N.P. Milner.  
Christ Church.  

D. Phil. thesis.  


d
t

Vegetius and the Anonymus De Rebus Belligris.

The name, title, literary persona and office of Vegetius are discussed in ch. 1, and although a firm decision is unjustified, comes stabuli seems better-attested than praefectus praetorio, comes sacrarum largitionum or comes rei privatae. It is suggested that 'Vegetius' is only a cognomen to a true gentillicium 'Flavius'. The author's self-presentation as the Emperor's director of studies-cum-secretary is noticed.

Ch. 2 provisionally locates Vegetius in Spanish horse-breeding senatorial circles, and treats of his conventional Latin education with little or no Greek, his Vergil-reverence and orthodox Christianity.

The date of Vegetius' Epitoma Rei Militaris is analysed in ch. 3 as being before the sack of Rome but in the aftermath of the battle of Adrianople. The Emperor-dedicatee is provisionally identified as Theodosius I. Scholarly debate on the question is thoroughly aired.

The genre, literary persona and date of the Anonymus De Rebus Belligris are argued in ch. 4 against the comparison of Vegetius. The Anonymus is characterized as a thaumaturgical sophist who compiled his 'inventions' from older mechanical sources. A late-4th. or early-5th. century date is supported in opposition to the A.D. 360's.

Ch. 5 argues that Vegetius' Epitome was intended to describe a Republican legionary organization adapted to late-antique Field armies with the unstated aim of reversing in detail and with specific advantages in mind the rapidly increasing barbarization of the army.

Ch. 6 addresses the extent to which tactics and strategic constraints, arms and equipment and siegecraft were understood by Vegetius in contemporary terms, particularly as shown by Ammianus Marcellinus.

It is argued in ch. 7 that the sources Vegetius actually used were late epitomes of the named sources, Cato, Celsus, Frontinus and Paternus, apart from Varro whom he used directly. Massive authorial intervention by Vegetius in the organization and content of the text is analysed.
Vegetius
and the Anonymus De Rebus Bellicis

A thesis presented to the University of Oxford
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,

By

N.P. Milner, M.A., Christ Church,

Preface.

This study arose out of a chance encounter with a text of Vegetius' Epitoma Rei Militaris in the possession of Mr. N. Fuentes while I was taking part in an excavation of a Flavian and Antonine fort at Strageath, Perthshire, directed by Professors S.S.Frere and J.J.Wilkes in September 1983. The lack of a modern English translation since the two-hundred year old version of Lt. J. Clarke cried out for a determined effort to supply one. It is due to Mr. Fuentes’s encouragement that I embarked on the project. But the task proved trickier than anticipated, as the Latin text is often very concise—excessively so for the modern interpreter’s purposes—, is prone to conceal its meaning behind platitudes, and presents an often confusing medley of archaic and late-antique military terms and customs.

Many questions presented themselves which could not be satisfactorily answered by reference to standard works on the subject. Despite the unique survival of a first-rate official document in the Notitia Dignitatum, the late-Roman army is in general poorly attested, since the evidence is excessively fragmented in coverage and much smaller in quantity than for the army of the Principate. Above all the character of Vegetius’ work had not been properly established—hence the present study.

My proposal was accepted to research the subject from Michaelmas 1985, and barring an absence of two terms working on Greek epigraphy at the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara and two summers on Dr. J.J. Coulton’s site-survey of Balboura, Lycia, has been pursued without serious interruption over sixteen terms. The British Academy provided funds in the form of a Major State Studentship for three years, and Christ Church also assisted with a Dixon scholarship for one year. I also worked as a research assistant to Dr. A.K. Bowman for half a year. My parents have also been generous with subventions throughout.

The study has been supervised by Dr. R.S.O.Tomlin from start to finish. I owe much to his patient guidance, common sense and learning. I am responsible for all remaining blemishes. I am also grateful to my friends Dr. Rudolf Wachter for assistance with printing up, and Nicholas Hardwick for checking references in the Bibliography.
# Contents

Introduction. ........................................................................................................ vi
Abbreviations. .................................................................................................... ix
Ch. 1. Vegetius: Life and Times, Pt. I. ................................................................. 1
   (a) Name ........................................................................................................ 1
   (b) Title ......................................................................................................... 3
   (c) Persona .................................................................................................. 4
   (d) Office ..................................................................................................... 10
      1. * Comes sacrarum largitionum? ......................................................... 10
      2. * Praefectus praetorio? ................................................................... 13
      3. Background as possessor and equine expert .................................. 19
      4. * Comes stabuli? .............................................................................. 22
      5. Conclusion ......................................................................................... 24
Ch. 2. Vegetius: Life and Times, Pt. II ................................................................ 26
   (a) Origo ..................................................................................................... 26
   (b) Education ............................................................................................ 31
   (c) Religion ................................................................................................ 39
      1. O. Seeck ............................................................................................ 55
      2. W. Goffart ......................................................................................... 59
      3. E. Birley ............................................................................................ 64
      4. C.D. Gordon ..................................................................................... 67
   (d) Honorius .............................................................................................. 68
   (d) Theodosius I ........................................................................................ 71
      1. The aftermath of Adrianople ............................................................. 71
      2. Before the sack .................................................................................. 76
      3. Gladiatorial games still normal ......................................................... 77
      4. * Colonii still recruited .................................................................... 78
      5. Pacified Sea ...................................................................................... 78
      6. Vandals conspicuous by their absence ............................................. 81
      7. Friendly relations with barbarians .................................................... 83
      8. Anti-Gratian polemic ...................................................................... 85
      9. Anti-Theodosius polemic? ................................................................. 90
     10. The date of Easter ............................................................................. 91
     11. Founding of cities .......................................................................... 92
     12. Antiquarian interests ...................................................................... 95
     13. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 96
   (e) Non-arguments. ...................................................................................... 97
      1. Ms. subscriptiones .......................................................................... 97
      2. Temporary ascendency of primiscrinitus? ........................................ 97
      3. Divus = 'late ruler'? ....................................................................... 98
      4. 'Worldwide rule' ............................................................................. 98
      5. 'Diacritical' imperial titles and panegyrical virtues? ...................... 99
     6. Birthday of navigation ..................................................................... 103
     7. The consular date of Eutropius' edition ........................................... 104
Ch. 3. The date of the Epitoma rei militaris. ......................................................... 105
   (a) Introduction .......................................................................................... 105
   (b) Valentinian III ..................................................................................... 107
      1. O. Seeck ............................................................................................ 55
      2. W. Goffart ......................................................................................... 59
      3. E. Birley ............................................................................................ 64
      4. C.D. Gordon ..................................................................................... 67
      5. 1. A.D. 366-370? ............................................................................. 119
     2. 2. Before the sack ............................................................................. 122
     3. The aftermath of Adrianople ............................................................ 122
     4. Gladiatorial games still normal .......................................................... 122
     5. Vandals conspicuous by their absence ............................................. 129
      (i.) Absence of silver coins .................................................................. 129
      (ii.) Surfeit of gold ................................................................................ 130
Introduction.

After having been one of the more widely read, copied, translated and admired classical Latin works in the Middle Ages, with at least 54 extant pre-1300 mss. comparable only to the elder Pliny among technical writers of antiquity,¹ the Epitoma Rei Militaris (Epit.) of Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (V.) fell into neglect after the Renaissance as new works on military science rendered obsolete its practical value and increasing knowledge of Roman history cast doubt on the reliability of its antiquarian information. No new widely available English translation has appeared since J. Clarke’s in London, 1767, which has been in part reprinted in the 20th. c.² No full-dress commentary has been prepared since N. Schwebel’s in Nuremberg, 1767, which subsumed Renaissance commentators; D. Nisard’s (Paris, 1878) is heavily based on Schwebel’s.³ In the 20th. c. D.K. Silhanek produced an unpublished commentary on books I–II.⁴

A good critical edition of the text of the Epit. was published by C. Lang in the Teubner series in 1885 (2nd. edn.). Since then newly discovered mss. have made a new edition desirable,⁵ and one was reported in progress for the Budé series in 1977,⁶ but has not so far appeared. In the 20th. c. L.F. Stelten prepared an unpublished text of books I–II based on the ‘oldest mss.’ which does not replace Lang’s.⁷ I cite Lang’s edition throughout this thesis. A good critical study of the text was published by A. Andersson, who decisively showed by a detailed demonstration of V.’s style that Lang’s square brackets are in the great majority of

cases unjustifiable. P. de Jonge further showed that a number of V.'s alleged textual and stylistic peculiarities were paralleled in authors such as Ammianus who belonged to the same age. A monograph of *Quellenforschung* was published by D. Schenk, but won only qualified acceptance. A series of articles by F. Lammert in the 1930's and early 40's advanced our understanding of tactical writings considerably. Neumann's *RE* article of 1965 summarised much of the recent scholarship. Paschoud revived negative views of V.'s competence as a hidebound compiler in 1967, while allowing that Epit. I obscurely attacked the barbarization of the army. Chastagnol argued that V. influenced the author of the *Historia Augusta*, while Goffart and Eric Birley have most recently written in favour of a 5th. c. date for V. A full bibliography has been recently published by Sablayrolles.

The Epit. was excerpted by a Renaissance forger who published it as an ostensibly new-found antique author called 'Modestus' in Venice, 1471. Although this pseudepigraphical work has long been known as a forgery it is still taken as genuine from time to time, most recently by Rémy. A text of 'Modestus' can be found in Nisard.

As well as of the Epit., V. was the author of the *Digesta Artis Mulomedicinae* (Mul.), which was edited for the Teubner series by E. Lommatzsch (1903). This work was preserved in the *corpus hippiaricorum* by a quite different line of transmission from the Epit. V. is fortunate in the perfect preservation of two substantial works from his hand. As Goffart has said, study of the Mul. enhances one's respect for the author's skills as an epitomator, and this obliges us to approach the Epit. with some expectation that it too has its value. In this study I

---

17Goffart, locc. cit., 92 = 72.
have tried to ask myself what V. intended to achieve with his book, rather than assume, with our predecessors, that it was simply an Art of War, and criticize it for its supposed manifold errors and omissions.

In order to answer this question it was necessary first to trace a social and political background in which he could be placed. Chapters 1–2 discuss his name, rank, social position, literary persona and bureaucratic outlook, and such biographical clues as could be deduced from his career as distinguished horse-breeder in the Western Empire, demonstrable knowledge of barbarian words and ways, and orthodox Christian religion.

Part of this background depended on an accurate dating of the text (Chapter 3). This thesis concludes that the Epit. was written in the aftermath of Adrianople and before the sack of Rome, pace Goffart and Birley, and identifies the Emperor-dedicatee as Theodosius I.

A comparison and contrast with the roughly contemporary Anonymus De rebus bellicis in Chapter 4 served further to round off our picture of V. and the Epit., while at the same time leading to new conclusions about the nature and date of the Anonymus’ work and its author as in part an epitome of old military technical writings compiled by a civilian amateur who was probably a pagan philosopher-thaumaturge addressing Theodosius I or Constantius III.

It was then possible in Chapters 5–6 to attempt to analyse what impact the Epit. might have had or have been intended to have in detailed proposals and reforms canvassed. Against the background of the Field Armies of the age of Theodosius, the legio antiqua is interpreted as intended as a viable alternative model whose unstated main aim was to reduce and downgrade the rôle of élite barbarian cavalry and infantry units, and of barbarian federate irregulars, without loss of tactical or strategic effectiveness. Thus it was primarily a proposal for a new model army, not an antiquarian essay in historical research, although inspired by the remnants of Cato’s De re militari.

Finally an analysis of sources (Chapter 7) allowed further elucidation of V.’s programmatic, inventive and hasty methods of working, thereby illuminating his goals, while revealing the greater than hitherto suspected extent of middle Republican material in the Epit. and the probable influence of Cato the Censor on such writers as Polybius, A. Cornelius
Celsus and Sex. Julius Frontinus. But the nature of the immediate sources used appears too jejun to conclude direct use of the primary works themselves.

**Abbreviations.**

Relatively few abbreviations are used in this thesis, apart from the common ones for ancient authors (the first or first two syllables) and their works (the first or first two syllables or acronyms). I list here most of the rest, and any remaining obscurities will be resolved by reference to the author's name in the Bibliography—

**AE** L'année épigraphique
**ANRW** H.Temporini et al. (edd.) *Aufstieg und Niedergang des römischer Welt* (Berlin 1972—)
**BAR** British Archaeological Reports (Oxford)
**BASP** Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists
**BGU** Berliner Griechischer Urkunden I–IV, Aegyptische Urkunde aus den koeniglichen Museen zu Berlin (Berlin 1895–1912)
**BHAC** A.Alfoldi et al. (edd.) *Bonner Historia Augusta Colloquium, Antiquitas Reihe 4* (Bonn 1963—)
**BJ** Bonner Jahrbücher
**Blockley** R.C.Blockley (ed.) *The fragmentary classicizing Historians of the later Roman Empire: Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus I–II*, ARCA classical and mediaeval texts, papers and monographs, 6, 10, (Liverpool, 1981–83)
**CCSL** Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (Turnhout, Belgium)
**Chron. min.** T.Mommsen (ed.) *Chronica minora*, MGH Auctorum Antiquissimorum I–III (Berlin 1892–1898)
**CIL** T.Mommsen et al. (edd.) *Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum* (Berlin 1863—)
**CJ** Codex Justinianus, P.Krueger (ed.) (Berlin 1877)
**CRAI** Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres
**CRP** Comes rei privatae
**CSEL** Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (Vienna)
**CSHB** Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae (Bonn)
**CSL** Comes sacrarum largitionum
**CTh** Codex Theodosianus, T.Mommsen (ed.) (Berlin 1905)
**Daremberg-Saglio** (edd.) *Dictionnaire des Antiquités grecques et romaines* (Paris 1877–1919)
**Dig.** Digest, T.Mommsen (ed.) *Digesta Justiniani Augusti* (Berlin 1868–70)
edn. edition
**Epit.** Epitoma Rei Militaris
**Foerster** J.W.Foerster *De fide Flavii Vegetii Renati*, Diss. (Bonn 1879)
**IGR** R.Cagnat et al. (edd.) *Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas pertinentes* (Paris 1906–27)
**Jones** A.H.M.Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* (Oxford 1964)
**JRS** Journal of Roman Studies
**Lang** C.Lang (ed.) *Vegetii Epitoma Rei Militaris* (Teubner edn., Leipzig 1885)
Lommatsch E. Lommatsch (ed.) Vegetii Digesta Artis Mulomedicinae (Teubner edn., 1903)
LSJ Liddell–Scott–Jones (edd.) A Greek Lexicon (Oxford 1940)
mag. mil. magister militum
mag. equ. magister equitum
MAMA W. M. Calder et al. (edd.) Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua I– (London 1928–)
MGH Monumenta Germaniae Historicca
Mul. Digesta Artis Mulomedicinae
NCO Non-commissioned officer
Not. Dig. Notitia Dignitatum, O. Seeck (ed.) (Berlin 1876)
Nov. Th. II Leges novellae Theodosii II Augusti, P. M. Meyer (ed.) (Berlin 1905)
Nov. Val. III Leges novellae Valentiniani III Augusti, P. M. Meyer (ed.) (Berlin 1905)
PG J. P. Migne (ed.) Patrologia Graeca (Paris)
PL J. P. Migne (ed.) Patrologia Latina (Paris)
PPo Praefectus praetorio
RE Pauly–Wissowa (edd.) Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart 1894–)
REA Revue des Études archéologiques
REL Revue des Études latines
rés. résumé
rev. review
S. O. Seeck Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste (Stuttgart 1919)
SB F. Preisigke et al. (edd.) Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten I– (Strasbourg 1915–)
Schwebel N. Schwebel (ed.) Flavi Vegetii Renati comitis de Re Militari libri quinque (Nuremberg, 1767), reprinted Strasbourg, 1806
SEG J. J. E. Hondius et al. (edd.) Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum I– (Leiden 1923–)
SHA Scriptores Historiae Augustae
TAPhA Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association
TLL Thesaurus Linguae Latinae
V. Vegetius
ZPE Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik
Ch. I. Vegetius: Life and Times, Pt. I.

(a) Name.

V.'s first name is given by mss. of the Epit. as 'Flavius', with the single but precious exception of the 7th. c. A.D. Excerptum Vaticanum Reg. 2077,¹ which gives the seeming praenomen + gentilicium(?) + cognomen combination 'Publius Vegetius Renatus'; mss. of the Mul. have the same. Since the latter work is certainly by the same author,² and all imperial servants from the time of Constantine onward were entitled to the name 'Flavius', it might seem possible that his full name included both. However, the use of 'Flavius' has been likened to 'Mr.' in English, and is now thought to have been correctly used in the West as a title only with the last name.³ Therefore V. may have had the name 'Flavius' as a family name, i.e. his real gentilicium, rather than a title, thus in addition to 'Publius', as in PLRE I.763, Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus; the omission of 'Flavius' at an early stage in the paradosis of the Mul. would then be explicable as due to a mistaken belief that it was merely the common title. In that case V. would resemble Q. Flavius Maesius Egnatius Lollianus, cos. A.D. 355, in being one of the few cases where 'Flavius' appeared regularly in the full nomenclature of a prominent aristocrat.⁴ Indeed, given the tendency of Roman aristocrats to polyonymy, unabated from the 2nd. c. A.D. to the late Empire,⁵ we cannot be sure that V. had no other names also, or that he is not already known to history under another name.

The gentilicium or cognomen 'Vegetius' is very rarely attested.⁶ No local distribution emerges from the paucity of examples. The fact that it derives from the Latin vegetus and that no other parts of the name are non-Latin suggests origins in the Latin-speaking half of the Roman Empire. The link with vegetus, and the cognomen 'Vegetus', is more illuminating:

¹E' in Lang’s sigla; cf. Lang, xi.
³R.S. Bagnall, A. Cameron, S.R. Schwartz, K.A. Worp, Consuls of the Later Roman Empire (Atlanta, Georgia, 1987), 38.
⁴Ibid., 40, n.18.
⁵A. Cameron, JRS LXXV (1985) 164–182.
'Vegetus' is definitely more common in western Spain, principally Baetica and Lusitania, as is the by-form 'Vegetianus'. Some instances of 'Vegetus' attested only as a genitive in -i, may resolve in a nominative in -ius, too. Gentilicia in -ius formed from cognomina are typical of the western Celtic provinces.

'Vegetus' is always attested as a cognomen, never a gentilicium. However it was the most important element for the senatorial family of Q. Valerius Vegetus, cos. suff. A.D. 91, from Iliberris, Baetica. Pflaum has listed later 2nd. c.–early 3rd. c. procuratores Kalendarii Vegetiani in Baetica, interpreted as administrators of a group of estates formerly the property of the Valerii Vegeti, left to the Emperor as a legacy. Compare also L. Marius Vegetinus Marcianus Minucianus Myrtilianus, clarissimus iuvenis, who was legatus provinciae Baeticae some time in the first half of the 3rd. c. A.D., when provincial governors not infrequently governed their native province. We shall return to the probable Spanish origins of Vegetius on other grounds later.

The agnomen or signum 'Renatus' is taken as indicative of Christian ideas. This may not always be so; other oriental mystery cults such as Magna Mater involved similar ideas of spiritual rebirth, such as for example in aeternum renatus, of a tauroboliant. But V. is very much a Christian in his writings.

As Cameron has shown, the tria nomina were obsolete in the 4th. c. V., like Q. Aur. Symmachus, unusual in having a name of this form (with agnomen). His contemporaries would have called him, in conformity with standard usage, by his last name, Renatus, or by

---

741 out of 77 examples in Mócsy. When his figures are adjusted to take account of the different sizes of the samples in each western province, Spain still comes first with 34%, Gallia Narbonnensis second with 16%, Noricum, Gallia Belgica and the two Germanies, and Britannia roughly joint third with around 10–12%. Thus a 'Vegetus' was twice as likely to come from Spain as from Narbonnensis.

83 out of 5 examples.

9W. Schulze, Zur Geschichte lateinischer Eigennamen (Berlin, 1933), 53, 55–60.

10CIL 2.2074, 2076, 2077.


14CIL 6.510.

15See ch. 2 (c).

16A. Cameron, JRS LXXV (1985) 173.

17As he is called by the 6th. c. Ioannes Lydus de Mag. 1.47.
another plus his last name.\textsuperscript{18} He may also have had another signum or nickname for domestic rather than public use, like other contemporaries.\textsuperscript{19} This last-name convention entails that the obscure magister officiorum Flegetius of Nov. Theod. II 21 (A.D. 441) cannot be a corruption of ‘Fl. Vegetius’. V. is therefore not named in any of the Codes.

(b) Title.

V.’s title is transmitted in two main traditions, that of the mss. used by Lang, which are unanimous in calling him vir inlustris, and certain ‘recentiores’ where the word ‘Etylius’ vel sim., is interpreted as a garbling of v.c. et ill.\textsuperscript{20} Lang divides his mss. into two groups, $\varepsilon = \text{AMGQL}$, and $\pi = \text{ITVDP}$. AMG call him vir inlustris comes, while II reads Flavii Vegeti Renati viri illustris comitis sacrum. II = Palatinus 909, a 10th. c. ms. prepared in Lombard Italy and later given to the Emperor Heinrich IV (1006–56) in Germany, is of primary importance for group $\pi$, the only group to name the imperial dedicatee of the work as ‘Theodosius’,\textsuperscript{21} the other group $\varepsilon$ having no named dedicatee.

As vir inlustris V. enjoyed the highest rank of imperial officialdom. The Notitia Dignitatum indicates nine categories of officials as viri inlustres: -\textsuperscript{22}  

1. Four praefecti praetorio  
2. Two praefecti urbis  
3. magistri peditum and magistri equitum  
4. praepositus sacri cubiculi  
5. magister officiorum  
6. quaestor sacri palatii  
7. comes sacrarum largitionum  
8. comes rerum privatarum  
9. comes domesticorum.

It is not at once clear that V. was one of the four comites consistoriani, i.e., quaestor, magister officiorum, CSL and CRP, as all nine categories were incidentally comites ordinis primi. However it is likely that he was not a comes rei militaris, as these were viri spectabiles,
not *viri illustres*. Since the obvious expansion of II's *comitis sacrum* is *comitis sacrorum* or *sacrarum*, it seems a natural conclusion that V. was styled *comes sacrarum largitionum* at an earlier stage of this ms. tradition, a title which accords with *vir ilustris* and a fortiori with *vir clarissimus*. As this is not a case of Renaissance or Byzantine scholarly guesswork, and as 10th. c. monks are more likely to have assimilated the title to simply *comes* like Frankish counts, than to have transmitted the unintelligible *sacrum*, it amounts to suggestive evidence from an early stage in the tradition. However, a different interpretation of the corruption is offered below. That Symmachus' Relationes (c. A.D. 384) address a number of officials as *v.c. et ilustris* who according to the Codes were still *spectabiles* is probably due to later editing. At Rel. 28.2.3 & 10 he calls Olybrius, ex-praetorian prefect, *clarissimum atque ilustrem*, and then (28.4.9) *spectabilem*, where perhaps the editor nodded.

(c) Persona.

V. does not trade on his having held any particular post, though high rank is evident. For Epit. I is written spontaneously to the Emperor on a subject which is par excellence an imperial preserve, the conduct of military affairs, even though V. was not himself a military man. He could do this by appealing to the respect due to learning, the usefulness of the Emperor being kept informed of what his distinguished precursors the *conditores* of the Empire had done, and the fact that he named only impeccable authorities while never claiming himself to be *more* than a faithful compiler.

The persona of 'innocent' compiler is maintained in Epit. II–IV, written upon the Emperor's direct commission. But even if there were grounds for thinking V. copied out his sources faithfully (there are not, see chs. 5–7), he exercised a fairly ruthless degree of

---

23 A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* (1964) 528, except that *comites rei militaris* of Egypt and Pontica were *ordinis primi*, i.e., *ilustres*. ibid. 641.

24 Since it was first proposed by Schoener, op. cit., 8ff., it has been accepted by M. Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* IV (Munich, 1914), 195, and more recently by RE Suppl. X (1965) col. 993 (A.R. Neumann); it is omitted from PLRE 1.763, but cautiously accepted by OCD (1970), 1111 (G.R. Watson).

25 See section (d) 4.


27 Epit. I praef. p.5.1–5, 1.8 p.13.9–11, 1.28 p.29.3–5.

selectivity on his own admission, refusing to talk about cavalry warfare\textsuperscript{29} or river patrols\textsuperscript{30} on the grounds that recent advances had rendered obsolete the traditional doctrines. Furthermore, the organization of material was his own\textsuperscript{31} and he did not trouble to indicate which parts were from which source. Thus he left it open to himself to add material of his own, should he wish to do so, without easy detection. This argues a high degree of confidence in his prestige with the Emperor to whom the work is dedicated, and to whose commission books II–IV were written, unless one takes the view that V. was just a litterator of a careless and arbitrary sort, and that the Emperor did not mind being associated with such an indifferent work on a subject at the heart of his concerns, and even ordered more of the same. At all events V. allowed himself considerable freedom, within the limits of an epitome, and enjoyed the Emperor’s confidence in continuing with a work whose faults do not appear to have detracted from its value at the time\textsuperscript{32}.

Moreover V. is trenchant, even intemperate, in his criticisms of the contemporary military, especially in Epit. I when he was writing presumably without imperial protection\textsuperscript{33}. 1.7 ends in a bitter tirade against the quality of recruits raised by the recruitment tax through collusion between government agents and landowners, and the trend among\textit{ honestiores} to choose civilian careers, symptoms in his view of a decadence due to the ‘long peace’.\textsuperscript{34} The science of arms could not be taught to the recruits because, he says, ‘neglect due to the long peace has abolished the tradition’.\textsuperscript{35} It was this lack which V. claimed to supply, recovering it from books.\textsuperscript{36} Whether or not the accusation was true, it was dramatic and sweeping.

At Epit. 1.20 V. delivered his most unguarded criticism, that in the matter of armour and equipment ancient custom had been set aside totally. For, he says, ‘when military exercises

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29}Epit. III.26 p.124.11–14.
\item \textsuperscript{30}Epit. IV.46 p.165.8–11.
\item \textsuperscript{31}See ch. 7 (i).
\item \textsuperscript{32}See ch. 7 (g).
\item \textsuperscript{33}See ch. 5 (a–c).
\item \textsuperscript{34}Epit. I.7 p.12.1–5: \textit{hinc tot ubique ab hostibus inlatae sunt clades, dum longa pax militem incuriosius legit, dum honestiores quique civilia sectantur officia, dum indicti possessoribus tirones per graiam aut dissimulationem probantium tales sociantur armis, quales domini habere fastidium.}
\item \textsuperscript{35}Epit. I.8 p.12.18–20: \textit{huius rei usum dissimulatio longae securitatis abolevit. Quem invenias, quis docere possit quod ipse non dixisti?}
\item \textsuperscript{36}Epit. I.8 p.12.20–p.13.11, 1.11 p.15.8–9, III.10 p.92.18–p.93.16.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
ceased because of neglect and laziness, soldiers became unused to wearing armour which had come in consequence to feel heavy. The quasi-medical explanation is typical of V.'s style.

As a result the Romans had suffered the defeats previously at Epit. I.7 ascribed to poor recruitment. However V. was not wholly unguarded, for all these failures were expressly laid at the door of the previous Emperors, Gratian and "anyone". V. further alleged that the art of building camps was now lost; this had led to similar defeats at the hands of the barbarian cavalry already lamented. By this point V. had alleged three different causes of the same defeats.

Many of the criticisms of Epit. I are repeated in more muted form in Epit. II–IV, such as failure to recruit for the legions, lack of heavy-armed infantry, lack of universal training and exercises, and loss of the ability to build camps. V.'s relations with the Emperor changed somewhat after the appearance of Epit. I. The Emperor's military competence was vindicated in the opening words of Epit. II praef., and V.'s role was made clearer as he was given the task, redolent of the civil servant, of writing a précis of ancient military science for the Emperor's information. The latter, meanwhile, was not bound to follow antiquity in all details, but was permitted room for his own innovations.

---


38 See ch. 7 (d).

39 Epit. I.20 p.22.8–10: sic detectis pectoribus et capitibus congressi contra Gothos milites nostri multitudine sagittisore sse deleiti sunt. Ibid. p.23.1–7: sed illi, qui laborem in portandis veteribus munimentis armorum ferre non possunt, detectis corporibus et vulnera sustineri cognosceat et morse... sic dum exercitium laboremque declinavit, cum maximo dedere occurritur ut pecudes.

40 Epit. I.20 p.22.3–4: Ab urbe enim condita usque ad tempus divi Gratiani et catafractis et galeis muniebatur peces pedestrise exercitus. Ibid. p.22.7–8: itaque ab imperatore posita primo catafractis, deinde cassinor de ceteris exercitus sceleribus et galeas eneas addiderit. Ibid. p.22.10–13: nec post tol collum, quae usque ad tantorum urbium excidia pervenerunt, cultum curae futur vel caifracias vel galeas pedestribus reddere. See ch. 3 (d) 8.


42 Epit. II.15 p.49.18–19, cf. IV.44 p.162.10–14 (for marines).

43 Epit. II.15 p.56.21–p.57.8.

44 Epit. III.10 p.92.7–p.93.8.

45 Epit. II praef. p.33.1–4: Institvta maiorum parvis armatae plenissime clementiam vestram perpetissimeque retinere continetis declaratur victorius ac triumphis, siquidem induhhatu adprobatio artis su rerum semper efficax.

46 Epit. II praef. p.33.4–7: Verum tranquillis suar imperator invictae, altiori constito, quam mens poterat serena concise, ex libris antiquitis desiderat, cum ipsam antiquitatem factis recentibus antecedat. Ibid. II.18 p.52.13–16: Nec movet, quod olim est consuetudo mutata quae viguit; sed huius felicitatis ac provisionis est perennias suar, ut prudse reipublicae et nova exagelit et antiqua restituat.
latitude, a sign of confidence in his own prestige. V. later at the end of book III praised the Emperor’s perfect accomplishment of various training skills declared in Epit. I to have been all but lost, implicitly taking credit for this and for the instruction in strategy with which the Emperor was now fortified by the appearance of book III. Epit. IV on fortifications then opened with a panegyric on the Emperor’s activity in constructing fortress-cities, following standard practice of the genre in crediting the Emperor with the virtues the author wanted him to adopt. A prediction that Rome would survive to see a yet more glorious future, as she survived in 390 B.C., marked the completion of the Emperor’s military education.

Thus we can see a change which might be interpreted as the conversion of one of the government’s critics into a collaborator, whose animus to some extent ran out of steam as he was forced to work for the régime. Authorial comment and polemic declines from a peak in Epit. I–II to virtual disappearance in Epit. IV. In this case it will have been really audacious, not to say courting trouble, to have written the _ausus litterarum_ of book I.

More likely, though, V. never risked a head-on collision with his own Emperor, was always a supporter of the Emperor’s dynasty, and had a ready audience for his criticisms of the military policy of the previous régime (Epit. I), which had left severe problems for his Emperor to tackle (Epit. II–IV). His Emperor was thus able to feel impressed rather than threatened by his friend’s comments on Republican military institutions in book I, and being himself perhaps an enthusiast for Republican history invited him to continue with more of the same. V. in

---

48 Epit. IV 30 (epil.) p.149.16-18: _Quae ad obpugnandas vel defendendas urbes auctores bellicarum artium prodiderunt vel quae recentium necessitatum usus inventi, pro publica, ut arbitror, utilitate digessi._ Cf. ibid. 1.5-6.

49 Epit. III 26 (epil.) p.124.17–p.125.5: _ut ad peritiam sagittandi, quam in serenitate tua Persa miratur, ad equitandi scientiam vel decorem, quae Humorum Alarumque natio velit imitari, si possis, ad currendi velocitatem, quam Saracenus Indasque non aquae, ad armaturae exercitationem, cibus cæpiadactores vel pro parte exempla intellelissime gaudent, regula proelandi, inno vincendi artificium iungerentur, quatenus virtute pariter ac dispositione mirabilis reipublicae tuae et imperatoris officium exhiberet._

50 Epit. IV praef. p.128.14–18: _In quo opera clementia serenissimae tuae obtinet palmam. Ab illis enim vel paucis vel singulis, a pietate tua innumerabiles urbes tua iugi labore perfectae sunt, ut non tam humana manu condita quam divino nunc videntur nata._ Cf. _non tam discendae sed recogscendae_ (Epit. II praef.); _ut, quae sponse pro reipublicae salute dispositae, aegrosolaculum casse Romani imperii conditores_ (Epit. I praef.).

51 Epit. IV praef. p.129.6–10: _Sed dispositionibus vestrae clementiae quantum profecerit muro rum elaborata constructio, Roma documentum est, quae salutem civium Capitolinae arcis defensione servavit, ut gloriosius postea varius orbis possideret imperium._

52 See ch. 5 (6), p.178.

53 Epit. I praef. p.4.11; II praef.

54 As Theodosius I was, cf. Ps.-Victor Epit. de Caes. 48.11–12; Claud. de IV cons. Hon. (A.D. 398) 399ff. has Theodosius advise his son to learn the military craft by studying the ancient _duces_ of the Latin Age.
CH. 1. 8

Epit. II–IV thus combined praise of the Emperor’s successes with encouragement for further reforms in the same direction as those set out in Epit. I.

But whoever the Emperor will have been, V. will have become sadly disappointed; the problems he identified were in fact structural, such as no western Emperor succeeded in solving. It is difficult to assess whether V.’s plans were at all practicable or not; their antique origins will not have been seen as a drawback, certainly. We cannot tell whether any attempt was made to implement them, but purges of the Gothic preponderance of troops in the Eastern armies were successfully carried out on at least three occasions, A.D. 378, 400 and 471,55 and V.’s reforms appear to imply a similar outcome.56 One unanswered question for the historical significance of V. is whether his views reflect those of the Emperor and his court, or of senatorial circles only tangentially connected with the court. V. at any rate places a very high premium on the military value of his book,57 this directly related to strategic usefulness.58 He likens himself to Cato in writing a military manual,59 and to Frontinus, heavily decorated by Trajan, in V.’s view, because of his military writings.60 This latter comparison implicitly flatters both the Emperor who might like to equate himself with Trajan,61 and V., who as a new Frontinus hoped to influence the Emperor directly.62 He saw himself as recovering information from books in the expectation that it

---

55 Cf. ch. 3 (a).
56 See below.
57 Epit. I praef. p.5.4: pro utilitate Romana. IV.30 p.149.18: pro publica, ut arbitior, utilitate.
58 Epit. IV.31 p.150.9ff.: Romanus autem populus pro decore et utilitate magnitudinis sua... classem... habuit praeparatum.
59 Epit. II.3 p.37.13–14: quae vero pro utilitate republicae scribuntur aeternas sunt.
60 Ibid. p.37.14–16: Idem fecerunt alii confarares, sed praecepua Frontinius, divo Traiano ab eiusmodi conprobatus industria. In fact it is clear from Frontinus’ surviving Strategemata that the de Re Miliari was written under Domitian. V.’s mistake is another clue that he did not use Frontinus directly (see ch. 7 (b, b)).
61 Ps.-Victor Epit. de Caes. 48.8–10 compares Theodosius I to Trajan, in physique and character, hinting at the latter’s being ancestor to the former; cf. K.H. Water “Trajan’s character in the literary tradition”, in Polis and Imperium:Studies in honour of Edward Togo Salmon (Toronto, 1974), 238–240, Claud. de IV cons. Hon. 19, Themist. Or. 14.205a. Also Pacatus Pan. Lat. in editing such a collection headed by Pliny’s and his own panegyrics may be hinting at a Trajan–Theodosius parallel.
would be implemented by the authority of the Emperor or his generals. Each stage of the process was marked; first the training and re-formation of the old legions according to the model offered in Epit. I–II, then the Emperor's course of instruction in strategy and winning dispositions in Epit. III, finally fortifications, in which the Emperor is already conspicuously successful in Epit. IV (plus an appendix on naval warfare). In Epit. IV the instructor of the Emperor's studies, self-appointed in book I, welcomed with an official commission in books II, III, and IV, expressed himself well pleased with his pupil's toleration of criticism and love of learning. The fruits of his reign and of his mind were there for all to see; V. had set himself the task of instructing 'the Emperor, whose learning can benefit all his subjects' in the beginning, and by the end this is stated to have been wholly successful.

V. emerges from the above as a high-ranking member of the court, whose perhaps temporary close and cordial relations with the Emperor seem to have had an intellectual bias, who in his turn trusted his adviser sufficiently to tolerate an independent and often critical outlook. The picture is however all from one side. What the Emperor really thought as opposed to what he said is not at all clear, but some disagreement of principle may perhaps be conjectured from consideration of what V. left unsaid. For V. never more than hinted at the most fundamental criticism of all, and yet the whole work can be interpreted as largely aimed at

---

63Epit. III.10 p.92.21–93.2: sed ne impossible videatur reparari disciplinam, cujus usus intercidit, doceatur exemplis. Apud veteres ars militaris in oblivionem saepius venit, sed prius a libris repetita est, posita daeum auctoriae forma.

64Epit. II.18 p.52.6–8: Si quis igiur pugna publica superari barbaros cupit, ut divinatis nutu, dispositione imperatoris invicti reparentur ex tironibus legiones, voitis omnibus peteat. Intra breve autem spatium temporis Juniores diligenter electi et exercitati cotidie non solum manserit sed etiam post meridiem omni armorum disciplina vel arte bellandi vetereis illos militis, qui orbel terrarum integrum subegerunt, factile coaequabunt.

65Epit. III.26 (epil.) p.125.3–5: ut... regula proeliiandi, inmono vincendi artificium incoeperet, quatenus virtute pariter ac dispositione murabilia respublicae iuue et imperatori officium exhiberet et multis... virtute refers to the recruitment and training programme and the formation of legions of Epit. I–II, personified in the Emperor's officium militis, and dispositione refers to the strategic skills imparted in Epit. III, personified in the Emperor's imperatoris officium. Thanks to Epit. III, the Emperor now has an 'Art of Winning Battles' available to him.


67Epit. II praef. p.33.4–16.

68Epit. III praef. p.64.15–18.

69Epit. IV praef. p.129.10–14.


71Epit. IV praef. p.129.1–2.

72Epit. I praef. p.4.4–6, cf. Claud. de IV cons. Hon. (A.D. 398) 228, where Honorius is told to 'learn for the world, what ordinary people learn for themselves'.
this target, namely the excessive use of barbarians instead of, as under the Republic, traditional armies of Roman citizens assisted by a few auxiliaries.\textsuperscript{73} V.'s reticence here is in striking contrast to Synesius de Regno, for example, although the tenor of his criticisms and precepts leads unmistakeably to the same conclusion.\textsuperscript{74} But his veiled criticism of barbarians is comparable to Pacatus' treatment of barbarians in Theodosius' army in his panegyric of Theodosius of A.D. 389; the outlandish Goths were here favourably contrasted with Antony's Egyptians at Actium, but the Roman forces were actually on the other side in the exemplum. Pacatus could not bring himself to accept that the barbarization of Theodosius' army betokened anything more than a temporary alliance of incompatibles brought about by the monstrousness of Maximus' crimes.\textsuperscript{75} V. wished to instigate changes which would, as if as a by-product, replace Theodosius' barbarian supporters with Romans.

(d) Office.

1. \textit{comes sacrarum largitionum?}

Internal evidence from the texts of Epit. and Mul. for V.'s office or offices is very scanty. As stated in (b) above, there is fairly good ms. authority for the view that he was \textit{comes sacrarum largitionum}. The CSL was responsible for paying all donatives and official perquisites and the cash element of the \textit{stipendium} and for supplying uniforms or cash uniform-allowances to the army, the civil service and court, for receiving all bullion and money taxes,\textsuperscript{76} for the minting of all coinage, and for the control and supervision of all gold (and probably silver) mines, \textit{gynaecae} (State woollen-mills), \textit{linyphia} (State linen-mills), \textit{baphia} (State purple-dye works), and \textit{barbaricarii} (workers in cloth-of-gold and precious metallic armour).\textsuperscript{77} In this connexion it is interesting that V. shows some concern about the cost of the

\textsuperscript{73} See ch. 5–6.
\textsuperscript{74} Synes. de Regno (19) 23B = 1092C–1093A: ἴδῃ ἀνακτητῆσιν ήμιν τὰ Ῥωμαίων φρονήματα, καὶ καταναλωτέοις αὐτορρείπται τὰς ἱκας, μηδὲ κοιμώμεις ἄνεξομένους, ἀλλ' ἀπαξιόντας ἐν ἀπόσυ τάξει τὸ βαρβαροῦ.
\textsuperscript{75} Pac. Pan. Lat. 2(12).32.3–33.5.
\textsuperscript{76} Until the commutation of taxes in kind in the late 4th. c. allowed the praetorian prefecture to build up gold reserves, first attested in A.D. 382 (CTh 8.1.12).
army and for getting value for money, and expresses this argument to the Emperor. Thus, ‘it is cheaper to train one’s own people than to hire (barbarian) mercenaries’, 78 ‘infantry are better than cavalry because they are tactically more flexible and a greater number can be kept at less expense’. 79 V. anticipates the Emperor’s objection that a return to the ancient legionary organization would cost more with the argument that ‘a well-ordered army costs the same as an ill-ordered one, so that it would be in the interest of this and future ages if the Emperor restored the strongest disposition of forces and amended the neglect of his predecessors’. 80 ‘Expertise will accomplish everything, if competent expenses are not withheld’. 81

V. also insisted that high pay for troops ought be be justified by a corresponding zeal for exercises. The soldiers were highly rewarded artists of the art of war, and should practise as seriously as other artists who were paid less. 82 The artistic professions cited, athletes, beast-hunters, charioteers and stage performers, were notorious for the high remuneration of certain successful individuals, despite their often infamis status. 83 Since the Historia Augusta made the same comparison, 84 perhaps V.’s and the Scriptor’s social distance from the troops is revealed by this. But V.’s point is that the artists were actually paid much less than the soldiers, who were thus by implication very well paid indeed. 85 It is interesting and possibly significant that V. veils this in coded language. He might have recalled the fate of Constantius II’s CSL

---

79 Epit. II.1 p.34.18–18: Ex quo intelligitur magis reipublicae necessarios pedites, qui possunt ubique prodesse: et maior numeros millium (suum) expensas minore nutiri.
80 Epit. II.3 p.37.17–22: Nam cum easdem expensas facias et diligenter et neglegenter exercitis ordinatus, non solum presen tenibus, sed etiam futuris saeulis proficiat, si provisione maioris tuae, imperator Auguste, et forissima dispositio reparetur armorum et emendet disseminatio praecedentium.
81 Epit. II.18 p.52.19–20: Quidvis enim efficit solertia, si competentes non denegentur expensae.
82 Epit. II.2 p.39.9–16: Athleta venator auriga proprius exiguum mercedem vel cetera plebis favorem cothidiana meditazione arcum suas aut servare aut augere consuevit: militium, cujus est manibus servanda respublica, studiorum oportet scientiam dimicandi, sumumque rei bellicae iuxta exercitii custodire, cui coningit non tantum gloriosa victoria sed easiam amplior praeda, quem ad opes ac dignitates ordo militiae et imperatori iudicium consuevit evehere.
83 Juv. 7.114 auriga, cf. Martial 10.74.5–6, Juv. 7.243 schol. refers to actors, Juv. 6.356 athletes, Martial lib. spect. 29.6 gladiators, Fronto ad M. Caes. 2.4 bestiarii, Tert. de spect. 22 quadrigariorum, scenicos, syntaxis, karenarios. Hieron. Ep. 69.9 fin., of the clergy, nunc plerosque cernimus vel favorem populi in aurigarum morem pretio redeemere vel tanto omnium hominum odio vivere, si non exsequantur pecunia, quod mimi imperitani gestibus.
84 SHA Avid. Cass. 6.3–4: dicit enim miserum esse, cum exercerentur athletae, venatores et gladiatores, non exerceret nullius; cf. id. Alex. Sev. 37.1 on the high rewards Severus Alexander refused to give to scenicos et venatores et aurigas.
85 Exiguum mercedem vel cetera plebis favorem is contrasted with amplior praeda, quem ad opes ac dignitates ordo militiae et imperatori iudicium consuevit evehere (ibid.).
Ursulus, whose peevish criticism of the army which ‘despite the huge financial burden upon the Empire could not find the courage to defend Amida’ in A.D. 359 was remembered and later avenged by his execution when Julian refused to save him from the army. However, it should be noted that V. was as rude about the army, though probably not that of his own Emperor, in Epit. 1.20.

There are some points of contact with the *sacrae largiriones* in V., including a single mention of *gynaeceae*, and two references to the Thracian gold-digging tribe named Bessi as a contemporary exemplum for the skill with which men can excavate tunnels (in the context of sappers). Claudian de cons. Mallii Theodori (A.D. 399) alludes to Theodorus’ term as CSL in connexion with the Bessi, and Pacatus in his panegyric to Theodosius (A.D. 389) also mentions them with Gallaecia in Spain as (presumably the main) suppliers of gold in the late 4th. c. A.D. Ammianus, too, refers to unnamed Thracian gold-miners who rebelled against Rome to side with the Goths in A.D. 376, who can only be the Bessi. A further possible contact may lie behind V.’s reference to the *color Venetus* or blue dye used to disguise spy-boats and their crews operating off Britain, if this is to be linked to *baphiae* or imperial dye-work. Certainly the blue uniforms would be produced by the textile-mills in the CSL’s department.

V. evinces warm interest in the saving of donatives given to the troops, using the expression *divinitus institutum*—‘divinely inspired institution’ (of the ancients) to describe a

---

86: Amm. 20.11.5: ‘*En quibus animis urbes a militae defenduntur, cui ut abundare stipendium possit, imperii opes iam fasiscunt!* quod dictum ita amarum militaris multitudo postea apud Calchedona recordata ad eius exitium consurrexit. Cf. id. 22.3.7–8.
87: Epit. L.7 p.11.3.
89: Claud. de cons. Mall. Theod. 38-41: *hic sacrae mandantur opes orbisque tributae possessi, quidquid fluvius evolvitur auri, quidquid luce procul venas rinnatu sequaces abidia pallentis fodit tertia Bessi.*
90: CTh 11.16.12 (380) refers to Theodorus as CRP, on a matter concerning the imperial patrimony. The editors of PLRE 1.901 suggest that he was *agens vices CRP* at the same time as CSL or else Claudian may have erred.
92: Amm. 31.6.6.
93: Epit. IV.37 p.154.3–8: *Ne samen exploratoriae naves candore prodatum, colore Veneto, qui marinis est flucibus similis, vela tinguntur et funes, cera etiam, qua ungerse solent naves, infectur. Nausaxque vel milites Venetam vestem indunt, ut non solium per nociem sed etiam per diem facilius latent explorantes.*
system of sequestration whereby the soldiers were allowed to spend only half the donative, while the rest was kept in sacks *apud signa*—'with the standards'. This prevented them from spending it on 'luxurious or vain things', given 'the propensity of most men, particularly paupers, to spend as much as they can get', allowing them instead to store up a handsome *castrense peculium*, as well as affecting in a positive way their attitude to the unit, since it was 'human nature to have the dearest concern for those things on which one sees that one's substance is staked'. Since V. only uses 'divine' metaphors for subjects on which he felt most positive, namely the poet Vergil, and the organization of the 'ancient legion', except when talking of the Emperor or the cosmic forces that decide the issue of battles, this ought to be significant. However the whole section II.19–21 also contains points of contact with the praetorian prefecture.

2. *Praefectus praetorio*

Not only is the connexion between pay and defence made explicit, but also that between taxation and defence, in contexts which suggest the *PPo's* department, rather than the *CSL*. The tasks of the *CSL* were, of course, strictly ancillary to the praetorian prefectures. The *CSL* did not set the budget or calculate the size of the indiction; he was not paymaster-general for the army or civil service; he was not responsible for taxes in kind, and he did not collect the money and bullion taxes—this was done by *curiales* and officials of the provincial governors' offices, these being departments of the praetorian prefectures. Instead *largitionales* supervised the officials of the *PPo*, where *largitionales tituli* were concerned, kept records and accounts, and assisted with transport and security of the bullion, deposited eventually by them in provincial or diocesan treasuries. The *PPo's*, meanwhile, was the bigger operation, his taxes brought in the

---

94Epit. II.20 p.54.3–17: *Iliad* vero ab antiquis divinitus institutum est, ut ex donativo, quod milites consecun tur, dimidia pars sequestraretur apud signa et ibidem ipsis militibus servaretur, ne per luxum aut inanium rerum comparationem ab contubernalibus posset absunti. Plerique enim homines et praecipue pauperes tantum erogant, quantum habere possent. Sepositio autem tertia pecuniae primum ipsius contaminabatur decetur adcommoda; nam cum publica sustenentur annona, ex omnibus donativis auge tur eorum pro mediature castrense peculium. Miles deinde, qui sumptus suos sciit apud signa depositos, de deserendo nihil cogiatur, magis diligiter signa, pro ills in acie fortius dimicat, more humani ingenii, ut pro ills habeat maximam curam, in quibus sumus videbimus esse substantiam.

95Epit. IV.41 p.160.13: quae Vergilius in Georgici divino paene comprehendit ingenio.

96Epit. II.21 p.55.6–7: Non tantum humano consilio sed etiam divinitatis instinctu legiones a Romanis arbitror constitutas.
greater yield, he calculated the size and frequency of taxation of all kinds, including in money and bullion, and of payments to functionaries, soldiers and civil servants, the CSL merely supplying the cash on demand, plus the uniforms which he was responsible for producing.

In general CSL's like PPo's were in office only briefly, a year or less being typical. Individuals such as Ursulus and Tatianus, specially competent, and Petronius Maximus, specially privileged, held office exceptionally for three years or more. Many, like Mamertinus, seem to have held it as a brief apprenticeship before promotion to PPo, which office Mamertinus held for four years, A.D. 361–365, after one or less as CSL, though others became magister officiorum or praefectus urbi.

The fundamental nature of V.'s criticisms, and the breadth of their financial and administrative scope, suit a PPo marginally better than a CSL. When he told the Emperor that he could soon create an army of citizens on the ancient model 'if competent expenses are not withheld', V. spoke as one addressing the question of the Empire's budget, its size and applications, matters outside the CSL's remit. When he stated the view that nothing was stronger nor more fortunate nor more praiseworthy than a State in which trained soldiers were in abundance, it was contrasted favourably with the alternative use of wealth, subsidies to barbarians. V.'s programme was to have a large fully trained and equipped standing army (of Roman citizens, not barbarians), instead of one that relied heavily on temporary barbarian mercenary levies, just as it was to have a standing navy, matters which raised the question of the whole imperial budget, not just that part which the CSL was responsible for managing.

Some of V.'s precepts impinge directly on the PPo's personal responsibilities, for example the full analysis of supplies and disbursements of annonariae species needed before...

---

97 Epit. II.18 p.52.6–20.
98 Epit. 1.7 p.17.12–16: Nihil enim neque firmius neque felicius neque laudabillus est republica, in qua abundant milites erudiit. Non enim vestium nior vel aurii argentit gemmarumque copias hostes aut ad reverentiam nostram aut ad gratiam inclinat, sed solo terrore subjugatitur armorum.
100 Epit. IV.31 p.150.12–15: Nemo enim bello lacessere aut facere audet iniuriam ei regno vel populo, quem expedition et promptum ad resistentiam vindicandumque cognoscit.
any campaign, their dispersal to fortified positions near the theatre of war, and the imposition of any supplementary taxation needed.\textsuperscript{102} For the concentration of \textit{annonariae species} in fortified points along the Emperor’s route-march, see Ambrose, and the Historia Augusta.\textsuperscript{103} Epit. III.8 deals with the same system of fortified supply-lines from the side of the responsibility for security of the general.\textsuperscript{104} Ammianus informs us about supplementary taxation, for example the \textit{conquisita} or \textit{incrementa}—special levies announced by the praetorian prefect Florentius, to make up what was lacking from the poll-tax and land-tax accounts or \textit{capitatio} in the devasted Gaul of A.D. 357,\textsuperscript{105} or the \textit{vectigalium augmenta multiplicata} in addition to the burdens of \textit{tributum} imposed on strife-torn Illyricum by Petronius Probus in A.D. 375.\textsuperscript{106} It is not possible to trace the edicts V. refers to, admonishing and coercing \textit{possessores} to move to strong-points animals, food and wine out of the enemy’s reach, and compelling \textit{provinciales} to do the same,\textsuperscript{107} but the policy is in full harmony with Ammianus’ description of measures taken in A.D. 359 in response to king Sapor’s invasion of Mesopotamia.\textsuperscript{108} On the other hand the repair of walls can be shown from edicts addressed to praetorian prefects.\textsuperscript{109} The \textit{annonariae species} attested by V., \textit{frumentum, pabulum, lignum, acetum, vinum, sal, and...
perhaps *aqua*, coincide with other 4th. c. A.D. evidence at least in part, and further parallels can be added from closely similar material in Epit. IV.7–11: *laridum*, *bitumen*, *sulphur*, *pix liquida*, *oleum quod incendium vocant*, *ferrum*, *carbones*, *nervi*, *equorum saetae* for torsion engines, *cornua*, *cruda coria* for armour, *trabes*, *tabulata*, *clavi ferrei* for military machines, *ligna* for spears and arrows, *aqua* and *sat*.* The *fabricae* were supplied with iron and other raw materials by the PPo, whose department contained a *scrinium armorum* responsible for these levies.

In these chapters V. is interested not in the administrative arrangements for levies in kind, but the strategic aspects of supplying an army, depriving the enemy of food and horses, and providing for a siege. Information which points towards the PPo's department is incidentally apparent only. It should be noted that the material reflects conditions in general compatible with the 4th. c. period of invasions. Thus V. may have supplied some of this material himself, especially since he singled out this section of Epit. IV for emphasis in his epilogue. To this may also be referred the statement that V. added to book IV modern material not found in the military rhetoricians. Note also the contemporary imperial activity

---

110Amm. 21.6.6: *omnisque ordo et professio vexabatur vestem armaque exhibens et tormenta, aurum quin et argentum multis posteaque rei cibariae copias et diversa genera iumentorum*: CTh 7.4.6 (360 S.); repetita consuetudo monstrabat expeditionis temporis. *bacellatum et panem, vinum quoque acutum, sed et laridum, carnum verbecinam eiam, militis nostros lata solere percipere: biduo baccellatum, tertio die panem: uno die vinam, uno die acutum, uno die laridum, biduo carnum verbeecinam. For annonariae species in the Historia Augusta, see passages cited by A. Chastagnol, art. cit., 73-74.

111Epit. IV.7 p.132.18.

112Epit. IV.8 p.133.14–18. Cf. Alaric's use of the *vectigal ferri* when *mag. mil.* in Illyricum, Claud. de bello Get. 535–539:

> at nunc Illyrici postquam mihi tradita iura mesque suum fecerit ducem, tot tela, tot enes, tot galeas multo Thracum sudore parari inque meos usus vectigal vertere ferri oppida legiimo iussu Romana coegi.

113Epp. IV.9 p.133.14–16.

114Epp. IV.9 p.133.8–9.

115Epp. IV.8 p.134.7–8.

116Epp. IV.8 p.133.18–19.

117Epit. IV.10–11.


119Epit. IV.30 p.149.19ff.: *illud iterum iterumque commonens, ut solitterissime caveatur, ne quando aut potius inopia emergat aut cibi, quibus malis nulla arte succurrerit; tideoque intra muros tanto plura conenda sunt, quantum scire victorius clausurae tempus in obedientium poesiae consistere. See ch. 6 (b) 3.

120Epit. IV.30 p.149.16–18: *quae ad obpugnaendas vel defendendas urbes autiores bellicarum artium proddiderunt vel quae recentium necessitatu usus invenisse digessi.*
of fortification eulogized in Epit. IV. praef. Comparison with the Mul. epilogue to the whole work on horse-medicine shows that it was V.'s wont to draw his most important moral with the words 'illud iterum iterumque commonentes'; so too, therefore, in Epit. IV.30, but just as V. was not a veterinary surgeon in Mul., he was not necessarily a praetorian prefect in Epit. either. But he does show knowledge of both professions.

However there are also a number of more specific allusions to the PPo's department. The bureaucratic records of the legion were 'entered daily in the acta with almost greater meticulousness than res annonaria vel civilis', a reference to the collection and recording of the annonae militaris, and to the civil courts mainly administered by the PPo's department. Shortly afterwards V. denounces abuses, common to the 4th. c. army and bureaucracy alike, of the right of officers to grant leave of absence and the misemployment of subordinates for carrying on private rackets, in terms of an unparalleled distinction between 'milities institiit' and 'supernumerarii' which strongly resembles that in the civil service between statuti or established bureaucrats and supernumerarii, those waiting for a paid position, though not necessarily in the PPo's department. V. also sets up a contrast known only from the civil bureaucracies between scholae = officia which required litterati milities and those which did not. Then in Epit. II.21 V. talks about the different grades of centurion, on different pay-scales, in each cohort, leading up to the primi pili centurio, 'who like the primiscrinius in the office of the praetorian prefects reaches an honourable and lucrative end to his service'. This is unusually precise technical language, referring to the primiscrinius or adiutor who headed the judicial bureau of the praetorian prefecture under the princeps who was from the mid-4th.

---

121Mul. III.27.8–9: illud iterum iterumque commonentes, ut diligentem curam passionum occurratur exordiis. Nam etiam incurabiles valetudines si praevente fuerint mediendi arae vacuuntur; inveteratiae causae quae eodem facile curari solent suae non possunt.
122Epit. II.19 p.53.6–9: Totius enim legionis ratio, sive obsequiorum sive militarium munera sive pecuniae, cotidie adscribatur actis maiore prope dilligentia, quam res annonaria vel civilis polysychis adnotatur.
123See ch. 7 (f), p. 289.
124Epit. II.19 init. –II.20 fin. deal with litterati, actually signiferi. Epit. II.21 deals with centuriones and since they ended up after a laborious chain of promotion as primi pili = primiscrini, who were at the head of the illiterati stream of the civil (and military?) bureaucracies, is perhaps intended to deal with illiterati. See ch. 7 (f).
125Epit. II.21 p.55.14–19: Ideo primi pili centurio, postquam in orbem omnes cohortes per diversas administraverit scholas, in prima cohorte ad hanc pervenit palmam, in qua ex omni legione infinita commoda consequeatur; sicut primiscrinius in officio praefectorum praetorio ad honestum quaestuosumque militiae pervenit finem.
c. sent in as a senior agens in rebus; it is unclear what the princeps and the cornicularius, who also ranked above the primiscrinus, did. V.’s exemplum reflects the rank of the primiscrinus which he acquired only towards the end of the 4th. c. A.D.\(^{126}\) V.’s view of the centurion, conformably with his probable rôle in the 4th. c. army, is wholly bureaucratic, but he displays an enthusiasm for administration worthy of John the Lydian.\(^{127}\)

In harmony with a background in civil administration is V.’s analogy for a council-of-war, in which the general is asked to judge the issues like a civil judge.\(^{128}\) No doubt an unemotional, cool debate is intended, but the choice of example may be drawn from the world V. actually was familiar with. V. is critical of the fact that the honestiores, his own class, were no longer keen on military service.\(^{129}\) But he himself speaks of the pars armata as if it were a world seen from without.\(^{130}\) The Emperor turns aside from the busy world of war to consult V. who inhabits a world of civil administration.

V. displays an appropriate interest in accounting, saving money, and the personnel-management side of administration in encouraging good work from personnel through the graduated payment of incentives and rewards. V. notices the financial rewards, honours and praise that fell to the lot of successful officers,—‘infinite rewards’ for the leading centurion,\(^{131}\) ‘great perquisites and great honour’ for the five ordinarii commanding the First cohort ‘pour encourager les autres’,\(^{132}\) the praefectus legionis praised for the courage of his men,\(^{133}\) the

\(^{126}\) A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* (1964) 587, 1242 n.58, CTh 8.8.2 (379 S.) in the office of the vicarius urbis, Symm. Rel. 23.7 (384) in the office of the praefectus urbis, CTh 8.8.4 (386) in the office of the praefectus praetorio, on which the other offices were modelled.

\(^{127}\) Epit. II.21 p.55.6-7: divinitatis instinctu legiones a Romanis arbitror constitutas.

\(^{128}\) Epit. III.9 p.89.9-11: Dux itaque vigilans sobrius prudens, tamquam de civili causa inter partes judicaturus, adhibebat consilium de suis et adversarii copias juricet.


\(^{130}\) Epit. II praef. p.33.1-3: Instituere maiorem partis armatae plenissime clementiam vestram permississeque retinere continuo declarare victorius ac triumphis.

\(^{131}\) Epit. II.20 p.55.14-17: Ideo primi pii centuria, postquam in orbe omnes cohortes per diversas administraverit scholas, in prima cohorte ad hanc perveniit palam, in qua ex omni legione infinita comoda consequatur.

\(^{132}\) Epit. II.8 p.43.6-8: Quibus magnae utilitates et magnus honor est ut veteribus constitutas, ut ceperi miliies ex tua legione omni labore ac devotione contingent et ad tuam praedia pervenire.

\(^{133}\) Epit. II.9 p.44.7-8: scient ad praefecti laudem subsectorum redundare virtuem.
tribune praised for the discipline and training of his men, leading to wealth and high rank both through regular promotion and through attracting the Emperor’s notice. The process of the Emperor noticing and praising military commanders and tribunes can be well seen in Hadrian’s speech at Lambaesis, A.D. 128, and it seems intrinsically likely that all sorts of benefits accrued to those named on that occasion by the Emperor in consequence.

3. Background as possessor and equine expert.

V. has also an aristocratic interest in quality; he knew the value of a long-term investment. Thus the Emperor’s ships should be built from the best materials only, using bronze nails, not iron, because the initially greater outlay led to a long-term saving. As an owner and breeder of thoroughbreds, V. knew the value too of proper medical care and finely tuned training, as he makes clear several times. With so many precious assets in his private care, we can see why a wealthy possessor might address the Emperor, the wealthiest possessor of all, on the administration of money and resources, without this necessarily implying anything about his having held public posts in civil administration. Any responsible property-owner would be interested in keeping accounts and getting value for money, and

---

134 Epit. II.12 p.46.4-6: Tribuni autem sollicitudo, tribuni laudatur industria, cum miles veste nitidus, armis bene munitus ac fulgens, exercitii usu et disciplina eruditus incedit.
135 Epit. II.24 p.59.15: cui constringit non tantum gloriosa victoria sed etiam amplior praedia, quem ad opes ac dignitaten ordo militiae et imperatoris iudicium consuevit evheere.
136 CJL 8.2532, 18042 = ILS 2487, 9133-9135; cf. M. Le Glay, in J. Fitz (ed.), Limes: Akten des XI. internationalen Limeskongresses, 1976 (Budapest, 1977), 545-558, and id., Mélanges d’histoire ancienne offerts à W. Sexton, Publ. Sorbonne Etudes IX (Paris 1974) 277-283. However, pace Le Glay there is no particular reason to believe in a special connexion between what Hadrian said and V.’s assertions (see ch. 7 (d)).
137 Epit. IV.34 p.152.5-9: utilius aereis clavis quam ferreis configenda; quamlibet enim gravior aliquanto videatur expensa, tamen, quia amplius durat, lucrum probatur afferre; nam ferreos clavos sepe et unore celeriter robigo consumit, aereis autem etiam in fluctibus proprium substantiam servat.
138 Mul. 1.56.1-2: Melius enim est diligentia studio custodire sanitatem quam aegritudinibus praestare remedia. Diligenia itaque dominus stabilum frequentior introitus et primum debi operaem, ut stratum pontilium eminat ipsumque si non et multibus lignis, sicut frequenter per imperiam vel negligentiam evestit, sed roboris vivacis duritiae et soliditatea compactum. l prol.10: Deinde, quis existimat erubescendum tales peritiam, quae dominam submoveat? Nam sicut incolumitas planitium habet lucrum, ita eorum interiorius affert videatur incommodum, praesertim cum mancipia, quorum plebibus curatio non putatur, saepè vilioribus pretiis quam equi venduntur aut muli. Il prol.3: Diligenia itaque paterfamilias; cum mortibus animalium suorum et [cum] medicinae expensis alique mercedibus faciar rationem, intelligit, unius mildissimis animalibus pretium ad multorum, quae sine dubio peritura sunt si cura non fuerint, solvium posse sufficer. 1.56.12: Nam imperitia rectoris et inecessus eorum debilitat et mores, praeque servorum impatienia, qui absentibus dominis ad cursum equos vehementer stimulant et non solum flagellis sed etiam calcariis caedunt, dum aut inter suas velocitatem cupiant experiri aut cum alienis vehemeni obstinatone contentiend, nec revocant aliquando currentes nec temperant. Neque enim de damno domini cogitant, quod eadem contingere gravitari.
would expect to appeal to similar interests in his fellow-possessores. The possessor after all was a tax-payer.

But V.'s attitude to the army is coloured by his background as a horse-breeder also. It was preferable to maintain the soldiers in health than to pay medical bills for the sick, just as it was better to look after the health of horses than to procure them remedies when sick. Similarly a trained soldier was an expensive asset for the State to lose, as was a horse or even a slave for a private citizen. It was a glorious thing for the State to have an abundance of trained soldiers, just as it was for a private citizen to own the best horses. It may well have been the differences in horses according to the nature of the breed and their treatment and training, a subject on which V. was an authority, that attracted him to Poseidonios' climatic theory accounting for the different military qualities of the races of men, which produced the barbarian-excluding result that the men from the north were over-pugnacious and under-intelligent, those from the south under-pugnacious and over-intelligent, but recruits from the temperate zone, i.e., the Roman world, had the right mix of qualities, being sufficiently pugnacious and intelligent.

V. seems to apply veterinary procedures to his interpretation of military recruitment and training. V. felt duty-bound to set out the criteria for identifying the good breeds of horse, paying notable special attention to the Hunnish warhorse, because 'in buying and selling horses

---

139 Epit. Ill.2 p.68.7–14: iam vero ut hoc casu aegri contubernaes oportunitis cibus reficiantur ac medicorum arie curentur, principiorum tribunorumque et ipsis comitib, qui malorum sustineti potestatem, inquis quaeritur diligentia; maie enim cum his agitur, quibus necessitas et bell i incumbit et morbi. Sed rei militaris periti plurius custodiant armorum exercitia ad sanitatem militum paene versus presse quam medicos.

140 Mul. I.56.1: Melius enim est diligentem studio custodire sanitatem quam aegritudinem praestare remedia.

141 Epit. III.10 p.90.6–12: Dux ergo, cui tianae potestatis insignia tribuantur, cuius fidei atque virtutis possessorum fortunae, tuaea urbiun, salus militum, reipublicae creditur gloria, non tantum pro universo exercitu sed etiam pro singulis contubernalibus debet esse sollicitus. Si quid enim illis eventi in bello, et ipsis culpa et publica videri inuria.

142 Mul. I prol.10: Deinde, quis existimet erubescendum ialem peritiam, quae domna submoveat? Nam sicut incolumitas iumentorum habet lucrum, ita eorum infortuna afferre videtur incommodum, prorectore cum manifesta, quarum pleibia curatio non putatur, saepe violoribus pretios quam equi vendontur aut muli.


144 Mul. I prol.12: Quis autem nosse curas omenorum erubescendum putet, cum optima iumenta habere gloriosum sit?

145 Mul. II prol.2–3.

146 Mul. III.6: Rubric: De signis, quibus agnosci patria.

147 Epit. I.2 p.6–7 (see ch. 7 (c)).
cheating is wont to practise upon the country a very great fraud. For those wishing to sell at a higher price pretend they are the best bloodstock. Similarly, the careless levying of recruits, the disappearance of honestior volunteers, and corruption among recruiting officers had led, we are told, to the delivery to the army of those unfit to work even on their masters' estates.

Thus recruits should be selected only with great attention to their 'points', like horses, enabling old criteria such as height to be disregarded. The qualities of the rustica plebs which commended them for the army are even comparable to those of the Hunnish warhorse.

The men needed prolonged training, like their horses. It was a waste of time and money trying to train inferior breeds of recruit.

But in spite of his in-depth knowledge of warhorses, V. omits virtually all mention of the subject from the Epit. It was his policy to cover only those areas of current military

---

149 Epit. I.7 p.12.1-5: dum longa pa x millium incuriosius legit, dum honestiores quique civilia sectantur officia, dum indicii possessoribus tironer per gratiam aut dissimulationem probantibus tales sociantur armis, quales domini habere fastidiant.
150 Epit. I.6 p.10.13-17: Sit ergo adulcens Martio operi deputandus vigiliantibus, lato pectore, umeris musculosis, valentibus brachiis, et pedibus non superfusa carne distentis sed nervorum duritiae co /leer (see further ch. 7 (c)); Mul. m.6.5: Hunniscis grande et aduncum caput, extentes oculi, angustae nares, latae maxillae, robusta cervix et rigida, ubea ultra genua pendentes, molores cosse, incurva spina, cauda silvosa, validissimae tibiae, parvae bases, plenae ac diffusae ungulae, ilia cavata iounque corpus angulosum, nulla in clunibus aurina, nulli in musculis tori, in longitudinali magis quam in altitudine statuam propensior, venter exhaustus, ossa grandia, macies grata et quibus pulchritudinem praeest ipsa deformitas: animus moderatus et prudens et vulnerum patiens.
151 Epit. I.3 p.7.9-13: (sc. rustica plebs, quae) sub divo et in Iabore nutritur, so/is patiens, umbrae neglegens, ba/nearum nescia. deliciarum ignara, simplicis animi, parvo contenta, duratis ad omnem laborum tolerantiam membris, cui gestare ferrum, fossam ducere onus ferre consuetudo de rure est. Cf. Mul. II prol.2-3: Primo quod barbarorum animalium a/a natura et ad omnen iuriam durius corpus est. Deinde quod sic instituantur a parvulis. ut nee potius medicinalem requirant et hibernis pascuis vigant et sine pernicie frigora pruinasque sustineant. Nostra vero iumenta et molliter generis sunt et tenebris frequentibus assueta calidisque stabulis imbuta, ubi si indicationem ex aliqua necessitate commiserint, continuo in aliquod genus incidunt morbi.
152 Mul. III.6.2: Ad bellum Hunnicorum longe prima docetur utilized patientiae, laboris, frigoris, famis.
155 Mul. III.6.2-3: Ad bellum Hunnicorum longe prima docetur utilized patientiae, laboris, frigoris, famis; Torigos dehinc et Burgundiones iniuriae tolerantes, iterio loco Frigiscos non minus velocitatem quam continuatione curas invictos, postea Epirotos Samaricos at Dalmatas, licet contumaces ad frea, armis habiles assequant.
156 Epit. I.20 p.22.1-2: nam licet exemplo Gothorum et Alanorum Hunnorumque equitum arma profecerint, pedites constat esse nudatos. Ibid. III.26 p.124.11-14: De equitatu sunt multa praecipua; sed cum haec pars...
performance which struck him as unsatisfactory, or perhaps safe to attack.\textsuperscript{157} Thus he was not writing a real Art of War.

4.\textit{Comes stabuli?}

If V. may have been \textit{CSL} and \textit{PPo}, he may also have been \textit{comes stabuli}, on general grounds as has been suggested by Goffart,\textsuperscript{158} and on autobiographical grounds if V. is talking about the purchase of warhorses for the army by the corps of \textit{straatores} or grooms of the Stable or by himself on behalf of the Stable at Mul. III.6.1.\textsuperscript{159} One wonders whether his peregrinations around the Empire were not on official business; if so, the easy conclusion is that he was procuring horses for the Emperor. It may be significant that the only breed for which he gave detailed points was the Hunnish warhorse, but he also dwelt at length on the excellence of Persian horses for comfortable civilian travel, which made them extremely expensive, but suitable no doubt for high-ranking officials.\textsuperscript{160} On the other hand he did not speak in detail about race-horses.

The rank of the head of the Stable, the \textit{comes stabuli}, was equated with that of \textit{tribuni} (or \textit{comites}) \textit{scholarum}, i.e., \textit{comes ordinis secundi (vir spectabilis)} at the least, and frequently \textit{comes ordinis primi (vir illustris)} at the beginning of the 5th. c. A.D.,\textsuperscript{161} so that it would partly accord with V.'s title as given by ms. II, \textit{viri illustris comitis sacrum} (sic), and mss. AMG, \textit{viri illustris comitis}. As head of the Stable, the \textit{comes stabuli} ran a department in its own right, independent of the praetorian prefecture or the \textit{largitiones} or \textit{res privatae}. The \textit{comes stabuli} was a high-ranking official, close to the Emperor; indeed, the post often went to

---

\textsuperscript{157}See ch. 5 (a-c).

\textsuperscript{158}W. Goffart, \textit{Traditio} XXXIII (1977) 65-100, esp. 89-90 = id., \textit{Rome's Fall and After} (1989), 45-80, esp. 69-70. R. Scharff, \textit{Tychê} V (1990), 135-147, esp. 145 and 137, assumes that V. was \textit{comes sacri stabuli} under Valentinian III, c. 440, without argument.

\textsuperscript{159}Mul. III.6.1: \textit{In permutandis vel distrahendis equis maximam fraudem patriae solet affere mendacium. Volentes enim vendere generosissimos fingunt. Quae res nos compulit, qui propriam diversas et longinquas peregrinationes equorum genera univera cognovimus et in nostris stabulis saepe nutrivimus, unusquisque nationis explicare signa vel merita.}

\textsuperscript{160}Mul. III.6.4: \textit{Ad usum sellae Persis provinciis omnibus praesit, equos exhibet patrimoniorum censibus aequitatis, ad vehendum molles et impigros, incessus nobilitae praebens.}

\textsuperscript{161}CTh 6.13.1(413).
a younger member of the imperial family, e.g., Valens for Valentinian in A.D. 364,\textsuperscript{162} and Stilicho immediately after his marriage to Serena in 384.\textsuperscript{163} As said above, V. appears to have enjoyed close and confident relations with his Emperor, such as we should have expected had we known that he had been \textit{comes stabuli}. That he does not openly write as such in the Mul. is not necessarily surprising, since he called himself a modest man,\textsuperscript{164} and was writing a general book on horse-medicine for private owners of horses, rather than specifically about his duties, whatever they may have been.

If he were truly \textit{comes stabuli} one might ask whether the subscription of ms. II (10th. c.)\textsuperscript{165} \textit{comites sacrum} might not be a corruption of it. If so, the missing element \textit{largitionum}, far from being omitted in error,\textsuperscript{166} was simply never there in the first place. A mediaeval scribe would have been less likely to understand \textit{comes stabuli} as the title is rather rare, and the corruption of an uncial \textit{STABULI} to \textit{SACRUM} is not impossible, particularly if the ‘ta’ were transposed. The transition from ‘b’ to ‘r’ is easy, and the ‘li’ could be confused with the final upright of ‘u’ so as to suggest three uprights and hence ‘m’. All that would remain is for uncial ‘t’ to be confused with ‘c’, which is also easy, since the downstroke of ‘t’ curled to the right.

The result, though a false title, might seem more satisfying to monks used to allusions to sacred things; \textit{sacrum} was presumably misinterpreted as an abbreviated neuter plural. Another possibility is that the title was originally given in the form \textit{comes sacri stabuli}, and the last element somehow dropped out; the corruption then of \textit{sacri} to \textit{sacrum} is not unduly difficult.

At any rate the ms. evidence for \textit{comes stabuli} is as good as for CSL.

\textsuperscript{162}Amm. 26.4.2.
\textsuperscript{163}JLS 1278, \textit{PLRE} I (1971), 854, s.v. ‘Stilicho’.
\textsuperscript{164}Mul. I prol.6: \textit{in quantum mediocritas ingenii paitur, plene ac breviter omnia enucleata digererem.} Epit. III praef. p.64.16: \textit{mediocritatem meam abbreviare iussisti.}
\textsuperscript{165}Comes sacrum also occurs in cod. Vat. 4497 (14th. c.), which has not been properly examined.
\textsuperscript{166}C. Schoener, \textit{Studien zu Vegetius: Programm der kgl. bayer. Studienanstalt zu Erlangen 1887–1888} (Erlangen, 1888), 8ff. Boecking \textit{Not. Dig.} II (Bonn, 1839), 330, cited S. Basil, Ep. 15 (\textmu\textsc{รกγυς προφητεων}) and \textit{Acta Conc. Oecumenicorum} (ed. E. Schwartz (ed.), vol. I (Berlin–Leipzig, 1927), Acta Conc. Eph. contra S. Cyrilum, A.D. 431, c.93-94 = 566-67 = A44-47 (\textmu\textsc{รกγυς του σακροῦ}), the Greek neuter plural implying the Latin translation \textit{comes sacrorum} (Schwartz, ibid. CT 40-41) in the 6th. c. A.D.), But it is less likely that V.’s title should have been transmitted in a Greek form given that the work is in Latin.
5. Conclusion.

V.'s proven interest in saving money and avoiding being cheated is a motive for writing the Mul. It does not suggest holding any particular financial office, least of all the sacrae largitiones or praetorian prefecture. Roman Emperors chose their ministers on other grounds than specialist skills, in the main. There were no rules governing appointments to the praetorian prefectures or other high-ranking ministries. Such men were appointed at the Emperor's discretion, usually independently of the interests of the bureaux. Some general statements exist to the effect that certain Emperors appointed persons to high civilian posts who had had some experience in administration. Active soldiers, orators and jurists for example might be held to have acquired the necessary experience. Merit might include long active service or ability, but the modern distinction between these concepts was not clearly observed. During a long period of service a financial official's honesty might be noted with approval.

But V.'s knowledge of horses was obviously a practical advantage if he was to be appointed comes stabuli, although he may have been uniquely qualified in this respect, the other comites stabuli revealing no special interest in horses. As a vir inlustris and a member of the sacred constitorium he will have had enough knowledge of government to explain any allusions to the departmental details of the largitiones or praetorian prefecture in the Epit. I must therefore disagree with Schoener, that the reflexions of a finance-minister in the end make themselves felt in the Epit. Any vir inlustris might make these remarks to the Emperor.

The evidence for CSL thus boils down to ms. II's comitis sacrum. In view of remarks made above about the similarity of this to comites stabuli, and the possibility of interpreting Mul. III.6 in this sense, I am inclined to accept the suggestion of Goffart that V. was indeed comes stabuli. Since constititiones are not addressed to comites stabuli, the fact that V. is not

---

169E.g., Constantius II, Amm. 21.16.3.
171CTh 8.1.1 (343 S.) PPo Or.; CTh 8.1.10 (365) mag. equ.
173Specifically at Epit. II.3 p.37.17: nam cum easdem expensas faciat et diligent er et neglegenter exercitus ordinatus, ibid. II.1 p.34.17: et major numerus millium expensa minore nutritur, and ibid. I.30 p.28.11: semper ergo legendi et exercendi sunt iuniores. Villius enim constat erudire armis suis quam alienos mercede conducere.
named in the codes becomes more explicable. As such V. would have had an important but rather obscure political presence at Court, so that his non-appearance in contemporary sources is explained, too. As such V. would have been sufficiently involved in defence procurement to have had a point d'appui for writing the Epit. and to have received the Emperor's interested approval, without occasioning surprise at his lack of military background. Thus several obscurities become a little lighter if we cautiously accept this idea.
(a) Origo.

As stated earlier, the name 'Vegetius' suggests especially Spain. The horse-rearing traditions of modern Spain, notably Andalusia, stretch back to late-Roman times at least. The attempts of Symmachus to obtain Spanish horses for his son's praetorian games in A.D. 400 reveal the existence of a large network of Spanish breeders, presumably aristocratic possessores of a similar status to Symmachus himself. The fame of one particular breeder, Euphrasius, had spread to Syrian Antioch, and there were on some studs in Spain breeds from other provinces, as well as Spanish. Euphrasius was in touch with a number of similar breeders in Spain, some of whom may have had literary interests. 'Euphrasius' being a name of Greek origin ending in -ius is likely to be a signum or nickname for domestic rather than public use. Some signa appear to reflect linguistic or literary interests, for example Strategius 'Musonianus', Marius Victorinus 'Tullianus'. 'Euphrasius' is not inappropriate for an orator or litterator.

V. was not only brought up in a horse-breeding milieu; he travelled the Empire and assembled a collection of different breeds on his own studs. He had done this over a long time, and doubtless had acquired the reputation of equine expert which he claimed. He was

---

1 Ch. 1 (a).
3 Symm. Ep. 4.62.
4 Symm. Ep. 4.63.1: Laodiccan quadrigae.
5 Symm. Ep. 4.58.3.
6 A. Cameron, JRS LXXV (1985) 175.
7 Amm. 15.13.2.
8 Cameron, art. cit., 176.
9 Mul. I prol. 6: cum ab initio actatis alendorum equorum studio flagrarem.
10 Mul. III.6.1: qui propier tam diversas et longinquas peregrinationes equorum genera universa cognovimus et in nostris stabulis saeppe nutrivimus.
11 Ibid. saepe nutrivimus.
qualified to receive applications from fellow-senators like Symmachus for horses or assistance towards games in Rome.

He was also self-consciously a man of letters. Mul. is largely a re- edition in better Latin, and newly arranged in a logical order, of the 4th. c. A.D. veterinary handbooks going under the names of Chiron, Apsynus and Pelagonius. He appointed himself director of the Emperor’s studies, and was commissioned by him to teach what the books contained of the ancient military science. On completion and publication of Mul. I–III 'citizens and friends' attempted to persuade V. to write a sequel on cattle; thus his work was eagerly awaited and received by the literary public. According to V., then, both Emperors and public resorted to him for new editions of old learning. So V. had access to a good library and amused himself building a literary reputation for producing epitomes of technical treatises, an activity congruous with the literary renaissance of the late-4th. c. A.D.

A Spanish breeder who could supply breeds from Asia Minor among others, whose fame had reached Antioch, whose name suggests possible literary reputation, Euphrasius, although Symmachus never refers to any literary interests in his letters to him, is likely to represent the circles from which V. comes best. Such people were clearly very wealthy and much travelled, frequently in Rome, and in some sense metropolitan public figures if only through their intimate connexion with quaestorian, praetorian and consular games. Euphrasius was also a senator, so that it is likely that some at least of the horse-breeding possessores had public careers, too.

13Mul. ed. C. Lommatsch, xxiv, xxxvi–xxxvii; Mul. I prol. 3–4: Chiron vero et Apsyrtus diligentius cuncta rimati eloquentiae inopia ac sermonis ipsius villitate sordescunt. Praeterea indigesta et confusa sunt omnia, ut parum aliqua curatibus quaerentis necesse sit errare per titulos, cum de eiusmod passionibus alia remedia in capite alia reperiantur in fine.
14Epit. I praef.
15Epit. II praef.
16Mul. IV prol. 1–2.
17Mul. IV prol. 1: cum magnopere peterent publicandum, si quid pro salute (sc. tam commodorum animalium) scriptum repertetur in libris.
20Cf. Symm. Ep. 4.58.3 (Euphrasius offered the honour of judging the winners). 4.60.3 (Euphrasius to share the popularity which will accrue to the house of Symmachus through the use of his horses). 21Symm. Ep. 4.61.2 (Symmachus warns him of the impending visit of the quaestores glebae senatoriae ).
Secondly, V. shows evidence of a bias towards Spanish history in the Epit. Sertorius particularly received his approbation.22 So did Scipio Africanus Minor at Numantia.23 He was also interested in African history. Apart from references to Hannibal and the Punic Wars, which probably derive from his Catonian source,24 he shows contemporary knowledge of tribes of north Africa,25 and liked to refer to the Jugurthine War.26 Other possible geographical pointers include an exemplum devoted to the Balearic islanders as the inventors of the sling,27 Celtic technical terms such as  

\[ \text{drungus} \],28 berba(?)29 and the garbled British word for spy-boats,30 Germanic technical terms such as  

\[ \text{tufa} \],31 caucia(?)32 burgus,33 barrius,34 or Latin translations of Germanic technical terms such as  

\[ \text{caput porci} \],35 reference to the Germanic tribes, the
Cimbri, Teutones and Ambrones, who invaded Gaul (and Spain, whence they were expelled by the Celtiberi, mentioned Epit. II.2 p.35.11) and were destroyed by C. Marius in 102 B.C. Complementary lists of peoples of the Roman Empire in Epit. I.1 and 28 begin with Gauls, Germans, Spaniards and Africans, and end with Italy and the Balkans, showing how westward was V.'s point of view. A propos of V.'s familiarity with things German, Goffart has drawn attention to his unique knowledge of breeds of war-horse from Inner Germany, including Toringi, Burgundiones and Hunnisci. It is noteworthy, too, that V. singled out Hunnisci for an exhaustive list of the points of the breed, a treatment not accorded the rest.

Thirdly, locations in the city of Rome are specified, as might have been expected whether V. had personal knowledge of the place or not. Thus, three references to the Gallic siege of the Capitol in 390 B.C. and two mentions of the Campus Martius next to the Tiber, for military exercises. But the Circus Maximus is mentioned as the venue for festive exhibitions of armatura, in the present tense, and this is confirmed as a part of contemporary Roman festivals held in the Circus such as the consular games of Honorius, A.D. 404. V.'s circumstantial reference to the admiring confusion of the crowd strongly suggests autopsy.

This passage seems likely to have been written in Rome itself. Further familiarity with Italy is suggested by the identification of Misenum and Ravenna as Augustan naval bases, and the specification of the Marsi, Samnites and Paeligni as bellicose tribes of history. The centurion who first lopped off an elephant's trunk in the war against Pyrrhus, 280–278 B.C., is located in Lucania.

Contrast V.'s vagueness about locations in Oriente, or his use of Oriens for the

---

36Epit. III.10 p.93.11-16.
37W. Goffart, Rome's Fall and After (1989), 69–70.
38Mul. 3.6.5.
39Epit. IV praef. p.129.8, IV.9 p.135.2, IV.26 p.147.5.
41Caud. pan. de VI cons. Hon. 621-637.
42Epit. II.23 p.57.5–14: Armaturam, quae festis diebus exhibetur in circo, non tantum armaturae, qui sub campidocitore sunt, sed omnes accipiant coniuberales cotidiana mediatione discebat, Nam et velocias usus ipsos acquirat corporis et scientia feringi dimicetur (V's medical explanation, cf. ch. 7 (d)); illud vero maius est, quod servare ordinis discunt et vexillum suum in tantis permixtionibus in ipsa prolusione comitantur nec inter doctos aliquis error existit, cum multitudinis sit tanta confusion.
43Epit. IV.31 p.130.
44Epit. I.28 p.29.10–11.
45Epit. III.24 p.117.2, cf. Florus 1.13.9, on which see below.
46Epit. III.24 p.116.19, meaning the battle of Magnesia.
whole of the near East, including Asia Minor. Sirago saw Italy and Spain present in the mind of the author when he offered the theory in Epit. I.2 of recruitment from the temperate zone; however the theory was actually Poseidonios'.

V. also seems to know quite a lot about the Balkans. The use of lead-weighted darts or plumbatae by two legions in Illyricum honoured by Diocletian and Maximian stands out from generally much older material. The specific location of Liburnia, à propos of the origin of the liburna or warship, as 'part of Dalmatia next to ladera', contrasts with the vagueness and error of Zosimus; other Roman writers too are vague about Liburnia. Uniquely, V. gives the name of the leather caps worn by soldiers from c. 3rd–5th c. A.D. out of battle-dress—pillei Pannonici, familiar from representations of the Tetrarchs. In another contemporary reference, V. alludes to the patrol-boats presently operating on the Danube as having reached a higher state of art than could be found in ancient military science. V.'s two allusions to the Thracian gold-miners, the Bessi, are not unique; but his enthusiasm for their skills may stem from autopsy. It is possible, too, that V. may have lived at some time among Greek-speaking soldiers, as he occasionally cites Greek words as military jargon; however, we must remember that the Latin-speaking military acquired a fair number of Greek terms, e.g.,

---

47 Epit. IV.31 p.150.22.
48 V. A. Sirago, Galla Placidia e la Trasformazione politica dell Occidente (Louvain, 1961), 475; see ch. 7 (c).
49 Epit. IV.33 p.151.18–19: Liburnia namque Dalmatiae pars est ladaerinae subiacens civilis.
50 Zos. 5.20.6: ἔθηκεν πᾶσα καλουμένα ἀντὶ τῶν πόλεων ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ κειμένην οὐσιοσθέντα, καθ’ ἐν δὲ ἄρρεν τοίνυν τῶν πόλων τὸ εἰδος ἐναυτηρίας.
52 Epit. I.20 p.23.27, cf. H. Ubl, 'Pilleus Pannonicus, die Feldmütze des spätromischen Heeres', in Festschrift für R. Pitioni, II (1976) 214–241. V.'s allegation that they were no longer worn is untrue, according to surviving 5th c. representations dating down to the third decade (Ubl 231–232), and should probably be put down to rhetorical exaggeration in the context of the tirade in I.20; see ch. 5 (b) 1. Ubl p.237 suggests they were a military version of Pannonian peasant head-gear; cf. p.234, representations of leather caps worn by women exist from Pannonia.
53 Epit. IV.46 p.165.8–11: De lusorii, quae in Danubio agrarias cotidianas tutantur excubii, reticendum puto, quia aris amplius in his frequentior usus invent, quam venas doctrina monstraverat. Cf. Not. Dig. ed. O. Seeck (1876), index 315–316; CTh 7.17 (412). No flotillas are recorded for the Rhine, and only a few on rivers on Gaul and some Alpine lakes; cf. A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (1964), 610.
55 Epit. II.18 p.51.17–19: in scutis signa pingeabant, ut ipsi nominant, digmata, sicut etiam nunc moris est fieri. Ibid. III.7 p.81.4–5: monoxyllos, hoc est pauso latiores scutulas ex singulis trabibus excavatas. Ibid. IV.21 p.143.2: exstra dictur pons..., quia... prostruiditur.
catafracta, schola, navarchus, trierarchus, ballista.\(^57\) Other references to the Balkans relate to more remote historical or mythological perspectives.\(^58\)

Internal evidence thus supports the hypothesis that V. was a Spaniard, but shows signs of familiarity with both Rome and the Balkans. In particular it is suggested that V. was writing Epit. II.23 in Rome. In addition, he was knowledgeable about Germanic breeds of horses and made notable use of some Germanic and Celtic military terms.

(b) Education.

That V. wrote in Latin need not imply ignorance of Greek. Latin was still the official language of the court at Constantinople until the praetorian prefect Cyrus (A.D. 439–441) abolished it. Greeks like Ammianus and Claudian could learn Latin with a view to reaching senatorial high-society in Rome with their works. But a western Emperor such as Theodosius, in Constantinople, could appoint a praetorian prefect from Aquitaine, Rufinus, who knew little or no Greek.\(^59\) In general upper-class westerners had little Greek, unlike as in the early Empire.\(^60\) V. probably knew little Greek, too. It is not clear that he was aware that the word *digmata*, offered as military jargon for ‘designs’ painted on shields, is Greek.\(^61\) On the other hand he may have been aware of the etymological meaning of *exostra*,\(^62\) and *monoxyii*,\(^63\) although it is possible that he copied out the etymologies unwittingly from the source. For V., Greek was in general the language of scientific obscurities, and these he certainly copied from the sources.\(^64\)

\(^{57}\) However Greek borrowed probably more terms from Latin, cf. L. Hahn, *Philologus* Suppl. X (1907), 675–718.

\(^{58}\) Epit. I.28 p.29.11–16 (ascendency of Epipios, the conquest of Persia by the Macedonians and Thessalians, the warlike Dacians, Moesians, and Thracians and the legendary birth of Mars among them), II.2 p.35.9–10 (the phalanx of the Macedonians, Graeci and Dardani, ), I.8 p.12.24 (Spartan, Athenian, and ‘other Greek’ writers of tactica ), III praef. p.64.1–2 (Athenian, Spartan and Macedonian ascendancies), ibid. p.64–65 (Spartan military science and the export of Spartan generals and military advisers), III.10 p.90.1–2 (Spartan military science), III.17 p.102.4 (Spartan invention of the tactical reserve, imitated by Carthaginians), IV.21 p.142.13 (legendary death of Capanus at Thebes), IV.20 p.141.18 (siege of Rhodes, 305–304 B.C.).

\(^{59}\) Libanius Ep. 865.

\(^{60}\) A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* II (1964) 987.

\(^{61}\) Epit. II.18 p.51.18.

\(^{62}\) Epit. IV.21 p.143.2: *quia... protruditur*. Actually, it should mean *machina, quae protrudit*.

\(^{63}\) Epit. II.25 p.60.14–15: *scafas... de singulis trabibus excavatis... isdem, sic ut dicunt, monoxyli*. Ibid. III.7 p.81.4–5: *monoxylos, hoc est paulo laiores scalfias ex singulis trabibus excavatas*.

