Zeus on the stud farm?

Against a Homeric instance of *attractio relativi*

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Abstract

The genitive ἧς at *Iliad* 5.265 is sometimes considered due to *attractio relativi*. Alternatively it is taken as a partitive or ablatival genitive, or emended. The question matters for Greek linguistic chronology because uncontroversial *attractio relativi* is not found until the fifth century BC. This paper addresses the question via a fresh examination of the syntax and sense of lines 265–9. The linguistically most plausible views are: (i) we should not understand εἰσίν with τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς, nor punctuate strongly after 267; (ii) ἧς should stand, and is a partitive genitive; (iii) οὕνεκα means 'because'. The resulting interpretation implies that Zeus accessed some pre-existing stock of horses, otherwise unknown to Greek literature. For many scholars this is a fatal objection to ἧς as a partitive genitive, with some concluding that ἧς is due to *attractio relativi* or corrupt, and others that ἧς is an 'ablatival genitive' (a suggestion that does not solve the perceived problem). This paper defends the partitive genitive analysis on the grounds that Homeric audiences could easily have imagined Zeus getting the horses from some pre-existing stock. Parallels support the plausibility of this background assumption. We do not have a Homeric instance of *attractio relativi*.

Keywords

Greek language; Homer; relative clauses; *attractio relativi*; Homeric horses; *Iliad* 5.265–9

1. Introduction

At *Iliad* 5.265–9 Diomedes explains to Sthenelos why Aeneas' horses will be worth capturing: they are descended from horses which Zeus once gave to Tros, via a trick which Aeneas' father, Anchises, played on Tros' grandson, Laomedon.[1] In order not to prejudice

[1] West (2011: 157) suggests that lines 265–72 originally came after 223, where they would have been spoken by Aeneas, and that the poet moved them later to their current location. I do not address this question, but take it that whether or not this view is accepted, the poet thought the verses suitable to their current location.

matters to be discussed, the text is shown here with the sign '#' where the choice of punctuation mark will depend on views taken about the syntax and sense. The translation follows the Greek line for line as far as feasible, and leaves various options open for discussion:

(1) *τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς, ἧς Τρωΐ περ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς*
'For (they are?) from that breed (of?) which far-seeing Zeus

δῶχ' υἱὸς ποινὴν Γανυμήδεος # οὕνεκ' ἄριστοι
gave to Tros as a price for his son Ganymede # Therefore/because/for-which-reason they are the best

ἵππων, ὅσσοι ἔασιν ὑπ' ἠῶ τ' ἠέλιόν τε #
of all the horses there are under the dawn and sun #

τῆς γενεῆς ἔκλεψεν ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγχίσης,
From/from that breed Anchises lord of men stole,

λάθρῃ Λαομέδοντος ὑποσχὼν θήλεας ἵππους· (*Il.* 5.265–9)
putting mares under them without Laomedon knowing.'

The syntactic analysis, punctuation, and interpretation of this passage depend on the answers to three questions: (i) whether to understand *εἰσίν* with *τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς* in line 265, and to put strong punctuation at the end of 267; (ii) whether to read *ἧς*, as transmitted, in line 265, and if so, how to understand this genitive; (iii) whether to understand *οὕνεκα* in line 266 as meaning 'because' (introducing a subordinate clause), 'therefore' (introducing a main clause), or 'for which reason' (introducing a subordinate clause). This article will provide a fresh examination of all three problems, and will conclude that the following combination of views is the most plausible on linguistic grounds: (i) we should not understand *εἰσίν*, nor put strong punctuation at the end of 267; (ii) we should read *ἧς*, taking this as a partitive genitive; (iii) *οὕνεκα* here means 'because'. It has, however, been objected on grounds of content that *ἧς* cannot be a partitive genitive; an answer to this objection will be proposed. The matter is important for Greek linguistic chronology, because our passage is sometimes taken as the main contender for an instance of *attractio relativi* as early as Homer (see section 3 below).

We shall begin by taking the three grammatical questions in turn. For our main concern least hangs on question (i), but we shall take this question first because questions (ii) and (iii) are easiest to discuss once a decision has been made on the punctuation of the passage.

