Title: *Kilometres 51 and 101: the development of Soviet residency and banishment policies in Ukraine, 1917-1940*

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Abstract: This article analyses the evolution of spatial constraints around Soviet cities and other sensitive zones, especially in Ukraine and Russia, arguing that banishment and residency prohibition was a consistent and significant element of Bolshevik policy from the revolution onwards, and not just from the start of passportisation of the early 1930s. It traces the development of legislation and extra-legal practices that led to the banishment and barring of multiple (and ever-increasing numbers of) categories of citizens from Russian and Ukrainian metropolitan areas and the zones around them, and also from other zones deemed to be in need of special protection. The article also traces the particular constellation of anxieties about nationalism, the peasantry and the border, which made Ukraine proportionally the most spatially restricted Soviet republic during Stalinism.

*Kilometres 51 and 101: the development of Soviet residency and banishment policies in Ukraine, 1917-1940.*[1]

The 101st and 51st kilometres—the forbidden zone or strip around metropolises and other sensitive areas—have become a key symbol of the closed nature of Soviet society. The phenomenon, usually designated by the larger of the two numbers (in Russian, *sto pervyi kilometr*) began to appear in language, literature, and anecdotes in the second half of the twentieth century, when intellectuals, subjected to this form of repression from the 1930s to the late Soviet period, became able to describe their experiences (Mel'nikova 2007).

In fact, though, spatial punishment, and more specifically the use of the 101st and 51st kilometre, was initiated by the Bolsheviks almost immediately after their advent to power. In creating a new symbolic geography, the Bolsheviks relied on the traditions of the Russian empire,[2] but they created a unique space with invisible but strictly enforced borders. These borders, drawn around various cities and other areas, were supposed to protect against any real or imagined opposition. The territories in which, for various reasons, 'socially dangerous elements' were forbidden to reside, were termed 'regime territories'. The growing numbers of areas with residency restrictions were designated with the term 'minus': 'minus 6', 'minus 12', and so on. Moreover, the constant increase of the list of regime areas resembled the weaving of a spider's web: it came to cover an ever-greater area, but always remained invisible and difficult to understand, not only for those punished by it (known in Russian as *minusniki*) but also by those meting out the punishment, for state punitive organs (Vronska & Stiazhkina 2021).

1 This research was supported by grant 0012084 from the John Fell Fund, University of Oxford.

2 In the first Criminal Code of the Russian Empire, 'The Code of Penal and Correctional Punishment' (1845), eviction featured as a ban on living in the capitals and adjacent territories, in all provincial locations and adjacent territories was well as in the 25-kilometre strip around them and in volosts near borders and fortresses (see Code, p.16.http://elib.shpl.ru/ru/nodes/17827-t-15-ch-1-ulozhenie-o-nakazaniyah-ugolovnyh-i-ispravitelnyh-izdanie-1885-goda-so-vklyucheniem-statey-po-prodolzheniyam-1912-1913-i-1914-godov-ch-2-ugolovnoe-ulozhenie-1916#mode/inspect/page/61/zoom/6, last accessed 8 May 2023. According to this law, the author of the Ukrainian anthem, Pavlo Chubins'ky, was exiled from Kyiv twice (in 1862 and in 1876) for taking part in oppositional activities. The second time, he was ordered to leave Kyiv, together with the historian Mykhailo Drahomanov. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, special territorial prohibitions were implemented with regard to Jews, who were forbidden to live in Kyiv, Mykolaiv and Sevastopol, as well as within the 50-kilometre strip on the border with Austria and Prussia.

In studies of the evolution of Soviet project which, for a variety of reasons (Geyer 1989; Snyder 2010; Viola 2011), developed in a context of 'permanent war' or 'permanent emergency' (Romano 2000; Liber 2016; Krasilnikov 2018; Shearer 2018; Stiazhkina 2021), punishment by banishment or prohibition on residency in state-designated areas is often linked only to kulak exile from the start of the 1930s (Zemskov 1991; Pokrovskii, Danilov, Krasilnikov & Viola 2005 pp. 9-12), or to the launch of passportisation in 1933 (Perepiltsiia 1953; Popov 1995; Muan 2005; Kolosov & Polyan 2009). Sheila Fitzpatrick presents the exile and deportation measures deployed by the Bolsheviks prior to 1929 as 'non-systematic', 'trivial' and directed at the members of the 'left opposition', certain 'counter-revolutionary organisations and groups' and 'former people [*byvshie liudi*]' (Fitzpatrick 2000, p. 122). By contrast, Pavel Pol'ian convincingly argues that exile and mass deportations (of Cossacks from southern Russia, Koreans, Karelians etc) were being deployed systematically from the very start of the establishment of Soviet power (Pol'ian 2003; on Cossacks, see also Holquist 2002, pp. 166-205). David Shearer, though he does not delve into the formation of the 'geographical minus', notes that banishment as a form of punishment was inflicted on thousands of people in the mid to late 1920s (Shearer 2009, pp. 97-98). Paul Hagenloh, meanwhile, reveals the use of regime territories and punishment by relegation to 'minus 6' to be a key mechanism of repressive policy (Hagenloh 2009, pp. 41-42, 51-52, 84, 124).

This article makes two principal claims about the logic of the formation, and growth, of regime geography, including the 101st and 51st kilometres. Firstly, it traces the consistent development and growth of Soviet practices of banishment and residency restriction from the revolution onwards, and disputes the notion of the 'triviality' and 'localism' of 'minus' punishment. Such banishment did not lose its practical significance after the start of passportisation either, and we trace its development up to 1940: a watershed dividing the repressive politics of 'peacetime life' from war and post-war policies, which were shaped by different domestic and external needs, and also by the definitive legal codification of first and second category regime areas. Secondly, we analyse the specific features of the creation and use of regime territory punishment in Ukraine, drawing particularly on documents of the Soviet special services held in the archives of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and on memoirs. It is worth noting that stories and statistics about *minusniki* appear only in fragmentary form in Ukrainian archives, either as records in the archival case files of victims of repression (usually in a line or less of text), or in scattered lists: an absence of quantitative data highlighted at the time by those working in the repressive organs (Platonova & Vronska 2002, pp. 29-30).

Overall, the development of 'regime geography' in Ukraine was in key respects similar to its evolution in the RSFSR and other republics, as one would expect of an increasingly centralised and repressive state. However, particular anxieties associated with Ukrainian territory and population meant that Soviet Ukrainian banishment and residency policies were especially, perhaps even uniquely, complex and restrictive. This was especially so in border and rural areas, as well as the metropolitan zones more conventionally associated with the '101st kilometre'. These concerns at times turned the republic into a testing ground for spatial punishment subsequently expanded or escalated in other parts of the Soviet Union: notably the more drastic and distant deportations of whole nation(alities) that became a key feature of Stalinist policy.

