Dysfunction as a Function of Authority:

Understanding the Power and Performance of International Non-Governmental Organizations

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ABSTRACT

In this work, I present a conceptual framework for understanding how international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) become powerful international organizations (IOs), and how their pursuit of legitimacy leads to the formation of specific kinds of organizational cultural proclivities and dysfunctional tendencies that shape how these groups behave as international actors. Despite their increasing prominence in international affairs, INGOs remain largely understudied by International Relations (IR) scholars; my work provides a theoretically driven and empirically supported analysis of the power and performance of these actors, thus filling the existing gap in the IR literature. Relying on the basic tenets of sociological institutionalism, I argue that there is an indissoluble relationship between the ways in which an INGO becomes powerful and its ultimate performance outcomes.

Throughout the forthcoming chapters, I construct a preliminary typology of INGOs based on how they generate their authority as international actors. By making claims about who they are and how they pursue their ends (authority sources), INGOs resembling different ideal types develop specific kinds of observable features and unspoken truths that guide and constrain their leaders and employees. These organizational systems may fortify the organization’s authority claims, but they can also lead to the development of specific kinds of innate dysfunctional tendencies. While these inefficiencies are present but manageable under normal circumstances, they can be exacerbated under certain conditions to the point of interfering with an INGO’s ability to pursue its ends in an effective manner. My research combines theoretically derived insights with empirical observations generated through ten case study analyses, over 200 loosely-structured interviews, limited reactive observation, and numerous additional off-the-record consultations with INGO practitioners and partners. By breaking open the “black box” of interest and identity formation in INGOs, and theorizing about the origins of institutional inefficiency and behavioral outcomes in this category of IOs, my work constitutes an important contribution to the IR literature about IO institutional design.
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INTRODUCTION:

INGOs in International Affairs

International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are increasingly prominent actors in international society. In the 21st century, many such groups occupy a central role in developing and implementing international strategies to solve global problems, ranging from climate change and environmental degradation, to poverty and development, to war and post-conflict reconstruction. During the period following World War II, INGOs proliferated at a rate even faster than that of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs),¹ and today, a substantial and growing proportion of international humanitarian and development aid is raised and allocated by transnational non-governmental groups.² INGOs collectively wield billions of US dollars, which they use to advance peace, provide emergency assistance, promote sustainable development, and advocate for transnational issues.³ They are active agents of international affairs, interacting and cooperating with other international organizations (IOs) and implementing global cooperation goals in local contexts.

¹ Following the conventional practice, I base the distinction between IGOs and INGOs on “whether or not the international organization was established by an agreement among governments: those that were created by such an agreement are described as intergovernmental organizations; those that were not, as international nongovernmental organizations” (Jacobson, 1979: 4).
² Buthe, Major, and de Mello e Sousa, 2012: 571.
³ While most INGOs have annual budgets in the millions of US dollars, many individual organizations have annual revenues in the billions. For instance, the American Red Cross spends USD 3.42 billion annually, and World Vision has USD 1.2 billion in annual expenses (Charity Navigator, 2012).
in every country around the world. Groups like Oxfam, Amnesty International, the International Rescue Committee, and Greenpeace are not just “household names;” they are prominent global actors with active operations in thousands of communities around the world.

Despite the substantial and growing influence of INGOs, International Relations (IR) scholars have paid little systematic attention to this category of IOs.\(^4\) For all the discussion about human rights norms, development policy, and effective delivery of aid, scholars of international affairs know surprisingly little about the institutions whose actions are at the core of these global issues. In the words of Stephen Hopgood, who conducted one of the few existing in-depth treatments of an INGO: “I wanted to know what human rights organizations were really like. I soon discovered a void existed... The foundational work does not exist.”\(^5\) Perhaps this is because rapid growth in INGOs is a relatively recent phenomenon,\(^6\) but given the fact that there are now over 27,000 international civil society organizations influencing public policy and delivering services to communities in every country around the world,\(^7\) the IR scholarship clearly lags

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\(^4\) Although Jacobson (1979: 5) includes INGOs in his IO typology, which was designed to assess the role of these organizations in the evolution of the global political system, his work focuses almost exclusively on IGOs because he sees them as being “generally much more important in the global political system than are INGOs.” Similarly, while Heins (2008) investigates the world of INGOs on a systematic and theoretical level in order to understand what they do, and why they prosper in modern society, his work constitutes more of an overview of competing perspectives on various issues related to civil society than it is a theory or framework for understanding INGO institutional behavior.


\(^6\) According to Keane (2003: 5), nearly 90% of all INGOs were formed since 1970.

behind empirical reality in terms of its ability to account for the power and performance of these international actors.

In this work, I build the conceptual foundations for understanding how INGOs operate internally and respond to external stimuli. Relying on the core principles of sociological institutionalism, I first theorize about how we might expect INGOs to behave, and then I unpack actual INGO behavior using an "inside-out" empirical approach. In so doing, I break open the "black box of interest and identity formation"\(^8\) in INGOs—an activity that IR scholars have largely reserved for states and IGOs. The Authority Sources Framework (or the ASF, outlined in Chapter 1) presents a typology of INGOs based on a series of expected relationships between an organization’s need to establish its legitimacy as an international actor and the presence of certain types of systemic organizational characteristics. The remaining chapters address the effects of an organization’s internal cultural proclivities and systems of meaning on the emergence of dysfunctional patterns, which predispose different types of INGOs to distinct ways of responding to endogenous and exogenous events. The ways in which different INGOs respond to these stimuli matters insofar as it determines how these organizations behave as international actors, as well as the conditions under which they are likely to succeed and thrive. In short, my work

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\(^{8}\) Checkel, 1998: 326.
identifies the source of an INGO’s power⁹ as an important driver of this organization’s ultimate performance outcomes.

Whereas “formal authorities” like the state “have authority because they have power,” INGOs are “theoretical authorities.” they “have power because they have authority.”¹⁰ It is only because they are perceived as being authoritative actors that they are able to wield the power necessary to influence others’ perceptions and actions. At a bare minimum, an INGO must be perceived as having a sufficient degree of moral authority to be able to “[tell] us what we should do.”¹¹ But in the densely packed INGO ecosystem, in which organizations have to compete fiercely for both legitimacy and dollars from private citizens, governments, foundations, and IGOs, simply having sufficient moral authority is not enough to ensure survival and success. To show potential supporters that they are both legitimate and well suited to achieve a particular task, INGOs must differentiate themselves from their competition on the basis of both what they do (e.g., global health advocacy versus disaster relief) and on the basis of identity claims about who they are and how they pursue their goals.

But what are these drivers of legitimacy in the INGO context? What kinds of identity claims would make states, IGOs, and other international actors perceive an INGO as being worthy of support? First, the individuals leading the organization and running its programs on a daily basis can be a source of

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⁹ In this work, I define power as the capacity or ability to influence the behavior of other actors.
¹¹ Ibid.
legitimacy for their organizations, either because they bring a level of technical or regional expertise to bear on the work, or because their exceptional charismatic qualities are admired and respected by those around them. Second, the principles to which an organization claims to adhere when conducting its affairs can be a source of legitimacy. Some INGOs generate support from outcomes-oriented stakeholders by claiming to be instrumentalist in pursuit of their goals, valuing the delivery of goods and services over any other proceduralist constraints. Others take the opposite approach, claiming to uphold the values of due process, transparency, and accountability over everything else, thus constituting a beacon of democratic inclusiveness and good governance to which other organizations should aspire. Still other INGOs generate authority from their rigid, almost dogmatic, adherence to a particular ideology about how to help those in need; external stakeholders who are moved by this kind of doctrinaire commitment to serving others will provide material and ideational support to these INGOs, rather than to their peers.

The central argument underpinning the three parts of this dissertation is that the ways in which an INGO generates its authority play an important role in determining the kinds of behavioral patterns this organization will exhibit. For example, if an INGO generates authority from an exceptionally charismatic leader, then the ways in which this group makes decisions will reflect the centrality of this particular leader’s preferences and ideas—even his or her emotional whims. On the other hand, if an INGO relies on the knowledge of its
technical or issue-area experts for legitimacy, then it will make decisions through an extensive discussion and debate process among members of a (formal or informal) committee, addressing every dimension of a problem before determining the optimal solution. My conceptual insights and empirical observations in the forthcoming chapters reveal that the characteristics that evolve within INGOs as a result of their sources of authority act as “double-edged swords”: although they can be a source of strength insofar as they reinforce an organization’s perceived legitimacy, these cultural and structural tendencies also predispose their “host” organizations to specific types of inefficient (or dysfunctional) behavioral patterns. These dysfunctional tendencies can be a source of weakness insofar as they undermine an INGO’s ability to achieve its stated goals in a timely and cost-effective fashion.12

While one might assume that organizations that exhibit inefficient behavioral patterns will not survive in a highly competitive environment, my research suggests that all INGOs—even the most powerful and prominent ones—have internal inefficiencies that slow their operations and hinder their overall effectiveness. All INGOs are dysfunctional in some ways, but the nature of the inefficiencies causing this dysfunction differs according to the ideal type category to which an INGO belongs. In other words, there is always some

12 Throughout this work, I focus on practitioners’ perceptions of whether their activities are efficient—that is, whether there is a high ratio of meaningful work produced to staff time and energy devoted to a given task. In later chapters, I address the complicated distinction between organizational “efficiency,” which is concerned with an organization’s ability to produce “as large as possible an output from a given set of inputs” (Farrell, 1957: 254), and “effectiveness,” which is concerned with the degree to which an organization actually achieves its stated objectives.
dysfunction, but not all dysfunction is alike, and understanding an INGO’s core features helps us predict the form that its dysfunction will take. Perhaps counterintuitively, my work illustrates that there is an intimate relationship between an organization’s dysfunctional tendencies and the strength of its legitimacy claims. Therefore, it may be impossible, and in fact undesirable, to eliminate these inefficiencies altogether, as doing so could have the unintended effect of undermining the INGO’s authority. As a result of these relationships, the global institutional landscape is filled with INGOs behaving in ways that may be marginally self-defeating in terms of efficiency outcomes, but are perhaps necessary in order for these groups to maintain their legitimacy and survive.

During periods of relative institutional stasis, a degree of inefficiency is consistent across INGOs of the three types identified below, but these dysfunctional tendencies are not powerful enough to truly undermine an organization’s ability to pursue its ends. Under normal circumstances, INGO leaders are able to manage their organizations’ inefficiencies without letting them interfere with their organizations’ overall effectiveness in any significant way. However, certain circumstances can exacerbate particular types of dysfunction within each of the three INGO types, and this can have disastrous consequences for the host organizations. For instance, organizations that rely heavily on the influence of a charismatic leader may become dependent upon this individual to the extent that, under normal circumstances, second-line
managers struggle to gain experience and credibility, engendering a state of “manageable inefficiency.” However, when this leader decides to leave the organization, a power vacuum can emerge with potentially devastating effects on the organization’s long-term sustainability.

Based on the relationships between an organization’s sources of authority and its internal design and cultural features (Part I), its systemic characteristics and its dysfunctional tendencies (Part II), and its inefficient behavior and overall performance outcomes (Part III), three distinct INGO institutional models emerge: the *Moral Charismatic Organization* (or the MCO), the *Expert Pragmatist Organization* (or the EPO), and the *Grassroots Proceduralist Organization* (or the GPO).

INGOs resembling the first type—the MCO—tend to be highly adaptable, flexible, and innovative groups whose employees and supporters follow their leaders obediently and passionately. These INGOs are swift and decisive in responding to global demands and humanitarian emergencies, and as a result, they tend to grow in rapid bursts. But their dependence on particular charismatic leaders and their unpredictability mean that they may also experience dramatic declines in support—even total collapse—under the wrong circumstances.

INGOs resembling the second type—the EPO—behave much like the individual academics and technical experts who fill their halls: they are precise in...
their statements and actions, preferring gradual and incremental change to transformative or radical behavior; they excel in closed-door meetings among experts, leaving the megaphones and the rallies to their peers; and they are highly strategic in pursuit of their goals, prioritizing outcomes over process under most circumstances. As a result, both their highs and lows are less dramatic than their MCO counterparts’, but EPOs are capable of achieving great success by maintaining a low profile and convincing powerful stakeholders to make minor changes with major effects.

The third and final type—the GPO—is characteristically decentralized in its governance and operations, with the headquarters office delegating an enormous amount of authority to semi-autonomous, confederated sub-units around the world. Holding the principles of due process, transparency, accountability, and democratic representation as sacrosanct, GPOs are highly rule-bound, sluggish institutions that are both culturally and structurally inclined to resist transformative change. These INGOs are able to achieve great success—often reaching focal levels within their respective industries—because they constitute stable, predictable institutional partners for states, IGOs, and peer NGOs. However, over long periods of time, they may fail to adapt to changing circumstances and, therefore, risk fading into obscurity.

Throughout the following chapters, I unpack and analyze these claims, outlining the conceptual origins of the anticipated relationships between various characteristics, and providing rich empirical support in order to adjudicate these
expectations. My dissertation answers important and previously ignored questions about INGOs as international actors, such as: *Why do different types of INGOs develop? How do these organizations become legitimate in the eyes of peers and partners? What is the relationship between how they become authoritative IOs and how they behave? And, How do their behavioral tendencies and design features lead to certain types of performance outcomes?* The project contributes to IR debates about the role of global civil society actors by addressing questions about if, and in what ways, non-state actors matter. It refines the discourse on institutional design and culture in IR, integrating scholarship from Sociology and Organization Studies to help expose the relationships between internal cultural phenomena and behavioral outcomes. This dissertation strengthens the sociological institutionalist foundations for understanding institutional dynamics by clearly illustrating the ways in which an INGO’s identity can shape its behavior. Furthermore, this work expands the IO institutional design literature into new and largely uncharted territory by focusing on a rapidly expanding yet under-studied group of international actors. My research is also relevant to practitioners of international affairs insofar as it illustrates how INGOs fit into the broader IO ecosystem. In doing so, it sheds light on how an INGO might minimize its dysfunction and avoid potential pitfalls without diminishing its authority. In addition, this research makes INGOs more accessible to potential partners by analyzing them from the “inside-out.” As such, my work has the
potential to facilitate the formation of more optimal and potentially fruitful partnerships within and among INGOs.

I. INGOs in International Relations

Providing a precise and widely accepted definition for the term “INGO” is more challenging than it may seem. As Martens writes in his article, “Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organizations,” “Although NGOs have become recognized actors in international affairs...it is unclear what this phrase actually encompasses.”\(^\text{14}\) Many thousands of disparate institutions, activist groups, and movements with diverse legal arrangements and institutional structures fall into the broad category of private, socially minded actors operating in the global space. In my research, I apply a sociological approach to defining INGOs, which focuses on an institution’s transnational composition and functions, rather than on the nature of its legal status.\(^\text{15}\) Like other sociological scholars, I use the negative aspects of the term to identify these groups: they are explicitly “non-governmental, non-profit-making, [and] not-uninational.”\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{14}\) Martens (2002: 271-2) rightly notes that this confusion “makes comparisons of single NGO studies difficult, if not impossible.”

\(^{15}\) Ibid. In the juridical sense, although progress has been made at the regional level to give unified legal status to these organizations NGOs (see, for instance, the 1991 European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations,” which eleven countries have ratified) there are still no globally recognized standards for evaluating the legal status of NGOs operating in multiple countries at once. NGOs “have not yet been recognized by states as having a legal international personality,” and there is “no widely adopted international convention on the nature and law of NGOs” (Martens, 2002: 274-5). Therefore, the juridical definition of NGO is not particularly helpful for the purposes of this research.

\(^{16}\) Lador-Lederer, 1963: 60. Many (for instance, Rosenau, 1998) also argue that organizations must also be non-violent to be considered NGOs. While NGOs may receive funding from governments, their volunteers, staff and members may not be official representatives of national governments.
term “international” clarifies two necessary conditions: (1) that members are from multiple countries, and (2) that an organization’s activities take place in multiple countries. And the term “organization” limits my scope to formal institutions with governing bodies, excluding ad hoc transnational movements and other non-institutionalized forms of collective action.

Perhaps most importantly, the “aims and purposes of the organization shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”

Summarizing these requirements, I limit the scope of inquiry in this work to the following definition of INGO: an independent, not-for-profit societal organization composed of private citizens from multiple countries whose goals involve promoting the public interest in multiple countries.

Although their mandates, constituents and approaches have changed dramatically over time, international civil society organizations have been influential in shaping relations among states and populations for hundreds of years. But since the middle of the 20th century, both their numbers and

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Russett, 1996: 67. Martens, 2002: 280 (citing Willetts, 1996) adds that there are rare hybrid organizations in which governments are represented as members, but in order to be considered NGOs, these organizations must “determine their own program independently of the influence of the government member(s).” Exceptions are limited to organizations that states institutionalize as instruments used for completing a particular task or set of tasks. Furthermore, financial support from governments may only be “to a limited extent so that [NGOs] are capable of maintaining themselves in case governmental contributions are withdrawn” (Martens, 2002: 280).

17 Union of International Associations, 2002: 38.
18 Following UN Resolution 1996/31, an international non-governmental organization must have a headquarters office, an executive body, an adopted constitution or founding document guiding policy formation, a financial income that is at least partially independent of governments, and a legal status in at least one state (UN Resolution, 1996/31).
19 UN Resolution, 1996/31.
20 Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor, 2001: 5.
influence have grown substantially: in 1950, there were roughly 1,000 INGOs, but by the turn of the 21st century, that number had risen to nearly 30,000.

Figure 1.1 – Total Number of Active INGOs since 1950

While these INGOs have wildly diverse missions and mandates, each of them shares the goal of promoting social or economic change to benefit individuals and communities around the world. Whether they promote change by working directly with populations in need, or indirectly by influencing the decisions and policies of other actors (e.g., state governments, IGOs, foundations), all INGOs are “self-organized” units that “undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider

21 In the words of Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor, “There have historically existed elements of a supranational non-governmental sphere.... What seems new, however, is the sheer scale and scope that international and supranational institutions and organizations of many kinds have achieved in recent years” (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor, 2001: 4).
22 See Figure 1, from Turner (2010: 82); Anheier and Themudo (2005).
While most INGOs do seek financial or strategic support from states and IGOs, they are not formally dependent upon the desires of these institutions, and their choices and actions often stand in direct opposition to the policies and practices of powerful states.

The recent proliferation and increasingly dense interconnectedness of INGOs has sparked a great deal of scholarship on the role of global civil society in international affairs. Some assert that the so-called “third sector” is becoming “thicker,” and that civil society engagement constitutes an “alternative world order” altogether. For some IR scholars, these groups shape the conduct of international affairs by creating, embodying and reinforcing a “world polity culture,” while for others, INGOs sensitize societies to the tasks related to dealing with the negative externalities of modernization. Some have analyzed how these groups influence the affairs of specific countries, or how particular types of organizations have become influential in specific issue areas. However, while these scholars have collectively argued that INGOs matter insofar as they shape the conduct of international affairs, few have attempted to

26 Boli and Thomas, 1997.
27 For instance, see Spiro, 1996.
29 For instance, INGOs influence business and government decision-makers; they directly control substantial financial resources; they are able to amplify their strength by mobilizing hundreds of thousands of members; and they wield an enormous amount of ideational power by working with states, IGOs, and local civil society organizations to structure social knowledge around a
uncover what these actors “are really like.”30 If INGOs are, in fact, “an increasingly potent force with which business and government must interact,” and if their power, prevalence and influence are, in fact, likely to continue to grow over time,31 then it is critical that IR scholars understand who these actors are and how they operate.

II. A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING IO BEHAVIOR

My work relies heavily on the underlying tenets of sociological institutionalism and extends the logic of this perspective into new conceptual and empirical territory. By focusing my attention on the ways in which institutions shape the identities and preferences of actors, constraining their decisions and defining the range of appropriate behaviors available to them in a given context, my work highlights the inherently bounded nature of these actors’ rationality. In this work, I argue that when they are faced with similar circumstances, INGOs resembling each of the different ideal types will respond in highly predictable ways that are distinct from one another. In order for this to be true, these organizations and their leaders must be limited not only in the cognitive sense (i.e., they cannot “fold out the decision tree” to its logical endpoint in the way that a synoptically rational actor could), but also in the normative

31 Doh and Teegen, 2003: 3.
sense (i.e., they are constrained by their own identities and cultures). This perspective helps explain why sub-optimal institutional arrangements persist over time, despite their negative consequences for organizational outcomes.

More specifically, my framework is largely indebted to the path-breaking works of Barnett and Finnemore, who argued that bureaucratic culture plays a critical role in the development of persistent inefficiencies, which they call “pathologies,” within IGOs. These scholars construct a sociological institutionalist framework for understanding the organizational features that produce both internal strengths and potential weaknesses in IOs, and in so doing, they argue that these groups are autonomous and powerful actors in their own right. Barnett and Finnemore’s inside-out approach to understanding institutions provides a counterargument to much of mainstream IR literature, which focuses on exogenous demands and treats IOs as little more than “tools in the controlling hands of states.” For rationalist scholars of institutions, endogenous concepts such as identity and culture do not play a substantial role in shaping behavior. Rather, external material demands and actors’ competing preferences mean that performance problems will “naturally arise when one actor (the principal) delegates to another actor (the agent) the authority to act in the interest of the former.” While the principal-agent perspective acknowledges that non-state actors are at least quasi-autonomous and purposive in their own

32 Jupille, Mattli, Snidal, 2013: 220.
35 Gutner, 2005: 11.
right, according to this view, their behavior is ultimately determined by exogenous demands rather than endogenous cultural constraints.

Like many of their fellow Constructivists in IR, Barnett and Finnemore turned their attention toward the “social fabric of world politics,”36 arguing that IOs’ identities and preferences are constructed through a process of mutual constitution between agents and their environments, and that a so-called “logic of appropriateness” is as important in shaping actors’ behavior as a “logic of consequences” might be.37 Focusing on what they call the “social content of the organization” — or “its culture, its legitimacy concerns, dominant norms that govern behavior and shape interests, and the relationship of these to a larger normative and cultural environment”38 — these scholars attempted to understand the origins of institutional patterns. Whereas previous IR scholars had investigated the ways in which material39 or external cultural40 factors drive IO behavior, Barnett and Finnemore identified internal cultural dynamics as the causal origins of IO behavioral outcomes. These scholars relied on the simple yet foundational claim that institutions benefit not only from their access to material

39 For instance, Allison (1971) highlights the ways in which competition for resources among sub-units within an organization can lead to inefficient and undesirable organizational behavior.
40 For instance, Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) world polity model suggests that IOs become inefficient because they try to accomplish symbolic legitimacy in the eyes of other actors rather than focusing on efficient outcomes.
resources, but also from the perception by other actors that they are legitimate and symbolically important in their own right.\textsuperscript{41}

Put simply, Barnett and Finnemore’s work posits that an IO’s bureaucratic nature\textsuperscript{42} is the source of both its power and its persistent pathologies. Because they generate their ability to influence from the rational-legal authority they embody and their control over technical expertise and access to information,\textsuperscript{43} and modern society values these characteristics in an institution, bureaucratic IOs are capable of making other actors willing to “submit to [their] authority.”\textsuperscript{44} However, these bureaucratic features can also lead to the development of specific kinds of “pathological” behavioral patterns within IOs, including a detrimental dependency upon the rules, a tendency to “flatten diversity” in favor of producing “universal rules and categories that are...inattentive to contextual and particularistic concerns,” and the emergence of “pockets of autonomy and

\textsuperscript{41} See DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Finnemore, 1996.
\textsuperscript{42} Following Weber’s original conception, Barnett and Finnemore argue that bureaucracies are hierarchical, practice continuity, are impersonal, and have expertise. In this context, hierarchical means that each individual has a set role and reports to specific superiors within a structure that divides labor according to expertise; continuity means that employees receive a salary for full-time work, and there are opportunities for career advancement; impersonal means that affairs are conducted according to rules and procedures that eliminate arbitrary and politicized influences; and expertise refers to technical merit or knowledge. This version of bureaucracy merely revises Beetham’s (1996: 9-12) prior conceptualization of this organizational archetype. See Chapter 4 for a more detailed treatment of these characteristics.
\textsuperscript{43} These authority sources echo Weber’s original identification of bureaucratic authority as having the following characteristics: 1) principles of “fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations;” 2) principles of “office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority,” or a “firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by higher ones;” and 3) the “management of the modern office is based upon written documents (‘the files’), which are preserved in their original...form.” From Weber, 1948: 196-7.
\textsuperscript{44} Weber (Gerth and Mills, eds.), 1948: 196-7. Barnett and Finnemore argue that IOs contribute to the “social construction of power” (Bourdieu, 1977: 209) by classifying and dividing the world into categories of actors and action, by fixing meanings that establish boundaries for acceptable action, and by diffusing those meanings throughout the world.
political battles” that can lead to the adoption of contradictory responses to problems.45

The structure of their logic is powerful: by focusing on how an IO’s sources of authority can also be the root of its dysfunctional tendencies, these scholars open the door for important discussions about how an organization’s identity and its performance outcomes are interconnected in ways that are perhaps not immediately intuitive. Their empirical investigation into three case IGOs seems to verify the basic idea that organizations of a particular bureaucratic form do exhibit the pathological tendencies predicted by their conceptual framework.46 However, their work is not nearly complete enough to be considered a theory of all “international organizations in global politics,” as their book subtitle suggests it is.47 Their framework’s predictive power is limited to one specific kind of organization: the bureaucratic IGO; their argument is neither accurate nor instructive in cases when IOs do not derive their legitimacy from rational-legal authority and expertise, and thus, do not behave like Barnett and Finnemore’s version of the archetypical bureaucracy. Furthermore, while their empirical work offers rich accounts of three of the world’s most relevant

45 Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 721-5. I discuss these pathologies in greater detail in Chapter 3.
46 Their three case IOs are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).
47 Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 9. In footnotes in both their initial article and the subsequent book, these scholars acknowledge that they “use the term international organization to mean intergovernmental organizations...with members from three or more states supporting a permanent secretariat to perform ongoing tasks related to a common purpose” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 177). This definition obviously excludes a number of other types of organizations that are international in scope and which play an important role in structuring social knowledge and influencing the conduct of international affairs, including but not limited to INGOs, multinational corporations, and organizations with special status like the International Committee of the Red Cross (or ICRC).
IGO, it is not systematically or rigorously linked to their conceptual framework. While interesting and significant, their work does not sufficiently explain the mechanisms that link authority to dysfunction, and dysfunction to performance outcomes.

Despite its shortcomings, Barnett and Finnemore’s work provides a useful foundation for analyzing the internal cultural features of any organization. The core insight from their work is that organizational archetypes (e.g., bureaucracy) develop as a result of an organization’s authority sources (e.g., rational-legal authority and expertise), and that organizations resembling an archetypical model suffer from particular types of pathological behaviors that are related to their core organizational features. The structure of their argument—and their key insight concerning the interconnectedness of authority and institutional pathology—provides a useful starting point for exploring the behavioral patterns and performance outcomes of other, non-bureaucratic IOs.

Although my work uses this sociological institutionalist logic as a conceptual foundation, I make a number of critical departures from Barnett and Finnemore’s arguments. First, I turn my attention toward a different category of IOs: the INGO. Despite this group’s size and internal diversity, my work illustrates that it is possible to categorize INGOs according to a succinct and theoretically grounded typology. Second, I expand the range of possible ways in

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48 I discuss the tenets of Barnett and Finnemore’s arguments in greater detail later in the work, particularly in Chapter 3.
which an IO can become an authoritative actor, looking beyond rational-legal authority and expertise and incorporating such concepts as charismatic leadership and procedural authority into the analysis. Third, I take the logic of the sociological institutionalist argument one important step further, analyzing not only the ways in which authority sources can produce internal inefficiencies, but also explaining the relationships between persistent pathologies and an organization’s ultimate performance outcomes. Barnett and Finnemore essentially conclude their argument with a description of the ways in which bureaucratic IGOs can be internally dysfunctional, but they do not tell us anything about the effects of these issues on IOs’ overall ability to survive and achieve their goals. My work, by contrast, directly addresses the relationship between dysfunctional tendencies and poor performance outcomes, making the ASF a theoretically and empirically useful tool for both IR scholars and practitioners. By continuing to focus on the effects of endogenously formed interests and identities on organizational behavior, but making these important modifications to existing scholarship on IOs, my work expands and refines the sociological institutionalist approach to understanding IO power and performance.

III. PROJECT SCOPE AND OUTLINE

Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) of this project is devoted to developing the preliminary typology of INGOs. In Chapter 1, I construct the Authority Sources
Framework (ASF), which is a conceptual tool that I will use throughout this work to help illuminate the relationships between an organization’s power, its propensity to react to different circumstances in particular ways, and its ultimate performance outcomes. The ASF posits a strong positive relationship between the ways in which an INGO derives its ability to influence others’ perceptions and actions (which I call an organization’s authority sources) and the core design and cultural features (which I call its organizational systems) that develop within it. My framework suggests that INGOs must legitimize themselves in order to compete and survive, and they do so by self-identifying in particular ways that lead to the development of specific institutional design features. For example, if an INGO is able to compel others to support its work because it employs individuals with localized knowledge and connections to populations in need (which I call localized authority), then this organization will likely distribute decision-making power among semi-sovereign sub-units “on the ground” (which I call decentralized autonomy). If, on the other hand, an INGO generates its support as a result of the efforts of an inspirational, visionary leader (charismatic authority), then it will place that particular individual at the center of its decision-making processes and endow him or her with an enormous amount of power

49 In this research, I use the phrase organizational systems to encapsulate both an organization’s observable structures and the unspoken truths that permeate it. This conception attempts to account for the actual operational and cultural behavior of a given organization, rather than what merely appears to be so. For instance, if an organization has an explicit formal hierarchy (observable structure), but employees widely disregard the organizational chart in favor of conducting their affairs in a more personal, informal manner (unspoken truth), then my analysis of this organization’s systems will account for both of these elements, but it will emphasize the unspoken truths over the observable structures if they are dominant in terms of guiding actual organizational behavior.
(personality-driven decision making). Whereas Chapter 1 is entirely conceptual and only briefly discusses the actual features we might expect the three ideal types to exhibit, Chapter 2 is entirely empirical in nature: it tests the ASF against the landscape of INGOs, using ten case study organizations to better illuminate the mechanisms described in conceptual terms in Chapter 1. To bring the conceptual insights from Chapter 1 “to life,” I rely on rich empirical observations generated from over 200 interviews with INGO practitioners representing ten case study organizations and a variety of non-case INGOs and partners.50

In Part II (Chapters 3 and 4), I use the preliminary typology of INGOs developed in Part I to discuss the ways in which different INGOs will develop dysfunctional tendencies—or behavioral patterns that lead to inefficient outcomes for the host organizations. As explained by the ASF, each INGO derives its ability to influence from a particular set of authority sources, each of which will be associated with a distinct group of organizational design features. While these innate characteristics (or organizational systems) may promote the organization’s perceived authority, they may also produce recurring challenges (or dysfunctional tendencies) for practitioners within INGOs. Despite their detrimental effects, these inefficiencies may be remarkably persistent over time. In large part, this is because these inefficiencies are inseparable from an INGO’s identity, and as such, leaders may not be able to reduce the negative

50 See the discussion of methodology (Section IV) at the end of this chapter for a detailed overview of the research design rationale, the ten cases, and the interview method I employed.
consequences of these tendencies without undermining the perception of their organizations as being legitimate. Put simply, Part II suggests that an INGO’s greatest strengths may be fundamentally linked to its greatest weaknesses. Paralleling the structure of Part I, Part II is also divided into a purely ideas-driven chapter (Chapter 3) and an observations-driven one (Chapter 4). In Chapter 3, I briefly review the scholarly debates about the origins of institutional dysfunction, and I lay the conceptual foundations for understanding how an organization’s internal cultural features can help us determine its persistent inefficiencies. Then, in Chapter 4, I apply data from the INGO landscape to the question of internal dysfunction, illustrating whether and how the conceptual mechanisms and relationships outlined in Chapter 3 operate in reality.

Part III is also divided into a conceptual and an empirical chapter (Chapters 5 and 6, respectively), but the focus of this part of my work is on the relationship between organizational inefficiency and overall ineffectiveness. Under normal circumstances, INGOs are able to manage their affairs in a state of what one might call “good enough” efficiency: there is some dysfunction inherent to their operations, and while this dysfunction may be associated with a less-than-optimal use of time and resources, it may not fundamentally hinder an INGO’s ability to pursue and achieve its goals. It is only when certain dysfunctional tendencies are amplified to the extent that they diminish an INGO’s ability to survive and succeed that these problems have crossed the line from inefficient to ineffective. The primary goal of Part III is to delineate between
inefficiency that is characteristic of periods of normalcy, and dysfunctionality that is truly disruptive to an INGO’s affairs. In order to accomplish this goal, Chapter 5 answers the question, “What are the circumstances under which we might expect to see dysfunctional tendencies becoming exacerbated to the point of impacting overall effectiveness?” I argue that if we understand an organization’s systemic features and associated dysfunctional tendencies (i.e., its ideal type), then we can predict how it might respond to various kinds of endogenous and exogenous stimuli. Turning to the data gathered through my empirical research, Chapter 6 then ascertains whether observable INGO behavioral tendencies confirm these expectations. The lessons learned in Part III have important implications for understanding some of the broader trends affecting the INGO landscape. For example, the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 helps us to understand why MCOs are the most likely of the INGOs to experience dramatic rises and falls in their growth trajectories, whereas GPOs are the most likely to provide stable institutional solutions to intractable global problems. Part III exposes the ways in which an INGO’s typological affiliation determines how it will behave as an international actor.

When considered as a whole, Chapters 1 through 6 provide a theoretically compelling and analytically rigorous account of the power and performance of INGOs. At the end of Chapter 6, I synthesize the information covered by the chapters, illustrating how INGOs belonging to different categories within the typology will behave and interact with other international institutions.
analysis has important implications for both scholars of IOs and practitioners of international affairs because it helps us understand which types of INGOs are likely to excel under certain circumstances, and which are likely to fail under others.

IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

In constructing the INGO typology in Part I, I use Weber’s early conception of the “ideal type” methodological approach to devise a series of abstract models that are intended to capture the essential features of different INGO organizational models. In the most basic sense, an ideal type is a theoretically grounded “word image” that simplifies a complex social phenomenon and reduces its features to a pure, abstract form against which actual entities and events can be compared.\(^{51}\) Designed to organize the features of some concept or historical complex into “a coherent word-picture,”\(^{52}\) ideal types necessarily represent simplified versions of empirical reality—reductions of the complex social world into the essential traits that define the holistic

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\(^{51}\) Weber used the term “ideal” to illustrate that these types are “idea-constructs,” intended to make sense of the chaotic social world (Hekman, 1983). In Weber’s words, an ideal type is constructed through “the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete...phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct” (Weber, 1949: 90). According to Weber’s early work, and reflecting an epistemological perspective that suggests that concepts cannot be simply derived from facts, ideal types are general abstractions of some conceptual “whole,” intended to help make sense of an otherwise unknowable social world. For Weber, the goal of social science research was to “take a deliberate attitude towards the world,” which he saw as a complex, unintelligible mass of events, and to “lend it significance” through the creation of such “analytical constructs” (Weber, 1949: 81).

\(^{52}\) Watkins, 1952: 23.
concept in contradistinction to other holistic concepts. In Weber’s “holistic ideal type was supposed to give a bird’s eye view of the broad characteristics of a whole social situation,” providing a heuristic tool to help explain the factors that produce either reflections or deviations from the model. In my work, the ideal type is a “purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation ... is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components.” Accordingly, throughout this work, I compare actual INGOs to the holistic, pure, abstract ideal types, which are intended to provide an explicit definition to simplify reality.

While it may be important for the social scientist to understand both the whole and the individual parts if he or she aims to truly explain a concept, period, or process, it is useful to begin with the construction of a theoretically derived and simplified image of the whole first because it can serve as a foundation from which the researcher can compare factors that reflect or disturb the model. In my work, the ideal typology provides the conceptual groundwork on which the empirical analysis is layered; without the former, the latter would be purely descriptive, in which case it would be far less theoretically compelling than it is as an analytic tool used to predict behavioral outcomes based on

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53 Thus, the ideal type would help the social scientist craft a “generally applicable theoretical system,” in much the same way that deductive economists use models to assist in the process of isolating mechanisms and predicting outcomes (Watkins, 1952: 24).
54 Ibid.
55 Kaufmann, 1978: 43.
56 These explicit definitions simplify what Weber referred to as “hundreds of words in the [researcher’s] vocabulary [which] are ambiguous constructs created to meet the unconsciously felt need for adequate expression and the meaning of which is only concretely felt but not clearly thought out” (Kaufmann, 1978: 92-3).
relationships between ideas that we might expect to find operating in the real world. In each Part of this project, the first chapter presents a series of conceptually driven predictions, and the second chapter provides an empirical analysis intended to “breathe life into” the ideal types and confirm or deny the predictions derived from them. As is the case with all ideal type research, the models themselves are designed to encapsulate the essential features of the various sub-categories (or types) of INGOs in their pure state. The empirical analysis then compares actual INGOs against a standardized set of patterns represented by the ideal forms.57

Because the central goal of my project is to better understand “the essential character”58 of INGOs, I designed a research project that would enable me to generate a deep understanding of the internal workings of particular organizations, while still allowing me to generalize about broad patterns affecting organizations across the INGO landscape. To fulfill the depth requirement, I adopted an “inside-out” approach to studying a number of specific INGOs, using the practitioners’ own words, experiences and perspectives as much as possible to illuminate the true “quality of practice” within these groups.59

Following Barnett and Finnemore’s work in this area, my analysis exposes the

57 Constructing a holistic ideal type model involves “analysis of overall patterns rather than...analysis of narrowly drawn sets of organizational properties,” and these “patterns are a function of the ideas, beliefs, and values— the components of an ‘interpretive scheme’— that underpin and are embodied in organizational structures and systems.” From Greenwood and Hinings, 1993: 1052 (citing Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood, 1980: 4).
58 Kvale’s (1996: 67) definition of quality.
internal behavioral patterns and cultural tendencies within a given type of IO, and as such, it does “essential work in explaining how things behave and what causes outcomes.”

To satisfy the breadth criterion, I selected a sample of INGO case organizations designed to be large enough to account for the diversity of groups belonging to this category of international actors while still being small enough to facilitate the kind of rich qualitative analysis and interpretation described above. All of the INGOs in this medium-N sample of cases (N=10) may be considered influential in their own right, but they are highly diverse in terms of their ages and the issues they address (see Figure 1.2). In selecting cases that covered the spectra of age and issue area, my goal was to control for these factors as possible intervening variables, isolating (to the extent possible) authority as the independent variable influencing behavioral outcomes. In other words, if I could show, for instance, that humanitarian, human rights, and development INGOs of diverse ages and sizes all resemble the same ideal type model based on the

60 Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 701. See also Secher (1962) on the goal of interpretive research in the social sciences.

61 In the INGO landscape, it is notoriously difficult to ascertain the overall “power” of particular organizations because of differences in scope, issue area, and theoretical and empirical debates about what success and influence actually mean. However, all of the organizations I study here may be deemed influential in the sense that they are widely recognized brands among practitioners in the industry; they experience a degree of success in both private and public fundraising efforts; and they are generally identified by sources on the subject as being successful, efficacious, or otherwise influential. I relied on a broad range of resources—from informal conversations with experts to published lists—to identify a set of organizations that are perceived by practitioners and beneficiaries as being influential. For example, five of my ten case study organizations (and ten of the non-case organizations where I interviewed practitioners) are listed in The Global Journal’s list of “The Top 100 Best NGOs” in the world, with four of those listed in the top 20 (The Global Journal, 2012). The INGOs used here are widely referenced by practitioners working on related issues and identifiable by those involved as key contributors in their respective fields. Because there is no ultimate authority on this issue, I used my judgment based on detailed and widespread analysis of written materials and practitioner observations.
sources of their authority, then I could more effectively argue that it was the
authority sources themselves—as opposed to the organizations’ ages, sizes, or
areas of work—that determine their organizational design and behavioral
outcomes.

These ten case organizations are sufficiently diverse in terms of their ages
and the issues they address to allow me to make preliminary generalizations
about the applicability of the typology to the INGO sector. However, this study
is necessarily limited in its ability to explain behavioral patterns across the entire
landscape of INGOs for a few reasons. First, as is the case with any medium-N
case study analysis, the number ten may be sufficient, but it is not large enough
to give us a complete and exhaustive understanding of this diverse group of
international actors. To truly understand organizational behavior across the
industry, an analysis of a more comprehensive set of case organizations is
needed. Given the simultaneous need for breadth and depth in this preliminary
study, I was limited in terms of how many organizations I could analyze, but in
the future, researchers ought to apply this typology systematically against a
larger sample of INGOs to get a better sense of distributional issues.

Second, while my ten cases include some of the world’s most powerful
non-governmental actors, a few key global organizations are missing from this
list. In particular, a handful of influential European INGOs founded in the
second half of the 20th Century—including Amnesty International, Greenpeace,
Médecins Sans Frontières (or Doctors Without Borders), and Save the Children—
as well as a small but powerful sub-set of INGOs that are driven by religious ideologies—including CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision—are omitted from this preliminary list of cases. There are two reasons why these groups were omitted from my sample. First, part of my goal in undertaking this project was to make a substantial empirical contribution to the IR literature by exploring under-explored territory. A few of the organizations mentioned above have already been studied by IR and development scholars, and while the works that have been published on these INGOs may not have been trying to identify the same kinds of patterns and principles as my own, there is relatively more information “out there” in the scholarship about these groups than there is about the ten included in my study. Organizations like Partners In Health and the International Rescue Committee are equally, if not more, influential according to some measures of power and impact in the non-profit sector, but there is far less scholarship of these groups. My inside-out investigation of under-studied INGOs constitutes a contribution to the literature in and of itself.

The second explanation has more to do with my own limitations than with my research goals: I faced a (perhaps inevitable) challenge related to access to these organizations and the individuals within them. Given that I had previously worked with a handful of INGOs, I was able to partially rely on my professional network to “open doors” within organizations and facilitate my research endeavors. Although I began with a list of the ten most ideal INGOs to
study, I quickly learned that in order to actually penetrate their walls and arrange the necessary interviews with employees, I needed to earn the support of at least one “champion” on the inside who would lend my project credibility and help push forward my research agenda. Although I attempted to reach out to individuals and institutions where I had no personal connections, and while that was often fruitful, I sometimes had to rely on my personal network to make connections at organizations so that I could study them. Convincing organizational leaders that taking to me was worth their employees’ time and energy was not a simple task. Once I was “on the inside” of an organization, arranging conversations with enough employees was relatively easy; I simply had to follow the leads as they were revealed to me and encourage interviewees to introduce me to their insightful colleagues. However, initially penetrating these institutions was quite challenging, and in many cases, it led to outright failure, either in the form of ignored emails and phone calls or simply rejection of my requests. For instance, I initially tried to arrange interviews with Médecins Sans Frontières and Save the Children, but I could not find a “champion” from within who would help convince others that helping with my research was worth their time. Therefore, while the baseline criterion for the ten cases in this study was clearly defined from the beginning, the process of identifying the exact ten organizations to satisfy the criterion was necessarily iterative: I set a goal and attempted to gain access to employees; if I was successful, then I would take on the organization as a full case, but if my attempts failed multiple times,
then I would find an INGO of a similar age working on similar issues and begin the process again. The sample of INGOs that ultimately emerged is neither perfectly representative nor exhaustive, but I am confident that it constitutes a sufficiently broad set of influential organizations to facilitate this research endeavor.

On the basis of the criteria outlined above, and taking into consideration the methodological limitations discussed in this section, the following ten case study organizations provide the empirical basis for the forthcoming analysis:

1) The Carter Center (TCC)
2) The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
3) Human Rights Watch (HRW)
4) The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
5) The International Rescue Committee (IRC)
6) Kiwanis International (KI)
7) Mercy Corps (MC)
8) Oxfam International (OI)
9) Partners In Health (PIH)
10) Seeds of Peace (SOP)

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62 See the Conclusion chapter for a discussion of the scope limitations associated with my selection of these ten case INGOs.
63 Listed in alphabetical order, with the acronyms that I will use throughout this work (see, for continued reference, Appendix A, which contains a list of frequently used acronyms).
Within my analysis of each case, I use a combination of loosely structured interviews,\textsuperscript{64} off-the-record conversations,\textsuperscript{65} document analysis,\textsuperscript{66} and reactive

\textsuperscript{64} In the words of Pole and Lampard, loosely structured interviewing “seeks depth and detail” and “sees value in individual experience,” aiming to “tap into the subjective experiences of the interviewee...exploring social phenomena from the perspective of individual social actors...via their personal recollections” (2002: 131).

\textsuperscript{65} I had around 30 off-the-record conversations with practitioners. These individuals insisted on speaking under the conditions of both total anonymity and confidentiality, and they did not allow me to record our conversations using a tape recorder or to take notes on my laptop. As such, their names and titles are not included anywhere in this work, and I have not included any direct quotes from those meetings.

\textsuperscript{66} In particular, I focused on the Annual Reports, Financial Statements, websites, newsletters, and other self-reflective documents written about each of the INGOs I studied.
observation\textsuperscript{67} to generate rich, qualitative interpretations of each organization’s core features and institutional ethos. Organizational culture is a concept that features prominently throughout my research and is worth briefly defining. For this work, organizational culture is a “dynamic phenomenon,” which is “constantly being enacted and created by our interactions with others.”\textsuperscript{68} Constituted by a set of structures, routines, rules and norms that guide and constrain behavior, culture is “a pattern of shared basic assumptions” that are learned by a group over time and “taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel” in relation to problems the group is trying to solve.\textsuperscript{69} My empirical analysis of organizational systems (Part I) and dysfunctional tendencies (Part II) incorporates assessments of both an organization’s observable structures, as well as the unspoken truths that underpin and sometimes contradict the explicit structures.\textsuperscript{70} As such, I ground the analysis of each individual’s interview responses—which might have been either intentionally manipulative or unintentionally biased—in my own interpretations of an organization’s

\textsuperscript{67} Reactive observation is “associated with controlled settings and based on the assumption that the people being studied are aware of being observed and are amenable to interacting with the researcher only in response to elements in the research design.” This stands in contrast to participant observation, which is “grounded in the establishment of considerable rapport between the researcher and the host community,” and it requires “the long-term immersion of the researcher in the everyday life of that community” (Angrosino, 2008: 165).

\textsuperscript{68} Schein, 2004: 1.

\textsuperscript{69} Schein, 2004: 17. Organizational culture has three cognitive levels, which interact and inform one another: (1) “artifacts” are those elements of an organization that can be tangibly perceived by the uninitiated observer; (2) “espoused beliefs and values” constitute the professed culture of the organization’s members and can be assessed by understanding the personal values widely expressed within an organization; and (3) “basic underlying assumptions” are the motivations and beliefs that guide the first two cognitive levels, but which are not always cognitively identified in everyday interaction (Schein, 2004: 26-31).

\textsuperscript{70} See footnote 49 on page 26 for more on the definition of organizational systems.
behaviors, which I formed through document analysis, off-the-record conversations, and reactive observation. Together, these methods allowed me to illicit more genuine and complete information about how an organization operates than the interviews alone could have provided.

I conducted over 200 formal interviews (as well as over 30 additional off-the-record conversations) with practitioners from across the INGO landscape. For each of my ten case study organizations, I interviewed an average of 17 employees from within the organization itself, and I consulted with numerous representatives of partner (and in some cases, competitor) organizations. My interviewees represent a breadth of perspectives in terms of functional area of work (e.g., researcher, board member, communications associate) and position within the organizational hierarchy (e.g., intern, middle manager, senior leader). I interviewed one person at a time, and the average length per interview was one hour. I held approximately 85% of the interviews in-person and, whenever possible, in the individual’s “home” office environment. In order to facilitate open and honest dialog about both organizational strengths and weaknesses, I conducted nearly all interviews under the conditions of

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71 My goal was to assess each organization’s internal systems and inefficiencies, which required incorporating the viewpoints of individuals in all areas and at all levels of the organization; the perspectives of the organization’s “elite” may be limited and/or skewed.

72 In the 15% of cases that I conducted over Skype or on the phone, it was almost always because the practitioners involved were based in field offices in diverse locations around the world. By speaking with individuals in what an ethnographer would call the interviewee’s “natural” setting, I was able to facilitate a degree of comfort, familiarity and openness that would not have been present for the interviewee in an unfamiliar setting (Angrosino, 2008: 162).
Roughly 30% of those interviewed have worked in both the organization’s headquarters and at least one field office and could speak to cultural dynamics and behaviors in multiple office contexts. Many interviewees have worked for more than one of my case study organizations and provided valuable comparative perspectives as a result. Though largely unstructured, my interviews were oriented around particular themes, and questions were intended to illicit particular kinds of insights about organizational culture, identity, and dysfunction.

