

**LEXICAL INNOVATION & LATIN PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY:
FROM CICERO TO BOETHIUS**

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**A thesis submitted for the degree of D. Phil. (Classical Languages and Literature)
in the University of Oxford**

(Faculty of Classics)



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ABSTRACT

This thesis studies the related linguistic phenomena of ‘lexical innovation’ and ‘lexical augmentation’ in selected Latin authors who translated Greek philosophical terminology between the Late Republican era to the sixth century AD. It is the first kind of comparative study of philosophical lexicalisation in Latin, collating and evaluating lexical data from the corpora of influential Latin authors, using a blend of synchronic and diachronic analyses. One of the arguments of the thesis is the bifurcated tradition of Greco-Roman intellectual thought: one, a continuous transmission of philosophical expression in Ancient Greek from Plato to Byzantium in the East; another, a process of renovation and synthesis, principally from the first century BC with authors such as Titus Lucretius Carus and Marcus Tullius Cicero. The findings suggest that the philosophical vocabulary of the Greeks was redefined through the creative literary projects of Latin intellectuals, forging their own terms within the linguistic, stylistic, and conceptual parameters of their language’s grammar. This ‘refraction’ of thought carried far-reaching consequences for early Christian authors and the Scholastic movement of the Middle Ages.

To understand the emergence of ‘philosophical Latin’, it is important to note that the development of this technical vocabulary comprised an ensemble of semantic and morpho-syntactic strategies: linguistic practices that engendered the expansion of philosophical expression, (neologism, calques, semantic extensions, and loan-words, among others). The analysis begins with an overview of past scholarship, contextualising this work in the light of modern linguistic and translation theories on the topic, which provide the rationale for the arguments advanced throughout the thesis. The structure is divided over five chapters based around qualitative and quantitative analyses of Latin philosophical terms introduced as the result of translations from Greek terms. This relies on specified criteria applied to new terms and meanings first attested in a given author; that is, there must be some textual ‘signalling’ (such as glossing or direct translation) to indicate certain Latin terms or meanings correspond with Greek ones. These analyses are applied using a case-study approach, beginning with Lucretius and Cicero, then Seneca the Younger, Apuleius, Tertullian, Calcidius, and concluding with Boethius. Within the analyses of Cicero’s and Apuleius’ philosophical works, there are additional selective linguistic commentaries, first on Cicero’s translation of Plato’s *Timaeus* dialogue in Chapter One followed by Apuleius’ *De Platone et Eius Dogmate* and his translation of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo* in Chapter Three. The study is accompanied by four sets of appendices for reference, collating and summarising the findings of this thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to my supervisor Tobias Reinhardt at Corpus Christi College, whose keen insights and lucid discussions of Latin and Greek philosophy, (as well as his practical career advice), have been invaluable. I also thank Neil O’Sullivan, my undergraduate Honours and post-graduate Masters supervisor at the University of Western Australia, whose wisdom and teaching gave me my grounding in classical education and who has always supported me throughout my studies. I owe a great deal of gratitude to James Adams of All Souls College, whose gracious support and guidance I was privileged to receive before and during my D.Phil, especially his encouraging feedback on my Master’s thesis in 2015. I also thank Michèle Fruyt of the Sorbonne Paris for her generous input on my thesis work in its incipient stages and Barney Taylor for his comments and suggestions, particularly on Lucretius. Thanks are also due to Corpus Christi College and the Faculty of Classics Craven Committee for awarding travel funding during my D.Phil. studies. In particular, for allowing me to attend the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* in Munich, where I was able to incorporate valuable lexicographic resources which informed the data analyses in my thesis, as well as giving me the opportunity to form contacts with other academics in my field. I also thank Jo Armitage at the Faculty of Classics for her invaluable administrative support throughout my degree, in particular during the uncertainty of the Covid-19 Pandemic and its impact on my studies. Finally, and most importantly, thank you to my family: Katrina, Colin, Alex, and Sunny for all your love and support over the years; I will always be grateful.

C.J.D.

Oxford

October 2020

ABBREVIATIONS

BNP	(2002-18). <i>Brill's New Pauly: Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World</i> . Leiden-Boston.
ERNOUT-MEILLET	A. Ernout and A. Meillet (1979). <i>Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine</i> . 4th ed. Paris.
GL	H. Keil (1857-1870/2009). <i>Grammatici Latini</i> , 8 vols. Cambridge.
HOFMANN-SZANTYR	J. B. Hofmann and A. Szantyr (1965). <i>Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik</i> . Munich.
IEW	Pokorny, J. (1959), <i>Indogermanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch</i> . Bern-Munich.
SYNT.	E. Löfstedt (1956). <i>Syntactica: Studien und Beiträge zur historischen Syntax des Lateins</i> , 2 vols. Lund.
LSJ	Liddell, H.G., R. Scott and H.S. Jones (eds.) (1940). <i>A Greek- English Lexicon</i> . 9th ed. Oxford.
OCD	S. Hornblower, <i>et al.</i> (eds.) (2012) <i>Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> . 4th ed. Oxford.
OLD	P.G.W. Glare (ed.) (2012). <i>The Oxford Latin Dictionary</i> . 2nd ed. Oxford.
TLG	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Graecae</i> . (1972—), Irvine.
TLL	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</i> . (1900—), Leipzig.
WALDE-HOFMANN	A. Walde and J. B. Hofmann (1966). <i>Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch</i> , 3 vols. 4th ed. Heidelberg.

References to primary works follow abbreviations in LSJ for Greek texts and *OLD* for Latin, with the exception of Cicero's *Timaeus* which I do not abbreviate (Plato's *Timaeus* is abbreviated to *Ti.* following LSJ), and the *Academica*, which is abbreviated to *Ac.* = *Academica Posteriora* for Book One (or at least the first 46 paragraphs thereof) and *Luc.* = the *Lucullus* (i.e. the second book of the *Academica Priora*). For patristic authors including and after Tertullian, abbreviations follow the *TLL* using supplementary references from Migne's *Patrologia Latina* (PL) where possible. For the *Vetus Latina* and *Vulgate* I use *Vet. Lat.* and *Vulg.* with individual *TLL* book title abbreviations (e.g. *Vet. Lat. 1 Cor. 15.53*). All translations are the author's unless otherwise noted.

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DEFINITIONS

The definitions below are for reference and are used throughout the thesis to varying degrees. Note that modern linguists are often not in agreement about the strict definitions of some of these terms, (see Introduction for discussion in more detail.) However, these are the senses in which these terms are used in this thesis:

Base

The part of a word to which other morphemes such as affixes are added (e.g. COLONIAL in the word *colonialism*). Contrast with a 'root', which is a base that cannot be analysed further into separate morphemes (e.g. COLONY is both the base and root of *colonial*.)

Calque

The translation of a Greek term by a new Latin word on a morpheme-by-morpheme basis, i.e. where a Latin prefix corresponds to a Greek prefix, and a Latin base corresponds to a Greek **base** of a word: *qualitas* = ποιότης. Also called a 'morphological calque' in this study.

Compound

A Latin word formed by the combination of two **bases**, e.g. *omnipotens* (OMNIS + POTENS).

Derivative

A word derived from a Latin **base**, often done by the use of affixes, e.g. *colligatio*, derived from COLLIGO.

Lexeme

The underlying lexical unit of a word and its grammatical variants, e.g. AMO is the lexeme of *amare*, *amavi*, *amatum*.

Lexical Augmentation

A categorical term intended to include semantic extensions, semantic calques, semantic borrowings, and loan-shifts. At root, where the meaning of a Greek term is loaned and applied to a pre-existing Latin word, this process creates in the Latin word a 'semantic calque' or 'semantic extension' etc., usually the broader, established sense is narrowed to apply to a specific concept, e.g. the established word *materia* to translate Plato's technical term οὐσία.

Loan-blend

The use of a Greek term in Latin modified to allow for Latin suffixes, e.g. Boethius' *syllogizo*. It can also include the use of a Greek base with a Latin prefix added to it.

Loan-word

The direct use of a Greek term in Latin without the addition of Latin affixes to the word, e.g. Lucretius' *homoeomeria*.

Sense Translation

The use of a neologism in Latin derived from an existing base to translate the sense of the Greek term, though not literally, sometimes due to lack of morphological complexity in the Greek which reduces the ability to calque by morpheme, e.g. Cicero's *cuneolus* (dim. of *cuneus* 'wedge') for γόμφος 'bolt'.

INTRODUCTION

‘I do not want paraphrase to be simply interpretation, but a struggle and rivalry over the same meanings’ (neque ego paraphrasin esse interpretationem tantum volo, sed circa eosdem sensus certamen atque aemulationem)

— Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* 10.5.4-5

SCOPE OF THE THESIS

At the foundation of this study is a process rather than simply a collection of words that we will come to term ‘Latin philosophical vocabulary’. The process is an interaction that took place between philosophical translation, seen as a complex set of antique literary practices, and the phenomenon of lexical innovation in selected Latin authors, chosen for their significant contributions to the language’s philosophical word-stock. Beginning in the first century BC and ending with Boethius’ translations of Aristotle and Porphyry in the sixth century, the common thread linking these individuals is a creation of new Latin technical terms through varying methods and literary forms, all within a single written tradition that constantly reinterpreted and renovated Greek terms (and thus concepts) into the Latin West.

However, not all philosophy requires a technical vocabulary. Amateur philosophers might converse about an array of complex topics without recourse to jargon. As cross-disciplinary scholars have remarked upon over the last few decades,¹ the ‘professionalisation’ of philosophy has meant that specialisation and technicalisation emerged with increasing frequency across disciplines within, for instance, university systems. This specialisation is not a modern phenomenon but was taking place rapidly in late antiquity and into the Scholastic period. As philosophy progressed from the Milesian School in Asian Minor to the Academy in Athens, based on individual geniuses such as Thales, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the expansion of technical terms hastened as epistemology and metaphysics became more complex, thronged with a diversity of opinions and written works. It is easy to fall into the assumption that such variegated intellectual activity occurred simultaneously in the Roman world, with an eventual admixture of thought by the Hellenistic period. The reality was not so, and we will see that a ‘continuity’ of philosophy into Western Europe between Ancient Greece and the later Roman world is better conceptualised as a step-wise progression, with the first interval of Greek philosophy ending in the first century BC with the advent of Roman rhetorical and literary philosophers like Lucretius and Cicero. From here a new intellectual tradition began, in which the spread of Rome’s influence across Western Europe

¹ Recently, see e.g. MARCONI (2014) and TRIPODI (2016).

and North Africa amplified the dissemination of its philosophical vocabulary. The predominance of philosophical concepts came down to a contest of vocabularies rather than of ideas. (The latter must be expressed in the first instance by the former, after all.) The creation of these vocabularies would prove pivotal to prosecuting philosophical arguments into posterity. The tradition inaugurated by intellectuals like Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca would give rise to an array of movements within the incipient intellectual milieu of, for example, Christian apologetics, where the reliance on the authority of these authors' vocabularies became increasingly magnified.

This was significant to the Latin West, specifically the development of theological doctrines, for example, within Roman Catholicism. The interest for this study, however, is the interface between Ancient Greek philosophical terms and the translation choices made by individual Latin authors who adapted and re-interpreted them through the parameters of their language. These choices required invention, and not simply along formal dimensions (*ex nihilo* — such as neology; the creation of new lexemes) but using the raw materials within the *lexis* as well, refashioning them into new, and often technical, senses within a philosophical literary genre (*ex materia* — semantic shifts, extensions, and loan-shifts, all categorised as 'lexical augmentation'). How each author approached this question of 'invention' or innovation is what will preoccupy this study, and in particular, comparing authors' techniques and translation approaches within the same tradition. It is this comparative approach that makes it important to acknowledge that lexical innovation was not occurring hermetically, but successive generations of authors were influenced by both the socio-linguistic factors of their time (synchronic) and the weight of the authority exerted by preceding authors who had written in the same tradition (diachronic). In particular, the analysis examines the consequences of these choices, firstly on the reception of philosophical Greek terms into the Latin *lexis*, and secondly on their own reception into later periods. The former involves a synchronic analysis; that is, the lexical items chosen by a given author at a specific time and how they were chosen and formed (morpho-syntactical analysis). This leads to asking how these choices impacted the meaning of the original Greek expressions over time. The latter involves a diachronic analysis, tracing the usage of a technical term from its first attestation

into later authors writing within the same tradition.² The combination of these types of analyses provides a wide-ranging study of philosophical terminology in Latin which will be of significant value to contemporary scholars examining related issues in this field.

PHILOSOPHICAL LATIN AS ‘TECHNICAL VOCABULARY’

The study of Latin technical vocabularies³ is useful to understanding the language as a whole, given that the only evidence we have of a Latin language has been transmitted to us by written (manuscript) or inscribed (inscriptions, papyri, ostraca) evidence. Technical vocabularies give scholars a glimpse into various linguistic substrata of Latin, providing a more detailed picture of the lexis below the eloquent heights of Ciceronian oratory or Vergilian poetry down into the practical usages of different social levels and professions. Yet we ought not to draw a bright line between the ‘literary’ and the ‘technical’ too early, just as we should be cautious about doing the same between ‘Classical Latin’ and the *vulgus*.⁴ Often, Latin technical vocabularies seeped into literary ones, providing a colour and depth to poetry or prose works for very specific purposes. Legal and rhetorical jargon, for example, penetrates the philosophical vocabulary of Cicero’s treatises,⁵ agricultural terms play a key role throughout Vergil’s *Georgics*, medical terminology as metaphors are also used by Tertullian in his Christian polemical works (see Chapter Four.)

The physicist Sir Arthur Eddington once described the phenomenon of entropy as the ‘arrow of time’. As the number of random events in a system increased, so we can infer that the arrow pointed forwards into the future, and vice versa. The development of technical

² For instance, the use of terms coined by Cicero in his translation of Plato, later used or not used in Latin Platonists like Apuleius or Calcidius; or the use of the term *substantia* in Seneca’s philosophy and its later adaptation to Christian Trinitarian theology by authors like Tertullian and Marius Victorinus.

³ For general discussions of technical vocabulary in antiquity, see STÉPHANIDÈS (1925); SAINT-DENIS (1943); DE MEO (1986); PUELMA (1986); ANDRÉ (1986); CALLEBAT (1990) (on the separation of technical and vulgar Latin); COLACE and CALTABIANO (1991), (1997), (2000); SCONOCCHIA and TONEATTO (1993), (1997), (2000); LANGSLOW (2000), 6–40; FÖGEN (2009).

⁴ In the context of Vulgar Latin, see ADAMS (2013), 6 and 10: ‘[S]ocial divisions in speech are [...] less sharp than any idealised socio-economic index might lead one to expect. Stylistic variations themselves are not absolute [...] [w]hat must be avoided, however, is then notion that this language of the *vulgus* was a separate language system completely discrete from that of higher social groups’.

⁵ See e.g. *Fin.* 4.1; 4.61; *Tusc.* 5.32; *Div.* 2.46.

vocabularies in any language may be seen as a kind of synecdoche for an intellectual entropy from which the ever increasing complexity of certain philosophical systems can be gauged. So, the ‘arrow of philosophy’ might be detected via the philosophical vocabulary of a given language. As time passed and new ideas were introduced within a society (e.g. in Greece) or brought from external sources (e.g. from Greece into Rome), the nuances of vocabulary increased almost exponentially and the complexity of a culture’s philosophical output rapidly grew. While linguistic changes in general, and changes in meaning in particular, occur at a relatively slow pace (see e.g. KUTUZOV et al. (2018, 1392)), the specific vocabulary of philosophy in Latin became subjected to increasing complexity over a relatively short timespan, beginning largely in the first century BC. This is one reason why, by the time of Middle Platonic authors like Apuleius, or early Christian Apologists like Tertullian, the need to gloss or apologise for novel vocabulary in Latin became less pressing and linguistic experimentation, at the expense of stylistic parameters (as circumscribed in earlier authors like Cicero or Seneca), became more frequent. We might also factor broad socio-linguistic changes into this development in technical vocabulary usage among Latin authors (beginning with Cicero and Vitruvius and continuing with Quintilian (rhetoric and law), Columella (agriculture), Aulus Gellius (grammar, rhetoric, philosophy), Gaius and Ulpian (law), among others) with increased contact (physical, economic and linguistic) after Cicero’s time between Greek and Latin speaking peoples, as well as other cultures, religions and ethnicities, making the stringent nationalistic demands of linguistic purism fall away to a large degree. Whichever explanations we use, as we will discover, the entropy (that is to say, the level of complexity) of the Latin philosophical vocabulary would increase rapidly from Cicero to Apuleius and into the time of Boethius.

Scholarship on this area of classical linguistics over the last half-century has covered a range of *Fachtexte* from medicine,⁶ anatomy,⁷ law,⁸ agriculture,⁹ architecture,¹⁰ veterinary

⁶ See variously SINIC’A (1979), 70-5; SABBAAH (1991); GAIDE (1996a), 99-108; GAIDE (1996b), 85-95; GAIDE (1998), 163-8; KOLLESCH (1999); LANGSLOW (2000); GOUREVITCH (2000), 113-26; LANGSLOW (2005), 287-302; GITTON-RIPOLL (2006), 329-43; ORLANDINI (2006); BETROCCHI AND ORANDINI (2007), 169-77; VIRE (2007), 211-19; CAM (2008), 281-91; CAM (2012), 823-35.

⁷ VÄÄNÄNEN (1937); SCHÖNBERGER (1939), 88-99; ERNOUT (1951), 3-12; BONFANTE (1956), 71-81; GOUREVITCH (1976) 85-110 and GOUREVITCH (1977), 56-74; BORK (1977), 120-54; ADAMS (1980), 50-62; ADAMS (1982a), 90-109; ADAMS (1982b) 37-45; ADAMS (1982c); ANDRE (1991); WATSON (2002), 222-57; LECAUDE (2014),

science,¹¹ to philosophy.¹² The indirect contributions of reference works such as the *TLL*, the *OLD*, and MERGUET's *Lexikon zu den Philosophischen Schriften Cicero's* should also be acknowledged, though these are principally occupied with different aims and broader lexicographic purposes. Nonetheless, these reference works have compiled (or are in the process of compiling) the technical vocabularies of key Republican and Imperial era authors, giving modern scholars unprecedented access to the technical terms used in discussing specific fields of intellectual endeavour in antiquity.

A key component of this study is the process of 'term-formation', as defined in LANGSLOW (2000, viii) as 'embracing all linguistic processes that lead to the creation of new terms in Latin.' However, before examining the 'term' element, we should concede that, when it comes to philosophical vocabulary, it is not immediately obvious whether we classify such words as technical terms or simply literary Latin from another genre. As discussed further in Chapter Four, the label 'philosophical terminology' is both vague and extensive, encompassing, for instance, pagan and Christian ('Ecclesiastical') vocabularies, with the same terms routinely taking on distinct semantic functions. Some time before the composition of even Lucretius' or Cicero's philosophical works, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, and their successors had been heavily expanding the Greek lexis to discuss philosophical problems, introducing a host of neologisms and semantic shifts to convey complex ideas. If the changes in vocabulary were rapid in Athens and Kition, then the process was accelerated across the Adriatic, with Roman thinkers coming to terms with, translating, and re-interpreting the Greek technical terminology with astonishing speed.¹³ How we might approach this new philosophical vocabulary in Latin as a 'technical' one is assisted by reference to modern linguistic methods.

321-33; KIRCHER-DURAND (2014), 403-13.

⁸ HILTBRUNNER (1999); see CAPIAUOLO's (1993, 481-5) bibliography for a more exhaustive list.

⁹ NIEHOFF-PANAGIOTIDIS (1999); FÖGEN (2009), 189-96.

¹⁰ CALLEBAT (1974), 13-329; FASCE (1990), 121-8; FLEURY (1981) and (1993).

¹¹ ADAMS (1995).

¹² For Cicero in particular, see MORESCHINI (1979), 99-178; POWELL (1995a); for Lucretius see e.g. SEDLEY (1998), esp. 35-9. For an overview of both Cicero and Lucretius's philosophical diction, see REILEY (1909). See also COLEMAN (1989); HÜLLSER (1999); FÖGEN (2000) (on Cicero's translations from Greek philosophical vocabulary) and (2009), §4.7 (for Seneca's philosophical vocabulary).

¹³ The majority of Cicero's philosophical compositions, for example, were undertaken over only a few years in the 40s BC. Lucretius' *gigantisches Lebenswerk* was composed over a much longer period, but still only within the first century BC, see e.g. BUTTERFIELD (2012), 1 n. 2.

LANGSLOW, citing HELLER,¹⁴ examined a schematic to apply to the question of what might constitute a ‘technical term’ by asking whether such a term is:

- (1) Not generally understood in the linguistic community as a whole;
- (2) Proper to a given specialist or technical discipline;
- (3) Normalised or standardised in its usage in the discipline.

Many of the terms used to describe Greek philosophical ideas by Latin authors could hardly be described as ‘technical’ using this rubric however. For example, point (2): how would a modern researcher, or even an author like Cicero, know whether a term was proper to a given technical discipline when the vocabulary for such a discipline was largely incipient and undefined at the time? Authors such as Cicero appeared to have been more interested in questioning whether a novel word or meaning might be acceptable (and intelligible) to his linguistic community as a whole, not only to philosophical specialists.¹⁵

Within a Classical philological context, there is no bright-line dividing the technical from the non-technical.¹⁶ SEDLEY defines a ‘technical term’ in the context of Lucretian philosophical vocabulary as a word or phrase, either a) specifically coined or adapted from an existing usage, b) at least implicitly earmarked by the author, and c) its sense must be recognisably different from, or at least recognisably more precise than, any distinct sense that the same term may bear in ordinary usage.¹⁷ DE MELO recently encountered a similar problem in his discussion on Varro’s grammatical vocabulary. He observed that it was straightforward to see terms like *casus* or *accusativus* as intended to be technical terms, whereas terms such as *exterere* ‘to rub out, elide’ are less clear: ‘Is it intended as a technical term, or is Varro

¹⁴ LANGSLOW (2000), 12-13; HELLER (1970). LANGSLOW (2000) also references DUBOIS (1966) who highlights the phenomenon of borrowing from other, now obsolete, terminology drawn from different fields to create novel technical vocabulary (e.g. old naval terms in aviation terminology). See also DROZD (1966), 441-443; GUILBERT (1973), 5-17; FLUCK (1980), 16-23; SCHIPPAN (1984), 243-244; WICHTER (1994); LERAT (1995); BRACHET AND MOUSSY (2006); and DEPECKER (2012), 1-9.

¹⁵ See e.g. *Fin.* 3.53: *re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus*. Also *Ac.* 25f discussed below.

¹⁶ LANGSLOW (2000), 15. See also ADAMS’ (1995, 668-9) for a useful discussion of the notion of ‘technical’ terms as distinct from laymen’s terms in veterinary contexts (and the futility of attempts to distinguish between the two).

¹⁷ SEDLEY (1998), 37.

presenting technical facts in non-technical language? There is no foolproof way of finding out.’¹⁸ LANGSLOW, adapting from DOVER,¹⁹ outlined a second set of principles perhaps more suitable for this type of study and which could assist in addressing questions such as the ones posed by DE MELO, although certainly not in any ‘foolproof’ manner. DOVER divides technical lexemes into specific categories, those which:

- (1) have no reference at all outside a specialised field, e.g. ‘palimpsest’,²⁰ ‘neutrino’;
- (2) have synonyms, e.g. ‘tibia’ = ‘shin-bone’;
- (3) have different denotations in majority usage and in one or more specialised areas, e.g. ‘induce’ in ordinary language compared with e.g. obstetrics;
- (4) become recognisable as technical because of the consistency with which they are used, e.g. the medical profession usually speaks of ‘severe pain’ rather than ‘ghastly pain’.

Note that criteria (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive, however (4) is qualitatively different from the rest, reliant on the productivity of a given term or phrase within a specialised field, rather than any inherent morphological or semantic characteristics. Consider the word *intellegens*, used by Cicero in his philosophical works in reference to nature, to the world, the soul of the world, to gods, but never to mankind.²¹ *Intellego* was a common enough Latin verb, used generations earlier in Plautus, but the specific way in which the present participle is employed seems unique to Ciceronian philosophical terminology and, therefore, if we draw upon criterion (3) from DOVER, we might categorise it as an item of technical vocabulary. In addition, when it comes to the lexical commentaries of certain texts in the case studies of Cicero and Apuleius, some of the terms counted as lexical innovations might not be

¹⁸ DE MELO (2019), 212. For *casus* as a case of Varro’s lexical augmentation, see ULLMANN (1964), 167.

¹⁹ DOVER (1997).

²⁰ Note the term ‘palimpsest’, for example, now has a new metaphorical use in literary studies referencing allusions that are not signalled through verbal correspondence.

²¹ See e.g. *N.D.* 2.36 and 2.120; *Leg.* 1.22 in the plural. See e.g. HARTUNG (1970), 95-6. Its use is also limited in Apuleius (*Flor.* 3.2). See HALICHAS (2012), 75. Cf. the use of the term in Cicero’s speeches, which is applied to men (*Ver.* 4.4.).

‘philosophical’ in the strict sense of the label but are actually technical in nature using DOVER’s criterion (1) above. (For instance, geographical and mathematical terms feature prominently in Apuleius’ *De Platone et Eius Dogmate* and *De Mundo* respectively.) However, as they appear in the contexts of ‘philosophy’-themed texts, I have included this kind of vocabulary in the analyses. It is from these kinds of principles that I have based the classification of lexical data collected in this thesis as forming part of the Latin philosophical terminology and, therefore, as a ‘technical’ vocabulary with finite bounds.

At this stage, we can frame the premiss of this thesis in broad terms. Beginning with Late Republican authors, the technical vocabulary of philosophy in Latin was born from a need to interpret specific Greek terms by Latin-speaking intellectuals. Consequently, the creation of such a vocabulary affected the evolution of ancient philosophy into posterity to a significant degree. The translation processes adopted by influential philosophical writers diffracted the reception of Ancient Greek philosophical terms into the Latin West. In which ways, then, did Latin authors adapt or re-interpret the Greek vocabulary for their readers, and what were the consequences?

The question of who influenced whom in the genealogy of authors composing philosophical and theological works naturally depended upon the availability of the texts to those particular authors at the time. To take the example of the Greek and Latin Patristics, in the former category, writers like Clement of Alexandria, John Chrysostom, or Origen, were better placed to directly appropriate the original Greek texts available to them into their works. These authors were speaking and writing in Greek, maintaining greater access to the original texts of ancient Greek philosophers and their later Greek commentators. However, Christian authors writing in the Latin West possessed a lower standard of Greek comprehension abilities (Lactantius or Augustine)²² and reduced access to primary Greek sources with a reliance on earlier commentators (Boethius on Cicero).²³ They would be more or less wholly reliant upon earlier translations and summaries of Greek texts; on the authority

²² Although see HOENIG (2018), 220-1 for Augustine’s gradual acquaintance with the Greek language and original Greek sources.

²³ Boethius, as we shall see, relied on Latin sources like Cicero but also Greek ones like Porphyry, see EBBESEN (2008/2017), 108-9. Boethius was well versed in the Greek language and his case is more unique than those of, e.g. Lactantius or Augustine, whose reliance on earlier authorities in Latin was immense. For the latter in particular, see HAGENDAHL (1967) and in relation to Cicero, see (1967), 35-169.

of previous writers like Cicero or Lucretius).²⁴ Of course, in later centuries, scholars had unprecedented access to Greek originals and their translations into Arabic, Latin, and other vernaculars, but throughout the formative periods of Western Europe's intellectual history (that is, the medieval and Renaissance periods), scholars were naturally more dependent on the transmission of texts in their native languages. It is partly this dependence on the substantially different linguistic media through which ancient ideas were transmitted and transformed which manifests itself in, for example, the two parallel intellectual traditions of European Christendom (Orthodoxy and Catholicism), whose dogmas were developed by the traditions from which — and the languages *in* which — they were articulated.

We will find that authors such as Cicero maintained a consistent disinterest in literal translation, preferring to use literary, rhetorical, and so-called *ad sensum* interpretations of Greek ideas.²⁵ His public view, like many other Roman politicians who possessed a firm grasp of the power of patriotic populism (for example, Cato the Elder) was that Latin was not only an equal to the Greek language, but superior to its lexical and semantic richness.²⁶ Yet a significant amount of the linguistic evidence available to us indicates that it was within the philosophical endeavours of authors individuals like Cicero that 'the Latin philosophical vocabulary was forged', as SEDLEY described it.²⁷ After all, if the Latin lexicon was as copious as we might be led to believe from Cicero's prefatory rhetoric, then why was it necessary to forge an new vocabulary at all?²⁸

The self-evident response could be that, before authors like Cicero, Latin actually had no distinct 'philosophical vocabulary' to discuss the doctrines of the various Greek philosophical schools, which had made their way over the Adriatic and into intellectual circles

²⁴ HOENIG (2018), 215-79 recently discussed the influence of Cicero's Latin translation of Plato's *Timaeus* on Augustine's philosophical ideas.

²⁵ E.g. *De opt. gen.* 14: *nec converti ut interpretes, sed ut orator*; also the discussion with Atticus regarding the Greek term ἐποχή (*Att.* 13.21), see HARTUNG (1970), 110, LAMBARDI (1982) and LÉVY (1992), 97. See also McELDUFF (2013), 8-11, esp. 10.

²⁶ See e.g. *N.D.* 1.7-8.

²⁷ SEDLEY (1998), 36; also NICOLAS (2000), 109: 'Qualitativement et quantitativement, Cicéron est un grand néologiste.' Also ADAMS (2003), 338. For Cicero's own admittance (albeit indirectly) of this contradiction see (the fictional) Varro's aside in *Fin.* 3.51: *quamquam tu [Cicero] hanc copiosiore etiam soles dicere. sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi faciendi Zenois exponere.*

²⁸ See also JONES (1959), 26.

at Rome.²⁹ Such an assertion should always be caveated with the generic qualification: based on the available evidence to us; that is, we must make the ‘best use of bad data,’ to use LABOV’s (1994, 11) observation regarding the study of historical linguistics. POWELL (1995a, 32) remarked that the actual composition of Latin philosophy was, ‘only the tip of what must have been a fairly large iceberg of both formal and informal philosophical discussion both in Greek and in Latin.’ Yet one would have been hard-pressed to detect attitudes similar to those of Lucretius and Cicero in the centuries prior to these two pioneers of Roman philosophy. The former saw philosophy as revolutionary, a medium through which Romans could transcend the limits of their political and religious strictures. The latter was a political quietist, viewing philosophy as a practical way of becoming a better citizen both in public life (*negotium*) and in leisure (*otium*), though it was in this latter limited social space where one could dedicate oneself seriously to philosophical pursuits, (as Cicero had done during his exile),³⁰ and that a good Roman would, in theory, already be living according to the particular moral and ethical framework derived from an understanding of philosophy and rational knowledge. Even his closest friend, Atticus, seems to betray an astonishment at Cicero’s philosophical project (*Att.* 12.52.3): ‘Regarding the Latin language, set your mind at ease. You will say: “how do you compose such things?”’ (*de lingua Latina securi es animi. dices: ‘qui talia conscribis?’*). Whether this was surprise at the speed at which Cicero was composing his philosophical works or the fact it was philosophy *in Latin* is unclear,³¹ but if the latter, it provides further evidence that the type of project Cicero was undertaking was unprecedented.

²⁹ See discussion of earlier, pre-Ciceronian Roman philosophy in MORFORD (2002), 1-4 and the discussion in Chapter One.

³⁰ Note the importance of *otium cum dignitate* to Cicero and other Roman politicians, i.e. using one’s leisure time for goods not just for oneself but for one’s countrymen as well (see e.g. *Academica* 1.25-6), as BARAZ (2012), 14 notes: ‘[...] both Sallust and Cicero, who can claim no public *negotia* of their own at the time of their writing, are engaged in constructing their intellectual occupation as a new type of *negotium*, functionally similar to the traditional ones, and just as valuable’ (see also WIRSZUBSKI (1954), 14-15 for the inherent political (as opposed to philosophical) overtones of *otium cum dignitate* in Cicero). So although the manoeuvring of party politics and the affairs of state came first in the societal sphere of *negotium*, these could and should be informed by a proper understanding of ethical philosophy, as would be generously provided by the intellectual pursuits of men like Cicero in his *otium*, thus (for him) fulfilling a type of *otium cum dignitate*, so BARAZ (2012), 43 again: ‘A feature that emerged as particular to Cicero is his tendency to think of the individual always as an active citizen, that is, in terms of the contribution that he makes to the wellbeing of the state.’

³¹ See e.g. SHACKLETON BAILEY (1960), 61-2.

What conservative speculations can we draw when inquiring into pre-Lucretian or Ciceronian philosophy in Latin? We can follow POWELL's view to begin with: that it was mostly oral discussion in groups, rather than written down to any great degree. Secondly, that it must have been largely reliant on Greek jargon rather than a widespread practice of neology in Latin (until Cicero at least). Thirdly, that there were novel ideas flowing into Roman intellectual circles from Greece or homegrown variations of Greek philosophical schools, all of which required some form of technical vocabulary, (though not always, as we discussed see above regarding 'technicalisation'). We can make a straightforward analogy to our present-day linguistic habits in English, with neologisms arising frequently, most notably in the areas of science and technology.³² These subject matters bring with them new terms and concepts corresponding to the latest software and hardware developments. Yet just as computers have been around for half a century, this does not mean new terms are no longer required to keep pace with technological changes. Whereas we once spoke about a 'mouse' connected to a computer 'tower' or 'cabinet', we now can speak of a 'touchscreen' on an 'iPad'. By analogy,³³ developments were occurring regularly within philosophical schools in both Greek and Latin by the time Cicero turned his mind to his treatises. And while discussing Plato might not have been new by Cicero's time, writing about and adding one's own interpretations and additions to Platonic philosophy in Latin certainly was.

Throughout the case studies, the proposition that Latin authors effectively 'Latinised' Greek philosophical expression — as opposed to reproducing the technical terms of the Greeks in any faithful manner, either through *ad sensum* or *verbum ex verbo* translation — remains the central point of inquiry. The issue was recently discussed in a dissertation by WHITE (2015, 80), who argued along the lines of LAMBARDI (1982) that Cicero's philosophical translations amounted to a 'creative rewriting' of Greek originals.³⁴ WHITE outlines various 'intertextual attitudes', which she observes in the philosophical translations of Cicero.³⁵ These range from a type of 'interpretation', i.e. reading an ambiguous or complex Greek term in a

³² See e.g. GREEN (1991), viii and MATTIELLO (2017), 23.

³³ The analogy is not perfect. The technological terms refer to concrete or discrete objects whereas philosophical terms were abstract, less clearly defined, and open to interpretation, as we will discuss further in Chapter One.

³⁴ WHITE (2015), 80.

³⁵ WHITE (2015), 64-71.

specific way, often using double translation (*Tusc.* 1.53-4 where φύσις is rendered *propria natura atque vis*), to appropriation and distortion (e.g. the conflation of πρέπον and εὐταξία as *modestia* in *Off.* 1.93 and 1.142 or the use of *materia* for Plato's difficult ontological concept of οὐσία in Cicero's *Timaeus*). These 'intertextual attitudes' towards translation of Greek have been commented on, in various forms, by a range of authors, chiefly in the context of *aemulatio*.³⁶ The determination of 'exceeding' or 'surpassing' the source³⁷ stemmed from a range of factors exogenous to Latin linguistic practices but nonetheless influential. These include, for example, the particular political and social agendas of authors,³⁸ and the parameters of an author's particular literary style.³⁹ We find the emergence of *aemulatio* exemplified by express statements in a range of authors apart from figures such as Cicero (discussed further in Chapter One). Quintilian, for example, who commented that the best Roman orators would be those who translated the 'richness' of Greek using only the 'best words' (*verbis optimis*) within their stock of Latin expression. Most revealing is Quintilian's sentiment when discussing the use of paraphrase (of Greek) in Latin (*Inst.* 10.5.4-5): 'I do not want paraphrase to be simply interpretation (*interpretatio*) but to be a struggle and rivalry (*certamen atque aemulatio*) over the same meanings (*sensus*).'⁴⁰ The Younger Pliny wrote in a nearly identical agonistic tone when he discusses translation from Greek into Latin and vice versa: 'There is nothing so far that prevents you comparing [your] reading to that which you read and to write like a rival (*quasi aemulus*), so you may grasp the subject matter and the

³⁶ In the context of e.g. *Tusc.* 1.1: *sed meum semper iudicium fuit omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora*, see SEELE (1995), 8; 10-11; POWELL (1995), 290: 'Cicero's expansion of Latin vocabulary may be seen as a sort of linguistic *aemulatio* to complement the literary feat of rivalling Plato's dialogues. As has been noted, there were Romans (and doubtless, *a fortiori*, Greeks) who thought that Latin simply was not up to the task of philosophical exposition: Cicero was determined to prove them wrong.' See also e.g. ATZERT (1908), 24; WIDMANN (1968), 270-1; and more generally BLATT (1938), 217-20.

³⁷ See generally MCELDUFF (2013); cf. FÖGEN (2009), 90f for a comparison of *aemulatio* in literary texts versus technical treatises in antiquity and BEALL (1997), 222-6 for a discussion of *aemulatio* in Aulus Gellius' translations from Greek.

³⁸ For the influence of Roman politics (particularly Caesar's ascension) on Cicero's philosophical treatises, see GILDENHARD (2007), 225-9 and BARAZ (2012); cf. also MCELDUFF (2013), 103.

³⁹ See further TRAGLIA (1971), 309; MORESCHINI (1979), 100, 177-8; and LAMBARDI (1982), 19.

⁴⁰ This is the clearest sentiment expressed by a Roman author regarding the competition for linguistic dominance over (and eventually conquest of) Greek thought and will be revisited later in this thesis.

argument.’⁴¹ As we will see, these competitive sentiments echo the earlier Ciceronian rhetoric, especially expressed in his philosophical *prooemia*. However, before Cicero, the historical attitudes in Roman intellectual circles were intrinsically reactionary apropos of linguistic purity.⁴²

The notion of *aemulatio*, therefore, extended to the goal of surpassing the ideas and intellectual predominance of the Greeks and to create not simply a Latin vocabulary for discussing topics like philosophy, but an entirely new conceptual framework.⁴³ To ‘Latinise’ Greek philosophical terms required innovation in Latin since, where Greek philosophical systems had been discussed, often, using neologisms or new meanings added to existing words by thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Zeno and others, this same process was inevitably necessitated in Latin. Though translation in Latin from Greek has been scrutinised *ad nauseam* in modern classical scholarship,⁴⁴ less attention has been devoted to the comparative study of Latin authors’ practices of lexical ‘innovation’ and ‘augmentation’ to varying degrees. This involved attempting to augment existing meanings of words within Latin or to resort to lexical innovation to coin or import new lexical forms.⁴⁵ It is through the lens of innovation within the Latin lexis that I hope to reconsider false dichotomies between authors such as Cicero ‘succeeded’ in translating or ‘faithfully interpreted’ Greek or not.

⁴¹ Plin. *Ep.* 7.9.3.

⁴² See SCIARRINO (2011), 4.

⁴³ The former precedes the latter; that is, the creation of a new Latin vocabulary for discussing e.g. philosophy has the inevitable consequence of creating an entirely new conceptual system in Latin. See e.g. *Fin.* 3.5: *quoniam saepe diximus, et quidem cum aliqua querela non Graecorum modo, sed eorum etiam, qui se Graecos magis quam nostros haberi volunt, nos non modo non vinci a Graecis verborum copia, sed esse in ea etiam superiores, elaborandum est ut hoc non in nostris solum artibus, sed etiam in illorum ipsorum adsequamur*. The issue of *aemulatio* is not just an ancient one, cf. the issue of German translation noted by BENJAMIN (1923/1968), 80. See also FÖGEN (2009), 67.

⁴⁴ I note the recently published and extensive volume on Cicero’s literary adaptations from Greek sources in BISHOP (2018).

⁴⁵ FRIEDRICH (1965), 8 discusses the ‘Selbstbereicherung der Sprache mittels Übertreffens eines Originals’, cf. *aemulatio* but extended to enriching the target language’s lexis and its ability to discuss novel and complex ideas. See also RENER (1989), 53ff. While not directly discussing lexical innovation, there are fruitful studies in the field of ‘language contact’ in antiquity (WEINREICH (1953); DUBUISSON (1992a)), linguistic interference (BIVILLE (2001-3)), bilingualism versus *diglossia* (LANGSLOW (2002), 26-8; ADAMS (2003), 349-50 and 754-5; DICKEY (2003a), 297; ROCHETTE (2010); MULLEN (2011)), code-switching (WENSKUS (1998), ADAMS (2003), 217-416), mixed language (LEIWO (1995), 56-7; ADAMS (2003), 67-83), and language choice (ADAMS AND SWAIN (2002), 2-3; LANGSLOW (2002), 39-41; ADAMS (2003), 35-6).

METHODOLOGY

The following key questions have informed the methodology pursued throughout this study:

1. Which linguistic tools of translation did Latin authors deploy in the practice of their lexical innovation and augmentation?
2. How was the Latin philosophical lexis augmented by these translations?
3. How did this differ (if at all) from their predecessors and contemporaries? and
4. To what extent did this influence later Latin authors' translations of Greek philosophical terms?

It is then incumbent on an analysis of this kind to provide linguistic evidence of the methods in which Latin philosophical vocabulary was forged and how these, in turn, shaped the descent of Greek philosophical vocabulary. This study must take into account modern theories of translation (explored below), which inform the linguistic spadework underlying the analysis. 'Linguistic spadework' here refers to research that, primarily, relies on reference works and on-line databases and their associated searchability functions, combined with a type of philological analysis (word-lists, comparisons of usages, translation, and commentary of texts) in extracting and compiling individual word-forms and subjecting them to linguistic scrutiny. These include the following reference works and databases:

- *TLL* – for the study of attested meanings in technical terms across a variety of authors at different times;
- *OLD* – for similar reasons as the *TLL*, with more coverage of terms in Latin (the *TLL* is currently incomplete);
- *Packard Humanities Institute Latin Text Database* – for a comparison of both lexical and syntactic evidence in different authors;

- *Corpus Corporum* (University of Zurich) – for online access to searchable later Latin texts contained within *Patrologia Latina* (especially relevant to my chapters on Tertullian and Boethius).

Though the discipline of classical philology ought not to imitate the methods and principles of scientists necessarily, the use of data analysis is an expedient way to frame the methodology of this type of study; that is, that there be *some* consistent method of extracting data, compiling and testing evidence, and drawing conclusions. In practical terms, this translates to both quantitative and qualitative analyses of each author, compiling and categorising those terms I classify broadly as lexical innovations and augmentations and extracting salient features of their vocabularies.

Studies such as those by BAAYEN AND NEIJT, RENOUF AND BAUER, and KAUNISTO have examined the contexts in which lexical innovation and augmentation occurs in various modern linguistic systems. The first discussed the idea of ‘contextual anchoring’⁴⁶ and conclude that ἅπαξ λεγόμενα are more likely to require this anchoring than higher-frequency words. RENOUF AND BAUER list different methods in which neologisms can be introduced into a language, focusing on a corpus of ten years of text in a British newspaper. They divided these methods into two categories: a) overt or conscious help (such as inverted commas, introductory and following phrases), glosses; and b) indirect help (root or base repetition, collocation, lexical signals, and others).⁴⁷ KAUNISTO follows similar categories, dividing his data into groups based on affixes such as: *-ability*, *-able/-ible*, *-dom*, and *-esque*, among others.⁴⁸ Where possible, I have adopted this approach and limited the study of lexical innovation to ‘overt’ or ‘conscious innovation’, as discussed in the methodology below. This confines the possible data to introductory or following phrases that expressly reference a

⁴⁶ BAAYEN AND NEIJT (1997), 569.

⁴⁷ RENOUF and BAUER (2000), 232f; see also ADAMS (2003), 462 on loan-shifts in the context of Latin technical vocabulary (specifically medical): ‘Loan-shifts again are found in the technical vocabularies created in Latin on Greek models, and again they will often have been introduced into the language by native speakers (of Latin) as distinct from language learners.’

⁴⁸ KAUNISTO (2013), 100f.

novel term or a direct translation of a Greek text,⁴⁹ though this is not always possible with some authors, notably Lucretius, who was writing in verse.

This leads on to the two central criteria I have identified as the parameters of the linguistic analysis to be applied to each author selected for this thesis. If a term is to be classified as a lexical innovation, it must satisfy the following:

- a) Overt or indirect ‘signals’ are used by authors which suggest the term they are employing is either a lexical *innovation* or *augmentation* (defined below); and
- b) The term corresponds to an original Greek term that it renders into Latin.

Neither a) nor b) are necessarily straightforward to circumscribe, for instance the criterion in a) could be satisfied with obvious introductory or following remarks (also called ‘autonymic’ expressions, e.g. *dicere*, *vocare*, *appellare* etc.),⁵⁰ but it could also be satisfied with signals like *quasi* or *quidam*. The criterion in b) is used broadly so that, in addition to treating direct translations of Greek texts by a given author as automatically satisfying both criteria, even if a Greek word is not present immediately in the vicinity of the Latin word under investigation, we can infer from the subject matter or source material of the passage that it corresponds to a given Greek philosophical term and thus satisfies the second criterion.⁵¹

In the chapter on Cicero, I examine translation techniques through which we can analyse his attempts at rendering Greek expressions into Latin. These techniques are sourced from modern scholarship on the subject and will be applied to specific examples of translation in his philosophy, and many of the authors surveyed elsewhere in this thesis. Beyond translation techniques however, a key question arising will be: apart from ideological contexts, how much did the popular trope of the Latin *egestas* (of philosophical vocabulary)

⁴⁹ POWELL (1995), 293: ‘One should not forget the obvious point that Cicero could not resort to the device of inverted commas to show that he was using a word in a new or special sense.’ On the issue of expression using quotation marks in ancient philosophy more generally, see ZANKER (2016), 42-60.

⁵⁰ See e.g. ALIZON-MOREL AND LECAUDÉ’s (2016, 583-4) discussion of linguistic autonymy in Aulus Gellius.

⁵¹ Many of the lexical innovations and augmentations in the chapter examining Tertullian for example have been inferred as translating specific Greek terms by their contexts or specific source material. In other cases, secondary literature has been consulted and used to source the Greek terms under translation.

actually matter to Latin authors?⁵² As outlined above, I aim to examine the extent to which Greek thought influenced Latin morphology, or whether Greek thought was in fact ‘Latinised’ within the Roman intellectual tradition beginning with authors such as Lucretius and Cicero. If the latter, was this due to:

- a) the obstinate nature of Latin syntax and morphology which changed the concepts under examination during the transmission of abstract terms from Greek philosophy into Latin (as argued in, e.g. PONCELET); and/or
- b) Latin authors’ techniques of lexical innovation, which allowed them to re-interpret Greek terms (as opposed to loan them directly) into their native philosophical systems?

Whatever combination of the above, the result was a mixed tradition, solidified over centuries, redefined within a Roman intellectual framework. The thesis will develop a linguistic model that traces the development of lexical innovation and augmentation, examining how this practice changed over time, and will follow diachronically the development of a Latin philosophical lexicon over an extended historical period. This investigation does not place as its objects of inquiry the motives, agendas, or attitudes of selected authors regarding the translation of Greek into Latin (veering into the domain of socio-linguists) — though these will be touched upon in contextualising the authors under examination. The focus will instead develop a type of ‘New Criticism’ in a classical context where the results of selected authors’ works (i.e. primarily textual and philological) form the mainstay of the analysis.

This is a focus on the *usage* of words over time (a combined synchronic and diachronic approach), and the changes in usage, which corresponded to changes in concepts.

⁵² The *egestas* trope was often used in ideological context as a type of argument as opposed to any particular comparative linguistic observation; see FARRELL (2001), 50-1. We can find it from Lucretius 1.138-9: *multa novis verbis praesertim cum sit agendum / propter egestatem linguae et rerum novitatem* (discussed below), Vitruvius (with regards to the technical terminology of musical theory, 5.4), all the way up to writers such as Seneca the Younger (e.g. *Ep.* 58.1: *quanta verborum nobis paupertas, immo egestas sit, numquam magis quam hodierno die intellexi*; and 87.40: *facilius, quod volo, exprimerem, si Latinum verbum esset, quo ἀντιπαρξία significatur*.) Note, even in the contrasting kinds of literary forms (one a didactic poem, the other private letters) the trope still strongly persists, see also especially in the form of letter writing, where ‘deficiency’ is argued to be a prominent reason for Cicero’s private code-switching into Greek (see e.g. STEELE (1900), 388-9).

Such an analysis can provide contemporary scholars with pertinent evidence in asserting specific claims about authors' individual translation practices in the subject area of philosophy. Gottlieb FREGE's view (1979, 253) on a similar problem facing the field of logic is pertinent to the present issue: '[I]t is the business of the logician to conduct an unceasing struggle against psychology and parts of language [...] in so far as they do not bring what is logical purely into expression.' Although classical linguists do not need to struggle against psychologism in quite the same way, one should at least keep a critical distance and let the consequences of an author's lexical and syntactic decisions (based on the best textual evidence available) speak for themselves, rather than as clues to the internal workings of the individual's mind.⁵³

The data presented throughout will only be reliable or persuasive if we keep in mind that any linguistic analysis based on an antique author's extant corpus is entirely dependent on the sources used, which in many cases are scarce or highly conjectural. A straightforward example is the claim that the philosophical lexicon of Latin was 'forged in the works of Cicero. This is to presume that we have an omniscient view of Latin prose before and after his works, which classicists would acknowledge is not an accurate depiction of the historical reality. We know Augustine often reverted to the authority of Varro's writings on multiple occasions, not only Cicero's, and yet the former have been largely lost to posterity, whereas the latter has been especially well-preserved (thanks to, for instance, monastic efforts in Europe during the ninth century).⁵⁴ Yet it is necessary, as researchers in this type of historical field, to accept the shortcomings of the available sources and to evaluate the material available as thoroughly as possible. It is in this qualified context that the claims of this thesis are made.

⁵³ On the issue of socio-linguistics applied to Latin philosophical vocabulary, see e.g. KAIMIO (2003), 636-7; FÖGEN (2009), 8, 67, 102.

⁵⁴ In particular, the Abbey of Corbie in northeast France, see BISCHOFF (1961). In general however, the authority of Cicero's philosophical project on later authors was immense and if other authors were writing Latin philosophy contemporary with Cicero, their influence on posterity, we can safely conclude, was minimal.

Lexical ‘Innovation’ and ‘Augmentation’ Defined

It is necessary to define more precisely what will be a foundational concept in this study: lexical innovation. The process of creating novel terms (whether technical or otherwise), which are added to the existing vocabulary (lexicalisation), is self-evident as a rudimentary definition of the phenomenon. However, it is equally important to understand that, for many Latin authors (notably Cicero), the default option was not simply coining new terms when confronted with a Greek concept. Studies in the field of word-formation generally focus on various mechanisms of lexical innovation or neology such as affixation or derivation, compounding, acronyms, blending, back-formation, and others.⁵⁵ This thesis does not ignore the methods developed in modern linguistics in this particular field and so I adopt, in part, the definition of lexical innovation as one of ‘novelty’ as used by RENOUF AND BAUER;⁵⁶ namely, *the occurrence of first-attested forms within chronologically arranged data*. This is more difficult in application to classical literature, where our data is fragmentary, dating of individual works can be imprecise, and the full spectrum of literary evidence, as compared with contemporary textual data in modern media, has not survived to posterity. It should be made clear, however, that this thesis is not undertaking a full-scale analysis of all available corpora within Latin philosophy (or of all the corpora within a selected author’s corpus). Rather, it focuses on detailed case studies, examining various methods Latin authors adopted when translating Greek philosophical vocabulary and their subsequent creation of new terms and meanings in Latin. I intend to focus on the following four main linguistic practices:

1. Calques (morphological);
2. Compounds and derivatives (including sense translations);
3. Loan-words used without a Latin equivalent;
4. Loan-shifts (semantic calques); and

⁵⁵ See generally SORNIG (1981); BAUER (1983); LEHRER (2009), 628f.

⁵⁶ RENOUF and BAUER (2000), 231-2.

5. Loan-blends (*vox hybrida*)

Practices 1 to 3 are ‘lexical innovations’; 4 to 5 are ‘lexical augmentations’. Issues of so-called ‘foreign influence’ on the semantics of a language have been studied in the modern era in some detail, yet the transference of these types of linguistic methodologies to classical philology has been under-utilised. A taxonomy of lexical innovation is found in LANGSLOW (1989, 36), drawing from UNTERMANN (1978, para. 5), who lists seven means of ‘term-formation’ which account for all modern technical terms, four of which are most relevant to the current study:

1. borrowing;
2. non-technical words becoming established in technical usage;
3. compounding and suffixal derivation;
4. the formation of free compounds: noun + determiner.⁵⁷

LANGSLOW (1989, 37) collocates the third and fourth means of term-formation in medical Latin into a single category labelled ‘new Latin formations’, which largely included calques. In this study, methods 1, 3, and 4 are all examples of lexical innovation, whilst method 2 is regarded as a form of lexical augmentation.

Regarding the latter, it should be kept in mind that this forms merely a subset of the tools used by linguists in the last hundred years to examine inter-lingual phenomena such as polysemy. So ULLMANN (1964, 165) on his discussion of polysemy: “‘Semantic borrowing’”, as it is usually called, will be particularly frequent where there is intimate contact between

⁵⁷ Modern technical terms can also be formed from proper names (e.g. the chemical element Einsteinium), neologisms based on Greek or Latin roots (e.g. the biological term ‘phytochrome’) and abbreviations or formulae (e.g. ‘DNA’ for deoxyribonucleic acid). These term-formation phenomena are listed in UNTERMANN (1978) but are not observed in medical, nor philosophical, Latin.

two languages one of which serves as a model to the other.’⁵⁸ In this statement, we find a myriad of issues, both in terms of micro- and macro-translation,⁵⁹ that are highly relevant to the relationship between the philosophical vocabularies of Ancient Greek and Latin: issues such as exemplarity, *egestas*, *aemulatio*, and language interference (among others). All these arise through the prism of lexical augmentation (e.g. semantic borrowing). More recently, DEIGNAN noted that, ‘it is fairly rare for a completely new lexeme to appear in the language. Gaps in the lexicon that arise through changes and developments in society and technology are more often filled by adapting existing lexemes. This happens through a range of processes, the most important of which is probably metaphor.’⁶⁰ Similarly, BYNON (1977/1983, 232) argues that, when Christian concepts were discussed in recipient languages such as German and English, the missionary’s task of introducing entirely unfamiliar concepts and institutions, and the linguistic forms that represented them, to pagan peoples must have appeared, ‘clearly a less attractive solution than that offered by the alternative possibility, which was to adapt the language of his audience to meet the situation.’ Authors in antiquity too, notably Quintilian, were alive to the fact that techniques like metaphor (*translata verba*) could be deployed as effective processes of lexical augmentation in Latin, where there might be a purported *egestas* of lexical items.⁶¹ So lexical augmentation is much broader in scope, with techniques like metaphor (*translatio*) and metonymy (*denominatio*) becoming seminal elements in analysing language development.⁶² As in his Greek predecessors Plato and Zeno,⁶³ the use of metaphor

⁵⁸ ULLMANN does not define language contact expressly but quotes (1964, 166 n. 1) the authority of WEINREICH (1953), who had defined language contact via bilingualism, thus: ‘[T]wo or more languages will be said to be in contact if they are used alternately by the same persons. the language-using individuals are thus the locus of the contact.’ See also BYNON (1977/1985), 240 and recently MOTT AND LASO (2020), 160-7.

⁵⁹ See PALUMBO (2009), 50 for a discussion of these terms in modern linguistics.

⁶⁰ DEIGNAN (2005), 25. See also ULLMAN (1962), 202; NOVOKHATKO (2016) and (2019), 386-8.

⁶¹ Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.34: *his illa potentiora, quod res plurimae carent appellationibus* [sc. in Latin], *ut eas necesse sit transferre aut circumire; etiam in iis, quae denominata sunt, summa paupertas in eadem nos frequentissime revolvit; at illis* [sc. Greeks] *non verborum modo, sed linguarum etiam inter se differentium copia est.*

⁶² See the discussion in Chapter 1.7 of Cicero’s use of *fabricator*, *artifex*, and *aedificator* as metaphors for the Divine Craftsman in Plato, (who himself used metaphors like *τεκταινόμενος*, *δημιουργός*, etc., which were translated into Latin accordingly). See also the discussion in LEEMAN (1963), 37-8.

⁶³ See SCHOFIELD (2002), 417-24 on the use of metaphor in the creation of Stoic philosophical vocabulary in particular. For Platonic metaphorical vocabulary, and ancient philosophy in general, see PENDER (2000) and the observation of MCCALL (1969), ix: ‘Almost all ancient technical terms were originally nontechnical in meaning [...] Thus, for example, before being used as a rhetorical term, “εἰκών” meant “statue” or “portrait” or “image”’.

to convey new senses (semantic shifts) in established vocabulary was a vital part of establishing a philosophical vocabulary.

FRUYT's discussions⁶⁴ of lexical innovation are instructive. She argues that innovations enter Latin mostly through individual or technical contexts (discourse), and many of them are ephemeral. She suggests that lexical innovations enter a language via three main routes: a) borrowings of a signifier ('les emprunts de signifiant'), which includes transcriptions, phonetic calques, or general borrowings which retain the phonology or orthography of the source language; b) morphological calques ('calques morphologiques'); and c) semantic calques ('calques sémantiques'). FRUYT explains that each of these phenomena relate to 'innovation' to varying degrees by: (a) introducing a completely new sequence of phonemes into the target language, (b) introducing a new term created out of pre-existing morphemes of the target language, and (c) adding a semantic layer by expanding what a pre-existing term signifies in the target language. FRUYT's approach is broadly followed in the methodology of this thesis.

Calques (loan translations) versus loan-shifts

While not all linguists agree on the parameters of what a **calque** or 'loan translation' encompasses, the definition adopted in this study follows the definition of the phenomenon as consisting of translating 'morphologically complex foreign expressions by means of novel combinations of native elements that match the meanings and the structure of the foreign expressions and their component parts'.⁶⁵ DURKIN defines a 'loan translation' as 'replication of the structure of a foreign-language word or expression by use of synonymous word forms in the borrowing language.'⁶⁶ HAUGEN AND MITHUN have suggested a difference between a

⁶⁴ FRUYT (2009) and (2017). See also discussion in SEELE (1995), 24-5.

⁶⁵ HOCK and JOSEPH (1996), 264. See also VINAY AND DARBELNET (1995), 32: 'a special kind of borrowing, whereby one language borrows an expression from another, but then translates literally each of its elements.'

⁶⁶ DURKIN (2009), 135; note DURKIN's caution that: 'We cannot be sure whether a particular formation is a loan-translation, or simply a coincidental parallel in another language.' This could happen in Latin generally, and in some well-known terms that became more technical over time (e.g. *substantia* for ὑπόστασις) but in the specific instances we examine in the authors surveyed in this thesis, overt glossing or translation will be the focus of inquiry and so the calque usually consciously mirrors the morphemes of the philosophical Greek term under translation. See DURKIN's qualification: 'Clearer cases occur when we encounter a highly lexicalised (possibly

calque and loan-shift in that the former consists of a morpheme-by-morpheme translation of a morphologically complex expression whereas a loan-shift represents a purely semantic transfer, consisting entirely of ‘native material whose meaning has been shifted to encompass an introduced concept’.⁶⁷

Loan-shifts or ‘semantic shifts or extensions’ in Latin are common, notably in Cicero’s practice, who was more likely to use a familiar term and augment it with a novel meaning than to invent one or calque one directly. As we will see, the extensive use of loan-shifts over time leads to polysemy, which affected the meaning, and the conceptualisation, of philosophical expressions.⁶⁸ NICOLAS discussed this phenomenon in Cicero in some detail and observes that among the ‘semantic calques’ (*calques sémantique*)⁶⁹ or loan-shifts, many ought to be counted as genuine neologisms given their (newfound) technical contexts, citing the example of *volupta* in rendering the Epicurean concept of ἡδονή.⁷⁰ The phenomenon of ‘calquing’ in Latin generally has been analysed recently, with two works being particularly valuable: NICOLAS (1996) and DETREVILLE (2012). The latter’s observations suggest that morphological calques became productive within philosophical Latin vocabulary on account of the ‘precise replication of useful Greek words in Latin, utilising common suffixes and bases that reflect the semantics of the Greek’ in addition to the common need for such words, and the authority of writers such as Cicero.⁷¹ As we will see in the chapter on Boethius, this is more accurate for his own calques in rendering technical Aristotelian terms of logic into Latin, which later took on lives of their own in both Latin and other vernaculars (such as Old English), due to Boethius’ strict compliance with word-formation rules of Late Latin when it came to affixations and compounds and his status as an authority in the medieval scholastic

encyclopedic) meaning which is very unlikely to be coincidental.’

⁶⁷ HAUGEN AND MITHUN (2003), s.v. *borrowing*; see also ADAMS (2003), 522-3: ‘In a loan-shift, a word A (of a language a) which shares a meaning or meanings with a word B (of language b) acquires a new meaning which its partial equivalent in the other language already had. The *pre-existing degree of overlap between A and B facilitates the semantic extension of A*’; HOCK AND JOSEPH (1996), 263. See also BOWKER AND PEARSON (2002), 214: ‘Neologisms can also be formed in another way, however, by assigning a new meaning to an existing word’; BUSSMAN *et al.* (1996), s.v. *neologism*.

⁶⁸ See CASSIN *et al.* (2014), 24f (s.v. αἰών and the later Latin equivalents of *aevum*, *aeternitas*, *perpetuitas*, *aeviternitas*, *sempiternitas*).

⁶⁹ See also ERNOUT (1954), 86-8.

⁷⁰ NICOLAS (2000), 131f.

⁷¹ DETREVILLE (2012), 50.

world and beyond. DETREVILLE's observation is less relevant for earlier authors such as Cicero and Lucretius, the former calquing more frequently than the latter, but certainly nowhere near as zealously as late antique philosophers such as Boethius.

There is one issue regarding loan-shifts or semantic calques that needs to be clarified before proceeding. The issue of polysemy is a difficult one, especially in the context of translation. If an author uses a Latin word in one particular context and a subsequent author uses it in a specifically different context (for instance, as a philosophical term) does this count as a novel meaning per se, or simply another translation usage? Take the example of *aequabilitas* in Cicero (*N.D.* 1.109) as a translation of the Epicurean *ἰσωνομία*. Before this usage, Cicero had employed it in at least two different senses according to the *OLD*: 'equity, fairness' and 'equality of status'. Varro also uses the word as a technical grammatical term meaning 'analogy, correspondence' (see DE MELO (2019), 1.214). It is only in Cicero's philosophical works where it takes on a sense of 'equability', reflecting the limited notion of 'equilibrium, balance' as distinctly found in fragments of Epicurus (see LSJ s.v. *ἰσωνομία*). It is this type of segregation of the semantic identities of a single term in which this analysis takes a close interest, to assert that an author is using a pre-existing Latin word in a novel sense (according to the available textual evidence). It is not strictly polysemy but rather might be construed as *new* variations in usage. This is different from simply using a term in a different context, as we will discuss in Boethius' use of terms like *significare*, which becomes a case, not of a novel meaning added to an existing term, but of a similar meaning used in a different context (in Boethius' case, his translations of Aristotelian logic).

Compounding and derivatives

Compounding, as a means of lexical innovation, was not so readily acceptable in Latin as in Greek. A rare example from Cicero is the compound *veriloquium*;⁷² the word is introduced once in the *Topica* and then discarded entirely. Derivation or affixation is more productive among the authors that will be surveyed in this thesis. The example, again from Cicero, of

⁷² See ADAMS (2003), 460; however, a distinction should be made between literary forms so that prose, especially rhetorical or philosophical like Cicero's dialogues, were less susceptible to large-scale introductions of new Latin compounds than e.g. Ennius', Accius', or Naevius' epic or Lucretius' didactic poetry. For a list of compound terms in Cicero, see LINDNER (2002), 166-9, 265-70.

qualitas is instructive. The term is used four times in the *Academica* and the *De Natura Deorum* but was productive in later authors such as Quintilian, Seneca, Apuleius, Tertullian, Augustine, and Boethius. Following suggestions by FRUYT, one reason for this might be that *qualitas* is more intelligible, and made from common derivational methods, rather than the compound *veriloquium*.⁷³ The study that follows does not take a strong view towards morphological theories known as ‘lexicalism’ or ‘derivationalism’ — the former content with analysing vocabulary on a case-by-case (sc. lexeme-by-lexeme) basis, the latter seeking generalisable rules of describing and predicting word-formation. Instead, the study is empirical, describing the term-formation practices on a case-by-case basis in selected authors avoiding general rules or predictive formulae for how Latin philosophical terminology was derived overall.⁷⁴ This is not to say that compounding is significantly different from affixation, but with the former the ‘word-forming rules’ of the language are not as clear-cut and even if the rules are clear to a given reader, *phonological* considerations prevent the word from being productive.⁷⁵ However, in the Latin authors surveyed in this thesis, one discovers that, where the occasion does call for a new compound term to render a Greek philosophical term, the lexical components of that compound are usually straightforward and ambiguity is, therefore, avoided, e.g. Cicero’s *veriloquium* (*verus* + *loquor* + *—ium*) or Apuleius’ *aequipedum* (*aequus* + *pes* + *—us*), among others.⁷⁶ In any case, given the findings in RENOUF AND BAUER and DURKIN, it is unsurprising that in Latin, derivatives were more common in rendering Greek technical philosophical terms than compounds. Derivatives could also be calques of course and there is usually a regular correspondence; for instance, if the word was a calque of a Greek term, it was mostly a species of derivative. However, some derivatives fall under the category of what I will label a **sense translation**, also called a ‘loan rendition’ in modern linguistics, described as ‘a more dynamic and imaginative kind of calque in which the translation of the foreign word is less than literal’ (MOTT AND LASO (2020), 159-60). This could also occur because the Greek term lacked sufficient morphological complexity (a


⁷³ See DETREVILLE (2012), 53 who, quoting findings in FRUYT (2011, 163), also notes that the productivity of a calque in Latin philosophical authors was due to its components being ‘common and understandable’.

⁷⁴ See LANGSLOW (2000), 270f for a discussion of these theories in relation to Latin linguistics.

⁷⁵ Considerations of style and aesthetics were clearly determinative, see also DETREVILLE (2012), 50-1.

⁷⁶ See again DETREVILLE (2012), 51.

requirement for morphological calques). An example will suffice from the *Timaeus*: in Cicero's translation, he renders Plato's γόμφος 'bolt' with *cuneolus* (dim. of *cuneus* 'wedge'). There are some grey areas however where we find calques of Greek terms that rely on Latin bases with different senses. For instance, in Cicero's translation of ἐναργής with *evidens*, we could construe this as a sense translation, since the Latin base is a verb, VIDEO meaning 'to see', but the Greek is a substantive ἀργής meaning 'bright'. However, its derivative ἐναργεία rendered by *evidentia* might be viewed as a morphological calque. We could also see it as *both* a morphological calque and a sense translation (see also *mutabilis* for σκεδαστός). The relationship between calques, derivatives, and loan-blends in the authors analysed in this study can be briefly summarised as follows:



Loan-words and loan-blends

In general, pure loan-words from Greek; that is, directly transferred (both Greek alphabet and inflection or Latin transliteration but the retention of Greek inflection), are the least interesting aspect of lexical innovation. VINAY AND DEBELNET (1995, 31) describe borrowing as a means, ‘to overcome a lacuna, usually a metalinguistic one (e.g. a new technical process, an unknown concept)’ and ‘is the simplest of all translation methods.’ The primary distinction this study draws is between simple transference or transliteration and the use of a loan-blend,⁷⁷ or to follow a similar distinction in modern linguistics: a loan-word which is introduced into a target language which shows accommodation to native phonology and morphology and may give rise to new derivatives within the borrowing language (a loan-blend or *Lehnwort*), and a loan-word which retains its foreign-language pronunciation and may show non-native morphology (*Fremdwort*).⁷⁸ This latter kind occurs very rarely in the selected authors surveyed, but where it does the term is generally glossed. For example, in *Luc. 37: de assensione atque approbatione, quam Graeci συγκατάθεσιν vocant, pauca dicemus*, the Greek term is retained with its original accusative inflection and orthography, and is glossed with the collocation *assensio + approbatio*. Although *συγκατάθεσις* is first used here by a Latin author, it cannot possibly be considered an ‘innovation’ (whereas a loan-word like *dogma* has been included in the data because of its usage *sans* Latin equivalent). These are, therefore, not included in the data of lexical ‘innovation’ throughout, simply because they are not additions to the Latin vocabulary (in this case, they are truly *loaned* from Greek and effectively given back, with a Latin equivalent kept for posterity). Loan-words that are brought into Latin via transference, (given Latin inflectional suffixes or not,) have no Latin equivalent in the text, and are used for the first time are included in the data, an example is *dogmata* below.

A loan-blend (also known as a *vox hybrida*) is more relevant for this investigation. It is defined as the borrowing of a complex word with substitution of one or more native morphs

⁷⁷ See NIESCHMIDT (1913) for an early overview of approaching this problem in Latin texts. See more recently O’SULLIVAN (2018) and (2021) for an approach to ‘alphabet-switching’ in Cicero’s works.

⁷⁸ The terminology is from DURKIN (2009), 139. See also discussion in SEELE (1995), 36-9 in the context of Cicero.

for morphs in the borrowed word⁷⁹ or a combination of native and borrowed morphological material. An example is the English *washable*, formed from the native root WASH and the borrowed suffix *-able*, which had come into English on loan-words from Latin and French and subsequently became nativised.⁸⁰ As ADAMS observes, where there was a particular gap in Latin vocabulary, a Greek loan could be used but integrated into Latin morphology, ‘thereby rendering it less obtrusively alien.’⁸¹ Using the example above in Boethius, the verb *syllogizo* can be classified as a loan-blend since the root SYLLOGIZ- is from the Greek συλλογίζομαι where the active Latin inflectional suffix *-o* is added to replace the Greek *-ομαι*.⁸² The creation of the verb through the active *-o* also brings it into the category of a derivative or affixation.⁸³ Whether we should count such ‘integrated loan-words’ (metaplasms) as strict loan-blends or simply loan-words introduced via transference or transcription is less obvious, and so with all the authors surveyed, I have always categorised the first-attested loan-words and blends together, not necessarily distinguishing the two for statistical reasons.⁸⁴

HOUSMAN (1972, 687) noted that, in the fragments of Lucilius, words like *Atticon*, *disyllabon*, and *emplouron* were all borrowed with Greek inflections however terms like *exodium* and *zetematium* were turned into loan-blends. In other words, Lucilius was more likely to give Greek adjectives Greek inflections but Greek nouns Latin ones. ADAMS (2003, 327 n. 56), citing modern linguists’ observations, says this makes sense as a general rule given what he calls a ‘hierarchy of transferability’: ‘It has often been noted that nouns are the part of speech most readily transferred from one language to another and integrated into the recipient language’.⁸⁵ What is interesting to keep in mind when we come to examining authors in this

⁷⁹ DURKIN (2009), 138.

⁸⁰ HAUGEN and MITHUN (2003), s.v. *borrowing*. Note, the suffix in English words does not lead to an accent shift, hence its nativisation, e.g. *prefer* -> *preferable*, *conquer* -> *conquerable*, etc. Cf. other suffixes such as *-ity*: *electric* -> *electricity*.

⁸¹ ADAMS (2003), 338: ‘[T]hose using a Greek word (particularly a noun) were not compelled to use it with overtly Greek morphology.’ For the declension of loans from the Ionian-Attic dialect in particular, see further ERNOUT (1953), 23-4; also of interest are Varro’s comments in *L.* 10.70.

⁸² See LANGSLOW (2000), 79 for examples in medical Latin.

⁸³ For an analysis of *voces hybridae* in Latin from Livius Andronicus to Varro (without any discussion of Cicero however), see GABELAND WEISE (1893), 339-68.

⁸⁴ For the complexities of integrated metaplasms in the context of Greek loan-words in Latin, see BIVILLE (1981), esp. 129 and 132.

⁸⁵ See also HAUGEN (1950).

thesis is the preponderance of substantives that are naturalised into loan-blends in Latin (thus confirming this ‘hierarchy’), but where the few adjectives are loaned, these are, in fact, given Latin inflections not Greek ones (e.g. *melancholicus* in Cicero or *paralogisticus* in Boethius).⁸⁶

There is an added difficulty in analysing loan-words that appear for the first time in Latin in a given author; namely whether the use of Greek letters was an artefact from the authors themselves or the respective scribes within the *paradosis*. The standards of consistency applied today to orthography might not have been applicable in antiquity, as we see from inscriptional evidence where alphabet-switching can be frequently observed (see e.g. *CIL* III.125).⁸⁷ This issue was discussed in the case of a fragment from Lucilius, who (despite the weight of editorial authority) might have used the term *ἄτομος* in Greek letters for comic or mocking effect at the expense of Epicureans, or at least transliterated the loan-word for this purpose.⁸⁸ We find a similar problem in Seneca’s *Epistles* (90.9), discussed in GITNER (2012, 9 n. 22), where the loan-word *architectos* becomes transliterated into Greek characters ΑΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΟΣ.⁸⁹ I do not propose any hard and fast solution to this problem, and ultimately the issue of orthography is a matter of the *paradosis* of the manuscripts (i.e. the individual choices made by scribes over time), but where such textual issues do arise with respect to loan-words, I do not take for granted the readings of modern editions, but discuss them in context on a case-by-case basis.

⁸⁶ Cf. the early Latinisation of Greek loan-words, especially nouns, in authors like Plautus, and the later practice of reproducing the Greek form in Accius. See e.g. HOPKINS (1898), 96 quoting MUELLER (1898).

⁸⁷ See e.g. ADAMS (2003), 620 with respect to bilingual Greeks writing in Latin: ‘Once the Latin letters were learnt, an unpractised writer might occasionally switch alphabets unconsciously.’

⁸⁸ See COLEMAN (1989), 86; REINHARDT (2005), 156-7.

⁸⁹ See the critical apparatus in REYNOLDS (1965), 334 for example. The term *architectus* from *ἀρχιτέκτων* had been naturalised into Latin as early as Plautus (*Mos.* 760), but scribes had assumed the Latin second declension masculine plural *architectos* was a Greek second declension nominative and hence the ΑΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΟΣ orthography.

SYNTACTICAL INNOVATION?

This thesis is largely concerned with the phenomenon modern linguistics terms ‘language interference’; the influence of an external language system on another (Greek on Latin). As such, we encounter a long scholarly tradition among modern linguists, who have formulated differing theories and conducted a range of empirical studies on the subject, with variant outcomes.⁹⁰ At root, the issue of how external influences change a given language, specifically its grammar (morphology and syntax), can be summarised as follows: external influences do change languages, but at different levels or ‘strata’ and in varying degrees. On one end of the spectrum, linguists have argued a structuralist approach, for example WEINREICH (1953, 44), who suggested that languages have ‘a complex resistance to interference’ and JAKOBSON (1938/1962, 241): ‘a language accepts foreign structural elements only when they correspond to its own tendencies of development.’ In their influential study on the issue of language interference and change, THOMASON AND KAUFMAN countered such views, suggesting that external factors influence a given language’s grammar in more than structuralist theory had countenanced (1988, 15): ‘though it is true that some kinds of features are more easily transferred than others [...] social factors can and very often do overcome structural resistance to interference at all levels [of a language system].’ This becomes pertinent in the case of social attitudes towards borrowing and incorporating Greek linguistic material into the Latin lexis. We have discussed, and will discuss further in the chapters below (especially Chapter One), the acceptability of using Greek terms in Latin literature and the phenomenon of linguistic purism in Latin. These social factors made Latin less susceptible to language change from linguistic interference with Greek, especially when it came to syntax.

This study confines itself primarily to Greek influence on the Latin lexis, but where noteworthy issues of syntax arise, these have been discussed in the context of the relevant author’s translation. The nature of this thesis’ main argument is that changes in lexis of Latin (that is through lexical innovation) produced changes in meanings of key philosophical terms over time (due to the diachrony of the lexical items themselves). Such changes necessarily

⁹⁰ See THOMASON AND KAUFMAN (1988), 13-20 for an overview; also TREFFERS-DALLER (2009), 69-73 for a survey of scholarship on ‘convergence’ and ‘transference’ in the context of language interference.

affect syntax (though to varying degrees) as well as lexis. For example, SAMUELS notes that extension in a grammatical system does not differ radically from that in lexis: '[T]here must be a close connection (though this time of function rather than meaning).'⁹¹ The parenthetical comment in SAMUELS' observation is crucial because, often, the change in syntax of Latin in a given author translating Greek serves a functional purpose rather than affecting the *meaning* of the concept itself, poetry is the best example of this.⁹² For this reason, examining changes in syntax is not as determinative to the thesis' core argument outlined above. Yet there is a risk, perhaps engendered by modern transformational grammar approaches to lexical and syntactical interactions, of compartmentalising or encapsulating vocabulary from syntax (the so-called 'lexicalist hypothesis' asserted in CHOMSKY (1970)).⁹³ As we will see in authors such as Cicero, the system of Latin grammar applied to the formation of words often necessarily relies upon or interacts with the system of Latin grammar that assembles phrases from words (see e.g. Chapter One in Cicero's justification as to why *forma* was a preferable alternative to translating *εἶδος* rather than *species* in *Top.* 30). The aim of the methodology used in this thesis is not to draw a bright line between lexical and syntactic issues arising from the phenomena of lexical innovation and augmentation, but rather to focus primarily on the former whilst including discussion of the latter where relevant and of particular interest, on an incremental basis.

Despite salutary comments by authors such as RAWSON (1975, 232): 'In fact the chief problems [in translating Greek technical terms] did not lie in the vocabulary, but in the syntax, of which [Cicero] speaks much less', I accept LÖFSTEDT's observation that: 'It is impossible not to conclude that [...] [Greek] nevertheless exercised no decisive or lasting influence upon the structure of Latin as a whole'.⁹⁴ Also important is the more recent study by CALBOLI (2009, 178): '[I]f we consider the core of Latin grammar [...] we must deny that Latin grammar was in any way changed by Greek, some isolated and insignificant exceptions aside.' I

⁹¹ SAMUELS (1972), 55.

⁹² For the use of Grecising syntax in Latin poetic authors see WACKERNAGEL (1928/2009), 94 n. 2, 172, 231; SYNT. 2.406-57; GÖRLER (1985); ADAMS (2003), 422 n. 24; COURTNEY (2004); and a useful bibliography in GITNER (2012), 243-66.

⁹³ See also LYONS (1977), 528f.

⁹⁴ LÖFSTEDT (1959), 99 discussing the impact of Graecisms on Classical and Silver Latin but before Late Latin, e.g. in Greek's influence on Biblical Latin (see also LÖFSTEDT (1959), 102).

acknowledge the important work done by COLEMAN (1975) and some syntactical anomalies found in, for example, Cicero's epistles, but it remains doubtful that further research into this area would lead one to re-evaluate LÖFSTEDT's observation, as true today as it was almost fifty years ago. As WHITNEY noted, the grammatical structure of a language resists intrusion most successfully because it is the 'least material and the most formal part of language'.⁹⁵ WHITNEY classified *lexical items* of a recipient language as the most susceptible to potential influence by external linguistic systems.⁹⁶ LÖFSTEDT's observation is relevant in another respect: since Greek terms were borrowed (and calques or loan-shifts etc., used) to amplify existing meanings in Latin, then these concepts had to be subjected to the (relatively impervious) laws of Latin grammar. This part of the research would, therefore, expand the focus beyond the purely philological and examine the differences in Latin and Greek philosophical frameworks as functions of the respective languages' lexica and grammars. So where Plato could discuss τὸ ὄν, to Seneca's frustration,⁹⁷ writers in Latin could not, since Latin had neither the present participle of *esse*, nor the definite article — two immovable limitations of Latin grammar.⁹⁸

MAROUZEAU argued that, for Latin to become the destined 'bearer of universal culture', it was necessary to 'do violence to its native function' for it to achieve the 'conquest of the abstract'.⁹⁹ He cites linguists such as JESPERSEN (1922, 429) who argued that the more advanced a language, the more developed its power of expressing abstraction. POWELL argues that it was not a conquest of the abstract, contra MAROUZEAU, but as mentioned above, a 'deliberate assault on the cultural territory that had previously been occupied by the Greeks.'¹⁰⁰ These observations provide a useful springboard to the discussion that follows, namely whether the works of Latin philosophical authors resulted in the 'de-concretisation' or the creation of a 'more abstract' lexis in their native language by incorporating Greek thought.

⁹⁵ WHITNEY (1881), 14.

⁹⁶ WHITNEY (1881), 18-20.

⁹⁷ Sen. *Ep.* 58.7.

⁹⁸ This did not prevent some attempts (e.g. Cicero *Timaetus*, 3: *semper sit* for Plato's *Ti.* 27d6: τὸ ὄν ἀεί) or later, Quintilian's *queens* (note: the manuscripts have *quae ens*, one editor prints *queens* (Halm), see critical apparatus in BUTLER (1959), 228), ascribed to one Verginius Flavus. See general observations repeating PONCELET's (1957) in MACKENDRICK (1989, 339 n. 8). See also the Italian Humanist Lorenzo Valla's comments (*Repastinatio* i. 12-13, 30-2) regarding Scholastic neologisms like *ens*, *entitas*, *quiditas*, *perseitas* etc.

⁹⁹ MAROUZEAU (1954), 63.

¹⁰⁰ POWELL (1995), 290.

ANALYSIS BY CASE STUDY: LUCRETIUS' TRANSFORMATION OF EPICUREAN VOCABULARY

The purpose of structuring this thesis around case studies is to examine, over a sufficiently expansive timeframe (to incorporate the theme of diachrony into the analysis), the different practices of lexical innovation concerning Latin philosophical vocabulary. Case studies build upon those that precede, beginning with Cicero, to which the most attention is devoted. The findings are then applied to Seneca for comparison. The third case study focuses on Apuleius in some detail, followed by Tertullian and then Calcidius, for a comparison with Cicero once again. The final case study is devoted to Boethius' logical translations of Aristotle and Porphyry. In this way, though proceeding in a temporally linear fashion, looking at the synchronic practices an author deploys, in their specific time, to render Greek philosophical vocabulary into Latin, we can also use a comparative study to add the dimension of diachronic analysis, comparing the approaches of authors with one another, especially where they are dealing with similar subject matter or, in some cases, the same Greek sources. As LANGSLOW (2000, 432) remarked: 'The purpose (and the direct vindication) of such an analysis [sc. of term-formation] of any writer's vocabulary is to allow direct comparison with other writers of the same genre and measurable linguistic characterization of an author or genre, technical or not, with respect to other varieties of the language.'

The beginning of the investigation centres upon the Epicurean poetry of Lucretius, an outlier in this study by genre, but no less important in instantiating an early point in the tradition of Roman transformation of Greek philosophy within the parameters of a Latin linguistic framework.

Lucretius' poetic re-interpretation of Epicureanism

'To transfer the qualities of the Greek classics into Latin was to create something new, valid in its own right and not simply as a reproduction. It was also, naturally, to perform the patriotic service of putting Rome on a level with Greece even in the arts of the word.'¹⁰¹ This was the observation of RUSSELL three decades ago in the context of Antonine literature. As we shall

¹⁰¹ RUSSELL (1990), 5.

see, this notion of ‘remaking’ original source material (in this case Epicurean philosophical concepts)¹⁰² as poetic inspiration for the invention of new literary creations, will become fundamental to understanding Lucretius’ literary (and philosophical) project. SEDLEY¹⁰³ has sufficiently demonstrated the transformative effect of Lucretius’ over seven thousand extant lines of dactylic hexameter on Roman philosophy. In his view, Lucretius’ composition method of the *De rerum natura* (*DRN*) involved two distinct phases: the first was a ‘downloading’ of Epicurean material into hexameters: ‘[F]ollowing the sequence of his sole Epicurean source closely, indeed almost mechanically’. In the second, he set about ‘reorganising’ this material into its final form as transmitted to us, a laborious process which ‘undoubtedly required radical rewriting in the final version.’¹⁰⁴ The first process, if it was an intentional part of Lucretius’ project, is of interest to the questions examined in this thesis. The notion of Lucretius’ taking Greek material from Epicurus’ well-known *Περὶ Φύσεως*, postulated to be the main source of the poem,¹⁰⁵ and fashioning them into workable Latin hexameters implies a more arduous task than the technological term ‘downloading’ implies. To further the digital metaphor, to perform such a task would be akin to attempting to run a Macintosh application in a Windows operating system. It would have been during this process that Lucretius ran up against new Epicurean philosophical terms which required a) an intelligible equivalent in Latin, and b) an equivalent amenable to the metrical contingencies of the medium. The fact that Lucretius composed an Epicurean and Empedoclean¹⁰⁶ tract in Latin dactylic hexameters, instead of a prose translation or dialogue, indicated an attempt at literary originality, but also made his task more labour intensive. In another way, Lucretius’ poem offered Romans an alternative identity, an Epicurean one; hence it is cast in the literary form of another text

¹⁰² Or Empedoclean poetry, as the case may be, see e.g. SEDLEY (1998), 44.

¹⁰³ SEDLEY (1998).

¹⁰⁴ SEDLEY (1998), 155-6.

¹⁰⁵ I will not wade into the *Quellenforschung* of the *DRN* but Sedley’s argument seems to me to be a useful starting point, SEDLEY (1998), Ch. 4-5. See also CLAY (2007).

¹⁰⁶ For Empedocles’ influence, see *Lucr.* 1.716-741; SEDLEY (1998), 11f (on Lucretius’ poetic technique). See also SEDLEY (2007).

which defined Roman identity (a text which itself drew very closely on a Greek model): Ennius' *Annales*, a poetic work which itself was central to 'Roman-ness' in Lucretius' time.¹⁰⁷

The claim that Lucretius was preoccupied with situating himself within a specific Latin literary pedigree, has given scholars some indication of the general aims of the poet in 're-creating for Latin readers the poetic genres of the Greeks'.¹⁰⁸ Though it was didactic in genre, KENNEY proposes that Lucretius' poem offers a 'personal testament of the poet' rather than an instruction manual of the Epicurean system as a whole.¹⁰⁹ Lucretius becomes, in WARREN's terms, a 'conduit and translator to Rome of Greek ideas'.¹¹⁰ Lucretius' didactic project was not simply one of instruction (compared with the translations of later eminent Latin authors like, for instance, Boethius) but a vehicle for novel poetic creation. He was a 'translator', not in the sense of simply rendering Greek philosophy into Latin in a pedagogical way, but rather, as expanding the expressive ability of Latin using a hybrid of lexical innovation and augmentation and an array of rhetorical and stylistic techniques deployed ingeniously to convey complex philosophical ideas from the Greek into Latin verse.¹¹¹

The opening words of Lucretius' narrator persona, addressed to his patron and friend G. Memmius, provide us with the best starting point in this section:¹¹²

*Nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta
difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse,
multa novis verbis praesertim cum sit agendum
propter egestatem linguae et rerum novitatem*

¹⁰⁷ Beyond mere formal similarities (epic genre, dactylic hexameter, archaising vocabulary), Ennius (in addition to Greek models such as Homer and Empedocles) served as key exemplars for Lucretius' poetic project. See e.g. GALE (2007), 61-4. See also LÉVI (2008) for an interesting discussion of Lucretius' allusion to, and re-interpretation of, Ennius in *Lucr.* 5.112-26 and its importance to Lucretius' philosophical project more generally and recently HARRISON (2016), 33-4.

¹⁰⁸ SEDLEY (1998), 31.

¹⁰⁹ KENNEY (2014), 2.

¹¹⁰ WARREN (2007), 19. See also SEDLEY (1999), 227.

¹¹¹ HINDS' (1987) article on Lucretius' use of *tnesis* in conveying the concept of *συμβεβηκός* is an illustrative example of the creativity of expression in Lucretius' poetic arsenal, which allowed him to convey Greek concepts effectively and cleverly for his readers' benefit, without necessarily resorting to lexical solutions like neology or semantic extension.

¹¹² Adapted from BAILEY (1947), *Lucr.* 1.136-45.

‘Nor did my mind deceive me as to how difficult it is to illuminate the obscure discoveries of the Greeks with Latin verse, especially since we must use many new words on account of the poverty of our language and the novelty of the subjects.’

The scheme of Lucretius’ project can be summarised as follows:

- 1) His task is seen as difficult but achievable;
- 2) To illuminate the ‘obscure discoveries’ of the Greek philosophers to his friend Memmius (and his Roman audience generally),¹¹³ he will need to deploy many new words;
- 3) This is because Latin is impoverished when it comes to a philosophical word-stock and the subjects that Lucretius wishes to convey in Latin are novel (presumably to Roman readers).

As to point 1, Lucretius can hardly be disputed on this assertion. Epicurean physics was a vastly complicated subject, difficult enough to express clearly in prose, let alone in Latin hexameters.¹¹⁴ SEDLEY writes: ‘Epicureanism, despite its (misplaced) reputation as an ordinary-language philosophy, was very nearly as jargon-ridden as Stoicism.’¹¹⁵

To proceed ahead to point 3, this is not as clear-cut and, as we will see in the following chapter (by the rhetoric of his dialogues’ prefaces at least) Cicero certainly did not agree with Lucretius that Latin was so badly impoverished. This enlivens a question regarding the nature of the *egestas* topos. Whether the socio-linguistic reality was one in which Latin authors expressed, or at least indirectly acknowledge, a sense of inferiority to the Greeks when

¹¹³ See MITSIS (1993), 119-28 (esp. 125f) for a discussion of the specific literary and rhetorical function Lucretius assigns to Memmius, not as an historical figure, but as a foil or ‘didactic addressee’ serving a specific purpose for his type of project (i.e. an ignorant and childish non-intellectual who constantly requires direction and education in the subtleties of Epicurean dogma).

¹¹⁴ BROWN (1997), 12. The importance of the metre to the expression of the concepts themselves cannot be overstated, see e.g. MINYARD (1978), 94: ‘In fact, [metre] causes words and expressions to be chosen or shaped primarily because of [their formal] qualities and not their analytical utility.’ See also (1978), 95.

¹¹⁵ SEDLEY (1999), 228.

discussing philosophy,¹¹⁶ or conversely, whether it was a rhetorical trope (especially in Lucretius, deployed as a foil to highlight his poetic prowess in overcoming such *egestas*) is a live issue, which I will touch on further below. However, it has been helpfully approached by TAYLOR (2020, 2-8) recently, who argues that, if there was this lexical *egestas* in Latin philosophical vocabulary, then this made it all the more important for Lucretius to choose the right expressions and expand the resources and potential of Latin. Yet this brings us to point 2, and the question posed early; namely, if such an *egestas* in Latin philosophical word-stock was, in fact, a rhetorical foil, then why would new words need to be coined at all? Lucretius readily admits that there is a causal link between points 2 and 3, but Cicero as we shall see, while accepting that point 2 is a requirement for writing about philosophy in Latin, would not concede that this was on account of an impoverishment in Latin compared with Greek.¹¹⁷ Again, this analysis proceeds on the basis that the authorial voice in Ciceronian prefaces (where we find much of his rhetorical bombast regarding translation, linguistic innovation, and related issues in Latin) is an accurate representation of Cicero's own personal views on the subject (a naive assumption). In any case, we can grant that Lucretius saw a clear chain of reasoning in deploying new words in Latin, for the sake of expressing Greek philosophy as best as he could to his audience. This was due to, according to him, the poverty of his mother tongue, which is only now faced with expressing these novel subjects of Epicurean philosophy in writing.¹¹⁸ Taking Lucretius' case as a whole, there may be no flaws in his logic but simply the component parts of his argument, which may invite further questioning.

¹¹⁶ See in particular FÖGEN (2000), 73.

¹¹⁷ See TAYLOR (2020), 8 who notes the difference of attitude here between Lucretius and Cicero: 'In his (nationalist) response to the supposed problem of *egestas linguae*, Cicero can thus be contrasted with Lucretius, who makes no attempt to deny the premiss that Latin is somehow lacking, and instead promises to rely on hard work and sleepless nights in order to find the right *dicta* and *carmen* for his task.' (1.140-5, on which, see pp. 11-14)

¹¹⁸ Cf. also Lucr. 5.336-8: *denique natura haec rerum ratioque repertast | nuper, et hanc primus cum primis ipse repertus | nunc ego sum in patrias qui possim vertere voces.*

Multa novis verbis: Examining Lucretian lexical innovation and augmentation

There is a distinction that must be made between lexical innovation and augmentation for the sake of poetry and of philosophy, a distinction blurred in the didactic genre of Lucretius' work. Collations of Lucretian poetic calques, compounds and derivatives have been the subject of insightful scholarship over the last century, particularly in PETERS (1926, 7-23), BAILEY (1947, 1.133-7), and more recently BENFERHAT (2014, on neologisms in philosophical contexts in particular)¹¹⁹ and TAYLOR (2020, 172-92).¹²⁰ TAYLOR's study is also valuable in understanding that, when faced with Epicurean technical terminology, lexical innovation or augmentation were not necessarily the first resort, rich and complex metaphors could also be deployed. For instance, we will see the elucidation of difficult terms like *homoeomeria* further below. An example is the noun phrase *animi iniectus* calquing a phrase by Epicurus: ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας. The use of *inicio* for ἐπιβάλλω adapts the Greek into Latin via a simple metaphor (in this case a military one)¹²¹ while simultaneously '(a) extending the meaning of that term beyond the narrow technical domain it occupies in Epicurus and (b) exploiting the metaphorical potential of the Latin term which he adopts' (TAYLOR (2020), 78-9). Using techniques like calques or loan-shifts was therefore only one aspect of Lucretius' practice of

¹¹⁹ There are flaws in BENFERHAT's methodology however, when it comes to identifying terms coined for the purposes of translating an original Greek word. Many of the Greek terms identified as the source of the listed neologism from Lucretius have no Greek text listed, thus coming down to educated guesses (e.g. Lucretius' *desipientia* is supposed to render ἀσοφία, which seems intuitive, but no evidence (either from the *Ep. ad Hdt.* or elsewhere) is proffered as to how ἀσοφία was the source of the translation, and the term does not appear in USENER (1977) at all among Epicurean terminology. Similarly, BENFERHAT's suggestion (2014, 598) that '*adhaero*' (*sic*; sc. *adhaereo*) was coined by Lucretius from the verb προσκολλάω is confusing given the term has no attestation in Epicurean texts and appears in Plato's *Phaedo* and *Laws* (LSJ s.v.), hardly source texts for the *DRN*. Yes, they do have (roughly) the same sense, but this is not evidence that Lucretius was translating that particular word into Latin for the first time and subsequently coining a new term.

¹²⁰ TAYLOR (2020), 173 makes the salient point that it is difficult to analyse lexical innovation (e.g. neologisms) in Lucretius' works since, 'in practical terms, it is often impossible to determine whether or not the first appearance of a word in extant texts is a neologism. To take the example of *innubilus* (3.21, a Lucretian ἄπαξ λεγόμενον), the fact that 3.18-22 is a close rendering of Homer, *Od.* 6.42-5 (the only Homeric passage where ἀννέφελος is found) may lead us to assume that Lucretius coined it for the purpose, but such an assumption, even if highly likely, cannot be proven.' See also especially BENFERHAT (2014), 597-8 who lists three main factors which make the study of neology in Lucretius difficult: 1) a reliance on the varying conjectures of editors; 2) Greek loanwords counted as novel Latin terms; and 3) our (lack of) knowledge of other Latin texts prior to and contemporaneous with Lucretius (except Cicero of course).

¹²¹ For the use of military metaphors in Lucretius more widely, see FOWLER (2002), 5-6, 7-13, 61, 92, 97, 117-19, 172; and TAYLOR (2020), 78-82, 88-96, 101, 180.

adapting Greek technical terminology. His use of periphrasis and double translation to convey Greek ideas was also a feature of his hexameters, as we shall see below in the context of *homoeomeria* (see also e.g. the *durissima* [...] *ponderibus solidis* to render *στερεότης* in Lucr. 4.87-88).¹²²

Instead of focusing on a complete list of compounds, derivatives or calques in Lucretius (many of which lack a Greek source term with which to compare), I will focus on Lucretius' philosophical terms used to convey the concepts of Epicureanism and atomism in Latin. Since Lucretius was composing his philosophy in hexameters, the ability to gloss from Greek words was limited (see n. 114 above). To find the Greek sources of Lucretian lexical innovations and augmentations, I follow two methods:

- a) Where earlier scholars have detected similarities between a passage in the *DRN* and text from the extant *Ep. ad Hdt.* (Diogenes Laertius Book 10) or some other Epicurean source, this strongly suggests Lucretius adapting Epicurus' terms into Latin verse.
- b) Using equivalent terms in Cicero.¹²³ Since there are only four Greek words directly glossed in Lucretius (all of which are loan-words),¹²⁴ the Greek evidence exists in Cicero exclusively. As only Cicero could cite the Greek term he was translating directly (given the formal flexibility of prose), we may construe from the nexus between the Ciceronian rendering and the Lucretian one which Greek term was under translation at the time.

¹²² A further example is Lucretius' *naturae species ratioque* for *φυσιολογία* (2.61). See also FOWLER (2002), 170 for a discussion of Lucretius' rendering of *στερεότης*. For periphrasis more broadly as a poetic technique in Lucretius, see DEROCHETTE (1929); FOWLER (2002), 351, 352, 388.

¹²³ For a detailed discussion and comparison of phrases used by Lucretius and Cicero, see REILEY (1909), 20-4; PETERS (1926).

¹²⁴ *crateres* (6.701), *harmonia* (3.100), *homoeomeria* (1.830), and *prester* (6.424).

*Lucretius' translations of Greek philosophical terms*¹²⁵

ἄθροισμα *glomeramen* (2.454, 2.686; 5.726) ‘an aggregation, mass’ (see *OLD* s.v.) from *glomerō* ‘to form into a ball’, with the deverbative *–men*, whose function is forming non-abstract substantives. Hence BAILEY’s (1947, 2.876) suggestion that Lucretius used the term to render Epicurus’ ἄθροισμα (LSJ s.v. II: an ‘assemblage of atoms’).¹²⁶ Lucretius’ use of the term varies from something molecular to something ‘round’ (e.g. in 1.360 and 5.726). There is no direct equivalent in Cicero.¹²⁷

ἄπειρία *infinitus* (1.616) (cf. Cicero’s *infinitio*, *Fin.* 1.21; *infinitas*, *N.D.* 1.73): A calque from the Greek, with the *in–* = ἄ privative, *finitio* ‘boundary, limit’ = πέρας ‘end, limit’ and the *–tus* / *–tio* = *–ία* (see e.g. *Ep. Hdt.* 1.45). As TAYLOR (2020, 187-8) discusses, Epicurus had used the adjective ἄπειρος in seven distinct contexts, two of which (regarding the number of worlds and infinite regression) have no equivalent in Lucretius’ *infinitus*, for the rest we find a close relationship between the Greek term and his Latin translation of it.¹²⁸

ἀποπαλμός *dissilio* (1.385, 291; 2.87, 106; 5.362): It is clear that Lucretius is adapting (in 2.87) a phenomenon described in Epicurus (*Ep. Hdt.* 44) as the effect of a certain cause, namely the springing apart of two atoms after a collision: ἢ τε στερεότης ἢ ὑπάρχουσα αὐταῖς κατὰ τὴν σύγκρουσιν (*confluxere*) τὸν ἀποπαλμὸν ποιεῖ (*dissilio*). What is of interest is that *dissilio* might not have been a distinctly novel or technical term in Lucretius,¹²⁹ but simply a quasi-poetic verb that had existed in the language (though we have no previous attestations surviving). It appears frequently in other authors antedating Lucretius (see *TLL* s.v.) predominantly among poets, with the exception of Classical usages in Vitruvius, Seneca,

¹²⁵ I have made reference to REILEY’s early work and TAYLOR’s recent work in this lexical analysis of Lucretius’ philosophical terminology adapted from originally Greek terms. There is also the helpful wordlists found in FOWLER (2002), 509-9. For Epicurean technical terminology generically see ARRIGHETTI (1960), 745-89 and USENER (1977).

¹²⁶ See USENER (1977), 18-19 for attestations in Epicurus and other sources.

¹²⁷ Although the form *glomerata* does appear in his translation of a section of the lost Aeschylus play the Προμηθεὺς Λυόμενος, see *Tusc.* 2.25.

¹²⁸ See also USENER (1977), 86-7.

¹²⁹ FOWLER (2002), 169 doubts its origin in Lucretius and suggests it is used rather for a play on words with *durissima primordia*.

and Pliny the Elder. However, in Epicurus, ἀποπαλμός (and ἀποπάλλω) seems to have been a purely technical term (see TAYLOR (2020, 189)). This is a common technique in Lucretius' philosophical language, the use of poetic or simply established terms that evoke a literary image rather than a neologism for the sake of new terminology (see below in terms like *imagines* for εἰδωλα or *primordia* for ἄτομος and σώματα). However, one could just as easily make the case for a Lucretian morphological calque here, with *dissilio* deriving from *salio* (see e.g. OLD s.v. *dissilio*), corresponding to παλμός (πάλλω); both terms, as an example, applying to the 'leaping' or 'tripping' upon hard surfaces, e.g. shields (Hom. *Il.* 645: ἐν ἄντυγι πάλτο and Flor. *Epit.* 3.10.13: *super ipsa Romani scuta salierunt*).¹³⁰ The coinage of *dissilio* would, therefore, not only be a morphologically precise rendering of the Greek technical term but a semantically precise one as well.

ἀπόρρους *emissus* (4.205) (cf. Cicero's *emissio*): BAILEY¹³¹ believes *emissus* translates ἀπόρρους (*Ep. Hdt.* 47: τῷ <τῷ> ἀπόρρῳ αὐτῶν μηθὲν ἀντικόπτειν ἢ ὀλίγα ἀντικόπτειν). The Loeb edition (following the USENER (1887/2010, 10) text) reads τῷ ἀπείρῳ (despite translating it as 'effluence') and LSJ do not cite ἀπόρρους (s.v. ἀπορροή) as attested in the *Ep. Hdt.* 47. Epicurus had mentioned ἀπόρροιαί a few lines earlier in *Ep. Hdt.* 46 but editors have not printed τῷ ἀπόρρῳ in 47. However, if we assume it is rightly τῷ ἀπείρῳ and Lucretius were translating from this section, as we have seen, he had recourse to using *infinitus* to render ἄπειρος rather than *emissus*, which would have been a complete mistranslation (uncharacteristic of Lucretius). The conclusion must be one of three possibilities: BAILEY's conjecture of τῷ ἀπόρρῳ instead of τῷ ἀπείρῳ is wrong, that the Loeb editor and LSJ are in error, or that Lucretius was simply not rendering this section from the *Ep. Hdt.* (perhaps rather adapting from an Empedocles fragment, e.g. fr. 89: πάντων ἀπορροαὶ ὅσσ' ἐγένοντο). Yet the similarities between Epicurus' words and Lucretius' *cum iaciuntur et emissum res nulla moratur* are too similar to ignore and incline me to rely on BAILEY's judgement. USENER (1887/2010, 10) gives us a hint at what might have occurred in the paradosis to cause the

¹³⁰ The militaristic overtones of the metaphor pair well with *conflixere*, rendering σύγκρουσιν — also a violent image derived from warfare. See FOWLER (2002), 169 who also points out *obvia* and *diversa* in the same passage with similar militaristic overtones. See also n. 121 above.

¹³¹ BAILEY (1947), 3.1205.

error. He writes: ‘hoc quomodo πολλοῖς καὶ ἀπείροις scriptor opponat’, suggesting the scribe worked backwards from the sentence a few lines later, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπείροις εὐθὺς ἀντικόπτειν τι, and interpolated τῷ ἀπείρῳ. Another approach is to work backwards from Lucretius’ *emissus* and read τῷ ἀπόρρῳ.

ἁρμονία *harmonia* (3.100; 3.118; 3.131; 4.1248) (cf. Cicero’s *harmonia Tusc.* 1.41): A direct transliteration of the Greek.¹³² BAILEY contends that many of Lucretius’ Greek loan-words where a Latin equivalent would have sufficed, indicates they were employed ‘almost from caprice’.¹³³ On the other hand, SEDLEY argues that the use of direct loan-words was a deliberate technique, ‘the creation of a Greek context tends, in Lucretius’ hands, to emphasise the remote and the exotic.’¹³⁴ *Harmonia* appears four times in Lucretius and we can infer that there was some thought put into the use of this loan-word, serving a specific role in the poem’s diction. What this role was appears to be a foil rather than a positively adopted Greek term describing, in this case, a reference to the soul as a condition of the body. Lucretius rejects the premise that the soul is a condition of the body (Lucr. 3.130-5) but deploys the musical metaphor used by the Greeks as a means of contrasting what had been understood as a condition of the body, with his argument that the soul is rather a part of the body itself. As TAYLOR (2020, 62) summarises: ‘Lucretius’ rejection of the term [*harmonia*], then, is made not on linguistic grounds (i.e. not on the grounds that the metaphor itself is inappropriate), but rather for reasons based in extralinguistic reality: there exists no psychic condition of the body (the harmonic theory is false)’.

ἄτομος, σώματα (σώματα πρῶτα), ἀρχαί, σπέρματα *materies* (1.171; 1.203 *passim*), *elementa* (3.244), *corpuscula* (2.153; 2.529; 4.199; 4.899; 6.1063), *principia* (1.198; 1.740 *passim*); *genitalia corpora* (1.167; 2.62; 2.548), *corpora prima* (1.61; 1.171 *passim*), *semina* (1.59; 1.176; *passim*), *primordia* (1.210; 1.483 *passim*): Lucretius refrained from using the loan-word *atomos/atomus* in Latin as apparently Lucilius had done, perhaps as a form of

¹³² See SEDLEY (1999), 237.

¹³³ BAILEY (1947), 1.139.

¹³⁴ SEDLEY (1999), 239.

mockery of the pretentious use of Greek philosophical vocabulary.¹³⁵ Cicero uses it but generally in the context of a gloss (i.e. where he glosses it with a Latin phrase such as *corpusculum* (*Academica* 1.6) or *corpora individua* (*Fin.* 1.17)). We find *atomos* only in the *capitula* or subject headings which were transmitted by Lucretian manuscripts within the text and also recorded in indices preceding Books 4-5. BUTTERFIELD has hypothesised¹³⁶ that initially the *capitula* were marginal notes meant to provide references for the content of the poem. They were then copied into indices and added in the text and it was in this form that they appeared in the archetype. Some of the material in the *capitula*, written in Greek and appearing in Book 1-2 were drawn from Greek philosophical sources and BUTTERFIELD suggests that these sections demonstrate a level of acquaintance with the sources of the *DRN* not found in the Latin *capitula*. In any case, I agree with BUTTERFIELD that words appearing in the *capitula* do not consistently reflect Lucretian vocabulary and these terms can be assumed to be from later annotator and un-Lucretian.¹³⁷

SEDLEY characterises the translations *materies*, *principia*, *primordia*, and *semina* as reflecting the role of atoms as ‘primitive starting points from which other entities are built up’.¹³⁸ The terms *materies* or *materia* were, in Latin, at least similar to the Greek concept of ὕλη, found in Aristotle and defined as: ‘that which is not in itself a *what?* nor a *how much?* nor any other thing from which, it is said, define being’ (ἧ καθ’ αὐτὴν μήτε τὶ μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὠρίσται τὸ ὄν).¹³⁹ The term ὕλη was used in a technical sense by Aristotle (though not in this sense in Epicurus as far as we can tell),¹⁴⁰ but derived from the established concept of ‘forest, woodland, wood cut down, firewood, fuel, stuff, material, matter, sediment, mud’ etc. (see LSJ s.v.). BEEKES notes the origin of the term going back to

¹³⁵ See REINHARDT (2005), 156.

¹³⁶ BUTTERFIELD (2013), Ch. 3.

¹³⁷ BUTTERFIELD (2013), 185: ‘It would be a mistaken inference, however, to conclude that because much of the language of the *capitula* is Lucretian it is therefore most likely to be from Lucretius’ hand.’ See also Fischer (1924); the critical annotations on the *capitula* in the Teubner edition of e.g. Book One (MARTIN (1957/1992), 1); and discussion in DEUFERT (2017), 178 n. 519.

¹³⁸ SEDLEY (1999), 230.

¹³⁹ *Metaph.* 1029a20; see also *Phys.* 192a32-33. For *materies* in verse as opposed to *materia*, see LEUMANN (1977), 285.

¹⁴⁰ See SOLMSEN (1977), 269 who notes its reference in Epicurus is to nourishment of the stars, not to a technical philosophical term. See Epicurus, *Ad Pythoclem* 93 and 112.

the Proto-Indo-European (P.I.E.) **suol-h₂* from root **SUEL-* ‘to smoulder’ or from **h₁eus-l-h₂*, in turn from **h₁eus-* ‘to burn’.¹⁴¹

Materia (derived from *mater*)¹⁴² has the denotations of ‘wood as building material, timber, woody part of a tree, wood branch or growth, mortar, any substance of which a physical object is made or composed, material, nutriment, food, etc.’¹⁴³, (see *OLD* s.v., though whether Lucretius was alive to the etymology of ὕλη at the time is unlikely). The notion of atoms as ‘building blocks’ is a commonly held one today but it is difficult to argue that the Epicureans saw atoms in the same way, i.e. as the ‘stuff’ of the Universe. As SOLMSEN argues: ‘The movements [of the atoms] in turn produce combinations with other atoms and cause the formation of more complex entities [...] Aristotle’s *hyle* has no such capacities’, and goes on to say: ‘to designate them [the atoms] as *materies* and treat them as such is to do them gross injustice.’¹⁴⁴ Similarly, REILEY (1909, 38) suggests that, ‘upon the simple solidity of the atom depends the whole physical system of Epicurus. It is for this reason that Epicurus adopted ἄτομος as his special and particular term’, but later argues that Lucretius’ *materies* could simply be a contrast with the notion of the ‘void’. Phrases such as *materiai concilium* (1.516-17) are translations of Epicurus’ σύγκρισις (see REILEY (1909), 61).

Primordia, as BAILEY has pointed out, is Lucretius’ favoured translation of ἄτομος (72 instances) with *principiorum* and *principiis* or the adjective *principialis* (2.423) taking its place in certain grammatical cases for metrical purposes. *Principia* may in fact correspond to Epicurus’ ἀρχαί whereas *primordia* appears to have no real equivalent in Epicurus’ Greek.

In *corpuscula*, REILEY (1909, 54-5) suggests that its rareness in Lucretius could be attributable to the use of it by an early Latin interpreter of Epicureanism, Amafinius, who was regarded as the ‘proprietor of the term’.¹⁴⁵ The term has no correspondent in Epicurus’ Greek.

¹⁴¹ BEEKES (2010), 2.1529-30; also 1.486 s.v.

¹⁴² See ERNOUT-MEILLET, 390 s.v. *materies*; MALTBY (1991), 357 (citing Paulus Diaconus and Isidore); VAAN (2008), 367; WALDE-HOFMANN, 2.50-1.

¹⁴³ Cf. Calcidius’ use of the sense translation *silva* and *silvester* for ὕλη in his commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus*. See also MORESCHINI (2003), 716 n. 10.

¹⁴⁴ SOLMSEN (1977), 273.

¹⁴⁵ REILEY (1909), 55. See also Cic. *Ac.* 6.

The term *elementa* has been supposed to correspond to Democritus' στοιχεῖα, which REILEY (1909, 56-8) suggests is used explicitly as a translation of the 'atom' concept in 3.244, elsewhere as 'letters' in the poem.

εἰδωλα *imagines* (3.430; 4.98; 4.101, 4.237; 4.326; 4.571-2; 6.420), *simulacra* (1.123; 1.687 and *passim*), (cf. Cicero's *imagines* *Fin.* 1.21; *spectra*, *Fam.* 15.16; *similia*, *N.D.* 1.105; *fluentes visiones*, *N.D.* 1.109). Lucretius uses *imagines* and *simulacra* 'according to the demands of the metre'.¹⁴⁶ (See also discussion below on *Lucr.* 4.67-74 and the *Ep. Hdt.* 48.)

ἐλάχιστον *minimum* (2.244) (cf. Cicero's *minimum* *Fat.* 22.). This term translates the Epicurean notion of 'smaller than the smallest' or 'less of the least' (LSJ s.v. ἐλάχιστος, III). FOWLER (2002, 320) renders it as a 'minimal unit of space'. Lucretius touches on the concept in 1.599 *minimae partes* referring to the atom and its motion. Cicero's gloss of this in *Fat.* is instructive: *minimo — id appellat ἐλάχιστον* referring to the *declinatio* of the atom (see s.v. κλίσις below).

κλίσις *clinamen* (2.292) (cf. Cicero's *declinatio* (*Fin.* 1.19; *Fat.* 22.1, 22.5, 23.10, 23.12, 47.8, 48.5, 48.8), *inclinatio* (*N.D.* 1.73) and *clinatus* (*Arat.* 34.12)). Lucretius' well-known *clinamen* or 'swerve' is formed using his preferred third declension neuter suffix *-men* and appears as a ᾗπαξ λεγόμενον.¹⁴⁷ Instead of **declinamen*, Lucretius' word is coined to reflect the form (and sound) of κλίσις. Why Cicero's terms survived into posterity and Lucretius' did not is speculative but seems explicable largely on account of the unusual poetic form of the

¹⁴⁶ REILEY (1909), 17; see also KENNEY (2014), 134 for a discussion of the *imagines* (εἰδωλα) and their function in Lucretius.

