU (PF)'s Hybrid Politics during the "Third Chimurenga"

The studies on the Zimbabwean media and 'patriotic history' are biased towards the traditional media (radio, television and newspapers). These studies do not adequately explore the role of the 'non-traditional' media and political practices embedded in history and culture such as *pungwes* in ZANU (PF)'s survival and legitimation efforts post-2000. I unpack ZANU (PF)'s hybrid politics within the *pungwes* which sought to balance the regime's repressive and legitimation goals during the "Third Chimurenga". This analysis is an important contribution to the literature on *pungwes*. I argue that the repressive and legitimation strategies within *pungwes* should not be seen as contradictory but mutually reinforcing. It is therefore incorrect to look at and only emphasize any one aspect of ZANU (PF)'s strategies as the repressive and legitimation strategies were part of the regime's hybrid politics that sought to punish opponents and circulate political ideas that sought to justify the regime's repression of opponents as well as distribution of patronage resources to supporters. The study of *pungwes* adds to understandings of complex nature of politics and the contradictions in hybrid regimes.

Lloyd Sachikonye (2011) argues that the 'fast-track' process was accompanied by a supportive ideology to justify state actions and the recurrent use of violence. Whilst ZANU (PF) used violence against MDC supporters, it also appealed to its liberation credentials whilst it dismissed the MDC as stooges of British imperialism (Kriger, 2005). Although violence was decisive, I argue that the exercise of power in a hybrid regime is a careful balancing act between coercion and legitimation strategies. As explained in

Chapter Two, hybrid regimes are not just concerned about retaining power through repressive means; they crave political legitimacy which influences the strategies that they deploy to prolong their stay in power.

Whilst the studies on 'patriotic history' acknowledge ZANU (PF)'s appropriation of liberation war strategies and narratives for political legitimation, they do not look in detail at the *pungwes*. These studies are biased towards the ZANU (PF) strategies in the mainstream media but not the role of the 'non-traditional'media or political practices embedded in history and culture such as *pungwes* in regime legitimation and persistence. We have also seen that one of the criticisms of the literature on hybrid regimes is that it also neglects the role of the 'non-traditional' media or governance practices drawn from history and culture in regime legitimisation and persistence. The focus on *Chimurenga* songs in the previous chapter and on the *pungwes* seeks to expand our understanding on the importance of the 'non-traditional' media in regime legitimation. Whilst ZANU (PF) circulated 'patriotic history' in the mainstream media (radio, television and newspapers), it also deployed *pungwes* to transmit the messages of 'patriotic history' and repress its opponents in rural areas.

The *pungwes* were part of the ruling party's attempt to exploit history to justify its claims to power and authority. The *pungwes* mirrored not only war-time practices but also *biras*, Shona religious ceremonies to invoke and appease spirits characterised by singing, dancing to the *mbira* and all-night beer drinking. They were an important discursive platform for the ideological objectification of MDC 'sell-outs' and legitimising ZANU (PF) rule. A ZANU (PF) ideologue, Tafataona Mahoso explained what benefits the ruling party sought to derive from revival of *pungwes*. He explained:

> When the *pungwes* were revived [in the 2000s], the people think of the survival of ZANU (PF) but we were thinking about the survival of the nation of Zimbabwe and it survived because we managed to garner support from a critical mass of the population. You need to decolonise African consciousness because everything has been oriented to the West and to the Western notion of development. So when you come to a situation where the peasants are now re-affirming the struggle to reclaim land, contrary to development theory, contrary to all the blueprints that exist, contrary to existing jargon [of liberalism], you cannot help but go back to the *pungwe* model of conscientising people. So to go against the weight of Western liberal tradition ….the real tradition that weigh us

> down is the Western tradition which is why I started with asking you the question "How are you interpreting this topic?" So we have to face that fundamental question and the only way we could *pikidura* (undo) that consciousness is by going back to the motives, to the miracles of the *pungwe* and *Chimurenga*, and it worked. So it was very important to say that Kaguvi, Nehanda, Chingaira fought in the First *Chimurenga* [1896-7]; Chitepo and Mugabe and so forth fought in the Second *Chimurenga* [in the 1970s] and that Mugabe is our bridge to the Third *Chimurenga* [in the 2000s]. So you claim legitimacy and you also situate this revolution within the peasantry because those are the majority, those are the people who don't aspire to be Europeans (Interview with Tafataona Mahoso, April 2013, Harare).

Mahoso is again emphasizing the importance of liberation war history and practices such as *pungwes* in ZANU (PF)'s survival and legitimation efforts during the *Third Chimurenga*. There were efforts by ZANU (PF) to establish a historical connection between the liberation war during which land was a central grievance and the controversial "fast-track" land redistribution exercise. As Mahoso reveals, the intentions were to "claim legitimacy and situate this revolution [fast-track exercise]" as a genuine struggle to address the historical injustices. The revival of *pungwes* was in line with ZANU (PF)'s agenda to own and monopolise the liberation struggle and de-legitimise its opponents which it dismissed as agents of Britain and Western imperialism as we have seen in previous chapters. The *pungwes* demonstrate the centrality of such historical practices in ZANU (PF)'s efforts to legitimise its rule and revive its waning support post-2000. Mahoso justified *pungwes* as a way to celebrate Zimbabwean history and culture and rejecting Western-oriented notions of development, human rights and democracy which in ZANU (PF)'s 'patriotic history' are regarded as alien and representing the new 'imperialism' of the West. Mahoso stated that:

> As you know within the African circle time doesn't expire. We don't have sunset laws within African time and there are no sunsets. *Ngozi* (the avenging spirit) is not a sunset issue; as long as it's not resolved, it extends to the next period. So obviously somebody sitting in Oxford will see us as very strange people who are ignoring all these European ideas but we don't aspire to do that. We aspire to ground ourselves and we aspire even to re-look at Europe from the African perspective and that's what has made us endure, that's what makes us unique in the whole region and the rest of Africa. A Zimbabwean is now known wherever you go they will say aah that guy must be from Zimbabwe. So we must reject the idea that somehow it's strange to be patriotic. That's exactly how other countries have developed and so we must be able to develop within our own time and to do it means that we must ignore what other people

> do for themselves except where it's relevant to us. But what is relevant to us is that *Chimurenga* trajectory (Interview with Tafataona Mahoso, April 2013, Harare).

