Perceptions of War, Savagery and Civilisation in Britain, 1801-1899

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Short Abstract

This dissertation traces the complex ways in which non-European military cultures – often designated as 'savage' – and the expeditions undertaken against them – regularly conceptualised as 'savage warfare' – were understood in the Victorian imagination. It addresses how these understandings shifted across time in relation to developments such as imperial expansion; cultural and intellectual shifts including the rise of evolutionary theory; and the practical issues that emerged in response to the undertaking of wars where such opponents were met on the field of battle. It is distinctive in working at the intersection of nineteenth-century intellectual, cultural, imperial and military history, and utilises a wide range of sources. The nineteenth century was a unique period during which this eclectic and differentiated debate – which both explored and contributed to the construction of ideas on 'savagery' – arose due to the proliferation of cross-cultural knowledge and the development of periodical culture. As members of the armed forces were on the front-line of cross-cultural interactions, the military context shines a light on the richness of this discourse and helps to frame a complex debate about the boundaries between 'civilisation' and 'savagery'. While understandings of 'savagery' that embodied assumptions of ruthlessness, bloodthirstiness, and a lack of moral understanding can be traced in British perceptions of 'savage' warriors during this period, this dissertation argues that the designation of a warrior culture as 'savage' was not uncontested, nor did it preclude the admission of 'civilised' characteristics, or criticisms with regard to British conduct in 'savage' wars. By uncovering the competing discourses on how 'savage' warriors were perceived during this period, this dissertation reinforces critiques of the 'cultural determinist' notion that military cultures are fixed; emphasises the lack of coherence with regard to British perceptions of 'savage' warriors, thus contributing to scholarship that has

identified the inconsistent nature of 'orientalism'; and challenges conventional periodisation of the development of colonial racism and anti-humanitarianism during the nineteenth century.

Long Abstract

This dissertation examines the complex manner in which British perceptions of non-European warrior cultures – referred to in contemporary discourse as 'savage' – were influenced by (and in turn influenced) the intellectual, cultural, imperial and military contexts of the nineteenth century. It explores how knowledge of 'savage' warrior cultures came to be encountered – both textually and visually; how characterisations of warrior cultures changed when the British armed forces met such opponents on the field of battle; the influence of theories such as cultural evolution on depictions of 'savage' warriors; how the practicalities of 'savage warfare' were discussed; and the extent to which such wars inspired public debate on the issue of military ethics. Through an exploration of these various themes, this dissertation reinforces critiques of the theory of 'cultural determinism' by demonstrating that perceived 'civilised'/'savage' distinctions were regularly undermined; emphasises the ambivalent nature of 'orientalism' by showing that a singular and coherent characterisation of 'savage' warriors cannot be traced; and demonstrates the complexity of chronology with regard to the development of colonial racism and anti-humanitarian discourse throughout the nineteenth century.

During the Victorian period the vocabulary used to define non-European cultures often established binaries between the British 'civilised' metropole and the non-European 'uncivilised' imperial subject. Within the field of military history, the existence of such discourse has been noted in passing in relation to the work of the military theorist Colonel Charles Edward Callwell, particularly his *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (1896), a detailed manual in which Callwell surveyed numerous nineteenth-century colonial conflicts and outlined general principles by which the British could maximise their advantages against what he often identified as 'savage' or 'uncivilised' foes. In this work, Callwell

authoritatively argued for a distinction between 'savage' and 'civilised' warfare. Due to his contemporary influence and gradual canonisation by military strategists who have claimed *Small Wars* to be applicable to counter-insurgency operations undertaken by Britain and the United States since the end of the Second World War, his ideas have often incorrectly been understood as exemplifying earlier nineteenth-century views on colonial warfare. While Callwell's *Small Wars* did reflect the dominant discourse of the 'savage' warrior in the very late nineteenth century, sustained academic attention paid to this work has overshadowed the ways in which the language of 'savagery' and 'civilisation' was used in relation to imperial military conflicts prior to this work, and in particular, in descriptions of the non-European military enemy; two areas which have not yet been adequately addressed in academic literature. Military practitioners, government and colonial officials, and public commentators often invoked the notions of 'civilised' and 'savage warfare' when discussing imperial conflicts in this period; this dissertation interrogates the distinction. Despite the existence of an understanding that 'savage', 'uncivilised' warfare was in some ways distinct from 'civilised' warfare, and that 'Western' ethics and norms of war might not apply to such wars, there was in fact a wider critical engagement by figures who questioned and problematised both the desirability and the practical applicability of such a differentiation.

The nineteenth century presents a unique context during which British imperialism accelerated and interactions between members of the armed forces and non-European cultures intensified; periodical culture proliferated, providing a highly accessible avenue through which to disseminate theories on human difference (especially regarding the military characteristics of non-Europeans); and societies and establishments were created – both in London and abroad – promoting the collection and display of artefacts and curiosities acquired by figures who traversed the Empire. To emphasise the complex chronology of critical perceptions of the 'savage' warrior, this dissertation begins in 1801 with the publication of one of the earliest narratives of non-European warrior cultures

published in Britain in the nineteenth century – John Barrow's *An Account of Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa in the Years 1797 and 1798*. In order to highlight that there was a long period of significantly variegated perceptions of the 'savage' warrior – exhibiting differing degrees of humanitarianism and racism in particular colonial contexts – which also gave way to an ascendancy of critical views in the period between the mid-1880s and the late-1890s, this dissertation concludes in 1899, the year of the first international Hague Peace Conference. It was on this occasion that British military representatives publicly and forcefully advocated for the official recognition of a distinction between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare' by arguing for the exclusion of those considered to be 'savages' from the limitations on technological advancements that conference delegates wished to be imposed upon future warfare.

This dissertation is divided thematically into five chapters. The first chapter – *The 'Savage' on Display: Representations of African Warriors of the Cape* – illuminates the manner in which characterisations of three South African warrior cultures – the San, Khoi and Xhosa – developed from the early nineteenth century to the late 1840s. Through an examination of the works of the colonial administrator John Barrow and the amateur anthropologist Richard Barnard Fisher, together with the discourse of colonial officials in London and accounts in contemporary periodicals, this chapter demonstrates that despite regular military conflicts with the British sympathetic portrayals can be evidenced until the mid-to-late 1830s. From the mid-1840s, it is clear that a turning point occurred: the physical display of the San in particular facilitated the dissemination of an existing polygenecist discourse that not only challenged their humanity but also influenced a re-interpretation of their military characteristics, reinforcing understandings of 'savagery' that were of a contemptuous nature. Such discourse also influenced a re-appraisal of the Xhosa, who, by the Seventh Frontier War (1846-7) were visually and textually represented as bloodthirsty cannibals, fortifying a distinction between the 'civilised' and the 'savage' warrior. This

chapter contributes to scholarship that has challenged orthodox periodisation of the development of anti-humanitarianism and colonial racism in Britain by emphasising that in the context of the Cape such disillusionment emerged earlier in the century in response to continued indigenous resistance (both military and spiritual) against the British.

The second chapter – *The 'Savage' on the Imperial Frontier* – begins by focusing on the Baluchi warriors of Sind. In contrast to the preceding chapter, this section demonstrates that when the British began to engage on the battlefield a different warrior culture perceived to be 'savage', and particularly when they suffered defeat, the notion of the 'savage' became more open to associations such as courage, military expertise and bravery. The accounts considered here (written by military practitioners and colonial administrators including Captain Thomas Postans, Sir Henry Pottinger, Captain Lewis Brown, Edward Backhouse Eastwick and General John Jacob) reveal that with regard to themes such as the interrelationship between religion and conflict and the treatment of prisoners of war, distinctions between the 'civilised' and the 'savage' warrior were either reinforced or undermined. Furthermore, this section shows that artistic representations of colonial warfare, and the commentaries they raised, could also variously challenge or support the applicability of such distinctions.

The second part of this chapter presents a close examination of General John Jacob's frontier policy in Upper Sind during the period in which he was Political Superintendent and Commandant (1847-58), and demonstrates that military practitioners were willing to criticise the perspective that fighting 'savage' opponents predestined a disregard for the 'rules of civilised warfare'. In order to elucidate the reasons as to why Jacob's policy differed from the approach of other colonial administrators (such as his predecessor Sir Charles Napier, a figure who reinforced the notion that 'savages' only responded to forceful and retributive punishments), this section analyses his wider intellectual interests,

and argues that his ideas on evolution and moral understanding in particular informed his notion that the British should utilise 'moral power' in frontier and colonial conflicts, rather than brute force.

By the mid-to-late nineteenth century, understandings of the 'savage' became more influenced by intellectual currents emphasising racial difference. In order to demonstrate this shift, the third chapter – *A Hierarchy of Races: Pitt Rivers and The Theorisation of 'Savage' Military Arts* – analyses the intellectual development of the anthropologist and archaeologist General Augustus Lane Fox Pitt Rivers. Pitt Rivers was a key figure during this period, whose ideas exemplified the change from viewing non-European means of warfare primarily as a form of 'spectacle' accompanying live exhibitions of 'savage' warriors, to explicitly associating them with racial understandings of human development, and suggesting a connection between the form and material of such objects with certain stages of cultural progress. His theories contributed to the fortification of distinctions between 'savagery' and 'civilisation'. This chapter clarifies how his writings were influenced by contemporary racial and evolutionary concepts, as well as theories of progress encapsulated by the institution of exhibitions, such as the International Exhibition held in London in 1862.

The fourth chapter – *Doctrine and Public Opinion on 'Savage Warfare'* – argues that while Callwell's *Small Wars* presented the first systematic analysis of 'savage warfare' which subsequently had an impact on official British military doctrine, discussions and debates on the nature of such warfare can be found in British military thought as early as the late 1840s. The first section of this chapter begins with a close analysis of the case study of the explorer Sir Samuel White Baker, who undertook a number of military campaigns in Equatorial Africa to suppress the slave trade, and was one of the first figures publicly to discuss what he understood to be the practicalities of 'savage warfare'. Through a

comparison of the work of Baker and two of his contemporaries – Colonel Callwell and Colonel John Cox Gawler – this section shows that experiences in fighting such wars raised similar themes and practical difficulties. Nevertheless, and despite earnest attempts to publicise the nature of 'savage warfare', it is notable that the British military establishment did not attempt to publish an official doctrine on irregular warfare until the aftermath of the publication of Callwell's *Small Wars* – the 1909 *Field Service Regulations*. This section concludes with an analysis of the factors that contributed to this limited official codification of the rules of 'savage warfare' in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.

The second part of this chapter returns to the case study of Baker's experiences in 'savage warfare' and examines the reception of his work in order to highlight the tensions recognised by Victorian commentators regarding the attainment of the 'civilising process' through 'uncivilised' means. The reviews of Baker's work *Ismailia: A Narrative of the Expedition to Central Africa for the Suppression of the Slave Trade* (first published in 1874) in periodicals such as *The Examiner*, *The Academy* and *The Times* demonstrate that despite the prevalence of the rhetoric of the 'un-improvable savage', contemporary commentators did reflect upon the military ethics of colonial campaigns. While it is evident that some commentators supported Baker's justification for the use of military force to suppress the slave trade (and therefore reinforced what were understood to be the expectations of 'savage warfare'), such views did not preclude discussion and criticism of what were perceived to be the unethical actions that were undertaken by Baker during his expedition. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates that public criticism of Baker's methods led him to re-frame the ethics of his military exploits in his second edition of *Ismailia*, published in 1879.

The final chapter – *An Ethics of 'Savage Warfare'* – begins with an examination of the case study of the Anglo-Zulu War (1879) in order to further show that despite the existence of a

discourse which claimed that a code of military ethics could not exist between what were understood to be 'unequal' states of civilisation (such as, some argued, the British and the Zulu) in practice, distinctions between 'civilisation' and 'savagery' were often undermined; public and private commentary on the war reveals that the British could be accused of engaging in 'uncivilised' behaviour, while the Zulu could be recognised for abiding by norms such as non-combatant immunity. Through an analysis of the literature of figures who criticised the war – including George William Cox, John William Colenso, Frances Ellen Colenso, and John Morley – the first section of this chapter argues that a common thread can be discerned: they shared a belief that those considered to be 'savage' cultures did indeed express conceptions of moral life and understanding.

The second part of this chapter analyses in closer detail the arguments put forward by the polymath James Anson Farrer, who despite not being a member of the armed forces, contributed the most detailed discussion on the military ethics of non-European cultures in Britain during the late-nineteenth century. Through an analysis of the reception of Farrer's work, this chapter demonstrates that a significant turning-point occurred in the final decades of the nineteenth century: in the midst of a strengthening of British militarism and popular imperialism, the professionalising rhetoric of the fields of science and anthropology, and calls by members of the British military establishment for the need to develop training and specialised doctrine for colonial warfare, disparaging characterisations of the 'savage' once again gathered force. This revival of critical conceptualisations of 'savagery' was influenced by growing frustration over the continued resistance of indigenous populations against British military endeavours; the emergence of a cult of heroism related to past British military figures (such as Jacob, Baker and General Charles Gordon); and a broader acceptance of the 'civilising' effects of warfare. This chapter concludes by arguing that – despite, and in part because of, a concurrent intellectual climate which articulated fears of British decline – the resonance of the arguments put forward by

military practitioners such as Colonel Callwell, Colonel Lonsdale Hale and Captain Frederick William von Herbert of the superiority of the 'civilised' British over the 'savage' enemy warrior – in morals and military practice – triumphed in public discourse.



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My love of history was sparked by the stories told to me by my grandfather, and furthered through my discovery of works by Richard Holmes at Elizabeth's Bookshop and visits to the Imperial War Museum and the National Army Museum during travels to London. Richard Bosworth's memorable introductory lecture to History 101, accompanied by the music of Wagner, captured my immediate attention, and my interest in the history of warfare was fostered during his spirited lectures, as well as tutorials and supervisions with Mark Edele and Pep Finaldi. My colleagues at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), especially Greg Reichberg and Henrik Syse, have been invaluable in their support throughout my time both at PRIO and at Oxford. I found a wonderful and supportive environment within the leafy medieval grounds of Lincoln College and I am so grateful to the Sloane Robinson Foundation for their patronage.

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Abbreviations

BodL – Bodleian Library

BL – British Library

HCPP – House of Commons Parliamentary Papers

ILN – Illustrated London News

JAI – The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland

JESL – Journal of the Ethnological Society of London

JICH – Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

JRAS – Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland

JRUSI – Journal of the Royal United Service Institution

JSAHR – *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*

JUSII – *Journal of the United Service Institute of India*

JWCI – Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes

NAM – National Army Museum

ODNB – Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

PPCRE – Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers

PRAI – Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institute

RUSI – (Royal) United Service Institution

TNA – The National Archives

USJ – United Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine

USM – (Colburn's) United Service Magazine and Naval and Military Journal

Unless otherwise stated the place of publication of materials referenced throughout this dissertation is London.

Introduction

At half past eight on a May evening in 1853, local Londoners and visitors to the capital who had gathered outside St. George's Gallery in Knightsbridge were ushered through to the spacious exhibition hall. Inside, they had the opportunity to gaze at Maxos, a former soldier of the Zulu King Panda's army, whose military exploits could be discerned from the several scars that adorned his body: his left eye and back were marked by wounds from an assegai. Surrounded by native military implements such as war shields and spears, Maxos was obliged to perform for the spectators a hunting expedition and a sham fight 'between hostile tribes' against the backdrop of 'excellent panoramic scenery' painted by the artist Charles Marshall (1806-90) from sketches drawn locally.[1]

This exhibition of the military life of the 'savage' – a term used arbitrarily to refer to non-Europeans of various geographical locales – was just one of the recurring shows presented to the London public throughout the nineteenth century.[2] The commentary inspired by such shows reveals that on the one hand, they were understood by many to be rational or 'scientific' amusements catering to public and academic interest in understanding human difference; on the other, indigenous people on show were often used as a vehicle for the British to reassert the belief in their own superior 'civilised' behaviour.[3] Reporting on an exhibition of a group of San from South Africa (referred to as 'Bushmen') in 1847, the *Illustrated London News* wrote: 'It was strange… in looking through one of the windows of

[1] 'The Zulu Kaffirs', *ILN*, 28 May 1853, p. 410.
[2] See, especially: 'The Noble Savage Reconsidered', in Richard D. Altick, *Shows of London* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), pp. 268-87, *passim*; Sadiah Qureshi, *Peoples on Parade: Exhibitions, Empire, and Anthropology in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Chicago, 2011); Sadiah Qureshi, 'Meeting the Zulus: Displayed Peoples and the Shows of London, 1853-79', in Joe Kember, Joe Plunkett and Jill A. Sullivan (eds), *Popular Exhibitions: Science and Showmanship, 1840-1910* (2012), pp. 183-98.
[3] There were exceptions; upon the exhibition of Sartje, the 'Hottentot Venus from South Africa' in 1810, letters of protest were published in local London newspapers. See: 'The Hottentot Venus', *The Morning Post*, 18 October 1810; 'Hottentot Venus', *The Morning Post*, 29 October 1810; Altick, 'The Noble Savage Reconsidered', pp. 268-72.

the room into the busy street, to reflect that by a single turn of the head might be witnessed the two extremes of humanity – the lowest and highest of the race – the wandering savage, and the silken baron of civilisation'.[4]

'Savage' warriors were also met on the field of battle in numerous imperial wars fought by the British throughout the nineteenth century. Yet a closer look at the particular discussions they inspired reveals that perceptions of the 'savage' were not as straightforward as the commentary of the *Illustrated London News* suggested. In a despatch written in January 1874 by General Sir Archibald Alison (1826-1907), who commanded the British Brigade during the Third Anglo-Ashanti War (1873-4), Alison recognised the tactical expertise of his 'savage' foe:

> The Ashantees stood admirably, and kept up one of the heaviest fires I ever was under. While opposing our front attack with immensely superior numbers, they kept enveloping our left with a constant series of well-directed flank attacks.[5]

In reminiscing about his experiences at the Battle of Ahmed Khel (19 April 1880), four months prior to Lord Roberts' infamous march from Kabul to Kandahar, Sir Donald Stewart's son Norman Stewart (1851-1926), who fought under his father's command, recounted his experiences fighting against the Afghans:

> It was a glorious sight to watch these swords-men advancing under such a withering fire without a thought of halting; on and on they came till they actually struck our line. … The enemy fought till not a man was left standing, and their dead lay actually in on our line, and when you come to think that some of these warriors, for warriors they certainly were, had nothing more formidable than 'bullis' (rafters from native huts), the actual piercing of our line was truly magnificent.[6]

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[4] 'The Bosjesmans, at the Egyptian Hall, Piccadilly' quoted in Altick, *Shows of London*, p. 281.
[5] General Sir Archibald Alison's despatch quoted in Charles Rathbone Low, *A Memoir of Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley* (2 vols, 1878), ii, p. 168.
[6] Major-General Sir Norman Stewart, *My Service Days: India, Afghanistan, Suakim '85, and China* (1908), pp. 79, 81.

The vignettes above begin to illustrate the complexities of nineteenth-century understandings of the idea of 'savagery', and it is such complexities which lie at the heart of this dissertation. Each of the five chapters is dedicated to exploring a particular case study in order to demonstrate the nuances of perceptions of the 'savage' warrior and 'savage warfare' and how they were articulated within the broader intellectual, cultural, imperial and military contexts of the period. This dissertation begins with an exploration of how knowledge of 'savage' warrior cultures came to be encountered in Britain, by examining the case study of three South African warrior cultures – the San, Khoi, and Xhosa – and how their characteristics were constructed both visually and textually from the early nineteenth century to the late 1840s. The second chapter provides a contrasting account of the 'savage' warrior by examining the construction of the Baluchi warriors of Sind (present-day Pakistan), in order to investigate how characterisations of a particular warrior culture changed when the British armed forces met such foes on the battlefield. The third chapter analyses the influence of the rise of evolutionary theory and its associated racial hierarchies on depictions of 'savage' warriors and their military arts. How the practicalities of 'savage warfare' were discussed and how public opinion was excited by the exploits of Sir Samuel White Baker in Equatorial Africa during the 1870s form the primary focus of the fourth chapter, which examines the extent to which 'savage warfare' inspired public debate on the issue of military ethics. The final chapter addresses this theme in a different context – the Anglo-Zulu War (1879) – and further interrogates the resonance of the contemporary claim that moral understanding was an exclusive trait of those deemed to be 'civilised' through a close analysis of the work of the polymath James Anson Farrer who made a particularly impassioned plea for recognition of the moral life of the 'savage'.

This dissertation explores these various themes by engaging with a broad range of historical sources including the autobiographies and personal private papers of military practitioners

and colonial administrators, as well as published narratives of military campaigns; the intellectual reflections and discoveries of anthropologists; nineteenth-century newspapers and periodicals (both civilian and military); official government documents; travel narratives of British explorers; and material culture, such as engraved images and battle paintings. Archives have been explored at the Bodleian Libraries, The National Archives, The British Library, and the National Army Museum. An analysis of such a broad range of sources is necessary in order to demonstrate how divergent perspectives on the 'savage' warrior and perceived distinctions between 'savagery' and 'civilisation' were within – as well as outside – the professional military establishment in varied contexts throughout the nineteenth century. Military culture was embedded in a much wider culture, within which debate flourished and preoccupations were often shared.

Following the work of scholars such as Heather Streets, this dissertation seeks to emphasise the advantages of incorporating military history within what has been identified as the 'New Imperial History'.[7] While the historiography of British military history of the early modern period reflects a richness of methodologies and historical perspectives,[8] the nineteenth century remains a source of great potential for culturally-embedded approaches to the history of war and Empire. By integrating the concerns of military historians with the intellectual and cultural context of the British Empire, and seeking in particular to understand the broader intellectual interests of military practitioners, this dissertation reveals that the writings of members of the armed forces were informed not only by the geo-political and strategic concerns of imperial expansion, but also by developments in

[7] Heather Streets, *Martial Races* (Manchester, 2004), p. 4. For a historiographical overview see: James Thompson, 'Modern Britain and the New Imperial History', *History Compass*, 5:2 (2007), pp. 455-62. As Streets notes, Hew Strachan's *The Politics of the British Army* (Oxford, 1997) presented an important challenge to the view of the British Army as an apolitical institution.

[8] See, for instance: John Grenier, 'Recent Trends in the Historiography on Warfare in the Colonial Period (1607-1765)', *History Compass*, 8:4 (2010), pp. 358-67; William P. Tatum III, 'Challenging the New Military History: The Case of Eighteenth-Century British Army Studies', *History Compass*, 5:1 (2007), pp. 72-84; Wayne E. Lee (ed), *Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World* (New York, 2011).

science, religion and 'anthropology'.[9] Furthermore, the argument is advanced that military culture was not isolated from civilian culture during this period; figures of the British military establishment played an active and significant role in the production and dissemination of knowledge of the world and its inhabitants beyond Britain; a development that was fostered by the proliferation of periodical literature, and by museums and learned institutions seeking to transport those at the imperial metropole to the exotic periphery.

The nineteenth century is a particularly important period within which to examine the discourse of 'savagery' and 'civilisation' as it is in this century that questions of 'otherness' became a profound area of interest due to the accelerated expansion of the British Empire and extensive first-hand contact with non-European cultures. By contextualising discussions on the 'savage' during this period, this dissertation demonstrates that the intensity of anti-humanitarian discourse and colonial racism varied significantly in response to local conditions, personal political agendas, intellectual trends, and military objectives and outcomes. Distinctions between 'savagery' and 'civilisation' could be reinforced or undermined both textually and visually. This dissertation further demonstrates the complexity and non-linearity of the chronology with regard to critical perceptions of 'savagery': in the early to mid- nineteenth century, variegated understandings of the 'savage' warrior gave way to the intensification of a pessimistic discourse in the mid-to-late 1840s. This discourse was later overwhelmed by a renewed faith in the 'civilising mission' during the 1870s; while the period between the mid-1880s and the late-1890s gave way to the re-emergence of a discourse re-asserting a 'civilised'/'savage' divide. While advances were made to regulate the conduct of 'civilised' European wars at the international level in the very late nineteenth century, attempts were also made at this time to enact legally-binding

[9] In the nineteenth century, the meanings of the terms 'ethnology' and 'anthropology' were not yet fixed, and 'ethnology' was used liberally to signify the broader study of human diversity. As 'anthropology' is now understood as a discipline dedicated to exploring the varied aspects of human development, and 'ethnology' is considered a subset of this discipline (examining the characteristics and customs of specific ethnic groups), for the sake of clarity, this dissertation will use the terms 'anthropology' and 'anthropologist'.

proclamations which effectively de-legitimised the position of the 'savage' warrior through fortifying distinctions between 'civilisation' and 'savagery'.

II

The nineteenth-century discourse on the question of 'civilisation' and 'savagery' was by no means new.[10] In the years prior to the French Revolution, a rich philosophical tradition in both Scotland and France emerged in the works of John Millar (1735-1801), Adam Smith (1723-90) and Charles de Brosses (1709-77), among others, whereby it was generally understood that earlier stages of human life could be discerned through the observation of those living in a contemporary 'natural' state (which was praised by some as preferential to contemporary European mores),[11] and the 'unity' of humankind was affirmed.[12] By the early nineteenth century, discussions on 'civilisation' in Britain were influenced by intellectual developments in the fields of political economy and moral philosophy; the idea of 'civilisation' came to encompass liberal political institutions, the doctrine of free trade, Protestantism, and the 'ethic of self-discipline and sexual restraint' which were chiefly understood as virtues of the middle classes. 'Savages', on the other hand, were now understood less as exemplars of purity and nobility,[13] but rather as being at the mercy of 'instinctive passions' and 'the forces of nature'. Similarly, with the rise of Evangelical Christianity, the notion of 'degeneration' became more associated with a 'savage fall from primitive religious grace' rather than 'a European fall from primitive cultural simplicity'.[14]

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[10] George W. Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology* (New York, 1987), p. 10.
[11] Some scholars have identified the notion that 'natural' or 'savage' man was to be idealised as 'romantic' or 'normative' primitivism. It is generally understood to be a critical response to the Enlightenment idea that social progress was best achieved through the advancement of science and reason. See: Frederick G. Whelan, *Enlightenment Political Thought and Non-Western Societies: Sultans and Savages* (2009), pp. 12-14.
[12] Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, pp. 11-19. For the corresponding discussion on the origins and development of religious belief – an issue that was too explored by intellectuals fascinated with the question of 'civilisation' – see: Marjorie Wheeler-Barclay, *The Science of Religion in Britain, 1860-1915* (Charlottesville, VA., 2010), pp. 22-7.
[13] On the concept of the 'noble savage' see: Ter Ellingson, *The Myth of the Noble Savage* (2001). Ellingson traces the provenance of the notion not to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, but rather to the French poet, author and lawyer Marc Lescarbot (c. 1570-1641).
[14] Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, pp. 30-6.