*Ukraine's political-economic, symbolic and legal space*

Ukraine was a suspect territory in the eyes of the Soviet authorities even before the establishment of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian revolution of 1917-20 and the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, recognised by numerous European powers and possessing its own parliament, laws and military, meant that many in Ukraine viewed the advent of the Bolsheviks and their victory as an occupation and the liquidation of independence. To legitimise their territorial claims on Ukraine, the Bolsheviks had declared the creation of a Soviet republic in Kharkiv in December 1917. Its name—the Ukrainian People's Republic—was directly opposed to the UNR, which had been declared in Kyiv and held full power over the territory of Ukraine (with the exception of a few Bolshevik-controlled enclaves). The Soviet quasi-UNR declared itself part of the federative Russian republic, and the Bolshevik army started to undertake an operation to 'liberate' Ukraine. The policy of *korenizatsiia*, pursued by the Bolsheviks from 1923 onwards as 'Ukrainianisation', was intended to demonstrate their commitment to, and active participation in, the development of Ukrainian-language culture, academia, education and bureaucracy. This policy enjoyed some success with populations who did not have their own alphabet and/or schools, books or literature. But in Ukraine, Bolshevik hopes were dashed: Ukrainianisation morphed into a large-scale movement, orientated toward Europe and often promoting the slogan 'Away from Moscow' (Sheveliov 1983; Palko 2020).[3]

The presence of veterans of the Ukrainian people's republic army (UNR)—with its experienced soldiers and officers, who had returned to Ukraine as part of the amnesty of 1921-22—seemed to the Bolsheviks to pose a genuine and ongoing threat of armed uprisings. The presence of a Ukrainian diaspora, made up of

3 An especially important role in this was played by the writer Mykola Khvyliovy, who later committed suicide.

former members of the Ukrainian parliament (The Central Rada), civil servants and senior military figures, strengthened the expectation of resistance coordinated by former UNR leaders, who had come together in the Ukrainian government in emigration. The threat posed by the entire Ukrainian emigration, which Symon Petliura in 1925 called 'salt in the eyes of the red occupiers of Ukraine' (Litvin 2000, pp. 404-05), was considered especially serious because it was linked to support for an independent democratic republic. (Kubicek 2008, pp. 96-114; Plokhy 2015, pp. 228-57; Shkandrii 2019, pp. 9-83).

While the Ukrainian diaspora generated anxieties beyond its borders, the borders themselves were one of several reasons that Ukraine came under particular scrutiny from the earliest days of Soviet power, and later became a testing ground for draconian spatial policies. The Soviet Union's borders with foreign states were the borders of Ukraine (with Romania, Poland). The links that survived between people on either side of the border made these Ukrainian territories a constant source of danger, linked to the regular cross-border migrations of the local populations, which were seen by the Bolsheviks as (and indeed often were) problems linked to contraband and to spying on behalf of Poland, with whom relations rapidly worsened over the course of the 1920s and 1930s (Humennyi 2016, pp. 272-81). The Ukrainian borderlands continued to be viewed as a threat during the Holodomor when whole villages, trying to escape the Bolsheviks and 'voting with their feet', attempted to cross the Polish border, some successfully (Snyder 2010, pp. 29-30). Parts of the Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Romanian borders became yet more significant in 1939-40 when the Bolsheviks were occupying Polish and Romanian territory and expected resistance from local populations as they often unwillingly became 'citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist republic'. The regime's fears regarding Ukraine's populations and territories were also linked to the areas where Jews, Poles, Germans, Greeks and other national communities lived in dense communities, which came under suspicion (and often also punishment) for espionage, nationalism and anti-Soviet conspiracy.

Beyond these borderlands, the rural and urban areas of Ukraine both aroused suspicions too, though for different reasons. The former came into especially sharp focus when the Bolsheviks carried out what Lynne Viola calls 'a civil war between the state and the peasantry' (Viola 2011, p. 103; c.f. Graziosi 2007, pp. 5-64; Tarkhova 2010). In March 1930 alone, armed resistance to the Red Army involved some 1.2 million peasants in the Ukrainian border territories (Vasil'ev p. 142). Moreover, since before the revolution (and increasingly so after it), many of Ukraine's regions also had high concentrations of industrial enterprises (Donetsk region, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk); over time, these regions became hubs for accelerated industrialisation and for the development of Soviet heavy industry, including the military-industrial complex.

These agricultural and industrial zones alike began to be seen as in need of protection from various 'dangerous' populations. These geographic and demographic specificities fuelled the strict and extensive spatial regulations that developed across Ukrainian territory between the revolution and World War II, to which we now turn.

*Minus territories, minus kilometres*

From the very first days after the Bolsheviks' advent to power, the regime pursued a clear course of excluding from mainstream society all those whom the new regime considered to fall short of the standards of the construction of the proletarian state. Step by step, with only short pauses usually linked to short-lived policy experiments (NEP, the campaign around the 1936 Constitution, the so-called Beria Thaw of 1938-39), purges (*zachistki*) targeted real and imagined regime opponents. The idea of casting out 'enemies of the revolution' from the central cities of Bolshevik Russia formed part of the broader concept of 'revolutionary logic' pursued over the course of the first two decades of the regime (Solomon 1996; Ryan 2012; Rendle 2020). This 'revolutionary logic' entailed not just the physical destruction of the revolution's opponents but also the uprooting of any sources of dissidence which might take hold amongst 'former people' (*byvshie liudi*). It is notable that Bolsheviks abided by the principle of 'he who controls the capital also controls the empire'; this principle formed the basis of a new symbolic geography throughout the entire existence of the Soviet state.

The mildest form of repression was expulsion from Moscow and Petrograd, which started to be deployed within weeks of the revolution. An instruction of the People's Commissariat of Justice from 19 November 1917 granted powers to special courts to carry out these measures. Revolutionary tribunals were, inter al., granted the right, 'according to circumstances and the dictates of revolutionary conscience' to subject to 'exclusion from the capitals, from particular areas or beyond the borders of the Russian republic', those who had been convicted of opposition to the new regime.[4] As early as 1918, the Bolsheviks in Moscow and Petrograd were already practising (though the practice was not yet legally regulated) the enforced banishment of particular categories of people, for terms ranging from several months a year; these people were not, however, deprived of the right to settle in provincial (*gubernskie*) Russian towns.

The 1920s constitute an important period not only in the overall evolution of Soviet punitive institutions and the formation of criminal legislation and extra-legal organs, but also specifically for the punishment of expulsion from one's place of residence, accompanied by a prohibition on settling in certain

4 *Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii pravitel'stva za 1917-1918* (Moscow, 1942), pp. 181–183 (article 170).

geographical areas, especially cities and border zones, as determined by the organs of state security in consultation with the higher authorities. The 1922 and 1926-27 criminal codes of union republics contained an article on the deployment of expulsion against those 'representing a particular danger by virtue of past activity and links to a criminal milieu' i.e. on the basis of subjective assessments. In this way, the 1920s witnessed not only attempts to legalise this form of punishment, but also the growth of conditions for arbitrary decision-making, mostly by extra-legal organs, in this sphere (Vronska & Stiazhkina 2021, p. 169).[5]

Such enforced removal affected, above all, 'socially alien' populations. This term has numerous synonyms, including 'former people', 'counter-revolutionary elements', 'parasites', 'socially dangerous', 'class-alien'. By the end of the 1910s, it already included merchants, business owners, traders, those profiting from exploitation of others' labour, priests, and Russian imperial police employees. At the start of the 1920s, the provisional list also came to encompass representatives of socialist opposition parties, and by the mid-1920s, criminals, bureaucrats, representatives of nationalist (primarily Zionist) social organisations; by the end of the 1920s and early 1930s, it also included 'nepmen', 'Trotskyists', 'right deviationists' and also 'saboteurs'; later, 'wreckers', 'Bukharinites'; and then whole peoples: Poles, Germans, Greeks etc (Alexopoulos 2003). Repressions carried out against socially alien people also designated families of 'enemies of the people' as 'socially dangerous' (Alexopoulos 2003). One could even end up on this list simply by virtue of 'links to a hostile environment' (Fitzpatrick, 2000 pp. 11-22; Alexopoulos 2003; Kozlova 2005, pp. 289-405).