The purpose of these practitioner interviews was to “obtain open, nuanced descriptions of different aspects of the subjects’ life worlds,” or their work-related environments and experiences. I paid close attention to both explicit descriptions as well as “implicit messages” delivered by interviewees; in other words, I was concerned with both what was said and how it was said.

Throughout my work, direct quotations and paraphrased materials from anonymous interviews will be included without reference to the specific individual involved. Those who requested to remain “off-the-record” do not appear in Appendix B, and while I cannot explicitly use data from those conversations, they were highly influential in terms of shaping my interpretations and alerting me to particular organizational themes.

Based on my theoretically derived expectations, I developed an aide-memoire: a “list of topics of discussion, around which [I] improvise[d]” in any given interview setting (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 8).

My goal was to “understand the complex behavior of members of society without imposing any a priori categorization that may limit the field of inquiry” (Fontana and Frey, 2008: 129).

This is important for understanding both the factual and the meaning levels (Kvale 1996: 32). Rather than asking interviewees directly about their opinions related to their work, I asked questions that led them to detailed, descriptive responses concerning their daily activities, which provided the empirical material from which I was able to draw thoroughly informed interpretations. As Kvale notes, by seeking “extensive and rich descriptions of specific [...] situations” the interviewer “will be able to arrive at meanings on another level” (Kvale, 1996: 33).

Fontana and Frey, 2008: 141. As Atkinson and Delamont note, some research requires that we “ensure that the analysis of spoken language remains firmly embedded in studies or organizational context, processes of socialization, routines of work, personal transformation, people processing, and
balanced what I learned through interviews and off-the-record conversations with limited reactive participation: I took part in the organizations’ daily activities, interactions, and events whenever possible, as a means of learning both the explicit and underlying aspects of these organizations’ cultures. To contextualize and deepen my interview-based empirical data, I spent time observing staff members in the context of meetings and casual conversations in the headquarters environment. Observational analysis proved useful for uncovering inconsistencies between what was said and what was done, and between what was said and what was meant.

In addition to the formal interviews I conducted with practitioners representing my ten case study organizations (and their respective partners), I also interviewed 37 individuals from diverse IOs that are not included in my list of case study organizations. These individuals represent other INGOs (including Save the Children, the Clinton Foundation, ORBIS International, and Human Rights First) as well as a number of UN departments, donor government agencies, and private sector partner organizations. These interviews were particularly helpful for understanding how external stakeholders and peers perceive their INGO counterparts. I rely primarily on the case study method to assess the empirical validity of my framework, but these non-case interviews helped me identify and fill gaps unaddressed by employees within the

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79 DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002: 1.
organizations. These non-case perspectives facilitated the creation of a broader, more complete representation of the INGO landscape as a whole.

My research goal has been to “secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question.” Therefore, I apply an empirically rich but analytically systematic approach to building a typology of INGOs and assessing its implications for IR scholarship and practice. My research attempts to triangulate information from a variety of perspectives and sources in order to develop complete and unbiased interpretations of organizational behavior in these INGOs. In the image of Denzin and Lincoln’s classic qualitative researcher, I employ a “wide range of interconnected interpretive practices” throughout my work, “hoping always to get a better understanding of the subject matter at hand.” However, despite its lofty ambitions involving the mixing of qualitative methods and the triangulation of primary and secondary source data, this project ultimately relies primarily on formal interviews and informal conversations (in other words, on first-person perspective), and this approach is not without limitations. For as much as I tried to create an environment in which interviewees felt comfortable sharing their genuine opinions and insights (see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of this process), relying heavily on first-person accounts makes it somewhat difficult to decipher fact from myth and shared norms from individuals’ perceptions. Relying on anonymous interviews

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82 Denzin and Lincoln 2008: 4-5.
has many benefits—most notably, it allows the researcher to understand the organization through the eyes of the very people who constitute it. However, as the research program around INGO interests and identities becomes more complex, researchers will want to incorporate documentary evidence and secondary source analysis into their work in order to more thoroughly identify the blurry lines between observable facts and underlying truths, as well as those between internal perceptions of the myths and symbols driving behavior and the external observations about how things really work.

On the basis of the theoretical insights and empirical observations presented in the following chapters, my research begins the process of closing the gap in the IR literature and allows scholars of international affairs to develop a deeper and richer understanding of how INGOs fit into the global institutional ecosystem. In the face of heightened disillusionment and criticism toward the traditional state-centric approaches to international problem solving, INGOs are becoming increasingly invigorated, and yet, we know very little about who these actors are and how they behave. In this work, I shed light directly on INGOs, categorizing them according to a theoretical framework that accounts for their need to legitimize themselves among states and IGOs, and arguing that their typological affiliation reveals an enormous amount about how they behave and interact as IOs. Departing from the standard, state-centric IR paradigm, my research applies questions about institutional power, pathologies, and
performance to the world of INGOs. The research presented in the following chapters may give rise to more questions than it answers, but that is the inevitable consequence of theory building in new territory. My work constitutes an important step in the right direction for the IR discipline because it takes a critical first cut at devising and applying theoretical tools to explain the behavioral logic of one increasingly prolific and relevant category of international actors: INGOs.
PART I:

TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (INGOs)
CHAPTER 1:

THE AUTHORITY SOURCES FRAMEWORK

Despite widespread acceptance of the idea that INGOs are increasingly prolific and relevant global actors, which “exercise authority and engage in political action across state boundaries,” little systematic attention has been paid to the diverse ways in which these actors generate their ability to influence the conduct of international affairs, or to the impact of their authority claims on their organizational designs. Relying on the underlying principles of sociological institutionalism, I present a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between the ways in which INGOs generate authority and the types of organizational behavioral patterns that develop within them. By opening the “black box” of identities and interests in INGOs, and building a framework that helps us understand how organizations in the diverse landscape will tend to behave, this research lays the foundation for further theoretical and empirical research related to both organizational efficiency and effectiveness over time.

In this first chapter of Part I, I outline the Authority Sources Framework (ASF), describing the ways in which an INGO can become a legitimate and influential international actor. After addressing the ways in which different

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authority sources produce certain types of organizational behavioral tendencies, I lay out my preliminary typology of INGOs. Although the framework suggests that nine ideal type organizations are theoretically plausible, I argue that three of the models represent the vast majority of powerful INGOs in operation throughout the world, and therefore, I focus my attention on these three ideal types throughout the dissertation.

As Hopgood rightly notes, the identity of an actor is critical in determining whether this actor is perceived as being authoritative or not:

*The word of an authority is enough to create a reason for us to do what the authority says simply because the authority says we should do it...because we accept the legitimacy of the authority. Crucial to being recognized as legitimate in this way is not what is said but the identity of who says it — who the speaker is.*

Others have argued that organizational identity constitutes the "subtext of many organizational behaviors." The centrality of the actor’s identity to its perceived legitimacy applies to both individuals and to organizations; as is well documented in management and organization studies, identity is a "root construct in organizational phenomena.” Upon initially putting its “identity stakes in the ground,” a specific INGO commits itself to defending a particular approach to doing business, which various stakeholders will be more or less likely to support from the start. These identity claims “lock in” over a short

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period of time during an organization’s foundational years, and the organization
develops particular internal organizational systems that reflect and perpetuate
these core authority claims. On the basis of the expected relationships between
organizational identity claims and behavioral tendencies, INGOs will cluster
around specific organizational ideal types. In this chapter, I discuss these
relationships and present a preliminary typology of INGOs, which constitutes a
necessary first step in understanding this diverse category of international
actors—a step that will facilitate further discussions about organizational
inefficiency (in Part II) and ineffectiveness (in Part III).

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORITY VIS-À-VIS WHO1,3 AND HOW1,3

In the words of Florini, “The swiftly growing number of coalitions of civil
society groups now claim the right to have a say in everything from nuclear arms
control negotiations to the operations of multinational corporations.” 87 But how
do INGOs “claim the right” to exert an influence over international affairs in the
first place? As explicitly private, non-state actors, INGOs do not benefit from the
type of traditional authority that can be delegated by state principals, nor do they
have the authority that is derived from an actor’s ability to influence others using
force or coercion. 88 By definition, states do not sign these non-governmental

87 Florini, 1999: vi (my italics).
88 Official state authority is often presented as the cornerstone of international legal legitimacy in
global governance (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 412). Weber refers to the authority that comes from
groups that are perceived as being the standard-bearers for powerful institutions in their society (i.e.,
states in the international system) as traditional authority.
organizations into existence, nor do they single-handedly sustain their activities with financial support. In fact, according to a 2006 study of US-based INGOs, only 10% of these organizations received any government funding, and only 20% of aggregate INGO revenues came from government grants.\(^8^9\) In the absence of formal state authority, INGO power exists exclusively in the realm of so-called “soft power,” or the ability to attract and co-opt (rather than coerce) others on the basis of resources such as diplomacy, assistance, civic engagement, and ideational influence.\(^9^0\) Moreover, INGOs are only able to wield their power insofar as they are able to convince relevant stakeholders (including donor states, IGOs, private donors, corporations, recipient governments, and local civil society organizations) that they are the most appropriate actor to complete a given task.

Whether or not INGOs are deemed appropriate is based on their perceived *legitimacy*, defined here as “a quality that leads people...to accept authority...because of the general sense that the authority it justified.”\(^9^1\) In this research, I apply the sociological interpretation of the concept of legitimate authority: an institution is legitimate in this sense “when it is widely *believed*” to have the right to have authority in a given arena.\(^9^2\) In order to be seen as a legitimate actor, an INGO must “justify to a peer or superordinate system its

\(^{8^9}\) Kerlin, 2006: 2. (Data from 2003.)
\(^{9^0}\) Nye, 1990.
\(^{9^1}\) Bodansky, 1999: 600.
\(^{9^2}\) Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 405. The sociological sense of legitimacy is distinct from the normative meaning. The latter posits that a well-founded authority claim is legitimate when “it is justified in some objective sense,” whereas the former simply has to do with other actors believing that an authority claim is legitimate, regardless of any objective measures (Bodansky 1999: 601).
right to exist.” It must show that its actions are “desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions,” and that it is worthy and deserving of financial and ideational support that will enable it to carry out its goals. If and when an organization successfully convinces others that it is legitimate, then it is endowed with authority—or an approved ability to use power to influence others. Once conferred, legitimate authority “helps an actor’s voice be heard, recognized, and believed” over other views and opinions. It makes an organization’s goals more “meaningful” and “trustworthy,” which makes its activities more stable and comprehensible. Because of their perpetual need to solicit “protracted audience intervention (particularly against other entities with competing cadres),” INGOs face stringent legitimacy standards. Despite the ever-present rhetoric of cooperation and collaboration, the environment in which INGOs operate is highly competitive, and there are no guarantees for long-term institutional survival. Their very existence, let alone sustained success, depends on the perception that they have legitimate authority.

But legitimate authority may come in many forms. While a number of scholars have discussed the different types of legitimacy that institutions may
embody,\textsuperscript{99} few treatments systematically develop vocabulary for describing divergent authority sources \textit{within} a specific category of organizations.\textsuperscript{100} To date, no work comprehensively addresses the different ways in which INGOs may become legitimate international actors. The ASF attempts to fill this gap, by providing a framework that facilitates understanding of the different ways in which INGOs can earn legitimate authority.

The ASF is based on the foundational idea that there are two principle ways in which any organization defines its core identity: the first is based on who is acting, and the second is based on how these actors approach their work.\textsuperscript{101} These identity claims are produced endogenously in the initial phases of an organization’s development: an individual or group of individuals decides to implement solutions to a problem or set of problems in a certain way. For instance, a group of charismatic students may form an INGO that is driven by an ideological commitment to ensuring that healthcare is universally available; or a group of scientists and lawyers may form an INGO that is driven by a pragmatic commitment to using diverse channels to improve global environmental

\textsuperscript{99} For instance, see Scharpf (1999) on “output” and “input” legitimacy; Suchman (1995) on pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy in all organizations; Hurrell (2005) on the five dimensions of legitimacy and the use of force; Bodansky (1999) on source-based, procedural, and substantive legitimacy, with respect to states; Berstein (2011) on different legitimacy requirements across international issues areas; and Buchanan and Keohane (2006) on a “global public standard” for legitimacy in global governance.

\textsuperscript{100} Suchman, 1995: 572.

\textsuperscript{101} INGOs may have more than just two types of authority, and these authority sources are not mutually exclusive. For instance, an INGO could claim to have a pragmatic approach to solving problems as well as an ideological commitment to solving them. However, my claim here is that each organization will have one particular who narrative and one how narrative that its leaders and employees will \textit{primarily} rely upon to communicate why it is better suited than its counterpart organizations to achieve a particular set of goals.
conditions. The extent to which these identity claims endow an organization with legitimate authority rests on sociotropic judgments by relevant stakeholders about whether the organization contains the right individuals and whether its activities constitute the best approach to solving a particular transnational problem. If these claims are perceived as being legitimate by the relevant stakeholders, then they may constitute what I call an INGO’s sources of authority. For instance, a private donor may choose to support a particular organization—and thus endow it with authority to act—because this donor is moved by the inspirational message of a particular charismatic leader, or because she shares a deep, moral commitment to health as a fundamental human right. Similarly, a government may accept the consultations of an INGO in its domestic affairs because it perceives this organization as having access to expertise in the relevant issues, or because it believes that this organization is highly committed to achieving a particular set of outcomes that will help the country and its citizens.

The ability to persuade actors to support groups that work for the benefit of others lies, as Hopgood notes, “not just, or even primarily, in what we say, but in who we are....” There are three primary ways in which INGOs can derive authority on the basis of who they are: {W₁-W₃}. These three sources of authority—charismatic, expert, and localized—are based on the legitimacy that is conferred upon particular types of individuals and groups as a result of their personal characteristics, skills or knowledge.

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W1 - Charismatic Authority:

In organizations that derive their ability to influence from charismatic authority, leaders are endowed with “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which [they are] considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with...specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”¹⁰³ For Weber, the “charismatic hero...gains and retains [authority] solely by proving his powers in practice.”¹⁰⁴ The charismatic leader offers a visionary solution to a problem and harnesses support from those around him or her to implement it.¹⁰⁵ In this work, charismatic authority is “power legitimized on the basis of a leader’s exceptional personal qualities or the demonstration of extraordinary insight and accomplishment, which inspire loyalty and obedience from followers.”¹⁰⁶ The leadership of charismatic individuals can generate follower trust in the leader’s beliefs, unquestioning acceptance of and affection for the leader, eagerness to obey and emulate the leader, heightened identification with the mission, increased emotional commitment to the cause, and a sense of deep involvement and motivation among followers and supporters.¹⁰⁷

Weber refers to a group that gathers under the leadership of a charismatic individual as a “charismatic community;” its members congregate on the basis of

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¹⁰⁶ Kendall, Murray and Linden, 2000: 438.
their personal commitment and their own charismatic qualities. Employees in organizations with charismatic authority replicate their leaders’ passionate and enthusiastic dedication to serving the interests of humanity, according to the vision prescribed by the charismatic leader. Leaders and communities in organizations of this type inspire supporters through their personal charisma and passion, as well as their emotional commitment to their cause and to one another. Organizations can legitimize themselves on the basis of the charismatic characteristics of their staff and leaders, and on their ability to use this charisma to persuade, convince, and otherwise generate support.

W2 - EXPERT AUTHORITY:

Organizations that derive their legitimacy from this version of expert authority will have highly trained, academically credentialed individuals with specialized theoretical or technical knowledge about specific transnational issues driving the work. In this research, expert authority refers to human capital, or the people who have expertise in given areas: this version of expert authority exists where the experts themselves exist. Highly trained lawyers, scientists, economists, and researchers of specific issues (e.g., human rights, transitional justice, economic development) will have this type of authority because they are “connected to a body of abstract theoretical knowledge produced and taught in

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academic settings.”¹⁰⁹ These are the same kinds of experts who might constitute an epistemic community: “professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”¹¹⁰

One INGO’s “About Us” web page illustrates how this type of legitimacy claim operates: “Our team includes more PhDs and MBAs than any other similar non-profit. Our highly respected scientists, economists and other professionals work hard and get results.” On another page, they call the “smart,” “innovative” people who work at this organization their “secret weapon.”¹¹¹ INGOs with expert authority are believed to be legitimate because of the credibility of their academic and technical specialists.

**W₃ - LOCALIZED AUTHORITY:**

Organizations that generate their ability to influence from what I call localized authority claim to be legitimate on the basis of individuals with specialized local (or “grassroots”) knowledge of particular environments. This is a version of expertise embodied by individuals who have access to information unavailable to others. However, rather than having theoretical, academic, or technical expertise in an area, these individuals are authoritative on the basis of their connectedness within and knowledge of a particular community or

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¹¹⁰ Haas, 1992: 3.
country. They understand the culture and needs of the people in an environment in which their organization is operating, and they are capable of connecting with the necessary stakeholders and institutions that produce action on a local basis. In INGOs with this kind of authority, individuals and groups based out of local offices can push action that is truly grassroots in nature. Because localized individual leaders and members claim to be closer to, and thus more “in touch” with and accountable to populations of concern, they are often given the respect and support of third party agents who trust their credibility. As a leader of one INGO of this type reported, “We would be nothing without our people on the ground...who rally support at the grassroots level, communicate the mission, and guide what we do at an international level. Without them, we’re just a building.” INGOs that define their identity in part on the basis of being driven by individuals with expertise concerning and connections within key local communities are staking their survival on the idea that other relevant stakeholders will see this localized expertise as a type of legitimate authority.

In addition to the three sources of authority based on who INGOs claim to consist of and represent \([W_{1-3}]\), the ASF identifies three ways in which INGOs can derive authority on the basis of how they solve problems: \([H_{1-H_3}]\). Each of these how authority sources is rooted in an organization’s expressed commitment to a particular approach to promoting global public goods. All INGOs act

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\[112\] As later chapters will reveal, the skills and knowledge needed to have this kind of localized expertise are often quite different—甚至 diametrically opposed in some contexts—to the skills and knowledge needed to have expert authority (as defined in this work).
according to the set of norms and values that they deem to be most in line with their core identity claims, but the substance of these internalized norms are not uniform across organizations with diverse identities. These three how authority sources encapsulate the different varieties of principled beliefs and norms that may drive and define different INGOs. In the first case, INGO actions are driven by an ideological commitment to a cause (moral authority); in the second, they are driven by a outcomes-oriented commitment to achieving certain goals (pragmatic authority); and in the third, they are driven by a process-oriented and principled commitment to doing their business according to the norms of transparency, accountability, and democratic governance (procedural authority).¹¹³

**H₁ - Moral Authority:**

In this work, moral authority applies to an organization that becomes legitimate as a result of a deeply held ideological commitment to a fundamentally selfless cause. By the very nature of the fact that they claim to be “universalistic and other-regarding in orientation,”¹¹⁴ all INGOs claim to have some degree of moral authority, in the sense that they claim to be endowed with the ability to “tell us what we should do.”¹¹⁵ However, a sub-set of these groups present themselves as being genuinely—even ideologically, spiritually, or dogmatically—committed to serving others. These groups go further than to

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¹¹³ Other scholars may have used these terms, or similar phrases, in their work to describe related sources of authority or legitimacy; however, I provide my own definitions, which are specifically tailored to the study of INGOs, in the forthcoming section.


pursue behavior that other actors agree is morally good; they claim to do business in a way that is truly and uncompromisingly mission-driven. They operate according to “a prosocial logic that differs fundamentally from narrow self-interest,”\(^{116}\) and they embed the underlying ideological commitment to serving populations in need into everything they do.

An interviewee from one INGO with this type of authority captured the concept succinctly: “All we care about here is making sure that poor people have access to the same basic life-saving services that rich people have. It’s hard to measure our success, but we will keep pushing until this idea is universally accepted as a moral necessity. […] And we won’t compromise for anything less than that.” This interviewee later said of his organization’s uncompromising commitment to health as a human right, “We aren’t religious, but if we were, you could call this our doctrine.” In a world in which it is believed that serving the needs of suffering strangers constitutes a superior moral position, those who are perceived as passionately and genuinely committed to doing so are endowed with moral authority.

**H2 - Pragmatic Authority:**

In the context of this research, organizations with *pragmatic authority* are committed to *instrumentally* pursuing a particular set of outcomes. In the case of many INGOs, these stated ends may still be altruistic insofar as they involve

\(^{116}\) Suchman, 1995: 579.
promoting the interests of others.\textsuperscript{117} It is not their goals that are different from other INGOs; rather, it is the manner in which they pursue these goals that is distinctive from other groups. These organizations are committed to using diverse data sources and approaches to achieve their desired ends, even if the progress that they are able to achieve is piecemeal, and they have to make compromises along the way. Their preference would be to slowly take small steps in the right direction, rather than to uncompromisingly push for comprehensive or radical change that may not be feasible in the short-term.

Like their counterpart INGOs, these groups behave according to a logic of internalized principled beliefs and norms, but for organizations with pragmatic authority, these norms involve a belief in the inherent value of outcomes-oriented problem solving; they aim to appeal to rational actors to make changes that will ultimately serve their interests as well as the interests of those in need. Within the bounds of what is appropriate in their fields, these groups use any means necessary to achieve their goals, and many third party actors support and cooperate with these INGOs as a result. One INGO with this type of authority claims to rely on “sound science,” “economic incentives,” “unlikely partnerships,” and “nonpartisan policy”—all of which highlight the inherent tendency toward taking an objective, data-driven, pragmatic approach to solving global problems. Of this INGO, one private sector partner noted, “They’re the

\textsuperscript{117} To use Abbott and Snidal’s (2002: 145) terminology, these “altruistic” actors may be “interest actors” insofar as “they act purposively and optimize in advancing the interests of others” and “treat their normative ends as goals to be optimized.”
only NGO we can work with in this space. They understand what it means to work with people on solutions that can *actually* be achieved.”

**H3- PROCEDURAL AUTHORITY:**

In this work, *procedural authority* applies when an organization legitimates itself on the basis of a particularly acute and genuine commitment to due process and good governance. This type of authority is similar to Hurrell’s first dimension of legitimacy, which “has to do with process and procedure,” and to Scharpf’s concept of “input legitimacy,” which depends more on the process of inclusive decision-making than on the quality of the final policy outcomes.\(^{118}\) Organizations with procedural authority claim that their work is appropriate, legitimate, and (by extension) worthy of support on the basis of the fact that they consistently act “in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.”\(^{119}\) For example, an organization with this type of authority might make the following claim when describing the core principles driving its work: “We are committed to openness and transparency because this is important to public accountability.”\(^{120}\)

These organizations will stake their legitimacy on their commitment to a system of governance that includes broad representation, transparency and accountability. They might posit that it is more important to “play by the rules” than to achieve their ends. In the words of one INGO leader:

\(^{118}\) Hurrell, 2005: 18; Scharpf, 1999.

\(^{119}\) Franck, 1990: 19.

\(^{120}\) Oxfam International Website, 2012: About Us.
We are very different from [well-known INGO with a similar mission].... They only care about what ultimately happens on the ground, they don’t care how they get there. They’ll work with anyone to get what they want, even if their so-called ‘partners’ are human rights abusers themselves. We’re not like that. We play by the rules and care about making change through the right channels using the right tools, even if that means it’ll take longer.

Even within the framework of being committed to achieving certain other-regarding goals, these INGOs prioritize good process over good outcomes, and many third party actors deem their activities to be legitimate as a result.

These six who and how authority sources \( \{W_{1-3}; H_{1-3}\} \) are established and instantiated in an organization’s early founding years—when the organization begins to seek funding and external support—and they remain relatively constant throughout an organization’s lifespan. These identity claims tend to “stick” in part because the most difficult phase in terms of establishing organizational legitimacy is the first one, during which an INGO has to establish the necessary credibility to begin having an impact, and it has to do so as a largely unknown entity with no prior achievements or history of earning support. As Ashforth and Gibbs note, once legitimacy is initially conferred upon an institution, it “tends to be taken largely for granted;” it is far easier to maintain legitimacy over time than it is to earn it in the first place.\textsuperscript{121} In a highly competitive landscape where INGOs compete with one another for brand recognition, financial resources, access to information, and other forms of material and ideational support, each organization must illustrate why it is the

\textsuperscript{121} Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990: 183.
best suited to achieve a certain set of goals. In the absence of clear, measurable, standardized outcomes on which to compare organizations working on emergency relief, human rights advocacy, conflict prevention, and other humanitarian and development issues, these organizations must rely on self-ascribed definitions of who they are and how they do business in order to earn legitimacy and thus, to earn support that will enable action that will ultimately affect peoples’ lives.

II. TOWARD A PRELIMINARY TYPOLOGY OF INGOs

Every organization is composed of certain types of individuals conducting their affairs in certain ways. In this section, I argue that when the dominant who is combined with the dominant how,122 particular organizational behavioral patterns emerge. In this research, I use the term “systems” to describe these patterns; this term encapsulates an organization’s observable structures and ways of operating, as well as the underlying norms and unspoken truths governing its behavior.123 The systems discussed in this section are not purely a

122 I rely on practitioners’ perspectives to assess which of the authority types is dominant in a given organization. Typically, the dominant who and the how are identifiable as identity claims that practitioners use to differentiate their organization from its peers. For example, from one INGO case interview: “We respect our peers who follow the right steps and rules to get to their goals, but we do whatever it takes to get there—even if that means breaking a few rules and building partnerships with unlikely characters. As long as it gets the job done.”

123 My use of the phrase organizational systems reflects a commonly applied maximalist definition of organizational culture, initially postulated by Schein, as having three components that need to be understood: “(a) observable artifacts, (b) values, and (c) basic underlying assumptions.” The artifacts include what can be observed on the surface, including “everything from the physical layout, ...the manner in which people address each other, ... and other phenomena, to the more permanent archival manifestations such as company records, products, statements of philosophy, and annual reports.” But we can easily make incorrect inferences about culture on the basis of artifacts alone, unless we “know
causal consequence of the identity claims (or authority sources) discussed in the previous section. Instead, the systems both reflect and further instantiate the claims that organizations make to legitimize themselves. While the causal relationship between an INGO’s sources of authority and its organizational system is not indisputable, this research strongly supports the idea that understanding the sources of an INGO’s authority helps us predict the ways in which this organization will behave. If each authority source discussed above is accompanied by a set of expected behavioral tendencies, and if the set of authority sources presented above is comprehensive, then we should be able to predict the organizational systems (or the observable and unspoken internal behavioral tendencies) of all INGs on the basis of particular combinations of who and how. These combinations represent distinct organizational ideal types, each of which has a set of unique and largely predictable behavioral preferences and characteristics (see Figure 1.1).

Although the figure below suggests that there are nine theoretically plausible ideal type organizations, my hypothesis is that INGs, in fact, cluster around the three ideal type models situated along the “diagonal” and shaded in blue in Figure 1.1. These three types dominate the landscape because certain types of who authority sources are inextricably linked to certain types of how sources. Specifically, charismatic authority and moral authority are deeply

how they connect to underlying assumptions,” as well as the “values, norms, ideologies, charters, and philosophies” driving behavior (Schein, 1990: 111-2).
interconnected in the INGO context; expert authority and pragmatism are closely associated with one another; and localized and procedural authority are fundamentally interrelated. To use more descriptive language, visionary, inspirational individuals (charismatic authority) will believe in their cause fervently, motivating others on the basis of their passionate commitment to the underlying ideology driving their cause (moral authority); this combination produces what I call the Moral Charismatic Organization. On the other hand, individuals with specialized, academic or technical knowledge about a particular subject area (expert authority) will prefer using their specialized knowledge to take a data-driven, impartial approach to unpacking and solving problems (pragmatic authority); this combination produces the Expert Pragmatist Organization. Finally, individuals with specialized knowledge about and connectivity within a particular local or national context (localized authority) will value principles that ensure the representation and inclusion in governance and decision-making processes of all relevant stakeholders, especially those who represent voices “on the ground” (procedural authority); this combination forms the Grassroots Proceduralist Organization.
Although it is theoretically plausible that these versions of authority mix in alternative ways (e.g., $W_1 + H_2 = \text{the “Charismatic Pragmatist Organization”} \), the resulting organization will not be able to establish its credibility as effectively as the three along the diagonal will, and therefore, INGO leaders are unlikely to choose these “off-diagonal” paths for themselves. For instance, while it is plausible that a charismatic leader ($W_1$) could inspire others on the basis of her dedication to making incremental change by focusing on achievable outcomes ($H_2$), this leader is likely to achieve greater success if she uses her charisma to energize those around her to pursue an ideal-state vision that is morally or ideologically grounded ($H_1$). These relationships (between $W_1$ and $H_1$, $W_2$ and $H_2$, and $W_3$ and $H_3$) are both more likely to occur naturally and more likely to be
effective when used together. As such, INGOs that are able to achieve a degree of success on the basis of their established legitimacy among their peers will tend to cluster around the three ideal types along the diagonal.

In fact, my empirical investigation into ten case organizations (the focus of Chapter 2) confirms the hypothesis that these specific linkages between who and how are quite common. In fact, all ten of the case INGOs resembled one of the three central ideal type models. If the sample of INGOs studied here is representative of the full landscape of INGOs, as it is designed to be, then it is reasonable to conclude that actual INGOs do cluster around these three ideal types. Therefore, throughout the forthcoming chapters, I focus on the three predominant ideal types:

- $W_1 + H_1 = \text{Moral Charismatic Organization}$;  
- $W_2 + H_2 = \text{Expert Pragmatist Organization}$; and  
- $W_3 + H_3 = \text{Grassroots Proceduralist Organization}$.

$W_1 + H_1 = \text{Moral Charismatic Organization (MCO)}$:

Many INGOs generate their ability to influence on the basis of the fact that they represent a group of charismatic individuals who solve problems in ways that are driven by ideological commitments and emotional attachments. When these authority sources are combined, a highly “anti-bureaucratic” organizational model emerges, which I call the Moral Charismatic Organization (MCO). In organizations that derive their ability to influence from the visionary
leadership and inspired followership of individuals endowed with extraordinary personal characteristics, we expect to find organizations in which personalities and emotional responses drive agenda-setting and decision-making processes. In these organizations, staff and followers will be highly devoted to the mission and the goals that visionary leaders communicate. Their cultures will promote a high degree of connectedness between individuals and their work, as well as mutual support among the organization’s staff and other external stakeholders.

When these features are combined with a fundamental commitment to pursuing an ideology driving the mission, we expect to find employees that are extraordinarily passionate and devoted to their cause. These individuals will also be committed to listening closely and responding thoroughly to needs as expressed by those receiving services – populations deemed to be “in need.” As such, these organizations will tend to avoid standardized, technocratic solutions to common problems, preferring instead to design each initiative around a specific set of contextual factors and needs. In order to fuel and sustain the engagement of their devoted staff members, MCOs will have systems in place to encourage broad participation in all organizational activities, as well as opportunities for personal and professional growth and learning across issue areas. These highly connected and mutually supportive employees will rarely say “no” to requests from co-workers and external stakeholders, as their desire is to commit themselves to providing for others.
When these systemic characteristics are combined within the context of an MCO, an organizational ideal type model emerges that stands in direct contrast to the ideal type bureaucratic IGO presented in Barnett and Finnemore’s work. These INGOs vehemently reject the possibility that they are static (or status quo) organizations. Unlike their bureaucratic counterparts, which they view as technical, impersonal, and dispassionate, these groups describe themselves as being truly connected to populations being served and responsive directly to their needs. Like Rothschild-Whitt’s “collectivist” organizations, which “explicitly reject the norms of rational-legal bureaucracy,” 124 MCOs differentiate themselves from organizations that they see as being inflexible, sluggish, and stifling of innovation, claiming that their un-bureaucratic approach facilitates more suitable responses to pressing and complex global issues. This rejection is not a reflection of a failure or slowness to implement bureaucratic systems; rather, it reflects an effort to promote entirely different values. 125 One managing director of a US-based global health organization summarized the classic MCO culture, which I discuss further in Chapter 2:

*We are not huge bureaucratic groups that can’t get anything done, and we do not take our orders from states or anyone else. We don’t like rules or hierarchy. ...We work quickly...we make decisions collectively, and we answer directly to the people.*

\[ W_2 + H_2 = \text{Expert Pragmatist Organization (EPO)}: \]

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When highly trained experts in particular technical or academic subject areas work together to solve problems using rational, data-driven arguments to persuade the relevant stakeholders to make incremental change that will ultimately drive toward achieving their desired outcomes, the Expert Pragmatist Organization (EPO) emerges. In organizations that derive their authority from the specialized expertise of individual members and leaders, we expect to find systems that facilitate the pursuit of—and celebrate the production of—high quality products and services, whether that entails research and reporting, technical assistance for governments and communities, or actual products delivered to populations in need. These organizations will strive for perfection through rigor and attention to detail, and the experts filling their halls will consistently engage in deep and meaningful internal dialogue about issues related to both the theory and practice of their work. Individual experts in these organizations will be endowed with a high degree of trust and autonomy to pursue their goals independent of oversight or guidance from administrative leaders. EPOs tend to have a distinctly academic culture, in which experts debate and criticize ideas until they are thoroughly vetted and deemed to be optimal solutions to particular problems.

When an organization stakes its legitimacy on its willingness to take an impartial, ends-oriented approach to achieving selfless goals, we expect that it will develop internal systems that promote the pursuit of outcomes even at the expense of due process and democratic inclusiveness. These INGOs will have
access to diverse external stakeholders that control different levers of power within a given society, including media outlets, state agencies, and for-profit corporations. EPOs tend to build unlikely and sometimes controversial partnerships, acknowledging that those with access to the most resources have the ability to create change on the largest scale. For instance, one EPO initiated a partnership with Walmart—a company that is largely seen as an “enemy” by many INGOs around the world—in pursuit of the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. These partners may not share the broader mission of the EPO, but they can help push forward the organization’s broader goals by making incremental change. EPOs will also develop excellent communication systems in order to successfully deliver tailored messages to distinct audiences. Their leaders and employees will share a commitment to avoiding unnecessary procedural steps—as well as unnecessary rejections for asking too much of partners—prioritizing the ends over the means by which their goals are pursued.

When expert and pragmatic authority claims are combined, the result is an ideal type organization that operates according to driving logic of doing “whatever it takes” to accomplish its goals. In the arenas of humanitarian aid, emergency relief, human rights advocacy, and development assistance, the groups that are willing to work with any partners using any means necessary to achieve their goals stand in clear contrast to the other models in this INGO typology. Their approach may seem misguided or misplaced to partners and peer organizations in their respective fields, particularly by those organizations
that are committed to pursuing either an uncompromising ideological position (as is the case with MCOs) or to respecting procedural norms of transparency, accountability and good governance above all else (as is the case with GPOs). These organizations may not always be seen as the easiest partners to work with by other civil society organizations, but they push forward real change by appealing to the sensibilities and harnessing the resources of actors across multiple industries.

\[ W_3 + H_3 = \text{Grassroots Proceduralist Organization (GPO)}: \]

When individuals empowered with knowledge of particular local communities pursue their missions with a deep commitment to upholding the standards of good governance and due process, organizations emerge that resemble the Grassroots Proceduralist Organization (GPO) ideal type. These organizations will devolve power into the hands of semi-sovereign organizational sub-divisions, usually appearing in the form of chapters, affiliates, or branches. Typically, these sub-units will be spread throughout the areas where the INGO operates, and situated as close to populations in need as possible. Each of these semi-sovereign units will develop a distinct sub-culture based on the particular localized experts leading their initiatives, and each of these sub-cultures will be characterized by a particular set of adopted norms and behavioral tendencies. Internal systems in GPOs will encourage “bottom-up” decision-making and agenda-setting practices, in which the localized sub-units
drive the discussion and set the organization’s preferences. Each sub-unit will have a high degree of autonomy and agency in driving its own agenda forward, but these decentralized offices will often come into conflict with one another and with the central organizing body for control over decisions and actions in the field.

GPOs tend to conduct their affairs in ways that are explicitly (and genuinely) committed to due process and good governance. They place a high premium on the principles of transparency, accountability, and democratic representation of stakeholders in agenda-setting and decision-making processes. These organizations will celebrate and prioritize procedural victories as much as, if not more than, they celebrate actual outcomes affecting peoples’ lives. In addition to following particular rules and guidelines, GPOs conduct their affairs in ways that are inclusive of multiple internal and external stakeholders. These INGOs are highly decentralized, and they can become highly disorganized when multiple sub-units simultaneously pursue their own ends under the umbrella of one unified organizational structure. These organizations are often characterized by tension between the central headquarters and the local office environments, in part because they may actually be in competition for external resources, but perhaps more importantly because they are in competition for decision-making authority within the organization. One leader clearly depicted this classic GPO tension:
It is our local national staff, who have an incredible knowledge of the places we work, that make us the strong force for good that we are. But that comes with a degree of entitlement. They feel like they can just control everything that’s happening here in our main office, but they don’t understand that we’re dealing with dozens of offices just like theirs facing different conditions and needs all around the world.

This chapter has argued that these distinct organizational ideal types emerge in ways that are far from arbitrary. Whether an organization behaves according to an internalized set of norms that promote flexibility, nimbleness, and rule-avoidance (i.e., the MCO), versus ones that promote technocratic proficiency and standardization across contexts (i.e., the bureaucratic IGO) is determined by the sources of those organizations’ authority. It is by no means coincidental that some INGOs develop decision-making processes that value the immediate emotional responses of passionate individuals (i.e., the MCO), while others rely on the specialized academic expertise of a few economists, scientists, or other experts (i.e., the EPO), and still others use the local knowledge of a highly connected set of decentralized leaders to determine their agendas (i.e., the GPO). There is an underlying logic driven by a set of theoretically predictable relationships that determines why one organization has a collectivist, consensus-driven culture while another has a highly autonomous and individualistic culture—or why one group sub-divides authority into confederated units around the world while another centralizes decision-making in the hands of a few key players in the headquarters office. To borrow the words of Schein, these
divergent cultures “guide and constrain the behavior of members of a group through the shared norms that are held in that group.”

As has been argued here, the source of these systemic organizational differences is *authority*. The claims that INGOs initially make to differentiate themselves from their peers and to legitimize their work have consequences for the ways in which they are ultimately designed and operated. Each authority source leads to the formation of certain kinds of internalized systems and schema that influence employees’ and leaders’ behavior. The distinctions between the three ideal types will be further illustrated in the following empirical chapter, which applies the ASF to the ten INGO cases, illustrating how these mechanisms operate within the walls of actual organizations. In Chapter 2, examples and descriptions will give meaning to the conceptual relationships outlined above. Together, Chapters 1 and 2 provide the foundation for a preliminary typology of INGOs—one that facilitates understanding of the expected behavioral and cultural tendencies of the many thousands of organizations serving the public interest around the world. Creating this typology constitutes the first step in presenting a theory of ordered relationships that exist in the complicated and diverse landscape of international actors. Throughout the rest of this work, this typology provides a foundation for discussing organizational inefficiencies (Part II) and potential ineffectiveness (Part III) in this increasingly large and influential category of international organizations.

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CHAPTER 2:

EMPirical Analysis: the Cases and the INGO Typology

To test the applicability of the typology presented in Chapter 1 to the world of INGOs, I conducted over 200 interviews, the majority of which were with practitioners working within ten case study organizations. The primary goal of these interviews was to ascertain how employees and leaders conceive of their own organizations and conduct their affairs. This empirical research suggests that INGOs do cluster around specific combinations of who and how, and they do resemble the predicted organizational systems outlined in Chapter 1. All ten of the case study organizations, selected as representative of the INGO landscape, fell into one of the three ideal type categories highlighted as being the most likely to occur in reality: $W_1+H_1 =$ Moral Charismatic Organization; $W_2+H_2 =$ Expert Pragmatist Organization; and $W_3+H_3 =$ Grassroots Proceduralist Organization.

After conducting the first few interviews with employees of a given INGO, I was able to identify the characteristics that they perceive as integral to their organization’s ability to earn legitimacy. These features became particularly clear when interviewees answered questions about what differentiates their organization from its peers. While I tailored the questions in each interview to

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127 See the Introduction to this work for a detailed overview of my research design and methodology.
the interviewee’s role and experiences, questions such as the following tended to
reveal widely-held beliefs about why each organization is perceived as being
legitimate: “Of all the organizations doing work in this area, why did you decide
that this particular one was the best fit for you?” “Why do you think your donors
are compelled to support your organization rather than others with a similar
mission?” Or, “What makes your organization better suited than others working
in this space to addressing this particular issue?” After aggregating and
interpreting sufficient qualitative data around these questions from practitioners
within each INGO, the distinct ways in which these groups conceive of their own
identities—and the sources of their own authority in their respective industries—
became clear to me.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the organizational systems outlined
in the INGO typology represent a combination of observable facts and unspoken
truths, and the task of determining which of these constituted the “more true”
reality within each case was easier than initially anticipated. In almost every case,
employees and leaders acknowledged remarkably similar tendencies within their
organizations. Employees and external partners recognized the same patterns
(and problems), and interviewees reported on these patterns and issues honestly
and thoroughly (though under conditions on anonymity).128 Even in large
INGOs with multiple departments and country offices, the normative fabric of

128 In Part II, which focuses on internal dysfunction, I discuss the topic of interviewee honesty in
greater detail, outlining a few reasons why I might have encountered more genuine self-reflection and
full disclosure than I expected.
their organization’s culture was recognized among employees whom I interviewed at nearly all levels of the organization and offices around the world. In the few cases in which observable facts and unspoken truths contradicted one another, most interviewees reported that the unspoken truths were more definitive of the organization’s actual behavior than the observable facts. For example, in cases where a hierarchical management structure is in place and widely disseminated among employees (observable fact), but employees largely ignore this formal structure in favor of using informal, networked communication across departments and reporting lines (unspoken truth), the latter was widely recognized as the “more true” organizational modus operandi.

The core organizational systems usually became apparent within the first few hours of interviews in any given INGO; however, I continued to conduct interviews with employees throughout these organizations until the initial insights were confirmed and re-confirmed across divisions and offices. Cultures and systems (as well as inefficiencies and cultural shifts, to be revisited) were remarkably apparent to and acknowledged by interviewees across cases. The INGOs studied here vary in terms of their resemblance to a particular ideal type; nevertheless, this research into ten diverse case organizations, in conjunction with a broader survey of the global aid and development landscape, suggests that many INGOs do exhibit the essential characteristics of the ideal constructions presented in Chapter 1, and most do cluster around the distinct categories based on the sources of their authority.
This chapter is divided into sections that individually address each of the three predominant ideal types described in Chapter 1. Throughout the chapter, I rely on the practitioners’ own words and perspectives as much as possible to illustrate the highly distinct nature of these three types of INGOs, and to reveal the extent to which employees and leaders recognize their own interpretive schema (and, later, their dysfunctional tendencies). The analysis in each section focuses on one case study organization that is a nearly perfect fit to the ideal type construct (Partners In Health as the Moral Charismatic Organization; the Environmental Defense Fund as the Expert Pragmatist Organization; Kiwanis International as the Grassroots Pragmatist Organization), but each section is also supported by reference to evidence from the other cases that fit each category to illustrate the similarities across diverse organizations. The conjectures presented at the end of this chapter provide the foundation for the discussions of inefficiency and ineffectiveness in Parts II and III.

I. \(W_1 + H_1\): The Moral Charismatic Organizations (MCOs)

The empirical research reveals that many INGOs do, in fact, become powerful on the basis of their moral and charismatic authority, and that these groups resemble the MCO ideal type organizational model along the dimensions described in Chapter 1. Four of my ten case study organizations clustered around this category: Partners In Health (PIH), Seeds of Peace (SOP), The Carter Center (TCC), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). While these INGOs
are diverse in terms of their goals, ages, and sizes, they share a set of core systemic features that are predicted by the ASF. Whereas bureaucracies are renowned for their adherence to procedures, these MCOs are just the opposite: their people are personally, emotionally, and passionately engaged, and their work is driven by ideological (rather than technical) requirements. Whereas bureaucracies may be filled with individuals who are at best “just doing [their] job”\textsuperscript{129} and at worst “lacking in heroism, human spontaneity, and inventiveness,”\textsuperscript{130} these four MCOs are filled with charismatic individuals who may sometimes lack sophisticated technical expertise but have particularly powerful personal charisma, as well as devotion to a cause. When combined, moral and charismatic authority claims enable these INGOs to build strong followership and commitment from within the organization and to inspire generous and wholehearted support from external stakeholders.\textsuperscript{131}

The first of the following MCO sections presents the context of the empirical analysis, providing some basic background information on the four INGOs that reflect the MCO ideal type model. The next section provides a discussion about the ways in which these organizations resemble particular features predicted in Chapter 1, beginning with W\textsubscript{1} (charismatic authority) and its associated systemic characteristics (devoted followership, supporter connectedness, and personality-driven decision-making), and followed by H\textsubscript{1} (moral authority) and

\textsuperscript{129} Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 708.
\textsuperscript{130} Weber, 1978: 216.
\textsuperscript{131} For comprehensive analyses of the consequences of charismatic leadership, see Bass, 1985; Avolio and Bass, 1988; Conger and Kanungo, 1987; Conger, Kanungo and Associates, 1988.
its associated systemic characteristics (*impassioned staff, a culture of ‘yes’, and needs-driven responsiveness*).

**A. Overview of the Four MCO Cases**

Background information about the four INGOs that reflect the MCO ideal type model aids in establishing the context of the empirical analysis. The most highly representative INGO of the four cases, Partners in Health (PIH), was co-founded by three students—Paul Farmer, Jim Kim, and Ophelia Dahl—in 1987 in order to provide a “preferential option for the poor,” specifically by ensuring that they have access to high quality healthcare services. So-called “PIH-ers” are dedicated to the idea that healthcare is a fundamental human right. By building close partnerships with local health providers in twelve countries around the world, PIH strives to implement sustainable, long-term strategies for addressing the health and wellness needs of some of the world’s most impoverished populations. While for many years the organization may have been considered marginal because of its self-described “radical” approaches to addressing the needs of the poor, today the organization is widely cited as being one of the most prominent and effective actors in the global health landscape.\(^{132}\) In his feature piece in the October 1\(^{st}\), 2012 issue of *Time Magazine*, former US President Bill Clinton devotes a paragraph to describing PIH as a “key example” of

\(^{132}\) Major news outlets from the *New York Times* to the *International Herald Tribune* have discussed PIH’s work in over 50 articles or reports in 2012 alone (PIH media page on website; consultation of major news source publications).
“innovation and cooperation”\textsuperscript{133} in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. During the last decade, the organization grew rapidly, thanks in part to a USD 45 million Gates Foundation grant, the publication of a best-selling book called \textit{Mountains Beyond Mountains: The Quest of Dr. Paul Farmer, A Man Who Would Cure the World},\textsuperscript{134} and the tragic 2010 Haiti earthquake.\textsuperscript{135} At present, PIH has over 13,000 employees around the world, and 42\% of its annual revenue of over USD 100 million comes from individual donors and family foundations.\textsuperscript{136}

The second MCO case example, Seeds of Peace International (SOP), is a US-based INGO dedicated to “[giving] rise to new generations of leaders uniquely inspired and equipped to build lasting peace.”\textsuperscript{137} Founded in 1993 by a prominent journalist, John Wallach, SOP was initially established to host groups of teenagers from conflict zones around the world at a summer camp in the US. The first summer coincided with the Oslo Accords process, and then-US President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and President of the Palestinian National Authority Yasser Arafat collectively welcomed the first 46 SOP youths from Israel, Palestine, Egypt and the US onto the White House lawn. Nearly 20 years later, SOP now operates year-round local and national programs that are intended to empower young people and instill in them a desire to

\textsuperscript{133} Clinton, 2012: 3.

\textsuperscript{134} Kidder, 2004.

\textsuperscript{135} Due to its long history of working in Haiti, PIH was a popular recipient of private donations during the months after the earthquake. During this period, PIH’s revenues nearly tripled, driving their annual income up from USD 63 million in FY2009 to USD 152 million in FY2010. Annual expenditures also tripled, increasing from USD 29 million in 2009 to nearly USD 90 million in 2010 (Partner In Health \textit{Annual Report}, 2010).

\textsuperscript{136} Partners In Health \textit{Annual Report}, 2012.

