

Stephen Priest Ultimate Reality

x2 page intro to each movement/chapter.

Realisation = understanding and making real: the synthesis of epistemology and metaphysics in your own existence, and anyway.

# ULTIMATE REALITY

**Modern Philosophy and the Fundamental Questions**

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Preface

The fundamental questions of philosophy have answers. There are obstacles to understanding this truth and, when it is understood, both philosophy and science will be changed.

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Preface

Contents	2
1. Doing Philosophy	3 pp 7
2. Logical Positivism	10 pp 23
3. Phenomenology	33 pp 20
4. Structuralism	54 pp 20
5. Conceptual Analysis	74 pp 17
6. Deconstruction	91 pp 19
7. Dialectic	110 pp 22
8. Existentialism	
9. Logical Atomism	
10. Theology and the Possibility of Metaphysics	132 pp 4
Notes	136 pp 17

I

DOING PHILOSOPHY

It is customary to point out that philosophy is a difficult subject. Certainly it requires disciplined logic and a powerful imagination and these two are rarely found in the same individual. Frege, for example, is a brilliant logician and Hegel an imaginative metaphysician. Nevertheless, it is rarely understood how very difficult philosophy is or why.

The greatest obstacle to doing philosophy is *understanding the questions*. There is irony in many academic subjects. Archaeology destroys the subject matter it would preserve. The natural sciences presuppose abstract mathematics and the consciousness of the scientist, which are scientifically inexplicable. Psychology does not study the mind. Social science is not science. The irony in philosophy is this: It is very rarely done. Practitioners in universities, at every level, would rather replace it by science, or write and teach the History of Philosophy, or examine purely linguistic and mathematical questions in ever smaller detail, than try to solve philosophical problems. Imagine a soldier in a smart uniform with a straight back, running on the spot, holding a salute as long as possible. In a formal sense, the achievement is very impressive, but he is going absolutely nowhere.

*To do philosophy you have to have thoughts you have never had before.* If your thoughts are: 'Ah yes, this is a case of so and so', you have not understood the question. In this book I therefore spend considerable time explaining what the questions mean. Often in philosophy, people want the answers before they grasp the questions. They do philosophy back to front, which is to say, they are not doing philosophy. If you are one of those rare individuals who grasp philosophical questions with clarity, or if you have had thoughts like those in this book yourself, then I apologize for my explanations.

Why are philosophical questions not understood?

In Western education systems, we are taught to think in *generalities*. We study 'the' brain, 'society', 'the' middle ages, 'friction', 'the' respiratory system,

‘cognitive impairment’, ‘the’ state, etc. Scientific laws are regularities which hold over domains of empirical reality, and generalizations are paradigmatically reports of such laws. Thinking dominated by generality is useful for the domination of nature. It is worse than useless for doing philosophy.

Human thinking is means-to-end thinking, especially in contemporary, goal-orientated, liberal, capitalist, Western society. We tend to notice things only in so far as they are means to our ends. We typically detect only those features of the world we assume useful to us. We perceive only enough *to get by*. Psychologically, in the West, we are always ‘on the way’ to something else. This *thinking as intellectual technology* is useful for earning a living. It takes us away from doing philosophy.

‘Objectivity’ (like ‘rationality’) is an over-used word. A commitment to objectivity in the sense of ‘the truth’, or ‘what is the case’, is impossible not to presuppose (which is *not* to say that ‘we’ know the truth) Any denial that there is truth is purportedly true. Any view indexing truth to societies, to individuals, to belief systems, thereby presupposes that there are societies, individuals, or belief systems (planet earth, and that there is something rather than nothing, and so on) This notion of objectivity is innocuous and ineliminable.

On the other hand, there is objectivity in the sense of being physically detectable, paradigmatically: a physical object ‘over there’ or ‘out there’. This causes the prejudice that the real world is essentially the one that you can see in front of you: medium sized dry goods, as Austin puts it. Much of our language is geared to understanding this spatio-temporal plurality but, when we begin to ask philosophical questions, we reach the limits of that part of language. It is therefore an impediment to doing philosophy.

Since the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason Western philosophy has been essentially operating within a Kantian paradigm. By ‘Kantian’ I mean: semantically or logically equivalent to concepts or claims deployed by Kant in his philosophical writings. Rorty's says: 'On both sides of the channel [...] most philosophers have remained Kantian. (Q) and 'Even those with the greatest doubts about most Kantian doctrines never doubted that something like his "transcendental turn" was essential. (I) Although Rorty's conclusion is true, he derives it from false premises. There is more than one Kant and it is a particular Kant who rules the West: not the Kant of faith and beauty, of moral philosophy and aesthetics, but the anti-metaphysical Kant of the First Critique, the Kant who says we cannot do metaphysics. He argues that we are cognitively constituted so that we can pose metaphysical questions, but we cannot coherently answer them. Subsequent movements in Western philosophy have endorsed this conclusion, and committed mass philosophical suicide. Each is an attempt to replace philosophy with something else: Marxism replaces philosophy by the attempt to overthrow capitalist society. Phenomenology replaces philosophy by the description of appearances, Logical Positivism by science, structuralism by the study of conceptual schemes, linguistic

philosophy by analyzing the meanings of words, post-structuralism by a re-writing of philosophical styles. 'Philosophy' is then understood as the attempt to replace philosophy by something else.

Kant's ideas are partly anticipated by Hume so I do not quarrel with talk of a 'Hume-Kant' paradigm. The root of philosophy as anti-metaphysics runs through the difference between Aristotle and Plato. Aristotle was unable to understand Plato. A Platonist can always understand why an Aristotelian is an Aristotelian but an Aristotelian can never understand why a Platonist is a Platonist.

Aristotle, and Hume-Kant, legitimize scientific thinking, which is itself general, means-to-end, putatively objective and in fact "objective". The natural sciences enjoy huge prestige in the West, and practically unlimited private and government funding, because of their lucrative victory over nature over the last several centuries. There is a propagandist book and television industry peddling materialist science as the explanation of anything and everything, and self-righteously denouncing non-scientific ways of thinking, being, and explaining, some of which are more logically rigorous than materialist science. Such pseudo-scientific ranting is not scientific but there is money to be made in naturalist apologetics. Science did a very good job of conquering the planet. Let us hope it also provides the means to save it.

There are limits to science. Some problems are too *macroscopic* for science to effectively address, others too *proximal*, too intimate. *Why is there anything?* falls into the first category, *Why are you you?* falls into the second.

Does anyone escape the critical paradigm? Hegel's Geist is Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, written all over the universe, something Kant says we cannot do. Heidegger finds Kant massively in the way of his *Fundamental Ontology* and is therefore unable to finish *Being and Time*. He writes *Kant of the Problem of Metaphysics* to try to free the obstacle. A few heroic colleagues are beating against the walls of the prison.

There are Philosophy of Religion courses in universities, but Kant caused epistemology and philosophy of language to be central to philosophy. Philosophy of Religion is often this: Can we soundly derive the conclusion *God exists* from purely empirical premises, using the methods of deductive logic? The answer, wait for it, is 'No'. Secular colleagues are content that Philosophy of Religion should be a marginalized, eccentric, and repetitious deductive failure. Should not Philosophy of Religion inspect the writings of the world's great spiritual leaders and mystics? That would not be counted as (Kantian) philosophy. Philosophers with a strong religious commitment usually keep it in a compartment strictly sealed off from their philosophy. It usually come as a surprise that so and so is Anglican or Catholic. The careers are in naturalism and physicalism.

In *The Critical Paradigm* I examine the strengths and weaknesses of the anti-metaphysical prison and the prospects for escape. If the arguments in *Philosophical*

*Questions: Theological Answers* are sound, Philosophy of Religion is the essence of philosophy.

Another reason for not understanding philosophical questions is the *refusal* to understand them. Bertrand Russell says people would rather do anything than think. This is an exaggeration. (*Anything?*) There is, however, such a thing as metaphysical terror. It requires courage to ask directly: What am I? Is there life after death? If so, what is it like to be dead? Is there a God? Is there any point in my existence? Am I free to choose what to do? Is there something unchanging in my life? We prefer some answers to others. Our preferences cause an impatient outward certainty, that cannot hide an inner uncertainty. We much prefer not to ask at all. As the West pretends that there is no such thing as death, only accumulation, its philosophy pretends there is no metaphysics (except as a congenital habit to be cured) Part of the job of anti-metaphysical philosophy is to ensure that metaphysical questions are construed as meaningless. If the questions are meaningless, then no psychological discomfort can possibly accrue. Can it?

Ayer's *Language Truth and Logic* is a model of philosophical prose, but its main theses, that the claims of metaphysics and theology are meaningless, and any genuine problem can, in principle, be solved by the methods of the natural sciences, are false. *Language, Truth and Logic* is not read as often as it used to be. Unfortunately, this is not because it is *passé*. It is because its conclusions have been thoroughly taken to heart, as conscious, or unconscious, premises of doing Western philosophy. Modern philosophy has plenty of language, and logic, but is very short on truth. Modern philosophy exhibits complexity without profundity.

Change is part of the paradigm. Change does exist, but it depends on the permanent. The permanent is hidden. The permanent does not depend on change. Make the permanent salient in a *Gestalt* switch.

Within the secular paradigm, explaining is explaining away. Of course, there are reductivist explanations, in Michael Inwood's example: "The Loch Ness Monster is a lump of wood." However, the inclusion of 'only' or 'just' often turns a true statement false. Reductionism is what Antony Flew, with his customary wit, used to call 'nothing-buttery'. The expression 'is nothing over and above' in a sentence almost always signals metaphysical closure. We need to replace reductionist explanation with *expansive explanation*.

## I

### THE VIENNA CIRCLE

The philosophy of the Vienna Circle is essentially Kantian. If the Kantian components of Logical Positivism were subtracted from it, the residue could not be correctly called 'Logical Positivism'. Most of the anticipations are in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

### Synthetic *A Priori* Propositions

The Positivists think their philosophy sharply distinct from Kant's, in their refusal to allow any meaningful synthetic *a priori* propositions. Any claim that is neither analytic and *a priori*, nor synthetic and *a posteriori*, is nonsensical. Pap says: 'A metaphysical proposition might be defined as a synthetic *a priori* proposition'. (Pap: 19)

Kant agrees that if there were metaphysical propositions, they would be synthetic *a priori* truths but thinks there is none. Kant insists there are many meaningful, true, and informative, non-metaphysical, synthetic *a priori* propositions in physics, geometry, arithmetic, and his own philosophy; statements which are not empirical and do not simply explicate definitions. If Kant is right, then Pap at best identifies a necessary condition for being metaphysical.

Kant and the Vienna Circle share this concept of the synthetic *a priori*:

*p* is synthetic *a priori* if and only if *p* is knowable, observation is not necessary for the knowledge that *p*, and *p* is nonetheless informative.

If *p* is synthetic *a priori* then *p* is a subject-predicate proposition, and 'informative' may be unpacked as either:

*p* is informative if and only if, the concept of *p*'s predicate is not already contained in *p*'s subject.

or, less metaphorically, as:

*p* is informative if and only if, in defining the subject of *p*, recourse does not have to be made to the (concept expressed by) the predicate in *p*.

The conjunction of Kant's claim there are synthetic *a priori* propositions, and the Logical Positivist's that there is none, entails a contradiction, so at most and at least one of Kant and the Vienna Circle can be right. Who is right?

If there is a class of statements which are genuinely informative or synthetic, and another class that is knowable to be true or false without observations, then there is a class of *a priori* statements and a class of synthetic statements. If we look through the writings of the Positivists, it is noticeable that many of the statements there do, in fact, fall into both categories. They are both synthetic and *a priori*. For example, the following tenets of Logical Positivism are synthetic *a priori*:

‘there is nothing which could not become an object of science’  
(Carnap, 1967: 293)

‘[...] every statement has a meaning only insofar as it can be verified’  
(Schlick, 1979 II: 264)

These claims are not true by definition, or open to empirical confirmation, so they are neither analytic nor *a posteriori*. Their content is supposed to come as news to the reader, so they are putatively informative or synthetic. If known but not *a posteriori*, they are knowable independently of experience, so *a priori*. It follows that they are synthetic *a priori*.

Many philosophical claims are synthetic *a priori*. Carnap’s neo-Humean doctrine of the self in the *Aufbau*:

‘The self is the class (not the collection) of the experiences (or autopsychological states)’ (Carnap, 1967: 299)

cannot be decided by experience, nor is it a tautology. If knowable, it is knowable intellectually, and it is informative, so synthetic *a priori*.

The Positivists show no awareness that their claims are synthetic *a priori*, and their philosophy is therefore self-refuting. Waismann sees a threat in construing sentences criterial of Logical Positivism as truth valued, or expressing propositions, because they can not be plausibly construed as either analytic and *a priori*, or synthetic and *a posteriori*. Waismann says:

“‘the meaning of a statement is its method of verification.’ To say this is not to hold a theory which can be true or false – but it is rather a recommendation as to the way in which we should deal with certain sentences when they have no conventional meaning’ (Waismann 1965: )

This will not do. The logical form of ‘the meaning of a statement is its method of verification’ is not imperative but indicative, because it is an identity statement, and all identity statements are indicative. Although ‘The meaning of a statement is its method of verification’ entails ‘S is meaningful, if and only if, S is verifiable’ it

entails nothing imperative. Waismann thinks it is *covertly* imperative but this is an assimilation of an imperative to *the putative truth that would make an imperative worth obeying*. Someone who holds a belief can obey an imperative to act on that belief, but belief, what is believed, is indicative.

The logical status of 'the meaning of a statement is its method of verification' is synthetic *a priori*. It is knowable without empirical observation, and informative, so the Vienna Circle is logically committed to at least one synthetic *a priori* proposition despite their overt commitment to 'There are no synthetic *a priori* propositions'. By 'overtly commitment' I mean 'profession'. 'Logically committed to' means here: 'The conjunction of the sentences of Logical Positivism entails [...]'. So, catastrophically, Logical Positivism entails that there are and are not synthetic *a priori* propositions, a contradiction. The philosophy of the Vienna Circle is either meaningless, or false.

The remedy is to give up the second conjunct, and endorse the first, of: 'there are, and there are no synthetic *a priori* propositions'. The Positivists do not realise how Kantian they are. Like Kant's, the sentences essential to their own theory are synthetic *a priori*. Kant sees this, and admits a meaningful, non-metaphysical, middle class of synthetic *a priori* statements. The Positivists should do the same and recognise their thorough Kantianism on pain of self-refutation. (5) 'There are no synthetic *a priori* propositions' is synthetic *a priori*.

## Metaphysics, Science and Common Sense

*The Critique of Pure Reason's* conclusion is the central doctrine of Logical Positivism: Metaphysical knowledge is impossible. Kant and the Positivists define 'metaphysics' as the study of reality, as it is independently of our experience of it, or as a whole, or both. For example, on the first page of the Preface to the first, ('A'), edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says 'the principles of metaphysics are not subject to any empirical test' (CPR 7 A viii), and it employs 'principles which overstep all possible empirical employment', and these 'transcend the limits of experience'. On the first page of Chapter One of *Language Truth and Logic*, Ayer says his criticism of metaphysics takes as its starting point: 'those who believe that it is possible to have knowledge of a transcendent reality' (LTL 33) The metaphysician, 'claimed to have knowledge of a reality which transcended the phenomenal world.' (LTL 33) So Kant and the Vienna Circle both hold that

$Kxp \rightarrow \neg (\text{metaphysical } p)$

'Transcendent' and 'phenomenal' are Kant's terms Ayer uses in a very Kantian way. Kant defines the 'transcendental employment' of our understanding as 'employment

extending beyond the limits of experience (*über die Erfahrungsgrenze*)' (CPR 299 A 296/B 353) Ayer says:

'from empirical premises nothing whatsoever concerning the properties, or even the existence of anything super-empirical can legitimately be inferred.' (LTL 33)

'Super empirical' means for Ayer, as it would for Kant, 'transcendent'. Ayer has just asked rhetorically in the same passage,

'Must he [the metaphysician] not begin as other men do with the evidence of his senses? And, if so, what valid process of reasoning can possibly lead him to the conception of a transcendent reality?' (LTL 33)

so for both Ayer, and Kant, 'all our knowledge begins with experience' (CPR 41) (1) By 'the phenomenal world' Kant and Ayer mean the empirical world; that which appears through the senses. Ayer contrasts the 'phenomenal world' with 'anything super-empirical' (LTL 33) and frequently uses 'phenomenal' and 'empirical' synonymously. Kant contrasts 'phenomenal' with 'noumenal', which entails 'super-empirical'. Kant too often uses 'empirical' and 'phenomenal' interchangeably. So Kant and Ayer endorse this empiricist tenet:

$\forall x \forall p (Kxp \rightarrow x \text{ has experience})$

If anybody knows anything then they have experience.

Ayer and Kant contrast metaphysics with common sense, and with science. In the resulting definitions, metaphysics is found disasterously wanting. For both thinkers, science is the paradigm of knowledge-yielding inquiry. Ayer says his first aim in *Language, Truth and Logic* is to:

'criti[cise] the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense' (LTL 33)

In the Preface to the second edition, Kant says metaphysics 'has not yet had the good fortune to enter upon the secure path of a science [...] *den sichern Gang einer Wissenschaft* [...]' (CPR 21 B xiv) and this for precisely the same reason as Ayer: 'Metaphysics is a completely speculative science of reason, which soars far above the teachings of experience *einer ganz isolierten spekulativen Vernunftkenntnis, die sich gänzlich über Erfahrungsbelehrung erhebt* [...]'. (CPR 21 B xiv)

According to Kant, the metaphysician purportedly employs a special non-empirical faculty called 'pure reason'. According to Ayer,

'the metaphysician [...] would say that he was endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition which enabled him to know facts that could not be known through sense experience.' (LTL 33-4)

The term 'intellectual intuition' (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) is Kant's. (CPR 35 Bx1 fn.) Kant explicitly says human beings do not possess it. If a being has intellectual intuition, then if they believe  $p$  then  $p$ :

$$Bxp \rightarrow p$$

and, because  $Kxp \rightarrow Bxp$ , the empiricist principle

$$\forall x \forall p (Kxp \rightarrow x \text{ has experience})$$

is violated by:

$$\exists x \ \& \ \exists p \ Kxp \ \& \ \neg(x \text{ has experience})$$

which is logically equivalent to

$$\neg \forall x \forall p (Kxp \rightarrow x \text{ has experience})$$

Kant and Ayer repudiate the view that philosophy should study the 'totality', or reality as a whole. For Ayer the metaphysician is someone who seeks 'first principles' but

'the belief that it is the business of the philosopher to search for first principles is bound up with the familiar conception of philosophy as the study of reality as a whole' (LTL 47)

A first principle,  $p^*$ , is a truth that is necessary for any truth

$$(\forall p) (Ep^*) \neg p^* \rightarrow \neg p$$

so any truth is sufficient for a first principle:

$$(\forall p) p \rightarrow p^*$$

Kant also thinks it mistaken to think that philosophy can study 'the whole', but this is how the metaphysician conceives metaphysics. Kant and Ayer attach very little sense to the expression 'the world as a whole'. For example, Kant says

'The world does not exist in itself, independently of the regressive series of my (re)presentations, it exists *in itself* neither as an *infinite* whole nor as a *finite* whole (*weder als ein an sich unendliches, noch als ein an sich endliches Ganzes*)' (CPR 448 A 505/B 533)

and claims, 'the world is not an unconditioned whole (*kein unbedingtes Ganzes*), and does not exist as such [as a whole]' (CPR 448 A 505/B 533) Ayer says of 'reality as a whole': 'This conception is one which it is difficult to criticise, because it is so vague' (LTL 47) For Kant and Ayer, the attempt to study the world as a whole, in any putative metaphysical inquiry, results in nonsense. For Ayer, the metaphysician produces sentences which are devoid of meaning by verificationist criteria. For Kant, the metaphysician produces the conjunction of statements and their contradictories: and, for Kant, to contradict oneself is to produce nonsense.

## II

### The World as a Whole

If Kant and Ayer do attach any significance to the expressions 'reality as a whole' or 'the world as a whole', then it is to denote the world as studied by science. Ayer says:

'The study of reality as a whole [...] if it is taken to imply, as it sometimes is, that the philosopher somehow projects himself outside the world, and takes a bird's eye view of it, then it is plainly a metaphysical conception. And it is also metaphysical to assert, as some do, that "reality as a whole" is somehow generically different from the reality which is investigated by the special sciences.' (LTL 47)

This image, of the metaphysician as a bird flying, is in Kant. Kant speaks of metaphysics as speculation 'which soars above the teachings of experience (*die sich gänzlich über Ehrfarungsbelehrung erhebt*)' (CPR 21) and says,

'Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the Ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding (*in den leeren Raum des reinen Verstandes*)' (CPR 47 A 5/B 9)

Kant and Ayer share metaphysical targets, and anti-metaphysical metaphors.

For Kant 'as a whole' can only mean something if it denotes the 'series of my (re)presentations (*Vorstellungen*)' (CPR 448) This is nature, the empirical world with which each of us is directly acquainted through sense perception. Ayer's word is not 'presentations' but 'sense contents', but the conjunction of the two theses is analytic.  
(5)

Kant thinks science is genuine inquiry into the empirical world, and distinguishes it from 'random groping', the category into which metaphysics falls. Kant says:

'[...] the study of nature has entered on the secure path of a science after having for so many centuries been nothing but a process of merely random groping (*bloßes Herumtappen*)'  
(CPR 20-21)

Kant and Ayer agree that natural science is the most reliable source of knowledge, and, if there is any rival for this place, it is common sense. They reject metaphysics because it is not commonsensical. Kant says metaphysics (comparing her to a queen) 'tried to trace her lineage to vulgar origins in common experience' but 'this genealogy has as a matter of fact been fictitiously invented' (CPR 8) Ayer says we should not despise common sense. Kantian and positivist attacks on metaphysics entail that the metaphysician uses concepts in abstraction from any commonsensical empirical application.

It is controversial whether the *Critique of Pure Reason* entails phenomenalism, but the positivist and the Kantian conceptions of the empirical world are mutually consistent. Both agree it is the one world of our experience that science investigates. For Kant, it is a 'series of presentations (*Vorstellungen*)', for Ayer a series of 'sense contents'. For Kant and Ayer, respectively, 'presentations' and 'sense contents' are not straightforwardly either mental or physical. As Ayer puts it: 'The distinction between what is mental and what is physical does not apply to sense contents' (LTL 123) He says 'they are neither' (LTL 123) Kant sometimes talks about 'presentations' in a direct realist way; as though we are directly acquainted with aspects of physical objects in perception, at other times, as though they are quasi-psychological sense contents. The coherent way to read Kant is to allow that presentations are 'neutral' between physical and mental descriptions of them, essentially the logical positivist line.

Kant and Ayer, then, share broadly similar conceptions of metaphysics, its relation to the empirical world, and to science.

The 'Sense and Sense' Argument

The 'sense and sense' argument is essential to the Kantian and Logical Positivist critiques of metaphysics. Its conclusion is that concepts only have meaning if, in the last resort, they, or the sub-concepts they 'contain', have an empirical use.

Kant and the Positivists share the view that the concepts used to make experience intelligible only have legitimate application in the spatio-temporal world we inhabit empirically. It is illegitimate to use those concepts to make claims about what supposedly lies in principle outside experience. This position is articulated most clearly by Moritz Schlick in his paper 'Meaning and Verification' (6) Schlick distinguishes two sorts of definition: verbal and ostensive. To define a word verbally is to explain its meaning in other words. To define a word ostensively is to point to the object it refers to, and pronounce the word: to name the object for the benefit of a learner. The 'sense and sense' is:

'It is clear that [...] to understand a verbal definition we must know the signification of the explaining words beforehand, and that the only explanation which can work without any previous knowledge is the ostensive definition. We conclude that there is no way of understanding any meaning without ultimate reference to ostensive definitions and this means, in an obvious sense, to 'experience' or 'possibility of verification'.

(Schlick)

If sound, this argument works with devastating force against metaphysical language. Metaphysical terms can be defined verbally but not ostensively. This would not prove fatal if those words used to define them verbally could in turn be defined ostensively. But this, it seems, is not the case. Take the word 'monad', for example. (8) Monads according to Leibniz are the, non-physical, ultimate constituents of reality. Each is a non-spatial, and non-temporal, atomic substance that 'mirrors' or 'reflects' all the others. None of the terms of this definition can be defined ostensively. We cannot point to entities outside space and time. Similarly, the word 'God' admits of verbal definition: 'omniscient, omnipotent, transcendent, spiritual being', perhaps. But none of these terms can be defined ostensively, or so it seems. Similar remarks could be made about Plato's 'Ideas', Hegel's 'Geist', or the concept of an immaterial soul, as deployed by Plato, Augustine or Descartes.

Schlick's potentially powerful argument is in Kant. As for the positivists, it is essential to Kant's theory of meaning. Compare this passage with Schlick's:

'There is something strange (*Befremdliches*) and even absurd (*Widersinniges*) in [the assertion] that there should be a concept which possesses a meaning (*Bedeutung*) and yet is not capable of any explanation (*der aber keiner Erklärung fähig wäre*)' (CPR 263 A 244 fn.)

Kant uses 'explanation' here to mean 'definition'. He says:

'that is, of *defining it* *d.i ihn zu definieren* [...]'

and

'they cannot themselves be defined' *sie also nicht definiert werden* CPR 263 A 246)

so his view is logically equivalent to Schlick's claim about 'definition'. Although Kant distinguishes categories from empirical concepts, as having no empirical origin, neither has any non-empirical use. Even though categories are psychologically imposed on experience and empirical concepts are abstracted from it, the function of both is non-metaphysical. Kant says:

'The categories have this peculiar feature, that only in virtue of the general conditions of sensibility (*der allgemeinen sinnlichen Bedingung*) can they possess a determinate meaning (*eine bestimmte Bedeutung*) and relation to any object (*Gegenstand*)' (CPR 263)

The 'conditions of sensibility' are space and time. So any object that can give a category meaning is a spatio-temporal. This is exactly Schlick's premise about ostensive definition.

Admittedly, there are differences between Kant and the positivists on concepts. Ayer and Schlick would either deny that any is *a priori*, or regard '*a priori* concept' as a senseless concatenation, yet Kant's categories are *a priori*. But their accounts have it in common that no concept has any transcendent meaning or reference. Schlick would have been in complete agreement with Kant's insistence that:

'[...] the understanding can never transcend those limits of sensibility within which alone objects can be given to us.' (CPR 264)

Kant, like the Positivists, thinks empirical objects ultimately enable all our concepts to be meaningful.

Kant's 'intuition' (*Anschauung*) is very close to the positivists' 'sense experience' or 'sense content'. Each of space and time is a pure intuition (*eine reine Anschauung* CPR 69 A 24/B 39) and Kant says 'the only intuition possible to us is sensible ([...] *ist alle uns mögliche Anschauung sinnlich*)' (CPR 162 B 146) but he talks about '*a priori* intuitions (*Anschauungen a priori*)' entailed by the sort of thinking used, for example, in geometry or mental arithmetic. Kant's thinks even the most abstract

thinking would not be possible concepts could be applied to the empirical world.  
Kant says:

'[...] the pure concepts of understanding, even when they are applied to *a priori* intuitions (*Anschauungen a priori*), as in mathematics, yield knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) only in so far as these intuitions [...] can be applied to empirical intuitions (*auf empirische Anschauungen angewandt werden können*) (CPR 162 B147)

Schlick and Kant argue that a non empirical concept only has a use if it can have an empirical use. Metaphysical concepts, although putatively non-empirical, can have no empirical use, so they have no use. Kant deploys this very positivist argument:

'Even [...] with the aid of [pure] intuition the categories do not afford us any knowledge of things (*keine Erkenntnis von Dingen*). In other words they serve only for the possibility of empirical knowledge (*zur Möglichkeit empirischer Erkenntnis*), and such knowledge is what we entitle experience (*Erfahrung*) (CPR 162 B 147)

Schlick says the explanation of meanings requires reference 'in an obvious sense to experience'.

The sense-sense argument is a positivist tenet, not confined to Schlick. Ayer says: 'No statement is literally meaningful unless it describes what could be experienced'. (LTL) Ayer accepts this needs revising, not to eliminate sentences of scientific theory, but thinks metaphysics is still excluded by this 'old empiricist principle'. His 'critical empiricism' is in Kant.

Although Kant and the positivists think thinking is only possible because there is sense-experience, neither is committed to the view that metaphysical thinking is impossible, as a psychological activity; just that it is nonsensical, so yields no knowledge. This is the common object of their attack. Kant says:

'If no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would still indeed be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it.' (CPR 162)

The positivist view is that 'God', 'angel', 'Monad', 'soul', although possible ideas, do not refer to anything.

Positivists reject innate ideas, so they need an explanation of how it is possible to possess mathematical concepts, which, *prima facie*, are not empirical, yet essential to science, and 'scientific philosophy'. Ayer says:

'It is necessary to make a distinction which is perhaps already enshrined in Kant's famous dictum that although there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.' (LTL 74)

Ayer says in the first instance 'we may come to discover them [mathematical statements] through an inductive process', but they are still *a priori*, because they are 'independent of experience in the sense that they do not owe their validity to empirical verification.' (LTL 75) Despite Kant and Ayer differing over the logical status of mathematical statements, both think sense experience initially necessary for the use of mathematical concepts. There can be no mathematical thinking, according to Kant, without the forms of 'pure intuition', space and time.

Ayer's claim:

'[...] it cannot be significantly asserted that there is a non-empirical world of values, or that men have immortal souls or that there is a transcendent God.' (LTL 31)

entails the conclusion of Kant's attacks on God and the soul. Kant spends much of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, especially the Paralogisms and Antinomies chapters, condemning metaphysics as the attempt to apply concepts outside possible experience: essentially the positivist line. Kant argues that the category of substance is used illegitimately by his rationalist predecessors. 'Substance' is indispensable in transforming our passively received sensory input into the world of enduring spatio-temporal objects. The rationalists' mistake is to apply the category of substance to the self: They assume that because the self is not a spatial object, it must be a non-spatial object. They fail to realise that the concatenation 'non-spatial substance' is incoherent.

## Analytic Statements

The Verification Principle, the Positivists' test of whether a statement is meaningful, depends on Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction. Kant and the Positivists agree that every statement is either analytic or synthetic, and that no statement is both analytic and synthetic. Their explanations of these terms are similar, even though they sometimes disagree about which statements are analytic and which synthetic.

Ayer says a statement is 'analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains' (LTL 78) He says Kant's account of analyticity is not 'clear', and contains the mistaken assumption that every statement has a subject-predicate grammar. This is too harsh. Kant also has a linguistic criterion for analyticity. He says the predicate is 'contained' in the subject, in an analytic statement. Although this is a metaphorical way of putting it, it is clear his concept of analyticity is very close to Ayer's. Kant means by 'contained' here:

If one were to define the word or concept which is the grammatical subject of the sentence, then one would have to use that word or concept which is the grammatical predicate of the sentence.

Kant's example 'All bodies are extended' (*alle Körper sind ausgedehnt*) (or, as we would say, 'All physical objects have size') (CPR 48 A 7/B 11), if analytic, is true by definition. The idea of size is already 'contained' in the idea of a physical object, so the statement provides no new information to someone who knows the definition of 'physical object'. Ayer's examples, if analytic, are true by definition and give no new information in the predicate, not already contained in the subject. Ayer says it is analytic that: 'Nothing can be coloured in different ways at the same time with respect to the same part of itself.' (LTL 79)

Ayer and Kant share the view that the negations of analytic truths are contradictory: "This is red but not coloured" is contradictory because 'If  $x$  is red then  $x$  is coloured' is analytic. Kant and Ayer think the mistake is in logic, and semantics, not a mistake about empirical colours. They think that all analytic truths are necessary, so none is contingent.

### Synthetic Statements

Kant says synthetic statements provide, in the predicate, information not already contained in the subject. Ayer says no inspection of the meaning of a synthetic statement is sufficient to decide its truth-value. Ayer says:

"“There are ants which have established a system of slavery" is a synthetic proposition. For we cannot tell whether it is true or false merely by considering the definitions of the symbols which constitute it.' (LTL 78-9)

Ayer and Kant agree that the negations of synthetic statements do not entail contradictions. 'That object is red', said when that object is not red, does not entail a contradiction, but expresses an empirical mistake about the colour of an object. For Ayer as well as Kant, 'both analytic and synthetic' is incoherent because it is contradictory to both affirm and deny that some subject contains some predicate, so 'analytic' and 'synthetic' are opposites.

### *A Priori* Statements

Kant and the Positivists mean by '*a priori*'; 'knowable to be true or false independently of sense experience'. If there are three chairs in the next room, and I

am told this, then I can know *a priori* that there are at least three physical objects in that room. This is *a priori* because I do not have to go and carry out any observations to decide its truth.

Kant and Ayer have similar definitions of '*a priori*'. Ayer says *a priori* statements 'cannot be confuted by experience' (LTL 31) Kant says

'we shall understand by *a priori* knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience but absolutely independent of all experience (*sondern schlechterdings von aller Erfahrung unabhängig stattfinden*)' (CPR 43 A 2/B 2)

Ayer holds the Kantian views that the sentences of arithmetic are *a priori*, and all analytic statements are *a priori*.

### *A Posteriori* Statements

All and only *a posteriori* statements are empirical, because *p* is *a posteriori* if and only if *p*'s truth-value can be decided only through sense experience. Kant says:

'Opposed to [*a priori*] is empirical knowledge, which is knowledge possible *a posteriori*, that is, through experience' (CPR 43)

This Kantian epistemological category is essential to Logical Positivism.

The Positivists think there are two, and only two, classes of meaningful statement: those which are analytic and *a priori*, and those which are synthetic and *a posteriori*. Into the first category fall all truths of mathematics and logic, all definitions: any statement true in virtue of the definitions of its terms. Into the second category fall all empirical claims; any decidable by observation. The two groups are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Any sentence not falling into either category is really a piece of nonsense.

Metaphysical language is rife with putative statements which fall into neither category: that the empirical world is an illusion, that there exists a transcendent God, that heaven is populated with immaterial souls, or resurrected persons, that, really, the world is composed of monads, that physical objects are mere reflections of Platonic Ideas. These and many more are dismissed as utterly nonsensical through the deployment of the verification principle. On the one hand, metaphysical sentences are not analytic and *a priori*. On the other hand, they are not synthetic and *a posteriori*. These are the only classes of meaningful statement, so the metaphysical sentences do not really mean any thing at all. The Positivists are not saying they are false. They are literally nonsensical and, so are not even capable of being true or false.

## Meaning and Truth

The verification principle close to certain ideas of Kant, despite seeming divergences from the Positivists.

Ayer is aware of similarities between his own philosophy and Kant's. Nevertheless, he takes there to be important dissimilarities. One concerns the verification principle. Kant and the Positivists are even closer than Ayer allows.

Ayer distinguishes his position from Kant's by claiming that Kant has employed a psychological, and so contingent, criterion for the rejection of metaphysics while he, Ayer, employs a logical criterion. Ayer says:

'It may be suggested that this (that metaphysics is nonsense) is a proposition which has already been proved by Kant. But although Kant also condemned transcendent metaphysics, he did so on different grounds. For he said that the human understanding was so constituted that it lost itself in contradictions when it ventured out beyond the limits of possible experience and attempted to deal with things in themselves. And thus he made the impossibility of a transcendent metaphysic not, as we do, a matter of logic, but a matter of fact. (LTL 34)

This distinction is overdrawn. Kant, just as much as the Positivists, makes the impossibility of metaphysics a matter of logic. As Ayer recognises, metaphysics for Kant generates contradictions: illogical sentences. Being the conjunction of a proposition and its negation is a sufficient condition for being meaningless. A putative state of affairs which is contradictory to describe is logically impossible, whatever the contingencies of our psychology. So, the impossibility of metaphysics is essentially a matter of logic for Kant, and only derivatively psychological. It is wrong to see Kant's attack as resting on pure psychology, and wrong to see the positivist attack as resting on pure logic.

Central to both attacks is the idea of truth: Meaning depends logically on the possibility of truth or falsity. Schlick spells out the positivist connection between meaning and truth. Schlick says:

'Stating the meaning of a sentence amounts to stating the rules according to which the sentence is to be used, and this is the same as stating the way in which it can be verified (or falsified). The meaning of a statement is its method of verification.' (1)

Schlick uses 'verify' and 'falsify' like this: To verify a statement is to demonstrate its truth. To falsify a statement is to demonstrate its falsity. Often 'verify' means 'show to be true or false'. Empirical statements are verified by observation. Analytic statements are verified by inspection of meanings; so those sets are meaningful.

There is no 'method of verification' of a metaphysical claim, so no metaphysical meaning either.

Ayer formulates the verification principle like this:

'A sentence has literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expresses is either analytic or empirically verifiable.' (LTL 5)

It is essential to Kant's theory of meaning that, for something to count as a genuine statement, it must not be contradictory. Kant's judgements (*Urteilen*) have psychological, as well as syntactic and semantic, properties. There is sufficient overlap with the positivists' 'proposition' to count judgements as statements, or as expressing propositions. Kant spells out this necessary condition for meaningfulness:

'The universal, though merely negative condition of our judgements in general, whatever be the content of our knowledge, and however it may relate to the object (*Objekt*), is that they be not self-contradictory (*nicht selbst widersprechen*); for if self-contradictory, these judgements are in themselves even without reference to the object, null and void (*auch ohne Rücksicht aufs Objekt nichts sind*)' (CPR 189 A 150/B 189)

If a sentence is contradictory it does not express a genuine statement. Contradictions are senseless. It is not just that they lack extension, they are not 'judgements' because they cannot be used to assert or deny anything.

Kant's thinks that if something can be used to genuinely assert or deny something, that is a sufficient condition of its being a judgement, or at least, its being identical with that non-psychological component of a judgement called a 'statement' or 'proposition'. Kant says: 'Truth and error therefore [...] are only to be found in the judgement'. (CPR 297) Something genuinely capable of truth or falsity is a judgement on Kant's theory, unless it is contradictory, and so logically false. Anything not capable of truth or falsity is not a judgement. Verifiability is the demonstrability of truth, and falsifiability the demonstrability of falsehood. Therefore, the positivist theory of meaning is Kant's. Schlick says: 'Verifiability is the sufficient and necessary condition of meaning.' ( ) The conjunction of the Kantian and positivist theories of meaning is analytic.

Kant's argues that trying to do metaphysics generates Antinomies: pairs of valid arguments, yielding a purportedly metaphysical statement, and its contradictory, as conclusions. We can list premises implying that the world did have a beginning, and that it did not, that it is finite, and that it is infinite, that God exists, and that he does not exist. It follows from Kant's theory, as from the positivists', that there is no way of deciding whether any of these putative statements is true. They are not verifiable or falsifiable.

That these sentences feature as conclusions of valid arguments is not sufficient for their truth. The premises also have to be true. The putative statements and their logical negations, the conclusions of the antinomies, seem equally plausible, but they cannot both be true. In this way, metaphysical thinking leads to contradictions. Coherence is necessary for meaningfulness, so metaphysical claims are meaningless, or, as Kant would put it, they are not judgements.

Kant, like the positivists, thinks metaphysics meaningless. It is not Kant's view, as it is not the Positivists' view, that metaphysics contains sentences that are meaningful but false. There is no way of showing them to be genuine assertions or denials; verifying or falsifying them. The conjunction of this tenet of Logical Positivism with the lesson of the antinomies is analytic. (4)

Both Kantianism and Logical Positivism entail *metaphysical anti-realism*. 'Idealism' in Kant's 'transcendental idealism' denotes anti-realism. Kant thinks there are no metaphysical propositions. There only seem to be.

Kant thinks coherence necessary for truth, so, if a statement is contradictory, it cannot be true. That a judgement 'be in complete accordance with logical demands, that is, may not contradict itself' Kant calls 'the negative condition of all truth (*die negative Bedingung aller Wahrheit*)'. (CPR 98 A 59-60/B 84) Ayer agrees with this but Kant and the Positivists have it further in common that logic is entirely *a priori*: Logic in itself gives no information about the empirical world. Referring to the exhibition of the internal coherence, or incoherence, of our knowledge Kant says: 'But further than this logic cannot go (*weiter aber kann die Logik nicht gehen*) It has no touchstone (*Proberstein*) for the discovery of such error as concerns not the form but the content'. (CPR 98 A 60/B 84) Kant says:

'Although our knowledge [...] may not contradict itself, it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with its object.' (CPR 98 A 59/B 84)

Ayer says:

'An empirical proposition, or a system of empirical propositions may be free from contradiction and still be false. It is said to be false not because it is formally defective, but because it fails to satisfy some material criterion.' (LTL 90)

So Kant and the Positivists both accept:

$$\forall p (p \text{ is empirical}) \rightarrow \diamond \neg [p \rightarrow (p \ \& \ \neg p)] \ \& \ \diamond \neg p$$

But they both accept that, in the case of purely logical propositions, if they are not contradictory then they are true:

$\forall p (p \text{ is purely logical}) \rightarrow \neg [p \rightarrow (p \ \& \ \neg p)] \rightarrow p$

Kant and the Positivists draw a sharp distinction between form and content: Logic exhibits the form, but not the content, of putative knowledge. Kant says logic concerns the 'mere form *bloßen Form*' of knowledge 'leaving aside all content *mit Beiseitesetzung alles Inhalts*'. (CPR 98 A 59/B 83) Ayer says 'It is characteristic of empirical propositions [...?] that their validity is not purely formal'. (LTL 90) Both agree that coherence is not sufficient for what they both call 'material truth'. Kant says:

'Agreement with logical laws is far from being sufficient to determine the material (objective) truth of knowledge (*materielle (objective) Wahrheit dem Erkenntnisse*)' (CPR 98 A 60/B 85)

The Positivists believe tautologies, analytic statements, logical truths, give no empirical information, so logic only makes explicit what, in a sense, we know already. Kant says:

'no one can venture with the help of logic alone to judge regarding objects, or to make any assertion (*etwas zu behaupten*).' (CPR 98 A 60/B 85)

What is material truth? Logic operates only *a priori* on statements. We need to know now what makes statements true or false in virtue of content, not form.

Kant and the Positivists hold a correspondence theory of empirical truth: Coherence is necessary for empirical truth, but coherence, conjoined with correspondence with the empirical world, is sufficient for empirical truth. Ayer says:

'Empirical propositions are one and all hypotheses, which may be confirmed or discredited in actual sense experience.' (LTL 93-4)

States of affairs which are in principle observable make *a posteriori* statements true or false. Kant says:

'Truth consists in agreement of knowledge with its object [...] knowledge is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related (*mit dem Gegenstande, worauf sie bezogen wird, nicht übereinstimmt*)' (CPR 97 A 58/B 83)

This 'agreement' is correspondence. Kant thinks categories only genuine use is empirical, so 'object', here, is 'empirical object', or even 'physical object'. Kant and the Positivists both hold:

$\forall p (p \text{ is empirical}) \rightarrow [ p \leftrightarrow \exists x (x \text{ is an empirical state of affairs with which } p \text{ 'agrees'}) ]$

The positivist theory of meaning and truth is essentially Kantian. (1)

## X

### Existence

Kant's theory of existence is adopted wholesale by the Positivists and employed, as it is by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in attacking arguments for the existence of God. The positivists' only reservation about Kant's attack on theism is he should have pushed the attack still further. Pap says:

'Kant, though he demolished the traditional proofs of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, gave a curious ethical proof of these dogmas of Christian theology. (Pap 1949: 18)

On one construal, Kant criticises proofs of the existence of God to 'make room for faith', not to make room for atheism. Kant's view in the *Critique of Practical Reason* is that people have a notion of their own self-perfection. As this cannot be realised on earth, there must exist an afterlife, to be enjoyed by an immortal soul, which there does reach perfection. ( ) Such claims make no sense within the positivist programme. Pap says 'Kant's ethical proof cannot be taken seriously'. The parallels between Kant and the Positivists on existence and God are confined to the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Kant presents his theory of existence in criticising the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. The Ontological Argument, deployed in various versions by Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz, is construed by Kant and the Positivists as having two premises

1. God is, by definition, that than which nothing greater can be (conceived)
2. Existence is a perfection.
3. Therefore, God exists.

Kant's attacks the second premise. A perfection (*perfectio*) is a property which a perfect being must possess. But Kant says it is a drastic mistake to think that

existence is any kind of property, or that 'exists' is really a predicate. Saying something exists is not saying it has a special characteristic, but saying it is instantiated; that there is one. If Kant is right, then the argument is unsound.

The Positivists agree that Kant's critique is effective against the Ontological Argument. Carnap says:

'It has been known for a long time that existence [...] is not a property (cf Kant's refutation of the ontological proof of the existence of God)' (Ayer 1959: 74)

and then proceeds to discuss its wider applications:

'Most metaphysicians since antiquity have allowed themselves to be seduced into pseudo-statements by the verbal and therewith predicative form of the verb 'to be', e.g., 'I am', 'God is'. (Ayer 1959: 74)

Ayer attacks 'the postulation of real non-existent entities', for example, by Heidegger. Ayer says:

'Heidegger [...] bases his metaphysics on the assumption that "Nothing" is a name which is used to denote something peculiarly mysterious.' (LTL 43-4)

Ayer accepts that his anti-metaphysical view of existence is derived from Kant. Ayer says:

'As Kant pointed out [...] existence is not an attribute [...] so those who raise questions about Being which are based on the assumption that existence is an attribute are guilty of following grammar beyond the boundaries of sense.' (LTL 43)

The positivists think Kant has only successfully said what 'existence' does not mean. The question still remains: What does 'exists' mean, if it does not denote a property?

Kant has a positive account of existence and, like the Positivist account, it is empiricist. Kant and the Positivists take the question 'What does exists mean?' to require the same sort of answer as 'What exists?' or 'What is real?'. Kant and the positivists telescope the questions together. For example Schlick says of the statement 'It is real':

'This means that there exists a very definite connection between perceptions or other experiences, that under certain conditions data appear.' (Ayer 1959: 97)

Schlick echoes Kant's remark that when we

'ascribe existence to an object' [...] in the case of objects of the senses this takes place through their connection with some one of our perceptions, in accordance with empirical laws.' (CPR 506)

For both philosophers, existence is paradigmatically empirical existence. The term 'exists' has only an empirical use, and no metaphysical function. Schlick says:

'For us (as for Kant; and the same applies to every philosopher who knows his business) it is simply a matter of saying what it means in everyday life or in science to ascribe real existence to a thing.' (Ayer 1959: 97)

Existence, and Non-Existence, feature in Kant's list of categories (under 'Modality') and so, in common with all the other categories, have no non-empirical application. The Positivists and Kant, at his most consistent moments, share:

$\exists x (Fx) \rightarrow (x \text{ is empirical})$

which implies that, if something is not empirical, it does not exist. Neither Kant nor the Positivists can attach any sense to the denial that there are non-empirical objects, Kant because a category is misused beyond the bounds of its application, the Positivists because such a putative claim is not, in principle, verifiable. Although ' $\exists x (Fx) \rightarrow (x \text{ is empirical})$ ' is an entailment common to Kantianism and Logical Positivism, by their criteria for sense, this entailment is nonsensical:

$\neg (x \text{ is empirical}) \rightarrow \neg \exists x (Fx)$

If a proposition entails a senseless proposition, that casts doubt on the sense of that proposition.

The Positivist, and Kantian, theories of existence are essentially identical. They stand or fall together.

## Science

Kant and the Positivists draw a sharp distinction between science and metaphysics. Both wish philosophy to share the sophistication of scientific method. Ayer says:

'The Vienna Circle [...] thought that they had succeeded where Kant failed, in finding a way to set philosophy upon the sure path of a science. (Ayer 1959: 9)

The Positivists have continued the critical turn, away from philosophy as an *a priori* means of inquiry into ultimate reality, and towards philosophy as a conceptual inquiry into science, and other thinking. The effect of the critique of pure reason is to abolish rationalist metaphysics. Ayer says:

One of his (Kant's) most important contentions was that the rationalists had been entirely mistaken in supposing that they could discover the nature of things merely by the exercise of reason. (LTL? )

The Positivists agree with Kant that philosophy should not compete with science. They agree over what scientific method is, and should be. Kant thought Newtonian mechanics was the whole of physics. We know now that Kant was wrong. Kant thought Euclid's the only possible geometry. We now know there are other geometries. These are massive and mistaken assumptions that Kant subscribed to and which, with the benefit of witnessing these new developments, the Positivists did not share. The Logical Positivists drastically underestimate the importance of Quantum Physics. Although Max Planck had published his crucial findings as early as 1905, the Positivists remain ignorant of the crucial lesson that the whole of physical reality depends upon consciousness.

Despite Kant's understandable ignorance about the future of science, he agrees with the Positivists that science should be mathematically rigorous, clear in its definitions and make essential use of experimental method. These, for Kant and the positivists, are the hallmarks of science. They think for a statement to be scientific it must be verifiable, and science is distinguished by consensus and progress. The Vienna Circle absorbed the implications of the Copernican Revolution for what scientific should be. Ayer says:

'It is true no doubt that the procedure of science is rather, as Kant said, to ask nature questions than to make random collections of empirical facts.' (\*I)

Since Kant, it is hard to take seriously the idea that the scientific investigator just passively receives information about the empirical world realistically; just as it really is. The scientist is a questioner, with an order of priorities which they bring to bear on the chosen subject matter. The scientist selects from the welter of information available, and interprets it according to agreed criteria. The Positivists recognise the Kantian point that the preconceptions of the scientist make a difference to the science. They fall short of recognising the determination of observations by the observer in Quantum Physics.

Two questions are crucial for the success of Logical Positivism. Does science contain claims about the world, as it really is, independently of our experience of it? 'The study of what exists "in-itself"' is one definition of 'metaphysics'. The danger

is; it might be as nonsensical to talk about atoms and molecules, as about God or monads. What stops science being metaphysics? The other question is: Does science rest on non-scientific assumptions? Do unscientific, metaphysical, and ultimately incoherent, presuppositions have to be made in order to do science?

The Positivists are aware of the two problems. To resolve the first, Schlick draws a very Kantian distinction between:

'simple nature which surrounds us in everyday life' (Ayer 1959: 101)

and

'the transcendent world of metaphysics.' (Ayer 1959: 101)

Schlick argues that the relationship between the world described by the theoretical physicist, and the world we perceive is identity. There are not two worlds, but two vocabularies for describing one and the same world: one practical, one scientific. The putative reality of the metaphysician is transcendent. It is not part of the world at all. As Schlick acknowledges, this is Kant's view. Kant thinks the single world ordered by the categories is both taken commonsensically, and investigated by the natural sciences.

Kant's doctrine of the unity of nature must not be confused with his thesis that there are things in themselves. Schlick says:

'Atoms in Kant's system have no transcendent reality, they are not things in themselves.' (Ayer 1959: 101)

In Kant's view, it is the claims of metaphysics which seem to create another reality. That the unity of nature obtains is one of the conclusions of the Analogies chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He says: 'By nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection of appearances'. (CPR 237 A 216/B 263) Nature, which is governed by 'empirical laws', (CPR 237 A 216/B 263), is not anything different from the everyday world we perceive. As he puts it: 'All appearances lie and must lie in one nature' and 'Our analogies [...] really portray the unity of nature'. (CPR 237 A 216/B 263)

The Positivists do not accept that the law abidingness of the empirical world is the result of the *a priori* conceptual framework of perceiving subjects, or that space and time are 'ideal'. Still, bearing in mind Kant's remarks above we can appreciate that Schlick is quite correct when he says:

'The distinction between the two [worlds] is [...] especially clear in Kant's philosophy. Nature and everything of which the physicist can and must speak,

belongs according to Kant to empirical reality, and what that means is (as we have already said) explained by him in just the way it must be by us.'  
(Ayer 1959: 101)

The Positivists adopt the Kantian thesis that there is only one world, no world of metaphysics, and so no danger of science being metaphysical.