Those wishing to uphold religious orthodoxy sought to defend a notion of 'civilisation' compatible with biblical authority.[15] By the late 1850s, the theory of cultural evolution took hold, due, as some scholars have argued, to the questioning of the prevailing philosophy of utilitarianism (which struggled to account for societies that seemed not to be motivated chiefly by the principle of rational self-interest).[16] In many respects, such understandings of cultural evolution revived earlier Enlightenment ideas on 'comparative' history and 'stages' of intellectual and cultural development. Scholars have contested the nature of these shifts, either emphasising a 'linear intellectual history', or 'the tangled interrelations of ideas and thinkers in particular contexts'.[17] This dissertation challenges linear teleologies, arguing that throughout the nineteenth century ideas of 'savagery' and 'civilisation' were constantly re-negotiated through a rich and confident debate driven especially by members of the British armed forces.

While there is a rich existing scholarship on the gradual development of the field of anthropology in Britain during this period,[18] these works have generally overlooked the ways in which the 'savage' was understood in relation to their perceived military capabilities; their army organisation, weapons of warfare, battlefield tactics, and articulations and adherence to norms of war in combat. In *Victorian Anthropology* (1987) George Stocking meticulously traced the ideas of 'savagery' and 'civilisation', and the development of cultural evolution in British intellectual thought in the nineteenth century;

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[15] See, for instance, W. Cooke Taylor's *Natural History of Society* (1840). Taylor (who was inspired by the Archbishop of Dublin, Richard Whately), believed in a literal interpretation of the Bible, arguing that in the aftermath of the 'fall, flood, Babel, and diaspora… [s]ome groups… degenerated into savagery, but others, aided by God, progressed toward new heights of civilization'. See: Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory* (Oxford, 2001), p. 58.

[16] Wheeler-Barclay, *The Science of Religion in Britain*, p. 20. Wheeler-Barclay noted, however, that 'the utilitarian tradition was reinforced since, according to social evolutionary theory, everything created by man had some intelligible origin and the irrationality of a particular institution was simply a function of historical perspective. Those customs and beliefs that outlived their time might hinder further progress, but their existence could not be allowed to undermine faith in a basically rational human nature'.

[17] Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, pp. 9, 19. For the latter position see: J.W. Burrow, *Evolution and Society* (1966).

[18] Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*; Henrika Kuklick, *The Savage Within: The Social History of British Anthropology, 1885-1945* (Cambridge, 1993); Henrika Kuklick, 'The British Tradition', in Henrika Kuklick (ed.), *A New History of Anthropology* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 52-78; Efram Sera-Shriar, *The Making of British Anthropology* (2013).

however, even his substantial study lacks the specific military dimension considered here. As this dissertation argues, the military dimension is crucial to understanding the complexities of the discourse on 'savagery' and 'civilisation'. By focusing on the knowledge production of members of the British armed forces, it demonstrates that the military qualities and characteristics of non-European cultures were a significant preoccupation for the British during this period.

Meanwhile, general studies on the history of the British Army and nineteenth-century colonial warfare have, merely in passing, acknowledged the existence of the discourse of 'savage' and 'civilised' warfare in relation to Colonel Charles Edward Callwell's (1859-1928) *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, a manual published by the British Intelligence Department in 1896, which has often been incorrectly identified as the first nineteenth-century British attempt to examine irregular warfare.[19] In this work, Callwell argued for the existence of a distinction between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare': the former encompassing notions of gentlemanly conduct, a 'fair fight' between like-minded opponents, fought in the open field; while the latter conjured traits such as treachery, faithlessness and lamentable transgressions of military ethics. Discussions of the latter were often accompanied by comments illustrative of a belief in British racial and military supremacy:

> … the enemy must be made to feel a moral inferiority throughout. The lower races are impressionable. They are greatly influenced by a resolute bearing and a determined course of action. … All orientals have an inborn love of trickery and deception, the Red Indians have won an evil notoriety by their duplicity and craftiness, and even mere savages like the Maoris and the Kaffirs are constantly imposing upon regular troops by many forms of tactical artifice.[20]

[19] For instance an edited volume on counter-insurgency states that 'Colonel Charles Callwell's *Small Wars* is generally agreed to be the start point for British irregular warfare writing'. See: Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds), *Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges* (2010), p. 32.
[20] Charles Edward Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 2nd edition (1899), pp. 72, 227.

Whilst Callwell's work may have reflected a more dominant understanding of non-European warfare in the very late nineteenth century, continual preoccupation with this particular treatise on the part of modern military historians has occluded the fact that Callwell's perspective and categorisations were not fully reflective of the nineteenth century, and of the many competing discourses that emerged earlier in the period. Furthermore, general military studies which acknowledge Callwell's work do not consider the broader intellectual and cultural context within which the discourse on 'savage' and 'civilised' warfare emerged, and within which it narrowed.[21] The complexities of this discourse can only be fully comprehended through an integration of the concerns of the cultural anthropologist and the military historian.

This dissertation confronts the conception of the 'civilised'/'savage' warrior distinction as an earlier nineteenth-century articulation of a concept which military historians have referred to as the 'Western way of war' thesis. While military history began to encompass perspectives that analysed the impact of warfare on society from the late 1960s, by the late 1970s, historians such as John Keegan sought to illuminate the 'face of battle', and the interrelationship between war and culture.[22] Such approaches were conceptualised as the 'New Military History'.[23] Within this paradigm some scholars revived the notion of Western 'exceptionalism'[24] and championed the 'cultural determinist'[25] approach which

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[21] Including J.A. De Moor and H.L. Wesseling (eds), *Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa* (Leiden, 1989), pp. 3-4; Edward M. Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army* (Manchester, 1992), p. 279; Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914* (1998), pp. 159-60; John M. MacKenzie, *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700-1964* (Manchester, 1999), p. 7; Hew Strachan, 'War is War: Imperial Legacy and Current Conflict', in *The Direction of War* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 196-7; T.R. Moreman, *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947* (1998), pp. xvii, 9.

[22] John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* ([1976] 2014).

[23] Peter Paret noted in the early 1990s that there was 'no general agreement on the meaning of the term'; however, '[m]ost military historians and others conversant with the discipline would probably agree that the New Military History refers to a partial turning away from the great captains, and from weapons, tactics, and operations as the main concerns of the historical study of war'. See: Peter Paret, 'The New Military History', *Parameters* (1991), pp. 10-18.

[24] As demonstrated, for instance, by Edward Creasy's *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: From Marathon to Waterloo* (New York, 1851).

[25] I utilise Patrick Porter's definition of the term 'cultural determinism' which views culture 'as an immobile, unified set of ideas and instincts, a natural "given" force created by traditions and collective experiences,

established a binary between 'Western' and 'Eastern' 'ways of warfare'.[26] Significantly, this particular approach re-emerged in concert with global developments which shook the foundations of a perceived Western military superiority – including nuclear proliferation by countries such as India and Pakistan, and the September 11 attacks on the United States.[27] While the 'Western way of warfare' was said to be exclusively driven by cultural traits including rationalism, self-critique, consensual political establishments, civic militarism and the 'citizen-soldier', among others, the 'Eastern way of warfare' was characterised by a 'reliance on indirectness, perfidy, attrition and protraction' and understood to be 'inherently more irregular, unorthodox, and asymmetric'.[28] Despite acknowledging 'the extraordinary dynamism' of campaigns undertaken by figures such as Attila the Hun and Genghis Khan, in *A History of Warfare* (1993) John Keegan concluded that:

> Culture is… a prime determinant of the nature of warfare, as the history of its development in Asia clearly demonstrates. Oriental warmaking, if we may so identify and denominate it as something different and apart from European warfare, is characterised by traits peculiar to itself. Foremost among these are evasion, delay and indirectness.[29]

It could be argued that the nineteenth-century British Army did express a preference for a particular approach to waging warfare that was informed by institutional cultural traits and values often described as the 'officer-gentleman tradition' (a tradition which encompassed a sense of honour, duty, *noblesse oblige* and sportsmanship, fostered by the regimental system),[30] and was concurrently at the mercy of broader societal criticisms, expectations and political pressures. However, this dissertation presents a challenge to the notion

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where identity is more or less fixed by inherited, socially transmitted factors'. Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes* (New York, 2011), p. 12. See also, Jeremy Black, *War and the Cultural Turn* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 16-17.

[26] Victor David Hanson, *Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (1989) and *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power* (New York, 2001); John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (1993).

[27] Paul Bracken, *The Second Nuclear Age* (New York, 2012).

[28] Robert M. Cassidy quoted in Porter, *Military Orientalism*, p. 12.

[29] Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, p. 387.

[30] Anthony Clayton, *The British Officer* (Florence, 2014), pp. 7-9, 125.

underpinning the cultural determinist perspective that in battle, there was – or is – an indisputable distinction between 'European'/'Western' and 'Oriental'/'Eastern' approaches to warfare. In doing so, it reinforces the work of scholars such as John A. Lynn and Patrick Porter who have underpinned their criticism of the cultural determinist approach through a broad sweep of historical examples (ranging from classical Greek warfare to contemporary conflicts against the Taliban), with Porter's study in particular drawing attention to the perceived failures of integrating the 'cultural approach' within recent British and American military operations in the Middle East.[31] Both works have challenged the perception of 'continuity' within the 'Western way of war' thesis, emphasising, on the one hand, that pragmatism, rather than strict adherence to cultural norms, has often driven military strategy and tactics and, on the other, that European armies were open to learning from and even idealising non-European military cultures (such as British respect for the Japanese armed forces in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5).[32]

This dissertation advances Lynn and Porter's studies by demonstrating that although discourses on the 'savage' warrior during the nineteenth century were underpinned by beliefs in cultural determinism, and some commentators and military practitioners invoked the notion that there was an uncontested distinction between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare', in practice, understandings of 'savage warfare' and the 'savage' warrior were not as unambiguous as the distinction implied. A closer examination of this discourse reveals that British perceptions of 'savagery' were often inconsistent and open to re-interpretation depending on the political, imperial and military context within which the traits and characteristics of non-European warrior cultures were discussed. At times, such commentary reinforced associations inherent within the term 'savage' (fanaticism,

[31] John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (New York, 2003); Porter, *Military Orientalism*, pp. 6-10.
[32] Porter, *Military Orientalism*, pp. 85-109. This is also argued by Hew Strachan who has noted that '… war generates its own dynamic. Its imperatives can even prompt a readiness to adapt and change despite culture – not because of it'. Hew Strachan, 'A General Typology of Transcultural Wars - The Modern Ages', in Hans-Henning Kortüm (ed.), *Transcultural Wars from the Middle Ages to the 21st Century* (Berlin, 2006), p. 103.

faithlessness, a lack of discipline and military expertise) while also being open to associations understood to be markers of 'civilised' warfare, such as abiding by norms of war, and demonstrating military traits such as valour, strength and perseverance. British failure on the colonial battlefield could lead to the re-appraisal of an irregular foe, and crucially, public commentaries on colonial warfare often expressed anxieties and criticisms in response to accounts of 'uncivilised' military actions on the part of the British. Contrasting perspectives were not limited to textual narratives; this dissertation shows that artistic representations of 'savage warfare' could also undermine understandings of a 'civilised'/'savage' divide.

In challenging the presumption that 'savage warfare' entailed a regular disregard for 'civilised' norms of war, this dissertation uncovers dissenting voices in the mid-to-late nineteenth century that not only argued that moral reasoning was a universal trait, and that those cultures believed to be 'savage' expressed an understanding and adherence to military ethics, but also contested the claim that 'Western' ways and means of warfare were more 'civilised' than those undertaken by the 'savage' enemy. In so doing, it also contributes to scholarship that has sought to emphasise the ambiguous and inconsistent interrelationship between knowledge production of non-European cultures and British imperialism (conceptualised as 'orientalism'),[33] including the work of Porter, John M. MacKenzie and Douglas M. Peers.[34] At times commentators praised non-European warrior cultures for adopting or approximating 'civilised' (British) morals and military characteristics (thus reinforcing the perception of British superiority and providing further justification for the

[33] Edward Said's *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* first published in 1978, is identified as the most ground-breaking text in this field of research and has inspired a number of critiques and reappraisals. See, for instance, Edward W. Said, 'Orientalism Reconsidered', *Cultural Critique*, 1 (1985), pp. 89-107; Daniel Martin Varisco, *Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid* (2007); and Patrick Porter, 'Afterword', in Tarak Barkawi and Keith Stanski (eds), *Orientalism and War* (Oxford, 2013), pp. 263-74.

[34] Porter, *Military Orientalism*, p. 23. MacKenzie has noted: 'In reality, Orientalism was endlessly protean, as often consumed by admiration and reverence as by denigration and depreciation', *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts* (Manchester, 1995), p. 215. Peers has stated, 'in practice orientalism proved to be much more ambivalent, contested and incomplete', in 'Colonial Knowledge and the Military in India, 1780-1860', *JICH*, 33:2 (2005), pp. 161-2.

expansion of British rule), while others argued for the need to affirm the existence and legitimacy of indigenous military customs, practices and moral understanding, and presented explicit critiques of the consequences of British imperialism – both for indigenous populations and for British society. Constructions of the military skills and characteristics of particular non-European warrior cultures were also open to revision, deliberation and debate, and were not necessarily unquestionably reproduced from prior authoritative works, further demonstrating the ambivalent nature of 'orientalism'.

III

An exploration and analysis of how knowledge of what were considered to be 'savage' warrior cultures came to be circulated and understood in the British imagination in the very early nineteenth century provides a point of departure for this dissertation. The expansion of the British Empire provided a unique – and in many ways unparalleled – opportunity for representations of non-European warrior cultures to emerge in Britain. Alongside objects related to natural history, soldiers and sailors returned from the imperial periphery with military implements and accoutrements such as assegais, headdresses, and war drums, as well as trophies and 'spoils of war'.[35] Textual accounts were also regularly circulated in the early nineteenth century; a development facilitated by the improvement of mass production technologies.[36] The first chapter begins with an exploration of the textual characterisations of three warrior cultures in the strategically significant region of the Cape in South Africa – the San, Khoi and the Xhosa. An exploration of narratives discussing these particular warrior cultures reveals that conventional periodisation of the development of a critical anti-humanitarian discourse (suggesting a distinct shift in the aftermath of the Indian

[35] Peter Thwaites, *Presenting Arms: Museum Representation of British Military History, 1660-1900* (1996), pp. 10-26; Bosquecillo [Duncan Blanckley Shaw], *A Visit to the United Service Institution in 1849* (1849).
[36] James Raven, *The Business of Books: Booksellers and the English Book Trade, 1450-1850* (2007), pp. 320-50.

Rebellion of 1857) needs to be re-considered,[37] and illustrates how in this particular imperial context a greater awareness of cultural differentiation gave way to a more inflexible, polygenecist understanding of human difference in the mid-to-late 1840s. This chapter argues that such a shift can particularly be evidenced when earlier textual characterisations in works of figures such as the colonial administrator John Barrow (1764-1848), the amateur anthropologist Richard Barnard Fisher (1794-1823, a staunch campaigner for settlement of the Cape), and humanitarians such as the radical abolitionist John Fairbairn (1794-1864) and Lord Glenelg (1778-1866), Secretary of State for War and the Colonies (1835-39) are contrasted with later textual and visual accounts that emerged during the display of the San in London and the eruption of the Seventh Frontier War (1846-7) between the Xhosa and the British. While scholars such as Andrew Bank and Christoph Strobel have traced the development of a growing disillusionment with the 'civilising mission' in the context of the Cape during this period, this chapter synthesises their observations with a close analysis of how perceptions of the military characteristics of the San, Khoi and Xhosa changed in concert with the development of such a 'conservative consensus'.[38]

To cater for the growing fascination with non-European cultures, in the early to mid-nineteenth century groups of indigenous people were brought to Britain and placed on display for spectators to muse on cultural and racial difference; a development which is further explored in the second section of this chapter. Detailed literature on the display of non-European cultures in Britain by scholars including Richard D. Altick and Sadiah

[37] As found in works such as D.A. Lorimer, *Colour, Class and the Victorians: English Attitudes to the Negro in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1978); and James Belich, *The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* (Montreal, 1989).

[38] Andrew Bank, 'Losing Faith in the Civilizing Mission: The Premature Decline of Humanitarian Liberalism at the Cape, 1840-60', in Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern (eds), *Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples 1600-1850* (1999), pp. 364-83; Christoph Strobel, *Testing Grounds of Modern Empire* (New York, 2008), pp. 61-90.

Qureshi[39] have provided a point of departure for this section. While scholars have tended to emphasise that the display of non-European people chiefly functioned as 'spectacles' to re-assert beliefs in British cultural and racial superiority, Qureshi has broadened this perspective by demonstrating that such displays not only facilitated contact between cultures, but also emerged as a means by which to investigate and develop theories on race and human difference. This chapter builds on Qureshi's study by examining how the display of South African warrior cultures influenced the manner in which their military attributes were perceived. Qureshi noted the interrelationship between human exhibitions and the undertaking of colonial military campaigns, briefly discussing how showmen took advantage of public interest in British political and military developments in South Africa through their display of the Zulu, especially during the war of 1879.[40] She discussed not only the diversity of the meanings of these displays, but also the reactions and responses they provoked in the later nineteenth century.[41] In contrast, this section examines the period prior to the early 1850s, and examines how the 'simianizing'[42] of the San had a significant effect upon the manner in which the military attributes of the three warrior cultures were characterised, as well as how such analogies contributed to fortifying distinctions between 'civilisation' and 'savagery'.

In order to demonstrate the dynamic nature of the term 'savage' and how it came to be associated with a particular warrior culture, the first section of the second chapter examines the ways in which the Baluchis of Sind were represented in military despatches, campaign narratives, and travel writing, as well as in the private papers of a number of notable

[39] Altick, *Shows of London*; Qureshi, *Peoples on Parade*. See also: Bernth Lindfors, *Early African Entertainments Abroad: From the Hottentot Venus to Africa's First Olympians* (Madison, 2014) and Rikke Andreassen, *Human Exhibitions: Race, Gender and Sexuality in Ethnic Displays* (2015).
[40] This is a point also made by Nadja Durbach in *Spectacle of Deformity: Freak Shows and Modern British Culture* (2010), p. 168.
[41] Qureshi, *Peoples on Parade*; these issues were further explored in Qureshi, 'Meeting the Zulus', pp. 183-98.
[42] I take this term from Durbach, who has noted that the British associated the Irish with apes in political cartoons from the 1860s, particularly during the rise of Irish nationalism in the 1880s and 1890s, *Spectacle of Deformity*, pp. 167-8.

Britons who gained first-hand experience of the region either as political agents or military practitioners. The figures explored here include Sir Henry Pottinger (1789-1856), an officer of the East India Company; Captain Thomas Postans (1808-1846) of the Bombay Army, who became Assistant to the Political Agent in Sind and Baluchistan in 1839; Edward Backhouse Eastwick (1814-1883), a philologist of the Bombay Infantry; and General John Jacob (1812-1858), an officer of the East India Company who became Political Superintendent and Commandant of the frontier of Upper Sind in 1847.

With a focus on the hitherto unexplored perceptions of the Baluchis of Sind in British literature, this chapter seeks to enrich existing histories which have investigated how specific warrior cultures were understood by the British in the nineteenth century, including works by James Belich and Rob Johnson.[43] Both historians have demonstrated that non-European warrior cultures (the Maori and Afghans, respectively) regularly adapted their military customs in battle against European opponents, and that British narratives of colonial warfare often reflected a certain partiality. Furthermore, Belich identified the establishment of a highly disparaging 'dominant interpretation' of Maori warfare informed by an interrelationship of factors including British belief in their own racial and military superiority, as well as a general expectation of success against non-European opponents in the mid-to-late 1860s. Although Belich recognised the existence of accounts that challenged this mainstream view, he argued that their perspectives 'were overwhelmed, ignored, set aside, or forgotten'. Belich also dismissed early-nineteenth-century praise of the Maori as a result of the need of missionaries to raise support for their activities, as well as to attract settlers to New Zealand.[44] In contrast, the case study of Sind explored in this chapter highlights the ambivalence of British interpretations of Baluchi warfare which were – at times – influenced by broader contemporary criticisms of the invasion of the country,

[43] Belich, *The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict*; Rob Johnson, *The Afghan Way of War, Culture and Pragmatism: A Critical History* (2011).
[44] Belich, *The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict*, pp. 311, 321-8.

thus providing greater scope for revisionist accounts that expressed admiration and respect for Baluchi military practices. As Johnson recognised in the Afghan context, British appraisals of non-European military cultures were often ambiguous – encompassing assessments of their perceived 'virtues' as well as 'vices' – and were often influenced by personal political agendas, military objectives, as well as changes in frontier policies.[45] As chapters one and four of this dissertation show, such perceptions were further complicated by the employment of non-British subjects as military allies enlisted to fight on behalf of the British Empire.

General John Jacob forms the primary case study of the second section of this chapter, as he was one of the first military practitioners in the nineteenth century to discuss the need to adhere in practice to the rules of 'civilised' warfare against what were considered to be 'savage' opponents. Jacob also revolutionised British colonial policy on the North-West frontier of Sind through his introduction of the doctrine of 'moral', rather than 'brute' force. Aside from two biographical accounts published by Alexander Innes Shand (1900), and H.T. Lambrick (1960),[46] Jacob's exploits – both intellectual and practical – have been generally overlooked. While both Shand and Lambrick provided great narrative detail on Jacob's military adventures and actions as a colonial administrator, they did not associate his unique approach to the Sind Frontier with his eclectic intellectual interests. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of his frontier policy in light of his ideas about evolution, theology, and moral understanding, as well as the manner in which he believed Britain should exercise her role as an imperial power. By focusing on the case study of Sind, this chapter demonstrates that theoretical distinctions between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare'

[45] Johnson, *The Afghan Way of War*, pp. 22-7.
[46] Alexander Innes Shand, *General John Jacob: Commandant of the Sind Irregular Horse and Founder of Jacobabad* (1900); H.T. Lambrick, *John Jacob of Jacobabad* (1960).

were, at times, and to differing degrees, subjected to criticism by military practitioners – like Jacob – who were at the front-line of colonial warfare, and further reinforces the argument that descriptions of the 'savage' were not necessarily consistent, nor coherent.

By the mid-to-late nineteenth century, it is evident that understandings of the 'savage' warrior emerged which were overtly associated with contemporary theories of evolution, and the notion of a 'hierarchy of races'. The third chapter focuses upon the intellectual development of General Pitt Rivers (1827-1900), one of the earliest figures who theorised the development of 'savage' means of warfare from an evolutionary perspective. Pitt Rivers' legacy and approach to museology and archaeology have been examined in detail in a number of biographical accounts; however, such works have generally focused upon how his collecting practices and ideas on cultural evolution informed (and were informed by) his archaeological interests.[47] Mark Bowden, for instance, dedicated four chapters of his work to narrating Pitt Rivers' experiences as an archaeologist, and Richard Bradley focused his study on the interrelationship between Pitt Rivers' intellectual development and his archaeological work.[48] Recently, Christopher Evans has related his archaeological pursuits to specific aspects of his military career, arguing that Pitt Rivers' duties as an ordnance appraiser and Assistant Quartermaster General in Ireland (1862-66) influenced his approach towards undertaking archaeological excavations; his experience as a prosecuting officer of British non-commissioned officers was said by Evans to have particularly inspired his insistence on providing 'proof' of his field observations.[49] In contrast to such works, the emphasis of the third chapter of this dissertation is rather to elucidate the broader intellectual and cultural context which inspired Pitt Rivers to theorise what he

[47] M.W. Thompson, *General Pitt-Rivers: Evolution and Archaeology in the Nineteenth Century* (Bradford-On-Avon, 1977); Mark Bowden, *Pitt Rivers: The Life and Archaeological Work of Lieutenant-General Augustus Henry Lane Fox Pitt Rivers* (Cambridge, 1991).
[48] Richard Bradley, 'Archaeology, Evolution and the Public Good: The Intellectual Development of General Pitt Rivers', *The Archaeological Journal*, 140 (1983), pp. 1-9.
[49] Christopher Evans, 'Soldiering Archaeology: Pitt Rivers and "Militarism"', *Bulletin of the History of Archaeology*, 24:4 (2014), pp. 1-20.

understood to be 'savage' means of warfare, including the development of theories on evolution and the fields of anthropology and sociology, as well as a gradual acceleration of advancement in the manufacture of military technologies in Britain. It also highlights the significant role that he and his contemporaries played in fortifying distinctions between 'civilisation' and 'savagery'.

This chapter traces the catalyst for a growing interest in (and 'racialisation' of) the military productions of non-European military cultures in Britain to the International Exhibition of 1862. Existing studies on nineteenth-century exhibitions in Britain have tended to overlook this exhibition in favour of the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition.[50] If the 1862 Exhibition is discussed, there is limited or no engagement with the military exhibits;[51] and this oversight can also be evidenced in general studies on international exhibitions in Britain during the nineteenth century.[52] This chapter is distinctive in associating the dominant discourse encapsulated by the international exhibitions – the theory of progress – with development in the military arts, and the arguments raised by Pitt Rivers in his lectures, particularly those on 'Primitive Warfare', presented to members of the (Royal) United Service Institution (RUSI)[53] in the late 1860s. These lectures have been mentioned in passing by some scholars,[54] while others have provided a brief descriptive account of their content;[55]

[50] Jeffrey Auerbach, *The Great Exhibition of 1851: A Nation on Display* (New Haven, CT., 1999); Louise Purbrick (ed.), *The Great Exhibition of 1851: New Interdisciplinary Essays* (Manchester, 2001); Jeffrey A. Auerbach and Peter H. Hoffenberg (eds), *Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851* (Aldershot, 2008); Geoffrey Cantor, *Religion and the Great Exhibition of 1851* (Oxford, 2011).
[51] Hermione Hobhouse, *The Crystal Palace and the Great Exhibition: Science, Art and Productive Industry* (2002), pp. 130-8.
[52] See, for instance: Anthony David Edwards, *The Role of International Exhibitions in Britain, 1850-1910* (New York, 2008).
[53] In 1839, the original United Service Museum was renamed the United Service Institution, which changed to the Royal United Service Institution in 1860, due to the attainment of a Royal Charter. For simplicity, hereafter, this dissertation will use the abbreviation RUSI. For the history of this organisation see: Damien P. O'Connor, *Between Peace and War: British Defence and the Royal United Services Institute, 1831-2010* (2011).
[54] Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, p. 21; Evans, 'Soldiering Archaeology', pp. 1, 9, 12.
[55] Thompson, *General Pitt-Rivers*, pp. 35-7; William Ryan Chapman, 'Arranging Ethnology: A.H.L.F. Pitt Rivers and the Typological Collection', in George W. Stocking (ed.), *History of Anthropology: Objects and Others: Essays on Museums and Material Culture* (Madison, 1988), pp. 30-3; William Chapman, "'Like a game of dominoes": Augustus Pitt Rivers and the Typological Museum Idea', in Susan M. Pearce (ed.), *Museums Economics and the Community* (1991), pp. 148-50.

however, to date, they have not been analysed in sufficient detail to clarify how Pitt Rivers understood and distinguished between 'savage' and 'civilised' weaponry. This chapter argues that the theories developed by Pitt Rivers exemplify an important shift with regard to understandings of non-European weapons of warfare in Britain. While such forms of material culture were predominantly used as visual accompaniments to elevate the 'authenticity' of spectacles in the early to mid-nineteenth century, in his work Pitt Rivers explicitly associated military productions with racial understandings of human development. In so doing, he established specific markers that indicated the manner in which the 'civilised' military arts of the British contrasted with 'savage' productions. Pitt Rivers' theories not only reinforced a distinction between 'savagery' and 'civilisation'; they also provided further justification for those seeking to re-assert a belief in British military superiority.