2. Whether to understand *εἰσίν*

Most editors punctuate with a full stop or high point at the end of 267, taking *εἰσίν* as implicit in line 265: 'For they are from that breed...'.[2] Monro (1906), on the other hand, prints a comma at the end of 267, as do Monro and Allen (1920). Their view on this point is due to Bekker (1863–72: ii. 12), who suggested that lines 265–7 consist of an antecedent[3] (*τῆς…γενεῆς*) followed by a long relative clause (*ἧς Τρωΐ περ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς | δῶχ' υἱος ποινὴν Γανυμήδεος, οὕνεκ' ἄριστοι | ἵππων, ὅσσοι ἔασιν ὑπ' ἠῶ τ' ἠέλιόν τε*), with *τῆς γενεῆς* in 268 resuming the antecedent again after the long relative clause. On Bekker's view, the structure is parallel to examples such as (2) and (3) (shown here with antecedent and resumption in bold, and with the relative clause and associated material underlined):[4]

(2) *τοῦ μὲν ἅμαρθ', ὃ δ' ἔπειτα* **Λυκόφρονα Μάστορος υἱόν**,
Αἴαντος θεράποντα Κυθήριον, ὅς ῥα παρ' αὐτῷ
ναῖ', ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα κατέκτα Κυθήροισι ζαθέοισιν,
τόν ῥ' ἔβαλεν κεφαλὴν ὑπὲρ οὔατος ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ… (*Il.* 15.430–3)
'Him he missed, but then he [verb still to come] **Lycophron the son of Mastor, Ajax' Cytherean companion**, who used to live with him, since he had killed a man in holy Cythera—**him** he struck with sharp bronze, on the head above the ear...'

(3) ***κούρην***, ἣν ἄρα μοι γέρας ἔξελον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν,
δουρὶ δ' ἐμῷ κτεάτισσα, πόλιν εὐτείχεα πέρσας,
τὴν ἄψ ἐκ χειρῶν ἕλετο κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων… (*Il.* 16.56–8)
'**The girl** whom the sons of the Achaeans picked out for me as a gift of honour, and whom I won with my spear, having sacked a well-walled city—**that (girl)** lordly Agamemnon took out of my hands again.'

Bekker's main argument for seeing this type of structure in passage (1) is unconvincing. He thought that if line 268 began a new sentence, we might have expected some sentence

[2] So Leaf (1900), but see his note *ad loc*.; Ameis and Hentze (1908); van Thiel (1996); West (1998).
[3] Depending on how the term 'antecedent' is defined, one might not wish to consider the demonstrative *τῆς* part of the 'antecedent', strictly speaking, but for present purposes this is not important.
[4] Further examples e.g. at *Il.* 1.300–1, 5.76–81, 6.271–3, 6.425–7, 11.122–7, 16.463–5, 17.306–9, 18.444–5; striking examples at *Il.* 13.427–35 and 17.610–7.

connective to join line 268 to what precedes: *ταύτης γὰρ γενεῆς…*, *καὶ γὰρ τῆς γενεῆς…*, or *τῆς περ δὴ γενεῆς…*, rather than simply *τῆς γενεῆς*.[5] But a sentence that concludes a Homeric digression may lack a sentence connective even if what precedes is syntactically complete.[6]

However, a different point strongly supports Bekker's view. If we punctuate strongly after line 267 then *τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς* comprises not only a complete main clause, but one with an unexpressed subject 'they' and unexpressed copula 'are'. Homeric nominal clauses (clauses with an unexpressed 'is' or 'are') usually have an overt subject if they have a logical subject and predicate at all; exceptions are rare except where the nominal clause has the same subject as the immediately preceding clause.[7] In addition, nominal clauses with a possessive, partitive or ablatival genitive as predicate are very rare, not only in Homer but down to classical Greek.[8]

The opening *τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς* is therefore unlikely to be heard as a complete main clause: it creates an expectation that there is more of the main clause coming. Since passages such as (2) and (3) suggest a possible structure in which there is indeed more of the main clause to come, our passage is best taken as structured like passages (2) and (3).

The expression *τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς*, then, is only the beginning of a main clause. Instead of proceeding to finish the main clause Diomedes first adds a relative clause and a *οὕνεκα-*

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[5] We might add to this list *ταύτης τοι γενεῆς*. Whether or not we consider *τοι* a 'sentence connective', this expression is actually attested as the beginning of a new sentence that rounds off a digression. At *Il.* 6.152–211 Glaukos starts to tell his genealogy, digresses with the story of Bellerophon, returns to his genealogy, and ends with his father's advice to act as befits his lineage. He concludes with line 211, *ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος εὔχομαι εἶναι* 'From *this* lineage and blood I declare that I am'. Compare the very similar use of the same verse at *Il.* 20. 241. LSJ (s.v. *τοι*) recognise here a 'recapitulating' use of *τοι*.

[6] At the beginning of *Odyssey* 9, Odysseus begins to respond to Alcinous' request that he tell his story. Before getting to the story proper, Odysseus comments that it is good to listen to a bard like Demodocus, and then digresses for several lines on how good it is in general when people are feasting and listening to a bard. Before getting on to the subject Alcinous has asked about, he rounds off this digression with a new sentence, line 11: *τοῦτό τί μοι κάλλιστον ἐνὶ φρεσὶν εἰδέται εἶναι* 'This seems to my mind to be a very fine thing.' Compare e.g. *Il.* 4.109 (where *τοῦ* could, in principle, be relative rather than demonstrative, but a demonstrative analysis is more likely); *Od.* 7.13 (with the same ambiguity in principle), in our passage (6).