\(^{64}\) Epit. IV.40 p.159.4–7: *Aut enim circa diem statum aut anie vel postea tempesitas fieri conpertum est. Unde praecedentes proxemudiev, nascentes die solemni χειριδίαν, subsequentes μεταχειρίδεαν Graeco vocabulo nuncuparunt*. Cf. Pliny HN 18.57.207, probably from Varro de Ora Maritima; cf. ch. 7 (f). Festus...
V. did not expect his readers to be more at home with Greek than he was. Presumably, therefore, V.'s Emperor was not a noted Greek-speaker either. But V. was still the exponent of altior doctrina, being qualified by his studies in, for example, Vergil and Varro. For V. Greek science was mediated through Latin scholarship; he transmitted it without recourse to the originals, and extremely sketchily too, and this was acceptable to his Emperor.

V. was not, then, writing in a rigorous intellectual atmosphere at court. Although he proclaimed that the whole of natural philosophy was to be consulted to work out the behaviour of the winds, he did not himself have the stomach for summarising more than the fewest details, resorting to religion to cover his inadequacy. Most unusually, he referred the reader to other authors for further guidance, including Varro, who we infer is the main source. V. was however not prepared to undermine his own position as representative of learned authority: the practical experience of pilots is discounted as resting on trial and error, not higher philosophy.

Although the sources for horse-medicine included Greek as well as Latin authors, V. used only Latin. Of the four 'Latin' authors named, Pelagonius, Columella, Chiron and...
Chiron the centaur, moreover, is mentioned as if a Greek mulomedicus by Columella, i.e., a legendary character given as the author of an anonymous work. This was probably already attached to the mulomedicina of Apsyrtus when it was translated into Latin (as to other mulomedicinae also?), or less probably was appended and translated by the translator of Apsyrtus. There is a Latin version of the corpus Hippiatricorum ascribed to the 4th c. A.D., which is variously titled Chironis centauri liber I expl., Chironi centauri veteriniani lib. II, Chiron centurus et Apsyrtus (lib. IX), Claudius Hermeros veterinarius (lib. X). It is thus a mulomedicina in ten books, newly arranged by Claudius Hermeros at some date after Vegetius, and supplemented by him. This is however essentially the work V. used, as is shown by the agreement between him and Chiron.

There is therefore reason to think V. read little Greek, but was none the less informed of Greek writings through the use of Latin translations. He thus conforms to the pattern of aristocratic education in the western empire during the 4th–6th centuries.

Parts of the Epit. go back to Greek sources, too, but again V. was demonstrably using Latin authorities. For at Epit. I.8 he shied away from Greek tacticci on grounds of irrelevance, but they made a reappearance in Epit. III prol. Nevertheless, it was the Romans

---

74 See Suda s.v., A.4739.
76 Mul. I prol. 3: diligentius cuncta rimat eloquentiae inopia ac sermonis iptius vilitate sordescunt.
78 Lommatsch, op. cit., xxxvii.
79 Cod. Monacensis 243, chartaceus, 15th c.
80 Lommatsch, ibid.; cf. Herzog, Schmidt, 77, §513.
81 A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire II (1964) 987, P. Courcelle, Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), esp. 15ff. (Symmachus), 20ff. (Macrobius), 78ff. (Jerome), and 165ff. (Augustine).
82 See ch. 7 (a, g, h).
who followed Greek tactics in practice and in their writings, whose material he found ‘dispersed through various authors and books’, and this was what he epitomized. It must be inferred therefore that he used only Latin authors.

In the Epit. V. made just one allusion to Homer, II. 5.801, compared to at least six to Vergil, Georg. 4.92ff., Georg. 3.346ff., Aen. 1.1, Aen. 2.354, Aen. 2.47, and Georg. 1.393–463. V.’s attitude to Vergil was one of high reverence for his ‘wisdom’ rather than, we may suspect, a merely aesthetic appreciation of his poetic brilliance. Similar Vergilmania existed as much in Christian circles, ridiculed by Jerome, as in pagan, like that of Macrobius’ Saturnalia. It is easy to see how this attitude could degenerate into sortes Vergilianae, as attested in the probably contemporary Historia Augusta. Interestingly, V. had almost as much respect for Varro, who is coupled with Vergil at Epit. IV.41 on weather-forecasting, and at 1.6 for reference to the selection of horses and dogs according to their ‘points’. These two ancient pagan authors, with Plato, Cicero, Seneca and Ovid, can also be seen enjoying reverence, because they were thought to have come close to realising that there is one God, in Lactantius, and must reflect V.’s Christian culture.

83Epit. III praef. p.64.13–16: Horum sequentes instituta Romani Marci operis praecepta et usum retinuere et litteris prodiderunt. Quae per diversos auctores librosque dispersa, imperator invicte, mediocritatem meam abbreviare iussisti.
84Epit. I.5 p.10.1–3.
85Epit. I.6 p.10.9–12.
87Epit. II.1 p.34.6.
88Epit. III.21 p.111.22–23 (to be restored to the text from the app. crit.).
89Epit. IV.19 p.141.7–8.
90Epit. IV.41 p.159–160.
91Mul. I pro1.8: sicut Mantuanus poeta divino ore testatur; ibid., IV prol.6 (cf. Verg. Georg. 2.473): ut ad providentissimorum virorum scripta redeamus, quorum firmat morum auctoritate iustitia amoremque devia terris ad siderum remanisse consortium; Epit. IV.41 p.160.13–14: quae Vergilius in Georgios divino poene comprehendit ingenio; Epit. I.6 p.10.7–9; sicut docetissimorum hominum disciplina comprehendit; quod etiam in apibus Mantuanus auctor dicit esse servandum.
92Hieron. Ep. 53.7.
93SHA Hadr. 2.8, Alex. Sev. 14.5, Clod. Alb. 4.5.4.
94Varro Rer. Rust. 2.7.4–5, 2.9.3–4; see ch. 7 (c. j).
95Lact. Div. Inst. 1.5.11, quoting Verg. Aen. 6.724ff., Georg. 4.221, in support of the contention that there is one God: Nostrorum primum Maro non longe auit a vertitate cultus de summo deo, quem mensim ac spiritum nominavit, haec verba sunt... ibid. 1.5.23: Plato, qui omnium sapientissimus iudicatur, ibid. 1.6.7: M. Varro, quo nemo unumdoctornemoapudGraecosquidemvivit, in libris rerum divinarum... It was of course the Emperor Constantine I himself who interpreted the 4th Eclogue as a prophecy of the Messiah to the council of Nicaea A.D. 325; cf. Der Kleine Pauly (1975), 1159, s.v. ‘Vergilius’. See further on V.’s religion below.
The only other author, apart from V.'s sources, to receive explicit testimony is Sallust, Cat. 7.497 and Hist. fr. 2.19 (Maurenbrecher).98 Other passages alluding to Sallust include Epit. I.1 p.5.19-20: *Afrorum dolis atque divitiis semper impares fuimus,*99 and indeed the whole chapter, discussing how it was that a small band of poor, unintellectual, short-limbed Romans could have conquered the Mediterranean world, takes up a theme discussed by Sallust Cat. 52.19-22, and especially 53.2-4,100 in which the tiny early Roman Republic, dedicated to *virtus,* overcame much more powerful adversaries. It also occurs in Sallust Cat. 7.3-7. Epit. II.3 also has resonances with Sallust Cat. 22.22-23,101 as does Epit. I.4 with Sallust Cat. 7.4-5102 in addition to the misquotation103 from Cat. 7.4: *Jam primum iuventus, simul ac belli patiens erat, in castris per laborem usum militiae discebant.* Epit. III.4 returns to the theme of competitive *virtus;* cf. Sallust Cat. 7.6.104

Sallust set himself to answer the debate whether war prospered more through *vis corporis* or *virtus animi.*105 He concluded that the latter was more effective in war than brute force.106 V. took up a similar position in Epit. I.1 init.: *In omni autem proelio non tam
multitudo et virtus indocta quam ars et exercitium solent praestare victoriam. \textsuperscript{107} Cf. I.1 fin.: Etenim in certamine bellorum exercitata paucitas ad victoriam promptior est, rudiæ et indoctæ multitudo exposita semper ad caedem. Accordingly, intellect for V. turns out to be a very important military quality. \textsuperscript{108} The art of war was after all one of the \textit{bonae artes}—\textit{noble arts}. \textsuperscript{109} It was one of the \textit{bonae artes} for Sallust too, as is clear from his reference to agriculture, navigation and architecture as illustrating obedience to \textit{virtus}. \textsuperscript{110} But the debate probably antedates Sallust. Cato the Censor’s œuvre will have treated the art of war on a level with agriculture and other arts, and the two physical and two moral criteria of selection (which do not seem particularly compatible with V.’s veterinary list of physical points of the recruit discussed earlier) \textsuperscript{111} recommended by V. may well be Cato’s. \textsuperscript{112}

V. also touches on another Sallustian debate at Epit. II.3, whether writing is as praiseworthy as doing. \textsuperscript{113} But V. goes way beyond Sallust, who merely stressed the special difficulty of the historian’s task, in claiming that things written for the benefit of the State are eternal, whereas brave deeds belong to but a single age. Epit. III.26 (epil.) p.125.4–5: \textit{quatenus virtute pariter ac dispositione mirabilis reipublicae uae et imperatoris officium}

\textsuperscript{107} Epit. I praef. init.
\textsuperscript{108} Epit. I.2 p.7.3–5: prudencia, quae et modestiam servat in castris et non parum prodest in dimicatione consiliis. Ibid. I.7 p.11.6–8: ut tirones non tantum corporibus sed etiam animis praestantissimi diligantur.
\textsuperscript{110} Epit. I praef. init.
\textsuperscript{111} Sall. Cat. 2.7: Quae homines arant navigant acidentificat, virtutem omnia parent.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. I.8 p.12.9–12: ut velocitas in illo requirenda est et robur, et urum armorum disciplinam ediscere valet, urum habeat confidentiam militarem. These may be summed up as velocitas and robur, \textit{prudencia} and \textit{confidentia/audacia}. See also ch. 7 (a–o).
\textsuperscript{113} Epit. II.3 p.37.10–16: Cato ille Maior, cum et armis invictus esset et consil exercitus saepae disceret, plus se reipublicae creditid profuturum, si disciplinam militarem conferret in litteras. Nam unus alius sunt quae fortiter flum; quae vero pro utilitate reipublicae scribuntur aeterna sunt. Idem fecerunt alii coniurati, sed praecipue Frontinius, divo Traiano ab eiusmodi comprobatus industria. Sall. Cat. 3.1: Pulchrutum est bene facere rei publicae, etiam bene dicere haud absurdum est; vel pace vel bello clarum fieri liceat; et qui fecerit et qui facta aliorum scripserit, multi laudantur.
exhiberes et militis probably alludes to Sall. Cat. 60.4: strenui militis et boni imperatoris officia simul exequebatur.\(^{114}\)

At Epit. III. 31 V. seems to have used ideas from Catiline's speech, Sall. Cat. 58—

Cat. 58.16: Nam in fuga salutem speres, quam arma, quibus corpus tegitur, ad hostibus avorteris, ea vero dementia est. Epit. p. 111.15–16: Nec insequimentium ullam periculum est, cum victi, quibus defendi potuerant, arma convertit.

Cat. 58.19–20: Animus setas virtus vostra me hortatur; praeterea necessitudo, quae etiam timidos fortis facit. Nam multudo hostium ne circumvenerint\(^{115}\) quest, prohibit angustiae loci.

Cat. 58.21: Quod si virtuti vostra fortuna invideri, cæve inulti animam amittatis, nee capi potius sicuri pecora trucidemini, quam virorum more pugnantes crevantam atque frustrum victoriam hostibus relinquatis. Epit. p. 111.10–15: Libenter capiui commodi qui sine dubio se inesse prevenerint. \(\ldots\) Nam cum abscedendi aditu patetfacto mentes omnium ad prehendeda terna consensunt, inulti more pecuchum truncidatur.

V. may also have read Seneca; at any rate Epit. III. 10 p. 90.1–4 seems inspired by Sen. de Ira 1.11.3–4, although we cannot tell whether directly or through some intermediate literature—\(^{116}\)

(Epit.) Hanc quondam relictis doctrinis omnibus Lacedaemonii et postea coluisse Romani; hanc solam hodieque barbari putant esse servandam; cetera aut in hac arte consistere omnia aut per hanc adsequi se posse confidunt.

(Scn.) Germanis quid est animosius? Quid ad incursum acrius? Quid armorum cupidius, quibus innascitur innuunturque, quorum unica illis cura est in alia neglegentibus? Quid induratus ad omnem patientiam, ut quibus magna ex parte non tegimenta corporum provisa sint, non sufragia adversus perpetuum caeli rigorem? Hos tamen Hispani Gallique et Asiae Syriaceque mollis bello viri, antequam legio visarit, caedunt ob nullum allam rem opportunos quam iracundiam. Agedam illis corporibus, illis animis delicias luxum opes ignarus, nee rationem, nee disciplinam: ut nulli amplius dicam, necesse erit certe nobis mores Romanos repetere.

It is to be observed that V.'s programme was precisely the practical one of recovering the military more of the Roman Republic from the literature so that the Emperor and his generals could carry them out.\(^{117}\)

\(^{114}\) Noted by W. Goffart, Rome's Fall and After (1989), 355, addendum to ch. 3, to n.71.

\(^{115}\) Emendavi ex mss. circumvenire.

\(^{116}\) Noted by W. Goffart, op. cit., 355, addendum to ch. 3, to n. 134.

Despite many contacts with Roman Republican history, particularly during the Punic Wars, V. surprisingly shows no clear signs of familiarity with Livy. Above all, V.'s exegesis of a 'twenty or more years' peace' after the First Punic War which so enervated the victorious Romans that in the Second Punic War they could not stand up to Hannibal is not Livian, although the figure itself is accurate enough. It is possible to reconstruct this military explanation in connexion with the comprehensive training-programme introduced by Scipio Africanus at New Carthage in 209 B.C. and argue that it is borrowed from V.'s Catonian source.

Passages which suggest points of contact with the historical tradition followed by Livy include Epit. I.20 p.23.14–19, II.16 p.50.8–13, III.14 p.99.6–12, on the triarii; cf. Livy 8.8.10ff. Also V. described the classic tactic for dealing with a charge of elephants, which was put into effect at Zama 202 B.C. When V. discussed the relative merits of striking with the point or with the edge, he, or rather his source, was following a tradition which has also touched Livy's account of the battle of Cannae, while the statement that the Romans not only easily beat but made a mockery of those fighting with the edge may refer to the famous dual between T. Manlius and the 'huge Gaul', also described by Livy. Moreover, a three-commander order of battle, such as V. described at Epit. III.18, is to be seen in action in Livy; the systematic use of stones by the Republican army is implied by Livy's criticisms of

---

118 Epit. I.28 (epil.) p.30.4–11. It was only after horrendous losses that they got down to tackling the basic problem of re-learning military science: *Tot iaque consulibus, tot ductibus, tot exercitiis amissis, iunct demum ad victoriam pervenerant, cum usum exercitiumque militare condiscere potuerunt.* Cf. Florus 2.6 fin.

119 Livy 26.51, Polyb. 10.20. See ch. 7 (a–c).

120 Quoted in ch. 7 (d), p.273 n.119.

121 Epit. III.24 p.118.4–8: *Praeterea venienibus beluis, quasi inrupissent aciem, spatium milites dabant.* Quae cum in agmen medium pervenissent, circumfusis undique armatorum globis cum magistris absque vulneribus capiebantur [inlaesae]. Cf. Livy 30.33.1–3: *Non conferetas autem cohortes ante sua quamque signa instruere; sed manipulos aliquamun inter se distantes, ut esset spatium qua elephanti hostium acti nihil ordinis turbarent... Vlas patientes inter manipulos antesignanorum vellibus—ea tunc levis armaturae era—compellit, dato praecipio ut ad impetum elephanorum aut post directos refugerent ordinis aut in dextram laevasque discurrit applicantes se antesignanorum viam, qua invulner in acuspital tela, beluis darent.*

122 Epit. I.12 p.16.8–21, cf. Livy 22.46.5, quoted in ch. 7 (d), q.v. p.265 n.80.

123 Livy 7.10.5–11.

124 Epit. III.18 p.102–104, cf. Livy 22.45.8: *consules cornua tenuerunt, Terentius laevum, Aemilius dextrum.* *Gemino Servilio media pugna tuenda data.* In V. the commander-in-chief stood on the right, and the third-in-command on the left, and there is no trace of the lottery system; but the parallel seems convincing in view of the Catonian context. See ch. 7 (g), p.293.
the Gauls and corresponds to statements by V. too;\(^{125}\) and Scipio Africanus’ training-programme of his soldiers at New Carthage, 209 B.C., included regular exercises with mock-swords and javelins with buttons on the tips, weapons cleaning and running in arms, painting a picture broadly similar to the training chapters of the Epit.\(^{126}\) Also the system of changing camp-guard at mid-day for both cavalry and infantry described by V. was introduced according to Livy by L. Aemilius Paullus in 168 B.C.\(^{127}\) The same general moreover used in the same year a method of withdrawing his army from a potential battlefield described in the supposed Catonian tactical section by V.\(^{128}\)

Furthermore, V.’s (Cato’s) 4th. and 5th. depugnationes can be seen in the *sinuata acies* used by Scipio against Hasdrubal for instance at Iliipa in 206 B.C.\(^{129}\) The first attested use of a real tactical reserve has been identified at Zama 202 B.C. in which Hannibal thwarted with it Scipio’s new tactic at Baecula, Iliipa and Campi Magni, and this corresponds to V.’s statement that the Romans learned it from the Carthaginians.\(^{130}\) And the invention of *velites*, who play an important part in Epit. III.16 p.101.13–21 and III.24 p.117.12–16, and whose formation seems to be alluded to in Epit. I.15 p.18.19–21, was described by Livy at the siege of Capua in 211 B.C.\(^{131}\) However, in no case is the use of Livy implied by close correspondences of wording or details. It is rather that Livy described events and institutions that have got into the Epit. by a different and independent route.\(^{132}\)

But V. was at least partly imbued with the spirit of ‘Livian’ (and Tacitean?) pessimism—\(^{133}\)

---

\(^{125}\) Livy 38.21.5–6: *Nec tela iam alia habebant praeter gladios, quorum, cum manum hostis non conserveret, nullus usus erat. Saxis nec modicis, ut quae non praeparassent, sed quod cuique temere trepidari ad manum venissent, <et> ut insuenit, nec arte nec virtut adiuvantes ictum, ushuan tur.* Cf. V. Epit. I.16 p.19, describing the use of stones in slings, sling-staves or by hand; III.14 p.98.20–99.6, use of stones for slings, sling-staves or by hand; IV.8 p.133.15ff., grading of stones according to intended use, the smallest for slings, sling-staves or by hand.


\(^{127}\) Livy 44.33.10–11, cf. V. Epit. III.8 p.85.10–12.

\(^{128}\) Livy 44.37.1–3, cf. V. Epit. III.22 p.112.15–20. Cato wrote de Agric., like de Re Mil. part of his *Encyclopaedia*, c. 160 B.C.; see further ch. 7 (g).


\(^{131}\) Livy 26.4.4–10, cf. Val. Max. 2.3.3.

\(^{132}\) See ch. 7 passim.

Like Livy, V. believed in demographic decline, too. And yet such thoughts run counter to V.’s programme; at Epit. 1.28 (epil.), *De adhortatione rei militaris Romanaeque virtute*, he was at pains to stress the demographic self-sufficiency of the Empire. According to him, the military problem could be solved merely by the recruitment and training of Romans, organized according to the ancient legionary system.

V.’s message was thus optimistic in essence, and his ‘pessimism’ where it occurs is a literary affectation. Criticism of the effects of the *longa pax*, which occurs several times in the Epit., is difficult to reconcile with the history of troubled 4th.–5th. c. A.D., too. It is possible that he was referring to the relative peace in comparison to the 3rd. c. established by the reforms of Diocletian and Maximian, but because of the absence of any further allusions to Diocletian it seems more likely that such criticism derives from V.’s reading of works in which it appears as a literary commonplace.

If the *longa pax* is not Livian, it is typical of later writers of the 1st.–2nd. c. A.D., bored of the age of universal peace inaugurated by Augustus. Tacitus used the phrase in a pejorative sense frequently. V.’s use is paralleled by Tac. Ann. 13.35.1, where it is applied to the idle Syrian legions Corbulo had to re-train. But Polybius also used the notion in a Republican context where the senate feared that the ‘long peace’—it was twelve years since the
last war (with Perseus), so they resolved on a new one with the Dalmatians—might make the Italians effeminate.\textsuperscript{140} It was also used by Velleius Paterculus.\textsuperscript{141}

V. did not blame the results of the \textit{longa pax} on his own Emperor, and it is tempting to think that he was drawing a subtle parallel to Trajan,\textsuperscript{142} who was seen as breaking the spell, awaking the ageing Empire from its lethargy by making new conquests.\textsuperscript{143} But V. is unlikely to have read Tacitus, a little-known author in the late Empire, if Orosius and Sidonius Apollinaris appear to know him.\textsuperscript{144} More likely a source of inspiration was Juvenal Sat. 6.292: \textit{Nunc patimur longae pacis mala}. Juvenal suddenly became popular in the late-4th. c. A.D.\textsuperscript{145} In the same satire he mentioned gladiatorial training-practices also used in the army; any resemblance to V. in this respect is probably coincidental, however.\textsuperscript{146} S. Augustine quoted Juvenal Sat. 6.287–295 to show how long-lived had been the corruption of society which resulted in the disasters of A.D. 410, in an effort to absolve the Christian Emperors of blame.\textsuperscript{147} The \textit{longa pax} was thus probably in many minds, besides V.'s.

If V. is unlikely to have read Tacitus, there are none the less some suggestive echoes. At Epit. III.11 p.94.18ff. V warned against giving battle after a long march: \textit{Observatur autem, ne longo spatio fatigatum militem neve lassos post cursum equos ad publicum proelium cogas; multum virium laboris itineris pugnaturus amittit.} Compare Tac. Hist. 2.26 l.10ff.: \textit{Timuisse se Paulinus ferebat tantum insuper laboris atque itineris, ne Vitellianus miles recens e castris fessos adgregaretur et perculsis nullum retro subsidium foret.} But the topos is commonplace.\textsuperscript{148} Tac. Hist. 2.21–22 has many resonances with V. Epit. IV.12ff. in the treatment of siege-warfare, too. However all such links are coincidental, due entirely, in all

\textsuperscript{140}Polyb. 32.13.6.
\textsuperscript{141}Vell. Pat. 2.110.2.
\textsuperscript{142}Cf. ch. 1 (c).
\textsuperscript{144}\textit{OCD}² s.v. 'Tacitus'.
\textsuperscript{145}Cf. Amm. 28.4.14, and the whole chapter owing much to Juvenal; see A.D.E. Cameron, 'Literary allusions in the Historia Augusta', \textit{Hermes} XCII (1964) 363–377.
\textsuperscript{147}Aug. Ep. 138.3.16 (CSEL XLIV.143), A.D. 411–412.
\textsuperscript{148}Cf. Amm. 16.12.4ff., for example.
probability, to similarity of subject-matter. There is no evidence, therefore, that V. knew Tacitus.

Livy need not be V.’s main source of historical knowledge for the middle Republic.

One historian whom V. might appear to have read, as well as Sallust, is Florus, who although unnamed can be linked to the Epit. through the following convergences—

Florus 1.13.9: *iun quippe terror beliarum exoleverat, et Gaius Numius quarta legioni/nus hostias usus proboce di abscisa mari posse bellus ostendat.*

Epit. III.24 p.117.2-3: *nam et centurio in Lucania gladio manum, quam promuscecum vocent, unus abscondit.*

Florus 1.18.23: *iun conversis a d extrema auxilia hostibus, cum Xenophontum illius docem Lacedaemona mississet, a vico militiae perississimo vincitur.*

Epit. III praef. p.64.18-65.6: *quantum aequem in proelis Lacedaemoniorum disciplina profuderit, ut omniam cetera, Xenophont, declaraturn exemplo, qui Aetium Regulum Romanumque exercitum sese victorem, cum Xerxeagminibus non virtute sed arte solus ferret auxilium, prostratis exercitibus cepti ac denuntique congressu triumphans bellum omne conficit.*

Florus 1.22.16: *callidus imperator (sc. Hannibal) in patenti bus campus observato loci ingeni, quod et sal ihi aceratrum epularum pulvis et eurus ad oriente semper quasi ex constituto, ita instruxit accem, ut, Romanis adversus haec omnia observis, secundum caelum tellus vento pulvare et sole pugnaret. Cf. Florus 1.38.15, C. Marius’ later use of Hannibal’s ‘art of Cannae’ to defeat the Cimbri.*

Epit. III.14: *Ordinarum aciem tris debet adire prospectare, solam pulvereum venire. Nam sal iante faciencem etipit visum, venustus contrarius tua inflectit ac deprimit, hostium adivut tela, pulvis a fronte congestus oculos implet et claudit... (cavendum est) ne post paululum accedente die nocument solis mutata converso, ne venetus adversus hora solita eo pugnante nascentur.*

Florus 1.34.10: *quippe adiutus et inustis et servilibus maxime operibus adiri ferre plenius vallum, qui arma nescirent, fata inquisire, quiis sanguine nollet, iubebatur.*

Epit. III.10 p.93.2-7: *Scipio Africanaus sub aitis imperatoribus Hispaniae exercitus frequenter victos accepit; hos discipline regulae custodire, omnii opere fossisque faciendis et diligentex exercitare, ut dicere sodatos due inquirinri debere qui madere hostium sanguine nutuant.*

Florus 1.43.5: *Certos esse (sc. Baleares) quis miretur ictus, cum haec sole genti armis sin, id unum ab infantia studio? Cibus purus a mater non accepi, nisi quem ipsa monstrante percussit.*

Epit. I.16 p.19.6-9: *Audarum unum primit Balearum insularum habitatores et iuvens et ista perit exercitio dicatur; ut materes parves filios nullum cibus contingere sinerent, nisi quem ex parte destitutis lapide percussissent.*

Florus 1.16. However, although there are some concions, it will be noted that V. is in general fuller than Florus. This feature has been used for instance to argue that V. did not use Frontinus’ Stratagems, where there are similar but fewer convergences with the Epit., but a lost

---

149Ms. II reads: *Nam et Minicius centurio quarta legionis primus astau in Lucania, etc.*
handbook of exempla also used by Frontinus and Valerius Maximus.\textsuperscript{150} It may be significant too that Frontinus also reports the same use of the elements by Hannibal's tactics at Cannae, though his account is not so close to V.'s as Florus';\textsuperscript{151} moreover, V. does not know it as an exemplum concerned with Cannae but as an integral part of the tactical chapters of book III which are likely to derive from Cato.\textsuperscript{152} For the other passages, which are exempla, it seems inescapable that V. used a sourcebook, perhaps a collection of exempla, also used by Florus, which may or may not be the same as the book of exempla V. used in common with Frontinus and Valerius Maximus. At any rate it is not demonstrated that V. read Florus, despite close similarities.

Finally the exemplum of Roman military youth swimming in the Tiber, offered twice, occurs in Porphyrio’s early 3rd. c. A.D. commentary to Horace—\textsuperscript{153}

Porphyrio’s early 3rd. c. A.D. commentary to Horace—\textsuperscript{153}

It is impossible to say whether V. took this material from Porphyrio, or Porphyrio from some other source from which V.'s exempla also derive. There is little sign in the Epit. that V. was familiar with Horace.\textsuperscript{154}


\textsuperscript{151}Front. Strat. 2.2.7: \textit{Idem apud Cannas, cum comperisset Volturrum annam ulter reliquorum naturam fluminum ingenios auras manue profiter, quae arenarum et pulveris vertice agener, sic dixit a ceteris, ut tota vis a tergo suis Romanis in ora et oculos incideret: quibus in commodis mire hosti adversanibus illam memorabilis adeptus est victoriam.} Frontinus confused the Volturnus river with the Volturnus wind; cf. Livy 22.46.8-9: \textit{Sol seu de industria iea locais seu quod forle ita sitere peropportunus utrique partis obliquus erat Romanis in meridiem, Poenis in septentrionem versis; venus—Volturrum regionis incolae vocans—adversus Romanis coortus multo pulvere in ipsa ora velando prospectum ademuit.} Polyb. 3.114.8 agrees with Livy against Florus and V. that the sun was not in the eyes of the Romans at the start at least.

\textsuperscript{152}See ch. 7 (g).

\textsuperscript{153}Pomponii Porfyrionia Commentum in Horatium Flaccum, rec. A. Holder (ad Aeni Pontem, 1894).

\textsuperscript{154}But cf. Epit. IV praef. and Horace Serm. 1.3.97-106.
V.'s reading of Vergil, Sallust, Seneca and Juvenal points to nothing more than the conventional education of his time. His reverence for Vergil and Varro, however, is paralleled in Lactantius, and thus reflects attitudes in harmony with Constantinian 4th c. Christianity.

(c) Religion.

It is certain that V. was a Christian. The Bible may be glimpsed in a couple of examples adduced by V. Thus, David and Goliath in Epit. I.16; it cannot have happened 'often', as V. says, that one so fully armoured was killed by a slingstone. Secondly, the peroration to the Sermon on the Mount, in which the true Christian is likened to the man who built his house on a rock, and the religious hypocrite to the one who built it on sand, appears to influence Epit. IV.34 on building ships from the best materials. The comparison is inept because V. is talking about what the houses are built on rather than what they are built of.

V.'s interpretation of the traditional lunar observations regarding the cutting of timber attempts to provide added validity by injecting some religion into the question. At Epit. IV.35 the rules for the date of Easter are enlisted in support of the best week in any month for tree-felling (that from full moon to the last quarter), indeed the only week, it is claimed, if the wood is not to decay within the year. The material was already in Cato: *diebus VII proximis, quibus luna plena fuerit, optime eximetur*, and was transmitted verbatim by Pliny who also interpreted it to mean the 20th–30th. day of the lunar month, that is, roughly transposing Cato’s prescription to the Greek lunar month of three decades. Now it has been worked out that Cato’s words are most likely to mean, ‘after the seven days subsequent to full moon, for best results’, i.e., the moon’s last quarter; otherwise, the cutting of timber was prescribed when

155I. Sam. 17.23ff.; cf. Epit. I.16 p.19.9–14: *Saepe enim adversum bellatores cassidibus catafactis [loricis]que munitis teretes lapides de funda vel fistubolo destinati sagitis sunt omnibus graviores, cum membris integris lealiter tamen vulnera importent et sine invidia sanguinis hostis lapidis ictu intereat.* The medical explanation is a mark of V.'s own composition; see ch. 7 (d). The story of David and Goliath was interpreted in all seriousness by Maximus, bishop of Turin, a contemporary of Jerome, as an exemplum of the proper behaviour of the Christian facing barbarian invasions, which he conceived to be a sign of the approaching day of judgement; cf. Max. Taur. (CCSL XXIII (1962)), Sermo 85.3.
157Epit. IV.33 p.152.16–18: *et contemplatione ipsius religionis agnoscinus, quam pro aeternitate his tantum diebus placuit celebrari.*
158Cato de Agric. 37.3–4 = Pliny HN 16.75.194, interpreted 16.74.188ff. V.'s talk of a decision, *placuit*, is used to help date the Epit. below; see ch. 3 (d) 10, p.91.
the moon was in either its first or last quarter—luna dimidiata—, or at new moon—intermestri. So either V. has simply substituted the rules for calculating the date of Easter within the lunar month, or he has misunderstood Cato’s words to mean, ‘on each of the seven days subsequent to full moon’, whether directly from de Agric. or from Pliny’s quotation. In either case we can say that V. at the least pointed the Christian parallel.

The allusion in Epit. IV.39 to the ‘birthday of navigation, which is celebrated with traditional games and public spectacles in many cities’ is a cryptic enough reference to the πλοιαφέστα, the festival marked in the calendar of A.D. 354 as Isidis navigium, a ship dedicated annually to the reopening of seafaring. The calendar agrees with Joannes Lydus in dating it to the 5th March, contra V.’s 10th March. V. suppresses the name of the pagan goddess.

Similarly, it is presumably due to a Christian bias that V. says, what is not in the traditional repertory, that in the first instance the camp should face east. This may be nothing more than a resolution of the problem of where to point if the enemy is not yet available, yet the solution is that which would appeal to a Christian paying homage to the eastern orientation of Christian worship. So too V. throws in a Christian password among the traditional pagan ones. At Epit. IV.40, lest he be thought too paganly astrological, he assures his readers that planets enter and leave the signs of the zodiac ‘on the course prescribed by the will of God the creator’.

---

162 See ch. 3 (c) 6, p. 103.
164 Epit. I.23 p.26.2–5: Porta autem, quae appellatur praetoria, aut orientem spectare debet aut illum locum, qui ad hostes respecit; aut si iter agitur, illum partem debet adiudere, ad quam est profecturus exercitus...
165 Epit. III.5 p.73.16–17: ut pusa ‘viritia’ ‘palma’ ‘virus’ ‘Deus nobiscum’ ‘triumphus imperatoris’ et alia...
166 Epit. IV.40 p.159.10–12: praescripto cursu Dei arbitrio creatoris.
That V. was seriously interested in the theology of justifying the régime is suggested by
the fact that he went out of his way to explain the theory of secunda maiestas. The doctrine was
first enunciated by Tertullian, but came into its own with the conversion of Constantine as a
justification for enforcing religious and political conformity, investing the throne with a
sacral character which survived for centuries. Here it is used to explain the transmutation of
the military oath by the Emperor into one by the Emperor’s majesty and the Holy Trinity. This
had the effect of integrating pagans who accepted the divinity of the Emperor into the theocratic
Christian State, since the Christian Emperor was invested with a majesty, symbolized by the
name of Augustus or ‘Majestic’, which embodied the representative and divine presence of God
himself. It does seem significant that V. put it this way round; he was seeking (1) to justify
swearing by God and the Emperor in that order, instead of by the Emperor; and (2) to persuade
people who were in any case willing to give their services to the Emperor, that they were really
giving them to God. He was not suggesting to Christians reluctant to serve the Emperor as
soldiers that if they loved God they should love his Representative and sign up.

This exegesis will not suit a 5th. c. date very well, when laws enforcing Christianity
were merely reiterated, but fits in comfortably against the background of Theodosius I’s
progressive showdown with the pagans. What we do not know is whether the oath by the
Emperor was changed by Theodosius, rather than by any of his Christian predecessors; this
chapter of V.’s would tend to suggest that such an innovation took place or perhaps was being
urged by V. That Constantine provided a neutral form of prayer for non-Christian soldiers to
recite at the new Sunday worship suggests that he was not inclined to impose a Christian oath
on them or any other Christian professions. Even the pagan Julian, who did try to
indoctrinate his troops, according to one not too reliable story was not prepared to lose

\[\text{References:}\]
167 Tert. Apol. 24.3; 33.1-3.
168 Cf. Eus. HE 10.4.15, Optatus Contra Parm. Donat. 3.3 (CSEL XXVI p.75.10ff.).
170 Epit. II.5 p.38.21-39.3: Jurant autem per Deum et Christum et sanctum Spiritum et per maiestatem
imperatoris, quae secundum Deum generi humano diligenda est et colenda. Nam imperator cum Augusti nomen
accept, tamquam praesentis et corporalis Deo fidelis est praestanda devoio, inpendendus pervigil famulatus. Deo
enim, vel privatus vel militans servit, cum fideliter cum diligit qui Deo regnat auctore.
171 Eus. VC 4.18ff., cf. Soz. 1.8.10ff.
important soldiers over religion and retained Valens and Valentinian in the army when they were willing to resign rather than sacrifice, 'knowing them to be useful to the State'.\footnote{172Socrat. 4.1.10, cf. Liban. Or. 18.168, cited by A.D. Nock, \textit{Harvard Theol. Rev.} XLV (1952) 225.} But by Honorius' reign the State was trying to enforce the debarment of pagans from any \textit{dignitas}, but could still be resisted by certain high-ranking soldiers.\footnote{173A.H.M. Jones, \textit{The Later Roman Empire} II (1964) 938, Zos. 5.46, CTh 16.10.21 (416). In A.D. 409 Honorius was forced to revoke the ban by the barbarian general, Generid.} The relative indifference of troops to 4th. c. religious changes is well-known.\footnote{174A.D. Nock, \textit{an. cit,} 223-227.} However to prescribe that soldiers swore their oath of military service by the Holy Trinity and the Emperor's majesty, at the culmination of the whole ceremony or \textit{sacramenta}, including tattooing and enrolment, which traditionally consecrated the individual to the Emperor as a god,\footnote{175F.J. Dölger, \textit{Antike und Christentum} II (1930), 268-280.} seems to be to attempt to enforce the theology of the régime as a condition of entry to military service. As such it would represent a new departure in late-4th. c. compulsory Christianity.

The divinity of the Emperor, in V.'s view, ranked only marginally behind that of God himself. At Epit. I praef. God is also named in the significant position at the very first sentence of the book, with the Emperor immediately behind.\footnote{176Epit. II.5 p.38.21ff.; ib. I.1 p.4.6: \textit{Octavianum Augustum} named in the significant position at the start of the book; ib. IV.36 p.152.20: \textit{per mensem iulium et Augustum}, named in close conjunction with the observation that trees should be felled on the days of the lunar month appropriate for the celebration of Easter.} The name of Augustus itself demanded veneration;\footnote{177Epit. II.6 p.39.13: \textit{divina et praesentia signa.}} the images of the Emperors guarded by the First cohort of the 'ancient legion' are 'sacred and propitious images' for V.\footnote{178Epit. II.18 p.52.6-8: \textit{Si quis igitur pugna publica superari barbaros cupit, ut diviniatis nutu, dispositione imperatoris invicti reparentur ex tironibus legiones, vois omnibus petat.}} Men are urged to pray for the activity of God and the Emperor alike if they would see the final defeat of the barbarians V. yearned for.\footnote{180Epit. II.20 p.54.4, II.21 p.55.6-7.}

What is surprising and interesting, is that V. did not carry this theology over into his explanation of the rise of Roman power. The 'divine inspiration' which lay behind the organization of the legions\footnote{181Epit. IV praef. p.128.1-4. Cf. Juv. Sat. 15.142-158, having a creator-god and a teleology which is much more 'Christian' than V., who appears to follow Horace Serm. 1.3.97-106 with his talk of \textit{utilitas}.} seems hardly to have any specifically Christian content at all, whilst the social-contract theory of the origin of civilisation is the familiar pagan one.\footnote{182Epit. II.11 p.54.4, II.21 p.55.6-7.}
Christianity is of a less philosophical and a more practical and anti-fatalistic kind, except where human destinies are concerned, where he confesses to some belief in the beneficent influence of divine providence and 'the disposition of the fates'.\textsuperscript{182} The latter may be influenced by monotheistic tendencies in late-Roman paganism; cf. Adrastia-Nemesis in Ammianus.\textsuperscript{183} V.'s 'monotheistic fatalism' is somehow related to his Vergil-reverence, though neither threatens to displace his Christianity.\textsuperscript{184}

V. might appear then to have been a somewhat mild Christian, not without a certain cultural sympathy for pagan beliefs in Fortune and Fate.\textsuperscript{185} Not seeing history, like Orosius, as the working out of God's purpose, V. took the traditional line in giving the fundamental rôle in war to Fortune, not God.\textsuperscript{186} However he stressed that it was possible for the losing side, too, through tenacity and skill, to make its own fortune.\textsuperscript{187} Moreover he did not allege, with Ammianus, that Rome had a 'special relationship' with Virtus and Fortuna.\textsuperscript{188} With his pragmatism V. had little military use for prayer, mentioned once on behalf of his plea for the

\textsuperscript{182}Mul. III prol. 1–5: \textit{Solemnis excusatio negligentium est dispensatione venientia deo imputare vel casibus: minus namque peccare se credit ignavia, si id, quod ipsius culpa accidisset, ad potestatem incipiat deferre fortunae. Sic de aegrotantibus dicitur mortuiros frustra curari, victiros etiam si medicina cesserit evasuros. Cui disputatione, quia non solum iners sed etiam impia est, non libenter assenserim. Malo enim nihil inexpertum reloquii, quam, si quid calamitatis evenisset, avaritiae vel dissimulationibus imputari. Sed fortasse aliquando vera illa videatur in homine, qui divina providentia ac dispositione fatorum creditur regi. Animalia vero, cum quibus divinitas nihilit dignatur habere commune, nisi hominum studio impensisque curatur, absque ambiguitate deprecantur. Quid enim iumentis spei superesse, quae divinitas fovere resputit, si hominum medela cessaverit?}

\textsuperscript{183}Amm. 14.11.25–26, n.b.


\textsuperscript{185}Epit. III.16 p. 101.11–13: \textit{Nam nescio qua occulto ratisone, immo poene divina, ait contra alias dimicant melius, et qui fortores vicercant ab inferioribus saepere vincuntur. Ibid. III.11 p.93.18–20: ad publici conflictus incertum et ad fatalem diem nationibus ac populis ratio disciplinæ militaris invitatur.}

\textsuperscript{186}Epit. III.25 p.119.8–14: \textit{Quod si aliquo casu omnis in acie fundatur exercitus, perversa clades; tamen reparations multis fortuna non defuit, et medicina quaerenda est. Dux ergo providus sub ea cautela publico debet Mariæ configurer, ut, si quid pro varietate bellorum vel condicionis humanæ secus acciderit, aboque gravi detrimento liberet victos. Ibid. III.22 p.113.16–18: \textit{Qui in acie publica vincitur pugna, licet et ilii aetatis principium prostrati, tamen ad defensionem suam potest adequare fortunam.}}

\textsuperscript{187}Epit. III.25 p.120.6–10: \textit{Nec opportunitas defit, cum pro felicitate superibus et incautius menues efferturus humanæ. Si quis hunc casum ultimum putat, cogit etiam omnium proeliorum inter iniuria contra illos magis falsae, quibus victoria debeatur.}

\textsuperscript{188}Amm. 14.6.3: \textit{Tempore quo primis auspiciis in mundanum fulgorem surget vir tum, dux erant homines, Roma, ut augureretur superabitu incremenun, foedere pacis aeternae Virtus conventit atque Fortuna pluresque dissidentes, quarum si altera defauisset, ad perpsectum non venerat summum.}
restoration of the old-Roman military organization of the Republic, upon which he was sure that the old pattern of success would ensue. But there were plenty of church leaders who thought that prayer was a viable substitute for arms, although the physical fight was not as important for them as the spiritual.

So V.'s fatalism was of no very profound type. He did not personify necessity or fortune as, for example, Ammianus, even though 'necessity' was a recurrent motif; and its cognates occurs no less than 68 times in the Epit. Favourite locutions are *necessitas conspuit* (I.8), *n. exiguit* (I.3), *n. persuaserit* (III.4), *n. incumbit* (I.10), *n. iminiet* (I.19), *n. premit* (I.24), and *n. postulat* (III.7). Armies are more vulnerable to attack precisely when necessity intervenes. But V.'s necessity is of a kind that can be avoided.

Good generals avoid meeting the enemy in pitched battle, according to V.

Goffart has drawn attention to the 'secularised' or 'desacralised' version of early Roman history adopted by V., and compares Ambrose Ep. 18.4–7 (A.D. 384), refuting Symmachus Relatio 3.9:

'Haec sacra,' inquit, 'Annibalem a moenibus, a Capitólio Senonas repulerunt.' Nam de Senonibus quid loquar quos Capitolii secretá penetrantes Romanae reliquiae non tulissent, nisi eos pavido anser strepitu prodidisset? En quales templá Romana praesules habent. Ubi tunc erat Jupiter? An in anseri loquebatur... (Roma speaks):

'Non in fibris pecudum, sed in viribus bellatorum tropaea victoriae sunt. Aliis ego disciplinis orbem subegi. Militabat Camillus, qui sublata Capitolio signa, caesis Tarpeia rupe triumphatoribus, reportavit: sarravit virtus, quos religio non removit.'

Prudentius wrote in riposte to Symmachus' text similarly in contra Symmachum II.17–30 (c. A.D. 404):

*Haec ubi legatus, reddunt placidissima fratrum ora ducum: 'Scimus, quam sit victoria dulcis fortibus, Ausoniae vir facundissime linguae,*

---

189 Epit. II.18 p.52.6–8.
190 E.g. Maximus of Turin (CCSL XXIII (1962)), Sermo 69.1–2, 83.1, 85.2.
191 Amm. 14.11.24ff., 25.9.7.
192 Epit. III.8 p.82.8–9: *necessitas somni, pascendium equorum dispersio.* IV.28 p.148.4–6: *Nam sive cibo sive somno fuerint occupatis sive olio aut aliqua necessitas dispersi.*
193 Epit. III.3 p.70.15–16: *Praemii vero et aceti vel non venet non istam salis omni tempore necessitates declinandas.* III.22 p.133.18–20: *qui vero supernum insidias subesse posse est, culpam suam non potes excusare, quia haec vivere possuit et per speculatores idoneos ante cognoscere.*
194 Epit. III.9 p.86.11–14: *Boni etiam daces non operio proxio, in quo est commune periculum, sed ex occulto semper adiemantur, ut integritas sui, quantum possunt, hostes interimant vel cerre terrant...* See ch. 5 (a) for the view that this is V.'s invention.
We see here the sense of military realism Prudentius ascribed even to the pious Honorius and Arcadius, thanks to their father Theodosius' tuition, in whose service he had left his native Spain.\textsuperscript{196} V.'s fits such a 'robust' Christian context quite well, however inconsistently with his love of Vergil and the pagan divine destiny of Rome. Ambrose and Prudentius probably accurately reflect the view of war prevailing in Christian circles at the courts of Theodosius and Honorius, at least during moments of clear thinking, and both of them, like V., were products of the Latin classical and rhetorical education; Prudentius' knowledge of Vergil was certainly profound.

V.'s Sallustian view of Rome's rise to power being explained by the hardy virtue of the early Republic\textsuperscript{197} was very acceptable to contemporary Christians. Hence Augustine's theological explanation of Rome's rise and fall was dependent on his reading of Sallust;\textsuperscript{198} God gave Rome power because Roman morals in the early Republic deserved it. For Augustine the corruption set in in the 1st c. B.C.\textsuperscript{199} or 2nd c. B.C.\textsuperscript{200} But unlike V., he offered no hope for the earthly survival of Rome, nor was it important to him.

V., by contrast, writing before the sack of Rome,\textsuperscript{201} was very much concerned with the physical survival of Rome and its civilisation, rights and liberties, property-owning, civic, provincial and imperial government, and the practice of the arts and sciences.\textsuperscript{202} He saw

\textsuperscript{196}So A. Kurfess, \textit{RE} XXIII.1 (1957), 1041, s.v. 'Prudentius 2'), cf. Gennadius de Vir. Inf. 13.

\textsuperscript{197} Cf. Epit. I.1, I.3, and Sall. Cat. 7.2–7, 52.19–22, 53.2–4. See above section (b).

\textsuperscript{198} Aug. Civ. Dei. 2.18, 5.12; id. Ep. 138.3.16 (CSEL XLIX p.142–143).

\textsuperscript{199} Quoting Sall. Cat. 11.6.

\textsuperscript{200} Quoting Sall. Jug. 35.10.

\textsuperscript{201} See ch. 3. (d) 2.

\textsuperscript{202} Epit. II.24 p.59: militem, cuius est manibus servanda respublica... miles, ...cui pugnandum est pro salute propria et libertate communi, III.3 p.69.17–18: Neque enim divisariarum secures possessor est, nisi armorum defensione servetur, III.10 p.89.19–90.1: Quis autem dubitet artem bellicam rebus omnibus esse postiorem, per quam libertas retinetur et dignitas, propagatur provinciae, conservatur imperium? Ibid. p.90.6–9: Dux ergo, ...caius fidei atque virtutis possessorum fortunae, tutela urbi, salus militium, reipublicae creditur gloria, III
hardihood and the other military virtues in terms of social geography, not history, finding the requisite qualities alive and well in the country. His practical cast of mind allowed for even the moral degeneracy of the city-dwellers to be overcome by means of a toughening regimen of training and instruction in isolated outposts in rural districts. He was not prepared to accept that the army should be a barbarian institution outside civil society, and sought to restore the enrolment of Roman provincials and upper-class citizens for military service.

As Christianity grew stronger, however, the practical lesson was not always on the lips of the new leaders of society, the priests and bishops, who naturally succumbed to a weakness for divine intervention. Ambrose was as susceptible as any other. To Valentinian II in A.D. 384, he advised that safety consisted in each and every one turning to the worship of God; Gratian in A.D. 378 he urged to go forth armed with the shield of faith and the sword of the Spirit. Gratian's Catholicism was to be a powerful aid in the struggle with the heathen barbarians. It was no coincidence that the barbarians broke into the Empire along the Danube, where the Christian religion had made least headway. The Emperor Theodosius was not immune to this sort of religious pressure; Ambrose describes with approval how at the battle of

---

203 Epit. 1.2 p.6: Ex quibus regionibus irlones legendi sint (rubric), ibid. 1.3 p.7: Utrum ex agris an ex urbisbus utiitcam sint irlones (rubric); ibid. p.7-6-13: De qua parte numquam credo potuisse dabitari aptiorem armis rusticam plebem, quae sub diuo et in labore nutritur, etc.; 1.28 (epil.) 8-18: Neque degeneravit in hominibus Marius calor nec effusae sunt ieruae, quae Lacedaemonios, quae Athenienses, quae Marsos, quae Samnites, quae Pelignos, quae ipsos progenere Romanos, etc.

204 Epit. 1.3 p.7.13-22.


206 Ambr. Ep. 17.1: Aliet enim salus tua esse non poterit, nisi unusquisque Deum verum, hoc est Deum Christianorum, a quo cuncta regitur, veraciter colat; ipse enim solus verus est Deus...

207 Ambr. de Fide 2.136-140: ...progrediere plane scio fides sanctius, et gladium spiritus habens: (139) nec est ambiguum, sanie Imperator, quod qui perfide alienae pugnam exceperimus, fidei catholicae in te vigenis habituri simus auxilium. Evidens enim aneuhoc diviae indignationis causa praecessit; ubi ibi primum fides Romanorum imperio frangetur, utd proute est Deo. (140) Non libet confessorum neces, tormenta, excilia recordari, piorum sacerdoria profanum munera. Nonne de Thraciae partibus per Ripensem Daciam et Myssiam, omnemque Valerian Pannoniorum, totum illum limitem sacrilegis pariter vocabas et barbaricis motibus audimus inhorrentem? Quid poterat nobis vicinia iam feralis invehere? aut quemadmodum res Romana tali tua poterat esse custodia?
the river Frigidus A.D. 394 he jumped down from his horse, advanced alone before the line and said, 'Where is the God of Theodosius?'

But V., though a Christian, was not interested in divine intervention. The religion of the barbarians was irrelevant to him. He kept a cool estimate of matters supernatural, leaving it open, for instance, whether it was more due to Manlius' attention to detail or to fortune that the geese gave warning of the night attack by the Gauls on the Capitol in 390 B.C. He declined to delve into supernatural or divine causes, either of the weather or of military disasters, and concentrated instead on the practical question of what men could do to avoid losses. In an age of increasing zealotry and superstition V. stands out as a man of enlightened common sense, a Christian but not one who had lost touch with a rational sense of balance between things of the world and things sacred and other-worldly. As someone close to the Emperor, himself at the 'sharp end of things', he offers us a clue to how it was that a 4th c. Christian could be passionately concerned with the practical problems of ensuring the earthly survival of the Roman Empire, conceived as the embodiment of a classical civilisation, while people like Augustine with their eyes fixed on the kingdom of God and the pursuit of iustitia, could let the troubled Empire go with equanimity.

---

208 Ambr. de Obitu Theod. 7.
209 Epit. IV.26 p.147.5–9: Nam ingressi Capitolinam arcam Galli Romanum nomen eruerat, nisi clamore anserum excitatias Mamilia restitisset. Mire diligentia sive fortuna viros, qui universum orbum erant missuri sub iugum, avis una servavit.
211 Cf. Aug. de Civ. Dei 2.29 C, 4.3 B.
Ch. 3. The date of the Epitoma rei militaris.

(a) Introduction.

This chapter is going to reassert the traditional view that V. wrote the Epit. after the battle of Adrianople A.D. 378, but before the sack of Rome A.D. 410.¹

The identity of the Emperor to whom Epit. I–IV is dedicated and who commissioned Epit. II–IV² is important for an assessment of the nature of the work, and of the practicability or otherwise of V.'s suggestions. Major changes took place in the nature of the imperial field armies and their political control during the possible timespan. The fixed parameters are that the Epit. was written between the death of Gratian A.D. 383³ and the edition of Fl. Eutropius, consular date A.D. 450.⁴ Within that period one main change took place as a result of Theodosius I's settlement with the Goths in the early 380's, to the effect that Germanic mercenaries and irregular units were used on an unprecedented scale against Maximus in 388 and then again against Eugenius in 394.⁵ Then upon the death of Theodosius succeeded two unmilitary Emperors, Arcadius and Honorius, who surrendered the previous military rôle of the Emperor as highly active commander-in-chief and campaigning general to their Germanic magistri militiae, becoming themselves at times little more than closely-guarded civilian figureheads for military rule.

Moreover, whereas in the East measures were successfully implemented by the party of the praetorian prefect Aurelianus⁶ in A.D. 400–401 to purge the Gothic preponderance from the field armies of Arcadius, repeated again in 471,⁷ the West could not purge until the fall of Stilicho in 408, and such a policy could not be sustained after the sack of Rome in 410. It is important to decide whether V. was writing in the aftermath of Adrianople A.D. 378, or after the sack of Rome A.D. 410 (and whether V. was in fact calling for such a purge), because the

¹See J. Clarke, Military Institutions of Vegetius (London, 1767) vi.
²See ch. 1 (c).
³Epit. 1.20 p.223: divi Gratiani.
⁴Lang, vi.
⁵J.H.W.G. Liebeschütz, Barbarians and Bishops (1990), 20ff.
⁶Synesius was his propagandist. See T.D. Barnes, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies XXVII (1986), 93–112. P.J. Heather, Phoenix XLII (1988), 152–172, plausibly identifies the main target of Synesius' De Regno as Alaric's Gothic foederati rather than Tribigild's laeti, captivi and coloni.
question has implications for his contact with political currents of his time. For a call for the restoration of discipline, training, heavy infantry armour and Roman manpower would have sounded differently in each period.

The ms. *subscriptiones* unfortunately offer no further guidance as to date. Lang p.vii reports that the subscriptions to mss. D,8 II,9 and V,10 three of the chief representatives of his class π, are inscribed *ad Theodosium imperatorem*, and name him elsewhere in the text too. But this class, like the only other class ε, depends ultimately on the edition of A.D. 450 from Constantinople, in spite of the fact that it lacks the famous Eutropian subscription, attested only in ε.11 And since the ms. tradition of class π is full of interpolations, and it cannot be explained otherwise why class ε, which is very scrupulous about rubrics, should not have transmitted the dedication to ‘Theodosius’ had it been genuine, it is unsafe to place any reliance on it. It seems certain, therefore, that the edition of A.D. 450 contained no such dedication.

It also contained no dedications to ‘Valentinianus Augustus’. This figures in no ms. earlier than the 13th. c. Sabbah has plausibly suggested that it arose from confusion with the consular date of Eutropius’ recension,12 pointing to Harleianus 2551 (14th. c.) and Vaticanus 4494 (14th. c.), in which Eutropius’ subscription is muddled with V.’s names and titles: *Eutropii Flavii Vegetii Renati viri illustri comitis Constantinopolitani Valentino (sic) Augusto consuli.* It is probably to be inferred, therefore, that the edition of A.D. 450 contained no dedication.13

8Parisinus 7231, 12th. c., Lang xxxii.
9Palatinus 909, 10th. c., Lang xxviii–xxxi.
10Vaticanus 4493, 12th. c., Lang xxxi.
11Lang, xvii; cf. W. Goffart, *Traditio* XXXIII (1977) 71 = id. *Rome’s Fall and After* (1989) 51. T.D. Barnes, *Phoenix* XXXIII (1979) 255 has proposed without reasons to consider class π as already bifurcated from class ε by A.D. 450, a step which would required detailed justification before it can be held to challenge Lang’s stemmata.
12Sabbah, *Mémoires* II, Centre Jean Paleme (St.-Étienne Univ., 1980) 134.
13See also under section (e), below, p. 104.
(b) Valentinian III.

1. O. Seeck.

Seeck\(^{14}\) revived the thesis of Gibbon\(^{15}\) that V. was writing the Epit. for Valentinian III (A.D. 425–455), and his argument was accepted by Grosse,\(^{16}\) Thompson,\(^{17}\) Stein,\(^{18}\) and Jones.\(^{19}\) Lang dated the Epit. to Theodosius I in his first Teubner edition of 1869, but accepted Seeck's date in the second edition of 1885.\(^{20}\) And now recently Goffart,\(^{21}\) Gordon,\(^{22}\) and Birley\(^{23}\) have attempted to build on Seeck.

Seeck said that (1) V's mention of Gratian showed that he lived in the West, confirmed by his knowledge of the obscure Urcilliani in Africa,\(^{24}\) whereas Theodosius reigned in the West only four months, not long enough for receipt of Epit. I–IV. During his three years' sojourn in Italy A.D. 388–391 he was only caretaker-Emperor of the West. V. would either have dedicated his work to both Theodosius I and Valentinian II or to Valentinian II alone as his legal ruler, not to Theodosius I alone. (2) V.'s complaint (I.20) of neglect of the army since Gratian could not have been made during the lifetime of either Valentinian II or Theodosius I, whereas if he had been blaming Maximus he would have said so explicitly with abuse of his 'tyranny' contrasted with praise of the happy age succeeding. (3) While the panegyrical rhetoric was mostly meaningless, and could be paralleled even in the official language on coins and inscriptions, in two places appeared some personal colouring, viz., III.26 in which the military exercises would suit a young Emperor of whom they could be expected, and IV praef. which referred not to small repairs to city walls and name changes like Resaina-Theodosiopolis but to

---

\(^{15}\)E. Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J.B. Bury, III (1897), 187 n.128.
\(^{17}\)E.A. Thompson, A Roman Reformer and Inventor (1952), 79.
\(^{19}\)A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (1964), 642.
\(^{20}\)C. Lang, viii–viii.
\(^{24}\)Epit. III.23 p.115.5; cf. ch. 2 (a).
the construction of a whole *limes*-system. However Theodosius I was too old at 40 for the exercises, and lazy by inclination—he died of dropsy,—and there was evidence that he never restored the Danubian *limes*, compared to indications in the Notitia Dignitatum that Valentinian III did. (4) The absence of any mention of the sack of Rome was explained by the assumption V. was writing some 20 years later, when other disasters would have extinguished its significance.

Argument (1) is not probant. Valentinian II was still a minor on the murder of Gratian A.D. 383, aged 12, when Theodosius I became Emperor of the whole Roman world, remaining so until his death A.D. 395.25 Valentinian II, by contrast, never reigned independently but was in his mother Justina’s shadow until his flight to Thessalonica A.D. 387. When restored by Theodosius in A.D. 388, he was 17; but from A.D. 391 his *magister militum* Arbogast ruled in his name until he asserted his authority in 392 and Arbogast refusing to be dismissed had his master assassinated or forced to suicide. Theodosius’ three-year-long sojourn in Italy A.D. 388–391 naturally overshadowed the independence of the western court during this time, too. V. might have written the whole Epit. during the four years from Valentinian’s flight to Theodosius’ departure, or if he had begun it before A.D. 387, ignored Valentinian as a minor.

There is no hint in V. that his Emperor was a youth or inexperienced. If so, one would have expected rhetorical praise of his childish military prowess and puny war-games foreshadowing future conquests, as for example in Merobaudes and Claudian.26 In contrast, there is evidence in several places of the Emperor’s experience27 and activity as commander-in-chief.28

25So Orosius 7.35.
27See below.
28Epit. I praef. p.5.8–9: *quaes... disposis, II.3 p.37.20–22: provisione maestatis tuae... fortissima dispositio...*, II.18 p.52.6–8: *dispositione imperatoris inviciti...*, ib. p.52.14–16: *huius felicitatis ac provisionis est perennitas tua, ut... et nova excoigiet et antiqua restituat*, II praef. p.33.10–13: *domino... domiari... aliqua de usu ac disciplina instiuae bellorum, nisi forte iussisses fieri, quod ipse gessisses*.
By saying, 'When I considered that Your Clemency was more able to forgive literary audacities than other (Emperors)',29 V. was not alluding to the Emperor’s undeveloped judgement30 but more likely to a contemporary literary renaissance. Syme31 has recently collected evidence which dates such activity to the last two decades of the 4th. c. in the west,32 coinciding with the reign of Theodosius I. But it was also a topos33 and need not refer to any kind of reality at all.

I follow Seeck’s argument (2) in not believing like Goffart and Birley,34 but contra Schoener35 and Sabbah,36 that V. implied any reproach to his addressee by his criticisms of Gratian and ‘anyone else’ in Epit. I.20. Gratian, having been unpopular for his favouritism towards Alans, being now dead and having no surviving issue, was a relatively safe target; even so, V.’s words were sufficiently ambiguous to be capable of the interpretation that military decline set in after, not under, Gratian.37 However, criticism of Maximus need not have been outspoken before Theodosius decided to get rid of him A.D. 387–388, and criticism of Valentinian II’s government, addressed to Theodosius, need not have been very risky, especially when as here the culprit was not named.38 And if V., as is conceivable if he were comes stabuli and a Spaniard,39 were related to Theodosius I, any such risk was further reduced. Certainly, it was safe to criticize the previous dynasty under Theodosius I or Valentinian II: Ammianus could say of Valens *nec bellicos nec liberalibus studiis eruditus*.40

Seeck’s argument (3) is acceptable also, with some reservations. The Emperor’s taking part in military exercises with his troops was a topos of panegyrical writing. Seeck cited

29Epit. I praef. p.4.10–11.
30So Seeck, art. cit., 82.
32Syme, art. cit., 363.
33Cf. Pliny Pan. Lat. 1.47.1, Mam. Pan. Lat. 3(11).23.4.
37Epit. I.20 p.22.3–13. The ambiguity lies in *usque ad tempus divi Gratiani*, meaning ‘to the beginning’ or ‘to the end’ of Gratian’s reign. However the infamy of the context of the criticisms of I.20 will be sufficient to damn Gratian; and V.’s other usage of *usque ad* supports the meaning ‘to the beginning of’, for which see below.
38See further below, section (d).
39See ch. 1 (d) 5 and ch. 2 (a).
40Amm. 31.14.5.
Ausonius^{41} and Claudian.^{42} Synesius challenged the cloistered Arcadius to behave like an Emperor and exercise with his troops.^{43} Even the pagan Zosimus granted the tough military virtues to Theodosius I when necessary, albeit his character inclined to sloth and debauchery.^{44} Therefore V. Epit. III.26 (epil.) p.124.15–125.5 is merely a topos, too, not necessarily having any personal colour at all. If Claudian attributed the same abilities to the 11 year-old and 13 year-old Honorius, there is little reason to believe the portrait was true of Theodosius, either, although given his military past it is much more likely to be true. Theodosius was not too old at 40 for these imperial virtues to be nonsensical in his case.

V. Epit. IV praef. can indeed be interpreted in terms of repairs to city walls, new city walls and name changes and upgrading of cities;^{45} Seeck’s *limes*-system seems unjustified by V.’s text, his reading of the eastern section of the Notitia Dignitatum rests on the incorrect belief that it was revised down to as late a date as the western section, and there is no archaeological evidence to sustain his idea that Valentinian III’s *magister militum* Felix restored the Danubian *limes* A.D. 427–430 before Aëtius gave it to the Huns.^{46} Epit. IV.1–30 is about the defence of cities, not line of frontier-fortification nor even military forts.

Argument (4) will be rebutted below.^{47} For the moment let it be stated that the city of Rome itself was for V. a symbol of his abiding faith in *disciplina militaris* and the future of the Empire. Had it been sacked he would have expressed himself differently: he does not even accept that it had been sacked by the Gauls in 390 B.C.

---

{41} Aus. Grat. Actio (A.D. 379) 14 (Graitian).
{42} Claud. pan. Hon. III. cons. (A.D. 396) 39ff. (Honorian), id. de bell. Get. 250ff. (Honorian); add also id. pan. Hon. IV. cons (A.D. 398) 518–564 (Honorian), Amm. 21.16.7: *equitandi et iaculandi, maximeque perite dirigendi sagittas, aritiumque armature pedestris perquam scientissimum* (Constantius II), id. 21.16.19: *saltu valebat et cursu* (Constantius II; n.b. he died like Theodosius in his 40's, but Ammianus does not appear to think it inappropriate in an obituary), id. 21.2.1: *quaiescans scutum variis rotibus excercetur in campo* (Julian), Pliny Pan. Lat. 1.13.1–2 (Trajan), cf. Pac. Pan. Lat. 2(12).10.3 (Theodosius I), Merobaudes Pan. 2.121–144 (Aëtius).
{43} Synesius de Regno (13–14) 1A–D.
{44} Zos. 4.50.1–2.
{45} See section (d) below, p.92ff.
{47} See section (d) below, p. 76.
Goffart's proposal\(^{48}\) that in Epit. IV praef. *urbes* means solely minor walled settlements of a well-known late Roman type\(^{49}\) that can indeed be paralleled elsewhere in V,\(^{50}\) even if correct, does not favour one Emperor over another since this type of fortified settlement existed throughout the possible timespan. But in fact Epit. IV.1–30 is a traditional subject of military manuals\(^{51}\) which in every case treat of traditionally-conceived cities, even if V. has an eye to contemporary developments.\(^{52}\) The relevant preface talks of the origin of civilisation, that is, dwelling in cities, and of contemporary city-foundation, name changes, embellishement and enlargement, and of imperial prestige, pointing to the activity of the eastern Emperors of the period.\(^{53}\)

2. W. Goffart.

In support of Valentinian III Goffart adduced two arguments to show that V. was writing in the western literary world.\(^{54}\) First the Mul. is correctly characterized as a revision in more elegant Latin of an earlier, coarser translation of a Greek manual,\(^{55}\) which would be pointless in a region where the Greek was easily accessible. Secondly at Epit. I.8\(^{56}\) where V. refused to look at Greek authors, he tacitly dismissed two outstanding military writers of the imperial epoch, Aelian and Arrian, whereas the Aelianic corpus was formed in Constantinople during the 4th.–5th. c.\(^{57}\) Moreover the Tactica of the 5th.–6th. c. Urbicius is effectively an abridgement of Arrian's Tactica where the latter deals with infantry.\(^{58}\) Like V., Urbicius is infantry-centred, but affirms the authority of Arrian. Therefore V. could not have been writing for a milieu where Arrian and Aelian were prized, although the real reason why he ignored


\(^{49}\) E.g., Eutropius Brev. 8.2 & 6, Amm. 30.9.1; Cass. Var. 1.17: 3.48; 5.9, Ennodius Pan. reg. Theodorico (*CSEL* VI.277) 10–12, Merobaudes Pan. 1 fr. 18. 2–9 (ed. F.M. Clover (1971), 63), Anon. de rebus belli. 20, J. Matthews, *Western Aristocracies and the Imperial court* (1975), 323–324, 'Theopolis'.

\(^{50}\) Epit. III.8 p.85.15ff., III.3 p.70.15–71.2, civitates sive castella, urbes atque castella.


\(^{52}\) Epit. IV.30 (epil.).16–18: quae ad obpugnandas vel defendendas urbes auctores bellicarum artium prodiderunt vel quae recentiam necessitatem usus invent... digesta. IV.1 p.129.15: urbes atque castella.

\(^{53}\) Epit. IV praef. p.128–129. See further in section (d) below.


\(^{55}\) See ch. 2 (b).

\(^{56}\) 8 p.12.20–13.11.


\(^{58}\) R. Foerster, *Hermes* XII (1877), 464.
them altogether was probably that V. knew little Greek.\textsuperscript{59} Thus the notion of Teuffel-Kroll-Skutsch,\textsuperscript{60} wrongly based anyway on ms. dedications \textit{ad Theodosium imperatorem},\textsuperscript{61} that V. may have been writing for Theodosius II is to be excluded, not to mention other indications such as the need to accept V.'s picture of a 'pacified sea'.\textsuperscript{62} None of the above, however, speaks against Theodosius I, a Latin-speaking eastern Emperor who spent several years in the west during his reign, and who appointed Gauls and Spaniards such as Rufinus and Cynegius (and V.? to the top civil posts in Constantinople.

Goffart's third argument, that Adrianople A.D. 378 was not mentioned because V. was writing for a western audience for whom this event was distant in time as well as place, is somewhat undermined by Goffart himself as he identifies in Epit. III.11 an allusion to Adrianople, as does Sabbah, independently.\textsuperscript{63} Goffart's reading (p.86 = p.66) of the 'panegyric' passage Epit. IV.31 p.150.4–8 affirming that the sea had long been pacified and the fight with the barbarians was taking place solely on land is too strained. He dismisses it as rhetorical and not meaning what it says. Rather, we should consider V.'s method of working. The imperial fleets of Ravenna and Misenum, above all, being now shadows of their former selves,\textsuperscript{64} it was V.'s wish to revamp the sea-going navy, for general strategic reasons unconnected with the present struggle with barbarian tribes. Thus he added an appendix on the subject, for it was not his wont to speak about matters that called for no reforms, such as cavalry or river patrol-boats.\textsuperscript{65} The fact that the sea was 'long since pacified' does not help V.'s strategic purpose but is literary insofar as it excused him for making it a short section. We take other such recusationes, his refusal to discuss cavalry and patrol-boats, to be based on knowledge (in these instances) that there was nothing to contribute from the books available to V. So this one ought to be 'true', too, not a rhetorical topos, for V. would naturally either have selected a different topos which did support his strategic aims, or if he was prepared to state

\textsuperscript{59}See ch. 2 (b).
\textsuperscript{60}W.S. Teuffel, W. Kroll, F. Skutsch, \textit{Geschichte der römischen Literatur} III (1913\textsuperscript{6}), 314.
\textsuperscript{61}See section (a) above.
\textsuperscript{62}See section (d) below.
\textsuperscript{63}G. Sabbah, \textit{Mémoires} II, Centre Jean Paleme (1980), 142. See further section (d).
\textsuperscript{64}M. Reddé, \textit{Mare Nostrum} (Rome 1986); cf. J.R. Moss, \textit{Historia} XXII (1973), 724.
\textsuperscript{65}See ch. 5 (a).
baldly that the infantry army could not stand up to the barbarians, he would hardly have shrunk from stating that the navy could not control the sea, had it been true. We have to accept that for V. there was no question of a naval threat from the barbarians, and that implies, as Goffart says (p.86 = p.66), that any 5th. c. date is questionable, given actual conditions. And since Ravenna was revived as a naval base serving the court of Honorius and his successors, it is very unlikely that V. was writing later than A.D. 402–403.66

In a somewhat special argument, Goffart (p.79–81 = p.59–61), taking account of Seeck’s caution67 that some Emperors’ achievements were distinctive, so that conventional epithets were unnecessary, maintains that V.’s compliments68 could not have been said to an outstandingly experienced general like Theodosius I, who had campaigned with his father and had personally held a field command. But the repertory of panegyrical virtues was the same for all Emperors, good and bad; if it is not legitimate to use these as evidence to exclude bad Emperors, it is inconsistent to rule out the successful on the same grounds. After all, *maximus victor ac triumfator* is borne by Valentinian I.69

At Epit. III.26 (epil.) p.124.15–125.5 V. states, according to Goffart, that the ‘tamer of barbarian nations’, who enjoyed ‘continuous victories and triumphs’ (II praef.), needed V.’s Epit. to learn what battle was all about. But this is to read rhetoric literally. What V. is really saying is that, by virtue of his book, the Emperor had now mastered various military skills, corresponding to matters dealt with in Books I–II (*disciplina militaris*), and Book III supplied the art of winning battles, adding the strategic skills of the *imperator* to the tactical skills of the *miles*. There was, of course, in reality no question that the Emperor was not master of all aspects of the subject before the book was ever written, as V. was careful to point out.70 This epilogue was thus a rhetorical version of the themes already listed in Epit. III.1,71 and marks

---

66Ravenna mint commenced production in 402–403, its inception presumably reflecting the transfer of the western court from Milan at this date; cf. M.F. Hendy, *Numismatic Chronicle* XII (1972), 123. Cf. M. Reddá, ibid. See also section (d) below.
68E.g., (Epit. II praef.) *domino ac principi generis humani, domitori omnium gentium barbararum; invictus* used six time, etc.
69E.g., *ILS* 771.
71Epit. III.1 p.65.13–18: *Primus liber tironum dilectum exercitiumque deprompsit, sequens legionis institutionem disciplinamque edocuit militarem; hic tertius classicum sonat. Ideo enim illa praemissa sunt, ut...*
with a flourish the stage reached by V.’s work at the end of Book III, in relation to the earlier books.

Goffart extrapolated (p.81–82 = p.61–62) from the exemplum of the Second Punic War\(^{72}\) a minimum interval of two decades between the end of V.’s *longa pax* and the time of writing, when the series of disasters suffered at the hands of the Goths\(^{73}\) had led to the point where the reaction which V. represented was about to set in. Two decades from the death of Gratian took one to the early A.D. 400’s, when a second Hannibal in the form of Alaric the Goth was wreaking havoc in Italy. Thus for Goffart the disasters were those culminating in the sack of Rome, A.D. 410.

Apart from the obvious fact that if V. were supposed to be writing in response to these disasters, the reign of Valentinian III (A.D. 425–455) seems much too late in the day, and were he writing under Honorius, by Goffart’s own admission (p.84 = p.64) Honorius’ reign reached so far back into the period of said disasters and before, that he could hardly avoid sharing the responsibility for the *neglegentia, dissimulatio* and *desidia* V. claimed as its cause, there is no hint in the text that V. intended the length of the *neglegentia* between the First and Second Punic Wars to be a significant factor. Rather the point was to justify optimism,\(^{74}\) as is the purpose of the exempla at Epit. III.10 p.93,\(^{75}\) that a return to *Romana disciplina* could bring victory, just as the neglect of it had lost it.

But for Goffart the reign of Valentinian III is a reaction to the disasters of Honorius, and in V. we have a principal witness for the military revival engineered by his *patricius* Aëtius. What is wrong with this idea is that it ignores so much other evidence from the text pointing to an earlier period, at any rate before the sack of Rome and the upsurge of naval warfare. Thus, for example, the branding of Gratian with responsibility for *neglegentia*,\(^{76}\) the

---

\(^{72}\)Epit. I.28 p.30.5.


\(^{74}\)See ch. 2 (b), p. 40.

\(^{75}\)Cf. Epit. II.4 p.38.10–12, II.18 p.52.8–13, III.25 p.120.8–10, IV praef. p.129.6–10.

\(^{76}\)Gratian would not have been remembered even a generation after his death, one would suppose.
evidence that V.’s Emperor probably ruled in the East whereas V. belongs to a western milieu, and the alleged co-operation of barbarians, the Goths, Huns and Alans, associated par excellence with the last two decades of the 4th. c.—these factors will be discussed below—; and secondly it ignores the problems of the lack of other evidence for a military revival under Valentinian III; while thirdly it assumes a connexion between a supposed military revival and a treatise calling for one, whereas the contrary is prima facie more likely to be the case.

Thus, the attempt to find evidence for such a military revival under Valentinian III is unconvincing. Goffart (p.87 = p.67) points to the period after the peace treaty with the Vandals in A.D. 442, saying that Nov. Valent. III 1077 is ‘oriented rather self-consciously to reform’, and ‘shares V.’s presupposition about an era of tranquillity not very long ago when certain indulgences were permissible that can no longer be afforded’: Haec enim superioris aetatis principes et divorum parentum nostrorum liberalitas inlustribus titulis redundantis opulentia saeculi minore allorum possessorum pernicie conferebant; quod quamvis et tunc inlustum, tamen inter initia levius videbatur, sub difficultate autem praesentis temporis... However, this Novel tells us nothing about military reconstruction. Rather it is about the growing difficulty of the State in raising goods and services, money and recruits from landowners who were becoming increasingly impoverished, so that privileged classes such as viri inlustres, previously immune, were no longer to enjoy such immunity. During the Gildonic War senators had successfully resisted the government’s attempts to recruit coloni from their estates;78 the recruitment of all coloni was shortly afterwards banned for good.79 Under Valentinian III there was no break with past problems, but continuity, under worsening conditions.80

77Ravenna, 20th. Feb., A.D. 441.
79See section (d) below.
3. E. Birley.

Birley\(^{81}\) quoted Varady\(^{82}\) on Valentinian’s ‘new army’ and Vegetius. Varady referred to a number of Novels of Valentinian III from the period A.D. 440–445 ordering levies to reinforce the Roman army, and quoted Nov. XXIV.1 (A.D. 443): *milires ad antiquum redigere numerum... diurnisque eorum exercitationibus inhaerere praecipimus. Castrorum quin etiam... clausurarumque pro antiqua dispositione curam refectionemque mandamus.* But this is actually a Novel of Theodosius II,\(^{83}\) about measures to restore eastern limitanean units by confirmations of their tax-exemptions, pay and land-rights, and renewed instructions to their *duces* personally to keep units up to strength, properly trained and equipped with adequately maintained fortifications and patrol-boats, and to abide by laws setting upper limits to customary extortion of soldiers’ and native allies’ pay. It does not presuppose a loss of the ability to train or to construct camps, of which V. complains, but chronic administrative weaknesses which had allowed *duces* to hold their offices as sinecures, and their units to decline.\(^{84}\) Moreover Mommsen and Meyer read *lusiorarumque*, not *clausurarumque*, and according to V. *lusoriae* were at the most developed state at the time of writing.\(^{85}\)

V. does, indeed, describe the administrative problems responsible for the decline of the legions—corrupt promotion and failure to fill vacancies (i.e., implying perhaps theft of pay by officers)—, but only in a single chapter.\(^{86}\) Thus it is a small part of V.’s much larger picture, which includes corrupt or incompetent recruitment, loss of technical expertise among officers, idle and luxurious soldiery, and complacent Emperors. But the Novel tells us nothing new apart from the reference to soldiers working *agri limitanei*.\(^{87}\) The abuses comprised therein were chronic, and can be illustrated also in the 4th. c.\(^{88}\) The fullness of the Novel’s catalogue


\(^{83}\) Nov. Theod. II 24, Constantinople, 12th. Sept., A.D. 443.

\(^{84}\) Epit. I.21 p.25.5ff., etc.

\(^{85}\) Epit. IV.46 p.165.8–11.

\(^{86}\) Epit. II.3 p.36–37.


\(^{88}\) Themistius Or. 10.1354–1366 praises Valens’ military reforms which restored arms and uniforms to units, brought them up to strength and ended the abuse whereby the pay of the missing men was drawn illegally by their officers. The Historia Augusta (Pesc. Nig. 3, Sev. Alex. 15) has the ideal emperors strictly punishing...
of ills is explained by its being a complete text of a law aimed at preparing slumbering units for action, not by its being an ideological new departure in vigorous enforcement of discipline.

In fact, none of the Novels of Valentinian III cited by Birley and Varady represents a revival. Nov. Valenti. III 6.2 and 6.3\(^9\) show the State trying to raise recruits from those obliged to provide them amid serious financial difficulties for the treasury, threatening heavier penalties on those who knowingly kept back recruits on their estates and imposing heavier burdens of providing recruits on the richest classes of society. Nov. Valenti. III 6.1\(^9\) on the same subject complained of the necessity of repeating established laws, especially when the matter had been the subject of a recent prohibition. Nov. Valenti. III 15\(^2\) set up a new sales tax, the *siliquarium*, to finance the formation of a large army, including existing personnel as well as new recruits. But this merely shows the exhaustion of the existing sources of supply.

The accident of survival of a number of laws on military matters from the A.D. 440's is due not to a great military revival but to the historical circumstances of the time, dominated by the Vandal emergency from 439 and the administrative repercussions of the publication of the Codex Theodosianus in A.D. 437 which gave an impetus to the recording and preservation of new imperial *constitutiones* in the years following, when *novellae* were collected as their name implies to supplement and adjust the three authoritative corpora of *constitutiones*.\(^9\) It so happens that the compilers of the Codex Theodosianus collected few examples of instructions to repair military units and installations and orders for levies of recruits for various wars, tribunes who extorted *stellatura* from their men. Synesius describes the practice of *duces* who pocketed their men's pay and allowed them immunity from service so that they could pursue their private avocations, presumably until such time as the unit was called into action, Ep. 129, cf. Ep. 62. Cf. Ep. 131 for a *dux* who sold off a mounted unit's horses. Libanius Or. 2.37–39 describes officers starving their men and horses. See A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* (1964), 644–646. See also below ch. 4 (c)(vi) and 5 (a–c).

\(^8\)May, A.D. 443 and July, A.D. 444.
\(^9\)March, A.D. 440?
\(^9\)On the subject of recruits or trained soldiers hiding from military service on estates and farms, with or without the collusion of domini and provincial governors, cf. CTh 7.18.2 (379), 4 (380), 5 (381), 6 (382), 7 (383), 8 (383), 9 (396), 10 (400), 12 (403). On the superfluous furnishing of *vagi* and veterans' sons (already personally liable to serve) and of *fugitivi* (banned like all slaves) by *possessores* as if *coloni* from their estates, cf. CTh 7.13.6 (370). On the extension to the *res privata* of the liability of estates to furnish recruits, cf. CTh 7.13.12 (397).
\(^9\)i.e., *Codex Gregorianus, Hermogenianus* and *Theodosianus*. 
although there will have been many given. Because of the historical circumstances, the Novels happen to some extent to supply this want.

Also statements of policy which sound reminiscent of V. are present in the Novels and not in the Codex by the same accident: the compilers of the Codex systematically omitted all the preambles. Thus there is nothing in the Codex Theodosianus comparable to Nov. Valent. III 6.2: *quid enim magis professis est desideriis expetendum, quam ut adiectis viribus per diiectum roboris militaris Romanus augeatur exercitus*, followed by reference to the need to secure sufficient recruits, *sine ullo tam necessariae rei dissimulazione*. But it does bear some resemblance to V. Epit. I.13 p.17.12–13: *nihil enim neque firmius neque felicius neque laudabilius est republica in qua abundant milities eruditi*, II.18 p.52.6–8: *si quis igitur pugna publica superari barbaros cupit, ut divinitatis nutu, dispositione imperatoris invicti reparentur ex tironibus legiones, votis omnibus petat*, and I praef. p.5.10–12: *et in hoc parvo libello, quicquid de maximis rebus semperque necessariis requirendum credis, invenias*. Similarly CJ 12.35.15 (A.D. 458) orders fines for soldiers caught pursuing private business and for their employers, as soldiers were officially obliged to be training daily: *sed propriae muniis insudare militiae... sed frequentes esse in numero suo iubeat, ut armorum quotidiano exercitio ad bella se praeparent*. V. covered the same topic at Epit. II.19 p.53.16–20: *Nec aliquibus milites instituti deputabantur obsequiis, nec privata eisdem negotia mandabantur; siquidem incongruum videre imperatoris militem, qui veste et annona publica pascebatur, utilitatisvacare privatis*. But these subjects were not new in the 5th. c.; it is simply that they are better recorded because legislation is better recorded.

What the Novels do show, is the considerable and growing difficulty of the western government in raising recruits, severer penalties and the removal of immunities showing that existing legislation was inadequate. They are evidence of the increasing impoverishment of the western empire, leading up to its final collapse, not of the creation of a new model army, based on Vegetian principles. There is in fact no evidence at all for such an idea.

94 Cf. CTb 7.18. 13–14 (403) giving the right to civilians to arrest deserters, CTb 7.13.17 (406) permitting the enlistment of slaves, and CTb 7.1.15 (396) threatening fines of 5 lb. gold against officers who continued to use soldiers for private business.

95 See further ch. 7 (f), p. 289.

Gordon argued in favour of Valentinian III that (1) V.'s Emperor was young,97 had founded many cities,98 and had a fleet on the Danube;99 that (2) it would be presumptuous to have addressed a military manual to an Emperor who had already proved himself a consummate general; and that (3) V. twice mentioned the Huns,100 whereas they were a virtually unknown tribe before the 5th. c., and no real threat to the Empire until Attila's accession in c. A.D. 433.

G. Sabbah devoted himself to a detailed refutation of Gordon, and showed that the attributes under (1) do not exclude Theodosius I, and that V. defended himself explicitly against (2) in I praef. p.4–5, saying that he was not informing the Emperor about things which he may not have known but was confirming for him that he was conforming in what he did to the pure Roman tradition, and in II praef. p.33–34 saying that he was writing to order and the fear of disobeying the Emperor took precedence in his eyes over appearing presumptuous in giving lessons to a master.

It follows from this that V. could not be writing for an infant Emperor Valentinian III, aged seven or eight according to Seeck's hypothesis, but a man who had at least reached the age of discretion, able to conduct his own affairs. Nor is there any hint that his Emperor had only recently come to man's estate. Thus he was probably more than twenty-one years old, an age which Honorius reached in A.D. 405, Valentinian III in 440.

As for (3), Sabbah pointed to Ammianus and Eunapius102 for evidence that knowledge of the Huns was reasonably full already in the years A.D. 390–395, that they played an important rôle in the events of A.D. 378,103 and at the side of the Goths, Alans and Taifali in

---

97Epit. III.26 (epil.) p.124.15–125.5.
98Epit. IV. praef. p.128–129.
99Epit. IV.46 p.165.3–11.
102Amm. 31.2.1–11, Eunapius History fr. 41 (Blockley); on the date of the first edition of Eunapius see W.R. Chalmers, The Classical Quarterly III (1953), 165–170, T.D. Barnes, Classical Philology LXXI (1976), 266.
103Amm. 31.16.3.
the devastation of the Danubian provinces between A.D. 378 and 383, and the army led by Theodosius against Maximus included important Hun contingents.104

c) Honorius.

Honorius was suggested by Teuffel-Kroll-Skutsch105 because of V.'s reference to repairing walls, interpreted therein as those of Rome, A.D. 401-402.106 However Goffart (p.83 = p.63) and Mazzarino107 (p.542) rightly refused to see in this passage any reference to the walls of Rome. Rome is mentioned merely as another Republican exemplum, in this case its inviolability to the Gauls in 390 B.C.108

Claudia Giuffrida109 has recently adjudicated in favour of Honorius also. Her argument relies on a schematic account of V.'s book on the one side, and of Theodosius I's and Stilicho's supposed pacific, philo-barbarian policy on the other. According to Giuffrida (p.35), V. reflected traditional politics, exemplified in Ammianus and Libanius, i.e., the annihilation of the barbarians, the patriotic unity of all Romans, the maintenance of old-Roman disciplina militaris and adventurous leadership by the Emperor and his marshalls.110 Following Straub's thesis,111 we find the orators Pacatus and Themistius on the opposite side, supporting Theodosius. After Theodosius' death the debate intensified, with Synesius112 calling in A.D. 399 for the 'Ammianian' ideals of restitutio ad integrum of the limites, the annihilation of the barbarians and the establishment of a truly national Roman army, at the court of Arcadius, and a strong contrast developing between Stilicho and senatorial circles in the west.113 According

---

104 Pac. Pan. Lat. 2 (12) 32.
108 See ch. 7 (b), p. 256.
110 Amm. 31.16.8, 31.5.12-14, Liban. Or. 24.5.
112 Synes. de Regno 22.45-48, (PG L.VI.1092a).
to Giuffrida (p.35–36), the nationalism which pervades the pages of the Epit. suits greatly the political tendency of the post-Theodosian epoch.\textsuperscript{114}

But the Roman senate only came out in its truly nationalist colours in A.D. 408, when it suddenly came down in favour of war with Alaric, against the advice of Stilicho, whereas as recently as the war against Gildo the senate had sent ambassadors to Milan to obtain \textit{adaeratio} of recruits.\textsuperscript{115} Thus the crisis of A.D. 408, the fall of Stilicho and the massacre of the families of the \textit{foederati} in Italy, the killing of the more faithful followers of Stilicho and the appointment of officials chosen by the senate represented the most plausible conditions for V. to write a work to the Emperor proposing as first priority (Epit. I) the recruitment and training of a national army,\textsuperscript{116} and holding up as a model the old legions, commended (Epit. II.2, 18, 21) for their self-sufficiency, cohesion and uniformity of training,\textsuperscript{117} just when the breach between the barbarians and the government of Honorius became irreparable, and 30,000 of them marched off to join Alaric in Noricum.\textsuperscript{118}

In support of this idea, V.’s \textit{longa pax}\textsuperscript{119} is interpreted as a reference to the pro-German pacifist policy pursued by Theodosius and identified with the disgraced Stilicho,\textsuperscript{120} V.’s references to Hannibal’s invasion of Italy in key chapters (I.28, III praef.) are seen as taking up Claudian’s parallelism between Alaric and Hannibal,\textsuperscript{121} and V.’s polemic against Gratian (I.20) is understood as an attack on the policies of Theodosius, unnamed only because he was the Emperor’s father.\textsuperscript{122}

The hypothesis does not, however, bear close examination. First, it is hard to describe Theodosius’ policy as pro-German or pacifist when it involved favour to one group of Goths, the Tervingi, and hostility to another, the Greuthungi,—which appears a classic case of \textit{divide

\textsuperscript{116}Giuffrida p.51.
\textsuperscript{117}Giuffrida p.55.
\textsuperscript{118}J.B. Bury, \textit{History of the Later Roman Empire} I (1923), 174, is sceptical of the number which actually joined Alaric.
\textsuperscript{119}See ch. 2 (b) and 5 (b–c).
\textsuperscript{120}Giuffrida p.54.
\textsuperscript{121}Claud. de cons. Sul. 3.1–15, de bell. Get. 149–150.
\textsuperscript{122}Giuffrida p.53.
et impera, also pursued by previous Emperors. Theodosius’ triumph over the Greuthungi in A.D. 386 is well-known. Similarly, Stilicho’s expulsion of Alaric from Italy in A.D. 402 or 403 and his defeat and massacre of Radagaisus and his Ostrogothic horde in 406 were not the actions of a pacifist.

Secondly Hannibal is one of a large number of Republican exempla cited by V; the alleged parallel with Alaric is far from proven, and in fact unnecessary, for Hannibal was the most notorious of Rome’s barbarian enemies in history.

Thirdly V.’s attack on Gratian plus ‘anyone else’ can be interpreted in a way which leaves Theodosius I unscathed (see (b) 1 above and (d) below). As for Giuffrida’s general thesis, it fails to take account of the apparently rather leisured circumstances of composition of the Epit. Book I appeared first and in a separate edition from Books II–IV, as the fuller subscriptio of the 1st. book and praescriptio of the 2nd. book make clear, together with V.’s own admission at Epit. II praef. Moreover, although the book is written against a background of military disasters, the theme tails off in books II–IV, implying that things were not getting worse as they should have been if the author were writing in A.D. 408–410.

Also V. is not yet publicly anti-barbarian, as the nationalist senatorial circles who applauded the events of A.D. 408 were. It is more that he is a realistic politician who values some proper contemporary uses of barbarians, e.g. in providing certain élite cavalry units to which he alludes with seeming approval. His point is rather to highlight and reverse the demilitarisation of the Roman People. The corollary to that admittedly is that he wished to see barbarians used only as they were in long gone times, in a strictly ancillary military rôle to the

---

123 E.g. Valens in A.D. 376, Amm. 31.4.12.
125 See ch. 7 (b).
127 Mss. AMGQLDP.
128 Mss. AMGQLD.
129 Lang, X.
130 Epit. II praef. p.33.16–34.4.
131 See ch. 5 (c).
132 Epit. I.13 armaturae. I.20 init. But V.’s proposed legionary cavalry would elbow many élite cavalry units out. See ch. 5 (c) 2, cf. 5 (b) 1.
ethnically ‘Roman’ forces. But he was realistic enough to see that this goal was a long way off, and he notably refrains from openly calling for it.

The lack of racial bigotry in V. also contrasts with Synesius and speaks rather against the view that he suits best the bitter antagonisms of the post-Theodosian epoch. Also the loss of discipline and training and inadequate or corrupt recruitment of Roman infantry were equally as important to V. as the barbarization of the army. It seems unsafe, further, to assign to Ammianus anti-Gothic views expressed only in the emotional context of the battle of Adrianople, as if they were leading motifs of his writing, although they may mark a wider shift in feeling against the barbarians after that event. Finally there is no evidence of Ammianus’ involvement in nationalist or any other senatorial circles in Rome. 133

But above all, since V. and his Emperor were motivated to redress the shortcomings of the Emperor’s predecessors, 134 it is implausible that he was addressing the son of the previous Emperor; the likelihood is rather that his Emperor represented a break with the past.

(d) Theodosius I.