The threat that science rests on metaphysical assumptions is answered by a Kantian argument. Pap agrees that science rests on presuppositions, but insists they are empirical. He gives the example: 'There are physical constants' which is 'a proposition a follower of Kant may wish to call a presupposition of empirical science'. (Pap 1949: 23) It is to be justified by the regularities in physics being exemplified in everyday experience. Kant, construed as an idealist, agrees with this for reason Pap rejects: Those regularities are, in the last resort, due to the subjective ordering activities of the categories. Despite this, Kant and the Positivists both justify science by the regularity of ordinary experience. No metaphysical truth vindicates science. Science has no metaphysical entailments:

$$\forall p (p \text{ is scientific}) \rightarrow \neg [\exists q (q \text{ is metaphysical}) \& (p \rightarrow q)]$$

The main consequent is false because first conjunct is false. Science has empirical entailments essentially:

$$\forall p (p \text{ is scientific}) \rightarrow [\exists q (q \text{ is empirical}) \& (p \rightarrow q)]$$

Here; if  $q$  is a presupposition of  $p$ , then  $p$  entails  $q$ .

The Positivists' conception of philosophy, and scientific method, is essentially Kantian, despite their rejection of what they understand as transcendental idealism, and despite the developments in science which Kant did not foresee.

## Ethics

The Positivists allow meaning other than 'literal', or 'factual'. Ethical sentences provoke or express emotions. They cannot provide any information, other than signal the affective state of the utterer. There is no moral content. There are no moral facts. Although this emotivist theory fundamentally exhausts the positivists' position on the subject, Schlick at least, thinks emotivism is a natural extension of Kant's account of ethics.

Schlick says Kant discovered the 'formal characteristic' of ethics. Kant correctly interprets ethical sentences as imperatives, not statements. Schlick credits Kant with noticing that:

'the good always appears as something that is demanded or commanded; the evil as something forbidden' (Ayer 1959: 252)

According to Schlick, modern ethics mistakenly assumes Kant's theory is complete. The categorical imperative provides only a formal criterion for morality, so Kant's ethics lack content. Schlick says Kant 'took only a preliminary step in the characterisation of the content of the good'. (Ayer 1959: 253) The task of the Positivists is to provide Kant's ethics with content.

The content could not be factual, because ethical sentences are not statements. The positivist solution is that the content is emotional. Ayer says:

'The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content [...] it merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker.' (LTL 17)

Ethical language reveals or provokes emotional attitudes. Ayer says: 'Ethical statements are expressions and excitants of feeling'. (LTL 110 ) (17)

This development of his ethics would have appalled Kant. He insists that the categorical imperative is purely formal, and in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, is at pains to deny that a will can be purely good if determined by 'subjective conditions' and 'impulsions'. (ML 77)

We could try to soften the Positivists' blow to Kant by saying they are just explaining the content ethical statements in fact have; not saying what it consists in to be good. This will hardly do though. Although emotivism is descriptive, and Kant's ethics prescriptive, Kant is trying to say what ethics is, in terms of the conditions for a truly good will, that is, intention. This is only possible, according to Kant, in complete abstraction from the emotional states of the agent. The positivist view is that ethical sentences are not just causes but consequences of emotional states. Kant could not accept such sentences as 'ethical' at all.

Although Schlick thinks of positivist ethics as providing a content for Kant's, this is an extension of his theory he would have found unacceptable, despite Ayer's use of the Kantian term 'critique' for his treatment of ethics. (LTL 1 2) Nevertheless, Kant and Ayer share the view that that moral sentences and imperatives, so do not express propositions.

The philosophy of the Vienna Circle is essentially a version of Kant's critical philosophy. Tenets essential to Logical Positivism, about meaning, truth, existence, science and ethics are logically equivalent to Kantian claims. Because some entailments essential to Logical Positivism are synthetic *a priori*, the movement is more thoroughly Kantian than it acknowledges.

II

PHENOMENOLOGY

‘La critique de Hegel par Kant vaudrait sans doute aussi contre Husserl’  
Jacques Derrida *La voix et le phénomène* (Derrida 1967: 114)

‘Hegel’s critique of Kant would no doubt also hold against Husserl’  
Jacques Derrida *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs* (Derrida 1973: 102)

Phenomenology is essentially Kantian. Its techniques and doctrines are anticipated in the critical philosophy and, if Kantianism were subtracted from it, nothing rightly called ‘phenomenology’ would remain. ‘Kantian’ means logically equivalent to claims, or semantically equivalent to concepts, advanced by Kant in his writings, especially the *Critique of Pure Reason*. (1)

After defining ‘phenomenology’, I discuss concepts variously essential to phenomenological techniques of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty: intentionality, structures of experience, phenomena, self-evidence, and the transcendental subject. Phenomenology essentially operates within the parameters of Kant’s philosophy.

What is Phenomenology?

Merleau-Ponty defines phenomenology:

‘Phenomenology is the study of essences, and all problems, according to it, come back to defining essences: the essence of perception, the essence of consciousness for example. But phenomenology is also a philosophy which places essences back into existence and does not think that one might understand man and world other than from their “facticity”’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: vii) (2)

'Phenomenology' means the careful description of what is given to consciousness, without assumptions about its objective nature, meaning, or cause. In Husserl's 'pure' or 'transcendental' phenomenology, the aim is to find presuppositionless certainty, by which all knowledge, and *a fortiori*, any knowledge in philosophy, science and mathematics, can be justified. The practice of pure phenomenology entails epoche: the methodological suspension of belief in anything but phenomena. The disclosure of fundamental structures of experience, common to all human beings, explain how we can be presented with a world. The world and consciousness of the world are grounded in the pure subjectivity of the transcendental ego, which is inseparable from its acts. This 'pure' phenomenology is revised by the existential phenomenologists, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, who, influenced by Heidegger, argue that being-in-the-world (*être-au-monde*) is an obstacle both to the completion of the epoche, and the existence of the transcendental ego, which they reject as phenomenologically impossible.

Phenomenology's most original and influential exponent, the Moravian philosopher, Edmund Husserl, conceives of phenomenology as essentially Kantian. Writing of 'our [Husserl's] links with great philosophers of the past and in the first place to Kant', Husserl says 'We [...] feel close to Kant's doctrine' (Husserl 1970: 214), and 'We agree with Kant in his main drift'. (Husserl 1970: 215) In *Ideas*, Husserl sees phenomenology as the culmination of western philosophy, a Kantian idea, and says 'Phenomenology is, as it were, the secret nostalgia of all modern philosophy. [...] *die Phanomenologie gleichsam die geheime Sehnsucht der ganzen neuzeitlichen Philosophie ist.*' (Husserl 1950: §62) Husserl adds that 'the first to see it correctly was Kant. *Und erst recht erschaut sie Kant*' (Husserl 1950: §62) So Husserl quite readily concedes that Kant was the first phenomenologist. (3) Descartes, Locke and Hume were 'striving towards' phenomenology but Kant was doing it:

'So the transcendental deduction in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was essentially operating on phenomenological territory.' (Husserl 1950: §62)

'*So bewegt sich [...] die transzendente Deduktion der ersten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft eigentlich schon auf phänomenologischem Boden*' (Husserl 1950: §62)

Husserl gives this reason why Kant did not pursue phenomenology further:

'[...] but Kant misinterprets the same as psychological, and therefore abandons it of his own accord.' (Husserl 1950: §62)

'*aber Kant mißdeutet denselben als psychologischen und gibt ihn daher selbst wieder preis*' (Husserl 1950: §62)

But it is Husserl who misinterprets Kant. Kant's phenomenology is no more psychological than Husserl's. Kant is engaged in 'transcendental logic', a critical *a priori* inquiry into the possibility of experience, which, like Husserl, he is at pains to distinguish from psychology. Kant never abandons phenomenology, although he does not produce the detailed descriptions of Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.

Husserl uses 'transcendental' (*transzendental*) for inquiry into how science, and ordinary experience, are possible: Kant's term. Husserl calls pure phenomenology 'transcendental idealism' (*transzendentaler Idealismus*): Kant's name. Husserl has not misunderstood himself.

## Intentionality

'Intentionality' (*Intentionalität*) expresses the idea that, as Husserl puts it, 'all consciousness is consciousness of'. (Husserl 1975: 13) Consciousness is always directed towards some object, even if that object is imaginary, purely mental or, in some sense, non-existent. Husserl uses the Kantian 'presentation' (*Vorstellung*) for one amongst many objects of awareness: 'presentations, probabilities, and non-being, and also the modes of appearance, goodness and value etc.' (Husserl, 1975: 13) Phenomenological intentionality, is essentially Kant's experience as a relation between subject and object. Kant speaks of a 'necessary connection in which the understanding, by means of the categories, stands to appearances (*Erscheinungen*)' (A 119, CPR 143) The necessity is that all experience is *of* some appearance. Kant says:

'Save through its relation to a consciousness, that is at least possible, appearance could never be for us an object of knowledge and so would be nothing to us.' (A 120, CPR 143-4)

Kant's quasi-empiricist view that we can only know 'possible objects of experience' entails the intentionality doctrine. All appearance is *to* some perceiving, or imagining, consciousness. The threefold structure: experiencer, experience, and experienced, is as essential to Kant's transcendental idealism, as it is to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

Phenomenological intentionality is distinct from the pre-Kantian scholastic concept of intentionality, revived by the Austrian psychologist and philosopher Franz Brentano, which entails that having experiences entails *representing* their object. The view of Kant and the phenomenologists is that consciousness *transcendentally constitutes* its object. Consciousness makes it what it is to us. In Husserl, the various acts of consciousness, and, in Kant, the application of the categories in making

judgments, make possible a world for us. Merleau-Ponty appreciates the Kantianism of the phenomenological idea of intentionality when he speaks of: 'the notion of intentionality' as 'too often cited as the main discovery of phenomenology [...]' and says

"All consciousness is consciousness of something", that is not new. Kant has shown in the *Refutation of Idealism* that interior perception is impossible without exterior perception.' (Merleau-Ponty 1945: xii) (4)

Both inner and outer experience are necessarily relational on Kant's view and in phenomenology.

Phenomenology inherits a paradox from Kant, about how I can be conscious of myself if subject and object are one and the same in self-consciousness: I am what I am aware of, but as self-conscious subject I am related to myself as object, and so appear distinct from myself and never as subject. Kant speaks of 'the subject (*das Subjekt*) which is the object (*der Gegenstand*) of [inner sense]' (B 68, CPR 88) and says 'The whole difficulty is how a subject can inwardly intuit itself (*wie ein Subjekt sich selbst innerlich anschauen könne*)'. This is a problem Husserl never solves, and is exploited by Sartre in his early critique of the transcendental ego. (5)

Kant thinks outer experience is straight forwardly intentional in the phenomenological sense:

'Outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations, this sense can contain in its presentation only the relation of an object to a subject (*nur das Verhältnis eines Gegenstandes auf das Subjekt*).' (CPR 87 B 67)

Merleau-Ponty accepts that the phenomenological solution to these problems, that subject and object are mutually constituting, is anticipated by Kant in the third *Critique*. Merleau-Ponty says:

'Kant himself shows in the *Critique of Judgment* that there is a unity of imagination and understanding and a unity of the subjects *before the object* (*il y a une unité de l'imagination et de l'entendement et une unité des sujets avant l'objet*)' (Merleau-Ponty 1945: xii)

The Kantian idea of intentionality is essential to phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty retains intentionality in his existential phenomenology, despite his repudiation of *epoche*, as necessarily incomplete. Merleau-Ponty says:

'Without doubt, the act of relating is nothing without the spectacle of the world which it binds.'

‘(*Sans doute l’acte de liaison n’est rien sans le spectacle du monde qu’il lie*)’  
(Merleau-Ponty 1945: iii)

where

‘The world is not what I think but what I live.’

‘(*Le monde est non pas ce que je pense, mais ce que je vis.*)’  
(Merleau-Ponty 1945: xi-xii)

The epoche

Revealing 'intentional structures' in pure phenomenology requires the reductive device of epoche, which is itself anticipated by Kant.

Husserl argues there are two fundamental attitudes to the world: taken for granted common sense, 'the natural attitude', and pure phenomenology, 'the phenomenological attitude'. The world, as it appears within the natural attitude, includes everyday physical objects, other people, and oneself:

'I find continually present to hand and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which I myself belong, as do all other men found in it and related in the same way to it.'

‘*Ich finde beständig vorhanden als mein Gegenüber die eine räumliche-zeitliche Wirklichkeit, der ich selbst zugehöre, wie alle anderen in ihr vorfindlichen und auf sie in gleicher Weise bezogenen Menschen.*’ (Husserl 1950: §30)

Belief in the objective reality of the world is *bracketed*, or *put in parenthesis*, to inspect it phenomenologically, or just as it appears to consciousness. This suspension of belief in the world of the natural attitude is called *epoche*, the Greek for 'suspension of belief'. The *epoche* effects the transition from our ordinary, taken for granted, assumptions to phenomenology. Husserl calls it a phenomenological, or transcendental, 'reduction', because what we naturally believe in is reduced to what is directly presented consciousness. Husserl does not deny the existence of physical objects, or endorse ontological idealism. He employs a methodological agnosticism about himself, and the external world, as a device to discover how objects of consciousness are possible. Husserl does not posit two ontologically distinct worlds, that of the natural attitude, and that of the reduction. The one world can be viewed in

two ways: from the 'natural standpoint' or from the standpoint of phenomenological description. (6)

Kant anticipates the phenomenological reduction, or *epoche*, in the difference between the first two major sections of *The Critique of Pure Reason*: the Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Aesthetic. In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant is concerned with the empirical world taken for granted in everyday thinking, containing physical objects entering into causal interaction. In this world, we judge some things possible, others impossible, some things to exist, others not to exist. Some objects are in groups, or are of a certain sort. Some stand on their own. The world of Kant's Analytic, constituted by the categories, is the world of everyday commonsense, the world of Husserl's natural attitude, Heidegger's 'being-in-the world' (*in der-Welt-Sein*), Merleau-Ponty's 'world that I live' (*monde que je vis*), and Sartre's 'lived world' (*le vécu*).

Kant's Aesthetic, on the other hand, depicts the world after the phenomenological *epoche*. Kant considers only what appears in its bare perceptual givenness, not the world as complex, physical, law-governed, and objective. Like Husserl, Kant is committed to only one world; treated in the Aesthetic only as it appears to perceptual consciousness, in the Analytic also as it appears to the understanding (*Verstand*). Subtracting the contribution of the understanding, and *a fortiori* the categories, is subtracting those features of the natural attitude Husserl requires us to suspend to do phenomenology: objectivity, causality, reality, substantiality, physicality.

Kant and Husserl share the same motivation in contrasting what is given to consciousness with what is taken for granted as existing objectively. Both philosophers are trying to answer 'How is experience possible?'. Husserl says:

'We are plainly concerned with a quite necessary generalisation of the question as to the conditions of the possibility of experience.' (Husserl 1970: 232)

and adds that the 'historical (Kantian) echoes [...] are intentional'.

It is not surprising that Husserl calls phenomenology 'critique' in *The Idea of Phenomenology*. It is, he says, a 'critique of cognition' (Husserl 1970b: 18), and he intends 'critique' in the Kantian sense of *exhibiting the limits of*. Kant and Husserl are trying to decide how the objective world is possible. They agree the answer lies in the subject's consciousness containing certain perennial cognitive structures. For Kant, these are the categories; for Husserl, the structures of intentional acts. For both philosophers, transcendently speaking, the empirical world is an achievement of consciousness. The move back from the phenomenological attitude, to showing how the natural attitude world is possible, is effected by Husserl in the detailed phenomenological descriptions of aspects of consciousness. By Kant, it is effected by listing the categories and justifying them. For this reason, Husserl says the

transcendental deduction in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was actually operating on the ground (*Boden*) of phenomenology. (Husserl 1950: §62)

### The Structures of Experience

One consequence of the *epoche* is that phenomenology is not concerned with the intrinsic nature of the subject, or object, of consciousness, or with establishing causal connections between subject and object. It aims to be purely descriptive of what appears to consciousness. This concentration of attention on the constitutive relations between subject and object, and lack of inquiry into their intrinsic nature is Kantian. It is essential to Kant's doctrine that I cannot know myself as I really am in myself, any more than I can know the objects of outer perception as they really are in themselves. No metaphysical knowledge is possible of either subject or object for Kant. We are acquainted only with 'phenomenal' appearances, and so know them only empirically. Husserl insists that nothing which appears to consciousness is either oneself, as one really is, or objects, as they really are. Rather than making the negative ontological claim, that we know nothing of subject or object, Husserl puts the reality of each 'in brackets'.

Husserl draws a distinction between the *act* of imagining, hearing, seeing, feeling, etc: the *noesis*, and *what* is imagined, heard, seen, felt etc: the *noema*. After the *epoche*, the phenomenological structure of consciousness is nevertheless relational. There exists a pure ego, that does not actually appear to consciousness, acts of consciousness, and the content of those acts.

Admittedly, *The Critique of Pure Reason* does not contain the wealth of detailed description, of kinds of mental acts, and their contents, found in Husserl's *Ideas*. Despite this, Kant draws a threefold distinction between: transcendental unity of apperception, mental act, and that act's content which corresponds, at the level of the reduced world of the *epoche*, to Husserl's transcendental ego, *noesis* and *noema*. The distinction between mental acts and their content is further anticipated by Kant, in the difference between *synthesis* and *the manifold*, for example in the definition of 'synthesis'. Kant says:

'By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different presentations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge.'

‘(*verschiedene Vorstellungen zu einander hinzutun, und ihr Mannigfaltigkeit in einer Erkenntnis zu begreifen*)’ (A 77/B 103, CPR 111)

The German *Erkenntnis* admits of a distinction between singular and plural, in the way 'knowledge' does not.

For Kant and Husserl, consciousness constitutes its objects, yet there remains a *given*, in experience. Both philosophers call this given 'phenomena': what is experienced, just as it is experienced. Kant characterises the synthetic constitution of objects by uniting presentations, but Husserl distinguishes, within the *noetic* component of the experience, various 'modes of attention', such as 'just noted', 'primarily noted', and even, "completely un-noticed", although still continuing to appear'. (Husserl 1950: § 268) What Kant classifies under the one term 'synthesising activity', Husserl distinguishes into a multiplicity of 'intentional acts'. Kant and Husserl think the world as we perceive it is the joint result of what is given phenomenally, and the constitutive activity of our transcendental psychology. Husserl fills out Kant's picture.

One way of thinking the similarity between the difference between the Aesthetic and the Analytic, and the difference between the phenomenological attitude and the natural attitude, is as between subjectivity and objectivity. Kant and Husserl are concerned to solve the problem: How does experience come to be of a world of objective, enduring, physical objects, given that our experiences are subjective, and fleeting? The *epoché* reduces the objective to the subjective; the world to my present experience of it, me to transcendental subjectivity. The world of the Aesthetic is subjective because it consists of experiences, temporal, or spatio-temporal, 'intuitions'. It requires the categories of the Analytic to be transformed into the objective, physical, law-governed, world of science and common sense.

For Kant and Husserl wholly, objectivity is an achievement of the subject. Experience of an entire, objectively existing, physical object, 'there', is transcendently 'built up' out of actual, and possible, perspectives on it. Kant and Husserl use the example of a house. (I do not know whether Husserl took this example from Kant.) Kant and Husserl note that it is not possible to visually perceive the totality of a physical object, at any one moment. Husserl speaks of

'The experience of a house, as I experience it [...] a house which appears in such and such a way, and has certain specific determinations when seen from the side, from nearby, from afar.' (Husserl 1975: 12)

Kant says:

'The apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house which stands before me is successive' (CPR 220)

Kant means one sees first one part, say the front, then another part, say the side, and so on. Kant says:

'that which lies in the successive apprehension is here viewed as presentation' (CPR 220)

This anticipates Husserl's distinction between the house perceived before, and after, the *epoche*: It is reduced to a momentary 'subjective mode of givenness, or subjective mode of appearance, exemplified by perspective'. (Husserl 1975: 13) The problem common to both philosophers is how we come to perceive the house as a whole, given that we are directly acquainted, at any one moment, only with a 'presentation' (*Vorstellung*), or an 'appearance' (*Erscheinung*), or 'profile' (*Abschattung*). If we do not see the whole house, how do we see the house as a whole?

Husserl postulates 'objectifying acts', which are 'original factors in the constituting of objects'. (Husserl 1950: § 332), as the solution to the difficulty that 'in principle a thing can be given only in one of its aspects', 'through perspectives', and that 'a thing is necessarily given in mere modes of appearing'. (Husserl 1950: § 137) The objectifying consciousness provides a *rule*, or a *frame*, or a *form*, which 'does not determine a content, but a form for all possible objects of this kind of possible experience'. Husserl says it is established *a priori* by this objectifying function that 'an absolutely fixed frame is marked out for the course of future experience'. For Kant the transition from subjectively given presentations, to experience of objectively enduring physical objects, could not be made without use of the categories of substance and causation, and the rule following considerations adduced in the Analogies. For Kant and Husserl, it is a necessary condition of something's being a physical object that it be a discriminable particular, capable of entering into causal relations. A necessary condition for my perceiving anything as a physical object, is that any perception is embedded in other possible perceptions in a rule governed way. (7)

Husserl's 'objectifying function' of consciousness is the role of Kant's categories. Kant says the categories are rules for making sense of perceptions, as perceptions of objective particulars. The categories determine the structure of experience *a priori*, as the various *noetic* functions do for Husserl. It is for this reason that one of the most respected phenomenological commentators says:

'Some of the functions performed by Husserl's intentions, naturally the objectifying and the constituting ones, are likely to remind the reader of Kant's analysis of experience, in which the intellect (*Verstand*), with the help of its categories, synthesises the sense-data supplied by the perceptions thus constituting identical objects within the flux of our sensations.' (Spiegelberg 1976: 110)

Spiegelberg has isolated the common treatment of the transition from subjective phenomena, to objective objects: the recoveries of the natural attitude from the

transcendental reduction, or *epoche*, of the natural attitude, and the Transcendental Analytic from the Transcendental Aesthetic.

Perhaps because their aims and techniques are similar, Husserl lists some differences between phenomenology and Kant's philosophy. In *Logical Investigations* Husserl reproaches Kant

'(to whom we [Husserl] feel quite close) for a failure to draw any clear distinction between these oppositions: thinking/intuiting, intuition/[?]signification, sensuous/categorial intuition, inadequate/adequate intuition, individual intuition/universal intuition.' (Husserl 1970: 832-833)

Husserl is closer to Kant than he supposes, because these distinctions are drawn Kant. Kant and Husserl use 'intuition' in a similar sense. As Sokolowski says, when Husserl means by intuition; 'consciousness of an object in its direct presence' (Sokolowski 1974: 27) Husserl says:

'To have something real primordially given, and to become aware of it and to perceive it in simple intuition, are one and the same thing.' (Husserl 1950: § 51)

Like Kant on the first page of the Aesthetic, Husserl introduces 'intuition' on the first page of *Ideas*, and contrasts 'outer perception' and 'inner or self perception'. Kant's terms are 'outer sense' and 'inner sense'. Husserl says the distinctions are not clear in Kant. Perhaps, but they are there.

Kant distinguishes thought from intuition, devoting the Aesthetic to intuition and the Analytic to thought, but insists thought and intuition are mutually dependent. Kant says:

'Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind' (A 51/B 75, CPR 93)

Kant says:

'that is no reason for confounding the contribution of either with that of the other' (A 51/B 76, CPR 93)

Kant never draws the detailed phenomenological distinctions Husserl draws. But Kant distinguishes thought and intuition. Kant says:

'The two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing'

(A 51/B 75 CPR 93)

Kant possesses a near equivalent to Husserl's 'signitive act', in 'judgement'. Signitive acts are judgements according to Husserl. Husserl breaks the signitive act down into: expressed meaning (sense), what is judged (content), and the object (referent), of the judgement. The expressed meaning is intentionally directed to the referent. Kant captures 'expressed meaning' when he says

'In every judgement there is a concept which holds of many presentations'  
(A 68/B 93, CPR 105)

For both writers, a term may have the same sense but distinct referents. Any judgment (*Urteil*) has a content (*Inhalt*) for Kant, which is distinct from its referent. Husserl's and Kant's judgements depend upon ultimate reference to intuitions, yet possess significance in the absence of any specific referent. Kant says 'All bodies are divisible'. (CPR 105) He says 'the concept of the divisible applies to various other concepts' but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to 'certain appearances that present themselves to us' (CPR 105)

There is at least a Kantian analogue of Husserl's distinction between fulfilled and unfulfilled intentions: the contrast, for example, between thinking of, or speaking about, an object in its absence, and actually perceiving it. For Kant and Husserl, absence phenomenologically depends on presence.

Kant does not use 'categorical intuition', but Husserl's concept is designed to denote the very Kantian thesis that, in perception, our conceptual scheme is 'read into' the objects we perceive, and so, to some extent, makes them what they are to us. Husserl says:

'As examples of logical categories we may cite such concepts as property, relative quality, substantive meaning (fact), relation, identity, equality, group, (collection), number, whole and part, genus and species.' (Husserl 1950: § 68)

Kant's list of categories includes: attribute, reality, three categories of relation, unity, totality, and plurality. Like Kant, Husserl thinks categories govern fundamentally different types of judgement. He says the 'meaning categories' are 'fundamental concepts of the various kinds of propositions, of their elements and forms, which belong to the essence of the proposition'. (Husserl 1950: § 68) Husserl is Kantian about categories, and about the logical form of judgments.

Husserl's distinction between adequate and inadequate intuitions is between what does, and does not, suffice for perceptual acquaintance with the essence of an object. We cannot directly perceive the totality of properties of an object, but we can to know what it is, in the sense of what sort of thing it is. This distinction is present in

Kant as the distinction between the multiplicity of the manifold in perception, and the categorial ordering of the manifold, in synthesis. Our conceptual scheme divides objects into sorts, or a complex, chaotic, bare manifold would be unintelligible, ('nothing to us'). Husserl uses 'manifold' to denote any complex of phenomena in need of ordering, in perception, or in thought. (8) Kant distinguishes universal from particular 'judgments', in the Table of Judgments. (A 70/B 95, CPR 107) For Kant, to perceive an object entails to judging it to be that particular *one*, and to be of some *sort*.

Kant does not draw Husserl's distinctions in Husserlian detail, as the translator of *Logical Investigations* recognizes, phenomenology is an execution of Kant's project. Findlay says:

'The vague 'syntheses' of Kant are for the first time given concrete flesh and blood and Husserl's theory [...] seems to raise the syntheses of Kant to a higher level of clarity, and to reconcile their subjective and objective sides.' (9)

Husserl underestimates the variety of intentional objects distinguished by Kant. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre appreciates that Kant engages in phenomenology, by adopting the standpoint of transcendental subjectivity. Sartre says:

' Kant adopted the point of view of the pure subject in order to determine the conditions for the possibility not only for an object in general but for the various categories of object: the physical object, the mathematical object, the beautiful or ugly object, the one which presents teleological characteristics.'  
(Sartre 1943: 5)

Kant and Husserl share a Cartesian, or first person singular, starting point for doing philosophy, made explicit by Husserl in *Cartesian Meditations* (Husserl 1960), and recognized in Kant by Heidegger. Heidegger says:

'Kant took over Descartes' position quite dogmatically, notwithstanding all the essential respects in which he had gone beyond him.' (Heidegger 1961: 45)

Kant, like Husserl, and Descartes, begins philosophy with the experience of the subject. The model for the subject is oneself, not another person. Kant went 'beyond' Descartes 'in essential respects' in the critique of metaphysics.

Phenomena and Appearances

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger draws on Kant to distinguish the 'ordinary' from the 'phenomenological' conception of a phenomenon. Heidegger says:

'If [?] by "that which shows itself" we understand those entities which are accessible through the emirical "intuition" in, let us say, Kant's sense, then the formal conception of "phenomenon" will indeed be legitimately employed. In this usage "phenomenon" has the signification of the *ordinary* conception of phenomenon. But this ordinary conception is not the phenomenological conception.'

(Heidegger 1927: 54)

and

'If we keep within the horizon of the Kantian problematic, we can give an illustration of what is conceived phenomenologically as a "phenomenon" [...]'

(Heidegger 1927: 54)

The central concept of phenomenology, 'phenomenon', is explained within the framework of Kant's philosophy. (10) Heidegger thinks the phenomenological phenomenon *phenomenologically* prior to the ordinary phenomenon: Unless we experience phenomena, in the phenomenological sense, we can not experience phenomena in the ordinary sense. The phenomenological phenomenon 'already shows itself in the appearance' (Heidegger 1927: 54) and 'What [...] shows itself in itself will be the phenomena of phenomenology' (Heidegger 1927: 55) 'In itself' here means 'as it is', 'directly', or 'as it does appear'.

Heidegger uses Kant's Aesthetic to argue that space and time are phenomena, in the phenomenological sense, but not in the ordinary sense:

'[...] manifestly, space and time must be able to show themselves in this way - they must be able to become phenomena - if Kant is claiming to make a transcendental assertion grounded in the facts when he says that space is the *a priori* "inside which" of an ordering.' (Heidegger 1927: 55)

Heidegger does not spell out the connection with the Analytic: The Analytic is about ordinary phenomena. The Aesthetic is about phenomenological phenomena, and the Aesthetic makes the analytic possible. (Unless the sentences of the Aesthetic are true, the sentences of the Analytic cannot be true.) But Heidegger refers us to the Transcendental Aesthetic, Section I, in a footnote. (Heidegger 1961: 55, A 23-30/B37-45, CPR 67-74) For Kant, unless space and time are our forms of intuition, we can not experience objective appearances. For Heidegger, unless there are phenomena, in the phenomenological sense, there can not be phenomena in the ordinary sense. Heidegger uses Kant to distinguish two senses of 'appearance':

'Kant uses the term "appearance" in this twofold way. According to him "appearances" are, in the first place, the 'objects of empirical intuition': they are what shows itself in such intuition. But what thus shows itself (the "phenomenon" in the genuine primordial sense) is at the same time an 'appearance' as an emanation of something which *hides* itself in that appearance - an emanation which announces.' (Heidegger 1961: 53-4)

The two sorts of appearance Kant distinguishes correspond to Husserlian objects of before, and after, the *epoche*. Heidegger's 'objects of empirical intuition', the objects of Kant's Analytic, and the objects of Husserl's 'natural attitude', are, paradigmatically, physical objects. Physical objects *appear* in the way that, for example, a motor car (rather than some sense data) might appear around a bend in the road. This is empirical or commonsensical appearing. The thing appears. The other sort of appearing, 'an emanation' in Heidegger's words, is the phenomenological sort of phenomenon: what remains when the transcendently constituted objectivity of the object of perception is suspended. It is what is directly given in experience. (11) The phenomenological, and ordinary, senses of 'phenomenon' distinguished by Heidegger are called by Kant 'appearances', and 'phenomena', respectively. Here is the 'ordinary' sense of 'phenomenon':

'Appearances (*Erscheinungen*), so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories, are called *phaenomena*.' (A 248-9, CPR 265)

This is the 'phenomenological' sense of 'appearance':

'The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is entitled appearance (*Erscheinung*)' (A 20/B 34, CPR 65)

Things-in-themselves are objects, as they are independently of our perceptions of them. Things-in-themselves *transcend* our perceptual and cognitive perspectives on them:

'[...] appearances are not things in themselves, and yet are what alone can be given to us to know, inspite also of the fact that their (re)presentation in apprehension is always successive [...]' (A 190/B 235, CPR 220)

Husserl uses the Kantian term:

'The perceived thing, as a whole, whatever parts, sides, moments accrue to it [...] transcends the perception.' (Husserl 1931: 87)

The idea of a phenomenon in phenomenology is Kantian. Kant uses 'appearance' in the phenomenological, and 'phenomenon' in the 'ordinary' sense.

### Self Evidence

It seems an essential aspect of Husserl's phenomenology cannot be reconciled with Kant's critical philosophy: the insistence that phenomenology be conducted without presuppositions, revealing phenomena as they are, without any perceptual or intellectual prejudice. It should be self-evident according to Husserl, what phenomena are like: for example, that red is not the same colour as yellow. Self-evidence allows Husserlian phenomenology to be an *eidetic* science. On the other hand, Kant's Copernican revolution entails an ineliminable intellectual, and perceptual, contribution of the subject's preconceptions to any inquiry.

Husserl's idea of self-evidence parallels Kant's concept of experience, in the third *Critique*. Aesthetic experience, for Kant, entails perceiving objects for their own sake, in their own right: contemplating them, in their bare particularity, as ends in themselves. This requires not bringing empirical, or functional, preconceptions to the object (although the categories are still imposed, or there could be no aesthetic *objects*). Merleau-Ponty acknowledges this anticipation of phenomenological self-evidence:

'Kant himself showed in the *Critique of Judgement* that there exists a unity of the imagination and the understanding and a unity of subjects *before the object*, and that, in experiencing the beautiful for example, I am aware of a harmony between sensation and concept, between myself and others, which is itself without any concept.' (Merleau-Ponty 1945: xii)

Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty are disillusioned with the goal of pure, presuppositionless, phenomenology, and Heidegger replaces it with hermeneutics, then with his own fundamental ontology. Merleau-Ponty and Sartre adopt existential phenomenology, based on the Kantian idea of reflection. (12) Merleau-Ponty thinks 'pure' phenomenology has to be altered, on Kantian lines, to be plausible:

'For an absolute self-evidence free from any presupposition to be possible, and for my thought to be able to pierce through to itself, catch itself in action at a pure 'assent of self to self' it would, to speak the language of the Kantians, have to cease to be an event and become an act through and through.'  
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 395)

There can be absolute, or pure, self-evidence to reflecting consciousness, because

'[...] reflection is not absolutely transparent to itself, it is always given to itself in an experience, in the Kantian sense of the word.' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 42)

Objective experience, on the Kantian view, is necessarily categorially organized, *a priori*. Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre's, compromise with the Husserlian ideal of pure phenomenology brings them close to Kant's doctrine that we never know objects, including ourselves, as they really are, only as they appear to us, despite Sartre's rejection of 'the being-behind-the-appearance' or 'the thing-in-itself', as phenomenologically illegitimate.

The goal is to make one's presuppositions explicit. It is impossible not to have any, but it might be possible to know what they are. Merleau-Ponty recognizes that the model for this search for preconceptions is Kant's 'Transcendental Deduction'. Merleau-Ponty says:

'The whole of the transcendental deduction hangs on the affirmation of a complete theory of truth. It is precisely to the sources[?] of this affirmation that we must revert if we wish to adopt a reflective method.' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 220)

The 'source[?]' of this affirmation is the list of categories. For Kant, and Merleau-Ponty, it is an inescapable fact about the human psyche that the order, significance and, intelligibility of the world has transcendental origins in inherent ways of thinking, in *a priori* concepts. Phenomenological reflection is the attempt to make these presuppositions explicit, just as the Analytic, including the Transcendental Deduction, is the attempt to make fundamental categorial presuppositions explicit. This is why phenomenology needs a 'new definition of the *a priori*' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 220) Merleau-Ponty says:

'Kantianism would seem to have seen quite clearly that the problem of perception resides in its being an originating knowledge.'  
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 43)

The ideal of pure phenomenology is present in *The Critique of Judgment*, and the post-Husserlian revisions are modeled on the transcendental deduction. Each version of phenomenology is essentially Kantian.

The Transcendental Ego

The early Husserl grounds experience, and all its structures, in the world but the later Husserl grounds them in the transcendental ego. Husserl means the same as Kant by 'ground' (*Grund*): *a* grounds *b*, if and only if, *a* makes *b* possible: if not *a*, then not *b*. Both authors sometimes use 'condition' (*Kondition*) in roughly this sense.

The term 'transcendental ego' (*transzendente Ich*), is Kant's. It refers to that which is conscious of objects, but which is not itself an object of its own consciousness. The transcendental ego is irreducibly subject, so not object its own object. Although not an entity, according to Kant and Husserl, it is a condition of any experience of entities. Husserl says:

'The originary of becoming in the stream of consciousness is quite a peculiar one [...]. The ego does not live in the positings as passively dwelling in them. The positings are instead radiations from the pure ego as from a primal source of generations (Husserl 1931: 291)

Kant claims, in the first edition of the *Transcendental Deduction*:

'There must [...] be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of all objects of experience, a ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions [...]

This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception.' (A 106-7, CPR 135-6)

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant rejects the view that the self is an immaterial spirit. The unity of consciousness is due partly to the synthesis of the objects of its experience, and partly to the possibility of self-consciousness. Kant says that the 'I think' (*Ich denke*) must be capable of accompanying all my presentations. That any of my thoughts can be had self-consciously is necessary and sufficient for their belonging to the same mind, called mine'. If it were impossible to be self-conscious, then experiences would not belong to persons. Such a putative experience would not belong to a single self or ego.

Husserl accepts much of this account. In explaining his view of the self he explicitly acknowledges Kant. Husserl says:

'In every actional *cogito* the ego lives out its life in a special sense. But all mental processes in the background belong to it: and it belongs to them [...]. All of them, as belonging to one stream of mental processes which is mine, must admit of becoming actional cogitationes [...]. In Kant's words, the I think must be capable of accompanying all my representations (Husserl 1931: 133)

Husserl reifies the transcendental ego into a non-physical, subjective, entity rather like a Cartesian soul. He says that, after the epoche, he remains as pure transcendental ego, and 'I exist', no longer then means 'I, this man, exist'. (Husserl 1931: 5) 'This man' belongs to the natural attitude, and so is put in parentheses by the phenomenological reduction. Nevertheless, the transcendental ego only exists so long as its experiences exist. Unlike Descartes' soul, it is not a substance. It is a structure of experience.

Despite his refusal to engage in ontology, only in description, Husserl says the transcendental ego exists. Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, think Husserl thereby hypostatizes the transcendental ego into something both ontologically peculiar, and phenomenologically illegitimate. In *The Transcendence of the Ego* (Sartre: 1958) Sartre argues that being conscious requires 'pre-reflexive consciousness', not reflexive consciousness, and Husserl's making the self into a 'thing' is a mistake. Sartre thinks that the phenomenologically correct approach to both these issues is to be found not in Husserl, but in Kant.

Sartre finds the distinction between reflexive and pre-reflexive consciousness in Kant:

'It must be conceded to Kant that the *I think* must be able to accompany all our (re)presentations. But need we then conclude that an I in fact inhabits all our states of consciousness? (Sartre 1958: 32-4)

Sartre says:

'This inference would appear to distort the Kantian view.

Kant and Sartre think that being conscious does not require being perpetually self-conscious. Sartre quotes Kant approvingly:

'Kant says nothing concerning the actual existence of the *I think*. On the contrary he seems to have seen perfectly well that there are moments of consciousness without the I, for he says 'must be able to accompany' (Sartre 1958: 32)

Sartre follows Kant, in avoiding assimilating pre-reflexive to reflexive consciousness, and avoiding existential commitment to the transcendental self. Sartre thinks Kant has a strictly phenomenological attitude to the self. Husserl does not realise, as Sartre and Kant do, that even the reduced self must, in strict phenomenology, fall before the epoche. The conscious subject does not appear to the consciousness of the conscious subject.

Kant and Sartre think most states of consciousness are not self-conscious states. In daily tasks, we are absorbed in what we are concerned with, and only, from time

to time, pause to reflect. A billiard player is absorbed in taking a shot. At their moment of greatest concentration, what they are not conscious of is themselves, but of the ball as 'to be played'. Self-consciousness impedes the play. It is un-Zen.

Sartre's Kantian conclusion is that subject-object distinction is produced by reflexive consciousness. A self only appears in self-consciousness, so in strict phenomenology, only in self consciousness *is* there a self. Kant says the unity of the ego is produced partly by the possibility of the 'I think' accompanying any (but not necessarily all) one's (re)presentations. The unity of consciousness is made possible by the unity of the manifold. But it appears as a distinct unity. So, phenomenologically, it is distinct from it. Merleau-Ponty recognizes this. Merleau-Ponty says:

'The unity of consciousness in Kant is achieved simultaneously with that of the world.' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: ix)

Each makes the other possible, yet each is not the other. I can be conscious of myself, but only in fundamentally the ways as I can be conscious of other people.

Heidegger's anti-psychologistic clarification of the Question of Being (*Seinsfrage*), by fundamental ontology (*Fundamentalontologie*), entails the original unity which makes the subject-object distinction possible: 'being-in-the-world'. Heidegger realises that the distinction between subject and object, and its presupposing *some* original unity, is Kantian. Heidegger says:

'Kant presupposes both the distinction between the 'in me' and the 'outside of me', *and also the connection* [italics?] between these [...].' (Heidegger 1962: 248)

The division between transcendental subject, and empirical object, depends on the transcendental unity of apperception. A monism of phenomena is presupposed by the distinction between, experiencer, experience, and experienced. This, together with the possibility of the *Ich denke*, seems to divorce the self from its presentations. But, as Heidegger says:

'The "I" is not just an 'I think', but an 'I think something'. And does not Kant himself keep stressing that the "I" remains related to its representations, and would be nothing without them?' (Heidegger 1962: 367)

Merleau-Ponty disallows any fundamental dualism between subject and object by his notion of the 'ready made world'. In so far as they are original unities, designed to dissolve subject-object dualism, 'being-in-the-world', '*le vécu*', and the 'ready made world' have the same function as Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. (16)

Phenomenology faces the same dilemma as Kant over the self. It maintains the Cartesian first person starting point for doing philosophy, yet is reluctant to postulate an immaterial soul. Heidegger praises Kant's phenomenologically correct view of the self. Heidegger says:

'Kant, indeed in strict conformity with the phenomenal content given in saying "I", shows that the ontical theses about the soul-substance which have been inferred (*erschlossen*) from these characteristics, [i.e. simplicity, personality, etc.] are without justification.' (Heidegger 1961: 366)

Heidegger posits a Kantian consciousness 'without the I' instead:

'[...] one *is* that with which one concerns oneself' (Heidegger 1961: 368)

Yet, phenomenology does not free itself of the idea of a transcendental ground for experience which is utterly subjective. Merleau-Ponty says:

'There can be sensation only on condition that it exists for a central and unique I' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 219)

Merleau-Ponty tries to give this a non-reified interpretation by quoting Kant:

'The I think must be able to accompany all our (re)presentations'  
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 219)

Merleau-Ponty accepts Sartre's reflexive/pre-reflexive distinction, but gives it a Kantian reading:

'The reflective I differs from the unreflective at least in being thematised, and what is given is not consciousness or pure being; it is, as Kant himself profoundly put it, experience.' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 219)

Ryle says 'Husserl [...] develops a Kantian or neo-Kantian doctrine of a pure or absolute subject'. (Ryle 1932) If anything, Ryle understates the prevalence of the Kantian theory of the self in the phenomenological movement. (13)

Transcendental Philosophy

Husserl and Kant share methods and similar motivations in doing philosophy. They aim to show how everyday experience, mathematics, and empirical science, are possible. Husserl says:

'Genuine science [...] demands as the foundation of all proofs judgements which as such are immediately valid, drawing their validity from primordial data intuitions.'  
(Husserl 1970: 3)

Phenomenology is the strict, subjective, science whose findings the mathematical, natural and social sciences depend upon. Phenomenology is, therefore, to answer two questions Kant set himself, in the introduction to the first *Critique*: 'How is pure Mathematics possible?' and 'How is pure science of nature possible?' (B 20, CPR 56) Transcendental philosophy shows how experience is possible, how there can be a world for us. For Husserl, the objects of phenomenological description depend on transcendental subjectivity; the phenomenological whole within which, and by which, they are constituted. For Kant, empirical objects are possible objects of experience because of our possession of the forms of intuition, and the categories. Objects of our experience are constituted *a priori* by the transcendental unity of apperception.

Both thinkers think transcendental philosophy is a second order *a priori* inquiry which uncovers necessary truths, and makes any first order inquiry possible.

The propositions of Kant's critical philosophy, and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, have the same logico-epistemological status. If true, they are necessary, and synthetic *a priori*. They are necessary in the same sense of 'necessary':

(1)  $p$  is necessary, if and only if, the truth of  $p$  is necessary for experience.

(2) If  $p$  is necessary for experience, then any experience is sufficient for  $p$

(3) Therefore, no experience can refute  $p$ .

Intuitively: experience entails its own prerequisites. Kant and Husserl both recognize, are not (here) discovering necessary truths in any stronger sense, for example any whose negation entails a contradiction.

The propositions of Kant's critical philosophy, and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, are synthetic because they are putatively informative, not analytic. They are *a priori* because, if knowable, they are knowable intellectually, without empirical investigation.

Husserl says phenomenology contains synthetic *a priori* propositions. (Husserl 1931: 77-9) He wants to discover the 'logically originated fundamental constitution

of all possible knowledge'. (Husserl 1931: 78) Kant says he has invented a 'transcendental logic' which 'would [...] treat of the origin of the modes in which we know objects'. (A 55/B 80, CPR 96) Husserl says, 'Individuals must be determinable in terms of concepts and laws and under the heading of "synthetic a priori principles"'. (Husserl 1931: 78-9) For Kant, any possible object of experience must conform to synthetic *a priori* principles. Kant thinks 'every alteration has its cause' (A 2/B 3, CPR 43) is a synthetic *a priori* principle, determining the course of any experience we could have. Such a rule holding depends on our possessing the *a priori* concepts.

In *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl claims his phenomenology exposes 'a transcendental grounding of knowledge'. (Husserl 1931) Kant says: 'I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with our mode of knowledge of objects'. (A 11-12/B 25, CPR 59) With such strong Kantian strains in phenomenology, it is unsurprising to find the initiator of the movement explicitly acknowledging his debt to Kant. For these reasons, Spiegelberg says:

'Husserl became fully aware and proud of the parallels and common concern he had with Kant and the neo-Kantians.' (Speigelberg 1960: 1060)

A conclusion of *The Critique of Pure Reason* is that all our knowledge is confined to appearances: the phenomenal world. Phenomenology furthers a Kantian project. Phenomenology has not essentially moved outside the parameters of Kantian thinking. This matters because Kantianism obstructs the solving of philosophical problems. If phenomenology is to be resumed, it has to escape the critical paradigm. (14)

### III

## STRUCTURALISM

Structuralism is an essentially Kantian project. If the Kantian components of structuralism were subtracted from it, the residue could not be correctly called 'structuralism'. By 'Kantian' I mean: semantically or logically equivalent to concepts, or claims deployed by Kant in his writings, especially the *Critique of Pure Reason*. After discussing Deleuze, I argue that Saussure, Levi-Strauss, Barthes, Lacan, Piaget, and Foucault, are all essentially Kantian thinkers, who rely on concealed metaphysical assumptions.

### Linguistic Idealism

Structuralists since Saussure include:

'[...] a linguist like R. Jakobson, a sociologist like C. Levi Strauss, a psychoanalyst like J. Lacan; a philosopher who is renewing epistemology like M. Foucault, a Marxist philosopher who takes up the problem of the interpretation of Marxism like L. Althusser; a literary critic like R. Barthes.' (Deleuze 1979: 294)

Their Kantian world-picture is linguistic idealism. Deleuze says:

'In truth there is no structure except that which is language, whether this be an esoteric or even non-verbal language. There is no structure to the unconscious except in so far as the unconscious speaks and is language. There is no structure to the body except in so far as bodies are supposed to speak with a language which is symptomatic of it. Even objects have no structure except to the extent that they hold a silent discourse, which is the language of signs.'

*'En vérité il n'y a de structure que ce qui est langage, fût-ce un langage ésotérique ou même non verbal. Il n'y a de structure de l'inconscient que dans la mesure où l'inconscient parle et est langage. Il n'y a de structure des corps que dans la mesure où les corps sont censés parler avec un langage qui est celui des symptômes. Les choses mêmes n'ont de structure que pour autant qu'elles tiennent un discours silencieux, qui est le langage des signes.'* (Deleuze 1979: 294)

If we read 'categories' (*Kategorien*), or 'concepts' (*Begriffe*), for 'language' this doctrine is Kantian. Kant thinks there is no meaning, organisation, or 'structure' without the *a priori* concepts called 'categories', and historically changing empirical concepts, which make subject, object, and the distinction between them, intelligible. I cannot know myself, or the world, without deploying this conceptual scheme.

Deleuze says, in structuralism, the unconscious is only structured in so far as it is linguistic. Kant differs only in emphasis. He does not use 'unconscious', but the

categories, although psychological, are unconscious because transcendent, which entails 'not appearing to consciousness'. Kant and the structuralists think structures making experience possible are not experienced. We can read Kant's 'noumenal self' as a Lacanian unconscious: It is not aware of itself as it really is. It is oneself as one really is. It is only a structured and determinate object in so far as it is categorically organized. There is only one self: oneself as one is in oneself, and as one appears to oneself.

Kant's thinks physical objects, including one's own body, are categorically constituted. For 'silent discourse' we can read 'the empirical world as organised by the categories'. Kant and the structuralists think what we perceive is essentially determined by the conceptual structure we impose. The properties of this structure are prior, in a logical and explanatory sense, to the properties of anything apparent. For Kant, the phenomenal world has those empirical characteristics it has, because we have the *a priori* conceptual scheme we have, because the table of categories lists all and only those categories necessary for experience. For the structuralist, patterns of behaviour, thought, and perception have the structure they have only because we possess just the conceptual scheme we do. Structuralism and Kantianism entail conceptual idealism.

Is Deleuze a Kantian? Authoring *La Philosophie Critique de Kant* (Deleuze 1963) is insufficient for subscribing to Kantian doctrine, but Vincent Descombes, in *Le Meme et l'Autre* (Descombes 1979, and 1980), says: 'Gilles Deleuze is above all a post Kantian' (Descombes 1980: 152), and quotes Deleuze: 'Philosophy is at its most positive as "critique" an enterprise of demystification'. In *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, Deleuze conceives his Nietzschean project as essentially Kantian; the implementation of a Kantian project:

'Nietzsche has never concealed [the fact] that the philosophy of meaning and of value must be a critique. That Kant did not conduct the true critique because he did not know how to pose the problem in terms of values, such is one of the principal motivations of the work of Nietzsche.'

*'Nietzsche n'a jamais cache que la philosophie du sens et des valeurs dût être une critique. Que Kant n'a pas mené la vraie critique, parce qu'il n'a pas su en poser le problème en termes de valeurs, tel est même un des mobiles principaux de l'oeuvre de Nietzsche.'* (Deleuze 1962: 1)

Deleuze sees the role of philosophy as demystification, as a critique of value: the exposure of underlying 'structures', which determine what appear to us as 'given' value systems. This is the critique needed now, in Deleuze's view, given Kant's successful critique of metaphysics. Descombes says 'His (Deleuze's) thought is subsequent to Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, in which the ideas of the soul, of the

world and of God are criticised.’ (Descombes 1980: 152) ‘Subsequent’ implies not just ‘chronologically subsequent’, but ‘philosophically subsequent’: The essentials of Deleuze’s structuralism are entailed by Kant’s Dialectic, and therefore by the Analytic, and Aesthetic, it presupposes. Deleuze’s Nietzsche is taking the next step, following Kant's victory over metaphysics.