[7] Clauses that arguably (although not uncontroversially) lack a logical subject-predicate structure consist primarily of assertions of existence (e.g. *εἴ περ ἀνάγκη* 'if (there is) necessity', *Il.* 24.667). For discussion see Lanérès (1994: i. 129–137). Of the nominal clauses listed by Lanérès (1994: ii. 689) for *Iliad* 1–4, I count 43 clauses with a logical subject and predicate (discounting examples with *χρή* as subject, since *χρή* is arguably a verb in synchronic terms). Of these, 36 have an expressed subject. Six of the others share their subject with the immediately preceding clause (*Il.* 2.38, 2.202, 2.218, 2.528, 3.193, 3.214); some of these should probably not be considered clauses at all (cf. Lanérès 1994: i. 170–171). The remaining example is *Il.* 1.231, *δημοβόρος βασιλεύς* '(You are) a king who devours the people').

[8] Guiraud (1962: 162–163, 207).

clause. At this point, the opening of the main clause is very distant. Instead of simply completing the main clause, the speaker helps the listener by making a new start, and this time proceeding much more succinctly:[9] *τῆς γενεῆς ἔκλεψεν ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγχίσης, | λάθρῃ Λαομέδοντος ὑποσχὼν θήλεας ἵππους·*

3. How to understand *ἧς*, and whether to read it at all

The form *ἧς* in line 265 looks, at first sight, like an instance of *attractio relativi*, or case attraction of the relative pronoun, well known from classical examples such as (4). The relative pronoun here takes the case of its antecedent (the genitive case of *τῶν δώρων*) rather than the one appropriate to its role within the relative clause (accusative case, appropriate to its role as object of *λαμβάνουσιν*):

(4) *φράσον δέ μοι, τίς ἡ ὠφελία τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων <u>ὧν</u> παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν*; (Pl., *Euthphr.* 14e)
'But tell me, what benefit do the gods get from the gifts <u>which</u> they receive from us?'

In our Homeric passage, if the relative pronoun is taken to represent the direct object of *δῶκ(ε)* '(he) gave', we might expect it to stand in the accusative. Instead, it stands in the same case as its antecedent *τῆς γενεῆς* 'that breed'.

If this is indeed an instance of *attractio relativi* then, as already mentioned, it has some importance for Greek linguistic chronology. The first certain examples of *attractio relativi* appear in the fifth century B.C.,[10] but our passage has convinced several scholars that *attractio relativi* can be found as early as Homer.[11]

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[9] On the discourse function of this type of structure in oral narrative see Polanyi (1978); for its use in Homer see Bakker (1997: 107–108); Probert (2015: section 14.2).

[10] See Probert (2015: section 7.2). For earlier bibliography see especially Förster (1868: 43–57), and cf. Rösler (1906: 8–9) and Hermann (1912: 237–243). For present purposes the term 'attractio relativi' should be taken to exclude the following (on which see Probert 2015: sections 7.2.1.1–7.2.1.3): (i) expressions of comparison involving a form of *ὅσος* or *οἷος* and no verb: *τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα | εὗρον <u>ὅσην τ' ὄρεος κορυφήν</u>* 'they found his wife, <u>as tall as the peak of a mountain</u>' (*Od.* 10. 112–13); (ii) expressions of the type *ἀνδρῶν ὄμματα θέλγει | <u>ὧν ἐθέλῃ</u>* (*sc. ὄμματα θέλγειν*) 'he lulls to sleep the eyes of men <u>of whom he wants (to lull the eyes to sleep)</u>' (*Il.* 24.343–4), in which the case of the relative pronoun is due to an infinitive understood in the relative clause; (iii) subordinators of the type *ἐξ οὗ* 'since', consisting of a preposition plus the associated case of the relative pronoun.

[11] So Bernhardy (1829: 301); Wackernagel (1926–8: i. 55) = Wackernagel and Langslow (2009: 77); Schwyzer and Debrunner (1950: 640); Meillet and Vendryes (1953: 640). Langslow at Wackernagel and Langslow (2009: 77 n. 15) leaves open the possibility that we have *attractio relativi* here, but notes that this is not the only possibility.