The *pungwes* were an important medium for transmitting 'patriotic history'. There were similarities in the content or themes propagated in the state-controlled media and those expressed via the medium of *Chimurenga* songs and *pungwes.* But the *pungwes* did not originate from the Ministry of Information and Publicity as other forms of media such as did the political songs and musical galas that were analysed in the previous chapter. The ideas that were propagated at *pungwes* tapped into history and real grievances such as racism, labour exploitation and economic disparities between blacks and whites, as we have noted. There were similarities in the content of 'patriotic history' that was disseminated via songs, galas, radio and newspapers and *pungwes.* However, *pungwes* were a unique form of media in that the 'patriotic history' was also accompanied by violence against white farmers, farm workers and MDC supporters. The *pungwe* is a form of media and an experience in which power is both legitimated discursively and performed, in some by literally beating up or killing those designated as 'sell-outs', making the *pungwe* the most strikingly 'hybrid' form of media in that it combined coercion and symbolic and ideological appeals which were at the core of ZANU (PF)'s legitimation and survival efforts during the "Third Chimurenga". We can see that whilst the story that was communicated was the same, the enemies being named were the same, the difference with the other forms of media analysed in the previous chapters is that those who were regarded as 'sell-outs' were directly disciplined which makes the *pungwe* a unique form of 'media' compared to music, galas, radio, television and newspapers.

The regime increasingly resorted to repressive strategies and political surveillance ahead of the crunch 2002 presidential elections. More farms were invaded, more *pungwes* were held and more 'sell-outs' were identified on occupied farms and communal areas for violent 'disciplining'. Writer and former white farmer, Cathy Buckle, noted that the strategies that were deployed by ZANU (PF) ahead of the 2002 presidential elections "were more frightening than before". Buckle made the following observation in Marondera District, where she was farming;

> They [*pungwes*] are back now as another election looms and the tactics being used are more frightening than before. Moments after a farm is vacated, either voluntarily or through coercion, shaven headed men move

> in and terrorise the neighbourhood. Using whatever threats they deem suitable these men demand, borrow using force or simply steal tractors and trailers from nearby farms. As dusk falls the vehicles set out in all directions to round up every man, woman and child they can find. People are ordered onto the trailers and then taken to the vacated farms to be re-educated. There is no food or water, no one is allowed to rest or leave and groups of people numbering upwards of 400 are re-educated for periods of 10 hours or more at a time. They are lectured to about politics, forced to chant slogans praising the government and condemning the opposition. They are made to raise their arms, with clenched fists [ZANU (PF) symbol], again and again and proclaim undying allegiance to the government. They are forced to line up and run and chant slogans and when they can run no more, the people are forced to do press ups and star jumps. They are made to sing songs popularised during the war for Independence and taught new ones which denounce whites, Britain, America, farmers, the MDC and anyone else who is not wholly supportive of the government (Cathy Buckle 'Under Cover of Darkness', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 9th November 2001).

The *pungwes* were also spaces for the delivery of ZANU (PF) patronage benefits to war veterans, youths and rural voters. The war veterans and youth militia played a key role in marshalling support for ZANU (PF) in rural areas. The *pungwe* was one of their central means of mobilisation, dissemination of messages and 'disciplining' of 'sell-outs' The war veterans and party youths were also given preferential treatment in the allocation of plots as well as agricultural inputs.

The ZANU (PF) legitimation strategies and ideological appeals during *pungwes* were fused with violence. The increasing resort to force and investment in surveillance and political control shows the challenges that ZANU (PF) encountered in creating a 'patriotic'citizenry. The party's legitimation strategy and ideological appeals were rejected by the opposition and others on the occupied farms and in communal areas which resulted in the party resorting to political violence to 'discipline' those who were opposed to 'patriotic history'. During the period under review, most rural areas were declared 'no-goes' as war veterans and youth militia took charge. They mounted roadblocks on the farms and rural areas. They invaded rural schools, council offices and clinics which they suspected to be sympathetic to the opposition. The farm houses on occupied farms were turned into 'bases' for the repression of opposition supporters. The violence against MDC supporters intensified during the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections. Several human rights watchdogs told of horrifying cases of

abduction, torture, beatings and even murder of white farmers, farm workers and MDC supporters in the run-up to these elections. Most of these cases took place at *pungwes* on the occupied farms and those that were held at 'bases' established by ZANU (PF), war veterans and youth militia in the communal areas.

The ZANU (PF) terror campaign in Murewa left MDC structures severely weakened. I interviewed MDC activists on how they responded to the situation on the ground. The MDC failed to penetrate in the rural areas because of political violence. Most areas were declared "no-goes" and MDC was not able to campaign effectively in rural areas as most of its activists were forced to go underground. One MDC activist in Murewa said:

> We tried to resist but it was difficult. So the only way was to go underground. Some activists fled to Harare, some left the country because the situation was bad. I went underground because I had seen what had happened to my colleagues. Their house had been burnt by these thugs [war veterans and youth militia] and they lost everything that was in the house. No-one wanted to associate with the MDC anymore because of what they had seen. Opposition activists were abducted; tortured and raped …The *sabhukus* (traditional leaders) were also involved in identifying MDC supporters in areas under their jurisdiction. They compiled lists of MDC activists which they submitted to the war veterans. Fear was pervasive and no one wanted to associate with the MDC publicly in the run-up to the presidential elections [in 2002] (Interview with an MDC activist in Murewa District, April 2013).

The resort to political violence and surveillance by ZANU (PF) shows weaknesses of the party's legitimation strategy and ideological appeals. Resistance from the opposition led the ruling party to resort to violence. Some ZANU (PF) supporters, war veterans and *sabhukus* who were also accused of disloyalty or lacking a strong commitment to the "Third Chimurenga" were labelled 'sell-outs' and violently 'disciplined'. The other key point to note is that *pungwes* and other aspects of the ZANU (PF) strategy led to split families and produced critical thinkers as well as compliant advocates and supporters of the regime.