¹⁴⁷ Nouns in *-men* or *-mentum* were often used by Lucretius in coining new terms (39 forms in total with 290 repetitions, see SWANSON (1962), 2. BAILEY (1947), 134 lists the following ᾗπαξ λεγόμενα in *-men*: *adaugmen* (6.614), *documen* (6.392), *frustramen* (4.817), *lateramen* (6.233), *vexamen* (5.340), to which can be added *augmen* (3.268) and *duramen* (6.530). Innovations in *-men* first attested in Lucretius and used afterwards include *conamen* (6.836), *glomeramen* (2.454), *molimen* (4.902), *momen* (2.632), *velamen* (4.585), and *vexamen* (5.340). See also LEUMANN (1977), 370-1.

latter's, who was bound by the contingencies of Latin hexameter and avoided *-tio* abstract substantives accordingly.¹⁴⁸

ὁμοιομέρεια *homoeomeria* (1.830) (cf. Cicero's phrase: *particulas, similes inter se, minutas*, *Luc.* 118). REILEY¹⁴⁹ notes that this term 'proves too much for the powers of Lucretius and he frankly admits it, [1.830-4]. The honors are decidedly with Cicero. He shuns altogether the sesquipedale verbum and turns the doctrine neatly with *particulas, similes inter se, minutas*.' As we will see, this is to miss the point of Lucretius' poetic technique in these lines. A better explanation may be that of SEDLEY's; namely that Lucretius used **ὁμοιομέρεια** as a way to draw attention to the strangeness of the Greek word, interrupting the hexameter and pointedly singling it out in the Latin as 'unwelcome' (see discussion below).¹⁵⁰

πρόληψις ἔννοια *notities* (5.182; 5.1047) (cf. Cicero's *notitia* (*Fin.* 5.59; *Top.* 31; *Leg.* 1.24), *notio* (*Fin.* 3.33; *Top.* 27, 83), *praesensio notioque* (*N.D.* 2.45), *anticipatio, praenotio, informatio* (*Luc.* 30; *N.D.* 1.43, 44-5)). Lucretius uses the poetic form *notities*, Cicero glosses in the *Lucullus* (21) with *notitia*. REILEY makes the case: 'These terms and phrases seem to render both **πρόληψις** and **ἔννοια** with no practical distinction. Etymologically, however, **πρόληψις** may be recognised in *praenotio, praesensio, anticipatio*. **ἔννοια** appears in *informatio, conformatio, notitia*.'¹⁵¹ REID observes that the Stoics distinguished between **πρόληψις** and **ἔννοια** but that Stoic philosophers never attempted to point out which were always defined as **πρόληψις** or **ἔννοια**.¹⁵² That Lucretius and Cicero conflated the two terms, or used them interchangeably, might be a reflection of the current usage of the terms among their contemporary philosophical schools (see e.g. *Luc.* 30).¹⁵³

¹⁴⁸ For the productivity of *-tio* in post-Ciceronian prose authors for rhythmical reasons (e.g. in composing well-structured *clausulae*), see HOFMANN-SZANTYR, 719-20.

¹⁴⁹ REILEY (1909), 23. See also KENNEY (2014), 92.

¹⁵⁰ SEDLEY (1999), 237. See also FARRELL (2001), 48-50; WARDY (1988), 126.

¹⁵¹ REILEY (1909), 19. See also DYSON (2009), 156-7 for a survey of Latin equivalents to **πρόληψις** and **ἔννοια** in Cicero and Seneca. See also Calcidius' unusual choice of *recordatio* in translating **ἔννοια** (*Tim.* 47a).

¹⁵² REID (1885), 213.

¹⁵³ See Chapter One, n. 164.

συμβεβηκός *coniunctum* (1.449, 451). This lexical augmentation has been helpfully discussed recently in TAYLOR (2020, 184-5) and I will not repeat the analysis here, except to note that the use of the pre-existing passive participle to render one of Epicurus' technical categories of atomic properties (**σύμπτωμα** and **συμβεβηκός**) is a close translation both semantically and morphologically, and as SEDLEY (1988, 308) and TAYLOR suggest (2020, 184 n. 41), this precise resemblance between the terms suggests Lucretius is translating Epicurus' more narrow usage of the term in *Ep. Hdt.* 40. Hinds (1987, 450) notes that the sense of *coniunctum* is that of an 'inseparable property'.¹⁵⁴ TAYLOR (2020, 185) also notes that Lucretius' use of *coniunctum*, while conflating and simplifying the distinction of **σύμπτωμα** and **συμβεβηκός**, appears in both technical (an essential atomic property) and non-technical senses, the latter mainly in Book Three (3.136, 159, 348, 349, 424, 556, 559, 579) where Lucretius discusses the conjunction of the rational and irrational parts of the soul, and the connection of body and soul.

συμπάθεια *consentio/consensus* (2.717, 915; 3.154, 170) (cf. also Cic. *N.D.* 3.28). Epicurus uses the Greek term (*Ep. Hdt.* 63-4) to describe the correspondence of motions between the soul and body that allows sensation through the whole corporal aggregation, it thus takes on a specific technical sense as opposed to the more general 'fellow-feeling, sympathy' as found in Aristotle, Diodorus Siculus, and Cicero's letters (see LSJ s.v.)). TAYLOR (2020, 188) suggests we should accept this as a genuine Lucretian (semantic) calque, despite the prior existence of the Latin word: 'Although the word *consensus* certainly existed before Lucretius wrote *DRN*, the sense "unity of sensation" or "co-affection" (rather than straightforward "agreement") is very likely a Lucretian loan-shift based on the Greek noun.'

συνίσταμαι *consisto/consto* (1.635; 6.455, *passim*). The lexical augmentation of this established *con-* verb is deployed to render the technical sense of Epicurus' relation between the compound body and its constituent parts (atoms or smaller compounds), found throughout various Epicurean fragments. TAYLOR (2020, 186-7) makes the point that we might infer

¹⁵⁴ See also HINDS' (1987, 450-1) suggestion of a form of didactic word-play in this section of Lucretius; namely the inseparability of the verb *segregari* in *Lucr.* 1.452 and the notion of 'inseparability' in the Epicurean concept of the *coniunctum*.

Lucretius' translation of Epicurus further by the syntactic Grecism in 6.455 (*facere* + infinitive = *ποιέω* + infinitive¹⁵⁵), although this could also be simply a function of metrical considerations (the construction is found disproportionately more often in Lucretius' poetry compared with any other Classical author) and literary imitation of Greek philosophical models (such as in Aristotle's numerous descriptions of the natural causes).

σφαῖρα *globus* (5.69; 5.472; 5.665) (cf. Cicero's *globus*, *N.D.* 2.47). The use of *globus* as a technical equivalent of **σφαῖρα** as applied to the heavenly bodies is first observed here in Lucretius regarding the Moon (5.69) and various other stars (including the Sun, 5.472) (see *TLL* s.v. I1ba and ζ (6.2.2051.64 and 6.2.2052.28): 'de terra et caeli corporibus [...] de luna [...] de variis sideribus'). Its use before this was either in reference to general shapes of solid bodies (e.g. Plautus *Poen.* 481) or specifically culinary in sense, as in Cato *Agr.* 79: *globos sic facito* and Varro *L.* 5.107: *a globo farina dilatato, item in oleo cocti, dicti globi* or (more rarely) a military sense, e.g. Cato *Mil. frg.* 11. Elsewhere, Cicero uses the term about the earth (*Rep.* 6.15), stars (*Rep.* 6.16), planetary bodies (*Rep.* 6.17) and earth-bound meteorites (*Div.* 1.97). The translation process here could therefore be described as simple synonymy, whereby the physical description of objects (previously in the context of cooking) and their forms as a *globus* is transferred to the natural world, specifically astronomy and the shapes of heavenly bodies. It is not until later that the term is applied to human organs, such as the eye (Calcidius *Comm.* 238, for example).¹⁵⁶

σφαιροειδής *globosum* (2.469) (cf. Cicero's *globosum*, *Timaeus*, 6). A derivative of *globus* and a direct calque of the Greek term with **σφαίρο-** corresponding to *globo-* (see entry above) and **-ειδής** 'like, connected to, resembling' to *-osus*.

¹⁵⁵ For the Greek causative construction, see further GIBSON (2002), 27-39; specifically in Aristotle's works see 31. See also VINCENT (2016), 299-300 for the phenomenon in Lucretius and other Latin authors.

¹⁵⁶ Calcidius also later introduces the derivative *globeus* as applied to the motion of the Universe (*mundus*), probably derived from the new semantic sense of *globus* introduced through Lucretius and Cicero.

ὑπέρεισις *obsto* (2.88). A common Latin verb meaning ‘to stand opposite’ takes the place of the technical sense of Epicurus’ abstract neologism, meaning something like ‘resistance’ (see e.g. *Ep. ad Hdt.* 44),¹⁵⁷ though LSJ define it as ‘supporting’ referring to a quality of the void.

The above catalogue of terms provides only a window into the ways in which Lucretius translated (or avoided using) Greek to explicate Epicurean terms. SEDLEY’s article on this area is required reading for a fuller account of the methods of Lucretius’ translations, but some points of interest can be highlighted here. Take the example of *εἶδωλα*, which Lucretius conveys using a range of words that, as SEDLEY notes, ‘collectively capture the idea, already present in the Greek, of a painted or sculpted image preserving the surface features of its subject.’¹⁵⁸ As we shall see in Cicero, the notion of using a range of different terms or phrases to convey the same concept, almost like a hermeneutic process of defining a foreign philosophical term in the Latin language, is also a cornerstone of Lucretian philosophy, even more so given the metrical constraints of his literary medium.

Lucretius’ use of Greek loan-words has been much discussed and there is no need here to recapitulate BAILEY’s and SEDLEY’s labours in cataloguing and examining the occurrences of Greek loan-words in Lucretius. Rather, I intend to use this previous scholarship to support the broader argument advanced in this thesis in demonstrating 1) the lack of a ‘faithful’ translation of Greek philosophical ideas, and 2) the transformation into a Latin context through selected Latin authors’ own creative methods. In Lucretius’ case, there are 111 individual common Greek nouns used within the *DRN*,¹⁵⁹ 29 Greek place names, 36 Greek personal names,¹⁶⁰ and 15 Greek common and proper adjectives.¹⁶¹ The deployment of Greek words varied dependent upon the context within the *DRN* and functioned primarily as a poetic device. The use of Greek was not necessarily a symptom of any *egestas* in Lucretius’ vocabulary (for which his remedy was to use the types of lexical innovations or

¹⁵⁷ FOWLER (2002), 171-2 also suggests the Greek equivalents *ὑπερείδω* and *ἀντερείδω* (from USENER (1977), s.vv.) and remarks: ‘It makes a difference to the tone that the Latin verb has a transferred usage in everyday speech; nothing “stands in their way”.’

¹⁵⁸ SEDLEY (1999), 231.

¹⁵⁹ SWANSON (1962), 14.

¹⁶⁰ SWANSON (1962), 16.

¹⁶¹ SWANSON (1962), 26.

augmentations), but instead, the use of Greek was, as previously noted, a way to draw attention to the strangeness of Greek within the Latin hexameter. SEDLEY argues that Lucretius' use of Greek only occurs when he is usually, 'quite simply trying to make us think of Greece'.¹⁶² The point of Lucretius' strategic use of Greek loan-words is to emphasise the gulf between the unfamiliarity of Epicurus' language, the Greek medium, and the more familiar Latin culture, with which Lucretius' audience is positioned. In contrasting the barriers between Greek and Latin, Lucretius seeks to bring the strangeness of Epicurean philosophy into a new home, carving out areas of the Latin language to allow for these new ideas to be taken up and read via a new literary vessel: Latin hexameter poetry.

Films and atoms: Lucretian translation in action

In Book 4.67-74, one finds a close paraphrase of Epicurus' *Ep. Hdt.* 48 in the discussion of sense perception, in the manner of Democritus' vision of emanating idols (εἰδώλα), minuscule and without physical bodies, but with form.

Epicurus (Usener text with emendation):

Ep. Hdt. 47-8:

ὅθεν καὶ τάχῃ ἀνυπέρβλητα ἔχει, πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα πρὸς τῷ <τῷ> ἀπορρῷ [Usener: ἀπείρῳ]
αὐτῶν μὴθὲν ἀντικόπτειν ἢ ὀλίγα ἀντικόπτειν [...]

Ep. Hdt. 48:

πρὸς τε τούτοις, ὅτι ἡ γένεσις τῶν εἰδώλων ἅμα νοήματι συμβαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ῥεῦσις ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦ ἐπιπολῆς συνεχῆς, οὐκ ἐπίδηλος τῇ μειώσει διὰ τὴν ἀνταναπλήρωσιν, σώζουσα τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ στερεμνίου θέσιν καὶ τάξιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, εἰ καὶ ἐνίοτε συγχεομένη ὑπάρχει, καὶ συστάσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ὀξείαι διὰ τὸ μὴ δεῖν κατὰ βάθος τὸ συμπλήρωμα γίνεσθαι

¹⁶² SEDLEY (1999), 238. Contrast BAILEY's interpretation, which asserts that Lucretius had used Greek loan-words gratuitously in many cases, and miscellaneously for when there was no Latin equivalent. I disagree with such a view and would suggest SEDLEY's interpretation to be the better approach.

Lucretius (Bailey text):

4.204-5:

*quid quae sunt igitur iam prima fronte parata,
cum iaciuntur et emissum res nulla moratur?*
[...]

4.67-74:

*praesertim cum sint in summis corpora rebus
multa minuta, iaci quae possint ordine eodem
quo fuerint et formai servare figuram,
et multo citius, quanto minus indupediri
pauca queunt et quae sunt prima fronte locata.
nam certe iacere ac largiri multa videmus,
non solum ex alto penitusque, ut diximus ante,
verum de summis ipsum quoque saepe colorem*

In rendering the notion of ‘films’ as images projected from solid objects (and perceived by our minds), Lucretius begins by translating the *ῥεῦσις ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦ ἐπιπολῆς* or the ‘continuous streaming from the surface of bodies’ with *sint in summis corpora rebus multa minuta*, | *iaci quae possint ordine eodem*. The notion of particles ‘flowing’ (*ῥεῦσις*) is replaced with a ‘throwing’ or ‘casting off’ (*iaci*) from the surface of objects. Epicurus then elaborates on how objects appear not to diminish despite the continual flow of particles from their surface: οὐκ ἐπίδηλος τῇ μειώσει διὰ τὴν ἀνταναπλήρωσιν, σῶζουσα τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ στερεμνίου θέσιν καὶ τάξιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἐπὶ πολλὸν χρόνον. The film preserves (σῶζουσα) ‘for a long time’ (ἐπὶ πολλὸν χρόνον) the original position and arrangement (θέσιν καὶ τάξιν) of the atoms in the solid body (ἐπὶ τοῦ στερεμνίου [...] τῶν ἀτόμων). Lucretius captures the preservation aspect in two ways: by saying these particles are cast off of the solid body in the ‘same order’ they were in originally (*ordine eodem*), and by saying that they preserve the figure of its shape (*formai servare figuram*). For now, it is noteworthy that Epicurus’ neologism ἀνταναπλήρωσις ‘a filling up again, replacement’ is not translated. Epicurus then

explains sometimes, films are also constituted very rapidly (συστάσεις [...] ὀξέλαι) in the atmosphere (περιέχοντι), perhaps such as mirages in hot air, because such images are not based on any bodily form (i.e. they have no content within them, τὸ μὴ δεῖν κατὰ βάθος τὸ συμπλήρωμα γίνεσθαι). In Lucretius' version, he recapitulates the earlier section of Epicurus' explanation by using the archaising lexical innovation: *indupedio* (> *impedio*) as an equivalent for Epicurus' ἀντικόπτειν. He describes the atoms' motion from the surface of the solid body, which are cast off more quickly (*multo citius*) since they are able to be less 'impeded' or 'entangled' (*quanto minus indupediri pauca queunt*). Finally, because they are positioned first at the front on the surface of the object (*et quae sunt prima fronte locata*), they can also be cast off rapidly. Where the new concept of ἀνταναπλήρωσις is found in Epicurus regarding this outflowing film, where one particle replaces another when the first flows off from the surface of an object, Lucretius introduces this term *indupedio* with the archaic privative prefix *indu-* as a variant to *in-* (see *OLD* s.v. *indu-*). The term is not strictly a neologism but simply an archaising form of *impedio*, the most likely reason for which was metrical considerations. It might more accurately be labelled a lexical augmentation, now adding to *impedio* the technical meaning of an atomic entanglement or collision. Yet its strangeness echoes the abstract in ἀνταναπλήρωσις, though this is not its analogue, and instead of the atoms filling up the places of those that are cast off, Lucretius explains why atoms can be cast off much more quickly, on account of their ability to avoid this entanglement or impediment (ἀντικόπτειν, *indupedio*). This simultaneously picks up Epicurus' earlier notion that the atoms in the thin film emanating from the solid body have unsurpassable speeds (τάχῃ ἀνυπέρβλητα — we might say today something like the 'speed of light'). This is due to a uniform movement with nothing or very few things hindering the flow of atoms by colliding with them (πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα πρὸς <τῷ> τῷ ἀπορρῶ αὐτῶν μηθὲν ἀντικόπτειν ἢ ὀλίγα ἀντικόπτειν). Here we see Lucretius varying his translation in his own creative ways, highlighting some key elements of Epicurus' doctrine but adding his own judgements and new arrangements as well,¹⁶³ all woven into Latin hexameters with great poetic skill.

¹⁶³ Cf. Cic. *Fin.* 1.6 in the context of translating Greek texts: *eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus*.

Egestas as a reality or trope in Lucretius

Recall FÖGEN's observation of *egestas* as being perhaps a foil for Lucretius against which he could demonstrate his linguistic and poetic prowess in conveying the 'obscure' discoveries of the Greeks (i.e. unknown to most Roman readers) in Latin verse. Following FARRELL, I agree with this characterisation and that there is a case to be made that Lucretius used the topos of the Latin *egestas* in relation to Greek to his advantage: '[I]t is clear that the "poverty" of Lucretius' Latin does not prevent him from matching and perhaps even surpassing the master's [sc. Epicurus'] exploitation of perceived parallelisms between philosophical truth and linguistic forms.'¹⁶⁴ Yet FÖGEN goes one step further and argues that, even if this was a stereotype, it presented a problem for Lucretius (and for Cicero). However, he did not necessarily need to create new words or equivalents for Greek originals, but could easily express a Greek technical concept in a few lines of verse instead of coining something new entirely. This underscores FÖGEN's argument that no single language is hamstrung by its circumstances and can capably express the same ideas as any other language, simply using different methods (linguistic relativism). As discussed above, I am not wholly convinced by this conclusion and below I examine the same section FÖGEN considered in Lucretius (1.830-33):

De rerum natura (Bailey's text)

*Nunc et Anaxagorae scrutemur homoeomerian
quam Grai memorant nec nostra dicere lingua
concedit nobis patrii sermonis egestas,
sed tamen ipsam rem facilest exponere*

Translation

Now we may examine Anaxagoras' *homoeomeria*,
as the Greeks say, though our language does not
allow us on account of the poverty of our mother-
tongue, nevertheless the theory itself is
straightforward to explain.

It seems the word *homoeomeria* means rather the *theory* of Anaxagoras, as opposed to a concrete use of a technical term applied to 'seeds', i.e. as in Aristotle (*Ph.* 203a19) and later

¹⁶⁴ FARRELL (2001), 50. See also FARRELL (2001), 51: 'We tend to take Lucretius' disclaimer about "poverty" too literally, to interpret it simplistically, and to believe in it implicitly; but we should not. For that matter, we should be careful of assuming too easily that poverty does in fact connote inadequacy.'

doxographers.¹⁶⁵ It is in some ways then unnecessary for Lucretius to find a *verbum ex verbo* equivalent for the umbrella term, and instead takes the liberty to illustrate the theory in a vivid way using Latin poetic metaphors (Lucr. 1.834f):

***De rerum natura* (Bailey's text)**

*principio, rerum quam dicit homoeomerian,
ossa videlicet e paucillis atque minutis
ossibus hic et de paucillis atque minutis
visceribus viscus gigni sanguenque creari
sanguinis inter se multis coeuntibus guttis
ex aurique putat micis consistere posse
aurum et de terris terram concreescere parvis,
ignibus ex ignis, umorem umoribus esse,
cetera consimili fingit ratione putatque.
nec tamen esse ulla de parte in rebus inane
concedit neque corporibus finem esse secandis.*

Translation

First, then, when he spoke of the *homoeomeria* of things, he thinks bones come from the from smallest and minute bones, and all flesh generated from the smallest and minute flesh, and blood having been created out of coagulated drops, he thinks gold able to be placed upon grains of gold, And earth compacted out of tiny pieces of earth, Fire from fires, and liquid to be from liquids, and he imagines and supposes all other things by similar reasoning. Nor, however, does he concede any void in things, nor any limit to dividing bodies.

The poetic exposition of Anaxagoras' theory is not an equivalent linguistic practice of introducing a new philosophical term into Latin based upon a Greek original. The didactic process Lucretius engages in here is not evidence that a philosophical term in Greek is equally capable of being expressed in Latin. Rather, it is a vivid illustration of Lucretius calling attention to (even lampooning) the strangeness of Anaxagoras' theory by his contrasting use of metaphors and sound with basic but striking Latin vocabulary (*ossa*, *viscera*, *sanguis*, *auris*) with the Greek word marking its entrance by clashing with the metre and the euphony of the Latin verse.¹⁶⁶ Certainly a theory or system of philosophy may be demonstrated, and in this case Lucretius makes repetitive use of physical exempla to demonstrate Anaxagoras' physical theory, yet this is not a translation of *homoeomeria* but almost an extensional description of it. FARRELL (2001, 49-51) argues that the passage, 'invokes the motif of *patrii*

¹⁶⁵ See BAILEY (1947), 745; also GIUSSANI (1923), 108-10; BROWN (1988), 174-5; PIAZZI (2005), 230-6.

¹⁶⁶ See also WILLS (1996), 208 who describes this passage as 'the most extended sequence of polyptoton extant in Latin.'

sermonis egestas, and [...] the deployment of this phrase in effect predicts the rhetorical stratagem that the poet will use to debunk the specious reasoning concealed behind Anaxagoras' hifalutin philosophical terminology.' However, another interpretation of what Lucretius is doing here is not so much a smirk to the audience with the *egestas* trope as some type of fiction¹⁶⁷ but rather a shrug and acceptance that Latin does have a kind of poverty (possessing no such technical or abstract equivalent for Anaxagoras' term), yet this is no hindrance to conceiving of the theory itself and certainly does not mean it cannot be fleshed out with the help of exempla and poetic imagery. In other words, the 'bettering' of his Greek models, as FARRELL describes it, is not a function of a Latin *egestas* in technical vocabulary being illusory, but rather a function of Lucretius' extraordinary poetic skill.

As the survey of lexical innovations and augmentations in Lucretius above demonstrates, there are often numerous instances where Lucretius' Latin equivalent for a Greek term bears a significantly variant connotation. This can be sometimes inaccurate, or rather distortionary (i.e. broader in meaning), in conveying the original sense of the Greek (e.g. *materies* or *primordia* for *ἄτομος*). That Lucretius was capable of describing Anaxagoras' ideas in hexameters using examples and poetic techniques is not strong evidence per se for linguistic relativism, i.e. that Latin was equally equipped with a lexicon to describe the same terms and concepts as in the Greek. It is rather an example of the literary and rhetorical powers of the poet on full display, in both explicating (using expressive metaphors) and undermining the concept in question (by using the jarring introduction of the Greek loan-word in the Latin verse to augment the theory's strangeness). The fact that Lucretius had used his own Latin terms elsewhere to translate Epicurean atomic theory but added new (technical) meanings to established Latin words, highlights the inherent difficulty of simple transference from one concept (expressed in a source language) to another (expressed in the target language.)

¹⁶⁷ Contrast the excessive use of unusual loans in e.g. Lucr. 4.1160-70 is more accurately a wink to the audience as a way of satirising the snobbery of Lucretius' time; see BENFERHAT (2014), 597.

Conclusions

This analysis of Lucretius is intended to serve as a preliminary case study of Latin authors in the first century in translating and transforming Greek knowledge. In particular, the focus has been on Lucretius' approach to translation and his use of lexical innovations and augmentations in explicating Epicureanism to a Latin readership. In this exercise, Lucretius had two tensions which were constantly operating behind his poetic compositions: The first was the tension between Lucretius as poet and Lucretius as Epicurean. The first could freely adapt his Greek source material according to the demands of his literary medium, expressing himself in a range of different and sometimes inconsistent ways. The second was an adherent of a specific philosophical school that contained a set of particular doctrines not so readily adaptable in a loose and inconsistent manner. This leads to the second tension; namely the demands of the didactic poetic genre in which he was composing. On the one hand, Lucretius needed to be as creative and expressive in his literary composition as he could, to capture his readers' interest and to leave a work of artistic excellence. On the other, he was required to explicate the, often technical, doctrines of Epicurus and his followers to an uninitiated audience in Latin in a clear and precise manner. So, in the comparison between a section from Book Two of the *DRN*, which found an analogue in Epicurus' *Letter to Herodotus*, we examined the interweaving of Epicurus' technical descriptions of atoms carefully arranged into Latin hexameters. Where Epicurus resorted to lexical innovation, Lucretius did too but in different contexts and, of course, where the demands of the metre allowed it. So *indupedio* becomes both a novel archaising verbal innovation and also a semantic shift (simply being derived from the more established *impedio*), now referring to atomic entanglement rather than just an 'impediment' in general. Lucretius would also add his own explanations and exegetical asides to enhance the clarity of concepts under discussion, for example the introduction of the awnings in a theatre analogy just after the discussion of the reflection of colour from the surfaces of solid objects (Lucr. 4.75-89). In the range of lexical innovations and augmentations collected above, we find that multiple Latin equivalents of Greek technical terms are often deployed to capture a range of senses of the original term but also to allow flexibility in metrical considerations. So εἰδωλα becomes *imagines* or *simulacra*, depending

on the line of verse. In other cases, the variety of terms for the same concept in the Greek gave Lucretius grounds for *variatio* in Latin; for example ἄτομος, σώματα (σώματα πρῶτα), ἀρχαί, and σπέρματα became *materies*, *elementa*, *corpuscula*, *principia*, *genitalia corpora*, *corpora prima*, *semina*, or *primordia*. Interestingly, Lucretius never outright adopts *atomos* in his vocabulary of atoms. This leads to another poetic technique favoured by Lucretius: the use of loan-words. In general, importing Greek was seen as stylistically (and culturally) inappropriate. So if lexical innovations and augmentations contributed to Lucretius' ability to convey Greek technical concepts in a new Latin context, loan-words served a significant poetic function, used to evoke a given place and time. The description of Anaxagoras' theory of *homoeomeria* (that atoms necessarily possessed the same properties of the substance they constituted) had no analogue in Latin, but Lucretius uses the Greek word itself to highlight the oddity of the theory. This also singles out the strange sound of the word, both to undermine it and to exaggerate its obscurity by a range of vivid metaphors in Latin. Similarly, the descriptions of the strange and exotic lands of Greece in Lucretius' poetry engendered a kind of poetic vocabulary that was equally strange and exotic, to transport the reader between cultures. Lucretius was, in many ways, directly and unflinchingly positioning himself at the interface between the intellectual traditions of Greece and Rome. As seen in the next chapter, he was complemented by the efforts of his contemporary, Cicero, who would not just assume the role of a translator or mediator between Greek wisdom and Latin readers, but would strive to create his own technical terminology in Latin.

1. CHAPTER ONE

CICERO: THE BEGINNINGS OF A LATIN PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY

‘How much [Cicero] has omitted, added, and altered in [his translations] to express the idioms of another language with his own, this is not the time to say’ (quanta in illis praetermiserit, quanta addiderit, quanta mutaverit, ut proprietates alterius linguae suis proprietatibus explicaret non est huius temporis dicere.)

— St. Jerome on Cicero, *Ep.* 57.5

1.1. CICERO'S INTELLECTUAL MILIEU

The lack of evidence of surviving substantive philosophical works in Latin before the first century BC might give us pause in over-crediting Cicero's achievements between 46 and 44 BC. Even conceding the existence of a fully fledged 'Roman philosophy' before Cicero's time, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of his intellectual output in the final years of Caesar's dictatorship.¹ His philosophical pursuits of this period were important not simply because of his political successes, but as BISHOP observes, rather because of their role as a collective response to his political failures at the time.² Of the speculative works that might have existed in the field of Roman philosophy before Cicero, Brutus' *On Virtue* can be cited, in addition to those of Lucretius discussed earlier. Cicero himself discusses the existence of Epicurean writers in Latin such as Amafinius and Rabirius in the *Academica* (*Ac.*) 5 and the *Tusculanae Disputationes* (*Tusc.*) 4.6-7.³ MORFORD provides some general comments about second century public personages such as Scipio Aemilianus and Gaius Laelius and the so-called Scipionic Circle,⁴ but in general, the availability of homegrown Latin philosophy in Rome before Cicero appears to have been minimal.⁵ MORFORD admits: 'While there were Romans who fancied themselves as philosophers in the first part of the first century BCE, Cicero was the first to define and systematise *philosophia togata*'.⁶ This might have been because, to a large extent, Roman intellectuals minded towards philosophical inquiry were comfortable reading and conversing in Greek and saw little need for Latin replication, as we know Varro strongly believed (*Ac.* 4-5).

As discussed in the Introduction, the arrival of the Embassy of Greek philosophers in 155 BC seems to have been a flashpoint in the Romans' interactions and interest in philosophy in general. Contemporaneous with Cicero, there were other geopolitical developments

¹ For a discussion on the volume of work Cicero undertook in this period, see recently WYNNE (2019), 24-6.

² BISHOP (2018), 5. The death of his daughter Tullia in February 45 BC was another factor that contributed to his philosophising.

³ See also *Fin.* 1.17-26 and also the *Tusc.* 2.7: *est enim quoddam genus eorum qui se philosophos appellari volunt, quorum dicuntur esse Latini sane multi libri*. See also WYNNE (2019), 16 n. 39.

⁴ See also Cicero's discussion of them in the *Rep.* and *Amic.*, discussed in ZETZEL (1972). More recently ZETZEL (2015), 61.

⁵ MORFORD (2002), 1-4.

⁶ MORFORD (2002), 5.

contributing to a morphing intellectual environment at Rome: the Republic's successes in the First Mithradatic War (88 BC) and the subsequent sacking of Athens by Sulla two years later are obvious examples. In the period between the arrival of the Embassy and the sacking of Athens, Roman intellectuals possessed access to the teachings of famous Greek Academic philosophers like Philo of Larissa (158-83 BC), pupil of Carneades, and Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 130-69 BC), a teacher of Cicero. The influx of Greek learning in this period was important and, by Cicero's time, the oral debates of various philosophy schools were both intense and vigorous as evinced from his personal correspondence with Atticus and Quintus (Cicero's brother), as well as other philosophically minded friends at the time.⁷ In Cicero's philosophy we find an original thinker and scholar who both synthesised Greek thinkers into his own literary works as well as usefully summarised and analysed many of their key principles for a Latin-speaking audience.⁸ With later twentieth-century scholars⁹ increasingly moving past the damning criticisms of late nineteenth-century German figures such as MOMMSEN and USENER¹⁰ the issue of the 'utility' or importance of studying Cicero's philosophical project in the 40s BC on its own terms has largely fallen away.¹¹

It is facile to attempt to pigeonhole Cicero's particular brand of philosophy and doing so is ultimately reductionist. His eclecticism often demonstrates sympathies for multiple schools of philosophy, particularly Academic scepticism and Stoicism. So in the dialogue *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* (*Fin.*), he disputes the character of Cato (the Younger)'s ethical beliefs (rooted in Stoicism) that Virtue alone is sufficient for mankind's happiness. In the

⁷ For instance, Varro, L. Papirius Paetus, Mescinius Rufus, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, M. Fabius Gallus, among others. See POWELL (1995a), 32; McCONNELL (2014), 161f.

⁸ See recently WYNNE (2019), 1 n. 2 for a refreshing opinion on this topic. Also BARAZ (2012), 119.

⁹ HARTUNG (1970), DAVIES (1971), BEARD (1986), OISERMAN (1988), POWELL (1995a), MOATTI (1997), REINHARDT (2003), GILDENHARD (2007), LEFÈVRE (2008), BRITTAIN (2006), HENDERSON (2006), WHITE (2015), and WYNNE (2019) are all excellent examples of this new wave of Ciceronian scholarship providing us studious examinations of his philosophical works for their own sake.

¹⁰ MOMMSEN (1886), 613; USENER (1887), lxxv. For the influence of earlier nineteenth-century German scholars like Wilhelm Drumann on Mommsen's opinions of Cicero, see e.g. WILAMOWITZ (1921/1998), 69. See also CANFORA (1988).

¹¹ See e.g. ALTMAN (2016), xiv: 'Cicero's star is currently on the rise, and a noticeable backlash against a blanket dismissal of his *philosophica*, treated as so many quarries in which to practice *Quellenforschung* throughout the nineteenth-century, and indeed well beyond, is currently underway.'

series of lectures in the *Tusc.*,¹² he seems to agree with such conclusions, warning against the passions, immoderation, and the evasion of pain, and instead encouraging a highly Stoic outlook on facing up to grief and sorrow. Sometimes these rebuttals are presented not as disagreements of principle but rather as attempts to resolve the argument entirely. So Cicero in *Fin.* 4.7 makes the point to the character of Marcus Porcius Cato that Stoic doctrines ‘may be true’ and certainly important, but they are not ‘treated as they should be, they are far too petty’ (*non ita tractantur ut debent, sed aliquanto minutius*). The implication here is that Stoics were good thinkers but (with the exception of Cato) poor rhetoricians, a point laboured in his *Paradoxa Stoicorum* (*Parad.*) and in obiter dicta in the *Tusc.*¹³ The apparent discrepancy in views between the *Fin.* and *Tusc.* might be explained away as simply Cicero taking on Stoic tenets and renovating them with his own well-honed Academic rhetoric.¹⁴ This further adds to the point that asking what Cicero’s views were per se is perhaps not as fruitful as asking how he expressed differing views and analysing the language (rhetorical or otherwise) with which he did so.¹⁵

In the *Ac.* and *Lucullus* (*Luc.*), Cicero’s Academic sceptic persona¹⁶ in the dialogue (which includes dogmatists as well, such as the characters of Varro and Lucullus) approaches epistemological matters with a high degree of suspension of judgement on absolute truth and falsehood, and his discussion of what could truly be known or comprehended by the mind. In one aspect of his thought, however, we find he was consistent, his disdain for — or at least disbelief in — the principles expounded by Epicureanism (for example the unequal critique of Epicureanism’s approach to virtue in *Fin.* 1.25, 2.44-57, and 2.69). As we shall see, his use of rhetorical and linguistic devices to cleverly paint his Epicurean characters in the dialogues (e.g. Velleius’ bombastic exposition in *De Natura Deorum* (*N.D.*)) as presumptuous and even

¹² There is an anonymous friend that Cicero invents for transitions between topics, but the overall structure of the *Tusc.* is largely one-sided and non-dialogical.

¹³ See e.g. the character of ‘M’ in *Tusc.* 3.10. See also SMITH (2018), 117 and 344 n. 46: ‘Elsewhere Cicero tries to show that in Stoic arguments there are actually tortuous strings of syllogisms, with each conclusion becoming the primary premise of the next syllogism, on and on monotonously to an eventual counterintuitive end.’

¹⁴ Note OISERMAN (1988), 155.

¹⁵ See e.g. BRITAIN’S (2016, 17). See also ALTMAN (2016), 159f.

¹⁶ See WYNNE (2019), 38-9 for a discussion of Cicero the character in the *Ac.* As a ‘radical sceptic’ in the vein of Clitomachus compared with the historical Cicero, who might have been less radical, in the vein of Philo. For the issue of the reliability of Cicero as a narrator in the later treatises in general, see (2019), 276.

flippant when it came to understanding the subtleties of, for instance, Stoic or Academic ethics or cosmology, are abundant. In his later *De Divinatione* (*Div.*) and *De Fato* (*Fat.*) dialogues (45-4 BC), Cicero is more sceptical of the Stoics' faith in the power of divination and fate, of Divine 'Providence' and its workings in the material world, largely influenced by Sceptics such as Carneades. Yet in the *Div.*, Cicero has his Stoic-influenced brother Quintus accuse him of hypocrisy by pointing out that Cicero himself had taken an early interest in prognostication and astrological divination in his large-scale Latin translation of the famous poetic works in the *Aratea*. Such an interest in divination was not, to be sure, incompatible with being a sceptic, as seen in the character based on Gaius Aurelius Cotta in Cicero's *N.D.* treatise. That Cicero took an interest in such matters of divination and soothsaying during his adolescence on a philosophical or pedagogical basis is also a separate question.¹⁷

This is a core issue with analysis of Ciceronian philosophy in general. There were many reasons for his interest in the subject, and his proclamations of the benefits of philosophy in the *Hortensius* or its status as the 'medicine of the soul' (*est profecto animi medicina, philosophia*) in the *Tusc.*, demonstrate that the study of philosophy had a deeper importance to him, personally and intellectually, than simply instruction. This accords with the broader views of, for example, FREDE (1999), who noted the shifting landscape of ancient philosophy in the mid second-century BC. For instance, the (physical) disappearance of the Athenian schools, particularly after Sulla's sack of Athens, which made it harder for intellectuals on both sides of the Adriatic to identify along institutional lines. As HATZIMICHALI (2011, 2) points out: 'It was no longer the norm to frequent a particular location (such as the gymnasia of the Lyceum or the Academy), to follow the lectures of a recognised scholar, or to engage in person in related debates. Philosophical identity towards the end of the Hellenistic period became a matter of personal intellectual outlook'. There were also linguistic stakes at play for Cicero's philosophical project, as outlined in the Introduction: there was the task of creating a new Latin vocabulary to discuss, debate, and re-interpret Greek concepts. In this task was also the inseparable issue of which types of texts were appropriate for the conveyance of these ideas into Roman intellectual society. In mirroring the

¹⁷ See BISHOP (2018), 44.

dialectic formats of Plato,¹⁸ Cicero was not solely interested in summarising and teaching his fellow Romans, but also exhibiting his own literary and rhetorical prowess.¹⁹ He wrote his own dialogues based in varying degrees upon the Greek models of Plato, Aristotle, and Heraclides, with his own characters in their settings. In using these literary forms, he was able to express his rhetorical skills, philosophical training, and literary abilities into concentrated doses of remarkable quality (given the speed and simultaneity at which the works were composed). Under literary abilities, one might also include his skills as a translator²⁰ since, within his dialogues, he frequently turned his attention to translate the poetry of Homer, Aeschylus, Euripides, or Sophocles into Latin verse, or excerpts from Plato (e.g. from the *Apology* in the *Tusc.*). Alongside these translations he often quotes older Latin poetic authorities (Ennius, Pacuvius, or Accius mostly) and even includes parts of his own poetic efforts (for instance, the large excerpt of the *Consulatus suus* in the *Div.*).²¹ All of this suggests that Cicero did not occupy himself solely with the philosophical controversies of his time, nor confine himself to re-capitulating those controversies for the benefit of Roman readers just because he could. Rather, he was placing himself within a literary tradition, which included the Greek and Latin masters — and which would now include him. It is not my intention to go further into these arguments, nor the socio-political motivations of Cicero's philosophical endeavours so late in life.²² The point of interest for this thesis is the translations from Greek, specifically his translations of Greek philosophical terminology, and how the cumulative efforts of these translations impacted upon Latin philosophical vocabulary. This aspect is particularly vital because it lies at the intersection between all of those skills outlined above

¹⁸ Note, beyond Platonic dialectics, Cicero's later dialogues also employed a more focused dialectic technique in which all sides of a philosophical issue were represented (e.g. epistemology) and then disposed of rationally by Cicero himself at the end of the dialogue. This was perhaps an echo of Aristotelian and Heraclidian models; see further WYNNE (2019), 29-35. For studies in Cicero's interest in the dialogue form, see generally LEVINE (1958); ZOLL (1962); LEEMAN (1963), 198-218; STEEL (2005); SCHOFIELD (2009); BARAZ (2012); BRITTAIN (2016), esp. at 16 n. 8.

¹⁹ See e.g. BRINGMANN (1971), 100.

²⁰ Though as we shall see, not necessarily a 'translator' in the modern conception of the term, see e.g. McELDUFF (2013), 187.

²¹ I follow WARDLE (2006), 146 on reading the title of the poem as *Consulatus suus* rather than the traditionally recorded *De Consulatu suo* (Non. 298.300; Lact. *Inst.* 3.17.14). See also JOCELYN (1984), 40.

²² These have been well discussed for over a century, most recently in McELDUFF (2013), 97-8. See also BISHOP (2018), 29-34.

which Cicero appeared to exhibit by turning to the writing of philosophy in Latin; namely, his rhetorical, philosophical, and literary abilities. It was not sufficient for Cicero, if faced with a Greek technical term without a Latin analogue, to simply borrow the Greek word and import it directly into his native language. This was unacceptable in most cases and certainly his own patriotic rhetoric in his prefaces, combined with his general linguistic purism,²³ forced him to consider other alternatives. In the consideration of these alternatives, Cicero was required to develop a critical knowledge of the philosophical concepts themselves as well as to introduce new terms or meanings in ways which were palatable to his audience. This required certain literary sensibilities. For the same reason, he had to apply his rhetorical adeptness to reduce the unfamiliarity of new vocabulary and to ease his readers into accepting new terms so as to grasp the Greek concepts as fully as possible, hence Cicero's autonymic observations in *de Oratore* (*de Orat.* 3.177): 'we form and coin [words] like soft wax to our own will' (*sicut mollissimam ceram ad nostrum arbitrium formamus et fingimus*). The sense of *arbitrium* can also include 'judgement' or 'opinion', and so the creation of new words is not simply an arbitrary or ad hoc process, but one delimited by matters of taste, judgement, and intellectual authority.²⁴ This issue of lexical innovation is, therefore, an important component of comprehending Cicero's philosophical project as a whole and Roman adaptation of Greek cultural artefacts generally — in this case, intellectual artefacts.²⁵

²³ For linguistic and literary purism in Cicero, see discussion in POWELL (1995), 289; MÜLLER (2001) 322-34; ALBRECHT (2003), 134-6.

²⁴ For Cicero's theory of language more broadly see DUGAN (2005), 75-171 and 268-9 regarding the fluidity of speech.

²⁵ See WHITE (2015), 6-7.

1.2. LEXICAL INNOVATION AND TRANSLATION PRACTICE

The study of Ciceronian translation from Greek sources has yielded an analysis of the intellectual project Cicero sought to build and the various choices he made in explicating the concepts of Greek philosophy into his native Latin.²⁶ The task of surveying Cicero's contributions to, or more accurately, his creation of,²⁷ a Latin philosophical vocabulary is therefore alleviated somewhat by relying on this existing scholarship. Yet perhaps more directly relevant to the current investigation is a detailed analysis of Cicero's use of linguistic markers he left behind in his prose works; that is, the frequent use of glosses or, as outlined in the Introduction, 'overt innovation'.²⁸ GLUCKER's study of this aspect of Ciceronian philosophy provided a useful collation²⁹ of Cicero's statements from his philosophical works in which he directly glosses a Greek word. It also provides a useful starting point in the analysis that follows, although the task of collecting data of Latin technical terms in Cicero's philosophy I have conducted separately, with specific emphasis on those terms that are lexical innovations, augmentations, or loan-words. As discussed in the Introduction, the core principle of analysis which guides this chapter will be the existence of a Latin term in Cicero's philosophical works which a) has an overtly signalled Greek equivalent, and b) is first-attested in that sense or form in Cicero. These two criteria encompass a range of stylistic and morphological phenomena that has been touched upon in the Introduction, e.g. loan-words (including loan-blends), semantic or loan-shifts, neology (calques, compounds and blending, affixation etc.). It also creates a more focused field of inquiry as opposed to examining broader questions of Ciceronian style within his philosophical works. However, this also leaves out a handful of lexical innovations where Cicero is not providing overt signals of translating a Greek term but we could, given the context, infer some original Greek

²⁶ See LEVY (1992), 91-2 for a brief overview of the most important literature on this subject. A list of important studies is provided here by chronology, although it is not to be taken as exhaustive: HOCHDANZ (1880); THIAUCOURT (1885); SALTZMANN (1885); NÄGELBACH (1888), 31-46; ATZERT (1908); FISCHER (1914); LISCU (1930); GAFFIOT (1934); HUMBERT (1940); DES PLACES (1942); WIDMANN (1968); POWELL (1995); FÖGEN (2000); GLUCKER (2012), WHITE (2015); HOENIG (2018, 38-101); and WYNNE (2019).

²⁷ See e.g. SEDLEY (1998), 36.

²⁸ RENOUF and BAUER (2000), 232f.

²⁹ GLUCKER (2012), 58-95.

behind the term. For instance, in *Fin.* 3.21 where Cicero discusses the concept of ‘appropriation’ (*conciliatio*), BOYS-STONES makes the observation that this translates the term *οἰκέλωσις*,³⁰ a reasonable deduction, given the context, but we have no overt indication of this from Cicero and so the Latin term here is not included in the analysis.

An outline of the main kinds of translation methods Cicero deployed in rendering Greek terms into Latin is a useful starting point for the analysis that follows, I adopt the general categories as outlined in NEWMARK,³¹ and other modern linguistic studies:

- a) Phonological translation³² (includes transliteration, transcription or ‘transference’,³³ e.g. when Cicero uses *dogmata* in the *Fin.* 2.105 with no Latin equivalent) and Naturalisation (i.e. loan-blends).³⁴
- b) Calques (i.e. lexical innovation, morphological calques); and
- c) Synonymy (i.e. lexical augmentation, loan-shifts or semantic calques and sense translations, discussed below).

More expansively, NEWMARK discussed a range of techniques available to translators,³⁵ which I expand upon here from WHITE’s study. Not all of these methods are applicable to examples from Cicero’s philosophical works but those that are provide useful classifications for some of his methods:

³⁰ BOYS-STONES (2014), 304 n. 14.

³¹ These condense the taxonomy of NEWMARK (1988, 103), also used in relation to Cicero in WHITE (2015), 33-6.

³² CATFORD (1965), 56: ‘translation in which the SL [source language] of a text is replaced by equivalent TL [target language] phonology.’

³³ CATFORD (1965), 48: ‘the implantation of SL meanings into the TL text’. HARVEY (2000/2003), 361 refers to it as ‘transcription’ but this also includes practices such as the glossing of loan-words and other contextual markers; see also SHUTTLEWORTH AND COWIE (2014), 179.

³⁴ NEWMARK (1988), 82: ‘adapting a term from a SL first to the normal pronunciation, then to the normal morphology of the TL.’

³⁵ NEWMARK (1988, 83-91).

Functional equivalent: The use of a culture-neutral word which generalises the original, sometimes with a new specific term.

Example: Cicero's translation of *Ti.* 41d rendering the specific metaphor of the Greek 'mixing-bowl' (κρατήρ) with the abstract verbal substantive *temperatio*.

Descriptive equivalent: When the meaning of a specific term is explained with several words, this is similar to paraphrase (see below). Compare with **paraphrase** which includes the process of double translation (the use of two similar terms to translate a single Greek).

Example: *Fin.* 1.17 where Cicero uses the Greek *atomos* and explains it with *atomos quas appellat, id est corpora individua*³⁶ *propter soliditatem censet in infinitio inani [...]ferri*.³⁷

Componential analysis: The comparison of the original term with a word in the target language, which has a similar meaning but no obvious one-to-one equivalent by demonstrating first their common and then their differing sense components.³⁸ This encompasses loan-shifts or other forms of lexical augmentation.

Example: In *Div.* 1.125 where Cicero translates *είμαρμένην* with *fatum*, originally a term meaning 'prophecy' or 'divine utterance': *fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci είμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat*.³⁹

³⁶ Here it appears Cicero uses the term as an adjective with *corpora* but elsewhere uses it as a noun, *Luc.* 55: *ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni affirmat; N.D.* 3.12.29: *ne individuum quidem, nec quod dirimi distrahere non possit*. See also REINHARDT (2005), 155 for a discussion of different ways in which Cicero renders *ἄτομος*.

³⁷ See GLUCKER (2012), 57 for more examples.

³⁸ NEWMARK (1988), 114.

³⁹ Cf. also Cicero's other innovation of *confatalis* (*Fat.* 30). He does not give the Greek equivalent however it has been suggested that *συνειμαρμένον* was the original term, however the suggested Greek equivalent does not occur in the Stoa (LSJ: s.v. *συνείμαρται*: 'has been determined by fate,' Aristid. *Or.* 24 (44).56; *συνειμαρμένα jointly determined by fate*, Plut. 2.569f, cf. Lyd. *Mens.* 4.81); see also MEIJER (2007), 225 n. 1154.

Modulation: when the translation reproduces the message of the original text in the target language in conformity with the current norms of the language (i.e. *consuetudo Latina*), since the original and the new term may appear dissimilar in terms of perspective. This is evident in sections from *Fin.* e.g. 1.4, 3.15, 3.35-40.⁴⁰ NEWMARK (1988, 89) notes the example of translating a double negative into a positive, but there are also other forms of modulation such as:

- Abstract for concrete (e.g. *temperatio* for κρατήρ);
- Passive for active or vice versa (e.g. *corporatus* for σῶμα ἔχων);
- Change of symbols, e.g. *architectus* (equivalent to a loan-blend).⁴¹

Recognised translation: when the translator usually uses the official or culturally accepted translation of any institutional term.⁴²

Example: *Timaeus* 38: *reliquorum autem, quos Graeci δαίμονας appellant, nostri opinor lares, si modo hoc recte conversum videri potest*, ‘Lares’ being the established Latin social conception of household gods, which does not exactly correspond with δαίμονες, an equally established Greek social conception of personal spirits.

Compensation: it occurs when loss of meaning in one part of a sentence is compensated in another part.

Example: *Timaeus* 7 (Ti. 29a) we find: *sic ergo generatus ad id est effectus quod ratione sapientiaque comprehenditur atque aeternitate inmutabili continetur* for οὕτω δὴ γεγενημένος πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτὸν καὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχον

⁴⁰ See e.g. GLUCKER (2012), 53-4.

⁴¹ See also KELLY (1979), 133 for various kinds of modulation examples.

⁴² Consider *honestum* for καλόν, in the Stoic sense of the highest ‘Good’, and *utilitas* for συμφέρον, in the sense of ‘expedient’, used in the *Off.* The terms could be argued as recognised translations, though neither are ‘official’ or ‘institutional’. Nor are they true ‘innovations’ or ‘augmentations’, but capture Roman virtues equivalent to (though not *verbum ex verbo*) the Greek originals, readily understood by Roman readers.

δεδημιούργηται. The Greek idiom *κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχον* is omitted in the Latin but is compensated for by the use of adjective + noun addition *aeternitate inmutabili continetur*.

Paraphrase: in this procedure the meaning of the original term is explained. The explanation is more constrained than that of **descriptive equivalent** (pleonasm etc.). As we shall see, this is a frequent tool of Cicero's translations with multiple examples throughout his *Timaeus*. In this category I also include 'double translation', i.e. the use of two Latin terms to render a single Greek one, for instance *Tim.* 17 where Cicero uses the nouns *consumptio* and *senio* to render *φθίσις*. Sometimes we also find a double translation using a substantive + noun phrase, e.g. *Div.* 2.124: *convenientia et coniunctio naturae, quam vocant συμπάθειαν*. It is important to keep in mind that, in many of these double translations, Cicero (and later authors) often included a lexical innovation so as to make the new term less obtrusive or unintelligible to the reader (i.e. deployed in conjunction with a more established term).

Couplets: it occurs when the translator combines two different procedures. See for example *Fin.* 3.17: 'However, acts of cognition (*rerum cognitiones*), which it is permitted to call them 'comprehensiones' or 'perceptiones' or — if these words are not pleasing or intelligible — *καταλήψεις*.'⁴³ Here Cicero combines the techniques of calquing (*comprehensio*), synonymy (*perceptiones*), and simple transference (*κατάληψις*) in the context of a gloss.

Notes, additions, glosses: additional information in a translation, dependent on the requirement of the translator's readership, as opposed to the original's. This is a common mechanism by which Cicero introduces new technical terms in his philosophical treatises.

⁴³ *Fin.* 3.17: *quam vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, καταλήψεις appellemus licet*; cf. Boethius' use of *cognitio* to translate directly Aristotle's *γνώμη* without a gloss (Boet. *Top.* 1.106b32). Compare also the use of *quasi* in *Timaeus* 47 introducing a new diminutive form of *cuneus* 'wedge' which makes the introduction of the new term less jarring for his readers 'as if little pegs': *crebris quasi cuneolis inliquefactis unum efficiebant ex omnibus corpus*.

Regarding lexical innovation or augmentation specifically, I adopt GRAEDLER's⁴⁴ four processes for rendering what is termed a 'culture-specific concept', or for our purposes, what we can label a 'technical' term or usage:

- a) Coining a new term;
- b) Explaining the meaning of the original term (in lieu of directly translating it);
- c) Preserving the original term intact (loan); or
- d) Opting for a word in the target language that seems similar to or has the same 'relevance' as the original term.⁴⁵

KAIMIO observed that Cicero does not ignore the use of loan-words or loan-blends but prefers even outright neologisms to either.⁴⁶ Cicero's practices (and statements in his prefaces) that distortion of the Latin usage was not permitted suggest, according to JONES, that 'word-for-word translation was not thought necessary or desirable'.⁴⁷ It is true in this sense that Cicero was not solely interested in a didactic agenda but neither did he want to repeat what was already known to those well versed in Greek,⁴⁸ and where he felt unable to provide a satisfactory equivalent *verbum ex verbo* he preferred to use Latin phrases to convey the Greek sense.⁴⁹ Cicero's lexical praxis here might be compared to SCHOEFIELD's interpretation of Zeno's lexical innovation. SCHOEFIELD characterised the Stoic founding father's use of novel vocabulary as 'the exploitation and redirection of the resources of ordinary language' rather

⁴⁴ GRAEDLER (2010).

⁴⁵ See also HARTUNG (1970, 20-3) who outlines five options open to Cicero in rendering Stoic technical terms, adapted largely from Cicero himself (*Fin.* 3.15); he could use a: Greek term as such, Greek loan-word in a Latinised form with Latin characters, Latin word which is an exact counterpart of the Greek term and well-known in this sense, Latin word which is transferred from another area of meaning (see e.g. *Fin.* 1.13), or a new Latin word entirely (i.e. a neologism). See also OKSALA (1953), POWELL (1995), 288-97; 11-12; FÖGEN (2000), 93-7; ROCHETTE (2005), 290-1.

⁴⁶ KAIMIO (1979), 310 referring to HARTUNG's taxonomy outlined above.

⁴⁷ JONES (1959), 27. See also Aulus Gellius 1.10.4 (quoting Caesar's *De Analogia*): *ut tamquam scopulum, sic fugias inauditum atque insolens verbum*.

⁴⁸ Unlike e.g. Varro, see *Ac.* 4-5 and see discussion below. Although note GLUCKER (2012), 48f and 51: 'I suggest that Cicero's remarks about the Greek terms he translated into Latin were intended mainly for such erudite readers as Brutus, Balbus and Varro (and, indeed, Atticus himself).'

⁴⁹ See e.g. ATZERT (1908), 12.

than mere ‘verbal invention’, for the purposes of explicating a complex system of ethics.⁵⁰ Neither Zeno nor Cicero shunned novelty, however, where appropriate (*dum modo essent idonea* as Cicero wrote in the *de Orat.* 1.155), but in Cicero’s case, novelty was balanced by rhetorical cushioning (as we shall see in the *Timaeus*) and an acute awareness of stylistics and the expectations of a Roman audience.

1.3. A HERMENEUTIC ANALYSIS OF CICERO’S PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM GREEK

A useful analytical tool to examine Ciceronian translation is through the lens of hermeneutics; that is, interpretation as a philosophical issue. HABERMAS argued that hermeneutic understanding is inevitably ‘prepossessed by the context within which the understanding subject has initially acquired his interpretative schemes’.⁵¹ WARNKE expands upon this point, using the example of ‘translation’ in general as a hermeneutic process that prioritises the target language, and the interpretative resources it contains, expanding it to express what is expressed in the source language.⁵² This expansion, in the current case study of Cicero’s philosophical translations, has been seen to extend along two axes: lexical ‘innovation’ and ‘augmentation’. Interpretative frameworks, especially in respect of ‘texts’, are relational under hermeneutic analysis⁵³ and, to apply HABERMAS’ point in the context of Cicero, one observes in many cases Cicero’s interpretation of Greek philosophical terms involves an approach not dissimilar to that of the Hermeneutic Circle; that is, his interpretation of a given Greek philosophical school (Stoics, Academics, etc.) is informed by his understanding of the individual terms as they relate to the concepts themselves, as well as the stylistic and cultural system of the target language. This means understanding the concept and expressing it in Latin, through a range of techniques that not only capture the technical sense of a given term,

⁵⁰ SCHOEFIELD (2002), 427.

⁵¹ HABERMAS (1980), 183.

⁵² WARNKE (2019), 243; cf. KELLY’s (1979, 148) discussion of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinker George Campbell’s comments on translation in the context of the Gospels: ‘The exact import of many of the words and combinations of words made use of in the [source] language will never be perfectly comprehended by one who is totally unacquainted with the history of their [i.e. the culture of the source language’s] religion, law, polity, arts, manners, and customs.’

⁵³ TAYLOR (1985), 18.

but his conceptualisation as a whole. His uses of translation techniques such as periphrasis, pleonasm, double translation, loan-shifts, and other methods, examined in more detail below, provide interpretative tools of understanding that allow him to conceive of a Greek notion in Latin, leaning heavily upon the pre-existing resources of its language. Where the burden becomes too great for the interpretation, Cicero will resort to a lexical innovation (or augmentation),⁵⁴ but frequently this phenomenon is applied within a certain hermeneutic, as we shall see, for metatextual reasons. I will explore selected examples of Cicero's interpretative method in action to discover what they can tell us about his approach to rendering Greek technical terms into Latin in mid-first century BC.

A Ciceronian translation 'praxis'?

Cicero's experience in not simply translating Greek texts⁵⁵ but even thinking in Greek⁵⁶ gave him a unique perspective when it came to creating his philosophical project. He separated himself from the practice of formal or linguistic equivalence of Greek words and thought not only by style, but also by his critical decisions in choosing his translation techniques.⁵⁷ In the *Fin.* (1.6), Cicero boasts that he is not just playing the part of a middleman (*interpres*) between Greek and Latin, nor directly translating from Greek (*neque sint conversa de Graecis*) but rather, using his own judgement and adding new arrangements of style. He expanded and experimented to provide Latin with a lexical arsenal to keep up with, and even counter, the pervasiveness of Greek philosophical terms at the time.⁵⁸ An oft-cited example of Cicero expressing an attitude towards translation comes from the *de Orat.*, where he (through the character of L. Licinius Crassus) recounts the experience of translating into Latin Greek speeches of the 'most eminent orators':

⁵⁴ Cf. HARTUNG (1970), 184-5.

⁵⁵ See e.g. his translations of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* as a 21-year old (now lost; see e.g. ALFONSI (1961-4), 7-18) his poetic adaptations of the *Aratea*, and his version of Plato's *Protagoras* (also lost) (see also LEEMAN AND PINKER (1981), 260).

⁵⁶ Cf. his bilingual compositions in both Greek and Latin in, e.g., *Att.* 9.4.

⁵⁷ See McELDUFF (2013), 109.

⁵⁸ See further PUELMA (1980), 137-78; ROBINSON (1997), 185-6; DYCK (2003), 287-8.

By reading these [works] I became aware that, in rendering into Latin what I had read in Greek, I found myself using not only the best words but even quite familiar ones, and even coining by analogy some words, which would be novel to us, provided only they were appropriate.⁵⁹

As with many of Cicero's direct or indirect statements like this, we should not take this at face value: Cicero's/Crassus' admission that his lexical innovation practice consisted of both lexical augmentation and neology is important, but also perhaps inconsistent. FÖGEN (2000, 105) interprets this section as Crassus' allowing the introduction of neologisms from Greek sources through carefully adapting them to the Latin linguistic system ('durch sorgfältig an das System der Zielsprache angepaßte Neologismen'). If we assume it is also Cicero's view, then how does his condoning of neology fit with his criticisms of, for example, Zeno and the Stoic school's 'poor' rhetorical skills, unappealing to listeners because, among other problems, their penchant for coining new terms whilst discarding ones approved by past usage (*nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata*) was yet another symptom of their pitiable style (*Fin.* 4.7).⁶⁰ In discussing his translations of Greek rhetorical terminology, Cicero happily — even proudly — admits that he resorts to coining new terms by imitating Greek exemplars. One solution to the seeming contradiction may be monolingual versus bilingual neology. Whereas Cicero is content (and permits himself) leeway to coin new words by analogy when rendering Greek speeches in Latin (a bilingual scenario), creating strange new words in one's own language to discuss philosophical ideas belies a poor style and is not acceptable (i.e. Zeno and the Stoa's penchant for coining new technical terms in Greek — a monolingual scenario).⁶¹ Yet this could be a false dichotomy: whether one is coining new terms for the sake of new philosophical ideas (the Stoics) or coining new terms for the sake of translating foreign Greek expressions, the coiner is, in either case, still creating new material in their own language to

⁵⁹ *De Orat.* 1.155: *quibus lectis hoc adsequerbar, ut, cum ea, quae legeram Graece, Latine redderem, non solum optimis verbis uteretur et tamen usitatis, sed etiam exprimerem quaedam verba imitando, quae nova nostris essent, dum modo essent idonea.*

⁶⁰ See n. 13 above.

⁶¹ Compare this with Lucretius' subtle disparaging of Anaxagoras' coining of complex terminology (e.g. *homoeomeria*, discussed above) by using visually arresting images through concrete exempla to explicate the Pre-Socratic's theory lucidly in Latin.

describe a new or foreign concept for the first time. Cicero's practice when it came to introducing new terms seems to be limited by the two caveats: *quaedam verba* and *modo essent idonea*, i.e. only certain or a few words have been coined by analogy and, even then, only when appropriate.

As MCEL DUFF (2013, 100) observes in this section, in laying out this *locus classicus* of translation theory in antiquity, Cicero, 'neither mentions faithfulness to the source text as a consideration nor articulates any sort of obligation or responsibility to it. The Greek text is important not so much for itself but for what it can do for Crassus.' The caveat Crassus/Cicero appends to his neology practice allows the retention of linguistic purism in any case; the 'where appropriate' signal seems to suggest that where the *egestas* in Latin is palpable, there would be a resort to neology by imitation/analogy. Yet all of this is relevant predominantly in the rhetorical texts, even if we accept Crassus' sentiments as reflective of Cicero the author's. To what extent did it continue into the *philosophica*?

DYCK points to *Att.* 12.52.3 (May 45 BC) as a clue that perhaps such a high standard of originality of translation did not continue into these later works. We have discussed this letter earlier, but the portion of it in question here reads as follows: 'They [the philosophical works] are copies, they've been made with little labour; I only contribute the words with which I'm well provided' (*ἀπόγραφα sunt, minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfero quibus abundo*). I will make no attempt to psychologise this statement in relation to Ciceronian self-deprecation as a rhetorical tool (his letters being no exception), but it is interesting to find Cicero so blasé about his philosophical endeavours. It might be explained by chronology: it is at this stage when Atticus seemingly becomes aware of the large-scale project Cicero is undertaking, but by late June, Atticus is directly advising Cicero on whom to dedicate his philosophical treatises to (in that case, the *Fin.* and the *Academica* books). So to begin with in May, Cicero was perhaps sheepish, or unwilling, to give away his works to Atticus, but by the end of June, presumably after Atticus' encouragement, Cicero begins to think much more highly of his project: 'I've promised to Brutus, as you advised, my treatise *de Finibus*, of which I think very highly, and you wrote to say that he's not unwilling to accept it' (*nunc illam περὶ Τελῶν σύνταξιν sane mihi probatam Bruto, ut tibi placuit, despondimus, idque <tu> eum non nolle mihi scripsisti*).

GLUCKER has argued that Cicero's methods of introducing terminology in his philosophy were more 'desultory' and less consistent than those of a modern writer deliberately composing a well-organised corpus.⁶² This makes sense, superficially, when we also observe that Cicero's philosophical project was one of Eclecticism, as discussed above, blending elements of Academic epistemology with Stoic ethics. Yet Cicero's use of each of these elements had a specific purpose (broadly, to move away from dogmatic scepticism) such that his borrowing and mixing of different philosophical schools of thought was very much planned and carefully thought out. In a similar way, Cicero's technical terms were not codified or prescribed but developed to serve specific purposes in given contexts; in short, they became communicative strategies to convey information about an original Greek term to his educated readers, while simultaneously shaping the Latin lexis for his own philosophical ends.⁶³ As I will argue, Cicero's creation of a Latin philosophical lexicon certainly consisted of a praxis constituted by a range of techniques (outlined above), often variegated and inseparably linked to his rhetoric (e.g. *Off.* 1.2-3), but founded on an intentional scheme in which the orator-turned-philosopher would apply to all of his literary efforts. The fact Cicero neologised a new term and then abandoned it later on, or temporarily stuck with it before turning to a more established term, was a part of his translation praxis. It is possible therefore to observe his own 'Ars vertendi' from examining the various examples present in his philosophical works.⁶⁴

A component part of the *ars* was a quasi-'hermeneutic', i.e. a methodology of translation which encompassed a number of translation techniques. An illustrative first case study is found in the *Tusc.* (3.16), when Cicero discusses the concept of *σωφροσύνη* concerning the Stoic's 'Sage' and proposes some Latin equivalents:

[T]he Greeks [...] apply the term *σωφροσύνη* to the virtue which I usually call, sometimes temperance (*temperantia*), sometimes self-control (*moderatio*), and occasionally prudence (*modestia*); but I hardly know whether (*haud scio an*) it could

⁶² GLUCKER (2012), 41. Cf. also WIDMANN (1968) and recent general observations in HINCKERS (2020), 87 that Cicero had no 'allgemeine Übersetzungstheorie' when it came to his translations from Greek.

⁶³ I adapt the term 'communicative strategy' from ELDER AND MULLEN (2019), 130; 142, who apply it in the context of Cicero's epistolary code-switching in Greek.

⁶⁴ PUELMA (1980), 146.

rightly be called “frugality,” (*frugalitas*), the term corresponding to which has a narrower meaning with the Greeks, who call “frugal” men *χρήσιμοι*, that is to say simply useful (*utiles*); but our term has a wider meaning, for it connotes all abstinence and inoffensiveness (and this with the Greeks has no customary term, but it is possible to use *ἀβλάβεια* ‘harmlessness’; for inoffensiveness is a disposition of the soul to injure no one)—well, *frugalitas* embraces all the other virtues as well; had its meaning not been so comprehensive and had it been confined to the narrow limits of ordinary acceptance, it would never have become the much eulogised surname of Lucius Piso.⁶⁵

As will be seen in Cicero’s version of Plato’s *Timaeus*, his rhetorical instincts were sharp during his translations and are on full display in the above text. To begin, this is not a usual case of pleonasm favoured by Cicero in all his rhetorical, epistolary, and philosophical works, generally used to strengthen a point or round off an expression.⁶⁶ By using pleonasm, it serves as a type of hermeneutic to convey the Greek expression from as many semantic perspectives as possible to his Latin audience. He begins by listing a mixture of established Latin terms (*temperantia*, *modestia*, and *frugalitas*) which he has had occasion to use throughout his speeches and earlier philosophical works. He draws attention to the aptness of *frugalitas*, which he justifies by arguing that its meaning is broader than its Greek equivalent *χρήσιμος* because the latter’s meaning is simply *utiles* whereas *frugalitas* includes the aforementioned virtues. He further justifies it by pointing to one of the cognomina of one L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus. Cicero, nonetheless, does not want to force it on his readers and so says *sed haud scio an recte ea virtus frugalitas appellari possit*, a classic *captatio benevolentiae*.⁶⁷ The term seems to have been used in a narrower sense in Cicero’s earlier speeches, something like the

⁶⁵ *Tusc.* 3.16: *Graeci σώφρονα appellant eamque virtutem σωφροσύνην vocant, quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, non numquam etiam modestiam, sed haud scio an recte ea virtus frugalitas appellari possit, quod angustius apud Graecos valet, qui frugi homines χρησίμους appellant, id est, tantum modo utiles; at illud est latius; omnis enim abstinencia, omnis innocentia—quae apud Graecos usitatum nomen nullum habet; sed habere potest ἀβλάβειαν: nam est innocentia adfectio talis animi, quae noceat nemini—reliquas etiam virtutes frugalitas continet; quae nisi tanta esset et si iis angustiis, quibus plerique putant, teneretur, numquam esset L. Pisonis cognomen tanto opere laudatum.*

⁶⁶ For pleonastic techniques in Cicero generally, see HAGENDAHL (1924), 169-70; SYNT. 2.176-8.

⁶⁷ See e.g. FÖGEN (2011), 457 on the introduction of *qualitas*.

opposite of avarice: *nunc vero quid faciat Hortensius? avaritiaene crimina frugalitatis laudibus deprecetur?* (Verr. 2.192). In the *Pro Sestio* he uses the abstract term as a play on Piso's name 'Frugi' but without any real definition. In the *Pro Gnaeo Plancio* a similar general notion is implied by the term when likening the good qualities in a slave (*frugalitas*, *labor*, and *vigilantia*) to those of a magistrate, hence the idea of 'economical' or 'useful'. Yet it is not until 45 BC, when Cicero composed the *Tusc.*, that he explicitly links it with the Stoic virtue of the Sage (that of σωφροσύνη) and says that we should not understand it in the ordinary 'narrow' sense, as he says: *quae nisi tanta esset et si iis angustiis, quibus plerique putant, teneretur*. Rather, it is with this more philosophical meaning that he later (in November 45 BC) ventures to use this wider meaning in the context of a defence of King Deiotarus at Caesar's home:

This king is an exemplar of all the virtues, as I think you, Caesar, know well; but in nothing is he more remarkable and more admirable than in his *frugalitas* 'temperance'; although I know that kings are not commonly praised in such terms. To be called a 'temperate' person does not convey much commendation to a king. Bravery, justice, earnestness, dignity, magnanimity, liberality, kindness, generosity—these are the qualities we commend in a king; temperance in a subject. Everyone is free to put what construction he pleases upon my words; none the less I pronounce *frugalitas*; that is, moderation (*moderatio*) and self-restraint (*temperantia*), which I judge to be the highest of virtues.⁶⁸

Cicero expresses the need to gloss his own lexical augmentation of *frugalitas* with *moderatio* and *temperantia*. In doing so, he conveys in the term more than its customary usage, hence he admits it originally would not be a common platitude applied to a king. Nonetheless, the new philosophical meaning of *frugalitas* as the fourth Stoic virtue of the Sage is only used in the

⁶⁸ *Deiot. 26: omnes in illo sunt rege virtutes, quod te, Caesar, ignorare non arbitror, sed praecipue singularis et admiranda frugalitas: etsi hoc verbo scio laudari regem non solere; frugi hominem dici non multum habet laudis in rege: fortem, iustum, severum, gravem, magnanimum, largum, beneficum, liberalem: hae sunt regiae laudes, illa privata est. ut volet quisque, accipiat: ego tamen frugalitatem, id est modestiam et temperantiam, virtutem maximam iudico.*


Tusc. and disappears in Cicero's philosophical treatises thereafter.⁶⁹ However, *frugalitas* does not replace *moderatio* or *temperantia*, which continue to be used in the later books of the *Tusc.* *Moderatio* seems to be preferred by Cicero and is carried over as a core concept into his later works such as *De Senectute* and *De Officiis*. He therefore went to great lengths to establish a new meaning of a word, but often chose not to stick with it entirely or, if he did, it was frequently confined to the same work. We might see this as mere experimentation, an attempt and then a self-admission of failure at lexical augmentation. However, as we will discuss next, Cicero's use or disuse of his own terminology was also a deliberate literary technique that could be described as a hermeneutical (i.e. an interpretative) method designed to engineer an almost 360-degree view of the meaning of a given Greek technical term.

Cicero would certainly not be the only philosopher to have been ambiguous about the precision and permanence of his technical vocabulary. We observe this phenomenon in Plato,⁷⁰ up to Enlightenment philosophers like Kant, whose philosophical project was far from 'desultory' (to use GLUCKER's term), and were in fact system-building and all-encompassing, as KEMP SMITH has somewhat piquantly opined: '[...] there is hardly a technical term which is not employed by [Kant] in a variety of different and conflicting senses. He is the least exact of all the great thinkers.'⁷¹ In the example of *frugalitas* above, the new meaning given to the term to enhance its philosophical ambit in covering the 'fourth virtue' of the Stoic's Sage is confined to the Hermeneutic Circle, so to speak, around which orbit the terms *moderatio*, *modestia*, and *temperantia*:

⁶⁹ In the *Off.* for example, it is replaced with *decorum*.

⁷⁰ For example, in his inconsistent use of the difficult concepts of αἰδώς, αἰώνιος and οὐσία.

⁷¹ KEMP SMITH (1915), 527; see also PARFIT (2011), xlii.




A Latin reader approaching the Greek term from any one of the four chosen equivalents is, to use HABERMAS' terms, unavoidably prepossessed by their given contexts within which he or she has initially acquired their interpretative schemes.⁷² However, Cicero makes an effort to avoid sole reliance on the established senses, going out of his way to imbue at least one of them with the new semantic range of the Greek term (in this case *frugalitas*). This is not an isolated example, as can be in the uses of *comparatio* and *proportio* in *Timaeus* 13 or *media* and *medietas* in the same translation at section 23. The interpretative process here demonstrates a relationality between the terms Cicero deploys to convey the 'whole' sense of the original Greek. *Frugalitas*, *moderatio*, *modestia* and *temperantia* are not one to one equivalences of the Greek but, in the individual parts, each contribute to the meaning of the whole of *σωφροσύνη* in an ingenious way.

⁷² For example, a Roman reader might be accustomed to approach *modestia* or *moderatio* through the lens of the *mos maiorum* instead of a specifically Stoic or Academic one.

Morbus, perturbatio, πάθη, μελαγχολία

The rhetoric of Cicero's prefatory braggadocio often directly affected his translation praxis. As discussed in the Introduction, there was an apparent divergence between Cicero's prefatory rhetoric of linguistic purism and the superiority of Latin, and the seemingly cautious ways in which Cicero introduced lexical innovations in the main text of his treatises. Yet we sought to resolve such a dichotomy by suggesting that both practices were inherently rhetorical, the one establishing Cicero's oeuvre as an independent literary work in Latin and the other using rhetorical techniques to introduce novel philosophical terms into Latin, while simultaneously remaining sensitive to his Latin readership and intelligibility. A clear example of this in practice is Cicero's discussion of the 'perturbations' of the human mind in the *Tusc.* By examining his treatment of the Greek terms *πάθη* and *μελαγχολία*, it is possible to uncover a certain hermeneutic of translation that functioned on two levels:



We can begin with a section from Book Three of the *Tusc.*,⁷³ where the narrator ‘M.’ seemingly representing Cicero’s blend of Stoic and New Academic views in many respects, addresses a claim by ‘A.’ (an unknown and docile character in the discussion) that the *sapiens* is susceptible to grief (*aegritudo* or λύπη, which Augustine would later render with *tristitia*). ‘M.’ outlines the Stoic taxonomy of four classes of πάθη (irrational emotions): φόβος, ἡδονή, ἐπιθυμία (and later λύπη) as passions or ‘perturbations’ that the *sapiens* understands how to avoid. Yet if λύπη is properly a physical affliction, the others cannot be classified under the same genus: ‘M: Surely not of the remaining disorders (*perturbationes*) of the soul too, terrors, lusts, fits of anger? These belong, speaking generally, to those which the Greeks call πάθη’. As we will see below, M. later considers grief (*aegritudo*) as most resembling a ‘disease’ because of its physical manifestations in the human body, but ἐπιθυμία, φόβος, λύπη, ἡδονή cannot be seen as equivalent. He goes on: ‘I might have called them “diseases” (*morbos*) and this would be a word-for-word rendering, but it would not fall within our usual usage (*consuetudinem nostram*).’ Immediately, M. sees some distinction between the physical afflictions of the body and the perturbances of the soul, and a literal rendering of the Greek term would produce a conflation rather than the necessary distinction: ‘For pity, envy, exultation, joy, all these the Greeks term *morbos*, movements that is of the soul which are not obedient to reason. We, on the other hand, should, I think, rightly say that these same movements of an agitated soul are *perturbationes* but not *morbos* in the ordinary way of speaking, unless you are of another opinion.’ In *Fin.* (3.35),⁷⁴ Cicero has the character of M. Porcius Cato (son of Cato the Younger) come upon the same conceptual problem: ‘The mind’s disorders (*perturbationes animorum*), which harass and embitter the life of the foolish, the Greek term for these is πάθη (interpreting literally I might have called them ‘diseases’ (*morbi*) but the word would not suit all contexts)’. Those contexts must be φόβος, ἡδονή, and

⁷³ *Tusc.* 3.7: *num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines, libidines, iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci πάθη appellant; ego poteram morbos et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet: nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantes; nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, nisi quid aliud tibi videtur.*

⁷⁴ *Fin.* 3.35: *nec vero perturbationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt (quas Graeci πάθη appellant, poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conveniret ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt πάθος; sit igitur perturbatio.*

ἐπιθυμία — the same problem M. encountered in the *Tusc.* So Cato continues: ‘For instance, no one speaks of pity, certainly not anger, as a “disease” (*morbis*) — though the Greeks term these πάθος. Let’s accept then the term “perturbation” (*perturbatio*)’.⁷⁵

FÖGEN (2000, 94-5) interprets Cicero’s (M.’s) justification in the *Tusc.* sections as based on an acceptability issue of usual Latin usage, which shuns *verbum ex verbo* innovations. However, read in conjunction with the section from the *Fin.*, the rationale for eschewing *morbis* does not appear to be stylistic but rather conceptual. Cicero simply does not accept that the Stoic passions of the soul (emotions) are physical, as a disease afflicting the body is so construed. Yet FÖGEN concludes: ‘Maßgeblich ist also bei der Übertragung das Kriterium des Sprachusus: Insbesondere eine Wort-für-Wort-Übersetzung verbietet sich dann, wenn sie für die Sprecher ungewohnt wirkt.’⁷⁶ At face value, this is an appropriate description of Cicero’s usual sheepishness in introducing new terms, but it fails to explain why he would go to the effort of singling out *morbis* as an alternative if he had no intention of sticking with it throughout the rest of the *Tusc.* The answer begins to become clearer if we read on in Book Three⁷⁷ and note M.’s discussion of *aegritudo* (λύπη): ‘Our countrymen showed a fine instinct, as they often do, in giving the name of “grief” (*aegritudo*) to vexation, anxiety, and anguish, by the analogy with human bodies that are ill (*aegri*).’ The ‘countrymen’ M. refers to are the famous Latin playwrights and poets like Plautus, Terence, and Pacuvius (see e.g. *OLD* s.v. *aegritudo*, 2), and so the literary pedigree of the term cannot be impeached. It is convenient for the narrator then, to take the side of these Roman literary giants, who saw grief as a physical affliction (*aeger*), and to denigrate the Greek philosophers when it came to classifying φόβος, ἡδονή, and ἐπιθυμία:

⁷⁵ Note also the later (and more etymologically cognate) translation of πάθος with *passio* in authors such as Apuleius, Tertullian, Jerome, and Augustine, among others, (see *TLL* s.v. *passio*, 10.1.615.5-6 and 10.1.615.15f). Also the later use of *passio* in medical contexts with the sense of ‘disease’, ‘an affliction, complaint of the body’, see LANGSLOW (2000), 162.

⁷⁶ FÖGEN (2000), 94-5. See also the broad overview of this section recently in HINCKERS (2020), 68-71.

⁷⁷ *Tusc.* 3.23: *itaque praeclare nostri, ut alia multa, molestiam, sollicitudinem, angorem propter similitudinem corporum aegrorum aegritudinem nominaverunt. hoc propemodum verbo Graeci omnem animi perturbationem appellant; vocant enim πάθος, id est, morbum, quicumque est motus in animo turbidus: nos melius; aegris enim corporibus simillima animi est aegritudo; at non similis aegrotationis est libido, non immoderata laetitia, quae est voluptas animi elata et gestiens.*

With almost the same term, the Greeks describe *all* disturbances of the soul, for they use *πάθος*; that is, “disease” (*morbus*), for any troubled movement in the soul whatsoever. Our usage is better, for grief of the soul closely resembles the condition of bodies out of health, but lust doesn’t resemble sickness, nor does intemperate joy, which is an excited and exuberant pleasure of the soul.

It is the superiority of Latin terminology, for M., which allows a more subtle distinction between a ‘diseased’ mind and one perturbed by irrational passions. The verb *perturbo* and its derivatives are found extensively (and almost exclusively) within Cicero’s rhetorical and philosophical works, and his preference for the imagery it conjures cannot be ignored in understanding why he opts for *perturbatio* rather than *morbus* in these sections.⁷⁸ Whereas *aegritudo* is apt because it is the emotion closest to physical distress (and hence *morbus* might be a useful correlate with it), other irrational emotions like *libido* or *immoderata laetitia* are, for M., simply not physical in nature and require better classifications. In these sections then, we see the rhetorician at work again, this time denigrating the Greek terminology in favour of Latin, although the reality is that Cicero is imbuing (probably) existing terms like *perturbatio* with a novel philosophical sense: ‘perturbation of the soul’ (*perturbatio animi*). The fact the *verbum ex verbo* equivalent is offered up to the reader for effect is not so the reader might be led into thinking this is a useful heuristic to understand the original Greek (as he did with, for instance, *medietas* in the *Timaeus*). Rather, Cicero shows how limited the original Greek sense is (*πάθος*) and that it requires a renovation using the superior vocabulary of Latin (and, presumably, Cicero’s superior philosophical nuance!) So, again, we find in the same book of the *Tusc.*, another instance of M. vaunting on behalf of his language’s superior lexis when discussing the ‘diseases’ of the mind, in which he reports the *philosophi* as having believed that *sapientia* = *sanitas animi* and *insipientia* = *quasi insanitas*: ‘These attributes are much better connoted by the Latin terms than by the Greek, as will be found also in many other instances’ (3.10: *multoque melius haec notata sunt verbis Latinis quam Graecis, quod aliis quoque multis locis reperietur*). With the tone set for a linguistic showdown between the

⁷⁸ The *TLL* shows derivatives like *perturbatio*, *perturbatrix*, and *perturbate* are all first-attested in Cicero (although *perturbatio* also appears in the anonymous *Rhet. Her.*, see s.v., 10.1.1825.32).

Greek and Latin terminologies, M. proceeds to describe ‘insanity’ and its causes in some detail, relying on the distinctions in terminology to inform his conceptualisation of the disorder: ‘The nature and meaning of the whole question at issue is shown by the exact force of the term [sc. *sanus*] (3.11: *totum igitur id, quod quaerimus, quid et quale sit verbi vis ipsa declarat*). He continues: ‘But there is nothing better than the Latin language’s usage, where we say that those who are unbridled in the indulgence of either lust or wrath are beside themselves (*exisse ex potestate*)’ (3.11: *itaque nihil melius quam quod est in consuetudine sermonis Latini, cum exisse ex potestate dicimus eos, qui effrenati feruntur aut libidine aut iracundia*). This is, M. explains, because those who are insane lose the power of reason. He then takes his fight to the Greeks: ‘Though why the Greeks call this state “madness” (*μανία*), I really can’t say. Our language makes clearer distinctions: we discriminate between *insania*, which has a wide application because of its link with folly, and *furor* or “madness”.’ M. later turns to the distinction in Roman law (the *duodecim tabulae*), which demarcated an individual who is simply subject to folly, but still able to perform duties and conduct their life as usual, and one who is mad (the latter not allowed to remain in control of their property). Yet he has not finished with his complaint against Greek terminology:

The Greeks mean the same thing we do, they just don’t have a suitable word for it. What we call “madness,” they call *μελαγχολία* “biliousness” — as if the mind were stirred up only by black bile and not by some more serious form of anger, fear, or grief, as happened with the frenzy (*furere*), as we say it, of Athamas, Alcmaeon, Ajax, and Orestes.⁷⁹

M. repeatedly stresses that Latin is ‘better’ in terms of semantic nuance (*melius haec notata sunt* and *distinguiamus nos melius*). In the case of *furor* and *insania*, it is because, where Latin can explain *furor* by a ‘perturbation of reason by passions and emotional states’, the Greeks

⁷⁹ *Tusc.* 3.10-11: [...] *Graeci autem μανίαν unde appellant non facile dixerim: eam tamen ipsam distinguimus nos melius quam illi; hanc enim insaniam, quae iuncta stultitia patet latius, a furore disiungimus. Graeci volunt illi quidem, sed parum valent verbo: quem nos furorem, μελαγχολίαν illi vocant. quasi vero atra bili solum mens ac non saepe vel iracundia graviore vel timore vel dolore moveatur, quo genere Athamantem, Alcmaeonem, Aiace, Orestem furere dicimus.*

resort to a physicalist explanation. This is based on their early medical theory of humourism, which M. deems hardly a dignifying manner in which to discuss the psychological afflictions of Homeric heroes like Ajax or Orestes.

It is in sections like these then that the patriotic bravado of Cicero's prefaces is made manifest in practice. In the case of *perturbatio* (like *insania* and *furor*), it is not necessarily the introduction of a strange, novel term to capture the Greek original accurately, but rather a form of *aemulatio* to surpass the Greek and to renovate it into a 'better' Latin linguistic (and hence conceptual) framework. Of course, it is not relevant to Cicero that Romans might have rarely, if ever, used technical jargon to discuss the Stoic conceptions of *πάθη* before him,⁸⁰ nor is it relevant that Cicero had to resort to lexical augmentation by changing the sense of *perturbatio* to now encompass a psychological state of the mind or soul. The salient factor is that Cicero can now use his philosophical works to his advantage, doing his countrymen a 'service' (*Ac.* 25-6) in marshalling the resources of the Latin lexis and adding to its semantic range, outdoing the Greeks by an increased nuance in meaning that directly reflects Cicero's Academic-Stoic blend of philosophy, especially in the *Tusc.* He simultaneously avoids the charge of excessive novelty or strangeness by a) avoiding *verbum ex verbo* renderings (even though he does provide them to the reader and *morbus* is a well-established term in Latin in any case (arguably more standard than the abstract *perturbatio*); and b) appealing to the authority of earlier Latin authors and even to Roman legal definitions. It is not that *morbus* is 'ungewohnt' because it was *verbum ex verbo*, as FÖGEN argued based on Cicero's purported justifications, but rather, because it is, for the character of M., and likely Cicero himself, *conceptually* a poor description of the genus of irrational emotions under discussion. This is directly due to the fact that it is a close translation of the Greek term (*πάθος*), which itself is (like *μελαγχολία*) inadequate.

⁸⁰ The use of terms like *aegritudo* before Cicero was not in the sense of abstract concepts that taxonomised the Stoic concepts of mental perturbations, but general descriptors of physical illness (see in *Pl. St.* 215 or *Ter. Hau.* 539, for example). Cicero is here 'technicalising' the terms, with the purpose of creating his own taxonomy of irrational emotions, renovating the Stoic formulae into a Latin context.

Translation choices with ἐτυμολογία and εἶδος

Stylistic preferences, as well as conceptual or metatextual ones, also influenced his decision to settle on a specific term. Two examples illustrate this neatly from the later work of the *Topica* (*Top.*). In *Top.* 30, he attempts to translate the notion of the Platonic εἶδος ‘form’:

[I]n a division there are species which the Greeks call εἶδη while our writers, if any of them happens to talk about this matter at all, call them *species*, which is not bad, but awkward for inflection when you speak. I would rather not, even if it were possible in Latin, say *specierum* and *speciebus*, and there is often reason to use these cases; but I should like to say *formis* and *formarum*. And because both words mean the same, I consider that convenience in speaking [sc. euphony] should not be ignored.⁸¹

The rationale here is that the case-forms of terms like *species* in the fifth declension’s genitive plural (*specierum*) and ablative plural (*speciebus*) are cacophonous compared with the more acceptable first declension ones: *formarum* and *formis* respectively. The section indicates Cicero’s awareness of the (morpho-syntactic) aptness of certain Latin equivalents for Greek terms which hinged not just on the semantic value of the word but its formal or aesthetic characteristics as well. This too influenced Cicero’s decision whether to employ one term over another. Here, he makes explicit that he is only doing it in this case because *utroque verbo idem significetur* and hence the substantive meaning is not forsaken in favour of the morphological aesthetic of the preferred term.

In *Top.* 35, the term *veriloquium* is introduced for the first time and then discarded:

⁸¹ *Top.* 30: *in divisione formae, quas Graeci εἶδη vocant, nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant, non pessime id quidem sed inutiliter ad mutandos casus in dicendo. nolim enim, ne si Latine quidem dici possit, specierum et speciebus dicere, et saepe his casibus utendum est; at formis et formarum velim. cum autem utroque verbo idem significetur, commoditatem in dicendo non arbitror neglegendam.* Trans. adapted from REINHARDT (2003), 131. See discussion of this section in WIDMANN (1968), 148f and recently HINCKERS (2020), 74.

Many arguments are also derived from denotation (*notatio*). This is when an argument is elicited from the meaning (*vis*) of a word. The Greeks call this ἐτυμολογία; that is, in word-for-word translation, *veriloquium*. But I shrink from the novelty of a word that is not particularly suitable and prefer to call this type ‘denotation’, because words are the designations (*notae*) of things.⁸²

Compounding or calquing of this kind was not as readily acceptable in Latin as Greek⁸³ so Cicero kept to using the more established form *notatio*, now with the new sense of ‘etymology’ in the sense of ἐτυμολογία.⁸⁴ However, *notatio* has the primary meaning of ‘denotation’ or ‘designation’, and Cicero prefers this because *sunt verba rerum notae*. Yet the Greek term ἐτυμολογία is not concerned with denotation per se but rather a particular type of meaning; that is, the ‘true or original meaning’ via derivation (or by inverse derivation, working backwards from what has been derived over time from the pristine meaning of the word), hence τό ἔτυμον from ἔτεός ‘the true sense of a word’ (see LSJ s.v., II).⁸⁵ Here, Cicero has (seemingly) sacrificed accuracy for style to a degree. Yet the question should be not why Cicero discarded the more literal morphological calque, but why he introduced it at all if he intended to discard it on account of a stylistic concern. REINHARDT (2003, 211) noted that, in the legal-rhetorical framework of Cicero’s *Top.*, ‘in the Republican era the jurists and the grammarians frequently had to interpret legal documents containing obscure words; this can [...] be done without a commitment to a particular linguistic theory.’ So, jurists’ pragmatic

⁸² *Top.* 35: *multa etiam ex notatione sumuntur. ea est autem, cum ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur; quam Graeci ἐτυμολογίαν appellant, id est verbum ex verbo veriloquium nos autem novitatem verbi non satis apti fugientes genus hoc notationem appellamus, quia sunt verba rerum notae.* Trans. adapted from REINHARDT (2003), 133.

⁸³ See ADAMS (2003), 460; REINHARDT (2003), 274. See also HINCKERS (2020), 71-2 recent general discussion of this section.

⁸⁴ Note that the word ἐτυμολογία is not attested in either Plato or Aristotle (see e.g. Aristotle’s *Top.* 112a32-3: μεταφέροντα τὸννομα ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον = ‘to examine meaning by etymology’), and is only found much later (see LSJ s.v., also REID (1885), 138-9 who notes even the older Stoics did not use the term, but preferred ὀνομάτων ὁρθότης, which could in fact more closely serve as the source of Cicero’s compounding calque *veriloquium*). Cicero has the character of Varro (who was in favour of conversing in Greek when it came to philosophical discussions), use the Greek compound alongside a periphrasis (rather than an equivalent Latin term) in *Ac.* 32: *verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata, quam ἐτυμολογίαν appellabant.* The real Varro had dedicated three books of the *De Lingua Latina* to the issue of etymology already.

⁸⁵ Cf. also Varro *L.* 5.5. For this difference in e.g. Cicero’s discussions in the *Top.*, see REINHARDT (2003), 208-10. For ancient theories of etymology in general, see BLANK (1982), 21-3.

interest in meaning, ‘which guided their etymological efforts, is in itself unlikely to derive from or to be informed by a coherent doctrine.’ Cicero is therefore noncommittal but pragmatic when it comes to naturalist or conventionalist interpretations on the relations between words and things, and simply says that words are the *notae* ‘tokens, designations’ of things, which, he adds, Aristotle termed *σύμβολα* (*Top.* 35). He does not need to tie himself to a view of etymological derivation of meaning as the ‘true’ sense of a word (as a lawyer and adherent of the Academic school, he perhaps viewed etymology as having very little to do with the ‘true meaning’ of words at all), so he concludes (*Top.* 35): ‘but when one understands what is meant, it is less important to fuss over the name’ (*sed cum intellegitur quid significetur, minus laborandum est de nomine*). While, stylistically, *veriloquium* might be *non satis apti* for Cicero, it is also conceptually not apt, since etymological argumentation did not (for Cicero) reveal any ‘true’ sense of a word.⁸⁶

As I have emphasised in this chapter, rhetorical technique was inseparable from Cicero’s philosophical method, and the *praeteritio* that Cicero the legal advocate frequently deployed in court⁸⁷ is also transferred into his dealings with philosophical terminology. This will be seen once more with the introduction of *medietas* in the *Timaeus* translation below. It is enough here to notice that *veriloquium* takes a discrete and specific function in Cicero’s hermeneutics. It serves as a foil to convey a closer sense of what the whole of the Greek term comprises, whilst simultaneously allowing Cicero to signal his disdain for the compound form (*à la grecque*) as well as the set of views concomitant with that particular linguistic theory, thus opting for the established, and more suitably sounding (and less ideologically loaded) term, *notatio*.

⁸⁶ Cicero does use etymologising arguments in the mouths of certain characters in other philosophical works (e.g. his brother in *Div.* 1.93), as well as puns based on etymology (see LAURAND (1928), 240). Yet it is unclear if he, in fact, believes in the same doctrine as, e.g. the Stoics, as to the proper or ‘true’ meaning of words as discoverable via etymology. See e.g. TONDINI (1959), 135 who describes Cicero’s theory of *notatio* as a ‘criterio arbitrario’ based on phonetic similarity of words (suggesting a conventionalist approach to meaning).

⁸⁷ E.g. *Cael.* 50: *obliviscor iam iniurias tuas, Clodia, depono memoriam doloris mei*.

Revision and Lexical Innovation with σοφίσματα

A final example that gives us some insight into Cicero's translation sensibilities is the case of the σοφίσματα discussed in the *Lucullus* (75). In later *testimonia*, we find Seneca the Younger quoting Cicero:

You [Lucilius] asked me what they call *sophismata* in Latin. Many have attempted to define the term, but no name has stuck, especially since the thing itself has not been received into general usage by us; the name, too, has been rejected. But the word which Cicero used seems to me most suitable: he calls them *cavillationes*.⁸⁸

Cicero seemed to have been the first to first gloss the term σοφίσματα in the *Lucullus*, where he writes: 'And I had (philosophers) who gave you some trouble, though they were insignificant: Stilbo, Diodorus, Alexinus, who had some twisted and cunning *sophismata* (for thus they are termed 'fallacious little conclusions').'⁸⁹ REID suggests that, in his revision of the book, Cicero 'no doubt here interposed in the second edition the translation *cavillationes* which [Seneca] quotes.'⁹⁰ In any case, we see two translations from Cicero: first is the phrase *fallaces conclusiunculae*, with the noun being a lexical innovation formed by the diminutive morpheme *-(un)cula* to the established *conclusio*.⁹¹ In the (more recent) version, Cicero consolidates the concept of 'trickery', expressed in the double translation *contorta et aculeate*, with *cavillationes* (an established abstract in *-tio* attested as far back as Plautus in the sense of a 'jeering' or 'banter'), now with the added metonymy of 'sophistical discourse' (see *OLD* s.v.). This term would become productive in later authors such as Seneca and Quintilian.

⁸⁸ Sen. *Ep.* 111.1: *quid vocentur Latine sophismata, quaesisti a me. Multi temptaverunt illis nomen inponere, nullum haesit. videlicet, quia res ipsa non recipiebatur a nobis nec in usu erat, nomini quoque repugnatum est. aptissimum tamen videtur mihi, quo Cicero usus est: cavillationes vocat.*

⁸⁹ *Luc.* 75: *atqui habebam molestos vobis sed minutos, Stilbonem Diodorum Alexinum, quorum sunt contorta et aculeata quaedam sophismata (sic enim appellantur fallaces conclusiunculae).*

⁹⁰ REID (1885), 265.

⁹¹ This innovation is also found in *Tusc.* 2.42 in relation to the Stoics' syllogisms. The *Tusc.* was composed around the same time. Similarly, see also *interrogatiuncula* in Cic. *Parad.* 2 and *de Orat.* 2.158 quoted in Sen. *Ep.* 82.

Qualitas and captatio benevolentiae

In the Latin of Cicero's time, to use a sentence like *sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et qualitatem nominabant* might amount to using something like a malapropism in everyday conversation — at least to ordinary Latin speakers or even educated ones. What Cicero does instead is to use a rhetorical technique (*captatio benevolentiae*)⁹² to introduce a new Latin term charitably by giving the impression that it has been forced on him by the pre-existence of a Greek term: 'Like a certain "quality" — for you will permit me, as we are dealing with unusual subjects, occasionally to employ words never heard before, as do the Greeks themselves, who have now been handling these topics for a long time.'⁹³ Though not always the case, in this instance the use of *qualitas* was not a mere ἅπαξ λεγόμενον but was to become highly productive in later Latin authors (e.g. Quintilian, Columella, Pliny the Younger, and Vitruvius).⁹⁴ The word *qualitas* is a clear calque of the Greek ποιότης, the relationship between the two being noted by Cicero only a few lines later.⁹⁵ On the one hand, we could see Cicero as successfully translating the Greek into Latin for the benefit of his audience, though this would be false. The 'translation' is in fact an outright neologism, just as strange to Cicero's readers in the Late Republic as directly importing ποιότης as a loan-word would have been.⁹⁶ In any case, the term *qualitas* became productive among Latin writers into posterity and, today, English speakers use 'quality' without a second thought to refer to objects or persons. On the surface, even this is still missing what else is happening with this so-called 'translation'.

In Plato's *Theaetetus*, Socrates uses the same type of *captatio benevolentiae* technique to introduce ποιότης to Theodorus: '[...] and the active becomes, not a quality, but

⁹² FÖGEN (2011), 457 argues this is a type of 'temporary' term for the Greek concept in Latin, however it might be better thought of as a polite introduction of a new term which Cicero prefers but is hesitant to coin ad hoc. After all, Cicero was first and foremost an orator and such techniques to win over his audience must have been deployed when it came to convincing his readers of the aptest Latin term or phrase for a Greek concept.

⁹³ Ac. 24: *quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant — dabitur enim profecto ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum inauditis.*

⁹⁴ For further discussion on the formation of *qualitas* as a calque see DETREVILLE (2012), 51-2. See also derivations from the term in later authors, e.g. Victorinus' *inqualitas* (ἄποιος) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.49.22).

⁹⁵ Ac. 25.

⁹⁶ However, modern linguistic research is relatively clear regarding lexical neology as less detrimental to comprehension on the interpreter's part than we might expect, see DURKIN (2009), 48; MORTUREUX (2011), 19.

endowed with a quality? Now perhaps quality seems an extraordinary word, and you do not understand it when used with general application, so let me give particular examples.’⁹⁷ It is no coincidence that Cicero replicated this scenario in his *Academica* books and this notion of ‘pseudotranslation’ becomes even more important here, given that Cicero is imitating and interpreting Plato — not merely conceptually, but also formally (i.e. in the dialogical form of his treatises). Yet Cicero’s work is different not just in its time and place, but with its interlocutors speaking in different ways and with opinions of these same concepts. It is not enough for Cicero to produce a mere epigone of Plato’s doctrines, but rather to create his own. So he has Atticus begin this section of the dialogue with a concession: ‘And moreover you shall be permitted to use even Greek words when you wish if, perchance, Latin ones happen to fail you’ (*quin etiam Graecis licebit utare cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient*). To which Varro responds:

That is certainly kind of you, but I will do my best to talk Latin, except in the case of words of the sort now in question, so as to say ‘philosophy’ or ‘rhetoric’ or ‘physics’ or ‘dialectic’, which like many others are now habitually used as Latin words. I have therefore given the name of ‘qualities’ to the things that the Greeks call *ποιότητες*; even among the Greeks it is not a word in common usage but belongs to the philosophers, and this is the case with many terms. But the dialecticians’ vocabulary is not of the popular language, they use words of their own; and indeed this is a feature shared by almost all the sciences: either new names have to be coined for new things, or names taken from other things have to be used metaphorically. This being the practice of the Greeks, who have now been engaged in these studies for so many generations, how much more ought it to be allowed to us, who are now attempting to handle these subjects for the first time!”

Cicero’s character then concludes with approval, suggesting that ‘Varro’ will be ‘doing a service to your fellow-countrymen if you not only enlarge the wealth of facts, as you have

⁹⁷ Pl. *Tht.* 182a: [...] τὸ δὲ ποιῶν ποιόν τι ἀλλ’ οὐ ποιότητα; ἴσως οὖν ἡ ‘ποιότης’ ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον.

done, but of words also' (Varro, *bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, ut fecisti, sed etiam verborum*). To which Varro replies: 'Then on your authority we will venture to employ new words, if we have to' (*audebimus ergo [...] novis verbis uti te auctore si necesse erit*).⁹⁸ It seems insufficient for Cicero simply to use an aside within the dialogue to clarify the introduction of an unusual technical term, as Socrates had done. He also fully expounds the justifications for using new words or augmented meanings of existing words in Latin (*aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda*); that is, lexical innovation and augmentation. That Cicero was successful in introducing new and unfamiliar Latin terms to replace the Greek terminology among authors composing philosophical works in Latin in the centuries after him is not to say that the entirety of his lexical efforts were productive or fully understood. Rather, it seems that many of the terms he introduced to treat philosophical concepts in Latin, though unknown or obscure in his own time, became understood by later authors and applied in specific contexts as technical terms.

To conclude, Cicero made use of specific interpretative tools in translating technical terms from Greek philosophical sources into Latin. The examples we have examined give us a window into Cicero's translation methodology, if one may call it that, and indicate that there was an interpretative strategy on Cicero's part in combining established terms familiar to a Roman audience with Greek technical terms, which required articulation in a new medium. In using techniques such as pleonasm, double translation, or periphrasis, Cicero realised that there was no one-to-one correspondence between a given word in Greek and one in Latin, and so used the multiple shades of meaning in various Latin terms (established and neologised) to expand his semantic range and to encapsulate more effectively the meaning of the original term under discussion. To use TAYLOR's terms quoted earlier, 'the readings of partial

⁹⁸ Ac. 25-6: *bene sane facis; sed enitar ut Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus ut aliis multis consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. qualitates igitur appellavi quas ποιότητας Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum sed philosophorum; atque id in multis. dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica, suis utuntur; et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium, aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. quod si Graeci faciunt qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto id magis nobis concedendum est qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur?* (Trans. RACKHAM (1933/2005), adapted).

expressions depend on those of others, and ultimately of the whole.’⁹⁹ Yet interpretation was not limited to semantics, and could also include stylistic (e.g. prosodic) concerns in which the aptness of a Latin term was contingent upon its acceptability both phonologically and morphologically. These decisions in Cicero’s translations all illustrate important interpretative techniques that guided his translations of Greek philosophical vocabulary.

1.4. RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY — CICERO’S PREFACES

BARAZ recently argued that Cicero never laid claim to originality in his philosophical works, at least not to the type of originality that would ‘satisfy the modern definition of “originality”’, which she notes as rooted in the Romantic tradition but that, nonetheless, he was ‘deeply original’ in a different sense.¹⁰⁰ She cites BEARD (whose assessment is echoed largely by FÖGEN¹⁰¹) to illustrate the point that Cicero, for the first time, ‘Romanised Greek philosophy, tackling Roman problems, with Roman exempla, in a Roman setting.’¹⁰² She goes on to argue that the debate over ‘originality’ in Cicero’s philosophy versus mere translation has occupied scholars as much as it did his critics.¹⁰³ As will be further discussed in Chapter Two, I think there is a danger around which one must carefully navigate when it comes to analysing Latin authors in this genre, especially Cicero, regarding issues such as ‘originality’, and their motives for translating Greek vocabulary into Latin — namely a rhetorical one.

Cicero’s prefaces may provide possible motives or agendas to be queried, and whilst no doubt interesting from a literary and historical perspective, leaves us none the wiser as to the consequences of Cicero’s transformation of Greek thought through the linguistic limits of Latin. As REINHARDT has noted about statements made by Cicero, specifically his *prooemia* (in this case to the *Topica*): ‘[W]e believe [Cicero] until evidence comes to light which makes

⁹⁹ TAYLOR (1985), 18.

¹⁰⁰ BARAZ (2012), 119. Note also recent attitudes instantiated by INWOOD (2005, 11 n. 8), whose characterisation of Cicero as a ‘missionary’ philosopher as opposed to a primary or original one falls back into the, now somewhat worn or at least misinterpreted, ‘originality’ debate as BARAZ describes.

¹⁰¹ FÖGEN (2000), 138.

¹⁰² BEARD (1986), 38.

¹⁰³ BARAZ (2012), 119.

it inevitable to review our position'.¹⁰⁴ Scholars have already sensed some issues in Cicero's philosophical prefaces; for example, the contradictions in Cicero's attitudes towards translation and the terms he uses to describe his activity in the prefaces.¹⁰⁵ However, the clearest problem that comes to mind is the marked contrast between the patriotic bravado expressed in the prefaces to his philosophical works and the careful, often unsure, manner in which he feels his way for new Latin words, forms, or meanings within the text of the dialogues themselves.¹⁰⁶ In *Fin.* (3.5), Cicero announces that: '[E]ven in the richness and copiousness of our vocabulary, we are not surpassed (*vinceremur*) by the Greeks', as if the richness of the two lexica was a point of armed conflict between the cultures.¹⁰⁷ In *Tusc.* (1.3), he further labours the metaphor of a sort of martial combat: 'Greece surpassed us in learning and in every kind of literary endeavour, an area in which it was easy to conquer those who did not fight back.'¹⁰⁸ It was, in Cicero's view, Rome's time to fight back:

Philosophy lay neglected up until this age and received no illumination in Latin letters; and it must now be brought to light and awoken by me so that, if I was of some use to my fellow citizens when engaged in public life, I may also be of use, if I can, when at leisure.¹⁰⁹

We may conjure an image of Cicero who, from the comfort of his libraries in Tusculum or Antium during his exile, would arm himself, ready for the metaphorical linguistic battle, with

¹⁰⁴ REINHARDT (2003), 177.

¹⁰⁵ See ROBINSON (1992), 19-34.

¹⁰⁶ His rhetorical repertoire of *topoi* is extensive and ALBRECHT (2003), 182f offers a useful stylistic analysis of how vital Cicero's *prooemia* were to his orations, wherein he sets an emotional mood or makes certain arguments *ex hypothesi* early on which do not necessarily mirror the art of his *narratio* but nonetheless are skilfully deployed to position his speech in relation to his audience in very contrived ways.

¹⁰⁷ See McELDUFF (2013), 103. Cf. also Cicero's combative rhetoric here with the derogatory aside by the character of Crassus in the context of the Latin concept of *ineptia* (*de Orat.* 2.17-18), where Greek is seen as lacking a term for it (in this context, a character flaw) because such a vice was allegedly in their cultural blind spot: *hoc vitio cumulata est eruditissima illa Graecorum natio: itaque quod vim huius mali Graeci non vident, ne nomen quidem ei vitio imposuerunt; ut enim quaeras omnia, quomodo Graeci ineptum appellent, non reperies*. See also LISCU (1930), 108 and PONCELET's (1957), 170 n. 1 critique of LISCU.

¹⁰⁸ *Tusc.* 1.3: *in quo erat facile vincere non repugnantes*.

¹⁰⁹ *Tusc.* 1.5: *philosophia iacuit usque ad hanc aetatem nec ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum quae illustranda et excitanda nobis est, ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi*.

an arsenal of Latin vocabulary great enough not only to equal the philosophical vocabulary of the Greeks, but also to surpass it:

And though we have often said — that in spite of some complaints not only of the Greeks, but of those men also who would prefer being accounted as Greeks to being thought our own countrymen — that we are so far from being conquered by the Greeks in the abundance of our words, that we are even superior to them in that particular; we must labour to establish this point, not only in our own arts, but in those too which we have derived from them.¹¹⁰

By the time of the *N.D.*, Cicero claims victory: ‘I seem to have made so much progress that we are not surpassed by the Greeks even in the abundance of words.’¹¹¹

This rhetoric gives the impression that what was expressed by Plato and Aristotle with technical Greek words (many were neologisms introduced by those philosophers)¹¹² will now be equalled and surpassed by the ‘richness’ of the Latin vocabulary: all that is required is someone as skilled as Cicero to accomplish the task.¹¹³ Yet how does this accord with the fact

¹¹⁰ *Fin.* 3.5: *et quoniam saepe diximus, et quidem cum aliqua querela non Graecorum modo, sed eorum etiam, qui se Graecos magis quam nostros haberi volunt, nos non modo non vinci a Graecis verborum copia, sed esse in ea etiam superiores, elaborandum est ut hoc non in nostris solum artibus, sed etiam in illorum ipsorum adsequamur*, cf. POWELL (1995), 289: ‘Cicero in his letters could invent words [...] without any apology. Greek words, too, were freely used in letters. On the other hand, in the speeches Greek is avoided almost entirely [...] The philosophical works represent the mean between these two extremes.’ See also OKSALA’s (1954, 133) discussion of this issue of ‘purity’ in the case of Caesar: ‘[O]bwohl sie mit der griechischen Kultur gut vertraut waren, die Entwicklung der lateinischen Sprache im Sinne der eigenständigen puristischen Linie kraftvoll förderten.’

¹¹¹ *N.D.* 1.8-9: *tantum profecisse videmur ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur*.

¹¹² See e.g. Dexipp. in *Cat.* 6.10-6.16: ἀνάγκη δὴ πάντα τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἢ χρῆσθαι ξέναις λέξεσι καὶ τῶν συνηθῶν ὀνομάτων ἀπηλλοτριωμέναις, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀγνώστων πραγμάτων εἰσὶν ἐξηγηταί, ἢ τῇ προχείρῳ χρῆσθαι συνηθείᾳ καὶ τὰ ἐπ’ ἄλλων κείμενα ὀνόματα μεταφέρειν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ σύμβολα καὶ σημεία τῶν πραγμάτων τίθεται τὰ ὀνόματα, τοῖς μὲν πᾶσι γνωρίμοις ἀνάγκη ἦν ἤδη κείσθαι ὀνόματα ἃ ταῦτα σημαίνει, ὅσα δ’ ἐπιστημονικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, παρὰ τῶν ἐπιστημόνων ἀπῆται τὴν θέσιν. See also KOTZIA (2001), 1089f.

¹¹³ See also FÖGEN (2000), 82. Again, see PONCELET’s (1957, 170 n. 1) comments on this issue which are persuasive. See also discussion in SEELE (1995), 83-4.

that Cicero resorted to a process of lexical innovation in Latin on a scale never seen before or even after his philosophical works?¹¹⁴

An explanation might be that technical terms in general are not necessary for the discussion of philosophical matters, as discussed in the Introduction.¹¹⁵ To take an example from the modern era, public interviews of politicians or journalists on issues such as ethics and morality, political philosophy, legal philosophy, folk psychology and so on, are often not laden with technical jargon, especially in mainstream media. Such areas of philosophy, however, possess very long histories of technical terms, for example in the writings of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. It is, therefore, inaccurate to claim that such lay persons cannot discuss these subjects in any detail; it occurs regularly in any case without the necessity of terms such as ‘*res cogitans*’, ‘Master-Slave dialectic’, or ‘*Aufhebung*’. However, philosophy is its own genre with its own style and vocabulary. The Greeks began to use this genre for many applications, stemming from and occurring in parallel with oral debates on similar issues. Plato’s dialogues, for instance, often displayed what LAPINI (2015, 1023) describes as an ‘osmosis’ between everyday language and philosophical jargon. This had the benefit of keeping philosophical discourse connected with the common people, and provided philosophers with ‘double-faced’ words that could be used in technical and non-technical senses. Yet Plato was not entirely without his own jargon, renovating established terms into core concepts around which his philosophical project was framed. As Greek philosophy progressed, the ‘professionalisation’ of philosophy was essentially the technicalisation of it, and engendered various schools with oral and literary cultures.¹¹⁶ These often created new

¹¹⁴ WYNNE (2019, 12) proffers the most recent explanation: ‘Thus he must think not that Latin is already better equipped for philosophy than is Greek, but rather that it starts with more raw materials out of which make philosophical terms of art (cf. *Tusculans* 1.1-5)’.

¹¹⁵ Certainly the Epicureans were highly averse to specialised or overly technical vocabulary; see e.g. Cicero’s discussion of Amafinius and Rabirius’ views on using ordinary language (*Ac.* 5).

¹¹⁶ See e.g. BURNET (1892/1930), 308: ‘The reality of the “ideas” is the sort of reality “we are always talking about,” and they are explained in a peculiar vocabulary which is represented as that of a school. The technical terms [in Plato] are introduced by such formulas as “we say.”’ Plato, as an example, often directly borrowed from other technical vocabularies at the time as well, for example scientific vocabulary of the fifth century BC exemplified in Empedocles (see TAYLOR (1911), 215). See also BALDRY (1937); more recently LAPINI (2020), 1014: ‘[...] in Greece a specifically philosophical language was late in arising, and perhaps never came to exist. In any case, the Greek philosophers, including the *physikoi*, drew considerable advantage from being able to shift tacitly from the commonly accepted meaning of a term to its technical significance.’

vocabularies in which highly specialised discussions of topics were discussed, especially Stoicism (see e.g. Cic. *Ac.* 41). As with social practices, vocabularies changed over time, and so the expressions used by the Academy to discuss philosophy became a different type of vocabulary in the Peripatetics. When Cicero was composing his own philosophical tracts, these vocabularies were cemented in the Greek intellectual and literary culture of his time, yet had only incipient (if non-existent) analogues in Latin.

Cicero's lexical innovations number over a hundred individual new Latin words or meanings and many more Greek loan-words in addition.¹¹⁷ Where a *mot juste* could not be found in Latin, his overt reliance on techniques such as periphrasis to gloss Greek words and introduce new Latin ones (or new meanings to existing ones) becomes palpable.¹¹⁸ By way of example, in the *N.D.* (1.109), Cicero has the sceptic, Cotta, introduce *aequilibritas* as an equivalent of the Greek *ἰσωνομία*: *confugis ad aequilibratam (sic enim ἰσωνομίαν si placet appellemus)*.¹¹⁹ Similarly, in his translation of Plato's *Timaeus*, Cicero diffidently introduces the notion of *comparatio proportiove* as follows: *id optime adsequitur, quae Graece ἀναλογία, Latine (audendum est enim, quoniam haec primum a nobis novantur) comparatio proportiove dici potest*. LAMBARDI notes the phrase is introduced with such 'apparent hesitation' that the concept of the *novitas rerum* is explicitly invoked to the reader.¹²⁰ In the same work, the abundance of double translations might indicate that Cicero was far from confident in directly expanding Latin vocabulary through lexical innovation directly (or at least that is the impression he gives his audience through the use of such a practice).¹²¹ This allows us to pose the question whether Latin was, in fact, 'even richer in vocabulary' (*copia verborum*, see the *Ac.* 26) than Greek in any meaningful sense at all.

