‘Brotherly Strangers’: Historicising and Disaggregating Kenya and Zambia’s Relations with China (1961-2000)



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Short Abstract

This thesis examines post-colonial Kenya and Zambia's relations with the People's Republic of China from ideological, political, economic and social perspectives, encompassing encounters between Kenyans, Zambians and Chinese as well as between their states. China's growing significance in Africa is a popular subject in the press and academia but hitherto has been little analysed from a historical dimension. Through the triangulation of the global Cold War, African history, and Chinese history, the thesis examines the encounters, conflicts, and dynamics of China-Kenya/Zambia relations from 1961 until 2000, as well as the basis on which historical narratives regarding Chinese encounters with Kenyans/Zambians have been constructed. In doing so, it explains the on-going development of these relationships and sheds light on the historical underpinnings – or lack thereof – on contemporary China-Africa relations.

The thesis title, 'brotherly strangers', identifies two key ostensibly contradictory aspects of China-Africa relations: 'strangers' in the sense of their diverse historical trajectories, but 'brotherly' in terms of an asserted shared historical lineage of western domination. The dynamics of their changing relations across a wide span of time are examined by the comparative studies of Kenya and Zambia's respective relations with China. From a Chinese state perspective, Zambia has been primarily of political/strategic importance, whereas Kenya, although politically estranged and even hostile, has been of greater economic significance. Their distinctive historical legacies, and the variation in China's relations with specific African states, challenges both the 'taken for granted' role of the China-Africa historical lineage in contemporary analyses, as well as its tendency to assume uniformity in these relationships.

Long Abstract

This thesis examines post-colonial Kenya and Zambia's relations with the People's Republic of from ideological, political, economic and social perspectives, encompassing encounters between Kenyans, Zambians and Chinese as well as between their states. China's growing significance in Africa is a popular subject in the press and academia but hitherto has been little analysed from a historical dimension. Through the triangulation of the global Cold War, African history, and Chinese history, the study examines the entanglements, dependencies, and dynamics of China-Kenya/Zambia relations from 1961 until 2000, as well as the basis on which historical narratives regarding Chinese encounters with Kenyans/Zambians have been constructed. In doing so, it explains the on-going development of these relationships and sheds light on the historical underpinnings – or lack thereof – on contemporary China-Africa relations.

Through the triangulation of the global Cold War, African history, and Chinese history, this thesis carefully considers the complex and contested engagements between independent African countries and China. Far from being easily manipulated by external powers driven by distinctive ideologies and geopolitical interests, both Kenya and Zambia approached, deepened and even negotiated their relations with China in the years after independence, seeking both ideological and material support. However, their engagements with China took different forms. From a Chinese state perspective, Zambia was primarily of political/strategic importance, whereas Kenya, although increasingly politically hostile, was of greater economic significance. The distinctive historical experiences of these relationships and the variation in China's relations with specific African states challenge both the 'taken for granted' role of the China-Africa historical lineage in contemporary literature, as well as its tendency to assume

uniformity in these relationships. This thesis suggests the way in which global and local forces interacted in the Cold War. The increasing availability of the state archives of major Cold War powers provide useful sources for such histories, enabling greater understanding of the influences of global forces on local experiences of African state and non-state actors. However, a no less significant perspective of how the 'global' is revealed and remade is provided in newspapers and interviews with actors from the period.

Rejecting a simple reiteration of national(ist) histories of China, Kenya and Zambia, this thesis analyses the intersections of decolonisation, the Cold War and Afro-Asian solidarity that are exemplified in China-Africa relations in the 1950s and early 1960s. Indeed, three major dynamics are observed and analysed in such a transnational history. There is of course the Chinese view of global events, which was translated into practical but also ideological foreign policy. There is also a history of what China did with African actors on the ground: it established contacts with, exerted influences on, and provided financial support for African nationalists sympathetic to Communist China. What however tends to be overlooked, and which is key to this study, were African (as well as Western) perceptions of the ideas and values that informed their engagements with Africa, especially when these concerned and were influenced by anti-Communist fears in the late colonial period. In this way, the thesis contests accounts of China's 'grand policy' in Africa for its underestimation if not ignorance of African agency, and instead stresses the inconsistency and diversity of Chinese engagement with Africans within and beyond the state.

Western philosophy and political science have consistently neglected African schools of political thought. Bearing in mind the diverse definitions and types of socialism, this thesis takes seriously the relevance of socialism as an ideology, while exploring various theoretical approaches, the historical context in which they operated and the distinctive practices they generated. Both Kenya and Zambia developed their distinct political, economic and social trajectories in ways that reflected their historical experiences and the distinct perspectives of their leaders that were developed in conversation with global socialist currents but equally in relation to their own societies and nations. As a result, the two countries experienced very different political trajectories. While Zambian Humanism was a catch-all term during the rule of Kaunda's UNIP, Kenyatta and the later anti-Odinga coalition within KANU preferred the slogan of 'African Socialism' much more than its substance or ethos. Kenya and Zambia's increasing divergence, in terms of their overall foreign policies and their relations with Communist China, in particular, reveals the diversity rather than the consistency of African experiments in socialism, making this comparative analysis particularly revealing.

It is misleading to understand the global Cold War in Africa as external manipulation driven by superpowers' ideological and geopolitical interests. This thesis, in analysing the developments of Sino-Kenyan relations in 1964-1970, argues that African countries and their leaders approached, deepened and even negotiated their relations with Communist China. Several visits by Kenyan delegations to China not only enabled better understanding of China's domestic situation and its vision, but also secured material benefits to Kenya. Kenya's decision to choose the Chinese rather than the Soviet economic and technical aid suggests that economic pragmatism triumphed over any ideological consideration. The thesis shows that the Sino-Soviet competition for

influences in the Third World offered a degree of bargaining power to the commonly perceived ‘weak’ African countries such as Kenya.

The Cold War equally served as a political strategy for Kenyan leaders to alienate their dissidents in post-independent Kenya. Within the ruling party KANU, the British, Americans and the Communist powers financed the factions of President Kenyatta, Mboya and Odinga respectively. This thesis challenges the conventional wisdom that Odinga’s alliance with Beijing was exclusively based on their shared ideological radicalness, and instead argues that his major adversary Mboya’s prior closeness with the US government pushed Odinga and his followers further towards the Eastern Bloc than they might otherwise have travelled. President Kenyatta, although backed by the British, had sought to maintain relatively neutral in the first few years after independence. Yet a few developments in 1965, some contingent in nature, shifted the balance of power: African socialism was adopted as Kenya’s economic blueprint; Pinto, a crucial figure in the radical group and well connected with Communist countries, was assassinated; and eventually, the discovery of arms in Odinga’s home posed a prominent threat to Kenyatta’s dominance. Sino-Kenyan bilateral relations were adversely affected by these domestic political developments.

This thesis also argues that Communist China’s direct influences on Kenyan political struggles were often overestimated by the limited intelligence services of Kenya and the West. Even in the most radicalised period of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government and its Kenyan embassy never sought to impose any regime change in Nairobi. The escalation from verbal attacks into physical conflicts between Beijing and Nairobi in early 1967 was a reflection of the complex and sometimes contradictory

nature of the Cold War in Africa: Despite political controversy, trade relations between Kenya and China continued to grow steadily. The shifting alliances during Kenya's succession struggle also suggests the inadequacy of regarding Cold War protagonists solely through an ideological prism.

In contrast to the 'introverted' nature of Kenyan politics, this thesis argues that Zambia's active participation in both regional and global affairs had direct consequences for Sino-Zambian relations in 1966-1974. China provided important moral and material support for Zambia's position with regard to southern Africa. Despite their political differences, Zambian elites maintained a relative high consensus that any alleged Chinese Communist threat would not be allowed to fuel power struggles within the ruling party UNIP. In contrast to Kenya's troubled relations with China in the second half of the 1960s, Sino-Zambian relations survived even the most disruptive years of the Cultural Revolution and Kaunda's personal attachments with Chinese leaders became even stronger. This thesis argues that Mao's revolutionary thoughts, embedded in the military training provided by China and to a lesser extent in Kaunda's introduction of the one-party rule, were mutually reinforcing.

In addition to these governmental dynamics, non-state actors – in the form of varied people-to-people initiatives – played a critical role in the communications between, and mutual perceptions of, Chinese and Zambians. This thesis challenges homogeneous characterisations of Afro-Asian solidarity by examining these diverse relationships, analysing the impact of cultural performances, football matches, and Chinese traditional medicine. It therefore contributes to the disaggregation of histories of the global Cold War. Zambia's trade relations with China, although experiencing steady

growth from independence onwards, were constrained by its landlocked geographical location. The case study of Zambia's maize deal with China reveals the discrepancy between the ambition and limited agency of many African countries in materialising their national interests vis-à-vis Cold War protagonists.

This thesis illustrates how Kenya and Zambia's relations with China in the last two decades of the Cold War were affected by and demonstrated the profound changes in both domestic and international politics during this period. China's foreign policy towards Africa during the reform era was increasingly pragmatic, a position articulated by Premier Zhao Ziyang during his tour of African countries in 1982-1983. As China's international outlook shifted from Soviet alignment to Western orientation, its asserted leadership in the 'Third World' also came under considerable challenge.

This thesis compares Kenya and Zambia's distinctive perceptions of China's policy shift during this period. In the second half of the 1970s, Kenya's political hostility to Communist China started to soften following the latter's ideological shift from radical communism to a tacit diplomatic alliance with the West. Kenya's new generation of leaders under President Moi engaged positively with China's reform agenda and initiated bilateral collaboration based on material benefits, demonstrating a significant degree of continuity with the country's position towards China from the early post-independence period. It is then argued that it was China's position that had unpredictably come into line with Kenya.

Zambia's relations with Communist China at the same period, while certainly closer, were also more complicated and sometimes contradictory. China's Maoist model, once

attractive for UNIP's pursuit of sustained economic development under the leadership of a one-party state, lost credit by the end of the 1970s with the launch of China's grand reform strategy. Accordingly, competing southern African liberation movements threatened the two country's declared 'brotherhood', while tensions arose as China's construction of the 'Uhuru' Railway failed to deliver satisfactory economic results in exchange for the debt burden incurred by Zambia. By historicising and disaggregating Kenya and Zambia's relations with China, this thesis rejects the tokenistic approach to so-called African agency in much of the existing literature of China-Africa relations, and demonstrates that ideology-driven political friendship could be potentially damaging for bilateral relations in a fast-changing and unpredictable international environment.

With its primary focus on economic activities such as investments and trade, the existing literature on 'China in Africa' has neglected the importance of historical connections and discourses in understanding the complexity of these relationships. Following the end of the Cold War, both Kenya and Zambia experienced different forms of political and economic liberalisation, as occurred elsewhere in the world. Yet no such 'dual liberalisation' took place in China: the political regime maintained its robust control over the country while gradually transforming its economy into a more market-oriented, and capital-driven entity. This 'global' China's renewed interests in Africa in the new millennium has, as a result, been less driven by a socialist political agenda than by the search for economic profits and resources. Just as China's unique historical trajectory from a 'Third World' leader to a leading global economy means that it poses an attractive model for many African leaders to follow, its hybridity of

socialist and capitalist features is best exemplified in the discourse of anti-imperialist nostalgia in China-Africa relations.

This thesis problematizes the distinction in these relationships between the 'past' and the 'present'. As the experience of China-Kenya/Zambia relations over five decades indicates, history has played a significant role in constructing, reshaping and negotiating their mutual expectations through contemporary engagements. To analyse this, the thesis engages with the missing voices of many ordinary Chinese and Africans who experienced, participated and shaped these historical trajectories. Drawing from three case studies – Chinese copper mining in Zambia, China's medical practices in both Kenya and Zambia and the new Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya – this thesis analyses the ways in which the past has been differentially deployed by diverse actors to comprehend the present and contrast it to a desired future. The unproblematic past deployed in public rhetoric, although facilitating official relations between China and Zambia, has suffered from a backlash in which the daily encounters of Chinese and Zambians were affected by their perceptions of each other, shaped as they have been by both history as event and its contemporary deployment as myth. On the other hand, the deployment of history in Sino-Kenyan relations has been less benign given their diplomatic difficulties in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s, and thus explains the predominantly profit-driven and present-minded dynamics of both state and individual interactions today.

In order to overcome the clear intellectual and methodological limitations of the existing literature, this project brings together scholarship from multiple disciplines such as international relations, politics, and history, as well as several related

historiographies such as Cold War history, African history and Chinese history. To achieve this, the thesis makes innovative use of a wide range of archival sources (from national, provincial, municipal, party and private archives), the press as well as oral histories (elite interviews, memoirs, and participant observations).

This research draws on material from five national archives: the Kenya National Archive (KNA), the Zambia National Archive (ZNA), China's Foreign Ministry Archives (CFMA), the UK National Archives (TNA), as well as the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). In addition, the papers of Zambia's United National Independence Party (UNIP) provide particular insights into the period of one-party rule. This thesis also draws on the Kenyan, Zambian and Chinese press, particularly the East African Standard and Times of Zambia, Kenya and Zambia's respective leading English language newspapers, as well as Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Last but not least, the thesis draws on oral testimony collected either during the author's own fieldwork or from other oral history projects. In 2014, I interviewed both governmental and non-governmental actors who worked closely with Chinese mining companies in Zambia. In 2016 in both Zambia and Kenya, I conducted interviews with senior politicians, policymakers, and activists who have been involved in developing foreign relations with China and their countries' foreign policy more generally. In 2017, my target interviewees were non-state actors, such as Chinese aid doctors, private businessmen, as well as local staff of host governments who were closely involved in

Chinese affairs. In addition, this thesis has benefited from the memoirs produced by prominent actors during the Cold War period.

In conclusion, the title of this project 'Brotherly Strangers' has two implications: there is a rich history for 'strangers' such as China, Kenya and Zambia to draw on in their claims to be 'brotherly' and friendly; moreover, China-Africa relations should be understood as simultaneously international and interpersonal. By both historicising and disaggregating the relations of groups of Chinese, Kenyans and Zambians, this thesis avoids reaching simplistic conclusions of China-in-Africa as either neo-colonial or altruistic but instead driven by complicated sometimes contradictory rationales.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

The abbreviations and acronyms listed below cover the main text and footnotes, excluding the archival references, which are detailed in the bibliography. Non-English names are translated, and the relevant state is mentioned where otherwise unclear.

ALNK	Cameroonian National Liberation Army
AMWU	African Mineworkers' Union – *Northern Rhodesia*
BRI	One Belt and One Road initiative
CAF	Central African Federation
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CHINAT	Chinese Nationalist
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIF	Cost, Insurance and Freight
C&F	Cost & Freight
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DP	Democratic Party of Kenya
EAS	*East African Standard*
FAZ	Football Association of Zambia
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FLN	National Liberation Front – *Algeria*
FNLA	National Liberation Front of Angola
FOB	Free on Board
FORD	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – *Kenya*
FRELIMO	The Mozambique Liberation Front
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITC	International Trade Centre
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KPU	Kenya People's Union
KMT	Kuomintang/Chinese Nationalist Party – *Taiwan*
MMD	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy – *Zambia*
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MUZ	Mineworkers Union of Zambia
Namboard	National Agricultural Marketing Board – *Zambia*
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition – Kenya
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NRANC	Northern Rhodesian African National Congress – *Zambia*
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement – *Kenya*
OSDE	Oriental Song and Dance Ensemble – *China*
PF	Patriotic Front – *Zambia*
PII	Post-Imperial Ideology
PLA	People's Liberation Army – *China*
SGR	Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway – *Kenya*
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
TAZARA	The Tanzania Zambia Railway

ToZ	*Times of Zambia*
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNIP	United National Independence Party – *Zambia*
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UoN	University of Nairobi
UPC	Union of the Peoples of Cameroon
UPND	United Party for National Development – *Zambia*
UPP	United Progressive Party – *Zamia*
US	United States of America
ZANC	Zambia African National Congress
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZCCM	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited

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Finally, I owe thanks to all my friends and family. They are the ones who remind me to search for the inner light. My parents have always been supportive of their single child of the family. My thanks to their love and care are beyond words.

Introduction

“谁都知道，非洲离我们非洲遥远，可是，在感情上，它又是那样的贴近我们。

我们都想多了解一些非洲的事情，偏偏我们过去了解得不多。……

我们和许多人初次见面，可是，战斗的友谊早把我们维系在一起了。”

Everyone knows that Africa is very far from us. But emotionally, it is so close to us.

We all want to learn more about Africa, but we did not know much in the past. ……

We met many people for the first time, but the militant friendship had already united us together.[1]

Han Beiping, 1964

This thesis examines post-colonial Kenya and Zambia’s relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from ideological, political, economic and social perspectives, encompassing encounters between Kenyans, Zambians and Chinese as well as state relations. China’s growing significance in Africa is a popular subject in the media and academia but has hitherto been little analysed from a historical dimension. Through the triangulation of the global Cold War, African history, and Chinese history, the study examines the encounters, conflicts, and dynamics of China-Kenya/Zambia relations from 1961 until 2000, as well as the basis on which historical narratives regarding Chinese encounters with Kenyans/Zambians have been constructed. In doing so, it explains the development of these relationships and sheds light on the historical underpinnings – or lack thereof – on contemporary China-Africa relations.

[1] Han Beiping 韩北屏, *Feizhou Yehui* 非洲夜会 (Encounter with Africa) (Tianjin: Baihua Edition, 1964), pp. 239-241.

China in Africa

Despite its growing role in shaping the international economic and political order as a whole, few topics about China's remarkable ascension to global superpower have captured the interest and imagination of both popular and academic audiences more than China's renewed engagement with the African continent. Africa has become a major platform from which to analyse and understand China's growing influence in the global South. Since 2000 research on 'China in Africa' has generated scholarship from a range of disciplinary backgrounds, mainly political sciences, international relations, economics, anthropology and sociology.[2] Nevertheless, the history of Chinese relations with Africa has been largely underrepresented. Considered either too recent to constitute 'historical facts' or insignificant in the formation of contemporary metanarratives, historical relations between China and Africa during the period analysed by this thesis are often discussed briefly and in reductionist ways before referring to their ongoing changing dynamics.

In order to overcome this limitation, it is necessary to address the 'two-sided' epistemological challenge of writing on China-Africa relations: on the one hand, there is a problematic tendency towards an oversimplified 'dragon in the bush' narrative; on the other hand, this China-Africa literature carries a strong moral baggage shaped by

[2] For a summary of the vast literature on this topic, see: May Tan-Mullins, "China and Africa", *Oxford Bibliographies* (Oxford University Press, 2016), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199920082/obo-9780199920082-0137.xml; Meine Pieter van Dijk, "China in Africa", *Oxford Bibliographies* (Oxford University Press, 2017), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199846733/obo-9780199846733-0192.xml; "Course Outlines & Bibliographies", China-Africa Knowledge Project Resource Hub, http://china-africa.ssrc.org/teaching-research-resources/course-outlines-reading-lists-bibliographies/.

Africa's colonial past and racialised discourse.[3] According to Large, this scholarship risks characterising China's rise in Africa in terms of 'a monolithic Chinese dragon in an un-variegated African bush stripped of historical and political content.'[4] For contemporary observers, there are two dominant but contrasting images of China. In the first three decades since its independence, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remained in the shadow of its Marxist-Leninist roots, its worldview rooted in its absolute domination of power, a command and control economy, and a vehemently anti-imperialist revolutionary agenda. Since Deng Xiaoping's 'Opening-Up' in 1978, however, China has embraced a market economy and a pragmatic foreign policy. This 'new' China, dominated by economic imperatives, has increasingly sought out natural resources and the sale of its goods to global market, particularly in the global South. The changes (and continuities) in China's positions mean that parallels with Europe's historical experiences in Africa are not particularly revealing. Two ends of the analytical spectrum tend to monopolise the discourse: critics highlight the more exploitative aspects of Chinese engagement with Africa while more sympathetic observers emphasise the opportunities presented by a supposed alternative approach to Western capitalist relations.[5]

[3] Yuzhou Sun, "The Two Challenges of Writing China-Africa Relations", Oxford University China Africa Network, Official Blog, 3 February 2016, https://oucan.politics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/blog/14178-the-two-challenges-of-writing-china-africa-relations, accessed in February 2019.
[4] Daniel Large, "Beyond 'Dragon in the Bush': The Study of China–Africa Relations", *African Affairs* 107, 426 (2008), pp. 45–61.
[5] For examples of critics, see: Pádraig Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011); Howard W. French, *China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa* (New York: Knopf, 2014). For examples of positive views, see: Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Dambisa Moyo, *Winner Take All: China's Race for Resources and What It Means for Us* (London: Penguin, 2013); Deborah Brautigam, *Will Africa Feed China?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

The second epistemological challenge concerns the moral disposition of this China-Africa literature, shaped as it has been both by Africa's troubled colonial past and equally historically significant Western fear of the 'Yellow Peril' and communism. Because both China and Africa were subject to (albeit distinct) histories of Western dominance and racism, their historical connection in a framework of anti-imperialist and South-South cooperation exemplified a major challenge to the global order dominated first by Europe and subsequently, the United States. Their multifaced and disaggregated engagements contribute to our understanding of human encounters across geographical landscapes to embrace a more encompassing cosmopolitanism. This Sino-African relationship was fuelled by their respective understandings of modernity, which did not necessarily correspond to the Western ideal. These had the potential to challenge the boundaries of the long-held view of the global trajectory of human evolution, beyond Fukuyama's 'end of history'.[6]

A comprehensive investigation into what Julia Strauss called 'historical and rhetorical lineages in China relations with Africa', is therefore of both historiographical importance and great contemporary significance.[7] In particular, the ways in which this older Afro-Asian solidarity discourse is used to legitimise more recent political, economic and cultural connections between former 'Third World' allies remains both under-researched and underappreciated. This thesis argues that the uniqueness of China-Africa relations in both the socialist and post-socialist periods is reflected in its challenge to both the 'East/West' and the 'North/South' divides. Therefore, this project goes beyond the Cold War timeframe by examining China-Africa relations across a

[6] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992).
[7] Julia C. Strauss, "The Past in the Present: Historical and Rhetorical Lineages in China's Relations with Africa", *The China Quarterly* 199 (2009), pp. 777-795.

wide span of four decades from the 1960s until 2000. This enables an understanding of the extent to which the Cold War itself was the key influence on these enduring and complex relationships and how these relationships evolved following its conclusion.

Historicising Postcolonial African States, Domestic and Foreign Policy

The field of 'China and Africa' has been dominated by an international relations approach, which is primarily preoccupied with the nation-state as the hegemonic actor in global politics stripped of its domestic context. Earlier work by Taylor, Alden and Rotberg for example ubiquitously emphasises China's foreign policy goals in Africa as the key determinant of this relationship.[8] This was challenged by those who proposed to study Sino-African multifaceted relationship from a more nuanced African perspective.[9] However, their shared realist approach and focus on states failed to address the intimate and subtle interplay between domestic and foreign politics. This thesis not only recognises the problematic tendency to characterise Africa as a whole but also proposes to historicise the interrelationship of the domestic and foreign politics of postcolonial African states as well as their Chinese counterpart.

If an Afro-centred approach to historical analysis is to be pursued, the crucial question is: 'What history for which Africa?'[10] In the particular case of African history, the professionalised field of academic inquiry was born in the cradle of African nationalism

[8] Ian Taylor, *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise* (London: Routledge, 2006); Chris Alden, *China in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2007); Robert Rotberg, *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008).
[9] Kweku Ampiah, and Naidu Sanusha (eds.), *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008); Giles Mohan and Ben Lampert, "Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into China-Africa Relations", *African Affairs* 112, 446 (2012), pp. 92–110.
[10] Bogumil Jewsiewicki and David S. Newbury (eds.), *African Historiographies: What History for Which Africa?* (London: Sage Publications, 1986).

and quickly harnessed to its mission. As the early research agenda of African history was profoundly shaped by the nationalist fervour of the 1950s and 1960s,[11] it was hard to resist the temptation to write back against a long tradition of racist, imperialist European scholarship that denied the continent any meaningful, authentic past worthy of the historian's craft.[12] This search for nationalist history was also fuelled by national universities in newly independent African countries, the most famous exponents being the Ibadan School and the Dar es Salaam School.[13] This task was often achieved through what Hobsbawm and Ranger famously called 'the invention of tradition', in the sense that 'certain values and norms of behaviour' were inculcated by repetition, 'which automatically implies continuity with the past'.[14] This was most evidently reflected in both Kenya and Zambia's elaboration of African socialism as embedded in the supposedly communal nature of 'traditional' African societies, which will be critically analysed in Chapter Two.[15]

This nationalist approach to historical writing and research was heavily critiqued in the late 1960s and the 1970s. In Franz Fanon's epic work *The Wretched of the Earth*, the mismatched promises of independence and freedom indicated the 'pitfalls of national consciousness'.[16] A group of so-called 'radical pessimists', in the words of Freund,

[11] See much of the work of Basil Davidson, for example, *The African Past: Chronicles from Antiquity to Modern Times* (London: Longmans, 1964); *Africa in History: Themes and Outlines* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968).
[12] Terence Ranger (ed.), *Emerging Themes in African History: Proceedings* (Nairobi: East Africa Pub. House, 1968).
[13] Donald Denoon and Adam Kuper, "Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation: The 'New Historiography' in Dar es Salaam", *African Affairs* 69, 277 (1970), pp. 329-349; J. I. Dibua, "The Idol, Its Worshippers, and the Crisis of Relevance of Historical Scholarship in Nigeria", *History in Africa* 24 (1997), pp. 117-137; Toyin Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2001).
[14] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.1.
[15] Henry S. Meebelo, *Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought* (Lusaka: Oxford University Press, 1973); Ahmed Mohiddin, *African Socialism in Two Countries* (London: Croom Helm, 1981).
[16] Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: Penguin, 2001), pp. 119-166.

reverted to structuralist methodological approaches such as class analysis, dependency theory, and neo-Marxism to explain their disappointment with the accommodation of African political economies with global capital in the context of superpower competition.[17] Neo-colonialism, the continued economic dominance of the West over former colonies, was a common accusation, historicised for example in Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.[18] While Fitch and Oppenheimer regretted Ghana's failure to pursue fully-fledged Marxism, Leys analysed the way in which Kenya was 'locked into' a subordinate role in the global market.[19] Shaw labelled Kenya 'a sub-imperial state at the centre of the 'periphery', a 'client' which is able to exert dominance in the region of the Third World.'[20] Zambia, according to Shaw, was unwilling to replace its 'inheritance of dependence on foreign trade, capital, technology and skills'.[21] In general, what had been heralded in the 1960s as progressive achievements of independence were now denounced as nothing but an illusion.

However, these such studies, generally from a political science perspective, have a problematic tendency to separate foreign policy from domestic political environment, thereby distorting the actual history of Kenya and Zambia's relationship with both regional and global actors. Their inherently linear understanding of human history and obsession with grand metanarratives of modernisation were also troublesome. The scholarship of Cooper, however, found new ways of transcending the rigid separation

[17] Bill Freund, *The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society Since 1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).
[18] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1972).
[19] Robert Beck Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of An Illusion* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966); Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism 1964–1971* (London: Heinemann, 1975).
[20] Timothy M. Shaw, "International Stratification in Africa: Sub-Imperialism in Southern and Eastern Africa", *Journal of Southern African Affairs* 2, 2 (1977), p. 145.
[21] Timothy M. Shaw, "The Foreign Policy of Zambia: Ideology and Interests", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, 1 (1976), p. 97.

of nationalist history from imperial history, and places great emphasis on comparative research.[22] By recognising both the 'possibilities' and 'constraints' of African independence, Cooper emphasises the importance to avoid writing the past from the present.[23] As Ellis argues, 'Africa needs more than ever a contemporary history that is sensitive to the depth of time', and perhaps one possible solution is to think 'more in terms of a world history in which Africa has its part'.[24] Some historians of Africa have begun to grapple with this challenge by offering empirically-grounded historical narratives to reject the methodological nationalism that besets much analysis of postcolonial African states' foreign policy. Branch's account of Kenyan politics since independence shows how the country's ambiguous path was chosen, and how political uncertainty prevailed until today.[25] Larmer's history of opposition politics in Zambia also seeks to 'avoid the pitfalls of teleological meta-narratives of nationalism, modernisation and developmentalism'.[26] Cullen and Grilli's respective studies of Kenya and Ghana's foreign policy have also contributed to an understanding of postcolonial African states beyond narrow-minded national histories.[27] To echo Larmer and Lecocq's proposition to rethink nationalism as a political ideology and force in Africa outside the boundaries of the postcolonial African state,[28] this thesis aims to

[22] Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005); Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
[23] Frederick Cooper, "Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective," *Journal of African History* 49, 2 (2008), pp. 167-196.
[24] Stephen Ellis, "Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa", *Journal of African History* 43 (2002), p. 26.
[25] Daniel Branch, *Kenya: In Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011* (New Have: Yale University Press, 2011).
[26] Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 10.
[27] Poppy Cullen, *Kenya and Britain After Independence: Beyond Neo-Colonialism* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Matteo Grilli, *Nkrumaism and African Nationalism: Ghana's Pan-African Foreign Policy in the Age of Decolonization* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
[28] Miles Larmer and Baz Lecocq, "Historicising Nationalism in Africa", *Nations and Nationalism* 24, 4 (2018), pp. 893-917.

historicise domestic and foreign policy of Kenya and Zambia, which have been both influenced by and impacted on the global political dynamics.

The Global Cold War and Decolonisation

The end of the Second World War witnessed the emergence of a dramatically different global order: the colonial powers were in a weakened state, becoming poorer and far less stable; the United States and the Soviet Union were poised to become the new 'super-powers' and neither had a vested interest in buttressing the existing system of colonial rule. The significance of this global shift of power was revealed clearly in the subsequent competitions for influence between the two blocs in new African countries.

Traditional understandings of the Cold War as essentially an East-West confrontation dominated by the two superpowers have been frequently criticised.[29] Benefiting from the increasing availability of state archives and other sources, a new generation of historians has reflected on the origins and nature of the Cold War, and challenged the historiography's dominant emphasis on the motivations of Washington, Moscow and their respective allies. The turn of the century witnessed the rise of what is commonly known as the 'new international history of the Cold War'.[30] The leading figure of this revolutionary approach, Odd Arne Westad, took these previously ignored 'peripheries' seriously, arguing that the most important aspects of the Cold War were neither military

[29] For introductory overviews of the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2005); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2006*,10th edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008).
[30] Odd Arne Westad, "The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms", *Diplomatic History* 24 (2000), pp. 551-565.

nor strategic, nor Europe-centred, but connected to political and social development in the 'Third World'.[31]

First used by French journalists to describe the developing areas in the early 1950s, the term 'Third World' became a 'convenient political catchphrase' following the landmark Bandung Conference of the Afro-Asian solidarity in 1955.[32] This predominantly poor, non-white, and initially non-aligned area of the globe belonged ideologically to neither the West nor the East, challenging the bipolar character of the global order and the work of many political scientists who failed to address the variation of ideas and movements in most of these places and their people. According to Lawrence, the PRC enjoyed 'the most complicated relationship to non-alignment': while continuously casting itself as member of the Third World, it also tended to gain influence 'in the way of the US and the Soviet Union'.[33] Both Friedman and Brazinsky have demonstrated China's search for status and supporters in the vast majority of Asia, Africa and Latin America, through their respective comparative studies of China's foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union and the United States.[34]

Between 1949 and 1979, China's foreign policy was shaped by what were understood to be mainly ideological considerations. China sought to break out of isolation and to secure international recognition and support, most notably its (ultimately) successful accession into the United Nations. Writing during Mao Zedong's rule, analysts such as

[31] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Makings of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[32] Robert J. McMahon, "Introduction", in Robert J. McMahon (ed.), *The Cold War in the Third World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 3.
[33] Mark Atwood Lawrence, "The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment", in McMahon, *The Cold War in the Third World*, p. 145.
[34] Jeremy Scott Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Gregg Brazinsky, *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

Larkin, Yu, Hutchison, and Ogunsanwo studied the evolution and effectiveness of China's anti-imperialist revolutionary agenda towards Africa.[35] In particular, Larkin and Ogunsanwo should be appreciated for avoiding the reproduction of anti-Communist attitudes dominant in the West. Aid or economic assistance was a key aspect of China's policy towards Africa, especially in comparison with the Soviet Union.[36] The specific case of the TAZARA Railway was studied in the 1970s by Yu, Barley and Hall and Peyman.[37] A decade later and before the end of the Cold War, Snow's work sought to bridge the gap between revolutionary China and China during Deng Xiaoping's reform era through the prism of win-win and South-South cooperation.[38]

The main limitation of these studies was however their realist approach that focused almost exclusively on states and their foreign policies. While this thesis certainly contributes to the history of international relations and diplomacy, it pays equal attention to ideas, cultures, and social mobility. According to Kwon, the global Cold War involved unequal relations of power among political communities that pursued or were driven to pursue a specific path of progress within the binary structure of the global order.[39] While the 'contest-of-power' has been an explicit theme of the Cold

[35] Bruce Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949–1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1971); George Yu, *China's Africa Policy: A Study of Tanzania* (New York: Praeger, 1975); Alan Hutchison, *China's African Revolution* (London: Hutchinson, 1975); Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958~1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
[36] Warren Weinstein (ed.), *Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1975)**;** Warren Weinstein and Thomas H Henriksen (eds.), *Soviet and Chinese aid to African nations* (New York: Praeger, 1980).
[37] George T. Yu, "Working on the Railroad: China and the Tanzania-Zamia Railway", *Asian Survey* 11, 11 (1971), pp. 1101-1117; Martin Bailey, *Freedom Railway: China and the Tanzania-Zambia Link* (London: Rex Colins, 1976); Richard Hall and Hugh Peyman, *The Great Uhuru Railway: China's Showpiece in Africa* (London: Gollancz, 1976);
[38] Philip Snow, *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988).
[39] Heonik Kwon, *The Other Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

War, the extent to which it rested on what Kwon terms the 'relation-of-domination' has been relatively neglected. As a social anthropologist himself, Kwon sought to study the 'other' Cold War as 'rooted in specific localities, in family ritual, and in the proximity to mass death'.[40]

Kwon's sociocultural approach to the study of the Cold War is clearly relevant to the context of African decolonisation. Postcolonial African states, societies, ideas and practices need to be understood within what Jeremi Suri described as the 'historical intersections' of on-going decolonisation, global waves of social mobilisation, and Cold War realpolitik:

> Cold War bipolarity was global in scope, and it affected not only relations with foreign societies, but also basic definitions of identity for newly emerging states which had to choose, in some form, which system they would adopt. Capitalist–communist rivalries inspired revolutionary political movements, and they offered almost certain sources of foreign assistance for figures – from Fidel Castro to Ho Chi Minh to Patrice Lumumba – seeking to build new states in former colonial territories. [41]

The local dynamics of postcolonial Africa thus preceded impact of the Cold War, but also interacted with it in important ways. Regarding the Third World as a *project* rather than a place, Prashad challenged the concept of a hegemonic order by analysing the ideas and initiatives of those 'new states': 'What they got instead was a compromise ideology called Arab Socialism, African Socialism, Sarvodaya, or NASAKOM that combined the promise of equality with the maintenance of social hierarchy.'[42] In my research, I have analysed various theoretical approaches of socialism, the historical

[40] Nick Cullather, "Narratives Are All We Have and All We Will Ever Have – Review of *The Other Cold War*", *H-Diplo Roundtable Review* XIII, 6 (2011), p. 11.
[41] Jeremi Suri, "The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global Social Awakenings: Historical Intersections", *Cold War History*, 6 (2006), pp. 353-363.
[42] Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (London: New Press, 2007), p. xvii.

context in which they operated and the distinctive practices they generated (Chapter Two).

Significant attempts to move away from the restrictive centre-periphery frameworks have been made within the transnational and global history framework, i.e. the 'global' turn. Byrne illustrates that two particularly important areas of this 'global turn' were Cold War and anti-colonial/post-colonial international history.[43] Elizabeth Schmidt, analysing foreign political and military intervention in Africa during the overlapping periods of decolonization (1956–1975) and the Cold War (1945–1991), concluded that: 'Although independence struggles and their aftermath were dominated by local issues, Cold War intervention rendered the conflicts more lethal and the consequences longer lasting.'[44] A number of other scholars have been similarly drawn to the more militant entanglement of postcolonial African politics within the global Cold War. The Algerian war of independence, according to Connelly, was influenced by a set of interconnected developments such as 'Cold War competition and regional rivalries, the spread of mass communications and emigrant communities, and the proliferation of international and non-governmental organizations'.[45] The Congo Crisis in 1960-1965 provides another important example. Patrice Lumumba, first Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, was described by Namikas as:

> … a clear victim of both nineteenth-century-style imperialism and the realities of the post-1945 Cold War. He had been born in a colonial stronghold, where little had changed in the last half century, and had matured during World War II and the early years of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. He witnessed the promise of the decolonization

[43] Jeffrey James Byrne, "Reflecting on the Global Turn in International History or: How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love Being a Historian of Nowhere", *Rivista italiana di storia internazionale* 1 (2018), pp. 11-42.
[44] Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 2.
[45] Matthew James Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

> throughout Africa become engulfed in conflicts and challenges because of the Cold War.[46]

Namikas uses archival material from both blocs to enrich her narrative of the first 'hot' conflict on the continent during the ideological confrontation. Benefiting from his unusual access to Cuban archives, Gleijeses argues that Havana did not intervene in Congo and later in Angola as a 'proxy' of Moscow, but instead, as an independent global actor in pursuit of its distinctive revolutionary vision.[47] Similarly regarding Cuba as an autonomous driving force, Hatzky sought to understand the motivations of individual Cubans for participating in military and civil engagement in Angola beyond their state's official discourse.[48] Historians have also sought to understand the lived experience of southern African liberation movements and their forces, in their engagements with in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Alexander and McGregor have studied the military training of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)'s intelligence cadres in the Soviet Union focusing on their individual experience and perceptions.[49] Williams has traced the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) across its three decades in exile through rich, local histories of the camps in Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola where its guerrillas interacted with Soviet, Cuban and East European instructors.[50] Schenck focuses on the nostalgia expressed by former Angolan and Mozambican worker trainees for life in East Germany.[51] Building on the

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[46] Lise A. Namikas, *Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960-1965* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013), p. 3.
[47] Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Piero Gleijeses, "Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975-1988", *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8, ii (2006), pp. 3-51.
[48] Christine Hatzky, *Cubans in Angola: South-South Cooperation and Transfer of Knowledge, 1976-1991* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2015).
[49] Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, "African Soldiers in the USSR: Oral Histories of ZAPU Intelligence Cadres' Soviet Training, 1964–1979", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, 1 (2017), pp. 49-66.
[50] Christian A. Williams, *National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa: A Historical Ethnography of SWAPO's Exile Camps* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[51] Marcia C. Schenck, "A Chronology of Nostalgia: Memories of Former Angolan and Mozambican

above achievements, this thesis makes one of the first attempts to bring the Chinese perspective and archival material to bear in analysing encounters between Africans and people of the East. China's 'alternativeness' in engaging with African actors will challenge the conventional understanding of the divisions of East and West, North and South in African decolonisation.

Kenya and Zambia as 'Brotherly Strangers' of China

Bearing in mind the above analytical and methodological concerns, this thesis examines post-colonial Kenya and Zambia's relations with China from ideological, political, economic and social perspectives, encompassing encounters between Kenyan, Zambian and Chinese states and people. Far from being easily manipulated by external powers driven by fixed ideologies and geopolitical interests, both Kenya and Zambia approached, deepened and negotiated their relations with China during the process of decolonisation and in the decades after independence in ways that shed light both on their own histories, and on the wider history of Africa-China relations during the Cold War. Rejecting the dominant narrative of China's 'grand policy' as applied to the Cold War period for its underestimation if not ignorance of African agency, this thesis highlights the inconsistency and diversity of China-Kenya/Zambia engagements within and beyond the state.

Both subject to British rule since the late nineteenth century, Kenya and Zambia became independent in 1963 and 1964 respectively. While Kenya's transfer of power was complicated by the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952–1960, both ruling parties – the Kenya

Worker Trainees to East German", *Labor History* 59, 3 (2018), pp. 352-374.

African National Union (KANU) and United National Independence Party (UNIP) – achieved power through elections and a relatively peaceful transfer of power.[52] From the perspective of Beijing, KANU and UNIP were mass parties led by African nationalists, as opposed to a vanguard party such as the South Africa Communist Party. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, China's attitudes and strategies towards Kenya and Zambia were not substantially different from other parts of the world undergoing decolonisation: it offered limited material support to the countries' anticolonial struggles (Chapter One). Both countries established diplomatic relations with the PRC immediately after their independence. As Chapter Two will show, both governments adopted forms of African socialism as a guide to national development in the mid-1960s.[53] In terms of foreign policy, both Kenya and Zambia declared themselves to be non-aligned, and were active members of the Afro-Asian solidarity conferences. In reality, however, Kenya's international outlook was largely pro-Western: it was heavily reliant upon global markets and especially the British for military support. Zambia, although also dependent on global mineral sales, was ideologically more sympathetic towards the Communist bloc, though not as radical as its neighbour Tanzania. Chapter Three will show that, after China's launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, its diplomatic relations with Kenya quickly deteriorated, and were frozen until the 1970s.[54] China's ties with Zambia during the same period grew stronger and robust: China helped Zambia to build its transnational railway to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam,

[52] David Birmingham, *The Decolonization of Africa* (London: UCL Press, 1995).
[53] Republic of Kenya, *Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism* (Nairobi: 1965); Kenneth Kaunda, *A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin M. Morris Kenneth D. Kaunda* (London: Longmans, 1966).
[54] Hutchison, *China's African Revolution*, p. 116; Wang Qinmei 汪勤梅, "Zhongfeiguanxi Zhong de yige Quzheqifu" 中非关系中的一个曲折起伏 (Twists and Turns of Sino-African Relations), in *Peking University African Studies Series: China and Africa* (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2000), pp. 59-71.

and also supported southern African liberation movements active in the region and in Zambia in particular (Chapter Four).[55]

The late 1970s witnessed China's great transformation from a socialist state to a liberal economy. Chapter Five will demonstrate that, while Kenyan elites perceived this as a positive gesture, this ideological shift was viewed more suspiciously by Zambian leaders, who felt somewhat abandoned by China's new international orientation.[56] The end of the Cold War had an enduring impact on Kenya and Zambia, as both experienced dual liberalisation in their political and economic systems.[57] China's 'return' to Africa, this time driven more by economic than political motives, provided opportunities but also challenges to Kenya and Zambia. The deployment of the historical past in the present is, as will be explored in Chapter Six, mostly evident in different aspects of their ever increasing and diversified interaction.

The thesis title, 'brotherly strangers', identifies two ends of the spectrum in terms of characterising China-Africa relations, 'strange' in the sense of their diverse historical trajectories, but 'brotherly' in terms of an alleged shared lineage. The dynamics of their changing relations across a wide span of time is illustrated by the comparative studies of Kenya and Zambia's respective relations with China. From a Chinese state perspective, Zambia has been primarily of political/strategic importance, whereas Kenya, although politically estranged and even hostile, has demonstrated greater

[55] Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958~1971*, pp. 204-213; Hall and Peyman, *The Great Uhuru Railway: China's Showpiece in Africa*.
[56] Zheng Kejun 郑克军, "八十年代初期中国对非洲政策的调整" (Adjustments of China's Policy towards Africa in the Early 1980s"), in *Zhongguo yu Feizhou* 中国与非洲 (China and Africa) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2000), pp. 87-99.
[57] Paul Nugent, *Africa Since Independence: A Comparative History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 411-422.

economic significance. Their distinctive historical legacies, and the variation in China's relations with specific African states, challenges both the 'taken for granted' role of the China-Africa historical lineage in contemporary literature, as well as its tendency to assume uniformity in these relationships.

This thesis also problematises the conventional distinction between the past and the present of China-Africa relations. As the case of China-Kenya/Zambia relations over five decades indicates, history has played a significant role in constructing, reshaping and negotiating these countries' mutual expectations through contemporary engagements. The unproblematic past deployed in public rhetoric, although facilitating official relations between China and Zambia, is challenged and undermined by the daily encounters of Chinese and Zambians. Their perceptions and misperceptions of each other are also shaped by both history as *event* and its contemporary deployment as *myth*.[58] In contrast, the deployment of history in Sino-Kenyan relations is less benign given their diplomatic conflicts in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s, at odds with the predominantly commercially-driven dynamics of both state and individual interactions.

After having discussed the rationale of using Kenya and Zambia's relations with China to understand the broader relevance of the global Cold War to postcolonial African history, a related question arises: would my research findings be different if other African countries, such as Tanzania, were selected? Brautigam argues: 'Tanzania and Zambia may be China's oldest and closest friends in sub-Saharan Africa … For decades

[58] This concept is borrowed from Cohen's characterisation of the Boxer Movement as successively, an experience for its participants, an event for historians to analyse, and a myth for nationalists to utilise. See Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

afterwards the world knew of China's aid program through the Tan-Zam railway. Many were surprised to learn that China had done anything else in Africa.'[59] This comment captures the popular perception of China-Africa historical relations: China's aid to Africa is central to their supposedly benign past. In recent years, there has been increasing study of China's historical legacy in Tanzania under Nyerere. Monson studied the lived experience of TAZARA through the prism of how today's local community deployed the narrative of solidarity and socialism to justify their needs.[60] Tanzania's version of socialism, or *ujamaa*, has also been studied enthusiastically on multiple terrains, including as a variation of global Maoism.[61] Roberts uses Dar es Salaam as a prism through which to analyse the intersection of the Cold War and decolonisation.[62] While the above studies all illustrate China's substantial relations with Tanzania, their collective findings are arguably less representative of the history of China-Africa relations as a whole – since the majority of the continent had more limited and frequently more hostile relations with 'red' China. In contrast, the useful comparative approach taken by this thesis seeks to reveal the diversity and complexity of such relations: while a commonly perceived pro-Western country like Kenya has however maintained robust trade relations with China throughout the period under analysis, a non-aligned country such as Zambia did not always enjoy an 'all-weather friendship' with China on issues such as southern African liberation movements.

[59] Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift*, p. 41.
[60] Jamie Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).
[61] Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Priya Lal, "Maoism in Tanzania: Material Connections and Shared Imaginaries," in Alexander Cook (ed.), *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 96–116.
[62] George Roberts, "Politics, Decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam c. 1965-72" (University of Warwick, PhD thesis, 2016).

Methodology and Sources

The existing scholarship on the history of China-Africa relations has clear intellectual and methodological limitations. On the one hand, most Africanists whose research engage with China cannot read or write in Chinese, which fundamentally limits their understanding of this engagement. On the other hand, Sinologists who study China's foreign relations during the Cold War have made few efforts to engage with the rich historiography of Africa. This project brings together scholarship from multiple disciplines such as international relations, politics, and history, as well as several related historiographies such as Cold War history, African history and Chinese history. To achieve this, the thesis makes innovative use of a wide range of archival sources (from national, provincial, municipal, party and private archives), the press as well as oral histories (elite interviews, memoirs, and participant observations).

Given the nature of the research, transnational in the perspective it takes and with an extended timeframe covering late-colonial, post-colonial and more contemporary historically-informed experiences, it is essential to consider the challenges presented by the 'postcolonial archive'. Luise White summarises historical writings on Africa after 1960 as based on 'some combination of metropolitan archives, newspapers and the contentious grounded knowledge in memoirs and interviews.'[63] In a similar vein, Gregory Mann is quoted to characterise the archives available for the postcolonial period as 'scattered, contingent and partial as the history they imperfectly capture'.[64] The nature of the 'colonial archive' has been a heated debate in the last two decades,

[63] Luise White, "Introduction – Suitcases, Roads, and Archives: Writing the History of Africa after 1960", *History in Africa* 42 (2015), p. 265.
[64] Ibid., p. 266.

most famously in the work of Anna Laura Stoler.[65] As an anthropologist engaged in postcolonial theory, Stoler approaches archives as sites of 'knowledge production, as monuments of states as well as sites of state ethnography'.[66] This observation is also relevant in postcolonial context in the sense that the archive is a political entity, whose contents, organisational structures, and the accessibility (as well as inaccessibility) are determined by the postcolonial state.

The nature of this research means that use of archives and documents in multiple locations is necessary. This thesis draws on material from five national archives, the Kenya National Archive (KNA), the Zambia National Archive (ZNA), China's Foreign Ministry Archives (CFMA), the UK National Archives (TNA), as well as the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). I have also made use of the United National Independence Party Archives (UNIP) in both London and Lusaka, as well as the Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA).

In contrast to some African countries where postcolonial archives are virtually absent, both Kenya and Zambia have functional state archives that have relevant documents concerning their foreign relations with China. ZNA holdings on Zambia's relations with China concentrate on formal state visits and agreements, but also trade, cultural activities and propaganda. While the National Archives Act 1969 stipulates that all records transferred to the ZNA for safe keeping 'remain closed to the members of the

[65] Ann Laura Stoler, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance", *Archival Science* 2 (2002), pp. 87-109; Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Ricardo Roque and Kim A. Wagner, *Engaging Colonial Knowledge: Reading European Archives in World History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); David M. Anderson, "Mau Mau in the High Court and the 'Lost' British Empire Archives: Colonial Conspiracy or Bureaucratic Bungle?", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 39, 5 (2011), pp. 699-716;

[66] Stoler, 'Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance', p. 87.

public for twenty years', 'some owing to their nature of confidentiality continued to remain closed to members of the public.'[67] Except for files on TAZARA, China's relations with Zambia's Second Republic are completely missing from the state archives.

This limitation was partly mitigated through the access to the no less significant records of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Following UNIP's removal from power in 1991, however, the depository suffered from 'almost complete neglect and rapid decay.'[68] Most of the UNIP records were however digitised and made available by the Endangered Archives Programmes of the British Library, of which the most useful material covers UNIP's contacts with China from 1960 until 1980. This material enabled an analysis of Zambia's perception of China's transition in the early post-Mao era.

The digitised KNA, 'a reservoir and living example of historical and ethnographic knowledge', equally suffers from operational challenges such as its staff's lack of skills.[69] Many requested documents were reported as 'lost' or 'misplaced'. Despite this, I managed to acquire many useful and revealing documents about Kenya's relations with China, especially bilateral trade figures, and materials concerning economic and technical assistance. While the Ministry of Commerce and Industry produced most of the documents on Kenya-China relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only appeared

[67] P. M. Mukula, *Information About the National Archives of Zambia: A More Than Three-Decade Service of the Memory of the Party, its Government and the Nation, 1947-1981* (Lusaka: National Archives of Zambia, 1982), p. 7.
[68] "Preserving the archives of the United National Independence Party of Zambia (EAP121)", Endangered Archives Programme, British Library, https://eap.bl.uk/project/EAP121.
[69] Matthew Carotenuto and Katherine Luongo, "Navigating the Kenya National Archives: Research and Its Role in Kenyan Society", *History in Africa* 32 (2005), p, 445.

in inter-ministerial communications occasionally, something which reveals the primarily commercial relationship between Kenya and China.

My experience in conducting archival research in China includes China's Foreign Ministry Archives (CFMA) in Beijing and the Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA). The gradual opening of archival collections dealing with post-1949 China progressed in the 1990s and peaked in 2007 when the CFMA was opened for the first time to the public.[70] However, the government's control has recently tightened: the CFMA first withdrew 90 percent of its documents and was then closed temporarily in May 2014.[71] My last visit of the CFMA after it reopened in December 2016 echoed Minami's experience: the entries related to Kenya and Zambia belonged to 'two conspicuously uncontroversial' divisions of the Foreign Ministry: the International Organizations Division and the Protocol Division.[72]

In cases where the archives of both postcolonial Africa and the PRC are limited in accessibility or organisation, historians explore other possible locations of 'shadow' collections. In her study of Nkrumah's Ghana, Jean Allman addressed this challenge by constructing and accessing 'a global, transnational archive, ranging from Accra to Beijing, from New Delhi to Frankfurt, from Moscow to Bucharest, from Tel Aviv to Harlem'.[73] In my case, I have used the public records of the Dominions Office (DO),

[70] Arunabh Ghosh and Sören Urbansky, "China from without: Doing PRC History in Foreign Archives", *The PRC History Review* 2, 3 (2017), p. 1.
[71] Arunabh Ghosh, "Urgent Update on Foreign Ministry Archives, Beijing," *Dissertation Reviews*, 6 August 2013, http://dissertationreviews.org/archives/5411; Maura Cunningham, "Denying historians: China's archives increasingly off-bounds," *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 August 2014, https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/08/19/denying-historians-chinas-archives-increasingly-off-bounds/.
[72] Kazushi Minami, "China's Foreign Ministry Archive: Open or closed?", Wilson Center, 2 October 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/chinas-foreign-ministry-archive-open-or-closed.
[73] Jean Allman, "Phantoms of the Archive: Kwame Nkrumah, a Nazi Pilot Named Hanna, and the Contingencies of Postcolonial History-Writing", *The American Historical Review* 118, 1 (2013), p.

the Foreign Office (CO), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) located at the National Archives in London and the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Maryland. Record Group 59, the General Records of the Department of State is particularly helpful in terms of understanding Kenya/Zambia's evolving relations with Communist China from the perspective of a Cold War superpower.[74] In addition to the telegrams and memorandums produced for bureaucratic purposes, these collections also feature the perspectives of a diverse range of political actors driven by different mindsets, ambitions and emotions. As Chapter Three shows, the US embassy in Kenya was in close contact with many Kenyan ministers, whose 'voices' were recorded in such meetings.

In addition to multi-sited archival research, this thesis draws on the Kenyan, Zambian and Chinese press. I surveyed Kenya and Zambia's respective leading English language newspapers, i.e. *East African Standard* and *Times of Zambia*. The *East African Standard* is Kenya's oldest paper, reporting 'from pre-independence, through Uhuru, to post-independence.'[75] Along with the *Daily Nation*, it is one of the two best-selling dailies in Kenya and mostly popular in cities.[76] Established in the colonial period in the Copperbelt, the *Times of Zambia* was owned by Lonrho from 1965 until 1972, when the UNIP government appointed its own editor, and finally took over the newspaper in 1975.[77] According to Kasoma, the press in Zambia remained relatively free until

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[74] Note that the US Department of State referred to the Chinese Communist and the Nationalist government respectively as *CHICOM* and *CHINAT*. These terms are used as they are in the thesis.

[75] Brian Tetley, "Moving into the 21st Century," *East African Standard*, 20 February 1995, p. 6, quoted in Michelle Sikes, "Print Media and the History of Women's Sport in Africa: The Kenyan Case of Barriers to International Achievement", *History in Africa* 43 (2016), p. 328.

[76] Gerard Loughran, *Birth of a Nation: The Story of a Newspaper in Kenya* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 18-19.

[77] Francis Peter Kasoma, *The Press in Zambia: The Development, Role and Control of National Newspapers in Zambia, 1906-1983* (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1986).

Kaunda's 'tightening grip' in the 1970s and 1980s; Kenya, in contrast, enjoyed a longer period of relatively free press until the 1990s.[78] More than a simple reiteration of the ruling party or state propaganda, the press allowed a certain degree of dynamic exchange of opinions and ideas. However, it is necessary to bear in mind the limitation of using African newspapers as 'a journal of record'.[79] *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) is an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which provides direct information on the policies and viewpoints of the CCP. In cases where Chinese archives are missing or partial, *People's Daily* is a useful historical source for its coverage of specific events. More recent media coverage of China-Africa relations in publications such as *Daily Nation* and *Lusaka Times* can be accessed online.

Last but not least, the thesis benefits from oral testimony collected either during the author's own fieldwork or by other oral history projects. I first visited Zambia in 2014 to study Chinese mining activities in the Copperbelt. Interviews with both governmental and non-governmental actors who worked closely with Chinese mining companies are utilised in Chapter Six. In 2016, I spent three months each in Zambia and Kenya, conducting archival research as well as elite interviews. I found it relatively easier to approach retired senior politicians in Zambia than Kenya to discuss my research, partly as a result of the active deployment of a benign past of Sino-Zambian relations in the present. In 2017, my target interviewees were non-state actors, such as Chinese aid doctors, private businessmen, as well as local staff of host governments who were closely involved in Chinese affairs. In addition, this thesis has benefited from memoirs produced by prominent actors in the Cold War.

[78] Francis Peter Kasoma, "The Press and the Multiparty Politics in Africa" (University of Tampere, PhD thesis, 2000), p. 25.
[79] Ellis, 'Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa', p. 18.

The sources discussed above are not used evenly throughout the thesis but instead their use is determined by both the specific topics of the chapters and the quality of sources for different subjects and periods. State and party archives are used from Chapters One to Five but are less useful for analysis of recent Kenya/Zambia-China relations. Newspapers are used continuously from Chapter Two to Six. As there are few people surviving with memories of earlier historical periods, the oral histories feature mostly in the last chapter.

Structure of the Thesis

The chapters of the thesis proceed mainly in chronological order following this introduction. Chapter One sets out a background narrative of Communist China's foreign policy towards Africa in the context of decolonisation and the Cold War. Driven by its foreign policy of the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence', China advanced an essentially anti-imperialist global vision as a point of departure from that of the Soviet Union. The Bandung Conference held in 1955 allowed Chinese leaders to directly engage with their African counterparts, relations which would lead to formal diplomatic recognition as well as bilateral exchanges of delegates. Although limited in scale, China's initial contacts with nationalists in late colonial Kenya and Zambia were facilitated through personal connections, which alerted the British colonial authorities fearful of the spread of Communism.

The next chapter offers a historical analysis of African socialisms that rejects the 'derivative thesis' which tends to deny the agency and autonomy of African thinkers

and policymakers. Through comparative analysis of Kenyan 'African socialism' and Zambian 'Humanism' in terms of designing, advocating and experimenting with socialisms, it analyses the distinctive trajectories of Kenya and Zambia's relations with China in the 1960s, which are best explained by local dynamics reflecting the different party-state nexus in the two countries, and which are clearly observable in interactions between various government actors as well as the press.

While Chapter Two emphasises the exchange of socialist ideas between Kenya, Zambia and China, Chapters Three and Four focus on the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of their relations in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s. Chapter Three analyses how Kenyan elites took the initiative to develop and deepen relations with China and were able to negotiate favourable terms for aid for their country's development. It continues with an analysis of the tri-dimensional nature of post-independent Kenyan politics with relations to domestic political parties and factions and their respective foreign backers. It also highlights the notable feature of Kenyan foreign policy as driven by practical rather than ideological consideration.

Chapter Four focuses on the 'extraverted' nature of Zambian politics as opposed to Kenya. It begins with an analysis of China's moral and material contribution to the southern African liberation movements, a gesture much appreciated by Zambian leaders in deploying the grand narrative of China-Zambia 'all-weather friendship'. People-to-people exchanges were carried out by artists, doctors and athletes, whose diverse forms of interactions contributed to more complex state-to-state relationships. As illustrated in the case of its 1967 maize deal, Zambia's geographical constraints played a significant role in its trade relations with China.

Chapter Five analyses the development of Kenya and Zambia's relations with China in the last two decades of the Cold War. In tracing the profound changes taking place in Kenya, Zambia and China, it highlights the diversity of influences on their relations, driven both by ideological concerns and pragmatic calculations. In general, post-Mao China's reform agenda was viewed negatively by Zambian President Kaunda and his UNIP party, as compared to Kenya's new generation of leadership under President Moi.

The last chapter is divided into two sections. The first section contextualises both the structural framework and historical contingency of China's relations with Kenya and Zambia in the post-Cold War era. It argues that China's 'abnormal' experience of dual liberalisation had an enduring impact on its renewed engagement with Africa. The second section will analyse the often-blurred boundaries between the Communist China and the capital-driven global China in terms of the official rhetoric of China-Africa relations. Drawing from three key sectors of mining, health and construction, this chapter concludes that the past has been differentially deployed by different actors to comprehend the present and contrast it to a desired future.

Chapter One: Decolonisation, the Cold War and Afro-Asian Solidarity: China, Zambia and Kenya at a Crossroads

Introduction

"China and Africa" is a very old story. African goods such as ivory and incense were arriving in China from at least the 7th century AD. If the year 1492 is central to the 'rise of the West', the earlier 15th century is cited by Chinese observers as the start of China-Africa relations. Between 1418 and 1433, the Ming dynasty's (1368–1644) naval fleet of 63 vessels sailed to the East African coast: as is often mentioned, Zheng He's fleet occupied no land, but instead returned with local medicines, and a giraffe for the emperor. The long history of China's relations with Africa matters because it is continuously deployed to justify claims that this is a historical partnership based on mutual interest rather than imperial extraction. Of course, the majority of this 'usable past'[80] is that of the post-World War II period, when the new People's Republic of China (PRC) under Mao Zedong was a leader of the non-aligned movement and the new "Third World".

This chapter analyses the development of "Red" China's foreign policy in the historical context of African decolonisation, which set the stage for increasing Afro-Asian engagement during the Cold War. The history of Kenya and Zambia's relations with Communist China is not simply a collection of three nations' respective nationalist historical trajectories: postcolonial African states, societies, ideas and practices need to

[80] Terence Ranger, "Towards A Usable African Past", in Christopher Fyfe (ed.), *African Studies Since 1945: Tribute to Basil Davidson* (London: Longman, 1976), pp 17-30.

be understood within what Jeremi Suri described as the 'historical intersections' of on-going decolonisation, global waves of social mobilisation, and Cold War realpolitik.[81]

After explaining the presence of a Chinese community in Africa prior to the establishment of the PRC, this chapter discusses the dialectical theory of China's foreign policy and how it was changed in practical experience with Africa and the wider world. It then traces the origins of Afro-Asian solidarity and explains China's activities in Africa in the wake of the Bandung Conference of 1955. During Premier Zhou Enlai's Africa tour in 1963-1964, China released its pivotal 'eight principles for China's aid to foreign countries', which sought to consolidate its leadership role in the global South. Yet China's subsequent failed diplomatic endeavours in preparation for the Second Afro-Asian Conference demonstrated the limits of its role in the non-aligned movement.

Against the backdrop of wider geopolitical contestations and motives, the second part of the chapter analyses the relationship between Chinese Communist leaders and political elites in late colonial Kenya and Zambia. These early ties influenced China's decision to provide political and economic support to these postcolonial states during the 1960s. While a handful of Kenyan and Zambian nationalists viewed Communist China as an attractive model for revolution and modernisation, even limited expressions of Communist sympathies raised concern and thus vigilance on the part of the decolonising British authorities. This was an early sign that China's involvement in post-independence Kenya and Zambia would entail great controversy within these countries and globally.

[81] Suri, "The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global Social Awakenings", pp. 353-363.

Early Generations of Overseas Chinese in Africa

The idea of 'China' or 'Chineseness' is not only about the state itself. As important as state-to-state relations between China and Africa are interpersonal ties. In this sense, it is essential to draw attention to the existence of a Chinese community in Africa even before the establishment of the People's Republic of China. 'Overseas Chinese' is the common English translation of *huaqiao* (华侨). According to Pan, the epitome of such individual was 'a sojourner who enjoyed the protection of the Chinese govt (throughout its embassies or consulates), and who lived in spirit in China, politically, culturally and emotionally attached to his mother country.'[82] The Society for the Studies of Overseas Chinese reported in 1955 that there were 36,000 overseas Chinese in Africa, mostly resident in four African countries: Mauritius, South Africa, Madagascar and Reunion (see Appendix I). The Central African Republic and Kenya had only 166 and 50 Chinese residents respectively.[83] As these overseas Chinese had migrated long before 1949, their 'Chinese' identity did not owe its origins to the new Chinese Communist government.