There are aspects of ZANU (PF) strategies that split families and bred mistrust and suspicion among relatives. The author is from Murewa and some of his relatives held positions in ZANU (PF) and were involved in violence that took place at *pungwes*. There were constant clashes among family members as they did not agree on violence

instigated against MDC supporters. Some family members believed that their relatives should not be involved in violence and commit murder as this would haunt the whole family and not just the family member involved. These differences resulted in strained relations among family members. Some informants in Murewa said they wanted their relatives who were involved in the 'bases' and *pungwes* to return home. I was also told of instances whereby some family members took advantage of the chaos and violence that characterised this period to settle personal scores or long standing grudges. We can see the complexities of the effects of the *pungwes* and other aspects of the ZANU (PF) strategy in rural areas.

The MDC activists in Murewa developed counter-strategies and alternative ways of passing information in the communities. Fearing reprisals from the war veterans, traditional authorities and youth militia, MDC activists became involved in clandestine activities. These activities included organising door-to-door meetings as opposed to open rallies or mass meetings which were disrupted by the ZANU (PF) militia and state agents. The MDC also distributed their campaign literature during the night to circumvent ZANU (PF) informers that were planted within communities and at strategic locations to monitor and record MDC activities. The MDC activists whom I interviewed in Murewa said that they also sought to counter ZANU (PF) strategies and violence through door-to-door campaigns which they held during the night. The most prominent activists would go underground during the day for fear of beatings, abductions and torture at the hands of ZANU (PF) militia and war veterans. The following interview with an MDC activist in Murewa reveals some of the strategies that the opposition party deployed to counter ZANU (PF) in the district. The MDC activist explained:

> It was no longer safe for the MDC to hold open meetings or rallies here in Murewa. Our people were being targeted if they attended those rallies. So we decided to conduct a door-to-door campaign. We also mobilised our youths to invade strategic locations such as Murewa [Business] Centre blowing whistles, singing, *toyi-toying*, chanting party slogans *Chinja maitiro* [Change Your Ways] and "Mugabe Must Go" among others. These activists would be wearing party regalia relaying our campaign message to the people in rural areas. The t-shirts and leaflets that we distributed carried our campaign messages in the June 2000 and 2002 elections. We also received a lot of support from some business people at Murewa Centre but they wanted to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. Those who came out in the open to show their support for the MDC had their businesses invaded or burnt by war veterans and youth

> militia. They business persons who supported the MDC provided our activists with food, fuel and also supported victims of political violence who were housed at a central location at Murewa Centre. Most activists who were targeted fled to other towns and only came back to Murewa when the situation had normalised. The prominent activists were not encouraged to sleep at their homes but to find somewhere to go to avoid abduction at night. The MDC activists who were abducted were taken to *pungwes* where they were 'disciplined'. Some of the victims of political violence were taken to Harare where they were supported with food, shelter, blankets and clothing sourced by the party's welfare department and NGOs. The displacement of our supporters and prominent activists weakened our campaign and ability to penetrate rural areas and disseminate our campaign messages (Interview with an MDC activist in Murewa, September 2013).

The reign of terror unleashed by ZANU (PF) and its allies - war veterans, youth militia and state agents severely weakened the MDC structures in rural areas. The increasing use or resort to violence and the ruling party's investment in political surveillance in rural areas suggests that its legitimation strategy and ideological appeals were not effective. We therefore need to be careful in assessment of the effects of the legitimation strategy and ideological appeals before we qualify them as successful. There are studies that have come to the conclusion that the party's legitimation strategies were successful in creating a 'patriotic' citizenry. This study has demonstrated that there were instances of resistance, appropriations, counter-portrayals and criticism of ZANU (PF) strategies and exclusive nationalist discourses. The regime's increasing resort to violence and political surveillance made it difficult for the MDC to gain a foothold in rural areas.

This section has explored the effects of the *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies during the "Third Chimurenga". Whilst *pungwes* were instruments of ZANU (PF) coercion of political opponents, they were key discursive sites for transmitting and performing the messages of 'patriotic history' and patronage of war veterans, youth militia and others in rural areas. Although violence was decisive, we need to acknowledge the importance of legitimation strategies during the "Third Chimurenga". The strategy of *pungwes* was in line with ZANU (PF)'s hybrid politics during the "Third Chimurenga". The *pungwes* testify to the workings of a complex and multi-purpose political machine that ZANU (PF) designed which combined repression with discourse and ideological appeals to legitimise the regime's claims to power. The *pungwes* were part of the regime's strategy to exploit or appropriate history and popular memory to

legitimise its rule. However, the *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies were resisted by MDC supporters and within families and communities. Some people including ZANU (PF) supporters resented the party's violence against 'sell-outs' at the *pungwes* which resulted in split families. The regime's repressive strategies also produced critical thinkers as well as compliant advocates and supporters. I summed up my discussion with a reflection on the views of MDC sources on *pungwes* and ZANU (PF) strategies in Murewa district. This analysis was important in understandings of ZANU (PF)'s use of *pungwes* as a strategy and MDC counter-strategies or responses.

8.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we saw that *pungwes* were spaces in which power was both legitimated discursively and performed through the violent 'disciplining' of white farmers, farm workers and MDC supporters. We have seen that *pungwes* combined coercion, discourse and patronage. In a hybrid regime, these strategies must not be seen as contradictory but mutually reinforcing. Whilst *pungwes* were key sites of ZANU (PF) coercion of 'sell-outs' they were also important platforms for the transmission and performance of the messages of 'patriotic history' through song and dance as in galas. To emphasize repression and ignore the importance of legitimation strategies such as discourse and ideological appeals is to misunderstand how power functions in a hybrid system. This chapter has shown us that the exercise of power in hybrid regimes is a careful balancing act between repressive and legitimation strategies. There is a tendency in the literature to emphasize the repressive effects of *pungwes* at the expense of their discursive effects.

Secondly, this chapter has added further insight into our understanding of the role of the 'non-traditional' media in hybrid regime legitimisation and persistence. We have already established that the literature on hybrid regimes and that on the Zimbabwean media and 'patriotic history' are overly biased towards the formal media. This chapter shows the importance of the 'non-traditional' media or the forms of media drawn from history and culture in regime legitimation and survival. The *pungwe* was a specific kind of media vehicle which was rooted in history and culture and combined the delivery of 'patriotic history' discourse and performance of coercive power. The political ideas that were communicated at *pungwes* mainly through songs and political speeches resonated with

'patriotic history' in the mainstream media which tapped into long standing historical grievances such as the unresolved land issue, land alienation, racism and labour exploitation. These ideas had traction among war veterans, youths and others who were ZANU (PF)'s key pillars of support in rural areas in the early 2000s. I have demonstrated that the *pungwe* was a different kind of media, doing different kind of work as compared to newspapers, radio and the galas as I have shown. We therefore need to look at these forms of media and political practices in order to fully understand the role of the media in regime legitimation and survival in a hybrid context.