\textsuperscript{137} Seeds of Peace Website, 2012.
promote and advance peace in their regions. There are now over 5,000 “Seeds” (former campers) and educators operating SOP programs in 27 countries, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Despite its relatively small size and budget (USD 5.6 million in 2011), SOP has received an enormous amount of media attention; it has been mentioned in reputable news outlets nearly six hundred times during its first twenty years in operation.138

The third of my case organizations that resembles the MCO is The Carter Center (TCC). Founded in 1982 in accordance with the vision of former US President Jimmy and Mrs. Rosalynn Carter, the Center has operated in over 70 countries over the past three decades in order to achieve the following goals: “Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope.”139 This sweeping project incorporates programs intended to resolve conflict, advance democracy and human rights, increase economic prosperity, prevent disease and improve health conditions around the world. TCC claims to have reduced the incidence of guinea worm disease worldwide by 99.9%; observed 83 elections and strengthened democracy in 34 countries; offered diplomatic interventions in multiple conflict and post-conflict settings; fortified international human rights standards; and created innovative approaches to improving public health for impoverished and war affected population groups.140 As of 2012, TCC had roughly 200 permanent staff members and total annual revenues of USD 213

139 The Carter Center Website, 2012: Homepage.
140 The Carter Center Website, 2012.
million.\textsuperscript{141} Despite President Carter’s obvious political connections, the organization is rarely, if ever, perceived to operate as a quasi-political entity working to further the goals of the US government; it is a nonpartisan, non-governmental group that pursues humanitarian ends exclusively.

The fourth INGO case that fits into the MCO category is the International Rescue Committee (IRC). Founded in 1933 at the suggestion of Albert Einstein, the IRC has over 12,000 employees working in 40 countries around the world, including roughly 350 based in the New York City headquarters office. In 2012, the IRC raised over USD 387 million in revenue, and they spent 92\% of their total funds on program services for people in need around the world, of which 56\% was devoted to health and resettlement expenses, and the remaining funds were spent on community development, water and sanitation, education, and other distribution costs.\textsuperscript{142} The IRC’s original purpose was to assist European refugees suffering under the Nazi regime, but the mission has gradually expanded over time, and nearly eight decades later, the IRC is committed to responding to “the world’s worst humanitarian crises and help[ing] refugees to survive and rebuild their lives.”\textsuperscript{143} The organization focuses on meeting the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), but their work also includes long-term development and post-conflict reconstruction efforts after wars, natural disasters, and other humanitarian emergencies, as well as advocacy on behalf of those

\textsuperscript{141} The Carter Center Annual Report, 2011-2012. TCC revenue in 2011 was over USD 235 million.
\textsuperscript{142} The International Rescue Committee Annual Report, 2012.
\textsuperscript{143} The International Rescue Committee Website, 2012.
affected by conflict and repression. After an emergency occurs, the IRC is committed to “arriving on the scene within 72 hours with urgently needed supplies and expertise,” and to “staying as long as [they] are needed.”

B. THE CASES AS EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE MCO IDEAL TYPE

Particular leaders within each of these MCOs (e.g., Dr. Paul Farmer at PIH, President Carter at TCC, John Wallace at SOP, Albert Einstein at the IRC) are endowed with a set of charismatic qualities that enable them to inspire others to support their causes. The charismatic authority of the founder-leaders of these four diverse organizations has, in each case, allowed the groups to grow and generate support from donors, partners, and talented recruits. For instance, in the PIH case, the story of “Paul,” “Jim” and “Ophelia” working as students to improve the lives of impoverished Haitians is widely known among global health practitioners and supporters alike. Paul, in particular, has earned international recognition for his dedication to serving the poor and his personal charisma. Some employees suggest that nearly all of the individuals who

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144 The International Rescue Committee Website, 2012.
145 The true charismatic leader, Dr. Farmer was given a MacArthur “Genius” Fellowship (1993), a Heinz Award (2003), the Conrad N. Hilton Humanitarian Prize (2005), the American Medical Association’s International Award in Medicine, the Austin College Leadership Award (2007), the Sandor Teszler Award for Moral Courage and Service to Mankind (2007), and he was named the Skoll Foundation’s “Social Entrepreneur of the Year” (2008). PBS’s “RX for Survival” series says of Dr. Farmer, “In true Robin Hood fashion, Farmer has begged, borrowed, and stolen AIDS drugs from virtually any source he could find, carrying the pills back to Haiti in his suitcase.” His response to receiving credit for his actions was, “We didn’t do it to be a model program; we did it because people were croaking,” (“RX for Survival,” 2006). One Cornell Health International student summarizes how countless young people see Dr. Farmer: “Dr. Paul Farmer has an amazing ability to see to the heart of many of the global health crises of our time” and his “unabashed quest for ending suffering shines through in everything he does” (Cornell Health International, 2007).
worked for and supported PIH during its first two decades joined the project because of what one staff member referred to as “Paul’s powerful presence and persuasiveness.” Employees at all levels report that it is largely thanks to Paul’s ability to convince all types of audiences that PIH’s mission is worth supporting. In the words of one of PIH’s senior directors, “[Global health is] a wretched topic, but we have a great time because Paul inspires us. Thanks to him, it’s been very easy to get people ‘on board’ over the years.” The followership that once resembled “idol-worshipping” of Paul, Jim and Ophelia has since diminished somewhat, in part because both Paul and Jim took positions in other organizations in recent years.\(^\text{146}\) Nevertheless, even after 25 years, the organization still highly resembles Weber’s “charismatic community;” leaders and employees are deeply personally committed and connected to the mission of the organization, and others respect and even revere their enthusiasm and dedication.

President Carter and John Wallace also embody the charismatic leader archetype, endowing their organizations with charismatic authority. As a former US President, TCC’s founder commands respect from political officials, institutional leaders, and civilians alike. Most interviewees at TCC said they work for the Center because President Carter is a personal inspiration, a national hero, and a Nobel Peace Prize winning international diplomat; in one employee’s

\(^{146}\) In August 2009, Dr. Farmer was named United Nations Deputy Special Envoy to Haiti, and in March 2009, Dr. Kim became the President of Dartmouth University. In April 2012, Dr. Kim became the President of the World Bank.
words, this is not because of “some doe-eyed naivety or celebrity fascination. It’s out of real respect and admiration for the man that everyone we encounter around the world shares.” Of John Wallace, SOP employees reported: “[He] was a visionary, a dreamer...and he dreamed on a big scale. And he made a lot of big dreams come true, and that’s why we followed him towards his goals;” he was “an inspiration to everyone around him;” “he had passion and the power of persuasion and inspiration in his corner.”

As is predicted by the ASF, the centrality of charismatic leaders in these INGOs produces the characteristic of devoted followership: people inside and outside the organizations tend to behave like passionate but obedient followers. They complete their tasks with an unusually high degree of intensity given the relatively minimal material gains they stand to earn for their work, and they tend to act and advocate in ways that perpetuate the expressed vision and preferences of their charismatic leaders. In the words of one PIH-er, “The ethos of Paul Farmer and everything he represents [...] is huge for us. The commitment of the individuals who work here and support us...they choose to do [what Paul thinks is right], and they never waiver. It’s incredible.” For PIH, employees and supporters are committed not just to the work itself, but also to following those who envision the change that needs to be achieved. Individuals supporting PIH are not simply supporting the work of an INGO; they see themselves as being part of a “movement for health and social justice.” The proliferation of “communities of concern” — or groups of private citizens around the world who
organize local fundraising and awareness events to benefit PIH — illustrates the
degree to which this INGO has inspired devoted followership.

Second, the devoted followers and supporters of these four MCOs are
highly connected to one another and to the populations being served; the
“charismatic community” that forms in and around these groups lays the
foundation for strong partnerships and a mutual sense of loyalty among
employees and stakeholders (supporter connectedness). One PIH employee said of
her co-workers: “We are all such good friends. That’s not normal in the
workplace.... Wanting to achieve a common goal overrides the differences
between people. Everyone is so emotionally invested, which puts up some
blinders and roadblocks, but it helps us push through the work as a team.”
Another interviewee said, “The spiritual component is something that we all
share, so I feel a bond with them [co-workers] that is really deep. It creates a
culture of trust and affection, and it’s funny how much of that is unspoken, but
it’s definitely there.” At SOP, many interviewees referred to the organization as a
“family,” in which personal relationships drive the professional work; one
interviewee reported, “I say ‘I love you’ to my boss. My staff were my
‘Seeds’... my ‘kids,’ before they were my employees. Many of our donors were
once counselors. I’d say it’s a pretty unique place.” This unusual sense of
connectedness among stakeholders at these INGOs manifests in everyday
interactions within them; individuals support and enable one another, and they
are constantly seeking ways to include peers and supporters in both major and minor organizational decisions.

But the highly supportive, inclusive, and personal nature of these MCO environments means that decisions tend to be primarily driven by the immediate emotional responses and passionate pleas of individuals, rather than by rational, technical, or strategic calculations about what is best for the organization (personality-driven decision-making). As graduate students, PIH’s co-founders made personal decisions on the basis of what and who they cared about—not on the basis of any prior experience or academic expertise. To a large extent, PIH still operates according to this highly personalized logic even after 25 years of accumulated experience and knowledge. As one PIH leader said, the organization remains “very Paul-centric in our mindset and our decision making...we’re creative, and we push the envelope, and we hope the money comes through.” Many noted that there is a degree of conflict between the need to make financially and strategically responsible decisions and the ongoing practice of acting on the basis of personal preferences and emotional responses to problems as they arise. One interviewee described this as a conflict between those who want to “decide on the fly and do whatever it takes,” and the people who have to say, “No, we can’t—we don’t have the money, the time, or the people.” Individuals at these MCOs will generate enthusiasm and push for alignment around issues that they personally care about and solutions that they believe constitute the “right” behavior. Consequently, MCO actions do not
always reflect accepted standards and best practices, or technically effective
approaches. In the words of one PIH-er, “People just say ‘I really care about this,’
and then we’re off to the races! People take on faith that there is going to be
enough money for it.”

The preference for relying on personal and emotional appeals rather than
rational, technical, or rules-based criterion for decision making often means that
these organizations rely more heavily on syndicating through informal and
networked dialog, rather than through formal, structured reporting and
communication. Thus, while organizational charts may be widely disseminated
among MCO employees, most report that they use these as useful information to
keep in mind, rather than strict rules governing reporting and decision-making
processes. In one SOP leader’s words, “It’s much more of a network than a chart.
Everybody is dealing with everyone’s business all the time. It’s like a web...or a
flat surface with a lot of connections between people throughout the
organization.” The fact that leaders, staff members, and supporters operate
according to a “web-like” logic of communication, using informal networked
connections to accomplish tasks, has important consequences for how these
MCOs respond to challenges and adapt to changing environments (to be
revisited in Part III).

These four MCOs also define themselves on the basis of having a truly
mission- or ideology-driven approach to solving problems. This version of moral
authority goes well beyond other actors making “a positive normative evaluation
of the organization and its activities,”¹⁴⁷ or accepting their actions as being morally righteous.¹⁴⁸ This version of moral authority (defined in Chapter 1 of this work) gains currency only if the organization claiming to have it is perceived as genuinely acting out of a deep ideological commitment to serving populations in need. These four INGOs define themselves on the basis of being genuinely selfless; they believe it is their mission to do what is necessary to serve the world’s most devastated populations; they do not back away from the underlying ideological commitment no matter who stands in opposition to it. Characteristic of this description, PIH-ers exhibit a fierce commitment to the idea that healthcare is a fundamental human right; at SOP, they deeply believe that empowering youth can reduce international conflict; at TCC, it is an ideological belief in the idea that peace is possible when populations are sufficiently served; and the IRC is unwaveringly committed to promoting the idea that all people living in harm’s way deserve a home where they are safe and secure.

As all four of these INGOs share a fundamental commitment to serving populations in need, their policies and practices are designed and implemented in a way that treats the needs of communities being served as sacrosanct. One leader at the IRC referred to his organization’s “morally right and pure” commitment to “helping the world’s most vulnerable people under terrible conditions” as an “oath... that we all live by.” The “PIH Vision” clearly

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¹⁴⁸ Hall, 1997: 594.
articulates the moral, ideological underpinning of their work: “When a person in Peru, or Siberia, or rural Haiti falls ill, PIH uses all of the means at our disposal to make them well... Whatever it takes. Just as we would do if a member of our own family—or we ourselves—were ill.”149 TCC claims that all of its work is “guided by a fundamental commitment to human rights and the alleviation of human suffering,” and its ambitious goals include seeking to “prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and improve health.” Importantly, these goals are not just stated on MCO websites and annual reports; they appear to be deeply internalized by employees and believed to be genuine by external stakeholders.

First, these MCOs’ employees are indeed remarkably passionate about pursuing their respective ideologies (*impassioned staff*). At PIH, individuals use the phrases “O for the P” (short for providing a preferential “option for the poor”) and “H of G” (short for the characteristic of “hermeneutic of generosity”) consistently throughout conversations, meetings, and other casual interactions, as reminders of the principles that are guiding their work. In one interviewee’s words, “People here don’t just believe in the mission—they live and breathe it.”

According to another, there is a “culture of trust” because employees share a “spiritual commitment to the work that bonds us together.” At SOP, “People are passionately involved...it’s personal and emotional for them.” Whether they are headquarters staff in New York City or program staff in the field around the

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149 Partners In Health Website, 2012: “Vision.”
world, SOP supporters seem uniformly enthusiastic and committed to the underlying ideology that peace is achievable.

Human resources departments within these MCOs report that personal values and devotion to the mission are more important criterion for hiring (with respect to most positions) than are technical qualifications or expertise. As such, people working in these INGOs resemble the opposite of Weber’s bureaucratic “specialists without spirit.” They are truly passionate and committed to their causes, and they tend to care more about the mission than their own personal career advancement. One IRC employee said, “Ladder-climbers’ don’t do well here. We don’t attract them, and the culture is not friendly to them. We prioritize more than just intelligence and efficiency—it’s about morality.” A PIH leader similarly noted, “This is not an organization where people just come to work to do their work. We stand behind our organization; we fight for our goals; we never stop believing that we can make real change.” After an extensive internal review of one of these MCOs, a private consulting firm determined that this INGOs’ greatest strength and best comparative advantage in terms of fundraising and partnership building was its passionate, devoted, selfless staff members.

Secondly, in line with this tendency to prioritize the pursuit of a cause over everything else, these organizations breed cultures in which it is rare to refuse when a peer, supporter, or person in need makes a request (a culture of ‘yes’). MCOs are highly responsive to emotional appeals for their help, and they

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tend to acquiesce even when it would be more strategically or financially responsible to refuse assistance. This attitude often leads these MCOs to commit to increasingly complex and time-consuming tasks, some of which may not constitute the most effective ways to achieve their goals. At PIH, many employees report that they are implicitly guided by a “whatever it takes” mentality; they are willing to give of themselves completely, and push their organization beyond its capacity if necessary in order to make sure that communities are being served according to the full extent and specificity of their needs. In one staff member’s words, “If people want a house and they ask us to build it for them, we’re going to build it, even though…we should probably be focusing on the health stuff.”

On occasion, PIH will fly specific patients from Haiti, Rwanda, or elsewhere to the US, and cover their costs of treatment at the world’s finest healthcare facilities in New York and Boston. Arguably, this is not a cost-effective use of donations; however, PIH-ers often find themselves incapable of saying “no” when a patient is in need. There is an inherent danger in this approach. As one PIH-er noted, “We want to respond to everyone’s needs, so we do way too much. We lose sight of what our core competency is — what our strategy is. We end up with field teams that have to struggle to keep a good program running.”

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151 For instance, in 2010-11, PIH moved 39 Twa families from their grass-thatched housing in the remote hills of Nyamicucu, Rwanda, into metal-roofed houses “conveniently close to schools, health care, and water facilities” (Partners In Health, 2011: “From Grass-Thatched to Metal Roofs”).
Leaders within the other MCOs are similar in this regard; they rarely refuse an opportunity to help individuals in need because it will be too costly, too time-consuming, or too dangerous. In one IRC leader’s words, “It’s a cowboy mentality that saves lives, and even as we have gotten bigger and more systematic, we’ve maintained that ‘pioneerist,’ ‘just get the job done’ spirit.” Another said, “When there’s an issue that needs resolving right away, when there are people suffering who need our help, we just forget the rules and do it, and no one can stand in the way or say, ‘No we can’t.’” Even with 12,000 employees spread throughout 40 countries, IRC staff members are convinced that “‘Red tape’ never holds us back... We’re just going to find a way ... to get the job done.” Another reported, “If there’s anything happening in the world, anywhere, even if it’s not what we usually do or are good at, we are going to respond and engage. We need to be there. People need our help.” The stated mission may limit the organization to emergency relief for refugees and IDPs, but this MCO responds to evolving needs around the world with ever-expanding development and relief projects.

This tendency to say “yes” is linked to the third feature that these MCOs’ moral authority produces: an immediate and direct responsiveness to needs as expressed by populations being served (needs-driven responsiveness). Because of their deep moral commitments to their causes, these four MCOs prioritize the demands and perspectives of people who are directly affected by the issues over the preferences of donors and the strategic plans of senior administrators. Their
employees pride themselves on listening fully and intently to what it is that the people they serve are asking for, rather than relying on academic theories of effective aid or on their industry peers’ notions of what is the approach with the greatest impact. A direct but perhaps unintended consequence of this needs-driven behavior is that these MCOs often develop innovative approaches that are uniquely suited to the characteristics of specific communities. Unlike their bureaucratic counterparts, which tend to apply standardized approaches to problems across diverse geographic locations,¹⁵² MCOs respond to particular needs in highly tailored ways as they arise. As one PIH-er said, “The only thing standard about our model is that we are flexible and innovative.” It is the patients’ and communities’ needs that drive the development of new initiatives in the field. Another noted, “We will never give someone a death sentence by not getting them what they actually need, regardless of what we thought they needed before we got to know them.” Similarly, at SOP the culture is one of “getting as much advice and insight from the ground from the people who are closest to our Seeds. [...] The local vision takes priority over everything else.... The Seeds should—and usually do—drive everything.”

As a result of all of these features, INGOs that resemble the MCO ideal type tend to develop personalized, flexible, and innovative approaches to providing services to and advocating on behalf of the populations they serve.

¹⁵² As will be discussed in Chapter 3, Barnett and Finnemore (1999; 2004) call this pathology “bureaucratic universalism.”
These organizations are suspicious of rules and standardized procedures that they see as hindering their ability to provide flexible, tailored solutions immediately. They are highly supportive and trusting of one another and of the populations they serve. They make decisions according to emotional impulses and moral criteria, rather than strategic or financial requirements. One PIH leader succinctly summarized the core characteristics of the MCO ideal type, describing her organization in the following way: “nimble, fast-moving, responsive, ... creative, innovative, push-the-envelope, do whatever it takes.” Employees have what one called a “knee-jerk reaction to the idea of bureaucracy” because they “still think of themselves as a really small, tight-knit family, working rapidly to get patients what they need.” Individuals in MCOs are highly devoted to their cause, to their leaders, and to each other; they enjoy their work, even when it is emotionally and physically taxing; they feel responsible to those they serve and to one another, even when they are frustrated and exhausted; and they are dedicated to pursuing the organization’s mission, even if it is clearly elusive or impossible to achieve.

II. $W_2 + H_2 = \textit{The Expert Pragmatist Organizations (EPOs)}$

While MCOs certainly occur frequently in empirical reality, many other INGOs earn their legitimacy on the basis of different identity claims. In the case of the EPO, these organizations differentiate themselves on the basis of their specialized theoretical or academic expertise in particular areas, in combination
with their commitment to taking a pragmatic, outcomes-oriented approach to solving global problems. Three of the case study organizations clustered around the EPO ideal type: the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). These organizations are led by teams of people who are committed to gathering and disseminating accurate and compelling data, and to using this data to persuade powerful public and private sector actors to make incremental change that will ultimately promote public welfare in some way. Although they address diverse issues, these INGOs share a fierce commitment to precision and quality, and they are eager to debate ideas among themselves and with others until the best outcome is determined.

In the EPO section of this chapter, I first contextualize the empirical analysis, providing some basic background information on the three INGOs that resemble this ideal type. Next, I discuss the ways in which these organizations resemble particular features predicted in Chapter 1, beginning with W2 (expert authority) and its associated systemic characteristics (perfectionism, persistent debate, and individual independence), and followed by H2 (pragmatic authority) and its associated systemic characteristics (ends-over-means approach, partnership pluralism, and a strong ‘inside game’).

A. OVERVIEW OF THE THREE EPO CASES
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) is the case organization that most nearly resembles the EPO ideal type. Headquartered in New York City and founded by a group of lawyers and environmentalists in 1967 who harnessed the power of the law to defend the environment, EDF is best known for its work on environmental policy issues including global warming, climate change, and ecosystem restoration. “We’re different,” the EDF website reads, because “we are passionate, pragmatic environmental advocates.” This non-partisan organization describes its work in the following way: “Grounded in science, we forge partnerships and harness the power of market incentives” to solve “the world’s most pressing environmental issues.”\textsuperscript{153} The Economist magazine called EDF “America’s most economically literate green campaigners,”\textsuperscript{154} and more recently this organization has received attention for its efforts to integrate “environmental metrics with core business strategies”\textsuperscript{155} within diverse private and public companies. According to Charity Navigator, an independent evaluator of non-profit organizations, EDF is “a leading national organization” providing “solutions that win lasting political, economic, and social support because they are nonpartisan, cost-efficient and fair.”\textsuperscript{156} With a USD 116 million budget in 2012 and a staff of roughly 350 in offices across the US, China and Mexico, EDF is

\textsuperscript{153} Environmental Defense Fund Website, 2012.
\textsuperscript{154} The Economist, 1991: 7.
\textsuperscript{155} The Economist, 2012.
\textsuperscript{156} Charity Navigator, 2012.
dedicated to finding “practical and lasting solutions to the most serious environmental problems.”

Another EPO, Human Rights Watch (HRW) is committed to “defending and protecting human rights” by “focusing international attention where human rights are violated.” To use their words, HRW uses “rigorous, objective investigations and strategic, targeted advocacy” to “build intense pressure for action and raise the cost of human rights abuse.” HRW was founded in 1978 as “Helsinki Watch” in order to ensure that the Soviet Union was in compliance with the Helsinki Accords and expose violations to the international media. After the addition of Americas Watch in 1981, Asia Watch in 1985, and Africa Watch in 1988, the so-called “Watch Committees” were incorporated as “Human Rights Watch” in 1988. With USD 152 million in total revenues in 2011 and nearly 300 full-time staff and researchers working in more than 80 countries around the world, HRW publishes more than 100 reports and hundreds of news releases concerning human rights abuses each year. In order to maintain its independence, this INGO does not accept funding from any government, either directly or indirectly. HRW meets with state governments, IGOs, regional governance bodies (e.g., the European Union, the African Union), and private corporations “to press for changes in policy and practice that promote human

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rights and justice around the world.” Since 1993, when Ken Roth became the Executive Director, the organization has grown eight-fold in size and dramatically expanded its global reach.

A younger but equally representative EPO, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) was founded in 2001 to “help societies in transition address legacies of massive human rights violations and build civic trust in state institutions as protectors of human rights.” ICTJ works in immediate post-conflict societies, countries emerging from oppressive regimes, as well as democracies where a history of violence or injustice is unresolved. Whereas HRW and EDF work primarily with governments and companies to achieve large-scale change from the “top-down,” ICTJ often works directly with local civil society groups, or “the people who are driving and shaping change in their societies” from the ground. Providing technical assistance and capacity building services, the ICTJ works to promote domestic ownership and victim involvement in transitional justice processes, including criminal prosecutions, war crimes tribunals, truth commissions, reparations legislation and institutional reform. Unlike the previous wave of human rights NGOs, which generally focused exclusively on documentation of abuse and advocacy, ICTJ focuses on implementing policies and practices that will help societies heal from the inside by addressing past crimes. With just over 100 full-time staff working in 30

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countries around the world, the ICTJ operates with less than USD 12 million in annual revenue.\textsuperscript{162}

\textbf{B. The Cases as Empirical Illustrations of the EPO Ideal Type}

All three of these case INGOs generate their authority on the basis of the individual experts who constitute their leaders, researchers, and staff (W\textsubscript{2}), as well as their pragmatic, outcomes-oriented approach (H\textsubscript{2}) to creating global change. EPOs’ perceived expert authority and the associated systemic organizational features are scrutinized first, followed by an exposition of the systems that emerge because of EPOs’ pragmatic authority. In the words of one EDF leader, “Our unique value proposition is that we have all these PhDs in science and economics from Ivy League schools. It’s all about the expertise and knowledge we bring to bear on issues.” An employee argued that the reason he decided to work at EDF, rather than a different environmental NGO, was because of “their extraordinary ... ‘stable’ of experts, who are seen as being credible by political and business leaders alike.” At HRW, employees believe that they have earned success because other actors perceive their organization as the following: “rigorous,” “academic,” “authoritative,” “neutral,” and “information-driven.” Employees frequently noted that their work is more focused on gathering and disseminating credible and academically rigorous research than it is on advocating for policy change. Similarly, ICTJ is composed of what one

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\textsuperscript{162} International Center for Transitional Justice \textit{Annual Report}, 2011.
\end{flushright}
external partner called “a really high profile staff with impressive CVs and rich international experience including government-level leadership.” It is not uncommon for these EPOs to actively recruit and devote significant resources toward hiring industry experts from other organizations across sectors; for instance, one environmental economist explained in our interview how EDF “poached” him from a prestigious, high paying consulting firm, agreeing to pay out the firm the rest of his contract.

As discussed in Chapter 1, expert authority is distinct from localized authority, though they both relate to the specialized knowledge of particular kinds of individuals. In the case of the latter, individuals have a high degree of knowledge about and connectedness within particular locales (discussed in the forthcoming GPO sections). In the case of the former, by contrast, experts have specialized technical knowledge or academic training in particular subject areas (e.g., human rights law, environmental economics, transitional justice). They are often trained in elite academic and policy institutions, and thus, endowed with a degree of authority on the basis of their resumes and experiences. One EDF interviewee described the difference between the “experts” of the EPO and the localized leaders of the GPO as follows: “Our experts aren’t ‘grassroots types.’ They make decisions because they know the theory, the landscape, and all the cases around the world. We don’t really have much of that local connection ... unlike, say, Greenpeace. That’s not how we think you get to the best solutions that can be applied globally.” These EPOs, and EDF in particular, are committed
to being “highly informed and highly educated,” and to making “an intellectual appeal...to smart, data-driven people who care about the quality of life of people on the planet.”

As predicted by the ASF, INGOs that derive their authority from their perceived expertise will, as a result, develop a set of internal organizational systems with three distinctive characteristics. First, they exhibit an intense commitment to producing high quality products and services (*perfectionism*). In order to maintain their credibility as expert voices on particular issues, EPOs must maintain an extraordinarily high standard—for both their people and their products. As one researcher for HRW put it, because we are “known for our accurate fact-finding and impartial reporting ... we have to continue to hire the smartest, fastest, most aggressive people to conduct the best research on human rights abuses available anywhere, including the halls of the ivory tower.” In their 2011 Annual Report, HRW writes that the first and most critical step in “how [they] work” is to “investigate”—or to conduct “meticulous research that provides irrefutable evidence of serious human rights abuse....” Unlike in MCOs, where individuals are often hired on the basis of their values and commitment to the mission, human resources teams in EPOs are concerned with finding the most highly educated, intellectually capable, and analytically rigorous people they can find. In the words of one HRW employee, “we are told to hire the smartest people in the pool...the most capable and effective people we can find...and that trumps everything else.” At EDF, one leader reported: “Nothing
can seem half-baked or sloppy, not when you’re working with Starbucks, FedEx and McDonalds, and not when you have a reputation to uphold.” Staff members in EPOs almost compulsively crosscheck and edit even seemingly nonessential pieces of writing and research. Consequently, these EPOs’ organizational cultures were described by employees as “intense,” “stressful,” “high-pressure,” and “anxiety provoking.” “We’re terrified that we’re going to make a mistake,” one HRW employee noted; “everything has to be perfect all the time.”

The second organizational consequence of legitimacy derived from issue experts is the tendency to discuss, debate and analyze both theoretical and applied questions (persistent debate). One HRW administrator explained this behavior in the following way:

*Our staff are great at what they do because they question things. They want to know why, why, why...why this policy, and why that approach. They challenge authority and they challenge the status quo. They want to make sure that everything is right, and that’s why they’re so successful at what they do. But because of that, we have to discuss and justify everything that we do as an organization. These debates would not happen in a place where the people weren’t so committed to questioning everything they see and hear.*

EPO employees debate issues related to both policy and practice, and they deliberate over questions that are both strategically essential and barely consequential at all. As might be the case in an institution of higher learning, individuals can expect to defend their positions to respectful yet critical audiences, and to receive feedback that is generally constructive and data-driven. Decisions are reached and positions adopted within the organization when positions are thoughtfully presented and sufficiently defended. As such, EPOs
are open to adaptation and innovation, but only after potential changes are thoroughly discussed and vetted among the experts. As such, change tends to occur slowly and deliberately, if it occurs at all. Because EPOs have a relatively rigid and incrementalist approach to conducting their affairs, they stand in contrast with their MCO counterparts, which prioritize their ability to act swiftly and in innovate, unconstrained ways.

Thirdly, senior administrators in EPOs tend to endow individual experts with an unusually high degree of autonomy and independence (individual independence). Because of their expertise and relevant affiliations, these individuals often initiate quasi-independent research projects and network among other professionals, thus promoting their organization’s brand among members of a particular epistemic community. At EDF, many employees echoed the sentiment of one interviewee, who said, “People regard themselves as fiercely independent.” Another noted, “People get very into their own worlds and their own areas of interest, so much so that we don’t really know what’s going on in the rest of the organization.” Because individuals in EDF and other EPOs have their own interest areas and agendas, people “know who to approach about certain issues, so there is very little formal strategizing or joint collaboration across programs.” Agendas in EPOs tend to be driven by the independent interests of the experts, in ways that often do not necessarily reflect the strategic interests of the organization at large. The result is a highly independent, autonomous culture in which individuals pursue their own
(perhaps tangential) initiatives and rarely collaborate across divisions. Perhaps out of necessity, these experts are generally trusted to act in accordance with the organization’s principles and preferences; as one HRW employee noted, “You don’t have to ‘toe the line,’ and you’re free to express that you have a conflict with something or your own idea that is different and you want to pursue it.... There’s an implicit trust that ultimately the organization’s interests will be served by what you’re doing.”

In addition to deriving their authority from their expert staff and leaders, these EPOs become legitimate in the eyes of particular supporters on the basis of their pragmatic approach to solving problems. For instance, when asked why his organization was different from its peers in the environmental landscape, an EDF leader said, “Because we’re more rigorously pragmatic, more data-driven, especially on the academic stuff. We want to make a little progress and build on it ... rather than just yelling into a megaphone and asking for major change all at once.” Another noted, “Quite honestly, we’re much more rational in our approach...much less interested in a fundamental economic and social critique as a core element of our advocacy, and more interested in achieving step-by-step outcomes.” The centrality of pragmatic authority to these EPOs often became apparent in contrast to one particular peer NGO—for instance, Greenpeace in the case of EDF, and Amnesty International in the case of HRW. As one HRW leader said, “We’re not process-oriented like Amnesty; we’re more outcomes oriented. We’re not the pacifist organization calling for grassroots change; we’re
pragmatic, we’re practical, we’re results oriented.” An interviewee at EDF similarly said, “People don’t want to be screamed at; they want to engage on the issues with an org that cares about making real progress. ... [Greenpeace] wants big change they can never get, and we want small change we know we can achieve.” EDF’s slogan “finding the ways that work” succinctly encapsulates this explicitly pragmatic approach to achieving their goals.

As a result of this core identity claim, EPOs engage in behavior that treats ends as critical, and means as less essential (ends-over-means approach). Employees often have a pragmatic focus on incremental effectiveness, rather than an ideological commitment to an end-state vision. To use the words of one EDF leader, “We know what we are good at, and what we can achieve,” and “[we do] whatever works to reach the goals we set.” As another interviewee noted, “We are still within the bounds of what’s ethical and sustainable, but we’re willing to look at solutions that are outside our comfort zone.” This outcomes-oriented approach creates the conditions under which EPOs create partnerships with diverse, and sometimes controversial, actors (partnership pluralism). For instance, EDF has partnered with McDonalds to reduce their styrofoam usage, with Starbucks to reduce their cardboard distribution, and with Walmart to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. In the words of one EDF interviewee, “We are pulling multiple levers and collaborating across industries; we don’t have a ‘cut and dr[ied]’ approach like Greenpeace to who we work with.” He later added, “We get approached often by groups that can’t go anywhere else, others would
tell them to just shut down because they’re ‘evil’ ... But they want to make a change, and we want to help them.”

This willingness to find common ground among unlikely partners is closely related to the third organizational feature, which is a tendency to prefer—and excel at—advocating for change through targeted, “backdoor” communication, rather than through public or mass mobilization. As one interviewee at EDF suggested, “We play a very good ‘inside game,’ because governments and businessmen see us as a group they can work with.” In a way, this strong inside game represents the natural culmination of the other EPO features described here: the issue-area expertise, the careful attention to detail and factual accuracy, the focus on achieving outcomes and partnering with powerful institutions that can help produce real change. HRW calls their approach to pushing change “‘grasstops’ advocacy,” which they claim contrasts directly with the “grassroots public messaging” of Amnesty and other human rights organizations. An interviewee at ICTJ likened her organization to a consulting firm, working with leaders across the institutional landscape, even those with a history of human rights abuses, to promote “change from within.” “We run the world quietly,” one EDF employee said, “whereas Greenpeace does ‘campaigns’ that are loud and push for extreme ideals. They’re the activists, and that’s great, but we cut the deals.” EPOs tend to be highly connected to powerful players within diverse institutions—from national governments and intergovernmental organizations to businesses to media outlets. One EDF
interviewee summarized how many of these EPO characteristics operate simultaneously and are mutually reinforcing:

We excel at playing the game. We are the org that all kinds of groups feel comfortable talking to quietly. Our counsel is valued by governments and businesses alike precisely because people see us as economically minded, scientifically grounded, and temperamentally mature. [...] There are no antics in what we do and how we advocate, and so people feel good about inviting us into their board rooms and their cabinet rooms because they know that we’re not going to ‘name and shame’ them or alienate them. We’re going to work with them to make change that will actually save people’s lives and improve the health of the planet.

III. \(W_3 + H_3 = \text{The Grassroots Proceduralist Organizations (GPOs)}\)

The above section on EPOs contained numerous instances in which employees within these organizations differentiated themselves from their direct peers on the basis of their own conception of the culture and behavior of the organization to which they belong. These peer INGOs against whom the EPOs were contrasting themselves (grassroots organizations that are highly proficient at mobilizing mass support and are uncompromising in their partnerships and messaging) cluster around the third ideal type model addressed in Chapter 1: the GPO. These organizations derive their authority from a combination of having access to localized expertise about specific communities being served and being committed to following certain procedural norms (i.e., democratic governance and accountability to stakeholders) in pursuit of their ends. Of the ten case organizations included in this research, three—Kiwanis International (KI), and Oxfam International (OI), and Mercy Corps (MC)—embody the predicted
features of the GPO. Following background information on these three INGOs is an assessment of the ways in which they resemble specific features predicted by the ASF, beginning with \( W_3 \) (\textit{localized authority}) and its associated systemic characteristics (\textit{decentralized autonomy}, ‘bottom-up’ agenda-setting, and \textit{subordinate sub-cultures}), and followed by \( H_3 \) (\textit{procedural authority}) and its associated systemic characteristics (\textit{transparent culture}, means-over-ends approach, and \textit{multi-stakeholder decision-making}).

**A. Overview of the Three GPO Cases**

The most highly representative GPO of these three INGOs is Kiwanis International (KI), a service organization founded in 1916 by two businessmen to provide “an opportunity for other men to experience new ideals in human relationships.”\textsuperscript{163} What began as a networking organization for young businessmen with a service component has since grown into a global volunteer organization with over 840,000 members of varieties of types of local service clubs,\textsuperscript{164} including over 600,000 adult members in more than 8,500 Kiwanis Clubs in 96 countries, all of whom are “seeking to improve people’s lives.” As the

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\textsuperscript{163} Kiwanis International Website, 2012: “Kiwanis: The Beginning to the Present.”

\textsuperscript{164} In addition to the standard “Kiwanis Clubs,” KI also operates other types of service clubs for people around the world. Aktion Clubs allow adults living with disabilities to participate in community service projects and develop leadership skills. Circle K International (CKI) is the largest university service leadership organization, which more than 12,000 young people volunteering in 17 nations. The secondary school version of Kiwanis, called Key Club International, is the oldest and largest service organization for teens in the world, with over 250,000 members in 5,000 school-based clubs in 30 countries. Builders Club, a youth leadership and civic engagement variation on the Kiwanis theme, has over 42,000 adolescent members designing and executing local community service projects around the world. Finally, Kiwanis Kids offers engagement opportunities for over 33,000 primary school aged children.
website reads, “Each community’s needs are different—so each Kiwanis club is different;” however, a typical Kiwanis club raises money to fund local projects that help people living in their “backyard,” such as helping the homeless, promoting literacy, or supporting youth leadership programs. These Kiwanis clubs raise over USD 100 million annually from local families and businesses, and they conduct roughly 150,000 service projects per year to support local populations in need. KI remained a North American organization until 1962 when global expansion was approved, and it remained an all-male organization until 1988 when women could become members. Since the 1990s, the organization has turned its attention from providing highly differentiated assistance in response to specific local conditions to projects which seek to address a need identified as widespread: the current Kiwanis slogan reads, “Serving the Children of the World.” In line with this revised purpose, Kiwanis launched two global service projects involving all of its clubs: the IDD (Iodine Deficiency Disorders) Campaign, which raised over USD 80 million to eliminate these harmful disorders that affect 80 million children in the developing world; and the Eliminate Project, which aims to raise USD 110 million over five years to provide approximately 400 million doses of the maternal/neonatal tetanus (MNT) vaccine to “the most vulnerable women and children in the world: those in remote and difficult to reach areas, conflict zones, and with limited access to healthcare.”165

165 Kiwanis International Website, 2012: “Kiwanis, UNICEF join forces to save 129 million mothers and
The second GPO among the case organizations, Oxfam (originally the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief) was founded in 1942 to eradicate poverty and enable people to exercise their rights. Oxfam’s national branches, or “affiliates,” collaborate under one International Secretariat, based in Oxford, UK. This INGO constitutes an “international confederation of 17 organizations networked together in 94 countries, as part of a global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty.”¹⁶⁶ The organization works to achieve its goals by implementing long-term sustainable development programs; campaigning and advocating for the rights of the poor at global, regional, national, and local levels; and providing emergency relief for victims of natural disasters and conflict.¹⁶⁷ Oxfam’s approach is “based on community participation, transparency...feedback systems and regular needs assessments.”¹⁶⁸ Oxfam has over 47,000 volunteers around the world, but fewer than 100 full-time staff operate the various International Secretariat offices. Across the confederation (including the affiliates and Secretariat), Oxfam had a total income of €918 million in 2011-2012, including €377 million in Community Fundraising Revenue (i.e., unrestricted money raised from private citizens,

¹⁶⁶ Oxfam International Annual Report, 2012. “Oxfam International” was officially formed in 1995 by the independent bodies around the world that had previously been operating under the name. The goal was to centralize some components of the work so as to achieve “greater impact on the international stage.” The largest of the 17 member organizations of Oxfam confederation (or “affiliates”) are in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, the United States and Australia. The International Secretariat also runs international advocacy offices in Brussels, Geneva, New York City, Washington D.C., and Brasilia.
¹⁶⁷ Ibid: 5.
rather than through institutional grants).\textsuperscript{169} Contributions from Oxfam affiliates fund the International Secretariat, 31\% of which comes from Oxfam Great Britain, 46\% of which comes from the next four largest Oxfam chapters, and 23\% of which comes from the remaining 12 Oxfam affiliates.\textsuperscript{170} In 2012, 62\% of global Oxfam expenditures supported program implementation, with 39\% of that €639 million allocated for “life and security” projects, 32\% for “livelihoods,” and the remaining 29\% divided among the “right to be heard,” “basic social services,” and “identity” initiatives.\textsuperscript{171}

Ellsworth Culver and Dan O’Neill founded the third GPO case, Mercy Corps (MC), in 1979 under the name “Save the Refugees Fund.” At the time, the organization aimed to raise money to provide lifesaving aid to Cambodians fleeing famine, war, and genocide. Now, MC’s mission is much broader: to “alleviate suffering, poverty and oppression by helping people build secure, productive and just communities.”\textsuperscript{172} This INGO has engaged in a variety of disparate development and aid projects during its first three decades in operation, ranging from soil conservation and watershed management in Honduras to medical services and relief in Jordan to microfinance lending programs (lending more than USD 1.5 billion since the mid-2000s) around the world. In their own words, MC was “among the first humanitarian groups to use relief and development programs to strengthen civil society. Simply handing out

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid: 49. Total International Secretariat income in 2011-2012 was GBP £10.6 million. 
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid: 52. 
\textsuperscript{172} Mercy Corps Website, 2012.
food, building a school or immunizing a child is not enough.... Working side by side with the poor but hard-working families, we bring diverse groups together to create societies that are more peaceful, open, democratic, and economically strong.”¹⁷³ Today, MC serves 19 million people to “build stronger communities and find their own solutions to poverty,” and it has provided over USD 2.2 billion in assistance to people in 114 countries.¹⁷⁴ The organization allocates 88% of its USD 312 million in annual revenue directly to programs, primarily humanitarian relief, economic development, and civil society initiatives around the world.¹⁷⁵

B. THE CASES AS EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE GPO IDEAL TYPE

These three INGOs—KI, OI, and MC—share the central features of the GPO ideal type, including first and foremost a reliance on localized and procedural authority to legitimize themselves. Turning to localized authority first, all three of these INGOs explicitly place their local community agents at the center of their conceptions of self. In the case of KI, it is the nearly 9,000 local “Kiwanis Clubs” in 80 countries that set their own agendas, raise their own funds, and support the operations of the headquarters office through membership dues. For OI, it is national chapters, or “affiliates,” that give credibility to the local programs and services Oxfam provides and fundraise for the International Secretariat, and for Mercy Corps, it is the “local national” staff throughout the world who determine

¹⁷³ Mercy Corps Website, 2013: “Our History.”
¹⁷⁴ Ibid.
how and where funds should be allocated within their own communities. As OI notes, “Harnessing the diversity of affiliates’ experience and expertise” allows the organization to “bring a much stronger and wider range of tools to any country.”

Localized authority stands in direct contrast to the expertise of the EPOs (which is derived from an elite academic background or institutional foundation in a particular thematic issue) as well as to the charismatic authority of MCOs (which is derived from the extraordinary personal characteristics of exceptional, inspirational individuals).

Exemplifying localized authority, the national staff leading program design and implementation at Mercy Corps “personify [its] core belief in local solutions to local problems.” The first few sentences describing MC’s “Team” on the website succinctly encapsulate what localized authority means within the INGO context:

“Our programs are led by those who speak the local languages, know the culture and understand the unique challenges of each community. More than 95 percent of our worldwide team members are from the countries where they work. Their hard work and personal commitment to success helps lift their neighbors from poverty.”

These local experts “know [the community’s] history, and actively invest in developing its human network,” and they “deeply comprehend the challenges and have the greatest stake in how they are solved.” As such, MC resembles the classic GPO in terms of its reliance on localized authority; it treats these individuals as central to “designing and pursuing the best strategies for their

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177 Mercy Corps Website, 2012: “Our Team.”
communities.” As one senior administrator in the headquarters office put it, “Any credibility I have in the policy world comes straight from the degree of ‘ground truth’ behind what I’m saying... and so whatever I say has to come from the mouths of the local people leading our initiatives around the world.” He continued by mentioning that “nearly all our advocacy staff have strong practitioner backgrounds and years of experience in the field, which is absolutely critical to our work...and our credibility.” The field-based practitioners who perform well in the field tend to “migrate to headquarters office, bringing their local knowledge with them.” Another interviewee fervently argued, “It’s part of our ethos. We’re field-driven. Our local people follow their passions and speak up for what they believe in and know is right. It’s just kind of in our DNA.”

I call the first organizational system produced by localized authority of this nature decentralized autonomy. As a result of the importance of local leaders to organizational legitimacy, power in GPOs is often devolved into semi-sovereign organizational sub-units, typically spread throughout the world (e.g., clubs, branches, affiliates, or local offices). While the headquarters offices certainly play a role in these GPOs, each decentralized unit has an extraordinary degree of authority to set its own strategies and agendas, coordinate its activities with local stakeholders, and implement its programs according to its own contextual constraints. Members and supporters often feel more loyal to particular chapters than to the central organization; for instance, one prominent Kiwanis Club’s

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178 Mercy Corps Website, 2012: “Our History.”
President said, “My heart is with the local Club, and I think that’s what you would find with 90% of people. We are our own organization within Kiwanis. HQ gives us all total autonomy and only steps in if a Club does something outrageous.” Similarly, Oxfam’s *Annual Report* acknowledges that “each of our affiliates have their own autonomy and independence.” Though the Oxfam International Secretariat has made repeated (and largely unsuccessful) attempts to centralize decision-making, at present, affiliates have to independently form what one interviewee called “coalitions of the willing” in order to take collective action under the OI umbrella. According to a number of field-based interviewees at MC, the organization is “highly decentralized,” and “country directors have enormous say” over their affairs and are “very independent of the ‘mother ship.’”

As one MC Country Director noted, “We have so much freedom to pursue our own avenues. Not many organizations have that in the field. Headquarters will never force us to do anything unless we think it’s a good idea to meet the local community needs.” While field offices in MCOs and EPOs may have some influence over organizational decision-making, they tend to feed their advice up to a far more centralized decision-making body that determines whether the organization will heed the advice. MCOs and EPOs tend to be far more headquarters-driven than their GPO counterparts, with MCOs following the emotional appeals of particular charismatic personalities and EPOs following the guidance of academic and policy experts based in the so-called “Global North.”
In GPOs, the preferences of local leaders (who are based in the countries being served and who act on behalf of local branches or chapters) take precedence over the opinions of a centralized body, which is often perceived as having little relevant expertise to bring to bear on local situations.

Due to the autonomous nature of these decentralized sub-units, the agendas of these GPOs are often set primarily from the bottom-up. In other words, they are initiated in field offices around the world based on local concerns and needs, and filtered back “up” to the headquarters offices for approval and additional support. One Kiwanis leader said that the role of headquarters was to “balance the needs and actions of nearly 9,000 Clubs and countless members around the world,” rather than to unilaterally determine what those needs ought to be. One frustrated headquarters-based interviewee reported that the Club members “feel they are entitled to privileges and ... to have a say over staff projects in this [headquarters] office. They think they can control whatever we do, and they don’t understand that there are thousands of others in 80 countries just like them making different demands.” Oxfam takes a more positive approach when discussing the decentralized nature of agenda-setting. “We specifically look to local partners when...developing our country strategies...because they have primary legitimacy in their own countries and because we believe that this will have most impact in terms of promoting long-
term, sustainable change.”179 MC is perhaps the most field-driven of the GPOs included in this analysis, in part because its headquarters staff members generally have more field experience than in their counterpart INGOs. As one interviewee stated:

The voices from the field really do matter here. There’s a moral authority that comes from those on the front lines. And the strategy really does come from the field, not from above. Headquarters is responsible for listening and transmitting local ideas to other parts of the organization, not the other way around.

Largely as a result of their high degree of autonomy, independence, and power in organizational agenda-setting and decision-making, these local units tend to develop divergent sub-cultures. As KI notes, “No two Kiwanis Clubs look exactly the same. And they shouldn’t. Each member’s and community’s needs are different, and each club should look different.”180 Given the above, this finding is perhaps unsurprising, but it is not trivial. When compared to MCOs in particular, which express highly unified cultural proclivities around the world, this feature can make GPOs seem like global amalgams of dissimilar, semi-autonomous pockets of activity. As one Kiwanis leader put it, “All the Clubs are so uniquely different, the idea that they all belong to one organizational entity is somewhat misleading. Some of them even refuse to engage in collective activities.” Similarly, according to its own written materials, “Oxfam has never had a global identity.”181 The US affiliate is culturally quite different from the other offices, and it has often “blocked” its counterpart affiliates from “doing any

number of things that [the US affiliate] doesn’t like or want to own,” in the
words of one Oxfam Great Britain employee. An MC interviewee explained that
each sub-unit closely follows the lead of the localized expert leading its affairs:
“Our culture differs dramatically from country to country... Decentralization
means that each office adopts the personality and style of the Country Director.”
While these cultural differences may be benign or irrelevant to these GPOs’
overall operations, this internal fragmentation can turn divisive, creating the
conditions under which power struggles among sub-units thrive.\textsuperscript{182}
Furthermore, with the prevalence of these decentralized, semi-autonomous units,
which oftentimes control their own fundraising, partnership building, and
program implementation efforts, the role of these INGOs’ headquarters offices
can become internally confusing and even contested.