The concept of *différence* features essentially in structuralist and post-structuralist theory. Kant anticipates uses of *Differenz* by Hegel, the putative non-concept *différance*, by Derrida, and Deleuze’s distinction between *différenciation* and *différentiation*:

‘Of the structure as virtuality, we have to say that it is still undifferentiated, even though it is completely differentiated’

*‘De la structure comme virtualité, nous devons dire qu’elle est encore indifférenciée, bien qu’elle soit tout à fait complètement différenciée’*  
(Deleuze 1979: 308)

In the structure, *différenciation* and *différentiation* do not obtain in abstraction from one another so are properly denoted

t  
‘différen-iation’  
c

(Deleuze, 1979: 308)

Descombes says Deleuze appropriates Kant, to deploy the concept of 'difference':

‘Kant's *Transcendental Aesthetic* proposes a philosophy of difference such as Deleuze demands. Kant did not go far enough however. He gave an account of *a priori* diversity, i.e. only that which is common to all intuitions (temporal form) He isolated a non-conceptual *identity*, but stopped short of a non-conceptual *difference*. The *a priori* theory of the sensible applies by definition to all possible experience, all experience whatever it may be, unfolds in a *here* and a *now*. But the *Transcendental Aesthetic* does not provide an account of the *real* experience inasmuch as this differs from the merely *possible* experience.’  
(Descombes 1980: 155)

Deleuze’s priorities are constituted by a Kantian set of antitheses between: sense and understanding, subject and object, empiricism and rationalism. Deleuze’s *difference* depends partly on a Hegelian adaptation of Kant’s dialectic. We see in Descombes,

the pragmatic turn of post-Kantian critiques. Deleuze desires a critique of everyday life, an 'empirical' critique, not just a metaphysical, or 'dialectical', critique. Deleuze shifts attention from a critique of pure reason, of categories, to what our categories apply to; a kind of critical ontology. Even in this, Deleuze does not renounce Kantian conceptualism. Deleuze thinks philosophy is either dialectical or empiricist, according to whether the difference between concept and intuition (in the Kantian sense of a relation to a particular entity) is taken as a conceptual, or a non-conceptual, difference. Deleuze has a Kantian concept of this difference between the conceptual, and the non-conceptual, depending on the difference between the subject matter of the Aesthetic, and the Analytic. Descombes thinks Deleuze's view in *Différence et Répétition* is: 'Difference may [then] be defined as the "being of the sensible".' (Descombes 1980: 155) Certainly, Deleuze talks of 'the very being of the sensible: difference', '*l'être même du sensible: la différence*'. (Deleuze 1968: 80) 'The being of the sensible', we could say, is precisely the topic of Kant's Aesthetic. Descombes says: 'The concept, as Kant says, is the representation of what is identical in several representations' (Descombes 1980: 155), which is the topic of Kant's Analytic. Deleuze's difference is explicable as, not different from, the difference between Kant's Aesthetic and Kant's Analytic.

Deleuze thinks that modern philosophy was transformed, in methods and objectives, by Kant's Copernican Revolution. Deleuze deploys a different vocabulary to describe pre-Kantian, and post-Kantian philosophy. Descombes says:

'[...] Deleuze gives the name "philosophy of being" to the old, pre-Kantian metaphysics, and "philosophy of will" to the metaphysics born of the accomplished critique.' (Descombes 1980: 156)

'Philosophy of will' is Nietzschean, and Kantian. Nietzsche, who is Kant's heir and adversary, his son, re-directs critique at 'true' morality. Kant's *Wille* is rational, Nietzsche's irrational: a Schopenhaurian transformation of Kant. Schopenhauer's philosophy is an abbreviation of Kant's philosophy.

The conceptual idealism, that structuralism inherits from Kant, precludes its wholly sharing the anthropocentrism of other movements within the critical paradigm. The subject, for Lacan, and to an extent for Foucault, is linguistically constituted as it is for Kant, even though Kant leaves overt room for a noumenal, autonomous self-in-itself: *Something* is linguistically constituted. Deleuze, and other structuralists, think of their philosophies as partly humanistic. Deleuze says:

'The first thing we learn from the Copernican Revolution is that we are giving the orders.' (Deleuze 1962: 19)

Deleuze is reiterating conceptual idealism: What passes for reality is linguistically constructed.

### De Saussure: *Begriff* and *Intuition*

de Saussure is the 'father of structuralism', because of three distinctions essential to his invention of modern linguistics: synchronic/ diachronic, signifier/signified, and langue/parole.

### Synchronic/Diachronic

In the *Course* Saussure distinguishes the two branches of the linguistics. Saussure says:

*'Synchronic linguistics* will be concerned with the logical and psychological relations that bind together coexisting terms and form a system in the collective mind of speakers.

*Diachronic linguistics*, on the contrary, will study relations that bind together successive terms not perceived by the collective mind but substituted for each other without forming a system.' (Saussure 1981: 99-100)

Synchronic linguistics implies the role of the categories in the Transcendental Analytic, so is a Kantian practice. Saussure's 'bind together successive terms' is a spatial metaphor, but any such relation has at least the role of a Kantian category in forming judgements (*Urteile*). In a metaphorical way, the Kantian doctrine that categories make judgements possible is their 'binding together'.

Saussure's relations, and Kant's categories, each form a 'collective mind'. According to Kant, all self-conscious rational beings share the same categories, and according to Saussure, all language users share the same ultimate synchronic structures. The two sets of beings turn out to be coextensive, just in case being a language user implies being rational, and self conscious, and *vice versa*. Whether this is right is an unsolved philosophical problem, but it is a *Leitmotif* of the critical paradigm, from Hegel's master and slave dialectic, Marx's class struggle, and Sartre's 'look' (*regard*), to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument.

Saussure calls synchronic relations 'logical and psychological'. There is an ambivalence, in Kant, between a 'logical' and a 'psychological' meaning of the categories, but the two readings are not mutually exclusive. Kant depicts the logical conditions of self-conscious experience, or (*vel*, not *aut*), reveals the transcendental psychology of any, self-conscious being. Ambiguity in Saussure's synchronic linguistics can be dismissed in a parallel way, by not claiming any logical relation is

distinct from any psychological relation, discoverable by synchronic linguistics. The one set of logical and psychological relations entailed by the definition of 'synchronic' may be understood under either a logical, or a psychological, description, or both.

Saussure says relations studied by synchronic linguistics are 'the constituents of any language-state'. (Saussure 1981: 101) Kant says categories are necessarily used in forming judgments (*Urteile*, propositions). Both thinkers putatively reveal necessary conditions for language. Kant calls these 'transcendental logic' (*transzendente Logik*) (A 50/B 74, CPR 92 ff.) Saussure calls them 'general grammar'. (Saussure 1981: 101) Transcendental logic and general grammar are each disclosed by a kind of methodological abstraction. The logical form of an *Urteil*, is determined by its categorial organization. Kant says, to reveal the Table of Judgments; 'we abstract from all content of a judgement (*Urteil*)'. (A 70/B 95, CPR 106) In discovering the grammar of a language state, Saussure says this 'means in practice disregarding changes of little importance'. (de Saussure 1981: 102)

Saussure is a critical thinker, in Kantian senses of 'critical'. Hegel knows it is an essential characteristic of Kant's critical philosophy to sceptically examine one's conceptual presuppositions, prior to first order inquiry. Saussure adopts exactly this critical attitude:

'Linguistics [...] works continuously with concepts forged by grammarians without knowing whether or not the concepts actually correspond to the constituents of the system of language. But how can we find out? And if they are phantoms what realities can we place in opposition to them?' (Saussure 1981: 110)

Saussure realises that a tacitly assumed conceptual framework might falsify any subject matter, in a way not apparent to the investigator, so his new linguistics includes a critical scrutiny of concepts, for their appropriateness. The clearest example of this 'critical turn' in Kant is the opening of the 'Transcendental Deduction', in the section 'The Principles of any Transcendental Deduction'. (A 84/B 116, CPR 120 ff.) Kant says:

'Many empirical concepts are employed without question from anyone. [...] But there are also usurpatory concepts, such as *fortune*, *fate* which though allowed to circulate by almost universal indulgence (*mit fast allgemeiner Nachsicht herumlaufen*), are yet from time to time challenged by the question *quid juris*' (A 84/B 116-7, CPR 120)

The Transcendental Deduction putatively entails a justification of the categories: All and only the categories apply to experience. (How they apply is argued for in the

Schematism.) Kant and Saussure aim 'to be rid of illusions'. (Saussure 1981: 110) Kant claims to rid us of philosophical illusion, Saussure of linguistic illusion.

Kant's and Saussure's inquiries into conceptual presuppositions are not empirical. Saussure says 'the concrete entities of language are not directly accessible' (Saussure 1981: 102), meaning no straightforward empirical investigation will yield language's deep synchronic structures. Kant says:

'[...] among the manifold concepts which form the highly complicated web of human knowledge, there are some which are marked out for pure *a priori* employment, in complete independence from all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a deduction [...] empirical proofs do not suffice to justify this kind of employment.' (CPR 121)

Kant and Saussure conduct critical, non-empirical, investigations into the conceptual conditions for language.

Diachronic linguistics, is the study of the empirical, historically changing, aspects of language 'without forming a system'. (Saussure 1981: 102) It is a first order, or scientific, inquiry of the sort Kant makes room for, rather than the second order, or conceptual, inquiry Kant engages in. Kant and the structuralists insist there is a mass of quasi-empirical, historically fluctuating, concepts which are made possible by 'deep' structure, so the opposition between the synchronic and the diachronic is an opposition between the systematic and the historical. Saussure thinks all inquiries may be classified in one of these two ways. Kant says:

'If I abstract from all content of knowledge, objectively regarded, then all knowledge subjectively regarded is either historical or rational. Historical knowledge is *cognitio ex datis*, rational knowledge is *cognitio ex principis*.' (CPR 655)

Kant anticipates the synchronic/diachronic distinction by stating what is essential to it.

### Signifier and Signified

Defining 'sign', Saussure says 'the linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound image' (Saussure 1981: 66), and insists this 'is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression it makes on our senses'. (Saussure 1981: 66) For 'impression it makes on the senses' we may read 'intuition', in Kant's sense, because *Anschauungen* are contents of sense experiences, so some of them are auditory. Saussure shares Kant's view that meaning is not only reference, but is essentially conceptual. Saussure's

*concept*, and Kant's *Begriff*, can both be translated 'concept'. The two constituents of the Saussurian sign jointly express the Kantian thesis that concepts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. Saussurian signs, like Kant's categories, only exist because of a unity of the *a priori* and the empirical. Saussure describes two complementary aspects of one process: part empirical, part conceptual:

'The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it "material", it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept, which is generally more abstract.'

(Saussure 1981: 66)

Saussure says, 'I call the combination of a concept and a sound image a sign.'

(Saussure 1981: 67) The prototype for the sign, even though Kant is talking about categories, not empirical concepts, is the schematised category: the rule-governed, temporalized, category in its correct empirical application: the unity of right concept and right intuition. Kant and Saussure think it is only in abstract thinking, and not in lived reality, that conceptual and empirical may be divorced. This is essential to Kant's epistemology and Saussure's linguistics. Saussure puts says: 'the linguistic entity exists only through the associating of the signifier with the signified.'

(Saussure 1981: 102) Kant thinks concepts and categories are redundant, outside their empirical employment. To sever them from their empirical use is a metaphysical mistake, a misuse of pure reason. Saussure's expression is not 'pure reason', but 'abstraction'. By 'abstraction', Saussure means (the putative objects of) 'non-empirical' thinking. He says of the signifier and the signified, the conceptual and the empirical;

'Whenever only one element is retained, the entity vanishes; instead of a concrete object we are faced with a mere abstraction'. (Saussure 1981: 102-3)

which entails Kant's famous dictum that

'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind  
(*Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind*)'  
(A 51/B 75, 93)

Saussure refuses to follow the empiricist route of allowing unconceptualised sensory experience, or the rationalist route of allowing an informative, non-empirical, use of concepts. The model he adopts, for structuralist linguistics, is the Kantian synthesis of concept and intuition: signifier and signified. Saussure's investigations in synchronic linguistics cannot be empirical, any more than Kant's critical philosophy. Kant says categories *a priori* rules governing the intelligibility of experience and, as

necessary constituents of judgements, preconditions of language. Saussure takes up these Kantian themes, anticipating a metaphor of the later Wittgenstein:

‘But just as the game of chess is entirely in the combination of the different chesspieces, language is characterized as a system based entirely on the opposition of its concrete units. We can neither dispense with becoming acquainted with them nor take a single step without coming back to them; and still, delimiting them is such a delicate problem that we may wonder at first whether they really exist.

Language then has the strange, striking characteristic of not having entities that are perceptible at the outset and yet of not permitting us to doubt that they exist and that their functioning constitutes it. Doubtless we have here a trait which distinguishes language from all other semiological institutions.’  
(Saussure 1981: 107)

Saussure's synchronic structures are semantically equivalent to some of Kant's theses about categories: Saussure's language a 'system'. It is based on ‘oppositions’ between its ultimate grammatical constituents. Kant thinks his own philosophy is a 'system', partly because of the categorial preconditions for knowledge. (A 832/B 860, CPR 653 ff.) According to Kant, it should be evident that in each list of three categories, the first two are opposites, and the third is the unity of the first two. Kant's systematic philosophy overtly presupposes ‘oppositions’ as much as Saussure's synchronic linguistics. Oppositions exist between the preconditions, and constituents, of language according to both thinkers.

Saussure remarks on a paradoxical feature of synchronic structures. They are indispensable to language, and so, thinking, yet so difficult to individuate that it may be doubted whether they exist. Singling them out, or telling them apart, is difficult because they are not empirical. Kant thinks the categories are indispensable for language and thought. If we did not possess the categories, we could not form judgements, and, *a fortiori*, would not be language users. If we possessed no categories, we would not be thinkers, because the categories are part of reason (*Vernunft*) and understanding (*Verstand*). The categories are not empirical even though, like Saussure's synchronic structures, they have empirical *roles*. They cannot be detected empirically, and have no quasi-Lockean empirical origin. They are *a priori*, in the sense of being preconditions for any experience. Kant thinks proof of the categories requires sustained philosophical argument; much of the Transcendental Deduction, in both editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the Principles chapter. Kant therefore subscribes to Saussure's view that language and thinking ‘contain’ (in the sense of ‘presuppose’ or ‘entail’) elements which are ‘not [...] perceptible’ but whose ‘functioning’[‘?'] makes both language and thought possible. (Saussure 1981: 107)

The *Cours* shows up the Kantianism of the signifier/signified distinction. Reading (auditory) 'intuition' for 'sound-image' this could be a description of the unity of concept and intuition in Kant's transcendental idealism:

'I propose to retain the word sign (*signe*) to designate the whole and to replace *concept* and *sound-image* respectively by *signified* (*signifié*) and *signifier* (*signifiant*): the last two terms have the advantage of indictating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts.'

(Saussure 1981: 67)

In Saussure's Kantian dialectic, these three names are 'each suggesting and opposing the others'. (Saussure 1981: 67) Saussure says ordinary language suggests no word other than 'sign' for the synthesis of signifier and signified. 'Sign' is a new name for Kant's synthesis of concept and intuition; a new sign for the sign.

### *Langue and Parole*

Jonathan Culler summarises Saussure's distinction between *langue* and *parole*:

'*La langue* is the system of a language, the language as a system of forms, whereas *parole* is actual speech, the speech acts which are made possible by the language. Saussure calls *parole* (speech) the 'executive' side of language. It is the set of instances of speaking by the members of a linguistic community. As he puts it, "speaking [...] is an individual act [...] It is willful and intellectual" meaning, at least, that the individual may choose what to say. *Langue* (language) on the other hand is social, collective, and "never requires premeditation". *Langue* is [...] a grammatical system that has a potential existence in each brain, or more specifically, in the brains of a group of individuals.' (Culler 1979: 29)

Kant says transcendental knowledge is knowledge of how knowledge is possible. It shares features with *langue*: It makes language possible. It is logico-grammatical in form, common to all language users, and not exercised freely by the individual. A thinking being allegedly cannot but employ this conceptual scheme. Transcendental knowledge is of (*inter alia*) the *a priori* categorial framework which makes empirical knowledge possible. Empirical knowledge is knowledge of possible objects of experience.

Empirical knowledge is like *parole*. Empirical knowledge varies from individual to individual. A person is free to accept, or reject, particular items as knowledge. For both theorists, there does not exist pure experience, or unconceptualised thought. Kant thinks the essential task of philosophy is to obtain knowledge of how knowledge is possible. Saussure thinks the essential task of linguistics is to obtain

knowledge of how language is possible. Kant uncovers transcendental logic, Saussure *langue*.

Saussure and Kant wish their disciplines to be a science. Jakobson captures the Kantianism of this structuralist project. Jakobson says:

‘The science of signs termed *semiotic* deals with those general principles which underlie the structure of all signs whatsoever.’ (Jakobson 1971: 698)

In this sense, the structuralist project is as transcendental as Kant's.

Science is the paradigm of knowledge within the critical paradigm. Husserl tries to construe phenomenology as a rigorous science (*streng Wissenschaft*). The logical positivists try to clear obstacles from the path of natural science. Saussure inaugurates the ‘new science’, the ‘science of signs’. They are echoing, not just Bacon and Vico, but Kant's complaint that metaphysical philosophy ‘is very far from having entered upon the secure path of a science.’ (B viii, CPR 17) Kant would like philosophy to exhibit the rigour, consistency, and concern with genuine problems, that science already possesses, but realises that is not yet possible. Saussure says:

‘A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable [...] I shall call it *semiology* (from the Greek *sēmeîon* ‘sign’) Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them. Since the science does not yet exist, no-one can say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance.’ (Saussure 1981: 16)

Kant seeks for philosophy ‘the path upon which it can securely travel’. (CPR 17) He means a scientific path. Saussure conceives semiology as a method for linguistics, social psychology, and anthropology.

### Levi-Strauss' Structural Anthropology

Edmund Leach calls structural anthropology ‘Kantianism without the transcendental ego’. (Leach 1973: 38) Kant is engaged in a transcendental *a priori* quest for the widest categorial conditions for experience: the conceptual scheme presupposed by any conceptual scheme. Levi-Strauss continues Kant's project by *a posteriori* means. Leach captures the essential Kantianism of this anthropology. Leach says:

‘Verbal categories provide the mechanism through which universal structural characteristics of human brains are transformed into universal structural characteristics of human culture. But if these universals exist, they must, at some rather deep level, be considered innate.’ (Leach 1973: 38)

Levi-Strauss studies the myths, and *mores*, the root presuppositions of world-views, especially as these saturate ways of living, and explain practices. The framework Levi-Strauss adopts for empirical research is Kantian. Kant's categories are universals. Given an *a posteriori* reading, they may be construed as physiological structures of the human brain; a transcendental conceptual scheme in terms of which humans find their social and natural environment intelligible. Kant's categories, like Levi-Strauss' universal structural characteristics, are, in a similar sense, innate. Neither Kant nor Levi-Strauss thinks there exists strongly innate knowledge; propositional knowledge held chronologically prior to experience. Both think there exist innate conceptual capacities to render objects intelligible. They exist logically, not chronologically, prior to experience. Kant and Levi-Strauss think experience is necessary for the exercise of such innate capacities.

Levi Strauss defines 'the notion of "structure"', 'la notion de <<structure>>' and asks 'What should we understand by social structure?', 'Que faut-il entendre par structure sociale?' (Levi-Strauss 1958: 304) He provides four criteria, singularly necessary but jointly sufficient, for anything's being a structure. Each necessary condition is Kantian. Levi-Strauss says:

*'En premier lieu, une structure offre un caractère de système. Elle consiste en éléments tels qu'une modification quelconque de l'un d'eux entraîne une modification de tous les autres'* (Levi-Strauss 1958: 306)

'In the first place, a structure offers a systematic character. It consists in elements such that any modification of one of them entails a modification of all the others' (Levi-Strauss 1958: 306)

Kant's categories form a system of reciprocal dependencies:

*Tafel der Kategorien*  
(Table of Categories)

I

*Der Quantität:*  
(Of Quantity)

*Einheit*  
(Unity)

*Vielheit*  
(Plurality)

*Allheit*

Stephen Priest Ultimate Reality

(Totality)

II

*Der Qualität:*  
(Of Quality)  
*Realität*  
(Reality)  
*Negation*  
(Negation)  
*Limitation*  
(Limitation)

III

*Der Relation:*  
(Of Relation)  
*der Inharänz und Subsistenz*  
(Of Inherence and Subsistence)  
(*substantia et accidens*)  
*der Kausalität und Dependenz*  
(*Ursache und Wirkung*)  
Of Causality and Dependence  
(*cause and effect*)  
*der Gemeinschaft*  
(Of Community)  
(*Wechselwirkung zwischen dem*  
*Handelnden und Leidenden*)  
(reciprocity between agent and  
patient)

IV

*Der Modalität:*  
(Of Modality)

Möglichkeit-Unmöglichkeit  
(Possibility – Impossibility)  
*Dasein - Nichtsein*  
(Existence – Non-existence)  
*Notwendigkeit -Zufälligkeit*  
(Necessity-Contingency)

(A 80/B 106, CPR 113)

The final member of each triad is the synthesis of the first two, so:

(1) *Allheit* is the unity of *Einheit* and *Vielheit*.

(2) *Limitation* is the unity of *Realität* and *Negation*.

(3) *Gemeinschaft* is the unity of *Inharänz und Subsistenz* with *Kausalität und*

*Dependenz.*

(4) *Notwendigkeit-Zufälligkeit* is the unity of *Möglichkeit-Unmöglichkeit* with *Dasein-Nichtsein*.

No member of any first pair of triad members is what it is in abstraction from the other. Kant anticipates the antithesis, taken up in structuralism and post-structuralism, as ‘binary opposition’.) No third member of any triad is what it is in abstraction from mutually constitutive relation between the first two members. In the Table of Categories, there is a completion of the oppositions which remain dialectical in structuralism. In the Antinomies chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant insists that, in three out of four cases, synthesis is impossible, and so anticipates the post-structuralist idea of the impossibility of (complete) synthesis.

Levi-Strauss says modifying any element modifies all the others. This is true of the categories in their implementation, as conceptual presuppositions of any possible object of experience, or as transcendental, and quasi-psychological, impositions on perceptual contents. Taking something as physical object entails applying the category ‘substance’, because a physical object is can be discriminated from the things it is not. The category of causality is presupposed, because being a physical object entails being capable of entering into causal relations. The ‘independence’ of the object cannot alter, without altering its causal efficacy. It could be the object it is, if it lacked its causal relations. No contribution of a category can be altered, without altering those of the others.

Levi Strauss says:

*‘En seconde lieu, toute modèele appartient à un groupe de transformations dont chacune correspond à un modèle de même famille, si bien que l’ensemble de ces transformations constitue un groupe de modèles.’* (Levi-Strauss 1958: 306)

‘In the second place, any model belongs to a group of transformations of which each corresponds to a model of the same family, even if the set of these transformations constitutes a group of models.’ (Levi-Strauss 1958: 306)

In reading Levi-Strauss’s second necessary condition for structure, the substitution of Kant’s *Kategorie* for Levi-Strauss’ *modèle* preserves the sentence, *salva veritate*, as a claim about Kant’s critical philosophy:

‘In the second place, any *Kategorie* belongs to a group of transformations of which each corresponds to a *Kategorie* of the same family, even if the set of these transformations constitutes a group of *Kategorien*.’

For Levi-Strauss' 'transformations', read Kant's 'judgement forms'. The categories are forms, in the sense of (dictating) the nature of things. Each category belongs to a group of categories, and has a corresponding judgement form. The set of judgement forms maps onto the set of categories, in a one-one mapping.

Levi-Strauss says:

*'Troisièmement, les propriétés indiquées ci-dessus permettent de prévoir de quelle façon réagira le modèle, en cas de modification d'un de ses éléments.'*

(Levi-Strauss 1958: 306)

'Thirdly, the properties indicated above permit the prediction of in what way the model will react, in case of the modification of one of its elements.'

Kant thinks we can know *a priori* certain pervasive synthetic facts about the world: that every change has a cause, that the quantity of matter remains constant, that the truths of arithmetic hold, that objects presented in space will be presented as Euclidian, that the laws of nature hold. This entails we can predict experience, not in phenomenological, or empirical, detail, but in fundamental structure. This *a priori* knowledge, and predictive power, are possible because of the constitutive relations between the categories and the judgement forms.

Levi-Strauss says:

*'Enfin, le modèle doit être construit de telle façon que son fonctionnement puisse rendre compte de tous les faits observés'* (Levi-Strauss 1958: 306)

'Finally, the model must be constructed in such a way that its functioning can take account of all the observed facts.'

Kant thinks critical philosophy 'takes account of' all empirical facts, by showing how they are possible. Kant thinks he has found the root conceptual scheme presupposed by any observed fact.

The transition from a Kantian conceptual idealism to structuralist social theory is expressed in Levi-Strauss' famous dictum in *Triste Tropiques*: 'Whoever says man says language, and whoever says language says society.' Although an anthropologist engaged in empirical research, Levi-Strauss embodies the social, and pragmatic, transformation of Kant that takes place within the critical paradigm. As an anthropologist, Levi-Strauss is essentially a social thinker, but also a pragmatist. Universal structural characteristics count as such just so long as they are exemplified in the actual myths, rituals, and living practices, of the subjects of his studies. The fundamentals of the world-view must be the fundamentals of the *ethos*. Nevertheless, if we subtract the idea of a quest for the perennial structures of the human mind in

terms of which the world is intelligible from Levi-Strauss' anthropology, there is little residue that could be called 'structuralist'. Levi-Strauss' structural anthropology is essentially Kantian.

Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' forces philosophy not to study the world as it is independently of the subject's conceptual and sensory means of perceiving it, representing it, or speaking about it. Philosophy studies those very structured perceptions, modes of (re)presentation, and speaking. Philosophy becomes second order. The structuralist who makes this most explicit is Roland Barthes.

## Barthes

Barthes' structuralism operates within the Kantian model of a reflexive study of concepts. Barthes suggests 'that language might be able to speak about language (*que le langage puisse parler du langage*)' and calls his own work 'the language of language (*le langage du langage*)'. (Barthes 1966: 13) Hegel's critique of Kant's critical philosophy includes: 'the categories must examine themselves in their own operation'. (Hegel 1830: 66z) The Kantian project, and this Hegelian imperative, have been implemented and obeyed by Barthes and the structuralists.

Barthes calls his work a 'critique' of literary criticism, of language, (in Deleuze's broad sense), of 'institutions', and of 'traditional' critiques. Kant's critique of metaphysics is part of 'traditional' critique, but, in its original form; 'Critique has had judging for its traditional function (*la critique a eu pour fonction traditionnelle de juger*)'. (Barthes 1966: 14) *Critique* in French can mean just 'criticism', as in 'literary criticism'. Narrowly, Barthes is saying literary criticism involves (e)valuation of writing. Broadly, 'critique' means what Kant means by it: a drawing of limits to, a delineation of the scope of, a debunking, a demystification: the revealing of something for what it really is. This is what Kant means by a *critique* of metaphysics, and Marx means by a *critique* of bourgeois ideology, or political economy. Barthes is more than a literary critic. He subverts, probes, and questions our taken for granted assumptions about sport, advertising, fashion, traffic regulations. He exposes the 'language', the covertly accepted rules, tacit or overt observance of which makes everyday life possible. Kant's empirical, phenomenal, world rests on normally unnoticed conditions; transcendental subjectivity and the categories. Barthes' taken for granted social reality rests on the tacit assumptions and rule-following.

Barthes invents, or discovers, three critiques of 'traditional critique': It is not subversive enough. It judges. It does not extend to everyday life. The first two are closely related. Traditional critique 'could only be conformist, that is, conform to the interests of the judges,' '*elle ne pouvait être que conformiste, c'est à dire conforme aux intérêts des juges*' (Barthes 1966: 14) If the critic makes value judgements, he

reveals, and imposes, his own value system which, is a reflection of his own interests. Barthes addresses the post-Kantian problem of Nietzsche and Deleuze. Barthes desires a 'critique of value', yet does not endorse Nietzsche's judgmentally atheistic *revaluation of values*, nor offer a transcendental critique of value in Deleuze's sense. He tries 'not to judge', to produce a value-free critique. Ironically, the ideal of the structuralist is the ideal of phenomenology. Barthes says:

'[...] *la véritable <<critique>> des institutions et des langages ne consiste pas à les <<juger>>, mais à les distinguer, à les séparer, à les dédoubler.*' (Barthes 1966: 14)

'[...] the true "critique" of institutions and languages does not consist in "judging" them but in *distinguishing* them, in *separating* them, in *splitting them up*.'

'*les dédoubler*' carries the implication of *dismantling*, *unravelling*, like pulling the wool out of a jumper, or *unfolding*, like letting a piled sheet *fall out of its folds*. The image is powerfully subversive because *critique* is revealing the object for what it is; for what composes it, for what makes it possible. All this, according to Barthes, is consistent with refraining from making value judgements. Barthes says:

'To be subversive, critique does not have to judge, it suffices for it to speak about language, in place of serving it.'

'*Pour être subversive, la critique n'a pas besoin de juger, il lui suffit de parler du langage, au lieu de s'en servir.*' (Barthes 1966: 14)

Like Kant's categories, the 'structures' the structuralists reveal are not readily apparent. They are deep and constitutive, not surface or epiphenomenal. It is not an empirical truth about the phenomenal world that it is categorially constituted, but a transcendental one. The structures of kinship, or a literary text, or the power relations in capitalist society, are not self evident: especially not to families thus bonded, author and reader, bourgeois and proletarian. Barthes says about structuralist literary criticism:

'[...] the question is to know whether one has the right, or not, to read in this literal discourse other senses which do not contradict it.'

'*la question est de savoir si on a le droit, ou non, de lire dans ce discours littéral, d'autres sens qui ne le contredisent pas.*' (Barthes 1966: 20)

'Other' here means 'other than that intended by the author'. Barthes' answer is emphatically 'Yes'.

The *codes of narrative* Barthes deploys in his *critiques* are Kantian: The *semic field* is the space of possibilities of the Aesthetic. The *proairetic* is the series of things, or events, made possible by the time of the Aesthetic. The *symbolic* is the Analytic's zone of meanings, constituted by categorical opposition, neither imaginary, nor empirically real. *Hermeneutics* is the understanding of understanding, the application of *Verstand* to *Verstand*, the method of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

There is a revolt against the subject as an autonomous generator of 'meanings', discoverable by psychological inquiry, or disclosed transparently through self-presence. From Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, through Hegel's expressive perspective of *Geist*, to Barthes's 'codes', from Lacan's linguistic unconscious, to Derrida's deconstruction of the subject, there is a rejection of the translucency of the Cartesian soul. Transcendental conditions for the subject's ability to speak, to find their environment intelligible, and even to be, are Kant's categories, Hegel's *Geist*, Marx's class structures, the structuralists' 'signs', or the grammar of Wittgenstein's public language.

## Piaget and Foucault

Piaget's genetic epistemology, and structural psychology, are within the critical paradigm, because they entail that the child is equipped with a set of *a priori* and innate categorial structures in terms of which it finds experience intelligible: time, number and causality. Kant does not think of the categories as historically changing, either within the individual or the species as a whole, so Kant does not anticipate the Piaget's 'developmental' psychology. Piaget's view that the child's intellectual capacities change with age is analogous to the Hegelian historical transformation of Kantian conceptual idealism. (1)

In 'Structuralism and Philosophy' (in Piaget 1971) Piaget presents a Kantian interpretation of Foucault. Piaget says 'What we would want of Foucault is [...] that he prepare the way for a second Kant to re-awaken us, along with himself, from dogmatic slumber. (Piaget 1971: 129) Piaget's allusion is slightly skewed because it is Hume who is supposed to have woken Kant from his dogmatic slumbers. Kant steals Hume's thunder in more profound ways than this. Foucault's intentions are Kantian, because he thinks of structuralism as having the following role:

'[Structuralism] sets itself the task of purifying the old empirical reason by constructing formal languages, it wants to carry out a second critique of pure reason.' (Piaget 1971: 129)

Piaget hopes Foucault will produce 'a constructive critique of the human sciences'. (Piaget 1971: 130) Piaget has been disappointed, but finds an analogue of Kant's transcendental logic in Foucault's concept of *episteme*. Piaget admits that 'Foucault's *epistemes* do not form a Kantian system of *a priori* categories' (Piaget 1971: 131) because they change, while Kant's categories are a-historical and unchanging. Nevertheless, as Piaget says;

'They are "historical a priorities" like Kant's transcendental forms "conditions for knowledge" but unlike these, conditions which apply for only a limited period and which, when their vain has been exhausted, yield to others.'  
(Piaget 1971: 132)

Like Hegel, Marx and Levi-Strauss, Foucault effects a historical and pragmatic transformation of Kant's critical philosophy. Piaget calls twentieth century structuralism 'this Hegelian or Kantian pattern'. (Piaget 1971: 123) Foucault thinks modern philosophy is essentially Kantian, and attempts to break with major tenets: the search for *a priori* transcendental categorial frameworks, the subjective, first person singular, or Cartesian starting point for doing philosophy, and, anthropomorphism. Foucault sees modern thought as a Kantian 'crisis'. He speaks of

'[...] the crisis in which we have been involved for so long, and which is constantly becoming more serious: a crisis which concerns the transcendental reflection with which philosophy since Kant has identified itself.' (Foucault 1976: 204)

Foucault thinks transcendental reflection should be replaced by a historical study of thought and action, which will not conceal the 'ruptures', the untidiness, of history beneath a distorting, ordered, *a priorism*. Foucault thinks philosophy is not free from Kantian anthropology. Foucault says it is '[...] necessary for empirical synthesis to be performed elsewhere than with[in] the sovereignty of the "I think". The fact that philosophical questions concern 'the status of the subject' (Foucault 1976: 204) and revolve around 'the question of man's being' is an obstacle to a more pragmatic way of philosophising, according to Foucault. It 'allows us to avoid an analysis of practice.' (Foucault 1976: 204) Foucault is therefore essentially involved in the historical, and practical, transformations of Kant's philosophy which are part of the critical paradigm. He differs from many critical thinkers in that he realises that this is exactly what he is doing.

What is Structuralism?

Frederick Jameson defines 'structuralism':

'[...] an explicit search for the permanent structures of the mind itself, the organisational categories and forms through which the mind is able to experience the world, or to organise a meaning in what is essentially in itself meaningless.'  
(Jameson 1972: 109)

The vocabulary is Kantian: 'categories', 'forms', 'in itself'. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant calls space and time 'forms (*Formen*) of intuition', for example in *die Form des innern Sinnes*, 'the form of inner sense' (A32/B49, CPR 77), and *a priori* concepts 'categories' (*Kategorien*), and what is, as it really is, 'in itself' (*an-sich*). Kantian and the structuralists think of a category, or a form, as an ideal condition for a mind's experience of the world.

Things-in-themselves things in abstraction from anything we can know about them. Jameson's use of 'in itself' is consistent with a reading of Kant which precludes the 'two worlds' ontology: There are no unknowable things-in-themselves (including selves-in-themselves) *in ontological addition to* phenomena. There is one world denoted in two ways: as it appears, and as it is. On the 'one world' reading of Kant, 'in itself' means 'as it is independently of experience or thought of it'. Kant argues that, without such cognitive organization, the thing-in-itself is indeterminate. Jameson speaks of 'what is essentially in itself meaningless'.

Jameson claims the categories, and forms, of the mind are 'permanent', and through them 'the mind is able to experience'. Kant argues for the categories' 'necessity' (*Notwendigkeit*) and *a priori* 'universality' (*Universalität*), and says, in the first edition Transcendental Deduction, that:

'the categories are [...] nothing but the conditions of thought in a possible experience, just as space and time (the forms of intuition) are the conditions of intuition in that same experience.' (A 111, CPR 138)

Anything necessary for experience is at least as 'permanent' as experience, because anything entails its own prerequisites. Homonymy *per se* is no guarantee of synonymy, but in Jameson's definition of 'structuralism' each term has exactly that rôle essential to its function in Kant's critical epistemology.

Kant is himself anticipated in what he anticipates in Structuralism. Terence Hawkes argues that Vico invented ways of thinking that developed into what we call 'Structuralism'. But this does not make structuralism un-Kantian, just not only Kantian. Hawkes speaks of a 'momentous historic shift in the nature of perception' constitutive of Structuralism, which could have been taken from Kant's own description of his Copernican Revolution:

‘[...] despite appearances to the contrary the world does not consist of independently existing objects, whose concrete features can be perceived clearly and individually, and whose nature can be classified accordingly. In fact every perceiver's method of perceiving can be shown to contain an inherent bias which affects what is perceived to a significant degree. A wholly objective perception of individual entities is therefore not possible; any observer is bound to create something of what he observes. Accordingly the relationship between observer and observed achieves a kind of primacy. It becomes the only thing that can be observed. It becomes the stuff of reality itself. Moreover the principle involved must invest the whole of reality. In consequence the true nature of things may be said to lie not in things in themselves, but in the relationships which we construct, and then perceive between them.’  
(Hawkes 1977: 17)

This would not be out of place in a summary of the central doctrines of the Analytic. Hawkes' statements are logically equivalent to ‘transcendental idealism’ (*transzendentaler Idealismus*). Kant thinks a sentence such as Hawkes' ‘the world does not consist of independently existing objects’ can be read in two ways: empirically (and false), and transcendently (and true). If we read ‘categories’ for ‘method’ in the observer's ‘method of perceiving affects the object to a significant degree’, we obtain Kant's doctrine that objects are transcendently constituted by our perception of them. Then we can read Hawkes' ‘despite appearances to the contrary’ as an expression of Kant's ‘empirical realism’ (*empirische Realismus*). Kant agrees experience is a ‘relationship, between observer and observed’, subject and object. He agrees that that only this relationship and its content, the phenomenal world, can be truly known. On this construal, the phenomenal world becomes ‘the very stuff of reality itself’, in the sense that Kant thinks we take it for reality. We assume empirical realism.

Reality *in-itself* is indeterminate. There is not any way the world is, not ordered by the categories and the forms of intuition. That the relation principle ‘must invest the whole of reality’ therefore is Kantian. It is Kantian that ‘any observer is bound to create something of what he observes’. If we experience, we cannot opt out of organising that experience categorially.

Structuralism is essentially Kantian but not only Kantian. Kant synthesizes the philosophies of his empiricist and rationalist predecessors. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff are each committed to an *a priori* conceptual scheme, which makes meaning possible.

## CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Although the American philosopher and psychoanalyst Jonathan Lear was right to say, over nearly years ago, 'that there are affinities between Kant and Wittgenstein is hardly news' (Lear 1984: 224) the Kantianism of Wittgenstein's philosophy has been underestimated. Wittgenstein is *essentially* a Kantian. If the Kantian components of his thought were subtracted, the residue could be correctly called 'Wittgensteinian' only in a biographical sense. Wittgenstein's sentences and concepts are logically or semantically equivalent to Kant's. Most of the anticipations are in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

*Did Wittgenstein think he was a Kantian?*

In the *Cambridge Lectures* (1930-32) Wittgenstein includes a section called 'Comments on Broad', about the philosopher of mind, C. D. Broad, Wittgenstein's part contemporary at Cambridge and a considerable Kant scholar. Wittgenstein says Broad 'divided Philosophy into Critical and Speculative' and these are 'terms which explain themselves'. (Wittgenstein 1930-32: 72) The distinction is drawn by Kant: between metaphysics, which putatively entails descriptions of reality as a whole, or reality as it is in itself, and his own criticism of this procedure. Broad's distinction is therefore Kant's.

Wittgenstein says Broad distinguishes three methods within 'critical philosophy'. (Wittgenstein 1930-32: 72) The first two are the 'Principle of the Extreme Case', and the 'Principle of Pickwickian Senses', to which Wittgenstein is unsympathetic. But then Wittgenstein says:

'A third method of critical philosophy Broad called "transcendental", which may be characterised briefly as Kant's critical method without the peculiar applications Kant made of it.' (Wittgenstein 1930-32: 73)

Wittgenstein's remark on Kant's version of critical philosophy is:

'This is the right sort of approach'. (Wittgenstein 1930-32: 73)

Wittgenstein thinks he is a Kantian.

Wittgenstein thinks Kant's critical method 'the right sort of approach' during his 'early' and 'late' phases, and in the transitional 1930's, despite rejecting of many

*Tractatus* views in the *Investigations*. Wittgenstein explicitly contrasts Kant's anti-foundationalism with the foundationalism of his rationalist and empiricist predecessors:

‘Hume, Descartes and others had tried to start from one proposition such as "cogito ergo sum" and work from it to others.’ (Wittgenstein 1930-32: 73)

but:

‘Kant disagreed and started with what we know to be so and so, and went on to examine the validity of what we suppose we know.’ (Wittgenstein 1930-32: 73-4)

Anti-foundationalism unifies Wittgenstein’s early and late philosophies. (1)

Wittgenstein does not explicitly characterise the first two methods of critical philosophy as Kantian, as he does the third, but it is nevertheless instructive to consider them. The 'Principle of the Extreme Case' is:

‘If you want to analyse a term it is useful to consider its application to odd and abnormal cases which may make you aware that it is more complex than it appears at first sight.’ (Wittgenstein 1930-32: 72-3)

Wittgenstein thinks this a useful method of showing that ambiguous expressions are ambiguous. Kant's method entails showing terms are ambiguous between a genuine, empirical, or ordinary language, use, and a metaphysical use which is spurious or vacuous. In the *Transcendental Dialectic*, Kant demonstrates this ambiguity by showing categories straying into 'abnormal' uses, beyond their application within space-time, for example, in putatively establishing or denying a cause of the universe, and the spatial limits of the universe, in the *Antinomies* chapter. Metaphysical misuses arise naturally out of empirical questions. Kant and Wittgenstein think language has its correct employment in everyday practices, in making the empirical world intelligible. When wrenched from this context, language has 'gone on holiday' in Wittgenstein's phrase, or is like a cog idling outside the machinery, not driving anything.

The second method of critical philosophy, the 'Principle of Pickwickian senses', is distinguishing between 'the common use of a term and its more precise analysis'. (Wittgenstein 1930-32: 73) Examples Broad gives are 'matter' and 'self', 'terms which we can continue to use even when we know that their "inner meaning" is very different from their common use'. (Wittgenstein 1930-32: 73) Wittgenstein's verdict is exactly the same as Kant's would be: 'This is the very last thing philosophy should do'. (Wittgenstein 1930-32:73) 'Matter' and 'self', are the pair of concepts fundamentally at issue in the *Paralogisms*. Kant is at pains to refute the rationalist doctrine that the self is a substance or soul. The metaphysician misuses the

category 'substance' to denote *that which has* experience, thereby stripping it of its legitimate empirical use in denoting possible *objects of* experience. Were the metaphysical case to go through, there would be a special use of 'self' to denote the real, or metaphysical, self, as well as the empirical use in which I refer to myself as 'myself', and you as 'yourself'. Kant and Wittgenstein resist any slide from 'myself' to 'my self'. (2)

Kant's critique of metaphysics essentially involves pointing out misuses of concepts. A theme of the Paralogisms, and the Antinomies, is that empirical concepts are mistakenly severed from their empirical use, and shorn of referent. Wittgenstein's Kantianism is clear here:

'It is shocking to use words with a meaning they never have in normal life and is the source of much confusion'. (Wittgenstein 1930-32: 73)

*Philosophical Investigations* is a large number of corrections of such confusions, but before turning to the *Investigations* we should examine the Kantian content of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

### The *Tractatus* as Transcendental Philosophy

P. M. S. Hacker writes:

'A critique is the investigation of the limits of a faculty. The aim of the *Tractatus* is to provide a critique, not of pure reason as in Kant, but of language.' (Hacker 1972: 25)

The contrast between 'pure reason' and 'language' should not be exaggerated. Kant and Wittgenstein think there are constraints on intelligibility. Reason for Kant and language for Wittgenstein allow us to make sense, but both are susceptible to overreaching the bounds of intelligibility. For Kant and Wittgenstein, the function of philosophy is to demonstrate this limit. (3)

David Pears, like Hacker, thinks the *Tractatus* is Kantian. Pears says 'The *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* is a critique of language' and 'this critique is Kantian'. (Williams and Montefiore 1965: 25) Pears points out a theme salient in philosophy since Kant. Pears says the *Tractatus* is 'a critique of traditional philosophy'. (Williams and Montefiore 1965: 25) Philosophy since Kant has tried to end philosophy. Kant and the early and later Wittgenstein think they have ended metaphysical dispute, or, at least, provided its cure. Heidegger speaks of an 'end' to philosophy. Marx gave up philosophy, to devote himself to a critique of capitalism. Logical Positivism, it was thought, would make philosophy unnecessary, except as a logical clarification of problems for scientific treatment. Logical clarification of

problems which cannot be resolved empirically makes metaphysics redundant, as does the description of being-in-the world, or the devising of a revolutionary theory.

Despite the book's austerity, a sort of anthropocentrism is present in the *Tractatus*: The world as it is independently of our experience is fundamentally as it appears to us. *Prima facie*, this is a non-Kantian claim, and inconsistent with Kant's epistemology, if noumenal reality is a different world from the world we experience. However, if we read Kant as saying that any intelligible reality will conform to the categories, including any reality in which skeptical questions may be formulated, then, *a priori*, any possible object of experience will be fundamentally as we expect it to be: spatio-temporal, physical, entering into causal interaction, etc. On this reading, it does not *make sense* to say noumenal reality could be radically different from anything we have experienced. (4) If we read Kant this way, then Pears is correct to say:

'Wittgenstein [...] thought that the propositions of logic disclose something about the world in somewhat the same way that Kant thought that the propositions of Newtonian physics disclose something about all possible experience.' (Williams and Montefiore 1965: 30)

Logic is an *a priori* constraint on what the world can be like, according to Wittgenstein, because a purported state of affairs whose description contains a contradiction, logically, could not obtain. Although Kant's thesis that there cannot be non-Newtonian experience is *prima facie* a contingent truth, in the sense that instead of the set of natural laws that does obtain, there could have obtained some different set, Kant argues that his scheme is 'necessary' (*notwendig*) This Kantian necessity is weaker than Wittgenstein's. Kant argues that it is a necessary condition for our having experience of the sort we do that it be Newtonian. It follows that experience is sufficient for Newtonianism, so no matter how our experience turns out it will be Newtonian. Kant's necessity is:

$p$  is necessary if and only if nothing in experience can refute  $p$

(which is consistent with  $p$ 's negation entailing no contradiction) (5)

For Kant, it is synthetic *a priori* that there will be no non-Newtonian experience, because the Newtonian law-abiding nature of the world is due to the conceptual scheme we impose upon it. Kantian and Wittgensteinian constraints both hold *a priori*.

There seems a sharp contrast between the categories - phenomena relation, and the logic-world relation. In the *Tractatus*, logic is a constraint on the world and the language that represents it. There is a one-one correlation between the elements of language and the configurations of objects in states of affairs in the

world. Kant repudiates a representational view of language, as he repudiates the idea of representations in the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of perception. (The translation of *Vorstellung* by 'representation' should not mislead us.) On Kant's view, categories transcendently *constitute* objects. Nevertheless, Kant insists empirical realism is true, and if we read *Vorstellungen* as 'representations' is committed to empirical representations of states of affairs.

That spelling out the elements of one's conceptual scheme is thereby spelling out the structure of the world is the *Tractatus* doctrine, illustrated by Wittgenstein in the *Notebooks*, by the model of a road accident in Paris. (Wittgenstein 1914-16: entry for 29<sup>th</sup> September 1914) The logical form of language pictures the facts. For Kant, synthetic *a priori* propositions such as 'Everything which happens has its cause (*Alles, was geschiet, hat seine Ursache*)' (A 9/B 13, CPR 50) are not only about how the world must appear to us, but also tell us the logical relations between categories.

In Hacker's view, 'Had Kant not pre-empted the title, the *Tractatus* might well have been called "Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics"' (Hacker 1972: 32), because of Kant and Wittgenstein's similar conceptions of philosophy. Hacker reminds us that philosophy for Kant 'does not extend knowledge, but rather prevents error'. (Hacker 1972: 30) The first *Critique*, and the *Tractatus* are putative antidotes to metaphysics. Each distinguishes legitimate from metaphysical uses of concepts. Each provides a program to follow, to avoid metaphysics. (6)

Hacker points out that Kant and Wittgenstein think they have a method for solving all philosophical problems. Kant says about the first *Critique*:

'I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved or for the solution of which the key has at least not been supplied.'  
(A xiii, CPR 10)

Wittgenstein says in the Preface to the *Tractatus*:

'The truth of the thoughts that are here set forth seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found on all essential points, the final solution of the problems.'  
(Wittgenstein 1974: 4)

Hacker says Wittgenstein is 'unconsciously echoing Kant'. (Hacker 1972: 32) Kant and Wittgenstein think they have nearly completed the task of philosophy, and it only remains to be clear about our concepts to ensure we do not misuse them metaphysically. There will always be this role for philosophers, because we have a natural tendency to transcend the limits of intelligibility in what we try to say and think. Kant says:

'That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, in order to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether.' (Kant 1950: 116)

As Hacker says, 'the Kantian idea echoes in Wittgenstein' (Hacker 1972: 85) Like Kant, Wittgenstein saw the illusions of metaphysics as the product of a deep-rooted need to thrust against the limits of language. (Hacker 1972: 134) Hacker's remark is true of Wittgenstein throughout his philosophical career.

Logical Atomism is the exhibition of the logical form of any possible language of ours, including its logical limits. The extraction of logical form from ordinary language is analogous to Kant's extraction of the categories from our empirical psychology. The logical form of language in Wittgenstein, and the categories in Kant, are each a constraint on what 'the world' (non-linguistic reality) can be like for us. For both Wittgenstein and Kant, the world appears to us through language. Although Wittgenstein talks about the elements of language 'picturing' the facts whereas for Kant, transcendentally speaking, they constitute them, on both accounts, nothing can be a possible object of experience for us that cannot be subsumed under our root conceptual scheme.

What falls outside this framework Kant calls 'noumenal', Wittgenstein calls what can only be 'shown'. The noumenal, and what can only be shown, are presuppositions of what can be made intelligible, and next to nothing else can be known about them. Both have a semantic or contrastive function. They give sense to the idea of a 'limit' to language in Wittgenstein, and give sense to 'appearance' and 'phenomenon' in Kant.

Wittgenstein's project in the *Tractatus* is Kant's in the first *Critique*: demonstrating the logical constraints on possible knowledge, the preconditions of what we do know, and thereby deciding the limits to that knowledge.

### *Philosophical Investigations*: Wittgenstein's Critique of Pure Reason

According to Pears, one distinction is 'more important than any other' for understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy: between 'metaphysical philosophy' and 'critical philosophy'. (Pears 1971: 25) Pears defines the task of 'critical philosophy':

'The proper task of philosophy is a systematic criticism of human thought which would demonstrate the impossibility of metaphysical speculation'

Pears says:

'linguistic philosophy [...] is another species of critical philosophy'.