Writing the history of China's initial encounter with Africa suffers from inherent methodological constraints. On the one hand, China's imperial archive of the Tang, Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties is vulnerable to 'distortion by secondary handlers';[84] on the other hand, 'no written records other than the tangible archaeological finds'

[82] Lynn Pan, *Sons of the Yellow Emperor* (London: Secker&Warbug, 1990), quoted in Melanie Yap and Dianne Leong Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996), p. 405.
[83] Society for the Studies of Chinese Overseas 华侨问题研究会, *Yafei diqu Huaqiao qingkuang jieshao* 亚非地区华侨情况介绍 (Introduction of Overseas Chinese in Asia and Africa), (1955).
[84] John Shen, "Foreword: Thoughts on the Use of Chinese Documents in the Reconstruction of East African History," in Li Anshan (ed.), *A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911* (New York: Diasporic Africa Press, 2012), pp. ii-iii.

could be identified in contemporary Africa.[85] It is generally believed that Admiral Zheng He's fleet had reached as far as Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu in today's Kenya, which makes the first third of the fifteenth century as the 'height of premodern Sino-African relations'.[86] In 1967, the secretary of the Royal Anthropological Institute in London confirmed that 'Indian and Chinese contacts with Africa began many centuries before the first Europeans rounded the Cape of Good Hope', as pieces of Chinese porcelain more than 1,000-year-old have been excavated on the Kenyan coast.[87] A record from the Tang dynasty (618-907) mentions the port of Malindi, and in 1225 a guide from a superintendent of foreign trade to East Africa described 'Zangibar' as the Land of the Black People, probably a reference to today's Zanzibar.[88] In addition to the official records of oriental traders, there were also tales of Chinese sailors who were shipwrecked on an island called Pate. They probably brought porcelains with them to local villages. As these Chinese sailors settled down and married locally, the village was named 'Shange', to resemble the pronunciation of Shanghai.[89] In 2005, a 19-year-old girl originally from the village of Siyu in the Lamu islands received a scholarship to pursue further studies in a Chinese college. This was based on her account that her forefathers were among those Chinese sailors.[90]

More recent Chinese migrants to Africa settled in Mauritius, Reunion and South Africa.

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[85] Karen L. Harris, "Contested Encounters (遭遇和竞争: 古代中非历史文献综述)", *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 13, 2 (2017), p. 249.
[86] J. L. L. Duyvendak, *China's Discovery of Africa* (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1949).
[87] "Historians gather the threads which link us with Asia", *Times of Zambia*, 14 April 1967.
[88] Ibid.; see also Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 1.
[89] Xia Chunping 夏春平 (ed.), *Shijie huawen chuanmei nianjian* 世界华文传媒年鉴 (Yearbook of Global Chinese Language Media), (Beijing: China News Service, 2011), p. 526.
[90] "Feature: Kenyan girl with Chinese blood steals limelight", *Xinhua*, 30 June 2005, http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/sbgx/t202741.htm, accessed in November 2017.

Between 1904 and 1910, a total of 63,695 Chinese indentured labourers were transported to South Africa to work on the Witwatersrand mines.[91] The labour scheme had an enduring impact on the political future of South Africa and beyond – forming part of 'a new politics of empire, race, and citizenship'.[92] In contrast to the forced use of Chinese labour in South Africa, the President of the Overseas Chinese Association in Kenya, Han Jun, told me that the first generation of overseas Chinese from Hong Kong and Guangzhou settled in Mombasa, some as skilled labourers and as restaurant workers. Mainland Chinese migrated in large numbers in the 1980s and early 1990s, a majority of whom worked on construction projects in Kenya such as the Moi Sports Stadium. Han Jun emphasised the contrast between 'the earlier generation of overseas Chinese' who struggled to make a living and these recent Chinese mainlanders who were relatively wealthy; the children of the earlier generation had little capital to start new businesses other than inheriting their parents' restaurants.[93] In Mombasa, I talked to a Hong Kong businessman Sam Ken, who now owns a hotel and a few restaurants. Having relocated from apartheid South Africa, his aunt first worked in local grocery stores before she opened her own hotel and restaurant in 1955. Their main customers at the time were 'white people and rich Indians' and sometimes those Hong Kong sailors whose ships docked in the harbour every two or three months.[94]

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[91] Thomas Ellis Naylor, *Yellow Labour: The Truth about the Chinese in the Transvaal* (London: Daily Chronicle Office, 1904); Peter Richardson, *Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal* (London: Macmillan Press, 1982).
[92] Rachel K. Bright, *Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-10: Race, Violence, and Global Spectacle* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Jamie Monson, "Review of *Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902–10: Race, Violence, and Global Spectacle*", *The American Historical Review* 119, 5 (2014), p. 1829.
[93] Interview with Han Jun, the President of the Overseas Chinese Association in Kenya, Nairobi, 10 November 2016.
[94] Interview with Sam Ken, Hong Kong businessman, Mombasa, 16 July 2017.

The construction of overseas Chinese identity in Africa is of course a historical process. For example, Park's studies of Chinese in contemporary South Africa revealed the historical tensions among three waves of Chinese migrants, i.e. Chinese South Africans; Taiwanese and more settled Chinese from the PRC; and the newest migrants from Fujian Province.[95] South Africa is a peculiar case here, as race was of paramount importance in the apartheid regime. According to Yap and Man, the small numbers of these Chinese made it difficult to accommodate them in terms of 'apartheid' divisions:

> They lived and traded on the fringes of all race groups, having established good working relationships with their customers. Being neither 'White' nor 'Black', and variously categorized as either 'Asiatic' and 'Colored', the Chinese felt compelled to safeguard their own culture and identity by obtaining classification as a group in their own right.[96]

Due to the limited available data, this thesis does not attempt to construct a comprehensive history of overseas Chinese in Kenya and Zambia. But it is at least crucial to point out the existence of such communities whose more local scale of interaction existed alongside the realm of international relations. The next section will focus on the foreign policy making of the PRC.

Defining China's Foreign Policy: From 'Leaning to One-Side' to 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'

China's foreign policy is often characterised by dichotomies, such as 'practice/theory, ideology/power, evolutionary/revolutionary, long range/short range, nationalism/universalism, activistic/quiescent, ideology as a rationalizer/ideology as a

[95] Yoon Jung Park, "Boundaries, Borders and Borderland Constructions: Chinese in Contemporary South Africa and the Region", *African Studies* 69, 3 (2010), pp. 457-479.
[96] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, pp. 317-318.

motivating force.'[97] Instead of being mutually exclusive, however, these categories in practice coexist and interact with each other. According to Mao Zedong's famous speech 'The question about correctly processing the contradictions among the people', there is always a principal contradiction that decides the progress of society due to its particularity.[98] Since anti-imperialist victory depends on the supposed contradictions of capitalism, it is essential to identify the principal contradiction in order to break the chain of imperialist power.[99] In the case of Africa, China proposed to resolve this principal contradiction through 'a socialist and revolutionary direction' under Mao's leadership.[100] Parallel to African decolonisation, however, a clash of two socialist blueprints emerged with the Sino-Soviet split. Jeremy Friedman distinguishes them as the 'anti-capitalist' revolution advanced by Moscow versus Beijing's 'anti-imperialist' revolution.[101] Both agendas would however be challenged and reshaped by the demands, ideas, and interests of the 'Third World' in ways that redefined the geopolitical environment.

In the first years of the PRC, its revolutionary leaders adopted the 'Leaning to One Side' foreign policy based on the belief that China naturally belonged to the Soviet camp, representing the advanced side of the principal contradiction i.e. proletarian regimes against capitalist imperialists, the latter led by the United States. The contestation of power on the Korean peninsula reinforced China's binary view of the world, within

[97] Jack Bermingham and Edwin G. Clausen, *Sino-African Relations 1949-1976* (Michigan: Munger Africana Library, 1981), p. 14.
[98] Mao Zedong, "On Contradiction", *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Volume 1 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp. 311-347. See also Wang Yunsheng 汪云生, and Guo Xingjuan 郭省娟, "Commentary Review of Studies on 'The Question about Correctly Processing the Contradictions Among the People'", (近年来《关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题》的研究述评), *Journal of University of Science and Technology Beijing* 23, 3 (2007), pp. 108-113.
[99] Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958~1971*, p. 16.
[100] Govind Purushottam Deshpande and Harmala Kaur Gupta, *United Front Against Imperialism: China's Foreign Policy in Africa* (Bombay: Somaiya Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1986), pp. 1-2.
[101] Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, pp.1-2.

which the clash of ideologies would deteriorate into the worst form of conflict i.e. war. The Communist government also faced the challenge of Taiwan, whose Kuomintang (KMT) or Chinese Nationalist Party regime was still considered by many Western countries as the only legitimate Chinese regime.[102] The issue of China's representation in the United Nations (UN) was the central focus of China's foreign policy until 1971.[103] The diplomatic slogan 'to sweep the house before inviting guests' reflected Beijing's determination to reject any foreign affiliations with Taiwan. Eager to break the economic embargo and diplomatic isolation of China by the US and its allies in Asia in the 1950s, Mao developed the concept of an 'intermediate zone' to describe the vast majority of Asia, Africa and Latin America that belonged to neither Communist nor Capitalist bloc.[104] 'Apart from the question of geographical distance' from Africa, as Ogunsanwo rightly argues, Beijing was not yet 'strong enough to adopt any meaningful policy towards Africa.'[105] In September 1954, however, China's annual Government Work Report declared that developing *de facto* relations with Africa was essential to enhance mutual understanding and create the conditions to establish *de jure* relations.[106]

[102] Note that except for direct quotations, all references to China in this research means the People's Republic of China.
[103] For studies of China and the UN, see Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Wei Liu, *China in the United Nations* (Hackensack, NJ: World Century, 2014).
[104] Mao Zedong, "Talks with Anna Louis Strong," in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, volume 4 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp. 1191-2.
[105] Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958~1971*, p. 4.
[106] Ai Zhouchang 艾周昌, and Mu Tao 沐涛, *Zhongfei Guanxi Shi* 中非关系史 (History of Sino-African Relations), (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1996), p. 218. Translation of '事务性的关系' learns from the legal term of 'de facto' relations as opposed to 'de jure' relations (正式关系), meaning a state of affairs that must be accepted for all practical purposes despite being illegal or illegitimate. Here it refers to the fact that PRC did not have formal, diplomatic relations with those African political bodies or governments.

The Sino-Soviet split between 1956–1966 was driven by opposed interpretations of Orthodox Marxism. China and the Soviet Union diverged on the means to achieve socialism domestically and on the direction of the global socialist camp against the capitalist world. Benefiting from the newly available sources, Luthi in 2008 periodised Sino-Soviet ideological disputes into three particular moments: China's abandonment of the Stalinist socioeconomic developmental model in 1955; Khrushchev's Secret Speech against Stalin in February 1956; and the Soviet adoption of a policy of seeking peaceful coexistence with the US in early 1956.[107] China's support for independence struggles in Africa throughout the Cold War can be partly explained by its own historical trajectory. While the Russian Revolution primarily aimed to remove class inequalities and build socialism within Russia, debates on the Chinese revolutionary path were at the outset focused on a nationalist impetus to defeat foreign invaders who had bestowed on the country 'a century of humiliation'. At the time when China was subject to Japanese occupation during the Second World War, Mao criticised the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.[108] China's revolutionary outlook was thus inherently anti-imperialist. The success of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in defeating both foreign and domestic enemies owed much to a united front across region, class, and ethnicity. Thus its leaders believed that the people of the 'Third World' should be united against imperialist enemies.

But there were obvious difficulties in Chinese practice of direct involvement with African decolonisation. Not unlike the U.S. or the Soviet Union, the PRC had to build up its contacts from nowhere. Sporadic contacts and communications with African

[107] Lorenz M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 2.
[108] Wang Qinmei 汪勤梅, "Maozedong yu Zhongfei Guanxi" 毛泽东与中非关系 (Mao Zedong and China-Africa relations), *Waijiao Pinglun* 4 (1996), pp. 4-8.

delegates were enabled through organising and attending international conferences. Among them, the events of youth groups, student unions, woman organisations and labour unions were crucial. For instance, against the background of the Korean War, the Third World Festival of Youth and Students was held in 1951 in East Berlin. At this conference, Chinese youth delegates met their counterparts from Nigeria, Ghana (then Gold Coast), Tunisia, and Algeria.[109] Since decolonisation occurred earlier in North Africa, Algeria and Tunisia were among the earliest countries to send formal delegations to China.

Particular distinctions were drawn between social class and nationalism in Africa. Populated by a largely illiterate and rural population, Africa was not an ideal location for a Soviet-style working-class revolution. In 1946 Stalin personally denounced indigenous political elites in the colonies, claiming 'these leaders in their majority are corrupt and care not so much about the independence of their territories, as about the preservation of their privileges regarding to the population of these territories.'[110] It was only during the Khrushchev era that the Soviet Union formed a meaningful Africa policy, whose underpinning was the 'socialist model of development.' This was based on the belief that 'a faster and better modernity would allow for the final victory of Soviet socialism over Western capitalism.'[111] In contrast, Maoism was attractive to many African leaders who were eager to mobilise their large rural population in their nation-building process. In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere adapted this 'ruralisation of Marxism' into local practices by initiating *Ujamaa*.[112]

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[109] LuTing'en 陆庭恩, *Feizhou Wenti Lunji* 非洲问题论集 (Treatises on Africa), (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2005), p. 554.
[110] Stalin to Molotov, 20 November 1946, quoted in Westad, *The Global Cold War*, p. 60.
[111] Alessandro Iandolo, "The Rise and Fall of the 'Soviet Model of Development' in West Africa, 1957–64", *Cold War History* 12, 4 (2012), pp. 683-704.
[112] Lal, "Maoism in Tanzania", pp. 96-97.

From the mid-1960s, the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' became the underlying basis of Chinese foreign policy. First raised in in the context of India's trade with Tibet, they were officially written into Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese Joint Statements in June 1954:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual non-aggression;
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit;
5. Peaceful co-existence.[113]

In retrospect, the promulgation of the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' can be seen to have taken place at a pivotal moment. Western European powers in the process of decolonisation created the potential for nationalist advancement in most former colonies. Yet such decolonising processes brought the threat of new foreign interventions in the context of the Cold War. Non-alignment was therefore favoured by many leaders of newly independent countries, both to avoid being dragged into proxy wars and to take advantage of funds and resources from both blocs.[114]

The Bandung Conference and China's 'Revolutionary Friendship' with Africa, 1955-1962

The five principles would soon be incorporated in modified form in a statement at the historic first Afro-Asian Conference held in Indonesia, later known as the Bandung

[113] "China's initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml, accessed in January 2016.
[114] John W. Burton, "Introduction to Nonalignment", in John W. Burton (ed.), *Non-Alignment* (London: Ander Deutsch Limited, 1966), pp. 11-27; Lawrence, "The Rise and Fall of Non-Alignment", pp. 139-155.

Conference. Attended by 29 countries including the PRC, the conference took place on 18–24 April 1955. It sought to enhance the solidarity of Asian and African countries in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism, to achieve and maintain national independence, and to secure world peace. Divisions of political orientation, race, colour, class, education, and national identity among delegates nevertheless made it difficult to achieve agreement. It was recognised that the common ground that delegates shared and frequently discussed was 'the history of Western imperialism in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East since the sixteenth century.'[115] Anti-imperial history was a unifying factor, but this was constrained by, what Lee observes, 'institutionalized acts of law, diplomacy, and the structural legacies of colonial rule.'[116] The residual romance of revolution went hand in hand with the realpolitik of a new world order in the making.

China's diplomatic aims at Bandung were to 'enlarge the world peace united front, promote national independence movements, and provide the conditions to establish and strengthen diplomatic relations with several Asian and African countries.'[117] Due to its close ties with the Soviet Union, Communist China was widely viewed as a proxy for the former's interests.[118] Premier Zhou Enlai however demonstrated his charisma and diplomatic acumen in advancing Beijing's autonomous position through his message of 'seeking common ground while reserving differences' (求同存异).[119] Through the invented narrative of a shared history with Africa of colonial subordination, China

[115] Christopher J. Lee, "Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung", in Christopher J. Lee (ed.), *Making a World after Empire: the Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), p. 10.
[116] Ibid., p. 3.
[117] Lu, *Treatises on Africa*, p. 563.
[118] Lee, "Between a Moment and an Era", p. 13.
[119] Sandra Gillespie, "Diplomacy on a South-South Dimension: The Legacy of Mao's Three-Worlds Theory and the Evolution of Sino-African Relations", in Hannah Slavik (ed.), *Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy* (Malta/Geneva: Diplo Foundation, 2004), pp. 113-114.

succeeded in presenting itself as an autonomous 'Third World' leader.

China's 'modern debut onto the world stage', however, would not have been possible without intellectual support to its political leadership. [120] In early 1960 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a separate department to deal with African affairs.[121] 1960, dubbed 'the Year of Africa', was a turning point in which seventeen countries became independent. China had by then established diplomatic relations with eight African countries: Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Somalia.[122] Among the 'Africa hands' in the Ministry, He Ying, ambassador to Tanzania and Huang Hua, ambassador to Ghana, were among the most capable.[123] Chinese diplomats not only dealt with political affairs in their host country but also made initial visits to establish links with numerous nationalist movements in still colonised countries. The embassy staff were also responsible for recruiting about 500 African students for courses at the Institute of Foreign Languages in Beijing by the end of 1960.[124] In this regard, a 1960 British diplomatic report on Chinese Communist activities in Africa expressed concern and reported speculation among both Western and Soviet bloc observers about the increasing size of the Chinese Embassy in Conakry.[125]

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[120] John K. Cooley, *East Wind over Africa: Red China's African Offensive* (New York: Walker and Company, 1965), p. 11.
[121] The National Archives of UK (hereafter TNA), FCO 141/7090, Kenya: Chinese communist activities in the Middle East and Africa, 1959-1962, "Chinese activities and influence in Africa", December 1961.
[122] Lu, *Treatises on Africa*, p. 573.
[123] Philip Snow, *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 89; see also: Huang Hua 黄华, *Qinli yu Jianwen: Huang Hua Huiyilu* 亲历与见闻: 黄华回忆录 (Experiences and Knowledges: Huang Hua's Memoir), (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2007), especially Chapter 18.
[124] Compiling Group of China Africa Education Cooperation and Communication 中非教育合作与交流编写组, *Zhongguo yu Feizhou Guoji Jiaoyu Hezuo yu Jiaoliu* 中国与非洲国家教育合作与交流 (China Africa Education Cooperation), (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2005).
[125] TNA, FCO 141/7090, "Chinese Communist activities in Africa", 28 March 1960.

Back home, Chinese communist leaders were keen to publicly celebrate 'revolutionary' progress in colonial Africa, and invited nationalists and other African representatives to Beijing on various occasions. China's 'revolutionary friendship' with Africa has been best illustrated in the case of Algeria.[126] Beijing was the first non-Arab country to recognise the Algerian Provisional Government in 1958 led by the National Liberation Front (FLN), whose political orientation was strongly influenced by Maoism. Non-state actors from Algeria, such as football teams, labour unions, journalists, and women's delegations, also paid frequent visits to China between 1958 and early 1960.[127] They were warmly received in Shanghai by various Chinese civil groups led by the municipal government. China's adeptness in social mobilisation was illustrated in these visits. The CCP was famous in using every conceivable medium to influence their foreign guests, including but not limited to newspapers, radio, school education, cadre training, and cultural facilities.[128] The slogans chanted by African visitors followed an inherent logic that linked support of Algerian independence to protest against French colonialism,

[126] For studies of Chinese-Algerian relations, see Kyle Haddad-Fonda, "An Illusory Alliance: Revolutionary Legitimacy and Sino-Algerian Relations, 1958–1962", *The Journal of North African Studies* (2014), pp. 1-20; Kyle Haddad-Fonda, "Revolutionary Allies: Sino-Egyptian and Sino-Algerian Relations in the Bandung Decade" (University of Oxford, PhD thesis, 2013); Donovan C. Chau, *Exploiting Africa: The Influence of Maoist China in Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014).

[127] Shanghai Municipal Archive (hereafter SMA), B126-1-495-9, "国家体育运动委员会国际司关于阿尔及利亚国家足球队接待工作情况简报" (Report of the International Department of National Sports Committee on the reception work of Algerian national football team), 18 December 1959; SMA, C1-2-3463-30, "上海市总工会联络部关于阿尔及利亚工人总联合会代表团名单" (Liaison Department of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions on the list of the delegation of Algerian General Confederation of Workers), 27 May 1960; SMA, C1-2-3463-68, "上海市总工会联络部关于乍得、伊拉克、桑给巴尔、马达加斯加、刚果、阿尔及利亚等工会代表在沪活动日程表" (Liaison Department of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions on the Shanghai event calendar for the union representatives from Chad, Iraq, Zanzibar, Madagascar, Congo, Algeria, etc.), May 1960; SMA, B92-2-1044-1, "上海人民广播电台关于接待阿尔及利亚新闻工作者代表团访沪工作的计划" (Shanghai People's Radio on the reception work of the visit of Algerian journalists delegation to Shanghai), 4-23 April 1966; SMA, H1-12-4-211, "1959 年 8 月 23 日阿尔及利亚、突尼斯、新加坡三国妇女代表团代表在上海市妇联座谈" (23 August 1959 Discussion of three women's delegations from Algeria, Tunisia, Singapore in Shanghai Women's Federation), 23 August 1959.

[128] David Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy", *The China Journal* (2007), p. 28.

then to a critique of American imperialism, and finally to Chinese-Algerian/Arab friendship.[129]

Although it is hard to access the degree of success of Chinese foreign propaganda in winning the hearts and minds of Africans, it was certainly believed to be influential by the British, whose intelligence operation sought to be a 'real and perceived bulwark against communism'.[130] The British Foreign Office's African Section of Research Department prepared two pairs of maps illustrating Communist activities in Africa in 1961 (Figures 1.1&1.2).



Figure 1.1: Left: Diplomatic & Cultural Activities of the Soviet Union & its European satellites; Right: Economic Technical & Military Assistance by the Soviet Union & its European satellites
Source: Photo taken from "Kenya: communist activities in Africa", 31 December 1961, FCO 141/7122, TNA.

[129] SMA, C36-2-67-16, "中国人民保卫世界和平委员会上海市分会关于上海市各界人民支援阿尔及利亚人民争取民族独立斗争大会" (Shanghai Branch of the Chinese People's Committee for Defence of World Peace on the list of presidium participated in the Mass Assembly of Shanghai people from all walks of life to support the Algerian people struggle for national independence), 25 March 1958.
[130] Caroline Elkins, "Archives, Intelligence and Secrecy: The Cold War and the End of the British Empire", in Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake (eds.), *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 269.



Figure 1.2: Left: Diplomatic & Cultural Activities of China & other Asian states of the Communist bloc; Right: Economic Technical & Military Assistance by China & other Asian states of the Communist bloc
Source: Photo taken from "Kenya: communist activities in Africa", 31 December 1961, FCO 141/7122, TNA.

The accompanying report concluded:

> While the Chinese effort in Africa is on a smaller scale than that of the Russians, particularly in regard to technical assistance, it is nevertheless formidably efficient and well-directed, and appears to be making considerable progress.[131]

What worried Britain most were Chinese and Soviet 'subversive' activities in Africa including 'supplying material, moral and in some cases military, support to selected African regimes and most fiercely anti-colonialist in attitude, or most radical in their domestic policies.'[132] Labelled as 'terrorists' by the British, such African radicals

[131] TNA, FCO 141/7090, "Chinese activities and influence in Africa", December 1961.
[132] TNA, FCO 141/7090, "Memorandum: Sino-Soviet propaganda in Africa", 1961.

would pose a great threat to colonial or apartheid rule; and without doubt, the Chinese were great teachers on such matters. The Nanking Military Academy was in the 1960s a major provider of military training for African nationalists from Rhodesia's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), as well as the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO).[133] As the Chinese government never publicly admitted this provision of guerrilla training, the only contemporaneous information on this came from the testimonies of African trainees.

In June 1961 for example, British intelligence reported that six nationals of the Cameroon Republic were arrested on their way home after they had taken courses in sabotage and guerrilla warfare in Beijing.[134] The Cameroonian authorities were able to interrogate this group and seized their notebooks and other relevant papers. In general, such young trainees were selected for their general intelligence rather than their scholastic ability. Before travelling to China, the six had been active members of the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), a radical nationalist party that aimed to overthrow the French administration by force.[135] After the UPC was outlawed in 1955, its leaders went into exile and continued to support, morally and financially, the UPC's Cameroonian National Liberation Army (ALNK), officially declared a terrorist group. Acting as a crucial intermediary between African nationalists and Communist countries, the Algerian FLN had helped send at least a hundred ALNK instructors to China and

[133] Snow, *The Star Raft*, p. 79. For later studies of the military training of these liberation movements, especially by the Soviet Union, see: Vladimir Shubin, "Unsung Heroes: The Soviet Military and the Liberation of Southern Africa", *Cold War History* 7, 2 (2007), pp. 251-262; Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, "African Soldiers in the USSR: Oral Histories of ZAPU Intelligence Cadres' Soviet Training, 1964–1979", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, 1 (2017), pp. 49-66.
[134] TNA, FCO 141/7090, "Chinese train African terrorists", June 1961.
[135] For a history of the UPC, see: Meredith Terretta, *Nation of Outlaws, State of Violence: Nationalism, Grassfields Tradition, and State Building in Cameroon* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014); Joseph Takougang, "Nationalism, Democratisation and Political Opportunism in Cameroon", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 21, 3 (2003), pp. 427-445.

the Soviet Union since 1959.[136] With the independence of French Cameroon in January 1960, the six arrested trainees planned to return home to become military and political instructors attached to ALNK training camps operating against the pro-Western Cameroonian government. Since the southern part of the British Cameroons would soon merge with this new country in 1961 to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon, the British were deeply worried about guerrilla warfare against its newly independent government.

But interpreting such intelligence reports requires great caution from historians. Colonial archives, Ann Stoler argues, are not 'sites of knowledge retrieval'; instead, scholars need to move from 'archive-as-source' to 'archive-as-subject', to analyse knowledge production under state authority.[137] In this case, one trainee's notebook entry referenced in the U.K. archives provides a glimpse of his highly personal perspective that illuminates social constraints and opportunities. This trainee wrote the following characterisation of political action after discussions with the local "Peace Committee" during a visit to Shanghai:

> Terrorist activities must be carried on, killing off all the puppet agents and traitors and carrying the struggle into the country. The country can do without the towns, but the towns cannot do without the country. We must be prepared to wait in hiding in the towns, developing our strength and waiting until the time is ripe. The Party members must then infiltrate into the various concerns and even work there and become friends with the workers – their behaviour must be exemplary – they should plant agitators under various forms. The masses must be mobilized and trained in strike methods. … Once we have established a firm foothold among the masses, it will be difficult to locate us and still more, to put an end to our activities.[138]

[136] TNA, FCO 141/7090, "Chinese train African terrorists", June 1961.
[137] Ann Laura Stoler, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance", *Archival Science* 2, 1 (2002), pp. 87-109.
[138] TNA, FCO 141/7090, "Chinese train African terrorists", June 1961.

While the Chinese teaching approach was very conceptual, it can be seen that Mao Zedong's military thoughts were well received by its foreign disciples: guerrillas operating in an underdeveloped country should win the support of the local peasantry, and the Party leadership should be embedded into the masses.[139] It should however be noted that China's involvement in nationalist activities in Africa was not exclusively military: unlike the cases of Algeria and Cameroon, China's financial support in Kenya and Zambia was channelled through nationalist parties and their leaders by peaceful means.

Premier Zhou Enlai's Africa Tour and the Failed Second Afro-Asian Conference, 1963-1965

Parallel to the increasing number of visits by African delegations in China, Beijing also actively approached many newly independent African countries from the start of the 1960s. From 13 December 1963 to 5 February 1964, Premier Zhou and Vice-Premier Chen Yi toured ten African countries: the United Arab Republic (today's Egypt), Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Immediately thereafter, between 14-26 February 1964, they visited Burma and Pakistan and, together with Vice Chairman Song Ching-ling, Ceylon between 26-29 February. This tour was characterised by the Chinese Foreign Ministry as 'a major milestone in the development of friendly relations between China and other Asian and African countries.'[140] One of the major motivations of this grand tour was to gather support for

[139] Snow, *The Star Raft*, p. 81.
[140] "Premier Zhou Enlai's three tours of Asian and African countries", Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18001.shtml, accessed in July 2018.

the upcoming Second Afro-Asian Conference.[141] As China had severed its relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1950s, the question of where and when the Conference would be held became a battle between the two communist superpowers. While meeting President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, widely respected as a leader of non-aligned movement, Premier Zhou argued that the prospects for anti-imperialist struggle depended on the 'further strengthening of Asian-African solidarity'. While Zhou's efforts turned out to be less satisfactory in North Africa, it was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who showed most support.

But probably the greatest legacy of these visits was the publication of the following 'eight principles for economic aid and technical assistance to other countries':

1. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual.
2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.
3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.
4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development.
5. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.
6. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.
7. In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.

[141] Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958~1971*, pp. 122-123.

8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.[142]

In essence, these eight principles provided the basis for Communist China's economic and cultural cooperation with the newly-emerged countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America throughout the decolonisation period.

By the time Zhou's delegation completed its official mission, six out of ten of the African countries visited had expressed open support for China's position with regard to the Second Afro-Asian conference. This led to the 'tactical success' for China in excluding the Soviet delegation from the Preparatory Meeting for an Asian-African Conference to take place in Algiers in April 1964.[143] The Sino-Soviet split further increased as both sides criticised each other for dividing the anti-imperialist forces at the conference. On 19 June, a coup took place in Algeria that overthrew Ben Bella's government. Against the wishes of most African leaders to postpone the planned conference, Beijing feared that this would increase the likelihood of Soviet participation. Eventually, African representatives decided that the Foreign Ministers' meeting scheduled for 26 June would be postponed. Two lessons were learnt from this incident: African countries were politically sensitive to domestic turmoil and retained significant agency on issues concerning global ideological confrontations.[144] Ogunsanwo concluded thus:

[142] "The Chinese Government's Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries," January 15, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, 中华人民共和国外交部 and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 中国中央文献研究室 (eds.), *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan* (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990), p. 388.
[143] Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958~1971*, p. 126.
[144] Ibid., p. 130.

> Chinese efforts in Africa – economic, political, military and diplomatic – would have been in vain if the conference had taken place without her. She was still seen as militantly and materially anti-colonialist and this by itself was enough to prevent her isolation at Algiers.

Li Qianyu drew a similar conclusion: China made a difficult compromise to indefinitely delay the conference in order to avoid being isolated in international politics.[145] China, as the weakest of the Cold War superpowers, had the most complicated relationship to non-alignment.[146] It can be argued that China's allegedly 'grand' policy in Africa was in practice far from coherent and had to be continually negotiated with African counterparts in a fast-changing international environment.

China's Contacts with Nationalists in Late Colonial Kenya and Zambia

Having laid out the broader historical context in the 1950s and early 1960s, this section focuses on the specific cases of this thesis – Kenya and Zambia, where China's influence was most effectively achieved through its increasingly active propaganda activities. British officials recorded that Chinese propaganda materials, mostly Mao Zedong's own writings and books on other Communist doctrines in favour of Beijing's line, were often posted to youth organisations, labour unions and even influential politicians.[147]

The complication of British decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s is best exemplified by the case of Mau Mau in Kenya.[148] Almost no topic in the history of sub-Saharan

[145] Li Qianyu 李潜虞, "Shilun Zhongguo dui Dierci Yafeihuiyi Zhengce de Yanbian" 试论中国对第二次亚非会议政策的演变 (China's Policy towards the Second Afro-Asian Conference), *International Politics Quarterly* 4 (2010), pp. 115-133.
[146] Lawrence, "The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment", p. 145.
[147] TNA, FCO 141/7090, "Memorandum: Sino-Soviet propaganda in Africa", 1961.
[148] Birmingham, *The Decolonization of Africa*, p. 43.

Africa has provoked more controversy, scholarship, and public fascination than the Mau Mau war, the conflict that consumed Kenya during the 1950s.[149] Far from being a simple black-versus-white war, Mau Mau fighters targeted both the British forces and their 'loyalist' African allies in and around the forests of central Kenya. Between 1952-1960, the British were preoccupied with the task of counter-insurgency but also prepared for a controlled process of decolonisation. In 1960, with the formal end of the Kenyan emergency, two Kenyan nationalist parties, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), were established. Jomo Kenyatta, who had been detained by the British authorities based on the charge of instigating Mau Mau, was widely seen as Kenya's future leader. Once released, he immediately led KANU to secure victory for the new government. To the surprise of British and other external observers, Kenyatta would as the first president of Kenya prove to be moderate in terms of his political view and foreign policy orientation.

China's direct contact with Kenya in the years immediately prior to its independence was extremely limited and had to be facilitated through Chinese embassies in the Eastern bloc. In December 1960 the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia received three Kenyan visitors, who requested financial help as well as invitations to visit China. One of them was known as 'Munyi', who acted as the Chairman of the African Anti-Colonial Movement. The Embassy was instructed to reject the request 'by the excuse that they have not heard back from the Ministry', yet the real reason was suspicion

[149] There has been a vast literature on Mau Mau, most recently: Huw C. Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Caroline Elkins, *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005); David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson 2005).

concerning Munyi's political stance.[150] The Chinese played it safe when getting directly involved in late colonial Kenyan politics, and preferred to meet Kenyan nationalists only on formal occasions such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. The increasing split within the Eastern bloc also had an adverse impact on such contacts. For instance, two Kenyan students who had been invited to study in China were arrested by Soviet police in November 1959. Although oral permission had been granted by the Soviet authorities to a Kenyan leader named 'Johnny' (translated by author from his Chinese name), they subsequently changed their minds. 'Johnny' reported to the Chinese Embassy in Sudan that the Cairo office of his organisation had been infiltrated by a Western intelligence agency. According to the Chinese Embassy, although it was unclear if the Kenyan students had been 'taken advantage of' during their arrest, they should still be invited to China as they were 'still young' enough to be 'educated in our favour'.[151]

Chinese influence in Kenya was in retrospect far too limited to win over prominent nationalist leaders such as Tom Mboya. Having 'earned his stripes in the bitter arena of trade union politics during the 1950s', trade unionist Tom Mboya acted as 'a spokesman for moderate nationalism' in front of audiences in New York and London.[152] In May 1960 he received an invitation to visit China, but never did so due to 'work pressure'.[153] Beyond his courtesy, it is unclear if he would have chosen to engage with the Communists in any case. From the perspective of global socialist revolution, Mboya was a potentially attractive figure given his leadership of urban workers in the

[150] China's Foreign Ministry Archives, Beijing (hereafter CFMA), 108-00126-03, "肯尼亚三人要求来华事" (Three Kenyans requested to visit China), 18 December 1959.
[151] CFMA, 108-00150-01, "关于肯尼亚两名学生来华学习事" (Two Kenyan students to visit China), 31 December 1959.
[152] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, p. 5.
[153] TNA, FCO 141/7090, "Chinese influence on Africa and in particular in Kenya", 1960.

anticolonial struggle. In stark contrast to Mau Mau, Mboya's clear articulation of modernity was attractive for foreign patrons. The United States was certainly keen to finance Mboya, whose Pan-Africanist nationalism transcended ethnic politics and sectarianism, and resonated with the allegedly American value of freedom. Through the channels of American labour organisations and the centrist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the CIA paid as much as $1,000 monthly to Mboya throughout the early 1960s.[154] With Mboya's clear inclination towards the U.S., the Chinese government started to criticise his anti-Communist position and sponsored his primary opponent within KANU, Oginga Odinga.

There is no doubt that Oginga Odinga played a critical role in the connection between China and decolonising Kenya. His early contacts in the 1950s with the Eastern bloc led to the sending of Kenyan students for overseas studies.[155] The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, North Korea, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic offered generous scholarships for these Kenyan students, some of whom would become leaders after the country's independence, and Odinga's most loyal disciples throughout his subsequent political battles during the Kenyatta administration (see Chapter Three). Odinga recalled his first visit to socialist countries in the late 1950s as motivated both by his curiosity regarding Communist solutions to the social problems and his suspicion of Western colonialists.[156] On several occasions, leaders such as Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito and Nasser promised rhetorical and financial support for his nationalist cause. At the Anti-Atomic Bomb Conference in

[154] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, p. 69.
[155] Daniel Branch, "Political Traffic: Kenyan Students in Eastern and Central Europe, 1958–69", *Journal of Contemporary History* 54, 4 (2018).
[156] Jaramogi Oginga Ajuma Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru: The Autobiography of Oginga Odinga* (London: Heinemann, 1967), p. 188.

Japan in August 1960, Odinga was able to meet the Chinese delegation, and made his first trip to Beijing directly from Tokyo. The visit was successful for both sides. Odinga came back home with a substantial amount of money (approx. £10,000) and positive impressions of Chinese industrialisation, social coherence, and education.[157] Beijing was also satisfied: its successful pursuit of an influential Kenyan nationalist as a political ally was a sign of diplomatic success.[158]

Similarly, contacts between Chinese statesmen and Zambian nationalists were initiated prior to independence in 1964. Between 1953 and 1963, Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) was part of the Central African Federation (CAF) along with Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi). As the CAF led by Prime Minister Roy Welensky was created to protect the interests of the white settlers and to hold this part of the British empire together, the colonial authorities were vigilant in ensuring its political stability against radical social forces. Frequently updated security reports dealt with 'Communism', although there was little evidence of actual communist activities or views among Zambian nationalists. For example, according to a June 1954 security report, 'Communist threats' amounted to the fact that Justin Chimba, Acting General President of the General Workers' Union, was funded by a 'Communist penetrated' labour union in U.K. to attend an overseas conference.[159]

Through its observer status at the All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra in December 1958, Beijing briefly engaged with Kenneth Kaunda and his then Zambia

[157] Ibid., p. 190.
[158] Snow, *The Star Raft*, p. 97.
[159] Oxford Bodleian Library (hereafter OBL), Papers of the Rt. Hon. Sir Roy Welensky, 237/1, "Northern Rhodesia", 15 June 1954.

African National Congress (ZANC).[160] Mineworkers on the Copperbelt, while regularly expressing their discontent in associational and religiously influenced forms of protest, played a prominent role in violent demonstrations against British colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia.[161] Particularly powerful was the African Mineworkers' Union (AMWU), whose leaders were also involved in ZANC. Established in 1958 following a split from the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC), ZANC was more radical in demanding a rapid transition to independence and was therefore regarded by Beijing as progressive. The organisation, even in the suspicious view of the Federal authorities, was not however communist-influenced. Simon Ber Zukas, of Lithuanian origin and active in South African communism, was found to have maintained contact with and offered advice to his former African nationalist associates after he was deported from Northern Rhodesia in 1952.[162] Zukas was notorious as the 'most dangerous outside influence in regard to the Federation' and known for his 'direct communist work'.[163] Additionally, the General President and the General Secretary of the ZANC had been prosecuted for being in possession of Communist literature in 1955.

The United National Independence Party (UNIP) was founded in October 1959 as a successor to the ZANC, which had been banned earlier in that year. Led by Kaunda on his release from detention in 1960, the party emerged as the largest nationalist party in the 1962 general elections.[164] As the authorities had banned the activities of some

[160] "赞比亚统一国家独立党" (Zambian African National Congress), *Renmin Ribao 人民日报* (hereafter *People's Daily*), 14 March 1959.
[161] R. I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 156.
[162] OBL, Papers of the Rt. Hon. Sir Roy Welensky, 237/6, "Externa influences affecting the African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia", 15 November 1955.
[163] OBL, Papers of the Rt. Hon. Sir Roy Welensky, 237/7, "Security intelligence review: Rhodesia and Nyasaland No. 6, October-November 1955", 16 December 1955.
[164] "Zambia: History", The Commonwealth, http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/zambia/history, accessed July 2018.

Zambian nationalists, UNIP's foreign contacts were facilitated mainly through its international offices, of which those in London and Cairo were particularly crucial. China equally used Egypt to gain access to the African continent following the Bandung Conference: its Cairo Embassy became 'the first basis for Chinese activity in Africa.'[165] In late 1959, a self-declared 'political Representative' for various African nationalist parties, including the Congolese National Movement, All People's Congress (Sierra Leone), Pan African Congress (South Africa), and KANU, reached out to UNIP's London Office to offer financial assistance. Claiming to be connected with the Chinese Embassy in Guinea, Jonathan D. Makota suggested he could act on its behalf to authorise the transfer of Chinese aid to UNIP.[166] He told Mainza Chona, who headed UNIP's London Office at the time, that he had travelled from his hometown in Northern Rhodesia to places like China. At a time when official communication was largely restricted, personal connections such as these served as the major channel for African nationalist parties to establish foreign contacts. As UNIP's Regional Secretary in Choma, Vernon Mwaanga also recalled his difficulty in attending the conference of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement in Algeria in early 1964. His visit was facilitated by UNIP's Cairo representative Wilted Phiri, who was responsible for publishing literature and broadcasting news of UNIP to the wider world. Mwaanga's first personal encounter with the Chinese was unusual: as he did not have enough money to pay his hotel bills at the conference, Phiri introduced him to the Chinese delegates, who then generously offered him $500.[167] This incident surely left a strong and positive impression for this future Foreign Minister of Zambia.

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[165] Chau, *Exploiting Africa*, p. 38-39; Cooley, *East Wind over Africa*, p. 155.
[166] United National Independence Party Archives, The British Library, London (hereafter UNIP BL), EAP121_2_5_5_3, United National Independence Party Northern Rhodesia (London Committee), 1960-1961, "Correspondence letter to the United National Independence Party Northern Rhodesia (London Committee)", 30 December 1960.
[167] Vernon J. Mwaanga, *An Extraordinary Life: A Passion for Service* (Lusaka: Fleetfoot Pub. Co.,

Beijing's support of UNIP's cause in the early 1960s was extended gradually and cautiously. As a nationalist party that advocated for the peaceful transition of power rather than armed struggle, UNIP was not a priority ally for CCP. Although considered radical in the views of British officials, Kaunda was considered 'right-wing' by Chinese analysts for his engagement with the US.[168] On 1 September 1960, the Representative of UNIP's new Cairo Office, Reuben Kamanga, contacted the local Chinese Embassy to request £20,000. The money would be used to purchase ten cars and a printer, as well as to cover local costs. On the one hand, Kamanga acknowledged the significance of China's moral and material support in Northern Rhodesia's independence struggles; on the other hand, his reiteration of Nkrumah's famous claim that 'We are looking neither East nor West, but forward' did not satisfy the Chinese equally.[169] Although China invited Kamanga for a general visit, he could not attend in person due to the constitutional conference scheduled for December that year. Instead, UNIP decided to send to China its Vice President and London representative, Mainza Chona. China's background check on Chona, who had studied law in London, relied on a British Communist Party member who worked in an Africa-related local organisation. This source acknowledged that UNIP was the 'only political party popular among the African masses', and that Chona agreed with Kaunda's stance that the current constitutional struggles based on non-violence principles was the only viable path to independence. There was also an absence of left-wing opponents to Kaunda within

2009), p. 122-123.

[168] CFMA, 108-00100-01, "北罗得西亚民族联合党要求援助事" (UNIP's financial request), 1 December 1960.

[169] CFMA, 108-00100-01, "赞比亚民族联合党副全国主席卡曼加访华（未成行）及我提供援助事情" (UNIP Vice President Kamanga's visit (did not happen) and his financial request), 1 September 1960.

UNIP.[170] As this was the first visit of a major nationalist leader from Northern Rhodesia, the Chinese government's strategy resembled that of the Bandung Conference: it sought 'common ground' with Chona's anti-imperialism while 'reserving differences' with his moderate anti-colonialism. In practice, this would be achieved through three main efforts: firstly, to reveal the imperialist nature of UK and US in controlling the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia and intervening in Congo; secondly, to clarify China's sympathetic attitudes towards the struggles in Northern Rhodesia and elsewhere in Africa through the careful introduction of Chinese revolutionary experience; and finally, to prevent UNIP from recognising Taiwan.[171] After six days' stay in China, Chona left Beijing with financial assistance of $3,000 and the promise of four scholarships. The Chinese Foreign Ministry concluded that Chona was 'Western influenced' and still held doubts about 'China's achievements, people's life and democratic freedom'.[172] It was thus necessary to continue 'influencing' him. These efforts would however soon be rewarded, as the general elections in January 1964 witnessed the success of Kaunda and UNIP to lead the new self-governed country towards independence (see Chapter Four).

The 'Communist Threat' in Late Colonial Africa

The concept of 'Socialism in Africa' has been understood and researched in many forms, including as an ideology and as a manifestation of diplomatic relations with Communist countries. But there exists another fascinating history that is largely untold

[170] CFMA, 108-00263-05, "报告关于北罗得西亚乔纳的情况" (Report of Chona from Northern Rhodesia), 13 January 1961.
[171] Ibid.
[172] CFMA, 108-00263-05, "北罗联合民族独立党副主席乔纳访华情况" (UNIP Vice President Chona's visit to China), 30 January 1961.

– China as a myth, manifested in the constant rumours of the 'Communist threat' in late colonial Africa. If rumours in colonial Africa can serve as first hand materials from which to interpret Africans' everyday encounters with colonial power, as Luise White argues in *Speaking with Vampires*, supposed Communist threats revealed by British colonial officials in the decolonisation period provide us with a picture of how such ideologies could be imported, accommodated and reconstructed into African contexts.[173] Such rumours frequently found expression in British intelligence reports; by such means, communism came to haunt Federal Welensky's CAF administration. Interviewed in the *Rhodesia Herald*, Welensky warned the British government that communism was a real threat to Central Africa. The handing over of power 'prematurely' to undeveloped African nation-states was the greatest danger, since communism would gain a real hold in these territories.[174] In his study of 1950s Northern Rhodesia, Jan-Bart Gewald illustrated perfectly how rumours of Mau Mau caused widespread fears among the white settlers.[175] Morris Malaya from Ndola, had 'mentioned privately that he would like to form a communist party branch' because it 'provided a better government for people who were poor like Africans'.[176] This comment from an ordinary young man was picked up in intelligence reports not because of its influence but exactly because of such a strong fear of communism. Mau Mau fighters, like Northern Rhodesian urbanites, were of course not indoctrinated in communism. But the popular appeal of communist discourse is perhaps suggested by

[173] Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 1.
[174] OBL, Papers of the Rt. Hon. Sir Roy Welensky, 247/1, "Communism a threat to Federation – Sir Roy", *Rhodesia Herald*, 1 April 1960.
[175] Jan-Bart Geward, "Rumours of Mau Mau in Northern Rhodesia, 1950 – 1960", *Afrika Focus* 22, 1 (2009), pp. 37-56.
[176] "Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, April 1954, no. 3", quoted in Geward, "Rumours of Mau Mau in Northern Rhodesia, 1950 – 1960", p. 50.

the fact that one of its prominent leaders, Waruhiu Itote, assumed 'an Asiatic nom de guerre' – General China.[177]

The swirling of rumours in the late colonial periods would ultimately contribute to a post-independence political culture in both Kenya and Zambia, with which China had to engage. While Odinga may never have been a communist, he articulated his own unofficial local adaption of communist discourse regarding the redistribution of wealth: 'I understood that in Communist countries the emphasis was on food for all. If that was what Communism meant then there was nothing wrong with that.'[178] Kaunda's own philosophy of 'Humanism' was a mixture of 'Fabian socialism, nineteenth-century liberalism, Christian morality and idealisation of the communal values of Zambia's pre-capitalist past'. [179] Parallel to the political agendas of elites, African rebels had alternative experiences of encountering a mythicized China on the ground. Having moved to Rhodesia after the Kenya Emergency, a white farmer appreciated the sophisticated weapons used by ZANU rebels in stating, 'I would call it Mao Mao rather than Mau Mau'.[180] Such a mythical 'Red' China would become increasingly important in understanding the Sino-African relations in the decades to come, an argument that will be analysed more in depth in the subsequent chapters.

[177] Snow, *The Star Raft*, p. 72. The name of General China probably came from Itote's fight against the Japanese during the Second World War. See: Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 230.
[178] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, p. 37.
[179] Megan Vaughan, "Exploitation and Neglect: Rural Producers and the State in Malawi and Zambia", in David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin (eds.), *History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years since 1960* (London: Longman, 1998), p. 178.
[180] Snow, *The Star Raft*, p. 72.

The 'Two Chinas' Issue

The controversy of China's political recognition was a contentious issue in Cold War politics. Newly independent African countries were no doubt influenced by colonial legacies, as two powerful European powers took opposite positions: while the UK recognised the PRC as the government of China and posted a 'Chargé d'affaires ad interim' in Beijing in January 1950, France made an equivalent recognition only in 1964. In the cases of Kenya and Zambia, both countries recognised the PRC on the eve of their independence but probably for different reasons.

Kenya's decision to recognise and support the PRC as the only legitimate government of China was partly because of economic considerations. Under British rule, it had trade connections with both the mainland and Taiwan. The trade figures in 1959, 1960, and 1961 showed that Kenyan exports to Taiwan had 'not been of any significance', except for some 'irregular trade' of sugar.[181] When businessmen from Taiwan proposed to open a shipping line between Taiwan and East Africa, the British trade official in charge was worried that its own diplomatic relationship with Communist China would pose challenges to any formal representation. He therefore recommended that 'neither of the Chinese countries should be encouraged to set up missions here.'[182] As long as the British could do business with both trading partners, it was better not to stimulate any political controversy by switching sides. This sense of pragmatism in dealing with this issue was inherited by Kenyan leaders. As the Chairman of Kenya's independence preparation committee, Mboya affirmed that the new government would recognise the

[181] Kenya National Archives, Nairobi (hereafter KNA), C/I&E/2/11, Trade with Formosa (Taiwan), 1956-1965, "Letter by J.H. Martin, Department of Trade and Supplies, Nairobi", 15 February 1962.
[182] Ibid.

PRC while, at the same time, consider the possibility of a 'two Chinas policy'.[183] Kenya's new Minister of Natural Resources Lawrence Sagini led a goodwill delegation to Taiwan in July 1963, possibly to discuss its representation at the independence ceremony scheduled for December that year. Odinga, however, succeeded in convincing Kenyatta to adopt the PRC's 'One China Principle'.[184] The rift between Mboya and Odinga was thus revealed by their position on this issue.

In the case of Zambia, the recognition of the PRC was straightforward for Kaunda's government. In February 1964, He Ying, a revolutionary veteran and then Chinese ambassador in Tanzania, proposed to visit Northern Rhodesia. Due to UNIP's busy schedule in preparing for the country's independence, this visit was delayed until June that year. Above all, Beijing was eager to know Kaunda's position on the 'two Chinas' issue and its implications for the upcoming independence ceremony.[185] During He Ying's visit, Kaunda and other Ministers clarified on several occasions that only Beijing's delegation would be invited to the ceremony, a decision that had been collectively agreed in a Cabinet meeting in April. But the possibilities of shifting alliances remained. Yang Hsi-kun, a leading diplomat in African affairs from Taiwan, was at the time visiting central African countries and planned to visit Northern Rhodesia soon. Thus, He Ying strongly advised Beijing to approve Kaunda' request of £20,000 for UNIP before Yang's visit in order to secure the PRC's already firm

[183] The US National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA), RG 59, Box 3963 (Political & Defense, POL 17 Diplomatic & Consular Representations KENYA to POL 15 Gov. KOR), 1963, "Incoming airgram from Nairobi to Department of State", 27 July 1963.
[184] The term 'One China Principle' is often used in China's official communications. It is the diplomatic acknowledgement of China' position that there is only one Chinese government.
[185] CMFA, 108-00563-01, "关于何大使访问北罗事" (Ambassador's visit to Northern Rhodesia), 11 February 1964.

standing.[186] Although both Kenya and Zambia ultimately recognised the CCP government, the issue of 'two Chinas' proved more controversial in Kenya due to the dynamic interactions between its domestic politics and the global Cold War. Chapter Five will return to this issue with a discussion of the PRC's success in obtaining its UN membership and the role of African states in this process.

Conclusion

Rejecting a simple reiteration of nationalist histories of China, Kenya and Zambia, this chapter has analysed the intersections of decolonisation, the Cold War and Afro-Asian solidarity that are exemplified in China-Africa relations in the 1950s and early 1960s. Indeed, three major dynamics can be observed in such a transnational history. One of these is of course the Chinese view of global events, which was translated into practical foreign policy. There is also a history of what China was doing with African actors on the ground. But what tends to be overlooked, and which is key to this study, were perceptions of ideas and values towards their engagements with Africa, especially when these concerned and were influenced by anti-Communist fears in the late colonial period. Such a reading of archival and other materials, while provisional, nevertheless challenges the monolithic tendency in writing on China-Africa relations. This will be further elaborated in the next chapter, focusing on debates regarding 'socialism' in the African context.

[186] CFMA, 108-00563-01, "关于何大使访问北罗的简况" (Brief of Ambassador's visit to Northern Rhodesia), 14 June 1964.

Chapter Two: Historicising African Socialisms: Kenya's African Socialism, Zambian Humanism, and Communist China's Entanglements

Introduction: Two Dimensions of Socialism

It is commonly recognised by scholars that there is no monolithic definition of socialism, and the meaning of the term was the subject of fierce and politically influential contestation during the Cold War. Although the great dispute regarding 'true' interpretations of socialism divided the Communist bloc throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Africa's own role in these debates, despite its perceived position as a laboratory for Western ideas and practices, has received little contemporary scholarly attention.[187] Marxist writers generally considered African societies as too underdeveloped to host a proletarian revolution.[188] Drew makes an important distinction between Marxist class-based analytic approaches to socialism and state-led African socialist experiments, both of which however fall under the broad umbrella of socialism in Africa.[189] There has also been an increasing interest in re-evaluating Africa's contributions to the theories and practices of socialism.[190]

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[187] Helen Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
[188] Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, 2 (1968), pp. 141-169; Arrighi and Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).
[189] Allison Drew, "Comparing African Experiences of Communism," in Noman Naimark, Silvio Pons and Sophie Quinn-Judge (eds.), *Cambridge History of Communism*, vol. 2, The Socialist Camp and World Power (1941-1968) (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2017), pp. 491-517.
[190] Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 42-43; Priya Lal, "Maoism in Tanzania," pp. 96-116; Eric Burton (ed.) 'Socialisms in Development', *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik XXX* 3, special issue (2017).

In Chapter One, it was argued that China's foreign policy was driven by an 'anti-imperialist' agenda, which was welcomed by many African nationalists in their struggles for national independence. In late colonial Africa, the 'Communist threat' was a dominant narrative, produced and perpetuated by the colonial authorities for the purpose of continued control. But ideological exchanges between China and Africa were not one-sided. This chapter will examine the state-led socialist experiments carried out in both Kenya and Zambia in the 1960s, and their resonances in shaping these countries' respective bilateral relations with Communist China.

Like any other school of thought, the two key dimensions of time and space have been central to interpretations of socialism from its inception. Chronologically, historical periodization requires the investigation of successive state-led, top down socialist experiments in Africa. While admittedly there were socialist activities in Africa dating back to the inter-war years,[191] the first post-colonial wave of African socialism arrived in the late 1950s with the independence of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana and Sékou Touré's Guinea.[192] Here, the ideology of socialism aimed at the unification of the people under a national banner. Therefore class as the fundamental dimension of socialism was downplayed as largely irrelevant to the African context. The mid-1960s witnessed significant attempts at socialist 'localisation' as Nyerere put forward a mass movement of *ujamaa* based on the assertion that Tanzanian society was traditionally egalitarian.[193] In Kenya and Zambia successively, Kenyatta's African socialism and

[191] Allison Drew, "Communism in Africa", in Stephen A. Smith (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 285-302.
[192] Carl Gustav Rosberg and Thomas Callaghy (eds.), *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* (Berkley: University of California, 1979), p. 5; Colin Legum, "Socialism in Ghana: A political interpretation", in William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *African Socialism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 131-159; Charles F. Andrain, "Guinea and Senegal: Contrasting types of African Socialism", in Friedland and Rosberg (eds.), *African Socialism*, pp. 160-174.
[193] Fred G. Burke, "Tanganyika: The search for Ujamaa", in Friedland and Rosberg (eds.), *African*

Kaunda's Humanism clearly regarded socialism as an essentially African phenomenon, although their specific interpretations of socialism differed significantly.

In the context of the early Cold War, most African leaders initially pursued foreign policy based on non-aligned principles and – seeking to maintain relationships with the former colonial powers and the US – were generally cool towards Communist outreach. However, the 'second wave' of state-led socialist experiments in the mid-1970s, known as Afrocommunism or Afro-Marxism, was characterised by the adoption of a vanguard party and Marxist class analysis in countries such as Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia.[194] Scientific socialism was also more generally accepted in Southern African liberation movements by parties like FRELIMO, and clear political alliances with Communist powers provided both theoretical support and economic and military assistance.[195] This extraversion of socialist ideology can be understood as both ideological, and involving realist calculations of economic and military gains.

But there is another dimension, which puts locality at the centre of analysis. Because socialism is by origin a Western invention constructed in relation to European historical trajectories, non-Western socialists – Africans, but also Latin Americans and Asians – faced the challenge of either asserting their 'traditional culture' as constituting an indigenous socialism, or translating global socialisms into local lexicons. The wide

Socialism, pp. 194-222.

[194] David Ottaway and Marina Ottaway, *Afrocommunism* (New York: Africana, 1981); Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1987).

[195] For the historical role of Soviet Union and China in Southern Africa, see: John E. Spence, *The Soviet Union, the Third World and Southern Africa* (Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1988); Vladimir G. Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008); Morgan Norval, *Red Star over Southern Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Selous Foundation Press, 1988); Steven F. Jackson, 'China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-1993', *China Quarterly*, 142 (1995), pp. 388-422.

spectrum of translated socialist discourses and practices range from the Far East to Sub-Saharan Africa, enabling scholars to compare variations from their origins. One dogmatic standpoint, drawing on Chatterjee and Brennan, dismisses such 'derivative' understandings of African socialism as empty or vague rhetoric.[196] In rejecting this approach, Lal argues that African socialism is essentially 'a philosophical disposition or identity'.[197] Comparable to Pan-Africanism or Negritude, the underlying impulse for either advocating or rejecting African socialism in those young nation-states was embedded in African societies' distinct historical trajectories of colonial rule, decolonisation and political culture.

Building on the useful but somewhat out-dated literature on African socialism, this chapter problematizes the 'derivative thesis' that tends to deny the agency and autonomy of African thinkers and policymakers. Having been understood and interpreted in specific contexts, African socialism must also be historically contextualised. Both the Soviet Union and the PRC researched and analysed the socialist practices of African countries, but their understandings differed sharply in terms of race and class. The chapter then seeks to locate China's socialism in the global debate drawing from its own experiences of local adaption. Through comparative analysis of Kenyan 'African socialism' and Zambian 'Humanism' in terms of designing, advocating and experimenting with socialisms, this chapter analyses the distinctive trajectories of Kenya and Zambia's relations with China in the 1960s, which are best explained by local dynamics reflecting the different party-state nexus in the two

[196] Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); James Brennan, "Realizing Civilization through Patrilineal Descent: The Intellectual Making of an African Racial Nationalism in Tanzania, 1920-50," *Social Identities* 12, 4 (2006), pp. 405-425.
[197] Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, pp. 42-43.

countries, and which are clearly observable in interactions between various government actors as well as the press.

African Socialisms in Historical Perspective

The academic study of African socialism arose with decolonisation in Sub-Saharan Africa and the national struggles for independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The first comprehensive volume on African socialism was published in 1964. Friedland and Rosberg acknowledged the obscurity of the term by referring to a 1962 Dakar conference where African leaders themselves had failed to agree on a precise definition.[198] But they maintained that the specific nature of African socialism would become clearer over time in the process of its implementation. While African socialists adopted different theories, it was also argued that certain themes were shared across the continent for which general socialist principles were relevant: (1) the problem of continental identity, (2) the challenge of economic development, and (3) the dilemma of control and class formation.[199] The fact that the letters A and S were commonly capitalised suggested that 'African Socialism' represented something distinct from other socialisms, both as a reaction against European tradition and a search for a unifying doctrine.

Fifteen years later, a new volume re-evaluated the practices of African socialism in the early 1960s and paid closer attention to the 'second wave'.[200] If the early volume envisioned a future of African socialism with some enthusiasm, *Socialism in Sub-*

[198] Friedland and Rosberg (eds.), *African Socialism*, p. 1.
[199] Ibid., pp. 3-4.
[200] Rosberg and Callaghy (eds.), *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, p. vii.

Saharan Africa (1979) recognised and reflected on the general failure experienced by the socialist transformations of the 'first wave'. With references to *ujamaa* in Tanzania and the cooperative programme in Zambia, Rosberg and Callaghy highlighted the inadequacy of party/state authorities in implementing their socialist vision.[201] The main reason for those failures was, they argued, the exaggerated emphasis on traditional African values as 'naturally' supporting socialism, without acknowledging internal resistance to socialist practices. However, institutional analysis of the leadership's will and weak state bureaucracy demonstrated little, except for the enduring colonial legacy on matters of political fragmentation, economic dependency, or patrimonial society. This analysis was also embedded in pandemic pessimism regarding African development following the oil crisis of the 1970s, which would be followed by neoliberal reforms that in most Sub-Saharan African countries further undermined the diminishing prospects for socialism. Simultaneously however, the relevance of a socialist agenda was apparently being shown to be feasible in Somalia, Congo/Brazzaville, and Benin and, perhaps more significantly, in the Afro-Marxist regimes of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Ethiopia.

The 1980s were marked by the advancement of liberation struggles in southern Africa, which suggested the potential for revolutionary transitions to socialism. While Munslow identified radical military coups, social revolutions and protracted people's war as three possible options,[202] Nugent characterised them as 'praetorian Marxism', antithetical to civilian governance.[203] Stripped of contextualisation, socialism was simply regarded as the final destination for each political sojourn, which anyone could

[201] Ibid., p. 3.
[202] Barry Munslow, "Introduction", in Barry Munslow (ed.), *Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism* (London: Zed, 1986), pp. 5-8.
[203] Nugent, *Africa Since Independence*, p. 246.

reach with the proper guidance. Writing in a triumphant tone, Munslow claimed that 'the protracted people's war has in certain ways proved to be the most propitious in creating some of the conditions for undertaking socialist transition.'[204] His message was straightforward: the failures of socialist experiments in earlier decades did not mean socialism was not a viable ideology for African countries; instead, they paved the way for the most desired path to be identified and chosen, namely, Afro-Marxism as the highest form of African socialism.

The fall of the Soviet bloc at the turn of the 1990s provoked an emerging literature on 'postsocialism'. Originally, it was intended to describe 'a culturally and geographically bounded experience confined to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and China, and conditionally to Cuba and Vietnam.'[205] African countries, as so often, were overlooked in such analyses of ideological legacies, historical memories and institutional ruptures. It was suggested that a clear line could be drawn between a (presumably failed) socialist past and the rosy future of liberal democracies destined to be the 'end of history'.[206] Yet this was challenged by ethnographically informed case studies of 'the complex, non-linear, lived experiences of those individuals and communities that have negotiated the shift from socialisms to postsocialisms.'[207] For instance, Monson's work on the historical memory of the TAZARA railway illustrated the continued relevance of a socialist lexicon for communities seeking to safeguard their social welfare.[208] Instead of evaluating a particular policy by its deliveries alone, it proved more helpful to contextualise it from both geographical and temporal

[204] Munslow, "Introduction", pp. 10-11.
[205] M. Anne Pitcher and Kelly M. Askew, "African Socialisms and Postsocialisms," *Africa* 76, 1 (2006), p. 2.
[206] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*.
[207] Pitcher and Askew, "African Socialisms and Postsocialisms," p. 4.
[208] Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway*.

dimensions. As Pitcher and Askew argued, 'inconsistencies and asymmetries associated with the effects of neo-liberalism' could be explained by 'institutional, aesthetic, psychological and discursive legacies' left by African socialism.[209]

While internal divisions were highlighted as a factor contributing to earlier socialist failures, external influences, particularly the ideological aspects of the Cold War, arguably played a much greater role in facilitating these radical regimes. Non-aligned principles were increasingly shown to be incompatible with the benefits of both moral and material support from the Communist countries. What Nugent called 'praetorian Marxism' was in fact built on an internationalist framework that interacted more directly with the global balance of power, and demonstrated that Africa had become more engaged in geopolitical affairs.[210]

Third World socialism functioned as both a social theory and a national ideology. As a social theory, it questioned the nature of the capitalist system in perpetuating inequality between the capitalists and the proletariat or wider poor, and aimed to deliver social welfare to the less privileged through a series of social reforms. As a national ideology, it was anti-imperialist in that it rejected an unfair world order based on endless interventions into and exploitations of the 'peripheries' by the West. To understand postcolonial African states, a triangulated analysis of the global Cold War, the political culture of individual African states, and those states' bilateral relations with Communist countries is therefore necessary. The following section will explore the often-conflicting perspectives of African socialism articulated by observers from the Soviet

[209] Pitcher and Askew, "African Socialisms and Postsocialisms," p. 11.
[210] Nugent, *Africa Since Independence*, p. 246.