The practicalities of and public opinion on 'savage warfare' are the focus of the fourth chapter of this dissertation. The first section concentrates on an analysis of the experiences and writings of the explorer and adventurer Sir Samuel White Baker (1821-1893). Baker undertook a number of military campaigns in Equatorial Africa between 1869-1873 at the behest of the Khedive of Egypt, Ismail Said (1830-1895) in order to suppress the slave trade and extend the influence of the Khedive throughout the region. He forms the primary case study of this chapter as he was one of the first figures to utilise the notion of 'savage warfare' when discussing his experiences in a series of lectures upon his return to England in 1873. As military historians have tended to focus upon figures associated professionally with the British armed forces as an institution, Baker's influence and contribution to the public discourse regarding colonial warfare has been overlooked. His achievements demonstrate that discussions and debates upon the tactics of the 'savage' warrior, as well as the appropriate means by which they should be fought against on the

battlefield, can be traced in Victorian literature long prior to the publication of Callwell's *Small Wars*. While Baker's experiences in Equatorial Africa have been comprehensively narrated in broader studies on British exploration of Egypt and the source of the River Nile,[56] as well as hagiographical accounts,[57] such studies do not discuss the pioneering contribution that Baker made to deliberations on 'savage warfare' in the aftermath of his military campaigns in Equatorial Africa, nor do they analyse his published works in light of this particular theme.

A comparative analysis of the practicalities of 'savage warfare' as discussed by Baker, Callwell, and Colonel John Cox Gawler (who wrote of his experiences commanding a punitive expedition into Sikhim, situated in the Eastern Himalayan Mountains, in 1861)[58] concludes the first section of this chapter. Within the last decade there has been a flourishing of literature on the history and doctrine of British engagement in 'small wars' (also termed counter-insurgency campaigns or 'low intensity conflicts').[59] Such literature has arisen due to the keenness of modern militaries to gather insights from historical conflicts in order to come to terms with contemporary missions such as those fought by multinational forces in the Middle East; and historical accounts – supplemented with cultural and anthropological studies – have often framed perceptions of how contemporary opponents have (and therefore should) be fought against.[60] Baker or Gawler are not mentioned in any of these works, and while Callwell is sometimes discussed in passing, or

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[56] Dominic Green, *Armies of God: Islam and Empire on the Nile, 1869-1899* (2008); Alice Moore-Harell, *Egypt's African Empire: Samuel Baker, Charles Gordon, and the Creation of Equatoria* (Eastbourne, 2010); Tim Jeal, *Explorers of the Nile: The Triumph and Tragedy of a Great Victorian Adventure* (New Haven, 2011).
[57] Michael Brander, *The Perfect Victorian Hero: Samuel White Baker* (Edinburgh, 1982); M.J. Trow, *The Adventures of Sir Samuel White Baker: Victorian Hero* (Barnsley, 2010).
[58] Colonel J.C. Gawler, *Sikhim: With Hints on Mountain and Jungle Warfare* (1873).
[59] Hew Strachan (ed.), *Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the Twentieth Century* (2006); Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 4-5; Matthew Hughes (ed.), *British Ways of Counter-insurgency: A Historical Perspective* (2013).
[60] Porter, *Military Orientalism*, pp. 6-10; Johnson, *The Afghan Way of War*, pp. 3-4, 299-301. Johnson has noted that '[i]n the attempt to make these direct comparisons, history is selected and reduced to stereotype: Afghanistan is rendered simply as the "graveyard of empires" and therefore, by definition, a hopeless, irredeemable place of perpetual conflict … the Afghans themselves are reduced to manageable categories and attributed with timeless characteristics', p. 299.

is raised as a starting-point for these studies, they predominantly focus upon conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as well as the influence and inspiration of the renowned British military officer T.E. Lawrence (1888-1935) on modern approaches to countering insurgencies.[61]

Tim Moreman's exceptional study *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947* (1998) provides a point of departure for this section. While Moreman did not elaborate upon the broader intellectual and cultural context of the use of 'savage'/'civilised' terminology (and at times reproduced it in his own work) he provided an insight into the practical measures and training (or lack thereof) undertaken by the British Indian Army who fought regularly on the North-West Frontier in order to demonstrate how those on the ground gradually recognised the unique characteristics of 'savage' wars. The discussion in this section differs from Moreman's work by focusing upon the context of Equatorial Africa, and does not limit the analysis to the experiences of the British Indian Army. Furthermore, it develops some of Moreman's observations in order to clarify why the British did not endeavour to compile an authoritative doctrine on 'savage' wars prior to the publication of Callwell's work, despite the earnest attempts by military practitioners to discuss their unique operational issues.

The particular principles espoused by Callwell have been used by Hew Strachan and Edward M. Spiers as a foil by which to highlight the common practical concerns that colonial warfare raised in the nineteenth century.[62] However, although Strachan has noted that such wars were often fought by European powers with a 'sense of racial superiority', in neither work is this dimension explored in any detail, nor is the discourse on 'small wars'

[61] Malcolm Brown (ed.), *T.E. Lawrence in War and Peace* (2005), pp. 42-7. See also: *The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago, 2007).
[62] Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, pp. 272-300.

placed in the wider intellectual and cultural context of Victorian Britain.[63] Daniel Whittingham is one of the few scholars to have closely analysed the work and influence of Callwell; yet he has not compared Callwell's ideas with contemporary works on the practicalities of colonial conflicts.[64] While Spiers, Moreman, Whittingham and Howard Bailes[65] have recognised the existence of such works, this section of the dissertation presents the first attempt to compare and contrast how the practicalities of 'savage warfare' were discussed in these writings. Through such an analysis, this section interrogates the claim that the 'diversity' of 'savage' wars precluded the development of an official British doctrine on such warfare[66] (which was not introduced until 1909 with the publication of the British Army's *Field Service Regulations*)[67] and suggests further reasons as to why this was the case.

While the first section of this chapter provides an introduction and analysis of the practicalities of 'savage warfare', the second part returns to the case study of Sir Samuel White Baker to emphasise that questions on the morality of 'savage' military campaigns were raised by the Victorian public (a theme which is continued in chapter five). Although John M. MacKenzie recognised that 'colonial campaigns of the nineteenth century were the subject of fierce moralising, a particularly intense justificatory process',[68] and scholarly works on the British anti-imperialist and pacifist movements have acknowledged that

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[63] Hew Strachan, 'Colonial Warfare, and its Contribution to the Art of War in Europe', in *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (1983), pp. 76-89.
[64] Daniel Whittingham, '"Savage Warfare": C.E. Callwell, the Roots of Counter-insurgency, and the Nineteenth Century Context', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 23:4-5 (2012), pp. 591-607; Daniel Whittingham, 'Warrior-Scholarship in the Age of Colonial Warfare: Charles E. Callwell and Small Wars', in Andrew Mumford and Bruno C. Reis (eds), *The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior Scholars in Counter-Insurgency* (2014), pp. 18-34.
[65] Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, p. 279; Moreman, *The Army in India*, pp. xx, 40-1. Whittingham, '"Savage Warfare"', p. 592; Whittingham, 'Warrior Scholarship', p. 29; Howard Bailes, 'Technology and Tactics in the British Army, 1866-1900', in Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson (eds), *Men, Machines & War* (Waterloo, Ontario, 1988), pp. 353-6.
[66] This is a point suggested by Moreman, *The Army in India*, p. xviii.
[67] War Office, *Field Service Regulations, Part 1: Operations* (1909).
[68] John M. MacKenzie, *Popular Imperialism and the Military, 1850-1950* (Manchester, 1992), p. 4.

colonial warfare was, at times, the focus of public criticism,[69] such histories do not analyse these arguments through the paradigm of discourses on 'civilised' and 'savage warfare'. Furthermore, existing studies have tended to overlook the ways in which military practitioners justified their actions in nineteenth-century colonial conflicts through the use of a discourse associated with the 'just war' tradition.[70] This particular tradition provides a framework for the judgement of the justice of resorting to war (*jus ad bellum*) and the means used during its undertaking (*jus in bello*). Scholars continue to debate the significance and applicability of the criteria subsumed under *jus ad bellum* in particular; however, it is generally understood to encompass the following: just cause, right intention, legitimate authority, proportionality, last resort and reasonable hope of success.[71] Although nineteenth-century military figures and public commentators may not have expressly referred to this particular tradition, the issues they raised – such as whether British military actions were undertaken in self-defence; whether such measures were proportionate to the task at hand; and what appropriate weapons could (and should) be used against 'savage' opponents – are encompassed in this analytical framework. Importantly, Baker's use of military measures to suppress the slave trade inspired great discussion and debate in periodical literature on these themes, especially in the aftermath of the publication of his account, *Ismailia: A Narrative of the Expedition to Central Africa for the Suppression of the Slave*

[69] Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire: British Radicals and the Imperial Challenge* ([1968] 2008); Gregory Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920* (Cambridge, 2007); Mira Matikkala, *Empire and Imperial Ambition: Liberty, Englishness and Anti-Imperialism in Late-Victorian Britain* (2011); Martin Ceadel, *Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations* (Oxford, 2000); Paul Laity, *The British Peace Movement, 1870-1914* (Oxford, 2001).

[70] Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 4th edition (New York, [1977] 2007); James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton, N.J., 1981); Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman (eds), *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (1994); Gregory M. Reichberg and Henrik Syse (eds), *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford, 2006).

[71] Howard M. Hensel, 'Theocentric Natural Law and Just War Doctrine', in Howard M. Hensel (ed.), *The Legitimate Use of Military Force* (Farnham, 2016), pp. 5-6. Hensel introduced further criteria, and some scholars have argued for the importance of introducing a category of *jus post bellum*, while in his work *On the Ethics of War and Terrorism* (Oxford, 2007) the philosopher Uwe Steinhoff claimed that *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* should not be considered distinct categories.

Trade, first published in 1874 in two volumes.[72] An analysis of this literature demonstrates that such criticism was not exclusively driven by pacifist arguments, and that Victorian commentators were willing frankly to admit to the contradictions and tensions raised by the attainment of the 'civilising mission' by 'uncivilised' means. Furthermore this chapter shows that public criticism led Baker in his revised single-volume account of *Ismailia* (published in 1879) to justify more forcefully what he perceived to be the morality of his use of military force to suppress the slave trade, despite the existence of an understanding that he was undertaking military expeditions against 'savage' foes.

In establishing that 'savage' wars were indeed discussed from the perspective of military ethics during the nineteenth century, the final chapter interrogates the claim made by Victorian commentators including Sir Samuel White Baker, Captain Frederick William von Herbert, Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wintle and Colonel Lonsdale Augustus Hale that a code of military ethics could not exist between combatants that were understood to represent different levels of the civilisational hierarchy. As this argument was often illustrated by the example of the British and the Zulu, the first section of this chapter begins with the case study of the Anglo-Zulu War (1879). Through an examination of the discourse surrounding this particular conflict, this section further undermines any supposed clarity in the 'civilised'/'savage' divide: although fought against an 'uncivilised' enemy, instigators of the war emphasised the morality of the conflict; commentators recognised that the Zulu abided by moral standards, and discussed the cultural significance of customs deemed by some as identifiers of their 'savagery' (such as disembowelment); and British 'uncivilised' actions were correspondingly denounced in public commentaries on the war. By examining the criticism of figures who opposed the undertaking of the conflict – including the historian and priest George William Cox (1827-1902); the theologian and Bishop of Natal John William Colenso (1814-83); his daughter, the author Frances Ellen Colenso (1849-87);

[72] Samuel White Baker, *Ismailia*, 1st edition (2 vols, Cambridge, 1874).

and the liberal statesman and editor John Morley (1838-1923) – the first section of this chapter demonstrates that such commentators did recognise the existence of moral law in 'savage' life, thus further challenging the perception that an uncontested distinction existed between the 'civilised' British and their 'savage' opponents.

While the Anglo-Zulu War inspired a rich contemporary moral debate, scholarly works and popular military histories have made only sporadic references to British and Zulu ethical (or unethical) military behaviour and therefore fall short of any sustained analysis on this issue.[73] John Laband discussed briefly the British use of a 'scorched earth policy' and Adrian Greaves and Xolani Mkhize have noted in passing the British use of 'dynamite tactics' against the Zulu.[74] Michael Lieven provided an exceptional starting-point for discussions on unethical military behaviour by the British, limiting his analysis, however, to what he identified as a British 'strategy of total war', and not examining debates on *jus ad bellum* in any detail.[75] This chapter examines the deliberations that arose on the morality of the Anglo-Zulu War both in *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* senses, and expands on Lieven's work by placing it within the wider context of the discourse about the perceived nature of 'civilised' and 'savage warfare'.

The second section of this final chapter focuses upon the writings of James Anson Farrer (1849-1925), a lawyer and scholar who contributed the most detailed defence of the existence of moral law and an understanding of ethics of warfare in 'savage' life in two published works, *Primitive Manners and Customs* (1879) and *Military Manners and Customs*

[73] See: Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics*, p. 109; Matikkala, *Empire and Imperial Ambition*, p. 3; Ceadel, *Semi-Detached Idealists*, p. 109; Laity, *The British Peace Movement*, pp. 82-3. Most of the mid-to-late nineteenth-century figures explored by such works were more vocal on discussing the morality of undertaking the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the First World War.
[74] John Laband, *Zulu Warriors: The Battle for the South African Frontier* (2014), pp. 252-4; Adrian Greaves and Xolani Mkhize, *The Tribe that Washed its Spears: The Zulus at War* (Barnsley, 2013), p. 170.
[75] Michael Lieven, "'Butchering the Brutes All Over the Place": Total War and Massacre in Zululand, 1879', *History*, 84:276 (1999), pp. 614-32.

(1885).[76] To date, Farrer's writings have not been studied in any respect; uncovering them provides an important and often overlooked dimension to existing scholarship on the anti-imperialist and pacifist movements in Britain during the mid-to-late nineteenth century. While Farrer's 1879 work was met with public support, his *Military Manners and Customs*, published five years later, was challenged severely by critics. This chapter argues that the poor reception of Farrer's latter work reflects a wider intellectual and cultural shift in late-nineteenth-century Britain whereby sympathetic portrayals of the 'savage' gave way to a revival of currents favouring popular imperialism and 'scientific racism'. Such an intellectual climate ultimately led to the prevalence of critical perspectives over sympathetic and respectful portrayals.

As the overall theme of tracing the discourse on 'savage warfare' has been unexplored in existing academic literature, this chapter concludes with a distinctive synthesis of scholarship on race and the idea of war as a 'civiliser'; the rhetoric of professionalisation of the disciplines of science and anthropology; the development of British military doctrine on 'savage warfare'; and the history of popular imperialism from the mid-1880s to the late-1890s.[77] Despite (and in part because of) concurrent intellectual ideas emphasising fears of British decline, these developments, alongside the publication of Callwell's authoritative work, and the arguments put forward by British military representatives at the 1899 International Peace Conference at the Hague defending their right to use the severely damaging expanding bullets against 'savage' foes, mark the triumph of the discourse fortifying distinctions between 'civilisation' and 'savagery' at the turn of the century.

IV

[76] James A. Farrer, *Primitive Manners and Customs* (1879); James Anson Farrer, *Military Manners and Customs* (1885).
[77] Douglas A. Lorimer, *Science, Race Relations and Resistance: Britain, 1870-1914* (Manchester, 2013); Moreman, *The Army in India*; Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*; Michael Paris, *Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850-2000* (2000).

This dissertation presents the first detailed analysis of the complex manner in which the 'savage' warrior and 'savage warfare' were perceived in Britain throughout the nineteenth century. Primarily based on qualitative textual analysis,[78] the idea of 'savagery' is placed within the context of nineteenth-century intellectual, cultural, imperial and military history, in order to examine how perceptions of non-European military organisation and capabilities, means of warfare, and adherence to military ethics were influenced by the expansion of the British Empire, the gradual development of the field of anthropology, intellectual currents such as scientific racism, and British engagement in numerous colonial wars. As well as challenging conventional periodisation of the development of colonial racism and anti-humanitarian discourse throughout the nineteenth century, this dissertation reinforces critiques of the antecedents to the 'Western way of war thesis' (or 'cultural determinism') by articulating ways in which perceived 'savage'/'civilised' distinctions were textually and visually undermined, and demonstrating that the British regularly reflected upon and adapted their war-making. It also contributes to literature highlighting the ambiguous nature of 'orientalism' by emphasising the temporal and geographical dynamism of the concept of 'savagery' and demonstrating that knowledge of non-European warrior cultures remained open to challenges, revisions and re-appraisals through chronicling the debates on the morality of 'savage' wars throughout the period. The four contested themes that interweave throughout the five chapters – the 'civilising mission', 'differentiation', 'reciprocity' and 'cultural determinism' – provide a framework for the conclusion.

[78] Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory*, 8:1 (1969), pp. 3-53.

Chapter One: The 'Savage' Warrior on Display

Representations of African Warriors of the Cape

Introduction

In 1797 the governor of the Cape Colony Lord Macartney (1737-1806) sent his private secretary Sir John Barrow (1764-1848) on a mission to establish contact with the indigenous tribes inhabiting the land recently occupied by the British. For almost seven months Barrow traversed over three thousand miles of the country, meticulously recording his observations which ranged from natural history (including the colours and fragrances of flowers and the flavour and qualities of local fruits) to impressions of the physical, moral and military characteristics of the inhabitants of the region.[79] In his memoirs, published a year prior to his death in 1848, Barrow reflected on the appropriateness and significance of his appointment:

> His Lordship certainly could not have proposed anything more accordant with my wishes, or more agreeable to my feelings, than to be the means and to have the opportunity of exploring a most interesting portion of the globe so little, and that little so imperfectly, known. Indeed, I was overjoyed to find myself the happy individual selected.[80]

At the turn of the century there were many figures – including travellers, colonial administrators, military practitioners and missionaries – who, while at the imperial periphery, shared Barrow's sense of purpose. Upon their return to Britain they often brought with them tales of imperial travel and adventure, as well as material curiosities –

[79] *An Autobiographical Memoir of Sir John Barrow, Bart., Late of the Admiralty* (1847), p. 210.
[80] Ibid., p. 142.

including natural history specimens and ethnographic materials of non-European cultures. The circulation and display of such knowledge within the metropole stoked public interest and fascination with the world beyond Britain. Local Londoners did not have to venture far to see representations of the exotic: at the East India House Museum in Leadenhall Street they could see 'native weapons, … Burmese and Javanese musical instruments, Buddhist religious objects… and a number of glass cases illustrating Indian natural history'.[81] Members of the British armed forces especially wished to be seen as contributing to the 'spirit of the age' – that is, to the gathering of knowledge of other cultures and the natural world. So popular was the collection of objects, curiosities and natural history specimens by military practitioners whilst garrisoning the Empire overseas that in 1831 the United Service Museum[82] was established to provide a repository for such discoveries and foster a sense of professionalism and moral behaviour, especially amongst new recruits.[83] Such endeavours reveal how porous the boundaries were between the British military and the development of a wider knowledge culture in the nineteenth century. This determined interest in collecting knowledge was certainly not limited to this period; the desire for collecting wonders of the world, historically relevant artefacts, and general curiosities can be traced from the 1600s to the mid-1850s. The period from the early eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century did, however, give rise to the gradual commodification and democratisation of such practices, as well as the broadening of public access to such materials from antiquarians and 'virtuosos' to people of all social classes.[84]

In addition to the publication of textual accounts and the circulation of material objects, non-European peoples – regularly referred to as 'savages' irrespective of their cultural and

[81] Altick, *The Shows of London*, pp. 299, 305; Barbara J. Black, *On Exhibit* (2000), pp. 23-5.
[82] On display at the museum one could find 'magnificent creeses, yattaghans, and daggers, from Syria and adjacent countries', a Damascus sabre, 'with undulated edge, the hilt formed of rhinoceros horn, with a verse of the Koran on the blade', and Chinese 'trophies', among many other items. See: Bosquecillo, *A Visit to the United Service Institution*, p. 7; 'The United Service Institution', *ILN*, 9 March 1844, p. 149.
[83] A North Coaster, 'To the Editor of the United Service Journal', *USJ*, 1, 1830, p. 367.
[84] Altick, *The Shows of London*, pp. 5-34, *passim*. See also: Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Conquest and Collecting in the East, 1750-1850* (2005).

national backgrounds – were also brought to Britain. In 1810, Sartje, known locally as the 'Hottentot Venus from South Africa' was 'displayed' for the viewing public at Number 225, Piccadilly, inspiring curiosity, but also sympathy from some spectators who believed her to be unlawfully incarcerated.[85] While detailed studies exist on the display of non-European cultures in Britain during the nineteenth century, such studies have not generally focused upon the manner in which the military characteristics of those considered to be 'savages' were discussed. This chapter illuminates the changing discourse surrounding three South African warrior cultures – the San, Khoi, and Xhosa, who were referred to in contemporary accounts as Bushmen/Bosjesmen, Hottentots and Kaffers/Kaffirs, respectively.[86]

Through an analysis of textual accounts written by figures such as John Barrow and the military administrator Richard Barnard Fisher, the first section of this chapter demonstrates that commentaries on warrior cultures were influenced not only by changing contemporary ideas on race, physiognomy and anatomy, but also by fluctuations in British military and imperial policies in South Africa. Furthermore, this section shows that despite persistent conflicts between Britain and the indigenous Xhosa of the Cape, and growing settler disillusionment, regular public affirmations of humanitarian sentiment can be traced until the mid-to-late 1840s, complicating ideas of 'savagery'.

The second part of this chapter examines the interrelationship between the display of indigenous African warriors in London, and the commentaries such exhibitions inspired. It

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[85] Janell Hobson, 'Venus and the Hottentot: The Emergence of an Icon', in *Venus in the Dark: Blackness and Beauty in Popular Culture* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 19-54.

[86] This chapter will refer to each culture by its more accepted terminology, unless reproducing contemporary source literature. Modern scholars often subsume the San and Khoi cultures by referring to both collectively as 'Khoisan'; however for the purposes of this dissertation, it is important to retain what was originally perceived to be the individuality of the three cultures in British sources, which would later be challenged in the 1830s and 1840s. For a detailed examination of the complex nature of African tribal identity in the Cape and its surrounding regions due to Dutch and British colonial incursions onto indigenous land see: Elizabeth Elbourne, *Blood Ground: Colonialism, Missions, and the Contest for Christianity in the Cape Colony and Britain, 1799-1853* (2002), pp. 71-6.

argues that the display of the San in particular facilitated the dissemination of an existing polygenecist discourse which included the suggestion that African cultures were more akin to animal species, which, in turn, influenced broader commentaries on their perceived military attributes. The display of the San and the facilitation of this discourse coincided with the broader development of pessimistic attitudes towards indigenous African warrior cultures in Britain and the Cape, as well as growing criticism of liberal humanitarianism and the concept of the 'noble savage'. Such criticism began to emerge from the mid-to-late 1840s, and can be evidenced in the writings of figures including the ethnologist Robert Knox, the author Charles Dickens, as well as military practitioners who fought against the Xhosa, such as Lieutenant-Colonel E. Elers Napier. This chapter further demonstrates that this shift was influenced by what scholars have identified as a 'conservative consensus' on the 'civilising' potential of native Africans which grew not only amongst commentators in the metropole, but also amongst settlers and missionaries in the Cape, in response to persistent indigenous spiritual and military resistance.[87]

This case study represents but one of the individual threads that contribute to the intricacies of the idea of the 'savage' warrior in the nineteenth century. It provides an important starting-point which highlights the incoherence of the perceived distinction between 'civilisation' and 'savagery', as well as the fact that understandings of the 'savage' warrior and colonial racism throughout this period did not follow a linear developmental trajectory. Furthermore, it contributes to scholarship that has sought to destabilise conventional chronologies which have considered the period from the late 1850s to the mid-1860s to have been the crucial one for the questioning of humanitarianism and the hardening of racial prejudice, coinciding with the further expansion of the British Empire.[88] This chapter challenges such periodisation by showing that humanitarian disillusionment

[87] Strobel, *Testing Grounds of Modern Empire*, p. 83.
[88] As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, conventional periodisation has been critiqued by Bank, 'Losing Faith in the Civilizing Mission', pp. 364-7.

and a parallel critique of the military attributes of the 'savage' warrior emerged prior to this period. The complexity of this chronology will be further evidenced in chapters four and five of this dissertation which show that despite such strong anti-humanitarian sentiment during this earlier period, faith in the 'civilising mission' re-emerged with great force in the early 1870s, and a recognition of the 'moral life' of 'savages' can also be traced in public discourse at the time of the Anglo-Zulu War (1879). The importance of a 'meaning in context' approach with regard to tracing the discourse on the 'savage' warrior is also demonstrated in this chapter. When such discourse is contextualised, it becomes evident that meanings and understandings of 'savagery' were influenced by personal political agendas, developing military policies, the emergence of broader theories on race and human difference at the metropole, as well as the particularities of 'events on the ground' at the imperial periphery.

This chapter begins by examining one of the earliest nineteenth-century textual discussions on the Cape Frontier written by John Barrow and entitled *An Account of Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa in the Years 1797 and 1798*. First published in 1801, Barrow's work provides an important very early nineteenth-century study of the native inhabitants of the Cape which established a contemporary reputation that endured for decades.[89] In this chapter, Barrow's *Travels* will be contrasted with portrayals that emerged later in the century in order to emphasise the changing discourse of the 'savage' warrior.

Barrow's 'Noble' African Warriors

The British first occupied the Cape in 1795, taking advantage of South Africa's strategic importance in the aftermath of the fall of the Netherlands to the French Army during the

[89] John Barrow, *An Account of Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa in the Years 1797 and 1798* (1801). Hereafter, *Travels*.