Within this evolving union-wide policy, is noteworthy that the Ukrainian list of 'dangerous and socially alien' people of the 1920s and 1930s always featured UNR army soldiers (so-called Petliurites). For instance, in the instructions of the OGPU on conducting one of the first mass operations of 1927 against 'counter-revolutionary elements' in some regions of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR appeared first in the list, followed by Belarus, the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia and the Far East. It is also significant that in this list of enemies, Petliurites were referred to alongside the White Guard, whereas no specific names were given to the leaders of 'counter-revolutionary' movements in other regions (Velikanova 2013). Later, in the 1930s, 'socially dangerous'

5 In November 1924, a peasant Ahmed Dzhelyadinov (b. 1882) was exiled from the Crimea 'without the right to reside in the country's metropolises' for 'spreading rumours'. In December of the same year, Anna Ershova (b. 1889), a housewife from Simferopol, was exiled from the Crimea and banned from living in 'metropolises' for the same 'crime'. In 1927, a resident of Simferopol, Galina Drozdovskaya (b. 1894), was exiled from the Crimea and banned from living in six cities of the USSR because she 'mocked the orders and activities of the Soviet government'.

Ukrainians always included 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists'. The fear of Petliurites and the repressions carried out against them were well-founded. After the defeat of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-21, the UNR authorities had continued their work in emigration. In March 1921, they created a state centre of the UNR, whose president from 1921 to 1936 was Symon Petliura (Shul'gin 1934). If for the Russian territory in the early 1920s, expulsion was a largely urban punishment (and often a metropolitan one), then in Ukrainian territory, it was largely directed at peasants who had formed partisan detachments of Petliurites. The atamans of these detachments forged contacts with the UNR and were preparing an armed uprising against Soviet power, carrying out raids against Bolsheviks who were confiscating grain from peasants, and already forming underground organisations, such as the 'Patriotic nest of Ichni', destroyed by the Bolsheviks in 1923. Some of the rebels were shot, and six were 'banned from residing in Chernihiv, Poltava and also the border regions of Volyn and Podolsk *gubernii*' (Vasylenko 2015, p. 159). These practices of expulsion and residency bans aimed to hamper the organisation of new underground peasant organisations.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) decree of 10 August 1922 'On administrative banishment' granted powers 'aimed at isolating those complicit in counter-revolutionary crimes' first to special commissions, functioning from 1922 to 1923 under the NKVD, and then to their successors: the special council (*soveshchanie*) attached to the USSR OGPU and, in Ukraine, the GPU of the Ukrainian republic (Zaitsev 1993, p. 12).[6] It was also at this time that the first defined list of towns where the exiled were forbidden to live was created: the 'minus 6' of Moscow, Petrograd, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa and Rostov-on-Don. It is noteworthy that this first list of cities considered dangerous by the authorities included three Ukrainian cities. Kyiv was the suspect and rebellious UNR city; Kharkiv, the proletarian capital of the Ukrainian republic with its leaders long suspected of conspiracy, and Odesa, a port city open to foreigners and therefore to 'harmful influences', spying and contraband.

As Paul Hagenloh correctly observes, minus-6 was the simplest of all the punishments as far as local NKVD functionaries were concerned, and they deployed it widely, banishing culprits from their regions and instructing them to register in their new area with local police authorities. Since such instances often concerned criminals, these rapid 'transfers' into neighbouring, non-regime towns elicited protests from local authorities, alarmed by the [prospect of] rises in the crime rate (Hagenloh 2009, p. 43). The document specifying the punishment 'by minus' took the form of a warrant where 'the undersigned' would recognise that he was obliged

6 This is the Special Commission of the USSR inside the NKVD (sometimes referred to as 'the Commission for Administrative Evictions' or 'the Administrative Commission').

to leave and to be registered in the local police authority chosen or defined by the OGPU authorities. In parallel with this document, information about the *minusnik* would be sent to the police authorities, who were supposed to register them. However, both these processes of punishment were unreliable in their implementation: information could be faked, and documentation on those subject to such punishment would often go astray in amongst piles of other documents.

As the punitive-repression organs continued their search for the optimal resolution of the problem of how to purge major Bolshevik cities of 'socially alien elements', the Politburo on 1 November 1923 approved the proposal of GPU head Feliks Dzerzhinskii to 'unload Moscow' of 'parasite elements' (Mozokhin 2006, p. 55). This constitutes the first use of the term 'unloading' (*razgruzka*), which would subsequently, and in conjunction with the idea of purging (*ochistka*), be actively deployed in expelling people out of cities and onto the 101st and 51st kilometres, as well as out of other places subsequently granted 'regime' status. This Politburo decision gave rise, in turn, to the formulation of the task of 'combatting the NEP scum' by means of expelling 'socially harmful elements' from Moscow and other industrial centres (Mozokhin 2006, p. 56).

The 'nepman minus' was already a visible and normalised element of Bolshevik policy in the 1920s, as reflected in literature of the time (Roisman 1928; Zoshchenko 1929).[7] However, he did not look the same union-wide. The spatial repressions carried out against nepmen in Ukraine aimed not only at the 'unloading' of cities, but also at establishing controls over peasants as agrarian producers. The acute need to provide cities with produce meant that the main 'nepmen' in Ukraine were peasants selling their own bread, resulting in millions of people being deprived of their right to deal with their own harvest (Kulchitsky 2013, p. 201). These figures do not fit the usual caricature of the urban 'nepman'. Indeed, sentences expelling peasants and banning them from residency in particular areas instead termed them 'speculators' or 'kulaks'.

The specific issues associated with Ukrainian territory, especially the ongoing struggle to restore independence, shaped Ukrainian (and sometimes central) policy in other ways too. It is striking that the 19 March 1924 resolution of the all-Ukrainian central executive committee (VUTsK) and the council of people's commissars (SNK) of the Ukrainian republic 'On the prohibition of socially dangerous citizens' presence in particular areas of the Ukrainian republic' appeared *ten days earlier* than the all-union equivalent.[8] Controlled

7 Zoshchenko's story's hero, the unmasked 'nepman' Sisiaev, was expelled from Leningrad in 1926 and was convicted to 'minus 7, or plus 7, or 8, who the heck knows'.

8 *Zbirnik uzakonen' ta rozporiadzhen' roytnicho-selianskogo uriadu Ukraini za 1924 rik* (Narodnyi komisariat iustitsii, Kharkiv, drukania UVO im M. Frunze, 1924), part 1, no. 1-55: http://irbis-

areas named in this resolution included the cities of Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Ekaterynoslav, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Kherson, and also Volyn, Podolsk and Donetsk provinces. Running ahead, or independently, of the centre was unusual for this highly hierarchical repressive system. While clearly not a purely local initiative, this list suggests the presence of serious local problems needing to be addressed by spatial restrictions.

The same resolution also contains the first mention of the 50-km forbidden zone around the aforementioned cities. It serves as a perfect illustration of Ukraine-related concerns: 'border' anxieties (around Volyn and Podolsk *gubernii*, where new spies and contrabandists were 'expected' to appear), fear of the peasantry who might be planning resistance, and new fears linked to the need to 'cleanse' cities where heavy industry was developing (Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Donetsk region). The NKVD and GPU and the Ministry of Justice were tasked with generating an appropriate instruction within a month and agreeing it with the Ministries of Internal Affairs of other republics. At this time, article 95-1 was also supplemented, specifying a year in prison for anyone breaking the rules on expulsion or attempting to return to an area from which they had been banned.[9]

The fundamental tasks of enforced expulsion of people considered socially dangerous were entrusted to the NKVD/OGPU/GPU. Expulsion in the form of 'unloading' and 'sanitation' was carried out by local punitive-repressive organs. And clearly defined extra-legal functions were assigned to the aforementioned special council of the USSR OGPU, which was 'legalised' by the USSR central executive committee (TsIK) via a special Statute on the rights of the United State Political Administration with regard to administrative banishment, exile and imprisonment in concentration camps' (March 1924).[10]

In the second half of the 1920s, the range of people subject to regime limitations, and the list of places in practice accorded 'regime' status, were both expanded. On 25 January 1928, the legal and executive organs of the Ukrainian Soviet socialist republic passed a resolution 'On the prohibition on socially dangerous people living in specified areas, and on the registration of people subject to legal or administrative exile'. This list of

nbuv.gov.ua/dlib/item/0000128, last accessed 8 May 2023.