1. The aftermath of Adrianople.

If the battle of Adrianople A.D. 378 was still significant to V., it is likely that he was writing not longer than a generation afterwards, i.e., not after the sack of Rome A.D. 410, an earth-shaking event for Romans. There are in fact grounds for thinking V. wrote in the aftermath of Adrianople. Goffart, who argues for a date close to A.D. 450, 135 nevertheless sees (p. 83 = 63) in Epit. III.11, 136 a possible allusion to the disaster of Adrianople, since Ammianus’ account of it stresses the exhaustion of the troops. 137 This seems a convincing candidate for the reference which has clearly to do with a near-contemporary disaster. V. appears to find the subject painful—ne quid amplius dicam—and to expect his allusion to be picked up despite this reserve. There is an antithesis between Romani duces responsible for the

---

133 A. Cameron, JRS LIV (1964), 15–28.
134 Epit. I p. 4.6–11, II.3 p. 37.18–22, II.18 p. 52.6–20.
136 Epit. III.11 p. 94.18–95.3: Observatur autem, ne longo spatio fatigatum militem neve lassos post cursum equos ad publicum proelium cogas; multum virium labore ianoris plag naturus amittit. Quid faciet, qui ad aciem marcidas adventat? Hoc et venere decelinarunt et superiorie vel nostra aetate, cum Romani duces per inperitiarn non cavissent, ne quid amplius dicam, exercitus didicerunt.
137 Amm. 31.12.10–13.7.
disaster, and exercitus who learned the lesson. If Adrianople were meant, the dux (Valens) was killed, so he could not have survived to 'learn', and per imperitiam also fits Valens. An Emperor responsible for a disaster appears to be the best explanation of V.'s awkward, compressed phraseology.

Moreover the battle followed upon an exhausting forced march in the heat of the day for the Romans from Adrianople itself to the Gothic camp, where the conflict took place, corresponding to V.'s scenario rather closely. That V. does not refer here to the fact that the soldiers had not been fed may be due to this not being relevant to the point under discussion, although the recommendation to feed the troops before battle is made in the same chapter. V.'s method of composition is heavily based on his sources which go back in this section to Cato de Re Militari, so that any contemporary references are merely remarks provided as modernising or literary adornment. Thus it is not significant that also in Epit. III.11 the first rule quoted under the rubric Quae ipso die procuranda sint, quo publica committitura pugna, is that the soldiers should be fed 'so that the food they ate might render them bolder and in a lengthy engagement they might not be fatigued because of hunger'. This was one of Scipio Africanus Maior's lessons from Ilipa 206 B.C., and has got into Frontinus' Strategemata, probably via Cato and Celsus.

Close reading of the Epit. suggests other possible allusions to Adrianople as well among the chapters on the conflictus publicus or pitched battle (general engagement). At Epit. III.9 p. 86.7–8 V. gives the information that a pitched battle lasted 'two or three hours', after which all hope for the defeated side was lost. It is not clear why V. should have been thinking of this timescale in particular, unless he was thinking of Adrianople which started about mid-day and was over when the sun was still high in the sky, the massacring of the defeated

---

138 Amm. 31.14.5: nec bellicos nec liberalibus studiis eruditus. Cf. id. 31.12.7: vicit iamn funesia principis destinatio...
139 G. Sabbah, Mémoires II, Centre Jean Paleme (St.-Etienne Univ., 1980), 142, came to precisely this conclusion independently of Goffart, arguing for dates between A.D. 383 and 391.
140 Amm. 31.12.10–12.
141 Amm. 31.12.13.
142 See ch. 7 (g).
143 Polyb. 11.20–24, cf. Front. Strat. 2.1.1. See also ch. 7 (b, g).
144 Amm. 31.12.11: cum in medium torridus procederit dies.
145 Amm. 31.13.7: solque sublimor... Romanos... exurebat.
went on till nightfall. This disastrous sequel may have been in V.'s mind at Epit. I.21, where he warned in an editorial passage that the failure to build a camp left an army vulnerable to annihilation if it should lose a pitched battle. Valens also committed the cardinal error of failing to provide for a retreat should the battle turn out badly. The result was that his men had to flee pell-mell. Meanwhile the Emperor found himself deserted first by his bodyguard, the Lancearii and Mattiarii, and then by the Batavian reserves, perhaps illustrating what V. was getting at by his sarcastic comment that for soldiers to betray the State by taking flight was worse than their being wounded or killed.

V. never thinks of a pitched battle other than in terms of a cataclysmic clash in which everything is at stake. His horror at this type of encounter affects the architecture of Epit. III. At III.9 p.86.4ff. the account of what to do in this branch of warfare is deliberately postponed, despite the fictional eagerness to rush on to it which the author attributes to his readers, including presumably the Emperor who commissioned it: *Quisquis hos artis bellicae commentarios ex probatissimis auctoribus legere dignabitur, quam primum rationem proelii depugnandique cupit audire praeepta.* Sed... He does not actually get down to it until III.11 p.93.18ff.; but first comes III.9, a chapter on the council-of-war to determine whether it was actually a good idea to engage in this type of encounter (p.86–89), and III.10 on the duty of the commander-in-chief to make sure that his army was actually trained to the peak of efficiency whereby it was ready for this degree of danger (p.89–93).

All three chapters have lengthy authorial introductions, in which V. spoke *sua voce.* III.10 ends with his last great tirade, complementing I.28, against the Roman army's loss of

---

146Epit. I.21 p.25.9–13: *Non solum autem considentes sine castris ista patiuntur, sed cum in acie casu aliqut coeperint cedere, munimenta castrorum, quo se recipiant, non habent et more animalium inulti cadunt, nec prius mortuini finis fit, quum hostibus volutas deueserit perseverati.*

147Cf. Epit. III.25 p.119.11–16: *Dux ergo providus sub ea cautela publico debet Marte coniugere, ut si quid pro varietae bellorum vel condicionis humanae secus acciderit, absque grave detrimento liberet victos. Nam si vicini colles fuerint, si post terga munito, si ceteris abscedentibus fortissimi quique restiterint, se suosque servabat.*

148Amm. 31.13.8: *omnes dispersi per ignosos transites cadunt.*

149Amm. ibid.

150Epit. I.20 p.23.1–5: *Sed illi, qui laborem in portandis veneribus munimentis armorum ferre non possunt, detectis corporibus et vulnera sustinere cogiuntur et mortis et, quod est gravius, aut capi aut certe fuga rempublicam proderet.*

competence,\textsuperscript{152} coupled with further exhortatory exempla culled from Republican history, showing that \textit{ars militaris} could be recovered even after famous disasters. There is no doubt that V., whose own rôle is foreshadowed by the talk of recovering the military art at first from books, later consolidated by the authority of generals, was at least to some extent writing in response to military disasters involving the main Roman army in his own time.\textsuperscript{153} But in V.’s view it was more long-term causes that had led to a situation of damaging weaknesses which had been exploited by the barbarians, alleging failures of recruitment, loss of skills and training, and the abandonment of heavy arms owing to the ‘long peace’, that is to say, the fact of the disasters is secondary to attempted explanations of it.\textsuperscript{154}

V.’s various explanations for these phenomena are discussed later (ch. 5), but the actual events can scarcely be doubted: a series of defeats inflicted on Roman forces and the sacking of cities by barbarians named\textsuperscript{155} as Goths. The outlook would appear as desperate as any comparable situation in history. So V. adduces that which followed the disasters of the first phase of the Second Punic War, at the Trebia 218 B.C., Lake Trasimene 217 B.C. and Cannae 216 B.C., significantly enough the parallel for Adrianople selected by Ammianus.\textsuperscript{156} The Second Punic War ended favourably for the Romans; at Epit. III.10 p.93 V. listed exempla which further illustrated occasions on which the Romans were beaten and then turned tables on their victors, Scipio Africanus Minor’s destruction of Numantia 133 B.C., Metellus’ success against Jugurtha 109–108 B.C., and Marius’ defeat of the Teutones and Ambrones at Aquer Sextiae 102 B.C., and of the Cimbri at Vercellae 101 B.C. Of course the choice of exempla was partly governed by V.’s desire to stress the rôle of \textit{disciplina militaris} which plays a conspicuous part in the literary record of these successes. However the disaster suffered at the hands of the Cimbri and Teutones at Arausio 105 B.C. was in the judgement of moderns\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{152}Epit. III.10 p.92.7–93.17. On the accuracy of his strictures, see ch. 5 (c).
\textsuperscript{153}Epit. III.10 p.92.18–93.2: \textit{Haec ex usu librosque antea servabantur, sed omissa duiu nemo quaesivit, quia vigintibus pacis officiis procul aberat necessitas belii. Sed ne impossibile videatur reparari disciplinam, quia usus intercitus, doceamur exempla. Apud veteres ars militaris in oblivionem saepius venit, sed prius a libris repetita est, postea ducum auctoritate firmata.}
\textsuperscript{154}Epit. III.10 p.92.10–12, 1.7 p.12.1–5, 1.20 p.22.8–12, ib. p.23.1–7, 1.21 p.25.7–9.
\textsuperscript{155}Epit. 1.20 p.22.9.
\textsuperscript{156}Amm. 31.13.19.
\textsuperscript{157}M. Cary, H.H. Scullard, A History of Rome (1975\textsuperscript{2}), 218.
second only to Cannae in the history of the Republic. It seems hardly coincidental that Epit. III.10 should culminate with the second most serious disaster, in a passage which is parallel to Epit. I.28 where the first most serious disaster is recalled. The impression that this is significant is heightened by the comparable treatment of Ammianus, when he cited Arausio also as an exemplum for Adrianople.\(^{158}\)

The closest contemporary parallel to the disaster-quotient of a Cannae or Arausio was clearly Adrianople, in which nearly two-thirds of Valens’ army was destroyed, along with the Emperor.\(^{159}\) Ammianus declared that Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae showed the barbarians what military might allied to science could do,\(^{160}\) in which assertion he appears as confident as V. in the power and necessity of traditional Roman military art to retrieve such disasters. Compare V.’s stoical advice on picking up the pieces after a major defeat, raising and training new levies of legionaries and auxilia, and optimism about winning through in the end.\(^{161}\) Indeed, one of V.’s main themes is the restoration of old legions with fresh levies and the creation of new legions \textit{de novo} on ancient principles, but as a solution to structural decline not specific defeats.\(^{162}\)

Certainly V. had a theoretical reason to write the Epit. in the structural decline of the Roman legion, of which he is our chief witness, but also he had more immediate, historical motivation in that he was writing in the aftermath of military disasters which brought the question of a loss of \textit{disciplina militaris} into the domain of public interest and debate. Thus, pagans like Libanius after Adrianople defended the army from accusations of cowardice and lack of training, pinning the blame on ‘some angry god’, and Eunapius wrote a rabidly pagan history from A.D. 270 to c. 378, published in its first edition in 380, aiming to show that the adoption of Christianity and especially the reaction after Julian, had caused the disaster.\(^{163}\) Supporters of the Christian Emperors invoked political and military failures: Themistius said

\(^{158}\)Amm. 31.5.10–12. 
\(^{159}\)Amm. 31.13.19. 
\(^{160}\)Amm. 31.5.12: \textit{quid potestas Marlia adhibita prudentia valet, radicior exsuruta discriminis didicere supremae}. 
\(^{161}\)Epit. III.25 p.120.1–10. 
\(^{163}\)T. D. Barnes, \textit{The sources of the Historia Augusta}. Collection Latomus CL V (Brussels, 1978), 120.
that if the two Emperors co-ordinated their actions and restored discipline and courage to the armies, victory over the barbarians would immediately follow. But despite V.'s book, the long-term weaknesses were left unchecked by contemporaries and were a harmful legacy long after Adrianople.

2. Before the sack.

Just as there is reason to think V. was writing in the aftermath of military disasters, so there is no evidence that he was writing after the sack of Rome in A.D. 410. In particular, reference is thrice made to Rome as an exemplum of a city that had never fallen, not even to the Gauls in 390 B.C. It would be especially tasteless an exemplum for the Emperor’s fortifications-programme to select Rome if it had suffered so terrifyingly symbolic a fate as the sack, which would have to be a contemporary event for V. Moreover he appears to have been writing in or not far from Rome at a time when exhibitions of armatura took place regularly before the plebs in the Circus Maximus, as for example we find in Honorius’ consular games of January, A.D. 404. It seems unlikely that V. would have included Rome among the unnamed cities reported sacked at Epit. I.20, where tantarum is a late Latin alternative to tot. In a passage pointing to the same meaning, he says not tanta but innumerabiles urbes, and elsewhere uses urbs, castellum or civitas indiscriminately for any fortified settlement, including ones whose inhabitants are oppidani. The sack of Rome is of a different order of magnitude, and there is no sign in V. that the disasters of which he speaks had yet struck at the very heart of the Empire.

Although Epit. I.20 p.22.10–12 is cast in the form of a topos, as comparison with Ammianus 31.5.13 will show, and V. talks somewhat airily of defeats and sackings in this context, with no attempt at specificity, had he had at his finger-tips such a cataclysmic event as

---

164 Libanius Or. 24.3–5 (A.D. 379), Themist. Or. 15.197b ff. (A.D. 381, Jan. 19th.).
165 Epit. IV praef. p.129.6–9, IV.26 p.147.5–9, IV.9 p.135.2–8.
166 Epit. IV praef. p.129.6–9.
167 Epit. II.23 p.57.5–6; see above ch. 2 (a).
168 Claud. pan. de Hon. VI cons. 622–640.
169 Epit. I.20 p.22.10–12.
171 Epit. IV praef. p.128.15–16.
172 E.g. Epit. IV.12 p.136–137.
the sack of Rome itself to invoke, he would hardly have failed to do so, since it would have far outweighed mere literary commonplace in impact, and would have confirmed his argument as nothing else. It would seem therefore that we are justified in setting a *terminus ante quem* at A.D. 410, rather than 450.


V. was writing at or near Rome at a time when gladiatorial games were still normal.173 Although, under Christian disapproval and economic duress, gladiatorial shows elsewhere became rarer in the 4th c. A.D., the tradition was especially strong at Rome, where it was historically linked with the holding of high office. For example we have Symmachus, whose son Memmius’ quaestorship in A.D. 393 involved the father in costly presentations of gladiators.174 After the sack of Rome in 410, however, this type of entertainment was dying out even in Rome.175 The view that in A.D. 399 Honorius’ closure of gladiatorial schools was a preliminary to a ban on the shows176 is probably mistaken, as there is no hint of this policy in Prudentius’ appeal for the banning of gladiators in A.D. 403,177 and the schools meanwhile appear to have been opened again.178 Thus it has been suggested that this temporary closure of the schools was motivated by the government’s concern at the spread of private armies of ex-gladiators bought by senators.179 However, what emerges is that V.’s unconcerned remarks fit better the unshaken gladiator tradition of the City before the sack, than the intermittent and controversial revivals of it between 410 and 434–438, when it was probably banned for good.180

---


177Prud. c. Symm. 2.1114–1129.

178Ibid. 2.1095, with reference to lanistae.

179G. Ville, 324; Amm. 14.6.16.


Also, it was still normal practice for domini to send coloni adscripticii for enrolment in payment of recruitment-tax when V. was writing Epit. I.7,\(^{181}\) whereas from the early 5th c. coloni were ineligible for army service.\(^{182}\)

5. Pacified Sea.

Furthermore, as has been said earlier,\(^ {183}\) V. excuses a short account of naval warfare as an appendix to Epit. IV on the grounds that the sea had long since been pacified and the struggle with the barbarians was land-based.\(^ {184}\) The passage is one of high profile, being specifically addressed to the Emperor;\(^ {185}\) V. could not have risked speaking rubbish at this point. Now there was considerable naval activity in the Mediterranean in the late 390's, after the death of Theodosius I in A.D. 395. First, Stilicho transported the western field army by sea to Greece in 397 for his abortive Peloponnesian campaign against Alaric.\(^ {186}\) Then in 398 a field force was shipped to north Africa to quell Gildo’s rebellion.\(^ {187}\) Then Marcellinus Comes sub a.400 records a ‘naval war’ against Gainas, whose Gothic force attempted to invade Asia by crossing the Hellespont on rafts.\(^ {188}\) They were sunk by the warships of Arcadius manned with Gothic crews under their chief Fravitta, magister militum in the east, who had already cleared the eastern Mediterranean of pirates from Cilicia to Palestine.\(^ {189}\) Zosimus, presumably following Eunapius, notices the ‘barbarian cunning’ represented by Gainas’ crossing the sea, so that this was seen as a significant departure even by contemporaries, and it was probably depicted also on the Column of Arcadius.\(^ {190}\)

---

\(^{181}\) V. Epit. I.7 p12.3-5: *dum indicii possessoribus tirones per gratiam aut dissimulacionem probantium tales sociantur armis, quales domini habere fastiditu*

\(^{182}\) A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* (1964), 619, citing CJ 12.33.3 (395-401), cf. CJ 11.48.18 (426 S.), CJ 12.43.1: *nullus tiro vagus aut veteranus aut centibus obnostus ad militem accedat*, which is Justinian’s adaptation of CTh 7.13.6.1 (370). See also section (b) 2 above and ch. 5 (b) 2 (v.), p.165.

\(^{183}\) Section (b) 2.

\(^{184}\) Epit. IV.31 (prol.) p.150.4-8: *quia iam dum pacato mari cum barbaris nationibus agitur terrestre certamen.*

\(^{185}\) Ibid. *praecipuo maiestatis tuae, imperator invictae...*

\(^{186}\) Claud. de Hon. IV. cons. 459-464.

\(^{187}\) Claud. bell. Get. 418-423, Oros. 7.36.

\(^{188}\) Marcellinus Comes, T. Mommsen (ed.), *Chronica minora II*, MGH Auct. Ant. XI (1894), 66.

\(^{189}\) Zos. 5.20.2.

Whilst this may lie outside V.'s field of vision, the invasion of Italy in A.D. 413 by count Heraclian, borne upon 3,700 ships\textsuperscript{191} or 700 ships carrying 3,000 soldiers\textsuperscript{192} from Africa was an inescapable use of the sea by rebels, even for westerners. In any case, Fl. Constantius' blockade of the coast of Septimania (Narbonnensis) in A.D. 414 to prevent provisions reaching Athaulf's Goths by sea shows the crucial importance of the sea in the war against the barbarians, too.\textsuperscript{193}

Indeed any westerner familiar with the problem of defending N. Gaul and Britain must have been aware of the use of the sea by barbarians throughout the 4th. c.\textsuperscript{194} And early in the 5th. c. the problem spread to the western Mediterranean. Alaric tried to take to the sea at Rhegium in A.D. 410,\textsuperscript{195} and Wallia in S. Spain in A.D. 416.\textsuperscript{196} Gunderic, king of the Vandals settled in Baetica, made raids on the Balearic Isles and possibly Mauretania Tingitana in the 420’s,\textsuperscript{197} and on Sardinia and Sicily.\textsuperscript{198} The Vandals had sea-power even before A.D. 427.\textsuperscript{199} The fortification of Carthage in 425 was perhaps against the Vandals,\textsuperscript{200} who pace Courtois\textsuperscript{201} had probably acquired ship-building capability by A.D. 419.\textsuperscript{202} In any case they had access while in Spain to ships moored in the ports.\textsuperscript{203}

After the fall of Carthage in A.D. 439 the Vandal naval threat reached massive proportions.\textsuperscript{204} The fortification of Naples\textsuperscript{205} and the sea walls of Constantinople\textsuperscript{206} were immediately taken in hand. Bury inferred from this that V. wrote before A.D. 440.\textsuperscript{207} But as we have seen, the naval situation in the western Mediterranean was highly insecure already

\textsuperscript{191}Oros. 7.42 and ms. ‘S’ of Marcellinus Comes, Chron. min. II. 71, sub a.413.
\textsuperscript{192}Ms. ‘T’ of Marcellinus Comes, ibid.
\textsuperscript{193}Oros. 7.43.1.
\textsuperscript{194}Cf. Amm. 27.8.5, 27.8.1. This suggests that V. was not from N. Gaul or Britain.
\textsuperscript{195}Jordanes 1.57, Oros. 7.43.12.
\textsuperscript{196}Oros. ibid.
\textsuperscript{197}Hydatius Chron. 86, 89.
\textsuperscript{198}Salvian de gub. Dei 6.68.
\textsuperscript{199}Cf. Prosper, Chron. min. 1.471–472, 1294 (a.427); J.R. Moss, Historia XXII (1973), 723–728.
\textsuperscript{200}Chron. Gall., Chron. min. 1.658, 98 (a.425).
\textsuperscript{201}C. Courtois, Les Vandales et l’Afrique (1953), 207.
\textsuperscript{202}CTh 9.40.24 (Constantinople, 24th. Jan., A.D. 419): His, qui conficiendi naves incognantiae ane per saisit barbaris tradiderunt... capitale... supplicium proponi decernimus...
\textsuperscript{203}Cf. CTh 7.163 (420), referring to ‘illicit goods exported to the barbarians’.
\textsuperscript{204}Nov. ValenL Ill 9 (440): satis incertum est ad quam eran terrae possint naves hostium pervenire.
\textsuperscript{205}CIL 10.1485.
\textsuperscript{206}Marcellinus Comes, Chron. min. II.80, sub a.439.
\textsuperscript{207}J. B. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire I (1923), 250 n.4.
from A.D. 410, the facts of which do not square with V. 's confident dismissal of this branch of warfare. At the latest one might with Sabbah conclude that the sea ceased to be pacified from A.D. 425.\textsuperscript{208} Either way, it is unlikely that V. could have been addressing Valentinian III, reigning from A.D. 425–455.

Moreover, at the time of writing it seems to be excluded that the naval bases of Misenum and Ravenna were of more than local importance, their fleets having dwindled to that level over the 3rd.–4th. c.\textsuperscript{209} Also V. could not otherwise have sensibly cited the example of Augustus' naval creations as a model of how to operate a sea-going navy.\textsuperscript{210} But Ravenna revived in importance once the court of Honorius moved there in A.D. 401–402, and this would seem to call for some recognition had V. been writing after such major installations had been built. The list of provinces served by the two fleets can be shown to have been probably drawn up by V., so he was not simply copying his sources mechanically at this (or indeed any) point.\textsuperscript{211}

The well-known reference (Epit. IV.37 p.153.18) to † picati or British spy-boats also implies a date before the loss of Britain in A.D. 410, assuming contemporaries realised control of Britain had been lost.

\textsuperscript{208}G. Sabbah, M\'\textemdash\textemdashoires II, Centre Jean Paleme (St.-\textemdash\textemdashtienne Univ., 1980) 139.
\textsuperscript{209}M. Redd\textemdash\textemdash., Mare Nostrum (Rome, 1986) 659-660, cf. A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire I (1964), 610.
\textsuperscript{210}Cf. Suet. Aug. 49.1: classem Miseni, et aliarum Ravennae, ad iustam superi et inferi maris, conlocavit.
\textsuperscript{211}See ch. 7 (i), p. 309.
6. Vandals conspicuous by their absence.

V.’s knowledge of things barbarian has already been remarked. He seems to be well-informed and up-to-date, giving us the earliest references we have to the Urclilliani in N. Africa and the Toringi in Inner Germany. The Goths, Alans and Huns are prominent in the Epit. for their contributions to Roman cavalry warfare, German breeds of war-horse—Hunnish, Toringian and Burgundian—come at the top of V.’s list in Mul. and the decline of Roman veterinary medicine is explained by widespread misguided imitation of the equine practices of the Huns and other gentes. V. alluded in the Epit. (III.26 p.124.11–14) to advances in cavalry warfare covering manoeuvres and tactics, arms, and breeds, whereby we should understand the discovery of the sovereign qualities of Hunnisci, so that there was no need for him to compile older knowledge on the subject. But although V. mentions the Goths, Alans and Huns, the Goths, the Persians, the Huns and Alans, the Saracens and Indians, and the Indians, as peoples familiar to Romans at the time, he never mentions the Vandals.

V. shows signs of political awareness of developments among the barbarians. The simultaneous mention of Goths, Alans and Huns points to the grouping that defeated Valens at

---

212See ch. 2 (a); cf. W. Goffart, Traditio XXXIII (1977), 89–90 = id. Rome’s Fall and After (1989), 69–70.
215Mul. 3.6.2–3.7.1, the rest are Frigisci Epiroiiae Samarici Dalmatae.
217Mul. 3.6.2–3: ad bellum Hunsorum longe prima doceant utilitates patientiae, laboris, frigoris, famis. Toringos dehinc et Burgundiones iniuriae tolerantiae, etc.
219Ibid. p.22.9.
221Epit. III.26, p.124.19, as one nation.
222Epit. III.26, p.124.20–125.1.
223Epit. III.24 p.118.2.
Adrianople. Pacatus referred in A.D. 389 to Theodosius’ defeat of these people in the early
years of his reign; victory over the same triad was announced in Constantinople in A.D.
379. No similar grouping occurs after Theodosius I.

Furthermore, V. is aware of the junction of the Huns and Alans, reported by Ammianus
as part of the background to the events leading up to Adrianople, and known to the
contemporary Ps.-Victor. By contrast, V. appears unaware of the later alliance of these
same Alans settled by Theodosius and Gratian in Pannonia in A.D. 380 and the Asding
Vandals, who joining with the Suevi and the Siling Vandals invaded Gaul on 31st. Dec., A.D.
406, and famously sacked Trier among other cities.

The Vandals’ career of destruction, along with the Alans and Suevi, took them from
Gaul (A.D. 407-409) to Spain (A.D. 409-429), where the Alans became permanently fused
with the Asding Vandals (A.D. 417), and to Africa (A.D. 429 on). Yet V. shows no interest
whatever in the Vandals, surprising a westerner from Spain or Gaul, and appears unaware
of the separate destinies of the Alans and Huns from A.D. 406, when the latter remained settled
in Pannonia until A.D. 427. V.’s silence on the Vandals is replicated by Ammianus and
Pacatus and, apart from one unimportant reference, Claudian. Although the Vandals caused
trouble before A.D. 406—Jerome named them in a letter of A.D. 396-397 among the Goths,
Sarmatians, Quadi, Alans, Huns and Marcomanni as devastating the Danubian provinces in the twenty years since A.D. 376—232 it was not yet conspicuous enough to attract much notice. Thus A.D. 407 would be a reasonable *terminus ante quem* for the Epit.

7. Friendly relations with barbarians.

Further, V.’s Emperor may have enjoyed a rapport with Persia,233 the Huns and Alans,234 and the Saracens and Indians.235 Whatever one makes of the Indians, there was a *cuneus* of Saracens recently posted to Constantinople in A.D. 378,236 and the eastern Notitia Dignitatum lists units in Phoenice and Egypt.237 The Goths, Alans and Huns whose good example was cited by V. for improvements in cavalry238 appear in a complimentary light, and even the bad example of barbarian equine practices for Roman owners presupposes non-hostile intercourse between the two peoples. Romans who ‘pretended they were trying to copy the custom of the barbarians’239 were surely not claiming to imitate their enemies? The only recorded deal between Romans and such a combination of nations was of course that achieved by Gratian and Theodosius I, on 3rd. Oct., A.D. 382.240

Since the Goths under Alaric revolted after Theodosius’ death in A.D. 395,241 it looks as though V. were writing between 383 and 395. If the Alans decided to throw in their lot with the Vandals towards the end of 406 (see above), that alone would have been a *terminus ante quem*, had the Goths not also been mentioned. Given ‘friendly’ relations between the Romans and these nations, a 5th. c. date seems precluded. But the picture is complicated by the fact that

---

232Hieron. Ep. 60.16.2. Gratian was supposedly faced with a Vandal incursion in Gaul A.D. 380, according to Jordanes Get. 27 (141), but Mommsen emended to Alamanni following Socr. 5.6, and is supported by F. Paschoud, Zosime t. II.2 (Budé edn., 1979) 407, 166.


234Ibid. p.124.18-20: *equitandi scientiam vel decorem, quae Hunnorum Alanorumque natio velit imitari. si possit.*

235Ibid. p.124.20-125.1: *currendi velocitatem, quam Saracenus Indusque non aequat.*

236Amm. 31.16.5.

237Not. Dig. or. 32.27-28 (Phoenice): *Equites Saraceni indigenae, Betproclis, Equites Saraceni, Thelsee;* ibid. or. 28.17 (Egypt): *Equites Saraceni, Thamudeni.*


239Mul. II prol. 1: *barbarorum consuetudinem imitari velle se simulant.*


the Goths are also mentioned as enemies in the same chapter as they appear as co-operating with the Romans.\textsuperscript{242}

The context of the panegyrical epilogue (Epit. III.26 p.124.15–125.5) seems to belong to contests in friendly rivalry at feats of arms. The reference to \textit{armatura},\textsuperscript{243} where the Emperor is outdoing his own \textit{campidoctores} or arms instructors, suggests that the similarly outclassed barbarians are in, rather than out of, the Roman army, apart from the Persians who merely admire rather than compete, perhaps as spectators. An occasion for such a military tournament is suggested by Claudian’s account of Honorius’ consular games of January, A.D. 404 in the Circus Maximus.\textsuperscript{244} If the Persians were there as spectators, then they were probably ambassadors, present at the Emperor’s court because friendly relations had been established. These did not exist under Honorius\textsuperscript{245} or Valentinian III,\textsuperscript{246} but the peace with Persia achieved by Theodosius lasted at least until Orosius’ time of writing, c. A.D. 417.\textsuperscript{247} Details of Theodosius’ peace with Persia are lacking, but Persian envoys visited Theodosius in 384 at Constantinople\textsuperscript{248} and in 389 at Rome,\textsuperscript{249} the latter being the occasion of Theodosius’ triumphal entry to the Eternal City on 13th. June.\textsuperscript{250} The Persians may well have stayed for Valentinian II’s consular games in January, A.D. 390, if there was not a military tournament already in June,\textsuperscript{251} or else witnessed the consular games of Timasius and Promotus, January, A.D. 389.

The king of Persia also sent Theodosius I some elephants to adorn his triumphal entry into Constantinople, presumably that of 12th. Oct., A.D. 386.\textsuperscript{252} He may have sent them as

\textsuperscript{242}Epit. I.20 p.22.9, cf. p.22.1–2.
\textsuperscript{243}Ibid. p.125.1–2, sec ch. 5 (b) 3 (iii.) and ch. 7 (d).
\textsuperscript{244}Claud. pan. de Hon. VI cons. 618–636, cf. Epit. II.23 p.57.5–6: \textit{armaturam, quae fessis diebus exhibeaut in circu}.
\textsuperscript{245}Claud. pan. de Probino et Olybrio consss. (A.D. 395) 371ff., id. pan. de Hon. III cons. (A.D. 396) 201ff., id. in Evropium (A.D. 399) 374–384.
\textsuperscript{246}V. A. Sirago, \textit{Gailla Placidia e la Trasformazione politica dell’ Occidente} (1961), 472.
\textsuperscript{247}Orosius 7.34.8.
\textsuperscript{248}Marcellinus comes, Chron. min. II.61, ad a.384.
\textsuperscript{249}Claud. pan. de Hon. VI cons. (A.D. 404), 69–72.
\textsuperscript{250}Cons. Const. Chron. min. 1.245, sub a.389.
\textsuperscript{252}Pan. Lat. 2 (12) 22.5, Geo. Cdr. 1.567 (Bonn), Cons. Const., Chron. min. 1.244, sub a.386.
part of a ceremonial military contingent. V. has 'Indians' controlling elephants, and it is possible that India was the Persians' source of elephants and elephant-expertise, too. 253 At any rate, Theodosius' army brought west against Eugenius in A.D. 394 contained units from the Middle East, including Colchi, Hiberi, Arabes and Armenii, and with some poetical exaggeration Sacae, Medi and Indi. 254 Bacurius the Iberian comes is well-known. 255

Before proceeding against Maximus in spring A.D. 388, Theodosius made pacts with kings on the eastern frontier, identified as Saracens along the limes between the Euphrates and Arabia Petraea. 256 It seems possible that Theodosius took with him contingents of Saracens on this occasion, and of other eastern tribes from outside the Empire with whom he made pacts. Whatever, the presence in Rome, A.D. 389 of Saracens and even of 'Indi' seems a possibility. But they may of course have competed in tournaments held at Constantinople in the earlier 380's, to which V. may allude (Epit. III.26. p.124.15–125.5).

8. Anti-Gratian polemic.

There are also programmatic reasons for assigning the composition of the Epit. to the reign of Theodosius. First, there is anti-Gratian polemic. 257 The neglect of the army is laid at the door of divus Gratianus, the only Emperor named in this context, and the only recent Emperor named in the entire work, the rest, Augustus, Trajan, Hadrian, Diocletian and Maximian, all being praised. In a parallel passage the neglectful predecessors of V. 's addressee are not named. 258 Under Gratian, according to V., field exercises were abandoned, soldiers became lazy, and armour seemed too heavy because rarely worn. So the soldiers petitioned the

253Epit. III.24 p.118.2. cf. Marcellinus comes sub a.496 (Chron. min. II.94): India Anastasio principi elephantum... duasque camelpardasias pro munere misti; Johann. Biclar. Chron. a.573 (Chron. min. II.213): Legati gentis Maccurritarum Constantinopolim veniunt dentes elephanthinos et camelpardam latino principi munera offerentes sibi cum Romanis amicitias collocans; and Eusebius VC 4.50, (ambassadors of the) 'Ἰουδαίοι απὸ τοῦ ἀπόλαυσαν ἡμᾶς bring gems and wondrous animals to Constantine. Cf. T. Drew-Bear, in La Géographie administrative et politique d'Alexandre à Mahomet. Actes de Colloque de Strasbourg 14–16 juin 1979 (Univ. de Strasbourg,1982), 117 n.102. The Seleucids at any rate had real Indian elephants which they had seized from the Parthians.


255PLRE I.144.

256Pac. Pan. Lat. 2 (12).32.2, ed. E. Galletier, III (Budé edn., 1955), 98 n.3; Amm. 14.8.5; cf. also Pac. Pan. Lat. 2 (12).22.2–3, mentioning Indi, Bosforani, Arabes, Gothi, Saracen, Scythi, Alban, as either neutral or friendly following Theodosius' victories of the early 380's, probably with some poetic colour.

257Epit. I.20 p.22.3ff.

258Epit. II.3 p.37.18–22.
Emperor (Gratian) that they might be permitted to hand in their *catafractae* and helmets. This had led, says V., to military defeats at the hands of the Gothic archers, and the sacking of cities.

Anti-Gratian polemic would not make sense after Theodosius, as responsibility for the neglect would have to fall on his successors also, or be explained away. Gratian did not reign long enough, effectively seven years, A.D. 375–383, or memorably enough to merit being singled out in a treatise addressed, say, to Honorius, except for the reason that it would have been impolitic to criticize the Emperor’s father (or grandfather in the case of an address to Valentinian III). But Theodosius’ seventeen-year reign was officially marked by successful large-scale battles both with barbarians and usurpers; how could a writer post-Theodosius be so pessimistic precisely about military decline under a half-forgotten Emperor who reigned some twenty years before, or fail to condemn the damage done by the usurpers Maximus and Eugenius to the armies of the western Empire, or by the treachery of Alaric? Some praise or mention of Theodosius’ or Stilicho’s heroic efforts to bring about at least a temporary respite would surely have been called for. It would have seemed odd to pass over in silence such momentous military history. The natural explanation of V.’s silence and brevity is that he was writing before the issue arose.

But if Gratian were to be held absolved of blame by V.’s words *ab urbe enim condita usque ad tempus divi Gratiani*, interpreted ‘from the foundation of the City to the end of the time of the divine Gratian’, a post-Theodosian date could more reasonably be defended. To be sure, it would ignore the ignominious context of Gratian’s being named in a chapter of criticisms of military decline. Also it might be thought contrary to the meaning of *usque ad praesentem prope aetatem* in the same chapter, meaning ‘almost to the present age’, i.e., presumably, to the starting-point of the present age, assuming the present age was felt to be continuing rather than ending. Nevertheless, if the less natural interpretation were correct, it would still imply that V. was damning Honorius’ father Theodosius and uncle Valentinian II, or Valentinian III’s uncle Honorius and grandfather Theodosius. Neither seems satisfactory.

---

259 Epit. L.20 p.22.3.  
But if on the other hand Gratian’s neglect was common ground for V. and his circle, he did not need to emphasize it. Gratian’s name occurs only once, and at Epit. II.261 the negligently ordered army of the previous Emperors is merely alluded to as a familiar fact. After Theodosius this would have ceased to be so, as memories of Gratian will have faded.

Sabbah has observed that the criticism of Gratian extends at least to the whole chapter (Epit. I.20).262 Thus the obsolescence of the leather caps called Pannonici occurred pari passu with the abandonment of the helmets, whose weight V. probably ironically suggests the wearing of the caps was intended to alleviate.263 Since the custom of wearing Pannonici had lasted ‘almost to the present time’, and properly equipped infantry had lasted ‘from the foundation of the City until the time of the divine Gratian’, it follows that the reign of Gratian was regarded as almost contemporary. Compare the reference to Adrianople, A.D. 378: superiore vel nostra aetate, ‘almost the present time’.264

If Gratian was an easy and familiar target, he was not alone. The Emperor Valens was presented by Ammianus, writing a history of the whole Roman world, as directly responsible for the disaster at Adrianople.265 V.’s concentration on Gratian confirms that he was a westerner writing for a western court. Gratian moved his court from Trier to Milan in A.D. 381266 and was the senior Augustus from the death of Valens. The dissatisfaction of westerners with the state of the armed forces would naturally centre on him. Historical sources contemporary with Theodosius are at one in their criticism of Gratian for neglecting the duties of government in his passion for hunting;267 Ps.-Victor and Eunapius add that he neglected his own troops in his favouritism for Alan ‘refugees’ with whom he surrounded himself and presumably practised hunting and archery. It was this neglect of the proper Roman army that

---

261 Epit. II.3 p.37.18–22.
262 G. Sabbah, Mémoires II, Centre Jean Paleme (St-Étienne Univ., 1980), 140–142.
264 Epit. III.11 p.95.1–3; see also section (d) 1 above. The rhetorical character of the allegations against Gratian is discussed in ch. 5 (c).
265 Amm. 31.12.7.
266 A. Piganiol, L’Empire Chrétien (1972), 243.
267 Amm. 31.10.18–19, Ps.-Victor Epit. de Caes. 47.5, Rufinus HE 11.13, cf. Philostorgius HE 10.5 (ed. J. Bidez (1972)).
had led directly to the revolt of the British army under Maximus, and the defection of Gratian’s Rhine army, resulting in the assassination of Gratian and the usurpation of Maximus.268

Significantly, Maximus got sympathetic treatment from the Spaniard Orosius269 and the Aquitanian Sulpicius Severus.270 V.’s attack on Gratian would lead one to expect that he welcomed Maximus, at least privately. But V.’s addressee was no usurper. His Emperor reigned for some considerable time,—long enough to win ‘continual victories and triumphs’,271 commission works of literature,272 gain a reputation for encouraging literature,273 stand comparison with ‘Octavianus Augustus’ and boni dehinc principes,274 win the admiration of the Persians, Huns and Alans, Saracens and Indians,275 found innumerables urbes,276 and maintain an effective fleet on the Danube.277 Maximus was hardly in a position to do most of these things, and may have been on bad terms with the Alans whose influence he had opposed when he murdered Gratian.

V.’s perhaps positive attitude towards Maximus will have been tempered by the tolerance or hostility with which the usurper was regarded at court. V. had a tendency to be elliptical when touching on sensitive subjects. Thus, concerning Adrianople, in hoc et veteres declinarunt et superiore vel nostra aetate, cum Romani duces per inperitiam non cavissent, ne quid amplius dicam, exercitus didicerunt, the last two clauses really mean et imperator ipse et exercitus didicerunt.278 So at Epit. I.20 p.22.10ff., Gratian’s successors are alluded to only indirectly: Nec post tot clades, quae usque ad tantarum urbium excidia pervenerunt, cuiquam curae fuit vel catafactas vel galeas pedestribus reddere.279 This failure of ‘anyone’ to give

---

268Ps.-Victor Epit. de Caes. 47.6, Zos. 4.35.2–6 = Eunapius fr. 51 (Blockley).
269Oros. 7.34.9: Maximus, vir quidem strenuus et probus atque Augusto dignus nisi contra sacramentum fidei per tyrannidem emersisset, in Britannia invitus propemodum ab exercitu imperator creatus in Galliam transit: ubi Gratianum Augustum ... interficit.
270Sulp. Sev. Dial. 3.11: Maximus imperator, alias sane bonus, depravatus consiliis sacerdum post Priscillianum necem...
271Epit. II praef. p.33.2–3.
272Epit. II praef. p.33.4–16.
274Epit. I praef. p.4.6–7.
276Epit. IV praef. p.128.16–17.
277Epit. IV.46 p.165.8–11.
278Epit. III.11 p.95.1–3. So G. Sabbah, Mémoires II, Centre Jean Palerne (St.-Étienne Univ., 1980), 142, although Valens’ death will have prevented him from ‘learning’.
cataphracts and helmets back to the troops resulted in the present disastrous situation in which
the infantry were still unarmoured.\footnote{Cf. Epit. I.20 p.22.2: \textit{pedites constat esse nudatos.}} That \textit{cuiquam}—'anyone'—has to refer to an Emperor-equivalent is deducible from the fact that it was the Emperor who permitted the abandonment of armour in the first place.\footnote{Epit. I.20 p.22.7–8: \textit{iacque ab imperatore posulant primo cataf fractas, deinde cassides se de<be>re refundere.}} Hence V. diplomatically avoided calling Maximus an Emperor or exposing Valentinian II to invidious criticism, and even side-stepped having to allude individually to either, by making so studiously vague a reference that it could be interpreted as having been aimed at one or the other or both. For the analysis of military neglect had to get somehow from Gratian to the present. This very ambiguity towards Maximus may well reflect the political relations between Trier and Constantinople.

V. is thus very critical of the neglect of the army in the western provinces under Gratian, and, by implication, continuing under Maximus and Valentinian II. This is the background to the defeats and sacking of cities which form the rhetorical ammunition in Epit. I.20. Since the criticisms themselves are largely cast in the form of commonplaces,\footnote{See ch. 5 (c).} the defeats and sackings need not be taken as having much specific content, and indeed, the historical record is silent as to any major disasters in the west during these years, although normal border incursions continued. The term \textit{urbes} can and probably does mean here merely small forts and fortified settlements, as said earlier.\footnote{See section (b) 1 fin. above, p. 59.}

But V.'s criticism of Gratian was not universally echoed. Pacatus never speaks but with respect for Gratian in his panegyric to Theodosius, and whereas Pacatus damned Maximus V. left him all but invisible. It seems likely that Epit. I was written before the downfall of Maximus in 388, since after his death there would have been nothing to be gained by sparing him. Since there is no hint that Epit. II–IV were addressed to a different Emperor, a possible occasion for the creation and delivery of Epit. I to Theodosius I was Theodosius' shadowy visit to Valentinian II and Justina in 384 to determine policy in the light of Maximus' usurpation in the Gauls.\footnote{A.H.M. Jones, \textit{The Later Roman Empire} (1964), 159.} Theodosius' decision to acquiesce in Maximus' coup for the time being at least
explains V.'s failure to attack Maximus. His criticism of Gratian, on the other hand, reflected the genuine and widespread indignation at his neglect of the army which had prompted Maximus' rebellion. However, the rhetorical character of V.'s specific criticisms of loss of discipline and skills, abandonment of heavy armour for infantry and falling Roman manpower means that they should not all be taken simply at face value. He may also have been making a covert appeal to Theodosius to intervene militarily in the west on the same grounds of military security as those invoked by Maximus,—covert perhaps for the sake of V.'s personal interests currently under Maximus' rule in the prefecture of Gaul. Such political manoeuvrings are probably irrecoverable for us, however.

9. Anti-Theodosius polemic?

Sabbah also decided Epit. I was written immediately after the death of Gratian, in 383–384, but in opposition to Theodosius' policy of collaboration with the Goths following the peace of 3rd. Oct. 382. The work was nonetheless dedicated to Theodosius. The lack of discussion of the merits of a pacific or any other policy towards the Goths is probably an objection to this view, and it is hard to believe that V. meant to suggest that it was the army of Theodosius that was the broken-backed instrument he was savaging in I.20, even if he did intend some of the criticism to rub off on his dedicatee. But certainly V. will have been sadly disappointed in Theodosius' army policy if, as it appears he did, he speeded up the increasing use of foederati and new formations of élite barbarian auxilia and vexillationes. Such disappointment will however have come later.

That V. should have been so western in outlook, but Theodosian in political affiliation, suggests residence outside Maximus' realm, thus, for example, Italy, and this fits other evidence of familiarity with Rome. It would also be explained by a relationship to

---

285 See ch. 5 (c).
287 G. Sabbah, 143.
288 See ch. 5 (b) 1.
289 See ch. 2 (a).
Theodosius, such as would fit occupation of the office of *comes sacri stabuli* and Spanish origins.\(^{290}\)

If Epit. I is to be dated between A.D. 383 and 388, and perhaps in A.D. 384 (see above), Epit. II–IV followed only after an interval,\(^{291}\) but at least before Theodosius' death in January, A.D. 395. Further indications that the Emperor was Theodosius I appear in Epit. II–IV.

10. The date of Easter.

At Epit. IV.35 V. made a gratuitous reference to the rules for calculating the date of Easter in support of his incorrect interpretation of the traditional lunar observations for felling timber.\(^{292}\) The determination of the date of Easter had been one of the principal points examined by the council of Nicaea in A.D. 325. But a further conflict was allowed to subsist between the 'Roman cycle' and the 'Alexandrian cycle' so that in A.D. 387 in particular the gap between Easter day at Rome and Alexandria was as much as five weeks. Theodosius himself intervened to establish once for all the unity of all Christians on the date of the principal festival. At his request, Theophilus, bishop of Alexandria, worked out a paschal cycle for 100 years, starting from Theodosius' consulship in 380. This put the 'Roman cycle' for the moment into abeyance.\(^{293}\) Sabbah has seen in V.'s reference a pious compliment to his Emperor, written precisely in the years (A.D. 387–388) when he decided to act, although it would still be a compliment at any time thereafter.\(^{294}\) One can interpret the actual rules given by V., *ut a quindadecima luna usque ad vicesimam secundum arbores praecidantur*, as being consistent with the 'Alexandrian cycle' which ultimately triumphed and which is described by

\(^{290}\)See ch. 1 (e), (d) 5.

\(^{291}\)Epit. II praef. p.33.16–34.4: *Ad quam temeritatem praecedens me indulgentia vestræ perennissatis animavi. Nam libellum de dilectu a quo exercitatione iterum dandum tamquam famulus obiuli; non tamen culpatus abscessi. Nec formido iussu adgredi opus, quod spontaneum cessit in pune.*

\(^{292}\)Epit. IV.35 p.152.15–18: *quod ars ipsa et omnium architectorum cotidianus usus edocuit et contemplatione ipsius religionis agnoscamus, quam pro aeternitate his tantum diebus placuit celebrari.* See further ch. 2 (c), p.44.

\(^{293}\)H. Leclerq, *Dictionnaire d'archéologie et de liturgie* XIII.2 (1938), 1553–1554, with references to S. Leo Magnus, Ep. 121 (al. 94), ed. J.P. Migne, *PL* LIV, 1055–1058; Gennadius de Vir. Ill. 34 (E.C. Richardson, p.73); Bede *HE* 5.21.

\(^{294}\)G. Sabbah, *art. cit.*, 145.
Bede.\textsuperscript{295} Theophilus specified that Christ was crucified on the 15th. Nizan, not the 14th., and laid down the rule that if the 14th. moon fell on a Sunday Easter Day should be postponed to the following Sunday.\textsuperscript{296} V.'s words therefore imply 'from the end of the 14th. moon to the beginning of the 22nd. moon', conforming exactly to the system described by Bede, who advocated the by now triumphant Alexandrian system in Britain and Ireland in the 8th. c., where the version of the 'Roman cycle' that had been in use before A.D. 343 still survived. The evidence thus suggests a \textit{terminus post quem} of A.D. 387 for Epit. II–IV.

11. Founding of cities.

The only other admissible criterion for dating appears to be the panegyrical ascription to V.'s Emperor of the foundation of \textit{innumerabiles urbes}.\textsuperscript{297} As was said above, in \textit{V. urbs} need mean nothing more than 'fortified settlement' or 'small fort'. V. refers also to the activity of restoration and enlargement, as well as to new foundation. In particular, reference is made to the 'elaborate construction of walls'.\textsuperscript{298} Thus Schoener found in it an allusion to the restoration of walled settlements in Thrace and elsewhere, carried out under Theodosius' praetorian prefect of the Orient, Cynegius, A.D. 384–388.\textsuperscript{299} As the work was probably done as quickly as possible, it was prone to be shoddy; so Theodosius enacted a law making public officials financial guarantors for the fabric of public buildings for fifteen years after completion.\textsuperscript{300} Theodosius was also assiduous in embellishing Constantinople, building a new suburb,\textsuperscript{301} and

\textsuperscript{295}Bede HE 5.21: \textit{ut... adventiente in eo (sc. mense) vespera diei quartae decimae, expectetur etiam dies dominica a quinta decima usque ad vigesimam primam diem eiusdem mensis.}

\textsuperscript{296}Ambrose Ep. 23 (Migne, \textit{PL} XVI), 883ff., lent his authority in support of the Alexandrians.

\textsuperscript{297}Epit. IV praef. p.128.11–18: \textit{Ideo potentiissimae nationes ac principes consecrati nullam maiorem gloriam putaverunt quam aut fundare novas civitates aut ab aliis conditae in nomen suum sub quadam amplificazione transferre. In quo opere clementia serenitatis tuae obiniti palam. Ab illis enim vel paucis vel singularibus, a pientate tua innumerabiles urbes ipsis iugi labore perfectae sunt, \textit{ut}, non tam humana mans conditae quam divino nutu videantur natae.}

\textsuperscript{298}Epit. IV praef. p.129.7.


\textsuperscript{300}C F 8.11.8 (8th. Feb., A.D. 385): \textit{Omnes, quibus vel cura mandato fuerit operum publicorum vel pecunia ad extructionem solita more credita, usque ad annos quindecim ab opere perfecto cum suis hereditibus teneantur obnoxii, \textit{iis ut}, si quid vitii in aedificacione intra praestitutionem tempus profererit, de eorum patrimonio, exceptis tamen his casibus qui sunt fortuiti, reformetur.}

\textsuperscript{301}Themist. Or. 18.222c–223b (A.D. 384).
the *forum Tauri*, dedicated in 393.\textsuperscript{302} The sobriquet *herba parietina*, given to Trajan,\textsuperscript{303} may have been intended to allude to Theodosius, who insisted on his own name being on new public buildings and was jealous of any public official building without imperial sanction.\textsuperscript{304}

Theodosius’ claim to descend from Trajan is well-known.\textsuperscript{305} Several cities called ‘Theodosiopolis’ are attested, named after Theodosius I or II. It is not always possible to differentiate between these founders, for lack of further evidence. Theodosiopolis = Resaina in Osroene was certainly founded by Theodosius I.\textsuperscript{306} Also very likely is “Theodosiopolis (4)”\textsuperscript{307} in Arcadia, Aegyptiaca.\textsuperscript{308} The eastern Notitia Dignitatum appears to belong to a date c. A.D. 395.\textsuperscript{309} ‘Theodosiopolis (3)’ and ‘(5)’,\textsuperscript{310} also in Egypt, may therefore be foundations of Theodosius I, under the same reorganization, also.

Theodosiopolis = Perperene in Asia got its new name by early in the 5th. c. A.D.\textsuperscript{311} It was well-established by the time of the councils of Ephesus A.D. 449 and Chalcedon A.D. 451. But there is no clue as to which Theodosius gave it his name.

‘Theodosiopolis (2)’\textsuperscript{312} in Armenia, modern Erzurum, was founded upon the partition of Armenia in the A.D. 380’s.\textsuperscript{313} The Greek sources attributed the foundation to Theodosius II;\textsuperscript{314} Armenian sources, however, prove that the founder was Theodosius I.\textsuperscript{315}

\textsuperscript{302}G. Sabbah, *art. cit.*, 136 n.20.
\textsuperscript{303}Amm. 27.3.7.
\textsuperscript{304}CTH 15.1.31 (5th. July, A.D. 394, Constantinople): *Si qui iudices perfecto opere suam postias nomen quam nostrae perenniatis scriberint, maestusst tanem aut obnoxii. Ille autem repetita sanctione decernimus ut nemini iudicium liceat novas militiamus industrias captare famam. Quod si quis in administratioone postius sine iussu nostro aedificii caperet, is propio sumptu et iam privatus perficere cogeret quod ei non licuerat inchoare, nec provincia permitteatur absedere prius, quam ad perfectam manum ceptum perduraret, et si quid de quibuslibet publicis titulis in ea ipsa fabrica praecessit eius impensum fuerit, reformarit.*
\textsuperscript{306}Joann. Malalas p.354ff. (Bonn), Edessene Chronicle p.102 (Hallier), *RE* VA (1934), 1922–1923, s.v. ‘Theodosiopolis (1)’.
\textsuperscript{307}RE ibid., 1928.
\textsuperscript{308}Not. Dig. or. 28.11: *Theodosiana*, probably the station of ib. 28.20: *ala Theodosiana nuper constituta,* cf. ib.28.8: *Archadiana* and ib. 28.21: *ala Arcadiana nuper constitita:* cf. also ib. 36.20: *equites promoti Illyriciani, Resain-Theodosiopolis; Hierocles 729.6.*
\textsuperscript{310}RE ibid.
\textsuperscript{311}RE XIX (1938) 890–892, s.v. ‘Perperene’.
\textsuperscript{312}RE VA (1934) 1223ff.
\textsuperscript{313}Procop. de Aedif. 3.5.2.
\textsuperscript{314}Procop. *Bella* 1.10.18, cf. id. de Aedif. 3.1.11, Theodor. HE 5.37.7.
V.’s words lend themselves to an interpretation which corresponds to the circumstances of, for example, the foundation of Theodosiopolis = Resaina, where a pre-existing settlement was raised to city-status, and named after the Emperor concerned. V. artfully implied a comparison between his Emperor and a Romulus or a Theseus in building civilisation.

Jones counted no less than nineteen cities commemorating the Emperor of the Theodosian house and their wives. Other cities founded by Theodosius I according to Georgius Cedrenus include Arcadiopolis in Thrace, formerly Bergula, and Nova Theodosiopolis = Aprus also in Thrace. Jones argued that Theodosius II was the more likely founder of the latter because the old name was used in A.D. 431, the new in A.D. 458. He also deemed Theodosiana in Cyprus, perhaps = Trimethus and Theodosiopolis = Pannium in Thrace to have been named after Theodosius II.

There is nothing to indicate which Theodosius renamed Augaza, one of the northern cities of the conventus of Ephesus, but its proximity to Valentinopolis = Auliucome, and Arcadiopolis = Titacazus (?) might suggest the settlement of barbarians in the region by Theodosius I. There was also a city of Theodosiana in Phrygia Pacatiana.

Jones points out that the custom of founding cities and naming them after Emperor was much weaker in the western Empire. V.’s panegyrical attribution of this activity would therefore suit an eastern Emperor far better than a western. Since there are grounds for placing the composition of Epit. I–III in the west (see above), the circumstances of Theodosius I’s

316 Ioann. Malalas p.354ff. (Bonn); A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (1964) 719 describes the processes involved.
317 Epit. IV praef. p.128.11ff.: Ideo potenissimae nationes ac principes consercari nullam maiorem gloriam putaverunt quam aut fundare novas civitates aut ab aliis conditas in nomen suum sub quadam amplificatione transferre. In quo opere clementia serenissimae tuae obiitae palma.
318 A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (1964) 719.
319 Geo. Cedrenus I p.568 (Bonn).
321 Ibid. 501 n.15.
322 Ibid. 26.
323 Ibid. 397 n.85, p.79.
324 Hierocles 668.11; A.H.M. Jones, ibid., 90.
sojourn in Italy A.D. 388–391 would seem to match the internal evidence of the text, insofar as he was an eastern Emperor temporarily based in the west.

There is, then, sufficient indication of Theodosius I’s activity as founder of cities to give rise to a panegyrist’s praise, as against Valentinian III, about whom the sources are silent in this regard. Jones considered Nea Valentia in Mesopotamia as a foundation of Valens; so too presumably Valentia, Phrygia. Only Valentinopole in Asia did he tentatively attribute to Valentinian III. It remains something of a puzzle why the western-based Pacatus failed to include city-founding in his panegyric of Theodosius I, whereas the western-based V. did not fail. Obviously V.’s extensive travels all over the Empire may be the explanation, but it is possible too that V.’s service as a courtier may have taken him to Constantinople, where Theodosius I’s activity as a founder of cities may have been more appreciated. Indeed, like Pacatus he may have followed Theodosius back to Constantinople in 391 and written Epit. IV. there.

12. Antiquarian interests.

V.’s Emperor’s ‘continual victories and triumphs’ (Epit. II prae.) suggest real military events, but one should not, pace Barnes, conclude that the Emperor campaigned in person, even if the wording implies that he did so. All this could be rhetorical colour. What seems more individual is V.’s agonizing (ibid.) over being asked to inform the Emperor on the art of war as traditionally practised by the old Romans, to satisfy the Emperor’s unaccountable taste for antiquities, when he surpassed antiquity himself. Theodosius I was well-known to be interested in Roman antiquities, without pretensions to scholarship, and admired...
‘harmless’ scholarly minds, perhaps a reference to Christians like V. He liked to talk of ‘studies’ with his high officials over dinner.

V. would seem well qualified to partake of such an occasion, as a *comes et vir illustri*, and a dabbler in Roman antiquities in Epit. I, which whetted his Emperor’s appetite for more. The Historia Augusta may allude to Theodosius’ court or at least to a similar contemporary ideal when it described Severus Alexander’s antiquarian interest in the stratagems of ancient Roman or ‘foreign’, that is, primarily, Greek or Carthaginian, commanders, which led him to invite to his strategic councils literary men and historians, as well as the usual professional soldiers.

13. Conclusion.

It emerges from the above that Epit. I was probably composed between A.D. 383 and 388, and perhaps in 384, whereas Epit. II–IV were written between A.D. 388 and 395. Epit. II praef.: *continuis... victorius ac triumphis*, may point to Theodosius’ victory over Maximus on 28th. Aug., A.D. 388, following his triumph over the *Greuthungi* at Constantinople on 12th. Oct., A.D. 386. Epit. III.26 (epil.) p.124.15–125.5 may point to tournaments in Rome, summer A.D. 389, or the consular games of Timasius and Promotus, the generals responsible for the victory over Maximus, in Jan., A.D. 389, or the consular games of Valentinian II, January, A.D. 390. Epit. IV praef. with its celebration of city-founding may suggest the period after Theodosius’ return to Constantinople in A.D. 391.

---

334 Ibid. 48.9: *simplicia ingenia aequo diligere, erudita mirari, sed innovia.*

335 Ibid. 48.18: *elegans laetumque convivium dare, non tamen sumptuosum, miscere colloquia pro personis, studia dignitibus, sermone cum gravitate iocundo.*

336 SHA Alex. Sev. 16.3: *Fuit praeterea illi consuetudo, ut, si de iure aut negotiis tractaret, solos doces et disertos adhiberet, si vero de re miliari, militares veteres et venes bene meritos et locorum partes ac bellorum et castrorum et omnes litteratos et maxime eos, qui historiam norant, requirens, quid in talibus causis, quales in disceptatione versabantur, veteres imperatores vel Romani vel exteriorum gentium fessissent.* A. Chastagnol, *BHAC* 1971 (1974), 77–78, holds that this passage was inspired by Epit. II praef., but I cannot agree because the latter lacks the context of imperial councils with its implication of face-to-face verbal consultation in company with other literary men, and professional soldiers and geographers. See further section (e) below.

(e) Non-arguments.

1. Ms. *subscriptiones*

It remains to discuss weak or false arguments in favour of Theodosius I. The weakness of arguments drawn from ms. *subscriptiones* has already been pointed out in section (a). Sabbah rightly criticized Chastagnol for relying on this;\(^{338}\) the same can be said for Barnes.\(^{339}\) All that can be ascertained is that interpolation of 'Theodosius' is some centuries older than interpolation of 'Valentinianus', and that there are signs that the latter arose from confusion with the consular date of Eutropius' recension.\(^{340}\)

2. Temporary ascendancy of primiscrinius?

Mazzarino's idea\(^{341}\) that in Epit. II.21 p.55.14–19 V. portrays the *primiscrinius* = *adiutor*\(^{342}\) as head of the praetorian prefect's department (under the externally appointed *princeps*), which position in the hierarchy he attained only under Gratian, and which he did not keep for long before the earlier arrangement was restored whereby this position went to the *cornicularius*,\(^{343}\) is based on a misunderstanding of Stein p.60, and is independently refuted by Goffart and Chastagnol.\(^{344}\) In fact, the *primiscrinius* was the top rank of the *illitterati* stream within the department, whereas the *cornicularius* was head of the *officiales litterati* or *Augustales*,\(^{345}\) and both retired together each year.\(^{346}\) The *cornicularius* was eventually chosen, like the *princeps*, from outside the department,\(^{347}\) but the *primiscrinius* both before and after it enjoyed the final rank in a laborious chain of promotion within the department, as also in the offices of the prefect of the City and the vicar of Rome.\(^{348}\) Thus it yields no clue as to the date of the Epit.

---


\(^{339}\) T.D. Barnes, art. cit., 255.

\(^{340}\) See section (a) above.


\(^{342}\) E. Stein, *Untersuchungen über das Officium der Prätorianerprefektur seit Diokleian* (1928) 57.

\(^{343}\) As, e.g., in *Not. Dig.* or. 2.51–52; *occ.* 2.42–46.


\(^{345}\) Ioann. Lydus de Mag. 1.48, 3.9, Stein, op. cit., 31–32, W.G. Sinnigen, *The Officium of the urban prefecture during the later Roman Empire* (1957), 66–67.

\(^{346}\) CTh 12.52.3 (444), Cass. Var. 11.17–18.

\(^{347}\) Stein, op. cit., 4–6.

\(^{348}\) CTh 14.4.10 (419).
3. Divus = ‘late ruler’?

Schoener’s notion that Gratian could only have been styled divus under the recent impact of his death, and so not under Valentinian III, since in the meantime Valentinian II, Theodosius I, Honorius and Arcadius had already died, is refuted by the evidence of V. himself, who calls divus also Augustus and Hadrian, Trajan and Vespasian. A.R. Neumann was therefore wrong to make this his main argument for Theodosius I, as also to bring to bear ms. dedications ad Theodosium imperatorem.

4. ‘Worldwide rule’.

It was argued by Mazzarino on the basis of V.’s list (Epit. I.28 p.29) of warlike peoples from ancient Greece, archaic Italy and the Balkans, that his Emperor ruled over both halves of the Empire. While Sirago was factually incorrect to say that V. was cataloguing current resources of the Empire, he was at least pointing to them. It has not been noticed that V.’s concluding chapter to Epit. I complements the opening chapter’s list of peoples of the west, Gauls, Germans, Spaniards and Africans (plus Greeks who appear in both lists), overcome by the old Romans too (Epit. I.1 p.5). But V.’s world-view of manpower resources was co-extensive, apart from the diocese of Thrace, with Gratian’s realm prior to the handover of two-thirds of the prefecture of Illyricum to Theodosius c. A.D. 379. V. gave up listing provinces just at the point where it began to involve the eastern Empire.

But although this confirms V.’s western outlook, it tells us nothing about his Emperor’s realm. Goffart and Sirago correctly understood the sense of the list (Epit. I.28) to embrace the whole Empire; however it was a topos to suggest world-empire so as to hint that one’s Emperor equalled or outdid famous rulers of the past. The same reading of Sidonius Apollinaris Carm. 5.40–50 would turn Majorian into the ruler of the entire Empire. V. merely meant to suggest that contrary to supposition the Roman Empire could still produce the...
plenty of its own fighting men, without making a political point about whose realm in particular he was speaking. As a westerner it was natural that he should start from the western provinces. Like Pliny the Younger he wished to deprecate the idea that ‘exhausted nature no longer produces anything worthy of praise’.355

At Epit. IV.31 p.150.15ff V. provided a similarly Empire-wide context, with a list of provinces and regions which makes no bones about including the eastern Empire. It is perhaps another example of the more eastern outlook of Epit. IV.356 There is never any hint in V. that his Emperor ruled over anything but both halves of the Empire. But given the nature of rhetoric, it amounts to only a weak argument in favour of Theodosius I, who was senior Augustus from A.D. 383 to 395.357 This is without prejudice to the argument that V.’s Emperor was probably reigning also in the east, whereas V. addressed predominantly the military problems of the west, a combination which points to Theodosius I more strongly.

5. ‘Diacritical’ imperial titles and panegyrical virtues?

Goffart358 followed Seeck359 in warning of the non-diacritical nature of complimentary titles given to Emperors: ‘No modern reader can decide the reference to a domitor omnium gentium barbararum (Epit. II praef.) is realistic while the reference to the Emperor’s all-surpassing felicitas (Epit. IV praef.) is hollow.’ However, for Mazzarino an Emperor addressed as dominus ac princeps generis humani (Epit. II praef.) could only have ruled over the entire Roman world,360 while Barnes comments that domitor omnium gentium barbararum goes beyond conventional titles like victor ac triumphator (e.g., ILS 794–798, given to Arcadius, Honorius and Theodosius II as an infant).361 He says domitor is never metaphorical362 and a conspicuously rare epigraphical use.363

---

356See section (d) fin.
357Cros. 7.35.1.
358W. Goffart, lcc. cit. 79 = 59.
361T.D. Barnes, Phoenix XXXIII (1979) 255.
362Cf. TLL V.1945 s.v.
363E.g., CIL 8.2387, Julian saluted domitor hostium, ILS 827, Theoderic the Ostrogoth domitor gentium.
But domitor can after all be shown to be a conventional title. Compare B. Levick, Anatolian Studies XVII (1967), 101-121 no.9: Omnipotenti principi florentissimo Augusto victoriosissimo imperatori domitori gentium barbararum restauratori imperii Romani Galerio Valerio Maximiano aeterno beatissimo [domino] nostro, dated A.D. 305-311. Levick cites CIL 2.4105: Licinianus devictor omnium gentium barbararum, ibid. 2.482 (Constantine I), ibid. 8.7006 (Constantine I): domitor omnium factionum, AE 1947.185 (Theodosius II): triumfator gentium barbararum. Chastagnol adds references to coins and medallions from the reigns of Maxentius and Constantine onwards, under the forms victor omnium gentium, exuperator omnium gentium, debellator gentium barbararum, and to an inscription of A.D. 315-316 for Constantine and Licinius: edomitis ubique barbararum gentium populis. Cf. a dedication for Julian at Ephesus: omn[ium ......] gentium [debellator?]. The legends continue on coins throughout the 4th. c.368 until Arcadius and Honorius who are each qualified as triumfator gentium barbararum. Chastagnol sees in this change a weak argument in favour of dating V.'s usage of titles in Epit. II praef. to the 4th. rather than 5th. c. A.D.370

As for dominus ac princeps generis humani (II praef.), Chastagnol notes the rarity of allusion to the human race in imperial titulature. But cf. the maximum prices edict of Diocletian: prospicientibus nobis qui parentes sumus generis humani, and also for Diocletian and Maximian, cf. propagatores generis humani. Constantine is restitutor humani generis in A.D. 314, and Valentinian III is dominus rerum humanarum in A.D. 443-445. So, the allusion may be rare but it is conventional.

---

366 ILS 8938.
367 AE 1924.71.
368 F. Gnecci, op. cit., I, p.27 no.11, p.63 nos.18-22, p.67-68 nos. 46-53, p.70 no.5, p.74 no.11, p.76 no.11, p.81 no.7.
369 Ibid. I p.82 nos.4-11; p.83 nos.3-4.
371 Ibid. 61.
372 Praef. 7 (1.10-11), S. Lauffer (ed.), Diokleitians Preisedikt (1971), 92.
373 CIL 3.133 (=6661).
374 CIL 6.1140 = ILS 692.
Chastagnol’s view that the Historia Augusta took such phraseology from V. is unlikely to be correct, given the wide currency of such language. However, it is useful to confirm the usage of such a title in the age of Theodosius I, to whose reign the Historia Augusta is dated by majority opinion. However that is not to say that there is any reason to presuppose that V.’s usage refers to a 4th. c. Emperor rather than a 5th. c. Chastagnol’s whole endeavour to prove that the Historia Augusta borrowed dozens of phrases from V.’s Epit. is ultimately unconvincing because Roman writers tend to repeat each other anyway, so that other contemporary authors can be found to have used the same ideas and language, themselves in many cases cited by Chastagnol. Parallels with V. occur frequently, to be sure, but how could they not when the subjects coincide? Biographical history of Emperors could not avoid covering the army, warfare and military taxation.

Barnes cited an inscription from Canusium alluding to Theodosius’ achievements, *cuius virtute felicitate iustitia et propagatus terrarum orbis et retentus* and compared Epit. III.10 p.89.21: *propagantur provinciae, conservatur imperium*. However apart from the fact that V. is not here talking about his Emperor but about the value of the art of war, similar phraseology can be found for other reigns, cf. [princip]auctoritate praecri[pua] Romani status ac libertatis propagatori semper et ubique victori d. n. Fl. Gratiano victori ac triumfatori piissimo Aug. and (Valentinian I) *propagator Romani imperii*.

The attempt to find concrete instances of the panegyrical virtues of IV praef., *felicitas, moderatio, castimonia, exempla indulgentiae, amor studiorum*, is futile. As Lang observed, they could fit any Emperor, even if they seem to fit Theodosius I best in the period A.D. 383–450 in question. However, what we know of Theodosius from Ps.-Victor

377Cf. SHA Alex. Sev. 14.6: *fuerunt multa alia signa, quibus principem humani generis esse constaret*; ibid. Max. et Balb. 17.7: *cum eos Augustos et principes generis humani videam*.
380T.D. Barnes, art. cit., 256; *CIL* 9.833 = *ILS* 780.
382*CIL* 9.661.
383Barnes ibidem.
384C. Lang, vii.
does match V.'s Emperor's interest in *studia*, and fits a context also similar to that offered in a fictional, idealised portrait of Severus Alexander by the late 4th c. Historia Augusta.

Sirago commented that *studiorum amor* is notably absent from Pacatus' panegyric of Theodosius: 'He would not have omitted it if it was an important quality of Theodosius.' A non-literary man might well, however, have turned to a V., rather than a Pacatus, who was obviously a literary luminary of the highest culture, perhaps rather too high for Theodosius' cultural purposes. Whereas, V. was a man of more modest literary pretension who aimed to write useful handbooks on practical themes. Such a man might have been thought more capable of relating, as one dilettante to another, a distillation of ancient military practices of the Romans. Theodosius was after all not cultured but eager to learn. Thus his 'love of studies' is likely to have been something quite outside Pacatus' own university-oriented world and really rather irrelevant to him, if he had even heard of it.

---

385 Epit. I praef., II praef., III praef., IV praef., and see ch. 1 (c) for V.'s persona as 'director of studies'.
386 See section (d) above.

At Epit. IV.39 V. referred to the ‘birthday, so to speak, of navigation, which is celebrated with traditional games and a public spectacle in many cities’, an allusion to the *navigium Isidis*, a nautical religious festival celebrated in Ostia, Alexandria, Cenchreae (Corinth) and other maritime cities to mark the reopening of the sailing season on 5th March. This was fused in Rome itself with the festival of the *vota publica* (held on 3rd January) in the late 2nd c. A.D. Nevertheless when V. was writing, festivals for the opening of sailing on 5th March (V. inexplicably says 10th March) were still being celebrated officially, despite their pagan character. Sabbah pointed out that all such ceremonies were banned by Theodosius in a law of 24th Feb., A.D. 391. However the signs are that the *πλοιαφέσια* continued to be celebrated even in the 6th c. But given the tenacity of Isiac worship among the senatorial aristocracy under Theodosius, Sabbah’s conclusion that it would have been tactless for V. the courtier to have underlined the permanence of this festival after the promulgation of the law banning all official pagan ceremonies would seem to be likely only if V.’s words are taken to imply Isiac worship. However his reticent circumlocution on this very point is easily explicable if, as it appears, he meant only to allude to the festival as marking the opening of navigation, thus suppressing embarrassing mention of the Isiac character of the ceremonies. Thus no special clue to date can be drawn from this, and we should not conclude on this basis that Epit. IV was finished before February A.D. 391.

---

388Epit. IV.39 p.158.6–8: *post natalem vero, ut ita dicam, navigationis, qui sollemni certamine publicoque spectaculo multarum urbium celebratur...* See also ch. 2 (C).
394A. Alföldi, ibid., F. Dunand, op. cit., 224.
Finally the production by Fl. Eutropius of an edition of the Epit. at Constantinople, A.D. 450 gives little clue to the date of composition. A.R. Neumann said that the work must have been in circulation for a considerable time beforehand, but how long is anyone's guess. Eutropius' cri de coeur that he did not have an exemplar before him is a typical mark of the amateur scholarship of the time, rather than of geographical or chronological remoteness of origin. Certainly the date preferred by Goffart and Birley in the A.D. 440's seems uncomfortably close to this re-edition, but that does not rule out earlier dates in the reign of Valentinian III proposed by Gordon (c. A.D. 435) and Seeck (Epit. I c. A.D. 426-7, Epit. II-IV c. A.D. 435) which are unacceptable on other grounds argued above.

395See section (a) above, p. 53.
396RE Suppl. X (1965), 993.
397L.D. Reynolds, N.G. Wilson, Scribes and Scholars (Oxford, 1968), 34.
399O. Seeck, 'Die Zeit des Vegetius', Hermes XI (1876), 82.
Ch. 4. Anonymus de rebus bellicis.

(a) Genre.

The 4th. or 5th. c. illustrated pamphlet entitled rather inadequately ‘De rebus bellicis’ (being also about imperial largess, coinage and taxation), provides a useful standard of comparison with V.’s Epit., with which it is roughly contemporary. ¹ Both De rebus bellicis and Epit. I are compilations prepared on their authors’ own initiatives for the instruction and information of a particular Emperor.² The De rebus bellicis addresses a single Emperor from the end of the preface to the end of the work. Each author sought to introduce innovations in areas which, par excellence, were the Emperor’s own business. In each case the innovations drew heavily upon antiquity, obviously so in the Epit. which sought to recover the disciplina militaris of the middle Republic, but demonstrably also for the De rebus bellicis.³ It is becoming clearer from recent research that the De rebus bellicis is a typical piece of late-Roman antiquarianism, if about innovation too. Thus the crucial chapters 1–2, highlighted in the preface (praef. 2), are about modern military donatives,⁴ but the message is mediated through an excursus on Roman antiquity which refers back to stories about congiaria given by Numa in wooden, leather and clay coins.⁵

The military machines too (De rebus bellicis 6–19) are in many cases derived from technical treatises of a sufficiently hoary antiquity. Thus the ballista quadrirotis or four-wheeled ballista has features expressed in language which closely resembles passages from Greek mechanici. The cochleae machina (7.4) in the view of Marsden⁶ is the equivalent of the universal joint or ἑρων τός of Heron Bel. 88ff. W., where the description of the universal joint’s operation is ‘very similar to Anonymous’ account here’. Marsden goes on to suggest

¹See section (c) below.
²De rebus bellicis praef. 16: utilia vestrae felicitati undique redacta conferre gestivi: Epit. I.28 p.28.3–5: haec fidelis ex devotionis initia, imperator invicete, de universis auctorisbus, qui rei militaris disciplinam litteris mandaverunt; in hunc libellum enucleata congesst.
³De rebus bellicis 15.1: inter omnia, quae ad usum bellicum provida posteriortis cogniavit antiquitas, thoracocamachum quoque... subsecit. ‘Quoque’ here seems to refer back to the currodrepanas, cf. 12.1: huiusmodi pugnacis vehiculi genus... repperit Parthicae pugnae necessitas, cf. 16.1: remedium... repperit ingeniosa necessitas (sc. the bridge of skins).
⁵H. Brandt, op. cit., 23–24, pointing to Suetonius’ lost de Regibus as the likely source.
⁶E.W. Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery: Technical Treatises (1971), 242 n.5.
that the same engine's innovative feature was a new kind of pull-back system in which the \textit{radii} were toothed iron bars, although the word is unattested in this sense, and the idea does not seem otherwise in evidence before the 15th. c. crossbow.\footnote{ibid. 243 n.6.} More likely is the observation of Ireland,\footnote{R.I. Ireland (ed.), A\textit{nonymi auctoris De rebus bellicis} (Teubner edn., 1984), ix.} that the Anon.'s words \textit{sagitas ex se non, ut aliae, funibus sed radiis intorta iaculatur} derive, whether directly or mediately, from a source such as Philo of Byzantium.\footnote{De rebus bellicis 7.6; Philo Byz. IV (Bel.), 75 fin.: \textit{την δὲ καταγωγήν αὐτὸ εἶχε ηὐφλην, ἀλλ’ ἔχοντο τοῦ ὀξείου τῆς ὑπερχύς τῆς εὐθείας ἐκατέρω μέροις ἀπειράμενα.}} Thompson had already seen the sense of \textit{radiis intorta} to refer to a windlass, \textit{δωνοκος},\footnote{E.A. Thompson, \textit{A Roman Reformer and Inventor} (1952), 114.} and the identical feature can be seen in the Anon.'s \textit{ballista fulminalis}: \textit{hunc tamen funem non manibus neque viribus militum trahi fabricae ipsius magnitudo permittit, sed retro duabus rotis viri singuli radiorum nisibus adninetes funem retrorsum tendunt, pro difficultate rei viribus machinis adquisitis}.

The \textit{ballista quadrirrotis} is, on Marsden's analysis, of the same type as (Ps.-)Heron's Cheiroballistra, a hand-held machine which he dated to Trajan's reign,\footnote{E.W. Marsden, op. cit., 236, 209.} but which is now dated to the Byzantine period.\footnote{D. Baatz., \textit{Britannia} IX (1978), 14–15. See ch. 6 (c–d).} Finds of components from 4th. c. Danubian forts bear very close resemblances to the surviving ms. drawings.\footnote{D. Baatz., \textit{Britannia} IX (1978), 14–15. See ch. 6 (c–d).} Nonetheless, the type as a larger model mounted on two-wheeled mule-carts or wooden pillar-bases first appears on Trajan's column;\footnote{E.W. Marsden, \textit{Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development} (1969), 190, D.B. Campbell, \textit{Britannia} XV (1984), 77; Trajan's column scenes 104–105, 163–164, 169, cf. C. Cichorius, \textit{Die Reliefs der Trajanssäule} (Berlin, 1896–1900), Plates 31, 46–48, F. Lepper, S. Freer, \textit{Trajan's Column} (Gloucester, 1988).} the Anon. offered one larger still, mounted on a four-wheeled carriage, and drawn by a pair of horses. This seems comparable to V.'s \textit{carroballista}, also drawn by pairs of horses or mules.\footnote{Epit. III.24 p.118.8–11: \textit{Carroballistas aliando maiores... superpositas curriculis cum binis equis vel mulis post aciem convenit ordinari...} Cf. also II.23 p.60.2–9.}

The large, static \textit{ballista fulminalis} (18) is a larger version still of the same basic design. The ease with which the gunner triggered the mechanism, as we have seen, excited the Anon.'s
admiration, but also probably that of his source, whom he copied.\footnote{Cf. Philo Byz. IV (Bel.), 74 Th. init.: \(\delta\omega\tau\tau\varepsilon\tau\omega\zeta\) \(\tau\nu\nu\tau\nu\nu\sigma\nu\tau\sigma\tau\varepsilon\ \eta\nu\varepsilon\\pi\sigma\nu\varepsilon\nov\ \eta\nu\varepsilon\\pi\sigma\nu\varepsilon\ \delta\nu\nu\\varepsilon\\nu\nu\nu\varepsilon\ \nu\varepsilon\\sigma\pi\varepsilon\\nu\sigma\nu\varepsilon\ \iota\nu\varepsilon\\nu\nu\nu\varepsilon\ \varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\\nu\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\ \eta\nu\varepsilon\\nu\nu\nu\\nu\nu\nu\\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\num
are completely different. Wide, low frames are reported characteristic of later types of this old
design.27 The surviving sample is, however, very small.

Pictures of the tichodifrus (8) show only the chassis, not the superstructure. Thus any
resemblance to the late-Roman reaping machine28 is coincidental. It is instructive rather to
consider its use. The tichodifrus or ‘wall-chariot’ was a mobile screen on two wheels
manoeuvred by two men (19.5), covering an advancing ballista, doubtless mounted on a
carriage. The tactical connexion with the ballista is emphasized.29 Its resemblance to the vinea
of V.30 has been noticed by Thompson.31 Note the smallness of dimension of V.’s vinea, 8’
wide by 7’ high by 16’ long, together with its similar double-hurdle construction,32 and the
similar tactical deployment against walls.33 Especially the apse-shaped variant called by V. a
pluteus, also described by Athenaeus mech.,34 manoeuvred on just three wheels, covering
obviously few soldiers armed with arrows, slings and javelins, whose task it was to dislodge
defenders from battlements, makes it likely that the tichodifrus was a conventional siege
machine of this type.

The detail of the provision of an armament of ‘tridents and spikes’ may be verbally
compared to Ammianus’ description of the ‘threefold spikes’ fitted to the frontalia of his
‘helepolis’, although these were probably attached to the heads of rams.35 The construction
reinforced with iron nails seems the same in either case.36 Whether or not Thompson was right
that Ammianus’ helepolis may have given ideas to the Anon., it is likely that the Anon.’s

27D. Baatz., art. cit.
29De rebus bellicis 8.1. 19.5.
30Epit. IV.15 p.138.
31E.A. Thompson, A Roman Reformer and Inventor (1952), 66.
bellicis 8.3: duasbus superimpositis crusibus fixorisque confoxis.
33Epit. IV.15 p.138.8–9: sub quibus obsidentes tut ad subruenda murorum penetrant fundamenta. cf. De
rebus bellicis 8.1: per hunc facilior in murum paretur ascensus.
34Epit. IV.15 p.138.9–16. Athen. mech. 38.9–10 (dated from 1st. c. B.C. to 2nd. c. A.D.), cf. O. Lendle,
Texte und Untersuchungen zum technischen Bereich der antiken Poliorkeistra. Palingenesia XIX (1983), 144.
35De rebus bellicis 8.4: fascis et lanceis armatur diligenter aptatis, Anm. 23.4.12: conservatur autem eis
frontalibus trisulcatis cuspides praecutae ponderibus ferreis graves, qualia nobis pictores ostendunt fulmina vel
fictores, ut, quidquid petierit, aculeis exertis abrumpat.
36De rebus bellicis 8.3: fixorisque confoxis, cf. 9: fixoris minuitis ad solidiatiem sui diligenter munitus
(clipeocentrus or ‘reinforced shield’); Anm. 23.4.11: ferreisque clavis aptata et consetitur coritis bubulis
virgarumque recenti testura...
information is entirely derivative. Ammianus' 'helepolis' is explicitly linked by him with historians and Demetrius Poliorcetes, in the 4th c. B.C. There was probably nothing new either about the Anon.'s *tichodifrus*.

The *plumbata tribolata* (10), a so-called combination of *plumbata* (lead-weighted dart) and *tribulus* (caltrop), is unlikely to be the Anon.'s invention, either. Τριβόλοι were also known as missiles, furnished with kindling material like *falaricae*, from at least the 3rd c. B.C. The *falarica* was similarly weighted with lead, according to Isidore, and could be used without kindling as a hand-thrown missile of smaller design in warfare or hunting. This smaller version appears more comparable to the Anon.'s missile which is itself likened to a hunting-spear. But surviving *plumbata* heads come in very various sizes, and some have shafts twisted to take kindling material.

The *plumbata mamillata* (11) was an ordinary lead-weighted dart with a special iron head perhaps in the form of a cone mounted on a hemisphere. The design of the head is not enlarged upon, so that we may take it that the Anon. did not invent it, but transmitted it from his source. Such an iron head was found at Mainz, 8.8 cm. long (35 g). Presumably it was this characteristically-shaped head which gave rise to the name *mamillata* ('breast-shaped') rather than the lead-weight which it shared with all other *plumbatae*. The illustrations to the Anon. incorrectly show a leadweight-like projection only on the *plumbata tribolata*, and then too far down the shaft.

---

37Amm. 23.4.10.
39Jos. Etym. 18.7.8: *falarica* est ictum ingens torno factum, habens ferrum cubitale et rounditatem de plumbo in modum sphaeræ.
41De rebus bellicis 10.2: *fit autem ex ligno in modum sagittae facto, cui ferrum substituer in formam venabuli apicatum infigitur...*, cf. 10.1: huc laculi genus... non arcus neque bullistae pulsae consuevit emitiri, sed manus impetu et varius elliun in hostem comminutus vadit.
43De rebus bellicis 11: Bene extensa et directa virga accipiet in extremitate sui roundum et in acumen deductum ferrum.
44L. Lindenschmit, Alterthämer unserer heidnischen Vorseit, Römisch-germanischen Centralmuseum in Mainz, I (1864), xi, Taf. 4 no.24, cf. Darenberg–Saglio IV.2 p.1000, s.v. *'sagitta*, fig. 6099.
The *mamillata* head will have come in different sizes, as the several ordinary surviving *plumbata* heads, which range from c. 9.2 cm. (33/4″), through c. 15.8 cm. (61/4″), to c. 25.3 cm. (10″). A *plumbata* head found at Mainz measured c. 20.6 cm. (81/8″). Völling has now published a complete list of the 42 known examples, ranging from 98 to 278 mm. All measurements are roughly from the tip to the farther end of the lead weight.

The shafts of such darts were obviously also apt for fitting collars ringed with sharp points, such as the twenty ‘mace-heads’ in bronze published a century ago by the French Bibliothèque Nationale, ranging in diameter from 40 mm. (19h 6″) to 15 mm. (3/s″), and in height from 57 mm. (2 1/4″) to 14 mm. (9fi6″). However there is no evidence to date they were ever so fitted. Arrian refers to maces as an arm of a certain type of Roman cavalry, but their description as a sort of axe makes them sound more massive than these.

The Anon.’s description inserts spikes in the lead weight of the *plumbata tribolata* (10.2), which seems a so far unattested mode of affixing such points; but the principle of casting caltrops like darts appears unoriginal. However this mode of affixing them seems unlikely to have been a practical idea, as they would have got in the way of the darter and been perhaps rather easily avoidable for the feet of the enemy, unlike ordinary caltrops which were smaller and laid in greater profusion. The small iron caltrop (*tribulus* or τριβόλος) could also be shot by slingers. Given the ingenuity and diversity of ancient missile-warfare, it is unlikely that the Anon. was the first to think of adding spikes to the lead weight of the *plumbata*.

---

46 Doncaster, in Current Archaeology XXXIII (July, 1972), 275.
47 Richborough IV, loc. cit., no.296.
50 A. Müller, in A. Baumeisser (ed.), Denkmäler des klassischen Altertums III (1888), 2077 fig. 2314.
51 Art. cit.
53 Arr. Tact. 4.9: οτ δὲ καὶ πεικέςας μικροίς φίλους πδευδήν ἐν καϊσὶ δοσάς ἐγώνας.
55 Dion. Hal. 20.1 has slingers of τριβόλος στραγγον ὀν 300 carts prepared by the Romans at the battle of Asculum against king Pyrrhus’ elephants.
or *falarica*, especially when the throwing of such weapons had been known for centuries already.

Thus the Anon. is likely to have got his *plumbatae* from a military treatise. While V. did not describe the *plumbata*, he clearly knew what it was, devoting a chapter to it (Epit. I.17), and making frequent reference to the weapon elsewhere. Its later attestation as a throwing mace suggests that the spiked form may have been a normal variant rather than an innovation of the Anon. Since his explanation in terms of precisely the caltrop is unsatisfactory, it may well be nothing more than his own interpretatio etymologica of *tribolata*. The *plumbata* was already used in the 3rd c. A.D., according to V., and may well have derived from a dart of similar dimensions and appearance called a *kéotpos*, launched from a sling, and introduced in the early 2nd c. B.C. V.’s description of its effect in long-range battle might suggest that contra the testimony of the Anon. it could still be so launched, although as a throwing-mace it will have been cast by hand, too.

The Anon.’s comment that the scythed chariot or *curroderpanus* (12.1) was discovered through the necessity of a Parthian = Persian war probably refers to its invention by Cyrus the great. The last reliable uses of this weapon are by Mithridates’ general Archelaos in 86 B.C. and his son Pharnaces in 47 B.C. The capture by Severus Alexander during his Persian campaign of A.D. 232 of 1,800 scythed chariots is apocryphal. Servius, writing in the late-4th c. A.D., knew of scythed chariots only from ancient history. So too V. Epit. III.24. Indeed the machine was already obsolete by the 1st c. A.D. Arrian adds several details to the bare statement of Aelian and Asclepiodotus that the use of chariots (and elephants) was rare, saying that it was never a Roman method of fighting, that the Persians introduced

---

56 E.g., Epit. II.15 p.49.7 & 18-19, III.14 p.98.9-10.
57 See ch. 6 (c) below.
58 Polyb. 27.11 (9).1, Livy 42.65.9.
59 See ch. 6 (c) below.
60 Cf. the similar expression (16.1, *ascogefyrus*) *repperit ingeniosa necessitas*.
61 Xen. Cyr. 6.1.29, Arr. Tact. 22.4.
62 App. Mith. 42, Plut. Sulla 18.4-6, 463 e-f.
63 A. Hirtius bell. Alex. 75.2.
64 SHA Alex. Sev. 55.2, 56.4.
65 Serv. ad Aen. 1.476: *curribus falcatis usos esse maiores et Livius et Sallustius docent.*
the scythed variety with cataphract horses beginning with Cyrus, and that all forms of chariot-
warfare and the use of elephants had long since been given up, except perhaps elephants among
the ‘Indians or Upper Aethiopians’. Ammianus’ silence tells us that Julian’s campaign of A.D.
363 did not encounter Persian chariots although they frequently met with Persian elephants in
battle.

The Anon.’s resemble the old Persian type in that they were drawn by heavy-armoured
horses and controlled by cataphract-wearing men, but differ in that they were much smaller
and lighter, drawn by two or even one horse, with the driver on horseback rather than on
the chariot-board. Xenophon’s words (Cyr. 6.1.28) imply Cyrus took exception to the wastage
of horsepower involved in four horses drawing the old-type unarmed chariots, as well as the
wastage of having two men in each, driver plus fighter, so that he may have introduced a two-
horse model at the same time as he removed the armed fighting man by arming the chariot itself;
but this is not explicit in the surviving literary sources.

The literary character of the Anon.’s exposition is increased rather than diminished by
his statement that the devastating effect of these machines can be better told by those who had
direct experience of warfare. These words make little sense in an age which did not see
scythed chariots in action and one wonders if the Anon. did not copy them from a much older,
perhaps Hellenistic, source.

Some features of the scythed chariot in the Anon. savour of chair-bound speculations
unconnected with actual conditions of fighting. In particular, the use of hinges for the blades
mounted at the axle-ends may have been intended to get over the same problem as that hinted at
by V., but appears likely to have diminished the offensive action of the edges. Moreover it is
not enough for the Anon. to replace the second rider’s control of his string with a ring attached
to the armour of the second horse’s flank, to which it was tied, without explaining how this

69 De rebus bellicis 12 & 14.
70 De rebus bellicis 13.
71 De rebus bellicis 12.4: quia vero huiusmodi machinae funera hostibus immittant vel quas turbatis
ordinibus strages efficiam. dicens melius qui sua bella cognoscunt.
72 Epit. III.24 p.116.7-8: Nam difficile currus falcatus planum semper inventi campum et leviter impeditamento
retinetur...
was to work, for assuredly the rider would not be able to reach it from his horse.73 This lack of practical understanding suggests that the Anon. worked from an epitome of someone else’s invention. Not to mention the ineffectiveness pointed out by Thompson of the self-whipping device on horses protected with cataphract armour, or the difficulty it would cause the rider in keeping control of his animals if they could feel the lashes.74

It is reasonable to conclude that the Anon. or his source conflated accounts of several different types of chariot, including ones with unarmoured horses, and riderless horses, and that many explanatory details have been omitted in the process of selection and précis. The Anon.’s words (praef. 13) also imply that the whipping-device was indeed for a riderless horse, therefore a one-horse scythed chariot, but the Anon has conflated his material ineptly in ch. 14, applying it to a two-horse chariot with a rider.75 Arrian found in his sources various kinds of scythed chariot, with armoured and unarmoured horses, with a single pole (cf. De rebus bellicis 14.3), with two or more poles,76 but unlike the Anon. did not think it worth transmitting.77 The Anon., one may postulate, had similar material at his disposal,—which points to the Greek tactici. The Anon.’s claim to have taken material from ‘everywhere’ into his epitome78 should no more be believed than Vitruvius’, who probably used a single source for his military machines whilst giving the impression of multiple sources.79

The bridge of skins or ascogefyrus (16) used no new principle either, but soldiers as diverse as pre-Classical Assyrians, Babylonians, Elamites and Dark Age Mongols, not to mention cetrati from Hispania Citerior and Lusitanians fighting on Pompey’s side against

---

73 De rebus bellicis 14.5, cf. 12.3.
74 E.A. Thompson, op. cit., 57 n. 6; De rebus bellicis 14.1.
75 De rebus bellicis 13: In terrenis vero congressibus tali est exoccipita sollertia ut equus... tali arte muniatur ut semetipsum verberans sine culaugnum magisterio efficax hostes hostiam urget.
76 Arr. Tact. 2.5: οὗ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἄρματι πολλοὶ πολιορκετέρα παντός... ἐκ νῦν ἡ ἀρματα, καθάπερ τὰ Ῥωμαί, ἡ ομορρήφορα, ὡς ἄρτεν τὰ Περσακτ᾽, καὶ οἱ περὶ παραγωγῆς τῶν ἔργων ἢ ἀφαχτῶν, καὶ ἡ ἀποκ οὐ μικροὶ ἢ ἄρποι, τὰ δὲ καὶ πολιορκείμαι.
77 Arr. Tact. 19.1: τούτων ἄρματος κατὰ εὐδοκίαν τὰς τε τάξεις καὶ τὰ ὀρθάτα τῶν τάξεως καὶ τὰ ἡγεσίας καὶ τὰ ποιήματα καὶ ὀρθάτα ἐπεζηκτέναι μεταξά τῶν πάνω εἶναι μία ἔργα, ἐκ ἐκελεύσεως κατ᾽ ἀναπαθὴν ἐξελίξει.
78 De rebus bellicis praef. 16: una vestra felicitas undique redacta consergere gestavi.
Caesar,\textsuperscript{80} carried skins for inflating into a personal float as part of their marching kit.\textsuperscript{81} Some Romans in Jovian’s army crossed the Tigris by this method in A.D. 364.\textsuperscript{82}

The ability to adapt such floats to buoy rafts requires no great leap of imagination. Rafts buoyed by inflated skins have been in general use in western and central Asia, being particularly well-known on the Tigris, for centuries,\textsuperscript{83} so it seems probable that the Rhodian who offered to transport 4,000 of Xenophon’s comrades in 401–400 B.C. on a bridge made of 2,000 inflated skins would have used this construction also.\textsuperscript{84} In this case a covering of earth and wood to keep the soldiers on a firm footing corresponds to the covering of \textit{cilicia} or goat’s hair mats in the Anon. (16.4).