While the localized experts constitute the who for GPOs, it is a
fundamental commitment to conducting their affairs according to a set of
democratic principles — or their \textit{procedural authority} — that constitutes the how.
Since their founding, these INGOs have explicitly and proudly expressed a
commitment to doing their business according to a set of widely accepted norms
related to democratic governance and due process. While upon first glance, all
INGOs may seem to be committed to these procedural norms, the difference lies
in how prominent these values are, how acutely and consistently they are
acknowledged, and how likely they are to have precedence over other norms

\textsuperscript{182} I thoroughly address this issue in Part II, which focuses on inefficiencies in the three ideal types.
and preferences (such as pursuing results or an ideological end-state). A simple illustration of the stark differences between these normative commitments can be found on these INGOs’ websites. For instance, the first section of OI’s “About us” page reads, “Oxfam believes that citizens have a right to hold governments and institutions accountable.... Likewise, we believe that non-governmental organizations should be accountable to the communities in which they work, to partner organizations, and to those from whom they receive support.” By contrast, the first words on the same page on the EDF website read, “In all our work, we combine science, economics and law to get results,” and PIH’s “Who we are” page begins, “At its root, our mission is both medical and moral. It is based on solidarity....” Unlike their EPO counterparts in particular, which are committed to achieving real if incremental results using whatever means necessary, these GPOs deeply believe that using appropriate procedural mechanisms is as important, if not more important, than accomplishing their ends.

Of the three GPOs included here, Oxfam perhaps best encapsulates this type of authority. On its homepage, OI writes: “In our humanitarian, development and campaigning work, we aim to help people in poverty to know and demand their rights, and to hold to account those in power. For Oxfam to

183 I have added the italics into these quotations, to emphasize the language that constructs different kinds of meanings for these organizations. As a GPO, Oxfam emphasizes its accountability and due process above all else, whereas EDF (as an EPO) wants readers to note that it treats results as its raison d’etre, and PIH (as an MCO) treats its ideological commitment to standing in solidarity with the poor as its “bottom line.”
call for greater accountability from others, we must be accountable ourselves.”

As a founding member of the International NGO Accountability Charter, OI has been central to the process of creating common standards for INGOs in terms of complying with reporting, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms. In the words of their Executive Director, Jeremy Hobbs, “At the cornerstone of our efforts is our commitment to the principles of ... sustainability, transparency, and accountability to our stakeholders.” He claims that OI strives for “excellence and modeling accountability in all that we do.”

This INGO requires that its activities be governed by “explicit procedures” to ensure that all population groups can “significantly influence our work.” Similarly, MC’s website reads: “Chief among our core values is accountability. That means Mercy Corps is responsible to all our stakeholders for the way we make decisions and the results of our actions.” Accordingly, the organization claims to be guided by the principles of acting ethically, treating people with respect, being open and transparent about its actions, and ensuring that all stakeholders participate in every stage of the work.

Within each of these INGOs, the foundational organizational structure reflects and instantiates a commitment to appropriate process. For instance, Kiwanis is designed to resemble a democratic government system. As one interviewee explained, “Kiwanis is like its own federated nation-state. There are

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185 Ibid: 41.
Districts, Lieutenant Governors, Governors, Presidents, Vice Presidents... and everyone has to get elected by their local Kiwanis constituents. It doesn’t matter how effective you are as a leader if you aren’t supported and can’t get elected at the end of the day.” One former Kiwanis International President whom I interviewed described his own trajectory as being representative of the standard way in which an individual can “rise through the organization:” he began his volunteer service as a Club member in 1961 before being elected as the local Club President four years later; he was next elected to be Lieutenant Governor, and then Governor, of his District (leaders of each of 53 districts serve as delegates to international Kiwanis conventions); in 1983, he was elected to serve as Treasurer of the International Board, then as President-Elect, and finally as President. This degree of procedural structure does not exist to the same extent in OI and MC, but the principles are common across these organizations: leaders can only elevate themselves by following certain rules and procedures, which often resemble the principles embedded in democratic governance systems. This internal commitment to democratic governance is, in fact, a distinctly GPO feature. While other INGOs may value “constituency” approval or local leadership, they hire and promote on the basis of other internalized norms that are different from the due process norms governing GPO actions: for instance, MCOs hire and promote largely on the basis of passion and ideological alignment, regardless of seniority, and EPOs will “poach” individuals from diverse sectors with geographically cross-cutting academic or technical expertise,
with little regard for whether anyone other than the senior administration approves of the decision. These kinds of behaviors, which prioritize other values above good governance and due process, would not be acceptable within GPOs.

The first systemic feature that results from this proceduralist commitment is a highly transparent culture, in which it is incumbent upon leaders to openly reveal information that is driving their decisions. One former OI senior leader recalls that the culture at Oxfam was “incredibly open compared to other INGOs. It was highly participatory... we pushed decisions all the way to the bottom of the hierarchy and made sure everyone knew why we did what we did.” He added that this policy “paralyzed and confused everyone in the end,” but that it was necessary for leaders to maintain this transparency because of the organization’s “fundamental commitment to following a set of democratic rules.” One field director differentiated MC’s culture from that of Save the Children and other INGOs he had previously worked for on the basis of its commitment to transparency:

There’s a culture of openness that is truly wonderful, of being able to say what you want and know that it will be considered all the way up, and if it’s not, you can question why and someone will tell you. The accountability and transparency means that we don’t just have to accept what leadership says and move on. [...] That’s hugely important.

This culture of transparency and openness can sometimes produce what many at Kiwanis referred to as a “recognition culture,” in which people expect to be widely acknowledged for their accomplishments, both large and small. Nevertheless, within GPOs, “transparency and strong feedback loops should
strengthen the power and agency of communities, partners and allies,” as Oxfam’s Executive Director Jeremy Hobbs noted. OI, for instance, applies what it calls “360 degree evaluation practices,” in which local programs and international leaders are subjected to scrutiny from other stakeholders.

The second systemic tendency that evolves as a result of an organization’s proceduralist authority is a commitment to pursuing *means-over-ends*, when and if necessary. Internal and external stakeholders perceive these INGOs to be authoritative in large part because they follow a certain set of rules in conducting their affairs; therefore, it is necessary for these groups to be primarily committed to rules and procedures, with outcomes being seen as secondary. In other words, if the rules are followed and the principles abided by, the outcomes will follow, but outcomes will be impossible to achieve—and perhaps even undesirable—if the processes are not in order. It is this systemic feature that leads GPOs to prioritize process even when it threatens their ability to produce efficiently and effectively. For instance, KI is committed to democratic governance processes in which it elects a new set of international leaders each year. This rapid turnover ensures that leaders are accountable to their constituents, but it can also “make it really difficult from the program standpoint because every year there’s a new agenda and a new focus, and the staff just has to adjust and retool all the time,” as one employee noted. Within this organizational context, “Even the process of making the decision about a project basically goes through a democratic election

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process. [...] Making sure that everyone is included in the process and has a vote sometimes seems more important than the issue itself." For example, while many interviewees acknowledged that it would likely be beneficial for the organization to have more women and minority leaders in the upper echelons of organizational leadership, “There just hasn’t been enough time for these individuals to move through the ranks and reach the top, so the organization will just have to wait. This democratic process is just too important to who we are.” Individuals cannot be considered for the international presidency unless they have served as Governor of their local district, which is a process that one interviewee described as being “intentionally restrictive” to ensure that people are “truly invested in the organization and what it stands for.” In Chapters 3 and 4, I revisit the stark contrast between this GPO means-over-ends approach and the behavioral patterns of MCOs and EPOs, focusing specifically on the negative consequences of these divergent tendencies for organizational efficiency.

This process-oriented, highly transparent approach to doing business is intimately linked to the third characteristic produced by procedural authority, here termed multi-stakeholder decision-making. While stakeholders may be engaged on an informal basis across INGOs, GPOs are distinguished by having formal processes in place to collect and evaluate feedback from diverse stakeholders, including local practitioners and partners, private and institutional donors, international allies and governments, private sector players and academic institutions, the wider public, and employees and volunteers at all levels within
the organization. For example, OI writes, “We require explicit procedures to be in place to ensure that...marginalized groups...can significantly influence our work.”¹⁸⁸ Within Oxfam, quarterly reviews are conducted so that local implementers and supporters can “give specific feedback on all the key...priorities,”¹⁸⁹ and this group consistently organizes and participates in international conferences among stakeholders with similar agendas to ensure that decisions are made collectively and with common goals in mind. In OI’s own words, “We engage with our key stakeholders throughout the program cycle to ensure that their views and contributions are taken into account.”¹⁹⁰ In particular, “Program Standards” are in place to ensure “the participation of people and communities...ensuring that decisions about how we use our resources are shaped by the priorities of people living in poverty.”¹⁹¹

Unlike MCOs, which make decisions on the basis of the needs on the ground or the personal preferences of passionate employees and leaders, GPOs make decisions on the basis of formally syndicated feedback from a broad range of relevant (and sometimes irrelevant) stakeholders. And unlike EPOs, which can be difficult for other INGOs to work with because of their controversial pragmatism, GPOs tend to be seen as what one interviewee called “great teammates,” in part because they “don’t tend to ‘go it alone’ — they want lots of players involved in important decisions that affect everyone.” As an overall

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¹⁹¹ Ibid: 19.
observation about this ideal type, GPOs tend to resemble democratic government systems more than their counterpart INGOs. The inherent commitment to transparency, accountability, and due process that one GPO leader said was “in their DNA,” produces a range of behaviors designed to ensure participation of multiple stakeholders, particularly those who are closest to the populations being served. When combined with localized authority, the features described in this section become mutually reinforcing, as the organization recognizes that it is the local experts who are the most knowledgeable, lend the most credibility to their actions, and, therefore, ought to have their voices explicitly included in all organizational processes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDEAL TYPE</th>
<th>AUTHORITY SOURCE</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS</th>
<th>CASE INGOs</th>
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</table>
| Moral Charismatic Organization (MCO) | W₁ Charismatic Authority | - Devoted followership  
- Supporter connectedness  
- Personality-driven decision-making  
- Impassioned staff  
- A culture of “yes”  
- Needs-driven responsiveness | - Partners In Health (PIH)  
- Seeds of Peace (SOP)  
- The Carter Center (TCC)  
- The International Rescue Committee (IRC) |
| Expert Pragmatist Organization (EPO) | W₂ Expert Authority | - Perfectionism  
- Persistent debate  
- Individual independence  
- Ends-over-means approach  
- Partnership pluralism  
- Strong “inside game” | - The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)  
- Human Rights Watch (HRW)  
- The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) |
| Grassroots Pragmatist Organization (GPO) | W₁ Localized Authority | H₃ Procedural Authority | - Decentralized autonomy  
- “Bottom-up” agenda-setting  
- Divergent sub-cultures  
- Transparent culture  
- Means-over-ends approach  
- Multi-stakeholder decision-making | - Kiwanis International (KI)  
- Amnesty International (AI)  
- Oxfam International (OI) |

Table 2.1: The INGO Ideal Types and Organizational Systems
IV. Lessons Learned from the Empirical Analysis

The above empirical analysis of the three core ideal type models—MCOs, EPOs, and GPOs—reveals a series of clear differences among various categories of INGOs. Table 2.1 (above) summarizes the essential features of the three models, and the case INGOs that resemble each ideal type.

Based on what has been presented in this chapter, I can conclude Part I with three basic conjectures. First, the ASF has proven to be a useful tool for understanding how INGOs develop systemic features and interact in the world of international actors. Actual INGOs do resemble these ideal type models, each of which is distinct from the others. Therefore, we should be able to use this conceptual framework to better understand and predict the types of behavioral tendencies that certain INGOs will exhibit. Second, the analysis reveals that INGOs cluster around the three core ideal type models—the MCO, the EPO, and the GPO—which suggests that there are, in fact, interaction effects among particular types of who’s and how’s: charismatic leaders will use emotional, ideological appeals to rally support; industry experts will rely on data and objective analysis to achieve incremental change; and local leaders will be committed to processes that ensure inclusion of all stakeholders, particular those at the “bottom” of the organizational structure.

The third conclusion that can be drawn from the above analysis is that the greater an organization’s reliance on a particular authority source, the more
nearly this INGO will resemble its respective ideal type model in terms of the organizational systems associated with that authority source. For instance, PIH reflects all of the core systemic features of the MCO and is, thus, the most highly representative of the ideal type. Its clear dependence on moral and charismatic authority compared to its peer MCOs means that it develops the organizational systems (and dysfunctional tendencies) characteristic of the MCO type more so than its peers do. On the other hand, MC is less representative of the GPO ideal type model than its counterpart INGOs KI and OI are, and this is because MC relies less heavily on proceduralist authority than its peer GPOs do.

Part I of this work establishes a preliminary typology of INGO ideal types, which presumes a relationship between the ways in which these organizations generate their authority and the types of systemic behavioral patterns that emerge within them. Chapter 1 outlines the expected relationships, and Chapter 2 comprises an application of the ASF to empirical reality, breaking open the “black box” of interest and identity formation in ten case organizations selected to represent the entire INGO ecosystem. The four organizations clustering around the MCO ideal type (PIH, SOP, TCC and the IRC) help us understand these lean, flexible, fast-moving, emotionally-charged, non-hierarchical organizations operating in the development, aid and human rights spaces. The three cases that reflect the EPO (EDF, HRW and the ICTJ) illustrate the defining features of these pragmatic, independent, data-driven organizations that use whatever means necessary to achieve their goals. And the three INGOs
resembling the GPO model (KI, OI and MC) shed light on the core features of these grassroots-driven, democratic, transparent, decentralized groups working on important issues affecting populations around the world.

The arguments presented in Part I of this work provide a necessary conceptual and empirical foundation for discussions about efficiency and effectiveness throughout the rest of this work. It is impossible to sufficiently address those subjects without first disaggregating the INGO category into manageable sub-groups based on systematic organizational features, and that is precisely what Chapters 1 and 2 have done. Having taken this essential step, researchers can proceed to address important questions that build from this foundation, such as: Why do some INGOs have better performance outcomes than others? Why do states and IGOs prefer to work with certain INGOs over others? Why are some INGOs more adaptable to changing external conditions than others? And, Why are some INGOs likely to succeed over time while others may fail?
PART II:

UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS OF INGO INEFFICIENCY
CHAPTER 3:
DYSFUNCTION AS A FUNCTION OF AUTHORITY

The chapters in Part I of this work argued, first, that an INGO’s ability to survive and thrive is dependent upon whether or not it is perceived as being legitimate, and second, that its perceived legitimacy is based on who it claims to be and represent and how it approaches solving global problems. Third and most importantly, Part I argues that as an INGO begins to form and proclaim an institutional identity, certain types of organizational systems develop that both reflect and further instantiate the self-conceived notions of who and how. For instance, an INGO that prides itself on having local country- or community-based leaders informing its efforts on the basis of the specific concerns and cultures of the communities being served will tend to empower those local leaders with authority through highly democratic, “bottom-up” decision-making processes. This organizational practice both increases the actual authority of these local experts and perpetuates the perception of this INGO as being authoritative on the basis of its access to local information and networks.

In short, the arguments from Part I may be summarized as follows: an INGO’s internal design (i.e., the norms, structures and schema that guide and constrain its behavior) follows from the organization’s identity (i.e., its claims about who it is and how it conducts its affairs). Chapter 1 contains an outline of a
series of authority claims that an INGO may make in order to earn legitimacy and support, and it uses examples to illustrate relationships between each type of authority and particular organizational systems. Chapter 2 subjects these relationships to tests against empirical reality. As was shown throughout Part I, the systems that emerge in connection to different authority types can be a source of strength to the extent that they provide further evidence to support the initial identity claims, as is the case in the above example of local empowerment furthering the perceived localized authority of an INGO. However, in Part II of this work, I argue that these very same organizational systems can be a source of weakness. Because each ideal type organization is predisposed to certain behavioral patterns (the focus of Part I), it becomes vulnerable to repeatedly engaging in certain wasteful, inefficient activities (the focus of Part II), which I call dysfunctional tendencies.

As was the model for Part I, Part II is divided into two chapters: the first (Chapter 3) provides the theoretical context and lays the conceptual foundation for understanding the phenomenon, and the second (Chapter 4) turns to the INGO cases, mapping the empirical world against the analytical framework from the previous chapter. This chapter is divided into three sections: (1) a theoretical introduction to the possible sources of inefficiency in institutions; (2) a discussion of the internal cultural sources of inefficiency in IOs; and (3) an overview of the types of inefficient behaviors we might expect to find in the three INGO ideal types introduced in Part I.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS OF ORGANIZATIONAL INEFFICIENCY

The origins of institutional inefficiency have been the subject of extensive debate among scholars across diverse social science disciplines. Among those who study international organizations (IOs), theories about the sources of organizational dysfunction may be categorized into four groups based on the supposed “locus of causality” driving inefficient behavior. For scholars of institutions, the nature of the source is one of the following: (1) external material, (2) internal material, (3) external cultural, or (4) internal cultural.

Most realist and neoliberal institutionalist explanations for the causes of inefficiencies in IOs fall into the first category: these scholars identify external material factors as the source of self-defeating organizational behaviors. More specifically, many of these scholars argue that state preferences place constraints on IOs that they cannot avoid, and these constraints may lead to poor performance outcomes for the organization to which some authority is delegated. For rationalist scholars who posit, for instance, that states “use IOs to create social orderings appropriate to their pursuit of shared goals: producing collective goods, collaborating in prisoner’s dilemma settings, solving coordination problems, and the like,” IOs are simply agents serving the interests of their state principals. According to principal-agent theory, when states delegate a degree of authority to agents (IOs) to complete certain tasks,

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192 In this work, I define inefficiency as the self-defeating activities that undermine an organization’s ability to achieve its stated goals in a timely fashion.
“performance problems naturally arise” because agents can conceal information from their principals.\textsuperscript{194} States can engineer IOs’ behavior by restructuring their incentives, thus aligning IO actions more closely with state preferences.\textsuperscript{195} From this perspective, it is states (or other types of principals) that create the environmental conditions under which IOs either thrive or suffer.

A few scholars of development and international affairs have applied rationalist frameworks to understanding the behavior of INGOs, identifying external material factors as the causal root of organizational inefficiency. For example, Cooley and Ron argue that “powerful institutional imperatives can subvert IO and INGO efforts, prolong inappropriate projects, or promote destructive competition among well-meaning transnational actors.”\textsuperscript{196} For these scholars, it is the highly competitive INGO environment, which requires organizations to compete fiercely for funding and contracts from state and IO donors, to produce short-term outcomes, and to focus on program costs rather than administrative support. These external material forces lead NGOs to “conceal, withhold, or distort information harmful to their interests” and to “act unilaterally” so as not to “hurt their chances of contract renewal and threaten their own organizational survival.”\textsuperscript{197} While the basic insight that competition affects behavioral outcomes may be valuable to some extent, this type of analysis is far too limited to constitute a complete explanation of NGO behavior because

\textsuperscript{194} Gutner, 2005: 11.
\textsuperscript{195} Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001.
\textsuperscript{196} Cooley and Ron, 2002: 6.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid: 15-17.
it disregards the influence of cultural factors on organizational behavior. Their simple argument that INGOs must compete for funds, and that the need to pursue self-interested outcomes (e.g., organizational survival) can produce negative externalities, may be correct, but it represents only one small part of the story.

A second type of materialist theorizing locates the source of dysfunctional behavior within the IO itself (internal material). These scholars focus on competition for resources among departments or divisions of an organization, which they argue can lead to undesirable (or inefficient) outcomes in decision-making. Bureaucratic politics theorists argue that behavior can be understood as results of internal bargaining games: “The name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically [within an organization].” From this perspective, it is internal competition over human and financial capital that produces behavioral outcomes that undermine the overall efficiency of the organization. Although recent IR scholarship has tended not to focus on the effects of bureaucratic politics on the emergence of inefficient outcomes, this phenomenon was well documented by scholars in the 1970s, and students of public administration and political science continue to write about this subject in the context of firms and domestic

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198 This argument may also be incorrect. Buthe, Major, and de Mello e Sousa (2012) use an extensive dataset on US funding allocation for international humanitarian aid to argue that ethical concerns and humanitarian discourse are far more important than materialist or self-interested concerns in determining the allocation of these funds.

199 Allison, 1971: 144.
institutions. As epitomized by Allison and Halperin’s work on this subject, these scholars focus on the “many actors as players” who bargain with each other according to individual sets of preferences that are based on “various conceptions of national security, organizational, domestic, and personal interests.” According to this paradigm, choices are not singularly rational; they are the result of “pulling and hauling” and often represent sub-optimal outcomes because of the competing internal processes and preferences at work. While it is certainly important to understand the ways in which internal material forces and bargaining activities constrain organizations’ behaviors, these theoretical approaches are also limited. This materialist approach does not help us understand why actors within certain organizations hold the beliefs and values that they do, and if we treat beliefs and values as core determinants of individual preferences, then we must first understand their origins in different contexts for the theory to be instructive.

The third body of theoretical literature related to organizational dysfunction identifies the locus of causality in external cultural (rather than material) factors. For scholars whose approaches fall into this category of analysis, the “social fabric of world politics” is central to and inseparable from international organizational dynamics. Ideational and normative factors shape

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200 For scholarship from the 1970s, see, for instance: Allison, 1971; Cox et al., 1974; Cox and Jacobson, 1977; Allison and Halperin, 1972. For recent scholars in public administration and political science, see, for instance: Yang, 2009; Carpenter, 2010; and Gage, 2012.

201 Allison and Halperin, 1972: 43.

what counts as acceptable behavior for actors, thereby constituting a so-called “logic of appropriateness” and determining how they should define and interpret their own interests.\textsuperscript{203} As perhaps the best example of this type of theorizing, the \textit{world polity model} suggests that IOs may become dysfunctional for two reasons. First, organizations’ actions “reflect a search for symbolic legitimacy rather than efficiency.”\textsuperscript{204} As such, their behavior may reveal a preference for adhering to norms and cues embedded in the cultural environment, which often comes at the expense of focusing on efficiency criterion.\textsuperscript{205} For example, many international solutions to global problems have taken on increasingly multilateral forms because they are perceived as being more legitimate than other forms of global governance, even in the absence of evidence concerning the actual efficiency of different models.\textsuperscript{206} Scholars from this tradition have also argued that bureaucratic organizations proliferated in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries because of a search for symbolic legitimacy in the external cultural environment, not because they were inherently any more efficient than other organizational forms.\textsuperscript{207} Second, these scholars argue that organizations’ actions reflect the ideational conflicts and contradictions embedded in the world around them, and this can lead to the emergence of internal inefficiencies. For instance, if an organization operates within a normative framework that values both human

\textsuperscript{203} March, Olsen, et al., 2004.
\textsuperscript{204} Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 717.
\textsuperscript{205} See, for instance, Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Zucker, 1989.
\textsuperscript{207} Meyer and Rowan, 1977.
equality and market capitalism, these two principles may produce “varied, often conflicting, functional, normative, and legitimacy imperatives,” which may lead the organization to “mirror and reproduce those contradictions.”

Illustrating how external cultural factors interact with organizational efficiency criterion in ways that can be self-defeating, Meyer writes:

Institutionalized products, services, techniques, politics, and programs function as powerful myths, and many organizations adopt them ceremonially. But conformity to institutionalized rules often conflicts sharply with efficiency criteria and, conversely, coordinate and control activity in order to promote efficiency undermines an organization’s ceremonial conformity and sacrifices its support and legitimacy.

Again, while external cultural factors certainly play a role in influencing organizational behavioral outcomes, they represent one small piece of the puzzle. The best evidence to support this point is that many organizations operating under the same cultural environmental conditions will develop different types of behavioral patterns and reactions to exogenous demands. In the hypothetical context described above, why would one organization, for example, choose to reflect the human equality principle while another opts to abide by the market capitalism principle? Society is wrought with inherent normative contradictions, which are by no means universally or uniformly adopted by organizations operating within it. There is another layer of culture that affects behavior, and produces inefficient outcomes, in ways that are far deeper and more meaningful than the external environmental forces described above. Internal cultural forces

powerfully influence actors’ preferences, choices, and behaviors, producing both self-reinforcing (see Chapters 1 and 2) and self-defeating (see the forthcoming sections in Chapters 3 and 4) outcomes for organizations.

II. INTERNAL CULTURAL SOURCES OF IO DYSFUNCTION

Although scholars across a variety of social science disciplines have argued that internal cultural factors are the primary source of organizational inefficiency, Barnett and Finnemore’s 1999 and 2004 works repackaged this approach and made it appropriate to an IR readership concerned with institutional design in IOs. For these scholars and their interdisciplinary predecessors, it is the very nature of a particular organization as a social form that leads to the development of poor outcomes in terms of efficiency. Barnett and Finnemore focused their analysis on IOs, arguing that their bureaucratic culture produces dysfunctional behavioral patterns, which they call “pathologies” because they are rooted in the very nature of these groups’ design.210 For Barnett and Finnemore, organizational culture is perhaps the most important variable in determining how individuals within organizations understand their environments and make choices:

*Once in place, an organization’s culture, understood as the rules, rituals, and beliefs that are embedded in the organization (and its subunits), has important consequences for the way individuals who inhabit that organization make sense of the world. ... It provides interpretive frames that individuals use to generate meaning.*211

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Adopting a sociological institutionalist approach to understanding organizations, they defend the position that IOs are shaped and constrained by their internal cultural proclivities. Individual actors’ rationality is bounded not only by an inability to “fold out the decision tree” to its logical (or optimal) end point, but also by the “social stuff” of which their organizations are made. Like their sociological institutionalist peers, Barnett and Finnemore argue that actors’ choices are not determined by instrumental calculations or means-ends rationality alone: in reality, they are heavily dependent upon past action and “filtered” interpretations of a given situation.

From this vantage point, institutions themselves constrain their members by “defining who they are, fixing the bounds of what they can imagine themselves doing in a given context, and by specifying what they should or should not be doing.” These internally imposed systems of meaning can blind actors to the wide range of institutional strategies that a synoptically rational actor might consider, forcing them to see only a limited range of possible solutions. This “solution set” would only include those options that they would consider available given the internal logic of appropriateness within their organizations. Because actors choose from a restricted set of potential responses,

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212 According to “standard decision theoretic analysis (and optimal design theory,” institutions are “synoptic searchers (optimizers),” which, in a process called “backwards induction,” foresee the “distant consequences of their choices and thus fold the ‘decision tree’ they face back from its terminal outcomes to determine their best strategies given the available alternatives” (Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal, 2013: 5-6).
214 Jupille, Mattli, Snidal, 2013: 220.
outcomes of decision-making may be suboptimal insofar as they do not maximize the organization’s ability to efficiently pursue its ends. Individual actors become enslaved to their systems of meaning, struggling to see beyond what they deem appropriate behavior based on the organization’s internal cultural dynamics. As such, an organization’s cultural norms “limit the capacity of any institution to deviate too far from the status quo,” which can restrict its ability to innovate, adapt, learn, and ultimately sustain itself. Because organizational culture can be deeply engrained and difficult to change within an institution, inefficient behaviors may persist over time despite their detrimental effects on organizational performance outcomes. IOs filled with cognitively and normatively bounded actors carry their culturally determined symbols, scripts, and responses to problems with them into diverse domains, reproducing their familiar institutional logics regardless of the problem’s specific nature and demands. For this reason, scholars have noted that in a sociological institutionalist universe, “problems are not only looking for solutions, but solutions are looking for problems.” When organizations fail to adapt to new challenges and changing conditions, organizational inefficiencies emerge.

Relying on basic insights from sociological institutionalism, IR scholars like Barnett and Finnemore have begun to unpack IOs from the inside in order to

\[\text{215} \text{ Peters, 2005: 140. See also Hall and Taylor, 2006: 951.}\]
\[\text{216} \text{ In Part III, I address the complex relationship between inefficiency and ineffectiveness in INGOs.}\]
\[\text{217} \text{ DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Dobbin, 1997.}\]
\[\text{218} \text{ March and Olsen, 1984: 740.}\]
\[\text{219} \text{ See, for instance, Levinthal and March, 1993; Olsen and Peters, 1996.}\]
understand their endogenously formed and culturally informed identities and preferences. Grounded in the understanding that organizations benefit not only from their ability to produce outcomes, but also from their perceived legitimacy and symbolic importance,220 these social constructivist scholars of IOs have turned to the “social content of the organization — its culture, its legitimacy concerns, dominant norms that govern behavior and shape interests, and the relationships of these to a larger normative and cultural environment.”221 They have argued that organizational dynamics are rooted, at least in part, in cultural values, symbols and practices,222 and they have done “more than simply argue that social structure matters; they tell us what the social structure is.”223

Epitomizing this constructivist turn in the study of IO dysfunction, Barnett and Finnemore developed a framework that is intended to explain the behavioral outcomes of IOs, based largely on the insight that organizations can become dysfunctional as a direct result of how they generate their perceived legitimacy.224 Their argument rests on their belief that all IOs are bureaucratic in form and function:

We ground our analysis on the fact that IOs are bureaucracies. Bureaucracy is a distinctive social form of authority with its own internal logic and behavioural proclivities. It is because of their authority that bureaucracies have autonomy and the ability to change the world around them.225

220 See DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Finnemore 1996.
Like all organizations that are bureaucratic in nature, IOs exhibit certain features from which both their power and pathologies are derived: (1) they are hierarchical, meaning that each individual has a set role and reports to specific superiors within a structure that divides labor according to expertise; (2) they practice continuity insofar as employees receive a salary for full-time work and have opportunities to advance their careers within the organization; (3) they conduct their work in an impersonal manner, according to rules and procedures that eliminate arbitrary and politicized influences; and (4) their officials are selected according to their expertise (or technical merit) and are expected to perform particular roles for which they are trained or have preexisting technical knowledge.\(^{226}\)

According to Barnett and Finnemore’s work, bureaucracies generate their power—or ability to influence the conduct of international affairs—from two sources: the rational-legal authority they embody, and their control over technical expertise and access to information.\(^{227}\) Because modern forms of authority are vested in legal systems and impersonal rules and procedures, bureaucratic IOs are imbued with the necessary legitimacy to influence other actors in global governance. In other words, because modern society values rational procedural answers to problems, bureaucratic organizations are capable of making other


actors—states and individuals alike—willing to “submit to [their] authority.”\textsuperscript{228} For Barnett and Finnemore, bureaucracy constitutes the institutional design of choice because this organizational form embodies forms of authority that “modernity views as particularly legitimate and good.”\textsuperscript{229} As Weber wrote, “The more complicated and specialized modern culture becomes, the more its external supporting apparatus demands the personally detached and strictly ‘objective’ expert, in lieu of...[one] who was moved by personal sympathy and favor, by grace and gratitude.”\textsuperscript{230} Endowed with rational-legal authority and expertise, IOs are able to influence the conduct of international affairs in three ways: by dividing and classifying the social world into categories of actors and action, by fixing meanings that orient and establish boundaries for acceptable action, and by diffusing these concepts throughout the world.\textsuperscript{231} In these three ways, IOs become powerful and autonomous actors insofar as they contribute to what Bourdieu calls the “social construction of power.”\textsuperscript{232}

These forms of power are derived from the very bureaucratic nature of the IOs; however, Barnett and Finnemore argue that their bureaucratic constitution can also produce pathological (or inefficient) tendencies. The cultural proclivities of bureaucratic organizations provide interpretive frames that determine how actors generate meaning and understand the incentives and outcomes that

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{230} Weber, 1948: 216.
\textsuperscript{231} Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; 2004.
\textsuperscript{232} Bourdieu, 1977: 209.
structure their decision-making. These interpretive frames, in turn, produce the five types of pathological behavior listed below:

(1) **Irrationality of rationalization**: Bureaucracies’ reliance on rules, routines and standard procedures makes them powerful to the extent that they contribute to a perception that the organization is efficient and impersonal in performing complex tasks. However, “the presence of such rules also compromises the extent to which means-ends rationality drives organizational behavior.”

Means can become so embedded that they come to determine the very ends towards which the organization is striving, thus overshadowing the organization’s stated mission and goals.

(2) **Bureaucratic universalism**: Because IOs operate in various country contexts simultaneously, they tend to “flatten diversity,” ignoring differences at the local level in favor of producing “universal rules and categories that are, by design, inattentive to contextual and particularistic concerns.” Their reliance on universal approaches lends IOs credibility on certain issues; however, when the circumstances do not fit the generalized knowledge that organizations attempt to apply, this behavior can undermine their effectiveness in achieving their desired ends.

(3) **Normalization of deviance**: In order to provide reliable and predictable responses to recurring problems, bureaucracies establish systems of rules and procedures that “safeguard against decisions that might lead to accidents and faulty decisions.” However, employees in these organizations also tend to make minor, calculated decisions that bend the rules, and over time, these exceptions can become the rules themselves. As deviance becomes part of the

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235 See also Meyer and Rowan, 1977; March and Olsen, 1989.
237 Ibid.
organization’s routine, or “normalized,” the organization can begin to undermine its own goals.

(4) **Insulation**: IOs tend to insulate themselves from feedback from the surrounding environment—both from the principals authorizing their behavior and from the communities benefiting from their services. This insulation can lead employees to ignore relevant information that might help them complete their tasks, and to develop “internal cultures and worldviews that do not promote the goals and expectations of those outside the organization who created it and whom it serves.”

(5) **Cultural contestation**: Within a bureaucratic organization, “pockets of autonomy and political battles” will likely emerge because of the characteristic division of labor. As “distinct internal cultures grow up inside different parts of the organization,” employees may begin to develop contradictory preferences and to interpret and respond to problems differently. This clash of internal cultures can lead to disunity and disorganization, which can produce self-defeating behavioral outcomes.

As discussed in the Introduction to this work, Barnett and Finnemore’s scholarship on the internal cultural sources of IO dysfunction does essential work in terms of expanding the IR discourse, and my research is indebted to theirs in many ways. The basic logic of their framework is powerful: by focusing on how an organization’s sources of authority can also be the very root of its self-defeating behavior, Barnett and Finnemore make possible important discussions about how an organization’s identity and its performance outcomes are related.

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to one another in complex and, at times, counterintuitive ways. However, as
discussed previously, their work is deficient in two critical ways. First, they claim
to provide a theory of behavior in international organizations, but their
definition of IO is far too limited to be considered a comprehensive explanation
for organizations across the landscape.241 There are hundreds of thousands of
diverse organizations that might be considered IOs according to different
definitions of the term. Barnett and Finnemore, by their own admission, limited
the applicability of their framework to just a small portion of the actors in the IO
landscape. Second, they made a fundamental mistake in assuming that all
organizations in the contemporary IO landscape operate according to the logic of
bureaucracy. Their error is rooted in their omission of other forms of legitimacy
in modern society; surely not all IOs derive their authority from rational-legal
authority and expertise alone. Where would an organization that derives its
authority from one exceptionally charismatic leader fit into their framework, for
instance? As outlined in the Authority Sources Framework in Chapter 1, there
are more paths to legitimacy than the one on which Barnett and Finnemore hang
their argument.

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241 In a footnote buried deep within Rules for the World, Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 177) write that
they “use the term international organization to mean intergovernmental organizations...with members
from three or more states supporting a permanent secretariat to perform ongoing tasks related to a
common purpose.”
III. UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS OF INGO DYSFUNCTION

Part I of this work articulates a response to the two critiques of Barnett and Finnemore’s work noted above: the limited scope of their analysis, and an unreasonable assumption contained within that analysis. This was done by first turning the focus of analysis toward a large and diverse category of IOs, which they had bracketed in their work: INGOs. Second was the exposition of a broader and more comprehensive set of types of authority from which IOs earn their legitimacy and, thus, become influential international actors. A clear argument arises: different combinations of authority sources produce particular kinds of organizational systems within INGOs. From this insight regarding the expected

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242 Figure 3.1 is not provided by Barnett and Finnemore; in fact, they are never quite this explicit about the central tenets of their framework. This figure represents my own interpretation of the core structure of their argument.
relationships between certain types of authority and certain types of internal behavioral tendencies, the description emerges of the three ideal type organizational models that dominate the INGO landscape: Moral Charismatic Organizations (MCOs), Expert Pragmatist Organizations (EPOs), and Grassroots Proceduralist Organizations (GPOs).

The remaining sections of Part II of this work contain a brief conceptual overview and a chapter of empirical analysis, illustrating how these ideal type organizations will tend to breed certain types of dysfunctional behavioral patterns. In addition to identifying many interesting relationships among cultural and behavioral characteristics, the discussion and analysis of these sections support the simple point that not all inefficiency is alike. In the words of one of the interviewees, “I’ve worked with probably 18 or 19 NGOs over my life, and every one of them has been highly dysfunctional...with their own types of internal problems.” INGOs are not necessarily any more or less efficient than other categories of international actors, and one INGO form is not necessarily more or less efficient than the next in terms of its internal operations. Nevertheless, the behavioral differences identified here set the stage for divergences in terms of an INGO’s willingness and ability to adapt to changing circumstances, and its place in the IO ecosystem more generally (to be revisited in Part III).

A. INEFFICIENCIES IN THE MCO
The Moral Charismatic Organization (MCO) stakes its credibility on the presence of charismatic leaders and followers, as well as its morally righteous approach to pursuing a vision for a better world. The result is an organization that relies heavily on the personal influence of particular charismatic individuals in all organizational functions, and a culture that promotes close interconnectedness among its staff, supporters, and beneficiaries. The systemic by-products of charismatic authority (devoted followership, supporter connectedness, and personality-driven decision-making) and moral authority (impassioned staff, a culture of ‘yes,’ and needs-driven responsiveness) will most definitely have the strong positive effect of reinforcing the organization’s initial identity claims; however, these tendencies may also lead to the development of certain persistent challenges to organizational efficiency.

Specifically, INGOs whose ability to influence rests on charismatic authority will avoid adopting technically-driven, impersonal responses to problems, even when those solutions might be more efficient than the alternative. Preferring to rely on the personal visions and emotional appeals of individuals within the organization, and not wanting to be seen as “status quo” bureaucracies, these MCOs suffer from a tendency to avoid rules and standard operating procedures at all costs. In part as a consequence of their reliance on specific charismatic leaders to drive decision-making, these INGOs may become dependent on a few specific individuals for sustained support and legitimacy. Their dependence on a few leaders becomes an organizational liability: MCOs
have difficulty developing sufficient second-line leaders and effective managers. Furthermore, INGOs with charismatic authority may find themselves making arbitrary decisions influenced by their members’ personal and emotional responses to needs, which can lead to ever-expanding, perhaps unsustainable, programs “on the ground.”

As a result of their deeply rooted ideological commitment to their missions, INGOs resembling this ideal type will develop internal systems that reward employee passion and devotion, as well as the act of listening closely and responding thoroughly to the actual needs of populations being served. In these organizations, employees and supporters will be eager to participate in organizational activities that have little to do with their job descriptions, and systems will be put in place to encourage individual development and exposure across issues. MCO employees rarely turn down opportunities to expand their work or the organization’s commitments. While MCOs may pride themselves on these characteristics, they can produce self-defeating tendencies: they make MCOs dependent on building consensus among many passionate, highly participatory internal stakeholders; they overexpose MCOs to feedback from external stakeholders with relatively little relevant knowledge or influence; and they make MCO employees stubbornly committed to applying a set of solutions designed specifically to address the concerns of particular populations in need, and thus, to reinvent successes and repeat failures in different contexts.
When combined in the context of the day-to-day operations of an INGO, these inefficiencies produce organizations that may be eager to change and expand their work in ways that are often unsystematic, uncoordinated, and ultimately unmanageable. MCOs waste a great deal of time and energy discussing problems and seeking consensus on answers, and designing new solutions to everything from minor administrative tasks to major programmatic challenges in the field. These organizations are passionate and innovative, but because they are perhaps stubbornly committed to using every dollar to save a life or otherwise help those in need, their internal systems can be highly disorganized and inefficient.

B. INEFFICIENCIES IN THE EPO

In contrast to their MCO counterparts, Expert Pragmatist Organizations (EPOs) earn their legitimacy on the basis of having access to expertise that is limited to those with technical or academic knowledge of an issue or industry, as well as having a practical, outcomes-oriented approach to solving problems. As a result of these authority claims (expert and pragmatic), EPOs develop into INGOs that emphasize the perspectives and preferences of their individual experts, and that endow these experts with a high degree of autonomy and independence to pursue their interests. They strive for perfection in their products and services, whether those include research and reporting, technical assistance for governments and populations, or actual goods delivered to those in need; and
they debate and discuss ideas and policies until they are certain that the best approach is being taken in any given context. EPOs tend to pursue their ends in ways that are uncharacteristically instrumentalist in the INGO landscape. They excel at working “behind closed doors” and in partnership with other institutions of power, including states and firms, which do not always share the other-regarding values driving the work of many INGOs.

As was the case with the MCO ideal type, these characteristics may serve as a source of strength for EPOs insofar as they reinforce and perpetuate the very identity claims that earned them authority in the first place. However, these internal systemic features can also lead to self-defeating tendencies in EPOs, and thus, can be a source of weakness for these organizations. In particular, leaders of these INGOs may struggle to make and implement decisions in the face of a constant stream of internal criticism and dissent concerning actions related to both internal organizational policy and external practice. Endowed with a high degree of trust and autonomy from the senior administrators, individual experts may deviate from strategic goals and embark on their own projects with or without organizational consent, which can create problems for both management and support staff. Furthermore, because experts are so powerful and knowledgeable within these organizations, EPOs have difficulty systematically transferring knowledge, resources, and institutional learning through the organization.
EPOs are committed to taking an impartial, ends-oriented approach to achieving their goals, and as such, they will tend to avoid procedural steps that they perceive as being cumbersome and unnecessary. Whereas MCOs have a cultural aversion to standardized procedures because of their “anti-bureaucratic” identity claims, EPOs simply overlook or side-step their own rules in order to get straight to the outcomes in question. The fact that they are so focused on ends can come at the expense of internal accountability, transparency, inclusion, and due process, which can produce frustration and the occasional need to backtrack and redo work. Because their access to the powerful players that wield both information and resources is so critical to their organizational ethos, EPOs may develop highly secretive cultures in which experts close their doors (both literally and figuratively) to their own colleagues and institutional peers if they are busy or disinterested. The appearance of disinterest or unwillingness to collaborate can lead to poor internal collaboration and dysfunctional external partnerships with organizations that value accountability and transparency (especially other local and international NGOs). EPOs may be accused of suffering from a “democratic deficit,” whereby members and populations being served do not have any significant influence over the INGO’s agenda or affairs. Another consequence of a culture that promotes independence for experts is that EPOs tend to suffer from a high degree of internal disagreement concerning ideological principles and appropriate means of pursuing their ends.
C. INEFFICIENCIES IN THE GPO

The third ideal type model, the Grassroots Proceduralist Organization (GPO), generates its authority from a combination of having access to knowledge and connections within a given local community or state, and having a commitment to following procedural norms of due process and good governance. Because of their claims to localized authority, GPOs become decentralized organizations with highly divergent sub-cultures across the international units and divisions. GPOs set agendas and make decisions through processes that begin with stakeholder buy-in at the local level, and filter up to the state, regional, and international levels for approval and funding. Their proceduralist authority claims lead to the development of organizational cultures that value transparency and engaging in appropriate processes in pursuit of diverse goals. These organizations pride themselves on consulting with multiple and diverse stakeholders, both internally and externally, when making decisions both large and small.

The autonomy and power of local divisions may be a source of pride for a GPO type organization that stakes its legitimacy on its localized knowledge. This feature is perhaps one of the GPO’s greatest strengths, but the internal systemic characteristics associated with the autonomy of local chapters can also produce challenges for these INGOs. Because power is devolved into the hands of semi-sovereign organizational sub-units (in the form of chapters, affiliates, branches, or offices), and because each of these sub-units will develop a distinct culture...
and set of behavioral norms, these INGOs tend to suffer from internal cultural fragmentation, in-fighting, contestation, and politicization. In the absence of a strong centralized authority, decisions can seem to be made on an ad hoc basis, guided by the preferences and interests of offices around the world, facing unique challenges and local needs. Without a clear organizational vision driven from the top, spontaneous or erratic decision-making can quickly interfere with an overall strategy: GPO leaders may have difficulty describing themselves and their work concisely and coherently to supporters, peers, and employees.

The commitment to due process and good governance is, of course, a source of strength and legitimacy for these INGOs. However, it can also mean that these organizations become highly inflexible and resistant to change. When every decision is subject to an arduous process involving diverse stakeholders, cumbersome procedures, and restrictive regulations, it can be difficult for GPOs to actually enact or implement any of them. Commitment to following the rules can quickly become enslavement to process that can be self-defeating for these INGOs. When at their best, GPOs are respected and admired for their explicit commitment to local needs and due process; they are by far the most transparent, accountable, and representative of the INGO ideal types included in this typology. They celebrate their own and others’ procedural victories, and they set a high standard for responsible decision-making across the IO landscape. They are strong peers and reliable partners. However, the cumulative effect of their inefficient tendencies means GPOs can often become crippled by their own
internal cultural fragmentation and political contestation among sub-units within the organization. This can be exacerbated by a commitment to pursuing proper means over strategic ends that can lead to inflexibility at best and wasteful behavior at worst. GPOs are the most resistant to learning and to adaptation over time: pulled in any number of directions at any given time and unable to make changes without engaging the whole organization in a democratic process, GPOs fall into familiar routines and limit themselves to comfortable, safe decisions.

As Schein rightly notes, “Culture is an abstraction, yet the forces that are created in social and organizational situations that derive from culture are powerful. If we don’t understand the operation of these forces, we become victim to them.”243 In this chapter, I have shown how different INGO ideal types can fall victim to their own internal cultural forces, arguing that an organization’s claims to authority can be simultaneously sources of strength and weakness. Authority claims produce organizational systems that perpetuate and reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the organizations, creating distinct ideal type organizational models. But inherent to each ideal type is a set of dysfunctional tendencies, which are also a product of the organization’s authority claims, and therefore, they may be called “pathological.”244 In the same way that rational-

243 Schein, 2004: 3.
244 In their work on IGOs, Barnett and Finnemore “use the term pathologies to describe such instances when IO dysfunction can be traced to bureaucratic culture” (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 702). Similarly, I use the term pathological to describe persistently inefficient tendencies whose origins can be
legal authority and expertise produce the bureaucratic ideal type, which may be characterized by such pathologies as the irrationality of rationalization and bureaucratic universalism, moral and charismatic authority produce the MCO ideal type, which may be characterized by dysfunctional tendencies such as overexposure and leadership liability, and so forth.

Each organizational form repeatedly falls into discernable traps, perpetuating self-defeating cycles that are difficult to break because they are fundamentally linked to the organization’s very ability to generate support and sustain its operations in the first place. In Chapter 4, I elaborate on the expectations outlined briefly in the above sections, turning to the ten cases from my empirical research inquiry to illustrate the ways in which these conceptual relationships operate once applied to the actual landscape of INGOs.

traced to the INGO’s organizational systemic features. The term is not meant to have a derogatory connotation; rather, it denotes that the source of the problem is internal and cultural in nature.
CHAPTER 4:

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: DYSFUNCTION IN THE THREE INGO IDEAL TYPES

Having laid the conceptual foundations for understanding organizational dysfunction as a function of internal cultural and ideational factors in the previous chapter, this chapter tests the applicability of these insights against the empirical world of INGOs. Drawing on the evidence gathered through over 200 interviews, roughly 30 off-the-record consultations, and reactive observation at ten in-depth case study organizations, my work finds support for the expected relationships outlined in Chapter 3. The four organizations resembling the Moral Charismatic Organization (Partners In Health, Seeds of Peace, The Carter Center, and the International Rescue Committee) suffer from the inefficiencies associated with the MCO ideal type; the same is true for the three Expert Pragmatist Organizations (the Environmental Defense Fund, Human Rights Watch, and the International Center for Transitional Justice), and for the three Grassroots Proceduralist Organizations (Kiwanis International, Oxfam, and Mercy Corps).