Cicero's prefatory remarks, combined with his actual practice found in his treatises, gives the impression of a rhetorician confident of the supremacy of Latin over Greek, only to rely upon coining new words and augmenting the meanings of existing words cautiously and

¹¹⁷ See also OKSALA (1953), 132-52 for a compilation of word-forms in Cicero's philosophical works.

¹¹⁸ Note that Cicero expressly admits to using double translations, and even loan-words, to render single Greek words in *Fin.* 3.15.

¹¹⁹ See e.g. PEASE (1955), 1.494: '*sic [...] appellemus*: one of the familiar apologies for a newly-coined word.'

¹²⁰ LAMBARDI (1982), 70.

¹²¹ See LAMBARDI (1982), 58 for a list of some double translation examples in Cicero's *Timaeus*.

even apologetically¹²² which, according REILEY, demonstrates the ‘fine conscience of the scholar’.¹²³ The *peripeteia* of this drama between the lexica of Greek and Latin is the eventual realisation that there is no distinction between what Cicero says in his prefaces and what he does in his dialogues — *both* are rhetorical devices serving rhetorical purposes and neither one can be taken as a more accurate insight into his true motives than the other.¹²⁴ The example of the frequent use of double translation can also be seen not so much a cautious hesitation, but the work of a seasoned rhetorician using a reliable rhetorical device, one which Cicero had been adept at deploying in his speeches.¹²⁵ The ‘fine conscience of a scholar’ and the apparent reticence of his introduction of new Latin words and meanings is no less a Ciceronian rhetorical stratagem than the over-confident assertions which abound throughout his prefaces.

This conclusion implies a highly sceptical interpretation. It imputes to Cicero a sort of sophistic quality, casting rhetorical trickery upon his readers so as to persuade them into thinking he was translating Greek philosophy for the benefit of the Republic. Such ‘trickery’ was manifested by his use of the superior expression and more copious lexicon of Latin not just to transfer Greek ideas into Latin, but to express them more precisely and surpass the Greeks entirely.¹²⁶ As BARAZ has noted on the issue of originality (which we may also extend to the aspects of style and relative success of Cicero’s translation project as a whole), there has been much ink spilled by critics on these issues. Some have asked whether Cicero really did successfully translate his Greek models, and of introducing what REE described as ‘a half-Greek enclave within Latin, for the purpose of discussing philosophy’.¹²⁷ On the other hand, some ask whether his philosophical works can simply be written off as outright failures of translation, poor imitations of Platonic dialogues, or mere rhetorical exercises in manipulating

¹²² See BELL (1991), 85 for some examples discussing Cicero’s attitude to the coinage of ‘technical’ terms.

¹²³ REILEY (1909), 15.

¹²⁴ This was evident in Cicero’s speeches as well, see e.g. TAHIN (2013), 11.

¹²⁵ For pleonasm in Cicero’s speeches see HATZ (1886). See also his use of double translation in his rhetorical manuals, e.g. *Orat.* 204: *in quo quaesitum est intotone circumitu illo orationis, quem Graeci περίοδον, nos tum ambitum, tum circumitum, tum comprehensionem aut continuationem aut circumscriptionem dicimus.*

¹²⁶ See e.g. JAX (1959), 156-6.

¹²⁷ Cf. REE (2001), 247.

the Greek originals for his own aims (e.g. by denigrating Epicureanism and promoting the sceptical Academic views of Antiochus of Ascalon or Philo of Larissa).¹²⁸

In the former camp falls the scholarship of FÖGEN, who emphasised the influence of socio-linguistic factors (especially issues of ‘inferiority’ of Latin vis-à-vis Greek) as motivators for Cicero’s translations, notably political and rhetorical.¹²⁹ FÖGEN also focused on linguistic equality as a means of explicating Cicero’s achievement (avoiding value judgements entirely regarding the inferiority or superiority for philosophical discourse of Latin versus Greek and rather acknowledging the linguistic accomplishments of Cicero in his own native language, providing a discourse of Greek philosophy in Latin, fertile for Roman conditions).¹³⁰ The latter view is most pronounced in the scholarship of PONCELET, among others,¹³¹ who (as POWELL and, more recently, WHITE have argued successfully),¹³² appear to err in arguing that Cicero ‘failed’ to produce an effective copy or word-for-word translation of Platonic philosophy. This failure, they assert, was due to the limitations of Latin (or as PONCELET describes it: ‘[L]’arsenal de moyens pauvres en nombre et en qualité’¹³³) in expounding the abstract concepts of Greek philosophy. PONCELET pronounces (1957, 21) that the ‘défauts’ of Latin philosophical works are (present tense) ‘incontestables et incontestés’. We might cede his point if we operated on the premise that Latin philosophical authors sought to reproduce and transpose Greek thought, both in terms of how it was conceptualised and how it was expressed.

¹²⁸ As to which school Cicero actually followed is still a matter of some debate, see POWELL (1995a), 18-19.

¹²⁹ For the influence of Roman politics (particularly regarding Caesar’s ascension to power) on Cicero’s philosophical treatises see e.g. GILDENHARD (2007), 225-9 and BARAZ (2012); cf. also e.g. MCELDUFF (2013), 103 and recently RENAUD (2018), particularly regarding Cicero’s appropriation of Plato and the tension between the contemplative and the political life.

¹³⁰ See FÖGEN (2000), e.g. 139f.

¹³¹ WHITE (2015), 82 includes MORESCHINI (1979) and TRAGLIA (1971) as falling into similar errors of assumption as PONCELET (1957).

¹³² POWELL (1995), 284-5; WHITE (2015), 80ff, 236-7. See e.g. WHITE (2015, 323) for an example of such a conclusion regarding Cicero’s manipulation or ‘rewriting’ of the original Greek philosophical texts to serve his own ends; also REINHARDT (2005), 166 and 175.

¹³³ PONCELET (1957), 363.

However, as we shall see, such an aim was not at all something Latin authors were interested in, and certainly not Cicero, until much later.¹³⁴ It was instead an intellectual and creative rivalry, at least initially, that motivated not an *imitatio* but an *aemulatio*. There is no need to fall on one side or the other regarding the relative success or failure of Cicero's translation project in general. This is partly because, as will become evident, the binary question is both incorrect and unhelpful. However, one could argue that I have, in summarising the above works of scholarship over the last century and their respective conclusions, categorised them unfairly or have set up a false dichotomy between them. It is certainly beyond the scope of this work to analyse each scholar's views in sufficient depth, or to evaluate each one with respect to the others. I will also cede that the notion of the scholarship falling into a binary category of Cicero's 'success' or 'failure' in his philosophical translations might better be replaced by a spectrum, between whose poles the various claims in the scholarship surveyed above could fall. Yet on either view, the argument remains the same: the very notions of Cicero's success or failure, creative literary rewriting or inferior imitation of Greek philosophy and so on, miss the point. The results of Cicero and later authors writing in Latin were very nearly the complete supersession of Greek philosophy (until the resurgence of access to Greek originals in the Latin West around the twelfth and thirteenth centuries), replaced or rather sublated within Latin.¹³⁵

Through authors like Cicero, the Scholastics of the Middle Ages rediscovered the ideas of the Academics, Stoics, and Epicureans (the latter most especially via Cicero and Lucretius in the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance).¹³⁶ By 'rediscovered', I do not mean

¹³⁴ Cf. POWELL (2005), 125-6 discussing Cicero's use (or rather adaptation) of the legal language of the Twelve Tables in the *Leg.* He notes that: '[Cicero's] law code is intended not as a historical reconstruction but as a statement of the natural principles of good government, for the benefit of Romans in 52 BC and their posterity, cast into the most dignified literary form he can muster (including allusions to the Twelve Tables) but with no reason to indulge in philological antiquarianism purely for its own sake'. Cicero borrowed elements from his source (in this case a symbolic legal one), whilst imbuing it with his own literary creativity and distinct style (see POWELL (2005), 131-2 for instance).

¹³⁵ The term is meant in the sense of *Aufhebung*, the *terme d'art* of HEGEL (e.g. (1976) 106-8), see e.g. FORSTER (1993), 132. Analysing the issue in this sense, the resulting tradition of ancient philosophy (via Latin) was the preservation, replacement, and modification of Greek terms (and by necessity, the Latin lexis and syntax as well), to varying extents.

¹³⁶ On the influence of Lucretius on the Western intellectual tradition see e.g. GREENBLATT (2011), 13, 185, etc. but note MONFASANI's (2012) important criticisms. See also DINKOVA-BRUUN (2011), 289 for an overview of the later expansion of the Latin philosophical lexicon, especially regarding the Aristotelian corpus.

‘recovered’ or ‘re-understood’ but rather, discovered through the lens and the linguistic limits of the Latin language. WHITE argues, following LEFEVERE’s theory, that all translation is rewriting of an original text,¹³⁷ that what Cicero achieved with his philosophical works was a ‘creative re-writing’ of the Greek originals. We could go further by saying that the *consequences* of Cicero’s philosophical works were not so much a rewriting, but a replacement. Greek strands of thought were to be refracted through a Latin lens (the Latin of Lucretius and Cicero, and later authors) and altered the direction of Western thought into the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. This then transformed how the ideas of Ancient Greece were understood, how they related to Roman culture, and, to a significant extent,¹³⁸ to later Western European culture.

1.5. THE CICERONIAN LEGACY

After an assessment of the results of these endeavours, Cicero’s vocabulary building has received effusive praise in the last few decades. He has been viewed as the high water mark of lexical innovation in Latin literary history.¹³⁹ In antiquity, Romans, in Cicero’s time and after, cited his achievements in forging a Latin intellectual *Wortschatz* and could evaluate his achievements by measuring the implementation of his philosophical terminology against their Greek originals.¹⁴⁰ Plutarch emphatically declared that it was Cicero’s work that accomplished the translation of Greek philosophical dialogues and the appellations of dialecticians and natural philosophers into Latin.¹⁴¹ Yet not all of his endeavours were successful. RENER notes

¹³⁷ See WHITE (2015), *passim*, but esp. 37 citing LEFEVERE (1992), vi.

¹³⁸ See e.g. SCHMITT (1972), 33; SEIGEL (1968, 30): ‘In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, Cicero’s writings provided more information about ancient culture than practically any other classical source.’

¹³⁹ Cf. MORESCHINI (1979), 100 in the context of the Latin *traduzione artistica*; see also MARIOTTI (1952), 12-16. Note, I do not include in this ‘high water mark’ the technical works of antiquity which increasingly transposed Greek technical terms in a range of fields into Latin, see e.g. FÖGEN (2009), 90f. For Cicero’s immense contributions to Latin philosophical vocabulary in general, see LAURAND (1934), 1.30; HORSFALL (1979), 81; PUELMA (1980), 153-4; LÉVY (1992), 106; HÖSLE (2008), 147-8; GLUCKER (2015), 46.

¹⁴⁰ PUELMA (1980), 153-4.

¹⁴¹ Plut., *Cic.* 40.2: ἐκεῖνος γάρ ἐστιν ὡς φασιν ὁ καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν καὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν καὶ τὴν κατάληψιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν ἄτομον, τὸ ἀμερές, τὸ κενὸν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξονομάσας πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα Ῥωμαίοις, τὰ μὲν μεταφοραῖς, τὰ δ’ οἰκειότησιν ἄλλαις γνώριμα καὶ προσήγορα μηχανησάμενος.

that many of his innovations fell into disuse.¹⁴² It is uncontroversial to claim that Cicero was in many ways an intellectual pioneer in Latin when it came to interpreting and reconfiguring Greek philosophy into the Roman literary world, although he could not have expected his prose works to resonate so far into the future, effectively creating a permanent vernacular not just for Roman, but for Western, philosophy as well.¹⁴³ The argument that he, perhaps, had reservations about the extent of his innovations is important. REILEY writes that, in Cicero's philosophy: 'We see the fine conscience of the scholar in his feeling for the right word [...] the meticulous hesitation of the open-minded Academic in the absolute acceptance of any precise term [...] [but] when we see the results in the aggregate, his work looks a bit like a glossary rather than an effort to free the Roman reading public from the Greek.'¹⁴⁴

An examination of Cicero's technical vocabulary, in particular his glosses from Greek, shows an author who appears hesitant (or at least he exhibits such a pretence to his audience), a writer who preferred conservative and incremental change to the Latin philosophical vocabulary. Like Lucretius, he wrote that *res novae* were not restricted to being conveyed merely by coined or unfamiliar words, but that he also had at his disposal existing words which could be imbued with a new meaning altogether,¹⁴⁵ or periphrases, double translation and pleonasm which could all be deployed when interpreting and discussing a Greek term to capture the meaning more accurately. Cicero was not averse to using Greek terms that had been naturalised by use (i.e. loan-blends), as he states in the *Fin.*,¹⁴⁶ but as POWELL observes, he could not resort to using inverted commas to demonstrate that he was using a word in a novel sense.¹⁴⁷ The semiotic concepts of *signifiant* versus *signifié*, adapted from the terminology of DE SAUSSURE,¹⁴⁸ usefully encapsulate the difference in translation techniques when it comes to lexical 'innovation'. The former encompasses the more mechanical

¹⁴² RENER (1989), 105.

¹⁴³ Cf. POWELL (1995b), 290.

¹⁴⁴ See REILEY (1909), 15.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *Tusc.* 3.7. See also his discussion of metaphor (*translata verba*) in rhetorical contexts in *de Orat.* 3.152.

¹⁴⁶ *Fin.* 3.5: *quamquam ea verba, quibus instituto veterum utimur pro Latinis [...] quamquam Latine ea dici poterant, tamen, quoniam usu percepta sunt, nostra ducamus*; cf. Cicero's *Part. Orat.* 5.16 on the difference between *nativa* words and *reperta* ones. See also LISCU (1930) and POWELL (1995a), 292.

¹⁴⁷ POWELL (1995), 293.

¹⁴⁸ The dichotomy of the *signified* (phonological) and *signifier* (conceptual/semantic) was explained in DE SAUSSURE (1959), 67.

translations such as morphological calques, examined below. The latter is the freer and looser adaptation of an existing term in the target language to the meaning of a term in the source language (lexical augmentation), a practice Cicero favoured.

The analysis below will be based on the dataset collected in **Appendix I**, which attempts to collate exhaustively Ciceronian lexical innovations and augmentations within his philosophical works. These terms can then be sorted into various categories, and I propose two main ones: 1) the translation *method*, following NEWMARK above, and 2) the lexical information about that term (how it was coined).

1.6. CICERONIAN TRANSLATION METHODS ANALYSED

Category of lexical innovation	Percentage (total number = 106 lemmata)
Augmentations (loan-shifts, etc.)	44% (47)
Sense translations	18% (19)
First-attested loan-words and loan-blends	6% (6)
Morphological calques	32% (34)

From a preliminary glance, we see that Cicero was likely to employ a morphological calque or a loan-word or blend 38% of the time, and to use an existing term to which to add a new meaning or to employ a sense translation 62% of the time. It shows that he was certainly careful in his introducing of novel terms but he was certainly not the ‘purist’ that we might assume from reading his prefaces. The following broad categories are intended to summarise the main methods of Cicero’s lexical innovations and first-attested loans into his philosophical works. As surveyed above, one can further refine the translation procedures themselves but the lists below provide a useful insight into the scale of Cicero’s philosophical lexicon and how it was constructed.

Loan-words and loan-blends (phonological translation, transference, naturalisation)

OKSALA (1954) has examined loan-words in Cicero's works in detail, however those that appear to have been attested first in Latin in Cicero's philosophical works are few. The issue, however, is that just because a loan-word appears in a philosophical work for the first time in Latin, this does not indicate that the term is strictly philosophical or pertaining to that subject matter. Many first-attested loan-words in Cicero's philosophical treatises are of concrete objects, plants, diseases, place-names, and persons (e.g. *lapathum*, λάπαθον). As a result, I have included only those pertaining to philosophical or mathematical terms, or things that could broadly be considered related to the subject of 'philosophy':

dialecticus (διαλεκτικός) *Fin.* 2.17

dogma (δόγμα) *Luc.* 27, 29; *Fin.* 2.105

empiricus (ἐμπειρικός) *Luc.* 122

*helica*¹⁴⁹ (ἑλίκη) *Timaeus* 31

melancholicus (μελαγχολικός) *Tusc.* 1.80

sophisma (σόφισμα) *Luc.* 75

The question of orthography when examining the Greek loans Cicero employs in his literary works is important to touch on here. In most cases, the Greek loans are in fact loan-blends, i.e. terms naturalised using Latin suffixation, hence REID (1885, 138): 'Cicero very seldom (excepting in his Letters) introduces a Greek word without a comment on its meaning, unless the word has been thoroughly naturalised.'¹⁵⁰ We might ask: in which words did Cicero preserve the Greek morphology of loans and in which did he naturalise them? An interesting case is *dogma* (δόγμα) found in Cicero's *Luc.* (27, 29) and the *Fin.* (2.105). If we accept the chronology of composition that places the second book of the first edition of Cicero's *Academica* treatises in approximately March of 45 BC, and the *Fin.* just after or nearly

¹⁴⁹ There is some doubt as to the textual evidence here with some manuscripts containing *felicitate*, but see *TLL* (s.v. *helix*, 6.3.2596.43-4) and PLASBERG's (1908, 180) critical apparatus which suggests this reading 'licet dubitari'.

¹⁵⁰ See discussion in HINCKERS (2020), 73 on Cicero's rare preference for a Greek loan-word, *sortes* (σωρείτης), instead of *acervalis* in *Div.* 2.11.

contemporaneous (late May or early June of 45),¹⁵¹ then we find an interesting progression of orthography. In *Luc.* 27, Cicero wrote: *quae neque de se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis quae philosophi vocant δόγματα*. PLASBERG (1908) prints the Greek neuter plural with Greek letters. This is a standard glossing that Cicero was wont to do when translating a Greek term, here with the sense translation *decretum*.¹⁵² In *Luc.* 29 later, he glosses again: *quoniam enim id haberent Academici decretum (sentitis enim iam hoc me δόγμα dicere)*, with PLASBERG again printing the Greek orthography. Two ninth-century manuscripts (**A** and **B** = Codex Vossianus fol. 84 and fol. 86), however, show *dogmata* in *Luc.* 27, and one other (**V** = Vindobonensis 189, ninth or tenth century) had *dogma* in *Luc.* 29. By the time of the *Fin.*, Cicero wrote: *ut proverbia nonnulla veriora sint quam vestra dogmata*. Here, there is no gloss and no Greek orthography and neither MADVIG (1876/2010, 318) nor REYNOLDS (1998, 88) report any *variae lectiones* in the paradosis. So we might posit two possibilities: Cicero retained the Greek orthography and glossed the term with a Latin neologism, as he had done elsewhere in his philosophical works, then transliterated the word a short while later in the *Fin.*, or he transliterated the Greek term into Latin orthography from the outset. Either way, orthography of loan-words in general is a matter of manuscripts as we noted above, p. 31, and often the choices made by scribes throughout the paradosis. There is ultimately no ‘innovation’ at play here on Cicero’s part, and the innovation we are interested in is the gloss, not the loan-word itself. The reason *dogma* is counted as a first-attested loan-word for the purposes of this study is due to its appearance in the *Fin.* without a Latin equivalent (i.e. *dogmata* is used instead of *decreta*). However, in general, loan-words do not bear upon the data to a significant degree (there are only 8 first-attested loan-words in Cicero’s philosophical vocabulary out of 106 lexical innovations and augmentations).

¹⁵¹ See e.g. MALASPINA (1997/2004), 214-5.

¹⁵² Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 95.10 using *decreta*, *scita*, and *placita* to render δόγματα and Apuleius’ translation of δόγματα with *consulta* in *Pl.* 1.189.

Ciceronian Lexical Innovations (morphological calques and sense translation neologisms)

The following terms appear in Cicero's philosophical corpus for the first time whilst also being overtly glossed or directly translated¹⁵³ from Greek technical terms. Entries marked with an asterisk (*) indicate sense translations:

<i>abscessio</i> (ἄπειμι)	<i>defenstrix</i> (σωτηρία)	<i>perceptum</i> (θεώρημα)
<i>acervalis*</i> (σωρίτης/σωρείτης)	<i>effector*</i> (δημιουργός)	<i>praesensio*</i> (μαντική)
<i>aegrotatio</i> (ἀρρώστημα)	<i>effectrix*</i> (δημιουργός)	<i>qualitas</i> (ποιότης)
<i>altrix*</i> (τροφός)	<i>efficiens*</i> (ποιητικός)	<i>sesquialter</i> (ἡμόλιος)
<i>animatio*</i> (γένος)	<i>enuntiatio*</i> (ἀξίωμα)	<i>sesquioctavus</i> (ἐπόγδοος)
<i>antecessio</i> (προχώρησις)	<i>evidens*</i> (ἐναργής)	<i>sesquitercius</i> (ἐπίτριτος)
<i>anticipatio</i> (πρόληψις)	<i>evidentia</i> (ἐναργεία)	<i>soliditas</i> (στερεοειδής)
<i>appetitus*</i> (ὄρμη)	<i>excandescencia</i> (θύμωσις)	<i>temperatio*</i> (συγκεράννυμι, κρατήρ)
<i>approbatio</i> (συγκατάθεσις)	<i>impulsio*</i> (δύναμις)	<i>tractabilis</i> (ἁπτός)
<i>aspectabilis</i> (ὁρατός)	<i>indifferens</i> (ἀδιάφορον)	<i>translativus</i> (μετάληψις)
<i>assensio</i> (συγκατάθεσις)	<i>indissolubilis/indissolutus</i> (ἄλυτος)	<i>unigena</i> (μονογενής)
<i>coagmentatio*</i> (συστατός)	<i>informatio</i> (πρόληψις)	<i>veriloquium</i> (ἐτυμολογία)
<i>colligatio</i> (δεσμός)	<i>inintellegens</i> (ἀνόητος)	<i>universitas*</i> (τὸ πᾶν)
<i>comprehensibilis</i> (καταληπτός)	<i>inliquefactus</i> (συντήκων)	
<i>comprehensio</i> (κατάληψις)	<i>medietas</i> (μεσότης)	
<i>concentio*</i> (ἁρμονία, συμφωνία)	<i>mulierositas</i> (φιλογυνία)	
<i>consumptio</i> (φθίσις)	<i>mutabilis*</i> (σκεδαστός)	
<i>convenientia*</i> (ὁμολογία)	<i>opinabilis</i> (δοξαστός)	
<i>cuneolus*</i> (γόμφος)	<i>parvitas</i> (σμικρότης)	

The favoured suffix is the suffix *-tio* with ~33% of Cicero's morphological calques using this morpheme to derive new nouns (from verbal bases).¹⁵⁴ Interestingly, frequency analysis of the

¹⁵³ One of the criteria for ascertaining lexical innovations outlined in the Introduction is the presence of direct signals, e.g. introductory or following phrases or glosses. In the case of Cicero's translation of the *Timaeus*, these signals are obviously not required.

¹⁵⁴ The five types of suffixes (see below) found in the data are used in three ways, to derive: nouns from verbs (*colligo*, *colligatio*; *alo*, *altrix*), nouns from adjectives (*mulierosus*, *mulierositas*), or adjectives from nouns (*acervus*, *acervalis*).

morpheme in Cicero's entire corpus indicates a preference for *-tus* rather than *-tio* by a ratio of 3:2 (see e.g. LANGSLOW (2000), 279 and n. 32). Less frequent are those abstracts in *-tas* (9%) and *-ia* (7%). These suffixes would become highly productive in later authors, often for rhythmical reasons. In this case, it is certainly part of Cicero's rhetorical sensitivities that the use of this abstract suffix also helped form well-balanced *clausulae*, a particular trait of his rhetorical works. The adjectival *-bilis* is less frequent (9%) but the aversion to forming such words using this suffix was common throughout Classical Latin, and only became more frequent in Silver Latin.¹⁵⁵ The following morpheme-to-morpheme equivalences are of interest:

Ciceronian ending	Original Greek ending
<i>-tio</i>	<i>-σις, -μα, -ια</i>
<i>-tas</i>	<i>-μα, -δης, -της, -ειδης, -ια</i>
<i>-ial/-entia</i>	<i>-ια, -σις</i>
<i>-bilis</i>	<i>-τος</i>

The most versatile for Cicero was *-tas*, assigned the most work in rendering an array of Greek abstract suffixes. There is ample literature on the development of this suffix from Archaic into Classical Latin,¹⁵⁶ yet it is enough to mention here the spectrum of abstract suffixes in Latin Cicero prefers, of which *-tas* is most productive compared with others such as *-tudo*, (a suffix we do not find used in Ciceronian lexical innovations, except for Cotta's *beatitudo* in *N.D.* 1.95, used in conjunction with *beatitas*),¹⁵⁷ or the feminine agent suffix *-trix*. Cicero was aware of the nuances in semantic function of his endings. For instance, with the verbal substantive *excandescencia* rendering *θύμωσις*, where the ongoing 'burning' or 'growing hot' (*excandescere*), with the enlarging, inchoative force of *-esco* (*OLD* s.v.), matching *-σις*,

¹⁵⁵ See HOFMANN-SZANTYR, 767-8. Though note also LEUMANN (1977), 348 who gives two observations on the suffix: 1) it is found throughout technical vocabularies and 2) that, since Cicero, the suffixation occurs from the past participle stem instead of the present (so *plausibilis* instead of **plaudibilis*), however see *comprehendibilis* in *Ac.* 1.41 (see *OLD* s.v. *comprehensibilis*). Note also SEN (2015), 105 n. 39.

¹⁵⁶ See STEWART (1910); HOFMANN-SZANTYR, 743-44; LEUMANN (1977), 373-5; CUPAIULO (1991), 106; FÖGEN (2000), 95-6 (on *beatitas* versus *beatitudo*); BRACHET (2002), 79-89; DAUDE (2002), 225-305.

¹⁵⁷ See DAUDE (2002), 252.

which denoted an ongoing action (contrast with *-μα*: the result of an action).¹⁵⁸ Where the Greek original lacked morphological complexity, Cicero regularly turned to sense translation.

There are, perhaps, three instances of phonological translation. Whether these are simply coincidences of phonology as the result of morphological calques is worth bearing in mind. In the instance of *indifferens*, rendering *ἀδιάφορον*, the phonology of the Greek is replaced by similar phonology in the Latin.¹⁵⁹ *Levitas* (*λειότης*), though in fact a semantic calque, and *medietas* (*μεσότης*, by analogy with other abstract nouns derived from second declension adjectives, e.g. *varietas*) might be classified in a similar manner.

Lexical augmentations (synonymy: semantic shifts, extensions, loan-shifts)

A loan-shift, also called a ‘semantic extension’, consists of extending a word’s meaning to accommodate a new concept or sense acquired from a donor language (MOTT AND LASO (2020), 158). These account for 44% of the philosophical vocabulary Cicero introduced. The extensive use of loan-shifts over time inevitably leads to polysemy which often dramatically affects the meaning and conceptual interpretation of ancient philosophical terms.¹⁶⁰ In addition, there is the metaphorical use of established terms applied for philosophical purposes, e.g. *fabricator*. There are also terms in this list which actually fit the label of morphological calque as well as being a loan-shift; namely *levitas* for *λειότης* (discussed further below in the *Timaeus* lexical commentary), and *incerta* for *ἄδηλα*. The following terms I have classified as Ciceronian lexical augmentations:

absolutio (τελείωσις)

aedificator (τό αἷτιον)

admirabilia (παράδοξα)

aequilibritas (ἰσονομία)

¹⁵⁸ See PEPPLER (1916), 460 and 464. Also WILLI (2003), 138. Note that Latin lacks such a distinction in their suffixes, so *-tio* encompasses both *-σις* and *-μα* in Cicero’s calques.

¹⁵⁹ SEELE (1995), 29 sees this as a straightforward calque, as I classify it here too, but it might also be viewed as a phonological or ‘echo’ translation, cf. Lucretius’ choice of *clinamen* over *declinatio* for κλίσις.

¹⁶⁰ See CASSIN *et al.* (2014), 24f (s.v. αἰών and the later Latin equivalents of *aevum*, *aeternitas*, *perpetuitas*, *aeviternitas*, *sempiternitas/tempus*). See also KELLY (1979), 140 for a discussion of examples of polysemy and ‘dynamic equivalence’ in Cicero’s translations.

aestimatio (ἀξία)
artifex (δημιουργός)
concuratio (παραβολή)
consequens (ἐπιγεννηματικός)
contentio (κρινόμενον)
corpus (σῶμα)
decretum (δόγμα)
dissimulatio/dissimulantia (εἰρωνεία)
effatum (ἀξίωμα)
extremum, finis, summum, ultimum (τέλος)
fabricator (τεκταινόμενος)
fatum (εἰμαρμένη)¹⁶¹
frugalitas (σωφροσύνη)
incerta (ἄδηλα)¹⁶²
levitas (λειότης)
materia (οὐσία)
mirabilia (παράδοξα)
morbus (πάθος)
nota (σύμβολον)¹⁶³
notatio (ἐτυμολογία)
notitia (ἐννοια, πρόληψις)¹⁶⁴
perspicuitas (ἐναργεία)

¹⁶¹ Cf. also Cicero's other innovation of *confatalis* (*Fat.* 30). He does not give the Greek equivalent however it has been suggested that *συνειμαρμένον* was the original term, however the suggested Greek equivalent does not occur in the Stoa (LSJ: s.v. *συνείμαρται*: 'has been determined by fate, Aristid. *Or.* 24 (44).56; *συνειμαρμένα jointly determined by fate*, Plut. 2.569f, cf. Lyd. *Mens.* 4.81'); see also MEIJER (2007), 225 n. 1154.

¹⁶² The Stoics and Epicureans disagreed on how to differentiate the ἄδηλα or 'not-manifest', 'unproved' (LSJ) inferences as opposed to the πρόδηλα 'clear' (LSJ) ones; see further discussion in AITKEN AND PAGET (2014), 189-90.

¹⁶³ Aristotle's σύμβολον does not have the same semantic sense as English *symbol* nor Latin *nota* (see LONG (2011), 100 for a discussion of the unique Aristotelian sense of the term), although this is the word into which Cicero renders the Greek. *Nota* is not a new Latin word, but the specific philosophical meaning of Aristotle's σύμβολον being imbued into the notion of *nota* is an innovation, albeit a subtly inaccurate *ad sensum* translation. Cf. also the use of *nota* in *Luc.* 84 regarding the Epicurean notion of 'peculiarity' (ιδίωμα).

¹⁶⁴ For the conflation of these two Greek concepts into the single Latin term and the conflation of the Stoic ἐννοιαί 'conceptions' with Platonic 'Ideas', see SANDBACH (1971), 30; REINHARDT (2003), 268; DYSON (2009), xvii-xix.

praecipuus, praepositus, productus, promotus (προηγμένον)¹⁶⁵

principatus (ἡγεμονικόν, ἀρχή)

procreator (ὁ συνιστάς)

productus (προάγω)

proportio (ἀναλογία)

quiescere (ἡσυχάζειν)

recordatio (ἀνάμνησις)

reducta, reiecienda, reiecta, remota (ἀποπροηγμένα)¹⁶⁶

solivagus (ἔρημος)

species (εἶδος, ἰδέα)

sumptio (λήμμα)

temperantia (σωφροσύνη)

visum (φαντασία)

As will be discussed in the context of the *Timaeus* translation below, the use of metaphor and metonymy in rendering certain Greek terms (for instance, *fabricator* for τεκταινόμενος etc.) is a crucial part of Ciceronian lexical augmentation. As will also be discussed below, the translation of culturally-laden terms like σωφροσύνη required less of a literal approach to capturing the sense of the Greek term and an almost hermeneutical translation process on Cicero's part, cycling through an array of near-equivalents to best capture all dimensions of the original. So *temperantia* is not Cicero's only choice in translating σωφροσύνη, he also suggests *modestia* and *frugalitas* (*Tusc.* 3.16). Similarly, Cicero canvasses a few possible established terms for Zeno's concept of 'things that are to be preferred' (προηγμένον) with *producta* being the etymological translation (*pro-* + *duco* from *προ-* + ἄγω), although other existing words have also been suggested and I include *promota* here as well (see LEWIS AND SHORT s.v. *promoveo*: 'II B. *subst*: prōmōta, ōrum, n., in the lang[uage] of the Stoics, things that are to be preferred, preferable things, as being next in degree to absolute good; a literal transl[ation] of the Gr. προηγμένα').

¹⁶⁵ For a brief discussion of Cicero's remarks on this term see GLUCKER (2012), 52-3.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. also the neuter pl. *reiectanea*: *autem, morbum, egestatem, dolorem, non appello mala, sed, si libet, reiectanea* (*Fin.* 4.72); *reicienda* (*Fin.* 5.78); and *reducta* (*Fin.* 5.90). See further TLL s.v. *reiectaneus*, 11.6.866.19-20: 'i. q. *reiectus*, non nisi neutr. plur. pro subst. ad vertendum t. t. *philos.* ἀποπροηγμένα'.

1.7. LEXICAL INNOVATION THROUGH TRANSLATION: CICERO'S *TIMAEUS* AS CASE-STUDY

What is intended for the rest of this chapter is to apply what we know from the above analysis regarding Ciceronian lexical innovation, to concrete examples directly. The best source to accomplish this applied methodology is Cicero's only surviving translation, that of Plato's *Timaeus*, which was composed around July 45 BC (MALASPINA (1997/2004), 215). The case-study below will be selective, consisting of a lexical commentary of the surviving work. Cicero's *Timaeus* is not a lengthy text, this makes it a useful case for such an applied analysis of Ciceronian translation techniques deployed to transform Plato's cosmological narrative into Latin. However, the text itself is blighted by various lacunae, either due to transmission issues or simply because Cicero chose to omit these sections from his version.

Past discussion of Ciceronian neology in his translation of the *Timaeus* have been limited, and the pertinent studies are PUELMA, LEMOINE, and SEELE. The second compares the lexical innovations in Cicero's translation with Calcidius' (discussed later in this thesis) and the word-list in that work has been used as the basis for the innovations collected below (1998, 79-81), however not without some caution. Whereas SEELE seems to under-count the amount of new terms or meanings used by Cicero in his translation of Plato (she argues for only 6 instances in total 1995, 29-30), LEMOINE seems to over-attribute terms he adjudicates as 'neologisms'. For instance, the poetic term *aerius*, first seen in Lucretius (5.825), cannot be considered a genuine Ciceronian coinage as prescribed by the criteria in the Introduction to this study (or simply by chronology; Lucretius' usage preceded Cicero's). Similarly, terms like *individuus* are Ciceronian but the first occurrence is not in the *Timaeus*, rather in the *Fin.* (1.17), which appears to date from May 45 BC, whereas Cicero's translation was more likely composed months later in June or July. Most detrimental, perhaps, is that LEMOINE's list of 'neologisms' fails to distinguish between a genuine neologism and a semantic shift or loan-word. So the abstract noun *aeternitas*, used well before Cicero's translation (in the rhetorical

works of *Inv.* 1.39¹⁶⁷ or *Pis.* 3) but only comes to bear the cosmological sense of ‘temporal eternity’ in relation to Plato’s *οὐσία* and the creation of the Universe in Cicero’s *Timaeus*. Similarly, *fabricator* as an equivalent of *τεκταινόμενος*, is a loan-shift not a neologism, also used in Lucretius years earlier (3.472). These limitations notwithstanding, such studies serve as valuable starting points for this commentary, and (later in the thesis) for our examination of Calcidius’ translation.

Selective Lexical Commentary on Cicero’s Timaeus

The following lexical commentary is not intended as a critical edition of the text but rather a method of examining in some detail the lexical contributions of Cicero throughout his translation. As we will see, syntactical peculiarities are of almost no interest in this translation since Cicero’s version is very much a creative literary work of its own, preserving a distinct *Latinitas*, rather than composed as a technical work or pedagogical tool to convey a Greek philosophical text (as we will find more common in Boethius, for instance). However, the issue of translating a text, composed in what is essentially a paratactic language, into a hypotactic one like Latin has been well analysed to date, and the unfavourable assessment of PONCELET’s regarding this, seemingly, consistent process of constructing relative clauses in Latin to translate Plato’s plethora of participles has been alluded to in the Introduction. I will touch on these aspects of the translation, yet I refer readers primarily to the previous studies of the issue in PONCELET and SEELE. As for this commentary and any treatment of textual issues, I incline towards MOORE-BLUNT’s statements about his own on Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* Book 2: ‘I have deemed it necessary not to investigate strictly textual problems, except for those cases where the choice of variants is directly relevant to problems of stylistic usage.’¹⁶⁸ In this case, the analysis here is not concerned as much with the style of the translation as with the

¹⁶⁷ LEMOINE (1998), 74 acknowledges that the term appears in the *Inv.* but says nothing further on why this is important. Did Cicero understand the term in the sense of Plato’s more complex *οὐσία* or *τὸ αἰδίων* (two distinct concepts) as in the *Ti.*? Further, does he instead construe both Greek concepts in a strictly temporal sense, and therefore uses *aeternitas* not so much in a novel way but in the same sense as was used in his rhetorical works? As we shall see, this is an important question for Cicero’s interpretation of Plato’s *Ti.* as a whole. Nor does LEMOINE discuss Cicero’s use of the term to translate *αἰών* in the *N.D.* 1.9 (which also does not mean the same thing as Plato’s *οὐσία*), composed in close temporal proximity to his *Timaeus*.

¹⁶⁸ MOORE-BLUNT (1977), 1.

instances of lexical innovation in Latin. I have followed both PLASBERG's 1908 and PLASBERG AND AX's 1938/1987 editions, with limited guidance from GIOMINI. I have, therefore, printed Greek terms with Greek orthography and where I have made textual suggestions and changes to PLASBERG's text, these are discussed in the commentary itself.

The Eternal Exemplar and its Everlasting Image

Cicero's extant translation begins here, a section of exposition commencing at 27d in Plato's dialogue where Timaeus of Locri begins asking his friends, Socrates, Hermocrates, and Critias, certain riddles relating to the concepts of Being and Becoming and, ultimately, the nature of the Universe.

The Greek abstract *γένεσις* is rendered with the noun *ortus*, which seems to be a reasonable equivalent ontologically, the Latin expressing (*OLD* s.v. *ortus*, 5): 'the coming into being (of anything) in relation to its source, origin, derivation', mirroring the Platonic concept of a 'generation' or 'coming into being' (LSJ s.v. *γένεσις*; note also Boethius' translation of the word with *factura* in Chapter 5.4, q.v.). The difficulty lies with the concept of *τό ὄν*, modified by *ἀεί*, which one could argue has a different meaning to Cicero's *quod semper sit*.¹⁶⁹ PONCELET (1957, 165) criticises Cicero's 'abus des relatives' (abuse of relative clauses) in this section of the translation, but the syntax is less of the issue as opposed to the conceptual translation of terminology (though see SEELE (1995) 54-5). Plato's expression *τό ὄν* produces a technical term that has given Western philosophy much grist for the mill. In the Greek, Plato substantivises the verb 'to be' (*εἶμι*) into a singular present participle which, combined with the modifier *ἀεί*, gives the predicative sense of 'that which is eternal or eternally', as if it is a substance or entity acting or behaving in an eternal way. This is seen in phrases such as Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (1.6.46): *θεοὶ δέ [...] ἀεὶ ὄντες* 'but the gods [...] the ever-beings' or 'those who are *eternally*.'¹⁷⁰ As will be seen in the lamentations of the *egestas* in Seneca's *Epistle* 58, Latin cannot perform this operation, as the language has no concept of *sum* as a

¹⁶⁹ Its technical sense in Plato is not clear either, as WHITTAKER's (1968) article demonstrates in some detail. This ambiguity in terminology becomes more pronounced later in the dialogue (37d in particular).

¹⁷⁰ See LSJ s.v. *ἀεί*. Certainly the popular etymology of *αἰών*, see e.g. Aristotle tells us in *Cael.* 279a27, posited that the term derived from *ἀεί* and *ὤν*.

present participle.¹⁷¹ Cicero later renders the related term *οὐσία* with *aeternitas*, and this might have been an option in this section too, e.g.: **quid est, quod aeternitas habeat neque ullum ortum, et quod gignatur neque aeternitas (habeat)?* Rendering *τό ὄν* with *aeternitas* would have been a mistranslation in any case, since every created thing in the spatio-temporal Universe ‘exists’ or has existence (*τό ὄν*), but here Plato specifies a specific kind of being: *τό ὄν αἰεί*. Cicero instead characterises the opposition as something which ‘always is or exists’ (*semper sit*) rather than something with an *ortus*, and requires an entire shift in accidens (participle to finite verb) to accomplish this oblique potentiality of the thing which is both eternal and without origin. This is less precise than the Greek, as it imports a sense of constant ‘existence’, a notion of spatio-temporality and physicality (‘we exist *here*, or *there*, or in this place,’ etc.). This could equally be said of the Universe or of ‘matter’ in general (that *quod ortus est* as Cicero renders *γένεσις* and *γένεσθαι*). Timaeus describes them as perennially becoming through creation and destruction, but this is, ontologically, subordinate to the non-temporal, eternal being of Forms. The substantive differences may seem minimal initially but this section vividly demonstrates the difficulties of translation Cicero faced from the outset. As HINTZEN has observed, the formal and conceptual difficulties of translating Greek active or medial participles into Latin were considerable for Cicero and only about 10% could be translated with an equivalent Latin participle.¹⁷² As the complexities of Plato’s thought unfold throughout Timaeus’ exposition, these difficulties become exacerbated *in primis* because Plato’s ideas must be filtered through the parameters of the Latin language.

In *Timaeus* 2, the phrase *quod gignatur nec umquam sit?* might be compared with *Orat.* 3.10: *Plato eas [ιδέας] gigni negat et ait semper esse.*¹⁷³ Note, the translation of the present middle participle *γιγνόμενον* with the cognate¹⁷⁴ *gignatur* in the passive voice of the present subjunctive provides for a semantic, as well as morpho-syntactic, equivalent to Plato’s original middle voice. If we interpret *gignatur* as an autocausative passive in the sense of ‘self-generated or created’¹⁷⁵ we have a meaning closer to the Greek *τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν*

¹⁷¹ See also SEELE (1995), 53 and her analysis of the grammatical shifts from Greek in Cicero’s translation.

¹⁷² HINTZEN (1993), 189.

¹⁷³ See also SANDYS (1885), 11–12.

¹⁷⁴ Varro suggests *gignor* derives from Greek *γίγνομαι*, see *L.* 6.96.

¹⁷⁵ PINKSTER (2015), 260ff.

ἀεί, ὃν δὲ οὐδέποτε (‘what is, on the one hand, the self-becoming-eternally and, on the other, never existing?’). Cicero is largely consistent with *gignatur* as the equivalent to *γιγνόμενος*, though, as we saw, he sometimes prefers *ortus est*.

Next, the key concepts of *νόησις* and *λόγος* appear, with Cicero opting for *intellegentia* and *ratio* as the functional equivalents. The adjective in Plato, *περιληπτός* ‘comprehensible’, is replaced with the passive *comprehenditur*.¹⁷⁶ Plato, in the *Rep.* 509d, categorises *νόησις* as the highest kind of knowledge, whose objects are pure ideas, the Platonic Forms (εἶδη which Cicero renders with *species* in *Timaeus* 22, 35, also *forma* in *Orat.* 10 and *Top.* 30, and *ἰδέα* in *Ac.* 30). Cicero is consistent in his translation of *νόησις* with *intellegentia* (see ERNOUT-MEILLET, 350), using it here and elsewhere in *Timaeus* 10 (Plato’s *Ti.* 30b). In the next section, Plato’s *δόξα* is translated with *opinio* and *δοξαστόν* with the passive deverbative *opinabilis* (*opinor* + *-bilis*). It appears that Cicero first introduced the term but first used it in the *Ac.* 31 (*TLL* s.v., 9.2.711.79), where Cicero’s Varro character gives an exposition of Platonic Ideas.¹⁷⁷

The dualism between ‘opinion’ (of physical reality) and ‘understanding’ (of the Forms) is central to Platonic doctrine. Plato’s rhetorical strategy in the *Ti.* was to begin with the concrete, physical world and lead the reader towards a deeper understanding of the ‘Idea’, hence the analogy of the Divided Line, the integral epistemological cipher of Plato’s *Republic* and *Timaeus* dialogues. Through this metaphor, Plato differentiates between human kind’s *δόξα* consisting of *εἰκασία* ‘conjecture’ of the shadows of physical objects and their *πίστις* ‘belief’ of these objects (e.g. *Rep.* 510a9, 511e), as distinct from their *διάνοια* ‘reasoning’ (*Ti.* 27d3 *διανοοῦμαι*) and their ultimate *νόησις* ‘understanding’ of the Ideas or Forms. *Timaeus* is, after all, giving a speech to Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates and so the logic of this speech much follow the logic of rhetoric (which *Timaeus* links to the dualism between *γένεσις* and *οὐσία*, belief and Truth etc., in *Ti.* 29c) and, in this way, *Timaeus* fuses the account of Creation with the objects partaking of Creation. He begins with the physical and temporal to disclose to the audience the incorporeal and ontological Ideas that underpin them

¹⁷⁶ The adjective (which would have been more suitable here) is *comprehensibilis*, a morphological calque used to render *καταληπτός* ‘grasped’ previously in the *Ac.* 41 (as well as the periphrasis *quod comprehendī possit* in *Luc.* 40), but here Cicero seems content with using the established *comprehendo* to render *περιληπτός*.

¹⁷⁷ See further REITZ AND FUCHS (2015), 52 n. 52.

(τὸ ὄν versus τὸ γιγνόμενον, the eternal ‘Be-ing’ contrasted with ‘the becoming’, see *Ti.* 29b-c).¹⁷⁸ In the phrase *nullius enim rei causa remota reperiri origo potest* ‘since without a cause of something no origin is able to be discovered’ we find *remota* in the sense of ‘doing without, away with etc.’ (cf. *remoto ioco* ‘jesting aside’ in *Fam.* 7.11.3, see *OLD* s.v. *removeo*, 6: ‘to set aside, leave out of account’). This passive participle renders the Greek adverb χωρίς.¹⁷⁹

PONCELET (1957, 142) condemns Cicero’s abilities of translation (or rather the inability to express Greek refinement of philosophical thought in Latin) when he compares Plato’s line in *Ti.* 28a: πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχον βλέπων αἰεί, τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται with Cicero’s *eam speciem quae semper eadem intuebitur atque id sibi proponet exemplar* [...]. PONCELET claims that, ‘[s]peciem est inséré pour transcrire τό + participe [sc. τὸ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχον]. Il en résulte que ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν ne sont pas représentés dans la phrase latine: *species*, utilisé dans une fonction de suppléance n’est plus immédiatement disponible; d’où il suit une imprécision de la forme, choquante pour un philosophe.’ Yet this is, perhaps, to misunderstand how Cicero conceived of the Platonic ἰδέα. In the *Ac.* 30-1, Cicero has the character of Varro say of the Academic school that: *mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem; solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. hanc illi ἰδέαν appellant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere*. It should not surprise us that, following SEDLEY’S (2013, 189) chronology, the revision of this version of the *Academica* books was occurring near-contemporaneously with the composition of the *Timaeus* translation.¹⁸⁰ Thus we find the same parallels in this section of *Ti.* 28a to *Ac.* 30-1: τὸ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχον being expanded to *id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset*. So returning to Cicero’s translation and PONCELET’S objections to it, the solution lies in the expanded meaning (lexical augmentation) of *species*. Superficially, PONCELET is right in observing that *species* is used to render the τό + participle phrase, but the term now also covers the collocation ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν. We know this because Cicero (using the character of Varro) viewed *species* as equivalent to Plato’s ἰδέα, defined as ‘that which is

¹⁷⁸ For a fuller account of Plato’s explanatory reasoning, see ASHBAUGH (1988).

¹⁷⁹ Cf. *Off.* 1.63 (rendering the present participle χωριζομένη in *Menex.* 246e).

¹⁸⁰ Whether this particular section was revised or not is not known, but in any case, the first version of the *Ac.* was likely composed earlier in 45 BC.

eternally simple, of a single quantity, and is its own quality (*tale quale esset*, picking up the notion of *δύναμις*).’ As a result, far from *omitting* to translate the notion of ‘form and quality’ (*ἰδέα καὶ δύναμις*), Cicero had captured this conceptualisation through the lexical augmentation of *species* in the near-contemporaneous work of *Ac.* 30-1.

In the aside beginning *omne igitur caelum sive mundus sive quo alio vocabulo gaudet* [...] *considerandum*, we find a close mirroring of Plato’s original. The notion of *κόσμος* first appears in Heraclitus, who used the argument that the Universe was never ‘created’ but always eternally existent.¹⁸¹ Augustine cites Varro in *Civ.* 6.6: *dicit ergo idem Varro adhuc de naturali theologia praeloquens deum se arbitrari esse animam mundi, quem Graeci vocant κόσμον* but could not have failed to notice Cicero’s *mundus* translation in this work as well. It is curious that Cicero does not insert a typical gloss in this early sentence, given his propensity to do so when a significant Greek term is discussed, especially given the difference between the theological ‘heaven’ (*οὐρανός*, *caelum*) and the more philosophical ‘cosmos’. Curiously, he glosses the word much later in *Timaeus* 36: *Graeci κόσμον nos lucentem mundum nominaremus*.

Cicero’s favoured method of introducing metaphors in the translation is using *quasi* or *quidam* to express into Latin (through paraphrasing or repeating a metaphor from Plato) some concept that is unfamiliar or strange.¹⁸² This is found early on here in 6: *atque illum quidem quasi parentem huius universitatis invenire difficile*. For comparison, see the stylistic use of *quasi*, *aliquis*, and *quidam* in Cicero’s speeches, e.g. *Rab. Post.* 8.4: *est enim haec causa: “quo ea pecunia pervenerit” quasi quaedam appendicula causae iudicatae atque damnatae* (where the diminutive is a lexical innovation), also *Verr.* 2.2.187; 2.5.35.¹⁸³

In *Timaeus* 6: *et cum iam invenerit indicare in vulgus nefas*, the term *nefas* can be interpreted as in *OLD* s.v. *nefas*, 1. The term probably derives from the syntactical negative *ne* rather than a genuine prefix (thus, *ne fas est*, ‘it is not divine law’).¹⁸⁴ It also has the sense of ‘impossible’, e.g. *Hor. Carm.* 1.24.20: *levius fit patientia quicquid corrigere est nefas* (see

¹⁸¹ See TAYLOR (1928), 65.

¹⁸² Cf. the *Ac.* 40: *quasi fundamenta, artem quaedam de iis quae visa*, and *quasi contineant omnem hanc quaestionem*; *Timaeus* 4: *quasi particula quaedam est*; 13: *quasi nodum viculumque*; 24: *ad mediam quasi decusavit*.

¹⁸³ See GOTOFF (1993), 19-20.

¹⁸⁴ BENVENISTE (1973), 415-6.

also LEWIS AND SHORT s.v. *nefas* II.b). Plato's phrase, ἀδύνατον λέγειν, if Cicero rendered it correctly, would make *nefas* closer to the Greek sense. However, a few lines later he has *quod ne dictu quidem fas est* containing the *ne fas est* phrase that carries the meaning of 'that which is not permissible to say by divine law', closer to the Greek (*Ti.* 29a): ὁ μὴδ' εἰπεῖν τινι θέμις ('that which is laid down or established, law (not as fixed by statute, but) as established by custom' (LSJ s.v. θέμις I). TAYLOR (1928, 71) suggests Plato held that, 'his theology should not be carelessly divulged to men who had not the moral and intellectual seriousness to think it out for themselves when the right way was indicated to them.' If we assume Cicero intended to put this monologue into the mouth of Nigidius Figulus, the Neo-Pythagorean, we might construe this as certainly theologically flavoured, rather than strictly epistemological.¹⁸⁵ From what remains of Nigidius' fragmentary works, we know he composed a treatise named *De diis* and various works defending divination and augury (see SWOBODA (1889/1964), 83f, 91f; SARTON (1970), 308f), to such a degree that he apparently had a reputation as a magician (CONTE (1987/1994), 220f).

In *Timaeus* 6 also, we come to the problem of the Creator of the Universe (ὁ τεκταινόμενος, *fabricator*), used variously in Plato as some sort of divine craftsman (distinct from later Neo-Platonic views of God as 'The One' from which νοῦς, and thence the World Soul, proceeds).¹⁸⁶ Linguistically, in both Greek and Latin, the term presents a problem since we might classify it as either of two things: a metaphor or a metonym (*translatio* and *immutatio* in Ciceronian terms).¹⁸⁷ Both lead to a lexical augmentation (semantic shift, in this case by metaphor and metonymy): the divine creation of the Universe was analogous to the creation of an object by a τεκταινόμενος or *fabricator* (metaphor) or the entire complex 'process of creation' before time can be represented by the concept of a divine craftsman (metonymy).¹⁸⁸ VENDRYÈS (1979, 237) discussed the phenomenon of 'creación de palabras por imitación' (imitative creation of words), where one language imitates the same metaphor of another to express a concept. In this case, the use of a term like *fabricator* metaphorically

¹⁸⁵ Such a distinctly theological flavour might also seem out of character if the monologue were assigned to Cicero *in propria persona*: a self-proclaimed Academic sceptic. Cf. *N.D.* 1.62, 3.85-6; also PEASE (1913), 29.

¹⁸⁶ See TAYLOR (1928), 82.

¹⁸⁷ See e.g. *Orat.* 92.

¹⁸⁸ In this sense, note e.g. the discussion in DILLON (2003), 81.


mirrors Plato's use of *τεκταινόμενος*, and other words relating to 'craftsman' and 'construction', easily in Latin. I first want to focus on modern linguistic discussion on similar phenomena. Adapting TOURNIER's (1985, 200) terminology of a *mutation par rayonnement* ('radial shift') one might make a sememe (S) as the various senses conveyed in (S₁₋₄) = *τεκταινόμενος*, *δημιουργός*, *τό αἴτιον* (i.e. *fabricator*, *artifex*, *aedificator* etc.) and derive the following:

(S₁): an agent who constructs things with materials;

(S₂) the Divine Creator of the Universe (**metaphor**);

(S₃) a person or thing that creates incorporeal things, e.g. lies, tricks (**metaphor**); or

(S₄): the complete process of creation of the Universe (**metonym**).



Between S₁ and S₂ for example, we can argue a lexical augmentation (semantic shift) occurs: the denotation of an agent who constructs things with materials now applies to the Divine Creator of the Universe in Cicero's usage. It is less clear whether S₁ to S₄ represents the same process: is using the term *aedificator* for the entire divine process or 'cause' of the Universe's creation, for example, a case of semantic shift or simply a metonymic movement in the same way 'tea' in English became used to refer to, first, the particular drink, then as the entire time of day and type of meal, 'high tea' etc.? RICHARDS (1936, 100; 132-3) usefully distinguished between the 'tenor' (the non-literal sense) of a metaphor and the 'vehicle' (the literal sense) through which it is described. In the case of S₂, Greek philosophical schools had variously described the tenor as some 'divine force' or cause (*τό αἴτιον*), as Seneca succinctly described

it in reference to Platonic, Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean formulations,¹⁸⁹ and the vehicle (in the Platonic myth) as a ‘craftsman’ who forges the Universe based on an eternal Exemplar. Cicero (translating Timaeus’ initial qualifications in *Ti.* 29b-d) makes it clear that this account (λόγος, *ratio*) is not scientific, final, or completely ‘true’ but rather a story with a likeness to the truth (ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, *veri similis*). In this way, Timaeus’ entire narrative is figurative and both Plato’s and Cicero’s uses of the craftsman metaphors are simply functions of such storytelling. Just as fairy tales, for instance, do not have ‘technical jargon’, so to speak, they do have expected terms which function as common ingredients in the narrative (‘witch’, ‘spell’, ‘princess’, ‘prince’ etc.). So Timaeus’ narrative has certain key figurative terms to explain the creation myth in a way that would permanently become associated with the creation myth.¹⁹⁰ *Artifex* is deployed to render δημιουργός as another lexical augmentation (a metaphorical-metonymic radial shift) of the well-established *artifex* ‘Creator’ (*OLD* s.v. *artifex*, 6) analogous with *fabricator*. Plautus had used the noun previously in the sense of a ‘professional’ or ‘practitioner’ (*Cas.* 356) but not in the sense of a deistic ‘creator’ or ‘producer’. It would be expected that Cicero might have used *artifex* to render τεκταινόμενος and *fabricator* for δημιουργός, since these correspond more closely with their Greek counterparts (*ars* perhaps a calque of τέχνη, see ERNOUT-MEILLET, 48 s.v. *ars*). In any case, forced to find multiple names for the same entity of ‘Creator’, Cicero eschewed directly importing from Greek and introduced a new meaning for an already established term. Apart from *fabricator* and *artifex*,¹⁹¹ Cicero uses a range of similarly anthropomorphic terms and periphrases (*is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur, quasi parens, aeternus deus*,¹⁹² *effector, genitor et effector, effector mundi*,¹⁹³ *fabricator, aedificator, efficiens, molitor deus, procreator*) to translate Plato’s notions of ὁ τεκταινόμενος, ὁ δημιουργός, τό αἷτιον, ὁ συνιστάς etc., indicating he was aware of the various images of the Platonic Creator, using

¹⁸⁹ Sen. *Helv.* 8: *sive ille deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione, diffusus, sive fatum est immutabilis causarum inter se cohaerentium series.*

¹⁹⁰ Cicero was aware of the utility of metaphors in rhetoric, see e.g. *de Orat.* 3.160-1: *omnis translatio, quae quidem sumpta ratione est, ad sensus ipsos admovetur, maxime oculorum, qui est sensus acerrimus [...] illa vero oculorum multo acriora, quae paene ponunt in conspectus animi, quae cernere et videre non possumus.*

¹⁹¹ Cf. *opifex* in *N.D.* 1.18.

¹⁹² Cf. *deus sempiternus* in *Luc.* 118.

¹⁹³ See also LEEMAN AND PINKSTER (1981), 257 for a discussion of the term *effector* in other Ciceronian texts.

polysemy as an interpretive tool.¹⁹⁴ While the decision to transfer these prototypical terms into metaphoric and metonymic usages was a synchronic decision made by Cicero during his translation, the semantic ranges of words like *fabricator* and *artifex* would be extended into cosmological-theological dimensions permanently and thus exhibit a diachronic aspect, with later philosophers like Seneca, Apuleius and the Latin Patristics all using these terms to describe, in some form or another, the concept of God.¹⁹⁵

There are here also two links worth noting between this work and Cicero's *N.D.* treatise. The phrase from *N.D.* 1.19: *quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a deo atque aedificari mundum facit* can be compared with *rursus igitur videndum, ille fabricator huius tanti operis utrum sit imitatus exemplar*. In the former, Cicero's Epicurean, Velleius, asks by what kind of 'mind's eye' or mental vision (*oculis animi*) allowed the deity to see the *fabrica*, or what Cicero calls in the *Timaeus* the *exemplar*. Note also that Cicero chooses to use the agent noun *fabricator* almost exactly mirroring the notion of a *deus* working from a *fabrica* in the *N.D.* This is significant since the metaphorical connections, as well as the literal textual similarities, are more than coincidental. Cicero's use of *exemplar*, while echoing each other superficially in terms of the translation from the Platonic original, both convey different metaphors. In the *Timaeus*, *exemplar* would be a superficially closer and more literal translation (i.e. *verbum ex verbo*) of the Greek παράδειγμα (*per* LSJ, e.g. in Herodotus: a 'pattern, model: of an architect's model (or perh. plan) of a building.)'), which Plato imbued with a theological sense (LSJ s.v: '[...] of the divine exemplars after which earthly things are made.')¹⁹⁶ The term also conveys a more nuanced sense (and perhaps a better illustration of an *ad sensum* translation of Plato's application of the Greek word) meaning (cf. *OLD* s.v.), 1: 'That which serves to exemplify, a

¹⁹⁴ See PANAGL (1986), 587; SEELE (1995), 34.

¹⁹⁵ For further discussion of this synchronic-diachronic process in semantic shifts of medical terms, see LANGSLOW (2000), 140-43, esp. 141-2 for the influence of Greek on semantic shifts in Latin.

¹⁹⁶ Whether Plato intended a literal 'plan' or 'model' which was to be copied into another medium, see discussion in BROADIE (2012), 62: 'According to one way, the eternal paradigm of the cosmos is an original of which the Demiurge makes a copy or representation or reproduction in a different medium. According to the other the paradigm is a recipe he follows.' See also KARFIK (2007), 129-150. In any case, the object of the Creator's 'mental vision' is clearly interior to the Creator himself and therefore not a physical or external object (e.g. an actual *fabrica*) on which he models the Universe but some mental process of organising his thoughts rationally, see BURNYEAT (2005), 143-65.

typical instance, example, illustration’, 2: ‘An example (for imitation), pattern, model’, 2b: ‘an original pattern, archetype; a Platonic “idea”; the “original” of a work of art’, 3: ‘A copy, reproduction’). 2b is the aptest to Cicero’s usage semantically but the sense overall is one of a positive example or model that one should emulate, imitate or copy.¹⁹⁷ This contrasts with the mechanical, straightforward *fabrica* used by Velleius in the *N.D.*, that builders use to construct some edifice. It follows then that Velleius, whose intention is to pillory the technological metaphors abundant in Plato’s dialogue,¹⁹⁸ decides to use a literal ‘architectural plan’ or ‘process of construction’ that the deity (or as Velleius says, the *architectus*)¹⁹⁹ looks to when constructing the Universe, instead of imitating some profound noetic idea or otherworldly exemplar.

Cicero uses *aeternitas* and *aliqui aeternus* to render τὸ αἰδῖον in this section, which is the ‘eternal’ nature of the original upon which the cosmos was based, according to Plato. Yet as HOENIG has recently discussed, Cicero also later applies this to the difficult concept of οὐσία (trans. 29c, discussed below). We need only acknowledge at this point that this is one of the first conflations of terms in Cicero’s translation of Plato that leads to some confusion in the Latin. HOENIG, following a suggestion from David Sedley,²⁰⁰ argues that Cicero erroneously identified the Universe as a *simulacrum aeternum* (discussed below) based on a specific ‘Form of Eternity’ which, she claims, fails to correspond to the conceptual scheme in Plato’s original. This would suggest some crucial conflation of terms in Cicero’s philosophical lexicon whereby words such as *aeternitas* (29b-c), *aeternus* (29b-c), *sempiternus* (36e), and *perpetuitas* (41b) are used interchangeably as if the generated, *temporal* perpetuity of the

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Calcidius use of the rare term *archetypus* in his translation of παράδειγμα, which more literally captures the meaning listed under 2b in LSJ.

¹⁹⁸ See DYCK (2003), 78.

¹⁹⁹ The word is not used in Cicero’s *Timaeus* translation at all, and possibly because the term is a specific Greek loan-word literally meaning a ‘master builder’, but in Velleius’ monologue, it usefully serves the purpose of further caricaturing the notion of a ‘Divine Architect’ or ‘Builder’. The borrowing between Latin and Greek here is indicative of stylistic choice to provide the subject matter a subtle Greek flavour (hence instead of *aedificator*, Velleius uses the loan-blend *architectus*. Although the latter had been in Latin at least since Plautus, its Greek flavour is noteworthy). For more on this stylistic choice, especially in relation to the portrayal of Epicurean arguments in Cicero’s philosophy, see REINHARDT (2005), 166-71.

²⁰⁰ HOENIG (2018), 98 n. 135.

copy is the same as the existential, non-temporal eternity of the Creator's exemplar.²⁰¹ As we shall see, this is perhaps not a Ciceronian 'error' at all.

In *Timaeus* 7 we find the Latin: *sic ergo generatus ad id est effectus quod ratione sapientiaque comprehenditur atque aeternitate inmutabili continetur* which translates *Ti.* 29a: οὕτω δὲ γεγενημένος πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτὸν καὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχον δεδημιούργηται. The literal Greek is: 'Then having come into existence in this way, it has been constructed after that which is apprehensible by logic and wisdom, and always remains the same.' The phrase κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχον is a Greek idiom, not particularly philosophic, but conveying the notion of unchanging sameness, and Cicero's noun + adjective addition *aeternitate inmutabili* appears to fall under the category of a 'compensation' translation procedure where one part of a sentence is omitted in the target language and compensated in another part.²⁰² In **A**, the oldest and least erroneous²⁰³ of the *Timaeus* transmission, we find καὶ omitted before κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχον, which would render the line: 'Then having come into existence in this way, it has been constructed after that which is apprehensible by logic and wisdom, *remaining the same*'. Whatever version Cicero was using, he makes explicit this idiom (for which there is no equivalent phrase in Latin) by using a literal rendering: *aeternitate inmutabili continetur* 'composed in immutable eternity'. So far, we understand *aeternitas* as a concept apropos of the eternal exemplar upon which the Creator modelled His cosmos.

Cicero then writes *ex quo efficitur ut sit necesse hunc quem cernimus mundum simulacrum aeternum esse alicuius aeterni* to convey Plato's τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι. This sentence has aroused the disapproval of some scholars, in particular regarding Cicero's interpretation of Plato's concept of 'Eternity'. Both *aeternum* and *aeterni* in Cicero are additions to the original and some have suggested a conflation of terms in Cicero's version, which leads him to understand that the generated *cosmos* made by the Demiurge is eternal like

²⁰¹ Cicero was not the only interpreter of the *Timaeus* to face this confusion. The uncertainty regarding whether the Universe had an origin in time (mostly hinging upon the exposition in *Ti.* 28d) or whether it was eternal found proponents on either side of the argument in the later Neo-Platonic tradition (e.g. Alcinoüs and Apuleius on the one hand and Atticus and Plutarch on the other), see MORESCHINI (2013), 517.

²⁰² Cf. Cicero's translation of the same idiom appearing again in *Ti.* 36c: τῇ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἐν ταῦτῳ περιεχομένη κινήσει with *eoque motu, cuius orbis semper in eodem erat eodemque modo ciebatur*; see also PONCELET (1957), 71.

²⁰³ See JONKERS (2017), 93.

its atemporal and unchanging παράδειγμα.²⁰⁴ Criticism of Cicero's glossing amounts to the following: that Cicero conflated the distinct concepts of eternity and sempiternity in Plato by using *aeternitas* to render αἰδῖος and αἰώνιος. I suggest that Cicero, in fact, correctly understood Plato's concepts and that both αἰδῖος and αἰώνιος were not distinct concepts of eternity in the *Timaeus* Creation myth.

Before we examine the scholarly consensus on this sentence, it is useful to know the context in which it appears. Timaeus' account is in its incipient stages and he walks his audience through the following syllogisms. (Square brackets indicate Ciceronian additions):

Pl. *Ti.* 29a: εἰ μὲν δὴ καλὸς ἐστὶν ὁδε ὁ κόσμος ὃ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ αἰδῖον ἔβλεπεν: εἰ δὲ ὁ μὴδ' εἰπεῖν τινι θέμις, πρὸς γεγονός. παντὶ δὴ σαφές ὅτι πρὸς τὸ αἰδῖον: ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ' ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων.²⁰⁵

***Timaeus* 6-7:** *atqui si pulcher est hic mundus et si probus eius artifex, profecto speciem aeternitatis imitari maluit, sin secus, quod ne dictu quidem fas est, generatum* [exemplum est pro aeterno secutus]. *non igitur dubium, quin aeternitatem* [maluerit exsequi], *quandoquidem neque mundo quicquam pulchrius neque eius aedificatore praestantius.*²⁰⁶

The first dichotomy here is simply between the Eternity of the Exemplar (αἰδῖος) and the generated nature of the Universe (γεγονός). By the time we get to 29b, the line τὸν κόσμον

²⁰⁴ Cicero was not the only interpreter of the *Ti.* to face this confusion. The uncertainty regarding whether the Universe had an origin in time (mostly hinging upon the exposition in *Ti.* 28d) or whether it was eternal found proponents on either side of the argument in the later Neo-Platonic tradition (e.g. Alcinous and Apuleius on the one hand and Atticus and Plutarch on the other). See MORESCHINI (2013), 517.

²⁰⁵ 'Now if this Cosmos is beautiful and its Demiurge good, it is clear that he fixed his gaze on the Eternal; but if otherwise (which is an impious supposition), his gaze was on that which has come into existence. But it is clear to everyone that his gaze was on the Eternal; for the Cosmos is the fairest of all that has come into existence, and He the best of all the Causes.'

²⁰⁶ 'And if this Universe is beautiful and if the Creator is good, then certainly he preferred to imitate the view of Eternity, but if otherwise, which is impious to say, he followed a generated exemplar rather than an eternal one. There is no doubt therefore that he preferred to follow the Eternal, since indeed there is not any universe more beautiful, nor a Creator of it more excellent.'

εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι has been glossed by Cicero (*mundum simulacrum aeternum esse alicuius aeterni*) for reasons unclear at that stage in his translation but which I will argue anticipate Timaeus' later comments in the creation myth (37d). Yet it is this initial anticipatory glossing that has caused some scholars to doubt Cicero's understanding of Plato's creation narrative.

ARCHER-HIND'S (1888) commentary on the Greek suggested that perhaps Cicero's manuscript gave εἰκόνα αἰδίου τινὸς αἰδίου, yet argues that restoring the text to such a conjecture would be 'rash' given all of the existing manuscripts and Proclus' testimony. He concludes that, though the phrase εἰκόνα αἰδίου might be defended on the same principle as αἰώνιον εἰκόνα in *Ti.* 37d: 'αἰδίου properly means exempt from time, and cannot strictly be applied to the phenomenal world, though its duration be everlasting.' As we shall see, such a distinction is purely Neo-Platonic, a school whose doctrines were very much more than mere restatements of Plato's teachings,²⁰⁷ and cannot be sustained in the text of the *Timaeus* itself. POWELL (1995a, 281) (half) defends Cicero's translation in arguing that **mundum simulacrum esse alicuius aeterni* would have been a 'legitimate gloss', but the addition of *aeternum* was a mistake: 'Did Cicero make a mistake in understanding his original here, or is the insertion of 'aeternum' due to a copyist of Cicero's text? In neither of these cases is there unequivocal evidence to convict Cicero of carelessness.' More recently, HOENIG (following a suggestion from Sedley)²⁰⁸ argued that Cicero's *simulacrum aeternum* might have been an 'erroneous identification' based on a specific 'Form of Eternity' which, she suggests, does not correspond to the conceptual scheme in Plato's original. This would again mean that Cicero has conflated the terms in his philosophical lexicon whereby words such as *aeternitas* (29b-c), *aeternus* (29b-c), *sempiternus* (36e), and *perpetuitas* (41b) are used interchangeably, as if the generated and temporal perpetuity of the universal copy is the same as the existential, non-temporal eternity of the Creator's exemplar. HOENIG further suggests (2018, 101) that Cicero 'failed to mark in his terminology the ontological difference between eternity and sempiternity'. Yet such a conflation is perhaps not a Ciceronian error at all, but a close understanding of Plato's own terminology and the inseparable connection between the Eternal Exemplar and its Everlasting Copy in the *Timaeus*.

²⁰⁷ WHITTAKER (1968), 131.

²⁰⁸ HOENIG (2018), 98 n. 135. However, for Cicero's (consistent) use of *aeternus* in relation to 'god' or 'gods' generally in various other philosophical works, see MERGUET (1887), 108.

To return to Cicero's *simulacrum aeternum*, a textual search of the entire extant Platonic corpus via the *TLG* yields no instances of the pairing *εἰκόνα αἰδίου*. Even as early as 29b, Plato only uses *αἰδῖος* to describe the Eternal Exemplar. Yet ARCHER-HIND's claim that *αἰδῖος* 'cannot strictly be applied to the phenomenal world, though its duration be everlasting' needs re-evaluation. By the time we reach 37d, we find in plain sight that Plato himself employs both *αἰδῖος* and *αἰώνιος* interchangeably and the concept of 'Time' in the Universe is revealed as simply an imitation of eternity, temporally everlasting:

Accordingly, seeing that that Model is an Eternal Living Creature (*ζῶον αἰδίου*), [the Demiurge] set about making this Universe, so far as He could, of a like kind. But since **the nature of the Living Creature was eternal** (*αἰώνιος*), it was impossible to attach this perfectly to what is generated; for which reason He planned to make some movable image of Eternity (*εἰκὼν [...] κινητόν τινα αἰώνος*), and, as He set in order the Heaven, of that Eternity (*αἰώνος*) which abides in unity He made an **Eternal Image** (*αἰώνιον εἰκόνα*), moving according to number, this being what we have called Time.²⁰⁹

Unfortunately, we do not have Cicero's version of this section due to a textual lacuna between 37c and 38c but it would be safe to assume (if he did translate this section) that he rendered both with either *aeternitas* or *aeternus*. This section is crucial, because, if Time were finite in Timaeus' creation myth, Plato would not have applied the self-same term to qualify it as he had done with the nature of the 'Living Creature' (i.e. the Eternal Exemplar) — both are modified with *αἰώνιος*. Similarly, the term *αἰδῖος* is not confined to the timelessness of the Exemplar, but to the stars and heavenly bodies as well (40b5), which are temporal.²¹⁰ WHITTAKER's analysis of this section, and other instances of the conflation of *αἰδῖος*, *αἰώνιος*, and *αἰεί*, usefully demonstrates the core issue; that is, Plato had no strict or systematic

²⁰⁹ *Ti.* 37d: καθάπερ οὖν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει ζῶον αἰδίου ὄν, καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν οὕτως εἰς δύναμιν ἐπεχείρησε τοιοῦτον ἀποτελεῖν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῶου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὐσα αἰώνιος, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῷ γεννητῷ παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν: εἰκὼν δ' ἐπενόει κινητόν τινα αἰώνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰώνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον δὲ δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν.

²¹⁰ See MASON (2006), 178; WHITTAKER (1968), 139; ILIEVSKI (2015), 7.

definition of ‘eternity’ or ‘everlasting duration’ and freely switched between terms when describing the atemporal nature of the Exemplar and the temporal infinite nature of Time itself.²¹¹

The diachrony of *αἰδῖος* and *αἰώνιος* is central to Western intellectual history and is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the simplest explanation is as follows: ARCHER-HIND is correct insofar as Neo-Platonists like Plotinus (e.g. *Enneads* 3.7.3) did understand a distinction between *αἰδῖος* and *αἰώνιος*. The former was atemporal, the latter simply ‘everlasting’ (LSJ s.v. *αἰώνιος*), as we find summarised in Proclus:

[...] the perpetuity (*αἰδιότης*) we spoke of was of two kinds: the one eternal (*αἰώνιος*), the other in time; the one a perpetual steadfastness, the other a perpetual process; the one having its existence concentrated in a simultaneous whole, the other diffused and unfolded in temporal extension; the one whole in itself, the other composed of parts each of which exists separately in an order of succession.²¹²

So *αἰδῖος* is later construed as having no temporal beginning or end whereas *αἰώνιος* had some temporal beginning but was infinite and everlasting. Yet in Timaeus’ account, the generated copy of the Creator’s exemplar is a *ζῶον αἰδῖον*, as well as possessing a nature that is *αἰώνιος*. Cicero renders both with the abstract *aeternitas*, understanding from Timaeus’ account that, because it was ‘impossible’ to attach the *αἰώνιος* quality perfectly to the generated Universe, the Demiurge instead made the Universe as an imitation, in the form of a ‘movable image’ of *αἰώνιος*. This movability progresses arithmetically; that is to say, in a set order, for an infinite duration in the form of *χρόνος*.²¹³

A glance at a dialogue contemporary to Cicero’s *Timaeus*, the *N.D.* (1.8), gives us further insight. Cicero uses the Epicurean Velleius to assail the Platonist position on creation, specifically the Timaeian narrative:

²¹¹ WHITTAKER (1968), 139-40.

²¹² Proc. *Inst.* 55 (trans. DODD (1963, 53)). See also Arist. *Cael.* 284a1 and Plot. 3.7.5.

²¹³ See LEYDEN (1964) and, more recently, CHASE (2011) — two useful and fuller studies of the development of the concept in antiquity (the former focusing more on Plato and Aristotle’s conceptual schemas of eternity and the latter tracing its development in thinkers such as Proclus up to the last of the Neo-Platonists and early Christian philosophers like Simplicius and Philoponus respectively).

[Sc. Plato] represented the world not only as having had an origin but even almost made by hand, also said that it would be everlasting (*sempiternum*). Can you suppose that someone could have a taste for natural philosophy if he thinks that anything that has come into being can be eternal (*aeternum*)?²¹⁴

Velleius' attack is simply ideological, in the sense that he sees synonymy between *sempiternus* and *aeternus* for his ridicule of the Platonic creation theory, but that the idea of a Universe enduring for infinite time is absurd in the view of Epicureans like him. Velleius is correct in that acolytes of Plato, from the Academy on to the Neo-Platonists, never doubted the everlasting duration of the generated Universe.²¹⁵ Time arose with the creation of the Heavens (37e), which Timaeus says is an image of moving eternity (37d) and is, therefore, also eternal itself, but in a *temporal* sense (this is highlighted by the crucial second element: the movement of Time *κατ' ἀριθμὸν* 'according to number'). A secondary question is whether Velleius' use of *aeternus* here is in fact in the same sense as Plato's *αἰών*? The *TLL* lists two primary semantic senses for *aeternus*: 'de rebus humanis quae per hominis aevum servantur' (1.0.1142.39) and 'de deo, mundo, sim., quae per infinitum vigent tempus (de hominibus humanisque fere i. q. divinus)' (1.0.1142.72). In this latter sense, we find the notion of a duration of a lifecycle; an 'age' or 'eon' in modern English parlance. Varro himself gives the etymology of the cognate *aevum*:

'Eternity' [*aevum*] comes from the duration [*aetas*] of all years; thence *aeviternus* which became *aeternus* [eternal]; the Greeks call it *αἰών*, which Chrysippus says is *ἀεὶ ὄν*.²¹⁶

²¹⁴ *N.D.* 1.8: *non modo natum mundum introduxerit sed etiam manu paene factum, is eum dixerit fore sempiternum. hunc censes primis ut dicitur labris gustasse physiologiam, id est naturae rationem, qui quicquam quod ortum sit putet aeternum esse posse?*

²¹⁵ See CHASE (2011), 128-30, specifically his summary at 128: 'The model (Greek *paradeigma*), according to Plato, was characterised by eternal everlastingness (*tên aiônion aidiotêta*), and so the Demiurge provided the world with temporal everlastingness (*tên khronikên aidiotêta*) by bestowing upon it time, as an image of eternity.'

²¹⁶ *Var. L.* 6.11: *aevum ab aetate omnium annorum; hinc aeviternum, quod factum est aeternum; quod Graeci αἰῶνα, id ait Chrysippus esse <ἀ>ε<ὶ> ὄν*.

This ‘eternity’ is durational and hence temporal; that is to say, simply the everlastingness of the age of the Universe, it endures through infinite time (the ‘duration of all years’) and is apt to describe Plato’s notion of Time in the physical Universe. If Cicero similarly understood *aeternus*, then we have a paradoxical situation: Cicero construed Plato’s creation of temporality correctly in the *N.D.* as outlined in Velleius’ attack and his synonymous use of *aeternus* and *sempiternus*, but (if we follow the views of some scholars outlined above) erred in the (near contemporary) translation in *Ti.* 29b by referring to the generated Universe as a *simulacrum aeternum*. This is surely not accurate.

Another question arises: Can we point to earlier instances of Cicero’s understanding of Time in a similarly conflated sense? Namely, did Cicero’s earlier usages of the abstract *aeternitas* concept in his rhetorical works influence the meaning in his use of the noun in translating the Platonic concepts of *αἰδῖος* and *αἰώνιος* in the *Timaeus*? In the *Inv.* 1.38, Cicero wrote:

But ‘Time’ is — in the sense that we are using it now, for it is difficult to define it generally with any exactness — a certain portion of eternity (*aeternitatis*) with some certain indicative length: annually, monthly, daily or nightly.²¹⁷

It appears that Time as understood *generaliter* (universally or abstractly)²¹⁸ is simply *aeternus*, whereas Time particularised as understood and measured by human beings (i.e. from the movement of the stars) can be seen as only a portion of this *aeternitas* bounded by certain durations, hence the hyponyms: days, months, years, etc. This seems to echo *Timaeus*’ claims in 37e: ‘[The Creator] contrived the production of days and nights and months and years, which did not exist before the Heaven came into being. And these are all portions (μέρη) of Time’.²¹⁹ We might ask whether Cicero understood the measures of *χρόνος* as part of Eternity

²¹⁷ *Inv.* 1.38: *tempus autem est — id quo nunc utimur, nam ipsum quidem generaliter definire difficile est — pars quaedam aeternitatis cum alicuius annui, menstrui, diurni, nocturnive spatii certa significatione.*


²¹⁸ See e.g. *OLD* s.v. *generaliter*, 1.

²¹⁹ *Ti.* 37e: *ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ συνισταμένων τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται: τὰτα δὲ πάντα μέρη χρόνου.*

and not Time, rendering *μέρη* with *pars*? I think the benefit of the doubt should be given here, and the sentence can straightforwardly be read as *tempus est [...] pars quaedam aeternitatis*, with the various *μέρη* corresponding to the *spati certa*. Such an interpretation ties all the elements of the Platonic view of Time together neatly.

Marius Victorinus' later exegesis of this portion of Cicero's *Inv.* adds to this conclusion, where he understands Cicero's type of *aeternitas* spoken of here as equivalent to *αἰώνιος*, which is a more 'general' or 'universal' time (*generale tempore*): *quia nec initium nec finem habet* ('because it has neither a beginning nor and end').²²⁰ Victorinus here cannot be referring to *tempus* in the sense of days, months, and years because such lengths of time obviously do have beginnings and ends, and are reliant upon physical bodies such as the Sun. The *generale* modifier is the abstraction of Time into atemporal *aeternitas*, a non-particularised concept without contingency upon the motion of stars or the measures of human beings (hence why Cicero says it is 'difficult' to describe). In the following way, it reflects Timaeus' account in 37d (καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῷ γεννητῷ παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν [...]):

Fig 1. Plato's scheme of Eternity



Given it was not possible to attach the Exemplar's eternal nature in its entirety to the generated copy, the Demiurge made the Copy imitate the eternity of the Exemplar by motion, i.e. the creation of a certain eternal moving image (εἰκὼν [...] κινητὸν τινα αἰώνιος) which was

²²⁰ Vict. *Rhet.* 1.39.

everlasting Time. As a result, human beings inferred (indirectly),²²¹ from this everlasting Time, certain measures or spaces of this Time based on the movement of the heavenly bodies. In this analogous sense then, Victorinus understands Cicero's scheme as follows regarding Fig. 1 above:

aeternitas = **A**, of which the:

tempus generalis = **B** is a moving image, a portion of which is:

tempus = **C**, as inferred by human measurement.

Since *tempus generalis* is an imitation of *aeternitas*, it is by definition *aeternitas* in a temporal sense, following an infinite duration of movement and our understanding of *tempus* is a measure of spaces of general time (days, months, years) and is, then, some portion of both atemporal and temporal eternity (*aeternitas*). So as early as the *Inv.*, Cicero's views of time could be construed as inherently Platonic.

To summarise then, the benefit of the doubt must be given to Cicero's translation of this concept of 'Eternity' in Plato's creation narrative and such a benefit is given based on the inference that Plato himself did not brightly divide the concepts of *αἰδιος* and *αἰώνιος* in his dialogue. HOENIG's suggestion (2018, 101) that Cicero, 'failed to mark in his terminology the ontological difference between eternity and sempiternity' begs the question, since Plato himself made no such clear distinction (*Ti.* 37d-e is evidence of this conflation) and the division of *αἰδιος* and *αἰώνιος* as separate technical terms only became cemented by the time of later Neo-Platonic doctrines. So the image Cicero conveys is as follows: the Universe is a *simulacrum aeternum* 'everlasting image' of 'something eternal' (*alicuius aeterni*), i.e. the Living Thing upon which the Creator based the *kosmos*.

Rhetorical Characterisation of the Creation Narrative

Cicero's translation of *Ti.* 29b: μέγιστον δὲ παντὸς ἄρξασθαι κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχήν with *difficillimum autem est in omni conquisitione rationis exordium* produces another variation,

²²¹ See e.g. ZUCKERT's (2009), 834 observations on Socrates' theology in the *Phaedo*.

where ‘natural beginning’ (κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχή) is rendered by *rationis exordium*, roughly ‘the beginning of reason’. The *exordium* could be a technical term for the ‘introduction’ or ‘prologue’ of a speech (*OLD* s.v. *exordium*, 4. See also *Inv.* 1.19) and one might argue it is an apt reading in this context. Cicero, following Plato, is about to explicate specific rhetorical principles of every *oratio* that can be considered ‘likely’ or ‘resembling the truth’ if they imitate their subject matter. In Plato, Timaeus seems to be speaking of more general principles however, recommending the importance of beginning at the natural ἀρχή of a discussion so the interpretation of Cicero’s *exordium* ought to be much broader, in line with a temporal ἀρχή. Proclus also understands it as a more general suggestion, and BRYAN (2012, 120 n. 19), following TAYLOR (1982, 73), suggests Cicero does the same here. The more general nature of the inquiry is captured by *conquisitio* (from *conquiro* ‘to search out and collect’, ‘to search for’ + the abstractising *-tio*) in the sense of a ‘(physical or mental) search’ (*OLD* s.v. *conquisitio*, 2), which seems to be unattested in this sense before Cicero (*TLL* s.v., 4.0.356.84). HOENIG (2018, 57) reads *inquisitione* which is not supported by the manuscripts.²²² This line is also attested by Nonius (p. 30 of the *De Proprietate Sermonum*).

In the sentence: *de re stabili et inmutabili [...] bene agi putat si similitudinem veri consequatur* we find the parallel relationship is brought out more clearly in Cicero’s translation than in Plato, as noted in LAMBARDI.²²³ In Plato, there are three descriptions of the ‘eternal’ or ‘unchanging’ subject matter: *μονίμου καὶ βεβαίου καὶ μετὰ νοῦ καταφανοῦς* ‘stable, firm and clearly perceived by thought’, and this leads to accounts of this subject matter as being *μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτότους* ‘stable and unchangeable’. Cicero only translates the latter two adjectives when he says that, when discussing subject matter *de stabili et inmutabili*, the corresponding accounts will be *neque redargui neque convinci potest*. This is more logical than the Platonic original, which is difficult to parse, and gives Cicero some advantage in balancing his section with the next line. Plato has Timaeus say: *τοὺς δὲ τοῦ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνο ἀπεικασθέντος, ὅντος δὲ εἰκόνης εἰκότας ἀνὰ λόγον τε ἐκείνων ὄντας*. TAYLOR (1928, 74) interprets this line as follows: ‘discourses about that which is itself a likeness likely and corresponding to their objects (ἐκείνων)’. JOWETT (1959, 13) has, ‘[b]ut when they

²²² See PLASBERG (1908), 160; GIOMINI (1975), 180.

²²³ LAMBARDI (1982), 127-8.

express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves, they need only be likely and analogous to the real words.’ The Loeb edition by BURY (1929, 53) has ‘whereas the accounts of that which is copied after the likeness of that Model, and is itself a likeness, will be analogous thereto and possess likelihood’. JOHANSEN (2004, 49) has: ‘while an account of what is made in the image of that other, but is only a likeness, will itself be but likely, standing to accounts of the former kind in a proportion [...]’, and more recently BARRY (2014, 36) suggests: ‘accounts we give of that which has been formed may be like the reality, since they are accounts of what is a likeness, are themselves likely, and stand in proportion to the previous accounts’. If it is difficult enough for modern English language translators to agree on what the line means, we must spare a thought for Cicero.

I reproduce the full Greek section to examine Plato’s meaning and to arrive at some basic interpretative starting point of the original to contrast with Cicero’s interpretation. The structural elements of it are emphasised in **bold** (e.g. particles and enclitics), concepts grammatically connected by virtue of their genitive case are asterisked (*[...]*), and by virtue of their accusative case are underlined:

ὥδε οὖν **περί τε** εἰκόνος καὶ **περὶ** *τοῦ παραδείγματος αὐτῆς διοριστέον*, ὥς ἄρα τοὺς λόγους, ὧν πέρ εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί, *τούτων αὐτῶν* καὶ συγγενεῖς ὄντας: *τοῦ μὲν οὖν μονίμου* καὶ *βεβαίου καὶ μετὰ νοῦ καταφανοῦς* μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτότους—καθ’ ὅσον οἶόν τε καὶ ἀνελέγκτοις προσήκει λόγοις εἶναι καὶ ἀνικητοῖς, τούτου δεῖ μὴδὲν ἐλλείπειν—²²⁴ τοὺς δὲ *τοῦ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνου *ἀπεικασθέντος, ὅντος δὲ εἰκόνος* εἰκότας ἀνὰ λόγον *τε ἐκείνων* ὄντας: ὅτι περ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια.

Immediately we notice that ‘both’ (τε) the *objects* of the accounts, i.e. the ‘copy’ (εἰκών) and the eternal paradigm (παράδειγμα), are in the genitive by virtue of περὶ. The first part of the section (up to τούτου δεῖ μὴδὲν ἐλλείπειν) reads easily enough:

²²⁴ I agree with TAYLOR (1928), 74 that this is essentially parenthetical to the main section.

‘Thus then, one must distinguish regarding both the image and its eternal paradigm, so the accounts, which are their interpreters, are the relations of those things [sc. the copy and its paradigm]:

1. On the one hand then, [concerning] that thing [sc. the paradigm] that is stable, firm, and clearly perceived by the intellect, so those [accounts of it] are stable and unchanging (as far as it is possible and apt for accounts to be irrefutable and invincible, there must be no falling short of that);
2. On the other hand, those [accounts] regarding that which is made to resemble that thing [sc. the paradigm], being an image, so those [accounts of the image] are probable and also duly correspondent with those things [sc. both the image and its paradigm].
3. Just as Eternal Being is to things which are created, so Truth is to belief.’

It is a dense section within which lie core principles of Platonic philosophy (and later Academic epistemology): the concept of the Divided Line, the explication of the Forms and their material Objects in space, Intellect and Perception, Eternal Being and the Perpetually Becoming, and the True and the truth-like. Importantly, Plato outlined accounts of the physical Universe as ‘probabilistic’ and in proportion to or ‘duly correspondent’ (*ἀνὰ λόγον*) with the copy (the Universe) and its model (the Eternal paradigm, used by the Creator to fashion the Universe). In the same way, Socrates described the categories of knowledge and perception in the *Republic*, the dialogue preceding the *Ti.*, particularly in the following section:

Socrates: This, then, you have to understand as what I meant by the ‘offspring of the Good’, which the Good generated in analogy to itself (*ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ*): i.e. just as

the Good is to thought and things known in the noetic region, so the Sun is to vision and things seen in the visible place.²²⁵

And also:

Socrates: Answering to the four [sections of the line], apply these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason to the highest, understanding to the second; assign belief to the third and to the last conjecture, then arrange them in proportion so that they participate in clearness to the same extent as those [their objects] partake of Truth.²²⁶

Plato makes it clear through *Socrates* that there is a proportional participation of our reality (the created Universe) in capital-T ‘Truth’ and the ‘noetic’ region (the permanent realm of the Forms) in ‘clearness’ (what is able to be sensed, perceived, etc.). It is important because if the realm of the Forms were inaccessible to human perception, there would be no way of reaching Truth at all since we could never perceive them either phenomenally or ‘noumenally’. This is the problem that later philosophers such as Immanuel Kant experienced (in his *Ding an sich* conceptualisation) in terms of epistemology and hence the need for a synthetic *a priori* knowledge; a compound of pure Forms (the noetic) and sense impressions. In this section, *Timaeus* makes a similar point in saying that accounts that speak of the changing, ever-becoming, physical Universe *can* participate in Truth in a limited way: only as a proportion of Truth or an ‘analogue’ of it, in the most basic sense; a resemblance (as opposed to an identical relation) to it. This is just as *Timaeus* had reasoned earlier when he said the perpetually becoming physical Universe we see and perceive around us cannot be identical to the Eternal paradigm upon which it was modelled, it can only approximate it.

²²⁵ *Rep.* 508b-c: τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τὰ γὰθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρὸς τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρὸς τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα. The noumenal world versus the phenomenal world, compare this to Kant's philosophy of the noumenal *Ding an sich* and the phenomenal.

²²⁶ *Rep.* 511d-e: ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν.

Some may question whether Cicero's translation actually captures Plato's original at all, considering that, here, Cicero associates the notion of 'truth' with *εἰκώς* using the phrase *similitudo veri*. Socrates distinguished two versions of *εἰκώς*: one with connotations of persuasiveness based purely on what the people consider to be 'probable', the other connoting some resemblance to Truth, as he says in the *Phaedrus*:

[They say that] he who is to be a competent rhetorician need have nothing at all to do with Truth (*ἀλήθεια*) in considering things which are just or good, or men who are so, whether by nature or by education. For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for the Truth about these matters, but for that which is convincing (*πιθανόν*); that is, probability (*τὸ εἰκός*), so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon that [sc. probability].²²⁷

The rhetorical trope of a 'probable' argument being more persuasive than Truth is ridiculed a few lines later by Socrates, who complains that, prior to rhetoricians like Tisias and legal advocates in the courts, the masses were persuaded by things which were actually similar to Truth (*ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς*).²²⁸ Yet if Timaeus opens his *μῦθος* by asking Socrates to accept his story as simply *εἰκώς*, why would the same Socrates immediately endorse this approach? (29d: ἄριστα, ὦ Τίμαιε, παντάπασί τε ὡς κελεύεις ἀποδεκτέον). The answer must be that Timaeus means the *second* version of Socrates' bifurcated definition of *εἰκώς*; that is, a story that is *ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς* (*veri simile*) as opposed to simply 'probable' or

²²⁷ *Phdr.* 272d-e: [...] ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων, ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἢ τροφῇ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι. τὸ παράπαν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις τούτων ἀληθείας μέλει οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ: τοῦτο δ' εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, ὃ δεῖν προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνη ἐρεῖν.

²²⁸ See *Phdr.* 273c: φεῦ, δεινῶς γ' ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τεισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δὴ ποτ' ὦν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος; *Phdr.* 273d: ὅτι, ὦ Τεισία, πάλοι ἡμεῖς, πρὶν καὶ σὲ παρελθεῖν, τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο τὸ εἰκός τοῖς πολλοῖς δι' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τυγχάνει ἐγγιγνόμενον: τὰς δὲ ὁμοιότητας ἄρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰδὼς κάλλιστα ἐπίσταται εὐρίσκειν.

probabilistic (a modern concept).²²⁹ This would be along the lines suggested by BRYAN (2012, 158) who argues: ‘Timaeus is using εἰκώς as a piece of technical, more or less metaphysical, jargon’.²³⁰ We draw a distinction then between εἰκώς as a rhetorical, probabilistic concept that is simply persuasive rather than ‘true’, and εἰκώς as something like the sense of an εἰκὼν (*simulacrum*, ‘copy’) of Truth (i.e. *veri simile*, ‘truth-like’). What I think BRYAN intends is that Timaeus’ novel use of εἰκώς in a metaphysical context differs from Socrates’ previous usage in a rhetorical context referring to the tricks used in the law courts by advocates who maintained that a narrative need not be true but merely ‘probable’ in order to be convincing. This would imply that, here, Plato introduces a lexical augmentation in the meaning of εἰκώς to cover a broader inquiry of the ‘likely story’ (εἰκὼς μῦθος) since it partakes in a proportion of, or as a resemblance to, the Truth (and not necessarily a rhetorical stratagem for ‘convincing’ his listeners).

It is this interpretation that Cicero might well have latched onto perceptively in his use of *similitudo veri*. The term *probabilis* was common in legal registers and more aligned with *πιθανόν* (as will be discussed below), for example with Cicero deploying it in *Inv.* 2.106 and in his orations (*Div. Caec.* 64.1-4; *Verr.* 2.2.154, 2.5.173; *Caec.* 71.4, etc.).²³¹ In a letter to one of Caesar’s famous assassins, (the Epicurean) Cassius, Cicero says that: ‘[I]t is difficult to persuade (*persuadere*) men that “the good is chosen for its own sake” but that “pleasure” and “peace of mind” are obtained by virtue, justice, and “the Good” is both true and convincing (*verum et probabile est*).’²³² Here one may consider that Cicero refers to Plato’s moral ‘Good’ as not just *πιθανόν*, but convincing precisely *because* it is truth-like, as opposed to Tisias’

²²⁹ Modern interpretations of the ‘probable’ can be divided into three groups (HÁJEK (2011)): quasi-logical (probability as a measure of objective evidential support), degree-of-confidence or degree-of-belief approaches (a measure of subjectively graded belief or confidence), and feature-of-the-world approaches: (a measure for undetermined features of the world). The second two categories are well-established interpretations in antiquity and the medieval era. As SCHUESSLER (2019) noted in his survey of medieval and Renaissance interpretations of probability: ‘Conspicuously lacking in the period from 1200–1500 [and we could add, in antiquity also] is an ancestor of the “classical” notion of probability [as in the later mathematical conception of probability as found in authors like Pierre-Simon Laplace in the nineteenth century], grounded on the equal possibility of events. This, then, seems to be a genuinely modern interpretation of probability.’

²³⁰ BRYAN (2012), 158.

²³¹ See also *TLL* s.v. *probabilis*, 10.2.1445.61-7.

²³² *Fam.* 15.19: *difficile est enim persuadere hominibus τὸ καλὸν δι’ αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν? esse; ἡδονὴν vero et ἀταξίαν virtute, iustitia, τῷ καλῷ parari et verum et probabile est.*

arguments as reported by Socrates as accounts being ‘truth-like’ simply because they are convincing on the probabilities (εἰκώς). While the term *probabilis* appears before Cicero, as noted by GLUCKER,²³³ in a fragment attributed by RIBBECK to Lucius Afranius, the use of the adjective was with a different sense (‘worthy of approval, commendable’, see *OLD* s.v., 1). It was Cicero who used *probabilis* and *similitudo veri* to convey the Platonic conception of accounts of things like the Universe being πιθανόν (*probabilis*) since they partook in Truth (ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, *veri simile*). This was opposed to the merely convincing, as the advocates and rhetoricians were accustomed to believe.²³⁴

οὐσία in Plato and Cicero

Cicero also uses *aeternitas* to render Plato’s central term οὐσία with the notion of ‘eternity, endlessness, permanence’. So *Timaeus* 8: *ad id, quod ortum est, aeternitas valet* renders *Ti.* 29c: πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία. MORENO HERNÁNDEZ’s study of this term in Cicero and Seneca is a useful starting point (1994, for Cicero see 407-14). He observes that Cicero did not have a term that would allow the translation of οὐσία as a technical term; that is, a term with a well-defined and unambiguous sense, whose meaning did not depend on the context in which it was used.²³⁵ LSJ list five distinct senses for οὐσία, with the second carrying the philosophical (technical) meaning, divided into eight sub-meanings ranging from a ‘stable being, immutable reality’ to the Pythagorean name for ‘I’ (the number). The semantic range of the single term is difficult enough to convey in the Greek and Cicero instead focuses specifically on the qualities of immutability and unchanging permanence. However, Plato’s use of the term even in this technical sense is not entirely consistent. NAILS (1979) outlines the different instances of the word in Plato’s dialogues with the following distinct meanings:²³⁶

²³³ GLUCKER (1995), 119.

²³⁴ GÖRLER (1992/2004), 69 however notes that Cicero’s rendition of πιθανόν with both *probabile* and *veri simile* varied and the latter dropped out of his preferred translation, opting for the former in later works.

²³⁵ MORENO HERNÁNDEZ (1994), 414.

²³⁶ NAILS (1979), 72-3.

1. Property (wealth)
2. οὐσία as property of an activity, an object, or a person (including “participation” of various things in οὐσία [where οὐσία functions like a Platonic form])
3. οὐσία as a component of the ontological ordering
 - a. used without reference to γένεσις or non-being (definitions, stipulations)
 - b. οὐσία/γένεσις
 - i. οὐσία contrasted with γένεσις
 - ii. οὐσία with γένεσις (“coming into being,” “generated being”)
 - c. οὐσία in opposition to non-being
 - d. οὐσία becomes ontologically fundamental through the use of modifiers

In this particular section, the instance of οὐσία falls under the definition in (b)(i) since it is placed in contrast to γένεσις, as ἀλήθεια is with πίστις in *Ti.* 29c. In rendering this particular οὐσία with *aeternitas*, Cicero conveys his understanding of the word as something ontologically fundamental. This is, however, the sole instance where Cicero renders οὐσία with *aeternitas*. He later uses *materia* as its equivalent due to Plato’s varied usage under the stress of the metaphor employed: that is, the Demiurge fashioning a created Universe with raw materials which are mixed together to create the Universal Soul, but also (possibly) due to some contamination with the Aristotelian technical use of οὐσία.²³⁷ These issues will be discussed in further detail below but, for now, it is important to understand that Plato used οὐσία in different ways throughout *Timaeus*’ account and Cicero was alive to this in his translation.²³⁸

²³⁷ See MORENO HERNÁNDEZ (1994), 414. See also the later use of *materia* for the Aristotelian ὕλη in e.g. Victorinus’ *In Isag.* 11.13-14.

²³⁸ As we shall see in Chapter 4.3, in his version of the *Timaeus*, Calcidius prefers *essentia* to render the Greek expression, a term attributed to Cicero by Seneca (discussed in Chapter 2.2) but for which we have no remaining evidence in his surviving works.

The probability and verisimilitude of Timaeus' creation narrative

In *Timaeus* 8 (*contentique esse debebitis si probabilia dicentur*) Cicero again renders a single Platonic term with multiple Latin equivalents. In this case, *εἰκότα* is translated by *probabilia* but elsewhere Cicero uses the phrases *similitudo veri* or *veri simile* as an equivalent. The adjective *probabile* is one he also uses to translate Plato's *πιθανόν*. HOENIG has recently discussed this section in some detail with the intention of demonstrating that Cicero's translation of these passages was first and foremost to imbue his own Academic scepticism within the Creation narrative. She first observes that Plato's *εἰκώς* was originally a rhetorical term and there is no evidence to suggest that his specific application of the term to epistemological contexts, as in the *Timaeus*, was maintained by the Academy:²³⁹ 'It is possible that *veri simile*, as an apparent synonym for *probabile*, was incorporated by Cicero into the vocabulary of sceptical epistemology, despite the fact that its usual Greek counterpart, *eikos*, did not belong to this field'.²⁴⁰ The issue here is the imposition of boundaries between 'philosophical' or 'rhetorical' terms. Neither *probabile*, *veri simile* nor *εἰκώς* were, strictly speaking, philosophical terms. *Veri simile* was, as far as the evidence suggests, never associated with epistemological inquiry in the subject of philosophy (or at least not to the Carneadean criteria to which Cicero applied it) and might originally have been a calque of *εἰκώς*, attested in many earlier Latin authors and used in rhetoric.²⁴¹ So can we say Cicero is guilty of imposing his own sceptic school of thought onto this dialogue through his choice of Latin terms, or is he simply doing what Plato had done before him and drawing on well-worn rhetorical and legal terms to apply to this dense and very metaphorical general conflation of terms in the Latin invites further questioning: What was the result of Cicero's interpretative process of pleonasm (periphrasis, circumlocution etc.) in translating Greek terms, not only in this case but also in many others elsewhere, both in this translation and in his other

²³⁹ HOENIG (2018), 62.

²⁴⁰ HOENIG (2018), 63.

²⁴¹ See GLUCKER (1995), 120. See also *OLD* s.v. *similitudo*, 1b. By the time of Boethius, the two words had become a single compound *verisimilis* rendering both *εἰκώς* and *πιθανός* (see e.g. Boet. *Top.* 110a38; 149b27, 151a29, 156b1,10; 161b35.)

philosophical treatises?²⁴² POWELL noted that Cicero's pleonasms in the *Timaeus* are often not conflation or misunderstandings of the original Platonic concept but rather a tool to further refine or clarify the idea in Latin.²⁴³ At other times, this results in pure tautology.²⁴⁴ Regarding the conflation of *veri simile* and *probabile*, HOENIG posits two options: a) that this was a deliberate act, possibly based on the conceptual innovations of Philo (but other scholars maintain that it was Cicero who was responsible for this innovation)²⁴⁵; or b) that this was simply a misunderstanding on Cicero's part and his long rhetorical pedigree from a young age perhaps led to his conflation of the rhetorical and epistemological, hence the confusion of *πιθανόν* and *εἰκώς*.

However, deliberate or accidental,²⁴⁶ the consequence was a significant 'Bedeutungsverschiebung' (to quote GÖRLER); a shift in meaning from the original Greek expressions. It introduced a more positive form of scepticism reliant on the active meaning of *probare* and its derivatives (e.g. *probabile*) rather than the mediopassive *πείθεσθαι*, with which *πιθανόν* is associated, found previously in the works of Greek sceptics like Pyrrho or Carneades.²⁴⁷ Similarly, the exercise of ascertaining Cicero's agenda in translating the *Timaeus* is less interesting than what took place as a result: the transformation of the original Greek concepts; i.e. a significant change occurred in any case. HOENIG concludes with the following :²⁴⁸ a) Cicero intended to present the Timaeian creation account as the cosmological theory that the sceptical Academy would have adopted as the 'most probable position'; b) to present the rhetorical nature of sceptical investigative method (specifically Philo's method)²⁴⁹ as applied to the created visible cosmos; and c) that Timaeus' narrative was intended to be

²⁴² Cf. Cicero's translation (and conflation) of *ὁ δημιουργός, τό αἴτιον* and similar concepts in the *Timaeus* by at least five different terms (and phrases), see PANAGL (1986), 587; PUELMA (1980), 164; LAMBARDI (1982), 105-6. Cf. also *κατάληψις* where Cicero suggests *cognitio, comprehensio* and *perceptio* in *Fin.* 3.17.

²⁴³ POWELL (1995a), 287-8.

²⁴⁴ See e.g. PONCELET (1957), 200-2.

²⁴⁵ HOENIG (2018), 62 n. 76 and n. 82.

²⁴⁶ GÖRLER's (1992/2004) conclusions suggest a mixture of a 'sprachlicher Zufall' and deliberate 'vereinfachen' on Cicero's part. GLUCKER's (1995) view, after examining the diachrony of both *πιθανόν* and *εἰκώς* in Greek, is that by Cicero's time, the terms, along with *εὐλογον*, had become increasingly interchangeable ((1995), 127; 132-3).

²⁴⁷ See GÖRLER (1992/2004), 70-1; see also HOENIG (2018), 63 n. 82.

²⁴⁸ HOENIG (2018), 55-6.

²⁴⁹ See HOENIG (2018), 74-5.

given to Cicero himself as a character in the potential dialogue which the translation might have formed. These are all theoretically interesting questions, but they are all (excepting argument (b)) speculative and veer towards psychologism (certainly (c) can be argued to be a bridge too far given the paucity of evidence in the surviving translation). Argument (b) is credible here and HOENIG's suggestion that Cicero deploys the sceptical-rhetorical terminology as a way of demonstrating what is 'probable' (as opposed to what is *true*), evinced by his qualified translation of *Ti.* 30b6 with his avoidance in translating ἡ ἀλήθεια is convincing.²⁵⁰

The phrase *causam quae impulerit eum qui haec machinatus sit* should be noted as another rendering of the ὁ δημιουργός, here via a circumlocution, he 'who skilfully devised these things' conveying an even more anthropomorphic image of a hands-on artisan manufacturing the Universe (perhaps incidentally, giving weight to Epicurean claims like that of Velleius in *N.D.* 1.8: *sed etiam manu paene factum*). Cicero then goes on to discuss the issue of *coniectura* in *Timaeus* 10: *quam ob causam non est cunctandum profiteri — si modo investigari aliquid conjectura potest [...] et divina providentia constitutum*. The assumption, based on Plato's dichotomy of the intelligent and the unintelligent creature, leads to the *coniectura* or 'inference' that the Universe must be of the former kind, given that God is the most excellent and his creation the most good. Here, again, Cicero's translation is laden with rhetorical connotations, with *coniectura* being the third Latin term used to render εἰκὼς λόγος.²⁵¹ What Cicero means here by *coniectura* is 'inference' or 'deduction' based on probable facts. In his second book of the *Div.*, Cicero writes, 'every sort of conjecture [...] is often applied by the ingenuities of man to many different and even contradictory uses. As in judicial cases, the prosecution draws one inference and the defense another, and yet both are plausible; so, in all matters in which it is customary to investigate by conjecture, ambiguity is

²⁵⁰ There is also the possibility, though purely speculative, that Cicero was perhaps translating with the assistance of a commentary. Could such a commentary have been authored by an adherent of Carneades (e.g. Clitomachus, whose works Cicero had previously used in writing his *Academica* treatises (e.g. *Luc.* 108 on the issue of ἐποχή) or of Philo of Larissa (or even by Philo himself) or any one of the Middle Academy's anti-dogmatists? Such questions remain, but at least a discussion of such an option would have been useful in this section of H.'s analysis.

²⁵¹ See HOENIG (2018), 75f.

found.’²⁵² This section was written in the year after Cicero translated Plato’s *Ti.*, it seems clear from this that his character in the *Div.* did not see *coniectura* as a simple stepwise process to arrive at the truth of the matter, but that it could lead to two entirely contradictory conclusions. Timaeus’ ‘likely story’ or ‘probable account’ (εἰκὼς λόγος) is not simply a deduction or inference based on probable facts — it is more than that, it is an account based on the immutable ἀλήθεια of God’s exemplar, as opposed to the ever-changing, always-becoming nature of the physical Universe. It is not a deduction, but an account that partakes in the eternal Truth of the Creator’s noetic paradigm. Here then, we see Cicero altering the original by introducing into the *narratio* the concept of deduction of the likelihood of certain facts within the creation myth by inference.

In the *posse* + infinitive construction in *Timaeus* 11: *nec absoluto simile pulchrum esse nihil potest* Cicero replaces the Greek optative to fit the Latin idiom, hence *esse nihil potest* for *Ti.* 30c: οὐδέν ποτ’ ἂν γένοιτο καλόν, *potest esse* for *Ti.* 31a: οὐκ ἂν ποτ’ εἴη, and *nihil porro igni vacuum aspici ac videri potest* for *Ti.* 31c: χωρισθὲν δὲ πυρὸς οὐδέν ἂν ποτε ὁρατὸν γένοιτο. Similarly, in *alius animans qui eum contineat sit necesse est*, the subjunctive *esse* replaces the infinitive in Plato at *Ti.* 31a: ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ περὶ ἐκείνῳ δέοι ζῶον. See also *sint* for *Ti.* 32a εἶναι, *oriretur* for *Ti.* 41e φῦναι, and *fingerent* for *Ti.* 42a πλάττειν.

Unigena, proportio and miscellaneous textual issues

The adjective *unigena* in *Timaeus* 12 renders *μονογενής* (*Ti.* 31b) and functions as a lexical augmentation based on a compound probably in use before Cicero’s time,²⁵³ used extensively later in antiquity by Christian authors’ descriptions of Christ. It is also used in another poetic sense later by Catullus (*Carm.* 64.300 and 66.53) meaning ‘one sharing a single parentage, i.e. brother and sister’ (*OLD* s.v. *unigena*, 2). Such *-gen-a* poetic compounds were relatively common, see e.g. *alienigena*, *caecigenus*, *primigenus*, *Troiugena*, etc. Here, Cicero gives it the specific cosmological connotation in reference to the *mundus* as ‘only-born’. In the same

²⁵² *Div.* 2.55: *vero coniectura omnis [...] ingeniis hominum in multas aut diversas aut etiam contrarias partis saepe deducitur. ut enim in causis iudicialibus alia coniectura est accusatoris, alia defensoris et tamen utriusque credibilis, sic in omnibus eis rebus, quae coniectura investigari videntur, anceps reperitur oratio.*

²⁵³ LINDNER (1996), 197. Paul. Fest. p. 195: ‘*oenigenos unigenitos*’. See also BADER (1962), 69.

section, Cicero renders the optative εἴτην with the subjunctive *contineat* (Ti. 31a: ζῶον, οὗ μέρος ἂν εἴτην ἐκείνω). See also *gigneretur* for γένοιτ' ἂν in translating Ti. 33a.

He then proceeds to gloss the Greek term ἀναλογία: *id optime adsequitur quae Graece analogia, Latine — audendum est enim, quoniam haec primum a nobis novantur — comparatio proportiove dici potest*. SEELE (1995, 30) suggests classifying *comparatio proportione* as a paraphrase, but what do we make of this second term, which appears to be first attested here. There is an important textual question as to whether *proportio* ‘analogy’ or *pro portione* ‘by proportion, in proportion’ should be read. If the former, the sentence would become a tautology and requires a coordinating or disjunctive conjunction. PLASBERG AND AX (1938/1987) print *pro portione* but note that correctors in manuscripts **A** (Leiden, UB MSS Voss. Lat. F. 84, (ninth-tenth century)) and **B** (Leiden, UB MSS Voss. Lat. F. 86, (tenth century)) had *proportiove*.²⁵⁴ PLASBERG²⁵⁵ also rejected printing *proportione* despite manuscript **V** (Vienna, ÖNB MS Lat. 189 (tenth century)), and the pre-corrected versions of **A** and **B** having *-iove* (to use a textual critic’s heuristic, it might also be noted that *proportiove* would be the *lectio difficilior* here, in contrast with the more common *pro portione*, though this is not, of course, persuasive per se). PLASBERG’s reasoning is based on the type of comparison at play here, i.e. the comparison of things with one another by proportion (*pro portione*). Reading the sentence this way would obviate the need to substitute the phrase with a coined univerbation in *proportio* which would require the *-ve* enclitic. Yet the context of the word (or phrase) is significant and Cicero explicitly says, ‘it must be ventured to say (this), since this is the first time *these words* are coined by us.’ The verb *novantur* refers to more than one word (*haec* read as the neuter nominative plural). If we read the text following PLASBERG, there is no coinage whatever and the word (or words) Cicero, or a character of his such as Nigidius in an intended dialogue, was venturing to coin was not a new term but simply a standard Latin phrase: ‘a comparison by proportion.’ The *TLL* lists the attestation of *comparatio* in multiple authors including in the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (c. 80 BC), Vitruvius, Fronto, Livy, Suetonius, Pliny the Younger, and others (*TLL* s.v. 2. *comparatio*, 3.0.2006.30f). *Pro portione* (or *portio*) is also extensively

²⁵⁴ AX (1965), 161.