9 *Zbirnik uzakonen' ta rozporiadzhen' roytnicho-selianskogo uriadu Ukraini za 1924 rik* (Narodnyi komisariat iustitsii, Kharkiv, drukania UVO im M. Frunze, 1924), no. 7.– article 68., pp. 162-163. This term was later extended to three years' duration.

10 *Zbirnik uzakonen' ta rozporiadzhen' roytnicho-selianskogo uriadu Ukraini za 1924 rik* (Narodnyi komisariat iustitsii, Kharkiv, drukania UVO im M. Frunze, 1924), pp. 468–470.

'specified areas' now included border regions, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Mariupol' and Vinnitsa *okruga* and their surrounding centres (Okipniuk 2002, p. 44). If, in the RSFSR, Bolshevik fears remained focussed on the capitals and border zones, Ukraine regime territories also encompassed agricultural areas. This was because Bolshevik policies of collectivisation ran up against resistance, which included calls for independence and the restoration of the UNR. What Terry Martin terms 'political banditry, which remained a serious problem until the mid-1920s' was in fact a continuation of the struggle for independence from Russia and the Bolsheviks (Martin 2001, pp. 313-14). The GPU recorded many conversations featuring not just peasants but also Red Army soldiers, claiming that the Ukrainian peasantry would have been better off under independence or under Petliura, or hoping for armed struggle against Russia, or even for the Bolsheviks' departure from Ukrainian territory, to be replaced by the chief ataman Livytskyy, once he had triumphantly returned home (Hrynevych 2013, pp. 294-96).

The risks (perceived to be) associated with Ukrainian territory were also determined by the presence of the border with Poland, which the Bolsheviks viewed as an extremely hostile power, which was planning, in league with Romania and with British support, to undertake aggressive action against the Soviet Union. Stalin considered the war with Poland unfinished, so the possibility of a revival of hostilities was always a factor in Bolshevik internal and external policy-making (Shearer 2018, p. 192). After Pilsudski's coup in Poland in 1926, Stalin assumed that war with Poland could result in the loss of Ukraine, since even amongst Ukrainian communists, there were 'quite a number of rotten elements, conscious and unconscious Petliurites, and also direct agents of Pilsudski' (Khlevniuk, Rees, Davies, Kosheleva & Rogovaya 2001, p. 274).

Both these factors had a significant influence on spatial punishment policy already in the 1920s. For Poles residing in the border territories, for example, expulsion was already a strong probability as early as the mid-1920s, often on charges of 'espionage' (whereas Russians, Ukrainians or Jews would be charged with anti-Soviet agitation or illegal border-crossing), even though the majority were illiterate and/or crossing the border to see relatives on the other side (Fischer 1960, pp. 433-36, 537-35; Samuelson 2000). From the mid-1920s and throughout the 1930s, expulsion and residency prohibition were meted out to Poles in a systematic, rather than spontaneous or selective, fashion. One of these numerous cases concerned the father and son Weiman, tailors from Gorodok. They were arrested on the same day (26 February 1926) for illegally crossing the border. The same decision of the special commission of the GPU UkrSSR sentenced the father to banishment and a ban on residing in regime territories and the son to three years in prison. [11] It is important to note that this was also the

11 *Reabilitovani istorieiu. Khmel'nytska oblast'*, vol. 3 (Khmel'nytskyi, 2012), p. 395.

period of *korenizatsiia* in Bolshevik nationality policy, which included the creation of national areas where national minorities (Germans, Poles etc) were densely packed together, and where national cultures were encouraged in a variety of ways (Brown 2004). However, as Terry Martin correctly observes, it was also in this period that the conditions for future ethnic cleansing were emerging (Martin 2001, p. 312). The use of expulsion and residency bans, including in Ukraine and especially in its borderlands, can be seen as a testing ground for such practices.

Beyond these emerging anxieties about national groups, Ukraine's agricultural territory also aroused concerns, which were again addressed through spatial restrictions. A specific feature of the grain-producing territories, making up all of Ukraine's non-urban territory, was the 'invisible minus' applied to peasants designated as kulaks. In the dekulakisation campaign, rural soviets and poverty committees established a 'geographic regime' to expel kulaks of the third category. The 'fortunate' ones (those not shot or deported) ended up in 'local reservations': territories unsuitable for cultivation, with poor soils, sloping land and other problems, which turned into 'ghettos' that were impossible to exit, even to go to neighbouring villages or the bazar, without *sel'sovet* permission (Vronska & Stiazhkina 2021, pp. 139-45).[12]

The final landmark before the introduction of all-union passport system was the order and instruction of 10-11 January 1930. The latter, in its section about banishment, lengthened the term of such removal from three to ten years, while the number of areas where the 'socially dangerous contingent' was prohibited from living increased to 'minus 15'; it also specified the creation of a 100-kilometre zone around Moscow and Leningrad and a 50-kilometre zone around Kyiv.[13] The 50-km radius around Kyiv was equivalent to 7853km: a territory which could fit two Luxembourgs, Monaco, Lichtenstein and Andorra. The Moscow and Leningrad radiuses covered an area of 31400 sq. km., and each of these radiuses amounted to an area the size of Belgium.

12 *Reabilitovani istorieiu. Cherkas'ka oblast'*, vol. 9, (Cherkasy, 2016), pp. 109-10, 123.

13 Tsentral'nyi arkhiv federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii (subsequently CA FSB), f.100, op.1, d.5, ll. 233-234. Published in: Pol'ian, P., 'Geografiia nesvobody: ob infrastrukture deportatsii i sovetskoi rezhimnosti', *Demoskop*, 651–652, 24 August – 6 September 2015 http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2015/0651/analit04.php, last accessed 8 May 2023 . The fifteen areas were 1. Moscow and the 100 km zone around it. 2. Leningrad and the 100 km zone around it. 3. Kyiv and the 50 km zone around it. 4. Kharkiv. 5. Stalino. 6. Dnipropetrovsk. 7. the Crimean ASSR. 8. Azov-Chernomosrski region. 9. the North Caucasian region. 10. ZSFSR [Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic]. 11. Sverdlovsk. 12. Magnitogorsk. 13. Chita. 14. Khabarovsk. 15. All settlements in the border zone.

In connection with the 'destruction of the kulaks as a class', the territories listed in the laws were tacitly supplemented by regulations on the areas around villages where peasants designed as kulaks were forbidden to reside.

*Passportisation and the announcement of regime areas*

By transforming huge territories into forbidden zones even before the introduction of passportisation, the Soviet authorities attempted to facilitate the registration of all 'socially dangerous' people whom they considered a threat. Passportisation itself got underway a decade and a half after the Bolsheviks came to power, with the resolution of the USSR TsIK and SNK 'On the establishment of a single passport system in the USSR and the obligatory registration of passports'. A corresponding instruction on the issuance of passports (14 January 1933) specified the 'social-political borders' associated with passportisation. However, the resolution itself only specified the cities where this campaign should be carried out: namely, Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Minsk, Rostov-on-Don and Vladivostok.[14] Here again, Ukrainian cities were accorded almost equivalent significance to RSFSR urban areas.