In Chapter 2, I noted that the first few interviews with employees of a given INGO were highly revealing of shared norms and behavioral tendencies, which I discussed in the context of organizational systems in Part I. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, this was also the case when it came to identifying dysfunctional tendencies within these organizations. Speaking under the conditions
of anonymity, most interviewees were remarkably forthright about the ways in which their organizations struggled to achieve their goals in an efficient manner. In each conversation, I aimed to spend approximately five minutes discussing the interviewee’s background and work responsibilities (which seemed to have the effect of making the interviewee feel comfortable speaking with me), followed by approximately 25 minutes of questions that directed interviewees toward more “positive” responses about their organizations. After the first thirty to forty minutes of each semi-structured conversation, the interviewees themselves began to exert more control over the direction of the interview. By the time the interviews approached the one-hour mark, nearly all of the 200 interviewees had led me into territory that was particularly important or interesting to them. To my initial surprise, this territory was often “negative” in nature, concerning the interviewees’ frustrations, concerns, and challenges.

With the exception of a few senior executives and board members who may have been more interested in protecting the reputation of their organizations than providing revealing responses to my questions, the vast majority of the interviewees used part of our time together to discuss the organizational practices that they found trying, irritating, or wasteful. After experiencing this pattern in the first ten or fifteen interviews, I began to expect this “pivot” after thirty or forty minutes of more structured question-and-

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245 For example, I might ask: “Why did you decide to apply for a job here?,” “What do you like most about working here?,” or “What makes your organization particularly effective in this space?”
answer. In hindsight, it seems clear that interviewees wanted to steer me toward these subjects because of a combination of three factors. First, after the first half-hour of the meeting, interviewees seemed to feel genuinely comfortable in the interview context, perhaps even temporarily forgetting that their words were being recorded for research purposes. Second, many interviewees reported to me afterwards that they appreciated having the opportunity to speak candidly and anonymously about their frustrations to a third-party individual who understood their organization but was not intimately involved with its affairs. Third and perhaps most importantly, I discovered after beginning my empirical inquiry that many interviewees hoped that I would return after completing my research to provide feedback and guidance to their leaders in order to help eliminate the problems that the employees had discussed with me. Perhaps as a result of these factors, interviewees consistently, and quite naturally, led me toward conversations about their organizations’ inefficiencies, revealing what I

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246 In addition to consciously adopting a style that was informal and approachable to put interviewees at ease, I revealed to them that I had previously been the Director of a non-profit organization, as well as a life-long volunteer, researcher, and consultant to various global social sector organizations. I believe this information had the effect of making interviewees feel like I was a peer—perhaps even an ally—who would understand and even identify with the frustrations they were experiencing. To be clear, I was always very explicit about my role as a researcher, but the additional information about my background may have influenced how the interviewees saw me.

247 I was surprised by the sheer percent of interviewees (roughly 60%) who happily used phrases like “occupational therapy,” “opportunity to vent,” or “cathartic experience” to describe our conversations as they ushered me out of their offices.

248 Although I expressed no interest in acting in a consulting capacity for these organizations, to-date, four of my ten case INGOs have formally asked me to present my findings and make recommendations to their senior leadership teams. When the invitation to return was not explicit and formal, the desire to learn from my thoughts was expressed in unofficial and informal terms. I assume that if these senior managers who encouraged me to advise them genuinely wanted to improve their organizations based on my insights, then they would have encouraged their employees to speak freely and openly with me about their frustrations.
interpreted to be genuine insights and observations about the downsides of their organizations’ cultures, structures and operations.249

As was the case with respect to organizational systems, the distinct ways in which these groups conceived of their own internal problems became clear to me after the first few interviews within any one INGO. Furthermore, perspectives were remarkably salient and shared among employees distributed both vertically and horizontally throughout their organizations. For instance, if an INGO suffered from cultural fragmentation, everyone from senior executives in New York to program staff in Kinshasa recognized the negative effects of this phenomenon on their affairs. Like the organizational systems addressed in Part I, the inefficient tendencies discussed here represent a combination of observable facts and unspoken truths, and while they necessarily constitute generalizations of many diverse conversations, I have made every effort to accurately reflect the practitioners’ sentiments.

Much like the counterpart empirical chapter in Part I, Chapter 4 is divided into sections covering empirical observations and analysis related to each of the three ideal types: MCOs, EPOs, and GPOs. It concludes with a brief discussion of the central lessons learned from these observations about the relationships between authority, systems, and inefficiencies in INGOs. I focus on one case that

249 In the rare cases when interviewees were more reluctant to discuss their organizations’ internal problems, I asked questions that would evoke relevant answers, such as: “Do you ever find yourself frustrated at work, and if so, why?” or “If you could change anything about your daily activities/leadership structure/organizational decision-making, what would it be, and why?” This method generally led to useful and revealing answers that I could interpret in context.
is particularly instructive of each ideal type, with reference to empirical data from the other cases when it is revealing or instructive. As has been the case throughout this work, I rely on the practitioners’ own words as much as possible to convey the true nature of each organizations’ characteristics and flaws.

I. Dysfunction in the Moral Charismatic Organization (MCO):

As described at length in the previous chapters, the MCO ideal type may be characterized by six core systemic features, which I have termed devoted followership, supporter connectedness, personality-driven decision-making, impassioned staff, a culture of ‘yes,’ and needs-driven responsiveness. The prominence of particular individuals in agenda setting and decision-making creates highly inspired, connected communities of practitioners and supporters, and the centrality of and commitment to a particular vision for the world produces cultures where the needs of people being served become sacrosanct, and pursuing them passionately is rewarded. These features are, no doubt, a source of organizational strength and credibility; however, as will be the case throughout this chapter, these features can produce inefficient outcomes under certain conditions.\(^{250}\) In particular, MCOs suffer from six types of dysfunctional behavior, which I call rationalization of irrationality, leadership liability, mission creep, consensus dependency, overexposure, and contextual particularism.

\(^{250}\) Part III focuses on the particular circumstances under which the various inefficiencies become truly destructive for the three ideal type INGOs.
As passionate leaders and inspired, devoted followers, MCO members pride themselves on responding to needs as they arise, which requires a commitment to flexibility and nimbleness. They rely heavily on personality-driven, emotionally laden reactions to problems, and as such, they tend to avoid applying structured, rule-based, technical solutions. MCOs see rules as a hindrance to their ability to move swiftly in response to complex problems that may arise at any moment “on the ground.” Whereas Barnett and Finnemore’s bureaucratic IOs suffer from an overreliance on rules and procedures, which they call the “irrationality of rationalization,” MCOs justify (or rationalize) to themselves and to others the application of responses that may seem irrational or erratic on the basis of the need to be flexible and adaptable to new issues as they arise. This *rationalization of irrationality* is rooted in an ideological rejection of the “normal professionalism” of other organizations, namely bureaucracies. MCOs associate the “business-as-usual” approach of following strict rules with the status quo institutions that they see as serving the interests of the powerful. As MCOs, these organizations see themselves as being highly connected directly to the people being served, who are, themselves, disconnected and distanced from powerful donors and institutions. In the words of one MCO leader, “The problems we deal with lie outside the rules, so our responses have to be bold and

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252 Lewis, 2007: 84.
253 This approach is *not* a reflection of these organizations being “at a pre-bureaucratic stage, lacking adequate development of basic management systems and procedures” (see Korten, 1987: 155, on the “third sector”).
innovative...we have to go in whatever direction we are pushed.” Even senior administrators within MCOs admit to their organizations’ aversion to rules and standardized responses: in the words of one former Executive Director, “Regardless of what rules needed to be broken, we’d say, ‘Let’s just do it!’ And we’d do it...often with amazing speed and alacrity.”

Rules may hinder bureaucratic IOs’ ability to respond quickly to problems, but a total lack of rules hinders MCOs’ ability to respond efficiently when similar problems arise over time. Believing themselves to be more radical than their bureaucratic counterparts, MCOs may distrust or simply disregard protocols and regulations that could make their efforts more efficient. Without standardized rules and procedures, employees often find themselves repeating the same work—and making the same mistakes—which wastes time and leads to frustration among staff members. As one PIH employee noted, “The lack of standard operating procedures is so inefficient. You have to start from scratch to make...pretty much anything happen.” A field-based employee of TCC wondered, “How can we get anything right when nothing is organized properly, and there are no procedures for taking care of even the most basic tasks?” After asking one interviewee about the degree to which she felt her activities were governed by rules or protocols, she responded: “Protocols? Oh gosh, we don’t have any of those! ... I mean, we love this way of doing things, but it can be really tough when push comes to shove.”
MCO leaders are often aware of the fundamental need for systems and rules to govern their activities, particularly as they grow beyond a certain size and scope; however, these organizations are openly fearful of becoming “too bureaucratic,” and they may see allowing rules to guide their actions as a first step in the bureaucratization process. “[Bureaucracy is] just not our way,” one PIH leader said. “We are collaborative and free—a team in all aspects, not a bureaucracy.” Even when they acknowledge, as one leader did in an interview, a “pressing need to tighten the organizational structures and protocols” due to the size of the staff and budget, they “don’t want to become one of the other guys. We need to maintain our way of doing things, even when that gets tough for everyone.” Even at the IRC, an MCO that is older than the others by more than half a century and larger by more than three-dozen countries of operation, one senior leader reported, “We are just starting to catch up with these things [systems and procedures], but we are long overdue. We could manage without systems for decades, and we even prided ourselves on it, but...it’s just too unwieldy to leave unmanaged.”

Charismatic MCO leaders can inspire, motivate and generate enthusiasm among those around them, increasing employees’ dedication to the cause, enhancing recruitment efforts, and inspiring donor support. Sometimes the image of the charismatic leader itself becomes a powerful symbol, which the MCO ceremonially adopts as central to its identity. For instance, one PIH-er
described the powerful influence of one of its charismatic co-founders, Dr. Paul Farmer:

> Our organization is dependent on the founders, and Paul especially, not only for building support but also for what we represent. It’s not just the individual, it’s the image of the mountain-climbing, selfless doctor in Haiti – the radical, pushing-the-boundaries ... renegade that made PIH what it is.

But the presence of these leaders who generate support and legitimacy for their organization purely on the basis of their passion and charisma can be a “double-edged sword” for the MCO. The centrality of specific charismatic founder-leaders who build support for their work on the basis of their personal passion and spirit can become a liability for MCOs in three ways. First, MCOs can become dependent on these individuals for inspiration and vision, funding and support, recruiting and partnership building, and so forth. Second, because these organizations prioritize hiring charismatic, passionate individuals over technical experts, they may sacrifice a degree of issue-area or management expertise in favor of enthusiasm and devotion to the cause. As Drucker notes, there is a stark difference between effective leadership and effective management: even leaders who excel at “the lifting of a man’s vision to higher sights, the raising of a man’s performance to a higher standard” (as charismatic MCO leaders do) may not be proficient managers or efficient implementers.254 When leaders lack experience in these areas, MCOs face issues related to implementing sustainable, long-term organizational strategies and expertly crafted solutions to problems. Third, because these charismatic leaders can be so prominent and highly regarded

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within an organization, MCOs often disregard the need to develop strong “second-line leadership.” These organizations appear to be fully aware of the potentially disastrous consequences of losing their charismatic leaders, and yet, they rarely devote the necessary time and attention to addressing the risks associated with this possibility.

As has been argued by other INGO scholars, this dependency upon charismatic individuals can lead to recurring internal disorganization and unintentional wastefulness, as well as issues related to long-term sustainability and growth. While the leadership liability issue is always present in MCOs to a small degree, leading to minimal inefficiency in terms of poor management and a lack of high quality second-line leaders, this problem may become more acute and far more potentially disruptive in the wake of a particular leader’s departure. The leadership liability issue may also be more extreme in the early stages of an organization’s life cycle, during which point the charismatic leaders have the most influence over organizational behavior and perceived legitimacy. As MCOs enter later stages of their development, when they may become more formalized institutions, the dependency on particular leaders may be gradually replaced by more broadly shared responsibility for leadership among institutionalized managers.

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256 For example, Smillie and Hailey (2001) show that leadership dependency is a major challenge for most development NGOs, regardless of their mission and approach.
257 In Part III, I discuss the conditions under which certain inefficiencies are amplified to the point where they impact overall performance and can potentially cripple organizations.
258 Schein, 2004; Kaplan, 1996.
One PIH-er illustrated how the leadership liability phenomenon takes root within an actual INGO: “The ethos of Paul Farmer and what he represents is huge for us—for fundraising and support, and for our identity. I don’t know what PIH will be after Paul.” Unfortunately, SOP had the experience of losing its charismatic founder-leader to cancer in 2002. As his health declined over time, he continued to exert disproportionate control over internal decision-making and external fundraising and brand management activities. Consequently, the organization failed to develop strong and self-sufficient second-line leadership to replace him, and SOP struggled in every way for many years after his death. A group of ultimately ineffectual directors cycled through the organization for the first five years after he passed, and the organization’s credibility with donors and supporters suffered enormously. The organization faced near fiscal collapse, struggling to raise even the necessary funds to keep their famous summer camp in operation. Although he had been terminally ill for years, the staff had not prepared properly for their leader’s death; the classic charismatic founder-leader, John wanted to be at the helm of his organization until his final days. Consequently, to use a current leader’s phrasing, SOP “had no one to pull us out of our ‘funk’ during that nightmare period. We just didn’t realize how hard it would be to do our work without John around.”

The third inefficient tendency to which MCOs are vulnerable is intimately linked to the first two: when particular individuals and their emotional (rather than rational) preferences “rule the day,” organizations can find themselves

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suffering from \textit{mission creep}, or an unintentional and perhaps irrational expansion of programs beyond their strategically conceived goals. This expansion of programs and services can become problematic insofar as it leads to organizational overstretch and, in the worst cases, catastrophic mission failure.\textsuperscript{259}

Because of their passion for the work and the specific communities they serve, MCOs are highly susceptible to the changing requests of the populations they serve around the world. When combined with their “just say yes” culture, this responsiveness to needs as they arise means that projects initially designed to solve one problem gradually expand almost uncontrollably to encapsulate increasingly broad and deep goals in the field. The \textit{mission creep} phenomenon helps explain, for instance, why PIH (a health organization) will enter a community in order to provide antiretroviral drugs to individuals living with HIV/AIDS, and it will end up using its resources to build more durable houses for the whole community, or to send individual patients to hospitals in the United States for highly specialized treatment. When programs expand well beyond their initial goals, these INGOs struggle to muster the financial and human capital to sustain their operations, and simultaneously, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify to potential supporters how their projects relate to the overall mission.

Not surprisingly, PIH suffers immensely from this problem: its programs are constantly expanding beyond their initial scope, and beyond the

\textsuperscript{259} See, for instance, Einhorn, 2001.
organization’s core competency in healthcare research and provision. One interviewee described how mission creep becomes embedded within PIH programs:

_We specialize in healthcare, but we realize that our patients won’t be truly well unless we accompany them throughout their life and provide them with their basic necessities. The bottom line is that we care about them, and if there’s something they need, even if it’s not health-related in the conventional sense, we’re going to do our best to provide it._

While this attitude is consistent with the moral authority claims typical of an MCO, one PIH-er noted that this approach comes with challenges: “If our patients want a house, we’re going to build it. But our donors don’t want to know how many houses we’ve built—they want health indicators, so then we have to scramble.” Another said, “It’s great that we do everything, but sometimes we can’t get it all done. We need to fund and support these programs, and as they expand into new areas, that becomes really tough for us, and especially for our finance and development teams who are farther away from the people being served.” One MCO Director of Finance noted that this is a source of enormous frustration for the administrative staff: “No matter how much we’ve raised and allocated, it’s never enough because people are deciding mid-project that they want to be doing more. Sometimes I just want to scream. They need to know that there’s not always enough money and people to do everything they feel is right.” As the goals of disparate programs continually expand over time, it can become increasingly difficult to scale back or discontinue any particular initiative, even when it is in the MCO’s best strategic interest to do so.
The remaining three inefficiencies are related more to the MCOs’ moral authority claims than to their reliance on charismatic leadership. As was established in Part I, the MCO culture is characterized by passionate and devoted staff members who simply want to please one another and serve people in need. These organizations are highly collectivist in nature, meaning they devote a great deal of energy to incorporating the perspectives of all employees into decision-making processes. While this feature serves to further energize and validate staff members, which is key to the MCOs’ success, the need to include everyone’s opinion in a collectivist manner can be stifling to these organizations’ productivity and frustrating to their leaders.

The first problem, which I call consensus dependency, is rooted in the MCO’s rejection of hierarchical structures and its embrace of an other-regarding approach to doing business, which holds that if someone is passionate about an issue, she has every right to have her voice heard and her ideas incorporated into policy. This “enabling management” style, which emphasizes participation and flexibility, stands in direct contrast to the “top-down management” that defines most firms. Managers in this type of enabling INGO “see themselves as ‘facilitators’, ‘organizers’ or ‘coordinators’,” rather than as dictators or directors. MCOs choose to believe “in the ideals and values of participation, closeness to the poor and flexibility,” rather than control, hierarchy and

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261 Ibid.
instrumentality, which “ironically [leaves] many of these NGOs with a set of basic management weaknesses.”

Many of my interviewees reported frustration associated with this problem in their organizations, and yet, the need to generate consensus seems to be considered integral to the MCO culture. As one interviewee reported, “We discuss things together, and everyone is involved in the decision-making process. ... That’s just how we do it.” The reliance on building consensus through unstructured and informal decision-making processes can be exhausting and confusing for leaders, producing results more slowly than comparable projects in other organizations and with unclear strategic metrics. One former Executive Director stated the problem succinctly: “Everyone’s encouraged to speak up, and we are all supposed to get along. But while that is great in some ways, it means that we sometimes get nothing done.” When everyone’s opinion matters and there is no clear process for determining how the organization will respond to a challenge, both stagnation and disorder may ensue. One PIH-er emphasized the phenomenon of slow action when she said, “There’s no chain of command, so I’m never sure what I’m supposed to be doing and who I should talk to...so sometimes, I just do nothing at all.” Another noted the chaos that may result from this style of management: “The ‘consensus model’ is too ambiguous, too confusing, for our size. People need some definition, to know who is in charge,

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262 Ibid. See also Biddle, 1984.
and their superiors need to take responsibility and make some decisions.... What we’re doing now is just too haphazard and, frankly, all over the place.”

The desire to be as inclusive as possible does not only appear in over-crowded staff meetings and international conference calls; in some cases this 

*consensus dependency* filters down into even the most mundane of daily interactions. For instance, a few PIH employees mentioned an email policy that they use to ensure maximum inclusiveness: “loopism” refers to the practice of carbon-copying a variety of people who may or may not be relevant to the issues at hand into an email conversation in order to engage multiple perspectives and keep everyone “in the loop.” While employees report that it is helpful to have access to information about what the organization is doing on a day-to-day basis, most were more concerned about the negative effects of such policies: they spend far more time than they would like reading and replying to emails that have little to do with their job descriptions or areas of expertise. When asked why she replies rather than simply ignoring and deleting these emails, an interviewee responded: “That’s just not how we ... operate. If you’re included, you speak up, and you can see how that can become a vicious cycle, right?” As one Executive Director of an MCO said, “I wish I had more power just to say ‘this is how it’s going to be,’ but that would go against how we do things here.”

MCO employees are quite proud of their organizations’ inclusive attitudes and approaches, and yet, they readily admit that they often “spend so much time talking about how everyone feels that we miss the opportunity to do anything at
all,” as one put it. The inclusive, collectivist approach to doing business creates the conditions for the fifth type of inefficiency: overexposure. Not only are MCOs challenged by their own desire to include as many employees as possible in internal decision-making, but they are also overexposed to the opinions and preferences of stakeholders outside the organization (especially the populations being served). Yet again, this problem stands in direct contrast to one of Barnett and Finnemore’s bureaucratic pathologies: whereas IGOs suffer from what they call insulation from external feedback and opinions that might help these organizations improve, INGOs of the MCO variety suffer from too much exposure to the desires and needs of individuals and populations around them, to the point at which it can become paralyzing. MCOs view their direct connection to the people they serve, and their willingness to let the needs of those people drive the organization’s priorities, as central to their value proposition. One TCC employee beamed with pride as he told me, “We’re out there really getting our hands dirty, interacting with the people, checking in with them constantly to make sure our programs are meeting their needs, not ours.” And yet, they acknowledge the ways in which this overexposure can be wasteful in terms of devoting time and attention to every piece of feedback received, and can lead to a general lack of organizational focus and mission clarity.

263 Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 722) argue that this can produce “internal cultures and worldviews that do not promote the goals and expectations of those outside the organization who created it and whom it serves.”
All four of the MCO cases suffer from overexposure; however, the primary source of the problem is different in each case. For instance, PIH is too vulnerable to the preferences of two groups: the individuals they serve (which is why the organization will devote resources to flying a patient from Rwanda to Boston to receive a surgical procedure), and to individual supporters throughout the developed world who want to be a part of what PIH calls the “movement for health and social justice” (which is why one interviewee told me that “everyone’s voice matters, and everyone can participate in our mission, even if they can’t make a donation”). These vulnerabilities create both funding problems and, in one administrator’s words, “major staffing issues.” In a slightly different way, the IRC is also overexposed: to the members of its Boards of Directors and Advisors. Characteristic of the MCO culture, these board members are overly involved in highly personal and emotionally-charged ways, rather than in the more conventional sense of providing strategic guidance and fiduciary oversight. As one IRC employee noted, “It’s their deep commitment that can get in our way. If you bring a board member to a camp and they see refugees, they want to give money out of their pockets or earmark funds for that project. They don’t always understand the complexity of the situation, and so this can undermine our work as a complete organization.” As this individual aptly noted, an overexposure to the personal preferences of individual stakeholders—whether they sit above or below the organization in terms of governance structures—can lead to sub-optimal outcomes.
As tends to be the case with MCOs, the fourth type of inefficiency once again represents the exact inverse of a common feature within bureaucracies. Barnett and Finnemore refer to the bureaucratic tendency to apply standardized models to diverse cultural contexts as *bureaucratic universalism*, which is a phenomenon rooted in what these authors call the “bureaucratic view that technical knowledge is transferable across circumstances.” They note that while this may sometimes be true, “when particular circumstances are not appropriate to the generalized knowledge being applied, the results can be disastrous.” Perhaps in an effort to avoid this particular organizational fallacy, MCOs reject the bureaucratic practice of “flattening diversity” through the application of universalized solutions to issues that arise in many places around the world choosing instead to design initiatives that are uniquely tailored to each local context. As one MCO interviewee noted, “Our whole model is predicated on the fact that we utilize our resources to deliver exactly what people want. We pride ourselves on being in sync with each community and their different needs...so every intervention is going to be fundamentally different.” While this *contextual particularism* may produce more locally driven, specially designed solutions to problems, it can be a source of inefficiency for MCOs because these organizations find themselves repeatedly devising plans and programs that

265 Ibid.
266 Barnett and Finnemore (1999; 2004) use this phrase to describe when bureaucratic universalism can lead IGOs to overlook important context-specific information while they are applying standardized models to diverse situations.
closely resemble one another. To use one interviewee’s words, “[We] basically start over in every country, which leads to a whole lot of ‘reinventing the wheel,’ and that means wasted time and energy that we can’t afford to waste.”

Figure 4.1 captures the core features of the MCO, drawing relationships between the ideal type itself, which was described at length in Part I, and the six dysfunctional tendencies described above. The reader will notice similarities between this image and the one encapsulating Barnett and Finnemore’s argument about bureaucratic IGOs (Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3). Although the specific terms have changed, the basic logic of the argument remains the same: the ways in which an organization earns its legitimacy have important consequences for organizational design and behavior, which have both self-reinforcing and self-defeating effects on these organizations’ performance.
II. Dysfunction in the Expert Pragmatist Organization (EPO):

The previous chapter introduced the following terms to describe an EPO’s core organizational systemic features: perfectionism, persistent debate, individual independence, ends-over-means approach, partnership pluralism, and strong ‘inside game.’ One interviewee encapsulated the culture that predominates within EPOs when he said: “We act like a confederation of self-actualized individuals ... where those individuals had all the power from their intelligence and capabilities. They define what the organization is and drive everything it does.” Completing this thought later, he highlighted a few of the negative externalities of this EPO individualism: “That culture was workable when we were just starting and small, but now that we’re successful and large, we need to be more systematic and less individualistic. It’s time to evolve.” While this culture does not necessarily constitute an inefficient institutional arrangement in and of itself, it leaves EPOs exposed to a host of dysfunctional tendencies, which I call constant critique, individual creep, horizontal siloing, ‘closed door’ syndrome, procedural opacity, and ideological discord. The organizational systems characterizing the EPO ideal type may, on the one hand, enhance the appeal of these organizations for potential employees and supporters alike (as discussed in Part I); however, these systemic features also have potentially destructive consequences for their host organizations.
First, epitomizing *constant critique*, individuals in EPOs feel compelled to debate and protest decisions because they are trained to be opinionated to the point of belligerence, if necessary. In this regard, they differ dramatically from their MCO counterparts, in which individuals choose to participate because they are passionate and perhaps overly zealous about the cause, and managers want to seek consensus because they truly care about everyone feeling included and enabled. EPO experts are often hired on the basis of their proficiency in posing difficult questions and soliciting information. For example, researchers at HRW are responsible for investigating and exposing human rights abuses, which are often committed by powerful actors—including governments and corporations—around the world. This job requires a commitment to questioning authority that is perhaps difficult for their researchers to “mute” or “turn off” when they return to the headquarters office. It is the very reliance of these organizations on these individuals’ well-argued opinions that can be both a blessing and a curse for EPOs. On one hand, EPOs would not have the necessary legitimacy to conduct their affairs if their experts were less probing, less intrepid, less stubbornly opinionated; but on the other hand, these individuals can prohibit efficient operations because they can be too intrusive, and too combative about organizational affairs that do not necessarily invite this degree of internal “push-back.”
One HRW senior administrator aptly encapsulated the simultaneous influences of having opinionated experts involved in making decisions and allowing those debates to become paralyzing for their organizations:

*We’re hiring researchers to ask questions, to press people, to find out what’s right. We can’t then ask them to turn all those things off when they come back to the home office. That’s why they’re so good. They’re as passionate about selecting the color of the wall paint as they are about finding out who did what in the field. But sometimes they are convinced they’re right about the wall paint, and we just need them to let us do our jobs like we let them do theirs.*

While ensuring that their experts feel empowered to share their opinions and debate ideas may be necessary in order for EPOs to retain this talent and earn the legitimacy their experts provide, it can also lead to the wasteful process of *constant critique*. It is not simply that experts feel entitled to share their opinions, and these opinions are disparate; it is that EPO experts feel obligated to play the “devil’s advocate” role until ideas are fully debated, and to uncover hidden meanings beneath stated truths that might otherwise be taken for granted. They are professional interrogators and fact-checkers, and when this energy is turned on administrators and support staff, internal tensions and inefficiencies emerge. As one EDF employee said, “We have a hard time ... responding quickly when things happen in the world because we’re ... very critical of everything we read and everything our people want to say.”

But the slow response time to rapidly changing global events is just one symptom of the need to constantly debate. Perhaps even more detrimental to internal operations is the effect of creating division among experts and
administrators within EPOs. Senior administrators in these organizations struggle to do their jobs effectively because they believe that any decision they make will be, as one director put it, “torn to shreds” by the employees whom it effects. The culture of debate is so pervasive that people will criticize the decision simply for the sake of being combative. One EDF manager added, “The flipside of everyone having an opinion is, well, everyone has an opinion. ... Everyone wants to make sure that the organization reflects their own views, and those views obviously don’t always align. This creates an enormous amount of stress when we try to make decisions and are constantly being argued and disagreed with.” One EDF employee’s interpretation of the source of the problem echoes my analysis: “I think it’s because there are so many bright people here.... But what’s the downside? They demand to be heard. And they demand that the policies are changed to reflect their views.” This kind of dysfunction is distinct from the consensus dependency issue that can be found within MCOs; in the case of the latter, employees feel obliged to participate in conversations beyond their purview, and consensus is sought on every decision, whereas in the former, experts insist on playing the “devil’s advocate” role, even when their feedback is not invited. Making operational, financial, and administrative decisions by committee is not an efficient means of conducting internal affairs, especially when the committee members are experts on human rights or climate change, rather than finance or operations. The challenge for EPO managers, then, is to
effectively massage the process so that their employees will accept the decisions that they make.

The informed yet demanding nature of the experts in EPOs is also the source of their second dysfunctional tendency, which is related to the presence of what I call rogue individuals. When experts become too independent—pursuing their own interest areas at the expense of fulfilling the organization’s collective mission—they can become challenging for leaders to manage and for finance teams to support. This problem is distinct from the mission creep that plagues MCOs, which occurs when teams grow increasingly attached to particular communities receiving help and, as a result, they overstretch their resources and engage in projects that lie outside their core competencies and goals.267 By contrast, the rogue individuals phenomenon that occurs in EPOs may be characterized by employees getting so invested in their own projects that they become difficult to “reign in,” to use one leader’s words, or keep focused on the organization’s overall mission. For example, an expert in ocean systems may spend his time participating in conferences, research projects, publications, and international policy discussions related to highly specific subjects that are perhaps only marginally linked to the overall mission of reducing environmental degradation. In EPOs, experts often engage in these activities without seeking

267 For example, this explains why PIH, a global health organization, is now building houses for entire communities in Rwanda.
approval first, leaving managers to make strategic sense of the range of activities that the organization finds itself supporting.

Due in part to the disproportionate power that EPO experts wield because of their centrality to organizational legitimacy claims, administrators struggle to provide boundaries or to discipline these *rogue individuals* when they spend too much time and money on activities that are not related to the organization’s strategic goals. As one interviewee summarized, “We were founded on a model of creative, independent experts, who had their own latitude to do and say what they wanted. ... People get scared if we even *talk* about tightening the reigns.” When experts across an organization want to engage in projects that are relevant specifically to their interests and refuse to be controlled by their managers, the result is staff overstretch and a lack of strategic coherence. One interviewee at EDF spoke directly to the first point: “People like to pursue things that interest them here, and they get super into it. ... The downside is that the more they take on, the more work there is to do ... We don’t have the time to pursue in depth all these things that interest us without making major sacrifices. And we’re not good at that.” Another interviewee at EDF identified the second point: “They think that because they are who they are they can just run off and do whatever they want, but someone has to make sense of everything and create some unity out of it.” As experts insist on engaging in their own tangential projects, EPO support staff and administrators grow frustrated because they are spread too thin.
A third dysfunction common among EPOs is also related to the relative power of experts within these organizations: horizontal siloing occurs when the experts do not effectively communicate their knowledge “up” to their senior management teams or “down” to the support staff or people on the ground. As is the case with more conventional types of siloing, this problem occurs when certain factions in an organization communicate more effectively within their own group than among or across groups. However, unlike conventional siloing, which usually describes the sub-division of an organization into business units (typically departments, programs, or otherwise vertically-arranged groups), horizontal siloing is a phrase intended to convey a lack of communication and sharing across strata of the organizational hierarchy.268 In the EPO case, experts and researchers—regardless of their department or business unit—do not always effectively share the information they have gathered through their experiences to others in the organization.269 In EPOs, this problem is almost always unintentional; people are not so much proactively protective of their own information as they are too busy, too preoccupied, or simply too knowledgeable about an area to be able to effectively pass along the information to individuals who are less well informed on the issue.

268 Whereas conventional siloing is often visually represented by vertically arranged conical shapes that are isolated from one another like wheat siloes, horizontal siloing might be represented by a series of tubes lying on their sides, overlaid on top of an organizational chart, separating the administrative strata from the senior program staff strata from the support staff strata, and so forth.

269 While these experts may communicate flawlessly when conveying the key findings from a particular investigation or study, the communication problems occur when it comes to sharing other types of information that are important for institutional maintenance, such as contacts in the field, interview notes, other relevant institutional players, contextual factors that influence the experts’ thinking, etc.
There are three negative consequences of this information blockage problem in EPOs. First and perhaps least significant in terms of efficiency outcomes, staff morale decreases. As one support staff member at HRW said, “The people here are so smart, but unfortunately, all our knowledge is concentrated in a few heads...so these guys have to be at the center of everything, and I sometimes have no idea what’s going on, and that can be really frustrating.” Even entry-level employees at EPOs are generally highly educated (often with degrees from elite institutions) and have impressive resumes. Many of them turned down opportunities to earn much more money in the private sector, but they chose to work for these INGOs because of their interest in serving a particular cause. When these (often over-qualified) support staff members begin to feel disconnected from the issues because knowledge is insulated within the “expert” strata of their organizations, early burnout and high levels of staff turnover result. Second, when knowledge is constrained to the expert bracket of the organization, opportunities for upward mobility and meaningful professional development disappear. EPOs are “knowledge organizations;” their legitimacy and credibility are entangled with the quality of their product, and the quality of their product is dependent on their access to specialized, otherwise inaccessible information. When staff members are not able to fully benefit from this institutional knowledge and expertise, their value to the organization remains stagnant, and they are less likely to be promoted—or to feel fully respected—by others within the organization. This is true for staff members
who have limited opportunities for promotion from within, as well as senior administrators who struggle to earn legitimacy in the eyes of their subordinates, which perpetuates the constant critique phenomenon. Third and perhaps most significantly, horizontal siloing leads to poor management of institutional knowledge over time, which means that the organization wastes time and energy recreating preexisting work and re-learning answers to old problems. One interviewee highlighted the value of information that is lost in translation at EPOs:

*The researchers do a fantastic job writing reports, but what happens to all their other knowledge about the field? All their contacts and communications? Everything they learned about how to penetrate certain institutions and understand certain systems? That’s just as important as the reports they end up writing, but our organization doesn’t benefit from that knowledge. We don’t have any way of managing it. So when a researcher leaves, that information disappears. Next time we go to China, well, we have to start over.*

The next three inefficiencies derive from the pragmatic approach characteristic of the EPO ideal type. To use the words of one EDF employee, EPOs generally believe that “it’s more useful to make as much progress as we can than it is to do things according to how we’re supposed to do them.” But because of this approach, as she continued, “People say that we sell out too easily, particularly other folks in the NGO community. They say that we don’t play well with others. We’re ‘wonkier...’ while others have more philosophical objectives, we just have practical ones.” In Part I, I explained how this pragmatism can be a source of strength: EPOs’ ends-oriented approach to
problem solving, their willingness to partner with organizations across ideological spectrums, and their ability to make change through “corridor diplomacy” give them a particular kind of comparative advantage in the INGO landscape. And yet, as is the case with the other two ideal types, these features can produce inefficiencies of a particular nature.

I call the first dysfunctional tendency that emerges in EPOs as a result of their pragmatic authority the ‘closed door’ syndrome. Whereas the horizontal siloing phenomenon described the process whereby institutional knowledge is not effectively communicated across the organization, the ‘closed door’ syndrome describes the perception of EPO members as having an unapproachable attitude toward cooperating and helping others (both inside and outside the organization). When employees believe their co-workers are either unwilling or unable to assist them, they may become demoralized and de-motivated. To quote one EDF interviewee, “It’s not obvious where to go for help, and people aren’t very open or willing to help when you do go to them. It ends up feeling like no one can help me with anything, or they just don’t want to, and I get passed off to the next person. ... It feels like there are always doors being closed in my face.” An ICTJ employee echoed this frustration: “…It’s hard to feel heard or supported, even when I really need something....” This creates the conditions under which employees accomplish less in a given period of time because they are intimidated or discouraged by the prospect of asking for help.
In terms of external relationships, this syndrome can lead other organizations, especially peer INGOs, to perceive EPOs as being non-collaborative or inappropriately self-interested organizations. One definitive characteristic of the INGO landscape is the need to project a selfless and cooperative image in order to build partnerships, seek funding, and survive.\footnote{Although it may be argued that the bottom line for all organizations, including INGOs, is the need to survive, that process for most INGOs necessarily involves the need to be perceived as being selfless, other-regarding and cooperative.}

Earning a reputation for being disinterested in collaboration or providing assistance to others can be highly damaging for an INGO. Recognizing the presence of an unapproachable attitude, which I have called the ‘closed door’ syndrome, the EPO leaders whom I interviewed said they understood why their peers have stigmatized them in this way. In the words of one EPO leader, “We’re supposed to keep peace in the network by working as teams, but we like to work independently, and there have been times when we have been ex-communicated because of it. When our experts get so into their work that they become insular and unapproachable, we’re seen as a bad ‘team player’ by peers in this field.

While they acknowledge the real consequences of this problem, many believe that their pragmatic attitude has simply been misunderstood by other organizations that place a higher premium on procedures than outcomes. In the words of one EPO leader, “I just don’t get why ‘making friends’ should be so important. We’re getting the job done, right?” When coupled with an unmatched ability to build partnerships with states and firms that some INGOs would not even consider meeting with, this so-called syndrome creates the conditions
under which EPOs may be treated with distrust and (in particularly extreme cases) disdain by their INGO peers. When it becomes unnecessarily time-consuming and challenging to build effective partnerships with organizations that have similar goals, EPOs become restricted in their ability to achieve their stated ends in an efficient manner.

The fifth dysfunctional tendency in EPOs is closely related to the ends-oriented approach these organizations take to conducting their affairs: operational opacity refers to the problem of insufficient transparency in decision making and agenda setting. Whereas MCOs suffer from the rationalization of irrationality problem (or a disdain for applying standardized procedures to manage their affairs and solve problems), EPOs suffer from a lack of interest in investing resources into projects that promote transparency and accountability but do little to advance organizational outcomes. EPOs will not hesitate to apply standardized procedures if doing so will help them achieve their goals. They do, however, take issue with the idea of doing extra work simply to make their operations perfectly transparent to internal and external stakeholders. Although they agree on principle that transparency and accountability are worth striving toward, they do not go out of their way to take action related to this belief. So for example, whereas a GPO might spend months compiling an “accountability report,” outlining and explaining the reasoning behind every internal decision that was made by the leadership team, an EPO would not see the utility in this exercise and might avoid it altogether.
The *operational opacity* phenomenon becomes problematic in two ways. First, external partners and potential supporters may be skeptical of—or, in the worst cases, offended by—the lack of transparency surrounding EPOs’ internal operational activities. Some donor agencies and international institutions require substantial documentation concerning an organization’s internal activities before they will engage the group as a partner or funding recipient. If complete transparency is important to an external stakeholder, then EPOs may be unlikely to meet their requirements; they will either have to spend a great deal of energy pulling together documentation at the last minute, or they will miss certain opportunities because they did not devote sufficient energy to documenting their operations all along.

Second, this problem can perpetuate the already problematic issue of poor internal communications. As one EPO employee said, “We’re all lords of our own little worlds here. There are definitely cases of the right hand not knowing what the left is doing, and probably not agreeing with it if it did. People just aren’t clear and open about what they’re doing.” EPO employees are by no means being intentionally opaque or misleading because they have anything to hide; they are not being deliberately secretive because they are breaking—or even bending—the rules. Rather, they have simply calculated that it is not worth their time and energy to document and communicate their every move, or they are too invested in their particular research projects to pause and consider who else might be interested in understanding their actions and thought processes. As
one EDF interviewee reported, “Because sometimes [people] believe they own an issue, they end up just charging ahead and not letting anyone else in on what they’re doing.” When asked what the effect of this lack of transparency was, this interviewee noted poor coordination and confusion:

> Sometimes it’s chaos. I’ve seen a farmer get approached by two different people in our organization about the same issue and get totally confused by what we’re doing. ... Those people didn’t know they were both working on something because they kept it to themselves, hoping to achieve their goals, and then tell people about it afterwards. It’s uncoordinated because people keep to themselves and can be really protective of their work and their connections.

An HRW support staff member reported similar effects within her organization:

> We are so busy chasing the stories in the field that sometimes people forget there are other people in this organization who need to know what’s going on, who can’t do their jobs without some information about how things are playing out. When we aren’t included in the process — when there aren’t consistent check-ins and we’re not kept in the loop — things can fall apart quickly.

When individuals within EPOs pursue their goals without sufficiently syndicating among their colleagues and partners before they act, miscommunications, repeated work, and general disorganization and waste can and do ensue.

The final dysfunctional tendency from which EPOs are likely to suffer is motivational disunity. This feature has the most pronounced effect in terms of differentiating EPOs from MCOs: whereas MCOs are characteristically unified and collectivist in their ideological foundation (though they may disagree in terms of how to pursue that shared vision), EPOs are so singularly focused on achieving outcomes that they can come to develop quite different positions
concerning *why* those outcomes are important. In other words, employees’ motivations for doing the work may be fundamentally different, even if the outcomes they wish to pursue are the same. While a plurality of opinions and perspectives can be valuable to an organization, this disunity can become problematic when it leads to internal miscommunications and misalignment in terms of what goals the organization ought to be pursuing. This problem can be explained by the division of labor among experts characteristic of a knowledge organization like the EPO. In much the same way that a bureaucratic division of technical labor leads to the formation of “pockets of autonomy and political battles” and “overlapping and contradictory sets of preferences among sub-groups,” an EPO division of expertise leads to the formation of competing perspectives about both *how* and *why* to pursue certain outcomes. When these disparate views come into conflict with one another, the organization can come to project a confusing, sometimes internally contradictory set of messages to supporters, peers and partners.

An example will help illustrate the point. One EDF economist explained that the scientists, economists, and environmental activists within his organization often adopt competing ideological perspectives that can create problems for his organization. In one particular instance that illustrates the larger phenomenon, the activists “spent a decade getting farmers on our team,” only to find out that the scientists within EDF had written a policy paper arguing that

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271 Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 724) call this pathology “cultural contestation.”
“we’re not accounting for greenhouse gas appropriately, and farmers are getting too much.” The President of EDF, who had been lobbying policy-makers in Washington, D.C. on the basis of the activists’ pro-farmer position on this particular issue, was “thrown under the bus when this paper came out...and it was all done under the same roof, under his watch.” At EDF, some employees want to see environmental change outcomes because they care about local farmers; others have a passion for global ecological sustainability; some believe in the power of market incentives to produce absolute gains in global economic and environmental health; others dislike major multinational corporations and simply want to “sue the bastards” who are violating legal regulations and undermining the authority of international law. It is common for EPOs to contain an amalgam of experts from across disciplines and backgrounds because these organizations prioritize finding the best answers above everything else: they want economists, scientists, lawyers and activists all working under one roof because together, they can find “innovative ways to solve big ... problems.”

One EPO employee summarized how motivational disunity manifests in his organization:

People here all care about the environment, but it’s for many different reasons, and it’s hard for us to be unified in saying anything, so we end up with really scattered messages sometimes. We end up trying to defend all kinds of views and findings all at once, which can be confusing, and kinda contentious for us.

272 Many at EDF refer to this phrase as the informal slogan (or motto) of the organization during its founding years. As one interviewee explained, “That was our reputation for many years...until we learned we needed to find a way to work with people, not just to sue them.”

273 Environmental Defense Fund Website, 2013: “Our mission and history.”
EPO employees feel the adverse effects of these six dysfunctional tendencies when trying to produce meaningful work in a short amount of time. With more than a hint of frustration in her voice, one interviewee highlighted the individualism inherent in EPOs: “Lots of our people ... left big organizations because they didn’t like the bureaucracy or the idea that they all had to conform to some set of ideas. People are much more ‘go it alone, believe what you wanna believe’ here.” On the basis of the features discussed in Parts I and II, the EPO ideal type is clearly distinct from the other organizational forms discussed in this work. Bureaucratic IGOs are hierarchical, technically driven, and rigidly controlled environments whose work suffers from being overly standardized and insulated from feedback; MCOs are collectivist organizations filled with passionate “team players” who prefer enabling and inclusive management styles; and as I will discuss at length in the next section, GPOs are bottom-up organizations, driven by highly democratic and transparent processes that treat widely dispersed, semi-autonomous voices as equal. These models differ from EPOs along every dimension except one: their commitment to pursuing social aims such as alleviating poverty, eliminating injustice, or reducing the effects of environmental degradation.
III. Dysfunction in the Grassroots Proceduralist Organization (GPO):

As was discussed at length in Part I of this work, GPOs are defined by decentralized authority vested in local leaders who are often widely dispersed around the world. These organizations delegate power to semi-sovereign sub-units, each of which has a distinct sub-culture of its own, which is defined in large part by the identity and preferences of its local leader. These organizations, and individuals occupying roles in the upper echelons of leadership in the headquarters offices, devote an enormous amount of time and energy to incorporating the viewpoints of each of these decentralized units into the broader vision and goals of the organization. These groups are often defined on
the basis of this grassroots approach: the people, ideas, and mobilization efforts “on the ground” in conflict zones or poverty-stricken environments around the world drive GPO activities, rather than the “elites” in London or New York City. In line with this philosophy, GPOs adopt “bottom-up” approaches to decision-making and agenda setting, and they are committed to the principles of democratic inclusion and accountability above all else. These characteristics are a source of strength insofar as they reinforce the perceived authority of these organizations as “voices of the people.” However, this fundamental commitment to a highly localized (rather than centralized) approach to doing business can create certain barriers to efficiency, stifling GPO operations and frustrating employees in the process.

First, the highly decentralized nature of GPOs is bound to produce cultural fragmentation. As one Kiwanis employee summarized, “There’s a major disconnect between ‘International’ and the clubs, and among the clubs themselves. Each of these groups has their own agenda, and they don’t always see the need to be part of a larger whole.” Another described the clubs as being “fickle and ‘flitty’ in their allegiances,” and “all over the map” in terms of preferences about organizational goals and activities. Sometimes this fragmentation is benign; after all, much of the work that GPOs do is highly localized and managed quasi-independently by these different chapters or branches in their own “backyards.” However, this diversity can at times be highly problematic for GPOs because it creates tension among the various
organizational sub-units, including between the headquarters office and the chapters themselves. “From my experience, the clubs don’t want anything to do with us,” one international headquarters staff member noted. “There are some leaders that want our help, but mostly they see us as getting in their way — taking their dues and trying to impose our views, which, by the way, they think are incorrect.” In the best cases, GPOs experience a kind of cultural disconnect between international and the field teams. One field-based employee at Oxfam described what I would call the “best case scenario” for fragmentation within a GPO:

To be honest, I’m not entirely sure what they [the international headquarters staff] actually do. They fill in the dots between chapters that are otherwise completely disconnected from one another. But we are absolutely autonomous, and ‘international’ is sort of like another affiliate, with its own culture and views. I guess I just don’t see them as the ‘bosses’ they’re trying to be.

A Mercy Corps employee highlighted the resentment and cynicism that tends to arise from regional and local offices in GPOs: “The more you’re in the field, the more cynical you become about how things are done at headquarters, and how the money is being spent...and the more control you want to have over how things are done and when and where.” She later emphasized that this fragmentation is always present within her organization to some extent, but that the severity of the problem fluctuates over time: “The tension between HQ and the field has always been present here, but sometimes it’s worse than others.”

Cultural fragmentation can also lead to disagreement and strained relations among the chapters or branches themselves. Because all of the chapters
have, as one interviewee stated, “their own community, prefer to work in their own ‘backyard,’ and maybe don’t care entirely about the larger goals of the organization,” they can become alienated from one another. This isolation of chapters from their counterparts around the world can create confusion and misalignment in an organization’s vision and programs. In the worst cases, it can produce bitterness and distrust among chapters. The leader of one prominent chapter of a GPO case organization reported that the other chapters were jealous of their accomplishments: “People at the other chapters look at us as the ‘bad guys’ because we’re successful. I think they actually resent us.” Because of this discord amongst units, it can be difficult for GPO leaders to convince their branches to operate as one organization—as a team. In the words of a Kiwanis senior leader, “Our biggest problem as an organization is that people don’t see a reason to participate beyond their local borders. Because each club is so different, we need to constantly remind them that they’re part of a larger whole—a worldwide service organization.”

The internal fragmentation inherent to GPO culture is closely related to a second dysfunctional tendency, which I call internal politicization. Fragmentation can be confusing and contentious in itself, but the politicization problem adds a layer of territoriality and jealousy around organizational budgetary concerns, access to information, and political processes. It is not uncommon within GPOs for sub-units to construct informal alliances in order to increase their collective authority and bargaining power within the overall organization. As might be the
case within a group of elected officials, political strategizing and alliance-forming behavior can create a lack of trust among members of the group. The collectivist ideal is replaced by the reality of the democratic process, in which multiple stakeholders are vying for control within an encompassing system of like units. This cultural phenomenon transcends the local and regional borders of GPO organizational structures, penetrating the walls of field and headquarters offices alike. As one headquarters-based Kiwanis employee said, “People build alliances and jockey into position against other ‘factions’ within our office all the time. They’re trying to buffer themselves against others taking what they think they own.”