It is, one supposes, more difficult to construct such a raft-bridge without wooden reinforcements. Skins and cables alone would be hard to secure tightly enough to walk on. So the Anon. advised a form of suspension running from cables under the skins in mid-stream to iron spits driven into the bank (16.3). Thus insofar as the Anon excluded wood from his account, he offered an unparalleled (for us) method of construction.

Roman armies of the 4th. c. A.D. carried around on carts, as a matter of course, \textit{monoxylis} or canoes together with cables, for constructing pontoon bridges.\textsuperscript{85} The Anon. also envisaged the carrying of long cables for the purpose of supporting his bridge of skins (16.3), assigning 50 packhorses for carrying materials (praef. 14). Although V. did not mention them, it is clear from the other sources that Roman army engineers commonly used inflated skins too, but whether separately or in close association with the canoes is an unanswered question. Both

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{80}Caes. bell. civ. 1.48.
\textsuperscript{81}J. Hornell, ‘Floats and buoyed rafts in military operations, \textit{Antiquity} XIX (1945), 73–79.
\textsuperscript{82}Amm. 25.8.2.
\textsuperscript{83}J. Hornell, \textit{art. cit.}, 74.
\textsuperscript{84}Xen. Anab. 3.5.7–12.
\textsuperscript{85}Amm. 23.3.9, 24.3.11, 24.7.4, V. Epit. II.25 p.60.14–19, III.7 p.81.3–9, Zos. 3.13.2, 3.26.3.
\end{quote}
appear to have had the same function, being simply floats for the bridge. In V., the bridge is constructed with planks laid over the canoes.

The term *utricularius* is sometimes assumed to refer to military specialists in building pontoon bridges, after Mommsen’s equation Ascarii = utricularii. Hoffmann still accepts the derivation Ascarii < *dakos* + *-arii* as a Greek equivalent to utricularii. However Thompson pointed out that the one attested instance of Ascarii in action (Amm. 27.2.9) offers little to bear out the suggestion. Since the term utricularii, known only from inscriptions, refers exclusively to civilian corporations in cities of Gallia Narbonensis and Alpae Maritimae, and is interpreted as being connected with the manufacture of floats used to lighten rafts and transport-boats used in the wine trade, or else with ‘ferrymen’ in these places, the alternative derivation of Ascarii < *ask* (Old High German) = ‘spear’, implying a formation analogous to *gaitsai* or *lanciarii* seems distinctly preferable.

The Anon. ‘s claim that the ascogefyrus was ‘new’ cannot, in the absence of explicit evidence, be explained by his thinking that he had dispensed with the canoes which Julian in A.D. 363 found such a drag on his movements. But his confusion as to the manner of carrying the materials around, on light carts (19.3), on 50 sumpter ponies (praef. 14), or on the backs of ‘very few men’ (ibid.), is indicative of a deeper confusion as to what was involved.

Thus he is not wholly reliable for the method of construction, either.

---

86 Amm. 24.3.11: imperator ipse praegressus constratis ponticulis multi ex utribus et iprocia navibus iδεμπομεν παλμονα τραβως exercituon non sine difficillate traduxit: ib. 25.6.15: hoc longe conspecto ardens ad transitum miles ea morsa tantummodo tenebatur, quod utribus e caesorum animalium coris coagumentare pontes architecti promoitebant: Zos. 3.30.3: Ἀκοκός ταινων αλληλος συνδημοτες και ζευγματα προπορω των δι των κατακεκουστος ἐπιχομενοι τε των ασδηθων. 87 Epit. II.28 p.60.17: superiectis eiiium tabulis, III.7 p.81.6–7: tabulis pariter et clavis ferreis praeaparatis. See also ch. 6 (b) 8.
88 Not. Dig. or. 9.3=24, occ. 5.21=166=7.119, or. 9.4=25, occ. 5.22=167=7.120, occ. 5.68=216=7.79 (auxilia palatina in Illyricum, Spain and Gaul), occ. 32.43 (auxilium limitaneum in Pannonia II).
93 De rebus bellicis praef. 14: novi ponis inventio, ch. 16.3: novo quodam et peregrino itineris apparatu.
Pontoon bridges figured naturally in military treatises. One example survives, in Apollodorus of Damascus. His raft-bridge is made on the same principle as the kelek traditional on the Tigris, using large numbers of inflated skins for extra buoyancy. Probably other pontoon bridges were illustrated in military manuals now lost. It is not unlikely that the Anon. took his ascogeyrus from the same source as the other machines. Note that the location of the curing the skins among the Arabs is, like the Libyan method of curing skins for the thoracomachus, more appropriate to someone writing in the eastern Mediterranean engineering schools of Hellenistic or Roman Rhodes or Alexandria, where for instance Philo of Byzantium and Heron worked, respectively, than for a late-Roman visitor to the western court. The Arabs may be the clue to why he called the bridge peregrino itineris apparatu; it could also have been described as a native invention by his source.

Technical military writers were careful to provide against enemy action at river-crossings. This is reflected in V. Epit. III.7 p.81.9ff., who prescribed armata praesidia on both banks as a first-degree precaution. Those detailed to hold the farther bridgehead would often have to swim across, as for instance we see when the Roman army of Jovian was trying to cross the Tigris in A.D. 363. Apollodorus of Damascus attached hinged screens to his raft-bridge to cover those defending it. The Anon.’s deployment of manuballistae on either bank, with the technical term otherwise attested solely in V., apparently a translation of (Ps.-)Heron’s ‘Cheirollistra’, is also redolent of the technical handbook.

The use of oxen geared to paddlewheels to propel the liburna or warship (17), though tried successfully in modern times, is not otherwise attested for antiquity. The use of
paddled warships driven by human power is, however, recorded of the 12th c. Chinese.\textsuperscript{104} The Anon.'s paddlewheel certainly resembles the measuring wheel which Vitruvius fixed to a ship's side,\textsuperscript{105} and waterwheels Belisarius fitted to a row of boats strung across the Tiber to power corn-grinding during the Ostrogothic siege of Rome in A.D. 537–538.\textsuperscript{106} But since the watermill was invented at the beginning of the 1st c. B.C. in the eastern Mediterranean, the idea of attaching it to ships could easily have been developed by mechanici there.\textsuperscript{107}

It is unnecessary to suppose, with Thompson,\textsuperscript{108} that the Anon. invented the device himself, even if he does call it 'new'.\textsuperscript{109} Such a remarkable invention receives very little space from its supposed author. The military mechanici included ships in their calculations, too; see for example Athenaeus mech. with diagrams showing internal and external views of a ship fitted with a base-weighted siege engine.\textsuperscript{110} It is not unlikely that the Anon. found his \textit{liburna}, too, in a similar source.

A single source for most of the inventions is a plausible hypothesis and not contradicted by any evidence. The use of colourful Greek compound names by the Anon. points also to the Greek mechanici, who coined such terms as \textit{gastraphetes},\textsuperscript{111} \textit{helepolis},\textsuperscript{112} and \textit{cheiroballistra}.\textsuperscript{113} Cf. also \textit{sambuca},\textsuperscript{114} and \textit{exostra}.\textsuperscript{115} The use of illustrations to explain the text too is typical of all the Greek mechanici. Although the Anon makes no use of \textit{scenographia} or the technique of exploded diagrams offered by Philo or Heron,\textsuperscript{116} his colourful sketches are in the same tradition as the siege engines and automata which appear in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{104}H.T. Horwitz, 'Zur Geschichte des Schaufelradantriebes', Zeitschrift des Österreichischen Ingenieur-und-Architekten-Vereines LXXXII (1930), 359ff.
\item\textsuperscript{105}Vitruv. 10.9.5ff.
\item\textsuperscript{106}Procop. bell. Goth. 5.19.19ff.
\item\textsuperscript{108}E.A. Thompson, \textit{A Roman Reformer and Inventor} (1951), 53.
\item\textsuperscript{109}De rebus bellicis 18.9: \textit{novo celeritate ingenio}.
\item\textsuperscript{110}Athen. mech. 33.4 W. and 35.4 W., illustrated in R. Schneider, 'Griechische Poliorcktiker III' (Athenaeus mech.), \textit{Abh. der könig. Gesellschaft d. Wissensch. zu Göttingen}, N.F. XII.5 (1912), Taf. ii.1 & 2.
\item\textsuperscript{111}'Belly-bow', Heron Bel. 81.1–2 W., Biston 61, 64 W.
\item\textsuperscript{112}'City-taker', Athen. mech. 27.2–4 W., Vitruvius 10.16.4, Biston 52ff. W.
\item\textsuperscript{113}'Hand-shooter', (Ps.-)Heron Cheir. 123ff. W., V. Epit. II.15, etc.
\item\textsuperscript{114}literally a four-stringed musical instrument, Athen. mech. 27.7ff. W., Biston 57ff. W., V. Epit. IV.21 p.142.13ff.
\item\textsuperscript{115}'Thrust out', V. Epit. IV.21 p.143.2–3, following a lost Greek tradition, see ch. 7 (a, i).
\item\textsuperscript{116}Cf. E.W. Marsden, op. cit., 62.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
other ancient Poliorketika and Pneumatika.\textsuperscript{117} Apollodorus of Damascus and Athenaeus mech.
in particular offer examples of the same landscape-type views as the Anon.\textsuperscript{118}

The Anon’s stress on the ease of the mechanical solutions\textsuperscript{119} is an exaggerated version
of the sales-talk of the Greek mechanici.\textsuperscript{120} The speed of the construction of the bridge of
skins\textsuperscript{121} parallels also V.’s pontoon bridge.\textsuperscript{122} Both are likely to reflect the language of
technical treatises, from which the material ultimately derives.

\textsuperscript{117}M. Henig, ‘Late antique book illustrations and the Gallic prefecture’, in M.W.C. Hassall, R.I. Ireland
\textsuperscript{118}Cf. R. Schneider, Abh. Göttingen NF X (1908), XII (1912), illustrations.
\textsuperscript{119}De rebus bellicis 6.5, 7.3, 7.5, 8.1, 16.1, 16.3, 18.10.
\textsuperscript{120}E.g. Athen. mech. 39.4 W.: \textit{μὴ τὰ ἄντρα ἐλεφάλετε φιλάξαντι ἀν βρᾶλες διαφρονται τὰ λυσθοῦτα.}
Biblo 44.1–3 W.: & ἔως ἀπειδῆ ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ κατά τὰς προοθέκας τῶν πολεμίων ἔργων βρᾶλες ἀνατρέψατε;
ἀντιστρατευόμενος τᾶς ὑπογεγραμμένας μεθόδους.
\textsuperscript{121}De rebus bellicis 16.3: \textit{intra breve tempus spatium praebuit liberam facultatem.}
\textsuperscript{122}V. Epit. III.7 p.81.7: \textit{it a absque mora constructus pons et funibus, qui propere habendi sunt, vinctus
lapidei arcus solidiatem praesae in tempore.}
(b) Persona.

Whatever his qualifications as an economist, the Anon was confident of getting a hearing on that score, not for his military machines. The economic chapters were in some measure intended to guarantee the utility of the military appendix. Given that the Anon had no personal experience of warfare, one wonders whether he had any personal knowledge of economic matters, either. V. also had no authority of his own in the matter of warfare, but could at least trade on the illustriousness of his (ultimate) sources. In both cases the antiquity of the material was in part a recommendation in itself. Also each wrote for the 'public utility', and each underlined the tried-and-tested nature of the precepts. Each attempted to be up-to-date by referring to the Danubian limes, to the main contemporary enemies, the Goths and the Persians, the contemporary military experience, and the state of the contemporary army. Each referred to the traditional classification of the art of war among the bonae artes.

Both authors, therefore, were writing for Emperors faced with military problems and interested in drawing contemporary lessons from antiquity. From the tantalizing autobiographical details of the preface it can be deduced that the Anon. was not an office-holder but a man of leisure—privatus, oto persuasus—who professed a talent for

---

123 H. Brandt, Zeitkritik (1988), 163, is unimpressed.
124 Praef. 2: Unde pro ingenii facultate unum capitulum de largitionum utilitate in hoc libello composui, non quod istud tam immane utilitari sufficit, sed ut ex hoc mediocrisitatis meae documento praemisso in reliquis utilitiis posi put fides ostendi. Ibid. praef. 11: his etiam adiectienda credidimus quae bellorum necessitatiis terrae vel maris in acquirendis victorias procurantur.
125 12.4: Quaia vero huiusmodi machinae funera hostibus immittant... dicent melius qui usu bella cognoscanl.
126 See ch. 7 (a).
127 V. Epit. I praef., II praef., etc., De rebus bellicis 15.1: inter omnia, quae ad usum bellicum provida posteriitis cogitatiis antiquias...
128 V. Epit. I praef. p.5-4-5: pro utilitate Romana proferantur in medium: De rebus bellicis praef. 1: felicis rei publicae vestrae commoditas... est suggerenda...
130 V. Epit. IV.46 p.165.9-8, De rebus bellicis 18.5.
131 V. Epit. I.20 p.22.9, III.10 p.92.12-17, De rebus bellicis 6.1-4, 19.2-8; see section (c) below.
133 V. Epit. I.8, II.3, etc., De rebus bellicis 5, and see section (c) below.
philosophy. His claim not to be from an aristocratic or wealthy or highly educated or well-placed background (praef. 6) is a philosopher's topoi, and need not exclude curial status, the more so as he was so anxious to reduce the tax-burden on *collatores* (1.1, 4.1, 4.3, etc.); that he was not a *possessor*, however, is to be deduced from his plan for this class to build milecastles all round the *limes* (20.2). It seems hinted that he had successfully advised someone in authority on a previous occasion, probably about economic matters, and was now bent on widening his area of influence to military matters as well.

The range of subjects addressed, including imperial spending, coinage, taxation, the army, and law, fall broadly under the head 'de republica gerenda', and it is the success of the reign through the establishment of the well-being of all the main classes—military, land-owning, agricultural and mercantile—, that is advertised (praef. 9). The theme was one traditionally addressed to rulers by philosophers and sophists; Themistius' Epistula de re publica gerenda set out an 'art of government' for a late-4th. c. Emperor, and survives in an Arabic translation. Although the predominantly pagan philosophers were less sure of an audience with the Christian Emperors, they still claimed the right of 'sophistic parrhesia' to express their views to the Court; so does the Anon. Thus the Anon., despite using the same mock-modest courtesy-title as V., *mediocritas mea* had a very different idea of his


137Praef. 5: *quem ingenio natura donaverit*, praef. 17: *mihi... subveniendum est propter philosophiae libertatem*.


139Praef. 5: *qui recte quicquam sentire fuerint approbo*.

140Praef. 2: *ut ex hoc mediocritatis meae documento praemisso (sc. unum capitulum de largitionum ulilitae) in reliquis ulilitis possit fides ostendi*.


144Praef. 17: *propter philosophiae libertatem*.

145V. Epit. III praef. p.64.16, De rebus bellicis praef. 2.
own genius. Whereas V. claimed to be nothing more than a faithful compiler, the Anon. rested his case on divine inspiration. The hypothesis that the Anon. was a sophist finds further support from the stress on a personal divine providence. Such reference to mystical communion is a well-known sophistic theme, shared for instance by Aelius Aristides and Apuleius, and going back ultimately to Plato and Socrates and beyond.

Many continued to flout the Greek patriotic prejudices of Eunapius and Libanius by seeking fame and fortune at the Roman Court, rather than their native cities. But with no clear distinction subsisting between philosophy and thaumaturgy, mathematics and astrology, sophists were vulnerable to accusations of magical practices. Sopater, pupil of Iamblichus, travelled from Syria to Constantinople where he won the confidence of the Emperor Constantine I, who numbered him among his intimate advisers, until he fell victim to a charge got up by Constantine’s Christian supporters of having ‘fettered the winds’ that brought the corn-ships to Constantinople, and was promptly beheaded. The celebrated philosopher and thaumaturge Maximus of Ephesus became compromised by his friendship with the late Emperor Julian, only to be executed for magic and conspiracy against Valens.

Nor were they confined to the eastern Court. Libanius of Asia, sophist and thaumaturge, won over the Emperor Constantius III at Ravenna in A.D. 421 sufficiently to be granted permission for a trial of his proposed art to operate against the barbarians ‘without using soldiers’—χωρίς ‹παλ τῶν. It is hard to see how this experienced general could have been taken in by mere magic, unless perhaps Libanius was proposing machines like the Anon’s, saving on manpower. However his ‘promise and high repute’ came to the ears of

---

146V. Epit. I praef. p.5.1–5, L8  p.13.4ff.
147De rebus bellicis praef. 1: caelesti semper instinctu, praef. 8: respicere dignemini quae nostris sensibus commoda providentia divinisuis auterit, praef. 15: magnum vobis munus concessu divinisuis apporto, ch. 21.1: divina providentia, sacraitissime imperator, domi fortisque rei publicae praetatis comparatis...
148His patron-deity was Asclepius, cf. Or. 33.2, 17, etc., and C.A. Behr, Aelius Aristides and the Sacred Tales (Amsterdam, 1968), 46–47.
149Cf. Apul. Apol. 49, Met. 2.28 etc. for divina providentia.
Placidia, who threatened Constantius with divorce if Libanius, ‘a magician and an unbeliever’, remained among the living.\textsuperscript{153} It is in such pagan sophistic circles that we should seek to locate the Anon.

(c) Date.

\textbf{1. A.D. 366–370?}

The ‘orthodox’ date of the Anon. was established by O. Seeck as after the birth of Valens’ son in A.D. 366, and, as was later ascertained, before his death in A.D. 370.\textsuperscript{154} He pointed to ch. 6.1 as indicating that the \textit{limes} had not yet been breached, as it was from A.D. 376 in the Danube lands.\textsuperscript{155} Too much weight is sometimes put on the use of the words \textit{circumlatrantium ubique nationum}.\textsuperscript{156} This is merely a metaphor likening the Empire to an animal hunted to bay by dogs, and does not in itself carry the implication of a cordon separating the quarry from the attackers, which would fit the notion of the second clause that the barbarians were attacking the \textit{limites} from the outside. The metaphor was rather popular. Ammianus uses it of courtiers attacking Julian, and of literary critics attacking Cicero,\textsuperscript{157} Seneca uses it of \textit{delatores},\textsuperscript{158} and Symmachus of his family’s enemies in the late-390’s.\textsuperscript{159}

Thus the only suggestion that the barbarians were actually outside the Empire resides in the words \textit{omne latus limitum tecta naturalibus locis appetat dolosa barbaries}. But surely this is a topos? Pacatus in his panegyrice of A.D. 389 could still speak of the nearer barbarians as being ‘separated from the Roman world by forests, rivers and mountains’, for it did not matter for rhetorical purposes whether or not the Rhine–Danube line still existed.\textsuperscript{160} And even if it were not a topos, the restoration of the \textit{limes} could have been seen as being realised in the A.D. 380’s.

\textsuperscript{152}Olympiod. fr. 38 M. = fr. 36. Blockley.
\textsuperscript{153}RE 1 (1894), 2325, s.v. ‘Anonymus 3’.
\textsuperscript{154}De rebus bellicis 6.1: \textit{In primis scelendum est quod imperium Romanum circumlatrantium ubique nationum perstringat insanias et omne latus limitum tecta naturalibus locis appetat dolosa barbaries.}
\textsuperscript{156}Amm. 22.12.4, 22.16.16.
\textsuperscript{157}Sen. de Cons. (Dial VI) 22.5.
\textsuperscript{158}Symm. Epp. 8.17.
\textsuperscript{159}Pac. Pan. Lat. 2 (12).22.2: \textit{Tua enim, imperator, auspicia non hae tamant genus tremunt quas ad orbe nostro silvarum intervalla vel flumina montesve distinguant, sed quas intemis ardoribus inaccessas aut continua hieme separatas aut interfusis aequoribus abiuaces Natura determinat.}
First, the Notitia Dignitatum gives some grounds for identifying Gratianic and Theodosian limitanean dispositions in the provinces of Scythia\(^{161}\) and Moesia I,\(^ {162}\) made after the death of Valens in A.D. 378, but before A.D. 395, when the eastern Notitia became set. Seeck noted that the *equites* and *cohortes* without a name which are peculiar to western Illyricum in the Notitia cannot stem from Valentinian I who ruled over Dacia Ripensis and Moesia I too.\(^ {163}\) They therefore belong to a time when both Illyricums were under different governments. His solution that the dispositions were made after Valentinian III won back Pannonia from the Huns in A.D. 427 may safely be discounted.\(^ {164}\) It thus seems possible to ascribe these dispositions to Gratian, who had forces under Vitalianus operating in Illyricum in the early 380’s,\(^ {165}\) or even Valentinian II, who was sent troops by Maximus for use ‘against the barbarians who were attacking the Pannonians under his jurisdiction’.\(^ {166}\)

It seems likely, also, that the central Danube was from A.D. 381 guarded mainly by Goths under Gothic commanders, after Athanaric’s followers returned from Constantinople with a commission from Theodosius.\(^ {167}\) Arguably, too, Gratian and Theodosius’ settlement of Tervingi, Huns and Alans along the Roman bank of the Danube in the early 380’s and Promotus’ successful campaign against the Greuthungi on the lower Danube in A.D. 386 implied a restoration of the frontier, albeit achieved with considerable Gothic co-operation.

It is striking that writers only advert to the ‘continuous suffering’ of Pannonia, Thrace and Moesia from A.D. 376 to the present after Theodosius was dead.\(^ {168}\) Indeed, frontier installations continued to be built or repaired under Stilicho, Constantine III and Theodosius II,\(^ {169}\) and even in the mid-5th c. the Danube was still seen as ‘frontier’ territory.\(^ {170}\)

---


\(^{163}\) O. Seeck, *Hermes* XI (1876), 81.

\(^{164}\) See ch. 3 (b) 1.

\(^{165}\) Zos. 4.34.1.

\(^{166}\) Zos. 4.42.5, A.D. 387. See also ch. 3 (d) 8 and ch. 5 (b) 1.

\(^{167}\) Zos. 4.34.5.

\(^{168}\) Claud. in Ruf. 2.45, de bell. Get. 541, 632, Prud. in Symm. 2.715, Hieron. Ep. 60.16, ib. 123.17, cf. Claud. de Hon. III cons. 113ff., id. de Hon. VI cons. 92ff.

\(^{169}\) H. Brandt, *Zeitkritik* (1988), 124; see also below this section, fin., p.128.

\(^{170}\) Prisc. fr. 15.4 Blockley: ἐνάνθε της τω 'Πασμο οἰκομένης Ρωμαίων τοῦ...
Seeck's second dating-criterion was the fact that although in the rest of the work the Anon. addressed only one Emperor, in the preface he addressed the plurality of Emperors demanded by court etiquette,\textsuperscript{171} and referred to a plurality of sons (praef. 8).\textsuperscript{172} He interpreted this as implying that more than one Emperor possessed a son at the time of writing, a situation which pointed, excluding usurpers, uniquely to the late A.D. 360's, given a \textit{terminus post quem} of A.D. 337.\textsuperscript{173} It was also most unlikely that the Anon.'s abuse of Constantine was penned while his son was still alive (Constantius II, ob. A.D. 361).

But Mazzarino, arguing for the unlikely hypothesis that Constantius II was the addressee, proposed that \textit{filios} meant in dynastic terms merely 'successors' or 'heirs apparent'.\textsuperscript{174} Bonamente observes that there was only one \textit{princeps} (Constantius II) and only one heir apparent or \textit{Caesar} (Gallus, then Julian) at any one time in which Mazzarino wished to place the Anon.\textsuperscript{175} Brandt argues convincingly against Mazzarino's theory of a 'Julianic tendency' in the Anon., and against Mazzarino's date in general.\textsuperscript{176}

Several scholars have observed that Seeck's interpretation of Praef. 8 could also support a date under Theodosius I, during A.D. 384–387 when Magnus Maximus, who had a son, Victor, was grudgingly recognised as Augustus, above all in A.D. 386.\textsuperscript{177} To be sure, there is not much to be said for the Anon.'s addressing Maximus; the global threat from the barbarians (6) and the projected war with Persia (19.4ff) comport ill with the territorial limits to his rule. However it could have been addressed to Theodosius I in Constantinople, the senior Augustus of the Roman world,\textsuperscript{178} who was personally faced with the problems of defending the Danube and eastern frontiers.

\textsuperscript{171}Cf. Symm. Rei. 3.1.
\textsuperscript{172}praef. 8: \textit{clementissimi principes, qui gloriaram bonae opinionis perpetua felicitate diligitis, qui Romano nominii debios affectus propagatis in filios}.
\textsuperscript{173}\textit{De rebus bellicis} 2.1: \textit{Constantini temporibus}.
\textsuperscript{174}S. Mazzarino, \textit{Aspetti sociali del quarto secolo} (1951), 45, 72–106, esp. 86.
\textsuperscript{175}G. Bonamente, 'Considerazioni sul De rebus Bellicis,' \textit{Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Università di Macerata} XIV (1981), 14.
\textsuperscript{178}\textit{Oros.} 7.35.1. See ch. 3 (e) 4.
Language, at least, was no object. His court consisted largely of Latin-speaking westerners like himself, and the official language there was still Latin. The strongest objection is the wholly western ms. tradition of the Anon., but the dossier of 4th.-5th. c. official illustrated mss. in which it was preserved also includes the eastern Notitia, drawn up around A.D. 395, and the Descriptio urbis Constantinopolitanae of c. A.D. 425, praising Theodosius II. The latter text was also unknown to Byzantine Greeks, and is likely to have been the product of Latin-speaking court circles. But if one of the documents can originate in Constantinople, so can others.

Supporting arguments in favour of Valentinian and Valens are not as strong as they have appeared. As Brandt points out, if an author had a particular reason to address such a work to an Emperor other than the general grounds that any Emperor must perforce have put a high value on res militares, since this was his main area of activity and chief responsibility, he would have said so. Had he been addressing Valentinian I, inventor of new arms, or Julian, author of a written Mechanica, the Anon.'s silence is remarkable. Moreover there would have been little reason to argue as he does for the special importance of armorum inventio among the other arts (praef. 6–7), as also does V. for ars bellica, or to point provocatively not to the achievements and interests of the Emperor but to those of the barbarae nationes (praef. 7), as also does V., unless the Emperor was inclined to be complacent about such things. Zosimus, for what it is worth, alleged that Theodosius I is reported to have been by nature indolent and apathetic, though capable of being roused to military exertion at times.

182 A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (1964) 689.
184 H. Brandt, op. cit., 141–142.
185 Amm. 30.9.4, Ps.-Victor Epit. de Caes. 45.6.
186 Ioann. Lydus de Mag. 1.47.
188v. Epit. III.10 p.90.2–4, p.92.12–18.
189 Zos. 4.27.1, 33.3–4, 43.2, 50.1–2.
The Anon. even hints at scandalous neglect in the area of military arms and equipment by the Emperor’s high officials (praef. 4, praef. 15–16). It might be no coincidence that he later proposes the compulsory retirement of all militares ordines or ‘officer echelons’ paid five or more annona (5.3), equal to 20 s. a year, 190 ‘not exactly a small sum’, says Brandt. 191 In fact it would appear that all officers down to the rank of primicerius were affected, that is, the entire superstructure of the army. 192 The stipendiorum tardius or brake on promotion which deterred recruits and of which the Anon. complains resembles the problems of service in the legions according to V., where vacancies in the lowest ranks were not being filled. 193 For it is the lowest echelons that the Anon. is concerned to replenish. The problem received some government action in A.D. 394, when iuniores were first ordered to be put in the lowest ranks. 194 Zosimus following Eunapius gives a vivid account of Theodosius I’s difficulties in paying for the army, and the resulting shrinkage of its size: “The army was reduced in a short time and came to naught, while the cities ran out of money,” 195—in part due to his alleged multiplication of the numbers of officers, which Zosimus presents as part of his failure to control largess: ‘He brought commanders of cavalry, of detachments and superior officers to such numbers, that there were twice what there had been before, and the lower ranks had none of what was paid out to them from the treasury.’ 196 These conditions appear to accord with De rebus bellicis 5.1: enormia militum alimenta..., quorum causa totius tributariae functionis laborat illatio. Evidence for high taxation under Theodosius I is not confined to the biased account of Zosinus and Eunapius. 197 The riot at Antioch was provoked by it. 198 Meanwhile it

191H. Brandt, op. cit., 106.
192Cf. Jones, 634.
193V. Epit. II.3 p.36–37. See also ch. 3 (b) 3, and ch. 5 (b) 1–2.
194CTh 7.1.14 (394), cf. 7.3.1 (393), 7.13.19 (408).
195Zos. 4.29.1: το μέν ατρατισμάτων ἐν ἄλλω μετέλεσε χρόνῳ καὶ εἰς τὸ μηδὲν περιστατο, ταύτα δὲ πάλαι ἐπιλείποντι τὰ χρηματα.
196Zos. 4.27.3: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφάντης καὶ λογαγοῦς καὶ ταξίδημος εἰς πλῆθος ἦγε τοιοῦτον ὅπετε δικαίως ἢ πρότερον εἰς λελέφθη, τούτα δὲ ἀτρατισμάτα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου ἐξεδόμενα αὐτὸς ἦσαν οὕτω.
was widely held that the officer-echelons systematically cheated and starved the lower ranks of their pay and rations.\(^{199}\)

Other arguments used to defend Seeck’s date ought to be discounted. Honsell has shown, contra Wiedemann, that \textit{utilitas publica}, stressed by the Anon. (praef. 2, 4, etc.) and by V.,\(^{200}\) does not point exclusively or especially to the reign of Valentinian and Valens.\(^{201}\)

Secondly, the introduction of the \textit{defensor civitatis} into the western Empire may have occurred under Valentinian I either before or after Seeck’s date for the Anon.; but in either case, the Anon. did not suggest (4) that a new official protect \textit{tenuiores} from \textit{potentes}, contra Wiedemann\(^{202}\) and Bonamente,\(^{203}\) but merely called for men of integrity to be chosen as provincial governors.\(^{204}\) Reports of corrupt governors can of course be demonstrated for any reign.\(^{205}\)

Thompson held that the Anon. (\textit{de rebus bellicis} 4) objected to Valentinian I’s having replaced \textit{curiales} as tax-collectors (\textit{exactores}) with \textit{officiliaes} or \textit{praefectiani},\(^{206}\) a situation which obtained until at the latest A.D. 386, when \textit{curiales} are once again found discharging their traditional function,—thus a \textit{terminus ante quem} for the work. Brandt’s objection that \textit{curiales} were in general at all times involved in the collection of taxes should be accepted,\(^{207}\) as the relevant decrees of Valentinian I and Valens express wishes rather than actual performance.\(^{208}\) Already in A.D. 365 they conceded to the province of Africa continuance of the former practice, as also to Cilicia.\(^{209}\) His attempt was unsuccessful,\(^{210}\) like other attempts later to collect taxes directly through \textit{officiliaes}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \(^{199}\)Cf. Liban. Or. 2.37–39 (380–81), Or. 47.31–32 (probably 389–392).
\item \(^{200}\)See above, section (b).
\item \(^{202}\)Art. cit., 145.
\item \(^{203}\)Art. cit., 47ff.
\item \(^{204}\)De rebus bellicis 4.6, so E.A. Thompson, op. cit., 41.
\item \(^{205}\)E.g. Zos. 4.29.1, for Theodosius I.
\item \(^{207}\)H. Brandt, op. cit., 89–90, with n.230.
\item \(^{208}\)CTh 12.6.7 (364 S.), 12.6.5 (365), 12.6.6 (365), 8.3.1 (364).
\item \(^{209}\)CTh 12.6.9 (365), 12.6.5 (365).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Further, it has appeared to Jones, Baldwin and Bonamente that the action of Valentinian I and Valens in concentrating gold minting at the court, instead of a number of public mints around the Empire, was a variation on the Anon.'s call (3.2) for the opifices monetae to be congregated on an island, where opportunities for fraud would be reduced. However, as Brandt points out, already under Constantine and Constantius II gold minting was predominantly centred on the Emperor's place of residence. Also, Valentinian I and Valens took the same action to protect the purity of the silver coinage, about which the Anon. is silent, whereas he has in mind the minting of gold and bronze coins in the same place. Yet bronze minting remained dispersed.

Finally, à propos of the Anon. 's proposal (20) for improved limes fortifications, Valentinian I was not the last Emperor after Diocletian to attempt to overhaul the frontier defences. Activity is also recorded for Constantine and Constantine II, Valens, Gratian, Stilicho, and Constantius III. Brandt cites the legislative and archaeological evidence for continuing maintenance and improvement of the Eastern Empire's limes under Theodosius II.
Brandt’s arguments against the orthodox date of the Anon. show that Seeck’s arguments are not conclusive, and that none of his supporters has produced better. Brandt himself proposes to date the document to the A.D. 430’s, or more cautiously A.D. 400–450. However his ten routes into the 5th. c. all lead as well, or better, to the late-4th. c. These are (i.) the argumentum ex silentio about the absence of silver coins in the Anon., (ii.) the surfeit of gold of which he complains (2), (iii.) the supposed reference (1) to subsidies to barbarians, (iv.) similarities between 5th. c. coinage decrees and the Anon (3.1), (v.) the system of raising recruits (4.5), (vi.) the treatment of the army (5, 15, 19), (vii.) a comparison of technology in V. Epit. with the Anon. purporting to show that the latter is later, (viii.) the treatment of barbarians (praef. 7, ch. 6, 19), (ix.) the private financing of fortifications (20), and (x.) the supposed proposal for a codification of the laws.

(i.) Absence of silver coins.

First, ‘the Anon. might almost have been living in a world devoid of silver coinage’. Since high quality silver coinage was issued from A.D. 357 to c. A.D. 420 in the West, and to c. A.D. 450 in the East, this looks like a fair argument for a 5th. c. date in the West. But according to Callu’s calculations, the eastern Empire struck few silver coins in the last quarter of the 4th. c. A.D., Gaul and Italy producing 90% of all silver emissions in the period A.D. 378–395. That would suggest that the Anon. was writing in the East if at this period, as implied by my point that the Anon. was mediating Greek technical expertise for a Latin-speaking eastern Emperor. Further, the issue of bronze coins was substantially greater after A.D. 400 in the East than the West, where it practically ceased under Valentinian III, whereas the Anon. envisaged a continuing major rôle for bronze.

221 H. Brandt, op. cit., 159.
222 Ibid., 147–162.
224 R. Reece, ibid.
226 See above section (a).
(ii.) Surfeit of gold.

The concentration of gold in the hands of *possessores* (2.4) with attendant social ills seems part of the Anon.’s justification of his bluntness in warning the Emperor (1.1) to curtail imperial largess. Thus the history of Roman coinage straddles the chapter division (1.10–2.1) while the concluding note (2.8–9) refers back to the discussion of virtuous poverty of early Rome (1.3ff.). Moreover the surfeit of gold is linked to the institution of a widespread gold currency.228 Such an institution dates not from Constantine’s creation of the solidus, as the Anon. would have it (2.1), but, after a progressive rise in the use of *adaeratio* and in gold emissions from the reign of Valentinian I and Valens, actually from the introduction of the *tremis* by Maximus in the West, and Theodosius in the East, from A.D. 383.229 This monetary development, moreover, seems to have worked against the interests of the poor as the government’s increasing demand for gold to meet its payments led to growing fiscal oppression.

Brandt cites a large number of authors from the late-4th. c. to mid-5th. c. A.D. denouncing gold and avarice as the root of Rome’s moral decline.230 The Church Fathers blamed the upper-class *possessores*, who were closely identified with the government.231 A particular opportunity for oppression was the exaction of illegal taxes,232 which was additional to the difficulties the poor were already having in raising enough gold coin to pay what was legally due.233

Many turned to brigandage or *latrocinia*, the Anon. continues (2.6), and supported *tyranni* (ibid.). In this, the behaviour of the Bagaudae or the Isaurians clearly corresponds to

---

228De rebus bellicis 2.1: *vilibus commerciis assignavit*. 2.3: *cunctorum dandi habendique cupiditates accendi*, cf. 3.1 for the connection between gold coinage and small transactions.


232De rebus bellicis 4.1, Salvian gub. 5.17 (CSEL VIII, 107), ib. 5.23 (109), 4.21 (70), 7.92 (185).

phenomena attributed by the Anon., namely living by crime, wasting estates and holding Roman law in contempt.\textsuperscript{234} Salvian in the mid-5th c. openly blamed the Roman authorities for causing the problem.\textsuperscript{235} Brandt convincingly demonstrates the term \textit{tyrannus} for Bagaudic-type brigand-leaders and well observes the implication of the Anon.’s \textit{saepe} and plural \textit{tyranni} to refer to generalised social unrest, and not the dynastic pretenders Magnentius, Procopius, Firmus, et al., previously considered by scholars. But the social phenomena which had given rise to Bagaudic-type manifestations had long been in the making,\textsuperscript{236} and the monetary phenomenon of a gold-led currency was established well before the end of the 4th c. A.D., as we have seen.

(iii.) Subsidies to barbarians?

Brandt adopts a variation of Kolb’s theory that the \textit{largitio immoderata} (1.2) was actually to barbarians: whereas Kolb understands the recipients to be external barbarians who repaid excessive largess with renewed demands and attacks while the Roman government’s capacity to resist was further impaired, Brandt argues that the largessed were \textit{foederati}, whether external or internal, deemed ‘Romans’ for propagandist purposes to dress up subsidies as pay or voluntary gifts.\textsuperscript{237} This view relies especially on passages from Priscus and Salvian describing the forced payments made to Attila as ‘salary’ or ‘gifts’, and recounting the tax-burden of raising the necessary cash, the impossibility of meeting the necessary expenses of the Empire, and the attraction of other barbarians outside the Empire to force tribute from the Romans as well.\textsuperscript{238} Even if this were the correct interpretation of the Anon.’s ‘newspeak’, Theodosius I stands accused also of voluntary excessive largess to barbarian \textit{foederati}, which thus accords more nearly with the Anon.’s assertion.\textsuperscript{239}

Probably, however, Brandt’s interpretation will not do. First, not a word in \textit{De rebus bellicis} 1–2 unequivocally suggests payments to barbarians of any sort. \textit{Bellorum... improbias}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{234}H. Brandt, op. cit., 47.
\item \textsuperscript{235}Salv. gub. 5.24–28.
\item \textsuperscript{236}E.g., Pan. Lat. 9 (4) 4.1, Vict. Caes. 39.17.
\item \textsuperscript{238}Priscus fr. 11, fr. 9.3 Blockley, Salv. gub. 6.98ff (CSEL VIII 153ff), cf. H. Brandt, op. cit., 17–21.
\item \textsuperscript{239}Zos. 4.33.3, cf. 4.30.1.
\end{itemize}
(1.1) equally naturally refers to civil wars as to ‘continual frontier and treaty violations’, and fits the context (2.6) of Bagaudic-type manifestations provoked by fiscal oppression. The Emperor was threatened by tyranni (2.6) thrown up by popular discontent caused by profusior erogandi diligentia, a phrase which parallels ne profusa largitio semina magis excitet proeliorum (1.1). Sero, semina, seem to be typically used for images of provoking civil war.

Theodosius I was effectively accused by Zosimus, following Eunapius, of being a second Constantine in his prodigality. It may be significant that the Anon. fears the Emperor’s profusa largitio (1.1) may re-enact Constantine’s profusa largitio (2.1) precisely. The panegyrist went out of his way to deny the accusation, alleging that the Theodosian court was ‘tougher than Spartan gymnasia’, but the lavish palaces of his praetorian prefects and generals in and around Constantinople, many of which gave their names to whole localities, belie the rhetoric. Brandt’s parallels between the Anon. and Salvian and Priscus rely on a reading of the Anon. which unnecessarily brings barbarians into the equation and which does not naturally evoke or explain the Constantinian parallels.

(iv.) 5th. c. coinage decrees and the Anonymus.

Brandt’s similarities between a coinage decree of Valentinian III and legislation of Majorian and the Anon. 3.1 are equivocal. Both decrees refer to the buying and selling of solidi, as in the Anon, the identical situation of suspect solidi being rejected giving rise to

---

240So H. Brandt, op. cit, 21.
241Amm. 14.2.1: namque et Isauri... ex larescinis occulis et raris alente impunitate adolescens in prius audaciam ad bella gravia prorsus gerunt. Note that improbum is unattested as an epithet of bellum in TLL, but impium seems analogous, and is used both of wars contravening treaties (Livy 8.39.10) and of civil revolts (Cic. Cat; 1.33, Rut. Nam. 1.300).
242Cf. V. Epit. III.10 p.92.2–5: Inter hostes discordiarum serere causas sapientius est ducis. nulla enim quamvis minima natio potest ab adversariis perderei, nisi propriis simulatis se ipsa consumpserit; SHA Alex. Sev. 1.7: (milles), cum senatus tam lularum diissiset principem, imperatores fecerant, atque ista res bella civilia severat...
243Zos. 4.27–29 (Theodosius), cf. 2.32–38 (Constantine), F. Paschoud, Zosime II.2 (Budé edn., 1979), 391 n.155.
244Pac. Pan. Lat. 2 (12),13–14.
245J. Mathews, Western Aristocracies (1975), 119–121.
247De rebus bellicis 3.1: ementis... solidum fraudalenta caliditas et vendentis damnosa necessitas difficultatem quanquam ipas contractibus inaltera.
similar language. One need only consult decrees of Julian\textsuperscript{248} and Valentinian I and Valens\textsuperscript{249} to find the same situation again, with similar language.

Further, decrees from the reign of Theodosius I, which saw the culmination of 4th c. legislation against coin crimes with the invoking of high treason in A.D. 389,\textsuperscript{250} show an obsession with the honour due to the imperial visage stamped on coins.\textsuperscript{251} Such an obsession is very marked in the Anon.\textsuperscript{252}

(v.) System of raising recruits.

The system of collection of recruits by curial(?) \textit{exactores} (4.5) acting on governors’ instructions presupposed by the Novel of Valentinian III\textsuperscript{253} is supposed to be different from the allegedly ‘earlier’ system of \textit{protostasia}, according to Brandt last attested in some form in A.D. 418.\textsuperscript{254} But the latter was merely a mechanism for the fair distribution of the cost of providing a recruit among those whose low census ratings made them liable for only fractions of one recruit. Whether or not the recruits raised by \textit{protostasia} were collected at any particular place or occasion by curial or gubernatorial \textit{exactores}, there is no reason to think that whole recruits charged directly upon \textit{possessori} and rich \textit{curiales} in kind or in cash were collected by any different agencies. Thus the continuance or otherwise of \textit{protostasia} has no bearing on the direct collection of recruits by \textit{exactores}, since the two systems were not mutually exclusive, but adjusted to the means of different classes of taxpayer.

(vi.) Treatment of the army.

Brandt’s idea seems plausible that the Anon.’s plan (5.3ff.) to solve the problem of prolonged service by higher military ranks through a reduction or limitation of the length of service permitted was suggested by comparable measures taken for the civil service.\textsuperscript{255} He

\textsuperscript{248}CTh 12.7.2 (363).
\textsuperscript{249}CJ 11.11.1 (367 S.).
\textsuperscript{250}CTh 9.21.9, cf. H. Brandt, op. cit. 53.
\textsuperscript{251}CJ 11.11.3 (379–383, cf. PLRE I.104 s.v. ‘Arintheus’): \textit{aeternales valus, dum fraudibus studet, duxerit villares}, CTh 9.38.6 (381): \textit{qui sacri oris imitator et divinorum vultuum adpetitor venerabilis formis sacrilegio eruditus impressit}.
\textsuperscript{252}De rebus bellicis 1.5, 1.8, 2.3, 3.1, cf. perhaps 2.5: \textit{afficta paupertas... nullam reverentiam turis aut pietatis affectum praeculuis habens}.
\textsuperscript{253}Nov. Valent. III.6.2 (443): \textit{his... quibus per suburbicarias provincias tironum congregandorum munus iniuximus...} Cf. ibid. 6.1 (400).
\textsuperscript{254}H. Brandt, op. cit., 71–72.
\textsuperscript{255}H. Brandt, op. cit., 149, 106–107.
shows how the time-limit, first attested in A.D. 379 for primicerii scriitorum and primicerii receptoriorum, was gradually extended to other senior offices. The timescale of course points to a date under Theodosius I as well as to the 5th c. There is explicit consideration, too, for the promotion opportunities of lower-ranking civil servants, and concern about the greed of those hogging highly paid posts. But the concern itself is as old as Tacitus’ objections to long provincial commands in the reign of Tiberius. However, the Anon. does not explicitly advocate such a system, but merely the automatic discharge of all officers paid above a certain salary in order to facilitate the movement of promoted men. If Theodosius I really doubled the number of senior army officers because of his lack of control on largess as Zosimus (and Eunapius?) suggested, this will have created the Anon.’s problem. But it is striking that he was trying to advocate wholesale removal, and not simply that of Theodosius’ sinecurists who could not be openly attacked to the Emperor’s face. This should warn us that the proposal is more rhetorical in nature than has been realised, and may therefore explain a strange anomaly.

Brandt is clearly right that no military functions are expected of the discharged veterans (5.6), who are not seen as a peasant militia like 5th c. A.D. limitanei. Paradoxically, however, he interprets the Anon.’s proposal that they should become tax-paying agriculturists as a counterblast to the presumably 5th c. institution of tax-immunities on land cultivated by serving limitanei milites, although nothing is said of this by the Anon. But veterans received tax-immunities not only on their allotment, but on other property such as family slaves, business activities and remissions of poll-tax for themselves and certain other persons in their household, not to mention blanket exemption from local taxes, curial service and customs duties. Thus they were probably only rarely collatores, but what is startling about the

---

256CTh 6.30.3.
257CTh 6.30.9 (385), 6.26.11 (397), 6.32.1 (416), 6.30.22 (419), 6.32.2 (422), CJ 2.7.8 (440), 12 (463), 13 (468).
258Nov. Val. III 30 (450), cf. De rebus bellicis 5.5.
259CTh 6.30.3 (379): *ita ut nullus ambitu tempora aevi longioris usurpet*.
260Tac. Ann. 1.80. He reports that some alleged Tiberius was jealous of too many enjoying the lucrative posts.
261Zos. 4.27.3, see (c) 2 (iii) and (c) 1 above.
262H. Brandt, op. cit., 108. There is an antithesis between miles and collatores, defenderant and habitabant.
263Ibid. 114, cf. Nov. Theod. II 24.4 (443), CTh 7.15.2 (423), CJ 1.27.2.8 (534).
Anon.'s description is that having been as soldiers a burden on the State finances veterans were now supposed to become a significant support. Surely he knew that this was illegal? There is no doubting their status; they are called veterani (5.6), and their discharge is stated to be honesta missione (5.3). However on the assumption that the proposal was rhetorical all becomes clear. The highly paid officers who are to be discharged—primicerii and above, as we saw—will have been relatively rich men, owners of substantial property which will have attracted land-tax over and above any immunities to which they will have been entitled as veterans. The Anon. was thus making a jibe at their ill-gotten gains.

The Anon. assumes that the allotments would be in the borderlands, where veterans were traditionally settled, though they were also given land abandoned by owners. Brandt is perhaps right (p.115) that the Historia Augusta describes the same arrangement, even though (1) the land-grants were prima facie to serving limitanei duces et milites, not veterans, (2) they were made on condition that their heredes also served (as limitanei, presumably), and (3) inopia hominum and senecrus possidentium could also refer to the abandonment of such borderlands by their civilian owners, or to worn out and depleted limitanean units, and not necessarily settlements of veterans, which the Emperor hoped to replenish through natural reproduction encouraged by the grants. For Mann's study points out that in the course of the 3rd. c. A.D. the praemia granted to veterans were made conditional upon their sons' serving in the army in their turn. He argued that the Historia Augusta passage refers to land granted to veterans on this condition, if it is to have any basis in historical fact,

---

265 Cf. CTh 7.20.3 (325), 7.20.8 (364), 11 (368 S.), tax-free allotments; CTh 11.1.28 (400), taxed other land; CTh 7.20.4 (325), poll-tax immunity for one, two, three or four capia granted to veterans, a continuation of privileges of serving soldiers, cf. CTh 7.13.7 (375).
266 Dig. 21.2.11 (Paulus), cf. J.C. Mann, Legionary recruitment and veteran settlement during the Principate (London, 1983), 29.
267 Cf. CTh 7.20.3 (325 S.), 7.20.8 (364), 7.20.11 (368 S).
268 SHA Alex. Sev. 58.4–5: Sola, quae de hostibus capta sunt, limitaneis ducibus et militibus donavit, isae ut eorum essent, [miliarex] si heredes eorum miliarem, nec unquam ad privatus pertinere, dicens attentus eos militiiros, si etiam sua rura defendere. Addidit sunt hic et animalia et servos, ut possent coleere, quod acceperant, ne inopia hominum vel per senectutem possidentium desererentur rura vicina barbariae, quod turpissimum illa ducet.
269 Cf. Nov. Theod. II 24 for such units, discussed in ch. 3 (b) 3 above, p. 64 ff.
like SHA Probus 16.6.270 He also suggested that in the 4th. c. the linkage continued, the sons having either to serve in the army or as curiales in return for the privileges granted to their fathers. Hence the term normally used in the Codes is filii veteranorum, not filii militum.271 The Anon. may well have assumed this institution.

In Brandt’s view the main motivation of the fact that the Anon. ended his ch. 5 with a separate proposal for recruiting supernumerary iuniores (5.7–8) was to obtain savings for the Fisc through the increase in numbers of low-paid troops—et minori utpote tirones stipendio sublevati—, but it is more likely, in view of the concern (5.5) for recruitment, to see the latter provision as evoked by a desire to prevent vacancies in the legionary roll—hos qui in matriculis continentur—remaining unfilled. This interpretation is more in line with an equivalent complaint by V. that legionary vacancies occurring through regular retirement, discharge on grounds of ill health, desertions and deaths were not being filled, and would not be unless a iuniorum turba were organized to succeed to vacancies on a monthly basis.272 So too the Anon. talks about filling vacancies caused by war casualties and desertions by a system of keeping troops of iuniores 100 or 50-strong in readiness off the roll but trained and armed and paid as tirones, as a means of preserving the parent unit at full strength (5.7–8). V.’s contrast of service in the fast-shrinking legions with the auxilia, which had no problem recruiting because the régime was less tough and ‘rewards came sooner’ also finds an echo in the Anon.’s awareness of the deterrent effect of poor promotion prospects (5.5: stipendiorum tarditas).273

Further, Brandt brings the size of 50 or 100-strong troops of iuniores in the Anon. into relation with evidence from the Notitia Dignitatum for units of these sizes274 and the Historia Augusta.275 The eastern Notitia points to the late-4th. c., rather than 5th. (see above), and many would date the Historia Augusta to the A.D. 390’s. Again the Historia Augusta is

---

270SHA Prob. 16.6: veteranis omnia illa, quae anguste adiuntr, loca privata donavit addens, ut eorum filii ab anno octavodecimo, mares dimitat, ad militiam miserentur, ne harcoine <um> quam disserent.
271J.C. Mann, loc. cit. 67.
272V. Epit. II.3 p.36.21–37.4.
273V. Epit. II.3 p.37.5ff.: ubi et minor sudor et maturiora sunt praemia. See further ch. 5 (b) 1 init., p.151.
274Not. Dig. occ. 33.62: ad burgum Centenarium, cf. CIL 8.8713, 9010; Not. Dig. or. 36.35: Cohors quinquagenaria Arabum, cf. ib. or. 34.40: Cohors prima centenaria (codd.: agerentaria).
275SHA Prob. 14.7: (ac probus) accepit praeterea sedecim milia tironum quos omnes per diversas provincias sparsit, ita ut numeris vel limitaneis militibus quinquagenos et sexagenos intersereret.
desirous of replenishing limitanean units with new recruits, and here the method in view seems to be the traditional one of recruiting *adcrescentes* or the rising generation of soldiers’ sons born in the camp or *cannabae*; the Anon.’s proposal which makes use of trained young men *extra hos qui in matriculis continetur* very probably has the same source of *tirones* in view, since although *adcrescentes* were supposed to be listed on the *matriculae*, they were not supposed to be maintained on the State *annona* until they were judged ‘fit for military service’ following Valentinian I’s only temporarily successful removal of the privilege or abuse whereby rations were drawn by soldiers’ families as well.276 Thus probably *adcrescentes* will routinely have qualified for a particular pay-scale after a physical examination, en route to becoming fully established soldiers.

The Anon. seems also to share V.’s neurosis about the legions rejecting heavy armour.277 The *thoracomachus* (15) is designed to relieve the discomfort of wearing it.278 Similarly the *clipeocentrus* (9, 19.2) is intended as a lighter, more wieldy shield than the *scutum*,279 and the paradigmatic infantryman (15.4) is as fully armed as V.’s, including greaves, helmet, *lorica* or *clibanus*, sword and *lanceae*.280 Like V., the Anon. thinks in terms of heavy infantry armies of 6,000 deployed in three battle lines,281 corresponding perhaps to V.’s *principes*, *hastati* and *triarii*.282 6,100 was of course the prescribed infantry total of V.’s *legio antiqua*.283 Thus the Anon’s military knowledge was a similar mixture of anxious contemporary observation and confident reaffirmation of ancient theory, like V.’s.

---

276 Cf. CTh 7.1.11 (372): *II, qui inter adcrecentes matriculis adiinetur, tamdui alimoniam a parentibus sumant, quoad gerendis armis idonei fuerint aessimati, ut ut cesset super eorum nomine praebito fiscalis annonae*. Cf. Jones, 631. See also ch. 5 (b) 2. (xi.), p. 172.
277 See ch. 5 (b-c).
278 De rebus bellicis 15.1: *ut hoc inducto primo lorica vel clivanus aut his similia fragilitatem corporis ponderis aspersitate non laederent.*
279 De rebus bellicis 19.2: *minoribus sane clipeis assumptis, ne si—quod usu plerumque evenit—pro armorum latitudine silvarum densitas inaccessa, et amisitae armorum enormitate refugium.*
280 Cf. V. Epit. I.20, II.15, IV.44.
281 De rebus bellicis 19.1.
282 See ch. 5 (e) 1 and 7 (d).
283 V. Epit. II.6 p.40.12.
Brandt’s comparison of the Anon. and V. argues for technical developments showing that the Anon. is later. First, V. is accused of ignorance of the Anon.’s combined *plumbata* and *tribulus* (10), knowing only their separate use. Then he is unaware of the *radiis intorta ballista* (7.6); the Anon.’s bridge of skins (8.4, praef. 14) allegedly used less manpower and materials than V.’s pontoon bridge. The Anon.’s heavy *liburna* presupposed a need for this type of warships, which is reflected in the 5th. c. rearmament against the Vandals rather than the insignificant late-4th. c. fleet as in V. The *tichodifrus* (8) might be a less manpower-intensive form of *helepolis*; whilst the *ballista fulminalis* (18) saved on manpower taken by those types allegedly already in use.

None of this is convincing. V. omits to described the *plumbata* in detail, so we cannot speculate accurately about his knowledge. As has been shown above in section (a), *radiis intorta* refers not to the means of propulsion of the *ballista* but to the pull-back mechanism, and this V. omits to mention; but Ammianus includes it, where, like the Anon., it is a windlass. V. nowhere says how many men or materials were needed to construct and carry the bridge of *monoxyli* or wooden floats, but there are good grounds for thinking in any case that the Anon.’s bridge was already ancient. Although there was ostensibly no military need for a maritime fleet at the time of writing V.’s Epit., the whole of his naval section concerns warfare using *liburnae*, not river patrol-boats or *lusoriae*. The *tichodifrus* of the Anon., covering only two men (19.5), for that reason had nothing in common with the vast engine described by Ammianus as a *helepolis* (which in any case denotes a kind of ram), but is instead a mobile screen on the same scale as and of similar (?) design to V.’s *pluteus*.

---

284 H. Brandt, op. cit., 151-156.
285 Ibid. 152.
286 V. Epit. III.7 p.81.3ff., H. Brandt, op. cit., 153, 156.
288 Ibid. 156.
289 V. Epit. IV.22 p.143-144, Amm. 23.4.2.
290 See section (a), above.
291 Amm. 23.4.2.
292 See section (a), above.
293 Amm. 23.4.10-13.
294 See section (a), above.
Ammianus’ *ballista* also used a three-man crew, while V.’s figure of eleven men assigned to aim and arm a single *carroballista*, if it was as small as the two-wheeled models on Trajan’s column, or the Anon.’s four-wheeled model even, is absurdly high, and looks like being a theoretician’s guess based on an arbitrary allocation of one Vegetian 11-man *contubernium* per century to artillery.

What emerges, then, is that the resemblances between the Anon.’s engines and V.’s or Ammianus’ are more striking than the so-called differences. Certainly there are no grounds for thinking the Anon.’s more advanced or sophisticated. The natural inference would be that they are all three roughly contemporary.

(viii.) Treatment of barbarians.

The Anon.’s respectful reference to barbarian technical skills (praef. 7), which has already been found comparable to that of V., Brandt thinks indicative of their 5th. c. technical advances, starting with the Goths’ (disastrous) crossing of the Hellespont in A.D. 400, the Vandal naval capability by A.D. 419, and the Huns’ later mastery of siege-warfare. However the Anon. was largely thinking of the Persians, since it was when fighting them that the full panoply of his machines was to be brought into play (19.4), and Persian military skill was well-known to 4th. c. Romans.

Against Brandt it may be urged that the Anon. never names the Huns or Vandals, whereas certain of his machines, notably the scythed chariot and bridge of skins, appear well-adapted to eastern warfare, having derived from thence. Admittedly reference is made also to warfare in icy or forested conditions (6.2, 19.2), clearly meaning war with Germanic peoples north of the Danube, and two machines are indicated for this, the *thoracomachus* (15, 19.2)

295 Amm. 23.4.2: it would have been implausibly large if more than one man had been needed to turn each windlass.
296 Epil. U.25 p.60.2ff., see also ch. 5 (g), ch. 7 (f).
297 V. Epit. III.10 p.90.2-4, p.92.12-18, see section (b), above.
298 H. Brandt, op. cit., 157-159.
299 See ch. 3 (d) 5.
300 See ch. 3 (d) 6.
301 Priscus fr. 6.2 Blockley, A.D. 447, Jordanes Get 42.221ff.
302 See ch. 3 (d) 7.
and the *clipeocentrus* (9, 19.2). The Anon., however, was not thinking of the technical skills of this enemy, but the difficult topographical and climatic conditions.

The *tichodifrus*, scythed chariots and torsion-engines, at least, were indicated for the Persians (19.5–9). Brandt lists three international crises with Persia, A.D. 421, 441 and 447, which led to military solutions, and two, A.D. 376 and 387, which were resolved peacefully. Contra Brandt’s view that we learn nothing of contemporary or future relations with Persia in V., the Persians appear to be on V.’s Emperor’s side at one point, and held up as enemies at another. The 380’s remain a possible context for the Anon., and V. is certainly not a *terminus post quem* for him as Brandt claims.

(ix.) **Private financing of fortifications.**

The private construction by *possessores* of milecastles along the *limes* to be publicly garrisoned (20) can be matched with 4th. c. evidence of the building of *πόλις* and *φολία* in Syria and Arabia, and of *centenaria* in Africa, where inscriptions record that they were privately financed. Brandt prefers a time when the State was urging or requiring the private financing and maintenance of fortifications, but the legislation he cites in the one case merely allows the walling of farms and estates along the eastern *limes*, which will naturally have been a re-enactment of earlier legislation as the above inscriptions show, in the second case requires merely the maintenance of the publicly financed new walls of Constantinople by the landlords of plots through which the walls ran, which is not comparable to the erection of *limes* fortifications in the Anon., and in the third case refers solely to the extension to formerly exempt groups of *munera* to repair roads and bridges at the end of the 4th. and in the 5th. c. Thus there is no evidence for 5th. c. official regulations requiring what the Anon. is proposing.

---

305 H. Brandt, op. cit., 159.
306 H. Brandt, op. cit., 159.
307 H. Brandt, op. cit., 159.
308 Probably by a local corvee system like the *σκοπελάριον* in Egypt; cf. R. S. Bagnall, *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt*, XIV (1977), 67–86.
309 H. Brandt, op. cit., 119 nn.4–6.
310 CTh 8.10.10 (420).
311 CTh 8.11.18 (= CTh 15.1.51) (413), cf. Nov. Valent. III 5.3 (440).
312 CTh 15.3.6 (423), cf. CTh 15.3.3 (387), 4 (399), 5 (412).
(x.) Codification of the laws?

The so-called proposal for a codification of the laws (21) was prompted by conditions of chronic confusion as to what was and was not valid law. But the Anon.’s spare words cannot support so elaborate a reading. He merely expresses the same general dissatisfaction as Ammianus. Legal reform was also canvassed for the new era opening under Honorius. The Codex Theodosianus of A.D. 438 was obviously long overdue, since it collected constitutions from the point at which the Codex Gregorianus (c. A.D. 291) and Hermogenianus (c. A.D. 294) stopped.

The ‘arma—leges’ topos’, characteristic of the 5th. c. A.D., is hardly present in the Anon. Domi forisque rei publicae praesidiis comparatis, restat unum... remedium, does not contrast things military with civil; praesidiis is a metaphor for all the measures the Anon. had proposed up to this point, economic, monetary, political, administrative and military, all of which were contrasted with the one remaining cavil (not mentioned before), —the state of the laws. Neither is there sufficient evidence in the rubric, De legum vel iuris confusione purganda, to endorse Brandt’s desperate-seeming attempt to see a reference to the juridical distinction, first apparent in the 5th. c., according to Brandt, between ius or jurists’ law, and leges or imperial constitutions.

3. A.D. 386 or 421?

Thus there is no evidence that points unequivocally to the 5th. c. A.D., and much that is common to the late-4th. c. and early-5th. c. That there are several items in common with Ammianus, Vegetius or the Historia Augusta, or the eastern Notitia Dignitatum, inclines the present writer to the view that the Anon. is contemporary with all four, since I follow Syme in

313Amm. 30.4.11: iuris... scientiam, quam repugnantium sibi legum abolevere discidia.
314Claud. de Hon. IV con. (A.D. 398), 505ff.:
firmatur sensum iuris priscamque resumunt
casti leges emendatuarque vetustae
accelerantur novae. ialem sensere Solonem
res Pandioniae; sic armipotens Lacedaemon
despecti muros rigidus munia Lycurgo.
315H. Brandt, op. cit., 130.
316De rebus bellicis 20.
317Ibid. 130.
dating the Historia Augusta to the A.D. 390’s, and Jones in treating the eastern Notitia Dignitatum as a document of the period down to A.D. 395.

On Seeck’s analysis, the only alternative to the A.D. 360’s was A.D. 386 or thereabouts, which satisfies the present writer’s view that it was delivered to the eastern Court, whatever its ms. tradition, since Theodosius I’s two main foreign policy tasks were to deal with the Persian and Gothic threats. Since the eastern Court came to Italy A.D. 388–391, the document or its author could have come westwards. The Greek technical source(s) and the Greek pagan, sophistic, thaumaturgical tradition which suits the intellectual context of the author suggest that the Anon.’s first language might well have been Greek as had already been surmised from his peculiar Latin. Similarly the social context of the sophists in Greek civic culture would explain the at least moderate wealth and independence our author would have needed to have the opportunity and facilities to travel to Constantinople and prepare such a work as the De rebus bellicis, and have it illustrated for submission to the Emperor. While Latin was still the appropriate language to address the Spaniard, Theodosius.

Moreover, flagrantly high taxation is attested for his reign, and Theodosian temple-smashing undertaken with gusto by the praetorian prefect Cynegius through the eastern provinces A.D. 384–388 offers a context for pagan fears of Constantinian prodigality funded by religious vandalism. A.D. 386 also solves the difficulty of tyrannos (2.6), convincingly reinterpreted by Brandt as brigand-leaders, at a time when the dynastic usurper Maximus was officially recognised by Theodosius and there had been as yet no other dynastic tyranni to oppose Theodosius. Furthermore, the military situation of a surfeit of

---

318Brandt follows Kolb in preferring a date in the mid-5th. c. A.D. Cf. F. Kolb, Untersuchungen zur Historia Augusta, Antiquitas Reihe 4, Beiträge zur Historia Augusta Forschung XX (1987) 66, 87.
319See ch. 3 (d) 11.
320O. Seeck, RE I (1894), 2325, s.v., ‘Anonymus 3’.
322See above section (c) 1.
324De rebus bellicis 2.2, cf. Firmicus Mat. de err. prof. relig. 28.6: tullitie, tullite securi, sacratissimi imperatores (sc. Constantius II and Constans), ornamenta templorum: deos isos aut monetae ignis aut metallorum coquat flammas, donaria universa ad utilitatem vestram dominiumque transferte.
325See above section (c) 2 (ii).
326See above section (c) 1.
officers is actually attested under Theodosius I, and V. agrees with the Anon. on the need for some system of replenishing vacancies in the legions, and in the deterrent effect of poor promotion prospects. Not to mention the Anon.'s devising smaller, lighter arms and special clothing to support the wearing of heavy armour, about whose alleged abandonment V. is so sensitive.

The Anon. also lived in an age when gold coins were used for small transactions, and this has been shown to be the case from the A.D. 380's, when a numismatic revolution long in the making first appears complete. Although *solidi* were abundant earlier, their high denomination made them inappropriate for small transactions; the *tremis* was introduced for the latter purpose. It is arguable that the Anon. would not have made so much of the matter if it were not a striking feature of his times.

Meanwhile, the breakdown of the Danube *limes* from A.D. 376 was not generally admitted as final until the rebellions after Theodosius I's death, presumably because it was his claim to have restored it. The situation squares with the sense of crisis in De rebus bellicis 6, while the barbarian enemy was still traditionally conceived of as raiding from outside, a conception which might continue to be used as a commonplace even after the frontier had broken down.

Against A.D. 386 there is the view that *filios* (praef. 8) refers not to living sons but to successors or heirs apparent, of whatever blood relation or otherwise, that the Emperors might be expected to have now or at any future time. Certainly the formulaic character of praef. 8 suggests it was a prayer for the *aeternitas* of the imperial house, which continues in its sons, but the relevant parallel panegyric refers to *his quos educatis atque educabitis*, thus clearly living individuals, the children of Diocletian, Maximian and Constantius I Chlorus being brought up at the time of delivery in A.D. 297–298. So, in De rebus bellicis praef. 8,
propagatis in filios ought to refer to living people too, who were being brought up by the Emperors as their destined heirs—Romano nomini debitos affectus. Propagare is the appropriate metaphor for natural sons rather than imperial nephews or cousins proposed by Brandt as possible filii, granted that filii was used in court etiquette for such connexions also.

Thus it is hardly an option to consider 5th. c. A.D. Emperors as addressee, the only candidates between A.D. 400 and 450 being the combination of the usurper Constantine III, Honorius who did not recognise him, and Arcadius, A.D. 407–408, when Constantine and Arcadius both had living sons. Such circumstances of usurpation and disaster do not suit the Anon. The period after A.D. 450 is precluded by the rapid decline and collapse of the Western government.

The sophist Libanius who advised Constantius III in A.D. 421 on how to operate against the barbarians ‘without soldiers’ is unlikely, therefore, to have been our Anon. Although Constantius had a living son, Valentinian III, born A.D. 419, Theodosius II’s first child, his daughter Eudoxia, was not born until A.D. 422. It is nevertheless possible that the Anon. knew that Eudoxia was pregnant and assumed the child would be a son. He is, notwithstanding, an example of the same kind of cultural phenomenon as that suggested here for the Anon.

Given that V. and the Anon. both offered unsolicited advice to Theodosius I and wrote to some extent similarly about the Roman army, could they be identical? This must be denied; the cultural, social and suggested geographical backgrounds of the two are completely diverse, not to mention their very different styles of writing. However it is interesting and may be significant that both did something comparable apparently almost simultaneously at the same Court. One may compare the activity of the historical epitomators Festus and Eutropius in Valens’ reign, and perhaps the ‘Lives of the Caesars’ prepared by Victor and his pseudonymous counterparts in the late-4th. c. In view of the fact that the Epitome de Caesaribus tells us about Theodosius’ literary interest, it may be that Theodosius I really encouraged such studies and the proffering of advice, and that neither the Anon. nor V. risked

334See above section (b).
335Ps.-Victor Epit. de Caes. 48.11–12.
as much as we may think by taking up the gauntlet to express their deep-seated anxiety about
the State of the Empire in the aftermath of Adrianople.

Since V. was writing an extremely delicate work for the Emperor, and was invited by
him when John I. was away, he had considerable room to doubt. Although he had
repeatedly before the swept personal solicitude in the phrase, but I obviously realize he
was his Emperor might be should have been given. No doubt he was the contemporary
belief in classical culture and in the underlying value of his module.

But in fact, V. was not an easy-going writer, nor a person to seek out, a
professed leader, but some to seek out, a person who was not allegedly
solicitous in the contemporaneous country. What the man's hand is a person from
who is to deplore the apparent dispensation of the uncontrolled power controlling
preservation or the making of influence, he allegedly one of the men to build
preservation and a method of selection of people of influence, the uncontrolled
action of the people and small of society, and with the administration of state.

Text continues...
Ch. 5. Vegetius and the army of Theodosius. Pt. I.

(a) Imperial Strategy.

Since V. was writing an ostensibly didactic work for the Emperor, and was invited by him after Book I to carry on,¹ he had considerable locus standi. Although we can readily believe his professed lack of expert personal authority in his chosen field,² obviously neither he nor his Emperor thought he should have kept silence. No doubt both shared the contemporary belief in classical culture and in the enduring value of V.'s sources.

But in fact V. was not an antiquary setting out to preserve an ancient text. He specifically tailored his material towards definite goals, attempting to remedy alleged deficiencies in the contemporary military organization. He used his book as a platform from which to deplore the supposed disappearance of the traditional legionary training-programme or disciplina militaris,³ the alleged loss of the skill to build proper camps,⁴ neglect of traditional procedures of selection or probatio of recruits,⁵ the so-called abolition of heavy infantry arms and armour, and with it the abandonment of static legionary tactics,⁶ and the failure to maintain

¹Epit. II praef.
²Epit. I.8 p.13.9-11: Nihil enim mihi auctoritas adsumo sed horum, quos supra retuli, quae dispersa sunt, veluti in ordinem epitomatos conscribo. Frustrated scholars from Stewechius ('If V. had not made his epitome Cato, Celsus, Frontinus, Paterinus, Macer, Menander, etc. would have survived,' quoted by Schwebel, vi) to J.W. Foerster, Diss. Bonn, 1879, p.1 ('Fuisse mihi videtur non mediocris fatuitatis, qui quae scribere ipse parum imellegeret nee esset digerendis rebu.r in eum quem proposuerat ordinem'), have reacted angrily to V.'s lack of military expertise. But the most satirical barb was delivered by Scriverius; he wanted, he tells us, to emend and comment upon Polybius but lacked the necessary skills, so settled for V.: Sic procl. Penelopes, cum ad ipsam dominam accessus non paret, cum ancillis illius misceret. Such comments are superficial. No one has asked himself what V. was trying to do with his military manual.
⁶Epit. I.20: Sed in hac parte antiqua penitus consueuta deleta est; nam liceb exemplum Gothorum et Alanorum Hunorumque equitum arma pecerentur, pedes constat esse nudatos, etc. Epit. II.15: Post hos erant ferentarii et levis armatura, quos nunc escutatores et armaturas dicimus, scutati [qui] plumbatis gladiis et missilibibus accincti, sicut nunc proprie omnes millites videntur armati.
proper navies to control the whole of the Mediterranean. Those areas of current military practice which were not allegedly deficient, the progress of cavalry training, arms and equipment, the supply of good mounts, and the performance of the river fleets, are deliberately omitted from his purview.

Thus all four books were intended in some measure as a critique of the present. It is all the more surprising therefore that he enjoyed the continued encouragement of the Emperor, who will have borne some of the blame unless V. were writing near the start of the particular administration he is addressing. Quite likely, therefore, since his concerns are overwhelmingly with the western Empire, V. was addressing Theodosius I during his sojourn in Italy A.D. 388-391, who had come to save the west from the misgovernment of the usurper. From his writings, V. appears to have enjoyed a position of confidence with his Emperor.

Book III was a particularly risky book to write, being on strategy and good generalship, issues which touched directly the competence of the Emperor himself and his magistri militum. The only direct criticism comes in a chapter (III.11) on what to do on the day of a general engagement before battle commenced, where an excited, rhetorical passage accuses 'Roman generals' of recent incompetence, plausibly interpreted by Goffart and Sabbah as a reference to the battle of Adrianople A.D. 378.

If V. is responding to specific events here, his general treatment of strategy appears modified by the same concerns. Horror of the general engagement or conflictus publicus affects the presentation of battle in Book III, since this section (III.11-25) is deliberately delayed from ch. 9 to ch. 11 against the imagined impatience of the reader in a literary enactment of the principle that everything else should be tried first, before the 'ultimate

---

7Epit. IV.31: *Romanus autem populus pro decor et utilitate magnitudinis suae non propter necessitatem tumultus alicuius classem parabat ex tempore, sed, ne quando necessitatem sustineret, semper habuit praeparationem. Nemo enim bello laessere aut facere audet iniuriam et regno vel populo, quem expediet et promptum ad restitendum vindicandumque cognoscit. Apud Misenum igitur et Ravennam singulae legiones cum classibus stabant, etc.*

8Epit. III.26: *De equitatu sunt multa praecepta; sed cum haec pars militae usu exerciti, armorum genere, equorum nobilitate profecerit, ex libris nihil arbitor colligendum cum praesens doctrina sufficiat.*

9Epit. IV.46: *De lusoris, quae in Danubio agrarias cotidianas tuerantur excubibus, reticendum puto, quia arit amplitus in his frequentior usus invent, quam velus doctrina monstraverat.*

10See ch. 1 (c) and ch. 3 (d) 9.

abyss'. In a passage that may seek to define the Emperor’s strategic relation to Valens, the reader is told that being no doubt eager above all to hear what the ancient sources had to advise on tactics for the pitched battle, he should know first that ‘good generals do not attack in open battle where the danger is mutual, but do it always from a hidden position, so as to preserve their own forces as far as possible and kill or at least terrify the enemy’. This is an extraordinary passage, given that Latin works on strategy traditionally culminated at the centre in the general action. Such is the structure of Frontinus’ Stratagems, where Book I treated of ea, quae ante proelium gerenda sunt, Book II ea, quae in ipso proelio agi solent (II.1-8), et deinde ea, quae post proelium (II.9-13), and V.’s Book III retains the outlines of the same structure too. The considerations raised in his chapters 9-10 on the state of readiness of Roman forces, too, do not inevitably lead to the adoption of guerilla tactics as the best solution, but certainly point in that direction unless a great deal of recruitment, arming and training had first taken place. This is quite different from the traditional precept that the general should not expose his own person in battle, and comes close to saying that the army should not be exposed unless all else fails.

Ammianus’ view was also that a guerilla strategy was needed against the Goths, whereas Profuturus and Traianus decided to pit legiones from Armenia against them in pitched battle in A.D. 377. Shortly before Valens’ fateful showdown, Ammianus describes a successful night raid on Fritigern’s marauding Goths led by Sebastianus while Valens was still in Constantinople, which seems to stand in significant comparison with Valens’ actions on taking direct personal charge of the campaign. Fritigern was afraid that this ‘effective general’

---

12Epit. III.9 p.86.9ff.: Ideo omnia ante cogitanda sunt, ante tempianda, ante facienda sunt, quam ad ultimum veniat abruptum.

13Ibid. 4ff., 11ff.: Quisquis hos artis bellicae commentarios ex probatisimis auctoribus brevioros legere dignabitur, quam primum rationem proelii depugnandi que audit audire praecipia. Sed... Boni enim duces non aperto proelio, in quo est commune periculum, sed ex occulto semper atemptant, ut integris suis, quantum possunt, hostes interimant vel certe terrorant, in qua parte, quae necessaria admodum sunt ab antiquis reporta perscribam.

14Cf. Onas. 33.

15Amm. 31.7.2: qui cum ad loca venissent, ubi particulatim perque furtam magis et latrocinia multitudino minuit debet hostis, ad id, quod erat perniciosum, intempestive conversi legiones ab Armenia ducis opposuere usum adhuc spirantium barbaris operisque quidem Martio saepe recte compactas, sed impares plebi immensa...

16Amm. 31.10.4: secuta luce impetu clandestino erupit vespereque incendente Gothorum viciantur cum nec... paulisper operius aggeribus et frutecis obscura nocte suspensus passibus consortus aggressus est adeoque
might attack and destroy his forces while they were scattered for plunder, which is exactly the strategy that V. recommends. Viewed through the prism of Adrianople, other examples of guerrilla tactics take on warmer colours. Ammianus again gives his approval to Count Theodosius’ strategy in Africa, A.D. 373. The blow delivered to Roman martial pride by defeat probably changed strategic perceptions radically; we cannot know that Ammianus and his contemporaries would have sneered at Profuturus and Traianus, ambo rectores anhelantes quidem altius, sed imbelles, before that event as they did after it.

The council-of-war was, we are told, one of the ‘chief opportunities for the general’s art’. To it informed persons from any part of the army should be brought, and a full and frank discussion of the balance of forces should take place in an atmosphere free from ‘all flattery, which does so much harm’. Again there may in this emotional language be an allusion to Adrianople, for at his council-of-war as reported by Ammianus Valens was carried away by his own determination ‘and the adulatory opinion of certain courtiers’. V.’s council-of-war, by contrast, might decide that battle was inadvisable. As a vir inlustris and member of the Consistory council, V. will have had direct of experience of the adulation which distorted the Emperor’s judgement, and of which Ammianus repeatedly complains. V.’s image of the...
Emperor judging as between parties to a civil suit may reflect his own preferred solution to the problem of flattery rather than official procedure, but is not necessarily an inappropriate method of analysing objectively the pro’s and con’s and choosing between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ in respect of a proposed military action.24

Further examples of V. putting his own programme into individual chapters probably not derived originally from his sources may be found in the rhetorically coloured ‘exhortations’ or adhortationes, designed in the one case25 to encourage the Emperor or his magistri militum, masked by si quis, to enlist Roman citizens in the legions (rather than mainly barbarian élite light infantry regiments of auxilia palatina,26 élite cavalry vexillationes and irregular units of barbarian foederati),27 and in the other intended to provide arguments for urging soldiers to train, in view of the rich rewards offered by the Emperor, not to mention their own safety and the liberty of all.28 These questions bring us to the ‘hidden agenda’ of the Epit., how to reverse the barbarization of the army and its failure to maintain skills.

(b) Army policy.

1. Barbarization and loss of skills.

If V. were well-informed about the military developments of which he was a contemporary witness, we should make a serious attempt to derive evidence from him, positive or negative, for army policy in the reign of Theodosius. Some confidence may be placed in the fact that V. is familiar with the progress made in the use of river patrols on the Danube.29 Very adroit use of this flotilla was made by Promotus against the Greuthungi in his victory of A.D. 386.30 He also alludes to ‘improvements’ to Roman cavalry led by the example of the Goths, Huns and Alans,31 which can now be linked to the barbarian units settled by Gratian and

24Epit. III.9 p.89.9-11: Dux itaque vigilans sobrius prudens, tamquam de civili causa inter partes indicaturas, aedibus consilio de suis et adversariorum consilio rei iudicet.
27This is implicit and unstated; see below.
28Epit. II.24 Rubric: Exempla adhortationum exercitii militaris de aliis aribus tracta.
29Epit. IV.46.
30Zos. 4.38-39.
31Epit. I.20.
Theodosius in Pannonia in particular. Whatever his opinion of the people, as a connoisseur of horseflesh V. must have known what he was talking about when he rated Hunnish war-horses above all others in De Mulomedicina.

V.'s remarks lamenting the 'broken strength' of the contemporary legions, disparaging the efficiency of composite armies with their backbone of auxilia and exalting the self-sufficiency of the old 6,000-strong integrated cavalry and infantry legions with legionary light-armed as well as heavy, should probably be read in the light of his unfavourable contrast between declining legions and flourishing auxilia, service in which was currently far preferable for their lighter conditions and earlier rewards. So in Epit. II.2 V. explains that the old auxilia were tactical ancillary units to the legions, not the principale subsidium (main reserves) as the auxilia palatina will have been, showing that it was the latter he was gunning for. The use of auxilia palatina as main reserves is traced from the evidence of Ammianus in ch. 6 (a) 3. It thus appears a pardonable if crude characterization to say that the relative rôles of legiones and auxilia in the late-4th. c. were the reverse of those described by Tacitus at Mons Graupius, A.D. 84, granted that several of the palatine legions were almost certainly light-armed too, were used in similar tactical rôles as reserves, and were probably highly barbarized like auxilia palatina.

Hoffmann has traced the rise of the mainly barbarian auxilia palatina, especially marked in the second half of the 4th. c. A.D., precisely at the expense of new formations of legiones palatinae and comitatenses, without using the evidence of V. Thus V's reference to the attenuation of the legion will refer to the legiones palatinae and comitatenses, numerically

---

32 Cf. the large number of cavalry units found in Pannonia II and Valeria c. A.D. 400, J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, op. cit., 28.
33 Mul. 3.6.2.
34 Epit. II.3.
35 Epit. II.1-2.
36 Epit. II.3 p.37.5-9.
37 Tac. Agric. 35.2.
38 See section (g) below, and ch. 6 (a) 3, p. 225.
39 D. Hoffmann, op. cit., I. 403-404.
fewer as compared to the auxilia palatina and equites/vexillationes, and in respect of size a mere fraction of the old legion of 6,000.

V.'s dislike also of the large numbers of barbarians enrolled from the frontier zones and beyond in irregular and ethnic units by Theodosius I especially, which are omitted from the 'regular' lists, is expressed by implication in Epit. III.1 in his criticism of oriental tyrants 'who armed innumerable populations' and the difficult logistics of moving their unwieldy hordes, and by the comment that it was cheaper to train one's own people than to hire alieni as mercenaries (Epit. I.28 fin.).

Yet there is in V. no expression of the fear of the barbarization of the army voiced by Synesius in Constantinople A.D. 399. Isolated remarks about the greater flexibility and lower cost of infantry compared to cavalry, and on infantry being the main strength of an army, which should perhaps be read in the light of the express progress of Roman cavalry exemplo Gothorum et Alanorum Hunorumque (I.20 init.), and the implication of the climatic theory of martial qualities that barbarians are either too pugnacious and stupid or too intelligent and cowardly, are all we get. A supposedly tendentious statement designed to understate the proportion of auxiliaries to citizens in the old Roman armies, identified by Schwebel, probably refers without inaccuracy to the old differential between the sizes of legions and auxiliary units, while the comment that the Romans traditionally ensured that the number of citizens in camp was not surpassed by that of sociales auxiliares neutrally restates conditions from the middle Republic, as we can see from the context, and this situation is replicated in Polybius' figures for his camp (if one ignores cavalry).

---

40 D. Hoffmann, op. cit., II.319-322, listing 107 legions, 96 vexillations and 107 auxilia palatina.
41 The standard hypothesis of the size of the 'new legion' is 1,000 men. Cf. E. Ritterling, RE XII (1950) 1350, D. Hoffmann, op. cit., I.4, 215.
42 J.H.W.G. Liebeschütz, Barbarians and Bishops: Army, Church, and State in the Age of Arcadius and Chrysostom (Oxford 1990), 30-34.
43 Synes. De Regno (14) 22.45-48 (PG LXVI.1092a).
44 Epit. II.1 p.34.16-18, cf. III.9 p.87.1-2.
45 Epit. I.2; see ch. 7 (c), p.259.
46 Epit. II.1 p.35.8-9, cf. Schwebel, 201.
We should have expected more anti-barbarian prejudice than this, given V.'s programme to restore the legions of 6,000 on a nationalist basis. Was it, then, merely the maximum condition called for, whereas Synesius wanted a national army as a sine qua non? Was V.'s minimum case, more moderately and realistically for his times, merely the restoration of traditional recruitment and training of Romans in the field army legions without prejudice to the existing use of barbarians?48 That must be denied; as will become clear below, the present reliance on barbarians had already reached unprecedented proportions, whereas the nature of the 'ancient legion' whose training and arms V. would restore is such as to entail the downgrading and reduction of barbarians units of elite cavalry and infantry, and of barbarian irregulars, if it were introduced on a wide scale.

Thus V.'s was a nuanced programme, in its way a sophisticated tract that could marshal a range of political and military sentiment in the desired direction subtly couched in military rather than political terms. But its implications amounted to a cunning and wide-ranging assault on the barbarians within, quite as much as on those without.

There is some reason to think that his Emperor's policy was at odds with V.'s programme. After the impetus given to the creation of new auxilia palatina regiments by Valentinian I,49 Theodosius150 and Honorius51 continued to create them in his wake, whereas only one new formation can be attributed to Valentinian II.52 Hoffmann thinks it possible that the settlement of Visigoths in 382 gave rise to a significant part of Theodosius' new auxilia palatina creations, Theodosius being persuaded of their value by Valentinian's creations in the west, as there were hardly any in the east hitherto, though perhaps many too were formed from units taken from the defeated army of Maximus. Several vexillationes were also created by Theodosius and Honorius, and the large number of limitanean cavalry units listed in Pannonia c. A.D. 400 in the Notitia Dignitatum has been linked with the settlement with the Goths, Huns

48Epist. II.18 p.52 appears to call for precisely this minimum case, in the culminating central point of the book presenting the legio antiqua of 6,000. But a reference to the 'long-changed times'—olim est consuetudo mutata quae viguit—points to the real task.
50Hoffmann, 241–243, identifying at least 12 regiments.
51Hoffmann, 404, identifying 24 regiments.
52Hoffmann, 168.
and Alans reached by Gratian and Theodosius in 380. Theodosius thus ultimately and perhaps already acted directly against the advice of V. He may have had no choice.

Blame for the defeat of Adrianople was put by contemporaries not on barbarization but on poor discipline in the army, neglect of the defences, and cowardice, in the eastern Empire at least, since Libanius defends the troops from these charges. According to him, the soldiers had been as brave as their predecessors of more glorious times: some ‘angry god’ had sided against the Romans, because of the failure to avenge the murder of Julian. Themistius’ strategy to crush the barbarian invader between the armies of the East and West in a co-ordinated pincer movement implied blame of Valens for not waiting for Gratian in 378.

But people do appear in the years following A.D. 378 to have been increasingly uneasy at the barbarization of the army, conceiving feelings of fear and resentment which intensified until Synesius openly called for the complete eradication of the barbarian element in the eastern armies in A.D. 399. Some support for such a conclusion may be found in Ammianus. Not only did this experienced soldier take a dim view of the post-Adrianople development whereby barbarian units were usually commanded by barbarian officers, instead of Romans—which given the training rôle of officers must have had a deleterious effect on training,—but he approved of the massacre of Gothic serving soldiers carried out in the aftermath of the battle by these Roman officers in the East on the orders of Julianus, magister militum per Orientem. His hostility to the popular recruitment-policy of adaeratio of recruits raised within the Empire springs from a deep-seated reason which he preferred to leave in an obscurity which may parallel V.’s veiled opposition to recruiting too many barbarians. The church historian Socrates, looking back from Constantinople in the mid-5th. c., also saw in Valens’ introduction of adaeratio of Roman recruits, which he linked to the admission of large numbers of Goths on condition of military service in A.D. 376, ‘the origin of disasters to the Roman

54 Liban. Or. 24.5.
55 Them. Or. 15.197a (A.D. 381).
56 De Regno (14) 23,48 (PG LXVI.1092 C–1093 A).
57 V. Epit. II.9, 12, 14, Nov. Theod. II 24.1.
58 Amm. 31.16.8.
59 Amm. 19.11.7, see section (b) 2. (vi.) below, p. 165.
Empire shortly after. His talk of Valens' neglect of the regular Roman forces parallels complaints made against Gratian soon afterwards.

V. represents a point on the same scale of perceptions, while it was not yet politic for him in his particular circumstances to voice these fears in precisely these terms. Synesius spoke out at a time when a powerful faction at Arcadius' court was in open revolt against barbarization. V., a member of another court himself, spoke out in guarded, indirect, but no less effective terms. Although V. nowhere equated loss of skills with barbarization, it was safe enough, without missing the ulterior target, to attack the loss of skills and discipline among the (already strongly barbarized) court troops as being responsible for defeats at the hands of the barbarians, especially when the proposed solution was a return to a national Roman army based on traditional disciplina militaris. Educated Romans could be expected to take the hint, while barbarian magistri militum might like to think that the targets were only loss of skills and indiscipline.

The threat from barbarians within as such will have been more sharply perceived as the reign of Theodosius went on and conditions worsened visibly. Having failed to defeat them in pitched battle, Gratian and Theodosius reached accommodations with the victors of Adrianople which resulted in the handing over to them of large tracts of Pannonia, Moesia and Thrace, and the having to accept a sudden and uncontrolled influx into the Roman army of thousands of Goths, Huns and Alans. The realities of this will have taken a while to sink in, but perhaps the most far-reaching implications will have been for the army.

In the years before the campaign against Maximus A.D. 388, Theodosius created rather few regular units, though they included perhaps five new barbarian auxilia palatina and a vexillatio palatina. But he also enrolled numerous barbarian irregular units. In the aftermath of Adrianople Goths were enrolled in large numbers, until they came to preponderate, if

---

60 socr. 4.34: Τούτῳ δ' ἀρχῇ γέγονε τοῦ δοκτορόρα τύχε πρὸς ἄλλων τὴν Ρωμαίων ἀρχήν.
61 T. D. Barnes, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies XXVII (1986), 93–112.
63 D. Hoffmann, op. cit. p.467. They included the Visi and Tervingi, aux. pal., Not. Dig. Or. 5.61, 6.61.
Zosimus is to be believed.\(^{64}\) For the period following the peace treaties of the early 380's, Themistius lists only Celts, Assyrians, Libyans, Iberians, soldiers from Tigris and Armenia, and Arabs.\(^{65}\) But Theodosius' expeditionary army of A.D. 388 was notable for the size and variety of its new irregular units: Goths, Huns, Alans, Iberians and Isaurians are mentioned.\(^{66}\)

After the defeat of Maximus, a considerable number of regular units (and perhaps irregular) of the western field army were taken into the eastern Emperor's two praesental armies listed in the Notitia Dignitatum,\(^{67}\) losses which must have greatly accelerated the barbarization of the western armies, and perhaps increased the barbarian element in the eastern armies. During Honorius' reign units of limitanei were drafted into gaps among the comitatenses and palatini in Africa and Gaul.\(^{68}\) Already Maximus' intervention had been prompted by Gratian's excessive favour towards Alan irregulars, and yet Maximus too had to rely heavily on barbarian irregulars.\(^{69}\) In the second civil war of A.D. 394 Eugenius' army of hordes of Frank and Alaman foederati\(^{70}\) was defeated by Theodosius' expeditionary army composed largely of Gothic, Alan, Iberian and Armenian foederati, apparently led by three tribal chieftains, Gainas, Saul and Bacurius, corresponding to the three federate blocks of Tervingi from Thrace, Goths and Alans from Pannonia, and Iberians and Armenians.\(^{71}\) Claudian's description of this army suggests that it was made up of numerous different ethnic tribal units, most of them, it seems, federate.\(^{72}\)

Despite strenuous efforts on the part of Theodosius, who seems to have reinforced the eastern field armies with more than twenty new regiments, at least twelve of them auxilia palatina, and to have filled gaps in the limitanei of Armenia, Mesopotamia, Osrhoene, Egypt

\(^{64}\)Zos. 4.30-31.
\(^{65}\)Or. 16.207a (A.D. 383), 34.20 (56-58), 15.189d, 18.219b.
\(^{66}\)Pac. Pan. Lat. 12 (2) 32.3-4, 33.4-5; Ambr. Ep. 40.22.
\(^{67}\)D. Hoffmann, op. cit. pp. 490-516.
\(^{69}\)Ambr. Ep. 24.4, 8.
\(^{70}\)cf. Zos. IV.53-54, Orosius VII.35.11-12, 19, Soc. V.25, Soz. VII.24, Greg.Tur. HF II.8(9).
and the Thebaid left after transfers to the comitatatus. foederati played an ever-increasing rôle in both halves of the Empire. Although recruitment of Roman citizens in the East was to some degree kept up, in the West both comitatenses and limitanei appear to have been allowed to run down, partly because of lack of recruits, and partly because funds were diverted to pay barbarian foederati. The remaining regulars became more and more barbarized as units of foederati were taken over en bloc by the field armies.