Eric Lohr correctly observes that 'for the Bolshevik state, the policy of bestowing citizenship was above all used as a filter to divide people into 'our' and 'alien'' (Lohr 2017, p. 12). Those who were not granted the right to receive passports were obliged to leave the aforementioned cities, and were not permitted to reside in the 100-kilometre strip around Moscow and Leningrad and 50-kilometre zone around Kharkiv. This list of restricted peoples appeared in a secret supplement (section II), stamped 'highly confidential', to the instruction on the issuance of passports, which was confirmed by the Soviet government on 14 January 1933. It included: former prisoners and exiles, including those convicted of minor crimes; those not engaged in socially useful labour in production or in workplaces (except invalids and pensioners); kulaks who had fled the countryside and 'dekulakised' people, even those working in enterprises and on the staff of Soviet institutions; those fleeing from abroad (except political emigres); and those who had arrived in the specified cities after 1 January 1931 without an invitation from a workplace or enterprise, if they did not have a specified occupation or worked in

14 *Sobranie zakonov i rasporyazhenii raboche-krest'ianskogo pravitel'stva SSSR*, 1932 n. Sb. № 84, Art. 516 ; *Zbirnyk zakoniv ta rozporyadzhen` Robitnycho-Selyans`kogo uryadu Ukrayiny, №1–20*. Sichen`-traven`. Kharkiv, 1933, № 1. Art. 5; Otraslevoi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sluzhby bezopasnosti Ukrainy (subsequently, OGA SBU), f. 9, op. 1, d. 188, l. 24.

enterprises or workplaces but were classed as 'flitters' due to frequent changes of employment; private traders; priests; and other suspect figures.[15] Over the remainder of the 1930s, this proscriptive list expanded to include further real and imagined political opponents of the Stalinist regime. As David Shearer correctly argues, 'with the introduction of the passport system, belonging to the category of "socially harmful elements", which had appeared long before, was recognised as a social status, punishable by law' (Shearer 2014, p. 314).

The first stage of passportisation was carried out in Moscow, Leningrad and the 100-km zone around these cities, and also in Minsk, Rostov-on-Don as well as in Kharkiv and the 50-km zone around it. Kyiv, which had featured earlier amongst the forbidden places for disloyal citizens along with its 50-km zone, was not part of this list, as the capital of the Ukrainian republic was Kharkiv at this time. Soon, though, in spring and summer 1933, passportisation and the 'sanitation' that accompanied it also unfolded in Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk and Stalino, though there was no 50-km zone around these cities specified in the regulatory documents.[16]

The first wave of passportisation in the Ukrainian republic was accompanied by a powerful propaganda campaign, organised in typical Bolshevik style. Agitational and informational material were distributed around the population, explaining the significance and substance of passportisation. These detailed the obligations of the leadership of workplaces and institutions, and also of individual 'conscious' citizens who were called upon to uncover 'counter-revolutionary elements' and 'cleanse' society of them. For instance, the Kharkiv tractor factory newspaper *Temp* carried the following announcement: 'Commanders, housewives! Uncover the class enemies! The resolution of the USSR TsIK from 27.12.32 on the introduction of the passport system is one of the historical documents which reflects the will and dictatorship of the proletariat in the struggle with the class alien element. We must cleanse socialist enterprises of former merchants, nobles, kulaks, sub-kulaks, white-guardists, who have got a foothold in production and Soviet trade and rural organisations and continue their subversive operations'.[17]

15 OGA SBU, f. 9, op. 1, d. 188, ll. 59-59 ob.

16 *Sobranie zakonov i rasporyazhenii raboche-krest'ianskogo pravitel'stva SSSR*, (Moscow, 1932) n. Sb. № 84. Art. 516; *Sbirnik zakoniv ta nakaziv robitnicho-selian-skogo uriadu SRSR*, no. 3, art. 22. (Kharkiv, Vidavnitsvo VUTsVK Radianske budinitstvo i pravo, 1933).

17 Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv vysshikh organov vlasti i upravleniia Ukrainy/Tsentral'nii arkhiv vishikh organiv vladi ta upravlinnia Ukrainy (subsequently, TsGAVOVU), f. 6, op. 1, d. 2131, l. 72.

Such appeals had a distinctly pragmatic goal. Firstly, as Al'bert Baiburin correctly observes, no administrative organs, however powerful and total they may have been, could ever have resolved the problem of filtration of such a large quantity of the population in such a short period of time (Baiburin 2017, pp. 109-11). The 'conscious' urban population was used to 'uncover enemies', just as the rural population was during the dekulakisation campaign. People learned about the horizontal implementation of repression, while also satisfying their own symbolic and material interest: people without passports who were banished to the 101st/51st kilometre left behind housing which could be occupied by someone else. Employees of the repressive organs of the Ukrainian republic themselves saw in the police campaign to 'strengthen revolutionary order' an opportunity to resolve the apartment question for their colleagues. For example, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs for the Ukrainian republic V. Balytsky in mid-November 1934 instructed his subordinates to 'take the necessary measures' to incorporate into the NKVD's accommodation supplies 15 per cent of the housing freed up by the removal of the 'undesirable elements' (Bazhan 2015, p. 70).

In reality, many people sought to avoid the harmful consequences of passportisation by fleeing the cities (or 'self-minusing'/*samominus*). Police reports of 1933 about the progress of passportisation recorded citizens describing how they were attempting to flee cities and get 'out of harm's way' in order not to get caught up in mass 'hunts' and repressions. Statements overheard on the streets or in apartments included the idea that 'you can't hide from communism and Soviet power…you've got to get away further of your own accord'.[18] They had already grasped the fact that if their 'dubious' origins were uncovered, the official decision on their 'geographic minus' might not be 100/50 kilometres, but significantly further away.

In this connection, David Shearer has noted that the first stage of passportisation in the first half of 1933 resulted in the urban population of the USSR declining by 400,000, which he calls 'the only period of real decline in city population numbers since the Civil War era' (Shearer 2009, p. 200). For the Ukrainian republic more specifically, the reduction in urban population (and overall republican population) was the result not only of passportisation but also of the Holodomor of 1932-33. One of the aims of passportisation was to prevent migration of the starving peasant population into the cities: peasants were supposed to be 'repatriated' to their place of habitation, and 'counter-revolutionary elements arrested' (Hagenloh 2009, p. 123). In such conditions, refusal of a passport and banishment 'with minus' amounted to a death sentence. One such 'non-passportised' inhabitant of Kharkiv Khaeichel Rodionoskii, father of three young children and a disabled civil war veteran,

18 TsGAVOVU, f. 6, op. 1, d. 2131, l. 125 ob.

referred explicitly to this in his letter of complaint to the procuracy, saying that he 'would be doomed to death by starvation'.[19]

However, it was another resolution on passportisation that marked the true start of the history of the 101st kilometre in the Ukrainian republic and Soviet Union alike. The SNK resolution of 28 April 1933 'On the issuance of passports on the territory of the USSR to Soviet citizens' contained the important detail that all citizens refused passports in a range of cities including Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk and several Russian cities, and also within the 100-kilometre border zone at the Western European border of the USSR, were not permitted to live in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkiv and the 100-kilometre zones around Moscow and Leningrad, and the 50-kilometre zone around Kharkiv.[20]

This resolution's instructions on border territories bore particular significance for Ukraine, as a border territory of the USSR, with a border whose length exceeded 2000km (Dominiczak 1992, pp. 147-0; Magocsi 1993; Livezeanu 1995; Chandler 1998; Borzecki 2008). Even in the 1920s, during the 'war scare' and immediately after it (1926-28), the Ukrainian borderlands were being 'purged' of 'undesirable elements', including through the use of banishment. For example, on 25 June 1928, the Politburo of the Communist Party of Ukraine decreed the eviction from the border area of the Mogilev-Podolsk district of 'former landowners, tsarist officers, former members of the White and Petliura armies, former stockholders and tsarist officials', as well as wealthy peasants and individuals convicted of banditry. In place of the purged individuals, 'specially selected' people were to be moved into this territory (Vronska & Stiazhkina 2021, p. 224). The Sovnarkom decision to 'purge' the 100 kilometre zone took concrete shape in the Ukrainian republican CC resolution 'On Transfers out of the borderlands' (20 December 1934). Kulaks and individual land-owners were subject to removal, and the NKVD plan deemed it necessary to remove 2000 families. Over-fulfilling the plan, NKVD