²⁵⁵ PLASBERG (1898), 74ff.

attested, including in authors like Plautus, Cato, and Varro (10.2.30.4-5). Note also the introduction of abstract substantives in *-tio* is a favoured device of Cicero's, as discussed above. Further, we might ask if the formation of *proportio* was a back-formation (whether by Cicero or an earlier author) from *pro portione* in an analogous way to, e.g., *triumvir* from *tres viri*, *trium virorum*. If we read the sentence as *comparatio proportiove dici potest* 'comparison or analogy can be said', we find a logical apodosis: 'since this is the first time these words are coined by us, comparatio or proportio may be said'. This affects the next three instances of *proportio* in the later lines of the section, so: *primum proportione ita id postremo comparetur, eaque inter se compareret vel proportione coniungeret, quodque anima aquae id aqua terrae proportione redderet*. In any case, nearly contemporaneously we find Varro using the same substantive in the accusative in *L. 8.57: ex his vocabula non reddunt proportionem* (though the prepositional phrase is far more frequent, see also DE MELO (2019), 1.228) so it may have been that the univerbation had occurred around this time in Latin already, but recently enough for Cicero to note that this was something of a novelty (or, at least, unusual).

In *Timaeus* 17 there is also another gloss: *et globosum est fabricatus, quod sphairoeides Graeci vocat*. The use of *globosus* is unusua, though not unique to Cicero.²⁵⁶ The adjective also appears in Lucretius (2.469): *scilicet esse globosa tamen, cum squalida constant* used as a synonym for *rotunda*.²⁵⁷ In *Timaeus* 18, the abstract noun *consumptio* partially renders *φθίσις* (*Ti. 33c: αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐαυτῷ τροφήν τὴν ἐαυτοῦ φθίσιν παρέχον*). The word is defined in the *TLL* as: 'de actu exhaustiendi' (4.0.618.54); in the *OLD*, 1 as the: 'process of consuming or wearing away.' *Consumptio* by itself is not a direct rendering of *φθίσις* but is part of a double translation: *consumptione et senio alebat*. Cicero uses both his new noun and another established one (*senium*) to reinforce the notion of Plato's *φθίσις*.²⁵⁸ Compare this hesitance in finding a one-to-one Latin term with his use of double translation, for instance, with the word *assensio* in the *Lucullus* (37): *de assensione atque approbatione, quam Graeci συγκατάθεσιν vocant*. However, in this instance, the use of *atque* could doubly

²⁵⁶ The form also appears in *Cic. Rep.* 6.15 and *N.D.* 2.49, 2.98, 2.116.

²⁵⁷ BAILEY (1947), 2.881.

²⁵⁸ Aristotle later uses *φθίσις* with respect to the waning of the moon (*Hist. an.* 582b2, *Gen. An.* 767a4). The term *senium* is used in Latin to refer to a similar phenomenon (see e.g. *Plin. Nat.* 7.155). The astronomical concept of 'waning' heavenly bodies is therefore well captured by Cicero here, in addition to the more organic notion of old age or 'wasting' away — a phenomenon for which the Living Creature the Creator constructs has no need.

serve as a polemic device used by Cicero's character of Lucullus to link the necessity of assent *and* approval to the mind's grasping of cataleptic impressions.²⁵⁹ Also for the Stoic τέλος, Cicero proposes (*Fin.* 1.42) *extremum* (which is the first time this word is used with this philosophical meaning), as well as other common terms such as *ultimum*, *summum*, and *finis*. RENER suggests the notion that Cicero employed the 'doublet' at times where he felt in doubt as to conveying an exact *verbum ex verbo* translation.²⁶⁰ There is a well-known section in *Fin.* 3.55 where Cicero seeks to explain the Greek term τελικά:

That division follows, such that some of the good things are 'those which pertain to that end' (you see this is what I refer to what are called τελικά; for let us establish this method, as it pleased, to say with several words what we cannot with one, such that the matter may be understood) however another is 'efficiency', which the Greeks call ποιητικά, and some are both.²⁶¹

Other examples of double translation can be found in his use of *praesensio* to convey 'μαντική': (*Div.* 1.1): *quam Graeci appellant μαντικὴν id est praesensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum*, used in conjunction with the term *divinatio*. Cicero seems to be feeling his way through translating a Greek term by using such doublets instead of a *verbum ex verbo* approach. Periphrases are also employed in a similar ways, e.g. when translating the Aristotelian notion of συμπάθεια: *qua ex coniunctione naturae et quasi concentu atque consensu, quam συμπάθειαν Graeci appellant*. The phrase *coniunctione naturae* would seem sufficient, but it appears there is some hesitation²⁶² of the accuracy of the translation, hence the periphrasis with additional nouns to reinforce the Greek sense to his readers.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ This is a difficult area of Stoic epistemology; see further REID (1885), 223 and BRITTAIN (2006), 24 n. 51.

²⁶⁰ RENER (1989), 110.

²⁶¹ *Fin.* 3.55: *sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello quae τελικά dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere quod uno non poterimus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci ποιητικά, alia utrumque.*

²⁶² Whether this is a rhetorical stratagem or a genuine hesitation is an open question, as discussed in the Introduction.

²⁶³ Almost as a commentator instead of a translator, see SEELE (1995), 35: 'Die Übersetzung eines griechischen Begriffes durch eine paraphrasierend — erklärende Wendung, wobei der Übersetzer sich implizit als Kommentator betätigt.'

In 20, Cicero introduces the adjectival compound *solivagus* ‘lone-wandering’ as a translation of Plato’s ἔρημος. The Greek term is not morphologically complex and so Cicero is required to source a Latin equivalent without resorting to calquing.²⁶⁴ Instead, he opts for the poetic practice of compounding. This term had been used earlier by Cicero in the *Rep.* 1.39 and in the *Tusc.* 5.38. Similar poetic compounds can be found in *montivagus* (*DRN* 1.404, 2.597, 2.1081; Cic. *Tusc.* 5.79),²⁶⁵ *multivagus* (*Stat. Theb.* 1.499; *Sen. Herc.* 533), *fluctivagus* (*Stat. Theb.* 1.271, 9.305, 9.360, *Silv.* 2.1.95, 3.1.84), *pervagus* (*Ov. Ars.* 2.18), *omnivagus* (Cic. *N.D.* 2.68), and *harenivagus* (*Luc.* 9.941). In the case of *multivagus*, the adjective appears to correspond to the Greek adjective πολυπλανής, and *montivagus* with ὄρειπλανής. Here, however, Cicero is translating only ἔρημος, which lacks the –πλανής element, so the adjective functions as a poetic embellishment of the Platonic original.²⁶⁶

Materia and the ‘Mean’

In *Timaeus* 21, Cicero approaches one of the most complex elements of Platonic ontology: the creation of the Universal Soul, ontologically prior to the body of the Universe (but not temporally, as Plato makes explicit, (see TAYLOR (1928, 105). In *Timaeus*’ story, this soul is composed of a compound of two essences or beings (οὐσίαι): that which is of the Same and that which is of the Other or Different.²⁶⁷ So Cicero’s version tells us that the soul was fashioned *ex ea materia quae individua est et quae semper unius modi suique similis* (*Ti.* 35a: τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας.) The difficulty with οὐσία appears again, here referring to the indivisible ‘Sameness’ element that possesses the eternally unchanging essence or being, which Cicero re-interprets into ‘stuff’ (*materia*) which is ‘always of a single kind (*modus*), similar to itself.’ This is not, conceptually, the same as Plato’s meaning. As

²⁶⁴ The term would later become a loan-word in Latin *eremus* but would sometimes be rendered by *desertum* or *solitudo*, e.g. in Evagrius’ translation of the *Vita Antonii*, see further GRAY (2015), 148.

²⁶⁵ For possible (though very few) lexical and broader textual connections between Lucretius and Cicero (specifically the neologism *montivagus*) see PIZZANI (1984), esp. 187.

²⁶⁶ Note *ludivagus* (Cassiod. *In psalm.* 1.4 (6) l. 351) was later used to mean simply ‘sportive’ (see LEWIS AND SHORT, s.v.) but this is the only example where the –*vagus* element has been ignored semantically.

²⁶⁷ Plato’s other late period dialogue, *Sph.* (236d-64b, esp. 255c-d), is a useful comparison to this dichotomy of Sameness and Difference as ‘beings’ or ‘kinds’.

discussed above in relation to Lucretius' use of *materies* for Epicurean ἄτομος, the etymology of *materia* goes back to the fundamental sense of any 'substance of which a physical object is made or composed' (*OLD* s.v.). This is, to be sure, one of the many semantic personas of the enigmatic οὐσία (as noted in NAILS' (1979, 72-3) taxonomy in definitions 1 and 2: 'property' or 'substance'), but here Plato's usage has been viewed as more ontologically fundamental than mere physical presence; rather, it is the 'essence' or primary being-ness of the eternal exemplar. Cicero earlier rendered οὐσία with *aeternitas* but now with *materia*: why? MORENO HERNÁNDEZ (1994, 414) suggests two possibilities: 1) the previous integration of the term into Cicero's philosophical vocabulary (e.g. in the *Academica* books), and hence its semantic extension to cover the sense in *Timaeus*' discussion of the Universal Soul;²⁶⁸ and 2) a contamination of Plato's metaphysics with Aristotelian thought, characteristic of Hellenistic-era Eclecticism. Another explanation might be the new metaphorical framework within which Plato has set up this origin story of the Universal Soul. Plato's metaphor for the admixture of essences in creating the Universal Soul is the κρατήρ, (as we shall discuss in *Ti.* 41d below, see also TAYLOR (1928, 106)), within which the Same and Different essences are compounded, as if by a chemist, into a new one: the soul. Since the Platonic vehicle for this metaphor was concrete and recognisable, i.e. the 'mixing bowl' of the symposium, what was Cicero to do? As we will see, he chose to abstractise Plato's κρατήρ with the noun *temperatio*. The metaphor is now encased, so to speak, by the verbal abstract concept of 'a proper combination, mixture'. The ingredients, unlike Plato who chose to abstractise them, are conversely concretised by Cicero. Moreover, Cicero had followed the Platonic metaphor at the beginning of the Creator of the Universe as an *aedificator* or 'демиург', fashioning the cosmos out of certain elements. *Materia* had also carried the much older sense of 'raw materials' of a builder, hence *TLL* s.v. *materia*, IIA (8.0.451.76-7): 'de qualibet substantia fabрили: de substantiis ad aedificia extruenda aptis'. Thus, instead of an οὐσία of Sameness and one of Difference, Cicero introduces two *materiae* or 'materials': one which is of an identical nature (*eiusdem naturae*) and the second is of the Other, difference (*alterius*). Even if Cicero

²⁶⁸ In the *Academica* books however, the discussion is about the *materia* by which the demiurge created the Universe (a sense used later in Apuleius in the specific application to the unformed 'space' or the 'receptacle' in *Ti.* 52bf). Cf. specifically *Ac.* 27-8 and *Ti.* 51a.

in fact believed the soul was of a divine, non-physical, and immortal essence,²⁶⁹ or simply suspended judgement on the topic, the (significant) semantic shift of *materia* to convey this sense of the Creator's ontological 'materials' shifts the import of Plato's οὐσία. Though the shift towards 'substance' as a criterion for 'being' or 'essence' (οὐσία) had taken place already under the Peripatetic school through Aristotle's metaphysics, the Latinisation of Plato's expression in this way accelerates the interpretations of 'essence' or 'being' as not simply tied to noetic Forms or Ideas, but 'stuff', i.e. *substantia*. So whereas Aristotle extended the notion that Forms *as well as* physical things possessed a primary 'substance', Cicero here imbues the notion of Plato's primordial 'Being' with a property associated with spatio-temporality, as the etymology of *materia* had consistently conveyed in Latin.

Later authors such as Seneca, as we shall see, made pertinent comments regarding Cicero's vocabulary in translating Platonic metaphysics. For instance, in *Epistle* 58.6f, Seneca says: 'I desire, if possible, to say the word *essentia* [...] I have Cicero as authority for the use of this word, and I regard him as a powerful authority'.²⁷⁰ There is, as far as we can discern, no direct evidence beyond *testimonia* that Cicero used the word *essentia* for οὐσία.²⁷¹ 'How otherwise can we find a word for that which the Greeks call οὐσία, something that is indispensable, something that is the natural substratum of everything? I beg you accordingly to allow me to use this word,' Seneca wrote.²⁷² The desperation here for a linguistic cognate of the crucial Greek term is palpable in Roman authors. As previously discussed at the beginning of this commentary, since Latin appeared to have no mechanism within its lexicon and grammar to translate technical concepts such as τὸ ὄν or οὐσία effectively, we find Roman

²⁶⁹ See e.g. *Tusc.* 1.24; but see also the character of Cato in *Sen.* 85.

²⁷⁰ *Ep.* 58.6: *cupio, si fieri potest, propitiis auribus tuis essentiam dicere; si minus, dicam et iratis. Ciceronem auctorem huius verbi habeo, puto locupletem.*

²⁷¹ Cf. GANZ (1990), 94: 'Rejecting fables he made a reference to the *rectissimum et summum bonum*, and in the opening passage of the work, taken from the opening of the *de Natura Deorum*, Hadoard [the ninth century *custos librorum* of Corbie Abbey] adds the term *essentia* to Cicero's text [...] *Essentia* is the first term to be defined in Hadoard's patristic florilegium, but it is not a Ciceronian term.' However, this does not address the question as to why Seneca would attribute the term to Cicero. MÜLLER (1890), 4.3.412 provides an uncertain fragment containing the word *essentia* attributed to Cicero by Sidonius Apollinaris (*Carm.* 14, *epist. dedic. p. m.* p. 144) but this is hardly firm evidence of anything, beyond another appeal to Ciceronian authority for using a *novum verbum*.

²⁷² *Ep.* 58.6: *quomodo dicetur οὐσία res necessaria, natura continens fundamentum omnium? rogo itaque permittas mihi hoc verbo uti.*

authors grappling with this by various means, either as a conceptual reinterpretation (Cicero's *materia* for a *οὐσία*) or literal calque (Seneca, Apuleius, and Calcidius' *essentia*) or a change of grammatical form entirely (*quod est*, τὸ ὄν) and this alters the concepts Plato propounded in the original Greek.²⁷³

In 22, Cicero employs the verbal abstract *copulatio* to render the Greek συναρμόττων from συναρμόζω 'to fit together' and seems to translate the adjective δύσμεικτος 'difficult to mix' with the double translation *fugientem et eius copulationis alienam* (τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτόν συναρμόττων βία = *naturamque illam quam alterius diximus vi cum eadem coniunxit fugientem et eius copulationis alienam*). The term *copulatio* is replaced later in translations such as Calcidius' with *concretio* but had been used earlier by Cicero in his discussion of Epicurus' 'swerve' and the cohesion of atoms with other atoms as a result in *Fin.* 1.19: *ita effici complexiones et copulationes et adhaesiones atomorum inter se*. The noun is also used in a section from *N.D.* 2.119 in a similar context where Balbus the Stoic marvels at the providential cohesion of the Universe: *quae copulatio rerum et quasi consentiens ad mundi incolumitatem coagmentatio naturae quem non movet, hunc horum nihil umquam reputavisse certo scio*.

In the translation of the mathematical proportions in *Ti.* 35b-c (*Timaeus*, 22) there are some additions to the clauses that expand upon the Greek. So the last proportion in Plato is expressed: ἐβδόμην δ' ἑπτακαίικοσιπλασίαν τῆς πρώτης 'the seventh [part was] twenty-seven times the first [part]', which Cicero renders: *postremo septimam, quae septem et viginti partibus antecederet primae*. The addition of the verb *antecedo* is noteworthy as there is no equivalent in the Greek, but it clarifies the sense of 'to be larger than' with respect to another inanimate object, hence the dative.

Next we come to an important gloss: *ut in singulis essent bina media — vix enim audeo dicere medietates, quas Graeci mesotetas appellant*, where Cicero provides us with one of the most insightful examples of his rhetorical philosophy at work. As noted at the outset of this thesis, the question of whether Latin authors sought to transform Greek philosophical expressions by creating a new philosophical vocabulary within Latin in translating the

²⁷³ Cf. PONCELET (1957), 92-94 for his critique of Cicero's rendering of *Ti.* 37b which centres around the concepts of τὸ γιγνόμενον and ἔχοντος αἰεί.

technical terms or that this transformation was a natural consequences of the translation process, is at the centre of this study. We know Romans such as Cicero and Caesar were purist when it came to their mother tongue and would admit few direct Greek loan-words for fear of sounding alien or obscure, or (perhaps worse) ‘too Greek’. Cicero, therefore, used a variety of techniques, as we have witnessed so far throughout this translation alone, to carefully bring in new words or new meanings to the Latin lexicon. Some of these techniques include periphrasis, circumlocution and double translation, others include lexical augmentation or metaphorical speech, and in the present instance we see him coining a new word outright, but with seeming hesitation and serious qualification. This hesitation is a rhetorical technique, a type of *captatio benevolentiae* as FÖGEN has noted and (as we will discuss below) a form of *praeteritio* ‘the announcement of the intention to leave certain things implies the mentioning of these things’.²⁷⁴ If Cicero were satisfied that a simple gloss here would suffice, he could have moved on without hindrance to the reader. Instead, he goes out of his way to make a point: ‘For **I would not dare** to say *medietas*²⁷⁵, which the Greeks call *μεσότης*, but let it be understood as if I had said it thus, for it will be **more clear**’. While Cicero (or another persona of the intended dialogue) says he would not ‘dare’ to use a neologism, he does anyway because ‘it will be clearer’. Here, we see the rhetorician at work, using Cicero’s trademark *praeteritio*. In other words: ‘I would not dare employ a new word like *medietates* in our mother tongue, fellow Romans, but let us pretend this were a word and that it may denote the same as the Greeks’ *μεσότης*, so that our meaning can be clearer.’ Cicero’s polite expressions demonstrate that coining new terms and introducing them ad hoc into his translation at this stage of the *Timaeus* was not just a linguistic concern but an acceptability one as well, skirting close to the edge of good Latin literary form and style. What Cicero is doing — like a Shakespearean aside, clarifying the actions of a character on stage during the performance — is gently elucidating these difficult concepts by dropping innovations in his translation qualified with polite language and expressions for the benefit of his Latin audience. Cicero admits that *μεσότητες* can be translated as *bina media* or ‘two middles’ but the word he prefers (although he would not dare to force it upon his esteemed readers), is actually the

²⁷⁴ See LAUSBERG (1960/1998), §882f.

²⁷⁵ See also the discussion in WÖLFFLIN (1886), 458-70, especially 459, for a diachronic analysis of the term from Cicero onwards.

morphological calque *medietates*, because it is ‘more clear’, but this is only his opinion. His translation was by no means a private hobby, a pastime for him with which he could amuse himself. The preface, with its conspicuous lack of reference to Plato, combined with the asides to his readers in areas where he is forced to innovate in Latin, give the text a very made-for-public consumption feeling. Cicero in his translation could have freely glossed his way through Plato’s dialogue but there is a glimpse, throughout the translation, of a man who set his task as one where his vocabulary would become productive, who made the effort to introduce vocabulary that could equal the technical abstractions of the Greeks, but that could also be understood by a Latin-speaking audience not necessarily well-versed in Greek vocabulary. One might question whether Cicero actually intended such an innovation to become productive, for the elaborate way it was introduced here is somewhat anticlimactic with *medietas* not being used by Cicero again (unlike other terms like *qualitas* or *comprehensibilis* etc.). Why are some terms carefully introduced to his readers and abandoned and others later used as if normal Latin words? It is difficult to answer this question without delving into psychologism but we know this translation was done two years before his assassination in 43 BC and so the time period for him to develop works in which terms like *medietas* were required was very limited in any case. Secondly, there is a sense that Cicero might have been signalling or marking his lexical innovations for posterity. It is not simply a question of whether Cicero preferred to continue using these technical terms in his works (which often he did, unless considerations of style weighed against it, e.g. *veriloquium*), he might have also kept in mind his readership and the next generations of Latin philosophers who might take up the terms in different contexts (which took place in the case of *medietas* in post-Classical Latin authors).

Latin Mathematical Vocabulary in Cicero's translation

In *Timaeus* 23, Cicero provides an array of Latin mathematical terms beginning with: *sequealteris autem intervallis et sequetertiis et sequeoctavis [...] omnia explebat*. The terms are unattested elsewhere in Latin, though intelligible,²⁷⁶ and appear ostensibly to be morphological calques. They have the following values based on the numerals in Plato's original:²⁷⁷

<i>sesquialter</i>	3:2	= 1 ½ (ἡμιόλιος)
<i>sesquitercius</i>	4:3	= 1 ⅓ (ἐπίτριτος)
<i>sesquioctavus</i>	9:8	= 1 ⅛ (ἐπόγδοος)

Cicero's translation runs like this: 'Then the one and a half intervals (3:2) and the one and a third (4:3), and the one and an eighth (9:8) were taken up and from these combinations He filled in all of the 4:3 interval with the first of the 9:8 intervals, with only a single fraction left over; then from the interval of this remaining fraction, a number that had the same comparison by portion in the extremes as 256:243'. The term *intervallo* here as applied to the musical divisions by proportion seems to be echoed in *N.D.* 2.146 where the discussion focuses upon, presumably, διαστήματα (in the sense of Plato's *Rep.* 531a), which Cicero seems to render with the terms *intervalla*, *varietas*, *distinctio*, or all three.²⁷⁸ Here, Cicero renders διάστημα with *intervallum* consistently.

That the Romans lacked a comprehensive vocabulary or linguistic system of mathematical inquiry and philosophy was evident to Cicero: 'Geometry was regarded with the utmost respect among the Greeks and thus none were held in greater honour than

²⁷⁶ Numerical terms using the prefix *sesqui-* are relatively numerous from Plautus to Cato, Varro, Cicero, Vitruvius into the Augustan and later Imperial periods. Note that the adverbial use of *sesqui* in Cicero's *Orat.* 188 is a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον (see *OLD* s.v., 1).

²⁷⁷ For a discussion of the musical theory and geometric progressions associated with Timaeus' Pythagorean account, see CORNFORD (1937), 66-74; TAYLOR (1928), 136-48.

²⁷⁸ See PEASE (1958), 2.930 for its use in a periphrasis in the *N.D.* *Varietas* had also appeared in Varro and Caesar, *intervallum* in Lucretius (referring to the more general sense in e.g. Democritus and Epicurus' διαστήματα of 'distance'). *Distinctio* appears first in Cicero (*Inv.* 1.75), later productive in Seneca and Pliny the Elder, inter alios. In the *Timaeus*, Cicero first uses the term to render the Greek gerundive διοριστέον (*Ti.* 29b), which *OLD* define this as a new meaning: '4b. an axiom'.

mathematicians. Yet we Romans have limited this art to the practical purposes of measuring and calculating.’²⁷⁹ Examples in inscriptions abound, with the practice of mathematics seemingly part of everyday life in Rome, especially when it came to boasting or recording magnitudes of success, see for example one cited by CUOMO (2001, 150) from *CIL* 6.10048 (Rome, 146 AD): *Summa: quadriga agitavit annis XXIII, missus ostio III CCLVII, [vicit MCCC]CLXII, a pompa CX. Singularum vicit ∞LXIII, XXXX XXVIII, [ex his seiuge]s II, L XXVIII inde septeiuge I; LX III. Binarum vicit CCCXXXVII, trigas ad ~~HS~~ XV IIII. Tenarum vicit LI [...]* The academic world has generally consigned Roman mathematics to irrelevancy, with illustrative statements by KLINE (1972, 178): ‘Roman mathematics hardly warrants mention [...] in all of the eleven hundred years there was not one Roman mathematician; apart from a few details this fact in itself tells virtually the whole story of Roman mathematics.’ CUOMO (2001, 194) writes that it is difficult to adduce a Latin equivalent of Euclid, Archimedes or Apollonius, and HODGKIN (2005, 70) goes further and suggests: ‘[W]here are the Latin equivalents of Heron or Nicomachus? True, these second- or third-rate mathematicians worked under Roman rule [...] However, they wrote in Greek, and in a tradition which was, and continued to be, overwhelmingly Greek.’ The Romans maintained a crude form of arithmetic and geometry, and the principal use of mathematics was in land surveying.²⁸⁰ As HODGKIN (2005, 70) notes, Roman surveyors organised as a profession in which a discipline was transmitted via ‘textbooks’ which, ‘both explained how they did it and wrote instructions whose foundation is in their training in some derivative of Euclidean geometry.’ KLINE (1972, 179) suggests it was from approximately 50 BC onwards when

²⁷⁹ *Tusc.* 1.5: *in summo apud illos honore geometria fuit, itaque nihil mathematicis illustrius: at nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate huius artis terminavimus modum.* Cf. also *Fin.* 5.7, where Cicero has Pupius Piso say: *ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poetae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum officina profecti sunt*, with which the character of Cicero agrees: *atque ego “scis me” inquam, “istud idem sentire, Piso”.* See also HÖSLE (2008), 157: ‘[M]athematical activity is for [Cicero] axiologically inferior to politics — something Plato would hardly have accepted.’

²⁸⁰ A notable problem was the use of the terms *demonstratio* and *fundus* in early Latin geometric textbooks of the ninth and eleventh centuries, whose denotations were first associated with the practical operation of reconstructing field boundaries in the former case (a predominantly legal and ‘gromatic’ (surveying) term) rather than the later augmented meaning of ‘geometrical demonstration’ or ‘deductive procedure’, and ‘real estate’ or a ‘property’ in the latter case (another legal term), rather than its later metaphysical meaning of ‘the foundation on which universal measures will be settled’, see ZAITSEV (1999), 525 and 534. This highlights the direction of Latin-speaking mathematics from concrete and practical problems to more theoretical ones.

Romans first began to write mathematics or geometry ‘textbooks’ largely taken from Greek sources. Vitruvius’ ten books known as *De Architectura* written in 14 BC, which is replete with architectural, mechanical, and mathematical terminology in Latin, often our only source of such vocabulary, and commanded significant influence into the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Leon Battista Alberti, Leonardo da Vinci, and Michelangelo all knew of his work. With Vitruvius’ *magnum opus* exempted however, there is an extreme paucity in Classical Latin of a mathematical vocabulary proper beyond basic arithmetic and Greek-influenced geometry and it was perhaps not until the (now lost) translations of Euclid’s geometry and Ptolemy’s astronomy by Boethius (according to Cassiodorus) that Latin attempted to grapple with the mathematical theory of the Greeks in any meaningful way.²⁸¹ Even in antiquity, Aulus Gellius for example noted in the second century AD that Latin had no single equivalents for Greek mathematical terms such as ἡμιόλιος and ἐπίτριτος (evidently not aware of Cicero’s translations of these terms, or terms such as *sescuplum* in Quintilian and Pliny the Younger), and that creating new terms to correspond to the Greek ones would be ‘absurd’: ‘Certain numerical figures which the Greeks call by definite terms have no corresponding names in Latin. But those who have written in Latin about numbers have used the Greek expressions and have refused to make up Latin equivalents, since that would be absurd (*absurde futurum erat*). For what name could one give to a number which is said to be *hemiolios* or *epitritos*?’²⁸²

The question arises which is one of particular import for theoretical mathematicians today, namely the relevance of a civilisation’s success or failure in formulating a language to discuss the ideas of mathematics and geometry at an abstract level. Cicero and others saw the need for a philosophical lexicon in Latin to compete with and surpass the Greeks’ dominance in that field, but the Romans seemed to have no pressing need for mathematics as a specialised field of study. KLINE (1972, 179) articulates the issue by emphasising Roman practicality: ‘[T]hey boasted of their practicality [...] Roman emperors did not support mathematics as did the Ptolemys of Egypt. Nor did Romans understand pure science. Their

²⁸¹ See further on this topic in EVANS (1976), 105-118; ZAITSEV (1999), 523-5.

²⁸² Gel.18.14.1-4: *figurae quaedam numerorum, quas Graeci certis nominibus appellant, vocabula in lingua Latina non habent. sed qui de numeris Latine scripserunt Graeca ipsa dixerunt, fingere autem nostra, quoniam id absurde futurum erat, noluerunt. quale enim fieri nomen posset “hemiolio” numero aut “epitrito”? See also ALIZON-MOREL AND LECAUDÉ (2016), 592-3.*

failure to develop mathematics is striking.’ However, not all Roman intellectuals necessarily felt the need for a ‘Roman vocabulary’ of x discipline, whether it was mathematics or philosophy. In *Ac.* 4-5, Cicero has the character of Varro argue the following:

Since I had seen that philosophy had been very carefully explicated in Greek treatises, I considered that anyone from our country who felt an interest in the subject, if they were learned in the teachings of the Greeks, would rather read the Greek texts than ours. But if they shrank from the sciences and systems of the Greeks, they would not care even for philosophy, which cannot be understood without Greek learning: and so I was unwilling to write what the unlearned would not be able to understand and what the learned would not take the trouble to read.²⁸³

It is a broader question that KLINE raises regarding the ‘ignorance’ of the Romans of theoretical mathematics and its attendant detriment to the intellectual life of the Republic and later Empire (1972, 179): ‘The lesson one can learn from the history of the Romans is that people who scorn the highly theoretical work of mathematicians and scientists and decry its usefulness are ignorant of the manner in which important practical developments have arisen.’ That it took until an architect-engineer (Vitruvius) to collate (and coin) a range of Latin technical terms to describe mathematical and geometric subjects whilst attempting to situate his work within high literary culture indicates that Roman intellectuals had no real use for pure mathematics beyond the philosophical, and even there Roman ‘philosophy’ was still in its infancy as late as the first century BC. There is also the point that CUOMO (2001, 201-2) raises, namely the false dichotomy between the pure and applied branches of mathematics in Rome. Vitruvius frequently reminds the reader that his training is both literary and technical, and being a good architect requires sound technical knowledge and reliability and loyalty, i.e.

²⁸³ *Ac.* 4-5: *nam cum philosophiam viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi si qui de nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca potius quam nostra lecturos; sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis abhorrent, ne haec quidem curaturos quae sine eruditione Graeca intellegi non possunt; itaque ea nolui scribere quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent.* Though cf. e.g. *Rhet. Her.* 4.10: *postremo haec quoque res nos duxit ad hanc rationem, quod nomina rerum Graeca quae convertimus, ea remota sunt a consuetudine. quae enim res apud nostros non erant, earum rerum nomina non poterant esse usitata. ergo haec asperiora primo videantur necesse est, id quod fiet rei, non nostra difficultate.*

a moral character based in experience and understanding (see e.g. Vitruvius 6.6-7). Romans like Cicero claimed that, whereas the Greeks were first to the field of mathematics and engineering, the Romans learned faster and used their superior practical reasoning and measurement to surpass them. These sentiments were largely socio-political rather than accurate social history: ‘As historical testimony, Cicero’s picture, while superficially not entirely false, fails to take into account the fact that practical activities were not limited to the Romans: a lot of mathematics done in Greece was about measuring and counting’ (CUOMO (2001), 194). It is sufficient to note here that Cicero had at least some interest in translating the (Pythagorean)²⁸⁴ mathematics of Plato’s *Ti.* into Latin for the first time (that we know of). He did so in a context where, (as observed with *medietates*), he was acutely aware of the need for technical terminology to convey the abstract philosophical ideas contained in the Greek. However, he was required to proceed with caution in case his expression became laden with an overabundance of newly minted technical terms.

At *Timaeus* 24, we find the first-attested verb *decusso* (OLD s.v. *decusso* ‘arrange crosswise; to make with a cross’) based on the older *decussis*. Cicero uses this verb to translate the Greek noun for the letter X or χεῖ (*Ti.* 36b: οἶον χεῖ προσβαλὼν). The Latin verb is later used in the first century AD by Columella (*De Re Rustica* 3.13.12). Vitruvius seems to have used the abstract noun *decussatio* later and adverbially in *decussatim*. In Christian inscriptions from Rome circa the third century AD, one finds the participial form *decussatum* in common phrases (e.g. *monogramma Christi decussatum*),²⁸⁵ though no inscriptions predating Cicero. Whereas Plato’s image is of the letter, Cicero’s is Latinised, referencing the numeral *decem* or 10 (X in Roman numerals). Whether it was spelt *decusavit* or *decussavit* is complicated by a corrector hand in V adding a second *s* and various editions by HALM *et al.*, BAITER, and MÜLLER printing the double *s*. PLASBERG and GIOMINI print the verb with a single

²⁸⁴ Cicero’s interest in the Pythagorean influence on Platonism is not limited to the *Timaeus*, see also his of the doctrine of music and spheres in the *Somium Scipionis* section of the *Rep.* See also RAWSON (1975/1983), 235 and HÖSLE (2008), 146 n. 6.

²⁸⁵ See for example ICVR VII, 20598.m; ICVR VII, 20406 < <http://www.edb.uniba.it/epigraph/41458>>

s, with which there seems no reason to disagree.²⁸⁶ Finally, the construction *concretum atque corporeum* provides alliterative effect in the double translation, compare with examples such as *commendare et concredere* in *Pro P. Quinctio* 62 and *Pro S. Roscio* 113.

Aspectibilis, concentio, temperatio and the Creator

In *Timaeus* 27, the adjective *aspectabilis*, introduced earlier in *Timaeus* 12 and 13, translates the Greek ὁρατός (*TLL* s.v., 2.0.800.66). The *OLD* defines it as: ‘able to be seen, visible’. There are numerous other verbal adjectives Cicero coined or added new meanings to using this morpheme to map onto the Greek –τός, including: *comprehendibilis* (καταληπτός), *indissolubilis* (ἄλυτος), *mirabilia* (παράδοξα), *mutabilis* (σκεδαστός, τρεπόμενος), *opinabilis* (δοξαστός), and *tractabilis* (ἄπτός). Cicero deploys various techniques in his translation of the –τός suffix throughout the *Timaeus*:²⁸⁷

–bilis	<i>aspectabilis</i>	ὁρατός (31b)
–tus	<i>indissoluta</i>	ἄλυτα (41a)
adjectival expressions	<i>fugientem et eius copulationis alienam</i>	δύσμεικτον (35a)
prepositional phrases	<i>caelum ita aptum est ut sub aspectum et tactum cadat</i>	συνεστήσατο οὐρανὸν ὁρατὸν καὶ ἄπτόν (32b)
posse	<i>solvi potest</i>	λυτόν (41a)
verb	<i>et corpus quidem caeli aspectabile effectum est, animus autem oculorum effugit obtutum</i>	τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ὁρατὸν οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος [...] ψυχὴ (36e)
relative clause	<i>eorum quae natura cernerentur</i>	ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν (30b)

²⁸⁶ See PLASBERG (1908), 174; PLASBERG AND AX (1938/1987), 169. Also see PEZZINI (2015), 228, 60: ‘The simplification of internal -ss- is a phonological phenomenon attested in republican Latin, but generally after a long vowel or diphthong: cf. e.g. *causa* < *caussa* (thirty instances in CIL 1², cf. e.g. 583, 590, 592, 593, etc.), *quaeso* < *quaesso*, *nasus* < *nassum*, *divisio* < *divissio*, etc.’ Note also Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.20.

²⁸⁷ See JONES (1959), 33.

The extensive *variatio* was thus an integral aspect of Ciceronian translation in the *Timaeus*,²⁸⁸ note also the translation of 32b with a technique of cognate terms being used for different purposes, perhaps to evoke the Greek original in a novel way. So the perfect passive *aptum est*, though cognate with the Greek ἀπτόν ‘tangible’, renders the aorist συνεστήσατο instead. The translation of λυτόν in 41a with *solvi potest* seems pleonastic (Cicero presumably could have used *dissolutus* if he was content to use *indissoluta* in the same section). But this avoidance might be explained by metrical considerations. The Latin sentence reads *omne conligātum sōlvī potēst* with the final two cola producing one of Cicero’s favoured *clausulae* (l - - - l - u - l),²⁸⁹ whereas **omne conligātum dīssolūtum* (l - u - l u - x l) does not (effectively suffix in an un-Ciceronian triple trochee). Variation in philosophical terms is, therefore, deliberate and not simply for semantic considerations but stylistic and metrical (sc. prosodic) ones as well.

The translation of *Ti.* 36b: ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ συνιστάντι πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ἐγγένητο with *animum igitur cum ille procreator mundi deus ex suae mente et voluntate genuisset* is of interest. Here, Cicero eschews finding an equivalent for the abstract noun σύστασις, which is only later translated in a different context by Victorinus with the morphological calque *consistentia*. Instead, he expands with pleonasm, *ex suae mente et voluntate* (κατὰ νοῦν) and *procreator mundi deus* (τῷ συνιστάντι), and replaces Plato’s objective genitive πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ‘the whole formation of soul’ with the accusative *animum genuisset*. Cicero’s translation of Plato’s ἁρμονία at *Ti.* 37a uses his favoured *-tio* abstractising suffix in *concentio* and provides the musical connotations of this metaphor. The *TLL* defines the term as deriving from *concino* ‘simul canere, conclamare’ (s.v., 4.0.52.48); the *OLD* has ‘unison singing or utterance.’ The Greek meaning (LSJ s.v. ἁρμονία, IV) can include notions of a musical scale, enharmonic scale, a musical mode, intonation or pitch of voices, among others. The musical metaphor of ἁρμονία applied to cosmological contexts seems to have been initially Pythagorean (see Arist. *Cael.* 290b13, *Mu.* 399a12).²⁹⁰

²⁸⁸ See also PONCELET (1957), 202-3; 353f.

²⁸⁹ The so-called ‘molossus + cretic’ *clausula* (l - (-) - l - u - l) (e.g. GRILLO (2015), 43). See examples from his rhetorical works, e.g. *Prov.* 43: *adiūtūs nōn dēbuīt*. See also BERRY (1996), 51-2.

²⁹⁰ See TAYLOR (2020), 61-3 on the use of the *harmonia* metaphor in Lucretius’ poetry.

In the periphrasis *quo nihil ab optimo et praestantissimo genitore melius procreatum*, Cicero provides another circumlocution for Timaeus' Creator. This translates Plato's abstract (*Ti.* 37a): *ψυχὴ, τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων* 'the Soul, having come into existence by the agency of the best of intelligible things²⁹¹ and existing eternally as the best of generated things.' Cicero seems to have read it roughly in the same way, translating the Greek partitive genitive into an *ab* + ablative of quality construction and including his favoured rhetorical *nihil* + superlative phrasing.²⁹² Why Cicero then substitutes the *ὁ ἄριστος* with *genitor* is unclear, but we might initially attribute it to the 'concretising' nature of Latin and assume Latin had no equivalent of 'The Best' as referring to God or some optimal supernatural being. Yet Latin had *optimus* 'best, ideal' which was frequently used to describe the best kind of man, idea, practice, age and so on, and often applied as an honorific title to gods directly (*OLD* s.v. *optimus*, 7a), for example in Ennius: *o Dionyse, optime pater* (*Ann.* 491) or in Accius: *totidem, pater optime* (*trag.* 241). The notion of an *optime pater* may be conceptually closer to *ὁ ἄριστος* but it still possesses the same anthropomorphising issue as *genitor*,²⁹³ which was to become a broader feature of Latin renderings of Plato's cosmic demiurge.²⁹⁴ TAYLOR notes parallels in Plato's *Ti.* with Empedocles, echoed in a section from the *Phaedrus* (246c) and concludes: 'Both passages, like that in the text [of the *Ti.*], are protests against the traditional Greek conception of a god as just a being with an immortal *body*.'²⁹⁵ ARCHER-HIND observes: 'It is very significant that the *δημιουργός* is identified with the object of reason, *νοῦς* with *νοητόν*. Here then we have another token that the *δημιουργός* is merely a mythological representative of universal *νοῦς* which evolves itself in the form of the *κόσμος*'. But these concepts of Plato's *δημιουργός* are not reflected in Cicero's Latin here.

²⁹¹ 'Noetic things' to be understood here with the specific Platonic sense of things perceptible to the divine *νοῦς*.

²⁹² The ablative of quality was common in Classical Latin, less so in 'Vulgar' and later Latin, see e.g. SYNT. 1.156-7; HOFMANN-SZANTYR, 68-70.

²⁹³ The word *genitor* is also poetic and figures in very similar honorific titles such as Acc. *trag.* 41: *genitorem iniustum approbas* and in inscriptions such as *CIL.* 1.1214.18: *RELIQVI FLETIVM NATA GENITORI MEO*.

²⁹⁴ This is not to critique Cicero's version as erroneously anthropomorphic compared with Plato's, certainly the latter instigated the metaphorical images of *ὁ τεκταινόμενος* and *ὁ δημιουργός*. Rather, it is the degree to which Cicero's version anthropomorphises which is noteworthy; i.e., re-interpreting the more abstract Platonic labels for the primary cause of the Universe (*τό αἴτιον*, *ὁ ἄριστος*, *ὁ συνιστάς*, etc.) with more concrete Latin terms like *genitor*.

²⁹⁵ TAYLOR (1928), 176.

Cicero next outlines the three key elements which the Demiurge combines (Ti. 37a: συγκεράννυμι): the Same (αὐτός, *idem*), the Other (θάτερος, *altera*), and Being or Substance (οὐσία, *materia*): *eadem iunctus alteraque natura, adiuncta materia, temperatione trium partium* (Timaeus, 27). Cicero's verbal substantive *temperatio* for συγκεράννυμι appears first in this translation defined as 'the mixing of substances in due proportion, blend, composition' (OLD s.v., 1). In Timaeus 28, the familiar Platonic terms δόξα and πίστις are rendered by *opinio* and *assensio*. In the Lucullus 37, Cicero uses the latter as part of a double translation (with *approbatio*) to describe the Stoic concept of συγκατάθεσις. As noted above, Plato's δόξα 'opinion' consists of man's εἰκασία 'conjecture' of the shadows of physical objects and his πίστις of these objects (Rep. 510a9, 511e). The Latin *opinio* conveys a certain sense of subjectivism, i.e. *opinor* 'I think', and *assensio* does not appear in Latin before Cicero, both of which are modified by the adjectives *firma* and *vera* and so here a certain species of opinion and belief is generated by true Reason: those which partake in Truth and, hence, the eternal.

In the lacuna which follows, we find only glimpses of the equivalent section in Plato (Ti. 37c = ἄγαλμα [...] καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς etc). We can speculate that Augustine, who had access to Plato's *Timaeus* only through Latin translation, namely Cicero's,²⁹⁶ knew of this section more fully than is preserved to us today due to his *testimonium* in Civ. 11.21: *et Plato quidem plus ausus est dicere, elatum esse scilicet deum gaudio mundi universitate perfecta*. *Testimonia* from grammarians demonstrates that they had access to this section of Cicero's translation (29: *curris curriculum inventum est solis et lunae*), see Nonius,²⁹⁷ Charisius,²⁹⁸ and an unknown grammatical source.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁶ See COURCELLE (1948), 156-9 who argues (157) Augustine used only Cicero's version and not Calcidius' (though see other opinions cited at 157 n. 10); HAGENDAHL (1967), 535: 'There is no reason for believing that Augustine ever read [Plato's] *Timaeus*, any more than Plato's other works.' See recently HOENIG (2018), 215-79.

²⁹⁷ Non. p. 198: *curriculum neutro genere Cicero Timaeo: "ratione igitur et mente divina ad originem temporis [curris] curriculum inventum est solis et lunae"*.

²⁹⁸ Gramm. 1.77.12K: *curriculum masculine deminutio est currus, neutraliter autem curriculum spatium ad currendem aptum vel ipsum currendi officium, ut Cicero et Varro locuntur*.

²⁹⁹ GL 5.576.3 'de dubiis nominibus': *currus generis masculine et ideo diminutive curriculum. nam Cicero curricos et curricula dixit*.

Lucifer, Cosmos, the Altrix, and Daimones

In *Timaeus* 29, Cicero renders Plato's Ἑωσφόρος 'lit. dawn-bringer' as found in *Il.* 23.226, *Hes. Th.* 381, and *Pi. I.* 4(3).24, with *lucifer*, found in Accius' *Trag.* 331. It is also found in Varro (*R.* 3.17: *stella Lucifer interdium, noctu Hesperus ita circumeunt*). The *sancta Mercuri stella* 'sacred star of Mercury' renders τὸν ἱερὸν Ἑρμοῦ 'hallowed to Hermes'. Cicero's use of *lucifer* is thus a nice allusion to previous poets writing in epic, mimicking Plato's use of the Homeric Ἑωσφόρος. In the sense of *lucifer* as 'Morning Star', Cicero's usage is first-attested and he explicitly glosses this later in *N.D.* 2.53: *infima est quinque errantium terraeque proxima stella Veneris, quae Φωσφόρος Graece Lucifer Latine dicitur cum antegreditur solem*. The term Φωσφόρος seems to be more astrological (attested as an adjective in Aratus for example) and is only found as a substantive in the pseudepigraphon entitled *Περὶ φύσιος κόσμου καὶ ψυχᾶς* (c. 1 BC - 1 AD) falsely attributed to Timaeus of Locri.³⁰⁰ It is also found in the *Ps.-Aristotle Mu.* 392a27 and 399a8 (LSJ s.v. φῶσφορος Ab). In the *N.D.*, Cicero glosses the astrological substantive for Venus with *lucifer* as he translated Ἑωσφόρος (attested more in epic poetry) with the same. Similarly in the *N.D.* 2.53, Cicero glosses the 'Star of Mercury': *infra hanc autem stella Mercurii est (ea Στίλβων appellatur a Graecis)*. The Greek term varies from the periphrasis used in the *Ti.*: τὸν ἱερὸν Ἑρμοῦ, and is only attested again in the *Mu.* 392a26, then later in the astronomer Eudoxus (*Ars* 5.10). We can conclude that the Greek Cicero translates in the *N.D.* is more specific to astrological vocabulary than the *Timaeus*, which is more poetic and freer in its sense, corresponding to the poetic description in Plato.

In *Timaeus* 35, Cicero writes: *ut hunc varietate distinctum bene Graeci κόσμον, nos lucentem mundum nominaremus*. The translation of the Greek κόσμος with the phrase *lucent mundus* is found in Cicero and later in Vitruvius (e.g. 1.5: *horum enim deorum et species et effectus in aperto mundo atque lucenti praesentes vidimus*). Cicero consistently translates the Greek κόσμος with *mundus*. He then continues, translating *Ti.* 40b τὰς δὲ πέντε κινήσεις ἀκίνητον καὶ ἐστὸς, ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῶν ἕκαστον γένοιτο ὡς ἄριστον '[...] but the other five motions were at rest and standing still, so that each of them could become the best

³⁰⁰ See ULACCO AND OPSOMER (2014), 155.

possible' with *quinque autem reliquis motibus orbum [...]* *immobilem et stantem*. Manuscripts **AV** and **B** have *orbem* but HALM (1861) prints *orbum*, as does PLASBERG AND AX (1938/1987, 176), which fits the sense better than *orbem*. Cicero's translation conveys the sense of the original, with some superfluity, writing that the Creator wished (*voluit*) the remaining five (*quinque*) divinities (i.e. heavenly bodies) to be deprived and bereft of motion (*motibus orbum esse et expertem*) so that they were *immobilem et stantem*. There are other reasons to discount *orbem*: Cicero's *orbis* corresponds to κύκλος consistently, which is not mentioned in this section of Plato's *Ti*. *Orbum* and *expertem* also take the ablative, hence *motibus*.³⁰¹

The noun *altrix*, referring to Earth, is poetic, found earlier, according to Varro, in Pacuvius (*L.* 7.18)³⁰² and translates τροφός 'nourisher' which is always feminine in Homer (e.g. in the sense of a 'nurse' in *Od.* 2.361) but masculine in tragedians such as Euripides. Here it is also feminine in Plato, agreeing with ἡμετέρα: (*Ti.* 40b-c) γῆν δὲ τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν 'our nourisher earth'. The other nouns in this section: φύλαξ 'guard' and δημιουργός 'creator' (presumably in the feminine) are rendered with *custos* and *effectrix*. The latter is an agent noun favoured by Cicero that only occurs elsewhere in Classical Latin in the *Fin.* 1.67 and 2.87 and *Div.* 2.124 (*TLL* s.v. *effector*, 5.2.128.30-4). The occurrences in the *Fin.* are not couched in theological language but rather seem to be used for effect to add a lofty tone to the diction of the imagery. In the *Div.*, written in after the *Timaeus*, we see Cicero's reference as more theological (*vim esse divinam effectricem somniorum*). If we postulate that both books of the *Fin.* were completed or nearly complete by June 45 BC and the *Timaeus* was begun in that same period, then we have near contemporaneous alignment of usage — either Cicero coined the word while writing the *Fin.* and conveniently used it to render the feminine of δημιουργός or coined it early in the translation of the *Timaeus* and then used it in the *Fin.* as well. The *TLL* observes that the word occurs later in a fourth-century author (purporting to be Apuleius), then in Lactantius, Victorinus, and Jerome. This is important because each of these translated Greek to varying degrees and each relied upon, or were familiar with, Cicero as a linguistic as well as a philosophical authority (compare also Tertullian's lexical innovation *factitator* for δημιουργός, *Adv. Val.* 21.2).

³⁰¹ See GILDERSLEEVE AND LODGE (1867/2005), §405.3.

³⁰² See RIBBECK (1871), 132; DE MELO (2019), 2.919.

The abstract noun *animatio* appears in *Timaeus* 35: *divinae animationis maxime speciem faciebat ex igne* to refer to what Plato called the *θεῖος* or ‘divine class’ of beings. The Greek term is an adjective acting in an abstract substantive sense: τὸ θεῖον (see LSJ s.v. II) and Cicero uses the pleonasm: *divina animatio*, the second term, it seems, being coined by Cicero to convey the abstract sense in Plato’s *θεῖος*. The term is later picked up in Tertullian to render *ἐνθύμησις* (*Adv. Val.* 9.4: *id est animationem cum Passione quae insuper acciderat, exposuit*) with a different sense, i.e. of a ‘stirring’ or animation rather than an abstract ‘being’.³⁰³

There is another instance of *captatio benevolentiae* in *Timaeus* 38: *reliquorum autem, quos Graeci δαίμονας appellant, nostri opinor lares, si modo hoc recte conversum videri potest* where Cicero posits a Latin translation of a Greek term but only hesitantly (‘of those remaining *daimons* (as they are called by the Greeks), or *Lares* as I think it is to us, if perhaps this might be seen as the correct translation’). HUTCHINSON puts this hesitation down to a ‘self-consciousness’ at play in Cicero’s awareness of the cultural differences between Greeks and Romans.³⁰⁴ One could also view it as a rhetorical trope, used deliberately to suggest Latin equivalents for Greek terms, albeit here neither a technical one and nor a Latin coinage, but rather a careful equivalence made by the speaker in matching the Latin lesser gods with the Greek counterparts. Note the word *lar* also possesses its own limitations and is not strictly the appropriate translation of *δαίμονες*, which is a broader concept.³⁰⁵ Apuleius later renders *δαίμονες* with a periphrasis (among other terms):³⁰⁶ *Platoni credam inter deos atque homines natura et loco medias quasdam divorum potestates intersitas* (*Apol.* 43.2) and Calcidius uses the loan-word *daemones* in Latin (*In. Tim.* 34.13-14; see *TLL* s.v. *daemon*, 5.1.4.42; 5.1.4.84; 5.1.5.27). Manuscripts **A** and **B** have *daemona*f and **V** has *demonas* but I retain PLASBERG’s Greek spelling here for clarity.³⁰⁷ In sum, the *Lares* themselves were good spirits of the deceased individuals who bring prosperity and other benefactions after death. Each Roman

³⁰³ See also *Anim.* 19 and *Adv. Marc.* 2.3. Cf. Macrobius *Somn. Scip.* 2.12.18: *cum morte animalis discesserit animatio*.

³⁰⁴ HUTCHINSON (2013), 199; cf. also REGEN (1971), 15: ‘[Cicero] ist aber selbst mit ihr am unzufriedensten.’

³⁰⁵ DEN BOEFT (1977), 11. See also discussion in SEELE (1995), 31-2.

³⁰⁶ See REGEN (1971), 15 n. 54.

³⁰⁷ The *TLL* also records no Latinised orthography of the term prior to Apuleius, see s.v. *daemon*, 5.1.4.52-3: ‘legitur graece Varro Men. 539 κακὸς δαίμων, latine inde ab Apul[eius]’.

house had a *lar familiaris* that was the tutelary spirit of the household.³⁰⁸ SAMTER (1901, 25f) considered the Lares to be equivalent of ‘ghosts’ associated with cults of the dead, citing examples of burning food which had fallen onto the floor before the Lares. In any case, the role of the Lares certainly expanded into many aspects of Roman life, especially after the Late Republican period under Augustus, including guardians of roads, crossways, and wayfarers, and even of the state in general (see *OCD* s.v.). These differed from the Greek conception of *daimones*, mainly seen as unexpected spirits intruding into the lives of humans. From Homer onwards, *daimones* could be used as an appellation for the Olympian gods themselves. *Daimones* thus acquired connotations of ‘Fate’. It is possible that Cicero was thinking of the meaning of *daimones* introduced by Hesiod (*Op.* 122, 126) in the sense of ‘guardians’ and wealth-bringing spirits, which later developed to mean ‘personal protecting spirits’, who accompanied human beings bringing them luck or charms, hence the adjectives *εὐδαίμων* and *κακοδαίμων* attested as far back as the fifth century (see *OCD* s.v. *daimon*.)

In the line: *quam ut profiteri nos scribere audeamus*, there is a textual question regarding *scribere*, as PLASBERG (1908, 184-5) notes in his critical apparatus. Denys Lambin (Lambinus of the sixteenth century) read the section with *scire* in his annotations but the sense is not heavily affected either way. We might retain *scribere* despite PLASBERG’s (1908, 185) argument for it, based on the claim that, at the time of writing the translation, Cicero was not thinking of it as a dialogue: ‘*scribere cum scribebat Tullius, si modo scripsit, de dialogo non cogitabat*’, which is hardly convincing.

‘Fate’ in Cicero’s translation

In *Timaeus* 40, Cicero translates the Greek notion of *μοῖρα* (but here specifically a Platonic cosmological context)³⁰⁹ with *fata*, plural of *fatum* (*OLD*, *fatum*: ‘5. Fate (regarded as the

³⁰⁸ See NETTLESHIP *et al.* (1894), 343-4.

³⁰⁹ Contrast e.g. early expressions of *μοῖρα* in Homer (*Il.* 6. 488-9), see e.g. LEUMANN (1950/1993), 280. See further discussion in WASZINK (1970), i.

force which moulds events), destiny'.³¹⁰ Also in *Timaeus* 43: *ita quasi in currum universitatis imposuit commonstravitque leges fatales ac necessarias et ostendit*. We may first question why Cicero employs the plural form *fata*? The Greek is a genitive singular: οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας 'nor will ye partake in the destiny of doom' (as τυγχάνω usually governs the genitive).³¹¹ Cicero might have read μοίρας as an accusative plural, interpreting τυγχάνω as 'come upon, meet with' + accusative, so: 'nor will ye come upon the destinies of doom'. An alternative is that he wished to be poetic in his translation, invoking the 'Fates' of death as a striking image for this section, given that the Creator is addressing the lesser gods directly, the language is, expectedly, more lofty, almost Milton-esque. To add evidence to this, the plural form *fata* was sometimes used in his orations for exaggerated effect apropos of 'destiny' or 'death' (e.g. *Cat.* 3.20: *nisi di immortales omni ratione placati suo numine prope fata ipsa flexissent* or *Phil.* 10.20: *cum vero dies et noctes omnia nos undique fata circumstent, non est viri minimeque Romani dubitare eum spiritum quem naturae debeat patriae reddere*). Similarly, in his philosophical works such as *Amic.* 35 when Laelius quotes from Scipio: *Haec ita multa quasi fata impendere amicitii, ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae, sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri*. The plural form also appeared twice in Cicero's own translation of Greek poetical works in his rendering of Homer's *Il.* 2.300 and 302 in the *Div.* 2.63: 2.300: ἡ ἐπεὶ Κάλχας μαντεύεται ἦ καὶ οὐκί = *auguris ut nostri Calchantis fata queamus* | *scire ratosne habeant an vanos pectoris orsus* and 2.302: οὐς μὴ κῆρες ἔβαν θανάτοιο φέρουσαι = *qui non funestis liquerunt lumina fati*.

Fatum in the singular is later associated with the concept of εἰμαρμένην, e.g. in *Div.* 1.125, where Cicero has his brother Quintus (a Stoic) say: *fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἰμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat*. This is the perfect participle of μείρομαι 'receive as one's portion', LSJ s.v: '[...] with collat. notion of its being one's due' and s.v. μείρομαι, III: 'it is allotted, decreed by fate'. As PEASE (1921, 483) notes: 'The term εἰμαρμένη (sc. μοῖρα)

³¹⁰ Cf. also Cicero's other lexical innovation of *confatalis* (*Fat.* 30) where he does not give the Greek equivalent, however it has been suggested that *συνειμαρμένον* was the original term, but the suggested Greek equivalent does not occur in the Stoa (LSJ: s.v. *συνείμαρται*: 'has been determined by fate, Aristid. *Or.* 24 (44).56; *συνειμαρμένα jointly determined by fate*, Plut. 2.569f, cf. Lyd. *Mens.* 4.81'); see also MEIJER (2007), 225 n. 1154.

³¹¹ See e.g. GOODWIN (1997), 233-4.

is from the verb *μείρομαι* (root *σμερ-*), and so properly denotes one's "allotment" [...] but it seems in Stoic etymologies to have been referred to *είρμός* (*είρω*), with which cf. the Lat. *series* (*sero*; cf. *Fat.* 27: *causa causam serens*). Certainly, *μείρομαι* and *fatum* are not cognates and Cicero's translation of the latter for the former, first in the *Timaeus* and then in *Div.* and elsewhere, can be seen as deliberately Stoicising in the sense PEASE described.³¹² According to BEEKES (2010, 922): 'Corresponding forms outside Greek are doubtful. Lat. *mereo* [...] 'to earn, acquire' (if properly *'to get one's share') might be cognate, but its formation, *(s)mer-eh₁-, is different.'³¹³ BEEKES notes that, for the nominal derivation *μοῖρα*, 'one may start either from an o-stem *μόρος* or from an older consonant-stem **μορ-*. The o-vowel could be an Aeolic zero grade.' In the sense Plato uses it in the *Ti.*, the phrase *θανάτου μοίρας* conveys the sense of 'doom of death', much as other nominal derivatives (*μόριος*, *μορόεις*) are associated with death. Cicero conveys this by including *mors*, although not technically cognate with *μοῖρα* or its derivatives, still echoes the Greek sense. He makes *fata* the subject of an added verb *peremo* (alternative spelling of *perimo* 'to reduce to nothing, destroy, annihilate' *OLD* s.v. *perimo*, 1) so that the sentence poetically reads: *neque vos ulla mortis fata periment* 'nor will the destinies of death destroy you'.

In the next section we find a second usage (see discussion above, p. 163) of *temperatio* is used to translate *Ti.* 41d: *καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον κρατῆρα* with *deinde ad temperationem superiorem revertit*. Plato uses the metaphor of a *κρατήρ*, the concrete image of a 'mixing vessel' (cf. *Phaedo* 111d: *ἡ πολὺν μὲν ὕδωρ ῥεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας*), whereas Cicero retains the verbal abstract to convey the sense of a well-combined mixture.³¹⁴ The phrase *leges fatales ac necessarias et ostendit* can be contrasted with *N.D.* 1.55 where, towards the end of the Epicurean Velleius' attack on the Stoic conception of 'that inevitability of Fate', Cicero has the gloss: *illa fatalis necessitas, quam εἰμαρμένην dicitis*. Here the *fatales* agrees in number with *leges* and so is pluralised to give the sense of 'destined and inevitable laws'.

³¹² Note that the use of *fatum* is not first found in Cicero, with earlier Roman philosophers like Lucretius using the term elsewhere (2.257) but Cicero's use of it as an equivalent of *εἰμαρμένην* in the Stoic/Academic sense is unique.

³¹³ See also MALTBY (1991), 380 citing Donatus' (*Ter. Andr.* 331) definition of *mereo*, describing the 'earning of a salary in exchange for labour': *merere est aliquid mercedis pro labore sumere*.

³¹⁴ See also earlier discussion at p. 159.

Finally, *Timaeus* 47 provides another double translation for the notion of the divine ‘Creator’, with the original Greek being (*Ti.* 42e) ὁ σφέτερος δημιουργός. *Effector* would be sufficient here but the addition of *genitor* again adds an unambiguous anthropomorphising element to *Timaeus*’ divine demiurge, providing a clear image of a father or progenitor figure of the Universe.³¹⁵

Cuneoli and the end of Cicero’s Timaeus

The term γόμφοι ‘bolts’ (*Ti.* 43a) in Plato’s original is rendered with a diminutive of *cuneus* ‘wedge’, so that the ‘small pegs’ which are συντήκοντες or ‘fused into one mass, welded together’ (LSJ s.v. συντήκω) or *inliquefactus* ‘made liquid, melted’ (*OLD* s.v.) into *unum corpus*. Two words are first-attested in this section and the familiar use of *quasi* is a possible clue that these are, perhaps, Ciceronian lexical innovations: the diminutive *cuneolus* appears to have been used first here, then by Vitruvius (10.12.1 *cuneoli ferrei*), then Columella (4.29.10 *harundineis cuneolis*) and Palladius (*Opus agriculturae* 3.17.3). That the diminutive term seems to have been attested also in architectural and agricultural writers could indicate its status as a technical term in both subjects. Conversely, the noun from which it derives (*cuneus*) is well attested across multiple registers (see e.g. *OLD* s.v.) and Cicero might have been simply diminutising a well-known concept for the first time. *Inliquefactus* is a Ciceronian innovation only attested in this work and in the near-contemporaneous *Tusc.*, Book 4. The contexts in both works are very different but the manner in which Cicero introduces the word in each is almost identical, with the typical marker *quasi* or *tamquam* being deployed to introduce the novel term to his audience: (*Tusc.* 4.20) *tales sunt et oculorum et tactionum et odoratorum et saporum, quae sunt omnes unius generis, ad perfundendum animum tamquam inliquefactae voluptate* and (*Timaeus*, 47): *qui erant a deo creati crebris quasi cuneolis inliquefactis unum efficiebant ex omnibus corpus* (corresponding to 43a: πικνοῖς γόμφοις συντήκοντες). PLASBERG (1908, 192) notes the following *variae lectiones*: *cuneoolif* (in V), *inliquifactis* as *inliquetif* with *fac* superscribed above the word (A),

³¹⁵ See e.g. Enn. *Ann.* 113: *o pater, o genitor*; ERNOUT-MEILLET, 270 s.v. *geno*.

also *inliq&if*(V), and *inliq; fatif*(B). The question of when the term was first used by Cicero gives us an opportunity to expand the utility of examining lexical innovation as a discrete linguistic phenomenon, into textual territory in dating, or at least speculating, as to the chronology of a given author's corpus. So we might ask whether it was more likely that Cicero neologised a new term ex nihilo in the *Tusc.*, to convey the concept of 'liquified pleasure' (*inliquefacta voluptate*)³¹⁶ or whether he was compelled, so to speak, to coin the term in rendering Plato's *συντήκοντες* (from *συντήκω*) in his translation of the *Timaeus*. I am inclined towards the latter given that there was a direct need for an equivalent and that this was done by a close, literal translation (a morphological calque):

- *συν*– often has the meaning of the completion of an action, altogether, completely, strengthening the force of the simple word (see LSJ s.v. *συν* DI2), and *in*– can indicate a form or substance into which something changes, grows, is made, etc., 'so as to become, to, into' (see *OLD* s.v. *in*, 19a); and
- *τήκω* 'melt, melt down' (LSJ, s.v.) = *liquesco* 'to become fluid, melt, liquify' (*OLD* s.v.).

We might venture to say that the *Timaeus* translation was either completed (or, at least, this particular section completed) before the *Tusc.*, (or Book Four at any rate). Whichever reasoning one accepts, this particular lexical innovation is decent evidence that both works were being composed in very close proximity to each other.

In *Timaeus* 48 we come across the lexical innovation of *defenstrix*. There are two separate *testimonia* for this section, firstly Augustine: 'If the lesser gods, who were charged by Plato with the making of man as well as of the other terrestrial animals, were able, as he says, to remove the burning quality from fire, while leaving that [quality] of shining to spring forth through the eyes'.³¹⁷ The words for 'burning', 'shining' and the 'springing through the eyes' are all present in Cicero's translation, though it is here where another lacuna interrupts the text, and the fuller account Augustine presumably had access in his day. The second

³¹⁶ Perhaps echoing Lucretius (4.1106): *membra voluptatis dum vi labefacta liquescunt*.

³¹⁷ Aug. Civ. 13.8: *si dii minores, quibus inter animalia terrestria cetera etiam hominem faciendum commisit Plato, potuerunt, sicut dicit, ab igne remove **urendi** qualitatem, **lucendi** relinquere quae **per oculos emicaret***.

testimonium is from Priscian (*GL* 3.19) where he discusses the formation of feminine agent nouns in *-rix* and notes that Terence added a *-t-* before the suffix to allow for euphony, giving the example of *tonstrina*, and Cicero did likewise, and Priscian cites his use of *defenstrix* (*defenstrix quoque Cicero in Timaeo protulit addita t*). *TLL* defines the word as: *fem. defensor*, ‘1: *is qui arcet*’ and *OLD* as: ‘1: *fem. of one who averts or repels*’.³¹⁸ It seems to render Plato’s abstract noun *σωτηρία* (*Ti.* 45d) ‘deliverance, preservation’. In Cicero’s translation, agent nouns in *-trix* were a lexical trademark, as we saw above with *altrix* and *effectrix*, so it would not be out of keeping for Cicero to have, in fact, used *defenstrix* in the section of the translation, now lost.

In translating *Ti.* 46c τοῦτο δέ ὅταν ἡ τῶν κατόπτρων λειότης ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν ὕψη λαβοῦσα, Cicero uses *levitas* to calque λειότης ‘smoothness’ neatly. It would be natural to assume this was the first time this term had been used with this novel sense by Cicero arising out of the morphological calque. Yet the term appears earlier in Cato’s *De agri cultura* with this sense and in Cicero’s earlier *de Orat.* (3.99): *in ipso tactu esse modum et mollitudinis et levitati*. There are, in fact, two separate (nearly homophonous) lexemes with their own distinct etymologies in Latin taking the form *LEVIS* and *LĒVIS*, and the concomitant abstract derivatives in *-tas*. The first is hypothesised to be a reflex of P.I.E. root *h₁leg^{wh}-u-* ‘light’ and the latter from *leh₁i-u-* ‘smooth’, whence Cicero’s *levitas* in this section of the *Timaeus*. The reason it calques neatly onto λειότης is because the Greek adjective λείος and *levis* are cognates (both from P.I.E. *leh₁i-u-*), thus presenting a rare instance of a semantic calque simultaneously acting as a morphological calque, thus not a Ciceronian coinage.

The final line of Cicero’s translation preserved to us: *quibus ex rebus philosophiam adepti sumus [...] mortalium generi deorum concessu atque munere neque dabitur*, which SEDLEY (2013, 201) argues persuasively was the actual final line of Cicero’s composition: ‘This rousing climax was a natural place to stop’. The rhetorical trope of philosophy as the greatest gift to mortals from the gods that Cicero ends on here is not novel to this section of the translation. REID (1885), 97 notes this formula as appearing in the *Timaeus* 52, *Leg.* 1.58,

³¹⁸ The feminine ἄπαξ λεγόμενον here suggests that Cicero’s unique use of the term is not impossible to believe, cf. Cicero’s other ἄπαξ λεγόμενον *perturbatrix* (*OLD* s.v: ‘one who throws into confusion’) in *Leg.* 1.39 where the masculine form *perturbator* was not attested until the fifth century AD in Sulp. Sev. *Chron.* 2.49.2 or *altrix* above; see *GL* 4.12-13 for a discussion on manuscript differences in *defenstrix* or the later-attested *defensatrix*.

Amic. 47, *Sen.* 40, *Tusc.* 1.64, *Off.* 2.5, *Fam.* 15.4.16. Pliny the Elder uses a similar formula when discussing trees and forests in *H.N.* 12.1: *diu fuere occulta eius beneficia, summumque munus homini datum arbores silvaeque intellegebantur* and Pliny the Younger also in his *Ep.* 6.16.3. The formula of ‘gods’ or ‘nature’ having given mankind (*datum est*) the ‘best’ or ‘supreme’ gift (*munus*) of philosophy is loosely paraphrased in *Leg.*, *Amic.*, and *Sen.*, which were (possibly) all later works, although *Leg.* is unfinished, (see discussion in ROBINSON (1943, 112) and could be dated between 46 and 43 BC; see *Fam.* 9.2.5 for the former.) The formula was also used in the Fourth Philippic (4.7.8-9) when Cicero mentions the family of the *Bruti*: *est enim quasi deorum immortalium beneficio et munere datum rei publicae Brutorum genus et nomen ad libertatem populi Romani vel constituendam vel recuperandam*. All these references must have been from a popular trope derived from Plato’s description of philosophy, but Cicero renders it most accurately in the last extant line of his translation (52): *quibus ex rebus philosophiam adepti sumus, quo bono nullum optabilius nullum praestantius neque datum est mortalium generi deorum concessu atque munere neque dabitur?*³¹⁹

Conclusions

The examination above has centred around two areas: a collation of Cicero’s lexical innovations and augmentations, and a lexical commentary on his partial translation of Plato’s *Timaeus*. Starting with the latter, we saw that Cicero transplanted the dialogue into a distinctly Roman environment, and this was done by altering not only the characters and location of the dialogue, but the philosophical terminology too. Cicero did not have his characters regurgitate Greek loan-words when describing Plato’s creation myth devised by Plato through the mouth of Timaeus (in Cicero’s version, perhaps the Neo-Pythagorean Nigidius Figulus). Instead, he carefully translated the philosophical terms using his own language’s lexical resources, often imbuing existing terms with new meanings to prevent his translation becoming too dense with technical and unfamiliar language. Where Cicero resorted to neology, his rhetorical instincts were at play using techniques such as *variatio*, *captatio benevolentiae*, and *praeteritio* to ease his readers into accepting his new words. In this way, Cicero was conscious of his translation

³¹⁹ There are echoes of this translation in his later work *Off.* 2.5: *quid enim est, per deos, optabilius sapientia, quid praestantius, quid homini melius, quid homine dignius*. See also BOYANCE (1954), 215.

as an independent literary work guided by principles of style and intelligibility for his Latin readership, balanced against the need for fidelity to the Platonic source material. As we have seen, this sometimes led to conflation of terms and a replacement of Greek concepts with new Latin ones; for example, *quod est* for τὸ ὄν or the various renditions of Plato's difficult οὐσία, choices that would become decisive for later Latin philosophy. The translation also raised questions, such as the extent of Latin mathematical vocabulary and how much genuine lexical innovation was at play for Cicero in rendering Platonic geometric theory, or did he, instead, draw upon an existing technical word-stock simply not preserved to us in Classical Latin texts? In many ways, Cicero's *Timaeus* neatly highlights all the key themes of this thesis: the *egestas* of topos of Latin philosophical vocabulary, the transformation of Greek knowledge through a Latin linguistic lens, and the specific lexical choices in translation that shaped the diachrony of key philosophical concepts into posterity. Though the prefaces of his treatises would have us believe Latin was already superior to Greek philosophical vocabulary, we saw that Cicero needed to work extensively to coin new terms or extend the semantic range of existing Latin ones, often asking existing terms to do more work than they could (e.g. *materia* for Plato's οὐσία). Though there were some difficulties in his lexical creations, we also saw a very adept translator, aware of the complex ideas within his source material. In this respect, Cicero exhibited a specific interpretive practice that drew on familiar rhetorical techniques, as well as lexical inventiveness, to capture the sense of a Greek term as fully as possible (as seen, for example, in his translation of the Greek terms σωφροσύνη or πάθη and μελαγχολία). The need for new terms meant linguistic experimentation and, as with many experiments, there are failures. Cicero was not always wedded to the neologisms he introduced in translating Greek terms, as we saw with *veriloquium* or *medietas*, largely for stylistic reasons, but the fact he chose to introduce them to his readers in the first instance provided a clue as to his overall 'praxis'. More often, these unfamiliar coinages did not represent some random inventiveness but served a specific purpose, like the *praeteritio* deployed by a skilled lawyer, allowing the reader to first understand a Greek term through a literal morphological calque, but subsequently abandoning it on account of stylistic (and sometimes conceptual) considerations. So with *veriloquium*, not only was the compound less acceptable formally for Cicero to use in his prose, but the very sense of the calque did not

convey (at least what Cicero understood as) Aristotle's *ἐτυμολογία* effectively. Similarly, with his translations of Plato's *αἰδῖος* and *αἰώνιος* in the *Timaeus*, Cicero demonstrates an intellectual sensitivity to his source material, encapsulating the Platonic Creation myth and its two different conceptions of Time carefully, despite the lack of distinction in Plato's own terminology.

Our analysis of Cicero's Latin version of the *Timaeus* will also serve as a useful comparator with later authors' translations of Platonic and Aristotelian texts. So we will see that Calcidius and Boethius' translations of Plato's *Timaeus* and Aristotle's *Organon*, respectively, were more greatly affected by the influence of Greek syntax (predominantly in Boethius) than Cicero would permit in his translations. This highlights the contrast between the deep stylistic considerations which affected Latin philosophical authors during the first century BC, as opposed to the increased literalness of authors adapting Greek philosophy into Latin in the later works of Calcidius and Boethius.

2. CHAPTER TWO:

SENECA'S GLOSSES OF PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY: TRANSLATION THROUGH RHETORICAL STRATEGIES

'Just how destitute in words our language is, indeed, how poverty-stricken, I haven't fully understood until today! When we happened to be discussing Plato [...] (quanta verborum nobis paupertas, immo egestas sit, numquam magis quam hodierno die intellexi. [...] cum forte de Platone loqueremur).

— Seneca, *Epistles* 58.1

2.1. SENECA'S LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE VERSUS CICERO'S 'MISSIONARY' PHILOSOPHY

The distinctions between linguistic approaches to lexical innovation in the philosophical endeavours of Cicero and Seneca are pertinent to the diachronic aspects of this study. A starting point is to compare the respective intellectual contexts of both authors and, from there, evaluate textual evidence in discerning Seneca's different approach from Cicero's.

A comprehensive discussion of Seneca's philosophical 'milieu' is given in INWOOD,¹ who suggested the following points of difference from Cicero:

1. Seneca was writing 'primary philosophy', not exegetical or 'missionary' work;
2. He was in an intellectual climate in which readers were much more open to Roman philosophy than they had been earlier;
3. The bilingualism of his social environment was at such a level that the Cicero-style treatises on what Greek terms and concepts really meant was no longer a high priority; and
4. He operated in a 'micro-climate' of intellectuals whose influence on him was immense and whose members' occupations as budding philosophers were a 'realistic option' for young Roman men of wealth and standing at the time.

There is little to disagree with on these points but there is some limitation with the first point that intellectuals such as Cicero were 'missionary' in their work, whereas later authors like Seneca were occupied with 'primary' philosophy.² This is a binary characterisation of the issue that revives the fraught 'originality' debate, particularly when it comes to Cicero's literary efforts, in which scholars have dabbled for a century or more.³ I do not wish to

¹ INWOOD (2005), 12-13.

² INWOOD's second point of difference is also debatable, i.e. that bilingualism had reached a 'critical mass' in Seneca's time. Bilingualism in Cicero's time was also extremely common and this might not have been as starkly different from the context in the first century AD, as INWOOD suggests.

³ INWOOD's dichotomy is reminiscent of EBBESEN's (2017), 8. See also the discussion in the Introduction and in BARAZ (2012), 119.

(re-)enter into such debates in this chapter, but I think there is a way of resolving the problem entirely using Seneca as a comparator.

Beginning with Lucretius and Cicero, this study has thus far examined the formative stages of a particular tradition in Latin intellectual history, somewhat confined, though important within the history of ideas; that is, the lexicalisation of Roman ‘philosophy’. This practice or linguistic phenomenon of lexical innovation is observable most clearly when examining the interpretation of Greek philosophical terms. It has been seen by now that, despite the patriotic prefaces of Cicero’s dialogue, Latin was not sufficiently equipped to discuss, much less question or criticise, Greek philosophical concepts in the early-to-mid first century BC. The combinatory artistic and intellectual force of Lucretian poetics and Ciceronian rhetoric was required to elevate Roman philosophy to a level at which it was capable of manipulating, re-interpreting, and evaluating the philosophy from the Academy, the Lyceum, and other Hellenistic strands of Greek intellectualism across the Adriatic thence to Rome.

This is where Seneca becomes relevant, whose Stoic and Platonic interests were primarily ethical, with an emphasis on physics.⁴ His philosophical works were more general, akin to Cicero’s *De Officiis*, *De Senectute*, and *De Amicitia*. In all of the major philosophical works of Seneca, ranging from *De Providentia* and *De Ira* to *De Tranquillitate Animi* or *De Brevitate Vitae* we see an approach to philosophy that is less pre-occupied with terminology than the substantive and practical aspects of ‘life’ (sc. morality and ethics), as opposed to describing a philosophical system.⁵ It is not until one examines the more technical works of Seneca, such as the *Naturales Quaestiones*⁶ (*N.Q.*) and the philosophical letters to Lucilius (*Ep.*), when Seneca’s confrontation with Latin philosophical terminology comes into view.

A way to resolve the ‘originality’ issue in debating Ciceronian versus Senecan philosophy (missionary versus primary philosophy, to use INWOOD’s phraseology) is to argue that philosophy itself (more generally, but in this context, ancient philosophy especially) was simply another literary vehicle within which an intellectual could express themselves. Whereas Silius Italicus wrote in epic, Lucretius used a didactic genre through his

⁴ INWOOD (2005), 15.

⁵ See e.g. ALBRECHT (1997), 1186: ‘His starting point, however, is practical life, not an abstract system.’

⁶ E.g. see AXELSON (1933), 1; HINE (2010), 14-15.

interpretation of Epicurean doctrines.⁷ Whereas Lucretius composed poetry to ‘cajole’ readers to understand the difficult concepts of Epicurean physics with his ‘honey’-like hexameters (*DRN* 4.8-25), Cicero wrote in various prose dialogues to expound competing philosophical schools’ theories on a range of subjects. However, the type of composition that we find in Cicero’s *Timaetus* differs from that of the *Tusc.* or *Fin.*, which themselves differ in style and substance from prose works like *De Senectute* or even the *Off.*, for example. The former type of composition is a translation replete with technical terms and close readings (or free renderings) of Plato’s original, the latter are types of dialogues full of Greek technical concepts and their Latin equivalents. Both of these types of prose works could be categorised as ‘technical philosophy’ that seek to interpret and evaluate key Greek philosophical concepts. In the case of the *Timaetus*, Platonic and Pythagorean understandings of the cosmos, in the case of, for example, the *Fin.*, a dialogue between Stoic, Epicurean, and Middle Platonist schools of thought pertaining to morality, virtue, and ethics. By contrast, compositions which turned their attention to broader aspects of life (we might term them ‘generalist’ philosophy or an ancient prototype of *Lebensphilosophie*) such as old age, friendship, anger, the briefness of human life, and so on, provide a philosophical canvas on which the author may demonstrate their literary creativity.⁸ However, this canvas need not be doctrinally precise and actively eschews technical verbiage as frequently as possible. When INWOOD characterises Seneca’s philosophical project as ‘primary’ philosophy, a more productive approach may be to assert simply that Seneca decided to use another literary form than Cicero had done, some of which overlapped with much of what Cicero had composed in his later period of 45-4 BC but, like Cicero, it was by no means the sole type of literary composition he explored in articulating philosophical subjects. In fact, the *N.Q.* and many of his letters contain obvious technical subjects that Seneca was at pains to explain with the appropriate vocabulary (or the *egestas* thereof) of his own language, much like many of Cicero’s more technical dialogues. That Seneca had a preference for the generalist *Lebensphilosophie* form over technical ones which

⁷ Note however, whether we firmly label didactic poetry as a ‘genre’ per se is a matter of critical debate, see e.g. DALZELL (1996), 110; VOLK (2002), 1-3. See also MINYARD (1978), 87f.

⁸ A useful approach is DEINLEIN’s (1975, 10), who divides non-fiction works into three categories along a spectrum. At one end, a technical handbook for practitioners, at the other, a text composed for literary appeal (Seneca’s philosophical works, for instance), and in between, one that exhibits a balance of literary structure and style with detailed examination of its subject matter (Cicero’s dialogues). Cf. also CALLEBAT (1994), 32.

required the translation of numerous Greek terms is, however, a useful premiss with which to begin the analysis which will occupy this chapter. It allows us to include Seneca within the same tradition instigated by Late Republican intellectuals like Lucretius and Cicero, whilst avoiding comparisons as to which philosopher produced more original or ‘primary’ philosophy than the other.

2.2. LEXICAL INNOVATIONS AND AUGMENTATIONS IN SENECA’S *NATURAL QUESTIONS* AND *EPISTLES*

The beginning of this chapter will therefore examine the sub-genre of Senecan philosophical works which were more likely require some technical vocabulary. The *N.Q.* and *Ep.* are natural choices because the former is concerned with natural philosophy (Stoic physics and epistemology in particular) and the latter contains a large wealth of (fictional) personal correspondence relating to the Latin language and its ability to convey specific Greek philosophical (specifically Platonic and Stoic) terms.

As for the overall diction of Seneca and his potentially unique innovations, BOURGERY has compiled an extensive list of ‘neologisms’ in Seneca’s works which I will not recapitulate here.⁹ Most of these neologisms seem to have been coined ad hoc as opposed to based on some Greek original directly. Seneca’s use of these terms is un-marked or not drawn attention to in his prose, (unlike in many cases with Cicero where he appears to apologise or seek permission to use certain lexical innovations). This suggests that either a) most of the ‘neologisms’ BOURGERY attributes to Seneca were, in fact, established terms, or at least rare but previously used either in prose or the vernacular, or b) Seneca simply felt no need to mark his own innovations as new in his literary works. The suggestion in a) seems most plausible, given that many of the terms BOURGERY attributes to Seneca seem to have also been attested in contemporary authors of the time, e.g. Pliny the Elder and Columella.¹⁰ However b) is also important because it suggests on the face of it that a large part of the ‘innovation’ in Seneca can be attributed to literary (sc. stylistic) choices, rather than a need to convey Greek original terms in Latin (i.e. on account of the Latin lexical *egestas*). BOURGERY also draws upon ARNIM

⁹ BOURGERY (1922), 249-85.

¹⁰ See terms especially in *-atio* such as *exundatio*, *inundatio*, *iaculatio*, *murmuratio*, *numeratio*, inter alia.

in compiling a list of philosophical terms Seneca uses to render Greek Stoic terminology. This more directly demonstrates Seneca's translation techniques in action. BOURGERY notes that Seneca generally attempts to provide Latin equivalents which were as synonymous (in meaning) as possible with the Greek, but often does not employ pre-established terms by earlier authors like Cicero.¹¹

Below, I have compiled and analysed direct glosses from Greek 'philosophical' terms which Seneca translates. These provide us with an insight into how Seneca's translations imbued existing words with new meanings or created new terms *ex nihilo*, and what were Seneca's own views on and approaches to the process of rendering technical Greek philosophical terms into Latin. There is also a broader insight to be gained from Seneca's translation practice, specifically regarding the *N.Q.*, which is deeply anti-anthropocentric in its intellectual goals and fundamentally questions the correctness of mankind's traditional observations of natural phenomena as opposed to how natural phenomena really are in themselves.

ἅλως (*corona, area*)

In *N.Q.* 1.2, Seneca explains how Latin interprets the concept of the 'halo' from Greek:

Now let us see what causes that bright light which surrounds stars. It is recorded in history that the day the deified Augustus entered Rome on his return from Apollonia a circle of varied colours was seen around the sun, colours that usually appear in a rainbow. The Greeks call it a "halo" (ἅλως). We can call it, most aptly, a "corona" [...] For this reason the Greeks called such shining lights "threshing-floors" (*areas*) because generally the places set aside for threshing grain are round. Whether we call them "threshing-floors" or "coronas," we must not imagine that these lights actually

¹¹ BOURGERY (1922), 298.

occur in the vicinity of the stars. They are far away from the stars, even though they seem to encircle them like crowns.¹²

Seneca is at pains to point out here that, whatever the technical term Latin speakers adopt in describing the ‘halo’ around the Sun, the salient point is to disbelieve the human eye in construing it as a *corona* in the literal sense of ‘crowning’ the sun (*coronare*). Although the term might have been most ‘appropriately’ employed (*aptissime*) given the regal occasion on which the phenomenon was reportedly first observed, the standard usage of *corona* has the ability to mislead the observer. One might think the phenomenon occurs at close range to the sun itself, as a crown is at close range to the wearer’s head, when in fact these *coronae* are a large distance away from it (*plurimum enim ab his absunt*). Seneca is not simply battling against the limitations of the human eye (a very obvious manifestation of anthropocentrism), but also the *egestas* of a Latin ‘scientific’ lexicon in describing such natural occurrences accurately.¹³ It is for this reason he employs two distinct etymological techniques intertwined with each other: the first is an excursus on the Greek concept itself (ἄλως, *area*), the second relates to its Latin equivalent (*corona*). He ultimately suggests either using *area* or *corona* on the caveat that this illusion of proximity is kept in mind.¹⁴ Such derivations are based upon a specific cultural etymology, established uniquely in Roman history (note e.g. Varro’s etymology of *area* in *L.* 5.38, see MALTBY (1991, 49); DE MELO (2019), 2.682). The pertinent point here is Seneca’s use of *area* as a translation of ἄλως in the sense of the natural phenomenon around the sun. Prior to Seneca, we have no evidence that *area* was ever applied to this specific natural phenomenon described by ἄλως (see *OLD* s.v. *area*, 2).¹⁵ Here, Seneca

¹² *N.Q.* 1.2.1-3: *videamus nunc quemadmodum fiat is fulgor qui sidera circumvenit. memoriae proditum est, quo die Urbem divus Augustus Apollonia reversus intravit, circa solem visum coloris varii circulum, qualis esse in arcu solet. hunc Graeci halo vocant, nos dicere coronam aptissime possumus [...] ob hoc tales splendores Graeci areas vocaverunt quia fere terendis frugibus destinata loca rotunda sunt. non est autem quod existimemus istas, sive areae sive coronae sunt, in vicinia siderum fieri. plurimum enim ab his absunt, quamvis cingere ea et coronare videantur [...]* (trans. adapted from CORCORAN (1971)).

¹³ For the *patrii sermonis egestas* topos elsewhere in Seneca, see *Ep.* 58.1 (*quanta verborum nobis paupertas, immo egestas sit, numquam magis quam hodierno die intellexi*) and 87.40 (*facilius, quod volo, exprimerem, si Latinum verbum esset, quo ἀνναπαξία significatur*).

¹⁴ Seneca in the end prefers to adopt the usual usage (*corona*) throughout the *N.Q.*, see e.g. 1.10.1 and 7.12.8.

¹⁵ We can find later evidence that the term was used as a translation of *πρασία* ‘garden-plot’, e.g. in translations of the Septuagint (*Si.* 24.31), see *GL* 3.357.

hints that *area* might be a possible appellation for this phenomenon: *sive areae sive coronae sunt*. Unlike Cicero's usual practice of using lexical augmentations, where an established word was 'drafted', so to speak, into service for explicating a specific Greek philosophical term in Latin (in addition to metaphorical or metonymic devices), here Seneca uses *area* more for illustrative purposes than a serious attempt at providing a new term to describe the 'halo' phenomenon around the Sun. Seneca etymologises in an analogous way to the Greek to derive the metaphorical image of the 'threshing floor', but does not imbue a novel meaning into the Latin term. We might also argue that the double use of the Latin and Greek terms together is an interpretative technique designed to explain the phenomenon as closely and accurately as possible by giving the reader insight into the Greek term's origins as well as the Latin term's, and thus to compare the two.

παρήλια (*soles, parhelia*)

In *N.Q.* 1.11, Seneca attempts to discuss the atmospheric optical phenomenon of 'sun dogs' in which two bright spots appear on either side of the Sun's 'halo' (discussed above). He begins the exposition with a concatenation of rhetorical questions: 'Now, how am I to express myself in this section? What should I call these things? Images of the sun? Historians call them "suns" and record that they have appeared two and three at a time' (*quomodo nunc me hoc loco geram? quid vocem? imagines solis? historici soles vocant et binos ternosque apparuisse memoriae tradunt*). Seneca makes sure to remind the reader that Latin does not have the tools to discuss such phenomena adequately, claiming that the 'historians' (perhaps a reference to Livy or even Cicero)¹⁶ describe them as 'suns'. He then proceeds to contrast what the Greeks term it:

The Greeks call them "parhelia," either because they are commonly seen in proximity to the sun or because they are near to some resemblance of the sun. They do not

¹⁶ Cf. e.g. Cic. *N.D.* 2.14 and Liv. 28.11.3.

resemble the sun entirely, only its size and shape. Moreover, dull and feeble, they have nothing of the sun's heat.¹⁷

Here too he seems to be somewhat doubtful even of the Greeks' term for the phenomenon given the *helio* element in their word, which he says is inaccurate '[*parhelio*] do not resemble the sun entirely, only its size and shape'. However, whereas the Roman historians called them outright 'suns', the Greeks at least include a somewhat more nuanced understanding thanks to the *para*- component of the term *parhelio*¹⁸ which captures their 'nearness' to the Sun, as well as their *similitudo* to it. Seneca further laments his lack of options in Latin, going so far as to ask the reader whether he should follow the poet Vergil's advice in naming an unfamiliar concept:

What name may we put to this? Or should I do what Vergil had done when he had doubts about a name for a concept: just use [the Greek name] anyway?

*et quo te nomine [sc. carmine] dicam,
Rhaetica? nec cellis ideo contende Falernis.*

So nothing prevents me from using this name *parhelio*.¹⁹

These lines from the *Georgics* (2.95-6) are likely misquoted and the original lines are somewhat tangential to the point Seneca is attempting to make,²⁰ it rather seems to be an

¹⁷ *N.Q.* 1.11.2: *Graeci parhelio appellant, quia in propinquo fere a sole visuntur aut quia accedunt ad aliquam similitudinem solis. non enim totum imitantur, sed magnitudinem eius figuramque; ceterum nihil habent ardoris hebetes et languidi.* (Trans. adapted from CORCORAN (1971)).

¹⁸ Probably written in Greek letters in the original, see the critical apparatus in GERCKE's (1970) edition.

¹⁹ *N.Q.* 1.11: *his quod nomen imponimus? an facio quod Vergilius, qui dubitavit de nomine, deinde id de quo dubitaverat posuit [...] nihil ergo prohibet illas parhelio vocari.*

²⁰ Vergil is praising a certain wine grown at the foot of the Rhaetian Alps rather than questioning what name to give it, see the eighteenth century observations in MARTYN (1741), 134: '[Seneca] seems not to have read our Poet very carefully. Vergil did not say *nomine*, but *carmine*: he was in no doubt about the name of the vine, but how he should celebrate it.' See recently THOMAS (1998), 1.173. The argument could be made that the name *Rhaeti* was a non-Latin word (either an endonym from the Celtic *rait* or exonym from the Greek *Ῥαιτοί*) and Vergil used this loan-word in creating the adjective *Rhaetica*, which Seneca then follows by analogy in

appeal to authority in justifying his pre-determined choice to use the transliterated Greek. With the term dealt with, Seneca then goes on to use it as a Latin technical term to be defined (1.11.3): *quidam parhelion ita definiunt: nubes rotunda et splendida similisque soli*. We might ask why Seneca has expended so much effort and (inaccurate) appeal to authority over the use of a single Greek loan-word to describe this visual phenomenon of ‘sun dogs’? The answer seems to be a type of anti-anthropocentrism, aiming to avoid the constraints of the Latin language and the limited human perspective. The Greek term, while not wholly accurate as Seneca makes clear, is nonetheless closer to what is actually happening in nature (in Seneca’s opinion), with the *helio* appearing alongside or near (*para*–) the Sun rather than actually being *soles* themselves. In doing this, Seneca must explicate the phenomena with periphrases as well as going to great lengths to crowbar the Greek term into the exegesis in order to term the phenomenon clearly to his reader. In introducing the loan-word, Seneca begins with his series of rhetorical questions as a means of signalling the audience of the *egestas* in Latin vocabulary in describing this particular natural phenomenon. His use of the Greeks’ description of it is a way for him to indicate that the Greeks have, in fact, a better term than the Romans do, or at least a term which is more precise, closer to how things *actually are* as oppose to how they seem to the human eye. He then uses an appeal to authority to justify his use of the Greek loan-word directly, a term he continues to use for the rest of the section.

Orbatio (στέρησις) and inopia (ἀνυπαρξία)

In a rare case of direct translation, Seneca renders a sophism of Antipater of Tarsus in (*Ep.* 87.38-9): *paupertas non per possessionem dicitur, sed per detractionem*, which he glosses with: *vel, ut antiqui dixerunt, orbationem. Graeci κατὰ στέρησιν dicunt*. The notion of *στέρησις* or ‘privation’ was allegedly used by Antipater (a Stoic) to refute the Peripatetic argument that ‘riches’ were simply many instances of poverty (*paupertas*). Seneca tells us that Antipater sought to resolve the premiss of this argument by using semantics, asserting that any amount of poverty could never sum to riches in the first place, since ‘poverty’ (*στέρησις*)

borrowing the noun *parhelio*. The analogy is faulty (Vergil’s loan-blend is adjectivising whereas Seneca simply borrows the whole Greek noun) but it seems this would be the only logical inference to make as to why Seneca quotes from this passage of Vergil here.

as defined by the Peripatetics, is a privative term, i.e. one of negation (*detractio vel orbatio*) and multiple negations cannot be subject to addition or sum to a positive. Seneca prefers to view wealth as an accumulation of many instances of poverty or ‘few possessions’ (*parvi possessio*), which eschews the logical hurdle Antipater poses in his reading of *στέρησις*.²¹ Seneca’s invocation of the term *orbatio* is done by appeal to authority: *ut antiqui dixerunt*, although there is no extant evidence that *orbatio* was used in this sense before Seneca. The verb *orbo* was used in old Latin tragedians such as Pacuvius and perhaps these same authors might have similarly used its substantive form (the evidence simply not surviving into posterity). An alternative is simply that Seneca is using inductive reasoning; that is, from the existence of *orbo* he extrapolated a nominalised form as perhaps having existed too, especially given the highly productive nature of the *-tio* suffix in Latin. In any case, the abstract noun is a clear translation of *στέρησις* (*στερέω* = *orbo*) and neatly captures the sense of the Greek technical term.

In the next section, Seneca again invokes the *egestas* trope to complain about the lack of a Latin equivalent for the technical Stoic term *ἀνυπαρξία*:

I could express my meaning more easily if there were a Latin word which could translate the Greek word which means *ἀνυπαρξία* [‘not-possessing’]. Antipater assigns this quality to poverty, but for my part I cannot see what else poverty is than the possession of little. If ever we have plenty of leisure, we shall investigate the question: What is the essence of riches, and what the essence of poverty; but when the time comes, we shall also consider whether it is not better to try to mitigate poverty, and to relieve wealth of its arrogance, than to quibble about the words as if the question of the things were already decided.²²

²¹ See also brief discussion in ARPE (1940), 68 regarding the use of *substantia* in Seneca’s argument here.

²² Ep. 87.40: *facilius, quod volo, exprimerem, si Latinum verbum esset, quo ἀνυπαρξία significatur. hanc paupertati Antipater adsignat; ego non video, quid aliud sit paupertas quam parvi possessio. de isto videbimus, si quando valde vacabit, quae sit divitiarum, quae paupertatis substantia; sed tunc quoque considerabimus, numquid satius sit paupertatem permulcere, divitiis demere supercilium quam litigare de verbis, quasi iam de rebus iudicatum sit.*

COOPER and BARNES have discussed Seneca's disdain for dialectic and technical philosophy and sophistic word-games in general,²³ and INWOOD touches on this issue when he argues:

Perhaps the theme of a need for something beyond Latin words to capture the sense of this sophism and solution suggests that for serious moral dialectic Latin terms suffice, that it is only frivolities that require neologisms and Greek technical terms.²⁴

KIDD suggests²⁵ Seneca's term is *inopia*, based on Seneca's summary of Antipater earlier (*Ep.* 87.39: *itaque ex multis inanibus nihil inpleri potest; divitias multae res faciunt, non multae inopiae*). If this is the case, the established term is now given the Stoic sense of ἀνυπαρξία, (making it a lexical augmentation), though the correspondence in this context is somewhat speculative.

The broader point INWOOD raises is important and a key point in understanding the difference in approaches between Cicero and Seneca. The former, though certainly mindful of the problems associated with technical vocabulary such as the Stoics', and uneasy with the introduction of new terms *ex nihilo*, was nonetheless willing to do so in certain circumstances, often using rhetorical techniques to ease their use with his readership (for example periphrasis, double translation, *praeteritio*, *captatio benevolentiae*, or simply using loan-shifts instead). Seneca however, is more likely (at least in his letters) to make the point of a lack of an equivalent term in Latin, and proceed to explain it in familiar terms, or simply leave the Greek intact and not re-interpret its sense by finding a new Latin term. In his actual philosophical works, he is even less likely to tackle these translation issues head-on and prefers using well-established terms to convey Stoic concepts clearly.

²³ COOPER (2004); specifically for logical puzzles and word-games see BARNES (1997), 13-14.

²⁴ INWOOD (2007), 258.

²⁵ KIDD (1999), 239 n. 141.

οὐσία and ὄν (essentia, quod est)

Seneca's comments in *Ep.* 58 to Lucilius are well known and ought to be discussed in some detail here. Approximately one-fifth of the letter is dedicated to discussing the limitations of Latin as a language of philosophical (particularly Platonic) discourse, notably the opening sections. The first of which begins with:

Just how destitute in words (*paupertas*) our language is, indeed, how poverty-stricken (*egestas*), I haven't fully understood until today! When we happened to be discussing Plato, a thousand things came up which needed names but lacked them; indeed there were some, which when they used to have them, they lost them owing to our fussiness (*fastidium*). But who would tolerate fussiness in the midst of poverty?²⁶

The familiar *egestas* trope as found in Lucretius (with whose work Seneca was familiar)²⁷ is again repeated to establish the context for the discussion which will follow:

'What is the point of this introduction?' you ask, 'what may be seen?' I won't hide it from you. I want, if possible, to use the term *essentia* with your approval; but if that is not possible I will use the term even if it irks you. I'll cite Cicero as an authority for this word (an abundantly influential one in my view). If you're looking for someone more recent, I'll cite Fabianus, learned and sophisticated, with a style polished enough even for our contemporary pedantry. For what will happen, Lucilius [if we don't allow *essentia*]? How will *ousia* be referred to, an indispensable thing, by its nature containing the foundation of all things? So, I beg you to permit me to use this word.

²⁶ *Ep.* 58.1: *quanta verborum nobis paupertas, immo egestas sit, numquam magis quam hodierno die intellexi. mille res inciderunt, cum forte de Platone loqueremur, quae nomina desiderarent nec haberent, quaedam vero, quae cum habuissent, fastidio nostro perdidissent. quis autem ferat in egestate fastidium?*

²⁷ Quotations from *Lucr.* appear throughout Seneca's works, e.g. *Ep.* 106.8 and 110.6, and *Tranq.* 2.14.

Still, I shall take care to use the permission you grant very sparingly. Maybe I'll be content to have just the permission.²⁸

As in the previous translation of *παρήλεια*, Seneca uses the appeal to authority to justify the use of the unusual Latin abstract *essentia* in rendering *οὐσία*. His main authority appears to be Cicero though, as we have noted, there is no evidence that Cicero in fact used this term at all.²⁹ His secondary authority is his contemporary Papirius Fabianus, the Roman rhetorician and philosopher. Seneca continues:

But what good will your indulgence do if I can find no way to express in Latin the very notion which provoked my criticism of our language? You will condemn our narrow Roman limits even more when you find out that there is a word of one syllable which I cannot translate [...] *ὄν*. You think me lacking in ability; you believe that the word is ready to hand, that it might be translated by *quod est*. I notice though a great difference; you're forcing me to render a substantive with a verb. But if I must do so, I shall translate it with *quod est*.³⁰

Since Latin appeared to have no mechanism within its lexicon or grammar to translate *τὸ ὄν* or *οὐσία* effectively, we find authors like Seneca (and Cicero before him) grappling with this by various means, either as an erroneous conceptual translation (e.g. Cicero's *aeternitas* for *οὐσία*) or literal calque (Seneca, Apuleius, and Calcidius' *essentia*, *οὐσία*)³¹ or, as Seneca

²⁸ *Ep.* 58.6: “*quid sibi,*” *inquis,* “*ista praeparatio vult? quo spectat?*” *non celabo te; cupio, si fieri potest, propitiis auribus tuis essentiam dicere; si minus, dicam et iratis. Ciceronem auctorem huius verbi habeo, puto locupletem. si recentiore quaeris, Fabianum, disertum et elegantem, orationis etiam ad nostrum fastidium nitidae. quid enim fiet, mi Lucili? quomodo dicetur οὐσία res necessaria, natura continens fundamentum omnium? rogo itaque permittas mihi hoc verbo uti. nihilominus dabo operam, ut ius a te datum parcissime exerceam; fortasse contentus ero mihi licere.* (Trans. adapted from INWOOD (2007)).

²⁹ See e.g. GANZ (1990), 94 (discussed in Chapter One, n. 271). Quintilian (in *Inst.* 2.14.2 and 3.6.23) attributes a certain Sergius Plautus with the first use of the term alongside *ens*. See also INWOOD (2007), 113; 114.

³⁰ *Ep.* 58.7: *quid proderit facilitas tua, cum ecce id nullo modo Latine exprimere possim, propter quod linguae nostrae convicium feci? magis damnabis angustias Romanas, si scieris unam syllabam esse, quam mutare non possum [...] τὸ ὄν. duri tibi videor ingenii; in medio positum, posse sic transferri, ut dicam “quod est.” sed multum interesse video; cogor verbum pro vocabulo ponere. sed si ita necesse est, ponam “quod est.”*

³¹ Apuleius, as we shall see, also used *substantia* as a synonym for *essentia*. See also discussion in INWOOD (2007), 114. Cf. also the conflation later in Calcidius, e.g. MORESCHINI (2003), 699.

prefers, a change of verb form (*quod est*, τὸ ὄν) and this alters the concepts Plato expressed in the original Greek.³² Concerning τὸ ὄν, Latin cannot perform the operation that Plato's participial term achieves, as the language has no present participle of *sum*.³³ Thus, the Latin reduces this concept to 'that which is' *now*, i.e. in time and related to objects (which have an origin and an ending), rather than 'that which is be-ing'³⁴ (τὸ ὄν), the 'Being of all beings' or that be-ing which has been, is now and will be, the self-same (ontologically fundamental in other words). As a result, there is an altering of the Platonic dualism of the dynamic relations between the object that is perpetually becoming (τὸ γιγνόμενον) and that which is simply eternal (ἔχοντος αἰεί).³⁵ The differences may seem formal rather than conceptually substantive at root, but these examples vividly demonstrate the difficulties of translation Latin authors (let alone we moderns) face from the outset, especially in their translations and interpretation of the densely terminology-laden dialogues of Plato's later period (such as the *Timaeus*). There is also the tension between *imitatio* and *aemulatio* in these Latin authors writing within this intellectual genre which becomes central to the issue of diachrony and the predominance of one way of thinking (about a given translation of a technical term) as opposed to another. In which ways were later authors bound to, for instance, Cicero's authority in using the coinage *essentia* and, if they were, how did this affect the transmission of a (Platonic) concept in Latin and its interpretation by later authors? These questions add complexity to the *aemulatio* issue discussed in the Introduction, where authors like Lucretius and Cicero were not interested simply in translating the knowledge of the Greeks but in surpassing it and re-interpreting it

³² Cf. PONCELET (1957), 92-94 for his critique of Cicero's rendering of *Ti.* 37b which centres around the concepts of τὸ γιγνόμενον and ἔχοντος αἰεί.

³³ See e.g. in Anglophone scholarship, general observations repeating PONCELET's (1957) such as MACKENDRICK's (1989), 339 n. 8: '[Cicero] was hampered, despite his claim (*Fin.* 1.10) that Latin is superior to Greek, by the absence in his native tongue of a definite article, a perfect active participle, and a present participle of *esse*.' Though superficially true, more work needs to be done to determine whether this was in fact a 'failure' and Cicero was actually 'hampered', or whether Latin simply re-described the original concepts in a new way through the prism of its own grammatical rules and word stock. See also the Italian Humanist Lorenzo Valla's discussion (*Repastinatio* i. 12-13, 30-2) of Scholastic neologisms like *ens*, *entitas*, *quiditas*, *perseitas*.

³⁴ Even the copulative 'is' I use here is deceptive, for the 'being' in question is existential and not of some quality or type but rather 'The Be-ing' (present participle). A person, animal, plant etc. can simply *be* (e.g. *homo est*) but this is not the same ontological idea of the Platonic τὸ ὄν.

³⁵ As discussed in Chapter 1.7, see HINTZEN (1993), 189.

into the contingencies of their times for new audiences. So we see already in Seneca, *aemulatio* is not only with the Greeks, but also with Latin predecessors.

Returning to the issue of τὸ ὄν in Seneca's interpretation, later in the discussion (*Ep.* 58.11), he expresses his dissatisfaction with the term *quod est* to render τὸ ὄν: *illud, cui nomen modo parum proprium inposuimus, quod est*. INWOOD's analysis is of relevance here, and I will examine it briefly to clarify the issue. To begin with INWOOD's opening explanation, it appears to be that Seneca regarded *essentia* as a more suitable term to render οὐσία than *quod est*, perhaps 'because of its unfamiliarity'.³⁶ While unfamiliarity is certainly one way to make a word technical, I do not see it as a necessary quality in making a Latin term *more appropriate* in translating a Greek term. Cicero, for example, regularly used familiar terms in translating Greek technical concepts, as we have studied in detail in the last chapter. If INWOOD's argument is rather that *essentia* was more appropriate because it was a more literal rendering of the Greek (and such literality thereby rendered it unfamiliar to the Latin reader and thus less clouded with earlier pre-conceptions or connotations inherent within more established terms), then this is a stronger point to make and certainly one that seems to underlie his opening rhetoric imploring Lucilius' approval. But, as INWOOD notes, Seneca abandons *essentia* in the rest of the discussion, so this raises the questions: a) is there a distinction in Platonic thought between τὸ ὄν and οὐσία? and b) does Seneca actually make such a distinction?

In the earlier discussion in Chapter 1.7 regarding Cicero's translations of Plato's οὐσία in the *Timaeus*, we concluded that Plato had used οὐσία in various ways throughout his dialogues. In sum, the *Timaeus* makes it clear that what 'is' (οὐσία) is necessarily different from the physical world of 'becoming' (γινόμενος). This dualism does not, however, shed much light on what (if any) distinction existed for Plato between the 'essence' of some thing (e.g. a Form) and τὸ ὄν. NAILS' study of the use of *ousia* is helpful in clearly articulating the distinction between τὸ ὄν and οὐσία. Her core claim, using a range of evidence from the Platonic dialogues spanning different periods, is that anything that Plato described as οὐσία

³⁶ The full analysis can be found in INWOOD (2007), 115.

could not have been something that is understood as ontologically fundamental.³⁷ Where *οὐσία* describes something eternal and atemporal, Plato adds a modifier (so in the *Ti.* 37e, the adjective *αἰδίων*). In any case, there are clear instances of Plato's conflating both terms, for example in the *Cratylus* 421b-c where Socrates uses the conjunction: τὸ δὲ 'ὄν' καὶ ἡ 'οὐσία' ὁμολογεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ ἰῶτα ἀπολαβόν: ἰὸν γὰρ σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ 'οὐκ ὄν' αὖ, ὥς τινες καὶ ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτό, 'οὐκ ἰόν.' Both τὸ ὄν and οὐσία are cognate in that they signify 'motion'. However, in the *Sophist* (239b), Plato has the Eleatic Stranger use the disjunction: μήτε οὐσίαν μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτε πλῆθος and later (250c) makes the point that 'being' (τὸ ὄν) might not be either rest or motion at all: τὸ ὄν οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται. To be sure, in the *Sophist*, the main *terme d'art* is τὸ ὄν and not οὐσία. ADAM, in his commentary on the *Republic* (509c), observes that (in that section at least) 'οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος', but lists other scholars who have drawn such distinctions in their interpretations.³⁸

Moving past various threads of argumentation and the substantive philosophical arguments as to whether these concepts are in fact distinct or not, we find in Seneca's letter that τὸ ὄν and οὐσία seem to have been regarded as equivalent. Evidence of Seneca's lack of distinction appears in *Ep.* 58.18 where he discusses the ontology of the Platonic Ideas, describing them as: *propria Platonis supellex est; ideas vocat*. The noun *supellex* is usually translated as 'personal baggage' or 'furniture' (see for instance GUMMERE (1917) and INWOOD (2007)). The *OLD* (s.v. *supellex* (c)) notes that the term can be used with a disparaging force 'to the literary resources, ideas, qualities; etc.; with which a person is endowed'. In this sense, Seneca uses it again later in *Ep.* 88.36. It seems then that Seneca viewed Plato's conception of the 'being' of pure Ideas as peculiar, or at least unique to, Plato and, therefore, somewhat obscure, as he mentions in the next section on the Forms (*Ep.* 58.20): *quantum locum habebit idos. quid sit hoc idos, attendas oportet et Platoni inputes, non mihi, hanc rerum difficultatem*. The question for Seneca is whether he believed things such as pure Ideas and Forms possessed οὐσία or whether they were better described as participating in τὸ ὄν. It seems Seneca described them as both; that is, as having both a fundamental reality (*essentia*) and so a participation in 'what is' (*quod est*). In *Ep.* 58.6-7, Seneca describes οὐσία 'as something

³⁷ NAILS (1979), 76-7; i.e. not along the lines of a metaphysical 'essence' as we later see in Greek Patristic theology.

³⁸ See ADAM (1902), 62.

that is indispensable, something that is the natural substratum of everything' (*res necessaria, natura continens fundamentum omnium*). In his (non-Platonic) division of *quod est* into six 'genera' or species, he provides us with evidence that he viewed τὸ ὄν as more interchangeable than οὐσία: *quod est* ranges from God and pure Ideas to material objects in the world and everything in between (both corporeals and incorporeals).³⁹ Taking this division of 'what is' in conjunction with Seneca's previous definition of οὐσία as the *natura continens fundamentum omnium*, one might conclude that οὐσία is a necessary subset of *quod est*; that is, its role as the substratum of everything 'which is', hence corporeal and incorporeal things share both τὸ ὄν and οὐσία (the latter logically follows from the former).

Proceeding on this basis, we can evaluate INWOOD's next line of argument (2007, 114-5) which suggests that, since *essentia* was unfamiliar, Seneca opts for *quod est* and suggests Seneca might have been making the point that, 'one can often get at the key ideas of even subtle discussion without resorting to stylistically disruptive coinages'. Yet if this were the case, why does Seneca deprecate the utility of *quod est* as insufficient in rendering of οὐσία, prefaced with a beseeching of permission to use the more unusual *essentia*? This brings us to the correct interpretation of the phrase *parum proprium* which INWOOD, drawing on others' suggestions, suggests could bear the sense that *quod est*:

- a) is not sufficiently exact, too broad in its meaning, with *proprium* being equivalent to the Greek *idion*; or
- b) being a noun/substantive clause, lacks the grammatical correspondence with the Greek (a nominalised participle).

There is a simpler alternative, though admittedly one which imputes a lack of rhetorical sincerity to Seneca. If we assume Seneca sees *essentia* and *quod est* (i.e. οὐσία and τὸ ὄν) as indistinct, then, like Cicero, Seneca uses (obliquely) a rhetorical technique of *praeteritio* for the benefit of his reader, whilst being careful to preserve the *latinitas* of his style at the same

³⁹ INWOOD (2007), 122; BRUNSCHWIG (1994), 113; see explicitly in *Ep.* 58.11. Note also the corporeal versus incorporeal categorisation reveals Seneca's casual contamination of Platonic metaphysics with that of the Stoics' (σώματα versus ἀσώματα, see e.g. KOTZIA (2001), 1100).

time.⁴⁰ Recall this technique at its most blatant in Cicero's *Timaeus* translation: '[S]o that there were two 'means' (*media*) – for I would not dare to say *medietates*, which the Greeks call *μεσότητας*, but let it be understood as if I had said it thus, for it will be more clear'.⁴¹ What we could see happening here in Seneca is a larger manifestation of this technique: Seneca begins a lamentation to Lucilius about the *egestas* in Latin, begging for permission (he says he will even settle for the mere *right* to use it (*Ep.* 58.7: *fortasse contentus ero mihi licere*)) to use *essentia* as the Latin equivalent of *οὐσία*. Since no such right has yet been granted by Lucilius (and Seneca will not postpone discussion of his Platonic concepts until he receives this rhetorical permission), he continues by using the easily understood substantive clause: *quod est* but finally makes a point to stress that this compromise is *parum proprium*. The sequence of these initial metatextual interplays smacks of all the elements of a *praeteritio*: I could use *essentia* — if you gave me permission — but I won't,⁴² instead I will settle for the less appropriate *quod est*.⁴³ To re-iterate, this presumes that Seneca views *essentia* and *quod est* as equivalents, which appears to be what has happened here.

However, I do not think it is sufficient to leave this (what is an admittedly cynical) approach to Seneca's rhetorical stratagems there. The conflation of key Platonic metaphysical concepts in Seneca's exegesis may not simply be a problem of translation but a *deliberate* confusion on Seneca's part. For Plato, the non-corporeal, eternal Forms are of the realm of *τὸ ὄν* whilst everyday objects and other existents simply possess *οὐσία* or a substance. Yet for Seneca, existence (*quod est*) is something that applies unmodified to *all* things and there is no distinction made between the ontological and atemporal eternity of the Forms and the temporal eternity of growth and decay in the existing world. The illusion here then, and one

⁴⁰ See ALBRECHT (1997), 1179: '[Seneca's] arrangement of thoughts is generally guided by rhetorical principles'; but cf. BOURGERY (1922), 121: 'Sans doute il use de précautions pour risquer *ens* et *essentia*, mais je soupçonne qu'il ne faut pas pendre au sérieux tant d'ambages [...] Il veut seulement s'amuser un peu, aux dépens peut-être de Lucilius [...]'

⁴¹ *Timaeus*, 23: *ut in singulis essent bina media — vix enim audeo dicere medietates, quas Graeci μεσότητας appellant, sed quasi ita dixerim intellegatur, erit enim planius.*

⁴² Despite his threat: *si minus, dicam et iratis* on which he does not follow through, abandoning the use of *essentia* in the rest of the letter.