However, even Greek authors who clearly use *attractio relativi* rarely do so in relative clauses as internally complex as our example.[12] Moreover, *ποινήν* in line 266 would be in the wrong case, because relative-clause-internal nouns and adjectives standing in a predicative relationship to the relative pronoun take the same case as the relative pronoun, whether or not there is *attractio relativi*.[13] Occasional exceptions or apparent exceptions have been found, but they are extremely rare and not early.[14] Emendation of *ποινήν* to *ποινῆς* has not, as far as I am aware, been suggested; but it would in any case be extremely unattractive, since solid support for *attractio relativi* in Homer would be desirable before a passage is emended into a better example of *attractio relativi* than it is.

If *ἧς* is read, from a grammatical point of view the far more straightforward analysis is as a partitive genitive, as first proposed by Lobeck (1835: 274n). As a partitive genitive, *ἧς* would indicate a whole-and-part relationship between the breed and the horses that Zeus gave to Tros: 'they are of that breed from which Zeus gave (some horses) to Tros...'. Against this analysis Bekker (1863–72: ii. 12–13), followed by Förster (1868: 46–47), objected to the implication that Zeus took the horses he gave to Tros from some pre-existing stock, of which we otherwise hear nothing. Bekker suggested the emendation *ἥν*, and was again followed by Förster (1868: 46–49). This emendation would avoid the grammatical and chronological difficulties of the solution with *attractio relativi*, while also avoiding the interpretative difficulty of the solution with a partitive genitive. Zeus would have given Tros the whole breed, and therefore the breed itself need not have existed before this event: Zeus would simply have created the horses on the spot.

Bekker and Förster did not convince subsequent scholars to emend the text. As already mentioned, some scholars have continued to take *ἧς* as an instance of *attractio relativi*. A different line is taken by both Monro and Chantraine, who simply state in their respective Homeric grammars that *ἧς* is a partitive genitive. They explicitly reject the explanation in terms of *attractio relativi* but do not record their responses to the perceived problem that a partitive genitive interpretation implies some pre-existing stock of horses, and that if this existed we might have heard a bit more about it in extant Greek literature.[15] (Probably they

[12] So rightly Förster (1868: 47–49).
[13] So, again rightly, Förster (1868: 48); Hahn (1964: 128 n. 66). Schwyzer and Debrunner (1950: 640) take *ἧς* to be an example of *attractio relativi*, but they note the anomalous *ποινήν* with an exclamation mark. For further bibliography see also Probert (2015: ch. 7, n. 38).
[14] See Probert (2015: ch. 7, n. 39) for bibliography on X., *Cyr.* 3.1.34 and Arist., *Juv.* 468a25, and for the view that at least the second of these passages is not a genuine example.
[15] Monro (1891: 246); Chantraine (1986–8: ii. 237); likewise Hahn (1964: 128 n. 66).

consider this a non-problem, and we shall effectively agree, but we shall try to lay the problem to rest via an actual argument for their position.) A third group of scholars have accepted a suggestion of Ameis and Hentze (1882: 92) that the problem disappears if *ἧς* is considered an "Ablativ des Ursprungs", with the sense being "von der Stammart, Race" ("Race" is the orthographic form used).[16] However, as long as any implication that Zeus got the horses from some pre-existing stock is perceived as a problem (Ameis and Hentze make clear that they would indeed perceive this as a problem) it does not help to label *ἧς* an 'ablative of origin'.[17] If Zeus gave Tros horses from some breed, the implication is that there was some such breed.[18] Indeed, little is to be gained by trying to distinguish here between 'ablatival' and 'partitive' genitive.

Should we emend the text after all? Or simply accept that Homer does not wish us to worry too much about the location of Zeus' stud farm? Uncontroversially, we should not worry about every detail that Homer chooses not to go into. However, in this case I believe that a stronger case can be made for the transmitted text, and for a partitive genitive interpretation (rather than a genitive by case attraction), by considering ways in which Zeus might actually have got the horses from some pre-existing stock. In so doing we will not be trying to determine where the horses 'really' came from, but what kinds of possibilities or background assumptions might have led Homer's audiences to find a partitive genitive acceptable. We shall return to this question in section 5.

4. The meaning of *οὕνεκα*

In Homer *οὕνεκα* usually means 'because'. Since *οὕνεκα* is clearly a combination of *οὗ* and *ἕνεκα* one might have expected, instead, the meaning 'because of which, because of whom'. When uncontracted *οὗ εἵνεκα* or *τοῦ εἵνεκα* occurs in Homer, the meaning is always indeed 'because of which' or 'because of whom'.[19] For *οὕνεκα*, however, by far the usual meaning is

[16] So Leaf (1900: 212) and Kirk (1990: 87), who call the genitive 'ablatival'; cf. Langslow's note at Wackernagel and Langslow (2009: 77 n. 15).
[17] Ameis and Hentze in fact appear to conflate two questions here: the function of the genitive *ἧς*, and that of the preceding *τῆς…γενεῆς*.
[18] If *γενεή* could denote a substance thought to embody genealogy, like blood (or as we would say DNA) one might consider the possibility of a genitive of material, with Zeus taking some particularly good *γενεή*-substance and fashioning some horses out of it. But I can find no evidence for such a use of *γενεᾱ́*/*γενεή*. Furthermore, a verb with a dependent genitive of material normally denotes some sort of 'making' (see Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904: i. 376; Schwyzer and Debrunner 1950: 128).
[19] *οὗ εἵνεκα* at *Il.* 2.138, 18.171; *τοῦ εἵνεκα* at *Il.* 3.87 = 7.374 = 7.388; *Od.* 3.140, 16.188.