(Pears 1971: 25)

If 'important' here means anything like 'important for the correct categorisation of Wittgenstein's thought in a taxonomy of philosophical projects' then Pears is right. (7) Kant and Wittgenstein differ not so much in methods as in their subject matter. For both, the critique of metaphysics consists in showing where 'a concept had been carried beyond the limits of its proper use' (Pears 1971: 25) but Pears says the subject matter of Kant's philosophy is 'psychological' and Wittgenstein's 'linguistic':

'Kant's critique starts from data of the first kind and the second wave of critical philosophy, the logico-analytic movement of this century, starts with data of the second kind.' (Pears 1971: 27)

Intuitively: Psychological data are ideas, thoughts, modes of thought. Linguistic data are words, sentences, types of discourse. The distinction between psychological and linguistic subject matter should not be exaggerated. Pears says: 'a significant sentence must express a thought, and a genuine thought must be expressible in words' (where 'thought' means 'what is thought' as in 'the thought that *p*'). Kant and Wittgenstein read 'thought' this way in criticising metaphysical thought, because metaphysics purportedly entails truths. It has putative content. In many passages, Kant refuses to draw any sharp distinction between linguistic and psychological subject matter. Kantian judgements (*Urteile*) have semantic, logical and psychological properties, because they are truth-valued, enter into logical relations with one another, and are 'made'. The content of judgement, what is judged, is some state or possible state of the world. This idea of cognition as a relation between subject and content is essential to propositional attitude psychology which is therefore also essentially Kantian.

According to Pears, Kant and Wittgenstein take a similar view of the human propensity to metaphysics. They 'have this much in common':

'Both regard it [metaphysics] as a natural and inevitable transgressor, and both think that much can be learned from its excesses.' (Pears 1971: 28)

Kant thinks the ideas of reason have a legitimate 'regulative' employment, and metaphysical mistakes arise from construing their use as constitutive. By pointing out metaphysical mistakes we become clearer about correct uses in philosophy. For Wittgenstein, as for Kant, understanding how a concept has been misused requires pointing out the conditions for its correct use.

The critical attitude to metaphysics, which Kant and Wittgenstein share, leads to a neglect, according to Pears, of religious, ethical, and metaphysical issues. We are

left with questions without answers, about the immortality of the soul, about the freedom of the will, the existence of God, and the nature of goodness:

‘The predicament is often supposed to have been produced by the second wave of critical philosophy in this century. But in fact it is a common feature of all critical philosophy. Anthropocentrism leaves religion and morality in an exposed position, and it produces this effect both when it takes a psychological form as it did in the eighteenth century and when it takes a linguistic form as it has done in this century.’ (Pears 1971: 34)

The questions neglected by Wittgenstein are those of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, and the second *Critique*. Wittgenstein, like Kant, thinks something can only be a genuine question if, in principle, it could be answered. Because Kant and Wittgenstein are epistemologists, they fail to see that the *existence* of the world presupposes real answers to metaphysical questions. Knowledge is not fundamental. Existence is fundamental.

Pears sees anthropocentrism as a consequence of the repudiation of metaphysics. If philosophy is not to be a generator of world-pictures, a competitor for science, then its subject matter can not be the ultimate nature of the cosmos. This hiatus has been filled in two ways. Firstly, thought is now about thought, language about language. Secondly, philosophy is about human beings, about what they are, and what they should do, and, of course, these issues are raised by human beings themselves. This ‘self-conscious turn’ is effected by Kant, who includes the human subject in accounting for what the world is. The old rationalist ideal of depicting existence as it really is, unaltered by any human point of view, is abandoned as unrealisable in principle. Instead, the subject matter of philosophy is humanity, its relations to itself, and to the world around it. We can see this, not just in the rule-governed practices of communities in *Philosophical Investigations*, but in Marxist theories of class, the existentialist category *being-for-others*, the structuralist anthropology of Levi-Strauss, the humanism of Ayer and the Vienna Circle. In Kant's 'Copernican revolution' man turned around to face himself, and turned his back on God. Humanism is a *Leitmotif* of the critical paradigm.

Hacker sees an important disanalogy between the Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Investigations* and the Kant of the first *Critique*. The thought of the later Wittgenstein

‘[...] runs deeply counter to the Kantian belief in the necessary constancy of our categorial framework.’ (Hacker 1972: 125)

In the *Investigations* Wittgenstein reminds us of a vast multiplicity of linguistic practices. He emphasises the diversity of human preoccupations, the details and complexities of language use within them. Admittedly, Kant does not do this. The

transcendental conditions for experience in Wittgenstein are social, because the post within the grammar is the post within the rule-governed activities of a community. Kant's individual is constituted by the transcendental categorial framework. Wittgenstein's individual is constituted by a social, transcendently agreed, grammar.

Nevertheless, there are constraints on what could be the case for us, according to the later Wittgenstein. Common sense is presupposed. There has to be a *grammar*, a (perhaps very complex) set of rules, *language games*, that is, human practices with language embedded in it. These depend upon a *form of life*; a biological constraint on what can be the case for us. No experience can be described in a way that is logically incommunicable, so the experience we find intelligible is necessarily social. The later Wittgenstein effects a social and pragmatic transformation of Kant's philosophy.

Since Kant, there has been a tendency to point to the diversity of ways of thinking, as well as what seems to be categorially common between persons: Hegel's phenomenology of 'shapes' (*Gestalten*) of consciousness, Marx's doctrine that man's 'social being' determines his consciousness, Levi-Strauss' structuralist anthropology, hermeneutics as the reconstruction of texts, or mentalities, radically different from our own and, as Hacker implies, Wittgenstein's language games. There has also been a countertendency which tempers any exaggeration of how different 'other mentalities' could be, and prevents a slide into crude sociological relativism. After all, the Martians of the philosophers' thought-experiments do tend to be spatio-temporal concept-users, surrounded by existing individual objects, which enter into causal relations. Martians, typically, do not escape the critical paradigm. Any comprehensible world has to minimally conform to Kant's forms of intuition and list of categories. Common sense is, by and large, what is commonly sensed. Wittgenstein's fundamentally commonsensical categorial framework is as constant as Kant's. Kant allows our set of empirical concepts to be as fluctuating as Wittgenstein's.

Hacker has a five-point taxonomy of tendencies to metaphysical error in the later Wittgenstein:

[1] superficial analogies in the surface grammar of language

[2] phenomenology of the use of language

[3] pictures or archetypes embedded in language

[4] natural scientific models for problem solving

[5] natural cravings and dispositions of reason

These are also in Kant.

[1] Kant's argument in the Paralogisms is that 'substance' is illegitimately used as grammatical subject by the Rationalist, in a way that yields the view that 'I' denotes a substance. The mistake is assimilating 'grammatical subject', a word, to 'subject' in the sense of 'that which experiences'. (A 348 ff., CPR 333 ff.) Kant's attack on Cartesian dualism is a putative exposure of grammatical mistakes and sleights of hand.

[2] Hacker means the description of how language is actually used, what Austin's 'Linguistic Phenomenology', his name for his own investigations. (Austin 1962) Kant points out legitimate empirical uses for concepts which are metaphysically misused. In the Paralogisms, Kant argues that being a substance cannot entail being immortal, and insists that the category applies only to possible objects of experience. Kant says:

'For only to such an object can the concept of substance be applied in a manner that is empirically servicable.' (A 349, CPR 334)

His question is just the same as Wittgenstein's would have been:

'But what use am I to make of this concept of a substance?'

*'Was soll Ich aber nun von diesem Begriffe einer Substanz für einen Gebrauch machen?'* (A 349, CPR 333)

In his impatience with metaphysics here, Kant is Wittgensteinian.

[3] Hacker is referring to the metaphors, and philosophical 'pictures', which mislead us into faulty conceptions. Kant is acutely aware of this tendency. Kant thinks there is a particularly misleading use of the imagination to generate such pictures; the 'figurative' use. For example, we tend to think of time in terms of a spatial metaphor or image; as a long straight line, perhaps receding into the distance behind, or in front of, oneself. No such line exists, but the habit of thought is compelling. Kant, like Wittgenstein, is concerned to account for time without the misleading picture. 'Accounting for time' here means something like 'showing the proper use of the concept without the image'.

[4] Kant and Wittgenstein think the paradigms of knowledge are natural science and mathematics. Both draw a sharp distinction between scientific questions, which are empirical and *a posteriori*, and philosophical questions, which are *a priori* and conceptual. (I mean by an *a priori* question, a question that has an *a priori* answer.)

The critique of pure reason is motivated by the contrast between internal disagreement and lack of progress in metaphysics, and consensus and continued progress in science. Kant thinks physics in particular has an explanatory power, and a mathematical precision, unmatched by any other inquiry into the universe. (8)

[5] Kant and Wittgenstein think there is a natural disposition of human thinking to metaphysics. Kant thinks we can no more give up metaphysics than 'the air we breath'.

Each component of Wittgenstein's assault on metaphysics, isolated by Hacker, is Kantian.

The *Investigations* is another attempt at Kant's project. The critical paradigm is Kant stuttering. This time, the demonstration of limits is piecemeal. We are allowed to stray into metaphysical misuses of terms to feel their *prima facie* plausibility, much as in the Paralogisms and the Transcendental Dialectic we are made to feel the compulsion of seemingly fundamental questions about the self, the origin and extent of reality, the existence of God. Like Kant, Wittgenstein allows us to stray only so far, and points out that our use of concepts is stretching and fraying them as they are wrenched from the only contexts that give them use. The *Tractatus*, the *Investigations*, and the first *Critique*, have it in common that there is no logically incorrigible metaphysical proposition upon which the set of true statements about the world of our daily experience may be premised. Hilary Putnam observes that, by the time of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein has adopted Kant's view of the language-object relation:

'The idea that truth is a passive copy of what is "really" (mind independently, discourse independently) "there" has collapsed under the critiques of Kant, Wittgenstein and other philosophers, even if it continues to have a deep hold on our thinking.' (Putnam 1981: Chapter IV)

Transcendentally speaking, perceiving objects makes them what they are. This sort of constitutive idealism is a hallmark of the Kantian philosophies which have followed Kant; from Marx's material 'praxis', the physical manipulation of nature, to Husserl's thesis that consciousness 'constitutes' the world, from the linguistic construction of reality in structuralism from de Saussure to Foucault, to the conceptual pragmatism of Karl Otto Apel, Jurgen Habermas, and Nicholas Rescher. Because, according to Kant, we cannot know reality unaltered by our concept of it (because knowledge is an 'instrument' in Hegel's metaphor) concepts themselves must become philosophy's subject matter.

## Kant's Private Language Argument

Leslie Stevenson argues persuasively that there are affinities between Wittgenstein's private language argument and Kant's transcendental deduction. Stevenson demonstrates the plausibility of extracting a single argument from both texts. (9) Instead of concentrating on the transcendental deduction, I shall draw on neglected passages towards the end of the first *Critique* to reveal Kant's view that meaning is necessarily social or public, and an utterly private language, one that could only be understood even in principle by the one who uses it, is a conceptual impossibility. Kant subscribes to the conclusion, and several of the premises, of Wittgenstein's private language argument.

Kant's version of the private language argument is in the chapter called 'The Canon of Pure Reason'. (A 820/B 848 ff., CPR 645 ff.) Kant draws a distinction between 'conviction' (*Überzeugung*), and 'persuasion' (*Überredung*), which is analogous to Wittgenstein's distinction between putatively private and actually public uses of language. Kant's distinction is between two sorts of judgement (*Urteil*) which we may here read as 'proposition':

'If the judgement is valid for everyone, provided only he is in possession of reason, its ground is objectively sufficient, and the holding of it to be true is entitled conviction. If it has its ground only in the special character of the subject, it is entitled persuasion.'

*'Wenn es für jedermann gültig ist, so fern er nur Vernunft hat, so ist der Grund desselben objektiv hinreichend, und das Fürwahrhalten heißt als den Überzeugung. Hat es nur in den besonderen Beschaffenheit des Subjekt seinen Grund, so wird es Überredung genannt.'*  
(A 820/B 848, CPR 645)

'Anyone' is a more philosophically perspicuous translation of *jedermann* than Kemp Smith's 'everyone' here. Crucially:

'Persuasion is a mere illusion, because the ground of the judgement, which lies solely in the subject, is regarded as objective. Such a judgement has only private validity, and the holding of it to be true does not allow of being communicated.'

*'Überredung ist ein bloßer Schein, weil der Grund des Urteils, welcher lediglich im Subjekte liegt, für objektiv gehalten wird. Daher hat ein solches Urteil auch nur Privatgültigkeit, und das Fürwahrhalten läßt sich nicht mitteilen.'*  
(A 820/B 848, CPR 645)

‘But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and in respect of it the judgements of each and every understanding must therefore be in agreement with each other.’

‘(*Wahrheit aber beruht auf der Übereinstimmung mit dem Objekte, in Ansehung dessen folglich die Urteile eines jeden Verstandes einstimmig sein müssen (consentientia uni tertio, consentiunt inter se)*’  
(A 820/B 848, CPR 645)

Kant's conclusion is

‘The touchstone whereby we decide whether our holding a thing to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore external, namely the possibility of communicating it and of finding it to be valid for all human reason.’

‘(*Der Proberstein des Fürwahrhaltens, ob es Überzeugung oder bloße Überredung sei, ist also, äusserliche, die Möglichkeit, dasselbe mitzuteilen und das Fürwahrhalten für jedes Menschen Vernunft gültig zu befinden.*)’  
(A 820/B 848, CPR 645)

If Kant’s ‘judgement’ putatively

'has its ground (*Grund*) only in the special character of the subject (*in den besonderen Beschaffenheit des Subjekt*)' (A 820/B 848, CPR 645)

then it is possible that, in Wittgenstein’s phrase, it

‘[...] refer(s) to what and only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private (*privaten*) sensations.’ (Wittgenstein 1953: § 243)

If so, then the force of Wittgenstein's 'another person cannot understand this language' (Wittgenstein 1953: § 243) is that of Kant's 'only private validity (*nur Privatgültigkeit*)'. (A 820/B 848, CPR 645)

Kant and Wittgenstein think a private language, in this strong sense, is an illusion. Kant says ‘persuasion’ is an illusion, and persuasion is exactly that sort of judgement which putatively has 'only private validity'. Wittgenstein's says it is, in one way, 'wrong' and, in another way, 'nonsense' that logically private judgements are possible. (Wittgenstein 1953: § 246) For both philosophers, meaning depends on the possibility of truth or falsity, and truth or falsity on the possibility of communication, about publicly observable objects. Wittgenstein’s criterion for the correctness of judgement is 'something independent'. Kant’s distinction between

conviction and persuasion can only be drawn by reference to something 'external' and this depends on the possibility of communicating (*mitteilen*). (A 820/B 848, CPR 645) For both philosophers, if a putative item of knowledge does not admit of being communicated it does not count as a part of language.

Jonathan Bennett draws parallels between Wittgenstein's private language argument and the Refutation of Idealism chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Bennett speaks of

'[...] insuperable theoretical difficulties which Wittgenstein - and before him Kant - have shown to be involved in the notion of an essentially private language.' (Bennett 1966: 204)

Bennett sees a parallel between Wittgenstein's thesis that a purely private recourse to one's own memories provides no criterion for the correctness, or incorrectness, of any first person singular psychological ascription, and this passage:

'I am conscious of my own existence as determined (*Bestimmt*) in time. All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination of my existence which are to be met with in me are representations: and as representations themselves require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and so my existence in time wherein they change, may be determined....' (B 275, CPR 245)

and summarises Investigations section § 265. Wittgenstein considers the possibility of an utterly 'subjective justification' for private psychological knowledge, and rejects it on these grounds:

'But justification consists in appealing to something independent - but surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For example, I don't know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the timetable looked. Isn't it the same here? - No; for this process has got to produce the right memory. If the mental image of the timetable could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said were true.)' (Wittgenstein 1953: § 265)

Suppose we read Kant's *Vorstellung* as 'representation' as Bennett does. Then several striking parallels may be extracted from these two passages. All representations are *of* something or other and all memories are *of* something or other. But the intentionality of the mental is only part of the Kant-Wittgenstein thesis. Some of my

memories, or other representations, might be of other mental states of mine. Both philosophers argue that first person singular psychological ascriptions are only possible on condition that non-solipsistic ascriptions are possible: No subject could possess knowledge of their own mental states unless they could also possess knowledge of what is not their own mental state. This is the force of Kant's 'something permanent' and Wittgenstein's 'something independent'. They both mean some objective reality that endures independently of a person's thought about it, or perception of it. In advocating this thesis, Kant and Wittgenstein share a profound anti-Cartesianism: First person singular present tense psychological ascriptions are not epistemologically primitive. Kant and Wittgenstein make their formulation logically dependent upon the possibility of third person non-psychological ascriptions. Jonathan Bennett does not exaggerate when he says that Kant's realism argument in the Refutation of Idealism, 'can be presented as a version of an argument which Wittgenstein uses in trying to show that there could not be a 'private language'. (Bennett 1966: 204)

What we could call the Kant-Wittgenstein Objectivity Thesis is:

(OT) No first person singular present tense psychological ascription can be known to be true or false without the existence of, and access to, some criterion for distinguishing truth from falsity, where no such criterion is even in principle introspectively available.

Any such criterion must be 'objective', where 'objective' must capture both 'permanent' and 'independent'. Kant would have approved of Wittgenstein's 'independent', because it means 'existing unaffected by any of my mental states'. Wittgenstein would have approved Kant's 'permanent' because it means 'enduring unaffected by any of my mental states'.

Attempts to solve problems arising from subjective and objective ascriptions characterise philosophy within the critical paradigm. Phenomenology entails description of subject-object relations, as they appear to consciousness. Hegel's dialectic is an attempt to break out of subject-object dualism, and synthesise the two antithetical concepts. Objectivist solutions to subject-object dualism, such as logical behaviourism, and central state materialism, are fatally punctured by ignoring the subjective point of view. Hegel's Master and Slave Dialectic, Sartre's existential phenomenology of self and other, Strawson's treatment of persons, and Wittgenstein's private language argument, are attempts to escape and ground subject-object dualism. Each is a version of the Kantian attempt to replace the Cartesian foundationalism, which takes first person singular present tense psychological ascriptions as epistemologically primitive, by transcendental social and linguistic pre-conditions for those very ascriptions. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* belongs centrally to that critical project.

Hacker has the *Tractatus* in mind in this historical remark:

‘Of the five main philosophical influences upon Wittgenstein: Hertz, Frege, Russell, Schopenhauer and perhaps Brower, at least three were deeply indebted to Kant. It is therefore not surprising that Wittgenstein's philosophy bears deepest affinities to Kant's despite the fact that he never studied Kant and despite the substitution of an austere Bauhaus style for the effusions of the Kantian Baroque.’ (Hacker 1972: 13)

If this is right, then the careful intricacies of the *Investigations* are something of a renaissance of that Kantian Baroque.

### *Conceptual Analysis: Wittgenstein and the Bounds of Sense*

Kant invented the method of conceptual analysis in its modern form:

‘[...] a great, perhaps the greatest part of the business of our reason consists in the analysis of the concepts which we already have of objects.’ (A5/B9 CPR 47)

Analytical Philosophy is the attempt to clarify, solve, or dissolve, philosophical problems by analyzing concepts. Twentieth-century analytical philosophy is the application to ordinary language of Kant's techniques of analysis in the ‘Analytic’ chapter of the first *Critique*. If we subtract the exhibition of the actual use of words, and the detection of the rules for their use, from the philosophies of Wittgenstein, Austin, Ryle, Hare and Warnock, then the residue cannot be called ‘conceptual analysis’, or ‘linguistic philosophy’.

Anthony Kenny says, ‘the term “analytic” was given currency by Kant’. (Williams and Montefiore 1965: 143) Kant invents this role for analysis:

‘Ontology that presumptuously claims to supply in systematic doctrinal form, synthetic *a priori* knowledge of things in general [...] must [...] give place to the modest title of a mere “Analytic of pure understanding (*Verstand*)”’ (A 247/B 303, CPR 264)

The model of conceptual analysis is the Transcendental Analytic, because the displaying of semantic entailments is essential to linguistic philosophy. This method is anticipated in the relation Kant claims between empirical concepts and categories. It is said Kant copied his categories from the logic text-books of his time. Whatever the historical facts, the categories' connection with empirical concepts is not merely contingent. For example, being a book entails being a physical object, which entails being a substance, which entails the possibility of entering into causal relations. No

empirical predicate may be applied without the possible use of some category, or categories. Whatever can be subsumed under empirical concepts can be subsumed under categories. Kant draws no sharp distinction between what our conceptual scheme is like, and how the world must be for us.

There are further fundamental affinities between Kant and the 'linguistic' philosophers: Ryle and Kant reject Cartesian mind-body dualism yet seek to avoid eliminative materialism. Hare tries to ground his ethics in a universalisability principle not dissimilar from the categorical imperative, and acknowledges the affinity. (Hare 1952, 16) For Kant, Wittgenstein, and Austin, making explicit the 'grammar' of some expression is showing the rules which govern its legitimate use.

It is not misleading to think of several philosophers of the British 'analytical' school as Wittgensteinian, in more than a merely historical sense. On this reading, Ryle practises Wittgensteinian philosophy of mind, Austin Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, Hare and Warnock Wittgensteinian ethics, Weldon Wittgensteinian political theory, Peter Winch Wittgensteinian philosophy of Social Science, Wollheim Wittgensteinian Aesthetics, and Toulmin Wittgensteinian philosophy of natural science. If Western philosophy since Kant is an explosion of Kantian projects, analytical philosophy in particular has been an application of Wittgensteinian techniques within the prevalent sub-divisions of philosophy. If Wittgenstein's techniques are Kantian so, *a fortiori*, are those of conceptual analysis.

Philosophy since Kant has been, and, for Austin, should continue to be 'the continual discovery of fresh types of nonsense'. (Austin 1962) For Kant, Wittgenstein, and Austin, making explicit the 'grammar' of some expression is showing the rules which govern its legitimate use. From Kant to Davidson, it is an assumption of conceptual analysis that ontology must be done obliquely. In discovering what language is like, we discover, fundamentally, what the world is like, because our conceptual scheme is transcendently adequate.

Few 'analytical' philosophers are ontologists. Those who are, ask Kantian questions, use Kantian methods, and, by and large, reached Kantian conclusions. In *Individuals* Strawson asks 'two questions, reminiscent in form and partly in content of Kantian questions':

'What are the most general storable conditions of knowledge of objective particulars?'

and

'Do these most general conditions involve the requirement that material bodies should be the basic particulars?' (Strawson 1959: 62)

Kant wrote the first *Critique* to answer the first question, and something like an affirmative answer to the second is entailed by Kant's book. Kant's answer to the first is, roughly: 'that we possess those forms of intuition and those categories that we do'. Kant's answer to the second question is 'yes', because empirical predicates can only be applied to entities to which the categories of substance, causality, plurality, etc. apply. Explaining that the forms of intuition and the categories are constitutive of some  $x$  is just to explain that  $x$  is a physical object. This logically commits Kant to a kind of materialism, rather than the idealism he failed to prevent being foisted on him. Strawson writes:

'It seems to me necessarily true [...] that no system which does not allow for spatial or temporal entities can be a system which allows for particulars at all, or at least can be understood by us as such. This point is the same as that made by Kant in saying that space and time are our only forms of intuition.' (Strawson 1959: 119)

Chapter one of *Individuals* is a sustained argument for answering 'yes' to the second question. Strawson does ontology by trying to decide what an intelligible world could be like for us. That there are constraints on what can be thought, or what can be said, means that the pre-Kantian question, 'What is there?', becomes 'What must there be for us?', or 'What must the world minimally be like for us to find it intelligible?' (10) This is also the way ontology is conducted in the *Tractatus*.

It is a hallmark of the critical paradigm to repudiate Cartesian mind-body dualism, so it is a root methodological assumption of post-Kantian philosophy that an ontological distinction between mental and physical substance should be obliterated. The dualism in the philosophy of mind, which has not yet been fully recognized, is subject-object dualism. This is a dualism that Kant has bequeathed to us. The difference between subjectivity and objectivity, spelled out in very different ways, is the subject matter of phenomenology, a guiding principle of Hegelian and Marxist epistemology and a tacit presupposition of externalism. It is a condition for the debates about materialism in analytical philosophy of mind. (11) Jonathan Lear thinks it essential to an understanding of Wittgenstein's later philosophy:

'The *Investigations* as a whole forms an extended study into the multifarious relations between subjective and objective perspectives.' (Lear 1984: 224)

Renford Bambrough once told me that what we should do next with Wittgenstein is try to refute him. I suggest the metaphysics of Wittgenstein's world has yet to be excavated. (12)

DECONSTRUCTION

‘But psychoanalysis has taught that the dead—a dead parent, for example—can be more alive for us, more powerful, more scary, than the living. It is the question of ghosts.’

Jacques Derrida *The New York Times*, January 23, 1994

Derrida’s thought (speech, writing) is essentially Kantian. Its techniques and doctrines are anticipated in Kant’s critical philosophy and, if its Kantianism were to be subtracted from it, almost nothing philosophical would remain. ‘Kantian’ means: logically or semantically equivalent to claims or concepts advanced by Kant in his published writings, especially in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. (1)

Acknowledged Anticipations

Derrida acknowledges three influences on his anti-metaphysical thinking: (a) 'the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics', (b) 'the Freudian critique of self-presence (*présence a soi*)', and (c) 'the Heideggerian destruction of metaphysics'. (2) Derrida identifies each of these as an element incorporated into his own writing. Each is Kantian.

Nietzsche

From Nietzsche, Derrida takes “the critique of [...] the concepts of being and truth, for which were substituted the concepts of play, interpretation and sign (sign without truth present)” (3) Kant and Nietzsche offers a critique of the concepts of being and truth in their putative metaphysical uses. Kant’s argument that *being* (*Sein*) is not a predicate putatively entails the impossibility of any transcendent ontology (which allegedly deploys the existential ‘is’, *ist*, as a logical predicate). Kant includes Existence, *Dasein*, in the categories (*Kategorien*), which, although not empirical in origin, only have empirical uses, so no genuine metaphysical use. The *Critique of Pure Reason* includes a critique of pure reason.

Nietzsche urges the substitution of an ontology of quasi-Heraclitean flux for the Platonic or Christian uses of ‘being’, in a way suggested by Socrates’ reports of Heraclitus in the *Theaetetus* as entailing

‘[...] all the things which we say are – which is not the right way to speak of them – are coming to be; because nothing ever is, but things are coming to be.’ (4)

If Nietzsche is right, the existential ‘is’ cannot be rightly applied as a predicate, because it cannot be rightly applied. Being falsifies becoming. *a fortiori*, ‘is’ has no metaphysically use. Nietzsche’s doctrine entails Kant’s, so Kant’s is necessary for Nietzsche’s. Derrida’s doctrine entails Nietzsche’s, so Kant’s is necessary for Derrida’s. Heraclitus’s *polemos* becomes Derrida’s play.

Kant argues for the impossibility of truth, and *a fortiori* knowable truth, about reality as a whole: what is, as it is in itself, or, what is, independently of a perspective, point of view, or conceptual scheme. Kant thinks we can only know something as it could appear to us. This means: as it would appear, if we were perceiving it. Catastrophically for subsequent understanding, Kant calls this doctrine ‘transcendental idealism’. Commentators thought transcendental idealism was a kind of idealism. Kant failed to remove the misunderstanding by expressly including the new chapter, The Refutation of Idealism, in the second ‘B’ edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Transcendental idealism is the conjunction of perspectivism and metaphysical anti-realism. Nietzsche is a transcendental idealist.

Kant, Nietzsche, and Derrida, reject what they take to be the old metaphysical ideal of ‘absolute’ knowledge. Derrida’s deconstructive method implies that there is no neutral ‘site’, or assumption free way of thinking (speaking, writing), from which to make true claims about other ways of thinking (speaking, writing) The subtitle of Derrida’s two-volume *Glas*, ‘Knell’, is *Que reste-il du savoir absolu?*, ‘What remains of absolute knowledge?’. (5) Derrida adopts the convention of parallel text (deployed in *Marges de la Philosophie*): quotation from, and commentary on, Hegel, the official philosopher of the Prussian state whose *Phenomenology of Spirit* culminates in the chapter ‘Absolute Knowledge (*Das Absolute Wissen*)’ on the left hand page, quotation from, and commentary on, the thieving homosexual novelist,

Jean Genet, on the right hand page. The philosophical use of this antithetical device is anticipated by Kant in the Antinomies chapter of the first *Critique*, where he juxtaposes on each of a series of pages two arguments, written in columns, yielding mutually inconsistent conclusions. Kant and Derrida exhibit to the reader the similarities and differences, between two philosophical positions, and how, in the last resort, the existence of each makes impossible the complete truth of the other. Kant and Derrida are interested in the impossibility of synthesis. Kant allows a dialectical synthesis in only one out of four antinomies, that concerning free will and determinism. In the remaining antinomies there is only an interplay, or *polemos*, of mutually inconsistent pairs of premises and conclusions and the stakes are as high as this: the origin of the universe, the bounds of what is, whether there is a creating God.

In the Antinomies, Kant does not use the words play, interpretation, and sign but the concepts are at work. Because categories are being used beyond the bounds of sense, the sign is deployed without truth present. Hegel was not only thoroughly acquainted with the Antinomies chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but bases his dialectic on the Third Antinomy. The greatest, or most disreputable, exponent of Absolute Knowledge is therefore a highly sophisticated post-critical thinker who would have found little novelty in the method of *Glas*. If not in his methods, then in his conclusions about *Sein* and *Geist*, Hegel escapes Kantianism where Derrida remains imprisoned: the great escape.

Kant deconstructs the metaphysics of presence. The phenomenal world, denoted by 'presence' in Derrida's 'metaphysics of presence', is conceptually constituted. The 'play' of language makes the subject's relation to the world what it is for Derrida. The transcendental role of the categories makes the subject's world what it is for Kant. Kant and Derrida's subject is not an author of meanings but constituted by language, and systematically unknowable. If Kant is any kind of idealist, like Derrida, he is a linguistic or conceptual idealist.

The expression translated 'without truth present' could equally be translated 'without present truth'. In a footnote to the English version, it is pointed out that 'jeu', here translated 'play', could be rendered 'interplay', 'game', or 'stake'. 'Game' (*jeu*), is a recurrent metaphor in the critical paradigm, used by Wittgenstein and other linguistic philosophers, as well as Derrida. Play is suggested by Kant's theory that the understanding is a source of *rules* for finding objects intelligible. Kant, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Derrida think that subject and object, and the relations between them, owe their being what they are to language. The subject is displaced, or distanced from itself, in self-consciousness. The object is distorted, or distanced from the subject, in consciousness of it. The subject's relation to the world is transcendently constituted: The subject did not invent this relation. The categorial framework, language game, perspective, or history of language, the subject is embedded in, makes the subject what it is, and the world what it is, for that subject.

Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence is a late phase of post-Kantian conceptual idealism.

'Interpretation' and 'sign' are 'substituted' by Nietzsche for 'being' and 'truth'. 'Interpretation' indicates the Kantian thesis that persons do not passively register what the world is really like through the senses. Rather it is, for us, essentially as we interpret it. No pure, passively received 'data' are available (in the way that Husserl, and the British empiricists, are supposed to believe.) The force of Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' is that a categorial framework moulds any sensory input into the world as it appears to us. Nietzsche and Derrida are pushing this revolution to the anti-metaphysical conclusions that Kant has already reached.

The sign in Nietzsche and Derrida has essentially the role of Kant's categories. Both category and sign have autonomy, because neither depends on the thoughts of the subject for meaning. The subject is constituted by signs in Derrida, by categories in Kant. The intelligibility of non-linguistic reality depends on the sign in post-structuralism, on the categories in the critical philosophy. Nevertheless, Kant and Derrida emphatically hold that there is a non-linguistic or non-conceptual reality. Neither's conceptual idealism stretches so far as to deny that. Derrida's signs and Kant's categories are 'transcendental' in Kant's sense: They are not items derived from, or caused by, experience but conditions for experience. Derrida is a transcendental philosopher.

Freud

Derrida's second acknowledgement is to Freud. Freud is not a philosopher. We should take him at his word when he says he is a psychoanalyst. This is not to deny that psychoanalysis might be of great philosophical interest, or that it might provide explanations of philosophical motivations. For psycho-analysis to be philosophy, there would have to be psychoanalytical solutions to philosophical problems. Derrida says he is not engaged in a psychoanalysis of philosophy. But what is the psychoanalytical status of this direct disavowal? Derrida is concerned with what philosophy represses, philosophy's other, what philosophy is afraid of, that which shows itself in the margins of philosophy.

In so far as Derrida represents Freud's ontology of the subject accurately, it is essentially Kantian. Derrida says there is a

“Freudian critique of self-presence, that is, the critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-proximity or self-possession.”

*‘(du sujet, de l’identité a soi, de la proximité ou de la propriété a soi)’ (6)*

Derrida's use of 'critique of self-presence' and 'critique of the subject' entails the thesis essential to psycho-analysis that a person is never directly acquainted with themselves psychologically just as they really are. Prior to analysis, much of the content of consciousness is opaque to introspection. The non-introspectible faculty of the psyche called the 'unconscious' partly determines the content of consciousness which is introspectively available.

Freud's theory of the self is Kantian. Roger Scruton points out that Kant's account of the self 'has provided the cornerstone of many subsequent philosophies of the self, from that of Schopenhauer to those of Husserl, Heidegger and Wittgenstein'. Scruton might allow at least Hegel, Freud, Sartre. and Derrida onto his list. (7) Kant thinks that, in self-consciousness, (including introspection) a person never knows or perceives themselves just as they really are, but only as they appear to themselves. I can never know myself *noumenally* only *phenomenally*. (*Noumenon*, in its etymology, derives from *noûs* : 'mind'.) The categories constitute the subject in introspection, or 'inner sense', as they constitute the objects of outer sense. In so far as I cannot know myself, I have freedom, but, in so far as I can know myself, I am not free but causally determined, The Kantian picture leaves conceptual room for the free 'play' of the Freudian unconscious but an inevitability of the contents of 'surface' consciousness being what they are.

Kant is engaged in a critique of self-identity, self-presence or self-possession. I am never fully present to myself. I cannot 'own' myself, in the sense of fully place the self that I know under my own control. I am not kn/own/ed by myself. My self is not myself.

Derrida's expression 'critique of [...] self-presence' could be used to denote Kant's paradox of subject-object dualism:

'The whole difficulty is as to how a subject can inwardly intuit itself; and this is a difficulty common to every theory.' (8)

because

' [...] it then intuits itself not as it would represent itself if immediately self-active but as it is affected by itself, and therefore as it appears to itself, not as it is.' (9)

The subject is in its own way. Being in its own way stops it being, in its own way. It affects itself in trying to know itself. Being it is an obstacle to knowing it. Kant and Freud think that the structures of the psyche itself are a barrier to its self-knowledge. Whenever 'I' is used, it has a single referent, but this referent falls under (at least) two distinguishable descriptions: of the self *as it is*, and of the self *as it appears to itself*. On the Freudian and Kantian account, the content of the appearance is determined by the content of the hidden, and it is difficult for the self to know the

content of the hidden. Indeed, where Kant is consistent, this is, according to him, impossible.

Kant sometimes speaks as though the *phenomena/noumena* distinction is causal. This is at variance with his considered anti-realist view of *noumena*, and inconsistent with transcendental idealism. Because causal relations are categorical, they only obtain in the empirical world. A causal relation between phenomena and noumena is not part of the empirical world. However, in so far as Kant subscribes to the causal view, *noumena* are at least a condition of phenomenal existence, possibly also of their being what they are. So, on that reading, I, as I really am, am a causal condition of myself as I appear to myself. In so far as this can be extracted from Kant, his view is not just consistent with Freud's doctrine that the unconscious *determines the* conscious. It is entailed by it.

The phenomenal self/noumenal self distinction captures 'critique of self identity'. Kant would not say I differ from myself because, logically, there could not be anything that is not what it is, whatever it is or is not. He accepts at least these complications about the self: I exist as subject, as that which experiences. I exist as object, for my own or others' experiences. I exist as both subject and object in so far as I perceive or know myself (even if only as an appearance). Derrida, following Sartre, and Hegel, is prepared to say the subject is not 'self identical' to describe this structure. Even though Kant shuns the Hegelian vocabulary, his paradoxical subject-object dualism entails the same the ontology of the self.

## Heidegger

Thirdly, and 'more radically', Derrida acknowledges Heidegger, for his 'destruction of metaphysics, of onto-theology, of the determination of being as presence'. (10) Nevertheless, Derrida overestimates Heidegger's attack on the 'metaphysics of presence'. Although *Dasein* is the site or the *Lichtung*, or the clearing in the forest where Being is disclosed to Being, and although Heidegger describes the extacies of time, which seem to vitiate pure presence, Heidegger's revival (or re-discovery) of truth as disclosure, *aletheia*, entails a metaphysics of presence of which Heidegger is acutely aware. One way from *Sein und Zeit* (1927) to *Zeit und Sein* (1962) is by a further clearing of the clearing, a clearing away even of *Dasein* to disclose *Sein*. In *Briefuber den Humanismus*, Heidegger insists his philosophy in *Sein und Zeit* is not a humanism, even though *Dasein* is essential to the *Fundamentalontologie* of that (incomplete and uncompleted) book. By arguing that the being of *Dasein* is prerequisite to the study of being (*Sein*), Heidegger's study faces the danger of being a study of human being, and so failing to escape the anthropomorphic shadow of the critical paradigm, even though eschewing its psychologism, as well as being diverted from the Question of Being, partly in the way that Heidegger rightly accuses

Aristotle. Aristotle's temptation is *ousia*, Heidegger's *anthropos*. Fundamental ontology purports to obviate the first danger, by describing human *being*. Escape is only fully assured by addressing the *Seinsfrage* directly, by not finishing fundamental ontology in 1962, but by finishing what was unfinished in 1927, describing not just human being but Being, and that means doing metaphysics.

In *Kant and das Problem der Metaphysik* Heidegger struggles to break out of the critical paradigm. The shadow of the *Critique of Pure Reason* lies on *Being and Time*, like a shadow on a lung. Heidegger failed to finish *Sein und Zeit* because Kant's critique of metaphysics stood massively in the way of describing the kind of time that is primordial with regard to being. Even the chapter headings and divisions of *Being and Time* mirror the first *Critique*. Kant, who is inside Heidegger's thinking almost as much as Derrida's, tries to kill fundamental ontology as it becomes non-Kantian. Answering, not just clarifying, the *Seinsfrage* exceeds Kantianism. Heidegger realised that he had to do metaphysics to answer the *Seinsfrage*, so Heidegger lectured and wrote about Kant straight after the publication of what he had written of *Being and Time*. The beginning of the *Kehre* is in 1927. Every turning has its beginning. Kant started the *Kehre*. In the *Kantbuch*, Heidegger argues that the Schematism is the most important part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is fair to say that Heidegger *deconstructs* Kant, by arguing that the Schemata are at once subversive of, and a kind of fulfilment of, Kant's thought. They are a fulfillment, because Kant is right in thinking he needs *some* account of how categories apply to sense contents. They are subversive, because they are not just categorical, or just sensory, and, in the end, as Kant admits, the schemata are a mystery in the depths of the soul. The schemata are bandages needed because the *Critique of Pure Reason* is broken in the middle and, unfortunately, the break is where rationalism and empiricism should be fused, and the categories tied to objects of experience, and not allowed to stray metaphysically.

Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl has not escaped the parameters of the Schematism. Derrida struggles to 'go beyond' Husserl, but neither Derrida nor Husserl has gone beyond Kant. Heidegger rightly identifies Kant as the greatest constraint, and identifies his point of greatest weakness. If anyone punches out of the critical paradigm it is Heidegger, but his fist is covered in broken pieces of Kant.

### Deconstruction as Critique

In so far as Derrida's project is philosophical, it is the Kantian project of a critique of metaphysics. Kant and Derrida think there is a terrible dilemma, or crisis, that any critique of metaphysics must face: To criticise metaphysics is to engage in it. Speaking of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Freud, Derrida says

‘Now all these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a sort of circle’

*‘Or tous ces discours destructeurs et tous leurs analogues sont prises dans une sorte de cercle’* (11)

The problem is:

‘There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics’

*‘il n’y a aucun sens à passer des concepts de la métaphysique pour ébranler la métaphysique’* (12)

This is precisely the problem for critical philosophy which Kant points to in the *Prolegomena*:

‘That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, in order to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether.’ (13)

Derrida’s ‘Ebranler’ is translated ‘attack’, but has the less straightforward senses of ‘to shake’, ‘to unloosen’, ‘to unsettle’, ‘to disturb’, ‘to (make) stagger’. The idiom ‘ébranler une cloche’ means ‘to set a bell ringing’, so one is reminded of the inevitability of conflict, but the impossibility of synthesis, in *Glas*. Derrida is not just making the point that metaphysical thinking is an ineradicable habit or propensity of reason. The problem goes deeper than that. Criticising metaphysics requires mentioning it, Deriding it, pointing out its contradictions, its vacuous concepts, the way it rests on what Derrida thinks is a questionable ‘presence’. Derrida has no *argument* for his view that shaking metaphysics presupposes metaphysics. I suggest: Attacking any paradigm requires communicating the failure, or limits, of the paradigm to the practitioners of the paradigm. This requires partly being in, and partly being out, of the paradigm. If the thought is new, it is hard to communicate. If it is easily communicated it is part of the old paradigm. The difficulty pertains to any historical shift in world view. It is not confined to metaphysics and anti-metaphysics. At the time of writing, 2011, exactly this problem is faced by anyone trying to explain either Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology, or the metaphysical and epistemological implications of Quantum Physics, to the Western philosophical community.

Derrida thinks there is something called ‘Western Metaphysics’ and says,

“we have no language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is alien to this history (*qui soit étranger a cette histoire*)”. (14) Kant argues that concepts as fundamental as 'being', 'cause', 'substance', 'time', have spurious metaphysical uses, and genuine non-metaphysical uses. His technique in the Antinomies is to show that when they are used to ask metaphysical questions, contradictions result. Derrida uses Heidegger's device of putting the metaphysical concept 'under erasure', leaving it on the page but crossing it out, in an anarchic stylistic display of how it misfunctions in 'our' taken for granted metaphysical assumptions: indicating that we are not to read the term in its purported metaphysical sense, but only take it as an intrusive, disruptive, device for breaking up ways of thinking that seem to give it a linguistic context. Kant does not use the stylistic device of 'erasure' but describes the meaning, and meaninglessness, of the categories as they stray beyond the bounds of possible experience. Unless metaphysics leads to incoherence, why place a putatively metaphysical concept under erasure? Why not place a term in single quotation marks, like this: 'I', 'now', 'being', to show that it is being used in a special, transcendental, sense, shorn of naturalistic content, and empirical limits, putatively appropriate for the revelation of timeless truth?

It is an entailment of Derrida's philosophy that no author has a complete mastery, or transparent control, over their own writing. It is not as though he or she could occupy some site unconstituted by language, in order to invent a text with pure originality. Besides, the richness and openness of language exceeds any conscious, or unconscious power, he or she might exercise over it. The author's putative product is open to multiple interpretations, of which the author's is only one. The author is not an authority. The author is not a dictator. The author is, in fact, another text, who can be deconstructed like any other. Kant thinks the subject operates *in* a conceptual scheme, and *presupposes* a transcendental logic whose own system and laws his empirical language necessarily cannot adequately characterise. Doing critical philosophy requires concern with a relationship, unperceived by the subject, between what falls under his autonomy and what does not, in the conceptual scheme he uses.

## Category and Sign

Derrida gives an example of the metaphysics of anti-metaphysics: the critique of the sign, which is part of his deconstruction of Structuralism. 'Sign', Derrida says, has always been understood as 'sign of'. This intentionality of the conceptual is an axiom of the metaphysics he questions. Within 'the Western tradition', it does not make sense to claim there might be signs that are not signs *of* something or other, concepts that are not concepts *of* something or other, even if the object, referent, signified, no longer exists, is just a thought, an image, or a physical object. The signification 'sign'

has always been comprehended, and determined, in its sense of sign-of, signifier referring to a signified, signifier different from its signified. Derrida says

“If one erases the radical difference between signifier and signified, it is the word “signifier” itself which ought to be abandoned as a metaphysical concept” (15)

Why abandon a concept because it is *metaphysical*? Why not rather *endorse* it on that very ground? Why assume there are *limits*? Derrida credits Levi-Strauss with the attempt to 'transcend the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible' but Derrida thinks Levi-Strauss' strategy fails because

‘[...] the necessity, the force, and the legitimacy of his act cannot make us forget that the concept of the sign cannot in itself surpass or bypass this opposition between the sensible and the intelligible.’

*‘ne peut en lui-même dépasser cette opposition du sensible et de l’intelligible.’* (16)

The concept of the sign is determined by this opposition. Kant's dilemma about the categories exists because Kant's epistemology is designed to expose the real relation between the sensible and the intelligible: The categories of the understanding render intelligible the contents of sensory input. There is an attempted transcendence of the sense-intuition dichotomy in the much quoted Kantian thesis that 'Concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind' (17) The 'difference' is partially 'erased' by Kant because sense experiences and categories could not exist in abstraction from one another. There is a mutual dependence between category and intuition. As Hegel points out, it is then possible to view each of sense (*Sinnlichkeit*), and understanding (*Verstand*), as a single aspect or moment of a larger dialectical whole. Each is *aufgehoben* in the lived experience of the subject. Kant's *intuitive understanding*, although humans do not possess it, is the synthesis of sense and understanding. In the case of a being with an intuitive intellect, there is no difference between its thinking something and that being the case.

But just as Kant cannot dispense with the concept of a 'category', which he inherits from Aristotle, and those rationalist metaphysicians whom he both opposes and incorporates into his own critical philosophy, who he *deconstructs*, so Derrida says:

“We cannot do without the concept of the sign; we cannot give up (*nous defaire*) this metaphysical complicity without also giving up the critique we are directing against this complicity, without the risk of erasing difference (*différence*) [altogether] in the self-identity of a signified reducing itself to its signifier, (*l’identité a soi d’un signifié*)

*réduisant en soi son signifiant*) or what amounts to the same thing simply expelling it outside itself.” (18)

Because the categories only have an empirical use, there exists the threat of concepts being reduced to the intuitions they subsume. In the Schematism chapter, the schematised categories appear to be just rules, according to which the empirical world is found intelligible. The converse difficulty also exists. Although Kant, like Derrida, thinks there is a non-categorical, or non-linguistic, reality, both writers see a danger of lapsing into a kind of conceptual solipsism, or, at least, an extreme conceptual idealism. In Kant, this takes the form of the anxiety that nothing non-categorical might exist. Because Kant synthesises rationalism and empiricism, his philosophy is in danger of being rewritten as either. Although neither a sensory input nor a *noumenal* reality can be ontologically reduced to the other, nor to our concepts of them, once the essential role of the empirical in giving the categories their employment is spelled out, it is open to the sceptic to doubt the existence of any non-conceptually ordered reality. Kant added the Refutation of Idealism chapter to the second ‘B’ edition of the first *Critique* precisely to obviate this difficulty.

A similar problem faces Derrida and he recognises it. If the signifier makes the signified what it is, then there is a danger of the signified being reduced to the signifier, or of the signifier being reduced to the signified. Kant and Derrida face a difficulty in preventing the obliteration of the 'difference' between category and intuition, signifier and signified. Kant self-consciously tries to avoid assimilating categories to intuitions, or intuitions to categories, but he does not wish to allow the categorical and the empirical each an independent existence either.

### The Implications of *Differance*

Kant's syntheses are defined in opposition to rationalist and empiricist models of philosophy (or anything) and are, at the same time, an appropriation of them. Kant deconstructs rationalism and empiricism, and the difference between them. In a proto-Hegelian *Aufhebung*, he abolishes each in its purity, and preserves both in their dependence. Kant *fulfils* them and *subverts* them. Derrida says of his own efforts to erase the difference between signifier and signified:

‘The *paradox* is that the metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the opposition it was reducing. The opposition is part of the system, along with the reduction.’ (19)

Derrida is right, and Kant would have agreed when he says:

‘[...] what I am saying here about the sign can be extended to all the concepts and all the sentences of metaphysics.’ (20)

and

‘[...] every particular borrowing drags along with it the whole of metaphysics.’ (21)

Derrida thinks this accounts for the fact that diverse philosophers (two of whom, are centrally within the critical paradigm) accuse each other of metaphysics:

‘This is what allows these destroyers to destroy each other reciprocally – for example, Heidegger considering Nietzsche, with as much lucidity and rigor as bad faith and misconstruction, as the last metaphysician, the last “Platonist”. One could do the same for Heidegger himself, for Freud, or for a number of others. And today no exercise is more widespread.’ (22)

One could do the same for Derrida himself. Derrida is one of these *quelques autres*. Derrida desires to give ‘logocentrism’, *différance* (which is neither a word nor a concept), ‘trace’, ‘the metaphysics of presence’, the status of not being privileged, but thereby gives them *the privilege of not being privileged*. Derrida massively privileges *différance*:

“[...] the movement of *différance*, as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language, such as [...] sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture. As a common root, *différance* is also the element of the same (to be distinguished from the identical) in which these oppositions are announced. [...] and *différance* [...] is the condition for any signification and any structure.” (23)

Derrida’s ‘root’ (*racine*), in ‘common root’, is foundationalist, implying either the epistemological doctrine that ‘we’ cannot know anything unless we can know about *x* (where *x* is: physical objects, sense data, God, Being, one’s own existence and so on), or the ontological doctrine that nothing can exist unless *x* exists. *Différance* is the foundation of antithetical concepts in language. Derrida has no argument for his foundationalism, so we might as well believe this:

“[...] the stillness of *sameness*, as that which produces similar things, that which renders the same, is the common root of all the mutually dependent concepts that mark our language, such as [...] sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture. As a common root, *sameness* is also the element of the different (to be

distinguished from the non-identical) in which these dependencies are trumpeted [...] and *sameness* [...] is the condition for any signification and any structure.” (24)

Kant and Derrida desire to escape foundationalism, but, ironically, Derrida is just as foundationalist as Kant. Derrida’s ‘condition for’ in ‘condition for any signification’ is *transcendental*, and so Kantian. *Différance* in Derrida, and the categories in Kant, are necessary conditions for meaning. Kantian arguments to the necessary conditions for knowledge, meaning, science, experience, are transcendental arguments of the form: if not *a*, then not *b*, *b*, therefore *a*. Unwittingly, Derrida deploys exactly this Kantian argument-form when he seeks to establish necessary conditions for meaning. *Différance* is the *transcendental signified*. Derrida is a transcendental philosopher.

Derrida is anxious that *différance* should be ‘not simply a concept’ (25) as Kant’s *a priori* concepts are so privileged they have to be called ‘categories’, or, as the medieval scholastics thought, some concepts are so profound they should not be called ‘concepts’ but ‘transcendentals’ (*Being, truth, etc.*)

Derrida thinks the West privileges speech over writing. This is not right. In European, and anglo-american, culture, putting something in writing has an authority, bindingness, and stamp of authenticity that mere speech lacks. Truth and meaning purportedly reside in *science*, something not just inscribed in journals, but all over the planet. Privileging writing over speech is one feature *distinguishing* the West from cultures essentially including oral tradition, and being bound by one’s word. Admittedly, Socrates and Christ spoke, and did not write, but their influence depends upon their teachings being written by Plato and the divinely inspired authors of the New Testament. Plato is not the author of Plato’s early dialogues, even though he wrote them, and the writers of the New Testament are not its author, even though they wrote it.