There are signs of these developments in V. For instance, when Pacatus talks of Theodosius hiring his Gothic, Hunnish and Alan enemies for the campaign against Maximus, he also alludes to their earlier sacking of Pannonian cities. V. also makes special reference to Roman defeats inflicted by Gothic archers 'which led to the overthrow of so many cities', this in almost the same breath as he informs us of the progress Roman cavalry had (since) made as a result of the collaboration with the Goths, Alans and Huns. There is a good chance that these are the same incidents under discussion. It has already been noted that the Hunnish and Alan cavalry, and the Saracens and 'Indians', whose admiration V.'s Emperor had earned, appear to be on his side in the epilogue to Book III.

V.'s concern is with Illyricum/Pannonia elsewhere in Book I, too. The historical example of the Joviani and Herculanii 'stationed in Illyricum, legions of 6,000 men each', in the reign of Diocletian and Maximian is held up for admiration of their special weapon, the matriobarbulus or lead-weighted javelin, with which they had deterred the barbarians from all wars in the region. In the final chapter to Book I, the named provinces from which V. wished to see recruitment of Romans are all in the Balkans and Italy. Thus it was the state of the army in the Balkans which worried V. most between A.D. 383 and 395, his regional

---

74Ibid. 612.
75Pac. Pan. Lat. II.32.3: *Qua tua benignitate pellectae omnes Scythiae nationes tantis examinibus confluabant, ut quem remiseras tuas, barbaris videreris imperasse dilectum.*
76Ibid. 32.4: *O res digna memoria! Ibat sub ducibus vestissime Romanus, et signa contra quae sierat sequebatur, urbesque Pannoniae quas inimica dudum populatione vacaverat miles impiebat.*
77Epit. 1.20 p.22.11-12: *post tot clades, quae usque ad totiarum urbium exsida pervenerunt...*
78Ibid. p.22.1-2: *licet exemplo Gothorum et Alanorum Hunnorumque equitum arma profecerint...*
79See ch. 3 (d) 7.
80Epit. 1.17: *Per hos longo tempore strenuissime consat omnia bella confecta...*
81Epit. 1.28.
concern being paralleled by Jerome's. And in this context Roman setbacks must be those that preceded the settlement of Goths, Huns and Alans by Gratian and Theodosius in return for settlement and military service.

V.'s routs of Roman armies at the hands of Goths because of specific details cannot be put down to reminiscences of Adrianople. The routs led up to the sack of cities identified above as in Pannonia. It is likely that cities had also been sacked in Macedonia and Thessaly in the period A.D. 378-380. It may be a sign of V.'s knowledge of the region also that the leather caps these troops wore 'almost to the present day' when not in battle-dress, were called *Pannonici*; V. is the sole source for this name.

The hapless troops were perhaps once those of Gratian, because it was from him that they had allegedly obtained permission to switch their heavy infantry to light-armed style, and V. is quite particular that they handed in their body-armour or *catafractae*, and their helmets, for which we may compare the military regulation on discharge. But whether this is contemptuous irony, of which V. is fond, or part of the truth, we cannot tell. Of course, if a *legio comitataensis* adopted the style and arms of an *auxilium palatinum*, something of the kind might conceivably have happened. The *scholae palatinae*, we know, did successfully petition Theodosius II for curtailments of the coercive powers of their own commanding officers. If the troops were once those of Gratian, and were lately losing battles against the Goths in the Balkans, it is possible that some of them were those lent by Gratian under Bauto and Arbogast to Theodosius in 378–379. But it is clear from Ammianus that Roman heavy infantry fought in large enough numbers for Valens at Adrianople, and Gratian's *comitatenses* and probably

---

82Hieron. Ep. 60.16.2 (CSEL LIV.1.1), c. A.D. 397, looking back over 20 years.
83Epit. 1.21 p.25.6–13; cf. 1.20 p.22.8–13.
84Zon. 4.32.2.
87Nov. Th. II 21 (17/4/441).
89Amm. 31.13.3: *et mutatis securium ictibus galeae perfringebantur atque loricae...*
Frankish troops under king Mallobaudes, *comes domesticorum*, as well still wore gleaming metallic, and so heavy, armour in A.D. 378. Thus either their adoption of light arms was very recent, or V. was indulging in rhetorical hyperbole to some extent at least.

Gratian’s policy of inviting and enrolling Alan deserters from the enemy, which caused fatal resentment among his existing troops, is parallel to Theodosius’ inviting Gothic deserters north of the Danube to join his colours. This was arguably, therefore, a common policy brought about by the military and political situation. In Gratian’s case one might speculate that it could have been the new Alan troops who most objected to wearing cataphracts and helmets, as the old troops were used to wearing them. Some of these at least were mounted and turn up as a *vexillatio palatina* in Italy. If V. criticized Gratian by name, he could not criticize Theodosius, because he was the dedicatee and reigning Emperor. But the points raised were equally pertinent to both.

One traditional sign of falling *disciplina militaris* was the failure or loss of ability to build camps. But some specific events of the 380’s may perhaps be identified in V’s exaggerated insistence on the failure to build proper camps ‘for many years’. The latest camp in this period of which we have knowledge was that built by Valens at Adrianople; there is no warrant at all in Ammianus for thinking of a general loss of the science of fortifications among regular Roman armies.

Yet V. insists that it was the failure to encamp that had led to specific defeats ‘by day and by night’. It is interesting in this connexion that Zosimus tells of an episode of Theodosius’ campaign against the Goths in 391 en route from Italy, in which he was nearly

---

90Amm. 31.10.10, 14.
91Zos. 4.35.2.
92Zos. 4.30.1.
94See ch. 1 (c) and 3 (d) 8-9.
95See section (c) below.
96Amm. 31.12.4: *vallo sudibus fossaque firmato*.
captured by the enemy in a night attack against his army which had just come from a victory, because it seems evident that they had not built a camp or kept up proper watches.99 Amazingly, the same thing appears to have happened in 380 also, if this or the later passage is not a doublet.100 These examples of Theodosius' generalship contrast with Ammianus' account of Julian after the battle of Strasbourg, when he remained on his guard and camped within a ring of arms, a respectable form of temporary camp when a more substantial structure was impossible.101

Grosse reconstructed the circumstances of the loss of fortifications skills hypothetically as the product of spreading barbarization,102 pointing to Ammianus for indication that the 'auxiliary soldiers'—i.e. auxilia palatina103—normally refused to undertake this sort of work already in Julian's reign as Caesar,104 and to Ammianus' colourfully expressed reservations about the Gallic legiones Magnentiacae at the siege of Amida, where they seemed to Grosse 'the real type of barbarian soldier of the time', useless for any work involved in defending cities.105 If the characterization is just, it was when such soldiers became the majority that the loss of science will have begun to be permanent.

But barbarians could be taught to build camps under appropriate supervision. The mainly barbarian Scutarii (schola palatina) and Cornuti (auxilia palatina) are mentioned as

---

99 Zos. 4.49.
100 Zos. 4.31.3-4.
101 Amm. 16.12.62: miles prope supercilia Rheni tendebat, scutorum ordine multiplicato vallatus. V. Nischer's view loc. cit. against Grosse Röm. Militärgeschichte (1921) 228 that this was a built camp is contradicted by other evidence of lines of fortifications constructed out of arms in Amm. (24.8.7, multiplicato scutorum ordine in orbiculatum figuram metatis tuitas quievimus castris, cf. 25.1.2, where vallo should imply Nom. vallus = stockade of spears and shields (cf. Livy 8.8.11: scuta innixa humeris, hastas suberecta cuspide in terra fixas, haud secus quam vallo saepa inhorei acies), 25.3.1, where the Roman army is unable to build a camp with palisade and ditches because of the constant Persian attacks, 29.4.5, Valentinian lays a camp ad tempus brevissimum, and 24.4.10, where Julian surrounds Mazzamalcha with ordine trino scuatorum, while he lies himself in a strongly defended camp). Ps.-Hyg. 52 is convincing proof of Grosse's interpretation of Ammianus.
102 R. Grosse, Byzantinische Zeitschrift XXII (1913) 95–96.
103 So Hoffmann, op. cit., I.72.
104 Amm. 18.2.6: auxiliae milites semper minia spenerentes huiusmodi ad obsequendi sedulitatem iuliani blanditis deflexi... Cf. V. Epit. II.3 p.37.5–9 on the lighter service and earlier rewards of the auxilia, in contrast to the legions, magnus... labor... gravior arma; plura munera, severior disciplina.
105 Amm. 19.5.2: virorum fortium et pernicium, ad planarios conflictus aportum, ad eas vero bellis artes, quibus stringebamus, non modo inhabiles, sed contra nimii turbatores; qui, cum neque in machinis neque in operum constructione iavarent, aliquotiens stolidius erumpentes dimicantesque fidelissime minuo numero revertebant, tantum proficientes, quantum in publico, ut aiunt, incendio aqua uniis hominum mansa aggesta.
taking part with other infantry units in building a camp in A.D. 377. On the other hand one can well believe that irregular units lacked such skills, and the post-Adrianople increase in barbarian units not officered by Romans of which Ammianus complains may well have furthered the loss of such skills also. In what is perhaps meant as satire, V. commends (Epit. III.10 p.92.12–18) the Gothic carrago and the Persian use of sandbags for building a rampart as lessons for the allegedly resourceless Romans. But V. may have a serious point too, since he recommends the multiform camp over the traditional rectangle. Grosse was perhaps right after all to see serious and grave developments behind V.’s rhetorical point.

2. Recruitment.

(i.) High demand for recruits.

Hoffmann’s magisterial verdict on Theodosius’ eastern army A.D. 379–388 was that he never had enough men to settle the Goths on the battlefield. Thus he was forced to make friends with them. Even Promotus’ victory over the East Goths/Greuthungi in 386 was achieved by treachery and craft, and national Roman troops played scant part. So too in the campaign against Maximus, Theodosius was forced to rely largely on internal and external allies. Only the defeat of Maximus enabled him to fill the gaps in his eastern army left from Adrianople with numerous elite units of the defeated western army. One explanation of the given historical circumstances of the Roman armies in both halves of the Empire would be a real shortage of Roman military manpower in this period, but the causes of this are complex. V. himself attributes it partly to demographic decline, partly to what we may call the continuing demilitarisation of the senatus populusque Romanus whereby fewer and fewer Romans were allowed or prepared to take up arms, partly to the unco-operativeness of great landowners in surrendering fit and able peasants to the levy, and partly to corruption among recruiting officers

---

106 Amm. 31.8.9.
107 Cf. J. Straub, Dissertationes Bernenses I.4 (1952) 19–39, esp. 25–28. His study of the carrago concluded that the phenomenon of the Gothic ‘Wagenburg’ in this sense belonged precisely to the movements of the late 4th. c. since the term is first attested in Amm. 31.7.7, cf. 7.5, and the concept is familiar to V., Claudian In Ruf. 125ff., SHA Aurel. 11.6 and Orosius 5.16.17. Note that the Alans also had a similar ‘Wagenburg’ (Amm. 31.2.18, perhaps already witnessed in the 2nd. c. by Arrian since he inserts it incongruously in the Anab. 5:22.4), and so too the Huns (Amm. 31.2.10) probably. See also ch. 7 (e).
109 Zos. 4.35.1.
and the government’s own neglect. We may add an increased demand for recruits in proportion to the increased size of the 4th. c. army, or if we accept MacMullen’s argument that there was actually a negligible increase in army size, then in proportion to increased desertion-rates.

On the other hand the evidence is plentiful for a vigorous campaign of recruitment of regulars in the East in the aftermath of Adrianople. Peasants were levied, even miners, but the government’s criteria of selection were as high as ever. Despite the crisis in which nearly two-thirds of the Eastern field army had been destroyed, slaves were not recruited, nor even were certain categories of tradesmen such as cooks, bakers, innkeepers or workers in imperial factories or slave workshops.

V. alludes to this law, which was traditional, in Epit. I.7. Further laws at this time include CTh 7.13.9 (26/4/380), recruiting-officers to be of incorruptible character, CTh 7.13.10 (5/9/381), the self-mutilated must serve, CTh 7.13.11 (15/5/382), penalty for offering another’s slave, CTh 7.22.9 (14/5/380), 10 (8/7/380) sons of soldiers compelled to serve, and CTh 7.18.3 (29/4/380), 5 (16/1/381), 6 (2/4/382), 7 (12/7/383), on deserters hidden on great estates.

(ii.) Proposal to recruit under age.

There are signs that V. was evaluating in detail the relevance of, and so selecting, parts of the old disciplina militaris with an eye to such contemporary needs. He was aware, for example, that recruits were then usually levied at an older age, by law generally set between 19

---

110 Cf. Finley, M.I., rev. of A.E.R. Boak, Manpower Shortage and the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West (Ann Arbor 1955), JRS XLVII (1957) 156-64. Finley’s justified demolition of Boak’s book is if anything supported by V.’s pluralism in explanations, although he was wrong to deny (p.160) that V. mentions or implies demographic decline at all. See also ch. 7 (c), p. 261.


112 Themistius Or. 14.181b; Libanius Or. 2.251, 24.16.

113 Amm. 31.13.19.


115 V. Epit. I.7 p.11.1-4: Piscatorum aucupes dulciarios linceones onoescque, qui aliqurd tractasse videbatur ad gynaeceas pertinet; longe arbitraver poletendos a castris.

116 CTh 7.13.9: in id delectos quosque viros atque ab omni suspicio pravissatis alienos lustras destinari. Cf. Epit. I.7 p.11.9ff.: Nec leve hoc puerur officium aut passim qubucumque mandandum... Nuncquam exercitus proficit tempore, cuius in probandis tironibus claudicat electio, etc. See further section (ix.) below.
and 35 years,\textsuperscript{117} than in the period of his ideal, when those ‘at the start of puberty’ were taken.\textsuperscript{118} Livy reports after Cannae 216 B.C. the levy of \textit{iuniores} from 17 years and of some \textit{praetextati}.\textsuperscript{119} Similarly Servius refers to the ancient Roman military training of 16 year-olds.\textsuperscript{120} But it does not seem to have been ancient custom to enroll them quite so young as V. suggests. As we see, \textit{post} rather than \textit{incipientem pubertatem} seems to have been the rule. V. may thus be over-compensating for a real contemporary shortage of Roman military manpower, to which reference is also made in I.5 and I.7.\textsuperscript{121} It may be that some of the bad recruits offered by \textit{possessoribus} \textsuperscript{122} were unsuitable by reason of their advanced age.\textsuperscript{123} And evidence shows that in the late-empire some soldiers did serve in their late middle-to-old age with as much as forty years’ service behind them, including senior under-officers earning high rates of pay, who will perhaps have been among those to be forcibly retired according to the proposal of the Anonymus de rebus bellicos.\textsuperscript{124}

(iii.) Proposal to test for strength rather than height.

A second response to the stated problem that volunteers for the army had become scarcer as the population had shrunk and a military career had become less attractive than the civil sector to the ‘physically superior class of youths’\textsuperscript{125} had been the abandonment of the old height qualifications of 6’ or 5’ 10” for \textit{ala} cavalrymen and the ‘First cohorts of the legions’,

\textsuperscript{117}CTh 7.22.2 (318 S.) 20-25 years, 7.13.1 (326 S.) 19-25 years, 7.22.4 (=CTh 12.1.35) (343 S.) 19-35 years.
\textsuperscript{118}Epit. I.4: \textit{Et quidem, si antiqua consuetudo servanda est, incipientem pubertatem ad dilectum cogendum nullus ignorat.}
\textsuperscript{119}Livy 22.57.9.
\textsuperscript{120}Serv. ad Verg. Aen. 7.162: \textit{PUERI ET PRIMAEO FLORE IUVENTUS: Bene Romanae militiae exprimit morem: nam post pubertatem armis exercebantur et sexto decimo anno militabant, quo eiam solo sub custodibus agebant.} See ch. 7 (c).
\textsuperscript{121}Epit. I.5 p.9.17-10.1: \textit{Sed tunc erat amplior multitudo, et plures militiam sequebantur armatam; necdum civilis pars florentiorum abducebat iuventum.} Epit. I.7: \textit{si copia suppetat... dum honestiores quique civilia sectorum officia...}
\textsuperscript{122}Epit. I.7 p.12.3-5: \textit{dum indici possessoribus tales sociantur armis, quales domini habere fastidianti.}
\textsuperscript{123}Epit. I.4: \textit{Melius enim est, ut exercitus iuvenis causeur aetatem nondum advenisse pugnandi, quam dolos praeterisse.}
\textsuperscript{124}Cf. A.H.M. Jones, \textit{The Later Roman Empire} (1964) 635, n.60, J.R. Rea, ‘A Cavalryman’s Career, A.D. 382 (?)–401’, ZPE LXVI (1984) 79–88, letter ii p.84, including a decurion superannuated with 35 years’ service, and a \textit{catafractarius} superannuated with only 20 years’ service. See ch. 4 (c) 2. (vi.), on De rebus bellicos 5.
\textsuperscript{125}Epit. I.5: \textit{Sed tunc erat amplior multitudo, et plures militiam sequebantur armatum; necdum enim civilis pars florentiorum abducebat iuventum.}
repealed for Italy as recently as the reign of Valentinian. V. fully justified government policy in this instead of calling for their restoration.\textsuperscript{126}

(iv.) Call for reversal of demilitarisation.

This process of demilitarisation of Roman society can be deduced also from the study of the career aims of Libanius’ pupils,\textsuperscript{127} from legislation attempting to compel veterans’ sons to serve,\textsuperscript{128} and the continued existence of a legal ban not always strictly enforced on curial-class volunteers\textsuperscript{129} such as Ammianus\textsuperscript{130} and the future Emperor Marcian.\textsuperscript{131}

Although population growth is likely to have occurred in some parts of the Empire,\textsuperscript{132} the unpopularity of military service also appears widespread among Romans.\textsuperscript{133} This social shift of Romans away from the military is one of V.’s major criticisms, and is perhaps the reality behind his literary concept of a \textit{longa pax}.\textsuperscript{134} As we can see from the final chapter of book I, a main aim of the book was to encourage the reversal of this demilitarisation. It is surprising that V. does not mention the occasionally attested practice of self-mutilation, whereby potential recruits attempted to evade service by cutting off their thumbs,\textsuperscript{135} although he does say that the ideal recruit should have long fingers, along with other physical qualities that make up for lack of stature.\textsuperscript{136}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[126]CTh 7.13.3 (367), cf. 7.1.5. The new minimum for Italy was 5’7’’; Grosse, \textit{Römische Militärgeschichte} (Berlin 1921), 216, thinks that a higher standard was applied to the Gauls and Germans, perhaps wishfully. CTh 7.22.8 (372) shows that there was a lower height standard in the \textit{ripenses} than the \textit{comitatenses}.
\item[127]P. Petit, \textit{Les étudiants de Libanius} (Paris 1957), 166ff.
\item[128]CTh 7.22.1 (313 S.), 2 (318 S.), 3 (333), 4 (=12.1.35) (343 S.), 7.1.5 (364 S.), 8 (364 S.), 7.22.7 (365), 8 (372), 9 & 10 (380), cf. 12 (389), 7.20.12 (400).
\item[129]CTh 7.13.4 (367), 5 (368), 10 (381); Amm. 15.12.3 denies that the Gauls would do such a thing, unlike Italians, but is contradicted by CTh 7.13.5 (368).
\item[131]Evagrius HE II.I.1.
\item[132]CTh 7.22.1 (313 S.), 7.13.4 (367), 5 (368), 10 (381); Amm. 15.12.3 denies that the Gauls would do such a thing, unlike Italians, but is contradicted by CTh 7.13.5 (368).
\item[133]Epit. I.6: \textit{Cum haec in tirone signa deprehenderis, proceritatem non magno opere desideres}.
\item[134]See section (e) and ch. 2 (b).
\item[135]CTh 7.22.1 (313 S.), 7.13.4 (367), 5 (368), 10 (381); Amm. 15.12.3 denies that the Gauls would do such a thing, unlike Italians, but is contradicted by CTh 7.13.5 (368).
\item[136]CTh 7.13.3 (367), cf. 7.1.5. The new minimum for Italy was 5’7’’; Grosse, \textit{Römische Militärgeschichte} (Berlin 1921), 216, thinks that a higher standard was applied to the Gauls and Germans, perhaps wishfully. CTh 7.22.8 (372) shows that there was a lower height standard in the \textit{ripenses} than the \textit{comitatenses}.
\end{footnotes}
(v.) Recruitment of coloni.

A second major criticism is the failure to recruit Romans from those whose property was liable for praebitio tironum, defined by a law of Valens as sive senator honoratus principalis decurio vel plebeius, which abolished senatorial immunities granted by Constantius II and Julian.\(^\text{137}\) The failure to trawl from the largest landowners was particularly serious in its implications. Twenty years after this legislation Symmachus in a letter of about the beginning of 395 protests violently that as if capriciously and irregularly he had been included in the capitula and as a result tirones were being exacted from his lands.\(^\text{138}\) This shows the State losing the struggle against the interests of the great possessores. V. merely accuses them of delivering useless bodies to the levy,\(^\text{139}\) a mild criticism when it appears the State was being cheated of large numbers of recruits as well.

Valens' law was of general application to the whole oriental prefecture; it was understood that in some provinces aurum tironicum was more common, in others corpora were exacted, and that such conditions could change according to the period of the indiction, and even from year to year. The growing trend of possessores not to provide the corpora of their coloni (or of their sons—ad crescentes—, in principle the same thing), which led in the early 5th c. to a ban of the recruitment of coloni,\(^\text{140}\) must have produced a tendency to look for adaeratio of the tax.\(^\text{141}\)

(vi.) Adaeratio of recruits.

If Mazzarino exaggerated when he said that the whole work of Ammianus is preoccupied with the problem of recruitment,\(^\text{142}\) we can certainly see Ammianus' strong objections to the developing imperial recruitment policy. It grieved him when some (treacherous) Limigantes were welcomed as mercenaries by Constantius II, a matter which

\(^{137}\)CTh 7.13.7 (375), cf. CTh 11.23.1 (361), 2 (362). See S. Mazzarino, Aspetti Sociali del Quarto Secolo (Rome, 1951), 275ff.

\(^{138}\)Symm. Ep. 9.10.2.

\(^{139}\)V. Epit. 1.7 p.12.1-5: dum longa paci militem incuriosius legit, dum honestiores quique civilia sectantur officia, dum indicii possessoribus tirones per gravitam aut dissimulationem probantium tales sociantur armis, quales domini habere fastidiant.

\(^{140}\)See ch. 3 (b) 2 and (d) 4, p. 63 and 78.

\(^{141}\)CTh 7.13.6.1 (370); indigenas atque ipsius provinciae finibus innutritos vel adficos censibus vel <de> ad crescentibus suis obiderinti iuniores...

\(^{142}\)S. Mazzarino, op. cit., 290.
removed the need for provincials to furnish corpora who were allowed instead to convert to aurum tironicum. The ill-starred policy is blamed on sycophantic courtiers—adulatorum cohors. So too again when in A.D. 376 Valens was persuaded by courtiers to admit the Gothic hordes ‘destined to overthrow the Roman world’—qui Romanam rem eversurus—as bringing large numbers of recruits for the army and permitting the State to collect gold instead of bodies from the provinces as recruitment tax. The State’s hunger for recruits at this time is shown by Valens’ unpopular insistence that monks could be recruited from their lands considered liable to praebitio tironum against the opposition of increasingly powerful Christian vested interests. We have already noticed that Socrates, too, linked adaeratio of recruits with the neglect of the regular army’s prestige and its strength, and deals done by Valens with the Goths in A.D. 376.

(vii.) Contemporary explanations of failure of recruitment.

But although V. was strongly motivated by the failure to recruit Romans in his time, his analysis of the problem (Epit. 1.7 fin.) was in terms of moral failures, of Emperors for allowing indiscipline in the matter of recruitment, of honestiores for failing to volunteer for army service as in the past, of recruitment officers for corruptly or negligently accepting poor-quality recruits from possessores. He does at least look at the mechanics of recruitment, and touches on legislation concerned with it and the practical problems those charged with it might be expected to encounter. But the failure to discuss adaeratio and the link with enrolment of barbarians is a disappointment for us.

Ammianus, too, with all his broader vision—he was writing a history—still fails in the end to discuss adaeratio, even though it is clear that he thought it an important and pernicious development. As we have seen, he to felt unable to go beyond the moral explanation that the Emperor’s flattering courtiers were to blame. The Anonymus de rebus bellicis, who analyses

\[143^\text{Amn. 19.11.7: aurum quippe grata ment provincia corporibus dabunt, quae spat rem Romanam aliquotiens aggravavist.}\]

\[144^\text{Amn. 31.4.4: quae ex ultimis terris tot tirocinia trahens et nec opinanti offerret, ut collatis in unum suis et alienigenis viribus invictum habere exercitum, et pro militari supplemento, quod provinciam annuum pendebat, thesauris accederet auri cumulus magnus.}\]

\[145^\text{Hieronymus Chron. (R. Helm, Eusebius VII (1956?), 248) ad a. 376 and Orosius 7.33.1–4.}\]

\[146^\text{Socr. 4.34, see section (b) 1 above.}\]
social unrest in terms of *avaritia potentium* in the same moralising spirit as the Church Fathers of the time.\(^{147}\) blames the shortage of recruits on the greed of excessive numbers of highly paid officers.\(^{148}\) Libanius blames commanders for keeping units under strength while drawing the superfluous pay and rations.\(^{149}\) The evidence is very strong for a chronic shortage of recruits in the late-4th. c. but the explanation of it was clearly elusive for contemporaries. We should perhaps point to a combination of divergent internal and external demographic pressures, the impoverishment of the State through an increasingly adverse political distribution of private and public power between various competing groups or structures in favour of senators and the Church, and the shrinking economic base of the Roman State as more and more lands were ravaged by invaders.\(^{150}\) But no surviving Roman historian had access to the sort of accurate synoptic quantitative information which would have allowed him to analyse socio-economic problems in anything but moral terms such as we see.

(viii.) Proposal for selective recruitment of *collegiati.*

V. in general supported the government’s policy of enforcing the legal ban on persons of servile status or certain hereditary occupations from joining the military. Hence *linterones omnesque, qui a/liquid tractasse videbuntur ad gynaecea pertinens* \(^{151}\) refers to hereditary workers tied (in this instance) to State-owned *lnyphia* (linen-factories) and *gynaecea* (woollen mills), which made linen garments, sails and military and official uniforms. Their low status was especially emphatic,\(^{152}\) among other partly hereditary trades forbidden to pollute *militia* in the cavalry at least, such as cooks, bakers, innkeepers and brothel-keepers, including also all those belonging to *ergastula* (workshops for slave labour).\(^{153}\) But V. proposes

---

\(^{147}\) See ch. 4 (c) 2 (ii), p. 130.

\(^{148}\) See ch. 4 (c) 2 (vi), p. 135.

\(^{149}\) Liban. Or. 47.31.

\(^{150}\) E.g., in A.D. 384 Theodosius remitted *collatio glebalis* to senators in the dioceses of Macedonia and Thrace, and abolished *capitatio* in Thrace, as Valentinian had done in the Illyrian dioceses shortly before; cf. Jones, 162.

\(^{151}\) Epit. 1.7: ‘linenweavers and all who shall seem to have dealt in anything to do with State textile mills’. See also ch. 7 (c), p. 261.

\(^{152}\) Hence Licinius drafted Christians into *gynaecea* and *lnyphia* as to a kind of hard-labour camps, cf. Eus. VC 2.20.34, Sozom. HEL.8. But although the workers were styled ‘slaves’ or *mancipia* (CTh 10.20.2 (357 S.), 9 (380)), those in one factory a *familia* (CTh 10.20.7 (372)), the workers were de facto free persons tied to their work, cf. A.H.M. Jones, op.cit. II.836.

\(^{153}\) CTh 7.13.8 (380), cf. CJ 12.34.1 (528-9), and cf. CJ 12.57.12 (436).
that other trades again might join up—hence blacksmiths, carriage-makers and stag and boar-hunters were welcome,\textsuperscript{154} but fishermen, fowlers and pastry-cooks were not or ought not to be.\textsuperscript{155} Since the latter group were purveyors of luxuries,\textsuperscript{156} they were inconsistent with a well-ordered army. Hence it was a merit of Theodosius in the panegyrist’s eyes that he instituted a supposedly Spartan régime at court, from which were absent specifically ‘fowlers often enrolled by a shameful levy in the provinces’ and ‘cohorts of huntsmen led under the standards’ who ‘did their military service at banquets’.\textsuperscript{157} However, Zosimus accuses Theodosius of enrolling troops of precisely cooks, wine-waiters and ‘others’.\textsuperscript{158} Pescennius Niger, according to the Historia Augusta, forbade bakers to accompany his army, because soldiers should have been content with \textit{buccellatum} or hard tack; he also sentenced to death a whole \textit{manipulus} of 10 or 11 men (a Vegetian-style \textit{manipulus/contubernium}, see below) for eating a chicken stolen by one of their number.\textsuperscript{159} It is clear that purveyors of luxuries were commonly enrolled, by a long-standing abuse, simply in order to keep the tables of senior army officers well-stocked.\textsuperscript{160} And where discipline was lax such ‘soldiers’ will have set up shop supplying other ranks as well. By law, under the Principate at least, it was forbidden to use soldiers for such purposes.\textsuperscript{161} V. may be proposing a new departure if all \textit{collegiati} were technically banned from military service as some certainly were.

\textsuperscript{154} Cf. Maur. Strat. 12 D., 7 A.pr.45ff., 9. 5.88ff. on the value of hunting for training soldiers.
\textsuperscript{155} Epit. 1.7: \textit{Piscatores aucupes dulciarios... longe arbitor pellendos a castris; fabros ferrarios carpentarios, maccellarios et cervorum apropriam venatores convenire sociare militiae.}
\textsuperscript{156} Cf. also cooks, bakers and innkeepers, the latter being purveyors of wine, cf. Ambr. de Tobia 5.17 (PL XIV 765).
\textsuperscript{157} Pac. Pan. Lat. 2 (12) 14.3: \textit{Ut taceam infamii saepe dilectu scriptos in provinciis aucipes ductusque subinsum venatorum cohortes militasse conviviis...}
\textsuperscript{158} Zos. 4.28.1.
\textsuperscript{159} SHA Pesc. Nig. 10.4-6.
\textsuperscript{160} Cf. Ambr. de Elia 46 on officers’ luxurious parties.
\textsuperscript{161} Dig. 49.16.12 (Macer I. pr. de Re Mil.): \textit{Officium regentis exercitum non tamum in danda sed etiam in observanda disciplina consistit. Paternus quoque scripsit, debere eum, qui se meminerit armato praeseesse, parcissime commenatum dare, eumque militarem extra provinciam duci non permettere, ad opum privatum piscarium venatum militem non mittere, nam in disciplina Augusti ita coevetur: ‘Esi sero fabrilibus operibus exerceris militis non esse alienum, vereor tamen, si quidem permiseris, quod in usum mensum tum meal tum fiat, ne modus in carre non adhibatur, qui mihi sit tolerandus;’ SHA Claud. 14.11: \textit{venatores, qui obsequiuntur duo, carpentarium unum, curum praetorii unum, aquarium unum, piscatores unum, dulciarius unum} (part of a fictitious equipage of a legionary commander).
Proposal to appoint professional recruiting officers.

V. complains about the evil consequences of having corrupt or incompetent recruiting officers, without giving details who these people might be. But the remedy that this important task should 'not be given to anybody', but to 'men of rank' or 'experienced and intelligent men', makes it likely that those charged with carrying out the levy, prior to the procedure before (usually) the dux or provincial military governor for limitanean service (or a magister militum for service in the comitatenses) known as probatio, are envisaged as being of the same sort as the protectores and tribuni who are found charged with rounding up vagi, veterans' sons and deserters in legislation. But since the rôle of beneficiarii employed by provincial civil governors in the collection of arrears of recruits raised by taxation is also attested, whereas curial procuratores tironum were the usual agents for exaction of recruits and aurum tironicum, V.'s reservations probably relate to the curial agents who were most likely to collude with local landowners. Thus his call for a tightening up probably meant greater use of beneficiarii, protectores and tribuni by the central military authorities. In this V. appears to reinforce government policy. Legislation stressed that the moral worth of selectors must be above corruption and uttered dire threats against colluding provincial governors and their curial agents.

Proposal for preliminary testing of recruits.

Before probatio four or so months' training was prescribed by V. to be carried out under the supervision of these officers. During this period the weaknesses of unsuitable recruits could be detected, so that they could be rejected in favour of better candidates. Only

---

162 Epit. I.7: Nec leve hoc pusetur officium aut passim quibuscumque mandandum...
163 Ibid.: A magnis ergo viris magnaque diligentia idoneos eligi convenit iuniores...
164 Epit. II.18: si exercitati et prudentes viri diletui praeponantur... Cf. CTh 7.13.9.
165 Cf. Cf. 12.35.17 (472).
166 Epit. I.7: in probandis tironibus... electio...per gratiam aut dissimulationem probantium... Epit. II.19: ab his, qui tirones probant...
167 CTh 7.18.10 (400), 17 (412); cf. 7.13.6 (370), 8.2.3 (380), 7.20.12 (400), 7.22.2 (318 S.).
169 Jones, 615 with n.16.
170 CTh 7.13.9 (380): in id delectos quosque viros atque ab omni suspicionis praviatis alienos iussimas dessinari. In his si male se gesserint, corrigendis non mediocrem fore denuitamus severa animadversione sententiam, cum judices suppicium exsationionis extremum et ultio inexpiabilis exceptura videatur, ne his quidem provincialibus temperatura, quos in officium ministeriumque praedarum vel capiendi ubertas vel formido simulata deduxerit. Cf. De rebus bellicis 4, denouncing corrupt official exactores.
those who passed this process successfully were then formally to be enrolled.\textsuperscript{171} Such a procedure would seem to us easier to organize if it took place at the base camp of the unit to which a recruit was sent by the provincial military governor after \textit{probatio}.\textsuperscript{172} But it is not attested anywhere, and, pace Davies, was probably not standard. That was perhaps why so much care was taken at \textit{probatio} to select recruits for their physical strength and good character;\textsuperscript{173} once they had been given their \textit{epistula probatoria} they would not normally be rejected during or after training. There was usually no interval between successful completion of \textit{probatio}, the taking the oath or \textit{sacramentum}, and \textit{signatio}, the ‘marking’ of the recruit with a name-tag sealed round the neck or, in the 4th c. and later, a tattoo (see below).\textsuperscript{174} Once approved, the recruits would be sent to their unit with a letter from the governor ordering the unit commander, who usually had no discretion in the matter, to enlist the recruits on the unit’s roll.\textsuperscript{175} A letter of A.D. 505 from the provincial military governor to the tribune of a vexillation at Hermopolis, Egypt, ordered him to enroll a particular locally born recruit if he passed the normal qualifications of physique, age and status, thus delegating the whole procedure to the local commander, but the \textit{de iure} right of selection and rejection remained always with the provincial authorities.\textsuperscript{176}

Thus V. was probably making a ‘new’ proposal designed to overcome the problem of accepting physically unfit bodies mentioned in the previous chapter Epit. I.7. The procedure

\textsuperscript{171} Epit. I.8: \textit{Sed non statim punctis signorum scribendus est itero dilectus, utrum ante exercitio peremptandus, ut, utrum vere tanto operi aptus sit, possit egosc. Et velocitas in illo requirenda videatur et robur, et utrum armorum disciplinam ediscere valeat, utrum habeat confidensiam militare. Plurique enim, quamvis non improbables videantur in specie, tamen experiantur comprobantur indigni. Repudiandi ergo minus utiles et in locum eorum strenuissimi subrogandi sunt.} Epit. II.5: \textit{Diligenter igitur lectis juvenibus animis et corporeibus praestantibus, additis etiam exercitiis cotidianis quibus voluisse, etiam ad quod amplius mensum, iussa auxiliosque invictissimi principis legio formatur. Nam victuris in eis punctis multis scripsit, cum mariquis inter stultae, iureare solent...}

\textsuperscript{172} Even the Emperor might carry out \textit{probatio}. cf. CTh 7.22.5 (333).


\textsuperscript{174} Passio Maximiliani (A.D. 295), Acta Martyrum Sincera, ed. T. Ruinart (1713) 300. CTh 7.22.5 (333) unusually orders limitanean \textit{daces} to inspect recruits after \textit{probatio} and release them from the \textit{sacramentum} if they failed to meet the requisite physical standards so that they might be redeployed to other, e.g. curial, service. So the system was to grant \textit{probatio} and apply the \textit{sacramentum} at once to qualified candidates, but the scrutiny was not always deemed reliable, as we see.

\textsuperscript{175} R.W. Davies, art. cit., 229-230.

\textsuperscript{176} ChLA IV (1967) 246.
itself, which does not easily fit the *probatio* -system at all, may derive from Cato de re militari.\textsuperscript{177} It is clear from Pliny Ep. 10.29–30 and CTh 7.22.5 (A.D. 333) that the initial *sacramentum* or oath of military service was normally administered at *probatio*, before *distributio in numeros*, although we must remember that it was renewed in every unit on New Year’s Day, and the anniversaries of imperial accession days and birthdays.\textsuperscript{178} But the circumstances of the ‘formation of a legion’ presupposed for this by V. will have been highly unusual under the Empire, when units were theoretically permanent. The likely explanation will be that hinted by Foerster, i.e., that there is basic material from Republican times when armies were normally raised annually, into which V. has interpolated his own late-imperial material.\textsuperscript{179} Polybius and Livy also describe comparable middle Republican conditions in which a legion was formed and the oath administered as part of a single process.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{177}See ch. 7 (c). J.W. Foerster’s identification (*De fide Flavii Vegetii Renati*, Diss. Bonn 1879, p.6) of an inconsistency that at one point (I.8 p.12.17) V. puts the *cotidiana exercitia* after *signatio*, at another (II.5 p.38.13) before, is incorrect since in the former case V. is talking about the regular training of enrolled recruits, not the four or so months’ trials prior to enrolment.

\textsuperscript{178}RE IA (1920) 1668, s.v. ‘*sacramentum* 1’.

\textsuperscript{179}J.W. Foerster, 5–8.

\textsuperscript{180}Polyb. 6.21.1–3, Livy 22.38.4 (217 B.C.).
(xi.) Call for monthly filling of vacancies.

The ‘crowd’ of recruits V. would have every month replace losses from the ideal legion\textsuperscript{181} is probably not merely a rhetorical way of insisting that vacancies be filled as they arose but presupposes an institution like the corps of cadets who were ‘trained in arms’, recommended by the Anonymus De rebus bellicis. The Anon. brigaded them in units of 100 or 50-strong, adding that they should be paid on the low pay-scale as recruits.\textsuperscript{182} V.’s legio antiqua had a large and important rôle for iuniores and armaturae—which V. seems to interpret to mean new recruits in training under the campidocor—to man the light-armed specialist lines, whereas the heavy-armed principes and hastati are conceived as entirely taking up cohorts I–X (the triarii apart).\textsuperscript{183} Both V. and the Anon. were seeking to address the problem of manpower shortage in the regular army, and in particular the failure to fill vacancies. The fact that they thought in parallel shows that neither was writing in a vacuum but against the background of similar contemporary institutions. It seems highly probable that the ad crescentes of a unit were intended to be, and were often in fact, so organized.\textsuperscript{184}

(xii.) Signatio.

V. is fairly explicit that in his day soldiers were ‘marked’ or ‘written on with pricked signs’, i.e., tattooed, when they were formally admitted to the unit (the verb is signo or scribo).\textsuperscript{185} Tattooing is confirmed by the 6th. c. doctor Aëtius,\textsuperscript{186} but the occasion of signatio normally followed directly upon probatio, and was perhaps in origin an act of religious dedication to the nomen augustum Caesaris modelled upon ancient cultic usage, culminating in the sacramentum.\textsuperscript{187} As we have seen, this took place as a rule before distributio in numeros,
unless, as may have happened often in the late-Empire, the whole process was delegated to the unit commander. Legislation refers to the placing of stigmata, *i.e.*, tattoos, on the arms of tirones (recruits), fabricenses (workers in imperial munitions factories), and the custodians of aqueducts in Constantinople. It has been demonstrated that the older view that soldiers were branded is an anachronistic interpretation of ancient evidence based on the prevalence of branding humans in modern Europe and America. The tattoos included the revered name of the Emperor. Augustine compared the dominicus character, on a sheep to the regius character on a soldier. Once a man received this mark, he belonged to the Emperor’s service, even if marked by someone not competent. In Greek the mark was known as a ϕατγϰος.

(xiii.) *Sacramentum.*

V.'s oath (II.5) is likely to contain genuine matter. It has the expected elements of promising to 'do whatever the Emperor ordered', and a readiness to die for the Roman State. He is most punctilious about the theology of the oath, which parades the Holy Trinity, and goes to some lengths to justify swearing by it to non-Christians. A reformist impulse may well lie behind it, and would suit the aggressively Catholic Theodosius I’s
attempts to eradicate paganism by terminating all remaining freedoms of conscience. It does not contain any of the archaic elements described by Livy, Cincius apud A. Gellius, or the procedure of swearing by proxy described by Polybius.198 It also does not follow the pattern of oaths sworn to uphold the salus of the pagan Emperors and of their families, last attested probably for Julian.199 Foerster is probably wrong (p.7) that pro Romana republica in the last clause is alien to the imperial court and ethos, and reflects a Republican source as does Servius ad Aen. 8.1;200 there are plenty of examples of the late-Roman State referring to itself as a respublica.201 There is even a hint that the 5th. c. oath contained such a clause.202

3. Training.

(i.) Proposal to train every day in the afternoon as well as the morning.

Training too remained a traditional and necessary part of legislation for the army. V. himself refers to constitutions of Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian regulating military training203 and gives an example in regulations of Augustus and Hadrian about ambulatio or marching manoeuvres which he admits were still observed.204 Cassius Dio also refers to the rules laid down by Hadrian as still in force in the 3rd. c. A.D.205 At the other end of the timespan Church Fathers could in the spiritual sphere make analogy from contemporary military training.206 Synesius challenged Arcadius to go down to see his soldiers in the exercise-field

---

198Cf. Livy 22.38.4, A. Gellius 16.4.2-4; Polyb. 6.21.1-3; 33.1-2.
199CIL 2.172; Arr. Epict. 1.14.15, 17; Suet. Cal. 15; Dio 59.3.4, 59.9.2; Tert. ad nat. 2.9, id., de cor. 11.1; Amm. 21.5.10. Cf. T. Momm. Romisches Staatsrecht (1887) 1.622ff. II.792.
200Serv. ad Aca. 8.1: legitima erat milicia eorum, qui singuli iurabant pro republica se esse facturos, nec discedere nisi completis stipendiiis, id est militiae temporibus: et sacramentum vocabantur. Cf. id. ad Aen. 7.614: sacramentum, in quo iurat unusquisque miles se non recedere, nisi praeepto consulit post completa stipendii, id est militiae temporas... (no reference to respublica).
201Cf. CTh 2.29.1.2 (362), 1.12.6.2 (398), 1.7.3.5 (398), Nov. Th. II 5.3.16 (441), 6.20 (438), 7.3 (440), 24.4 (443).
202Nov. Theod. II 7.1 (439): iuratur in militiae sacrament, ut necessitates publicae procurentur...
204Epit. L27 p.28.8-10: Praeterea et vetus consuetudo permanit et divi Augusti atque Hadriani constitutionibus praecavetur...
206Amb. De off. 1.32: Qui disciplinam bellicam vult adsequi, quidunque exercetur armis et tamquam in procinctu positis proludit proelium et velit coram postio praestandi hoste, atque ad peritiam viresque socuandae et suos explorat laceros vel adversarios: declinat iactus et vigilans exit obtutus... Cf. also Terullian ad Mart. 3 (c. A.D. 197); Nemo miles ad bellum cum delictis venit nec de cubiculo ad actum procedit, sed de pappilionibus expeditis et substrictis, ubi omnis curitia et imbonitas et insua eius constant. Ediam in pace labore et incommodis bellum pater imum ediscunt, in armis deambulando, campum decurrendo, fossam moliendo, testudinem densando. 

and take part in their exercises.207 Those examples which are contemporary with V. demonstrate the extent of rhetorical hyperbole in his assertions, also partly contradicted by himself (I.13, I.18), that training had vanished completely and had to be recovered from books.208 Clearly some set of rules will have remained in being, and the Emperors Theodosius II and Valentinian III, for instance, re-enacted the general duty of limitanei ducés to ensure that their soldiers were kept to their daily training and that fortifications and patrol-boats were maintained in good repair.209 But V. insists, repeatedly, on its being a remarkable thing that in antiquity the Roman recruits trained in the afternoon as well as in the morning, every day; thus the Mediterranean custom of taking the siesta, established by the 1st. c. B.C.,210 may not have been acknowledged by Cato, from whom V.’s information on training appears to derive.211 We may take it that training in the morning, at least, still subsisted in V.’s day.212

(ii.) Proposal to restore ancient drills for light and heavy legionary infantry and for legionary cavalry.

V. pretended that scientific drill and training in arms was in his own day neglected to the point of oblivion, when teachers of it could no longer be found.213 Not being a professional military man all he could do was reconstruct from the limited evidence available to him the contents of the ancient disciplina militaris described by Cato, in the hope that generals would give it practical embodiment in keeping with the spirit of the original.214 But his innocence is a literary conceit: the choice of Cato had far-reaching military and political consequences, he knew. Thus the proposed programme of training for light and heavy

207Synes. De Regno (9) 12.22 (PG LXVI.1073 A).
208Epit. I.8, I.11, III.10.
209Nov. Th. II 24.1 (443): (ducés) in ipsis piersunque limitibus commorari et millies ad antiquum redigere numerum, inminenibus magisteriis potestatisibus diurnisque eorum exercitacionibus inhaerere praecipissmus... Cf. CIL 12.35.15: sed frequentes in numero suo suscepi, ut armorum quotidiano exercicio ad bella se praeparent...
210Cf. meridiatio. Cic. Div. 2.142, meridior, Catull. 32.3, Mart. Epigr. 4.8.4, SHA Alex. Sev. 61.
211See ch. 7 (d).
212Epit. I.11 p.15.13ff.: non tantum mane sed etiam post meridiem exercerantur ad palos, Epit. II.18 p.52.9ff.: exercerat c Sidie non solum mane sed etiam post meridiem. Epit. II.23 p.56.23ff. Cf. Amm. 29.1.16 for Valens’ siesta.
213Epit. I.8 p.12.18–21: Sed huius rei usum dissimulatio longae securitatis abolevit. Quem inventas, qui docere possit quod ipse non didicit?
214Epit. I.8 p.12.20–21: De historiis ergo vel libr is nobis antiqua consuetudo repetenda est. Epit. L.11 p.15.8–9: Antiqui, sicus invent iur in libr is, hoc gener e exercuer e utones. Epit. III.10 p.92.22–93.3: Apud veteres ars militaris in oblivionem soepius venit, sed prius a libr is repetita est, postea ductum auctoritate firmata. Scipio Africanus... See ch. 7 (d).
legionary infantry arms and legionary cavalry already implied the radical reorganization of the army treated in greater detail in Epit. II.

(iii.) Proposal to teach all recruits *armatura*.

Despite his rhetoric, V. concedes the partial retention in his own day of the special drill known as *armatura*.\(^{215}\) The continuance of this tradition for cavalry at least is attested by Claudian for Rome A.D. 404.\(^{216}\) The Emperors Julian and Constantius II learned *armatura pedestris*, the latter, according to the drift of the Ammianus passage, almost certainly in addition to *armatura equestris*.\(^{217}\) We may easily assume that the Emperors acquired both as a matter of course. Courtiers could represent Ursicinus' sons' expertise in this as a threat to Constantius II.\(^{218}\) From other references in Ammianus it is apparent that both types of drill were a normal thing in the regular army of the mid-4th c.\(^{219}\) Although the term *armatura* is not attested with this particular meaning before the 4th c. A.D., the exercises denoted are likely to be very ancient.\(^{220}\) Since V. similarly alluded to the partial retention of *salitio equorum* or vaulting wooden and live horses while holding arms, probably originally devised for *velites* in the Republic,\(^{221}\) this may have belonged to the *armatura equestris*. It was impolitic to suggest even rhetorically the cessation of a drill traditionally associated with the Emperor's own martial expertise, and in fact V. praises his Emperor's skill at *armatura*.\(^{222}\) V.'s proposal to teach all recruits *armatura*, not just those under the *campidactor*, presupposes that it was a special drill taught only to a select few in the 4th c.\(^{223}\) He naturally believed it was the characteristic drill of...
the old legions, and again his proposal presupposes the reorganization of the army on these lines.

(iv.) Proposal to teach recruits castrametation.

For internal reasons that are discussed in ch. 7 (e), it can be deduced that Epit. I.21–25 did not originally form part of the training programme sketched out in I.9–27, but was a block of later material inserted by the editorship of V. Foerster pointed out the joins. I.21–25 ought to be about what a tiro could do in camp-building, hence debet tiro condiscere (I.21 init.). But the contents are pertinent only to the Emperor, to duces, and metatores. V. closes in the belief that he has given what the tiro needs: ad hunc ergo usum instituendus est tiro (I.25 fin.). V. felt very strongly, as can be seen from III.10 p.92.7ff., where it is almost completely irrelevant, about the army’s alleged loss of castrametation skills. He goes beyond rhetorical indignation to change the structure of the training-programme to accommodate this, albeit inadequately. There can be no reasonable doubt that he believed in a real loss of such skills.

(c) Rhetoric and Army discipline.

One of the most difficult problems in reading V. is to disentangle fact from rhetoric. But the task must be attempted, because rhetoric is in the end about putting the most effective dress on a case, which must itself be grounded in fact of some kind. Ch. I.20 is the most extended piece of rhetorical writing in V. and the one which most fully canvasses the author’s reasons for writing off his own bat a booklet for the Emperor on the levying and training of recruits (Book I). After he received the Emperor’s commission the polemical content was toned down to constructive criticism in book II, and significantly decreased in quantity from books II-III, until almost indetectable in its solicitous wisdom in IV, where the implication that the Mediterranean fleets at Misenum and Ravenna had ceased to be maintained at their old state of readiness is given something of an extenuation by V. The polemic may be tabulated as follows:

---

225 A rare allusion to earlier critique is Epit. IV.44: Præcipuam ergo esse debet tegminum cura, ut catafracti vel loricae galeae et ocrees munites De onere namque armorum nemo potest conqueri, qui stans pugnati in navibus...
226 Epit. IV.31ff.
The abandonment of heavy armour, by which is meant helmets and body-armour, and with it necessarily the 'unbeaten' static legionary tactics that it entailed, was for V. one of the main pillars of his objection to the modern field army, the others being the failure to recruit Romans, to train recruits, and maintain the training of professional soldiers, which may be linked to a failure to create new or maintain old regular infantry units (legions). But there are also strictures against subsidies to barbarians, composite armies with a large auxiliary element, overlarge armies in general, a readiness to fight pitched battles, leading a tired army into pitched battle, absenteeism from the standards, excessive remuneration of soldiers, the 'natural discord' between cavalry and infantry, untimely remissions of tribute to provincials and failures to impose unpopular supplementary taxation and slowness or laxity in concentrating food-stocks and populations at fortified points during an invasion, and the failure to maintain an operational sea-going navy in the Mediterranean.

However the tirade of I.20 disconcertingly boils down to not much more than a series of commonplaces about unsoldierly armies. Apart from the reference to a successful petition to Gratian, behind which some hard fact is not impossible, though hard to evaluate from the only (vaguely) similar instance, the rest may be paralleled in set-piece descriptions of

---

228Epit. II.2 p.35.16ff.  
229Epit. III.1 p.66.1ff.  
230Epit. III.9 p.86.11ff.  
231Epit. III.11 p.94.21ff.  
232Epit. II.19 p.53.1ff.  
233Epit. II.20 p.54.3ff.  
234Epit. II.21 p.55.6ff.  
236Epit. IV.31 p.150.9ff.  
237Cf. the petition of the scholae palatinae to Theodosius II that the right of beating senatores and ducenarii (under-officers) be removed from comites. Nov. Th. II. 21 (17/4/441).
undisciplined armies by Sallust, Tacitus and Fronto. The avoidance of heavy armour was traditionally linked with some other leading elements of V.'s criticisms, namely shirking the labour of training, the failure to build camps or keep up guard duties, and inevitable defeat in battle.\(^{238}\) Compare V.: ...illi, qui laborem in portandis veteribus munimentis armorum ferre non possunt... Sic dum exercitium laboremque declinant, cum maximo dedecore trucidantur ut pecudes.\(^{239}\) The closest parallel is Fronto, who describes in particular for our purposes how long years of peace turned legionaries into velites.\(^{240}\)

V's otherwise paradoxical talk of 'neglect due to long years of peace' is also most explicable when compared with the literary tradition. Thus too, among Fronto's Syriatici milites, vaulting horses was a rarity,\(^{241}\) and few could throw the pilum properly.\(^{242}\) Racketeering, private business activities and absence from the standards were hallmarks of indiscipline.\(^{243}\)

But there may be some truth in V.'s assertion that leave of absence was granted more rarely in the past,\(^{244}\) since the corrupt granting of leave was a standing abuse in the 4th. c.\(^{245}\)

---

238 Sall. BJ. 44.1: Exercitus... iners inbellis, neque peculii neque laboris patiens. Tac. A. 13.35.1: pace longa segnes, munia castrorum aegerrime tolerabant. Satis constituit fuisse in eo exercitu veteranos, qui non stationem, non vigiliae inessent, vallum fossamque quasi nova et mira viserent, sine galeis, sine loricis...

239 Epit. 1.20 p.23.1ff.


241 Fronto ad Verum Imp. II.1: Pausi militem equam sublimibus insistire, ceteri aegre calce genu poplite repere. Cfr. V. Epit. I.18, discussed above.

242 Fronto, ibid.: haud multi vibrantis hastas, pars maius sine vi et vigore tamquam lan\(c\)es iacerre. Cfr. V. Epit. I.20 p.24: Missilibus auiem quibus ususae paritibus pedes exercitus, pila vocabantur, ...cuius generis apud nos iam rara uel a.

243 Fronto Princ. Hist. 12: apud signa infrequenties... praesidinis vagni, exploratorum <mo>re palantes; Sall. BJ.44.Sui quoque lubevati, ab signis aberant... palantes agros vastare, villas expugnare, pecoris et mancipiorum praedas certas agere exaque mutare cum mercatoribus vino adventicio et aliis talibus; Tac. A.13.35.1: nitidi et quiescenti.


245 Cfr. M.P. Speidel, Yale Classical Studies XXVIII (1985) 205: Constantine in a law of A.D. 323 forbade praepositas, decuriones and tribuni to grant furlough on pain of a capital penalty, which they had obviously done up to then. Cfr. 7.1.2. R. Grosse, Römische Militärgeschichte (Berlin 1921), 115 and 246ff. wrongly suggested tribuni and praepositus had the right to issue furlough in 4th.-6th. centuries. But the sources
The obligation of soldiers of munificent rank to perform munera is attested still in the 6th c., but one supposes that they will have regularly passed on the task to their servants or to the civilians from whom they extorted firewood, water and fodder, and other expensive commodities.246 Soldiers’ taking advantage of the system was a problem well-known to the Emperor Augustus and Tarutienus Paternus in the age of Commodus,247 but the legalising of abuses such as salgamum and stellatura by setting limits to them seems to prove that the problems were aggravated in the late-Empire.248

The mere use of literary topoi does not of course imply that V. was simply a layman writing in a library, having no personal knowledge of the subject. Even an expert like Ammianus could write about the corrupt court troops of Constantius II by drawing upon similar literary prototypes.249 Furthermore, both he and V. looked back to the Tetrarchic period for the model well-disciplined army,250 and so probably did their contemporaries, Eunapius and Synesius.251 The structural faults of the Roman army, like the failures of imperial strategy and inadequate response to invasion, were failings of government on both the civil and military side, and were not especially the fault of the soldiers themselves. It was these that had in V.’s view led to ‘attenuation of the legions’.252 The system depended on vigorous rule from the top,
so it was to the amendment of the 'neglect of predecessor Emperors' in the widest sense and the 'restoration of the strongest military disposition' that V. sought to animate his Emperor. But the model of vigorous rule to which contemporaries looked back was the reign of Diocletian and Maximian.

His complaints were thus politically sensitive. They stood their best chance of hitting the target (the Emperor's conscience) by being hidden behind traditional rhetoric and mixed with a work which purported to be a panegyrical Art of War, justifying while adjusting the military policies of the Emperor. Though antiquarian in colour, V. was in reality only interested in his assertions being of practical use. His book, peppered with anachronistic glosses, was obviously written with the present constantly in mind.253 His marked selectivity of subjects is determined by his opinion of present needs. He naturally took full advantage of the cultural conditions whereby the present was criticized by many Romans, Theodosius I in particular, according to how it measured up to the standard of antiquity as it appeared to them.254 The work, it may be thought, is as direct a criticism of military policies addressed to an Emperor as it was permitted to make within the political conditions of the time.

(d) **Size and the legio antiqua.**

1. Regular units.

Whatever its date or historicity, the legio antiqua of Book II recommended itself as a model for the modern army in a number of ways first among which is size, to which V. drew attention with his talk of attenuation of the modern legion in Epit. II.3. V.'s legio antiqua had a minimum of 6,100 infantry and 726 cavalry,255 and, since the ancient consuls commanded pairs of legions, that made a minimum grand total of 12,200 foot and 1,452 horse augmented to about 20,000 foot and 4,000 horse by their complement of auxilia. The old consular army was comparable to modern field armies under a magister militum (which is probably what V. means by comes maior, i.e., a comes ordinis primi.)256 Compare the force of 20,000

---

253See ch. 7 (d).
254Ps.-Victor Epit. de Caes. 48.11–12, cf. SHA Pesc. Nig. 11.3–12.2, based on a contemporary ideal?
255Epit. II.6.
256Epit. II.4: In omnibus auctoribus inventur singulos consules adversum hostes copiosissimos non amplius quam binas daxisse legiones additis auxiliis sociorum. Epit. II.9: Sed legati imperatoris ex consultibus ad exercitus mutatbatur, quibus legiones et auxilia universa obtemperabant in ordinatione pacis vel necessitate.
crammed into Amida during the Persian siege of A.D. 359 consisting of six legions of field army plus a frontier legion and some other troops. Such a tactical unit, if it can be so called, might have resembled a pair of legiones antiquae plus auxilia in size and variety of arms, but lacked their supposed training and cohesion, and their crucial preponderance of heavy-armed infantry. Compare also for similar size Theodosius’ two praesental armies created after the defeat of Maximus in A.D. 389, which were each composed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cavalry</th>
<th>Infantry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 vexillationes palatinae</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 vexillationes comitatenses</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 legiones palatinae</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 auxilia palatina</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For small-scale wars one old legion was sufficient, which with auxilia totalled about 10,000 foot and 2,000 horse, the old praetorian commander corresponding to modern ‘lesser dukes’—minores duces, by which are presumably meant limitanean duces, who were usually comites ordinis secundi or comites minores inferioriores. It was not prima facie unreasonable to propose to reform regular army units along the lines V. suggests, at least in respect of size.

---

bellorum, in quorum locum nunc inlustris viros constat magistros millium substitutos, a quibus non tantum binae legiones sed etiam plures numeri gubernatur. Epit. III.1: Quod si magnae hostium copiae dicerentur, consularis potestas cum viginti milibus pedium et quattuor equitum sum quam comes maior mitebatur.

257 Amm. 18.9.3; 19.2.14.
258 D. Hoffmann, op. cit., 490.
2. Foederati

In a probable oblique reference to the increasing use of foederati, V. attacked those who favoured the largest possible muster of forces, citing the ominous examples of Xerxes, Darius and Mithridates for problems of logistics and supply, and the likelihood of horrendous losses if defeated.\textsuperscript{260} V. favoured small, well-trained armies on principle, and stressed it from the outset.\textsuperscript{261} This had important tactical implications. He is unlikely to have supported the strategy of Julian's eastern campaign A.D. 363, or for that matter the decision to meet the Goths in a general engagement at Adrianople A.D. 378, but would have endorsed the strategy of ambush and raids praised by Ammianus.\textsuperscript{262} Note that Ammianus attributes the same strategy to Theodosius' father in Britain A.D. 368 and Africa A.D. 373.\textsuperscript{263} It may be significant that Theodosius apparently did not attempt to join forces with Gratian in a repeat of the intended strategy of Adrianople.

By contrast, Theodosius' probably huge armies of federates and irregulars with which he overcame Maximus and Eugenius are unlikely to have found favour with V. Even the panegyrist Pacatus did not disguise the fact (while making a virtue of it) that the horde of 388 suffered shortages of grain, a thing which V. instances as afflicting overlarge armies.\textsuperscript{264} According to Zosimus, too, on Theodosius' return journey in 391 he suffered a dangerous raid, which V. again instances as one of the drawbacks of such armies.\textsuperscript{265} Though smaller, the old legionary armies had the advantage of proper training and cohesion, and entrenched skills in mobile and static tactics, and could be replicated on a wide scale.\textsuperscript{266}

3. Auxilia and vexillationes.

V.'s theory has no interest in the early Imperial armies which were normally made up of assorted legionary vexillations on detachment plus auxiliary cohorts and alae,\textsuperscript{267} and were not

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{260}Epit. III.1.
\item \textsuperscript{261}Epit. I.1; III.1.
\item \textsuperscript{262}Amm. 31.7.2; cf. section (a) above.
\item \textsuperscript{263}Amm. 27.8.9; 29.5.32.
\item \textsuperscript{264}Pac. Pan. Lat. 2 (12). 32.5; V. Epit. III.1.
\item \textsuperscript{265}Zos. 4.49; V. Epit. III.1.
\item \textsuperscript{266}Epit. III.1; Vetere autem, qui remedia difficiliaum experimentis didicerant, non tam numerosos quam eruditos armis exercitus habere voluerunt. Epit. II.4, cf. II.18 p.52.1ff.: Necessere est enim invictam esse rempublicam, cuius imperator militari arte percepta, quantos voluerit, faciat exercitus bellicosos.
\item \textsuperscript{267}Cf. R. Grosse, op. cit. pp.29-30.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
complete legions fighting as an integral unit, aided by a few auxiliaries in an ancillary rôle, as had been the Republican pattern. He preferred instead the integrated light and heavy infantry plus substantial legionary cavalry which was the hallmark of the middle Republican legion. The choice was perhaps predetermined by his Catonian source-material, but V.’s selective organization of the excerpted sources was addressed to solving problems of strategy, tactics and military organization in his own day. It seems implicit that V. was motivated to reducing the rôle and numbers of ‘untrained’ barbarian light infantry units by restoring light-armed specialists to the legion, and by the same token to diminishing the elite barbarian cavalry regiments by reattaching a substantially increased cavalry arm to the legions which more than doubles the cavalry Cato knew. The proportion of barbarians V. envisaged as serving as auxilia to his legions will have been correspondingly small vis-à-vis the Roman citizens.

(e) Tactical flexibility and the legio antiqua.

1. Legionary light and heavy Infantry.

If the size of the ancient consular army was comparable to ‘regular’ divisions of the modern field army, the legio antiqua of V. was also intended to be comparable in the variety of its special tactical subdivisions. As well as the 6,100 heavy infantry, these included 726 probably heavy and light cavalry, whose task was to protect the legionary infantry and attack the enemy, respectively, and the battle-array was an integrated structure with several light-armed contingents of iuniores or recruits, who to judge by their names might be thought of by V. as infantry equivalents of scholae palatinae (sagitarii iuniores, scutati = scutarii?), armaturae), with infantry legionary specialists as equivalents of auxilia palatina (excubatores), legiones palatinae (Mattio barbuli = Joviani and Herculani) and legiones comitatenses or pseudocomitatenses (ballistarii, funditores). It is certain that V. conceived of the levis armatura as, like the gravis armatura and the equites legionarii, legionaries, not auxiliaries, and in particular young troops or recruits, in imitation of the Republican system.

---

268 See ch. 7 (a-d, g).
271 Epit. I.20, II.2, II.15-17, III.14.
272 Epit. III.14: de armaturis velocissimis, de sagittariis iuvenibus, de bonis iaculatoribus... de scutatis expeditissimis, de sagittariis iuvenibus, de his, qui alacriter versuis vel mattiobarbulis... dimitant...
But the First and Second lines of *gravis armarura* comprised cohorts I–X of older, mature and fully trained troops.\(^{273}\) The debt to the manipular army of the 3rd.–2nd. c. B.C. is thus obvious.\(^{274}\) By recommending the *legio antiqua*, he was therefore able to imply a reduction in the present inflated rôle of élite auxiliary infantry, of whose military capabilities in general he had a low opinion.\(^{275}\)

The tactical subdivisions presuppose the classic stationary battle with its mobile opening and finishing phases, but in its late-antique form. The *levis armarura* units formed the Third and Fourth lines in the battle-array, which opened the battle and then retreated behind the heavy-armed *principes* (First line) and *hastati* (Second line).\(^{276}\) The *hastati* at any rate may have been conceived by V. as filling the rôle of modern *legiones palatinae* such as the Lanciarii.\(^{277}\) The crossbowmen/catapultiers (*manuballistarii*), artillerymen (those operating *carroballistae*) and slingers (*fundibulatores* and *funditores*), were to stand along with the stone-throwers (*accensiliuniores* i.e., recruits or *tirones*) in the Fifth line, but their weapons have probably been updated to 4th. c. date.\(^{278}\) The general arming of the First and Second lines, in addition to the Third (probably) and Fourth, with *plumbatae* or lead-weighted javelins and *catafractae*, in incongruous company with the ancient *pilum* and *vericulum*, demonstrates similar crude updating.\(^{279}\)

The legionary heavy-armed tactical reserve-force anciently called *triarii* were in III.14 to occupy the Sixth line; in I.20, a simplification of the same battle-array, V. placed the light-armed on the wings, allowing the *triarii* to become the Third line. In II.15 the section on the Second line or *hastati* has become displaced in the paradosis to the end, p.50.3ff., whereas it

\[^{273}\]bid.: *In his duobus ordinibus et aetate maturi et usu confidentes et munitionem etiam gravioribus armis conlocantur*.

\[^{274}\]Cf. Livy 8.8-10, Polyb. 6.21.7. See ch. 7 (d).

\[^{275}\]Epit. II.2.

\[^{276}\]Epit. III.14: *Tertius ordo disponitur de armaturis velocissimis, de sagittariis iuvenibus, de bonis lancioribus, quos ante ferentarios nominabant. Quarum item ordo construatur de scutatis expeditissimis, de sagittariis junioribus, de hastis, qui alacriter veritis vel mattiobarbulis, quas plumbatæ nominant, dimicant, qui dicentur levis arma*.

\[^{277}\]Cf. Epit. III.14: *in seundo ordine circumdantur catafractis sagittari et optimi militis cum spiculis vel lanceis ordinariis, quos prius hastatius vocabant*.

\[^{278}\]See ch. 6 (c) below.

\[^{279}\]Epit. II.15, III.14.
obviously belongs after 'dicitur' p.49.15.\textsuperscript{280} The battle array of II.15–16 is essentially the same as that of III.14. The use of legionaries for the tactical reserve implied doing without the \textit{auxilia palatina}.\textsuperscript{281}

V. fails to distinguish consistently between light and heavy infantry. At I.20 we read that there were among \textit{principes} and \textit{hastati} both \textit{sagittarii} and \textit{pedites scutati}, armed each with cataphracts and helmets, but the archers with \textit{manicae} or arm-guards on the left arm, the \textit{scutati} with, in addition to shields, \textit{ocreae} or greaves on the right leg. The \textit{triarii} seem to have been simply \textit{scutati}.\textsuperscript{282} But it emerges from II.15 that the \textit{sagittarii} (light armament) were armed with helmets, cataphracts and swords, in addition to bows and arrows, and there were \textit{scutati} in both the legionary heavy infantry and supposedly light contingents. \textit{Scutati} were also throwers of \textit{plumbatae} or lead-weighted javelins among both heavy infantry and light auxiliary contingents, carrying these weapons slotted inside their shield.\textsuperscript{283}

Thus the details of arms and equipment do not sustain the basic distinction which V. tries to make between heavy (legionary) and light (legionary) lines, because the heavy equipment seems to be worn also by the Third and Fourth lines and light arms are found among the First and Second. V. can thus call \textit{scutati} both light (Fourth line) and heavy (\textit{Triarii}) in the same chapter (III.14). This is not simply the result of V.'s tendency to favour heavy armour, most noticeable in I.20, but corresponds to early Byzantine evidence from Maurice. \textit{Scutati expeditissimi}, standing beside \textit{sagittarii} and \textit{mattiobarbali} in V.'s Fourth line (III.14), corresponding to \textit{scutati [qui] plumbatis gladiis et missilibus accincti, sicut nunc prope omnes milites videntur armati} (II.15), may imply a kind of light-armed shield-bearing infantry descended from Classical and Hellenistic Greek peltasts.\textsuperscript{284}

Describing an infantry order of battle considered obsolete at the end of the 6th. c. A.D., Maurice like V. used the term \textit{σκουράτος} for heavy-armed infantry,\textsuperscript{285} but also mentioned

\textsuperscript{280} As observed by A. Gemoll, cf. app. crit. Lang ed.
\textsuperscript{281} See ch. 6 (a) 3.
\textsuperscript{282} Epit. I.20 p.23.15, II.16, III.14 p.99.6ff.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid. II.15 p.49.7, 18.
\textsuperscript{284} Cf. Ael. Tact 2.9.
Ch. 5.187

*light-armed or archers*, who were trained to shoot arrows while holding a shield. Hence light *scutati* are not only conceivable, but their specification may be identical apart from the detail of being mounted to one of those described by Procopius. In an apologetic passage defending the writing of modern history, he defines the ways in which the modern soldier of the 6th. c. was unfairly written off as mere ‘archer’. Unlike his dishonourable ancestor in Homer, the modern archer wore a *thioph* (cuirass, i.e., mailshirt) and *kynulbes* (greaves), and carried a *eïpes* (sword). Some in addition had a *bêsel* (spear), and wore moreover a small *domês* (shield) without a handle, attached to the shoulder, covering the region of the face and neck. They were trained to shoot from horseback at high speed, in all directions. Quite apart from the fact that these may be the successors to V.’s obscure *ocreati equites*, offered as successors to *legionarii equites*, they explain how late-antique archers in general were able to hold a shield and wear equipment usually seen as belonging to the heavy-armed.

V. comments also that it was proof of the partial survival of the drill that *armaturae* fought better than ‘the rest’ in his own day. He is probably talking about *scholae palatinae*, which included units of *armaturae*. Being the 4th. c. Emperors’ elite troops, they will naturally have shone in battle by comparison with other divisions.

However, like modern *exculcatores*, V. elsewhere equates them with the antique *ferentarii* and *levi armatura* (i.e., light infantry) described as *velocissimi*. Since they are grouped in the battle-line (Epit. II.15, III.14) with infantry *sagittarii iuvenes* and *boni iaculatores*, their arms are likely to have been throwing-spears or bows. They were probably very similar also to V.’s (light) *scutati*, stationed in the corresponding position immediately...

---


287 Proc. Bell. 1.1.8-16.

288 V. Epit. II.1 p.34.10-13.

289 Epit. I.13: *Constat enim etiam nunc in omnibus proeliis armatur<cas> melius pugnare quam ceteros. Ex quo intellegi debet, quantum miles inexcercitato sui melior, cum armaturae uicissimo eruditis reliquis comhernialer iust bellandi arte praeerant.*

290 Along with *scutarii*, gentiles, *scutarii sagittarii* and *scutarii cibanarii*; cf. R. Grosse, op. cit. p.94. D. Hoffmann op. cit. p.292 analyses the use of the term *scutarius* as a generic for *scholae palatinae*; V. may be using *armatura* similarly.

291 See below.
behind them in a line which also included 
sagittarii iuniores and *hi qui alacritur veruris vel mattiobarbulis*, *quas plumbatas nominant dimicant*. Besides the shield that gave them their name, the *scutati* were armed with *plumbatae* (lead-weighted javelins), *gladius* (= *spatha* or sword), and *missibilia* (ordinary javelins). V. added (Epit. II.15) that almost all soldiers were now armed thus. Which amounts to saying that ‘almost all’ foot-soldiers were now armed with *exculcatores, armaturae* and *scutati*, a verdict which is in agreement with the rhetorical tirade of I.20 and therefore probably an exaggeration.293 Hence the statement that it was generally agreed that in contrast to cavalry ‘modern infantry are unprotected’, by which is meant that they no longer wore helmets or body-armour.294

*Exculcatores*,295 known as *σκούλκατορες* in Byzantine sources,296 are associated with *armaturae* and *funditores* in V. Epit. II.15-17, and clearly resemble Ammianus’ *proculcatores* in both function and word-formation.297 Etymologists are inclined to believe the word is of Germanic rather than Latin origin.298 It is clear that these *armaturae* in V.’s eyes were light-armed infantry, and so cannot be the same as the *armaturae* in the *scholae palatinae*, who were all mounted. But since there were probably, at least, such light-armed (but mounted)
scurarii as well as heavy among the scholae palatinae, as there were also units of armaturae, this may suggest a degree of corresponding organization between the 4th. c. infantry army as V. conceived it and the contemporary mounted units. Clearly, V. equates the light-armed specialists in his battle line with contemporary light infantry units such as the Exculcatores, Sagittarii, Funditores, Exploratores, and Ballistarii. Comparison with Ammianus suggests that V.’s armaturae here is short-hand for leves armaturae, which come in the corresponding position in Ammianus’ theoretical array also. Unfortunately we know nothing more about the nature of their specialisation, and no units outside the scholae survive in the record. The existence of under-officers called armaturae, most frequently attested in the early 3rd. c. A.D. legion but still occurring in late antiquity, may be relevant. It is suggested by Brennan that as 4th. c. units of Lanciarii and of Ballistarii may well have grown out of legionary detachments of these specialists, so other specialist units may have been developed on the model of equivalent legionary detachments; some such perhaps lie hidden in the record behind the colourless name of the parent unit.

The disposition of cohorts of heavy legionaries into principes = coh. I-V, hastati = coh. VI-X, cannot of course be harmonised with Republican or Imperial divisions of centuries into pilani = triarii, principes, hastati, and looks like a piece of anachronistic guesswork, along with the unhistorical division of cohorts into five centuries apiece.

---

300 Not. Dig. occ. 5.173, 175 = 7.20, 122, 5.207, excucatores (aux. pal.); Not. Dig. occ. 5.170, 174, 193, 211 = 7.121, 41, 45, 75 or. 5.54-56, 6.54-56, 69, 7.56, 9.27, sagittarii (aux. pal. and leg. ps.); Not. Dig. or. 7.52, funditores (leg. ps.); Not. Dig. or. 7.43, 57, 8.46-47, 9.47, occ. 7.97 = 41.23, ballistarii (cf. Hoffmann 1.181, and Amm. 16.2.3); Not. Dig. occ. 7.110 = 28.21 (leg. ps.), 40.25, occ. 41.34, 35, 37 42.29 (mil. lim.). Cf. P. Brennan, Chiron X (1980) 553-567.
301 Amm. 14.6.17: deinde leves armaturas, post iaculatores... See further ch. 6 (a) 2.
304 See ch. 7 (f), p. 285.
2. Legionary light and heavy Cavalry.

V.’s 726 legionary cavalry\(^{305}\) were partly heavy-armed, carrying *cataphractae loricae* and helmets as body-armour, and partly light mounted archers.\(^{306}\) Their weapons were the lance or *contus*, and bow and arrows.\(^{307}\) V. was aware that *alae* had been replaced by cavalry *vexillationes* in the field force.\(^{308}\) But *legionarii equites* were something distinct, in his view, likened to the obscure *ocreati equites* or ‘greaved cavalry’, which may be identical to Procopius’ mounted archers wearing cuirasses and greaves.\(^{309}\)

There may also have been *sagittarii* among heavy cavalry, as the infantry *sagittarii* appear to have worn heavy armour, but apart from a single reference to the legionary decurion teaching his *turmales* how to shoot arrows and use the lance,\(^{310}\) V. elsewhere associates *contati* with *loricati*, and *sagittarii* with light cavalry.\(^{311}\) *Contati* may have been equipped with arrows in additions to the pike, like the legionary cavalry described by Josephus.\(^{312}\) V.’s heavy cavalry cuirassiers, *loricati/catafracti equites*, were for use in protecting legionary infantry, rather than against enemy cavalry, because their weight made them slow and therefore vulnerable to lassos, at which the Huns were particularly adept.\(^{313}\)

Although V. talks about *catafracti equites* being vulnerable to lassos, a Hunnish tactic according to Ammianus,\(^{314}\) and makes their proper deployment fighting with legionary infantry against loose-order infantry rather than against cavalry,\(^{315}\) elsewhere he speaks only of *loricati*, *contati*, *sagittarii* and *qui loricas non habent*.\(^{316}\) V.’s habitual usage is that *lorica* =

---

\(^{305}\) Epit. II.6 p.40.13. Most of the best mss. have 730, but the figures add up to 726.


\(^{307}\) Epit. II.14 p.48.5, cf. 1.15 p.18.15..

\(^{308}\) Epit. III.10 p.90.14, cf. II.1.

\(^{309}\) Epit. II.1, cf. Procop. Bell. 1.1.8–16. Cf. also Arr. Tact. 4.8 who may allude to their ancestor.

\(^{310}\) Epit. II.14.

\(^{311}\) Epit. III.16, 17.

\(^{312}\) Jos. BJ 3.5.5 (96).

\(^{313}\) Epit. III.23, III.16; cf. Amm. 31.2.9.

\(^{314}\) Amm. 31.2.9.


\(^{316}\) V. Epit. III.16: *loricati omnes et contati iuncti sint pedites, sagittarii autem vel qui loricas non habent longius evagentur.*
catafracta, and the deployment of loricati with the infantry confirms the identity of loricati and catafracti equites, i.e., cataphractarii. Contati ought to be equivalent to contarii, according to the variability of the ending (see above). V. thinks they are body-armoured as in the illuminations of Anon. de rebus bellicis, whereas 3rd. c. evidence suggests that they were not. The solution is that there were probably both heavy and light contarii; Ammianus also arms Persian cataphracti with conti and multiplica missilia, so there may have been no difference between a heavy contarius and a cataphractarius. According to V. there were also catafracti sagittarii on foot, and Ammianus mentions a single type of mounted specialists who were both catafractarii and sagittarii. V. does not specify the arms of the light cavalry who were not archers, but apart from bows otherwise refers only to gladii and conti as cavalry arms. Elsewhere V. treats contarii and sagittarii as antithetical pairs. In general the complexity of specialists and equipment, and the incompleteness of the evidence, defies any rigidly schematic analysis, and in any case it was not V.'s plan to describe the cavalry army in detail.

The number 726 does not resemble Republican cavalry numbers, or early Imperial legionary cavalry, but is of the order of magnitude of a milliary ala, or of a couple of 4th. c. A.D. turmae mentioned by Ammianus. The creation of such unprecedented numbers of legionary cavalry was probably intended to displace elite mainly barbarian cavalry units from the field force. Their brigading in turmae of 32 under decuriones is almost certainly taken

317 They are either alternatives in variatio (e.g., I.20, II.16), or are coupled by vel and que (e.g., I.16, II.14), a common late-Latin form of imprecision.
319 Between chapters 11-12, and 12-13.
321 Amm. 25.3.4.
322 Epit. II.15 p.49.20: erant item sagittarii cum caesidia catafractis et gladiis, sagitis et arcubus. III.14 p.97.12: in secundo ordine circumdaii catafractia sagitaria.
323 Amm. 16.12.7: equestres... turmae, inter quas catafractarior erat et sagittarii, formidabile genus armorum.
324 Epit. I.18, II.14.
325 Epit. III.6 p.79.18, III.9 p.87.3. Cf. (infantry) IV.17.
327 Polyb. 6.20.9 (300-strong).
328 Jos. BJ 3.6.2 (120-strong).
329 Amm. 18.8.2.
from V.'s Republican-derived sources for the legion, rather than from auxiliary units of the
Principate (which they obviously resemble also). 330

**3. Mixtum agmen.**

Despite his predisposition in favour of the heavy legionary infantry and their static
tactics, V. was not blind to the advantages of having highly mobile tactical arms as well. Such
flexibility was essential if one was going to recommend as he does the use of guerrilla tactics
against a mobile enemy. Hence the importance, in his view, of the general’s decision which
cavalry to send against the ‘flying platoons’ or *drungi* of enemy cavalry at III.16. The first
author to use the barbarian word *drungus*, V. is aware of recent developments in which the
Gothic, Hun and Alan light cavalry had shown itself superior to Roman heavy cavalry, 332 and
recommends a mixed formation or *mixtum agmen* of light cavalry and light infantry operating
with men on foot, corresponding to the ancient *velites*, ‘running one between two horsemen’.
The antique operation of *velites* is better described by Isidorus, who adds that they were
conveyed to the scene behind the riders, and then jumped down to perform. 333 Ammianus
appears to echo V.’s recommendation by analysing the effective use of a similar tactic against
Roman *clibanarii* or heavy-armoured cavalry by a mixed formation of Germans at the battle of
Strasbourg. 334

Although light infantry usually operated with light cavalry—for example, Valens sent
foot-archers and a *turma* of cavalry to stop Goths infesting roads along which supplies were
brought, 335—and Ammianus uses the words *velites* and *velitares*, we cannot tell whether or

---

330 Polyb. 6.25.1–2, describing 10 *turmae* (30-strong) each under 3 *decuriones*, one of whom was senior
commander of the *turma*. Cf. Livy 4.38.2, 22.38.3–4. On the absence of *decuriones* from the legions of the
Principate, cf. M.P. Speidel, in S. Mitchell (ed.), *Armies and Frontiers in Roman and Byzantine Anatolia*,

331 Except perhaps SHA Prob. 19.2. See ch. 6 (a) 1.


26.4.4ff., Polyb. 6.21.7.

334 Amm. 16.12.21: *quidquid apud eos per aequales copias praepollebat, in laevo cornu locavere conseruerunt.* 
Isid.que sparsam pedes miscuere discursatores et leves profronto radione iuta posseste. Norant enim licei
prudens ex eqvo bellatorem cum clibanario nostro congressum frena retinebant et scutum, hastam una manu
vibrante, tegminibus ferreis abscondito bellatori nocere non posse, peditem vero inter ipsos discriminium
verices, cum nihil caveri solet praeter id, quod occurrit, humiliert occulite reptantem, latere forato lumenti
incitum rectorem praecipiebim agere levi negotio trucidandum.

335 Amm. 31.12.2.
not they behaved like V.'s quasi-antique mixed formation. Ammianus at any rate is probably using a literary device for avoiding the technical term, whereas V. is serious in recommending the antique institution, but it seems there were some parallels in modern practice. Maurice gives some details of a *mixtum agmen* or *τάξις ἢ λεγομένη σύμμετρος* which does not resemble the ancient *velites* and yet may be in V.'s mind. In particular he says that the formation is suitable against cavalry when one's own cavalry are too few, which corresponds to V.'s brief statement. Thus V. probably anachronistically equates *velites* with a contemporary formation, which would be fully in accordance with his usual style of working.

4. Legionary Technical services.

As well as coherence and training, and tactical flexibility, it was the self-sufficiency of the antique legion which V. stressed in his appeal to the Emperor. The image of the legion as an armed city on the move, different from the traditional comparison of the legionary camp to the appearance of a city, was a particularly topical variation probably by V. himself. The legion's own technical services were an important part of its self-sufficiency. V. is aware that modern field armies took with them fewer back-up services, relying for arms and armour on the system of imperial armouries set up in important cities by Diocletian, but refrains from voicing the implication of the material that this should be changed. All other artificers and technicians mentioned, such as masons, blacksmiths, wainwrights, carpenters and sappers, still needed to be with the army for repairing arms and armour, building camps,
fortifications, vehicles, siege- and torsion-engines, and undermining walls. In the list of legionary equipment (II.25), materials for making pontoon-bridges, for conducting sieges and making siege-engines, and for building camps and hewing timber are included, but tools for the creation of arms and armour are not specified. V. was not prepared to risk openly provoking the opposition of the palatine ministers, the Praetorian Prefects, or by A.D. 390 magister officiorum, whose empires included control of the imperial fabricae. As we saw with the downgrading of barbarian units, V.'s approach towards his dangerously controversial goals was indirect and hidden.

(f) Organization and the legio antiqua.

V. set out to interpret the ancient legion as a practical contemporary model for the late-Roman field army. The evidence available to him of the ancient organization was in any case meagre. His description of its organization is correspondingly imaginative and overtly modernising. His knowledge of the contemporary army is likely to have been considerably better than his anachronistic ideas about the legio antiqua. The natural interpretation of the frequent glosses on the material with modern (4th. c. A.D.) technical terms or equivalents is that they are by V.; as such they point to a certain level of knowledge.

Book III, on strategy, despite being based on the same antique sources, is almost entirely related to the contemporary field army organization. Most striking after reading about legionary cavalry in Book II, is the tripartite division of the army into legiones, auxilia and equites/ vexillationes. It is clear that tribunes, vicarii and principia, commanded whole units in this set-up, and that the praefectus legionis is no longer part of the picture. The several units, commanded often by tribunes, would come under the overall command of the dux or

343 The cunicularii were presumably experts who directed the work done by legionaries as at Maozamalcha, A.D. 363; cf. Amm. 24.4.21. Dig. 50.6.7 (6) refers to artifices who dug the fossa.
345 Cf. Maur. Strat. 12.B (8).6 for a list of equipment carried on carts by each 10-man contubernium or sexagesima (relating to the early Byzantine period).
346 Jones, II.834-835.
347 See ch. 7 (f).
348 See ch. 7 (g).
350 Epit. III.4.8,9,10. He occurs only in 1.13 and II.9.
commander-in-chief when they were assembled at a mustering-point for a campaign,351 or were being led on campaign as a field army.352 Such a dux had a number of comites, vicarii and tribunes and domestici under him.353

Individual ranks of under-officers are rarely mentioned, but we do get circitores,354 and campidoctores,355 who were immediately junior in rank to ordinarii.356 V.'s method of updating can be shown for III.8: the archaic centuriones make a sole appearance in a chapter where they are otherwise termed campidoctores/ principia, and the same context offers the archaic circumitores with V.'s gloss circitores. At I.25 V. transmits the centuriones of his source in precisely the same context357 and at III.8 the watches for the camp are also organised on a centuriate basis, because V. has here failed to update his material.358 But at III.6 the marching column is kept in time by campidoctores vicarii vel tribuni, substituted for the archaic centuriones whose task this was.359 Apart from these isolated references, centuries and centurions do not occur in Books III-IV. Thus V. has in mind field army units, with their modern command-structures, not limitanean units which preserved the older structure in some measure.360

In Books I–II, too, the legio antiqua had to be fitted into this late-antique strategic and administrative framework. Undifferentiated officers in the late-4th. c. were usually termed

351Compare ibid. III.4 p.71.11 with ib. p.72.7ff., and cf. III.6, 9,10.
352Epit. III.8,17.
353Epit. III.6,8,17,18.
354Epit. III.8.
355Epit. III.6,8.
356MAMA 1 (1928) 168: διό καὶ τοίχοικον τῶν ἀρχαίων (Laodicea Combusta = Ladinik).
357Epit. I.25: Post hoc a centurionibus fossa inspectur ac mensurat et vindicatur in eos qui neglegentius fuerint operari. Cf. Epit. III.8 p.84.6-8: Opus vero centuriones decempedis metiuntur, ne minus foderit aut erraverit alicuius ignavus...
358Ibid. p.84.20-21: ac de singulis centuriis quateri equites ex quaterni pedies excubium noctibus faciant. Cf. Epit. II.19: Cootidanis sitam in pace vigilias, item excubium sive agrarias de omnibus centuriis et contuberniis vicissim millies faciant.
For V. this was the 'correct', i.e., contemporary, term, as opposed to the earlier *principes*, V. ignoring for the sake of the implied etymology that the latter denoted 'under-officers'. V. has probably inserted *principia* in an archaic context at I.13. The term, which would imply a singular *principium* (nowhere attested with this meaning), therefore seems not to be derived from the title *princeps* for *ad hoc* commanders.

Aside from substitution, the method of integration generally practised by V. is the use of glosses. The fact that these often sound inaccurate and misleading seems to have been perceived by V., but left unresolved. Instead he prescribed conning over the material until one's critical faculties were worn down, a course which suggests no great respect for the Emperor's intellect. V. confirms by his otherwise unnecessary glosses on *centurio = centenarius*, *centuria = cohor*, and *turmales = equites* under a decurion what was already clear from other sources, that there were few legionary centurions and little or no legionary cavalry in V.'s own day. Legionary decurions and legionary *turae* existed only under the Republic (see above); legionary cavalry under the Principate was differently organized. Decurions and *turae* at least in the frontier *alares* still existed in the reign of Constantine. A papyrus list of soldiers belonging to *ala III Assuriorum* puts the *prefect[us]* (sic) in first place with the title *princeps I turman* (sic), and a *decurionales* (sic) of the *tura* is

---

361 Epit. III.24.8. So too Amm. 22.3.2: *praesentibus loviornor Herclianorum quiprincipis et tribunos: 25.5.1: collecti duces exercitus officia legationis principis et turae super createndo princeps consultabant: 28.6.17: numeror principis; 15.5.16: principiorum vertices — 'top brass' or senior army officers under Silvanus *magister pedium* in Gaud A.D. 355. These examples refute Godfrey's attempt to limit the term to buildings, CTh 7:20.2, comm. ad loc. (Lipstae, 1736). Cf. also CJ 12.17.16 (491–505).

362 Epit. II.7.


364 Epit. II.4 p.38.5-10.

365 Epit. II.8 p.43.9-10: Erant etiam centuriones, qui singulas centurias curabant, qui nunc centenarii nominabant. Epit. II.13 p.46.16-p.47.1: Centuriones insuper, qui nunc centenarii vocabant, ... singularia insuper gubernare centurias. First securely attested from Concordia cemetery, c. A.D. 400, and found thereafter in several types of unit, guards-, field-, and frontier-, the *centenarius* is tentatively interpreted as an administrative military official, identical to the *ekandrapgos* or *kentrapgos* of Byzantine literature, cf. R. Grosse, op. cit. 117-118. See also P.Oxy. X (1914) no.1253, listing members of the *pantyropes* and *koptaros*, comprising 2 *centenarii*, 1 *cornicularius*, and 2 *protectors*, who received *epeira viatica* consisting of gold, carpets and provisions from the city of Oxyrhynchus some time in the 4th. c.

366 Epit. II.14 p.48.5-6: *turae* suae, id est sub cura sua equites postos... In practice the contemporary *tura* was some 350-strong, according to Ammianus (18.8.2), and was commanded by a tribune (ibid. 24.3.1); cf. CTh 7.13.8: Lydus de Mag. 1.46, ῥοποιας ἄρρατος ἐξ ἄρρατος ἀρρατος, known of 500-strong *turae*, which must be a paper strength.

duly listed in second place. A law of Constantine forbade praepositi, decuriones and tribuni to grant leave, which they had obviously done until then. The latest attested decurions are in J.R. Rea, *ZPE* LVI (1984) 84, letter (iii.) dated A.D. 401, from a unit which resembles an *ala*.

Despite the new existence of the *centenarius*, the old century seems definitely to have been seen as obsolete in the field army by *V.*'s time. Although *V.* states that the 'ancients' divided cohorts into centuries and gave *vexilla* or their own standards to the centuries (II.13) so that *contubernales* would not get lost in battle, *V.* later and in the context of his own day talks about 'digmata' or painted shield-designs devised for each cohort for the selfsame purpose. The standards of the contemporary legion were dragons for cohorts and eagles for the whole legion. *V.* conceived of the century as some sort of cohort, because the original distinction was no longer made. Thus for *V.* centuries could set up *dracones/signa*, even though he says these were specifically cohort-standards, and cohorts could have different shield-designs corresponding in function to century-*vexilla*, because the contemporary legion which he knew was divided only into cohorts and *contubernia*. No independent evidence for the existence of century-standards at any period has been found beyond the fact that under the Principate there was a *signifer* in every century.