⁴³ Seneca has in fact used precisely this rhetorical formula around the same time as he wrote this letter in his *N.Q.* 2.2.4 (c. early 60's AD, see e.g. HINE (2010), 10 for dating): *vide quomodo auribus tuis parcam. expedire me poteram, si philosophorum lingua uti voluissem, ut dicerem unita corpora. hoc cum tibi remittam, tu invicem mihi refer gratiam.*

that has been tempting to believe for many scholars examining this letter to date, is to assume Seneca really *was* concerned with faithfully transposing Plato's views of Being into Latin the impressionable Lucilius (and his wider readership, if this was his intent).⁴⁴

Just as in the opening of the letter, when Seneca admits that spending so much time on linguistic concerns was a waste (*quantum tempus apud grammaticum perdiderim*), the lesson for Lucilius is that spending so much time on the intricacies of Being and its myriad subdivisions is equally a waste. So in *Ep.* 58.25-6 we find a second peremptory dismissal of his earlier efforts:

“What good,” you ask, “will this technicality do for me?” None, if you ask me. But just as the engraver relaxes, refreshes and, as they say, ‘nourishes’ his eyes, tired from lengthy concentration, so too we should sometimes relax our mind and refresh it with certain amusements (*oblectamenta*). But let the amusements themselves be work and from them too, if you pay attention, you will gain something which could turn out to be good for you. This, Lucilius, is what I normally do: from every notion, even if it is quite remote from philosophy, I try to dig out something and make it useful.⁴⁵

The second part of the letter on metaphysics then is simply a rhetorical *expolitio* or ἐξεργασία of the first part in which Seneca gets weighed down with lexical pedantry.⁴⁶ In this conclusion, Seneca gives us one his most pragmatist reveals in all of his written works (the most pragmatist he gets will be later in *Ep.* 65). Not only is the study of metaphysics a collection of

⁴⁴ See e.g. GRIFFIN (1976), 416-19 who saw the *Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium* as, ‘really dialogues with an epistolary veneer’; also INWOOD (2007), 131 on the narrative *persona* in the letter. Seneca knew he was writing for publication (e.g. *Ep.* 21.5). See further MARSHALL (2014), 43.

⁴⁵ *Ep.* 25-6: “quid ista,” inquis, “mihi subtilitas proderit?” si me interrogas, nihil. sed quemadmodum ille caelator oculos diu intentos ac fatigatos remittit atque avocat et, ut dici solet, pascit; sic nos animum aliquando debemus relaxare et quibusdam oblectamentis reficere. sed ipsa oblectamenta opera sint. ex his quoque, si observaveris, sumes, quod possit fieri salutare. hoc ego, Lucili, facere soleo: ex omni notione, etiam si a philosophia longissime aversa est, eruere aliquid conor et utile efficere.

⁴⁶ *Exergasia* (also known as *expolitio*) is a rhetorical device, well described by LEWIS (1964), vii. 192: ‘One kind of *mora* is *Expolitio*. Its formula is “Let the same thing be disguised by a variety of form; be different, yet the same.” That is, the idea or theme repeated in a different form is that of getting weighed down with intricate distinctions and inquiries which actually have no substantive purpose (i.e. *tempus perdere*, in Seneca's words) beyond intellectual amusement.

amusements (*oblectamenta*) with no real import — it is not even philosophy. We might hope to contain the damage by arguing that here all Seneca means is that Platonic ontology is too technical and obscure to be of any practical, ethical benefit and so is better ignored entirely or at most somewhat, if incidentally, relevant to living a good intellectual life. Yet this charitable reading is not quite possible, given that Seneca cites Aristotle and his own Stoics who dabbled in the amusements of metaphysics as well. Seneca, as the philosophical pragmatists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would come to believe, saw that philosophy's purpose was to get beyond metaphysics, or perhaps a better turn of phrase would be to reduce metaphysics by simply omitting the 'meta-', entirely and to study physics. God or Nature itself was, for the Stoics, immanent and material, seen throughout the divinely ordered Universe. To busy oneself with what was 'beyond' the physical was to perhaps reach too far. As BOYS-STONES accurately described it, for Seneca and the emerging Roman school of Stoicism, the heirs of Plato were philosophical rivals, not allies, and more fundamentally, Plato's Forms were seen as 'fantasies: the ontological epigones of sophistical dialectic'.⁴⁷ What are we left to do with *Ep.* 58 then, if it is nothing but an intricate rhetorical exercise (for Lucilius' benefit) in denigrating metaphysics as a serious field of inquiry into the 'Truth'? The answer comes a few letters later in letter 65, where Seneca presents to Lucilius more Aristotelian and Platonic metaphysics (more of the latter than the former) now in the guise of causes, which is essentially the same exposition he had introduced in 58 regarding Forms and the 'six ways' (*sex modis*, *Ep.* 58.6) of Plato's Being.⁴⁸ In this letter, Seneca pillories both Aristotle and Plato: 'This throng of causes, which is asserted by Aristotle and Plato, contains either far too much or far too little' (*Ep.* 65.11: *haec, quae ab Aristotele et Platone ponitur, turba causarum aut nimium multa aut nimium pauca comprehendit*). INWOOD describes this as a 'serio-comic' critique on Seneca's part, BOYS-STONES goes further and characterises it as reminiscent of a Shakespearean joke, 'comparable with the ever-growing number of rogues supposed to have attacked Falstaff'.⁴⁹ Whatever the undertones of Seneca's rebuke, he ultimately

⁴⁷ BOYS-STONES (2013), 142.

⁴⁸ See again BOYS-STONES (2013), 141. Letters 58 and 65 could have been part of a 'packet' of letters, as ALBERTINI (1923), 131 n. 1 and GRIFFIN (1976), 418 suggest could have been Seneca's practice, given the large quantity of his letters transmitted over short timeframes.

⁴⁹ INWOOD (2007), 146; BOYS-STONES (2013), 138 n. 23.

disregards the metaphysicians' conception of causes in 58.11-14 and then turns to his own Stoic opinion of the soul, largely side stepping Plato's view, despite the close affinities with the *Phaedo* dialogue throughout the letter. What is revealing about *Ep.* 65 is not so much Seneca's critique of Platonic and Peripatetic doctrines (and eventually his discarding their metaphysical concepts entirely in the letters to Lucilius which follow) but rather his obiter dicta on truth in 58:

You ask, what is god's purpose? Goodness. So, to be sure, Plato says, "What was the cause for god in making the cosmos? That he is good. A good person does not begrudge any good thing. And thus he made the best that was possible." All right, then, you be the judge and give a verdict, proclaim which one seems to say what most closely appears to say the truth, not which one may say what is truest—for that is as far above us as is truth itself.⁵⁰

The rhetorical imperative is cryptic and, as INWOOD has pointed out, hints at a certain Academic scepticism. Choose a theory of causes that *appears* to be the truth, as opposed to which one is *actually* the most truthful. The latter, being neither relative nor contingent upon anything or anyone, is, for Seneca, far above human ken (*id enim tam supra nos*) and thus there is very little to say about it. Two conclusions are of interest here: 1) that Seneca's conception of truth is pragmatic, and 2) Seneca had some kind of direct access to Platonic works (here the *Timaeus* 29d-e),⁵¹ whether from a Platonist handbook accessible at the time or the actual text itself.⁵² The latter is important, because if he did have primary source material available, none of it was used in *Ep.* 58. If none of it was used, despite his having access to such material, it strengthens the conclusion that that letter was purely for rhetorical purposes,

⁵⁰ *Ep.* 58.10: *quaeris, quod sit propositum deo? bonitas ita certe Plato ait: "quae deo faciendi mundum fuit causa? bonus est; bono nulla cuiusquam boni invidia est. fecit itaque quam optimum potuit." fer ergo, iudex, sententiam et pronuntia, quis tibi videatur verissimum dicere, non quis verissimum dicat. id enim tam supra nos est quam ipsa veritas.* (Trans. adapted from INWOOD (2007), 11-12.)

⁵¹ Cf. Cicero's *Timaeus*, 9: *quaeramus igitur causam, quae inpulerit eum, qui haec machinatus sit, ut originem rerum et molitionem novam quaereret. probitate videlicet praestabat; probus autem invidet nemini; itaque omnia sui similia generavit.*

⁵² See BOYS-STONES (2013), 139.

designed in such a way as to undermine the metaphysical concepts themselves and their proponents, to show to Lucilius the ultimate worthlessness of inquiring into whether they were true or not.

We might ask the following questions: Why did Seneca go to such lengths to ask for permission to use a term like *essentia* in *Ep.* 58 only to abandon it? Why did he go to such lengths to outline Platonic (supplemented with Peripatetic and Stoic) metaphysics, only to write it all off as ‘amusements’ (*oblectamenta*) to distract him from proper moral philosophy? Both can be answered by arguing that Seneca is not ‘doing philosophy’ in either letter 58 or the later letter 65 but rather using rhetorical techniques to undermine the discipline of Platonic metaphysics (even metaphysics as a whole). The introduction of *essentia*, an un-Latin term for Seneca (who has to appeal to Cicero’s authority to use it), is in fact a form of *praeteritio* in which he mentions the term for effect but drops it immediately in favour of the more usual (though less appropriate, *parum proprium*, as he says in 58.11) phrase *quod est*. The point is both to confuse the issue and to labour the rhetorical trope of the *egestas* in Latin philosophical vocabulary. However, the broader point is to begin the letter with an unnecessarily detailed excursus on language and terminology, only to dismiss it as wasting time *apud grammaticum*. In a similar parallelism, he goes on to focus on the unnecessarily complex divisions (six in total) of Plato’s concept of Being, and again to repeat this in the form of Peripatetic and Platonic views on the causes of things in *Ep.* 65. After much confused discussion on these metaphysical topics, Seneca again dismisses them (in the case of the division of Forms and Being) as *oblectamenta*, or jokes (in the case of causes) at how Aristotle and Plato counted too many, or too few, to be credible. *Praeteritio*, *expolitio* and various *captatio benevolentiae*, among other rhetorical tropes, are found doing the heavy lifting in both of Seneca’s ‘philosophical’ letters on Platonic metaphysics.⁵³ All of which

⁵³ Seneca’s array of rhetorical stratagems *Ep.* 58 might seem to contradict his own observations just a few letters earlier in *Ep.* 52.9 (*quid enim turpius philosophia captante clamores? numquid aeger laudat medicum secantem?*) and elsewhere, rebuking overly ostentatious rhetoric in philosophical discourse. Yet here it seems Seneca references performances in the public square of philosophical disputation. The integration of rhetorical techniques in the dispensing of philosophical (sc. Stoic) *consilium* seemed to have been perfectly acceptable, even *de rigueur* for Seneca, at least in the *Ep.* and *N.Q.* (especially in the prefaces of the latter), see e.g. his dicta on the use of simple language to persuade someone to whom the philosopher is giving counsel (*Ep.* 38.1-2). See WILLIAMS (2015), 136: ‘[S]tyle and form are inseparable from Senecan philosophical meaning’; see also 136 n. 8 for an overview of scholarship examining the rhetorical techniques Seneca employed in his literary works.

underscore Seneca's pragmatist approach to these issues, using metaphysics as a foil against which he can dissuade Lucilius' interest and to contrast, in later letters, with the importance of practical morality and ethics in attaining wisdom and virtue, rather than wasting time with abstract and overly complex metaphysical pursuits.

Eûpos (Eurus)

In a revealing section concerning the Greek names for various winds in the *N.Q.*, Seneca gives us this explanation for why the retention of *Eurus* (for *Eûpos* the 'south-east wind') is justified in Latin:

Eurus comes from the winter sunrise [S.E.], a wind which our people call Vulturnus. [...] Varro also uses the name Vulturnus. But *Eurus* is already Latinised (*civitate donatus est*) and does not enter into our speech as though it were a foreign word.⁵⁴

As discussed in the Introduction, modern linguistics makes a distinction between a naturalised *Lehnwort* and a loan-word that retains its foreign pronunciation and may show non-native morphology (*Fremdwort*). In this section from Seneca, we see the former example in action and he explicitly acknowledges this phenomenon by saying: *nostro sermoni non tamquam alienus intervenit*. We could classify *Eurus* as a loan-blend, i.e. a loan-word retaining the foreign base but substituting a Latinised substantive suffix (the second declension masculine *-us*). The use of the metaphor *civitate donatus est* is also noteworthy in that Seneca's use of it is the first such recorded case of the metaphor being applied philologically, as if the foreign loan-word had been given 'citizenship' status in Latin (see *OLD* s.v. *civitas*, 5).⁵⁵ Seneca also uses this metaphor again in a letter to Lucilius regarding Stoic virtue:

⁵⁴ *N.Q.* 5.16.4: *ab oriente hiberno eurus exit, quem nostri vocavere vulturnum [...] Varro quoque hoc nomen usurpat — sed et eurus iam civitate donatus est et nostro sermoni non tamquam alienus intervenit.* (Trans. adapted from CORCORAN (1971)).

⁵⁵ Cf. Cic. *Fin.* 3.40 where it is used in relation to philosophical ideas: *ei (philosophiae) quasi civitatem dare*. Later used in linguistic contexts by Columella, Quintilian, Suetonius, Fronto, and Aulus Gellius. See also ADAMS (2003), 27 n. 84.

[...] our school of philosophy holds that the honourable and the good have been understood by analogy (*analogia*). Since the word “analogy” has been admitted to citizen rank (*civitate donaverint*) by Latin scholars I do not think that it ought to be condemned, but I do think it should be brought into the citizenship which it can justly claim. I shall, therefore, make use of the word, not merely as admitted (*recepto*), but as established (*usitato*).⁵⁶

Varro had used the term *analogia* in a grammatical context multiple times;⁵⁷ however, as we saw in Cicero, the philosophical-mathematical concept of ‘proportion’ had been rendered with the lexical innovation *proportio*. Seneca does not feel the need to follow Cicero’s Latin equivalent in this case, despite the context being philosophical and not grammatical (Seneca speaks of the Stoics as gaining knowledge of what is honourable and good by ‘analogical reflection on our experience’⁵⁸). Seneca justifies the use of the *Lehnwort*⁵⁹ on two grounds: a) that it has received its due citizenship by earlier Latin authors (*civitate donaverint*) and b) that it has been established by use (*usitatus*). He explicitly calls attention to the fact that he is not using it ad hoc simply on the basis that its meaning is more convenient in the Greek as directly received (*utar ergo illo non tantum tamquam recepto*) but because authors like Varro and Caesar had used — and therefore established — it on multiple prior occasions, thus naturalising it into Latin.

⁵⁶ *Ep.* 120.4: *per analogian nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum iudicant. hoc verbum cum Latini grammatici civitate donaverint, ego damnandum non puto, puto in civitatem suam redigendum. utar ergo illo non tantum tamquam recepto, sed tamquam usitato.* (Trans. adapted from GUMMERE (1925)).

⁵⁷ See e.g. DE MELO (2019a), 369f for the use of *analogia* and *ratio* as grammatical terms.

⁵⁸ See INWOOD (2007), 324.

⁵⁹ In Varro, *analogia* is treated like an ordinary first declension noun except in the case of the accusative singular where it takes not only *-am* but also frequently *-an* (see NETTLESHIP (1889), 186-7) making it an almost liminal case of *Lehnwort* and *Fremdwort* (cf. also DE MELO (2019), 1.235). Such a scenario is discussed in DURKIN (2009), 139: ‘Where different variants of a particular borrowed word show differing degrees of naturalization [...] the distinction between *Lehnwörter* and *Fremdwörter* cannot easily be used as a criterion for determining how words will be treated lexicographically’, citing the example of *appendixes* versus *appendices* in English.

αἰρετέον and expetibilis

This Latin term does not directly gloss a Greek term in the text (*Ep.* 117.5) but it is worthy of discussion here. It appears first attested in Latin in Seneca and INWOOD suggests it is a translation of the term *αἰρετέον*, used by Chrysippus: ‘*expetibilis* is the novel word employed to render the Greek *haireteon*, whereas *expetendum* is the established term used for *haireton*. If it is a coinage it is a relatively easy one for a Roman to accept’.⁶⁰ The question here is whether *expetibilis* is a calque of *αἰρετέον* or in fact of *αἰρετόν*. A more literal calque would be the Latin gerundive *expetendum* for *αἰρετέον*, whereas the *-bilis* adjective would calque *αἰρετόν*. Chrysippus’ distinction seems to be that Goods (*ἀγαθά*) are ‘choiceworthy’ (*αἰρετόν*) whereas goodwill or benefactions (*ὠφελήματα*) ‘ought to be chosen’ (*αἰρετέον*): ‘since they are predicates and correlates of Goods (*ἀγαθά*)’.⁶¹ However, Seneca’s antonymic analysis yields a different view:

So our [Stoics] are forced to twist their words and insert another syllable into the word “chosen” (*expetendo*) — a syllable which our language does not allow to be inserted. But, with your permission, I shall add it. “That which is good,” they say, “is a thing to be desired; the choiceworthy (*expetibilis*) thing is that which falls to our lot after we have attained the Good [...]”⁶²

It is possible to argue that Seneca has the terms in reverse and misunderstood Chrysippus’ distinction of *αἰρετόν* and *αἰρετέον*; that is, the gerundive now applies to the Goods themselves whereas the adjectival *-bilis* term applies to their correlates.⁶³

⁶⁰ INWOOD (2007), 292.

⁶¹ Chrysipp. in ARNIM (1964), 3.22.

⁶² *Ep.* 117.5: *coguntur nostri verba torquere et unam syllabam expetendo interponere, quam sermo noster inseri non sinit. ego illam, si pateris, adiungam. “expetendum est,” inquit, “quod bonum est: expetibile, quod nobis contingit, cum bonum consecuti sumus”* (Trans. adapted from GUMMERE (1925)).

⁶³ Note later in Boethius’ translation of the *Elench. Soph.* 180b29, he renders the Aristotelian *αἰρετόν* with the gerundive *eligendum*, further confusing the issue. Alternatively, the interpretation of the concept in Aristotle is more conflated (with the passive adjective suggesting the same as the gerundive). See also his use of Seneca’s *eligibilis* for *αἰρετός* in the *Topica* below, p. 328.

What is also noteworthy about this section is Seneca's excuse as to why he needs to use this lexical innovation. It seems that he does not want to assume responsibility for the coinage but rather attributes it to *nostri*, which appears to refer to the *Stoici* mentioned in an earlier section of the letter. Their hands have been forced in rendering the Greek term of *αἰρετέον* and they were required to insert the adjectival *-bilis* suffix; a new morpheme which conveys an 'ability' (see *OLD* s.v. *-bilis*), perhaps a mis-calqued morpheme to correspond to the Greek *-εον* denoting 'similarity' or 'materiality' (*αἰρετέον* 'something that is to be grasped or seized'). Yet in the next sentence, Seneca asks for Lucilius' permission again and resolves to add the syllable to *expetendo* to create the word. This is an odd chronology, and it is unclear whether Seneca is imitating those *Stoici* who used the neologism or is coining it for the first time himself. I think the latter is true and it is again explicable using rhetorical technique, here *captatio benevolentiae*, i.e. the polite 'by your permission' and the lamentations of how 'our Stoics' (whose company includes Seneca) were compelled to coin new words to discuss Greek philosophical terms as a means of justification for the novel term he is about to use in discussing the notion of 'desirability'.

2.3. CONCLUSIONS

That Seneca was innovative in Latin when it came to his literary compositions cannot be denied, and the work done by BOURGERY and INWOOD has certainly established this as a legitimate observation already. However, a closer study of Seneca's glosses of Greek philosophical terms, either of natural philosophy, metaphysics, or ethics, reveals a conservative approach in Seneca's contributions to Latin philosophical vocabulary despite an overt acknowledgement of the *egestas* trope in Latin when it came to philosophical vocabulary. Especially when considered in contrast to Cicero, Seneca was more likely to rely on established terms, circumlocutions, or simply to transfer the Greek as a loan-word, as opposed to trying his hand at fashioning a Latin equivalent for his readers. Yet like Cicero, Seneca resorted to rhetorical stratagems such as *praeteritio*, notably in his letters to Lucilius, to rely on rare or coined words of his predecessors (e.g. *essentia*). The justification for such hesitancy in Seneca seems to be that he rarely engaged in re-interpreting the Greek term (and

concept) in Latin, but rather aimed to remain as close as possible, both semantically and formally, to the original. As a result, we have no real genuine lexical innovations in Seneca's philosophical vocabulary. Nonetheless, his discursive comments on the translation and interpretation of Greek terms in Latin are of considerable interest to this study.

3. CHAPTER THREE:

APULEIUS' LEXICAL INNOVATION AND LITERARY PHILOSOPHY

‘[T]here are words unusual to Romans, and, as far as I know, up until now, non-existent, that my studious labours have produced from the Greek language, as if I have minted Latin coins’ (nomina etiam Romanis inusitata et in hodiernum quod sciam infecta; ea tamen nomina labore meo et studio ita de Graecis provenire, ut tamen Latina moneta percussa sint.)

— Apuleius, *Pro Se de Magia (Apologia)* 38.5

3.1. APULEIUS' IN CONTEXT

The extent to which Lucius Apuleius Madaurensis' (c. 125-c. 170 AD) translations of Greek philosophical concepts reshaped Platonic and Aristotelian thought in Imperial era Latin is the next stage of inquiry in this thesis. In particular, I examine the techniques Apuleius deployed to Latinise Middle Platonic concepts using literary and rhetorical techniques. The latter informs the former to some extent in that, if Apuleius' practices of lexical innovation were extensive and if these practices re-interpreted the Greek sources into original literary creations, there will be evidence of a continuity between the practices of Lucretius and Cicero up to the second century AD. This practice, as has been so far discussed, involved Roman authors' transformations of Greek philosophical terms. As in Chapter One, this requires a collation of lexical data sourced from the author's philosophical treatises and translations where the process of re-interpreting Greek philosophy can be directly observed.

It is noteworthy at this early stage that Apuleius is the first of the authors studied here not to be based in or around Rome itself, but rather an inhabitant of a *colonia* in North Africa. Seneca the Younger was born in Cordoba, but raised in Rome for most of his life. Apuleius, though educated in Rome and Athens briefly, did not remain there, but returned to Numidia and travelled extensively.¹ As will be seen, the tradition of Latin philosophy, specifically those who contributed to the development of its philosophical vocabulary, changes geographically after Apuleius with the reception of classical philosophy into early Christianity. Those thinkers who greatly influenced Latin philosophical vocabulary in the first few centuries (c. first to fourth centuries AD), such as Tertullian, Lactantius, Augustine, and Marius Victorinus were all non-Romans proper (Carthaginian, Numidian, Numidian, and Gallic respectively). This alone is not a significant fact, but it does indicate that the tradition went beyond the confines of the Italian peninsula itself and began to manifest itself in the distant reaches of the

¹ For evidence of Apuleius' education in Carthage, Athens, and Rome and wider travels to Asia Minor, see KOOTEN (2003), 50 (esp. n. 125).

empire, in different socio-linguistic and intellectual environments.² Despite this, the appeal to the authority of Classical era authors such as Lucretius and Cicero becomes abundantly manifest and many of the approaches towards lexical innovation, pioneered by these earlier writers re-interpreting Greek thought, became quasi-shibboleths in the philosophical projects of Latin-speaking authors writing outside of Rome.

3.2. APULEIUS' APPROACH TO LEXICAL INNOVATION

In the *Apologia* (*Apol.* 38.5), we find an expression of Apuleius' own practice of lexical innovations:

In [my works] you will notice [...] that there are words unusual to Romans, and, as far as I know, up until now, non-existent, that my studious labours have produced from the Greek language, as if I have minted Latin coins.³

The *egestas* trope of Lucretius, Cicero, Quintilian, and Seneca, is also found in *De Platone et Eius Dogmate* (*Pl.*), here with the explicitly Ciceronian invocation of a *captatio benevolentiae*: 'For indulgence may be given to the novelty of my words in serving the obscurity of these matters.'⁴ We have here a continuous tradition of a very specific kind, one which recognises the need for new terms in the Latin philosophical lexicon, but whose cause is the apparent 'obscurity' of the original Greek terms which require discussion in Latin. There is a further question here as to what Apuleius actually meant by his *moneta percussa sint* metaphor: either it is the creation of new terms ex nihilo or it is the imprinting of new

² As MORESCHINI (2005), 485 notes, the societal makeup of North African colonies, particularly Carthage, was more civilised than many of the others of the Roman Empire, renowned for its prosperity. Its flourishing Christian intellectual culture towards the end of the second century AD included the study of not only the Latin language, but Greek as well.

³ *Apol.* 38.5: *in quibus animadvertes [...] nomina etiam Romanis inusitata et in hodiernum quod sciam infecta; ea tamen nomina labore meo et studio ita de Graecis provenire, ut tamen Latina moneta percussa sint.*

⁴ *Pl.* 9.200: [...] *detur enim venia novitati verborum, rerum obscuritatibus servienti.*

forms on existing material, as in the actual process of how coins were minted.⁵ In Quintilian (*Inst.* 1.6.3), the metaphor appears as a didactic tool for orators in the usage (*consuetudo*) of language: *utendumque plane sermone ut nummo, cui publica forma est* ‘and clearly we ought to use language as currency, upon which is the public stamp’. Here, Quintilian is treating the *sermo* as a public good, to be used in a way which is usual and customary (*consuetudo*). Quintilian’s sentiment would also be repeated by Fortunatus (*Ars. Rhet.* 122.9-10: *vir perfectissimus dixit: Verbis utendum est ut nummis publica moneta signatis*). By contrast, in Horace (*AP.* 59) we find: *licuit semperque licebit signatum praesente nota producere nomen* ‘It has been, and always will be, permitted to produce a word marked with a present-day seal.’⁶ Also in Juvenal (7.53-5): *sed vatem egregium, cui non sit publica vena, qui nihil expositum soleat deducere, nec qui communi feriat carmen triviale moneta* ‘but the excellent bard, with whom there is no common genius, who usually spins out nothing vulgar, who does not stamp a trivial song on public money.’ The most revealing is in a letter by Fronto to Antoninus Augustus (136.9f): *in primis oratori cavendum ne quod novum verbum ut aes adulterinum percutiat, ut unum et id verbum vetustate noscatur et novitate delecte* ‘first of all a speaker must be beware that she does not coin a new word like debased bronze, so that one word and precisely one word may be both known by its old age and please by its novelty.’ He later presses this point using an extended metaphor of words as coinage:

Be a follower of that old money. Lead coins and adulterated metal of every kind are more often found in recent money than in older coinage, which is stamped with the names of Perperna, manufactured by a pristine art. What then? Should I not prefer a coin of Antoninus or Commodus or Pius for myself? Those are stained and contaminated and discoloured and spotted, more spotted than a nurse’s apron. May each pipe of your flute resound loudly, if possible, so that you may render your

⁵ For the process of minting coins in Roman times, see ADKINS AND ADKINS (2014), 344: ‘Later coins were made as blanks that were originally cast in open molds, although they may have been cast on flat surfaces. The blanks or flans were then stamped with a pair of dies — the lower die for the obverse and upper die for the reverse [...] The face of the die had a design engraved in intaglio, so that it appeared in relief on the coins. A heated blank was taken with tongs from the furnace and positioned on the lower die (pile), which was usually placed on an anvil. The upper die (trussel) was held over the blank and struck with a hammer [...]’

⁶ See discussion in BRINK (1971), 146.

language more vociferously rather than more monotonously; you may seek some word, not one coined outright (for that, indeed, is absurd) but used more elegantly or more aptly or more happily.⁷

Fronto's exhortations to look back upon the pristine coins (sc. vocabulary) of the past are a warning against lexical innovation in general (arguing that the creation of new words is absurd). The linkage between the metaphorical use of minting words as if coins in Apuleius and other authors is therefore within a specific tradition of rhetoric, perhaps beginning with Quintilian, warning against rhetoricians and writers resorting to neology. Apuleius, however, like Horace to some extent, is prouder of minting new words when adapting Greek concepts into Latin, seeing it as an achievement rather than a vice.⁸

The following chapter examines two of Apuleius' philosophical works to varying levels of linguistic detail: *De Mundo* and *De Platone et Eius Dogmate*.

3.3. *DE MUNDO* — A CASE STUDY OF APULEIAN TRANSLATION AND LEXICAL INNOVATION

In contrast to the freer and more creative composition in philosophical works like the *De Deo Socratis* where very few technical terms are subjected to Apuleian translation in Latin, the translation of the pseudo-Aristotelian⁹ *Περὶ Κόσμου* is a seminal text in which to analyse Apuleius' translation techniques and his specific approaches to lexical innovation in some detail. The Greek original was subject to multiple translations in antiquity and complete versions of it also existed in Syriac and Arabic, as well as two Armenian translations.¹⁰ The issue of authenticity has dogged much of the discussion about the nature of the *De Mundo*

⁷ Front. 136.9f (following HOUT (1999, 377-81)): *monetam illam veterem sectator. plumbei nummi et cuiuscemodi adulterini in istis recentibus nummis saepius inveniuntur quam in vetustis, quibus signatus est Perperna arte factis pristina [...] quid igitur? non malim mihi nummum Antonini <aut Commodi> aut Pii? polluta <ista> et contaminata et varia et maculosa maculosioraque quam nutricis pallium! omnis personet tibia sonora, si possit, ut hebetatiorem linguam sonantior reddas. verbum aliquod adquires non fictum aperte (nam id quidem absurdum est), sed usurpatum concinnius aut congruentius aut accommodatius.*

⁸ See also the discussion in HIJMAN (1994), 1745-6.

⁹ That Apuleius himself regarded the Greek original to be non-Aristotelian has been argued by scholars e.g. see HIJMAN (1987), 429 and THOM (2014), 4.

¹⁰ LORIMER (1933); GOTTSCHALK (1987), 1132

(*Mun.*) in Apuleius' corpus. PURSER argued that it was an Apuleian work of his later period, due to the general 'lack of grasp' of the Greek original which suggested it could not have been done in the same period of, or shortly after, his education in Athens earlier in life.¹¹ HARRISON concludes that the work is 'typically Apuleian'.¹² I intend to proceed on the basis that the translation is an authentic one. This assumption stems from the weight of textual criticism regarding the authenticity issue¹³ so far and the common attribution of authorship to Apuleius as early as the fifth century (for instance by Augustine, who had significant knowledge of Apuleius and his works, and Servius).¹⁴

The translation itself covers the sections of the *Περὶ Κόσμου* from 391a1 to 401b29 and is neither literal nor simply a reproduction either. MÜLLER's study of the relationship between the Greek original and the Latin argued that Apuleius' version was neither a 'translation' nor a paraphrase as we understand it today, but a work intended to stand on its own literary merit, pointing out that only 9 sentences are literally translated from the Greek in the entire text.¹⁵ So CONTE notes: 'The effort to introduce into Latin the technical-specialist language of the natural sciences, an effort that is shared by the other [Apuleian] philosophical works, is particularly evidenced here.'¹⁶ BEAUJEU suggested the *De Mundo* is a complete, but not a literal, translation.¹⁷ REGEN likewise concluded that it is a work of more than mere translation, but philosophical re-interpretation.¹⁸ Scholars have variously referred to it as 'free translation' or 'adaptation'¹⁹ of the original Greek work. Importantly, these rather cursory summaries of Apuleius' project here (or more precisely, the results of it) indicate something more complex: a linguistic (and thus conceptual) renovation of Greek thought through a Latin

¹¹ PURSER (1911), 250-1.

¹² HARRISON (2000), 181; see also FOWLER (2016), 136 n. 6. See REGEN (1971), 24 n. 79 for a brief survey of scholars sceptical of Apuleius' authorship of the work.

¹³ See also LORIMER (1924), 20. See also KOOTEN (2003), 50 n. 124; BEAUJEU (1973), ix-xxix.

¹⁴ See HARRISON (2000), 175 for an overview, although as he notes that attribution by such authorities is not proof of any kind of authorship, so discounting an Apuleian *PH* despite Cassiodorus' attribution. See also REDFORS (1960), 114-5 for arguments for and against the attribution of both the *Mun.* and *Pl.* to Apuleius (in any case, he sees both works as 'undoubtedly' composed by the same author).

¹⁵ See MÜLLER (1939), 5; HJIMANS (1987), 428: 'Apuleius appears to make a strenuous effort to claim the work as his own.'

¹⁶ CONTE (1987/1994), 555; see also MÜLLER (1939), 131.

¹⁷ BEAUJEU (1973), 113.

¹⁸ REGEN (1971), 24.

¹⁹ See e.g. MÜLLER (1939), 130f; BEAUJEU (1973), 309; HARRISON (2000), 174.

lens. For our purposes, this translation is, therefore, an important parallel to the translations of Greek philosophy undertaken by Cicero, who had less of an interest in faithfully reproducing his Greek sources. The opening of the *Mun.* begins with an allusion to the familiar prefaces of Cicero's philosophical works (*praef.* 285):²⁰ 'In the course of reflection and a most attentive examination, Faustinus, my son, often Philosophia seems to me the Investigatrix of Virtue and the Terminatrix of Vices, who shares in divine things' (*consideranti mihi et diligentius intuenti et saepe alias, Faustine fili, virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum, divinarum particeps rerum philosophia videbatur*).²¹ There are also echoes of Lucretius in *praef.* 287, with the image of Philosophy entering the heavens (1.73),²² and the combination of these allusions firmly locate Apuleius' translation as creative work of Latin literature in the tradition of his Classical Latin forefathers, rather than a mere didactic exercise for the benefit of uninitiated Latin speakers. The personal interventions on the part of the author and the numerous glosses of Greek terms are both, according to HARRISON, 'characteristic features' of Apuleian translation.²³ In studying this particular text, I want to examine in detail the lexical innovations and augmentations appearing in the translation, highlight the techniques Apuleius favours, and compare these with the earlier authors in this study. I have compiled these lemma in **Appendix II**. The Latin text to which I make reference hereafter is based on the edition of BEAUJEU's (1973), with some emendations. In pinpointing purported Apuleian lexical innovations and augmentations within the work, I have used a combination of manual examination supplemented by older works whose focus was on the literary and translation style of Apuleius but whose word-lists and indices are invaluable to a study of this kind: KOZIOL (1872), BERNHARD (1927),²⁴ MÜLLER (1939), REDFORS (1960, 51), and BALDASSARI (1986).

²⁰ Numbering follows BEAUJEU's edition.

²¹ Compare Cicero's *Orat.* 1.1: *cogitanti mihi saepe numero et memoria vetera repenti* [...] *Quinte frater* and *Off.* 1.1: *Marce fili*.

²² See HARRISON (2000), 185.

²³ HARRISON (2000), 188.

²⁴ KOZIOL (1872), 249-309 and BERNHARD (1927), 337. Note that the latter's list is largely incomplete and occasionally erroneous, e.g. listing *graveolens* (from Vergil) as a 'neubildung'. Similarly, KOZIOL's is extensive but also prone to minor errors, e.g. classifying *inreligiosus* as a neologism (1872, 270) despite being well attested in both Livy, Pliny the Younger, and Tacitus. Similarly, *globosus* (1872, 289) appears much earlier in Lucretius and Cicero (see discussion on *globus* in Lucretius in the Introduction).

3.4. LEXICAL COMMENTARY: PARTICULAR LINGUISTIC FEATURES OF THE *DE MUNDO**Preface and Discussion of the Heavens (285 – 295)*

The preface of the *Mun.* is mostly faithful to the original Greek with some minor differences. The addressee now becomes his son Faustinus rather than the Ἀλέξανδρος of the Greek.²⁵ FLETCHER argues that Apuleius' address to his son here, and in the second book of *De Platone*, reveals an explicit protreptic: '[I]t states, proves and convinces someone to adopt the philosophy'.²⁶ Almost immediately, Apuleius invokes the precedent of lexical innovation in Latin set by Cicero by using *indagatrix* and *expultrix* (*Tusc.* 5.5) to refer to 'Philosophia'. There are no equivalents such as these in the Greek and the prosopopoeia of Philosophy as a sort of divine goddess who allows mortals to penetrate the obscurity of the Universe and to understand natural phenomena is unique to Apuleius. The uses of *-trix* substantives with genitives (here *virtutis* and *vitiorum*), anaphora, and as epithets, are common phenomena within Latin (especially Late Latin) authors.²⁷ In a more metatextual way, the dual personification of Philosophy using the two unusual terms *indagatrix* and *expultrix* endows the work with a feeling of novelty. Apuleius' 'translation' starts to take on its own novel character, foreshadowed by the use of new and unusual Latin terms. In this way, Apuleius is doing two things: 1) deploying a type of inverse *captatio benevolentiae*, throwing the reader headlong into a strange linguistic experience though based upon a familiar subject matter: the natural phenomena of the Universe, and 2) by invoking the lines of Cicero from the *Tusc.*, he is placing himself directly within the same tradition as these philosophical pioneers in Latin.

Apuleius' reference to both Aristotle and Theophrastus (*prudentissimum et doctissimum philosophorum*) as sources of the work has elicited debate among Apuleian

²⁵ Presumably the pseudo-Aristotelian author saw this as 'Alexander the Great', the famous pupil of the philosopher (referring to him as the ἡγεμόνων ἀρίστω 'best of princes' at 391b6-7), see FORSTER AND FURLEY (1955), 338; BEAUJEU (1973), 310.

²⁶ FLETCHER (2014), 96.

²⁷ See e.g. anaphora in Pl. *Most.* 203; with genitives in Cic. *Clu.* 14; and as epithets in Cic. *Top.* 95. Further SERBAT (1995); MAGNI (2016), 105. See also HOFMANN-SZANTYR, 157-8: 'Im Spätlatein nehmen diese adjektivierten *-tor*-Bildungen namentlich in der volkstümlichen und Übersetzungsliteratur überhand'. LEUMANN (1977), 376-7.

scholars; namely, that the author might have been at least aware that his source text was, perhaps, not something authentically Aristotelian.²⁸ The first gloss we meet in the preface renders a Greek word that does not appear in the source text. The line translated seems to be 391b13: ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν μέσον, ἀκίνητόν τε καὶ ἐδραῖον ὄν ‘then the centre of this [the cosmos], being unmoved and fixed’, which Apuleius translates as *cuius cardinem — sic enim dixerim κέντρον — robustum et immobilem*. It is unclear why κέντρον and not μέσον is singled out. HARRISON suggests this is could be a correction of some kind.²⁹ Apuleius uses *cardo* (‘the pivots or poles on which the Universe was supposed to rotate about the earth’),³⁰ which Cicero also used to translate Aratus’ ἄξων (*N.D.* 2.105: *extremusque adea duplici de cardine vertex dicitur esse Polus* (Arat. 22-4: ἀλλὰ μάλ’ αὖτως ἄξων αἰὲν ἄρηρεν [...] καὶ μιν πειραίνουσι δὺν πόλοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν). The term appears in Plato’s *Ti.* (54e) and Aristotle’s *APr.* (41b15) with the technical geometric sense of the ‘centre of a circle’ (LSJ s.v. κέντρον⁶) but the Pseudo-Aristotelian author did not use this in the present section. The double translation *genetrix atque altrix* (I.290) for μήτηρ and ἐστία (391b14) is interesting given Cicero had used the latter in a similar context in translating τροφός in Plato’s *Ti.*³¹ In *universitas* we find the same unique sense as used in Cicero’s *Timaeus* (and in Pliny *Nat.* 2.11): ‘The sum of things, the universe’ (*OLD* s.v. *universitas*, 1c).³² The verb *intimo*, also used in Apuleius’ *Pl.* 2.222, does not appear earlier and seems to have the sense here of ‘to make familiar (with),’ (*OLD* s.v.) or ‘have a share in’, which echoes the term in the original: μεταδίδωμι ‘give part of, give a share’ (LSJ s.v.). Similarly, *supernus* is used in a novel sense to mean ‘situated on the surface or upper side’ (*OLD* s.v.) referring to the surface of the earth, and the noun *liquiditas* could be a lexical innovation in the productive *-tas* suffix. This section has no equivalent in the Greek and appears to be a creative addition by Apuleius.

²⁸ See MÜLLER (1939), 112; HIJMANS (1987), 429; THOM (2014), 4. Whether Apuleius was translating from a Greek original or another Latin version is highly speculative and I leave the question open here.

²⁹ HARRISON (2000), 188.

³⁰ *OLD* s.v. *cardo*, 3.

³¹ Also *artifex* in I.291: *ut in tornando artifex solet forcipe materiam comprehensam reciproco volumine rotundare*; cf. *Timaeus*, 6: *atqui si pulcher est hic mundus et si probus eius artifex, profecto*.

³² We know that Apuleius was familiar with Plato’s *Ti.* from the *Apol.* 49 (see e.g. REDFORS (1960), 19), however whether he had access to Cicero’s translation of it is uncertain. See also HIJMANS (1987), 417 n. 86.


In I.291, we have a shift in the use of analogies from the Greek into the Latin. In the Greek, the analogy focuses on a ball rotating itself in a lathe (391b23-4: *καθάπερ τῆς ἐν τόρῳ κυκλοφορουμένης σφαίρας*) to explain the rotation of the heavens. However, Apuleius introduces the *artifex* as the agent of the analogy, who turns the sphere of the heavens as if with a pair of forceps or pliers (*ut in tornando artifex solet forcipe materiam comprehensam reciproco volumine rotundare*).³³ This tendency towards concretising and anthropomorphising the creation narrative to a more explicit extent than the Greek original has been previously observed in Cicero's rendition of the Timaeus creation narrative. We also come across two glosses in this section: *eos polos dicimus, a quibus, veluti a cardinibus, directio quaedam profecta axis est dictus* 'we call these [sc. points] *poles* (*polos*); and the certain straight line that emerges, just as from pivots (*cardinibus*), is called the *axis*'. Both *polus* and *axis* are Greek loan-words, but it is important to contextualise them:

Yet although the whole sky is turned like a sphere, it must nevertheless be held by **roots** (*radicibus*) that a divine mechanism has fixed at **vertices** (*vertices*) [...] We call these points 'poles' (*polos*); the straight line that emerges from it, like from **pivots** (*cardinibus*), is called the 'axis' (*axis*): the boundary and divider of the Universe, in the middle of which it holds the terrestrial globe fixed. As for these **vertices**, which we said were immobile [...]³⁴

Apuleius' use of *radices* and his reprise of the *cardines* are both used as supplements to clarify the sense of the Greek *polos* and their *axis*. A few lines later, Apuleius abandons the use of the Greek *polus* entirely and opts to stick with the Latin *vertices*. This expansion of the original serves a dual purpose, both interpretive as well as a creative literary expansion:

³³ See LEHOUX (2018), 428-9 for further discussion on the differences in the uses of these analogies. This specific analogy also recalls Vitruvius (9.1.2) as noted by BEAUJEU (1973), 311.

³⁴ *Mun.* I.291: *sed cum omne caelum ita revolvatur ut sphaera, eam tamen radicibus oportet teneri, quas divina machinatio verticibus adfixit [...] eos polos dicimus, a quibus, veluti a cardinibus, directio quaedam profecta axis est dictus, divisor et distinator mundi, orbem terrae in medietate constituens. verum hi vertices, quos immobiles diximus.*



As we have seen earlier in Cicero (e.g. in *Tusc.* 3.16 rendering σωφροσύνη), the hermeneutical approach to translation, using an interpretative circle of established synonyms (in conjunction with metaphor and simile: *radicibus*; *veulti a cardinibus*) in Latin to provide the reader a clearer understanding of the technical concept under discussion is also at work in Apuleius' term-formation. This synonymy allows Apuleius to demonstrate his literary prowess by deploying a type of *variatio*, emphasising literary creativity as well as an understanding of the concepts under examination.³⁵

The deverbative *-tor* agent nouns in I.291: *divisor et disterninator mundi* (translating the Greek διάμετρος τοῦ κόσμου (292a-2)) form a double translation of the type *established term* + *lexical innovation* with *disterninator* being first attested here (cf. the lexical augmentation *disternino* in *Soc.* 8). The use of the double translation, with one established and one coined noun (*divisor* and *disterninator* respectively) to translate the single Greek technical term διάμετρος, as we have seen, is also a Ciceronian technique. However, there is a difference. Whereas Cicero often issues a rhetorical apology or excessive politeness when introducing new terms, Apuleius is content to, 'sneak them in unnoticed by appending them to an already established Latin word', as RAMSAY observed.³⁶ This indicates that Apuleius was perhaps less cautious in using his own terms, but it also creates a false dichotomy. Both Cicero and Apuleius introduced a large portion of new Latin philosophical vocabulary (the latter's less influential than the former), and both were rhetoricians before philosophers.

³⁵ See e.g. REDFORS (1960), 49: '*Variatio sermonis* ist das leitende Stilprinzip in [the *Mun.*]', and 53. See also BERNHARD (1927), 330.

³⁶ RAMSAY (2017), 48.

However, to say Cicero was more adept at giving his reader the impression he was generally reticent to introduce new terms, (despite doing so anyway, and on a larger scale than Apuleius no less), is simply to observe that he took more rhetorical measures than Apuleius to cloak his innovations in politeness in an attempt to reduce their strangeness to his audience.

The adjective *interminus* in I.290: *agens et stellarum choros intermino lapsu* is a lexical innovation (*OLD* s.v.) and translates the Greek phrase (391b19) ἀπαύστως δι' αἰῶνος 'unceasingly through all time'. It also appears later calquing the Greek ἀτέρμονος (XXXVII.370 referring to Saturn): *interminum ad finem tempus appellant* (διήκων ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέρμονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα (401a17)). MÜLLER's observations on this section are salient. He suggests that the mathematical exposition and technicality of the source text are largely shunned by Apuleius, who is more interested in literary creativity: 'Diese mathematische Genauigkeit ist nicht für Apuleius, er verwendet mehr Mühe darauf, mit 'determinator' eine eigene Neubildung anzubringen.'³⁷

There are some terms in the final paragraph of the opening section (I.291) which indicate Apuleius perhaps had access to some source material from Varro, specifically the form *caeligenus*: *L. 5.62: utrique testis poesis, quod et Victoria et Venus dicitur caeligena*. The term might have been unique to Varro,³⁸ and the naturalised *antarcticus* (appearing in the Greek in *L. 9.24: ab eo quem ἀνταρκτικὸν vocant astrologi et is a brumali?*), is also found in Hyginus.³⁹ The lexical innovation *inerrabilis* 'not liable to wander, having a constant motion' (*OLD* s.v.) translates the Greek adjective ἀπλανής (392a23) 'not wandering, steady, fixed' (*LSJ* s.v.) and is composed of the common *-bilis* suffix, with the negative *in-* prefix (cf.

³⁷ MÜLLER (1939), 116. However, he refrains from claiming that Apuleius has no mathematical understanding whatsoever by citing sections reproduced by Apuleius from the *Timaeus* in the *Pl.* (1939, 117). MÜLLER may be giving too much credit here (a common mercy in his work, see LORIMER's criticisms in (1940), 171), since, as we will see later, there are further lapses in Apuleius' understanding in his *Pl.* work when rendering Greek geometrical vocabulary into Latin.

³⁸ Depending on how we read *dicitur*, this could be a quotation and so not first in Varro at all: 'because it is said: "both heaven-born Victoria and Venus"' or 'because it is said both Victoria and Venus [are] heaven-born.' See also DE MELO (2019), 2.699: 'Apuleius may have got it from here [sc. Varro] or formed it afresh.'

³⁹ *Astr. 1.6: sic in sphaera metiuntur, initio sumpto a polo qui boreus appellatur, ad eum qui notius et antarcticus vocatur*. Also later in Martianus Capella, see *TLL* s.v. MÜLLER (1939), 149 suggested another parallel to Varro, found later in XIX.332: *cum menstruus cursibus lunae detrimenta* echoing *R. 1.5.4: menstruus cursus lunae*, although such lunar phraseology is very common: see e.g. Cicero *N.D.* 2.50; Catullus 34.16-17; and Manilius 3.517.

Cicero's *indissolubilis* for Plato's ἄλυτος in *Timaeus*, 40).⁴⁰ The Greek notion of ζῳοφόρος κύκλος 'animal-bearing circle, circle of the zodiac' = ὁ ζῳδιακός, is rendered by *circulus signifer* 'starry circle'.⁴¹ The mathematical term ἐγκάρσιος 'oblique' is rendered with *obliquus*, later translating περιφερής (396b26) in XXI.336 (see discussion below on this section). As MÜLLER observed,⁴² the mathematical precision of this section is largely avoided and technical discussions in the original of the position of the zodiac passing through the centre of the fixed stars is replaced with an image of 'encirclement': *ambit* and *complexione circumdatus*. This leads to a misinterpretation of the cosmology so that, whereas in the Greek the circle of the zodiac is centred within the fixed stars, in the Latin the circle 'surrounds' (*ambit*) the fixed stars:

τῶν γε μὴν ἐμπεριεχομένων ἄστρον τὰ μὲν ἀπλανῇ τῷ σύμπαντι οὐρανῷ συμπεριστρέφεται, τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχοντα ἔδρας, ὧν μέσος ὁ ζῳοφόρος καλούμενος κύκλος ἐγκάρσιος διὰ τῶν τροπικῶν διέζωσται.⁴³

*iam astrorum innumerabilis multitudo partim labitur cum orbis inerrantis regione, quam circulus ambit signifer, obliqua complexione circumdatus.*⁴⁴

The astrological names in 392a25f (II.293) are Latinised to provide another distinctly Roman context. This practice, observed previously in Cicero's *Timaeus* translation, is a clue as to what, as HARRISON describes it: 'is not unthinking linguistic transposition, but an active and engaged literary adaptation of the original for which accurate rendition is not the first

⁴⁰ Cf. also Apuleius' use of *inerrans* (*Mun.* XXIX. 355) applied to the stars as in Cicero's *N.D.* 2.54. Note also there is no attested form of **errabilis*, a phenomenon not uncommon in Latin; see e.g. LEUMANN (1977), 348 for the usage of the negative prefix *in-* with the *-bilis* suffix: 'Oft ist die negierte Form die wichtigere'.

⁴¹ See REDFORS (1960), 69 who notes a similarity to Cicero's *Arat.* (317-8), who rendered ὁ ζῳδιακός with *signifer orbis*. See also *Met.* 11.26: *signifero circulo*.

⁴² MÜLLER (1939), 114.

⁴³ 392a10-13: 'Then of those stars encompassed within it [the ether], there are fixed ones that revolve in concert with all the heaven, these keep the same position; in the middle of these is the so-called circle of the zodiac (ζῳοφόρος), set obliquely through the tropics'.

⁴⁴ II.291-2: 'Now of the innumerable multitude of stars, some are moved along with the inerrant domain of the sphere, a domain that the zodiac surrounds with its obliquely arranged circle'.

priority.⁴⁵ So Apuleius glosses the ‘globe of Phaenon’, Κρόνος, with Saturn, the ‘globe of Phaethon’, Διὸς, with Jupiter, the ‘globe of Pyroeis’, Ἄρεος, with Mars, Stilbon (Ἑρμος) with Mercury, and Phosphoros (Ἀφροδίτη) with Venus. The astrological terms in 392b4-5 of the Greek (*quas Graeci cometas et docidas et bothynos appellant*) are not rendered in Latin but are glossed with a periphrastic description: *se iaculari atque emicare et scintillare flammae quaedam ostensae oculis nostris videntur* ‘some kinds of flaming phenomena appear to our eyes as a springing up, leaping forth, and a sparkling’. The Greek word *cometas* had been naturalised into Latin to *cometes*, found earlier in Cicero (*N.D.* 2.14 and *Div.* 1.18). The vivid Greek description of the lower ether as φθαρτή ‘destructible’ and ἐπίκηρος ‘liable to death’ (392a35) are both conflated into *vitiabilis* ‘liable to damage’ (*OLD* s.v.), another lexical innovation in the productive *-bilis* suffix. Note that Apuleius imbues the cosmology here with an Epicurean tone, altering the Greek original so that the regular orbits of the stars (392a30-1: ὁ δὲ αἰθήρ τά τε θεῖα ἐμπεριέχει σώματα καὶ τὴν τῆς κινήσεως τάξιν) are substituted with a ‘feeding’: *quae divinas et immortales vivacitates ignium pascens*, reminiscent of Lucretius’ *aether sidera pascit* (1.214; 5.525).

In III.295, Apuleius’ literary abilities become further pronounced, whilst also revealing a textual issue in the Greek. The phrase ἐν δὲ τούτῳ (sc. ὁ αἶθρ) [...] νέφη τε συνίστανται καὶ ὄμβροι καταράσσουσι (392b10) ‘so in this air [...] clouds condense themselves together and heavy rains fall down’ is adapted into *et* (sc. *inferior aer*) *in nubes cogitur et reciprocis flabris aperitur et nimbis vehementibus rumpitur* ‘it (the lower atmosphere) is also condensed into clouds and opened up by the receding winds and is ruptured by violent rain storms.’ The Bekker edition prints *συνίστανται* ‘they condense,’ presumably referring to the νέφη but there is a manuscript variant (which the Loeb follows) in the singular (*συνίσταται*), thus ‘it (the lower atmosphere) is condensed into clouds and heavy rains fall down.’ This corresponds to the Latin translation (*cogitur*) more accurately. The verb *rumpo* is particularly vivid and frequently found in poets (especially in Vergil and Ovid). The crescendo of the section comes in the next few lines: *nivibus etiam et glacie inhorrescit et praecipiti grandine desuper verberatur; turbinum flatibus typhonumque conflictu fit procellosa, sed telis fulminum et missilium caelestium iaculis ignescit*. The Greek is almost as descriptive but less dynamic:

⁴⁵ HARRISON (2000), 188.

χιόνες τε καὶ πάχναι καὶ χάλαζαι πνοαί τε ἀνέμων καὶ τυφώνων, ἔτι τε βρονταὶ καὶ ἀστραπαὶ καὶ πτώσεις κεραυνῶν μυρίων τε γνόφων συμπληγάδες. The literary comparison reinforces HARRISON's observations noted above and underscores the fact that Apuleius is adapting and creating rather than translating mechanically from his Greek source.

Geography and Climate Exposition (296 – 309)

In this section of the translation, we find significant alterations to the Greek, which transforms the Latin translation into a true Middle Platonic text. Section V.297 (393a5-6) includes some additions to the original: *superna quapropter dii superi sedes habent, infima ceterorum animantium terrena possident genera, per quae serpunt et erumpunt* (καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνω πᾶν θεῶν ἀπέδειξεν οἰκητήριον, τὸ κάτω δὲ ἐφημέρων ζώων). There is significant expansion and a change in the cosmology of the original, with the following alterations:

1. Apuleius substitutes or adds the notion of gravity (*gravioribus leviora*) as a principle of the location of the elements;
2. He then introduces the notion of affinity and even filiation (*affinitas, coniuges copulae*) between the elements, whereas the Greek speaks only of the elements 'embracing' or interlocking (περιέχω);
3. He places water within the earth, instead of representing the earth enveloped by the 'wetness', as in the Greek; and
4. He adds to the chain of five elements a sixth: God (*inmortalis dei*).⁴⁶

He consequently gives a distinct Stoic interpretation to the cosmological exposition, i.e. the distribution of the elements according to their weight (emphasised by Zeno, see e.g. Cic. *N.D.* 2.115f), and their stepwise transmutation from the earth to the celestial fire, are all

⁴⁶ See also BEAUJEU (1973), 313-15.

commonplaces of Stoic physics. God as the source of life (*vivacitas*) also recalls the *vis vitalis* (ζωτική δύναμις),⁴⁷ which Cicero's Stoic character Balbus discussed in *N.D.* 2.24. The distinction between the principle of fire and ether and the stars that it inflames also resembles the supreme Being of Stoicism, at once immanent and transcendent to the world, which it imbues and animates by a diffusion of ethereal πνεύματα, and which will one day be re-absorbed into its pure eternal substance. Finally, by making God a sixth link in the chain of elements, closely associated with the ether — but distinct from it — Apuleius underlines its transcendence and accentuates the tendency marked in the Greek to deviate from Stoic monism and to move closer to the Platonic 'dualism' between God and the Soul of the Universe (see, for instance, Plato's *Timaeus* and Cic. *N.D.* 2.81-97).⁴⁸ The Romanisation process in this section becomes more evident with the exposition of the geography of the Mediterranean Sea (393a27f = VI.300). So Γαλατικός becomes *Gallicus* 'belonging to the Galatians' even though *Galaticus* had been used by Pliny (*HN* 21.160). The Aegean and Myrtoan seas of the south-west Aegean are seen before the eastern seas of Pamphylia, Assyria, and Egypt (*his iungitur Siculum et post Creticum, eo indiscretis finibus Pamphylium, Assyrium, Aegyptium. sed ante Aegaea <et> Myrtoa sunt maria*) compared with the Greek (393a30-2): συνεχές δὲ αὐτοῦ, τῇ μὲν τὸ Αἰγύπτιον τε καὶ Παμφύλιον καὶ Σύριον, τῇ δὲ τὸ Αἰγαῖον τε καὶ Μυρτώον 'contiguous with this on one side are the Egyptian, Pamphylian, and Syrian seas, then on the other both the Aegean and Myrtoan.' We might interpret the vista described in the Latin as unfolding from a markedly Roman perspective.⁴⁹ This adds another Roman dimension to the translation; not merely linguistic but spatial too. Also of note is the affixation *circumvehor*, a lexical augmentation of an existing verb here used by Apuleius in the sense of '(of the sea) to flow around' (*OLD* s.v., 3) translating the Greek verb περιρρέω.

At VIII.305, Apuleius uses another *-bilis* derivative in the phrase *tenues et frequentes vixque visibilis* 'scarcely visible' to convey ἀόρατοι παντάπασιν 'entirely invisible', the Latin not as forceful as the Greek but, perhaps, due to prosodic considerations more than semantic

⁴⁷ The phrase ζωτική δύναμις that BEAUJEU (1973, 314) cites is of Stoic origin but its first instance is in Diodoros Siculus (*Hist.* 2.51) whose the source is supposed to be Posidonius. Philo and Clement of Alexandria also later use the phrase in a more technical sense.

⁴⁸ BEAUJEU (1973), 314-15.

⁴⁹ HARRISON (2000), 189; BEAUJEU (1973), 317 who also cites Apuleius' ignorance of geography as a possible reason for the misdescription of the original Greek geography.

ones. The word *visibilis* had been used in Pliny (*Nat.* 11.146) in the sense of ‘capable of seeing’ but here, as in *Soc.* 2, Apuleius uses it with the passive sense of ‘capable of being seen, visible’ (*OLD* s.v. *visibilis*, 2). At VIII.303 the lexical innovation *prolixitas* ‘extension in space, elongatedness’ (*OLD* s.v.) formed from *prolixus* + *-tas*, is a sense translation of the Greek simplex *μῆκος* ‘length’ (393b21) (cf. Cicero’s *colligatio* for the simplex *δεσμός*.)

Geological and Meteorological Exposition; Harmony of the Universe (305 – 340)

The transition from geographical discussions of seas to terrestrial phenomena can be seen as what HARRISON observed as a ‘reinterpretation of the link between the two sections.’⁵⁰ The Greek change in sections (394a5-9) is largely inclusive of both aquatic and terrestrial phenomena:

We have now inquired into the nature and placement of the *land and sea* which we call the inhabited region. Now let us speak about the most notable phenomena in and about the inhabited world, summarising only necessary things.⁵¹

Apuleius reduces this textual way-marker entirely and writes: *de mari satis dictum. terreni vero casus ita se habent [...]*, and despite some overlap with volcanic activity occurring in the sea (XVII.326-XIX.332), HARRISON argues that Apuleius’ contraction of the original: ‘recognises that in some sense the account of the land and seas has not finished, and that the summarising sentence in the Greek is in fact misleading.’⁵² In this sense, there is nothing added to the Greek, but Apuleius simply makes the exposition for the reader more clear by condensing the original.

The lexical innovation *eructatio* at VII.305 is another nominalisation in *-tio*, a suffix heavily favoured in forming Cicero’s innovations, 28 of which are attested in his

⁵⁰ HARRISON (2000), 190.

⁵¹ *Mete.* 394a5-9: γῆς μὲν δὴ καὶ θαλάττης φύσιν καὶ θέσιν, ἥντινα καλεῖν εἰώθαμεν οἰκουμένην, τοιάνδε τινὰ ἱστορήκαμεν. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀξιολογωτάτων ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν παθῶν νῦν λέγωμεν, αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα κεφαλαιούμενοι.

⁵² HARRISON (2000), 190.

philosophical works alone. Here, more specifically it is the *-atio* alternate used with verbs of the first conjugation in which the *-ā-* forms part of the stem, cf. *accusatio*, *confirmatio*. It appears to be an addition to the Greek original ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀπορρέουσα (394a14) to create a more descriptive image of exhalations erupting from the soil of the earth: *harum altera arida est atque <fumo> consimilis, quae terrenis eructationibus surgit* (τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ ξηρὰ καὶ καπνώδης, ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀπορρέουσα). The noun *ningor* ‘snowstorm’ translates the Greek νιφετὸς (394b2) and appears to be a lexical innovation from the established verb *ningo* + *-or*. The verbal substantive *abolitio* is printed in BEAUJEU (1973, 129) and is an established Latin term, though the *OLD* reads *obolitio* in this section (VIII.306), which would be an orthographical variation unique to Apuleius and has been printed by other editors.⁵³

In the section beginning X.310f there are multiple glosses and Greek loan-words to translate the names of the various winds. The first is ἐγκολπίαι (X.310-11): *qui facti e telluris halitu constant, terrigenae nuncupantur; at illi qui excutiuntur e sinibus ἐγκολπίαι graece sunt nominati*. LSJ define ἐγκολπίας as a ‘local wind blowing from a bay’, Apuleius renders ἐγκολπίαι with the periphrasis *illi qui excutiuntur e sinibus* ‘those which are blown out from bays’.⁵⁴ The next is ἐξυδρία (X.311): *vel cum imber effusus conciet flabra, quae ἐξυδρίαι Atticorum lingua vocitantur*. The Greek ἐξυδρίας ‘rainy wind’ is converted into another periphrasis: *vel cum imber effusus conciet flabra, quae ἐξυδρίαι Atticorum lingua vocitantur*. The loan-words *euros*, *boreas*, *zephyros*, and *austros* are not naturalised into Latin but refer to the east, north, west, and south (*oriens*, *septemtrio*, *occidens* and *medius dies* (= *meridies*)) winds respectively.

The verb form *interfl[u]ant* is noteworthy in that six of the manuscripts print *interfluant* and one prints *interfluunt* with only the sixteenth-century editor Vulcanius printing *interflant*. The *OLD* counts *interflo* (back-formed from *interflant*) as a Latin word (see *OLD* s.v. *interflo*) and would thus be a lexical innovation unique to Apuleius, but BEAUJEU (1973, 130) sides with the preponderance of manuscript evidence and prints *interfluant*, which makes the most sense on this occasion.⁵⁵ BEAUJEU notes that the phrases used in this section parallel

⁵³ See e.g. HILDEBRAND (1842), 360.

⁵⁴ Seneca (*N.Q.* 5.8) had a lengthy discussion of these so-called ἐγκολπίαι ‘gulf breezes’ as well but never translates the Greek term directly.

⁵⁵ Note also the earlier use of *interfluuntur* in IV.297, although there it is in relation to the ocean.

many of those used by Seneca (*N.Q.* 5.12.2-5) and that Seneca's text perhaps functioned as an alternative source for the description of wind names in these sections.⁵⁶

In the next section, Apuleius writes:

Though the *eurus* is the east wind, it receives the name of *aparctias* when it blows from the east in the summer time; but it is called *apeliotes* when it is produced from the equinoctial sunrise [sc. east]; it is *eurus* when it sallies forth from the harbour places of winter. And, of course, *zeyphyrus*, which is known as *favonius* in the Roman tongue, when it arises from the summer occidental region [sc. west]⁵⁷

Apuleius translates the Greek names for the various East-West Ἄνεμοι or 'wind gods' (*Venti*) as follows: East (*ventus orientis*) = Εὐρος (*quando hiemalis ortus portis emittitur*),⁵⁸ ἀπαρκτίας (*cum eum oriens aestivus effundit*), Ἀπηλιώτης (*cum aequidianis exortivus procreatur*), West = Ζέφυρος (*Favonius* = west wind during summer). The term *aequidianus* (*aequus* + *dies* + *-anus*) is not found elsewhere and seems to be a calque of ἰσημερινός. In XII.317, we find more Greek loans: *Anaphysemata* = *eos spiritus, qui de fundo vel hiatibus terrae explosi ad superna minari solent*, and *prester* = *hi cum maiore vi torti sunt, fit procella terrestris*. He translates the term ἀναφύσημα 'upward blast' (LSJ s.v.) as 'the projected breaths of the depths or crevices of the earth which are accustomed to be driven up to the heights of the sky.'⁵⁹ The *πρηστήρ* or 'hurricane' (LSJ s.v.) is translated as *procella terrestris*, a more violent manifestation of the *πρηστήρ* (*cum maiore vi torti sunt, fit procella terrestris*).

The section beginning: *Eurus igitur aequinoctialis orientis est* and ending with *qui tamen graeca lingua ἀπαρκτίας dictus est* (XIII.319) contains multiple glosses, all of which are expropriations from Aulus Gellius, as outlined in ROCHETTE,⁶⁰ specifically from *Noctes*

⁵⁶ BEAUJEU (1973), 320.

⁵⁷ XI.312-14: *nam quamvis eurus sit ventus orientis, idem tamen aparctias accipitur nomen, cum eum oriens aestivus effundit; apeliotes autem vocatur, cum aequidianis exortivus procreatur; eurus est, quando hiemalis ortus portis emittitur. Zephyrus vero, quem Romana lingua favonium novit, hic cum de aestivis occiduis partibus surgit [...]*

⁵⁸ See discussion in Chapter 2.2.

⁵⁹ Note that BAEHRENS (1912, 266) reads the sentence *ad superna ferri solent* and calls *explosi ad superna* 'unlateinisch'. I defer to the reading of BEAUJEU (1973, 132).

⁶⁰ ROCHETTE (2005), 308.

Atticae 2.22.3-26 with the only difference in glosses being Apuleius' use of the more usual *septentrio* for ἀπαρκτίας, which Gellius translated with the neologism *septentrionarius*. Similarly, the section in XV.322 contains the naturalised technical terms *typhon* (τῦφον) and *sceptos* (σκηπτός) are again glossed in Latin using periphrases: *ignitum non erit fulmen* and *omnibus quae e nubibus cadunt nomen est* respectively. The forms *claricantes* (*clarico*) and *convibro* seem to be Apuleian lexical innovations added to the section taken from the *Noctes Atticae*.

The lengthy section in XVI.323-5 discussing rainbows and coloured clouds is also taken from Aulus Gellius. The Rainbow, *Irin*, is glossed with Latin *arcus*, a common term (as Apuleius points out) with multiple uses in the sense of 'rainbow' attested in early and Classical Latin literature (e.g. in Plautus, Cicero, Lucretius, and Vergil). Of interest is Apuleius' use of *medietas*, which Cicero had coined originally in Classical Latin to translate the Greek term for 'mean' or 'middle' (μεσότης). The word is used in post-Classical Latin on numerous occasions by Apuleius, Lactantius, and Tertullian, however here it seems to have the more general meaning of 'the fact of being intermediate' (see *OLD* s.v. *medietas*, 1) rather than Ciceronian technical geometrical sense. This is a practice we have encountered before in Apuleius and could be seen as a form of etymologising. ROCHETTE summarises this section by noting that only the Greek words appear as the technical terms for the various natural phenomena, except for the first instance of *Irin* which is directly glossed with a *vulgus* term.⁶¹ All these technical terms are first transliterated into Latin orthography then explained using paraphrase. The adjective *multicolorus*, referring to Iris, is unique to Apuleius but can be seen as a simple variation on *multicolor* found earlier in Pliny (*Nat.* 37.173). Similarly, *discolorus* is unique but is simply a variation of *discolor*, attested in e.g. Lucretius (10.128). The feminine noun *crassitas* 'thickness, density' is a possible lexical innovation modelled on the established *crassitudo* but does not correspond to any word in the original Greek. All of XVII.328, in fact, is an addition by Apuleius to the source text, ostensibly for dramatic effect. He begins by introducing the first person observations of the narrator (*vidi et ipse apud Hierapolim Phrygiae non adeo ardui montis*), then interpolates a story about living things which are close to the gaping fissures in the mountain (*proxima quaeque animalia et in alvum*

⁶¹ ROCHETTE (2005), 309.

prona atque proiecta venenati spiritus contagione corripunt et vertice circumacta[s] interimunt). The image is made more perilous when Apuleius adds that, ‘even priests would be eunuchs, who would dare to approach close enough, always raising their faces to heaven; so they know well that, since the density of the stale air is concentrated in the lower layers, the evil energy reaches and strikes the beings of a shorter height more easily.’⁶²

Through XVIII.330-1, Apuleius translates the classification of earthquakes and deploys more of these naturalised Greek loan-words, for example ἐπικλίνται (*epiclintae*) becomes a loan-blend and glossed as an earthquake with an acute angular motion to the earth (*acutis angulis mobiles*) compared with the βράσται (*brastae*), which have perpendicular effects on the earth’s surface (*directis angulis*). The ἱζηματίαι (*hizematiae*) are those quakes that collapse inward (sink-holes, *qui abstrudere videntur*), and ῥήκται (*rhectae*) those *quorum impulsu dissilit tellus* (‘which tear apart the earth by a shock’). Other loan-words such as *ostae*, *palmatiae*, and *mycetias* are also all naturalised into Latin and Apuleius eschews *verbum ex verbo* translation, instead opting for circumlocutions. Yet whereas *ostae* = *motus*, *quibus* <semel> *solum quatitur*, the other two periphrases contain lexical innovations, so *palmatiae* = *quorum pavitatione illa quae trepidant sine inclinationis periculo nutabunt, cum directi tamen rigoris statum retinent* with *pavitatio* (from *pavito*, –are) being an –atio nominalisation ‘the action of trembling or shaking’ (*OLD* s.v.). This picks up the sense of ‘an earthquake with violent shocks’, *LSJ* s.v. *παλματίας*, which also seems to have been a coinage in the original *Περὶ Κόσμου*. *Mycetias* = *taetri odoris inquietudo terrena* with *inquietudo* ‘an outbreak of disorder, disturbance’ (*OLD* s.v.). The word *μυκηται* means simply ‘bellowers’ in Greek (*LSJ* s.v. *μυκητής*) and the noun form appears to be rare (*Theoc.* 8.6 and *Corn. de Natura Deorum* 22; cf. the more common *μυκάομαι*), so perhaps Apuleius’ creation *inquietudo* was aimed at evoking the kindred sense of ‘noisy disorder’ in the Latin.

The form *corporata* in the sense of ‘to form a corporate society’ is here a novel usage by Apuleius, perhaps rendering the Greek *συνεστηκυῖα* (396b37), similar to the lexical innovation of *corporatus* in Cicero’s *Timaeus* 10 (see *OLD* s.v. *corpo*, 1 and *corporatus*, 1, and *TLL* (s.v. *corpo*, 4.0.997.53) 2b: ‘i. q. corporeus’). The abstract *temperantia* in this

⁶² XVII.328-9: *Antistites denique ipsos semiviros esse, qui audeant propius accedere, ad superna semper sua ora tollentes; adeo illis cognitum est vim mali, ad inferiora aeris noxii crassitate densata, inferiores quoque facilius adire atque percellere.*

section bears less of a psychological meaning (as it did in Cicero's use of the term), but rather a more abstract 'balance, equilibrium' applying to inanimate systems, referring to the balance of an entire civil society within, for example, a city (see *OLD* s.v. *temperantia*, 3). The noun *perservantia* in XXI.336, like *temperantia*, is a lexical augmentation with the new sense of 'continued existence' as opposed to 'steadfastness, persistence' (*OLD* s.v.). Apuleius uses his new sense to emphasise the notion of 'preservation' from the Greek concept of σωτηρία. Initially translated in the preceding sentence by *salus*, the concept is reinforced with *persevantia*, so: *ex ea salutem operi machinata. principiorum igitur consensus sibi concordiam peperit, perseverantiam vero amicitiae inter se elementis dedit* 'and from this [concord], [nature] contrived salvation to its work. It is thus the agreement of the first principles which has engendered their concord, but the persistence of the amity between the elements, these are owed to the equal distribution of their very specific properties' rendering (396b4-5): καὶ ἐκ τούτων μηχανησαμένη τῷ παντὶ σωτηρίαν. αἰτία δὲ ταύτης [sc. σωτηρία] μὲν ἡ τῶν στοιχείων ὁμολογία. Note that Apuleius also employs Lucretius' translation of στοιχείον: *elementum*. In the neuter plural *flammda*, we find a term attested only here, the *Met.* and the *De Deo Socratis*. Though inconclusive, it is of interest in terms of the authenticity of the *De Mundo*, given the lexical overlaps. The term is formed from *flamma* + *-idus* 'flaming' (*OLD* s.v.) and corresponds to the simplex θερμὸν (396b25), but whether we classify it as a genuine sense translation appearing first in this text is unclear. I have tentatively included it in the data for the purposes of this study. The opposition set up by the geometric adjectives *directus* and *obliquus* render ὀρθὸν περιφερεῖ (396b26) although, as MÜLLER notes, the Latin formulation is not strictly a mathematical opposition, as in the Greek.⁶³

The participle *circumreferentes* in XXII.338 is listed by the *OLD* (s.v. *circumrefero*) as a single form perhaps corresponding to the participle ἐπάγουσα in 397a14. The single form of the term is not supported by BEAUJEU (1973, 141), who prints it separately *circum referentes* following two eleventh and twelfth-century manuscript readings. If the term were a single derivative formation it would likely be an Apuleian innovation. The evidence for a single

⁶³ MÜLLER (1939), 113: '[K]ein mathematische strenger Gegensatz mehr ist, denn auch eine schräge Linie [sc. *obliquus*] kann eine Grade sein, nie aber kann es eine gekrümmte Linie [sc. *περιφερής*].'

morphological calque is strong however, with the prefix *circum-* rendering the prefix ἐπί– and *referens* rendering οὐσα. Apuleius was also fond of using compounds in *circum-*, with nearly 50 lemmata found in his works alone, some of which are lexical innovations (e.g. *circumvehor*).

In XXII.340, the form of *conciens* as an adjectival substantive is conjectured to be found only here with the meaning ‘pregnant, teeming’ (*OLD* s.v.), approximately referencing the περιβλύζουσα ‘boil or bubble all around’ in the original (397a25: ἡ τε γῆ φυτοῖς κομῶσα παντοδαποῖς νάμασί τε περιβλύζουσα καὶ περιοχουμένη ζώοις). The term here refers back to the *terra* being described as *scatebris fontium manantem* and *aquarum agminibus concientem*. The participial meaning is found earlier in Velleius Paterculus (2.74.2.6): *ad arma conciens magnum exercitum conflaverat* in the conventional sense of *concieo* ‘to rouse up, muster’ (*OLD* s.v., 1b). Even if it were read with the basic ‘to stir up or set in violent motion’ (*OLD* s.v., 1a), the sense would be scrambled: ‘stirring up with watercourses’? There are two explanations for why this particular meaning has been grafted onto the participial form read in this section: a) either the text is corrupt and to make sense of the sentence this new meaning has been imbued into *conciens*, or b) Apuleius was genuinely using the term in new sense, unattested previously. BEAUJEAU claims the text is corrupted, suggesting that Apuleius originally included a description of the ζῶα in 397a26 but a copyist possibly omitted it ‘par distraction’.⁶⁴ *TLL* suggests: ‘*fortasse concipientem*’ (4.36.22), instead of *conciens*. There are then two problems to address: a lexical one and a textual one. Taking the second issue first, one might argue Apuleius simply decided to conflate the two descriptions of the original: παντοδαποῖς νάμασί τε περιβλύζουσα καὶ περιοχουμένη ζώοις. The first participle περιβλύζουσα conveys the ‘boiling, bubbling with streams’ and the second conveys ‘traversed everywhere by animals’. Since the most logical equivalent of περιβλύζουσα here is *scatebra*, he then renders περιοχουμένη but applies it to the watercourses and springs instead of animals. Alternatively, we might infer that an error has been made in transmission, following BEAUJEAU, with the original including animals. Yet what of the sense of *conciens* itself? In the sense of ‘pregnant with’, it is a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον in Apuleius with the only analogue being *inciens* ‘pregnant’. However, *inciens* is cognate with the Greek terms ἔγκυος and ἐγκύμων

⁶⁴ BEAUJEAU (1973), 329.

whereas *conciens* would not have such a lineage, but seems rather to be a calque (*con-* + the present participial form of *cieo*). In spite of its unusualness, this form is attested in the consensus of the codices.⁶⁵ The *TLL*'s suggestion that it ought to be read as *concupiens* is, therefore, less certain, although it is an elegant solution to the semantic strangeness. *Concupio* is found in other authors applying to water (e.g. Ovid *Met.* 1.27; Frontinus *Aq.* 10) and could feasible work here with the following sense: 'bubbling with springs, soaking up (*concupiens*) the watercourses'. Yet there is another solution, much simpler than positing errors in all the manuscripts, and one that relies on lexical innovation rather than conjecture. If we accept that *conciens* is an Apuleian morphological calque then we need to ask why it was coined in this context. Apuleius favoured the *con-* suffix to form novel Latin terms, either new or established, in rendering Greek ones in the *Mun.* In Chapters 19-21 of the *Mun.*, MÜLLER counted 19 individual terms formed with *con-*, usually rendering a range of Greek prefixes (e.g. ἐν-, ἐπι-, σύν-, ὁμο-). Here, the source seems to be περιχοιμένη (*con-* = περι and *cieo* = ὀχάομαι), which would make *conciens* mean something more like 'criss-crossing, traversing', hence: *videas et viridantibus comis caesariatam esse terram et scatebris fontium manantem, et aquarum agminibus concientem, parientem atque educantem* 'and you see the earth, fleeced with long green hair, flowing and crisscrossing with bubbling waters of springs and water courses, flourishing and nourishing'. This resolves the sense semantically, but does not explain the morpho-syntax: the active present participle was used to render a Greek passive one (a 'modulation' translation, per NEWMARK's taxonomy outlined in Chapter 1.2). This might have been to make the imagery more vivid, with the water enlivened to become the active means by which the earth is nourished. Another solution is to see the term simply as a lexical augmentation, adding the sense of 'collecting up, drawing together' to *concieo*.⁶⁶ Either way, the adjectival *conciens* can be argued to be an Apuleian original, but was either: a) originally applied to something like *animantes* and not watercourses with the meaning of 'teeming with', b) a morphological calque of περιχοιμένη with the meaning 'criss-crossing' or c) a lexical augmentation of *concieo* with a new meaning of 'collecting together'.

⁶⁵ See BEAUJEAU's critical apparatus (1973, 142).

⁶⁶ The term has this meaning in some contexts too but usually through violent motion or shaking (see *OLD* s.v. and also earlier in the *Mun.* X.311.)

The noun *adludio* ‘an overflowing, flood’ (*OLD* s.v. *alluvio*, 1; *TLL* 1.2.1700.69-70) translates (in conjunction with the perfect passive participle of *mergi*) ἐπικλυζομένη (397a30) and is a semantic extension, originally a legal term meaning ‘an addition made to a person’s land by sedimentation’. In the passive infinitive *anilitari* (> *anilito*), Apuleius introduces a lexical innovation⁶⁷ based on *anilis* + *-ito*, ‘to produce the feebleness of old age in (a female)’ (*OLD* s.v.), here in reference to the feminine earth resisting such ageing, rendering the Greek τὴν ἀγήρω [‘ageless’] φύσιν ὁμοίως τηρεῖ. Apuleius might have found inspiration in Cicero’s *aniliter* ‘in the manner of an old woman’ (*N.D.* 3.92). The adverb *regionaliter* is an Apuleian lexical innovation from *regio* + *-alis* + *-ter* (*OLD* s.v.) added to the original to convey the sense of ‘locally’-occurring, pernicious (*pestifera*) disasters. In the form *opimatur* (from *opimo*), we find another lexical augmentation adding to the original Greek meaning. The established sense of the verb appears to be derived from an agricultural context (see e.g. Columella (8.7.5, 8.9.2)) meaning ‘to fatten (for eating)’, referring to animals. Apuleius’ use of the verb is in the sense of ‘to enrich, fertilise (soil)’ (*OLD* s.v. *opimo*, 2) so that, whereas the Greek explained the ‘washing off’ of noxious contaminants from the earth’s soil, he adds that the earth’s progeny is simultaneously fertilised as well as cleansed: *imbribus etiam madefacta non solum ad educandos fetus suos opimatur, verum etiam pestifera contagione proluitur* (397a34-5: καθαιρομένη τε ὄμβροις ἀποκλύζεται πάντα τὰ νοσώδη).

The Creator the Universe (341-374)

In this section we find a concentrated collection of Apuleian innovations with strong echoes of Cicero’s techniques in his *Timaeus*, especially due to the overlapping cosmological subject matters of both works. The agent noun used in *-tor*, *sospitator*, ‘a saviour, preserver’ (*OLD* s.v.) appears also in the *Met.* and *Apol.* The form also has a feminine equivalent *sospitatrix* in the *Met.* It is derived from the verb *sospito* which appears to be mainly used in religious contexts (*OLD* s.v.), thus lending the innovation a heightened theological connotation, referring to God as *Sospitator quidem ille <et> genitor est omnium* (XXIV.343).

⁶⁷ Cf. MÜLLER (1939), 120.

The abstract noun *praepotentia* XXVI.346 ‘superior or outstanding power’ is a lexical innovation formed from a simple addition of the *-entia* suffix to the established *praepotens* translating *πρόσχημα* (398a12). It is not a morphological calque (*σχῆμα* ‘form, shape figure’ as opposed to ‘ability, power’ in *potens*) leading to a change in meaning. The Greek conveys ‘pomp’ or ‘pretence’ (LSJ s.v.) in almost all literary attestations whereas the compound with *potens* implies a predominance or power relating to a pre-eminent status (see *TLL* s.v., 10.2.785.45). However, there is another meaning of *πρόσχημα* attested in a papyrus (*OGI* 470.23) dating between 100 BC and 100 AD conveying the sense of ‘nobility’. This meaning seems to be what Apuleius understood from the term in this context. The noun *incensor* in XXVI.349 appears only here and in the obscure late-classical jurist (second century AD), Claudius Saturninus, in a treatise on Roman law penalties regarding ‘those who set fire to crops’ (*Dig.* 48.19.16.9: *messium incensores*). The noun means ‘a person who kindles or sets fire to’ (*OLD* s.v.) and, given the attestation history, perhaps suggests the noun was a technical term for an official post or duty. The phrase *specul[at]orum incensores* translates the Greek *φρυκτωρία* ‘making signals by beacons’ (LSJ s.v.). The adjective *salutifer* (XVII.352) is a lexical innovation meaning ‘that brings safety or well-being’ (*OLD* s.v., 1) carrying previous senses as ‘health-giving, medicinal’ (see e.g. *Ov. Ep.* 20.174). The form *salutiger* ‘a person who conveys the means of well-being’ (*OLD* s.v.) is a variation of this but unique to Apuleius in *Soc.* 6.

The adjective *natatilis* is another Apuleian lexical innovation formed from the verb *nato* ‘to swim’ + *-ilis* meaning ‘swimming, aquatic’ translating the Greek *ἐνυδρόν* in 398b30. In this particular sentence however, it carries intertextual importance. The context of the section is a discussion of ‘mutual impulses’ (*impulsi mutui*) and how like is attracted to like, specifically how winged (*volucres*), aquatic (*natatiles*), or terrestrial (*terrestres*) animals will be naturally drawn back to their respective habitats (*aer* ‘air’, *aqua* ‘water’, and *agrestes* ‘fields’ i.e. the wild) if they are parted from a related animal (*animal simul*). In the tricolon of adjectives, only *natatilis* seems to be attested first here,⁶⁸ with *volucris* and *terrestris* well established. As a point of comparison, in Cicero’s *Timaeus*, 35 we find the same tricolon but,

⁶⁸ The term is found first in Apuleius and then in Augustine, who studied Apuleius ‘intensely’, see HUNINK (2003). Cf. *Aug. Civ.* 1.20: *nec de inrationalibus animantibus, volatilibus natatilibus, ambulatilibus reptilibus, quia nulla nobis ratione sociantur.*

significantly, with similar adjectives: *alterum pinnigerum et aerium, tertium <aquatile, pedestre et> terrestre quartum*. The adjectives *aquatile*, *aerius*, and *terrestris* are well established, with the first attested in Varro (*R.* 1.64.1; *Men.* 576), the second appearing in Lucretius (5.825), and the third in Plautus (*Ps.* 3.46). However, *pinniger* is a lexical augmentation by Cicero, adding the meaning ‘winged’ (*OLD* s.v. *pinniger*, 2) to the sense previously used by Accius meaning ‘carrying or wearing feathers’. Apuleius, like Cicero in translating the *Timaeus*, used a form of lexical innovation to express the threefold classification of animals. The parallels between Cicero and Apuleius here point to a broader contention I am proposing, namely that we can infer Apuleius had (some) knowledge of Cicero’s translation while he completed his own.

The verb *decisio* in XXIX.354 appears to be a lexical augmentation with the previous sense meaning ‘a settlement, agreement’ used in e.g. Cicero *Q. Rosc.* 48 but here Apuleius’ new sense is a ‘curtailment, diminishment’ (see *OLD* s.v. *decisio*, 1) referring to the moon’s brightness over monthly periods, translating the Greek *μεινυμένη καὶ φθίνουσα* ‘waxing and waning’. (XXIX.355). The Greek word *κόσμος* appears in this section and earlier in XXII.337 but Apuleius does not attempt to gloss or translate it in any detail ([*h*]oc ornamentum et velut monile κόσμος rectissime Graeca lingua significat). He etymologises it as the most appropriate term for the harmony of the single revolution of the Universe since he sees it as an ‘adornment just like a necklace (*monile*)’.⁶⁹ The familiar abstract noun *concentio*, used by Cicero in the sense of the Platonic Greek concept of *ἁρμονία* (see *TLL* s.v., 4.0.19.58-9) is used in the same sense here by Apuleius: *unam harmoniam resonant, sic divina mens mundanas varietates ad instar unius concentrationis relevat*. The adjective *omnituens* (*omni* + the present participle of *tuor*) ‘all-seeing’ is another Apuleian innovation and *frugalis* appears to be a lexical augmentation meaning ‘of or concerning vegetable produce’ (*OLD* s.v. *frugalis*, 2), whereas the original sense seems to have been ‘of good character or habits, not given to excess, etc.’ attested in Plautus, Terence, and various inscriptions⁷⁰ (see e.g. *CIL* 8.20382).

In XXXIII.362 we find another Apuleian gloss, this time on the familiar Greek term *οὐρανόν* ‘heaven’ which Apuleius again describes as an apt term for that which is the ‘highest

⁶⁹ For the secondary meaning of ‘to adorn’ in *κόσμος* see BEEKES (2010), 2.760.

⁷⁰ Nearly all inscriptions containing *frugalis* appear to be in the sense of ad hominem superlatives with this common meaning.

of the high' (*ut qui sit altitudinis finis*). He then translates the Homeric noun ζόφος 'nether darkness' (400a9, see LSJ s.v.) with the lexical innovation *fuscitas* from *fuscus* + *-tas*, presumably because the adjectival connotations of *fuscus* are associated with night, gloom, and the underworld (see e.g. Verg. A. 7.408), which ζόφος also contains (see e.g. Hom. *Od.* 20.356) and there was no equivalent noun in Latin. The deployment of unusual and poetic vocabulary here is not strictly 'philosophical' but it foreshadows the introduction of a quotation from Homer's *Od.* (42-5) in the same section.⁷¹ The adjective *insulatus* at XXXIV.364 is a lexical innovation from *insula* + *-atus* 'made into an island' (*OLD* s.v.), whose meaning would be easily intelligible to Latin readers, also later used by Augustine. Another agent noun in XXXV.365, *praecentor*, is a lexical innovation derived from the verbal base *praecino* rendering the Greek κορυφαῖος (400b8: ἐν χορῷ δὲ κορυφαῖος = *praecentor in choris*).

In XXXVII.370 we again find a series of *-tor* nouns, some of them lexical innovations of Apuleius', others borrowed for poetic and phonetic effect.⁷² So we have *fulminator* 'hurler of thunderbolts', *serenator* 'a person who makes the weather clear', and *triumphator* 'a person who celebrates a triumph' (also in *Apol.* 17) all unique to Apuleius. *Fulminator* and *triumphator* translate κεραύνιός or κεραύνειος (401a18) and τροπαιοῦχος (401a24) respectively, while *serenator* has no equivalent in the original. *Triumphator* can be viewed as a morphological calque, given the Greek term is formed from the root τρέπω 'to turn' thence τροπαῖος 'causing the turning (of the enemy), granting victory',⁷³ which Apuleius translates with *triumpho* 'to celebrate a triumph', traditionally referring to Roman generals (see Var. *L.* 6.68). The other agent nouns in this section are taken from Cicero (*fulgurator* and *propagator*⁷⁴), Lucretius (*tonitrualis*),⁷⁵ and Ennius (*imbricator*) adding to the lofty diction of this section describing Jupiter (Ζεύς). In this section we also find simple glosses of the more well known names of Greek gods: Ζεύς = *Iuppiter* = *vitae nostrae auctor* and Κρόνος =

⁷¹ Cf. also another *-tas* noun in XXXVI.369 *dulcitas* 'sweetness' which Apuleius takes from Accius (*Trag.* 640). For an overview of poetic word forms in the *Mun.* see BERNHARD (1927), 337-44.

⁷² See TOSI (1986), 132f for a discussion of Apuleius' use of agent nouns with suffix *-tor* for phonological reasons.

⁷³ See BEEKES (2010), 2.1503.

⁷⁴ The title *propagator* also appears in inscriptions, see *CIL* 8.18256.

⁷⁵ Though some manuscripts dispute this reading in Lucretius, see *OLD* s.v. *tonitrualis*.

Saturnus = quasi κρόνον quendam, incoeptum ab origine, interminum ad finem tempus. The final lexical innovation in the word is found at XXXVIII.373 *ineffugibilis* ‘inescapable, unavoidable’ calquing the Greek adjective ἀναπόδραστος (from αν- + ἀποδιδράσκω -τος) which itself appears to be a lexical innovation in the Περὶ Κόσμου. Compare Apuleius’ innovation with Cicero’s calque of καταληπτός with *comprehendibilis* (*comprehendo* + *-bilis*) in *Ac.* 1.41. The naturalisation of τροπαιόφορος in the section: *est militaris, est triumphator et propagator, tropaeophorus; et multo plura eiusmodi apud haruspices et Romanos veteres inveneris* functions here as another epithet of Jupiter, along with the other agent nouns: *propagator* which appears to be a Ciceronian innovation (*Att.* 8.3.3) and *triumphator*, an Apuleian innovation.

The section XXXVIII.372-3 discusses the various Greek terms for ‘fate’ or ‘destiny’, glossed from the Greek, as Cicero had done with e.g. εἰμαρμένην in *Div.* 1.125 and μοῖρα both with *fatum* or *fata*. Apuleius follows Cicero’s initial taxonomy by using *Fatum* + a paraphrase to render both, but unlike Cicero in the *Lucullus* (27; 29, translating δόγμα), the noun *decretum* is used to translate the adjectival participle πεπρωμένην as a destined ‘decree’ (see LSJ s.v. πόρω II.2). The Greek term ἔννομον ‘ordained by law’ (LSJ s.v.) is translated by *quod unicuique adtributio sua sit adscripta*.

3.5. LEXICAL COMMENTARY ON APULEIUS’ *DE PLATONE ET EIUS DOGMATE*

A work on Platonic doctrine attributed to Apuleius is thought to date roughly to the 170s AD.⁷⁶ It is in the format of a handbook or didactic treatise rather than a literary work like the *De Deo Socratis*.⁷⁷ Though the work is not a translation of any single Platonic text, it does provide useful insights into the technical vocabulary of Apuleius’ Middle Platonism. Glosses and rhetorical devices abound, in the style of Cicero and Seneca, which Apuleius deploys throughout the text to familiarise the concepts he is attempting to discuss in Latin. The

⁷⁶ HARRISON (2000), 180.

⁷⁷ See e.g. HIJMAN (1987), 427-8. Though scholars have noted the literary elements, especially in the prose-rhythm of both the *Mun.* and *Pl.*, see AXELSON (1952); BEAUJEU (1973), xvi; HARRISON (2000), 178f.

following adapted commentary is only concerned with these instances and selected examples of lexical innovation found in the text.

The presence of lexical innovation practices in Apuleius' *Pl.* is less extensive than the *Mun.* owing to the freer style of this work (it is not a close translation of a text but an overview of various aspects of Platonic thought). I begin with BERNHARD's observations on lexical innovation in the *Pl.* He argues that coinages are fewer compared with works such as his *Met.* or *Apol.*, where literary imagination was the driving force behind Apuleius' lexical innovation. However, in *Pl.* (similar to the *Mun.*), the use of novel formations was impelled by a different motivating factor: the difficulty of conveying the Platonic terms in Latin and the 'inelasticity' of the Latin lexis at the time.⁷⁸ This again invokes the recurring trope of the *egestas* in Latin philosophical vocabulary and authors such as Apuleius are useful examples of the linguistic practices used in antiquity to enrich the Latin lexicon and introduce new interpretations of technical Greek terms. The way in which Apuleius introduces new terms in the *Pl.* echoes Ciceronian practices (e.g. the use of *quasi* and other mollifying techniques which form a type of *captatio benevolentiae*) but differs in one important aspect: Apuleius felt less of a need to mollify the introduction of new vocabulary and was more liberal in his deployment of his innovations.⁷⁹ REDFORS notes (1960, 51 n. 50) that it is '[e]twas überraschend' that Apuleius feels the need to apologise for his new terms in some instances throughout the *Pl.*, considering that in the *Apol.* (discussed above) he boasts about his ability to coin new terms and expressions in Latin. Apuleius' practice is superficially at odds with his hyperbole in the *Apol.*, but REDFORS' contradiction can be resolved, like in the case of Cicero, by viewing these 'apologies' as hardly meant to be sincere, but rather to serve as communication strategies. That is, Apuleius is situating himself within the same philosophical and rhetorical tradition as authors like Cicero, deploying these similar rhetorical tools to enhance or expand his expressive capabilities in Latin to render philosophical Greek terms more effectively for his Latin readership.

⁷⁸ BERNHARD (1927), 329.

⁷⁹ RAMSEY (2017), 46-7: '[W]hereas Cicero appears to regret using such terms and makes it clear that they will only suffice until a more suitable way of conveying the concept becomes apparent, Apuleius liberally applies his own new terms to describe Platonic concepts in a way that suggests they are intended to be definitive, often when a suitable established Latin term already exists.'

In V.190, Apuleius cites the Greek ἀπερίμετρος and provides echoes of Ciceronian translation, referring to God as the *genitor rerumque omnium exstructor, beatus et beatificus* [...] (cf. Cicero's *Timaeus*, 21 *sic deus ille aeternus hunc perfecte beatum deum procreavit* and 47 *genitor et effector* etc.). The addition of *beatificus* (perhaps a neologism) in the pleonastic phrase: *beatus et beatificus* echoes another Ciceronian technique. ROCHETTE and FOWLER note⁸⁰ ἀπερίμετρος is first attested here and later, in Eusebius, the term certainly does not appear to be Platonic though may have been a later adjective derived from ἀπειρία in Plato (cf. *Fin.* 1.21: *infinio ipsa, quam ἀπειρίαν vocant*). In the next section, Apuleius supplements his lexical innovation *innominabilis* with an established Latin adjective *indictus* followed by Greek adjectives used by Plato: *et ut ait ipse, ἄόρατον, ἀδάμαστον*. These appear to be adjectives left as ornamental embellishments and left untranslated to convey 'infinite, invisible, unbroken', as he had done in his literary works elsewhere for similar ornamental effects.⁸¹ The reasoning here merits discussion. As ROCHETTE notes, except ἄόρατον, neither ἀπερίμετρος nor ἀδάμαστος are Platonic terms (the former Homeric, the latter possibly coined by Apuleius or borrowed from the vernacular).⁸² On the one hand, Apuleius could have straightforwardly translated the Greek adjectives into Latin but, conversely, he would have sacrificed the Greek flavour of the original terms used by Plato. A third option could have been using the adjectives but glossing them, as he does elsewhere (especially in the *Mun.*). It seems that he opted for leaving the Greek untranslated for the second reason: to preserve the original Platonic flavour of the descriptions of God, whilst complementing them with new Latin adjectives in the same section (*beatificus* and *innominabilis*).⁸³

In the same section, Apuleius regularly refers to Platonic 'matter', this time in the sense of the 'Receptacle' in Plato's *Ti.* 52b (χώρα). He interprets this concept as an 'incomplete substance' (*materiam inabsolutam, informem, nulla specie nec qualitatis*

⁸⁰ ROCHETTE (2005), 294-5; FOWLER (2016), 153.

⁸¹ See e.g. the eleven Greek loan-words left untranslated in the *Asclep.*, cited in ROCHETTE (2005), 296 n. 21.

⁸² ROCHETTE (2005), 295.

⁸³ The arguments posed by MARCHETTA (1992), 207-9 and ROCHETTE (2005), 295, that it can be assumed Apuleius left these terms untranslated because there were not yet suitable equivalents in the Middle Platonic tradition in Latin, should be queried. We can observe a number of lexical innovations Apuleius coined elsewhere (e.g. in the *Mun.* and in this translation) for Greek terms with no pre-existing Latin equivalent, most strikingly in his mathematical vocabulary, (discussed below).

significatione distinctam), a sense almost opposite to the usual, strict and wider, senses of *materia* had been in Latin (see discussion regarding Lucretius' and Cicero's use of the term earlier). Apuleius explains that this *materia* is prior to everything and is marked or shown (*signari*) by impressions of the Forms (VII.194: *signari inpressione formarum*). Cicero had deployed the notion of *materia* in relation to Plato's cosmology in two ways: metaphorically, in conjunction with the figure of the *aedificator* or 'Builder' of the Universe, fashioning the Universal Soul out of raw materials (Sameness and Difference) (*Timaeus*, 21), and in reference to Plato's primordial and unformed 'space' (χώρα) (*Ac.* 27-8; cf. *Ti.* 51a). Apuleius use of *materia* is in this second sense.

Aristotelian metaphysics: essentia, substantia and οὐσία

In VI.193, Apuleius attempts to summarise the bifurcated definition of 'Being' in Platonism by using *οὐσία* in two ways: the Formal, noumenal realm of pure Ideas (unchanging and eternal) and the realm of the perishable, physical world (changeable and perennial). The term *οὐσία* itself is rendered by *essentia* (*οὐσία, quas essentias dicimus*) as Seneca had highlighted a century earlier.⁸⁴ So far, so good; however, just as Apuleius begins to list the elements of the 'primary' and 'secondary' types of being in Plato, he introduces an important double translation: *et primae quidem substantiae vel essentiae primum deum esse et mentem formasque rerum et animam*. From Seneca we saw *οὐσία* generally rendered with *essentia*, despite its awkward form in Latin (which led to Seneca not using it again). Apuleius, however, equates *οὐσία* as divided into two kinds of 'substances' or 'essences', namely the primary substances (God, mind, Forms, soul) and secondary ones (those created and perishable things in the Universe: *secundae substantiae, omnia quae informantur quaeque gignuntur et quae ab substantiae superioris exemplo originem ducunt*.) There is a conceptual problem with this re-interpretation. It appears on the surface that Aristotelian metaphysics has crept into Apuleius' summation of Plato's ontology by introducing the concept of *substantia*

⁸⁴ Sen. *Ep.* 58.7-8; see discussion in Chapter 2.2.

into the realm of *νοῦς* and Forms.⁸⁵ As recently summarised in MARMODORO AND MAYR (2019, 18-19): ‘There is a further feature usually ascribed to substances, namely that they are particulars, rather than universals.’ It is difficult to see how the primary ‘substance’, so-called by Apuleius (i.e. of God and the Forms), could be a particular, as the term *substantia* usually implies but Aristotelianism provides an answer; that is, that the ‘primary god’ of Aristotle’s theology was *both* a particular (object of knowledge) and universal (the process of understanding, self-reflection, etc.). Thus the apparent conflation of *essentia* with *substantia*, while un-Platonic, is not a misreading of Plato necessarily but an articulation of Aristotelian thought, and is thus an interesting case of Middle Platonic interpretation. A brief look at the *Timaeus* provides us with an explanation of why this interpretation differs from Plato’s original ontology (*Ti.* 51e-52a): ‘the unchanging Form, un-generated and indestructible, which neither receives anything else into itself from elsewhere nor itself enters into anything else anywhere, invisible and otherwise imperceptible’. As in the *Sophist* (240b), we find that the Forms have some kind of being (*ᾧν πῶς*), but not *physical* presence per se (*οὐκ ὄντως ᾧν*).⁸⁶ They do not exist in Space or Time, i.e. they are not *substantiae*; only those generated things of the Universe participate in them.⁸⁷ This is partly in accord with the Stoic position on *substantia* as outlined by Seneca:

In the nature of things, they say [sc. the Stoics], some exist and other things do not exist. And even the things that do not exist are really part of nature. What these are will readily occur to the mind, for example centaurs, giants, and other figments of false

⁸⁵ This influence of Peripatetic doctrine is seen later in XVII.215-6 in Apuleius’ division of human body into a tripartite structure. See REDFORS (1960), 21 for other admixtures of Platonism and Peripatetic doctrine in Apuleius’ representation of Platonic ethics in the *Pl.*, (compared with the more faithful exegeses of Platonism in the *Apol.*). Also GOTTSCHALK (1987), 1148-9.

⁸⁶ What the difference between *ᾧν* ‘being’ and *ὄντως ᾧν* ‘presence’ is not clear in the section, but I suspect the latter refers to a spatio-temporal being as opposed to an eternal or formal one (e.g. Beauty exists because of the Form of Beauty, not based on a separate predicate, whereas a beautiful person is *ὄντως ᾧν* by participating in the *ᾧν* of the Form of Beauty).

⁸⁷ The participation issue and how the Forms manifest within *χώρα* (Space), which itself is eternal according to *Timaeus*’ account) continues to evoke speculation and confusion, see CORNFORD (1937), 196 for a summary, also SILVERMAN (2002), 143f.

reasoning, which have begun to have a definite shape, although they have no substance.⁸⁸

Although as RAMSAY (2017, 110) notes, Seneca's uses of *substantia* are not always limited to that of a corporeality: '[H]e often uses the term to render the Greek οὐσία as well, meaning "being", not necessarily in a materialistic sense.' This conflation of *substantia* with *essentia* (οὐσία) is, therefore, problematic from a Platonic perspective but less so from a Peripatetic one.⁸⁹ The Latin term *substantia* also presents itself as a linguistic issue as much as a philosophical one. The *OLD* defines the term as ranging from having a quality of being real or having an actual existence to the sum or aggregate of one's possessions. In general, the gist of *substantia* is some actuality, especially the primary meaning of 'corporeal existence'. Other meanings of the term apply to incorporeal objects but still carry the sense of 'reality' or 'materiality', which is difficult to apply to those Primary Substances of Forms, God, Soul etc., of which Apuleius discusses (though this notion of 'reality' later becomes important to the *una substantia* of God in Trinitarianism, see Chapter Four). The conception here is thus more Aristotelian in the sense that the primary substances precede the secondary ones and causally give rise to the properties or *essence* of the latter (as opposed to the perishable objects in the Universe imitating, or participating in, the eternal Forms of Platonism). So Aristotle says in the *Metaphysics* in relation to the Soul:

And since the soul of animals (which is the substance (οὐσία) of the living creature) is their substance in accordance with *logos*, and the form (τὸ εἶδος) and essence (τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι) of that particular kind of body (at least each part, if it is to be properly defined, will not be defined apart from its function; and this will not belong to it apart from

⁸⁸ Sen. *Ep.* 58.15: *in rerum, inquit, natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt. et haec autem, quae non sunt, rerum natura complectitur, quae animo succurrunt, tamquam Centauri, Gigantes et quicquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit, quamvis non habeat substantiam.*


⁸⁹ Although see REGEN (1971), 37-8 for a discussion of the blurring of the distinction between the divine *ousia* and *dynamis* in Apuleius' translation of the Psuedo-Aristotelian *Περὶ Κόσμου* but also cf. MARCHETTA (1991), 97-9 for a differing interpretation (i.e. that the distinction is preserved in Apuleius' Latin version).

perception); therefore, the parts of the soul are prior, either all or some of them, to the concrete animal (τοῦ συνόλου ζώου); and similarly in other individual cases.⁹⁰

The οὐσία and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (substance and essence) are thus distinct in Aristotle but the primary and secondary natures of οὐσία are here explained and parallel the bifurcation in Apuleius.

Apuleius' Mathematical Vocabulary

By VII.195-6, Apuleius comes upon the Platonic solids as outlined in the *Timaeus* dialogue and he is forced to render technical geometric terms into Latin for the first time and so begins to turn to lexical innovation. From the section, we can deduce the following scheme: Unlike the Greek, Apuleius decides to use single terms to characterise the three-dimensional solids and uses the lexical innovations *octangulus* 'octahedron' and *vigintianguulus* 'icosahedron' instead of ἰσόπλευρα τρίγωνα ὀκτὼ (*Ti.* 55a) and δις ἐξήκοντα τῶν στοιχείων [...] γωνιῶν δώδεκα (*Ti.* 55a-b). These are all sense translations or loan-words; neither morphological nor semantic calques.



⁹⁰ Arist. *Mete.* 7.1035b14f: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζώων ψυχὴ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι (ἐκαστον γοῦν τὸ μέρος ἐὰν ὀρίζεται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὀριεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως), ὥστε τὰ ταύτης μέρη πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια τοῦ συνόλου ζώου, καὶ καθ' ἑκαστον δὴ ὁμοίως.

A question of accuracy arises⁹¹ with *vigintiangulus* however, as it literally means ‘twenty-cornered, twenty-angled’ but Plato’s regular icosahedron is twelve-angled (γωνιών δώδεκα). Apuleius later reinforces the point with the phrase *sphaera angulata viciens*. The shape *vigintiangulus* seems to be more closely describing is the regular dodecahedron (twelve faces, twenty vertices), but this ‘fifth element’ is not discussed in Apuleius’ *Pl.*, unlike in the *Mun.* where it is described as ether (*Mun.* I.291).⁹² A similar translation error occurs with *octangulus* (an octahedron has six vertices, not eight). In addition to sense translations, the term *aequipedum* ‘equal-footed’ is a morphological calque of ἰσοσκελής and is unique to Apuleius, with later incarnations of the same translation, including *aequicrurius*, found in Boethius.

Senecan echoes in Apuleius’ glossing

Apuleius next provides us a revealing aside:

According to Plato, things have two natures: one which he calls δοξαστήν ‘a thing capable of an opinion’, which is able to be seen by the eyes and touched by the hands, the other, which communicates itself to the mind, conceivable and intelligible (*cogitabilis et intellegibilis*) — but forgive me for the novelty in vocabulary (*novitati verborum*), they are employed on account of the obscurity of the subject matter.⁹³

The terms *cogitabilis* and *intellegibilis* are not first-attested to Apuleius. Both appear in Seneca’s *Ep.* 58.16 and 124.2 respectively, as noted in BEAUJEU’s commentary.⁹⁴ It is possible the noun *novitas* may mean ‘unusual’ here (*OLD* s.v., 2b) although the general semantic range

⁹¹ See BEAUJEU (1973), 261.

⁹² It is interesting to compare Apuleius’ approach to later Renaissance translations of Euclidean geometric terms (discussed briefly in KELLY (1979), 136).

⁹³ IX.200: *naturasque rerum binas esse, et earum alteram esse, quam quidem δοξαστήν appellat ille et quae videri oculis et adtingi manu possit; alteram, quae veniat in mentem, cogitabilem et intellegibilem; detur enim venia nouitati verborum, rerum obscuritatibus servienti.*

⁹⁴ BEAUJEU (1973), 266.

of the word covers ‘newness, novelty’ etc. The phrase also evokes the phraseology in Lucretius (1.136-9).⁹⁵ The two options I see in this aside are as follows:

- a) Apuleius knew of Seneca’s letters and so used these adjectives but claimed they were *novitas* and felt the need to apologise for using them; or
- b) he independently coined these terms (from the basic pattern of *cogito* + *-bilis* and *intelligo* + *-bilis*) and apologises for their novel use.

The former is more likely given that the context in which *cogitabilis* is used in Seneca covers the same subject matter as discussed by Apuleius here (Plato’s division of *οὐσία* or as Seneca translates it *quod est*).⁹⁶ A corollary of this assumption is that Apuleius had read or was, at least, familiar with Seneca’s discussion of Platonic ontology.

Apuleius then translates the terms *ἐγγειος* and *ἐπίγειος* with *terrenus* and *terrestris* at XI.204, both established Latin terms. The interest in this section is the gerundive *nuncupanda* expressing a type of obligation on Apuleius to render the Greek terms with these specific Latin equivalents. In XI.204, Apuleius coins the term *ultramundanus* which BEAUJEU (1973, 271) suggests is a translation of the Greek term *ὑπερουράνιος* from Plato’s *Phaedrus* (247c). This would be another direct calque from the Greek if Apuleius had this original term in mind.

In the beginning of Book 2 (IV.226), Apuleius discusses the term *ἀοργησία* ‘lack of gall’ which is found first in Aristotle (*EN* 1108a8 and 1126a3). The term is translated with the familiar double translation technique: *indignatio et incommobilitas* ‘indignation and impassibility’, the latter being a lexical innovation from *in-* + *commoveo* + *-bilis* + *-tas*

⁹⁵ 1.136-9: *nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta* | *difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse*, | *multa novis verbis praesertim cum sit agendum* | *propter egestatem linguae et rerum novitatem*. See also BEAUJEU (1973), 266.

⁹⁶ *Ep.* 58.16: *nunc ad id, quod tibi promisi, revertor, quomodo quaecumque sunt, in sex modos Plato partiatur. primum illud “quod est” nec visu nec tactu nec ullo sensu comprehenditur; cogitabile est*. Note also that in this letter, Seneca (like Apuleius here) apologises for the use of neologisms to render the Greek notions of ‘being’ (see also BEAUJEU (1973), 266).

(*OLD* s.v.) with *-bilis* denoting an ability to perform the verbal base⁹⁷ and *-tas* nominalising the term into an abstract noun giving the sense of immobility or indecision concerning the passions which Apuleius then highlights with the description: *ea stupore defigit immobili*. In VII.229 the Greek term *δσιότης* ‘piety’ is rendered with another feminine abstract in *-tas*: *religiositas*, which is another Apuleian lexical innovation. Apuleius seeks to further clarify the use of the word by repeating it in the following terms: *quarum religiositas deum honori ac suppliciis divinae rei mancipata est*. In VIII.231, Apuleius broaches the topic of the *ἄλογος τριβή* which Quintilian had described (*Inst.* 10.11) as an ‘irrational knack’ (*inrationalis usus*). Apuleius translates it as a *usus nulla ratione collectus* and which he claims is part of the ‘science of flattery’ (*adulandi scientia*), a branch of rhetoric that claims to persuade what it cannot teach (*quae persuasum velit quod docere non ualeat*). This *ἄλογος τριβή* or *adulandi scientia* is also given the moniker *captatrix verisimilium* a ‘striver after verisimilitudes’. The female agent noun contrasts with the earlier *disciplina contemplatrix bonorum* ‘the Contemplatrix study of goods’. The latter was found in Celsus but is extremely rare, and the former appears to be a lexical innovation. In VIII.232, one observes that Apuleius borrows Quintilian’s translation of *civilitas* for *πολιτική* (see *Inst.* 2.25 and 33; and 2.14).

At XV.241 we find the Greek socio-political term *ὀλιγαρχία* which Apuleius defines with a lengthy exegesis: *ea sic nascitur, cum, propter pessimum pastum eius partis animae quae ex cupiditatibus constat, non solum rationabilitatis et irascentiae loca possidentur, sed etiam eorum quae non necessaria sunt cupidine*. The part of this definition which is of interest is the double translation: *rationabilitas* and *irascentia*, both abstract terms first attested here. In the same section, Apuleius translate Plato’s *φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδὲς* (*Rep.* 581a) with *accipitrem pecuniae* and *lucricupido* respectively, the former being a phrase borrowed from Plautus’ *Persa* (409) (*OLD* s.v. *accipiter*, 1b) and the latter being a lexical innovation also based on the scaffold of Plautus’ *turpilucricupidus* in the *Trinummus* (100).⁹⁸

⁹⁷ This is one of its many senses, for a wider view of its semantic range see KIRCHER-DURAND (1991), 121-2 who argues that its general sense is that of a ‘semic constant, that of non-actualisation.’ See also HOFMANN-SZANTYR, 348-50.

⁹⁸ See *TLL* s.v. *lucricupido* and BEAUJEU (1973), 299 n. 248.1.

3.6. APULEIUS' *PERI HERMENEIAS*

The attribution of the *Peri Hermeneias* (PH) to Apuleius is contested.⁹⁹ The valuable contributions of RAMSAY's and LONDEY AND JOHANSON's are the two works I have taken to be my foundation for tentatively attributing this work to Apuleius. RAMSAY notes that the text is 'always ascribed to Apuleius in the manuscripts',¹⁰⁰ however, the bulk of her study does not take a side as to whether attribution to Apuleius is correct. LONDEY AND JOHANSON (1987, 3) argue that 'there is no real doubt that the work dates from the second century AD.'¹⁰¹ I intend to leave the question open but examine the methods of lexical innovation in the work here for completeness.¹⁰² The title of the treatise shares the Greek name with the second text of Aristotle's *Organon* of the same title, also commonly named *De interpretatione*. It is a complex text covering the relationship between logic and language. There is therefore a significant amount of definitional vocabulary, both logical and linguistic: propositions (quantity, quality), modalities, symbols, nouns, and verbs. RAMSAY's discussion of the introduction of new vocabulary in the *PH* (2017, 43-58) and LONDEY AND JOHANSON's chapter on Apuleius' technical writing in the *PH* (1987, 50-61) are both highly instructive for this chapter, and I do not intend to reproduce the arguments articulated in their research. The collected lexical innovations of the *PH* have been included in **Appendix II** for completeness. However, some general observations on the text's approach to lexical innovation here will be useful.

RAMSAY argues that the 'conservative approach to linguistic innovation' contrasts with the types of terms introduced in other Apuleian philosophical tracts such as the *Pl.*¹⁰³ Those

⁹⁹ See the useful overview in HIJMAN (1987), 408-9.

¹⁰⁰ RAMSAY (2017), 16; see also MORESCHINI (1991), 189 in the critical apparatus.

¹⁰¹ Although see HUBY (2007), 61.

¹⁰² Debates concerning authenticity should not detrimentally impact the scope of examination in this work. To avoid examining the work altogether is unhelpful for the purposes of this study; that is, to collate a large enough sample of data as possible in supporting the arguments advanced regarding lexical innovation in Apuleius' philosophical corpus). As to the question of whether the *PH* forms any part of the *Pl.*, I agree with both RAMSAY (2017, 49) and HOENIG (2018, 102-3 n. 1), mostly on lexical and stylistic grounds, that any theory attempting to link the former as being part of the latter is, by now, a discredited one.