Union and China in order to understand the interplay between ideologies and foreign policies.

Socialisms in Conflict: Contrasting Sino-Soviet Approaches to the "African Road to Socialism"

The perpetual history of debates within socialism is both terminological and theoretical. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels themselves attacked their predecessors in the early-nineteenth-century as 'utopians' whose theories were inherently inferior to their 'scientific socialism'.[211] Since then, contestation over and inconsistency of socialist vocabulary has been consistent. However, a social theory usually gains considerable momentum when it is transformed into a national ideology. When the Russian Communist Party succeeded in leading a revolution and consequently in establishing a sovereign state in place of the Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Union became the incarnation of Marxist-Leninism for leaders elsewhere who were struggling to define a path towards political freedom and economic independence.

Soviet writings on Sub-Saharan Africa focused primarily on ideologies based on doctrinal tenets, but also assessed the opportunity of the Soviet Union to gain influence in various African countries.[212] Ivan Potekhin, the leading Soviet expert in Africa during the Khrushchev era, rejected 'African socialism' as a credible socialist theory and only recognised the existence of an 'African road to socialism.'[213] This judgment, shared by other Marxist-Leninist disciples, was based on the belief that Marxist-

[211] Anthony Wright, *Socialisms: Theories and Practices* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 1.
[212] Arthur Jay Kinghoffer, *Soviet Perspectives on African Socialism* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1969), p. 19.
[213] Ivan Potekhin quoted in Kinghoffer, *Soviet Perspectives on African Socialism*, p. 62.

Leninism was the sole socialist orthodoxy that therefore had to be adopted in its entirety. In practice, though, such dogmatic understanding was pragmatically adjusted to facilitate Soviet diplomatic strategies on the African continent. As Kinghoffer pointed out, Soviet Africanists sought to pay attention to Africa's complexities so as to guard against a singular dependence on an essentially binary 'bourgeoisie vs proletariat' model, and identified other forces such as the peasantry, nationalism, race and religion as playing critical roles in African societies.[214]

In China, the revolution was two-staged. Initially the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sought to abolish the semi-feudal and semi-imperialist system that had come into being since the First Opium War in 1842. According to Mao's theory, the birth of a modern China involved the 'New Democratic Revolution' that required a degree of cooperation with the nationalist Kuomintang. After the successful seizure of power to establish the People's Republic of China in 1949, the primary aim of the CCP was the elimination of all private ownership to enable a centralised economic system based on state planning, the so-called 'Socialist Revolution'. [215] Throughout both the liberation movement and the nation-building process, the CCP defined its own approach to scientific socialism, one that took account of China's largely rural society. This gave it a reputation for political leadership in the new 'Third World' and made communist China a potential model for economic development.

China's own variant of socialism was often equated to Maoism, a political theory derived from the teachings of the Chinese political leader Mao Zedong. Never

[214] Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "The Soviet View of African Socialism", *African Affairs* 67, 268 (1968), p. 205.
[215] Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 2 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 309.

'intellectually burdened by orthodox Marxist perspectives on the relationship between political and economic forces in history', Chinese Communists were dedicated to transforming an economically backward country into an industrial society led by state-owned enterprises.[216] The First Five Year Plan issued in 1953 focused on developing China's heavy industry, and the urban economy was more or less nationalised within three years. In rural areas, agricultural collectivisation successfully turned individual peasant proprietorship into cooperative farms. By the standard of the abolition of private property, China could be identified as a socialist country. However, Cook points out that the complex and, sometimes, contradictory nature of Mao's ideas and practice hinders understandings of its basic tenets. The picture became even more blurred when other national leaders introduced Maoism into different contexts. Cook's latest volume, exploring the application of Mao's theory from Cambodia to Tanzania, offers us a flavour of such diversity.[217]

Maoism and African socialism were both widely considered as derivative Marxist theories. For leaders in the 'Third World', it was not until the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s and the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 that Maoism was fully appreciated as 'a complete military, political cultural, and economic ideology distinct from Soviet communism.'[218] By comparing the different views of African socialism held by Soviet and Chinese scholars, it is possible to tease out the focal points of their ideological disagreements, which Jeremy Friedman distinguished as the anti-capitalist revolution advanced by the Soviets and the anti-imperialist Chinese alternative.[219]

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[216] Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic*, 3rd edition (New York: Free Press, 1999), p. 108.
[217] Alexander C. Cook, "Third World Maoism," in Timothy Cheek (ed.), *A Critical Introduction to Mao* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 288-299.
[218] Ibid., p. 290.
[219] Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, pp. 1-2.

However, the practical boundary between the socialist rhetoric and socialist practices was for both countries often fluid.

To shed light on the distinct Sino-Soviet approaches towards Africa in the global ideological struggle, the following section will deal with two primary divisions, namely race and class. The particular attraction of Christian-influenced humanism in countries like Zambia was rooted in the nourishing soil of Western democratic socialism, which will be discussed in the following section.

The early advocates of African socialism also held strong Pan-Africanist beliefs, as Nyerere famously articulated that 'African nationalism is meaningless, is dangerous, and is anachronistic, if it is not the same time Pan-Africanism.'[220] However, a similar idea – *negritude* – that called for a common identity of Africans, intellectually and culturally rather than politically, proved more controversial. Originally developed by francophone African intellectuals in France during the 1930s, negritude held deep racial implications, sometimes considered as 'anti-racist racism'. [221] Leopold Senghor, negritude's leading thinker, emphasised the borderless nature of black identity, which was deeply rooted in the 'soul' rather than in 'reason'.[222] Aiming to integrate socialism with negritude, he called for further assistance from global Marxists, as well as 'contemporary scientists and philosophers' and 'the theoreticians of Arab Socialism'.[223]

[220] Julius Nyerere, "A United States of Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* I, I (1963), pp. 1-6.
[221] Bennetta Jules-Rosette, "Jean-Paul Sartre and the Philosophy of Négritude: Race, Self, and Society", *Theory and Society* 36, 3 (2007), pp. 265-285.
[222] Asli Berktay, "Negritude and African Socialism: Rhetorical Devices for Overcoming Social Divides," *Third Text* 24, 2 (2010), p. 208.
[223] Ibid., p. 209.

Soviet scholars, however, had great doubts about such an approach, dismissing racial solidarity as a distraction from global class struggles. The Soviets were concerned that their Chinese counterparts were attempting to unite the Third World countries based on an anti-white racial outlook. It was recognised that such a distinction between race and colonisation was clearly made before the USSR's rift with China, with Potekhin writing that white people could also make friends with the Africans.[224]

Analysis of Chinese scholarship nevertheless shows that the significance of race in China's relations with African countries was overstated. Conscious of its racial basis, negritude was interpreted by Chinese observers primarily in terms of its 'collective, humanist, and communal' nature that would only be realised through the existing social structure of African society.[225] In the eyes of Chinese scholars, Senghor's socialist experiment in Senegal was simply a variant on democratic socialism that was heavily influenced by the ideas of European social democratic parties, reflecting its pro-Western foreign relations.[226] Potekhin's condemnation of 'reactionary forces' which introduced racial bias into politics to justify their 'repugnant anti-popular policies', was beyond the considerations of Chinese leaders, whose country had a limited historical legacy of multi-racialism.[227] This racial dimension was however highlighted by Ali Mazrui who described Sino-African relations as 'the yellow man's burden', a hybrid of the famous 'yellow peril' and 'the white man's burden'.[228] He argued that an African

[224] Kinghoffer, *Soviet Perspectives on African Socialism*, p. 72.
[225] Tang Dadun et al. 唐大盾, *Feizhoushehuizhuyi: Lishi, Lilun, Shijian* 非洲社会主义：历史，理论，实践 (African Socialism: History, Theories and Practices), (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1988), p. 205.
[226] Ibid., 53-54; Shen Yang 沈阳, "Woguo feizhoushehuizhuyi yanjiu de huigu yu zhanwang" 我国非洲社会主义研究的回顾与展望 (Review and Outlook of the Chinese Research into African Socialism), *Studies on Marxism* 12 (2014), pp. 142-143.
[227] Ivan Potekhin quoted in Klinghoffer, *Soviet Perspectives on African Socialism*, p. 73.
[228] Ali A. Mazrui, "The Yellow Man's Burden: Race and Revolution in Sino-African Relations," in Seifudein Adem (ed.), *China's Diplomacy in Eastern and Southern Africa* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing

and Chinese shared experience of 'being non-white' laid the foundation for an affinity between yellow and black peoples, historically benefiting from 'the absence of conflicting cultural perspectives seen in close proximity.'[229]

Class was another key dimension in which the Chinese approach to African socialism diverged from that of the Soviets. Through the lens of ideological analysis, scholars from both Communist regimes recognised that African decolonisation was often caught in a binary between capitalist and socialist directions of travel. Among those countries claiming to have chosen the 'middle path', nationalism was the most prominent feature in the application of the 'Marxist analytical toolkit' to a supposedly traditional African communal system with its alleged humanist values.[230]

But there were always contradictions in such assumptions. On the one hand, the official Soviet position claimed that ideology arose from inherent local material circumstances (instead of being transplanted); on the other hand, that an absence of bourgeois ideology in pre-colonial Africa indicated a congenital deficiency that would prevent it evolving logically to a more advanced socialist stage.[231] This dilemma was mitigated by the assertion that African countries could potentially follow a non-capitalist path, jumping over the stage of industrial capitalism, in the way the Soviet Union had done under Lenin and Stalin.

Limited, 2013), pp. 1-25.
[229] Ibid., p. 2.
[230] Klinghoffer, *Soviet Perspectives on African Socialism*, p. 79; Li Anshan 李安山, "Feizhoushehuizhuyi de Liluntedian Gaishu" 非洲社会主义研究的理论特点概述 (Overview of the Theoretical Features of African Socialism), *Issues of Contemporary World* 4, (1986), pp. 65-66.
[231] Klinghoffer, *Soviet Perspectives on African Socialism*, p. 80.

Several decades earlier, modern China seemed to have experienced a similar dilemma when revolutions led by bourgeois nationalists against warlords and foreign powers failed to bring social stability and economic prosperity. The success of the Chinese Communist Party itself, in Mao's own writing, was often attributed to 'three magic weapons': the united front, the armed struggle, and party construction. [232] Collaborations with the bourgeoisie and other classes marked the three historical stages of the Great Revolution in China, the ten years of Civil War and the War of Resistance against Japan. The dominant role of 'a rural revolutionary class' was also significant in such a proletariat-led revolution that saw Maoism having achieved the 'ruralisation of Marxism' among 'Third World' countries.[233] Therefore, Chinese scholars believed that China's social system was a particularly attractive model for Asian, African and Latin American countries 'with similar national conditions.'[234]

African Socialisms as Ideologies and Practices: Zambian Humanism and Kenya's African Socialism

Having discussed how Soviet and Chinese understandings of African socialism evolved in the early Cold War period, this section will focus on nationalism as another significant source of intellectual inspiration. With the belief that almost all political movements need to construct ideologies to justify their causes, Hodgkin contended that this was particularly evident in the case of relatively young movements in colonial

[232] Mao Zedong, 'F. 7 Introducing the Communist' in Tony Saich (ed.), *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis* (London: Sharpe, 1996), p. 907.
[233] Mazrui, "The Yellow Man's Burden"', p. 11.
[234] Huang Zongliang 黄宗良, and Kong Hanbing 孔寒冰, *Shijie Shehuizhuyi Shilun* 世界社会主义史论 (The Historical Essays of World Socialism) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004), p. 359; Yang Xiansheng 杨显生, "Guanyu Feizhoushehuizhuyi de Lishi Toushi yu Fansi" 关于非洲社会主义的历史透视与反思 (Historical Perspectives and Reflections with regard to African Socialism), *Contemporary World and Socialism 5*, (2006), p. 51.

Africa. African nationalists however struggled to maintain the effectiveness of their parties.[235] In addition to the challenge of breaking from colonial rule, African nationalists also faced the task of weakening 'traditional' authorities to pave the way for nation-building. As the products of European and North American schools and universities, anti-colonial African elites borrowed theories, including socialism of all kinds, from western countries. The traits of African nationalism most strongly emphasised were 'the Christian idea of human brotherhood', 'the traditionalist democratic belief in the right to choose from our own governors', and 'the socialist conception of a society'.[236] Indeed, African political movements were rather 'mixed-up' for observers.

In contrast to the functionalist approach to African politics advanced by most political scientists such as Hodgkin, historians are now aware of more complicated factors, and sometimes even contingencies, that helped shape particular polities. In the mid-1960s, both Kenya and Zambia officially adopted socialism as their national philosophies, which became known as 'African socialism' and 'African Humanism' respectively. As Askew and Pitcher point out, "no fewer than thirty-five countries out of fifty-three proclaimed themselves 'socialist' at one or other point in their history" between the 1950s and 1980s.[237] Like Lal, I reject the idea that socialist policies in African countries were derivative discourses. The socialism advanced by these countries' leaders acted neither as 'a mechanistic instrument of Pan-Africanist efforts to achieve transnational unity' nor as 'rhetorical instruments' to 'explain, rationalize, and justify governmental involvement'.[238] This is not to deny the temptation for authoritarian regimes to

[235] Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London: Frederick Muller, 1956), p. 169.
[236] Ibid., p. 17
[237] Pitcher and Askew, "African socialisms and postsocialisms," p. 1.
[238] Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, p. 39.

consolidate their power over citizens through a socialist doctrine. For example, Jomo Kenyatta arguably articulated a moderate version of socialism as a way of deflecting domestic criticism of his close relations with former colonial powers like Britain. For those who were considered conservative and capitalist by Marxist standards, international ideological confrontations offered them a degree of leverage that could counterbalance domestic criticism of potential foreign interference in their domestic regimes. The increasingly aggressive activities of a 'culturally revolutionary' China between 1966 and 1969 had diverging impacts on Kenyan and Zambian politics, which cannot be explained by recourse to realist theories.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese Communist leaders sought to develop relations with the ruling parties of Kenya and Zambia, i.e. KANU and UNIP, and their political leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda and Oginga Odinga, on the basis of Afro-Asian solidarity and 'Third World' non-alignment. Yet an ostensibly similar approach to both countries delivered diverse diplomatic results. From 1966, the start of the Cultural Revolution marked China's ideological move towards the far Left, and Mao's literature on world revolution targeted both countries and their political elites. After a document called *'Sessional Paper No. 10 (1963-1965): African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya'* was debated and passed in the House of Representatives, Kenya officially adopted African Socialism as a national ideology in 1965. While President Kenyatta remained indifferent to radical voices within his party calling for the redistribution of lands and the prioritisation of social equality among Kenyans, Zambia under President Kaunda chose the path of Humanism, more in line with Nyerere's Tanzania. Although both leaders termed themselves 'African Socialist', the two

differed substantially. On a socialist spectrum drawn, Kenya is on the right, and Tanzania is on the left, with Zambia somewhere on the centre left.

That these and other countries established such national ideologies at virtually the same time allows us to analyse the 'knowledge sharing' process among independent African elites. In March 1965, the newly created Zambian Office of National Development and Planning, 'anxious to be in close touch with development planning work in other countries in Africa', requested the Development Plan and related publications of the Kenyan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.[239] The Tanzanian government did the same, though the tone of its request sounded less flattering: M. Carpenter, Director of Planning at its President's Office, sought clarification of the exact criteria that her Kenyan colleague had used to prioritise certain industries over others, based on their 'probable contribution to development'.[240] This seems to hint at subsequent, more overt criticisms of Kenya's 'socialist' experiment expressed in the government-owned newspaper *The Nationalist* of Tanzania. The Bureau of African Affairs in Ghana made similar criticisms in its 'socialist weekly', *The Spark*, despite the apparently friendly relations between the two governments.[241] The global influence of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries can be detected through the adoption of Marxist-Leninist terminology in these publications.

[239] KNA, EPD/30/01, African Socialism, March-July 1965, "Correspondence from the Office of National Development and Planning, Zambia to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Kenya," 1 May 1965.
[240] KNA, EPD/30/01, "Correspondence from the President's Office, Directorate for Development and Planning, Tanganyika to the Director, Ministry for Economic Planning and Development, Kenya", 11 May 1965.
[241] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391 (Political & Defense, POL 7 Visits. Meetings, Kenya to POL 12 Kenya), 1964-1966, "The Spark attacks Kenyan Program of African Socialism," 15 July 196.

Debates about socialism took place between and within African countries on the extent and ways in which African societies were inherently 'socialistic'. In the view of many external observers, Kenya's African Socialism and Zambia's Humanism shared common traits, in emphasising the supposedly communal nature of 'traditional' African societies as the foundation of the state's provision of social welfare. Many scholars analysed the moral, political, economic and foreign policy dimension of these two theories.[242] This research suggested that empirical observation of socialist practice was integral to their philosophical underpinnings. The commonly perceived 'failure' of such socialist experiments was exactly the result of attempts to distinguish their 'utopian' ideals from the constraints and challenges that existed in practice. This analysis rejects both the defeatist argument that they failed because of their 'unscientific' approaches to socialism, and the uncritical optimism that leads others to defend the heroism of these so-called 'African sages'.[243] It argues that analysing the interaction of socialist powers like Communist China and the Soviet Union with African philosophy can help break the dualism between 'Western' and 'African' political thought by adding an additional but no less significant dimension of interaction between African and non-Western socialisms.

[242] For such scholarship, see: Henry S. Meebelo, *Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought* (Lusaka: Oxford University Press, 1973); Paul A. Mwaipaya, *African Humanism and National Development: A Critical Analysis of the Fundamental Theoretical Principle of Zambian Humanism* (Washington, D.C: University Press of America, 1981); Ahmed Mohiddin, *African Socialism in Two Countries* (London: Croom Helm, 1981); Clive Dillon-Malone, *Zambian Humanism, Religion and Social Morality* (Ndola: Mission Press, 1989).

[243] "African Sage Philosophy" is the name now commonly given to the body of thought produced by persons considered wise in African communities, and more specifically refers to those who seek a rational foundation for ideas and concepts used to describe and view the world by critically examining the justification of those ideas and concepts. See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-sage/.

Zambian Humanism

Through an exchange of letters with his friend Dr. Colin Morris, an English Methodist minister who helped found the United Church in Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda first articulated his understanding of Humanism in the book *A Humanist in Africa* in 1966.[244] In April 1967, President Kaunda officially launched Humanism as the national philosophy and ideology of Zambia.[245] Three years after national independence, this was a key moment for postcolonial Zambia to define its own path to the future. The transition of Zambian Humanism from a theory into a national ideology would not have been made possible without Kaunda's leadership of both the party and the country. On 15 August 1967, Kaunda introduced "A Guide to the Implementation of Humanism in Zambia" in front of 6,000 delegates and guests at UNIP's Mulungushi Conference. He made a passionate call for 'an agrarian revolution' that would involve 'the re-grouping of all villages, and a complete reorganisation of UNIP.'[246] A series of attempts were made to institutionalise Zambian Humanism across the country: schools were instructed to include the philosophy in their teachings; civil servants had to be trained and examined on the subject; and publications on humanism were directed by the Kenneth Kaunda Foundation and then UNIP's Research Bureau during the one-party state.[247]

[244] Kenneth Kaunda, *A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin M. Morris Kenneth D. Kaunda* (London: Longmans, 1966).
[245] "Humanism – the new philosophy: President presents socialist manifesto", *Times of Zambia*, 28 April 1967.
[246] "KK makes stirring call for 'revolution", *Times of Zambia*, 16 August 1967.
[247] J. M. Mwanakatwe, *End of Kaunda Era* (Lusaka: Multimedia, 1994), p. 50; Raymond Mwangala Mwangala, "Found A Modern Nation-State on Christian Values?: A Theological Assessment of Zambian Humanism" (University of KwaZulu-Natal, PhD thesis, 2009), pp. 50-51.

The pragmatic and eclectic nature of Humanism was reflected in Kaunda's determination to 'draw on the economic systems of both East and West, and harness them to its purpose'.[248] Yet this did not mean that Zambian Humanism was simply a hybrid of capitalism and communism. The key defining character of Zambian Humanism is its emphasis on a humanity rooted in the nature of African 'traditional' communities. This was not a new idea: for instance, Dugald Campbell identified an indigenous form of socialism in Central Africa as early as the 1920s: "Despite the seeming anomaly, all Bantu are pronounced socialists, and socialism, I was going to say kingly socialism, is their fundamental and fixed form of Government."[249] The irony here is that Henry Meebelo, 'the leading party theoretician' who served as the first director of UNIP's Research Bureau in 1973-1976,[250] drew on a British explorer who probably knew very little about pre-colonial African societies, let alone the potential of such 'socialism' to provide an alternative mode of governance to colonial rule.

According to Mwaipaya, the frequent misconception of Zambian Humanism resulted from its emphasis on metaphysical principles and practicality over its theoretical base.[251] 'Man-centredness' and various other virtues, namely generosity, hospitality, kindness, accessibility, inclusiveness, self-reliance, and equality, were seen as allowing individuals to perform to a high moral standard that would ultimate contribute to the construction of a classless society.[252] Consequently, Zambian humanists deprecated

[248] Kenneth Kaunda, *Towards Complete Independence: Address by H.E. the President, Dr. K. D. Kaunda at the UNIP National Council held at Matero Hall*, Lusaka, quoted in Meebelo, *Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought*, pp. xiii-xiv.
[249] Dugald Campbell, *In the Heart of Bantuland: A Record of Twenty-Nine Years Pioneering in Central Africa among the Bantu People* (London: Seely, Services & Co. Ltd., 1922), p. 44, quoted in Meebelo, *Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought*, p. 3.
[250] M. C. Musambachime, "The Archives of Zambia's United National Independence Party", *History in Africa* 18 (1991), pp. 291-296.
[251] Mwaipaya, *African Humanism and National* Development, pp. 5-6.
[252] Ibid., p. 9; Henry S. Meebelo, "The Concept of Man-Centredness in Zambian Humanism", *African Review* 3 (1973), pp. 559-575.

capitalism as an exploitative system that relegated human beings to emotionless apparatuses. Marxism-Leninism seemed potentially attractive for its advocacy of human emancipation, yet only on a surface level, since 'ideology is not the servant of man but his master in a communist society.'[253] Kaunda articulated his belief in the great potential of man to achieve his ideal without being supressed by the political and social construct of the modern world. He announced: 'one cannot be a humanist without being a socialist while it is possible for one to be a socialist without being a humanist.'[254]

If a society based on Zambian Humanism is a person-centred society, it is also God-centred. Diverging from isolationist and individualist tendencies associated with materialism and industrial capitalism, Zambian humanists regarded man as a communal social being that is 'in a relation of being to being with God, in the sense that, like the Almighty, he is, if only to a limited degree, a causal force of life in his environment, which he dominates, being the most powerful among created things.'[255] The social teaching of Christianity within Zambian Humanism also served to distinguish it sharply from the atheism of scientific socialism. Kaunda himself declared that the philosophy of Zambian Humanism is not exclusive to Christians, indeed, that it was complementary with Islam or Hinduism. Nevertheless, this claim of an ecumenical approach is undermined by a lack of serious engagement with religions other than Christianity, probably out of the consideration of making a particular national ideology attractive to a more diverse population. Indeed, Dillion-Malone argued strongly that religion actually 'permeates the entire content of Zambian Humanism and significantly affects

[253] Meebelo, *Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought*, p. 39.
[254] Kenneth Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and Guide to Its Implementation: Part II* (Lusaka: Division of National Guidance, 1974), quoted in Dillon-Malone, *Zambian Humanism, Religion and Social Morality*, p. 7.
[255] Meebelo, *Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought*, p. 17.

its interpretation' instead of being absorbed into the social and cultural domain.[256] But he was also right to distinguish between an atheist like Marx and an anti-theist like Lenin. The former was, he states, 'primarily concerned with the manner in which religion functioned in society' and held the belief that religion would disappear as a form of alienation with the overthrow of bourgeois supremacy.[257] Lenin, on the other hand, actively campaigned against the existence of religion in a 'quasi-religious' manner that aimed to 'bring about a state of secular salvation in the communist society'.[258]

Having discussed Humanism as a theory and as a national ideology, this section will analyse its implications for Zambia's foreign policy and its relations with China in particular. When articulating his understanding of Humanism, Kaunda also responded to Western speculation about his closeness to China by asserting that his four visits to the West since independence, compared to one trip to Beijing for three days, did not make him a Communist.[259] Non-alignment was indeed emphasised as the guiding principle of Zambia's foreign policy, built on the global and non-discriminatory principles of Zambian Humanism:

> Non-alignment to us simply means being able to deal with countries of the East and of the West as fellow human beings. First and foremost, whether they are believers or non-believers is none of our business. We see in each of them one common thing. They are God's children made in His own image. We are, therefore, prepared to deal with them as brothers and sisters provided, they accept us in the same spirit of the brotherhood of man, East, West, North and South.[260]

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[256] Dillon-Malone, *Zambian Humanism, Religion and Social Morality*, p. 1.
[257] Ibid., p. 54.
[258] Vladimir Lenin, *Collected Works, 5th edition, vol. 15* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), quoted in Dillon-Malone, *Zambian Humanism, Religion and Social Morality*, p. 55.
[259] "Some call me a Communist – President. There is nothing wrong in copying from Chinese", *Times of Zambia*, 16 August 1967.
[260] Kenneth Kaunda quoted in M.A. Ranganathan, *The Political Philosophy of President Kaunda of Zambia* (Edinburgh: Holmes McDougall, 1985), p. 43.

In a 1969 foreign policy report, Zambian officials observed that China's 'reference to Mao's works' was conducted 'rather like Christians do to the Bible', and interpretations were 'religiously made in solution of problems.'[261] China, once a nation 'stagnating and staggering in poverty, hunger, ignorance and disease', had managed to provide 'sufficient food, shelter, and clothing', a miracle that Kaunda was eager to repeat in his own land.[262] Highlighting its universal human values, Soremekun called Zambian Humanism a 'cosmic neo-Humanism' that 'aims at transcending the boundaries of Zambia to reckon the world.'[263] In this sense, it embraced a sense of cosmopolitanism that set aside the 'family quarrel' between socialism and capitalism which was considered as essentially a 'white man' issue.[264]

Such an articulation can be usefully compared to a 1965 Zambian delegation's impression of China's model as 'peculiar onto itself, requiring neither Capitalism nor Communism to explain it'. I.R.B. Manda, Secretary to the Delegation, commented: 'The fact of survival of China's 650,000,000 people has dictated this.' Though the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was cautious in making any concrete statement on the Sino-Soviet split, China's protracted strategy to effectively mobilise the masses on military lines was potentially attractive for a frontline state like Zambia in a southern African region dominated by hostile militarised regimes.

[261] Zambia National Archives, Lusaka (hereafter ZNA), FA/1/94, Relations with China, 1965-1968, "Chinese policy on Zambia", 1968.
[262] "Some call me a Communist – President", *Times of Zambia*, 16 August 1967.
[263] F. Soremekun, 'Kenneth Kaunda's cosmic neo-Humanism,' *Africa Quarterly* 12, 4 (1973), pp. 285-313.
[264] "A history of Humanism", *Times of Zambia*, 19 February 1971.

Before the dispatch of the 1965 Zambian goodwill mission to Beijing, President Kaunda identified three major issues to discuss with the Chinese government: 1) the forthcoming Afro-Asian Summit Conference, 2) the U.N., and 3) the Vietnam war. The delegation's leader, Minister of Agriculture Elijah Mudenda, held a private meeting with Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian on 19 August. Acknowledging that Afro-Asian countries shared an identity of the poor versus the Western rich, they went on to agree that economic dependence had hindered the political independence of African countries such as Congo; China itself, it was suggested, had only learnt the value of self-reliance following the withdrawal of Soviet technical aid and experts.[265] Rejecting the claim that Communists were dogmatic, Li pointed out the danger of copying others' practices, such as the introduction of cooperatives in Zambia. Mudenda expressed Zambia's position on the need for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war and proposed the involvement of the Organisation of African Unity in achieving this.

In a letter to the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs that same month, Mark Chona, the Special Advisor for Political Affairs to President Kaunda between 1968 and 1980, followed the advice of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in condemning 'the American aggressive policy in Vietnam' and sought to influence 'African States to the view that the Vietnam question cannot only be considered as a South East Asian question but for humanity as a whole.' [266] Today, asked about his opinions on China's role in international affairs, Chona praises Zambia's 'new strategic partner' for having provided 'moral, diplomatic, and above all, physical resources' for Southern African

[265] ZNA, FA/1/94, "Minutes of the meeting of the 19th Aug. (morning) with Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien," 19 August 1965.
[266] ZNA, FA/1/94, "Correspondence from Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 20 August 1965.

liberation movements.[267] Chona played an important role in the peace process in Angola and struggles against apartheid South Africa. He believes that both China and Zambia were surrounded by enemies and this led to their bilateral affinity regardless of political differences.[268] As can be seen from the above analysis, Zambia's moral philosophy of humanism found expression in actual policies and government practices. It also enabled the country's leaders to find significant common cause with China, notwithstanding its very different approach to socialism.

African Socialism in Kenya

While Zambian Humanism played a central role in Zambian politics, the influence of African Socialism in Kenya was short-lived after the assassination of its key advocate, Tom Mboya, in 1969. As Minister for Economic Planning and Development, Mboya had elaborated and advocated a Kenyan type of socialism. Contrary to Zambia where the president himself championed his country's national ideology, the publication of the *Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism* in 1965 was a more or less collective endeavour by a group of politicians, to which there were some objections within KANU. The Paper's publication followed a heated debate on the ideological direction of Kenya after independence.[269] In August 1965, President Kenyatta announced:

> The Government has produced this Sessional Paper which discusses in detail both the theory of Democratic African Socialism and its practical application to planning in Kenya. There has been much debate on this subject and the Government's aim is to show very clearly our policies and also our programme. This should bring an end

[267] Interview with Mark Chona, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zambia (1965-1968) and Special Advisor for Political Affairs to President Kenneth Kaunda (1968-1980), Lusaka, 25 August 2016.
[268] Ibid.
[269] Mohiddin, *African Socialism in Two Countries*, p. 67.

> to all the conflicting, theoretical, and academic arguments that have been going on.[270]

Informed by what Mohuddin terms a 'teleological view of the development of societies', *Sessional Paper No. 10* argued that 'all societies aim ultimately at achieving the same goals; and that all societies will, in fact, achieve these objectives.'[271] African 'tradition' was important but only in the sense that modern Kenyans were thought to be motivated to 'contribute willingly without stint to the development of the nation'.[272] Virtues such as political freedom, shared communal interests, and mutual social responsibility functioned in a consequentialist way as certain rewards (or punishments) were promised based on their contributions. Kenyan African Socialism, like its Zambian Humanist counterpart, diverged from scientific socialism in its recognition of religion as a legitimate moral code for the Kenyan community. But Christianity was not as dominant in the Kenyan case, where indigenous beliefs, Islam and Hinduism had co-existed for much longer than Zambia. In a meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Chen Yi only three months before independence, a KANU delegation argued that the tolerance of different religions in China in fact proved Chinese people's 'advocacy for socialism rather than communism.' [273]

African socialism in Kenya is commonly viewed as more of an economic blueprint than a social or religious ideology. Branch terms it 'a development strategy based on private property and private foreign investment.'[274] Achieng Oneko, who was then the Minister

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[270] "Definition of African Socialism: 'Unifying voice of our people' – President", *East African Standard*, 28 April 1965.
[271] Mohiddin, *African Socialism in Two Countries*, p. 68.
[272] Ibid., p. 89.
[273] CFMA, 108-01279-03, "陈毅会见并宴请肯尼亚非洲民族联盟代表团谈话记录" (Meeting minutes between Vice Premier Chen Yi and Kenya African National Union delegation), 4 September 1963.
[274] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, p. 54.

of Information, Broadcasting, and Tourism, also emphasised its practicality by talking about Socialism a 'way of solving problems'.[275]

This distinction would deliver very different outcomes for socialism in the two countries in the years to follow. If Morris was the key influence of Kaunda's Zambian Humanism, the architects of African socialism in Kenya were those who had received their higher education in economics under British rule.[276] Between 1961 and 1963, foreign experts from West Germany, Switzerland, and the United States also offered advice to the soon-to-be independent Kenyan government.[277] Jacob Oser, an American economist from Syracuse University, worked closely with Mboya to promote economic growth in Kenya.[278] *Sessional Paper No. 10* proposed a threefold strategy: a) reform of the colonial economy towards the construction of a viable mixed economy b) Africanisation of all economic sectors to ensure wider local participation c) encouragement of foreign investment from a variety of countries.[279] Rejecting the Marxist principle that class was the key division in society, Kenya's African socialism sought to prevent the emergence of intra-Kenyan class antagonisms, reflecting the fact that, at this point, non-Africans controlled a disproportionate share of the national economy.[280] Thus any class struggle was to be waged between the poor Kenyans and the rich foreigners, via Africanisation. J. G. Kiano, Minister for Commerce and Industry, however rejected the idea of 'nationalisation for nationalisation's sake':

> This exercise is of no substantial help to the country because in terms of development it is more practical to use our resources to create new

[275] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Arms smuggling," 5 April 1965.
[276] Mwaipaya, *African Humanism and National Development*, 1.
[277] Daniel Speich, 'The Kenyan Style of "African Socialism": Developmental Knowledge Claims and the Explanatory Limits of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History* 33, 3 (2009), 458.
[278] Jacob Oser, *Promoting Economic Development: With Illustration from Kenya* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).
[279] Mohiddin, *African Socialism in Two Countries*, 76.
[280] Ibid., 72.

> development, new industries and new employment opportunities for our unemployed people.[281]

There was of course an ideological consideration. Mboya told the Kenyan National Assembly on 5 May 1965: 'Nationalisation [elsewhere] has been resorted to as a weapon against dangerous foreign influence. This kind of decision is political and not economic. It has nothing to do with socialism as such and the need has not arisen in our country.' [282] Only two days later, Kiano similarly stated that Kenya would prove 'once and for all that Africans can totally reject ideologies based on the historical experiences of alien races.'[283] National models of socialism were thus justified by such claims regarding indigenous identity as well as a rejection of foreign ideologies including foreign socialisms.

After independence, President Kenyatta carefully managed the balance of power in both his party and government. This was especially true after a series of army mutinies had taken place in Tanganyika, Uganda and finally in Kenya in 1964. Kenyatta's government was increasingly beset by instability characterised by political competition that was both ideological in a conventional left-right sense but simultaneously involved ethno-regional and personal rivalries.[284] As Speich argues, the political struggles among Kenyan politicians should not be reduced to 'a third world instance of the global Cold War'.[285] From the 1960s until the early 1970s, Kenyatta's government largely favoured a neutral position on prominent Pan-African issues such as the Congolese civil

[281] KNA, MIS/17/4/62, African Socialism in Kenya, 1965, "Statement issued by the Hon. Dr. J. G. Kiano," 7 May 1965.
[282] "Debate opens on African Socialism: Confusion costly to Kenya – Mr. Mboya", *East African Standard*, 5 May 1965.
[283] KNA, "Statement issued by the Hon. Dr. J. G. Kiano," 7 May 1965.
[284] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, p. 36.
[285] Speich, "The Kenyan Style of 'African Socialism'", p. 451.

war. This diplomatic 'low-profile' was an approach that, according to Okumu, 'avoids radical aggressiveness which [Kenya] cannot defend or promote.'[286]

Kenya, like Zambia, initially adhered to non-alignment, although arguably for different reasons. Mohiddin characterises Kenya's non-alignment policy in terms of its openness to foreign ideas and technical expertise regardless of the East-West cleavage, and maintains that Kenya refused to become a satellite of the superpowers.[287] This is supported by Makinda's analysis of Kenya's 'quiet diplomacy', 'shaped by the need to attract more foreign capital, maintain commercial links with neighbouring states, ensure the security of her borders, and consolidate the domestic political power base.'[288] However, the government's political, economic, and even military dependence on Britain was widely criticised, notably by Mboya's major political adversary and fellow Luo, Oginga Odinga, as making Kenya a puppet of post-independence Western neo-imperialism.[289]

Partly to disguise its ambiguous but implicitly pro-Western outlook in the international arena, the Kenyan government deployed a rhetoric that exaggerated the threat of superpower interference in its domestic politics. The issue of China, in this context, became a key battleground between the 'moderates' and the 'radicals' within the ruling party. On 3rd April 1965, the Kenyan parliament debated a controversial motion about the suspected smuggling of arms from Communist countries to be used to overthrow

[286] John Okumu, "Kenya's Foreign Policy", in Olajide Aluko (ed.), *The Foreign Policies of African States* (London: Hodderand Stoughton, 1977), p. 136.
[287] Mohiddin, *African Socialism in Two Countries*, p. 70.
[288] Samuel M. Makinda, "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy", *Third World Quarterly* 5, 2 (1983), p. 302.
[289] "No attempt to break free from Britain says Mr. Odinga," *East African Standard*, 3 September 1968.

the Kenyatta government. The Minister for Health and Housing, Joseph Otiende warned MPs:

> We did not fight the British Government and the White people in order to make way for the yellow people to become colonists of this country. If they came like the British, with guns, it would not be so bad. The British just shot down a few houses and took control. But if the Chinese worked underground and supplied arms to overthrow the popular Government, there was very real danger to the country.[290]

In this way, Chinese Communists were scapegoated for promoting 'red terror'. Such fears were exacerbated by the Western powers, among which United States played a critical role, especially during William Attwood's term as the first US ambassador in Kenya between 1964 and 1966. Historical sources present a visible synchronism between the so-called ideological split within KANU and America's active deployment of intelligence between 1964 and 1966. In April 1965, Parliament debated an allegedly Chinese Communist propaganda material – a magazine called 'African Revolution'. It called Kenya's African socialism a 'fool's dogma' which had to be converted into Communism.[291] Against the majority of the speakers in the House, Vice-President Odinga spoke in favour of China and the East. He criticised 'a rising sense of emotionalism in the House' that had created a mythical enemy designed simply for scapegoating. 'At one time "Mau Mau" was the cry', said Odinga, 'now the cry was "Communism", but when people were asked where it was and what it was like it could not be found.'[292] An official statement issued by the Chinese Embassy in Kenya declared the magazine 'a fabrication created by the imperialists' who were plotting to 'stir up the relations with China and Kenya.'[293]

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[290] "Smuggling of arms denied: Members not present to back up claim," *East African Standard*, 3 April 1965.
[291] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Recent political developments in Kenya", 15 April 1965.
[292] "Smuggling of arms denied", *East African Standard*.
[293] "我驻肯尼亚大使馆发表声明 揭露帝国主义伪造宣传品挑拨中肯关系阴谋" (The Chinese Embassy in Kenya issues a statement), *People's Daily*, 21 April 1965.

Such political rifts became manifold, especially from 1965 onwards when Odinga started to openly challenge Kenyatta's authority. It is noticeable that the rise of the opposition party Kenya People's Union (KPU) took place at exactly the point when the country debated its national development plan. Kenyan politicians like Mboya and Odinga were thus not passive victims of the Cold War but political opportunists who deliberately engaged with global ideological debates in active search for foreign patronage. Often, they favoured the technique of delegitimising their political opponents as Communist puppets. Kenyan non-alignment was in practice implicitly anti-Communist.

The Deployment of the 'Red Terror' on Two Political Terrains

Although both Zambian and Kenyan statesmen deployed ideas about Communist China in the process of constructing their national ideologies, it is evident that China's presence aroused less controversy in Zambia than Kenya. Although the leaders of both countries clung to non-aligned principles and Afro-Asian solidarity by the late 1960s, their international outlooks were strikingly different: Kaunda's Zambia became identified as a frontline country in support of southern African liberation, while Kenyatta's Kenya was preoccupied with its economic development, with a heavy reliance on Western aid and trade.

Political scientists have attempted to understand the nature of African states through comparison, among which Kenya and Tanzania are often counter-posed for their

respective 'capitalist' and 'socialist' trajectories.[294] Tanzania and Zambia have also been compared for their emphasis on rural development and the role played by foreign aid.[295] Historians, by contrast, have just begun to grapple with this challenge. In his history of opposition politics in Zambia, Larmer uses the case of Kenya to explain the role of 'material incentives, particularly the effective distribution of patronage', in either de facto or de jure one-party states in African countries. As 'a weak party in which several semi-corporate groups competed for influence', KANU tended to favour a system tolerant of diverse points of view with, of course, certain restrictions.[296] But in UNIP's case, Larmer argues, 'a certain ideological commitment from organisers and members' prevented the effective allocation of material incentives to UNIP loyalists, and MPs were 'relatively marginal in party decision-making'.[297] KANU's adoption of *harambee* ('Let's pull together' in Swahili) as a form of 'self-help development' allowed Kenyan MPs to reward their party loyalists in their respective constituency, as the basis of the party's drive for social and political control in Kenyan society.

One such example within KANU was Geoffrey Kamau, the Mayor of Nakuru. In September 1964, he accompanied Oneko on a trip to Shanghai, Wuxi, Nanjing and

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[294] Lionel Cliffe, *Underdevelopment or Socialism?: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya and Tanzania* (Brighton: University of Sussex, 1973); Joel D. Barkan, *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania* (Nairobi, Heinemann Kenya, 1984); Joel D. Barkan (ed.), *Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Maria Nzomo, "The Foreign Policy of Kenya and Tanzania: The Impact of Dependence and Underdevelopment, 1961-1980" (Dalhousie University, PhD thesis, 1981).

[295] Dean E. McHenry, Jr., "The Struggle for Rural Socialism in Tanzania," in Rosberg and Callaghy (eds.), *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, pp. 37-60; Stephen A. Quick, "Socialism in One Sector: Rural Development in Zambia," in Rosberg and Callaghy (eds.), *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, pp. 83-111; Howard White, *Import Support Aid: Experiences from Tanzania and Zambia* (The Hague: Institute of Social Justice, 1994); Gary Gappert, *The Prospects for Regional Development and Panning between Tanzania and Zambia* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1968).

[296] Jennifer A. Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From 'Haranbee!' to 'Nyayo!'* (Berkeley: University of California, 1992), p. 30.

[297] Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 93.

Beijing. He later described China as a promising land where people earned high wages, received free education and where prostitution and theft had never existed. Immediately following the press release announcing the *Sessional Paper No. 10*, Kamau sought in a pamphlet to refute what he called the 'distasteful Western imperialist stories about China.'[298] Precisely because of his junior position in the government, Kamau would not have been targeted by overt Chinese propaganda. His accounts were thus more meaningful than the dominant polarised views of China and Chinese people that arose from their respective ideological protagonists.

Debates on the nature of African socialism(s) took place in parliaments and government bureaus but also in the press, where a range of actors expressed their opinions in vivid ways. In both Zambia and Kenya, two leading newspapers, *Times of Zambia* (*ToZ*) and *East African Standard* (*EAS*) closely followed these highly contested debates, allowing historians to compare the extent to which their countries' respective relations with Communist China were reflected in their interpretations of socialist ideas and practices. In general, it is clear that there was greater contestation and even contradiction in the Kenyan title than its Zambian counterpart in the second half of the 1960s.

For instance, a 1966 *ToZ* article sought to reconcile socialism and Christianity by arguing that both stressed 'the importance of the individual and the desire to strike a right balance between the goals of freedom and equality'.[299] To distinguish African socialism from the 'evil' of Soviet Communism, the author emphasised the supposedly democratic nature of African Socialists who allowed different opinions on national and

[298] "Nakuru Mayor refutes West's idea of China," *East African Standard*, 29 April 1965.
[299] Wilfred Grenville-Grey, "How the Christian should view African Socialism", *Times of Zambia*, 21 September 1966.

international politics. Only two months later, another *ToZ* writer supported Wilfred Grenville-Grey's contention: 'Although the origins of communism are Russian, there is no one in the world today who can stand by and let this subject roll over them.'[300] Simultaneously, the *ToZ* covered the Zambian government's August 1966 goodwill trip to China, led by Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe. The newspaper highlighted the warm welcome this delegation received in Beijing, the signing of the Sino-Zambian cultural cooperation agreement, and its arrival back in Lusaka, where it was greeted by the Chinese Ambassador (see also Chapter Four).[301] Within the same year, President Kaunda promulgated his new philosophy of Humanism and warned against the danger posed by the East-West confrontation in Zambia.

At roughly the same time, Kenya experienced intensive struggles between the leading party, KANU, and the KPU opposition. Both parties deployed the issue of 'Chinese Communism' in their propaganda but in contrasting ways. On the one hand, KANU's Mboya criticised foreign powers that 'saw non-alignment as a convenient cover for their activities', and firmly rejected an alleged attempt by the Chinese to supply arms 'to overthrow the popular government'.[302] On the other hand, the acting secretary of the KPU's Nairobi branch, C.K. Kodundo, warned that KANU was 'drifting towards a dangerous method of political propaganda by thinking that it could improve domestic problems in Kenya by seeking to create a Chinese or Communist nightmare'.[303] In this context, the *EAS* published a series of articles that sought to distinguish African socialism from Communism. The fact that Kiano addressed this issue, both in his

[300] Stuart Gregg, "What makes an African socialist?", *Times of Zambia*, 16 November 1966.
[301] "Chinese support Zambia", *Times of Zambia*, 23 August 1966; "All smiles after Peking Agreement", *Times of Zambia*, August 30, 1966; "A smiling welcome", *Times of Zambia*, 17 September 1966.
[302] "Cold War the danger to African unity", *East African Standard*, 5 April 1965.
[303] "KANU creating Communist bogy – K.P.U.", *East African Standard*, 19 July 1967.

speech to parliament and in press statements, demonstrated the multiple terrains on which these battles were fought. The article quoted Kiano thus: "The people of Kenya would never be the ideological slaves of any outsiders and would defend their freedom through self-help." [304] Chinese analysts of this material noted that the *EAS* was British-owned, thus explaining its not so graceful intention of 'stirring the water', which had already suffered from numerous undercurrents.[305] From the start of China's Cultural Revolution, the *EAS* would play a more prominent role role in shaping Kenyans' perceptions of China during the most troubled years of Sino-Kenyan diplomatic relations (see Chapter Three).

Compared to the *ToZ*, the *EAS* was more interested in China's overall strategy in Africa, and in its domestic politics. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, an *EAS* editorial summarised two opposing views of China's role in Africa, represented respectively by Malawi's President Banda and President Kaunda.[306] Refusing to recognise the People's Republic of China, Banda was a diehard anti-Communist who was said to have turned down Chinese financial aid of up to £18 million during his visit to Dar es Salaam. In contrast, President Kaunda gladly accepted £100 million from Beijing for the TAZARA railway project after his disillusion with the sceptical Western donors. The *ToZ* also followed political affairs in the East African region with great interest. It was clear by mid-1967 that Zambia had decided to follow in Tanzania's diplomatic footprints rather than those of Kenya. Mboya was described by the *ToZ* as a political pirate who sought to desperately salvage his economic gains from Cold War confrontation; Odinga, on the contrary, was instructively labelled as a 'proponent of African socialism.'[307] To

[304] "Kenyans prefer African Socialism", *East African Standard*, 10 April 1965.
[305] Wang, "Twists and Turns of Sino-African Relations", pp. 59-71.
[306] "Editorial: Two views of China", *East African Standard*, 17 August 1965.
[307] "African socialism on the march: Mboya's recipe, self-reliance backed by foreign aid", *Times of*

many Zambian leaders, the self-defined 'socialist' experiment in Kenya meant little except for the priority given to foreign aid.

In August 1967, at a time when the Tanzanian and Zambian governments had dispatched a joint ministerial team to Beijing to negotiate the construction of the 1,042-mile cross-border TAZARA rail link, KANU officials and members were marching in protest to the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi.[308] This march was in retaliation for an earlier demonstration outside the Kenyan Embassy in Beijing by Red Guards, who demanded an apology from a Kenyan diplomat who, it was claimed, had killed a Chinese person in a car accident.[309] With the launch of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution under the direct command of Chairman Mao, the mid-to-late 1967 was thus a critical moment in both Chinese history and China's relations with African countries: While Zambia deepened its ties with Beijing, China's presence in Nairobi was increasingly unpopular. The following two chapters (Chapters Three & Four) will detail the almost parallel developments of this divergence.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the history of African socialism in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At this time, the leaders of newly independent African countries commonly referred to the 'communal' nature of pre-colonial societies to justify their specific approaches to socialism. The chapter discussed the similarities of and tensions between the Soviet and Chinese engagements with African socialist experiments. In contrast to

Zambia, 5 May 1967.
[308] "KANU March on the Embassy: Protest note refused by Chinese diplomats", *East African Standard*, 22 August 1967.
[309] "Editorial: Noise of the dragon", *East African Standard*, 23 August 1967.

Soviet Marxism-Leninism, China's emphasis on a rural anti-imperialist approach to socialism was particularly attractive to 'Third World' countries.

Both Zambian Humanism and Kenyan African Socialism claimed to arise from African 'traditional' values: Zambian Humanism advocated a person-centred Christian society, while Kenya's African Socialism aimed to reform the colonial economy through 'Africanisation' and foreign investment. These differences influenced China's respective relations with Kenya and Zambia. This chapter finds that the Chinese presence in Zambia was less controversial than that in Kenya. Surrounded by white-minority regimes, Zambia became a frontline country supporting Southern African liberation movements, a cause that China actively supported. In contrast, Kenya became entangled in the global Cold War, as part of which China financed the opposition in its unsuccessful political struggles against President Kenyatta.

Western philosophy and political science have long neglected African schools of thought. This may be explained by a fundamental Eurocentrism that has often disregarded the intellectual credibility of 'the periphery', as well as the challenges faced by Africans themselves to develop an endogenous path towards self-realisation and national development. Bearing in mind the diverse definitions and types of socialism, this chapter has sought to take seriously the relevance of socialism as an ideology, while exploring various theoretical approaches, the historical context in which they operated and the distinctive practices they generated. As the prominent Kenyan historian Bethwell Allan Ogot once argued, 'the prevailing self-consciously progressive ideologies' of nationalism, liberalism, and socialism illuminated the possible directions

to be taken by Third World leaders in the post-war era.[310] The majority of the new leaders and intellectuals in African countries were also brought up 'on this sumptuous socialist menu', at the time when they were young and militant.[311] In this sense, socialist conviction was woven in diverse ways with nationalist thinking and activity in postcolonial Africa.

Virtually every advocate of African socialism argued that these 'Western' or 'foreign' ideas needed to be localised before they could take root. Africa's particular historical experience of class, race and religion was significant in shaping the ultimate construction of socialist architectures in particular countries. Yet most debates assumed a binary division between 'orthodox/scientific socialism' and other forms of socialism, before any historically conscious and empirically rich analysis could be attempted. An attractive, but ultimately unhelpful, solution to this dilemma is to regard African socialism as essentially 'derivative'. In fact, however, Kenya and Zambia, developed their distinct political, economic and social trajectories in ways that reflected their historical experiences and the distinct perspectives of their leaders that were developed in conversation with global socialist currents but equally in relation to their own societies and nations. As a result, despite considerable similarities in their historical development, these two states did not deliver identical outcomes. While Zambian Humanism was a catch-all term during the rule of Kaunda's UNIP, Kenyatta and the later anti-Odinga coalition within KANU preferred the branding of 'African Socialism' much more than its substance or ethos. In fact, Kenya and Zambia's increasing divergence, in terms of their overall foreign policy and their relations with Communist

[310] Bethwell A. Ogot, *Who, If Anyone, Owns the Past? Reflections on the Meaning of "Public History"* (Kisumu: Anyange Press, 2010), p. 221.
[311] Ibid., p. 223.

China, in particular, revealed the diversity rather than the consistency of African experiments in socialism.

While this chapter affirms the relevance of African socialism, it also recognises the problematic nature of ideology when deployed in the interests of realpolitik, especially when overt propaganda from both the West and East was disseminated across the continent. The following chapter will focus on the subsequent evolution of Kenyan politics and its relations with China through the lens of the global Cold War in the mid-1960s and 1970s.

Chapter Three: Caught In-Between: Kenya's Foreign Policy and Its Relations with China (1964-1970)

Introduction: A Hidden Dragon or a Crouching Lion?

> China's policies in Kenya too were opportunistic, badly conceived and not successful.[312]
>
> Alan Hutchison, 1975

Having analysed the varied ideas and practices of African socialisms and their relationship to China's engagements with Kenya and Zambia, this chapter shifts the focus from the ideological to the diplomatic dimensions of Sino-Kenyan relations in the second half of the 1960s. Challenging the assumption that African countries lacked political leverage over powerful Cold War actors,[313] this chapter argues that Kenyan elites took the initiative to develop and deepen relations with China. Shortly after independence, the Kenyan government dispatched two delegations, the first to the US late December 1963, and the second to the USSR and the PRC in April-May 1964. This chapter will first focus on the process and wider impact of successive Kenyan official visits to Beijing. Since both the Soviet Union and China signed economic and technical cooperation agreements with Kenya following these visits, it is argued that the Sino-Soviet competition for global influence enabled Kenya to negotiate improved terms for the development aid than might otherwise have been on offer.

[312] Hutchison, *China's African Revolution*, p. 116.
[313] Westad, *The Global Cold* War; Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa*.

The second part of this chapter will analyse the tri-dimensional nature of post-independent Kenyan politics, analysing the relationship of domestic political parties and factions with their respective foreign backers. The Chinese authorities utilised Marxist class analysis to identify what they understood as the most 'advanced/progressive' forces in the Third World. This influenced their decision to finance Oginga Odinga's faction within the ruling party KANU, while the US maintained close connections with his rival Tom Mboya. As Professor Godfrey Muriuki argues, President Kenyatta's increasingly western-oriented conservative position was prompted by two events.[314] The armed mutiny against the newly independent government in January 1964 challenged his confidence in the loyalty of Kenyan soldiers, and he turned to British troops to help ensure national security and his own position. Furthermore, the conflict with Somalia on Kenya's north-eastern province led Kenyatta to form a military alliance with Ethiopia, whose leader Haile Selassie was strongly pro-Western.[315] In general, Kenya's so-called 'quiet diplomacy' delivered concrete gains in geopolitical affairs, although sometimes at the price of its non-aligned reputation.

As Chapter Two has clearly demonstrated, heated debates concerning ideology took place in Kenya parallel to the global East-West confrontations, and the 'red terror' provided by Communist China became a handy scapegoat. Kenya's official adoption of African Socialism in 1965 was ostensibly contradictory as 'a political document to counter the socialist idea'.[316] Against the assumption that Kenya can be characterised simply as a Western ally in the global Cold War framework, this chapter questions the

[314] Interview with Professor Godfrey Muriuki, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, 10 November 2016.
[315] Daniel Branch, 'Violence, Decolonisation and the Cold War in Kenya's North-Eastern Province, 1963–1978', *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, 4 (2014), pp. 642-657.
[316] Interview with Muriuki, Nairobi, 10 November 2016.

inevitability of what became a Sino-Kenyan diplomatic crisis. Evidence from archival sources and interviews in Kenya, China, the US and the UK suggests that this crisis resulted from a complex as well as unpredictable process that was shaped by a series of historical contingencies. The influence of incidents, such as the assassination of Odinga's most capable adviser, and the discovery of arms imported from Communist countries, will thus be explained in this chapter.

In the context of the increasingly dominant one party-state approach to post-independence African politics, neither Odinga nor the opposition party Kenya People's Union (KPU) had sufficient capacity to challenge the political establishment in Kenya. As China's international outlook became increasingly revolutionary, this chapter will discuss its impact on Sino-Kenyan relations, particularly expressed in the frequent exchange of protest notes between the Chinese embassy in Nairobi and the Kenyan government from mid-1966 onwards. This bilateral antagonism tended to escalate from verbal attacks into physical confrontations in both Beijing and Nairobi. The August 1967 march by KANU members at the Chinese embassy will be analysed in detail with the use of archives, news reports and pictures. Though Sino-Kenyan relations remained at a low point in the second half of the 1960s, their bilateral trade relations remained strikingly consistent and stable. Specific data for imports, exports, and visible balance will be provided, and this information will be used to explain this striking dichotomy between political and economic relations.

Finally, this chapter will address the succession struggle to Kenyatta among three political factions in Kenya, supported as they were by various foreign powers. In contrast to China's continuous alliance with Odinga throughout the period, the US

shifted its support from Tom Mboya to Daniel Arap Moi in reaction to changes in Kenyan domestic politics and its own foreign policy agenda. As the first US Ambassador to Kenya between 1964-1966, Attwood's professional background as a journalist and writer provided a 'down-to-earth' but also indiscreet flavour to American diplomacy, a legacy with which his successor struggled. This shows that individual personalities had a profound and unexpected influence on foreign relations.

A Review of Kenya's Foreign Policy and Its Relations with China

Three types of secondary literature have studied the relationship between Kenya and China in the 1960s and 1970s. There are many scholarly works on foreign policy during Kenyatta's reign, most of which were published in the 1970s and 1980s. In accordance with Nkrumah's thesis of neo-colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as much broader leftist analysis at the time, Kenya's positive engagement with the world economy and multinational corporations was widely criticised by dependency theorists.[317] Shaw labelled Kenya 'a sub-imperial state at the centre of the 'periphery', a 'client' which is able to exert dominance in the region of the Third World.'[318] While understandably critical of an unjust and unequal post-war order, such 'sceptics' nonetheless downplayed the agency of African governments and elites in developing multilateral, multifaceted diplomatic strategies on the world stage.[319]

[317] Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964-1971* (London: Heinemann, 1975).
[318] Shaw, 'International stratification in Africa", p. 145.
[319] Katete Orwa, "Foreign Policy, 1963-1986", in William R. Ochieng (ed.), *A Modern History of Kenya 1895-1980: In Honour of B. A. Ogot* (London: Evans Brothers, 1989), pp. 219-244.

Scholars of international relations often assume dichotomous distinctions between systems and individuals, theory and practice, domestic and foreign relations, and radical and conservative political perspectives. However, the validity of such binary frameworks is complicated by historical realities. Howell rightly terms Kenya's international outlook as essentially double-faced: on the one hand, it aligned with other Third World countries in support of a peaceful and equal world order; on the other hand, it prioritised political stability in the East African region.[320] This is demonstrated by Kenyatta's call for the preservation of the 'territorial *status quo*" at the Cairo Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in 1964, which contrasted sharply with Nkrumah's vision of Pan-African unity. Howell's emphasis on national consciousness and national integration was criticised by Okumu: KANU members generally lacked a sense of loyalty in propagating a unified public image in front of the electorate, and foreign policy issues were barely mentioned in most political campaigns throughout the 1960s.[321] He further challenged the validity of Kenya's 'long-standing commitment and genuine radical persuasion' after KANU's left-wing dissidents led by Odinga lost their influence by 1968.[322] However, the extent to which an ostensibly socialist orientation had shaped Kenya's initial 'radical' foreign policy before this time is itself questionable, as the preceding chapter has clearly demonstrated; and the meaning of such 'radicalness', if it ever existed, was perceived and assessed by contemporaneous actors in contrasting ways.

[320] John Howell, "An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, 1 (1968), p. 29.
[321] John J. Okumu, "Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy", *The African Review* 3, 2 (1973), pp. 264-265.
[322] Ibid., p. 265.

Other studies directly examine the East-West tension in Kenya with reference to propaganda or foreign aid. According to Okumu, Kenya's 'quiet diplomacy', a diplomatic posture that aimed to 'promote economic and social modernisation', was in reality constrained by a 'poor' nation's ability to attract foreign aid.[323] Mboya and Odinga had for example secured scholarships for Kenyan students in the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. Their personal rivalry also seemed to map onto the 'proxy war' hypothesis. Okoth portrayed US policy in Kenya as a source of conflict and instability, leaving the country 'with virtually no right to determine its own form of government and economy'.[324] A major limitation of such analysis is however the 'centre-periphery' model on which it rests, in which self-interested Kenyan elites struggled to cope with (presumably) well-trained, goal-oriented Western diplomats. Cullen's recent article about Anglo-Kenyan relations in the 1960s instead suggests that the deployment of Cold War rhetoric helped rather than harmed Kenyatta's bargaining of arms sales with the British.[325]

The last but not the least significant body of relevant literature is that by Kenyans themselves and experts in Kenyan politics. Those who have studied Kenyan history since independence are evidently aware of the influence of the East-West confrontation.[326] The edited volume by Gertzel, Goldschmidt, and Rothchild contains statements from Kenyan leaders on issues such as the 'danger of colonialism', 'non-alignment' or that make particular allegations with regard to Communist China.[327]

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[323] Ibid., p. 263.
[324] P. Godfrey Okoth, *United States of America's Foreign Policy toward Kenya 1952-1969* (Nairobi: Gideon S. Were Press, 1992), p. 113.
[325] Cullen, '"Playing Cold War Politics": The Cold War in Anglo-Kenyan Relations in the 1960s', *Cold War History* 18, 1 (2018), pp. 1-17.
[326] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*; Charles Hornsby, *Kenya: A History since Independence* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012).
[327] Cherry J. Gertzel, Maure Leonard Goldschmidt, and Donald S. Rothchild, *Government and Politics in Kenya: A Nation Building Text* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), pp. 577-583.

Critical of the state-level analysis in most IR work, Widner gives significant credit to Kenya's political parties in designing or implementing political strategies during the Kenyatta era.[328]

In order to analyse the realities of the US position in relation to Kenya, it is necessary to consult primary sources beyond the official archive. For example, *The Reds and the Blacks*, written by the first US Ambassador to Kenya William Attwood, offered 'an eyewitness account of Communist tactics in a vast, turbulent and largely unreported continent.'[329] Policy documents and intelligence reports of the US Department of State, plus routine telegrams from Nairobi with information provided directly by Kenyan ministers, help us reconstruct a consistent analysis of US involvement if not interference in Kenyan affairs.

Addressing questions such as African socialism or Kenya's position in the Cold War, prominent Kenyan politicians frequently draw on their personal experiences of historical events, thus offering 'social' context that enriches conventional political history. In this regard, both Mboya and Odinga published their autobiographies in the 1960s, whose titles formed a sharp contrast: Mboya had envisioned a bright future enjoyed by Kenyans in *Freedom and After*, but Odinga responded with a simple statement, *Not Yet Uhuru*.[330] Lonsdale, commenting specifically on General China but making a point of relevance for historians of modern times, states: 'we are ignorant strangers when we first meet historical actors.'[331] Therefore, caution is always required in interpreting recent reminiscence, whether oral or written.

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[328] Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya*.
[329] William Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure* (London: Hutchinson, 1967).
[330] Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After* (London: A. Deutsch, 1963); Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru*.
[331] John Lonsdale, "Foreword", in Myles Osborne (ed.), *The Life and Times of General China: Mau Mau*

China's Relations with Newly Independent Kenya

Almost immediately after Kenya's independence ceremonies, the new government dispatched a senior ministerial delegation to the US in late December 1963. The main purpose of this visit was to re-assure American policymakers and investors that Kenya would be a stable, trustworthy partner in the international community. Washington was clearly unhappy about Odinga's 'vague and often inaccurate view of US'.[332] In February the following year, the General Secretary 'Orland' of the Nyanza KANU branch, Vice President Odinga's constituency, visited Beijing.[333] Likely arranged through Odinga's connection with the Sino-African Friendship Association, this was an unofficial and largely secret visit. During his extensive travels to Beijing, Hunan Province and Guangxi Province, Orland made it clear that Odinga believed in a 'socialist path' and supported China's stance on the Sino-Soviet split. Despite his relatively low rank, Orland was treated with great respect and with a clear expectation that he would contribute positively to China's anti-imperialist influence in Africa. However, the Chinese government did not only invite such radical figures. Jomo Kenyatta's eldest son, Peter Magana, who was considered by the Chinese to be 'a British imperialist stooge', also visited Beijing at Odinga's recommendation.[334] This visit was intended to win over 'middle forces' including President Kenyatta himself.