An ability to navigate political alliances effectively is a key to success in GPOs. To quote one interviewee at Oxfam, “What gets rewarded is an ability to talk political strategy and to align yourself with the right groups of people internally. There’s a surprising amount of political maneuvering for a non-profit that’s just trying to do some good in the world.” One interviewee claimed that people in his organization are “choosing sides all the time, which creates all this tension both between and within offices;” and another stated bluntly, “Status and politics rule the day here. Sometimes it feels more like people are competing than collaborating.” The theme of territoriality was common across GPOs in my INGO sample, with employees frequently making comments such as, “people get really protective about their roles, and territorial when others try step in.” One interviewee offered an example from her own experience: “I once had
someone bring their actual job description to me and ask me to back off. I was just trying to help.” She continued, “I realize now that people align against one another and pick their ‘horses’ all the time, and so I learned to do the same so that I could survive within this system.”

In addition to divisiveness and politicization, the decentralized nature of GPOs can produce strategic discord across the organization. Given the internal fragmentation described above, GPO leaders do not always have the necessary legitimacy (in the eyes of local leaders) to dictate how the branches should behave. Local GPO leaders earned their roles on the basis of their expertise related to a particular environment, and as a result, they may hesitate before taking direction from individuals who they perceive as being removed from—and perhaps ignorant about—the nuances of the community in which they operate. As such, it can be difficult for managers to align the chapters around one unified, clear vision for the organization. When each sub-unit is pursuing activities that are in line with the specific interests and needs of the particular community in which they work, coherent organizational strategy may be replaced by a series of disparate activities around the world. As one Kiwanis headquarters employee said, “When there are so many people who have been chosen to lead in different parts of the organization, there’s inevitably a problem of competing agendas. Sometimes people just forge ahead, sometimes it’s

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274 Strategy is commonly defined as the “pattern of decisions...that determines and reveals [an organization’s] objectives, purposes, or goals, produces the principal policies and plans for achieving those goals, and defines the range of business the company is to pursue (Andrews, 1971).
debated and resolved. But it’s usually unclear when we take one step where we’re going to put the next foot.” A number of interviewees described this problem using the phrases “too many chefs in the kitchen,” or “too many brides at the wedding.” By the time local leaders progress through their organization to the top of their respective sub-units, they “know exactly what they want to do when they’re in charge. It’s their turn.”

As local branches forge ahead, GPO headquarters offices are left to build strategy from a disparate set of activities around the world. “There’s no clarity in anything we do,” as one interviewee bluntly stated. A Mercy Corps employee summarized the effects of this lack of clarity: “Our brand struggles because it’s hard to say what we’re doing. Our biggest challenge is how to tell people where their money’s going when everything is so scattered and incoherent.” Management teams feel stretched: “There are times when I feel like we’re running in fifty directions all at once.” Program teams worry that this lack of clarity diminishes the quality of initiatives in the field: “A local team will start a project and not finish it, which brings our overall quality down. We take on too much, and it doesn’t all add up, and our unity, clarity, brand, and ability to communicate what we do all suffer. So we suffer as an organization.” Senior leaders fear they are stifling internal development by being unclear about the organization’s direction: “We reward our local chapters for being proactive and entrepreneurial, but there’s no real ‘next-level’ thinking about where these disparate projects are taking us. We should be asking ourselves, ... ‘Do we have
the time and resources? Is it sustainable? Does it even make sense given our mission?" GPO employees consistently use the phrases “locally-driven” and “opportunistic” to describe their modus operandi, and these organizations would not (and arguably could not) change these parts of how they operate. However, many interviewees echoed the sentiments of one senior leader who said, “All that’s great, but we need some guidelines to make sure we’re all pulling our oars in the same direction.”

The previous three inefficiencies are direct by-products of GPOs’ localized authority claims, and the organizational systemic features they produce; the next three occur as a result of these INGOs’ procedural authority claims. First, GPOs suffer from what I call procedural rigidity. This phenomenon refers to the process whereby the means subsume the ends in terms of the way the organization conducts its affairs. GPOs prefer adjusting their missions to fit their existing rulebook, rather than beginning with the problem and crafting procedures that will most efficiently reach the solution. In the context of GPOs, this procedural rigidity means that employees are either unwilling or unable to be truly flexible and innovate in their responses to problems as they arise. Consequently, GPOs are generally slower than their peers when it comes to responding to internal and external challenges and adapting to fit changing circumstances over time.\(^{275}\)

This rigid adherence to rules and procedures also leads to the formation of sub-optimal policies by restricting the possible range of solutions to a narrow set

\(^{275}\) I discuss these issues at length in Part III.
of comfortable options. For instance, if there is a devastating tsunami in a part of the world that is difficult to access by ground transportation, a GPO may be unwilling or unable to send assistance via air transportation because of procedural (rather than financial or strategic) constraints. Meanwhile, MCOs and perhaps a few EPOs will have moved on the opportunity to provide assistance, while GPOs allowed means-oriented considerations to subsume their ultimate goal of helping the population in need. In instances like this one, GPOs may let their commitments to following the rules stand in the way of both efficacy and efficiency criterion.

The fifth GPO dysfunctional tendency—change resistance—is intimately linked to the procedural rigidity problem. GPOs are bound by their own definitions of due process, or what interviewees casually referred to as “the way we’ve always done things” or “the way it works around here.” Because they are so committed to what is comfortable, GPOs can be inflexible, slow to adapt, and uncreative in their responses. Their inability to evolve over time can become highly problematic over the long-term. For example, Kiwanis is currently experiencing what one interviewee called an “existential threat” to their organization: membership has decreased steadily over the past few decades, dropping by more than 20% since 1990. One of the interviewees explained that this “slow death” was being perpetuated by an internal resistance to new ideas:

*The decline in membership has led some to try to be innovative and change the way we do things, but this makes people so uncomfortable that they resist and*
retrench, back into their traditions and the business-as-usual ways of doing things. So we continue to shrink, and no one’s really doing anything about it.

One senior leader echoed this observation in our interview, saying that people “get ‘turned off’ when we try to make changes. It ends up being ‘too little too late’ when we really need to adapt.”

GPOs’ resistance to change can be explained, at least in part, by an organizational cultural phenomenon whereby people believe that their organizations are “steeped in tradition and history, and if we change, then people have an attitude like the world’s coming to an end.” But part of the explanation is structural. Certain organizational features—including rigid bylaws, voting mechanisms, and promotion procedures—perpetuate the GPO inability to swiftly enact change. For example, Kiwanis’ bylaws dictate that a specific committee of elected officials who only meet once per year must make a variety of (seemingly mundane) decisions about organizational activities. As one interviewee reported, “[We] really need dynamite to move a mountain around here, even for small changes. ... It’s like having handcuffs on.” To use another example, nearly all of Kiwanis’ top leadership positions (in the headquarters office and at the chapter level) are determined through complex electoral processes that can take place over a period of years, or even decades. The President of the international body, for instance, must rise through the ranks from local to regional to global organizational governance, and then from lower positions in the international administration to increasingly higher positions over
time. As one disgruntled headquarters staff member reported, “People spend more time thinking about how they’re going to get elected than how to lead. It’s all about status and power, and people get entrenched in the system in order to win, which is contradictory to change and innovation.” At Oxfam, the resistance to change is also clearly a product of both cultural and structural forces. With great frustration, one interviewee suggested that his organization may be incapable of truly innovative behavior:

*Just look around [the headquarters office in Oxford]... All the self-referential tendencies, all the inertia. I don’t know whether it’s possible to translate that into innovation or creativity. If I ever propose something radical or transformative, my plans are rejected and we retreat to the safety of how we normally do things. It’s always the same, there’s not outside-the-box thinking.*

One Oxfam leader summarized the negative consequences of being attached to such “labyrinthine processes,” which restrict GPOs’ ability to change:

*We are losing to faster organizations because we are slaves to our own process. The path of evolution has mutations, and our peers are just plain mutating faster than we are. It’s a constant source of frustration for everyone here with a brain and a desire to make real change, to transform systems, to uplift the poor and turn things on their heads. The process alone rules the day, and that makes us fundamentally worse at doing our job.*

*Democratic excess* is the sixth and final dysfunctional tendency from which GPOs suffer. I chose these specific words carefully, in order to highlight the contrast between this phenomenon and its analytic opposite, “democratic deficit.” The latter occurs when institutions that are designed to be democratic in structure fail to fulfill a minimum standard of procedural and social behavior
required to maintain democratic legitimacy. The word *deficit* conjures the negative repercussions of a *shortage* of democratic standards; organizations that suffer from this problem are argued to be illegitimate because they are, for instance, not accessible enough to the citizen or stakeholder, lack proper representation of those affected by decisions, or are not accountable enough to those they are intended to serve. Democratic *excess*, on the other hand, refers to the downsides of an institution having a *surplus* of democratic proceedings built into their operations. One Mercy Corps interviewee defined this phenomenon in colloquial terms, based on his experience:

*In some ways, we are overly democratic: our product suffers because we’re trying to make too many people happy... We should be coming out with our strongest, most clarified message, but instead we have to represent the voices of all our offices, all our projects, all our supporters. It’s just too much. We’re shooting ourselves in the foot.*

As has been the case with many of the other inefficiencies presented in this chapter, these dysfunctional tendencies do not have consistently or uniformly negative consequences for their organizations. EPO individualism and practicality can be strengths, and yet, they produce *horizontal siloing* and *motivational disunity*; MCO passion and charismatic leadership can be strengths, and yet, they produce *mission creep* and *leadership liabilities*. Similarly, GPO democratic proceduralism can be a source of strength, and yet, when these organizations rely too heavily on their explicitly democratic mechanisms to make decisions and take action, the result can be sluggish, overly restrictive, ultimately

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wasteful outcomes in terms of human and financial capital expenditures. One Kiwanis interviewee summarized how democratic excess can lead to inefficient behavior: “Everything’s always going up a ladder to be discussed and coming back down to get voted on, and then going back up, and so it becomes a much bigger deal than it needs to be, and it takes six months to get out the door, or it eventually dies.” When I followed up to ask how often this kind of overtly inclusive process hampers her efforts, the interviewee responded: “Oh, that happens all the time. Nothing ever gets done because everyone has to touch it, to vote on it, to approve it, and so we can’t be very progressive with our ideas, and we definitely can’t move swiftly on anything.” At Oxfam, a similar commitment to democratic inclusiveness, to the point of excess, restricts leaders’ ability to act authoritatively and limits the organization’s ability to innovate. As one interviewee noted, “…Once something is brought up, it gets fed into the democratic process and … we’ll have four or five meetings on it and take it seriously, even if it’s a terrible idea. Everyone knows it’s bad and we’re wasting our time, but people are too afraid to interfere with the process.”

Volunteers and local national staff members around the world tend to be highly involved in these organizations’ activities because, as one leader said, “They are our constituents; we work for them. But they want to be included to the point where we simply can’t get things done.” It is a uniquely GPO phenomenon to view these individuals working for the organization in the field as constituents; for MCOs and GPOs, populations in need and donors are the
only groups that might be considered “constituents.” GPOs are legitimate in large part on the basis of their grassroots composition, and therefore, they must consider the people who constitute the “grass” as central to their efforts. As one interviewee reported, “It’s this inclusive, accountable thing. It makes people feel like they deserve a say in everything we do, but there end up being three times as many people involved as there should be, and everything takes three times as long to get done.” A recent survey taken within one of the prominent Oxfam affiliate offices revealed that employees (not just managers) spent approximately 65% of their day in internal meetings and 35% of their time implementing (or, as one interviewee said, “actually working”). Too much emphasis on process, transparency, and participation can be accompanied by slower, less efficient outcomes for GPOs.

When the six tendencies described above all exert an influence within an INGO, the result is a distinct ideal type organizational form that may be characterized by its fragmented culture, its dependency on “bottom-up” consultation, and a rigid conformity to established ways of doing business. While many of these GPOs have an enormous impact around the world, more often than not, they are hindering their own potential effectiveness by being too sluggish and too internally politicized. The need to conform to the disparate preferences of local stakeholders around the world often means settling for the safest, easiest, most comfortable policy options. International leaders spend a significant amount of their limited time managing the competing preferences of
different local leaders, which comes at the expense of setting clear, unified objectives for their organizations. While these INGOs do resemble bureaucratic organizations in a few key ways, GPO employees are far from the “specialists without spirit”\textsuperscript{277} Weber describes, who provide technical, dispassionate solutions to problems within bureaucracies. They are grassroots activists who care deeply about changing the world, but their efforts may become stifled within the context of the systemic features inherent to the GPO ideal type model. The need to maintain the legitimacy they derive from procedural and localized authority creates the conditions under which action is muted and innovation is nearly impossible to achieve.

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\caption{Understanding the Origins of Dysfunction in GPOs}
\end{figure}

Parts I and II have both been devoted to understanding the origins of distinct organizational ideal type models that characterize the INGO landscape. In Chapter 1, I identified the fight for legitimacy as the causal locus of organizational behavioral patterns and outlined the different ways in which an INGO could become an authoritative actor, and in Chapter 2, I introduced empirical data from original research to animate the insights about organizational systems. Having described the essential features of the MCO, the EPO, and the GPO in Part I, the focus of Part II has been the analysis of types of dysfunctional behavioral tendencies that develop within the three ideal types. Using a combination of theoretical insights (Chapter 3) and empirical observations (Chapter 4) about the origins of institutional inefficiency, I have argued for the existence of six distinct dysfunctional patterns within each of the three organizational ideal types (see Figure 4.4, below).

To avoid any potential misunderstandings about the implications of the chapters presented thus far, it is worth briefly reiterating what I have not argued. First, I have not argued that INGOs are more or less efficient than their governmental, intergovernmental, or private sector counterparts. A comparative analysis of efficiency across sectors is well beyond the scope of this project, and it would require an expertise in many types of organizations beyond INGOs. I have simply argued that inefficiency can come in many forms, and that
understanding an organization’s sources of authority can help us predict what
form of dysfunction it will exhibit (or be innately predisposed to exhibiting).
Second, I have not argued that one INGO ideal type is more or less efficient than
the other two types, nor have I made any claims about the desirability of one
organizational form over another, in terms of efficiency or any other potential
measure of success. Third, to this point in my work, I have not argued that
INGOs are in any way ineffective organizations, or that one type is any more or
less effective than the others. Efficiency and effectiveness are certainly related,
but they must be treated as separate concepts: the former refers to the costs
associated with behavior, and the latter refers to the actual results of actions. It
is certainly possible for a highly inefficient organization to be effective in terms
of accomplishing its goals, and a highly efficient organization may be completely
ineffective in terms of achieving its desired impact. Although there may be a
positive correlation between an organization’s efficiency and its effectiveness, I
have not argued that INGOs are ineffective institutions because they experience
certain types of dysfunction.

In Part III, I will address the subject of overall performance for the first
time in this work, focusing on elucidating the conditions under which everyday,
manageable institutional inefficiency becomes potentially crippling
organizational ineffectiveness. Mirroring the structure of Parts I and II, this final

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278 Efficiency is defined as being “productive of desired effects...especially without waste,” whereas
effectiveness is simply “producing a decided, decisive, or desired effect” (Webster, 2013). Part III
focuses on analyzing this difference in the INGO context.
Part is divided into a conceptual chapter, which discusses what we might expect to find in the real world based on our growing knowledge of each of the ideal types, and an empirical chapter, which tests these predictions against actual case INGOs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal Type</th>
<th>Authority Source</th>
<th>Organizational Systems</th>
<th>Dysfunctional Tendencies</th>
<th>Case INGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Moral Charismatic Organization   | W₁ Charismatic Authority | - Devoted followership  
- Supporter connectedness  
- Personality-driven decision-making       | - Rationalization of irrationality  
- Leadership liability  
- Mission creep     | - Partners In Health (PIH)  
- Seeds of Peace (SOP)  
- The Carter Center (TCC)  
- The International Rescue Committee (IRC) |
| (MCO)                            | H₁ Moral Authority   | - Impassioned staff  
- A culture of ‘yes’  
- Needs-driven responsiveness | - Consensus dependency  
- Overexposure  
- Contextual particularism |                                                                         |
| Expert Pragmatist Organization   | W₂ Expert Authority  | - Perfectionism  
- Persistent debate  
- Individual independence | - Constant critique  
- Rogue individuals  
- Horizontal siloing  
- “Closed door” syndrome  
- Operational opacity  
- Motivational disunity | - The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)  
- Human Rights Watch (HRW)  
- The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) |
| (EPO)                            | H₂ Pragmatic Authority | - Ends-over-means approach  
- Partnership pluralism  
- Strong “inside game” |                                                                         |                                                                         |
| Grassroots Pragmatist Organization | W₃ Localized Authority | - Decentralized autonomy  
- “Bottom-up” agenda setting  
- Divergent subcultures  
- Transparent culture  
- Means-over-ends approach  
- Multi-stakeholder decision-making | - Cultural fragmentation  
- Internal politicization  
- Strategic discord  
- Procedural rigidity  
- Change resistance  
- Democratic excess | - Oxfam International (OI)  
- Kiwanis International (KI)  
- Mercy Corps (MC) |
| (GPO)                            | H₃ Procedural Authority |                                                                         |                                                                         |                                                                         |

Figure 4.4: Key Features and Cases Associated with the Three Ideal Types
PART III:

FROM INEFFICIENCY TO INEFFECTIVENESS
CHAPTER 5:
FROM INEFFECTIVENESS TO INEFFECTIVENESS

To briefly review what has been argued so far, each ideal type generates its legitimacy from two distinct authority sources: one who (W₁-W₃) and one how (H₁-H₃). Because these authority sources are intimately linked to an organization’s very conception of its own identity, they lead to the development of particular combinations of observable patterns and unspoken truths (or what I call organizational systems), which play an integral role in shaping organizational culture and behavior. In some instances, these characteristics reinforce the perception of an organization as having a particular type of authority. For example, the perfectionism phenomenon in EPOs means that these groups only release products and deliver services that are of the highest quality, which leads external stakeholders to believe that whomever compiled the information must have exceptional knowledge about certain issues, thus confirming or enhancing said organization’s perceived expert authority.

However, while these organizational systems (the subject of Part I) may be a source of strength insofar as they substantiate an INGO’s authority claims, they also constrain actors within these organizations by defining the range of appropriate action in a given situation and predisposing them to certain types of
dysfunctional behavioral patterns (the subject of Part II). Chapters 3 and 4 argue that INGOs belonging to different ideal type categories will suffer from distinct sets of dysfunctional tendencies. Each of the eighteen inefficiencies discussed in Part II is associated with wasted time and energy, as well as frustration among employees and leaders alike. But under normal circumstances, these inefficiencies are manageable; they do not interfere with an organization’s overall effectiveness in pursuing its ends or its ability to survive and thrive over time. During periods of relative normalcy, when INGOs can operate in what one might call a state of “good enough” efficiency, the problems discussed in Part II are consistently present but remain in a relatively low-intensity state of activation in which they do not undermine the host INGO’s ability to achieve its desired impact on the world.

While an organization can operate in this state of “manageable inefficiency” for months, years, and even decades at a time, these relatively comfortable or static periods may be punctuated by moments in which particular types of internal problems are intensified, potentially reducing an INGO’s overall effectiveness. Specific types of events can exacerbate problems that previously existed at low levels of intensity within their organizations, and the consequences may be disastrous. Part III addresses the conditions under which an organization’s behavioral tendencies cross the line from inefficiency (where they cause minimal wasted time and energy) to ineffectiveness (where they can actually hinder an organization’s ability to perform well and pursue its goals.
effectively). This section of my work focuses on the abnormal periods that punctuate the institutional stasis described in Parts I and II, addressing the endogenous events (e.g., leadership changes, rapid growth periods) or exogenous shocks (e.g., international crises, normative shifts) that can amplify previously low-intensity problems, leading to potentially devastating outcomes for their host organizations. As was the case in Parts I and II, Part III is divided into two chapters. The first one (Chapter 5) is devoted to a conceptual overview of the problem, and the second one (Chapter 6) empirically assesses whether the evidence supports the predictions made in the previous chapter. In the following sections of Chapter 5, I present simple conjectures about the expected conditions under which minimally problematic inefficient tendencies become truly crippling for their host organizations.

Understanding when institutional inefficiency becomes crippling ineffectiveness sheds light on why INGOs resembling the three ideal type models will behave in remarkably distinct ways as international actors. The patterns that will be discussed in Part III help answer questions such as the following: Will certain INGOs tend to expand and contract in rapid, unpredictable sequences, while others evolve gradually over time? Will some keep to themselves and quietly drive change in relative isolation, while others aggressively and boldly engage the public and partners to achieve their ends? Will some succeed in certain types of institutional arrangements, while for others, engaging in partnerships may lead to more
trouble than it is worth? And, Will some INGOs be likely to survive and thrive over time, while others may succumb to crisis and potential collapse?

Understanding each ideal type’s organizational systemic features is a necessary precursor to understanding its dysfunctional tendencies, but it is the problematic patterns that deserve more attention in these final chapters because the ways in which they manifest within organizations leads to the emergence of striking patterns in the INGO landscape. For instance, Moral Charismatic Organizations (MCOs) are the most likely to experience dramatic bursts of growth, but they are also the most likely to fail catastrophically. In other words, their growth rates are the highest, but their death rates may also be the highest of the INGO types. MCOs may excel in the early stages of organizational development, when entrepreneurship, innovation, and collectivity are praised and encouraged, but they will struggle to sustain their activities as they expand their operations over time. MCOs tend to generate enormous name recognition and receive extraordinary praise over a short period of time, but all of this can disappear in an instant under the wrong circumstances. Expert Pragmatist Organizations (EPOs), on the other hand, are likely to quietly persist, rarely experiencing either dramatic growth or catastrophic failure. Their death rates are quite low, but their global recognition may remain low over long periods of time as well. These organizations are content to grow in incremental steps, if at all, and to occupy a “behind the scenes” position in the global institutional landscape. States and IGOs seek their expertise through back channels, while the
public may never know about their existence in the first place. In contrast to the other two types, Grassroots Proceduralist Organizations (GPOs) may grow to become exceptionally prominent and powerful organizations, but they are the most likely to suffer from a “slow death” because they struggle to adapt to changing circumstances over long periods of time. GPOs rarely experience sudden catastrophic failure, but they are the most likely to find themselves in a state of gradual and irreversible decline, facing the existential threat of impending irrelevance as they fail to react properly to new global circumstances. By unpacking the conditions under which low-intensity dysfunction becomes crippling ineffectiveness, we can better understand the origins of these general trends among INGOs in the IO ecosystem.

In short, this chapter presents the idea that INGOs of different types are predisposed to falling into certain “traps” in response to particular kinds of internal and external events, and these pitfalls can have disastrous outcomes in terms of institutional effectiveness. For MCOs, which are characteristically eager to take bold, innovative, and swift action, the traps are associated with periods of rapid growth and leadership change. If, for example, an international crisis precipitates a major funding opportunity for an INGO (e.g., a tsunami renders thousands of people homeless, and states and the public become eager to fund an aid agency that can quickly set up centers to help those suffering), we

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279 See Chapter 4, page 210, for definitions of “efficiency” and “effectiveness.” The key point is that efficiency has to do with costs associated with inputs, whereas effectiveness has to do with results associated with outputs.
can expect MCOs to be natural “first responders,” swiftly and fearlessly taking initiative in response to the emergency. But as they receive enormous amounts of financial support and public attention, their highly anti-bureaucratic nature may hinder their ability to absorb this growth. Given their insistence on making decisions by consensus and avoiding “cumbersome” rules and procedures, MCOs may fail to implement the necessary structures and systems to manage a rapid influx of capital and staff, which can lead to mismanagement of funds in the best cases and potentially fatal errors in the worst cases. MCOs may also find themselves paralyzed by a charismatic leader’s departure, even if the departure was expected and, indeed, inevitable. When an individual on whom the organization has been particularly dependent for both internal inspiration and external support decides to leave the INGO, MCOs may find themselves incapable of filling the role which he or she played due to poorly developed second-line leadership within the organization or supporters’ unwillingness to see anyone else as the “rightful” leader. We can expect these periods to be tumultuous and potentially disastrous, and whether they precipitate total collapse will depend on how forgiving and patient supporters and stakeholders choose to be.

For EPOs, the “traps” are very different, but the consequences may be similar. These highly outcomes-driven organizations may experience crippling problems when they are forced into cooperative arrangements that they view as being cumbersome or wasteful. EPOs are filled with industry experts with
unparalleled knowledge about particular issues, and they may be hesitant about sharing their knowledge resources simply for the sake of collaborating. Potential partners may perceive the EPO culture of strong opinions and fierce debates as a sign of smugness or arrogance, and the independent, private nature as a lack of approachability and accountability. If these interpretations (real or perceived) become widely shared, then an EPO’s reputation can become damaged. If potential supporters come to distrust EPOs, then material and ideational support may be cut, and EPO effectiveness will clearly be challenged. EPO inefficiencies are also likely to be exacerbated to dangerous levels when an international problem requires swift and decisive action. While MCOs are “rushing to the scene,” EPOs may get stuck in a state of debate, deliberating over the optimal solution to a problem when what is needed is an instantaneous reaction.

With respect to GPOs, finally, we would expect them to be vulnerable to the pitfalls associated with major disruptions to the status quo. If, for instance, a GPO’s central management is forced or otherwise compelled to make a decision that will change how resources are distributed or overseen across the organization, we would expect the everyday territoriality and internal fragmentation characteristic of the GPO type to be exacerbated, potentially causing sub-units to pit themselves against one other and to undermine the efforts of the organization as a whole. Under status quo conditions, the sub-units may not be particularly cooperative all the time, but when they feel threatened by a major internal disruption to the norm, we might expect them to become
defensive, placing their own self-interested and localized goals over the needs of the organization. As an organizational type that is fundamentally change-resistant, the GPO will most likely also struggle to adapt to major disruptions to its external environment. Events that shock the INGO ecosystem, either through the introduction of a new funding or policy priority, or by the appearance of a new competitor to the landscape, may exacerbate the GPO’s inability to transform itself quickly, its strict adherence to a preexisting way of conducting its affairs, and its deep commitment to making decisions through a highly democratic and inclusive (and thus, inherently slow) process. While other INGOs may adapt and continue to assert their competitive advantage as incumbent institutions, GPOs risk stagnating and becoming irrelevant over long periods of time.

Table 5.1 summarizes the key conjectures presented in Chapter 5, highlighting the events that can amplify particular kinds of dysfunctional behavior, the conditions under which these events emerge and become problematic, and the possible reasons for which different types of INGOs will continue to engage in these potentially self-destructive behaviors even if they are aware of the risks involved. In the rest of this chapter, I explain the conceptual logic driving these conjectures, and in Chapter 6, I turn, once again, to the empirical world to ascertain whether or not, and in what ways, these predicted results can be observed in reality.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Event</th>
<th>What are the conditions under which this event occurs?</th>
<th>What are the consequences for organizations?</th>
<th>Why do organizations react this way if they know the risks?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCOs</td>
<td>A major international incident or global policy priority shift creates new funding opportunities.</td>
<td>Growth outpaces an MCO’s ability to manage it effectively (amplifying the rationalization of irrationality, consensus dependency, and contextual particularism).</td>
<td>MCOs’ commitment to radical, transformative change leads them to engage in risk-seeking behavior and compels them to &quot;act first and think second&quot; when opportunities arise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Change</td>
<td>Charismatic leader(s) leave their organizations because of burnout, new professional opportunities, death or illness.</td>
<td>Management issues arise when poorly developed second-line leadership fails to inspire followership/support (intensifying the leadership liability issue).</td>
<td>Charismatic leaders have difficulty &quot;letting go&quot; of their projects before their departures, and followers and supporters struggle to see others as legitimate leaders until it is too late.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPOs</td>
<td>EPOs feel compelled to partner when donors or powerful stakeholders demand it.</td>
<td>Working with others exacerbates the ‘closed door’ syndrome and operational opacity problem, leading to distrust and damaged reputations.</td>
<td>EPOs are partnership-averse, but if they are sufficiently dependent upon the support of a particular actor (or actors), then they will see cooperation as a “necessary evil.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident Requiring Swift Action</td>
<td>A large-scale or urgent human rights or humanitarian crisis may require immediate attention.</td>
<td>Impeded by the intensified constant critique problem, they fail to act swiftly, which can mean losing ground to their competitors.</td>
<td>EPOs cannot control when exogenous crises will take place, and when they occur, EPOs’ culture of debate and commitment to high-quality products restrict them from moving swiftly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPOs</td>
<td>Funding shortages, donor fatigue, or demands from powerful stakeholders compel GPOs to make a major strategic or management change.</td>
<td>When sub-units feel threatened, they will retrench to protect themselves, which amplifies the internal politicization, cultural fragmentation, and strategic discord problems.</td>
<td>GPOs are compelled by their circumstances to adjust their management or allocation of resources, and they are culturally and structurally committed to making changes democratically with all sub-units involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous Disruption to the Status Quo</td>
<td>A new funding priority or the appearance of a new INGO competitor may alter a GPO’s external environment.</td>
<td>These events exacerbate the change resistance, procedural rigidity, and democratic excess problems, which prohibit GPOs from adapting to the new external conditions.</td>
<td>GPOs benefit from status quo arrangements and from being perceived as stable, predictable partners, so they are designed to move slowly and inclined to avoid risk and change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INEFFECTIVENESS IN MCOs

Based on what we now know about organizational culture and identity in Moral Charismatic Organizations (MCOs), we can expect that these organizations will be highly volatile. In part because of the vehement commitment of their leaders and followers to driving transformative change in pursuit of a particular ideology, we expect that these organizations will be eager to react swiftly and boldly to changing circumstances, and they will be comfortable making “high risk, high potential reward” decisions to drive their organizations forward. Their collective passion and ambitions will make them fundamentally impatient, and as a result, they will be unable to resist the temptation to respond quickly to changing exogenous circumstances. MCOs’ easy adaptability and eagerness to take initiative may lead to rapid bursts of growth and change, which would allow them to survive and thrive, at least in the short-term. However, these tendencies may also predispose MCOs to crisis, and potentially rapid collapse, in a way that is unique to this ideal type. Whereas we expect EPOs and GPOs to be comfortable with a slower-paced, incrementalist approach to action and change, MCOs will most likely have difficulty resisting opportunities to grow and involve themselves in more projects, which could lead to large-scale burnout, a loss of credibility, and, in the worst cases, catastrophic failure.
Given what we now know about MCO culture, we might anticipate two kinds of incidents intensifying particular pathologies within these INGOs: (1) periods of rapid growth and (2) internal leadership transitions. First, periods of rapid growth may lead to intense bursts of extraordinary success, but ultimately, these punctuations may produce negative outcomes for MCOs as these fundamentally anti-bureaucratic organizations struggle to build the necessary systems to manage the challenges associated with their increasing size. Because of their innate desire to be transformative, swift, flexible, and bold organizations, we expect MCOs to aggressively pursue opportunities as they arise. When natural disasters and other types of humanitarian emergencies create opportunities for global aid organizations to expand their work, we expect to see MCOs “rushing to the scene,” whether or not they are internally prepared to absorb the necessary changes to manage the growth they will inevitably experience.

Based on the discussions from Parts I and II, we can expect that these opportunities will initially lead to periods of rapid growth, but they will ultimately prove unsustainable after intensifying three specific inefficiencies within MCOs. Under normal circumstances, the rationalization of irrationality, consensus dependency, and contextual particularism problems are not highly problematic for MCOs: when an organization is small and focused enough, it can avoid rules, make decisions with universal involvement and unanimous consent, and formulate specific solutions to widely diverse problems as they emerge.
around the world. However, when MCOs expand at a rate that is faster than their ability to adjust their internal systems, then we might expect to see the negative effects of these tendencies becoming increasingly pronounced, and increasingly destructive. After the initial wave of enthusiasm passes, MCO leaders may “learn the hard way” that rapid growth will be too difficult to manage without making significant internal changes. It may no longer be possible to avoid the rules entirely, to make decisions by consensus, or to apply a uniquely designed model to each local community in which they work. When this realization occurs, we expect to see a potentially irrevocable tension emerging between an MCO’s internal cultural fabric and the practical management requirements associated with growth.

As was discussed in Part I, MCOs have a deeply rooted desire to be innovative, flexible, and capable of swift action and adaptation, but rapid growth is necessarily accompanied by increasingly complex management challenges, which must be met with a level of stringency and clarity in decision-making and policy-setting processes. In short, a degree of order must be overlaid onto the collectivist, at times chaotic MCO model in order for leaders to effectively manage greater organizational size and program scope, as well as an increasingly large and complex budget. Under these circumstances, we might expect to find that those within the MCO who are responsible for working with local communities (e.g., program staff) will insist that maintaining the collectivist, enabling, anti-bureaucratic culture should be the first priority,
whereas those who are responsible for ensuring that funds and staff are not mismanaged (e.g., finance and development staff) will try to convince the rest of the organization that some degree of bureaucratization is necessary to manage growth. Furthermore, because rapid growth is often associated with a rapid influx of capital and staff, MCOs may find themselves becoming increasingly dependent on the desires and preferences of their donors, many of whom will demand a level of procedural structure and hierarchy that MCOs are not accustomed to providing. Consequently, these events may leave MCOs struggling to overcome two types of problems: an internal tension between staff members responsible for delivering services and those responsible for managing the organization’s administrative affairs, and an external tension between the MCO itself and partner institutions requiring more systems and order than an MCO is comfortable (or capable of) implementing.

But if there are so many risks associated with these periods of rapid growth, then on what basis can we rationalize MCOs taking these opportunities in the first place? Why would they not simply anticipate these problems and take a more gradual, cautious approach to change (not unlike that of their EPO and GPO counterparts)? Parts I and II illustrate that MCOs have a preference for being radical and taking transformative action, thus differentiating themselves from the bureaucratic organizations that they see as representing a failing institutional status quo. They pride themselves on being innovative and flexible, and on taking action immediately without deliberating incessantly about the
advantages and disadvantages of acting. By swiftly and aggressively taking opportunities as they arise, MCOs may hope to grow exponentially faster than their peers, ensuring their own short-term survival and maximizing their ability to have an impact. While we might expect this strategy to lead to enormous success for MCOs in some cases, it may also lead these organizations to face all of the above problems simultaneously, thus causing them to struggle to manage the necessary changes associated with rapid growth. On the basis of the cultural norms that are foundational to their identity claims, we expect to find MCOs engaging in “high-risk” behavior that, by definition, may become untenable, unsustainable, and unruly.

The second type of endogenous event that we expect to find intensifying MCO dysfunction—turning a marginally inefficient organizational stasis into a potentially quite disruptive period of ineffectiveness—is internal leadership change. As was discussed in Part II, the liability associated with the centrality of particular leaders to organizational affairs is always present, but it expresses itself in varying degrees of intensity depending upon the circumstances facing the organization. In periods of relative normalcy, the problem leads to a lack of effective management skills at the top (as opposed to leadership qualities\textsuperscript{280}) and an

\textsuperscript{280} Management skills refer to an individual’s ability to coordinate and guide employees’ and stakeholders’ efforts, using financial and human resources efficiently. Effective managers excel in the areas of organization, coordination, and resourcing; they are almost always endowed with formal authority within an organization. Leadership skills, on the other hand, are related to an individual’s ability to influence peers and employees into behaving in certain ways and supporting certain goals. Effective leaders excel in terms of being able to inspire, motivate, and communicate well with those around him. Leaders are not necessarily endowed with formal authority within organizations.
absence of properly developed “second-line” leadership. During these times, MCOs are able to function decently well despite the inefficiencies associated with the leadership liability: their charismatic leader propels them both in terms of fostering perceived credibility and generating internal and external support for the organization’s efforts. However, when a leader decides to leave an organization, we expect the liability problem to be exacerbated quite significantly, to the point at which it may prohibit an organization from achieving its desired ends. If MCOs have not sufficiently prepared for this eventuality, then they may find themselves scrambling to fill the leadership vacuum and struggling to assuage the frustrations of employees and supporters alike.

The conditions under which we expect to find this kind of disruptive leadership change occurring within MCOs are relatively straightforward: when a charismatic leader becomes unwilling or unable to continue his or her efforts, then the MCO may find itself struggling to fill the void that follows. He or she may experience “burnout,” accept an opportunity to work elsewhere, or experience disease or death. The predictability of these conditions begs the question: Why would we expect MCOs to be so unprepared for their leaders’ inevitable departures? Why would they not devote the necessary time and attention to preparing employees, supporters, and future leaders for the post-

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281 In this context, “burnout” refers to a diminished interest in work as a result of exhaustion or personal over-stretch.
charismatic-leader circumstances? First, there is the unfortunate reality that charismatic leaders are likely to have a high degree of belief in the appropriateness of their own views and actions and a self-assuredness that mitigates against consideration of other conceptions of what is correct or good. Rightly or wrongly, charismatic leaders may see their organizations as a direct product of their vision, and thus, believe that their leadership is integral to the organization’s ability to pursue its goals. Additionally, a leader’s sense of deep connectedness to the mission and the group may prohibit her from parting with the organization in a way that enables it to thrive even in her absence. This leader may not be intentionally sabotaging her organization; it is far more likely that she is simply blinded by her own passionate commitment to the work and the cause, which can make it difficult for her to extract herself before it becomes absolutely essential to do so.

But it is not only the charismatic leaders who are responsible for their MCOs falling into the leadership liability “trap” after they depart. Unfortunately for these INGOs, their employees and second-line leaders are also at least partly to blame for their organizations’ inability to transition smoothly into a post-charismatic-leader reality. As truly devoted followers, the individuals who work for and otherwise support these charismatic leaders may struggle to see anyone else as the legitimate MCO leader. For as much as they may try to develop new leaders and create barriers between donors and partners and their charismatic leaders in order to break the dependency, we have seen in Parts I and II that
MCO supporters can be so committed to following one particular leader (or group of leaders) that they may continue to look to the original individual for guidance until it is too late. Based on these expectations, it may be extremely difficult (if not impossible) for MCOs to completely and effectively transition in advance of the leader’s actual departure.

Given what we have learned about MCOs in this work, we can expect that the problems associated with rapid growth and leadership changes have the most destructive potential of all the MCO inefficiencies discussed in Part II. While MCOs are by no means perfectly efficient organizations under normal circumstances, they are usually able to manage their affairs with minimal inefficiency. However, under the conditions described above, their normal state of manageable inefficiency might become total ineffectiveness. In the next chapter, I turn to the four MCO case study organizations to assess the degree to which these conceptually driven predictions are reflected in empirical reality.

II. EXPERT PRAGMATIST ORGANIZATIONS (EPOs)

The theoretical expectations and empirical observations from Parts I and II revealed that EPOs will tend to be more incremental and calculating organizations than their MCO peers, and they will experience rises and falls in more moderate steps. MCO cultural proclivities predispose them to being somewhat impulsive and risk-seeking institutions that excel in adapting their mission and programs in response to exogenous circumstances but may fail to
adjust their internal systems and sustain their growth over time. EPOs, on the other hand, have internal characteristics that make them likely to excel at managing their internal growth, but they may be challenged when it comes to adjusting their mission and programs in response to changing external demands.

As was illustrated in Part II, under normal circumstances, EPOs tend to waste time and energy in a few distinct ways: reigning in experts who tend to “go rogue,” managing poor internal communications processes, and unifying an otherwise disjointed set of motivations for pursuing the mission, for instance.

With so many highly credentialed experts representing diverse “schools of thought,” disciplines, and philosophical perspectives, EPOs may never be able to eradicate these issues entirely; however, under normal circumstances, these dysfunctional tendencies do not become so problematic that they are destructive to organizational performance. They are inefficient in the strictest sense of the word, but the problems discussed in Part II do not normally challenge their host organizations’ overall effectiveness.

Particular kinds of events, however, may damage an EPO’s reputation and undermine its legitimacy, which can lead to a decrease in organizational effectiveness over the long term. Certain dysfunctional tendencies that are manageable within EPOs under normal circumstances will be intensified when an EPO is asked to engage in a partnership with another institution (or group of institutions), or respond to a crisis in a swift and decisive manner. With respect to the first type of event, if an EPO feels compelled to engage in a cooperative
institutional arrangement when it believes that building a partnership will waste
time and energy, then we might expect to see an amplification of the negative
consequences associated with the ‘closed door’ syndrome and the operational opacity
problem. We know from Parts I and II that EPOs are not particularly eager to
cooperate with other organizations purely for the sake of appearing cooperative;
they are not prone to engage in cumbersome, potentially wasteful institutional
arrangements simply because that is what they, as socially-minded non-
governmental actors, are “supposed to do.” EPOs tend to prefer a more
individualistic, “straight to the point” (to use the words of one interviewee)
approach to conducting their affairs. Furthermore, given their propensity to
engage in “corridor diplomacy” and make “backdoor deals,” EPOs may also see
strategic value in avoiding highly public efforts to build coalitions. As such, we
would expect to find these INGOs avoiding partnerships that restrict their ability
to leverage those direct channels to powerful institutions. While EPOs may
gladly negotiate with other actors and build partnerships that they view as being
instrumental to the pursuit of their ends, it is likely that they will rarely
participate in coalition-building activities if they do not see sufficient practical
value in doing so.

Why, then, would an EPO ever voluntarily commit to a partnership that it
sees as being superfluous, or even counterproductive, to its ends? When an
institution on which the EPO feels dependent for material or ideational support
compels it to cooperate with another actor (or group of actors), then we might
expect even the most partnership-averse EPOs to oblige. The more dependent the EPO leaders believe they are on this supporter, the more likely they will be to follow the suggestion and engage in the partnership. This pressure could come from one particularly powerful institution, or it could come from a large group of individual donors or supporters (including, perhaps, the public): when individuals collectively call for the EPO to join forces with other organizations pursuing similar goals, then we can anticipate the EPO cooperating but viewing the arrangement as a “necessary evil.”

While this partnership-building behavior may result in short-term benefits by, at least temporarily, ensuring the continued support of these stakeholders, the long-term consequences may be more problematic than advantageous in terms of overall EPO effectiveness. Under normal conditions, operational opacity and the ‘closed door’ syndrome are not especially problematic; they may result in frustration, internal miscommunication, and other forms of low-intensity inefficiency (discussed in Part II), but they do not significantly undermine an EPO’s ability to achieve its goals. When EPOs feel compelled to form partnerships with other institutions, however, the impact of these pathologies may be amplified, causing more serious damage to an EPO’s reputation and its ability to succeed. Both of these issues are associated with an absence of transparency and accountability within EPOs, and while this cultural tendency toward privacy may not be associated with actual misconduct, it does define an approach to doing business that is not universally shared (or widely accepted) by
actors operating in the international humanitarian and development space. In fact, global non-profit organizations may be expected to uphold an exceptionally high standard of accountability and transparency, given the nature of their work and its dependency on external donors. Therefore, when EPOs attempt to work with institutions that value, and perhaps even require, that their partners embody these principles, we can expect there to be negative consequences for EPOs. Partner organizations may become suspicious of these groups, which could potentially do damage to the partnership itself. But perhaps far more significantly, these partners may share their distrust with the donors and stakeholders who brought them together in the first place, which could tarnish an EPO’s reputation and lead to a decrease in their material and ideational support. With less support, EPOs will necessarily be less capable of achieving their goals. These problems may never lead to complete organizational collapse, but as EPOs become isolated and distrusted, they may find it increasingly difficult to pursue their ends effectively.

The second type of event that has the potential to exacerbate an existing pathology within EPOs is an exogenous incident that requires swift action from the relevant organizations. Far more so than everyday occurrences, a massive or urgent humanitarian crisis (such as a natural disaster, a human rights catastrophe, an eruption of armed conflict, a mass killing, or a corrupt election process) demands immediate attention from INGOs and other global institutions working on related issues. EPOs are not naturally inclined to take action in a
swift and decisive manner; as illustrated in Parts I and II, these groups are prone to debate and committed to producing the highest quality products and services, regardless of how long it takes. Under normal circumstances, EPOs (like their MCO and GPO counterparts) operate in a state of “good enough” efficiency. Despite the presence of the constant critique dysfunction and the tendency to strive for perfection in everything they do, EPOs are able to pursue their goals in a way that may not be optimally efficient, but it also does not significantly impede organizational effectiveness. However, this culture of vehement debate and incessant editing and re-editing of work may become a substantial hindrance to EPOs when they must respond quickly to exogenous shocks. Because of their commitment to identifying and providing the very best response to a problem (and not simply a sufficient one), EPOs are not comfortable making a decisive statement or taking an immediate action without properly debating, vetting, and cross-checking it. Therefore, as other INGOs (especially MCOs) take initiative and act quickly to make themselves relevant and benefit from funding opportunities that emerge as a result of these exogenous incidents, we may find EPOs struggling to produce swift responses and losing their competitive advantage to their peers as a result. Their unparalleled expertise in an area may become irrelevant if they fail to act sufficiently rapidly in response to an event that requires attention.

On the basis of the organizational systems and dysfunctional tendencies inherent to EPOs, we can expect that the issues described above are the ones that
have the greatest potential to cripple their host organizations. Distrust among partners in the context of cooperative arrangements may lead to a perception of EPOs as difficult to work with, which could potentially decrease their ability to generate material and ideational support in the long run. Similarly, inaction (or unnecessarily slow action) in response to events that lie within their areas of expertise may lead to missed funding and publicity opportunities, and to the perception that EPOs are no longer focal (or even relevant) in their respective industries. It is probably the case that neither of these situations would lead to catastrophic outcomes for EPOs in the short-term; however, they can be highly destructive over the long-term because they have the potential to gradually erode an EPO’s legitimacy, thus diminishing its ability to earn support. As a result, these groups may find themselves outpaced by the bold, innovative, fast-moving MCOs and outlasted by the stable, reliable, predictable GPOs.

III. Grassroots Proceduralist Organizations (GPOs)

In light of what we have learned about GPO culture and dysfunction (see Parts I and II), we can expect that these organizations will be by far the most stable of the INGOs. Part II illustrated that GPOs are organizations that are innately averse to change, preferring gradual development and steady adaptation to rapid growth and high-risk behavior. As a result, these groups are far less susceptible to disruptive fluctuations in size and scope than MCOs are. They are comfortable with the status quo and enjoy the benefits derived from the
perception that they are reliable institutional partners. However, as we learned in Part II, the same features that lend GPOs their credibility as stable partners may be the source of their unwillingness and inability to adjust internally to new demands on their staff and resources. Given their unwavering commitment to democratic inclusion and due process, as well as their rigid adherence to rules and standard operating procedures, GPOs are predisposed to being representative but uncreative, and deliberate but sluggish.

Under normal circumstances, GPOs experience a degree of inefficiency as a result of their dedication to incorporating local leaders into decisions and their principled adherence to accountability in their operations. As has been argued in previous chapters, the institutionalized decentralization and procedural rigidity inherent to GPO culture drive these organizations to experience a consistent but low-intensity level of cultural fragmentation, internal politicization, and strategic disunity. While interviewees might have described these issues using adjectives like “annoying,” “frustrating,” “disappointing,” and “unfortunate,” these pathologies usually exist within the context of manageable inefficiency: during periods of relative stasis, these issues do not impede their host organizations’ ability to achieve the impact they seek. However, when a GPO’s equilibrium is destabilized, either by an endogenous or exogenous shock, these dysfunctional tendencies may become intensified, manifesting within their hosts in ways that may be quite devastating.
First, a GPO’s internal status quo could be destabilized by an endogenous critical juncture moment (or strategic *turning point*), which would most likely be sparked by a need to alter the funding structure within the organization. When GPO headquarters offices are forced or compelled to make a strategic decision to raise, allocate, or distribute resources differently across sub-units—or when they demand that the sub-units raise, allocate, or distribute their own resources according to different priorities—we might expect to see an amplification of previously manageable problems to the extent of impacting overall organizational effectiveness. Given the highly decentralized nature of GPOs, we know that local leaders expect to be treated as at least semi-autonomous managers of their sub-units, who can leverage their own expertise related to the local community in which they work to determine where, when, and how to budget and allocate funds. Under normal conditions, when GPO sub-units are given the necessary freedom and power to make these decisions for themselves, they will tend to cooperate with the other chapters and the headquarters office. However, if their control over what they believe to be their own resources is in some way challenged by an organization-wide decision related to the use and management of funds, then the *fragmentation, politicization, and discord* problems may become exacerbated, leading to a substantial increase in tension among the sub-units and, in particular, between certain sub-units and the headquarters office.
Given what we have learned about GPO culture throughout this work, we can anticipate that if GPO sub-units feel threatened or overly constrained by a centralized decision, then they will do whatever is necessary to stop that decision from being made and protect their own resources and autonomy, even if this behavior means that they must pursue their own local needs at the expense of the broader organization’s interest and goals. Regardless of the extent to which the turning point decision will actually change the international management and allocation of resources within a GPO, if the chapters perceive that their position is being undermined, then they may retreat into a self-protective stance from which they are willing to undermine the organization in order to ensure their own autonomy and survival. When sub-units are not working together to push the organization in one unified direction, GPOs may suffer in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness.