¹⁰³ RAMSAY (2017), 45.

innovations found in the *PH* are largely direct calques of Greek originals as shown in table below (adapted from RAMSAY):

Apuleian innovation	Reference	Greek original
<i>pro-tens-io</i>	190.5-6	πρό-τα-σις
<i>rogata-mentum</i>	190.5-6	ῥαξιῶ-μα
<i>sub-stitut-iva</i>	190.11-12	ὑπο-θετ-ικός
<i>de-dicat-ivus</i>	191.1-2	κατα-φατ-ικός
<i>ab-dicat-ivae</i>	191.3-4	ἀπο-φατ-ικός
<i>de-clarat-iva</i>	192.8	κατ-ηγορ-ικός
<i>in-demonstra-bilis</i>	206.1-2	ἀν-απόδεικ-τος

Though not discussed in RAMSAY's study, the (almost) exclusive use of the calquing technique in rendering the Greek terms is disproportionately found in this work. We find them, as noted above, scattered throughout the *Met.* and in his philosophical work, but 50% of all Apuleian morphological calques of Greek philosophical terms collated in **Appendix II** are found in the *PH* alone. The glosses in the *PH* are also illustrative. For example, at the beginning of the tract (190.2-3), Apuleius writes of the *pronuntiabilis* or 'statemental', itself apparently a lexical innovation, likely rendering ῥαξιῶμα (or ῥαξιῶματικός, see *TLL* s.v., 10.2.1917.13). He then lists a brief lineage of terminology employed by different Latin authors and the Greek originals: *quam vocat Sergius effatum, Varro proloquium, Cicero enuntiatum, Graeci πρότασιν tum ῥαξιῶμα, ego verbum e verbo tum protensionem tum rogamentum; familiarius tamen dicetur propositio*. The important points to note here are the following:

- Apuleius is placing himself directly within a tradition (whether rhetorical-philosophical or otherwise) with specific intellectuals (e.g. Cicero and Varro);
- He acknowledges the Greek originals (thus glossing);
- He notes the common terminology: *propositio* (though see LONDEY AND JOHANSON (1987), 36, 39);

- d) Nonetheless, he coins two terms: *protensio* and *rogamentum*, the former a morphological calque of *πρότασις*,¹⁰⁴ the latter a sense translation of *ἄξιωμα*;¹⁰⁵ and
- e) He explicitly acknowledges the literalness of his translations (*verbum ex verbo*).¹⁰⁶

In the next section, we find the lexical innovation of *substitutiva* (for *ὑποθετικός*) another morphological calque, introduced with another Latin technical term: *condicionalis* which RAMSAY (2017, 98) notes is used by Apuleius' contemporary, a jurist named Gaius (c. 130-80 AD) in a legal context ('with conditions attached', see *OLD* s.v.; see also LONDEY AND JOHANSON (1987, 75)). That Apuleius used the collocation of an established technical term with his own innovation is a common technique,¹⁰⁷ as earlier seen with *protensio* and *rogamentum* with *propositio*.

The terms *qualitas* and *quantitas* are familiar technical vocabulary, especially with the former — once coined to render a Platonic term by Cicero, now used as features of logical propositions. LONDEY AND JOHANSON (1987, 51) and RAMSAY (2017, 102) argue both terms are first used in this sense, however one can find similar usages for *qualitas* in Quintilian (see *OLD* s.v., 2b-c) and so I have not included it as a novel usage.

RAMSAY observed that one of the ways in which new terms are introduced in this text is via the following technique: neologism + cognate verb. So in 194.9-11, Apuleius writes: *utriusvis harum revictio confirmat alteram, non tamen et utriusvis confirmatio revincit*

¹⁰⁴ See LONDEY AND JOHANSON (1987), 39.

¹⁰⁵ The root of *ἄξιωμα* is *ἄξιός* 'worth' (see LSJ s.v.) but it also carries a secondary meaning of a 'request, petition' (LSJ s.v. *ἄξιωμα* II.3) which Apuleius might have been playing with in forming *rogamentum* (from *rogare* 'to ask, beg, request'). Note also both *-mentum* and *-μα* are neuter suffixes denoting the result of an action and are considered cognate (see *OLD* s.v. *-men*). See RAMSAY (2017), 95: 'It is less obvious how *rogamentum* was derived from *ἄξιωμα* if this was the intention. The LSJ compares the verb *ἄξιόω* to the Latin verb *postulare*, which could be seen as a synonym of *rogare*. The author may simply have in mind the very first stage of dialectic exchange where the interlocutor is first presented with a question which he must accept in order for it to become a premise of the syllogism. This seems likely in light of the fact that author clarifies his use of *propositio* later where he makes it clear that a question is being posed which must then be accepted as true by the interlocutor in order for the syllogism to proceed [...]'. See also LONDEY AND JOHANSON (1987), 39, 54.

¹⁰⁶ As we have seen earlier, an explicitly Ciceronian turn of phrase, see Cic. *Fin.* 3.15 and 3.52; *Luc.* 31 and *Top.* 35. See also POWELL (1995a) 276f.

¹⁰⁷ See e.g. *Pl.* 2.226 *indignatio et incommobilitas*.

alteram ('and so the refutation (*revictio*) of one of these [near-equals] confirms the other, yet the confirmation of one does not refute (*non revincit*) the other').¹⁰⁸ The substantive occurs later in the ninth-century archbishop Hincmar's theological works, whereas the verb is well established, appearing in Lucretius, Cicero, and Livy among others. RAMSAY argues that the lexical innovation of *revictio* 'balances' the two clauses, and one can see it working in this manner if we break the sentence down into the following antitheses: *revictio* <--> *confirmatio* and *confirmat* <--> *revincit*. So, in this instance, the introduction of a new term is not necessarily to render a Greek philosophical expression directly or to fill an *egestas* in the Latin lexis, but rather for rhetorical balance, creating two clauses with binary grammatical pairs: noun with noun, verb with verb.

Finally, there is the example of a loan-blend in 197.14-15 with *cachinnabilis*. The relevant context is as follows:

If, for example, you were to take man [as subjective particle], you would say something about him by indicating of him either a property, e.g., *capable of laughing* (*cachinnabile*); or a genus, e.g., *animal* [...]¹⁰⁹

RAMSAY (2017, 151) notes that the Greek example of laughing as a technical 'property' of an individual is found in Porphyry (γελαστικός) and indirectly in Aristotle (*PA* 673a821).¹¹⁰ ERNOUT-MEILLET (80, s.v. *cachinno*) define it as follows: 'Quelquefois, en poesie, employé pour *rīdeō*, *risus*, à l'imitation du grec καχάζω'. The borrowing of the root of the Greek verb and adding the Latin *-bilis* produces a loan-blend etymologically closer to the Greek original than later translators.¹¹¹ The term also appears in Apuleius' *Met.* 3.7.57. Instances of lexical innovations like this provide further evidence of the *PH*'s Apuleian authorship.

¹⁰⁸ Trans. LONDEY AND JOHANSON (1987), 87.

¹⁰⁹ Trans. LONDEY AND JOHANSON (1987), 91: *ut si hominem substituas, quicquid de eo dixeris, aut proprium eius significaveris, ut cachinnabile, aut genus, ut animal [...]*

¹¹⁰ See also BARNES (2003), 208.

¹¹¹ Cf. Boethius' *risibilis*; see also RAMSAY (2017), 37.

3.7. CONCLUSIONS

The follow quantitative analysis of Apuleius' lexical innovations and augmentations drawn from his philosophical translations is illustrative:¹¹²

Category of lexical innovation	Percentage (total number = 56 lemmata)
Augmentations (semantic calques, etc.)	18% (10)
Sense translations, etc.	32% (18)
First-attested loan-words and loan-blends	2% (1)
Morphological calques	48% (27)

These statistics are revealing in that they show, very much like Cicero, combining sense translations and lexical augmentation, Apuleius was just as likely to draw upon the existing resources of Latin as he was to coin a new term (morphological calques or sense translations), especially in the *PH*, a logical treatise, (morphological calques would soon become a critical tool for Latin philosophers rendering logical terminology in particular, e.g. in Boethius). Like Cicero too, he was reticent to use loan-words outright or even lexical augmentations, much preferring to create his own neologisms either by calque or by sense.

The analysis of Apuleius' three philosophical works (*Mun.*, *Pl.*, and *PH*) has given us further examples of an unbroken tradition in Latin literature of translating and ultimately transforming Greek thought through a particularly Roman lens. What is interesting is that, unlike Lucretius or Cicero, Apuleius was not Italian by birth, nor did he receive a thorough education in Rome, but was, in fact, from the colonies (in this case, North Africa). As we shall see with the Latin Church fathers, the trend of non-Italic Romans writing in Latin and furthering the creation of a new philosophy becomes more commonplace as we enter the Christian era.

¹¹² Note that these statistics do not include innovations in Apuleius' philosophical translations lacking Greek equivalents, though these are included in **Appendix II**.

In compiling and analysing Apuleius' contributions to the creation of this new Latin vocabulary, we have observed that he consciously situated himself within a tradition of 'innovators' in this field, drawing on not just the technical vocabulary of his predecessors such as Cicero and Seneca but explicitly linking himself with their efforts in deploying almost identical rhetorical techniques (*captatio benevolentiae*, *praeteritio*, using the trope of the Latin *egestas* in philosophical terminology etc). Though the vocabulary introduced to Latin by Apuleius certainly did not have the posterity of figures like Cicero, it was nonetheless influential and his translations of Greek would come to impact upon Church fathers such as Tertullian and Augustine (for the latter, see HAGENDAHL (1967), 680-9). There is also the fact that Apuleius was three types of writer at once when composing his philosophical tracts: a rhetorician and sophist, a literary writer, and a Middle Platonist.¹¹³ The intersection of these three men produced a novel approach to the interpretation of Greek philosophy and re-imagining it in his native vernacular.¹¹⁴ Through this re-imagination, the use of philosophical terms (both established and newly coined) was crucial in setting out Apuleius' views of Platonism, as it stood in the second century AD. It was not, for Apuleius, a matter of simply repeating Platonic philosophy for students or colleagues, but to make sense of it as he understood it, to bring concepts into a Latin context (for instance, by replacing Greek names for various winds, or the proper names of divinities, with Roman ones in the *Mun.*), and blending concepts of Stoicism and Aristotelian thought into a coherent whole.¹¹⁵ This was not always successful, and as we have seen there were constant conflations of core metaphysical terms (*substantia* with *essentia* for οὐσία), mistranslations of mathematical vocabulary (*vigintiangularis* for γωνιῶν δώδεκα, *directus* and *obliquus* for ὀρθὸν περιφέρει), and a more free and literary approach to the direct translation of Greek texts (in the *Mun.* especially). Whether this was a deliberate process in the mind of Apuleius is not apropos of this study; rather the results of Apuleius' translations and his creation of a new set of philosophical terms is of interest. It is from this evidence that we can continue to argue the contention I set out in

¹¹³ See e.g. *Apol.* 12, 39.1, 41.7, 64.3.

¹¹⁴ See HOENIG (2018), 158: '[Apuleius] adjusts and tailors his Platonism carefully to the particular authorial agenda, genre, and audience of his works. This strategy is entirely in line with Apuleius' concept of "philosophical rhetoric", a skill he has mastered thoroughly.'

¹¹⁵ See e.g. REDFORS (1960), 53, who remarks in relation to the *Mun.*, that beyond mere *variatio* and poetic or archaic diction, Apuleius pursued genuine 'renovation and originality' in his choice of words.

the Introduction, namely that the Graeco-Roman philosophical tradition was not a continuous one, with Romans extending the ideas of the Stoics, Plato, and Aristotle into the Christian era, but rather a hybridised transformation, or ‘Latinisation’ of Greek thought which changed it permanently, giving way to its own intellectual heritage in Europe. Through the next chapter, I will examine how this heritage became the receptacle for the changes of ancient philosophy in Latin Christian and pagan contexts by discussing the approaches to translation and lexical innovation in Tertullian, Calcidius, and then Boethius in the sixth century AD.

4. CHAPTER FOUR:

BETWEEN PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARIES —

TERTULLIAN AND CALCIDIUS

4.1. 'CHRISTIAN TECHNICAL TERMINOLOGY'

'[G]ibt es denn ein Kirchenlatein?' KOFFMANE's question posed in 1879¹ challenged the notion of discrete historical vocabularies in Latin. Though it can be a useful heuristic to divide the lifespan of the Latin lexicon into, for example, Archaic, Classical (Golden and Silver Latin), post-Classical (Imperial Latin), and Ecclesiastical, the technical vocabularies within these historical iterations of the language do not neatly proceed in a discrete fashion. The ways in which we might distinguish, for instance, the philosophical terminology of Classical and post-Classical Latin from 'Kirchenlatein' are not immediately obvious. Two issues arise regarding Ecclesiastical Latin and the analysis that follows:

- a) Can 'Christian technical terminology' be considered a sub-category of 'philosophical vocabulary' in Latin? and
- b) Is it useful to think about 'Ecclesiastical Latin' involving a change to the Latin language in terms of lexis?²

The opening claim of this chapter is to answer both questions in the affirmative. Firstly, the inheritance of pagan philosophical terminology into the works of Latin Church Fathers is undeniable and thus demands some type of treatment. One could make the claim that, not only was early Latin Christian terminology a sub-genre of Latin 'philosophical vocabulary' but an extension of it, often by authors who were originally educated in pagan philosophy and later converted to Christianity and synthesised their learned philosophical vocabulary with their translations of Christian terms from Greek sources.³ Secondly, with the increasing prominence of Christian doctrinal debates within the early Church, especially those that occurred in the context of metaphysics (Christology and Trinitarianism), the imperative for Latin authors to express Greek philosophical concepts in their native tongue was strong. The expression of these concepts often meant the difference between heresy and orthodoxy, and so the

¹ KOFFMANE (1879), 1.

² MOHRMANN (1951), 280.

³ See HAUSCHILD (1881/1876), 4-7.

significance of Christian theological terminology (inherited from Latin philosophers like Cicero), cannot be overstated.

Mention should also be made of Ecclesiastical Latin and Latin philosophical vocabulary, namely the parallel development of various philosophical schools, such as Middle- and Neo-Platonism, during the formative stages of Christianity emerging in Greek and Latin-speaking communities. Both the Christian and pagan strands of philosophy possessed shared concerns about the direction of their doctrines. In the maturing of Middle Platonism over the first and second centuries AD for example, the concerns of free will, the nature of God and eternity, and the implications of evil in the world for mankind (sc. ethics), formed important cornerstones of philosophical inquiry for pagans such as Plutarch, and Christians such as Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, and Augustine. Plotinus too, in instigating the Neo-Platonic interpretations of the Old Academy, further imbued religious connotations into his philosophy. As COPLESTON (1946/2003, 506) described it: ‘Neo-Platonism was the last breath, the last flower, of ancient pagan philosophy; but in the thought of St. Augustine it became the first stage of Christian philosophy.’ One can then see continuity between the concerns of pagan philosophers and early Christian apologists, despite deep antipathies palpable among them (e.g. Porphyry’s polemical works against Christianity composed in Sicily, burned in 448 AD).

These philosophical oeuvres refined, augmented, and re-interpreted Platonic concepts that led to increased complexity and richness in Greek and Latin philosophical vocabularies. Platonic philosophy’s renovation into Eclecticism after Antiochus of Ascalon and Plutarch produced a hybridised intellectual movement of Stoic and Peripatetic thought, both always having been reliant upon technical terminologies.⁴ Other collections of so-called Middle Platonic works, like those attributed to Hermes Trismegistus and the Chaldean Oracles, also started to blend Platonic, Stoic, and Neo-Pythagorean concepts into new forms of regional philosophies (the former establishing itself in Egypt, for example). Each, in turn, produced new terms in Greek, which would find their way into North African Christian authors writing in Latin (notably Lactantius). These terminologies often appeared in (substantially orthodox)

⁴ In contrast to Epicureanism, which was a Hellenistic school with a disdain for technicism and whose philosophy was consistently excluded from the school of the Eclectics. See ZELLER (1931/1967), 284.

Christian works (such as Tertullian's and Lactantius') through the discussion of various heresies such as Valentinian Gnosticism.

It is important then to keep in mind the reality on the ground in the eras of authors like Origen or Tertullian up to Porphyry, Marius Victorinus, or Calcidius. Greek and Latin philosophy had not ended with the Hellenistic era, but was growing, co-mingling with, and subsequently exerting an influence upon Christian doctrinal debates. We might go further to say that the influence was so entrenched that it became bi-directional and, by the time of philosophers like Boethius, Christian technical terminology was also exerting influence upon the conceptualisation (in Latin) of Greek philosophical doctrines. For example, the translation of the Aristotelian *Organon*. In the formative stages of ecclesiastical debates throughout the Koine-speaking world, and thence into Latin West,⁵ much of the vocabulary of Christian doctrine needed to be created either from nothing or based on the terminology of Greek Christian sources. As HADOT observed: 'A quoi est due, cette invasion de mots nouveaux dans la langue latine? Une première cause réside dans la philosophie contemporaine. Le même invasion de mots abstraits et composés se produit vers la même époque, dans la langue grecq.'⁶ CARRION argues that the spiritual (sc. Christian) revolution within the Roman Empire initiated a concomitant linguistic revolution that expressed itself through new terms (lexical innovation), loan-words, loan-shifts, and polysemy.⁷ When it came to loan-words, by the time a concept had entered into Latin, there remained the option of employing Greek in certain scenarios, namely where:

- (a) the liturgy of worship required it;
- (b) Latin equivalents were entirely absent;
- (c) an equivalent existed but was 'too pagan'; or
- (d) an equivalent was not sufficiently 'bildungsreich' or educational for the Latin reader.⁸

⁵ See MOHRMANN (1951), 282-4 for an overview of the early Latinisation of Christianity in first and second centuries AD.

⁶ HADOT (1957), 205.

⁷ CARRION (2014), 259. See also MOHRMANN (1952), 19.

⁸ KOFFMANN (1879), 6-7.

A combination of these rationales seems to be at play in each of the authors that we will examine in this chapter. Most noteworthy from our perspective are (b) and (d). Whilst initially (d) would have been a prevalent issue for Latin writers (and translators), as the mastery of doctrine increased across the Latin world, (b) and therefore (d) became less of an obstacle. Just as with other technical vocabularies such as law, medicine, and rhetoric, the language of Christian philosophy became more specialised, with each new author adding their technical terms to polemicise against heresy using the concepts of key theological controversies of the times. As KOFFMANE remarked, the energy of the Roman ‘Geist’ in transforming and eliminating (‘ausscheiden’) what were once indispensable Greek technical terms from their vocabulary of theology was remarkable.⁹ This spirit of lexical creation, the goal of providing Latin a new vocabulary to add to the lexicon to articulate the tenets of Christian thought, whilst simultaneous surpassing their reliance upon Greek technical terminology, is a continuation of a tradition beginning with Lucretius and Cicero, and best exemplified in the authors that will be surveyed in this chapter.

MOHRMANN’s comments¹⁰ on ‘semantic innovation’ (loan-shifts, sense translations, etc.) are important to address at this stage. She observed that, at the time a new meaning was introduced into a Latin, a synchronic analysis is often required rather than an etymological (diachronic) one. This is because, she argues (1961, 326), the new meaning of a word is largely based upon or influenced by the contemporary meaning of the existing word subject to undergoing semantic innovation. As we shall see, this was not always the case and some Christian authors (e.g. Tertullian) were acutely aware of a term’s etymology, especially in use in pagan contexts (such as Cicero’s). However, MOHRMANN qualifies her claim in saying that there are instances of, what one could describe as, ‘etymological translation’ among Christian authors in adding new meanings onto existing words, though these are comparatively few compared to the contemporary influence on a word’s interpretation. Her analysis contrasts semantic innovation in Greek with Latin and concludes that such innovation was more frequent in the former than the latter. This was due to the tendency of lexical innovation in

⁹ KOFFMANE (1879), 7.

¹⁰ MOHRMANN (1961).

Latin (rather than lexical augmentation), and this again was purportedly due to the Latin *egestas* in abstract thought compared with Greek.¹¹ She observes further that the semantic innovation of a term in Latin was often the starting point for further derivation, due to the ‘grammatical’ (as opposed to lexical) character of Latin.¹² For instance, once the term *salus* had been augmented by the specific Christian technical meaning concerning Christ, derivatives were simple enough to formulate (e.g. agent nouns: *salutificator* in Tertullian or *salvator* in Lactantius). Thus semantic innovation bred lexical innovation, at least as far as Latin was concerned. Yet MOHRMANN acknowledges (1961, 33) that, in many cases in the semantic augmentation of a Latin term, one can recognise a Greek word behind it. This suggests that, perhaps, MOHRMANN’s approach needs refinement: on the one hand, semantic augmentation leads to lexical innovation, but on the other, both of these phenomena are ultimately the *causata* of the translation of a given Greek term. In many of the terms examined in this chapter, we find that the first attested form a Latin term often appears with a linguistic ‘signal’; that is, a gloss or paraphrase of an earlier Greek one.

Especially in the translation of Scripture, it is important to acknowledge that, like Classical authors translating Greek philosophical concepts into Latin for the first time, it was difficult for Christian authors to systematise their lexical innovations. Rather, they created technical vocabulary in an ad hoc fashion, when the need arose. Though this is not always the case, and certainly Cicero often applied a specific method when rendering Greek terms into Latin (i.e. a set of techniques and choices of translation within given parameters) and kept to his own stylistic and conceptual limits around neology and loan-words, it was also not the case that Latin authors necessarily began with semantic innovation and proceeded to create derivatives to form their technical vocabularies based purely on grammatical rules or theory (an intensional approach to lexicalisation). When we examine the specific calques and glosses of Latin Christian authors, we see that each author proceeded largely on a case-by-case basis (extensional) sometimes using different terms for the same Greek one, and sometimes conflating two or more Greek terms into a single Latin one.

¹¹ MOHRMANN (1961), 332; cf. PONCELET (1957), 363.

¹² MOHRMANN (1961), 334. A dichotomy borrowed from DE SAUSSURE (1922), 183f.

This chapter focuses on the vocabulary of Christian authors writing in Latin but more specifically, the creation of new terms or new meanings in Latin in translating Greek Christian technical vocabulary. In studies of Ecclesiastical Latin and early Church theology, scholarship has taken it as read that Latin authors writing in this area were forced to create new terms and forge a new vocabulary for their apologetics and doctrinal debates. It is the aim of this chapter to accept the assumption, but also to qualify and quantify it in some detail, collecting data from selected authors who best exemplify the practice of lexical innovation. For this reason, I have chosen to examine selected works by Tertullian, and Calcidius (the latter will mostly be used as a comparative case study to Cicero's translation of Plato's *Timaeus*).

The inclusion of Tertullian is due to his prodigious efforts in introducing doctrinal vocabulary into Latin, specifically in his Trinitarianism, Soteriology, and traducianism. His early translations of passages of Scripture as well as observations made by subsequent Church Fathers such as Augustine¹³ and Jerome¹⁴ also indicate that he was an influential source of intellectual tools, as well as lexical ones, in the discussion of Christian theology in Latin. Victorinus is significant due to his unique position in the history of Christianity, his earlier role as orator-cum-theologian, and his intellectual development from Neo-Platonic philosophy to Christian doctrine, the importance of the vocabulary of the former on the vocabulary (or lack thereof) of the latter, and the influence he had on authors such as Boethius. However, the section I have completed regarding his lexical innovation practices has been omitted due to word-limit constraints (see below for a summary of my findings). Four important authors and works absent from this chapter require explanation, namely Cyprian, Jerome, Augustine, and the translations of the *Vetus Latina*.

Cyprian was first and foremost a church leader. He was not concerned with speculative theology; his works were instead pastoral. On doctrine, his was Biblical, rooted in the teaching he received as a catechumen. Cyprian makes no attempt to philosophise about it, and therefore does not have the specific problem of coining new vocabulary for Greek concepts in Latin. The fundamental concepts he had already sourced from the Old Latin translations of Greek Scriptures used in Carthage and in the works of Tertullian, which we know he regarded

¹³ Augustine was, in any case, hostile towards him, see e.g. *Haer.* 86 and *Bon. Viduit.* 4.6.

¹⁴ See e.g. *Jer. Vir. Ill.* 53 (PL 23.698).

in high esteem.¹⁵ There also do not appear to be any extant traces of a direct translation by Cyprian on texts in Greek and he does not appear to have translated Biblical texts (in his quotations he strictly reproduces the text of the Old Latin Bible, even when the syntax is less Classical than his own).¹⁶ It appears that whenever a Latin term is used in a technical (theological) sense in Cyprian, its most likely source appears to be Tertullian.

With respect to Jerome, those scholars who have examined his Vulgate translation provide us with some reasons for his exclusion here. For example DIRKSEN's observation that: '[Jerome] coined no new words for his revision [of the Old Latin translations of the Gospels] and introduced very few new words into the texts. The Old Latin translation had done all this.'¹⁷ Examining his version of the Old Testament is equally beyond the scope of this investigation given that much of recent scholarship on Jerome suggests he translated (most frequently) directly from Hebrew, not Greek, sources.¹⁸ This is not to say Jerome's translations are irrelevant to a study of this kind, and certainly his views expressed in his personal correspondence often directly bear upon the central argument of this thesis:

So I not only admit but also freely proclaim that, in translating from the Greek (except in the case of the holy scriptures where even the order of the words is a mystery), I render sense for sense and not word for word. For this I have the authority of Tully.¹⁹

There is an important dichotomy in understanding why Jerome is ultimately of less value to the aims of this thesis than would appear. The letter in which the above text originates is a defence of his (sometimes) free translation of Origen's *On the First Principles*. He defends such freedom of translation by arguing that his adaptations from non-Biblical Greek sources are rightly sense translations, eschewing mechanical reproduction at all costs and suiting the

¹⁵ See e.g. Cyp. *Ep.* (PL 4.232).

¹⁶ See POIRIER (1999), 172 (perhaps not surprising given they were sacred texts.)

¹⁷ DIRKSEN (1939), 70. Note GOELZER (1884), 14 who counted around 350 neologisms in Jerome, (see 1884, 14 n. 2.) though these were not primarily introduced in the translation of Greek terms as such.

¹⁸ See generally the studies of KAMESAR (1993) and KRAUS (2017), 19-23; 107-8. KRAUS (2017), 50-5 examines Jerome's translations from Hebrew in some detail.

¹⁹ Jer. *Ep.* 57.5 (PL 22.571): *ego enim non solum fateor, sed libera voce profiteor, me in interpretatione Graecorum, absque Scripturis sanctis, ubi et verborum ordo mysterium est, non verbum e verbo, sed sensum exprimere de sensu. habeoque huius rei magistrum Tullium [...]*

style and correct diction of the contemporary rules of Latin. This is in line with Classical authorities like ‘Tully’. On the other hand, he argues that the interpretation of the *scriptura sancta* must not be translated freely, nor even their word order disturbed due to the *mysterium* that they convey. BROCK argues that Jerome in this passage offered ‘no new ideal for translating the Bible’ but was simply ‘reflecting the accumulated experience of over half a millennium of biblical translation’.²⁰ This aligns with what earlier Biblical scholars such as GRÜZMACHER have observed, that Jerome’s most important works were ultimately reproductions via translations, not creative or original.²¹ These observations, combined with those discussed earlier in DIRKSEN, suggest that, though Jerome situated himself within a tradition of authors like Cicero in adapting Greek source material *ad sensum*, this was restricted to specific contexts (namely non-Biblical ones). He simultaneously places himself outside of that tradition and firmly into the Christian one of faithful imitation of the Scriptures without lexical innovation. The primary purpose of this thesis is the collection of evidence that demonstrates the creation of a philosophical vocabulary in Latin diachronically. An analysis of Jerome’s lexical innovations would add relatively little to this objective.

Augustine’s influence and the various *testimonia* of his predecessors is vital to any study of Christian vocabulary in general, but for this thesis, the emphasis centres upon the translation and re-interpretation of Greek technical terminology. Two factors militate against the inclusion of Augustine in such a study: a) his lack of translations from Greek, and b) his probable lack of knowledge of the Greek language.²² Given these two contingencies, it is less relevant to this examination to compare or analyse Augustine’s theological vocabulary apropos of Tertullian’s or Victorinus’.

The question of the *Vetus Latina* translations of scriptures should be addressed. In a preface to his translation of the Gospels addressed to Pope Damasus in 384 AD, Jerome laments ‘there are almost as many forms of [the Old Latin] texts as there are copies’ (*tot enim*

²⁰ BROCK (1979), 70.

²¹ GRÜZMACHER (1906), 110.

²² See e.g. LEO (1907), 472; COURCELLE (1948), 159; O’DALY (2001), 159 regarding Augustine’s sources: ‘We can exclude any direct use of Sextus Empiricus [...] or of other Greek writers, given Augustine’s slight knowledge of Greek.’

sunt exemplaria pene quot codices).²³ The sheer size of the corpus, as well as the textual analysis required to adjudicate which sections of the translations are pre-Vulgate, and which have been influenced by the Vulgate translation, make any superficial analysis of the subject fraught with danger.²⁴ An in-depth philological analysis of the translation methods of the Old Latin translators and their lexical innovations would be a significant undertaking too great for the current scope of this thesis. Where the Old Latin translations become relevant is within direct quotations within the works of early Latin authors interpreting Greek theological concepts.

The ambit of this chapter is to identify those selected authors outlined above who fall directly within the tradition begun by Cicero in the first century BC in creating philosophical vocabulary of Latin from direct translations or adaptations of Greek texts, and who best illustrate the translation practices and approaches which either transformed and altered original Greek concepts by virtue of the pre-existing parameters within the Latin language (sc. morphology and syntax), or which accurately reproduced their Greek originals using new technical vocabulary.

This chapter originally included an analysis on the works of Marius Victorinus, but due to the constraints of the word limit for this thesis and the relatively fewer contributions from his lexical innovations compared with the other authors in this study, I have omitted this section here. My conclusions on Victorinus are as follows: Like Cicero and Apuleius before him, Victorinus acutely aware of rhetorical contingencies in his creation of new philosophical vocabulary both in his non-Christian translations from Porphyry and later in his anti-Arian tracts dealing with Christological technical terminology. Greek loan-words were generally confined to his work on Greek metrical theory but occasionally he stressed the importance of retaining Greek originals in his Christian writings to retain the correct sense of the concept in teaching Christians fundamental aspects of Trinitarian doctrine (e.g. *consubstantialis* and *ὁμοούσιος*). Common Latin abstract suffixes such as *-ia*, *-alis* and *-tas* were favoured in

²³ Jer. *In Am. lib. 3 praef.* (PL 29.525).

²⁴ See DIRKSEN (1939), 64-70 and his summary of the textual analysis of the Vulgate and Old Latin recensions and their complex relationship with each other. See also KEDAR (1988), 300: 'The multiplex material that gives fragmentary and sometimes contradictory evidence of old Latin Bible translations is subsumed under the name "Old Latin" or "Vetus Latina".'

Victorinus' lexical innovations, whereas classic abstract suffixes such as *-tio* seem to have been avoided in general. The quantitative analysis of Victorinus' lexical innovations and augmentations is summarised below:

Category of lexical innovation	Percentage (total number = 30 lemmata)
Augmentations (semantic calques, etc.)	20% (6 lemmata)
Sense translations, etc.	7% (2 lemmata)
First-attested loan-words and loan-blends	0% (0 lemmata)
Morphological calques	73% (22 lemmata)

It is clear that Victorinus favoured the creation of new terms via morpheme-for-morpheme calques of Greek philosophical and theological terms wherever he was required to express these concepts in Latin (e.g. *alteritas* for *ἑτερότης*, *cognoscentia* for *σύγγνωσις*, *filietas* for *υἰότης*, *praeprincipium* for *προαρχή*, *substantialitas* for *οὐσιότης* etc.). This separates him quite dramatically from his predecessors, who favoured a balance between outright neology such as morphological calquing and loan-words, and the use of existing lexical material (lexical augmentation and sense translation). Victorinus occasionally did have recourse to Greek loan-words (primarily *ὁμοούσιος*) for distinctly theological reasons, but even there he was not averse to providing a Latin equivalent through lexical innovation (*consubstantialis*).²⁵ The data indicates then that Victorinus was a writer trained in the sensitivities required to translate Neo-Platonic vocabulary with considerable care, and the transfer of this training to his later (highly influential) approach to forming Latin Christological terminology in countering other philosophical schools of Christian thought such as Arianism.

²⁵ Since this word did not become a term in Victorinus' philosophical or theological works per se, I have not counted it as an 'innovation' or loan-word in the sense used throughout this thesis. In Victorinus' grammatical and metrical works, the incidence of first-attested Greek loan-words is extremely high and statistically overrepresented. To adjust for this, I have excluded all lemmata from Victorinus' *Ars Grammatica* and have focused solely on the philosophical and theological corpus.

Geography

Of additional interest to this study of lexical innovation in Latin in this chapter is the fact that this phenomenon has now spread to the *coloniae* of the empire by the time of authors like Tertullian. We saw in the previous chapter that Apuleius had continued the tradition of creating or contributing to Latin philosophical vocabulary as a bilingual author from North Africa. In this chapter, Latin apologists like Tertullian and Lactantius also hail from this same region, and their geographical positions are equally as important as their temporal ones. In North Africa especially, we know that the earliest dated Latin reference to the New Testament derives from transcripts of a trial of the so-called Scillitan Martyrs (c. July 180 AD).²⁶ As MONCEAUX wrote, the development of ‘Christian’ Latin in North Africa was informal, shapeless, and often ad hoc but contained all the flavour of African temperament and sectarianism.²⁷ ADAMS (2007, 565-6) notes that, ‘[o]n the one hand Africa produced many writers of literary style who were untouched by local influences. But on the other hand there are extant several texts and documents from the hand of writers who had not had a literary education, and these reveal a marked intrusion of vernacular loan-words into more popular varieties of the language.’ So while some provincialisms may have exerted influence on the choices of terms for Christian authors rendering Koine Greek into Latin, there has been a tendency among scholars to overplay the role of regional peculiarities in the translation of Greek Biblical texts (and African Latin literature in general) in the second century AD.²⁸ In any case, it is prudent to keep in mind that authors such as Tertullian, Lactantius, Augustine and many others, both pagan and Christian,²⁹ would all employ a type of vocabulary linked to their

²⁶ See e.g. HOUGHTON (2016), 3-4. Note however BARDY (1948), 107 who hypothesises that the earliest Latin translations of Greek Christian texts and scripture occurred in Rome rather than North Africa. Although see also the arguments of HAUSSLEITE (1896), 152.

²⁷ MONCEAUX (1905), 3.

²⁸ MOHRMANN (1949), 86-7. See also KROLL (1897) and NORDEN (1909), 593ff. See further ADAMS (2007), 516-18. See also the sociological aspects of this discussion in WILHITE (2007), Ch. 2, also 189-91 *contra* e.g. TEEUWEN (1926), 3: ‘Wie Cicero ein heidnischer Römer war, so ist Tertullian ein römischer Christ.’

²⁹ Minucius Felix, Fronto, and Arnobius are further examples.

regional variation of Latin which, though not determinative in their choices of Christian theological terminology, might have exerted some influence, if only in a lexical dimension.³⁰

4.2. VOCABULARY AS THEOLOGICAL BATTLEGROUND IN TERTULLIAN

One aspect of Christian authors' debates regarding heresies is the antagonism over vocabulary, which has encouraged detailed secondary studies of style and lexical choices in these works. Continental scholarship on Tertullian in recent decades has offered varied conclusions regarding his contribution to philosophical Latin in the late second and early third centuries. MOHRMANN concludes that Tertullian was a contradictory character, whose lexical 'innovations' were largely that of the parlance of his 'co-religionists' in general usage among the Christian community in his time, but co-opted for his own apologetics.³¹ NORDEN proposes that Tertullian inaugurated the Christian terminology used by theologians and later writers in posterity, both in discussing the Trinity and Church doctrine in general.³² The optimal conclusion could lie somewhere between the two, although as this investigation will show, perhaps closer to NORDEN's view than MOHRMANN's. Tertullian was undeniably prolific when it came to coining new words, with 982 new terms consisting of 509 nouns, 284 adjectives, 28 adverbs and 161 verbs.³³ Most of these are found in the works entitled *Adversus Valentinianos*, *De Anima*, and *Adversus Marcionem*.³⁴ MOHRMANN's caution, however, ought to be borne in mind (for all authors in this study, not just Tertullian): that there is always the

³⁰ See HOPPE (1903), 114 on Tertullian, 'manche Wörter ein spezifisch "afrikanisches" Gepräge zu haben scheinen'. Yet see ADAMS (2007), 575 for the (lack of) influence on, especially, syntactical constructions in educated African authors writing in Latin: 'The African writers whose works have survived were mostly highly educated products of the rhetorical schools, writing a learned, even bombastic, variety of the language. They were well capable of resisting any alien syntactic patterns that they might (perhaps) have heard around them. Even if we allow that a writer such as Apuleius knew Punic, he too was so subtly fluent in Latin that he would not have admitted Punic constructions unless he had chosen to do so. Unlike Greek, Punic did not have the status to inspire cultivated writers of Latin to transfer its patterns into the other language as a cultural display.'

³¹ MOHRMANN (1950), 43-7.

³² NORDEN (1895), 2.546; also OSBORN (2003), 138. See also HAUSSLEITE (1896), 152.

³³ HOPPE (1932), 133-48; also BRAUN (1997), 269.

³⁴ Interestingly, the former is a specifically philosophical work and the latter is a polemic against a powerful heresy of Greek origin at the time (Marcionism). Many innovations also appear in *Adv. Val.*, a work composed to counter gnostic influence on Christian doctrine.

possibility that the ‘innovation’ attributable to him was simply a first *testimonium* of a word from the Christian *sermo* of his community.³⁵ It is important then to situate Tertullian in the tradition of Latin authors actively seeking to add to the Latin philosophical lexicon, whether ancient or Christian.³⁶ It is not necessarily a case of measuring Tertullian’s ‘creativity’, but rather to examine how he used a range of linguistic techniques to convey Christian concepts from the Koine Greek of the Septuagint into ‘Kirchenlatein’. To do this, it is of a reduced value to the reader if conclusions are drawn from Tertullian’s lexical innovations *en masse*, based on data collected by past scholars in this field. This chapter will instead examine Tertullian’s term-formation practices; that is, only those terms whose *raison d’être* can be traced to a Greek original, and those passages in which Tertullian explicitly glosses Greek terms.

Sources

Given Tertullian’s works were largely polemical in subject matter, the arguments he espoused were a response to pre-existing doctrines (and their attendant terminologies) in Greek.³⁷ The question is which Greek sources did he draw upon to create Latin philosophical and Christian doctrinal vocabulary in Latin? An obvious one is the Septuagint, which Tertullian drew upon heavily against, for instance, the Marcionites’ interpretation of certain passages of the Gospels. Other sources include Greek apologists such as Origen, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Irenaeus, Marcion, and Theophilus of Antioch (an opponent of Marcion).³⁸ There were also other sources in both Greek and Latin, such as the Gnostic writings of the adherents of Valentinus.

³⁵ See MOHRMANN (1950), 43f.

³⁶ We know from Tertullian’s testimony that he was openly hostile to pagan philosophy in general, see e.g. *Apol.* 46.18 and MORESCHINI (2005), 182-3, certainly more so than he was towards the Greek apologists like Quadratus, Aristides, Justin Martyr, and Tatian, among others (see MORESCHINI (2013), 486), although he had dedicated works to friends in his youth who were perhaps pagan philosophers (e.g. the *Ad amicum philosophum*, which Jerome reports was a work of Tertullian’s (*Ep.* 22.22), see also MORESCHINI (2013), 488-9.)

³⁷ See e.g. DEMMEL (1944), 14-15 for a discussion of Tertullian’s knowledge of the Greek language.

³⁸ For a discussion of Greek sources of e.g. Tertullian, see EVANS (1948), 31-8 and EVANS (1972), 1.xx.

Scholars have asserted that Latin versions of the Old and New Testaments were in circulation during Tertullian's lifetime³⁹ and he possibly had access to them.⁴⁰ However, we also know that many terms Tertullian used to render the Greek of the Septuagint do not appear elsewhere. This might suggest that he was not necessarily working from an established or official version in Latin, but coining new terms as he needed during ad hoc translations. EVANS suggests Tertullian read the Old Testament in the Septuagint version, 'possibly making his own translation into Latin as need arose.'⁴¹ It becomes much more difficult, however, when we come to Tertullian's polemics against Greek Christian writers, whose original texts are lost to posterity, preserved only in his direct or indirect citations. Nowhere else has this issue created such deep divisions in scholarships as the *Adversus Marcionem* (c. 207 AD), a five-book polemic against Marcionism.

One of Tertullian's most influential works, it has elicited debate over whether he had direct access to the original Greek versions of Marcion's *Evangelion* or his *Apostolikon*⁴² or whether he was reliant upon Latin versions of them. The *locus classicus* on the subject began with HARNACK, who concluded, apparently without much doubt, that Tertullian was reliant upon Latin versions of Marcion's work.⁴³ Since then, SCHMID (1995) and ROTH (2009) advanced a series of counter-arguments to the effect that Tertullian himself had partly translated Marcion's Greek originals into Latin throughout the *Adv. Marc.*⁴⁴ An attractive conclusion on this issue of a Greek or Latin *Vorlage* was recently offered in LANG (2017), which cautions against absolute conclusions on whether Tertullian relied solely on a Greek or Latin version(s).⁴⁵

³⁹ See O'MALLEY (1967), 1-2.

⁴⁰ See further MOHRMANN (1950), 42-3; CAPELLE (1913), 1-21; BARDY (1937), 3-20; and KLAUSER (1946), 1.467-82.

⁴¹ EVANS (1972), xx; also LABRIOLLE (1914), 210. See further HOUGHTON (2016), 6.

⁴² The former is believed to have been an expurgated version of the Gospel of Luke, the latter an edited edition of the Pauline Epistles. Whether these were in fact emended to suit Marcion's theology (as Tertullian argued in *Adv. Marc.* 4.6.2) or whether it simply represented an earlier form of Christianity, is difficult to ascertain given the evidential void of Marcion's original works.

⁴³ HARNACK (1924), 178*.

⁴⁴ SCHMID (1995), 40-59; ROTH (2009), 467.

⁴⁵ LANG (2017), 71-2.

Whether Tertullian had been fully bilingual in both languages we lack the evidence to say,⁴⁶ but there are clues either way. In one work, he suggests a difference between the Tau of the Greeks and ‘our T’, classing himself as a native Latin speaker (*Adv. Marc.* 3.22.6), though elsewhere he claims he learned both.⁴⁷ Since we do not have Marcion’s original Greek texts beyond reconstructions from Tertullian himself, any discussion of specific Greek terms Tertullian translated in his polemics are speculative and reliant on secondary scholarship, largely HARNACK’s work, or a comparison with relevant Biblical passages in Koine Greek.

Past studies of Tertullian’s vocabulary

The examination of Tertullian’s lexical innovation practices has been almost exclusively confined to Germanic scholars, with little interest in the subject in Anglophone studies beyond EVANS (1972). In general, the interest in Tertullian’s ‘diction’ has come from theologians rather than classical philologists. While stylistic interest is one aspect, close studies of this area of his works have been due to the theological implications for understanding the minutiae of lexical choices in Christian authors, which played a significant role on any discussions of heresies and associated doctrinal issues. Early scholarship includes HAUSCHILD, HOPPE, and DEMMEL. The latter focused on the large array of ‘Neubildungen’ in the suffixes of *–antia* and *–entia*. He suggested Tertullian had coined 36 individual new terms in Latin with these suffixes alone, and differentiated between five types of neologism, those conditioned by: style, a substantivising tendency, independent neologisms, Greek terms, or Biblical citations. This chapter is concerned with the fourth type and, more broadly, to include all lexical innovations and augmentations formed from his translations of Greek apologetic texts or scripture.

Before beginning the analysis, because of a degree of overlap between this study and previous lexical and stylistic research on Tertullian, I want to examine a review by MORESCHINI (2001) of WELLSTEIN’S (1999) study *Nova Verba in Tertullians Schriften gegen*

⁴⁶ Though see HAUSCHILD (1881/1876), 14 for an early view on Tertullian’s competence in reading Koine Greek.

⁴⁷ *Adv. Prax.* 2: *Monarchiam, inquiunt, tenemus et ita sonum ipsum vocaliter exprimunt etiam Latini, et tam opifice ut putes illos tam bene intellegere monarchiam quam enuntiant; sed monarchiam sonare student Latini, οἰκονομίαν intellegere nolunt etiam Graeci. at ego, si quid utriusque linguae praecerpsi, monarchiam nihil aliud significare scio quam singulare et unicum imperium.*

die Häretiker aus montanistischer Zeit. The comments about, and critique of, the latter are highly instructive and will guide some of the analysis that follows. MORESCHINI expressed his disappointment that WELLSTEIN's book did not include 'more about the history of the ideas and the philosophical doctrines themselves'. He commented that, since studies of Tertullian as an 'inventor' of a philosophical vocabulary were 'almost completely missing', the problem was 'of first importance for Latin as a medium for Greek and Mediaeval philosophy.'⁴⁸ He did not elaborate on this issue further, and it is not clear which types of studies MORESCHINI means precisely, but it is hoped that this thesis as a whole, and this chapter in particular, will address some of his suggestions. His comments also link the history of ideas with diachrony; that is, the semantic evolution of a given vocabulary, in this case, theological and philosophical. MORESCHINI complains of WELLSTEIN's more style-focused study and concludes that it failed to provide 'clues for understanding Tertullian's theology'. Importantly, he argues that 'invention' or creation of new words alone does not necessarily imply a significance for Christian doctrine: 'If *inconvertibilis* and *innatus* do have a philosophical and theological significance the same cannot be said for such *nova verba* as *incorruptibilitas*, *corruptorius*, *incorruptorius*, *extraneus*, *auctrix*, *pusillitas* [...] which are, on the philosophical and theological level, of relatively little interest.'⁴⁹

This attitude perhaps clarifies why philosophers and theologians have been more interested in Tertullian's lexical choices than classical philologists. MORESCHINI is concerned with the conceptualisation of Greek Christian theology in Tertullian and the implications for the ideas themselves. However, while WELLSTEIN's study is limited to Tertullian's style and diction, and follows closely in the philological vein of HOPPE in the earlier in twentieth century, it is still a valuable (and recent) overview for examining some of the instances in which Tertullian handled Greek original terms and transposed (and thereby altered or re-interpreted) them into his native Latin tongue. MORESCHINI is correct when he notes that the 'invention' of new words does not necessarily imply significance for Christian doctrine, especially when we note 26% of Tertullian's innovations were *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα* (the highest of the authors surveyed in this thesis). However, such assertions might also run the risk of

⁴⁸ MORESCHINI (2001).

⁴⁹ MORESCHINI (2001).

neglecting a broader issue: the many ἄπαξ λεγόμενα and rare terms in Tertullian's collection of *nova verba* reveal an important fact about his theological project; namely that he was not averse to innovation and experimentation, like his philosophical predecessors, to construct (in his case) a new Christian philosophical vocabulary. Cicero's lexical innovations often became unproductive or remained ἄπαξ λεγόμενα, but this can not be a measure of his influence (or lack thereof) on later authors creating new terms in the same subjects. It is, therefore, important to study such terms in Tertullian's works, analyse them quantitatively and qualitatively, and to evaluate and understand them in the context of Tertullian's broader literary project.

WELLSTEIN also makes important comments in the conclusions of his study. Here, he argues that one finds the use of *nova verba* for purely stylistic reasons (e.g. rhythm or formal effect) 'nur sehr selten'. The use of neologisms in Tertullian, WELLSTEIN concluded, more frequently led to the creation of appropriate expression in Latin, often serving dual purposes: a) to translate the Greek terms with slavish accuracy ('sklavische Genauigkeit'), or b) to provide solutions in Latin more elegantly than later attempts. He concludes that Tertullian's lexical choices were influenced by the need for correctly sounding words, as well as ones pithy and appropriate to the context to give weight to a particular expression.⁵⁰ He observes that Tertullian used his lexical innovations more freely, without apologising for the novelty of the expressions (as was Cicero's wont),⁵¹ and contrasts the multiple usages of Tertullian's innovations to Cicero's frequent abandonment of his newly coined terms in favour of more established ones. Apuleius too was less concerned with the unfamiliarity of his new lexical creations in Latin. It might be argued that one reason for such unapologetic creativity was the rapid expansion of technical vocabularies after the Late Republican era (as discussed in the Introduction). The issue of lexical innovation in Tertullian is, therefore, more important than merely stylistic and should not be dismissed as such. However, we must be careful to note that analyses of lexical innovations alone do not provide us a more privileged insight into Tertullian's theological project more broadly beyond understanding his literary style, it is simply another tool of analysis. As has been made clear from the beginning of this study, the

⁵⁰ WELLSTEIN (1999), 332-3.

⁵¹ See also HAUSCHILD (1881/1876), 18 who counts 79 instances of glossing a Greek term in Cicero, whereas only 8 in Tertullian. Glosses are discussed in more detail below.

examination of lexical innovation should not be divorced from a thorough investigation of lexical augmentation as well. The importance of novel interpretations of pre-existing terms, some of them wholly untechnical in etymology, transforming into specific theological terms through which Christian doctrines could be debated, reached new levels of significance in Tertullian's polemics against Gnostic and Marcionite heresies. As we will discuss, commonplace terms like *substantia*, *persona*, and *forma* began to take on critical functions in rebutting various differing views on Trinitarianism and Christology. However, one might temper MORESCHINI's critique by acknowledging that the study of Tertullian's creation of new forms of expression in Latin theology through which to discuss early Church doctrine directly affected the interpretation of those concepts into posterity (especially for those later Church fathers who either had limited access to Greek original texts or had limited knowledge of the Greek language and so were reliant on pre-existing Latin translations and exegeses).

To reduce duplication, I intend to rely on the data in HAUSCHILD, HOPPE, DUMMEL, and WELLSTEIN to a large degree in formulating the arguments of this chapter. WELLSTEIN divides the *nova verba* in Tertullian into eight categories.⁵² There is some overlap between categories (e.g. terms that 'render Gnostic vocabulary' and those coined 'to confront heresies'), but WELLSTEIN's taxonomy provides a useful way of examining new formations in Tertullian's vocabulary. As I have done with Cicero's lexical innovations and augmentations, I divide Tertullian's into relevant morphological genera. One issue with Tertullian is the relative scarcity of direct glosses (or 'signals', as discussed in the Introduction), and thus a study like this must rely on context to infer which Greek terms he is translating (e.g. direct passages from the Septuagint or Greek Christian apologetic works). In other cases, Tertullian is providing his own commentary on the work of a Greek author and we can infer which terms Tertullian translates based on those contexts. For example, *aequiparantia* (*Adv. Val.* 16.3)

⁵² Those that: 1) were used by earlier or contemporaneous translators of the Bible into Latin (WELLSTEIN 1999, 63f); 2) deviate from traditional Bible translations (1999, 87-93); 3) translate non-Christian philosophical terms (1999, 106-8); 4) render Gnostic vocabulary (1999, 119-20); 5. are abstract terms which render whole expressions in the Greek original (1999, 157f); 6) are formed in allusions to Biblical citations (1999, 158f); 7) are dogmatic terms coined referring to specific subject matters: a. Attributes of God and Jesus Christ (1999, 172f); b. Holy Ghost (1999, 215f); c. The Trinity (1999, 218f); d. Sin, Satan, the Fall (1999, 229-245); e. Resurrection (1999, 246f); f. Prophets and Apostles (1999, 267f); g. Ethics (1999, 270f); h. Baptism (1999, 271f); i. Epiphany (1999, 272f); j. *Benedictio* (1999, 274f); 8) are coined to confront heresies (1999, 278-329).

appears to correspond with σύγκριμα from a passage which resembles Irenaeus' (*Adv. Haer.* 5.1.8): φύσιν ἐμπεποιηκέναι αὐτοῖς, ὥστε εἰς συγκρίματα καὶ σώματα ἐλθεῖν, πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι δύο οὐσίας (*natura qua pervenire mox posset in aemulas aequiperantias corpulentiarum ut duplex substantiarum conditio ordinaretur*), whom Tertullian himself had singled out as a source for his work (*Adv. Val.* 5.1). Yet correspondences like these are usually educated guesses and should be acknowledged as such in both this study and WELLSTEIN's previous scholarship on the subject.

Collected lexical innovations and augmentations in Tertullian

All ἄπαξ λεγόμενα⁵³ are noted with the symbol ‡, augmentations with an asterisk (*):

–entia/–antia substantives

aequiparantia (σύγκριμα) > *aequiparo* + –antia

apparentia (ἐπιφάνεια/φαντασία) > *ad-* + *pareo* + –entia

delinquentia (ἁμαρτία) > *delinquere* + –entia

discentia (μάθησις) > *disco* + –entia

duricordia ‡ (σκληροκαρδία) > *durus* + *cor* + –ia

multinubentia ‡ (πολυγαμία) > *multus* + *nubo* + –entia

multivorantia ‡ (πολυφαγία) > *multus* + *voro* + –antia⁵⁴

olentia (ὀσμή) > *oleo* + –entia

purificantia (κάθαρσις/καθαρισμός) > *purifico* + –antia

refrigescentia ‡ (κατάψυξις) > *refrigesco* + –entia

reminiscentia (ἀνάμνησις) > *reminiscor* + –entia

renidentia (γελᾶν) > *renideo* + –entia

subtililoquentia ‡ (πιθανολογία) > *subtilis* + *loquor* + –entia

–alis substantives

agnitionalis ‡ (κατὰ γνῶσιν) > *agnitio* + –alis

circumcordialis ‡ (περικάρδιος) > *circum-* + *cordus* + –alis

⁵³ This includes δῖς, τρίς, and τετράκις λεγόμενα within Tertullian's corpus.

⁵⁴ For the Greek terms on which these were based, see NORDEN (1909), 608, DEMMEL (1944), 98.

conformalis (σύμμορφος) > *co-* + *forma* + *-alis*

passionalis (ἐμπαθής) > *passio* + *-alis*

substantivalis ‡ (κατ' οὐσίαν) > *substantia* + *-ivus* + *-alis*

***-tio* substantives**

ablatio (ἀφαίρεσις) > *ab-* + *ferre* + *-tio*

adimpletio (πληρώματος) > *ad-* + *impleo* + *-tio*

*animatio** (ἐνθύμησις) > *animo* + *-tio*

*compassio*⁵⁵ (συμπάθεια) > *con-* + *pati* + *-tio*

dedecoratio (ἀτιμία) > *de-* + *decoro* + *-tio*

dilectio (ἀγάπη) > *diligo* + *-tio*

flagellatio (διαμαστίγωσις) > *flagello* + *-tio*

nullificatio ‡ (φαυλισμός) > *nullus* + *ficio* + *-tio*

*prolatio** (προβολή) > *pro-* + *ferro* + *-tio*

reprobatio (ἀπεδοκίμασαν) > *reprobo* + *-tio*

***-tas/-itas* substantives**

cavositas ‡ (κοιλιάς) > *cavosus* + *-tas*

sensualitas (αἴσθησις) > *sensualis* + *-tas*

trinitas (τριάς) > *trinus* + *-tas*

***-bilis* substantives**

contradicibilis (ἀντιλεγόμενος) > *contra-* + *dico* + *-bilis*

illaesibilis (ἀκράτητος) > *in-* + *laedo* + *-bilis*

inapprehensibilis (ἀόρατος) > *in-* + *apprehendo* + *-bilis*

innascibilis (ἀγέννητος) > *in-* + *nascor* + *-bilis*

inventibilis (ἀνεξερεύνητος) > *inventus* + *-bilis*

incommiscibilis (μέμεικται οὐδενί χρήματι) > *in-* + *commisceri* + *-bilis*

ineffigiabilis ‡ (ἀσχηματιστός) > *in-* + *effigio*

⁵⁵ For the original Greek term see Prisc. *Gramm.* 2.550.5.

–tor/–trix substantives

adflictator ‡ (θλίβων) > *adflictio* + *–tor*

circumductor (μεταγωγεύς) > *circum-* + *duco* + *–tor*

conquistator (συζητητής) > *conquirere* + *–tor*

defectrix ‡ (ἀποστᾶσα) > *deficere* + *–trix*

desultrix ‡ (ὑστερήσασα) > *desilio* + *–trix*

factitator ‡ (δημιουργός) > *factito* + *–tor*

potentator ‡ (δυνάστης) > *potens* + *–tor*

salutificator ‡ (σωτήρ) > *salus* + *facio* + *–tor*

con– substantives and verbs

concivis (συμπολίτης) > *con-* + *civis*

conculcatus ((κατα)πατούμενος) > *con-* + *culcatus*

concupiscentivus ‡ (ἐπιθυμητικός) > *concupisco* + *–ivus*

conresuscito (συνεγείρω) > *con-* + *resuscito*

consubstantivus (ὁμοούσιος) > *con-* + *substantia* + *–ivus*

ob– substantives and verbs

obaemulor ‡ (παραζηλώω) > *ob-* + *aemulor*

obmusso ‡ (θρυλέω) > *ob-* + *musso*

obnexus (στραγγαλιά) > *ob-* + *nexus*

in– substantives

illiberis (σπέρμα μὴ ἡ αὐτῷ) > *in-* + *liberis*

*indignativus*⁵⁶ ‡ (θυμικός) > *in-* + *digno* + *–ivus*

inenarrativus ‡ (ἄρρητος) > *in-* + *enarro* + *–ivus*

innatus (ἀγέννητος) > *in-* + *natus*

⁵⁶ WELLSTEIN (1999, 108) classifies this as a ‘Grammatik’ term used by Tertullian, but chronologically Tertullian’s philosophical use of the word (in reference to *anima*) is first, followed by Diomedes in a grammatical sense in the fourth century (see *TLL* s.v. *indignativus*).

insubditivus ‡ (ἀπαθής) > *in-* + *subditivus*

invaletudo (φόβος) > *in-* + *valetudo*

***sub-*, *super-* substantives and verbs**

subfermento ‡ (συλλαμβάνω) > *sub-* + *fermento*

subsurio ‡ (ἐγκισσᾶν) > *sub-* + *surio*

supergressus (ὑπερβολή) > *super-* + *gressus*

superinducticius ‡ (παρείσακτος) > *super-* + *induco* + *-ius*

superterrenus ‡ (ἐπίγειος) > *super-* + *terrenus*

Miscellaneous Substantives

*beatus** (μακάριος)

detentus (ἀκρατητῶς) > *detino*

*eruditus** (παίδευσις/ παιδευθείς)

fluxilis (ῥευστός) > *fluere* + *-ilis*

*forma** (ὑπόστασις)

molinus (λίθος μυλικός) > *mola* + *-inus*

naturificatus ‡ (διὰ τὸ φύσει πνευματικὸν εἶναι) > *natura* + *facio*⁵⁷

pacatorius (εἰρηνικός) > *pacator* + *-ius*

*persona** (ὑπόστασις)

*scintillula** (σπινθήρ) > dim. of *scintilla*

unio (τὸ εἶν) > *unus* + *-io*

ventriloquus (ἐγγαστρίμυθος) > *ventrus* + *loquus*

Miscellaneous Verbs and Participles

circumfingo (περιπλάσσω) > *circum-* + *fingo*

decinero (συναναλίσκω) > *de-* + *cinis* + *-o*

defensa (ἐκδίκησις) > p.p.p. *defendo*

depeto (παρακαλέω) > *de-* + *peto*

⁵⁷ The apophony of *facio* in compounds (word-initial *a* becomes a raised *i* in internal open syllables, and *e* in internal closed syllables) has been discussed elsewhere, see e.g. SCHEER AND SEGERAL (2003), 248; MATEU AND ONIGA (2020), 12.

*desipio** (ζυμοῦν) > *de-* + *sipio*

figulo (πλάσσω) > *figulus* + *-o*

frugesco (καρποφορώ) > *frux* + *-esco*

ignavesco ‡ (κοπιάζω) > *ignavus* + *-o*

multifico (πληθύνω) > *multi-* + *ficio*

munditenens ‡ (κοσμοκράτωρ) > *mundus* + *teneo*

praedesigno ‡ (προχειρίζω) > *prae-* + *designo*

First-attested loan-words and loan-blends

apostatis (ἀποστάτης)

*baptizor*⁵⁸ (βαπτίζω)

biaeothanatus (βιαιοθάνατος)

catabolicos (καταβάλλω/καταβολή)

charisma (χάρισμα)

episcynium (ἐπισκύνιον)

*esetos*⁵⁹ (*ἔσेतός/ἔστός)

hypobrychium (ὑποβρύχιον)

histriculus (?ῥστριξ + *culus*)

idolothytus (εἰδωλόθυτος)

necrothytus (νεκροθυτος)

paredrus (πάρεδρος)

protoplastus (πρωτοπλαστός)

⁵⁸ Cf. *βαπτιστής* ‘one who baptises’ (see LSJ s.v.). The Latinised form *batizo* was already in use, possibly confined the North African region (see FUNCK (1886), 318), so adding the agent suffix *-tor* would not have been noticeably unusual in Tertullian’s time. Note also the use of *βαπτίζω* as a medical term in Theodorus Priscianus ‘to bathe a wound’ (LANGSLOW (2000), 496).

⁵⁹ There are textual problems associated with this loan-word. The form *ἔσेतός* does not appear in the LSJ, but EVANS (1964), 64 proposes this is either the Greek original from which Tertullian transcribes, meaning ‘pushed in’ to water, or simply a scribal misreading of the adjectival *ἔστός* from *ἵστημι*.

Selected quantitative analysis of Tertullian's lexical innovations

Category of lexical innovation	Percentage (total number = 106 lemmata)
Augmentations (semantic calques, etc.)	7% (7)
Sense translations, etc.	46% (49)
First-attested loan-words and loan-blends	11% (12)
Morphological calques	36% (38)

Quantitatively,⁶⁰ Tertullian placed himself in the tradition of predecessors like Cicero and Apuleius, with around 50% of his new terms reliant upon existing words either as semantic calques or sense translations (derivatives from existing terms, e.g. *invaletudo* for φόβος or *defensa* for ἐκδίκησις) where possible. The other 50% is made up of lexical innovations (morphological calques like *circumfingo* for περιπλάσσω, *conclavis* for συμπολίτης, *conquisitor* for συζητητής etc.) and direct loan-words. One might attribute this to his rendering of Biblical passages from Greek into Latin or a concerted method of closely conveying the Greek nomenclature of his theological opponents to counter them effectively with his own terms. However, what the data also show less obviously is that, in general, where a Latin equivalent was required for a Greek term, Tertullian preferred a new monolexemic derivative to a phrasal term or circumlocution as we often saw in earlier authors like Lucretius or Cicero.⁶¹ The low proportion of semantic calques (loan-shifts) will be explained below, but it appears here too that, when adapting a Greek term into Latin, Tertullian was more likely to translate using a new sense translation rather than imbuing a pre-existing term with a new technical meaning. This does not mean that he was not borrowing frequently from pre-existing vocabularies (legal, agricultural, medical, etc.), but many of these terms were for rhetorical effect rather than to translate Greek expressions. In general, however, the data show that Tertullian, while highly experimenting and creative in

⁶⁰ Note that the number of lemmata in the selected categories will overlap (e.g. some lexical augmentations are also calques, etc.).

⁶¹ This particular development is in line with lexical phenomena in other technical subjects like medicine, see e.g. LANGSLOW (2000), 377; also see Afterword below.

his term-formation processes, was still situating himself in the rhetorical tradition of Cicero and Apuleius before him, avoiding a surplus of novel or strange terms to express his arguments, whilst also allowing himself the flexibility to derive new lexemes in translating Greek.

Qualitative analysis of Tertullian's lexical innovations

General observations concerning the various reasons for lexical innovation in Tertullian have been summarised by scholars elsewhere.⁶² Tertullian adopted the practice of coining new terms or meanings governed by two parameters: aesthetics (style and sound) and vocabulary building to fill gaps in Latin technical terminology (primarily when combating heresy in his apologetics). There was significant overlap in Tertullian's stylistic and formal aesthetic considerations in his prose, and the need to expand the Latin lexicon enough to discuss the concepts expressed by his intellectual rivals writing in Greek. From the above categories, Tertullian, though inventive, appears to remain within the morphological limits established in the Latin language rather than relying on the Greek term as such for technical meaning, hence the extensive dependence on well-known abstract suffixes like *-ia* and *-entia*, *-bilis*, and agent nouns in *-tor/-trix*. For the adjectival ending *-bilis*, on HOPPE's count,⁶³ there are over 30 lexical innovations with this ending in Tertullian, of which 12 are ἁπαξ λεγόμενα. Of these, 7 appear to be direct translations of Greek theological or philosophical terms. This is self-explanatory and applies to all morphological categories above, but we can isolate terms in *-bilis* as especially productive in Tertullian's philosophical and theological vocabulary (as opposed to giving new meanings to terms established from the *Vetus Latina* translations, for example).⁶⁴ The introduction of a handful of new verbal and participial forms also warrants

⁶² HOPPE (1903), 114-15; DUMMEL (1944); WELLSTEIN (1999), 330-1.

⁶³ HOPPE (1932), 133-48.

⁶⁴ See e.g. WASZINK and VAN WINDEN (1987), 294 on *inenatabile* and *inrespirabile*; see also WELLSTEIN (1999), 111.

note, demonstrating that techniques like morphological calquing were not simply limited to substantives (*circumfingo* for περιπλάσσω and *praedesigno* for προχειρίζω⁶⁵).

Tertullian borrowed liberally from legal, medical, agricultural, and grammatical vocabularies to render Biblical passages, dogmatic concepts, or (much more commonly) to act as rhetorical or metaphorical tools in his polemics against religious opponents. Of the terms analysed above, very few are genuine lexical augmentations, however his use of technical vocabulary from other subject areas was extensive.⁶⁶ Throughout this study, the sole criterion for classifying a term as a lexical augmentation is that it must be a pre-established word in Latin imbued with a novel sense. Simply using established terms metaphorically or by analogy is not always sufficient, although as acknowledged in the Introduction, and in the discussion of Cicero's *Timaeus* translation especially, there is not always a bright line between a semantic shift and a metaphorical use. Common Latin medical terms, for example, *restitutor* and *medicus*, become metaphors for God, altered to convey an overt theological meaning.⁶⁷ Grammatical terminology is also deployed to convey theological controversies, such as his polemic against Marcion's notion of 'deprivation' (*ablatio*), a term later used by the grammarian Diomedes (Gramm. 1.441.22): *aphaeresis est ablatio de principio dictionis* to render ἀφαίρεσις, though it had also been in use by early Latin translators in rendering the Biblical ἀφαίρεμα (Cod. 100 Lev. 8.27), which is probably the sense in which Tertullian uses it. Similarly, the grammatical term⁶⁸ *singularitas* is used to render the Gnostic (Valentinian) notion of 'solitariness' in *Adv. Val.* 37.

An interesting vocabulary item is found in *Adv. Marc.* 5.3 in the translation of παρείσακτος with *superinducticius*. The closeness of translation can be explained by the fact that Tertullian is rendering a section of Paul's *Epistle to the Galatians* (2.4). The section is obscure in meaning, but it appears that Paul is referring to certain 'false

⁶⁵ It is worth noting that this verb is the only *prae*- formation among those in Tertullian's neologisms that directly renders a Greek term. There are no less than 37 new *prae*- formations, see CHAPOT (1997), especially at 275 n. 7.

⁶⁶ See HOPPE (1903), 114; WELLSTEIN (1990), 331-2; and his list of various registers of vocabulary in Tertullian in 345-51.

⁶⁷ *Pat.* 15.1; *Scorp.* 5.12; *Adv. Marc.* 5.11.1-3. See also the discussion below with technical medical loan-words used by Tertullian for rhetorical effect. The terms cited as examples are not considered lexical augmentations for this study.

⁶⁸ See e.g. BRAUN (1977), 48.

brothers' (ψευδάδελφοι) who were privily brought into (παρείσακτος) a meeting he was attending in Jerusalem. It is this latter term that Tertullian translates with a lexical innovation, compounding *super-* with the past participial base of *INDUCO* and adding the suffix *-icius*. This suffix was often used in juristic terminology, and here Tertullian could have added to the Greek the sense, i.e. that these imposers carried an official status as secret or uninvited attendees to the meeting, or that they had contravened a certain legal protocol at the time.⁶⁹ Whatever the reasoning, the morphological calque of the Greek term suggests that Tertullian strived to keep close to the meaning of the Greek original. Similarly, the somewhat awkward compound *subtililoquentia* calques *πιθανολογία*, but Tertullian's term comes to denote something closer to 'delicacy of speech', whereas Marcion's use of the term suggests a 'persuasiveness of speech' (cf. e.g. Plato, *Tht.* 162e), specifically with respect to the philosophers (*Marc.* 5.19.7: '*hominum*' *subtililoquorum et philosophorum*).⁷⁰

Notable lexical augmentations in Tertullian

No analysis of Tertullian's contributions to Christian doctrinal vocabulary would be complete without a discussion of his use of the following key terms in novel senses: *persona*, *substantia*, *status*, *gradus*, *potestas*, *species*, and *forma*.⁷¹ These each took on what we can say were technical, theological meanings in Tertullian's works, specifically in his polemic against the Monarchian Praxeas (*Adv. Prax.* 2.4):

[T]he Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost: three, then, not in condition (*status*), but in degree (*gradus*); not in substance (*substantia*), but in form (*forma*); not in power (*potestas*), but in aspect (*species*); yet of one substance, and of one condition, and of one power, inasmuch as He is one God, from whom these degrees and forms and

⁶⁹ See ADAMS (2013), 562; also LEUMANN (1918), 23-4. The suffix *-icius* does not only connote a legal term but is used in administrative and grammatical vocabulary as well.

⁷⁰ Cf. Cicero's *suaviloquens* (*Brut.* 15.58), *breviloquens* (*Att.* 5.20.1), and *breviloquentia* (*Rep.* 5.11). See also Seneca's criticisms of these terms in *Seneca apud Gellium* 12.2.4-9.

⁷¹ Some of these well-established Latin terms have not been included in the collection of lexical innovations above. In part, this is due to the fact that Tertullian often uses these terms in non-technical senses as well (i.e. metaphorically), and so it is difficult to classify these as 'innovations' or 'augmentations' in a distinct sense.

aspects are reckoned, under the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.⁷²

Scholars have discussed these terms at length,⁷³ but we can infer the following correspondences from the Greek terms:

<i>substantia</i> (οὐσία)	<i>forma</i> (εἶδος)
<i>potestas</i> (δύναμις)	<i>species</i> (ἰδέα)
<i>status</i> (ὑπαρξίς)	<i>gradus</i> (ἀξία)

Substantia as a (possible) calque of ὑπόστασις⁷⁴ can serve as a starting point given we know that Greek authors like Origen (late second century) and Basil of Caesarea (fourth century) had formulated Trinitarian doctrine in the following way: God, the Son, and the Holy Spirit were all of one essence (οὐσία), manifesting themselves through three different ὑποστάσεις or ‘substances’.⁷⁵ To trace the diachrony of *substantia* adequately from Classical Latin into Christian dogma would require a monograph, but here it will be sufficient to analyse where Tertullian’s translation of the Greek terms instigates a significant re-interpretation of Christology.

His understanding of *substantia* was an early indication of the gradual disentanglement of terms in Latin to refer to the Greek *ousia* and *hypostasis*, however, his use of it was highly ‘elastic’.⁷⁶ To understand Tertullian’s distinction between the two, and how that compared with the contemporary formulation by Greek-speaking Christian intellectuals, the detailed comments made by Basil (*Ep.* 38) are instructive:

⁷² *Adv. Prax.* 2.4: [...] *patrem et filium et spiritum, tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie, unius autem substantiae et unius status et unius potestatis, quia unus deus ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti deputantur.*

⁷³ See e.g. ARPE (1940); EVANS (1948), 38-58; STEAD (1963).

⁷⁴ See CASSIN et al. (2014), 307, who question the classification of the term as a calque. See also ARPE (1940), 65, 67; BRAUN (1962), 170 n. 2; PELLICER (1966), 195-8; also the bibliography in BRAUN (1977), 703.

⁷⁵ For a summary of the theological aspects of Basil and Origen’s Trinitarianism, see RAMELLI (2012), 302.

⁷⁶ See e.g. KITZEL (2014), 509. This description could be applied to the approach of most Latin authors in their usages of *substantia* from the first century A.D. on.

[...] [T]hat which is specifically referred to is indicated by the expression “hypostasis”. For if you say “man,” by the indefiniteness of the term used you have produced in our minds a sort of vague (ἀόριστος) concept (σημασία), so that, although the nature of the thing is indicated by the noun, the thing which subsists (ὑφίστημι) in that nature and is specifically indicated by the noun is not made evident to us. But if you say “Paul,” you have indicated by the noun the nature subsisting in the particular object. This, then, is subsistence or “hypostasis” (person). It is not, however, the indefinite notion of “ousia” (essence) which, by reason of the generality of the term employed, discloses no “sistence” (στάσις); it is the conception which, by means of the specific notes that it indicates, restricts and circumscribes in a particular thing what is general and uncircumscribed [...] ⁷⁷

And in *Ep.* 236:

The distinction between *ousia* and *hypostases* is the same as that between the general (τὸ κοινόν) and the particular (τὸ ἕκαστον), as, for instance, between the animal and the particular man. Wherefore, in the case of the Godhead, we confess one essence (οὐσία) so as not to give a variant definition of existence, but we confess a particular *hypostasis* (ὑπόστασις), in order that our conception of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be clear and without confusion. ⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Basil, *Ep.* 38: [...] ὁ ἰδίως λεγόμενον τῷ τῆς ὑποστάσεως δηλοῦσθαι ῥήματι. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον εἰπὼν ἐσκεδασμένην τινὰ διάνοιαν τῷ ἀόριστῳ τῆς σημασίας τῇ ἀκοῇ ἐνεποίησεν, ὥστε τὴν μὲν φύσιν ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος δηλωθῆναι, τὸ δὲ ὑφιστάσθαι καὶ δηλούμενον ἰδίως ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος πρᾶγμα μὴ σημανθῆναι. ὁ δὲ Παῦλον εἰπὼν ἔδειξεν ἐν τῷ δηλουμένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος πρᾶγματὶ ὑφιστάσθαι τὴν φύσιν. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόστασις, οὐχ ἡ ἀόριστος τῆς οὐσίας ἔννοια, μηδεμίαν ἐκ τῆς κοινότητος τοῦ σημεινομένου στάσιν εὐρίσκουσα, ἀλλ’ ἡ τὸ κοινόν τε καὶ ἀπερίγραφτον ἐν τῷ τινὶ πράγματι διὰ τῶν ἐπιφαινομένων ἰδιωμάτων παριστώσα καὶ περιγράφουσα· ὡς καὶ τῇ Γραφῇ σύνηθες τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν [...]

⁷⁸ Basil, *Ep.* 236.6: οὐσία δὲ καὶ ὑπόστασις ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφοράν, ἣν ἔχει τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον· οἶον, ὡς ἔχει τὸ ζῶον πρὸς τὸν δεινὰ ἄνθρωπον. διὰ τοῦτο οὐσίαν μὲν μίαν ἐπὶ τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὥστε τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον μὴ διαφόρως ἀποδιδόναι, ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδιάζουσιν, ἵνα ἀσύγχυτος ἡμῖν καὶ τετρανωμένη ἡ περὶ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἔννοια ἐνυπάρχη.

Basil viewed οὐσία as a vague concept (ὁ ἀόριστος τῆς σημασίας) denoting ‘essence’, synonymous with Aristotle’s secondary ‘Substance’, whereas ὑπόστασις was closer to ‘subsistence’ (*res subsistens* in later Church theology) or some individual reality expressing, in a concrete form, its ‘essence’. It was not always so dichotomous however, as TOOM notes, the terms *ousia*, *hypostasis*, and *physis* were synonymous during the first four centuries AD.⁷⁹ In pagan authors like Apuleius, we saw similar conflation of Latin terms such as *essentia* and *substantia* when discussing οὐσία. When it came time to articulate these concepts in Tertullian’s Latin, EVANS explains: ‘[S]ubstantia means a concrete individual thing [...] The Three are one *per substantiae unitatem*, because they are one identical substance, one single Thing [...] The unity depends on this, that the Father is the whole substance, *pater tota substantia est*, which the Son is *derivatio totius et portio*.’⁸⁰ Tertullian’s *substantia* applies generally to, as BRAUN describes it, ‘telle ou telle réalité concrètement et individuellement existante’, but also to non-physical ‘realities’ like the soul, *angelica substantia*, among others.⁸¹ However, in all cases, it must be kept in mind that Tertullian’s *substantia* designates an individual and fundamental reality (*res*).⁸²

His use of *substantia*, at first glance, appears to be in accordance with the meaning of the term as a referent of Aristotle’s ‘primary substance’ (the First Category of his Tenfold Division),⁸³ though he never explicitly links Aristotelian philosophy to his use of the term.⁸⁴ ARPE and STEAD provide us with more extensive studies of the history of term, but I will begin with the *OLD*’s division of meanings, which suggests that the semantic range of *substantia* covered both the *res* and the *essentia* of a thing or person:

1. *The quality of being real of having an actual existence; also of having a corporeal existence.* (Sen., Quint., Fro., Gaius., Apul.)

⁷⁹ TOOM (2007), 39. See also MORESCHINI (2003), 699.

⁸⁰ EVANS (1948), 44.

⁸¹ BRAUN (1962), 180.

⁸² BRAUN (1962), 182.

⁸³ That is, ‘πρώτη οὐσία’ (in *Cat.* 2a12): οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἥ μήτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ’ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινὶ ἐστιν. See further EVANS (1948), 41.

⁸⁴ ARPE (1940), 74.

- b. (w. gen.) *the reality of a thing* (dist. from a mere outward appearance of it); (absol.) *the actual state of affairs*. (Quint., Tac., Paul.)
2. (usu. w. ref. to absts.) *Underlying or essential nature, make-up, constitution, that which makes a thing what it is*. (Sen., Quint., Fron., Apul., Papin., Ulp.)
3. *The material of which a thing (corporeal or incorporeal) is made*. (Gaius., Apul., Paul.)
4. (w. gen.) *The sum or aggregate* (of one's possessions); (absol.) *possessions, assets, one's all*. (Julian., Gaius., Scaev., Quint., Ulp., *CIL*)
5. *The basic unit of measurement* (in any calculation). (Fron.)

STEAD argues⁸⁵ that, since Tertullian was attempting to refute Monarchianism, his usage of *substantia* regarding the Trinity cannot simply be in the Aristotelian sense of the *πρώτη οὐσία* because his arguments for *una substantia* (*Adv. Prax.* 2.4) would confirm the Monarchian view that God was singular and not of three persons. Yet STEAD's argument assumes that *una substantia* refers to something like a 'single person' in a corporeal sense. It is rather, that there is 'one *res*' of God, made manifest through three *personae*. So Tertullian's usage corresponds to meanings (1) and (3), with some semantic overlap into (2), construing the one, single *substantia* of the Father as what Basil and Origen understood as the *οὐσία* (i.e. meaning (2) of *substantia*)—not the three *ὑποστάσεις*.⁸⁶ Tertullian understands *οὐσία* as a thing's reality and, therefore, employs *substantia* rather than the vaguer *essentia* – an important semantic difference ('essence', properly construed, is the second Aristotelian category whereas *substantia* seems to encompass both first and second categories at once).⁸⁷ In Tertullian's formulation, that God has a reality, i.e. that He 'exists', is not in dispute, and the same goes for the Son and the Holy Spirit, both of which are 'real'. So all three share a reality or existence (*substantia*) and manifest themselves through different forms, aspects, degrees, etc. In the Greek formulation, the simplest way to understand Basil's interpretation is to say that *ὑπόστασις* can be pluralised (into three *ὑποστάσεις* or 'realities' or 'persons'), whereas *οὐσία* cannot (there is only a single divine 'essence', shared by all three realities (*ὑποστάσεις*) of

⁸⁵ STEAD (1963), 50.

⁸⁶ BRAUN (1962), 192.

⁸⁷ See further WITT (1989), 103-4; DAHL (2019), 156.

the Trinity, just as all Pauls share the common essence of being a ‘man’ or ‘animal’ etc.).⁸⁸ The following scheme is a summary of Tertullian’s use of these central terms in his Trinitarian philosophy:

Latin terms		Greek terms	English translation
<i>substantia</i>	}	<i>οὐσία</i>	‘essence’
<i>potestas</i>			
<i>status</i>			
<i>forma</i>	}	<i>ὑπόστασις</i>	‘person, reality’
<i>species</i>			
<i>gradus</i>			

The re-interpretation of Basil’s formulation by Tertullian can be summarised as follows: Whereas Basil saw *οὐσία* as ‘essence’, a more general referent synonymous with Aristotle’s secondary category of ‘Substance’, Tertullian saw *οὐσία* as ‘reality’ or ‘individual thing’, i.e. as Aristotle’s primary category of ‘Substance’. Jesus, then, is a circumscribed, concrete subsistence of the Divine *οὐσία* in Basil’s formulation, whereas Jesus is seen as a manifestation or *persona* of the Divine substance in Tertullian. The differences between *persona* and *hypostasis* are, however, less significant than between *substantia* and *ousia*.

This brings us to Tertullian’s understanding of *persona* (*πρόσωπον*). The use of this term in a theological context was novel and gave a dramatic flavour to the understanding of the Trinity so that God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit each took on separate characters or *personae*. The Greeks understood *πρόσωπον* through the notion of *hypostasis*.⁸⁹ Tertullian uses the sense of the term with great flexibility ranging from the sense of a ‘character’ (*Adv.*

⁸⁸ See e.g. KARIATLIS (2010), 65-6.

⁸⁹ TOOM (2007), 39; especially in the works of the Cappodocian fathers Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus.

Prax. 11) or a ‘mask’ (*De spect.* 23)⁹⁰ to a ‘person’ (*De paenit.* 11; *De monog.* 7; *Adv. Marc.* 2.23) or even simply as a ‘face’ (*Adv. Prax.* 14). As OSBORN notes, Tertullian employed it in a variety of ways without explanation or justification and as a means of contrast with the metaphysical *substantia*; that is, that the *sermo* is proved by its rational substance (*substantia*) which takes form or subsists within three *personae*.⁹¹ Boethius later laments the *egestas* of Latin technical vocabulary when discussing *ὑπόστασις* in Latin:

But the Greeks far more clearly called the individual subsistence of a rational nature by the name *ὑπόστασις*, while we, through lack of appropriate words, have kept the name handed down to us, calling *persona* that which they call *ὑπόστασις*; but Greece, with its richer vocabulary, gives the name *ὑπόστασις* to individual subsistence.⁹²

Boethius thus sees a philosophical distinction between *persona* and *subsistentia*, prefigured in Tertullian’s distinguishing of *substantia* and *persona*.⁹³

The term *forma* is similarly used in diverse senses, from ‘shape’ generally (*Test. Anim.* 3; *Resurr.* 59), to a form of substance (*Anim.* 3) or the form as something which makes substance perceptible to the senses (*Adv. Marc.* 2.5), to the juridical sense of a ‘statute or custom on which an advocate bases his plea’⁹⁴ (*Apol.* 2). As we will see in Boethius’ use of terms like *significare*, Tertullian employs the broad gamut of these terms’ semantic range but, markedly, adds new meanings to them to discuss specific doctrinal points.

⁹⁰ See Boethius’ etymology of this theological term in *Eut.* 3.8-9f: *nomen enim personae videtur aliunde traductum, ex his scilicet personis quae in comoediis tragoediisque eos quorum interest homines repraesentabant*. Also GALONNIER (2013), 209-10.

⁹¹ OSBORN (1997), 137-8.

⁹² Boet. *Eut.* 3.24-30: *longe vero illi signatius naturae rationabilis individuum subsistentiam ὑποστάσεως nomine vocaverunt, nos vero per inopiam significantium vocum translaticiam retinuimus nuncupationem, eam quam illi ὑπόστασιν dicunt personam vocantes; sed peritior Graecia sermonum ὑπόστασιν vocat individuum subsistentiam*. Also GALONNIER (2013), 208-13.

⁹³ There is more to be said on Boethius’ lexical augmentation of the term *subsistentia* in contrast with *substantia*, particularly as applied to God; see recently MORESCHINI (2014), 87-89.

⁹⁴ EVANS (1948), 54.

Analysis of Selected Glosses in Tertullian

The following section supplements the analyses in HAUSCHILD, LABRIOLLE, and BRAUN but specifically by examining instances where Tertullian resorts to lexical innovation to render a ‘signalled’ Greek term in scripture (glosses). It is not the intention here to examine the first-attested Latin terms in Tertullian for this provides only a superficial indication of the translation techniques themselves with which he chose to render Greek technical vocabulary into Latin. Instead, I will analyse some of the more important glosses and direct translations of Greek technical terms in Tertullian, as well as a brief synopsis of Tertullian’s novel borrowings from Greek.

Below are specific sections from Tertullian’s works in which a Greek term is discussed and glossed. The exploration of Tertullian’s glosses will provide a useful starting point in understanding his approaches to translating from Greek and subsequently choosing a Latin term, either using an established form or creating a new one:

Adv. Prax. 5.2-3: rationalis enim deus, et ratio in ipso prius, et ita ab ipso omnia: quae ratio sensus ipsius est. hanc Graeci λόγον dicunt, quo vocabolo etiam sermonem appellamus: ideoque iam in usu est nostrorum per simplicitatem interpretationis sermonem dicere in primordio apud deum fuisse, cum magis rationem competat antiquiorem haberi, quia [non] sermonalis a principio sed rationalis deus etiam ante principium, et quia ipse quoque sermo ratione consistens priorem eam ut substantiam suam ostendat.

This section has been much discussed by O’MALLEY⁹⁵ and BRAUN.⁹⁶ It invites an examination of the issue, in early Christian vocabulary, of Latinising the term λόγος. BRAUN argued that, in the eyes of both Cicero⁹⁷ and Seneca, the Greek implied the sense of *ratio*, whereas in early Latin Christian translators, we find that the sense ascribed to the word was one of Christ’s divinity.⁹⁸ The question for Tertullian was whether to use the earlier, more literal, translation

⁹⁵ O’MALLEY (1967), 17-20.

⁹⁶ BRAUN (1977), 264ff.

⁹⁷ As in Chapter One, Cicero consistently translates νόησις and λόγος with *intellegentia* and *ratio* in his *Timaeus* 3. Note however that the adjectival *intellegens* renders ἔννοος (*Timaeus* 10).

⁹⁸ BRAUN (1977), 264-5.

of *verbum* or the more dynamic *sermo*. Both were established terms, the former was common parlance in Rome and the latter in Africa, though we may doubt whether Tertullian was persuaded to use one or the other based on concerns of dialect alone.⁹⁹ BRAUN argues that Tertullian was able to connote the dynamism of the divine essence contained in the Judaic concept of ‘the Word’, of which the λόγος in the Gospel of John was a successor, by employing *sermo*, whereas the neuter *verbum* perhaps did not convey the requisite animated sense as *sermo*: a living, active Word made flesh (as opposed to an abstracted concept).¹⁰⁰ Tertullian also uses *sermo* in double translations, especially with *ratio* (Ap. 21.10: *apud vestros quoque sapientes λόγον, id est sermonem atque rationem*) to convey this concept of Logos, whilst retaining the Christian terminology of the divinity of Christ through the ‘Word’. Despite opting for the term, in the same section, Tertullian conveys λόγος as a notion belonging to *ratio* rather than mere speech (*quia [non] sermonalis a principio sed rationalis deus*); or rather that *ratio* is ontologically *prior to sermo*, despite the conflation of terms among the customary usage his fellow Latin speakers (*iam in usu est nostrorum*).

Such an example of *sermo* and *ratio* is a microcosm of the broader tension found within Tertullian and later Latin Patristics; namely the balancing act between retaining pagan philosophical expressions that had been used by authorities such as Cicero (*ratio*), and more non-specialised Latin terms imbued with Christian overtones (*verbum* and *sermo*). Augustine later also discusses the terminological competition between *verbum* and *sermo* (*In Evang. Ioh.* 108.3) to whom *sermo* was known as a Latin equivalent but not in widespread use within the Church (which had reverted to *verbum*). The trajectory of λόγος into Latin is an example of the critical impacts of the transposition of a Greek concept into another linguistic framework on the diachrony of key philosophical terms throughout the intellectual tradition of Europe. As BRAUN observes, Tertullian was an ‘expert en matière de langage’ and used the tension

⁹⁹ See HARNACK (1914), 316; BRAUN (1977), 269.

¹⁰⁰ It is no coincidence that *verbum* is used 15 times in Tertullian’s polemic in *Carn.* against the docetism of Marcion, Valentinus, and Apelles in which, during the *amplificatio* of his attack (§17-23) he argues that Christ was possessed of ‘truly human flesh’ derived from his mother (see further EVANS (1956), xi). It is here where, as suggested by O’MALLEY (1967, 16 who caveats this claim by admitting a lack of certainty, and BRAUN (1977, 268)) that Tertullian uses *verbum* as a term of his adversaries to counter the arguments that Jesus was not of human flesh.

and competing senses of both terms to influence the trajectory of the word's theological connotations.¹⁰¹

Adv. Iud. 2.1: Igitur gradum conseramus et summam quaestionis certis lineis terminemus. Cur etenim deus universitatis conditor mundi totius gubernator hominis plasmator universarum gentium sator legem per Moysen uni populo dedisse credatur et non omnibus gentibus adtribuuisse dicatur?

Tertullian resorted to borrowings from Greek to render the Christian technical terms used in Genesis beginning with *Gen. 2:7*, where the Septuagint uses the verb πλάσσω 'to shape, mould' (s.v. LSJ).¹⁰² The terms *plasmare*, *plasmator*, and *plastica* all translate the Greek term, only one of which appears attested before Tertullian (*plastica*).¹⁰³ While *plasmare* lived on into the works of Christian poets such as Prudentius,¹⁰⁴ *plasmator* is a ἄπαξ λεγόμενον and appears to be a loan-blend with PLASMA as the base, fused with the Latin masculine agent suffix *-tor*. The other lexical innovation introduced by Tertullian, but which failed to be incorporated into the wider Latin lexis, was the naturalisation of πρωτοπλαστός with *protoplastus* 'first-formed', which he applies to Adam and Eve (that is, the *protoplasti*).¹⁰⁵

Adv. Marc. 5.17.1: Ecclesiae quidem veritate epistulam istam ad Ephesios habemus emissam, non ad Laodiceanos [...] in dispensationem adimpletionis temporum — ut ita dixerim, sicut verbum illud in Graeco sonat — recapitulare — id est ad initium redigere vel ab initio recensero.

The explicit reference to St Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians (the Laodiceans) gives a clue as to which Greek word he was adverting to with *recapitulo*: ἀνακεφαλαιόομαι (*Ep. Rom. 13.9*) 'to be summed up' (LSJ s.v.). The phrase *in Graeco sonat* is also revealing, later used in, for

¹⁰¹ BRAUN (1977), 270 n. 2; cf. MORESCHINI (2013), 506 who simply argues that Tertullian preferred to use *sermo* later in his works than *verbum* which was his earlier term of choice.

¹⁰² BRAUN (1977), 397; for further discussion on more standard Latin terms used by Tertullian to render the Greek of the 'creation' episode in Genesis see 399f.

¹⁰³ *Plasticus* appears in Vit. 1.1.13 and later in Tertullian *Nat. 1.12.6* (TLL s.v. *plasticus*).

¹⁰⁴ Of note is the fact that the verb *plasmare* appears later only in Prudentius' *Apotheosis* which itself, like his other work the *Harmatigenia*, takes its inspiration directly from Tertullian.

¹⁰⁵ Tert. *Castit. 2*; *Adv. Iud. 13*.

instance, Jerome (*Gal.* 5.11) to convey what a word would ‘mean’ in Greek. Yet the literal sense is how the Greek equivalent may be uttered (*sonat*); in other words, Tertullian tells us there is a type of identity between *recapitulare* and its Greek counterpart (*ἀνακεφαλαιοῦμαι*), obviously not phonemically, but rather semantically: *re-* = *ἀνα-*, and *caput* = *κεφαλή*. This is thus a metalinguistic reference to the concept of a morphological calque. The calque itself is a modulation, rendering a passive into an active, and the gloss is of the Ciceronian formula: the new Latin word, ostensibly strange to a Latin audience, introduced by a periphrasis: *id est ad initium redigere vel ab initio recensero*, a rare rhetorical concession found in Tertullian.

Adv. Marc. 4.9.3: *συνταλαίπωρον (id est commiseronem) et συμμισούμενον (id est coodibilem) in leprosi purgationem [...]*¹⁰⁶

The designation of these nouns has been discussed elsewhere,¹⁰⁷ possibly from a letter of Marcion’s to a member of his community, or as referring to a dedicatee of his *Antitheses* work. Tertullian gives us the direct calques of the Greek nouns, of which both substantivised forms appear to be previously unattested as well. Only the verbal form of *συνταλαιπωρέω* ‘endure hardships together, share in misery’ appears before his usage and is not limited to a single register (appearing in Sophocles, Aristotle, and the medical writer Aretaeus (LSJ s.v.)). As for *συμμισούμενον*, there is no extant use of this before Tertullian except for the similarly-compounded *συμμισησπονηρέω* ‘to feel common hatred of what is bad’ (LSJ s.v.) in the second book of the Maccabees in the Septuagint (2 *Ma.* 4.36: *τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως ἐπανελθόντος ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ Κιλικίαν τόπων ἐνετύγχανον οἱ κατὰ πόλιν Ἰουδαῖοι συμμισησπονηρούντων καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑπὲρ τοῦ παρὰ λόγον τὸν Οὐνιαν ἀπεκτονῆσθαι*). Whatever Tertullian’s source, his own lexical innovations mirror the morphemes of the originals closely: *συν-* + *ταλαιπωρέω* = *co-* + *misero*, and *συν-* + *μισούμενον* = *co-* + *odibilis*. Note that the poetic adjective *odibilis* appeared earlier in Accius (*TLL* s.v., 9.2.459.37). Here we see Tertullian building on established, albeit rare, literary vocabulary to coin his own terms, closely mirroring the heritage of the original Greek terms.

¹⁰⁶ See also *Adv. Marc.* 4.36.5: *Age, Marcion, omnesque iam commiserones et coodibiles eius haeretici, quid audebitis dicere?*

¹⁰⁷ See e.g. HAUSCHILD (1881/1876), 24-5; MOLL (2009), 164-5; LIEU (2015), 193.

Idol. 3.4: εἶδός Graece formam sonat; ab eo per diminutionem εἰδῶλων deductum aequè apud nos formulam fecit.¹⁰⁸

This section of the *De Idolatria* is crucial in establishing what Tertullian defines as an ‘idol’ and why the substance or material of the idol is immaterial to the question of idolatry, as he writes:

For since even without an idol idolatry is committed, when the idol is there it makes no difference of what kind it be, of what material (*materia*), or what shape (*effigies*); lest any should think that only to be held an idol which is consecrated in human shape. To establish this point, the interpretation of the word is requisite.¹⁰⁹

Tertullian then argues that the form or *eidos* is important in establishing the definition of an idol: ‘εἶδός, in Greek, signifies *forma* “form”; εἰδῶλων, derived diminutively from that (*per diminutionem* [...] *deductum*), thus like in our language *formula* is derived from *forma*.’ Tertullian highlights the parallel morphological process in Latin to explain the etymology of ‘idol’ here: in laying out the process of ‘idol’ deriving from εἰδῶλων which, in turn, is derived as the diminutive from εἶδός, he compares *formula* as the diminutive of *forma*. The semantic parallels between the terms are also similar: consider *formula* as an example, whose primary definition is as follows in the *OLD*: 1. A) pretty appearance, prettiness; b) shape, outline. The Greek εἰδῶλων is primarily defined in the *LSJ* as follows:

I.1. A. phantom [...] of ghosts

2. any unsubstantial form;

¹⁰⁸ The surviving manuscript evidence in the Codex Agobardinus (105^v) presents the sentence as follows: [Ei]dos Graece formam sonat; ab eo per diminutionem idolum deductum. It is unclear whether εἶδός is spelt *eidos* or *edos* (the right hand margin is illegibly blurred). See critical apparatus in REIFFERSCHIED AND WISSOWA (1954).

¹⁰⁹ *Idol. 3.3-4: quando enim et sine idolo idololatria fiat, utique, cum adest idolum, nihil interest, quale sit, quae de materia, quae de effigie, ne qui putet id solum idolum habendum, quod humana effigie sit consecratum. ad hoc necessaria est vocabuli interpretatio. ei]dos Graece formam sonat; ab eo per diminutionem idolum deductum; aequè apud nos forma formulam fecit.*

3. image reflected in a mirror or in water

4. in the system of Epicurus, film given off by any object and conveying an impression to the eye

II. image in the mind, idea [...] phantom of the mind, fancy

III. image, likeness

Both convey a diminution of value in the *forma* or εἶδος itself, something that is belittling and, as Tertullian sees it, a negative connotation, hence the polemic in this text.

Anim. 14.2 and 15.1 et in duas amplius apud Posidonium, qui a duobus exorsus titulis, principali, quod aiunt ἡγεμονικόν, et a rationali, quod aiunt λογικόν, in decem septem exinde prosecuit; ita aliae ex aliis species dividunt animam [...] inprimis an sit aliqui summus in anima gradus vitalis et sapientialis, quod ἡγεμονικόν appellant, id est principale, quia si negetur, totus animae status periclitatur.

Here in 15.1, Tertullian exhibits similar periphrastic techniques as we have seen in Cicero and Apuleius. The scheme is as follows: Latin [established term(s)] + Latin [lexical innovation] = Greek term. Here, in translating ἡγεμονικόν, Tertullian uses multiple Latin terms to render the Greek (*vitalis* and *principalis*),¹¹⁰ both of which are established in Latin, however *sapientialis* is his own, modelled on the same morphology as the concomitant terms in the translation itself (adjectives in *-alis*). Of interest is why he felt the need to introduce a new term when in the previous section (14.2) he had glossed ἡγεμονικόν with the established *principalis* and moved on. It seems, as in Cicero, Tertullian is attempting his own interpretive process for the benefit of his readers, striving for semantic accuracy by configuring specific Latin terms (new derivatives if required) around the Greek gloss to convey different aspects of the original sense. Recall POWELL'S suggestion that Cicero's pleonasms in the *Timaeus* were frequently

¹¹⁰ See ROTH (2009), 437 for the observation of *variatio* in Tertullian's use of multiple equivalents for a single Greek term. Also FISCHER (1972), 10-11, 26 n. 73, 31 n. 88, who notes the variation in Tertullian's vocabulary when citing from Scripture.

not conflations or misunderstandings of the original Platonic concept but, instead, functioned as a tool to further refine or clarify the Greek idea in Latin.¹¹¹

Adv. Prax. 8: *hoc si qui putaverit me προβολήν aliquam introducere, id est prolationem rei alterius ex altera, quod facit Valentinus alium atque alium aeonem de aeone producens, primo quidem dicam tibi, non ideo non utitur et veritas vocabulo isto et re ac censu eius quia et haeresis utatur: immo haeresis potius ex veritate accepit quod ad mendacium suum strueret. prolatus est sermo dei an non? hic mecum gradum fige. si prolatus est, cognosce προβολήν veritatis, et viderit haeresis si quid de veritate imitate est. iam nunc quaeritur quis quomodo utatur aliqua re et vocabulo eius. Valentinus προβολή suas discernit et separat ab auctore, et ita longe ab eo ponit ut aeon patrem nesciat; denique desiderat nosse nec potest, immo et paene devoratur et dissolvitur in reliquam substantiam. apud nos autem solus filius patrem novit, et sinum patris ipse exposuit [...]*

Tertullian's understanding of Christology was based upon the Son's procession from (but not separation from) the Father. The Valentinians of Carthage, against whose doctrines Tertullian argues here, saw the emanation of the Son from the Father as modal: a separation between the two. Tertullian does not deny that there is a *prolatio* of the Son from the Father, but strongly denies that the former is, in some sense, separate from the latter. This is why he seeks to justify his use (a rare occurrence in Tertullian) of a technical term of the heretics: 'Stand firm with me, if there was a prolation, acknowledge that, yes, the true doctrine has a *προβολή*, and you'll also have seen that the heresy imitates the truth anyway' (*hic mecum gradum fige. si prolatus est, cognosce προβολήν veritatis, et viderit haeresis si quid de veritate imitate est*). The Latin equivalent of the Valentinian technical term is an existing one (used in Plautus, Caesar, Cicero, and Livy among others) but is now imbued with this new meaning of a 'procession', in a Trinitarian sense, from one Divine 'person' to another.¹¹²

Adv. Hermog. 19.5: *possum et aliter principium interpretari, non ab re tamen; nam et in Graeco principii vocabulum, quod est ἀρχή, non tantum ordinatium sed et potestativum capit principatum, unde et archontes dicunt principes et magistratus. ergo secundum hanc quoque*

¹¹¹ POWELL (1995a), 287-88. See the discussion of *frugalitas* in Chapter One and Cicero's hermeneutical approach to translation using techniques such as a periphrasis, synonymy, and lexical augmentation.

¹¹² See further HAUSCHILD (1881/1876), 19-20; RANKIN (2001).

significationem principium pro principatu et potestate sumetur; in principatu enim et in potestate deus fecit caelum et terram.

Tertullian uses the additional adjectival modifiers to render the polysemous ἀρχή. The term *principatum* is an established rendering of the Greek term¹¹³ but Tertullian wishes to further nuance the theological components of the word's meaning, hence the lexical innovations in *-ivus*: *ordinativus* and *potestativus*, both signifying an order and a power associated with the 'beginning', i.e. in God's creation. Note the deverbative nature of the adjectives in *-ivus* perhaps a linguistic attempt on Tertullian's part to convey the orderly and powerful nature of the *principatum* as co-efficient with the actions (sc. God's actions) in the creation of the heavens and earth.

Anim. 23.6: quae omnia ut fidei commendet, et animam retro in superioribus cum deo egisse in commercio idearum et inde huc transvenire et hic quae retro norit de exemplaribus recensere, novum elaboravit argumentum, μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις, id est discentias reminiscentias esse; venientes enim inde huc animas oblivisci eorum in quibus prius fuerint, dehinc ex his visibilibus edoctas recordari. cum igitur huiusmodi argumento illa insinuentur a Platone quae haeretici mutantur, satis haereticos reperiunt, si argumentum Platonis elidam.

This section comes from Tertullian's summary of the origin of human souls in Plato's *Phaedo* and *Timaeus*. His antipathy toward Plato is comically expressed in an earlier line where he describes him as a 'spice-merchant' to heretics (*omnium haereticorum condimentarium factum*). He seemed to aim to establish a premiss whereby, since the heretics (sc. Gnostics) change (*mutantur*) Plato's arguments about the soul's 'recollection' (ἀνάμνησις) of its eternal origin with God, if he can effectively nullify Plato's arguments then he *ipso facto* will rebut the heretics' as well. Cicero had rendered the Platonic notion of ἀνάμνησις with the more common *recordatio* in *Tusc.* 1.57. It is, at first, puzzling then why Tertullian resorts to lexical innovation at all when the established *recordatio* was available (and had been used to translate this same Greek term in the past).

¹¹³ See Chapter One (Cic. *Timaeus*, 5).

The *TLL* provides a useful case history¹¹⁴ of the verb forms *recordor* and *reminiscor*, with Cicero using *recordor* 19 times in his philosophical works and *reminiscor* only 4. In fact, no Latin author appears to use the latter verb more frequently than the former, and the highest usage count of *reminiscor* is not until Augustine. Even in Tertullian, there is only a single instance of *reminiscor* in his entire corpus. Interestingly, *memini* is highly productive in Tertullian, with 76 usages found, and only 28 for *recordor*. We might ask whether Tertullian's preference for *memini* influenced the formation of the related abstract *reminiscentia*? Another answer is etymological: *reminiscentia* is cognate with ἀνάμνησις unlike *recordatio*. Note also, the Classical term *recordatio* (*recordor*) has the root COR 'heart', which Cicero had used as a lexical augmentation to render ἀνάμνησις.¹¹⁵ By contrast, *reminiscentia* (from *reminiscor*), as well as ἀνάμνησις, seem to have for the root MENS 'mind' (from the P.I.E. *men-).¹¹⁶ In Plato's phrase μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις, the recollection or 'reminiscing' of the soul's divine origins in the noumenal realm of pure Ideas can only be done by learning and study, i.e. through reason and the contemplative life (philosophy).¹¹⁷ The study of philosophy is, according to Plato in the *Meno* dialogue, mere recollection of the Ideas at the soul's divine origin; the link between philosophising as a rational inquiry of the mind (νόησις) is inextricably linked to man's ἀνάμνησις (via the soul). To convey the noetic aspects of this process, Tertullian avoids conjuring notions of the bodily realm (*cor*) inherent within the etymology of terms like *recordor* and *recordatio* and employs the less common, though etymologically cognate, *reminiscor* to form the substantive *reminiscentia*.¹¹⁸

Tertullian's use of Greek loan-words

¹¹⁴ See *TLL* s.v. *recordor/recordo* (11.2.411.33-59).

¹¹⁵ See further WALDE-HOFFMAN 1.271f; ERNOUT-MEILLET, 144 s.v. *cor* and 397 s.v. *commentor*; VAAN (2008), 135. See also MALTBY (1991), 156 citing Isidore (11.1.118), who notes the relation between *cor* and Gk. καρδία.

¹¹⁶ *IEW* suggests the root MEN³ as the common base of the reflexes ἀνάμνησις, *reminiscor*, *memini*, and *mens*; see the entry in the Linguistic Research Centre's database of Pokorny's *etyma* from the *IEW* at <<https://lrc.la.utexas.edu/lex/master/1282>>; see also LEWIS AND SHORT s.v. *reminiscor*.

¹¹⁷ See *Meno* 81d4-5 and *Phaedo* 66b-d and 72e3-78b3.

¹¹⁸ See further HAUSCHILD (1881/1876), 21-2. Though see DEMMEL (1944), 92-4 who argued the more regularly formed *discentia* in the clause *id est discentias reminiscentias esse* influenced the formation of the nominalised *reminiscentia* thus the neologism was for stylistic purposes rather than anything particularly semantically nuanced.

We have seen how Tertullian made use of periphrases and glosses in articulating Greek theological and philosophical terms, whether those of were of certain Christian doctrines from the East he was attempting to refute, or adapting from the terminology of philosophers like Plato. He also relies on direct loan-words from Greek to convey specific concepts. Take his use of *biaeothanatus*, where he writes (*Anim.* 57): ‘I may be permitted to use the actual words and terms with which magic now rings, that inventor of all these opinions’ (*ut ipsis iam vocabulis utar quibus auctrix opinionum istarum magia sonat*). It is here we find a clue as to his use of Greek words for the first time in Latin: to provide a strangeness or foreign character to selected topics, especially in matters of magic and the occult.

In the transliteration of *πάρεδρος*, for instance, we find the specific meaning of the term relating to occult practices (LSJ s.v.):

III. in Magic, assistant divinity, familiar spirit, *Pmag. Berol.* 1.54, *Pmag. Lond.* 121.884, *Tab. Defix. Aud.* 155 A 20, *Pmag. Par.* 1.1850

2. of things, giving magical aid, *τρίστιχος Ὁμήρου π.* *Pmag. Par.* 2145.

The salient point here is that the only attestations of the Greek original are in papyri. The section in Tertullian runs as follows: *scimus etiam magiae licere explorandis occultis per catabolicos et paredros et pythonicos spiritus* (‘we know well it is permitted for sorcery in exploring the occult through the catabolic, the paredral, and the pythonic spirits’). Each term in Tertullian’s text is a transliterated borrowing: *catabolicos* (from *καταβάλλω* or *καταβολή*), *paredros* (*πάρεδρος*), and *pythonicos* (*πυθόνικος*) giving the description a distinctly un-Latin air.

Tertullian also uses the polysemy of Greek loan-words to add to his expression on occasion. The term *episcynium* is used in a metaphorical sense for example: *ensoriae intentionis episcynio* ‘the eyebrow of censorial intention’. The term in Greek connoted ‘superciliousness’ (see LSJ s.v. *ἐπισκύνιον*, II) and it is this meaning that Tertullian draws upon against the ‘arrogance’ of his accusers.

The loan-blend *histriculus* presents an interesting issue. The context in which it appears is a section from the *De pallio*, where Tertullian anticipates objections from critics

regarding his view that wearing the casual Greek *pallium* instead of the formal Roman *toga* was not a social faux pas. He argues that changes in appearance can be detrimental at times, but only if they are unnatural. He exploits (for his own rhetorical purposes), perhaps from the stories of Statius' *Achilleid*, Achilles' apparent penchant for cross-dressing:

But no doubt he was already covered with hair (*histriculus*), no doubt he had already secretly proved himself a man to somebody, when he still put up with a woman's flowing robe, doing his hair, applying make-up, consulting the mirror, caressing his neck, effeminated as far as his ears by piercings, as may still be seen in his bust at Sigeum.¹¹⁹

HESLIN suggests *histriculus* could be derived from ὕστριξ + *culus* ('porcupine' + 'anus') suggesting the coming of puberty in Achilles and a 'bilingual pun'.¹²⁰ The *TLL* (s.v. *hystriculus*, 6.3165.9) notes the sense of 'spinosus, pilis asper' and the term could be construed as a metonym for 'puberty' in general.

In another section from the *De pallio*, notoriously difficult to make sense of due to the plethora of medical terminology, Tertullian launches a lively polemic against pagan Rome's hedonism and luxury, employing lexical innovations and loan-words amongst medical metaphors to achieve the effect of conveying a type of surgery against the sins of his predecessors:

Indeed, I do not flatter any vices, nor spare any dirt or bubbling scab (*impetigo*). I apply the branding iron (*cauter*) to the desires that led M. Tullius to buy a round table of citrus-wood for 500,000 sestertii [...] I drive the lancet (*scalpellum*) into the sadism that led Vedius Pollio to throw his slaves before the eels (*murenarum*) to feed on. [...] I will slice that greedy gullet which first induced Hortensius the orator to kill a peacock for the sake of food [...] I will administer a purging medicine (*catharticum*) to the

¹¹⁹ *Pall.* 4.2: *certe iam histriculus, certe iam virum alicui clanculo functus, adhuc sustinet stolam fundere, comam struere, cutem fingere, speculum consulere, collum demulcere, aurem quoque foratu effeminatus, quod illi apud Sigeum strongyla servat.* Trans. HUNINK (2005).

¹²⁰ HESLIN (2005), 272 n. 93.

impurity of Scaurus, the dice of Curius, the drunkenness of Antonius [...] As for that civic pus (*purulentia*)—who will draw it forth and cleanse it, except a sermon dressed in the pallium? “With speech,” it is said, “the wisest of medicines, you convinced me.”¹²¹

The arresting imagery is heightened by the myriad loans of medical terminology from Greek.¹²² There are also some unusual terms that seem to have been picked out from Pliny and Latin medical writers, e.g. *impetigo* (found also in Celsus, see e.g. LANGSLOW (2000, 11)). The terms *catharticum*, *cauter*, *purulentia*, and *exvaporare* all appear to have been used for the first time here by Tertullian, though hardly in any philosophical sense.¹²³

To conclude, Tertullian employed Greek loan-words in four ways: where no Latin equivalent was available (e.g. *apostata*, *charisma*, *biaeothanatus*),¹²⁴ to add to the foreign flavour of a particular image¹²⁵ (e.g. the description of the Spartan Lycurgus’ death via *apocarteresis*, adding occult overtones to a particular opinion with which he disagrees, or to imbue his polemic with gratuitous descriptors to shock his audience, such as the medical terms in the *Pall.* above), to expand his expressive abilities by drawing on the polysemy of a Greek term (*episcynium*), or to modify a loan-word with a Latin suffix (a loan-blend) like *baptizor* referring to John the Baptist (adding the agent suffix to the Greek loan βαπτίζω) or *histriculus*.¹²⁶

¹²¹ *Pall.* 5.5-7: *atquin nullis vitiis adolor, nullis veteris parco, nulli impetigini. adigo cauterem ambitioni, qua M. Tullius quingentis milibus nummum orbem citri emit [...] immergo aequae scalpellum acerbitati ei, qua Vedius Pollio servos muraenis invadendos obiectabat. [...] praecidam gulam, qua Hortensius orator primus pavum cibi causa potuit occidere [...] dabo catharticum impuritatis Scauri et aleae Curii et vinolentiae Antonii. et memento istos interim ex multis togatos fuisse; quales apud pallium haud facile. has purulentias civitatis quis eliciet et exvaporabit, ni sermo palliatus? sermone, inquit, me suasisti, medicamine sapientissimo.* (Trans. HUNINK (2005), adapted).

¹²² The liberal use of technical medical terminology to enhance the imagery of a passage was later used in Lactantius as well (see ADAMS (1988) on Lact. *Mort.* 33). See also LANGSLOW (2000), 178-201 for a detailed survey of metaphorical uses of medical terminology in A. Cornelius Celsus, Scribonius Largus, Theodorus Priscianus, and Cassius Felix.

¹²³ Note the medical writer Cassius Felix later renders καθαρτικόν with *purgatorium* (found earlier in Augustine), see LANGSLOW (2000), 356 (though Cassius does not gloss the Greek beside the Latin term).

¹²⁴ Cf. the general observation of KOFFMANE (1879, 7) at the beginning of this chapter.

¹²⁵ We have seen this kind of use of Greek loan-words earlier in Lucretius for example.

¹²⁶ The increased use of loan-blends will also be observed in Boethius (Chapter Five).

Conclusions

So far this chapter, we have examined in some detail, (though by no means exhaustively,) Tertullian's novel contributions to Latin philosophical vocabulary. By drawing on a variety of earlier scholarship, notably WELLSTEIN's more recent study, and combining it with a close analysis of Tertullian's translations of Greek technical terms in his philosophical and theological works, we may assert the following: that Tertullian was instrumental in the development of Latin technical vocabulary, specifically in the subject matter of Christian apologetics. Tertullian was at ease deploying lexical innovations or loan-words as ways of enhancing his expressive and rhetorical capabilities. This reveals an author with high ambitions for his native language in treating complex doctrinal debates and evaluating them with new vocabulary. His lexical innovation practice was largely preoccupied with rendering the established (although still fairly nascent) Greek Christian vocabulary into Latin but it was also used as a linguistic weapon when refuting heresies. Amongst these, the Gnostics' vocabulary (as see in the *Adv. Val.* polemic) required careful translation into Latin to pick apart its most persuasive tenets. Similarly, in his work against Marcionism, Tertullian was not simply preoccupied with the technical terms employed by the Marcionites but also in the translation of key passages from Scripture from Greek, which Tertullian appeared to have done on an ad hoc basis himself, without necessarily relying on pre-existing Latin (sc. *Vetus Latina*) translations. In doing so, many of the terms in Biblical texts found their first Latin incarnations in Tertullian's polemics, making him an important lexical influence on later generations of Christian philosophers relying on Latin renditions of Scripture.