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and the End of Empire in Kenya (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2015), p. xiv.

[332] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Telegram from Nairobi to Department of State", 2 June 1964.

[333] Note that only his Chinese name was recorded in the document, thus his English name was translated by author. CFMA, 108-01001-02, "中国对外文化联络委员会交际司以及湖南、广西外事办公室接待肯尼亚非洲民族联盟尼安萨省支部总书记奥论德访华工作简报" (Brief on the reception by China's External Cultural Contact Commission and Hunan and Guangxi External Affairs Offices of the KANU Nyanza General Secretary), 27 February 1964.

[334] CFMA, 108-00463-06, "中国对外文化联络委员会接待肯尼亚总统肯雅塔之长子彼德.肯雅塔访华计" (Plan for China's External Cultural Contact Commission to receive a visit by Peter Kenyatta), 30 April 1964.

During 3-11 May 1964, the same ministers who had led the delegation to the US paid their own official visit to Beijing, 'arriving and departing via Moscow.'[335] Kenyatta's choice of Odinga as the head of this delegation had been strongly opposed by another delegation member, Finance Minister James Gichuru, who insisted that his own ministry was more directly relevant to it.[336] Despite his distaste for Odinga's political ambition, Kenyatta did not wish to openly challenge his deputy. The resulting compromise was that Odinga was not 'allowed' to meet with foreign heads of state without the presence of other government members. It is however hard to prove whether this rule was complied with, as any such private meetings would less likely to be recorded. Minister of State Joseph Murumbi did however report to the US Embassy in Nairobi that he was present at all meetings between Odinga and their hosts in Moscow and Beijing.[337]

Perhaps impressed by the fulsome welcome from his Chinese hosts, in his speech to a farewell banquet Odinga openly blamed British colonial rule for exploiting African labour and warned of the danger of neo-colonialism for the Kenyan economy. Commenting on the specific issue of China's exclusion of the UN, he directed his criticisms at the US, a country he had visited only five months before:

> Before I end I might refer to your position in the international field. … The America of today is just over 300 years old. China and her civilization goes to several thousands of years. Let me remind you that our government on being admitted to the United Nations made it categorically clear that we will continue to give your government all the support for membership to the U.N.[338]

[335] TNA, DO 213/214, Ministerial Delegation from Kenya Visiting China via Soviet Union, 1964, "Visit of Kenya delegation to China", May 27, 1964.
[336] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Airgram from Nairobi to Department of State", 4 May 1964.
[337] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Airgram from Nairobi to Department of State", 21 May 1964.
[338] "奥金加·奥廷加团长的讲话" (Speech by head of delegation Oginga Odinga), *People's Daily*, 7 May 1964; TNA, DO 213/214, "The speech delivered by the leader of the Kenya Government Delegation", 6

Meanwhile in Nairobi, the US embassy received frequent updates from its identified contacts in the Kenyan delegations about Odinga's activities in China. When meeting embassy officials after his return, Finance Minister Gichuru described the trip to the Eastern bloc as 'purely exploratory', as any decision to accept Chinese or Soviet assistance would be made in Nairobi with his authority and not that of Odinga.[339] He reassured the US that Kenyatta would be 'most reluctant to approve any deal involving [an] influx [of Eastern] bloc technicians.'[340]

The practical result of the visit was the 'Agreement Concerning Economic and Technical Cooperation' signed by Odinga and Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi on 10 May 1964. The Chinese government promised a five-year interest-free unconditional loan of $15 million in the form of 'complete set equipment, single equipment and technical assistance'; and Kenya would repay the loan within a period of ten years.[341] The Kenyan Cabinet quickly discussed and approved the agreement. Only two weeks after the delegation returned to Kenya, Murumbi told the Chinese Ambassador Wang Yutian that a Ministerial Commission chaired by Odinga would soon propose a list of engineering projects to be financed by the Chinese loan, and Chinese technical experts who came to Kenya for fieldwork would be taken care of by the Kenyan government.[342]

May 1964.
[339] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Airgram from Nairobi to Department of State", 7 May 1964.
[340] Ibid.
[341] KNA, ABM/2/3133/91/01, Technical Assistance Agreement with PRC, 1964, "Agreement Concerning Economic and Technical Cooperation", 10 May 1964.
[342] CFMA, 108-00472-12, "中国驻肯尼亚大使王雨田同农业部长麦克凯齐、国务部长穆隆比、工程、交通和动力部长姆挖永姆巴的谈话记录" (Minutes of meeting between Chinese Ambassador to Kenya Wang Yutian and Kenyan Minister of Agriculture McKenzie, Minister of State Murumbi, and Minister of Engineering, Transport and Power Mwamyumba), 13 May 1964 - 24 June 1964.

For the British, it was vital to limit radical influences among Kenya's political elites, and counterbalance possible Communist penetration that might result from the provision of such aid. Given Kenya's willingness to accept assistance from both the Soviet Union and China, the British were particularly uncomfortable with China's 'quick, cheap and effective aid'.[343] Terence Garvey, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, reported that the Chinese deal allegedly concentrated on a 'single worthwhile project', an irrigation scheme on the Tana River.[344] But the Chinese actually promised much more in the subsequent package: a spinning, weaving, printing and dyeing mill and a sugar-refinery would be provided as fully equipped and operational plants. In terms of technical cooperation, the Chinese government would dispatch three experts on bamboo weaving to provide technical guidance; meanwhile, the Kenyan government would send trainees to China to learn ivory carving.[345] It is noticeable however that the Kenyan Ministry of Commerce and Industry stressed that only 'pure' or advisory experts should be selected, indicating a concern to exclude Chinese political agents.[346]

Following Odinga's May 1964 visit, Minister of Information Achieng Oneko, considered a radical nationalist by Western observers, led a good-will delegation to Beijing in August 1964. The main purpose of his visit was to propose cultural exchanges such as press and broadcasting, and possibly to attract additional aid.[347] Lawrence Sagini, Minister of Natural Resources, carried out 'watchdog duty' for the

[343] TNA, DO 213/214, "Visit of Kenya delegation to China", 27 May 1964.
[344] Ibid.
[345] KNA, ABM/2/3133/91/01, "Protocol to Agreement concerning Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Government of Kenya and the Government of the People's Republic of China", 10 December 1964.
[346] KNA, AE/19/70, China Aid Policy, 1964-1965, "Correspondence from the Permanent Secretary for Commerce & Industry to the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury", 26 August 1964.
[347] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Airgram from Nairobi to Department of State", 6 August 1964.

US government, and reported on the visit to the US embassy after his return. Clearly, certain 'pro-West' Kenyan ministers were monitoring the outreach activities of their fellow ministers to China, and reporting their information to the US government.

Kenya and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry

China's generous response to the Kenyan government's requests for aid and assistance can only be understood in the context of its ideological and increasingly geopolitical conflict with the Soviet Union. In Moscow, the Kenyan Ambassador had insisted that his country refused to choose sides in what he termed a 'family affair'.[348] But his counterpart in Beijing told Garvey that China's leaders had tried to convince Kenya that 'Soviet aid is fraudulent and that acceptance of it spells disaster for all but the most circumspect recipient.'[349]

Shortly before the Sino-Kenyan agreement of economic and technical cooperation was drafted, discussions about an equivalent agreement had taken place in Moscow. While most studies of about the Sino-Soviet split tend to emphasise issues such as understandings of Marxism or relations with the West,[350] I argue that the two countries' different approaches to economic and technical aid, as well as foreign trade, carried more weight for many African countries. Kenya's ultimate preference for Chinese aid over its Soviet equivalent was based on economic rather than ideological reasoning.

[348] NARA, RG 59, Box 2396 (POL 17-5 Kenya - Somali to POL 12-6 KOR N), 1964-1966, "Conversation with the Kenyan ambassador in Moscow regarding the Odinga visit, Sino-Soviet rivalry, Kenyan students, and Kenya's northeast region", 5 June 1964.
[349] TNA, DO 213/214, "Visit of Kenya delegation to China", 27 May 1964.
[350] Examples see: Li Mingjiang, *Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological Dilemma* (London: Routledge, 2012); Peter Dally, *The Sino-Soviet Split: A Trap for the West* (Cheltenham: British Anti-Communist Council, 1984).

The Soviet 'aid' was offered in the form of grant commitments that needed to be repaid. Since the 'concessionary' nature of the repayment conditions usually meant more liberal conditions of 'interest rates, amortization periods, and/or prices (for the aid goods and services or for the exports offered by the aid recipient as repayment)', it was less attractive than China's unconditional aid.[351] Kenya was not one of the nine African countries that signed either agreements or protocols of economic and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union between 1959 and 1972. Such an agreement had been proposed during Odinga's visit in April-May 1964, but it was rejected at a Cabinet meeting in June. Chaired by Odinga, this Cabinet's committee brought together the seven senior Kenyan ministries including Home Affairs, and Commerce as well as the Treasury secretariat.[352] According to John Esseks, the Soviet aid on offer did not provide 'turn-key' projects, which meant that responsibility for 'organizing and financing the actual construction, the installation of equipment, and the starting up of the facility' lay with the recipient government.[353] Kenyan trade delegates complained about this, and demanded that the Soviet government undertake the local costs of its funded aid projects.

Soviet officials, instead, proposed supplying certain goods which Kenyans could sell in both local and global markets, then use those earnings to finance its own projects at home.[354] This proposition was in fact similar to a conventional Western economic cooperation and trade agreement, in which both parties were committed to the exchange

[351] John D. Esseks, "Soviet Economic Aid to Africa: 1959-72", in Warren Weinstein (ed.), *Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 88-89.
[352] KNA, AE/19/70, "Minutes of the meeting held on Wednesday 3rd June 1964 in the office of the Minister for Home Affairs", 3 June 1964.
[353] Esseks, "Soviet Economic Aid to Africa: 1959-72", p. 89.
[354] KNA, AE/19/70, "Minutes of the meeting held on Wednesday 3rd June 1964".

of goods either at 'market prices' or 'the prices in the principal markets'.[355] At the Cabinet's meeting, Commerce Minister Julius Kiano provided a list of such goods to be considered for import from the USSR: 'agricultural machinery and implements', 'motor cars and tractors', 'watches', 'cameras', 'textiles', 'chemicals', and possibly, 'crude oils'. However, only machinery, watches, textiles and chemicals were judged to be profitable imports in Kenya, with the rest being either inappropriate or uncompetitive. The Kenya National Trading Company, responsible for overseeing the sale of any Soviet imports, produced a comprehensive report comparing the Soviet and Chinese aid programmes. It calculated that Kenya would have to purchase 'about 15,000 tons of sugar each year' from the USSR in order to pay back the total £5 million loan over the next 12 years.[356] In contrast to the 2.5% Soviet annual interest, the Chinese offer was interest-free, and Kenya's trade with China was as much as £400,000 to £500,000. Calling the Soviet aid 'a confidence trick', the Kenya National Trading Company recommended that the Chinese offer of a five-year interest-free unconditional loan of $15 million should instead be pursued.[357]

It is often assumed that ideological or political considerations tended to override practical calculations of national interest during the Cold War. Certainly, the US government was primarily concerned about any political strings being attached to such Communist aid. Impressed that 'both Soviet and Chinese wanted Kenya [to] loosen ties to West', Minister of State Murumbi reported the much stronger anti-American attitudes among Chinese leaders, who had even attempted to 'push [a] racist line about Chinese and Africans being colored brothers'.[358] Yet it did not prevent him concluding,

[355] Esseks, "Soviet Economic Aid to Africa: 1959-72", p. 90.
[356] KNA, AE/19/70, "USSR and Chinese aid – National Trading Company", 5 November 1964.
[357] Ibid.
[358] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Airgram from Nairobi to Department of State", 21 May 1964.

along with the other six ministers, that Chinese aid was more favourable than that of the Soviets. The British also considered this aid to be 'a long awaited first step of serious Communist economic offensive in East Africa', but he was confident that the 'experienced personnel and financial strength' of the West would prove definitive.[359]

The Three Dimensions of Kenyan Politics: Kenyatta, the 'Kenya Group' and the Odinga Faction

Despite Kenya's willingness to accept Communist aid, concerns about, and efforts to counter, Communist infiltration were frequently debated in the Kenyan Cabinet. Odinga's public praise of China should be understood in the context of rising domestic political competition. It was clear from mid-1964 that three factions had started to diverge within Kenya's ruling party: with Kenyatta closely aligned with Britain, Odinga and Mboya occupied the left and right ends of the political spectrum respectively. Since Chinese Communist leaders used class analysis to identify the most progressive force, Kenyatta was grouped into the 'right force' with almost no differentiation from Mboya. However, Odinga's alliance with Beijing was not exclusively based on a shared radical ideology, as Mboya's prior friendliness with the US government had pushed Odinga and his followers further towards the Eastern Bloc than they might otherwise have ventured. The US appraised Mboya as 'by far the most skilled and brilliant political leader on the scene.'[360]

[359] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Airgram from Nairobi to Department of State", 23 May 1964.
[360] NARA, RG 59, Box 2392 (Political & Defense, From POL 12-3 Kenya To POL POL 15-1 Kenya), "Internal political balance sheet", 6 August 1965.

In July 1964, the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi reported urgently to Beijing that Odinga's fierce struggles with the so-called 'imperialists and their running dogs' had intensified.[361] It blamed these conflicts entirely on Kenyatta, dating back to his attempts to exclude his old friend Odinga from the coalition government in 1962. Odinga's disagreements with Kenyatta on events such as the Zanzibar Revolution, military mutinies in East Africa, and Kenya's military deals with Ethiopia were also presented as political manipulations by Odinga's opponents. Despite their significant political differences, Bildad Kaggia, the dissident Kikuyu leader from the Central Province, and Paul Ngei, an elder of the Kamba ethnic group, were also praised for their anti-imperialist positions on land policies, and their support for land restitution resonated strongly with the Chinese. The overall assessment by the Chinese of the political situation in Kenya was optimistic: 'the unity of Odinga, Kaggia and Ngei has been rather close, and to some extent has become the leading force of every party.'[362]

Beijing's confidence in Odinga was matched by a wariness about him in London and Washington. When meeting British diplomat Terence Garvey in Beijing, Odinga had praised Chinese development in comparison to his 'dreadful' experience in India, full of 'crawling beggars'. But when questioned about what brand of socialism Kenya had chosen, he avoided any reference to Marxist-Leninism. Garvey subsequently wrote: "I would greatly prefer to do business with them [Chinese] than with this ophidian creature [Odinga], who, frankly, gave me the creeps."[363] Two months later, US Ambassador to Kenya Attwood was visited privatively by Odinga, in one of the few

[361] CFMA, 108-00465-02, "肯目前形势和我们的看法" (Current situation in Kenya and our view thereof), 1 July 1964.
[362] Ibid.
[363] TNA, DO 213/214, "Letter from Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires, Peking to the Commonwealth Relations Office", 19 May 1964.

instances of a meeting between an American official and an alleged Communist sympathiser. Attwood was however impressed by the famous "Double O's" outspoken character: "You Americans remind me of the Chinese. We can talk frankly together and we can laugh. But the Russians – well, they are different – they are too much like the British."[364] This 'curious' joke convinced Attwood that Odinga's 'seemingly genuine and even emotional defense of Chinese Communist polices' confirmed his 'naiveté'.[365]

The Escalation of Violence in Kenyan Politics, 1965

In early 1965, the level of violence in Kenyan political struggles showed a marked escalation. Pio Gama Pinto's murder would illustrate that the entanglement of Kenya's domestic politics in the global Cold War had begun to produce dangerous, even fatal results. As the first Kenyan politician to be assassinated since Independence, Pinto's murder came as a shock to the public. Born in Kenya but sent to India at the age of eight, Pinto was active in union movements in Bombay, the heart of the Indian struggle for national independence. He returned to Kenya in 1949 and became involved in anticolonial activism. After he joined KANU, Pinto soon gained recognition for his 'formidable organizational skills and tactical nous in parliament and beyond'.[366] But Pinto's Asian ethnicity sparked distrust and even hatred among some Kikuyu leaders, who referred to him as 'the most dangerous man'.[367] Although he rarely made public appearances, Pinto was perceived by the US as 'the organizer, tactician and paymaster and possibly the link with the Chicoms [Chinese Communists]'.[368] He however tried to

[364] Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks*, p. 242.
[365] NARA, RG 59, Box 2392, 1964-1966, "An evening with Oginga Odinga", 21 July 1964.
[366] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, p. 45.
[367] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Assassination of Pinto: Brains and organizer of Odinga forces", 5 March 1965.
[368] 'Chicoms' stands for Chinese Communists in US official documents. See NARA, RG 59, Box 2392,

mitigate the tension between the radicals and the West by suggesting a US Embassy official join Odinga's trip to Central Nyanza so as to 'know him in his own background'.[369] On 24 February 1965, Pinto was shot dead by unknown assailants in Nairobi. Murumbi – half Goan himself and a close friend – recalled the day when he heard the news: Nairobi was flooded with competing rumours that Americans, Chinese Communists, or Kikuyus were responsible.[370] In contrast to Murumbi's posthumous praise of Pinto that he 'lived his socialism',[371] Washington believed that his radicalism was provoked by racial discrimination under British colonial rule, and that he was pushed further to the leftist Eastern Bloc in reaction to Mboya and the Kikuyu's alliance with the West.[372] One US Embassy official described Pinto as 'basically an opportunist and probably not ideologically committed to communism', who might have shifted his allegiance if he saw political advantage in doing so.[373]

The Arms Smuggling Controversy and the Anti-Chinese Motion in the Kenyan Parliament

Despite his controversial position in Kenyan politics, Pinto's death was certainly a considerable loss to Odinga's faction and the political scene in Kenya was markedly changed as a result. Following these events, a group of KANU leaders formed an anti-Odinga alliance called the 'Kenya Group' in June 1965. The growing tension between the 'Old Man' Kenyatta and his deputy reached a critical point in April when arms were

"Odinga presents views on national and international problems; Pinto urges more US contact with Odinga", 24 December 1964.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Anne Thurston, *A Path not Taken: The Story of Joseph Murumbi* (Nairobi: The Murumbi Trust, 2015), p. 218.
[371] Ibid., p. 214.
[372] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Assassination of Pinto".
[373] Ibid.

found in Odinga's properties in Kisumu and Nairobi. Chinese Communists were alleged to have supplied arms to overthrow Kenyatta's government, which led to the anti-Chinese motion in the Kenyan parliament. But at this point, Kenyatta did not want a showdown with Odinga. Njoroge Mungai, the then Minister for Internal Security and Defence, simply denied the allegation of arms smuggling and called for calm in the House. Given that Kenyatta had requested that British troops stationed at Aden be put on stand-by for their further deployment in Kenya, this moderate response obviously disappointed the US, which at the very least expected Odinga to be placed under house arrest.[374]

Despite widespread allegations of Communist penetration following this arms smuggling incident, Kenyatta refrained from immediately siding with the 'Kenya Group'. To ensure his own prestige and the unity of KANU, the president deliberately maintained the fragile balance of power.[375] Meanwhile Communist sympathisers such as Odinga and Oneko were careful not to openly advocate the introduction of a Communist party-state model.[376] Washington believed that Beijing had urged Kenyan radicals to counter-attack more aggressively against the 'Kenya Group'. At this stage, Chinese leaders still maintained diplomatic communication with Kenyatta's government despite public criticism of China by senior Kenyan politicians. When Zhou Enlai passed through Kenyan territory on his way to and from Tanzania in June 1965, he greeted President Kenyatta in his telegrams but did not receive any reply.[377] To some

[374] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Why there has been no conclusive confrontation between Kenyatta and Odinga; the relationship between the two leaders", 21 May 1965.
[375] Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya*, p. 32.
[376] "Cold War the danger to African unity", *East African Standard*, 5 April 1965; "Socialism to solve problems – Minister", *East African Standard*, 5 April 1965.
[377] "在途经肯尼亚和埃塞俄比亚的领空时 周总理分别致电问候两国领导人" (Premier Zhou greets leaders of Kenya and Ethiopia), *People's Daily*, 6 June 1965; "在访问坦桑尼亚后飞过各国领空时 周总理致电问候肯尼亚等国领导人" (Premier Zhou greets leaders of Kenya etc.), *People's Daily*, 10 June

observers, the fact that the Chinese embassy was allowed to be located next to Kenya's armed forces headquarters suggested trust;[378] for others, this confirmed suspicions of Communist infiltration. After realising that the embassy staff could view a military training ground through their office windows, Kenyatta ordered the expulsion of Wang Teming, a reporter from the Chinese news agency Xinhua which was thought to be sympathetic to the state interest. He was charged with 'infringing [upon] the national interests' of Kenya.[379] Xinhua responded to this 'regretful' decision by blaming the 'imperialists, old and new colonialists' behind-the-scenes.[380]

From the mid-1960s onwards, the Chinese authorities directed increasing attention and resources towards Tanzania, where President Nyerere had adopted a more radical political orientation. The US Ambassador Attwood's counterpart in Tanzania warned that Zanzibar could become 'a base for subversive and insurgency operations against [the] mainland from Kenya to the Cape.'[381] At least two US informants from the 'Kenya Group', Charles Njonjo and Jeremiah Nyangah, reported that the Chinese continued to finance Odinga via their embassy in Dar es Salaam.[382] Abdulrahman Mohamed 'Babu', a committed Marxist with strong Chinese contacts, used his position as the Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Economic Planning to arrange meetings with Odinga.[383] A month after Odinga had reportedly met with Babu in Mombasa, the

1965.
[378] Interview with Professor Vincent Simiyu, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, November 2016.
[379] NARA, RG 59, Box 2394 (Political & Defense, POL 17 Diplomatic & Consular Representations KENYA to POL 23-10 KENYA), "Chinese Communist Embassy site provoked Kenyatta's suspicions; other aspects", 13 August 1965.
[380] "肯尼亚当局采取不友好行动无理要求我记者离境" (Kenyan authorities demand our journalist to leave the country without reason), *People's Daily*, 5 August 1965.
[381] George Roberts, "Politics, Decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam c. 1965-72" (University of Warwick, PhD thesis, 2016), p. 38.
[382] NARA, RG 59, Box 2394, "Memorandum to United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Conversation with Jeremiah Nyagah", 20 August 1965.
[383] Roberts, "Politics, Decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam c. 1965-72", p. 37.

Chinese government received Odinga's request of a total £5 millions of funding. China was also briefed by Odinga on the prospects for Kenya's presidential succession: the conservatives were divided into the pro-Mboya US-backed camp and those, including Kenyatta himself, who were supported by Britain.[384] As one of the few Africanists in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Ambassador He Ying suggested that it was not appropriate to impose Communism in Kenya, where 'complete national independence' had yet to be realised owing to the right-wing force now under the leadership of Kenyatta. The best chance lay in a united front that would take advantage of the internal conflicts between the 'adversaries', i.e. Mboya and Kenyatta.[385] Ultimately, such recommendations went unaddressed, with the launch of the Cultural Revolution in China.

Sino-Kenyan Relations amidst the Cultural Revolution, 1966

In May 1966, an unprecedented revolution swept over Mao's China. The 'spill-over' of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese foreign policy was powerful. Reflecting Marshal Lin Biao's description of Maoist thoughts as 'a powerful ideological atomic bomb', it sought to universalise China's revolutionary trajectory 'in the age of complete breakdown of imperialism and victory of socialism in the whole world'.[386] In less than a year, more than three quarters of the c. forty countries with which China had diplomatic relations experienced degradation or deterioration in diplomatic relations, including six African countries.[387] Chinese embassies in African countries were either

[384] CFMA, 108-01117-01, "奥廷加对肯形势看法及对我要求" (Odinga's take on the Kenyan situation and his requests to us), 20 September 1965.
[385] Ibid.
[386] Lin Biao, "Preface to the Reprint of Quotations from Chairman Mao," in Mao Zedong, *Chairman Mao on World Revolution* (Nanjing: Nanjing Revolutionary Committee, 1970).
[387] Barbara Barnouin and Changgen Yu, *Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution* (London:

controlled by Red Guards who intentionally distributed Mao's published works and badges, or in a state of 'laissez-faire' in which diplomats disengaged from local affairs in the host countries. Long points out that exporting revolution in the post-colonial African context not only went against the protocol of international relations, but also challenged the legitimacy of new African leaders who desired political independence and economic development above anything else.[388] In the case of Kenya, 'tribal or faction struggles' and the country's 'close relations with the West' were thought to contribute to this alienation.[389] These studies, nevertheless, lacked perspectives other than the Chinese state.

Chinese regulations on the release of state documents mean that China's Foreign Ministry archived materials are only available to the year of 1965. However, the state-run press provides an alternative, and fairly consistent guide to China's foreign affairs for the period afterwards. *The People's Daily* featured a total of 275 (in 1964) and 87 (in 1965) reports about Kenya, all of which were positive in tone. But from August 1965 onwards, the number of Kenya-related news stories decreased sharply: there were fifteen articles in 1966, only eleven in 1967 and almost none by 1970. In contrast to the relatively stable number of published articles on other African countries, this was a direct reflection of China's worsening relations following a dramatic reshuffle within KANU. From 11 March 1966, party delegates met for a national convention in Limuru. A key motion was proposed by Mboya to decide the fate of the post of party vice-president, then held by Odinga alongside that of state vice-president.[390] Despite

Kegan Paul International, 1988), p. 66.; Wang, "Twists and turns of Sino-African relations", p. 59.
[388] Long Xiangyang 龙向阳, "1966-1969 Nian Zhongguo yu Feizhou Guanxi Chutan" 1966-1969 年中国与非洲关系初探 (An Initial Investigation of Sino-African Relations, 1966-1969), in *Peking University African Studies Series*, p. 79.
[389] Wang, "Twists and Turns of Sino-African Relations", pp. 65-67.
[390] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, p. 58.

Odinga's efforts to 'buy votes' with 'a great deal of (presumably Chinese) money', it was passed with no difficulty.[391] Competition then arose over nominations to fill posts in KANU's national headquarters. Again, Odinga's radicals were clearly beaten by Kenyatta's key allies, including Mwai Kibaki and Ronald Ngala. As a result, Odinga resigned from both the party and the government, as did his followers Kaggia and Oneko. They subsequently formed a new party, the KPU, which claimed to inherit 'KANU's abandoned mantle as the party of redistribution'.[392] When asked about the conflict between the KANU and the KPU, Professor Muriuki recalled, 'to me, [they] were really proxies fighting for Cold War battles'. But he equally claimed that Odinga and Kaggia had 'very good arguments' to advocate the re-distribution of land that had been 'stolen by the white men'.[393] As an opposition party with little access to state resources, its socialist identity held a certain attraction for potential allies who had long been marginalised under Kenyatta's rule.

Although some of his supporters had called African Socialism 'merely a device imposed on Kenya to buttress western capitalism', Odinga stated his loyalty to the *Sessional Paper No. 10* as 'setting Kenya on the road to socialism' prior to his departure from KANU.[394] But Odinga now faced a dilemma. Since the ruling party still ostensibly followed a socialist creed (previously approved by him), Odinga was forced to identify with the radical left, infused with a revolutionary agenda. This coincided with Mao's ambition to 'challenge for the mantle of leader of the world revolution' in his rejection of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence.[395] This was in a context in which, by the

[391] Hutchison, *China's African Revolution*, p. 119.
[392] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, p. 59.
[393] Interview with Muriuki, Nairobi, 10 November 2016.
[394] NARA, RG 59, Box 2394, "Press Interview of Vice President Oginga Odinga", 5 October 1965.
[395] Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, p. 148.

mid-1960s, Africans frequently expressed their frustration with the stagnation of decolonisation (e.g. southern Africa) as well as the overthrow of some African leaders who were friendly to the East (e.g. Nkrumah in Ghana). As Branch argues, 'unified, one-party states charged with delivering development rather than democracy' became the prevailing political orthodoxy in sub-Saharan Africa.[396] Without doubt, the existence of the KPU and its communistic background was a potential nightmare for the Kenyan political establishment. On several occasions, KANU spokespersons made it clear that any attempt by foreign forces to 'meddle in affairs of African states' would be strongly opposed.[397]

Such harsh warnings issued by a foreign country would have been taken seriously by the Chinese Foreign Ministry if two of its leading figures, Chen Yi and Zhou Enlai, were not at that moment being attacked by Red Guards. Through mid-1966, as the head of the Communist Party work committee in charge of the Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry, Chen Yi had prevented forty-four radical young translators from overthrowing the ministry hierarchy.[398] There was a brief period in which China's embassies were paralysed by its domestic political upheavals. But in August 1966, the Foreign Ministry received two letters from so-called 'Chinese sympathizers abroad', who criticised the 'bourgeois' behaviour of Chinese diplomats as depredating the 'egalitarian ideals' advanced by the Cultural Revolution at home.[399] Not long after, Mao ordered embassy staff to return to Beijing for political education. Odinga was thus deprived of possible Chinese patronage because of the turmoil within the CCP. At this

[396] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, p. 59.
[397] NARA, RG 59, Box 1970 (Political and Defense, POL 33 CHICOM-HK to POL CHICOM-KENYA), "Principal points March 15 statement by governing party KANU", 16 March 1967; NARA, RG 59, Box 1970, "Reaction to plans for revolutionary Chinese Communist diplomatic activity", 22 March 1967.
[398] Barnouin and Yu, *Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution*, p. 5.
[399] Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, p. 51.

point, it became likely that Sino-Kenyan relations would severely suffer from China's overtly critical campaign against Kenyatta's government.

Tit for Tat: Reciprocal Diplomatic Protests, 1965-1967

Amid the heated debates in Kenya's parliament about the Communist threat in mid-1965 (see Chapter Two), the Chinese embassy in Nairobi had carefully managed the protests it initiated. Most of its attacks were directed at alleged 'colonialists' or 'imperialists' instead of Kenyan politicians themselves. But this changed dramatically in June-July 1966, when several Kenyan Ministers were criticised in an Embassy Protest Note for 'subjecting the PRC to slander, vilification and grave provocation.'[400] All the named Ministers were anti-Odinga conservatives, including Moi and Kibaki, who had claimed that the KPU had borrowed its symbol of a bull from the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). As the PLA had never used such a symbol, it is clear these Kenyan Ministers were playing an inaccurate card invoking a Communist terror. In restating its adherence to China's Five Principles in dealing with African countries (see Chapter One), the Protest Note declared:

> The words and deeds of the Kenya Ministers can only be regarded as an effort to cater to the needs of imperialism. The Chinese Embassy holds that the foregoing statements of the Kenya Ministers have seriously damaged the normal relations between China and Kenya.[401]

On the day after the *East African Standard* reported the 'Peking protest', it published an editorial titled 'Chinese Crackers'. It claimed the Chinese mission in Nairobi had breached diplomatic protocol by trying to 'impugn other countries and political

[400] "Kenya answers China note: Peking protest over 'hostility of Ministers'", *East African Standard*, 13 July 1966.
[401] Ibid.

ideologies'.[402] The editor sarcastically expressed his pity that the newspaper was not named in the protest Note. The *EAS* was regarded with distaste among Chinese leaders at the time, mainly because of its 'British ownership', which perhaps explained its 'attacks of China and violation of Sino-Kenyan relations'.[403]

Meanwhile the political revolution underway in China was watched closely in Kenya. Between July and September 1966, the *EAS* published five editorials related to China. In its editorial of 16 July, Confucius the famous teacher, politician and philosopher of ancient China, was constructed as a wise man of all times, in opposition to the Chinese Communist Party in the shadow of Chairman Mao's personality cult.[404] In this way, the editorial questioned the very nature of 'Chineseness' concealed in the undiplomatic language of the Protest Note. To illustrate the principle of 'reciprocity', the *EAS* quoted Confucius's 'Golden Rule' that 'what you do not like when done to yourself, do not do to others'. Its editorial of 24 August highlighted the potential danger of 'excess population settlement' by aggressive Communists 'under the guise of technical aid and artisanal assistance.'[405]

In 1967, antagonism between the two countries escalated. On the night of 27 January, the glass-front hanging on the high wall of the Chinese embassy was broken by a rock thrown by an unidentified person.[406] Today equipped with a guardhouse, higher walls and fences, the Chinese embassy is no longer an easy target. On my first visit to the embassy in 2016, I almost missed its front gate, as there were no conspicuous

[402] "Editorial: Chinese crackers", *East African Standard*, 14 July 1966.
[403] Wang, "Twists and Turns of Sino-African relations", p. 66.
[404] "Editorial (Saturday Essay): The sayings of Confucius", *East African Standard*, 16 July 1966.
[405] "Editorial: Chinese U.N. membership", *East African Standard*, 24 August 1966.
[406] NARA, RG 59, Box 1970, "Incident at Communist Chinese Embassy in Nairobi", 12 February 1967.

showcases or slogans (Figure 3.1). Back in 1967, however, the embassy prominently displayed pictures of peoples from different parts of world studying the thoughts of Chairman Mao and of Red Guards (Figure 3.2).



Figure 3.1: Today's Chinese Embassy in Nairobi
Source: Photo from the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, http://ke.chineseembassy.org/chn/sgzc/zjsg/



Figure 3.2: "China's Embassy in Nairobi – with the Gates Locked against Callers"
Source: Photo and caption from *East African Standard*, 29 July 1967, available at the Kenya National Archives.

Following the smashing of the glass frontage, a protest note from the Chinese embassy was presented to the Kenyan authorities, demanding punishment of the perpetrators, compensation for the damages caused, and effective action to counter anti-Chinese activities.[407] This was again rejected. In March, a 'Chicom document' analysed in a US intelligence report showed that the Africa-based Chinese diplomats had been encouraged to engage in 'revolutionary activities'.[408] If proved to be authentic, this document had the potential to be the straw that would break the camel's back – leading to an anti-China motion in Kenyan parliament. On 29 June, China's Chargé d'Affaires in Nairobi was declared *persona non grata* and asked to leave the country immediately.[409] A few days later, a letter signed by a Chinese embassy official, along with Mao badges and quotations from Mao's works, was discovered in a secondary school in Njoro. As the recipient of the letter was living in this agricultural town southwest of Nakuru, a KPU stronghold, the opposition party was suspected of involvement. Admitting that he had information on where the KPU received its funds, Moi characterised the embassy official's actions as 'gross interference in domestic matters'.[410] In October, the Kenyan government issued the Prohibited Publications (no. 7) Order, which formally banned the publications of China's Foreign Language Press.[411]

[407] "我驻肯尼亚大使馆正告肯尼亚政府" (Our Embassy in Kenya warns Kenyan government), *People's Daily*, 4 February 1967.
[408] NARA, RG 59, Box 2255 (Political and Defense, POL JORDAN-US to POL 2 KENYA), "Reaction to plans for revolutionary Chinese Communist diplomatic activity", March 22, 1967.
[409] "Envoy who attacked Kenya told to go: Ambassador recalled from Peking", *East African Standard*, 30 June 1967.
[410] "Sedition in Kenya must stop – Mr. Moi warning to Chinese", *East African Standard*, 3 August 1967.
[411] NARA, RG 59, Box 1970, "Kenya bans literature from Foreign Languages Press of Peking", 27 October 1967.

While the Chinese embassy constantly attacked Kenyatta's government, in China the rebel group organised by the Gang of the Four spiralled out of control. Under the banner of the 'seizure of power', they claimed the right to lead the Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry.[412] A military rebellion challenged Chairman Mao's leadership, and the Head of State, Liu Shaoqi, became the target of a mass criticism campaign. Air, land and river transportation in China was on the verge of total paralysis. As the Kenyan Ambassador in Peking, Theophilus Koske, had already been recalled for consultations, Kenyan authorities' intelligence on events in China was probably limited. [413] In August, Red Guards started attacking foreign embassies in Beijing. Both the Soviet and British missions experienced large demonstrations, and a Soviet diplomat was reportedly beaten.[414]

This radicalism soon spread to the Kenyan embassy. Triggered by a car accident reportedly involving a Kenyan diplomat, a demonstration was organised that demanded a formal apology. This time, the KANU Nairobi branch responded with a similar protest outside the Chinese embassy on 22 August.[415] KANU marchers carried placards stating 'Chinese should behave like other countries', 'Chinese keep your Communism in China. We don't need it here!', and 'Red Guards are behaving like hungry dogs' (Figure 3.3). Separated by the grille gate, they confronted a Chinese diplomat (Figure 3.4). Now with arms crossed, the same Chinese diplomat standing by the gate was pictured by the *EAS* displaying what the newspaper described as an 'inscrutable gaze' (Figure 3.5),[416] while

[412] Barnouin and Yu, *Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution*, p. 2.
[413] "Envoy who attacked Kenya told to go: Ambassador recalled from Peking", *East African Standard*, 30 June 1967.
[414] "Red Guards attack embassy", *East African Standard*, 19 August 1967; "Chinese fire U.K. mission in Peking: 'Break-in' radio flash", *East African Standard*, 23 August 1967.
[415] "KANU March on the Embassy: Protest note refused by Chinese diplomats", *East African Standard*, 22 August 1967.
[416] Ibid., photo caption.

his colleagues watched from the embassy windows (Figure 3.6). On the same day, the Kenyan Foreign Ministry met with the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires to discuss the protest in Beijing. To the surprise of the Kenyans, the official 'deliberately and cunningly' took advantage of this meeting to present his own protest note criticising Moi's aforementioned statement.[417] According to the Chinese protest note, the Chinese Embassy provided Chairman Mao's works and badges only 'upon the request of Kenyan people,' which

> … should have been an extremely normal practice by the Embassy in order to enhance the friendship between the Kenyan and Chinese peoples, in accordance with international conventions.[418]

The Kenyan government rejected this characterisation and criticised the earlier protest as 'contrary to the accepted norms of international practice, diplomatic decorum and civilised behaviour.'[419] It accordingly demanded that China 'forthwith repair the damage to Kenya's Embassy in Peking, and bring the misdirected and malicious offenders to justice'; otherwise, 'swift reciprocal action' would be taken.[420]

[417] "Peking envoy 'tried to plant note'", *East African Standard*, 22 August 1967.
[418] "我大使馆就肯尼亚副总统亲自出马反华向肯政府提出最强烈抗议" (Our embassy strongly protests the anti-China actions of the Kenyan Vice President), *People's Daily*, 23 August 1967.
[419] "Kenya warns China 'stop hooligan or face the consequence'", *East African Standard*, 24 August 1967.
[420] "Kenya warns China: We will hit back: Note demands safety for Peking Embassy", *East African Standard*, 24 August 1967.



Figure 3.3: "The Branch Sectary Leads the Nairobi KANU Demonstrators in Their March on the Chinese Embassy"
Source: Photo and caption from *East African Standard*, 21 August 1967, available at the Kenya National Archives.



Figure 3.4: "The KANU Members Brandish Their Posters"
Source: Photo and caption from *East African Standard*, 22 August 1967, available at the Kenya National Archives.



Figure 3.5: “The Inscrutable Gaze of a Chinese Diplomat Met KANU Demonstrators Who Marched to the Embassy to Protest against Attacks on the Kenya Embassy in Peking”
Source: Photo and caption from *East African Standard*, 22 August 1967, available at the Kenya National Archives.



Figure 3.6: “Members of the Diplomatic Staff of the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi, Watch from the Windows during the KANU Protest March”
Source: Photo and caption from *East African Standard*, 21 August 1967, available at the Kenya National Archives.

The question these events raise is: why should China have forfeited her diplomatic connections given their evident usefulness in such a violent and disruptive way? Larkin argued that the Chinese government regarded this rupture as a reasonable risk to take in exchange for the potential revolutionary benefits, defined mainly by 'her image as a revolutionary state.'[421] China's protest note clearly supports this thesis. By asserting the indisputable status of Chairman Mao in leading the world revolution, China stood firmly against the so-called 'revisionist' Soviet Union and its allies. Yet the physical attacks on foreign embassies were clearly catalysed by the radicals who had seized power. According to Ambassador Koske, who was declared *persona non grata* at the end of June 1967, the Cultural Revolution depicted in the foreign press was far more violent than it really was. Koske's exposure to China as a Kenyan diplomat gave him a unique perspective on the country and China's accomplishments in terms of the redistribution of wealth.[422] This contrasted sharply with the public perception of China and Chinese politics at that time, summarised by the *EAS* editorial thus:

> Kenya certainly has its troubles, notably over unemployment and land problems, but it is fundamentally sound and above all united in a policy of nation-building. China is plunged in civil war, with its leaders at each other's throats, the Army and the Communist Party at loggerheads, and millions of people suffering misery as a consequence.[423]

The pronounced negative portrayal of the 'red terror' during this period certainly undermined the popularity of Oginga and the KPU, as well as the ability of Kenyan radicals to articulate a positive view of radical socialism.

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[421] Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949-1970*, p. 174.
[422] NARA, RG59, Box 2257 (Political and Defense, POL 13 KENYA to POL 15-1 KENYA), "Conversation with Mr. Theophilus A. Koske, Kenya Ambassador to Peking", 4 July 1967.
[423] "Editorial: Sabotage from Peking", *East African Standard*, 24 August 1967.

The diplomatic deterioration between Kenya and China in 1966-1967 was at the time considered a major threat to their bilateral trade. According to a US government analysis, 1967 witnessed 'a hostile pattern' between Kenyan and Chinese governments. The Chinese embassy in Nairobi even transferred its funds to the National Bank of Commerce in Dar es Salaam in early September.[424] However, official figures from the Kenyan Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Appendix II), show that the volume of Sino-Kenyan trade rose steadily from KShs. 1.2 million in 1961 to KShs. 156 million in 1978. The balance of this trade was mostly in favour of the PRC except for the period prior to Kenya's independence and afterwards in the years of 1966, 1973, and 1974. Another authority, the Kenyan Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, probably using a different method of calculation, provides data showing much smaller trade volumes (Appendix III). Yet the level of Sino-Kenyan trade is still shown to rise in a similar pattern. The drop of Kenya's imports from China in 1967 might be suggestive of this intense period of their diplomatic hostility, but if so, its impact did not endure. Meanwhile, the bilateral trade agreement signed in 1964 (discussed earlier in this chapter), was then revised and reaffirmed in 1978. Although the years in-between witnessed dramatic changes in both Chinese and Kenyan politics and diplomatic relations, trade – as these figures show – was mainly treated as a technical issue and was maintained despite the changes in each country's ideological orientation. For example, in response to China's concerns about an imbalance in trade in 1966 in its own favour, as well as allegations of Chinese goods being dumped in Kenya, the Senior Assistant Secretary of the Kenyan Commerce Ministry offered the following reassurance: 'The Kenya Government has neither raised any question nor made any complaints to the Chinese side about the trade between the two countries. We have

[424] NARA, RG 59, Box 1970, "China and Kenya trade hostages", 18 October 1967.

never complained that China has exported too much to Kenya.'[425] In November that year, Mbiyu Koinange, Minister for State in the Office of the President, met with the Chinese Ambassador to negotiate the sale of white maize from Kenya to China.[426] Zambia also had a maize deal with China in 1966, which will be discussed in the next chapter. In general, bilateral trade with China continued to be encouraged in many African countries despite a growing sense of national grievance against Communist China at that time.

Kenya's Succession Struggle and the Superpowers, 1968-1970

By May 1968, when President Kenyatta suffered a serious stroke, it was already clear that the nomination of his successor would significantly determine Kenya's future. Drawing on the work of those such as Branch who have studied the history of presidential succession since Kenya's independence, this section will focus on the influence of foreign powers and their potential influence on post-Kenyatta Sino-Kenyan relations.[427] Not long after the Limuru meeting of KANU and the formation of the KPU in 1966, Daniel arap Moi was promoted to the position of the Vice President, with the support of Kikuyu members of KANU close to Kenyatta. Njonjo, who served as the Attorney General, pressed for a constitutional amendment that would allow the Vice President to succeed automatically to the presidency in the event that it was vacated mid-term.[428] This proposal was intended to strip the power to select the

[425] KNA, KETA/7/17, External Trade-Trade with China, 1963-1980, "Correspondence from the Chinese Embassy in Kenya to the Kenyan Ministry of Commerce and Industry", 18 September 1966.
[426] KNA, KETA/7/17, "Resume of the meeting held in the Hon. Mbiyu Koinange's Office Harambee House at 2.30 P.M. on Monday 28th November 1966 to discuss sale of maize to China", 28 November 1966.
[427] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, pp. 67-82.
[428] NARA, RG 59, Box 2256 (Political and Defense, POL 6 KENYA to POL 12 KENYA), 1967-1969, "Intelligence Note: Kenya: Solving the succession issue?", 20 December 1967.

president from the National Assembly, over which Mboya retained strong control. Although Mboya was perceived as the 'enforcer' of KANU's anti-Odinga campaign, Kenyatta had sought to weaken political competition from the Luo to his Kikuyu base. Now that Odinga had removed himself from the ruling party, Mboya emerged as the most formidable challenge to Kenyatta's inner circle. Odinga and his KPU remained a significant opposition.

External observers believed that each of the three factions competing to succeed Kenyatta received some level of foreign backing. While Odinga was clearly identified with the Communist East, it was not always straightforward to distinguish American interests from those of the British with regard to KANU. One of their divisions concerned the issue of China's representation in the U.N., as the US government, at odds with the British, sought to persuade Kenya to 'understand the position of the Chinese Nationalists'.[429] 'A fundamental assumption underlying our policy for Kenya', stated in the US Embassy's Annual Policy Assessment for 1968, 'has been that it is in the US' interest to keep the country within the free-world strategic and economic orbit.'[430] But for Washington, the British business community in Kenya, and to a lesser extent the British government, regarded Kenyatta's closest associates and advisers as their allies.[431] Mboya, in contrast, acted as an important ally in extending US influence in Kenya as well as East Africa more generally. Although the US government subsequently switched its support from Mboya to Moi, this was not as Okoth argues,

[429] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Airgram from Nairobi to Department of State", 20 June 1964.
[430] NARA, RG 59, Box 2255, "Annual policy assessment – Kenya II FAM 212.3-5", 17 August 1968.
[431] NARA, RG 59, Box 2257, 1967-1969, "Research Memorandum: Kenya: Will the establishment survive?", 9 December 1968.

because of Mboya's 'controversial character' but instead a dispassionate evaluation of the situation.[432]

During Attwood's ambassadorship in Nairobi, Mboya was granted considerable ideological and material support in the service of 'anti-Communism'. But with the expulsion of Odinga and worsening relations with China, a credible Communist threat to Kenya's western alignment had largely disappeared by 1968. As a result, Cold War dynamics were less relevant to Kenyan politicians, who were preoccupied with political campaigns in their own community, usually defined in ethnic rather than ideological terms. In that sense, Mboya was disadvantaged. Despite his stronghold in trade unions and the National Assembly, he lacked a stable ethnic base: the majority of Luo people saw Odinga as their leader.[433] Even the US government was fully aware of the weakness of Mboya and came to the conclusion:

> On the basis of present trends, the establishment should be able to obtain the election of Moi as Kenya's next president. Under the terms of the constitution, he will be acting president for the three months following Kenyatta's departure and immediately before the presidential election. This advantage – together with the establishment's control of the government and at least part of the party machinery – should be sufficient to give Moi the edge.[434]

In May 1969, President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warmly received Moi in Washington. As 'heir apparent to President Kenyatta', Moi was considered crucial to the future of US-Kenya relations.[435] The assassination of Mboya on 5 July 1969 cleared the last obstacle for Moi to become the *de facto* successor to President Kenyatta.[436]

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[432] Okoth, "US Foreign Policy Impact on Kenya's Domestic and Foreign Policies", p. 173.
[433] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair*, p. 74.
[434] NARA, RG 59, Box 2257, "Research Memorandum: Kenya".
[435] NARA, RG 59, Box 2256, "Meeting of Vice President Moi of Kenya with President Nixon – Action Memorandum", 3 May 1969.
[436] Mboya's assassin Nahashon Njoroge asked the police after his arrest: "Why don't you go after the

Another reason for the American government distancing itself from Mboya was the backlash from the controversial publication of Attwood's memoir *The Reds and the Blacks* in 1967, which revealed the astonishing extent of US influence at the heart of the Kenyan political establishment. According to Attwood for example, Kenyatta had promised not to talk about America's involvement in Congo but 'only Kenya'. When there were demonstrations outside the American embassy in Nairobi, Moi reassured him that 'you have many friends – America has many friends – both in and out of the government'; and Odinga, the alleged 'Communist stooge', even talked frankly with him and shared his distaste of their Russian 'friends'.[437] While Attwood may have expected public appreciation of his heroic efforts and smart tactics in deterring the Communist threat in Kenya, the reception of his book among Kenyan politicians clearly proved him wrong. Odinga used quotes in the book, such as, 'Africa will have an entire generation of "cool young men who were educated in Western ways', to introduce a parliamentary motion in 1967. This criticised the external manipulation of Kenya's foreign policy: if such a statement had been made by the representative of an Eastern Bloc country, Odinga argued, the government of Kenya 'would have been trembling and shivering.'[438] In May 1967, KANU was forced to issue a public statement, in which the book was labelled the 'most shallow and casual treatment of Africa, nothing but cheap Cold War propaganda.'[439] The new American Ambassador Ferguson was pressed to clarify his position. To many Kenyans, anti-Communist publicity had become boring; instead, Americans appeared to be 'too friendly' and were given 'too

big man?", a famous statement that raised suspicions that Mboya's shooting was a political assassination.

[437] Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks*, pp. 218-236.

[438] NARA, RG 59, Box 2255, "National Assembly debate on Kenya's foreign policy", 2 April 1967.

[439] NARA, RG 59, Box 2256, "KANU statement on 'The Reds and the Blacks'", 21 May 1967.

much freedom' in Kenya.[440] Attwood's casual 'then-Jomo-told-me' treatment of President Kenyatta similarly offended KANU conservatives.[441] With the KPU continuously attacking a government that it claimed had 'sold Kenya to the foreigners', the US was forced to make amends for the disrespectful manners of its former ambassador.[442]

Odinga remained a powerful contestant for the presidency before and after Mboya's assassination, but the relevance of Communist influence in Kenyan declined substantially. Attempts to boost Odinga's reputation in China through, for example, issuing a commemorative stamp of the KPU leader, did nothing to win him support from Kenyan politicians.[443] And the refusal of Chinese embassy to fly its flag at half-mast in honour of Tom Mboya sparked public controversy.[444] Reflecting on these events, the US authorities concluded that Sino-Kenyan relations that were 'never high at the best of times – are now lower than ever.'[445] After three years of political harassment and detention of party leaders, the KPU was banned on 30 October 1969, and Kenya became a *de facto* one-party state.[446] The US assessment had not changed two years later: 'renewed Communist support' was simply 'unlikely'.[447] By the start of the 1970s, Sino-Kenyan relations were cold compared to Kenya's increasingly robust ties with the West in political, economic and cultural fields. But Kenyan leaders were never beholden to a simple Western alignment in all areas, certainly not in economic matters. It was clear that, from Independence onwards, Kenya's rulers had no interest

[440] NARA, RG 59, Box 2257, "The Reds and the Blacks – A Kenyan's view", 2 July 1967.
[441] Ibid.
[442] NARA, RG 59, Box 2257, "The Attwood book", 8 November 1967.
[443] NARA, RG 59, Box 2255, "Political note #6", 19 July 1969.
[444] NARA, RG 59, Box 2255, "Political note #8", 9 August 1969.
[445] Ibid.
[446] Between 1966-1969, KPU received most support amongst the Luo people in Nyanza province.
[447] NARA, RG 59, Box 2419 (Political & Defense, POL 23-9 KENYA to POL 32-4 KOR), 1970-1973, "Odinga released – what next?", 3 April 1971.

in sacrificing the country's global reputation by supporting US opposition against China entering the UN, a decision that a future generation of Chinese leaders would remember and appreciate.

Conclusion

Instead of being easily manipulated by external powers driven by ideological and geopolitical interests, Kenya and its leaders approached, deepened and even negotiated their relations with Communist China. Successive visits by Kenyan delegations to China in the mid-1960s not only enabled a better understanding of China's domestic situation and its geopolitical vision, but also secured material benefits for the country. The decision by the Kenyan government to choose Chinese rather than Soviet economic and technical aid is best explained by its careful, dispassionate study of their respective terms rather than any ideological considerations. The chapter suggests that the Sino-Soviet competition for influence in the 'Third World' offered a degree of bargaining power to commonly perceived 'weak' African countries such as Kenya.

The growing relevance of the global Cold War in post-independence Kenya was revealed in the tri-dimensional politics of the ruling party KANU. The British, Americans and the Chinese respectively financed the factions of Kenyatta, Mboya and Odinga. China's preference for Odinga was mainly based on ideological considerations that left-wing politicians would be united to fight a fundamentally universal anti-imperialist war. But it was also true that Odinga's major adversary Mboya, both in the parliament and his Luo ethnicity, had already established close relations with the US government. This had the effect of pushing Odinga and his followers further towards

the Eastern Bloc than they might otherwise have travelled. Although backed by the British, President Kenyatta had sought to maintain relative neutrality in the first few years after independence. Yet a number of developments in spring 1965, some contingent in nature, shifted the balance of power: African socialism was adopted as Kenya's economic blueprint; Pinto, a crucial figure in the radical group and well connected with Communist countries, was assassinated; and eventually, the discovery of arms in Odinga's home resulted in an anti-Chinese motion being passed by the Kenyan parliament.

The expulsion of Odinga from KANU and his subsequent establishment of the opposition party KPU suggested that the need for more financial support from China was heightened. Against the assumption of both secondary literature and US intelligence that China was pressing hard on the Kenyan radicals to deliver revolutionary gains, the Chinese Foreign Ministry had in fact advised its embassy in Nairobi not to impose any regime change. However, this relative constraint of behaviours by Chinese diplomats when engaging with Kenyan affairs, was disrupted by the launch of the Cultural Revolution back home. Driven by the ultimate call to spread Mao's revolutionary thoughts in the world, the Chinese embassy increasingly delivered protest notes criticising Kenyatta's government and his conservative Ministers, which in return invited reprisals from KANU leaders. From the start of 1967, verbal attacks escalated into physical conflicts both in Beijing and Nairobi: the KANU march outside the Chinese embassy on 22 August as retaliation to a similar protest carried out in Beijing that was triggered by a car accident of a Kenyan diplomat. However profound the impact of the Cultural Revolution was, China's bilateral trade

with Kenya remained little affected. Even at the height of their political controversy, Kenyan officials made it clear that China's exports were warmly welcomed.

From 1968 onwards, Kenya's succession struggle became a fierce battlefield for potential candidates and their respective foreign patrons. Having shifted its support from Mboya to Moi, the US was clearly aware of the ethnic rather than ideological nature of Kenyan politics, as well as a wider Kikuyu-Moi coalition consolidated by the new constitution that protected automatic succession. The idea that Kenyans were increasingly tired of anti-Communist propaganda was also a contributing factor. The book published by the first US Ambassador Attwood in Kenya irritated the Kenyan politicians to the extent that the US had to disassociate itself from its earlier 'red terror' campaign. Since the KPU was barely able to secure seats in national and local elections dominated by KANU, China's involvement in Kenya's succession issue was rather minimal. This low tide of Sino-Kenyan relations would not change until the death of Kenyatta and the start of the Moi presidency in 1978.

Chapter Four: Disaggregating the Grand Narratives of China-Zambia 'All-Weather Friendship' (1966-1974)

Introduction: An 'All-weather Friendship'?

> Our relations with China were warm and uncomplicated.[448]
>
> Vernon Mwaanga, 2009

Postcolonial Zambian history has been primarily understood through the prism of the regional context, which has arguably been distorted by a strong focus on the country's role in supporting Southern African liberation movements.[449] China-Zambia relations are, as a result, commonly constructed as grand narratives of 'all-weather friendship' designed to support regional liberation, exemplified by the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway.[450] This perspective was articulated by Mark Chona, who served as Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1965-1968 and Special Advisor for Political Affairs to President Kaunda in 1968-1980.[451] During an interview in Lusaka in 2016, Chona provided an overarching analysis of the position adopted by Zambia after its southern neighbour Rhodesia declared independence from

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[448] Mwaanga, *An Extraordinary Life*, p. 308.
[449] Timothy Scarnecchia, "Front Line Diplomats: African Diplomatic Representations of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front, 1976 1978", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, 1 (2017), pp. 107-124; Andy DeRoche, *Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); Clarence Chongo, "Decolonising Southern Africa: A History of Zambia's Role in Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle, 1964-1979" (University of Pretoria, PhD thesis, 2016); Hugh MacMillan, *The Lusaka Years: The ANC in Exile in Zambia, 1963-1994* (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2013).
[450] Yang Youming, "China and Zambia, we grow up together", The Chinese Embassy in Zambia (27 October 2014), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1204529.shtml (10 January 2019)
[451] "Interview with Mark Chona - Commonwealth Oral History Project", Institute of Commonwealth Studies (22 March 2016), https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/2016/interview-with-mark-chona/ (10 January 2019).

the British empire in November 1965: he stressed Zambia's unique geographical position as a frontline state, its just cause of supporting liberation movements in the region, and his and Kaunda's own tireless diplomatic efforts within international organisations.[452]

Most literature on the Cold War in Africa places great emphasis on the turbulent process of national liberation in southern Africa, which it is argued was exacerbated by ambitious, manipulative foreign patrons with conflicting global interests. For instance, Borstelmann aims to understand 'the complicated interplay of two major themes of twentieth-century American history: racism and anticommunism' through the prism of American support for the white minority government of South Africa and other southern African colonial rulers.[453] The tendency to regard local liberation movements as 'proxies' of superpowers is also reflected in Saunders and Onslow's analysis: their three distinct phases of the Cold War in southern Africa starts with the 'overwhelming success of the East in Angola and Mozambique' in 1975, where the Soviet-backed People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) consolidated power in leading independence struggles; much of the second phase (1980-1985) involved 'growing militancy, violence, and repression of dissent'; and the period up to 1990 saw the 'winding down' of superpower competition due in large part to the new political thinking in the USSR.[454] In a similar vein, DeRoche starts his analysis of Kaunda's key role in US relations with southern Africa in 1975, when Gerald Ford replaced Richard Nixon as US President after the

[452] Interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, 24 August 2016.
[453] Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 4.
[454] Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow, "The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1976–1990", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 222-243.

latter's resignation, indicating that changes in the superpowers were determinative of regional outcomes.[455] This chapter, however, focuses on the earlier period of 1966 to 1974, because the rationale underlying Kaunda's foreign policy took shape in the 1960s, when Zambia's non-aligned position in the Cold War frustrated Western leaders in the same way that 'US non-alignment in the struggle against racism exasperated black African leaders'.[456] More importantly, this choice of periodisation reflects the fact that China-Zambia relations during the Cold War involved much more than a simple embodiment of the East-West confrontation: like the country's relations with both the US and USSR, Zambia's engagement with China shows that Kaunda's government possessed significant agency in setting the terms for its winder geopolitical relations, which were also influenced in intra-Zambian factors.

As Chapter Three has clearly demonstrated, the Cold War offered a political strategy for Kenyan leaders to denigrate dissidents and their domestic opponents in post-independence Kenya. In contrast to the 'introverted' nature of Kenyan politics, Zambian leaders led by President Kaunda himself did not shy away from participating in international affairs, the twists and turns of which had more direct consequences on China-Zambia relations. In an interview, Vernon Mwaanga, former Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1973-75, had no difficulty in recalling Sino-Zambian relations as 'warm and uncomplicated' with cheerful laughter.[457] Thinking more pragmatically, Chona characterised China as a 'much much safer ally' than the USSR, since it 'did not evoke emotions exaggerated' in the West.[458] This positive view of

[455] DeRoche, *Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa*, p. 7.
[456] Ibid., p. 4.
[457] Interview with Vernon Mwaanga, Ambassador to the United Nations (1966-1972) and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zambia (1973-1975), Lusaka, 19 August 2016.
[458] Interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, 24 August 2016.

China's moral and material support of Zambia's moral cause of ending the racist southern Africa regimes represented a consensus among Zambian elites, whose individual political differences were of limited relevance to such an 'extraverted' policy. During the Cold War period, Zambia's foreign relations with China were both more united and friendlier than those of Kenya. Kaunda himself also maintained close personal attachments with Chinese leaders throughout his presidency.

This significantly personalised nature of China-Zambia relations extended to cultural and social spheres, expressed in the form of 'people-to-people diplomacy'. As part of public diplomacy, the diplomatic exchanges of citizens complement traditional and formal diplomacy.[459] Many cultural delegations, composed of Chinese artists, doctors and athletes, visited Zambia, generating attention and debates both in the parliament and the press. The construction of the TAZARA railway in 1970-1975 led tens of thousands of Chinese technicians and workers to enter and live in some of the most rural areas of the country. Following the official endorsement of Zambian Humanism in 1967, nationwide ideological debates made frequent and revealing references to China and its Cultural Revolution in particular. Unlike the *EAS's* largely negative reporting's influence on Kenya's bilateral relations with China (Chapter Three), the coverage of China and Mao in the state-controlled *Times of Zambia* (*ToZ*) was relatively positive. Nevertheless, one of the key features of Zambia's 'extraverted' disposition was the prioritisation of geopolitical interests over domestic economic calculation, which was most clearly revealed in 1972 when Zambia closed its southern

[459] The term 'people-to-people diplomacy' became popular during the second term of the Eisenhower presidency of the US, see: Kenneth Alan Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2006); Battsetseg Serj, "Building Bridges across Cultures: A Case Study of the People-to-People Campaign, 1956-1975" (University of Kansas, PhD thesis, 2014).

border with Rhodesia. While it has been argued that Kenya kept trading with China despite their bilateral political tension, the negotiation of Zambia's maize deal with China in 1967 was, it will be shown, characterised by politically charged debates. In order to contextualise China's role in post-independent Zambia, this chapter starts with a review of the historiography of Zambia's foreign policy.

Zambia's Foreign Policy under Kaunda: Idealist, Structuralist and Realist Approaches

According to Ian Taylor, the extensive research of Zambia's foreign policy identifies the country's geopolitical position surrounded by non-majority ruled states and the personality of President Kaunda as the key determinants of policy.[460] Although Kaunda's successors have attempted to shape Zambia's profile in the post-Cold War global order in different ways, the birthmarks left by the country's founding father (and still influencing Zambian politics today) are still visible, especially on occasions where his historical legacy is considered benevolent in contemporary foreign affairs.[461] The rationale for Zambia's foreign policy under the leadership of Kaunda and his ruling UNIP party is summarised by Taylor into three approaches – 'idealist, structuralist and realist' – each constrained by their respective historical context.[462] While this chapter only deals with the mid-1960s and the 1970s, analysis of these perspectives over a longer durée helps place Zambia in a much broader transnational context in which the country also contributed to related debates on Pan-Africanism and non-alignment.

[460] Ian Taylor, "Review Article: Zambia's Foreign policy: Themes and Approaches", *Politikon* 24, 2 (1997), pp. 57-65.
[461] Aged 94 in 2019, Kenneth Kaunda, along with Robert Mugabe and Daniel arap Moi, is among the oldest living former head of states in Africa.
[462] Taylor, "Review Article: Zambia's Foreign Policy", p. 58.

The rise of the so-called 'idealist approach' to Zambia's foreign affairs was profoundly shaped by the nationalist influence on African studies in the 1950s and 1960s. Writing against a long tradition of 'racist, imperialist European scholarship', academics of both European and African origin rejected the notion of 'a continent without history' by focusing on the new African nation-states.[463] Zambia's foreign policy was by this definition well-intentioned but constrained by (post-)colonial legacies. Following Rhodesia's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), 'survival' became Zambia's immediate task 'in conditions of extreme vulnerability to economic pressure from Rhodesia.' [464] In order to maintain its economic independence, Kaunda's government reached out in an overtly non-aligned way to the international community, in an active search for both political and material support. The adoption of 'Zambian Humanism' in 1967 was, as discussed in Chapter Two, an elaboration of Kaunda's governing philosophy, one that emphasised morality rather than self-interest. This idealist approach helped explain Zambia's transformation into a one-party state as well as its nationalisation of the mining sector in 1972.