GPO headquarters leaders may be aware of the risks associated with making a major decision that will be perceived as a threat to their sub-units, but if that is the case, then why would they pursue the change in the first place? There are three conditions under which we would expect a GPO’s leadership to feel compelled to present a decision of this kind to the rest of the organization. First, a global funding shortage may mean that a GPO’s budget will be cut, and resources will be pulled from one or all of the following: offices (e.g., funding for the Sudan country office), programs (e.g., funding for malaria prevention in East Africa), or thematic areas (e.g., funding for global post-conflict peace-building.
efforts). A universal organizational funding shortage will necessarily mean that a GPO headquarters office must determine which of those options suffers most, and when that occurs, we can expect to find local leaders and program stakeholders becoming polarized, politicized, and combative in order to defend the offices and issues to which they are most connected. Second, donor fatigue around a particular issue (e.g., funding for HIV/AIDS prevention programs) could lead to an internal funding contraction, which could have similar consequences. The internal GPO stakeholders that are most responsible for administering programs related to this issue may retrench and become difficult for GPOs to manage. Third, a GPO may be compelled by its Board of Directors or Advisors, or by another particularly powerful stakeholder, to make a significant internal change that will have implications for the allocation of resources. If the Board decides to take an organization in a direction that supports global health initiatives more than democracy-building programs, then the organization will have to reallocate funds accordingly. Any one of these circumstances might compel a GPO to propose a major strategic or management change that could have the unintended but perhaps inevitable effect of intensifying the pathologies discussed above.

In addition to an endogenous disruption like the one described above, we might expect GPOs to struggle in response to exogenous shocks to the environmental status quo. As was established previously, GPOs thrive under conditions of stability, during which status quo institutions are powerful and
unchallenged. When this comfortable stasis is interrupted by an exogenous shock, GPOs may have difficulty adapting with sufficient speed and flexibility to the new environmental constraints, and, as a result, they may risk becoming irrelevant over long periods of time. A disruption to the institutional status quo may come in one of two forms: a shift in the funding available to support certain issues, or a change in the landscape of institutional solutions to a particular problem. With respect to the first condition, funding for a particular kind of work may become limited as a result of shifting global priorities or an alteration to the normative fabric around an issue, which may force a GPO (and other INGOs) to adapt accordingly. In order to survive and thrive in the new funding environment, GPOs may have to either change what they do (by altering their mission and goals to reflect the kind of work for which funds are available and reducing their efforts in the areas that are no longer prioritized) or otherwise convince their partners and donors that they have changed what they do in response to the new circumstances.

With respect to the second condition, a new competitor organization may enter the INGO landscape, altering the existing institutional status quo and challenging the GPO’s focality in a certain issue area or industry. If this new player provides what others believe to be a better solution to the problems that a GPO is trying to address, then the GPO may have to defend its position or show that it can adapt to be more effective than the new player is. But because GPOs are comfortable with their existing strategies and solutions to global problems,
we can anticipate that they will be reluctant about changing what they do or how they do it, even when the exogenous circumstances require that they adapt and evolve. In both of these cases, an exogenous shock to the global funding or institutional landscape may alter the environmental status quo. When a GPO is required to display the necessary flexibility to innovate and adapt to these changes to the system in which it is embedded, then we might expect it to struggle in the face of certain intensified pathologies. Specifically, the change in resistance, procedural rigidity, and democratic excess problems may be amplified to the point of making their host organizations incapable of responding to the new challenges. Over the long-term, these problems may limit their host organizations’ ability to survive and thrive in their institutional environments.

We know from Part II that GPOs are highly resistant to change, but under normal circumstances, this is a manageable problem: it simply means that GPOs tend to stick to what they know and do best, rarely straying far from their core competencies or taking major risks. But when a shift toward a new funding priority takes effect, or a new institutional player challenges a GPO’s focality in its area, then a GPO must either overcome its innate tendency to resist change, thus proving to its stakeholders that it is capable of adapting to the new circumstances, or it may gradually become less and less relevant, heading down a path of steady and perhaps irreversible decline. Three innate GPO cultural proclivities may become problematic when these organizations need to adapt: a deep-seeded desire to avoid transformative change, a commitment to following
strict rules and regulations, and a need to put every decision up to an organization-wide (and potentially quite contentious) voting process. As a result, we can expect that GPOs will be unprepared to change their mission and activities in response to exogenous demands, and they will be reluctant to accommodate new circumstances. Because of the intensified change resistance and democratic excess problems, GPOs may have difficult actually adapting their mission and priorities; they are both culturally and structurally predisposed to taking a long time to deliberate over and come to a decision about making even the most minor of changes. Furthermore, because of the amplified procedural rigidity problem, GPOs may be incapable of manipulating external stakeholders into believing that they are changing when, in fact, they are not; their strict adherence to accountability and transparency makes them both normatively and logistically incapable of “lying” to peers and partners. Their exorbitant systems of “checks and balances,” as well as their inability or unwillingness to innovate and transform when necessary, may hold GPOs back during these moments when change is demanded of them. As a result, they may risk losing their competitive edge to existing MCOs and EPOs, as well as the new INGOs that threatened their position in the first place.

Under the conditions discussed here, we expect that GPOs may struggle to compete and survive over time. But if GPO leaders are even somewhat aware of the fact that certain endogenous or exogenous shocks are likely to pose such substantial risks to their organizations, then why not simply prepare themselves...
for the inevitable? The answer to this question speaks to the core of my argument about the relationship between organizational legitimacy and behavioral outcomes. As has been argued throughout this work, INGOs are fundamentally and problematically constrained by their internal cultural proclivities, which emerge as a result of their need to earn legitimacy as international actors. GPOs generate their authority on the basis of their local expertise and commitment to transparency and due process. As such, they are innately prone to prioritizing the voices of local leaders over those of central administrators, and to emphasizing the value of sound processes and structures over flexibility and speed in decision-making. In other words, they are democratic and deliberate, but these features make GPOs incapable of effectively preparing for the types of shocks described above. If a GPO changed the traits that make it a GPO, then it would risk undermining its own perceived legitimacy among external stakeholders and internal sub-units alike, which could reduce its ability to generate support and accomplish its goals.

An organization cannot simultaneously be lean, innovative, and centrally directed (and thus, prone to swift action) and democratic, decentralized, and risk-averse (and thus, prone to slow, deliberate action). Neither model is better or more effective in its own right, but each may tend to succeed or fail under certain circumstances. For instance, when powerful institutions are seeking a partner INGO that will apply a tried and tested model to addressing a recurring global problem, they will most likely identify GPOs, rather than MCOs, as reliable
recipients of their support, which will give GPOs the competitive advantage over their peers. However, when certain endogenous and exogenous demands require an organization to rapidly change and adapt its goals, an MCO will be far better suited to meeting the challenge than a GPO will be. If a GPO fails to adapt over time, it will become less and less relevant, and the result may be a slow and steady decline into obscurity.

The above sections suggest that INGOs of different types may fall into fairly predictable “traps,” which are caused by endogenous and exogenous events of a particular nature. Based on the extensive interviews I conducted with practitioners and partners, it seems likely that INGO leaders are at least somewhat aware of the interconnectedness of their cultures with internal dysfunctional tendencies and specific types of inefficiency (see Chapter 6 for more on the empirics underpinning this analysis). But if they understand these relationships and potential pitfalls, then why would we expect them to consistently fail to address the problems or prepare their organizations accordingly? The explanation is partly normative and partly instrumental, and it speaks directly to the intimate relationship between organizational legitimacy and dysfunction that is at the core of my work. First, we expect INGO leaders to be culturally constrained by the organizational systemic and dysfunctional tendencies inherent to each of the models. When faced with a decision, an INGO leader will only be able to consider options that fall within the range of
appropriate responses, given the cultural scripts defining his organization’s internal systems of meaning. For example, a GPO leader would never consider breaking the rules entirely in order to provide a rapid response because the cultural norms inherent to the GPO model would not allow him to see that as an option. Second, INGOs may benefit strategically from adhering to their internalized cultural scripts and interpretive schema because these provide the foundation for their perceived legitimacy and, thus, their ability to generate support. For instance, by following strict procedural norms, a GPO will be seen as valuing transparency and accountability above all else, which will perpetuate the sense that this organization has procedural authority. There is an intrinsic relationship between an organization’s cultural proclivities and its ability to establish and maintain its authority as an international actor. To defy one is to undermine the other, and thus, the normative and instrumentalist explanations are deeply intertwined and perhaps inseparable.
CHAPTER 6:

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: HOW MANAGEABLE INEFFICIENCY BECOMES INEFFECTIVENESS

In Chapter 5, I offered a conceptual overview of the relationships between inefficiency and ineffectiveness within the three ideal types. I provided a set of conjectures related to the circumstances under which we might expect to find certain pathological tendencies being amplified or intensified, leading to potentially disastrous outcomes for their host INGOs. In this chapter, my goal is to test the applicability of these conjectures to the empirical landscape. As such, the structure of Part III mirrors that of Parts I and II, with Chapter 6 paralleling the empirical chapters about organizational systems (Chapter 2 in Part I) and dysfunctional tendencies (Chapter 4 in Part II). As has been the case throughout my work, the empirical chapters are primarily based on insights gathered through the ten in-depth case study analyses, and they are secondarily informed by additional interviews with non-case INGO practitioners and partners, as well as off-the-record consultations, reactive observation, and analysis of written materials.

Because the subject of ineffectiveness was the most sensitive and difficult for most interviewees to discuss, there are two minor methodological differences
between this chapter and the previous empirical chapters in this work. First, in the subsequent sections, I rely more heavily on a small group of highly knowledgeable and critically analytic interviewees within each organization. Within every case INGO, I found two or three interviewees (usually senior leaders who understood the value of my research and the relationships I was trying to understand) who were willing and able to provide more thoughtful analyses of their organizations’ cultures and behaviors, rather than simply offering surface-level observations. In most cases, these interviewees had worked with their organizations for many years, and they could thoroughly report on past events and internal changes over time. My interviews with these individuals tended to last an hour to ninety-minutes, and many of them led to follow-up meetings and emails to discuss certain issues in greater detail. Whereas my goal in the previous empirical chapters was to aggregate the perceptions of employees across these organizations, this chapter is more focused on highlighting the thoughtful analyses of a few particularly insightful individuals. Second, in this chapter, I rely more heavily on perspectives from outside the organization to provide as genuine and unbiased a treatment of institutional ineffectiveness as possible. Interviews with individuals representing peer INGOs and donor agencies, as well as secondary sources such as newspaper articles and academic reports, were particularly useful resources in this section of my project. These external accounts shed light on the relationships between conditions and events.
that many employees within the INGOs might have been either unwilling or unable to report themselves.

In the forthcoming chapters, the difference between organizational inefficiency and ineffectiveness comes into stark relief. There is, of course, a clear difference between the technical definitions of the two terms: the former refers to wasting time and resources while the latter refers to failing to adequately produce intended outcomes. But in a purely abstract sense, this difference may be difficult to clearly discern. It is worth emphasizing that the difference between these two concepts is not simply a matter of degree (as in: ineffectiveness is just an extreme version inefficiency). In the context of organizational behavior, ineffectiveness is qualitatively different from inefficiency. When organizations experience inefficiency, they are not able to achieve their goals in a way that is as timely or cost-effective as they would like for it to be, but that is very different from not being able to achieve their goals at all. When organizations suffer from ineffectiveness, on the other hand, their ability to accomplish their ends is fundamentally restricted, which is a much more serious—and potentially fatal—problem.

In accordance with this important difference, the following discussion about ineffectiveness in the three INGO ideal types focuses on the times when an organization is deeply challenged by its own internal pathologies to the point at which it cannot pursue its goals at all. As will be discussed at length in this chapter, the specific events that lead to the onset of ineffectiveness differ based
on the specific proclivities of each of the ideal types. However, the underlying reason for the transition from “manageable inefficiency” to “crippling ineffectiveness” almost always has to do with an organization’s inability to generate sufficient material or ideational support to continue its efforts. Whether the problem is related to an INGO’s reputation among donors being damaged or its inability to compete effectively with its peers, the outcome is the same: the organization cannot adequately produce its desired effect on the world because it does not have sufficient support to do so. It is ineffectiveness (as opposed to inefficiency) that determines whether an organization expands or contracts, and whether it survives or collapses, and as such, it is ineffectiveness that can tell us the most about how an INGO will behave, in the broadest sense of the word.

As has been the case throughout this work, I argue that the nature of an organization’s identity, as determined by its need to establish its authority as an international actor, is the most significant factor in determining whether and how institutional ineffectiveness emerges within an INGO. The internal cultural explanation cuts deeper than either external or internal material explanations can, exposing, for example, why an organization might find itself in a resource-constrained position in the first place. The “lowest common denominator” is identity, which I have argued is a relatively stable concept that is deeply encoded within an organization in the form of underlying interpretive schemes and systematic cultural patterns. It defines the range of actions and solutions available to organizational leaders, and it determines, in large part, how they will
react to particular kinds of endogenous and exogenous demands. INGOs with similar identities will exhibit similar behavioral patterns, regardless of differences in their ages, sizes, and areas of expertise. It is for this reason that PIH (a 20-year-old global health MCO) responds in the same way that the IRC (an 80-year-old emergency relief MCO) does to various types of stimuli.

In the following analysis, I illustrate that INGOs constitute “dynamic fields of complexity challenged by ever-present demands for ‘change,’”282 and the ways in which they approach these demands determine how effective they can ultimately be. MCOs, EPOs, and GPOs all have innate cultural proclivities that make them more or less adaptable to new internal and external circumstances, and the nature of their interpretive schema shapes how they will respond to their environments. In the following sections, it becomes clear that MCOs, for instance, are prone to taking ambitious, risk-seeking actions, which may lead to enormous success over short periods of time, but can also spark catastrophic failure. Given their distaste for cumbersome bureaucratic rules, and their affinity for rapid action and innovation, MCOs have the necessary flexibility to adapt in the face of changing exogenous demands and excel in partnerships with institutions that prefer radical, fast-paced change to predictable approaches; however, they are poorly equipped to manage internal growth in a sustainable, systematic way over the long-term. Their anti-bureaucratic cultures tend to impede their ability to systematically manage increasingly complex tasks. It is for

282 Nasim and Sushil, 2011: 188. See also, Burke and Trahant (2000); Pettigrew et al. (2001).
this reason that we find a variety of recently created MCOs closing their doors after what has appeared to be a period of success and growth; they were not capable of managing the influx of capital and staff, nor were they willing to cut funds to their programs, so while the world thought they were thriving, they were actually internally hemorrhaging money and ultimately unable to sustain their efforts.

While MCOs tend to be the first INGOs to fill new market needs when they emerge, which allows them to grow in intense bursts in the short-term, their trajectories over time can be extremely volatile. They are less stable than their INGO counterparts because they tend to falter when trying to adjust in response to endogenous changes. In the face of rapid internal growth, MCOs will struggle to build the necessary systems to manage increasingly expansive and complicated tasks, and when a sudden leadership transition creates an internal power vacuum, MCOs will have difficulty filling the void left by the former charismatic leader(s). This explains why even though everyone at Seeds of Peace knew that John Wallach was terminally ill, they were completely unprepared for the leadership vacuum created by his death, and they entered a seven-year period of nearly fatal chaos. The problems associated with rapid growth and staff transitions can lead to mismanagement in the best cases and a complete inability

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283 For example, PIH became one of the first and most committed organizations to assist with disaster relief efforts immediately following the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Although it was explicitly a global health organization, this MCO quickly positioned itself at the forefront of efforts to help people suffering from a wide range of ailments, from homelessness and hunger to a lack of clean water, and everything in between. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, PIH more than doubled its annual revenue and program expenses (Partners In Health Annual Reports, 2009-2012).
to recover from budgetary and leadership deficits in the worst cases. In short, MCOs may achieve great success, but they are more prone to crisis and collapse than either of the other two INGO ideal types. As organizations, they epitomize the phrase “high-risk, high potential reward.”

By contrast, this chapter illustrates that EPOs may gradually fade into the background as a result of a few sources of crippling dysfunction, but they rarely fail suddenly or catastrophically. By now it should be clear that EPOs tend to be more cautious and measured than their MCO peers, and they are accustomed to “taking two steps forward and one step back,” to use the words of one interviewee. These outcomes-oriented organizations are far more risk-averse than MCOs are, and as such, they will hesitate before taking any major steps in one direction or another. Filled with experts who feel compelled to debate even minor decisions, and to identify optimal (rather than simply suitable) solutions, EPOs are perhaps the best of the INGOs when it comes to producing high-quality products and services. However, they struggle when it is necessary for them to provide unified and swift responses to exogenous events requiring urgent attention. While their peers earn a competitive advantage by responding quickly and decisively to international events, EPOs find themselves losing support as a result of their inability to act sufficiently quickly. As one senior leader at HRW asked, “How can we ever be the world’s leading expert on human rights abuses if we can’t even tweet about them when they happen?” When EPOs lose support and credibility because they cannot overcome their
propensity to debate and deliberate, then they become less capable of pursuing their ends effectively.

Whereas MCOs may try to undermine, change, or destabilize status quo systems, EPOs tend to excel when working within them. They thrive in highly technical roles where they consult directly with government officials and IGO representatives about the nuances of a particular issue. Under these circumstances, they can directly tackle their goals without wasting time on the procedural constraints and transparency requirements associated with cumbersome coalitions and partnerships. When they are compelled to engage in such cooperative arrangements, the risk is that their independence and pragmatism may be interpreted as uncooperative, which can do serious damage to their reputation and, therefore, undermine their ability to generate support for their work. It is for this reason that EPOs are seen as “unhelpful” or “terrible partners,” as two external interviewees said. When EPOs maintain a low profile and pursue their goals independently and according to their preferences, they tend to achieve modest but sustained success. However, when they are forced to work in partnerships that go “sour,” or when they are required to take swift action when they are not prepared to do so, they may lose their credibility among donors and supporters, which will make them less effective institutions overall. Again, for EPOs, ineffectiveness rarely translates into total collapse; rather, the consequence tends to be increasing isolation from other institutions and a reduced ability to influence stakeholders as a result.
The forthcoming section on GPOs exposes the ways in which these stable, transparent, predictable institutions can internally erode or fall behind their peers as a result of events that challenge the status quo. These groups are by far the least likely of the three INGO types to be willing and able to adapt to changing circumstances when flexibility is required of them. As was established in Parts I and II, GPOs are quite rigid and fixated on “the way things have always been done,” which can come at the expense of innovation and progress over time. As highly process-oriented, decentralized, and democratic institutions, they are resistant to transformative change and far more inert than their peer INGOs. While they may become focal institutions by focusing on their core competencies and excelling in those areas, their power can erode over time as they fail to take action in response to new problems and struggle to adapt to changing exogenous demands. As one interviewee who described himself as a “transformative thinker” reported, “I have seen the bulk of radical transformative plans get rejected, and we go back to the safe territory.”

It is this rigidity—this stubborn commitment to maintaining the status quo—that can ultimately lead to ineffectiveness in GPOs. As the same interviewee explained, “New [INGOs] are challenging our ideas about process, doing the same job we’re doing but with none of the bulkiness, the bureaucracy. [We] could learn a lot from these other models...because our internal processes are labyrinthine.” GPOs may be well-served by a low-risk strategy insofar as it enables them to generate a reputation for being stable and reliable and earn a
great deal of institutional and financial support as a result; however, this strategy can also leave GPOs with substantial and potentially intractable long-term problems. For instance, Kiwanis’ global membership has been shrinking every year over the past few decades, and the headquarters staff is actively concerned that the sub-units are slowly realizing that they do not need the central administration, and are perhaps held back by their affiliation to the broader organization, and are leaving the organization as a result (and taking their local sources of funding with them). Even at Oxfam—one of the world’s most successful and influential development INGOs—there is a palpable fear among employees that their seemingly stalwart institution is, in fact, becoming increasingly irrelevant over time because it refuses to adequately adapt to changing circumstances.

These INGOs are the most likely of the three types to miss opportunities for growth when they emerge, and to fail to adapt in order to continue to compete against other organizations working in their areas. As one interviewee described, “We are so stuck in our ways that we sometimes don’t even see the opportunities when they arise.” As a result, shocks to either the internal organizational status quo or the external environmental stasis that require GPOs to change can destabilize these organizations and lead to long-term ineffectiveness. Whereas collapse can occur suddenly for MCOs, total failure is a long-term process for GPOs. Because of their change-resistant, sluggish, and highly decentralized nature, they are the most likely of the three INGO types to
suffer from a gradual decline into total obscurity due to an inability to adapt to new internal and external demands.

As the empirical analysis constituting the remainder of this chapter will reveal, the expected relationships outlined in Chapter 5 do present themselves in actual INGOs. Even the industry leaders that I have examined in this work fall into the “traps” predicted by the previous chapter and suffer in terms of their overall effectiveness as a result. Many of these cases have struggled at different times in the past; some have nearly collapsed; and others are currently facing an existential threat. All of these problematic moments have arisen as a result of specific events that amplified these organizations’ preexisting internal pathologies, turning what would otherwise be wasteful but manageable dysfunction into crippling ineffectiveness. As the last piece of this dissertation’s puzzle, the relationship between inefficiency and ineffectiveness becomes clear by example in the following empirical analysis of INGO behavior.

I. Moral Charismatic Organizations (MCOs)

As Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 summarizes, crippling dysfunction may occur within MCOs in response to two types of events: rapid bursts of internal growth and critical leadership transitions. In the first instance, we expect to find MCOs growing at a rate that is perhaps faster than their ability to manage the increasing size and scope of their work, which we suspect could lead to mismanagement, misallocation of resources, and miscommunications within and across
organizations. In the second case, we anticipate that there will be substantial challenges for MCOs associated with the departure of a particularly charismatic leader (or group of leaders). My empirical observations reveal that both of these expectations are, in fact, strikingly present within and among MCOs.

MCO employees are eager to do what is asked of them—or what they believe is required of them—in order to save lives. As one IRC interviewee said, “We’re all a bunch of ‘pleasers.’ If we’re asked to go in, we go in. We just say ‘yes’ and figure the rest out later.” Interviewees across my MCO case organizations (PIH, SOP, TCC, and the IRC) confirmed this pervasive eagerness to get involved, and many acknowledged the downside: that a tendency to aggressively take opportunities as they arise—or, as one MCO interviewee put it, to “pounce on the moments right when they happen!”—can lead to potentially devastating financial and human capital overstretch, as well as internal tension and waste. As was anticipated, MCO highs are high, and their lows are quite low. When an MCO grows exponentially in response to an international crisis that presents an opportunity for growth and expansion, it is often the case that disruptive internal problems emerge as a result of the rapidly increasing size of the budget, staff, and mission scope. Making decisions by consensus becomes logistically impossible; avoiding any standard operating procedures becomes unruly and unmanageable; and designing solutions that are specifically tailored to each individual problem faced by each community in the field becomes unsustainable. And yet, when staff and leaders are accustomed to taking these
approaches when conducting their affairs, and when they see them as being core to their organizational identity and culture, then MCOs will continue to engage in these behaviors. Over time, maintaining these patterns and refusing to adapt internally can lead to an enormous amount of wasted time and resources, as well as high levels of internal tension and frustration. In the worst cases, it can lead to catastrophic failure for MCOs.

The PIH case offers a clear illustration of how MCOs experience internal ebbs and flows (or peaks and valleys) because of their strategy of taking “high-risk, high-reward,” “risky,” “radical,” and “bold” action in response to global problems as they arise. Even though PIH is widely regarded as being one of the most effective INGOs in the world, it has still experienced the negative consequences of its own persistent pathologies being amplified by specific events and leading to nearly fatal errors. For this INGO, the notion of developing systems and procedures to manage growth has been seen by many as directly contradicting the “rule-breaking” attitude that gave the organization its initial credibility; the idea of streamlining decision-making to improve efficiency runs counter to the collectivist, enabling management style that makes MCOs distinct in the landscape; and the suggestion of standardizing international programs according to industry best practices (rather than the specific needs of communities) stands in opposition to MCOs’ deeply engrained desire to respond

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284 The Global Journal’s list of “The Top 100 NGOs” worldwide placed PIH at #2 in 2012 and at #5 in 2013, for instance.
directly to the voices of populations in need. PIH is neither culturally nor strategically inclined to show restraint or to miss opportunities when they arise. Therefore, while other INGOs may experience stable growth over time, gradually becoming more formalized institutions and absorbing the changes slowly and smoothly, PIH-ers openly acknowledge that their unstable growth trajectory may be unsustainable over the long-term.

To use a specific example, PIH underwent a period of dramatic growth in the wake of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, PIH established itself as a “first-mover” to the scene, integral to the global relief and reconstruction efforts. The organization took a position in the international media spotlight and was flooded with donations from around the world; as a result, it roughly doubled in size during this brief period, expanding its overall program budget from approximately USD 60 million in 2009 to just under USD 120 million in 2011. However, by 2012, donors grew tired of supporting the earthquake relief efforts, and the rate at which dollars were flowing in slowed substantially. Whereas PIH had seen a 50% annual increase in funding over the previous two years, in 2012, funding increased by less than 10%. Because a substantial portion of PIH’s revenue had been earmarked for Haiti relief efforts, funding to other international programs had to be significantly reduced, and faced with budgetary gaps, PIH was forced to call upon its “angel donors” to help ensure that programs could survive.

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285 Partners In Health Annual Reports, 2009-2012.
As one PIH-er said, “We definitely bit off far more than we could chew.” The organization only realized the problem after it was too late to solve it. PIH charged ahead, assuming the dollars would continue to flow in at the incredible post-earthquake rates. Following the naturally risk-seeking MCO pattern, PIH continued to “act first, think second,” as one interviewee said, which led to the practice of “acting first, raising second.” In 2012, PIH incurred a USD 20 million deficit: the organization raised just over USD 100 million, but it spent more than USD 121 million on programs and administrative costs that year.286 Despite PIH’s historic ability to overcome these budgetary shortfalls when they arise, being in this position is precarious to say the least. In the words of one interviewee, this pattern would become “seriously problematic if, one day, the money isn’t there when we ask for it.” In the wake of the substantial growth sparked by the earthquake, a number of interviewees reported sentiments echoing one interviewee’s words:

*Everything feels like it’s exploded over the last year. We’ve gotten so big and so broad. [...] We’re running around like chickens with our heads cut off. I feel like we’re just waiting for the other shoe to fall now...to mess up something because we can’t handle doubling in size so quickly.*

Leaders and employees alike recognize that they are “walking a fine line,” as one said. An inability to manage rapid growth can quickly become mismanagement of time and funds, misallocation of resources, and misdirection of programs. If donors become aware of any misusage of their funds or manipulation of the

286 Partners In Health Annual Reports and Financial Statements, 2011-2012.
facts, they may withdraw their support, worsening the problem and definitively
damaging the INGO’s ability to pursue its goals. MCO leaders understand that
aggressively taking opportunities regardless of the potential pitfalls is quite
risky, and yet, they are compelled by their innate organizational cultural
predispositions to continue to engage in this kind of behavior.

Interviewees from inside and around my MCO cases revealed that these
issues can lead to potentially irrevocable tensions within the organization, which
can become highly problematic over time. One senior finance officer shared that
although she was “shocked” by how “outdated and clumsy” the financial
management systems were, she was “wary about the process of adding
procedures... [because] we don’t want to become so rigid.” She implicitly
understood the contradiction between an anti-bureaucratic MCO culture and the
need to systematize to manage growth. Another described the PIH systems as
being “embarrassingly behind where they need to be, given how much money
and how many people we’re trying to keep track of.” A third interviewee
echoed: “We’re far too large for this style of doing business,” saying that more
effective systems would have to be put in place, or else PIH would undoubtedly
damage its reputation and do a disservice to its constituents by mismanaging
funds. Many interviewees referred to high levels of frustration between program
staff members and finance and development officers. While PIH has certainly
benefited in the short-term from these periods of growth, it is unclear whether
the growth it has experienced so rapidly will be sustainable over the long-term. If
MCO managers are not able to carefully balance the contradictory—and perhaps equally strong—forces of bureaucratic institutional requirements and inherent anti-bureaucratic cultural norms, then MCOs may find themselves struggling to systematically sustain their operations after these periods of rapid growth.

The deleterious effects of the second type of event—a poorly handled leadership transition—are perhaps even more striking in my case MCOs. To use an example, when the Co-Founder of SOP, John Wallach, passed away in 2002, the organization had not designed, let alone begun to implement, a succession plan for after his death. According to a number of interviewees, John and all of his employees knew that his time was limited;\(^\text{287}\) and yet, John was “so passionate about the organization he’d built that he just couldn’t let it go,” as one interviewee reported. Meanwhile, the rest of the leadership team was so consumed by the day-to-day activities—and so unable (or perhaps they were unwilling) to undermine John’s leadership while he was still at the helm—that they did not effectively plan for the inevitable next step. When John ultimately passed, SOP lurched into a nearly seven-year period of internal tumult, frustration, and mismanagement. At least five CEOs cycled through the organization in the immediate aftermath of John’s death, none of whom stayed for more than a year or two. Many of the organization’s most talented and committed employees left the organization altogether, claiming that the work

\(^{287}\)John was terminally ill with cancer for a number of years.
environment was “toxic,” and that they were not confident that the organization would survive for long.

During this traumatic and tumultuous period, SOP failed to follow through on a variety of financial obligations, and the group had to “basically beg for forgiveness” from donors just so that “we could keep the camp’s doors open.” In the words of one current employee, “Frankly, I’m surprised we made it through that period at all. John’s death rocked the organization so hard, we nearly fell apart entirely.” Many interviewees reported on this time period using similar language and emotions; it is clear that the organization nearly experienced total collapse in the wake of John’s death. This example illustrates the ways in which the leadership liability problem can be present but manageable within an MCO for years, but as soon as the health or commitment of a charismatic leader comes into question, an organization’s dependence on that particular persona can become problematic to the extent that the organization is unable to properly function.

In addition to an individual’s unwillingness or inability to continue leading, a perceived loss of credibility can also intensify the leadership liability problem and lead to disastrous outcomes for MCOs. The controversy surrounding the “Kony 2012” movement provides another recent (and highly publicized) example of the kind of catastrophic failure that can emerge from the downfall of one particular charismatic leader. Jason Russell, the founder and figurehead of the Kony 2012 movement, directed and starred in a short
documentary film about the human rights abuses of one of the leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, Joseph Kony. When over 100 million people viewed the film on YouTube, Russell became the focus of international media attention and public adoration.\textsuperscript{288} The campaign to “make Kony famous” was launched in early March, and after a few weeks of considerable international attention, Russell was able to mobilize thousands of followers to support the cause. On March 8\textsuperscript{th}, the \textit{New York Times} wrote that Russell had successfully made the LRA leader “a household name ... in a matter of days, baffling diplomats, academics and Ugandans who have worked assiduously on the issue for decades without anything close to the blitz of attention that Mr. Russell and his tight-knit group of activists have generated.”\textsuperscript{289}

However, as one journalist wrote, “Of course skepticism also went viral. ... Some questioned Russell’s character.... They also questioned how Russell was spending the money of the charity he ran, Invisible Children.”\textsuperscript{290} After only a few weeks, the charismatic leader’s personal credibility and emotional stability came into question. On March 16\textsuperscript{th}, just eight days after the \textit{New York Times} piece mentioned above was published, the San Diego police detained Russell when he was “found in the street in his underwear, screaming and interfering with

\textsuperscript{288} The video “went viral” in part thanks to “tweets” from key celebrities, each of whom is “followed” by multiple millions of Twitter users. For instance, Kim Kardashian “tweeted” to her more than 18 million followers on March 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2012: “#Kony2012 Wow just watched! What a powerful video! Stop Kony!!!...” Oprah Winfrey tweeted her support to her 20.6 million Twitter followers on March 6\textsuperscript{th}, 2012, and Justin Bieber, Rihanna, and other celebrities with equally large followings chimed in over the course of the next few days.

\textsuperscript{289} Kron and Goodman, 2012: 1.

\textsuperscript{290} Tapscott, 2012: 1.
traffic.”291 After Russell was hospitalized for “reactive psychosis,” the movement essentially fell apart. The enormous potential of the activism sparked by the video dissipated as the charismatic leader lost his credibility among his followers. The movement was set to culminate on April 20th, 2012, when activists around the world were supposed to “blanket cities with posters of the wanted Ugandan warlord.”292 Sadly, optimism around the “most successful viral video campaign of all time”293 had been replaced by headlines like The Guardian’s “Kony 2012 Cover the Night fails to move from the internet to the streets.”294 As Garber noted in The Atlantic’s “How Kony 2012’s Big Event Fizzled Out,” “The thing was a flop. Hardly anyone came out,”295 Garber pointed out that there may have been many reasons why the campaign failed, writing that “there are...PhD dissertations to be written about the Kony campaign and the way it exploded and, at least for the moment, faded.”296 However, she emphasized the centrality of Jack Russell’s charismatic leadership to the movement’s catastrophic demise: “The campaign’s fortunes were connected to the person—which is to say, the persona—of Russell himself. When he fell, publicly and embarrassingly, the campaign fell too.”297

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293 Garber, 2012: 1.
294 Carroll, 2012.
296 Ibid: 1.
297 Ibid: 2.
Although Invisible Children is not one of the case organizations investigated in depth in this work, this is a clear example of an MCO that imploded because it was too dependent on one charismatic leader’s public persona. Though perhaps exceptional in terms of the sheer size and speed of its meteoric rise and fall (over the period of weeks, and involving millions of people around the world), the Invisible Children case is emblematic of the ways in which the leadership liability problem can come to plague organizations when specific events occur. When the charismatic leader is no longer deemed fit for leadership, or he or she is no longer willing or able to lead, the dependency problem can be amplified to the point of undermining an MCO’s overall effectiveness.

While the Kony example is perhaps the most striking instance of MCO collapse in recent years, there are countless examples of INGOs whose legitimacy rests in part on a charismatic leader with an ideological vision falling apart because they failed to implement the necessary systems to manage their growth, or because their second-line leaders could not sustain the momentum after the departure of the founder-leader(s). For instance, a UK-based group known as Childhood Development and Aid (CDA) was founded in 1990, and by 2001 it employed over 500 staff members and administered humanitarian programs in ten countries around the world. Characteristic of many MCOs, the organization ran projects that were wildly diverse and perhaps only tangentially related to the
mission, and they struggled to reduce their costs in any one area so as to compensate for their growing deficit. When their creditors and donors began asking questions in 2002, CDA’s senior management wrote to their previous employees for assistance:

\[
CDA \text{ is crumbling and we are desperately looking for help before it is too late.} \\
...\text{We urgently need to find a solution to our funding problems that will sort out our immediate cash shortfalls and improve financial stability for the future. As you probably remember from your time working with us, it is nothing new for CDA to be suffering from cash flow constraints. However, the cumulative effects of having no reserves have now reached the point where it is becoming impossible to go on.}\]

When no major donors were identified to fill the budget shortfall, the organization was forced to close down all of its programs and close its doors.

This sequence of events is quite common among MCOs: the organization is founded by charismatic leader, thrives for a few years, expands rapidly into diverse issue areas, appears to be achieving great success, fails to implement necessary systems to manage growth, begs donors for help, is unable to fill budgetary gaps, loses credibility, and ultimately fails. Under normal circumstances, MCOs can manage their inefficiencies decently well; however, when they experience growth that draws attention to their rule-avoiding tendencies or their charismatic founder-leaders move on, they risk total collapse.

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298 CDA was dedicated to working on recreation and rehabilitation for children in urban communities (Macedonia), supporting health care facilities and training health workers (Albania, Burundi, Liberia), providing safe drinking water for children in schools (North Korea), providing information about sexual and reproductive health for communities (Azerbaijan); delivering nutritional support for children and mothers (Tajikistan, Burundi, Haiti), and supporting de-mobilized child soldiers after conflict (Sierra Leone). From a “Case Study of Financial Collapse,” presented by Mango: Strengthening the financial management and accountability of humanitarian and development NGOs and their partners (2002).

299 Unite for Sight 2012: “Pitfalls to Avoid for New NGOs.”
Of the three INGO ideal types conceptualized in this work, MCOs are the most likely to be incapable of recovering from these “traps” and ceasing to exist as a result.

II. EXPERT PRAGMATIST ORGANIZATIONS (EPOs)

The evidence from my empirical project reveals that the expected relationships described in Chapter 5 also express themselves in EPOs. The exogenous events summarized in the table at the end of the last chapter do, in fact, create the conditions under which certain pathologies are exacerbated within EPOs. During periods of relative normalcy, EPOs are able to maintain a level of “good enough” efficiency, where “a degree of disunity and individuality can even be healthy,” as one interviewee noted. However, when EPOs are compelled to build partnerships that they do not view as being instrumental to pursuing their ends, or when they are expected to respond rapidly to international crises related to their areas of expertise, then EPOs will be hindered by their own internally-driven compulsion to debate issues until the perfect solutions are derived.

Even though they might all be considered leaders in their respective fields, each of the EPO case organizations presented here (EDF, HRW, and the ICTJ) has succumbed to the problems outlined in Chapter 5. They have all suffered in some way from the negative consequences of engaging in partnerships to which they are not fully committed, and having their reputations
damaged as a result of seemingly uncooperative behavior. Confirming the expectations from Chapter 5, even the most partnership-resistant of my case organizations would join a cooperative arrangement if its supporters demanded it. As one interviewee said in reference to a specific instance, “We finally made a partnership happen ... and actually it was mostly because a bunch of the joint funders said, ‘Come on, guys. Coordinate,’ so we did ... even though we didn’t want to.” In the words of one EDF interviewee, “A lot of other NGOs don’t like to partner with us. [...] They want to see a detailed explanation of everything we do and how we do it, but we just don’t spend our time on those kinds of things.”

Another senior administrator explained that partnerships were not her organization’s “strong suit” because, in her words, “We’re more rigorously pragmatic...more centrist. We decided a long time ago we were not anti-corporate, and there are some folks who just don’t see it that way. [...] We’re more data-driven and ‘wonky,’ and we’re willing to be incrementalist.” While being pragmatic and willing to work with corporations is, of course, not problematic in and of itself, when other partner organizations interpret the EPO attitude as being “smug,” “arrogant,” “closed off,” or “uncooperative,” then there are negative consequences in terms of these INGOs’ ability to generate support and pursue their ends. The same interviewee explained that her

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300 These are a few of the words that were either used by external (non-EPO) interviewees to describe the attitude of a particular EPO they had worked with, or by internal (EPO) interviewees to describe how they think they are perceived by others outside the organization.
organization’s cultural tendency toward being more concerned with the ends than the means is often seen as a major issue by partner organizations:

But because of that, people say we ‘sell out’ too easily, especially other folks in the NGO community. We haven’t always worked and played well with others. We don’t put as much time and attention as I know we need to into talking to colleagues and peers about where we are going in terms of policy. [...] Being more open to working with others would bring cohesion to the environmental NGOs.

HRW also reflects this pattern. Every year, this INGO publishes a *World Report* addressing the state of human rights around the world. As a piece of writing, research, and analysis, the *World Report* brings the organization great renown because “the work that we do is well researched and backed up, and our findings are well checked and corroborated by many sources. [...] It’s about our expertise.” A number of interviewees told me that the *World Report* is the reason why they wanted to apply for a job with HRW in the first place. As one said, the *Report* was of “extremely high quality, and clearly contained information that no one else had been able to gather,” which made him believe that HRW was the foremost human rights organization in the world. However, the *World Report* is a highly controversial document. It is intended to expose human rights abuses large and small, and to “name and shame” the offenders, regardless of how powerful they are. In it, HRW is unashamedly critical of both state governments and international institutions,301 and as a result, “People either love it or they hate it,” as one interviewee noted. While publicly accusing human rights abusers

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301 For instance, in April 2013, HRW presented a letter to US President Barack Obama, entitled “Sharing Concerns Regarding U.S. Drone Strikes and Targeted Killing,” in which the organization implicitly accused the Obama Administration’s actions of being both illegal and inhumane (HRW, “Joint Letter to President Obama on US Drone Strikes and Targeted Killings,” April 11 2013).
of committing crimes is certainly in line with the organization’s mission, it “doesn’t help us make friends, that’s for sure.” Much like EDF, HRW is not always seen as an amenable partner. One leader who has been with the organization for over a decade succinctly captured the problem for HRW:

We are very effective, but we don’t play well with others. That’s the biggest downfall of our organization. [...] We’re as hypercritical of others as we are of ourselves. Our whole purpose is to criticize, to point out what people are doing, aren’t doing, etc. And people don’t tend to like that. Other groups can sometimes see us as difficult to work with, and it’s harder than you might think to get the job done when people don’t want to work with you. Much as we like to think we can ‘go it alone,’ we need partners even when we don’t want to work with them.

When EPOs fail to cooperate with organizations that are trying to accomplish similar goals, they can isolate themselves from their peers, making it more difficult to earn funding and influence other actors. Their perceived inapproachability often leads to poorly managed relationships. As one EPO interviewee reported, when a partnership “completely fell apart,” it was not because the two groups developed disparate goals; it was because managers in the partner organization “felt like they couldn’t talk to us, and they didn’t know how to work with us. I think they were just put off by our style.” Forming and maintaining strong partnerships “requires both energy and compromise,” and “we just weren’t willing to give it what it took to make it work.” When no results are realized from a partnership, INGOs not only waste valuable time and resources, but tensions can also flare within and among organizations, which can lead the allegedly “belligerent” party to be deemed “uncooperative” or, worse yet in the INGO context, “self-interested.”
My empirical work on INGOs also illustrates that EPOs are not adept when it comes to responding swiftly to urgent international crises, and this can be highly problematic for their performance outcomes. A number of observations made by staff members suggest that this problem stands out above the others as perhaps the most important challenge facing these organizations. As one communications officer noted, there is a fundamental tension between an EPO’s perfectionism and its need to simply respond when a major international event takes place:

*Even when people know it’s a highly time-sensitive issue, they still get frustrated if we [the communications staff] even try to respond quickly. They always want to make sure there’s a researcher and an advocate involved, in the process, and [...] they want there to be more people in the room...before any decision about how to respond is made. It’s a tension, and sometimes we wanna just say ‘there’s the door,’ so we can just get something written up and released, but it’s not that simple.*

Another senior manager discussed this issue in terms of what he called “quality control,” or his organization’s ability to release the highest quality products and services possible:

*That’s everything we’re about. But how do you find a balance between the ‘need for speed’ and the need for quality? When you think about impact, accuracy and rigor and credibility is sine qua non. You can never negotiate on that or dilute that. But we also need the speed. How do we tweet when all of our materials go through rigorous review? We’re supposed to be one of the most important human rights organizations in the world, but if we can’t tweet when an actual human rights abuse is happening somewhere out there, what does that make us?*

When it comes to completing long-term projects that demand the highest quality (such as HRW’s annual *World Report*), EPOs are perhaps unmatched in their abilities. However, when it comes to producing immediate responses to
urgent exogenous events, EPOs struggle to overcome their commitments to perfectionism and incessant debate. Many high-level interviewees across my EPO case organizations confirmed that the inability to adjust swiftly when exogenous circumstances demanded it probably led to missed opportunities and a degree of stagnation compared to their peers. Given these realities, EPOs find themselves losing ground to their peer INGOs, which are capitalizing on the opportunities provided by external events that demand immediate action on the part of the international community and taking advantage of the influx of capital and attention they receive as a result of being “first-movers.” It is perhaps for this reason that EPOs rarely reach focal levels within their fields. EPOs may be able to persist at moderate levels of success by “flying under the radar,” as one interviewee called it, and avoiding the risks associated with acting swiftly. But in the instances when they are outpaced by their peers because their very nature as EPOs predisposes them to fall into certain “traps,” their ability to accomplish their goals will be challenged and they will be less effective as organizations.

III. **G R A S S R O O T S  P R O C E D U R A L I S T O R G A N I Z A T I O N S (GPOs)**

Whereas the crippling dysfunction described with respect to MCOs and EPOs can set in rather quickly, the problems that are most detrimental to GPO effectiveness tend to appear gradually over time. As was hypothesized in the previous chapter, these problems do manifest in response to particular kinds of events, but their effects may not be fully expressed until months or even years
later. This gradual onset is to be expected, given the inherently slow-moving, risk-averse nature of GPOs; compared to EPOs and especially MCOs, GPOs experience more moderate highs and lows, and change comes in slow and reluctant waves. From my analysis of the three GPO case organizations (KI, OI, and MC), combined with my interpretations of data gathered through non-case interviews, it is clear that internal decisions to restructure or reallocate funds, as well as shocks to the global funding environment, can have crippling consequences for GPOs in the long run.

During periods of relative normalcy, GPOs are capable of maintaining a sufficiently productive level of overall effectiveness, despite the inefficiencies that are consistently present within them (see Part II). Before diving into the potentially crippling problems, it is worth noting that GPOs’ problems are all exacerbated by increases in their overall size and breadth. On the one hand, as they become larger and more dispersed around the globe, they may become more focal in their respective industries, which can obviously lead to positive outcomes for GPOs in terms of their ability to generate material and ideational support. On the other hand, as they expand outward, it can become increasingly difficult for GPOs to manage all of the decentralized branches and to align the entire organization around one clear mission and a unified set of goals. With more and more sub-units focused on pursuing their own interests and achieving outcomes in their own “backyards,” the fragmentation and disunity inherent to
the model become increasingly difficult for GPO leaders and headquarters staff to manage.

With this context in mind, it is clear from my empirical work that GPOs struggle to pursue their goals effectively when their leadership makes a turning point decision on behalf of the organization, especially when this decision affects the way in which the GPO allocates its resources. To use an example from among the case INGOs, when the Kiwanis senior leadership wanted to launch its first “Worldwide Service Project,” the group engaged in an organization-wide decision-making process that took many months to complete. The process was particularly contentious because many of the organization’s chapters believed that the new project would reduce their autonomy. If implemented, the decision to initiate a global service project would mean that chapters would be responsible for directing their attention and funds away from their local communities and focusing, instead, on a global cause that the headquarters staff deemed worthy of the organization’s collective support. After an arduous debating and voting process, KI decided to initiate its first worldwide service project, which involved working in partnership with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the US Fund for UNICEF to eliminate iodine deficiency disorders (or IDD) globally.
The campaign itself might be seen as a success, and over the short-term, the project helped Kiwanis earn international recognition and support. However, KI’s strategic decision to pool its resources to support one global effort—rather than continue letting its chapters determine how they wanted to spend their own time and money in their local communities—became highly disruptive for this GPO. The chapters that were the most committed to maintaining their autonomy rejected the idea of “raising money for strangers living halfway around the world,” to use the words of one interviewee. Headquarters staff members wasted countless hours trying to convince the chapters that a globally focused project would unify the brand and harness the organization’s collective power to accomplish a meaningful goal. Despite their efforts, the proponents of the worldwide project were met with a great deal of hesitation and resistance, as well as a downright refusal to participate from a number of chapters. Even the headquarters leaders who were completely supportive of the strategic decision to introduce global service initiatives into the organization’s portfolio acknowledged that this critical juncture led to certain highly problematic outcomes for their organization. One interviewee illustrated how this decision to reallocate resources intensified the organization’s existing internal fragmentation and disunity:

There was always tension between the chapters and HQ, but when we asked them to turn their focus away from their own communities and toward these projects that some of them see as being so far away and beyond their ability to help...not to

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302 Kiwanis raised USD 80 million in its first Worldwide Service Project, which has provided access to iodized salt to more than 80 million underprivileged children around the world.
mention not something they’re very interested in doing, we may have done irreparable damage to our relationship with some of those chapters. They just don’t seem to want to help the organization’s broader mission anymore. I think they might even see us as a hindrance. I worry that this is unsustainable, and what happens when they feel like they just don’t need us [the headquarters office] anymore?

The Kiwanis example illustrates how a GPO’s strategic decision to redistribute resources can lead to potentially crippling problems for the organization. GPOs are resistant to change and comfortable with the status quo, so when a decision of this nature is enacted, these groups tend to react in ways that are not particularly healthy or constructive. Although Kiwanis remains a large and powerful institution today, many interviewees implied or explicitly stated that they believed the organization is in a gradual (and perhaps irreversible) state of collapse. As one interviewee said, “Each year there’s been a decline, and there are fewer and fewer members, and that’s been the main source of revenue for us, so that’s causing cash flow problems.” She later explained, “With the global service projects, a lot of the contributions that were coming in for operations are just not there anymore.” Another revealed the “vicious cycle” that constitutes the central problem for Kiwanis and other GPOs: “With the serious decline in membership, people are trying to be creative, which leads to some minimal change, but then people get uncomfortable and retrench into tradition again. And then our membership declines more.” Another senior leader worried: “I’m just not sure what we’re going to do. We’re getting smaller and
smaller, and we’re losing out to newer global service organizations everyday. It’s hard to see how we turn this thing around.”