When it came to Tertullian's translation techniques, we have seen, at times, that it was often a stylistic choice, but more frequently he used lexical innovation to fill a void in doctrinal terminology in Latin and to treat different theological terms not previously discussed in as much detail, if at all. Unlike Classical philosophers like Cicero or Seneca, Tertullian was not as concerned about relying upon established terms in the language (lexical augmentation) to expedite the comprehension of his concepts by his Latin readers. Instead, he was content with experimenting with new derivatives or loan-words without necessarily glossing or justifying his choices. Where he does turn to directly glossing Greek words, he sometimes had

recourse to familiar techniques as observed in Cicero and Apuleius: periphrases or double translations, with a familiar term paired with his own coinages.

Tertullian was, then, both a pioneer and a successor of a tradition of translating Greek philosophical terminology begun in Classical times, and (through his own creative efforts) extended into the Christian era and into specific doctrinal subject matters. History shows that his linguistic efforts would prove immensely influential among later Christian writers, including other North African authors such as Cyprian and Augustine, (and, as we shall see, even on the terminology of later Roman philosophers like Boethius). He thus permanently shaped Christian doctrinal concepts, many of which originally formulated by Greek-speaking Christian thinkers, by re-interpreting and transforming them through the Latin language.

4.3. CALCIDIUS AND THE *TIMAEUS*—LITERARY AUGMENTATION OF PLATO AND CICERO

As a final discussion, comment must be made regarding Calcidius' translation of Plato's *Timaeus* (17a – 53c) in the fourth century AD. The current level knowledge of Calcidius himself, spanning scholarship from the late nineteenth century,¹²⁷ remains low and contextualising the translation therefore proves difficult. MAGEE suggested that it arose from an invitation by a certain Osius or Hosius, a bishop of Cordoba, who participated in the ecumenical councils of Nicea and Serdica in 325 and 343 BC, but evidence for this is inconclusive.¹²⁸ Whether Calcidius' command of Greek was strong or weak (or simply whether he was Greek himself), or if his translation exemplifies a Christianising quality or otherwise, are equally uncertain, and some syntactical and lexical peculiarities in his translation both affirm and militate against these questions.¹²⁹ In either case, the ad hominem analysis of Calcidius 'the author' is beyond the scope of this study and, instead, I limit the analysis that follows to the linguistic aspects of his version of Plato's *Timaeus*.

¹²⁷ See the early works of e.g. WROBEL (1875) and (1876), SWITALSKI (1902), and STEINHEIMER (1912).

¹²⁸ See MAGEE (2016), viii.

¹²⁹ MAGEE (2016), xiv-xv; see HOENIG (2018), 161: 'A closer look at Calcidius' vocabulary and syntax, nevertheless, leads to the impression that he was a native speaker of Greek.' For Calcidius' Christianising tone generally see WASZINK (1972), 236; MORESCHINI (2003) xiv, and in his translation of the term for Plato's 'Creator' see RATKOWITSCH (1996), 142

The work is more didactic (combined with his commentary) than Cicero's, as we shall see below. There are, however, major additions or excursuses in the translation itself (e.g. on the stars (59-91), demons (127-36), destiny (142-90), and some doxographical additions (275-301)), which suggest Calcidius' version was not necessarily a mechanical reproduction at all, but nonetheless aimed at functioning as a didactic piece of work upon which his commentary could further expand. Contrasted with Cicero's expurgated version of Plato's original however, Calcidius' is more extensive, preserving all of the earlier dialogue format between Socrates, Timaeus, and the other guests, as well as important early exchanges in the Timaeian creation narrative (e.g. *Ti.* 27c-d; 29c-d) omitted by Cicero entirely.

In terms of the vocabulary employed to translate key Greek terms in the dialogue, we also find a parallel to Cicero in the re-interpretation of Platonic terminology. BAKHOUCHE recently discussed¹³⁰ Calcidius' options when expressing a Greek term for which Latin had no equivalent: either he transliterated the term without an explanation (e.g. *noys* for *νοῦς*), deployed some neologism found previously in Cicero (e.g. *medietas* for *μεσότης*), or created his own term (e.g. *adunatio* for *συναρμότητον*). The second option BAKHOUCHE cites contains within it an assumption: that Calcidius had access to Cicero's translation and relied on it sporadically. I think this is a fair assumption to make, but I will address the issue in further detail below. For now, it is enough to keep in mind that, if it is difficult enough for scholars to contextualise who Calcidius was and the particular circumstances in which he wrote the translation and commentary, it is even more difficult (if next to impossible) to draw any firm conclusions as to which source texts he was reliant upon during this period. We can note that the three options BAKHOUCHE outlines provided Calcidius some flexibility in his translation methodology, and lexical innovation, in particular, was an important technique in his toolkit.¹³¹ We might also add periphrasis or pleonasm to BAKHOUCHE's three options above. Paraphrasing and glossing were useful didactic tools for Calcidius in further unpacking the subject matter of Plato's dialogue for Latin readers. So we find him occasionally having recourse to paraphrasing a Greek technical term (or terms) instead of calquing or transliterating directly, e.g. *ratio continui competentis* for *συνεχῆς ἀναλογία* in *Comm.* 18 and

¹³⁰ BAKHOUCHE (2011), 117f.

¹³¹ See BAKHOUCHE (2011), 119.

legitimus filius for *gnisius* (γνήσιος) in *Comm.* 34. Pleonasm is also observable, e.g. in his rendering of *Ti.* 42e: ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβερνᾶν ζῶον, ὅτι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ γίγνοιτο αἴτιον with *ut quam optime mortalis natura regetur exceptis improsperitatibus, quarum esset auctoritas et causa penes ipsos*. Here, the Greek κακῶν is already picked up with *penes*, but Calcidius adds his own abstract formation *improsperitas* (without analogue in Plato's text) as an additional layering of the image of these adverse and ominous things which might become the cause of the human soul's own ills (see *TLL* s.v. 7.1.698.65). Likewise in 40a: κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον εἶναι καθ' ὅλον, Calcidius renders with *undique ineffabilis pulchritudinis ornamentis stipans eum et conuigetans ad aeternitatem*. The notion of the Creator's ornamentation of the heavens in κόσμον is greatly expanded with the evocative *ineffabilis pulchritudinis ornamentis* and the final double translation, which includes the ἅπαξ λεγόμενον *conuigeto*, is an addition to Plato's original. The verb is used only once again later in his commentary expressing the intensified sense of *vegeto* 'to animate, enliven'.¹³²

¹³² For another instance of Calcidius' neology in addition to Plato's original Greek, see his use of *orbiculata circumvolutatio* in rendering *Ti.* 43d.

Comparing lexical innovation in Calcidius' and Cicero's translations

The influence of Calcidius' translation on the Middle Ages was immense,¹³³ perhaps more significant than Cicero's. As WROBEL (1875, 178) remarked, Calcidius' translation would become one of the foundational texts for training scholars in Platonic principles, particularly cosmology, into the Middle Ages (certainly up to the thirteenth century). As alluded to above, scholars are not in agreement¹³⁴ as to whether Calcidius actually relied on Cicero's translation at all and current opinion suggest there are no substantive parallels with Cicero's version.¹³⁵ There are reasons to doubt this claim however, following RATKOWITSCH,¹³⁶ who argued that there are detectable lexical and syntactic parallels, often with entire clauses from Cicero being imitated in Calcidius' version. We also find, for example, lexical innovations first introduced by Cicero in Calcidius' translation, but some scholars have sought to dispatch such coincidences by asserting that those Ciceronian terms had made their way into general literary usage by Calcidius' time.¹³⁷ While true, we might suggest that, given the identical subject matter of Cicero' and Calcidius' works, the deployment of a rare Ciceronian lexical innovation in Calcidius' translation of an identical section of the same text perhaps ought to be viewed as more than simply coincidental.

To begin with *Ti.* 40b, where we find Calcidius' translation: *terram vero matrem et altricem omnium terrenorum animantium constrictam limitibus per omnia vadentis et cuncta continentis poli diei noctisque custodem locavit*¹³⁸ which translates Plato's: γῆν δὲ τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, ἰλλομένην δὲ τὴν περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο. Cicero translated this as (*Timaeus*, 37): *iam*

¹³³ See VAN WINDEN (1965), 2; MAGEE (2016), vii-viii; *OCD* s.v. *Calcidius*; for the influence of Calcidius' translation in other aspects on medieval thinkers such as John Scottus Eriugena (e.g. in the areas of cosmology, astrology, the 'World Soul', inter alia), see MARENBOON (2002), 74f; for a discussion of Calcidius' influence in the Middle Ages more generally. Also DRONKE (2008).

¹³⁴ Beginning with SWITALSKI (1902) and most recently MAGEE (2016) and HOENIG (2018), this group of scholars contend that Calcidius likely did not use Cicero's translation. Those who do are fewer, most recently RATKOWITSCH (1996), 142 n. 11.

¹³⁵ HOENIG (2018), 164-5.

¹³⁶ RATKOWITSCH (1996), 142 n. 11.

¹³⁷ See e.g. SWITALSKI (1902), 10-12.

¹³⁸ The text of Calcidius' translation and commentary is taken primarily from the edition of MAGEE (2016) with reference to the editions of WASZINK (1975) and WROBEL (1876).

vero terram altricem nostram, quae trajecto axi sustinetur, diei noctisque effectricem eandemque custodem. The term *altrix* appears to be a Ciceronian sense translation rendering τροφός and Calcidius uses the same term in a double translation: *mater* and *altrix*. He also condenses Plato's φύλαξ and δημιουργός (Cic. *custos* and *effectrix*) with *custos*. Another example is found in the adjective *indissolubilis* which Cicero used in *Timaeus*, 40: *immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis* translating *Ti.* 41a: ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἔστέ οὐδ' ἄλντοι (*indissolubiles*) τὸ πάμπαν. Calcidius has *immortales quidem nequaquam nec omnino indissolubiles*. The argument, made by SWITALSKI, that these words were common in Latin by the time Calcidius was translating, is valid, but other lexical choices, such as Cicero's innovation *opinibilis* used by Calcidius, had a limited usage outside of Cicero's philosophical works. (The only post-Ciceronian attestation we know of is found in Aulus Gellius, quoting a Roman sophist named Favorinus.) Taking these observations with the additional coincidences of near-exact duplications of sentence structures that appear to mirror Cicero's version in an identical fashion and the evidence (for Calcidius' knowledge of Cicero's version) as a whole becomes more compelling. Calcidius' translation of *Ti.* 28a is another instructive example: *porro alterum opinione cum inrationabili sensu opinabile proptereaue incertum*, which Cicero had translated as *alterum quod adfert <ad> opinionem sensum rationis expers, quod totum opinabile est*. The main differences being the use of the ablative of instrument with *cum* in the former and the relative clause with *quod* in the latter, but overall the translations are closely parallel and Cicero's lexical innovation is re-used. In the next section (*Ti.* 28b) we find again in Calcidius: *omne igitur caelum vel mundus seu quo alio dignatur nomine* compared with Cicero's: *omne igitur caelum sive mundus sive quo alio vocabulo gaudet*.

I will now move away from examining textual parallels in the two authors and instead focus on using lexical innovation as a means of understanding Calcidius' translation project more broadly and his use of Cicero as a lens through which to view the Greek original. RATKOWITSCH makes an important point which so far does not seem to have been evaluated in any detail, 'für sicher, daß Chalcidius Ciceros Übersetzung benutzte, jedoch bewußt eine neue, modernere Version verfaßte, die sich nicht nur sprachlich, sondern auch inhaltlich von Cicero abheben sollte.'¹³⁹ That Calcidius had access to Cicero's translation, yet was

¹³⁹ RATKOWITSCH (1996), 142 n. 11.

consciously attempting to avoid the stylistic tropes and vocabulary of Cicero's translation deserves further examination.

Consider the first example I cited above, in which one observes the sentence rendering *Ti. 40b* (*terram vero matrem et altricem omnium terrenorum animantium constrictam limitibus*). Calcidius' Latin contains a somewhat unnecessary pleonasm: *matrem et altricem*, which covered Cicero's *altrix* (τροφή) and which could have been borrowed from the Ciceronian translation directly (see below however). Cicero's double translation *effectricem eandemque custodem* is avoided altogether and only *custos* remains to cover φύλακα καὶ δημιουργόν. We might ask what was Calcidius' purpose here? He avoids the original periphrasis in Greek and inserts a new one where there is, it seems, no need. One explanation is that Calcidius is attempting to augment the original Greek by the 'compensation' technique (from NEWMARK's taxonomy in Chapter One) by using an earlier periphrasis as a substitute for the later one, yet this leads to a secondary question: why use *altrix* at all? The term itself was used after Cicero in Vergil, Ovid, and Seneca, but that Cicero had chosen the word in the same sentence of his translation of Plato's text may be grounds to suspect Calcidius was at least aware of its pedigree. In a later section (*Ti. 44b*), Calcidius introduces the agent noun *auxiliatrix* 'supporter' to convey Plato's noun τροφή 'nourishment':

Pl.: ἂν μὲν οὖν δὴ καὶ συνεπιλαμβάνηται τις ὀρθὴ τροφή παιδεύσεως.

Calc.: *ac si ad hunc statum accedat auxiliatrix eruditionis honestae moderationisque diligentia.*

The term *altrix* we recall rendered τροφός (τροφή), with the same meaning in the substantive (i.e. 'nourisher'). Here we see Calcidius had a perfectly adequate agent noun he could draw upon (and had, in fact, used earlier,) but preferred to resort to the lexical innovation *auxiliatrix*, perhaps as a means of creating a poetic embellishment of the Greek original. Possible explanations are outlined below:

- In translating *Ti.* 40b, Calcidius was aware he was using Cicero's term *altrix* to translate *τροφός* and decided to add *mater* to create a double translation as his own creative expansion.
- He then dropped the translation of *δημιουργός* entirely in the same clause in order to balance the sentence.
- Later, in *Ti.* 44b, Calcidius inserts his own coinage, *auxiliatrix*, for poetic effect to convey the same concept of 'nourishing' and 'supporting' (*τροφή*), though there is no need to add a newly-coined noun into his translation when he had recourse to the pre-existing Ciceronian term *altrix*, used earlier in his translation.

The net result of these possibilities leads us to this conclusion: Calcidius was not interested in mechanical reproduction of the Greek, and nor was he interested in relying upon Cicero's translation verbatim, though he did have knowledge of this version and, on occasion, borrowed the same terms Cicero had used in identical sections of the dialogue.

The question then arises as to why Calcidius would need to introduce his own terms if he already had access to Cicero's terms rendering the Greek ones in the exposition of the creation narrative. A rudimentary example of a lexical innovation in the translation itself is the coinage of the adverbial *indissolubilter*, which is simply a derivative of Cicero's substantive *indissolubilis*. This aspect of Calcidius' translation has been examined by LEMOINES, whose list of neologisms uncovers this salient point: most of them are found in Calcidius' *commentary* rather than in the translation proper. Those lexical innovations or augmentations found in the translation bear two important traits:

1. They are rare (both within the text itself and also compared to the number of them which appear in his commentary); and
2. They are usually used in surplus; i.e. many of those found in the translation *do not* correspond directly to a Greek term.

A few examples will suffice to highlight this point. Beginning with *Ti.* 39e-40a:

Pl: εἰσὶν δὴ τέτταρες, μία μὲν οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πτηνὸν καὶ ἀεροπόρον, τρίτη δὲ ἔνυδρον εἶδος, πεζὸν δὲ καὶ χερσαῖον τέταρτον.

Cic: *erant autem animantium genera quattuor, quorum unum divinum atque caeleste, alterum pinnigerum et aerium, tertium <aquatile, pedestre et> terrestre quartum.*

Calc: *constituitque quattuor, primum caeleste plenum divinitatis, aliud deinde praepes aerivagum, tertium aquae liquoribus accommodatum, quartum quod terrena soliditas sustineret.*

The lexical innovations or augmentations corresponding to the Greek terms (in **bold**) are underlined above. In Cicero, *pinniger* is an adjective ('winged') being a lexical augmentation of the older poetic adjective 'carrying or wearing feathers' in Accius (*TLL* s.v. *penni-*, *pinniger*, 10.1.1097.7f). Instead of re-using this distinctive term, Calcidius creates his own compound: *aerivagus*. Further, instead of using a double translation like Cicero's *pinniger et aerium*, he uses *praepes* in the nominal sense with his adjective *aerivagus* ('air-wandering birds'). There are two close intertextual references to Cicero with Calcidius' construction: Firstly, we observed that Cicero used a similarly-structured compound *solivagus* 'lone-wandering' to translate and add to the Greek ἔρημος (*Timaeus*, 20). These compounds were mostly confined to poetic contexts, so we see *montivagus* (*DRN* 1.404, 2.597, 2.1081) and *multivagus* (*Stat. Theb.* 1.499; *Sen. Herc.* 533) for instance, but they were also used by Cicero in his philosophical works: *montivagus* in *Tusc.* 5.79 and *omnivagus* in *N.D.* 2.68. Calcidius preserves the poetic aspect of *pinniger* by coining his own poetic adjectival compound *aerivagus* along the same morphological lines as his predecessors had done.

There is a further intertextuality that might connect this lexical innovation to Calcidius' knowledge of Cicero. In the construction *praepes aerivagus* we find a parallel from Cicero's own poem, *Marius*, quoted by the character of his brother Quintus in the *Div.* 1.106: *hanc ubi praepetibus pinnis lapsuque volentem conspexit Marius*. Compare the noun + adjective construction: *praepes pinnae* with Calcidius' *praepes aerivagus*. It is, of course, a

long bow to draw by suggesting that Calcidius was emulating *both* Cicero's version of the *Timaeus* and his poetry, but what I hope to illustrate here is that, even if only the translation was known to Calcidius, it indicates that he was creative in his own right and occasionally sought poetic expansion in his translation rather than mere replication. Another example is found in the translation of *Ti.* 46c where τῶν κατόπτρων λειότης had been rendered *speculorum levitas* by Cicero but is translated as *teres speculi serenitas*. Instead of re-using Cicero's term in *-tas*, Calcidius uses the more established abstract *serenitas* but asks it to bear a new meaning, now picking up the physical smoothness of the mirror (λειότης), rather than its conventional sense of 'serenity' (referring to the weather) or 'calm disposition' (referring to people).¹⁴⁰

In the translation of *Ti.* 35a, Cicero introduced the verbal abstract *copulatio* to render συναρμόττον, which Calcidius translates instead with the more common *concretio*. However, he then uses a double translation to introduce a semantic shift: *adunatio*, which only seems to be attested before Calcidius in Cyprian (third century). Nonetheless, the meaning of the abstract noun now carries the notion of a nexus between elements in Plato's cosmological sense. Here again we see Calcidius either refusing to use, or simply not aware of, a Ciceronian original term and instead resorts to pleonasm to convey the same concept with rare substantives now imbued with specific senses through the transposition of the Platonic creation myth into Latin.

In Calcidius' version of *Ti.* 34b: ἐσόμενον θεὸν λογισθεὶς λείον καὶ ὁμαλὸν πανταχῇ he again expands on Cicero's *is qui erat de aliquando futuro deo cogitans levem illum effecit et undique aequabilem* by introducing a double translation of ὁμαλὸν πανταχῇ using lexical innovations (a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον as well):¹⁴¹ *et umquam futurum deum levem eum et aequiremum indeclivemque*. The existing *aequabilis* used in Plautus, Varro, and Cicero has been superseded by two new adjectives conveying 'equal-sidedness'. So *indeclivis* conveys the sense of 'without sloping or declivity' and *aequiremus* 'equal sided' (nicely picking up πανταχῇ), literally 'equal-oared', conjuring the metaphor of a boat kept steady by its rower using oars on both sides of the vessel.

¹⁴⁰ See OLD s.v. *serentias*.

¹⁴¹ See BAKHOUCHE (2011), 604 and VILLALOBOS (2014), 46.

In *Ti.* 46b, Plato discusses the smoothness of a concave mirror as important to its reflective properties: τοῦτο δέ, ὅταν ἡ τῶν κατόπτρων λειότης, ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν ὕψη λαβοῦσα, τὸ δεξιὸν εἰς τὸ ἀριστερὸν μέρος ἀπώσῃ τῆς ὀψέως καὶ θάτερον ἐπὶ θάτερον, which Cicero had rendered with: *id fit cum speculorum levitas hinc illincque altitudinem adsumpsit et ita dexteram detrussit in laevam partem oculorum laevamque in dexteram*. Calcidius has: *quod fit, quotiens teres speculi serenitas hinc inde tumidioribus et provectis in molem lateribus dextram visus partem in laevam speculi, laevam item in dexteriora deiecit*. Instead of using *levitas*, Calcidius uses a lexical augmentation, changing the usual usage of *serenitas* (*OLD* s.v., 1. ‘a dry, bright condition of the air or sky’; 2. (fig.) favourableness of conditions’) to the ‘smoothness’ of an object’s surface (e.g. a mirror’s). The *-tas* abstract is retained however, finding correspondence with λειότης, but *levitas* is disregarded in favour of another abstract, now imbued with a new sense. It is useful to note that Cicero’s translation of 46a does not survive, but there the abstract λειότης and its adjective λείος are used several times and Calcidius renders it via the technique of *variatio*. So ἐμφανῇ καὶ λείᾳ becomes *quae in humida cernuntur superficie*, περὶ τὴν λειότητα becomes *in tersam aliquam levemque materiae superficiem*, and περὶ τὸ λείον καὶ λαμπρὸν συμπαγοῦς (46b) becomes *ex levigati corporis conspectu*.

There are also examples where no creative impulse seems to lead Calcidius to ignoring the Ciceronian term but rather clarity of expression appears to be the motivating factor. In *Timaeus*, 12, Cicero uses the compound *unigena* rendering μονογενής (*Ti.* 31b) whereas Calcidius prefers the more common term *unicus*:

Pl: διὰ ταῦτα οὐτε δύο οὐτ’ ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ’ εἰς ὃδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονὼς ἔστιν καὶ ἔτ’ ἔσται.

Cic: *idcirco singularem deus hunc mundum atque unigenam procreavit.*

Calc: *idcirco neque duo nec innumerabiles mundi sed unicus a deo factus est.*

Calcidius' translation collects more of Plato's original than does the terser Ciceronian version, hence ἄπειροι κόσμοι becomes *innumerabiles mundi* and the more literal sense of 'making' conveyed in ποιέω becomes *factus est* in Calcidius' Latin (as opposed to more organic metaphor of 'procreating' in Cicero's *procreo*). The contrastive *neque [...] sed* construction mirrors Plato's original more closely than Cicero's double translation: *singularis et unigena*.

However, there are some instances where Calcidius avoids using Cicero's terms to the detriment of his own translation, for example in the rendering of δύναμις in *Ti.* 41c which Cicero had translated with *vis* but which Calcidius, instead, translates with *sollertia* 'skill' which, as BAKHOUCHE has noted,¹⁴² is a 'strange' translation that weakens the sense of the Greek original:

Pl: μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν γένεσιν.

Cic: *imiteminiue vim meam, qua me in vestro ortu usum esse meministis.*

Calc: *imitantes ergo meam iuxta effectum vestrum sollertiam.*

There is a question of interpretation that provides an illustration of Calcidius' understanding of the Platonic Creator. The use of δύναμις in Greek authors varied from a physical 'force' to a more abstract concept of 'means, skill' (compare LSJ s.v. A and II. 1-2 for the former with II. 3 for the latter). In Latin, the term *vis* is much less nuanced, and carries the primary meaning of physical force. It appears that Calcidius construed the 'potentiality' of the Creator as something more abstract, less physical, and associated more with *sollertia* than *vis*. The salient detail here in Calcidius' version is that in the generation of mortals by the gods, the Creator orders the gods to imitate the skill of the Creator himself, not necessarily his physical 'power'.

Conversely, there are examples where Calcidius does not follow Cicero's terms but deploys either loan-words or rarer, post-Classical terms in his translation to translate more precisely the Greek expression: so we find *archetypus* for παράδειγμα which captures the

¹⁴² See BAKHOUCHE (2011), 118 and 614.

chronology of the notion of ‘original’ or ‘first-made’ more literally than does Cicero’s *exemplar*. Similarly with *modulamen*, Calcidius uses it to translate *ἁρμονία* in the Pythagorean sense of ‘euphony’ or ‘harmony’, which Cicero had rendered with *concentio*, a less precise term conveying a ‘singing-together’ rather than the mathematical notion of the harmonic measure or interval (*modulus*). In *Ti.* 41c, Plato has: *αὐτῶν ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον εἶναι προσήκει* referring to the immortal part endowed by the gods to mortal beings, Cicero translates with *creantur ut deorum immortalium quasi gentiles esse debeant*, a more concise and stylistically leaner version than Calcidius’: *consortium divinitatis et apellationis parilitas* (*ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον*) but the latter more closely renders *ὁμώνυμος* by using the rare post-Classical abstract *parilitas* ‘equality’.

Ultimately however, we must concede that we have too little evidence to make definitive claims about Calcidius’ access to Cicero’s translation. The argument that he ‘consciously avoided’ Ciceronian vocabulary in his own translation as an attempt at originality and creativity runs the risk of using circular logic; that is, perhaps he simply did not have Cicero’s translation at hand and thus was forced to resort to coining his own terms for Greek words, the same way Cicero was forced to do centuries before. Even more problematic is that, throughout all the post-Classical authors we have surveyed, the appeal to the authority of Cicero’s lexical choices has been frequent, if not a cliché (the use of *essentia* being a prime example). Why would Calcidius, if he did have Cicero’s version at his disposal, not use many of the same terms Cicero had coined and quote his authority as justification? There are numerous questions, and perhaps there were external pressures on Calcidius from the Bishop of Cordoba for a new and original version, stripped of the old pagan vocabulary of Cicero? This is all speculative, but it is worth reminding the reader that the lack of evidence with respect to Calcidius himself should make us question many of the assumptions upon which our analysis proceeds. I have hoped to demonstrate that, if we do accept the assumption that Calcidius had access to Cicero’s version, there is at least some linguistic evidence, especially through the lens of lexical innovation, to confirm this. Ultimately however, it is mere speculation without more proof.

Collected lexical innovation in Calcidius

The table below categorises Calcidius' lexical innovations and augmentations (the latter indicated with an asterisk (*)) from his *Timaeus* translation, according to morphological characteristics. All ἄπαξ λεγόμενα are indicated with (‡):

–bilis

*derivabilis*ST ‡ (μετάπειστον) > *derivo* + *–ibilis*¹⁴³

*perceptibilis**¹⁴⁴ (περιληπτός/καταλεπτός) (in pass. sense) > p.p.p. *percipio* + *–bilis*

–tor/–trix

*auxiliator*ST (σωτήρ) > *auxilium* + *–tor*

*auxiliatrix*ST (τροφή) > *auxilium* + *–trix*

–tio

adunatio^{MC} (συναρμόττον) > *aduno* + *–tio*

*comprehensio** (δυσχυρίζομαι) > *co-* + p.p.p. *prehendo* + *–tio*

–tas

*summitas** (πρώτος) > *summus* + *–tas*

First-attested loan-words or loan-blends

aplanes (ἀπλανής)¹⁴⁵

epogdoos (ἐπόγδοος)

¹⁴³ See WROBEL (1875), 183 who notes that the form *deviabile* appears in the *ed. princ.* with the marginal gloss *derivabile*. The paradosis throughout all the codices, however, contains *derivabile* and its variant *dirivabile*.

¹⁴⁴ The term is found in Christian authors (e.g. Irenaeus, 130-202 AD) with the sense of 'perceptible to the senses', but only appears to become applied to the mind or soul in Calcidius, see *TLL* s.v. (10.1.1201.61). The *recentiores* prefer *percipibilis* however (see LEMOINE (2005), 242 though he suggests *καταλεπτός* as the original Greek term translated by *perceptibilis*).

¹⁴⁵ For the term's use as a substantive in Calcidius, see WROBEL (1875), 180.

Miscellaneous

*aequiremus*ST (ὁμαλός) > *aequus* + *remus*

aerivagus^{MC} ‡ (πτηνὸν καὶ ἀεροπόρον) > *aer* + *vagus* (*vago*)

*indeclivis*ST (ὁμαλός) > *in-* + *declivis*

*nuto** (μεταπειστός)

praeconfundo^{MC} ‡ (προαπορηθῆναι) > *prae-* + *confundo*

Category of lexical innovation	Percentage (total number = 14 lemmata)
Augmentations (semantic calques, etc.)	29% (4 lemmata)
Sense translations, etc.	36% (5 lemmata)
First-attested loan-words and loan-blends	14% (2 lemmata)
Morphological calques	21% (3 lemmata)

The data from Calcidius' translation suggests he kept closely to the standard vocabulary of his time and rarely neologised if a Latin term was lacking. Rather, the introduction of neologisms or loan-shifts seems to be largely for expansion of the original text, an indication that Calcidius did not seek to reproduce the Greek mechanically but to add his own creative literary additions. These, I have argued, not only serve a stylistic purpose to expand upon the Greek, but also differentiate his translation from his predecessor's (Cicero's). A classic example is the use of Cicero's calque *comprehensio* translating κατάληψις to translate the Platonic verb δυσχυρίζομαι 'to affirm confidently' (LSJ s.v.) which bears a subtly different meaning to the Stoic κατάληψις. The use of *auxiliator* as a neologism rendering σωτήρ (Ti. 48d) is done in conjunction with more established terms such as *salutaris* (22d) and *liberator* (48e) indicating two important points: that, 1) Calcidius was content to employ *variatio* where required, diversifying the diction of his translation for stylistic purposes, and 2) the use of these three substantives can be likened to Cicero's hermeneutical process of translation, giving the reader three different interpretative options in comprehending the notion of σωτήρ: 'assistance, help' (*auxiliator*), 'freedom, deliverance' (*liberator*), and 'salvation' (*salutaris*),

the latter bound up with Christian connotations.¹⁴⁶ Though not listed in the above table as they do not directly correspond to a Greek word, Calcidius introduces these neologisms and semantic shifts as additions to the original Greek text: *circumvolutatio*, *completio* (lexical augmentation), *coniventia*, *existentia*, *locularis*, and *mulcebris*. Loan-words are sparse in the translation (in contrast to the commentary, see below). When it came to mathematical vocabulary, as we saw in Cicero, the terms used to render certain proportional increases were consistent in form but unattested before Cicero (e.g. *sesquialter* for ἡμιόλιος). In Calcidius we find the established *sescuplum* for ἡμιόλιος, but the direct use of a loan-blends: *epogdoos* (ἐπόγδοος) instead of Cicero's *sesquioctavus*, and the established loan-word *epitritos* (ἐπίτριτος), instead of Cicero's *sesquitercius*.

The following lexical innovations and augmentations are found in Calcidius' commentary:

–tio

detuitio^{MC} (παράφασις) > *de-* + *tueor* + *-tio*

*effulsio*ST (ἀνάφορον/φάσις/φαῦσις)¹⁴⁷ > p.p.p. *effulgeo* + *-tio*

*intuitio** (ἐμφασις) > *in-* + *tueor* + *-tio*

*praecessio*ST (ὑπόθεσις) > *praecedo* + *-tio*

*tuitio** (φάσις) > *tueor* + *-tio*

–bilis

complexibilis^{MC} (σύμπλεκτος)¹⁴⁸ > *complex* + *-bilis*

contionabilis^{MC} (δημηγορικός / συμβουλευτικός)¹⁴⁹ > *contio* + *-bilis*

¹⁴⁶ See e.g. *Vulg. Gen.* 49.18 and *Psa.* 41.5.

¹⁴⁷ WASZINK (1975) supposes ἀνάφορον, φάσις, or φαῦσις as the original Greek terms Calcidius renders by *effulsio* (see WASZINK's 'II. Indices ad Commentarium' s.v. *effulsio*), however from my reading the predominant meaning of the Latin term in the commentary refers to φαῦσις 'lighting or rising' (see LSJ s.v.). Note also WROBEL (1875), 183.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. DEN BOEFT (1970), 70 who suggests this is a morphological calque of σύμπλεκτος. See also the later form *complexabilis* in Cassiodorus (*In Psalm.* 39.15).

¹⁴⁹ See LEMOINE (2005), 239 who suggests Calcidius is etymologising based on the Aristotelian term συμβουλευτικός (βουλή = *contio*). Calcidius' term appears to be formed from Quintilian's *contionalis*.

participabilis^{MC} (μετεχόμενος)¹⁵⁰ > p.p.p. *participo* + *-bilis*

-ivus

*motivus*ST (τὸ κινεῖσθαι / κινητόν)¹⁵¹ > *motus* + *-ivus*

Miscellaneous

*aquilonianus*ST ‡ (τὰ βορειότερα κλίματα)¹⁵² > *aquilonia* + *-us*

*artificialiter** (μαθηματικῶς)¹⁵³

bicoris^{MC} ‡ (δίκωρος) > *bi-* + *cora*

constellatus^{MC} (κατησπερισμένος) > *co-* + p.p.p. *stello*¹⁵⁴

*silva** (ῥύλη)

*silvester** (ῥύλη)

-tor/-trix

*opinatrix*ST ‡ (δόξα)¹⁵⁵ > *opino* + *-trix*

First-attested loan-words or loan-blends

calathoides (καλαθοειδής)

catabibazon (καταβιβάζων)

categoricus (κατηγορικός)¹⁵⁶

conoides (κωνοειδής)

¹⁵⁰ See LSJ s.v. and LEMOINE (2005), 242 for the possible Greek original.

¹⁵¹ LSJ suggests τὸ κινεῖσθαι as the Greek original, LEMOINE (2005), 242 suggests κινητόν. The term appears elsewhere only in the *De Pulchritudine Mundi* in the Pseudo-Augustine *Libri Sententiarum XXI* (see the PL edition, 40.730).

¹⁵² The form *aquilentanae* also appears in various *codd.* and the *ed. princ.* (see WROBEL (1875), 181). Also *TLL* s.v. *aquilonianus* (2.0.378.15). MAGEE (2016), 228 has *aquilentanae*. The term appears to be derived from *aquilonius*, e.g. in Cic. *N.D.* 2.50:

¹⁵³ A translation of the Greek adverb used by Theon of Smyrna, according to BAKHOUCHE (2011, 676), but here in the new sense of ‘mathematically, scientifically’ as opposed to ‘according to art’ as attested earlier in Quint. *Inst.* 2.17.42.

¹⁵⁴ See BAKHOUCHE (2011), 677.

¹⁵⁵ That *opinatrix* corresponds to δόξα is my conjecture but the context conjures the same dichotomy as Plato’s: *cuius duplex virtus, altera intellegens opinatrix altera* [...] See also DEN BOEFT (1970), 181

¹⁵⁶ A simple transliteration, but cf. Apuleius’ translation of κατηγορικός with *declarativus*.

cylindroides (κυλινδροειδής)

eropticum (ἐποπτικός)

hegemonicon (ἡγεμονικόν)¹⁵⁷

*hexahedron, hexahedrum*¹⁵⁸ (ἑξάεδρον)

hypolipticus (ὑπολειπτικός)

limma (λεῖμμα)

mesembrinos/meshemerinos (μεσημβρινός/μεσημέριος)

noys (νοῦς)

oranos (ὀρανός)

paraphasis (παράφασις)

phasis (φάσις)

psychogonia (ψυχογονία)

pyramoides (πυραμοειδής)

uranos (οὐρανός)

usia (οὐσία)

Category of lexical innovation	Percentage (total number = 35 lemmata)
Augmentations (semantic calques, etc.)	14.5% (5 lemmata)
Sense translations, etc.	14.5% (5 lemmata)
First-attested loan-words and loan-blends	54% (19 lemmata)
Morphological calques	17% (6 lemmata)

Calcidius' commentary clearly takes more liberties than his translation when it came to importing Greek loan-words directly. BAKHOUCHE (2011, 42) argues that the commentary itself was written for a non-philosopher, but the liberal use of Greek loan-words in the commentary seems at odds with this conclusion. However, BAKHOUCHE's observation makes

¹⁵⁷ Note also Calcidius glosses this Greek term with *ratio* (*Comm.* 218): *ut domicilium esset partis animae principalis, quod hegemonicon a philosophis dicitur, id est ratio.*

¹⁵⁸ WASZINK (1975) prints *hexahedrum* which would make the term a loan-blend rather than a direct loan; *TLL* reads *hexa(h)edron* (6.3.2677.59).

sense when we note that most of the loan-words are glossed with paraphrases or Latin equivalents. So with *hypolipticus* (*Comm.* 74), Calcidius translates the term of the *mathematici* as *quasdam earum* (sc. *stellarum errantium*) *sequaces esse*. There are many other such examples in the commentary and these served a didactic purpose, similar to the use of Greek loan-words in Cicero's dialogues.

The term *bicoris* has been commented upon by scholars¹⁵⁹ and is a classic example of a loan-blend: the Latin *bi-* morpheme replaces *δι-* and combining with the Greek *κορος* 'twin pupil.' The adjective *complexibilis* appears in the following context (*Comm.* 169): *divinatio vero necessitati quidem subiectarum rerum, ambiguarum etiam, sed quarum iam fatalis completus sit exitus, vera est et complexibilis* 'but the divination of things subject to necessity, including the contingent ones whose fated outcome has already been brought to completion, is true and comprehensive'. DE BOEFT suggests that Calcidius derived the adjective *complexibilis* from *completus exitus* to summarise the whole section: *quarum iam fatalis completes sit exitus*: '[Calcidius] misunderstood a Greek word [...] Which Greek word? Possibly, if we suppose a literal translation, *συμπλεκτός*.' This explanation is speculative, with the adjectival *συμπλεκτός* not attested until the Septuagint. It is difficult to guess which Greek term, if any, Calcidius' term is supposed to have translated in the context and may have simply been an adjectival derivative of *complexio* meaning 'capable or susceptible of a conclusion' (DE BOEFT (1970), 70 n. 1; see also *TLL* s.v. *complexio*, 3.0.2100.48).

The common adjective *silvester* 'wooded, overgrown' and the noun *silva* 'wood, forest' become imbued with the new technical meaning of essential material in the Aristotelian sense, so (*Comm.* 273): *necessitatem porro nunc appellat* (i.e. Plato) *hylon, quam nos Latine silvam possumus nominare*. MAGEE calls these loan-shifts 'the most distinctive elements of Calcidius' philosophical vocabulary'¹⁶⁰ and parallels the use of *materies* in Lucretius for Epicurus' atoms and Cicero and Apuleius' use of *materia* for *χώρα* (contrast, however, Cicero's use of *materia* for *οὐσία* in the *Timaeus*). The use of the notion of 'unformed wood' in *silva* gives the Timaeian *ὑλη* the unmistakable Aristotelian overtones of

¹⁵⁹ See e.g. WROBEL (1875), 181 (who notes later editors had *bicorni* instead of *bicoris*, however the manuscript paradox is consistent with having *bicori* or *bichori*); LEMOINE (2005), 239; MAGEE (2016), 750.

¹⁶⁰ MAGEE (2016), 725-6; see also VAN WINDEN (1965), 31; MORESCHINI (2003), 716 n. 210; BAKHOUCHE (2011), 831-2.

hylomorphism.¹⁶¹ The significant influence Calcidius' choice of loan-shift was in his commentary on the later medieval tradition interpreting Platonic metaphysics should not be underestimated.¹⁶²

The term *tuitio* and its derivative *intuitio* are not unique to Calcidius but seem to be given here the novel sense of rendering the Greek geometric terms *φάσις* and *ἔμφασις*, the former referring to an 'appearance' and the latter a 'reflection' or image (see LSJ svv.). However, Calcidius also uses the lexical innovation *effulsio* to refer to *φάσις* (among other terms, see s.v., **Appendix III**) in his commentary. The derivative *detuitio* is not attested before Calcidius and seems to be a lexical innovation conveying the abstract sense of *παράφασις* (from *παραφαίνομαι*) as in a 'transparent vision' (*Timaeus* 239, trans. MAGEE (2016), 499). Calcidius explains *παράφασις* as follows: '*paraphasis* occurs whenever it is not on the surface of a mirror, but inside, and in those depths where we find an image plunged into darkness, such as is found on a translucent but dark shard of glass, or upon a lake made black by its great depth.'¹⁶³ BAKHOUCHE (2003, 11) argues that Calcidius' terms are constructed using derivatives of the verb *tueor*, 'to watch, to look at,' which distorts the meaning of the words from the Greek *φαίνω* 'to seem, to appear', which the four terms quoted by Calcidius are supposed to translate. As a result there is a false semantic calque in the change of perspective from a Greek 'showing' to a Latin 'seeing.' This is an important renovation in that the Latin subjectivises the phenomenon of reflection or refraction based upon the 'direct vision' of the subject (*tuitio* < *tueor*) instead of the behaviour of light on the object itself (in the case the mirror or reflective surface). Thus an 'appearance beside or along with' (*παράφασις* < *παρεμφαίνω*) is replaced with a 'looking down to' (*detuitio*) and an 'appearance in' (< *ἔμφασις* < *ἐμφαίνω*) becomes a 'looking into, upon' (*intuitio* < *intueor*).

Finally, *nuto* is an interesting case of a possible double lexical augmentation, in the first case in the translation (*Ti.* 51e), with *nutans* rendering *μεταπειστός*, which itself seems to have been a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον* in Plato's dialogue, meaning 'open to persuasion' (LSJ s.v.).

¹⁶¹ See VAN WINDEN (1965), 31.

¹⁶² See GILSON (1952), 118.

¹⁶³ Calc. Comm. 242: *paraphasis ab his appellatur, prouenit quotiens non in cute speculi, sed introrsum et tamquam in penetralibus simulacrum invenitur obumbrante aliqua nigredine, ut in pellucidi quidem sed fuscii vitri lamina vel stagnis atris ex alto profundo.*

Then in the Commentary itself (67), where BAKHOUCHE (2011, 679) suggests *nuto* is a semantic ἄπαξ, presumably because it is now applied to an astrological context describing planetary movement (contrasted with *insistens*), possibly rendering μεταπίπτω. However, *nuto* had been used in a similar sense describing an incline from the horizontal in Ovid (*Ars.* 2.263) and so I would be less inclined to view this as a special or novel usage of the verb. However, its use in the translation of μεταπειστός certainly would be a semantic extension.

5. CHAPTER FIVE:

BOETHIUS AND THE CREATION OF LATIN LOGICAL TERMINOLOGY

‘[I]f Latin philosophical books were composed using a language based on the sincerity of an unprejudiced translation, I see much to have been accomplished were nothing more desired from the Greek writings’ (quocirca multum profecisse videor, si philosophiae libris Latina oratione compositis per integerrimae translationis sinceritatem nihil in Graecorum litteris amplius desideretur.)

— Boethius, *Commentary on Prophyry’s Isagoge* 2.135-6

5.1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BOETHIUS

The final chapter examines and collates the lexical innovations of Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, writing on the threshold of the Middle Ages. Boethius is a crucial figure insofar as his influence on the Scholastics and later philosophical thought of medieval figures was immense. In particular, Boethius' ambitious project to translate Greek philosophical texts into Latin, specifically the *Organon* of Aristotle,¹ makes him an important case study in the type of research undertaken in this thesis. Nor were his works simply important on future thinkers in his field, but his incorporation of past philosophical translators such as Cicero, into his own commentaries — in particular of Cicero's *Topica* (Aristotle), but also the *Timaeus* (Plato) — makes him of additional interest.² This placed Boethius directly within the same tradition of philosophical translation and lexical innovation that has been highlighted throughout this study. A question for the reader might be that a narrowly focused study of Boethian philosophical vocabulary, particularly from Aristotelian works of logic, is a highly specialised and less applicable field of inquiry than, for example, studying Cicero's broad range of works examining Peripatetic, Academic, Stoic, and Epicurean schools of thought. Yet as we will find, though the lexical subject matter in this chapter is certainly of a specialised and technical character, the lineage of these terms reaches us all the way down to our modern English usage of philosophical vocabulary, confirming, perhaps beyond any doubt, how crucial Boethius' translations choices of Greek terms were for posterity. Terms that we use regularly today, such as *affirmative*, *consequential*, *definitive*, *denominative*, *diminution*, *duality*, *equivocation*, *negative*, *perceptible*, *predictive*, *proportional*, *specific* are all Boethian lexical innovations or augmentations, building a sophisticated vocabulary in Latin that would be harnessed and expanded upon throughout the medieval and early Renaissance periods.

¹ I include here Boethius' translation of Porphyry's *Introduction* ('Εἰσαγωγή') to Aristotle's *Categories*.

² Like Cicero too, he saw his translation project as a type of national duty to his countrymen, see e.g. *In Cat.* 2, *Prooemium* (PL 64, 201B3-9). Also GALONNIER (2007), 136-7

5.2. 'ORIGINALITY' IN BOETHIUS' TRANSLATIONS

The ramifications of Boethius' translations of the Aristotelian *Organon* in the late fifth and early sixth centuries on the intellectual history of Europe are difficult to emphasise effectively within one chapter. Scholars' views of Boethius' legacy range from laudatory hyperbole³ to gross underestimation.⁴

Boethius was a Roman of a patrician heritage, descended from the well-known Anicii, whose line included consuls, senators, emperors (Anicius Olybrius), and a pope (Gregory I). Like Cicero, Boethius was a politician as well as an intellectual, versed in both Greek and Latin as a young man and attaining the office of a senator at the age of 25, and later a consulship in 510 AD. Like Cicero too, Boethius attempted not only to articulate the thought of Ancient Greek into his native language, but to transpose and re-interpret it in Latin. This situates him directly within the same tradition we have examined from the late Republic until the late Imperial era, namely, one that sought to equip Latin with a vocabulary extensive enough to not only transpose Greek philosophical expressions into Latin but also to commentate, debate, and create new ideas based on established concepts.⁵ This has, therefore, entailed a consequential discussion among scholars about Boethian 'originality' often with contradictory and confusing conclusions.

CHADWICK, for example, writes: 'Boethius was by temperament a man who liked to strike out on his own' and then '[n]either in his dialectical studies nor in his works on mathematics did Boethius claim to be original'.⁶ Presumably, the proposition here is that in some disciplines, Boethius was bold enough to forge his own ideas and interpretations (*De consolazione Philosophiae*), but in other, more technical, disciplines he was content to remain a mere replicator of those pre-existing ideas. One might query how well such an observation holds. If modern-day scholars were able to assess Boethius' temperament over a thousand

³ See e.g. CHADWICK (1981), 1.

⁴ See e.g. BARNES (1981), 84-5.

⁵ See KELLY (1979), 71: '[Boethius]' interest was that of Cicero's, the formation of a philosophical terminology in Latin.'

⁶ CHADWICK (1981), 2-3. Although, as with the dialectical and rhetorical topics, Boethius does stake a claim to simplifying and producing a new interpretation of a complicated tradition obsessed with 'details' (*de unoquoque*) rather than explicating the 'whole' (*de communi*) as he describes it, see *In Top. Diff.* 1207A: *de cuius quidem rei traditione nihil ab antiquis praeceptoribus accepimus. de unoquoque enim praecipunt, nihil de communi laborantes. quam partem doctrinae vacuam, ut possumus, aggrediamur*; also STUMP (1978), 143.

years ago, we might then be diagnosing a particularly inconsistent personality trait: on the one hand, pioneering new works in fields such as rhetoric and philosophy, but on the other entirely unoriginal and mechanical in his reproductions of Greek ideas. Propositions like SHIEL's, that Boethius' logical commentaries are mere translations of the marginalia in Greek manuscripts, are, in the vein of BARNES above, simplistic and narrow views of a more complex issue and significantly deprive Boethius of his scholarly reputation (the so-called 'one source-no thinking' argument).⁷

The answer to such originality questions in Boethius is, therefore, just as fraught as it was with like Cicero or Seneca. Neither are we in a certain enough position to assess Boethius' psychological state of mind at the time of his compositions, nor (in my view) is the question of originality an especially important one. The only questions which appear to me as being crucial in this respect are: a) to what extent did Boethius contribute to the Latin philosophical vocabulary? and b) were these linguistic contributions influential in the intellectual tradition of which he was a part? This chapter argues that answering both of these questions in the affirmative is an uncontroversial claim. Additionally, the sheer scale of Boethius' literary projects means that there will necessarily be differing aims and approaches within a single author's corpus. The translation of Greek logical texts, as opposed to the composition of an original literary work like the *De consolazione Philosophiae* or theological tracts like *De trinitate* or *De fide catholica*, have very different purposes. Though the latter is more consciously 'original' than the former, such distinctions are less useful given the starkly varying aims of the works under comparison.

As we have done throughout this thesis, beyond mere stylistic questions, what was the purpose of Boethius' philosophical vocabulary and how much of it was created or re-imagined to bolster the Latin lexical arsenal in interpreting Greek concepts? Given Boethius' intellectual stature in the history of ideas, it is not surprising that these questions have been frequently asked and answered without a large amount of analysis. EBBESEN's remarks on this issue are salient when he observes that Boethius' translations of Aristotle's *Organon* were 'extremely faithful to the originals', rendering word-for-word and 'morpheme by morpheme' and notes that 'this choice of this procedure was very deliberate.'⁸ EBBESEN then contrasts this with the commentaries which, he observes, 'are more informative, though it is difficult to

⁷ For a rebuttal to SHIEL (1990), 349-72 see EBBESEN (1990), 376-7 and (2009), 49.

⁸ EBBESEN (1990), 375.

evaluate their testimony because almost everything in them comes from a Greek source.’⁹ While true that the commentaries provide further paraphrase of the Greek expressions Boethius aimed to translate, they are one step removed from the process of conceptualising the Greek terms from Aristotle into Latin. The practice of conceptualisation (glossing, calquing, borrowing, etc.) took place in the first stage (the translations) and it is here where any question of originality needs to be approached first.

EBBESEN’s summary that the translations are ‘morpheme by morpheme’, *prima facie*, suggests that most of Boethius’ logical terminology was created by (morphological) calquing, ostensibly because ‘he wanted his readers to see the real thing’, as EBBESEN puts it.¹⁰ In what follows, I intend to provide the relevant lexical (and to a lesser extent syntactic) data to test such claims, posing the overriding question: to what extent did Boethius’ approach to translating Greek in the sixth century differ from his Classical and Imperial-era predecessors. I apply the same rubric as in previous chapters in analysing the lexical innovations and augmentations of selected authors: firstly, the individual vocabulary items from Boethius’ translations are sourced and collected into data sets, and secondly, I analyse these data by the type of word-formation that Boethius used in creating his own terms (it is at this stage where past claims like EBBESEN’s are most relevant). Lastly, I will summarise the types of techniques used by Boethius in rendering Greek terms directly into Latin and to what extent was the result a mechanical reproduction of Greek originals or a re-interpretation of them given the specific linguistic parameters of the Latin language.

A final word on the originality issue in Boethius is necessary before the data analysis begins. Boethius’ legacy was not forged on his ability to reproduce Greek expression. Like Cicero and others before him, what separated Boethius from mere technical translators working in didactic environments such as monasteries and schools was his imagination. The *De consolazione Philosophiae*, written in his last days of captivity before his execution, attests to the power of Boethius’ imaginative and creative instincts. The influence of such an imaginative work is beyond doubt, but more importantly, the manner of composition is remarkably creative. Presumably not surrounded by a library of Greek and Latin source material, Boethius composed a work of intense intellectual accomplishment largely from

⁹ EBBESEN (1990), 375.

¹⁰ EBBESEN (1990), 375. As we shall see, Boethius’ own comments regarding his ‘word-for-word’ translations seem to be the basis for claims like EBBESEN’s. The lexical data, however, may tell a different or at least a more nuanced story.

memory and his erudition. It is, of course, flawed to extrapolate the entirety of his philosophical corpus based on a single work composed in extraordinary circumstances but it is, I think, still indicative of the type of author we are analysing and ought not to be relegated to mere biographic detail. Combined with the literary creativity seen in works like *De consolacione Philosophiae* were translation projects, which, as we shall see, were faithful to the concepts of the Greek originals, yet framed within a Latin linguistic context that required the imagination of Boethius to create a vocabulary of logic in Latin. This allowed Boethius to become an exemplar for later Latin authors, even those discussing different schools of philosophy (like Platonism), on which to rely upon for an accurate interpretation of Aristotelian thought.¹¹ In construing ‘originality’ in Boethius, it is vital then to situate his translation project in a continuum of the same tradition that included Lucretius, Cicero, Seneca, Apuleius, Tertullian, and Victorinus. This tradition did not always seek reproduction or imitation, but *aemulatio* and creative literary experimentation with the result of re-imagining Greek concepts in the Latin West, influencing new generations of medieval thinkers thereafter.

5.3. BOETHIUS’ LEXICAL INNOVATIONS AND AUGMENTATIONS

The lexical innovations and augmentations collated below are sourced from the *Aristoteles Latinus* editions of: Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (eds. 1 and 2) (*Isag.*), Aristotle’s *Categoriae* (*Cat.*), *De Interpretatione* (eds. 1 and 2) (*De Int.*), *Analytica Priora* (*APr.*), and *Topica* (*Top.*). These have been placed in roughly chronological order found in DE RIJK (1964, 1-49; 125-62),¹² however I have combined the terms in the *Isag.* with the *De Int.* for convenience. The sheer number of Boethius’ innovations requires a certain categorisation method. To this end, I follow the method used throughout this thesis and sort the terms into their morphological categories for each of the five translation texts outlined above. Terms with an asterisk (*) indicate lexical augmentations of existing words, and double-dagger (‡) indicates a *ῥαξ λεγόμενον*. Note that, where Boethius uses a loan-word or blend previously used in Latin, but with a new sense, this has been counted as a lexical augmentation. For instance, *elenchus* in

¹¹ E.g. Basilios Bessarion’s *In Calumniatorem Platonis* (1.1.1 p. 3.32-5.20): *fuertunt etiam, qui convenire inter sese duos philosophos [sc. Plato and Aristotle] summo ingenio nixi sunt ostendere, ut apud Graecos in plerisque Simplicius fecit, apud Latinos facturum se pollicitus est Boëthius*. See also MARTIN (2009), 56; SUTO (2012), 4.

¹² See also BRANDT (1902), 238ff; MCKINLAY (1907), 130; and more recently SUTO (2012), xix.

the *Analytica Priora* translation had been used by Pliny as a ‘pearl necklace’ and by Suetonius as an ‘appendix to a book’, but for the first time here as a logical ‘argument of disproof or refutation’.

Porphry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s De Interpretatione

–tio nouns

*speculatio** (θεωρία)

–ivus adjectives

*adunativus*ST (ἐνοποιός)

*completivus** (συμπληρωτικός)

divisivus (διαιρετικός)

*enuntiativus** (ἀποφατικός)

–bilis adjectives

cal(e)factibilis (θερμαντικός)

inintendibilis (ἀνεπίτατος)

inremissibilis (ἀνάνετος)

ambulabile (βαδιστικός)

–tas adjectives

*rationalitas** (τὸ λογικόν)¹³

Verbs and Participles

*consideror** (θεωρέομαι)

*consignifico** (προσημαίνω)

specificor (εἰδοποιέομαι)

perspicidendum ‡ (σκεπτέον)

¹³ Note there is a *vario lectio* of *rationalitas* in the *De Int.* 2.7. This word is found earlier with the logical sense of τὸ λογικόν by the so-called Eustathius translator of the *Hexaemeron* (likely prior to Boethius.) I follow MINIO-PALUELLO’s edition and record *rationalitas* here, this term is first found in Tertullian (*Anim.* 38) pertaining to the soul then only in *De Int.* with the logical sense.

Miscellaneous

contraiacentes (ἀντικείμενοι)

*factura** (γένεσις)

inpermistus (ἀμιγής)

*inquisiti*ST (πυνθανόμενοι)

specificus (εἰδοποιός)

*superfluous** (περιττός)

*Categoriae***–ia/–entia nouns***consequentia** (ἀκολουθήσις)**–tio nouns***assignatio** (ἀπόδοσις)*commutatio** (ἀλλοίωσις)*diminutio** (ἐνδεια/μείωσις)*praedicatio** (κατηγορία)**–bilis adjectives***gressibilis*ST (πεζόν)*honorabilior* (τιμιώτερος)*scibilis** (ἐπιστητός)*susceptibilis*ST (δεκτικός)**–ivus adjectives***aegrotativus*ST (νοσώδης)*affirmativus** (καταφατικός)*denominativus** (παρώνυμος)*negativus** (ἀποφατικός)*perfectivus* (ποιητικός)*sanativus* (ὑγιεινός)**–tas adjectives***superfluitas** (ὑπερβολή)**Adverbs***indubitate** (ἀναμφισβήτητος)*quadrupliciter* (τετραχῶς)*universaliter** (καθόλου)

Verbs and Participles*mensuro** (καταμετρέω)*pertractor** (ἐπισκέπτομαι)**Miscellaneous***aequivocus* (ὁμώνυμος)*crementum** (αὕξησις)*mutatus** (ἀλλοιότερος comp. of ἀλλοῖος)*permanentior* (μονιμώτερος)*univocus** (συνώνυμος)

*Analytica Priora***–entia nouns***experientia*ST (ἐμπειρα)**–alis adjectives***proportionalis** (ἀνάλογον)**–tio nouns***redargutio** (ἐλεγχος)*reduplicatio* (ἐπαναδίπλωσις)**–bilis adjectives***argumentabilis* (*difficilius*): δυσεπιχειρητότερος; (*facile*): εὐεπιχείρητος*docibilis** (διδακτός)*suspiciabilis** (δεκτικός)**–ivus adjectives***communicativus* (μεταδοτικός)*ostensivus* (δεικτικός)*praedicativus** (κατηγορικός)**–tas adjectives***particularitas* (κατὰ μέρος) (cf. *particularis*)**Verbs and Participles***cointerimo* ‡ (προσαναίρῶ)*pernoto* (διασημαίνω)*praeexistens* (προυπάρχω)*quadrangulor* (τετραγωνίζομαι)¹⁴

¹⁴ MINIO-PALUELLO (1962), 188 prints the verbal form (pass. inf. *quadrangulari* rendering τετραγωνίζεσθαι), but note a variant manuscript reading is the (more common) adjectival *quadrangularis*.

*redarguor** (διαλέγομαι)

submaneo ‡ (ὑπόκειμαι)¹⁵

Adverbs

commutatim (ἐναλλάξ) (cf. *permutatim*)

contingenter (ἐνδέχεται)

contradictorie (ἀντικειμένως)

*privative** (στερητικῶς)

Loan-words and loan-blends

antesyllogismus ‡ (προσυλλογισμός)

asymmeter (ἀσύμμετρος)

catasyllogizor / *katasyllogizor* ‡ (κατασυλλογίζομαι)

*elenchus** (ἐλέγχος)

ikos (εἰκώς)

isoskeles (ἰσοσκελής)

parallilos ‡ (παράλληλος)

prosyllogismus (προσυλλογισμός)

supersyllogizo ‡ (κατασυλλογίζομαι)

symmeter (σύμμετρος)

Miscellaneous

*hircocervus*ST (τραγέλαφος)

immediatus (ἄμεσος)

inconiunctus (ἀσύναπτος)

indemonstratus ‡ (ἀναπόδεικτος)

indisciplina (ἀμαθία)

*praedicamentum** (κατηγορία)

rectilineum (εὐθύγραμμον)

*reduplicatum** (ἐπαναδιπλούμενον)

¹⁵ Cf. Vitruvius' *submano* 'to run or flow underneath' (*OLD* s.v.).

*Topica***–antia/–entia nouns***annunciantia*ST (τὰ παρηγγελμένα)*circumstantia** (περιουσία) (cf. *circumvitalis*)*clementia** (ἐπιείκεια)*contemperantia* (συμμετρία)*instantia** (ἔνστασις)*superhabundantia** (ὑπερβολή)**–alis adjectives***disciplinalis* (ἐπιστημονικός)*finalis** (πεπερασμένος)**–tor/–trix nouns***salvatrix* (σωστική)*seductor** (φέναξ)**–tio nouns***aequivocatio* (ὁμωνυμία)*celatio* (κρύψις)*diffinitio* (διορισμός, λόγος, ὀρισμός, ὅρος)*exanimatio** (ὀλιγωρία)*increpatio** (ἐλεγχος)*obviatio** (ἔντευξις)*perspectio** (σκέψις)*refrigdatio* ‡ (κατάψυξις)*rememoratio** (ἀπομνημόνευσις)**–bilis adjectives***disciplinabilius* (ἐπιστημονικώτερον)*eligibilis** (αἵρετός)

*impassibilis** (ἀπαθήs)
incadibilis (ἀμετάπτωτος)
incommensurabilis (ἀσύμμετροs)
inreprobabilis ‡ (ἀμετάπειστος)
insensibilis (ἀναίσθητος / νοητός)
*insuperabilis** (ἀμετάπτωτος)
*perceptibilis** (δεκτικός)
*partibilis** (μεριστός)

–ivus adjectives

*affirmativus** (κατασκευαστικός)
agitativus (κινητικός)
certativus (ἀγωνιστικός)
*congregativus** (συγκριτικός)
conservativus (φυλακτικός)
constructivus (κατασκευαστικός) (cf. *affirmativus*)
*contemplativus** (θεωρητικός)
cooperativus (συνεργός)
*corruptivus** (φθαρτικός)
destructivus (ἀνασκευαστικός)
determinativus (ὀριστικός)
*diffinitivus*ST (ὀρικός)
disgregativus (διακριτικός)
dissolutivus (διαλυτικός)
*distributivus** (διανεμητικός)
effectivus (ποιητικός) (cf. *perfectivus*)
exercitativus (γυμναστικός)
habituativus ‡ (εὐεκτικά)
imperativus (προστακτικός)
*inquisitivus** (ἐξέταστικός)
ministrativus (ὑπηρετικός)
operativus (ἐνεργός / πρακτικός)

propositivus (προτατικός)

salvativus (σωστικός)

significativus (σημαντικός)

speculativus (θεωρητικός)

–tas adjectives

coaequalitas (συμμετρία)

contiguitas (συννοχή)

*idoneitas** (εὐπορία)

*insensibilitas** (ἀναισθησία)

*iocunditas*ST (τέρψις)

Adverbs

certatorie (ἀγωνιστικῶς)

corruptive (φθαρτικός)

*denominative** (παρωνύμως)

habituative ‡ (εὐεκτικῶς)

*indubitanter** (ὁμολογουμένως)

inexperienter (ἀπείρως)

insuspecte (ἀνύποπτος)

*irrationabiliter** (ἀλόγως)

permutatim (ἐναλλάξ)

subalternatim (ὕπ' ἀλλήλους)

Verbs and Participles

*adminiculans*ST (συνεργός)

*alteror** (ἀλλοιοῦμαι)

*calumpnior*ST (συκοφαντέω)

condetermino ‡ (προσδιορίζω)

*consignifico** (ἐπισημαίνω)

*diffino*ST (ὀρίζομαι)

*dignifico** (ἀξιόω)

extramitto (ἐκπέμπω)

*notifico** (τὸ γνῶριμος)

*pigrito** (ἀποκνέω)

*praeordino** (προτείνω)

*praesignifico** (προσημαίνω)

*subaudio** (ὑπακούω)

*superaddo** (ἐπιπροστίθημι)

*superhabundo** (ὑπερβάλλω)

transcado (μεταπίπτω)

*protervio** (δυσκολαίνω)

Loan-words and loan-blends

aporema ‡ (ἀπόρημα)

armonicus (ἁρμονικός)

cacexia / *kacexia* (καχεξία)

diameter (διάμετρος)

discolus [*sum*] (δυσκολαίνων)

geometer (γεωμέτρης)¹⁶

ginnastes ‡ (γυμναστής)

paralogizo (παραλογίζομαι)

syllogizo (συλλογίζομαι)

paralogismus (παραλογισμός)

philosophima ‡ (φιλοσόφημα)

praesyllogizandum ‡ (προσυλλογιστέον)

prosyllogizo (προσυλλογίζομαι)

paralogizo (παραλογίζομαι)

sophismaticus ‡ (σοφισματώδης)

syllogizo (συλλογίζομαι)

*syllogistice** (συλλογιστικῶς) *magis syllogistice* (συλλογιστικώτερον)

tetracubitus (τετράπηχys)

¹⁶ Note, the more common *geometres* can be found as early as Cicero (*Luc.* 22; *Fat.* 15).

Miscellaneous

falsigraphus (ψευδογραφῶν)

*particularis** (ἐπὶ μέρους / κατὰ μέρος)

praeconfitendum ‡ (προδιομολογητέον)

*protervia** (δυσκολία)

*submultiplex*ST (πολλοστημόριος)

*subtriplex*ST (τριτημόριος)

*De sophisticis elenchis***Verbs***adinterrogo* (προσερωτάω, προσπυνθάνομαι)¹⁷*coaduno** (συμφέρω)*condesignor* ‡ (προσδηλοῦμαι)*contraago*ST (προσδιαλέγομαι)**Loan-words and loan-blends***insyllogizatus* (ἀσυλλόγιστος)*paralogisticus* (παραλογιστικός)*ricus* (ῥοικός)*sinonimus* (συνώνυμος)**–bilis suffix***commensurabilis* (σύμμετρος)¹⁸**Miscellaneous***condividendus* ‡ (προσδιαιρετέος)*immodificatus* (ἀσυλλόγιστος)*observabilior* ‡ (εὐφυλακτότερος)*probamentum** (ἀξίωμα)*quadratura** (τετραγωνισμός)*tetracubitus* (τετράπηχys)*transvertendum* (μεταστεπτέον)**Adverbs***tribualiter* (φυλετικῶς)

¹⁷ Note the PL edition (64.1037B) which prints *praeinterrogo*. I follow MINIO-PALUELLO's *adinterrogo* here.

¹⁸ Note this term is first attested in Bothius' mathematical work *Arithm.* 1.18 p. 37.23, which was probably chronologically prior to the *Elench. soph.*

–tio nouns*interemptio** (ἀναίρεσις)*obviatio** (ὕπαντησις)*suspectio** (ὑποψία)**–ivus adjectives***ditativa* (χρηματιστική)*temptativus, temptativa* (πειραστικός, πειραστική)

5.4. ANALYSIS OF COLLATED LEXICAL INNOVATIONS AND AUGMENTATIONS

Selected quantitative analysis of Boethius' lexical innovations and augmentations

Category of lexical innovation	Percentage (total number = 214 lemmata)
Augmentations	33% (71)
Sense translations, etc.	7% (15)
First-attested loan-words and loan-blends	17% (37)
Morphological calques	43% (91)

Qualitative analysis of Boethius' lexical innovations and augmentations

The core issue for Boethius in translating Aristotle was the near-complete dearth of a formal logic word-stock in Latin in his time. As BARNES notes: 'Within the audacious policy of making Greek wisdom available to the Latins lies the grand project of turning Aristotle into a Roman; within the grand project lies the ambitious plan of composing a Peripatetic logic in Latin.'¹⁹ Boethius himself makes use of the popular *egestas* trope in his theological tracts, lamenting the lexical *inopia* 'lack' in Latin when it came to philosophical terms regarding Christology and lauding the more *peritus* 'experience, skilled' vocabulary of the Greeks.²⁰ It is against such a context that the sheer breadth, depth, quality, and quantity of Boethius' lexical

¹⁹ BARNES (1991), 74.

²⁰ See Chapter Four discussion of *Eut.* 3.24–30 at n. 89. See also *Eut.* 3.59 and the allusion to Cicero (*Tusc.* 2.35): *neque enim verborum inops Graecia est, ut Marcus Tullius alludit*; see further MAGEE (1989), 52 n.7.

innovations and augmentations must be viewed. His reliance on Latin commentaries and translations was minimal and his goal of conveying the concepts of the Greek as accurately as possible appears to have been a chief concern throughout his translations. In both Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Cicero's *Topica*, Boethius expresses dissatisfaction with the existing Latin translations in circulation at the time (i.e. Victorinus')²¹ and sets himself the task of a new edition of both works. He is aware of the unique position he occupies in treating certain kinds of philosophical subjects in Latin for the first time.²² In terms of the type of Greek vocabulary Boethius found expedient to translate or source as a basis of his own Latin terms, as BIDEZ has demonstrated, much of this must have been found in the School of Porphyry, whose commentaries provided essential, if not occasionally word-for-word, sources for Boethius' own.²³

From the statistics above, Boethius resorted to direct loans less frequently than lexical augmentation, as KELLY writes: 'His technique, modelled partially on that of Cicero, was to take a Latin word which covered part of the semantic field of the Greek, and rigorously keep to it, as in *aequivoca* for *ὁμώνυμα*. Boethius was classicist enough to avoid borrowing.'²⁴ However, he still had significant recourse to loans when desired (17% of the time, most abundantly in the *Top.*), sometimes even alternating between a Greek loan and a Latin lexical augmentation in different works, e.g. *elenchus* in the *APr.* and *increpatio* in the *Top.* for Aristotle's *ἔλεγχος*.

Another consideration to bear in mind is the nature of the subject in which Boethius was writing. We have some evidence that logic was the first subject students of the Neo-Platonic tradition undertook as pupils, followed by physics and ethics, and culminating in metaphysics.²⁵ Given Boethius' Herculean ambition of translating all the works of Aristotle and Plato into Latin, it makes sense that he would begin with the logical works and move on

²¹ See e.g. *In Isag.* 1.23.17; 1.33.2; 1.34.12-37; 1.64.8; 1.94.12; 1.95.14-96.2 (all reference to the commentary on the *Isagoge* are to BRANDT's (1906) edition).

²² *De syll. hypoth., prol., PL* 64, 831C: *quod igitur apud scriptores quidem Graecos perquam rarissimos strictim atque confuse, apud Latinos vero nullos reperi, id tuae scientiae dedicatum, noster etsi diuturnus, coepti tamen efficax labor excoluit.*

²³ BIDEZ (1923), 189-201.

²⁴ KELLY (1979), 135; I would query whether Cicero in fact did 'rigorously stick to' his lexical innovations. As we have seen, he often introduced then abandoned terms in favour of giving established ones new meanings (loan-shifts).

²⁵ See generally, on the Neo-Platonic curricula at Athens and Alexandria, WESTERINK (1976), 7-32; CHADWICK (1981), 20-1. Note also the testimony of the Neo-Platonic curriculum in Ammonius Hermeiou (in BUSSE (1885), 5.31-6.20).

from there. Yet this also entails an overriding consideration in his early translations; namely, a didactic one. It is not important that he began translating the logical works because of the given order of subject matters in the curriculum of his time, but more relevantly, these would have been the first educational texts of Latin-speaking pupils undertaking the study of philosophy in that era, hence Boethius' translations of these logical texts required, we could speculate, a more pedagogical purpose rather than a creative literary contribution to Latin for its own sake. Immediately then, the type of translation project in question is very different from a) those of Cicero's *Timaeus* or Apuleius' *De Mundo* (stand-alone works of literary originality), b) those of Tertullian's or Victorinus' (specific translations of rival Christian doctrines for the purposes of polemic and re-interpretation), and c) even Boethius' own literary endeavours elsewhere (e.g. the more creative *De consolazione Philosophiae* or the more theological *Opuscula Sacra*). This has implications across the range of selected texts under translation; it means that the specific vocabulary (lexical innovations) Boethius will deploy to render Greek logical terminology will be guided by didactic considerations, and therefore, we expect a high degree of literalness (morphological calques) as well as 'un-Latin' syntax aimed at keeping as close to the Greek under consideration as possible.

It also means that very basic Latin terms such as *monstrare* and *res* becomes re-contextualised with new usages applied to the field of logic, but not necessarily 'lexically augmented' (e.g. through semantic extensions). So in the *De Int.*, *monstrare* is used to describe semantic relations of spoken words to things and truth-values, from which the more technical *demonstrare* 'reference' is derived,²⁶ and the semantic range of *res* is used to its full extent, covering 'extramental things', not just a limited, almost Wittgensteinian, array of physical objects, facts, and events but Platonic incorporeals too, such as 'goodness' (but never *intellectus*, i.e. mental objects).²⁷ It is, then, not a semantic shift in the term since it retains its primary meaning of 'to point out' or refer to something (see e.g. *OLD* s.v. *monstro*), but a change of which objects it is applied to in a given context (a change of application). The common terms *significare* and *designare* present a similar problem. In the *De Int.*, Aristotle uses the verb *δηλοῦν* for the speech of human beings and *σήμεινεν* for the sounds made by

²⁶ See further SUTO (2012), 25-6.

²⁷ See again SUTO (2012), 26 n. 43. For contrast, consider Cicero's use of *bonum* with the lexical augmentations of *extremum*, *finis*, *summum*, and *ultimum* for the Stoic *τέλος*. Unlike Boethius use of *res*, which had always been applied to non-corporeals as well as corporeal things, simply now applied in the field of logic, Cicero's usages of these common terms gives them an extra meaning, i.e. a moral dimension so that *extremum* is no longer simply referring to space or time, but to quality or degree of a condition (e.g. of the ultimate *bonum*).

animals, yet Boethius uses the wide semantic range of *significare* to translate both of these, and *designare* once to render the former term. The interchangeability of usages is a change in the (more technically distinct) thought of Aristotle, and yet Boethius is not strictly adding new technical meanings to either Latin verb but simply using them in both general and specific senses interchangeably.²⁸ This presents a challenge to a study of this kind: should this chapter include all of the technical (and non-technical) nuances Boethius introduces to well-established Latin words such as those above? The answer is, ideally, yes since these usages would become highly influential in the Latin West into the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and permanently expand the range of expression in Latin in this field. Yet it is also useful to be circumspect, noting that past works such as KRETZMANN's, MAGEE's, and SUTO's are detailed examinations of the complexities of philosophical interpretation of Boethian logical terminology (specifically on issues such as signification and meaning). To delve into these nuances of Boethius' logical works is beyond the scope of this thesis and would additionally require a detailed examination of Boethius' commentaries, quite beyond his translation practice alone. It is sufficient for now to note in the data collected above that terms which take on new meanings (lexical augmentation) brought about by the original Greek terms are recorded. This will be the salient fact: that the change or augmentation of meaning was a *result* of translation from a Greek original. So in the *Topica*, for example, Aristotle uses the specific term *σκέψις* for an argumentative 'inquiry' or 'examination' into a question, specifically by a dialectician rather than a philosophical inquiry or questioning (see e.g. *Top.* 155b3). Boethius renders this term with *perspectio*, an abstract noun previously used in Lactantius with the more general sense of 'the act of perceiving, perception' (see e.g. *TLL* s.v., 10.1.1736.31-2). It is this new meaning in addition to the new context of Aristotle's rhetorical or argumentative 'topics', that makes the semantic extension, more specifically applied to the dialectician's act of inquiry into a question or matter rather than a general sense of simply 'perceiving'. By contrast, the terms *res*, *monstrare*, *significare* and so on, while now operating in the domain of logic, do not have their semantic range augmented (there is no semantic shift in using the already established meaning of *significare* (e.g. see *OLD* s.v., 1 and 1b) to

²⁸ See SUTO (2012), 24: '[I]t is difficult to claim that '*significare*' has the technical meaning of 'sense' in Boethius' works. If '*significare*' had such a technical meaning, Boethius would have kept the word for the semantic relation of spoken words to thoughts in the mind ('sense') while choosing another word for the semantic relation of spoken words to things ('reference')." Also MAGEE (1989), 62, esp. 63: 'In this respect Boethius' terminology is flexible. Refinement comes with the ideas developed in response to specific passage of Aristotle's treatise.'

encompass the meaning of *δηλοῦν*, for example), but their specific contexts and uses to explicate Boethius' interpretations of Aristotelian logic are important in their own right, though beyond the scope of this study.

Boethius' compounds *ossigenus*, *putrimordax* and *umbricilius* also present an interesting issue. They are certainly not a 'philosophical' terms in any technical sense. They are morphological calques of the compounds *ὀστεογενής*, *σηψιδακές*, and *ὀφρυόσκιον* in the *Topica* (140a5) quoted by Aristotle, possibly from the Athenian comic poet named Plato. Aristotle is discussing obscurity in argumentation, in this case, the use of unusual words (*ὀστεογενής*, *ὀφρυόσκιον*, and *σηψιδακές* instead of *μυελός*, *ὀφθαλμόν* and *φαλάγγιον*.) These are examples used specifically to illustrate a genus of obscurity in dialectics (others being e.g. equivocation and metaphorical language), and so become relevant for our purposes in a purely contextual sense, but as to their function as 'terms', I do not think these ought to be classified as philosophical vocabulary and I have, therefore, excluded them from the data above.

In terms of Boethius' method, we are fortunate enough to have multiple editions of the same commentary for some of the logical works and this provides a unique window into the mind of Boethius the translator and his careful choices of the most appropriate philosophical terms.²⁹ MINIO-PALUELLO suggests that the medieval manuscript tradition indicates evidence for both first and second editions of Boethius' *Top.*, *Isag.*, *Cat.*, *De Int.*, and *APr.*, however as DOD (1982) has pointed out, these revisions could also plausibly be explained by 'the work of an unknown editor, possibly working in Constantinople where Boethius' works are known to have been transcribed (and perhaps edited) already in the sixth century.'³⁰ Short of more textual evidence and evaluation, I intend to accept MINIO-PALUELLO's hypothesis for now, and would echo EBBESEN's observation that: 'Boethius did not take his task as a translator lightly'.³¹ As we have seen with Lucretius and Cicero, the importance of style and palatability for a Roman audience were crucial to the linguistic choices such Classical authors made in rendering Greek technical terms in philosophical works. Rather than an instructional text, Lucretius had poetic and metrical parameters through which he expressed his literary abilities. Cicero, being a consummate rhetorician, preferred clarity and intelligibility ahead of any

²⁹ See MAGEE (1989), 67.

³⁰ See DOD (1982), 54.

³¹ EBBESEN (2009), 37.

mechanical or faithful translation process. As we progressed into the Imperial era, Apuleius (though also acutely responsive to his own rhetorical sensibilities), felt less of a need to clothe his lexical innovations in periphrases, apologies, or other rhetorical devices, and was freer in his deployment of new Latin terms to render Greek ones. In Tertullian and Victorinus, a comparable approach was adopted and technical terms more freehandedly introduced with translation *de littérature* often sacrificed for technical precision. Yet by the sixth century, Boethius saw translations such as Victorinus' (specifically of Porphyry's *Isagoge*) as too obscure or simply erroneous in the interpretation of technical Greek terms.³² Some have argued³³ that Boethius viewed many of the terms used in Victorinus' translation of the *Isagoge* as bound up too closely with the Scholastic (sc. Christian) terminology of his time. He, therefore, undertook his own philosophical project, founded upon a more faithful, didactic translation into Latin stripping the language of Victorinus' equivocality and going back to as close as possible a translation of the core Aristotelian concepts themselves.³⁴ This was achieved by: 1) a literal translation of the Greek (lexically and often syntactically), 2) a commentary thereof, and sometimes 3) a second edition commentary refining the exegeses on the Latin translation itself. In the beginning of his second book of commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* he writes:

This second work of mine, containing the exposition, will set out a successive translation, by which I fear that I am guilty of faithful interpretation, since I rendered the expression and comparison [of the original text] word for word.³⁵

The *verbum ex verbo* method is justified, according to Boethius since,

³² See e.g. *In. Isag.* 1.94.11-13: *sequitur locus perdifficilis, sed transferentis obscuritate Victorini magis quam Porphyrii proponentis, qui huiusmodi est*; also ADAMO (1967), 144-5; 160; CROCCO (1975), 46 n. 34. An example of Boethius detecting an outright error in Victorinus is *In Isag.* 2.06 in which Boethius reports that Victorinus translated *Isag.* 11.13-14 τῶν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους συνεστώτων ἢ ἀνάλογόν γε ὕλη with *omnes namque res ex forma et materia consistent, ipsa autem forma irrationabilis est* from which Boethius observes: *tollendum est 'irrationabilis' est et dicendum 'proportionabilis' est*. See discussion below on the lexical innovation *proportionabilis*.

³³ ADAMO (1967), 160.

³⁴ See discussion below, also MAGEE's (1989, 56) suggestion, for example, of Boethius' choosing *nota* instead of *symbolum* on grounds that the latter might have been too closely associated with the early Apostles' Creed.

³⁵ *In. Isag.* 2.135.5-8: *secundus hic arreptae expositionis labor nostrae seriem translationis expediet, in qua quidem vereor ne subierim fidi interpretis culpam, cum verbum verbo espressum comparatumque reddiderim*.

in these texts, in which the very cognition of the matter is being questioned, we ought not express it through the charm of a splendid speech, rather with unadulterated truth. Therefore, if Latin philosophical books were composed using a language based on the sincerity of an unprejudiced translation, I see much to have been accomplished were nothing more desired from the Greek writings.³⁶

There are two important points at play in Boethius' statements here. First, literal translation is to be preferred to oratorical brilliance (*luculentae orationis*); literal translations can always be elaborated upon at a later stage using commentaries and exegeses. Second, it seems the ultimate end for Boethius' project is not simply a pedagogical instruction on Aristotelian logic but an entire *replacement* of the obscure³⁷ Greek philosophical terms entirely: *nihil in Graecorum litteris amplius desideretur*. Boethius' comments both accord with, and also require re-evaluation of, recent observations of translation in antiquity such as McELDUFF's, who argues that the surpassing of Greek source material by Latin translators did not arise from a lack of regard for the material, but rather:

[...] from a lack of interest in one of the prevailing concerns of modern translation: whether one should translate closely or freely, and how one should respect the [source text] and best transfer it into a new language and culture. Roman concerns centred on a desire to be seen to control the [source text], not to be controlled by it; the more translation became an important facet of elite literary production, the more critical it was that authors imposed their identity upon its products.³⁸

There is no doubt, from the survey we have conducted so far in this thesis, Latin authors sought to impose their identity and creative instincts upon the re-interpretations of Greek source texts. Yet in Boethius' case, it is not as obvious as McELDUFF suggests. By his time in the development of Latin literature, we see a more mature 'scientific literature', and in

³⁶ *In. Isag.* 2.135-6: *in his scriptis in quibus rerum cognitio quaeritur, non luculentae orationis lepos sed incorrupta veritas exprimenda est. quocirca multum profecisse videor, si philosophiae libris Latina oratione compositis per integerrimae translationis sinceritatem nihil in Graecorum litteris amplius desideretur.*

³⁷ Two points should be kept in mind: 1) that Greek knowledge was visibly disappearing in the Latin West at this time in European history, and 2) that the original Greek logical terms of Aristotle and Porphyry that Boethius sought to render into Latin were also highly technical or neologistic terms themselves.

³⁸ McELDUFF (2013), 187. Cf. also SEELE's conclusions (1995), 102.

Calcidius, for instance, the use of a closer translation as the basis for a complementary commentary work. Not only had the form of such philosophical compositions changed from Cicero's time, but the subject matters in which authors took a keen interest too. Subjects that were dominated by more technically-laden matters than those of Lucretius' or Cicero's.³⁹ In any case, Boethius was concerned with whether one ought to 'translate closely or freely, and how one should respect the [source text] and best transfer it into a new language and culture' (McELDUFF (2013), 187 above). His self-conscious admission of his *verbum ex verbo* approach to translating texts of Aristotle's and Porphyry's is a direct indication of an author weighing the demands of literal semantic exchange from the source to the target language on the one hand, and the parameters of style and taste for the benefit of his audience on the other. Yet even granting that Boethius may not fit the traditional Roman mould of translator and, in fact, his work more closely resembles the modern day conception of what translation is, he nonetheless continues to share the ultimate goal of his predecessors, as McELDUFF describes: 'a desire to be seen to control the [source text], not to be controlled by it' (2013, 187). While attuned to the original source text and the meaning of terms, his translations demonstrated independence of thought, careful decisions as to terminology, and offered Latin readers versions of Aristotle which could replace the Greek texts themselves. This required drawing upon affixes and bases already within the Latin philosophical (and sometimes theological) vocabulary and innovating new uses and connotations, either forming new terms entirely or adding new meanings, like his predecessors. Intelligibility was an issue, but the limits of style and taste played no part for Boethius in his renditions of Greek logical works, even allowing Latin syntax to become distorted if necessary. These translations then, by no means as literary as his predecessors' projects, still necessitated a specific kind of (didactic?) creativity; conscious choices on Boethius' part in rendering technical philosophical terms, and creating the lexical tools by which to express and debate such concepts in Latin. The choices in constructing equivalent technical terms with specific morphemes and lexemes were, therefore, didactic processes as much as translation issues. How best to represent a term or concept for the student of logic, using the resources of the Latin lexis? Where Lucretius might be inclined towards metaphor or figurative language, lengthy and descriptive hexameters on a singular

³⁹ This is not to say either author did not engage with technical subjects. Lucretius' discussion of Epicurean atomic theory was highly technical, and Cicero's translations of Stoic jargon were also exercises in technical translation.

Greek philosophical expression (e.g. *ὁμοιομέρεια*), or Cicero might have preferred to gloss the Greek term in question, introduce a morphological calque directly, and then carefully couch it in rhetorical tropes such as *praeteritio* to mollify the novelty of his creation, Boethius is looking for exactness, precision, and a means to convey the component parts of the Greek term in Latin, whilst losing as little information as possible in the translation process. This is, therefore, no longer about *aemulatio* or surpassing the source in the sense of earlier Latin translators, nor is it about displaying an impeccable prose or poetic style, but rather like a technical writer composing an instruction manual, mapping the original Greek concepts into mirror images for Latin readers. This is not always successful, and as we discussed in the Introduction, the notion of ‘linguistic equality’ is a difficult one to agree with entirely, especially in the context of classical linguistics. Yet, perhaps, the task was ameliorated by the subject matter in Boethius’ case. Here, unlike say Cicero or Lucretius (the former translating esoteric cosmological Platonic-Pythagorean texts like the *Timaeus*, and the latter rendering the mysterious and ‘obscure’ notions of Epicurean and Empedoclean atomism into Latin verse), Boethius has the subject of logic, one which is precise and defined, and — hence the name — logical in expression. This affords Boethius some conceptual and linguistic leeway when using the *verbum ex verbo* approach to translation. Thus, in Boethius we see an endpoint and starting point in the history of technical translation in philosophical contexts in antiquity. The end of literary *aemulatio* translations, in which Latin took it upon itself to forge a new direction of thought through authors’ own unique styles and literary temperaments, replaced with a precise and literal approach to its subject matter. We ought not to forget that, just prior to, and contemporary with, Boethius, we saw the literal translations of Christian apologists with respect to scripture, and Boethius, in the manner of authors like Calcidius, discussed above, cemented such a translation technique by his time when it came to translating secular philosophy. Yet the purpose was didactic and instruction-focused for a particularly reason: to empower Latin speaking students of these subjects to read, comprehend and discuss them in their native language, without reliance on the Greek. This was, in many ways, a form of surpassing the Greek sources, or ‘unshackling from’ may be a better way to put it, and Boethius’ project would become instrumental in the development of this field of philosophy in the Latin West throughout the early Middle Ages and into the Scholastic period.

Morphological and semantic calques

The high proportion (43%) of morphological calques in Boethius' translations indicates a linguistic project of close reproduction of Greek source terms. EBBESEN rightly observes that morphological calquing was a trademark 'morpheme for morpheme' approach to Boethius' translations, a preference for accuracy over style. However, one also finds a significant proportion of terms which are either sense translations or lexical augmentations (~40% in total). This indicates that Boethius was only slightly more likely either to coin new terms as literally as possible or to convey the sense using novel derivatives. In the *Cat.*, as an example, there are not nearly as many calques present among Boethius' nominalisations. Many abstracts in *-tio*, for example, do not calque the original Greek morphemes and are rather simply lexical augmentations of pre-existing abstracts: so *assignatio* (ἀπόδοσις), *commutatio* (ἀλλοίωσις), and *praedicatio* (κατηγορία). There are, however, abundant calques to be found in adjectives in *-bilis* (e.g. *honorabilior* (τιμιώτερος) and *perceptibilis*, *susceptibilis*, *suspiciabilis* (δεκτικός) and, especially, in *-ivus* (e.g. *aegrotativus* (νοσώδης), *affirmativus* (καταφατικός),⁴⁰ *perfectivus* (ποιητικός), and *sanativus* (ὑγιεινός)), as well as adverbs (e.g. *quadrupliciter* (τετραχῶς) formed by analogy with the more established *multipliciter* (πλεοναχῶς)).

Another instance of lexical augmentation is the central concept of *κατηγορία* rendered with *praedicatio* in the *Cat.* and then *praedicamentum* in the *APr.*, the former a semantic calque of the abstract substantive observed in Cicero's oratory (*Verr.* 1.2) and now given the meaning of the Aristotelian *κατηγορία*, the latter a relatively more recent instrumental noun in *-mentum* with a similar form earlier used in Augustine in a different sense (*Conf.* 4.6; *Trin.* 5. 8). Similarly with *ποιητικός*, Boethius uses *perfectivus* in the *Cat.* and *effectivus* in the *Top.*, both with similar though subtly different meanings (the former implies a cause or purpose, the latter implies finality and the accomplishment of an action). Note also *κατασκευαστικός* ('positive, constructive'), an adjective Aristotle uses to refer to a type of proposition which establishes an argument (e.g. using an enthymeme or three-part syllogism), as opposed to a type which refutes an argument. Boethius renders it with the semantic calque *affirmativus*⁴¹ in

⁴⁰ Cf. Apuleius' *dedicativus* for *καταφατικός*, which implies the sense of 'dedication' or 'giving', whilst Boethius' implies affirmation or strengthen of the proposition.

⁴¹ Initially used in a grammatical sense by Diomedes in c. fourth century AD.

the *Top.* as well as with the morphological calque⁴² *constructivus* in the same translation. The former implies a type of agreement or concordance, the latter a construction of an argument (a metaphorical ‘construction’ facilitated by a syllogistic proposition). The adjective *affirmativus* gives us a useful converse case where Boethius conflates two Greek concepts into one Latin term. So in the *Cat.*, he uses the adjective for *καταφατικός*, literally ‘in accordance with something asserted’. In this sense, *affirmativus* is a closer loan translation (*ad-* + *firmo* + *-ivus* = *κατα-* + *φημί* + *-ικός*) than it is for *κατασκευαστικός* (*κατα-* + *σκευάζω* + *-ικός*). Similarly for *αἰσθητικός*, Boethius uses *sensatus*, (found earlier in the Vulgate translation), though one would have expected *αἰσθητικός* to be rendered with *sensitivus* based on the practice Boethius uses for Greek terms in *-ικός* elsewhere.⁴³

Some comparisons between logical terms in the *Peri Hermeneias* ascribed to Apuleius and Boethius’ translation of it will be illustrative. In Boethius’ translation, the Greek term *γελαστικός* is rendered with the adjective *risibilis*, compared with Apuleius’ *cachinnabilis* (*PH* 197.14-15). RAMSAY provides a useful comparison table,⁴⁴ which I paraphrase below:

<i>κατα-φατ-ικός</i>	= <i>affirmativus</i> (Boethius); <u><i>dedicativus</i></u> (Apuleius)
<i>ἀπο-φατ-ικός</i>	= <i>negativus</i> (Boethius); <u><i>abdicatorius</i></u> (Apuleius)
<i>κατ-ηγορ-ικός</i>	= <i>praedicativus</i> (Boethius); <i>declarativus</i> (Apuleius)
<i>ἀν-απόδεικ-τος</i>	= <u><i>indemonstrabilis</i></u> (Boethius); <u><i>indemonstrabilis</i></u> (Apuleius)

Direct calques have been underlined above for reference. It is clear that in rendering some of these rhetorical-logical terms, Apuleius’ translation was more prone to direct calques than Boethius’.

Generatio and factura

An important example of conflation (though, as we shall see, it is more precisely a differentiation) is found in the *De Int.*, where Boethius employs the verbal substantive derivative *factura* for *γένεσις* (119a17) and then *generatio* for the same Greek term (123b14).

⁴² Compare *con-* + p.p. of *struo* + *-ivus* with *κατα-* + *σκευάζω* + *-ικός*.

⁴³ The critical apparatus in MINIO-PALUELLO’s edition of Boethius’ *Cat.* (1961, 21) shows no variant readings of the line: *cum sensato fit*, translating Aristotle’s *Cat.* 7.8a7: τῷ αἰσθητικῷ γίνεται. Note that the thirteenth-century translator of the *Cat.*, William of Moerbeke, does use the term *sensitivus* to render *αἰσθητικός*.

⁴⁴ RAMSAY (2017), 54.

Factura is a lexical augmentation previously used in Pliny the Elder's *HN* 1.4 and in the Vulgate translation but now with the meaning of a 'happening, event'. The Greek term of *γένεσις* had been used in Plato's *Ti.* with the sense of 'generation', or some creation of the Divine Creator. The verb *facio* usually translates the concept of *ποιέω* (e.g. in the same work 1118b37; 120a4; 121b6; 122a10) but in the two respective contexts in Aristotle, the meaning differs slightly. So in 19a17:

Arist: [...] ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενέσεων, ὅσαι κατὰ δύναμιν λέγονται τὴν τοιαύτην. φανερόν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐτ' ἔστιν οὐτε γίνεται [...]

Boet: [...] *quare et in aliis facturis quaecumque secundum potentiam dicuntur huiusmodi—manifestum est quoniam non omnia ex necessitate vel sunt vel fiunt* [...]

'The same with all other happenings which in any such sense are called potential. It is clear then that not all things are or become of necessity.'

The context is important since it is here in Book 9 that Aristotle confronts the problem of future contingents, famously illustrated by the sea-battle that will not happen tomorrow. In general, Aristotle's logic followed the Principle of Non-Contradiction; that is, something either is happening or it is not, it cannot be the case that it is both. However, Aristotle found an exception to this by introducing contingency: if a person says a sea-battle will not occur tomorrow and it does not, then the proposition that person asserted was always in the past necessarily true. Aristotle denies this: οὐχ ἅπαντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐτ' ἔστιν οὐτε γίνεται, all that is necessary is that something does or does not occur (contradictories). To this end, Boethius uses *factura* in his translation with the sense of some on-going event or happening, reinforced by the meaning of *fio* 'to become' in the same sentence and we could also argue *factura* as being derived from *fio* not *facio*. Yet by playing on the senses of both *fio* and *facio*, Boethius conveys the notion of some contrivance or manufactured circumstance but also something which may or may not 'become', i.e. that could occur potentially but it is not certain whether it will or not (in Aristotle's illustration, it is up to the sailors to have a sea-battle or not). The *fio* sense is further qualified in Boethius' commentary to emphasise a notion of agency or, if not direct agency, at least some manufactured outcome: 'so for everything that

becomes *by deliberation* (*quod fit a quolibet consilio*), the source of that thing is he who deliberates it, not necessity.⁴⁵ When the word *γένεσις* comes up again in 23b14, Boethius changes terms:

Arist: [...] αὐται δέ εἰσιν ἐξ ᾧ αἱ γενέσεις. ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων δὲ αἱ γενέσεις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀπάται.

Boet: *hae autem ex his ex quibus sunt generationes; ex oppositis vero generationes, quare etiam fallacia* [...] ⁴⁶

‘These then (erroneous judgements) are from those which are ‘generations’. Indeed the generations are from the oppositions, and hence the falsity.’

In this context, Aristotle is drawing attention to a deliberate movement between oppositions, from which arise the *γένεσις* or *generationes*, which, in turn, produce the error or falsity (*fallacia*), e.g. when a person believes a thing is bad when it is actually good, the *process* of arriving at that false opinion was where the error occurred (his reasoning in forming the belief). The *generatio* is thus the spectrum between oppositions, and it is now more an ontological concept rather than a specific event or occurrence (like a sea-battle). So both *factura* and *generatio*, while sharing a large semantic overlap, allow Boethius to differentiate carefully the ideas under discussion in Aristotle’s text using specific Latin terms.

Sophistes and fallaces argumentatores

A textual issue is worth noting in Boethius’ *De Int.* translation (117a36) where MINIO-PALUELLO (1965, 9) prints *non autem aequivoce et quaecum cetera talium determinamus contra sophisticas importunitates*, but whose critical apparatus notes a handful of manuscripts print either the genitive plurals *argumentorum* (instead of the adjective *sophisticas*) or *argumentatorum* (after *sophisticas*). In his commentary on the text, Boethius glosses the

⁴⁵ Boet. *Comm. De Int.* 233.19-20: *omne enim quod fit a quolibet consilio, ipse qui consiliatur illius rei principium est, non necessitas*. See also the translation by BLANK AND KRETZMANN (1998), 141: ‘For of everything that happens as the result of any deliberation, the source of that thing, even, or state of affairs is not necessity but the person who deliberates.’

⁴⁶ Note the awkward syntax of the Latin attempting the mirror the Greek, except where the Greek had the utility of the participle (*ἀντικειμένων*) the Latin does not and some verb of being or doing must be supplied.

genitive plural of *sophistes* with the phrase *fallaces argumentatores*.⁴⁷ If we take MINIO-PALUELLO's text as accurate, we could argue that in the first instance of translation, Boethius chooses to retain the Greek loan-word in the text and then, later in his commentary on the section, he glosses the Greek with a Latin phrase using the agent noun *argumentator* (previously only attested in Tertullian and Augustine) functioning now as a term for sophists (as part of a descriptive paraphrase in conjunction with the adjective *fallax*).

Lexical augmentations from possible Christian sources

A brief comment should be made regarding terms first-attested in Latin Christian authors in different contexts, and used in new technical senses by Boethius in his renderings of Aristotle's logic into Latin. The following terms appear for the first time in either early Christian authors or in Christian translations (the *Vetus Latina* and Jerome's *Vulgate*) and are used by Boethius in translating Aristotle and Porphyry. I have bracketed the Greek which Boethius' usage translates, but if the author in question used the same term for a different Greek one, this is the form bracketed:

coaduno (συμφέρω) *Vet. Lat. 3. Esdr. 9.56* (for συνάγομαι); *Iren. 1.11.1*

corruptivus (φθαρτικός) *Vet. Lat. 1 Cor. 15.53*

dignifico (ἀξιόω) *Ignat. Ad Rom. 2.2*; *Orig. in Matth. 129*

docibilis (διδακτός) *Vet. Lat. Is. 54.13*; *1 Tim. 3.2*

impassibilis (ἀπαθήs) *Tert. Adv. Prax. 29*

increpatio (ἐλεγχος) *Tert. Adv. Marc. 4.7*

indubitanter (ὁμολογουμένως) *Vet. Lat. 1. Tim. 3.16*

interemptio (ἀναίρεσιs) *Tert. Adv. Prax. 27*; *Aug. In Evang. Ioh. 55.1*

irrationabiliter (ἀλόγως) *Tert. Paenit. 1.4*

mensuro (καταμετρέω) *Vet. Lat. Mich. 2.4*

mutatus (ἀλλοιότερος comp. of ἀλλοίος) *Tert. Pall. 4.*

obviatio (ὑπάντησιs) *Anon. Orig. In Matth. 16.1*⁴⁸

perceptibilis (χωρούμενος) *Iren. 4.20.4*

⁴⁷ Boet. *Comm. De Int.* 233.2.

⁴⁸ It is generally believed that Jerome did not translate Origin's commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, see KLOSTERMANN AND BENZ (1931/2011), 72.

perspectio (σκέψις) Lact. *Inst.* 2.8.68

praedicamentum (κατηγορία)⁴⁹ Aug. *Conf.* 4.16.29

probamentum (ἀξίωμα) Vet. Lat. 2 Cor. 13.3

protervia (δυσκολία) Ambr. *Off.* 1.43.211

protervio (δυσκολαίνω) Vet. Lat. 1 Cor. 13.5 (Tert. *Patient.* 12.9)

rationalitas (τὸ λογικόν) Tert. *Anim.* 38.6; Vet Lat. *Exod.* 26.9.

reduplicatum (ἐπαναδιπλούμενον) Tert. *Patient.* 14.

rememoratio (ἀπομνημόνευσις) Vulg. *Psalm.* 37.1 (trans. ἀνάμνησις)

suspectio (ὑποψία) Arn. *Adv. Nat.* 7.13.8

redargutio (ἐλεγχος)⁵⁰ Vet. Lat. *Psalm.* 37.15 (cod. 421); Iren. 2. tit.

scibilis (ἐπιστητός) Tert. *Adv. Marc.* 5.16

seductor (φένναξ) Vulg. 2 Johan. 7

sensatus (αἰσθητός, αἰσθητικός) Vulg. *Ecclus.* 7.27.

superhabundantia (πλεονεξία, ὑπερβολή) Jer. In *Ezech.* 6.18.6; Vulg. *Lev.* 25.37.

superhabundo (ὑπερβάλλω) Tert. *Resurr.* 34.47

The argument here is not necessarily that Boethius was intimately acquainted with the works of Tertullian and other Christian apologists, nor is it relevant for us to establish that these terms were in fact vocabulary established within the vernacular or in the works of earlier translators of Biblical texts (which many of them very likely were). Rather, it is more interesting to establish that, in transposing Aristotle's lexicon into Latin, Boethius was at ease in employing terms that had been largely used in Christian contexts to translate Greek philosophical vocabulary. Unlike Victorinus, where the pagan Neo-Platonist philosopher converts into a Christian theologian, here Boethius is simply blending the lexica of both Christian and pagan philosophy into a singular Latin version of Aristotelian logic, without any religious imperative. This becomes of interest when comparing Victorinus' translations of

⁴⁹ Boethius quotes Victorinus' use of this term on several occasions, see e.g. *In Porph. Comm. pr.* 1.23.

⁵⁰ There are various Greek originals from which the Latin term is used as an equivalent in the Vet. Lat. (e.g. ἐλεγμούς in *Psalm.* 37.15 and ἀπελεγμόν in *Act.* 19.27 (see further *TLL*, 11.2.1.474.54 and 67 etc.), but Boethius is specifically concerned with the sophisticated ἔλεγχος 'refutation', see e.g. *Elench. soph.* 175b16: *si autem aliquis putet secundum aequivocationem redargutionem esse, quodammodo non erit respondentem effugere, quin redarguatur* (εἰ δέ τις ὑπολήψεται τὸν κατὰ ὁμωνυμίαν ἔλεγχον εἶναι, τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔσται διαφυγεῖν τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον).

Porphry with Boethius', where the latter (it is argued) appears to remove the Christian overtones from Victorinus' earlier version (see discussion below).

Lexical augmentations from non-Christian philosophical and rhetorical sources

As seen in Cicero and Tertullian, Boethius was also willing to borrow established terms in Latin and add new technical meanings rather than relying upon the creation of entirely new forms. He also does this to a large extent (over 50% of his lexical augmentations) with earlier non-Christian authors, notably Cicero and Quintilian, hence we find: *assignatio* from Cicero (who had used it with a specific legal sense of 'assigning land' etc.) and which Boethius uses metaphorically to render ἀπόδοσις. The Greek term varies slightly in semantics, ranging from an 'answer' (lit. 'giving back') to the πρότασις, to a 'conclusion' that follows from a premiss, to a 'definition' (see LSJ s.v.). This latter sense is what Boethius is specifically translating in Aristotle's example (*Cat.* 7a7-8): οἶον τὸ πηδάλιον πλοίου ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ, οὐκ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις with *ut remus navis si assignetur, non erit conveniens assignatio* (*Cat.* 41). Here then, the literal assignation or allotment of meaning to an apt (*coveniens*) correlate term is the important sense Boethius seems to wish to convey, hence the use of the (traditionally) legal term that bears the meaning of allotment or division of legal property, e.g. land.

Commutatio (ἀλλοίωσις) is also from Cicero (and Quintilian), who both used the term in different senses either as a general change or alteration or in the context of rhetorical figures of speech (see *OLD* s.v.) but here it takes on the technical meaning as used in Aristotle of 'change according to the category of quality'.⁵¹ *Crementum* (αὔξησις) is found in Varro, Pliny the Elder, and Valerius Maximus, *clementia* (ἐπιείκεια) is widely attested in Lucan, Pliny the Younger, and Statius, but here Boethius uses it in a legal sense 'clemency in judgement'. *Insuperabilis* (ἀμετάπτωτος) is found in Vergil and Seneca (among others) but here is specifically translating the nature of a belief being 'unchangeable' (= in Greek) or 'insurmountable' (= in Latin) by argument. The adjective *effectivus* seems to be derived from Quintilian's noun *effectiva*, meaning 'practical art' (*Inst.* 2.18.5). The following lexical augmentations are noteworthy: *sylogistice* (συλλογιστικῶς) is derived from Quintilian's *sylogisticus*. *Factura* (γένεσις) had been used in Pliny the Elder in the sense of ποίησις as distinct from γένεσις here (see discussion above, pp. 339-1).

⁵¹ Arist. *Cat.* 14.15b12; see further DÍAZ (2011), 325.

The adjective *enuntiativus* (ἀποφατικός) is an interesting case study. From its formal characteristics, we might assume it is derived from Seneca (*Ep.* 117.12), who had used the term in relation to Stoic metaphysics. Seneca discusses the Stoic corporeal ‘goods’ and the incorporeal ‘sayables’ (*enuntiativi*) expressed by corresponding verbs. LONG AND SEDLEY (1987, 198) suggest Seneca coined the term to translate either of two Stoic technical terms: ἐκλαλητικός or προφορικός. If this is correct, Boethius is translating a different term (ἀποφατικός) in a different context; namely, a logical one, with a different sense (an ‘abdicative’ type of argument, i.e. ‘reasoning from the negative’).⁵² But as we saw earlier, Apuleius had rendered ἀποφατικός in his *Peri Hermeneias* with the morphological calque *abdicativus*. It is curious why Boethius chose to borrow the Senecan term from an originally Stoic context and apply it here. It means something quite separate from the Greek, and if Boethius is adding a novel sense to it, this sense is contradictory to the term’s original sense. Yet there is a solution that might reveal Boethius’ choice in terminology here. The solution relies on the polysemy of the prefix *ex-* or its alternative here *e-*. Let us assume that Boethius knew neither Seneca’s use of *enuntiativus* nor Apuleius’ *abdicativus*, but decided to translate ἀποφατικός as closely as possible, as was his practice with the Aristotelian translations. Like ἀπο-, the prefix *e-* in Latin can have a variety of senses, one of which Seneca had used earlier: ‘out’ or ‘forth’, hence *enuntio* ‘to speak out, express’. Yet it can also have a ‘privative force’ (*OLD* s.v. *ex-*), hence terms like *exanimo* ‘to deprive of life’. So Boethius might have combined this privative sense of *ex-* to calque the privative sense of ἀπο-, with *nuntio* corresponding with the φημί base and the suffix *-ivus* straightforwardly calquing *-ικός*. This assumption means Boethius created a morphological calque from the Greek original, the form of which corresponded with an earlier term coined by Seneca in translating Stoic terminology, entirely by coincidence. For the purposes of this study, I have counted it as a lexical augmentation but the possibility of it being an outright neologism via a morphological calque should not be ruled out.

The influence of Greek on the syntax of Boethius’ translations

⁵² ERNOUT-MEILLET, 452 wrongly assume the sense of the Greek to be the less technical ‘to speak out’ found in Homer (see e.g. LSJ s.v. ἀπόφημι, A): ‘Dans la langue de la grammaire et de la rhétorique, “exprimer, énoncer”,’ but the sense is a technical one, LSJ s.v. ἀπόφημι, II: ‘deny’.

A point should be made regarding syntax, though not integrally part of the scope of this chapter, requires some mention in Boethius' unique context. In keeping with our earlier observations of the *Isag.* translation that, despite the existence of Latin translations before Boethius such as Victorinus', he started fresh to provide Latin philosophy with a new set of logical terms more faithful to the Greek ones and more accurate in capturing both sense and context. To achieve the latter, syntactic fidelity was required in addition to terminological accuracy. EBBESEN describes Boethian translation as possessing a 'supreme contempt' for standard Latin word order.⁵³ This might be an overstatement, as Boethius' syntactic infelicities are occasional and not enough to become obviously subversive or incomprehensible for the reader, but EBBESEN highlights an important point which ties into Boethius' introductory pronouncements on keeping to *verbum ex verbo* translation to retain the 'unadulterated truth' of his originals. A basic example is in Boethius' translation of Porphyry (*Isag.* 2.14-5)⁵⁴ where the original reads: *τριχῶς οὖν τοῦ γένους λεγομένου* rendered with *tripliciter igitur cum genus dicatur*, whereas Victorinus had translated the sentence as *totiens igitur de genere dicto* which, though more comprehensible in Latin, is less accurate. Boethius employs the rare adverb *tripliciter* (only found in the earlier technical treatise *Rhet. Her.* 54, see *OLD* s.v.) to calque the adverb *τριχῶς*. Similarly, at the beginning of Boethius' translation of the *Top.*, the Greek reads *πρῶτον οὖν ῥητέον τί ἐστι συλλογισμὸς καὶ τίνες αὐτοῦ διαφοραί* (*Top.* 100a18) which he renders as *primum igitur dicendum quid est syllogismus et quae eius differentiae*. The sentence retains the word order, the interrogative *quid* for *τί*, and the *dicendum* gerundive renders *ῥητέον* but lacks the *sum* common in second periphrastic (passive) conjugation (i.e. *dicendum est* 'it must be said' or 'it is to be discussed'), making it closer to the Greek syntax.⁵⁵ The next section yields another unconventional syntactic formulation, with the Greek (100b24-5): *ἐριστικὸς δ' ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων, μὴ ὄντων δέ* rendered with *litigiosus autem est syllogismus qui ex his quae videntur probabilia non sunt autem [...]* The position of the first *est* and the last *autem* are somewhat

⁵³ EBBESEN (1990), 375 and n. 11.

⁵⁴ All references are to BUSSE's (1887) edition.

⁵⁵ Cf. Boethius own usage in his commentaries e.g. *In Isag.* 1.93.5: *dicendum est quoniam genus actu quidem ipso*; also 1.96.16-18: *tollendum est 'irrationabilis' est et dicendum 'proportionabilis' est*; also cf. early and Classical Latin in Pl. *Amph.* 619: *ego, inquam. quotiens dicendum est tibi?*; Cic. *Quinct.* 72.12: *dicendum necessario est*; Cic. *Caec.* 39.3: *dicenda, demonstranda, explicanda sunt omnia*; 41.8: *quo die citato reo mihi dicendum sit*.

awkward and certainly un-Classical or even standard Latin for the time.⁵⁶ The word order can be explained by looking at the Greek where Boethius appears to have mirrored the structure (δ' ἐστὶ = *autem est*; οὐτως δέ = *sunt autem*).

These observations are minor and serve only to give an impression of some of the syntactical irregularities in Boethius' translations but they bolster the claims made about the extent of the literalness of his translation in both lexical and syntactical dimensions. This literalness does not make the Latin translation unintelligible however, but it certainly does impinge upon the *Latinitas* of its style, which Boethius readily admits is a necessary *causatum* of his method.⁵⁷

A comparison of Victorinus and Boethius' translations of the Isagoge

We previously cited ADAMO (1967, 160), who noted that Boethius' translation project of Porphyry seemed to be born from, among other things, an intention to strip Victorinus' version of its Christian overtones and to return to as a faithful an interpretation of the Greek text as was possible in Latin. Three examples will be serve to illustrate the point, this time from a lexical perspective.

We take the first from *Isag.* 1.22-2.23: λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πάλιν γένος ἡ ἐκάστου τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχή, which Victorinus purportedly rendered with *dicitur rursus genus uniuscuiusque nativitatis principium*. Boethius' version reads: *dicitur autem et aliter rursus genus quod est uniuscuiusque generationis principium*. He followed Victorinus closely in all but one respect: the abstract *nativitas*, which is substituted with *generatio*. The latter is more philosophical,⁵⁸ and as we discussed above, conveys a specific aspect of Aristotle's use of γένεσις. Victorinus' *nativitas* seems to have been used only in the confines of Tertullian's theology (*Adv. Marc.* 4.27) and Vulgate translations. As the *TLL* suggests, the diachrony of the

⁵⁶ A simple search through the PHI Latin texts database yields very few instances where Latin clauses end with *autem* unless for abnormal emphasis (e.g. Sen. *Ep.* 71.18: *si manet etiam comminuto corpore incolumis: manet autem*.)

⁵⁷ See e.g. the section discussed in *Isag.* 2.135.5-10; discussed in BARNES (1981), 77; also briefly in LERER (2014), 27.

⁵⁸ It had also been used in the context of the natural sciences see e.g. Plin. *Nat.* 8.187; 212; 9.157; and *passim*. Note also Cassius Felix's use of *nativitas* in a medical sense of a 'disease being born', LANGSLOW (2000), 196.

term *nativitas* was, after use within Christian doctrine, tied to the concepts of sin, mortality, and the birth of Christ.⁵⁹

Similarly, with *Isag.* 10.14-15: τῆς ἀνωτάτω οὐσίας διαιρετικῶν οὐσῶν τῆς τε ἐμψύχου καὶ ἀψύχου διαφορᾶς, Victorinus renders διαιρετικός by *divisibilis* but Boethius uses the lexical innovation *divisivus*. We can ask why Boethius was dissatisfied with the straightforward (and accurate) rendition of διαιρετικός with Victorinus' *divisibilis*? The answer seems to be in its previous usage, attested in Tertullian (*Anim.* 14), where he discusses the indivisibility of the soul. One wonders whether the term took on a specific Christian provenance (although Tertullian's *Anim.* is a highly philosophical text, not confined to Christian dogmas). If it did, Boethius might have been alive to its theological cache and decided to coin a new adjective, along the same morphological lines as *divisibilis* but replacing the *-bilis* suffix with his favoured *-ivus*.

The second example is not concerned with replacing 'Scholastic' or Christianising terminology but rather it is discussed to show Boethius' preference for extremely close renderings of the Greek with recourse to lexical innovation where necessary. In *Isag.* 11.13-14, Victorinus translates τῶν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους συνεστώτων ἢ ἀνάλογόν γε ὕλην with *omnes namque res ex forma et materia consistent, ipsa autem forma inrationabilis est*. Boethius says the term *inrationabilis* needs to be removed and the new term *proportionabilis* used: *tollendum est 'irrationabilis' est et dicendum 'proportionabilis' est* (*In. Isag.* 1.96.16f).⁶⁰ The reasoning is straightforward: it appears Victorinus misreads ἀνάλογόν for ἄλογον and translates it accordingly with a *-bilis* adjective meaning 'irrational'. Boethius, instead of re-using his translation, which was *ad similitudinem*, decides a better conceptual (i.e. sense) translation would be *proportionabilis*. We can recognise the base of this adjective as being derived most likely from Cicero, who we observed in Chapter 1.7 as using the noun *proportio* to render ἀναλογία (*Timaeus*, 12). Here, the Greek original is an adjective however and not an abstract noun so, by extension, Boethius adjectivises Cicero's noun into *proportionabilis*. Two key points can be observed: 1) Boethius was attentive to the meanings and readings of the original Greek text, and 2) he consciously appears to place himself in the same tradition as earlier authors like Cicero in creating new terms, not only re-using his

⁵⁹ *TLL* s.v. *nativitas* (9.1.139.74-6), IA1a: 'in corpore nati, mortalis, peccato obstricti sim. (opp. perpetuitas [...]) divinitas [...] fort. de ipsis ea nativitate praeditis [...]; nativitas a filio dei christiano assumitur [...])'