#### Id-identity and The Metaphysics of Absence:

Derrida thinks ‘Western Philosophy’ presupposes the metaphysics of presence. This is not right. That there is pure-self presence, or self-giveness of meaning, is criticised or rejected by many philosophers in the changing and retrospectively selected canon. Heraclitus thinks there is only flux, so it is wrong to say of anything that it ‘is’. Zeno thinks motion is contradictory, because it implies something both is, and is not, at a place. Hegel thinks time is dialectically constituted. McTaggart thinks time is contradictory, so impossible. Sartre thinks the present is the ‘is been’ (*est été*) Merleau-Ponty thinks time constitutes itself, in a way that is systematically incomplete. The examples could be multiplied. Derrida has been influential in literary criticism but not in philosophy. Why not? Not because Derrida is subversive of philosophy, but because the philosophers have seen it a thousand times before.

There is not one homogeneous thing called ‘Western Philosophy’, not just because philosophers disagree with one another, on just about everything, and not just because the procession from Parmenides to Derrida is an illusion (There are *libraries*) but because the philosophy is the questioning. Like anything else; novel writing, or doing physics, philosophy is not its history. Writing a novel is not writing a history of the novel (unless you are *very* post-modern). Doing physics is not writing the history of physics. Doing philosophy is not writing the history of philosophy.

If anything has characterised ‘the Western intellectual tradition’ since the middle ages it is not philosophy but the growth of *science*. Science is genuinely eliminative of the metaphysics of presence. Physics has no concept of ‘now’. Science is a subject without a subject. In an insane *epoché* in reverse, the materialist scientist suspends his own existence. Science is the real destruction of the metaphysics of presence, and this is *not* deconstruction but elimination. There is no ‘constituted’ now, no subject or self ‘contaminated’ by absence, by what it is not or the ‘play of signifiers’, no covert teleology towards fulfillment. *Contra* Derrida the ruling technocratic orthodoxy represses the metaphysics of presence. If anything, the West is characterised by an assault on the metaphysics of presence; an assault in which Derrida is unwittingly wholly complicit.

Kant is the accomplice’s mentor, and accomplice, in the Aesthetic and the Schematism. Kant rejects pure presence, or now-ness, and argues that time is determined by the schematised categories. Kant therefore anticipates the central doctrines of *La voix et le phénomène*:

“We thus find that the schema of each category contains and makes capable of (re)presentation only a determination of time. The schema of magnitude is the generation (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of the object. The schema of quantity is the synthesis of sensation or perception with the (re)presentation of time; it is the filling of time. The schema of relation is the connecting of perceptions with one another at all times according to a rule of time determination. Finally, the schema of modality and its categories is time itself as the correlate of the determination whether and how an object belongs to time. The schemata are thus nothing but *a priori* determinations of time in accordance with rules.” (26)

There is no ‘pure’ time or ‘now’ present(ed) to a subject just as it is. Time is conceptually constituted in a way that blurs the distinction between sensibility and understanding, and makes both possible in their mutual dependence. We know from the Refutation of Idealism chapter that Kant thinks the subject is conscious of itself as ‘determined in time (*in der Zeit bestimmt*)’. (27) The term Kemp Smith translates as ‘determination of time’, *Zeitbestimmung*, need carry no connotation of an ontological distinction between time and its determination. Kant rules out the

possibility of time being realistically ‘there’, prior to its conceptual constitution, when he says the schema of magnitude ‘is the generation (synthesis) of time itself (*die Erzeugung (Synthesis) der Zeit selbst*)’. (28) Nor do the schemata exist in abstraction from their roles in time constitution. Kant says ‘The schemata are nothing but *a priori* determinations of time in accordance with rules. (*Die Schemate sind daher nichts als Zeitbestimmungen a priori nach Regeln.*)’ Kant emphatically italicises *Zeitbestimmungen* but Kemp Smith does not italicise ‘determinations of time’. *Bestimmung*, which Kant embeds in *Zeitbestimmung*, can mean: ‘destination’, ‘destiny’, ‘vocation’, ‘destignation’, ‘statement’, ‘definition’, ‘regulation’, ‘rule’, ‘modification’, ‘stipulation’, ‘diagnosis’, ‘analysis’ or ‘ordinance’ as well as ‘determination’.

Derrida thinks presence depends upon *différance*. He says

“But this pure *différance* [e], which constitutes the self-presence of the living present, introduces into self-presence from the beginning all the impurity putatively excluded from it.’

*‘Mais cette différence pure, qui constitue la présence a soi du présent vivant, y réintroduit originairement toute l’impureté qu’on a crue pouvoir en exclure.’*  
(Derrida 1967: 95, 1973: 85)

and

‘Thus understood, what is supplementary is in reality *différance* [a], the operation of differing which at one and the same time both fissures and retards presence.’

*‘Ainsi entendue, la supplémentarité est bien la différence, l’opération du différer qui, a la fois, fissure et retarde la présence.’* (29)

Allison translates ‘la supplémentarité est bien la différence’ as ‘what is supplementary is in reality différence’ but Derrida is saying that supplementarity is différence, not what(ever) is supplementary is différence. Difference [e] is not only foundational, but ‘pure’, and therefore, *pace* Derrida, metaphysical and, if there is such a thing as a consensus in ‘Western Philosophy’, it is that the present, if it exists at all, is ‘impure’ in Derrida’s sense. Heraclitus, Zeno, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Kant all attack pure presence. The real difficulty lies in persuading people to see plausibility in the views that Derrida is *attacking*: that *there is pure presence* (with a multiplicity of changing contents), that *it is only ever now*, that *‘now’ is when everything is ‘given’*, that *it is mysterious that it is now*, that *it is mysterious that it is now now*, that *I am now* might be a profound identity statement, not only a trivial tautology produced by a relation between two indexicals. It seems psychologically

easier to grasp, at least in capitalist means-to-end thinking, that the now is only the becoming past of the future.

‘Present’ may mean ‘now’, or ‘in the presence of’. Deconstructed Kantian time is putatively necessary for presence in the sense of both *being present* and *being presented* as significant. Kant says:

‘The schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding are [...] the true and sole conditions under which these concepts obtain relation to objects and so possess significance.’ (30)

Schemata, as Levi-Strauss and Derrida would approve, are not wholly sensible, and not wholly intelligible, yet partly both, in a way that subverts any sharp distinction between them. Kant says:

‘This mediating (re)presentation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible.’ (31)

In the Schematism, Kant deconstructs the metaphysics of presence.

Kant and Derrida do not think there is ‘pure’ perception. Understood as the rejection of some extremely naïve view, on which the world is simply passively sensed as it really is, Kant (along with just about anybody called ‘a philosopher’) would agree with Derrida’s famous claim ‘perception does not exist’. (32) Kant agrees with Derrida that perception is always conceptually constituted, that perception is not ‘primordial’, or uniquely foundational, with regard to knowledge. Kant agrees with Derrida that there is no beginning, or, even more ‘radically’ than Derrida, he argues it is equally illusory to hold that there is, or is not, a beginning. The whole concern with what is or is not ‘pure’, and thereby possibly metaphysical, is Kantian. Kant usually uses ‘pure’ (*rein*) to mean ‘non empirical’ or ‘devoid of empirical content’, as in *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

Is there anything in Derrida’s writing that is not essentially Kantian? The attack on metaphysics is Kantian. The linguistic constitution of what passes for reality is Kantian. The critique of the subject is Kantian. The deconstruction of absolute truth is Kantian. That there are deeply hidden presuppositions of taken for granted ways of speaking or writing is Kantian. That thinking presupposes binary oppositions is Kantian. That fundamental categories are antithetical, and so disrupted, is Kantian. The impossibility of dialectical synthesis is Kantian. That meaning is not naively, and straightforwardly, present to the subject is Kantian. That the subject cannot

directly and truthfully know itself is Kantian. The uncertain relations between structure and content, and structure and itself, is Kantian.

On the other hand, many of Derrida's styles, or voices, are not Kantian. It is a historical and philosophical naivete to assume there is a distinction between, on the one hand, continental philosophy and, on the other hand, analytical philosophy (a naivete Derrida never falls into). (33) There is a difference between something and something here. Many influential French philosophers are happiest when their writing takes on the richness, ambiguity, and subtlety of literature. Many influential Anglo-American philosophers are happiest when their writing takes on the rigour, precision, transparency, openness in principle to public refutation, of science or mathematics. Derrida's style is quasi-poetic in its deployment of metaphor, pun, literary and philosophical allusion, its questioning of the boundaries between the serious and the frivolous or the tragic and the comic. Kant's writing is dense and serious, stipulatively definitional, and logically argumentative. Derrida, this Algerian-born, Jewish *pied-noir* is very French. Kant, this Koenigsburg second-generation descendent of the Scottish immigrant, Cant, in his outward formality but secret wit, is very Prussian. Derrida, the Jewish intellectual who privileges writing over speech, but nevertheless questions how a beginning is possible and deems the structure of his own books arbitrary, and in a sense not his own, cannot expunge the literal, and the third person singular, from his writing. In this passage, and in arguing with Adrian Moore, Derrida unconsciously deploys the third person singular in seeking to eschew it and so deconstructs a central tenet of his thought:

“All sentences of the type “deconstruction is X” or “deconstruction is not X”, *a priori*, miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false. As you know, one of the principle things at stake in what is called in my texts 'deconstruction' is precisely the delimiting of ontology and above all of the third-person present indicative: S is P.” (34)

Derrida either fails to notice, or fails to notice that it is a catastrophe for his writing, that “they are at least false” and “one of the principle things at stake [...] is [...]” are third-person present indicative. Self-refutingly, Derrida is, and is not, committed to the third person singular. As he could have put it himself, his sentences are “at least false”. This contradiction is at once the hidden teleology, and the subversion, of Derrida's text: *pharmakon*. (35)

In writing 'S is P', ([subject] is (of predication) [predicate]) Derrida has only provided an example of an indicative sentence. 'S is P' tells us nothing about grammatical person or, if the 'is' is timeless, tense. Being of the form 'S is P' is sufficient for being indicative but not necessary, and neither necessary nor sufficient for being third-person present indicative. It is not necessary because there are third-person present indicative sentences that are not subject-predicate form: 'It is raining',

‘Something exists’, ‘I am’. Despite his argument that being is not a real predicate (by which he means ‘being’ (*sein*) is not a logical predicate even if it functions grammatically as a predicate) Kant, like Derrida, tends to make the mistake of assuming that any indicative sentence is of subject-predicate form.

Kant, this ‘Scottish empiricist’ who, like Hume and Reid questions the possibility of the empirical, cannot free himself of metaphor and incompleteness. In criticising Plato(nism) Kant deploys *noumenon* as a limiting concept and, with dubious coherence, implies there exist things in themselves. Existence is a category, and categories have only an empirical use, so one thing things-in-themselves cannot do is *exist*, on pain of contradiction. Plurality is a category, so another thing things-in-themselves cannot do is admit of quantification. The *noûs* of pure reason haunts Kant in *noumena* more vividly than it ever/n appeared to Plato. With double irony, Plato’s forms had content (the *eidos* is, in a sense, only *what* the thing is) Kant’s forms are pure. Noumena are not essences. Stylistically, the difference between Kant and Derrida is only a difference of degree but, as the late Kathleen Wilkes was fond of pointing out, that can be a considerable difference. It would be an extra naive to assume that stylistic difference makes no philosophical difference: as though the philosophy could remain intact as the style is varied. Where would logical positivism be without the rage for clarity?

Despite his repudiation of metaphysics, Kant seems an archetypally systematic philosopher. The *Critique of Pure Reason* has an architectonic, displayed like an eighteenth-century order of battle, in its table of contents. Kant seems to think there are four of anything important: four groups of categories, four groups of judgement forms, four paralogisms, four antinomies. (J. L. Austin is supposed to have asked: Why can’t there be nineteen of anything in philosophy?) Derrida, on the other hand, seems explicitly interventionist, and anti-systematic, to the point of anarchy (but not anarchism). Derrida writes in a detailed but piecemeal way, full of gesture and tactic, that seems to evade any summary or picture of his work as a whole.

In practice, Kant’s attempts at system result in a convoluted work, full of half-defined terms, revised in their applications, and even given new senses incompatible with their original stipulatory part and partial definitions: ‘intuition’, ‘synthesis’, ‘transcendental’, ‘transcendent’, ‘exists’. Once the architectonic is committed to the book, it suffers the dis-order of battle with metaphysics. Like most contents pages, it only ever reported forms, not contents. In practice, Derrida privileges a handful of key concepts: logocentrism, phallogocentrism, the metaphysics of presence, sign, signifier, signified, differance. (No one has enough grip on what a concept is to doubt whether *differance* is a concept.) Derrida’s privileged concepts form an anti-metaphysical system called ‘deconstruction’. Like Kant’s categories (unavowedly), and Hegel’s categories (avowedly), they are the concepts they are, only in action. Despite their intentions, Kant ends up piecemeal, Derrida holistic and systematic.

Deconstruction is parasitic on other writings. Derrida's writing is a *re*-writing of *inter alia*: Plato, Freud, Mallarme, Levinas, J. L. Austin, Searle, Jabes, Bataille, Hegel, Heidegger, Levinas, Levi-Strauss. Kant does not engage in this close re-writing of other authors' texts, and does not deploy Derrida's multitude of textual devices, that are at once teleological and subversive. Deconstruction can be defined as: a scrupulous reading of other people's books, paying particular attention to the parts that don't matter. Kant does not fall under this description, because he is not scrupulous in reading other people's books. To the extent that he reads Plato, Berkeley, or Hume, he plunders and ab-uses them, as a cavalier philosopher. Kant has no interest in being a historian of ideas, so he has no interest in being a meticulous historian of ideas.

Kant has targets, but names them less frequently than Derrida names his. Kant's thought is parasitic upon the thought of Plato, and Descartes, as objects of his critique of pure reason. If we did not call them 'Plato' and 'Descartes', the *thought* would have to be there, at least as a thinkable possibility. In philosophy, biography is beside the point. Derrida's privileged neologistic concepts allow him to be more freefloating, and less of a parasite than he would like to be, or than his re-reading, re-writing, re-working, his writing *about*, would suggest. Self-sufficiency and parasitism admit of degrees so, although this difference is a difference of kind, there is a difference of degree between the two kinds, not a sharp difference, and in the difference between Kant and Derrida it is only a difference of degree. There are no underlabourers without undergrowth, no Kant without pure reason, no Marx without capitalism, no logical positivism without the (allegedly pseudo-) questions of metaphysics, no later Wittgenstein without language 'on holiday', (on Holy Day), and no Derrida, and no deconstruction, without the metaphysics of presence.

So, what (on earth) do we do now?

Philosophy since Kant has nearly all been anti-metaphysical. Derrida is in no way unusual, or new, or 'radical', in criticising metaphysics. Phenomenology, Logical Positivism, Existentialism, Linguistic Philosophy, Structuralism, and so called 'Analytical Philosophy', are all anti-metaphysical. Their practitioners are typically aware that their putative anti-metaphysics is implicated in metaphysics. Like Derrida, but unlike de-readers, they have read Kant. (8) I draw the distinction between de-readers and de-riders as follows: De-readers read Derrida and admire his work but have not read Kant, and so are unaware that the attack on metaphysics is neither new nor subversive. De-riders have read Kant and Derrida, seek to expose Derrida's metaphysical presuppositions, and think genuine metaphysics is possible. They know their thought is defined in opposition to what they aspire not to be. Like Derrida, they have often read Hegel. It is hard to break from Kant. It might be that the only serious

way of being non-Kantian in philosophy is to be anti-Kantian, and that means doing metaphysics. Trying to be different will not be different. Difference is enough for a break in problematic but not enough for a historical break. Something is a break only if it is intelligible as such, which means not much of a break.

Why deconstruct metaphysics? Why offer a 'critique' of metaphysics? Metaphysics is *a more radical questioning* than that entailed by any neo-Kantian anti-metaphysical movement. It is a 'shaking' of everything. Derrida would probably endorse Iris Murdoch's view that *It is always a significant question to ask about any philosopher: what is he afraid of?* (36) So, what is Derrida afraid of? Like Kant, *Derrida is afraid of metaphysics*. What is there to fear in metaphysics? Plenty: death, life, life after death, no life after death, God, the wrath of God, no God, no wrath of God, meaning, meaninglessness, that I really exist, that I really do not exist, that it is now, that it is never now, that nothing is real, that nothing *is* real, de-generation and corruption, that there is no truth, that there is only truth, that there is a foundation, that there is no foundation. The truly 'radical' ('from the root', from the root: *radix*, 'root'), unlike Kant, unlike Derrida and the other orthodox members of the critical paradigm, will not be afraid to do metaphysics.

## VI

### DIALECTIC

Hegel is Kantian in his method but not in his conclusions. Does the thought of Hegel fall within the critical paradigm? Hegel's own comments on Kant's philosophy show that it does. Hegel thinks of his system as the culmination of Western metaphysics, in particular, as the extrapolation of insights of his most philosophically developed predecessor: Kant. Hegel's project therefore displays a hallmark of the critical paradigm; that of bringing philosophy to an 'end'. Like Wittgenstein, the Logical Positivists, Marx, Heidegger, and Derrida, Hegel thinks that if his own methods are applied, any future philosophy will be redundant. The central aspects of Hegel's method are developments of Kant's ways of thinking, and Hegel acknowledges this.

Hegel's philosophy essentially divides into two sorts: dialectic, or 'logic', and phenomenology. Dialectic is the sort of reasoning that exhibits the dependencies between fundamental concepts and categories in a progressive, or accumulative, way.

Phenomenology is the description of sorts, or 'shapes' (*Gestalten*), of consciousness. Dialectic and phenomenology are mutually dependent projects because the shapes of consciousness are themselves dialectically interrelated. Still, I shall deal first with dialectic, then with phenomenology.

## Dialectic

Hegel devises his dialectic in response to a specific limitation he sees in Kant's philosophy: Kant's failure to allow the categories to examine their own limitations in action, rather than prior to their exercise. ( ) Hegel praises Kant's project of a critique of pure reason, in particular as a critique of metaphysics. He says 'a very important step was undoubtedly made when the terms of the old metaphysics were subjected to scrutiny'. (UL6Z) Hegel regards Kant's critique of metaphysics as a crucial turning point in the history of western philosophy. Until Kant wrote, philosophers conceived of themselves as engaged in the study of reality, the world as it really is. Since Kant, they conceive of themselves as engaged in studying how the world must be thought, or perceived, or represented in language. (t3) Hegel calls the pre-Kantian thinker, the 'plain thinker', in distinction from the 'critical thinker'. Hegel says:

'[The plain thinker] pursued his unsuspecting way in those categories which had offered themselves naturally. It never occurred to him to ask to what extent those categories had a value and authority of their own.' (Lz)

Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and others, do not ask whether their conceptual tools are adequate to discover reality. Kant sets himself the job of inspecting the powers of these tools, and finds them wanting with respect to any possible metaphysical employment. It becomes an important part of Hegel's technique to be methodologically reflexive. Hegel thinks a philosophical description must be able to take account of itself, so thought becomes its own subject matter.

Hegel presents two departures from pre-Kantian metaphysics. He tries to philosophise without any preconceptions[?] and, without any philosophical foundations. Hegel rejects the assumption that statements about *x*'s (physical objects, oneself, sense data, God, etc.) are epistemologically or ontologically primitive with regard to everything else.

(EP) 'Epistemologically primitive' means: Unless we can know about *x*'s, we cannot know about anything.

(OP) 'Ontologically primitive' means: Unless *x*'s exist, nothing can exist.

This anti-foundationalism is endorsed by Kant. That there are categories means that the inquirer brings a fundamental *a priori* framework to bear in any inquiry, so there are no 'given' data or other philosophical foundations.

Cartesian certainty of one's own existence is not an incorrigible philosophical starting point. If critical philosophy has a starting point it is ordinary thinking, and for Kant this is not a sort of foundationalism because empirical judgements depend on transcendental conditions. This ordinary, everyday, commonsensical, starting point for philosophy, together with the rejection of foundationalism, is one of the *Leitmotifs* of the critical paradigm. Hegel thinks it does not matter at what point one opens his philosophical system, the remainder may be dialectically exhibited from any starting point. (This is part of the point about preconception.) In the *Phenomenology*, he does, in fact, start with Sense Certainty which seems the poorest and most rudimentary sort of knowing; the confrontation with a bare particular. Although empirically less complex than ordinary, prereflexive, consciousness, Sense Certainty has the structure of our pre-philosophical experience. This everyday starting point is not only Hegel's but Husserl's (the 'natural attitude'), the later Wittgenstein's (ordinary language is in order as it is), Heidegger's (being-in-the-world), Sartre's (*le vécu*, the lived (world)), and Marx's (bourgeois ideology)

The starting point present to ordinary consciousness is subjected to philosophical reflection which is systematic, and critical, in that it questions assumptions. Hegel calls this a sort of freedom, thereby linking freedom and criticism in an association that he inherits from Kant, and which Marx will inherit from him. Hegel says:

'If, as has been said it is characteristic of free thought to allow no assumptions to pass unquestioned, the old metaphysicians were not free thinkers. They accepted their categories as they were, without further trouble, as an *a priori* datum not yet tested by reflection' (L66)

Hegel accepts from Kant that this is an unacceptable way to do philosophy. It makes metaphysics depend on the historical contingency of using the particular categories acquired. These categories might be inadequate or misleading. We see the importance Hegel attaches to Kant's thought in the history of philosophy when he says about the practice of metaphysics resting on assumptions: 'the critical philosophy reversed this'. ( 5 ) Hegel has in mind Kant's 'Copernican revolution', especially its recognition that the subject contributes the categories to experience. It is the philosopher's task, according to Kant, to expose these categories. Hegel recognises that this can be described as the philosopher making their own assumptions explicit.

Kant examines how far forms of thought are capable of leading to knowledge. (L) Hegel is almost as obsessed with this question as Kant, but reaches a diametrically opposed answer. While Kant decides the categories only reveal the

world as it appears, Hegel concludes the categories reveal the world as it really is in itself. This is a break with the critical paradigm.

It follows that there are no things in themselves. There are ways reality is, independently of the ways in which we can make it intelligible. Hegel thinks those categories he displays in the Science of Logic depict the essential properties of reality as a whole, the totality. Kant thinks metaphysics, in that sense, is quite impossible: the project of discovering the characteristics of the whole is as doomed as the project of knowing reality as it is in itself. Both these projects are not only coherent and feasible according to Hegel. He claims to have implemented them in his own philosophy.

Is Hegel is a metaphysician in the senses Kant condemns? Michael Inwood says:

‘Positivists, analytical philosophers, Hegel and Heidegger all contrast their own enterprises with metaphysics, and regard metaphysics as something to be avoided or overcome. But they do not mean the same thing by the term "metaphysics" or even apply it to the same instances. (Hegel, for example, applied it to Leibniz and his followers, but not to himself.)’ ( 8)

Hegel regards himself as a critical philosopher, who has incorporated the anti-metaphysical and reflective lessons of the Copernican Revolution. Pre Kantian metaphysics is engaged in the depiction of a transcendent reality (to use Kant's term), a non-empirical realm of monads (Leibniz), Forms (Plato), God (Descartes). Hegel attempts a rational depiction of the world we experience as it must be in itself. Using Kant's distinction between ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’, we can say that Hegel rejects classical transcendent metaphysics, but argues there must be a way the world really is. Hegel thinks we are forced to this realism, once the presuppositions of our existing ways of thinking are made explicit. Hegel therefore deploys Kant's technique of transcendental argument. Hegel thinks Kant employs the correct, transcendental, technique but is too reticent to push it to its logical conclusions: the dialectical depiction of the whole.

Hegel conceives of his philosophy as the completion of Kant's project. Kant falls short of Hegel’s ideal of completeness. For Hegel, the true is the whole. How, in that case, can Hegel's thought be truly called 'critical'? Hegel says:

'[The categories must] examine themselves: in their own action, they must determine their limits and point out their defects’ (LL 67z)

The critical method is employed reflexively, historically, and pragmatically. A category is criticised by the revelation of its short comings in its employment.

Hegel regards any attempt to criticise the categories in abstraction from, or prior to, their employment as paradoxical, and even contradictory. Hegel thinks Kant drastically underestimates the number of categories, and is mistaken in thinking them a-historical.

Although Hegel strongly influenced American Pragmatism, the writings of Pierce, for example, it is not often noticed that Hegel's own thought is highly pragmatic. In the Logic, the pragmatic turn is effected for Kant's critical philosophy, and this critical pragmatism reaches its political apogee in Marx. This transformation of Kant's philosophy by Hegel is not purely incidental to his own thought. It is not as though Hegel's system could survive, in its essential tenets, if its Kantianism were subtracted from it. The pragmatic and reflexive elements are a critique of the categories, and this provides Hegel with his own distinctive concept of dialectic. Hegel says:

'This is that action of thought, which will hereafter be especially considered under the name of dialectic' (Lz)

Whatever the importance of Hegel's empirical and non dialectical writings, dialectic is essential to Hegel's own conception of philosophy.

Hegel explicitly credits Kant with anticipating of his own concept of dialectic in three parts of the critical philosophy: the triadic arrangement of the categories, the Antinomies, and the idea of an Intuitive Understanding. Hegel says:

'Kant says that the first category is positive, the second the negative of the first, the third the synthesis of the two' (P)

Hegel says this 'betrays a great instinct for the Concept (*der Begriff*)'. The Concept in Hegel's system is the whole's concept of itself, so Hegel allows that Kant has a grasp of an idea essential to an adequate philosophy of history. Hegel concedes that the schema of three, in the table of categories, 'conceals within itself the absolute form, the concept' (39) Kant's triadic structure, where the third category of every group of three subsumes the meaning of the first two, provides Hegel with the model for the process of *Aufhebung* in the Logic, where each category subsumes and abolishes its dialectical predecessors.

It is essential to dialectical thinking that philosophical problems may be exhibited as 'contradictions'. Two, seemingly mutually exclusive, conclusions may be obtained about the same subject matter. Hegel partly conceives his system as 'overcoming' contradictions between subjective and objective, mental and physical, universal and particular, individual and social, appearance and reality, and as the reconciliation of what is true in idealism and materialism, libertarianism and determinism, the sacred and the profane. Dialectical philosophy is essentially the

conflict and resolution of antitheses. Concepts are defined in opposition to one another and so, really mutually dependent. Antithetical concepts turn out to be consistent, and complementary, perspectives on a reality which is 'wider' than appears from the limitations of just the single perspective, of one side each pair.

The idea of philosophical problems constituted by apparent contradictions is essential to Kant's antinomies. An antinomy is a pair of arguments, each of which is valid, which yet yield mutually exclusive, or apparently mutually exclusive, conclusions. Neither is logically flawed, yet what each seemingly compels us to believe cannot both be true simultaneously.

Kant and Hegel draw opposed conclusions from the existence of antinomies. Kant thinks there are only four antinomies. Hegel thinks there is an infinite number of them. Every concept implies a 'contradiction', so Kant drastically underestimates the scope of his own concept. Kant thinks that in the first, second and fourth antinomies the contradiction is a logical one, so one or more of the premises of the argument on one side or the other must be false. Kant says each argument falsely assumes transcendental realism. Empirical realism and transcendental idealism are mutually consistent, and true.

Kant thinks the conclusion of the third antinomy, about freedom and necessity, is not a genuine, logical, contradiction. Kant thinks libertarianism and determinism are mutually consistent. Persons are phenomenally, or empirically, determined yet noumenally free, or free as they are in themselves. Hegel's dialectic takes its cue from the third antinomy. Hegel treats the conclusions of the many antinomies he finds, not as genuine logical contradictions (although he frequently lapses into talking as though they were), but as paradoxes that are only apparent: antitheses which can be dialectically exhibited as really complementary points of view on a single reality. Hegel thinks Kant's procedure in the third antinomy is far more philosophically advanced than his procedure in the other three, because of its genuinely dialectical method.

Hegel takes his dialectical approach to problem-solving from the antinomies. He takes the vocabulary of his dialectic from that chapter. Kant calls the first conclusion of each antinomy the 'thesis', and the second the 'antithesis'. Kant does not use 'synthesis' in this context (even in the case of the third antinomy) but 'synthesis' is a Kantian term which has much of the sense of Hegel's use of it. Synthesis is a power of mental unification of phenomena, the transcendental unity of apperception is sometimes described by Kant as a synthetic unity; because of its combinatory power of giving rise to a unitary self. So, 'thesis', 'antithesis' and 'synthesis' are all used by Kant in 'dialectical' senses largely acceptable to Hegel. It has become fashionable recently to deny that Hegel much used these terms but if one looks at Hegel's books it is quite apparent that he used them frequently and that they are quite essential to his system.

Hegel praises Kant for demonstrating 'the necessity of these contradictions' (~) Kant and Hegel think Reason has a natural propensity to completeness, to metaphysics. Kant and Hegel think ordinary empirical thinking gives rise to regress and contradictions. For Hegel this paradoxical tendency of everyday thinking did not spell the end of metaphysics as the study of the whole, or the real, rather it spelled the end of empiricism and naïve 'commonsense'. This is a break with the critical paradigm. Empiricism and common sense have to be thought of as very limited, circumscribed ways of understanding; arising mainly from the finite subjective point of view of the individual human being. We have a natural propensity to dialectic and metaphysics and we exercise this through the pragmatic revision of our categories. The main deficiency of Kant's philosophy is that it never escapes the finite subjective point of view.

Kant's rejection of dialectic as the 'logic of illusion' (ePQ) is a terrible missed opportunity to be a critical metaphysician. Hegel regards Kant's 'synthesis' as a genuine piece of speculation. Hegel divides logic into three sorts: 'abstract', 'dialectical', and 'speculative' (U 113) Speculation is the highest, and richest, because it includes the other two, and brings thinking to its rational completion, and so to truth. Hegel thinks his own system contains speculation to the correct degree. (lo) So, Hegel praises Kant's concept of an 'intuitive understanding' as 'a truly speculative idea'. (I) Kant's mistake is to say this synthesis of sense and understanding is not possible for human beings or, at least, that we do not have it. Kant appreciates the conceptual and, in Hegel's view, ontological, mutual dependence of sense and understanding, but does not stress that this unity actually obtains; as the real structure of human cognition and hence, of the totality's cognition of itself. Hegel says, 'He expressed it (intuitive understanding) and consciously destroyed it again'. (2)

Hegel recognises Kant's invention of the distinction between reason (*Vernunft*) and understanding (*Verstand*), the linchpin of his own philosophy. Hegel says Kant's philosophy 'describes reason very well'. (HP 26) Hegel says:

'Since Kant's time it has become customary in the language of philosophy to distinguish understanding and reason, while by earlier philosophers this distinction was not drawn.' (P 43)

Even though Kant drastically underestimates the power of reason, he invented it in the form which contrasts with understanding: the form appropriate to genuine philosophising. Hegelian dialectic is an essentially Kantian method.

## Phenomenology

So far as I know it has not been pointed out, save by Hegel himself, that the divisions into chapters, and the sequential structure of the argument of the *Phenomenology of*

*Spirit* is modelled on the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Both books begin, after an introduction, with a section on perception. Hegel's is called 'Consciousness', and Kant's the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. Next follows a treatment of self-consciousness. Hegel's is called 'Self-Consciousness', and Kant's account of the transcendental unity of apperception is concentrated in that section of the 'Transcendental Analytic' called the 'Transcendental Deduction'. After that, both philosophers treat of reason. Hegel's chapter is called 'Reason', Kant's the 'Transcendental Dialectic'. Finally, Hegel concludes his book with two sections, one called 'Spirit' and the other 'Religion'. In Kant's book the last part of the 'dialectic' deals with the existence of God.

This is not just a coincidence. Historically, it illustrates Kant's influence on Hegel. Philosophically, it illustrates Hegel's Kantianism. Hegel says, 'He [Kant] describes the main stages in theoretic consciousness' and says 'the first faculty is sensuousness', 'the second understanding', and 'the third reason'(P 3-3) Hegel has complaints against Kant's critical philosophy. He says the stages of reason are just 'narrated', merely 'empirically understood', show 'no development of the concept', are treated in a 'psychological manner', or 'subjectively' and in a 'finite' way. In each case, he is not claiming that what Kant says is false, just inadequate. Kant has not pushed his thought through to its logical conclusion: Hegelianism.

The *Phenomenology* describes the whole's growing conception of itself; *Geist's* progress to Absolute Knowledge. The Concept is *Geist's* conception of itself. History, especially the history of philosophy is *Geist's* conceptual progress. In the history of philosophy Hegel allocates Kant a place second in importance only to his own. He says:

'It is [...] the self-thinking absolute Concept that passes into itself which we see making its appearance in Germany through this [Kant's] philosophy.' ( )

Two crucial pieces of Hegelian metaphysics are included in this statement. The end, or goal, of philosophy is reality's consciousness of itself, so the idea of self-consciousness is essential to philosophy. The 'Germanic' phase of history is the last, the most culturally, politically, and spiritually developed, according to Hegel, as well as the most free. Unpacking the phase, 'the culmination of history', takes up the last quarter of the *Philosophy of History*. (1) So, not only does Kant introduce the whole's consciousness of itself into philosophy, he does so at history's culminating point. Kant encapsulates, or makes explicit, the rationality and freedom of the Germanic phase of history in a way achieved by no other philosopher, save Hegel himself.

Hegel shares the Enlightenment's tremendous optimism in the powers of reason. He makes the freedom and reason of the Enlightenment the essential characteristics of the Germanic phase. Freedom and reason are also the subject matter of Kant's

philosophy according to Hegel. The first *Critique* deals with the powers of reason, the second with the reality and consequences of freedom, and the aesthetics, in the third *Critique*, is the synthesis, or harmonisation, of freedom and reason. Freedom and reason are central themes of Hegel's philosophy of history. The whole's self-knowledge is wholly rational, and what it knows when it knows itself fully, is that it is wholly free. Freedom and reason are two aspects of the whole for Hegel. His comment on the historical growth of freedom, reason, and self knowledge is:

'The consciousness of this action in its abstract form is the Kantian philosophy' (426)

This is why he remarks 'the truth underlying the Kantian philosophy is the recognition of freedom' (4) and 'in the Enlightenment (the absolute Concept) made its way to Germany' (446) For Hegel, Kant remains the paradigmatic Enlightenment philosopher, and achieves in abstract form a speculative synthesis of freedom and reason.

According to Hegel, 'all reality falls within self-consciousness', in Kant's philosophy. (UP b) This applies equally to Hegel's own philosophy. In Kant, all the structures of subject-object dualism 'fall within', or presuppose, the transcendental unity of apperception: the formal unity expressed by saying the 'I think' must be able to preface my thoughts, for them to be mine. In Hegel, 'all reality' falls within *Geist's* self-consciousness. The transcendental unity of apperception is the individualistic prototype for Hegel's social and cosmic *Geist*. Hegel says:

'The Kantian philosophy no doubt leads reality back to self-consciousness but it can supply no reality to this essence of self consciousness nor can it demonstrate being in the same' (26)

Kant introduces the idea of the whole's conception of itself, but suffers from two drawbacks: He does not know that this is what he has done. For Hegel, being fully self-conscious requires being conscious that one is self conscious. Kant has no answer to 'What is self consciousness?' as an ontological question. He therefore never reaches the truth about reality: Absolute Idealism, the doctrine that reality is ultimately spiritual, ultimately self-knowing, and so, in the last resort, *is* self consciousness. Hegel says:

'[Kant's philosophy] apprehends simple thought as having difference in itself  
( )

Hegel means the sort of thinking we engage in presupposes self-consciousness. 'Difference' draws attention to the paradox that in self consciousness what is conscious is what consciousness is of, yet, in some sense, the two cannot be

straightforwardly identical. As subject I am conscious, as object I am what my consciousness is of. Hegel sometimes describes this psychological structure by saying something, oneself, 'differs' from itself or 'is different' from itself. Kant has anticipated this idea of 'difference', that subject and object are at once 'distinct' and 'identical'. But, Hegel says:

'[Kant] does not yet apprehend that all reality rests on this difference' (~UP4~)

Kant mistakenly thinks the subject-object difference is just psychological. Hegel, construes it metaphysically. The difference between subject and object is an essential property of the whole that has conscious beings as parts.

A tendency within the critical paradigm is exhibiting as mutually consistent two sorts of description: objective, and subjective. The objective description is of what is, as we think it to be, independently of our experience (without me *qua* me in it.). The subjective description is of what is, as it appears to a conscious subject (or from 'my' point of view). Kant's philosophy wrestles to reconcile these two perspectives. Hegel thinks Kant fails, and so tries to produce a complete account of what is, including perceiving subjects. Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique* is an attempt to reconcile existentialism's methodological solipsism with objective description, by embedding it in Marxism. (9)

Most of the shapes (*Gestalten*) of consciousness described are subject-object in structure, but this difference is both maintained and dissolved, *aufgehoben*, in Absolute Knowledge.

In this last, absolute, phase of knowledge, the previous shapes of consciousness can perceive themselves to be, and so become, what they really are. the 'difference' between subject and object is overcome, logically, conceptually, and from our historical-temporal point of view, chronologically.

Hegel contrasts 'difference' with 'identity', for example, in 'identity in difference', the relationship between concepts which are dialectically antithetical. In the *Logic*, categories are dialectically related in this way, and, logic is the description of the whole's essential properties, its Concept of itself. So, in this sense, all reality rests upon this 'difference'. For Hegel, all reality is dialectical.

The first interpretation of 'difference' fits the *Phenomenology*, the second fits the *Logic*. They are mutually consistent interpretations just so long as the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*, as Hegel hopes, are not incompatible. Although Kant possesses the correct concept of 'difference', according to Hegel, he does not deploy it in a way that is post-critically metaphysical, only psychologically.

Hegel allows that Kant anticipates teleology and anthropomorphism in his own philosophy.

On teleology, Hegel says Kant's philosophy 'deals with the infinite idea'. (47) Kant's mistake is to be unaware of the nature of his own subject matter. The progress

of the Idea is teleological. It expresses itself through human art, political institutions, laws, etc. A teleological view of the world is characteristic of the Enlightenment, in Hegel's view, and therefore of Kant's philosophy as the epitome of Enlightenment thinking: 'all existence, all action was called upon to serve a useful purpose' (426) There is just one fundamental purpose, reality as a whole's self-knowledge. All lesser, mundane, purposes, of the human-saturated world, are means to this cosmic end. Hegel acknowledges that the appropriate thinking for seeing the world in a teleological way is in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*.

Although Hegel chastises Kant for individualism and subjectivism, human beings have an essential role in Hegel's Absolute Idealism. Conscious persons are the vehicles, or means, by which reality brings itself to self-realisation. Our progress as free, self-conscious, rational beings is *Geist's* progress. Persons are reality's points of view on itself. A prerequisite for this metaphysics is Kant's Enlightenment anthropomorphism:

'that for which everything had to be is man, self-consciousness, taken however as signifying all men generally' (46)

Kant's anthropomorphism remains empirical, so Hegel criticises the critical philosophy:

'[Kant] does not get clear of the conception of reality in which reality consists in the conception of a sensuous present existence.' (47)

Kant's critical philosophy is part of the metaphysics of presence.

But does Hegel, and for that matter, Derrida, escape something Kant succumbs to? Kant revolts against the metaphysics of presence, in the doctrine that the categories are transcendental, so non-empirical, meanings that structure any possible present for us, including any conception 'the subject' may have of themselves. Kant rejects the Cartesian ego, the soul subject, and the empirical 'impression' foundations for philosophy. He argues that subject and object are conceptually constructed *a priori* in ways that make complete self-knowledge and knowledge of objective reality impossible. So, the two elements of the metaphysics of presence, I as perceiver, world as presently perceived, if possible, are only possible on transcendental conditions over which perceiver and world have no control. Kant's 'deconstruction', of metaphysics includes a 'deconstruction of the subject', because Hegel's 'imminent critique', and Derrida's shaking of logocentrism are a continuation of the Kantian project of showing the constitutive autonomy of the categories, their 'play' on the world as 'signs'.

Hegel's own conception of his philosophy, as pushing Kant's critical method to its logical conclusions, is correct, at least so far as dialectic and phenomenology are concerned, and those are the essential methods of Hegelianism.

Is Marx a Kantian?

The thought of Karl Marx is a pragmatic and social transformation of Kantianism. (1) On a strongly idealist reading of Kant, the world as it is for us is transcendently constituted by our cognitive acts. For Marx, the world is physically constituted by our labour, our physical acts. The transcendental conditions of these constitutions are, for Kant; the categories or *a priori* conceptual structure of the individual psyche, for Marx; classes or the economic structures of a particular society. *Categories* become *classes*.

Habermas says

'all the elements of a critique of knowledge radicalised by Hegel's critique of Kant are present in Marx' (HI ~5)

even though Marx does not 'construct a materialist epistemology' (HI ~5) Although Marx is less interested in epistemology than in criticizing capitalism and devising a theory of revolution, a powerful materialist theory of knowledge is nevertheless implicit in Marx's writing, as the conjunction of two theories: *materialist ontology*, and the *theory of ideology*.

The view that all processes are in the last resort really physical entails, in classical Marxism, that mentality is causally determined by those physical processes. The doctrine that any person's mentality is determined, and thus constrained by, their socio-economic location in the class system, is a historical theory of knowledge. Kant tries to decide the necessary limits to, and conditions for knowledge: the logical structure of anything that anyone could in principle know. Marx tries to establish the historically changing limits to, and conditions for knowledge: the class origin of what passes for knowledge. For these reasons, Habermas' assertion that there is no materialist epistemology in Marx cannot be endorsed, unless 'construct' means 'overtly construct'.

Habermas draws parallels between *synthesis* in Kant and *praxis* in Marx. Human beings fundamentally transform their environments according to Kant and Marx, cognitively for Kant, practically for Marx. Habermas says Kant's subject of synthesis is a 'transcendental consciousness', but Marx's agent of praxis is 'a species subject that produces itself in history'. However, Kant's considered view is that there is no subject still less a subject as 'consciousness', unless by 'subject' is meant transcendently unified synthesising activity itself. Habermas' reading of Kant on

the self is rather like Husserl's: The subject is hypostasised into a pure transcendental consciousness. Despite this, the contrast Habermas draws is real: Marx's subject is social, physical, and historical. Kant's subject is individual, mental and trans-historical. There is a problem about the plasticity of the self, especially in Marx. If we ask 'What experiences?', there seems nothing to force a conclusive answer. So, Marx sometimes thinks of individuals as subjects, for example, in his use of 'physical subject' but, at other times, he talks as though classes were subjects, and, at other times, borders on the quasi-Hegelian view of history itself as the subject of experience.

Habermas emphasises the contrasts. There are similarities. The subject in Kant and Marx is subjective and transcendental. It experiences but, in that respect, is not experienced. The physical agent in Marx is not aware that their subjective constitution is determined by ('reflects') their class location, anymore than Kant's subject is aware that their experience is constituted by the categories. The prescribed ways to discover these facts about oneself are to study Marxism, and Kantianism, respectively

The subject in Kant and Marx is irreducibly active. Both break cleanly with the empiricist model of the subject passively receiving information about the world without imposing a cognitive or practical structure upon it. Finally, the subject for Kant and Marx is self-conscious. Kant says the 'I think' must, in principle, be capable of prefacing any of my thoughts. Marx calls humans 'species beings'. A species being is a being that is conscious of being the sort of being it is. Humans are aware of being humans, and this is one of the defining characteristics of being human.

Kant and Marx think full self-knowledge systematically evades human beings. Kant says you are never directly acquainted with yourself, as you really are in yourself (with the possible exception of your noumenal freedom). You are aware of yourself through the forms of intuition and the categories, and these are not a guide to the noumenal self. Marx thinks my true un-alienated nature is not apparent to me, because of the distorting class structure of capitalism. I cannot become what I would really like. I cannot realise my true creative nature, because of exploitive labour relations. Kant and Marx think full or true self knowledge is impossible, or at least very difficult.

Kant and Marx have a dilemma about freedom and determinism. Kant's Newtonian phenomenal world structured by the categories, and Marx's historical world structured by class relations, are both deterministic. On the other hand, Kant and Marx are intensely moralising theorists, and each recognises that room must be left for human freedom; to obey the categorical imperative from pure duty in the one case, to overcome class conditioning and engage in revolutionary activity on the other. For Kant and Marx, in our true nature, we are free, where this means: We ought to be what we really are. We ought to realise our own true nature, and this entails being free.

Habermas puts the cognition/practice contrast in this way: 'Synthesis takes place in the medium of labour rather than thought, as Marx assumes' (1) If synthesis is practical, if it is praxis, then 'the substratum in which it leaves its residue is the system of social labour and not a connection of symbols' so we need to study 'not logic but the economy'. ( ) The system of social labour is analogous the phenomenal world ordered by the categories. We study economics to find out the structure of labour relations, as we study transcendental logic to decide the categories. In Marx, 'synthesis no longer appears as an activity of thought but as one of material production', where 'production' entails 'altering physical objects'. Habermas says: 'That is why for Marx the critique of political economy takes the place held by the critique of formal logic in idealism'. (1 ) Hegel, at his worst moments, criticises formal logic, and thinks dialectic a useful substitute but Kant does nothing like that. If we substitute 'pure reason' for 'formal logic', in Habermas's sentence, the contrast with Kant is made out.

Habermas points out that 'unity, which can only come about through the activity of a subject, remains in some measure imposed on nature by the subject'. Habermas does not say in what measure, but Kant's synthesis and Marx's praxis each makes the world what it is for us. For Marx, as for Kant, the world we perceive is a very human world. We have constructed the world; by thinking and perceiving it, according to Kant, by physically manipulating it, according to Marx. Synthesis, and praxis, are each the 'unity' of subject and object: a relation between agent and nature, or perceiver and external world. This unity is much tighter in Kant than in Marx. In Kant the relationship is logical: Subject (or self) and object (or nature) are logical constructions out of phenomena. The dualism presupposes a prior monism, which can be described subjectively, as the original unity of apperception, or objectively, as the categorically ordered empirical world. For Marx, the praxis relation is contingent and historically changing. As Habermas says, it is not an 'absolute unity'. (1) Kant does not use the term 'absolute' but his original, or transcendental, unity is absolute because it is logically prior to what it unites.

There is another contrast between synthesis and praxis conceived as subject-object relations. Habermas says: 'Marx [...] does not view nature under the category of another subject, but conversely the subject under the category of another nature'. ( ) To put the point baldly: Marx is a materialist, Kant an idealist. For Kant, if there were no minds there would be no nature. For Marx, if there were no nature there would be no minds. Marx calls his ontology 'naturalism' which he says is a synthesis of materialism and idealism which escapes the errors of both. Habermas chastises neo-Marxists, who think the mind-dependence of nature can be reinstated within a materialist-Marxist framework. He says we cannot 'eradicate the autonomy' of nature, nor its 'externality' and 'independence', 'Nature retains a substantial core that does not reveal itself to us'. ( ) Neo-Marxist criticisms are directed against a sort of idealism stronger than Kant's; Hegel's perhaps, in which no aspect of reality is in

principle thoroughly resistant to rational inquiry. Kant allows opacity to nature on two levels: In many matters we are empirically ignorant. If this were not, so we could not, for example, make scientific discoveries. He thinks we do not know the world as it really is in itself, only as it appears to us. If we take this opacity in conjunction with Marx's notion of praxis, it is clear that Marx already subscribes to many of the views that make Kant an 'idealist', in his sense. Habermas comes close to allowing this when he says, 'Kant's thing in itself reappears under the name of a nature preceding human history'. (4) If this 'nature in itself' does exist in Marx, then it is best understood as that which undergoes historical transformations. Habermas quotes from Marx:

'... prehistoric nature is in any case not the nature in which Feuerbach lives, not the nature that today exists nowhere except perhaps on a few Australian coral islands.'  
( )

Marx intends natural objects as those unmanipulated by praxis; a natural nature. Marx also uses 'nature' to denote the world humans alter through *praxis*, are located in, and of which they are themselves a part. Nature in itself is not wholly indeterminate, as things-in-themselves must be according to Kant, but a striking parallel is captured by Habermas in this sentence:

'While epistemologically we must presuppose nature as existing in itself, we ourselves have access to nature only within the historical dimension disclosed by labour processes'. ( )

If we take a weak view of things in-themselves, then Kant and Marx have the same subject matter, using 'nature' and 'things-in-themselves' respectively, to denote it. A 'weakened' view means: Things-in-themselves do not exist in addition to, or 'over and above', phenomena. Rather there is just one world, but two ways of mentioning it: as it appears to us, and as it is in itself. There is no non-categorical access to the one world for Kant, no non-historical, classless access to the one world for Marx, before communism.

What Habermas says of Marx's position applies partly to Kant's position. Habermas says:

"'Nature in itself' is [...] an abstraction, which is a requisite of our thought: but we always encounter nature within the horizon of the world-historical self-formative process of mankind' (134)

Noumena are presuppositions of thought. We have to be able to give sense to the idea of the world as it is, to make sense of its appearing to us. We have to be able to give

sense to the idea of nature in itself, to make sense of its manipulation in praxis. Only if nature is underlyingly 'natural' can it be subject to historical transformations, as part of the human, man made, world.

Another piece of Kantianism in Marx is captured by this:

'like Kant's original apperception, the materialist concept of synthesis preserves the difference between form and matter'. ( )

Categories are not phenomena and praxis is not nature. Nature is what praxis operates on. Phenomena are what categories operate on. The categories constitute the phenomenal world, and praxis constitutes nature. Habermas quotes one of Marx's definitions of the labour process:

'[...] forming objects [...] subjecting them to a subjective end; their transformation into results and containers of subjective activity.'

This would do as a definition of Kant's 'synthesis'. Habermas says:

'the materialist concept of synthesis thus retains from Kant the fixed framework within which the subject forms a substance that it encounters.' ( )

Marx is involved in a pragmatic, social, and historical transformation of Kant's philosophy. This takes many forms.

Is human nature is a-historically fixed or historically changing? It might be thought the contrast between Kant and Marx could not be more stark on this point. The categories are conditions for any self-conscious being's experience, so *a fortiori* must be common to all persons. Marx's philosophy includes a theory of history which entails there is no fixed, a-historical, human essence. Human essences shift according to economic, social and political pressure.

These contrasts exist, but taken in conjunction with other doctrines of Kant and Marx, they appear less stark. Habermas detects a constant human nature in Marx, as well as the historically changing one. He compares it with Kant:

'This framework is established once and for all through the equipment of transcendental consciousness or of the human species as a species of tool making animals.'(k)

The point about Marx on human nature is acute; human beings are labouring animals. The conditions of their labour change historically, according to the class divisions within society. Persons are engaged in praxis. Persons are irreducibly agents, who transform the environment into a world of man made objects which, in turn,

transforms them. This reciprocal, or dialectical, interrelation of subject and object is a fundamental structure which is held constant in Marxist theory of history.

Habermas says:

‘What is Kantian about Marx's conception of knowledge is the invariant relation of the species to its natural environment, which is established by the behavioural system of instrumental action - for labour processes are the "perpetual necessity of human life"(135 )

It is within this inflexible framework that historical change takes place. Habermas says:

'On the other hand in distinction from Kant, Marx assumes empirically mediated rules of synthesis that are objectified as productive forces and historically transform the subject's relation to his natural environment'( )

Admittedly, Kant's subject is not 'historically transformed', still less by 'productive forces'. Nevertheless, Kant allows something which could be accurately described as 'empirically mediated rules of synthesis'. Kant talks of concepts as rules, rules for making reality intelligible, which, although acquired in a Lockean way and so empirical and not *a priori* or 'possessed independently of experience', are brought to bear psychologically on objects of experience. Perceiving  $x$  to be  $F$ , where ' $F$ ' is some empirical concept, entails judging  $x$  to be  $F$  for Kant. Synthesis is involved in the observation of empirical objects *qua* empirical objects, not just *qua* categorically constituted objects.