Third, the discussion of *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies in Murewa, a particularly violent and contested district was crucial in understandings of the ruling party's hybrid politics in rural areas. This discussion was based on my interviews with a range of ZANU (PF) actors as well as MDC activists in Murewa. It showed the complexities of the effects of *pungwes* and other ZANU (PF) strategies. The increasing resort to violence and political surveillance by ZANU (PF) made it difficult for the opposition to penetrate and gain a foothold in rural areas. The MDC attempt to circulate an alternative discourse to counter 'patriotic history' was difficult as most areas were declared "no-goes". The escalation of violence left the MDC structures in rural areas severely weakened. The *pungwe* was a key instrument for the repression of MDC supporters in rural areas as we have seen. It could therefore be argued that ZANU (PF)'s increasing investment in violence and surveillance demonstrates the weaknesses of the regime's legitimation strategy and ideological appeals.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

In this thesis, I explored the media under a hybrid regime drawing on the media policies and institutional changes that were introduced by the ruling ZANU (PF) party in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2005. This study was based on interviews with Zimbabwean elites, journalists and artists and a media content analysis focusing on the state press. I also extended my analysis of the media to look at the production and circulation of ZANU (PF) cultural productions such as *Hondo yeMinda* (War for Land) songs, musical galas and *pungwes* (all-night gatherings) held during the "Third Chimurenga". These forms of media were key vehicles in transmitting and performing ZANU (PF)'s exclusive nationalist discourse post-2000. I have argued that the party's media strategies during the "Third Chimurenga" are best understood through the lens of the "hybrid regime". In addition, I have argued that the literature on the Zimbabwean media and 'patriotic history' and that on "hybrid regimes" is overly biased towards the formal media and the political institutions of the judiciary and legislature; it neglects the role of the 'non-traditional' media and the important roles of ministerial management of the media, patronage, and the uses made of history and culture in producing legitimacy and regime survival, aspects which I hope to have adequately addressed in this study.

This thesis provides new insights into the media under a hybrid regime and the strategies deployed in regard to it. Here, I return to the questions that I posed in Chapter One regarding the media and the role of the state in a hybrid regime. I have argued that there were various kinds of hybrid regimes in Zimbabwe from 1980 which influenced the ruling ZANU (PF)'s strategic approach or intervention, including in the media. In Chapter Four, I traced the historical trajectory of the media in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front party in the 1960s and '70s to understand the origins of hybrid media policies and institutions in Zimbabwe. I also explored the historical roots of *Chimurenga* (liberation) songs and *pungwes* (all-night gatherings) that were used by ZANU (PF) post-2000. These forms of 'media' were at the core of the party's media and mobilisation

strategies during the "Third Chimurenga". In addition, I discussed the Rhodesian inheritances and the shifts and continuities in media policy and state practices under the ZANU (PF) government from 1980 to the 1990s. This discussion was crucial in giving us insight into media policies and state practices in shifting hybrid contexts as well as aiding my explanation of the radical departure in ZANU (PF)'s approach towards the media post-2000, which is the main focus of my study.

The thesis was based on the fascinating case of the media policy and institutional changes that were introduced by the ZANU (PF) government in response to pressure from opponents and the legitimation needs of the new hybrid regime that the party built post-2000. I explored how the party's media strategy innovated under the newly created Department of Information and Publicity in the Office of the President and Cabinet headed by Professor Jonathan Moyo. I discussed the broad range of legal, institutional and ideological means and mechanisms of media control that were deployed by the Information and Publicity Ministry and demonstrated how and why these strategies worked so effectively. I interrogated the tensions and contradictions that characterised this hybrid media system and how they were overcome. I also explored the role of the media and the framing technique in the party's legitimation and discrediting of alternative viewpoints. I extended my analysis to look at the role of the 'non-traditional' media or the forms of media with particular historical and cultural resonance in ZANU (PF)'s legitimation and survival efforts post-2000. The ZANU (PF) media system was carefully designed institutionally and ideologically (in terms of the careful framing of narratives in the state press and the party's cultural productions such as songs) and the uses of a recognisable and highly selective history, real grievances, and an only partially distorted view of the opposition MDC party to de-legitimise it. This study testifies to the workings of a complex and sophisticated media system whose agenda cannot simply be reduced to repression and propaganda as implied in some studies.

In the section below, I elaborate further on the key contributions of this thesis to our understanding of the media under a hybrid regime as follows: i) The Media Policies and Institutional Practices in a Hybrid Context; ii) Framing of Media Content and; iii) the Significance of History and Culture in Regime Legitimation and Survival.

9.2 The Media Policies and Institutional Practices in a Hybrid Context

Firstly, this thesis gives insight into media policy, institutional practices and the role of the state in a hybrid system. In Chapter Five, I discussed how ZANU (PF) officials created an innovative media strategy in response to the new political challenges and the ruling party's legitimation needs after 2000. Several studies have looked at the media policies and institutional changes that were spearheaded by the newly created Ministry of Information and Publicity in the Office of the President and Cabinet to good effect. However, as I showed, there are important gaps in these studies with respect to the origins of ideas, the means and mechanisms of media control, the divisions among party and state elites in their approach towards the media and how these divisions were overcome. With regard to the latter point, ignoring the divisions among party and state elites in their approach towards the media creates the impression of a monolithic and seamless ZANU (PF) and a state that relies on repression and propaganda and which did not care deeply about its legitimacy or the sustainability of its actions. This thesis is a departure from the all-too familiar narrative of repression and propaganda. Instead, it looks at both the party's repressive strategies and the subtle means and mechanisms of media control that expressed ZANU (PF)'s concerns for legitimacy. I have demonstrated that hybrid media systems are complex and sophisticated. As we have seen, media laws or policies and institutions in a hybrid regime are carefully designed to achieve repression and legitimation. To ignore how policies and institutions including in the media are carefully designed to balance repression and legitimation is to miss a fundamental aspect about the political architecture of hybrid regimes, and of ZANU (PF).