19 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Khar'kovskoi oblasti, f. R - 408, op. 8, d. 1930, l. 88

20 *Sobranie zakonov i rasporyazhenii raboche-krestyanskogo pravitel'stva SSSR* (Moscow, 1932), Sb. № 84. article 516, 517. The full list was: Kyiv, Odesa, Minsk, Rostov-on-Don, Stalingrad, Stalinsk, Baku, Gorkii, Sormovo, Magnitogorsk, Cheliabinsk, Grozny, Sevastopol, Stalino, Perm', Dnepropetrovsk, Sverdlovsk, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Nikolsk-Ussuriisk, Spassk, Blagoveshchensk, Anzhero-Sudzhensk, Prokop'evsk, Leninsk. In the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars No. 861, in addition to Kyiv and Odessa, which had already dropped out of the aforementioned January instruction on passportisation, other Ukrainian cities were likewise classified as regime areas: Stalino and Dnepropetrovsk.

employees actually removed nearly 8000 households of 'undesirable elements' in December 1934, and in the first month of 1935, removed 9470 households, or 40,000 people (Chentsov 1998, p. 79). They were transferred to Eastern Ukraine, or beyond its borders.

Although expulsion 101 kilometres beyond the borders was couched as a 'purge' of the kulaks, *edinolichniki* and 'undesirable elements', this repression took on (even more) palpably national-political colouring from as early as 1935. The problem was that Polish peasants generally owned little land, and so belonged in the category of 'poor' peasants and could not be ascribed to the categories of 'kulak' or 'sub-kulak' and therefore could not be expelled 'on a class basis' (Yakubova 2004, pp. 392-93). Hence Poles in the border zone were not evaluated on a social basis, but in terms of national risk, with GPU reports transforming them into agents of hostile foreign powers (Kalakura 2008, p. 54). Similar rhetorical 'transformations' happened to other nationalities in other Soviet border regions, including Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians and Koreans (Martin 2001, pp. 311-93). Consequently, expulsion instructions in NKVD reports now included separate lines to record those who had been expelled for reasons of nationality: one report, typically, claimed that 'from 20 February to 10 March 1935, 286 Polish and 1903 German families were expelled from the border regions of Kyiv and Vinnitsa regions to the Eastern part of Ukraine'.[21]

However, the use of expulsion into other areas of Ukrainian territory (which occurred, for example, during the liquidation of the Markhlevskyi Polish national region, and its peopling with 'upstanding Soviet citizens') did not generate the desired outcomes. Poles expelled from the border regions to the East of Ukraine complained and asked to be returned. Kate Brown calculates that 23,000 Poles sent to Eastern Ukraine returned home (Brown 2004, p. 144). Reacting to this threat, at the end of 1935, a separate decision was taken to remove from border regions some 6-7,000 Polish and German families, sending them out of Ukraine altogether, and soon the target was increased to 15,000 families.[22] That same year, the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs G. Yagoda recommended the removal of several tens of thousands of Greeks from the Black Sea border regions (Shearer 2009, p. 216).

This transformation of the national communities of borderlands into *minusniki* reveals two tendencies. The first is the burgeoning of panic and mobilisational sentiments with regard to a future war, in which real and imagined enemy agents were first and foremost defined by their ethnic identity. The second tendency was connected to the beginning of the transformation of the 'class empire' into a 'empire of nations', wherein

21 *Politburo i krest'ianstvo: vysylki, spetsposeleniia*, 2 vols (Moscow, Rosspen, 2006), vol. 1, p. 124.

22 *Politburo i krest'ianstvo: vysylki, spetsposeleniia*, 2 vols (Moscow, Rosspen, 2006), vol. 1, p. 124.

Russians were designated the most devoted and most important of the 'fraternal peoples'. The purging of 'suspect' nationalities from the 100km borderland zone involved not only the formation of a specific group of *minusniki* but also the first step (together with the removal of ethnic groups from border territories of other republics in the 1920s) and acquisition of practical experience for the later mass deportations of ethnic groups (Pol'ian 2003; Legters, Lyman 1997).

Meanwhile, from 1934, banishment from Ukrainian *cities* largely targeted the relatives of real and imaginary opponents of the Soviet regime, in particular from the Ukrainian artistic intelligentsia. This is clear in the letter sent by CC First Secretary P. Postyshev to the head of the Ukrainian republican GPU on 28 March 1934:

> It is essential to evict the families of arrested counter-revolutionary nationalists from their apartments and they must be transferred from the borders of Ukraine to the north. Family members of those arrested must be rapidly removed from their place of employment or study. To reiterate, it is essential to remove the families, and all those who lived in the same 'nests' as them, from Ukraine as swiftly as possible. Although it is possible that there is no factual material on the latter, they are nevertheless part and parcel of the same gang.[23]

Here it is noteworthy that in 1934 and indeed later, inhabitants of Ukraine designated as enemies by the Soviet authorities were deemed guilty of nationalism, which the highest authorities always regarded as the most dangerous and most counter-revolutionary form of political consciousness. Without having issued formal instructions for the Ukrainian republic, the heads of the repressive apparatus were already taking the initiative in combatting 'Ukrainian nationalism'. V. Balytsky's subordinates in the republic treated his orders with the utmost seriousness, especially in the run-up to the transfer of the seat of government from Kharkiv to the new capital, Kyiv. In summer 1934, P. Postyshev himself gave a bravura performance to the Kyiv obkom regarding the results of the 'purging' of Kyiv of 'counter-revolutionary' and 'socially alien' elements, noting the 'shock work' of the Kyiv region branch of the NKVD; this resulted in 'the removal of 20,000 people from Kyiv' (Shapoval, Zolotarev 2017, p. 238).

The murder of Sergei Kirov, first secretary of the Leningrad obkom, on 1 December 1934 served as pretext for yet another wave of political terror, which included further 'purging' of 'socially alien elements' from major Soviet cities. The year 1935, for the first time since the introduction of the Soviet passport system, saw a passport exchange, aimed at subjecting citizens to a more rigorous system of checks and aiming to avoid

23 OGA SBU, f. 13, d. 408, t. 3, l. 576.

previous ‘mistakes’, when punitive-repressive organisation bosses felt that many ‘anti-social elements’ had been granted passports. To take one example, during the 1933 passportisation of Kharkiv, a merchant Patsaev was not granted a passport and had been exiled beyond Kharkiv’s 51st kilometre, but his wife had been granted a passport despite her family links to him, her origins and her ‘political unreliability’. This ‘mistake’ was subsequently corrected.[24]

On 31 January 1935, People’s commissar of internal affairs G. Yagoda signed another ‘top secret’ NKVD order (no. 0069) on passport work, to be implemented in conjunction with the earlier order of 14 January 1933.[25] This 1935 order was the first to make explicit mention of the concept of ‘regime area’ (*rezhimnaia mestnost’*), though, as noted above, the process of gradual creation of regime areas had been tacitly unfolding in the Soviet state since the earliest days of its existence. The instruction specified ‘9. Areas, in which passportisation is carried out on special instructions of the Main Administration of Worker and Peasant Police Force, as asserted by the USSR Sovnarkom on 14 January 1935, that is, areas where passports are *not routinely issued to all citizens*—are to be termed *regime areas*. 10. Areas where passportisation is carried out according to the resolution of the USSR sovnarkom of 28 April 1933, that is where passports are issued *without exception to all citizens* regardless of social position (including to those refused passports in regime areas) are to be termed *non-regime areas*.’[26]

Another significant innovation was introduced on 8 August 1936, via a resolution of the USSR Sovnarkom. Now, in point 10 of passports issued to former convicts, there was a special note, reading ‘issued on the basis of point 11 of the USSR Sovnarkom resolution no. 861 of 28 April 1933’. There was also an expansion in the list of ‘crimes’, with a pronounced emphasis on political (or ‘counter-revolutionary’) crimes that entailed a ban on the issuance of a passport. The 1936 resolution noted that: ‘in the cities of Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkiv, in the 100 kilometre zones around Moscow and Leningrad and the 50 kilometre zone around Kharkiv, passports will not be issued or registered to those who have served prison or exile sentences’ (this was regardless of the fact that by this time, Kyiv and not Kharkiv was already the capital of the Ukrainian

24 TsGAVOVU, f. 6, op. 1, d. 213, 1. 125 ob.

25 Otraslevoi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ministerstva vnutrennikh del Ukrainy (subsequently, OGA MVD Ukrainy), f.45, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 78, 126-126 ob.