'because'.[20] In other words *οὕνεκα* normally introduces a causal clause, as in passages (5) and (6):[21]

(5) *τοῖσι δὲ τεῦχε κυκειῶ ἐϋπλόκαμος Ἑκαμήδη,*
τὴν ἄρετ' ἐκ Τενέδοιο γέρων, ὅτ' ἔπερσεν Ἀχιλλεύς,
θυγατέρ' Ἀρσινόου μεγαλήτορος, ἣν οἱ Ἀχαιοί
ἔξελον, <u>οὕνεκα</u> βουλῇ ἀριστεύεσκεν ἁπάντων·
ἣ σφωϊν πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιπροΐηλε τράπεζαν… (*Il.* 11.624–8)
'And fair-haired Hecamede made them a drink, (Hecamede) whom the old man had carried off from Tenedos when Achilles sacked it: great-hearted Arsinous' daughter, whom the Achaeans had picked out for him (Nestor), <u>because</u> he was the best of everybody in counsel. She firstly put before them a table...'

(6) *αὐτὴ δ' ἐς θάλαμον ἐὸν ἤϊε· δαῖε δέ οἱ πῦρ*
γρηῢς Ἀπειραίη, θαλαμηπόλος Εὐρυμέδουσα,
τήν ποτ' Ἀπείρηθεν νέες ἤγαγον ἀμφιέλισσαι,
Ἀλκινόῳ δ' αὐτὴν γέρας ἔξελον, <u>οὕνεκα</u> πᾶσι
Φαιήκεσσιν ἄνασσε, θεοῦ δ' ὣς δῆμος ἄκουεν·
ἣ τρέφε Ναυσικάαν λευκώλενον ἐν μεγάροισιν.
ἣ οἱ πῦρ ἀνέκαιε καὶ εἴσω δόρπον ἐκόσμει. (*Od.* 7.7–13)
'She went to her bedroom. And the old woman from Apeire, the chambermaid Eurymedusa, kindled a fire for her, (Eurymedusa) whom ships curved on both sides had once brought from Apeire, and they had picked her out for Alcinous as a gift of honour, <u>because</u> he ruled over all the Phaeacians and the people heeded him like a god. She had brought up white-armed Nausicaa in the palace. She lit up a fire for her and prepared supper inside.'

[20] On the origins of this meaning of *οὕνεκα* see Probert (2015: section 7.2.1.3).
[21] In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* Ebeling (1880, s.v. *οὕνεκα*) counts 57 examples of *οὕνεκα* 'because'; 7 examples of *οὕνεκα* 'that', introducing a complement clause (not a possibility for our passage); and one example of *οὕνεκα* = *οὗ ἕνεκα* (our passage (7)). The exact figures will depend on decisions made in difficult cases (our passages (1) and (8) are counted under *οὕνεκα* 'because'), but the overwhelming preponderance of causal *οὕνεκα* is clear.

If *οὕνεκα* is 'because' in our passage (1),[22] the narrative structure is similar to that of passages (5) and (6). In both these passages the narrator introduces a female character, giving some details of her history. Hecamede had once been selected as a gift of honour for Nestor, because he was the best of everybody in counsel. Eurymedusa had once been selected as a gift of honour for Alcinous, because he ruled over all the Phaeacians and the people heeded him like a god. In each case, the summary of the woman's history ends with a *οὕνεκα*-clause, giving a reason for one element of the transaction. After the *οὕνεκα*-clause the narrator returns to the main narrative. In passage (1), Aeneas' horses have led to the story of Zeus giving horses to Tros. The story of Zeus and Tros likewise ends with a *οὕνεκα*-clause giving a reason for one element of the transaction—this time not a reason for the choice of recipient (already explained with *υἷος ποινὴν Γανυμήδεος*), but a reason for the choice of gift. After the *οὕνεκα*-clause Diomedes returns to Aeneas' horses, or at least to their more recent prehistory.