The existing studies of Zimbabwe do not explore the divisions among party and state elites in the formulation and implementation of the media policies in detail. I explored the divisions among key political figures such as the then Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, and the Permanent Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson, George Charamba, who were the main architects of the ZANU (PF) media strategies in the early 2000s. Whilst Minister Moyo and other ZANU (PF) hardliners managed to repress the critical press through heavy-handed means such as newspaper shutdowns and the incarceration of journalists, some officials did not agree with these strategies. These officials preferred what they called 'smart' ways of handling the critical press such as improving the content in the state press as a way of challenging the critical press

editorially. They noted that improving content in the state press would retain audiences and advertisers thereby keeping the newspapers economically viable and building regime legitimacy. We can see that although the officials who were responsible for the media agreed in preserving ZANU (PF) interests, they differed in their approaches.

The divisions among the ZANU (PF) elites also revolved around the purpose of the media laws and the contestations over the ideal relationship between the media and the state. I showed how these divisions were particularly pronounced during the crafting of the controversial Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) in 2002. Whilst some state and party officials preferred a law that recognised 'freedom of information' in conformity with international norms and standards, ZANU (PF) hardliners such as Information Minister Jonathan Moyo preferred laws that would restrict the flow of information which they defended in terms of what they called 'national' interests. A parliamentary legal committee that was chaired by the then ZANU (PF) legal secretary, Edison Zvobgo, dismissed the Access to Information Bill arguing that it violated the constitutionally-guaranteed rights of freedom of expression and association. It was important to highlight these divisions to understand the contradictions that characterised ZANU (PF)'s hybrid media system after 2000. In hybrid regimes, media policy and practice is characterised by inherent tensions and contradictions. These tensions, interestingly, made ZANU (PF) a flexible and adaptable regime that was difficult to oppose and better able to deploy different strategies over time, and so build regime legitimacy effectively as circumstances changed. It retained a variety of capacities that would not have been available to a purely repressive regime. As we have seen, for example, the government came up with media laws and institutional practices consistent with those that existed in Western jurisdictions but which were deployed to achieve the regime's undemocratic objectives. In "plagiarising" the media laws that existed in Western jurisdictions, the architects of the ZANU (PF) media strategy sought to pre-empt any criticism of these laws by the West and to achieve international legitimacy and acceptance – or at least to minimise the effectiveness of criticism. In effect, the passage of media laws in this manner helped to create the impression of an administration whose conduct towards the media was based on internationally recognised legal norms and standards, and hence should be acceptable to wider international audiences.

In another case, we saw again how the media laws were crafted to placate domestic constituencies but in practice were used to control. Thus ZANU (PF) introduced Broadcasting Regulations under the Presidential (Powers Temporary) Measures Act for a period of six months in response to a Supreme Court ruling which had declared the ZBC monopoly over broadcasting unconstitutional in 2000. When this period lapsed, the government enacted the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) in 2001. This Act created the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ), which was ostensibly responsible for issuing licenses to prospective broadcasters, but the actual intention (and practice) of the broadcasting law was to make sure that the area of broadcasting remained 'impenetrable' for private and foreign players. The Act included the provision that the members of BAZ be appointed by the Minister of State for Information and Publicity and that successful broadcasters who were issued licenses would be required to devote 75 per cent of their content to 'local' programmes. The BAZ was established in 2001 but did not issue any licenses and the ZBC monopoly over broadcasting remained intact. As we saw, the architects of this broadcasting law said that the provision of public hearings for prospective private broadcasters was not intended to open up the airwaves for private broadcasters but to create the illusion of a liberalised broadcasting environment. In this way, the hybrid regime that ZANU (PF) built sought to achieve both some legitimacy and control.

This thesis has also explored how the ZANU (PF) media strategy innovated outside the realm of the law in order to achieve the same combination of legitimacy and control. I have demonstrated that Minister Moyo developed a number of means of controlling the state press after 2000. These strategies included: 1) purges and appointment of loyalists in line with the party's new media strategy; 2) the establishment of a new ethos and a hands-on style of management that placed history and culture at the core of what Moyo was trying to address in the media; 3) the management and manipulation of journalists via meetings, money, threats to jobs, and creating and disseminating content via briefings. The media briefings that were held by Moyo with journalists and editors from the state press were a kind of political 're-education' that created a shared ideology that became a self-disciplining kind of power. The journalists were 'lectured' on what constituted the 'national' interest and how this was supposed to be defended in the news

media. Many found these arguments convincing, and they were weeded out if they did not. Many journalists and editors I interviewed argued that "journalism does not exist in a vacuum" and questioned the notion of 'professional journalism' which they said ignored African history and culture. These strategies were effective in creating a committed and self-policing journalistic team and shaping the journalistic practice of news framing in the state press. They did not require heavy-handed intervention to maintain.

This thesis has shown us that media policies and institutions in hybrid regimes are carefully drafted to achieve legitimacy. These media policies and institutions borrow from those that exist in liberal jurisdictions but they are manipulated by political executives in hybrid regimes to achieve undemocratic objectives. We have also seen that hybrid media systems are characterised by contradictions. Rarely are they defined by repression alone. We therefore need to go beyond the fact of repression and examine how these media policies are also crafted to achieve legitimation. This thesis has shed additional light into the legal, institutional and ideological means and mechanisms of media control in hybrid regimes. The subtle means of political control are preferred to evade criticism and create the impression of regimes whose conduct in the media is based on 'legality' in a bid to win over demanding domestic and international constituencies.

9.3 Patriotic Journalism and Framing in the Zimbabwean State Press

Various studies on the Zimbabwean media and 'patriotic history' acknowledge the power and sophistication of the pro-government narratives that were circulated in the state-controlled media (Ranger, 2004, 2005; Tendi, 2010). Terence Ranger (2005) observed that Jonathan Moyo was the leading promoter of 'patriotic journalism' in the state media. Ranger defined 'patriotic journalism' as a brand of destructive journalism that made an exclusive appeal to patriotism and regarded all those who did not agree with the ruling party's ideology as traitors. The study by Miles Tendi (2010) gives further insight into the role of 'patriotic history' in the state media. Tendi notes that ZANU (PF) started to use history creatively to legitimise its claims to power and authority. Building on these works, I looked at the complex relationships between journalists and state officials, the conditions under which they operated and how this shaped the framing of news in the state press. I also analysed the content that was circulated in the state press to add further

insight into the themes that were covered in the literature on 'patriotic history'. This thesis reinforces the narrative power of ZANU (PF)'s ideas that were circulated in the state-controlled media as acknowledged in the literature. The thesis has also shown us the importance of the media and the framing technique in legitimacy construction and argued that the literature on hybrid regimes does not pay adequate attention to the uses of historical narratives to legitimise power and authority in these contexts. I have thus sought to demonstrate that the ZANU (PF) media strategy was carefully designed ideologically in terms of the selection of themes and their framing in the state media and the party's cultural productions.