26 OGA MVD Ukrainy, f.45, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 78, 126-126 ob. Italics as in the originals.

republic).[27] It was this document that instigated the insertion of special indications into passports, which would long determine the categories of 'clean' and 'stigmatised' citizens.[28] Finally, towards the end of 1936, the NKVD formulated a rather extensive 'list of regime cities and areas of the USSR, where passportisation is to be carried out in accordance with the USSR SRN instructions of 14 January 1933'.[29] This long list made no mention of the 100- or 50- kilometre zones around the major Soviet cities, but it did contain a region-by-region list of areas in all the union republics, many of which were situated significantly further than 100/50 kilometres away from the republican capitals or regional centres. These refinements to the enumeration of 'socially dangerous' categories of people, according to V. Kolosov and P. Pol'ian, 'had brought territorial mobility and social rights into alignment with social status, and the regime defined this status for every social, ethnic and territorial group of the population' (Kolosov & Pol'ian 2009, p. 25).

It is striking that the greatest numbers of these controlled areas were located in the Russian and Ukrainian republics. In total, the document listed 547 populated areas, including areas where Gulag camps were located. Not including the latter, the RSFSR had 161 'regime' areas, Ukraine 135 and Belarus 47. In view of the fact that the RSFSR was three times larger than Ukraine, but had only 27 more 'regime' areas, we must assume that the particularly stringent 'regime' controls over Ukrainian territory reflected all of Moscow's fears about Ukraine: its position on the border; the need for 'cleansed' industrial cities; the threat of protest; peasant uprisings; the fear of Ukrainian and other 'nationalisms', linked to the ethnic groups inhabiting the Ukrainian republic. In the first half of 1938, there was a notable and substantial expansion of 'passportised' areas of the Soviet Union, which led to an upsurge in work to 'sanitise' the corresponding areas. The document also specified exemptions from this rule in the case of petitions from camp authorities or local police department decisions. But once again, Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, Sochi and Sochi region were not permitted such 'leniency'.[30]

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27 OGA SBU f. 9, op. 1, d. 188, ll. 65 ob–66; d. 80, ll. 27-28.

28 OGA MVD Ukrainy, f. 45, op.1, d. 5, l. 35 ob.; OGA SBU, f. 9, op. 1, d. 176, ll. 101-101 ob. The NKVD order of 16 August 1936 laid out the new instructions for carrying out passport work. Point 6 of these instructions instructed employees 'not to permit those with these notes in their passport to reside in regime areas, unless they can provide documentary proof that these restrictions on regime area residency have been lifted'.

29 OGA SBU, f. 9, op.1, d. 188, ll. 67-71 ob.

These lists of regime territories and the ways that they changed over time point to several conclusions. Firstly, these changes were based on internal political and economic processes. The former included the formation of new administrative borders between areas and regions; the promotion of cities to 'regional' status; and the creation of new republican capitals. The economic factors behind these changes included the process of industrialisation and the formation of the military-industrial complex, whose enterprises required that the towns where they were located were transformed into 'closed' regime areas. Beside these factors, regime territories also arose on the symbolic map of the Soviet Union due to the personal preferences of Soviet leaders: for example, the spa territories where the party elite chose to spend their holidays or build their special dachas were designated as 'regime'. Finally, it is important to note that in the period of the Great Terror, practices of spatial punishment became more unified: Ukrainian republican practice now differed little from Russian policies, since Ukrainian resistance was thought to have been eliminated. Notably, the 'apex' of regime territories remained unchanged from 1923 onwards: Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkiv, Kyiv. The all-Union and Ukrainian capitals were already so well-known by the end of the 1930s that, as noted above, rumours of new 'purges' led people to flee them pre-emptively, rather than waiting to be arrested or banished.

The incorporation of western Ukrainian and other territories into the Soviet Union at the start of World War II was accompanied by the violent Sovietisation of these regions. The new authorities zealously undertook to 'sanitise' the annexed territories, ridding them of 'disloyal' people via physical destruction, mass deportations and passportisation. This large-scale campaign of Soviet terror deserves fuller analysis than we have space for here (see e.g. Iarosh 1995; Gross 2002; Liber 2016, pp. 201-78; Stiazhkina 2021, pp. 95-172). However, it is evident that the year 1940 was especially busy in terms of passportisation and sanitisation. The Commissariat of Internal Affairs continued their efforts to 'sanitise' the former capital and new capital of Ukraine, which had already been 'cleansed' more than once: yet another order to 'purge' regime and passportised areas came into force on 3 June 1940.[31] Ukrainian refugees from Western Ukraine were seen as potential conduits for ideas of Ukrainian independence, spies, or representatives of foreign national networks. I. Serov, the commissar for internal affairs of the Ukrainian republic, professed himself extremely displeased with the inadequate measures implemented with regard to 'cleansing the capital', noting that: 'this is my final warning that what I require is not the number of people breaking the passport regime and living in the capital, but rather how many people

30 OGA SBU, f. 9, op. 1, d. 188, l. 81v. The year 1938 saw a raft of similar instructions issued, all reinforcing the residency restrictions applying to these Soviet megapolises and spa zones.

31 OGA MVD Ukrainy, f. 3, op. 1, d. 6, l. 192.

have been banished, put on trains and sent out to non-regime areas: that's what I'm interested in. So that's what you need to work on'.[32]

The experience accumulated during the process of passportisation, the aspiration to ever harsher measures and the expansion of the categories of people liable to banishment from the major megapolises of the USSR all contributed to the implementation of a new Statute on Passports, passed by the Soviet government on 10 September 1940.[33] This was the first time in Soviet history that two categories of regime areas were formally defined, namely the first and second category, with the first applying restrictions to a larger segment of the population than the second. The list of people subject to residency prohibition, and the associated constraints in regime areas appeared in part IV (articles 36-45) of this instruction, have never before been published (only summarised without correct source attribution). Article 37 listed the regime areas belonging to the first category: 'forbidden zones and the border step along the whole Soviet border, the city of Moscow and Moscow oblast (already not 100km, but the whole oblast), Leningrad and the 100 kilometre zone around it, the city of *Kyiv* and a 50-kilometre zone around it, the cities of Baku, Byalistock, Grodno, *Lviv*, *Sevastopol and Sevastopol area*, the towns of Surmansk, Sochi and Sochi region, the towns of Gagry and the Mineralovod group of resorts'.[34] To

32 OGA MVD Ukrainy, f. 3, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 192-96.

33 *Sobranie postanovlenii i rasporiazhenii pravitelstva SSSR*, 1940, № 1–32, art. 591, 809-815; OGA MVD Ukrainy, f. 45, op. 1, d. 77, l. 62; OGA SBU, f. 9, op. 1, d.207, l. 56.