Napoleonic Wars.[90] During his time in South Africa, Barrow collected regional intelligence that was later passed on to the Secretary of State at War (1794-1801), Henry Dundas (1742-1811).[91] Barrow's work was clearly intended to promote the cause of the British in maintaining a presence in the region; his book was dedicated to Dundas, and Barrow's opening remarks in chapter one highlight not only the Cape's commercial and strategic advantages, but also its ideal location as a military post to provide an area of respite for troops on active service in India, or to acclimatise troops from Europe destined for service there.[92] However, significantly, Barrow's characterisations of the indigenous population of the Cape were not solely influenced by political concerns. As this chapter shows, Barrow made distinctions between the nature and character of the three warrior cultures, the San, Khoi and Xhosa, which were not merely determined by their 'civilising' potential or usefulness as allies for British colonial expansion; for the physical and military attributes of the Xhosa, an enemy of the British, Barrow retained his highest praise.

Importantly, tensions amongst the British and the Boers influenced the manner in which the San in particular were discussed. According to Barrow, the 'disposition' of the San was 'lively and chearful; in his person active. His talents are far above mediocrity; and, averse to idleness, they are seldom without employment'.[93] As the San were neither land cultivators nor cattle breeders, Barrow argued that in times of desperation due to a lack of subsistence, they were 'driven to the necessity of hazarding a toilsome and dangerous expedition of plunder into the colony'. It was this form of existence that Barrow argued 'naturally leads to habits of cruelty'. However, tellingly, Barrow suggested that this was not the original nature of the San, but that their violent treatment at the hands of the Boers had not only

[90] John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 220.
[91] J.M.R. Cameron, 'Barrow, Sir John, First Baronet (1764-1848)', *ODNB*, 2008, http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2167/view/article/1544, accessed 14 July 2016.
[92] Barrow, *An Account*, pp. 1-2.
[93] Ibid., p. 283.

altered their character, but also made their 'cruelty' in kind during acts of plunder understandable:

> … in the eye of political justice it may be considered as a crime for a starving family, driven by imperious want to the necessity of taking the property of another who has perhaps more than he can possibly use, yet in the law of nature the offence is venial…. [T]he Bosjesmans for their conduct have not only the plea of nature and humanity, but also that of retribution. They were driven out of their own country, their children seized and carried into slavery, by the people on whom they now commit their depredations, and on whom they naturally take every occasion of exercising their revenge.[94]

The San are here portrayed as not inherently violently 'savage'. Rather their natural 'timid' state had been 'subdued'.[95] Barrow claimed that the San's 'very altered disposition from that of the nation at large' could be evidenced in their 'barbarity' against black slaves of Boer farmers:

> Should they seize a Hottentot [Khoi] guarding his master's cattle, not contented with putting him to immediate death, they torture him by every means of cruelty that their invention can frame, as drawing out his bowels, tearing off his nails, scalping, and other acts equally savage. Even the poor animals they steal are treated in a most barbarous and unfeeling manner….[96]

It is highly likely that Barrow chose to emphasise that the San's cruelty was the result of their violent treatment by the Boers in order to provide a further justification for British interests in the region. Indeed, Barrow took pains to narrate examples of such abuse in his account, claiming, for instance that 'a [Boer] farmer thinks he cannot proclaim a more meritorious action than the murder of one of these people [the San]'.[97] As will be shown, the severity of the characterisations of the Boers would alter in concert with changing opinions of the 'civilising' potential of the native inhabitants of the Cape: an account

[94] Ibid., p. 285.
[95] Ibid., p. 286.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid., p. 85.

written by Lieutenant Colonel E. Elers Napier (1808-70) in the late 1840s – a figure who expressed pessimism with regard to the 'civilising mission' – claimed that the Boers were 'rude and untutored' but also 'brave, hospitable and kind'.[98] Elers Napier sought to defend the Boers by arguing that they were 'often forced in self-defence to adopt severe retaliatory measures against their barbarous foes', and were 'as a body perfectly incapable of perpetrating those cruel acts so calumniously laid to their charge'.[99] Furthermore, Elers Napier quoted Barrow to justify his view that the Boers undertook such actions with 'reluctance'. An examination of Barrow's use of the term in his work, however, suggests a different interpretation; not that such violence was used in a 'reluctant' manner, but rather that *service* in expeditions against the San was 'at all times taken with reluctance, especially by… [those who] were least exposed to the attacks of the savages'.[100] Elers Napier arguably sought to misrepresent Barrow – a figure still considered to be an authority on the Cape decades after the publication of his account – in order to conform with the specific prevailing critical intellectual and political climate of the late 1840s.

Despite their perceived 'savagery', Barrow did not deny the San a sense of courage and willingness to sacrifice their lives to assist non-combatants to escape in the midst of attacks by the Boers. Their military exploits were framed not only as ethical, but also rational pursuits. Despite the fact that they were driven by desperation to 'plunder', such activities were understood by Barrow to have been conducted in a reasoned, organised manner: when 'pursued, they always divide; one party to drive away the cattle, while the other continues to harass the pursuers…'.[101] Furthermore, Barrow chose to narrate the complexities involved in fashioning poisoned arrows – the key military implement of the

[98] Lt.-Colonel E. Elers Napier, *Excursions in Southern Africa, Including a History of the Cape Colony, an Account of the Native Tribes, Etc.* (2 vols, 1849), i, pp. 129-30. Hereafter, *Excursions*. Elers Napier was the son of Lieutenant Edward Elers of the Royal Navy, who died in 1814. He took the name Napier after his mother re-married Admiral Sir Charles Napier (1786-1860) in 1815.
[99] Ibid., p. 130.
[100] Barrow, *An Account*, pp. 234-5.
[101] Ibid., pp. 286-7.

San – including the expertise required to distinguish between the most effective poisons drawn from native flora and fauna.[102] Abiding by a code of military ethics, organisation, pragmatism, and innovation in the military arts were all indicators of a 'civilised' warrior culture, and understood by him in these terms. Yet, as this chapter shows, such military attributes would later be either denied or re-interpreted to correlate with the negative public impressions of the San which were partly generated by their physical display in London exhibition halls.

With regard to the Khoi [Hottentots], although Barrow agreed that their position on the 'scale of humanity' was 'low', and he did not consider their appearance to be 'prepossessing', he believed that they were

> … a mild, quiet, and timid people; perfectly harmless, honest, faithful; and, though extremely phlegmatic, they are kind and affectionate to each other, and not incapable of strong attachments. A Hottentot would share his last morsel with his companions. They have little of that kind of art or cunning that savages generally possess.[103]

The Khoi were placed under greater scrutiny by Barrow due to the fact that under the governorship of General Sir James Craig (1748-1812),[104] the British had established a 'Hottentot' or 'Cape Corps' during their first occupation, which was renamed the Cape Regiment in 1801.[105] Khoi soldiers were recruited by the British primarily to foster local support against potential Boer rebellion.[106] Although they were initially 'employed to cook, and perform other menial offices for the soldiers', they were established into a corps under the guidance of Lieutenant John Campbell (98th Foot), and first assisted in the suppression

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[102] Ibid., pp. 141-2, 270.
[103] Ibid., pp. 151-2.
[104] Craig was governor of the Cape for two years after British occupation in 1795, for which he was awarded an Order of the Bath. James Sturgis, 'Craig, Sir James Henry (1748-1812)', *ODNB*, 2009, http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2167/view/article/6572, accessed 11 July 2016.
[105] *History of the Cape Mounted Riflemen* (1842), p. 11.
[106] Timothy J. Stapleton, *A Military History of South Africa* (3 vols, Oxford, 2013), i, p. 206. It is unclear from contemporary accounts whether the San were recruited within the same corps, and successive secondary sources discussing the Corps generally conflate the two native identities under the term 'Khoisan'.

of a rebellion on the frontier (1797-8) partly as a mounted corps, acting as guides and despatch carriers.[107]

Thus despite his belief in their 'indolence', and claim that they were 'naturally of a fearful and cowardly disposition', Barrow also argued that they were amenable – a theme that would continue throughout successive accounts of the Khoi published in the early to mid-nineteenth century: '[T]hey will run into the face of danger', Barrow claimed, not of their own volition, but rather 'if led on by their superiors'.[108] The Khoi 'were capable of being *formed* into excellent soldiers… the character he [Craig] gave them was that of an orderly, tractable, and faithful body of men; ready on all occasions to obey the orders of their officers with cheerfulness and alacrity'.[109] Here the Khoi were understood to have been transformed from 'savage' warriors into 'soldiers' due to *British* military discipline and organisation; a status that could ultimately only be achieved under the tutelage of a superior, greater civilised, military culture. The Khoi were still, however, believed to be better adapted to this role than other indigenous inhabitants of the region.

Significant in Barrow's discussion of the Khoi and Xhosa is his association of their body and facial characteristics with certain character traits; a preoccupation which can be understood in relation to broader developments in Europe in the fields of physiognomy and comparative anatomy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Physiognomy had been revived as a means by which to gather knowledge – 'a way to access the invisible internal through the external' – by Johann Caspar Lavater (1741-1801), a Swiss poet and philosopher, and popularised through the publication of numerous interpretive 'pocket books'[110] which sought to enlighten the reader how to analyse the features of their

[107] *History of the Cape Mounted Riflemen*, pp. 10-11.
[108] Barrow, *An Account*, p. 152.
[109] Ibid., p. 107. Emphasis added.
[110] See, for instance: John Luffman, *Physiognomical Sketches by Lavater, Engraved from the Original Drawings* (1802).

contemporaries through visual illustrations accompanied by analytical commentary.[111] Barrow was clearly influenced by such accounts: the male Khoi body was said to be 'delicately formed as that of a woman', and to 'mark the[ir] inactive and effeminate mind'.[112] The Xhosa women, however, exhibited '[g]ood temper, animation, and a cheerful turn of mind, [which] beamed in all their countenances'.[113] His further comments touched upon the fields of physiognomy as well as 'craniometry', the reading of human skulls, which had been established by the Dutch and German naturalists Petrus Camper (1722-1789) and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840). While in the late eighteenth century Camper claimed that different races presented a particular 'facial angle'[114] (for an Ancient Greek statue, the standard of 'perfection' was assigned 90 degrees, for Europeans 80 degrees, Africans 70 degrees, and an orangutang 50 degrees) (Figures 1 and 2), Blumenbach assigned particular skull shapes to five races whom he identified as American, Ethiopian, Caucasian, Mongol and Malay (Figure 3).[115] Barrow articulated what he perceived to be a reflection of civilisation in the Xhosa women's high spiritedness, as well as their facial angle which approximated to that of the European:

> The rapid movement of their dark sparkling eyes gave animation to their countenances: their teeth were beautifully white and regular; they had neither the thick lips nor flat noses of Africans in general: and the whole contour of the face and head was equally well formed as those of Europeans; but the most striking feature in their character was a degree of sprightliness, activity, and vivacity, that distinguished them from the women of most nations but little civilized….[116]

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111 Sharrona Pearl, *About Faces: Physiognomy in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (2010), pp. 11-12; Michael Shortland, 'The Power of a Thousand Eyes: Johann Caspar Lavater's Science of Physiognomical Perception', *Criticism*, 28:4 (1986), pp. 383-5.
112 Barrow, *An Account*, p. 157.
113 Ibid., p. 168.
114 *The Works of the Late Professor Camper, on the Connexion between the Science of Anatomy and the Arts of Drawing, Painting, Statuary, &c. &c.*, T. Cogan (trans), (1794); John S. Haller, *Outcasts from Evolution: Scientific Attitudes of Racial Inferiority, 1859-1900* (Urbana, 1995), pp. 9-11.
115 Jonathan Conlin, *Evolution and the Victorians* (2014), p. 135; Patrick Brantlinger, *Dark Vanishings: Discourse on the Extinction of Primitive Races, 1800-1930* (New York, 2003), pp. 19-20.
116 Barrow, *An Account*, p. 168.

Significantly, prior to this remark, Barrow observed that the 'personal charms' of the Xhosa women 'were not of a very captivating nature, though, getting over the prejudice of colour, which was that of a dark glossy brown, verging on black, several of them might have been accounted handsome'.[117] Barrow's brief recognition of the 'prejudice of colour' hints at a disruption to the eighteenth-century view that there was potential for 'human unity-across-colours', and that 'colour difference' was the result of degeneration due to environmental conditions; all humans were still ancestors of Adam and Eve.[118] As Edward Beasley has argued, during this earlier period, varieties of skin colour were noticed, however Europeans were more likely to distinguish their superiority with regard to religious faith, class (reflected in dress), and technological developments.[119] At the turn of the century, Barrow was writing in a period during which ideas of polygenesis (the notion that different races emerged from different origins) and racial difference – articulated earlier by figures such as the philosophers Voltaire (1694-1778) and David Hume (1711-1776) – were beginning to gather momentum, and a growing interest in 'classification' of the natural world emerged.[120]

However, Barrow's discussion of the Xhosa men during this early nineteenth century period reveals that he maintained a perspective on the 'savage' that was more enlightened. For the Xhosa men, he reserved his fullest praise. He wrote that they 'were the finest figures I ever beheld… tall, robust, and muscular; their habits of life had induced a firmness of carriage, and an open, manly manner, which, added to the good nature that overspread their features, showed them at once to be equally unconscious of fear, suspicion, and treachery'. A young, tall Xhosa man was considered by Barrow to be

> … one of the finest figures that perhaps was ever created. He was a perfect Hercules; and a cast from his body would not have disgraced the

[117] Ibid.
[118] Edward Beasley, *The Victorian Reinvention of Race* (New York, 2010), p. 10. This perspective continued – at least in theory – in evangelical thought.
[119] Ibid., p. 11.
[120] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

> pedestal of that deity in the Farnese palace. Many of them had indeed very much the appearance of bronze figures.[121]

To associate the Xhosa with Hercules – a figure that embodied the ultimate martial qualities of courage and strength in Graeco-Roman mythology, in the form of one of the most famous antique statues, discovered in the mid-sixteenth century and displayed as part of the Farnese collection in Rome[122] – was an extraordinary affirmation of Xhosa military prowess (Figure 4). Later in his work, it is clear that Barrow was willing to concede his respect for the Xhosa because they did not fall in line with his perceptions and expectations of indigenous Africans

in general:

> Though black, or very nearly so, *they have not one line of the African negro in the composition of their persons*. The comparative anatomist might be a little perplexed in placing the skull of a Kaffer in the chain, so ingeniously put together by him, comprehending all the links from the most perfect European to the Ourang-Outang, and thence through all the monkey-tribe. The head of a Kaffer is not elongated: the frontal and the occipital bones form nearly a semicircle; and a line from the forehead to the chin drawn over the nose is convex like that of most Europeans. *In short, had not Nature bestowed upon him the dark-colouring principle that anatomists have discovered to be owing to a certain gelatinous fluid lying between the epidermis and the cuticle, he might have ranked among the first of Europeans*.[123]

While the 'blackness' of the Xhosa might have limited their acceptance in the highest level of the hierarchy of races, Barrow clearly felt greater respect for the Xhosa than for the San and the Khoi. Such respect was related to the fact that the Xhosa exhibited other characteristics and traits, beyond the shape of their skull, which conformed to Barrow's personally-conceived markers of 'civilisation' and 'masculinity'. The Xhosa were understood to be members of a 'state'; soldiering was undertaken when the state demanded

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[121] Barrow, *An Account*, p. 160.
[122] James Dallaway, *Of Statuary and Sculpture Among the Antients* (1816), p. 219.
[123] Barrow, *An Account*, pp. 205-6. Emphasis added.

it; they abided by a code of military ethics, as war was undertaken not for territorial aggrandizement or individual gain, 'but for some direct insult or act of injustice against the whole, or some member of the community'; and their general physical activities – including hunting expeditions – developed their 'erect deportment, and a boldness and openness of expression that indicate nothing like fear'.[124] Importantly, Barrow's understanding of their general lifestyle was framed in an aspirational manner akin to the notion of the 'noble savage',[125] and in contrast to the 'vices' of 'civilisation'. Rather than claiming their nakedness to be a form of 'savage' immodesty, Barrow wrote that 'their body is neither cramped nor encumbered by clothing'. The Xhosa were exalted as embodying the peak of physical health and perfection, as well as values of moderation, purity and 'peace of mind', in stark contrast to the stunted growth, disturbing passions such as jealousy, and 'licentious appetites which proceed frequently more from a depraved imagination than a real natural want', of 'civilised' societies. Barrow emphatically concluded that '[t]here is perhaps no nation on earth, taken collectively, that can produce so fine a race of men as the Kaffers'.[126]

Barrow's *Travels* reflect a nuanced early nineteenth-century perception of the 'savage' warrior, evidently suffused with understandings of European cultural and military superiority, and clearly influenced by contemporary ideas on race, physiognomy and comparative anatomy, yet drawing significant distinctions. While the San's 'habits of cruelty' were justified by Barrow due to their treatment by Boer incursions (thus their 'savagery' was not inherent), and the Khoi were characterised as malleable and effective soldiers under British command, the Xhosa were seen to have naturally embodied traits – physical and psychological – that approximated to Barrow's understanding of military

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[124] Ibid., p. 202.
[125] In his classic work Hoxie Neal Fairchild defined the idea of the 'noble savage' as 'any free and wild being who draws directly from nature['s] virtues which raise doubts as to the value of civilization'. See: *The Noble Savage: A Study in Romantic Naturalism* (New York, [1928] 1961), p. 2. Ter Ellingson, who published a revisionist account of the origins of the concept defined the 'noble savage' as 'a mythic personification of natural goodness by a romantic glorification of savage life', *The Myth of the Noble Savage*, p. 1.
[126] Barrow, *An Account*, pp. 204-5.

excellence. The manner in which Barrow sought to differentiate between the three warrior cultures was not merely influenced by their perceived 'usefulness' as allies for British colonial expansion, as his more favourable characterisation of the Xhosa, in contrast to the Khoi, indicates. Furthermore, Barrow's differentiation between the three indigenous groups can be seen as a greater willingness to acknowledge the cultural complexities of the population of the Cape. As this chapter shows, later commentators, including figures such as Charles Dickens, would by contrast eschew such cultural awareness by grouping together numerous non-European identities and essentialising their perceived 'savage' characteristics in order to establish a broad-ranging critique of the concept of the 'noble savage'.[127]

This chapter now turns to examine a slightly later work, first published in 1814 by the military administrator and amateur anthropologist Richard Barnard Fisher.[128] Fisher's work was – in part – influenced by the work of Barrow, and is significant to examine as it was frequently republished, and it informed a series of popular 'guides' produced to enlighten future British emigrants on the particularities of the region and its indigenous inhabitants.[129] Fisher's pamphlet was, however, more critical than the work of Barrow, which is most likely due to Fisher's emphatic belief in the necessity for the British to establish a permanent settlement in the region.[130] A confidant of the governor of the Cape (1811-1814), General Sir John Cradock (1759-1839), Fisher persistently petitioned the Colonial Office, including figures such as Henry Bathurst (1762-1834), Secretary of State for War

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[127] Charles Dickens, 'The Noble Savage', *Household Words*, 11 June 1853, pp. 337-9.
[128] In 1811, he published *A Sketch of the City of Lisbon, With Observations on the Manners, &c, of the Portuguese*.
[129] See, for instance: *Considerations on the Means of Affording Profitable Employment to the Redundant Population of Great Britain and Ireland, Through the Medium of an Improved and Correct System of Colonization in the British Territories in Southern Africa* (1819, attributed by the *Quarterly Review* to a Mr. Patrick Colquhoun); *A Guide to the Cape of Good Hope, Describing its Geographical Situation, Climate, &c.* (1819); and John Wilson, *The Emigrant's Guide to the Cape of Good Hope* (1819).
[130] Settlement would not be officially instituted as British colonial policy until 1820. This is despite the fact that the Dutch had ceded sovereignty over the Cape to the British in 1814. See: Tim Keegan, *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order* (1996), pp. 61-5.

and the Colonies (1812-1827), to send workers and settlers to the region.[131] To the abolitionist and later MP William Wilberforce (1759-1833) he made calls for the introduction of a British legal and educational system, as well as the Christianisation of the indigenous inhabitants.[132] Prior to exploring Fisher's work in greater detail, this chapter now briefly establishes the political and military context of the Cape from the time of Barrow's account to 1814.

Fisher's 'Savage' African Warriors

After a short period during which the Cape was returned to the Dutch in the aftermath of the Peace of Amiens (1803), the British re-occupied the area in 1806. Tensions simmered between the indigenous population, settlers (Dutch and English) and missionaries, as the interests of each group jostled for attention. Humanitarian figures – including liberal members of the settler population – sought to reinstate the rights of indigenous African labourers and slaves brought to the region. As early as 1809, the Caledon Code was introduced by the governor and Second Earl of Caledon, Du Pre Alexander (1777-1839) to limit the manner in which local and slave labour was controlled by the colonists (including the introduction of 'circuit courts' whereby labourers could raise concerns over maltreatment); however, as some scholars have recognised, it had limited positive effect.[133] Dutch settlers in particular argued against the introduction of such labour regulations, claiming them to be a 'violation of their rights'.[134]

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131 Vincent T. Harlow, 'Cape Colony, 1806-1822', in *The Cambridge History of the British Empire* (8 vols, Cambridge, 1936), viii, pp. 220-1; 'R.B. Fisher, Esqre. to Earl Bathurst', 13 September 1816, in George McCall Theal, *Records of the Cape Colony* (36 vols, 1902), xi, pp. 173-5. Hereafter, *Records*.

132 'R.B. Fisher to William Wilberforce, Esq., M.P.', 13 September 1816, in Theal, *Records* (1902), xi, pp. 176-83.

133 Elbourne, *Blood Ground*, pp. 164-5. Strobel has noted that in such matters 'officials rarely intervened on their behalf and generally sided with the colonists. The code also denied Khoisans the right to own land and required them to carry passes when traveling', *Testing Grounds of Modern Empire*, p. 64.

134 Strobel, *Testing Grounds of Modern Empire*, p. 64.

Military conflicts between the Xhosa and colonial and indigenous forces fighting on behalf of the British over the frontier border escalated tensions throughout the period 1811-1836. Since Dutch settlement, colonial encroachment onto indigenous African lands forced the Xhosa to retaliate through cattle-stealing, a response that was returned in kind by the colonists.[135] In 1811, Governor Cradock ordered the removal of native inhabitants living between the Great Fish Fiver and the Sundays River in the Zuurveld, which was believed to be within the boundary of the Cape Colony,[136] despite the insistence of the Xhosa that the land had indeed been purchased by them from the Dutch in the very late eighteenth century.[137] In 1811, a 'system of retaliation' was introduced to intimidate the Xhosa, the severity of which intensified during what became the Fourth Xhosa War (1811-12). While the orders of Colonel Graham (1778-1821), who led the British and colonial forces, were initially tempered with suggestions of conciliation and 'kind treatment if they comply', continued resistance led to an escalation of violence, and the Xhosa were forced to withdraw in the face of indiscriminate shooting, the capture of African cattle and the destruction of local fields.[138] This was especially the case in the aftermath of the death of Anders Stockenström, the father of the future Cape governor Andries Stockenström, a *landdrost* who commanded a force from his own district and was attacked by the Xhosa during an 'amicable conference' with the Xhosa chiefs in 1811.[139]

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135 Shula Marks and Richard Gray, 'Khoisan and Dutch at the Cape', in *The Cambridge History of Africa* (8 vols Cambridge, 1975), iv, pp. 439-58, *passim*.
136 Donald Moodie, *An Inquiry into the Justice and Expediency of Completing the Publication of the Authentic Records of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, Relative to the Aboriginal Tribes* (1841), pp. 24-5.
137 In 1810 the Xhosa chief Ndlambe had told Anders Stockenström (1757-1811), who had visited him to warn him of the British plans to expel the Xhosa from the Zuurveld, that the land 'had cost him eight hundred oxen, with great emphasis, backed by the councillors, describing the colour, shape of the horns, etcetera, of many of the cattle thus paid'. Quoted in Ben Maclennan, *A Proper Degree of Terror* (Cape Town, 1986), pp. 102-3.
138 Ibid., pp. 102-9.
139 Maclennan suggested that the Xhosa chose to attack Anders Stockenström as they mistrusted his 'talk of an amicable solution', when their messengers had already notified them 'that colonial forces had crossed the Sundays, that blood had been shed, and that some men of importance had already fallen victim to the Boers' guns'. Furthermore, '[t]hey may have felt that the death of such an important official… would strike such a panic as to bring about the retreat of the whole assault force'. Such mistrust was further due to the past treachery of the Dutch who commanded the frontier. Ibid., pp. 104-5.

On 2 January 1812, Graham wrote to Cradock's military secretary Lieutenant-Colonel Reynell: 'My intention is now to attack the savages in a way which I confidently hope will leave a lasting impression on their memories, and show them our vast superiority in all situations'.[140] Detachments of Boers and soldiers of the Cape Regiment were ordered to 'fire on all men Kaffirs' and the Xhosa's food supplies were systematically carried off or burned.[141] As chapter four shows, later in the century, especially in the aftermath of the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849, military commanders and colonial officials would lament the use of such 'scorched earth policy tactics', yet at the same time justify them as being highly appropriate to the conditions of what was by then understood as 'savage warfare'. Indeed, Graham himself claimed to express 'regret [at] the necessity of destroying so many of the savages', yet sought to justify his tactics as necessary, alleging that the Xhosa were deceitful, and that the British always acted on the defence in response to their incursions.[142] While later theorists of 'savage warfare' also emphasised the deceitful nature of the 'savage' enemy warrior, in contrast, they explicitly championed the use of strong *offensive* actions to ensure success during such military operations.

The manner in which Cradock and Graham pursued their policies was undertaken without clear sanction from the Colonial Office, demonstrating the significance of examining the dynamics of colonial conflicts as they unfolded on the front-line. On 20 December 1811 the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies Lord Liverpool (1770-1828) in fact responded to Cradock's initial letter[143] outlining his policy of expulsion by urging restraint and stating:

> It were much to be wished that an arrangement for this purpose could have been amicably concluded, and I trust that every attempt to effect it by conciliation will have failed before compulsion is resorted to. It must

[140] Graham quoted in ibid., p. 112.
[141] Ibid., pp. 112-3.
[142] Ibid., p. 113.
[143] 'Sir John Cradock to the Earl of Liverpool, 18 October 1811', in Theal, *Records* (1901), viii, pp. 179-81.