However, scholars influenced by Marxist tradition, especially the dependency school led by André Gunder Frank, attacked this 'idealist approach'. Through the lens of Marxian structuralism, Zambia's foreign policy was criticised as a negative result of the world capitalist system, with which Kaunda deliberately collaborated for the benefit of a small segment of the country's population.[465] This approach was exemplified by

[463] Jean Allman, "Between the Present and History: African Nationalism and Decolonization", in John Parker and Richard Reid (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Modern African History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 225.
[464] Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict* (Lewes: Julian Friedmann Publishers Ltd, 1974), p. 26.
[465] Taylor, "Review Article: Zambia's Foreign Policy", p. 59.

Timothy Shaw's 1976 article and later his co-authored book with Douglas Anglin in 1979. Shaw argued that Humanism was not intended to replace Zambia's 'inheritance of dependence on foreign trade, capital, technology and skills'; instead, the reform of the copper industry and the expansion of the parastatal sector were 'accommodative' practices.[466] Mine nationalisation provided evidence in this regard: within only two years, Zambia incurred international debts of $250 million as a result of this purchase. In this way, foreign control over this strategic industry changed only its form, from direct ownership into financial and service-based supply. In the class-based framework of such analyses, Lusaka's advocacy for the peaceful end to settler colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa was understood as driven by a 'new national bureaucratic bourgeoisie' that favoured regional coexistence.[467] Specifically, Anglin and Shaw identified President Kaunda, his Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the parastatals, and UNIP as the exclusive shapers of foreign relations.[468] In this capitalist world system, Zambia was considered to have betrayed its nonaligned principles by favouring relations with the West instead of the Eastern Bloc. China was the noteworthy 'positive' exception, whose provision of the TAZARA railway represented a 'non-imperialistic Third World model'.[469]

The major limitation of these works is an assumption of a unified 'Third World project' and Zambia's alternative approach to this restrictive structuralist framework thereof. Chan argued that, though a complete break from the capitalist system was impossible, the Zambian elite's apparent collaboration with it in the form of a comprador class was

[466] Timothy M. Shaw, 'The Foreign Policy of Zambia: Ideology and Interests', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, 1 (1976), p. 97.
[467] Ibid., p. 105.
[468] Douglas Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence* (Boulder: Westview, 1979), p. 357.
[469] Ibid., p. 364.

not always conscious.[470] In addition, the so-called interests of the elite and those of the wider public were not necessarily in conflict, as through Zambianisation, access to housing and other social welfare was improved. It was in practice difficult to define the 'elite' of Zambian society according to established Marxist class analysis focused on economic determinism. It is fair to argue that Zambian Humanism was more successful as a moral agenda against racial politics in Southern Africa than as a practical guide to the country's development. However, it is important not to assume that Zambian Humanism, like other forms of African socialisms examined in Chapter Two, was simply derivative and thereby can be judged as either 'authentic' or 'revisionist'.

The third approach addressed these issues more effectively. 'Realists' or 'sceptics', according to Taylor, regarded Zambian foreign policies as 'multi-causal, essentially reactive and centred around the personality of Kaunda'.[471] As the most prominent advocate of this approach, Chan encompassed both 'idealist' understandings of Kaunda as a noble man and miscalculations in specific cases that were not entirely of his own making.[472] Above all, he identified international prestige as the single most important goal of Kaunda's foreign policy, through the promotion of five images: 'moral suasion'; leader in international groupings; 'predictability'; 'political alliance'; and 'older brother, elder statesman'.[473] By downplaying the relevance of the class aspects of foreign policy-making, Chan was able to explain the inconsistency of its deliveries, particularly in the 1980s. However, all of these above political science studies carry the problem of

[470] Stephen Chan, *Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and Reality in Foreign Policy* (London: British Academic Press, 1992), pp. 121-127.
[471] Taylor, "Review Article: Zambia's Foreign Policy", p. 62.
[472] Stephen Chan, *The Decline of Kaunda: Essays of Praise and Complaint, 1983-1991* (Canterbury: Kent Papers in Politics and International Relations, 1991), p. 1.
[473] Stephen Chan, "The Search for Peace – The Basis of Zambia's Regional Policy", *Contemporary Review* 248, 1444 (1986), p. 250.

proceeding from 'pre-established political perspectives' and thereby distorting the actual history of Zambia's relationship with both regional liberation movements and its southern African neighbours.[474] Larmer's detailed analysis of Zambia's diplomatic endeavours with South Africa provides a more balanced judgment enabled by newly available archival materials that suggests that Kaunda was ready to pursue 'a more constructive relationship' with Apartheid South Africa, sometimes against the wishes of regional liberation movements themselves.[475] From the perspective of these exiled organisations particularly the African National Congress (ANC), 'the legacy and lessons of exile' in Lusaka, in the words of Macmillan, were 'caution, moderation and scepticism about utopian experiments in both the political and economic spheres.'[476]

Bearing in mind the strengths and limitations of the above three characterisations of Zambia's foreign policy, this chapter will examine Zambia's relations with China in the 1960s and early 1970s from political, military, cultural and economic perspectives. In particular, historically informed arguments will be developed based on the archival records and oral testimonies collected from diverse sources, which challenge and largely reject the contemporaneous, International Relations-types of theories discussed above. It recognises the significant exchange of ideas as well as material resources between China and Zambia and argues that initiatives put forward by Zambian actors have played no less an influential role in shaping this relationship than structural factors such as the Cold War or the non-aligned movement. By examining a diverse range of encounters between Zambian and Chinese actors, this study disaggregates the grand

[474] Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 186.
[475] *Ibid.*, p. 223.
[476] Macmillan, *The Lusaka Years*, pp. 291-292.

narratives of China-Zambia 'all-weather friendship', which have so often framed twenty-first century characterisations of this relationship (see Chapter Six).

This approach rests on its critical engagement with methodological approaches that combine archival, published and oral sources. While some historians perceive an interview as an archival document, 'one that adds more information to the historical record that must, in turn, be evaluated for accuracy', some tend to care more about 'memory, subjectivity, and identity' of such narration.[477] When I first contacted Chona for an interview, he gently declined. He was in the process of writing his memoir, and too much public exposure would distract him and unintentionally disclose information he wished to reserve for his own study. I eventually secured two interviews with Chona on a specific basis: understanding his personal role in Zambia's foreign services with regard to China. Along with Kaunda and his Foreign Minister in 1975-76 Rupiah Banda (later Zambia's President between 2008 and 2011), both Chona and Mwaanga were awarded the Chinese Ambassador's Award of Friendship in 2015, an award that 'show[s] the heartfelt gratitude to those who have laid a solid foundation for China-Zambian friendship.'[478] This partly explained their willingness to be interviewed by a Chinese researcher like me. It is noteworthy that unlike in Kenya where I struggled to gain access to politicians actively involved in Chinese affairs, Zambian political leaders today are heavily invested in the historical myth of an 'all weather friendship', therefore creating the hazard for historians of writing the past from the present.

[477] Ronald J. Grele, "Reflections on the Practice of Oral History: Retrieving What We Can from an Earlier Critique," *Suomen Antropologi* 4 (2007), pp. 11-23.
[478] "Chinese Embassy in Zambia holds the first award ceremony of Chinese Ambassador's Award of Friendship", The Chinese Embassy in Zambia (23 November 2015), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1317393.shtml (15 January 2019).

This thesis seeks to reflect the specific strengths and weaknesses of both the 'documentary' and 'textual' approaches to oral history.[479] As far as this chapter is concerned, the so-called triangulation of sources was attempted: after having conducted archival research and having read Vernon Mwaanga's memoir *An Extraordinary Life*, I came to my first interview with Mwaanga with written quotes at my disposal. Some of my questions served as fact-checking exercises, especially when there was a considerable gap in the written records. As Mwaanga also made references to other political figures including Mark Chona, I was able to compare their respective answers to similar questions, and in this way, develop a more nuanced analysis. To offer a more personalised account of China's military aid to Zambia, I benefited from an oral history project led by Li Danhui, who published excerpts of the private journal of Ma Faxian, a retired Chinese deputy commander who went to Zambia as a military adviser between 1972-1974.[480] This source material was only published in Chinese before, and was almost unknown to Western scholars who do not read Chinese. According to a Chinese scholar who once accessed Ma's whole collection, the published excerpts occupied only a small proportion and were carefully selected to avoid any trouble to Ma while he is still alive. China's increasing restriction on archival management simply means that it is no longer possible to access and publish his collection as a whole.

The following section will examine Zambia's political and military relations with China as an effective alternative to the superpowers. The chapter will then move to the cultural sphere of such interactions, which helped shape the personalised feature of China-

[479] Linda Shopes, "'Insights and Oversights': Reflections on the Documentary Tradition and the Theoretical Turn in Oral History", *The Oral History Review* 41, 2 (2014), pp. 257-268.
[480] Li Danhui 李丹慧 (with Zhou Na 周娜), "Feizhou Conglin de Xinshiming – Ma Faxian" 非洲丛林中的新使命—马法贤 (New mission in the African jungle—Ma Faxian), *Cold War International History Studies*, 2008-2018. It is a series of articles published in this journal from 2008 until the latest issue, which is unfinished yet.

Zambia relations. Last but not the least, economic ties will be explored, and through a careful analysis of a specific maize deal, the chapter will demonstrate that Zambia's domestic economic interests were indeed sometimes surrendered for geopolitical reasons.

United for Southern African Liberation Movement

According to contemporaneous accounts, China's contributions to Zambia's anti-colonial cause encompassed both rhetorical and material support.[481] But this did not reflect the reality of Zambia's relationship with the socialist world immediately after its independence. When Zambia was about to establish its first embassy in the Communist world in Moscow, the new Ambassador Vernon Mwaanga, who just completed his Oxford University diplomatic course sponsored by the British Labour Party and the British Trade Union Congress, did not feel comfortable being interviewed by the BBC about the ideologies of capitalism and communism. At that time, his aim as ambassador was to understand 'the complexities of the big powers' politics and particularly the East-West conflict'. He later complained that by then he had to rely on 'textbook knowledge provided by biased Western "experts"'.[482] But one thing was clear: Zambia would seek much needed development assistance from both superpowers. In December 1965, Kaunda accordingly sent two delegations almost simultaneously to Moscow and Washington.[483] These visits, however, turned out to be disappointing.

[481] Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift*, p. 41; Taylor, *China and Africa*, Chapter Nine, pp. 164-166.
[482] Mwaanga, *An Extraordinary Life*, pp. 149-150.
[483] Andrew J. DeRoche, "'You Can't Fight Guns with Knives': National Security and Zambian Responses to UDI, 1965-1973", in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola (eds.), *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 82-84.

For the US, Zambia was valued for two main reasons: 'its potential economic and political importance in East-Central Africa', and 'its desire to expand its relations with small and middle-sized Western-oriented powers.'[484] Zambia's non-alignment was judged by Professor G. Goundrey, a UN-recruited advisor to Zambia's Ministry of Finance, to be based 'as much on isolationism and parochialism as on political analysis'. Though 'any significant move to the East' by the Zambian government seemed unlikely, Goundrey warned the US embassy that Western reluctance to provide capital assistance could induce the Cabinet to 'turn more and more to the Bloc'.[485] Due to his 'active, close relationship with most of the top Zambian leaders', Goundrey's 'highly personal' opinions carried weight for the Americans. In his meeting with US officials in December 1965, Sikota Wina, Minister of Local Government and Housing, revealed that the Zambian government was worried about the flow of arms from Beijing to 'refugee political groups' in Zambia and that 'bribes totalling about $200' had been given to individual politicians by the Chinese Embassy.[486] Although other Zambian politicians initially shared such concerns about Chinese influence, Sikota Wina and others would change their attitudes dramatically after Kaunda's state visit to Communist China in summer 1967.

Before his departure, Kaunda had 'an advance word' with the US Embassy in Lusaka, especially on the situation in Vietnam. Kaunda sought to position himself as an intermediary between Beijing and Washington. However, the US State Department was

[484] NARA, RG 59, Box 3040 (POL 17 Zambia to POL 33-7 Zambia), 1964-1966, "Diplomatic representation in Lusaka – and the importance of encouraging an expansion of free world missions", 13 August 1965.
[485] NARA, RG 59, Box 3038 (Political & Defense, POL 1 ZAMBIA), 1964-1966, "Report of Conversation with Professor G. Goundrey", 1 August 1965.
[486] 'Refugee political groups' in the words of Sikota Wina is referring to southern African liberation movements, which had not yet been given permission to operate militarily by 1965. See NARA, RG 59, Box 3038, "Memorandum of conversation with Sikota Wina, Sean Kelly, William Jones", 29 December 1965.

not convinced that Kaunda would be able to mitigate the fundamental differences between the US and China in terms of 'how [the] world should be organized to preserve peace'. [487] For realists, it was naïve for the president of a country like Zambia to see himself as capable of influencing the superpowers. But for those who were familiar with Kaunda and his political philosophy of Humanism, it was not surprising. Colin Morris characterised Kaunda as 'a strange mixture of genuine personal humility and driving ambition', who frequently talked about his future retirement and his dream to become the UN Secretary General.[488] While Kaunda never publicly revealed such an aspiration, his intention to lead international organisations such as the Commonwealth and Non-Aligned Movement was well known. En route to the Far East in 1967, Kaunda gave a press statement at the Nairobi Airport. He urged powerful states to 'leave small countries' out of their ideological conflicts, and reiterated the importance of the consolidated efforts of international organisations, including the Commonwealth, to solve the Rhodesian crisis.[489] It is noteworthy that Chona admits today that China's experiences with the issue of Vietnam inspired the Zambian government to handle its own relations with Rhodesia.[490] The fact that both China and Zambia faced (albeit different) geopolitical challenges on their southern borders probably facilitated their shared position on the issue of nuclear monopoly.

In China, Kaunda received 'the full red carpet treatment' wherever he travelled: with the Chang'an Avenue in front of the Tiananmen Square decorated with Chinese and Zambian flags, his portraits were held alongside with those of Chairman Mao by the

[487] NARA, RG 59, Box 2847 (POL 7 Zambia to POL 12-3 Zambia), 1967-1969, "Outward telegram from the Department of State to Amembassy Lusaka", 8 June 1967.
[488] NARA, RG 59, Box 2848 (Political & Defense, From POL 14 ZAMBIA to POL 15-1 ZAMBIA), 1967-69, "Insights into Kenneth Kaunda by Colin Morris", 17 July 1967.
[489] NARA, RG 59, Box 2847, "Kaunda's Nairobi Press Statement of June 13, 1967", 18 June 1967.
[490] Interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, 24 August 2016.

crowds, who shouted slogans such as 'Long live the friendship of China and Zambia!'[491] Press coverage of his activities and speeches was also exceptional for a visiting African head of state. Whilst an economic and technical cooperation agreement was formally signed, it was the wider significance of the Zambian government's 'opening to the East' that really mattered. In a press statement following his return, Kaunda reflected on his first-hand observations of Communist China: a peace-loving country under frequent threat by the US-backed Taiwanese regime, it showed military preparedness and technology to resist against any external attack, as well as insisting on pursuing its UN membership. He was equally impressed by this country's 'disciplined, hardworking and capable people'.[492]

To the surprise however of many external observers, Zambia did not follow China's stance in condemning US 'imperialism' in Vietnam, and only recognised the basic rights of Vietnamese people to settle their national question.[493] But the US government was still concerned: Kaunda had praised the Chinese leadership for successfully exploding their H-bomb, and following his return, he protested against the superpower monopoly over atomic weapons.[494] This near U-turn in Kaunda's position on nuclear non-proliferation was, according to the CIA, an indication of Chinese influence over Kaunda. DeRoche argued that the Rhodesian UDI had escalated Zambia's rising concerns for national security, and that the Zambian government believed it was necessary to obtain nuclear weapons technology to prevent being attacked by South

[491] "卡翁达总统到京受到数十万群众欢迎 周恩来总理举行盛宴欢迎赞比亚贵宾" (President Kaunda is welcomed by hundreds of thousands in Beijing), *People's Daily*, 22 June 1967.
[492] NARA, RG 59, Box 2847, "President Kaunda's June 28 Press Statement", 3 July 1967.
[493] TNA, FCO 95/251, Zambia: Chinese Aid, 1967-1968, "Joint Communiqué of People's Republic of China and Republic of Zambia", 1967.
[494] NARA, RG 59, Box 2847, "President Kaunda's June 28 Press Statement".

Africa.[495] In view of the 'rapidly expanding' number of world issues on which Lusaka and Washington had differing views, the US State Department prepared a new position statement on the issue of nuclear that could be passed to Kaunda.[496] By the end of 1967, Zambia's declared non-alignment was perceived by the US government as involving a *de facto* tendency towards the East.[497]

Unlike Kenyan politicians who pursued foreign assistance to support their domestic struggles (see Chapter Three), divisions within UNIP were mainly driven by domestic issues such as the supposedly 'regionally biased' distribution of development expenditure and perceived 'unfair provincial representation' in the party's leadership. After Simon Kapwepwe defeated Reuben Kamanga to become the vice president of UNIP in 1967, this conflict between Northern Province and Eastern Province was widely recognised as the key division within UNIP.[498] In his meeting with US Ambassador Robert Good the following year, Minister of Finance Arthur Wina characterised the political differences among Zambian leaders as 'a conflict of cultures' between 'the essentially stable, farming and cattle-heading' in Barotse, Southern and Eastern Provinces, and the 'nomadic (the "slash and burn" method of agriculture)' practices of the Bemba.[499] While Wina did not explicitly link these two traditional cultures to more contemporary ideological debates, Ambassador Good speculated that the values and institutions of the global West were more attractive to southern Zambian groups versus 'the more volatile peoples of the [Zambian] north' who were thus

[495] DeRoche, '"You can't fight guns with knives'", pp. 87-88.
[496] NARA, RG 59, Box 2847, "Telegram from the Department of State to Lusaka", 30 June 1967.
[497] NARA, RG 59, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of East African Affairs, Box 1 Records relating to Malawi and Zambia, 1967-1975, "Vice President's African trip", 21 December 1967.
[498] Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 63.
[499] NARA, RG 59, Box 2847, "Arthur Wina on the Zambian political situation", 22 November 1968.

predisposed to the radicalism of the communist bloc.[500] However, these intra-Zambian political differences between its North and the rest did not fit neatly into the global East-West division. Friendly as he was to the West, Arthur Wina was a conservative economist who advocated against Zambia's reliance on foreign aid.[501] Similarly, the radical Bemba leader Kapwepwe's 'bitter feelings about white racist colonialism' did not convince the US that he should be regarded as a Communist.[502] One thing that was often neglected in studies of Zambia's foreign policy was its relative wealth – officially, a middle income country – arising from Copperbelt minerals which, to a larger extent constrained Zambia's radicalism, dependent as it was on global mineral markets and the western corporations that controlled access to them.[503] Both Wina and Kapwepwe were equally committed to the government's efforts to 'translate Zambia's national mineral wealth into economic prosperity', and their rift arose mainly in terms of which provincial base should receive more of their potential benefits.[504]

A reliance on multi-lateral diplomacy, especially through the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), was another prominent feature of China-Zambia relations. China's rhetorical support of the African people 'in their just struggle against the US led-imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism' was commonly expressed as mass mobilisation through, for example, 'great rally of the people of all circles of Peking in commemoration of the "African Liberation Day"' on 24 May 1965. Organised by the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations

[500] Ibid.
[501] NARA, RG 59, Box 3038, "Report of Conversation with Professor G. Goundrey".
[502] NARA, RG 59, Box 2848, "GRZ Foreign Minister Kapwepwe attacks foreign investment", 6 March 1967.
[503] Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, pp. 185-224.
[504] Ibid.

and Friendship with Foreign Countries (together with four other peoples' organisations), this rally invited diplomatic envoys of African countries, African friends, experts and students to attend and address the meeting.[505] In December 1966, another rally of 100,000 citizens was organised in Beijing to condemn the US bombing of Hanoi.[506] Representatives of UNIP received invitations for both events. UNIP's participation in global organisations, significantly more active compared to Kenya, was nonetheless constrained by growing clashes between Moscow and Beijing. Having failed to gain control AAPSO's central bodies including its Cairo secretariat, China established its own rival committees.[507] As a result, many African states were pressured to choose sides. The Zambian Cabinet decided to continue contributing to AAPSO while still participating in China-backed events such as the Games of the New Emerging Forces Federation (GANEFO). In September 1966, two Zambian delegates submitted a provisional application for GANEFO membership when they were in Beijing. In February the following year, the Indonesian Embassy in London, through the medium of the Chinese government, requested the Zambian Foreign Ministry to clarify its attitude towards the country's membership of GANEFO, headquartered in Jakarta.[508] In a letter to the Chinese Embassy in Lusaka, Zambian Foreign Ministry simply stated that 'the competent authorities were unable to recommend the [Zambian] Government the ratification of this provisional application'. But the unspoken reason for this decision was in fact 'a contravention to this country's non-alignment policy'.[509] This example showed that Zambia sought to reduce the negative influences of superpower

[505] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_5_26, Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, 1965-1966, "Correspondence from Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity", 11 June 1965.
[506] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_5_26, "Correspondence from Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity", 24 December 1966.
[507] Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71*, p. 239.
[508] ZNA, MFA1/1/244, Afro-Asian Activities – General, 1967-68, "'GANEFO' Federation – Indonesia", 6 February 1966.
[509] ZNA, MFA1/1/244, "For the attention of Mr. P. Banda", 26 May 1966.

competitions by avoiding expressing its ideological position in fixed organisational terms.

China's support of southern African liberation movements derived largely from its own analysis of African revolution. According to Larkin, the Chinese believed that successful national revolutions would 'multiply and speed the continental revolution', and that the Chinese revolutionary experience could provide useful lessons for Africans.[510] Guided by Mao's theory of consolidating the 'intermediate zone', China dispatched military advisers to African countries alongside arms supplies. In military camps based in Tanzania, Chinese advisers trained freedom fighters exiled from Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia from 1964 onwards. China's active support of armed struggles in places like Tanzania and Ghana caused concerns for African leaders, including Kaunda, who expressed his great relief that Nyerere had managed to contain the communist take-over in Zanzibar.[511]

An emerging scholarship has offered various accounts of China's military assistance to/in Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s. Altorfer-Ong highlighted the 'double-edged sword' of such schemes: on one hand, a strengthened Tanzanian military capacity would reduce its dependence on British colonial forces; on the other hand, the internal balance of power was altered due to the militarisation of Zanzibar.[512] According to Roberts, Nyerere's acceptance of Chinese military aid was consistent with the motif of his foreign policy: 'diversifying Tanzania's sources of aid' while maintaining 'his

[510] Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949-1970*, pp. 167-168.
[511] NARA, RG 59, Box 3038, "Melady's four-hour visit with President Kaunda", 4 and 8 July 1965.
[512] Alicia N. Altorfer-Ong, "A Historical Re-Examination of Sino-Zanzibari and Sino-Tanzanian Bilateral Relationships in the 1960s" (London School of Economics and Political Science, PhD thesis, 2014), p. 143.

credibility as a non-aligned leader'. Therefore, the rise of China, instead of posing a clear Communist threat, actually complicated the Cold War into a 'three-sided' game.[513] For Zambians, their perceptions of Chinese policy in Africa and the Cultural Revolution were experienced through the prism of Zambian Humanism. Often referring to Zambia as a 'socialist country', Chinese diplomats expected Zambia to 'develop a Chinese-type of system'.[514] A 1968 policy report by the Zambian Foreign Ministry also highlighted China's appreciation of its Zambianisation policy and the positive potential of nationalising foreign interests in the country. On the one hand, the Chinese were described as having 'little patience' and coming out 'too violently against countries that are in the grip of the "imperialists"'; on the other hand, the Chinese did not hesitate to openly express themselves, which somewhat reassured Zambians.[515]

The analysis now turns away from state-to-state relations to focus on a personal experience of military cooperation. Using archival documents of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the private journal of retired Chinese deputy commander Ma Faxian, Jiang Huajie offered a case study of China's little known military training in Zambia in the 1970s.[516] Many of the materials used by Jiang arose from an oral history project led by Li Danhui, who published fourteen Chinese articles about Ma's lived experience in Zambia between 1972-1974, which for the purpose of this research are treated as primary sources.[517] Ma's perspective is uniquely useful in understanding

[513] Roberts, "Politics, Decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam c. 1965-72", p. 104.
[514] ZNA, FA/1/94, "Chinese policy on Zambia", 1968.
[515] Ibid.
[516] Ma Faxian, born in May 1926, Shouguang, Shandong Province. He joined the PLA in March 1940 and retired in May 1978 as the Deputy Division Commander of Shanghai Garrison, Nanjing Military Region. See: Jiang Huajie 蒋华杰, "Lengzhan Shiqi Zhongguo dui Feizhou Guojia de Yuanzhu Yanjiu (1960-1978)" 冷战时期中国对非洲国家的援助研究 (1960-1978) (A study on Chinese aid to African countries in Cold War era, 1960-1978) (East China Normal University, PhD thesis, 2014), pp. 80-94.
[517] Li Danhui 李丹慧 (with Zhou Na 周娜), "Feizhou Conglin de Xinshiming – Ma Faxian" 非洲丛林中的新使命—马法贤 (New mission in the African jungle—Ma Faxian), *Cold War International*

the everyday encounters between Chinese military advisors and their Zambian counterparts, a story that is almost absent in the official narratives. Admittedly, one major weakness of Jiang's study was his almost exclusive emphasis on China's perspective and Chinese sources: the agency as well as the diversity of Zambian actors in terms of religion, education and culture were regrettably underestimated. In contrast, this research places China's military aid to Zambia in the wider regional and global context while, at the same time, not losing sight of more nuanced social aspects of those state relations.

In this context, Britain's military connections with newly independent African countries, Eastern Africa in particular, were strong. Britain had directly intervened at the request of the host governments during the East African mutinies in January 1964 and made plans to put down a 1965 Coup against Kenyatta's government.[518] Zambia's national army had initially heavily relied on the British to provide military weapons and training. But this had changed dramatically since November 1965. Greatly disappointed by Britain's reluctance to confront UDI militarily, Kaunda realised the necessity to replace British officers with those of Zambian nationality.[519] Worse, it was suspected that the new Conservative government elected in Britain in 1970 would resume arms sales to apartheid South Africa.[520] Kaunda had every reason to fear that the Zambian army lacked sufficient military capacity to deal with potential border conflicts. In late 1970, Zambian Defence Minister Grey Zulu approached the Chinese embassy in Lusaka to request military assistance. Beijing quickly responded by

History Studies, 2008-2018. It is a series of articles published in this journal from 2008 until the latest issue, which is unfinished yet.

[518] Poppy Cullen, "Operation Binnacle: British Plans for Military Intervention against a 1965 coup in Kenya," *The International History Review* 39, 5 (2017), pp. 791-809.

[519] Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era (1960-1978)", p. 82.

[520] Cullen, *Kenya and Britain after Independence: Beyond Neo-Colonialism*, p. 181.

dispatching two officials to carry out secret research and to build up relevant contacts in Zambia. In February 1971, China delivered light weaponry to equip as many as 10,000 infantry soldiers, along with a detailed plan for military training. A team of fifteen Chinese military advisers, including Ma Faxian, organised four intensified training programmes for a total of one thousand Zambian officers and sergeants over a 30-month period between 1972 and 1974.[521] With instructions to enable the Zambian military to 'use Chinese weapons, follow the establishment of Chinese army units, and adopt Chinese training strategies', Deputy Commander Ma and his comrades-in-arms aimed to transform the Zambian defence force into 'a determined anti-colonial and anti-imperialist people's army', which was loyal to President Kaunda, UNIP, and the people of Zambia.[522] This training coincided with the introduction of the one-party state at the end of 1972, resulting in 'the continued centralisation of all meaningful decision-making power in the presidency as an institution and in Kaunda as an individual'.[523] Indeed, China's military aid to Zambia in early 1970s fed into and helped secure Kaunda's personal presidential supremacy.

The promotion of state ideology, manifested as Maoism in China and Humanism in Zambia, was a prominent feature of one-party rule in both countries. The emphasis on 'ideological and political education' was central to this Chinese military training. For the Zambian army, the aim was to break the 'apolitical' tradition inherited from British colonialism by bringing Mao Zedong's military thoughts into the training. For China, it was for the first time that Maoist ideology would be introduced in an African

[521] Ma Faxian 马法贤, *Yuanfei riji* 援非日记 (Journal about Aid to Africa), quoted in Jiang, "A study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era (1960-1978)", pp. 83-84.
[522] Ibid., p. 85.
[523] Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 91.

'bourgeois' army outside the communist world.[524] A 'democratic way of teaching' was used, so that officers and soldiers would teach each other and themselves. The progress of training was reportedly satisfactory: 90% of the Zambian trainees met the Chinese standards by the end of the programme. According to Ma's journal, in 1972 senior Zambian military officers declared that the combat experience of the PLA was relevant to the Zambia context, and recognised that the human being was the determinant factor of military success on future conflicts. Defence Minister Grey Zulu also spoke highly of Chinese military training in various occasions. For example, in 1973 he demanded that the Zambian armed forces should learn to unite the popular masses to assist its battles, through Maoist ideas such as 'to concentrate power part by part and to destroy enemies one by one' as well as 'better to break one finger than to hurt ten fingers'.[525]

Though the training curriculum had to be approved by Zulu and Zambia's Land Force Commander, China's ideological and political education faced significant cultural issues during its implementation. The Chinese ambassador to Zambia, Li Fenqiang, had to remind Chinese military advisers that ideological indoctrination should take consideration of the local context, particularly, the fact that 'Zambians were Christians, from the president to the popular masses'.[526] In practice, Chinese advisors tried to avoid referring to ideologies, and instead emphasised concepts such as 'the people's army' and 'people's war'. The primary resistance from the Zambian side was against the CCP's advocacy that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun' (枪杆子里出政

[524] Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era, 1960-1978", p. 86.
[525] Ma, *Journal about Aid to Africa*, volume 3, 28 January 1973, quoted in Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era, 1960-1978", p. 90.
[526] Ma, *Journal about Aid to Africa*, volume 2, 2 September 1972, quoted in Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era, 1960-1978", p. 90.

权).[527] This famous quotation from Mao reflected the CCP's rise to power as enabled through military success in the anti-Japanese war and the civil war against the KMT regime. While the use of violence was more or less justified during anti-colonial struggles, the transformation of UNIP from a nationalist party into a ruling party meant that 'the barrel of a gun' was now intended to maintain rather than to destabilise the political order. Zambian officials thus insisted removing this idea from the curriculum. Without notifying the Chinese experts, they arranged for a doctor to deliver a separate lecture on the topic of the imperialist invasion of Zambia and the national ideology of Humanism with an emphasis on 'non-violence'.[528]

The 'son' of the Vice President Mainza Chona, who was (according to Ma) 'politically anti-China', was also invited to explain that Zambian Humanism was superior to the theory of class struggle advocated by Chinese experts.[529] Ma was, it should be noted, mistaken in identifying Mark Chona as VP Mainza Chona's son (he was in fact his younger brother) and in labelling the Vice President 'anti-China'. In fact, Mainza Chona was sympathetic to Communist China throughout his vice presidency between 1970-1973. However, this reflected the fact that, for Chinese military advisers during the Cultural Revolution, any challenge to Mao Zedong thoughts was considered reactionary. At the level of state diplomacy, China-Zambia relations remained politically amicable. Yet the everyday encounters between Chinese advisers and Zambian trainees were subject to great differences in terms of political culture, ideological inclination, and religious beliefs. By the end of the training, Ma was

[527] Mao Zedong, "Problems of War and Strategy", *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Volume 2 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 224.
[528] Ma, *Journal about Aid to Africa*, volume 2, 2 September 1972, quoted in Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era, 1960-1978", p. 90.
[529] Ma, *Journal about Aid to Africa*, volume 3, 5 December 1972, quoted in Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era, 1960-1978", p. 91.

disappointed to find that most Zambian soldiers were very prudent and cautious in relating to their Chinese Communist instructors. The mobility of Chinese advisers was highly restricted and Zambian soldiers were forbidden to contact them outside training activities. Theoretical debates about the existence of God also triggered tensions, as when Chinese experts refused to pledge loyalty to Christianity. Such dynamics reveal that state propaganda of China-Zambia brotherhood did not lead to any straightforward sharing of views between Chinese and Zambians in reality. Cultural diplomacy or people-to-people diplomacy, which we will now discuss, was arguably a more significant element of China-Zambia relations in revealing if not mitigating such estrangement.

People-to-People Exchanges: Artists, Doctors and Athletes

In the early 1960s, hundreds of professional song and dance ensembles (文工团) operated under the direction of China's regional, provincial, or municipal governments. In January 1962, the Oriental Song and Dance Ensemble (OSDE) (东方歌舞团), a national-level troupe was established. Sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, its mission was to 'study and perform [the] music and dance of the people of Asia, Africa, Latin America'.[530] Emerging in the Bandung era, the OSDE offered what Wilcox describes as 'an aesthetic embodiment of the anti-colonial internationalism' in the Third World.[531] More specifically, such ensembles also produced cultural events that actively commented on revolutionary changes on the African continent. Even during the

[530] "Study and Perform Asian, African, and Latin American Countries' People's Song and Dance", *People's Daily*, 14 January 1962, quoted in Emily Wilcox, 'Performing Bandung: China's Dance Diplomacy with India, Indonesia, and Burma, 1953-1962', *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 18, 4 (2017), p. 520.
[531] Wilcox, "Performing Bandung", p. 520.

Cultural Revolution, Zambians were no strangers to such Chinese creative productions: a 40-strong troupe from Beijing toured in Kitwe, Lusaka and Livingstone in July 1966. They performed 'Militant Africa' (also known as 'The Raging Congo River'), a dance-drama about Congolese independence and the assassination of its Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2).[532] The dance-drama was produced by the Art Troupe of Political Work Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Originally called 'Battle Drum at the Equator', it was soon adapted into different regional forms of Chinese traditional opera such as Beijing opera.[533] In June-September 1965, the Beijing People's Art Theatre produced its own play, 'Congo Wind and Thunder', which depicted the heroic fight of Congolese people against the conspiracy of the UN and US.[534] Using costumes and make-up to blacken their faces and bodies, these Chinese actors imitated the Africans who had fought against colonisers (see Figure 4.3). This show was performed by hundreds of Chinese dancers in Beijing to greet Kaunda's state visit in June 1967.[535]

[532] "Chinese go African for tour", *Times of Zambia*, 21 July 1966.
[533] Art Troupe of Political Work Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army 中国人民解放军政治部文工团话剧团, *Chidao Zhangu* 赤道战鼓 (Battle Drum at the Equator) (Beijing: Zhongguo xiju chubanshe, 1965).
[534] Ying Ruocheng 英若诚, He Tu 禾土, and Su Min 苏民, *Gangguo Fenglei* 刚果风雷 (Congo Wind and Thunder) (Beijing: Zhongguo xiju chubanshe, 1965).
[535] Anthony Grey, "Thousands welcome President in Peking", *Times of Zambia*, 22 June 1967.



Nchanga plant

CATCALLS GREET U.P. IN

CHINESE GO AFRICAN FOR TOUR

CHINESE disguised — as Africans. It's a dance Zambia will be seeing next week, when a 40-strong troupe from Peking arrives to give performances in Kitwe, Lusaka and Livingstone. The dance is called "Militant Africa." The Chinese party will also include singers and musicians.

Figure 4.1: 'Chinese go African for tour'
Source: Photo and caption from *Times of Zambia*, July 21, 1966.



Figure 4.2: Dance 'The Raging Congo River', China Opera and Dance-Drama Theatre
Source: Photo from Baidu Baike, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%88%98%E6%96%97%EF%BC%8C%E5%89%8D%E8%BF%9B%EF%BC%81%E5%88%9A%E6%9E%9C%E6%B2%B3%E5%9C%A8%E6%80%92%E5%90%BC, accessed in January 2019.



Figure 4.3: Drama 'Congo Wind and Thunder', Beijing People's Art Theatre
Source: Photo from Beijing People's Art Theatre, http://www.bjry.com/play/html/2015/06/20150701226.html, accessed in January 2019.

A Sino-Zambian bilateral agreement to promote cultural cooperation had been signed during a previous Zambian 'goodwill' visit led by Vice President Kamanga and Foreign Minister Kapwepwe in August 1966. A separate cultural cooperation agreement was meanwhile signed with the Soviet Union in August, in line with Zambia's declared pursuance of the non-aligned policy. Along with several other pledges such as the offer of a £10 million loan, Zambia's agreement with China identified five spheres of cooperation:

1. Educational – exchange of experts including visits of various delegations;
2. Student exchange;
3. Exchange of artists and art ensembles;
4. Artefacts – literary works, films, broadcasts and other cultural exhibitions, including personnel involved in all these;

5. Science and exchange of information in this field by experts of the two countries.[536]

China dispatched its 'East-Is-Red Song and Dance Ensemble' to Zambia immediately after the signing of the cultural cooperation agreement. It toured the whole country after its debut in Lusaka, where it was hosted by the University of Zambia. This caused some anxiety among British officials, who highlighted the 'crude type' of propaganda material used by the Chinese performers.[537]

Zambia's own reaction towards China's cultural diplomacy should be understood in the context of the Cultural Revolution, one of the most profound horrors to which the Chinese were subjected during the twentieth century. The narrowness and dogmatic nature of cultural activity in this period was best captured in the popular saying that 'about 800 million people watching eight shows' (八亿人看八个戏), namely 'revolutionary model theoretical works' (革命样板戏).[538] Nevertheless, scholars under the influence of the 'cultural' turn have started to recognise it as 'a time of both brutal iconoclasm and radical experimentation' in the arts.[539]

While Communist publications were banned in countries like Kenya during the Cultural Revolution (see Chapter Three), Zambia followed Tanzania's approach in its relatively

[536] ZNA, MFA1/1/155, China (Communist) Cultural Co-operation Agreement with, 1966-67, "Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Cultural Cooperation Agreement between Zambia and China", March 1967.
[537] TNA, DO 209/71, China: 10m Loan Offer, 1966, "Chinese aid to Zambia", 11 August 1966.
[538] Paul Clark, "Model Theoretical Works and the Remodeling of the Cultural Revolution", in Richard King et al. (eds.), *Art in Turmoil: the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-76* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), p. 167.
[539] King et al. (eds.), *Art in Turmoil*, p. xi. See also: Jiehong Jiang, *Burden or Legacy: From the Chinese Cultural Revolution to Contemporary Art* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007); Laikwan Pang, *The Art of Cloning: Creative Production during China's Cultural Revolution* (London: Verso, 2017)

openness towards Maoist propaganda, especially after Humanism was installed as the new national philosophy in April 1967.[540] While there was a general distaste of Chinese propaganda among Zambian ministry officials, it did not seem to seriously bother the country's most senior politicians. In May 1967, Chinese delegates were found to have distributed thousands of Mao badges as well as Maoist literature at the Lusaka Agricultural Show. As the Permanent Secretary of Zambia's Foreign Ministry, Mark Chona mildly suggested that he would bring the matter privately with Kapwepwe in his upcoming trip to China.[541] In November, the Ministry of Education issued a circular to all school heads in Lusaka, demanding that the works of Mao Zedong be removed from school libraries.[542] It was estimated that the Chinese embassy had sent several thousand copies of 'Quotations from Chairman Mao tse-Tung' and 'Selected Readings from the Works of Mao tse-Tung' to schools. While resisting the spread of Chinese Communist literature, Zambia's overall response was clear: 'Zambia must refuse to be a pawn in the cold war.'[543]

In October 1967, China sent a Song and Dance Troupe to perform at the celebrations of Zambia's third anniversary of independence (See Figure 4.4). The group of 53 Chinese dancers and singers stayed in a Kitwe hotel, only appearing in hotels' public spaces when they took their meals. As most Chinese visitors to Zambia were diplomats and journalists, this was the first time many locals had seen a sizable group of young Chinese women. Curiosity, or 'mystery' in the words of a *ToZ* reporter, was the dominant feeling. These Chinese dancers and singers impressed Zambians as being

[540] "Humanism – the new philosophy: President presents socialist manifesto", *Times of Zambia*, 28 April 1967.
[541] ZNA, FA/1/94, "From Mainza Chona to the PS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 14 August 1967.
[542] "Ministry recalls books. Lusaka schools' purge on Mao", *Times of Zambia*, 30 November 1967.
[543] ZNA, FA/1/94, "From H.S. Soko copied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 19 May 1967.

'extremely shy'.[544] A hotel waiter complained that their Chinese guests were separated from other diners by a curtain, and clearly did not want to mingle. Interview requests were refused on the basis that talking and being photographed was 'not good'. This deliberate distancing between Chinese performers and Zambians was not surprising: in the context of the growing political tensions in China, any contact with foreigners could cause trouble.



Figure 4.4: Chinese Folk Song and Dance Troupe performs in Zambia, 18 October 1967
Source: Photo from "From Zambia Cultural Services to Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 1 December 1967, China (Communist) Cultural Co-operation Agreement with, 1966-1967, MFA1/1/155, ZNA

The role of gender in the Cold War history and history of international relations as a whole has been largely absent. This research recognises this limitation through the presented evidence above. The term used by most Communist propaganda to describe solidarity among comrades was 'brotherly', reflecting and assuming the indisputable power held by male leaders. Interestingly however, China-Zambia cultural exchanges,

[544] "Mystery of the Chinese dancers", *Times of Zambia*, 12 October 1967.

especially in the form of song and dance troupes, allowed a limited degree of mobility among Chinese women. For ordinary Zambians, these visits enabled them to see Chinese women performing for the first time at close hand. The *ToZ* also paid attention to the way in which they were dressed in 'loosely-fitting short-sleeved shirts and trousers' during the day, and 'neat grey tight-collared tunics and carefully-pressed matching trousers with slippers' at night.[545] These outfits were usually associated with men in both Europe and Africa.

A similar public interest in Chinese women and their fashion was also expressed in Kenya. An *EAS* report directed attention to the fashion industry of China in 1965: in contrast to the famous 'haute couture' of Shanghai girls up to 1949, Ian McCrone found out that 'baggy slacks and unfashionably cut jackets' became the popular outfit of Chinese women, and the first pair of nylons was seen on 'a solidly proportioned interpreter, who has more to do with foreigners than the average Chinese woman' (see Figure 4.5).[546] While this supposed lack of fashionable taste could be attributed to 'the national submergence of sex',[547] it was equally naïve to assume that such 'submergence' resulted in the elevated social status of women in Communist China. In fact, even in the dance troupe, in which women formed the majority of performers, it was Mr. Hsu who was responsible for public engagements with Zambian politicians and journalists. Despite the occasional display of 'first lady diplomacy' by Madame Betty Kaunda and Madame Jiang Qing, the relations between Chinese and Zambians were overwhelmingly patricentric.

[545] Ibid.
[546] "Chinese women's fashion choice – baggy trousers", *East African Standard*, 24 December 1965.
[547] Ibid.



Figure 4.5: "Chinese women in baggy trousers and jackets"
Source: Photo and caption from "Chinese women's fashion choice – baggy trousers", *East African Standard*, 24 December 1965.

This careful approach by the Chinese visitors was clearly demonstrated in a press conference the following day. The leader of the visiting troupe, Mr. Hsu Ping, sought to dispel any concerns about their activities. He announced that 'there is nothing mysterious about us' and rejected accusations that they were handing out Mao badges to Zambians as groundless. [548] He also stressed that 'red books' of Mao's Thought were given out on request. But the *ToZ* reporter refuted this claim: 'The two Chinese who

[548] John Edlin, "'East is Red' men say no badges, but plenty thoughts of Mao", *Times of Zambia*, 13 October 1967.

offered Mao badges to Zambians did so in the foyer of the Hotel Edinburgh on Wednesday. I saw the Zambians reject the offer.'[549]

Ideological contestation was in any case ubiquitous in the cultural sphere. The Chinese Song and Dance Ensemble initially refused to perform at the independence anniversary event at Matero Stadium in Lusaka because artists from the 'imperialist' United States and the 'revisionist' Soviet Union were invited to the same event. Their Zambian hosts sought to mollify the Chinese by suggesting that they would perform ahead of Russian artists.[550] In contrast to the highly politicised impact of Communist activities (or alleged activities) in Kenya, Zambian leaders generally downplayed potentially controversial matters. Mark Chona, claiming that 'those who exaggerated those [propagandist] reports were anti-Chinese', suggests that the Cultural Revolution was a domestic Chinese event of limited relevance to the Zambian context.[551] This is however more of a retrospective judgment than a reflection of the events of the time: Zambia's rulers clearly wished to prevent their citizens from associating with Maoist teachings and symbols, recognising them as manifestations of a belief system opposed to theirs, while equally seeking to prevent controversy over such propaganda efforts negatively affecting their overall relationship with China.

Unlike these artists who usually toured a foreign country for a few weeks, most Chinese aid doctors stayed longer, and therefore interacted more substantially with their African patients. An official Chinese report released in 1974 noted that the purpose of dispatching aid doctors was to carry out 'Mao Zedong's proletarian line of foreign

[549] Ibid.
[550] ZNA, MFA1/1/155, "Record of a Meeting between Mr. Yen, Chinese Chargé d'Affaire, and Mr. Chimuka, Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 20 October 1967.
[551] Interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, 24 August 2016.

affairs' against 'colonialists, imperialists, and hegemons'.[552] This 'honourable mission' involved the selection, training and dispatch by China's provincial and municipal hospitals of medical teams to numerous African countries, including Zambia (from 1978).[553] Chinese doctors were however already present in Zambia before this date, since they treated Chinese technicians during the construction of TAZARA. The initial idea to bring Chinese doctors to Zambia arose during a goodwill visit led by Sikota Wina, then Minister of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, in September 1969.[554] He was particularly impressed by acupuncture, the traditional Chinese method of treatment using needles to puncture the skin (see Figure 4.6).



Figure 4.6: Chinese Doctor Uses Acupuncture to Treat the Relatives of Zambian TAZARA Construction Workers
Source: Photo and caption from Planning Department of the Foreign Ministry, *Zhongfei Guanxishi shang de Fengbei* 中非关系史上的丰碑—援建坦赞铁路亲历者的讲述(Grand Monument in the History of Sino-African Relations – Participant Accounts of the Tanzam Railway) (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2014).

[552] Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era, 1960-1978", p. 228.
[553] Li Anshan 李安山, "Zhongguo Yuanwaiyiliaodui de Lishi, Guimo jiqi Yingxiang" 中国援外医疗队的历史、规模及其影响 (Chinese Medical Teams Abroad: A History of Cooperation), *Foreign Affairs Review* 26, 1 (2009), pp. 25-45.
[554] NARA, RG 59, Box 2847, "Sikota Wina returns from mainland China", September 1969.

However, this 'friendship gesture' created legal complications. According to the Medical Council of Zambia, all doctors had to either register fully with the authorities or acquire temporary permits while receiving their qualifications at a local medical school.[555] The Medical Council, although affiliated with the Ministry of Health, functioned independently from government. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry meanwhile claimed that Zambian patients would suffer difficulties due to Chinese doctors' inability to communicate in English.[556] The enduring impacts of language impediment were also highlighted by Doctor Yu, the former leader of a Chinese medical team between 1990-1992 and 1996-2001, which will be discussed in more details in Chapter Six.[557]

Such health diplomacy was however by no means immune from the ideological divisions of the period. In March that year, someone claimed to be a Chinese Maoist in Zurich sent an anonymous letter to Mainza Chona, the Minister for Presidential Affairs, criticising Zambia's acceptance of smallpox vaccine from the Soviet Union.[558] Described by Chona as 'excessive' and 'cheap' propaganda, this letter aroused discussions within the Foreign Ministry. Yet the matter quickly settled down and was not publicly exposed. Fifty years later when I interviewed Vernon Mwaanga, who served as director of the National Intelligence Services, he said he strongly doubted that it was really written by a Chinese person. He explained that the matter was picked up by the Foreign Ministry because some ministers were less experienced in handling such potentially inflammatory materials, thus had to be advised not to overreact.[559]

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[555] "Qualifications doubted by Medical Council: Chinese doctors face ban", *Times of Zambia*, 9 September 1969.
[556] "Nalumango warns Chinese doctors", *Times of Zambia*, 10 September 1969.
[557] Interview with Doctor Yu Huizhen, Lusaka, September 2016.
[558] ZNA, FA/1/94, "From Mainza Chona to the PS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 17 March 1967.
[559] Interview with Vernon Mwaanga, Lusaka, 19 August 2016.

Sport was a further arena of the Cold War battle: political controversy surrounding China's football matches with Zambia reflected the geo-diplomatic conflicts between China and Taiwan. In his study of the political and social history of soccer in Zambia, Chipande argues that Kaunda and UNIP used soccer as 'a tool for political propaganda' during the one-party Second Republic (1972-1991).[560] While Zambia became a full member of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in 1964, China had withdrawn its membership in June 1958 when FIFA officially recognised the Republic of China (Taiwan) as an independent country. For years the People's Republic of China only played friendly matches with nations that recognised it as the sole 'China'.[561] In 1971, presidents Nyerere and Kaunda jointly invited China's national football team for friendly matches against their respective countries. The team, the ability of which was unknown, arrived in Dar es Salaam in late November that year and was originally scheduled to play three games in Lusaka, Chingola, and Luanshya shortly after Christmas. However, the Football Association of Zambia (FAZ) was warned by FIFA that Zambia would face 'an indefinite suspension' if these games went ahead.[562] Although China had recently been readmitted to the UN in October that year, it was not yet a member of FIFA (it finally re-joined in 1979).[563] For FAZ officials, the consequences of playing against a non-member state were uncertain. As was the case with the Chinese doctors, it was the government that had initiated cultural programmes

[560] Decius Chipande, "Chipolopolo: A Political and Social History of Football (Soccer) in Zambia, 1940s – 1994" (Michigan State University, PhD thesis, 2015), p. 114.
[561] "1949-1979 Chronicle of events of Chinese National Football Team" (1949 年-1979 年中国足球国家队大事记), Sports 163, 19 March 2007, http://sports.163.com/07/0319/03/39TS1BEK00051C88.html (20 October 2018).
[562] "Don't play China, FIFA warn Zambia, Tanzania", *Times of Zambia*, 4 December 1971.
[563] "1949-1979 Chronicle of events of Chinese National Football Team", Sports 163.

to promote bilateral relations, but without having carefully assessed the potential difficulties and consequences of such initiatives.

Indeed, Zambian leaders faced the dilemma of achieving material gains in ways that did not damage their country's political friendships. In this case, it was finally agreed that a team of selected ex-internationals – retired football players who were thus not affiliated to FAZ or FIFA – would represent Zambia in its matches against the Chinese team.[564] The *ToZ*'s use of the term 'old crocks' to describe these retired Zambian players reflected wider unhappiness with the increasingly authoritarian nature of the UNIP government that found indirect expression on the football field. In 1975, a series of defeats of the Zambian team in regional matches triggered anger and dissatisfaction from the public. In response, Minister of Labour and Social Services, Dingiswayo Banda dissolved both the National Football League and the FAZ.[565] From that point forwards, football administration fell into the hands of the UNIP officials.

This section has demonstrated that cultural diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges constituted an important element of China-Zambia relations in the 1960s and the 1970s. In addition to the overt role of politicians or social elites in developing foreign relations, a range of non-state actors – artists, doctors, and athletes – travelled from China to this landlocked country in central Africa (notably, few if any such Zambians travelled in the opposite direction). Their physical presence, together with the ideas, performances, and expertise that they brought or that Zambians had about them, generated surprise, curiosity and debates about the nature of Chinese society among Zambians. On the one

[564] "China will play 'old crocks'", *Times of Zambia*, 21 December 1971.
[565] Chipande, "Chipolopolo", p. 114.

hand, these visits encompassed cultural representations of Mao's China as 'revolutionary', 'brotherly', and at times 'professional'; on the other hand, these individual experiences sometimes revealed or generated tensions and contradictions that underlay state relations. In Hatzky's study of the strategies of Cuban government to recruit volunteers, the social transformation of these 'subjects' proved crucial in creating a vision of 'a permanent, global revolution'.[566] Jiang asserted that China's aid to Africa in the educational, agricultural, military, industrial and infrastructural, and medical sectors was in reality 'an experiment to test the rationality and universality of China's own development road.'[567] In this way, such initiatives arguably revealed as much or more about China than about Africa.

Sino-Zambian Trade Relations and the Politics of 1967 Maize Deal

Having discussed the political and cultural aspects of China-Zambia interactions, this final section will direct its attention to the no less significant economic dimension of their relations. In the period immediately after independence, Zambia was not considered economically important for the Eastern bloc, and trade was minimal. As Zambia's first ambassador to the Soviet Union since 1965, Mwaanga recalled his disappointment regarding Soviet inability to provide substantial assistance to Zambia after UDI.[568] This was also true of China. A Chinese delegation headed by China's Vice Minister of Foreign Trade paid an exploratory visit to Zambia to identify trade possibilities in May 1966. However, it was disappointed to find out that 'a great deal of the commerce of this country seemed to be already in British hands.'[569] One of the

[566] Hatzky, *Cubans in Angola: South-South Cooperation and Transfer of Knowledge, 1976-1991*, p. 91.
[567] Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era, 1960-1978", p. 228.
[568] Mwaanga, *An Extraordinary Life*, pp. 151-168.
[569] TNA, DO 209/101, Visit by Chinese Trade Delegation, 1966, "From the British High Commission

major channels to facilitate bilateral trade was participation in Zambia's annual shows, particularly the Lusaka Agricultural Show organised by the Agricultural and Commercial Society and the commercial and industrial exhibition in Ndola, later renamed the Zambia Trade Fair.[570] China participated in the Zambia Trade Fair from 1965, that year winning first prize for its presentation. The 1967 Lusaka Agricultural Show was financially successful, and the Jubilee Hall filled with Chinese ivory carvings was a particular feature.[571] When asked about his impression of the Chinese pavilion, a Zambia teacher said it was 'fabulous', as other foreign exhibitions simply 'tr[ied] to sell you tyres and sewing machines'.[572]

In general, however, China-Zambia trade in this period was limited in both scale and diversity. British diplomats estimated that, in 1966, the value of Zambian exports to China was £205,000, three times the value of its imports from China; in 1967, however, the value of Zambian exports to China rose to £3,127,000, eleven times the value of its imports from China.[573] Following copper, maize was Zambia's second largest export to China, with a total value of £557,000. China's exports to Zambia were more diverse, ranging from manufactured goods such as bicycles and sewing machines to clothing, textiles, crockery and tinned foods. One major reason for limited Zambian exports was the challenge of transportation. Via ports in Kenya and Hong Kong, goods from mainland China could reach East Africa despite the embargo imposed by western countries.[574] Zambia, in contrast, suffered from its landlocked position, as well as 'the

in Lusaka to London", 24 May 1966.
[570] Dick Hobson, *Showtime: A History of the Agricultural and Commercial Society of Zambia, 1914-1976*, (Lusaka: Agricultural and Commercial Society of Zambia, 1979), p.157.
[571] Ibid., p. 158.
[572] NARA, RG 59, Box 1513 (Political and Defense, CSM 6 VIET S to CSM 3), 1967-1969, "Chicoms feature Mao at Zambia Trade Fair", 5 July 1967.
[573] TNA, FCO 29/336, Zambia's Relations with China, 1968-1969, "Chinese activity in Zambia", 17 December 1968.
[574] KNA, AE/3/844, Kenya Supply Board, Export Control, China, 1967, "From the Director of Trade &

legacy of a transportation system that was never intended to serve its broader economic and social development needs.'[575] By 1966, UDI and the subsequent boycott of Rhodesia made the situation even worse. In this context, Zambia's reliance on Rhodesia Railways was identified as a major problem that needed to be overcome. The alternative routes to the ports of Beira (Mozambique) and Lobito (Angola) were under equally illegitimate Portuguese colonial rule. Although Zambia's reliance on these routes had declined by 1966, the 'poor condition' of the roads linking Zambia with Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) was still a huge problem, especially in the rainy season.[576] Through the case study of 1967 Zambia's maize deal negotiation with China, this section demonstrates the vulnerability of Zambian economy to these transport problems, which further contributed to China's determination to help Zambia build its transnational railway.

Maize has long been the dominant food crop in eastern and southern Africa, whose production occupies 75 percent or more of cereal area in today's Kenya and Zambia.[577] With a huge population to feed, China has been a global maize importer historically. In late 1966, it approached Kenyan trade officials to import white maize (see Chapter Three). At the start of 1967, it expressed its interest to purchase up to 100,000 tons (equivalent to one million bags) of maize from Zambia. Zambia for its part was eager to sell the massive stocks of maize accumulated during the previous season as soon as possible.[578] The original price offered by Zambia's Ministry of Commerce, Industry

Supplies to the Secretary for Commerce and Industry', 5 June 1967.
[575] Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway*, p. 21.
[576] TNA, DO 209/101, "From the British High Commission in Lusaka to London", 24 May 1966.
[577] Melinda Smale and Thom Jayne, "Maize in Eastern and Southern Africa: 'Seeds' of Success in Retrospect", *EPTD Discussion Paper No. 97* (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2003), p. 4.
[578] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, China Trade with, 1967-1968, "Export of Maize to China", 24 January 1967. For a detailed study of Zambia's maize industry in the 1960s, see The Industrial Development Corporation of Zambia Limited, *Maize Industry in Zambia: A Feasibility Study* (Lusaka: INDEC, 1968).

and Foreign Trade was £20.15s. per long ton via either Beira or Lourenco Marques in Mozambique, excluding the cost of delivery and shipment to China.[579] This offer was accepted by China almost immediately, and a bilateral meeting was therefore proposed to negotiate the details. Although Beijing intended to invite a Zambian trade delegation in March or April 1967 to sign the contract, Zambia's Ministry of Finance strongly suggested a first meeting should take place in Lusaka, 'where the maize can be examined'.[580] Zambia's Minister of Commerce Justin Chimba, 'reluctantly' agreed to not 'proceed with the conclusion of a sale agreement', and 'presumed' that the responsibility of negotiation would rest in the Finance Ministry through the Grain Marketing Board.[581] Until 1989, maize marketing in Zambia was controlled and subsidised by the parastatal Grain Marketing Board, and then, the National Agricultural Marketing Board (Namboard) during the Second Republic, administered by the Ministry of Agriculture.[582] The close involvement of senior political figures at the highest level would prove to be a prominent feature throughout the negotiation and implementation of this maize deal with China.

In April-May 1967, Commerce Minister Chimba led a Zambian trade and economic delegation to the Far East. From China, the delegation visited Japan and Hong Kong before its final stop at Singapore. In Beijing, a Trade Agreement was signed to promote bilateral trade relations on the basis of equality and mutual interest, and with conditions guaranteed no less favourable than those accorded by either party to a third country.[583]

[579] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "From Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Foreign Trade to Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 6 February 1967.
[580] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "From Ministry of Finance to Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 22 March 1967.
[581] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "From Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Foreign Trade to Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 1967.
[582] Nicole Mason, "Smallholder Supply Response to Marketing Board Activities in a Dual Channel Marketing System: The Case of Zambia", *Journal of Agricultural Economics* 66, 1 (2015), pp. 36 -65.
[583] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "Trade Agreement between Zambia and China", 13 July 1967.

Despite these positive general agreements, specific negotiations on the maize contract proved more difficult. China had recently offered between £18 and £19 FOB per metric tons for Argentine maize, lower than the price it had offered to Zambia.[584] This convinced Chimba to favour the price of £20.15s. fairly early in the discussions. However, Chinese and Zambians were divided on the contract's actual terms regarding delivery. Zambian officials insisted that the C&F or CIF price should apply to Chinese ports, which would cost more for China.[585] When this was rejected, Zambian delegates felt they were being exploited. One Zambian legal adviser was also excluded diplomatically by the Chinese. 'Our [Chinese] friends are certainly very shrewd', complained one delegate in a handwritten note to Mark Chona, the then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a few days after the meeting.[586] However, L. S. Muuka, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported that '[o]n the whole, the contract ultimately agreed upon was a reasonable one.' But he was equally aware that Chimba 'overruled the strong objections of his officials', which made him to conclude that 'not much team spirit was evidenced throughout the trip'.[587]

In early June 1967, the Zambian ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs met again in Lusaka. They learnt that the export capacity of the Dar es Salaam route had already been absorbed by copper and it was impossible for Zambia to transport as much as 10,000 tons of maize on a monthly basis: Zambia would fail to export its maize to China

[584] FOB is "Free On Board", which means that the seller pays for transportation of the goods to the port of shipment, plus loading costs. See ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "Maize export contract with the China National Cereals, Oils & Foodstuffs & Export corp.", 8 June 1967.
[585] C&F is cost and freight, which means that the price invoiced or quoted by a seller for a shipment does not include insurance charges, but includes all expenses up to a named port of destination. In comparison, CIF is cost, insurance, freight, which means that a seller also has to pay for the insurance.
[586] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "Handwritten note to Mark", 4 May 1967.
[587] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "Observations on the Zambian Trade and Economic Mission to the PRC, Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong led by the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Foreign Trade, from the 7th of April, to the 20th of May, 1967", August 1967.

and create storage difficulties at Dar port.[588] The report of the meeting concluded that 'practical issues outweigh our good intention.'[589] Therefore, the Ministry of Commerce suggested two alternatives to be considered by the Chinese: either Zambia would arrange for the maize to be shipped to China at an increased price of £23.10 (CIF); or the Chinese ships would call at Portuguese African ports to collect the maize at the contracted price of £20.10 (FOB). The difficulty for both governments was then to maximise the mutual material benefits without sacrificing their political relations.[590]

In August, the Chinese National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs, Import and Export Corporation agreed to pay £23.10.-d. per metric ton CIF as well as to bear the extra cost of the stowed and trimmed maize.[591] The reason given by the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires was simple: China's 'strained political relations' with the Portuguese made collection in Mozambique impossible.[592] But the Chinese government also made it clear that Indian, South African, American and Israeli ships should not be contracted to deliver the maize.[593] Exacerbated by the Middle East Crisis and the subsequent closure of the Suez Canal, costs of freight and insurance were increasing dramatically. Political instability also discouraged many ship owners from sailing into Chinese waters.[594]

The Zambian Cabinet, meanwhile, was itself sharply divided on the maize deal. While President Kaunda and his senior ministers prioritised political friendship with China,

[588] Benefiting from a rich deposit on the Copperbelt, mining in British-ruled Northern Rhodesia and early years of Zambia had been owned and managed by two private companies, Rhodesia Selection Trust and the Anglo-American Corporation, until 1969.
[589] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "The maize export contract with the Chinese National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs, Import and Export Corporation", 12 June 1967.
[590] Ibid.
[591] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "Zambia-China Maize Sale", 4 August 1967.
[592] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "Trade Agreement between Zambia and China", 13 July 1967.
[593] ZNA, MFA1/1/64, Communist China –Technical Assistance, 1965-1967, "Trade: Maize sale to China", July 1967.
[594] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "From Ministry Commerce to Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 31 August 1967.

most middle-ranked Ministry of Commerce officials defined Zambian national interests in economic terms. In a Parliamentary debate in July 1967, Cecil Burney MP challenged Chimba to accept that Zambia would lose £1.2 million because of the high cost of shipping the maize to Zambia. As an independent MP for Ndola, Burney was notable for his outspoken criticism of UNIP in relation to the economic interests of Zambians in the post-UDI era.[595] In reply, Chimba simply requested patience among MPs as he was not yet able to supply the updated transport cost.[596] G.H. Mutale, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce, expressed his concern in a handwritten note:

> My attention was irresistibly drawn to the TZ article of July 13, 1967 in respect of the maize deal. If Mr. C. Burney's statistics can be relied upon one can't see much economic benefit to Zambia out of the deal, unless the whole thing is political in which case other factors would come into play. I note that though Mr. Chimba refuted Mr. Burney's allegations he was either unable or unwilling to furnish the House with any new figures.[597]

The Cabinet report characterised the revised maize deal contract as 'not per se an economic proposition': at best it 'represented less loss' compared to earlier maize exports to Japan and Scotland.[598] However, the Ministry of Commerce sharply criticised the Grain Marketing Board, which, in its view, had failed to advise on the issue of shipping costs and had shown 'bad faith to the Government'.[599] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs disagreed with the Ministry of Commerce, because the latter had tried to discuss the issue with the Chinese 'before they even discussed with us', and unfairly blamed 'we politicians' for trying to 'please the Chinese by sacrificing money'.[600] In December 1967, Permanent Secretary Mutale again complained about

[595] DeRoche, '"You Can't Fight Guns with Knives"', pp. 89-90.
[596] "£1.2m. may be lost on deal", *Times of Zambia*, 13 July 1967.
[597] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, "Note from Mutale to Muuka", 15 July 1967.
[598] Note that the emphasis in the original. ZNA, MFA1/1/64, "Trade: Maize sale to China".
[599] Ibid.
[600] ZNA, MFA1/1/64, "Under Secretary (2)", 9 June 1967.

the ‘tendency by the Chinese to include unnecessary articles’ in their deal and their preference for the ‘the international price structure’ rather than that of Zambia.[601] These debates surrounding the maize deal with China thus encapsulate the complex, and sometimes, conflicting values underlying the implementation of Zambian foreign policy.