34 OGA SBU. f..9, op. 1, d. 207, ll. 59 ob. – 60. (Ukrainian cities and areas italicised). The second category of areas consisted of: Anzhero-Sudzhensk, Alma-Ata, Ashkhabad, *Akkerman,* Briansk, Batumi, Baranovichi, Brest, Voronezh, *Vinnitsa*, Vileika, Grozny, Gor'kii, Dzerzhinsk, *Dnepropetrovsk, Drogobych*, Erevan, *Zhitomir*, *Zaporizhia*, Irkutsk, *Izmail*, Kalinin, *Kamenets-Podolsk*, Karachev, Kemerovo, Krasnoiarsk, Kazan', Kishinev, Leninsk-Kuznetskii, *Lutsk*, Magnitogorsk, Minsk, Molotov, Molotovo, Novosibirsk, Novorossiisk, *Mikolaiv*, Orel, Ordzhonikidzegrad, *Odesa*, Petrozavodsk, Prokopevsk, Pinsk, *Reni*, Rostov-on-Don, *Rivne*, Smolensk, Saratov, Stalinabad, Stalingrad, Sverdlosk, Stalinsk, Stalino, Sukhumi, *Stanislav*, Tbilisi, Tashkent, Tula and region, Taganrog, Tuapse, Tiraspol', *Tarnopol'*, Frunze, *Kharkiv, Kherson*, Cheliabinsk, *Chernovitsy,* Iaroslavl, Artemovsk and Aliatskii areas of Azerbaijan, *Shostinski and Nezhinsk areas of Chernohiv oblast,* and the area around factory 182 of Dagestan autonomous republic.

flesh out the details of the passport system and the 50- and 100-kilometre rings, the USSR NKVD instruction of 27 December 1940 issued a 61-page document of guidance for the Statute on passports.[35]

1940 was the last year before the 'Great Fatherland' war, according to the Soviet narrative, but it was not the last year in which the regime of Soviet space was strengthened in both a legal and practical sense. 'Regime territories' and residency bans in particular cities and areas continued in the 1940s and beyond. In the 1940s, the legislation and practice encompassed new categories of 'suspect', 'unSoviet' and 'hostile' figures, including new social groups such as former POWs, former Ostarbeiters, prospective returnees from evacuation to Ukraine, 'traitors and Nazi collaborators', 'cosmopolitans' (a euphemism from the antisemitic campaigns of the late 1940s and early 1950s), and representatives of the Greek-Catholic church. The internal 'regime' territory and regulations also changed due to the new configuration of international relations, whereby former 'enemy peoples' (Poles, Romanians, Hungarians etc) became fraternal peoples, and former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition transformed into enemies. However, 1940 marked the last year of the specific ways that spatial punishments had been developed in the 1920s and 1930s.

*Conclusion*

This analysis of the formation of the 101st and 51st kilometres has shown that this quintessential form of spatial punishment arose, as was the case with many other forms of repression and discrimination, through practices that were legalised and defined in detail *after*, rather than before, their first use. 'Revolutionary logic' lay the heart of the juridical theory and repressive practice of the Bolshevik regime, and from the regime's very beginnings, it was put into practice in the form of banishment, removal, and prohibitions on return applied to people living in the territories of occupied national states and on the territory of the former Russian empire.

In the 1920s, the 101st km and 51st km were designated by the term 'minus', although this only covered the strictest regime zones and by no means captured the quantity of places (towns, areas, regions) that were included in special lists and instructions, forming the basis of Soviet residency prohibitions. In this context, Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkiv, which appeared in the very first list of the early 1920s, formed part of the idea of 'minus 6', but their 100km and 50km forbidden 'aureoles' were not yet part of the new revolutionary-repressive lexicon. Subsequent lists of forbidden places of the 1920s and 1930s (termed 'regime' areas from 1935) always included specific detail about the 100- or 50- kilometre zones around the capitals.

35 OGA SBU, f. 9, op. 1, d. 207, ll. 86-149; OGA MVD Ukrainy f. 45, op. 1, d. 77, ll. 68–82.

The 101st and 51st kilometre zones, intended as a residency restriction, could also serve as a means of repression (in decisions taken by the extra-legal organ, the Special council of the USSR NKVD), and of discrimination, in the context of 'purging' passportised areas and in the prolongation of punishment affecting those who had served their sentence but still could not return to their usual social environment. However, set against the Great terror, mass purges, shooting, the Gulag and family repercussions, these territorial limitations were often viewed as a good outcome, or as relatively merciful treatment by the Soviet authorities.[36] This is despite the fact that almost all of those removed from large cities were stripped of active and passive electoral rights, which led to discrimination in finding work, registering to study, and other spheres of life in Soviet society. Spatial punishment was especially onerous for rural inhabitants, those banished from border-zones or those who had previously lived in dense national communities.

Overall, the regime restrictions on Ukrainian territory evolved in line with the logic and the direct instructions issuing from Moscow. However, a key specificity of the Ukrainian case lay in the fact that the categories of 'former' and 'socially dangerous' people (liable for expulsion and residency prohibition) were always linked to a particular category: Petliurites. The Bolsheviks anticipated that 'Petliurites' and 'Ukrainian nationalists' would carry out not so much conspiracies as uprisings, military operations and terrorist acts, aimed at restoring Ukrainian independence. The widespread peasant participation in the UNR army, the ataman principle of organising armed divisions, the operations of the UNR government and the widespread circulation of information about them amongst peasants, all made these fears—at least in 1932-33—well-founded.

The regime 'kilometres' applied to Ukraine were akin to shuffling a deck of cards, carried out with the primary aim of uprooting activists from their usual setting and forcing them to live in areas where they would not earn the trust of other peasants, as outsiders. The legal basis and practices of spatial punishment systematically alienated people from their previous understandings of 'home' and 'little homeland', viewing such alienation as a way to prevent national resistance. Republican officials, all too aware of the dangers of the idea of Ukrainian independence, took the initiative in compiling lists of regime areas, which included not only border zones, capitals and industrial cities, but also agricultural *gubernii* (*okruga*) of Ukraine. Another specificity of the non-urban territory of Ukraine was the phenomenon of 'invisible regime kilometres', applied

36 In the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, when a mass rehabilitation of terror victims took place in Ukraine, *minusniki* did not apply, as a rule, because they did not deem this punishment to have been a significant repression.

locally to ‘third category kulaks’. The whole Ukrainian territory became covered in an invisible network of local ghettos, situated in lands unsuitable for agricultural cultivation, which its population was forbidden to leave.

The Bolsheviks experimented with repressive practices in the 100-kilometre zone as early as the 1920s, and more systematically in the 1920s. ‘Ukrainian nationalism’ was considered the basis for expulsion, or harsher punishment, even during *korenizatsiia*; so too was Zionism. In the 1930s, repression increasingly largely targeted Poles in the Ukraine border region. When belonging to the ‘kulaks’ was no longer a viable reason for expulsion, and as the international situation allowed, the Soviet authorities expanded the use of expulsion on national grounds. And when the use of regime geography did not bring the desired outcome, the authorities in Moscow switched to large-scale, organised repressive campaigns against nationalities. These campaigns were targeted at ‘non-native’ populations of each republic (see e.g. Martin 1998; Petrov & Roginskii 2003; Mitkov 2017; Abylkhozin & Akulov 2021). Ukraine was a key testing ground for such policies.

Anxieties about the border, but also persistent peasant resistance ‘from below’ (which at times escalated into armed confrontations with the Bolsheviks), meant that the list of regime areas in Ukraine was barely shorter than that of the RSFSR, despite the significant differences between the republics’ size and population. Indeed, there were, proportionally, more ‘regime’ territories in the Ukrainian republic than in any other republics: a clear indication of the particular fears associated with the territory. The specificity of Ukrainian ‘regime kilometre’ punishment became less pronounced after the Holodomor of 1932-33, and methods of expulsion and residency restriction became more homogenised over the course of the Stalin era. By that time, however, the fundamentals of ‘regime geography’ had already been established, and Russia and Ukraine would remain the most tightly controlled Soviet republics.

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