This means there is in Kant, as in Marx, a shifting, contingent, empirical component in the subject-object relation. It would be an exaggeration to say this component 'historically' transforms that relation, even though the component alters, but it contributes everything empirical and contingent to that relation.

Because of praxis, humans perceive an anthropomorphic world. Practical synthesis is the cause of the cognitive synthesis. Marx has something like an account of how what might be true in Kant's Analytic is plausible. Marx and Merleau-Ponty would have endorsed the pragmatic dictum of C. I. Lewis: 'Only a creature that acts is capable of knowing'.

Synthesis and praxis both have the function of producing objectivity, or of giving the subject the impression of being confronted with a world that is 'other', or 'external', or over against him or her, to perceive (Kant) or act upon (Marx).

Habermas says:

‘The objectivity of the possible objects of experience is constituted within a conceptual-perceptual scheme rooted in deep-seated structures of human action; this scheme is binding on all subjects that keep alive through labour.’ ( )

In different ways, Kant and Marx both think this objectivity unreal. For Kant, objectivity is empirically real but transcendently ideal. The correct transcendental account, the account of how knowledge is possible, will mention that the application of the categories of substance, unity, plurality, causation, etc. gives rise to the empirical world of objectively enduring physical objects entering into causal interrelation. Empirical truth presupposes the original unity of apperception; a monism out of which dualisms arise: subject and object, sense and understanding.

At the level of things-in-themselves, although there is a phenomenal self and a noumenal self, there is no subjectivity or objectivity because there are no empirical human subjects: no points of view. For Marx, human beings are alienated from nature, at least under capitalism, and experience the world as other. This is due to the division of labour and class relations. Really, and ideally, escape from this is a political possibility for Marx.

But human beings experience their environment as an obstacle; as something to be technologically dominated in the struggle for survival. Human beings are parts of nature. They are natural. This is part of what Marx meant when he called his philosophy 'naturalism'. To view oneself as a participant in nature, as in the midst of it, and as pervaded by it in all one's actions, is, in that sense at least, not to be alienated. Marx thinks on the level of nature in itself objectivity does not exist in opposition to subjectivity.

Habermas speaks of objectivity being 'grounded' in different ways in Kant and Marx. '*a* grounds *b*' means '*a* makes *b* possible' (or, 'if not *a* then not *b*') Marx and Kant believe there are transcendental conditions for the objectivity of experience:

‘The objectivity of the possible objects of experience is thus grounded in the identity of a natural substratum, namely that of the bodily organisation of man, which is orientated towards action, and not in an original unity of apperception, which according to Kant guarantees with transcendental necessity the identity of an ahistorical consciousness in general.’ (1)

Both think there are transcendental grounds for the unity of the subject. For Kant, this is the transcendental unity of apperception; the requirement that any of my thoughts must in principle be capable of being prefaced by 'I think'. For Marx, the subject is historically constituted by the labour of previously existing subjects. The subject's constitution is socially inherited:

'The identity of consciousness, which Kant understood as the unity of transcendental consciousness, is identity achieved through labour.' (1 40)

Habermas identifies a difference between Kant and Marx:

'The identity of societal subjects [...] alters with the scope of their power of technical control. This point of view is fundamentally unKantian' (13)

Marx's specifically historical claim is not inconsistent with Kant's transcendental idealism. Although the categories are invariant according to Kant, empirical concepts are contingent in that any given subject might or might not possess any particular empirical concept. What Kant lacks is not a sense of history but any notion of the social construction of the self: the idea that any subject's being what he/she is depends on their interaction with other subjects. Hegel's Master and Slave Dialectic effects this social transformation of Kantian subjectivity, and that section of the *Phenomenology* provides Marx's model for social-individual relations and class struggle.

Goldman

Lucien Goldmann thinks Kant anticipates central tenets of Marxism. In what follows, I depend heavily on Howard Williams' excellent account of Goldmann on Kant and Marx. (7) Goldmann thinks the last of Kant's four fundamental questions of philosophy facilitates a Marxist answer to the other three. ( ) Goldmann interprets Kant's *Anthropology* as containing 'the most profound and radical critique ever made of bourgeois man'. (a) Goldmann detects a fundamental tension between two views of humanity in Kant's philosophy: Humanity as it is, and humanity as it ought to be, which implies that people possess an ideal of self improvement, which is frustrated by their very nature as humans. Goldmann substitutes 'capitalist society' for 'human nature', and produces a quasi-Marxist theory of alienation. This interpretation is seen by Goldmann as consistent with Kant's theory in the first *Critique*, that we only know objects as they appear, not as they really are, even though Goldmann gives this a Marxist twist by saying the appearance/reality distinction is inevitable, given the distorting, alienating, institutions of capitalist society. We are estranged from our selves, from other people, from the products of our labour, and from nature, and we are unable to know these as they are in themselves because our 'knowledge' is ideological: circumscribed by the perspective from our class location.

Marx thinks specific social and economic conditions determine the thoughts of a particular class. His theory, in *Capital*, is designed to destroy economic and social appearances, and unmask real economic and social relations as they are under

capitalism. While Kant produces a critique of pure reason, Marx produces a critique of bourgeois ideology. This is the Marxist social and pragmatic transformation of Kant.

It is not irrelevant to this Kantianism that the term 'critique' features in the title of so many of Marx's books. Amongst the early writings are: *Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State* and *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. *Capital* itself is subtitled *A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production*, and the sketch for *Capital, Grundrisse*, is subtitled *Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*. Do Kant and Marx use 'critique' in the same sense? The referents differ. The objects of their critiques differ. But this is a difference of emphasis: Marx continues where Kant finishes. Marx and Kant criticise metaphysics. The idealist, theistic, and cosmic targets of the early writings of Marx are essentially the targets of the first Critique. If Lucien Goldmann is right, Kant produces a critique of bourgeois ideology in the Anthropology, and in the appearance/reality distinction of the first Critique. Kant never wrote anything of the enormous complexity and sophistication of *Capital*, in criticism of the human condition in capitalist society. Marx never wrote anything of the complexity, or sophistication, of the first Critique in criticism of metaphysics. Nevertheless, the overlap in targets is there.

There exists very little residual difference in the meaning of 'critique' for the two thinkers. For Kant and Marx, a critique is an unmasking of illusions: metaphysical, or social and economic. It is an explanation of how the illusions came to be believed in: through a natural tendency of human reason according to Kant, through the perpetuation of bourgeois ideology, by the capital owning class, in Marx. Kant and Marx use 'critique' in the sense of 'drawing limits to'. Marx draws limits to the truth of Hegel's philosophy, or to the usefulness of political economy. Kant draws limits to the powers of pure reason to yield knowledge. Kant and Marx try to extract truth from spurious, or mystifying, doctrines. The transformation in the objects of critique from Kant to Marx can be seen in this quotation from Marx:

'The criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the criticism of theolo[??] into the criticism of theology'.  
( )

Marx's theory of history is a social, and pragmatic, transformation of Kant's critical philosophy. To see this, consider the famous extract from *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*:

'In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations which are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of the material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of

society - the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousnesses of men that determine their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution.’  
*A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*, trans. N.J. Stone (Charles H. Kerr, Chicago, 1904), p. II ff:

Both Marx's 'relations of production' and Kant's categories are 'definite', and may be specified precisely by Marxist or Kantian theory. They are both 'indispensable', the relations of production for the perpetuation of life, in that form of society, the categories for rational, self conscious, experience. Both exist, and are what they are, independently of the subject's will. Kant's subject does not choose his or her categories, any more than Marx's subject chooses his or her relations of production. Both are the 'real foundation' of 'consciousness'. For Kant, there could not be the sort of consciousness we have unless there were categories. For Marx, there could not be consciousness, or definite sorts of consciousness, without definite relations of production.

Marx's Copernican Revolution is: consciousness does not determine men's existence, but social existence determines consciousness. Kant and Marx repudiate the individualistic idealism which makes the nature of the external world dependent upon a person's empirical consciousness of it. Both agree there are transcendental conditions for that very empirical consciousness. For Marx, these are social and pragmatic: the relations of production. For Kant, they are the categories.

Kant describes the conclusions of the Antinomies as 'contradictions', produced by the metaphysical misuse of categories. Marx says the relations of production come into conflict with the material forces of production, and this produces the social revolution. Marx's contradictions produce a historical problem, the solution to which is Marxism. Kant's contradictions produce a philosophical problem, the solution to which is Kantianism. Marxism is a social and pragmatic transformation of Kantianism

Marx enlists Kant as an ally, in severing morality from theological premises:

‘Morality recognizes only its own universal and rational religion, and religion only its own particular and positive morality. Following the Instruction, censorship will have to repudiate such intellectual heroes of morality as Kant, Fichte, Spinoza for

being irreligious and threatening discipline, morals and outward loyalty. All of these moralists proceed from principled opposition between morality and religion, because morality, they claim, is based on the autonomy, and religion on the heteronomy of the human spirit.' 'Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction' *Gesammte Ausgabe I i* (1) 161, quoted in McLellan 1980: 77.

There is plausibility in Marx's construal of Kant as a secular moralist. If acting from duty, in accordance with the categorical imperative, is not only necessary, but sufficient, for being moral, then theological premises for moral conclusions are redundant. The postulates of pure practical reason: the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, and the existence of God, then emerge as *only* postulates: fictions to live by. On this construal, Kant is like Nietzsche not like Aquinas, not criticizing reason to make conceptual room for faith.

Marx uses Kant in his attack on Gustav Hugo (1764-1844), the founder of The Historical School of Law:

'[Hugo] identifies himself as a disciple of Kant and calls his natural law an offshoot of Kantian philosophy. At this point we take up his Manifesto.

Hugo misinterprets the master Kant in saying that since we cannot know what is true, we consequently let pass as entirely valid what is untrue if it merely exists. Hugo is a sceptic concerning the essence of things [...] he pulls together evidence from all corners of the world to prove that positive institutions such as property, the state, marriage etc. are not informed by any rational necessity [...] 'The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law' *Gesammte Ausgabe I i* (1) 252, quoted in McLellan 1980: 80.

Hugo appropriates only the empiricist component of Kant's philosophy, to describe social institutions piecemeal, in a way inimical to the exposure of their role in capitalist society. Marx appropriates Kant for his destruction of naïve political empiricism and, in the same piece, calls Kant 'the German theorist of the French Revolution'. (254, McLellan 1980: 79) Kant welcomed the French Revolution of 1789 even though he was dismayed at the subsequent excesses of the Terror. But Marx has more in mind than this. Kant's severing of the political, and the moral, from theological assumptions rehearses in theory the republican secularism of the French Revolution in practice. McLellan says '[...] it is true that Marx has many expressions and lines of argument that are akin to Spinoza and Kant [...]' (McLellan 1980: 101) even though Marx 'declares himself a disciple of Hegel' (during his time as a journalist in the 1840's).

Lucio Colletti argues that Feuerbach's influence on the *Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State* has been exaggerated, and some of its central tenets are Kantian. Colletti says:

‘[...] at the points in his *Critique of Pure Reason* where Kant does most to demolish the older ontology (for example in the ‘Note on the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection’), it is also possible to see a critique of ‘real universals.’ (Colletti in Marx 1975: 24)

Colletti misunderstands Kant when he writes

‘The human subjectivity or ‘essence’ estranged by wage-labour [...] is no longer that of traditional metaphysics (Kant’s ‘transcendental ego’, Hegel’s *Logos*) but a function which mediates man’s relationship both to nature and to his own kind.’ (Colletti in Marx 1975: 53)

‘Kant had attempted in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (which has been much misunderstood and often falsely opposed to the *Critique of Pure Reason*) to show that the barriers that could not be overcome by theory (contemplation) were amenable to practical solutions.’ (Lukacs 1971: 123)

Despite his attack on Kant’s ethics as only formal and the thing-in-itself as mysterious, Lukacs says

‘It has escaped the notice of Kant and the critics of his critique of the ontological argument that [...] – admittedly in a negative and distorted form arising from his purely contemplative viewpoint – Kant has hit upon the structure of true praxis as a way of overcoming the antinomies of the concept of existence.’ (Lukacs 1971: 127)

Lukacs allocates Kant a crucial role in the Marxist strategy for overcoming of the contradictions of German idealism (and other kinds of philosophy) between subject and object, freedom and determinism, appearance and reality. Lukacs argues that the prior unity, which makes philosophical dualisms possible, is *activity*. (Lukacs 1971: 123) Kant fails to emphasize the historically determining, and self determining, structure of *praxis*, because he is trying to identify the necessary conditions for experience in transcendental logic. If Lukacs is right, Kant has made conceptual room for Lukacs’ own considered view that the proletariat is the subject and the object of history.

Jindrich Zeleny argues that three tenets of Kantianism are adopted by Marx:

‘(a) In Hegel’s eyes it was a deficiency of Kantian criticism that the “absolute standpoint” had been only ‘man and humanity’. “Thus it is not recognized that philosophy can only proceed from God, but rather, as is said, from man”. In that sense, Marx returned at a new level to Kant, since he saw the alpha and omega of all

theory in men, how they are active in particular, historically alterable, social and natural relations.’ (Zeleny 1980: 201)

‘(b) We can say of Marx’s relation to mathematics that it is a departure from the Hegelian critique of Leibniz and Kant, and establishes a certain reproach to Kant.’  
‘In *The German Ideology* Marx abruptly rejects “belles-lettres philippics, derived from the Hegelian tradition, against quantification.’ (Zeleny 1980: 201)

‘(c) In his recognition of the limitations of human reason Marx seems to stand closer to Kant than Hegel, even though human knowledge is understood differently by the two thinkers – with Kant, a supra-historical distinction between experiential knowledge and ‘thing-in-itself’; with Marx, a result from his practical, historical understanding of reality.’ (Zeleny 1980: 201)

‘In Aron’s view, Sartre retreated from Marxism and aligned himself with Kant.’  
(Poster 1979: 34) Mark Poster *Sartre’s Marxism* (Pluto Press, London, 1979)

‘We might speak of a Hegelian-Marxist revolution in the knowledge of man, but it would be more accurate to give Kant and Kantianism credit for the major shift in emphasis’ Henri Lefebvre *The Sociology of Marx* trans. Norbert Guterman (Allen Lane 1968) (Lefebvre 1968: 27)

‘Idealism [...] did see and develop the “active side”, the subjective aspect of the cognitive process. The subject, in this perspective, did not grasp objects in themselves, but as products of his activity; that at least had been the conception of knowledge first enunciated by Kant. It was to idealism’s credit, in Marx’s view, that it had underlined the active role of the subject within the subject-object relation; but idealism had perceived that activity as activity of the thinking, conscious subject, and had not taken into account real, practical, sensuous activity.’ Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez *The Philosophy of Praxis* trans. M. Gonzalez (Merlin and Humanities Press, London and New Jersey 1977) (Vazquez 1977: 118)

It is possible to overestimate Kant’s subjective individualism, and miss his argument for its social presuppositions:

‘Persuasion is a mere illusion, because the ground of the judgement, which lies solely in the subject, is regarded as objective. Such a judgement has only private validity, and the holding of it to be true does not allow of being communicated.’  
(A 828/B 848)

‘But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and in respect of it the judgements of each and every understanding must therefore be in agreement with each other.’ (A 828/B 848)

‘But it is only from a practical point of view that the theoretically insufficient holding of a thing to be true can be termed believing.’ (A823/B 851)

‘This practical point of view is either in reference to skill or in reference to morality.’ (A823/B 851)

## VII

### METAPHYSICS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THEOLOGY

Who escapes?

Rorty's says:

'The great exceptions to this neo-Kantian consensus are [...] Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. (IL)

Dewey and Wittgenstein are centrally located within the critical paradigm.  
Heidegger partly escapes.

Rorty interprets Kant as subscribing to a representational theory of mind:

If A perceives, thinks, or speaks, then A is in a mental state which represents some object of perception, thought or speech.

Rorty says:

'Two putative successor subjects to philosophy as epistemology - empirical psychology and philosophy of language, respectively [...] remain within the neo-

Kantian consensus by taking philosophy to be paradigmatically, the study of representing. (r 4)

Most empirical psychology and philosophy of language are fundamentally Kantian but the false implication of Rorty's claim is that if someone takes philosophy to be the study of representing, then it is thereby Kantian.

Kant repudiates any representational theory of the mental, and replaces it with transcendental idealism which implies that objects of thought, language, and perception are transcendently *constituted*.

a constitutes b

is inconsistent with

a represents b

Rorty's mistake rests on a translation of Kant's term *Vorstellung*, which may mean variously 'presentation', 'introduction', 'imagination', and 'idea' but is translated by Norman Kemp Smith as 'representation'.

If we translate '*Vorstellung*' as 'representation', then we force Kant to hold a doctrine inconsistent with his theory of synthesis: the transcendental organising psychology of the subject has a role in producing the physical world as experienced. Kant held the theory of synthesis in that form, and on the assumption that in interpreting a philosopher's work we should aim to maximise its internal coherence, we should translate '*Vorstellung*' in a way that does not preclude the truth of the synthesis doctrine.

Kant conceived his own philosophy as a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. The refusal to intellectualise appearances, or sensualise concepts, requires jettisoning representational theory of mind, common to Kant's rationalist and empiricist predecessors. The new synthesis requires the world as we experience it to partly result from an intellectually imposed a priori framework, partly to result from a passively received sensory input. The framework does not 'represent' the sensory input.

The conceptual idealism Kant subscribes to is in the movements I have identified as essentially Kantian. Husserl thinks 'the world' is transcendently constituted. Ayer points out the scientist's theoretical preconceptions. Putnam, and the structuralists, claims that, since Kant, no inquiry can be thought of as free from interpretations, embedded in the language we use. Hegel and Marx reject the representational theory of mind, and replace it with a quasi-Kantian constitutive model: Hegel with a historical version of conceptual idealism, Marx with socio-economically determined

praxis. None of these positions may be accurately characterised as representational.. All of them are 'constitutive'.

Rorty is right that, as post-Kantian philosophers, we have a 'neo-Kantian image of philosophy as a profession' (393), but this cannot be 'involved with the image of the "mind" or "language" as mirroring nature'.

The reason Rorty thinks Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey are unKantian is:

'Each of these three in his later work broke free of the Kantian conception of philosophy as foundational.' ( )

The *Critique of Pure Reason* is no more, and no less, foundational than *Philosophical Investigations*, *Being and Time*, and *The Quest for Certainty*. What does Rorty think Kant's foundationalism consists in? Rorty's says:

'Kant's advance in the direction of taking knowledge to be of propositions rather than of objects - his step away from the attempts of Aristotle and Locke to model knowing on perceiving' ( )

but this is inconsistent with the claim a few pages earlier that

'Kant [...] talked about inner representations rather than sentences' (q)

if a proposition is what is expressed by an (indicative) sentence. If we just drop the claim about representations, then we can allow that Kant takes propositions to be the objects of knowledge, just so long as propositions are Kantian judgements (*Urteile*). Rorty's says:

'Kant [...] was the first to think of the foundations of knowledge as propositions rather than objects. (O)

In a sense any foundationalist believes some proposition is the foundation of knowledge: some true proposition from which all other true propositions may, in principle, be logically derived. Taken historically Rorty's claim is obviously false. Think of knowledge as true belief with an account in the *Theaetetus*. Philosophers trying to do history should be wary of making claims of the form 'X was the first to [...]'. The chances are, someone else did it earlier.

If Kant is any kind of foundationalist, then according to him, knowledge has a twin foundation:

'Empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself.' (CPR 42)

But this is not foundationalism in any straightforward sense. Kant thinks the *a priori* categorial framework of the subject largely makes the objects of knowledge what they are, so there can be no, non-tautological, logically primitive, or axiomatic, set of propositions for Kant: no statement about oneself, about God, about sense data, about physical objects, out of which the rest of knowledge is to be logically constructed. If there are any foundational propositions for Kant they have to be the ones which report the existence and limits of the categorial framework, and the ones which assert the existence of sensory experience. Kant repudiates the narrow empiricist and rationalist conceptions of foundationalism, in sense experience and innate ideas respectively. He does this by saying both are jointly the foundation of knowledge.

There is a large number of post-Kantian philosophers who I have not considered in this book. Some, like Schopenhauer, Schelling, Fichte, and the neo-Kantians in Germany, because their doctrines seem so pervasively Kantian that no extended argument is called for. Others, including many moral and political philosophers as well as aestheticians, I have excluded in order to keep the book quite short, although similar arguments to those I have used could extend the thesis into those areas, similarly with the philosophy of science.

Is American Pragmatism Kantian? It is possible that the pragmatic transformation of Kant's philosophy is carried so far in that movement that it is hardly accurate to call it Kantian.

What of the status of this book? Is it essentially Kantian? It could and perhaps will be called 'analytical history of philosophy' and analytical philosophy is firmly within the critical paradigm. Kant was not himself much concerned to write about the history of philosophy, so the status of this book in that sense remains ambivalent. If philosophy is solving problems we have little idea how to solve, then work in the history of philosophy is not philosophy. Philosophy is not the history of it, but the practice of it. It follows that the present work, although a book about philosophy, is not a philosophy book.

### *Doing Theology*

How will realising that the answers to philosophical questions are theological change *theology*? To understand this, it is necessary to briefly inspect what has passed for theology over approximately the last eight hundred years.

Salient during this period is a *decline in faith*, from the Western Christendom of the high middle ages, to the multitude of secularisms of the twenty-first century.

From the standpoint of the believer, this is a spiritual catastrophe. It was caused partly by the rise of materialist science, which requires metaphysical *epoche*, partly by the rise of capitalism. If everything is physical, God does not exist. If the value of everything is its financial value, then spiritual reality, despite ferocious attempts to sell religion, is seen as valueless. In the liberal phase of global capitalism (1968-2001) many in the West, especially the young, were crying out for spiritual fulfilment. As they turned to oriental religion, crystal gazing, paganism, marijuana, the established churches failed to meet their need.

The response to secularism has united disparate kinds of Christianity. The response is terrified appeasement, collapsing into obsequious capitulation. The *ur*, and possibly fundamental, act of appeasement was St. Thomas Aquinas' fusion of Aristotle's secular philosophy with Christian theology. One can see why this seemed a promising strategy at his time (1221-1273) The West had re-learned its Aristotelian science from the Arabs during the Crusades. St. Thomas was presented with two systems, each of which he thought true: Christianity, and Aristotelianism. If two beliefs are true, they must be mutually consistent. He therefore set about reconciling them into a single system. Unfortunately, the subsequent attitude of the West to Aquinas' synthesis has, in a sense, been very straightforward: *Endorse the Aristotle but drop the Christianity*. Indeed, secular philosophy since the thirteenth century is essentially Thomism with the Christian component deleted. Compared to this, the attacks on Aristotle mounted by Descartes, Hobbes, Locke and others seem only local wars. In the twenty-first century, the West still lives in an Aristotelian age, a secular paradigm. Is there a lesson here? Yes. Theologians should not treat the writings of Aquinas as though they were scripture. Appeasement of secularism results in catastrophic defeat. Theology needs metaphysical philosophy.

To the secular mind, God only appears as *something extra*, something *tacked on* to the empirical world, looming outside of space-time (in some non-spatial sense of 'outside') To the Aristotelian mind, faith is belief; belief that appears, from within the critical paradigm, to be without a shred of evidence. My distinguished colleague, Sir Anthony Kenny, asked me over the dinner table a few weeks ago whether I really believe there is a huge 'disembodied intelligence'. To answer the questions in this book, I have recourse to a God who is infinitely near. This revelation of God belongs to ways of knowing which are almost lost to the modern world so, although what I say is new to us, it is a recovery of spirituality that is ancient and unchanging. There is *knowledge* of God.

Aquinas's endorsement of Aristotle brought in the Trojan Horse. Karl Barth, Bonhoeffer, Bultmann have compromised with secularism.

The later Wittgenstein is Fergus Kerr's Trojan Horse. Although Wittgenstein's emphasis on public rule-following is ideologically conducive to the liturgy of the Church as an institution, Wittgenstein's externalist anti-metaphysics is antithetical to spiritual inwardness and divine mystery. These will not 'follow later'.

One form of theological capitulation to anti-metaphysical philosophy is:

“Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, the Vienna Circle, Derrida, or whoever, has shown that *we cannot talk about God*. Nevertheless, this conclusion is by no means as damaging to faith as might be supposed. They are criticizing reason, but leaving room for faith. After all *God is ineffable*. We theologians, or anybody of faith, should celebrate and welcome warmly these seemingly anti-theological thinkers. Indeed, let us turn the tables on them by writing books, and journal papers, showing that Christianity is perfectly compatible with empiricism, transcendental critique, existentialism, positivism, post-structuralism, or whatever.”

It is clear why this kind of appeasement appeals. God is ineffable: *The language geared to the space-time plurality falls infinitely short of describing Him*. When Thomas, towards the end of his life, had a profound religious experience, said everything that he had written is, by comparison, *as straw*. This is the insight the church should build upon.

In their appeasing, theologians feel they are adapting to philosophical criticism, keeping the idiom of the faith up to date in a way that will allow it to survive:

“We cannot talk about God, but we are theologians. We have to talk about something. We’ll talk about why we can’t talk about God.”

However appealing, this appeasement is a spiritual and intellectual disaster. Unfortunately, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, the Vienna Circle, Derrida *et al.* do not leave room for the ineffable God. They do not criticize reason in a way that leaves room for faith. The critical paradigm entails *the emasculation of faith of any content whatsoever*.

God, the soul, immortality, heaven, hell, resurrection: these concepts have to have some *minimal* sense, no matter how inadequate to divine reality, if there is to be faith. The critical paradigm does not tolerate an unknowable ineffable God. It allows no God. Kant personally thought he was criticizing reason to make room for faith, like Aquinas, so, even in this idea, the Kantian paradigm is adhered to. Unfortunately his *Critique of Pure Reason* effectively eliminates the transcendent, and theological, aspects of his own philosophy. For example: ‘Existence’, ‘substance’ and ‘causation’ are Kantian *categories*. Categories only have an empirical use. Therefore it is meaningless to say that God *exists*, or *depends on nothing else*, or *causes* anything, according to the Kant of the First Critique.

Theology is dominated by Biblical exegesis: understanding scripture in its ‘historical context’. This is an extremely worthy enterprise, usually conducted with painstaking scholarship and attention to the Biblical languages. However, it is not theology. Theology, as the etymology of the term suggests, is the study of God. I am

reminded of a distinction the atheistic philosopher Bernard Williams used to draw between two questions (about any text in the history of philosophy): ‘What does it mean?’ and ‘What did it mean?’ We cannot address one of these questions without partly addressing the other. James Griffin, the classics don, used to distinguish a third question: ‘Now, what does it *really* mean?’ This is the question theologians should be asking about the Bible. What is the *timeless truth* that scripture expresses? Uncovering that timeless truth is doing theology.

There is an invalid argument in favour of doing Biblical exegesis only historically: The Gospel authors were divinely inspired. Therefore, finding the true meaning of the Bible is discovering their intentions, in the places and times in which they wrote. That the Gospel authors were divinely inspired does not entail that the correct method of understanding what they wrote is historical. Presented only historically, the Bible looks like a patchwork containing inconsistencies. That scripture expresses unchanging truth that might be difficult to disclose, is plausible if the Gospel authors were divinely inspired. Its disclosure requires spirituality, not just intellectual understanding. Theology is not the history of how the Bible came to be written. That belongs to history: the history of how the Bible came to be written. Theology is the study of God: theo-logy.

It is the post motor car age. With great effort, some people are pushing a motor car, with its engine switched off, a few feet. Others are standing at the side of the road shouting out parts of the Highway Code, with that book open. One person is sitting in the driving seat feeling important, even though the engine is switched off. Some of the people have heard of petrol, and something called ‘driving’. They shout about petrol and driving. Derelict motor car factories are studied in immense detail. The bricks in their walls are counted. In the background, one or two real drivers look on, ignored or laughed at for their ridiculous pretension.

Philosophy has done immense damage to theology. This damage can and should be repaired. This depends, however, on several forces.

It is sometimes said in Western, capitalist, liberal, intellectual circles that ‘the intellectual’ does not have much effect on politics or history. This seems to me to be an extraordinarily implausible claim. Would the twentieth century have happened just the way it did if Marx and Engels had never written? Would the Second World War have ended as it did, or the Cold War have been what it was, if Einstein had never lived or Rutherford had never split the atom? Sometimes the causally inefficacious intellectual is voiced in the same breath as condemning the intellectual as irresponsible: “Sartre was an irresponsible Marxist spokesman, when the Soviet Union was totalitarian” etc. But if Sartre is ineffectual then why should it matter? People who live under less liberal regimes often think their intellectuals very valuable, and their governments think it worth their while to persecute them.

If we give up the idea that ideas are causally efficacious then history becomes unintelligible. Nobody could do anything *because* they were angry, or *because* they

had been given the sack, because motives and reasons would not cause anything. *That there is mental causation is an ineliminable presupposition. How thoughts affect matter in the brain is an unsolved philosophical problem: Does consciousness push atoms around?*

I once listened to a discussion between the anti-religious philosopher A. J. Ayer and the Anglican theologian Don Cuppitt, about whether there is a God. At the outset, quite reasonably, Ayer asked Cuppitt for his definition of 'God'. Cuppitt said that by 'God' he understands a set of moral imperatives. Ayer's face flooded with glee. I cannot remember Ayer's exact words but his reply was along these lines: Oh! I see! We have been at cross- purposes. We might as well pack up and go home. *I too believe in moral imperatives.* I thought perhaps you meant by 'God' something else; 'almighty, all-good, transcendent being, or some such'. The battle was lost before it began.

Is there a lesson here? I think so. Appeasement does not work. Water down the faith, and they will destroy you nonetheless.

Now  
Being  
Consciousness  
are the same.  
The three together make up reality, or the reality of God.  
The Trinity.

## Notes

(1) Kemp Smith's 'empirical test' is Kant's *Proberstein der Erfahrung* (A viii), and 'transcend the limits of experience' is *über die Grenze aller Erfahrung hinaus gehen*. So the conjunction of Kant's claim that metaphysics putatively 'transcend(s) the limits of experience' (CPR 7) and Ayer's claim that the metaphysician claims 'to know facts that could not be known through sense experience' (LTL 34) is analytic. Some identity of semantic content obtains between Kant's *Erfahrung* and Ayer's 'experience' because neither philosopher subscribes to the view that 'experience' just means 'sense experience' but both hold the empiricist theory that if there is non sensory experience then that is only possible on condition sense experience is possible. Kant, for example, has it as the conclusion of the Refutation of Idealism that inner sense is only possible on condition that outer sense is possible. Ayer's view, articulated in Ayer (1973) is that 'what happens when one is self-conscious is that one claims some present or past experience as one's own, where its being one's

own is a matter of its being related to other experiences and to one's body'. (LTL 120) Kant and the Vienna Circle admit a passively received or 'given' content of experience, Intuitions *Anschauungen* and sense data respectively.

It follows that when Kant asserts 'Das alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfangs ist gar kein Zweifel' (A1 / B1), even though sense experience is only part of the extension of 'experience', he means that knowledge is only possible on condition there is sense experience. This is exactly the view of the Positivists as can be shown by the fact that the denial of only one of the conjuncts of the conjunction formed from the first sentence of Kant's introduction and the assertion formed from answering 'yes' to Ayer's rhetorical question yields a contradiction.

2 For Ayer's use of 'empirical' and 'phenomenal' see LTL passim but especially chapters 1 and 2. For Kant on phenomena and noumena see CPR especially pp. 265, 266 ff., 291 ff., 382, 469, and 471. Kemp Smith's 'phenomena' is just Kant's *Phaenomena* (see for example B294/A235 ff) Kant shares Ayer's conception of metaphysics as a spurious search for 'first principles'. He calls them *Grundsätzen* (Aviii, CPR 7), where *Grundsatz* is the ordinary German for 'principle' or 'axiom'. I take it *p* is just such a putative 'first principle' on Ayer's account, or a 'Grundsatz' on Kant's if and only if *p* cannot be derived even in principle from any empirical proposition but *p* is allegedly informative about a purported transcendent reality. Kant and the Positivists hold the view that no proposition falls under that description (even though *Grundsatz* also has legitimate, non-metaphysical uses according to Kant)

4 On Kant's theory of meaning a contradiction does not express a genuine proposition. This is the force of:

Von welchem Inhalt auch unsere Erkenntnis sei, und wie sie sich auf das Objekt beziehen mag, so ist doch die allgemeine, obzwar nur negative Bedingung aller unserer Urteile überhaupt, das sie sich nicht selbst widersprechen; widrigenfalls diese Urteile an sich selbst (auch ohne Rücksicht aufs Objekt) nichts sind. (B 189/A 150)

If 'propositions' is read for 'Urteile', it follows that a contradiction cannot feature as part of a genuine assertion or a genuine denial, so that if (as Kant believes) the putative propositions of metaphysics entail contradictions, then metaphysics cannot be genuinely informative.

5 Just as long as the 'two worlds' ontology is not foisted on Kant then the world as it is in itself is not numerically distinct from the world of appearances, which is itself identical with that studied by the natural sciences. Similarly the Positivists reject any

suggestion that the world studied by the sciences is numerically distinct from or in any way duplicates ontologically the world as it appears to human perceivers.

6 Moritz Schlick 'Meaning and Verification' in Feigl and Sellars 1949.

7 Schlick in Feigl and Sellars 1949:148.

8 See Leibniz 'Monadology' in G. W. F. Leibniz Selected Philosophical Writings ed. Parkinson (Everyman, London, 1976)

9 For the Ideas see Plato, Republic, translated by Desmond Lee (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 197 ) For Hegel's conception of *Geist*, see G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction* translated by H. B. Nisbet, with an introduction by Duncan Forbes (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975), especially pp. 30, 52 ff., 63, 76, 82, 92, 124, 313 ff. For Descartes on the soul see Descartes *Meditations* and Descartes *Philosophical Letters* ed. Anthony Kenny (Blackwell, Oxford, 1970)

10 The 'sense and sense' argument common to Kant and Schlick may be formulated thus: For any genuine but not straight-forwardly empirical concept, there must exist, at least in principle, some empirical definition into sub- concepts at least one of which admits of ostensive definition. In this formulation a concept is empirical if and only if its only use is empirical, so Kant's categories are empirical in this sense even though (according to Kant) they are also *a priori*.

11 Ironically Ayer deploys a version of the 'sense and sense' argument against what he takes to be a reification of the self by Kant. He says that

Kant postulate(s) a self which is always a subject and never an object of consciousness. It is to this "transcendental" self, as Kant called it, that the task is assigned of processing the raw material of experience, so that a world emerges in which one's everyday self or selves can find a place. In Kant's system, the transcendental ego stands outside this world. Its labours make our experiences possible, but because it is not a possible object of experience, it is not itself in space or time. (Ayer, 1976, P-118)

Admittedly, many passages in all three Critiques can be read to substantiate this view, but it is at variance with Kant's warnings in the Paralogisms chapter (CPR ) that it is a mistake to think of the self as a substance. Indeed, part of the anti-metaphysical message of the first *Critique* is that the transcendental ego should not be hypostatized metaphysically. Philosophers from Hegel to Husserl have attributed a

substantial subject to Kant's theory, and this is a part of the 'two worlds ontology' attributed to Kant. In fact it is possible to understand myself as I am in myself as not numerically distinct from myself as I appear to myself, and this is really Kant's considered view. Ayer's verdict on the reified transcendental subject is: 'Clearly there can be no empirical evidence for the existence of any such entity'. (Ayer, 1976: 119) Kant would have wholeheartedly agreed.

12 Schlick in Feigl and Sellars 1949: 148

13 Reading 'proposition' for 'judgement', 'a sentence expresses a genuine proposition if and only if it possesses truth conditions' is a formulation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for factual meaning which feature in Kant's concept of a judgement, and the positivists concept of a genuine proposition.

14 The view of Kant and the positivists of any putative metaphysical statement is captured by: If  $p$  cannot in principle be verified or falsified, then  $p$  is not genuinely informative. Both hold this principle consistently with the theory that analytic statements and contradictions (which are necessary truths and necessary falsehoods respectively) are conclusively verifiable and falsifiable, but are still not thereby informative because they are not empirical (nor synthetic *a priori* either, in Kant's view)

15 In this passage, Kant's word for 'to judge' is *urteilen* and Kemp Smith's 'to make any assertion' is a translation of *irgend etwas zu behaupten* (A 60/B 84), so clearly Kant is denying that logic can be genuinely informative: exactly the positivist view.

16 So the Kantian and positivist theory of truth for some empirical proposition may be formulated as follows: ' $p$  is true if and only if  $p$ ', where this sentence is given a realist rather than a redundancy reading. The coherence condition, which is necessary for truth for Kant and the positivists, is catered for because that  $p$  not be a contradiction is a necessary condition for  $p$ 's being an empirical proposition.

17 Ayer, like Kant, repudiates a Utilitarian analysis of ethical judgements. The reason he gives is: 'It is not self contradictory to say that it is sometimes wrong to perform the action which would actually or probably cause the greatest happiness'. (LTL 105) Although Kant would have found Ayer's emotivism unacceptable, and even though Ayer devotes most of the first half of Chapter VI of LTL to showing that ethieal sentenees 'are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false', he allows that exhortations to moral virtue are not propositions at all but ejaculations or commands which are designed to provoke the reader to action of a

certain sort' (LTL 103), which is at least consistent with Kant's view that moral principles are best understood as action guiding imperatives.

18 Pap 1949: 54.

19 For the original and full statement of the argument see the extract from St. Anselm's *Proslogion* in John Hick (ed.) *The Existence of God* (Macmillan, London, 1964) For rigorous discussion of the argument see Jonathan Barnes *The Ontological Argument* (Macmillan, London, 1972)

20 Ayer 1976: 9

21 Ayer 1940: 206

22 So, on the Kantian and positivist theory of scientific ontology any true sentence or set of sentences of the natural sciences contains terms which denote objects, or properties, or constituents of objects, which are numerically identical with items which could in principle be observed.

( ) I thank Daniel Came, and Michael Inwood for useful discussion. An ancestor of this paper was presented as a talk to the Department of Philosophy of King's College, London. I thank those present for their comments.

## Phenomenology

(1) *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan, London, 1979) (henceforth 'CPR') and Immanuel Kant *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Philipp Reclam, Stuttgart, 1980)

(2) 'La phénoménologie, c'est l'étude des essences, et tous les problèmes, selon elle, reviennent à définir des essences: l'essence de la perception, l'essence de la conscience, par exemple. Mais la phénoménologie est aussi une philosophie qui replace les essences dans l'existence et ne pense pas qu'on puisse comprendre l'homme et le monde autrement qu'à partir de leur <<facticité>>.'  
(Merleau-Ponty 1945: i)

(3) He might not be right to do so. Michael Petry argues that 'Phenomenology had first been brought into discussion as a distinct discipline by the mathematician and logician J. H. Lambert, who conceived of it as the theory of the appearances

constituting the bases of all cognition deriving from experience.' (Hegel 1981: p. xiv) For the phenomenology of J. H. Lambert (1728-1777) see Lambert (1764) esp. II 217 ff. In the history of ideas, claims of the form '*A* was the first to think that *p*' should be made with immense caution.

(4) Merleau Ponty talks about 'la notion d'intentionnalité' as 'trop souvent cité comme la découverte principal de la phénoménologie' and says: <<Toute conscience est conscience de quelque chose>>, cela n'est pas nouveau. Kant a montré dans la Réfutation de l'Idéalisme, que la perception intérieure est impossible sans perception extérieure' (Merleau-Ponty 1945: xii)

(5) See (1985) and \*\*\*

(6) Because, like Husserl, Kant rejects empirical idealism this passage entailing a logical relation between perceiver, perception and perceived should be read as expressing the constitutive perspectivism of transcendental idealism:

'So bald wir unsere subjektive Beschaffenheit wegnehmen, das vorgestellte Objekt mit den Eigenschaften, die ihm die sinnliche Anschauung beilegte, überall nirgends anzutreffen ist, noch angetroffen werden kann, indem eben diese subjektive Beschaffenheit die Form desselben, als Erscheinung, bestimmt.' (A44/B62)

'If our subjective constitution be removed, the (re)presented object, with the qualities which sensible intuition bestows upon it, is nowhere to be found. For it is this subjective constitution which determines its form as appearance.' (CPR 84)

Husserl is a transcendental idealist. I mean by 'transcendental idealism' any doctrine entailing that some non-empirical proposition *p* is necessary for experience (knowledge, science, presentation of the world etc.), so experience is sufficient for *p*.

(7) Kant and Husserl subscribe to a 'physical efficacy' thesis: a particular *a* is a physical particular only if it is capable of affecting some other particular, *b*. So, on the efficacy thesis there are true sentences of the form *Rab* where '*R*' expresses a causal relation, if there are some physical objects. It is a kind of functionalism; essentialist functionalism about physical objects.

(8) See, for example, CPR 111, 131-2, 144, 155, 161, 166, 169, 198, 213.

(9) F. N. Findlay (Husserl 1970: 36)

(10) The term Macquarrie and Robinson translate as 'appearance' is 'Erscheinung', and their 'phenomenon' is 'Phänomen'. See Heidegger 1962: 53-4, and Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 2, *Sein und Zeit* (Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1977), p.41-2. For Kant's use of 'appearance' see CPR 65, 124 ff., 143-4, 201, 470, and 494. For 'phenomena' see CPR especially pp. 257-275.

(11) It follows that Heidegger in *Being and Time* is engaged in producing a transcendental argument. An argument is transcendental if and only if it putatively establishes some non-empirical conclusion necessary for knowledge or experience. If an argument is transcendental, knowledge or experience is sufficient for the conclusion.

(12) Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology is an attempt to answer 'the question of being' (*die Seinsfrage*): 'What is Being?' (*Was ist, 'Sein'?*) Heidegger is not entirely correct in thinking this question was forgotten between the times of the ancients and Hegel because, not only Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Berkeley, but Kant raises it when he says

'"Sein" ist offenbar kein reales Prädikat, d.i. ein Begriff von irgend etwas, was zu dem Begriffe eines Dinges hinzukommen könne.' (A597/B625)

'"Being" is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing.' (CPR 504)

The question of what being is, is raised by Kant in a way that is logically distinct from the question of what exists.

Nevertheless, if anyone escapes the critical paradigm it is Heidegger. However, Fundamental Ontology, in so far as it escapes Kantianism, departs from phenomenology also.

(13) See Ryle (1932) Ryle's later work *The Concept of Mind* (Hutchinson, London, 1949) is a kind of phenomenology in reverse. The inner world is bracketed so that outward behaviour may be described as it appears. This is third-person phenomenology or phenomenology of the other. (If it is philosophy of mind, it is philosophy of mind without the mind.)

(14) Jean-Francois Lyotard says about phenomenology:

'It is philosophy, and even post-Kantian philosophy because it seeks to avoid metaphysical systematisation'

and draws this contrast:

‘Kant was looking for the *a priori* conditions of knowledge: but this *a priori* already prejudices the solution. Phenomenology does not want this hypostatization: from there its interrogative style, its radicalism, its essential incompleteness (*son style interrogative, son radicalisme, son inachevement essential*)’ (Lyotard 1982: 4)

but misses the point that Husserl (rightly) thinks the findings of Husserlian phenomenology are synthetic *a priori*.

### Structuralism

(1) Wolfe Mays, who worked with Piaget as his research assistant, told me that Piaget thought of his developmental psychology as more Hegelian than Kantian. Piaget might well not have misunderstood himself, but then we need to know the distance Hegel succeeded in establishing between Kant and himself. See the papers in Stephen Priest (ed.) *Hegel’s Critique of Kant* (Oxford, 1987).

### Conceptual Analysis

(1) The anti-foundationalism common to Kant and Wittgenstein entails that there exists no epistemologically primitive proposition,  $p^*$ , such that any proposition,  $p$ , can be known only if  $p^*$  is known.

(2) Hacker says:

‘In an argument reminiscent of Kant’s third paralogism, Wittgenstein observed that “It seems that I can *trace* my identity, quite independently of the identity of my body. And the idea is suggested that I trace the identity of something dwelling in my body, the identity of my mind.”’ (Wittgenstein 1968: 308, quoted in Hacker 1990: 486)

(3) Wittgenstein says:

‘(The limit of language shows itself in the impossibility of describing the fact to which a given sentence corresponds // which conforms to the sentence // (is its translation) without repeating that very sentence.

(We are concerned here with the Kantian solution of the problems of philosophy.)  
(Wittgenstein *Early Big Typescript: TS. 211*, quoted by Baker and Hacker 1980: 527-8)

Michael Inwood has suggested to me that Kant's claim in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is not that a transcendent or noumenal reality is *unintelligible* but that it is *unknowable*. I agree with Inwood that Kant thinks there is no transcendent knowledge. However, Kant is logically committed to the unintelligibility of the transcendent. The contradictions entailed by the first, second and fourth Antinomies, if genuine, imply that metaphysics is incoherent and so senseless or logically false. The fact that the categories have only an empirical use entails that their putative non-spatio-temporal use lacks reference. 'Existence' (*Dasein*) is itself a category, so, on a Kantian view, metaphysical facts or entities cannot be coherently said to exist. The text of the first *Critique* entails: There is no metaphysical knowledge, not because such knowledge is difficult to obtain but because there is nothing to be known.

(4) I take it that Hacker construes Kant in the first way, not the second, when he writes:

'[...] the noumenal world, even though *qua* moral beings we belong to it, is not an object of possible knowledge. But its existence is a necessary presupposition of our thought. It is 'the property' of beings not constrained by our forms of sensible intuition – e.g. of God. All such conceptions are diametrically opposed to W.'s later philosophy' (Hacker 1996 II: 184-5)

I accept that if noumena are unintelligible there is a problem about reconciling the first *Critique* with the moral philosophy (and the aesthetics). The solution is to construe the postulates of pure practical reason as *only* postulates. On this 'Nietzschean' construal of Kant, God and the soul are presuppositions of our moral lives making sense but false, or fictional, presuppositions. I argue this in a contribution to a forthcoming volume edited by Daniel Came: *Nietzsche and Aesthetics* (Oxford University Press).

(5) Hacker says:

'More Kantian minded philosophers –and in this respect the *Tractatus* is Kantian – transpose the causal questions to a logico-metaphysical plane, and struggle to elucidate the "metaphysical" conditions of the possibility of representation. But that is no less misguided. For the possibilities in question, e.g. the possibility of thought being about what is not the case or or the possibility of expectation anticipating the future, are *logical* possibilities. And the question as to how a logical possibility is possible is confused. It invites an answer in terms of transcendental or 'metalogical' machinery – as in the *Critique of Pure Reason* or the *Tractatus*. But what is logically possible is just what makes sense. There is no such thing as a transcendental or

metalogical structure which makes possible what is logically possible. The bounds of sense have no foundations. They are not reflections of the essential constitution of the human mind, but are constituted by grammatical rules.’ (Hacker 1996 I: 20)

I suggest Kant and (the early and later) Wittgenstein might allow some non-metaphysical sense to ‘How is a logical possibility possible?’ because it could be answered by saying: ‘Because there are sentences free from contradiction, others entailing contradictions’ and so on. A logical question requires a logical answer.

(6) Although Elizabeth Anscombe is right to point out that

‘Different philosophers have meant different things by “metaphysical”. Kant also attacked metaphysics: but Kant would not have called “Every rod has a length”, or “Time is one-dimensional and has only one direction’, metaphysical in the sense in which he attacked metaphysics; whereas for Wittgenstein they are so.’ (Anscombe 1959: 151)

Kant and Wittgenstein agree that being a transcendent claim is a *sufficient* condition for being a metaphysical claim. Both Kant and Wittgenstein think that the claims of transcendent metaphysics are neither true nor false. This anti-realism is entailed by Pear’s remark:

‘[...] the critical business is to be done by applying the test of expressibility in factual discourse in much the same way that Kant applied the test of possible experience, and the metaphysic fails the test.’ (Pears 1987: 8)

so long as if  $p$  is expressible in factual discourse and if  $p$  is testable in possible experience then  $p$  is either true or false.

(7) Pears says:

‘The simplest general characterization of his philosophy is that it is critical in the Kantian sense of that word. Kant offered a critique of thought and Wittgenstein offers a critique of the expression of thought in language.’  
(Pears 1987: 3)

Fergus Kerr says:

‘Wittgenstein’s “critique of language” (TLP 4.0031) is a radicalization of Kant’s critique of pure reason. Reminding us that Wittgenstein spoke of Kant’s depth, Drury insists on the comparison, citing in particular this remark by Kant: ‘The critique of

pure reason is a preservative against a malady which has its source in our rational nature. The malady is the opposite of love of home (homesickness) which binds us to our father land. It is a longing to pass out beyond our immediate confines and to relate ourselves to other worlds.”

(Drury 1983: 84, quoted in Kerr 1986: 37-8)

On my view, Wittgenstein is applying Kant's method to the detail of ordinary language. Kant is the radical (*radix* 'root'). Wittgenstein is the foliage.

(8) Baker and Hacker are right to point out that

‘There was a strong tradition prior to Kant that necessary truths might be discovered in experience. This is prominent in Locke's discussion of real essences, and it has had a recent renaissance after two centuries of dormancy.

The idea is certainly one for which Wittgenstein had no sympathy.’

(Baker and Hacker 1985: 267)

It follows that Plantinga, Kripke, Putnam and others who endorse *de re* necessities which are discoverable *a posteriori* escape the critical paradigm.

(9) See Stevenson (1982). I find Stevenson's argument convincing and do not pursue it here.

(10) Kant assimilates how the world fundamentally *must be* to how we (self conscious rational beings) *must conceive* of it. His assumption is that, transcendently speaking, it does not make sense to distinguish those two thoughts. I detect this assimilation in each of the central movements of the critical paradigm, but in ‘analytical’ thought it exists, for example, in Quine (1961), Davidson (1980) and Harrison (1974). Note that for Davidson and Kant there is fundamentally only one conceptual scheme.

(11) Nagel has a rare appreciation of these matters. See Nagel 1979, 1986.

(12) I am grateful to Daniel Came and Michael Inwood for discussion of the issues raised here. An ancestor of the paper was given as a talk to the Department of Philosophy of King's College, London. I thank those present for their comments.

Post-Structualism

- (1) Kant, I. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Stuttgart, 1980), *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1979)
- (2) Jacques Derrida *L'écriture et la différence* (Paris, 1967), 412, Jacques Derrida, 'Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', in R. Macksey and E. Donato (eds.), *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1979), 250.
- (3) Derrida 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250, (*des concepts d'être et de vérité auxquels sont substitués les concepts de jeu, d'interprétation et de signe*) ((*de signe sans vérité présente*)), *L'écriture et la différence*, 412,
- (4) Plato *Theaetetus* trans. John McDowell (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1973), 152d 17. See Nietzsche *The Will to Power* trans. Walter Kaufmann (Vintage Books, New York, 1967) ¶ 1067.
- (5) See: Jacques Derrida *Glas* 2 vols. (Paris, 1974), *Glas* trans. J. P. Leavy and R. Rand (Nebraska, 1990), *Marges de la Philosophie* (Paris, 1972), *Margins of Philosophy* (Sussex, 1982), *Positions* (Minuit, Paris 1972), *Positions* trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1981)
- (6) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (7) Roger Scruton Kant (Oxford, 1982), 57.
- (8) (*Hierbei beruht alle Schwierigkeit nur darauf, wie ein Subjekt sich selbst innerlich anschauen könne; allein diese Schwierigkeit ist jeder Theorie gemein.*) Kant *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, (B 68), *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 68, p. 88)
- (9) ([...] *es denn sich selbst anschautet, nicht wie es sich unmittelbar selbsttätig vorstellen wurde, sondern nach der Art, wie es von ihnen affiziert wird, folglich wie es sich erscheint, nicht Wie es ist.*) Kant *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (B 69), *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 69, p. 88)
- (10) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (11) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (12) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.