A contemporary officer supposedly commanding 200 men called a *ducenarius* and another supposedly commanding 100 men called a *centenarius* also occur as glosses in *V.*’s description of the tactical commands of the five *ordinarii* in charge of the milliary First cohort.

---

371 Epit. II.13 p.46.7-14: *antiqui... cohortes in centurias diviserunt et singulis centurias singula vexilla constituereint, ita ut, ex qua cohorte vel quota esset centuria in illo vexillo litteris esset adscriptum...* Cf. Epit. II.18 p.51.17-21: *Sed ne milites aliquando in tumultu proelii a suis contubernalibus aberrarent, diversis cohortibus diversa in scitis signa pingeberint, ut ipsi nominant, digmata, sicut etiam nunc moris est fieri. Praeterea in adverso scuo uniuscausique militis litteris erat nomen adscriptum, addito ex qua esset cohorte quae centuria.*
372 Ibid. L23: *intra quam primae centuriae, hoc est cohortes, papillones tendunt et dracones et signa constituant.*
373 Epit. II.13: *Primum signum totius legionis est aquila, quam aquilifer portat. Dracones etiam per singulos cohortes a draconariis feruntur ad proelium.* Cf. Epit. II.7 p.41.7: *signiferi qui signa portant, quos nunc draconarios vocant.* Cf. M. Durry, *Les cohortes prétoriennes* (1938), 105, stating that in the army of the Principate there was no *signum cohortis*.
374 D. Breese, *JRS* LIX (1969) 50 n.7. Cf. M. Durry, ibid., pointing out that in the 3rd c. A.D. there were still only one *tubicen* and *cornicen* per maniple of legionaries. W. Zwicker, in 27. *Bericht der Römisch-germanischen Kommission* (1937) 7-22 discusses the ambiguous evidence for both cohort- and century-standards under the Principate.
These may well be (false) interpretationes etymologically invented by V. to explain the modern titles. They may perhaps have represented the differentiated honorary ranks of equestrian status which the posts conferred, as the rank of senator which comes immediately above the ducenarius in the field cavalry regiments and auxilia palatina will correspondingly have conferred honorary senatorial status. The commands of the centurio prae pili, princeps and secundus hastatus, in charge of 400, 150 and 150 men respectively, can be interpreted as theoretical guesswork.376

V. thinks of the centurio prae pili as equivalent to the civilian primicerinus = primicerius adiutorum = adiutor377 of the praetorian prefect’s department, rather than as a military primicerius = domesticus to the tribune or commander of a unit.378 The princeps held an office which in the palatine ministries came right at the top above the heads of sub-departments of the illiterati streams who were primicerii, and of the litterati streams, called Augustales, of palatine bureaucrats headed by the cornicularius.379 It is also the term for the heads of all the military officia listed in the Notitia Dignitatum.380 Statements as to the overall administrative responsibility of the princeps in Epit. II.8 p.43.1-2 and II.12 p.45.21-23, and the fact that the centurio prae pili was promoted from him, show that V. wanted the princeps to have a similar status, certainly higher than no. 3.381 He was probably conscious that Imperial ministers of the rank of spectabilis and above received their princeps officiorum from the highest rank of the schola agentum in rebus, the ducenarii.382 Yet he had to rank the

---

375Epit. II.8: primus hastatus duas centurias, id est CC homines, ducebat in acie secunda, quem nunc ducenarium vocant. Like the centenarius first securely attested at Concordia cemetery, c. A.D. 400, and found in a variety of units, including guards, field- and in the officia of the frontier-army, ducenarii were perhaps administrative military officials, but they are even less frequently attested than centenarii. In the scholae palatinae they were exempted along with senatores from whipping and demotion inflicted by comites scholarum in A.D. 441 (Th. II Nov. XXI); in Jerome’s list of singula militiae equestris officia the ducenarius occupies 4th. place after tribunus, primicerius and senator, and before centenarius, biarchus, circitor, eques and tiro, Hieron. c. Iohanne, 19.425 (PL XXIII.370 B). Cf. R. Grosse, op. cit. 118-120.

376See ch. 7 (f).

377Cf. E. Stein, Untersuchungen über das Officium der Praesorienerpräfektur seit Diocletian (Vienna 1928) 58 n.1, W.G. Sinnigen, The Officium of the urban prefecture during the later Roman Empire (1957) 41, 52-53.


379Cf. ch. 3 (e) 2, p. 97.

380R. Grosse, 123.

381See ch. 7 (f), p. 286.

382W.G. Sinnigen, 14.
princeps below the primus hastatus = ducenarius because of the overriding tactical command of the Second line which he had erroneously given him.

Although the details are confused, it is clear that V. understands the ‘commands’ of the ordinarii or centurions of the First cohort of the antiqua legio in wholly contemporary terms, as if administrative military officiales, as also the ‘commands’ of all the legionary centurions, equated with centenarii. V. took the point that they were all formerly field officers, and tried to work out the size of their commands, but did not understand how it worked.

(g) The description secundum normam militaris iuris.

A third method of dealing with the legio antiqua from a contemporary point-of-view was to present it in parallel with a modern legionary establishment, ‘according to the form set by military law’. To this end V. claimed to present the principia of the legion ‘according to present-day rolls’ in Epit. II.7, listing what seemed to him the main modern legionary officers, and then listing (Epit. II.8–14) the ancient legionary officers with some of their modern equivalents, as if this procedure spoke for itself. However V. has hardly left us a systematic comparison, having contented himself with sporadic glosses leaving much else unsaid. Clearly he had no reason to engage in antiquarian research, so that the phrase introducing II.7 secundum praesenres marriculas—like secundum normam militaris iuris for the whole section—will reflect a wider determination to dispense with all that was not useful to his own times. But we can see also that he had little definite information on the ancient legion, so that the phrase makes a virtue of a necessity.

The result is that the legio antiqua is mainly a new model army very remotely connected with Cato’s legion. Thus the modern tribunus maior reappears as the tribunus militiae praecipuus of the allegedly antique legion and the new-style minor tribunus as the tribuni vel...
praepositorii (II.12) and the praefectus legionis bears a similar relation to his praefectus castrorum (II.9–10), since the latter was chosen after lengthy reliable service like the minor tribunus, and their duties are artificially and unconvincingly divided between them. Likewise, V. will have simply assumed the existence of standard-bearers carrying the totally unattested century-vexillum corresponding to the draconarii for the dragon-standard of the cohort, the smallest unit of his own day above the contubernium (II.13). He will have assumed the existence of decani because they existed in his own day (see below), and set the size of the First cohort at 1,000 contubernales and of the other cohorts at 500 contubernales in imitation of the decimal multiples of contemporary units. As we saw, late-Roman ordinarii, who appear to represent primarily administrative military officials to V., are crudely equated with the primi ordines of the First cohort, and other legionary centurions, with which they probably had little in common (II.8).

However, the problems with the modern list in II.7 and our lack of knowledge of the officers of the field army legion are such that we cannot assume the use of an official up-to-date source for V.'s information even here, it being possible and perhaps likely to interpret the praesentes matriculas as being based merely on a grammarian's list of 'parts of the legion' (see below).

I summarise the two lists as follows:

**SECUNDUM PRAESENTES MATRICULAS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legionis Antiquae Iudices et Principia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tribunus maior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tribunus minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ordinarii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustales ordinarii iuncti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flaviales = secundi Augustales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aquiliferi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imaginiferi (v.l.: imaginarii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>optiones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>signifer/draconarii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tesserae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campigeni/antesigni = campidoctores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metuores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beneficiarii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

389 Cf. CI 12.42.1 (323): *ne cui liceat praepositorum vel tribunorum cohortium vel vicariorum...*
390 See ch. 7 (f), p. 287.
391 See ch. 7 (f), p. 286.
392 Cf. Jones 682, Grosse 34.
librarii
tubicines
cornicines bucinares
armaturae duplares, simplares
mensores
duplaires, sesquiplares
torquati duplaires, simplares
 candidati duplaires, simplares
circumitores\textsuperscript{393}  550 decani
QUINQUE ORDINARI
centurio primi pili = primiscrinius
primus hastatus = ducenarius
primus princeps legionis = princeps
secundus hastatus
triarius prior = centenarius?

From Glosses:
ducenarius
cenenerii
capita contubernii = decani
circltores\textsuperscript{394}

Apart from in Book II, when V. is talking about the legio antiqua\textsuperscript{395} and in Book I, where the old system of imparting armatura is under discussion\textsuperscript{396} the praefectus legionis does not otherwise occur. Instead the commanding officer in II.7 is a tribune, as is usual for virtually all types of unit in the 4th. c.\textsuperscript{397} Below him in V.'s list is a lower-ranking or minor tribune. Although tribunes differed widely in rank according as the rank of the unit they commanded, so that for example the tribune of a legio palatina would out-rank that of a limitanean legio, V. means two levels of tribune within the legion. Jones was probably right to see in the tribunus minor the vicarius or acting tribune, 'who seems normally to have been a senior non-commissioned officer of the unit', i.e., presumably most often the primicerius. It seems not unlikely, given the confusion in Roman administration between function and title which can be seen in the loose use of such terms as praefectus, praepositus, dux and comes, that in the absence of the 'real' tribune, which judging by papyri from Egypt seems to have been frequent, the vicarius who took over his function provisionally at least might enjoy his title.\textsuperscript{398} Hence instances of interpolation of vicarii into laws referring to tribunes may be due to the frequency with which vicarii were in fact occupying such positions.\textsuperscript{399} So V.'s contemporary legion was commanded by either type of tribune, but it was pointed of V. to say

\textsuperscript{393}Epit. III.8 p.85.6–8.
\textsuperscript{394}Epit. III.8 p.85.6–8.
\textsuperscript{395}Epit. II.9.
\textsuperscript{396}Epit. I.13.
\textsuperscript{397}B. Grosse, op. cit. 145ff.
\textsuperscript{398}Jones, 1278 n.158.
\textsuperscript{399}CJ 12.42.1 (Constantine), 3.13.5 (A.D. 397); cf. A.H.M. Jones, loc. cit.
that the tribunes or praepositi of the mythical legio antiqua led the training of their men by personal example.\textsuperscript{400}

Centurions and decurions are quite properly absent from the list of principales or principia of the contemporary legion that V. gives us at II.7. On the other hand the presence of the contemporary equivalent in the form of ordinarii in both lists probably suggests that V. has tampered with both in the attempt to homogenize them. The 5 ordinarii plus 45 or 50 centuriones in the ancient list (II.8) are probably not mutually distinct in V.'s view, as he uses ordinarii as the contemporary term for 'centurions' of various kinds.\textsuperscript{401} Thus there are also ordinarii in the modern list (II.7), somehow complemented by Augustales and Flaviales, and, leaving aside aquiliferi and imaginarii, optiones. Ordinarii and optiones are attested in the 4th–5th c. army, the former as senior NCO's of some kind,\textsuperscript{402} and the latter as administrators, as paymasters above all of foederati, who as irregulars were identified by the name of the government official who paid them.\textsuperscript{403} Augustales and Flaviales, the latter named probably after Constantine and certainly not Vespasian as suggested by V.'s interpretatio etymologica, first appear in the same period.\textsuperscript{404} A frontier unit garrisoned at Syene in A.D. 579 appears to have had a command-structure of a primicerius and 7 ordinarii (one of them an adiutor) and an unspecified remainder of priores/priores.\textsuperscript{405} V. also seems to locate the ordinarii within the body of primi = priores (Epit. II.7): Ordinarii dicuntur qui in proelio, quia primi sunt, ordines ducunt, where I take their stated tactical rôle to be V.'s interpretatio etymologica.

So there are a number of indications in both of V.'s lists pointing to the 4th. c., whether or not all the officers mentioned could ever be found in a single field army legion. From the ancient list (II.8) we can see that at least the centenarii and ducenarii, and perhaps also the

\textsuperscript{400}Epit. II.12.

\textsuperscript{401}Epit. II.8; cf. J. F. Gilliam Trans. and Procs. of the Am. Philol. Assoc. LXXI (1940), 131–134 (= Mavors II (1980) 5–8), J.R. Rea, ZPE XXXVIII (1980) 217–219. Note that V. may miscalculate the total of centurions as 55, because he assumes 10 for the milliary First cohort. So too at II.25 p.60.10. Otherwise we should count, with Oudendorp, 5 centuriones & 5 ordinarii for the First cohort, with the 5 centuriones lacking any obvious tactical rôle (cf. Schwebel, comm. ad V. Epit. II.7 p.213).

\textsuperscript{402}cf. R. Grosse, op. cit., 112.

\textsuperscript{403}T. Mommsen, Hermes XXIV (1889) 238.

\textsuperscript{404}J. G. Keenan, BASP X (1973) 43–46.

\textsuperscript{405}P. Monac. I. no.2 (A.D. 578), cf. Jones 675.
centurio primi pili = primiscrinius = primicerius, correspond to ranks attested for mounted units and auxilia palatinae. From the modern list (II.8) campigeni = campidoctores appear in both legiones palatinae and auxilia palatina, while Augustales, Flaviales and ordinarii appear only in legiones palatinae and limitanean legions, but the sample of available evidence is very small indeed.

John the Lydian worked from a similar list, from which the relevant parallels in consecutive order are: τριβούνιοι, δημιαρχοι — ὁρδιάρχοι, ταξιαρχοι — συγνήφερα, σμειοφόρα — ὀπτίλωνες, ἀρετοὶ ἡ γραμματέης (de mag. I.46). Whereas V. retails the old Varroonian etymology of optio even though in his own day they had ceased to have a tactical rôle, becoming like centurions purely administrators, typically of pay and provisions, John the Lydian combines the etymological gloss with the contemporary description.

From the modern list (II.7) the presence of imaginiferi and imagines of the Emperor in the army of the 4th. century, despite the religious change, does not seem unthinkable, pace Grosse. V. himself glosses imagines imperatorum as ‘divine and propitious standards’, and makes it clear in the preceding chapter that the soldiers’ oath by the Trinity and the Emperor’s majesty indicated that the latter was owed divine worship ‘as the present and corporal God’. John’s list (ibid.) has them lower down: ἱμαγινίφεραι, ἐκοινοφόροι.

Aquilae, mentioned eight times by Ammianus, seem unproblematic at least as the main legionary standard. Indeed, the Joviani and Herculi, legiones palatinae, also had the eagle as their standard. Ammianus’ reference to a clash between units of Procopius’ Divitenses

---


408 Varro, de l. l. 5.91.

409 So ms. II. The v.l. imaginarii preferred by Lang is unsupported by all other evidence outside V.

410 Op. cit. 233. V., at least, is not talking about the antiqua ordinatio legionis, as G. believed.

411 hoc est divina et praesentia signa. Epit. II.6.

412 iam quam praesenti et corporali Deo fidelis est praestanda devoitio... Epit. II.5.

413 Amm. 15.8.4; 16.12.12; 17.13.25; 18.2.17; 20.5.1; 26.2.11; 26.7.17; 28.5.3.
(legio palatina) and Valens' Jovii and Victores (auxilia palatina) as 'legions' and to their standards as 'eagles' may suggest a large degree of similarity between the organization of field army legions and auxiliaries at this date, although it may also be due to Ammianus' classicising literary style. Many of the surnames of palatine and pseudocomitatensian legions such as Lanciarii, Ballistarii, Funditores, Fortenses auxiliarii, Prima Isaura sagittaria show more reason to suppose that many field army legions were light-armed. Thus no problem with aquiliferi for the late-4th c.; John the Lydian omits them.

But the next item in V.'s modern list, Signiferi qui signa portant, quos nunc draconarios vocant, implies interpretation by the author in line with his view that the contemporary legion possessed only an eagle and dragons as its standards. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the draconarius replaced the signifer as such in the late-Roman army, and there is now new evidence that the draconarii reported to magistri signorum or draconum. The tendency of literary historians to use traditional terminology for new things is well known. Thus it is very probable that dragons lie behind instances of signa in Ammianus, especially when he speaks of the terror which the sight of the standards inspired in the Barbarians. Ammianus also once uses the term signum for the vexillum, so one cannot simply replace it with draco at every opportunity. But it remains questionable whether old-style signa/signiferi still existed in the later 4th c. as Grosse believed. His dating of V. to c. A.D. 430 allowed a distinction to be suggested between the evidence of Ammianus and that of V. which is rejected here. That the term itself continued to be used around A.D. 375 by limitanei is confirmed by O.Douch, nos. 21, 37, 120, 176. John the Lydian lists both, separately.

414 Amm. 26.7.17; 26.7.14-15; 25.6.3. See also ch. 6 (c), p. 243 n. 198.
417 Drako Amm. 15.5.16; 16.10.7; 16.12.39; draconarius 20.4.18; signa inspiring terror 18.2.17; 27.2.6; 28.5.3; 29.5.15. Cf. R. Grosse, Mil. Gesch. (1921) 232.
418 Cf. Amm. 27.10.9 & 12.
419 Grosse, 233.
That the *tessera* was still used in the 4th. c., despite the doubts of moderns over the alleged illiteracy of the troops, is twice vouched for by Ammianus\(^{422}\) and in any case it could exist by word of mouth, in native languages, if necessary.\(^{423}\) The rôle of the *tesserarius*,\(^{424}\) the next item in the list, in announcing the password ‘through the *contubernia*’, rather than through the centuries, is a glimpse again of the structure of the new cohort as divided into *contubernia*. Similarly the statement that legionary cavalry respected their cohorts ‘through the affection of the *contubernium*’.\(^{425}\)

From the ancient lists (II.8) the ‘*decani*’ in charge of 10-man *contubernia* in the *legio antiqua* are twice glossed *caput *contubernii* by V., showing the projection of the contemporary organization onto the *legio antiqua*.\(^{426}\) Neither term is confirmed by Ammianus. V.’s words *unus quasi praeesser decanus* either imply that he is not using the term as a title, but as a function, or that the nature of the responsibility was weak. D. Hoffmann conjectured that *caput contubernii* = *cap. z.* of Concordia inscr. no. 12.\(^{427}\) It may be suggested here that the new title may be explained if the size of the *contubernium* had temporarily shrunk e.g. to 7, with the 8th. man acting as *caput z.*, interpreting the *z* as the Greek numeral for seven.\(^{428}\) But a *decanus num(eri) scut(ariorum)* is known from an inscription to have died at Prusias ad Hypium aged 45, and his unit probably belonged to the *scholae palatinae*.\(^{429}\)

---

\(^{422}\)Amm. 21.5.13; 23.2.2.

\(^{423}\)Ps.-Hyginus 43, viv a *tessera*. O.Douch, an archive from a limitanean unit in Egypt c. A.D. 375, has several instances of a *tesserarius*, nos. 12,15,30,33,41,53.

\(^{424}\)Cf. Joh. Lyd. de mag. 1.46: *εν τῷ καταφέλει μὲν τῇ σημασίᾳ τῷ πλήθει περιμετρίωτα*.

\(^{425}\)Epit. II.21: *ita legionarii equites cohortes suas contubernii adfectione venerantur*. In the context of centuries, we should have expected ‘century’, not ‘cohort’. As far as V. was concerned, there was no longer any practical difference between a century and a cohort (see above). Thus it was a matter of indifference whether to say ‘cohorts’, as here, or ‘centuries’ as in ibid. II.19: *de omnibus centuriae et contuberniis*.

\(^{426}\)Epit. II.8: *Erant decani, denis militibus praepositi, qui nunc caput contubernii vocantur*. Ibid. II.13: *Rurus ipsae centuriae in contubernia divisa sunt, si decem militibus sub uno papilionie degetibus unus quasi praesett decanus, qui caput contubernii nominatur*. The *decani* were 11th. men, cf. Epit. II.23 and the calculations ibid. II.6.

\(^{427}\)Op. cit. II.28 n.206; I.76.

\(^{428}\)Cf. *caput scholae* (CI 12.37.17.5 (491-505)) and *caput totius legionis* (V. Epit. II.8 p.42.15 (= *centurio primi pili*, i.e., *primicerius*).

\(^{429}\)AE (1951) 30, cf. Hoffmann, op. cit., 293. The man’s rank is in fact specified as *b.b. decanus*, but the resolution of the abbreviation remains obscure.
The term δεκαδρόχος of the Panopolis papyri (A.D. 299-300) clearly translates the cavalry decurio, not the decanus; so too the inscription from Mons Claudianus is usually interpreted, Τὸ προοιμία Κλαύμεντενου δεκανοῦ. But there are also unexplained decani in the 2nd. c. fleets. The military decanus reappears later in Byzantine literature as δεκαδρόχος, and is firmly attested in literature of the late-4th–early 5th. c. A.D. His displacement by the caput contubernii can only have been very brief, but is perhaps another indication that V. was up to date.

V. further tells us that the contubernium used to be called (at the period of the legio antiqua) a manipulus. Grosse commented that we can understand all of Ammianus’ 11 references to the maniple in the same sense, although the literary-formulaic character of some of these references is obvious from the fact that two refer to maniples of the Persians. The old manipular organization of the legion in which a maniple equalled two centuries had certainly disappeared by the time of Hyginus, usually dated to the 2nd. c. A.D., so it is possible that the term acquired some such new meaning. The Historia Augusta, at any rate, knows of a unit of seemingly ten or eleven commanipulones, which would lend credence to V. His etymological explanation shows a comparable confusion to Isidore’s, who says that soldiers were called manipuli either because they started the battle primo manu ( = in the-
front rank?), or being in front of the standards they used handfuls of straw for provisional standards, and so were called *manipulares milites*.

According to Maurice, the 5th–6th c. Byzantines had units called decarchies and pentarchies; the decarchies were placed under decarchs, and the decarchy is glossed *contubernium*, responsible for a wagon each in the baggage-train. V.'s assignment of *singula contubernia... hoc est undecim homines* to each *carroballista* seems like overuse of manpower to arm and aim the engine, but being embedded in a chapter cataloguing the legion's equipment probably reflects a source describing the organization of the baggage-train similar to that used and updated by Maurice.

The next item in the modern list (II.7), *campigeni*, is unparalleled. V. glosses *antesignani*, but this appears at this date a generic term for senior field officers. At least it is sufficiently clear that he is referring to *campidoctores/-ductores*, because the proffered etymology makes a pun on *exercitii genus* and *crescit in campo*, and there can be little doubt that the former element is the special drill or *armatura*, which was imparted specifically by *campidoctores* in the exercise-ground or *campus*. The presence of these officers in the contemporary infantry army is attested not only by V. himself, but by inscriptions commemorating members of palatine legions and *auxilia* from the Concordia cemetery, and by Ammianus, who likewise equates them with *antesignani*. They are attested only in infantry units and appear to rank one to each unit, not far below the tribune. They are named

---

439 Jsid. Etym. 9.3.50. The latter explanation is from Ovid Fasti 3.117.
441 Epit. II.25 p.60.2–5.
442 Epit. II.7: *Campigeni, hoc est antesignani, ideo sic nominati, quia eorum opera atque virtute exercitii genus crescit in campo*.
445 CIL 5. 8773: *Vassioni campidictoribus (octori) numeri Bataor(um) sen(iorum)*. Another inscription belonging to the grave of a man probably of a *legio palatina*, the Lanciarii, shows that the campidictor, -ductor was junior in rank to the *ordinarius*. Cf. MAMA 1.168: Πιπου ὑπὸ καμπιδικτόρους φρεσκαινῆς, and Hoffmann, op. cit., 329.
446 Amm. 19.6.12: *horum campidictoribus ut fortium factorum antesignanis... armatas statuas... locari iussert imperator*; 15.3.10: *tribunus ex campidictore eo tempore vacans*.
among the top-ranking principia by V. It would seem reasonable provisionally to give them the rank next below ordinarii. According to V. their armour was the bearskin-covered helmet and ‘small cuirass’, like that of the signiferi. In his array they counted as heavy armament, and occupied a position among the principes in the First line of battle. This frontal position may find some confirmation in Ammianus’ formula for a stationary battle-array.

The list continues with metatores qui praecedentes locum eligunt castris, and after several other items we have mensores qui in castris ad podisium demetiuntur loca, in quibus tentoria milites figant, vel hospita in civitatis praestant. The distinction is unknown to Ps.-Hyginus §§ 37, 46, where the metator is found laying out the interior of the camp. 2nd–3rd c. A.D. inscriptions mention mensores for the first time in military contexts. Ammianus names an agrimenso leader of a military undertaking. 6th c. Byzantine sources make some distinction between antecessores/praeparatores who prepared the way for the army and reconnoitred for water and forage and mensores who measured out

---

448Epit. III.6 p.78.18-19: campidoctores vicarii vel tribuni.
449campidoctoribus et principis Ibid. III.8 p.83.17, under which phrase are probably subsumed the centuriones and tribuni who inspect the work, ibid. p.84.6-9.
450Epit. II.16.
451Epit. II.2
452Epit. II.15: Sed ante signa et circa signa nec non etiam in prima acie dimicantes principes vocabantur, hoc est ordinarii ceterique principales. The gloss suggests that V. regarded the terms ordinarii and principales as overlapping with antesignani and signiferi, and with principes, but the latter ought to refer to all ranks in the First line, not just officers.
453Amm. 16.12.20: Quos cum... nostrorum conspexere ductores, steterant vestigiis fatis, antepilani hastatisque et ordinum primis velut insolubili muro fundatis... I take Amm.’s antepilani as = V.’s antesignani, Amm.’s hastati as = V.’s signiferi, cf. Amm. 20.4.18 hastatus = draconarius, and Amm.’s ordinum primi as = V.’s principes and hastati, cf. Epit. III.14 p.99.10-11 primis ordinibus, ibid. II.16 primae aequi. Note that Julianus Caesar could be complimented by a signifer as faustus antesignanus et fortis, parallel to bellicosus duxtor, Amm. 16.12.18; Gratian fought inter antesignanos against the Germans, Amm. 31.10.13; and Simplicius was in a metaphorical relation of a field officer to his general when assisting the praefectus urbis Maximinus, cum Maximo velut antepilano suo contendens, in his bloody prosecutions for adultery, etc., Amm. 28.1.46.
454Cf. M. Lenoir (ed.), op. cit., § 127. Castrorum metator in Cic. Phil. 11.12 is considered a job-description rather than a title. A metator is responsible for the siting of the camp in Front. Strat. 2.7.12. But the Schol. ad Lucan 1.382 says that the metator is properly the quartermaster. Cf. also F.T. Hinrichs, Die Geschichte der germanischen Institutionen, Wiesbaden, 1974, 158-160, for the development of a corps of officers called mensores in the 2nd c. A.D.
455CIL 3.3433, 8112; 6.3606, 32536b; 8.2564.
456Amm. 19.11.8.
the camp, but later sources do not. The Theodosian Code treats the terms as synonymous, with the meaning 'quartermaster'.

Next come beneficiarii who are described as promoted by the beneficium of tribuni. Varro said something similar of optiones. Beneficiarii are still found in the Byzantine or Arab period, but only sporadically from the beginning of the 4th c. A.D. onwards. However they are included in John the Lydian's list, with an erroneous explanation: Βενεφικιάδου, ὁ ἐπὶ θεραπευτῶν βεκτείμων τεταγμένοι. V. does not mention other ranks of beneficiarius, such as bf. pr(aefecti), bf. leg(ati), bf. co(n)s(ulis), presumably because the grades of their employers no longer existed as such. But P.Oxy XLI (1982) 3480 shows a beneficiarius officii praesidis Augustamnicae from c. A.D. 360-90, and P.Lips. 55 has one on the staff of the praesidio Thebaidos with the task of collecting recruits raised by the recruitment tax from the cities of Constantine and Diocletianopolis from A.D. 375-379. CTh 8.4.7 (361) treats beneficiarii as a grade of cohortales. It is precisely the military beneficiarii such as bf. tr(ibus) that are not attested for the 4th c. This raises further suspicions about V.'s praesentes matriculas.

Then, librarii or clerks, attested like the beneficiarius only occasionally after A.D. 300. 4th c. examples are P.Flor. 71.605, 723, 87.11.

---

457 Mauricius: διψεύντορας (antecessores) ἢ τοι πρεπαρτόρας (praeparatores) — μηψορας (1.3.35: 1.9; 2.12); Joh. Lydus de mag. I.46: μηψωρες, προμέται — μηψώραι, χωρομέται.
459 CTh 7.8.4 (393), mensorum. Mensores occur as government quartermasters in CTh 7.8.4 (393), and metatores as the same in Th. 11 Nov. 25, line 24 (444), cf. CTh 7.8.10 (413); 7.8.16 (435).
460 Varro de l. l. 5.91: Quos hi (sc. decuriones) primo administros ipsi sibi adoptabant, optiones vocari coepti, quos nunc propriam ambitionem tribuni faciunt.
461 BGU 691.
462 Cf. R. Grosse, op. cit., 129.
464 P.Lips. 55: ἑπεφλεκτράρη τάξεως ἡγεμονίας θεσαίας ἀνετήρη τράφων Κωνσταντίνως καὶ Ἀκαθάρτων πόλεως.
466 For the first three centuries A.D., see G.R. Watson, 'Immunis librarius', in Britain and Rome: Essays presented to Eric Birley on his 60th birthday, ed. M.G. Jarrett, B. Dobson (Kendal 1965) 45-55.
Next, *tubicines cornicines et bucinatores*, hardly attested outside the literary sources after A.D. 300; but a *boukìντόρος* is mentioned in an edict of Anastasius,*⁴⁶⁷* and Maurice mentions both the *boukìντόρος* and *touβότόρος*.⁴⁶⁸ The musicians are explained in greater detail in II.22 (for *legio antiqua*) and III.5 (for the contemporary field-army). V. forgets to make any distinction, again showing how much the *legio antiqua* depends on imaginative reconstruction from the present, although the bronze *cornu* and horn *buccina* appear to have swapped places at III.5.⁴⁶⁹ John the Lydian’s list has all three, but explains their tasks differently.⁴⁷⁰ For the order compare the corps of *duplarii* who made a dedication to Elagabalus at the camp of *legio III Augusta* at Lambaesis:⁴⁷¹

\[
\begin{align*}
tess(\text{erarius}) \\
tub(\text{icen}) \\
corn(\text{icen}) \\
buc(\text{inator}) \\
imi(\text{munis}) \\
ar(\text{orum}) \\
b(\text{ene})f(\text{iciarius}) \\
mel(\text{n(is))or}) \\
lib(\text{arius}) \\
pol(\text{lio}) \\
limi(\text{munis}) \\
mar(\text{sus}) \\
dup(\text{larius}), \text{ et cet. omnes.}
\end{align*}
\]

Next, *armaturae duplares* and *simplices*, which correspond to the earlier *duplarii* for those on double pay, and to an unattested equivalent for those on single pay (perhaps *simplarii*), though this may be an error for *sesquiplicares* (see below). V. confines his explanation to the epithets, since *armaturae* were probably still familiar as specialist cadres

---

⁴⁶⁷ SEG IX (1944), no.356.66.
⁴⁶⁸Maur. Strat. 12 B (8) 22.33ff. The *tubicines* sound thrice at evening as a signal for work to cease. When the army is to move, the *bucinatores* sound thrice at dusk the signal for the route-march.
⁴⁶⁹Cf. R. Mencacci, ‘Lo strumento del bucinatore A. Surus e il cod. Pal. Lat. 909 di Vegezio’, BJ CLXXVII (1987) 259-272, holds that the error is due to a ms. correction to V. in line with a 5th. c. A.D. change in meaning of the two terms. But it can also be explained by confusion of the name of the *cornu* with the substance in the mind of an early copyist.
⁴⁷¹CIL. 8.2364.
⁴⁷²Correxi W. ’cum post mensorem recenseatur’, however *librarius* is much commoner in these lists, and they varied in rank. Cf. M.P. Speidel, TAPhA CXII (1982) 212.
within the infantry legions;\(^{474}\) and as mounted units of scholae palatinae, at any rate, they were famous.\(^{475}\) The connexion with the war-dance display, called armatura (equestris and pedestris) in the late-Empire at least, seems reinforced by the references to trainers and training.\(^{476}\) Gladiators too might perform armatura,\(^{477}\) and the performers collectively called themselves, e.g., the armatura Thracum universa on a gravestone for one of their number.\(^{478}\)

The existence of a grade of principalis called armatura is inferred from ex armatu(ra), d(iscens) ar(maturam) in an inscribed list of veteran under-officers of c. A.D. 211–212 from Lambaesis, Numidia.\(^{479}\) Compare the abbreviation arm. (not extended armorum (custos) here) found on two inscribed lists at the camp of legio III Augusta at Lambaesis, Numidia.\(^{480}\) Also compare from Pannonia Inferior the private inscriptions mentioning an armatura legion(is), perhaps leg. IIII Fl. f., and a q(uon)d(am) armat[ura] leg(ionis) II ad(iutricis) stip(endiorwn) XVI... qui vixit ann. XXXIII.\(^{481}\) The evidence is the more significant that the same legionary lists contain can(didatus), on which see below.

V.'s treatment of armaturae contrasts with torquati duplares, torquati simplices, below, where he essays to explain the torques. Oddly enough in view of the contemporary and later use of the torques,\(^{482}\) V. describes it in the past tense,\(^{483}\) possibly because he was

\(^{474}\) As such they are not infrequent in the 3rd. c. A.D. Cf. A. Paserini, Dizionario Epigraphico IV. 608, citing CIL 3.3336, 8.2618, AE 1909.167, BJ CXXXV (1930) 9 no.13, and CIL 3.10435 and AE 1908.9 which show that they formed a collegium. R. Cagnat, L'armée romaine d'Afrique et l'occupation militaire de l'Afrique sous les empereurs (Paris 1913) 188-89 cited Mommsen, Jahrbücher des Vereins von Altertumsfr. im Rheinlande (1880) 53 n.1, for the view that armaturae trained recruits; however it is clear from V. (I.13, II.22) that it was campidoctores who trained recruits to be armaturae, as also from CIL 6.3736 (A.D. 176) corr. v. Domaszewski RE II (1896) 1178, where the training rôle belongs to an ex armatorum (Augusti exercitator) armatur(um). Campidoctores are first attested (in the Praetorian Guard) under Septimius Severus. The earliest attested armatura is ILS 2362, late 1st c. A.D. They still occur in late-imperial and Byzantine times, cf. one from the limitanean legio II Traiana at Apollônos in 4th.–5th. c. (G. Wagner, Les Oasis d'Égypt (1987) 36 no.49), SB 1.1839, and Maur. Strat. 12.B(8).7, if not an armourer.

\(^{475}\) Cf. section (b) 3. above, p. 176.

\(^{476}\) Cf. Firm. Mathes. 8.5: au qui saltu quadrigas transeat au <qui in> dorso stans equorum mirifica se moderatione sustinet, atque ad primus equo vectus armaturas exerceat, V. Epit. II.23 p.57 5–14, Claud. pan. de Hon. VI. cons. 621–637. See also ch. 7 (d), p. 266.

\(^{477}\) See. Tit. 8.

\(^{478}\) CIL 6.10197.

\(^{479}\) CIL 8.2618, giving the year in which they began their military service variously from A.D. 170–186. N.b. also candidatus, ex candidatus. Dated by J.C. Mann, Legionary recruitment and veteran settlement during the Principate (London, 1983) 69.

\(^{480}\) CIL 3.5268 & 2569.

\(^{481}\) CIL 3.1663 (Belgrade), 3336 (Intercisa).

\(^{482}\) Zos. 4.40.8, cf. 2, in which a unit of Gothic comitatenses(?), stationed outside Torni c. A.D. 386 and attacked by limitaneni(?). Under Gerontius appear to have worn the torques as the badge of rank of their unit. Cf. Ambr. de ob. Val. 68.9: torques autem insignia esse victoriae dubitari non potest, cum hi, qui in bello fortiorer
repeating the rhetorical point that in the decayed modern legions rewards were no longer given for valour but through ambitio. Certainly the torque was part of the uniform of officers. By the 3rd. c. A.D. some tormenti may have formed a privileged group within the legion, with duplarius-rank, such as V. suggests. John the Lydian again makes mention of them.

The list proceeds desultorily with duplares, sesquiplares, these oddly isolated, and strangely explained in the past tense, unless V. is still referring to tormenti, in which case simplares should be emended to sesquiplares. John the Lydian garbles a comparable distinction between armaturae, and it seems clear that V.'s sesquiplaris is identical with the earlier sesquiplicarius, and with the contemporary semissalis and denoted a man on 1 1/2 annonae. V.'s use of a presumably obsolete term arouses suspicion again that the list is not all it claims.

The list ends with candidati duplares, candidati simplares, without explanation. The Thesaurus linguæ Latinæ s. v. candidati militares wrongly takes V.'s summary of the list as the explanation. V.'s candidati do not appear in this company to be members of the Emperor's close bodyguard of candidati associated with the scholae palatinae, but might rather seem akin to the corps of protectores and domestici, often seconded—to various staffs and army posts. We find that Ammianus was seconded as a domesticus to the staff of Ursicinus magister equitum per Orientem. Such a domesticus is mentioned in...
passing by V. in a context which lists the titles *comes*, *tribunus* and *domesticus*,\(^{494}\) this series of officers occurring as *tribunos electos, quorum scitur industria* in a parallel passage,\(^{495}\) officers whom a commander-in-chief might typically find on his staff or in command of units in his expeditionary army. Since *protectores* are known from the mid-3rd c., the Chronicon Paschale may refer to the origin of *protectores* under the garbled information that the 6th. *schola* of *candidati* or *seniores* was founded by Gordian 'the elder', and the 7th. *schola* of *candidati* or *juniores* by Philip 'the younger', so that they were 'left out of the corps of the *scholares* ', as though the latter already existed.\(^{496}\)

But the position of our *candidati* in the list suggests a lower status and there is no evidence that *protectores* were ever called *candidati*. More likely, perhaps, they were another grade of *principalis* of some legions,\(^{497}\) such as appear on two inscribed lists from the early 3rd. c. A.D. at the camp of *legio III Augusta* at Lambaesis, Numidia,\(^{498}\) and on the list of veteran under-officers already mentioned from the town of Lambaesis.\(^{499}\) But a resemblance to the *domesticus* (and the earlier military *beneficiarius*) is suggested by the secondment of *candidati* to the Proconsul of Africa or the governor of Numidia.\(^{500}\) *AE* 1917.57 shows six on secondment to the *officium* of the legate at Lambaesis in the early 3rd. c.\(^{501}\) Inscriptions associated with *legio II adiutrix* in Pannonia Inferior also show *candidati legionis*, and *cand(itat)us d(omini) n(ostri)*,\(^{502}\) which Mommsen took to be the same kind of NCO as *candidati legionis*.

A different kind of *candidatus* is offered by Speidel in his discussion of *CIL* 3.11135.\(^{503}\) From a dedication dated A.D. 235-238 we learn the career of a soldier of *legio*

---

\(^{494}\)Epit. III.10 p.90.15-16.
\(^{495}\)Ibid. III.9 p.88.17-18.
\(^{496}\)Chronicon Paschale (CSHB IV.1.)(Bonn 1832) 501-502.
\(^{497}\)So T. Mommsen, *Ephe~ris* Epigraphica IV (1881) 532 n.2.
\(^{498}\)CIL 8.2568 & 2569, dated c. A.D. 220 by J.C. Mann, *Legionary recruitment and veteran settlement during the Principate* (London, 1983), 69. Cf. also 2866 (Lambaesis) *candidatus legionis III Augusta*), died at about 45 years; 2801 (ibidem) *mili(i) leg(ionis III Augusta*) *candidatus consularis*, died at about 35 years.
\(^{499}\)CIL 8.2618, dated A.D. 211-212 by Mann, loc. cit. Cf. also 2866: *D(is) m(anibus) s(acrum) P. Egnatius Donatus, candidatus legionis III Augustae*, *Feci consulei nix marito merendi.* *Vix(it) ann(orum) XXXV.*
\(^{500}\)CIL 8.2801 (Lambaesis): *mili(i) leg(ionis) III Augustae* *candidatus consularis*.
\(^{502}\)CIL 3.3308, 3398, 3503. Cf. also CIL 3.14356 (Carnuntum): *candidatus dom(ini) n(ostri).*
XIII Gemina at Carnuntum; after entry as a miles he was promoted librarius numeri = legionis, custos armorum, signifer, and optio octavi pr(incipis) pr(ioris) candidatus, i.e., optio ad spem ordinis. This special status of optio candidatus explains why he ranked above the signifer rather than, as usual, the other way round.504

The continued existence of munifices, the lowest ranking soldiers, whose status was characterized by their lack of immunity from fatigues or munera, in the 4th. c. is confirmed by Ammianus,505 the Theodosian Code,506 and a papyrus letter of the comes et dux Aegypti to the praef(ectus) k(astri) of a cavalry unit stationed in Egypt in A.D. 396 ordering the promotion of Sarapion munifex to the unit’s schola catafractariorum,507 and in A.D. 505 by a papyrus letter from the comes rei militaris Thebaici limitis to the tribune of a vexillation stationed at Hermopolis, ordering the enlistment of a new recruit.508

The evident signs of carelessness in the construction of the list, not all due to textual errors, and its relative brevity suggest that it was not intended to be very thoroughgoing or more than representative sample, although there seems to be a rough descent in order of rank. It resembles some 3rd. c. legionary lists of principales cited above, but contains some 4th. c. elements particularly in the upper reaches. It is almost as if V. began to update an older list, but gave up in the middle. Traces of obsolescence and the sporadic use of the past tense reinforce this impression. The appearance of the old legionary junior rank principales—‘under-officers’, which V. misinterprets as equivalent to the contemporary principia—‘officers’,509 more strongly suggests the use of an older list dating from the Principate.510

The list given by John the Lydian, aiming simply to set out the ‘parts of the legions’, is considerably longer and more garbled by the author’s glosses (John is worse-informed about the Roman army than V.), but similar in essence, having the appearance of grammarian’s list of

505Amm. 25.2.2, munifex gregarius: 16.5.3, munificis militis vili et fortuito cibo contentus.
506CTh 8.5.2. (316)
508CPhA IV (1967) 246; cum cœtis etbris [conubera] libis suis militibus [op]eram navatur...
509Cf. V. Epit. II.19 p.53.20-21; ad obsequia tamen iudicium vel tribunorum nec non etiam principaliun...
lemmata, though Latin-Greek in his case, and in the same approximate order of items. John’s list has been plausibly said to derive from a common source although there is a large number of items not shared by V., and of V.’s much shorter list aquiliferi, Augustales, Flaviales, campigeni, librarii, and candidati are not shared by John. For the coincidences of word-order are too frequent to be otherwise explained. John’s omissions tend to rule out the chance that he compiled his list from V. supplemented by other sources. The likelihood is rather that V. may have excerpted his list of principia from a similar grammarians catalogue of ‘parts of the legions’, perhaps in the belief that it was based on current matriculae, or his criteria of selection were based on his general knowledge of current matriculae. At all events, secundum praesentes matriculas as a description seems somewhat disingenuous, and the list leaves out several other contemporary officers. Evidence is insufficient to say that any of the officers listed was not actually to be found in a late-4th. c. legio, but one can only wonder at the significance of the omission of senatores, actuarii, adiutores, opinatores, protectores, circitores, biarchi, magistri primi, semissales, etc.

Nor was V.’s material necessarily different for some parts of the organization of the ancient legion which may seem to belong in the 2nd.-3rd. c. A.D. Here too he was perhaps transmitting officers from a grammarians list—why not the same one?—and employing educated guesswork about their duties, which resulted in such unhistorical combinations as a praefectus legionis co-existing with a praefectus castrorum, an incoherent and illogical sharing of duties between them in which discipline and training were given to the praefectus legionis but the praefectus castrorum was chosen after long experience to teach others, and the assignment of plausible-sounding duties to the praefectus fabrum in a vaguely 3rd. c. pre-Diocletianic context long after that officer had ceased to be anything other than an aide-de-camp. It is also possible that contemporary limitanean legions preserved some or all of these

---

512 Epit. II.7, init.
titles, since in the Notitia Dignitatum they are commanded usually by a praefectus legionis, who may have sat in a base-camp with the administrative Headquarters while other detachments were garrisoned separately in forts commanded by praepositi/praefecti castrorum.

Most notably, no senators appear as army officers in V.'s legio antiqua. V. is careful to distance it from legati imperatoris who as 'ex-consuls' controlled the provincial armies on behalf of the Emperor 'like 4th. c. magistri militum', by putting the legio itself under the immediate command of a praefectus legionis who held vicariate powers,517 a situation analogous to that found in imperial consular provinces as the reforms of Gallienus led to the progressive phasing out of senators from army service as legati legionis.518 But vicariate status may have belonged to limitanean praefecti legionis in much later times too.

The laticlave tribunate also disappeared at the same epoch,519 and with the ad hoc appointments in the midst of military crisis of centurions, primipilares, praetorian tribunes and praefecti legionis as praepositi of legionary vexillations and duces of expeditionary forces, the necessary changes were wrought which broke up the titles and commands of centurions and tribunes on the ancient pattern.520 But V. imposes on the centurions and tribunes a contemporary interpretation. V.'s reconstruction of the legio antiqua was probably not all in line with contemporary field units, but may have included a limited amount of possibly 3rd. c. A.D. information, or else culled from old-fashioned contemporary limitanean units.

517 V. Epit. II.9: Proprius iudex erat praefectus legionis, habens comitivae primi ordinis dignitatem, qui absente legato sanc quam vicarius ipsius potestatei maximum retinebat.


519 Ibid. 43. The last proven trib. lat. is date/A.D. 249, and the last deducible case is no later than A.D. 260.

Ch. 6. Vegetius and the army of Theodosius. Pt. II.

(a) Field Tactics in Ammianus and Vegetius.

Like the legio antiqua, V.'s tactics can be shown to derive ultimately from Cato's De re militari. How realistic or contemporary was V.'s faith in 'ancient' military science? The best contemporary parallel material we have is in Ammianus. Although modern commentators have rightly stressed that Ammianus' battle narratives are written up for rhetorical and literary purposes with elaborate topoi, character-vignettes of the Emperor and the opposing generals or chiefs, avoidance of technical minutiae, and stereotyped contrasts between Roman disciplina and barbarian savagery, not to mention many vivid snapshots of life-and-death struggles, bloodshed, horror, terror and agony which are all the stronger coming from a man who had experienced such scenes, not all 'boring' details of numbers, topography, troop movements and dispositions have actually been sacrificed for these and similar effects. Ammianus shows that despite its historic roots V.'s traditional material on tactics would still have been deemed relevant to contemporary conditions. Not only can V.'s updating of details be checked against Ammianus, but much of the military background seems to be in harmony with what we learn from the historian, too.

1. Special 'mobile' formations.

Although Cato probably described the globus, perhaps in approximately the same sense as what Ammianus and V. understood by the term, 4th. c. A.D. barbarians and Romans were also familiar with this 'flying platoon'. V.'s up-to-date interpretation of the globus is guaranteed by the earliest attested use—except perhaps SHA Prob. 19.2—of the barbarian term drungus: drungos, hoc est globos... globis, quos dicunt drungos. Firmus and the Isaflenses

---

1 See ch. 7 (a–d, g).
4 Cato fr. 11 (Jordan) de re mil. = Festus L.466: sive opus sit cuneo aut globo aut forcipe aut turribus aut serra, ut adorire. There are clearly affinities with V. Epit. III.17–19. Cf. also A. Gell. 10.9, and F. Lammert, Das Gymnasium LI (1940) 15–18.
5 Cf. Livy 4.29.1, and J. Marquardt, Römische Staatsverwaltung II (1884) 425–6.
in A.D. 373 concealed reserve *globi* behind their battle line with the aim of moving up unnoticed and then suddenly 'surrounding' the Roman array, namely by turning one of the wings. The manoeuvre is foreseen by V., who recommends meeting it with similar reserve *globi* from one's own side. Since the main Roman array consisted of stationary infantry which typically fell into a dense formation with interlocked shields called by Ammianus a *testudo*, the need to hold substantial reserves for mobile formations and specific attacks is obvious and was not lost on V. V.'s assertions on the use of reserve *globi* to breach the enemy line make it virtually indistinguishable from a manoeuvre called a *cuneus* or 'wedge', also familiar to barbarians and Romans alike. Thus when the Limigantes lured Constantius II into a trap under colour of a parley in A.D. 358 the Romans attacked using such a wedge; Ammianus and V. agree in the contemporary military slang term *caput porci* or 'hog's head' for it. This term like *drungus* is also likely to be of barbarian origin, but Germanic rather than Celtic, in fact a Latin translation of the original. Another example of the wedge is probably to be seen in the *globus* of elite Alamanni who broke through part of the Roman lines at Strasbourg, but there is no named example in Ammianus of the V-shaped counter-manoeuvre for a wedge which V. calls a

---

is preferred by A. Walde, J.B. Hofmann, *Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1938) and declared 'sans doute' by A. Ermont, A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la langue latine*, augmented edn. by J. André (Paris 1979) 185. Thus it came into Latin and Greek (*δρυγος*) from Gaul or Britain. See also ch. 2 (a).
forfex or ‘pincher’; at Strasbourg at any rate the Romans met it with the formation known as a castra praetoria, which since it allowed the Romans to attack the unprotected flanks of the Alamanni will perhaps have been similar in plan.16

Both cuneus and globus in Ammianus can mean simply a division of troops, mounted or on foot,17 or an irregular robber band,18 or as in V. a ‘flying platoon’ or drungus, as above. Mobile, loose formations were characteristic of certain barbarian methods of attack. Thus the Hunnish light cavalry were wont to enter battle cuneatim.19 The Goths, on the other hand, seem on occasion at least to have adopted more ‘static’ Roman tactics, for it ‘was a sign of extreme desperation’ when they began attacking in loose globi after two days of fruitlessly trying to take the city of Adrianople.20 There may therefore have been some truth in V.’s sardonic comment that contemporary barbarians took the art of war, alone among the other arts, seriously.21 Had he not been so guarded on this subject, V. might have added that it was precisely because the barbarians had acquired ratio and disciplina through service in or familiarity with the Roman army that they had become so dangerous, as Seneca predicted they would.

2. ‘Stationary’ battle formations.

V.’s seven depugnationes or general actions (Epit. III.20) would appear to go back to Cato,22 but seemed to him nonetheless still applicable to contemporary 4th. c. Roman battles. According to V. the simplest 1st. depugnatio was still the one most commonly used,23 although military experts pointed out that long, straight fronts were vulnerable to inequalities in

---

15Epit. III.19: Nam ex lectissimis militibus in V litteram ordo componitur et illum cuneum excipi atque ex uraque parte concludit, quo facio aciem non posset rumpere. Cf. forfex in Cato fr. 11 de re mil. (Jordan).

16Amm. 16.12.49: quae conformatio castra praetoria dictiatur, ubi densior et ordinibus frequens miles instar turrium fissa formitae consistens proelium maiore spiritu repetit et vulneribus declinanidis intentus sequit in modum myrmiliorum operiens hostium latera, quae nudabat ira flagrante, desrictis gladiis perforabat.

17Amm. 25.1.16, 27.5.41, 27.8.7, 31.5.9 (Romans).

18Amm. 26.4.5, 31.11.5 (Goths), 27.2.2 (Germans).

19Amm. 31.2.8–9.

20Amm. 31.15.13: nullo ordine iam, sed per procerus pugnabatur et globos; quod desperationis erat signum extremae...

21Epit. III.10, p.90.2–6, probably inspired by Sen. De Ira 1.11.3–4, quoted ch. 2 (b), p. 37.

22Epit. III.20 p.106.6–7: Una depugnatio est fronte longa quadro exercitu..., cf. Cato fr. 10 (Jordan) de re mil.: Una depugnatio est fronte longo, quadrato exercitu (Nonius Marcellus, M. 204,32–33, L. 301); cf. Arr. Tact. 26, Onas. 21. See further ch. 7 (g), p.92 ff.

23Epit. III.20 p.106.7–8: sic utiam nunc et prope semper solet proelium fieri.
the ground which might cause weak points if the line were to have a curve or a gap in it. The other depugnationes involved such simple variations as either or both wings attacking first, supported by the use of reserves, and the removal of certain parts of the line away from the enemy.

In fact most of the detailed battle-narratives in Ammianus can without undue difficulty be fitted into this simple scheme. For instance, examples of the 4th. or 5th. depugnatio, in which one attacked with both wings at once, keeping the middle of the line back from the initial action, may be seen in the bicornis figura and lunaris acies employed by Julian in battle with the Alamanni near Brotomagum (Brumath) A.D. 356, and with the Persians in A.D. 363.24 The speed of this attack is stressed both by V. and Ammianus.25 V. also stressed the risk implied to the denuded middle of the line, unless a screen of light infantry and mounted archers were posted in front as in the 5th. depugnatio. It may be significant that only the hot-headed Julian is stated as using this crescent-formation in Ammianus. V., to be sure, distinguished lunate or crescent-shaped formations as naval, whereas land battles used straight lines,26 but it seems legitimate to interpret the 4th. and 5th. depugnationes so, especially as Onasander used the same description for the comparable land formations too.27

The battle of Strasbourg A.D. 357 may also have been fought in the 4th. depugnatio, to judge by the fact that the Romans placed all their cavalry on the right and began the battle there (this first stage lasts down to Amm. 16.12.37), but the Roman left wing of (light?) infantry was also advanced at the start of the proceedings (16.12.27), when they came across pits full of armed Germans and were exhorted to continue by Julian first in the succession of his exhortations. Next we find (16.12.37) that the Roman left wing of infantry routed the German right, at about the same time as the Roman cavalry on the right broke ranks and fled. Meanwhile the main body of Roman infantry had been compelled to defend their own flanks by forming a testudo of shields, the fleeing cavalry were held up gremio legionum protecti, and the legionary heavy infantry enabled the cavalry to reform because they stood their ground in

24Amm. 16.2.13; 25.1.16-17.
25Epit. III.20 p.108.21–p.109.6; Amm. 25.1.17: illatis conciatius signis.
26Epit. IV.45.
27Onas. 21.5–9.
tight formation, immobile.\textsuperscript{28} I.e., the centre of the infantry line had hitherto remained unshaken and in fact unassailed, because their station was withdrawn from the action. Note again that they had been denuded of their cover because of the movement of the wings. Then followed the second stage or \textit{comminus} ('hand to hand') battle, in which the infantry of the centre were intimately involved (16.12.42ff.).

In the battle of Adrianople A.D. 378 the cardinal rule of battle was broken that one should not attack before one has finished forming the line.\textsuperscript{29} Up to that point the Romans had been going by the book, conformably with V.'s dictum that one should always strive to be first to draw up the line.\textsuperscript{30} But there is some reason to think that Valens was intending to draw up a crescent-formation also. Thus the right wing of cavalry was from the outset posted forward of the main infantry line.\textsuperscript{31} Presently we find as the battle gets under way that the left wing of infantry has pressed the attack forward over a long distance, apparently before the left cavalry could arrive and deploy.\textsuperscript{32} Once again the heavy infantry in the middle found itself denuded by the movement and subsequent collapse of the wings, whereupon it was forced to take up the main brunt of the battle in a very exposed position.\textsuperscript{33} The intended tactics resemble Strasbourg more than somewhat, except that there the wings were just kept in place, and there the left wing contained, we are told, no cavalry. Ammianus fails explicitly to tell us the fate of the right wing at Adrianople; these may have included the mounted \textit{scholae palatinae} units, the Sagittarii and the Scutarii who fled in the opening stages.\textsuperscript{34}

Examples of the simple 1st depugnatio in which the two sides met in parallel extended lines can probably be found in Valentinian's high altitude battle against the Alamanni,\textsuperscript{35} in Jovinus' artfully extended line so as to make his force appear larger than it was employed also

\textsuperscript{28}Amm. 16.12.37-38: \ldots ni conferri illi sibique vicissim inexiti steisissent immobiles.
\textsuperscript{29}Amm. 31.12.16 (the impetuous but cowardly Sagittarii and Scutarii, \textit{scholae palatinae}, were to blame).
\textsuperscript{30}Epit. III.18 p.103.22: \textit{Semper autem studiere debes, ut prior instruas aciem, quia ex arbitrio tuo potes facere qued tibi uitile iudicas, cum nullus obstisit.}
\textsuperscript{31}Amm. 31.12.11: \textit{atque, ut mos est, ululante barbarae plebe ferum et triste, Romani duces aciem struxerunt ante posito dextrae cornu equitum primo pede primo pars maxima subsedebat.}
\textsuperscript{33}Amm. 31.13.2: \textit{steterunt improrecti pedies ita concurvatius manipulis...}
\textsuperscript{34}Amm. 31.12.16: \textit{inertia discessu...}
\textsuperscript{35}Amm. 27.10.13: \textit{latius sete pandens exercitus infusus urimque cornibus affictabat...}
against the Alamanni, and in the battle of ad Salices commanded by Richomeris, Profuturus and Traianus in A.D. 377 against the Goths, a battle which appears to have been fought with no preliminary skirmishing.

Quite other was the aciem rotundo habitu figuratum used by Count Theodosius against Firmus and the Isaflenses in Africa A.D. 373. This was called for against an enemy far superior in numbers, since Theodosius had a force of only 3,500 men. A similar-sounding formation was taken up by a Roman force expecting to be annihilated by the Saxons they had unsuccessfully tried to ambush. V. naturally did not include this in the catalogue of model depugnationes, but mentioned it among other standard legionary tactics of the ‘ancients’. A half-way stage to this formation is also described by V. in a manoeuvre to counter the attempted turning of the two wings by the enemy, in which each wing was bent back and rounded, so that the Romans covered one another’s backs.

The classic stationary legionary tactics which V. consistently recommends were a product of the heavy armour worn. Although V. rhetorically insisted both belonged to the past, it is clear from Ammianus that such tactics, involving a two-stage battle, first eminus with light infantry and cavalry skirmishing, then if necessary comminus with heavy infantry close-quarters combat, were the norm right up to and including Adrianople A.D. 378. There is no doubt about the familiar two-stage battle development at Strasbourg, Ctesiphon, ad

---

36Amm. 27.2.5: in aperta planitie compositus aciem dilatatam arie solerit, ut spatii amplioribus occupatis accepisset Romani hostium multitudinem apparerent...
37Amm. 31.7.10-15: ad suos quisque manipulos properans miles stabili gradu consistens nec vagabatur nec relictis ordinibus procurabat...
38Amm. 29.5.41, cf. 29.5.29, 29.5.38: conglobatis suis scutaque in formidabilem moventibus gestum controversas istem opposuit manus.
39Amm. 28.5.6: stetere sitem non conglobati, extremaque sorte vires icoet non integras suggere confiigere cogebar
40Epit. I.26: lubet etiam, ut instruant orbes, quo gener, cum vis hostium interruptit aciem, resisti ab exercitiis militibus consueviti, ne omnis multitudine fundatur in fugam et grave discrimen immineat.
42Epit. I.20, II.17, III.14, 17, 20.
43Amm. 16.12.42-43: Alamanni pulsis disiectisque equibus nostris primam aciem peditem inesserunt... sed postquam comminus venitum est pugnabatur paribus diu momentis.
44Amm. 24.6.10-11: praepilatis missibus per procuratores principiiis pugnae tempitatis... et cum unique solito more conclamaretur virorumque alacritatem sonans classicum iuvaret, hastis et muceribus strictis hinc inde comminus pugnabatur.
Salices, or Adrianople. The main Roman lines at the latter battle in particular are clearly shown to have been heavy-armed. The stationary, close-order style of heavy combat is obvious at Strasbourg, ad Salices and Adrianople. V.'s attitude is explained above as partly rhetorical hyperbole and partly a true reflection of the new field armies of Gratian and Theodosius which made use of barbarian élite light cavalry, élite light infantry, and irregulars on an unprecedented scale. This new military picture therefore seemed to V. to contrast sharply with the situation before A.D. 378.

The tactical disposition of the Roman battle-array itself at both Strasbourg A.D. 357 and Ctesiphon A.D. 363 also resembled the traditional scheme of V. Epit. II.15 and III.14. In V. the lines of heavy infantry stood in front ‘like a wall’; behind them were lines of light armed missile-shooters; last of all were the heavy-armed infantry reserves, who were only called into action if the front lines failed. The heavy-armed ‘wall’ at Strasbourg is clear, while battle raged at close quarters, the light-armed still performed, i.e., they shot over the Roman heavy-armed. Finally a German élite globus broke through the Roman lines and fought it out with the Roman Primanorum legio = legio I Italica, a seemingly heavy-armed élite legio palatina perhaps to be identified with the postsignanos in acie locatos extrema, at any rate a reserve
force in wall-like formation known as *castra praetoria*. In the battle near Ctesiphon A.D. 363 the Roman array had the *catervae peditum infirmae* located between the *priores* and *postsignani*, 'following the Homeric tactic' (cf. Iliad 4.297ff.) so that the weaker troops could not turn tail or throw into disarray the main front. This ancient scheme was reproduced also in V.'s battle-array, in which the older and experienced troops form the heavy-armed front lines and reserve lines, the junior and light troops the lines in between, but merely reflects the normal disposition for the *comminus* stage of the battle.

Ammianus has left us a typical battle-array of his day in a simile for the huge households of slaves accompanying rich Roman ladies in public. As in V. Epit. II.15-16 and III.14, the heavy-armed close-order lines are placed in front, the light-armed and missile-shooters next, and finally the reserve force. Note the close correlation of *armaturae* and *taculatores* with V.'s Third and Fourth lines, and of the *subsidiales acies* with V.'s *subsidia*, which he equated with the ancient *triarii*. Incidentally note that the latter term has no perceptible contemporary connotation for V., although there existed an *optio triarius* in the Tetrarchic period. V. does not, of course, explain what the *triarius prior* was doing as an *ordinarius* in the First cohort of the *legio antiqua*, but neither does he reconcile with his array the presence there of the *primus* and *secundus hastatus*. Ammianus' array has the merit of showing that V.'s modern glosses for light specialists of the ancient array were in accordance with contemporary usage, whatever we think of the whole attempt to assimilate a Catonian array to a late-imperial and vice versa.

3. Reserves.

The use of reserves, to which V. devotes III.17-19, and which plays a significant part in the model *depugnationes* of III.20, is amply attested in Ammianus. V. knows that there

---

55 Amm. 16.12.49: *...ubi densior et ordinibus frequens miles instar turrium fixa firmitate consistens...*
56 Amm. 24.6.9; cf. Epit. III.14.
57 Amm. 14.6.17: *primo catervas densas opponunt et fortes...*
58 *deinde levae armaturae, post taculatores...*
59 *ultimaeque subsidiales acies, si fors adegerit, luvaturas.*
60 Epit. III.14, cf. II.15, transposed as mentioned in ch. S (e) 1, p. 185.
62 Cf. Epit. II.8 with II.6 and II.15; *cf. ch. 5 (d), pp. 198-199*.
were different kinds of reserves, heavy and light infantry and cavalry, for supporting the wings and the main central front, posted in different parts of the field in accordance with their tactical rôle. So at Ad Salices A.D. 377, when the Goths broke the Roman left wing, the injured part was successfully reinforced by a reserve force waiting in the appropriate vicinity. It was the lack of such reserves to back up the left wing at Adrianople as recommended by V. that sealed their fate. Compare Pollentia A.D. 402 where Stilicho sent in infantry subsidia to support Alan cavalry on the wing because of the danger to the whole line if the wing gave way. The reserves posted behind the middle of the line at Adrianople included the possibly light-armed Lancearii and Mattiarii, a pair of legiones palatinae, and the Batavi, auxilium palatinum. At Strasbourg it is probable that the palatine legion of the Primani=legio I Italica posted 'in the middle' behind Roman lines was a similar reserve force. It was probably a heavy-armed dense formation, and its rôle was renovative. A second reserve force at the same battle may more clearly be seen in the Batavi and Reges, paired auxilia palatina, who came to the aid of the infantry upon the rout of the cavalry, presumably by having to extend and defend the right wing to prevent its being surrounded. Perhaps the same auxilia palatina may also be seen as mobile reserves accompanying Julian as he ranged about the field bringing succours where needed. A further example of the use of auxilia palatina as the main mobile reserve for the palatine legions can be seen in an episode from the retreat of Jovianus from Persia, A.D. 363, when the Jovii and Victores came to the rescue of the Joviani and Herculiani. A more separate deployment may be seen when Count Sebastianus was posted

---

63 Amm. 31.7.12: subsidialis robustissimus globus e propinquo latere fortier excitus sustentavit.
64 Epit. III.18, III.20 (2nd. depugnatio).
65 Amm. 31.13.2: et quia sinister cornu ad usque plaustra ipsa accessit ultra, si qui alissent suppeditas, processserunt, a reliquo equitatus desinere multitudine hostili urgen te ac si ruina aggeris magni oppressum atque detectum est.
67 Amm. 31.13.8–9.
68 Amm. 16.12.49: ubi densior et ordinibus frequens miles instar turrium fixa firmitate consistens proelium maiore spiritu repetivit.
69 Amm. 16.12.45: formidabilis manus extremae necessityatis articulo circumventos, si iuvisset fors, erupserat; cf. V. Epit. III.18.
70 Amm. 24.6.9: ipse cum levis armaturae auxiliis per prima postremaque discurrent. Cf. Hoffmann 1.72.
71 Amm. 25.6.2–3: Ioviani et Herculiani... acriter resisterunt, dein legiones Ioviorum atque Victorum laborantibus suis ferentibus auxiliis elephanos duo straverunt cum hostium plebe non parva et in laevio proelio viri periere forisissimi, Iulianus et Macrobius et Maximus, legionum tribuni, quae tunc primas exercitus obiunebant.
with a reserve force at the back of a mountain, and was able to destroy part of the Alamannic fugitives routed by Valentinian c. A.D. 367.\textsuperscript{72}


Although V.'s ultimate source Cato in his lost \textit{De re militari} spoke of superficially similar matters, as surviving fragments appear to show,\textsuperscript{73} we can probably be sure that the material was understood and transmitted only as it seemed to make sense in terms of contemporary warfare at each stage of transmission. It seems clear that V. at least did not hesitate to point his own parallels, adapt, or even supplement the material. Certainly Cato was not the source for the \textit{barritus}, the ancestral war-cry of the Cornuti and Bracchiati, whose recruitment by Constantine led to the widespread adoption of the \textit{barritus} throughout the Roman army.\textsuperscript{74} V.'s dictum that the \textit{barritus} should not be raised before the \textit{comminus} battle commenced\textsuperscript{75} is strongly borne out by Ammianus in four cases out of five.\textsuperscript{76} Only at ad Salices A.D. 377 might it seem that the \textit{eminus} battle was heralded by it, and there the distinction is unreal because the Romans were prepared for the close encounter immediately upon making contact with the enemy.\textsuperscript{77}

5. Signals.

If agreement is demonstrable between Ammianus and V. in many aspects of tactics, the reverse is the case with signals. Whereas V. gives precise definitions for musical signals (II.22, cf. III.5), in Ammianus confusion reigns. According to V. both the contemporary and the ancient legion had only \textit{tubicines}, \textit{cornicines} and \textit{bucinatores}. The \textit{tubicen} guided the movements of soldiers for whatever reason, for example to go on manoeuvres or to mount or change the watches; the \textit{cornicen} announced the movements of standards. But V. contradicts

\textsuperscript{72}Amm. 27.10.15: \textit{cum subsidiali manu locaus}... Their identity is obscure, cf. Hoffmann II.178 n.19.

\textsuperscript{73}As well as Cato fr. 10 (Jordan = Nonius Marcellus L.301), which was discussed above in view of its close connexion with the 1st. \textit{depugnatio}, V. Epit. III.20, Cato fr. 11(= Festus, L.466), \textit{sive opus sit cunique aut globo aut forice aut turribus aut serra, ut adoniare}, has clear affinities with V. Epit. III.17-19.

\textsuperscript{74}A. Alföldi, 'Cornuti', \textit{Dumbarton Oaks Papers} XIII (1959) 169-179.

\textsuperscript{75}Epit. III.18: \textit{Clamor autem, quem barritum vocant, prius non debet adollii, quam acies urraque se iunseri. Inperitorum enim vel ignovorum est vociferari de longe, cum hostes magis terreantur, si cum telorum locu clamoris horrore accesseris.}

\textsuperscript{76}Amm. 16.12.43 (Strasbourg), 21.13.15 (Constantius' speech at Hierapolis), 24.6.11 (Ctesiphon), 26.7.17 (Procopius' appeal to Valens' troops at the river Sangarius).

\textsuperscript{77}Amm. 31.7.11, cf. 10: \textit{nec vagabatur nec relicis ordinibus procursabant}...
himself at III.8, where the *vigiliae* were called out by the *tubicen*, only to be called back by the *cornicen*. According to V., *bucinatores* sounded the *classicum*, the sign of the Imperial High Command, whenever the Emperor was present, or a soldier was being executed. It was allegedly normal in battle for the *tubicines* and *cornicines* to sound together, because both soldiers and standards were involved. The same should hold true for changes of camp and campaign-marches. The presence of the Imperial High Command on campaign should have kept the *bucinatores* busy sounding the *classicum*.

Epit. Book III which deals with strategy and tactics "sounds the *classicum*."

Although sources do not confirm V.'s system, in Ammianus no system is in evidence, when as a serving soldier he must have known what it was. Literary convention ruled out too much technical accuracy, and encouraged the inclusion of obsolete instruments such as the *lituus*. Thus the *tuba* summons the army for a march on one occasion, but *litui* sound the order for march as Julian invades Assyria, and *classica* order the march to break and build camp. The *classicum* calls the legions into battle at the siege of Bezabde, but *bucinae* herald the start of Julian's assault on Aquileia, called *tubae* at the start of the second day. *Litui* summoned the army to a *contio* or general assembly when Julian crossed the Abora at Cercusium, but the *classicum* called the *contio* at which Julian declared war on Constantius II. The *classicum* sounded as battle began at Ctesiphon, *litui* heralded the Roman attack on a German robber band led by Jovinus, *bucinae* heralded Jovinus' second

---

78Epit. II.22: *Habet praeterea legio tubicines cornicines bucinatores, etc.*
79Epit. III.1: *hic tertius classicum sonat.*
80Cf. J. Marquardt, op. cit., 421 n.1, citing Livy 7.35.1, 26.15.6, Propert. 5.4.63, Silius Ital. 7.154, Front. Str. 1.5.17, Caes. b. civ. 2.35.7, Leo Tact. 11.21.27, for the *bucina* used to call the four night-watches or *vigiliae*. Cf. V. Epit. III.8: *A tubicine omnes vigiliae committuntur et finitis horis a cornicine revocantur*. See ch. 7 (f), p. 288.
81Amm. 16.12.7.
82Amm. 24.1.1.
83Amm. 24.8.7.
84Amm. 20.11.19.
85Amm. 21.12.5.
86Amm. 21.12.12.
87Amm. 23.5.3.
88Amm. 21.5.1.
89Amm. 24.6.11.
90Amm. 27.2.3.
battle with Germans, and rubae accompanied the start of battle led by Valentinian against the Alamanni. Ammianus uses classicum in such a broad sense that even the Goths are attributed it.

Neither is there any special connexion between bucinae and the Imperial High Command in Ammianus; the bucinae were ordered to sound the bellicum for an attack on the Gothic soldiers stationed in Hadrianople led by the local magistrates. The tusa was ordered to sound the bellicum for forming the battle-line when the Goths attacked the Scutarii and Cornuti building camp with other Roman units in A.D. 377. The cornicines make a unique appearance when they gave the signal for battle with the Lentienses in A.D. 378. Thus Ammianus uses tusa, cornu, bucina, lituus, classicum and bellicum interchangeably.

Ammianus tells of two signals—'mute' according to V.'s classification into 'voiced', 'semi-voiced' and 'mute'—whose technical sense is more assured. It was evidently standard practice to raise the vexillum to order the Romans to begin battle. Ammianus attributed the same signal along with classica to the Goths, probably metaphorically, as also to the Persians, where we learn the detail that it was flame-coloured. It was probably also the vexillum that Julian ordered his men to raise when he sent them across the Naarmalcha near Pirisabora and they had captured the opposite bank from the Persians. Certainly the five ships that carried them raised the vexillum as they started out. Although V. mentions vexilla...
and flammulae in his list of ‘mute’ signals, he does not describe their use. Elsewhere he says that vexillationes got their name because they used vela, hoc est flammulae, agreeing on the colour with Ammianus.

The other ‘mute’ signal was the gathering the hem of the cloak and waving it on high to indicate that the enemy were nearby, used by Ammianus himself near Nisibis A.D. 359. This sort of signal, along with a ‘barbarian-style’ whipcrack such as was used during the displays of armatura at the Sixth consular games of Honorius A.D. 404, was mentioned by V. also among those signals soldiers should learn to observe in their quarters, on the march and in all exercises. A similar but perhaps impromptu signal was the waving of hands and cloaks by the Gallic and German swimmers first across the Tigris to indicate that they had killed the Persian guards posted on the other side when the Romans were retreating from Persia.

(b) Mobilisation, Logistics and Commissariat.

1. Training the Field force.

V. was well aware that when the 4th. c. field army was faced with a campaign, it had first to be assembled from a multiplicity of small units garrisoned in numerous cities and forts around the Empire. A strategically-placed city was usually chosen as a mustering-point for the entire force. The mobilisation of large numbers of scattered units was effected through the tessera.

V. had this system in mind, and criticizes it in a context (III.9-10) designed to highlight his rhetorical point about the army’s lack of coherent discipline and training, viz., how to meld together a disparate army formed of units which may include tirones or novices who had never

103 Epit. II.1.
104 Amm. 18.6.13: porrecto extentius brachio et summisitibus sagis conorsitis elatius adesse hostes signo solio demonstrabam...
105 Claud. de Hon. VI cons. 625; V. Epit. III.5: Sunt et alia muta signa, quae dux beli in equis aut in indumetis et in iipsis armis, ut dinoascat hostis, praecipit custodiri; praeterea manu aliquid vel flagello more barbarico vel certo mova, quia utitur, veste significat.
106 Amm. 25.6.14: efficacius audaciae signum elatis manibus conorsitique sagulis ostendebant.
107 Amm. 16.2.8 (Remi A.D. 356), 23.3.2-4 (Carrhae A.D. 363), cf. Zos. 3.12.1 (Antioch, for the army, and Hierapolis, for the fleet), Amm. 27.10.6 (Sirmium A.D. 384), 28.3.1 (London A.D. 369), 29.5.10 (Sirmium A.D. 373).
108 Tessera sollemnis, Amm. 14.2.5: cf. 21.5.13, 23.2.2; Valens at Constantinople issues the tessera for the march A.D. 378, Amm. 31.11.1-2; king Sapor knew the system worked: diffusum abunde militem per provincias levi tessera coligi posse expertus, Amm. 25.7.2.
seen war, and veteres milites or seasoned troops who had become disaccustomed to campaigns owing to the peaceful conditions of their garrison-duty. The problem would have arisen even if the legio antiqua had become a reality, as it would have been necessary on grounds of internal security to garrison it by numerous separate detachments. V.'s solution was a stiff programme of individual and joint training and manoeuvres, under the personal leadership and inspection of the dux. Ideally troops were supposed to be kept up to the mark in their garrisons, but evidently this could not always be taken for granted, as the occasional mutiny showed. Thus V. provided himself with two more occasions to summarise the training chapters of Book I, already summarised earlier at II.23.

The routine and undramatic preparation of a field army for campaign does not find a place in Ammianus' narrative, but there is no reason to suppose that Ammianus, writing in the tradition of Tacitus, would not have described a Corbulo-style training-programme had one been instituted for any field army in the period with which he was concerned. For example a suitable moment might have been Count Theodosius' review of the African legions at Panchariana statio. This was the occasion for uniting with them the troops he had brought with him from Gaul. Evidently no such special measures were taken, however. In what survives of Ammianus, only the court troops of Constantius II acquire unsoldierly habits, but Ammianus significantly fails to correct Ursulus' criticism, all the more weighty for coming from a CSL, that as demonstrated by the fall of Amida the quality of the army did not justify its enormous cost to the taxpayer, merely reporting that the resentment of the army was eventually satisfied by his judicial murder. V.'s whole approach is coloured by strong complaints about chronic neglect of the regular infantry army associated perhaps only for political convenience with the name of Gratian in particular.

109 Epit. III.9 p.88 15ff.: Sed cum legiones auxilia vel equites ex diversis advenerint locis... cf. Epit. III.4 p.72.2ff.: Ita exercitati et eruditi in sedibus milites, sive illi legionarii sive auxiliares sive equites fuerint, cum ad expeditionem ex diversis convenerint numeris, aemulatione virtutis proelium magis necesse habeant optare quam otium...
110 Amm. 29.5.9: consociato indigena militie cum eo, quem ipse perduxerat.
111 Amm. 22.4.6-8.
112 Amm. 20.11.5: "En quibus animis urbes a militie defendantur, cui ut abundare stipendium possit, imperii opes iam fatigati" quo dicitam ita armatam militare malitudo postea apud Calcedonam recordata ad eius exitium consurrerit. Cf. Amm. 22.3.7.

Essential to the mobilisation of armies was the movement and availability of supplies, above all food for men and fodder for pack-animals and war-horses. Closely connected with this was the denial of such supplies to the enemy. With the growth in the size of the army and bureaucracy from the 3rd c. onwards, the provinces were more and more organized around the stockpiling and guarding of military and civil service supplies raised largely by taxation in kind in a network of forts and fortress-cities connected by military roads. When an army marched, supplies had to be ready in advance along the route in military dépôts, so as to be available for distribution to the soldiers on arrival, but security was to be observed so that the enemy might not know the proposed movements, at least beyond the frontiers. The elaborate bureaucratic system of these mansiones (stage-posts) and stativae (permanent camps), often themselves in fortress-cities, is attested in a detailed passage from the Historia Augusta and an extended analogy by Ambrose, based on first-hand knowledge. Once the frontier had been reached there were no more mansiones or stativae, so that soldiers had either to carry their rations as buccellatum (hard tack), or the army was weighed down by a long supply train, such as...
Julian’s flotilla on the Euphrates in A.D. 363. On his own account a much-travelled man, V. is aware of the contemporary availability of coloured maps showing the routes and terrain which he must have used himself, such as the Peutinger Table, a mediaeval copy of a civilian 4th. c. A.D. road-map of the Roman Empire. But his assertion of antique military usage supports Dilke’s view that such painted maps are unlikely to have been a later development than written itineraries.

On *arduae expeditiones*, as V. calls major expeditions outside the Empire, it was standard procedure to live off the enemy’s crops as much as possible and to burn everything which could not be taken. In A.D. 363 after Julian had burned the fleet, the Persians began burning their own crops so as to deprive the Romans of this resource. After a very few days the ample supplies carried by pack-animals for tribunes and counts had to be made available for distribution to all ranks on an equal basis, as recommended by V.120

---


118We have one example of a perhaps military painted map (3rd. c. A.D.) in the Dura Europos Shield, cf. Dilke, op. cit., p.120.

119Amm. 24.7.7.

120Amm. 25.2.1; cf. V. Epit. III.3: *in expeditionibus arduis per capita magis militum quam per dignitates ab antiquis praebebantur annonae, ita ut post necessitatem eisdem a republica reviderent.*
3. Invasion.

Since the barbarians at various times and places often invaded Roman territory, not to
mention brigands and barbarian groups who lived in inaccessible places within the Empire, it
was necessary to keep supplies under close guard in fortified positions, to watch the roads,\(^\text{121}\)
and on occasion to scorch the earth to deny food and fodder to the enemy, even within the
frontiers. Writing in the troubled times of the late-4th. c., V. typically had this latter arena of
war with the barbarians to be external. Thus the talk in Epit. III.3, after touching on the careful calculation of
resources and expenses needed for supplies to be aggregated ‘before war is begun’ in places
well-defended and ‘opportune for waging war’, turns abruptly and unexpectedly to a state of
siege in which the enemy ‘though hungry themselves’ try to starve the Romans out. The
\textit{possessores} and \textit{provinciaes} were to be urged, even compelled by government
\textit{prosecutores},\(^\text{122}\) to remove all crops and wine, fruits and livestock to fortified cities, away
from the \textit{hostis inferens bellum}. Reference is then made to the impossibility of communication
with other cities ‘owing to the roads being closed’. Food-rationing was to be instituted at once
in the cities. But the subject then reverts straight back to the issuance of rations to the ancient
expeditionary army, clearly not itself under siege, before concluding remarks on the need for
proper garrisons in fortress-cities, and the strategy of breaking up barbarian bands through the
induced shortage of food. It looks as though material on being besieged by the barbarians has
been inserted by V. into material originally about preparations for war against the external
enemy.

The same material is used again in the context of preparing for a siege in IV.4.\(^\text{123}\)
\textit{Possessores} were urged to gather up all means of sustaining life behind walls, including
livestock, domestic fowl, fodder, wine, crops and fruits, and burn everything left behind.
Food-rationing was to be immediately instituted in the cities, and open spaces and private

\(^{121}\) Cf. Amm. 31.12.2: \textit{et quoniam exploratione sollicita cognitum est cogitare hostes fortibus praesidiis
itineras claudere, per quae commutatur necessarii portabantur, occurrunt...} quae prope erant, pedibus sagittariis et equitum turma citius missa.

\(^{122}\) Cf. for the term CT\textbf{h} 12.8 (A.D. 409): \textit{DE AURI PUBLICI PROSECUTORIBUS}, meaning ‘official
escorts of public gold’ (Pharr). CJ 10.74 changes this to \textit{persecutoribus}.

\(^{123}\) See ch. 1 (d) 2, p. 15.
gardens there dug up for growing food. One is reminded of the contemporary reference behind the use of the terms *possessor*es, and *prosecuto*res, and V. himself tells us that numbers of cities had been sacked by Goths. That this was contemporary official policy can be seen from Ammianus’ description of measures taken in A.D. 359 in response to king Sapor’s invasion of Mesopotamia. The compulsory movement of the population, rich and poor, into fortified strong-points, along with the stockpiling therein of supplies and collection of livestock, and the burning of the country abandoned, are in complete harmony with V.  

4. Fortified Dépôts.  

According to the testimony of V., supplies of fodder and food, firewood and water for the army were a major responsibility of the general. In order to render them secure from the enemy invader, garrisoned dépôts were needed along the strategic routes, situated in cities and forts, and traffic moving on the roads needed the protection of fortifications and soldiers or militiamen. In the absence of pre-existing fortifications *tumuli* *castella* or temporary forts had to be provided and guarded by numbers of infantry and cavalry *in agrariis* (on outpost-duty). Such dépôts are quite frequently attested in Ammianus, as we see for instance at Batnae in Osdroene A.D. 363, where the *calones* (grooms serving cavalry) were issued with fodder ‘as usual’, and 50 were killed when a pile of *paleae* (chaff bales) collapsed. When the Isaurians attacked Pamphylia in A.D. 354, they found the province full of garrisons. Starved of food, they attempted to storm a fortified dépôt of military food supplies serving all
units guarding Isauria, and having the significant name of Paleae.\textsuperscript{130} The Isaurians were successfully starved into submission on another occasion in A.D. 367-8.\textsuperscript{131} The same policy was unsuccessfully attempted against the Goths in A.D. 377.\textsuperscript{132} V. recommends a similar use of the food weapon.\textsuperscript{133} The fortification of specific roads, through installing \textit{burgarii} in \textit{burgi} or fortlets, is also attested from the second half of the 4th. c. A.D. in Britain, Spain, Belgium and Pannonia, at least.\textsuperscript{134}

Where the frontier was repaired or extended, careful thought was taken for the provision of fortified dépôts. Compare the granaries rebuilt by Julian along with the seven Rhine fortress-cities in A.D. 359.\textsuperscript{135} Similarly when Constantius II as Caesar built up Amida into a fortress-city, it was also to provide a refuge for the regional population, and a depository of mural torsion-engines, presumably to supply the smaller forts in the sector. With its permanent legionary garrison and troop of native horse, it will certainly have been an important base of supplies for units in the region.\textsuperscript{136} Valentinian spent three months at the abandoned base at Carnuntum in A.D. 375 preparing \textit{arma et alimenta} prior to his projected invasion of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[130] Amm. 14.2.13: \textit{quoniam inedia gravi afflictabantur, locum petivere Paleas nomine vergentem in mare valido muro firmatum, ubi condatur nunc usque conmeatus distribui miltibus omne latus Isauriae defendendaris assueti.}
\item[131] Amm. 27.9.7: \textit{latrones... ad laterosa montium saxa, quae incollant, exciue tandem copiae conseruerunt; ubi cum eis nec quiestendii nec inventndii ad vicium utilia copia luxaretur, per indiatias pacem ibi tribui poposcerunt... obdubiaque datis, ut imperium est, immobiles diu manere nihil audentes hostile.}
\item[132] Amm. 31.8.1: \textit{opportunitatem milites nancii immensas alias barbarorum caseras inter Haemimonianas angustias cluserat aggerum objectu celorum, hae spe nimirum, ut inter Histrum et solitudines perniciosa hostium multitudo compacta nulloque repperiensi exitus perire inedia, cunctis utilibus ad vivendum in civitales validas comportatis, quarum nullum etiam circumcisedere conatus sunt haec et similia machinari penitus ignorantes.}
\item[133] Epit. III.3: \textit{Saepius enim penuria quam pugna consumit exercitum, et ferro saevior famam est... In omni expeditione usum est et maximum telum, ut ibi sufficiat victis, hostes frangat inopia... Qua ratione famem collecti patiantur hosces, dispersi vero crebris supervenis facile vincitur.}
\item[135] Amm. 18.2.3: \textit{id inter potissima mature duxit implendum, ut ante proeliorum fervorem civitates multo ante excisas ac vacas introaret receptasque communiret, horrea quin etiam estrueret pro incensis, ut condit possit annon a Britanniis sueta transferri. The names of three of them show their military origins, Castra Herculis, Quadraburgium and Trecensim.}
\item[136] Amm. 18.9.1: \textit{Hanc civitatem olig perquam brevem Caesar etiamtum Constantius, ut accolae suffugium possit habere natissimum, eo tempore, quo Antoninopolin oppidum allud struxit, turribus circumcident amplis et moenibus locatoque ibi conditorio muralium tormentorum facit hostibus formidatam suoque nomine voluit appellari.}
\end{footnotes}
the Quadi. Count Theodosius established a similar dépôt at Lamfoctum for food to be stockpiled in the rear of the front in A.D. 373.

5. Calculating food-stocks for a campaign.

The availability of enemy crops and stores was easily miscalculated. Julian’s subtraction of part of the 17 days’ supply of rations which soldiers on campaign always carried, in order to store it in a fort he had rebuilt on the Meuse, with the intention of making up the shortfall from the crops of the Chamavi, led directly to famine in his army, because the enemy’s crops were unripe. When Julian invaded Assyria and Persia in A.D. 363 he plundered and burned the enemy’s crops as he went, but still managed to run out of supplies later on after having failed to foresee that the Persians would burn their own crops. Valentinian invaded Alamannic territory in A.D. 368 plundering and burning enemy crops all the way, but only after a massive build-up of troops and food-supplies in advance, and he took care to store under guard the foodstuffs he took from the enemy against unforeseeable eventualities. Count Romanus took a justifiably cautious attitude in Africa when he announced that he would not move against the Austoriani who had been ravaging the territory of Leptis until abundant supplies including 4,000 camels to transport them had been piled up. In direct contrast, Count Theodosius evidently acting on reliable information felt able to remit the African provinciales the duty of providing commeatus for the army, declaring at Sittis that the harvest and stores of the enemy would be their granaries.

---

137 Amm. 30.5.11.
138 Amm. 29.5.13: Lamfoctense oppidum occupavit... ubi abunde rei cibariae copiam condi effectit, ut, si pergens interius alimentorum offendisset penuriam, iuberet e propinquuo convectari.
139 Cf. SHA Alex. Sev. 47.1: nec portarent cibaria decem et septem, ut solent, dierum nisi in barbarico...
140 Amm. 17.9.2-3: ex annona decem diem et septem, quam in expeditionem persens vehebat cervicibus miles, portionem subrostram in isdem condidi castris, sperans ex Chamavorum segetibus id suppleri posse, quod ablatam est, longe autem aliter accidit, frugibus enim nondum etiam maturis miles expensis, quae portabat, nusquam reperientia victus, extrema minitans Julianum compellationibus incessebat et probris...
141 Amm. 24.1.14-15; 24.4.9.
142 Amm. 24.7.7; 25.2.1.
143 Amm. 27.10.6-7: ...cuncta satorum et vectiorum, quae visebantur, iniecta cohortium manu vorax flamma vastabat praeter alimenta, quae collegi dubius rerum eventus adihebat et custodiri.
144 Amm. 28.6.5: ...non nisi abundantii commeatus aggeto et canaliorum quamtuor militibus apparatus castra firmabat esse nostrum.
145 Amm. 29.5.10: inter residua autem multa et clara id amorem eius auxerat in immensus, quod a provinciis commeatus exerciti prohibuit nisi, messes et condia hostium virtutis nostrorum horrea esse fiducia memorans speciosa.
Lamfoctum was then established to hold these stockpiles, after he had ravaged enemy
farmlands.146


We have already had occasion to notice the 50 calones or grooms killed at the chaff
dump in Batnae. These calones, normally called galearii in the later Empire, as V. is aware,147
were an important part of army logistics, because there were so many horses and mules for
them to look after, requiring large numbers of them.148 Their condition, following on foot
behind the cavalry, was menial, as we see confirmed by Ammianus' choice of simile for the
inferior relations of Persian infantry to Persian cavalry,149 and by two early imperial grave
reliefs for cavalrymen. These depict helmeted calones walking behind the horse and carrying
vexilla, as described by V. in remarks about the marshalling of the baggage-train under vexilla
as an institution introduced by 'the ancients'.150 The marching-disposition of the impedimenta
or baggage-train recommended by V. is the one usually called an agmen quadratum, in which
the baggage-animals, calones and wagons were placed in the middle of a rectangle of
rearguard, vanguard and flanking guards, such as Julian adopted when marching to Dura.151

A major problem for an expeditionary army was crossing rivers. Although both
Ammianus and V. report that the cavalry might swim,152 possibly sitting on their horses is
meant, for the Armenian followers of the fugitive king Papa crossed the Euphrates partly sitting

146Amm. 30.5.12-13.
147Epit. III.6 p.78.5, cf. I.10 p.15.5: lizas, quos gallarios vocant. See R.S. Bagnall, The Florida Ostraka,
Greek, Roman and Byzantine monographs VII (Durham, N.C., 1976) pp.17–18; and M.P. Speidel, 'Lixa of the
148Cf. the 'large number' of soldiers and calones with horses unable to be accommodated inside Adrianople in
A.D. 378, Amm. 31.15.4; 31.12.10. Also note Jos. B.J. 3.4.2 (69) on the numerosity of soldiers' servants,
who shared in their training.
149Amm. 23.5.83: iussu faciunt ut calones sequiurque semper haec turbam tamquam addicte perenni servito
nec stipendiis aliqando fulsa nec donis. Cf. 24.1.4: sarcinas vero et calones et apparitionem imbellen
impedimentorumque genus omne inter utrumque laus instituit procedentium ordinatim, ne qua vi subita
rapereur, ut saepe contingit, impropecta.
150A. Neumann, Die Skulpturen des Stadtgeistes von Vindobona. Corpus signorum imperii Romani,
v.Petrikovits, Die Innenausen römischer Legionslager während der Principatzeit (Opladen 1975) 57ff. Cf. V.
Epit. III.6 p.77.17 – p.78.10.
151V. Epit. III.6 p.77.3ff., Amm. 24.1.4, Zos. 3.14.1.
152Amm. 24.2.8: equites vero cum iumentis armati clementiores gurges fluminis obliquius traversant. V.
Epit. III.7: Expediit vero equites fases de cannis aridis vel ulva facere consueverunt, super quos loricas et arma,
ne uidantur, inponunt; ipsi equique natando transeunt colligatosque secum fases pertransunt <for>is.
on their swimming horses. Certainly the infantry and calones appear in general not to have had the ability to swim rivers, and the difficulty of getting baggage and wagons across is obvious. Thus the ability of the Gauls and Germans to swim the Tigris in A.D. 363 was exceptional and peculiar to their native traditions. When the rest of the Roman army was allowed to cross, many Romans drowned through inability to swim, while others took their chance on improvised rafts and inflated skins. V. refers to the drowning of impedimenta, pueri and bellatores on such occasions, and strongly recommends that infantry, cavalry, horses and lixa/galea = calones should be taught to swim in the sea or in rivers in summer.