> be quite unnecessary for me to point out the impolicy of a systematic War with the Caffre Nation, or the little benefit that could possibly be derived from it by the most complete success, and I am convinced that the general Interests of the Settlement would be better promoted by taking measures of precaution against the Marauders and repelling their Intrusions when made than by resorting to general and offensive hostilities.[144]

During the conflict, however, in a triumphant letter to Liverpool written on 7 March 1812 in which he stated 'that the whole of the Kaffir tribes have been expelled from His Majesty's Territories', Cradock sought to further justify his measures: '… conciliatory offers and amicable negotiation appeared hopeless from the menacing conduct of Slambie [Ndlambe] (the principal chief), the warlike array of his followers, and the unprovoked attacks that were made upon some of our detached parties'.[145] Although the successor to Liverpool, Lord Bathurst, upheld his predecessor's serious reservations, ultimately he was required to communicate to Cradock in a somewhat terse letter dated 30 November 1812 that the Crown had sanctioned his approach.[146] Tellingly, however, Bathurst concluded his letter with an emphasis on the alleged 'improvement' that Cradock had 'represent[ed] to have taken place' with regard to the treatment of the San and Khoi by the settlers: '… I cannot but contemplate with satisfaction the impossibility which now exists of perpetrating with impunity any cruelties similar to those which formerly disgraced the Colony'.[147] By 1814, a shift in policy emerged with the incoming Governor Lord Charles Somerset (1767-1831) whose military missions were accompanied by British alliances and accommodations with local leaders of particular Xhosa factions.[148] However, such strategies failed to secure peace on the frontier; once a member of a particular tribe was proclaimed the 'principal

[144] 'The Earl of Liverpool to Sir John Cradock, 20 December 1811', in ibid., pp. 216-18.
[145] 'Sir John Cradock to the Earl of Liverpool, 7 March 1812', in ibid., pp. 353-4.
[146] 'Lord Bathurst to Sir John Cradock, 30 November 1812', in Theal, *Records* (1901), ix, pp. 28-30.
[147] Ibid., p. 30. See also: Maclennan, *A Proper Degree of Terror*, pp. 129-30. He had also congratulated Cradock on the 'eradication of the small pox from the Colony' through the introduction of vaccinations.
[148] Strobel, *Testing Grounds of Modern Empire*, pp. 70-1.

chief' of the Xhosa, inter-tribal hostilities were inflamed as leaders of other factions proceeded to protest and retaliate through violence.[149]

The key text published in 1814 on the military customs of the tribes of South Africa was a pamphlet entitled *The Importance of the Cape of Good Hope, as a Colony to Great Britain* written by Richard Barnard Fisher, a paymaster of the 1st Battalion of the 60th Regiment.[150] Fisher regularly referenced Barrow's earlier account throughout his work and they held similar views of the Boers,[151] as well as of the significance of the Cape for British commercial and strategic interests.[152] However, due to Fisher's belief that the nature of British control in the Cape was precarious during this time, the two works are distinguished by the fact that there is a more critical tone in Fisher's account, especially with regard to his characterisations of the San and Khoi.

In order to emphasise the necessity and practicality of a Cape settlement, Fisher inconsistently either emphasised that the native inhabitants were 'harmless' enough to cohabit with, or that their 'savagery' required them to be further civilised by the British. The Khoi, for instance, were characterised as being so 'poor, dejected, quiet, [and] tame' that they would not present any serious military resistance to British settlers. Although not agreeing with Barrow 'in thinking them so extremely honest and faithful', he did, however, concur with his opinion that although they were 'phlegmatic, they are nevertheless kind and affectionate to each other, and by no means incapable of strong attachments'. Significantly, Fisher chose to misattribute to Barrow the comment that such 'attachments' were especially made 'to the English military, many of the females being known to live with

[149] Roger B. Beck, *The History of South Africa*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 2014), pp. 58-9.
[150] Richard Barnard Fisher, *The Importance of the Cape of Good Hope, as Colony to Great Britain*, 3rd edition ([1814] 1816).
[151] Fisher saw the Boers as 'aggressors, from that selfish, and abominably covetous spirit which they have ever possessed', ibid., pp. 11-12.
[152] Ibid., pp. xi-xii.

English soldiers'.[153] In his account, Barrow had in fact made no allusion to the co-habitation of British soldiers with Khoi women. Such arrangements were known, however, and not generally considered socially or officially unacceptable in the Empire until the mid-nineteenth century, especially in India following the 1857 Rebellion.[154] Fisher presumably chose to mention them in order to further reinforce his view that settlers could successfully integrate into existing Cape society. Alongside such pronouncements, however, he tended to emphasise his impression of the inferiority of the Khoi. They were claimed to have 'little or no memory whatever', and were judged on the basis of his own understanding of the basic tenets of civilisation: their perceived lack of leadership and form of governance, nomadic behaviour, and even '[a] certain dejection… upon all their countenances' were all identifications of their 'savagery', and thus need of British 'civilisation'.[155]

In contrast – and in line with Barrow's account – Fisher retained his highest praise for the Xhosa, who, he claimed, were:

> … totally and entirely distinct, and unlike in every respect, to either of the former. They are a tall, robust, muscular people, their colour a very dark glossy brown bordering on black. … They are a very warlike people, and live, if not quite in a state of social society, yet under some sort of government, under a leader or king, known at present by the name of Gaika, who is represented, if not a man of talent, yet a man of considerable vigour and ability.[156]

It was not only the Xhosa's identifiable leader, form of government, and 'warlike' nature that afforded them greater respect; Fisher distinguished the Khoi and Xhosa on the basis of differences in their complexions: while the Khoi were 'dingy brown',[157] the Xhosa were 'very dark glossy brown bordering on black'. Farhad Dalal has recognised that words such

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[153] Barrow quoted in ibid., pp. 7-8.
[154] On this issue see: Durba Ghosh, *Sex and the Family in Colonial India: The Making of Empire* (Cambridge, 2006); William Dalrymple, *White Mughals* (2002).
[155] Fisher, *The Importance of the Cape*, p. 8.
[156] Ibid., pp. 10-11.
[157] Ibid., p. 8.

as 'black' became 'racialized' (used as nouns) from the seventeenth century onwards.[158] While Barrow's earlier observation of the 'blackness' of the Xhosa merely limited their association with the highest ('white') level of civilisation, Fisher's work suggests that colour hierarchies were not only established between 'white' and 'black'; different shades of the same colour were at this point imbued with ideas of greater or lesser civilisation, purity, and even authenticity. The Khoi were disparaged by Fisher as their complexions did not correspond authentically to the shade of black associated with the more 'civilised' African warrior tribe – the Xhosa.

The works of Barrow and Fisher demonstrate that early nineteenth-century understandings of non-European warrior cultures were not unquestioningly reproduced from prior written accounts (thus establishing a 'hegemonic', unreflective understanding of the 'other').[159] Fisher was clearly influenced by previously published works such as Barrow's (he did not explicitly claim to contest Barrow's account of the Cape, and wrote that his was 'the only book that affords real information, with amusement, on the subject'[160]), yet this did not prevent him from questioning existing understandings, quoting (or misquoting) selectively, or challenging what he perceived to be misrepresentations in order to further his own political agenda. Furthermore, Fisher himself did not maintain a consistent interpretation of the native inhabitants of the Cape. While praising the Xhosa's 'warlike' nature in his pamphlet, in a letter to Earl Bathurst, dated 13 September 1816, this particular trait was re-interpreted, and the Xhosa were now characterised as a military threat to the British. He wrote: 'In its present defenceless State, [the colony]… may be taken by any power, but is most likely, by the Reduction of the Cape Regiment, and other military force there, to

[158] Farhad Dalal, *Race, Colour and the Processes of Racialization* (Florence, 2002), p. 165.
[159] This is a point made by scholars who have challenged Edward Said's polemical notion of 'orientalism', including Reina Lewis, *Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel, and the Ottoman Harem* (New Brunswick, 2004), p. 3.
[160] Fisher, *The Importance of the Cape*, p. vii.

become a *Prey to the revengeful and blood thirsty Caffres*'.[161] It is highly likely that due to the fact that Fisher's calls for a Cape settlement were not immediately heeded by the Colonial Office, and his political agenda was yet to be fulfilled, he now chose to re-cast his account in order to amplify the threat of the Xhosa. Their 'warlike' nature, originally considered a mark of their 'civilisation', was now characterised by a notion of 'savagery', through the suggestion that the Xhosa undertook warfare merely for the desire for vengeance, or to satiate a thirst for blood.

Despite Fisher's generally more critical account, broader characterisations of the native inhabitants of the Cape during this period were infused with a humanitarian sentiment. Fisher's work was severely criticised – alongside what was perceived to be his 'extraordinary degree of ignorance' due to a series of inconsistent statements in his work – in an article discussing a number of books recently published on the Cape in the broadly liberal-conservative periodical the *Quarterly Review* in 1819.[162] The periodical acknowledged that it had been three years since the third edition of Fisher's work had been published; and emphasised the importance of setting out their criticisms – especially of his account of the Khoi – precisely because of the pamphlet's popular influence. This chapter now turns to examining this critique in further detail, and highlights similar public affirmations of humanitarian sentiment with regard to the indigenous populations of the Cape – both locally and abroad – in order to indicate that sympathetic perspectives were prevalent during this period despite regular military conflicts with what were perceived to be 'savage' African warriors. It places such discussions within the context of political and military developments in the region, up to the mid-to-late 1840s, after which an important shift took place, and humanitarian sentiment was challenged by a wave of pessimism. This changing discourse will be traced by examining the commentaries on the display of the San

[161] Fisher to Bathurst, 13 September 1816, p. 174. Emphasis added.
[162] 'Book Reviews - The Cape of Good Hope', *Quarterly Review*, July 1819, pp. 203-46.

as living exhibitions in London, as well as visual and textual representations of the Xhosa which coincided with the undertaking of the Seventh Frontier War.

A Determined Humanitarian Challenge

While agreeing on fundamental issues such as their 'tractable' nature and critiquing their treatment by the Boers, the article in the *Quarterly Review* chose to highlight that it was not only the anti-slavery and missionary movements that had ameliorated the condition of the Khoi, but the influence and experience of British military training. Fisher had suggested in passing that the Khoi were malleable enough to make 'tolerably good soldiers under British officers', and 'expert marksmen, either with spear, bow, or gun'.[163] However, the *Quarterly Review*, arguably influenced by the earlier work of Barrow, went a step further by emphasising specifically that British military discipline had elicited a very important 'civilising' effect on the Khoi:

> General Craig, after the capture of the Cape, brought forward, experimentally, the physical and moral qualities of this degraded race, by forming them into a military corps, and proving how capable they were of strict discipline, obedience, instruction, and, what had least of all been expected, of cleanliness; their clothing, their accoutrements, and their persons, being kept as neat and in as good order as those of the European troops.[164]

Like Barrow's work, the *Quarterly Review's* humanitarian sentiment with regard to the Khoi was, however, still driven by a notion of European cultural superiority underpinning the 'civilising mission' which sought to transform Africans by encouraging them to abandon indigenous customs and embrace British Christian cultural, social and moral values. Had the Khoi been given access to cocoa-nut oil, it was claimed, they 'would, no doubt, have made use of these ingredients' rather than animal fat as a protection from the sun and insects bites; the former practice was considered to be more 'civilised' than the latter, as

[163] Fisher, *The Importance of the Cape*, pp. 8-9.
[164] 'Book Reviews - The Cape of Good Hope', pp. 226-7.

was the notion that the Khoi soldier would abandon with 'readiness… their sheep-skin clothing for cotton, linen or woollen'. The fact that Khoi soldiers had adopted European manners of cleanliness and dress now proved that they were not only capable of 'civilisation', but also that they were 'more sensible than the boor [sic] to the comforts of civilized life'.[165] Such commentary undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of local customs that were either culturally significant, or were developed to suit the environmental conditions of the region by indigenous inhabitants.

While war erupted again in 1818-19, with the British proceeding to push the Xhosa beyond the Fisher River to the Keiskamma River, stoking mutual distrust through the 1820s and 1830s, figures from the British missionary and humanitarian movements continued vocally to protest against the mistreatment of the indigenous population. In 1830, the radical abolitionist John Fairbairn (1794-1864), editor of the *South African Commercial Advertiser*, publicly re-affirmed the civilising potential of the Xhosa in particular:

> With regard to this people as a nation, or as individuals, and their susceptibility of improvement and civilization, as it is called, we would say, without hesitation, that we know of nothing of which an Englishman is capable of which they are not capable. They have the same powers of mind, the same passions, the same virtues, the same vices. Nothing is wanting but education to put them on a footing with the proudest people in Europe. In their notions of justice, in friendship, in affection between relatives, in gratitude, and in resentment, they have nothing to learn from Europeans.[166]

Such egalitarian sentiment was reflected in alterations to existing Cape colonial policies. In 1828, under the governorship of Sir Richard Bourke (1777-1855), Ordinance 50 reinstated many of the rights that were removed by the Caledon Code. It proclaimed that '… no Hottentot or other free Person of colour residing in this Colony, shall be subject to any compulsory service to which other of His Majesty's subjects therein are not liable', and

[165] Ibid., p. 227.
[166] John Fairbairn, *South African Commercial Advertiser*, 3 April 1830, quoted in Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), *HCPP*, 1836 (538), VII.378.

allowed the San and Khoi 'to obtain and possess by Grant, Purchase or other lawful means, any Land or Property therein'.[167] However, such legal initiatives failed to lead to greater economic advancement for the indigenous populations of the Cape; although slavery was abolished in the British Empire in 1833, freed slaves were still constrained by the fact that they had to sell their labour to white farmers, and exploitation persisted.[168]

As the Xhosa were regularly expelled from territory which was then settled by Europeans and other African tribes, tensions remained and war again broke out in 1834-5 (the Sixth Frontier War), resulting in the brutal death of Hintsa ka Khawuta (1789-1835), chief of the Gcaleka Xhosa, and the displacement of thousands of people.[169] Importantly, despite growing local resentment, the *South African Commercial Advertiser* continued to maintain a humanitarian position under the editorship of Fairbairn, who had previously used the newspaper as a vehicle through which to advocate respect towards the Xhosa and recognise their diplomatic equality.[170] The magazine especially challenged Governor Benjamin D'Urban's characterisation of the Xhosa in his 'Proclamation' of 10 May 1835, which officially declared the extension of the colonies eastern boundary to the Kei River.[171] In this proclamation, D'Urban forcefully argued that 'it is absolutely necessary to provide for the future security of the colony against such unprovoked aggressions, which can only be done by removing these treacherous and irreclaimable savages to a safer distance'. In response the *South African Commercial Advertiser* wrote on 7 October 1835: '[t]he terms 'savages' and 'barbarians' as at present used amongst us, explain nothing, and, in fact,

[167] Ordinance 50 quoted in Robert Ross, *The Borders of Race in Colonial South Africa* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 30-1.
[168] Strobel, *Testing Grounds of Modern Empire*, p. 67.
[169] Keegan, *Colonial South Africa*, pp. 143-4.
[170] 'In every respect they should be treated as a nation having a regular Government, and a regular Executive, responsible to us, and we to them in every case'. Quoted in ibid., p. 138.
[171] Benjamin D'Urban, 'Proclamation', 10 May 1835, Cape of Good Hope: Caffre War and Death of Hintza, *HCPP*, 1836 (279), XXXIX.41.

signify nothing. Our neighbours are men; and unless they are treated as men, they will harass and torment us as injured or neglected men do'.[172]

In Britain, Lord Glenelg (1778-1866), Secretary of State for War and the Colonies (1835-1839) wrote a despatch (dated 26 December 1835) severely criticising D'Urban's approach towards the Xhosa, and his characterisation of the native inhabitants as 'irreclaimable savages'. He wrote:

> It would be difficult for me to describe the pain with which I have read and have laid before his Majesty the preceding passage [of D'Urban's proclamation]. I am well aware with what prompt and earnest humanity you applied your mind, shortly after your arrival in the colony, to the improvement of the social condition of the Caffres; and I would venture to refer the views and feelings expressed in the words which I have quoted, to the passing excitement of the hostilities in which you were engaged.[173]

Furthermore, in his despatch Glenelg proceeded to argue that the British were responsible for the outbreak of the conflict, and that the manner in which the war was conducted by the British was reprehensible: 'I doubt, indeed, whether the history of modern Europe affords an example even of a single case in which, without some better pretext than that of mere retribution, any invaded people were ever subjected to the calamities which Colonel [Harry] Smith[174] here describes'.[175]

A closer look at Glenelg's critique reveals that he was primarily driven by an evangelical sentiment that refused to accept that the native inhabitants of the Cape were incapable of being 'civilised'. Hence his argument against D'Urban's use of the term 'savages'. This is indicated in Glenelg's differentiation between the terms 'savage' and 'barbarian': Glenelg

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[172] Quoted in Strobel, *Testing Grounds of Modern Empire*, p. 79.
[173] Lord Glenelg quoted in 'The Late Caffre War', *The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register*, 21:84, 1836, pp. 289-90.
[174] Sir Harry Smith (1787-1860) commanded a force during the Sixth Frontier War, and was appointed governor of the newly established Province of Queen Adelaide in 1835-6. However, under pressure from Glenelg, the British withdrew from the territory. He would later become governor of the Cape Colony (1847-52). Keegan, *Colonial South Africa*, p. 220.
[175] 'The Late Caffre War', p. 290.

used the latter freely, presumably as he believed it still assumed a 'civilising' potential. Although expressing some ambiguity with regard to the applicability of the 'laws of civilized nations' during conflicts with 'barbarous men', as such interactions did not imply that an understanding or reciprocity of such laws could be guaranteed (an issue that would underlie arguments on the development of doctrine for 'savage' wars, discussed in chapter four of this dissertation), Glenelg maintained his humanitarian position by arguing that:

> … the great principles of morality are of immutable and universal obligation, and from them are deduced the laws of war. … Whether we contend with a civilized or a barbarous enemy, the gratuitous aggravation of the horrors of war, on the plea of vengeance and retribution, or on any similar grounds, is… indefensible.[176]

The tension which nonetheless existed between acknowledging the 'savage' or 'barbarous' state of the colonised and retaining faith in the 'civilising mission' can be evidenced in another critique of D'Urban's characterisation of the Xhosa produced by the London Missionary Society in 1836. In *The Missionary Magazine and Chronicle* the society presented their readers with an engraved image titled 'The Humane and Generous Caffre' which was accompanied by a short anecdote of the Sixth War (Figure 5).[177] A merchant and his father-in-law were said to have been 'attacked and murdered by the Caffres', and during the attack one of the merchant's children had gone missing. The child was found in bushland by a Xhosa warrior called Sitamba. The front-page article continued:

> In this perilous situation the infant must speedily have perished but for the prompt and compassionate assistance of Sitamba: who, leaving his own wife and children… amid all the dangers peculiar to the period, with a tenderness of which those who have only heard the Caffres spoken of as 'irreclaimable savages' can scarcely conceive, took the defenceless and affrighted child in his arms, carried him several miles through the country, and restored him to his sorrowing friends. This the generous Caffre accomplished at the risk of his life and the actual expense of his liberty; for after having rescued the child from being devoured by wild

[176] Ibid., pp. 290-1.
[177] 'The Humane and Generous Caffre', *The Missionary Magazine and Chronicle*, xiv, November 1836, pp. 523-4, referred to in Elbourne, *Blood Ground*, pp. 288-9.

> beasts or some other equally painful death… Sitamba was detained at Graham's Town, and imprisoned as a spy.[178]

Sitamaba is pictured in the image as a warrior chief (distinguished by the plumes of feathers on his headdress) holding the child in his left arm. His stance is balletic; the palm of his right hand is positioned outwards, drawing attention to the fact that he is without his key military accoutrement – the assegai. His forward movement causes his leopard-skin *kaross* to represent the form of a pair of angel wings; indeed, he looks almost about to ascend to the heavens. The composition of the image highlights the contrast between Sitamba's benevolent manner in the foreground, and the background scene of chaos and conflict, within which a smaller representation of a Xhosa warrior is seen, holding an assegai in his right hand, and a shield where the child is positioned with Sitamba. From the magazine's opening remarks, it is clear that the contrast was intended to influence pessimistic readers to re-consider their scepticism about the potential of the 'savage' enemy warrior to perform acts of compassionate heroism, and furthermore, to suggest that the missionary movement had not set itself an unattainable task: both the necessity of Christian teaching and the likely success of the mission were reflected in Sitamba's 'civilised' behaviour.

It is therefore evident that humanitarian sentiment with regard to the indigenous populations of the Cape was publicly re-affirmed in the mid-to-late 1830s, despite regular conflicts with the Xhosa tribes and growing settler disillusionment. Subsequently, in 1837, an established British Parliamentary Select Committee published their report on the impact of British rule on native inhabitants across the colonies, leading to the establishment of the Aborigines Protection Society, which sought to defend the indigenous peoples' legal and religious rights, and also pursued a 'civilising' agenda.[179] In the Cape, an alternative frontier

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[178] 'The Humane and Generous Caffre', p. 524.
[179] *Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Aboriginal Tribes (British Settlements)*, (1837); Brantlinger, *Dark Vanishings*, pp. 86-7.

policy was introduced by the Lieutenant-Governor Andries Stockenström (1792-1864), between the years 1836 and 1838, including the limitation of colonial expansion and the introduction of formal treaties between the colony and the Xhosa chiefs.[180] Yet Stockenström's system began to break down under the pressure of Eastern Cape settler protests led by their vocal spokesman (an original 1820 settler) Robert Godlonton (1794-1884), and war again broke out in 1846-7 (the Seventh Frontier War, or 'War of the Axe').[181] In response to this conflict the British government sent a reinforcement of troops 'commissioned for the special service of bringing into discipline and commanding the irregular forces already embodied… for the defence of the Colony, against the irruption of Kaffirs'.[182]

With the complexities of the context of the Cape in mind – including the pressures of settlers, perceived difficulties of keeping order and shifting military imperatives – this chapter now turns to examine the impact of changing cultural attitudes on race and human difference in Britain and their influence on perceptions of the San, Khoi and Xhosa. It begins by exploring the interrelationship between the physical display of African warrior cultures in London in the mid-to-late 1840s and textual interpretations of their character and behaviour, including lectures that accompanied their exhibition (by figures such as the ethnologist Robert Knox), as well as newspaper reviews and broader meditations by Victorian commentators, including the military practitioner Lieutenant E. Elers Napier, one of the figures who had been sent to the Cape colony in August 1846 for 'special service',[183] and the novelist Charles Dickens. Such 'spectacles' were arranged to indulge a growing public interest in human difference, and in many respects presented behaviours that were

[180] Keegan, *Colonial South Africa*, p. 137.
[181] Godlonton would later write, 'It would be easy to subjugate all Kaffirland and take it for ourselves for ever if men would generally turn out for the work…. All Kaffirs, even to Natal, must be subdued, their lands conquered from them and they themselves made servants'. Quoted in Keegan, *Colonial South Africa*, p. 234.
[182] Despatch from the Right Hon. Earl Grey to Governor Sir P. Maitland, K.C.B, No. 12, Correspondence with the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope Relative to the State of the Kafir Tribes on the Eastern Frontier of the Colony, *HCPP*, February 1847 (786), XXXVIII.27.
[183] Elers Napier, *Excursions*, i, pp. 1-2.

in part constructed to cater to broader expectations of 'savage' cultures.[184] As the next section of this chapter shows, the display of non-European cultures facilitated the dissemination of an existing polygenecist discourse that questioned the humanity of African cultures (the San, in particular), in ways which further influenced how their military attributes were perceived. As this section demonstrates, due to the broader intellectual climate, as well as sensationalised reports (including imagery) of the Seventh Frontier War, by the late-1840s the margin for sympathetic responses towards indigenous African cultures was significantly diminished, leading to a serious re-appraisal of the 'savage' African warrior.

The 'Ark of Zoological Wonders':[185] Questioning the Humanity of African Warriors on Display

In the early-1840s the study of differences in humankind became institutionalised in Britain through the establishment of organisations such as the Ethnological Society of London.[186] Founded in 1843 as a development from the Aborigines Protection Society, the organisation's membership reflected the complex nexus that existed between the Empire and the British military establishment in particular: a large proportion of the society's members were army and naval officers,[187] a fact that highlights the significant role the armed forces played in the process of knowledge production during the nineteenth century. On 26 November 1845, Lieutenant George A.F. Ruxton (1820-1848) of the 89th Regiment presented a lecture titled 'On the Bushmen of South Africa', which was accompanied by 'Two Bushmen children, a boy of fifteen years and a girl of eight, [who] attended the meeting as living illustrations to the paper'.[188] While it is unclear whether Ruxton played a

[184] This process was further complicated by the fact that some people on display rebelled against their managers. See: Qureshi, 'Meeting the Zulus', pp. 189-90.
[185] Quotation from 'The Bosjesmans, at the Egyptian Hall, Piccadilly', *ILN*, 12 June 1847, p. 381.
[186] Qureshi, *Peoples on Parade*, p. 186.
[187] Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, pp. 242-5.
[188] 'Ethnological Society', *The Literary Gazette*, 6 December 1845, pp. 810-11.

part in conveying the children from South Africa to Britain, he was known to have 'formed the daring project of traversing Africa in the parallel of its southern tropic – from Walwich Bay eastward', and 'made himself acquainted with the Bushmen' on his travels.[189]

Due to the fact that the Ethnological Society (by contrast with the Anthropological Society) predominantly embraced an evangelical attitude and allied themselves with the cause of monogenesis – a belief which supported the intrinsic unity of humankind – the commentary on their presentation was rather sympathetic. As the *Journal of the Ethnological Society* would not be established until 1848, the details of Ruxton's paper can only be obtained from an account that was re-published in other papers including *The Literary Gazette* and *The Athenaeum*. The account noted that Ruxton discussed their habitation, physical appearance, diet and character, which was summarised as 'cheerful and exceedingly active', while their weapons were said to be 'a short heavy club, a bow and poisoned arrows, and the *assogai*, or dart which they hurl with great dexterity and precision'.[190] Although claiming them to be 'poor outcasts' whose condition was 'the most desolate and forlorn', this rather favourable account – which affirmed their potential to be 'civilised' – reflects the liberal and evangelical outlook of the society's members.

Shortly after their appearance at the Ethnological Society, however, the children were placed on display at the Egyptian Hall,[191] and the broader commentary on this exhibition presented a questioning of the position of indigenous Africans on the scale of humanity, as well as a characterisation of the Xhosa as 'murderous'. The playbill of the San children stated that '[a]t the same time will be exhibited, a fine and curious specimen of the GREAT URSINE BABOON, with some exceedingly rare varieties of the MONKEY TRIBE, from

[189] 'Obituary', *The Gentleman's Magazine*, November 1848, p. 549.
[190] 'Ethnological Society', *The Athenaeum*, 6 December 1845, p. 1177.
[191] On the history of the venue, including details on the varied nature of the exhibitions held there since its inception in 1812 see: Aleck Abrahams, 'The Egyptian Hall, Piccadilly, 1813-1873', *The Antiquary*, February 1906, pp. 61-2.