- (13) Kant *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* with an introduction by Lewis White Beck (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis and New York, 1950)  
(Kant 1950: 116)
- (14) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (15) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (16) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (17) Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 51/B 75, CPR 93)
- (18) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (19) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (20) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (21) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (22) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (23) Derrida *L'écriture et la différence*, 412, 'Structure, Sign and Play', 250.
- (24) The Author The Present: this page.
- (25) Jacques Derrida *Marges de la Philosophie* (Paris, Minuit, 1972), Jacques Derrida *Margins of Philosophy* (Sussex, 1982) 9. (Derrida 1982: 9)
- (26) Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 146/ B 184, p.185)
- (27) Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 275, p. 245))
- (28) Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 146/ p. 184)
- (29) Jacques Derrida *La Voix et le phénomène: Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris, 1967), 98, Jacques Derrida *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs* (Evanston, 1973), 88.
- (30) Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 146/ B 186, p. 186)

(31) Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* (A138/ B 177, p.181)

(32) Derrida *Speech and Phenomena*. 45 fn.)

(33) \*\*\*\*.

(34) David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (eds.) *Derrida and Difference* (Evanston, 1988), 3.

(35) The debate between Moore and Derrida is in Simon Glendinning (ed.) *Arguing With Derrida* (Oxford, 2001)

(36) John Llewellyn quotes Iris Murdoch's remark from *The Sovereignty of Good* (London, 1970) at the beginning of his *Derrida on the Threshold of Sense* (London, 1986) vi.

## Dialectic

1 Priest (1986) is a detailed discussion of the philosophical relationship between Kant and Hegel, and I refer the reader to the papers collected there. For a summary of recent work on Hegel's dialectic, see Stephen Priest, 'Hegel's Dialectic', *The Bulletin of the Hegel Society* (19 ), and for similar discussion of the phenomenology, Stephen Priest, 'Hegel's Phenomenology', *The Bulletin of the Hegel Society*, (198 )

2 For Hegel's comments on Kant at LL 66z see Priest (1986), p. 17 ff.

3 The critical turn effected by Kant may be formulated as follows: no genuinely philosophical proposition is a report about the true nature of reality as it is independently of person's experience, or thought about it. Any genuine philosophical proposition is a report about person's means of experiencing or thinking, or about the conditions for the possibility of such experience or thinking. So, for some language 'L' which is not a meta-language prior to Kant's critical turn sentences of philosophy could be sentences of L. After Kant's critical turn sentences of philosophy could not be sentences of L, but are paradigmatically sentences about L, in particular about L's possibility. This formulation is congruent with the definition of transcendental argument (page~ 1~ above) because the sentences of critical philosophy will express propositions which are reports of conditions C...Cn in the absence of which L could not exist, or at least not be a meaningful language.

4 A new variety of anti-foundationalism, characteristic of the critical paradigm, may now be formulated. Again, it is the conjunction of a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that there exists no meta physically privileged set of entities such that if those entities did not exist then no other sorts of entity could exist. In particular, philosophy is not to consist in logically deducing propositions about the rest of reality from propositions just about those entities:  $E \sim (Ea = Eb \dots n)$  It might be objected that there do exist such privileged entities within the critical paradigm. For example, any materialist will agree that unless physical objects (or 'matter') existed, nothing else could. Also, Peter Strawson argues in Strawson (1959) that unless we could individuate physical objects ('material particulars') we would not be able to individuate other sorts of entity (events, persons, states of consciousness) Although not an ontological thesis it is prima facie an epistemological counterpart to the foundationalism excluded by the negative thesis. The crucial difference is in 'metaphysical'. The sorts of entities privileged within the critical paradigm are intended to be non-metaphysical: i.e. not entities beyond the range of our possible experience. The positive thesis is that philosophy within the critical paradigm is premised - often in a loose sense - on some sentence or sentences about common sense. There are two ways of taking 'common sense' here. It can mean what is minimally assumed to exist by (most) human beings, or it can mean what the philosopher pre-philosophically believes exists. What is believed in the two cases need not differ because of this ambiguity. This is anti-foundationalist because it is not impossible for common sense, or some aspect of it, to be called into question and typically philosophical explanations are offered of how common sense is possible. Thus Husserl claims the natural attitude is constructed out of acts of consciousness; Ayer thinks physical objects are logical constructions out of sense data; Wittgenstein thinks ordinary language including psychological self-ascription is possible only on condition it is rule governed, public and embedded in a set of language games; Heidegger claims to lay bare ontological pre-conditions for our common sense beliefs in the 'being of entities' and Marx thinks what passes for common sense has historical pre-conditions: at his time capitalism. There are two tendencies at work here: one is asking the critical question, 'What is it?'; the other is the asking of 'How is it possible?' of some item of common sense (experience, physical objects, language, bourgeois ideology) Clearly transcendental philosophy will answer the second question by transcendental argument (see page above)

5 LL 66z. The point Hegel accepts from Kant can be put thus: for any proposition 'p' which putatively is or is part of an epistemologically primitive philosophical claim, it is assumed that it is prima facie logically possible that  $\neg p$ . This skepticism about unrevisable starting points is typical of the critical paradigm although the Logical Positivist's sense data theory (phenomenalism) constitutes a partial exception to it.

6 G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (London, Unwin, 1969) Michael Inwood (ed.), Hegel (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985), p.6. The essential features of Hegel's conception of synthesis or 'aufheben' may be expressed thus: if C and C' are semantic opposites, then it follows that C could not be meaningful unless C~ or some semantic equivalent were meaningful and that C~ could not be meaningful unless C or some semantic equivalent were meaningful. Thus although opposites, they are each dependent on the other for any semantic role. It is Hegel's view that in such cases there exists, or at least could be invented, some further concept, C~-, which denotes those aspects of reality already denoted by each of C and C~. Thus C and C' are in one sense of the German 'abolished' but in another sense 'retained' by C~-. Several features of this model are anticipated by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In particular the third antinomy depends for its formulation upon two contrasting concepts: freedom and necessity. Kant's synthesis - that rational self-conscious beings are noumenally free but phenomenally determined - is not denoted by some new concept C~ that includes as its semantic components 'free' and 'determined', but it is clear that were Hegel to devise such a concept it would be a synonym, or partial synonym of 'both free and determined' in Kant's sense.

9 Three books in the 'analytical tradition' tackle the same problem. Colin McGinn, in *The Subjective View*, examines our subjective and objective means of representing the world. Thomas Nagel in *The View From Nowhere* (Oxford, 1986) attempts to do justice to both subjective and objective descriptions of the world and find a description of the whole which will find room for the perceiving subject. A.W. Moore *Points of View* (Oxford)

10 See G.W.F. Hegel *Faith and Knowledge*, trans. W. Cerf and H.S. Harris (State University of New York Press, 1977), especially p.~77 ff.

11 Hegel (1977), p.80.

12 See Priest (1986), p. 28 ff.

13 G.W.F. Hegel. *The Philosophy of History* trans. J. Sibree (Dover Publications, New York, 1956), Part IV.

Habermas Refs

Goldmann Refs +Williams

Kant German + CPR A and B Refs

JHPP ALL REFS AS FOOTNOTES

Marx

( ) I have in mind the publication and reception of Kojin Karatani *Transcritique: On Kant and Marx*, trans. Sabu Koshu, (MIT, Cambridge Mass. 2003) Karatani's thesis presupposes at least the absence of logical consistency between Marxism and the critical epistemology of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

( ) Jurgen Habermas Knowledge and Human Interests ( )

(15) The German Ideology 43, quoted by Habermas.

(16) Grundrisse 389 quoted by Habermas.

(17) Williams 1983 Chapter 9.

(18) Williams 1983 223.

For Rorty on pragmatism and the history of modern philosophy, the reader should consult not only PMN but his *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Harvester Press, Sussex, 1982), especially the introduction. For the status of Frege in the history of modern philosophy the crucial statement for Frege's historical and philosophical importance is by Michael Dummett in 'Frege's Place in the History of Philosophy' in his *Frege: Philosophy of Language* (Duckworth, London, 1973). P.M.S. Hacker and G. Baker take a diametrically opposed view in their *Logical Excavations* (Blackwell, Oxford, 198 ), and Dummett has replied in his review of their book 'An Unsuccessful Dig' in C. Wright (ed.), *Frege: Tradition and Influence* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1984). umably with

Abbreviations

CPR: *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan, London, 1979)

EACH MOVEMENT IN MOD PHIL IS SECULAR BUT RESTS ON METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS. THEY CAN ONLY BE EXPLAINED THEOLOGICALLY.

WRITE A SECOND PART TO EACH CHAPTER SHOWING THEOLOGY'S APPEASEMENT OF SECULAR PHILOSOPHY.

SHOW HOW EACH ANTI-METAPHYSICAL PHIL RESTS ON METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS.

Each phil. emasculates the spiritual. Will not do to say this is the ineffability of God. The content of faith is under attack.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEOLOGY CATASTROPHIC. SHOW THIS AT END OF EACH CHAPTER.

Obsequious following of secular philosophy is by theology appeasement. It sustains secularism.

Main Entry: **secular** [sek-yuh-ler] Show IPA Show Spelled

Part of Speech: *adjective*

Definition: not spiritual or religious

Synonyms: [civil](#), earthly, laic, laical, [lay](#), [material](#), [materialistic](#), nonclerical, nonreligious, of this world, [profane](#), [temporal](#), unsacred, [worldly](#)

Notes: **sectarian** means of or relating to or characteristic of a sect or sects, while **secular** means not specifically relating to religion or to a religious body or not religious or spiritual in nature

Antonyms: [godly](#), [holy](#), [religious](#), [spiritual](#)

Main Entry: **profane** [pruh-feyn, proh-] Show IPA Show Spelled

Part of Speech: *adjective*

Definition: immoral, crude, disrespectful of religion

Synonyms: [abusive](#), atheistic, blasphemous, [coarse](#), [dirty](#)\*, [filthy](#)\*, [foul](#), godless, [heathen](#), idolatrous, impious, impure, indecent, infidel, irreligious, [irreverent](#), irreverential, [mundane](#), [nasty](#), [obscene](#), pagan, profanatory, [raunchy](#), sacrilegious, [sinful](#), smutty, [temporal](#), [transient](#), transitory, unconsecrated, ungodly, unhallowed, unholy, unsanctified, [vulgar](#), [wicked](#), [worldly](#)

Antonyms: [clean](#), [moral](#), [sacred](#)

\* = informal/non-formal usage

Nor do I make any historical claim about the extent to which structuralists read, heard about, or were 'influenced' by Kant.

The first structuralist was Aristotle.

Quantum physics enforces a synthesis of metaphysics and epistemology.

Marx's pragmatic transformation of Kant is consistent with his partly Kantian view that the human subject does perceive the world as it is ordered through his or her subjective, historically constituted categories.

[[Marx's thought is dialectical. Kant[WHO?] is right to identify dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason, especially in the triadic arrangement of the categories and in the Third Antinomy.]]

[[The categorical imperative is a principle of universalisability and, although abstract because derived from a consideration of logical consistency, the categorical imperative is an egalitarian principle and, to that extent, socialist. This reading of Kant should balance the construal of noumenal freedom as an *a priori* legitimation of bourgeois individualism.[WHO IS THIS?]]]

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(9) ([...] *es denn sich selbst anschautet, nicht wie es sich unmittelbar selbsttätig vorstellen wurde, sondern nach der Art, wie es von ihnen affiziert wird, folglich wie*

*es sich erscheint, nicht Wie es ist.*) Kant *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (B 69), *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 69, p. 88)

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## EXISTENTIALISM

Include:

1. Heidegger

2. Richardson

3. Nietzsche and Spinoza

for Nietzsche's *ontology*.

### **The End of the Will to Power: From Aesthetics to Theology**

**Stephen Priest**

‘Doit-on lire Nietzsche, avec Heidegger, comme le dernier des grands métaphysiciens? Doit-on au contraire entendre la question de la vérité de l'être comme le dernier sursaut ensommeillé de l'homme supérieur?’

Jacques Derrida ‘Les fins de l'homme’ (1)

The Nietzsche of *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik* and after considers the highest art, paradigmatically fifth-century Attic tragedy, the joint product of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. (2) In *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im Aussermoralischen Sinn*, Nietzsche claims that *any* human being operates ‘als künstlerisch schaffendes Subjekt’ (I) ‘as an artistically creating subject’, so, in Nietzsche's broad sense, we are all artists because we all make life tolerable by projecting the Apollonian onto the Dionysian. In *Der Wille zur Macht* Nietzsche speaks of ‘Die Welt als ein sich selbst gebärendes Kunstwerk - -’ WP 796 (1885-

1886), 'The world as a work of art that gives rise to itself - ', so in the *Nachlass* the totality of what is, is both artist and artwork.

Although Nietzsche's concept of art gains dramatically in extension in this way, which we could call a transition from *cultural aesthetics*, through *humanist aesthetics* to *cosmic aesthetics*, I am not concerned to trace the history of this idea here. Rather, I disprove Nietzsche's anti-realism about aesthetics in its broadest extension by showing that the Apollonian is not an illusion but a fundamental presupposition of the Dionysian. Beauty is not invented but discovered, not projected but discerned.

By the last page of *Der Wille zur Macht*, the end of his writing but the beginning of his metaphysics, in an inversion of the Platonic worlds of *doxa* and *episteme*, flux and form, the changing and the unchanging, Nietzsche consigns the now unmentioned but still present Apollonian to vedantic and Schopenhaurian *maya* and upholds the Dionysian as reality. Nietzsche is to Schopenhauer as Buddhism is to Hinduism (and Schopenhauer is to Kant as Hinduism is to Vedanta). In disavowed but apposite Kantian terms, the Apollonian is the *Erscheinung*, the categorized and schematized *phenomenon*; the Dionysian the *Ding-an-sich*, where this 'Ding' can no more refer to a thing than it can in Kant's critiques because the Apollonian provides the Schopenhaurian *principium individuationis* which the Dionysian at once makes redundant and subverts.

Can this world of Dionysian 'Becoming' be understood? In implicitly ascribing quasi-Parmenidean, and even theological, properties to the Dionysian, or the Heraclitean, Nietzsche unconsciously relies upon that metaphysics he seeks to repudiate. On at least three levels; logical, semantic, and ontological, a Platonic and even Judeo-Christian ontology is an unacknowledged transcendental presupposition of his philosophy; so Nietzsche is a metaphysician and a theologian *malgre lui*. Thinking the possibility of Nietzsche's aesthetics uncovers the hidden metaphysical ground. The Dionysian presupposes the Apollonian, the Nietzschean the divine. I show this, in Section I, by a commentary on the final section of *Der Wille zur Macht*. Once the Apollonian presuppositions of the Dionysian are made explicit, I argue in Section II that Nietzsche's aesthetic anti-realism is false but some of his claims about art and the aesthetic may nevertheless be ironically understood to express profound truths.

## I

**(1) 'Und wißt ihr auch, was mir >>die Welt<< ist?'**

And do you also know, what "the world" is to me? (3)

Nietzsche's question presupposes a logical commitment to being, predication, presence, essence, unity, self and other, knowledge and truth.

The use of 'ist' is predicative, so not only is a distinction between a subject of predication and its predicates presupposed but existential commitment to the world, here in the metaphysical sense of the totality of what is whatever is. 'ist' is present tense but presence is presupposed not only in the empirically temporal (but ultimately a-temporal) sense of 'now' but also in the quasi-spatial sense of 'presence to' because there is, allegedly, something the world is to Nietzsche.

In 'the world' not only 'world' but the use of the definite article implies a unity, the unity of the whole out of its parts and the unity that makes that unity possible; the primordial un-it-y which is a one-ness which does not even in principle admit of division: the atom, not the bundle. This one-ness which does not even in principle admit of plurality is a metaphysical property of what is, whatever is, because any putative duplication the world could only be a part or extension of the world.

Despite his intermittent repudiation of a realist ontology of the self, and his endorsement of a Humean introspected flux, Nietzsche is unable to dispense with 'to me', 'mir'. Not only is the existence of the self entailed but, as his dative implies, it is an object of presentation: The world is something (even if not some-thing) *to me*. Solipsism is assumed to be false because you ('ihr') or the reader, purportedly exist because addressed. It follows that there is not only a self/not-self distinction, a distinction between the portion of what is with which one is identical and the remainder with which one is not, but also a self/other distinction, a distinction between oneself, whatever one is, and at least one qualitatively similar being who one is not. The metaphysical distinction between 'self' and 'other' has not been 'overcome'.

By asking 'what' the world is, Nietzsche is committed to essences because if there is something that something is then there is at least one essence, in the minimal sense of the set of properties which distinguish something from what it is not, even if not overtly in the sense of the Platonic realism it ultimately requires. Nietzsche tends to present a caricature of Plato's philosophy to his readers but Plato has no more interest than Nietzsche in groundless ontological extravagance. Plato thinks much harder than Nietzsche about his own presuppositions, including the existence of *types*: what it is for sorts or kinds to exist as opposed to what it consists in for sorts or kind of things to exist.

Finally, if one can 'know' what the world is to Nietzsche then there is knowledge as opposed to, say, belief, opinion, conjecture or perspective. Knowledge

is truth entailing so if there is knowledge there is truth. Nietzsche, in any case, presupposes truth at every turn. If there are only perspectives it is true that there are only perspectives. If the self does not exist it is true that the self does not exist. If the Apollonian is an illusion it is true that the Apollonian is an illusion, and so on. Truth, like other metaphysical concepts, is not an extravagant postulate but a presupposition it is terribly difficult to extirpate.

It is not open to Nietzsche to reply with any plausibility, in quasi-Wittgensteinian or Kantian fashion, that in identifying his metaphysical assumptions I am being misled by grammar, because shorn of the ontological implications I have identified, Nietzsche's claims are shorn of content: By asking 'Do you know what 'the world' means to me?' he is not then asking the reader what the world means to him. Nietzsche is doing metaphysics or he is doing nothing.

## (2) 'Soll ich sie euch in meinem Spiegel zeigen?'

'Shall I show it to you in my mirror?'

Nietzsche's use of 'mirror' commits him to the existence of representations and the onus is on the Nietzschean to show that he is not logically committed to a quasi-Lockean representational theory of perception *malgré lui*. Even if not all representations are re-presentations, for example if, despite their construction, there is an *ur* presentation, an original presence, Nietzsche's mirror contains re-presentation because *ex hypothesi*, Nietzsche perceives the world, a presentation, and he shows the world 'to us' in his mirror. He presupposes at the very least: a re-presentation of a re-presentation of that presentation. The 'original' presentation is of 'the world' as it is 'to' Nietzsche, not as it is to another but, in way presupposed by the possibility of communication, as it could in principle be for another. This play of the constant and the variable is Kantian: categorically *a priori* but intuitively *a posteriori*. Here we could insert the differences between Locke and Wittgenstein or between Husserl and Derrida. To avoid the representational theory of perception, Derrida's "There has never been any perception' would provide just one sufficient condition. (4) Nietzsche's mirror would not thereby be shattered (because the shards of a mirror are mirrors). There would be no mirror.

## (3) 'Diese Welt:'

'This world:'

Aside from the commitment to the totality of what is whatever is, in 'Welt', the use of the demonstrative 'this', 'diese', commits Nietzsche to a grammar of indexicals with ontological presuppositions; a covert metaphysics of actuality. Although a pure

logic of indexicals provides truth conditions for indexical sentences in a token reflexive way, this 'this' as once presupposes the presence or possible presence of the demonstrated, the world, and the tacit subject(s) this is a presence or possible presence to. This metaphysics of presence, although not avowed by Nietzsche is a condition for his thought. If we push thinking further than Nietzsche, the attempt to think the essence of presence points to theology.

In a way through logic, and in a way through connotation, there is an implicit ontology of possible worlds in 'this world'. The use of 'this' not 'the' suggests at least the logical possibility of numerically distinct worlds. Despite the exclusive sense of 'world', derived from the logical impossibility of there being anything that there is except what there is, whatever there is, conceptual room remains for ways the world could have been or could be: possible worlds in a literal sense of 'world', ways *everything* could have been. To explain the possibility of possible worlds, (which would be to explain the possibility of possibility) would require at least: exemplifications of transcendental types, creations, pure Being which excludes the Nothingness it might be thought to dialectically imply.

If we reject realism about possible worlds we leave unanswered the ontological question of what it is for there to be possibilities, here, what it is for there to be certain possibilities which Nietzsche seeks to repudiate. The metaphysics of actuality stands in need of explanation. For example; if (as David Lewis thought) to say this world is actual is to say that we are amongst its members, Nietzsche is committed to an ontology of possible worlds one of which is 'our' world. As Derrida might ask: Who are we? (5)

#### (4) 'ein Ungeheurer von Kraft'

'A monster of power'

['Kraft': 'energy', 'force']

In the absence of argument in philosophy we might as well believe the opposite. Why not the opposite of a monster? Why not a benevolent, pantheistic God or, if a clean distinction can be drawn between what happens and the source of what happens, the transcendental God of Judeo-Christian theism? Then the world is a perpetual fountain of presence: both creator and creation. Nietzsche has said the world is a monster. Although 'Ungeheurer' is deployed by Nietzsche as a noun, and is very naturally translated 'monster', the word has an adjectival use to mean 'mighty' and an adverbial use to mean 'mightily', predicates which the Judeo-Christians use to ascribe an essential property to God.

We need not translate 'Kraft' as energy as Kaufmann and Hollingdale have done but could choose any of: 'strength', 'power', 'force', 'vigour', 'efficacy', 'validity'.

Suppose 'Kraft' does mean 'energy' here. *pace* the claims of modern physics, we have next to no idea what energy is. 'Energy' is a metaphysical concept.

**(5) 'ohne Anfang'**

'without beginning'

Suppose the world is without a beginning if and only if:

$$\exists x x t^1 \rightarrow \exists y [y t^2 \ \& \ (t^2 < t^1)]$$

That what is did not begin to be, or what becomes did not begin to become, is a metaphysical claim and, in the absence of argument, we might as well believe the opposite. The world has a beginning:

$$\exists x x t^1 \rightarrow -\exists y [y t^2 \ \& \ (t^2 < t^1)]$$

Nietzsche's preference is inconsistent both with Jewish and Christian scripture and with the Kantian thesis that the claim that there was a first event is neither true nor false. (I do not read Kant as only pointing to an epistemological *aporia* but as a metaphysical anti-realist: Metaphysical sentences are not truth-valued.) Nietzsche's view is consistent with the Aristotelian and Thomist thesis that the beginning of the world cannot be proven. Although whether what happens began to happen is currently thought to be an unsolved philosophical problem or, less plausibly, an empirical problem, there are reasons for believing that there was a first event. For example:

(1)  $\exists x x t^1 \rightarrow \exists y [y t^2 \ \& \ (t^2 < t^1)] \rightarrow - \exists x t t = 0$

(2)  $\exists x t t = 0$

(3)  $-\left[\exists x x t^1 \rightarrow \exists y [y t^2 \ \& \ (t^2 < t^1)]\right]$

Nietzsche's 'ohne Anfang' identifies one of the properties necessary for anything's being God. If we read 'world' as 'the totality of what is, whatever is' then Nietzsche is committed to the thesis that what is possesses one of the properties of God.

**(6) 'ohne Ende'**

'without end'

Suppose the world is without end if and only if:

$$\exists x x t^1 \rightarrow \exists y [y t^2 \ \& \ (t^2 > t^1)]$$

Again, Nietzsche presents a metaphysical thesis without argument so we might as well believe the opposite. The world is not without end:

$$\exists x x t^1 \rightarrow -\exists y [y t^2 \ \& \ (t^2 > t^1)]$$

His preference is inconsistent with Christian scripture's eschatological entailments. However, there seems no *a priori* proof of the end of the world. No contradiction seems entailed by the supposition that each event has a successor event, nor by its logical consequence that each event therefore has an infinite number of successor events. That the world *will* end remains an article of faith for Christians. That the world *will not* end remains an article of faith for Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's 'ohne Ende' identifies one of the properties ascribed by theists to God so if the world is the totality of what is, then Nietzsche and the theists agree that there is world without end.

### (7) 'eine fest, eherne Größe von Kraft'

'a firm, iron quantity of power'

['Größe von Kraft': 'magnitude of force', 'quantity of energy']

Read one way, this is an impressionistic statement of the Third Law of Thermodynamics which entails that the overall quantity of energy in the universe does not vary. Although an axiom of science, this neo-Newtonian doctrine might have to be given up to make sense of mental causation. We cannot give up mental causation or we give up making sense.

Read another way, Nietzsche unknowingly ascribes to the world a property of God: God remains constant, 'fest': firm, solid, hard, compact, strong, stout, tight, fast, stable, fixed immovable, rigid, constant, permanent, enduring. 'fester Boden' is 'firm ground'. 'festen Fuß fassen' is 'to gain a (firm) footing'. 'eherne' is brazen, brass, bronze. (Not 'iron', as Kaufmann and Hollingdale have it.) There is the unchanging. Theists who know that they are theists call the unchanging 'God' (or some synonym).

### (8) 'welche nicht größer, nicht kleiner wird'

'that does not become bigger, nor smaller'

Suppose the world does not grow bigger or smaller if and only if:

$$\exists!w [-(w t^1 < w t^2) \& -(w t^1 > w t^2) \& t^1 < t^2]$$

We could read Nietzsche's claim as an expression of the Third Law of Thermodynamics. If the quantity of energy (force, power, 'Kraft') is constant ('fest') then it does not vary. Nietzsche has introduced *the permanent* into his world of flux.

This temporal logic is inapplicable to God, because God has no temporal properties. Nevertheless, God does not even in principle grow bigger or smaller, because God has no temporal properties.

### (9) 'die sich nicht verbraucht'

'that does not expend itself'

Suppose  $w$  expends itself if and only if:

$w$  at  $t_1$  is  $>$   $w$  at  $t_2$  and  $w$  at  $t_2$  is  $>$   $w$  at  $t_3$ ...

then  $w$  does not expend itself if and only if it is not the case that

$w$  at  $t_1$  is  $>$   $w$  at  $t_2$  and  $w$  at  $t_2$  is  $>$   $w$  at  $t_3$ ...

but if it is not the case that

$w$  at  $t_1$  is  $>$   $w$  at  $t_2$  and  $w$  at  $t_2$  is  $>$   $w$  at  $t_3$ ...

then

$w$  at  $t_1 = w$  at  $t_2$  &  $w$  at  $t_3 = w$  at  $t_2$

or

$w$  at  $t_1$  is  $<$   $w$  at  $t_2$  and  $w$  at  $t_2$  is  $<$   $w$  at  $t_3$ ...

and the world is the cause of its own not doing that. We need this clause to capture the subject 'Diese Welt', and Nietzsche's reflexive 'sich'. The world thereby has one of the characteristics of God because according to traditional theism, God's power is in no way *expended* by the act of creation. This is just one of the meanings of 'creation *ex nihilo*'.

**(10) ‘sondern nur verwandelt’**

‘but only transforms itself’

Suppose  $w$  transforms itself if and only if  $w$  causes itself to gain and lose properties (including the property of having certain members):

$w$  is  $F$  at  $t$  &  $w$  is  $\neg F$  at  $t_1$  &  $w$  is  $G$  at  $t_3$ ...

and  $w$  causes itself to gain and lose such properties. What has such power? What does the totality of what there is have to be like in order for the Nietzschean picture to be accurate? Even though the reflexivity of (9) carries over to (10), it is a presupposition of ‘transforms’ (‘verwandelt’) that what is admits of a distinction between transformer and transformed, or changer and changed, or agent and acted upon. This distinction within what is cannot be thought of on the model of causal interaction between physical objects (because it pertains to the Dionysian). Nietzsche is at this moment thereby committed *malgre lui* to a bifurcation between transformer and transformed, or as the theist would put it, creator and created, God and creation.

**(11) ‘als Ganzes’**

‘as a whole’

The un-it-y which is presupposed by the unity of parts is not of the nature of a thing. Un-it-y is no-thing-ness. This no-thing-ness is not nothing but, if not everything either, makes everything possible. The whole in the sense of ‘the totality’ is only possible if there is a whole in this transcendent sense. (See the treatment of (1) above.)

**(12) ‘unverwänderlich groß**

‘of unalterable size’

I take it that this claim is logically equivalent to (8):

$\exists!w [-(w t^1 < w t^2) \ \& \ -(w t^1 > w t^2) \ \& \ t^1 < t^2]$

and that (13) and (14) are a metaphorical re-iteration of (8) and (12).

**(13) ‘ein Haushalt ohne Ausgaben und Einbußen’**

‘a household without expenses or losses’

**(14) ‘aber ebenso ohne Zuwachs, ohne Einnahmen’**

‘but just the same without increase, without income’

**(15) ‘vom >>Nichts<< umschlossen als von seiner Grenze’**

‘enclosed by "Nothingness" as by its frontier’

[‘Nichts’: nothing]

[‘seiner Grenze’: its boundary]

In Presocratic terms, Nietzsche repudiates Being, endorses Becoming, and endorses Nothing or Nothingness. As a heuristic (I make no biographical claim) we may read Nietzsche as adding to a range of possibilities opened by Heraclitus and Parmenides:

- (a) Heraclitus: Being and Nothingness do not exist. There is only Becoming.
- (b) Parmenides: Becoming and Nothingness do not exist. There is only Being.
- (c) Nietzsche: Being does not exist. There is only Becoming and Nothingness.

Nietzsche provides no argument for his endorsement of a philosophy of Becoming and Nothingness rather than a Heraclitean or Parmenidean ontology, or Hegel’s recognition of a synthesis of Being (*Sein*) and Nothingness (*Nichts*) in Becoming (*Werden*) in the opening paragraphs of his dialectic. Nietzsche has no refutation of Hegel’s view that Being and Nothingness, as opposites, are mutually dependent on levels we could identify as phenomenological, psychological, semantic and ontological so that, *a fortiori*, there cannot be Nothingness or Becoming without Being. Nor does Nietzsche have any reply to the Parmenidean suggestion that it is contradictory to say that there is Nothingness, because that would be to ascribe existence to the non-existent.

There cannot be Becoming but no Being. To see this, consider the difference between, on the one hand, Becoming and, on the other hand, absolutely nothing whatsoever. It is right to characterise this difference as follows. In the first case there is Becoming. In the second case there is no Becoming. In the first case Becoming exists. In the second case it is not the case that Becoming exists. Being is primordial with regard to Becoming. If there is Becoming then there is being but the reverse does not follow.

Does the world have a limit, a threshold? Does Becoming have a limit, a frontier, boundary, limit, border, edge, end, term, extreme point, limitation? If there is Becoming, as Nietzsche supposes, then arguably there is Nothingness because if Becoming is the transition from Being to Nothingness, or from Nothingness to Being, or both, then there is Nothingness. There is also thereby Being, a conclusion Nietzsche would wish to resist but one he is forced to.

If we push Nietzsche's metaphysical presuppositions still further and ask 'What is Being?' the only plausible answer is that Being is immaterial, infinite and that which is ultimately necessary for beings. Being has the properties of the being of God. Being is the being of God.

### (16) 'nichts Verschwimmendes, Verschwendetes'

'not something blurry, or wasted'

Suppose  $x$  is blurry if and only if  $x$  is describable only by fuzzy logic. Then the world is not blurry if and only if it has a determinate character reportable in propositions with truth values which do not admit of degree. There is no incoherence in this, but Nietzsche has missed an opportunity to argue for his view that truth is not simple or straightforward, if an ontology of Becoming may only be characterized by fuzzy logic. If  $x$  is  $F$  but also becoming not- $F$  then the proposition  $Fx$  might (for example) be rightly allocated the truth value 0.4 and the proposition that  $x$  is not- $F$  allocated the truth value 0.6, and so on. These allocations could be indexed to times so that:

$\exists x (Fx 0.9 \text{ at } t1 \ \& \ Fx 0.8 \ t2 \ \& \ Fx 0.7 \ t3 \ \dots)$

and so

$\exists x (-Fx 0.1 \text{ at } t1 \ \& \ -Fx 0.2 \ t2 \ \& \ Fx 0.7 \ t3 \ \dots)$

Although this logic does not model the transitions themselves, in the sense that we still do not know what the change from being  $F$  to being not- $F$  consists in, it presents necessary and sufficient conditions for transitions, and so, in a sense, Becoming. On the other hand, the world *qua* totality of what is, for example Becoming, is arguably not 'blurry' (or hazy) because it is determinately that, and not in the process of becoming anything it is not. This rejection of the indeterminate, however, again implicates Nietzsche in a philosophy of Being rather than Becoming: the Being of the totality of what is.

### (17) 'nichts Unendlich-Ausgedehntes'

‘not endlessly-extended’

$w$  is endlessly extended if and only if: For any stretch of  $w$  there exists another stretch of  $w$ , so the world is not endlessly extended if and only if:

It is not the case that: [For any stretch of  $w$  there exists another stretch of  $w$ ].

However we read this, Nietzsche cannot plausibly mean that the world is not endlessly extended *in time*. He has clear stated that the world is infinitely extended in both past and future time (in (5) and (6) above) and it is a logical consequence of the doctrine of eternal return that this is so. Suppose Nietzsche means that the world is not infinitely spatially extended. Again, he provides no argument and *prima facie* the negation of his view might be right. In the Antinomies chapter of the first *Critique* Kant regards the issue as irresolvable and Nietzsche has said nothing to rule that out either.

### (18) ‘sondern als bestimmte Kraft’

‘but as a definite power’

[but as definite force]

If what is is a definite force then there are individuals, and therefore individuation so, *pace* Nietzsche, the Schopenhaurian *principium individuationis* operates at the Dionysian level. Nietzsche presupposes a distinction between power, that which exerts power, and the effects of power within the world, in the sense of the totality of what is, so unwittingly presupposes a distinction between creator, creative act and creation. This tripartite cosmic taxonomy is a necessary condition for the world being ‘a definite force’. In Judeo-Christian terms, the world, the whole of what is, divides into creator, creation, and the creative relation. Again, Nietzsche is committed to theology *malgre lui*.

### (19) ‘einem bestimmten Raum eingelegt’

‘set in a definite space’

[‘Raum’. room, place, area, expanse, capacity, volume, accommodation]

What is the difference between a definite space and an indefinite space? In a sense, Newtonian space is ‘definite’ because locations within it obtain in the presence or absence of physical objects. In a sense, Leibnizian space is ‘indefinite’ because locations within it shift with the movement of physical objects. Again, Nietzsche introduces the permanent, the absolute, the metaphysical, into his world of flux, in this case eschewing the Leibnizian anticipations of Relativity theory. If Newton’s

arguments that absolute space and time are the ‘sensoria of God’ are sound, then Nietzsche has unknowingly admitted the imminence of God to the universe.

**(20) ‘und nicht einem Raume, der irgendwo >>leer<< wäre’**

and not a space that might be “empty” somewhere

[‘and not a sphere that might be "empty" here or there’]

Kaufmann and Hollingdale translate ‘Raume’ as ‘sphere’ rather than ‘space’. Perhaps unconsciously, they thereby express Nietzsche’s Heraclitean disavowal of a fundamental ontology which is Parmenidean. Parmenides’ *sphairon* is implicitly repudiated, or at least hidden and suppressed, by flux even though it is an entailment of Parmenides’ poem that the *sphairon* cannot be ‘empty’ anywhere: There is no non-being, no Nothingness. Nietzsche offers us no reason for arbitrating between Heraclitus and Parmenides in Heraclitus’s favour. If the argument about (15) above is sound, the Heraclitian presupposes the Parmenidean, the Dionysian the Apollonian.

Reading ‘Raum’ uncontroversially as ‘space’, Nietzsche is claiming that there is no empty space. Again, he provides no argument so we might as well believe the opposite.

**(21) ‘vielmehr als Kraft überall’**

‘rather as power everywhere’

[‘but rather as force throughout’]

Power is a disposition but it is less clear that a disposition can be everywhere unless this is equivalent to the quasi-functional claim: For any  $x$ ,  $x$  has some power.

**(22) ‘als Spiel von Kräften und Kräftenwellen’**

as play of powers and power waves

[‘as a play of forces and waves of forces’]

When Derrida says that ‘Le jeu est toujours jeu d’absence et de presence’ (Derrida 1967: 426) ‘Play is always the play of absence and of presence’ we could translate this ‘toujours’ as ‘still’, allowing it the force of ‘nevertheless’. (6) Then Nietzsche’s substitution of ‘Spiel’ for ‘Sein’ is still implicated in the metaphysics it putatively repudiates. In this metaphysics of presence, presence is the presence of Being and

Being is the being of presence. There is a difference between presence, and either no presence or absence. This is a difference between Being and Nothingness. (For example, if there is a play of forces and waves there is a play of forces and waves rather than nothing whatsoever.) There is a difference between Being and Nothingness and this, at least in so far as it is an intelligible difference, is a difference between presence, on the one hand, and either no presence or absence on the other.

Once we probe further, once we ask: What is presence? or Does presence have an essence? How is presence possible? Why is it now now? Why is it always now? we ask questions which only admit of theological answers. The eternal now (as opposed to its Dionysian contents) has all and only the properties of God. Presence is the presence of God.

### **(23) ‘zugleich Eins und Vieles’**

‘at the same time one and many’

What is, is in a sense the one, and in a sense the many. The world can only be ‘one’ in the sense that does not in principle admit of being many because what is, whatever is, is essentially one because any putatively distinct addition would only ever be part of what is. In Judeo-Christian theology, being the one is an essential property of God and being the many is a contingent property of creation. If we consider Nietzsche’s *Welt*, the totality, it contains both the one and the many, both God and creation. Both Nietzsche and Plotinus are neo-platonist theologians, or proto-theologians, the difference between them being that Plotinus makes his fundamental assumptions explicit.

### **(24) ‘hier sich häufend und zugleich dort sich mindernd’**

‘increasing here and at the same time decreasing there’

We know from (7), (8) and (12) that the world does not increase or decrease *qua* totality: The totality of what is, whatever is, remains that despite what comes and goes. Nietzsche means that some components of the world increase or decrease locally, some occupants of ‘hier’ and ‘dort’. This is an uncontroversial claim which might be confirmed empirically.

### **(25) ‘ein Meer in sich selber stürmender und flutender Kräfte’**

‘a sea of forces flowing and rushing together,’

If ‘Meer’, ‘sea’, here has only the literal force of ‘set’ then the claim has no strong theological connotation. If the whole, in a sense, exceeds the parts then, in at least a

pantheistic sense, if the forces are creation then God is the sea. If there is a stronger distinction between sea and forces, for example if the sea as a whole is an *agent* which causes the events within it, or if flowing and rushing is something *done by* the sea, then there obtains a cleaner distinction between God and Creation which the Judeo-Christian could endorse. The sea is necessary for the flowing and rushing as God is necessary for the events in creation. The sea is omnipresent. (In the metaphor, there are no waves that are not in the sea) The sea therefore has yet further properties of God.

**(26) ‘ewig sich wandelnd’**

‘eternally changing,’

[‘eternally changing itself’]

This quasi Heraclitian thesis is true if and only if:

- (1) For any time,  $t$ ,  $w$  changes at  $t$ .
- (2)  $w$  did not begin to change.
- (3)  $w$  will not cease to change.

Nietzsche has no argument for these claims even though they are not self-evident. It is empirically and psychologically compelling that at any time at least some portion of the world is changing, and it follows that the world is changing, but anyone believing the premise needs to refute the conclusions of Parmenides and Zeno who hold the opposite view. As we saw in the cases of (5) and (6) above, it is not clear that change never began or that change will never cease.

**(27) ‘ewig zurücklaufend’**

‘eternally flooding back,’

The doctrine of eternal return entails that for any event and any time there is a qualitatively similar event at a later time, so the world has no end:

$\exists x x t^1 \rightarrow \exists y [y t^2 \ \& \ (t^2 > t^1)]$

As a mythological test of the *Übermensch* there is no need for the reality of the eternal return to be proven, only its consistency. Here, however, Nietzsche is explicitly asserting the eternal return as an ontological doctrine, not just as a myth.

In the absence of any proof that there was a first event or there will be a last event, Nietzsche is right to suppose that the eternal return is possible. There is no contradiction in the supposition that every life of mine has an infinite number of qualitatively identical predecessors and successors. From a Logical Positivist point of view, the supposition is senseless because unverifiable. Although it is right that I would not be able to tell which life I am in (and because they are all qualitatively identical I cannot change my behaviour in the light of the 'test'. For example, there is no *first one* to set the pattern for the remainder) the Positivists unjustifiably assimilate ontology to epistemology. From the fact that we cannot tell whether a claim is true or false it does not follow that it is neither true nor false. The logico-epistemic status of Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal return is synthetic *a priori*. Nevertheless, in his doctrine of eternal return, Nietzsche breaks out of his conservative acquiescence in the Kantian orthodoxy and engages in that subversive activity prohibited by modernity: metaphysics. Kant's prohibition is on any metaphysical synthetic *a priori*.

Nietzsche says the eternally flooding back is

**(28) 'mit unheuren Jahren der Wiederkehr'**

'with tremendous years of recurrence,'

and

**(29) 'mit einer Ebbe und Flut seiner Gestaltungen'**

'with an ebb and a flood of its forms;'

so there are forms. If there are forms then one form is distinct from another and the *principium individuationis* has not been expunged from the Dionysian. The ebb and flow is

**(30) 'aus den einfachsten in die vielfältigsten hinaustreibend'**

'out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex,'

so, even at the Dionysian level, there is a distinction between the simple and the complex:

(a) 'simple' (def.)  $x$  is simple if and only if  $x$  has no parts

and

(b) ‘complex’ (def.) ‘ $x$  is complex if and only if  $x$  has parts’

The Dionysian is therefore not wholly indeterminate but presupposes Apollonian distinctness.

We do not know that a thoroughgoing entropy is not true, one which would preclude the emergence of the complex out of the simple but only allow the reverse.

Nietzsche suggests that the motor of change is contradiction:

**(31) ‘aus dem Stillsten, Starrsten, Kältesten hinaus in das Glühendste, Wildeste, Sich-selber-Widersprechendste’**

‘out of the stillest, most rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory,’

Is change self-contradictory? *prima facie*, there is a coherent account of change:

‘change’ (def.)  $x$  changes if and only if  $x$  is  $F$  at  $t_1$  &  $x$  is not  $F$  at  $t_2$

but arguably this fails to capture change itself and only models the situation before and after the change but we need to know what is happening at the time of change. Change is contradictory if this holds:

$x$  changes if and only if  $Fx$  and not  $Fx$  at  $t$

but that does not look plausible as an account of change. It is the claim that something both possesses and lacks a property at a time. It does not capture the requisite notion of *gaining* or *shedding* properties. Zeno thinks that moving is both being in a place and being in a distinct place at a time:

‘moves’ (def.)  $x$  moves if and only if  $x$  is at  $P$  at  $t$ ,  $x$  is at  $P_1$  at  $t$

Zeno concludes that there is no motion. Why do we not follow him? It is usually thought fatal to the existence of any putative phenomenon to identify a contradiction in the entailments of its description. (Ghosts and time travel are often ruled out as being ‘contradictory to describe’.) We do not think this in the case of motion because the reality of motion is so psychologically compelling. The lesson is this: A contradiction in a theory is only sufficient to refute *that theory*, and there remains open the possibility of a consistent theory of any subject matter.

**(32) ‘und dann wieder aus dem Fülle heimkehrend zum Einfachen,’**

‘and then again returning home to the simple out of this abundance,’

Nietzsche allows the opposite possibility to (30): the most complex forms degenerating into the most simple.

**(33) ‘aus dem Spiel der Widersprüche zurück bis zur Lust des Einklangs,’**

‘out of the play of contradictions back to the joy of concord,’

Nietzsche allows the opposite of (31): concord or consistency, the dance of Siva.

**(34) ‘sich selber bejahendnoch in dieser Gleichheit seiner Bahnen und Jahre’**

‘still affirming itself in this uniformity of its courses and its years,’

This ‘uniformity’ is change itself.

**(35) ‘sich selber segnend als das, was ewig wiederkommen muß’**

‘blessing itself as that which must return eternally,’

What is this ‘segnen’, ‘to bless, ‘to give benediction to’, ‘to make the sign of the cross over’, ‘to consecrate’? If what is *blesses itself* then what is divided into *the blesser* and *the blessed*. In Judeo-Christian terms, the true or ultimate source of blessing is called ‘God’ and the blessed ‘creation’. Nietzsche overtly draws a theological distinction which the theist is happy to endorse.

**(36) ‘als ein Werden, das kein Sattwerden, keinen Überdruß, keine Müdigkeit kennt-:’**

‘as a Becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness:’

An analysis of Becoming (*Werden*) which is not false but nevertheless inadequate is:

$$\exists x (Fx t^1 \ \& \ -Fx t^2 \ \vee \ -Fx t^1 \ \& \ Fx t^2) \ \& \ t^1 < t^2$$

It is not false because it entails that something either becomes *F* or becomes not *F*, and that is necessary and sufficient for its ‘becoming’ in the sense of gaining or shedding properties. Becoming is then a kind of change, a change in what is true of some subject of change. The analysis is inadequate because Becoming itself is left unanalysed. Although it is reasonably clear what it consists in for *x* to be *F* at *t*<sup>1</sup> and

to not be F at  $t^2$ , it is not clear what the transition is between  $t^1$  and  $t^2$  entailed by ‘gaining’ a property, ‘shedding’ a property, ‘changing’, or ‘Becoming’. Intuitively, the analysis depicts the situation before the Becoming and depicts the situation after the Becoming but fails to depict the Becoming. Suppose we allow for degrees of property acquisition or loss over time:

$$\exists x (Fx^n t^1 \ \& \ Fx^{n1} t^2 \vee \neg Fx^n t^1 \ \& \ Fx^n t^2) \ \& \ t^1 < t^2$$

where ‘ $n$ ’ stands for ‘to some degree’, for example: ‘to degree  $n$ ’, ‘to degree  $n1$ ’. This analysis is also inadequate, but not just because the transition itself is still omitted. The further inadequacy is the one Socrates perceives in reporting Heraclitus’s doctrine of change in the *Theaetetus*:

[ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίνεταί πάντα ἃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες: \[152ε\] ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίνεταί.](#) *Platonis Opera* ed. John Burnet (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1903) 152 d-e

‘The fact is that, as a result of movement, change and mixture with one another, all the things which we say are – which is not the right way to speak of them – are coming to be; because nothing ever is, but things are always coming to be.’ Plato *Theaetetus* trans. John McDowell (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979) p. 17 152 d-e

Becoming is so thoroughgoing that it not only does not entail a subject of change but logically precludes any. Nietzsche chooses the gerundive ‘a becoming’ (*ein Werden*) rather than the continuous ‘becoming’ (*Werden*) to signal the self sufficiency of Becoming; its independence of anything which does become. Because the world, in the sense of the totality of what is, is Becoming it is at least false, and arguably makes little sense, to say that there is a subject of that change or totality of changes. Apart from Becoming there is nothing (*Nichts*), *a fortiori*, there is no subject of Becoming.

It follows that the quasi-Aristotlelian analysis of change is inadequate to Nietzschean Becoming. Heraclitus escapes Aristotle. Nevertheless, ‘a’ becoming presupposes individuation: one process or episode of becoming which is numerically distinct from what it is not so, again, the Dionysian presuppose the the Schopenhaurian *principium individuationis*, the Apollonian, so ultimately, the Platonic.

**(37) ‘diese meine dionysische Welt des Ewig-sich-selber-Schaffens’**

‘this, my Dionysian world of the eternally-self-creating,’

Nietzsche recognizes the eternally self-creating. In Judeo-Christian theology, being the eternally self-creating is a property of God. God is *causa sui*. This self creation of God by God is eternal, not in the sense of being extended over infinite time, but in the sense of never ceasing to take place in the eternal present. There is a distinction between two kinds of presence, on the one hand, the presence which is transient, that which is present, the Heraclitean event, and, on the other hand, the presence which it consists in for the time to always be now: the Now. The first is the presence of creation, the second the presence of God. Nietzsche recognizes both eternity and self-creation so, again, introduces theological properties *malgré lui*.

**(38) ‘des Ewig sich-selber-Zerstörens,’**

‘the eternally self-destroying,’

If there is the eternally self-destroying then there is eternity. Although God’s acts are eternal or timeless, a theist might readily agree with Nietzsche that the empirical world is a mass of processes which are beginning and ending. Although God is necessarily not self-destroying, what is self destroying in so far as God’s creation has an end, the end of the world. God is part of what is and that end is brought about by God.

**(39) ‘diese Geheimnis-Welt der doppelte Wollüste’**

‘this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight,’

There is creation and destruction. There is God and the devil. As Nietzsche says, there is mystery.

**(40) ‘diese, mein >>Jenseits von Güt und Böse<<,’**

‘this, my "beyond good and evil,"’

The theist may readily agree that there is a ‘beyond’ good and evil because God is beyond *human concepts of* good and evil. God is the creator of values which exceed any human understanding of values.

**(41) ‘ohne Ziel, wenn nicht im Glück des Kreises ein Ziel liegt,’**

‘without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal;’

['Ziel': point]

['Glück': luck/happiness]

['wenn nicht': if not]

There is a clear sense in which the world, what is as a whole, cannot have any point, any goal, outside itself: There is not any goal or point outside what is because there is not anything outside what is. Nietzsche qualifies 'ohne Ziel', 'without goal', with 'wenn nicht', 'if ... not'. A theist could happily agree with Nietzsche that there is a circle of creation and destruction, of emanating from and returning to God. The joy (happiness, luck) of this circle, creation by God and coming back to God is the goal, is the point. For all his protests against Plato, Nietzsche is a neo-platonist *malgré lui*. Economically; God is the point of God.

**(42) 'ohne Willen, wenn nicht ein Ring zu sich selber guten Willen hat'**

'without will, unless a ring has good will toward itself'

For the theist, everything is brought about by the will of God, or at least permitted by the will of God, but God does not have to *exert* any will because that would suggest a limit on his power. The theist could therefore accept Nietzsche's 'ohne Willen' as meaning not 'without will' but 'without will-power'.

**(43) 'wollte ihr einen Namen für diese Welt?'**

'--do you want a name for this world?'

It might be inappropriate to try to name reality because reality might be ineffable, a conclusion endorsed in interestingly different ways at least by Aquinas near the end of his life, by Kant in his attitude to the *Ding-an-sich*, by the early Wittgenstein and by Zen Buddhists. Is 'God' the name of God?

**(44) 'Einer Lösung für alle ihre Rätsel?'**

'A solution for all its riddles?'

Nietzsche mentions riddles, in the plural, but speaks of a single solution. A theist can readily accept that the world is a mystery or a riddle. If there is a solution to the riddle, or all the riddles, of the world then a solution of this magnitude is appropriately named 'God'.

**(45) 'Ein Licht für euch, ihr Verborgenen, Stärksten,**

### **Unerschrockensten, Mitternächlisten?’**

‘A light for you, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid,  
most midnightly ones?’