More generally, the Zambian governments used similar processes to its Kenyan counterpart to negotiate trade agreements with China. A goodwill mission, preferably led by a senior politician, would initiate the process; then the Ministry of Commerce would explore the feasibility of such agreement; and finally a specific institution such as the Kenya National Trading Company or the Grain Marketing Board of Zambia negotiated the final terms of the agreement. Although politically and ideologically more divided than their UNIP counterparts, Kenyan politicians tended, as Chapter Three showed, to prioritise concrete economic gains, for instance, in choosing the Chinese over the Soviet aid offer. In Zambia however, ‘an intra-ministerial crisis’ in the Cabinet arising from a similar trade negotiation was likely to end up favouring those loyal to President Kaunda.[602] As negotiating power was almost exclusively in the hands of senior politicians, Zambian policymaking tended to be less consistent to the external observers. Instead of being ‘exploited’ by stronger trading partners such as China, it was the dominance of politics over economic interests that largely contributed to the failure of Zambia’s 1967 maize deal. The British to conclude that Zambians had ‘learnt their lesson’ and would not export further maize to China.[603]

[601] ZNA, MFA1/1/241, “From the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, 8 December 1967.
[602] NARA, Box 3038, “Report of Conversation with Professor Goundrey”.
[603] TNA, FCO 29/336, “Chinese activity in Zambia”.

Conclusion

As this chapter has illustrated, China provided urgently needed moral and material support for Zambia's position with regard to southern Africa. Despite their political differences, Zambian elites maintained a relative high consensus that any alleged Chinese Communist threat would not be allowed to fuel power struggles within the ruling party UNIP. In contrast to Kenya's troubled relations with China in the second half of the 1960s, Sino-Zambian relations survived even the most disruptive years of the Cultural Revolution and Kaunda's personal attachments with Chinese leaders became even stronger. This chapter has argued that Mao's revolutionary thoughts, embedded in the military training and to a lesser extent in Kaunda's introduction of the one-party rule, were mutually reinforcing.

In addition to these governmental dynamics, non-state actors in the form of varied people-to-people initiatives played a critical role in the communications between, and mutual perceptions of, Chinese and Zambians. This chapter challenged homogeneous characterisations of Afro-Asian solidarity through these diverse relationships, analysing the impact of cultural performances, football matches, and Chinese traditional medicine. It therefore contributes to the disaggregation of histories of the global Cold War. Zambia's trade relations with China, although experiencing steady growth from independence onwards, were constrained by its landlocked geographical location. The case study of Zambia's maize deal with China revealed the discrepancy between the ambition and limited agency of many African countries in materialising their national interests vis-à-vis Cold War protagonists.

Chapter Five: Political Transition and Multifaceted Engagements: Zambia, Kenya and China in the Late 1970s and 1980s

Introduction

The proceeding two chapters of this thesis, examining Kenya and Zambia's respective political, economic and cultural engagements with China in the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, have demonstrated the ways in which African countries and their leaders approached, deepened and negotiated their relations with Cold War powers in general and China in particular. The comparative approach has been especially useful in understanding the diverse and complex interplay between global dynamics and the local experiences of African state and non-state actors.

The state of Kenyan politics at the end of the 1960s was a great disappointment to Chinese leaders: as shown in Chapter Three, Oginga Odinga was first excluded from the ruling party KANU, and was then identified and marginalised by his position as the leader of a Communist-backed opposition. Economically, Kenya's trade remained largely with Britain, while political and sociocultural exchanges with China were minimal in comparison to the West. International organisations, however, provided potentially more meaningful platforms where the Chinese government could engage with Kenyan leaders. Kenyatta's distaste for Communism did not for example prevent him supporting China's membership of the UN. The normalisation of China-US relations in the 1970s also convinced the Kenyan leadership to reassess its policy

towards China. The early 1980s witnessed simultaneous processes of leadership transition in Kenya and China: in 1980, President Moi met Deng Xiaoping in Beijing to discuss the future of Sino-Kenyan relations, that would be, driven by economic interests and trade opportunities.

Zambia, in comparison, was a more unpredictable and surprising partner for the Chinese. President Kaunda, who was initially considered moderate in the view of the West, gradually developed his Humanist philosophy into an all-compassing national ideology. The 1970s witnessed the increasingly authoritarian rule of his ruling party UNIP. The declaration of a one-party state in 1972 was the culmination of Kaunda's supreme leadership in both the party and the state. Simultaneously in China, its new leadership struggled with domestic rehabilitation from the Cultural Revolution and Mao's revolutionary legacy. The result was, as this chapter will demonstrate, that the increasingly left-wing UNIP identified post-Mao China as co-opted by US-led neo-imperialism in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Even more troublesome was Sino-Zambian division in relation to southern African liberation movements. Beijing's support of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in Rhodesia, driven by its predominant anti-Soviet agenda, clashed with Lusaka's support of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). This again proved that South-South solidarity was subject to unpredictability in the context of geopolitical and ideological entanglements.

This chapter will analyse the development of Kenya and Zambia's relations with China in the last two decades of the Cold War. Unlike the 1960s, when revolutionary Maoism

directed Communist China's diplomatic activities, this period was marked by the absence of a clear agenda towards Africa, sometimes characterised by contradictory actions. The cleavage between Mao and post-Mao Chinese foreign policy towards Africa, however, was simply taken for granted. Situated in both the domestic and international politics of Kenya, Zambia and China, this chapter argues that while profound changes took place in three countries, these did not happen overnight but as a result of policy changes and discussions which will be analysed below. Therefore, no singular structure can explain these countries' multifaceted engagements. This chapter will briefly discuss major developments in global politics in the early 1970s, including most importantly, China's admission to the UN in 1971. Zambia's one-party state under the leadership of Kaunda was eager to learn from Chinese experience in managing party-state relations. Closely following Kenyatta's footsteps in maintaining close ties with the West, the new Kenyan President Moi nonetheless engaged with China more positively. The chapter will then compare Zambia and Kenya's distinctive perceptions of China's new foreign policy during the reform era. This chapter will conclude with an analysis of the implications of these changes from the perspective of economic and technical cooperation.

Foreign Policy from Within and Without

The conflict between ideology and pragmatism was central to the internal and external dynamics of all Communist regimes during the Cold War. Maoism, initially a military doctrine, began after the onset of the Cultural Revolution to encompass 'military, political, cultural and economic ideology distinct from Soviet communism'. [604]

[604] Cook, "Third World Maoism", p. 290.

Domestically, Mao's nation-wide campaign reshaped the CCP leadership by empowering a young political force that had risen in the Cultural Revolution by attacking allegedly 'rightist' senior officials.[605] Internationally, Chinese foreign policy during this period was more successful in exporting Maoist ideology to the 'masses' than 'aid projects and diplomacy aimed at political leaders.'[606] But Africa in general and Zambia in particular was far from a passive recipient of Chinese Communist propaganda: developments in both domestic and international politics in the early 1970s fundamentally reshaped Zambia's foreign policy and its relations with China in the subsequent decade.

Shortly after the launch of Simon Kapwepwe's breakaway United Progressive Party (UPP) in August 1971, Kaunda ordered his Administrative Secretary to send pamphlets to its Beijing embassy to warn that Kapwepwe's agents were allegedly 'hibernating in the Foreign Service'. Titled 'Two Faces of Kapwepwe', the pamphlet sought to clarify foreign confusion regarding the Zambian political situation and to restore trust in Kaunda's government.[607] Like Odinga in Kenya, Kapwepwe was a leading figure in shaping Zambia's foreign policy and had visited China as Foreign Minister in 1966. His frequent public criticisms of colonialism and imperialism made him an unpopular figure in Western diplomatic circles. Nevertheless, Kapwepwe did not enjoy any close personal connection with the East: the division between Kaunda and Kapwepwe was not primarily ideological but rather driven by their rivalry for high office. Opposition politics, as Larmer argues, was built on 'the sectional and regional challenges to and

[605] Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge: Belknap of Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 193.
[606] Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, pp. 149-50.
[607] United National Independence Party Archives, Lusaka (hereafter UNIP Lusaka), 7/23/22, Embassy of Zambia in Peking, 1970-1973, "The two faces of Kapwepwe", 10 February 1972.

within UNIP that originated from the nationalist struggle itself' as well as UNIP's failure to 'address and manage popular expectations in the 1960s.'[608] For the Chinese government, the Copperbelt-based UPP, with its strong support base of Bemba speakers, was not an attractive vehicle for the CCP's aims. Eisenman argues that the early 1970s saw a 'return to normalcy' in China, following the CCP's National Conference on Foreign Affairs in May 1971 call for work with 'organisations across the political spectrum'.[609] The United States' new willingness to support rather than undermine China's status in international affairs also facilitated their limited collaboration in Southern Africa, where the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola was particularly significant.[610] Chinese supplies of weapons and advisers to liberation movements also increased through camps in both Tanzania and Zambia.

Internationally, the decade began with the Third Summit of Non-Aligned Countries held in Zambia. In September 1970, representatives from about 60 non-aligned countries gathered to discuss issues concerning global peace and equality. The decision to hold this meeting in Lusaka reflected both Zambia's strategic position in the frontline of southern Africa's liberation wars and President Kaunda's reputation in the non-aligned world. Zambia, a relatively small and politically unimportant country in its own right, had achieved a disproportionate significance. In this regard, Kaunda's Zambia aspired to the prominence of Tito's Yugoslavia in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) – 'a combination of a one-party and one-man state, with [its] own path to socialism'.[611]

[608] Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 92.
[609] Joshua Eisenman, "Comrades-In-Arms: The Chinese Communist Party's Relations with African Political Organisations in the Mao Era, 1949–76", *Cold War History* 18, 4 (2018), pp. 15-16.
[610] Brazinsky, *Winning the Third World*, p. 11.
[611] Radina Vučetić, "Tito's Africa: Representation of Power during Tito's African Journeys", in Radina Vučetić and Paul Betts (eds.), *Tito in Africa: Picturing Solidarity* (Belgrade: Museum of Yugoslavia, 2017), p. 15.

The two presidents had a strong personal friendship, and Yugoslavia actively influenced Zambia's development agenda in the 1970s.[612]

In the run-up to the conference, the Zambian government was aware of prominent divisions within the NAM regarding the détente between the Soviet Union and the United States throughout the 1960s.[613] Foreign Ministry officials noted above all the 'political' challenges:

> [The] spirit which had existed just before the Belgrade Conference [1961] has been built up after the Dar es Salaam Conference [1970]. This spirit could be described as lukewarm e.g. Algerian attitude. There are also Middle East and the southeast Asian problems.[614]

The priority of many NAM's member states had to a large extent shifted from independence and armed conflict to economic development. This was reflected in the summit's 'Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Co-operation, and Democratisation of International Relations'. The Lusaka Declaration addressed the marginalised place of the Third World in the global system, and the urgent need to change the structures of world politics.[615] It called for an end to international inequality, especially the monopoly over the technological revolution by the rich, and of new forms of domination:

> International relations are entering a phase characterised by increasing interdependence and also by the desire of states to pursue independent policies. The democratisation of international relations is therefore an imperative necessity of our times. But there is an unfortunate tendency on

[612] President Kaunda twice visited Yugoslavia, in May 1970 and November 1974. See "Bilateral Relations Between Yugoslavia and the Countries of Africa", Vučetić and Betts (eds.), *Tito in Africa: Picturing Solidarity* (Belgrade: Museum of Yugoslavia, 2017), p. 147.
[613] H. Hveem and P. Willetts, "The Practice of Non-Alignment: On the Present and the Future of an International Movement", in Yashpal Tandon and Dilshad Chandarana (eds.), *Horizons of African Diplomacy* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1974), pp. 2-3.
[614] ZNA, MFA1/1/549, Conferences of Heads of Non-aligned States, 1970-1971, "Guiding notes on non-aligned summit – Lusaka – September, 1970", September 1970.
[615] Shaw, "The Foreign Policy of Zambia: Ideology and Interests", p. 83.

> the part of some of the big powers to monopolise decision-making on world issues which are of vital concern to all countries.[616]

In retrospect, the 1970 Lusaka Declaration should be remembered for its direct 'response to global *detente* and multi-polarity'.[617] It reasserted the potential role of the 'Third World' in global peace-building and development and the need for a redistribution of global resources. Vernon Mwaanga, Zambia's Foreign Minister between 1973 and 1975, subsequently praised non-aligned countries for not 'seeking to take sides in their voting pattern in the United Nations system.'[618] Within a year of the NAM summit, the majority of non-aligned countries would vote in favour of the PRC's membership of the UN, a topic to which this chapter now turns.

Diplomatic Manoeuvres: the PRC's Admission to the UN, 1971

As noted in Chapter One, both Kenya and Zambia invited Beijing rather than Taipei to set up its embassies in their capitals at independence. Taiwan – like the PRC – utilised aid as a diplomatic tool to facilitate official relations with newly independent countries, with significant results in Francophone West Africa.[619] Taylor's analysis of Taiwan's foreign policy shows that the diplomatic competition between the 'two Chinas' provided opportunities for African leaders to negotiate financial and political benefits. [620] Anti-Communism was an important factor. For example, Malawi's President Hastings Banda regarded Communist China as a destabilising force in

[616] *Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Co-operation and Democratisation of International Relations* (Lusaka: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1970), p. 5.
[617] Shaw, "The Foreign Policy of Zambia: Ideology and Interests", p. 85.
[618] Vernon Mwaanga, *The Long Sunset: My Reflections* (Lusaka: Fleetfoot Pub. Co., 2008), p. 176.
[619] Chiao Chiao Hsieh, *Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949–1979* (London: Sherwood Press, 1985).
[620] Ian Taylor, "Taiwan's Foreign Policy and Africa: The Limitations of Dollar Diplomacy", *Journal of Contemporary China* 11, 30 (2002), p. 129.

Africa.[621] In Kenya, Tom Mboya and his allies strongly rejected Communism and maintained contact with Taiwan throughout the 1960s. Kenyan MP John Okwanyo from Migori (Nyanza Region) had visited Taiwan in November 1964. The Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Nairobi sought to dissuade him from making the trip, warning that 'his government would [as a form of retaliation] stop trips to Communist China by Kenyans'.[622] In a later meeting with the American ambassador in Nairobi, Okwanyo disclosed that President Kenyatta had approved his Taiwan tour but insisted that he should not make any statement against Kenya's declared 'One China' policy. Adopting a somewhat triumphant tone in recording Kenyan visit to Taiwan, the US State Department nonetheless admitted that President Kenyatta would not publicly reveal his 'great admiration for Chiang Kai-shek', let alone recognise Taiwan officially.[623] In 1968, the wives of three prominent members of the pro-US 'Kenya Group' – Tom Mboya, Joseph Odero-Jowi, and John Okwanyo – paid another non-official visit to Taiwan.[624]

Kenyan leaders were divided on the issue of China's membership of the UN. In 1964, MP Clement Berder Ngala-Abok identified the Chinese foreign policy as the main obstacle to its admission. Njoroge Mungai, Kenyatta's first cousin and then Minister of Health, nevertheless argued that the organisation would be strengthened by its inclusion.[625] The Kenyatta government characterised its pro-admission position as 'common sense', because 'the world cannot ignore the country having the greatest

[621] "Editorial: Two views of China", *East African Standard*, 17 August 1967.
[622] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Kenyan MP discusses Taiwan trip", 30 March 1965.
[623] Ibid.
[624] NARA, RG 59, Box 1970, "Communist Chinese protest Kenya favoritism", 2 November 1968.
[625] NARA, RG 59, Box 2391, "Kenyan foreign policy; Non-alignment, Communist China, Somalia", 15 September 1964.

population, one which is a potential nuclear power within the next decade.'[626] Although Kenya was concerned about 'an aggressive Red imperialism' that would 'export excess population settlement under the guise of technical aid and artisan assistance', the threat of its 'Communist creed' was not immediate.[627] Furthermore, Britain's position on the 'two Chinas' continued to influence Kenyan policy. The UK's representative to the UN called for the expulsion of Taiwan but insisted that a two-thirds instead of a simple majority vote should be obtained.[628] In 1967, Kenya voted in favour of China's admission, which was however rejected, along with other 15 African countries.[629]

During the deterioration of Sino-Kenyan diplomatic relations in the late 1960s (see Chapter 3), the Kenyan press increased its coverage of Taiwan and its engagements with Kenya. The previously neutral tone of the *East African Standard* on the issue of Chinese UN representation started to favour Taiwan's position. In its report of the 'Double Tenth' revolution's anniversary, the Republic of China (ROC) was characterised as 'the official international representative of all China'.[630] The PRC was particularly irritated by the picture accompanying the report: titled 'Guarding Chinese culture', it portrayed Taiwan's foreign aid programme for African technicians, from which '600 farm specialists from 30 African countries' including Kenya benefited (Figure 5.1).[631] This led to a protest from the Chinese embassy. One month later, the *EAS* published a satire about the personal cult of Chairman Mao during the Cultural

[626] "Editorial: Chinese U.N. membership", *East African Standard*, 24 August 1966.
[627] Ibid.
[628] "UN keeps out China", *East African Standard*, 29 November 1967.
[629] ZNA, FA1/94, Relations with China, 1965-1968, "Admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations", January 1968.
[630] "'Double Tenth' began a new era", *East African Standard*, 10 October 1968.
[631] "Guarding Chinese culture", *East African Standard*, 10 October 1968.

Revolution with the conclusion: 'It is hoped the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi will not protest over that tiny mention of the "other" China – Taiwan.'[632]



Figure 5.1: "Part of Free China's Foreign Aid Programme Includes Seminars on Agricultural Techniques for African Technicians"
Source: Photo and caption from "'Double Tenth' began a new era", *East African Standard*, 10 October 1968.

In contrast to Kenya's sometimes ambiguous stance, Zambia actively supported the restoration of China's representation in the UN. As Zambia's Permanent Representative to the UN from 1968-1971, Mwaanga participated in key discussions at the General Assembly and was recognised by Chinese leaders as an important ally. While he simply voted in favour of the restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in 1968, he made a stronger statement the following year: the UN, he argued, should not deny the legitimacy of a country with the largest population in the world; those who opposed China were enemies of the principles of the UN Charter; the victory of the Communist government in its struggles with Chiang Kai-shek's regime was backed by the Chinese people; and the US was to blame for its military encirclement of China.[633] Therefore,

[632] "Saturday Essay: Chinese mango mania", *East African Standard*, 9 November 1968.
[633] Mwaanga, *The Long Sunset: My Reflections*, pp. 319-321.

the exclusion of the PRC, in Mwaanga's own words, was 'unrealistic, impolitic, undemocratic, and certainly not in the interests of mankind.'[634]

On 25 October 1971, a dramatic late-night vote took place in the General Assembly. An earlier motion to require a two-thirds majority (as advocated by the UK) to expel the Republic of China was surprisingly defeated. This allowed the motion to readmit the PRC to be passed with 76 votes to 35 with 17 abstentions. The *Times of Zambia* dedicated its 27 October headline to China's victory in the UN and published President Kaunda's congratulatory statement accompanied by a picture of Kaunda and the Chinese ambassador (Figure 5.2).[635] On the following day, the *ToZ* published different reactions from Beijing, Taipei and Johannesburg towards the 'breach of the Great Wall by China'.[636] Mwaanga commented that the result was 'best for the United Nations', and that 'perhaps President Nixon and some of the senators advocating punitive measures must have lost their heads'.[637] In private, Mwaanga enjoyed good personal relations with some top US officials such as George H. W. Bush, then the US representative to the UN. In 1974, Mwaanga met his 'old friend' Bush in China, who was Chief of the US Liaison Office at that time. When asked if he would have imagined being in Beijing after what they went through in the UN, Bush reportedly replied: 'We have to deal with the realities of the world, and it also shows that you guys were always right and we were wrong.'[638] It is clear that from the Cuban missile crisis to the Vietnam War, Zambian leaders were actively engaged in multilateral politics in ways that belied the country's ostensibly marginal position in global politics. Chan describes Kaunda's

[634] Ibid., p. 326.
[635] "China in, Taiwan out – and UN goes wild" & "KK welcomes Peking victory", *Times of Zambia*, 27 October 1971.
[636] "China chortles as ousted Taiwan throws a tantrum", *Times of Zambia*, 28 October 1971.
[637] "Bad loser Nixon 'lost his head' – Mwaanga", *Times of Zambia*, 30 October 1971.
[638] Interview with Vernon Mwaanga, Lusaka, 19 August 2016.

mediation efforts as 'a political act, seeking political gains and capable of political losses, not simply a humanistic urge.'[639] This intermediate role would however soon prove to be problematic when southern Africa liberation movements experienced direct intervention by the Cold War powers.



Figure 5.2: "Dr Kaunda and the Chinese Ambassador Tour the Exhibition. Behind Them is a Portrait of Chairman Mao"
Source: Photo and caption from "KK welcomes Peking victory", *Times of Zambia*, 27 October 1971.

Consolidating Power and Deepening Friendship: UNIP, Kaunda and China, 1972-1975

With the advent of the Second Republic in December 1972, Zambia officially became a one-party state. The Central Committee of UNIP was the supreme organ with

[639] Chan, *Kaunda and Southern Africa*, p. 150.

authority over the cabinet, and Kaunda became the leader of both party and state. As a result, Zambia's friendly relations with China would be further strengthened. UNIP's Vice-President Mainza Chona led a government goodwill mission to China and North Korea in September 1972. As usual, the delegation had a short stopover in Nairobi. On this occasion, Zambia's senior politicians were warmly received by the Kenyan government, which was in the process of evaluating China's recent admission by the UN.[640] Indeed, there was an increasing stream of delegations visiting China from various parts of the world including, most famously, that of the US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. China's domestic politics had also undergone dramatic changes. The 'Lin Biao incident', in which Mao's 'closest comrade-in-arms and successor' was killed, brought to an end the worst excesses of China's Cultural Revolution, with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping restored to take charge of foreign and economic affairs respectively.[641]

Having failed in their efforts to persuade Western donors to fund their projected cross-border railway to Tanzania, Zambian leaders increasingly sought Chinese aid and technical assistance. The 1972 goodwill mission led to China funding four major projects and pledges: 1) the Samfya/Serenje Highway; 2) water pumps and other equipment for water development; 3) a thousand 'Yellow River' trucks, as well as a repair plant and later an assembly plant for these trucks; and 4) ten thousand radio sets for the rural areas.[642] Visits to the Chinese communes run by the Tachai Production

[640] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/14, People's Democratic China, 1969-1972, "A report on the tour of the PRC and DPRK by a Zambian government goodwill mission led by His Honor VP Hon. M.M. Chona", 15-30 September 1972.
[641] Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), p. 8.
[642] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/14, "Record of the second meeting held between the Zambian goodwill mission and the Chinese government delegation", 18 September 1972.

Brigade and Shih Ping Production Brigade, which combined defence systems with agricultural production, left a strong impression on the Zambian delegation. They also visited a crane manufacturing plant in Tianjin, which was one of the suppliers for the TAZARA railway. The literature on sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1970s often depicts this as a period of suffering from rapidly increasing economic problems and rising discontent as a result. Zambia was no exception to this: the UNIP government was 'ideologically unwilling and/or practically incapable of addressing' these economic challenges e.g. within the mining industry.[643] These visits to China nonetheless shows that Zambian political elites were actively in search of potential development models, among which China's state-led economic interventions appeared particularly attractive.

President Kaunda paid his second state visit to China in February 1974, only two months after he was 're-elected' as president under the one-party state system.[644] In preparation for his visit, the Chinese press praised the achievements of Zambians under Kaunda's leadership in fighting against the Smith UDI regime in Rhodesia. This was thought especially impressive given the country's economic dependence on copper, the politically acceptable export of which would soon be made possible through the transnational railway connecting to Dar es Salaam, the harbour of its neighbour and ally Tanzania.[645] It was noteworthy that Zambia's main source of national wealth – copper – was deployed in a nationalist account: 'The brave Zambians … are constantly sweeping away colonial influence in the economic arena. … They have achieved

[643] Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 91.
[644] "前来我国进行正式访问 卡翁达总统离开赞比亚 途经亚丁时鲁巴伊主席到机场迎送" (President Kaunda leaves Zambia to pay a formal visit to our country), *People's Daily*, 21 February 1974.
[645] "赞比亚捍卫主权粉碎封锁获新胜利 中赞友好合作关系日益发展" (Zambia achieves new success in defending its autonomy and breaking containment), *People's Daily*, 21 February 1974.

enormous victories in its nationalised copper industry.'[646] A direct outcome of this visit was a soft loan of $50 million intended to support Zambia's development programmes. Declaring that the offer was the best that a developing country like China could possibly afford, Chinese Minister of Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Fang Yi stressed that it was 'the spirit behind the offer which was important'.[647] According to Mwaanga however, the actual signing of the loan agreement was complicated by Zambia's distorted diplomacy under the party-state system. Humphrey Mulemba, the Chairman of the Economic and Finance Sub-Committee of UNIP's Central Committee, was appointed by President Kaunda to represent the Zambian government. Foreign Minister Mwaanga was not only excluded from Kaunda's private meeting with Mao but also the signing of the bilateral agreement.[648] The dominance of party structure in foreign affairs clearly triggered grievances among the country's top officials.

China 'later let it be known' that Mao first raised his 'Three Worlds Theory' during this meeting with Kaunda, although the idea had been formulated long before.[649] Distinct from the Cold War binary division of the world between Capitalist and Communist, Mao's framework took into account the Third World's respective economic performances resulting from the exploitative global economic and imperial system.[650] This idea was reinforced during UNIP Secretary-General Grey Zulu's visit to China in September 1975. Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian told his Zambian

[646] "清除经济领域中殖民主义势力 采取积极措施利用本国资源 赞比亚发展民族工业取得成就" (Zambia achieves enormous victories in developing national industry), *People's Daily*, 25 February 1974.
[647] Mwaanga, *An Extraordinary Life*, p. 309.
[648] Ibid., pp. 310-311.
[649] Stephen Chan, "China's Foreign Policy and Africa: The Rise and Fall of China's Three World Theory", *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 74, 296 (1985), p. 378.
[650] Gillespie, 'Diplomacy on a South-South dimension", pp. 123-125.

guests 'from the bottom of his heart rather than out of modesty or politeness' that China remained a poor developing nation regardless of its socialist ideology. The two superpowers, and particularly the Soviet Union, were characterised as 'endangering the tranquillity of the world', whose detente and disarmament initiatives were deceptive.[651] China's collaboration with the European Economic Community and some capitalist European countries was also justified by Li as collective efforts to counter the hegemony of the superpowers.

Compared to the six earlier visits by Zambian delegations in 1975, the one led by Zulu was particularly significant for its declared purpose of learning from the so-called 'great Chinese experience in the management of the Party and the State'.[652] On 30 June 1975, President Kaunda had announced the nationalisation of all lands in Zambia. As a result, the ruling party faced the ultimate challenge of achieving effective control of the main political, economic and social elements of national life. Among the many fields in which the Zambian delegation sought to learn from Chinese experience were mass mobilisation and political education. It was noteworthy that although Kaunda initially refused to equate his philosophy of Humanism to that of Communism, the extent to which his country had now embarked on a socialist road was demonstrated by the adoption of a Socialist Constitution at UNIP's 1978 General Conference.[653] UNIP was also enthusiastic about the idea of a 'Socialist Intelligentsia', which would be developed through political workshops and college courses about Scientific Socialism. A UNIP Central Committee memorandum revealed that the party's Secretary-General had

[651] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_1_6, Report of Zulu on His Visit to PRC, 1975, "Observation on our relations with China over Southern Africa", 1-21 September 1975.
[652] Ibid.
[653] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_4_32pt1, Report of the Meeting between the Head of the International Liaison Department of the CCP and the Research Bureau of the Party, 1980, "Matters brought by the research bureau", January 1980.

during the mid-1980s received invitations from, among others, the Communist parties of Cuba, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union.[654] Parallel to state-level relations, party-to-party diplomacy formed another important element of South-South cooperation outside the traditional lines of Cold War diplomacy. When characterising the CCP's adoption of 'democratic centralism' as a deviation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Chinese leaders advised that 'in any kind of learning, one has to bear in mind specific conditions prevailing in one's country'.[655]

The Changing Positions of China and Zambia in Southern Africa, 1974-1979

The unfolding of the southern African liberation process reveals the complexities of the global Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa: between the capitalist and the socialist bloc, the global and the regional dynamics, and between military and non-military approaches. China-Zambia relations suffered from the fallout of such complications and contestations. Initially in the late 1960s, President Kaunda was dedicated to the principle of non-violence and advocated relatively moderate solutions to end colonial rule. The PRC, however, pursued a more radical approach in its support of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, China channelled its military training and assistance for liberation movements mainly through Tanzania and Zambia.

[654] ZNA, CO 2/3/001, UNIP Central Committee, 1984-1986, "Draft Central Committee Memorandum", 17 July 1984.
[655] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_1_6, "Report of his Honour A. G. Zulu MCC., Secretary-General of the Party on his official visit to the Republic of India, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China", 1-21 September 1975.

China's support for Angolan liberation was atypically stronger and more complex than its general limited participation in the liberation movements of Lusophone Africa. Initially lacking a clear preference among the competing nationalist movements in Angola, Beijing's material commitment to the struggle was relatively low. Jackson finds that the MPLA was the main Angolan movement featured in the Chinese press up to 1973, but thereafter, attention turned to the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) which developed a patron-client relationship with China in late 1973.[656] The turning point arrived when the Portuguese coup overthrew the authoritarian regime of the Estado Novo in April 1974. The Cold war powers reacted swiftly. One month later, a leading People's Liberation Army (PLA) general led the first contingent of 112 Chinese military advisors to train FNLA forces based in Zaire. By September, China had provided 450 tons of military supplies.[657] The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also funded the FNLA from July 1974 and relied on Zairian and FNLA sources for its intelligence reporting on Angola. The Soviets, however, publicly recognised the MPLA as the true representative of the Angolan people. Despite diplomatic efforts for the three leading movements – the MPLA, the FNLA and the UNITA – to negotiate for peace, manifest in the Alvor Agreement in January 1975, the resulting coalition government proved to be short-lived, especially after foreign supplies of arms increased.

According to Jackson, China's involvement in the Angolan independence movement should be understood as a legitimate practice of foreign relations.[658] China's support of African insurgencies was part of its efforts to increase its prestige among global South countries in regional organisations, to compete with the superpowers for both short-

[656] Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93", p. 401.
[657] John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 67.
[658] Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy", p. 389.

term and long-term influence, and to attract supporters to its worldview. When meeting Grey Zulu's delegation in September 1975 (see above), Li Xiannian explained China's position on Angola was 'in line with the Organisation of Africa Unity which ha[d] recognised all the movements', and that China 'never accused one movement against the other'.[659] For its part, Zambia, strategically located and ideologically compatible, served as one of China's 'closest allies in Africa', in the words of Mwaanga.[660] Drawing on his assertion of Zambia's neutrality in the Cold War, Kaunda advised US President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State Kissinger to 'examine the motivations of the liberation movements', even those with support from the socialist bloc.[661] The Chinese leadership was well informed of Zambia's position and efforts to solve the Angolan crisis, which was much appreciated as 'a gesture of trust'.[662]

But this mediating role was not without problems. Accusing its 'old friend' of helping the Soviet Union by supporting the MPLA, Beijing pressurised Lusaka to oppose Soviet intervention in Angola. Chinese leaders stressed on several occasions that a successful struggle depended on 'indigenous' instead of 'external' efforts. In December 1975, when meeting his US counterpart Henry Kissinger, Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua stated that he expected 'their African neighbors' to facilitate negotiations between three liberation movements.[663] At this moment, Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire had become China's new regional ally. The Ford administration encouraged Beijing to take a more active position by shipping weapons directly to the US-backed UNITA. But Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping expressed concern that the 'national pride' of African

[659] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_1_6, "Observation on our relations with China over Southern Africa".
[660] Interview with Vernon Mwaanga, Lusaka, August 19, 2016.
[661] Andy DeRoche, *Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa*, p. 22.
[662] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_1_6, "Observation on our relations with China over Southern Africa".
[663] DeRoche, *Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa*, p. 43.

leaders would lead to a negative reaction to such direct intervention. In this case, China's prestige among national liberation movements weighed heavier than its geostrategic interest in thwarting the Soviet Union:

> And even though the outcome of the civil war in Angola was less than ideal to Mao and his colleagues, China still fared significantly better than the United States in that it maintained some semblance of influence.[664]

What Brazinsky characterised as China's 'schizophrenic policy' was in fact a reflection of China's political upheaval in the early post-Mao era: until a new national development agenda was determined by the new generation of leaders, the overall significance of Arica in its foreign policy agenda was weakened. Eventually China would replace its socialist era's principle of 'foreign aid in exchange for political support' ('以援助换政治').[665] Not entirely in agreement with China, Zambia was nonetheless generally grateful for China's contribution to the liberation movements in southern Africa. According to Zulu's memoir:

> … the Chinese policy at that time was that they gave military weapons to freedom fighters gratis and added that they did so because they were not merchants of death but only interested in assisting those who were fighting for freedom in their respective countries.[666]

The prolonged process of Angolan civil war was thus regarded as 'a proxy war' waged by external powers, the so-called 'merchants of death'.[667]

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[664] Brazinsky, *Winning the Third World*, pp. 333-334.
[665] Jiang Huajie 蒋华杰, "Xiandaihua Guojiaanquan yu Duiwaiyuanzhu – Zhongguo Yuanfei Zhengce Yanjin de Zai Sikao" 现代化、国家安全与对外援助——中国援非政策演进的再思考（1970－1983）(Modernity, National Security and Foreign Aid – Revisiting the Evolution of China's Africa Policy, 1970-1983), unpublished paper, p. 9.
[666] Alexander Grey Zulu, *The Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu* (Ndola: Times Printpak Zambia, 2007), p. 386.
[667] Ibid.

While both China and Zambia advocated for an end to colonial and minority rule in southern Africa, they were increasingly divided with regard to which liberation movements to support. During Zulu's 1975 visit for example, the Zambian delegation reported that the pro-ZANU Chinese government was displeased by Zambia's support of the Soviet-backed ZAPU:

> It seems that disrupting ZANU's plan is tantamount to disrupting liberation efforts and strategy. The Chinese, therefore, strongly feel that the Soviet Union is gaining ground with the help of 'friends' of theirs like Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique. It would appear that there are no consultations at all with the Chinese what Zambia is feeling with minority and racist regimes in the South regarding the liberation of those areas.[668]

In early 1976, Kaunda and his frontline allies struggled unsuccessfully to forge a coalition government in Angola so to contain the militarily victorious Soviet-aligned MPLA. At a special OAU conference, Kaunda and the anti-MPLA forces were dramatically defeated, as there was 'a chain reaction of African nations recognizing Neto's government'.[669] Kaunda's credibility was damaged by the revelation that UNITA was supported militarily by apartheid South Africa. This, coupled with the growing regional influence of Marxist Leninist governments in Angola and Mozambique in the late 1970s, pushed UNIP into more radical positions.

As Zambia became more ideologically sympathetic to Soviet-style Scientific Socialism in the late 1970s, it grew more critical of China's anti-Soviet position in regard to liberation movements. In 1979, the Asian Affairs Desk of Zambian Foreign Ministry declared:

> Chinese anti-Sovietism has affected her relationship with the liberation movements in Africa. The main reason she did not support the MPLA in Angola was because of Russian involvement in the local conflict. For the

[668] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_1_6, "Observation on our relations with China over Southern Africa".
[669] DeRoche, *Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa*, p. 55.

> same reason she does not give any support to ZAPU of the Patriotic Front, led by Mr. Joshua Nkomo, because the organization gets assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba. … China's actions in Africa and elsewhere which have recently tended to be carried out primarily to undercut the USSR could be detrimental to progress on the continent of Africa especially vis-à-vis the Southern African situation.[670]

The significance of hostility between two Communist powers in Africa could not be underestimated. As Saunders and Onslow rightly argued, the Cold War in southern Africa 'constituted a highly complex clash of systems and ideas', which took the forms of both propaganda and military conflict.[671] China, as a result, struggled to justify its leading position in the 'Third World'.

Negotiating for Closer Relations Between Kenya and China, 1975-1978

Compared to the changing positions adopted by China and Zambia on matters of southern African liberation, relations between Kenya and China in the second half of the 1970s were less complicated. Despite the continuation of bilateral trade between the two countries, Sino-Kenyan diplomatic relations had been essentially frozen since the expulsion of their respective Charge d'Affaires in 1967. Their engagements in 1971 were for example limited to a donation to Kenya from the Red Cross Society of China and an Afro-Asian Table Tennis delegation to China.[672] In April, a team of US table tennis players and journalists arrived in Beijing, famously the first American delegation to visit Communist China. But less well known is the use of 'Ping Pong diplomacy' in

[670] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/65, Peking-China, 1977-1980, "From the Asian Affairs Desk of Ministry of Foreign Affairs", January 1979.
[671] Saunders and Onslow, "The Cold War and Southern Africa", pp. 224-225.
[672] "我驻肯尼亚使馆临时代办 把我红十字会捐赠物资交给肯政府" (Our Charge d'affaires in Nairobi hands in the donation from the Red Cross Society of China to the Kenyan government), *People's Daily*, 5 May 1971; "前来参加亚非乒乓球友好邀请赛 七个亚非国家乒乓球代表团到京" (Table tennis delegations from seven African and Asian countries competes in friendly matches), *People's Daily*, 30 October 1971.

Asian and African countries. In November 1971, the Afro-Asian Table Tennis friendship invitational tournament kicked off in Beijing, with more than 600 players from 51 countries in Asia and Africa, including Kenya and Zambia.[673] In return, China dispatched a team to Kenya, Ethiopia and Tanzania the following year. During a reception, Nairobi's Mayor encouraged the visiting Chinese athletes to have extensive contact with Kenyan youths to enhance their friendship.[674] Although the team was not formally received by any senior Kenyan officials, it certainly helped break the ice between two governments.

Just as China was recovering from the Cultural Revolution, Kenyan authorities re-evaluated their foreign policy towards China under the auspices of the new Foreign Minister Munyua Waiyaki. In August 1975, Waiyaki spoke to Wang Yueyi, the Chinese ambassador in Nairobi since 1974, on the need for closer relations. It was not however until 1978 that Kenya's embassy was reopened in Beijing. According to Nzomo, this was Kenya's direct response to the Sino-American normalisation, as Waiyaki once commented that:

> We can see that there is a great deal of cooperation between the West and the East far away from Kenya. This trend is being observed by Africa. We in Kenya certainly know which side our bread is buttered on, perhaps more so than most.[675]

With the increasing Sino-American rapprochement and the enduring Sino-Soviet rivalry, Kenya indeed identified the buttered side of its bread. Late 1978 also witnessed the transition of the Kenyan presidency from Kenyatta to Daniel arap Moi. Although

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[673] "Afro-Asian Table Tennis Friendship Invitational Tournament: Gala Opening in Peking", *Peking Review* 14, 45 (5 November 1971), pp. 10-12.
[674] "肯尼亚内罗毕市市长接见我乒乓球队 肯尼亚乒协举行招待会欢迎我乒乓球队" (Nairobi mayor receives our table tennis team), *People's Daily*, 10 October 1972.
[675] *Africa Report*, March-April 1977, p. 40, quoted in Nzomo, "The Foreign Policy of Kenya and Tanzania", p. 450.

someone who had in the 1960s warned of the threat of Communism and Maoism, the new president soon recognised the political and economic opportunities of collaboration with post-Mao China.

From Revolution to Pragmatism: Reception of China's Post-Mao Foreign Policy in Zambia and Kenya, 1978-1980

In September 1976, Chairman Mao Zedong died in Beijing. With the death of the once all-powerful leader of the PRC, the country experienced fierce power struggles between the so-called 'Gang of Four' and Hua Guofeng. Backed by the PLA, Hua Guofeng managed to supress the Gang and seized the party leadership along with Ye Jianying, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. Having been rehabilitated from previous prosecutions, Deng Xiaoping launched the country's economic reform programme in 1978. Due to the decreasing priority of Communist ideology in the party, the CCP progressively developed direct relations with political parties beyond the Communist bloc. In autumn 1977, an unidentified 'senior African politician' proposed to visit China on behalf of his party but was rejected by the Chinese authorities. Prompted by negative implications of this event, argues Zheng, Beijing issued an official decree that approved Sino-African party-to-party exchanges. It declared that such relations should be based on the principles of 'self-independence, complete equality, and non-interference of domestic politics'.[676]

[676] Zheng, "Adjustments of China's Policy towards Africa in the Early 1980s", pp. 90-91.

According to Strauss, a key feature of China's official rhetoric about its relations with Africa is its 'substantial continuities with the Maoist past.'[677] This was a result of CCP's constant self-reflection. When meeting UNIP's research bureau staff in January 1980, the Deputy Head of the International Liaison Department of the CCP declared:

> … the history of Socialism is young and since it is young, it is engaged in learning. Like a child who learns to walk, in the process, it makes mistakes. Since learning is not subject to a fixed pattern, Socialism is far from being perfect, that's why there is need to sum-up the past experiences and to build anew each socialist country, basing its revolutionary struggles on the local conditions prevailing.[678]

In reality, the China 'model' to be introduced to their Zambian guests necessarily reflected these changes and sometimes even the contradictions between the past and present.

This section will compare Zambia and Kenya's distinctive perceptions of China's post-revolutionary foreign agenda led by the great reformer Deng, a reception which strikingly reversed the pattern of the Mao era: Kaunda and his UNIP party, influenced by radical socialist movements and ideas and experiencing unprecedented military destabilisation by its racist southern neighbours, anxiously rejected China's deepening political and economic relations with the West. Kenya's presidents, both Kenyatta and Moi, took advantage of the normalisation of China-US relations to renew political and economic cooperation with the PRC. China's ideological transition in the early post-Mao period was thus perceived less favourably by Zambia than Kenya.

[677] Strauss, "The Past in the Present", p. 777.
[678] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_4_32pt1, "Analyse conditions objectively", 23 January 1980.

In July-August 1979, a UNIP delegation toured various parts of China. Led by Kapasa Makasa, Chairman of UNIP's Rural Development Committee, it represented, like its 1975 predecessor (see above), a further attempt for Zambia to learn from the Chinese experience. Zambian delegates saw the new Chinese senior leadership as filled with 'a sense of uncertainty': 'China is now bent on modernisation', they noted, and was 'courting western countries and doing away with a few traditional encumbrances'.[679] This involved the introduction of heavy machinery in agricultural production and the re-distribution of land. But above all, they were concerned about the impact of China's opening up policy on Sino-African relations:

> The Chinese themselves dispelled any fears that African issues would now take secondary place. It would, however, be naïve not to harbour such fears because China cannot effectively pose as the champion and friend of the oppressed while at the same time embracing Africa's traditional exploiters.[680]

In the view of UNIP, itself leaning heavily towards 'scientific socialism' at this time, China's Africa policy had become overly reserved, if not inactive, compared to both the superpowers. In the early 1980s, Sino-Soviet relations faced three particular 'obstacles': Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the presence of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia.[681] Now turning its head from revolution to economic development, China's main export to Africa was no longer Communist ideology but instead material goods such as 'cheap garments and simple household wares'. As Snow put it, 'increasingly the business of China was business'.[682]

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[679] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_1_10, 1979, "Visit to the People's Republic of China by a UNIP delegation 22nd July – 10th August 1979", August 1979.
[680] Ibid.
[681] Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy, from Brezhnev to Yeltsin* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 76.
[682] Snow, *The Star Raft*, pp. 179-180.

UNIP officials were at the time divided regarding China's new foreign policy orientation. There were neutralists, led by J.S.M. Mumba, who considered China's border war with Vietnam as integral to the broader Sino-Soviet conflict, and suggested Zambia should not side with either party.[683] But others blamed Beijing for its 'negative and criminal role' in collaborating with the 'American imperialist bandits,' in the words of the Provincial Political Secretary G.P. Chambo.[684] Dr. Henry S. Meebelo, Principal Advisor to the Secretary-General of the Party and Director of UNIP's Research Bureau, seconded Chambo's analysis by adding that:

> … one other dimension to the events in China is purely a matter of power-struggle between the ultra-leftists as personified by the so-called Gang-Four on one hand and the ultra-rightists led by Vice-Premier Teng. This is quite obvious from the fact that the Gang-Four has been in prison since the Vice-Premier was rehabilitated and that recently even more radicals in the Chinese Communist Central Committee and the Political Bureau have been removed. We are likely by the same token to have a reversal of the state-of-affairs when Vice-premier Teng goes.[685]

UNIP's Research Bureau was a direct product of Zambia's turn to one-party rule. In 1973, the Central Committee of UNIP emulated communist regimes in establishing a Research Bureau 'to provide research facilities for the Secretary General and his staff, the Chairmen of sub-committees of the Central Committee, cabinet ministers, and other party and government functionaries as well as help in preparing their reports, position papers and speeches, articles, and other academic work.'[686] Once appointed as its director, Meebelo, a former civil servant, emerged as 'the leading party theoretician in

[683] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/65, "To the Deputy Director from the Clerical Officer", 15 January 1980.
[684] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/65, "To Comrade J.S. Mumba from the Provincial Political Secretary", 28 February 1980.
[685] Lusaka UNIP, 7/23/65, "To the Secretary-General of the Party from the Principal Advisor to the Secretary-General of the Party and Director of the Research Bureau', 18 March 1980.
[686] Musambachime, "The Archives of Zambia's United National Independence Party", pp. 291-292. His contributions to Humanism include *Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought* (Lusaka, 1973), "The Concept of Man-Centredness in Zambian Humanism", *African Review* 3 (1973), pp. 559-579; *Zambian Humanism and Scientific Socialism: A Comparative Study* (Lusaka, 1987).

expounding and interpreting the philosophy of humanism'.[687] It is no wonder therefore that his language of the 'left' and 'right' struggle echoed that of Marxism-Leninism.

The year 1978 witnessed the ideological divergence of the two countries: Kaunda consolidated his power prior to the 1978 one-party state elections by constitutionally excluding opposition leaders Simon Kapwepwe and Harry Nkumbula from participation. Meanwhile in Beijing, at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping replaced Mao's heir Hua Guofeng to become paramount leader of China. Influenced by the 'accession of Marxist regimes in Mozambique and Angola and the radicalisation of regional liberation politics', UNIP's interpretation of China's transition of leadership as a victory of the 'ultra-rightists' reflected its clear move to the left.[688]

In Larmer's analysis of Zambia's political terrain in the late 1970s, technocratic officials became increasingly dissatisfied with those 'who claimed the legacy of Zambia's own nationalist struggle' inside the party, and even engaged in private discussions that evolved into a coup plot to overthrow Kaunda's government.[689] In China, however, technocrats and 'freedom fighters' could not be so clearly separated. A clear example was Deng Xiaoping, who had helped the CCP to organise protests and political activities in the nationalist era and ran the PRC's daily affairs along with President Liu Shaoqi and Premier Zhou Enlai in the 1950s. The economic failure of the Great Leap Forward however convinced him to later adopt liberal policies with regard

[687] Ibid., p. 293.
[688] Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 172.
[689] Ibid., p. 158.

to privatisation and foreign capital.[690] A group of middle-aged intellectuals and technocrats, for example Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, was promoted by Deng to carry out relatively bold and aggressive reforms.[691] Holding deep faith in Maoism even in post-Mao China, UNIP officials believed that:

> … after skilful manipulations and agreements in the inner leadership the Government has a balance between Maoists and Deng Xiaoping's technocrat supporters. ... What has happened now is that, instead of remaining at the centre to play left against right in the party as Mao did, Hua had actually taken control of the left, the bureaucracy, the military and security forces to consolidate his position against the rightists led by Deng Xiaoping.[692]

Based on this analysis, Deng Xiaoping represented the interests of the 'technocrats' who had suffered most during the Cultural Revolution, and therefore firmly rejected Hua's 'two whatevers' (两个凡是) editorial. Entitled 'Study the documents well and grasp the key link [that is, class struggle]' (学好文件抓住纲), this editorial of 7 February 1977 reaffirmed that 'all the policies that Mao had approved and all Mao's directives were to be followed'.[693] As a ruling party that increasingly faced challenges from its own domestic intellectual elites, it can be understood why UNIP ideologues favoured Hua's faction over that of Deng. Similar to earlier Chinese Communist thinkers' analysis of African ideas and practices of socialism (see Chapter Two), African intellectuals now interpreted China's new 'socialist' thinking in relation to their own circumstances.

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[690] David S. G. Goodman, *Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography* (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 13-14.
[691] Richard Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p.4.
[692] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/65, 'Political Report No. 5/80 For the period August 1 to September 30, 1980'.
[693] Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*, p. 192.

Zambia's technocratic officials, critical of Kaunda's support of liberation movements at all costs, believed that the security threats allegedly posed by Zambia's regional hegemon, apartheid South Africa (and also the Smith regime in Rhodesia), were exaggerated in order for the party-state to control all aspects of public life.[694] I argue that this siege mentality, of feeling threatened by a powerful neighbour, can also be identified in one Zambian analyst's characterisation of China's geopolitics. Describing China as a 'superstate', Chambo explained its territorial expansion in Indo-China, part of modern India and some Russian settlements on the Amur, which 'has nothing whatsoever to do with socialism.'[695] He instead advanced a theory in which the PRC's foreign policy represented the continuation of an 'ancient Chinese feudal policy of conquering neighbouring countries.' Chambo even quoted Mao's suggestion that 'the job of the Chinese people' is 'to combine Karl Marx with Chin Shihuang', the first emperor to unify China.[696] With no intention to understand the original meaning of this quotation, Chambo used it to criticise Mao's despotism and tyranny to re-establish China's 'old borders' in Southeast Asia.

Chambo's criticisms of China's socialist ideology and economic policies reflected the increasingly radical UNIP government's opposition to all forms of capitalism at the height of one-party rule. Notably, China's earlier acceptance of Soviet aid in the 1950s was now characterised as 'riding on the devil's back', whose ultimate aim was to 'carry out her hegemonistic plans of subjugating other nations.'[697] In stark contrast to the frequent celebration of the CCP by UNIP visitors to China in the 1960s and 1970s, this

[694] Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 172.
[695] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/65, "To the Deputy Director, Research Bureau from the Provincial Political Secretary', 23 June 1980.
[696] The original Chinese quotation is '解决中国的问题，须马克思加秦始皇'.
[697] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/65, "To the Deputy Director, Research Bureau from the Provincial Political Secretary', 23 June 1980.

report denounced China's growing alliance with the West and especially the US as 'undermining the international socialist movement' and debasing socialism. In Chapter Two's analysis of African socialism, I distinguished the 'second wave' from its earlier form on the basis of the adoption of scientific socialism by the ruling party. Unlike in the 1960s when most African countries favoured non-aligned principles, most southern African liberation movements received economic and military support from the USSR and its allies, and many endorsed its political ideology once in power. The CCP however backed liberation movements that had not been supported by the Soviets, most of which were less successful in gaining power (with the exception of ZANU-PF). Chambo was convinced that:

> Chinese politics and diplomacy are very dangerous to developing countries that continue to get aid from her. China, in order to ruin the Soviet Union, has reversed all her progressive policies. She is now openly supporting all the enemies of the Soviet Union and other reactionary groups and governments that fight progressive forces all over the world.[698]

In his view, the Soviet Union was the legitimate leader of the Communist world, to which post-Mao China no longer belonged.

A series of analyses of China's affairs at the turn of the decade by UNIP's Research Bureau caught the attention of Mainza Chona, who succeeded Grey Zulu in 1978 as UNIP's Secretary-General. In March 1980, he commented:

> I must say that it is extremely interesting and objective. It reflects the sudden change in China. One would wish either the Ambassador comes to report fully, or we send either a special envoy or a delegation. There is great need to see these shifts in socialist countries including neighbouring Mozambique. Please see what you can say about this after you have read the file. But the report is a fair one in the circumstances.[699]

[698] Ibid.
[699] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/65, "To the Deputy Director of Research Bureau from the Secretary-General", 4 March 1980.

Immediately after the Party Congress in September 1980, Mainza Chona led a UNIP delegation to China. He heard from Vice Premier Wan Li that the Cultural Revolution was 'a disaster and retrogressive', and that Chairman Mao was to be blamed for his disrespect of 'some of the good and high principles which he had formulated'.[700] On the matter of party-state relations, the Chinese government had decided to reform its constitution to emphasise economic development through the decentralisation of power. In response, Mainza Chona appreciated the detailed briefing and discussed several aid projects including the TAZARA railway and the building of UNIP's new party headquarters. The implications of the changing nature of China's trade and aid with Zambia will be discussed below.

After Kenyatta: President Moi's State Visit to China, 1980

According to Oyugi, Moi's Kenya was 'the most extreme right-wing government in Africa', one that maintained the close Western ties established by Kenyatta.[701] Not long after he became the new president of Kenya, President Moi dispatched Joshua Odanga, 'a seasoned diplomat', as his ambassador to China in April 1979.[702] During his five-day visit to Kenya's neighbour Tanzania in January 1980, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang reassuringly asserted that 'the basic point of departure of Chinese foreign policy is to strengthen China's unity and co-operation with African and other Third World countries', and announced that China was prepared to assist African countries to develop their economic and technological capabilities.[703] Seven months later, Chinese

[700] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/65, "Record of official talks at party level between the Communist Party of China and the United National Independence Party of Zambia', 30 September 1980.
[701] Interview with Edward Oyugi, Commissioner, Commission on Revenue Allocation & Professor, Kenyatta University, Nairobi, 23 November 2016.
[702] Nzomo, 'The Foreign Policy of Kenya and Tanzania', p. 451.
[703] "China 'ready to assist Africa'", *The Standard*, 15 January 1980.

Vice Premier Ji Pengfei led an official delegation to Kenya, which was received by Vice-President Mwai Kibaki and other Cabinet Ministers.[704] As in earlier periods, the Kenyan government displayed a strong sense of pragmatism when dealing with China. Concerned about the 'jobless youth now flocking into urban areas in search of gainful employment', Kibaki requested China's assistance to promote small-scale industries. In this and other ways, China's own experience in managing rural development was regarded as an asset.[705]

Both the approval and the timing of Moi's subsequent state visit to China during Vice Premier Ji's stay in the country reflected Kenya's contested politics at the beginning of the 1980s. As Kenya's unemployment rate increased to nearly 20 per cent, and debt and inflation also soared, the public became increasingly critical of the government's mismanagement and corruption.[706] Moi followed Kenyatta's lead in buying off leading critics and building alliances with potential critics through the appointments to senior positions. His approach soon sparked protests. The campuses of the University of Nairobi (UoN) and the Kenyatta University College were the main sites of such political activism.[707] In August 1980, Moi addressed a large crowd of students at UoN. In addition to calling for solidarity with Nyayo principles,[708] Moi promised his supporters that two or three students would be invited into his official delegation to China.[709] His announcement sought to shift public attention from contentious debates

[704] "Chinese Vice-Premier arrives", *The Standard*, 20 August 1980.
[705] "Kenya has much to learn from Chins, says Kibaki", *The Standard*, 22 August 1980.
[706] Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2012*, p. 142.
[707] For student protests against the Moi regime in the 1970s and 1980s, see: M. N. Amutabi, 'Crisis and Student Protest in Universities in Kenya: Examining the Role of Students in National Leadership and the Democratization Process', *African Studies Review* 45, 2 (2002), pp.157-77.
[708] Nyayo is a Swahili word for 'footsteps'. 'Nyayo philosophy' means following a distinctive African tradition of leadership. Refer to Daniel Arap Moi, *Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles* (London: Macmillan, 1986).
[709] "Moi to visit China", *The Standard*, 22 August 1980.

to a more recent, tangible foreign policy direction. Above all, it was a strategy to incorporate youth activism into more constrained political activity. The Editorial of *The Standard* on 23 August characterised a joyful crowd of students cheering 'Nyayo' and 'Bravo, the People's President!'.[710] According to this media characterisation, Sino-Kenya relations were suddenly elevated to prominence by a heroic President Moi. His criticisms of the racial policies of South Africa during a meeting with Ji were also highlighted.[711] Nonetheless, both sides shied away from any serious ideological engagement: economic development and modernisation remained at the centre of Kenya-China relations.

Compared to Zambia's comprehensive and critical analysis of Chinese politics, Kenya's attitudes towards reform era China were simple and perhaps naïve. China's post-Mao leadership was described as 'significantly pragmatic and forward looking'. Kenya had rediscovered this 'great country's importance in world affairs'.[712] The above-mentioned Editorial praised the 'inspiring' Chairman Hua Guofeng's commitment to assist African countries, although this man was the handpicked heir of Mao whose 'authoritarian fervour' had previously antagonised Kenyans.[713] Chapter Three's analysis of Sino-Kenyan relations in the late 1960s showed that bilateral trade continued and was even enhanced despite growing political tension. Moi, who as Vice President had banned all Communist publications and attacked Chinese ideological 'subversion', now as President shook hands with Chinese leaders to secure better deals. What he did not pay enough attention to, however, was the CCP's own political

[710] Note that the *East African Standard* changed its name into *The Standard* in 1977. "Editorial: Kenya and China", *The Standard*, 23 August 1980.
[711] "We're against racism, says Kenya", *The Standard*, 22 August 1980.
[712] "Editorial: Kenya and China", *The Standard*.
[713] Ibid.

struggles between the 'Mao clique' and the reformists. It only took him two weeks to realise his naivety.

On 8 September 1980, the shocking news reached Nairobi that Hua Guofeng suddenly resigned from all his posts. Zhao Ziyang, 'a dauntless economic planner', had been summoned to Beijing to become Premier of the State Council.[714] Another rising lieutenant of Deng was Hu Yaobang, who was in charge of politics and ideology of the party.[715] Meanwhile in Nairobi, Kenyan party leaders and senior Chinese technocrats were busy negotiating bilateral agreements to be signed during Moi's forthcoming visit. One particular area of cooperation was the bio-gas energy industry. The Kenyan Minister of Energy P. Kariuki spoke highly of Chinese achievements, from which Kenya should learn in order to become 'agriculturally self-reliant'.[716]

One week after China's political reshuffle, Moi landed in Beijing, becoming the first Kenyan president to visit China. Consisting mainly of Kenyan technocrats, his delegation would sign five development agreements as well as approving the construction of a sports complex by China. Although Moi held talks with Hua and Deng, it was the new Premier Zhao Ziyang who took the lead. He shared his insights of China's 'Economic Revolution geared at replacing the Cultural Revolution of the last decade', the latter characterised as a mistake (see Figure 5.3).[717] Described by the Kenyan press as 'able, open-minded', Zhao was the leading spokesperson of China's policy towards Africa in the reform era.

[714] "Chairman Hua resigns as China's Premier", *The Standard*, 8 September 1980.
[715] Baum, *Burying Mao*, p. 100.
[716] "Moi clinches China deals", *The Standard*, 15 September 1980.
[717] "President gets down to business", *The Standard*, 16 September 1980. See also Zheng, "Adjustments of China's policy towards Africa in the early 1980s", p. 90.


PEKING: President Daniel arap Moi meets Chinese leaders during the first day of his official 6-day visit to China.

Figure 5.3: "Peking: President Daniel arap Moi Meets Chinese Leaders during the First Day of His Official 6-Day Visit to China"
Source: Photo and caption from *The Standard*, 15 September 1980, available at the British Library.

Unlike their Zambian counterparts, Kenyan leaders embraced China's shifting political orientation from the East to the West. They respected China's efforts to tackle its immense social and economic problems:

> Without destroying the socialist base of the country, the new Chinese leadership has upheld the right of the people's communes and their sub-divisions to make their own decisions and to establish a system of comprehensive responsibility.[718]

Moreover, the end of China's ideologically informed interventions into African affairs was highly appreciated. When addressing African envoys accredited to Beijing, Moi condemned the 'big powers' for both the arms race and imbalances of trade between them and Africa. Calling for a policy of 'positive non-alignment', he commented:

> China has over the last two decades demonstrated that a qualified and determined nation, can achieve its development goals from within, and

[718] "Editorial: Kenya's ties with China", *The Standard*, 20 September 1980.

> despite numerous plots by foreign powers bent on sabotaging it. … In China, the Third World has a friend in trying to bring this to an end.[719]

For Henry Gathigira, the Editor-in-Chief of *The Standard*, Moi's visit to China took place at a 'crucially important time'. He pointed out that the reciprocal speeches of President Moi and Premier Zhao made no reference to neo-colonialism or imperialism in the diplomatic trademarks, which had been a central feature of such speeches in Mao's heyday.[720] Ironically, his criticism of Chinese newspapers for hypocritically flattering Chinese leaders also applied to his own paper, in which the president was commonly slavishly praised. Nzomo later concluded that, politically, Moi's visit to China helped boost Kenya's image as a non-aligned country.[721] As Moi's presidency faced challenges from both within and outside KANU, this timely celebration of China's achievements under its supposedly 'realistic and pragmatic' leadership was in effect an endorsement of Kenya's own. Moi's attitudes towards Communist China certainly improved as a result, but this overture was less about China than about Kenya.

China's Economic Relations with Kenya and Zambia, 1982-1989

Having discussed how Zambian and Kenyan leaders reacted to China's changing foreign policy in the reform era, the final section of this chapter will analyse the implications of these changes for their economic relations. As shown in Chapter One, Communist China's official aid policy was set out in the Eight Principles laid down by Premier Zhou Enlai during his Africa tour in 1963-1964. Above all, these eight points urged the self-reliance of African countries in developing mutual interests with China,

[719] Ibid.
[720] "President Moi and the new China", *The Standard*, 23 September 1980.
[721] Nzomo, 'The foreign policy of Kenya and Tanzania', p. 451.

especially when other donors refused to offer assistance. According to Larkin, Beijing's efforts to expand markets and economic advantage rested on the assumption that those countries which received Chinese aid would 'take public stands friendly to China'.[722] Occasionally, economic interests might be sacrificed for political reasons. This changed dramatically after 1982. During his 1982-1983 tour of eleven African countries[723], Premier Zhao Ziyang launched the new Four Principles of Chinese aid policy towards Africa. Although the Maoist virtue of self-reliance was re-asserted, it was now adapted to the prevailing international status quo. Zhao made it clear that aid would be limited as 'China is also readjusting its economy and we have our own difficulties ... we must not strain to do what is beyond our country's capabilities.' His message was however conveyed in language that 'continued to assert shared experiences and the presumptive sympathy engendered.'[724] Compared to Chinese aid policy during Mao's era, aid and technical assistance would now be offered based on the practical considerations of both sides and implemented in more diverse forms.[725]

In addition to economic and technical aid, there were also changes to the terms of Sino-African trade. Zambia's bilateral trade with China had increased substantially since 1971. Copper products, cobalt and small quantities of tobacco were among its major exports to China. China's total copper imports from Zambia rose from 10,000 metric tons per year in the early 1970s to 20,000 metric tons in 1976.[726] Meanwhile, Zambia restructured its imports by removing 'unpopular' Chinese goods, which mainly

[722] Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949-1970*, p. 107.
[723] These were (in order of tour schedule): Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Gabon, Zaire, Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Kenya.
[724] Strauss, "The Past in the Present", p. 790.
[725] Zheng, "Adjustments of China's Policy towards Africa in the Early 1980s", pp. 93-94.
[726] UNIP BL, EAP121_2_5_1_9pt6, Correspondence by Ministry of Commerce & Report on the visit to the PRC, 1976, 'Report on the visit to the PRC', 22 October 1976.

consisted of tinned beans, beef and pork. Other cheaper and more durable exports such as white cotton sheets and bicycles were however welcomed by Zambian consumers. Having suffered from a severe drop in the global copper price, Zambia's volume of trade with China reached an estimated 40 per cent of its total trade by 1978.[727]

One of the immediate benefits of Premier Zhao's tour was the promotion of African exports. China pledged to increase its imports of coffee, tea and soda ash from Kenya, and both countries agreed to implement their new international development strategy.[728] The first visit Premier Zhao made during his 1983 tour of Kenya was to a co-operative coffee farm.[729] Given the depressed international commodity markets of the early 1980s, China's increased purchase of Kenya's major cash crops was a considerable relief. More broadly, the enhancement of Sino-Kenyan trade contributed to South-South cooperation which, while not necessarily anti-imperialist, at least challenged the Western monopoly over global trade. *The Standard*'s editorial of January 1983 summarised the positive responses from African countries to China's new strategy by referring to Moi's speech:

> In view of the fact that industrialised nations have demonstrated 'their lack of political will to break away from selfishness on the question of a new international eco order' and to 'recognise the inevitable interdependence of all countries', the alternative is to 'explore and exert rapid means of co-operation and pooling of resources of economic salvation through our own efforts.'[730]

The following section will compare China's respective economic and technical cooperation with Kenya and Zambia, which demonstrates the relevance and significance of historical continuity in influencing more recent China-Africa relations.