Port Natal' (Figure 6).[192] In its association of the children with the primate species there was a complete shift of emphasis from that of Ruxton. The *Illustrated London News* reported that the Xhosa 'pursue and exterminate the Bushman Tribe with unrelenting ferocity'.[193] Significantly, this quotation was taken from the 1845 playbill, which demonstrates that representations of the Xhosa in advertisements constructed chiefly to attract spectators were actually reproduced as 'fact' in British periodical literature, thus blurring the distinction between 'truth' and 'performance' (a development which, as this chapter shows, can also be traced in later commentaries on the San).

In 1847, two San men, women, and a child were exhibited at the Egyptian Hall for the admittance price of one shilling.[194] They had been brought to England by Mr. J.G.R. Bishop, a merchant who had employed them as servants during his residence in the Cape.[195] As scholars on nineteenth-century British spectacle have recognised, such live displays were often marketed as an opportunity for the British public to see non-Europeans in their natural, 'unmediated' environment; however, due to highly-publicised accounts of colonial interactions, spectators also developed clear expectations with regard to the customs and activities that would be displayed, and it is evident that shows were choreographed, and advertising material was designed, to reinforce these expectations.[196] The central position of the poster for the exhibition declared in bold font that a 'Bush Fight' and 'War Dance' could be viewed at four and eight in the evening, suggesting that this was a key event to be anticipated of the 'savage' peoples on display. Tableaux images of the San undertaking various customs and rites were bordered with menacing snakes coiled

[192] 'Bushmen Children or Pigmy Race!' (1845), John Johnson Online Collection, Bodleian Library: London Play Places 10 (47).
[193] 'Bushmen Children', *ILN*, 6 September 1845, p. 160.
[194] Visitors included Sir Robert Peel and Prince Louis Napoleon, see: 'Chit-chat: The Bosjesmans, or Bush People of Africa', *The Theatrical Journal*, July 1847, p. 239.
[195] Lindfors, *Early African Entertainments*, pp. 76-7.
[196] Qureshi, *Peoples on Parade*, pp. 123-5.

around what appear to be human bones, reinforcing characterisations of what were expected to be 'violent' and 'bloodthirsty' 'savage' cultures (Figure 7).[197]

However, such displays were not exclusively arranged as 'spectacles' for profiteering showmen. The pedagogical aspect of this particular San exhibition can clearly be evidenced through the sale of an accompanying book on the history, manners and customs of the San (titled *History of the Bosjesmans*, 1847) which could be purchased by spectators for sixpence, and included extracts of works by figures who had travelled to the region such as the explorer and natural scientist Martin Hinrich Carl Lichtenstein (1780-1857) and the Scottish Congregationalist missionary Robert Moffat (1795-1883). A list of San vocabulary (in phonetics) as well as the material 'curiosities' accompanying the display, including natural history specimens, ornaments, and weaponry, were also provided.[198] As chapter three shows, by the late 1850s to the mid-1860s the military implements of non-Europeans would become a particular focus for figures such as General Pitt Rivers who would explicitly associate the form and development of weapons of warfare with an imagined hierarchy of races. In this earlier period, however, while denigrating commentary on non-European military implements existed,[199] they were chiefly understood as accompaniments to enhance the 'authenticity' of exhibitions alongside painted scenery and traditional indigenous dress.

Furthermore, a lecture presented by the notorious anatomist and ethnologist Robert Knox (1793-1862) was re-printed in full in the accompanying book which reflected his own ideas on racial difference, as well as his critique of British military policy in the Cape.[200] Knox had first been acquainted with this particular group of San during a lecture tour in the

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[197] 'Egyptian Hall - The Bosjesmans' (1847), reproduced in Lindfors, *Early African Entertainments*, p. 80.
[198] *History of the Bosjesmans, or Bush People: The Aborigines of Southern Africa* (1847), pp. 10-35.
[199] *Douglas Jerrold's Newspaper*, for instance, noted that: 'A most primitive-looking bow was slung across the shoulders', in ibid., p. 43.
[200] 'Dr. Knox's Lecture on the Bosjesmans, or Bush People, at Exeter Hall, Monday, May 17, 1847', in ibid., pp. 5-10.

north of England, and was given the opportunity to 'introduce' them to the British public on 17 May 1847 during a lecture at Exeter Hall 'before a most scientific and fashionable audience', prior to their regular display at the Egyptian Hall.[201] Before Knox had gained his reputation as a disgraced anatomist who had 'unwittingly' purchased cadavers from the murderers William Burke and William Hare, he was a surgeon in the British armed forces who had developed his skills attending to the wounded in Belgium in the aftermath of the Battle of Waterloo (18 June 1815), and later accompanied the 72nd Highlanders to South Africa (1817-1820).[202] It was during this period – through his interactions with the indigenous populations of the region – that he gradually established an interest in racial difference.[203] Knox's theory of 'scientific racism' was most explicitly articulated in his work *The Races of Men* (1850), where he argued: '… human character, individual and national, is traceable solely to the nature of that race to which the individual or nation belongs…. Race is everything: literature, science, art, in a word, civilization, depend on it'.[204] As Sadiah Qureshi has noted, Knox's lecture on the San most likely informed his chapter 'Dark Races of Man' in his 1850 work.[205] They bear similarities, particularly as they are both suffused with the idea of polygenesis.

Indeed, at variance to the earlier accounts by Barrow and Fisher, a significant proportion of the material within the accompanying exhibition book not only presented a more determined notion that the 'savage' San were less advanced than Europeans, but also that they shared more in common with the animal species – as the earlier display of the San children with a baboon suggested. In the introduction to the exhibition book, the anonymous author positioned themselves firmly in relation to this debate:

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[201] Ibid., p. 5.
[202] A.W. Bates, *The Anatomy of Robert Knox* (Brighton, 2010), pp. 31-6; Qureshi, *Peoples on Parade*, p. 103. Brantlinger has noted that despite his posthumous reputation, Knox 'had a "considerable" influence on theories of race in the 1850s and 1860s', *Dark Vanishings*, p. 40.
[203] Sera-Shriar, *The Making of British Anthropology*, pp. 91-2.
[204] Robert Knox, *The Races of Men: A Fragment* (Philadelphia, 1850), p. 7; Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, p. 64.
[205] Qureshi, *Peoples on Parade*, p. 113.

> The romantic stories told by travellers in the interior of Africa of baboons or monkeys abducting women and children, and domiciling them in the woods and bushes, seems, on beholding these peculiar people, no longer unaccountable, as in external appearance they appear the connecting link between man and the monkey.[206]

It is likely that the claim that the San could be positioned between man and the primate species in the evolutionary hierarchy had gained greater currency during this period due to the highly influential work of the ethnologist James Cowles Prichard (1786-1848), especially his book *The Natural History of Man*, first published in 1843.[207] Despite his professed general belief in monogenism, in this work Pritchard affirmed the ideas of the French naturalist and polygenecist Jean Baptiste Bory de Saint-Vincent (1778-1846), in arguing that the San 'differ[ed] most widely from what he [Saint-Vincent] terms the Japetic species of men, and as forming the transition from the genus homo to the genera of orangs and gibbons: he even finds analogies between them and the macacos'.[208] Prichard and Knox have been often characterised as intellectual polar opposites, and in his *Races of Men* Prichard was criticised by Knox of 'misdirecting the English mind as to all the great questions of race'.[209] However, Prichard's views on the native inhabitants of the Cape in fact suggest a certain ambiguity with regard to his professed belief in the unity of humankind.[210] Knox too had earlier wavered on this issue in the 1820s,[211] although by the time of his *Races of Men* he was a staunch polygenecist. Such inconsistencies demonstrate how open to discussion and debate this particular issue was in the earlier nineteenth century, and how formative the period of the mid-to-late 1840s was in crystallising the opinions of figures such as Knox.

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[206] *History of the Bosjesmans*, p. iii.
[207] James Cowles Prichard, *The Natural History of Man* (1843).
[208] Ibid., p. 514.
[209] Knox, *Races of Men*, p. 25.
[210] For a similar observation see: Conlin, *Evolution and the Victorians*, pp. 141-2.
[211] Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, pp. 64-5. Knox had articulated a monogenesist perspective in a public lecture presented in 1822: 'We may view the human race as derived originally from one stock, to which the arbitrary name of Caucasian has been given'. See: 'Inquiry into the Origin and Characteristic Differences of the Native Races Inhabiting the Extra-Tropical Part of Southern Africa', *Memoirs of the Wernerian Natural History Society*, 5:1 (1824), p. 210.

From this time, polygenesis would become the dominant theory of human origins in British anthropological research, until the debate between monogenesis and polygenesis was overshadowed by the publication of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* in 1859 and his arguments in support of a theory of common descent.[212]

Significantly, the questioning of the San's very humanity would begin to influence the manner in which their military attributes – including their weapons of warfare – were interpreted by commentaries on the exhibition in British newspapers. For instance, in Knox's account, as the San were reduced to 'miserable bondage' due to Dutch settlement, they were forced to poison their arrows.[213] While Barrow's earlier work discussed the complex manner in which this military implement was furnished,[214] Knox did not consider the weapon in any detail, but rather dismissed the San's use of the poisoned arrow as 'the resort of a feeble race'.[215] Newspaper commentaries on the San exhibition which referenced their use of poisoned arrows further reinterpreted Knox's observation on their weaponry, not only suggesting that it was unsporting and deceitful, but also associating its use with the action of an animal stalking its prey. The *Manchester Guardian* wrote: '… it must be no pleasant thing to see a man *stealthily prowling* in your neighbourhood with a poisoned arrow fitted to the string, waiting only till you give him an opportunity of stealing upon you unperceived, to send the death-shaft on its flight'.[216]

The exceptionally strong eyesight of the San – which was considered a great advantage in the military field – was also a characteristic that was reinterpreted by broader commentaries on the exhibition. Knox had written that in contrast to the 'beautifully coloured iris' of the

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[212] Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species* (1859). Darwin wrote: '… I should infer from analogy that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed', p. 484.
[213] 'Dr. Knox's Lecture', p. 6.
[214] Barrow, *An Account*, pp. 141-2, 270.
[215] 'Dr. Knox's Lecture', p. 6.
[216] 'The Bosjesmans, or Bush People from Southern Africa', *Manchester Guardian* quoted in *History of the Bosjesmans*, pp. 45-6. Emphasis added.

European, the eyes of the San were 'dark and penetrating'; yet despite lacking an aesthetic beauty, he admired 'the energy of these eyes, for they are absolutely telescopic and microscopic too – at least, so they appeared to be to me on various occasions'. He continued:

> Often I have seen them tried in the field, when, watching the movements of an enemy, we required to push forward an advanced guard, a patrol, or a party to sweep the country of any ambuscades laid for us, and never do I remember seeing them at fault. I am aware that the transparency of the climate… aided them in this respect, but we, of course, had the same advantages.[217]

As Luke Davidson has recognised, an important element in the history of British natural theology was the exaltation of the eye '[f]or its beauty, its expressive capacity, its ideal position in the body, [and] its protective mechanisms'.[218] While ophthalmology was ridiculed as a specialist discipline in the eighteenth century, the early nineteenth gave rise to an extraordinary emergence of literature and the establishment of institutions seeking to examine the eye and its attendant capabilities and diseases, a shift partly influenced by the epidemic of Egyptian Ophthalmia in the British armed forces, which had crippling consequences on military effectiveness, and broader economic, social and moral implications.[219] During this early nineteenth century period practitioners and commentators emphasised their belief that '[t]he organ of vision is unquestionably the most valuable, the most indispensable, and the most ornamental of all our senses'.[220]

However, whilst broader commentaries on the exhibition of the San conceded that they possessed a 'wonderful range of vision, reaching out as far as twelve or fifteen miles with great accuracy', and that due to such 'power they have been used in our wars against the

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[217] 'Dr. Knox's Lecture', p. 8.
[218] Luke Davidson, "'Identities Ascertained": British Ophthalmology in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century', *Social History of Medicine*, 9:3 (1996), pp. 327-8.
[219] Ibid., pp. 314-6.
[220] John Stevenson, *On the Morbid Sensibility of the Eye* (1811) quoted in ibid., p. 326.

Kaffirs as better telescopes than Dollond's', such praise was regularly qualified. *The Morning Post* continued: 'There is a rolling restlessness in the eye which marks the extent of cunning but the want of reason in some inferior animals'.[221] As a consequence of their proclaimed affinity with the animal kingdom, the military skills of the San were now reinterpreted as resulting from instinct, rather than a cultivated expertise.

The identification of the San as the 'lowest class of humanity', or the removal of their humanity by denying them the faculty of reasoning and explicitly identifying their existence with animals, or, in some cases, claiming that animals were superior to them, reflected growing ambivalence on this particular issue in the mid-to-late 1840s. In their account of the 1847 exhibition *The Morning Post* articulated all of these theories in the same article, suggesting at one point that, '… there are many of the inferior animals possessing a greater development of the higher faculties than this savage specimen of the humankind. The beaver, for example, possesses the faculty of constructiveness to a very marked extent'. They continued:

> The Bosjesmans, on the contrary, do not appear, as far as we can ascertain, to have any notion of raising huts or cabins, but they wander about in herds or tribes, in search of food and the exigencies of the hour. In this peculiarity, as well as in their external form, they bear a marked resemblance to the baboon, ourangoutang, or chimpanzee…..[222]

The display of the San evidently facilitated the dissemination of polygenecist perspectives that questioned their humanity, suggesting their resemblance to the animal species, which had a further impact upon the manner in which their military attributes were characterised. Indicators of their 'civilised' warrior culture – as identified earlier by Barrow – were now dismissed, and their military skills were either denied or reduced to impulsive actions devoid of forethought and pragmatism, reinforcing distinctions between the 'civilised' and

[221] 'The Bosjesman, or Bushmen, Aborigines of Southern Africa', *The Morning Post*, 19 May 1847, p. 6.
[222] Ibid. Emphasis in original.

the 'savage' warrior. Spectators were, of course, at liberty to form their own opinions on the San; in some cases their perceptions would have been reinforced by such broader commentaries, while in other cases they may have rejected the constructed behaviour of the native inhabitants as it challenged their own humanitarian Christian sensibilities or beliefs in concepts such as the 'noble savage'.[223] However, the interpretative emphasis clearly shifted during this period. The display of the San allowed the polygenecist views of Knox in particular to gain an exceptionally wide-ranging audience; his opinions were regularly circulated by local newspapers and periodicals – at times without attribution – and were in many cases re-interpreted or represented as objective facts on the manners and customs of the San. This tension between 'fact' and 'fiction' further emerges in broader critical discussions on the native inhabitants of the Cape during and shortly after their display. This chapter now turns to examining two such critiques – by E. Elers Napier and Charles Dickens – prior to analysing visual representations of the Xhosa that emerged during and in the aftermath of the War of the Axe, and suggesting reasons as to why such a critical re-appraisal of the African warrior emerged in the mid-to-late 1840s.

A Critique of Liberal Humanitarianism

In a review of Lieutenant-Colonel E. Elers Napier's two volume work, *Excursions in Southern Africa* (1849), which was, tellingly, dedicated to the former Cape Governor Benjamin D'Urban, the moderate periodical *The Athenaeum* chose to include extracts of his 'portraits' of the native tribes which raised similar themes to those articulated in the *Morning Post* review of the earlier San exhibition. Although criticising Elers Napier for '[h]is hatred and contempt for a dark skin… [which] take, in these volumes, the form of a needless harshness', and stating that his descriptions of the native inhabitants were 'not written in a spirit of perfect fairness', they were nonetheless repeated verbatim and claimed to be

[223] Qureshi, 'Meeting the Zulus', pp. 194, 197.

'interesting'. The notion, for instance, that the San were 'the lowest in physical type and moral character' and 'the most degraded race', was proffered and not questioned. As reproduced in the review, Elers Napier had written of the San:

> Their shameless state of nearly complete nudity – their brutalized habits of voracity, filth and cruelty of disposition – appear to place them completely on a level with the brute creation whilst the 'clicking' tones of a language, composed of the most unpronounceable and discordant noises, more resemble the jabbering of apes, than sounds uttered by human beings.[224]

'Civilisation' was now not only demarcated by a culture's use of garments, habitation, expressions of moderate behaviour and cleanliness; a comprehensible language was also considered an important identifier distinguishing 'civilised' humans from 'savages'. Indeed, a group of San, exhibited at 6 Leicester Square during the early 1850s, were advertised as 'MEN MONKIES' whose manner of communication was said to be 'more like the gibbering of monkies than the language of men'.[225] Such commentaries were articulating a longer tradition which considered language to be reflective of 'the soul of a people'.[226] The San's use of what were claimed to be incomprehensible 'clicks' was considered a mark not only of their perceived intellectual and cultural inferiority but also of their ambiguity as members of the human species.

As the Khoi were known to fight as allies of the British in the Cape Wars, Elers Napier was rather less clear-cut in his characterisation of what he perceived to be their military attributes. The Khoi was '… a compound of the strangest anomalies; and appears to be made up of a mixture of the greatest contradictions and inconsistencies of human nature'. He continued,

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[224] 'Book Review - *Excursions*', *The Athenaeum*, 15 December 1849, p. 1267.
[225] Kurt Koenigsberger, *The Novel and the Menagerie: Totality, Englishness, and Empire* (Columbus, 2007), p. 56; Qureshi, *Peoples on Parade*, p. 77.
[226] Maurice Olender, *The Languages of Paradise: Race, Religion and Philology in the Nineteenth Century* (1992), pp. 4-5.

> Indolent, debauched, and drunken, as he naturally is, still, by a knowledge of the ingredients of his composition, and a judicious display of firmness, tempered by kindness and good treatment, he is easily to be managed; and though no great reliance can ever be placed on him, in charges of trust, he – like the Sepoy, under European discipline and leaders – makes, when sober, a good and gallant soldier; and it is on the Cape Mounted Rifles – composed chiefly of this race – that many of the greatest hardships, fatigues, and dangers of the last and former Kaffir wars have principally fallen.[227]

Elers Napier's ambivalence with regard to the status of the Khoi was clearly influenced by the broader discourse questioning the place of indigenous Africans – particularly the San – along the scale of humanity. Constrained by this discourse, Elers Napier was willing to admit to their courageousness, yet this was immediately qualified by his claim that without the influence of the British they 'naturally' led a life of idleness and depravity. Furthermore, the Khoi's contribution to the success of British military expeditions was still not attributed to their own personal endeavours, but rather to the discipline and leadership of British officers, as articulated in preceding accounts.

Although Elers Napier referenced Barrow regularly throughout his work, the Xhosa were portrayed in stark contrast to his earlier nineteenth-century characterisations. The Xhosa were understood to be a member of a group of 'savage hordes', who 'continue to be at the present day… sunk into the lowest depths of savage barbarism; and they appear then, as at present, to have been without any observance of the common decencies of life'.[228] Elers Napier claimed them to be 'without a knowledge of God or faith towards man; and scantily clad'. Although he recognised that the Xhosa were 'a far more athletic and warlike race of men', he believed them to be

> … equally, if not more cruel than the latter [Khoi], in carrying on the exterminating wars waged among themselves and against their neighbours; for their ferocity and bloodthirstiness are, even at the

[227] Elers Napier, *Excursions*, i, p. 118.
[228] Ibid., p. 186.

> present day, carried to such a pitch, as not unfrequently to lead them to cannibalism itself, with all its attendant horrors.[229]

Elers Napier's work in particular illustrates the general *volte-face* that had emerged in the late 1840s on the idea of the 'savage' yet 'noble' African warrior. He presented an exceedingly sympathetic account of the Boers, and regularly affirmed his belief that the frontier wars were the result of either the fault or misunderstandings of the indigenous warrior tribes. In narrating his impression of the South African landscape, he revived an earlier conception of civilisation based on the notion that possession of land was related to whether it was 'usefully' cultivated:[230]

> Civilization and Cultivation appearing to have wandered hand in hand through this lovely South African Eden – we moralized on the scene; and the thought naturally occurred, how much more advantageously were now dispensed these bounteous gifts of Providence, than at the period when the possession of such fair tracts of land was disputed by beasts of prey, with a set of barbarous savages – as cruel, bloodthirsty, and nearly as brutalized, as the ferocious animals with which they had daily to contend. Let any one visit the neighbourhood of Wynberg and Constantia, after reading the old chronicles of the Cape; and he will require no further proof of the futile puerility of those 'Jean Jacques Rousseau' opinions and Utopian arguments, extolling the primitive savage state, over that of culture and civilization.[231]

Elers Napier was not alone in his vocal criticism of the concept of the 'noble savage' during this period; similar scathing critiques were written by the philosopher and satirist Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) and the novelist Charles Dickens (1812-1870). Carlyle used his piece 'Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question' first published anonymously in *Fraser's Magazine* in 1849, a publication generally known for its more progressive Tory

[229] Ibid., pp. 186-7.
[230] On this concept see: John Gascoigne, 'Science and the British Empire from its Beginnings to 1850', in *Science and Empire*, Brett M. Bennett and Joseph M. Hodge (eds), (New York, 2011), pp. 48-50.
[231] Elers Napier, *Excursions*, i, p. 171.

views, to criticise the concept and make a shocking call for the re-institution of slavery.[232] In his article 'The Noble Savage' published in *Household Words* in 1853, Dickens wrote of his own impression of the 'savage' warrior:

> Think of the Bushmen. Think of the two men and the two women who have been exhibited about England for some years. Are the majority of persons – who remember the horrid little leader of that party in his festering bundle of hides, with his filth and his antipathy to water, and his straddled legs, and his odious eyes shaded by his brutal hand, and his cry of 'Qu-u-u-u-aaa!' (Bosjesman for something desperately insulting I have no doubt) – conscious of an affectionate yearning towards that noble savage, or is it idiosyncratic in me to abhor, detest, abominate, and abjure him?[233]

Dickens claimed that war was a perpetual affair in the life of 'noble savages', and that during a speech heralding the coming of conflict, in contrast to the 'civilised' response 'of crying "Hear, hear!" as is the custom with us… [the savage] darts from the rank and tramples out the life, or crushes the skull, or mashes the face, or scoops out the eyes, or breaks the limbs, or performs a whirlwind of atrocities on the body, of an imaginary enemy'.[234] Dickens' characterisation of the 'savage' warrior as expressing a frenzied aggression merely at the *thought* of fighting against an enemy was arguably influenced by his own witnessing of a contrived fight during the San's exhibition in the late 1840s. Dickens was known to have attended such displays,[235] and his comments echo earlier claims made by newspapers such as the *Glasgow Herald* that the San were unable to exercise the intellectual faculty of imagination, and therefore became so delirious during their

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[232] [Thomas Carlyle], 'Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question', *Fraser's Magazine*, December 1849, pp. 670-9. Criticisms of Carlyle's opinions can be found in *The Anti-Slavery Reporter*, 1 January 1850, pp. 10-12, which included an extract of the *Inquirer* who wrote: '… the new Reformer's dislike of our frothy, benevolent agitations has at length become as extravagant and repulsive as any of the hypocrisies or corruptions which he denounces. His sour meditations have altogether unsettled his judgement, and obscured his moral perceptions', p. 11.
[233] Dickens, 'The Noble Savage', pp. 337-8.
[234] Ibid., p. 339.
[235] Qureshi, 'Meeting the Zulus', p. 183.

performances, that they were required either to be placated by whisky or physically restrained to contain their excessive behaviour.[236]

Significantly, Dickens' comments highlight the complex process by which 'knowledge' was constructed through the display of non-European warrior cultures. While the San's activities were in part choreographed to conform with expectations of 'savage' cultures, and spectators such as Dickens claimed to be more capable of distinguishing between the constructed 'displays' and genuine behaviour than the 'performers', Dickens himself utilised what he saw during the exhibitions to make a critical comment on what he claimed to be the genuine nature of the San. As the *Illustrated London News* had earlier utilised a claim about the 'ferocity' of the Xhosa that was printed on the 1845 playbill of the San children exhibited at the Egyptian Hall, Dickens was similarly partaking in the process of obscuring the distinction between 'fact' and 'fiction'. Expected behaviours of 'savage' warriors were constructed for the consumption of spectators, which were then utilised by commentators to make critiques and judgements on what they claimed to be 'natural' 'savage' behaviour.

Furthermore, Elers Napier and Dickens shared a critical standpoint towards liberal humanitarians who extolled the virtues of 'natural' man. The suggestion that the state of the 'savage' could in any way be superior to 'civilised' life provided a very direct challenge to the mid-nineteenth-century ideology of progress (of which Dickens was ironically in other respects a critic), encapsulated in the 1851 and 1862 Exhibitions. While earlier figures supportive of the 'civilising mission' such as Barrow and Glenelg articulated a more nuanced understanding of the 'savage' warrior, with Barrow in particular seeking to outline what he perceived to be the particular characteristics of individual indigenous tribes living in the Cape, Dickens especially chose to forgo differentiation and subsumed a variety of

[236] 'The Bosjesmans', *Glasgow Herald*, 19 June 1848, n.p.

non-European cultures – including the Ojibbeway Indians, the San, and the Zulus – to establish a general critique of the concept of the 'noble savage'. For figures such as Elers Napier and Dickens, questioning the identification of the 'savage' state as inferior led to the destabilisation of British self-perception as the standard-bearers of progress. The existence of 'savagery' reassured those critical of some aspects of liberal humanitarianism of the validity of their notion of 'civilisation'; a project that was forward-moving, not allowing for the anxieties of a potential future 'degeneration'.

During reporting in London on the Seventh Frontier War (1846-7), negative appraisals of African warrior cultures which fortified distinctions between the 'civilised' and the 'savage' warrior – especially of the Xhosa who were characterised as faithless, cruel, and even cannibalistic – were at their height. This chapter now turns to examining the visual representations of the Xhosa during this war published in the *Illustrated London News*. The images present a striking portrayal of 'savage warfare', depicting the British as staunchly courageous in the face of a 'savage' enemy with an unbridled lust for destruction.