Nietzsche tends to flatter his reader in a conspiratorial way; as though the reader were somehow radical or risqué (rather than a neo-Kantian metaphysical conservative). In Christian scripture, God says: ‘I am the light’, so both Nietzsche and the Christian can accept that there is a light to be found, an ultimate explanation of the world. The light of the world common to Nietzsche and the Christians is *presence*. Apollo is the god of light, which partly anticipates the intuition; Presence is the presence of God.

### **(46) ‘-Diese Welt ist der Wille zur Macht – und nichts außerdem!’**

‘-- This world is the will to power - and nothing besides!’

If the world, in the sense of the totality, is *will* then it has one of the properties of God. It is part of the definition of ‘God’ to have or be will. If this will is ‘will to power’ then there is something it is exercised over. Whatever is brought about by ultimate will, the will that makes everything actual, has the essential property of being creation: being that which is created by act of will. Not in his psychology, not in his politics but in his cosmology, Nietzsche has unknowingly stumbled upon the will of God: The will to power is the will of God.

If we ask the question *Why does anything happen?* the answer is the fundamental ground of change which Nietzsche describes as *der Wille zur Machte*. Will is an *intelligent* and *personal* will because willing presupposes the discrimination of items to be willed and the ability to choose between them. These are intelligent and personal capacities, so Nietzsche’s God, if not the God he adheres to then at least the God which adheres to him, is an intelligent and a personal God. There could be either a cause or (*vel*) a reason why anything happens. If the *will* is the ultimate ground of change then there is a *reason why* everything happens, not just a cause of everything that happens. What happens is willed to happen that way.

Nietzsche’s ‘and nothing besides’ implies that if there were no will to power there would not be anything. It is precisely the Judeo-Christian claim that without the will of God there would be nothing. Although Nietzsche, like most moderns, has been taught that the existence of God is an extravagant postulate, an other-worldly object of belief without evidence, this is a crude misunderstanding of theism. Theists have no more interest than Nietzsche in believing ridiculous things for no reason. God is the ultimate presupposition, a presupposition which, as we see in the case of Nietzsche, is impossible to eliminate.

**(47) ‘Und auch ihr selber seid dieser Wille zur Macht – und nichts außerdem!’**

‘And you yourselves are also this will to power--and nothing besides!’

[‘außerdem’: ‘else’]

The universe is the macrocosm. The individual is the microcosm. As the totality of *what is* is not determined by anything outside itself, so human individuals are not ultimately caused to act by anything outside themselves but are self-determining. This entails the Judeo-Christian view that human individuals have free will. We are at least amongst the causes of their own actions, and could refrain from doing what we do. Despite intermittent and strong disavowals, Nietzsche has ascribed to us human beings the Platonic, Cartesian and Christian property of having free will.

If ‘you yourselves are also this will to power’ and ‘this world is the will to power’ then you partake of the nature of the will to power. If the will to power is the will of God then you partake of the nature of God. As the Christians say: You are made in the image of God.

The last page of *The Will to Power* is an ‘end’ of Nietzsche’s philosophy in different senses. Despite Nietzsche’s overt disavowals of metaphysics it entails a Heraclitean ontology of flux which, despite or (*vel*) because of its insistence on Being as Becoming, is a kind of metaphysics. It provides a teleology and a transcendental presupposition for Nietzsche’s thought on ethics and aesthetics which are putatively eschewed. The aesthetic presupposes the metaphysical and the metaphysical presupposes the theological, so Nietzsche’s aesthetic philosophy presupposes the theology it would repudiate.

Metaphysics is not what we have been led to believe. Metaphysics is not an extravagant postulate but an ineliminable presupposition. Nietzsche remarks:

**Wie stark das metaphysische Bedürfnis ist... (MM 153)**

‘How strong the metaphysical need is...’

Nietzsche only understands this ‘Bedürfnis’ as a need, a want, or even a lack. He never realises this ‘Bedürfnis’ is a necessity, a requirement.

The metaphysical properties which Nietzsche with unconscious but inescapable logic ascribes to the Dionysian world are sufficient for the existence of God: being without beginning or end, permanence, will, intelligence, presence, immanence, Being. Whose will is the will to power? The will to power is the will of God. What is the artwork? The artwork is creation. Who is the artist? God is the artist. (6)

II

Because the Dionysian presupposes the Apollonian, Nietzsche's anti-realism about beauty is false. For example, he is wrong to claim at WP 804 (Spring-Fall 1887) that

**Das Schöne existiert so wenig als das Gute, das Wahre.**

The beautiful exists as little as the good, or the true.

(I take it that, in the idiom, if  $x$  exists as little as  $y$  then neither  $x$  nor  $y$  exists, because  $y$  does not exist. I leave aside any interpretation premised on degrees of existence.) He is right in his view that the beautiful involves both the Apollonian and the Dionysian but wrong that the beautiful is an illusory projection of the Apollonian on the Dionysian. The Apollonian shines through the Dionysian. The Apollonian pervades the Dionysian. By 'pervades' I mean:

$a$  pervades  $b$  if and only if  $a$  is at least where  $b$  is but not ( $a = b$ )

The Apollonian is present through the Dionysian and the aesthetic is that disclosure. The beautiful, like the good and the true, is not an extravagant postulate but a deep presupposition. Beauty is really there. Metaphysics is not a set of extravagant postulates but a set of ineliminable presuppositions which, as we have seen, Nietzsche is no more able to dispense with than anyone else.

Nietzsche simply assumes without argument that realism about beauty is false, for example when he claims at WP 804 (Spring-Fall 1887) that

**Ein Ding als schön empfinden heist: es notwendig falsch empfinden.**

To experience something as beautiful means: necessarily to experience it wrongly.

In the absence of argument, he might as well preface each of his claims with 'It is not the case that'. The judgement that an object is beautiful is *prima facie* neutral with regard to the truth value of either 'Beauty is invented' or 'Beauty is discovered'. Nevertheless, arguments could be mounted for aesthetic anti-realism on Nietzsche's behalf. For example:

(1) Aesthetic properties depend upon secondary qualities.

- (2) Secondary qualities are mind dependent.
- (3) If anything depends upon anything mind-dependent then it is mind-dependent.
- (4) Aesthetic properties are mind-dependent.
- (5) Realism about aesthetic properties is false.

This argument is valid but not sound. Premises (2) and (3) are true (leaving aside the strict Lockean view on which secondary qualities are powers really in the object, possessed because of its primary qualities). However, premise (1) is false. (1) *seems* true because when we talk of the rhythm or pitch of music or the vividness of colour we do ascribe aesthetic properties to phenomenological sounds and hues, and those are secondary qualities (leaving aside the strict Lockean view on which they are ideas of secondary qualities). However, the rhythm of the music or the vividness of the colour are only aesthetic qualities because the transcendent pervades them. Without the presence of beauty, which is ultimately the presence of the divine, the rhythm would only be rhythm, the vividness only vividness. It is the transcendent in the immanent which lends to aesthetic qualities their aesthetic nature. Without the transcendent in the immanent, aesthetic facts would not be aesthetic.

The discovery of beauty is not a straightforward *empirical* discovery, like the discovery that an object is a certain colour or shape. The beauty of an object is metaphysically analogous to the *existence* of the object or the *presence* of the object or the object's being *just the one it is*. The apprehension of beauty is the apprehension of the infinite in the finite. It takes an aesthetic sensibility to detect it. Not Nietzsche, not Nietzsche's Dionysius but Pseudo-Dionysius, or Dionysius the Areopagite, does possess this sensibility:

Supersubstantiale vero pulchrum pulchritude quidem dicitur propter traditam ab ipso omnibus existentibus iuxta proprietatem uniuscuiusque pulchritudinem; et sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa, ad similitudinem luminis cum fulgore immitens universes pulchrificas fontani radii ipsius traditiones, et sicut omnia ad seipsum vocans, unde et cællos, dicitur, et sicut tota in totis congregans.

That, beautiful beyond being, is said to be Beauty – for it gives beauty from itself in a manner appropriate to each, it causes the consonance and splendor of all, it flashes forth upon all, after the manner of light, the beauty producing gifts of its flowing ray, it calls all to itself, when it is called beauty. (7)

Pseudo-Dionysius is a real Dionysius and Nietzsche's Dionysius is a pseudo-Dionysius

At WP 1048 (1885-1886) Nietzsche speaks of

**Eine antimetaphysische Weltbetrachtung – ja, aber eine artistische.**

An anti-metaphysical world-view – yes, but an artistic one.

but this is an impossibility. Because the aesthetic is a beginning of the revelation of the divine, and the aesthetic is essential to the artistic, a view is *anti*-artistic to the extent to which it is anti-metaphysical. Indeed, the suppression of metaphysics leads to the suppression of art or the production of the arbitrary and aesthetically worthless under the title 'art', as many twentieth century offerings showed. Indeed, Nietzsche's extension of the artistic from the *cultural* to the *humanist* and from the humanist to the *cosmic* anticipates the dogma that anything can be art, and so the essential failure of twentieth-century art as an aesthetic (no matter how *conceptually* interesting). Nietzsche's famous or infamous claim

**Die Kunst macht den Anblick des Lebens erträglich, dadurch daß sie den Flordes unreinen Denkens über dasselbe legt. (MM 151)**

Art makes the sight of life bearable by laying the veil of unclear thinking over it.

[‘unreinen’: ‘impure’, ‘unclean’, ‘dirty’, ‘foul’, ‘smutty’, ‘obscene’, or ‘out of tune’]

if not overtly logically inconsistent with

**Die Kunst macht dem Denker das Herz schwer. (MM 153)**

Art makes the thinker's heart heavy.

is at least in tension with it. Can the thinker's heart be made heavy by art and his life made bearable by art at the same time? Perhaps. There can be mixed emotions. The thinker's condition is both exacerbated and ameliorated by art. This is not impossible but it does stand in need of explanation, explanation Nietzsche does not provide. The answer is to recognise, not a distinction between the beautiful and the artistic, because if there were no beauty there would be no art, but that a particular work of art can be a great work of art without being beautiful, for example, Picasso's *Guernica*.

Nietzsche's claim that the artist has ‘remained childlike’ (ein Kind oder ein Jüngling geblieben) (MAM 147) and art is the ‘childishness of reason’ (Kinderei der

Vernunft) (MAM 162) are reminiscent of Christ's saying that to enter the Kingdom of Heaven we must become as little children. Because the aesthetic is a part disclosure of the spiritual, and the apprehension of the spiritual requires de-conditioning, the artist or the person capable of aesthetic appreciation, must be free of preconception; like a child.

Nietzsche's claim that art

**beschwichtigen und hielen nur vorläufig, nur für den Augenblick; sie halten sogar die Menschen ab, an einer wirklichen Verbesserung ihrer Zustände zu arbeiten.** MAM 148

heals and smooths only temporarily, and holds man back from working toward a genuine betterment of his condition.

holds in a society in which art is compartmentalised; provides a temporary relief from drudgery; a society in which art is closeted in galleries because the architecture, the statuary, the street furniture, the public art is so soullessly utilitarian. On the other hand, in a synthesis of the functional and the aesthetic, for example in some architecture or engineering, precisely the opposite of Nietzsche's claim holds: there is an incentive to empirical betterment. The aesthetic is revelatory of the divine so is a route to the genuine betterment of the human condition. Art *per se* has little to do with thought, cloudy or clear. Art makes translucent the veil of the empirical and discloses the metaphysical through it.

Nietzsche says that

**Der Künstler [...] glaubt an Götter und Dämonen, durch-seelt die Natur, haßt die Wissenschaft...** MAM 159

The artist [...] believes in gods and demons, ensouls nature and hates science...

Nietzsche assumes that all this is undesirable. He bears some of the ideological responsibility for the contemporary worship of science, even or especially by those with little or no scientific training. Science is not fundamental. Science presupposes metaphysics, metaphysics it cannot explain.

Nietzsche speaks of

### GS 376

***Unsere langsamen Zeiten.* – So empfinden alle Künstler und Menschen der <<Werke>>, die mütterliche Art Mensch: immer glauben sie, bei jedem**

**Abschnitte ihres Lebens – den ein Werk jedesmal abschneidet -, schon am Ziele selbst zu sein, immer wurden sie den Tod geduldig entgegennehmen, mit dem Gefühl: <<dazu sind wir reif>>. Dies ist nicht der Ausdruck der Ermüdung – vielmehr der einer gewissen herbstlichen Sonnigkeit und Milde, welche jedesmal das Werk selbst, das Reifgewordensein eines Werks, bei seinem Urheber hinterläßt. Da verlangsamt sich das *tempo* des Lebens und wird dick und honigflüssig – bis zu langen Fermaten, bis zum Glauben an *die* lange Fermate...**

Our Slow Periods. It is thus that artists feel, and all men of "works," the maternal species of men: they always believe at every chapter of their life -a work always makes a chapter- that they have now reached the goal itself; they would always patiently accept death with the feeling : "we are ripe for it." This is not the expression of exhaustion-but rather that of a certain autumnal sunniness and mildness, which the work itself, the maturing of the work, always leaves behind in its originator. Then the tempo of life slows down turns thick and flows with honey into long pauses, into the belief in *the* long pause. . . .

The insight in this passage stands in need of theological explanation. The reason why the artist who has finished the artwork feels ready for death is that true art is a spiritual strengthening. As Nietzsche says, this preparedness for death should not be confused with exhaustion, nor is it just a feeling of accomplishment. The 'slowness' that Nietzsche identifies is conducive to the revelatory of absolute stillness, the infinite, the permanent, the indestructible present. The artist who partakes of this, knowingly or not, has insight into eternity.

As an empirical or historical claim, it is false that:

**Die Kunst erhebt ihr Haupt, wo die Religionen nachlassen. (MM 150)**

Art raises its head where religions abate.

[‘nachlassen’: ‘relax their hold’, ‘recede’, ‘let go’.]

On the contrary, the increase in secularism in the twentieth century was at least correlated with and, arguably, caused a degeneration in what counts as art to the point that anything can be art, which is to say, nothing is art. The highest art is expressive of spirituality: the Gothic cathedrals of Western Christendom in the high middle ages, the intricate carvings of Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic architecture and statuary, the choral music of Bach, Handel and Mozart, the painting and sculpture of the Renaissance which, although a revival of classical forms, is overwhelmingly spiritual in subject matter. Here the criteria for ‘highest’ are aesthetic: the complexity, the detail, the balance, the emotional impact, the absorption of interest,

the genius of execution and consequent difficulty of replication, all accompanied by not just the bearing of repeated exposure but the invitation to and the reward of repeated scrutiny.

When Nietzsche speaks of ‘The world as a work of art that gives rise to itself- -’, ‘Die Welt als ein sich selbst gebärendes Kunstwerk - -’ at WP 796 (1885-1886) he is right in his insight that the world is a work of art but fails to realise that this logically presupposes a metaphysical distinction within what is, between artist and artwork, because the concept of something that gives rise to itself is not coherent:

(1) If  $x$  gives rise to  $y$  then  $x$  predates  $y$ .

(2) If  $x$  gives rise to  $x$  then  $x$  predates  $x$ . (from (1) by substitution)

(3) If  $x$  predates  $x$  then there is a time at which  $x$  both exists and does not exist. (from (1))

(4) It is false that there is any time at which  $x$  both exists and does not exist.

(5)  $x$  does not predate  $x$ . (from (4) by *modus tollens*)

(6)  $x$  does not give rise to  $x$ .

(1) is true if causes which ‘give rise’ to their effects predate them. (4) is true because  $\exists t (\exists x t \ \& \ - \ \exists x t)$  is contradictory. Coherence may be lent to Nietzsche’s words if they mean something equivalent to: ‘What is, whatever is, changes itself artistically, or with a result which is art’. However, this is metaphysically possible only if what is, whatever is, is (to use an archaic terminology) both agent and patient, or admits of a distinction between whole *qua* cause and whole *qua* effect. This is precisely what theists mean by ‘God’ and ‘creation’. God and creation jointly exhaust what is. What is *qua* creator is called ‘God’. What is *qua* created is called ‘creation’ or, as Nietzsche puts it, ‘a work of art’. Nietzsche only has the first half of this picture:

(1) Beings, and their becoming, are a work of art.

(2) Being, as the being of God, is their artist.

One might accept Nietzsche’s claim at WP800 (March-June 1888) that

**- die “Berschönerung” ist eine Folge der erhöhten Kraft.**

Beautification is a consequence of increased power.

[“becoming more beautiful” is a consequence of enhanced strength.]

so long as this strength is a *spiritual* strength; the strength to shed conditioning despite opprobrium, despite the weight of scientific and pseudo-scientific ideology, the strength to argue for the true not just the pragmatic, the expedient, the profitable. This is the strength of the monk, the saint, the intellectual who writes and thinks against the grain.

The claim at WP 801 (Spring-Fall 1887; rev. Spring-Fall 1888) that

**wer nicht geben kann, empfängt auch Nichts**

who cannot give, also receives nothing

is not only consistent with the Christian doctrine ‘As you sow, so shall you reap’ and Buddhist teachings about karma, but arguably entailed by them. When he says that the sober, the weary, the exhausted, the dried up can receive nothing from art, a distinction needs to be drawn between the kind of receiving which is a reward, and the kind which fulfils a need. Nietzsche assimilates these, so fails to appreciate that the spiritual need of ‘the weary, the exhausted, the dried up’ can in some measure be met by art.

Despite his evangelical atheism, Nietzsche comes close to spiritual insight when he says at WP 803 (1883-1888):

**“Schönheit” ist deshalb für den Künstler etwas außer aller Rangordnung, weil in der Schönheit Gegensätze gebändigt sind.**

“Beauty” is for the artist something outside all orders of rank and in beauty opposites are tamed.

In many religions, ‘God’ is the name either of the unity of opposites or the ineffable ground which makes that unity possible. God has or is ‘power over opposites’ and ‘God’ is the ‘highest sign of power’. The tension which is absent or released is the dialectical dependence between opposites which generates change and difference. This delights the earthly and the divine artists’ will to power because it is beyond the dualisms of the empirical world including, as understood ordinarily and by Nietzsche ‘beyond good and evil’. Here Nietzsche unconsciously concedes the dependence of the Dionysian on the Apollonian in his aesthetics. Beauty is ‘outside all orders of rank’ and ‘in beauty opposites are tamed’ so, because Becoming depends upon opposites, Beauty is beyond becoming. Beauty is beyond the Dionysian. Beauty is Apollonian.

Although very widely believed as a fragment of pseudo-scientific ideology, it is almost wholly false that the beautiful has only a biological value or function. WP 804 (Spring-Fall 1887) The correlations between the beautiful and the life-preserving, and the ugly and the life-threatening are not close. The beautiful might be life threatening, not just because a particularly beautiful face might belong to a dangerous person, or a beautiful waterfall possess a treacherous bank, or a beautiful berry be poisonous, but because the whole preoccupation with beauty is a distraction from the urgent pragmatics of evasion or combat. The ugly might be life sustaining not just because the aggressive sergeant major's advice might save your life in action, or the uninspiringly prepared cabbage nourish you, or the boring logarithms sharpen your wits, but because there is such a thing as fascination with the ugly, which allows an evaluation of the unusual as a benefit, a threat, or neither. If we construe 'beautiful' in a very broad and popular sense, to include whatever we find pleasurable, then Nietzsche's biological reductionism is at least as implausible. Wine, rich dinners, and smoking, although pleasures are not in the biological sense 'life-enhancing'.

Nietzsche asks at WP 817 (Spring-Fall 1887; rev. Spring-Fall 1888)

**Wurde irgend ein Ring in der Ganzen Kette von Kunst und Wissenschaft fehlen, wenn da Weib, wenn das Werk des Weibes darin fehlte?**

Would any link be missing from the whole chain of art and science if woman, if the work of woman, were missing from it?

The mystical is essentially passive, receptive. The artistic is essentially mystical in this respect, so the artistic is essentially passive, receptive. Therefore, everything would be missing. Many of the world's greatest mystics have been women; Catherine of Siena, Teresa of Avalon, Katherine Hilderburg. Where would we be if we neglected their insights and did philosophy with a hammer? We would be *where we are now*.

One might endorse Nietzsche's claim at WP 818 (Nov. 1887-March 1888) that

**Man ist um den Preis Künstler, das man Das, was alle Nichtkünstler "Form" nennen, als Inhalt, als "die Sache selbst" empfindet.**

One is an artist at the price of experiencing that which all non-artists call "form" as content, as "the thing itself".

The artist reverses form and content and so, in a sense, turns the world upside down. However, the topsy – turvy world is the world of metaphysics which is not a different

world but what is, understood in a metaphysical not only an empirical way. The key to the aesthetic is the apprehension of the infinite in the finite.

Nietzsche thinks the artistic is the projection of perfection, the ‘perfection of existence’ (*Daseins-Vollendung*), the ‘deification of existence’ (*Vergöttlichung des Daseins*) WP 821 (March-June 1888). If we reverse Nietzsche’s anti-realism but retain his theological vocabulary, we obtain a truth. Art is the *disclosure* of the divine through the exposure of some limits of the empirical. It is *revelation* of perfection. A pessimistic art is indeed impossible, as Nietzsche says, but for a completely different reason. Art is the disclosure of the Good. The aesthetic is a portal to the divine. In aesthetic experience, one begins to see things as they are: infused by the glow of the divine.

That Nietzsche simply assumes anti-realism about beauty is characteristic of someone who has never truly apprehended beauty. Perceiving a beautiful object is not sufficient for perceiving the beauty of that object. I can perceive *that* an object is beautiful. I can perceive the beauty of the object. But the apprehension of its beauty is not another sense perception of it. The beauty of the object is not an extra empirical quality of it that could be sensed. Nonetheless, there is experience of beauty. It follows that aesthetic experience is not sense experience, even if sense experience is necessary for aesthetic experience. What is aesthetic experience?

In the experience of an object as beautiful, the aesthetic *pervades* sense experience. Experiencing something as an object of aesthetic appreciation entails sensing not just its ‘suchness’, its detail and its givenness, in a way that is to some degree shorn of pre-conception, but its pervasion by spirituality. Aesthetic experience belongs to unconditioned experience. Means to end thinking and thinking in generalities are obstacles to aesthetic experience. They are *an-aesthetics*. An-aesthetics are obstacles to an aesthetics.

Nevertheless, there can be the beauty of the exquisite appropriateness of an object to its function. Even the function of an object can be beautiful if it is apprehended in its own right. In ordinary day to day experience we hardly perceive objects aesthetically because we sense only as much as is necessary for our practical purposes. There is no *a priori* obstacle to the apprehension of non-physical objects as beautiful. A logical proof might exhibit elegance, economy and pleasing precision and be a source of aesthetic delight. A number, for example the infinite number Aleph Zero, might have an awesomely beautiful role in the number system. Someone might have a beautiful thought as opposed to the thought of some beautiful thing, a thought perhaps beautiful in its intricacy and connotation.

Although aesthetic judgement involves the intellect, and although the Greek etymology of ‘aesthetic’, ‘pertaining to the senses’, suggests that the aesthetic is empirical rather than rational, aesthetic apprehension transcends the distinction between rationalism and empiricism. Indeed, the failure of philosophical aesthetics is due to an oscillation between rationalist and empiricist solutions. Aesthetic

apprehension is unconditioned. It is a disclosure of presence, presence presupposed by both thought and experience as ordinarily conceived. It is partly revelatory of the work of God. In short, aesthetics belongs to revealed theology. This explains at once the objectivity of beauty, the fact that there are degrees of beauty, the fact that we can be right or wrong in our aesthetic judgments and the fact that the aesthetic is not part of the commonplace. There is no serious projectivist aesthetics because projectivists are far from realising beauty's dependence on the divine. Nietzsche's famous remark in *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik*, shorn of its reductivist 'nur' ('only'), is ironically insightful:

**[...] nur als ästhetisches Phänomen ist das Dasein und die Welt ewig gerechtfertigt.** GT 5.

[...] existence and the world are only eternally *justified* as an *aesthetic phenomenon*.

We can bear the world as an aesthetic phenomenon because that is a glimpse of the infinite through the finite, a glimpse of the world as divine creation.(8)

#### Notes

(1) (Derrida 1972: 163-4) 'Do we have to read Nietzsche, with Heidegger, as the last of the great metaphysicians? Should we, on the contrary, understand the question of the truth of Being as the final drowsy start of the superior man?'

(2) As Daniel Came puts it in 'NAME OF PAPER': 'Attic tragedy is said to depict the necessity of cruelty, suffering, catastrophe, and death – its Dionysian content – over which it casts a veil of Apollonian beauty, primarily in the form of beautiful speeches and the artistry of the production. The Apollonian elements of the drama offset and dilute the impact of the painful subject-matter, making it tolerable to humans. In tragedy, suffering and beauty coexist, and suffering is redeemed by the beauty of its representation, thereby "seducing" the spectator to affirm life. The justificatory effect of tragedy, then, consists, first, in its revealing to us the inherent pain of life and, second, in its capacity to compensate for this pain by casting over it a layer of transfiguring Apollonian beauty.'

(Came 19 REFERENCE)

(3) References to *Der Wille zur Macht* are to Volume X of *Nietzsche's Werke* (Naumann Verlag, Leipzig, 1906). Although translations are my own, the numbered paragraphs of this edition are usefully mapped by the translation of *Der Wille zur Macht* by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale: Friedrich Nietzsche *The Will to Power* edited by Walter Kaufmann (Random House, New York, 1967). In square

brackets '[ ]' below the translation, I place alternative translations of some expressions because translating entails choosing, and thereby closing off some interpretations and opening up others. Translators present us with very different Nietzsches depending on how they render 'Kraft', 'Glück', 'Raum' etc. I mainly follow Heidegger in using 'Nietzsche' to refer to the man's work not the man.

(4) In the discussion following the reading of 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences' at John Hopkins University in October 1966, Derrida says 'Now I don't know what perception is and I don't believe that anything like perception exists.' (Derrida, 1970: 272)

(5) See Derrida 1972: 147. Derrida entitles this subsection of 'Les fins de l'homme' 'Nous lisant', which could be translated 'reading us' or 'we reading'.

(6) Although Derrida cites

'la critique nietzschéenne de la métaphysique, des concepts d'être et de vérité auxquels sont substitués les concepts de jeu, d'interprétation et de signe' (Derrida, 1967: 412)

'the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, in which for the concepts of being and truth the concepts of play, interpretation and sign are substituted'

alongside the Freudian critique of self-presence and Heidegger's 'Destruktion' of metaphysics, like Kant, he recognizes the difficulty of formulating any 'critique' of metaphysics without thereby presupposing metaphysics:

'Or, tous ces discours destructeurs et tous leurs analogues sont pris dans une sorte de cercle. Ce cercle est unique et il décrit la forme du rapport entre l'histoire de la Métaphysique et la destruction de l'histoire de la métaphysique: *il n'y a aucun sens à se passer des concepts de la métaphysique pour ébranler la métaphysique; nous ne disposons d'aucun langage –d'aucune syntaxe et d'aucune lexique – qui soit étranger à cette histoire; nous ne pouvons énoncer aucune proposition destructrice qui n'ait déjà du se glisser dans la forme, dans la logique et les postulations impliquées de cela même qu'elle voudrait contester.*' (Derrida, 1967: 412)  
(Derrida's italics.)

'Now, all these deconstructive discourses and all their analogues are caught in a sort of circle. This circle is unique and it describes the form of relationship between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics: *there is no sense* in going beyond the concepts of metaphysics in order to free oneself from

metaphysics; we do not have any language at our disposal – no syntax and no vocabulary – which might be foreign to this history; we are not able to enunciate any destructive proposition which might have not already had to slide into the form, into the logic and the implicit postulations of that which it would like to contest.’

Derrida has diagnosed Nietzsche’s illness. Although Derrida is right about the language, we can go much further. It is the *truth* of metaphysics that is presupposed by the putative eschewal of metaphysics. Kantian metaphysical anti-realism (in the Antinomies chapter of the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*) presupposes metaphysical realism. To take just one example, if there neither was nor was not a first event then there are no events. This very strong conclusion: *nothing happens*, is inconsistent with Kant’s own empirical realism. Although Deleuze is right, in *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, to see in Nietzsche the implementation of an essentially Kantian project:

‘Que Kant n’a pas mené la vraie critique, parce qu’il n’a pas su en poser le problème en termes de valeurs, tel est même un des mobiles principaux de l’œuvre de Nietzsche.’ (Deleuze 1962: 1)

‘Kant did not conduct the true critique, because he did not know how to pose the problem in terms of values, such is one of the principal motivations of Nietzsche’s work.’

Deleuze misses a Nietzschean reading of *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* Book II which construes ‘Postulaten’ as not truth entailing, a reading which might have appalled Kant, but one more consistent with the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* than the one he perhaps intends. Despite his anti-Kantian protestations, Nietzsche’s philosophy does not exceed the anti-metaphysics of the Transcendental Dialectic. It is implicated in the same metaphysical, even theological, presuppositions.

(7) See Eco 1988: 24, Pseudo-Dionysius 1980: IV, 7.

(8) I am grateful to Daniel Came, Benedikt Paul Göcke and Michael Inwood for useful discussions.

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## LOGICAL ATOMISM

### Private Worlds

#### Subjectivity and Solipsism in Wittgenstein's Tractatus

In the 5.6s there are some seemingly solipsistic remarks that find no place in the later philosophy of *Philosophical Investigations* and are stylistically at variance with much of the rest of the *Tractatus*. Here I consider how they are to be interpreted and whether they are true.

Wittgenstein is writing from a firmly first person singular or grammatically Cartesian standpoint. He begins the remarks on subjectivity with;

## 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

The use of the possessive pronoun 'my' here makes it clear that he is speaking of the first person case. He is not logically committed to solipsism by this remark, nor to expressing propositions true of Wittgenstein and of no other person. He is speaking of the way in which each person apprehends their own case rather than that of another. We do not have to mean by 'one's own case' 'one's own mind' or 'one's own body' only. He says 'my world'. 'World' does not mean the totality of what is but the totality of what is available from my perspective. It means 'the totality of what there is as far as I am concerned', or as far as each of us is concerned from his own viewpoint.

When Wittgenstein says the 'limits of my language mean the limits of my world' he is indicating that the language each person has imposes a constraint on what our experience can be like, or, to retain the concept of the world; a constraint on how the world can be for each of us. Wittgenstein could only hold this view if he thought that language had a cognitive function, not just a communicative function. Here it is useful to take a concrete example, say from the visual field (which Wittgenstein considers a little later). If you survey the items of your immediate visual environment they are all intelligible to you. You know what they are. Wittgenstein is saying that this would not be possible unless you had a language. The experience or totality of experience called the 'world' is by each of us made intelligible in terms of a set of concepts and categories which are furnished by language. Unless 'book' 'read' 'philosophy' 'paper' were concepts in our language you would not be able to engage in reading this paper. Being intelligible is being understood under a description. When there is no language there is no description and where no description no intelligibility and hence, for you, no world. He is assuming that it is a necessary condition for there being experience that it be cognitively structured by language. He avoids the concrete because he is concerned with logical form. It aids our understanding of his system, though, to give examples which he would have shunned.

Continuing to develop the notion that there are constraints on what the world can be like for each person Wittgenstein says:

### 5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.

What is logically impossible is not a possible object of experience. Logic in particular provides a more severe constraint on what the world can be like for each person than language in general because it is a contingent fact that language contains certain concepts rather than others and hence certain elements in our conceptual scheme are only contingent constraints on our experience but in the case of logic the

constraints are necessary. Logic provides the unchanging framework of intelligibility within which particular concepts of language (like 'house', 'book', etc) can come and go.

Logic is a limit to the world because what is logically impossible is inconceivable and inexperiencable. When he says that 'logic pervades the world' he is saying that logic is not just a part of language or mathematics but emphasising that it is a constraint of the way in which the world can appear for each of us. Perception and imagination must be included in this if the earlier interpretation of 'world' as the totality of what there is for each person from his own subjective viewpoint is correct. To return to the concrete, we could not come upon a person who was bigger than himself, or a person whose parents were younger than him, or something that was beside itself. Nor could we imagine these things. These purported state of affairs are impossible in a much stronger sense of 'impossible' than that in 'It is impossible for me to jump over that house'. It just so happens that the world is such that I cannot jump over houses. It is quite conceivable that the world should change so that I might be able to do this. What Wittgenstein is saying is that it is not conceivable that the world might change such that persons might be older than themselves or something might be above itself.

This interpretation is borne out by his next comment; So we cannot say in logic, 'The World has this in it, and this, but not that'.

Logic tells us nothing about the content of the world in the sense that there happen to be certain objects in it rather than others. Rather, logic provides the framework or constraint on the sort of object that can be encountered in the world. In language in general of course we can say that the world has this in it but not that, but no such claims can be made in logic. Logic is the constraint on intelligibility not a list of what intelligibility is intelligibility of.

Wittgenstein concludes the 5.61 section in this way;

For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.

We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.

Here the notion of the 'world' is being stretched to mean 'possible world for each of us'. We cannot say that the world has this or that in it in logic because that would imply that the world is fixed and not allowing of change. Although logic limits the sort of world we can each experience and the sort of object that can compose it, it cannot be any constraint on what objects do compose it out of all the ones that are logically possible. This is what Wittgenstein means by not 'excluding certain possibilities'. He is speaking of what is practically possible, or of what is not actual but might well be actual. He is not saying that what we believe to be logically impossible might turn out to be possible after all. To say in logic what is in the world would require logic to cease to be a limit of the world ie, to cease to be logic. To say what should contingently be the contents of the world would require logic to operate outside the framework which it is ie, to view its own limits and this is logically impossible because it would require logic to be both beyond the world and yet the limit to it.

In this passage Wittgenstein accepts that you do not have to see 'both sides' of a limit (to use his spatial metaphor) to perceive a limit as a limit. The world, the totality of what is for each of us is limited. To retain the metaphor, we are not just on the inside of the limit, each of us is the inside. It is a necessary truth that we cannot think what we cannot think but by stating it at this point Wittgenstein emphasises that in a sense we are co-extensive with our own thought and that the same logical constraint on thought also provides the structural constraints on language. What we cannot think we cannot say, follows logically from this. The notion of a limited, subjective world constrained by logic and language must be borne in mind in understanding the next paragraph;

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.

For that the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.

The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which I alone understand) mean the limits of my world.

The truth that there is in solipsism is that the world is my world. Wittgenstein is not conceding to a fully solipsistic position where only he and his thoughts are real, (although at this stage in his thought he clearly thinks that this is a logically coherent position to hold). What he is extracting from solipsism is a fundamental point about subjectivity; the fact that, in a sense, each person not only has but is a point of view. The world is my world in the same ways as one generally thinks of one's foot or one's hand as one's own. On this view taken from solipsism, a person is co-

extensive with the world where 'world' means 'totality of what there is in his point of view'.

In this passage Wittgenstein considers that he has reached some of the limits of what can be expressed. What the solipsist is drawing our attention to - that the world is his world - 'cannot be said' but 'makes itself manifest'. To understand this, we have to keep in mind a distinction which holds throughout the Tractatus; that between what can be meaningfully expressed in language and that which can only be 'shown' or which 'makes itself manifest'. Language is meaningful for the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus in so far as the propositions which compose it correspond to or are logical pictures of states of affairs in the world. The logical form of the proposition must represent the logical form of the world. There is a one to one correspondence between the atomic components of the proposition and the state of affairs it depicts. Our language is primarily suited for the depiction of the world; its function is cognitive. When we try to use language as Wittgenstein does in the Tractatus to explore and depict the relations between language and the world, then on these criteria it, strictly speaking, becomes meaningless. Wittgenstein was perfectly aware of this. Near the end of the book (6.54) he says of the propositions in the Tractatus that they must be seen as nonsensical by anyone who understands them. He uses an image; the philosophical propositions of the Tractatus are like the steps of a ladder to allow us to climb to a higher level. Once we have reached the new level we must throw the ladder away.

To understand how the truth in solipsism 'makes itself manifest' consider (6.522);

There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words.

They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.

The truth that there is in solipsism certainly falls into this category.

At (6.44) he does not expressly mention solipsism but says;

Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical.

Whereof we cannot speak we can only experience or 'feel'. It is this aesthetic or quasi religious dimension to persons' experience which can only be shown or make itself manifest. It does not belong to philosophy not because it is not possible or is not real but because it cannot be said. At 6.53 he says that the correct method in philosophy would really be to say nothing except what can be said; ie to restrict one's discourse to propositions which picture the world - say in natural science. When a person says something which can only be shown or which makes itself

manifest then we should point out that such purported propositions are devoid of meaning. This does not commit Wittgenstein to the view that there are no religious, ethical or aesthetic dimensions to human experience; quite the contrary. All he is saying is that these domains fall into the category or 'things that cannot be put into words'.

Where Wittgenstein uses the expression 'cannot be said' it is often useful to understand this as 'cannot be communicated'.

To return to 5.62, he says that the world's being my world is manifest in the fact that the limits of language mean the limits of my world - where only I understand this language. The truth extracted from solipsism, 'the world is my world', can be appreciated by remembering that there are constraints on what my world is and these constraints are linguistic. My world is a thoroughly private limited whole. When he says he alone understands this language, he is saying that from his perspective it seems that only he can correlate propositions with stages of affairs. No one else does this for him and he does not do it for anyone else. Again, these remarks on subjectivity and privacy do not commit Wittgenstein to solipsism. He can be taken as depicting the viewpoint of each person not just his own. This is clear from;

5.621 The World and life are one.  
and 5.63 I am my world. (the microcosm).

At 5.63 he does not say 'I am the world' - that would be the solipsists' position. 'I am the world' means 'I am co-extensive with the totality of my experience now' including say 'my visual field' which is at least as much a part of my as, say, my body. Wittgenstein is departing from the notion that persons are to be identified solely with their bodies, or, for that matter, their minds in any abstract sense. What is logically private to each person is their experience, not their body or a ghost in the machine. Each person's perspective, and hence in Wittgenstein's terms their 'world' is logically private. This can be seen by appreciating that the visual field of another person is logically private to you. Wittgenstein is identifying the person with what is logically private to him, not just the visual field but the whole content of his experience at any one time. When he says 'The World and life are one' he is not using 'life' in the sense of 'organic life' but in the sense of 'life' in 'my life', although he means 'what is lived' he is still not restricting the account to his own case, if he had intended this he would have said 'The world and my life are one', not 'The world and life are one'. He is saying that each person is to be identified with what he lives - not just in the sense that each person is temporally co-extensive with his own lifetime, this is necessarily true, - but in the sense that each person is the sum total of his experience. The statement at 5.63 that 'I am my world' ie, an instance of

5.621 which is a generalisation. This is the force of his saying that he, being his world is the 'microcosm'. The world as it is lived by all persons, or the world as it is from every perspective would be the 'macrocosm'. Although he does not use the term 'macrocosm' here there logically could not be the 'microcosm' he does mention unless this were contrasted with the whole. He might easily have inserted the words 'The macrocosm' in brackets after 5.621.

The following is crucial to an elucidation of the concept of subjectivity;

5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. If I wrote a book called *The World as I found it*, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not etc, this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.

The point is that the subject is not an object. This was presumably Hume's mistake in the *Treatise* section of Personal Identity when he could not find himself in introspection. Wittgenstein is saying that as subject you cannot find yourself amongst the objects which compose the world. The reason Hume cannot come across himself is that he is it; he is what he is looking for. The knower cannot simultaneously be the known, the seeker cannot be the found. We are not introspectively transparent to ourselves.

In the hypothetical book 'The World as I found it' Wittgenstein is concerned with the criteria by which each of us makes the distinction between what is himself and what is not himself. The possible candidates he mentions are his body and the will. He does not elucidate the relationship between subjectivity and the human body, even though there are important logical and phenomenal differences between the way in which a person experiences or apprehends his own body and the body of another. These are the differences between a third and first person perspective, or an objective and subjective account. What he does say is that noticing which aspects of your body fall under the direct control of your will is a way of distinguishing you from what is not you. If we think of examples of this, hands and feet can be moved at will and so count as part of you, heart beats do not as you cannot control them, breathing perhaps does not fit this clear demarcation as I can breath at will but do not need to. Breathing bridges the gap between freedom and determinism. The upshot of this investigation, according to Wittgenstein is that in an important sense there is no such thing as the subject or self; 'there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.' He is implying that if we believe in a difference between ourselves and our respective 'worlds', then this can only be a sort of decision we have taken, or

is just a belief; it cannot be a discovery that we have made. Because a person cannot locate himself as an object in his world it has to be concluded that he just is that world.

There is another possibility;

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

The subject is the viewpoint that cannot view itself. It is a sort of subjective horizon; another limit to the world; a limit that you are. This is the heart of the problem of subjectivity. Wittgenstein anticipates that the reader will have understood his thoughts on subjectivity by analogy with visual perception; the eye cannot see itself. (It misses the point to say - 'yes it can, in a mirror')

5.633 Where in the world is the metaphysical subject to be found?

You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field.

But really you do not see the eye.

And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.

Nothing in 'my world' allows me to infer that it is apprehended by a self or subject. Wittgenstein is reminding us that we can only grasp what subjectivity is by adopting a radically and thoroughly first person perspective. It is no use trying to imagine what subjectivity is for another person, this is secondary. We grasp subjectivity from our own case. This is the force of Wittgenstein's rejection of the following diagram as an accurate portrayal of the visual field;

5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not like this

What is wrong with this is that it shows the visual field of another not of you yourself. It is an objective portrayal of subjectivity and hence inadequate. As he said before, subjectivity can only be shown it cannot be meaningfully represented. There can be no 'picture' of subjectivity, whether in propositions or visual pictures.

Continuing now with the general theme of the structure of the world as it is for a person he says:

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same time a priori.

What ever we see could be other than it is.

Whatever we describe at all could be other than it is.

There is no a priori order of things.

The visual field is not just a metaphor for the structure of subjectivity it is part of or an instance of that very structure.

There is, as we have seen, an a priori constraint on our experience and that is the logical form of language. There is, though within this framework no constraint on the possible objects of experience. There is no a priori order of 'things'. We cannot know prior to experience what experience is going to be like. It is a contingent fact that the objects of our experience are not otherwise, but it must be remembered from his earlier remarks and the distinction between logical and practical possibility that there are deeper logical limits on how the world can be. It is within this fundamental and necessary order that there can be the contingent ordering of objects.

Once he has extracted 'how much truth there is in solipsism' he has this to say about it;

5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

The truth in solipsism is subjectivity. This paragraph is reminiscent of the fact that there is no phenomenal difference between the world as experienced by a Berkeleyan Idealist of a materialist realist, or, indeed the solipsist. The self or subject of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension because the subject is not an object in the world. It is a limit of the world. If a sense is to be given to the word 'I' in my own case then it is in 'I am my world'. Solipsism coincides with realism because the self is nothing other than the content of experience that could be reported in a purely realist account of the world from a first person standpoint. The self is not a 'thing' for each of us so it has to be 'everything' for each of us, where 'everything' means the sum total of my experience from this perspective.

Wittgenstein concludes the 5.6's with these comments on how it might be useful for philosophy to look at the problem of the self;

5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non psychological way.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'.

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world - not a part of it.

The problem of the self, when reformulated in the way Wittgenstein suggests is nothing other than the problem of subjectivity; the problem of how it is possible that each person is a point of view or a perspective. Notions that the self is the soul or the body are of no use in answering this question. We want to know that it is that is unique or exceptional about the first person case as opposed to the person, that is we need a logical and phenomenal investigation of the discrepancies between a first and third person account of persons; a clarification of the differences between the ways in which each person experiences or apprehends his own case and the way in which he apprehends that of others. These are not questions of ontology - the problem of subjectivity would remain even if there could be a discovery that say dualism or materialism or idealism were true. There would still be a logical asymmetry between consciousness and self-consciousness whether or not persons have two parts to them or one.

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What is Living and What is dead in Philosophy?

The Critical Turn

The Critical Paradigm

Philosophy and Anti-Philosophy

Is Philosophy Dead?

Philosophy and Anti-Philosophy Since Kant

PHILOSOPHY AND ANTI-PHILOSOPHY

INFERENCE TO THE ULTIMATE

EXPLANATION

THE BEING OF PRESENCE AND THE PRESENCE OF BEING

## WHAT IS WHAT IS?

### **Modern Philosophy and the Quest for Ultimate Reality**

Contents

2

1. Doing Philosophy

3 pp 7

Stephen Priest Ultimate Reality

2. Logical Positivism Quantum Physics: Consciousness escapes	10 pp 23
3. Phenomenology Husserl: Presence escapes. Heidegger: Being escapes	33 pp 20
4. Structuralism	54 pp 20
5. Conceptual Analysis Analytical Idealism and Phil Rel escape	74 pp 17
6. Deconstruction Derrida: Presence: partly escapes.	91 pp 19
7. Dialectic Hegel: Being and Consciousness escape.	110 pp 22
8. Existentialism	
9. Logical Atomism Leibnizian entailments escape.	
10. Theology and the Possibility of Metaphysics	132 pp 4
Notes	136 pp 17
Bibliography	153 pp 16

## **Inference to the Ultimate Explanation**

**UNUSED:**

I argued in 'What is Empiricism?' that modern philosophy is essentially Kantian. Kant's philosophy is a putative synthesis of empiricism and rationalism which massively privileges empiricism and entails the impossibility of a priori metaphysics. Locke, Hume and Kant 'tamed' rationalism, so the scope of reason is now largely considered only an empirical scope.

Is there philosophy outside the critical paradigm and, a fortiori, outside empiricism?

The claim that there is a mind is not empirical. The claim that there is a brain is empirical.

BEYOND EMP SCI () Distinction between observation and theory not clear (mod phil sci) therefore emp rat distinction not clear.

Observation theory laden.

Theory about s.o. (empirical basis ?)

BEYOND EMP EMP AS NAT Arguably, the epistemological distinction between empiricism and rationalism depends upon the physiological distinction between the senses and the brain. Human beings can exercise two kinds of cognitive capacity: They can sense and they can think because they can use their senses and they can use their brains. Rationalism, construed as physiological epistemology, is the thesis that a subject may use their brain to acquire knowledge not available through the senses. Empiricism is the thesis that that is impossible, and pure sensory input provides the brain with information about the world as it is. From a Kantian point of view, the brains would have no subject matter, nothing to think about, without a sensory input. Sensory input would be nothing or 'nothing to' a subject without a brain to interpret it.

Experience is either necessary for empirical knowledge or sufficient or both. What is experience?

does it logically follow that this something is me. Why not ? What has been said about something when it is said that that is me ? It can be coherently imagined that there should be something qualitatively identical to me that is numerically distinct from me. How come ?

This cluster of problems arises for any being such that there is something it consists in to be that being, yet the solution has to be different for each such being.

Philosophy deconditions the individual. Society = set of rules for avoiding the raising of philosophical questions. esp. society thereby avoids terror in face of death,

meaninglessness. (existentialism). God, heaven is revealed if society is stripped away.

Empiricism and the Possibility of Metaphysics.

There are questions which can be meaningfully posed from within the empirical world which cannot be answered by any further scrutiny of the empirical world. These are metaphysical questions.

Some metaphysical questions are confused with empirical questions which are much more familiar. Empirical questions have empirical answers but metaphysical questions have no empirical answers.

For example: 'What makes a day today?' looks empirical but is not. It is confused with 'What makes something a day?' which is empirical because its answer is: The earth orbits the sun once every twenty four hours, etc. However, once all those empirical facts are in, we can still raise the metaphysical question: What is true of a day if that day is today?

Was there a first event? looks empirical because it is confused with: 'Suppose there was a first event, what was it?' A prima facie plausible empirical answer is 'The big bang'. 'Was there a first event?' is not empirical, because any prima facie candidate for a first event might have had a predecessor. Any space-time universe that began with a big bang might have had a predecessor universe, or an infinite number of predecessor universes. This cannot be ruled out empirically, for example by the discovery of a particular universe, but it might be possible to rule it out a priori.

'Is there life after death?' looks empirical because, from a third person perspective, death presents the disintegration of the body and the absence of the other's presence. In fact, none of us has any idea what death is from a first person singular perspective and we were never directly acquainted with the other's subjective interiority when they were alive. Empirical death might not be metaphysical death.

'Why is someone you?' looks empirical. The obvious answer looks like: Your parents gave birth to that unique child in that place at that time with that genetic make up. It has been subject to that totality of social, economic and other influences. However, this explanation tells us nothing about why you view the world from that human being, why you 'are' that human being, why you are coextensive with that human being (if you are). Is there a genuine difference between right and wrong?, is ethical and What is the point in existing? is existential but neither can be answered without recourse to metaphysics.

Science is powerless to answer metaphysical questions because science is constrained by empiricism. Science is the deployment of reason within empirical bounds. Some questions are too macroscopic to be answered scientifically: Why is there anything at all?, Does the universe have a purpose?, Why does this set of

natural laws hold, and not a different set? Some questions are too intimate to be answered scientifically: Why does consciousness exist?, Why is one of the people me?. Empiricism provides only medium range knowledge. Some targets are out of range, some so close as to be blurred or invisible.

There is no empiricist explanation of empiricism so there is no empiricist justification of empiricism. The claim that all knowledge is ultimately empirical knowledge and there is therefore no a priori metaphysical knowledge, cannot be substantiated empirically. Empiricism rests upon non-empirical presuppositions which in a sense are metaphysical.

Kant is right to say 'Metaphysics has to do properly with synthetic propositions a priori, and these alone constitute its end' (36) [Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics trans. P. G. Lucas p. 24] because the logical status of any metaphysical proposition is synthetic a priori. Intuitively: It comes as news that, say, there is a God or a first event or life after death so these claims are synthetic. Nevertheless, they are decidable intellectually, from one's armchair, so they are a priori. Kant insists there are synthetic a priori propositions but denies that any is metaphysical. They belong to mathematics, fundamental physics and his own critical philosophy, for example, the propositions expressed by most of the sentences of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant and the British empiricists both deny that there are synthetic a priori propositions.

This metaphysical anti-realism is mistaken because it is a presupposition of the existence of nature that there are metaphysical realities. For example, on the minimal assumption that something is happening now, there either was or was not a first event. On the minimal assumption that you are alive there either is or is not life after death. On the minimal assumption that there is a universe, it was either created or not. Doing metaphysics is raising fundamental questions with bivalent answers and eliminating one alternative.

In an anticipation of Kant's Antinomies, Reid says:

'The weakness of human reason makes men prone, when they leave one extreme to rush into the opposite [...] from ascribing active power to all things to conclude all things to be carried on by necessity.' (33)

Although his psychological advice might be sound, Reid misses the point that any event happens either with a probability of 1 or a probability of less than one. These two possibilities exhaust the universe.

Ayer is therefore wrong to say: 'the utterances of the metaphysician [...] are literally senseless' (34). The sentences of metaphysics are synthetic a priori, as are most of the sentences in Language Truth and Logic.

Kripke suggests that if a mental state is identical with a physical state it is necessarily identical and doubts this. Saul Kripke Naming and Necessity (Oxford, 1980). Descartes says: 'I have a clear idea of myself [...] I have a distinct idea of body' [Sixth Meditation]. In objection to Descartes' arguments for dualism (and many other arguments) it is customary to claim that the imaginable is insufficient for the logically possible. Obviously, if I imagine  $241 + 75$  to equal 314 it does not follow that it is logically possible that  $241 + 75$  equals 314. However, in the epistemology of modality nobody is in a position to dispense with imagination. If I imagine that phenomenon, not just something symptomatic of it, and if my imaginings are free from contradiction in the sense that a complete description of the content of what I imagine entails no contradiction, then that phenomenon is logically possible. How thorough we can be in searching for contradictions is an epistemological issue which does not cast doubt on the absence of contradiction being criterial of logical possibility.