7. Proposal to train all classes of soldiers, grooms and horses to swim.

Though highly relevant to the contemporary situation, the recommendation (Epit. I.10) is probably not an example of V. adding to the traditional disciplina militaris but rather of perhaps raising the profile of one of its more neglected elements. Porphyrio already in the early 3rd c. A.D. cited in his commentary on Horace the same precept with the same illustration of the Campus Martius next the Tiber as an integrated training-ground for both field-exercises and swimming. Obviously youths still combined military training with swimming in the Tiber when Horace was writing, though to what extent this was practised among the wider Roman army even then is questionable. Julius Caesar made no boast about his men’s swimming ability when they had to jump into the sea and fight to the shore in Britain; rather he stressed

---

153 Amm. 30.1.9-10: ...residui omnes equis invecti natantibus et circumluiente flumine saepe demersi lactatique infirmati periculoso madore expelluntur ad contrarias margines...
154 Amm. 25.6.14: electique sunt ad id negotium habiles, qui maxima prae ceteris flumina transmeare in regionibus genuinis a prima puertia sunt institui...
155 Amm. 25.8.1: ...aut imperitia nandi gurgite fluminis absorbebantur...
156 Amm. 25.8.2.
157 Epit. III.7:
158 Epit. I.10: Non solet autem pedites sed et equites ipsosque equos vel lixas, quos galiarios vocant, ad natandum exercere per commodum est, ne quid imperitis, cum necessitas incumbit, eveniat. Cf. III.4: Seu mare sive fluvius vicinus est sedibus, aeterno tempore ad natandum cogendi sunt omnes...
159 Porphyrio ad Carm. III.7.25: Notum est iuventatem Romanam apud veteres et exercitatam in campo Marito, et post hoc exercitium naturae solitam fuisset in Tiberi[m], quia et peritia nandi rebus militaribus sit necessaria. Id. ad Carm. I.8.8: Qui in campo Marito exercitabus, etiam natabant post exercitium, quia et hoc videtur necessarium militiae esse. Cf. V. Epit. I.10: ...campum Marium vicinum Tiberi delegerunt, in quo iuventus post exercitium armorum sudorem palveromque diiseret ac laetitudinem cursus natandi labore deponeret. Epit. I.13: ...sudorem cursu et campestri exercitio collectum iuventus natans abluebat in Tiberi...
160 Cf. also Cic. Pro Cael. 36.
their fear and unreadiness.\textsuperscript{161} Comparison of all the evidence about the Roman army’s ability to swim suggests that real proficiency was always unusual, apart from among certain barbarian groups such as the Batavi,\textsuperscript{162} but that it probably did form a minor part of the training. The lack of provision of swimming-baths or mention of swimming in winter shows that it was not taken very seriously.\textsuperscript{163} But the proposal to train soldiers’ servants alludes to the traditional discipline also mentioned by Josephus.\textsuperscript{164} The safety of the servants and grooms was a matter of deep concern to the soldiers, who were frequently their fathers and relatives.\textsuperscript{165}


V. recommends a kind of pontoon-bridge carried around in pieces, \textit{monoxyli} or dug-out canoes, together with cables and chains, planks and nails, by the Roman army on carts.\textsuperscript{166} It is clear that Julian’s army in Persia carried such equipment with it on carts, but it was not enough to bridge the Tigris.\textsuperscript{167} On that occasion Roman \textit{architecti} promised to build a bridge of skins, a design which is also attested by the Anon. de rebus bellicis.\textsuperscript{168} Other bridges of boats, across the Euphrates,\textsuperscript{169} Danube,\textsuperscript{170} and Rhine,\textsuperscript{171} were much more substantial structures on much larger boats.


As well as crossing rivers, favourable opportunities to mount ambush on a marching army listed by V. include mountain-passes and valleys, forested tracts where the route could be blocked by means of barricades of interlocked tree-trunks called a \textit{concaedes} or ‘abattis’, and rest-periods when the horses and mules were dispersed for grazing, or the army sleeping or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{161}Caes. B.G. 4.24–26: \textit{summa difficilis... nostri perterrit... nostris militibus cuntantibus.}
\item \textsuperscript{163}A.R. Neumann, \textit{Classical Philology} XLII (1947) 157–173, esp. 159–163, with refs.
\item \textsuperscript{164}Pos. BJ 3.69.
\item \textsuperscript{165}M.P. Speidel, \textit{Ancient Society} XX (1989), 246, cf. Maur. Strat. 5.1.
\item \textsuperscript{166}Epit. II.25 p.60.14–19; III.7 p.81.3–9.
\item \textsuperscript{167}Amm. 24.7.4: \textit{subiectis ignibus exuri cunctas iussert naves praster minores duodecim, quas profuturas pangendis pontibus disposuit vehi carpentis... 24.7.8: maerebat tamen ob haec imperator et miles, quod nec contabulandi pontis erat facialis amisit navibus temere... Cf. Zos. 3.26.3: \textit{Kal πάντα, πληρ ἀκτισθένηκα Ρωμαίοις Περσαίων ἡν τεσσάρων, ἕλκενωμεθα τυχὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἄμεσας φερόμενα ἱστολαύθες, τῆς ἀνακοπήσεως ὃς εἰς ἐκεῖς ἱπποτροφίας οἰκεῖας.}
\item \textsuperscript{168}Amm. 25.6.15, cf. Anon. 16. See further ch. 4 (a), p. II3.
\item \textsuperscript{169}Amm. 23.2.7.
\item \textsuperscript{170}Amm. 27.5.2.
\item \textsuperscript{171}Amm. 29.4.2.
\end{itemize}
foraging. The relevance of the information is not in doubt, but for example compare the Isaurians’ ambushing Musonius, vicar of Asia, as he was passing down a narrow and winding pass, the Alamanni closing routes into Germany with *concaedes*, the Persians attacking the grazing animals of the Romans, and Lucillianus and Victor’s night attack on the Persians guarding the north bank of the Naarmalcha in A.D. 363.

(c) Arms and equipment.

Although V.’s sources transmitted very old information, so that much of the background material is rooted in the middle Republic, the insertion or substitution of late-antique weapons is one of the ways in which V. made the whole argument relevant and up-to-date. The 2nd., 3rd. and 4th. centuries saw technical advances in weaponry which slowly introduced into the Roman army equipment more familiar to us from the Middle Ages. Along with the late-4th. c. A.D. Latin translation by Ambrose of Josephus’ Jewish War known as ‘Hegesippus’ Histories’, and the Anonymus de rebus bellicis, V. is the earliest author to mention the *arcuballista* or crossbow and the somewhat similar *manuballista*, whilst the term *fustibalus* or ‘sling-staff’ is unique to V., although obviously identical with the *fundibalus* or *fundibalum* wielded by *fundibulatores* or *fundibularii*. The sling-staff is briefly described at Epit. III.14, from which it has been likened to a small hand-held portable version of the mediaeval trebuchet. V. later considers it and the crossbow, with the sling, to be so familiar—because so contemporary—as to require no explanation. This treatment contrasts with that of so traditional a weapon as the *pilum*, which is given detailed explanation,

---

172 V. Epit. III.22, cf. III.8 p.82.4–9, III.10 p.91.2–12, III.18 p.104.4–11.
173 Amm. 27.9.6.
174 Amm. 16.11.8: *difficiles vias et suapte natura clivosas conceadibus clausere sollexer arborebus immensior roboris caestis*. Cf. 17.1.9, 17.10.6.
175 Amm. 24.5.5.
176 Zos. 3.16.3–3.17.2.
177 Heges. 2.15.8 (CSEL LXVI. 177. 25).
178 Anon. de rebus bellicis 16.5.
179 TLL VI.1556.
180 These variants are attested in Latin translations of the Bible from the 4th. c. A.D. and later, and other sub-literary late-Roman devotional writings. Cf. also E. Vit. 14.6.44, Heges. 5.44.2 (CSEL LXVI. 394.24) (*fundibulum*), Ps.-Rufin. Ios. bell. Jud. 3. p.714.22, ed. Bas a. 1524 (*sagittarios et fundibulatores*), TLL VI.1556.
182 V. Epit. IV.22: *Fustibalos arcuballistas et fundas describere superflicium puto, quae praesens usus agnoscit.*
because it was no longer sufficiently familiar although there were modern equivalents in the *verutum* and *spiculum*. The *fustibalus* or *fundibalus* is described by no other ancient source, but its mode of operation for slinging medium-sized stones is known from mediaeval art.

It is likely that the *manuballista*, which V. incorrectly says was formerly called a *scorpio*—Ammianus equally incorrectly says that the *onager* or mangonel was formerly called a *scorpio*—was a hand-held dart-shooter perhaps resembling the crossbow except that it was powered by torsion, not tension. Such a weapon is also illustrated in a 13th c. English ms. illumination to a Norman-French version of Vegetius, in which it is clearly differentiated from the crossbow by means of its thick, twisted sinew, whereas the crossbow’s string is drawn extremely thin. V. names *manuballistae* and *arcuballistae* as weapons handled by the same specialists in a gloss on *tragularii*. It is therefore unlikely that *manuballistae* were operated on a stand. Recent archaeological finds of artillery components from a late-4th. c. destruction layer at the Roman fort at Gornea, Rumania, conform closely to the diagrams and dimensions of Heron’s *Cheiroballista*, from which it is clear that the latter was a hand-held torsion-weapon which was in use in the 4th. c. if not earlier. The earliest known Roman crossbows appear on two Gallo-Roman reliefs of hunting-scenes perhaps from

---

188 *Epit. II.15, p.50.2–3: erant *tragularii, qui ad manuballistas vel arcuballistas dirigebant sagittas*. These fighting in the same line as *funditores* (stingers) and *sagittarii* (archers).
2nd.-3rd. c. A.D., proving that the *arcuballista* was not brand-new in V.'s own time.\(^{191}\) In any case Arrian mentions a similar weapon used by Roman auxiliary cavalry in 2nd. c. A.D. which Campbell provisionally identifies with the *arcuballista*.\(^{192}\) Byzantine sources indicate that the small bolt or *μεία* (*fly*) was a normal part of the archer's equipment, along with small quivers and wooden pipes through which arrows were shot.\(^{193}\) The pipe-like device is explained as part of a primitive crossbow described by the Arab writer Al Tarsusi at the end of the 12th. c.\(^{194}\) Chinese tombs have revealed pictures of crossbows from the first centuries B.C. and A.D. with complex lock and trigger mechanisms. The oldest lock was found in a Chinese tomb at Schouchou dated to about 228 B.C. Others have turned up in central Asia and Korea.\(^{195}\)

Also apparently popular in late antiquity was the *mattiobarbulus*, *martiobarbulus* or (*sagitta*) *plumbata*, a lead-weighted wooden dart with feather flights, two forms of which are illustrated in the illumination to Anon. de rebus bellicis 10, where it is indicated that it was flung by hand from the lower end. V.'s witness that it was already in use by a pair of legions of 6,000 men called Mattiobarbuli by the accession of Diocletian A.D. 284 and Maximian A.D. 286, and that as a result of the effectiveness of these legions the Emperors honoured them with the titles Joviani and Herculanii and ranked them before all other legions,\(^{196}\) refers not to the origins of the weapon but of the *legiones palatinae* the Joviani and Herculanii.\(^{197}\) These appear

\(^{191}\)E. Espérandieu, *Recueil général des bas-reliefs de la Gaule romaine 2. Aquitaine* (1908) 442–444, no. 1679 (Solignac) and 1683 (Puy, Saint-Marcel). E. Harmuth, *Die Armbrust* (Graz, 1975) 18ff., dates the Puy relief with E. Espérandieu to the 1st. c. A.D.


\(^{196}\)V. Epit. 1.17.

\(^{197}\)Cf. Hoffmann, *Bewegungsheer*, 215–217. His rejection of Mommsen's interpretation of the 4th. c. Joviani and Herculanii palatine legions as mobilised divisions of the Scythian provincial garrison legions created by Diocletian *I Jovia* and *II Hercula* is called in question by the inscription of Aur. Gaius from Tembris, near Cotiaeum, which in line 8 seems to link *I Jovia* with the *comites*, i.e., part of the Emperor's Field Army. See T. Drew-Bear, *Colloque 1979*, 97, 101–2. If so, the original formations were large enough to have given rise to several detachments, so that V.'s figure of 6,000 for those is not impossible; Victor De Caess. 39.18 implies that they were originally *auxilia*, a statement which is difficult to evaluate on its own.
to have still enjoyed first rank in A.D. 363 according to Ammianus, but perhaps no longer at the time of writing, although it is not clear from his words that the Jovii and Victores, *auxilia palatina*, were not associated in the honour.\(^{198}\)

The Joviani and Herculliani were commanded earlier by the usurper Magnentius\(^{199}\) and were closely involved with Julian in his reprisals against Constantius' ministers at Constantinople.\(^{200}\) The association of two top-ranking legions with this weapon is thus significant, even if there is no other evidence of it beyond V. Though not mentioned by Ammianus, a number of examples of *plumbatae* have been found in 3rd.-4th. c. archaeological contexts,\(^{201}\) and the *mattiobarbulus* is still preserved in Byzantine texts of the 9th. c. A.D., by which time it was equated with a throwing-axe (*τζικοφριον*) or a mace that was also thrown (*βαρθωκιον*),\(^{202}\) as already implied by the Anon. De rebus bellicis 10.\(^{203}\)

As V. foresees them in use by both the heavy and light armaments, they were to be carried in fives slotted into the shield in addition to the *spiculum* and *verutum*, and one has doubted whether it was possible for a soldier to carry all these in the left hand.\(^{204}\) Maurice, who at the end of the 6th. c. recommended the *μαρτσζιβάρθωκιον* for the heavy infantry,\(^{205}\) also provided for their use by the light infantry, who carried them in leather cases.\(^{206}\) But the development into a mace points to an increase in size and weight.

---

\(^{198}\) Amm. 25.6.2-3: *loviiani et Herculiani... acriter restiterunt. dein legiones Ioviorum etque Victorum laborantibus suis ferebant auxilia... et sapientiam... in quo statu... et laborantes... et... et... et... et... legiones... obtemerunt.*

\(^{199}\) Zos. 2.42.2.

\(^{200}\) Amm. 22.3.2.


\(^{203}\) See ch. 4 (a).

\(^{204}\) P. Couissin, *Armes*, p.482.


The **plumbata** is the only 'new' weapon formally included in the avowedly antiquarian section on the training of the ancients (1.8-28); the **justibilus** is slipped into I.16 merely en passant. But, like lanciarii, now attested among legionaries at Apamea in the early 3rd. c., there is no reason to think that **mattiobarbuli**—both men and weapons—were not also older than Diocletian, as indeed V. says. A similar dart in respect of size and design, except that it had perhaps no lead weight, was the **kéórtos**; launched not by hand but from a special sling or cestrosphendone. This weapon was introduced c. 171 B.C. and may represent an early prototype of the imperial **mattiobarbulus**. According to Polybius it had wooden flights and was shot 'like a leaden bullet from a sling'. The position of Epit. I.17, coming straight after the sling, may suggest an updating of such a weapon originally described by Cato in his lost _De disciplina militari_. It is hard to see how V.'s **mattiobarbuli** could have 'imitated archers', the weapon having a greater range than ordinary javelins, unless in fact the **plumbata** was slung. In that case, we are informed by the testimony of the Anonymus de rebus bellicis that it was thrown already by the 4th. c., whereas V. was unaware that his sources were referring to a slightly different weapon.

Ammianus is very vague about the arms of the infantry army. The Persian heavy infantry resembled the Roman in their stationary style of battle; but they are armed with _conti_. The Romans who ran through the hindmost of the Gothic train with _conti_ were perhaps mounted _contarii_. Ammianus is especially imprecise about ordinary weapons used by the Romans. Alongside the modern _verutum_, we find the ancient _pilum_ which according to V. the _spiculum_ replaced, and the historic term _gladius_ is preferred to the modern _spatha_. We can say that the latter replaced the _gladius_ before the _spiculum_ replaced

---

207 J.-C. Balty, _CRAI_ (1987) 221 with Fig. 5 p.223, id. _JRS_ LXVIII (1988) 101.
208 Polyb. 27.11 (9).1, Livy 42.65.9.
210 Amm. 25.1.13.
211 Amm. 31.7.6.
213 Epit. II.15: _spiculum_ is glossed _lancea_ at III.14 p.97.13.
the pilum, because the expression *cum ad spathas et ad pila ventum est* had become commonplace before the time of V. for the close-quarters stage of battle. Ammianus uses the word *hasta* for 'standard', as he uses *hastatus* for 'standard-bearer', but also calls *hasta* what appear to be a thrusting-spear, used at close-quarters immediately before swords, of Gothic and Roman cavalry. V. also calls the standard of the *draconarius* and the *signifer* a *hasta*, and uses it of a throwing-spear carried by the infantry as well, where it is synonymous with *missibile*, and further likens the fire-dart known as a *falārica* to the *hasta* on account of its greater size as compared to the fire-arrow called a *malleolus*. A *hasta* which is used both for thrusting and for throwing may well be a *lancea*, according to the description of one kind of Roman cavalry in Arrian. The use of slings, assumed by V., is demonstrated for Persians, Goths and Romans by Ammianus also.

(d) Siegecraft.

V. devotes 30 chapters of Book IV to siege warfare, including both material from earlier arts of war and new stratagems invented during 'recent emergencies'. Since in his epilogue (IV.30) V. chooses to stress the lesson that the main point was to store enough food and drink to withstand a siege, it is very likely that the new material is found in IV.7 and

---

216 Amm. 25.1.8: *ademptis signis hastisque diffractionis*, where the punishment of a cavalry unit would require a symbolic action of breaking standards rather than usable spears; Amm. 27.10.12: *prompte alios praetere duos iuvens lecti... Salvius et Lupicinus, Exutorius unus, alter e schola Gentium, bellum fragore terribilis consciantes hastaque crispando... idemque antipignant*, where they seem to be standard-bearers leading their companies over a height.
217 Amm. 20.4.18: *Petulantium tunc hastatus, abstraham sibi torquem, quo ut draconarius uetebeatur, capitati latianii imposuit confidierint...* Cf. 16.12.20: *steterunt vestigis ipsius anteplanam hastatisque et ordinum primis velut insolubilis muro fundatis...* 
218 Amm. 31.5.9: *obvios hastis perforabatur et gladiis (barbari).* Amm. 31.13.5: *diffractis hastarum plerisque collisione assidua gladiis contenti dextris in confertas hostium turmas mergebant.*
219 Epit. I.20 p.22.16-18: *Quid ipsi draconarii atque signiferi, qui sinistra manu hastas gubernant, in proelio facient, quorum et capitia nuda constant et pectora?*
220 Epit. II.14: *cenetrio* qui hastas vel missilibia perieris iaculatur et fortiter.
221 Epit. IV. 18: *Falārica autem ad modum hastae valida praefigitur ferro*, where the description of an iron-headed wooden spear resembles that of the *pilum* at I.20, II.15.
222 Arr. Tact. 4.9: *Δρακόντες δὲ ἐν σφυροκοπία φρονοῦτεν, καὶ ἀκορίστα χειρός, δότε τούτου δέτοι, καὶ δρακόντας ἐν τούτῳ ἐνεργεύεσθαι...* But note that both *dōdrē* and *kontēl* were also used for both throwing and thrusting, according to Strabo 10.448.
223 Amm. 20.11.12, 24.2.15, 24.4.16, 26.8.8, 31.7.14, 31.15.13. Cf. V. Epit. I.16.
224 V. Epit. IV.30: *Quae ad obpugnandam vel defendendas urbes auctoribus bellicarum artium prodiderunt vel quae recentium necessitatum usus inventi, pro publica, ut arbitrör, utilitate digessi...*
IV.10, on the same subjects, especially when they show links with the inorganic parts of III.3 (see above), and III.8 p.85.12ff. where precepts for provisioning an army, whether camped in a fort or a city, follow an account of how to build a camp. V.’s strategic calculation is the dire
one that greater quantities of supplies should be stockpiled in proportion to the certainty that the
length of the siege lies in the power of the besieger, a situation which implies acceptance of the
passive rôle of limitanei, and the assumption that the comitatenses were not going to rescue
them either.

All the other material in IV.1-30 is rooted in tradition, but V. has made it relevant and
up-to-date. V.’s identification of the ballista with arrow-shooting engines rather than stone-or
beam-throwers is not classical, but corresponds to the 4th. c. Anonymus De rebus bellicis and
Ammianus.225 The arrow-shooting ballista is first identified on Trajan’s column,226 whilst
stone-throwing ballistae may have been still in use at Bremenium (High Rochester,
Northumberland) c. A.D. 220,227 as they were at Hatra about the same time.228 The onager
must be a 3rd.—4th. c. development, but is first attested in Ammianus and V. (see above). Its
appearance in V.’s legio antiqua is anachronistic,229 but the legio itself is not so antique after
V.’s treatment.

Siege-warfare in V. is in other respects parallel to what we learn from Ammianus also.
Compare the trumpets at the Roman siege of Bezabde,230 the use of cilicia or goat’s hair-mats
to check missiles passing between battlements,231 the digging of cuniculi or saps by Roman
legiones palatinae (the Mattiarii and Lanciarii) and auxilia palatina (Jovii and ?Victores) at

225 Contrast V. Epit. IV.22, and Amm. 23.4.2-3 (for many other examples, see I. Viansino, Ammiani
Marcellini rer. gest. Lexicon (Darmstadt, 1985) 171), and Anon. de rebus bellicis 7 & 18, on the one hand, with
Vitr. 10.11.1-9, Caece. B. Civ. 2.2., Tac. A. 12.56.2, 15.9.1, id. H. 3.23.2, 3.29.1, 4.23.3, Gell. 7.3, etc., on
the other. At Amm. 24.4.16 aptaee ligni sagittis ballistae will be an archaism.
226 D.B. Campbell, Britannia XV (1984) 77, E.W. Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical
227 Cf. D.B. Campbell, ibid. 83.
228 D. Baatz, Britannia IX (1978) 9.
230 Amm. 20.11.8, 20.11.21 (tubae ), 20.11.19 (classicum ); V. Epit. IV.12 (tubae ).
231 Amm. 24.2.10; per propugnacula ciliis undique laxius panis, quae telorum impetus cohiberent... V.
Epit. IV 6: per propugnacula duplicita saga ciliicique tenduntur impetuque excipient sagittarum. Neque enim
facile transiunt spicula quod cedit ac fluctuat. Cf. Amm. 20.11.9: defensores sub obietis ciliciis, ne
cospicieruntur ab hostibus, latebant intrinsecus...
Mozamalcha;²³² the Roman aggeres or aggestus (siege-mounds) at Bezabde, and the Persian and Roman ones at Amida,²³³ the Roman ram with its shed-timbers covered against fire-attack with wet hides and centones or patchwork blankets,²³⁴ the Persians’ trapping the Roman ram in a noose.²³⁵ The sappers at Aquileia advanced behind screens called pluci and crates,²³⁶ and the Roman siege-mounds at Bezabde were destroyed by fires carried by the Persians sallying from the fortress.²³⁷ The different types of inflammable oil and bitumen were familiar to both Ammianus and V.²³⁸ The fire-dart or malleolus has a place in Ammianus’ catalogue of machines,²³⁹ and in his narrative.²⁴⁰ The use of cylindri or massive boughs cut into sections, as well as of architectural fragments, for dropping from the walls onto hostile men and machines, described by V, may be mentioned by Ammianus, unless perhaps as the context implies he means column-drums.²⁴¹

²³²Amm. 24.4.13: cuniculos... cum vineis, 24.4.21-22, Zos. 3.22.2; V. Epit. IV.24: De cuniculis, per quos aut muros defodiat aut civilitas penetratur (rubric), IV.15: (vineae) sub quibus obsidientes tuti ad subruncendam murorum penetrandam fundamenta. II.11 (legio antiqua): ut eum cunicularios habere...
²³⁴Amm. 20.11.13: ucmdariorius et centones erant opertae materiae plures, aliae unctae almaine diligenter, ut ignis in eas laberetur innoxious. V. Epit. IV.14: ne exurat incendio, coriis vel ciliis cemtibusque vestitur.
²³⁵Amm. 20.11.15: cum... aris maximus adventaret, prominentem eius ferream frontem, quae re vera formam effingit arietis; aris subtili illaqueatam altrias se minoriis, ne retrogrademum restimere vires nee ferre muros assitalibus densis contemplabiliter possit... V. Epit. IV.23: Alii laqueis capios arietes per multitudinem hominum de muro in solutum tradunt et cum ipsis testudinibus evertunt. Placeas in medium forsicas denitionibus multarum inlignant ferrum, quem humor vocant, adprehensumque arietem aut evertunt aut ipsa suspenderat, ut impetum non habeant fertiendi.
²³⁷Amm. 20.11.18-19; 20.11.22-23: pone sequentibus aliis, qui flammas occulte portabant... qui vehabant foculos repensis incuri... cf. V. Epit. IV.28: in lanternis portant lucernas et incensis machinis rursum levantur in murum.
²³⁸V. Epit. IV.8: Bitumen sulphur picem liquidad oleum, quod incendiarium vocant, ad exuendam hostium machinas... Amm. 20.11.15: fundentes quoque ferventissimam picem; Amm. 25.6.37: In hac regione oleum conficiit Medicum, quo illium telum, si emissum lentius lexore arcu—nam ictu extinguitur rapido—aucter usque, tenacetcre creata et, si aqua voluerit ablueare quioscum, aequum exsici aciere incendium nec remedio ullo quam ictu pulviser consopitar.
²³⁹Amm. 23.4.14-15: Malleoli autem telli genus, figurantur hac specie: sagitta est cannea inter spiculum et harundinem multis libri formam, quo lentior linea staminat, concavatur ventre subtilissimo et planis viros atque in alveo ipsi ignem cum aliqua suscipit alimentum. et si emissa lentius arcu invalido—arete ictu enim rapidiore extingitur—aucte usque, tenacetcre cemat aequumque conspensa aciere exsici acierium nec remedio ullo quam supericio pulvere consopitar. Cf. Epit. IV.18 on the malleolus and the falarica.
²⁴⁰E.g., Amm. 20.11.13, 21.12.10, 24.4.16.
²⁴¹Amm. 31.15.13: contrarii per prouum saxis et columnarum fragenoniet et cylindris; V. Epit. IV.8: intercisit ex validissimis arboribus cylindri, quas tales vocant, ut sint volubiles, laevignarunt, quae per prouum labentia subito inpera bellatoros solent [equos quoque] deserrere; Epit. IV.23: interdum bases columnaeque
At Julian's siege of Aquileia A.D. 361 three mobile wooden towers were constructed with a drawbridge in the lower storey, and soldiers shooting from the top, and conveyed on rafts to the city walls.\textsuperscript{242} V. describes a wheel-based mobile tower with a ram in the lowest storey, a drawbridge in the middle, and \textit{contati et sagittarii} in the top storey.\textsuperscript{243} The most important feature of design was that such structures should be higher than the defences of the city.\textsuperscript{244} Ammianus takes due account of this also.\textsuperscript{245} Ways to measure the height of the walls for the construction of ladders and machines earned a separate chapter in V.\textsuperscript{246} and Ammianus specified ladders were made-to-measure at Aquileia.\textsuperscript{247} There can be no doubt that V.'s chapters on siege-warfare summarised contemporary wisdom, even if it had a long history.\textsuperscript{248}

(e) Conclusion: the \textit{legio antiqua} and the Epit.

V. tailored his material taken largely from late epitomes written in the Latin tradition of arts of war and only embellished from other sources (see ch. 7) to very specific contemporary purposes, reinterpreting for his own age the traditional (and originally Catonian)\textsuperscript{249} wisdom on recruitment and training in Book I, and attempting to construct from inadequate sources a new legionary organization based on Cato's\textsuperscript{250} in Book II. He had scant regard for what might be called historical accuracy, because this was only peripheral to the literary task of writing an epitome in the \textit{artifex} tradition, which called for a coherent set of rather basic precepts,\textsuperscript{251} not a history as such, especially as his military goals were shaped by present political considerations.

\textit{marmorea vibrato impetu iactantur de muri arietesque confringunt.} On cylindri and rotae (V. loc. cit.) see \textit{Ath. Mech.} 37.3, \textit{op.\ cit.}.

\textsuperscript{242}Amm. 21.12.9–10.

\textsuperscript{243}V. Epit. IV.17.

\textsuperscript{244}V. Epit. IV.19: \textit{Constat aetem inefficax machinamentum reddi, si inveniatur inferius.}

\textsuperscript{245}Amm. 21.12.9: \textit{lineas turres propugnaculis hostium celsiores, 20.11.20: sublimes aggestus, qui iam consummati muri alias imminebant.}


\textsuperscript{247}Amm. 21.12.6: \textit{aptas plerique vehentes ad mensuram moenium scalas...}

\textsuperscript{248}F. Lammert, \textit{Klio} XXXI (1938) 402: 'Der poliorketische Abschnitt des Vegetius steht aber in Wirklichkeit in keinerlei Gegensatz zu dem Bilde der römischen Belagerungskunst, das wir oben aus dem ihm gleichzeitigen oder wenig älteren Ammianus Marcellinus gewonnen, wenn die Gesamtheit seiner Nachrichten herangezogen und sachlich erläutert wird.' Lammert successfully refuted E. Sander's argument for a decline in late-Roman siegework.

\textsuperscript{249}See ch. 7 (a–d).

\textsuperscript{250}See ch. 7 (f), p. 285.

\textsuperscript{251}The \textit{artifex} literature is isagogic, cf. E. Norden, \textit{Hermes} XL (1905) 508.
Books III and IV on strategy and siege-warfare summarise the traditional, originally Catonian body of knowledge in such a way as to make it seem relevant to the modern field army organization and contemporary weaponry, as well as to highlight his own preferred strategies and special measures adapted to contemporary conditions, in particular the avoidance of pitched battles and the provisioning for long-term sieges at the hands of the enemy invader. He adapted strategic advice in Book III to the special situation of leading a new or an inexperienced army which was likely to be smaller than the barbarian adversary, to the importance of guerilla warfare against the invader, and to the use of food as a strategic weapon. He augmented his account of siege-warfare with matter belonging to the defensive point-of-view in Book IV not least because he was preoccupied with the invasion of Roman territory by barbarians.

The section on naval warfare appended to Book IV is mainly a selection of traditional but not irrelevant material on shipbuilding and ocean navigation plus a very short description of battle-tactics, included and so organized precisely because the Roman government had allowed the Mediterranean fleets to dwindle to insignificance. The decay of a sea-going naval capability was the naval equivalent of the failure to maintain a properly equipped and trained standing army. The prominence of basic first principles of construction and navigation is analogous to the emphasis on recruitment and training in the earlier books.

V.'s omissions of river fleets, cavalry and auxiliary units in general also demonstrate the extent to which he was writing precisely to a programme for the present, his own awareness of the contemporary strategic scene, and the subservience of antiquarian research to his political ends. V. interpreted in a loose sense his promise to be a faithful compiler. He is on a number of occasions not above invoking the mos maiorum for seemingly untraditional ideas. Thus his proposal to punish only the ring-leaders of a mutinous army does not accord

252See ch. 7 (g, h).
253V. Epit. III.1, III.3, III.9-10; III.18 p.104.3-11, inserted very inorganically into a section on the pitched battle.
255M. Reddé, Mare Nostrum (Rome 1986) 659-660.
256See ch. 1 (c), p.4.
with ancient severitas, and the prominence in the ‘ancient’ training of swimming is not borne out by results so far as they can be determined in historical fact. These perversions may have been induced by such current political events as the need to absorb the armies of defeated usurpers, and perhaps the publication of Ammianus’ Res Gestae in which the plight of Jovian’s army trapped behind the Tigris plays a prominent part.

Other anachronisms arise from his advocacy of certain sorts of modern arms and armour. The wearing of expensive cataphractae by principes, hastati and triarii seems unlikely ever to have been so general for any Roman legionary line from any period as V. would have it. The late-6th. c. Byzantine writer Maurice transmits older material for the infantry army perhaps relevant to the 4th.—5th. centuries, in which cataphracts are recommended for picked skoutatoi but required only for the front two men of each file. Nor do plumbatae figure frequently enough in the historical record for them to have been standard equipment in a wide variety of imperial units (V. and the Anon. are the first to mention them), yet Maurice is close to V. in equipping both his light and heavy infantry with them. V.’s religious piety, or his knowledge of his Emperor’s, is perhaps responsible for his assertion that the camp should face east, demoting to second place Hyginus’ recommendation that it should always face the enemy. Such anachronisms arise because V. was not much interested in historical facts but in making ancient military matter relevant to his contemporary concerns. That was not necessarily a suggestion of bad faith on his part, according to his lights, since he could have argued that he remained true to the spirit of the original while updating it.

---

257 V. Epit. III.4 p.72.18–21. Cf. Val. Max. 2.7.15; 6.3.1ff., Polyb. 6.36.6–6.38, Amm. 29.5.22–24 (Count Theodosius in Africa), Polyen. 8.24.1–3 (Augustus), V. Epit. I.1, II.9, III.10 p.90.17ff. But see Tac. A. 1.44, where the mutinous legions in A.D. 14 seized and tried their own ring-leaders and settled other old scores.

258 V. Epit. I.20, II.15–16, III.14, cf. IV.6, IV.44. But cataphractae = loricae were common in his own day; Pan. Lat. Pac. 12 (2) 33.4 (the lorica worn by Theodosius’ Goths), cf. the Roman arms despoiled by Goths, Amm. 31.5.9, 31.6.3; the Lentienses expected Gratian’s comitatenses to wear glistening metal armour in Amm. 30.11.12.


261 V. Epit. I.17, II.15 p.49.7, 18–19, II.16, II.23, III.14 p.98.9, IV.21, IV.44.


263 V. Epit. I.23, Ps.-Hyg. De met. castr. 56.
Scholarly research into the *legio antiqua* has been concentrated on identifying the date of a unit which, we can now see plainly, never had a concrete existence as such. The best efforts of specialists had concluded that it probably reproduces features which might theoretically be expected of a late-3rd c. A.D. legion, if we had any information on it. The unexpected appearance of an *optio triarius* in a recently discovered inscription dated to the Tetrarchy further reinforces the illusory promise that V. preserves much information of substance for this period.

Only P.K. Cooper, in his unpublished Oxford D.Phil. thesis, saw that the *legio antiqua* was a largely unhistorical reconstruction by V. himself, but he too was misled into thinking that V. was researching into the legion of the late-3rd. century A.D., and was seriously engaged like himself in scholarly investigation in the cause of truth, rather than writing a military-political tract. More recently, W. Goffart has also concluded that 'the *antiqua legio* is not an historical reconstruction but an eclectic compendium of ancient rules adaptable to modern conditions', and that the whole purpose was to describe an analogue according to which existing field army units known to us from the Notitia Dignitatum could be reorganized to form a single homogeneous organism, cohesive and uniform in its training and discipline, self-sufficient in independent operations. The second part of this characterization, so far as it goes, justly summarises the most important of V.'s technical military aims, but the first part overlooks the extent to which he worked skilfully within the framework of his sources, and the

---

264 The *legio antiqua* was dated to the age of Diocletian by R. Grosse, followed by P. Couissin and E. v.Nischer, to A.D. 260–290 by E. Stein, followed by H.M.D. Parker; older scholarship—Lange, and Försell, followed by D. Schenk—had plumped for misunderstood reforms of Hadrian, which appear in fact not to have involved organizational changes. E. Sander, 'Die antiqua ordinatio legionis des Vegetius', *Klio* XXXII (1939) 382–391, concluded that it was a patchwork of material from Cato, Frontinus, Paternus, and anonymous sources of the period A.D. 260–290, and after the Diocletianic and Constantinian reforms, stitched together by V.

265 The *terminus ante quem* was the standard hypothesis that the 'new legion' of 1,000 (est.) men was introduced in Diocletian's reign, with legionary cavalry finally hived off into separate units; cf. E. Ritterling, *RE* XII (1950) 1350, D. Hoffmann, *Bewegungsheer*, 1.4, 215.


269 Ibid. 96–97 = 76–77.
significance of his processes of selection therefrom, and especially the anti-barbarian 'hidden agenda' which the *legio antiqua* represents.

We are on firmer ground if we concentrate on what V. claims to be combating. His sarcastic sallies are designed to show that he felt himself to be living in an age in which the court troops were largely unmilitary *urbani milites* who rarely handled arms and armour, and had forgotten how to build camps, and who were not even kept up to strength and fully trained by the government. Veiled comments in significant chapters are in harmony with a state of affairs in which the deficiencies were being supplied at great cost to the State by the use of numerous units, regular and irregular, of mainly light-armed mounted and pedestrian barbarian mercenaries of one sort or another, who despite their lack of general sympathy with the useful arts of Roman civilisation showed ominous zeal for acquiring the art of war, so he pretended at least.

He charged that recruitment and equipping of regular heavy infantry in particular had been neglected for many years and particularly since the start of Gratian’s reign, and proposed in the *legio antiqua* the creation of a new model field army with integrated cavalry and light and heavy infantry, which did not rely unduly on barbarian manpower but sought to mobilise the Roman People. The rest of the work is shaped around the practical introduction of these principles, understood in the context of contemporary military conditions. His rank as *vir inlustris* guarantees some high degree of respect, among the Emperor’s closest advisers at least for a time, and the phenomenon of V. offers us unique evidence of an attempt to affect imperial policy by political publication of a book which is much more than a simple *Art of War*.

---

270 V. Epit. I.3, I.10 (‘rivers not always crossed by bridges’), I.16 (‘it is no effort to carry a sling’), I.20 (‘cuirass and helmet seem heavy to an infantryman who perhaps rarely exercises with, perhaps rarely handles arms’), III.8 (‘a walled city is not always available in wartime for a permanent or temporary camp’), IV.44 (‘no one can complain of the weight of his armour who fights standing on board ships’).

271 V. Epit. I.1, II.7, II.8, II.10 p.92.7ff.

272 V. Epit. I.17, I.8, II.10, III.2.

273 V. Epit. I.20 p.22.1–2, II.8 p.30.12–13, II.1 p.34.16–18.

274 V. Epit. III.10 p.90.1–4.

275 V. Epit. I.7, I.20, II.8, II.3, II.18.

276 V. Epit. I.praef., II.1, II.4, II.18.
Ch. 7. Vegetius and the military rhetoricians.

(a) Background.

Broadly speaking, V. Epit. I–II follow a ‘Latin’ tradition of tactical writing, III–IV, in origin at least, a ‘Greek’. Thus the subject-matter of I–II is closely related to Roman history and Roman institutions. In Book I, Roman military training and discipline presented as a winning combination of practices whose superiority to other (i.e. Greek and barbarian) systems was, so it seemed, a necessarily admitted fact, since the Romans had conquered the whole of the Greek and much of the non-Greek World. In Book II V. intended a theoretical outline of the ‘ancient legion’, as the unit out of which the winning system was constructed, but the desire to present a model for the present made the result an incoherent amalgam of a 2nd c. B.C. legionary battle-array with a composite legionary organization which included elements from the 2nd–4th c. A.D. The Roman background was therefore all-encompassing in these two books.

V. early on at I.8 gave up the time-consuming attempt announced in I praef. to extract military information from ‘divers historians’, and at the same time justifiably rejected Greek tactica (a tradition which survives in the epitomes prepared by Asclepiodotus, Onasander, Aelian and Arrian in the Roman period) in his search for Roman disciplina, and cited Cato, Celsus, Frontinus, Paternus and the constitutiones of Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian (V. seems to have known the latter as preserved through the collating activities of Paternus) as the authorities for his theme.

But Books III–IV derived ultimately from the Greek tactical writings. This is acknowledged first by V. in his preface to III, where we are told of Roman military theorists’ debt to the science worked out above all by Spartan tactici, although contributions of Athenians

---

1 Epit. I.1, listing the conquests of the Gauls, Germans, Spaniards, Africans and Greeks.
2 The fruit of this preliminary research may be seen in a number of exempla from Sallust and from handbooks of exempla (see ch. 2 (b)).
3 Epit. I.8: diligentissimus juris militaris auctor. One of Paternus’ surviving fragments quotes the disciplina of Augustus; cf. Dig. 49.16.12 §1 (Aem. Macer de re mil. I, see further below). Praetorian Prefect under M. Aurelius and Commodus, he was adlected to the Senate as a consular to be executed c. A.D. 182. R. Grosse, Deutsche Literaturzeitung LV (1934) 61–65, endorsed the observation of M. Schanz, Hermes XVI (1881), 137ff. that V. knew the constitutiones only through Paternus.
4 Epit I.8, and Cato and Frontinus cited again, II.3.
The Romans evidently learned the value of this by observing the devastating use of it made by the Carthaginians during the First Punic War, acting under the strategic direction of the Spartan Xanthippus, and in the Second Punic War, when Hannibal engaged a Spartan, perhaps his biographer Sosylus, as strategic adviser. Sosylus, we know from a papyrus fragment of his history of Hannibal, could analyse tactics in a naval engagement between the Carthaginians and Romans aided by Massiliots by citing precise tactical exempla of named commanders at Artemisium in 480 B.C.

So the Romans emulated the Carthaginians in adopting Greek military science, and had a lot of learning to do particularly in the Second Punic War, according to V. It was of course the merit of Scipio Africanus to have retrained and reorganized the army at New Carthage in 209 B.C. It will be shown that it was Cato who in his de Re Militari described what the Romans had adopted particularly under Scipio Africanus Maior of Greek military science. In this connexion it is significant that Pliny the Elder says that Cato had learned his military science ‘under Scipio, or rather under Hannibal’, and adds the detail that Cato could not stand Scipio. He will thus have given due credit in his book to Scipio’s debt to the Carthaginians.

Secondly, the subjects of III–IV, encompassing field strategy and tactics, siege-warfare and maritime naval warfare, were demonstrably covered by the Greek tradition of tactical writings. Already in the 4th. c. B.C. Aeneas Tacticus went on to discuss naval tactics (lost) at the end of his surviving work on siege-warfare, and also wrote books (lost) on military preparations, supplies and finances, camps, plots and subversion, and things to say to the troops. Since his definition of tactics is preserved it follows that he wrote a book on it too, so

---

5Epit. III praef. (init.): Athenienses et Lacedaemonios... Thus horum (p.64.13) perhaps embraces both. Cf. also III.10 p.90.1ff., the Spartan example of cultivating the art of war followed by Romans, and III.17 p.102.3ff., the Spartan science of using a tactical reserve imitated by Carthaginians, and then adopted by Romans. See E.L. Wheeler, ‘The Hoplomachoi and Vegetius’ Spartan Drillmasters’, Chiron XIII (1983), 1–20.

6Epit. III praef., identified by E.L. Wheeler, art cit., 1–2.

7U. Wilcken, Hermes XLI (1906) 141. F. Jacoby FGH II (1930) no. 176, id., RE IIIA.1 (1929), 1204, seems to underestimate his status. Nepos Hann. 13.3 says that he taught Hannibal Greek.

8Epit. I.28.

9Pliny HN pr. 30: non quo mihi temperare quo minus ad hoc pertinentia ipsa censorii Catonis verba ponam, ut appareat eisam Catoni de militari disciplina commentanti, qui sub Africano, immo vero et sub Hannibale didicisse militare et ne Africannum quodem ferre potuisset, qui imperator triumphant reportasset, parasosuisse istos qui obtraccionem alienae scientiae faciam sibi auxcipantur.

10Aen. Tact. 40.8.
that he obviously must have covered the whole range of military science.11 A number of Greek epitomes of Aeneas were made, by Polybius among several others.12 Philo of Byzantium also followed his poliorcetics with naval warfare, and traces of his work can be detected in Epit. IV.13 Both Asclepiodotus and Aelian, writing in the Roman period, start by dividing tactics into land and sea warfare, but do not go on to give the naval part. The signs are that this will have been Aeneas’ arrangement. Aelian even promised in his preface to talk about naval warfare later, no doubt following the source, but as Arrian, who followed Aelian very closely, omitted this sentence, it seems improbable that Aelian ever edited a naval section.14 As well as Aelian and Asclepiodotus on the Greek, Frontinus was, according to Aelian, an authority on the Greek (and Roman) tradition.15 This is confirmed by Frontinus’ surviving Strategemata, which cover Greek military history also (and include a few naval tactics). So the character of the tradition within which V. operated was one of epitomes of epitomes.

(b) Cato, Celsus, Frontinus, Paternus and the Roman tradition.

It should be stated at the outset that it is impossible to find in the Epit. any definite trace of the work on military science included by A. Cornelius Celsus in his Encyclopaedia, written under Tiberius. The source-notice at Epit. I.8 would at first sight lead one to suppose that V. used it for book I along with Cato, Frontinus and Paternus and the constitutiones of Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian, whereas that at Epit. II.3 might suggest prima facie that books II–IV were compiled from Cato and Frontinus, among ‘many others’. However it is suggested by the evidence of book III that ‘Frontinus’ subsumed Cato, at least, and the fact that Celsus and Frontinus are presented in a zeugma at I.8, coupled with the fact that Celsus comes between

---

11 Cf. F. Lammert, Klio XXXIII (1940) 280–282; Ael. Tact. 3.4; D. Whitehead, Aineias the Tactician (Oxford 1990), 13–16.
14 F. Lammert, Klio XXXII (1940), 282.
15 Aelian Tact. praef. 3: Ετελεύθερον τούτου τοῦ χρόνου παρὰ Φρόντινο τοῦ ἑπτάχρονον ὑπαύγον ὁ Φούκις ἡμερὰς τινὰς διήρητα δόξαν ἀπεκφράσμενον περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ἐπιτελεῖν σημασίαν τ’ ἀνδρὰ εὐρίᾳ ὅλης ἔποςeca σπουδήν ἔχοντα εἰς τὴν παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τετελειμένην μάθησιν, ἀπεκφράσει περὶ περὶ παρὰ τῆς τῶν τετελείων καταγραφῆς "ὁ δὲ ἐποιεῖτο παρὰ Φρόντινο δοκῶν αὐτήν, ἐπει δὲ τόν τὸν ἄκρον ἔδωκε τῇ Ἱερομάρτυρι δαίμονας προσεύχετο. Cf. ibid. I.2, where ‘Fronto the consular of our time’, i.e., probably Frontinus again, is cited as one of those having written on Homeric tactics.
Cato and Frontinus, probably means that we have to assume that Frontinus subsumed Celsus too.\textsuperscript{16}

Indeed, since the plan of Celsus’ Encyclopaedia is thought to have followed that of Cato’s Encyclopaedia, which contained his de Re Militari, it may well be that Celsus transmitted the Catonian material on the army to Frontinus.\textsuperscript{17} Schenk argued that Celsus was the main source for book I on stylistic grounds that have fallen victim to Andersson’s demonstration that the style of the whole Epit. is in general (apart from the use of the 2nd. pers. sing. in book III) homogeneous.\textsuperscript{18} In particular the frequent citation of and allusion to classical authors, principally Sallust and Vergil, and the common use of exempla taken from Republican history, is typical of late-4th. c. style, rather than early imperial,\textsuperscript{19} and the concentration of this feature in book I will be due rather to the special publication of this book as a one-off, before V. embarked on the more protracted labour of producing books II–IV to commission. Moreover, the said stylistic features are not lacking in the later books either, nor in V.’s other work, Digesta Artis Mulomedicinae.\textsuperscript{20} The conclusion against Celsus as the source for book I in particular is also a defeat for Schenk’s one-source, one-book principle, and is backed up by the repeated assertion of V. himself that books I, III and IV of the Epit. are in each case a compilation of various authors.\textsuperscript{21}

If Frontinus borrowed from Celsus, we have to ask also from what source Josephus took his famous excursus on the Roman army and its discipline, training, philosophy, equipment and camp-construction, which has much in common with V. Epit. I–II. This is perhaps most notable in his ideological accent on daily training, its philosophy and its results. Thus the Roman Empire was won by valour not by fortune,\textsuperscript{22} the Romans are always ready for

\textsuperscript{16}V. Epit. I.8: quae Cato ille Censorius de disciplina militari scripsit, quae Cornelius Celsus, quae Frontinus perstringenda duxerunt...
\textsuperscript{17}F. Marx (ed.), A. Cornellii Celsi quae supersunt (Leipzig–Berlin, 1915), vii–viii.
\textsuperscript{20}Andersson, op. cit., 21ff.
\textsuperscript{21}Listed by A.R. Neumann, RE Suppl. X (1965) 1014.
war, they are always training, battles bring them no surprises or tests,23 training of minds forms part of their disciplina,24 their army behaves as one body in war,25 the invincibility of the Populus Romanus in the stationary battle has set the bounds of their Empire at the ends of the earth,26—all these are loudly echoed by V. If as seems likely this material comes from a 1st c. A.D. Roman source, we have to reckon with Celsus. More evidence for this is considered in connexion with Josephus' material on castrametation below, which appears also to be in some relation to Cato which is independent of Polybius.27

The theme mentioned in book III of Romans having to learn when faced with Carthaginian expertise recurs at the end of book I,28 which cites Cato three times.29 The source-notice in book I is a fuller list including Cato, Cornelius Celsus, Frontinus, Paternus and the constitutions of Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian,30 because originally published separately. But Frontinus will have been just as much a source of book I as he allegedly was of books II–IV, for which only he and Cato are explicitly named among alli conplures,31 and that Celsus and Paternus will have been just as much sources of books II–IV as they allegedly were of book I. We must not assume that V. changed the source-notice in I.8 to cover the additional publication of II–IV, for he added a new source-notice in I.3. Schenk's scheme Celsus = book I, Paternus = book II, Frontinus = books III–IV is thus not supported by the source-notices. Since the sources were the same, why then did V. cite them differently? Because he wished in Epit. II.2 to highlight the two most famous names in his sources and insinuate that he was doing an equivalent service to the State in writing a military handbook as Cato had done, and bore the same relation of exceedingly honoured citizen to his Emperor as Frontinus, thrice consul, had done to Trajan.32 After all, he was a vir inlustris.

24Jos. BJ 3.102, V. Epit. I.1, I.2, I.7, I.8, II.19.
27See section (c) below.
29V. Epit. I.8, I.13 = Cato de Re Mil. fr. 3 (Jordan), I.15, otherwise only II.3.
30V. Epit. I.8.
31V. Epit. II.3.
32See ch. 1 (c), p. 8.
Book I, about the recruitment and training of legionaries, promises because of the subject and the frequent mention of his name to follow Cato's de Re Militari. But it was of course normal for ancient writers to cite authorities at second- or third-hand or even further removes. Caesar named the antique Eratosthenes rather than Poseidonios whom he actually followed. As there was a common ancient tendency to suppress the names of the more immediate sources, or to copy authors unnamed, we have to reckon with the possibility that V. may have actually used epitomes of even Frontinus and Paternus. This would seem to be indicated for instance if there were signs that V. had a persistent problem of too little information to go on.

(c) Epit. I.1–7 (Recruitment).

In book I some fragments of Cato may still be discerned through later accretions. Though individually often equivocal, they add up to a consistent archaic picture. Epit. I.1–7 deal with recruitment. I.1 answers the question how the Romans acquired their Empire. The question and the answer are paralleled in 1st c. A.D. sources such as Onasander and Josephus (see above), and V. adds topoi likely to be related to those of Caesar, Velleius Paterculus and Ammianus (Caes. BG 4.1.9, Vell. Pat. 2.106.1, Amm. 16.12.47) on the height of the Germans, Sallust (Jug. 35.10) on the venality of Rome to the Africans and Horace (Ep. 2.1.156–7) on the intellectual conquest of Rome by the Greeks. But the second part of the chapter (from p.5.21) summarises the gnomic military philosophy behind the professionally trained legion which already informs the training-programme instituted by Scipio Africanus at New Carthage, 209 B.C. The severe punishment of desidia (Epit. I.1. p.6.3) corresponds to Polybius' account of the chastisement of ἀναθέπια (Polyb. 6.37.9ff.), and the 'daily' exercises and practice battles find a counterpart in Scipio's rolling four-day cycle of marching exercises,

---

33 A. Klotz, Cäsarstudien (1910) 27, cited by F. Lammert, Gnomon X (1934) 271–274.
34 Cf. Jerome's habitual citation and even quotation of Greek authors ostensibly from the originals but actually from Latin secondary literature, translations, handbooks, commentaries, etc., P. Courcelle, Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 78ff.
35 Pliny HN pr. 21ff.
36 Also similar, but not identical, is Cic. de Harusp. Resp. 9.19: Quam voluissimus licet patres conscripti ipsi nos amemus, tamen nec numero Hispanos nec robore Gallos nec calliditate Poenos nec artibus Graecos... superavimus.
37 Livy 26.51.3ff, Polyb. 10.20.
arms-cleaning, combat-training with wooden foils and javelins with buttons on the tips, and a
day of rest (Polybius reverses the last two days of the cycle).

Epit. I.2 summarises the climatic theory of military virtue found in greater detail in
Vitruvius 6.1. V. does not state the climax of the theory that the perfect mix of bodily and
mental vigour was to be found in the *populus Romanus* and in *Italia gentes*, and as is clear
from 1.28 would not have wished to exclude other provinces of the 4th. c. Empire. But
barbarians are by implication excluded. The original theory however is that of Poseidonios. It
perhaps got into V. by means of Varro, a named source for the naval section Epit. IV.41.
There is some reason to think that V. may have directly used Varro quite extensively (see
below).

Epit. I.3 discusses whether recruits from the country were better than those from the
city. Since it was already the view of Cato that they were, and as the type of the farmer-
warrior cited by V., the dictator of 458 B.C. Quinctius Cincinnatus, was already ancient by
Cato’s lifetime, there is every possibility that the 2nd. c. B.C. moralist already held the view
expressed by V. that recruits from the City were corrupted by luxury. V.’s exemplum of
Roman youth swimming in the Tiber also appears in Porphyrio’s 3rd. c. A.D. commentary to
Horace.

Epit. I.4 treats of the ideal age to recruit *iirones* while they were still young and fit
enough to fulfil all that was required of them physically and mentally. V. proposed a somewhat
violent difference of emphasis in his inaccurate assertion that ‘ancient custom’ prescribed the
recruitment of those ‘entering puberty’, whereas modern usage preferred somewhat older
recruits. In fact the ancient Roman custom was to recruit after puberty, even in times of
.crises. For example Livy reports after Cannae 216 B.C. the levy of *iuniores* from 17 years and

---

39 Theiler, ibid., conjectures that Vitruvius found it in Varro.
40 Cato de Agric. praef. 4: *at ex agricolis et viri fortissimi et milites strenuissimi siguntur.*
41 Cf. Varro Rer. Rust. II praef. 1–2, on the ‘good old days’ when most Romans lived in the country and did
not desire the ‘urban gymnasia of the Greeks’.
42 Porph. ad Hor. C. 3.7,25, 1.8.8.
43 V. Epit. I.4: *Et quidem, si antiqua consuetudo servanda est, incipientem pubertytem ad dilectum cogendum
nullus ignorat.* See ch. 5 (b) 2 (ii.), p. 162.
of some praetextati. Similarly Servius refers to the ancient Roman military training of 16 year-olds as being 'after puberty'. This divergence may reflect a serious contemporary shortage of Roman military manpower, to which V. also makes reference in I.5 and I.7. The three categories of soldier mentioned by V. could well be those of the 2nd. c. B.C. legion, equites, pedes sagittarii, and scutati; that is, legionary cavalry, legionary light infantry and legionary heavy infantry, cf. Epit. II.2. If so, the material probably derives ultimately from Cato. Some support is lent to this thesis by the use of the 2nd. pers. sing. sive velis inbure which has been one means of determining that a large part of book III summarises Cato.

Epit. I.5 discusses outmoded legislation for the height of recruits, such as that amended by the Emperor Valentinian. Since according to Polybius the allies provided the right and left wings of the consular army, V.'s talk of the recruitment of alares equites, like primis legionum cohortibus, suggests the early Empire rather than the Republican period. But one should be cautious as legionary cohorts make their début in the Second Punic War and these Roman regulations may have been imposed on their allies. V. admits to being willing to ignore these regulations in order to obtain more recruits, showing a significantly progressive and not uncritical attitude to ancient wisdom, found wanting in the present shortage of Roman manpower. Unfortunately, V. found this punctiliousness a strain; from now on he preferred to edit ancient wisdom to agree with his own notions.

Epit. I.6 offers, after the manner of horses and dogs, a checklist of points to observe when selecting recruits, embellished with an elegantly chosen quotation on bees from Vergil's Georgics. The technical term conformatio corresponds to forma in Epit. II.12, and in Varro

---

44Livy 22.57.9.
45Serv. ad Verg. Aen. 7.162: Pueri et praeaevo flore iuventus: bene Romanae militiae exprimit morem; nam post pubertatem armis exercebantur et sexto decimo anno militabant, quo eiam solo sub custodibus agebant.
46Cf. equites, leves milites, and scutati in Livy's manipular legionary array dated 340 B.C., 8.8.3ff.
47See section (f) below.
48Cf. equites, leves milites, and scutati in Livy's manipular legionary array dated 340 B.C., 8.8.3ff.
49Polyb. 6.26.9.
50M.J.V. Bell, Historia XIV (1965) 415 (210 B.C.), Polyb. 11.23.1, defining the term 'cohort' as three maniples.
51See ch. 5 (b) 2 (i).
52Varro Rer. Rust. 2.5.7–8 (cattle), 2.7.5 (horses), 2.9.3–4 (dogs), Vergil Georg. 3.49–59 (cattle), 3.72–88 (horses), 4.92–94 (bees).
CH. 7. 261

Rer. Rust. 2.7.4 and Tacitus Germania 6.2 where it refers to the physical points of a horse. As V.'s object is to excuse the selection of recruits who were not tall by stressing other criteria, the idea may thus be his own, being a horse-breeder, to apply a close imitation of the checklists used in the selection of animals. Alternatively, the main source may have already adapted it from Varro and Vergil, but as in Epit. IV.41 V. cites both these authorities in a passage which is thought to have been directly constructed by V. (see below), this is less plausible. It is notable, too, that there seems to be the same value-judgement regarding these two authors in each case.53

The idea of Epit. I.7 of selecting or rejecting recruits on the basis of the trades which they practised relates, on a natural interpretation, to a period after the enrolment of the capite censi by Marius in 107 B.C.,54 even probably to the late-antique period. For V. has in mind a re-examination of the artisans and shopkeepers, purveyors of luxuries and small-traders, apparently excluded by law from military service,55 recommending that only some should, like contemporary infamis occupations, be banned. The picture is complicated by the fact that purveyors of luxuries were commonly enrolled, by a long-standing abuse, simply in order to keep the tables of senior army officers well-stocked.56 By law, under the Principate at least, it was forbidden to use soldiers for such purposes.57

Similarly, the recommendation buried in the middle of the chapter that recruits be selected for honest birth and good morals—et genere... et moribus debet excelle—,58 is qualified by the clause 'if numbers suffice'—si copia suppetat—, a reservation on the part of

54Sall. Jug. 86.2, Val. Max. 2.3.1.
55See ch. 5 (b) 2 (vii.), p. 167.
56Cf. Ambr. de Elia 46 on officers' lavish parties.
57Dig. 49.16.12 (Macer I. pr. de Re Mil.): Officium regens exercitum non tantum in danda sed etiam in observanda disciplina constuit. Paternus quoque scriptum, debere eum, qui se meminerit armato praeesse, parciissimorum commutum dare, equam militarem extra provinciam duci non permittere, ad opus privatum piscatorem venati milium non mittere, nam in disciplinae Augusti ita caverat: 'Esti scio fabrilibus operibus exerceret milites non esse alienos, vereor ianen, si quicquam permiserem, quod in usum meum aut tuum fiat, ne modus in ea re non adhiberetur, qui mihi sit tolerandus:' Pac. Pan. Lat. 12(2). 14.3: ut taceam infamis saepe dilectus scriptos in provincias auxilium ducalique sub signis venatorum cohortes militias convivias; SHA Claud. 14.11: venatores, qui obsequantur, duum; carpterrarium unum, curam praetorii unum, aquarium unum, piscatorem unum, dulciarius unum (part of a fictitious equipage of a legionary commander).
V. that parallels his belief expressed in I.5 that the population was larger in the past and civilian careers did not then attract 'the more flourishing youth'—florentiorem iuventatem,—which in context means 'tall youths of good family'. But the original slur on tradesmen and those not of honest birth is entirely compatible with the pre-Marian army and may have been expressed by Cato. If so, we can see how far from the original is the crafting of Epit. I.7. The two physical and two moral criteria for selection, summarised in Epit. I.8, but which run through parts of Epit. I–III, can therefore perhaps be taken as Cato's: velocitas/alacritas and robur, prudentia and confidentialiaudacia, since the moral qualities are linked to 'honest birth'.

In I.7 the primary concern for recruiting men of the requisite physical and moral qualities, coupled to the belief that these were reliably to be found only in superior social status, has been muddled with the government's efforts to prevent luxury in the army and late-antique legislation banning the recruitment of men of infamis occupations and hereditary trades. Once again V. shows his independent outlook in proposing innovations. The section on recruitment concludes with an exemplum of Sertorius in Spain in the 70's B.C. also inserted merely because V. admired him through his reading of Sallust, and a blistering tirade against the poor quality of recruits raised by the late-Roman recruitment tax.

Thus parts of chapters I.1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 appear to go back to Cato, but there is also literary allusion to the late-Republican and early imperial period. V. will thus have added literary quotations from or allusions to Sallust in I.1 (Jugurtha 35.10), I.4 (Catilina 7.4) and 7 (Histories on Sertorius), and Vergil in I.6 (Georgics 4.92 ff), and perhaps some veterinary and rhetorical comment of his own in I.5–7 and given us the reactions and responses of a 4th. c. A.D. Roman to the historic material, both critical of antiquity (I.5–6), and of the present day (I.7).

59A point repeated in I.28 and III.10 p.92.18ff., both editorial.
60See ch. 2 (b), p. 36.
61CTh 7.13.8 (380) cf. CI 12.34.1 (528–9), CI 12.57.12 (436).
62See ch. 5 (b) 2 (viii.), p. 167.
The section on training (I.8–27) opens with a note of the testing and rejection of recruits in the period after selection but before tattooing. The subject recurs at Epit. II.5 in the context of the formation of a legion, from which we learn that the test-period lasted four or more months. Nothing comparable can be found for the raising of recruits for the army of the early or late-Imperial periods,64 and the formation of a legion from new recruits was obviously a relatively infrequent act during the age of professional standing armies. However it will suit military conditions in the Republican period quite well, when legions were enrolled for particular campaigns, often annually. On the other hand tattooing belongs to the late Empire alone,65 so that we have a deliberate amalgam of early and late-Roman material. This is the character of the rest of the Epitome.

After a paragraph of V.'s own comment dismissing Spartan, Athenian and other Greek tactica (the ultimate origin of Epit. III–IV as we have seen) in favour of the celebrated sources of Roman *disciplina militaris*, comes a list of the latter (I.8). This source-notice was only ever intended for the account of training which is the main meat of book I, for which a rejection of the Greeks appears justified by the subject-matter limited to legionaries, although much of legionary tactics and all of Roman siegecraft were of ultimately Greek origin.66 V. was aware that much of the material in books III–IV was originally Greek and admitted it in III praef. His historical awareness is therefore not itself in doubt. However it was not his purpose to write history, but to criticize contemporary developments under the guise of writing a military handbook.

If we take the training chapters of book I as an entity, excluding I.21–25 on castrametation which V. thought should form part of the training, we find a more consistent picture emerges. First the whole material is addressed to the needs of training the recruit in physical fitness, weapons-practice and battle manoeuvres. Secondly there is behind it the

64 See ch. 5 (b) 2 (x), p. 169.
65 See ch. 5 (b) 2 (xii), p. 172.
constant principle of moving from unarmed to armed exercises, and of overcompensating for weight and effort on the battlefield by making practice arms double-weight, and manoeuvres very lengthy and arduous.67 Thirdly it consistently seems to reveal archaic origins which suit Cato as the claimed original source.

The section opens and closes (I.9, I.27) with remarks about the marching and manoeuvring drills known as ambulatio, deambulatio, decursio, campicursio, etc.,68 which V. with characteristic insouciance never distinguishes. In I.9 V. defines the speeds for the militaris gradus and plenus gradus, technical terms of which only the latter is familiar in Livy,69 and leaves undefined the top speed called cursus; but the drills are not described until I.27, where we learn that a certain portion of the twenty-mile marching-drill in arms was completed at the cursus (plenus gradus at II.23 p.59.1). Scipio Africanus at New Carthage in 209 B.C. set his men to run 30 stades in arms, about four miles, every four days.70 But Augustus and Hadrian issued constitutiones that cavalry and infantry should perform ambulatio three times a month.71 V.’s words et vetus consuetudo permansit et divi Augusti atque Hadriani constitutionibus praecavetur suggest that it was already ancient custom before receiving imperial regulation.

Epit. 1.9–10 continue with themes of running and jumping for exercises in traversing country, also for use in armed combat,72 and swimming rivers.73 The running and jumping, at least, is given another exemplum taken from Sallust's Histories à propos of V.'s hero

---

68 V. Epit. 1.9, I.27, II.22 p.56.12, III.4 p.71.14; Tertullian ad Mart. 3: in armis deambulando, campum decurendo.
69 Livy 9.45.15 pleno gradu, cf. 30.5.4 modico gradu. Sall. Jug. 98.4 pleno gradu. The militaris gradus is unique to V. It will correspond to the speed of the 'standard march' or iustum iter known from Caesar, defined as a normal route-march on good roads in good weather between camps, leaving time to build the camp and curare corpora, and leave in good time the next day; cf. G. Veith, in J. Kromayer, G. Veith (edd.), Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer (Munich, 1928), 352.
70 Polyb. 10.20.
71 V. Epit. I.27.
72 V. Epit. III.14 p.97.18–21, II.23 p.57.16ff., confirmed by Donatus ad Aen. 11.284: qui enim scripserunt de arte militari dicitum summum genus esse dimicandi, quotiens calcato umbone adversariti se in hostilem clipeum erigit males et ita contra stantis vulnerat ertia. Cf. id. ad Aen. 9.749.
Sertorius, whereas for swimming he was lazy enough to repeat from I.3 the exemplum of Roman military youth swimming in the Tiber.

The account of combat-practice with a wooden foil and wicker shield against a 6' post or palus (I.11–12) is over-schematic. V. never states the obvious point that this was only a preliminary to fencing with wooden foils between two men. This method of training was also associated with the gladiatorial schools, as V. says (I.11). Although Valerius Maximus says that it was P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105 B.C.) who introduced gladiatorial methods of training to the army, the parallels between soldier-combat and gladiator-combat naturally will have gone back much farther. That this was so is proved by the fact that Cato obviously mentioned the training of gladiators, for Nonius Marcellus quotes the de Re Militari: DISCIPLINOSVS etiam <de> pessima arte potest dici. Cato de Re Militari: 'quam gladiator disciplinosus'.

Training with wooden foils, at least, was part of Scipio Africanus' four-day cycle at New Carthage in 209 B.C. V.'s insistence in I.12, Non caesim sed punctim ferire docendos tirones, that recruits learned (disceban imperf tense, so in antiquity) to strike with the point, not with the edge (carelessly summarised as 'with the point and the edge' at II.23 p.57.14ff.) belongs to the period after the general introduction of the short Spanish stabbing-sword or gladius to the legions during the Second Punic War. It is not improbable that it was at New Carthage that it was introduced. For as well as ordering sword-practice with foils, Scipio reorganized the arms fabricae, so that the whole city became a 'workshop of war'.

V.'s comment that the Romans easily vanquished and even made a mockery of those fighting

75 Cf. Antyllus apud Oribasius De Rem. 6.36.2–4.
76 Val. Max. 2.3.2, cf. Front. Strat. 4.2.2, Auct. B.Afr. 71, Amm. 16.12.49.
77 Nonius Marcellus 741 L. 463.4 M. = Cato de Re Mil. fr. 14 (Jordan).
78 Polyb. 10.20.
79 Ad palum quoque vel sudibus exerceri per commodum est, cum latera vel pedes aut caput petere punctim caesique condiscant.
80 Suda s.v. μακαλόπα, following a lost portion of Polybius book 29, says that the Romans at the time of Hannibal abandoned their national sword, which was of Gallic type (i.e., a long slashing sword), for the Spanish type. Cf. Livy 22.46.5 (b. of Cananae 216 B.C.): Gallus Hispaniæque scuta eisdem formæ fere erant, dispares ac dissimiles gladii. Gallus praetorti ac sine muriocus, Hispano, punctum magis quam caesim aduesto petere hostiem, brevitate habiles et cum muriocibus.
81 Polyb. 10.20, cf. 10.17.10, Livy 26.47.3; H.H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War (1930) 95.
caesim may refer to the famous duel between T. Manlius and the ‘huge Gaul’; Manlius stabbed him from below with his Spanish gladius, which Livy accords him in spite of the archaic date, winning the enemy’s torque and the cognomen Torquatus.82

V.’s explanation for the principle involved is a sensible medical interpretation, but may be guesswork on his part. For it uses the morphologically late forms caesa and puncta for a cut and stab-wound, otherwise not attested except for the former in a late glossary,83 and the second part of the explanation which attempts to theorize in general about the degree of relative exposure of the two methods of attack ignores the real reason that a different movement was required by a change of weapon-design. An interest in things medical is a feature of V.’s style (see further below).

The suspicion that the source on training gave little information beyond the bare summaries which V. reproduces at II.23 and, to a lesser extent, III.4, is strengthened by the chapter I.13 Armaturam docendos tirones. Virtually everything in this chapter is padding designed to make up for the fact that V. had no information on the content of armatura. Worse still, the term is not attested as an army drill before the late-4th c. A.D. The desperate equation with contemporary armatae, units of scholae palatinae, ‘who it is generally agreed fight better in all battles than other units,’ will be V.’s interpretatio etymologica.84 The antiquity of the drills seems real however.85 V. could excuse his own ignorance of what was involved by the statement that armatura was only partly preserved even for the experts.86

The statement that doctores armorum were remunerated with double pay and that barley-rationes were issued to soldiers who failed to demonstrate proficiency in armatura is

---

82Livy 7.10.5–11 (361 B.C.).
84Constit enim etiam nunc in omnibus proelis armat<ur<as> melius pugnare quam ceteros.
85The term in the sense of a drill is only attested in Ammianus, Firmicus Maternus and V., cf. TLL s.v. 606. Otherwise it means ‘armour’, ‘type of arms’ or ‘force so equipped’. Polybius in his excursus (18.28–32) on the comparative superiority of the Roman ord<inatio> over the Macedonian phalanx reports (18.32.12) that many Greeks were amazed at their defeat by the Roman katanikos; but this is probably a translation of (gravis) armatura. Livy 44.9.2–7 (169 B.C.) shows that displays of similar-sounding manoeuvres and tactics by iuv<enes Romani were already commonplace in the Circus—ludic<ro circensis>—as under the Empire (cf. V. Epit. II.23 p.57.ff., and ch. 5 (b) 3 (iii.)), even if they were not called armatura at the time.
probably a guess prompted by a cryptic note in the sources of book II: *armaturae duplaires qui binas consecutur annonas, simplices qui singulas,87* and the punishment of soldiers with barley-ration was of course a literary commonplace.88 The examination sub praesentia praefecti legi

onis, tribunorum vel principiorum shows its probable origin in the head of V. by its 4th. c. A.D. terminology. A rhetorical commonplace follows about the glory of the State which has an abundance of fully trained soldiers, backed up by a doubly relevant citation of Cato for the view that mistakes in war admit of no second chance. Comparison with II.23 suggests that V. was thinking here of the displays of *armatura* in the Circus Maximus put on to celebrate consular games such as those described by Claudian in A.D. 404; the mistakes were those which the trained Circus performers failed to make in their intricate manoeuvres, despite the admiring confusion of the crowd.89

That V. digressed is acknowledged in the opening words of 1.14, *sed ad inceptum revertor,* in which V. returned to the use of posts for target-practice with spear-shafts. But the brief contents of even this chapter may contain flannel. V. pretends that the *doctor armorum* was again on hand to ensure among other things that the recruit directed the spear 'into the post or next to it'.90 Now is it credible that any arms instructor of any age or people would have tolerated a throw which missed its mark, let alone a Roman?

The training of legionary archers (1.15), which involved the interesting figure of one-third or a quarter of all recruits, clearly antedates the reforms of Marius or later contemporaries whereby the legionary light-armed were abolished. Cato in *libris de disciplina militari,* i.e., de Re Militari, is cited, presumably at second-hand, for the value of having good archers in battle, but V. does not expand this. An exemplum follows immediately in which an unidentified Claudius 'overcame an enemy to whom he had previously been unequal by creating and training numerous *iaculatores* ' and is probably correctly explained as a reference to the origin

---

87Epit. II.7 (cf. ch. 5 (g)).
88Cf. Front. Strat. 4.1.25, 37, Suet. Aug. 24, Livy 27.13.9, Polyb. 6.38.3. It is not attested under the Principate after Augustus allegedly used it for decimated cohorts, and is notably absent from the various military punishments mentioned by the jurists Aem. Macer and Arrius Menander, Dig. 49.16.5, 49.16.6, 49.16.13 §4–6.
89V. Epit. II.23 p.57.5ff.: *Armatura, quae festis diebus exhibetur in circo...; illud vero maius est, quod servare ordines ducant et vexillum suum in tanis permissionibus in ipsa prolustione comitantur nec inter docios alios error existit, cum multitudinis at tanta confusio.*
90V. Epit. I.14: *ut destinato icia vel in palam vel luxa dirigat missile.*
of the velites, introduced under the command of Appius Claudius Pulcher at the siege of Capua 211 B.C.\textsuperscript{91} This may have been told by Cato too, only V. misunderstood his sources. A second exemplum about Scipio Africanus Minor at Numantia 133 B.C. is taken from a source close in wording to one in Frontinus Strategemata, but substantially fuller in detail.\textsuperscript{92} As in III.10, mentioned below, it seems demonstrated that V. did not use Frontinus Strategemata; nor should it be assumed that Frontinus de Re Militari contained exempla.\textsuperscript{93}

It will be noticed that these citations talk about sagittarii, iaculatorii, velites and funditores altogether, whereas V. treats them all separately, weapon by weapon (which explains why velites, who used a light type of hasta which V. ignores, are never properly treated, though much in evidence). Thus the arrangement is unlikely to be very old, if the material does not fit the arrangement. Once again the doctor ad hanc rem, sounding suspiciously like a late-Roman campidoclor, is in attendance to ensure, among other things, that the recruits shot straight, 'whether on horseback or on the ground'.\textsuperscript{94} That is suspicious, for mounted archers are typical of the late Empire.

The following chapter (I.16) on slings, the weapon of legionary accensi of the old manipular army,\textsuperscript{95} also appears to contain little that is not exemplum, medical interpretation, or statement of the obvious. The exemplum of the invention of the sling by the Baleares, the only weapon to be treated to an invention-myth by V., owes its inclusion in all probability to a certain Spanish pride which explains also the redundant references to Sertorius mentioned

\textsuperscript{91}Cf. Val. Max. 2.3.3, mentioning rather his proconsular colleague for the siege, Q. Fulvius Flaccus: velitum usus eo bello primum reperitus est, quo Capuam Fulvius Flaccus imperator obsedit: nam cum equitatui Campanorum crebris excursionibus equites nostri, quia numero pauciores erant, resisteri non posseint; Q. Navias centurio e pedibus lectos expedidit corporis brevibus et incurvis septenis armatis hastis, parvo tegmine manibus, velocit salut iungere se equitumibus et rursus celeri motu delabat instituit, quo facillis equestri proelio subiecti pedites viros partier aequos hostium telis incesserent, eaque novitas pugnae unicum Campanae perfidae debilitavit auxilium, ideoque auctori eius Navio honos a dace est habitus. Cf. Livy 26.4.4–10. (J. Clarke, Military Institutions of Vegetius (London, 1767) 27 n.)

\textsuperscript{92}Cf. Front. Strat. 4.7.27: Scipio Aemilianus ad Numantiam omnibus non cohoribus tantum, sed centurias sagittarios et funditores interposuit. V. Epit. I.15: Africanus quidem Scipio, cum adversum Numantinos, qui exercitus populi Romani sub lugum miserant, esset acie certatus, alter se superiorem futurum esse non creditit, nisi in omnibus centurias lectos sagittarios miscuisset. The differences are as striking as the similarities between Frontinus and V.

\textsuperscript{93}See section (b) below, p.297, 301.

\textsuperscript{94}V. Epit. I.15: sive in equo sive in terra.

\textsuperscript{95}Cf. Livy 1.43.7.
earlier; the source is probably a handbook used also by Florus:96 Fundarum usum pri
ing Balearum insularum habitatores et invenisse et iia periter exercuisse dicitur, ut mares parvos
filios nullum cibum contingere sinterent, nisi quem ex funda destinato lapide percussissent. The
observation that ‘smooth stones shot from a sling or a fustibalus’ (‘sling-staff’, a 4th. c. A.D.
weapon)97 are often more grievous than all darts against soldiers clad in helmets, cataphracts
and breastplates’ is militarily absurd, but perhaps theologically sound as an allusion to David
and Goliath,98 for the ensuing medical explanation of death from the impact of the stone
without loss of blood would seem to fit best a blow between the eyes. An interest in medical
explanation was one of Schenk’s reasons for attributing the main source of book I to Celsus,
whose medical works survive from his Encyclopaedia.99 However, Schoener observed that
medical metaphors—medicina, remedium—occur only in books III–IV, and in fact a certain
feeling for things medical is quite naturally attributable to the author of the Mulomedicina, and
is in evidence notably in passages introducing material or explaining it (or padding it out), i.e.,
where the compiler’s intervention is most evident.100

Empty generalisations about the existence of funditores in all battles of the ancients, the
need to carry slings because they weigh nothing (this may be V.’s irony), and the fact that
conflicts often take place in stony territory look like make-weight. From II.23 we learn that
sagittarii and funditores practised with targets of brushwood or straw called scopae, placing
themselves 600’ away and shooting with arrows or stones shot from a fustibalus. The late-
antique weapon (see ch. 6 (c)) suggests that this information, too, is from a late-Roman source;
for a traditional sling would not be able to carry a missile over such a distance. In I.15 we are
told that recruits practised archery by aiming at the 6’ post.

96 Cf. Florus Epit. 1.43.5: Certos esse (sc. Baleares) quis miretur ictüs, cum haec sola genti arma sint, id
unum ab infantia studium? Cibum puer a maire non accipit, nisi quem ipsa monstrante percusserit. Cf. also
Strabo 3.5.1 and Diod. Sic. 5.18.3–4.
97 See ch. 6 (c), p. 24c.
98 See ch. 2 (c), p. 44.
Heft IX) (Leipzig, 1930), 28ff.
100 C. Schoener, Studien zu Vegetius: Programm der kgl. bayer. Studienanstalt zu Erlangen 1887–1888
(Erlangen, 1888), 24.
1.17, *De exercitio plumbatarum*, contains nothing but an elaborate gloss plus historical note on the *(sagitta) plumbata* or lead-weighted dart. For V. equated it with a weapon of the 3rd. and 4th. c. A.D. called a *mattiobarbulus* or *martiobarbulus* (probably a kind of throwing-mace, see ch. 6 (c)), associated by him with the two crack regiments the Joviani and Herculiani created by Diocletian and Maximian. This is a clearer example of V. ’s method. The source will have been as laconic as II.23: *missibilia quoque vel plumbatas iugi perpetuoque exercitio dirigere cogebanur*. So V. supplied his own interpretation. But the original *plumbata* may have been the *cestras*, launched from a sling or *cestrosphendone* and introduced in the early 2nd. c. B.C., which the late-antique weapon still resembled in appearance.\(^1\)

In 1.18 we return to the legionary cavalry, who were trained to vault wooden horses. V. compares this exercise with its alleged partial survival to the time of writing, which reminds us of his treatment of *armatura*, but its ancient credentials are evident from Polybius, who alludes to the vaulting of live horses by legionary cavalry.\(^2\) The contents of the chapter are probably composite. V. chose this point to mention that the vaulting of wooden horses took place under cover in winter, and in the *campus* or training-field in summer, but we learn from II.23 that porticoes were constructed for the cavalry, and basilicas for infantry, to do their exercises in in general, and they trained under such cover only when the weather was inclement, otherwise using the *campus* ‘even in winter’.\(^3\) Similarly at III.2 the cover was provided so that exercises in general could continue daily even in rain and snow.\(^4\) His assertions that recruits vaulted at first unarmed, then in arms, and that they vaulted not only from the right but also from the left-hand side, and both up and down from the horse, sound like a reconstruction based on no definite information which satisfies all the limited available possibilities.

---

\(^1\)See ch. 6 (c), p. 244.
\(^2\)Polyb. 6.25.4.
\(^3\)V. Epit. II.23 p.58.14ff.: ...ut tempore hiemis de tegulis vel scindalis, quae si deessent, certe de cannis, uiva vel culmo et porticus tegerebatur ad equites et quaedam velut basilicae ad pedes, in quibus tempestate vel venis aëre turbis sub lecto armis erudiebatur exercitus. Ceteris autem eitiam hibernis diebus, si nives tantum pluviaeque cessarent, exerceri cogebanur in campo, ne intermissa consuetudo et animos militum debiliaret et corpora.
\(^4\)V. Epit. III.2: Itaque pedes sine intermissione imbribus vel nivibus sub lecto, reliquis diebus exerceri in campo voluerunt.
Hard information in I.19, Ad portandum pondus exercendos tirones, is exhausted in the first half of the first sentence,\textsuperscript{105} telling us that recruits should very frequently be made to route-march at the military step carrying up to 60 lb. weight. The rest of the sentence is perhaps V.'s interpretation, for parallels from Ammianus and the Historia Augusta suggest it is modern;\textsuperscript{106} and the rest of the chapter is an insipid statement of general principle and an apposite quotation from Vergil, Georgics 3.346–348, typical marks of V.'s editorship.\textsuperscript{107}

Important for an assessment of the whole work is the extent to which V.'s present-day concerns obtrude on and supplement the ancient material. This is shown to be very considerable by I.20, Quo armorum genere usi sint antiqui. For the genuine material is anticipated by a long tirade against the alleged lack of armour and training of the modern army, and when it does come it is as an exemplum introduced by way of a rhetorical question.\textsuperscript{108} The account of the ancient arms and equipment is of the principes, hastati and triarii, and is essentially a summary of very similar material to that given at much greater length by Polybius 6.22–23. V. sticks to the same material for the ordinatio of the ancient legion in II.15-17, and his recommendations for the modern at III.14 are heavily based on it too. 'Polybian' features are the single greave,\textsuperscript{109} the bina missibilia which did not bend on impact but rather had an especially strong joint between the steel head and wooden shaft so that they could not be broken off,\textsuperscript{110} and the catafractae, of which makes V. make such tendentious play, giving them even to the light-armed.\textsuperscript{111} But it is evident from Polybius that most hastati, principes and triarii actually wore the pectorale, the front-piece of a lorica, and few could afford a mailed cuirass.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{105}V. Epit. I.19: pondus quoque baiulare usque ad LX libras et iter facere gradu militari frequentissime cogendi sunt juniores...

\textsuperscript{106}quibus in arduis expeditionibus necessitas annnonam pariter et arma portandí. Cf. Amm. 17.9.2: ...ex annona decem dierum et septimam, quam in expeditionem persens vehebat cervicibus miles, portionem subtraxat. SHA Alex. Svev. 47.1: ...neque portarent cibaria decem et septimam, ut solent, diurni nisi in barbarico.

\textsuperscript{107}A. Andersson, Studia Vegetiana: commenatio academica (Upsala 1938) 21ff.

\textsuperscript{108}V. Epit. I.20 p.23.7: Unde enim apud antiquos murus dicebatur pedestris exercitus, nisi quod pilatae legiones praeter scuta etiam catafractis galeisque fulgebant?


\textsuperscript{110}V. Epit. II.15 p.49.8ff, cf. I.20 p.24.3ff: ...quod in scuto fixum non possit absidius; cf. Polyb. 6.23.8–11.

\textsuperscript{111}V. Epit. I.20 p.23.11, II.15 p.49.5, p.49.20 (light-armed); cf. Polyb. 6.23.15.

\textsuperscript{112}Polyb. 6.23.14–16: Οὐ μὲν οὖν πολλά προσλαβώμεν τινὰ μεταμόρφωσιν πάντων, δ’ προστίθεμεν μὲν πρὸ τῶν στρατιῶν, καλοῦσα καὶ καρδιοφύλακα, τελειαν ἔχουσα τὴν καθίσματιν: οἱ δ’ ἐν πρὸς τὰς μυρίας τιμώμενοι δραμάς ἀντὶ τοῦ καρδιοφύλακας σὺν τὰς ἄλλας...
V. goes on to describe the legionary light-armed or velites, calling them *levis armatura, funditores et ferentarii*, but although he gives their tactical rôle, he omits their arms.\(^{113}\) These are supplied at II.23,\(^{114}\) but more importantly V. probably had a description resembling that of Polybius in front of him while writing I.20, because he otherwise inexplicably launched into a comment on the alleged disappearance of the modern leather *pileus Pannonicus*.\(^{115}\) In the context this must be his equation with the leather cap of the velites.\(^{116}\)

Livy and Polybius indicate that the different infantry classes of the middle Roman Republic were organized by a mixture of age-range and property qualification, so that the youngest and poorest provided the velites, those next to them in age the hastati, those in their prime the principes, and the oldest the triarii.\(^{117}\) At I.20 V. carries this over implicitly; hence the *levis armatura* consisted of the ‘swiftest’ men; cf. I.15, where legionary archers were ‘a third of all iuniores’. At III.14 the light-armed Third, Fourth and Fifth lines comprise *armaturis velocissimis, sagittaribus iuvenibus, scutatis expeditissimis, sagittaribus iunioribus, accensos tanquam iuniores et postea additos*. Whereas the heavy First and Second lines contain the old and experienced: *exercitati et veteres milités, optimi milités*. The parallels seem persuasive. The age of V.’s material, and the similarities with Polybius and Livy, make it likely that it derives from a 2nd c. B.C. Latin source, which given the other evidence of V.’s sources can hardly be other than Cato de Re Militari.\(^{118}\)

The description in I.20, II.16 and III.14 of the *triarii* and their rôle in taking up the fighting after the *hastati* and *principes* had been worn down is in harmony with Livy’s

---

\(^{113}\) V. Epit. I.20 p.23.19ff.

\(^{114}\) V. Epit. II.15 p.49.16ff.

\(^{115}\) V. Epit. I.20 p.23.26: *Usque ad praesentem prope acetum consuetudo permansit, ut omnes milités pilleis, quos Pannonicos vocabant, ex pellibus usenatur; quod propriea servabatur, ne gravís galea videretur in proelio homini, qui gestat aliquid semper in capite*. The interpretation is probably V.’s irony. See ch. 5 (b) 1.


\(^{117}\) Polyb. 6.21.7. Livy 8.8.

\(^{118}\) So M. Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften* (Geschichte der Wissenschaften in Deutschland bd. XXII) 1 (1889). 54.
manipular array. Although the canonical order should be hastati, principes and triarii, V. consistently interprets the principes evidently on etymological grounds as the front line. The exchanging of the hastati and principes was part of standard procedure according to Livy 8.8.9-10, and may be found in use. But V. is careless of accurate detail; his triarii are armed identically to the principes and hastati, whereas in fact they carried the hasta, not the bina missibilia i.e., two pilae. Also the glib equations between ancient and modern types of soldier and weapons at I.20, II.15 and III.14 render easy but fallacious anachronistic interpretations as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin Word</th>
<th>Modern English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gladius</td>
<td>spatha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pugio</td>
<td>semispathium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pilum</td>
<td>spiculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vericulum</td>
<td>verutum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plumbata</td>
<td>mamicbarbulae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foricenteri</td>
<td>ecaudatores-and-armatiae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>funditores</td>
<td>fundibulatores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tragularii</td>
<td>manuballistarii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ballistarii</td>
<td>arcuballistarii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dizzy switching back and forth between 600 years ago and now shows that V. was primarily interested in finding comparisons with the present, which is exactly what he promised to do in I praef.: ut, quae sponte pro reipublicae salute disponis, agnoscas olim custodisse Romani imperii conditores... His were not the methods or the aims of an antiquary, even a Roman one, who would have been genuinely interested in ancient legionary arms and procedures per se. We can see from his sketchiness, inaccuracy and willingness to flannel, that

---

119 Livy 8.8.9-13 (340 B.C.): Ubi his ordinibus exercitus instructus esset, hastati omnium primi pugnam inibi. Si hastati profugare hostem non possent, pede presse eos retro cedentes in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant. Tum principum pugna erat; hastati sequabantur; triarii sub vexillis cons titebant, sinistro crure correcto, scuta intinx in humeris, hastas suberectas cuspide in terra fixas, haeque secus quam vallo saepa inhorret acies, tenentes. Si apud principes quoque haeque prospere esset pugna, um acie ad triarios se sistin referabant. Inde rem ad traiarios redisse, cum laboratur, proverbio inrebuut. Triarii consurgentes, ubi in intervalia ordinum suorum principes et hastatos receptissent, exemplo compressis ordinibus velut claudebant vias unque continenti agmine, iam nulla spe post relicta, in hostem incidebant; id erat formidolosissimum hostis, cum velut victors insecutum novam repente aciem exsurgentem, auctum numero, cernebant. Cf. V. Epit. I.20 p.23.14ff.: Sed triarii genibus postis solebant intra scuta subsidiere, ne stantes vulnerarentur venienibus tellis et, cum necessitas postulasset, tamquam requieti vehementius invaderent hostes, a quibus constat saepe factum esse victoriam, cum hastati illi et qui prior es sistis esto rrenti. Cf. II.16, III.14 fim.

120 Cf. Front. Strat. 2.3.16.
121 Livy 22.5.7, 40.27.6.
123 V. is the sole source for this weapon, whose name = 'small spit' has possibly primitive overtones. It occurs in Pliny HN 33.107, 35.149 in non-military contexts.
124 V. is the sole source for these specialists; cf. Livy 24.42.2: Cn. Scipionis femur tragula confixum erat (214 B.C.).
V. had incomplete information and actually was not primarily interested in what happened long ago.

Chapter 1.20 is followed by the inserted section on castrametation (1.21-25) mentioned above. Indeed, the whole of 1.21 is taken up with prefatory editorial comment. 1.26-27 round off the account of training with battle-manoeuvres in the barest possible outline, before an editorial epilogue in 1.28 closes book I, making the points that (1.) the Roman Empire still possessed the manpower resources to man the army; and (2.) that the science of arms, though forgotten, could be relearned by the Roman People, as happened in the Second Punic War. The exemplum serves to remind us that this is the period to which the bulk of the material actually relates. So behind the attempt to restate what military precepts the ‘founders of the Roman Empire’ (I praef.) observed is not only a crisis of confidence in the quality of the contemporary military but maybe also a more deep-seated distrust of the whole military system, such that it was felt that it could only be purged by getting back to origins and starting again, by mobilising and training Roman manpower. The nationalist overtones of this for Romans were unmistakeable against a background of widespread and increasing use of barbarians in all sections of the military.

That V. was not averse to repeating material at quite substantial length has already been noted, and is probably an indication that he was padding out relatively jejune sources, rather than judiciously selecting from a plethora of authors as he implies in his prologues and epilogues. In this case he may not have had complete texts of Celsus, Frontinus and Paternus before him, but epitomes on a smaller scale than that which he was himself producing. Alternatively, if he had been overwhelmed by good material, he might have satisfied his own contemporary political purposes by taking from the sources little more on some subjects, such as training, than a list of rubrics, upon which he could then more freely embroider with exempla and purple patches of rhetoric. But such nonchalance would seem surprising in a work written for an Emperor and polemical against recent military policy. Whichever was actually the case, he proclaims several times his devotion to his sources, and yet literary embellishment and
editorial comment and interpretation clearly distorted their gist as we have seen. What we can say is that this is an author who writes with apparent confidence in what is likely to have been a very sensitive area.

The chapters detailing the training of legionaries are not confined to book I.9–27. Summaries of largely the same material are provided also in II.23, *De exercitiatione militum*, and III.4, *Quemadmodum oportet providere, ne seditionem milites faciant*. Allusions to the same processes can be found also in III.9 and III.10, and I.4. It can be suggested that the material consistently contains archaic features that point towards Cato. Note in particular the presence throughout of legionary archers and slingers, which belong most naturally in the 3rd. and 2nd. c. B.C. Also the special drill called in the late Empire *armatura*, a subject of military connoisseurship for Emperors, may have been typical of the legion in that era. Livy shows that displays of similar-sounding manoeuvres and tactics were already commonplace in the Circus, as under the Empire, even if they were not called *armatura* at the time. V. believed at any rate that *armatura* was the basis of ancient legionary armed combat; whereas in the late Empire it was a specialised skill learned by few and considered by V. to be partly lost.

(e) Epit. I.21–25 (Castrametation).

The section on castrametation I.21–25, largely recapitulated in III.8, discusses a subject not mentioned in either of the two main summaries of legionary exercises at II.23, III.4. The date for the main composition of this section seems likely to be considerably later, since the precepts for the shape of the camp in both sections are far removed from both the rigid square shape of the Republican and the oblong early Imperial camp. Instead it might be square, triangular, semicircular or irregular (I.23), or irregular, square, circular, triangular or oblong (III.8). It is also possible that these shapes are supplied by V.'s editorship, for he goes on to give the 2:3 rectangular shape of the camp of the Principate but as being commended merely for

---

125Epit. I. praef., 1.8: *Nihil enim mihi auctoritatis adsimo sed horum, quos supra retuli, quae dispersa sunt, velut in ordinem epitomata conscribo, I.28: Haece fides ac devotionis intuitu... de universis auctoribus... conessi, etc.