Images of the Xhosa during the War of the Axe (1846-7)

The Seventh Frontier War erupted in response to an act of theft. In Fort Beaufort, Tsili, a Xhosa man, was arrested for stealing an axe from a trader, and was subsequently ordered to attend a trial in Grahamstown. On the way to the trial, near the Kat River, a rescue of Tsili was undertaken by 40 Xhosa. Tsili had been manacled to a Khoi escort, Kaptein Platjies, a provisional Khoi constable, and accounts vary as to the latter's treatment.[237] Elers Napier's account alleged that that the group of prisoners (Tsili, Platjies, an English soldier and a Mfengu prisoner who were both 'ironed together') 'were suddenly attacked by a strong body of Kaffirs, who liberated their countryman, dreadfully mutilating, in so doing, the

[237] Susan I. Blackbeard, "'An Unprecedented but Significant Atrocity": A Window into the War of the Axe, 1846-1847', *South African Historical Journal*, 67:2 (2015), pp. 202-7.

poor Hottentot; whose wrist, bearing the handcuff, was first severed from his body, after which he was deliberately pierced to death with assegais'.[238] During the rescue Tsili's brother was shot dead. Due to the refusal of the Xhosa to surrender the assailant of Kaptein Platjies, a protracted war broke out amongst the British and the Xhosa.[239]

The sensationalisation of British experiences in this particular conflict certainly contributed to the heightening of portrayals of the Xhosa as an 'uncivilised' enemy. While they were not exhibited on a London stage during the 1840s, visual representations of the Xhosa could be found in issues of the *Illustrated London News*, detailing British involvement in the Seventh War. The war's significance is reflected in the editorial choice to publish an image entitled 'The War in Kaffirland – The Death of Capt. Bambrick', on the cover of the issue published on 18 July 1846 (Figure 8).[240] In the image, Bambrick, a British soldier of the 7th Dragoon Guards is positioned front and centre, valiantly fighting upon his horse, surrounded by three Xhosa warriors; one of whom is gripping the reins of Bambrick's horse, and has his assegai positioned to be imminently thrust at his neck, while Bambrick's cavalry sword has pierced his chest. Two Xhosa soldiers are positioned behind the British officer; one pointing a musket at his lower back; another surreptitiously untying his kit bag. Significantly, Bambrick is shown prior to his death, facing his foes with an expression of stoicism; while his Xhosa assailant is pictured wide-eyed and grinning demonically, still attempting to pierce Bambrick with the assegai, despite being almost fatally wounded. Many of the visual tropes of what was now commonly expected of the 'savage' are here represented: an emphasis on their deceitfulness, ferocity and bloodthirstiness.

Written narratives of the attack reinforced the imagery of the Xhosa as 'savage' enemies. One such account was written by Harriet Ward (1808-73) in *The Cape and the Kaffirs*, first

[238] Elers Napier, *Excursions*, ii, p. 86.
[239] Blackbeard, "'An Unprecedented but Significant Atrocity'", pp. 205, 207-11.
[240] 'The War in Kaffirland', *ILN*, 18 July 1846, p. 33. The artist of the sketch is unknown, attributed only to 'a correspondent'.

published in 1848, and partly written while she was stationed in South Africa with her husband, John Ward, an officer of the 91st Regiment.[241] A prolific writer who had established her reputation in military circles through articles published in the *United Service Journal*,[242] Ward wrote that Bambrick was

> … a fine old Waterloo soldier… reckless of the foe, seen or unseen, and accustomed to charge wherever that foe might be, dashed into the bush at the head of his troop, went too far, and fell in consequence by the hand of a concealed savage. Shocking to relate, his body was cut in pieces by the enemy, and either burned or hung about the bush. … He must have received many wounds. His charger galloped past the troop without its rider; its trappings and saddle were covered with blood; while the savages bore off the mangled body of their victim, brandishing his sword on the top of the hill as they retreated.[243]

The 'savage' treatment of British captives was a theme that would further be emphasised in an article and accompanying image entitled 'Kaffirs Bush-Fighting' published in the *Illustrated London News* on 25 July 1846 (Figure 9):

> In the right hand corner of the View are shown two Kaffirs stripping the body of one of their slain enemies; another is shouting in triumph…. [The British Army] lost half their baggage, and ran the gauntlet through thousands of these savages, banging at them from every bush – that is, from almost every inch of the country, and causing much loss and annoyance. *A horrible feature of this warfare is the ferocity of the Kaffirs to the wounded: when one of our men is down, they rush at him in spite of guns, great and small, drag him off, rip him up, and do all sorts of horrors. One unfortunate man they got hold of, they actually roasted on one of the captured waggons.* We have found a much more formidable foe than we expected, which promises a long and severe war….[244]

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[241] Valerie Letcher, 'Harriet Ward: Trespassing Beyond the Borders', *English in Africa*, 26:1 (1999), pp. 3, 9-10; Harriet Ward, *The Cape and the Kaffirs*, 3rd edition (1851).
[242] See, for instance: 'A Voice from Cafferland', *USM*, 1, 1844, pp. 1-9. Ward had also re-written parts of Elers Napier's original work which was published as *Past and Future Emigration; or, the Book of the Cape* (1849). *The Athenaeum* review of Elers Napier's later work, *Excursions* (1849) claimed that Elers Napier's 'intemperate and extreme opinions… prevented any publisher from accepting it until Mrs. Ward had drawn her revising pen across its more acrimonious lines. In doing so, however the judicious editress travelled, the author considers beyond her warrant; and made his book the vehicle for conveying sentiments on colonial government, the convict question, and other matters, against which he holds it necessary to enter a formal protest in the work now before us', *The Athenaeum*, 15 December 1849, p. 1266.
[243] Ward, *The Cape and the Kaffirs*, pp. 85-6.
[244] 'Scenes from the War in Kaffirland', *ILN*, 25 July 1846, pp. 51-2. Emphasis added.

In contrast to Barrow's cheerful, content, courageous yet mild and gentle warriors free from 'licentious appetites', the Xhosa are here textually and visually portrayed as insatiable cannibals. The manner and facial expressions of the two figures 'stripping the body' of the fallen British soldier are purposefully represented as demonic, an impression heightened through the glee expressed on their faces. Unlike Barrow's idealisation of Xhosa life, their nakedness is here portrayed in a way that re-emphasises their perceived 'savagery'. Furthermore, published directly beneath this image of the pandemonium of Xhosa warfare is a representation of British soldiers rescuing their ammunition waggon (Figure 9). The contrast between the two images is striking: the British are depicted as calm and composed, and in the foreground of the image a standoff between a Xhosa and British soldier, assegai and musket, inches apart, highlights the technological disparity between the two foes.

What accounts for this changing perspective on indigenous African warrior cultures during this particular period which coincided with – and was in part facilitated by – their display in London exhibitions halls? A first suggestion can be found in Ward's discussion of Bambrick's death, as well as in the commentary of an article published on the War of the Axe in the *Illustrated London News* (18 July 1846). While Ward included the following ironic passage after discussing the manner in which Bambrick's body was mutilated: 'Oh "pastoral and peaceful" people! as Missionary Society Agents have styled them', the *Illustrated London News* noted:

> Upon one occasion, a large body of Kaffirs attacked a Wesleyan Chapel, eight miles east of Graham's Town, but stoutly defended by a little garrison within: several balls perforated the door. We may here mention that, in some instances, the missionaries have fled from among those whom they supposed they had converted. It is, also, a melancholy fact that the Kaffir translation of the New Testament has often afforded a supply of wadding for the enemy's guns, and it has been picked up in that state![245]

[245] 'Scenes from the War in Kaffirland', *ILN*, 18 July 1846, p. 40.

By this period, a growing frustration with local indigenous resistance to both military occupation and spiritual conversion was noted; the pages of the translated New Testament symbolically utilised to increase the effectiveness of the former. As Andrew Bank has recognised, by the early 1840s, humanitarian optimism in the Cape was in decline, 'the self-assured language of reform, the passion, zeal and combative spirit… at the height of the abolitionist campaigns were noticeably muted, if not wholly absent, from editorials and columns of the liberal press'.[246] Such a re-assessment is particularly evident in the language used by the editor of the *South African Commercial Advertiser*, John Fairbairn, who argued publicly in 1847 that: 'In race, colour, language, customs [the Xhosa] differ as much [from the colonists] as any two varieties of the same species ever did or can do'.[247] Although Fairbairn did not go as far as to claim that the Xhosa were of a different species, his comments present a stark contrast to his earlier liberal pronouncements.

Such growing disillusionment and pessimism with regard to the 'improvability' of the 'savage' can be evidenced not just in the discourse – both private and public – of prominent colonists, merchants and colonial officials,[248] but also of London Missionary Society evangelicals in the colony. In 1848 William Elliot, a leading campaigner of the London Missionary Society, wrote that in the aftermath of emancipation:

> The authority of the missionary has been diminished; the population of the missionary institutions has become injuriously dense, by a vast influx of late apprentices and other persons of colour, who prefer abundant leisure and unrestrained freedom to those habits of industry and those salutary restraints, which must be sustained and submitted to in ordinary social life.[249]

[246] Bank, 'Losing Faith', p. 368.
[247] Fairbairn quoted in ibid., pp. 369-70.
[248] Ibid., pp. 370-1.
[249] Elliot quoted in ibid., p. 374; Alan Lester, *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain* (2001), p. 141.

With the difficulties faced by some foreign missionaries in converting 'savage' heathens to the evangelical faith (with some commentators – including Dickens – arguing that greater attention should be paid to the misfortunes of home),[250] theoretical ideas on the ability to 'civilise' the 'savage' were gradually questioned, and a growing prejudice and belief in 'Western' racial superiority – buttressed by British economic and industrial ascendancy – strengthened. Stories of white adventurers and settlers in Africa struggling to adapt to the tropical environment and attendant diseases such as malaria and yellow fever, which led to extraordinary death rates, especially inspired the characterisation of the continent as the 'white man's grave'.[251] Such perceptions were emboldened with the failure of the Niger Expedition of 1841, an event which inspired Dickens to write in a review of an account of the expedition published by the Colonial Office and the Admiralty in 1848:

> To change the customs even of civilized and educated men, and impress them with new ideas, is – we have good need to know it – a most difficult and slow proceeding; but to do this by ignorant and savage races, is a work which, like the progressive changes of the globe itself, requires a stretch of years that dazzles in the looking at … Believe it, African Civilisation, Church of England Missionary, and all other Missionary, Societies! The work at home must be completed thoroughly, or there is no hope abroad.[252]

Although Dickens' comments suggest that prior to his discussion on the 'noble savage' in *Household Words* he still believed that there was a hope – albeit quite limited – in the potential of the 'savage' to be 'civilised', he, like his contemporaries such as Knox and Carlyle, would within a few years champion more controversial, static understandings of human diversity and the hierarchy of races, reinforcing distinctions between the 'civilised' and the 'savage' warrior. As this chapter shows, such attitudes with regard to indigenous

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[250] See, for instance: 'The Dens of London', *Ainsworth's Magazine*, July 1853, pp. 171-80.
[251] Leila Koivunen, *Visualizing Africa in Nineteenth-Century British Travel Accounts* (New York, 2009), pp. 22-3; P.D. Curtin, '"The White Man's Grave:" Image and Reality, 1780-1850', *Journal of British Studies*, 1:1 (1961), pp. 94-110.
[252] [Charles Dickens], 'Book Review - Narrative of the Expedition sent by her Majesty's Government to the River Niger in 1841', *The Examiner*, 19 August 1848, p. 533; partly quoted in Patrick Brantlinger, *Rule of Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism, 1830-1914* (New York, 1988), p. 178.

African warriors in particular were the result of a complex interplay of factors at the metropole and the imperial periphery: while the display of indigenous inhabitants of the Cape in Britain facilitated the dissemination of a polygenecist discourse which questioned their humanity and, in turn, influenced the manner in which their military attributes were characterised, these processes coincided with a growing 'conservative consensus' that emerged amongst commentators in Britain and settlers in the Cape due to persistent indigenous resistance that was of a spiritual and military nature. Nonetheless, while disillusionment over the 'civilising' potential of the native inhabitants of the Cape reached significant proportions during the late 1840s and early 1850s, this trajectory was by no means sustained throughout the rest of the nineteenth century; as chapter four shows, figures such as the adventurer Sir Samuel White Baker sought to abolish the ongoing slave trade in Equatorial Africa with immense public confidence in the British 'civilising mission' during the early 1870s. The present chapter reveals the initial stirrings of a racial discourse and denigration of the military attributes and capabilities of the 'savage' warrior that would re-emerge with great intensity in the mid-to-late 1880s and beyond, yet did not build up consistent momentum towards this point.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that British perceptions of indigenous warriors of the Cape can only be fully understood if the discourse on 'savage' warrior cultures is contextualised, not only with regard to the nature and character of the conflicts fought by the British against 'savage' enemies, but also within a longer time-frame, and in light of cultural and intellectual developments regarding race, physiognomy, and comparative anatomy. This chapter demonstrates that a clear contrast can be evidenced from initial accounts of the San, Khoi and Xhosa written at the beginning of the nineteenth century to visual and textual accounts in the late 1840s; earlier representations by figures such as Barrow were

rather more sympathetic and ambiguous, especially with regard to the Xhosa, who by the War of the Axe, were considered to represent the typical associations of 'savagery' – faithlessness, murderousness and cannibalism – associations which fortified distinctions between the 'civilised' British and their 'savage' foes. This chapter shows that such a shift in opinions was clearly inspired by disillusionment over the spiritual potential of native inhabitants of the Cape, as well as what was perceived to be their irrepressible nature due to persistent outbreaks of conflict between the British and the Xhosa throughout the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

The display of the San in London provided a unique opportunity for the synthesis of various types of 'knowledge' gathered by earlier travel writers and missionaries, anthropological accounts such as those written by Prichard and Knox, publicity surrounding the spectacle, as well as the personal impressions of spectators; complex interrelationships which – in light of the 'constructed' nature of the exhibitions themselves – regularly blurred the distinction between 'fact' and 'fiction'. The questioning of the San's status as human beings was facilitated through such accompanying materials suffused with ideas of polygenesis, which in turn influenced the manner in which their military attributes were perceived. Although the Khoi fought as allies for the British, this broader discourse also had an impact upon the manner in which they were later characterised: figures such as Elers Napier recognised that the Khoi fought admirably and bravely for the British, yet in light of the general questioning of indigenous African humanity, Elers Napier modified earlier paternalistic attitudes, and found fault with the Khoi for his own confusion about their status by claiming that they exhibited an 'inconsistent' nature.

This chapter raises a number of themes that are elaborated in the following chapters: how ideas on race influenced understandings of the production of military arts in the mid-nineteenth century; how colonial officials and military practitioners began to theorise

'savage warfare', as well as the measures that were put in practice against 'savage' opponents; and whether ethical considerations played a part in such discussions. Prior to engaging with these themes in greater detail, the first section of the next chapter looks closely at a different case study of the 'savage' enemy warrior: the Baluchis of Sind. This is primarily in order to emphasise that a singular, coherent characterisation of the 'savage' warrior cannot be traced in the nineteenth century. While the discourse on 'savage' African warriors of the Cape presents a strengthening of critical representations in the mid-to-late 1840s, British experiences in the field against the Baluchis led to a greater appreciation of their military expertise, and an acknowledgement that although 'savage', they possessed characteristics such as courage, valour and an understanding of military ethics, especially in the aftermath of British defeat. The second section of this chapter illuminates the early stages of the advancement of practical guidelines for 'savage warfare' by the British in their struggle to fight adversaries on the imperial frontier by examining closely the writings of General John Jacob, a pioneering, yet overlooked figure in British military history.

Chapter Two: The 'Savage' on the Imperial Frontier

Part I

From Cowardice to Courage: The Baluchi Warriors of Sind

Introduction

In the aftermath of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42), the strategically advantageous position of Sind,[253] a region in the Indus Valley ruled by Baluchi Amirs, became a talking-point for British imperial policy-makers once more. Informally, it was thought that the annexation of the country would not only assist the British in their wish to protect British India from the threat of France and Russia, a threat which had been perceived since the late eighteenth century; it was also seen as an opportunity to restore a resilient military reputation in the region in the aftermath of the retreat from Afghanistan in 1842.[254] Officially, the British presented the Baluchi Amirs with consecutive treaties – the terms of the final treaty, signed in February 1843, which imposed the forfeiture of land, were considered by the Amirs to be especially unjust. An attack on the British Residency in Hyderabad provided the conqueror of Sind, Sir Charles Napier (1782-1853), with the necessary pretext to invade.[255] The ethical ambiguity of the annexation, which eventually occurred in 1843, was not lost on Napier, nor on the wider Victorian public at the time. In fact, prior to the annexation, in a journal entry dated 7 October 1842, Napier wrote: 'We

[253] For consistency, unless a direction quotation is used from a primary source, this chapter will use the spelling 'Baluchi,' 'Baluchistan' and 'Sind'.
[254] See, for instance, Robert A. Huttenback, *British Relations with Sind, 1799-1843* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 2-12, 64; James Alfred Norris, *The First Afghan War, 1838-1842* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 3-31.
[255] Huttenback, *British Relations with Sind*, pp. 65-108.

have no right to seize Scinde, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it will be'. [256]

Even after a number of minor skirmishes and two major battles (Miani, 17 February 1843 and Hyderabad, 24 March 1843) the Baluchi tribesmen persisted in engaging the British in conflicts. One particularly noteworthy battle was undertaken at Truckee on 8 March 1845. This battle was especially distinctive in that although the Baluchis were considered to be 'savage' adversaries, accounts of the battle written by the British reveal the utmost respect and praise for the ways in which the Baluchis fought against, and in the aftermath of the battle honoured, their British opponents. It was the general custom of the Baluchis to tie a green thread around the wrist of a fallen soldier who was considered to be brave, and a red thread for those considered to be heroic. This custom would be immortalised after the battle in a ballad written by the poet Sir Francis Hastings Doyle (1810-1888), titled 'The Red Thread of Honour'. Although often mistakenly thought to refer to Afghan respect for British soldiers as they fought during the First Anglo-Afghan War,[257] the true source of Doyle's inspiration was Sir Charles Napier's account of the battle at Truckee:

> … when a chief dies bravely,
> We bind with green *one* wrist –
> Green for the brave, for heroes
> One crimson thread we twist.
> Say ye, O gallant Hillmen,
> For these, whose life has fled,
> Which is the fitting colour,
> The green one or the red?[258]

[256] *The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier, G.C.B* (4 vols, 1857), ii, p. 218. In 1884, a year after the annexation, the colonial administrator Henry Lushington published a critique of the decision to invade Afghanistan and Sind entitled *A Great Country's Little Wars* (1844).
[257] See for instance, Kate McLoughlin (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to War Writing* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 141.
[258] Sir Francis Hastings Doyle, *The Return of the Guards, and Other Poems* (1866), pp. 100-4. Emphasis in original.

The Baluchis honoured the heroism of a number of British soldiers by tying a red thread around *both* the left and right wrists – an expression of sincere respect for their fallen enemies.[259]

Through the case study of British perspectives on the Baluchis at war, this chapter furthers the argument established in chapter one that ideas on non-European warrior cultures were more dynamic and complex than has been hitherto understood. Alongside descriptions of the Baluchi who is 'blood-thirsty' and has a 'love of plunder' one finds narratives such as the 'Red Thread of Honour', and, as this chapter shows, visual representations which challenged a simplified distinction between the 'civilised' and 'savage' warrior. The first part of this chapter focuses upon the ways in which the Baluchi were represented in military despatches, campaign narratives, travel writing and the private papers of a number of notable military figures and colonial administrators including Sir Henry Pottinger, Captain Thomas Postans, Captain Lewis Brown, Edward Backhouse Eastwick, and General John Jacob. It argues that British defeats at the Battles of Sartaf and Nafusk in 1840 marked a significant turning-point in depictions of Baluchi warriors, and analyses the ways in which British accounts discussed themes such as the interrelationship between religion and war, and the treatment of prisoners of war, in order to emphasise the ambiguous nature of notions of 'savagery'. Through a greater focus on first-hand military narratives – more concerned with the practical military expertise and ethical conduct of 'savage' warriors – this chapter demonstrates that members of the British armed forces did not consistently typify their 'savage' enemies and were willing to present nuanced accounts which – at times – recognised qualities generally associated with 'civilised' opponents: honour, bravery, and

[259] Doyle noted this in his *Lectures on Poetry Delivered at Oxford* (1877), p. 275. He had decided to re-publish the poem as it had been 'translated into Pushtoo, and has become a favourite among the villagers of the North-western frontier of India; my informant added that the tradition of "The Red Thread" was universally known among them', p. x. For Sir Charles Napier's account see: Lieutenant-General Sir William Napier, K.C.B., *History of General Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde* (1851), p. 233. Sir Bartle Frere's biographer, John Martineau, likened the distinction to 'a posthumous Victoria Cross', *The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere* (2 vols, 1895), i, p. 154. Hereafter, *Sir Bartle Frere.*

adherence to norms of warfare. Challenges to a 'civilised'/'savage' divide can also be witnessed in portrayals of 'savage warfare' in mid-century British battlefield paintings. Two contrasting representations of the Battle of Miani are analysed: the first by Edward Armitage which was inspired by William Napier's *The Conquest of Scinde* (1845), and the second by George Jones which presented a revisionist account of Armitage's work. While Jones was concerned to honour Napier's generalship, Armitage – unconstrained by an affiliation with the British military establishment – chose to place 'uncivilised' British actions at the forefront of his painting which challenged expectations of 'civilised' British behaviour in battle.

The second part of this chapter focuses upon the practical measures of General John Jacob who led his regiment – The Sind Irregular Horse – to battle at Miani, Hyderabad and Truckee. Jacob is an exceptionally important figure as he revolutionised British colonial policy on the North-West frontier of Sind by encouraging the use of 'moral power', rather than brute force, against his 'uncivilised' adversaries. Profoundly interested in questions regarding science, religion and the evolution of humankind, Jacob was one of the earliest military practitioners in the nineteenth century to discuss the need to adhere to the rules of 'civilised' warfare against what were considered to be 'savage' opponents. In order to understand why Jacob's frontier policy differed in many respects from those of his contemporaries, this section places his approach to the frontier tribes of Sind in the context of his eclectic intellectual interests. To begin with, meanwhile, this chapter examines the work of Sir Henry Pottinger, an army officer of the East India Company who wrote one of the earliest nineteenth-century books which provided an illustration of the

manners and customs of the Baluchis at war, and had a significant influence on later attitudes.[260]

Sir Henry Pottinger (1789-1856)

In 1810, Henry Pottinger and his colleague Captain Charles Christie of the Bombay Native Infantry disguised themselves as Muslim pilgrims and took a journey by sea from Bombay to Sind in order to explore and report back to the British government on the relatively unfamiliar area between Persia and India. This expedition, fraught with considerable danger, was essentially an early reconnaissance of the navigability of the River Indus system. Captain Christie did not survive the journey, and was killed in Persia during the Battle of Aslanduz (1812).[261]

Pottinger adapted the original notes for his official report into a narrative history of the region, believing such anecdotal details to 'be deemed very interesting as of countries utterly unknown to Europeans, of whose people, governments and customs no records are extant since the time of Alexander the Great'.[262] Entitled *Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde* (1816), Pottinger's book was favourably reviewed by a number of periodicals including *The Gentleman's Magazine*, who saw it as a 'highly-intelligent Work not often discovered in the Itinerary of an Asiatic traveller'.[263] The *Quarterly Review* believed it to be 'a valuable contribution to Asiatic geography', which 'brings us acquainted with a rude and barbarous people, whose manners have probably undergone very little change from the earliest ages', a comment which highlights the journal's conservative editorial outlook in assuming that the region and its inhabitants had remained undeveloped prior to British contact. The only fault the reviewer found with the book was that it did not contribute to the science of

[260] Sir Henry Pottinger, *Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde, Accompanied by a Geographical and Historical Account of these Countries* (1816), p. 56. Hereafter, *Travels*.
[261] Norris, *The First Afghan War*, p. 15; Pottinger, *Travels*, p. 245.
[262] Pottinger, *Travels*, p. xxvi.
[263] 'Travels in Belochistan [sic] and Sinde', *The Gentleman's Magazine*, August 1816, p. 146.

natural history.[264] *The Critical Review* – a publication primarily devoted to book reviews, with an underlying Tory perspective – did choose to note that 'it is not true, as the author supposes… that there is no intermediate account of these countries',[265] and referred to the orientalist Sir William Ouseley (1767-1842), and his translation of a work by the tenth-century Arabian traveller Muhammad Abu'l-Qasim Ibn Hawqal which had been published in 1800.[266] This book had included an account of Sind; however its geographical focus and lack of descriptive details on the inhabitants of the area meant that Pottinger was able to maintain the pioneering significance of his work.

Pottinger began his description of the manners and customs of the Baluchis by stating that they 'are a people whose origin is so obscure, and whose history, like that of all other barbarous tribes, is so blended with romantic fiction and tales of wonder, that I have found it exceedingly difficult to reduce either the one or the other to any credible form'.[267] The main 'classes' were identified as the Baluchi[268] and the Brahooe, who were then subdivided 'into such an infinite number of tribes, who take their names from the most trivial circumstances, that it is morally impossible to account for them'.[269] Despite taking care to try to identify the numerous tribes and sub-tribes of Sind and Baluchistan, Pottinger continued his narrative by making more generalised statements on the characteristics of the Baluchis, and only occasionally associated certain tribes with particular traits. As mentioned in chapter one, the process of essentialising characteristics was relatively common in British imperial literature. C.A. Bayly noted that such stereotypes operated by 'abstract[ing] social characteristics from complex local identities for the sake of ruling' – a form of 'orientalism'.

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[264] 'Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde', *Quarterly Review*, April 1816, pp. 85-111.
[265] 'Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde', *The Critical Review*, September 1816, pp. 263-9.
[266] Sir William Ouseley, *The Oriental Geography of Ebn Haukal* (1800).
[267] Although in the extracts discussed above Pottinger is referring to the manners and customs of Baluchis inhabiting the area of Baluchistan rather than Sind, their military traits were believed to be the same across both regions, therefore his observations are equally as relevant.
[268] The three principle tribes of the Baluchis as identified by Pottinger were the Nharooes, Rinds and Mughsees.
[269] Pottinger, *Travels*, pp. 53-4.