⁶⁰ See also MINIO-PALUELLO (1961), xxxviii.

predecessors' lexical innovations but adding to them and using them as the basis for his own terms to assist the accuracy of his translations.

In some instances, Boethius prefers a phrase rather than a single noun or adjective to render a Greek substantive, and we find Victorinus rendering *Isag.* 21.14 ὑστερογενής with *postnativus* (compare this with the earlier *nativitas* for γένεσις) and *Isag.* 21.12 προεπινοέομαι with *praenoscor*. For the former, Boethius prefers the comparative phrase *posterioris generis* and for the latter *ante subintelligor quam*. In his commentary, Boethius uses Victorinus' *praenoscor* (*In. Isag.* 128.23-129.1) only to gloss it with his own lexical innovation *huc accedit quod species praenoscentur, id est praeintelleguntur, hoc est ante esse cognoscuntur quam accidentia*.

The use of the –ivus suffix and Greek loan-words in Boethius

The suffix *–ivus* deserves special mention. From the above data (especially in the *Top.*) the suffix appears to have been the favoured morphological tool for Boethius in forming deverbative adjectives (i.e. substantives that retain their verbal sense), formed from a perfect passive participle base (e.g. AFFIRMO: *affirmatus, affirmativus*). It is found in nearly 18% of all the collated lexical innovations and augmentations in Boethius but its most overt usage is seen in the *Top.* where it is used predominantly in forming morphological calques.⁶¹ Importantly, it is the main suffix through which Boethius is able to calque literally (sc. morphologically) Greek technical terms and so serves as an expedient translation tool, especially for technical terminology. Finally, Boethius' use of Greek loan-words and loan-blends for the first time in his translations is low (17%), however more of them appear in his commentaries, a similar phenomenon to the one observed in Calcidius (note the case of *sophistes* above however). This suggests Boethius aimed to preserve the Latin lexical character of his translations, in spite of his literalness of style (calques and some Grecising syntax) in transposing the original texts.


⁶¹ For the productivity of this suffix in later Latin authors see PAUCKER (1884), 113-22; however, BREITMEYER (1933) offers a more extensive analysis, see specifically at 153-4.

6. AFTERWORD

One of the assumptions throughout Latin literature has been the relative poverty of Latin compared with the abstract and abundant lexicon of the Greeks. When it came to philosophy, this was at its most magnified, with mid-twentieth century scholars like Roland Poncelet condemning Latin as a failed philosophical language. Yet as this study has touched upon, not only was the *patrii sermonis egestas* topos, from Lucretius onwards, a rhetorical device, it is too narrow a lens to apply in understanding the variegated translation practices of philosophical authors in Latin. This table summarises the statistical findings of ‘lexical innovation’ in the selected authors from Cicero to Boethius:

Category of lexical innovation	Cicero (106 lemmata)	Apuleius (56)	Tertullian (106)	Victorinus (30)	Calcidius (49)	Boethius (218)
a) Lexical augmentations (semantic calques, loan shifts etc.)	44% (47 lemmata)	18% (10)	7% (7)	20% (6)	18.5% (9)	33% (71)
b) Sense translations	18% (19)	32% (18)	46% (49)	7% (2)	20% (10)	7% (15)
c) First-attested loan-words and loan-blends	6% (6)	2% (1)	11% (19)	0% (0)	43% (21)	17% (38)
d) Morphological calques	32% (34)	48% (27)	36% (38)	73% (22)	18.5% (9)	43% (94)

The categories **c)** and **d)** can fairly be described as lexical innovations that keep as close to the source language as possible: morpheme-for-morpheme calquing or directly loaning the Greek term outright. Categories **a)** and **b)** are less literal — which does not necessarily imply less accurate — but which provide the author a greater freedom of using pre-existing Latin terms and senses for their own term-formation. As the data show (the sum of categories **a)** and **b)** for each author), the case studies do not, in fact, confirm a glaring *egestas* in Latin, with Cicero relying on either lexical augmentations or sense translations 62% of the time, Apuleius 50% of the time, Tertullian 53%, Victorinus lower at 27%, then 38.5% in Calcidius and 40% in Boethius. If anything, what the data demonstrate is that, diachronically, there was a nearly inverse trend between *verbum ex verbo* and *ad sensum* approaches in creating Latin philosophical terms:



As more pedagogical approaches to translating Greek sources became common with authors such as Victorinus (theology) and Boethius (logic), so the reliance on literal translation in their terminologies increased. Yet at the beginning of the tradition, in the Classical and early Imperial eras, the reliance on neology per se, while significant, was not more than authors' reliance on pre-existing material in the Latin language. Apuleius' increased reliance on morphological calques can be explained by the inclusion in this study of his more technical logical treatise, the *Peri Hermeneias*, which (as we saw) accounted for 46% of the morphological calques in Apuleius' philosophical vocabulary. Like Boethius, Apuleius took a literalist, didactic approach to the field of logic and hence the reliance on these types of neologisms. If we bracket the *PH* from Apuleius' data, we find that he relied on these *verbum ex verbo* techniques only 26% of the time in his philosophical translations (compared with *ad sensum* techniques 50% of the time). Of interest too is the overall percentages of ὑπαξ λεγόμενα in the authors surveyed: <1% (Cicero), 10% (Apuleius), 27% (Tertullian), 16% (Victorinus), 11% (Calcidius), and 8% (Boethius). We can conclude that these authors all

exercised significant influence (especially Cicero and Boethius) on later generations of Latin philosophers, who adopted their innovations and augmentations into posterity.⁶²

The findings in this study are also in accord with some of the conclusions in recent studies of Latin scientific literature. In ADAMS' study of veterinary terminology in Latin, he deduces seven ways in which technical terms were formed by *veterinariii* and laymen working in the same area (1995, 671): (i) Greek loan-words; (ii) specialised uses of old terms; (iii) metaphors; (iv) shifts of meaning (metonymy); (v) compounding; (vi) coinage by suffixation; and (vii) phrasal terms. Our study has come across each of these same kinds of practices in Latin philosophical authors to varying degrees, with practices like (ii)-(iv) and (vii) being relied upon to a greater extent in earlier, Classical-era authors than in later ones. This was largely because literal translation of Greek philosophical vocabulary increased as pedagogical methods (in both Christian and pagan contexts) became more precise and the aim of keeping as close to the original source texts was paramount. So, in the field of Latin medical authors too, LANGSLOW makes the following points (2000, 418): '[...] a significant development over time which one might infer from [the medical texts surveyed] is that the "scientific" style in Latin texts of "high" medicine becomes increasingly regular, consistent, and — most important for its survival — acceptable in elite circles.' And (2000, 432): 'It struck me [...] that all the means of term-formation considered may be seen as "conspiring" towards a formal compression of names for medical things (with considerable regularity according to lexical field), and thus as tending to favour the "compact" ("noun-based") style of writing'. Similarly, where relative clauses, circumlocutions, metaphors and other linguistic devices were often relied upon by earlier authors like Lucretius or Cicero in the Classical period, often for stylistic reasons, as philosophical terminology became more 'technicalised' over time, so the names for philosophical things became more abundant. The misgivings earlier authors had regarding style and acceptability in introducing new terms to translate Greek ones (e.g. nominalisations through reliance on abstract suffixes — *essentia* being a classic example), later authors began to have fewer aversions to these practices. Philosophical texts like Calcidius' version of the *Timaeus* or Boethius' translations of Aristotle's *Organon*, became

⁶² Tertullian's high count is a mark of his frequent neologisms in his polemics which failed to become productive into the future. Yet it should be remembered that 74% of his innovations would bear some influence on future Latin intellectuals, which is nonetheless significant, (see e.g. DEMMEL (1944), 130.) The works of Cicero, Victorinus, and Boethius would all become pedagogical tools during the Scholastic period and their low percentages confirm their lasting influence.

more ‘compact’, to use LANGSLOW’s description, and thus the specific philosophical subject matters became increasingly laden with new terms and jargon (not simply when it came to Latin nouns and adjectives, but its verbs as well).

Beginning with Cicero’s lexical innovation, the prose works rapidly composed during the end of his life point to an author with more freedom of diction, using Greek loanwords on occasion, but generally opting for semantic shift, pleonasm, metaphor, and metonymy, to convey the sense of Greek technical terms. In examining his approach in Ch. 1.3, an almost hermeneutic methodology can be gleaned, in which Cicero is self-conscious of the stylistic and metatextual considerations of his literary works and his target audience, carefully choosing rhetorical techniques where neology was required, such as the introduction of terms like *qualitas* and *medietas*, where we saw techniques like *praeteritio* and *captatio benevolentiae* employed extensively to ease his readers into gradual familiarity with his novel vocabulary. Authors like Lucretius, Cicero and Apuleius manifested an unmistakable creative intensity. In Cicero’s translation of Plato’s *Timaeus* in Ch. 1.6, we witnessed an attempt at literary translation rather than didactic replication with the full array of translation techniques engaged to convey the esoteric subject matter of the dialogue into Latin. Some of the translation choices in this project such as the metaphorical physicality of *materia* for οὐσία, the conception of the relations between αἰδῖος and αἰώνιος and *aeternitas* and *tempus* as a central ontological concepts, were so important that they would exercise significant influence upon later Latin intellectuals discussing Academic metaphysics, either for a broader philosophical agenda (e.g. Seneca’s Stoicism) or for genuine interest (e.g. Apuleius’ Middle Platonism). Lexical innovation and augmentation were tools for Cicero to showcase not simply his own originality and interpretations of technical concepts, but also his mastery of the source material. All this took place in the shadow of the *egestas* trope, which Cicero largely defied. The so-called *otium* of his latter years was in fact a *negotium* occupied with the creation of a new Latin vocabulary, clothed in the patriotic rhetorical bravado his listeners were accustomed to in the political arena. The deep tension between these two facts makes Cicero’s philosophical project deserving of much closer study.

If Cicero set in motion the creation of Latin philosophical terminology, Seneca was less interested in following in his footsteps and more in composing in his own genre of *Lebensphilosophie*, less technically loaded yet still faced with the articulation of Greek technical terms. Although innovative in his own right when it came to his literary

compositions on philosophy, Seneca's glosses of Greek terms, either of natural philosophy, metaphysics, or ethics, point to a conservative approach in his contributions to Latin philosophical vocabulary. This, too, we saw in Ch. 2.2 in the context of his use of the *egestas* trope in *Ep.* 58. Especially when considered in contrast to Cicero, Seneca was more likely to rely on circumlocutions, glosses, Greek loan-words or lexical augmentation rather than trying his hand at neology. For the latter, we saw a different technique of lexical augmentation than in Cicero, using a pre-existing Latin word like *area* to illustrate etymologically the sense of the Greek word under examination (*ἄλως*) instead of the addition of a novel sense to an established term. In fact, it seemed that a genuine terminology-building project was not something Seneca was interested in and hence the lack of significant data to compare with other authors in the Latin philosophical tradition. Yet like Cicero, Seneca often resorted to rhetorical techniques such as *praeteritio*, notably in his letters to Lucilius, to rely on technical terms coined by his predecessors. Seneca was also rarely engaged in the re-interpretation of Greek philosophical expressions into Latin, choosing to stay as close as possible, both semantically and formally, to Greek terms. As a result, we in fact have no genuine lexical innovations in Seneca's philosophical vocabulary.

By the time of the Middle Platonism of Apuleius, we encountered an orator-philosopher like Cicero yet geographically and culturally quite different. He was less concerned about linguistic purism or a form of 'patriotism through translation', but was creatively engaged in bringing a range of Greek philosophical texts into Latin. In his version of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo* discussed in Ch. 3.3, Apuleius creatively expands upon the original with his own additions, apparently aiming for a composition both literary and philosophical, bringing concepts into a Latin context. In Ch. 3.5 we examined his *De Platone et Eius Dogmate* and how Middle Platonic conceptual influences affected the translations of key Platonist terms. The intersection of Apuleius' roles as sophist, literary author, and acolyte of the Middle Platonic school gave him a unique position in the tradition of figures who made lasting contributions to the Latin philosophical vocabulary.

In the fourth chapter, we began by examining Tertullian's contributions to Latin philosophical vocabulary, drawing upon WELLSTEIN's more recent study in this area, and adding to it a close analysis of Tertullian's translations of Greek technical terms in his philosophical and theological works. It was concluded that Tertullian was instrumental in the foundation of Latin apologetic vocabulary, the so-called 'Ecclesiastical' terminology of late

antiquity. His extensive use of calques and neology (more so than lexical augmentation) suggested a polemicist with high ambitions for his native language in tackling the doctrinal debates gaining currency in the Greek-speaking world. For instance, Gnosticism and its terminology required equivalents in Latin to analyse their concepts in some detail. Similarly, Tertullian's extended polemic in the *Adv. Marc.* was perhaps the *coup de grâce* against the spread of the Marcionite heresy in the Latin West. This was largely due to Tertullian's direct quotations of Marcion's works (the originals are lost), and his careful undermining of their core claims by translating key terms and wielding them against the heresy's doctrines. Tertullian was not only preoccupied with the technical terminology employed by Marcionites but also in the translation of key passages from Scripture from Koine, which he appears to have done himself without reliance on the pre-existing Latin versions (the *Vetus Latina*). In doing so, many of the terms found in Biblical texts found their first Latin incarnations, making Tertullian an important influence on later generations of Christian philosophers relying on Latin versions of the Gospels. Tertullian was both a pioneer and a successor of a tradition of translating Greek philosophical vocabulary begun in Classical times under Cicero and Lucretius, and (through his own creative efforts) extended into the Christian era and into Christian doctrinal subject matters. This would, in turn, influence later Christian writers, including other African Latin writers such as Cyprian and Augustine, who took up many of Tertullian's lexical innovations used in his polemics against heresies, and shaped the manner in which Christian doctrinal concepts were re-interpreted and transformed through the Latin language.

The end of the Chapter Four examined Calcidius' extant translation of the *Timaeus*, naturally comparing his efforts to those of Cicero's in 45 BC. We inferred two important conclusions from this comparison that: 1) his translation was more didactic than literary, and 2) he went to some lengths to differentiate himself from Cicero, in rendering Platonic terminology into Latin. The explanation for this can largely be ascribed to context; that is, the process of translating Greek philosophy into Latin in Calcidius' time was a very different endeavour than in Cicero's. Calcidius might have been commissioned by a Christian bishop to complete the translation of Plato, unlike Cicero, whose work was more a self-imposed 'duty' to his countrymen and a personal project in his time out of Roman politics. Calcidius' Latin is more literal, less punctuated by glosses or rhetorical asides to his audience, and focused on rendering Plato's words as closely as possible into Latin. He also furnished his translation

with a full commentary, allowing greater depth of analysis, less concerned about the importation of direct Greek loan-words in explicating the difficult subject matter of the dialogue. Calcidius' techniques in introducing new Latin vocabulary to translate a Platonic term were, however, similar to Cicero's in the use of periphrases or circumlocutions. Calcidius, though not averse to morphological calques, relied heavily upon lexical augmentation too. He deployed established terms (many of which were sourced from Christian vocabulary) and added to them philosophical meanings to transfer Platonic concepts into Latin. Overall, Calcidius was operating within the same tradition as Cicero, yet had at his disposal a great depth of vocabulary and he employed it to his advantage in conveying Platonic terms as accurately as possible, for the educative purposes which his translation and commentary were composed.

In the final chapter on Boethius, we saw almost a 180-degree shift in purpose of translation from Cicero's time; that is, from the purely creative and literary to the literal and didactic. This meant not only a high proportion of morphological calques, but intriguingly, serious changes to typical Latin syntax in order to more closely render the Greek texts Boethius was pre-occupied with at the time. The range of new vocabulary he introduced, each performing a didactic function, appeared to have been intended to keep his Latin translations as close to the Greek source terms as possible. Although fidelity to the Greek was paramount, this did not mean he needed to rely on established terms used by his predecessors. His translations largely shunned reliance upon lexical augmentation (unlike Calcidius' didactic translations) and so Boethius was subtly different in that he was not completely within the same tradition inaugurated by Lucretius and Cicero, but pioneered a new method of philosophical composition. Boethius' prodigious translations efforts of the sixth century were enormously impactful on the philosophy of the Middle Ages. Syntax also became a site of interpretation in Boethius' translations, avoiding rhetorical or stylistic considerations completely and aiming purely for precision, to express that *incorrupta veritas* he had claimed he wished to convey in his Latin versions. As we saw in Ch. 5.4, though morphological calquing was the main technique Boethius relied upon, he was not limited only to neology. He also relied on semantic extensions, many of which had been used much earlier by Christian writers, with new senses added to convey Aristotelian technicalities. He also had recourse to phrasal and pleonastic translations, circumlocutions and glosses, so as to more accurately capture the sense of the original. The scale of lexical innovation and the flexibility of

translation techniques (reaching as deep into the linguistic fabric of Latin as the syntax itself), displayed an author keenly aware of the original Greek terms under translation and conscious of the need to express them as closely as possible to his Latin audience.

This study has illustrated the following: that there was a definite and continuous tradition within Latin literature of philosophical translation of Greek technical terminology, and that this tradition could be characterised as a spectrum between the poles of creative literary composition and highly literal didactic translation; between the rejection of the *fides interpretes*, or ‘mere middleman’, to the imprimatur of conveying the *incorrupta veritas* of the source texts. We saw the earlier Classical authors grouped around the former end and later authors like Victorinus and Boethius around the latter.⁶³ All were, nonetheless, required to exercise their own stylistic and rhetorical faculties⁶⁴ to various degrees in choosing which translation techniques best reflected the goals of their respective philosophical projects. Yet each author certainly had their own interpretations of the Greek concepts under consideration, and this reminds us that through such technical translation, the very fundamentals of these Greek philosophical terms were often re-interpreted, and permanently transformed in their transmission into the Latin West. This, then, was no ordinary case of bilingualism, language interference, or code-switching, but a deeply nationalistic competition, as evinced in the remarks of Cicero and Quintilian, between intellectual rivals. The need for Roman dominance was not merely imperial but philosophical. And unlike other disciplines like rhetoric, where the exemplars of Demosthenes or Aristides were held as sacrosanct, the Roman approach to exemplars like Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, or Epicurus was less faithful and appeared to have less of an interest in mechanically reproducing their concepts. By the Christian era, these authors were specifically being used as either straw-men or polemic foils against which Christian thought could predominate, or as sources of ideas to be sublated and transformed into the apologetic contexts in which they were translated. So to compose philosophy was not an ‘art’ in the same way oratory had been; there were no set formulae binding Cicero or Lucretius

⁶³ More broadly, Christian authors would alternate between literal translations when it came to conveying sacred texts in Latin and more *ad sensum* translations when adapting Greek theological works (usually to refute them or, in some cases, to expand upon them). So we see later Latin authors resorting to literal translation techniques (and thus necessitating a greater reliance upon lexical innovation, e.g. in the form of morphological calques) for differing reasons: one for fidelity to sacred Christian texts (Terullian, Jerome, etc.), the other for specifically didactic purposes (Calcidius and, especially, Boethius).

⁶⁴ Especially rhetorical. It is worth reminding the reader that of all the authors selected throughout this study, Calcidius was probably the only author who was not also trained as a rhetorician, as far as we know.

from the outset, it was a much freer creative exercise. This had ramifications, and the pioneering efforts of these Late Republican authors gave later Latin philosophers authorities on which to mount their own original projects, whether it was Seneca's unique version of Roman Stoicism or Apuleius' rhetorical Platonic literary compositions.

The thesis has aimed to provide a beginning for closer lexicographic interest in the creation of the Latin philosophical vocabulary. It was never intended as an exhaustive or definitive collation of such terms but, more modestly, attempted to provide a single source which examines the key translation techniques used in coining new terms and meanings in the textual corpora of significant authors across the formative years of Latin philosophy. These techniques are complemented by lexical data across a sufficiently large time-period for future scholars in the fields of Latin philology and ancient philosophy, with new tools to further expand studies in this area. By examining Latin philosophy through the lens of lexical innovation, we were also able to add new perspectives to some of the philosophical debates within specific authors, their understanding of the Greek source material they adapted, as well as a handful of textual issues (found particularly in the lexical commentaries on Cicero's *Timaeus* and Apuleius' *De Mundo* and *De Platone et Eius Dogmate*). This study has also re-evaluated the veracity of commonly deployed tropes such as the *egestas* view of the Latin philosophical vocabulary, often taken for granted but a more complex phenomenon in reality. The predominating view of mid-twentieth century continental classical linguists such as PONCELET's that Latin had neither the resources nor the capacity to convey the thought of the Ancient Greeks required re-evaluation as LAMBARDI's study of Cicero's *Timaeus* had foreshadowed, with this investigation demonstrating that the issue of linguistic reality versus determinism and 'success' versus 'failure' in rendering Greek philosophical terms into Latin, are all, in some ways, false dichotomies. The lexical resources in Latin were more than ample for many of the pioneers of its philosophy, and where neology was required it was either part of a broader renovation of the Greek terms under examination, often bound up with literary and rhetorical stratagems as well (Lucretius, Cicero, Seneca, Apuleius), or a function of pedagogy for the benefit of particular audiences (Tertullian, Victorinus, Calcidius, Boethius).

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I — CICERONIAN LEXICAL INNOVATIONS FROM HIS PHILOSOPHICAL CORPUS

The following compilation of Ciceronian lexical innovations builds upon my previous research and further data collection during my D.Phil. This list excludes loan-words (for a complete list of these, see Ch. 1.6), however loan-blends are included.

Where a particular definition is a novel sub-meaning, the numbers beside each definition follow the conventions of the *TLL* and *OLD* respectively. The format of each entry follows this structure:

abscessio n. (ἀπειμι v.)

A *TLL*, 1: ‘vocabulum a Cicerone ut uidetur formatum, ab ecclesiasticis receptum pro graeco ἀποστασία’; **B** *OLD*, 1: Removal, loss; **C** (*Timaeus*, 44) cum [...] ad corpora tum accessio fieret, tum abscessio; **D** (*Ti.* 42a) τὸ μὲν προσίοι τὸ δ’ ἀπίοι τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν.

Key:

(A) description/definition in the *TLL*

(B) definition in the *OLD*

(C) Cicero’s Latin translation of the Greek original

(D) the Greek original (with Stephanus reference in quotations specifically from the *Timaeus*).

All entries have their part of speech described and their Greek original listed adjacent. Entries:

- with (^{LI}) indicate coinages (lexical innovations) introduced by Cicero through various methods;
- with (^{LA}) indicate loan-shifts/semantic extensions (lexical augmentations) where an existing Latin word has been imbued with a new meaning;
- with a dagger (†) indicate loan-blends; and
- with a double-dagger (‡) indicate ἀπαξ λεγόμενα.

Finally, where a definition could not be obtained from the *TLL*, due to its currently being incomplete, this has been noted with ‘N/A’.

It should be noted that the compilers of the reference works consulted (see Introduction) have catalogued each Latin entry for an entirely different purpose for the premise of this thesis, and as such, the data from these sources has a healthy lack of built-in bias in that respect, particularly when it comes to novel meanings or first-attested usages. The entries in the data below are obviously not comprehensive, but they provide enough insight into Cicero's translation techniques and lexical innovation practices without compromising the general validity of the study. Square bracketed text indicates cross-references, either to an entry within the same Appendix or to others (indicated in bold).

ABSCESSIO^{LI} n. (ἄπειμι v.)

TLL, I: 'vocabulary a Cicerone ut uidetur formatum, ab ecclesiasticis receptum pro graeco ἀποστασία'; *OLD*, 1: removal, loss; (*Timaeus*, 44) cum [...] ad corpora tum accessio fieret, tum abscessio; (*Ti.* 42a) τὸ μὲν προσίοι τὸ δ' ἀπίοι τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν.

ABSOLUTIO^{LA} n. (τελείωσις n.)

TLL, IV1: 'perfectio: in universum'; *OLD*, 1: finishing, completion; (*Timaeus*, 41) tria genera nobis reliqua sunt eaque mortalia, quibus praetermissis caeli absolutio perfecta non erit; (*Ti.* 41b, 14) θνητὰ ἔτι γένη λοιπὰ τρία ἀγέννητα· τούτων δὲ μὴ γενομένων οὐρανὸς ἀτελής ἔσται.

ACERVALIS^{LI} adj. (σωρίτης; σωρείτης n.)

TLL, I: 'adi. ab acervus [1: de rebus aliis super alia cumulatis]; *OLD*, 1: characterised by piling up (trans. Gk. σωρίτης); (*Div.* 2.11) quem ad modum soriti resistas, (quem si necesse sit, Latino verbo liceat acervalem appellare).

ADMIRABILIA^{LA} adj. (παράδοξα n.)

TLL, Ib: 'huc spectat philosophorum notio'; *OLD*, 3: contrary to common opinion, paradoxical; (*Fin.* 4.74) haec παράδοξα illi, nos admirabilia dicamus [*MIRABILIA*, q.v.].

AEDIFICATOR^{LA} n. (τό αἷτιον n.)

TLL, I2: 'translate'; *OLD*, 2. (w. mundi) a maker, creator, architect (of the world); (*Timaeus*, 7) neque eius aedificatore praestantius; (*Ti.* 29a) ὁ δ' ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων.

AEGROTATIO^{LA} n. (ἄρρώστημα n.)

TLL, I2: 'de animo [malis]'; *OLD*, 1: (usu. w. animi) an unhealthy moral condition, morbid desire or passion; (*Tusc.* 4.23) deinde aegrotationes, quae appellantur a Stoicis ἀρρωστήματα). [*AEGROTATIVUS* (νοσώδης) **Appendix IV**, q.v.].

AEQUILIBRITAS^{LI} n. (ἰσονομία n.)

TLL, I: 'ab aequilibris'; *OLD*, 1: equal proportion, equilibrium; (*N.D.* 1.109) confugis ad aequilibratam (sic enim ἰσονομίαν si placet appellemus).

AESTIMATIO^{LI} n. (ἀξία n.)

TLL, I4: 'per analogiam significationis pretium significat in philosophia i.q. ἀξία'; *OLD*, 7: moral worth, value; (*Fin.* 3.34) nam cum aestimatio, quae ἀξία dicitur. [*DIGNIFICO* (ἀξιόω) **Appendix IV**, q.v.].

ALTRIX^{LI} n. (τροφός n.)

TLL s.v. *altor*: I: ‘i.q. *nutrix*, cf. *de lupa*’; *OLD*, 2: (of the earth) b (of plants etc.) *nourisher, sustainer*; (*Timaeus*, 37) *iam vero terram altricem nostram*; (*Ti.* 40b) γῆν δὲ τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν [*AUXILIATRIX* (τροφή) **Appendix III**, q.v.].

ANIMATIO^{LI} n. (γένος n.)

TLL, I: ‘i. *sidera divina mente animata*’; *OLD*, 1: ‘a form of life’; (*Timaeus*, 35) *erant autem animantium genera quattuor, quorum unum divinum atque caeleste [...] divinae animationis maxime speciem faciebat ex igne*; (*Ti.* 39e-40a) εἰσὶν δὲ τέτταρες, μία μὲν οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος, [...] τοῦ μὲν οὖν θείου τῇν πλείστην ιδέαν ἐκ πυρὸς ἀπηργάζετο [*ANIMATIO* (ἐνθύμησις) **Appendix III**, q.v.].

ANTECESSIO^{LI} n. (προχώρησις n.)

TLL, I: ‘*de tempore et causa*’; *OLD*, 1: *a going in front or forward*; (*Timaeus*, 37) *quae [...] in orbibus eorum conversiones quaeque antecessiones eveniant*; (*Ti.* 40c) καὶ [περὶ] τὰς τῶν κύκλων πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἐπανακυκλήσεις καὶ προχωρήσεις.

ANTICIPATIO^{LI} n. (πρόληψις n.)

TLL, I: ‘*Gloss.* πρόληψις, πρόλημμα’; *OLD*, 1: *a previous notion, preconception*; (*N.D.* 1.43) *quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem* [*INFORMATIO*, q.v.].

APPETITIO^{LI} n. (ὁρμή n.)

TLL, II1: ‘*rerum communiter explet notionem [...] ὁρμή Stoicorum*’; *OLD*, 2a: *a natural or instinctive desire, appetite (for), impulse (towards)*; (*Fin.* 4.39) *appetitionem, quam vocant ὁρμήν*.

APPROBATIO^{LI} n. (συγκατάθεσις n.)

TLL s.v. *approbatio*: I: ‘*probatio, assensio...in sermone philosophorum*’; *OLD*, 1b: (in Stoic phil.) *the assent given by the mind to what it perceives*; (*Luc.* 37) *de adsensione atque adprobatione, quam Graeci συγκατάθεσιν vocant* [*ASSENSIO*, q.v.].

ARTIFEX^{LA} n. (δημιουργός n.)

TLL, IA3: ‘*de deo sive natura mundum fabricantibus*’; *OLD*, 6: *a maker, creator, producer*; (*Timaeus*, 6) *atqui si pulcher est hic mundus et si probus eius artifex, profecto speciem aeternitatis imitari maluit*; (*Ti.* 28a) εἰ μὲν δὴ καλὸς ἐστὶν ὁδε ὁ κόσμος ὃ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ αἰδίον ἔβλεπεν [*EFFECTOR*, q.v.; *EFFECTRIX* q.v.].

ASPECTABILIS^{LI} adj. (ὁρατός adj.)

TLL, I: ‘*ab adspectare [...] vertens gr. ὁρατόν*’; *OLD*, 1: *Able to be seen, visible*; (*Timaeus*, 12) *animal unum aspectibile [...] effecit (deus)*; (*Ti.* 30d) ὁ θεὸς ὁμοιωσαι βουλευθεὶς ζῶν ἐν ὁρατόν.

ASSENSIO^{LI} n. (συγκατάθεσις n.)

TLL, I2: ‘*in philosophorum sermone. de assentiendo visis ab assentior [de homine visis adsentiente]*’; *OLD*, 3: (in Stoic phil., transl. Gk. συγκατάθεσις) *the assent given by the mind to natural impulses*; (*Luc.* 37) *de adsensione atque adprobatione, quam Graeci συγκατάθεσιν vocant* [*APPROBATIO*, q.v.].

COAGMENTATIO^{LI} n. (συστάτος adj.)

TLL, I: ‘i.q. *coniunctio, copulatio: de effectu coniungendi*’; *OLD*, 1: *the state of being fitted or joined together*; (*Timaeus*, 17) *omnis enim coagmentatio corporis vel caloris vi vel frigoris vel aliqua impulsione vehementi labefactatur et frangitur et ad morbos senectutemque compellitur*; (*Ti.* 33a) κατανοῶν ὡς συστάτῳ σώματι θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα δυνάμεις ἰσχυρὰς ἔχει περιστάμενα ἔξωθεν καὶ προσπίπτοντα ἀκαίρως λύει καὶ νόσους γῆρας τε ἐπάγοντα φθίνειν ποιεῖ.

COLLIGATIO^{LI} n. (δεσμός n.)

TLL, II: ‘i. quod colligat, instrumentum colligandi’; *OLD*, 2: something that binds or connects, a bond, tie; (*Timaeus*, 23) *sesquialteris [...] intervallis [...] sumptis ex his colligationibus*; (*Ti.* 36a) ἐπιτρίτων καὶ ἐπογδόων γενομένων ἐκ τούτων τῶν δεσμῶν ἐν ταῖς πρόσθεν διαστάσεσιν.

COMPREHENDIBILIS^{LI} adj. (καταληπτός adj.)

TLL, I: ‘qui sensibus vel cogitatione percipi potest’; *OLD*, 1: able to be grasped by the senses or intellect; (*Ac.* 41) *id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec?* ‘nos vero’ inquit; ‘quonam enim alio modo καταληπτόν diceres?’

COMPREHENSIO^{LI} n. (κατάληψις n.)

TLL, IIB1: ‘de actione non corporali [...] per sensus vel cogitationem [...] in philosophia (κατάληψις Stoicorum)’; *OLD*, 5b: something that is perceived, a perception; (*Luc.* 31) *mens hominis, amplectitur maxime cognitionem et istam κατάληψιν, quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensione dicemus.*

CONCENTIO^{LI} n. (ἁρμονία n.)

TLL, I: ‘a concinere [1: simul canere, conclamare]’; *OLD*, 1: unison singing or utterance; (*Timaeus*, 27) *et corpus quidem caeli aspectabile effectum est; animus autem oculorum effugit optutum, est autem unus ex omnibus rationis concentrationisque, quae ἁρμονία Graece*; (*Ti.* 36e) καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ὁρατὸν οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος μέν, λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχῆ.

CONCURSIO^{LA} n. (παραβολή n.)

TLL, II: ‘de non animantibus [...] a concurrere [gloss. in unum veniunt, congruent, conveniunt, congredi]’; *OLD*, 1c: (astrol.) a conjunction (of stars); (*Timaeus*, 37) *inter ipsos deos concursiones*; (*Ti.* 40c) χορείας δὲ τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ παραβολὰς ἀλλήλων.

CONIUGATIO^{LA} n. (συζυγία n.)

TLL, II: ‘technice: apud rhetores in conclusione’; *OLD*, 1: etymological connection; also, a mixing together; (*Top.* 12) *haec verborum coniugatio συζυγία dicitur, ex qua huius modi est argumentum: si compascuus ager est, ius est compascere.*

CONSEQUENS^{LA} part. (ἐπιγεννηματικός adj.)

TLL s.v. *consequor*: ‘part. praes. adi. et subst. consequens, -tis; subst. neutr. plur. consequentia, -ium.: III de effectu: c t.t. rhetorum de conclusione et ratione’; *OLD*, 1: following in time, subsequent; (*Fin.* 3.32) *posterum quodammodo et consequens putandum est quod illi ἐπιγεννηματικόν appellant.* [[CONSEQUENTIA](#) (ἀκολούθησις) **Appendix IV**, q.v.].

CONSEQUOR^{LA} v. (ἐπικαταλαμβάνω v.)

TLL, IIA: ‘sequendo apprehendere’; *OLD*, 2b: to overtake in time, catch up with; (*Timaeus*, 32) *mensis generata, quando luna lustrato suo cursu solem consecuta est*; (*Ti.* 39c) μείς δὲ ἐπειδὰν σελήνη περιελθοῦσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς κύκλον ἥλιον ἐπικαταλάβῃ.

CONSUMPTIO^{LI} n. (φθίσις n.)

TLL, IB: ‘de actu exhauriendi’; *OLD*, 1: process of consuming or wearing away; (*Timaeus*, 18) *se ipse (mundus) consumptione et senio alebat sui*; (*Ti.* 33c) αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τροφήν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φθίσιν παρέχον.

CONVENIENTIA^{LI} n. (n. ὁμολογία)

TLL, IIa: ‘i.q. cohaerentia, coniunctio, concordia’; *OLD*, 1: Agreement between persons, arrangement, convention; (*Fin.* 3.21) *quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet.*

CONTENTIO^{LA} n. (κρινόμενον pres. part.)

TLL, IIc1c: ‘metonymice, id ipsum de quo certatur, argumentum’; *OLD*, 4.d: a point of disagreement, subject of dispute (*Top.* 95) *sed quae ex statu contentio efficitur, eam Graeci κρινόμενον appellant, mihi placet id, quoniam quidem ad te scribo, qua de re agitur vocari* [cf. *Arist. Rh.* 1391b9].

CORPORATUS^{LI} part. (σῶμα ἔχων n. + part.)

TLL s.v. *corporo*: part. perf. pass. pro adi. *corporatus*, -a, -um: IIb: ‘v. sub. *corporo* [part. perf. pass. pro adi. *corporatus* i. q. *corporeus*]’; *OLD*, 1: endowed with a tangible body; (*Timaeus*, 10) *quando quidem cernitur et tangitur et est undique incorporatus*; (*Ti.* 28b, 8) ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἀπτὸς τέ ἐστὶν καὶ σῶμα ἔχων [*CORPUS*, q.v.].

CORPUS^{LA} n. (σῶμα n.)

TLL, IVC2a: ‘*quaevis unitas vel tortum [...] de atomis, elementis*’; *OLD*, 11: a concrete object (and not something insubstantial); (geom.) a solid body; (abst.) solid character or appearance, substance; (*Timaeus*, 50) *animus [...] sensum omnem effugit oculorum; at ignis, aqua [...] corpora sunt eaque cernuntur*; (*Ti.* 46d) τοῦτο δὲ ἀόρατον πῦρ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ καὶ ἀήρ σώματα πάντα ὁρατὰ γέγονεν [*CORPORATUS*, q.v.].

CUNEOLUS^{LI} n. ‡ (γόμφος n.)

TLL: ‘a cuneus diminutive’; *OLD*, 1: a small wedge, a pin; (*Timaeus*, 47) *crebris quasi cuneolis inliquefactis unum efficiebant ex omnibus corpus*; (*Ti.* 43a) πυκνοῖς γόμφοις συντήκοντες, ἐν ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀπεργαζόμενοι σῶμα ἕκαστον.

DECRETUM^{LA} n. (δόγμα n.)

TLL, I: ‘sub. *decerno* [3.2A t.t. *usus latior: philosophiae, praecepta principalia significans, sententia, doctrina*]’; *OLD*, 1: an idea held with conviction, dogma, principle, opinion; (*Luc.* 29) *decretum (sentitis enim iam hoc me δόγμα dicere).*

DEFENSTRIX^{LI} n. ‡ (σωτηρία n.)

TLL, fem. *defensor*, ‘I: *is qui arcet*’; *OLD*, 1: fem. of one who averts or repels; (*Timaeus*, 48) *urere [...] lucere [...] per oculos emicare [...] defenstrix* (recorded in *G.L.* 3.463.19) *defenstrix quoque Cicero in Timaeo protulit addita t*; (*Ti.* 45d) σωτηρίαν γὰρ ἦν οἱ θεοὶ τῆς ὀψέως ἐμηχανήσαντο. *TLL* adds this reference: ‘*Prob. Cath. Gramm. IV 13 –x (traditur defensatrix) rationabiliter debet dici*’ [*AUXILIATOR*, q.v.; *SALUTIFICATOR* (σωτήρ) **Appendix III**, q.v.].

DIALECTICUS[†] n. (διαλεκτικός n.)

TLL, I: ‘i.q. *ad disputationem, disserendi artem pertinens*’; *OLD*, 1: related to a process of reasoning (esp. the dialectical method of the Academy), logical, dialectical; (*Div.* 2. 122) *quaero etiam, si velim scribere quid aut legere aut canere vel voce vel fidibus aut geometricum quiddam aut physicum aut dialecticum explicare*; (*Pl. Rep.* 534e) [...] ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῶν ἐπάνω κείσθαι.

DISSIMULATIO^{LI}, DISSIMULANTIA^{LI} n. (εἰρωνεία n.)

TLL, IB: ‘i.q. *artificium simulationis cum in agendo tum in loquendo, quo quis figens se aliquid nescire vel alia quacumque simulatione usus aliter agit vel loquitur ac sentit [...] figura rhetorica*’; *OLD*, 2: (Socratic) irony; (*Luc.* 15) *ea dissimulatione quam Graeci εἰρωνείαν vocant.*

EFFATUM^{LA} perf. part. of effor (ἀξίωμα n.)

TLL, I: ‘*apud philosophos fere i. q. enuntiatum, placitum*’; *OLD*, 1b: (log.) *an assertion, proposition*; (*Luc. 95*) *quidquid enuntietur (id autem appellant axioma, quod est quasi effatum)* [*ENUNTIATIO*, q.v.]; *ROGAMENTUM Appendix II*, q.v.; *PROBAMENTUM Appendix IV*, q.v.].

EFFECTOR^{LI} n. (δημιουργός n.)

TLL, Ib: ‘*i. q. is qui efficit [...] in theologia: gentilium*’; *OLD*, 1: *one who creates or causes, an author or originator*; (*Timaeus*, 40) *quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum*; (*Ti. 41a*) ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων [*EFFECTRIX*, q.v.; *FACTITATOR Appendix III*, q.v.].

EFFECTRIX^{LI} n. (δημιουργός n.)

TLL, I: ‘*i. q. quae efficit*’; *OLD*, 1: *fem. of effector*; (*Timaeus*, 37) *diei noctisque effectricem eandemque custodem*; (*Ti. 40c*) φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτὸς τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο [*EFFECTOR* q.v.; *FACTITATOR Appendix III*, q.v.].

EFFICIENS^{LI} (efficientia) pres. part. (ποιητικός adj.)

TLL, IA: *ab efficio, efficiens [...] rei efficientis vel effectae*’; *OLD*, 1: (usu. phil.) *that produces or gives rise to something; (of a cause) efficient (rather than accessory)*; (*Fin. 3.55*) *efficientia, quae Graeci ποιητικά appellant* [*EFFECTIVUS*, q.v.; *PERFECTIVUS Appendix IV*, q.v.].

ENUNTIATIO^{LI} n. (ἀξίωμα n.)

TLL, IIA: ‘*spectatur effectus enuntiandi [...] i. q. sententia, dictum*’; *OLD*, 2b: (quasi-concr.) *a phrase, expression; (log.) and assertion*; (*Fat. 1.28*) *enuntiationum quae Graeci ἀξιώματα vocant*. [*EFFATUM*, q.v.; *ROGAMENTUM Appendix II*, q.v.; *PROBAMENTUM Appendix IV*, q.v.].

EVIDENS^{LI} adj. (ἐναργής adj.)

TLL, IIA: ‘*translate: a fere i. q. manifestus, perspicuus, apertus: pro adi.: varia ex usu*’; *OLD*, 2: *clear, obvious (to the understanding)*; (*Timaeus*, 31) *atque ut esset mensura quaedam evidens*; (*Ti. 39b*) ἵνα δ’ εἴη μέτρον ἐναργές [...]

EVIDENTIA^{LI} n. (ἐναργεία n.)

TLL: ‘*ab evidens (vox a Cic. ad ex. gr. ἐναργεία formata)*’; *OLD*, 2: *the quality of being evident to the mind, obviousness; that which is evident*; (*Luc. 17*) *quod nihil esset clarius ἐναργεία ut Graeci, perspicuitatem aut euidentialiam nos si placet nominemus fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba* [*PERSPICUITAS*, q.v.].

EXCANDESCENTIA^{LI} n. (θύμωσις n.)

TLL, I: ‘*i. q. actus vel qualitas statusve in iram excandescendi*’; *OLD*, 1: *the eruption or flaring up of anger or sim*; (*Tusc. 4.21*) *ut [...] excandescencia [...] sit ira nascens et modo existens, quae θύμωσις Graece dicitur*.

EXTREMUM^{LA}, n., FINIS^{LA}, n., SUMMUM^{LA}, n., ULTIMUM^{LA}, n. (τέλος n.)

TLL, s.v. extremus: ‘*neutr. pro subst. Παγ: respectu rei proficientis: fere i. q. eventus*’; *OLD*, 4: *the ultimate pitch or degree (of a quality, condition)*; (*Fin. 1.42*) *quoniam autem id est vel summum bonorum vel ultimum vel extremum — quod Graeci τέλος nominant*.

FABRICATOR^{LA} n. (τεκταινόμενος n.)

TLL, I: ‘*qui arte fabri adhibita aliquid conficit*’; *OLD*, 1: *a maker, fashioner*; (*Timaeus*, 6) *ille fabricator huius tanti operis utrum sit imitatus exemplar*; (*Ti. 28c*) πρὸς πότερον τῶν παραδειγμάτων ὁ τεκταινόμενος αὐτὸν ἀπηργάζετο.

FATUM^{LA} n. (είμαρμένη n.)

TLL, Ib: ‘necessitas, είμαρμένη’; *OLD*, 4: Fate (regarded as the force which moulds events), destiny; (esp., abl.) by fate; (Div. 1.125): *Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci είμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat.*

FRUGALITAS^{LA} n. (σωφροσύνη n.)

TLL, I: ‘i. q. abstinentia, temperantia, modestia’; *OLD*, 1: steadiness of life, sober habits, temperance, self-restraint, etc.; (Tusc. 3.16): *Graeci σώφρονα appellant eamque virtutem σωφροσύνην vocant, quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, non numquam etiam modestiam, sed haud scio an recte ea virtus frugalitas appellari possit.*

HELICA[†] n. (έλικη n.)

TLL, I: ‘i. q. spira, gyrus, volumen’; *OLD*, 1: a convolution, spiral; (Timaeus, 31): *omnis enim orbis eorum quasi helicae inflexione vertebat*; (Ti. 39b) πάντας γάρ τοὺς κύκλους αὐτῶν στρέφουσα έλικα, cf. (Arist. PA, 680b) Ἔστι δὲ τοῖς στρομβώδεσιν ἐν τῇ έλικῇ τοῦτο, τοῖς δὲ μονοθύροις ἐν τῷ πυθμένι [...]

IMPULSIO^{LI} n. (δύναμις n.)

TLL, IA: ‘de actione corporea i. q. pulsus, ictus, attactus [...] de animantibus et part. corp’; *OLD*, 1: a push, thrust; (Timaeus, 17) *omnis enim coagmentatio corporis vel caloris frigoris vi vel aliqua impulsione vehementi labefactatur*; (Ti. 33a) πάνθ’ ὅσα δυνάμεις ισχυρὰς ἔχει περιστάμενα ἔξωθεν.

INCERTA^{LA} adj. (ἄδηλα adj.)

TLL s.v. *incertus*, ‘graece resp. ἄδηλος (saepe; cf. Cic. ac. 2.54 ea dico -a, quae ἄδηλα Graeci) [...] IA1a: i. q. de quo non constat, non manifestus, non probatus (perceptus, diiudicatus sim.), ignotus, occultus’; *OLD*, 6: not clearly ascertained or identified, doubtful, uncertain or 8b: (of language, signs, etc.) not admitting of certain interpretation, vague or ambiguous; (Luc. 54) *ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt (ea dico incerta quae ἄδηλα Graeci)?*

INDIFFERENS^{LI} pres. part. (ἀδιάφορον adj.)

TLL, IAa: ‘in serm. phil. de rebus inter bona et mala i. q. ἀδιάφορον’; *OLD*, 1: (phil. of things) neither good nor bad, indifferent; (Fin 3.53) *quod sit indifferens cum aestimatione mediocri; quod enim illi ἀδιάφορον dicunt.*

INDISSOLUBILIS^{LI} adj. (ἄλυτος adj.)

TLL, I: ‘i. q. immortalis’; *OLD*, 1: indestructible, imperishable; (Timaeus, 40) *inmortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis*; (Ti. 41a) ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ’ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν [*INDISSOLUTUS*, q.v.].

INDISSOLUTUS^{LI} adj. (ἄλυτος adj.)

TLL, I: ‘ab in et solutus sec. gr. ἄλυτος [...] i. q. indissolubilis’; *OLD*, 1: indestructible, imperishable; (Timaeus, 40) *quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissoluta me invito*; (Ti. 41a) ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων δι’ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος [*INDISSOLUBILIS*, q.v.].

INDIVIDUUS^{LI} adj. (ἄτομος n.)

TLL, IA1a: ‘i. q. indivisibilis [...] de atomis q.d. ex doctrina Democriti’; *OLD*, 1b: an atom (in the atomic theory of Democritus); (Fin. 1.17) *atomos quas appellat, id est corpora individua propter soliditatem censet in infinitio inani [...] ferri.*

INFINITIO^{LI} n. (ἄπειρία adj.)

TLL, I: ‘ab infinitus ad vert. Gr. ἄπειρία’; *OLD*, 1: infinitude, boundlessness; (Fin. 1.21) *infinutio ipsa, quam ἄπειρίαν vocant.*

INFORMATIO^{LI} n. (πρόληψις n.)

TLL, II: ‘vario usu fere i. q. adumbratio, definitio, demonstratio [...] t.t. phil. i. q. πρόληψις, imaginatio’; *OLD*, 1: formation (of an idea), conception; (*N.D.* 1.43) *quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem* [*ANTICIPATIO*, q.v.].

ININTELLEGENS^{LI} adj. ‡ (ἀνόητος adj.)

TLL, I: ‘i. q. non intellegens’; *OLD*, 1: lacking understanding, senseless; (*Timaeus*, 10) *nihil esse eorum quae natura cernerentur inintellegens intellegente [...] praestantius*; (οὐδὲν ἀνόητον [...] κάλλιον ἔσεσθαι ποτε ἔργον [...])

INLIQUEFACTUS^{LI} adj. (συντήκων part.)

TLL, 1: ‘i. q. liquefactus’; *OLD*, 1: made liquid, melted; (*Tim.* 47) *crebris quasi cuneolis inliquefactis unum efficiebant ex omnibus corpus*; (*Ti.* 43a) ἀλλὰ διὰ σμικρότητα ἀοράτοις πυκνοῖς γόμοις συντήκουντες, ἐν ἑξ ἁπάντων ἀπεργαζόμενοι σῶμα ἕκαστον.

IRONIA[†] n. (εἰρωνεία n.)

TLL, IA1: ‘definitur, explicatur [...] sensu philosophico, de Socrate [...] fere i. q. dissimulatio sapientiae ea quae fit ad auditorem illudendum’; *OLD*, 1b: simulated ignorance, Socratic irony; (*Luc.* 15) *Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis quos volebat refellere; ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione quam Graeci εἰρωνείαν vocant*; (*Luc.* 74) *quid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non esset nisi probavisset, ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla fuit ratio persequi.*

LEVITAS^{LA} n. (λειότης n.)

TLL, Ia: ‘i.q. natura levis, λειότης [...] respicitur superficies corporum [...] generatim’; *OLD*, 1: smoothness, evenness; (*de Orat.* 3.99) *in ipso tactu esse modum et mollitudinis et levitati*; (*Timaeus*, 49) *id fit cum speculorum levitas hinc illincque altitudinem adsumpsit*; (*Ti.* 46c) τοῦτο δέ ὅταν ἡ τῶν κατόπτρων λειότης ἐνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν ὕψη λαβοῦσα.

MATERIA^{LA} n. (οὐσία n.)

TLL, IIIA1c: ‘de re primaria substantiam specierum efficiente: de universa substantia rerum naturalium, in doctrina Academicorum de οὐσία’; *OLD*, 4b: (phil.) the basic substance of the universe, matter (= Gk. ὕλη);⁶⁵ (*Tim.* 21) *ex ea materia quae individua est et quae semper unius modi suique similis* (*Ti.* 35a): τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχούσης οὐσίας.

MEDIETAS^{LI} n. (μεσότης n.)

TLL, IIB1b: ‘incorp.: a spectiatim: in serm. mathem. de numeris inter binos limites sive extremitates certa lege atque ratione interiectis’; *OLD*, 1: the central point or part, also an intervening part; (*Timaeus*, 23): *ut in singulis essent bina media — vix enim audeo dicere medietates, quas Graeci μεσότηας appellant*; (*Ti.* 36a) ὥστε ἐν ἐκάστω διαστήματι δύο εἶναι μεσότηας.

MELANCHOLICUS[†] n. (μελαγχολικός n.)

TLL, IA1: ‘i.q. melancholia affectus: de hominibus’; *OLD*, 1: having an atrabilious temperament, melancholic; (*Tusc.* 1.80) *Aristoteles [...] ait omnis ingeniosos melancholicos esse.*

⁶⁵ Note the *OLD* does not list the sense attested in Cicero’s *Timaeus* (i.e. translating Plato’s οὐσία not Aristotle’s ὕλη).

MIRABILIA^{LA} adj. (παράδοξα n.)

TLL, IB1ba: ‘*causa admirationis est in rei novitate vel raritate [...] vel in eo, quod praeter expectationem accidit*’; *OLD*, 1a: causing wonder, marvellous, remarkable, extraordinary; (*Luc.* 136) *sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum, quae παράδοξα nominantur* [*ADMIRABILIA*, q.v.].

MORBUS^{LA} n. (πάθος n.)

TLL, I2ba: ‘*de moribus vitiosis vel animi passionibus [...] doctrinae philosophorum*’; *OLD*, 2b: (transf., hyperb., etc., of var. conditions or afflictions) [...] (phil., as transl. of Gk. πάθος); (*Tusc.* 3.7) *haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci πάθος appellant; ego poteram ‘morbos’, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet*. [*COMPASSIO* (συμπάθεια) *Appendix III*, q.v.; *PASSIONALIS* (ἐμπαθής) *Appendix III*, q.v.].

MULIEROSITAS^{LI} n. (φιλογυνία n.)

TLL, I: ‘*i.q. mulierum cupiditas*’; *OLD*, 1: excessive fondness for women; (*Tusc.* 4.25) *ceteri morbi [...] ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam quae Graece φιλογυνία dicitur*.

MUTABILIS^{LI} adj. (σκεδαστός adj.)

TLL, I1a: ‘*praevalente sensu facultatis mutandi [...] corporaliter [...] de rebus*’; *OLD*, 1: liable to change, changeable, fluctuating; (*Timaeus*, 27) *cum materiam mutabilem arripuit*; (*Ti.* 37a) *ὅταν οὐσίαν σκεδαστήν ἔχοντος τινος ἐφάπτηται*.

NOTA^{LA} n. (σύμβολον n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*, 6: a mark used to represent a sound, letter, word, etc. a symbol, character; (*Rep.* 3.3) *vocis [...] infiniti soni paucis notis inventis sunt omnes signati et expressi*. (*Top.* 35) *itaque hoc quidem Aristoteles σύμβολον appellat, quod Latine est nota*. [Cf. *Arist. De Int.* 16a26-9: τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην, ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν γένηται σύμβολον, ἐπεὶ δηλοῦσί γέ τι καὶ οἱ ἀγράμματοι ψόφοι, οἶον θηρίων, ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὄνομα.]

NOTATIO^{LA} n. (ἐτυμολογία n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*, 4: the explanation (of a term) according to its derivation (used by Cicero to render Gk. ἐτυμολογία); (*Top.* 2.10) *multa etiam ex notatione sumuntur. ea est autem, cum ex vi nominis argumentum elicitor: quam Graeci ἐτυμολογίαν vocant, id est verbum e verbo, veriloquium* [*VERILOQUIUM*, q.v.].

NOTITIA^{LA} n. (ἔννοια, πρόληψις n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*, 5: conception, idea; (*Luc.* 30) *notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἔννοια tum πρόληψις vocant* [*ANTICIPATIO*, q.v.; *INFORMATIO*, q.v.].

OPINABILIS^{LI} adj. (δοξαστός adj.)

TLL, 1a: ‘*spectat ad rationem incertam, veritatem mancam [...] in doctrina Platonica (sc. de rebus quae sensibus percipiuntur, mutabiles sunt sim.)*’; *OLD*, 1: based on opinion (rather than knowledge); (*Ac.* 31) *hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem appellabant*; (*Timaeus*, 3) *alterum quod adfert ad opinionem sensus rationis expers, quod totum opinabile est, id gignitur et interit nec umquam esse vere potest*; (*Ti.* 28a) [...] τὸ δ’ αὖ δόξη μετ’ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὧντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν [*OPINATRIX* (δόξα) *Appendix III*, q.v.].

PARVITAS^{LI} n. (σμικρότης n.)

TLL, 1A1: ‘*i.q. status parvi cuiusdam, exiguitas sim. [...] rerum variarum*’; *OLD*, 1: smallness, minuteness; (*Timaeus*, 47) *vinclis [...] talibus, quae cerni non possent propter parvitatem*; (*Ti.* 43A) *ἀλλὰ διὰ σμικρότητα ἀοράτοις πυκνοῖς γόμφοις συντήκοντες*.

PERCEPTUM^{LA} n. (θεώρημα n.)

TLL s.v. *percipio*: *p. p. p. perceptus, -a, -um*: 1: ‘*n. pro subst. i. q. res percepta: a de eis, quae animo, mente comprehenduntur (i. q. θεώρημα Cic. fat.); OLD*, 1: *a general idea, proposition, principle; (Fat. 11.15) si est divinatio, qualibusnam a perceptis artis proficisitur? (percepta appello quae dicuntur Graece θεωρήματα) [CONSIDEROR (θεωρέομαι) Appendix IV, q.v. CONTEMPLATIVUS (θεωρητικός) Appendix IV, q.v., SPECULATIO (θεωρία) Appendix IV, q.v.].*

PERSPICUITAS^{LA} n. (ἐναργεία n.)

TLL IIa: ‘*i. q. status vel qualitas eorum, quae perspicua sunt: vi passiva de eis, quae facile perspiciuntur (sive mente [maxime sub a et b] sive oculis [...] significatur: a status manifestus, certus: in philosophia rerumve cognoscendarum doctrina (technice maxime Cic. ac.); OLD*, 3: *the quality or fact of being self-evident; (Luc. 17) quod nihil esset clarius ἐναργεία ut Graeci, perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos si placet nominemus fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba [EVIDENTIA, q.v.].*

PRINCIPATUS^{LA} n. (ἡγεμονικόν / ἀρχή (temporis) n.)

TLL: IA1a: ‘*technice in philosophia pertinet ad regendum animum vel mundum (fere sec. gr. ἡγεμονικόν [...] metonymice de ipsa parte principali)’*; also s.v. *hegemonicon*: ‘*t.t. philos. (maxime Stoicorum) quo principatus quidam significatur*’; *OLD*, 6: (phil., as a transl. of Gk. ἡγεμονικόν) *the governing part, guiding principle; (N.D. 2.29) omnem [...] naturam necesse est [...] habere aliquem in se principatum [...] autem id dico quod Graeci ἡγεμονικόν vocant; (Timaeus, 5) ab aliquo temporis principatu); (Ti. 28b) ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος. [HEGEMONICON, q.v. Appendix IV].*

PROCREATOR^{LA} n. (ὁ συνιστάς pres. part.)

TLL: I2: ‘*i. qui procreat: de quolibet auctore: a de deo universitatis creatore; OLD*, 1: *a begetter, creator (Timaeus, 26) animum igitur cum ille procreator mundi deus ex suae mente et voluntate genuisset; (Ti. 36D) ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ συνιστάντι πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ἐγεγένητο.*

PROPORTIO^{LA} n. (ἀναλογία n.)

TLL, s.v. *portio*: IA1aβ(2): ‘*i. q. ratio, proportio, analogia [...] in locutionibus adverbialibus notione ‘ἀνάλогον, κατ’ ἀναλογίαν’ sim. (respicitur saepe ratio, quae est inter singulas partes, vel inter partes et totum [...] speciatim in philosophia vel arithmetica eaque nisis artibus)’*; *OLD*, 2: [back-formation from *pro portione (portio)*] *proper spatial relation between parts, proportion; (Timaeus, 13) id optime adsequitur, quae Graece ἀναλογία, Latine (audendum est enim, quoniam haec primum a nobis novantur) comparatio pro portione dici potest; (Tim 31c) δεσμῶν δὲ κάλλιστος ὅς ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ συνδούμενα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν ποιῇ, τοῦτο δὲ πέφυκεν ἀναλογία κάλλιστα ἀποτελεῖν. [PROPORTIONALIS (ἀνάλογον) Appendix IV, q.v.]*

PRAECIPUUS^{LA} adj., PRAEPOSITUS^{LA} part., PRODUCTUS^{LA} part., PROMOTUS^{LA} part. (προηγμένα part. προάγω)

TLL, s.v. *praecipuus*, IA1c: ‘*comparatione non expresse illustrata [...] appendix ad a et b: neutr. pro subst.*’; s.v. *praepositum*, I: ‘*secundum aestimationem (sc. in doctrina Stoicorum de eo, q.d. προηγμένον*’; s.v. *produco*: IB1aα(I)(B): *fere i. q. porro ducere, in longum ducere, extendere sim.: in sermone communi: a spectata varias actiones incorporales: -untur animantes: qui promoventur, adiuvantur, foveantur: speciatim in civitate. Also IB1aβ(I): variae, quae augentur, promoventur, incitantur sim. (effectus indicatur passim per praepos. ad, in). Also IIC2: i. q. promotus, non nisi neutr. plur. pro subst. in versione t. t. Stoicorum προηγμένα ([...] erit verbum e verbo, si ita appellantur); s.v. *promoveo*: *p. p. p. promotus, -a, -um pro adi. vel subst. 2: usu pro subst. [...]; neutr.: per plur. -a vertitur t. t. Stoicorum q. e. προηγμένα; OLD*, 1: (Stoic phil.) *a thing which, while not absolutely good, is advanced above the point of indifference; (Fin. 3.52) προηγμένα, id est producta, nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus—id erit verbum e verbo—vel promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta.**

PRAESENSIO^{LI} n. (μαντική n.)

TLL: 1a: ‘i.q. actio vel effectus praesentiendi, praesagatio [...] pertinet ad futura (ad latentia, nondum manifesta)’; *OLD*, 1: an awareness beforehand, foreknowledge, presentiment; (Div. 1.1) quam Graeci appellant *μαντικήν* id est praesensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum.

QUALITAS^{LI} n. (ποιότης n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*, 1: a distinguishing quality, characteristic; (Ac. 24-7) qualitates igitur appellavi quas ποιότητας Graeci vocant [*INQUALITAS* (ἄποιος) **Appendix III**, q.v.].

QUIESCERE^{LA} v. (ἡσυχάζειν v.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*, 2a: to rest from toil, pain, or sim., enjoy a respite (fig.); (Luc. 93) placet [...] Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur [...] tria paica sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perueniat, quiescere (id est quod ab his dicitur ἡσυχάζειν).

RECORDATIO^{LA} n. (ἀνάμνησις n.)

TLL: ‘I strictius cum respectu memoriae vel commemorationis [...] saepe iuxta memoria [...] A potius de actione vel effectu: I proprie [...] a usu communi: a indicatur, [...] quid vel quis in memoriam revocetur: (I) per gen. obi. [...] quo significantur: (A) res [...]’; *OLD*, 1: ‘the act of calling to mind, recollection’ (Tusc. 1.57) habet primum memoriam et eam infinitam rerum innumerabilium: quam quidem Plato recordationem esse vult superioris vitae; (Pl. Phd. 72-73a) ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὐσα.

REDUCTA^{LA} part. reduco, REIECIENDA^{LA} gerundive reicio, REIECTA^{LA} part. reicio, REMOTA^{LA} part. removeo (ἀποπροηγμένα part.)

TLL s.v. *reduco*, B1: ‘reprimatur, sc. coercetur, minuitur, infirmatur vel omnino resolvitur, tollitur: a iudicio aestimantis, definientis vel rescindentis; -itur: quod minoris aestimatur (sc. p. p. plur. -ta pro subst. pro term. techn. Stoicorum q. e. ἀποπροηγμένα)’; s.v. *reicio* ΠΑ1αα(1): ‘varia (sc. fere affectiones animi, virtutes, vel incommoda, mala sim., sed verba, tempus; hic illic -untur, antequam adsint, ut accedat notio arcendi, prohibendi [...] in philosophia spectat ad ἀποπροηγμένα’; *OLD*, 1: (in Stoic phil., as a category of ἀδιάφορα) things which, while not absolutely bad, fall beneath the level of indifference; (Fin. 3.15) ‘proegmenis’ et ‘apopregmenis’ concedatur. quamquam haec quidem ‘praeposita’ recte et ‘reiecta’ dicere licebit; (Ac. 37) quae pluris aestimanda ea [Zeno] praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. [Cf. reiecienda Fin. 5.78; reducta Fin. 5.90].

SPECIES^{LA} n. (n. εἶδη, ἰδέα)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*, 13: (in Platonic philosophy, = ἰδέα) an eternally existing archetype of any class of thing; (Ac. 30) mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem; solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. hanc illi ἰδέαν appellant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere (Top. 30.) in divisione formae, quas Graeci εἶδη vocant.

SESQUIALTER^{LI} adj. (adj. ἡμιόλιος)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*, 1: one and a half times as great, in the ratio of 3:2 (Timaeus, 22) [partem] tertiam, quae esset secunda sesquialtera, prima [de] tripla (Ti. 35b) τὴν δ’ αὖ τρίτην ἡμιολίαν μὲν τῆς δευτέρας, τριπλασίαν δὲ τῆς πρώτης.

SESQUIOCTAVUS^{LI} adj. (adj. ἐπόγδοος)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*, 1: one and one eighth times as great; (neut. sg. as noun) one and one eighth. (Timaeus, 23) [...] et sesquioctavis sumptis ex his colligationibus in primis intervallis sesqueoctavi intervallo sesquetertia omnia explebat. (Ti. 36b) [...] καὶ ἐπογδῶν γενομένων ἐκ τούτων τῶν δεσμῶν ἐν ταῖς πρόσθεν διαστάσεσιν, τῷ τοῦ ἐπογδοῦ διαστήματι τὰ ἐπίτριτα πάντα συνεπληροῦτο [*EPOGDOOS* **Appendix III**, q.v.].

SESQUITERTIUS^{LI} adj. (adj. ἐπίτριτος)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*, 1: one and a third times as great; (Timaeus, 23) sesquialteris autem intervallis et sesquetertis et sesqueoctavis sumptis ex his colligationibus in primis intervallis sesqueoctavi intervallo

sesquiertertia omnia explebat. (Ti. 36a-b) ἡμιολίων δὲ διαστάσεων καὶ ἐπιτρίτων καὶ ἐπογδῶν γενομένων ἐκ τούτων τῶν δεσμών ἐν ταῖς πρόσθεν διαστάσεσιν, τῷ τοῦ ἐπογδῶν διαστήματι τὰ ἐπίτριτα πάντα συνεπληροῦτο.

SOLIDITAS^{LI} n. (στερεοειδής adj.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*: 2: *density and firmness of texture*; (Timaeus, 15) *sed cum soliditas mundo quaereretur*; (Ti. 32b) νῦν δὲ στερεοειδῇ γὰρ αὐτὸν προσῆκεν εἶναι.

SOLIVAGUS^{LI} adj. (ἔρημος adj.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*: 1: *wandering by oneself, not gregarious, solitary*; (Timaeus, 20) *deinde eum circumdedit corpore et vestivit extrinsecus caeloque solivago volubili et in orbem incitato complexus est*; (Ti. 34b) καὶ κύκλῳ δὴ κύκλον στρεφόμενον οὐρανὸν ἕνα μόνον ἔρημον κατέστησεν. [[AERIVAGUS Appendix III](#), q.v.]

SUMPTIO^{LA} n. (λῆμμα n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*: 2: (log.) *a statement taken as true*; (Div. 2.108) *demus tibi istas duas sumptiones (ea quae λήμματα appellant dialectici, sed nos Latine loqui malumus)* [[ACCEPTIO Appendix II](#), q.v.].

TEMPERANTIA^{LA} n. (σωφροσύνη n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*: 1: *self-control, moderation, restraint*; (Tusc. 3.16) *eri etiam simile illud est, qui sit temperans — quem Graeci σῶφρονα appellant eamque virtutem σωφροσύνην vocant, quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, non numquam etiam modestiam.*

TEMPERATIO^{LI} n. (κρατήρ n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*: 1: *the mixing of substances in due proportion, blend, composition*; (Timaeus, 42) *deinde ad temperationem superiorem revertit*; (Ti. 41d) καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον κρατήρα.

TRACTABILIS^{LI} n. (ἄπτός n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*: 1: *able to be handled, tangible*; (Timaeus, 13) *corporeum [...] et aspectabile idemque tractabile omne necesse est esse*; (Ti. 31b) σωματοειδὲς δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁρατὸν ἄπτόν τε δεῖ τὸ γενόμενον εἶναι.

TRANSLATIVUS^{LI} adj. (μετάληψις adj.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*: 1: *relating to a change of plea in a court of law, as a result of an exceptio*; (Inv. 1.10) *translativa dicitur constitutio, quia action translationis et commutationis indigere videtur*. Cf. Quint. Inst. 3.6.46: *μετάληψιν, quam nos varie translative, transumptivam, transpositivam vocamus.*

UNIGENA^{LA} adj. (μονογενής adj.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*: 1: *produced as the sole one of its kind*; (Timaeus, 12) *ut hic mundus esset animanti absoluto simillimus hoc ipso quod solus atque unus esset, idcirco singularem deus hunc mundum atque unigenam procreavit*; (Ti. 31b) ἵνα οὖν τόδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾗ τῷ παντελεῖ ζῶντι διὰ τὰ ταῦτα οὔτε δύο οὔτ' ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους ἀλλ' εἰς ὃδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονὼς ἔστιν καὶ ἔτ' ἔσται.

UNIVERSITAS^{LI} n. (τὸ πᾶν n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*: 1c: (spec.) *the sum of things, the universe*; (Timaeus, 6) *illum [...] quasi parentem huius universitatis*; (Ti. 28c) τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός.

VERILOQUIUM^{LI} n. (ἐτυμολογία n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*: 1: *argument from the true meaning of a word*; (Top. 35) *ea est autem, cum ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur; quam Graeci ἐτυμολογίαν appellant, id est verbum ex verbo veriloquium*. [[NOTATIO](#), q.v.].

VISUM^{LA} n. (φαντασία n.)

TLL: N/A; *OLD*, 1b: (phil.) a sense impression received by the eye (Gk φαντασία); (Ac. 40) *in qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus (quam ille φαντασίαν, nos visum appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc quidem verbum, erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone saepius)*

APPENDIX II — COLLECTED LEXICAL INNOVATIONS IN APULEIUS' PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

The terms listed below are only those first-attested terms in the works based on Greek original terms. An asterisk (*) represents a lexical augmentation, superscript ^{MC} = morphological calque and ST = sense translation. Entries with a dagger (†) indicate loan-words. Entries with a double-dagger (‡) indicate ἄπαξ λεγόμενα. Terms with no Greek equivalent are Apuleius' deliberate additions to the translation, recorded here for reference.

ABDICATIVUS^{MC} (ἀποφατικός) (PH. 191.3-4) [NEGATIVUS, ENUNTIATIVUS Appendix IV, q.v.].

ADBICO* (ἀποφαίνω) (PH. 177.20-1)

ACCEPTIO* (λήμμα) (PH. 183.23, *passim*) [SUMPTIO Appendix I, q.v.].

ADLUVIO* (ἐπικλύζω) (Mun. 340)

AEQUIPEDUM^{MC} (ἰσοσκελής) (Pl. 1.195) [ISOSKELES (ἰσοσκελής) Appendix IV, q.v.].

AEQUIPOLLENS^{MC} (ἰσοδύναμος) (PH 181.8, *passim*)

ALTRIX* (ἐστία) (Mun. 290) [ALTRIX (τροφός) Appendix I, q.v.].

ANILITOST ‡ (τὴν ἀγήρω φύσιν ὁμοίως τηρεῖ) (Mun. 340)

ANTARCTICUS† (ἀνταρκτικός) (Mun. 291)

CIRCUMREFERO^{MC} (ἐπάγουσα) (Mun. 338)

CIRCUMVECTUS* (περιρρέω) (Mun. 301)

CLARICO ‡ (Mun. 322)

CONCIENS^{MC} ‡ (περιοχουμένη) (Mun. 340)

CONDICIONALIS^{MC} (ὑποθετικός) (PH. 177.6)

CONVERSIBILIS^{MC} (ἀντιστρεπτή) (PH. 181.19, *passim*)

CONVIBRO (Mun. 322)

CORPORATA* (συνεστηκυῖα) (Mun. 333)

CRASSITAS (Mun. 328)

DECISIOST (μειουμένη καὶ φθίνουσα) (Mun. 354)

DECLARATIVUSST (κατηγορικόν) (PH. 192.8) [CATEGORICUS, PRAEDICATIVUS Appendix III, q.v.].

DEDICATIVUS^{MC} (καταφατικός) (PH. 191.1-2) [AFFIRMATIVUS Appendix IV, q.v.].

DISTERMINATORST ‡ (διάμετρος) (Mun. 291)

ERUCTATIO^{MC} (+ *surgo*) (ἀπορρέω) (Mun. 305)

FLAMMIDAST ‡ (θερμόν) (Mun. 336)

FULMINATOR^{MC} (κεραύνιος, κεραύνειος) (Mun. 371)

FUSCITASST (ζόφος) (Mun. 362)

HINNIBILIS^{MC} (χρεμετιστικόν) (PH. 178.24, 29; 179.4)

ILLATIO^{MC} (ἐπιφορά) (PH. 199.9-11)

- ILLATIVUS^{MC} (ἐπιφορικός) (PH. 183.22-3; 184.3)
- INCOMMOBILITAS^{MC} (ἀοργησία) (Pl. 2.226)
- INDEFINITUS^{MC} (ἀδιόριστος) (PH. 190.20-1; 193.11-12)
- INDEMONSTRABILIS^{MC} (ἀναπόδεικτος) (PH. 206.1-2)
- INEFFUGIBILIS^{MC} (ἀναπόδραστος) (Mun. 372)
- INERRABILIS^{MC} (ἀπλανής) (Mun. 292; Pl. 11.203) [APLANES **Appendix III**, q.v.]
- INNOMINABILIS^{MC} (ἀόρατος) (Pl. 1.190) [INAPPREHENSIBILIS **Appendix III**, q.v.]
- INQUIETUDOST (μυκτητής) (Mun. 331)
- INTERMINUSST (ἀπαύστως δι' αἰῶνος) (Mun. 290)
- INTIMO* (μεταδίδωμι) (Mun. 287; Pl. 2.222)
- LUCRICUPIDUSST (φιλοκερδής) (Pl. 2.241)
- MULTICOLORUS (Mun. 323)
- NATATILISST (ἔνυδρόν) (Mun. 353)
- NINGORST (νιφετός) (Mun. 309)
- OCTANGULUSST (ἰσόπλευρα τρίγωνα ὀκτώ) (Pl. 1.195)
- OPIMO (Mun. 341)
- PARTICULARIS (μερικός) (*passim.*)
- PARTICULARITERST (ἐν μέρει) (PH. 182.22, 24; 184.6; 188.3)
- PAVITATIO^{MC} (παλματίας) (Mun. 331)
- PRAECENTORST (κορυφαῖος) (Mun. 365)
- PRAEPOTENTIAST (πρόσχημα) (Mun. 346)
- PROLIXITAS* (μῆκος) (Mun. 303)
- PROTENSIO^{MC} (πρότασις) (PH. 190.5-6)
- ROGAMENTUMST ‡ (ἀξίωμα) (PH. 190.5-6) [ENUNTIATIO **Appendix I**, q.v.; PROBAMENTUM **Appendix IV**, q.v.].
- RELIGIOSITAS^{MC} (ὁσιότης) (Pl. 7.229)
- REVICATIOST (?ἀνατροπή) (PH. 194.9-10)
- SUBSTITUTIVUS^{MC} (ὑποθετικός) (PH. 190.11-13)
- TEMPERANTIA* (ὁμόνοια) (Mun. 333, 337) [TEMPERANTIA (σωφροσύνη) **Appendix I**, q.v.; CONTEMPERANTIA (συμμετρία) **Appendix IV**, q.v.].
- TRIUMPHATOR^{MC} (τροπαιοῦχος) (Mun. 371)
- ULTRAMUNDANUS^{MC} ‡ (ὑπερουράνιος) (Pl. 1.204)
- VIGINTIANGULUSST ‡ (δὺς ἐξήκοντα τῶν στοιχείων [...] γωνιῶν δώδεκα) (Pl. 1.195)
- VITABILIS^{MC} (παθητός) (Mun. 295)
- QUANTITAS* (ποσότης) (PH. 190.17-18)

APPENDIX III - COLLECTED LEXICAL INNOVATIONS AND AUGMENTATIONS IN TERTULLIAN, VICTORINUS, AND CALCIDIUS

Items marked with an asterisk (*) indicate lexical augmentations. A double dagger (‡) indicates a term is a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*. The following letters denote each author:

T = Tertullian

V = Victorinus

C = Calcidius

ABLATIO (ἀφαίρεσις) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.19.4-5) **T**

ADFLICTATOR ‡ (θλίβων) (*Adv. Marc.* 5.16.1) **T**

ADIMPLETIO (πληρώματος) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.33; 5.17; *Monog.* 5) **T**

ADINTELLEGO ‡ (προσνοέω) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.42) **V**

ADUNATIO (συναρμόττον) (*Tim.* 38a; *Comm.* 28) **C**

AEQUIPERANTIA (σύγκριμα) (*Adv. Val.* 16.3) **T**

AEQUIREMUS (όμαλός) (*Tim.* 34b) **C** [[INDECLIVIS](#), q.v.].

AERIVAGUS (πτηνὸν καὶ ἀεροπόρον) (*Tim.* 40) **C** [[SOLIVAGUS](#) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

AGNITIONALIS ‡ (κατὰ γνώσιν) (*Adv. Val.* 27.3) **T**

ALTERITAS (ἐτερότης) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.23.13, *passim*) **V**

ANIMATIO* (ἐνθύμησις) (*Adv. Val.* 9.4) **T** [[ANIMATIO](#) (γένος) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

APLANES (ἀπλανής) (*Comm.* 69; 94 114; 116; 144) **C** [[INERRABILIS](#) **Appendix II**, q.v.].

APPARENTIA (ἐπιφάνεια) (*Adv. Marc.* 5.17; *Monog.* 5.2) **T**

APOSTATIS (ἀποστάτης) (*Adv. Marc.* 1.14; 5.11) **T**

AQUILENTANUS / AQUILONIANUS ‡ (τὰ βορειότερα κλίματα) (*Comm.* 67) **C**

ARTIFICIALITER* (μαθηματικῶς) (*Comm.* 62) **C**

AUXILIATOR (σωτήρ) (*Tim.* 48d; *Comm.* 267) **C** [[SALUTIFICATOR](#), q.v.; [DEFENSTRIX](#) (σωτηρία) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

AUXILIATRIX (τροφή) (*Tim.* 44c) **C** [[ALTRIX](#) (τροφός) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

BAPTIZOR (βαπτίζω) (*Anim.* 50) **T**

BEATUS* (μακάριος) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.14) **T**

BENEVOLENTIA* (εὐωδία) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.53.18; 4.25.42) **V**

BIAEOTHANATUS (βιαιοθάνατος) (*Anim.* 57) **T**

BICORIS ‡ (δίκωρος) (*Comm.* 243) **C**

CALATHOIDES (καλαθοειδής) (*Comm.* 90) **C**

CATABIBAZON (καταβιβάζων) (*Comm.* 88) **C**

- CATABOLICOS (καταβάλλω, καταβολή) (*Anim.* 28.5) **T**
- CATEGORIA (κατηγορία) (*Isag.* 1.3) **V** [**PRAEDICAMENTUM**, q.v.; **PRAEDICATIO** **Appendix IV**, q.v.].
- CATEGORICUS (κατηγορικός) (*Comm.* 319) **C** [**DECLARATIVUS** **Appendix II**, q.v.; **PRAEDICATIVUS** **Appendix IV**, q.v.].
- CAVOSITAS ⚭ (κοιλιάς) (*Pudic.* 20.8) **T**
- CHARISMA (χάρισμα) (*Ieiun.* 10.5; *Bapt.* 20.5; *Praescr.* 29.3) **T**
- CIRCUMCORDIALIS ⚭ (περικάρδιος) (*Anim.* 15.5; 43.2) **T**
- CIRCUMDUCTOR (μεταγωγεύς) (*Adv. Val.* 10.3) **T**
- CIRCUMFINGO (περιπλάσσω) (*Anim.* 23.3) **T**
- COGNOSCENTIA (σύγνωσις) (*Gen. Div. Verb.* 1.13; *Adv. Arrium* 1.31.36, *passim*) **V**
- COMMEABILIS* (πορεύσιμος) (*Tim.* 24e) **C**
- COMPASSIO (συμπάθεια) (*Resurr.* 3; 40; *Pudic.* 3) **T** [**PASSIONALIS** (έμπαθής), q.v.; **MORBUS** (πάθος) **Appendix I**, q.v.].
- COMPLEXIBILIS (σύμπλεκτος) (*Comm.* 169) **C**
- COMPREHENSIO* (δισχυρίζομαι) (*Tim.* 49d) **C** [**COMPREHENSIO** (κατάληψις) **Appendix I**, q.v.].
- CONCIVIS (συμπολίτης) (*Adv. Marc.* 5.17, *Res.* 41) **T**
- CONCULCATUS ([κατα]πατούμενος) (*Res.* 22.4) **T**
- CONCUPISCENTIVUS ⚭ (έπιθυμητικός) (*Anim.* 16.3) **T**
- CONOIDES (κωνοειδής) (*Comm.* 90) **C**
- CONRESUSCITO (συνεγείρω) (*Res.* 23.1) **T**
- CONSISTENTIA* (σύστασις) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.49.22) **V**
- CONSTELLATUS (κατηστερισμένος) (*Comm.* 65) **C**
- CONSUBSTANTIALIS (όμοούσιος) (*Adv. Arrium* 2.10-11) **V** [**CONSUBSTANTIVUS**, q.v.].
- CONSUBSTANTIVUS (όμοούσιος) (*Ad. Val.* 12; 18; 37) **T** [**CONSUBSTANTIALIS**, q.v.].
- CONTIONABILIS (δημηγορικός / συμβουλευτικός) (*Comm.* 223) **C**
- CONTRADICIBILIS (αντιλεγόμενος) (*Carn.* 23.4) **T**
- CYLINDROIDES (κυλινδροειδής) (*Comm.* 90) **C**
- DECINERO (συναναλίσκω) (*Adv. Val.* 32.4) **T**
- DEDECORATIO (άτιμία) (*Resurr.* 52.16; 53.2; *Coron.* 14.20) **T**
- DEFECTRIX ⚭ (άποστᾶσα) (*Adv. Val.* 38.1) **T**
- DEFENSA (έκδίκησις) (*Adv. Marc.* 2.8.1) **T**
- DELIQUENTIA (άμαρτία) (*Resurr.* 46.4; *Adv. Marc.* 4.20.6) **T**
- DEPETO (παρακαλέω) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.20.6) **T**
- DERIVABILIS ⚭ (μετάπειστον) (*Tim.* 51e; *Comm.* 207) **C**
- DESIPIO* (ζυμούν) (*Pudic.* 13) **T**
- DESULTRIX ⚭ (ύστερήσασα) (*Adv. Val.* 38.1) **T**

- DETENTUS (ἀκρατηῶς) (*Adv. Val.* 32.2) **T**
- DETUITIO (παράφασις) (*Comm.* 239; 242) **C** [[PARAPHASIS](#), q.v.].
- DILECTIO (ἀγάπη) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.27) **T**
- DISCENTIA (μάθησις) (*Anim.* 23.6; 24.11) **T**
- DIVISIBILIS* (διαιρετικός) (*Porph. Isag.* 10.15) **V** [[DIVISIVUS](#) **Appendix IV**, q.v.]
- DURICORDIA ‡ (σκληροκαρδία) (*Adv. Marc.* 5.4; 5.13) **T**
- EFFULGENTIA* (ἀπαύγασμα) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.27.18, *passim*) **V**
- EFFUSIO (ἀνάφορον, φάσις, φαῦσις) (*Comm.* 118; *Comm.* 117; *Comm.* 119; *Comm.* 124) **C** [[PHASIS](#), q.v., [TUITIO](#), q.v.]
- EMPYRIUS (ἐμπύριος) (*In Gal.* 4.9 p. 1180B) **V**
- EPISCYNIIUM (ἐπισκύνιον) (*Pall.* 4) **T**
- EPOGDOOS (ἐπόγδοος) (*Tim.* 36a) **C** [[SESQUIOCTAVUS](#) **Appendix I**, q.v.].
- EPOPTICUM (ἐποπτικός) (*Comm.* 127) **C**
- ERUDITUS* (παίδευσις/ παιδευθείς) (*Adv. Val.* 29.3) **T**
- ESSENTIALITAS (ὀντότης) (*Adv. Arrium* 3.7.12) **V**
- EXSISTENTIALITAS ‡ (ὑπαρκτότης) (*Gen. Div. Verb.* 7.5; *Adv. Arrium* 1.30.21, *passim*) **V**
- EXSISTENTIALIS (ὑπαρκτός) (*Adv. Arrium* 3.18) **V**
- FACTITATOR ‡ (δημιουργός) (*Adv. Val.* 21.2) **T** [[EFFECTOR](#), q.v.; [EFFECTRIX](#) **Appendix I**, q.v.].
- FIGULO (πλάσσω) (*Carn.* 9.6; *Adv. Val.* 24.2; *Cast.* 5.1) **T**
- FILIETAS (υἰότης) (*Gen. Div. Verb.* 30.36; *Adv. Arrium* 1.24.3, *passim*) **V**
- FLAGELLATIO (διαμαστίγωσις) (*Mart.* 4) **T**
- FLUXILIS (ῥευστός) (*Adv. Val.* 24.1-2) **T**
- FRUGESCO (καρποφορώ) (*Adv. Val.* 17.1; *Carn.* 22) **T**
- HEGEMONICON (ἡγεμονικόν) **C** (*Comm.* 218) [[PRINCIPATUS](#), q.v. **Appendix I**]
- HEXAHEDRON, HEXAHEDRUM (ἑξάεδρον) (*Comm.* 53) **C**
- HISTRICULUS (?ῥστριξ + *culus*) (*Pall.* 4.2) **T**
- HYLICUS (ὕλικός) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.24, *passim*) **V**
- HYPOBRYCHIUM (ὑποβρύχιον) (*Idol.* 24) **T**
- HYPOLIPTICUS (ὑπολειπτικός) (*Comm.* 74) **C**
- IDENTITAS (ταυτότης) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.48.25, *passim*) **V**
- IGNAVESCO ‡ (κοπιάζω) (*Anim.* 43.12; *Adv. Prax.* 16.16) **T**
- ILLAESIBILIS (ἀκράτητος) (*Adv. Val.* 27.2) **T**
- ILLIBERIS (σπέρμα μὴ ᾗ αὐτῷ) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.34.8) **T**
- INAPPREHENSIBILIS (ἀόρατος) (*Adv. Val.* 27.2) **T** [[INNOMINABILIS](#) **Appendix II**, q.v.].
- INCOMMISCIBILIS (μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι) (*Anim.* 12.2) **T**

- INDECLIVIS (όμαλός) (*Tim.* 34b) **C** [[AEQUIREMUS](#), q.v.]
- INDIGNATIVUS ‡ (θυμικός) (*Anim.* 16) **T**
- INDISCERNIBILIS (ἀδιάκριτος) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.49) **V**
- IDOLOTHYTUS (ειδωλόθυτος) (*Idol.* 13; *Spect.* 13) **T**
- INEFFIGIABILIS ‡ (ἀσχηματιστός) (*Anim.* 24.1) **T**
- INENARRATIVUS ‡ (ἄρρητος) (*Adv. Val.* 27.2) **T**
- INNASCIBILIS (ἀγέννητος) (*Adv. Val.* 37.2) **T**
- INNATUS (ἀγέννητος) (*ANIM.* 4.1) **T**
- INQUALITAS (ἄποιος) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.49.22) **V** [[QUALITAS](#) (ποιότης) **Appendix I**, q.v.].
- INSUBDITIVUS ‡ (ἀπαθής) (*Adv. Val.* 27.3) **T** [[IMPASSIBILIS](#) **Appendix IV**, q.v.].
- INSUBSTANTIALIS (ἀνούσιος) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.26) **V**
- INTELLECTIBILIS (νοητός) (*Gen. Div. Verb.* 7.13; *Adv. Arrium* 1.24.16, *passim*) **V** [[INSENSIBILIS](#) **Appendix IV**, q.v.].
- INTUITIO* (ἐμφασις) (*Comm.* 239) **C**
- INVALETUDO (φόβος) (*Adv. Val.* 21.1) **T**
- INVENTIBILIS (ἀνεξερεύνητος) (*Hermog.* 45.5) **T**
- LIMMA (λείμμα) (*Comm.* 45) **C**
- MESEMBRINOS/MESHEMERINOS (μεσημβρινός/μεσημέριος) (*Comm.* 66; 92)
- MOLINUS (λίθος μυλικός) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.35.1) **T**
- MOTIVUS (τὸ κινεῖσθαι / κινητόν) (*Comm.* 57; 225; 292) **C** ([AGITATIVUS](#) (κινητικός) **Appendix IV**, q.v.].
- MULTIFICO (πληθύνω) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.15.9) **T**
- MULTINUBENTIA ‡ (πολυγαμία) (*Ieiun.* 1) **T**
- MULTIVORANTIA ‡ (πολυφαγία) (*Ieiun.* 1) **T**
- MUNDITENENS ‡ (κοσμοκράτωρ) (*Adv. Marc.* 5.18.12; *Fug.* 12.3) **T**
- MUNICIPATUS (πολίτευμα) (*Adv. Marc.* 3.24) **T**
- NATURIFICATUS ‡ (διὰ τὸ φύσει πνευματικὸν εἶναι) (*Adv. Val.* 29.4) **T**
- NECROTHYTUS (νεκροθυτος) (*Spect.* 13) **T**
- NOYS (νοῦς) (*Comm.* 176; 252) **C**
- NULLAFICATIO (φαυλισμός) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.14.15) **T**
- NUTO (μεταπίπτω/μεταπειστός) (*Comm.* 67; *Tim.* 51e) **C** [[TRANSCADO](#), q.v., **Appendix V**]
- OBAEMULOR ‡ (παραζήλω) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.31.6) **T**
- OBMUSO ‡ (θρυλέω) (*Anim.* 18.1) **T**
- OBNEXUS (στραγγαλιά) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.37.1) **T**
- OLENTIA (ὀσμή) (*Adv. Marc.* 2.22.3) **T**

OPINATRIX † (δόξα) (*Comm.* 213) **C** [**OPINABILIS** **Appendix I**, q.v.].

ORANOS (ὄρανός) (*Comm.* 98) **C**

PACATORIUS (εἰρηνικός) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.29.15) **T**

PARAPHASIS (παράφασις) (*Comm.* 239; 242) **C** [**DETUITIO**, q.v.].

PAREDROS (πάρεδρος) (*Anim.* 28) **T**

PARTICIPABILIS (μετεχόμενος) (*Comm.* 331) **C**

PASSIONALIS (ἐμπαθής) *Adv. Val.* 16.3) **T** [**COMPASSIO**, q.v.; **MORBUS** (πάθος) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

PATRICUS (πατρικός) (*Gen. Div. Verb.* 17.2; *Adv. Arrium* 1.25.19, *passim*) **V**

PERCEPTIBILIS* (περιληπτός) (*Tim.* 28a) **C** [**PERCEPTIBILIS** (δεκτικός) **Appendix IV**, q.v., **SUSCEPTIBILIS** (δεκτικός) **Appendix IV**, q.v.; **SUSPICABILIS** (δεκτικός) **Appendix IV**, q.v.]

PERSONA* (ὑπόστασις) (*Adv. Prax.* 11; *Spect.* 23; *Paenit.* 11; *Monog.* 7; *Adv. Marc.* 2.23; *Adv. Prax.* 14) **T**

PHASIS (φάσις) (*Comm.* 239) **C** [**EFFULSIO**, q.v., **TUITIO**, q.v.].

POSTNATIVUS † (ὑστερογενής) (*Porph. Isag.* 21.14) **V**

PRAEPRINCIPIUM † (προαρχή) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.33.9, *passim*;) **V**

PROLATIO* (προβολή) (*Adv. Prax.* 8) **T**

POTENTATOR † (δυνάστης) (*Res.* 23.11) **T**

PRAECESSIO † (ὑπόθεσις) (*Comm.* 150) **C**

PRAECONFUNDO † (προαπορηθῆναι) (*Tim.* 49b) **C**

PRAEAETERNUS (προαιώνιος) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.56) **V**

PRAEDESIGNO † (προχειρίζω) (*Res.* 23.43) **T**

PRAENOSCENTIA (πρόγνωσις) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.33.12) **V**

PRAENOSCOR (προεπινοέομαι) (*Porph. Isag.* 21.12) **V**

PROTOPLASTUS (πρωτοπλαστός) (*Castit.* 2 fin.; *Adv. Iud.* 13) **T**

PSYCHOGONIA (ψυχογονία) (*Comm.* 208) **C**

PURIFICANTIA (κάθαρσις/καθαρισμός) (*Castit.* 10) **T**

PYRAMOIDES (πυραμοειδής) (*Comm.* 20) **C**

REFRIGESCENTIA † (κατάψυξις) (*Anim.* 43.3) **T**

REFULGENTIA* (ἀπαύγασμα) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.27.18) **V**

REMINISCENTIA (ἀνάμνησις) (*Anim.* 23.6) **T** [**REMEMORATIO** (ἀπομνημόνευσις) **Appendix V**, q.v.]

RENIDENTIA (γελᾶν) (*Anim.* 49.1) **T**

REPROBATIO (ἀπεδοκίμασαν) (*Adv. Marc.* 3.7.3) **T**

SALUTIFICATOR † (σωτήρ) (*Ieiun.* 6.3; *Adv. Marc.* 2.19.3; *Resurr.* 47.5) **T** [**AUXILIATOR**, q.v.; **DEFENSTRIX** (σωτηρία) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

SCINTILLULA* (σπινθήρ) (*Anim.* 23.1) **T**

SENSUALITAS (αἴσθησις) (*Anim.* 17.38) **T**

SILVA* (ῥύλη) (*Comm.* 273; 290 *passim*) **C**

SILVESTER* (ῥύλη) (*Comm.* 218; 236; 289) **C**

SUBFERMENTO ‡ (συλλαμβάνω) (*Adv. Val.* 17.1) **T**

SUBINTELLIGENTIA ‡ (ὑπόνοια) (*Gen. Div. Verb.* 5.8; 5.10) **V**

SUBINTELLIGO (ἐπινοέω) (*Porph. Isag.* 13.1) **V**

SUBSTANTIALITAS (οὐσιότης) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.50.18, *passim*) **V**

SUBSTANTIVALIS ‡ (κατ' οὐσίαν) (*Adv. Val.* 27.3) **T**

SUBSURIO ‡ (ἐγκισσᾶν) (*Adv. Val.* 17.1) **T**

SUBTILLOQUENTIA ‡ (πιθανολογία) (*Adv. Marc.* 5.17.7-8) **T**

SUMMITAS* (πρώτος) (*Tim.* 32a) **C**

SUPERGRESSUS (ὑπερβολή) (*Resurr.* 40.8) **T** [[SUPERHABUNDO](#), q.v., **Appendix V**; [SUPERHABUNDANTIA](#), q.v.,

Appendix V; [SUPERFLUITAS](#), q.v. **Appendix V**]

SUPERINDUCTICIUS ‡ (παρείσακτος) (*Adv. Marc.* 5.3) **T**

SUPERTERRENUS ‡ (ἐπίγειος) (*Resurr.* 49.5) **T**

TRINITAS (τριάς) (*Adv. Val.* 17; *Adv. Prax.* 3) **T**

TUITIO* (φάσις) (*Comm.* 239) **C** [[EFFULSIO](#), q.v., [PHASIS](#), q.v.].

UNIO (τὸ ἔν) (*Adv. Val.* 37) **T**

UNITIO (ἔνωσις) (*Adv. Arrium* 1.33; 1.52; 1.61) **V**

URANOS (οὐρανός) (*Comm.* 98) **C**

USIA (οὐσία) (*Comm.* 129) **C**

VENTRILOQUUS (ἐγγαστρίμυθος) (*Adv. Marc.* 4.25; *Adv. Prax.* 19.4) **T**

VITALITAS* (ζωότης) (*Adv. Arrium* 4.5) **V**

APPENDIX IV — COLLECTED LEXICAL INNOVATIONS IN BOETHIUS

All lexical augmentations are indicated with an asterisk (*). A double-dagger (§) indicates a *ᾗπαξ λεγόμενον*:

ADINTERROGO (προσερωτάω, προσπυνθάνομαι) *Elench. Soph.*

ADMINICULANS (συνεργός) *Top.*

ADUNATIVUS (ἐνοποιός) *Isag.*

AEGROTATIVUS (νοσώδης) *Cat.* [[AEGROTATIO](#) (ἄρρώστημα) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

AEQUIVOCATIO (ὁμωνυμία) *Top.*

AEQUIVOCUS (ὁμώνυμος) *Cat.*

AFFIRMATIVUS* (καταφατικός, κατασκευαστικός) *Cat., Top.* [[DEDICATIVUS](#) **Appendix II**, q.v.].

AGITATIVUS (κινητικός) *Top.* [[MOTIVUS](#) (τὸ κινεῖσθαι / κινητόν) **Appendix III**, q.v.].

ALTEROR* (ἁλλοιοῦμαι) *Top.*

AMBULABILIS (βαδιστικός) *De Int.*

[*quae*] ANNUNCIANTIA (τὰ παρηγγελμένα) *Top.*

ANTESYLLOGISMUS (προσυλλογισμός) *APr.*

APOREMA § (ἀπόρημα) *Top.*

ARGUMENTABILIS (*difficilius*): δυσεπιχειρητότερος; (*facile*): εύεπιχείρητος *APr.*

ARMONICUS (ἁρμονικός) *Top.*

ASSIGNATIO* (ἀπόδοσις) *Cat.*

ASYMMETER (ἀσύμμετρος) *APr.* [[INCOMMENSURABILIS](#), q.v.].

CACEXIA / KACEXIA (καχεξία) *Top.*

CAL(E)FACTIBILIS (θερμαντικός) *De Int.*

CALUMPNIOR (συκοφαντέω) *Top.*

CATASYLLOGIZOR / KATASYLLOGIZOR (κατασυλλογίζομαι) *APr.*

CELATIO (κρύψις) *Top.*

CERTATIVUS (ἀγωνιστικός) *Top.*

CERTATORIE (ἀγωνιστικῶς) *Top.*

CIRCUMSTANTIA* (περιουσία) *Top.*

CLEMENTIA* (ἐπιείκεια) *Top.*

COADUNO* (συμφέρω) *Elench. Soph.*

COAEQUALITAS (συμμετρία) *Top.* [[COMMENSURABILIS](#) (σύμμετρος), q.v.].

COINTERIMO (προσαναίρέω) *APr.*

COMMENSURABILIS (σύμμετρος) *Elench. Soph.* [[COAEQUALITAS](#) (συμμετρία), q.v., [SYMMETER](#) (σύμμετρος), q.v.].

COMMUNICATIVUS (μεταδοτικός) *APr.*

COMMUTATIM (ἐναλλάξ) *APr.* [[PERMUTATIM](#), q.v.]

COMMUTATIO* (ἀλλοίωσις) *Cat.*

COMPLETIVUS* (συμπληρωτικός) *Isag.*

CONDESIGNOR ‡ (προσδηλοῦμαι) *Elench. Soph.*

CONDETERMINO ‡ (προσδιορίζω) *Top.*

CONDIVIDENDUS ‡ (προσδιαιρετέος) *Elench. Soph.*

CONGREGATIVUS (συγκριτικός) *Top.*

CONSEQUENTIA* (ἀκολουθήσις) *Cat.* [[CONSEQUENS](#) (ἐπιγεννηματικός) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

CONSERVATIVUS (φυλακτικός) *Top.*

CONSIDEROR* (θεωρέομαι) *Isag.* [[CONTEMPLATIVUS](#) (θεωρητικός), q.v., [SPECULATIO](#) (θεωρία), q.v.; [PERCEPTUM](#) (θεώρημα) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

CONSIGNIFICO* (ἐπισημαίνω, προσσημαίνω) *De Int., Top., and Elench. Soph.*

CONSTRUCTIVUS (κατασκευαστικός) *Top.* [[AFFIRMATIVUS](#) (καταφατικός, κατασκευαστικός), q.v.; [DEDICATIVUS](#) **Appendix II**, q.v.].

CONTEMPERANTIA (συμμετρία) *Top.* [[COAEQUALITAS](#) (συμμετρία), q.v., [COMMENSURABILIS](#) (σύμμετρος), q.v., [SYMMETER](#) (σύμμετρος), q.v.].

CONTEMPLATIVUS* (θεωρητικός) *Top.* [[CONSIDEROR](#) (θεωρέομαι), q.v. [SPECULATIO](#) (θεωρία), q.v.; [PERCEPTUM](#) (θεώρημα) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

CONTIGUITAS (συνοχή) *Top.*

CONTINGENTER (ἐνδέχεται) *APr.*

CONTRAAGO (προσδιαλέγομαι) *Elench. Soph.* [[REDARGUOR](#) (διαλέγομαι), q.v.]

CONTRADICTORIE (ἀντικειμένως) *APr.*

CONTRAIACENTES (ἀντικείμενοι) *De Int.*

COOPERATIVUS (συνεργός) *Top.*

CORRUPTIVE (φθαρτικός) *Top.*

CORRUPTIVUS* (φθαρτικός) *Top.*

CREMENTUM* (αὔξησις) *Cat.*

DENOMINATIVE* (παρωνύμως) *Top.* [[DENOMINATIVUS](#), q.v.]

DENOMINATIVUS* (παρώνυμος) *Cat.* [[DENOMINATIVE](#), q.v.]

DESTRUCTIVUS (ἀνασκευαστικός) *Top.*

DETERMINATIVUS (ὀριστικός) *Top.*

DIAMETER (διάμετρος) *Top.*

DIFFINITIO (διορισμός, λόγος, ὀρισμός, ὅρος) *Top.*

- DIFFINITIVUS (ὁρικός) *Top.*
- DIFFINO (ὀρίζομαι) *Top.*
- DIGNIFICO* (ἀξιόω) *Top.* [[AESTIMATIO](#) (ἀξία) **Appendix I**, q.v.].
- DIMINUTIO* (ἐνδεια/μείωσις) *Cat.*
- DISCIPLINABILIS (ἐπιστημονικώτερον) *Top.*
- DISCIPLINALIS (ἐπιστημονικός) *Top.*
- DISCOLUS [SUM] (δυσκολαίνων) *Top.* [[PROTERVIA](#), q.v., [PROTERVIO](#), q.v.]
- DISGREGATIVUS (διακριτικός) *Top.*
- DISSOLUTIVUS (διαλυτικός) *Top.*
- DISTRIBUTIVUS (διανεμητικός) *Top.*
- DITATIVA (χρηματιστική) *Elench. Soph.*
- DIVISIVUS (διαιρετικός) *Isag.* [[DIVISIBILIS](#) **Appendix III**, q.v.].
- DOCIBILIS* (διδακτός) *APr.*
- EFFECTIVUS (ποιητικός) *Top.* [[PERFECTIVUS](#), q.v.; [EFFICIENS](#) **Appendix I**, q.v.]
- ELENCHUS (ἐλεγχος) *APr.* [[INCREPATIO](#), q.v.].
- ELIGIBILIS* (αἰρετός) *Top.*
- ENUNTIATIVUS* (ἀποφατικός) *De Int.* [[NEGATIVUS](#), q.v.; [ABDICATIVUS](#) **Appendix II**, q.v.].
- EXANIMATIO* (ὀλιγωρία) *Top.*
- EXERCITATIVUS (γυμναστικός) *Top.*
- EXPERENTIA (ἐμπειρία) *APr.*
- EXTRAMITTO (ἐκπέμπω) *Top.*
- FACTURA* (γένεσις) *De Int.*
- FALSIGRAPHUS (ψευδογραφῶν) *Top.*
- FINALIS* (πεπερασμένος) *Top.*
- GEOMETER (γεωμέτρης) *Top.*
- GINNASTES ‡ (γυμναστής) *Top.*
- GRESSIBILE (πεζόν) *Cat.*
- HABITUATIVE ‡ (εὐεκτικῶς) *Top.*
- HABITUATIVUS ‡ (εὐεκτικά) *Top.*
- HIRCOCERVUS (τραγέλαφος) *APr.*
- HONORABILIOR (τιμιώτερος) *Cat.*
- IDONEITAS* (εὐπορία) *Top.*
- IKOS (εἰκώς) *APr.*
- IMMEDIATUS (ἄμεσος) *APr.*

IMMODIFICATUS (ἀσυλλόγιστος) *Elench. Soph.*

IMPASSIBILIS* (ἀπαθήs) *Top.* [*INSUBDITIVUS Appendix III*, q.v.].

IMPERATIVUS (προστακτικός) *Top.*

INCADIBILIS (ἀμετάπτωτος) *Top.*

INCOMMENSURABILIS (ἀσύμμετρος) *Top.* [*ASYMMETER* (ἀσύμμετρος), q.v.]

INCONIUNCTUS (ἀσύναπτος) *APr.*

INCREPATIO* (ἐλέγχος) *Top.* [*ELENCHUS* (ἐλέγχος), q.v.]

INDEMONSTRATUS (ἀναπόδεικτος) *APr.*

INDISCIPLINA (ἀμαθία) *APr.*

INDUBITANTER* (ὁμολογουμένως) *Top.*

INDUBITATE* (ἀναμφισβήτητος) *Cat.*

INEXPERIENTER (ἀπείρως) *Top.*

ININTENDIBILIS (ἀνεπίτατος) *Isag.*

INPERMISTUS (ἀμιγής) *Isag.*

INQUISITI (πυνθανόμενοι) *Isag.*

INQUISITIVUS* (ἐξεταστικός) *Top.*

INREMISSIBILIS (ἀάνετος) *Isag.*

INREPROBABILIS $\ddagger$ (ἀμετάπειστος) *Top.*

INSENSIBILIS (ἀναίσθητος / νοητός) *Top.* [*INTELLECTIBILIS Appendix III*, q.v.].

INSENSIBILITAS* (ἀναισθησία) *Top.*

INSTANTIA* (ἔνστασις) *Top.*

INSUPERABILIS* (ἀμετάπτωτος) *Top.*

INSUSPECTE (ἀνύποπτος) *Top.*

INSYLLOGIZATUS (ἀσυλλόγιστος) *Elench. Soph.*

INTEREMPTIO* (ἀναίρεσις) *Elench. Soph.*

IOCUNDITAS (τέρψις) *Top.*

IRRATIONABILITER* (ἀλόγως) *Top.*

ISOSKELES (ἰσοσκελής) *APr.* [*AEQUIPEDUM Appendix II*, q.v.].

MENSURO* (καταμετρέω) *Cat.*

MINISTRATIVUS (ὑπηρετικός) *Top.*

MUTATUS* (ἀλλοιότερος) *Cat.*

NEGATIVUS* (ἀποφατικός) *Cat.* [*ENUNTIATIVUS*, q.v.; *ABDICATIVUS Appendix II*, q.v.].

NOTIFICO* (τὸ γνῶριμος) *Top.*

OBSERVABILIOR $\ddagger$ (εὐφυλακτότερος) *Elench. Soph.*

OBVIATIO* (έντευξις, υπάντησις) *Top. and Elench. Soph.*

OPERATIVUS (ένεργός / πρακτικός) *Top.*

OSTENSIVUS (δεικτικός) *APr.*

PARALLILOS (παράλληλος) *APr.*

PARALOGISMUS (παραλογισμός) *Top.*

PARALOGISTICUS (παραλογιστικός) *Elench. Soph.*

PARALOGIZO (παραλογίζομαι) *Top.*

PARTIBILIS* (μεριστός) *Top.*

PARTICULARIS* (ἐπὶ μέρους / κατὰ μέρος) *Top.*

PARTICULARITAS (κατὰ μέρος) *APr.*

PERCEPTIBILIS* (δεκτικός) *Top.* [*SUSCEPTIBILIS*, q.v., *SUSPICABILIS*, q.v.; *PERCEPTIBILIS* (περιληπτός) **Appendix III**, q.v.].

PERFECTIVUS* (ποιητικός) *Cat.* [*EFFECTIVUS*, q.v.; *EFFICIENS* **Appendix I**, q.v.].

PERMANENTIOR (μονιμώτερος) *Cat.*

PERMUTATIM (ἐναλλάξ) *Top.* [*COMMUTATIM*, q.v.]

PERNOTO (διασημαίνω) *APr.* [*PRAESIGNIFICO* (προσημαίνω), q.v., *SIGNIFICATIVUS* (σημαντικός), q.v.]

PERSPECTIO* (σκέψις) *Top.*

PERSPICIDENDUM ‡ (σκεπτέον) *Isag.*

PERTRACTOR (ἐπισκέπτομαι) *Cat.*

PHILOSOPHIMA ‡ (φιλοσόφημα) *Top.*

PIGRITO* (ἀποκνέω) *Top.*

PRAECONFITENDUM ‡ (προδιομολογητέον) *Top.*

PRAEDICAMENTUM* (κατηγορία) *APr.* [*PRAEDICATIO*, q.v.; *CATEGORIA* **Appendix III**, q.v.].

PRAEDICATIO* (κατηγορία) *Cat.* [*PRAEDICAMENTUM* q.v.; *CATEGORIA* **Appendix III**, q.v.].

PRAEDICATIVUS* (κατηγορικός) *APr.* [*DECLARATIVUS* **Appendix II**, q.v.; *CATEGORICUS* **Appendix III**, q.v.].

PRAEEXISTENS (προυπάρχω) *APr.*

PRAEORDINO* (προτείνω) *Top.*

PRAESIGNIFICO (προσημαίνω) *Top.* [*PERNOTO* (διασημαίνω), q.v., *SIGNIFICATIVUS* (σημαντικός), q.v.]

PRAESYLLOGIZANDUM ‡ (προσυλλογιστέον) *Top.*

PRIVATIVE* (στερητικώς) *APr.*

PROBAMENTUM* (ἀξίωμα) *Elench. Soph.* [*ENUNTIATIO* **Appendix I**, q.v.; *EFFATUM* **Appendix I**, q.v.; *ROGATAMENTUM* **Appendix II**, q.v.].

PROPORTIONALIS* (ἀνάλογον) *APr.* [*PROPORTIO* (ἀναλογία) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

PROPOSITIVUS (προτατικός) *Top.*

PROSYLLOGISMUS (προσυλλογισμός) *APr.*

PROSYLLOGIZO (προσυλλογίζομαι) *Top.*

PROTERVIA* (δυσκολία) *Top.* [[DISCOLUS](#), q.v., [PROTERVIO](#), q.v.]

PROTERVIO* (δυσκολαίνω) *Top.* [[DISCOLUS](#), q.v., [PROTERVIA](#), q.v.].

QUADRANGULOR (τετραγωνίζομαι) *APr.*

QUADRATURA* (τετραγωνισμός) *Elench. Soph.*

QUADRUPLICITER (τετραχῶς) *Cat.*

RATIONALITAS* (τὸ λογικόν) *Isag.*

RECTILINEUM (εὐθύγραμμον) *APr.*

REDARGUOR* (διαλέγομαι) *APr.* [[CONTRAAGO](#) (προσδιαλέγομαι), q.v.]

REDARGUTIO* (ἐλέγχος) *APr.*

REDUPLICATION (ἐπαναδίπλωσις) *APr.*

REDUPLICATIONUM* (ἐπαναδιπλούμενον) *APr.*

REFRIGDATIO ‡ (κατάψυξις) *Top.*

REMEMORATIO ‡ (ἀπομνημόνευσις) *Top.* [[REMINISCENTIA](#) (ἀνάμνησις) **Appendix IV**, q.v.]

RICUS (ῥοικός) *Elench. Soph.*

SALVATIVUS (σωστικός) *Top.* [[SALVATRIX](#) (σωστική), q.v.; [DEFENSTRIX](#) (σωτηρία) **Appendix I**, q.v.]

SALVATRIX (σωστική) *Top.* [[SALVATIVUS](#) (σωστικός), q.v.; [DEFENSTRIX](#) (σωτηρία) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

SANATIVUS (ὕγιεινός) *Cat.*

SCIBILIS* (ἐπιστητός) *Cat.*

SEDUCTOR* (φένεξ) *Top.*

SIGNIFICATIVUS (σημαντικός) *Top.* [[PERNOTO](#) (διασημαίνω), q.v., [PRAESIGNIFICO](#) (προσημαίνω), q.v.].

SINONIMUS (συνώνυμος) *Elench. Soph.* [[UNIVOCUS](#), q.v.]

SOPHISMATICUS ‡ (σοφισματώδης) *Top.*

SPECIFICOR (εἰδοποιέομαι) *Isag.*

SPECIFICUS (εἰδοποιός) *Isag.*

SPECULATIO* (θεωρία) *Isag.* [[CONSIDEROR](#) (θεωρέομαι), q.v., [CONTEMPLATIVUS](#) (θεωρητικός), q.v.; [PERCEPTUM](#) (θεώρημα) **Appendix I**, q.v.].

SPECULATIVUS (θεωρητικός) *Top.*

SUBALTERNATIM (ὕπ' ἀλλήλους) *Top.*

SUBAUDIO* (ὕπακούω) *Top.*

SUBMANEO ‡ (ὕπόκειμαι) *APr.*

SUBMULTIPLEX (πολλοστημόριος) *Top.*

SUBTRIPLUS (τριτημόριος) *Top.*

SUPERADDO* (ἐπιπροστίθῃμι) *Top.*

SUPERFLUITAS* (ὑπερβολή) *Cat.* [[SUPERHABUNDANTIA](#), q.v., [SUPERHABUNDO](#), q.v.]

SUPERFLUOUS* (περιττός) *Isag.*

SUPERHABUNDANTIA* (ὑπερβολή) *Top.* [[SUPERHABUNDO](#), q.v., [SUPERFLUITAS](#), q.v.]

SUPERHABUNDO* (ὑπερβάλλω) *Top.* [[SUPERHABUNDANTIA](#), q.v., [SUPERFLUITAS](#), q.v.; [SUPERGRESSUS](#), q.v. **Appendix IV**]

SUPERSYLLOGIZO (κατασυλλογίζομαι) *APr.*

SUSCEPTIBILIS (δεκτικός) *Cat.* [[PERCEPTIBILIS](#), q.v., [SUSPICABILIS](#), q.v.].

SUSPECTIO* (ὑποψία) *Elench. Soph.*

SUSPICABILIS* (δεκτικός) *APr.* [[PERCEPTIBILIS](#), q.v., [SUSCEPTIBILIS](#), q.v.].

SYLLOGISTICE* (συλλογιστικῶς) *magis syllogistice* (συλλογιστικώτερον) *Top.*

SYLLOGIZO (συλλογίζομαι) *Top.*

SYMMETER (σύμμετρος) *APr.* [[COMMENSURABILIS](#), q.v., [COAEQUALITAS](#) (συμμετρία), q.v.].

TEMPTATIVUS, TEMPTATIVA (πειραστικός, πειραστική)

TETRACUBITUS (τετράπηχυς) *Top.*

TRANSCADO (μεταπίπτω) *Top.* [[NUTO](#), q.v. **Appendix IV**]

TRANSVERTENDUM (μεταστεπτέον) *Elench. Soph.*

TRIBUALITER (φυλετικῶς) *Elench. Soph.*

UNIVERSALITER* (καθόλου) *Cat.*

UNIVOCUS* (συνώνυμος) *Cat.* [[SINONIMUS](#), q.v.]

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