[727] "Zambia may drop food imports from China", *Times of Zambia*, 13 October 1978.
[728] "China to buy more from Kenya", *The Standard*, 18 January 1983.
[729] "Zhao tours tea farm", *The Standard*, 18 January 1983.
[730] "Editorial: China winning more friends", *The Standard*, 19 January 1983.

As briefly discussed above, Moi's 1980 state visit to China resulted in the signing of a new economic and technical cooperation agreement, replacing the first one signed 16 years earlier (see Chapter Three).[731] Enabled by a strong political desire for bilateral cooperation, the rural projects funded by the agreement drew on China's expertise in two key industries – agriculture and energy.[732] But the single largest and most expensive aid project from China was the construction of a National Sports Complex in Nairobi, which consisted of a 60,000-seat stadium, a gymnasium, a swimming pool and a hostel. An interest free loan of ¥70 million (equivalent to K£17.5 million) over a period of six years was offered to cover the cost of these projects, with K£15 million allocated for the sports complex alone.

When negotiating with their Chinese counterparts, the four Kenyan ministries of Agriculture, Energy, Health and Industry displayed a good level of coordination. The main limitation was the shortage of expert staff. China initially demanded that Kenya should cover the travel costs and expenses of the Chinese technical experts carrying out feasibility studies. Unwilling to accept the demand, the Kenyan Foreign Ministry complained that 'Chinese are very tough negotiators who hardly move an inch from their position'.[733] It was likely that MP Onyoka's earlier agreement with the Chinese in 1979 weakened Kenya's position at the negotiation table, as both sides struggled to agree on upon new changes to this draft agreement. Kenyan authorities were upset to find out that their Chinese counterparts added an additional grant of K£4,000 to compensate for expenses incurred by three Chinese bamboo-weaving experts who

[731] KNA, ABM/17/65, Chinese Assistance for Development Projects, 1980-1984, "State visit to the PRC memorandum by Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs", 9 December 1980.
[732] "We're against racism, says Kenya", *The Standard*, 22 August 1980.
[733] KNA, ABM/17/65, "Preliminary report: State visit to China", 13 October 1980.

worked in Kenya from May 1964 to March 1966. According to the protocol signed in 1964, China sent three experts on bamboo weaving and Kenya also sent trainees to China to learn ivory carving.[734] During the years when Sino-Kenyan bilateral relations deteriorated, those training schemes had been disrupted, and obviously forgotten by the Kenyan government, but not by China.

The proposed draft agreement concerning the Chinese medical team generated more substantial disagreements. The Kenyan authorities stated that no exemption should be made for 'any professional misconduct' by the Chinese medical team, and insisted drugs and medical instruments be procured locally, except for acupuncture.[735] As shown in Chapter Four, legal complications commonly occurred with Chinese medical teams in Africa. Kenya adopted a stringent position, especially on the issue of financial responsibility:

> If this is a technical assistance programme, then the Kenya Government would only be expected to pay local salaries according to the qualification of the doctors that come. We do not need interpreters, cooks and drivers. We shall expect the doctors to be able to communicate directly with their professional colleagues. The language in our hospital is English.[736]

In comparison, Zambia tended to be more willing to accept Chinese ways of doing things for the sake of the two countries' political friendship. This probably explains why Chinese medical teams, largely independent of Zambia's official health service, left a more influential and enduring impact in Zambia than in Kenya. For example, the Director of the Health Professions Council of Zambia told me that a memorandum of understanding applied to Chinese doctors who came to Zambia under the government-

[734] KNA, ABM/2/3133/91/01, "The Protocol to the Agreement concerning Economic and Technical Cooperation between Kenya and PRC', 10 December 1964.
[735] KNA, ABM/17/65, "Draft Kenya/China protocol", December 1980.
[736] Ibid.

to-government agreement, which in practice meant legal exemption from Zambian regulations enabling them to operate autonomously.

In preparation for Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiannian's visit to Zambia in January 1979, the Asian Affairs Desk of Zambia's Foreign Ministry prepared a Brief for President Kaunda, which addressed the significance of aid and economic cooperation in recent Sino-Zambia relations. During the crisis caused by the closure of Zambia's border with Rhodesia in January 1973, the Chinese government had offered 'a grant of K6.4million' plus 57 trucks with 'an estimated value of K170,000', a level of support unmatched by any other country. In 1979 China was about to start the construction of UNIP's new Headquarters as well as a textile mill in Kabwe. The Brief, however, expressed concerns about China's new alliance with the Western world, and presented a negative characterisation of Sino-Soviet competition in Africa as driven by a thirst for raw materials and strategic manipulation.[737]

As shown in Chapter Three, China's aid projects to Africa usually took the form of 'turn-key' projects. After the financing and actual construction was completed, China passed these ready-made projects to national governments for operation. The Mulungushi textile plant in Kabwe was a typical example. After five years of construction (including one year of delay) financed by a £11.17 million interest-free loan from China, the completed mill was handed over to the Zambian Defence Ministry in October 1983.[738] The mill thereafter received steady supplies of raw materials and

[737] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/65, "Brief on the PRC on the occasion of the visit of the Chinese Vice Premier Li Hisen Nien from 12th January to 16th January, 1979".
[738] Grayson Koyi, "The Textile and Clothing Industry in Zambia", in Herbert Jauch and Rudolf Traub-Merz (eds.), *The Future of the Textile and Clothing Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2006), p. 269.

spares, as well as technical know-how, from China, but later experienced technical and operational difficulties. As the two largest textiles mills in Zambia, the Kafue Textiles and the Mulungushi Textiles were responsible for 80 per cent of the domestic market requirements. In 1985, however, Minister of Commerce and Industry L.S. Subulwa wrote to Prime Minister Kebby Musokotwane about their limited spinning and weaving capacities. Subulwa reported that an additional 26.4 million square metres of textile output were needed to meet Zambia's annual demand for fabrics. In recognition of the financial difficulties facing the parastatal sector, Subulwa suggested that new textile factories should be established by the private sector.[739] Mr. Kayumba, a technician in 1980 and Assistant to Managing Director of Mulungushi textiles since 2011, later recalled that the plant ran well in the first decade, but that production stagnated from 1980 onwards. The plant's technology was not sufficiently advanced to compete with those in Tanzania and it eventually closed down in 1994.[740]

Many Zambians shared Kayumba's mixed feelings towards Chinese aid, being grateful for such assistance while being worried by the two countries' unequal relations. While its ideological and political significance has been frequently discussed in literature on Sino-Zambian relations, the failure of the TAZARA railway to achieve its stated aim of transporting Zambian copper exports has been largely overlooked. Monson however analysed the uneven success of the 'ordinary train' since its completion in 1975. Between 1975-85, TAZARA suffered from 'technological malfunctions and management failures', worsened by Zambia's increasing political and economic

[739] ZNA, ITD/102/63/35, Mulungushi Textiles Zambia Ltd, 1985, "Possibility of expanding and improving spinning and weaving capacities at Kafue and Mulungushi textiles", 28 August 1985.
[740] Interview with Mr. Kayumba, Assistant to Managing Director of the Mulungushi Textile, Lusaka, August 2016.

crises.[741] A major complaint against the Chinese was the poor quality of imported railway engines and wagons that frequently broke down. As early as 1970, Zambian Ambassador to China Philemon N'goma had expressed his concern about the rapidity of Chinese construction:

> Finishing a piece of job ahead of schedule is one thing and producing work of a high standard at the same time is another. For this reason, it seems necessary, if it is not already too late, to ensure that strict commercial and international practice is adhered to.[742]

N'goma was equally concerned about the real intention behind China's provision of interest-free loans:

> After all the sums of money involved are large and while we appreciate the assistance in making it possible for us to obtain the loan, we will have to pay back the money. We must get our money's worth. It would be tragic for us to begin repairs in the first year or two of the completion of a project. The Chinese themselves are very strict on what they consider to be in their best interest.[743]

In N'goma's opinion, the loan was subject to the 'feelings and convenience' of the Chinese rather than those of the Zambians. This emphasis on Chinese-imposed standards and qualities appears in numerous documents. The ostensibly generous Chinese offer, while appreciated for the solidarity it represented, was regarded by many Zambians as inferior to that of the West. Unlike those national leaders who prioritised political friendship over economic specifics, N'goma spoke on behalf of some lower level Zambian officials who stressed, perhaps unsuccessfully, the problems of doing so. Learning from China's own mistakes of following the Soviet model of 'big, foreign, and complete' ('大、洋、全'), Mao had directed that foreign assistance to Africa

[741] Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway*, p. 101.
[742] ZNA, MFA1/1/348, Zambia/Tanzania Rail Link, 1970, "Letter from P. Ng'oma to Minister of Power, Transport and Works", April 1970.
[743] Ibid.

should be capable of 'achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results' ('多快好省').[744] But in practice, the emphasis on speed of delivery over quality and sustainability was not a unique problem of Mao's China, as such complaints continued to appear during the reform era and indeed are a common characterisation of Chinese aid to Africa today.

The operation of the TAZARA railway, adversely affected by the reopening of the southern rail route in 1978, looked increasingly bleak from the early 1980s.[745] Prior to Premier Zhao's 1982 tour, Zambia requested China to reschedule TAZARA's loan and debts repayments 'as a matter of dire necessity arising out of circumstances beyond the control of Zambian and Tanzanian governments.'[746] According to its Ministry of Power, Transport and Communications, three factors had contributed to the unsatisfactory performance of TAZARA and its failure to generate sufficient revenue: the defectiveness of Chinese locomotives, the destruction of bridges by Rhodesian military action, and torrential rains in Tanzania. Chinese officials did not however accept this reasoning. When meeting Zambian Ambassador Mwondela in May 1983, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Lu Xuejian blamed Zambia's preference for the southern route for most of her imports and exports, despite the expanded cargo capacity of the Dar es Salaam port. Feeling betrayed by their Tanzanian colleagues for providing 'this misinformation', Zambian officials instead complained about the lack of effective co-ordination between the two neighbouring countries.[747]

[744] Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era, 1960-1978", p. 104.
[745] Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway*, p. 101.
[746] ZNA, MCT 2/9/010, Tripartite Meetings of the Tanzania's, Zambian's & the Chinese, 1980-1989, "Brief on the PRC for use by KK, on the occasion of the visit to Zambia by the Chinese PM, Zhao Ziyang", 30 December 1982.
[747] UNIP Lusaka, 7/23/99, Peking-China, 1983, "Correspondence from Shonga to Goma", June 1983.

The uneven rhetoric of solidarity, which clearly did not rule out disagreements between Tanzanian and Zambian officials, indeed continued into the 1990s.

Conclusion

As this chapter has illustrated, Kenya and Zambia's relations with China in the last two decades of the Cold War were affected by and demonstrated the profound changes in both domestic and international politics during this period. China's foreign policy towards Africa during the reform era was increasingly pragmatic, a position best summarised by Premier Zhao Ziyang during his tour of African countries in 1982-1983. As China's international outlook shifted from Soviet alignment to Western orientation, its asserted leadership in the 'Third World' also came under considerable challenge.

In the second half of the 1970s, Communist China's political marginalisation in Kenya started to soften following its ideological shift from radical communism to a tacit diplomatic alliance with the West. Kenya's new generation of leadership under President Moi engaged positively with China's reform agenda and initiated bilateral collaboration based on material benefits, demonstrating a significant degree of continuity with Kenya's earlier position towards China from the early post-independence period. It could even be argued that due to Kenya's more or less consistent foreign policy, it was China's position that had unpredictably come into line with Kenya.

Zambia's relations with Communist China at the same period, while certainly closer, were also more complicated and sometimes contradictory. China's Maoist model, once

attractive for UNIP's pursuit of sustained economic development under the leadership of a one-party state, lost credit by the end of the 1970s with the launch of China's grand reform strategy. Accordingly, competing southern African liberation movements threatened the two country's declared 'brotherhood', while tensions arose as China's construction of the 'Uhuru' Railway failed to deliver satisfactory economic results in exchange for the debt burden incurred by Zambia. By historicising and disaggregating Kenya and Zambia's relations with China, this thesis rejects the tokenistic approach to so-called African agency in much of the existing literature of China-Africa relations, and demonstrates that ideology-driven political friendship could be potentially damaging for bilateral relations in a fast-changing and unpredictable international environment.

Chapter Six: Dual Liberalisation, China's 'Return' to Africa and the Past in the Present of China-Africa Relations

Introduction: Global China as Socialist and Capitalist

Building on the analysis of China's historical engagements with Kenya and Zambia so far, this chapter will examine their recent relationships in historical perspective. Using the reductionist framework of 'China in Africa', politicians, journalists, and academics have in the last decade deployed the rhetoric of a Chinese 'scramble for Africa', 'empire' building, or simply neo-colonialism, to characterise what is a much more complex relationship. The vast literature produced by contemporary researchers, while highlighting China's renewed interest in Africa, has a striking tendency to engage simplistically with the historical aspects of this complex relationship. C.K. Lee suggests a new theoretical framework by treating 'China in Africa' as an *event* that holds capitalism's structural tendency and historical contingency in the same plane of analysis.[748] Following William H. Sewell Jr.'s notion of 'eventful capitalism', Lee recognises that unavoidable, spontaneous series of events are embedded in capitalism's powerful self-reinforcing logics and its abstract temporality.[749] Sewell's dual affiliations as a historian and political scientist allowed him to think critically about how these two disciplines deal with the concept of 'time' in different ways: while historians regard time as 'fateful, as irreversible in the sense that a significant action, once taken, or an event, once experienced, irrevocably alters the situation in which it

[748] Ching Kwan Lee, *The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017), p. 165.
[749] William H. Sewell Jr., "The Temporalities of Capitalism," *Socio-Economic Review* 6, 3 (2008), pp. 523-524.

occurs', social scientists seek to discover and apply causal laws 'assumed to be independent of time and space.'[750] This conflict of practices has created significant impediments for interdisciplinary research. In the specific field of 'China in Africa', empirical research based on fieldwork has developed rapidly in recent years, but questions have been raised with regard to theoretical conceptualisation in accordance with distinctive disciplines. Compared to social scientists, historians are notably underrepresented in global research networks on this topic.[751]

Lee finds the scholarship on both 'Chinese state capitalism' and 'capitalism in China' to be inadequate in explaining the 'conceptual flexibility' of globalised China and its variegated local impacts.[752] Capital travels across national boundaries and institutional frameworks, and intrudes upon the imperatives of nation-states as these engage each other on the global stage. As a result, contemporary Chinese state capital is 'more open to political negotiation and concession than profit-maximizing global private capital in responding to African developmental impulses and labor demands.'[753] Lee therefore proposes three aspects of the historical experience of China-Africa relations as most relevant for contemporary foreign investors (and, we might note, intellectual analysis of this relationship): 'dependent underdevelopment, the rise of populist politics and resource nationalism, and the legacy of popular struggle.'[754]

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[750] Ibid., pp. 517-618.
[751] In the 2018 Chinese in Africa/Africans in China (CA/AC) Research Network conference in Brussels, the biggest international conference for China-Africa studies where I also presented a paper, there was is only one panel (out of 29 panels in total) attributed to historical research. I learnt from the conveners that their previous conferences also attracted limited historians.
[752] See Andrew Walter and Xiaoke Zhang (eds.), *East Asian Capitalism: Diversity, Continuity and Change* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Nan Lin, 'Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and its Future," *Management and Organization Review* 7, 1 (2011), pp. 63-96; Barry Naughton and Kelly S. Tsai and (eds.), *State Capitalism, Institutional Adaption, and the Chinese Miracle* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[753] Lee, *The Specter of Global China*, p. xiii.
[754] Ibid., p. 15

But a question then follows: does this eventful global China involve the expansion of capital alone? While Sewell emphasises the temporalities of capitalism, this thesis demonstrates that China-Africa relations have in the last few decades been transformed by political, economic and social forces other than capitalism alone. Socialist ideas and practices were of course central to Communist China's involvements in Kenya and Zambia in the context of the Cold War's global ideological struggles (see Chapter Two). To recall what Strauss calls 'the past in the present': 'China's rhetoric on its involvement with Africa has retained substantial continuities with the Maoist past, when virtually every other aspect of Maoism has been officially repudiated.'[755] If capitalism has become one of those 'principles', so have 'non-interference, mutuality, friendship, non-conditional aid and analogous suffering at the hands of imperialism'.[756] China's renewed economic interest in Africa, while certainly driven by its own 'variety of capital', coexists with other orbits of histories.[757] It is therefore crucial for this thesis to analyse not only China's contemporary relations with Africa from economic, political, and social perspectives (as in the past) but also the history of all aspects of these relations as they are recalled and articulated in the present.

This chapter will first contextualise both the structural framework and historical contingency of China's relations with Kenya and Zambia in the post-Cold War era. Dual liberalisation, in terms of market reform and liberal democracy, was implemented unevenly across the African continent in response to the changing domestic and international environment. In Zambia, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy

[755] Strauss, "The Past in the Present", p. 777.
[756] Ibid.
[757] Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

(MMD) successfully challenged the authority of the then ruling party UNIP and ruled Zambia under President Frederick Chiluba from 1991-2001. In Kenya, the authoritarian rule of KANU's president Moi came under increasing attack and multi-party elections were held in 1992. The opposition performed well and its leader Mwai Kibaki finally replaced President Moi in 2001. In both cases, political dissent was the major driver for radical changes in these countries' national and foreign agendas. Meanwhile, in the former communist states of Europe and Asia, new governments sought to create free market-oriented capitalist economies, a transitional process that is often called 'post-communism'.[758] Having opened up its own national economy as early as the late 1970s, the Chinese government developed its 'Go Out' policy that urged Chinese firms, mostly state owned enterprises (SOEs), to take advantage of increasingly globalised world trade to invest in new markets. China's investments in Kenya and Zambia in the new millennium would rapidly develop in the context of these changes, creating new relationships with both countries which, this chapter will argue, were in fact influenced by their historical relations.

The second section will analyse the often-blurred boundaries between 'Communist China' and the capital-driven global China in terms of the official rhetoric of China-Africa relations. Three key sectors (mining, health, and construction) will be discussed in relation to specific projects: Chinese copper mining in Zambia, China's medical practices in both Kenya and Zambia and the recent Chinese-built Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR). It is evident that in all these cases the historical legacies of brotherhood and solidarity have lingered, despite the dominant

[758] Jeffrey C. Isaac, "Communism, Post-Communism, and Democracy", *Perspectives on Politics* 15, 2 (2017), pp. 317-327.

contemporary narratives of China's capitalist expansion. To put it simply, there is a significant degree of hybridity between 'capitalism goes global' and 'socialism goes global'. Indeed, the hybridity of 'centralized control' and 'decentralized improvisation', in the words of Lee, determines the nature of Chinese state company operations in Africa.[759] While the preceding chapters of this thesis have fulfilled the conventionally defined vocation of historians to understand and explain the past, this chapter seeks to articulate the meaning of this recent past through the lens of present-day narrators. It is evident that a wide range of Chinese, Kenyan and Zambian actors have a powerful tendency to narrate the past in the service of a particular reading of the present, reproducing and reconstructing *myths* surrounding China-Africa relations in the new millennium.

Part I: Post-Cold War Kenya and Zambia's Relations with China

Dual Liberalisation in Zambia and Kenya

African politics was generally characterised by one-party states, dictatorships, and military regimes from soon after independence until the late 1980s. In both Kenya and Zambia opposition parties were excluded from elections, while ruling parties tightened their control over almost every aspect of society and deployed national resources in their own interests. However, between 1989 and 1994, thirty-five sub-Saharan African countries, including both Zambia and Kenya, reintroduced multiparty democratic

[759] Lee, *The Specter of Global China*, p. 5.

systems.[760] Both international pressure and domestic opposition movements shaped what Samuel Huntington described as 'the third wave of democratisation'.[761]

Some pro-democracy movements had however developed before this period of global transformations. During the 1980s, economic difficulties such as rising unemployment, the falling value of salaries, and collapsing social welfare, haunted ordinary Zambians in politically influential urban constituencies.[762] While rural areas had long been marginalised in the country's development agenda, the UNIP one-party state had bought a degree of compliance from urban dwellers through e.g. food subsidies.[763] Yet public sector strikes and food riots in the late 1980s demonstrated that anti-government grievances had become uncontainable. Civil society actors such as churches and trade unions played a central role in these protests in line with their general effectiveness as drivers of political change in post-independence Zambia.[764] On occasion, union leaders signalled their opposition to official socialism with reference to Christian moral traditions. Opposed to the interests of ruling party-states, supporters of these social movements sought 'material and cultural improvements in their lives and those of their families and wider communities.'[765] The discrepancy between UNIP's stated

[760] Nicholas Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 86.
[761] Samuel P. Huntington, 'How Countries Democratize,' *Political Science Quarterly* 106, 4 (1991-1992), pp. 579-616.
[762] Nugent, *Africa since Independence*, p. 412.
[763] Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*, updated and expanded with a new preface (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), p. 119.
[764] For trade unions, see Miles Larmer, "'The Hour Has Come at the Pit': The Mineworkers' Union of Zambia and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, 1982-1991", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 32, 2 (2006), pp. 293-312; for churches, see Marja Hinfelaar, 'Legitimizing Powers: The Political Role of the Roman Catholic Church, 1972-1991', in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 129-143.
[765] Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 254.

commitment to Humanist ideology and Zambians' unmet expectations of economic development fatally damaged the credentials of Kaunda and his party.

Zambia's political crisis of the 1980s had many roots, central to which was underdevelopment resulting from continued economic dependency on a single commodity. Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM) was established in 1982 as the overall holding company for the country's extractive resources. This was the final attempt by the UNIP government to consolidate its control over the mining sector.[766] However, mineral wealth did not directly translate into social prosperity. The profits generated by mining in the first decade of independence were followed by the collapse of the global copper price from 1974 onwards, challenging the efficacy of nationalisation in enabling development.[767] When the IMF and World Bank first proposed liberalising African national economies, political demands were not central to their structural adjustment programmes. Around the turn of the 1990s, however, it was made clear to the Zambian government that international assistance now came with conditions such as the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd announced in June 1990: 'Economic success depends extensively on the existence of an efficient and honest government, on political pluralism and, I would like to add, respect for the law and free and more open economies'.[768] When, in the late 1990s, mine privatisation was imposed on Zambia as a condition of its latest structural adjustment package, Chinese investors (alongside

[766] A. Fraser and J. Lungu, *For Whom the Windfalls? Winners and Losers in the Privatisation of Zambia's Copper Mine* (Lusaka: Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia, 2007), p.8.
[767] Miles Larmer, "Historical Perspectives on Zambia's Mining Booms and Busts", in Alastair Fraser and Miles Larmer (eds.), *Zambia, Mining, and Neoliberalism: Boom and Bust on the Globalized Copperbelt* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 33.
[768] "Aid and Political Reform", *Briefing Paper*, quoted in Gorm Rye Olsen, "Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post Cold War Africa: How Serious is Europe and For What Reason?", *African Affairs* 97 (1998), p. 343.

other foreign stakeholders) purchased the smaller mining companies resulting from the break-up of ZCCM.[769] It is noteworthy that the MMD's wholesale implementation of market liberalisation under Chiluba did not achieve the anticipated economic growth, but instead, resulted in massive job losses and further declines in living standards. While Zambia's economic liberalisation did not secure popular support from the masses, no other alternative policy was articulated in the 1990s.

The Kenyan experience during the same period differed both in terms of its ethnically divided opposition politics and the heavier, but arguably less effective, pressure for reforms exerted by international actors. Nugent points out that 'the inability of the opposition politicians to submerge their differences' significantly contributed to the enduring dominance of KANU in Kenya.[770] Widespread disillusionment with the Moi regime burst onto the national stage in the early 1990s: a pro-democracy coalition was quickly formed by churches, professional associations and civil society bodies. Frustrated by the closed nature of Moi's regime, two former KANU ministers – Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba – launched a campaign to reintroduce multiparty politics in 1992.[771] This resulted in the formation of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). Yet, unlike the unified MMD, two political parties split from FORD shortly afterwards: FORD-Kenya was led by Oginga Odinga and most Luo politicians, while FORD-Asili was led by Kenneth Matiba and some Kikuyu dissidents.[772] In addition,

[769] "Brief History of ZCCM-IH", ZCCM-IH, http://www.zccm-ih.com.zm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106&Itemid=102, accessed on 6 May 2014.
[770] Nugent, *Africa since Independence*, p. 418.
[771] Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa*, p. 102.
[772] David Throup and Charles Hornsby, *Multiparty Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi State and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998).

Mwai Kibaki formed the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) with the help of some former KANU politicians of Kikuyu ethnicity.

Cheeseman presents Kenya's transition to multiparty democracy as 'externally triggered'. As argued in Chapters Two and Three, Kenyan politics had long been characterised by patron-client relationships. But with the economic slowdown in the late 1980s, Moi's fellow politicians had fewer incentives to maintain their loyalty. One major difference from Zambia was that Kenya's economic decline was less severe, which enabled Moi to fund and maintain the loyalty of key state institutions such as the police force. As it became clear that Moi would not step down, international actors intervened: in November 1991, the World Bank and the IMF declared that future aid would be suspended or even terminated if there were no reforms in the direction of 'good governance'. This forced Moi to legalise opposition parties, although at minimum cost to his power. The West's promotion of liberal democracy rested on what Makinda terms 'the recognition of the superiority of open political systems' but was also motivated by 'debt repayment, the need to reduce economic assistance, the fear of refugees, and the desire to keep Africa at arms length'.[773] Indeed, while there was no single uniform interest underlying the 'international community', the post-Cold War global context had significant implications for specific African countries. In Kenya for example, political openness and human rights were, during the Cold War, less significant to the West than KANU's pro-western stance, but became more important once the Communist threat was removed.

[773] Samuel M. Makinda, "Democracy and Multi-party Politics in Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, 4 (1996), pp. 565-566.

The legacies of this dual political and economic liberalisation for Zambian and Kenyan politics were multifaceted. In the 1991 elections, Zambia made history by becoming the first Anglophone African country to change its government through the ballot-box. But electoral alternation did not mean that the MMD would embrace democratic values in government. Multiparty elections in the 1990s, 'held within the political and legal structures of the single-party era', have brought only limited democratic consolidation. [774] One valid criticism levelled against the successive MMD governments was an epidemic of corruption. Claiming that corruption was a 'logical impossibility in a country ruled by a devout born-again Christian such as himself', Chiluba attacked and jailed his accusers from the press and civil society, and scapegoated Kaunda and UNIP (now in opposition) for inciting public resentment.[775] Between 2001 and 2008, the MMD was criticised for repeating 'the worst practices of the ousted regime', and it was not until the success of Michael Sata's Patriotic Front (PF) in the 2011 elections that democratic gains were further consolidated. During his election campaigns, Sata frequently criticised the poor labour relations of foreign mining firms, the Chinese in particular, which successfully turned populist demands into popular support.[776] Sata's death in 2014 put Edgar Lungu in power: he won a presidential by-election in 2015 and the most recent general election in 2016, beating Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND). Despite use of anti-Chinese campaigning in 2011, the PF governments under both Sata and Lungu essentially followed their predecessors' liberal economic policy to encourage foreign investments.

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[774] Shadrack Wanjala Nasong'o, *Contending Political Paradigms in Africa: Rationality and the Politics of Democratization in Kenya and Zambia* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 5.
[775] Nugent, *Africa since Independence*, p. 413.
[776] For studies of anti-Chinese populism, see Steve Hess and Richard Aidoo, "Charting the Roots of Anti-Chinese Populism in Africa: A Comparison of Zambia and Ghana", *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 49, 2 (2014), pp. 1-19.

Compared to Zambia, Kenya's democratic transition took longer and unfolded in a more ambiguous manner. Utilising KANU's expertise in exploiting societal divisions to retain power, Moi handpicked his successor to lead KANU: Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of the country's first President. Meanwhile, opposition forces united to form the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and nominated Kibaki as their presidential candidate in the 2002 elections. Once elected as Kenya's third president, Kibaki was obliged to reward his alliance supporters. Therefore, an ostensibly 'historic event for the politics of change' proved to be 'a reshuffling of the KANU pack, with the Moi loyalists losing out to others who were steeped in older KANU traditions.' [777] Subsequent Kenyan political parties struggled to maintain unity, and eventually Raila Odinga (son of Oginga Odinga, discussed in previous chapters) of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) emerged as a strong opponent to Kibaki in the 2007 elections. Although Kibaki was declared the winner in the presidential contest, opposition parties won a majority in the National Assembly. Accusations of electoral fraud led to violence that left around 1,000 dead. The violence was only ended by a power-sharing agreement in which Odinga became Prime Minister. The most recent two elections in 2010 and 2017 were contested between Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, demonstrating what Nugent called 'a strong sense of history repeating itself'.[778]

Unlike in Zambia where populist sentiments against foreign companies have been common, one characteristic of Kenyan politics is its relative indifference to the issue of

[777] Nugent, *Africa since Independence*, p. 421.
[778] Ibid., p. 411.

economic dependence. Kenyan national leaders more or less embraced the global neoliberal order. Former political detainee Professor Edward Oyugi told me that Kenya's relations with post-Mao China were 'tragic' for their shared 'extreme right-wing' attitudes to foreign capital.[779] It is generally agreed that no particular anti-Chinese campaigning has been carried out by leading Kenyan politicians after the death of President Kenyatta.[780] Hong Kong businessman Sam Ken also equally appreciated Kenya's alliance with the West for maintaining the political and social stability while its neighbours such as Ethiopia and Rwanda experienced violence.[781]

China's 'Abnormal' Dual Liberalisation and Its 'Return' to Africa

The above discussion clearly raises the question about the specific relationship between political liberalisation and economic transformation, an issue that has equally been examined in the context of former Communist regimes. From the late 1970s, China experienced a structural change in its economy, which resulted in a diverse mix of state-owned, collective, private, foreign-funded, and share-holding economic entities. To the surprise of contemporaneous domestic dissidents and external observers, China did not democratise in the same way as Central and Eastern Europe did in 1989. China's political rights and civil liberties rankings on the *Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties Freedom Index* have shown little improvement compared to its dramatic increase of economic freedom ranking on the *Fraser Institute Economic Reform Index*, which has changed from zero in 1975 to 5.3 points out of 10 in 2000.[782] While

[779] Interview with Edward Oyugi.
[780] Interview with Dang Song, Former Chinese SOE manager and businessman, Nairobi, 21 November 2016.
[781] Interview with Sam Ken, Mombasa, 16 July 2017.
[782] Yanlai Wang, Aimin Chen, and Shunfeng Song, *China's Economic Development and Democratization* (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 5.

modernisation theorists asserted that economic development would automatically lead to political democracy, their stance has been challenged by new theoretical and empirical approaches.[783] Przeworski and Limongi in their 1997 study argued that 'the emergence of democracy is not a product of economic development' and that 'it can be initiated at any level of development.'[784] Huntington, the father of 'the third wave', highlighted both the 'essential' socio-economic conditions and the centrality of leadership for democratisation to take effect.[785] There is a consensus among China scholars that market reform and open economic policy have brought prosperity as well as a degree of liberty and pluralism in governance. The nature, manner and speed of such political change, however, remain heavily contested.

It is exactly China's 'abnormal' experience of dual liberalisation that characterises its 'return' to Africa. China's engagement with Africa is, according to Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira, occurring under new circumstances 'in which a more developed China operates under conditions of growing interdependence and plays an increasingly important role in the global economy'.[786] China's increasing overseas investments should be understood as a direct result of domestic economic decentralisation since the mid-1980s, whose main features can be summarised thus:

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[783] See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", *The American Political Science Review* 53, 1 (1959), pp. 69-105; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address", *American Sociological Review* 59, 1 (1994), pp. 1-22; Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered", in Larry Jay Diamond and Gary Marks (eds.), *Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset* (London: Sage,1992).

[784] Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts", *World Politics* 49 (1997), pp. 155-183.

[785] Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?", *Political Science Quarterly* 99, 2 (1984), pp. 193-218; Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (London: University of Oklahoma Press), p. 65. & p. 310.

[786] Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, "Introduction: China Returns to Africa" in Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.), *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and A Continent Embrace* (London: Hurst and Co., 2008), p. 6.

1. Granting freedom to pursue wealth and to own private assets to Chinese people;
2. Granting production autonomy to peasants;
3. Granting production autonomy to state owned enterprises;
4. Granting regulations formulating power to people's congress of provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under Central Government, cities of the provincial government seats, and other cities approved by the State Council;
5. Division of administrative responsibilities between the central and local governments though the 1994 taxation and expenditure reform that demarcates tax revenues and responsibilities for expenditures between central and local governments.[787]

In the name of the 'Go out' policy (走出去战略) introduced in 1999, the Chinese government sought to reduce red tape as well as to provide fiscal and non-fiscal incentives for Chinese enterprises to develop activities beyond the national border.[788] The intensified competition provided by multinational companies in China's partly liberalised domestic market also forced Chinese companies to globalise. China has been Africa's largest economic partner since the turn of the millennium. China-Africa trade has grown at approximately 20 per cent per year since 2000. It is estimated that Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa has grown from nearly zero to approximately $50 billion in a decade.[789] Africa's construction sector has been the largest recipient of financing from China in recent years.

[787] Wang, Chen, and Song, *China's Economic Development and Democratization*, pp. 5-6.
[788] Peter Kragelund and Godfrey Hampwaye, "Seeking Markets and Resources: State-Driven Chinese and Indian Investments in Zambia", *International Journal of Technology and Globalisation* 6, 4 (2012), p. 357.
[789] The trade and investment figures cited are derived from International Trade Centre (ITC) Trade Map; the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); "2015 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment", Ministry of Commerce of the PRC; National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC; and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. Unless otherwise stated, the increases cited are in nominal terms. See Irene Yuan Sun, Kartik Jayaram, and Omid Kassiri, "Dance of the Lions and Dragons: How Are Africa and China Engaging, and How Will the Partnership Evolve?", McKenzie&Company, June 2017.

These fast-growing economic relations were accompanied by powerful endorsement at the state level. In 2000 China established a multilateral platform for exchanges and cooperation with African countries that have formal diplomatic relationships with China. The Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has the stated aims of strengthening friendly relations and cooperation, dealing with the challenges of economic globalisation, and seeking mutual development.[790] FOCAC ministerial conferences, held every three years, and alternating between China and Africa, have, along with their follow-up actions, facilitated Sino-African collaboration across different sectors. It is clear that China-Africa cooperation has both dramatically expanded and deepened in less than two decades. While bilateral economic and trade relations have been stressed in the media and public discourse, cooperation in other fields has been gradually expanding. Therefore, FOCAC should be understood as a multi-level and comprehensive mechanism critical to the historical trajectory of China-Africa relations.

In retrospect, the years surrounding 1990 marked a watershed in the history of these relations. The world was preoccupied with a strong sense of historical determinism resulting from the Western victory at the end of the Cold War. According to Francis Fukuyama, the advent of Western liberal democracy signalled the endpoint of humanity's sociocultural evolution and the final form of human government.[791] African intellectuals equally acknowledged the significance of this historical watershed, but with a different answer. According to Bethwell Ogot:

> In East Asia, a new type of history was in the making which showed that just as cultural nationalism helped end the era of formal colonialism, it

[790] "中非合作论坛" (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation), FOCAC Official Website, https://www.focac.org/chn/ltjj/ltjz/, accessed in June 2018.
[791] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *The National Interest* 16 (1989), pp. 3-18.

> might still play a part in resisting dominant global orders. They chose to build the present on the foundations of the past. They argued that unlike the West, where the individual is the centre piece of a democracy that is intended to disempower government, in East Asia the tradition is one of respect for authority with the individual under strong obligation to the group.[792]

If there were a choice to be 'between the past and the present', Ogot considers that the East Asian model promoted above all by China, is probably more suitable for Africa. China's ability to achieve economic success while maintaining its 'supposed' political tradition in the past few decades has effectively challenged the Western norm, therefore, providing an 'alternative' path of governance and development for the post-Cold War global South. The focus of recent studies on Chinese politics has also shifted from the potential for democratic transition to authoritarian resilience.[793] While it is impossible to review all relevant literature in this respect, it is at least critical to highlight the various attempts to challenge the political dichotomies and linear models of change in modern China. Its unique historical trajectory from a 'Third World' leader to a strong global economy is best captured in the discourse of nostalgia, which will be analysed in the following section.

The Discourse of Nostalgia in China-Africa Relations

The discourse of nostalgia plays a significant role in present-day engagements between Chinese and African states and people. Generally understood as 'a longing for things as they were in an idealised past', the word 'nostalgia' intersects with debates over the

[792] Bethwell Allan Ogot, *Who, If Anyone, Owns the Past? Reflections on the Meaning of 'Public History'* (Kisumu: Anyange Press Ltd, 2010), p. 227.
[793] See Vivienne Shue and Patricia Thornton (eds.), *To Govern China: Evolving Practices of Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Vivienne Shue, "Party-State, Nation, Empire: Rethinking the Grammar of Chinese Governance", *Journal of Chinese Governance* 3, 3 (2018), pp. 268-291.

status of 'history' in relation to 'truth'.[794] As 'a practice of coincident temporalities', it denotes a specific way of enfolding the past into the present, and indeed the future.[795] In the PRC, nostalgia manifests itself in relation to the collective trauma termed the 'century of humiliation' ('百年国耻'): the political infiltration, economic exploitation and military invasion by western imperialists that is said to have destroyed China's splendid civilization, and created a historical memory of enormous humiliation which still resonates powerfully today.[796] Callahan notes that 'the master narrative of modern Chinese history is the discourse of the century of national humiliation.'[797] At the centre of this discourse of national humiliation is a sense of 'victimhood' or 'shame', which has frequently been deployed to legitimise the PRC's political system under the CCP's leadership.[798] The national self-identity of Chinese as victims forms a stark contrast with the collective memory of their rich history and culture before the mid-nineteenth century, a legacy claimed by different generations of the CCP leadership. Mao used it to endorse an ideology that emphasised the belonging and attachment of individuals to the state. But it also helped justify the CCP's one-party rule during the reform era,

[794] Callum Ingram, "Building Between Past and Future: Nostalgia, Historical Materialism and the Architecture of Memory in Baltimore's Inner Harbor", *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 41, 3 (2015), p. 321.
[795] Eric Worby and Shireen Ally, "The Disappointment of Nostalgia: Conceptualising Cultures of Memory in Contemporary South Africa", *Social Dynamics* 39, 3 (2013), p. 458.
[796] Chen Jian 陈兼, "Quanqiulengzhan yu Zhongguo 'Manchang de Jueqi'" 全球冷战与中国'漫长的崛起'(The Global Cold War and China's "Prolonged Rise"), *Cold War International History Studies* (冷战国际史研究), No. 15 (2013), pp. 31-32.
[797] William A. Callahan, "National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29, 2 (2004), p. 204.
[798] See Peter Hays Gries, "Narratives to Live By: The 'Century of Humiliation' and Chinese National Identity Today," in Lionel M. Jensen and Timothy B. Weston (eds.), *China's Transformations: The Stories Beyond the Headlines* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp. 112–128; Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Paul A. Cohen, *China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past* (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 148–184; Alison Adcock Kaufman, "The 'Century of Humiliation', Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order", *Pacific Focus*, April 2010, Vol.25(1), pp.1-33.

during which any attempt to democratise the political system was banned by the leadership.[799]

While political scientists develop conceptual frameworks that explain paradigms in the foreign policy-making process, Miller has explored how public discourses are articulated in foreign policy. Using a database drawing on the General Debate speeches in the United Nations, she tested whether post-colonial states favoured discourses reflecting what she termed Post-Imperial Ideology (PII), which she identified in both Indian and Chinese foreign policies.[800] A strong sense of victimhood is the core of PII, which asserts 'a desire to gain and regain status, especially pertaining to lost territories and maintaining pre-colonial-era borders'.[801] Kaufman similarly notes that 'China's elites today hold a fairly consistent view of where China has come from, but diverge significantly on where it is going.'[802]

The legacy of colonialism and imperialism for contemporary foreign policy is arguably more significant in Africa. Colonisation in Africa involved the triangulation of 'the physical, human, and spiritual' experience, in essence a 'metamorphosis' envisioned by 'ideological and theoretical texts'.[803] Since 'the scramble of Africa' was initiated by external actors, an underlying question remains as to 'whether modernity and postmodernity could have been 'invented' (or, indeed, 'conducted') without the resources [of these forces]'.[804] African history more generally has long been narrated

[799] Chen, "The Global Cold War and China's 'Prolonged Rise'", pp. 27-42.
[800] Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).
[801] May-Lee Chai, "A Review of *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*", *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 41, 1 (2014), p. 30.
[802] Kaufman, "The 'Century of Humiliation', Then and Now", p. 26.
[803] Valentin Yves Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 2.
[804] Jennifer Wenzel, 'Remembering the Past's Future: Anti-Imperialist Nostalgia and Some Versions of

as a history of external exploitation, whether the Atlantic slave trade or the extraction of natural resources, a process in which indigenous forces were marginalised from the start. [805] The resultant exploitative global system, rooted in the uneven and asymmetrical relationship between the metropole and the periphery, did not disappear with political independence, and in some respects can be said to have been enhanced by African states acting as 'gate-keepers'.[806]

To understand the resulting tension in postcolonial African political thought and action, the concept of anti-imperialist nostalgia is useful. While most colonial states 'mourn the passing of what they themselves have transformed' based on 'imperialist nostalgia',[807] this anti-imperialist nostalgia does exactly the opposite: it 'holds in mind hope for changes that have yet to be realized, changes that were always yet to be realized.'[808] This on-going process, in which the limitations of what has been achieved are acknowledged, whilst at the same time an imagined better future is pursued, dominated the development discourse in many newly independent countries. In the context of the Cold War, the two Communist giants envisaged contrasting revolutionary programmes: while the CPSU claimed its legitimacy of rule by building a superior economic system, the mandate of the CCP, itself a product of anti-imperialist revolution, was to 'build a strong, united, independent, prosperous, and modern China'.[809]

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the Third World', *Cultural Critique* 62 (2006), p. 2.
[805] Amina Mama, "Is It Ethical to Study Africa? Preliminary Thoughts on Scholarship and Freedom", *African Studies Review* 50, 1 (2007), pp. 1-26.
[806] Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christopher S. Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jean-François Bayart and Stephen Ellis, "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion", *African Affairs* 99, 395 (2000), pp. 217-267.
[807] Renato Rosaldo, "Imperialist Nostalgia", *Representations* 26, 1 (1989), pp. 107–22.
[808] Wenzel, "Remembering the Past's Future", p. 7.
[809] Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, pp. 215-224.

In this sense, the terminology of the 'Third World' was, as suggested in previous chapters, a powerful imaginary. Dissatisfied with the new world order divided between West and East, people on the fringe of this binary division envisioned alternative possibilities, which should ideally have come into reality yet could only arrive in a (perpetually delayed) future. As argued in Chapter 2, the historical evolution of African socialisms, both theories and practices, reflects the heterogeneity of this philosophical disposition or identity. By acknowledging 'the past's vision of the future' while at the same time recognising 'the distance and the difference between that vision and the realities of the present', this anti-imperialist nostalgia prompted discussions of 'historicity, the nation-state, and utopian projection and promise.'[810] Instead of being a *fait accompli*, anti-imperialism, loosely (re)interpreted as struggles against global inequality and injustice, continues regardless of the collapse of both the European empires and later the USSR, encapsulated in the continuity of the slogan *'a luta continua'* long after its specific deployment in anti-liberation struggles ceased to be directly relevant. The intersection of colonial victimhood and nationalist victory has been a notable feature of China-Africa relations but has diverse implications in specific contexts, something which will be analysed in the following sections.

While the official discourse of anti-imperialist nostalgia has been popular in China-Africa relations, it has sometimes backfired in the everyday encounters between ordinary Chinese and Africans. Between late 1988 and early 1989, there were widespread demonstrations against African students in Nanjing and other Chinese cities. The fact that such a burst of racism took place during the reform era called into question China's credentials as a Third World leader. According to Barry Sautman, while the

[810] Wenzel, "Remembering the Past's Future", pp. 7-8.

social isolation of African students from locals and their different living standards were partly responsible for the tension, 'a marked downplaying of Third World themes in the Chinese media' also contributed to this unprecedented intensification of tension.[811] During the Maoist era, Africa had been portrayed in state propaganda as poor, uncultured and troubled by disease; and China was reported to be a major donor as well as a dedicated teacher that could pass on its experience to the 'backward' continent. This national mentality of Chinese students was then confronted by a new image of male African students who supposedly enjoyed an easy life with better accommodation and living standards, and with Chinese girlfriends. This stereotype of African students as coming from poor 'backward' homes, yet prospering in China because of this altruistic brotherhood, generated a racialized sense of injustice and antagonism among Chinese students. It is noteworthy that although this kind of resentment already existed in Mao's era, it only became vocal when the old rhetorical account of fraternity lost its hegemony during China's post-socialist transition.

Part II: The Past in the Present

History as a professional practice conventionally requires us to establish a chronological sequence of events through careful investigation of the existing evidence. Historical knowledge of foreign relations commonly entails utilising national archive records of foreign ministries, which formally conduct diplomatic missions overseas on behalf of their nationals. An additional difficulty of writing history as 'event', which most often applies to historians of the contemporary period, arises from the inconvenient fact that popular perceptions based on unverified sources of information,

[811] Barry Sautman, "Anti-Black Racism in Post-Mao China," *The China Quarterly* 138 (1994), p. 414.

rather than archive-based academic or elite history, dominate the everyday representation of this historical trajectory. Who owns the historical narratives anyway? As far as this thesis is concerned, this is not only a question of what happened to Kenya and Zambia's relations with China across the past few decades but also why and how their historical relations were (and are) perceived by different actors from all three countries.

This section will examine the deployment of historical discourses by actors working in or in relation to three specific cases: Chinese copper mining in Zambia, China's medical practices in both Kenya and Zambia, and the Chinese-built Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR). These cases have been selected from the myriad contemporary relations between China and Africa, Chinese and Africans, because each illustrates the relevance of historical discourse in the present, but does so for different reasons and to varied effects. As China's economic footprints in Africa are said to be dominated by a thirst for natural resources such as oil and minerals, copper mining in Zambia is an ideal context to understand the dynamics between global capital and local geopolitics it embodies.[812] Revisiting the dominance of resource nationalism discourse, the chapter tries to demonstrate the multifaceted engagements between Chinese investors and Zambian workers, whose expectations have been greatly influenced by China's historical presence in Zambia.

China's contemporary aid to Africa, which has attracted enormous interest from the press and academics, is distinct from conventional Western practice because of its lack

[812] For studies of China's resource diplomacy in Africa, see: Marcus Power, Giles Mohan, and May Tan-Mullins, *China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Powering Development?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Pádraig Carmody and Ian Taylor, "Flexigemony and Force in China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Sudan and Zambia Compared", *Geopolitics* 15, 3 (2010), p.496-515.

of a central state development agency and its unique definition of aid. The provision of medical teams in two-year missions is an enduring example of official aid with 'Chinese characteristics': having survived the upheavals of extreme leftism in the 1970s, it is China's longest-running aid programme, involves the largest number of countries and has arguably been the most effective.[813] Since 2000, many Chinese doctors have opened private clinics or pharmacies at the end of their official missions. Through their interactions with local medical institutions, practitioners, and even patients, this group of Chinese professionals contributes to our understandings of China's knowledge transfer in Africa as it has both endured and evolved throughout the socialist and post-socialist periods.

China is undoubtedly the single-largest bilateral infrastructure financier in Africa, with an astonishing $21 billion spent on infrastructure in 2015, more than the combined total of the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, whose members include the African Development Bank, the European Commission, the European Investment Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank, and the Group of Eight (G8) countries.[814] For the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) in Kenya, China EXIM Bank financed more than 90 per cent of the total cost of $3.2 billion. As Kenya's single largest infrastructure project since independence, SGR has become a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (一带一路), a development strategy involving infrastructure and investment in countries in Europe, Asia and Africa under the current President Xi Jinping. More than sixty years after the completion of

[813] Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era, 1960-1978", p. 201.
[814] Sun, Jayaram, and Kassiri, "Dance of the Lions and Dragons", pp. 23-24. For Infrastructure Consortium, see their official website at: https://www.icafrica.org/en/.

the TAZARA railway, China is building a number of railway projects across the continent. But this time, they are no longer driven by socialist solidarity.

The Deployment of History in the Exploitation of Minerals – A Benign Past for a Promised Future

The dramatic transformations that have taken place on the Zambian Copperbelt across colonial and postcolonial history have provided fertile soil for the deployment of the past in political and social discourse. This backbone of the Zambian economy was the hotbed of anti-colonial agitation and, after independence, the focus of national development efforts.[815] However, by the time the China Non-ferrous Metal Mining (Group) Co. successfully gained control of the Chambishi mine in 1998, Zambia's copper industry was, after decades of losses and decline, being revitalised after neoliberal reform and privatisation under the MMD (see Chapter Five). Today however, after two decades in which Zambia's mines have again been in private hands, Copperbelt residents' collective memories of the heyday of corporate paternalism under state control refuse to fade, and communities continue to articulate constructed nostalgic expectations regarding the supposed obligations of foreign mining companies. While the type of expectations identified by Ferguson mainly contradicted modernisation theory approaches,[816] the continuing phenomenon of unmet expectations is identifiable in the popular argument that foreign mine companies are 'exploiting' Zambia. This found particular expression in Patriotic Front's election campaigns in the 2000s, centred on its promise to strengthen indigenous actors in national economy.[817]

[815] Larmer, "Historical Perspectives on Zambia's Mining Booms and Busts", p. 33.
[816] James Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 14.
[817] Peter Kragelund, "Bringing 'Indigenous' Ownership Back: Chinese Presence and the Citizen

'Zambian mines for Zambians', a comfortable claim for any opposition party seeking high office to make, has however proven to be a difficult promise to keep.

For the mining communities of the Copperbelt, the late colonial and early independence period is recalled nostalgically as a time when the mining industry was able to take care of society as a whole. As a senior officer from Mineworkers' Union of Zambia, the oldest and still the most influential African trade union in the mining sector, told me:

> The role of copper in this country must be the one that directly supports other industries … The mining sector should provide capital for the generational growth of business around it. Without that, at the end of day, we have nothing to show to our investors.[818]

Unlike other natural resources such as forests that can be regenerated, mineral reserves are one-use resources whose extraction is dependent on technology not usually manufactured in the countries where reserves are found. It therefore involves not only transporting machinery but also the international transfer of technological capability and intellectual capital. The political landscape of mining in Zambia after privatisation is affected by contestations of foreign companies, each of which not only strives for profits but also seeks advantages in global and local discourses in which their behaviours are debated, criticised and justified.

One prominent feature of my interviews with government officials, unionists and representatives of NGOs about Chinese mining activities is the dominance of comparison, in which interviewees highlight differences between 'the Chinese way of doing things' and the activities of other copper mines. For example, in March 2014

Economic Empowerment Commission in Zambia", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 50 (2012), p. 457.

[818] Interview with Charles B. Muchimba, Director of Research and Information, Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ), Kitwe, 28 March 2014.

Konkola Copper Mines Plc (KCM) created great controversy in Zambia for threatening to dismiss 1,500 workers, and therefore became a popular target for such comparison in daily conversations.[819] The Chinese director in charge of investments in the Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ), 'the first Chinese overseas economic and trade cooperation zone established in Africa',[820] recalled that in November 2013 then President Sata had threatened KCM with expulsion from Zambia (Figure 6.1). In this sense, he implied that those Chinese companies with a low profile would sustain relatively good relations with the Zambian government.[821] Since this incident also involved laying off 1,500 Zambian workers due to 'decreased copper grades at some of its mines', people's perceptions of the present were easily affected by their memories of the past.[822] The Indian ownership of KCM was frequently highlighted by the representatives of other companies as a negative example. In discussing the contributions of foreign mining investors, the Zambian spokesperson of ZCCZ claimed that Indians 'didn't do as much as the Chinese have done'.[823] His characterisation of the Chinese as being 'simple, down to earth' was explained by an appreciation of 'some parts of Communism from our old Chairman Mao', including the encouragement of equality, a Communistic approach that had supposedly been

[819] "ZCTU [The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions] is disappointed with the happenings at the Konkola Copper Mines", *Lusaka Times*, 22 March 2014, https://www.lusakatimes.com/2014/03/22/zctu-disappointed-happenings-konkola-copper-mines/, 1 May 2014. This planed dismissal announced by Vedanta Resources PLC aimed to cut down on labour costs and improve its profitability, but a leaked video revealed that its past audit reports had been manipulated. See: "Zambia's curse of abundance: Of copper mines and taxes", *Lusaka Times*, 21 May 2014, https://www.lusakatimes.com/2014/05/21/zambias-curse-abundance-copper-mines-taxes/, 1 May 2014.
[820] "About ZCCZ", ZCCM Official Website, http://zccz.cnmc.com.cn/outlineentem.jsp?outlinetype=2&column_no=071002, accessed in March 2019.
[821] Interview with an anonymous investment director of the Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone, Lusaka, 23 March 2014.
[822] "KCM defies Sata", *Lusaka Times*, 7 November 2013, https://www.lusakatimes.com/2013/11/07/kcm-defies-sata/, 1 May 2014.
[823] Interview with Steven Lindunda, Zambian spokesperson of the Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone, Kitwe, 31 March 2014.

inherited by his Chinese colleagues.[824] Because of his dual identity as both a retired Zambian politician and a current employee of Chinese company, this spokesman's characterisation of the earlier China-Zambia 'friendship' (analysed in earlier chapters) demonstrates its significance in shaping more recent political debates. Regardless of whether Chinese officials truly treated Zambian labourers in a 'comradely' way, it suggested that Chinese investors were most clearly distinguished from others by their Communist historical identity, which – although it may not be a prominent feature of current public discourse – has nonetheless been retained by successive generations.



Figure 6.1: Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ)
Source: Photo online from ZCCZ official website

An additional feature of the deployment of historical China-Zambia relations in the contemporary mining industry is the perception of the goodwill shown by Chinese investors to learn from their Zambian 'teachers'. A senior Zambian engineer working for the Mineworkers Safety Department of the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water Development recalled his experience in working with the Chinese CEO of Chambishi

[824] Ibid.

mine, who took his advice of digging a channel between two underground layers in the mine in order to have fresh air flow downwards.[825] He stressed that while foreign media focused on the accidental explosion at Chambishi in 2005 as evidence of Chinese neglect, the mine's CEO was in fact highly responsive to his demands.[826] Contrary to the historical evidence of Chinese technical and military experts mentoring Zambians,[827] the former are now characterised as diligent students who learned from their mistakes and have begun to catch up in understanding Zambian government regulations. This characterisation was not exclusive to Zambian officials. The director of the leading environmental NGO on the Copperbelt encapsulated his extensive experience in dealing with the Chinese as 'you get what you ask for': you should not expect Chinese investors to spontaneously improve their preventive measures in reducing environmental pollution, but as long as they are told to do so they will always comply.[828] While it is impossible to definitively measure the extent to which nationalist nostalgia of ZCCM resonated with overseas operators, the willingness of Chinese mine investors, senior managers and engineers to gradually learn to respect the dignity, as well as the national pride, of their 'Zambian friends', has persuaded at least some of the latter to cautiously welcome the Chinese presence in Zambia.

[825] Interview with Labson Chinyamuka, Senior mining engineer of Zambian Mineworkers Safety Department, Kitwe, 6 April 2014.
[826] This accident was covered widely in the Chinese and international media, see: "37 killed in factory explosion in Zambia", *Xinhua*, 21 April 2005, http://china.org.cn/english/international/126486.htm, 5 May 2014; "Dozens killed in Zambia explosion", *BBC*, 21 April 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4466321.stm, 5 May 2014; "Blast at Zambia copper mine kills 46", *The New Zealand Herald*, 21 April 2005, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10121648, 5 May 2014.
[827] Snow, *The Star Raft*, p. 77; Hall and Peyman, *The Great Uhuru Railway: China's Showpiece in Africa*, pp. 87-106.
[828] Interview with Peter Sinkamba, Executive Director of the Citizens for a Better Environment, Kitwe, 4 April 2014.

'When they came back, they are not strange. They were there before.'[829] This comment about the presence of the Chinese in Zambia came from Billy Chewe of the Ministry of Mines, formerly a mineworker for Chinese-owned contractors, and now responsible for issuing contracts to bidding companies. It illustrates how history has always been there to be mobilised. While the TAZARA Railway had by the 1980s lost its economic salience for transporting Zambian copper for export purposes, the political footprints left by the Chinese four decades ago continue to influence Zambian expectations of their (re-)encounter with the Chinese as something familiar. Their 'raw encounters' with 'a cadre of Chinese managers' proved, according to Lee, a heavy blow to Zambian workers who held nostalgic ideas of socialist friendship but experienced only 'a compelling and effective conduit of capitalism in Africa.'[830] Criticisms, such as Chinese state-owned mining companies paying salaries lower than the minimum wage, forcing local miners to work under unsafe conditions, and refusing to respond to collective complaints made by workers, were heightened by a 2011 Human Rights Watch Report.[831] 'You'll be fired if you refuse' became a popular phrase encapsulating the coercive approach of Chinese companies towards their Zambian employees.

Since then, views have become more mixed as to whether the Chinese are the 'worst employers' on the Copperbelt or in Zambia more generally, depending on their interpretations of legal requirements.[832] A labour relations inspector reported

[829] Interview with Billy Chewe, Chief Mining Engineer of Zambian Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water Development, Lusaka, 8 April 2014.
[830] Ching Kwan Lee, "Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa's Chinese Enclaves', *The China Quarterly* 199 (2009), p. 652.
[831] Human Rights Watch, *'You'll Be Fired if You Refuse': Labor Abuses in Zambia's Chinese State-owned Copper Mines*, 4 November 2011, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/11/04/you-ll-be-fired-if-you-refuse, accessed on 2 January 2014.
[832] Hairong Yan and Barry Sautman, "'The Beginning of a World Empire'? Contesting the Discourse of Chinese Copper Mining in Zambia", *Modern China* 39, 2 (2013), pp. 131-64; Deborah Brautigam, "Are the Chinese the Worst? A Comparative ILO Study in Zambia", *China in Africa: The Real Story*, 26 April 2012, http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2012/04/are-chinese-worst-comparative-ilo-

(anonymously) that Chinese companies usually only comply with national legislation on minimum wages and conditions of services, and ignore collective agreements reached between companies and trade unions, as well as written contracts with individual employees.[833] Chinese companies thus obey laws that may cause potential political disputes, but remain indifferent to the demands of unions and workers. A particular case is the right of workers to attend funerals. The Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Act requires all employers to pay a funeral grant of 50,000 ZMK (equivalent to US$9.50 in 2013) 'in the event of the death of an employee, spouse or registered child'.[834] In a standard working contract used by Chinese companies, the funeral assistance is ten times more than the legally required amount.[835] While it was easy for Chinese managers to assume that such a generous offer would satisfy their Zambian workers, the reality turned out to be the opposite – complaints were commonly made about Zambians being prevented from attending the funerals of their relatives.[836] A Ministry of Labour official asserted that paid leave of at least five days to mourn the death of biological children, parents, and spouse is 'common practice' in Zambia, a 'provision' that should be obeyed.[837]

In Lee's comparative studies of the managerial ethos of Chinese state capital and global private capital in Zambia, she points out that the unique Chinese discourse of 'eating

study.html, accessed on 13 May 2014; Barry Sautman and Hairong Yan, *The Chinese Are the Worst?: Human Rights and Labor Practices in Zambian Mining* (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2012).

[833] Interview with an anonymous Labour Relations officer, Zambian Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Lusaka, April 10, 2014.

[834] Note that the currency code for the Zambian Kwacha changed on 1 January 2013 from ZMK to ZMW and the currency value was divided by 1,000. Zambian Ministry of Labour and Social Security, *The Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Act*, Chapter 276, Act No. 25 of 1982 (Lusaka: 1994).

[835] *Offer of Employment on Contract* (Kitwe: Zambia China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone Development Ltd, 2013).

[836] Interview with an anonymous Labour Relations officer.

[837] Ibid.

bitterness' was common among all Chinese expatriates but more institutionalised in the state-owned firms:

> Reinforced by the state discourse of China's victimization by the West, Chinese managers drew moral and nationalistic boundaries with the eating bitterness rhetoric and glossed over the class exploitation inflicted on them by state capital.[838]

As for Zambian workers, those who have apparently successfully internalised some elements of these characteristics are likely to enjoy more promising career development.[839] Instead of coercing their employees to follow instructions, Kevin Zhang from the Human Resources Department of ZCCZ argued that flexible measures had proved to be more useful in managing Zambian workers, for example, incentive awards for the prevention of thefts and rolling one-year contracts to sustain their so-called 'sense of crisis'.[840]

As noted, Zambians draw historical comparisons in assessing the value of Chinese contracts of employment. For some Zambians, Chinese-Zambian labour relations during the construction of TAZARA were not adversely affected by the high unemployment rate as they are now; it was then (supposedly) more difficult to fire someone and replace them with a new employee with similar skills or experience.[841] But this explanation, arising from the difference between state and market economies, was rejected by the Chief Mining Engineer who had prior experience of working for Chinese. In his opinion, China's historical presence in the country was 'not very

[838] Lee, *The Specter of Global China*, p. 122.
[839] Interview with Sande Ngalande, Zambian director of the Confucius Institute of the University of Zambia, Lusaka, 28 March 2014; Interview with an anonymous construction headman for a Chinese construction company in ZCCZ, Kitwe, 5 April 2014; Interview with Steven Lindunda.
[840] Interview with Kevin Zhang, Human Resources director of the Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone, Kitwe, 5 April 2014.
[841] Interview with Martin Chembe, Public Relations Officer of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, Lusaka, 21 March 2014.

integrated', thus limiting the likelihood of labour disputes between Chinese employers and Zambian workers.[842] Regardless of historical accuracy, it is clear that labour relations in Chinese companies in Zambia transcend the words written on papers to bear broader and deeper cultural and historical meanings.

In interviews with Chinese actors, a strong sense of victimhood reinforced by widespread political and media hostility was expressed and clearly plays an important role in their sense of self-identity. The Chinese Ambassador to Zambia between 2011 and 2014, Zhou Yuxiao told me: 'Mining in Zambia has a history of one hundred years, whereas China has only been involved for ten years with only 5% occupation in the total production. If you have to ask China to admit their mistakes, we are only responsible for 5% of the mistakes of the last ten years.'[843] The western colonisation of Zambia as a historical moral wrong was articulated by Chinese actors to emphasise their 'only recent' involvements in mining activities compared to their 'Western' counterparts, many of which, such as Canadian or Australian companies, have no direct ties to Zambia's colonial past.

