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Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity.

Abstract:

A finite population of agents playing a 2 x 2 symmetric game evolves by adaptive best response. The assumption that players make mistakes is dropped in favor of one where players differ, via payoff heterogeneity. Arbitrary mutations are thus replaced with an economically justified specification. The depth as well as the width of basins of attraction is important when determining long-run behaviour. With vanishing noise and balanced payoff variances, the risk dominant equilibrium is selected. ...

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Publisher:
Nuffield College (University of Oxford)
Series:
Economics Working Papers
Publication date:
1997-05-06
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:fe9ac87f-d5ce-42b9-bff2-133dbc4ffad6
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11939
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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