In Chapter Six, I analysed the content of the coverage of Fast-Track Land Reform in the state press. This analysis built on a similar study by Wendy Willems (2004) which explored the framing of the land issue in the Zimbabwean press. Willems looked at the framing of the land issue in the state-controlled and private press emphasizing the polarised media debate that characterised the fast-track land occupations. My argument was based on an analysis of the coverage of Fast-Track Land Reform in the state press and the interviews that I conducted with selected journalists.

I wanted to have a broad understanding of how the media control strategies deployed by the Ministry of Information and Publicity under Jonathan Moyo, as explained above, shaped the framing of 'patriotic journalism' in the state press. I hope to have effectively demonstrated how ZANU (PF) after 2000, and specifically Moyo's Ministry, created both a self-disciplining journalistic machine and a compelling set of narratives or (frames) to create real legitimacy. My analysis of the coverage of the land issue and its framing in the state-controlled press demonstrated the following key points: i) there was a careful construction of a narrative to legitimise land occupations that selectively invoked history and blamed the British in particular for the slow pace of land reform by negating its historical obligations and meddling in Zimbabwe's internal affairs to scuttle land reform; ii) there was an emphasis on how unequal land ownership still was in 2000, despite 20 years of independence; iii) there was an emphasis on the importance of the binaries of 'us' versus 'them' in the framing of the land issue, in which white farmers were cast as archaic, racist, exploitative landlords who had not changed since colonial times, while blacks remained impoverished and exploited; iv) there was an effort to

produce a negative portrayal of the MDC as anti-land reform and pro-white and British, which had some truth to it, but which was also a distortion of particularly the role of race, and which also set up an unnecessary incompatibility between redistribution and respect for rights. I have demonstrated that the negative portrayal of the MDC was based on the party's blunders and miscalculations which provided journalists with ammunition to further discredit the party. I made the point that the strategy of framing worked very well as a legitimating tool for Fast-Track land reform because of its uses of a recognisable (if selective) history, its invocation of real grievances, and use of an only partially distorted picture of the MDC.

Besides looking at the content, I also demonstrated the strategic choices that were taken by key figures such as Professor Jonathan Moyo (Minister for Information and Publicity) and George Charamba (Presidential Spokesperson and Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity) regarding framing. This thesis is one of a few where these key figures tell their own stories and explain the decisions they took regarding media policy formulation and implementation. Allowing them to explain their choices gives us a deep insight into the reasons behind them. These strategic choices in the media included: the need to balance repression and legitimation and changing tact in very Machiavellian ways to achieve their objectives; carefully drafting the media laws including "plagiarising" some of the laws that existed in Western jurisdictions, as we have seen, "to avoid further fall-out with the West" and pre-empt any Western criticism of the media policies, to design media laws and institutions to win over demanding domestic and international constituencies and achieve legitimacy; placing history and culture at the core of the media strategy for legitimation purposes but also as the basis for repudiating Western liberal notions of development and journalism; and the careful construction of narratives in the state-controlled media and the party's cultural productions for legitimation purposes.

9.4 The Significance of History and Culture in Regime Legitimation or Survival

Thirdly, this thesis demonstrated the importance of the 'non-traditional' media and history and culture in producing legitimacy and regime survival. These aspects are neglected in the literature on hybrid regimes and their uses of the media as well as in the

literature on Zimbabwe which is biased towards the traditional media. We saw that the architects of the ZANU (PF) media strategy post-2000 conceived history and culture to be an important part of how they made claims to legitimacy and how they reached and communicated with a broad audience. History and culture were also key in ZANU (PF)'s repudiation of the liberal notions of development and journalism. This thesis contributes to a Zimbabweanist scholarly literature on 'patriotic history' and media through exploring ZANU (PF)'s artistic work such as music and the creation of media platforms like galas which elaborated and disseminated the themes of 'patriotic history', with great creativity and appeal, far beyond the reach of newspapers. I extended my analysis of the role of the 'non-traditional' media and political practices drawn from history and culture in regime legitimation through my analysis of *pungwes* (all-night gatherings), a form of 'media' drawn from the 1970s *Chimurenga* (liberation) war which was revived by ZANU (PF) and its allies – the war veterans, youth militia and others during the "Third Chimurenga".

In Chapter Seven, I discussed the role of the 'non-traditional' media in a hybrid regime focusing on *Hondo yeMinda* (War for Land) songs that were produced by ZANU (PF) post-2000. These songs were co-ordinated by the Ministry of Information and Publicity. This thesis shows that the music strategy was carefully designed institutionally (in terms of the role of state institutions, officials and artists) and ideologically (in terms of selection of lyrics and their framing). The ideas for some of the songs were originated by Minister Jonathan Moyo. The music strategy was also merged with the re-branding of state media institutions. For instance, the transformation of ZBC *Radio 3* to *Power FM* and the state's support for Western style *hip hop* music to capture the youths and re-orient them politically to its 'patriotic history'. The state and party officials who co-ordinated the music strategy said that the youths, whom they referred to as 'born frees', were deliberately targeted because they were opposed to 'patriotic history'. They were picking appropriate media for a particular audience to increase effectiveness. We can also see that the forms of media such as music were merged with other strategies and included history and culture to increase their capacity to legitimate ZANU (PF)'s claims to power and authority.