126Livy 44.9.5–7 (69 B.C.), cf. V. Epit. II.23 p.57.5ff., and ch. 5 (b) 3 (iii.) above, p.176.


128Polyb. 6.42.1–5, remarking that formlessness was the main feature of Greek camps, because Greeks believed in the superior qualities of natural defences, and wished to avoid the labour of digging their own, in contrast to the Romans.
aesthetic reasons. He may be informed of contemporary military wisdom and flexibility which may lie behind his suggestion that the Romans take lessons in castrametation from the Gothic *carrago*, which was circular, and Persian camps built with sand-bags.

There is no obvious reason why these various shapes should not be compatible with the transmitted regulations for the size of the defences. In both sections there are three specifications given for the camp-fortifications, with various dimensions: according to I.24, (a.) turf rampart 3' high and a shallow fosse; (b.) rampart (presumably 3'-4' high) and fosse 9' wide by 7' deep (*tumultuaria fossa*); (c.) rampart 4' high and fosse 12' wide by 9' deep (*legitima fossa*); according to III.8, (a.) turf rampart (no height given) and a shallow fosse (omitted), (b.) rampart (no height given) and fosse 5' wide by 3' deep (*opere tumultuaria fossa*), (c.) rampart (no height given) and fosse 9' or 11' or 13' or 17' wide (no depth given) (*stativa castra*). The cavalier treatment of numbers does not militate against the two sections coming from the same source, as strongly suggested by the triple arrangement and compatible technical terms, but merely shows V.'s scant regard for such accuracy.

The specifications compare with Ps.-Hyginus de Mun. Castr. 49–50: (a.) fosse 5' wide by 3' deep (*loco securiori*), (b.) fosse (?) 8' wide by 6' deep (*loco suspectiori*). The system for dividing the four night-watches between four groups of four men from each century in V. seems on the face of it the same as in Ps.-Hyginus 1, and V.'s recommendations for the siting of the camp are closer still to Ps.-Hyginus 56–57. But there is no reason to suspect

---

*Footnotes:
129* Epit. III.8 p.82.21–23: nec utilissimae praebidicit forma, tamen pulcheriora creduntur quibus ultra latitudinis spatium tertia pars longitudinis additur. Cf. Ps.-Hyg. 21: castra, in quantum fieri posuerit, tertiaa esse debeat... Hoc dixi tertia, ut putus longum pedes TCCCC, latum pedes MDC.
130*Epit. III.10 p.92.7–18. See ch. 5 (b) 1, p. 161.
131* Cf. Ps.-Hyg.1: Ex quibus in vigilias singulis <quaternis> erat et non plus quam octoos papilionis singulae tendunt, and V. Epit. III.8 p.84.20–85.4: de singulis centuriae quaterni equites et quaterni pedes exculptum nocubis faciunt. Et quia impossibile videbatur in speculis vigilantes singulos permanere, idem in quattuor partes ad clepsydrum sunt divisae vigiliae, ut non amplius quam tribus horis nocturnis necessit sit vigilare. R. Grosse, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*. XXII (1913) 98, thought that V. meant that each vigilia was divided into four one-hourly shifts; rather each group will have been in *speculis* for one three-hourly shift a night, and sleeping somewhere nearby for the other three shifts. Cf. Onas. 10.10.
132* Cf. Ps.-Hyg. 56: porta praetoria semper hostem spectare debet, and V. Epit. 1.23 p.26.2–3: porta autem, quae appellatur praetoria, aut orientem spectare debet aut illum locum, qui ad hostes respicit... V. Christianizes the material, probably. Cf. Ps.-Hyg. 57: ceterum quomunque latere flumen sive fontem habere debentut in qualcumque positione castrorum, and V. Epit. 1.22 p.25.14ff.: castra... tuuo semper facienda sunt loco, ut lignorum et paludis et aquae suppetat copia. Ps.-Hyg. 57: ne mens castris innimeat, per quem superviae hostes aut prospecire possint quid in castris agatur; ne silva celatara hostes adiacat... ne vicini fluminis torrentis subita tempestate castra inunda sit inereant, and V. Epit. 1.22 p.25.17–20: cavendum etiam, ne mens sit vicinus...
direct use of Ps.-Hyginus by V. who mentions details not in Ps.-Hyginus such as the need to camp near supplies of \textit{pabulum} and \textit{lignum}, and the danger to health posed by marshes.

Above all there are no \textit{velites} in V.'s camp, yet they played an important and distinctive part in the guard routine for Polybius' camp,\textsuperscript{133} and there is no sign of the \textit{principes}, \textit{hastati} and \textit{triarii}, for which there were special arrangements in Polybius' camp, and which form the basis of V.'s \textit{legio antiqua}.\textsuperscript{134} There is no mention of the \textit{quaestor}, either, unlike in Polybius.\textsuperscript{135} As will be shown below, it seems likely that Polybius' account of the camp derived from Cato; V.'s account cannot however be connected with such an archaic source. Rather it resembles that of Josephus sans certain archaic features as we shall see, which may perhaps derive from Celsus. Since V. did not read Greek,\textsuperscript{136} the simplest alternatives are either that Frontinus compiled a section on castrametation from a later source such as Celsus or Josephus, or V. owed it to Paternus. More complex combinations of later epitomes subsuming other epitomes are obviously possible too. If the multiform camp is one of V.'s modernising interpolations, it is of a piece with the Christian eastern orientation (I.24) and late-Roman \textit{campidocores et principia} (III.8 p.83.17).

But the important point is the complete absence of archaic material which might be linked to Cato. In support of Paternus, perhaps, III.8 ends with a paragraph on protecting supply-lines by building \textit{castella} or block-houses at strategic points along roads.\textsuperscript{137} A system of frontier \textit{burgi}, the term being first attested under Trajan,\textsuperscript{138} was under construction on a massive scale during the decade of Paternus' fall from power as Praetorian Prefect.\textsuperscript{139} At IV.10

\begin{itemize}
\item aut \textit{\textless collis \textgreater} alius, qui \textit{\textless ab adversarii caput} possit officere. Considerandum, \textit{\textless ne} torrentibus inundari consuuerit \textit{\textless campus et hoc cau} \textit{\textless veni} \textit{\textless paliatur} exercitus; cf. Epit. III.8 p.82.13–19.
\item \textsuperscript{133}polyb. 6.35.5.
\item \textsuperscript{134}Epit. II.15–17; III.14; cf. Front. Strat. 2.3.16; Scipio adversus hanc formam robur legionis triplici acie in fronte ordinatum per hastatos et principes et triarios opposuit....ea ipsa intervalla expeditis velitibus inlevit...
\item \textsuperscript{135}polyb. 6.31.1, 3, 6.35.4.
\item \textsuperscript{136}see ch. 2 (b).
\item \textsuperscript{137}Epit. III.8 p.85.15ff.: \textit{Quod alius non potest evenire, nisi per loca idonea, qua nostrorum ambluat commenetus, praesidia dispositione, sive illae civitates sive sive castella marata...Intra quae in agraris aliquant pedes equitique degentes tamen hier commenetas praeant.}
\item \textsuperscript{139}O. Hirschfeld, 'Die Sicherheitspolizei im römischen Kaiserreich,' \textit{Kleine Schriften} (Berlin, 1913), 594, citing CIL. 8.2495: \textit{burgum [Commodianum] speculatorium inter duas vias ad salutem commenantium, in
V. equates the two: *castellum parvulum, quem burgum vocant.*, in a chapter on protecting water-supplies. But it is more probable that V. is responsible for inserting this material. Road networks were being fortified with *burgi* in precisely the second half of the 4th. c. A.D. in at least Britain, Spain, Belgium and Pannonia.\(^{140}\)

Josephus’ information on castrametation and camp discipline also shows some parallels. For instance, the Romans always build a camp, so they are never vulnerable to surprise attack;\(^{141}\) it is precisely such attacks that V. imputes to the alleged failure to build camps in his own day.\(^{142}\) The Roman army takes with it a multitude of artificers and builders for this purpose;\(^{143}\) V. lists such builders under the rubric *De officio fabrorum* (sic) in his description of the *legio antiqua.*\(^{144}\) Josephus’ camp ‘resembles a city’ with its towered wall and gates, symmetrical lay-out, market-place and seats of judgement, and artisans’ workshops;\(^{145}\) V. develops the idea for his ‘properly constituted legion’, which can create for itself a self-sufficient fortress-city as well as move around.\(^{146}\) Discipline in camp revolves around the same system of *munera,– lignatio, pabulatio, aquatio,–* performed for tribunes and other officers by ordinary rankers, in both Josephus’ and V.’s camps.\(^{147}\)

In two respects V. is less detailed than Josephus; he does not discuss the system of the *tessera* that controlled the watches and sentries, and omits the traditional method of striking camp.\(^{148}\) There is no good reason for these omissions. Obsolescence does not in general deter V., as we can see, and the evidence suggests anyway that the *tessera* still existed in the late-4th. c. A.D.\(^{149}\) It would appear, therefore, that V.’s source was even more concise than

---


\(^{141}\) Jos. BJ 3.76.

\(^{142}\) V. Epit. I.21, III.8, III.10 p.92.10ff.

\(^{143}\) Jos. BJ 3.78.

\(^{144}\) V. Epit. II.11.

\(^{145}\) Jos. BJ 3.79-84.

\(^{146}\) Epit. II.18, cf. II.25 fin.

\(^{147}\) Jos. BJ 3.85 ξύλεα το καὶ ἐπιστασιός... καὶ ὥρα, V. Epit. II.19, III.8 p.84.16–17, p.85.14–15.

\(^{148}\) Jos. BJ 3.87–92, Polyb. 6.34.7–12, 6.40.1–3.

\(^{149}\) See ch. 5 (g), p. 205.
Josephus' If Josephus' source was Celsus, then V. did not make direct use of Celsus, as we suspected already, still less did he consult Cato on castrametation. But the material may well have derived from Celsus summarised in Frontinus or Paternus, or rather we should say from an epitome of either or both.

Despite suggestive parallels Josephus' excursus probably did not derive in part or even mediatelv from Polybius' excursus on the Roman military system preserved in his Histories. For although, whilst omitting much archaic matter on the selection and raising of consular legionary armies, he also like Polybius transmitted the anachronistic square-shaped camp, the simile of a city, the three-signal method of striking camp, the savage discipline, the tessera, and descriptions of cavalry and infantry arms, where Polybius was brief, such as for the method of striking camp, Josephus is much fuller, and where Polybius dwelt at length, for instance on the savage punishments of decimation and fiastuarium, and on rewards for bravery, Josephus is brief. Josephus' descriptions of arms do not correspond to Polybius', his tessera was delivered at dawn whereas Polybius' was at dusk, his munera are different from those on which Polybius chooses to comment, his camp resounds to the trumpet whilst Polybius' uses the bucina, and his discussion of training finds no counterpart in Polybius. There is a vaguely similar order of subjects, but details are covered in different depths, or are actually at variance. Given the Roman subject, and the prescriptive nature of Polybius' text, it seems likely that his account went back to a Latin model which was more detailed still, and that Josephus' account ultimately derived from the same more detailed Latin model. Thus we may infer from V. that Josephus' immediate source was a presumably 1st. c. A.D. military handbook such as that by Celsus deriving ultimately in
part from Cato’s de Re Militari and that the latter was directly Polybius’ main source of information, written by his elder contemporary.

Elizabeth Rawson argued that Polybius’ excursus derived from commentarii of military tribunes, since it lays down the basics from their point of view. That would not be surprising of Cato as they were still the most senior officers of the legion after the commander-in-chief (the consul), who would naturally not be concerned with such hum-drum duties. Her suggestion (p.18) that because Cato—Vegetius diverges on the order principes—hastati—triarii from Polybius’ hastati—principes—triarii Polybius did not get his account from Cato, is without weight, given V.’s method of working and the fact that he did not have Cato’s original words before him. Her view (p.22) that, because Cato fr. 15 = Front. Strat. 4.1.16 indicates that thieves had their right hand cut off whereas Polybius says they suffered fustuarium, Polybius was not using Cato, places too much stress, as she admits, on a minor detail. There is however some consensus that Polybius’ source dated from before his own day (p.13, p.22), but as Rawson observes it must postdate the introduction of the military oath in 216 B.C. (Livy 22.38, cf. Front. Strat. 4.1.4). Cato was a generation older than Polybius.

In fact a passage of Polybius’ excursus can be compared more closely to a fragment of Cato’s de Re Militari, because his technical term procubitores was sufficiently obscure to be collected by the Augustan scholar Verrius Flaccus, and thereby preserved by his epitomator Festus. Thus procubitores dicuntur fere velies, qui noco custodiæ causa ante castra excubant, cum castra hostium in propinquo sunt, ut M. Cato in eo, quem de re militari scriptis. Polybius also tells us that the γρωσφωμάχοι or velies guarded the outside of the camp perimeter: τὸν δ’ ἐκτὸς ὑπάφανεν ὁ γρωσφωμάχος πληρόθηκε, παρ’ ὅλον καθ’ ἡμέραν τῶν χάρακα παρακυτῶντες — ἀβτὴ γάρ ἐπιτετακται τούτοις ἡ λειτουργία — ἐπ’ <τε> τῶν εἱόθων ἀν’ δέκα ποκοῦται τούτων αὐτῶν τὰς προκοπὰς. This was a night-watch duty; καθ’ ἡμέραν means ‘day by day’. Προκοπία, which is not attested for any earlier author, may even reflect a Latin technical term *procubitus vel sim.

161Festus 298 L. (253 M.) = Jordan p.81, Cato de Re Mil. fr. 8.  
162Polyb. 6.35.5, cf. 6.36.2.  
163Polyb. 6.35.1.
The conclusion is therefore that Epit. I.21–25 did not originally form part of the training programme sketched out in I.9–27, but was a block of later material inserted by the editorship of V. To confirm it, J.W. Foerster pointed out the joins. I.21–25 ought to be about what a tiro could do in camp-building, hence *debet tiro condiscere* (I.21 ini.t.). But the contents are pertinent only to the Emperor, to *duces*, and *metatores*. V. closes in the belief that he has given what the *tiro* needs: *ad hunc ergo usum instituendus est tiro* (I.25 fin.).\(^{164}\) The explanation is to be sought partly in V.’s style of operation and partly in the ephemeral nature of book I, written to satisfy an immediate political need. V. originally did not intend to write any more than this booklet on recruitment and training, the issues on which his greatest indignation was vented, but could not resist throwing in ammunition on castrametation, about which he felt scarcely less strongly, as can be seen from III.10 p.92.7ff., where it is almost completely irrelevant.

(f) Epit. II, the military Rule-book and Paternus.

In I.27 V. cited the *constitutiones* of Augustus and of Hadrian in support of the ‘ancient custom’ that cavalry and infantry should be drilled in *ambulatio* thrice a month. His words suggest that the drill was so organized also before the imperial intervention, and that the Emperors Augustus and Hadrian codified previous practice. But the codification was much more extensive than V. seems to appreciate; for it is argued that Augustus issued a collection of army regulations covering such things as discipline, training and conditions of service, and perhaps all subjects that an officer of the time needed to know.\(^{165}\) Hadrian appears to have revised and reissued the rule-book, for it was his regulations that were still apparently in force under Severus Alexander.\(^{166}\) There is no unambiguous evidence independent of V. (I.8) that

---


\(^{165}\) Cf. A. Neumann, ‘Das Augusteisch-Hadrianische Armee-Reglement und Vegetius’, *Classical Philology* XXXI (1936) 1, 4–5, id., ‘Das römische Heeresreglement’, *Classical Philology* XL1 (1946) 217, 221; citing Dig. 49.16.12 (Macer I. pr. de Re Mil.): *Officium regentis exercitum non tantum in danda sed etiam in observanda disciplina constitit. Paternus quoque scripsit, debere eum, qui se meminerit armato praesesse, parcessime comnmematum dare, equam militarem extra provinciam duci non permittiere, ad opus privatum piscatum veniam militem non miitere, nam in disciplina Augusti tia caverur*: ‘Etsi scio fabrilibus operibus exercer milites non esse alienum, vereor tamen, si quidquam permisero, quod in usum meum aut tuum fiat, ne modus in ea re non adhibeatur, qui mihi sit tolerantias.’

Trajan issued army regulations, but naturally all Emperors will have done so in their function as commander-in-chief,\(^{167}\) and Hadrian probably alluded to him rather than Augustus in his speech at Lambaesis.\(^{168}\) But there is a difference between issuing ad hoc regulations and codification, and only Augustus and Hadrian are generally believed to have carried out the latter.\(^{169}\)

Contrary to the view of Alfred Neumann and others that V. used directly or indirectly the rule-book of Hadrian, subsuming within it that of Augustus, itself a compilation based on Republican rule-books conjecturally going back to P. Rutilius Rufus, Scipio Africanus Minor and Cato de Re Militari,\(^{170}\) V. only seems aware of ad hoc military regulations of Augustus and Hadrian and, despite the source-notice in I.8 mentioning Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian's *constitutiones*, only once makes detectable use of them in a reference in I.27, where he omits the name of Trajan presumably from carelessness. Nor is there much further scope in book I, to which this source-notice relates, for use of such regulations, unless as seems unlikely they maintained obsolete precepts for training legionary archers, slingers, *ferentarii* and *velites*.

Like Schanz and Grosse, Schenk felt that the *constitutiones* were available to V. only insofar as they were cited by Taruttienus Paternus.\(^{171}\) That may be so, but the important point is the very limited use of such material in book I and apparent non-use of it in books II–IV. Little can be conjectured about the contents of Paternus’ possibly juristic work, but surviving fragments show that he covered in some detail in four books\(^{172}\) both antiquities of the Roman army in the age of (e.g.) Romulus and current regulations of the 2nd. c. A.D., supported by

\(^{167}\) Cf. Pliny Ep. 10.29.1: *conditorem disciplinæ militaris firmatoremque*.


\(^{169}\) A.A. Schiller, in Festgabe für Ulrich von Lübnow (Berlin, 1970) 295–306, doubts even that Augustus or Hadrian codified or published army regulations, pointing out that the legal evidence of such *constitutiones* consists of nothing but a few rescripts or edicts issued in response to specific problems or queries.


\(^{171}\) D. Schenk, ‘Flavius Vegetius Renatus: Die Quellen der *Epitoma rei militaris*, *Klio*, Beiheft XXII (N.F. Heft IX) (Leipzig, 1930), 12ff. See also section (a) init. above, p.253 n.3.

\(^{172}\) Dig. index Florentianus.
quotations from the *disciplina Augusti*. Schenk, drawing attention to the alleged similarity, only superficial in fact, between Dig. 49.16.12 §1 (cited above) and V. Epit. II.19 p.53.13–p.54.2 (see below), and V.’s announcement at II.4 that he would proceed to explain the *ordinatio* of the ancient legion *secundum normam militaris iuris*—‘according to the norm of military regulations’—, thought that V.’s book II, not book I, was based on Paternus; for in I.8 V. called Paternus a *diligentissimus iuris militaris adsertor*—‘most diligent champion of military regulations’. Furthermore, his belief that there was no later source for Epit. II than Paternus led him to revive the 19th. c. notion of major reforms to army organization by Hadrian, earlier refuted by J. Plew, and without support from the abundant epigraphical evidence of the later 2nd.–3rd. c. A.D. Most scholars with good reason had already dated the *legio antiqua* of book II to the late-3rd.–early 4th. c. A.D., the period when we know least about legionary organization.

However, apart from not overlooking the fact that Paternus is not named as a source for book II in the source-notice II.3 (although he is likely to be included in *alii conplures*), one should not simply assume that V. always meant the Imperial rule-book or particular ad hoc *constitutiones* by *ius militare*. Not only does V. use *lex* and *ius* in the wider sense of ‘rules and traditions of warfare’, but Isidore of Seville defined *ius militare* in some detail as rules of the conduct of war in the widest sense, including both international relations, army discipline in the field, and the differentiation of pay, rank and rewards. Thus although he may have been praising Paternus for his diligent citation of Augustus’ regulations in I.8, there is no necessity to take it that V. promised to explain the *ordinatio* of the ancient legion in accordance with official regulations in II.4, certainly not those of Augustus and Hadrian, at least.

173Cf. Ioannes Lydus de mag. 1.9 (Romulus), Dig. 50.6.7 (long list of modern *immunes*), Dig. 49.16.7 (precept on capital punishment of *proditores* and *transfugae*), Dig. 49.16.12 §1 (precept forbidding use of soldiers for private services, quoting from the *disciplina Augusti*, cited above).

174Schenk, 23ff.

175J. Plew, *Quellenuntersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Hadrian* (Strasbourg 1890), 64ff.


177V. Epit. I.1: *ius, ut ita dixerim, armorum*; ibid. III.14: *instrucrionis lex*; ibid. III.26: *Regulae bellorum generales*. Cf. Isid. Eryn. 5.7.1–2: *Quid sit ius militare, ius militare est bellii inferendi sollemnitas, foederis faciendi nexus, signo dato egressio in hostem vel comitio. Item signo dato receptio; item flagiii militaris disciplina, si locus deseratur; item stipendiorum modus, dignitatum gradus, praemiorum honor, veluti cum corona vel torques donanur. Item praedae decisio, et [pro] personarum qualitatis et labori iusta divisio; item principis portio.*
Assuming that II.4-22 sets out the *ordinatio* meant in II.4,\textsuperscript{178} it seems logical to link the military regulations there mentioned with the phrase *secundum praesentes matriculas*—"according to present-day rolls"—in accordance with which V. promised to list the 'officers of the legion' in II.7ff., the more so as the section opens (II.5) immediately with an account of the *sacramentum* or oath which is couched entirely in 4th. c. A.D. Christian terms. II.6 then follows as a kind of blueprint for the numerical composition of the legion: *decem cohortes esse debere*... *cohors habet pedites DLV, equites LXVI... legio plenatur, quae habet pedites sex militia centum, equites DCCXX<VI>*. Although it is called the *antiqua ordinatio legionis* in II.7, the blueprint in II.6 is not written out in the past tense. That is because it is in all probability a modern reconstruction (see below). There then follows a combined (and confusing) list of late-Roman principia and possibly earlier principales in II.7\textsuperscript{179} as a kind of entrée to a (very uneven) comparative account of the other main ancient legionary officers II.8-14, followed by a comparative account of the ancient battle-order II.15-18 (emphasized by an epilogue appealing directly to the Emperor), followed finally by a comparative summary of the bureaucratic arrangements of the ancient legion II.19-21, to which is appended a note on the military musicians II.22. The comparative method is effected by frequent glib equations between ancient and modern officers, units and specialists. So when V. promised to set out the *ordinatio* of the ancient legion "according to the norm of military regulations", he meant the modern military organization. This was of course an impossible task. He knew too little about ancient military conditions and, as we can see even from our remote vantage-point, the details were always going to be incompatible; hence his 'difficulty'.

There is little to be said for Sander's view that V. was a simple copyist who transcribed from his sources such expressions as *nunc* and *hodie*, with the result that it must have been

\textsuperscript{178}V. Epit. II.23 opens with the words *legionis ordinacione digesta*: V.Epit. II.7 opens with *antiqua ordinacione legionis exposita*, but this would be too soon after the exordium in II.4 to be a final comment, and would exclude the lengthy section on the officers of the ancient legion which follows. Rather it points to the extraneous nature of II.7 itself as a modern list inserted for comparative purposes.

\textsuperscript{179}One of V.'s regrettable and frequent equations. It is argued in ch. 5 (g) that V. perhaps also drew part of the list from 2nd.-3rd. c. A.D. sources, and was not notably insincere in his endeavour; cf. the imperfect tense towards the end (p.42.3-7).
Paternus who combined the *antiqua ordinatio* with the legion of his own day.\(^{180}\) The intervention and personality of V. are demonstrable right across the whole work, and many of the contemporary references can be confirmed as pointing to the 4th. c. A.D. (see ch. 5–6).

Neither is the quality of the ancient material on the *legio antiqua* consistent with sustained Paternian authorship. For one thing it is far too exiguous, and it is too composite for another. Only II.15–17 refer to the order of battle of the legion in the age of Cato. II.23, as it emerges from our comparison with I.9–20, 26–27, also summarises in all probability the training of the Catonian legion. II.2 p.36.7–14 also contains a note of the archaic organization and II.14 describes legionary cavalry *decuriones* who belong in the 3rd.–2nd. c. B.C.\(^{181}\) That apart, V. describes another legion which belongs to a totally different era, even a 4th. c. A.D. reconstruction of a hypothetical Catonian legion. For this second legion can be broken down to a hypothetical 2nd.–3rd. c. A.D. list of ‘parts of the legion’; the rest can be suggested with various degrees of probability to be a mixture of good and indifferent guesswork, most likely, since the period of the conjectures and that of the compiler coincide, by V. himself.

What then does this second legion consist of? Certainly a note of ten cohorts including perhaps the fact that the first was a double cohort and had a special status in keeping the eagle and *imagines* (II.6).\(^{182}\) Then a list of officers, generally without details. The list did not, one might think, analyse the commands of different centurions (II.8) as V. has systematically done into five centuries per cohort (and ten for the First cohort), which seems certainly wrong for all periods before our information ceases c. A.D. 250.\(^{183}\) It did, however, mention their titles.\(^{184}\) V. would appear to have adapted them to fit his scheme, an amalgam of Cato’s battle-order and late-Roman units based on decimal divisions, because he revives the archaic title *triarius* without eliminating the *primus pilus*, when the *triarii* should be identical with the *pilani*.\(^{185}\)

---


\(^{181}\)See ch. 5 (e) 2, p. 191.

\(^{182}\)Cf. Ps.-Hyginus de Mun. Castr. 3: *Cohors prima causa signorum et aquilae intra <viam> sagulariam et, quoniam duplum numerum habet, duplum pedaturam accipiet*...

\(^{183}\)E. Sander, *Klio* XXXII (1939) 385.

\(^{184}\)As the rubric suggests: *Nomina eorum, qui antiquos ordines ducabant.*

\(^{185}\)Varro de ling. lat. 5.89: *Hastati dixi qui primi hastis pugnabant, pilani qui pilis, principes qui a principio gladiis; ea post commutata re miliari minus illustria sunt. Pilani triarii quoque dixi, quod in acie tertio ordine*
Also the list correctly presented the princeps prior (V. calls him primus princeps and princeps primae cohortis) before the hastatus prior (V. calls him primus hastatus), corresponding to the acknowledged promotion of the primus pilus from the princeps prior, and the special administrative responsibilities of the princeps which are also mentioned by V.'s source, but V. has switched them around to conform to his mistaken belief that the hastatus prior was the commander of the Second line and was therefore second only to the primus pilus.

The list also mentioned the legatus legionis (II.9), praefectus legionis (ibid.), praefectus castrorum (II.10), praefectus fabrum (II.11), tribunus militum (II.12), but perhaps the minimal information on commands of the centurio and decurio derived from Cato (II.13–14), as legionary decurions did not exist under the Empire. V. himself, by one of his equations, suggests a parallel between the ancient century and the modern cohort, so that the identification of the vexillum with a century-standard to match the draco for the modern cohort is suspect. Similarly the writing on the vexillum indicating the number of the 'cohort or century' appears merely inspired by the writing on the front of the shield of each soldier’s name and 'cohort or century', which is mentioned in the next breath after the equation of ancient shield painting with contemporary painted 'digmata' or shield-designs. Thus an ancient method of avoiding the loss of shields is perhaps adapted by V. to his reconstructed and probably illusory century-vexillum.

V. assumed that all officers existed simultaneously in the same unit, apart from the legatus whom he could hive off as a provincial governor (II.9). So he attempted to divide duties of general command over similar departments of the army's activities between the extremi subsidio deponebantur; quod hi subsidebant ab eo subsidium dictum... The nature of the so far unique optio triarius of the Tetrarchic period is obscure in an inscription published by T. Drew-Bear, 'Les voyages d’Aurelius Gaius, soldat de Diocletian', La géographie administrative et politique d’Alexandre d’Ahmed. Actes de Colloque de Strasbourg 14–16 juin 1979 (1982) 97, 108–109.

186Ep. II.8: ut ex primo princeps legionis promoveretur centurio primi pili... (princeps) ad quem in legiones prope omnia, quae ordinanda sunt, pertinens, cf. ibid. II.12: Reliquae cohortes, prout principi placueret, a tribunis vel a praepositis regendarunt.

187See ch. 5 (f), p. 192.

188See ch. 5 (q), p. 200.

189V. Epit. II.13. The identification of century and cohort seems to give the game away.

190V. Epit. II.18: Praeterea in adverso scuto uniusculisque militis literis erat nomen adscriptum, addio et ex qua esset cohors et quae centuria.
praefectus legionis and praefectus castrorum when their very nature makes them seem hardly divisible, and to attribute duties to the latter which belonged to other officers. Thus the former was in charge of discipline and training, but the latter was chosen after lengthy service to teach the rest what he had done so meritoriously, and the former was in charge of arms, horses, uniforms and pay and rations (annona), whereas the latter was in charge of choosing the camp-site and designing its defences, of making payments (expensae, not necessarily distinct from the annona), of doctors and the sick, of vehicles, pack-animals, and tools, buildings and siege-engines and artillery. The job of training is also given to the tribunus militum in the same terms as to the praefectus legionis, and also again to the centurio. Elsewhere it is given to the dux, as is the enforcement of discipline. Chief responsibility for the care of the sick is here given to the praefectus castrorum; elsewhere it is given to the comes, qui maiorem sustinet potestatem, i.e., praefectus legionis. Decisions about the site and design of the camp and its rampart, and the soldiers’ quarters, here taken by the praefectus castrorum, are otherwise the responsibility of metatores and mensores, so that one suspects an interpretatio etymologica on V.’s part, especially as this was his first idea for the praefectus castrorum. Similarly the duties of the praefectus fabrum (V. prefers the unusual form fabrorum) are at variance with our knowledge that he was an aide-de-camp, but suit the etymology of the title. V.’s late-4th. c. exemplum of the Bessi, miners from Thrace, to illustrate the use of cunicularii, placed under the praefectus fabrum, is certainly his own contribution, and so far as it is known the Roman army always used ordinary soldiers, not specialist miners, in sapping operations.

\[191\] V. Epit. II.9: Ipse autem iustus diligens sobrius legionem sibi creditant ad disibus operibus ad omnes devotionem, ad omnes formitatem industriam, quiens ad praefecti laudem subiectorum redun dare virtutem. Cf. II.12: Tribunus autem sollicitudo, tribunus laudatus industry, cum miles vestis nitida, armis bene munus ac fulgens, exercitii usus et disciplina eruditis incedit.

\[192\] V. Epit. II.14: ...vigilans sobrius agilis, magis ad facienda quae ei imperantur quam ad loquendum paratus, consubernales suos ad disciplinam retineat, ad armis eurcitium cogat, ut bene vestiti et calcari sint, ut arma omnium defricentur ac splendent.

\[193\] V. Epit. III.9 p.88.15ff. (cf. dux itaque vigilans sobrius prudent. p.89.9), III.10 p.90.12ff.

\[194\] V. Epit. III.2: Iam vero ut hoc causa aegri consubernales oporaturs cibis reficiantur ac medicorum arte curantur, principiorum tribunorumque et ipius comitis, qui maiorem sustinet potestatem, lugis quereriu diligentia. Cf. II.9: Proprius autem iudex erat praefectus legionis, habens committitae primi ordinis dignitatem...

\[195\] V. Epit. II.7: Metaores qui praecedentes locum eligiit castris... Mensores qui in castris ad podisum demetituvit loco, in quibus tentoria milites fiant, vel hospita in civitatis praestant.

\[196\] See ch. 5 (g).


\[198\] Cf. Amm. 24.4.21: legionarios milites, quibus cunicularum erant fodinae mandatoe.
The list of ‘parts of the legion’ seems to have included a catalogue of the legion’s equipment. At any rate a stylistic similarity has been observed between II.11 and II.25—

(II.11) habet praeterea legio fabros tignarios structores carpentarios ferrarios, pictores reliquosque artifices... habeant etiam fabricas scutarias loricarias arcuarias..., and (II.25) habet ferreos harpagonas... habet quoque dolabras... habet praeterea artifices,—which appear to suggest prima facie at least such an origin.\textsuperscript{199} The same phraseology also links II.22 to the same milieu: habet praeterea legio tubicines cornicines bucinatores... It is unclear precisely what credence should be given to V.’s unsupported interpretation of the musical signals, but the special use of the \textit{bucina} for the \textit{classicum}, in view of the long association of the \textit{bucina} with night-watch and guard-duties, seems improbable.\textsuperscript{200} The information that there was one \textit{carroballista} allotted to each century and one onager per cohort\textsuperscript{201} yields a total of 55 catapults and 10 stone-throwers per \textit{legio antiqua}, an order of magnitude which seems confirmed by Josephus’ figure of 60 field-pieces of the rather different artillery in use in A.D. 67.\textsuperscript{202} However, V.’s figures are entirely schematic, being based on his unconfirmed and highly suspect figures (II.6, II.8) of five centuries per cohort, apart from ten in the First cohort, so that the only solid conclusion seems to be that of one piece per century. The gun-crew consisting of the 11-man \textit{contubernium} (II.25) is also schematic, being the Vegetian 10-man \textit{contubernium} plus \textit{decanus} presented as the one-tenth unit of the century of the \textit{legio antiqua} (II.6, II.8, II.13); both the unit and the officer are not attested before the late-4th. c. A.D.\textsuperscript{203}

II.19–20 may have originally consisted of no more than a valuable note on the \textit{signiferi}, mentioning that they had to be literate because they kept soldier’s savings deposited \textit{apud signa}, apparently by law half their pay, if the proportion is not V.’s invention, and a burial fund to


\textsuperscript{200}Cf. J. Marquardt, \textit{Römische Staatsverwaltung} (1885) 421. See ch. 6 (a) 5. But cf. Ps.-Hyg. de Mun. Castr. 21: \textit{si longiora fuerint (castra), classica dicentur nec bucinum in tumultu ad portum decimanoem facile posuerit excubaturi}. Note also that V. wrongly calls the night-watch \textit{excubitus} (Epit. III.8 p.84.21, cf. 85.8: \textit{excubitus}); cf. Isid. Eym. 9.3.42: \textit{excubiae autem diurnae sunt vigiliae nocturnae}, and R.W. Davies, \textit{Aegyptus} III (1973) 88. But at Epit. III.8 p.85.2 V. refers correctly to the \textit{vigilae}.

\textsuperscript{201}Epit. II.25.


\textsuperscript{203}See ch. 5 (g), p. 205ff.
which the whole legion contributed premia. On this base V. cleverly constructed a mini-
excursus on the legionary bureaucracy, citing examples from his own world, the civil
service, and denouncing abuses, familiar to himself, of the right of officers to grant leave of
absence and the misemployment of subordinates for carrying on private rackets, both of which
were of course equally rife in the late-4th. c. A.D. army and civil service. But V.'s
‘solution’, based on a note from the Catonian source that accensi were used for menial services
in the ancient legion, to employ accensi not milites instituti—‘established soldiers’—for
obsequia, probably shows because he saw these accensi as equivalent to modern
supernumerarii that his imagination, though fruitful, was inspired by the civil service; for
supernumerarii was the term for unpaid civil servants waiting for a position among the statuti
or established bureaucrats. Adcrescentes would have been the contemporary military
equivalent, had V. been inclined to think in such terms. So Schenk’s alleged parallel
between Dig. 49.16.12 § 1 (cited above) and V. Epit. II.19 p.53.13–p.54.2 is illusory.

So too the information (Epit. II 19 p.53.1–6) that some scholae required litterati milites
is probably V.’s own reconstruction based on his experience of the great civil service.

---

204 G.R. Watson, The Roman Soldier (1969) 104ff., R.O. Fink, Roman Military Records on Papyrus


206 A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (1964) 648–49, citing CTh 7.1.12 (384), 15 (396), 16 & 17
(398) for the army, and ib. 604–05, citing CTh 7.12.2 (379), 6.27.15 (412), Symm. Ep. 4.43, 9.59 for the civil
service.

207 Cf. accensi in the Catonian battle-order at V. Epit. III.14 p.99.4–6, and the Servian 'constitution', Livy
L.3.14, and Livy 8.8.10, Festus 13 L. s.v. adscriptii, ibid. 216 L.: Optio qui nunc dicitur, aente appellabantur
accensis. Is ait aitur dariar centurioni a tribuno millium,..., ibid. 506 L.: s.v. velati, ...Cato eos ferentarios
dixit, qui tela ac potiones militibus proeliantibus ministrabant, Varro de ling. lat. 7.58: Accensos ministratores
cato esse scribit (Jordan p.81, de Re Mil. fr. 8).

208 Cf. A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire I (1964) 571, 585, 598, citing CTh 6.32.1 (416), 2 (422),
6.30 .7 (382), 11 (386), 13 (395), 15 (399), 16 (399), 17 (399).

209 CTh. 7.13.6 (370), 7 (375). Supernumerarius of course was earlier a military term especially of the 3rd.
c. A.D., used in contradistinction to ordinarius, meaning not attached and attached to a unit, respectively, and
applied to officers, esp. centurions, rather than common soldiers; cf. J.R. Rea, 'Ordinatus', ZPE XXXVIII
At Epit. III.17–20 V. uses a number of expressions for reserves—superflui, reservati, supernumerari— which
are not used in any technical sense; cf. illos, quos post aciem supernumerarios diximus debere ponit (III.20
p.108.2).

210 D. Schenk, 'Flavius Vegetius Renatus: Die Quellen der Epitoma rei militaris', Klio, Beihf. XXII (N.F.
Heft IX) (Leipzig, 1930), 23ff. Cf. H. Bruncke, Quaestiones Vegetianae, Diss. Inaug. Leipzig (Helmstadt,
1875) 12.
departments with their streams of officiales illitterati and litterati or Augustales. In fact, the primiscrinus cited as an exemplum for the career of the primi pili centurio (Epit. II.21) was the top rank of the illitterati stream within the praetorian prefecture, whereas the cornicularius was head of the officiales litterati or Augustales, and both retired together each year. The cornicularius was eventually chosen, like the princeps, from outside the department, but the primiscrinus both before and after enjoyed the final rank in a laborious chain of promotion within the department, as also in the offices of the prefect of the City and the vicar of Rome.

It is unclear to what extent these arrangements were reflected in the 4th. c. military bureaucracies also, but the existence of primicerii, Augustales and adiutores in military units suggests some possible contemporary connexions. There is a possibility therefore that V. wrote from knowledge of these. Either way, much of the material is contemporary.

But the information (II.21) is minimally sound for the Principate that legionary cavalry were associated in some way with the infantry 'cohorts' (for which interpret 'centuries', for there is mention of contubernii adfectio, 'the comradeship of the contubernium'). We may take it that the figures for the antiqua ordinatio are entirely schematic which in II.6 consistently attribute 66 cavalry or two turmae to cohorts II–X, doubling this for the First cohort, and do not reflect any historical reality. But epigraphical evidence from the 1st. to 3rd. c. A.D. shows that legionary cavalry as they were promoted remained on the books of the century. For the rest, the promotion of centurions through different cohorts is explained by V. as mirroring that of bureaucrats in the 4th. c. Praetorian Prefect's officium. This is undoubtedly valueless as an exemplum for the legio antiqua, but instructive for V.'s civilian horizons and confident way with the material, and perhaps points towards knowledge that contemporary military centurions were bureaucrats, too. It emerges, therefore, that most of II.19–21 is probably V.'s original composition, and what is not is exiguous enough to have come from the hypothetical 'parts of
the legion', or at any rate, such material is likely to have come from a tactical work on a smaller scale than that planned by V.

Finally chapters II.1–2 are also a list of definitions of 'parts of the military' presented with a few comments as continuous prose. Such an introduction is however in the tradition of the briefer tactici. V.'s information is partly transmitted also by Varro, who may or may not be responsible for the etymologies in question. Isidore seems to have read a source similar to but not identical with that of Epit. II.2 init. Parts of II.1 however also seem to point to Cato. The statement that auxilia were sent by the socii vel foederatae gentes relates to pre-Social War conditions, for in that war socii disappear. The assertion that Roman manpower 'mainly predominated' in the legions is also early, since it must be an allusion to legions of Latins and socii, who were not Roman citizens. It has been thought that the statement that a 'far greater' number of soldiers was customarily enrolled in the legions than in the auxilia is also early, as under the Empire the numbers equalised. But the context of this last case makes it likely to refer to the old differential in size between legions and auxiliary units, which was maintained under the Principate too. The rubric to Epit. II.2 should probably be moved down by three sentences, so that it is picked up by the opening words: Quid autem inter...

Far from considering it based on any extended narrative by P. Taruttienus Paternus or on imperial Army Regulations, therefore, I conclude that the legio antiqua, like the whole of book II, is an amalgam of two basic sets of material, on the one hand the Catonian legionary battle-order (II.15–17, cf. II.2) and exercise-list (II.23), and on the other an ingeniously but

---

218 Cf. V. Epit. II.1: Exercitus ex re ipsa atque opere exercitii nomen accepit, ut ei numquam liceret oblivisci quod vocabatur... Legio autem ab eligendo appellata est, and Varro de ling. lat. 5.87: Exercitus, quod exerciendo fit melior. Legio, quod legiuntur militis in selectu, cf. ib. 6.66: Indem ab legendo legio et diligentis et dilectis.
220 J. Kromayer, G. Veith, Heerwesen (Munich, 1928), 382.
221 E.g., Livy 37.39.7.
222 J. Kromayer, G. Veith, 311ff.
223 Ibid., 484.
224 Epit. II.2 p.35: Quid inter legiones et auxilia intersit (rubric).
unreliably amplified list of 'parts of the legion' which on account of the presence of the terms praefectus legionis, praefectus castrorum and praefectus fabrum will be of imperial date, between the late-1st. and 3rd. c. A.D. It is impossible to say whether the 'parts of the legion' section was transmitted by Paternus or Frontinus, although it will be too late for Cornelius Celsus (fl. under Tiberius).

But the surviving fragment of Paternus listing legionary immunes is so full and detailed that it is hard to imagine that V.'s sporadic and meagre hard information on the legion could have been supplied by this author. The suspicion must be that V.'s real information was too jejune to be based on the original works by Frontinus or Paternus. We know from the Digest that 3rd. c. A.D. legal epitomes de Re Militari were compiled by the jurists Aemilius Macer and Arrius Menander; we owe to them most of our fragments of Paternus, whose work was probably of a similar legal nature. It may well be that epitomes of these or similar were the actual sources used by V., and it is possible (though not the interpretation preferred here) that it was the juristic epitomes to which secundam normam militaris iuris (II.4) referred. That it was not the originals that V. actually used is again suggested by the absence of reliable detail in V. For a fragment of Aem. Macer book I de Re Militari gives us considerably more information on the duties of tribunes, for example, than we learn from Epit. II.12, De officio tribuni militum.

(g) Epit. III and Cato.

There is not space in this study for a full and closely detailed analysis of Epit. III–IV, alleged by Schenk to be mainly from Frontinus, although it is agreed that this cannot be established beyond a certain probability. But another possible parallel to V. Epit. III.6, in

225 Dig. 49.16.12 = Macer I. pr. de Re Mil. quoted in section (f) init. n.165 above.
226 RE IVA (1932) s.v. Taruntius Paternus, col. 2405–2407 (Berger), seeing P. as jurist.
228 Dig. 50. 6. 7 (Aem. Macer de Re Mil. I): Officium tribunorum est vel eorum, qui exercitui praesunt, millies in castris continere, ad exercitationem producere, claves portarum suscipere, vigilias interdum circumire, frumentationibus commilitonum interesse, frumentum probare, mensorum fraudem coercere, delicta secundum suae auctoris modum castigare, principis frequentier interesse, querellas commilitonum audire, valetudinarios inspicer.
addition to those offered by Schenk from Frontinus Strategemata, is Josephus’ description of Vespasian’s order of march which he adopted ‘in the customary Roman order’ as he invaded Galilee. It reads like a detailed theoretical prescription, and should reflect a good Roman source, perhaps Celsus again, later subsumed we suppose by Frontinus. It is far more detailed than V. at any rate, but includes a light-armed scouting party sent ahead to detect ambushes, like V.’s exploratores, a detachment composed of ten men from each century for the purpose of marking out a camp ahead of the army, like V.’s metatores and mensores, and a detachment of pioneers to build a road where necessary for the army to traverse forests and broken country, as V. recommends the army to do for security in preference to the easiest route. Josephus’ marching column was kept in time by a centurion ‘according to custom’: this function is also represented by V.’s substituted campidoctores vicarii vel tribuni. Epit. III.8 on castrametation, as has been said already, is of a piece with I.21–25, and may, because remarks resemble the age of Ps.-Hyginus and later, derive from Paternus or Frontinus.

There are a number of signs of Cato’s work in Epit. I–II, as we have seen. But the most certain example is in book III, namely those tactical chapters dealing with the tactical reserve and the seven depugnationes at Epit. III.17–20, identified by close verbal connexions with the quoted words of Cato. In this connexion we find the triple command-structure of the array under three duces prescribed in Epit. III.18 actually attested during the Second Punic War, for example at Cannae. There is also an interesting historical note that the tactical reserve was first invented by the Spartans, then imitated by the Carthaginians, and finally taken over by the Romans, and in fact the first attested use of a real reserve is to be seen in

230 Schenk, op. cit, 44ff.
231 Jos. BJ 3.115–126 καθ’ ἔθνος Ποριατος ἐθνος.
232 The nearest thing to it appears to be Arrian Acies c. Alanos 1–10, which however identifies units.
237 The first analysis of this was by M. Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften (Geschichte der Wissenschaften in Deutschland, bd. XXI) 1 (1889), 54, seeing signs of Cato in V. Epit. I.9–14, 20–27, II.1,2,4,15, III.14–17, 19, 26.
238 See below and cf. ch. 6 (a) 1–2.
239 Livy 22.45.8: consules cornua tenere, Terentius laevum, Aemilius dextrum; Gemino Servilio media pugna tuenda data.
240 V. Epit. III.17.
Hannibal's tactics at Zama 202 B.C.\textsuperscript{241} This historical argument links up with the Spartan advisers Xanthippus (named) and Sosylus (unnamed) mentioned in III praef. as having improved the fortunes of the Carthaginians in the First and Second Punic Wars, which might be thought an odd recommendation for the contents of book III if it were newly written in A.D. 390, but natural if originally written in the 2nd. c. B.C. From the same period we find one of V.'s tactics for dealing with elephants, which was put into effect at Zama 202 B.C.,\textsuperscript{242} and V.'s (Cato's) 4th. and 5th. \textit{depugnations} in use by Scipio against Hasdrubal at Ilipa in 206 B.C.,\textsuperscript{243} while V.'s system of changing camp-guard at mid-day for both cavalry and infantry was introduced by L. Aemilius Paullus in 168 B.C.\textsuperscript{244} The same general also in 168 withdrew his army from battle which he declined, using a manoeuvre described in V. Epit. 22 p.112.15–20.\textsuperscript{245} Cato would probably have included all these contemporary developments in his \textit{de Re Militari}, written like \textit{de Agricultura} c. 160 B.C.

Other signs of Cato in book III include a reference to \textit{vellites} in III.16, contiguous with the chapters on the tactical reserve III.17ff., an historical account of stratagems to deal with elephants that includes reference to the use of \textit{vellites} in III.24, and a battle-array, albeit modernised, obviously based on an archaic one consisting of \textit{principes, hastati, ferentarii,} and \textit{triarii} in III.14. Moreover, the array is introduced by a warning that seems plausibly related to the débâcle of Cannae 216 B.C. At least the correspondence between Florus' description and V.'s language is sufficiently remarkable.\textsuperscript{246} Note also that the term \textit{ferentarii} was already obsolete by Livy's time, for he does not use it, neither does Caesar, and Varro treated it as an

\textsuperscript{242}V. Epit. III.24 p.118.4–8, cf. Livy 30.33.1–3.
\textsuperscript{244}V. Epit. III.8 p.85.10–12, cf. Livy 44.33.10–11. See also ch. 2 (b), p. 39.
\textsuperscript{245}Livy 44.37.1–3.
\textsuperscript{246}V. Epit. III.14: \textit{Ordinarus aciem tria debet ante prospecere, solem pulverem ventum. Nam sol ante faciem eripit visum, venius contrarius tua inflectit ac depunit, hostium adiuvat telis, pulvis a fronte congregat oculos implet et claudit. . . \textit{(cavendum est) ne post paululum accedant die nocet solis mutata conversio, ne venius adversus hora solita eo pugnante nascatur.} Florus 1.22.16: \textit{callidus imperator (sc. Hannibal) in potentibus campis observato loci ingenio, quod et sol ibi acerrimus et plurimum pulvis et eurus ab oriente semper quasi ex constituit, ita instruxit aciem, ut Romanis adversus haec omnia obversis, secundum caelum tenens vento pulvere et sole pugnaret.} Cf. Florus 1.38.15, C. Marius later used Hannibal's 'art of Cannae' to defeat the Cimbri.
archaism. They were evidently abolished along with velites, rorarii and accensi by Marius’ reforms or other reforms during the 1st c. B.C. But in V. there are ferentarii in each of the three battle-arrays, in the thumb-nail sketch of the ‘complete’ legion, and in the Catonian 7th. depugnatio. Other Cato fragments also have the term.

Finally one can link to Book III another Cato fragment. This is preserved in a quotation by M. Fronto, in a letter to L. Verus in which the rhetor praised his Emperor for his firm discipline and retraining of the effete Syrian troops preparatory to the war with Parthia A.D. 163–66. He quotes from what is agreed to be Cato’s Dierum dictarum de consulato suo, a published diary of his consulship, in a passage which is long enough to suggest that this work was still extant in the mid-2nd. c. A.D.—

... nonne Cato docuit, orator idem et imperator summus? Ipsa subiecici Catoris verba, in quibus consiliiorum tuorum expressa vestigia cerneres: “Interea unamquamque turnam manipulum cohortem temptabam, quid facere possebat; proelii levibus spectaban culus modi quisque esset; si quis sivemere fecerat, donabam honeste, ut alli idem vellent facere, aequo in contione verbis multis laudabam. Interea aliquot <p>au<ca> castra feci, sed ubi anni tempus venit, castra hiberna...” 253

V.’s general took personal charge of training in III.9 p.88.15ff.—

... (dux optimus) exercet ipse saepius temptabitque, quid artis possint habere, quid virium, quemadmodum sibi ipsi consentiant...  

247Cf. TLL s.v., Varro de ling. lat. 7.57.

248For Marius’ abolition of velites, cf. Festus 238 M., as emended by A. Schulten, Hermes LXIII (1928) 240. M.J.V. Bell, Historia XIV (1965), 421, argues from Frontinus Strat. 2.3.17, mentioning Sulla’s deployment of velites et levem armaturam at Orchomenus, that Festus meant that Marius merely gave the velites bigger shields (although he admits that they had wholly disappeared by Caesar’s time). Kromayer–Veith, 309 n.3, 385 n.1, dismissed Frontinus’ evidence as an anachronism in the source, Livy. Some support to Bell’s view is lent by Sallust’s mention of ferentarii in Cat. 60.2. See ch. 5 (e) 3, p. 192.


250V. Epit. II.2, along with sagittarii, funditores and ballistarii.

251V. Epit. III.20 p.110.13–14: sed in illa (sc. parte)... ommes equipes et ferentarios ponas.


Thus similar ideas are expressed by V. in language which although adapted to late-imperial military conditions seems to reflect some of the above assertions of Cato, possibly through parallel passages which may once have existed in the de Re Militari.

Of those who cite Cato’s de Re Militari, it was probably seen only by Verrius Flaccus. Festus’, Nonius Marcellus’, and Priscian’s citations of linguistic peculiarities certainly or probably derive from this Augustan scholar’s grammatical compilations de Obscuris Catonis or de Significatu Verborum. Aulus Gellius 7.4.5 also comes from this source. Because of the archaic word *vitiligunt*, the elder Pliny’s quotation in the preface to his Natural History looks suspiciously like a fragment preserved in such a source too. V. is the only other citator, but if he had really had access to the original work he would surely have made more of the fact. He never explicitly quotes Cato verbatim, and in the one case where we can compare the original words with V.’s, it is not clear that V. knew he was quoting Cato, and V.’s version shows linguistic modernisation of the original. Compare V.’s *una depugnatio est fronte longa quadrato exercitu* (III.20 p.106.6-7) with Cato de Re Militari fr. 10 (Jordan p.81): *una depugnatio est fronte longo quadrato exercitu*. The context in which it is preserved by Nonius Marcellus is a demonstration of the archaic masculine gender of *frons*. V.’s text makes *frons* feminine and translates *quadrato* by a late-Latin adjective, *quadro*. It is obvious that if he had had the original text, he would have had to interpret dozens of archaisms, but of this, not a word is said. A work which was probably a rarity four hundred years earlier, and which no one can be demonstrated to have seen after Verrius Flaccus, was surely not in V.’s hands either.

Furthermore a stylistic variation was observed in these chapters by Schenk which very plausibly points towards Cato. The great majority of instances of the verbal 2nd. pers. sing. and all cases of *tuus -a -um* occur in precisely Epit. III.9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22—showing an obvious connexion with the tactical chapters of book III. The other instances are more equivocal, infrequent and much more isolated: Epit. I.4 p.9.6, I.6 p.10.15-16, I.9 p.13.21, II.23 p.57.4, III.24 p.116.14, IV.15 p.138.12, IV.27 p.147.13. It is highly

---

256Nonius Marcellus 301 L. = 204.32 M.
suggestive that three fragments of Cato de Re Militari have the verbal 2nd. pers. sing., and that this work was part of Cato's Encyclopaedia addressed to his son, _ad Marcum filium_.257 Also Cato's surviving _de Agricultura_ from the same Encyclopaedia is full of examples of the 2nd. pers. sing. The _de Agricultura_ was written c. 160 B.C.,258 and two procedures connected by Livy with L. Aemilius Paullus in 168 B.C. may have been reported by Cato.259

But it is another argument against Schenk's view that Celsus was the main source of Epit. I, not Epit. III, that his Encyclopaedia of which _de Re Militari_ was part clearly must have followed Cato's model rather than (as it did not) Varro's nine _disciplinae_.260 If V. does not name Celsus as a source for II–IV, we have plenty of reason to suspect that he lies behind the shorthand _Cato ille Maior... aliis complures, sed praecipue Frontinus_ (II.3); so too, probably, Paternus, who was listed as a Roman military rhetorician by John the Lydian along with Celsus, a mysterious Catilina, Cato and Frontinus, and Vegetius himself, in the 6th. c. A.D.261 There is no reason to think that John the Lydian, any more than John of Salisbury,262 had ever seen the original work of Cato. The mysterious Catilina may well have been a later epitomator of the authors of the same tradition as that followed by V., and so a possible unnamed source used by him.

(h) Epit. III–IV and Frontinus.

For Frontinus, named by V. as his main source after Cato, we are unfortunate in the loss of his _de Re Militari_, but his surviving _Strategemata_, which is generally agreed to have provided Exempla to the lost theoretical work,263 was analysed for parallels to the structure of

---

258OCD 215 s.v. 'Cato (1)'.
259See ch. 2 (b), p. 39.
261Ioannes Lydus de mag. 1.47: μάρτυρες Κέλσος τε καί Πάτερνος καί Κατιλίνας, οδο ὅ συναρτήσεις ἀλλ' ἑτερος. Κάτω εἰς πρὸ αὐτῶν ὁ πρῶτος καὶ Φρόντινος, μεθ' οὗ καὶ Πενάτος. Παξιδία ἀπώτερες.
V. Books III and IV by Schenk. To be sure, there are possible exceptions to the Frontinian scheme in Epit. III.1–3, 5, 8, 26 at least, and in part or all of the naval chapters IV.31–46 (see below). Although nothing is known for certain of the structure of Frontinus’ lost work, parts of it may with some probability be deduced from the order of subjects and the rubrics themselves in his Strategemata, the internal resemblances to V. listed by Schenk allowing a certain amount of conjecture as to the contents. It emerges that the Catonian tactical chapters of book III.9–22(?) would appear to be embedded in the part assigned to Frontinus. Parts of the Strategikos by Onasander, a Greek philosopher writing to flatter in Rome during the mid-first century A.D., are thought to have influenced Frontinus too. Onasander followed the following scheme:—

1–2 qualities of the general and his staff, 3 council-of-war, 4 need to have a just cause, 5 religious duties of general on leading army on campaign, 6–7 logistics, 8–9 encampment, 10.α’ training and discipline, 10.β’ foraging, 10.γ’ spies, 10.δ’ night guards, 10.ε’ night retreat, 10.ξ’ parleys with the enemy, 10.ζ’ deserters, 10.η’ reconnoitring the enemy camp, 10.θ’ secrecy of plans, 10.ι’ religious duties of general on leading army to battle, 11.α’ pursuing the enemy, 11.β’ accessibility of general, 12 meal before battle, 13–14 morale, 15–24 battle-tactics, 25–26 signals, 27–29 tactical discipline, 30–31 choosing a battlefield, 32–33 strategic gambles, 34 rewards and decorations, 35.α’ booty, 35.β’ prisoners, 36.α’ burial of the fallen, 36.β’ encouragement in defeat, 37 vigilance in peace, 38 generous treatment of surrendered cities and of traitors, 39 attacking cities by night and by day, 40–42 siege warfare.

Not only is the general pattern of pre-battle, battle and post-battle, followed by the treatment of siege warfare, observable in Onasander as in V. Epit. III–IV and Frontinus Strat. I–III, but there are numerous resemblances of detail between precepts of Onasander and of V. Thus the dust-cloud announcing the approach of the enemy, and related functions of fires by

265 Onas. prooemium harps on the idea that the Romans as world-conquerors were the people best-placed to appreciate wisdom on strategy collected by ‘many’. He says that he repeats examples mostly from Roman history, but does not specify them in the narrative.
night, the need for only a short march to battle, being first to occupy the heights commanding mountain-passes, avoiding marshes when encamping, continually changing camp, continual drill in winter, related infantry manoeuvres, infantry mock-battles, cavalry manoeuvres in broken country, mounting guard by night in relays, secret retreats by night; precautions to be taken with guides, remaining in a fortification and launching a surprise attack on an overconfident and thoughtlessly blockading enemy, the need for secrecy, danger of pursuing the enemy into broken country, the need for a meal before battle, exhortation by the general in adversity, intervals left in the battle-line for the light-armed to retire through, danger of extending the battle-line at the expense of its depth, use of natural features to protect the flank of the line, crescent formation, oblique formation, tactical reserve, the giving of signals by gesture, importance of shining armour, choosing broken ground if the enemy are superior in cavalry, exhortation in defeat, generous treatment of traitors to the enemy, advantage of terror

267 Onas. 6.8, V. Epit. III.5 p.74.14-19.
268 Onas. 6.9, V. Epit. III.11 p.94.18ff.
269 Onas. 7.1-2, V. Epit. III.6 p.79.7ff.
270 Onas. 7.2, V. Epit. III.2 p.67.18.
271 Onas. 9.1, V. Epit. III.2 p.68.22-p.69.3.
274 Onas. 10.4 (armed with staves), V. Epit. I.11-12 (training with staves), I.13, II.23 (armatura), III.9 p.88.15ff., III.4 p.72.1-2 (mock-battles).
275 Onas. 10.6, V. Epit. I.26, III.2 p.68.16-19.
276 Onas. 10.9-12, V. Epit. III.8 p.84.20ff.
278 Onas. 10.15, V. Epit. III.6 p.75.19-p.76.8.
279 Onas. 10.20, V. Epit. III.11 p.94.12-18.
281 Onas. 11.1-5, V. Epit. III.6 p.79.1-13, III.22 p.113-114, III.25 p.119.16ff.
285 Onas. 21.1, V. Epit. III.15 p.100.11ff.
290 Onas. 26, V. Epit. III.5 p.74.7ff.
292 Onas. 31, V. Epit. III.13 p.96.15ff.
293 Onas. 36.3-6, V. Epit. III.25.
294 Onas. 38.7-8, V. Epit. III.6 p.80.6ff., III.26 p.121.11-13.
when first attacking a city, precautions by the besiegers against night-sallies from the besieged, use of trumpets in attacking cities, advantage of encouraging defeated citizens to lay down arms, and sending women and children and the elderly into a besieged city.

As well as these details, there are many similarities between Onasander and V. relating to broader themes. So, for instance, the general should not be too severe, he should form a council-of-war and be accessible to informants; cavalry should be sent ahead to detect ambushes; encamping within palisade and ditch, the efficacy of the sling as a weapon of the light-armed, the military advantage of friends being posted together in the line; the general should do nothing rash except as a last throw, and should not himself enter battle. Also the recommendations that soldiers pursuing and retreating should not break ranks, and that the general should keep up his guard when under peace, find echoes in V. Many general parallels will no doubt be due to the effect of common military situations which were produced by the little-changing conditions of ancient warfare. Not all the above examples, however, can be explained away as simply a common stock of military axioms drawn by coincidence from those available to Onasander and V. alike. The order of subjects and the sheer number of connexions, many in addition to those collected by Schenk, makes it likely that Frontinus' work included from Onasander a number of the same points which have finally got into V. Epit. III–IV. But at no point is there a really close verbal correspondence between Onasander, what survives of Frontinus, and V., so that Schenk cannot be said to have proved the question.

297Onas. 42.17, V. Epit. IV.12 p.136.14ff.
298Onas. 42.18–21, V. Epit. IV.25.
299Onas. 42.23, cf. V. Epit. IV.7 p.133.12–14.
300Onas. 2.2, V. Epit. III.4 p.72.7ff., contra III.10 p.90.17ff.
301Onas. 2.3, 11.6, V. Epit. III.9 p.86.15ff.
302Onas. 6.7, V. Epit. III.6 p.76.15ff.
303Onas. 8–9, V. Epit. I.21–24, III.8.
304Onas. 19.3, V. Epit. 1.16.
305Onas. 24, V. Epit. II.2 p.35.16ff.
306Onas. 32–33, perhaps distorted by V. Epit. III.9 p.86 (see ch. 5 (a)) to mean that the general should above all not meet the enemy in open battle but adopt guerilla tactics.
Indeed, it is surprising and so much the worse for Schenk that at Epit. III.10 V. inserted a couple of exempla, Scipio Africanus Minor at Numantia and Metellus in the Jugurthine war, which occurred in a handbook which is postulated to have been used by both Valerius Maximus and Frontinus, for they occur in unbroken succession in all three, but that the differences of substance are too great for V. to have taken it as expected from Frontinus directly. Schenk’s suggestion that the requisite variant occurred in the lost Frontinus de Re Militari is a counsel of despair, because Frontinus Strategemata I praef. suggests that the latter work was to supply the exempla to complement the former. Only at III.21 is there an exemplum which is coextensive with one in Frontinus. But that does not prove that V. did not take it from the same handbook as the others. Another exemplum in I.15 also points to a common source with Frontinus Strategemata, and tells against direct use of this work. This removes any confidence that V. made any direct use of Frontinus de Re militari either, although there remains a presupposition that this work lies somewhere behind much of the structure of the material in Epit. III–IV.

(i) Epit. III–IV and Vegetius.

It is very clear that, including parts of the ‘Frontinian’-Catonian chapters on tactics III.9–22 (?), book III and book IV are both of a composite nature, like I–II. Even in the tactical chapters of book III, continuous though they seem to be, there are signs of adaptation by V. too. Thus the extensive editorials (III.9 p.86.4–15, III.10 p.89.17–p.90.12, p.92.7–p.93.17), the insertion of the late-Roman tripartite division of the field army legionum sive auxiliarum necnon etiam vexillationum (III.10 p.90.13–14), legiones auxilia vel equites (III.9 p.88.15–16), the substitution of the late-Roman ranks comes, tribunus, domesticus, contubernales (III.10 p.90.15–16), the probable reference to Adrianople (III.11 fin.), the substitution of late-Roman for Republican military specialists in the battle-order (III.14), and the substitution

---

309V. Epit. III.10 p.93.2–11, Val. Max. 2.7.1–2, Front. Strat. 4.1–2.
311Cf. Front. Strat. 4.7.16: Scipio Africanus dixere solius est hostis non solum dandum esse viam ad fugiendum, sed etiam munitiendum, and V. Epit. III.21: Ideoque Scipionis laudata sententia est, qui dixit viam hostibus, qua fugerent, muniendam.
312See section (d) above, p. 268.
313See ch. 3 (d) 1, p. 71.
of late-Roman officers such as vicarii, comites and tribuni vacantes for command of the tactical reserve (III.17), at least.

The same types of editing are also to be seen in those parts of Epit. III not assignable to a compilation from Cato. So for instance the substitution of the 4th. c. officers principia tribunique et ipse comes, qui maiorem sustinet potestatem (III.2), the insertion of 4th. c. weaponry to defend late-Roman fortress-cites: ut urbes et castella ab his militibus, qui minus prompti invenientur in acie, armis sagitis fustibalis, fundis etiam et saxis onagris ballistasque defendantur (III.3 p.70.17-19), and the tripartite late-Roman division of the army, along with more contemporary officers: in omnibus legionibus sive auxiliis et vexillationibus a tribunis vicariis principiisque (III.4 p.72.8-9). Note also among traditional ones a Christian password Deus nobiscum (III.5 p.73.16), and contemporary standards aquilae dracones vexilla flammulae tufae pinnae (III.5 p.74.4-5) and signals: praeterea manu aliquid vel flagello more barbarico vel certe mota, qua utitur, veste significat (III.5 p.74.9-10). Compare also campidoctores vicarii vel tribuni (III.6 p.78.18-19) and campidoctores et principiis (III.8 p.83.17), and the notable fact that the use of coloured maps by the best generals of olden time (III.6 p.75.16ff.) was already ancient history to V.316

In book IV the modernisation extends to the substitution of new weapons and specialists or their interpolation among old—

IV.8 fundas sive fustibalos... onagros, IV.9 onagri vel ballistae, IV.10 ballistas sagittariosque, IV.18 ballistae, IV.21 funditores lapidibus, sagittarii iaculis, manuballistarii vel arcuballistarii sagitis, iaculatoris plumbatis ac missilibus, IV.22 ballistae onagri scorpiones arcuballistae fustibali [sagittarii] fundae... manuballistas... fustibalos arcuballistae et fundas... onagrum, IV.29 missibilita sive plumbatae vel lanceae vel spatulatae vel spicula... fundis sive fustibalis... ballistae vero et onagri, IV.43 catafacti vel loricati galeati etiam et ocreis muniti... sagitis missibilitibus fundis ballibilitibus onagris ballistis scorpionibus,
glosses which presuppose modern conditions of war—

IV.15 vineas dixerunt veteres quas nunc militari barbaricoque usu caus<is>ias vocant, IV.21 scorpiones dicebant, quas nunc manuballistas vocant... fustibalos arcuballistas et

314 Cf. Ioannes Lydus de Mag. 1.8: δόρατα εὐχαρίας, ὡσεὶς τῶν δαρειῶν θεουκαπές, διότι ἐξ ὁμιλωτον τῆς τόσον μὲν ἔστησα, διδαγμένες δὲ λοφίας καλούσι δὲ αὐτὰς οἱ μὲν θεοῦς θεοῖ, οἱ δὲ χώρας τοίχως, ἀντὶ τοῦ μακροθυμίας, διοίκησις τῆς λέζους τής βαίνει εἰς τὸς τόπος οὐκέτι δόρατα μακρὰ ἐξηργημένως διαρκεῖται — φλεγμωνίω ἀυτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ φλεγμονος χρόνους καλοῦσι.
315 Cf. Claud. pan. Hon. VI cons. 625 (whip signal), and ch. 6 (b) 5 above.
316 See ch. 6 (b) 2, p. 232.
and tell-tale signs of modernity such as the first occurrence of technical terms known in Byzantine literature (IV.16 *fossatum, sudatum*). Greater emphasis on defence is consistent with the late Empire's strategic constraints, and material on food-supplies and fortress-cities in IV.7 and perhaps IV.10 combines with the same in III.3, partly repeated, to suggest direct contribution by V. himself, supported by his editorial comment at IV.30 (epil.).

It is clear therefore that V. has had a great impact on the composition of all parts of the Epitome. The arrangement, reconstruction and modernisation of the material is marked. Though purporting to give what the 'ancients' had to say on various matters of military import, it has been quite extensively if unevenly interpreted by the author to make sense and yield practical lessons to his own generation. We can in general see that the core of most of the material is very ancient, much of it having Latin origins in the age of Cato the Censor, if not in his actual writings as V. promises, but there is at least as much overlay which relates to the Empire and more particularly to the 4th. c. A.D.

Late-19th. c. scholars reacted against V., deeming him a liar, or a fool. Early 20th. c. scholars were resigned to the impossibility of dating the material, while recognising the value of particular details. Schenk thought to solve the problem of sources and thereby pave the way for an historical exegesis of the material, but made the wrong assumption as to the type of epitome he was dealing with. Instead, although it is possible to make progress in identifying V.'s sources, more direct and more remote, for individual passages and for larger sections, the question is perhaps more 'academic' than has been generally appreciated, since it emerges that V. was no simple copyist, but cut up, embellished and reinterpreted material with

---

318 See further below. Cf. ch. 5 (a), pp. 147-148.
319 See ch. 6 (b) 3, p. 233.
323 O. Schenk, op. cit., 4-5. Although he correctly identified the Epit. as a compilation from different sources together with the compiler's independent criticisms, he wrongly took each book as dependent chiefly upon one source only.
great freedom. In particular, the marked lack of concern to avoid needless repetition suggests that the work was probably carelessly written with enthusiasm and speed rather than with scholarly care and attention. But the result is likely to have satisfied a busy Emperor with a keen amateur taste for Republican military history.324

Lammert was no doubt right to see many influences of Aeneas Tacticus, Philo of Byzantium and their tradition, followed by Apollodorus of Damascus and Athenaeus mechanicus and the ‘Anonymus Byzantinus’ Peri Strategikes (and Syrianus Naumachica325), reflected in V. Epit. IV siege and naval warfare sections.326 However these are not linked to the explanation of the repetitions, which are as Schenk observed part of the typical style of V.’s editorship.327 Sander’s attempt to deduce a number of different sources on the basis of repetitions, and the identification of these as various historians rather than military rhetoricians, was unsuccessful.328

As in I–II, there are repeated passages throughout III–IV, including the ‘Frontinian’–Catonian chapters, which because this is a stylistic feature of V.’s approach to the whole work are probably due to his thoroughgoing reworking of the material. The most notable example occurs whenever he has a chance, even interpolating it very inorganically at times such as at III.18, to list occasions for the working of military opportunity. Thus it is opportune to attack soldiers traversing defiles, forests, or rivers, or when they are weary, off duty, eating, sleeping, looking after their horses, etc.—

(III.8) cum militibus ad capiendum cibum occupatis, ad munera facienda dispersis facile neantur insidiae; postremo noctis obscuritas, necessitas somni, pascentium equorum occasionem superventibus praestat.

(III.10) ad transitus fluviorum, ad praecipitam montium, ad silvarum angustias, ad paludum aut viarum difficultates superventus nullo sciiente disponat atque ita iter suum temperet, ut cibum capientes aut dormientes aut vacantes certe, securos inermes discalciatos, destruis equis, nihil suspicantes ipse paratus invadat.

(III.18) in itineribus lam fatigatis, in fluminum transgressione divisis, in paludibus occupatis, in lugi montium laborantibus, in campis sparsi atque securis,

324See ch. 1 (c) and ch. 3 (d) 12, p. 7 and 95.
327D. Schenk, op. cit. 62ff.
in mansione dormientibus oportunum proelium semper inferitur, cum allis negotiis occupatus hostis prius interimatur, quam praeparare se posit. (III.22) inparatis, cibus capientes, in itinere lassis, eques suos pascentibus ac nihil tale suspicantibus superventus adsolent fieri... et paene urique partii in itinere ad subcessas communis occasio est... oportunis valibus vel silvis montibus... dormientibus noctu adversariis... in transfretatione flavorum... (IV.27) opportunitas enim insidiarum aliter non potest inveniri, nisi scias, quibus horis adversarius a laboris intentione discedat, quibus reddatur incautior, interdum medio die, interdum ad vespem, saepe nocte, aliquando eo tempore, quo simitur cibus, cibus utriusque partis milites ad requiem se pos sunt, solius aut aliq... (IV.28) nam sive cibo sive somno fuerint occupati sive oto aut aliqua necessitate disperisi, tunc oppidani repente prorumpunt, ignorantes perimunt... (IV.45) ad instar autem terrestris proeli superventus fiunt ignorantibus nauticis vel circa opportunas insularum angustias conlocant insidiae. idque agitur, ut imparati facilius deleantur; si longo remigio fatigati sunt hostium nautae, si vento urguntur adverso, si pro rostris est rheuma, si nihil suspicantes dormiunt inimici, si statio, quam tenent, extum non habet, si dimicandi optata evenit occasio, fortunae beneficis jungendae sunt manus et ex opportunitate proelium conserendum.

Other repetitions certainly are the work of V., for they occur in editorial passages—

(III.10) dicat aliquis: multi anni sunt, quibus nullus fossa aggere valloque mansurum circumdat exercitum. respondetur: si fuisset ista cautela, nihil nocturni aut diurni superventus hostium nocere potuissent. (I.21) nemo iam diu dictis fossis praefuisque sudibus castra constituit; sic diurno vel nocturno superventu equitum barbarorum multis exercitus scimus frequentor adjectos. non solum autem considerent sine castris ista patiuntur, sed cum in acie casu aut aliquo coeperint cedere, munimenta castrorum, quo so recipiant, non habent... (Cf. III.25) nam si vicini collae fuerint, si post terga munitione, si ceteris abscedantibus fortissimi quique restiterint, se suosque servabunt.

So too in tendentious passages—

(I.20) sed gravis pediti lorica videtur et galea fortasse raro meditanti, fortasse arma raro tractanti... pedites autem scutati praeter catafractas et galeas etiam ferreas ocreas in dextris cruribus cogenerunt accipere. (IV.44) praecipua ingerat esse debet tegminum cura, ut catafracti vel loricae galeati etiam et ocreis muniti sint. de onere namque armorum nemo potest conqueri, qui stans pugnatur in navibus; scuta quoque validiora propter ictus lapidum et amplo rata sumuntur.

Many items of neutral military information are also repeated sporadically at various appropriate points, e.g.—

(I.27) non solum autem in campis, sed etiam in clivis et arduis locis et descendere et ascendere utroque acies cogebatur, ut nulla res, vel casu prorsus, pugnantibus posset accidere, quam non auque boni milites adscendere exercitacione dicissent. (III.2) similiter equites non solum in planis sed etiam in abruptis et fossarum hiatus difficilimum semilis sequi et equos suos adscendere exercere lussentur, ut nihil his in necessitate proelii accidere posset incognita.

(II.1) equitibus campi, classibus maria vel flumina, peditibus colles urbes plana et abrupta servantur. (III.6) nam in campis patentiis equites magis solent inpugnare quam pedites; at vero in locis silvestribus vel montuosissive palustribus pedestres... (II.13) si de peditibus tuis victoriam speras, contra equites hostium, loca aspera inaequalia montuosia debes eligere, si vero de equitibus tuis contra adversarii pedites victoriam quaeris, sequi debes paulo quidem editiona loca, sed plana atque patenta, neque silvis neque paludibus impedita.
Lammert observed a number of repetitions in the siege-chapters in IV.1–30; these are due in part to coverage of the same tactic from the point of view of the defenders and the attackers of the city. There is a certain shift in treatment, as the first eleven chapters cover fortifications and provisioning for a siege, whereas the succeeding nineteen chapters are on tactics of siege-warfare, in which the presentation of attack and defence tactics is partly integrated, partly separate, but in the main weighted towards defence. V. followed no very carefully planned scheme, but wrote as he went along, executing only a general plan.

Some of the repetitions relate to general principles, obviously repeated because of their importance. Thus in III.3 the principle: saepe enim penuria quam pugna consumit exercitum, et ferro saevior fames est, is selected for repetition at III.9: nam fames, ut dicitur, intrinsecus pugnat et vincit saepius sine ferro, and at III.26: qui frumentum necessariaque non praeparat, vincitur sine ferro. Indeed, V.'s chapter on 'General Rules of War' (III.26) is an extended list of such principles, the majority of them repeated from all parts of book III, but also including one or two from books I and II, and a few which are not repeated from any part of the text as we have it. The most significant part of the list appears to be a summary of the seven depugnationes of III.20. As no part refers to book IV, we may assume that V. composed it before he wrote book IV. The list resembles in format the list of necessariae sententiae in the probably contemporary work Palladius de Agricultura. It is also taken up by the Byzantine Maurice in a similar list, some of whose principles are Greek translations of the Latin versions in V.

---

330F. Lammert, *Klio* XXXI (1938) 399, was wrong to schematize IV.8–11/12 as defence, IV.12–30 as attack.
331Epit III.26 p.122.13; cf. Front. Strat. 4.7.1: C. Caesar dicebat idem sibi esse consilium adversus hostem, quod pleisque medici contra vias corporum, fames potius quam ferro superandi.
332Epit. III.26 p.122.3: Amplius iuvat virtus quam multitudo. Cf. 1.8: In omni enim conflictu non tam prodest multitudo quam virus (the clearest example).
334Pall. de Agr. 1.6.
335E.g., Epit. III.26 p.121.1–2: In bello qui plus in agraribus vigilaverit, plus in exercendo militie laboraverit, minus periculum sustinebit. = Maur. Strat. 8.2.2: ὁ πλέον συμαγγείων τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ πλέον τῷ γιοιαίνον τοῖς στρατηγῶν ποιεῖν ἐκάζεστα κινδυνεύει κατὰ τῶν πόλεμων.
The repetition of wider subjects is also part of the editorship of V., as in the course of writing he came to cover the same themes from slightly different points of view. Thus legionary training is dealt with at I.9–20 & 26–27, II.23, III.4 p.71.14–p.72.7, III.9 p.88.15–p.89.9, III.10 p.90.12–p.92.2. Castrametation is covered at I.21–25 and III.8, and there is more on it at III.10 p.92.8–93.8. The battle-array of the ancient legion occurs at I.20, II.15–17 and III.14. The use of legionary light-armed is touched on at I.4, I.15–16, I.17(?), I.18(?), I.20, II.2, II.15, II.17, II.23, III.14, III.16–18, III.20, III.22, and III.24. Signals are discussed at II.22 and III.5. Food supplies and the protection of civilian populations are the subject of III.3 and IV.7. Care of the sick is mentioned at II.10, III.2, and IV.7. Swimming is referred to at II.3, I.10, II.24, III.4, and III.7.

Some of the repetition is also related to the purveying of modern or modernised information. Thus at III.14 the legionary array is presented in modernised form, with the ancient equivalents to the various specialists added as glosses, whereas at II.15–17 it is explicitly ancient, with modern glosses. At IV.22 are described the modern arrow-shooting ballista and stone-throwing onager, together with the ancient scorpionis, glossed inaccurately as modern manuballistae, and the modern weapons fustibali and arcuballistae (sling-staves and crossbows), all as weapons for use in defence of a city-wall. At IV.29 is a part-repetition of the same weapons, with some variatio, all as weapons of defence again of a city. The contemporary exemplum of the Bessi is also re-used to illustrate military sappers at IV.24, as II.11.

But many of these and other repetitions are partly or simply make-weight, designed to pad out the material to fill the chapters under the rubrics V. had set himself. This is most

---

336 The leaping on and off horses was relevant to the tactics used by velites. Cf. Isid. Etym. 9.3.43, Livy 26.4.5.
337 E.g., crossbows are replaced by bows, but sling-staves remain: sagittae quoque arcubus missae et saxa manibus fundis sive fustibalis directa. Also the talk recurs of expert tuning of ballistae and onagri and their thunderbolt-like effect.
339 V. Epit. I praef.: per quosdam gradus et titulos antiquam consuetudinem conamur ostendere. A. Andersson, Studia Vegetiana: commentatio academica (Upsala 1938), ch. 3, argues convincingly on grounds of style that the rubrics are by V., although F. Lammert, rev. in Philologische Wochenschrift LX (1940), 79, reminds us that such a framework is typical too of tactical treatises such as Frontinus'. Cf. also Aelian Tact. praef. 7.
obvious in the case of the same exempla occurring twice (I.3 & I.10, II.11 & IV.24, IV praefer. & IV.26, cf. IV.9). It also seems the natural interpretation of repetitions of material in close succession, e.g.—

(IV.26) *frequenter dolum excogiant obsidentes ac simulata desperatione longius abeunt, sed ubi post metum mirorum vigilis inferiit incauta securitas, tenebrarum ac noctis occasione capita cum scalis clanculo ventiunt murosque conscendunt.* (IV.27) *obsidentes astu se a proelio subtrahunt, ut adversariorum neglegentiae licentiam tribuant, quae ipsa inquinata cum creverit, repente admodus machinis vel adpositis scalis occupant civitatem.*

(IV.27) *quibus horis adversarius a laboris intentione discedat, quibus reddatur incautor, interdum medio die, interdum ad vesperum, saepe nocte, aliquando eo tempore, quo sumitur cibus, cum urbisque paritis millies ad requiem aut ad curanda corpora dispergunt.* (IV.28) *nam sive cibo sive somno fuerint occupati sive oto aut aliqua necessitate dispersi.*

Cf. also, within the same chapter, IV.25 p.146.1–8, ibid. p.146.8–13, III.21 p.111.8–11, ibid. p.111.20–22, identified by P. de Jonge as a stylistic feature of V.340 Such padding allows the same conclusion for repetitions placed farther apart, such as IV.22 and IV.29, and II.23, summarising (with slight variations due to V.'s insouciance) the training chapters I.9–19, 26–27.

(j) Epit. IV.31–46 (Naval warfare), Frontinus and Varro.

The only section of the entire Epitome which does not exhibit these repetitions is that on shipbuilding and navigation (IV.33–42). Here the natural conclusion will be that V. must have had too much, rather than too little material to go on, as V. implies at one point.341 None the less, he did not hesitate to embellish it with contemporary material. Thus Christian allusions in IV.34 and IV.35,342 a garbled indigenous word for British spy-boats (IV.37, to be set beside the fact that V. is one of the earliest authors to use the probably Celtic word *drungus*)343 plus probably the whole exemplum,344 a circumspect reference to the festival of the *navigium Isidis*

---

341 Cf. V. Epit. IV.40: *sed omnia enumare nominatin au ineptum videatur aut longum, cum auctores plurimi non solum mensum sed eisiam dieum rationem diligentem expresserint.*
342 See ch. 2 (c), p.144.
343 See ch. 6 (a) 1, p.217.
344 The blue-dyed sails, rigging, hulls and sailors' uniforms are reminiscent of the blue weed with which late-Romans loved to paint Britannia; cf. Claud. pan. de III cons. Hon. 54, id. de cons. Stil. II.247–249, id. de bello Gothico 417–418.
and an official decision about the date of Easter (IV.39), some moralising about the greed of merchants in sailing during dangerous weather (IV.39, to be set beside much more of the same in Ambrose de Elia 70–71, cf. id. de Off. 1.243), and an allusion to Vergil’s Georgics (IV.41).

However, the other naval chapters IV.31–32, 43–46 exhibit all the typical hallmarks of V.’s own editorship intended to amplify and elaborate on typically jejune source-material, so probably the same source as the rest of Epit. III–IV. Thus the typically incomplete list of provinces originally served by the two fleets at Misenum and Ravenna was actually composed after the withdrawal of Aegyptus from Oriens in the late A.D. 360’s, the deterrence-theory of arms is restated in a naval context in terms derived from III præf., the structure of the two naval legions under praefecti, and ten tribunes commanding a cohort each, bears a suspicious resemblance to the fictitious organization of the legio antiqua, and should not be believed lightly, the heavy arms of marines clearly derive from V.’s tendentious idea of the heavy infantry of the ancient battle-array, the advantage of height presented by turrets on the ships and the use of fire-darts are described in terms which derive from earlier comments on siege-warfare, while opportunities for ambush appear to derive from those already listed for land warfare. Finally three dictionary definitions are given for the asser, falx and bipennis (IV.46), which could well have come from a reference book in V.’s library.
Lammert's earlier opinion that Epit. IV.1–30 represents a systematic 'Poliorketik' was modified by the feeling that rather it combined two strands of the same tradition, that of essentially Philo of Byzantium subsuming Aeneas Tacticus on the one hand, and that of the lost source of the 'Anonymus Byzantinus' (= Anon. Peri Strategikes) subsuming Philo and Aeneas Tacticus on the other. In harmony with this view, he believed in the identity of the author of the 5th–6th c. Naumachica (identified by Dain as Syrianus) with the 'Anonymus Byzantinus', so that V. Epit. IV.31–46 in his view probably derived also from the same Greek tradition (the conclusion is tenable regardless of the question of identity). The Latin redactor of this Greek tradition was seen as either Varro, named as a source at Epit. IV.41 for material on navigation, and who is also known to have written on military matters and machines, or Frontinus.

The scholarly Varro is the more convincing candidate. The ultimately Greek origins of much of the material in Epit. III–IV are not in doubt, including that on tactics mediated through Cato and 'Frontinus', but it is far from certain that 'Frontinus' included sections on shipbuilding and navigation (Epit. IV.33–42) in his lost work. In fact a good part of the naval section of Epit. IV may contain material directly derived from Varro, rather than through 'Frontinus'. This seems not unlikely for the sections on shipbuilding and navigation, because of the different treatment of the material as noted above, the fact that what can be deduced from surviving fragments of Varro de Ora Maritima in Pliny and Servius 'Fuldensis' (contemporary with V.) seems to be directly behind the navigational chapters IV.38–42, and the possibility that Varro de Ora Maritima or de Architectura was behind those on shipbuilding IV.33–37.

---

353 Philologische Wochenschrift LI (1931) 800.
356 Cf. Epit. IV.35: quod ars ipsa et omnium architectorum cotidianus usus edocuit. The astronomical observations for felling and hewing timber recur in Pliny HN 16.74.190–191; id. 16.18.42 says that the farges—was in great demand for building ships.
The independent use of Varro's works by V. would then tie up with the same suggested above for I.2 (as this is also in Vitruvius, perhaps from Varro de Architectura) and I.6 (Rer. Rust.).

(k) Conclusions.

1. There are substantial amounts of Cato de Re Militari in Epit. I–III, certainly Epit. I.20, II.2, II.15–17, III.1, III.9–22, and less certainly Epit. I.1, I.3–4, I.7–19, I.26–27, II.1, II.13, II.23, III.24, but V. did not compile them from the original (ch. 7 (a–d, g)).

2. From our knowledge of the external structure of Celsus' Encyclopaedia we can say that it is very likely that Celsus summarised Cato de Re Militari (ch. 7 (b, e)).

3. It seems apparent that, contrary to expectation, V. did not use Frontinus' surviving work Strategemata (ch. 7 (d, f)).

4. From our knowledge that Frontinus' lost de Re Militari embraced both Greek and Roman tactics and followed a structure that, so far as it can be conjectured, loosely tallies with Epit. III.6–IV.30, coupled with assertions by V. (in contexts which suggest Cato) that Epit. III covers Greek tactics and internal evidence that Epit. IV.1–30 follows sources originally written in Greek, it seems likely that there are portions of Frontinus de Re Militari in Epit. III–IV, including moreover the Catonian tactics (ch. 7 (f)).

5. It seems very likely that Epit. IV.38–42 was summarised by V. from Varro de Ora Maritima, therefore probably Epit. I.6 from another work by Varro, likewise less probably Epit. I.2, and Epit. IV.34–37 (ch. 7 (h, c)).

6. As the chapters on castrametation Epit. I.21–25, III.8 show some slight connexion with the 2nd c. A.D. in details in harmony with Ps.-Hyginus, together with a complete absence of archaic features characteristic to the legio antiqua, it is not improbable that they relate to the latest named sources, the lost Paternus de Re Militari or Frontinus de Re Militari (ch. 7 (e)).

7. The citation of all sources except Virgil and Varro in Epit. I.8 makes it virtually certain that Epit. I.9–27, which consists of only two basic sections, training and castrametation, the former having some connexion with Cato, derive from only one or two hypothetically immediate sources which subsumed the rest, thus Paternus, or Paternus and Frontinus (ch. 7 (b)).
8. The citation of the *constitutiones* of Augustus and Hadrian in Epit. I.27 on the training of legionaries is likely to derive from Paternus (ch. 7 (f)).

9. The possible use of a 3rd. c. A.D. list of 'Parts of the Legion' vel sim. as one of the two main sources of Epit. II, suggests that V. used at least one source later than the latest named source, Paternus (ch. 5 (g)).

10. Celsus and Paternus are likely to be at least as much sources of Epit. II–IV as Epit. I, where alone are they named (ch. 7 (b)).

11. The jejuneness of V.'s sources demonstrated for Epit. I–IV by the frequent use of repetition, padding and editorial interpretation which relies on implicit guesswork is probably incompatible with direct use of any of the named sources, apart from the non-jejune chapters from Varro (ch. 7 (g)).

12. There is certainly a large amount of 4th. c. A.D. material in Epit. I–IV, which it is most economical to assign to the massive authorial intervention of V. himself. This is largely confirmed by the contexts and the ascertained homogeneity of style (ch. 7 (g)).

13. There is no evidence for the alleged reforms of Hadrian (contra Schenk) or the use by V. of an imperial military rule-book (contra Neumann) (ch. 7 (f)).

14. Bruncke was right to conclude that V. did not use the sources he alleges in Epit. I.8 and II.3. But the corollary is not, as he thought, that V.'s source-notices were propaganda. Rather he used late epitomes that derived from the named sources, except for Varro whose work was consulted directly.

---

Bibliography.


Alfoldi, A., A festival in Isis in Rome under the Christian Emperors of the IVth. century, Dissertationes Pannonicae II.7 (Budapest, 1937).


Altheim, F., Literatur und Gesellschaft in ausgleichenden Altertum 1 (Halle, 1948).


Anderson, A., Studia Vegetiana: commentatio academica (Uppsala, 1938).

Arnim, H. v., 'Incidiim Vaticanum', Hermes XXVII (1892) 118-130.


Bachrach, B.S., A History of the Alans in the West from their first appearance in the sources of classical antiquity through the early middle ages, Minnesota monographs in the Humanities VII (Minneapolis, 1973).


Bagnall, R.S., 'Army and Police in Roman Upper Egypt', Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt, XIV (1977), 67-86.


Barnes, T.D., Literary Convention, Nostalgia and Reality in Ammianus Marcellinus', in G. Clarke et al. (edd.), Reading the Past in Late Antiquity (Rushcutters Bay, Australia, 1990) 59-92.


Behr, C.A., Alexius Aristides and the Sacred Tales (Amsterdam, 1968).

Bell, M.J.V., 'Tactical Reform in the Roman Republican Army', Historia XIV (1965) 404-422.


Delli-Bruce, H., Geschichte der Kriegskunst in Rahmen der politischen Geschichte II (Berlin, 1921).


Dias, E., 'Zu spätlateinischen Schriftstellern', Philologische Zeitschrift XXXII (1912), 767–768.

Dilke, O.A.W., Rome, Essays presented to Eric Birley (Strasbourg, 1982), 93–141.


Dilke, O.A.W., Greek and Roman Maps (London, 1985).


Dominowski, A. v., 'Ausgrabung in Carnuntum 1885', Archäologisch-Epigraphische Mittheilungen aus Österreich-Ungarn X (1886), 12–32.


Enslin, W., Zum Heermeisteramt des spätromischen Reiches I: Die Titulatur der magistri militum bis auf Theodosius I., Klio XXIII (1930) 306–325.

Enslin, W., 'Kaiserluts Gesetzgebungswerk und Reichsverwaltung', Klio XVIII (1923) 104-199.

Hornell, J., ‘Floats and buoyed rafts in military operations’, Antiquity XIX (1945), 73–79.


Johnson, S., Late Roman Fortifications (London 1983).


Jordon, H., M. Catonis praetor librum de re rustica Quae Extant (Leipzig 1867).


Kienast, D., Untersuchungen zu den Kriegsfotien der römischen Kaiserzeit, Antiquitates Reihe I Bd. XIII (Bonn 1966).


King, C.E., Roman Silver Coins V: Carausius to Romulus Augustus, with valuations by D.R. Sear (London 1987).


Kolb, F., Untersuchungen zur Historia Augusta, Antiquitates Reihe 4, Beiträge zur Historia Augusta Forschung (Bonn 1887).


Kolias, T.G., Byzantische Waffen: ein Beitrag zur byzantinischen Waffentechnik bis zur lateinischen Eroberung, Byzantina Vindobonensia bd. XVII, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Vienna 1988).


Marquardt, H., 'The monetary systems of the Roman Empire from Diocletian to Theodosius I', *The Numismatic Chronicle*, Ser. VI, vol. VI (1946), 111–120.


Morel, W., 'Note on Vegetius', *The Classical Review* LV (1941), 75.