When change does occur in GPOs, it tends to come in the form of deliberate and definitive decisions that are made at the culmination of protracted and laborious processes. For example, in 2008, after months of international deliberation among leaders, Oxfam decided to move from “a system in which multiple, autonomous Oxfam affiliates could work in any given country” to a “single management structure (SMS) in each country—but with a continuing commitment to preserving a diverse confederation.”

This decision, which has been called “a complex process that aims to deliver greater impact, efficiency and recognition,” threatened a number of Oxfam affiliates because it constituted a plan to restructure how resources would be allocated and managed at the local level; not surprisingly, the decision was met by “uneven responsiveness” from offices around the world, and implementing it has been “arduous.”

According to Harvard University’s Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations, “‘Going live’ has turned out to be such a complex process that it demands enormous time and attention of senior staff at the country level as well as key staff throughout

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303 Jayawickrama, 2012: 1. The decision was made in response to an acknowledgement that “having multiple affiliates running separate programs in the same country is inefficient and is a liability given Oxfam’s own advocacy on aid effectiveness.”

304 Ibid: 1-3. As this key report on the SMS process states, “There have been times when affiliates have blocked or reversed decisions made by Country Leadership Teams or Program Governance Groups, where timely compromises and agreements have to be made to maintain momentum on the SMS process,” which has “led to frustration and to demands that deeper changes...be undertaken.” During this experience, many “philosophical differences” among Oxfam affiliates were exposed and confronted, and many of the “more profound differences” have yet to be resolved.
the confederation,” leading, in some cases, to a “decline in program spending and a drop in external-facing efforts.”

When the decision was being made, there was substantial resistance from affiliates around the world—particularly those that were relatively less powerful than their peers, and thus, might have been subsumed under the leadership of another more powerful local affiliate. Once the decision was made, these chapters grew increasingly frustrated and resentful, and they were not particularly eager to help the headquarters office “roll out” the new systems associated with the change. Consequently, rather than realizing the benefits of change, Oxfam has been stalled for nearly five years in the process of trying to implement the change itself. In the face of substantial resistance from affiliates, it is yet to be determined whether the SMS will succeed, or if it will be abandoned before it can be fully actualized. The decision to move to a single management system was by no means a radical or transformative one; it existed purely in the realm of management and would have few, if any, consequences for Oxfam’s ability to help populations in need. And yet, Oxfam’s reaction to the SMS illustrates by example the lesson that for a GPO, this type of interruption to the internal status quo may seem monumental and may lead to insurmountable challenges.

As was predicted in Chapter 5, exogenous interruptions to the status quo also have the potential to destabilize GPOs by exacerbating the dysfunctional

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tendencies to which they are prone. The three GPO case organizations studied in this work may be considered integral actors in their respective fields, and as such, they have been better than their peers at adjusting to external changes that require institutional adaptation. As relatively mature organizations (ranging from approximately 40 to 100 years old), the GPO cases studied here have survived any number of shifts in the global policy and funding landscape without collapsing altogether. And yet, despite their successes, these organizations have still suffered from the problems predicted in Chapter 5 of this work. They have struggled to adapt when it has been necessary, and their leaders are deeply concerned about the implications of this problem for their long-term survival. Even though these groups may appear to be prosperous “power-houses” from the outside, the empirical research presented here clearly illustrates that the leaders of these GPOs are worried that their resistance to change and adaptation will be the cause of their ultimate—and perhaps imminent—demise.

For instance, Oxfam has struggled to adjust to a humanitarian and development environment in which delivering goods and services can no longer be thought of as “charity.” As an interviewee representing a donor agency said, “Global development today is not about handing out ‘pocket change,’ and it’s not about an act of charity. If you asked someone in Nigeria whether they thought they were receiving charity, they’d be horrified! No one wants that. That’s just not what it’s about.” Both private and institutional donors are not as
eager as they once were to support operations that appear to constitute “charity,” as opposed to long-term, sustainable and locally-driven development efforts. As one of the world’s first global charities, Oxfam has struggled to abandon its “charity narrative,” as one interviewee called it. “... If we keep talking about charity, and continue to be dependent on five-quid donations from individuals, then we’re screwed.” Whereas an MCO could quite swiftly adapt to new exogenous requirements, and an EPO would continue to define its positions on the basis of its expertise in an area, many GPOs will lack the necessary flexibility to adjust when it is most needed, which can lead to highly problematic outcomes over the long-term.

When younger competitor organizations enter the market and destabilize the institutional status quo, the internal dysfunctions associated with a GPO’s inability to adapt will be amplified. New INGOs will define themselves and their work in ways that reflect the contemporary normative and policy environment in their industry, and therefore, they may be able to achieve great success in generating support as a “more appropriate” response to a global challenge than their “outdated” GPO counterparts can provide. A new INGO operating in the poverty and development space would disassociate itself from the “charity” narrative from the start, and its mission and programs would align with the current belief that aid is not about the rich donating to the poor, but rather, it is about various stakeholders working together to promote system-wide change that will lead to sustainable economic development. Established GPOs like
Oxfam, by contrast, struggle to stay relevant and to redefine themselves in the context of an aid landscape that now rejects the validity of dispersing donations as a means of engaging in sustainable global development activities. In the face of this kind of global shift in priorities, GPOs will struggle to overcome their resistance to change and procedural rigidity, and they may fail to sufficiently adapt to keep pace with the changing institutional landscape.

To use a concrete example of this phenomenon, OI has been a global leader in mobilizing grassroots audiences around the world to participate in raising money and awareness to alleviate poverty. However, as the world has increasingly turned to Internet-based technology to engage private citizens and organizations around the world, this GPO has been unable to effectively leverage the power of online tools to energize more people and expand its work. Meanwhile, organizations like Avaaz, which were founded in an Internet-obsessed era, rely heavily on these online resources as a means of accessing and harnessing the support of people around the world. During its first six years in operation, Avaaz has engaged over 25 million people as members while avoiding the cumbersome costs associated with “bricks and mortar” operations (e.g., office space, utilities, administrative staff). While Oxfam has been problematically slow to adapt to 21st century cultural and normative requirements, groups like Avaaz have gained an enormous amount of international attention and have achieved great success in pursuing their goals.

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306 Avaaz.org was founded in 2007.
In the face of these kinds of exogenous changes to the global funding environment and institutional landscape, GPOs find themselves scrambling to keep their foothold in the competitive world of INGOs. To use the words of one interviewee, “While we are staring at our navels and making sure all the rules are in place, other groups are changing and charging ahead.” Because it is linked to a reduction in a GPO’s competitive position relative to its peers, this pattern clearly has implications for organizational effectiveness, and not just efficiency. If GPOs cannot adjust accordingly when these problems associated with disruptions to the status quo begin to set in, then they will find themselves in a gradual state of decline. As one GPO interviewee noted, “I’m just not sure we’re gonna be able to stay relevant forever. These other guys are trying to convince the world that they can do it better and faster than we can, and you know what? They may be right.” For leaders of Kiwanis and Oxfam, this thought seems to be “top of mind” at present.

Based on the analysis presented throughout this work, it is clear that INGOs operate in a world defined by bounded rationality. When faced with similar events and environmental constraints, organizations that resemble different ideal types will respond differently. If they could all “fold out the decision tree”\textsuperscript{307} to determine the most optimal outcomes, then they would all make the same decisions. However, as is evident from the preceding analysis,

\textsuperscript{307} Jupille, Mattli and Snidal, 2013: 21.
these organizations are motivated and guided by endogenously formed sets of norms, values, and cultures. They are fundamentally shaped by their need to earn legitimacy among other actors in their respective environments, to the extent that they develop a “way we do things,” beyond which other types of behaviors are almost inconceivable. These internal logics, or interpretive schema, constrain decision-makers and reinforce organizational identities and strategies. INGO leaders make decisions that may be best suited to their organizations’ specific cultural requirements and preferences, but these choices are not necessarily optimal ones in the sense of producing perfectly efficient or effective outcomes. INGO leaders are limited in their ability to make optimal decisions by two factors: their incomplete foresight, and the values, identities, and norms that characterize their organizations’ internal dynamics.

The fact that members of the three ideal type groups will respond differently to internal and external stimuli has important implications for the efficiency of the INGO market itself. The diversity of INGOs means that different types of actors will be more or less well suited to complete certain kinds of tasks and to engage in certain types of institutional arrangements. For instance, stable, predictable INGOs that thrive under status quo conditions (i.e., GPOs) are likely to excel in building mutually-beneficial relationships with risk-averse, powerful institutions that want to see results but do not want to see transformative change. However, risk-seeking actors that benefit from the effects of radical changes that destabilize status quo arrangements will be more likely to identify and work well
with transformative, risk-taking INGOs (i.e., MCOs). As has been established in this chapter, each ideal type has its strengths and weaknesses, and the more institutional actors can recognize those differences, the more likely they are to build strong and sustainable partnerships and relationships.

To use the language of one interviewee, “I tend to think about an ecosystem of NGOs, and we are one of the actors. We are maple-trees; we’re not any other kind of tree. Another organization will be an apple tree. They’ll just plain be better at making apples. And that’s a good thing for the whole ecosystem.” By definition, an INGO’s ability to achieve its goals depends on whether it can identify sources of material and ideational support for its cause. As has been established throughout this work, INGOs of different types are distinct from one another in terms of both culture and behavior, and as such, some will be better positioned than others to occupy specific niches in the international humanitarian and development landscape. If institutional supporters can recognize these differences and their implications for INGO behavior, the whole industry will be able to pursue global change more efficiently and effectively.
CONCLUSION:

REVIEW OF FINDINGS, OUTSTANDING ISSUES, AND IMPLICATIONS

In the preceding chapters of this work, I argue that organizational identity plays a central role in determining the behavioral outcomes of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). Rooted in the core claims of sociological institutionalism, my work emphasizes the role of cognitive and normative influences in shaping the actions of institutions. The preceding analysis illustrates that social actors do not operate in a world in which they can make synoptically rational decisions; their choices are defined and constrained by systems of meaning that characterize their institutional surroundings. In the case of INGOs, these interpretive schema emerge as a result of the process of organizational self-definition: the need for legitimacy drives INGOs to define themselves on the basis of their sources of authority, and the identity that forms as a result determines the range of appropriate action available to these organizations and their employees. The systemic features that develop within these organizations may be a source of strength for their host INGOs insofar as they reflect the authority claims on which an organization’s legitimacy depends; however, they are also inextricably linked to specific types of dysfunctional
tendencies from which an INGO may suffer. These intrinsic strengths and weaknesses play an important role in determining how an INGO will behave as an international organization (IO).

This final chapter is divided into three sections. First, there is a review of the key findings from the previous chapters, which highlights the relationships among the arguments presented in different Parts of the dissertation. Second, there is a discussion of the theoretical and policy implications of this research for both scholars and practitioners of international affairs. The third section addresses several outstanding issues related to the present and future of the INGO landscape.

I. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS

After establishing that INGOs are increasingly prominent but understudied actors in international affairs in the Introduction, I position my project as a sociological institutionalist response to the absence of systematic and comprehensive IR scholarship on the origins of INGO behavioral and performance outcomes. Applying the basic logic of Barnett and Finnemore’s argument about the power and pathologies of IOs, my work suggests that in order to survive, INGOs must establish their legitimacy in a competitive landscape in which they are dependent upon external sources of material and ideational support. By making certain claims about who they are and how they

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conduct their affairs, INGOs are able to earn legitimacy among their peers and supporters, but in so doing, they lay the foundation for the formation of a relatively stable organizational identity that will define the INGO’s internal cultural dynamics and dysfunctional tendencies. My research combines theoretically derived insights with empirical observations, relying heavily on research accumulated through ten in-depth INGO case study analyses, over 200 loosely-structured interviews, reactive observation, and more than 30 off-the-record consultations with INGO practitioners and partners. Analyzing INGOs from the “inside-out,” and leaning on practitioners themselves for first-hand accounts of organizational culture and behavior, my work constitutes an important step toward fully understanding how organizations in this highly diverse and previously under-researched category of international organizations generate their power and ultimately perform.

As a theoretically systematic and empirically rich analysis of organizational behavior in the world of INGOs, my work begins to fill a significant gap in the IR literature. Even though these groups constitute perhaps the most numerous and organizationally diverse category of international institutions, they are the least studied and the least well understood in IO research. As a discipline that continues to be largely state- and IGO-centric in its understanding of international politics, contemporary IR scholarship has overlooked the vastly more numerous—and arguably more effective—world of international institutions not controlled by states and the organizations they sign
into existence. This work is a significant and practical contribution to understanding the components of the dynamic IO sphere, departing from the standard IR paradigm of treating states and IGOs as the only relevant actors in international affairs and INGOs as little more than an afterthought.

The chapters that comprise Part I of this work are dedicated to answering two key questions: first, how can an INGO generate authority as an international actor, and second, how do these authority claims lead to the development of particular organizational systemic features that shape behavioral outcomes? The answers to these questions constitute the theoretical foundations of my work and are critical to the remaining sections of the dissertation. In response to the first question, I argue that INGOs become authoritative on the basis of a combination of who they are and represent, and how they claim to conduct their affairs. INGOs can earn legitimacy on the basis of their charismatic leaders, their highly trained and credentialed experts, or their locally influential and knowledgeable grassroots leaders \(W_1-W_3\), as well as on their morally sound dedication to pursuing an ideology, their pragmatic or instrumentalist commitment to achieving outcomes, or their dedication to the principles of democratic inclusiveness and due process \(H_1-H_3\).

As was discussed in Chapter 1, three of the combinations will dominate the INGO landscape: charismatic leaders \(W_1\) will leverage their extraordinary personal traits to motivate potential supporters and followers on the basis of passionately delivered, ideologically motivated claims about how the world
ought to work (H₁); issue area or technical experts (W₂) will use their access to and sophisticated analysis of data to instrumentally pursue the most effective outcomes (H₂); and organizations driven by grassroots leaders who are connected within and knowledgeable about specific local environments (W₃) will treat inclusivity, transparency and accountability as sacrosanct (H₃). These combinations produce the three ideal types— the Moral Charismatic Organization \{W₁ + H₁ = MCO\}, the Expert Pragmatist Organization \{W₂ + H₂ = EPO\}, and the Grassroots Proceduralist Organization \{W₃ + H₃ = GPO\}— which, together, constitute the INGO typology. Organizations resembling each of the three types are associated with a particular set of interpretive schema, or observable structures and underlying truths that define their identities and internal operations. These organizational systems guide and constrain the behavior of employees, creating identifiable routines, rituals and processes that employees consider to be definitive of their organizational cultures.

After explaining the Authority Sources Framework in Chapter 1, I briefly outline the kinds of organizational systemic features we might expect to find in the three INGO ideal types. Then, in Chapter 2, I turn to the ten INGO cases, testing the conceptually driven assumptions presented in Chapter 1, and describing the systemic characteristics that are emblematic of each ideal type. MCOs are characterized by the omnipresence of highly devoted followers, the dense interconnectedness of supporters to suffering populations and to one another, the centrality of personality to decision-making processes, the
extraordinary passion of staff members, the inability to decline requests for assistance, and the direct responsiveness to needs as expressed by communities being served. EPOs, on the other hand, are defined by a high degree of perfectionism, a tendency to persistently debate decisions, a fiercely independent culture, an approach that values ends over means, a willingness to partner with diverse institutions, and a strong “inside game” when it comes to negotiating with other policy-makers and practitioners. Finally, GPOs are distinguished by a highly decentralized nature in which semi-autonomous sub-units vie for authority, a tendency to set agendas from the “bottom-up,” a plethora of diverse sub-cultures, a commitment to transparency, an approach that holds means above ends, and a pattern of consulting multiple stakeholders before making a decision.

These organizational systems play a complex role in the context of an INGO’s identity and behavior. On the one hand, they can fortify the very authority claims that led to their development in the first place. For example, the centrality of a particular personality in an MCO’s decision-making culture is both a product and a reinforcement of the charismatic leadership that defines MCOs: the fact of his centrality to his INGO’s affairs perpetuates his image as an extraordinary leader on whose vision and guidance the organization relies, which may further convince potential supporters and followers that this leader is exceptional and worthy of support. Because these intrinsic organizational systems can be a source of strength for INGOs, employees and supporters often
describe them with great pride, revealing a belief that they are integral to their organizations’ efforts and identities, as well as their ability to earn material and ideational support.

On the other hand, as these organizational systems become deeply engrained in an INGO’s culture, they can lead to the development of specific kinds of dysfunctional tendencies that are unique to each ideal type. If Part I of this work is dedicated to understanding the strengths of MCOs, EPOs, and GPOs, then Part II is devoted to understanding their weaknesses. In Chapters 3 and 4, I unpack and analyze the relationships between organizational systemic features and dysfunctional tendencies in each of the three ideal types. After briefly reviewing the literature about the origins of institutional inefficiency in Chapter 3, I argue that it is important to focus on internal cultural factors in order to fully understand the behavior of INGOs. In Chapter 4, I turn to the empirical evidence once again, testing the expected relationships presented in Chapter 3 against reality, and describing the world of INGOs through the eyes of their practitioners.

In this second half of Part II, it becomes clear that for MCOs, their internal inefficiencies are related to a tendency to avoid the application of rules and systems to govern processes, a potentially problematic dependence on a few specific personalities, an inability to stop expanding projects and activities in the

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309 As was discussed in Part II, these dysfunctional tendencies are analogous to the IGO features that Barnett and Finnemore (1999; 2004) call “pathologies” in their work.
field, an irrational desire to seek consensus on all decisions, an overexposure to feedback from external stakeholders, and a tendency to “reinvent the wheel” in every local context. For EPOs, their problems originate from a need to constantly debate and criticize every decision, a tendency for individuals to “go rogue” around the world, an impediment to effective communication across the organization, a tendency to seem disinterested in colleagues’ and supporters’ requests, a lack of internal transparency, and an environment in which ideologies differ greatly among individuals and departments. And for GPOs, internal dysfunction occurs as a result of dramatic cultural fragmentation and politicization across sub-units, confusion and disagreement about core strategic aims, rigidity around procedural routines, resistance to transformative ideas and possible changes, and stringent adherence to the rules associated with democratic governance.

Because they are intrinsic to the INGO models, all of the dysfunctional tendencies described in Part II will be consistently present within their host organizations. However, under normal circumstances, these problems may appear in only modest levels of intensity, reducing their hosts’ ability to conduct their affairs in an efficient manner but not affecting their overall effectiveness in pursuing their ends. As was illustrated throughout Part II, INGOs do not operate as perfectly efficient organizations during periods of relative normalcy, but they are still able to survive, grow, and pursue their goals. Employees may be frustrated by the inefficiencies they face on a daily basis, but their organizations
are not fundamentally crippled by these pathologies. However, specific types of endogenous and exogenous events may amplify problems within their host organizations, turning a few of the previously manageable dysfunctional tendencies into truly problematic issues for these INGOs.

Part III is dedicated to explaining and characterizing the circumstances under which the otherwise manageable dysfunctional tendencies (discussed in Part II) are exacerbated to the extent that they undermine an organization’s overall effectiveness. Chapter 5 attempts to answer the question, “Within each of the ideal types, what are the conditions under which ‘good enough’ efficiency will become potentially crippling ineffectiveness?” In this part of the dissertation, I present a series of conjectures about how we might expect INGOs of different types to react to various endogenous and exogenous events. For instance, based on their organizational systemic features and associated dysfunctional tendencies, we might expect to see MCOs falling into performance “traps” in the wake of periods of rapid growth, and when a charismatic leader becomes unwilling or unable to lead. After periods of intense growth, these innately anti-bureaucratic organizations will struggle to implement the procedural and systematic requirements necessary to manage increasingly large and complex tasks. Internal tension will emerge between those who believe that a certain degree of order and structure is compulsory once an organization reaches a certain size and scope, and those who believe that upholding the MCO cultural values of innovation, speed, and flexibility should be prioritized at the expense
of implementing what they view as cumbersome and restrictive systems. When a charismatic leader decides to leave the organization, the poorly developed second-line leadership and institutional dependency on this particular persona will be exacerbated, making it difficult for MCOs to smoothly manage their affairs. Under these specific conditions, MCOs may become so plagued by their internal pathologies that they may experience internal crisis and risk ultimate failure.

For EPOs, we might expect to find the events intensifying internal pathologies to be exogenous in nature. Given their cultures and approaches to conducting their affairs, EPOs will have difficulty cooperating with others and providing rapid, decisive responses to exogenous stimuli requiring immediate attention. These INGOs are inherently individualistic, pragmatic, partnership-averse institutions, but they may be compelled to engage in a cooperative arrangement when a private supporter or institutional stakeholder on which they feel sufficiently dependent requests or demands it. Under these conditions, their lack of concern for transparency and accountability may damage the relationship with the partner, which can have negative ramifications in terms of the EPO’s reputation. If they are isolated from the practitioner community and fail to earn support from their peers and potential donors, EPOs will struggle to achieve their goals. Furthermore, when they are required to respond rapidly to an exogenous shock, EPOs’ commitment to vehement debate and producing the best answers to the questions at hand will impede their ability to act. While other
INGOs treat these moments of urgency as opportunities, EPOs may stagnate and lose ground to their competitors.

Finally, GPOs may experience ineffectiveness when they are forced to make a major internal decision to restructure or reallocate funding, or when there is a shock to the international funding climate or institutional landscape. In Chapter 5, I illustrate why we might expect to find GPOs suffering from heightened internal politicization, fragmentation, and discord among their sub-units in the run-up to, and in the immediate aftermath of, a major internal turning point decision. When resources are scarce, or GPO leaders are otherwise compelled to rethink the ways in which funding and resources are distributed across the institution, the chapters or branches may feel that their control over their own resources is being threatened. Retrenching into a defensive, self-protective stance, each sub-unit will guard its own “turf” and pursue its own interests, even though doing so may undermine the broader organizational mission. Furthermore, given their nature as slow-moving, deliberate organizations that prefer working within a relatively confined comfort zone to taking risks, GPOs are likely to have difficulty adapting to changing external demands. If the funding environment changes, and a GPO must adapt its mission to fit the new criteria, a GPO’s innate resistance to change will be intensified, prohibiting the organization from making the necessary adjustments. Similarly, if a new INGO emerges, threatening to accomplish the same goals in a
more efficient or effective way, then GPOs will struggle to adapt their ideas, methods, and programs to outperform their new competition.

Having provided the conceptual foundation for making these claims in Chapter 5, I turn to the examples drawn from the real world in Chapter 6, ascertaining the degree to which actual INGO behavior reflects these expectations. This analysis confirms the basic hypotheses from Chapter 5, illustrating through example, and using the practitioners’ own words to the extent possible, how the conditions described above can lead to an intensification of certain pathologies within INGOs, potentially damaging their overall effectiveness. When taken together, Chapters 5 and 6 reinforce the explanatory power of the Authority Sources Framework by illustrating the ways in which an organization’s typological affiliation (i.e., whether it is an MCO, an EPO, or a GPO) can play a significant role in determining how it will respond to various kinds of environmental and internal stimuli.

Chapter 6 concludes with a brief discussion of the broader implications of these findings for the INGO landscape. By then end of this chapter, it becomes clear why, for instance, MCOs are the most likely to experience periods of rapid and dramatic growth, but they may also be the most likely to suffer from potentially catastrophic failure; why EPOs will be far more likely to persist over time, growing and progressing in incremental, gradual steps while maintaining a low profile; and why GPOs are the most likely to become sturdy, reliable
in institutional partners for states and IGOs, but are also at risk of suffering from gradual declines into obscurity and irrelevance.

The arguments from the preceding chapters may be summarized by the following images, which illustrate the relationships between authority claims, organizational systemic features, dysfunctional tendencies, and behavioral outcomes. Figure 7.1 encapsulates the logical flow of the conceptually driven argument underpinning the dissertation, while Figure 7.2 applies the logic to the three ideal types, integrating into one image the central lessons learned about MCOs, EPOs, and GPOs in Parts I, II, and III. My intentions have been to better understand the associations and interactions among various phenomena pertaining to the third sector, rather than to predict directly causal relationships between variables $x$ and $y$. Nevertheless, I have used arrows in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 to illustrate the hypotheses presented about the relationships where appropriate. As has been discussed at length throughout this work, there may be strong reinforcing mechanisms among these factors; as such, these images necessarily represent visually compelling oversimplifications of the more complex relationships described in the previous sections.
Figure 7.1 – Basic Structure of the Preceding Arguments
Figure 7.2 – Relationships Among Key Factors in the Three Ideal Type INGOs
II. THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In this work, I have created a framework for understanding the ways in which INGOs generate their authority and behave as international actors. The analysis that stems from this framework illuminates the core features of the three dominant organizational models in the typology, using rich empirical data to illustrate the conceptual insights. Furthermore, I have used the models to tackle a number of interesting questions related to INGO institutional behavior and performance outcomes. While this project has not conclusively answered all of the questions it has raised, it constitutes a significant contribution to scholarship on IOs and institutional design, as well as to the practice of international organizational management and strategy.

A. IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

(1) My work applies the central tenets of sociological institutionalism to the study of IOs in a conceptually systematic and empirically rich way. It clearly shows that institutions shape their members and processes by defining a set of shared norms and values that determine the range of appropriate behavior. Furthermore, the ASF illustrates in concrete and compelling ways how actors are bounded by their own rational limitations and cultural contexts. Efficiency concerns may be important, but my research clearly shows that these are not the only factors determining how actors behave. In fact, the very persistence of such inefficient processes (or dysfunctional tendencies) within INGOs illustrates that
actors are blinded to the wide range of possibilities for action that a synoptically rational actor might consider. Although insights from other institutionalist schools of thought make occasional appearances throughout the dissertation, my work demonstrates the validity of the foundational claims of sociological institutionalism within the INGO context. By extending the logic to a new realm of international actors, my work gives this perspective even more empirical and theoretical credibility.

(2) My research refines the IR discourse on the ways in which internal cultural forces can shape institutional dynamics in IOs. Relying on literatures from a variety of social science disciplines, my work identifies endogenous normative and ideational factors as important determinants of INGO behavioral outcomes. Principal-agent problems, bureaucratic politics, and resource constraints may compromise organizational effectiveness, but as my analysis has illustrated, these problems do not tell the whole story about dysfunction in IOs. In order to truly understand how organizations become inefficient, and why these inefficient arrangements persist over time in spite of the problems they create for organizations, we must understand the internal cultural fabrics and value systems defining organizational identity and constraining members’ actions.

(3) My work speaks directly to Barnett and Finnemore’s influential work on IOs, arguing that although the basic sociological institutionalist logic of their argument is powerful and transferable, their work has significant holes that
needed to be addressed. Although their adaptation of sociological principles to the world of international relations constituted an important step in the right direction for the IR discipline, Barnett and Finnemore’s argument about the bureaucratic culture of IOs was not sufficiently comprehensive because it failed to account for the diverse ways in which an international organization can become legitimate. Although my work builds from their foundation, it takes the important step of expanding the range of ways in which an IO can become powerful and, thus, exert an influence over other actors’ preferences and actions.

(4) My work takes the IO literature into largely uncharted territory, tackling the behavior of a category of international actors that has been largely ignored by other scholars in this sub-field. In the preceding chapters, I provide a framework that encapsulates the core ways in which INGOs become authoritative, elaborate on the ways in which these authority sources create distinct institutional ideal type models, explain the relationships between these models and specific types of dysfunctional behavior that emerge (and persist) within organizations, and discuss the ways in which these features lead to different attitudes toward and reactions to changing endogenous and exogenous circumstances. As a comprehensive (if preliminary) treatment of INGO power and performance, my work substantially broadens the IO institutional design literature. Based on the foundation provided in these chapters, scholars can begin to build a more complete typology of INGOs, and debates about the
origins and outcomes of IO institutional behavior can be more informed and, thus, more fruitful.

(5) In a similar vein, my research contributes to the Constructivist research agenda in IR by rigorously examining a previously underexplored category of international actors from the inside, exposing through qualitative empirical analysis the inner-workings of an expansive and powerful group of IOs. In this project, I break open the “black box” that has been the global social sector, investigating the endogenously formed identities and interests of actors in this group, as well as the sources of their ability to influence the conduct of international affairs. Although this project has been primarily theoretical in its design and ambitions, one of its most significant contributions to the literature on IOs is empirical in nature. While many scholars have discussed the role of INGOs in an abstract sense, few have actually ventured within the walls of these organizations to understand how they operate from the inside. With the exception of a few works that discuss one specific organization or institutional arrangement,\textsuperscript{310} IR scholars have done relatively little empirical work to understand the inner-workings of INGOs. As part of this project, I have accumulated hundreds of hours of rich interview data, and compiled case study overviews of ten of the most influential INGOs in the world. This empirical contribution represents a significant step in the right direction for a discipline

\textsuperscript{310} See the Introduction for a brief discussion of these works. Perhaps the clearest example of this kind of focused analysis is Hopgood’s (2006) work on the history and culture of Amnesty International.
that has been basically silent on the issues of identity, strategy, operations, and culture in INGOs.

**B) IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS:**

In addition to the contributions to IR scholarship outlined above, my work has four important implications for practitioners of international affairs. Although my intended audience is social scientists trying to study the ways in which institutions operate at a global scale, it is important to briefly acknowledge the ways in which my work could influence those who practice international relations as well.

(1) My work could potentially impact how INGO practitioners formulate their organizational strategies. I have argued that organizations exhibiting certain features will be likely to express specific types of inefficient behavioral tendencies as a result, but as Part III of this work illustrates, some of these dysfunctional tendencies can be kept at a manageable level while others may be intensified under certain conditions. The theoretical and empirical findings from this part of the work may inform the kinds of strategies INGO leaders pursue in order to manage the delicate balance between their organizations’ identities and the performance outcomes they can expect to achieve. In combination with necessary future research efforts, this project offers insights that can guide INGO managers and employees in their efforts to maximize efficiency and effectiveness.
while maintaining the organizational culture that lends them their power in the first place.

(2) My project may have practical implications for practitioners representing institutions seeking to enter into institutional or financial arrangements with INGOs (e.g., state government agents, IGO liaisons, and foundation representatives). Because it analyses INGOs by considering their internal characteristics, it succeeds in making an otherwise largely opaque and inaccessible landscape of diverse organizations more understandable for external observers, which makes my work useful for a variety of practitioners of international affairs who could benefit from understanding the norms and values driving their potential partners, as well as the behavioral outcomes they can expect from different types of INGOs. If these non-INGO practitioners can properly comprehend the relationships between organizational characteristics and behavioral outcomes described throughout this work, then they may be able to construct arrangements with these organizations that will maximize both partners’ strengths and minimize potential challenges.

(3) My research provides a foundation for developing a different perspective on the desirability of certain types of organizational behaviors. Like other sociological institutionalists, I argue that particular kinds of inefficiencies are persistent over time within organizations, and some of them are entirely unavoidable. But the argument presented here takes this line of thinking one step further: because certain inefficiencies are directly linked to specific sources of
authority, then to reduce the effects of one may mean undermining the other. As such, the ultimate goal for INGO managers may not be as simple and straightforward as reducing inefficiency as much as possible. With every attempt to eliminate dysfunctional behavior, an INGO may risk compromising the very organizational identity on which its credibility is dependent. Without a sufficient degree of legitimacy, INGOs can accomplish very little (if anything at all), so exhibiting some of the inefficiencies associated with their authority claims may simply be the price these organizations must pay to survive and achieve their goals.

(4) My findings may have implications for practitioners and researchers working across diverse industries, beyond the global social sector. While the preceding analysis has been specifically designed to explain the behavior of international non-governmental groups, the logic of the central argument may hold across organizations of various types. An organization’s authority claims lead to the formation of an identity, which will be reflected in its organizational systems, which are associated with innate dysfunctional tendencies, and these features will make an organization vulnerable to certain types of performance “traps” and predispose it to responding to endogenous and exogenous stimuli in particular ways. Although much more work is needed to build a conclusive typology of organizations more generally, I believe that the central argument about the relationships described in Figure 7.1 would hold true across organizations of all types.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Although this project’s contributions are significant, I have maintained a relatively circumscribed scope throughout the preceding chapters. This dissertation has constituted a preliminary attempt at developing a typology of INGOs based on how they derive their authority and how they ultimately behave. Thus, while it has broken important conceptual and empirical ground in the ways described above, this first contribution to scholarship in this burgeoning area is limited in two important ways.

First, this initial set of INGO cases has led to a remarkably uncomplicated analysis insofar as each of the ten cases fits squarely within one of the core ideal types: it is either an MCO, an EPO, or a GPO. As such, this first sample of INGOs merely “proves the rule” of the typology; it does not facilitate analysis of when and under what conditions the typology becomes complicated by organizations that resemble multiple (or none of the) ideal types. In other words, the empirical world must be more complex than these ten cases suggest it is. Based on my analysis of the INGO landscape beyond my ten cases, I believe that there are organizations that resemble two or even three of the types simultaneously. While upon first glance, the presence of what one might call “Mixed-Type INGOs” may seem to defy the logic of the ASF, I would argue the opposite: these cases may, in fact, justify the explanatory power of the framework. The fact that none of my case organizations was “mixed” in this sense means that I can only provide
educated hypotheses in this area; however, it seems to be the case that when an INGO exhibits the features of multiple ideal types at once, this can lead to internal tension and politicization around the organization’s identity and vision. For example, informal consultations with experts in this area have led me to believe that Amnesty International currently has elements of each of the three ideal types operating within its halls, and, perhaps counter-intuitively, this mixed identity has not strengthened the organization internally. Rather, it has led to internal confusion, resentment, and fighting over the group’s identity that must be resolved if this organization is to continue pursuing its goals effectively. The scope of my project has been limited to the ten cases that I investigated here, and therefore, I cannot conclusively speak to the effects of mixing types within an organization in this work. However, the typology provided in the preceding chapters gives us the language and the analytic tools needed to have informed conversations about identity politics within INGOs in a way that was previously impossible. In future research endeavors, the inclusion of particular case INGOs that appear to have elements of multiple types operating simultaneously within their walls (e.g., Amnesty, Médecins Sans Frontières, or Save the Children) could facilitate valuable discussions about why, how, and under what conditions multiple types emerge within one INGO, and, perhaps more importantly, what the effects of this mixing are on organizational behavior and performance.

A second scope limitation relates to change over time, and, more specifically, to this preliminary project’s inability to sufficiently address whether
and in what ways INGOs transform from one type to another over the course of their life cycles. Again, the ten case organizations studied here point to the durability or “stickiness” of institutional identity. The IRC, for example, has always been an MCO, despite nearly a century of growth, professionalization, and increasing complexity in programs and management around the world. However, beyond my ten cases, there are most likely INGOs that have evolved over time, transforming from one type to another. My survey of the INGO landscape suggests that these groups can only move in one direction along the diagonal: from an MCO to an EPO and perhaps on to a GPO. The explanation for this trajectory is rather straightforward. If an MCO survives the loss of an entrepreneurial, charismatic leader, its second-line leaders my feel it is necessary to “reinvent” the organization’s identity or “re-brand” its image. These leaders will most likely turn to industry knowledge and proven expertise in an area to salvage the organization’s legitimacy post-charismatic leadership. If the supporters of the “old-guard” (or the MCO culture) within the organization do not push back against the institutional change, then the systems and dysfunctional tendencies will also transform to reflect the new identity of the organization. Similarly, as an INGO grows beyond a certain reach in terms of geographic and issue-area decentralization, it may have to transform its identity to reflect a highly localized approach to doing business, in which a confederated and “bottom-up” approach best reflects the organization’s global interests and involvements. Having conducted this preliminary research, my informed
hypothesis is that an INGO’s identity will remain relatively stable during periods of institutional equilibrium, but if a crisis or significant punctuation of that equilibrium forces the INGO’s leaders to consider re-branding the institution as a means of maintaining or regaining legitimacy, then the INGO’s typological affiliation may change. Again, the issue of change over time has been largely beyond the scope of this project, but it is worthy of rigorous investigation in the future.

Despite the necessarily circumscribed nature of this dissertation, the work that has been conducted here has important implications for the study and practice of international relations, and for our ability to describe and explain the behavior of international non-governmental organizations. In addition to the lessons highlighted in the sections above, this work may shed light on a number of interesting questions about the past, present, and future of the so-called “global third sector.” These issues deserve far more theoretical and empirical attention in future research endeavors, but in the meantime, I can offer preliminary conjectures based on the knowledge that I have accumulated while completing this dissertation.

At present, the distribution of INGOs across the ecosystem seems to satisfy the existing market needs, and thus, it is not likely to change drastically in the near-term future. Although it is well beyond the scope of this project to precisely measure the number of MCOs, EPOs, and GPOs in operation around the world, my data suggests that organizations in the global social sector are
distributed according to the following basic arrangements. A handful of focal GPOs dominate the sector in terms of material resources and perceived legitimacy among populations. INGOs like Oxfam, Mercy Corps, Greenpeace, and CARE are household names, their budgets are enormous, and they are consistent recipients of massive government and IGO grants. A slightly more numerous but far less popularly recognized group of EPOs operates “behind the scenes” in coordination with states and IGOs on specialized projects related to their areas of expertise. A variety of smaller EPOs go largely unnoticed by the public, but there is hardly a country in the world that does not benefit from their technical expertise and specialized consultations. MCOs constitute the most prolific category of INGOs. All a charismatic leader with a cause needs to create an organization is one supporter who believes in the idea, the approach, or the leader herself. In other words, the barriers to entry are quite low for this group. While MCOs may have an enormous impact on populations in need, they will perhaps never reach the global focal status of their GPO peers because of their innate volatility and unpredictability.

The existing institutional arrangements satisfy the demand for three distinct types of responses to global problems: a stable, comprehensive, but perhaps less-than-innovative approach (the GPO model); a technocratic, expert-driven approach that favors corridors over megaphones (the EPO model); and a

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311 Greenpeace International and CARE International were not among my case study organizations, and in the absence of sufficient empirical data, I cannot make any definitive claims about their organizational cultures or systems; however, from interviews with partners and knowledgeable practitioners, I can comfortably assume that these groups resemble the GPO ideal type model.
transformative, ideologically-driven approach that may be unpredictable but “moves the needle” in terms of transformative ideas and solutions (the MCO model). In the absence of a major shock to the global institutional ecosystem, this distribution of INGO types will likely stay the same (or roughly similar) throughout the coming decades. The only potentially disruptive influence in the near future may be the rise of a technology-driven, people-powered INGO model. These new INGOs have adopted an approach that is unique insofar as it relies heavily on leveraging the power of social media and other forms of Internet-based communications to instantaneously mobilize millions of members into action. A few such groups have emerged in recent years. For example, Avaaz was established in 2007 in order to provide a “global web movement to bring people-powered politics to decision-makers everywhere,” and it already boasts nearly 25 million members who can be “mobilized at the click of a button.” While the efforts of Avaaz and similar Internet-based activism INGOs are impressive, it will be difficult for these groups to sustain their credibility and impact over time because they are dependent on the whims and wishes of a very volatile and diverse global public. 

Avaaz Website, 2013: Homepage; About Us. Avaaz boasts on its website that it “played a crucial role in making [the Palestinian statehood vote] happen. Nearly 1.8 million of us signed the petition calling for statehood, many then donated to fund polls showing that 79% of people backed statehood in key European states.” It claims that “over 2 million Avaaz members pressured Brazil’s President Dilma to reject the [forestry] bill and save the Amazon.” It also reports having “organized a 1 hour meeting with top White House officials to deliver the petition [signed by 3 million Avaaz members, against US government web censorship],” which they call “a huge win for internet freedom and for people power!” (2013: Highlights)

Not only may their millions of members be fickle, but they are asked to do very little in order to maintain their membership. Becoming a member is free and takes 30 seconds, and ignoring an email
seems unlikely that these Internet-based groups will undermine or replace the more institutionalized (and perhaps more legitimate) MCOs, EPOs and GPOs, but this is a subject that ought to be thoroughly addressed by a future research endeavor.

While the existing INGO arrangements may be sufficient at present, in future decades, the third sector will most likely become more diverse in order to accommodate increasingly complex global governance challenges. Because INGOs coexist within the context of fierce competition with one another and with other types of IOs, they must differentiate themselves on the basis of both the content of their work and their approach to completing it. While there is a degree of institutional isomorphism insofar as INGOs cluster around one of the three ideal type categories (MCO, EPO, GPO), the act of self-definition can, in fact, constitute an act of differentiation from the existing institutions working in a given sub-field. For example, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (or the Environmental Defense Fund and Greenpeace International, and so forth) may occupy the same niche in terms their mission and goals, and yet, they claim to be dramatically different organizations from one another and, indeed, experience relatively more or less success with different donors and partners as a result. In the face of stringent legitimacy requirements and mounting competition, INGOs will have to work harder to diversify themselves within a

takes even less time than that. Many individuals and institutions have questioned whether this kind of activism even constitutes social mobilization because it requires so little attention and effort on the part of the members.
sector that is becoming densely packed with institutions requiring material and ideational support to survive.

Moreover, based on the research conducted for this project, it may also be safe to conclude that the increasing centrality of INGOs to global politics will perpetuate the diversification of actors operating within the global social sector. Whereas in the past, more conventional international institutions (i.e., states and IGOs) may have seen INGOs as peripheral to the management of global issues, perhaps even operating outside the space of “legitimate” international relations, these non-state actors are now widely considered to be mainstream by practitioners across the public, private, and social sectors. Today, INGOs are becoming fully integrated into the global ecosystem of international actors, which has given them an opportunity to wield more substantial resources to impact an increasingly broad range of issues affecting populations around the world. Simultaneously, as private citizens have become disillusioned by the state-driven institutional arrangements that have failed to solve the global issues about which they are concerned, these individuals are increasingly calling upon INGOs to help represent their needs and interests. The evidence I gathered from hundreds of practitioners and partners strongly suggests that INGOs will only continue to grow in size, strength, and influence over time. Until now, INGOs have been somewhat constrained in terms of how they are supposed to behave, and, as such, the range of possible authority sources available to them has been relatively limited (W1-W3 and H1-H3). With more credibility and legitimacy as
international actors, INGOs will be able to generate authority in ways that are currently not included in the ASF. When they do not have to follow a specific set of interpretive scripts in order to be taken seriously, INGOs will diversify in order to meet the challenges associated with increasingly complex global governance demands.

While these concluding thoughts are informed by hundreds of conversations with INGO practitioners and partners, they are not intended to stand alone as arguments. Much more theoretical and empirical work must be done before we can prove that, at present, INGOs are distributed across the landscape in the ways described above, or that in the future, they will become more diversified and more influential. My research has been exclusively focused on understanding the current state of affairs among INGOs, and it has been largely focused on issues related to internal operational and strategic choices, rather than overall impact or achievements. These issues extend far beyond the scope of my research design, but they should be the focus of future research projects in IR. Nevertheless, despite this dissertation’s somewhat limited scope, after hundreds of interviews and an in-depth analysis of ten case organizations, I can confidently assert that the general patterns related to the INGO landscape described here most likely do (and will) reflect empirical reality.

It is worth reiterating that while I have argued that all INGOs are dysfunctional in particular ways, these organizations may not be any more or less inefficient than their public or private sector counterparts. In analyzing the
power and performance of INGOs, it is important to avoid committing the
“nirvana fallacy,” or the logical error of comparing actual events and practices
with unrealistic or overly idealized alternatives. It would be fallacious to
compare the actual behavior of these organizations against a standard of optimal
organizational efficiency. Perfect efficiency is perhaps implausible within an
organization of any kind, and in the INGO context specifically, the centrality of
particular norms and cultures to institutional design features means that optimal
efficiency may not even be desirable. Managers in INGOs must choose among
“alternative real institutional arrangements,” and balance the need to maintain
their legitimacy with their efficiency goals. The decisions they must make are not
straightforward in terms of how they will impact organizational outcomes,
especially when there is such a strong link between an organization’s
dysfunctional tendencies and its perceived authority.

Although their actions may not always lead to rationally optimal
outcomes, INGOs do have an enormous impact on the world around them. From
raising and distributing billions of dollars, to deploying hundreds of thousands
of volunteers and staff members to field locations around the globe, to putting
pressure on state and regional governing bodies and other international actors,
these groups unquestionably influence international affairs. I do not mean to
suggest that INGOs are uniformly benevolent actors; corruption,

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314 Demsetz, 1969.
mismanagement, and poor intentions occasionally feature in the INGO landscape, just as they do in any other sector. Nor do I wish to supplant the relative disregard of INGOs in institutional design analyses with the idea that these organizations are ubiquitous—or even dominant—in the landscape of international actors. These groups may remain secondary to states and IGOs in terms of their ability to influence the conduct of international affairs. However, my preliminary research has revealed that, in a general sense, INGOs do possess substantial power and are using it around the world for the benefit of populations in need. And because these organizations matter to international relations, they should matter to International Relations scholars.

Having constructed a typology of INGOs on the basis of how they become authoritative international actors, we are now able to understand the internal cultural dynamics within these organizations, which, in turn, enables us to better predict how certain types of INGOs will respond to different endogenous and exogenous circumstances. The behavioral outcomes of INGOs (and perhaps organizations of all types, though this is another subject that must be addressed in a future research endeavor) are influenced in important ways by organizational symbols, routines, cultures and systems of meaning. As INGOs become increasingly relevant international actors, appreciating these internal dynamics constitutes an important step towards fully understanding the role of these groups in shaping the conduct of international affairs.
APPENDIX A:

LIST OF FREQUENTLY USED ACRONYMS

GENERAL TERMINOLOGY:
- IR: International Relations
- INGO: International Non-Governmental Organization
- IGO: Inter-Governmental Organization
- IO: International Organization

THE THREE IDEAL TYPES:
- MCO: Moral Charismatic Organization
- EPO: Expert Pragmatist Organization
- GPO: Grassroots Pragmatist Organization

CASE STUDY ORGANIZATIONS:
- EDF: The Environmental Defense Fund
- HRW: Human Rights Watch
- ICTJ: The International Center for Transitional Justice
- IRC: The International Rescue Committee
- KI: Kiwanis International
- MC: Mercy Corps
- PIH: Partners In Health
- SOP: Seeds of Peace
- TCC: The Carter Center
- OI: Oxfam International
APPENDIX B:

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

(NAMES AND TITLES REMOVED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY)

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND (16 interviewees)

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (20 interviewees)

INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (18 interviewees)

THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (18 interviewees)

KIWANIS INTERNATIONAL (21 interviewees)

MERCY CORPS (10 interviewees)

OXFAM (6 interviewees)

PARTNERS IN HEALTH (20 interviewees)

SEEDS OF PEACE (8 interviewees)

THE CARTER CENTER (20 interviewees)

NON-CASE IOs AND INgos:
+ Save the Children (1 interviewee)
+ Clinton Health Access Initiative (5 interviewees)
+ US Fund for UNICEF (3 interviewees)
+ ORBIS International (3 interviewees)
+ Avaaz (2 interviewees)
+ USAID (1 interviewee)
+ Innovations for Poverty Action (1 interviewee)
+ Kennedy Foundation (1 interviewee)
+ AIDS Project L.A. (1 interviewee)
+ The Documentary Group (3 interviewees)
+ The Salt Institute (2 interviewees)
+ World Vision (1 interviewee)
+ MedicMobile (1 interviewee)
+ Change.org (1 interviewee)
+ FACE AIDS (2 interviewees)
+ Results for Development (1 interviewee)
+ 350.org (1 interviewee)
+ Keep a Child Alive (1 interviewee)
+ US Congressional Liaison for NGOs (1 interviewee)
+ Documentary Film Maker, INGOs
+ Amnesty International (2 interviewees)
+ Consultant and Project Advisor for governments, IGOs, and local and international NGOs in Pakistan (1 interviewee)
+ Center for Global Development (2 interviewees)
+ Human Rights First (1 interviewee)
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DEDICATION

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On a more personal note, thank you to my fiancé, Spencer Witte, for putting up with my incessant brainstorming, writing, and editing sessions over the past few years, and for supporting me through every step of this at-times arduous journey. Finally, if it weren't for my parents, I would never have had the opportunity to pursue higher education in the first place, and I would not have been able to formulate insights about the global third sector, which I hope to use as a launching point for my career. Thank you, so much.