There were three major sources of these songs that the state officials who were behind the music strategy elaborated on. Most of the songs were *Chimurenga* songs from the 1970s liberation struggle against colonial rule that were re-worked to suit the new context of the "Third Chimurenga". Some of the songs originated from the state agencies including the Ministry of Information. Minister Moyo originated lyrics for some of the songs that he gave to artists to sing and also produced his own songs which were not just focused on politics. Some artists who genuinely believed in the "Third Chimurenga" approached the Ministry of Information for support. The state patronage offered to artists such as 'Cde Chinx', who was the leader of the ZANLA Light Machine Gun (LMG) Choir in the 1970s liberation struggle, in the production of *Hondo yeMinda* songs was strategic. The idea was to legitimize the party's claims that 'Fast-track' constituted the third and final phase of the liberation struggle. The other reason for state patronage of accomplished artists such as 'Cde Chinx' was to 'orientate' and inspire the youths to sing in support of the status quo. The Ministry of Information also organised musical galas to which artists were invited to perform. These galas were broadcast live on television. The themes of the musical galas were organised around iconic nationalist figures such as the late Vice-Presidents Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda and national holidays such as Heroes Day and Independence Day. The careful framing of the themes for the musical galas and the uses of history was intended to build consensus around these programmes and make it difficult for people to dismiss them as ZANU (PF) propaganda platforms. It was also strategic to organise the musical galas around iconic nationalist leaders such as Joshua Nkomo to lure people from regions that had been hostile to ZANU (PF) after 1980 and which had strongly supported the MDC after 2000.

The artists who produced *Hondo yeMinda* or *Chave Chimurenga* (Its Now War) songs were not just lured by monetary benefits provided by the state. As we have seen, some of them genuinely believed in the "Third Chimurenga", much as some of the key journalists and editors in the state media did. However, some of the young artists were also attracted by the possibility of fame since the music was played on radio and television and promoted through the galas. Music that was considered politically unpalatable, on the other hand, was not played on the state broadcaster and the artists were not invited to perform at the musical galas. In some cases, however, the artists did not want to perform at the galas and produce pro-ZANU (PF) songs for fear of being associated with the

failures of government and thereby alienating their supporters. I also looked at the lyrics of the songs to understand the themes that were selected and how they were framed to understand the role of the 'non-traditional' media in legitimacy construction. As we have seen, the ZANU (PF) music strategy was carefully designed in terms of the role of state institutions, state officials and artists and in terms of the framing of lyrics and selection of themes. The music strategy shows that the forms of media and political mobilisation strategies that are drawn from history and culture are crucial means for regime legitimation and survival: the ZANU (PF) songs during the "Third Chimurenga" clearly demonstrate the importance of the 'non-traditional' media in particular. We therefore need to broaden our scope to look at these forms of media for a better understanding of the media in a hybrid regime.

The discussion of *pungwes* in Chapter Eight sought to provide further insight into the role of the 'non-traditional' media in a hybrid regime. I traced the historical roots of *pungwes* and reviewed a wider literature that explores the uses of the *pungwe* after 2000. In Chapter Four, we established that *pungwes* were part of the 'alternative' media that ZANLA forces used in the 1970s to mobilise the 'masses' to support the war against colonial rule and used again by ZANU (PF) as an instrument to repress supporters of ZAPU after independence in the 1980s. The *pungwes* held during the "Third Chimurenga" were important spaces to perform the messages of 'patriotic history' through song and speeches like the galas, but they were also a space in which coercive power could be demonstrated. The *pungwes* were thus spaces in which power was both legitimated discursively and performed, in some cases through beatings, rapes, torture and even the killing of those designated under the rubric of 'patriotic history' as sell-outs. Unlike the songs and the galas analysed in Chapter Seven, the *pungwes* did not necessarily originate from the Ministry of Information and Publicity. However, they were perhaps the most explicitly 'hybrid' form of media that ZANU (PF) used post-2000 to legitimise its rule and violently 'discipline' those who were designated 'sell-outs'.

This thesis has made a crucial contribution to our understanding of the role of the media in sustaining a hybrid regime. The notion of the hybrid regime was useful in interrogating how the ZANU (PF) media policies and institutional practices were designed and their motives, as well as the contradictions that characterised the hybrid

media system that the party built post-2000 and how these were overcome. It is not enough to look only at the mainstream media or the repressive and propaganda strategies, to fully understand how hybrid media systems function. As we have seen, the ZANU (PF) media system during the "Third Chimurenga" was carefully designed institutionally (in terms of state patronage, media laws and institutions) and ideologically (in terms of the careful framing of media content and the uses of a recognisable but selective history, real grievances, and an only partially distorted picture of the opposition to de-legitimise it in ways that were coercive in part only and which produced legitimation). This thesis has also shown us the importance of the forms of media with particular historical and cultural resonance in regime legitimation and survival, a topic which is neglected in the study of hybrid regimes generally and which has not been sufficiently recognised in the literature on media in Zimbabwe. The thesis shows the great variety of strategies used, the careful ways in which they were tailored to particular audiences by a small group of highly educated and culturally sophisticated officials, and the means by which coercion and patronage were woven into institutions and performances, often with a powerful historical resonance.

9.5 Conclusion

The Zimbabweanist scholarly literature on the media and 'patriotic history' does not acknowledge that ZANU (PF) is running a "hybrid regime", which influenced the party's strategic approach or intervention in the media. In this study, I have demonstrated the importance of the notion of the "hybrid regime" in understanding Zimbabwe. I have in addition argued that the studies on hybrid regimes generally and specifically on Zimbabwe are overly biased towards the traditional media (radio, television and newspapers) and pay insufficient attention to the legitimating strategies in the media. I have demonstrated that these strategies are historically and culturally specific and they reside within institutions and in practices that need careful study that goes beyond (but include) traditional media, and which go beyond but include repression, notably in terms of creating institutional power via patronage and making a compelling ideological and intellectual case to legitimise power. I have also noted that the studies on hybrid regimes are largely quantitative and electoralist in approach and that they do not explore other ways that these regimes seek to legitimise their rule outside the realm of elections. This

study adds to understandings of how hybrid regimes use the media including the forms of media or political practices drawn from history and culture in legitimising their rule.

Broadly, this thesis contributes to our understanding of some of the challenges being faced by the media in Africa since the advent of multi-partyism on the continent in the 1990s. This study confirms what is explained in the wider literature that the state remains the biggest threat to the media. But unlike old-school authoritarians in the colonial and the post-colonial regimes in Africa, the political executives in hybrid regimes that emerged on the continent in the post-Cold War era are adept at embracing democratic norms and standards, not for their love for democracy, but because they realise that in this contemporary era "democracy is the only broadly legitimate regime form". The media plays an important role in producing legitimacy and regime survival in this context, as explained in this study.