Two potential objections to *οὕνεκα* as 'because' might be raised. Firstly, one might think horses more likely to be excellent because they have been handled by a god than *vice versa*. At the end of the Catalogue of Ships (*Il.* 2.763–7), Homer singles out the horses of Eumelus as the best horses in the Greek army (after Achilles' horses, of course). These had been reared by Apollo (see section 5 below). A causal connection is not made explicit, but it is readily concluded that the horses are excellent because a god had a hand in their upbringing.[23]

The second potential objection is that if Zeus chose horses for Tros from this breed *because* these were the best horses, again some pre-existing stock or breed of horses is implied. Those who object to any suggestion of pre-existing horses must also object to taking *οὕνεκα* as 'because'. The alternatives should be surveyed.

Aristarchus (Sch. *Il.* 5. 266*b* (A)) took *οὕνεκα* as an equivalent of *τοὔνεκα* 'therefore'. If this equivalence is taken at face value, it ought to imply that *οὕνεκα* begins a new main clause. But *οὕνεκα* does not otherwise have such a use. Plausibly, Aristarchus did not intend

[22] Maximus of Tyre (40. 6) evidently understood *οὕνεκα* as 'because', since he quotes part of the passage in a form that clearly makes the *οὕνεκα*-clause relate to the past: *ἧς Τρωΐ περ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς | δῶχ' υἷος ποινὴν Γανυμήδεος, οὕνεκ' ἄρισται | ἵπποι ἔσαν* (see West 1998, apparatus of parallel passages to *Il.* 5.265b–7). Ameis and Hentze (1908: 61) likewise take *οὕνεκα* as 'because': "*οὕνεκα* weil begründet, warum Zeus dem Tros gerade diese Pferde als Buße gab". Likewise Leaf (1900: 212); Lang, Leaf, and Myers (1914: 90).

[23] In a similar vein, Achilles at *Il.* 23.274–8 mentions his own horses' excellence and immortality together with the fact that Poseidon had given them to Peleus (cf. section 5 below). We learn elsewhere that Achilles' horses are supernaturally fast because both their parents are winds (see section 5 below), but in *Iliad* 23 Achilles only makes a more general connection between their immortality (and concomitant excellence) and their origins as a god's gift. Again it is readily understood that Achilles attributes the horses' immortality and excellence to the role of the gods in their history.

that *οὕνεκα* begins a new main clause but simply that it expresses a consequence—a possibility we now come to.

Some take lines 265–7 to mean 'For they are from that breed which far-seeing Zeus gave to Tros as a price for his son Ganymede, for which reason they are the best of all the horses there are under the dawn and sun.'[24] On this view, *οὕνεκα* would be equivalent to *οὗ ἕνεκα*. Elsewhere in Homer there is one clear example and one possible example of *οὕνεκα* in the sense of *οὗ ἕνεκα*:

(7) *δὸς δ' ἔτι Τηλέμαχον καὶ ἐμὲ πρήξαντα νέεσθαι*
οὕνεκα δεῦρ' ἱκόμεσθα θοῇ σὺν νηῒ μελαίνῃ. (*Od.* 3.60–1)
'And grant too that Telemachus and I return home having achieved that (thing) because of which we came here in our swift black ship.'

(8) *ἣ δ' Ἄτη σθεναρή τε καὶ ἀρτίπος, οὕνεκα πάσας*
πολλὸν ὑπεκπροθέει, φθάνει δέ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν
βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· (*Il.* 9.505–7)
'But she, Ate, is strong and sure-footed, because of which (i.e. for which reason) she outstrips them all by far, and across the whole land she gets there first in hurting people.'
OR
'But she, Ate, is strong and sure-footed, because (i.e. as I conclude from the fact that) she outstrips them all by far, and across the whole land she gets there first in hurting people.'

In (7), *οὕνεκα* introduces the type of relative clause traditionally conceived as having its antecedent understood rather than expressed (in current linguistic terminology a free relative clause). This kind of relative clause functions as a noun phrase; it does not modify any actual preceding noun phrase or any other preceding material. The meaning is 'that (thing) because of which...', used as the direct object of *πρήξαντα*.

Passage (8) has been taken in two ways, as shown by the two translations. Under the first interpretation, *οὕνεκα* means 'because of which' and introduces a sentential relative clause: not a relative clause functioning as a noun phrase, but one commenting on the preceding

[24] So anonymous (1821: 150); Paley (1866: 172), who also allows for the possibility that *οὕνεκα* means 'because'; Lattimore (1951: 135, "and therefore").

clause. Like *οὕνεκα* for 'that (thing) because of which', sentential *οὕνεκα* 'because of which' would be straightforwardly equivalent to *οὗ ἕνεκα*. It is this sentential use that would provide a true parallel for 'because of which, for which reason' as a possibility in passage (1).