In contrast, history is deployed in a positive manner when the 'past' involved can be considered benign. The provision of non-conditional aid, such as the construction of the TAZARA, and the apparent personal friendship of early national leaders, were recalled as two historical instances that have facilitated China-Zambia relations and helped the countries to overcome political difficulties.[844] While the professional

[842] Interview with Billy Chewe, Lusaka, 21 March 2014.
[843] Interview with Yuxiao Zhou, Chinese ambassador in Zambia, Lusaka, 20 March 2014.
[844] "Ambassador Zhou introducing the outcomes of China-Zambia cooperation to the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia", Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Zambia, 7 March 2014, http://zm.chineseembassy.org/chn/sbgx/zz/t1134858.htm, accessed on 15 April 2014.

vocation of politicians shapes their reliance on historical legacies to deal with contemporary foreign affairs, their personal memories, sometimes deployed unconsciously, may have been shaped by their constant recall of the past. The deployment of nostalgia for the supposed certainties of the early years of Zambian independence is widespread, and China's friendship with Zambia is easily deployed as one element of this. Nostalgic perceptions of China's close relationship with Kaunda's Zambia likewise influences the Chinese view of the PF government, whose shift from an anti-Chinese standpoint in opposition, to its later, more favourable attitude towards Chinese investments, was explained by two Chinese interviewees as 'making the right choice at the crucial point'.[845]

The above-mentioned 'Post-Imperial Ideology' can be identified among the Chinese community in Zambia beyond those state-owned companies. Two Chinese private entrepreneurs, who have been doing business in Zambia for thirty-four years and fifteen years respectively, felt a strong sense of disappointment regarding the negative treatment of Chinese investors by the PF government, compared to its predecessors.[846] Unlike most Chinese cadres who were dispatched to work in Zambia for the first time in the past five to six years, these interviewees' experience of the transfer of power in Zambian politics enables them to view former President Sata through a more historically comparative lens. Roger Lee nostalgically recalled that, under President Kaunda, Zambians 'put their thumbs up' when they saw Chinese walking down the streets: this was despite the fact that they 'didn't really know China well' except for

[845] Interview with Zhou Yuxiao; Interview with an anonymous investment director.
[846] Interview with Roger Lee, Vice President of the Association of Chinese Corporation in Zambia, Lusaka, 17 March 2014; Interview with Liu Huihuang, Taiwanese/Chinese private mine owner, Kitwe, 5 April 2014.

'some sort of non-conditional help offered by China'.[847] Having started his mining business in Zambia in 1997, Liu Huihuang was frustrated by the way 'vicious competition among Chinese ourselves' in this industry resulted in a new negative reputation in Zambia.[848] For both men, the expression of anti-Chinese sentiment during the transition from MMD to PF threatened to deteriorate into a prolonged diplomatic crisis, which might have reversed the assumed historical amicability of China-Zambia relations.

Parallel to these evolving relations between Chinese and Zambian states are the general self-perceptions of the Chinese as victims of Western 'media manipulation'. Consistent with the message of suffering articulated in the 'century of humiliation' discourse deployed by the Chinese government in the 1960s and 1970s, the current articulation of Chinese victimhood corresponds to the Zambian nationalist nostalgia related to the history of mining, and deliberately conflates the present situation with the supposed 'shared past' in which both countries fought against 'Western imperialists'.[849] In addition, by highlighting Chinese humbleness in the face of the complexities of Zambian regulatory regimes, and their unique work ethics in relation to their Zambian employees, Chinese actors promise both themselves and Zambians a bright future built on the historical evolution of their foreign relations. At the April 2014 gala dinner celebrating the 50th anniversary of China-Zambia relations as well as the 90th birthday of Kenneth Kaunda, the general manager of China Non-ferrous Metal Mining Luo Tao announced, 'As two important symbols of China-Zambia friendship ... TAZARA

[847] Interview with Roger Lee.
[848] Interview with Liu Huihuang.
[849] "Ambassador Zhou introducing the outcomes of China-Zambia", Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Zambia.

represents the past and history, while CNMC represents the present and future' (Figure 6.2).[850]



Figure 6.2: Luo Tao and Kenneth Kaunda in an Event in 2014
Source: Photo online from the China Aluminium Network website.

For many Zambians, their anger towards irresponsible foreign investors profiting from their mineral wealth is linked to historically rooted expectations, in their case nostalgic memories of the nationalised ZCCM. Mukela Muyunda, CEO of ZCCM-Investments Holdings Plc between 2011 and 2014, the company that today holds the state's minority shares in privatised mining companies, complained that Chinese shareholders kept relevant information close to their chest in board meetings, something which never happened with other multinational mining companies.[851] While he speculated that the reluctance of Chinese companies to improve was 'maybe because they are protected at the government level,' he nevertheless insisted on the potential for moral persuasion to

[850] "Honour and dream – A historical record of the reform and development of CNMC", *China Non-Ferrous Metal Newspaper*, 4 July 2012, http://www.cnmc.com.cn/detail.jsp?article_millseconds=1341394055733&column_no=010305, accessed on 12 March 2014.
[851] ZCCM-IH, *ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc: Annual Report and Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 March 2013* (Lusaka: 2014), p. 9.

improve matters in the future because, 'of course we want to maintain good relationships with each other'.[852] The difficulties encountered during the recent experience of Chinese mining in Zambia have, in general, been contained because of expectations for a promised future that are rooted in a nostalgic sense of a better past.

Healthcare Cooperation in Transformation: From Chinese Medical Teams to Private Clinics

In 2013, *CCTV* broadcast a special report to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Chinese medical teams in Africa. It reported that since 1963, China had sent about 20,000 doctors to 51 countries in Africa, treated 'hundreds of millions' of African patients, and trained tens of thousands of African medical personnel.[853] When attending the China-Africa Ministerial Health Cooperation and Development Conference in August 2013, President Xi announced: 'China-Africa friendship has a long history. It has withstood the test of international changes and gained more precious feelings and trust than gold.'[854] Other than the TAZARA Railway, Chinese medical teams (hereafter CMTs) are probably the second most important case of China's historical friendship with Africa. Following Algerian independence in July 1962, the Chinese government responded to Ahmed Ben Bella's urgent request for medical aid by dispatching its first such team in January 1963. While *CCTV* simply reported that the number of CMTs continued to increase across time, Li Anshan has noted that no CMTs were sent to

[852] Interview with Mukela Muyunda, Chief Executive Director of ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc, Lusaka, 11 April 2014.
[853] "The 50th anniversary of the dispatch of the Chinese medical teams", *CCTV*, http://news.cntv.cn/special/yuanwai/index.shtml, accessed in November 2018.
[854] "Xi Jinping meets with the representatives of the China-Africa Ministerial Health Cooperation and Development Conference", *CCTV*, 16 August 2013, http://news.cntv.cn/2013/08/16/ARTI1376653485609723.shtml, accessed in November 2018.

Africa in 1979-1980 when China was pre-occupied with its internal economic reconstruction. The number of recipient African countries for the CMTs started to grow in the early 1980s but remained static between 1988 and 1995 for two primary reasons:

> On the one hand, China had almost satisfied African countries' requests for CMTs, while on the other, the end of the Cold War affected many African countries. As their marginalization increased, some engaged in civil war or lapsed into political chaos.[855]

In general, China's medical cooperation in Africa has corresponded to the shifting priorities and strategies of China's diplomacy.[856] In countries like Somalia and Congo, on-going conflict disrupted the operation of the CMTs. In Burkina Faso, Gambia, and São Tomé and Príncipe, the CMTs withdrew because of the switch of diplomatic relations from the PRC to Taiwan. The CMTs, initiated and developed rapidly during Mao's era, have nonetheless continued into the post-socialist period.

It is noteworthy that individual provinces, rather than the central government, have played the key role in supplying health manpower. According to Shen and Fan, this is probably explained by: 1) the related Chinese infrastructure or economically based diplomatic involvement in various African countries, 2) the large demand for human resources for health in Africa and, 3) China's reliance on its own public healthcare system in engaging international cooperation for certain inland provinces.[857] This shows that China's lack of a central aid agency and its unique definition of aid – one that differs from the global standards agreed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – make comparisons with other countries' aid

[855] Li Anshan, "Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa: With Special Emphasis on the Medical Teams and Anti-Malaria Campaign", *Discussion Paper 52* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2011), p. 11.
[856] Shuang Lin *et al.*, "China's Health Assistance to Africa: Opportunism or Altruism?", *Globalization and Health* 12, 83 (2016), p. 3.
[857] Gordon C. Shen and Victoria Y. Fan, "China's Provincial Diplomacy to Africa: Applications to Health Cooperation", *Contemporary Politics* 20, 2 (2014), p. 191.

flows difficult. Described by Brautigam as aid 'with Chinese characteristics', China's official aid is indeed 'a subset of the many kinds of official finance offered by the Chinese government, some of which finance other economic activities carried out overseas by Chinese companies, institutes and provincial ministries.'[858]

It is certainly naïve to think that China's medical aid has always been altruistic. According to Jiang, the success of CMTs in Africa is not a result of the 'revolutionary health road' advocated by Mao, but instead the practical benefits of health aid, itself strengthened by the correction to a damaging leftism within China's public health system at the end of the 1970s.[859] During the Korean War, China sent many medical groups to the battlefields. In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, China signed health cooperation agreements with all Eastern Bloc countries except Cuba on the basis of socialist solidarity. In the context of the global Cold War, medicine and public health became frontlines in the ideological struggle between the two blocs. The stated approach of Chinese healthcare provision of 'no strings attached' in practice required displays of diplomatic loyalty by recipient states on issues of concern to the PRC such as Taiwan, Tibet and the status of the Uyghur people.[860]

Walking on the streets of Lusaka today, it is not unusual to encounter Chinese characters printed on the walls. Some indicate Chinese restaurants with names like Dong Fang ('Oriental') or Peacock, and some advertise Chinese-run clinics, often carrying the surname of the leading doctor. Chinese clinics are concentrated mainly in

[858] Deborah Brautigam, "Aid 'with Chinese Characteristics': Chinese Foreign Aid and Development Finance Meet the OECD-DAC Aid Regime", *Journal of International Development* 23, 5 (2011), p.752.
[859] Jiang, "A Study on Chinese Aid to African Countries in Cold War Era, 1960-1978", p. 201.
[860] Shuang Lin *et al.*, "China's Health Assistance to Africa", p. 3.

Lusaka and two large mining towns, Kitwe and Chingola. According to the 2014 report of the Health Professions Council of Zambia, there are a dozen registered Chinese health practitioners in Zambia, not including the provincial CMTs which rotate every two years.[861] But it is clear that many more are in operation.

Among the Chinese community in Zambia, Doctor Yu Huizhen enjoys the reputation of an 'old Zambian' ('老赞比亚'), which refers to a Chinese who lived in Zambia prior to 2000. Yu participated in two Henan-provided medical teams, first in 1990-1992 and again as a captain in 1996-2001. After the latter mission was completed, he decided to stay and opened his own clinic in Lusaka. In his analysis of Chinese migrants in Zambia, Di Wu identified a strong correlation between their province of origin and their profession: usually people from Henan province are doctors and people from Jiangxi are builders.[862] As professionals who are both familiar with the local market and socially well connected, Chinese doctors were able to take advantage of economic liberalisation and deregulation to start their own businesses. KG Dental Clinic, a well-known clinic nationwide, was established by Dr Gao Kenan in 1994, who first arrived in Zambia in 1988 as aid doctor from a military hospital in Beijing.[863] While there is an obvious official distinction between the CMTs and private clinics, in reality, they are perceived as a whole by the local community: until today Yu is commonly referred to as 'Captain' Yu, a position held during his service in the CMT. Both Yu and Gao have maintained close relations with other Chinese medical practitioners in Zambia as well.

[861] "Registered Health Practitioners", Health Professions Council of Zambia, 2014, http://www.hpcz.org.zm/, accessed in June 2017.
[862] Di Wu, "The Everyday Life of Chinese Migrants in Zambia: Emotion, Sociality and Moral Interaction" (London School of Economics and Political Science, PhD thesis, 2014), p. 18.
[863] Interview with Doctor Gao Kenan, Chinese medical team former member and now owns a private dental clinic, August 2016.

While Chinese doctors practiced during the construction of the TAZARA railway (see Chapter Four), Zambia accepted its first official CMT only in 1978. The mining towns of Kabwe and Luanshya, then experiencing growing difficulties in providing health services to mineworkers and their families, were their first destinations. 'Captain' Yu recalled that this policy of providing healthcare for the 'popular masses' proved diplomatically unsuccessful. 'It now appears that the closer you are to cities, the easier you get access to high level officials,' 'Captain' Yu continued, and 'the second time I came with the medical team, we moved to the University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka, as well as hospitals in the cities of Ndola and Livingstone.'[864] As further evidence of the diplomatic significance of Chinese doctors, he recalled the experience of treating former Zambian President Mwanawasa as a member of the medical team. Immediately after the MMD's election victory in December 1991, Vice President Mwanawasa was in a road accident.[865] 'One day around 10am, the dean of the hospital called me to his office. As soon as I entered the room, I saw Mwanawasa and his personal security guard.' 'Captain' Yu recalled that after the treatment, he asked Mwanawasa if they could have a group photo. The Vice-President agreed but insisted the photo be kept private, at a time when China-Zambia bilateral relations suffered from President Chiluba's closeness with Taiwan. Having consulted the Chinese embassy for advice of action, 'Captain' Yu and his colleagues received the command from Beijing that they should be prudent in this case. Invited to the State House for further medical treatment, a group of Chinese doctors (as well as the Chinese ambassador) entered through the back door to avoid any public attention. The treatment however turned out to be

[864] Interview with Doctor Yu Huizhen, Chinese medical team former leader and now owns a private clinic, Lusaka, August 2016.
[865] "Zambia's vice-president badly injured in road accident", UPI Archives, 8 December 1991, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/12/08/Zambias-vice-president-badly-injured-in-road-accident/3199692168400/, accessed in November 2018.

successful as the CMT received a special honour from the Chinese Ministry of Health for treating Mwanawasa.

Li argues that the CMT is a kind of foreign aid that costs little, has quick effects, and has a great impact.[866] Based on Li's incomplete yet still rich data, the CMTs have provided treatment for more than fifty African statesmen and ministers, including those from Algeria, Zanzibar, Tunisia, and Mali.[867] Supposedly a form of 'grassroots' aid, the CMT may in fact be most influential for its capacity to establish respect and trust with the political elites in the recipient countries. But this argument was somehow absent from Li's English version of his article, which could be explained by the discrepancy between Chinese and international readership, whether intentional or not. Public information about Mwanawasa's medical treatment by Chinese doctors is also nowhere to be found. In Yu's personal account, Mwanawasa's knowledge of the CMTs came from his wife Maureen Mwanawasa.[868] Her uncle, who operated a hotel and a farm in Kabwe, regularly visited the CMTs for heart disease treatment. Sometimes on weekends he invited the medical team to his farm, thus developing close relations with them. Such historical contingency, considered as 'unscientific' or 'anecdotal', is commonly absent from official records. Yet it may indeed play a critical role in shaping historical trajectories. Unlike his predecessor Chiluba, Mwanawasa adopted a notably friendlier position towards China during his presidency in 2002-2008. In 2011 the Chinese government even donated a public hospital named after him to the Zambian government. The Levy Mwanawasa General Hospital has been used to host CMTs ever since (Figure 6.3).[869]

[866] Li, "Chinese Medical Teams Abroad", pp. 25-45; Li, "Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa".
[867] Li, "Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa", pp. 39-40.
[868] Interview with Doctor Yu.
[869] Interview with Doctor Chikoya, Medical Superintendent of Levy Mwanawasa General Hospital,



Figure 6.3: Levy Mwanawasa General Hospital
Source: Photo by author

Dealing with illness and medical emergencies is a common challenge during overseas fieldwork. My first encounter with Chinese doctors in Zambia resulted from an ordinary cold that developed into a serious cough and a low fever. Having failed to treat myself with tablets brought from China, I took the advice of my Chinese host to see a doctor. 'Word of mouth' proved to be the most effective form of advertisement among the Chinese community in Zambia. After thirty minutes' drive, I arrived at Doctor Qu's Clinic (Figure 6.4). As someone who grew up in a so-called 'third-tier' city of China, I was familiar with the layout of this clinic: a reception desk by the entrance, a large hall with several long benches, and several consulting rooms. It is common for the Chinese to combine offices and domestic residences in the same compound for safety and convenience. Dr Gao's dental clinic is located in a residential mansion that served as the Yugoslavian embassy until the 1980s. Being assigned to a doctor with an East Asian

Lusaka, August 2017.

appearance in Doctor Qu's clinic, I naturally started communicating with him in Chinese. But he looked puzzled. I then learnt that the doctor was originally from North Korea, who worked in Zambia to 'earn foreign currency'. Such an anecdotal experience implies that the legacies of socialist fraternity lingers in unpredictable forms in Chinese private clinics in Zambia.



Figure 6.4: Reception of a Chinese Clinic in Lusaka
Source: Photo by author

In contrast, Kenya has never received any official medical aid from Communist China because of its 'capitalist' nature.[870] Doctor Li Chuan, originally from Shandong province, worked in the CMT in Dodoma Regional Hospital of Tanzania in 1989-1991. He followed the Tanzanian ambassador to Kenya in 1992 and opened his own Oriental Chinese Herbal Clinic in Nairobi two years later.[871] Doctor Li's office was decorated

[870] Interview with Doctor Li Chuan and Doctor Li Xiaoxiao, Owners of Oriental Chinese Herbal Clinic, Nairobi, 2016.
[871] "About us", Oriental Chinese Herbal Clinic, https://chinese-herbal.co.ke/index.php, accessed in November 2018.

with multiple photos of him standing alongside prominent Tanzanian leaders, as well as a framed recommendation letter from former Minister for Health P. M. Sarungi (Figure 6.5).



THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Telegraphic Address: "AFYA" DAR ES SALAAM
Telephone: 20957; 24019,
20261, Ext. 151, 142

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER FOR HEALTH
P. O. BOX 9083
DAR ES SALAAM

Ref: No: .....

25th June, 1992

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: DR. LI CHUN SPECIALIST IN ACUPANCTURE

This is to certify that Dr. Chun had worked in Dodoma Regional Hospital Tanzania since Sept. 1989 until Dec. 1991 under the bilateral cooperation between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Government of the People's Republic of China.

During the tenure of his work, Dr. Chun done commendable job and was liked and respected by colleagues and patient. His professional performance and dedication was acknowledged and appreciated by the Ministry.

Prof. P. M. Sarungi (MP)
MINISTER FOR HEALTH

This is to certify that I know Dr. Li Chuan very well. He worked in my home town. The name is slightly mispelt by omission of a between u and n. It should read Chuan not Chun.

TANZANIA HIGH COMMISSION
01 JUL 1992

Joe M. Lusinde
HIGH COMMISSIONER

TOTAL P.01

Figure 6.5: Recommendation Letter from Tanzanian Minister for Health P. M. Sarungi to Doctor Li Chuan
Source: Photo by author

As a specialist in Chinese acupuncture and herbal practice, he complained that 'Africans don't understand traditional Chinese medicine', and noted it was the Ministry of Culture instead of the Ministry of Health which regulated the practice of acupuncture when he arrived in Kenya.[872] Using herbal medicines and various mind and body practices, such as acupuncture and tai chi, traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) is primarily used as a complementary health approach in the West.[873] Doctor Li's

[872] Interview with Doctor Li Chuan and Doctor Li Xiaoxiao.
[873] "Traditional Chinese medicine: In depth", U.S National Center for Complimentary and Integrative

daughter, who was also working in the clinic after completing her medical training in the UK, explained that there is no clear distinction between conventional and complimentary medicine in Kenya: 'Therefore, it all depends on whether the relevant government officials believe you are legal or not':

> TCM is characterised separately by the Ministry of Health. There are people who claim to be herbalists that do not understand the basics. For instance, if you have a certificate from India, you can study acupuncture in the UK and come to Kenya to practice. There are even some Chinese who have only taken a few medical classes and pretend to be doctors.[874]

Doctor Li Chuan also emphasised that the lack of a comprehensive regulation system for TCM is troublesome: the quality of imported herbal medicines cannot be guaranteed, and attempts to grow plants such as artemisia annua in East Africa had failed.[875] According to Procopio, it was a deliberate decision of Kenya to follow 'pre-set routes of multilateral cooperation rather than negotiating with China independently'.[876] The difficulty of regulating imported medicines was however a concern shared by the Zambia Medicines Regulatory Authority, as one of its staff mentioned that not all practitioners follow the legal procedure of registering their medicines when they visit the country.[877]

In conclusion, China's medical aid to Africa has a rich history that dates back to the socialist period. Initially inclined towards other Communist regimes or countries friendly to the Eastern bloc, Chinese medical cooperation has significantly diversified.

Health, https://nccih.nih.gov/health/whatiscam/chinesemed.htm, accessed in November 2018.
[874] Interview with Doctor Li Chuan and Doctor Li Xiaoxiao, Nairobi, 2016.
[875] "中国传统医术走进非洲人家" (Traditional Chinese medicine has entered homes in Africa), China Investment, http://www.chinainvestment.com.cn/type_fmgs_post/7025.html, accessed in November 2018.
[876] Maddalena Procopio, "Negotiating Governance: Kenyan Contestation, Cooperation, Passivity toward the Chinese" (London School of Economics and Political Science, PhD thesis, 2016).
[877] Interview with Nyambe Lyoko, Assistant Director of Zambia Medicines Regulatory Authority, Lusaka, 21 August 2017.

While conventional CMTs continue to be dispatched to many African countries, some Chinese doctors have become private entrepreneurs after the completion of their official missions. In Zambia, the Levy Mwanawasa General Hospital donated by the Chinese government symbolises a 'hidden' story of how Chinese medical teams helped improve Sino-Zambian diplomatic relations by treating a former President. In Kenya, Doctor Li's clinic suggests the great potential of traditional Chinese medicine in the absence of officially dispatched CMTs. Despite the heterogeneity of China-Africa medical cooperation, the sense of socialist solidarity has somehow survived in an industry otherwise marked by capital-driven market economies.

China's Infrastructure Finance and the Belt Road Initiative

There has long been a historical association between railways in Africa and the imperial mission. 'The White Man's Burden', illustrated in Rudyard Kipling's poem, offers a picture of colonialists building ports and roads in order to connect supposedly virgin lands to the empire:

> The ports ye shall not enter,
> The roads ye shall not tread,
> Go make them with your living,
> And mark them with your dead.[878]

The Kenya-Uganda railway, built by the British during the Scramble for Africa, linked the interior of Lake Victoria with the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa in Kenya. Mazrui argues: 'It is indeed arguable that no single factor in the recent history of East Africa has been more important for regional integration than that railway line' which 'was part

[878] Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden: A Poem", *The Times*, 4 February 1899, http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_burden.htm.

of a major imperial strategy in Britain.'[879] Similar railway projects were carried out in Central Africa under the direct control of the British South Africa Company as early as the 1890s, and continued until the formation of the Central African Federation in 1953.[880] The grand imperial strategy, envisioned by Cecil Rhodes, was to extend British hegemony in southern Africa to elsewhere. More than simple territorial conquest, the vision of the Cape to Cairo Railway reflected 'a kind of colonial and imperial imaginary', which according to Merrington generated a particular founding *myth* of regarding South Africa as 'Mediterranean' rather than as 'African'.[881] In this way, infrastructure can be interpreted as shaping the broader formation of national and regional identity and of simultaneous cultural transition.

Through the lens of European and Chinese involvements in building railways in East Africa and Central Africa, Mazrui drew a comparison between 'the white man's burden' and 'the yellow man's burden'. 'Both sought fulfilment in enhancing African mobility': the Uganda Railway encouraged Europeans to arrive and settle in eastern Africa, 'with consequences which included the Mau Mau insurrection against the white presence, as well as the more positive result of greater regional integration in East Africa as a whole'. Later, the Chinese-built railway line between Zambia and Tanzania facilitated 'a new arena of international between the black man and the yellow man' on the basis of pan-socialism.[882] Indeed, nothing better represents the longevity of China-Africa friendship than TAZARA. According to an official document about the development of China

[879] Mazrui, "The Yellow Man's Burden", p. 18.
[880] W. Travis Hanes III, "Railway Politics and Imperialism in Central Africa, 1889-1953", in Clarence B. Davis, Kenneth E. Wilburn, and Ronald Robinson (eds.), *Railway Imperialism* (London: Greenwood, 1991), pp. 43-66.
[881] Peter Merrington, "A Staggered Orientalism: The Cape-to-Cairo Imaginary", *Poetics Today* 22, 2 (2001), p. 323.
[882] Mazrui, "The Yellow Man's Burden", pp. 19-21.

Non-ferrous Metal Mining (Group) Co., Ltd, a company with no direct links to this railway project:

> Zambia is located in the beautiful mid-South of Africa, world famous for the Zambezi River and Victoria Falls. Its political stability, passionate people, and rich copper make this place a paradise for investment. TAZARA ran across history, witnessing the past and future of China-Zambia friendship and cooperation.

If the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan is described by Todd Hall as a 'MacGuffin', a movie plot device that serves to produce dramatic conflict between protagonists,[883] I argue that the TAZARA railway is driven by the same rationale for an opposite purpose: it is not the economic or strategic value of the railway that consolidates the friendship between China and Zambia – since both have been insignificant – but rather the role of the railway as a tangible object of friendship. There has been continuous interest from the Chinese government and scholars on the historical legacy of the TAZARA.[884] These studies reiterate the official discourse of China-Africa relations as characterised by the dedication and even sacrifice of the Chinese people in constructing the railway. African actors also deployed the discourse but probably for a different reason. Dissatisfied with the railway authority and its services, the local communities along the railway corridor, according to Monson, 'strategically deployed the same language of freedom and socialism' to protest the station closures in 1994.[885]

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[883] Todd Hall, "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A MacGuffin?", East Asia Seminar Series, University of Oxford, 13 November 2018.

[884] See for example: Planning Department of the Foreign Ministry, *Zhongfeiguanxi Shishang de Fengbei* 中非关系史上的丰碑—援建坦赞铁路亲历者的讲述 (Grand Monument in the History of Sino-African Relations – Participant Accounts of the Tanzam Railway) (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2014); Shen Xipeng, *Zhongguo Yuanjian Tanzantielu Yanjiu* 中国援建坦赞铁路研究 (Studies of China's Aid to Tan-Zam Railway) (Hefei: Huangshan Publishing House, 2018); Zhang Yang, "美国对中国援建坦赞铁路的阻挠" (The American Obstruction to China-aid Tanzam Railway), *Contemporary China History Studies* 19, 3 (2012), pp. 65-126.

[885] Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway*, p. 5.

Since 2000, there has been an exponential scaling-up in China's financial assistance to Africa with a particular focus on infrastructure. But this time, the burden of the 'yellow man' is different from the 'white man' not because of an overt revolutionary agenda. Despite the lack of precise figures, China has made a significant contribution to Africa's most ambitious infrastructure developments. The unique feature of Chinese infrastructure financing is the direct involvement of Chinese contractors that are funded through bilateral loans from China's EXIM Bank.[886] Yet not all Chinese loans are concessional. This is distinctive from OECD's official development assistance (ODA), which is defined as 'flows to developing countries provided by official agencies which have a clear development purpose and are at least particularly concessional in nature.'[887] China's infrastructural model is intended to bring mutual benefits to both the financier and the borrower, both conceptualised as lower-income countries. Unlike OECD countries, the Chinese approach to development assistance, it is argued, is not donor driven and thus eschews any interference in domestic affairs.[888] This state-led developmental strategy has been welcomed and is seen as particularly attractive by African leaders.[889]

In Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's 'Preface' to the 2014 publication *Grand Monument in the History of Sino-African Relations*, President Xi paid homage to those Chinese experts who sacrificed their lives in constructing the Tanzam railway during

[886] Vivien Foster, *Building Bridges: China's Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2009), p. 7.
[887] See ODA Statistics Portal, http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/, accessed in November 2018.
[888] Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift*.
[889] Paul Kagame, "Why Africa welcomes the Chinese", *The Guardian*, 2 November 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/02/aid-trade-rwanda-china-west, accessed in March 2019.

his first state visit to Tanzania, which indicates the 'community of common destiny' between China and Africa.[890] The concept of a 'community of common destiny', which first appeared in Hu Jintao's report at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, best summarises Xi Jinping's 'new era' diplomacy: with the stated aim of building 'a world defined by mutual cooperation', it proposes a 'novel' approach to international relations that replaces an 'out-dated' model associated with the US and Western powers.[891] At the 70th UN General Assembly in 2015, Xi further elaborated this ideal international system from the perspectives of political partnership, security, economic development, cultural exchanges and the environment:

> We should build partnerships in which countries treat each other as equals, engage in mutual consultation and show mutual understanding ... We should create a security architecture featuring fairness, justice, joint contribution and shared benefits ... We should promote open, innovative and inclusive development that benefits all ... We should increase inter-civilization exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness and respect for differences ... We should build an ecosystem that puts mother nature and green development first.[892]

Instead of carrying its 'burden' alone, China ostensibly prefers sharing it with African partners in their pursuit of such a 'common destiny'. Based on China's own experiences, it is suggested that infrastructure investment will pave the way for broad-based economic social development and poverty alleviation.[893]

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[890] Planning Department of the Foreign Ministry, *Grand Monument in the History of Sino-African Relations*, pp. 1-2;
[891] Jacob Mardell, "The 'Community of Common Destiny' in Xi Jinping's New Era", *The Diplomat*, 25 October 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-community-of-common-destiny-in-xi-jinpings-new-era/, accessed in November 2018.
[892] "Speech by Xi Jinping at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly", *China Daily*, 30 September 2015, quoted in Denghua Zhang, "The Concept of 'Community of Common Destiny' in China's Diplomacy: Meaning, Motives and Implications", *Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies* 5, 2 (2018), pp. 196-207.
[893] James Kynge, "How the Silk Road plans will be financed", *Financial Times*, 9 May 2016.

Translated in English as the 'One Belt and One Road' initiative, BRI incorporates the overland routes for road and rail transportation ('the Silk Road Economic Belt'), as well as the sea routes ('the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road').[894] The Silk Road, which derives its name from the lucrative trade in silk carried out along its length since the Han dynasty (207 BCE-220 CE), was a critical ancient network of trade routes that connected the East and West. In a 2013 speech at Nazarbayev University, Xi declared that 'through the millennia, the people of various countries along the ancient Silk Road have jointly written a chapter of friendship that has been passed on to this very day', which showed that peoples of 'different races, beliefs and cultural backgrounds are fully capable of sharing peace and development'.[895] Peter Frankopan, historian and author of *The Silk Roads*, highlights the historical referencing of BRI as:

> … a hugely important project that seeks to rejuvenate old links across the spine of Asia. It is both transforming global trade networks and rebuilding the land based connections and pathways which spread goods, ideas and histories for millennia. As we enter the Asian Century we enter an age which poses great challenges but also offers tremendous opportunities.[896]

In a similar vein, Valerie Hansen talks of 'the enduring power of a metaphor': Historically the 'Silk Road' in fact consisted of multiple routes, along which the actual quantity of silk transported was exaggerated; moreover, there used to be a Chinese imperial military presence in Xinjiang.[897] These historical findings challenge the common perception, embraced and perpetuated by Chinese nationalists, of the Silk

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[894] "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on some major issues concerning comprehensive deepening the reform", Article 26, Section VII, 12 November 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494_7.htm, accessed in November 2018.
[895] Xi Jinping, "Promote friendship between our people and work together to build a bright future", *Xinhua*, 7 September 2013, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml, accessed in November 2018.
[896] Peter Frankopan quoted in The New Silk Road Project, https://www.thenewsilkroadproject.com/, accessed in November 2018.
[897] Valerie Hansen, "Locating the Silk Road(s) in History and Today", Global and Imperial History Research Seminar, University of Oxford, Oxford, 26 October 2018.

Road as a centralised, flourishing, and peaceful road, and demonstrate both the political utilisation of historical examples in China's contemporary infrastructural initiatives, and the tangential relationship between historical imagery and reality. It is in this context that the SGR will be examined through a triangulation of official documents, media reports and participant observation.

Except for the eastern coast of Africa, most of Sub-Saharan Africa was not integrated into what has been historically known as the Silk Road. Historical reference has frequently been made with regard to Admiral Zheng He's trip to East Africa in the 15th century as a proof of China's historical connectivity with the region. In 2005, the Chinese Embassy in Kenya published a special interview with a Kenyan archaeologist from the National Museum, Hermann Giriama (translated from his original printed name in Chinese), in memory of the 600th anniversary of Zheng He's first expedition. Titled 'Africa expects the second "Zheng He Age" to arrive', it quoted Mr Giriama:

> Zheng He's fleets were huge, which proved China's enormous national strength at that time. In stark contrast to the later exploitative Western countries, Zheng He's fleets did not oppress the weak or even colonise Africa. Nowadays the Chinese economy is developing rapidly. Kenyan and African people hope that more and more peace-loving Chinese will come to Africa for tourism and investments.[898]

Li Anshan, historian and the retired director of PKU's Center for African Studies, likewise wrote:

> Unfortunately, the peaceful and friendly diplomatic relations between Asian and African independent states did not continue. What did Vasco da Gama do in East Africa? R. R. Palmer, the famous world historian, disclosed, "Cities were devastated, ships burned at their docks, prisoners butchered and their dismembered hands, noses, and ears sent back as derisive trophies. One Brahmin mutilated in this way, was left alive to bear

[898] Lan Zhishen, "专访：非洲期待第二个"郑和时代"的到来" (Africa expects the second 'Zheng He Age' to arrive), Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Kenya, http://ke.chineseembassy.org/chn/sbgx/t204432.htm, accessed in November 2018.

> them to his people. Such, unfortunately, was India's introduction to the West." Then the scramble of Africa and colonialism followed. A Kenyan archeologist made a comment on the difference between Chinese and Portuguese contact with Africa in early times: one was equal and peaceful, the other arrogant and violent.[899]

It is without doubt that ancient China's historical encounter with Africa is today narrated in a nationalist fashion that deliberately echoes their contemporary relations.



Figure 6.6: "Zheng He – The Historic Chinese Diplomat Visited Kenya"
Source: Photo and caption online from "Brief Encounter. Of romance & railways – Kenya's SGR train ride", *Diary of a Muzungu*, 14 February 2018.

The SGR project, with Zheng He's statue installed at the Mombasa Terminus (Figure 6.6), fits perfectly into this historically framed picture of 'equal and peaceful' contact

[899] Li Anshan, "Contact Between China and Africa Before Vasco da Gama: Archaeology, Document and Historiography', *World History Studies* 2, 1 (2015), pp. 34-59.

between China and Africa.[900] Built by the China Road and Bridge Corporation between September 2014 and May 2017, the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR stretches for 472km and has 79 bridges, two major stations, with seven intermediate and 23 passing stations. This is Phase I in a long-term plan designed to link land-locked South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia and eastern DR Congo to the Indian Ocean over the next 25 years. Established in 2013, the Northern Corridor Integration Projects is a multilateral development initiative to accelerate growth in the region through improved infrastructure that will ease the movement of people, goods and services. The fact that the railway line runs parallel to the metre-gauge Uganda Railway built by the British more than a hundred years ago makes the drawing of literal parallels, both good and bad, compelling.[901] A former Chinese SOE manager and businessman told me proudly that the SGR would 'last for a century', and that 'it is written in history'.[902] Many Kenyan SGR passengers with whom I travelled on the SGR in July 2017 also highlighted new railway's convenience compared to the dysfunctional, old-fashioned 'colonial railway' (Figure 6.7). While it is unsurprising that China's advanced railway technology has surpassed its colonial counterpart, it equally signals an alternative modernity that can be positively imagined among Kenyans and which enables an ideational break from a postcolonial dependence on aging western technology.

[900] The caption of the statue states: "Zheng He – The Historic Chinese Diplomat Visited Kenya. Zheng He (1371-1433) was a great Chinese navigator and diplomat during China's Ming dynasty. Zheng commanded 7 expeditionary voyages to 30 countries and regions located in the Western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean from 1405 to 1433. During the period, Zheng's fleet paid 4 visits to Mombasa, enhancing mutual understanding between China and Kenya and strengthening China-Kenya friendly exchange."

[901] For a positive report of the SGR, see Melissa Lefkowitz, "Riding the Madaraka Express: Can a brand new, Chinese-built railway lay the tracks to Kenya's future?", *Slate*, 11 September 2017, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/09/the-madaraka-express-a-ride-on-kenyas-brand-new-chinese-built-railway.html, accessed in November 2018; for negative coverage, see Njoki Chege, "My extremely underwhelming Madaraka Express train ride", *Daily Nation*, 16 March 2018, https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/blogs/Madaraka-Express-train-ride/620-4344782-u8jtkv/index.html, accessed in November 2018.

[902] Interview with Dang Song, Nairobi, 21 November 2016.



Figure 6.7: Passengers entering the Nairobi station to take the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway
Source: Photo by author

A range of Kenyans, both non-state and state actors, have expressed enthusiasm about and participated in the development of the SGR from the construction to the operational phase, but this has generated conflict as well as cooperation. As early as January 2017, a group of Maasai youths in Narok County threatened to attack Chinese SGR construction workers after a local security officer was assaulted by one of the former. It was reported that the Chinese workers had been 'slapping local laborers'.[903] Weidi Zheng conducted interviews with local officials and youths who confronted the Chinese workers. She found that the Maasai villagers were angry that Chinese companies recruited people of Kamba ethnicity to work on their construction sites. Her informant said:

> The British used to discriminate against the Maasai. You know our Maasai are smart and strong. The British did not allow us to receive education because they were worried that we would surpass them. Instead they supported the Kikuyus, offered them good education. The Kikuyus beat us in turn, taking our lands and resources.[904]

[903] George Sayagie, "Maasai youth threaten to attack Chinese workers over assault", *Daily Nation*, 5 January 2017, https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/narok/Maasai-youth-issue-threat--to-Chinese-SGR-workers/1183318-3506998-aoi5ipz/index.html, accessed in December 2018.
[904] Interview with Weidi Zheng, Doctorate student, SOAS, Nairobi, June 2017.

Once again, the resentment expressed in this comment is constructed in comparative historical terms, drawing on the legacy of colonial rule in Kenya: the Massai youth urged the Chinese to contribute more to the local community in order to 'make them remember'.[905] It is clear that the 'collective memory' invoked by such locals does not always serve the same purposes as the official discourse of Sino-Kenyan 'historical' friendship.

Kenyan elites certainly used the SGR as a way to make people remember. Weeks before the its official launch, Caroline Mutoko, a famous Kenyan radio personality, urged President Kenyatta to name it something 'fancy' and 'easy on the mouth'.[906] The SGR's predecessor – the Uganda Railway – was known as 'The Lunatic Line' for the high cost of capital and labour during its construction: not a good reputation but catchy and memorable. At the end of May 2017, an advertisement in local newspapers unveiled the name of the SGR to be 'The Madaraka Express'. 'Madaraka' is a Swahili word for 'self-governance', and Madaraka Day is a national holiday that commemorates Kenya's independent self-governance on 1st June 1963. It is noteworthy that the TAZARA is also commonly known as the 'Great Uhuru Railway' with 'uhuru' being the Swahili word for 'freedom'. It was not a coincidence that President Kenyatta launched the new express ahead of the August 2017 General Election (Figure 6.8). 'This is a historic moment we are witnessing today because this project will transform the economy of this country and all Kenyans,' he continued, 'The foundation we are laying today will help propel the economy of this nation because we will set up special economic zones

[905] Ibid.
[906] Beatrice Obwocha, "SGR train named Madaraka Express", *Daily Nation*, 31 May 2017, https://www.nation.co.ke/news/SGR-train-named-Madaraka-Express/1056-3949074-11qjuipz/index.html, accessed in December 2018.

along the route of this railway and at the port.'[907] President Kenyatta was also keen to promote the SGR as 'the most ambitious infrastructure development in Kenya's history' in his state of the nation speech in May 2018.[908]



Figure 6.8: President Uhuru Kenyatta has opened the 472 km Standard Gauge Railway between Mombasa and Nairobi
Source: Photo online from "Mombasa – Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway opened", *Railway Gazette*,
31 May 2017.

Controversies have however continued to emerge in the Kenyan media since the SGR's launch. In August 2018, there were widespread concerns that the Kenyan government faced fiscal pressures arising from its obligations to repay Chinese loans for the railway. As Kenya already has East Africa's highest debt to GDP ratio of 57 per cent, it is

[907] Gitonga Marete, "Uhuru flags off cargo train as new era begins", *Daily Nation*, 31 May 2017, https://www.nation.co.ke/news/uhuru-flags-off-cargo-train-as-new-era-begins/1056-3949046-4jw585z/index.html, accessed in December 2018.
[908] Uhuru Kenyatta, "Remarks by His Excellency Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta, C. G. H., President and Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces of the Republic of Kenya during the State of the Nation Address at Parliament Buildings", 2 May 2018, http://www.president.go.ke/2018/05/02/remarks-by-his-excellency-hon-uhuru-kenyatta-c-g-h-president-and-commander-in-chief-of-the-defence-forces-of-the-republic-of-kenya-during-the-state-of-the-nation-address-at-parliament-buildings-n/, accessed in January 2019.

unsurprising that public anger followed the revelation that a further Sh370 billion ($3.59 billion) loan was to be negotiated to expand the SGR line.[909] In November 2018, the Auditor General to the Kenyan Ports Authority warned that Kenya risked losing its Mombasa port to China 'should the country fail to repay huge loans advanced by Chinese lenders'.[910] Kenyan newspapers also claimed that Sri Lanka's Hambantota port had been 'seized by its Chinese creditors when it failed to repay the lenders', an obvious mistake that Kenyans must try to avoid.[911] Such warnings demonstrate how quickly optimism about the capacity of infrastructural projects to bring about transformation from historical backwardness to contemporary modernity can turn into pessimism about the continuity of indebtedness and neo-colonial dependency. 'While there clearly can be long-term benefits in improving local and regional connections, upgrading transport networks and energy supplies', argues Frankopan, 'the pain of getting these wrong can be serious.'[912] It will surely take time for the consequences of China's massive overseas infrastructure construction in Africa to become more evident, as the process itself is 'history in the making'.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to achieve two goals: firstly, it contextualised the respective historical trajectories of Kenya, Zambia and China during and since the key global

[909] Wanjohi Githa, "Bill seeks to curb Kenya's big appetite for borrowing", *Daily Nation*, 31 August 2018, https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Bill-seeks-to-limit-govt-s-appetite-for-borrowing/1056-4736938-fvd2w9/index.html, accessed in December 2018.
[910] Moses Michira, "Auditor: Chinese debt could lead to loss of Mombasa port", *Standard*, 20 December 2018, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001306878/how-china-could-be-handed-mombasa-port-for-free, accessed in January 2019.
[911] Gitau Warigi, "Report about Kenya's exposure on Chinese SGR loan alarming", *Daily Nation*, 23 December 2018, https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Report-about-Kenya-exposure-on-Chinese-SGR-loan-alarming/440808-4907212-13y6k83/index.html, accessed in January 2019.
[912] Peter Frankopan, *The New Silk Roads: The Present and the Future of the World* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), p. 186.

turning point of the early 1990s. Secondly, it analysed the continued relevance of history in present-day Kenya/Zambia-China interactions via three case studies. Following the end of the Cold War, both Kenya and Zambia experienced different forms of political and economic liberalisation, as occurred elsewhere in the world. Yet no such 'dual liberalisation' took place in China: the political regime maintained its robust control over the country while gradually transforming its economy into a more market-oriented, and capital-driven entity. This 'global' China's renewed interests in Africa in the new millennium has, as a result, been less driven by a pronounced socialist political agenda than by the search for economic profits and resources. It is in this context that the bulk of the literature on 'China in Africa' has focused on economic activities such as investments and trade, but in doing so has neglected the importance of historical connections and discourses in understanding the complexity of these relationships.

Just as China's unique historical trajectory from a 'Third World' leader to a leading global economy means that it poses an attractive model for many African leaders to follow, its hybridity of socialist and capitalist features is best exemplified in the discourse of anti-imperialist nostalgia in China-Africa relations. Drawing from three case studies – Chinese copper mining in Zambia, China's medical practices in both Kenya and Zambia and the recent SGR – this chapter has analysed the ways in which the past has been differentially deployed by diverse actors to comprehend the present and contrast it to a desired future. Indeed, the title of this project 'Brotherly Strangers' has two implications: there is a rich history for 'strangers' such as China, Kenya and Zambia to draw on in their claims to be 'brotherly' and friendly; moreover, China-Africa relations are simultaneously international and interpersonal. By both

historicising and disaggregating the relations of groups of Chinese, Kenyans and Zambians, one can avoid reaching simplistic conclusions of China-in-Africa as either neo-colonial or altruistic.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of 'China in Africa' has undoubtedly captured the on-going popular imagination. But most contemporaneous observations of China's renewed interest in Africa have failed to seriously and critically engage with the historical aspects of this complex relationship. This thesis has made one of the first attempts to historicise post-colonial Kenya and Zambia's relations with the People's Republic of China from ideological, political, economic and social perspectives, encompassing encounters between Kenyans, Zambians and Chinese as well as between their states. It has analysed not only the encounters, conflicts, and dynamics of their relationships, but also the basis on which historical narratives regarding Kenya/Zambia-China relations have been constructed. In doing so, it has shed light on the historical underpinning – or lack thereof – on contemporary China-Africa relations.

In his research of African-Russian ties across three centuries, Maxim Matusevich sought to place Africa 'outside conventional geographical areas and epistemological space – not in traditional diasporic locations, and not in the context of the transatlantic or Indian Ocean slave trade'.[913] In a similar vein, this thesis has made several interdisciplinary attempts to explain the topic of African-Chinese encounters. It has rejected the methodological national(ist) histories of China, Kenya and Zambia, and instead analysed the intersections of decolonisation, the Cold War and Afro-Asian solidarity that are demonstrated in China-Africa's relations since the end of the Second World War. Indeed, three major dynamics can be identified in this transnational history.

[913] Maxim Matusevich, "Introduction. Africa and Russia: An Invisible Link", in Maxim Matusevich (ed.), *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007), pp. 7-8.

There is of course the Chinese view of global events, which was translated into practical but also ideological aspects of foreign policy. There is secondly an empirical history of what Chinese and African actors did: Beijing established contacts with, exerted influences on, and provided financial support for, African nationalists sympathetic to Communist China. But thirdly, what tends to be overlooked, and which is key to this study, were the mutual and external perceptions of ideas and values towards Sino-African engagements, especially when these concerned and were influenced by anti-Communist fears in the late colonial period. Taking this third neglected dynamic into account, the thesis has contested accounts of China's 'grand policy' in Africa for its underestimation if not ignorance of African agency, and instead has stressed the inconsistency and diversity of Chinese engagement with Africans within and beyond the state.

From the outset, ideology has been a driving force in shaping perceptions of China and Africa. According to Mao Zedong, the mission to study 'African history, geography and the socio-economic situation' was driven by an ideological need to understand 'how imperialism came, how it supressed the people, how it met people's resistance, why the resistance failed and how it is now rising.'[914] China's initial support of the anticolonial struggles in both Kenya and Zambia was however mainly channelled through its established contacts in the Eastern Bloc. Beijing's essentially class-based analysis of world revolution did not distinguish significantly between the ruling parties of Kenya and Zambia (and many other African countries who have achieved their national independence through ballot boxes). It was rather the diverse and changing

[914] Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxian* 毛泽东外交文献 (Selections of Mao Tsetung's Works on Diplomacy), quoted in Li Anshan, "African Studies in China in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Survey", *African Studies Review* 48, 1 (2005), p. 63.

visions articulated and strategies implemented by the leaders of KANU and UNIP that shaped their relations with Communist China. The historical evolution of African socialism provides a primary example of how African schools of political thought have been in constant conversations with global socialist currents. While Zambian Humanism was a catch-all term during the rule of Kaunda's UNIP, Kenyatta and the later anti-Odinga coalition within KANU preferred the slogan of 'African socialism' much more than its substance or ethos. The varied interpretations of socialist ideas and practices by African states, manifesting the ideological currents during the Cold War, had enduring impacts on their respective relations with China.

The category of 'race' was however subsumed within the priorities of Communist China's anti-colonial and anti-imperialist discourse. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, China's supposedly 'alternative' ideological approach to Marxism-Leninism in the form of Maoism became increasingly attractive to African leaders, most of whom focused on transforming their backward agrarian economies into industrial societies led by one form of state intervention or another. For the Soviet Union, the potential for their Chinese counterparts to unite the 'Third World' on the basis of an anti-white racial perspective was a huge concern. But the usefulness of the Sino-African shared experience of being non-white was overstated by Chinese leaders, whose country had a limited historical legacy of multi-racialism. Given the largely limited social interactions between ordinary Africans and Chinese, mutual processes of imaginations driven by curiosity were articulated through cultural manifestations such as literature and theatres, which further contributed to stereotypes and misconceptions of each other. Partly as a result, a backlash against China's powerful discourse of shared colonial

victimhood occurred when China's leadership of the Third World came under challenge in the period of post-socialist reform.[915]

Africa, following its essential invisibility in world politics during the colonial period, was 'discovered' by a generation of diplomats, journalists, experts, and intelligence officers from the various Cold War powers. Operating from a position of limited existing knowledge and with access to limited intelligence, these men tended to draw dogmatist, facile conclusions about Africa and Africans, informed by their own nationalist, ideological or racist dispositions. From the late 1950s onwards, such experts experienced and shared a pandemic fear of Communist subversion across the continent, which was informed by heightened fears of socialist and/or communist successes. For example, the Zanzibar Revolution in 1964 convinced the US that the islands would serve as a subversive base for the region as well as an "'African model' of their own revolutionary tactics'.[916] However, against the Western assumption that China was encouraging Kenyan radicals to deliver revolutionary gains, the Chinese Foreign Ministry had in fact advised its embassy in Nairobi not to impose any regime change. Yet this initial constraint by Chinese diplomats in relation to Kenyan affairs was disrupted by domestic developments in the form of the launch of the Cultural Revolution. Kenyan leaders were themselves poorly informed about the basis of the CCP's power struggles between the 'Mao clique' and the reformists in the late 1970s. Kaunda's government, although better informed of political developments in Beijing, itself underestimated the potential for China to transform itself in the wake of Mao's death.

[915] Sautman, "Anti-Black Racism in Post-Mao China", p. 414.
[916] Thomas Burgess, "A Socialist Diaspora: A li Sultan Issa, the Soviet Union, and the Zanzibari Revolution", in Matusevich (ed.), *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters*, p. 264.

There is no doubt that understanding African politics exclusively through the ideological lens has its limits. This thesis has made a sustained assessment of the varied forces and factors that shaped the complex and contested engagements between independent African countries and China. While it makes no attempt to provide an analysis that is representative of the African continent as a whole, the comparative approach of studying Kenya and Zambia's engagements with China nonetheless reveals the structural differences in their domestic and foreign politics that were informed but are also shaped by the global ideological confrontation of the Cold War period. The resulting contestation of power should not simply translate into foreign manipulation. Facing similar challenges of state-building and economic development, the newly independent nations of Kenya and Zambia approached, deepened and even negotiated their relations with China as they searched for both ideological and material support in achieving these goals.

However, these countries' diverse engagements with Communist China subsequently diverged. Kenyan leaders took strategic advantage of the Cold War tensions, utilising it to denigrate dissidents and their domestic opponents, while at the same time pursuing an ostensibly non-aligned but essentially pro-Western foreign policy. By its connections with and support for Odinga Odinga, the Chinese official presence in Kenya was effectively scapegoated by KANU leaders as a threat to Jomo Kenyatta's government. This case shows that African heads of state and their supporters were adept at manipulating the limited external threat to their benefit.

The case of Zambia serves in this thesis to illustrate the fundamental role of geopolitics in determining the priorities of a relatively young African nation. Threatened by its hostile southern neighbours, Zambia under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party maintained friendly relations with China for both ideological and pragmatic reasons. The turbulent process of decolonisation in the region of southern Africa was exacerbated by ambitious, manipulative foreign patrons with conflicting global interests.[917] In contrast to the Soviet Union and Cuba's direct interventions in the liberation movements, China's influences were generally limited and mediated through its regional allies, Tanzania and Zambia. China's willingness to construct a transnational railway between these two countries was therefore primarily a strategic rather than an economic one. The prioritisation of geopolitical interests over domestic economic calculation was also a key feature of Zambia's 'extraverted' disposition. Chapter Five shows that China's geopolitical expansion in Asia was critically received by certain Zambian officials in 1980 reflected their own experience of being threatened by powerful neighbours such as UDI Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa. In summary, the distinctive historical experiences of these relations and the variation in China's relations with specific African states – demonstrated by the comparison between Kenya and Zambia – challenge both the 'taken for granted' role of the China-Africa historical lineage in contemporary studies, as well as their tendency to assume uniformity in these relationships.

By comparing Kenya and Zambia's relations with China, this thesis also attempts to understand two contrasting state perspectives underlining the much cited but little

[917] Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War*; Saunders and Onslow, "The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1976–1990", pp. 222-243; DeRoche, *Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa*.

explained concept of 'African agency'.[918] Bearing in mind the danger of separating ideology from national and/or economic interests, this thesis has nonetheless illustrated the complex and sometimes contradictory nature of the Cold War in Africa. China's changing global image, from a leader of the Third World to an economic superpower, has been interpreted and engaged with by African states and elites that were simultaneously experiencing their own processes of historical change. It can be argued that the KANU governments of both President Kenyatta and President Moi have pursued a consistently pragmatic foreign agenda. Despite political tensions and ideological rifts with China since the mid-1960s, Sino-Kenyan trade continued to grow steadily. China's tacit alliance with the West from the second half of the 1970s gave greater assurance for Moi's government to strengthen bilateral cooperation with China. Above all, it was material and economic gains that informed Kenya's approach to its external relations in general and China in particular. Since their economies remained closely aligned with and subordinate to Western powers, developing nations had little incentive to overturn their existing global relationships in favour of a doctrine of radical anti-imperialism. In this respect, China's contemporary widespread involvements in infrastructural projects such as the SGR carries with it, for African countries, the risk of bringing about not only development but also indebtedness and a new form of neo-colonial dependency.

In contrast, China-Zambia relations under President Kaunda were cordial despite their political differences. Zambian leaders maintained a relative high consensus that any alleged Chinese Communist threat would not be allowed to fuel power struggles within

[918] Ampiah and Sanusha (eds.), *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China*; Mohan and Lampert, "Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into China-Africa Relations", pp. 92-110.

UNIP. The case study of Zambia's maize deal with China revealed the discrepancy between the stated ambition and limited practical agency of many African countries in materialising their national interests vis-à-vis Cold War protagonists. China's Maoist model, once an important influence on UNIP's pursuit of sustained economic development under the leadership of a one-party state, lost credibility by the end of the 1970s with the launch of China's grand reform. Tensions also arose as China's construction of the 'Uhuru' Railway failed to deliver satisfactory economic results in exchange for the debt burden incurred by Zambia. It can then be seen that ideology-driven political friendship provided a potentially fragile basis for bilateral relations in a fast-changing and unpredictable international environment. The difficulties encountered during the recent experience of Chinese mining in Zambia have been contained in part because of expectations for a promised future that are rooted in a nostalgic sense of a better past.

To understand the nature and scope of African agency, the thesis has disaggregated Kenya and Zambia's state perspectives by investigating their respective modalities and incentives that informed their foreign-policy making. In all three countries, the ruling party played a no less significant role than the national government in shaping China-Africa relations. The Chinese Communist Party's support for independence struggles in Africa throughout the Cold War can be partly explained by its own historical trajectory. The success of the CCP in defeating both foreign and domestic enemies owed much to its success in establishing a united front across regional, class, and ethnic divides. Thus, its leaders drew on this experience in its belief (sharply contrasting to the Soviet Union) that the people of the 'Third World', regardless of such divides should be united against imperialist enemies. Both Kenya and Zambia's ruling parties

were closely involved in the provision of knowledge, manpower, and resources in engaging with China during the time period under examination. In a context in which there was limited capacity to gather intelligence and facilitate communication, personal connections and networks served as the most effective channel for Chinese and Africans to establish their initial contacts. Beijing's initial choice of Oginga Odinga as a close Kenyan ally was a reaction to the fact that Tom Mboya had already become a client of the US. But when the ruling party failed to maintain its own unity, external links could become counterproductive. Odinga's later expulsion from KANU and the formation of his own opposition party had the effect of pushing Beijing to adopt a more antagonistic position against the Kenyatta government, severely damaging the countries' political (though not economic) relationship. Kenya's attitudes towards China only improved when Moi used his 1980 visit to China to pacify challenges to his rule from both within and outside KANU.

While foreign patronage is certainly a risky venture for any party, it was (and remains) especially dangerous for opposition party and leaders, opening them up to charges of being puppets of external interests. However, a robust party-state such as that of Zambia's Second Republic (1972-1991) was also not an automatic guarantee for diplomatic success. Zambia's political terrain in the late 1970s was marked by increasing divisions between technocratic officials and radical 'freedom fighters' within UNIP, with the former secretly discussing a potential coup to overthrow Kaunda's government. A parallel struggle can also be identified in the post-Mao CCP, where a group of middle-aged intellectuals and technocrats, for example Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, was promoted by Deng to carry out bold reforms. The fact that Deng's faction represented the interests of both technocrats and nationalist vanguards was

however dismissed by UNIP's Research Bureau in its analysis of change in China: by following a dogmatic Marxist-Leninist class analysis, it reached the false conclusion that Mao's handpicked heir Hua Guofeng had consolidated his power against 'the rightists led by Deng Xiaoping'. The ideological divergence between two parties in the early 1980s limited China's support of Zambia's position on matters related to southern Africa.

With its primary focus on economic activities such as investments and trade, the existing literature on 'China in Africa' has neglected the importance of historical connections and discourses in understanding the complexity of these relationships. Following the end of the Cold War, both Kenya and Zambia experienced different forms of the political and economic liberalisation implemented in much of the wider world. Yet no such 'dual liberalisation' took place in China: the political regime maintained its robust control over the country while gradually transforming its economy into a more market-oriented and capital-driven entity. This 'global' China's renewed interests in Africa in the new millennium has, as a result, been driven not by a pronounced socialist political agenda but rather by the search for economic profits and resources. Just as China's unique historical trajectory from a 'Third World' leader to a leading global economy means that it poses an attractive model for many African leaders to follow, its hybridity of socialist and capitalist features is best exemplified in the discourse of anti-imperialist nostalgia in China-Africa relations, a discourse which however only partly conceals the evident contradictions in these relationships.

This thesis has problematized the distinction in these relationships between the 'past' and the 'present'. As the experience of China-Kenya/Zambia relations over five

decades indicates, history has played a significant role in constructing, reshaping and negotiating their mutual expectations through contemporary engagements. To achieve this, this thesis has sought to recapture the missing voices of many ordinary Chinese and Africans who experienced, participated and shaped these historical trajectories. In doing so, this thesis has analysed the ways in which the past has been differentially deployed by diverse actors to comprehend the present and contrast it to a desired future. The unproblematic past deployed in public rhetoric, although facilitating official relations between China and Zambia, has suffered from a backlash in which the daily encounters of Chinese and Zambians were affected by their perceptions of each other, shaped as they have been by both history as event and its contemporary deployment as myth. On the other hand, the deployment of history in Sino-Kenyan relations has been less benign given their diplomatic deterioration in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s, and thus explains the predominantly profit-driven and present-minded dynamics of both state and individual interactions today.

In conclusion, the title of this project 'Brotherly Strangers' has two implications: there is a rich history for 'strangers' such as China, Kenya and Zambia to draw on in their claims to be 'brotherly' and friendly; moreover, China-Africa relations should be understood as simultaneously international and interpersonal. By both historicising and disaggregating the relations of groups of Chinese, Kenyans and Zambians, the thesis rejects simplistic understandings of 'China-in-Africa' as either neo-colonial or altruistic, but instead as driven by complicated, sometimes contradictory and historically informed rationales. This thesis will hopefully contribute to, inspire and encourage future interventions of a similar kind.

Appendix I: Data of overseas Chinese in Africa

Region	Number of overseas Chinese	Source of information
Mauritius	17,851	June 1952 census by Malagasy government
Union of South Africa[919]	5,600	Reported by returned overseas Chinese from South Africa in 1954
Madagascar	5,378	1949 Malagasy government survey, reported by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1950
Reunion	5,000	Reported by returned overseas Chinese from South Africa and Madagascar in 1954
Mozambique	1,500	Reported by returned overseas Chinese from Madagascar in 1954
Rodrigues[920]	400	Reported by returned overseas Chinese from Madagascar in 1954
Uganda and Tanganyika	250	Reported by Chiang Kai-shek's consul in the Malagasy Uprising in 1950
Seychelles	200	Reported by Chiang Kai-shek's consul in the Malagasy Uprising in 1950

[919] Union of South Africa is the historic predecessor to the present-day Republic of South Africa. It came into being on 31 May 1910 with the unification of four previously separate British colonies: the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Orange River colonies. It included the territories formerly part of the Boer republics annexed in 1902, the South African Republic and the Orange Free State.

[920] Rodrigues is a 108-square-kilometre (42 sq mi) autonomous outer island of the Republic of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, about 560 kilometres (350 mi) east of Mauritius. It is part of the Mascarene Islands which include Mauritius and Réunion.

Central African Federation	166	Survey of overseas Chinese in Southern Rhodesia conducted by Chiang Kai-shek's consul in Madagascar in 1945
Kenya	50	Reported by Chiang Kai-shek's consul in the Malagasy Uprising in 1950
Egypt	22	Reported by Chiang Kai-shek's consul based in Alexandra in 1947
Zanzibar	20	Reported by Chiang Kai-shek's consul in the Malagasy Uprising in 1950
Congo	2	Reported by the central government's Chief Information Office in 1950
Africa in total	36,439	

Source: Society for the Studies of Chinese Overseas 华侨问题研究会, *Yafei diqu Huaqiao qingkuang jieshao* 亚非地区华侨情况介绍 (Introduction of Overseas Chinese in Asia and Africa), (1955).

Appendix II: Kenya's trade with China, 1962-1980 (K. Sh.)

Year	Imports	Exports	Re-exports	Visible balance
1962	165,400	1,071,280	-	905,880
1963	687,780	3,409,420	-	2,721,640
1964	1,895,420	7,274,500	-	5,379,080
1965	13,912,380	7,877,940	4,725 (K£)	- 6,029,715
1966	22,883,520	12,559,740	-	- 10,323,780
1967	17,517,220	21,848,840	-	4,331,620
1968	38,879,000	18,615,040	-	- 20,263,960
1969	31,834,380	8,739,880	-	- 23,094,500
1970	23,022,276	9,533,216	-	- 13,489,060
1971	24,253,496	12,378,994	-	- 11,874,502
1972	28,692,925	17,517,650	-	- 11,175,275
1973	24,267,720	32,368,539	-	8,100,819
1974	32,252,157	61,405,474	-	29,153,317
1975	83,715,230	35,692,624	-	- 48,022,606
1976	27,835,833	27,908,294	-	72,461
1977	61,098,375	8,258,122	-	- 52,840,253
1978	116,282,528	29,200,727	52,800	- 87,029,001
1979	102,063,745	53,958,495	-	- 48,105,250
1980	81,110,328	37,321,947	849,270	- 42,939,111



Chart by author.

Source: KNA, External Trade-Trade with China, 1963-1980, KETA/7/17.

Appendix III: Kenya's trade with China, 1964-1976 (K£'000)

Year	Net imports	Exports and Re-exports	Visible balance
1964	696	394	- 302
1965	954	633	- 321
1966	1,944	931	- 1,013
1967	876	1,092	+ 216
1968	1,592	437	- 1,155
1969	1,151	477	- 674
1970	1,213	619	- 594
1971	1,435	876	- 559
1972	1,219	1,618	399
1973	1,677	3,070	1,393
1974	4,627	1,785	- 2,842
1975	1,471	1,395	-76
1976	3,055	413	- 2,642
1977	5,814	1,460	- 4,354
1978	5,103	2,702	- 2,401
1979	4,804	1,959	- 2,845
1980	7,608	1,956	- 5,652



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Source: Statistical Abstract (1967, 1977, 1979, 1981), by Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development.

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