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Annex 1: List of Interviews with Zimbabwean politicians, government officials, war veterans, journalists and artists

1. **Professor Jonathan Moyo**- Former Minister of Information and Publicity in Zimbabwe, 2000 to 2005 and Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services from 2013 to 2014. Professor Moyo is currently the Zimbabwean Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education. The interview took place in Harare in April 2013.

2. **George Charamba-** Presidential Spokesperson and Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Publicity. The interview took place in Harare in March 2013.

3. **Dr Tafataona Mahoso**- Former Chairperson of the Media and Information Commission (now Zimbawe Media Commission). Dr Mahoso was the head of the Mass Communication division at the Harare Polytechnic before he was appointed as Chairperson of the Media and Information Commission in 2002. He is currently serving as the Chief Executive of the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) and Chairperson of the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ). The interview took place in Harare in April 2013.

4. **Bright Matonga**- Former Deputy Minister of Information and Publicity. I interviewed Matonga in Harare in April 2013.

5. **Dr Sikhanyiso Ndlovu** (now late) **-** Former Minister of Information and Publicity. I interviewed Dr Ndlovu in Harare in April 2013.

6. **Caesar Zvayi-** Former Deputy Editor and now the Editor of *The Herald* (state-controlled newspaper). The interview took place in Harare in February 2013.

7. **Munyaradzi Huni**- He is the Political Editor of *The Sunday Mail* (the main state-controlled weekly newspaper). The interview with took place in Harare in May 2013.

8. **Pikirayi Deketeke** – Former Editor of *The Herald* (the main state-controlled daily newspaper) now serving as the Chief Executive of Zimpapers, the state-controlled newspaper chain. The interview took place in Harare in March 2013.

9. **William Chikoto-**Former Editor of *The Sunday Mail*. The interview with Chikoto took place in Harare in March 2013.

10. **Lovemore Ranga Mataire-** A Senior Reporter at *The Herald* newspaper. He was interviewed in April 2013.

11. **Dickson Chingaira aka 'Cde Chinx'**- A Zimbabwean artist who produced *Chimurenga* 'revolutionary' songs in the 1970s liberation war against colonial rule. 'Cde Chinx' was the leader of the ZANLA Choir Light Machine Gun. He is one of the artists who was commissioned by the Ministry of Information and Publicity to produce songs for the "Third Chimurenga" in the early 2000s. The interview with 'Cde Chinx' took place in Harare in March 2013.

12. **Last Chiyangwa *aka* 'Tambaoga'**- A Zimbabwean artist who produced "Third Chimurenga" songs. The interview with Tambaoga took place in Harare in March 2013.

13. **Elizabeth Bwanya**- A Zimbabwean artist and leader of the Mbare Chimurenga Musical Choir. The interview took place in Harare in July 2013.

14. **Tendai Biti**- Former Secretary-General of the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. The interview with Biti took place in Harare in April 2013.

15. **Eddie Cross-** He is the MDC Policy Advisor. The interview with Cross took place in Harare in July 2013.

16. **Munyaradzi Gwisai**- Lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe and former MDC Member of Parliament for Highfield Constituency. The interview with Gwisai took place in Harare in June 2013.

17. **James Makore**- An MDC Member of Parliament who worked in the party's mobilisation and advocacy unit. The interview took place in Harare in August 2013.

18. **Joseph Chinotimba**- A war veteran and former executive member of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). The interview with him took place in Harare in August 2013.

19. **Patrick Nyaruwata**- A war veteran and former executive member of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). The interview with Nyaruwata took place in Nyabira in July 2013.

20. **Andy Mhlanga** – A War Veteran and former executive member of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). The interview with Mhlanga took place in Harare in August 2013.

21. **Jabulani Sibanda** – Former Chairperson of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWA). The interview took place in Harare in August 2013.

22. **Shadreck Makombe** - Former Secretary-General of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWA). The interview took place in Harare in August 2013.

23. **Interview with War Veteran X**- A War Veteran in Murewa District interviewed in April 2013.

24. **Interview with War Veteran Z**- A War Veteran in Murewa District interviewed in April 2013.

25. **Former Farm Worker-** Interview with a former farm worker at Glen Somerset Farm. The interview took place in April 2013.

26. **ZANU (PF) Activist 1** – A ZANU (PF) activist interviewed at Glen Somerset Farm in Murewa District in October 2012.

27. **ZANU (PF) Activist 2** – A ZANU (PF) activist interviewed at Glen Somerset Farm in Murewa District in October 2012.

28. **"Cde Banda"**– A War Veteran from Murewa District. The interview took place at Craiglea Farm in Goromonzi in October 2012.

29. **"Cde Chijaka"-** A War Veteran and ZANU (PF) member for Nyamhita Branch in Murewa district. The interview took place at Glen Somerset in April 2013.

30. **Interview with ZANU (PF) Nyamhita District branch**, Murewa, April 2013.

31. **Interview with an MDC activist**, Murewa District, April 2013.

32. **Interview with an MDC activist,** Murewa District, August 2013.

List of Hondo yeMinda (Struggle for Land) Songs analysed:

Below is the list of *Hondo yeMinda* (Struggle for land) songs whose content I analyzed. The analysis of these songs was crucial in elaborating the themes covered in ZANU (PF)'s 'patriotic history' and the role of the 'non-traditional' media in the ruling party's legitimation and survival efforts post-2000. The songs were a crucial part of the media strategies that were deployed by the Ministry of Information and Publicity led by Professor Jonathan Moyo from 2000 to 2005. The songs mainly focused on the land issue which was the primary theme in ZANU (PF)'s 'patriotic history' during the "Third Chimurenga". They were promoted on radio, television and the televised musical galas.

The songs by Last Chiyangwa *aka* "Tambaoga":

1. ***Rambai Makashinga*** (Continue to Endure), 2000
2. ***Kuminda*** (To the Fields), 2001
3. ***Agrimende*** (Agreement), 2002

The songs by Dickson Chingaira *aka* “Cde Chinx”:

1. ***Hondo yeMinda*** (Struggle for land), 2001
2. ***Zimbabwe IShumba*** *(Zimbabwe is a Lion and Britain is Prey), 2002*