Under the second interpretation of passage (8), *οὕνεκα* is 'because', in an evidential sense. Fränkel (1960: 192) argued for this second interpretation and has been followed by some scholars.[25] More recently, Schröder (2004) has made a new case for the first interpretation.[26]

Given the use of *οὕνεκα* as an equivalent of *οὗ ἕνεκα* in passage (7), in a relative clause functioning as a noun phrase, it would not be surprising if *οὕνεκα* = *οὗ ἕνεκα* were also usable in a sentential relative clause—whether or not passage (8) actually provides an example of this use. At the same time, and again irrespective of the interpretation of passage (8), *οὕνεκα* 'because' remains much better attested than *οὕνεκα* 'because of which'.

For our passage (1), then, *οὕνεκα* 'because of which, for which reason' cannot be ruled out on linguistic grounds. But the reasons for preferring *οὕνεκα* 'because of which' to *οὕνεκα* 'because' would be the two points of content already noted: (i) the idea that the horses' excellence should be a consequence of Zeus' involvement, and (ii) uneasiness about the implication that the horses came from some pre-existing stock.

As regards the second point, if we conclude that *ἧς* in 265 is a partitive genitive, we shall already have the implied pre-existing stock of horses, and in that case, as far as point (ii) is concerned, we might as well take *οὕνεκα* in its most common meaning 'because'. In order to proceed further on these questions, it is time to return to where the horses came from. In doing so, we shall see that possible answers to point (i) emerge as part and parcel of an answer to point (ii).

5. Where did the horses come from?

As we have now seen, the main objection to *ἧς* as a partitive genitive, and one of the objections to *οὕνεκα* as 'because', is that if Zeus had some pre-existing stock of horses, we might expect this stock to appear somewhere else in extant Greek literature. We might begin by asking whether we are really entitled to this expectation. Some things do appear just once in Greek literature, and once-mentioned items happen to include stud farms. On a widely (but not universally) accepted interpretation of *Il.* 4.500 we have here, and nowhere else, a fleeting

[25] Hainsworth (1993: 129); Griffin (1995: 133).

[26] For earlier literature favouring 'because of which', see Schröder (2004: 1–2). Schmitt (1880: 62) noticed the ambiguity between 'because of which' and evidential 'because' here, and took this to be relevant for the development of *οὕνεκα* 'because'.

reference to a stud farm of Priam's at Abydos.[27] At *Il.* 2.766 Homer mentions that the horses of Eumelus (son of Admetus and grandson of Pheres) had been reared by Apollo at a place called Pereie, probably in Thessaly.[28] This stud farm presumably belonged to Admetus rather than to Apollo, especially if it was indeed in Thessaly. In both cases we have a human stud farm rather than a divine one. Nevertheless, a stud farm may appear just once in Greek literature, even if a god has worked on it.

How easily, then, might Homer's audience have imagined that Zeus had a stud farm? There are hints in the *Iliad* that Achilles' horses were bred by Poseidon on some sort of farm. Achilles acquired them from Peleus, who was given them by Poseidon (*Il.* 16.866–7, 23.274–8). They are the offspring of Zephyrus and the storm-wind Podarge (*Il.* 16.149–51 with Janko 1992: 336), the latter described as *βοσκομένη λειμῶνι παρὰ ῥόον Ὠκεανοῖο* 'grazing in a meadow by the stream of Ocean' (line 151). The detail that Podarge was grazing suggests that she had (for whatever reason) already taken equine form before the incident happened. The impregnation of a grazing mare by a male wind is paralleled in the story that Boreas, in the form of a stallion, impregnated some of Erichthonius' three thousand mares while they were grazing (*βοσκομενάων*, *Il.* 20. 223). Erichthonius evidently has a stud farm of major proportions, and the parallelism between the two episodes makes it easy to imagine that Poseidon has some sort of farm too, conveniently situated near his domain the sea. The author of the *Rhesus* ascribed to Euripides appears to read Homer in this way, since he adds the detail that Poseidon had himself broken in the horses that he then gave to Peleus (*πωλοδαμνήσας*, line 187).[29]

If Poseidon bred horses on a farm beside the sea then it would not stretch the imagination much further to think that Zeus had some such farm on the slopes of Olympus or somewhere else—even if Zeus does not have Poseidon's particular connection with horses (a point that Bekker 1863–72: ii. 12 adduced against the transmitted *ἧς*). The horses Zeus bred there might even have been divine, like Achilles' horses. Their descendants are fairly clearly not divine,[30]

[27] See Leaf (1900: 189); Ameis and Hentze (1908: 39); tentatively Willcock (1978–84: i. 230); for a different view see Monro (1906: 293); for discussion see Kirk (1985: 392).
[28] For *Πηρείῃ* as the right reading, and for the existence of a place called Pereie in Thessaly, see Hunt at *P.Oxy.* VIII, p. 94.
[29] For the point that the author of the *Rhesus* bases the story of Achilles' horses on the Homeric passages that mention them, see Fries (2014) on *Rhesus* 185–8.
[30] When introducing the chariot race of *Iliad* 23 Achilles makes the point that he would of course win, were he competing himself: his horses are pre-eminent by far, for they are divine (*Il.* 23.274–8). Among the participants in the chariot race itself is Diomedes, now in possession of the descendants of Tros' horses (*Il.* 23.290–2). At no point in the chariot race is it suggested that these horses are divine.

but this is to be expected because they have in the meantime interbred with mortal horses (*Il.* 5.269).

One way, then, in which audiences might have imagined Zeus getting some horses from a pre-existing stock is for him to have bred them on some sort of farm. He gave some of his best breed of horses to Tros, because this was the best breed in the world. We also understand that the breed was particularly fine because Zeus had bred it, but this causal relationship need not have been made explicit, any more than the causal relationship between the excellence of Eumelus' horses and Apollo's role in their upbringing (see section 4 above, on *Il.* 2.763–7). Nothing stands in the way of taking *οὕνεκ' ἄριστοι ἵππων* as giving the grounds for Zeus' choice of gift.

A second possibility is that Zeus simply stole the horses from some mortals somewhere. Aphrodite's gift of Helen to Paris provides a model for this kind of divine gift giving. Helen does not, strictly speaking, belong to Aphrodite but to Menelaus, but this point does not prevent the transaction. (It does cause the Trojan war, but that is another matter.) Gods sometimes steal from humans to give to other humans. In this case *οὕνεκα* could not mean 'because of which': Zeus' involvement would not have caused the horses' pre-eminence. Instead, when Zeus needed a really good gift for Tros he chose some pre-eminently splendid horses, just as Aphrodite chose a pre-eminently beautiful woman when she needed a really good gift for Paris.[31] The possibility that Zeus stole the horses for Tros does not eliminate the consequence that relatives of these horses continued to exist somewhere else in the world—but these relatives would simply be horses, even if very splendid ones. We should not be surprised if we hear nothing else about them.[32]

It would be wrong to insist that our passage suggests the horses' origins with any clarity. But if possibilities were easily available to Homer's audience then they need not have baulked at the passing implication that there was some pre-existing stock. We have seen that there are indeed possibilities that make sense in terms of Homeric gift exchange between

[31] For Helen's pre-eminent beauty see e.g. E., *Hec.* 635–7. Similar gift-giving happens between Homeric humans: when a city is sacked a distinguished warrior may get a woman specially chosen for him as a gift of honour. (Notice the use of *ἔξελον* 'they picked out' at *Il.* 11.627, our passage (5); *Il.* 16.56, passage (3); *Od.* 7.10, passage (6).) Like Helen, these women have been taken away from somebody else.

[32] Similarly we do not necessarily hear much about a captured woman's relatives. We do hear plenty about Helen's husband, and a little about Chryseis' father: these men are important to the legends about Troy. Briseis' father and husband, on the other hand, are very shadowy figures. For a detailed attempt to piece together Briseis' background and to explain why her father in particular is so shadowy, see Reinhardt (1961: 50–57).

gods and mortals. They allow the passage to be taken in the linguistically most natural way, with *ἧς* as a partitive genitive and *οὕνεκα* as 'because'.

6. Conclusion

The following text and translation lay out the interpretation of *Iliad* 5.265–9 defended here:

(9) *τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς, ἧς* Τρωΐ *περ εὐρύοπα* Ζεύς
δῶχ' υἱ*ος ποινὴν* Γ*ανυμήδεος, οὕνεκ' ἄριστοι*
ἵππων, ὅσσοι ἔασιν ὑπ' ἠῶ τ' ἠελίόν τε—
τῆς γενεῆς ἔκλεψεν ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀ*γχίσης,*
λάθρῃ Λ*αομέδοντος ὑποσχὼν θήλεας ἵππους·* (*Il.* 5.265–9)
'For from that breed of which far-seeing Zeus gave to Tros as a price for his son Ganymede, because they are the best of all the horses there are under the dawn and sun—from *that breed* Anchises lord of men stole, putting mares under them without Laomedon knowing.'

This interpretation implies that Zeus got the horses from some pre-existing stock. We have argued that Homeric audiences would have taken this implication on board without difficulty. They were familiar with the concept that a god might breed horses on a farm and then give them to a mortal, and also with the concept that gods sometimes stole from mortals to give to other mortals. *ἧς* in line 265 should be taken as a partitive genitive, and the idea that we have a Homeric instance of *attractio relativi* here should be abandoned.[33]

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