However, it is also important to recognise that with regard to the military capabilities of different tribes throughout the region, Pottinger was reliant upon the knowledge of locals who themselves essentialised the traits of other tribes, potentially due to inter-tribal tensions and rivalries, or to discourage British collaboration with tribal enemies. This process of information gathering complicates the argument that 'orientalism' was driven exclusively by Western interests.[270]

Pottinger chose to focus upon the military traits of the Nharooe Baluchi tribe, as he considered them to be 'the most savage and predatory class of Belooches'. He began by assessing their physique: being 'tall, handsome' and 'active' they did not have 'great physical strength', yet they had the ability to acclimatise easily and 'undergo every species of fatigue'.[271] Although Pottinger did not dwell on this issue, acclimatisation was extremely significant for the British Army when embarking upon campaigns and expeditions to areas such as Sind, where temperatures could soar to beyond 50 degrees Celsius. As General John Jacob would later narrate in his description of frontier fighting in Sind, '[e]ven at midnight the wind appeared like a blast from a furnace'.[272] To emphasise the superiority of the British, the ability to withstand the extraordinary heat of the region was often portrayed as a mark of strength and courage for British soldiers, yet was understood to be an innate and unremarkable capacity in native inhabitants of the region. This is despite the fact that locals and those of bordering countries were also known to struggle to endure such extreme weather, as is demonstrated by the work of Captain Thomas Postans who wrote in 1843: 'The Affghans and northern tribes dread this climate so much that they have a

[270] Bayly also noted that 'a sort of orientalism certainly existed in India before the British', in *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 369.
[271] Pottinger, *Travels*, p. 58.
[272] Shand, *General John Jacob*, p. 16.

proverb which says, "The sun of Sindh will turn a white man black, and is sufficiently powerful to roast an egg"'.[273]

Pottinger continued that the Nharooe Baluchi was 'fearless of death, and, in battle, said to fight with great gallantry', but this was not seen by Pottinger as a virtue, but rather as a demonstration of their recklessness. Instead of extolling their 'capital' marksmanship as an advantage, he emphasised that due to such skills they 'avoid as much as possible, coming to close combat', and were thus lacking in courage.[274] With regard to following a moral code in battle Pottinger claimed that the Nharooe Baluchis were

> [b]ound by no laws, and restrained by no feelings of humanity… while they deem private theft dishonourable and disgraceful in the extreme, they contemplate the plunder and devastation of a country with such opposite sentiments, that they consider it an exploit deserving of the highest commendation; and, steeled by that feeling, they will individually recount the assistance they have rendered on such occasions, the numbers of men, women, and children they have made captives and carried away or murdered, the villages they have burned and plundered, and the flocks they have slaughtered when unable to drive them off.[275]

In his narrative, Pottinger did not differentiate between Baluchi behaviour in battle against a foreign foe, and what he described as inter-tribal 'lawless incursions', or *Chupaos*. *Chupaos* were said by Pottinger to be 'almost always conducted under the immediate superintendence and orders of the chiefs', and motivated by the profits gained by plunder. The 'depredators' would arrive at a village at night, 'and, as soon as the inhabitants have retired to repose, they begin their attack by burning, destroying, and carrying off whatever comes in their way'. Pottinger went on to observe that the inhabitants were ready and willing to retaliate against the marauders: those 'left behind, are seized, mutilated, and murdered in the most cruel manner by the exasperated inhabitants,' whilst 'others are killed

[273] Thomas Postans, *Personal Observations on Sindh* (1843), p. 11. Hereafter, *Personal Observations*.
[274] Pottinger, *Travels*, pp. 65-6.
[275] Ibid., p. 58.

in the skirmishes which take place….'[276] He utilised his conflation of *Chupaos* with Baluchi warfighting in order to demonstrate his belief in their inherent savagery, and in claiming that the attacked inhabitants were quite willing to enact such punishing revenge, the often assumed 'innocence' of non-combatants, with whom readers might be inclined to sympathise, is undermined in his narrative. All members of Baluchi society are here represented as vicious and bloodthirsty.

With regard to the traits of the Baluchi soldier, Pottinger suggested that rather than possessing inherent strength and warrior-like capabilities, a warrior 'character' had to be constructed by the Baluchis through the spectacle of their military 'accoutrements':

> … when armed cap-a-pee, [he] makes a very formidable display. He carries a matchlock, sword, spear, dagger, and shield, besides a multiplicity of power flasks, priming horns, and pouches; the latter crammed with balls, slugs, flints, tinder boxes, and other warlike apparatus, which, on active service, must encumber him beyond conception; they do not, however, seem to mind it, and a warrior's prowess is often estimated by the weight of his accoutrements.[277]

Yet to be burdened with so many materials also suggested an element of disorder, a theme which was often raised in British accounts of non-European military administration and practical capabilities. As Douglas M. Peers has noted, in Indian garrisons 'British order and cleanliness were juxtaposed with Indian disorder and disease'.[278] In 1835, an anonymous naval officer wrote:

> As soon as you enter the cantonments, the English and everything belonging to them displays itself – cleanliness, neatness, regularity – forcing such a contrast to the surrounding country in a perfect state of

[276] Ibid., p. 59.
[277] Ibid., p. 65.
[278] Douglas M. Peers, 'Imperial Vice: Sex, Drink and the Health of British Troops in North Indian Cantonments, 1800-1858', in *Guardians of Empire*, David Killingray and David Omissi (eds), (Manchester, 1999), p. 32.

> nature, where the most lawless villains – strangers to civilization – are allowed to prowl about, seeking their prey.[279]

The contrast between British 'order' and native 'disorder' often acted as an effective literary device to further emphasise the need for British imperial intervention to 'civilise' native inhabitants.

Overall, Pottinger's early account of Baluchi military capabilities was highly disparaging. He suggested that they did not follow a moral code in battle; that their strength as warriors was related to their 'accoutrements' rather than their fighting skills; and that they were cowardly, as indicated by their avoidance of close combat. In 1831, Pottinger would undertake another mission to Sind during which he would keep a detailed journal, the accompanying notes to which suggest his intention to publish a second work on the area and its inhabitants. Due to the more official nature of this visit, Pottinger's notes on the military capabilities of the Baluchis were more detailed than in his earlier work.

Pottinger's 1831 mission was the result of a developing British interest in the commercial advantages of Central Asia, as well as a desire to counteract the influence of Russia upon the region. The fear of a Russian invasion of India was heightened with the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) which established peace between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and was reflected in the publication of two influential books by Colonel de Lacy Evans (1787-1870): *On the Designs of Russia* (1828) and *Practicability of an Invasion of British India* (1829). The repercussions of a Russian invasion as outlined by Evans were seriously contemplated by both the Duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough, who was President of the Board of Control at the time.[280] However, in a secret despatch to the Governor of

[279] A Naval Officer, 'A Journey from Calcutta, via Cawnpore, to Bombay', *USJ*, 1835, p. 40, quoted in Peers, 'Imperial Vice', p. 32.
[280] Norris, *The First Afghan War*, pp. 29-31. In his political diary Ellenborough wrote on 1 September 1829, 'The Directors are much afraid of the Russians. So am I, and the Russians begin to threaten us. They hint that they have open to them the route to Baghdad, and they announce the presence in Petersburg of an Afghan

Bengal written in January 1830, Ellenborough emphasised that the Amirs of Sind were to be reassured that British commercial interests in the region were not a prelude to conquest.[281] Pottinger was thus officially briefed by the Governor-General of India, Lord William Bentinck (1774-1839), to establish a dialogue between the East India Company and the Amirs of Sind to open up the River Indus for British commercial purposes. Despite the reassurance of his contemporaries that the objective of attaining access to the Indus was for the introduction of 'English goods and not Englishmen',[282] Pottinger's own account of this mission suggests an interest in the potential military capabilities of the Baluchis of Sind which moved beyond the parameters of publicly proclaimed official concerns.

In assessing the numerical strength of the military of Sind, Pottinger began by claiming that it was difficult to discern how many troops all three States[283] could assemble in case an urgent need arose. He argued that this was because 'the little attention to veracity by all classes in Sind and the extraordinary suspicions to which all our questions, however simple, gave use, were insurmountable obstacles to getting at the truth on this, and other points'.[284] Pottinger's comment provides a significant insight into the way that information gathering operated at the imperial periphery. C.A. Bayly identified the notion of an 'information panic': the result of a colonial administration struggling to come to terms with the customs and processes of a colonial society, which is heightened by a belief that local actors are purposefully withholding information. Although the absence of knowledge could lead officials to make further generalisations and abstractions with regard to local behaviour, such colonial knowledge was not always 'a purely fictional construct', but rather created from an initial observation of local customs and actions. This form of 'orientalism', Bayly

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Chief, and of Ambassadors from Runjeet Singh', Edward Law (Lord Ellenborough), *A Political Diary, 1828-1830* (1881), p. 92.

[281] Secret Letters received from Bengal and India, 12 January 1830, Vol. 5, IOR/L/PS/5/5, BL.

[282] Norris, *The First Afghan War*, p. 40; Secret Letters received from Bengal and India, 12 January 1830.

[283] Khairpur (Upper Sind), Hyderabad (Lower Sind), and Mirpur.

[284] Henry Pottinger, 'A Memoir on Sinde', August 1832, Pottinger Papers, FO 705/17, TNA (un-paginated).

argued, can thus be seen rather as a 'distorting mirror'.[285] It is important to recognise that such distortions operated in concert with the perceived position of the colonizing power. Firstly, as Bayly recognised, limited knowledge often drove the British to embellish and emphasise threats in order to maximise control.[286] Pottinger's comments reveal that this process of distortion was also undertaken from a perception of dominance, in order to *downplay* a potential threat: his lack of knowledge due to the mistrust of locals led him to diminish the potential numbers of troops that could be mustered by the three States. It was claimed by Amir Moorad Ali-khan of Hyderabad that they could muster 100,000 men, yet Pottinger claimed this to be untrue, and 'a piece of Sindian bravado', arguing rather that they could only raise a maximum of 40,000 men 'and a considerable number of these would serve with reluctance and desert with alacrity'.[287]

The cavalry, which was rumoured to be the primary source of the Sindian Force's strength was criticised by Pottinger, who believed them to lack the necessary training and skills:

> The men, though strong and athletic, are quite untrained to military exercises or drill of any description, and their Horses are under sized and have neither strength nor activity for a charge. … [C]onsequently the Sindian Soldier although strong and hardy, comes into the field of Battle untaught and unprepared, and therefore his Military Knowledge and dexterity, come within a very small compass.[288]

With regard to expressions of bravery in battle, Pottinger argued that cavalry troops had been known to dismount and fight 'desperately hand to hand'. However, as mentioned in his earlier published work, he did not consider this to be a mark of courage, but rather 'the effect of despair'. Pottinger did not dwell upon the capabilities of the infantry, but rather

[285] Bayly, *Empire and Information*, p. 173.
[286] Ibid.
[287] Pottinger, 'A Memoir on Sinde'.
[288] Ibid.

claimed them to be more inferior than the cavalry, and denigrated the manufacture of the weaponry used by them as 'clumsy and inefficient'.[289]

After narrating all of the shortcomings he perceived of the Sindian forces, Pottinger concluded with the claim that

> … the Sindians have the presumption to think that they are superior to all their neighbours in courage and the science of war, and that they can even contend with the 'Lion' of the Punjab – Ranjit Singh – and his disciplined and hardy troops on equal terms; But this merely proves that they are perhaps of all nations that which is *most ripe for destruction*….[290]

Furthermore, Pottinger suggested that in clashes with the British, inspired by pride, they would 'fight one desperate action, should [the] occasion require it – Yet they will assuredly receive such a lesson, as will tend to break their confidence and Military Spirit for ever'. He concluded, however, that the Amirs of the three States acknowledged the 'utter hopelessness of attempting to contend with the British Power', quoting the Amir of Khairpur who was said to have asserted, 'whenever your mighty power is shaken, there will be little hope left for us'.[291]

Although it would take another decade before events in the region precipitated an armed British invasion of Sind, Pottinger's notes reveal how discussions on colonial military capabilities were influenced by geo-political concerns. Pottinger's 'Memoir on Sinde' was never published, and it is questionable whether his views on the Sindian military would have been articulated in as cavalier a manner as his private papers disclose. It can be presumed that the self-assurance in his remarks which disparaged and downplayed the military effectiveness of the Baluchis was driven by a desire to reassure his fellow and senior colleagues of British military supremacy in light of growing insecurity over Russian

[289] Ibid.
[290] Ibid. Emphasis added.
[291] Ibid.

influence on the region. Nevertheless, British opinions of the Baluchi warrior would undergo a significant reappraisal within the next decade as they were met as opponents on the field of battle in a number of campaigns undertaken during the annexation of Sind in 1843. After this point, opinions of Baluchi military capabilities became more diverse, though it is important to note that the initial observations of figures such as Pottinger were still influential. The account published by Captain Thomas Postans in 1843, and dedicated to Pottinger, introduced an important theme neglected in Pottinger's work, which was yet complementary to his emphasis – the interrelationship between the Islamic faith of the Baluchis and warfare. Despite this, however, the point to emphasise here is that Postans' narrative shifted focus part way through, and thus bears witness to a growing development toward a multiplicity of perspectives.

Captain Thomas Postans (1808-1846)

Although little is known of the life of Captain Thomas Postans of the Bombay Army, who became Assistant to the Political Agent in Sind and Baluchistan in 1839, periodicals reveal that he had a keen interest in archaeology and assisted the orientalist and antiquary James Prinsep (1799-1840) in acquiring copies of the inscriptions of the Indian Emperor Ashoka Maurya (304-232 BCE).[292] During his time in India, Sind, and Baluchistan, he often produced sketches of local inhabitants. He was accompanied on his travels by his wife Marianne, and having become fluent in Hindustani she became a prolific writer, producing a number of books which recounted her experiences of living in Sind and India.[293]

Postans published his *Personal Observations on Sindh* in 1843 to generally encouraging reviews, although the liberal-radical magazine *The Spectator* challenged what they viewed as his

[292] 'The Kapur-Di-Giri', *JRAS*, 8 (1846), pp. 308-14. Alexander Cunningham, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum* (1877), p. 14. Postans became a contributing member of The Royal Asiatic Society in 1843. See: 'Proceedings of the Twentieth Anniversary Meeting', 10 June 1843, *JRAS*, 7 (1843), p. iii. He also published *Hints to Cadets* (1842) which provided details and observations on the nature of military service in the East India Company.
[293] Mrs Postans, *Western India in 1838* (1839); Mrs Postans, *Cutch: Or, Random Sketches Taken During a Residence in one of the Northern Provinces of Western India* (1839).

support of the annexation, concluding that 'in all the story of British India, unscrupulous as many of our wars appear to have been, nothing seems so unscrupulous as this invasion of Sindh: the Rohilla war of Warren Hastings was a reputable transaction compared with it'.[294] *The Spectator* was not alone in its criticism of the annexation, as a number of prominent public figures believed it to have been undertaken without a just cause.[295] In an article published in 1876 in the *Contemporary Review*,[296] Gladstone reflected that

> … [the] conquest [of Sind] was disapproved, I believe, unanimously by the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel, of which I can speak, as I had just entered it at that time. But the ministry were powerless, inasmuch as the mischief of retaining was less than the mischief of abandoning it, and it remains an accomplished fact.[297]

In his book Postans did not articulate great sympathy for the native inhabitants of the region, claiming that they possessed a 'degraded' character, and that 'they are said to be distinguished for indolence, cunning, and want of faith, are mean, knavish, and proud…'.[298] Like Pottinger, Postans claimed that the Baluchis had no moral code when fighting in wars, and that rather than excelling in military tactics, it is 'the strongest man [that] is the best soldier'. He argued that the Baluchis had an inherent love of plunder, a certain blood-thirstiness, and when driven by a desire to enact vengeance, they were merciless.[299] Significantly, Postans introduced the theme of religion in his analysis of Baluchi warrior capabilities, making an explicit connection between their warlike nature and their faith in Islam. Prior to exploring this theme in his work, it is thus important to briefly narrate the

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[294] 'Captain Postans on Sindh', *The Spectator*, 22 July 1843, pp. 686-7.
[295] Further details on contemporary criticism of the invasion of Sind will follow later in this chapter.
[296] Under the editorship of James Thomas Knowles Jr. (1870-77), the *Contemporary Review* – a journal initially established as a platform to discuss theological debates – broadened its purview to engage in political and imperial concerns. See: Walter E. Houghton (ed.), *The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900* (5 vols, Toronto, 2006), ii, p. 904.
[297] W.E. Gladstone, 'Russian Policy and Deeds in Turkistan', *The Contemporary Review*, June 1876, p. 875 quoted in Major-General Sir F.J. Goldsmid, *James Outram - A Biography*, 2nd edition (2 vols, 1881), i, p. 347; Adolphus William Ward and G.P. Gooch (eds), *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919* (Cambridge, 1970), p. 211. See also, Lieutenant-Colonel James Outram, *The Conquest of Scinde: A Commentary* (2 vols, 1846).
[298] Postans, *Personal Observations*, p. 71.
[299] Ibid., pp. 44, 72-3.

context within which British understandings of Islam arose in early to mid-nineteenth-century Britain.

Islam as a Religion of the Sword?

In challenging the notion that understandings of Islam during this period were exclusively injurious,[300] the religious historian Clinton Bennett has recognised that alongside the 'confrontational approach' of figures such as Sir William Muir (1819-1905) one can find 'conciliatory' scholarship such as Charles Forster's (1787-1871) *Mahometanism Unveiled* and Godfrey Higgins' (1733-1833) *An Apology for the Life and Character of the Celebrated Prophet of Arabia*, both of which were published in 1829.[301] These two approaches arose in the context of a growing interaction between Western Christians and Muslims due to the expansion of the British Empire. While early Orientalists were inspired to learn Arabic and explore the similarities shared by both religions, it was the duty of members of the British missionary movement to turn imperial subjects in Africa and India away from the 'heathen' faith. Although tensions existed between the British colonial administration and Christian missionaries in the early nineteenth century,[302] in the aftermath of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 these were largely overcome, and as a result hostility towards Muslims increased, despite the fact that the majority of disaffected sepoys were Hindu.[303]

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[300] Following the tradition of Edward Said, this is an argument put forward by Shahin Kuli Khan Khattak in *Islam and the Victorians: Nineteenth Century Perceptions of Muslim Practices and Beliefs* (2008).

[301] Clinton Bennett, *Victorian Images of Islam* (1992). For a discussion that furthers and complicates the research of Said on 'orientalism' by focusing on Victorian understandings of Islam see: Philip C. Almond, *Heretic and Hero: Muhammad and the Victorians* (Wiesbaden, 1989).

[302] The governor of Bombay (1826-1830), Sir John Malcolm expressed to the 'Select Committee of Enquiry into the Affairs of the East India Company' on 17 April 1832: 'In our precipitate attempts to improve the condition of the people [of India], we have often proceeded without sufficient knowledge…. I have been led, by what I have seen, to apprehend as much danger from political as from religious zealots. If the latter at times create alarm to the natives from infringing their superstitious observances and religion, the former unsettle their minds by the introduction of principles and forms of administration foreign to their usage, and at variance with long established habits and prejudices'. *Reports from Committees: Eighteen Volumes - East India Company's Affairs - Political* (1831-2), vol. 14, p. 36.

[303] Bennett, *Victorian Images of Islam*, p. 15. This shift in opinion is reflected in the Indian reformer Sayyid Ahmad Khan's (1817-1898) efforts to challenge the notion that Indian Muslims were 'inherently fanatical and politically disloyal' through his published works where he drew attention to causes of the Rebellion that were of a non-religious nature. See: Safdar Ahmed, *Reform and Modernity in Islam* (2013), pp. 60-1, fn. 45.

Of the two writers considered so far – Sir Henry Pottinger and Captain Thomas Postans – the former referred to the religion of the Baluchis only very briefly. He claimed that they were 'with a very few exceptions to the westward, Soonee [Sunni] Moosulmans, and inveterate in their hatred and enmity against the Sheeas [Shia], under which persuasion, I am convinced, it would be more dangerous to appear in Beloochistan, than even as a Christian'. Pottinger found it significant to explain to his readers the distinction between Sunni and Shia Islam in a footnote.[304] Yet no reference was made in his published work to the interrelationship between Islam and warfare.

In his book *Personal Observations on Sindh*, on the other hand, Postans explicitly associated the religion of the Baluchis with their warlike nature, and warned his readers that they were 'fierce' and 'strongly attached by all the feelings of clanship, and connected by religion, intermarriage, and other sources of general union'.[305] Despite the fact that the heads of the Baluchi clans were now at the mercy of the British government, 'their numerous sons, brothers, and immediate followers, are yet in a position of freedom, excited by the most violent passions, and ready for every species of revenge'. Postans candidly compared the relatively unified inhabitants of Sind and Baluchistan with the fractious distinctions of religion and caste found in India which had allowed the British a 'peaceful occupation of the country'. Instead, '[t]he Biluchi chiefs, warriors, and retainers, individuals and tribes, those of the mountains and those of the plains, are unanimous'.[306]

Questions about the interrelationship between Islam and violence were considered by numerous Victorian commentators and inspired by the available literature during the period. While Charles Forster used historical examples to show that Islam was not always

[304] Pottinger, *Travels*, p. 61.
[305] Postans, *Personal Observations*, p. 349.
[306] Ibid.

propagated by the sword,[307] despite being sympathetic to his subject, Godfrey Higgins argued that faith in Islam inspired an 'enthusiasm' for the use of violence.[308] By the mid-nineteenth century, scholars were discussing and debating the interrelationship between Islam and violence in two spheres – the propagation of the faith through the use of force, and the notion that faith in Islam encouraged violent behaviour. In writing on the Baluchis, Postans claimed:

> Fanaticism fans the flame, and every Moslem, urged by his own feelings of clanship, and natural fierceness of disposition, to deeds of blood, believes that he acts in conformance to the ordinances of the Koran when he supports the government of true believers, and draws his sword against the strange infidels, who are enemies of the faith of Islam. The descendants and followers of the Amirs of Sindh, who, after the battle of Miani fled to the hills – the Biluchi chiefs who constrained them to take arms against the British – the princes who mourn their father's loss, – all these will bind themselves to revenge upon their conquerors; and, as long as one of them remains to wield a sword, will he not do so for his chiefs and for his Prophet?[309]

The associations made by Postans between Islam and war coalesced around a number of themes: Islam was understood as a unifying force for the Baluchis; faith in the Prophet and the Holy Qur'an was said to inspire fanaticism and vengefulness; and those of the faith were alleged to be instructed to defeat the non-believers (infidels) by the use of violent means. Postans presumably framed the interrelationship between Islam and violence in such a way due to his sympathy over the annexation of Sind, and his faith in the British imperial enterprise. He too claimed that 'Mahommedan governments have seldom proved conducive to improvement and civilisation, the reason of which may be found in the first great fact that the fanaticism of the Moslems always induces them to make converts instead of ameliorating the condition of the people…'.[310] His arguments are a reflection of a wider debate which established Islam as a religious falsehood, and the antithesis to modernity and

[307] Bennett, *Victorian Images of Islam*, pp. 29-30.
[308] Higgins, *An Apology*, p. 70, partly quoted in Almond, *Heretic and Hero*, p. 40.
[309] Postans, *Personal Observations*, pp. 349-50.
[310] Ibid., p. 160.

civilisation, arguably impelled by British engagement against what was perceived to be Islamic 'fanaticism' during the First Anglo-Afghan War, which partly explains Postans' inclusion of the issue in his work.[311] The claim that the Muslim faith spread through forced conversions at the point of the sword gave greater salience to the arguments of those who believed in the distinctive 'truth' of the Christian faith and supported the cause of the British 'civilising mission'.

Despite Postans' claim about Baluchi 'fierceness' and religious 'fanaticism', when he turned to discuss their weapons expertise the tone of his narrative underwent a significant shift. Unlike Pottinger, Postans did not consider it necessary to reinterpret Baluchi military behaviour in a disparaging light in order to support British strategic concerns; in this work, he admitted without qualification that the Baluchis were courageous in battle. This departure was most likely influenced by the reputation of the Baluchis as fighters in the Battles of Sartaf and Nafusk, to which this chapter now turns.

A Turning Point: The Battles of Sartaf and Nafusk (1840)

At the Battle of Sartaf (16 May), a convoy returning from the recently re-occupied area of Kahun led by Lieutenant Walpole Clarke was routed by 2,000 Marri Baluchis.[312] Once Clarke sent for a reinforcement of ammunition, the Baluchis took a sudden charge, and after a two hour fight the British suffered great losses, and Clarke was killed.[313] In his

[311] In an account of the war edited by the British lawyer Charles Nash and based on the written experiences of an anonymous British officer, the existence of a 'body of fanatic Mussulmen, termed Ghazees, or Defenders of the Faith' was mentioned, 'whose enthusiasm had been enlisted by Dost Mohamed [the overthrown Afghan ruler] against the Kafir, or infidel English, and their renegade King, as the Shah was represented to them'. See: *History of the War in Affghanistan* (1843), p. 162. This interrelationship between Islam and fanaticism would gain greater salience in the latter part of the nineteenth century. See, for instance: Henry Bellew, *The Races of Afghanistan* (1880), pp. 81-2.

[312] Captain Lewis Brown, *Private Journal kept by Captain Lewis Brown* (Bombay, 1841), pp. 7-10.

[313] The numbers of Clarke's force and casualties vary across accounts. Brown, who held the garrison at Kahun, noted at first that only one dooly-wallah survived, which was later revised to 1 *havildar* (Indian infantry sergeant) and 11 privates. The casualties of the cavalry were not mentioned. George Buist noted that 148 men were slain, while 1 *havildar* and 10 privates escaped. Edward Backhouse Eastwick noted that out of 160 men, 30/40 escaped and 6/7 cavalry were wounded. Only Brown mentioned that the Baluchi losses were 'unknown, and ever will be, they only acknowledge to 25'. See ibid., pp. 8-9; George Buist, *Outline of the*

account of the battle, published in 1843, the newspaper editor George Buist (1805-1860) noted that '[t]o this day the Murrees [Marri Baluchis] speak of [Clarke's] bravery, calling him "Burra Bahadoor [The Brave]"'.[314] The British were again defeated on 31 August at the Battle of Nafusk, when a relief column led by Major Thomas Clibborn was attacked by Marri Baluchis and several skirmishes took place. Many men died of heat exhaustion and lack of water. Edward Backhouse Eastwick (1814-1883), a philologist of the Bombay Infantry, described the Baluchi attack as 'formidable':

> One most distinguished chief of the Marris actually thrust his shield against the mouth of a gun as it was about to be fired, and was blown away from it. … They fought like madmen, or wild beasts, and so great was the peril of our troops that Major Clibborn himself wrote that 'nothing but a fortunate discharge of grape saved the regiment, at the last moment, from complete destruction'.[315]

After the battle, Clibborn dispatched a party to send for water. Upon the realisation that they would not return, a retreat was ordered. The garrison at Kahun could not be relieved. Out of desperation, on 23 September Captain Lewis Brown who was holding Kahun wrote to the Chief of the Marris: 'I'll give you back your fort, on conditions, viz. that you give me personal security for my safe arrival in the plains; if not, I will remain here 2 months longer, having provisions for that time'. The Marri chiefs assembled and presented their terms to Brown – if he left the fort in three days, they would provide protection from attack during their retreat.[316] Brown was met at the garrison by Gaumaul Khan, the nephew of the Chief of the Marris, and an agreement was made. Importantly, Gaumaul Khan articulated his hope that, 'there would now be a lasting peace between his tribe and the British', and emphasised that the Baluchis had fought during the battle in a principled manner: they had just cause as they 'had only fought at the Nuffoosk [Nafusk] pass to save their country, and

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Operations of the British Troops in Scinde and Affghanistan (Bombay, 1843), pp. 178-9; Edward Backhouse Eastwick, *Dry Leaves from Young Egypt* (1849), p. 111.

[314] Buist, *Outline of the Operations*, p. 179.

[315] Eastwick, *Dry Leaves from Young Egypt*, pp. 137-9.

[316] Brown, *Private Journal*, p. 22.

their lives', they did not kill any British soldiers when fighting had finished, and prisoners were treated with the utmost respect, by being 'fed, clothed, and set free'.[317] Eastwick too referred to the Marris as a 'noble-hearted tribe' who 'added kindness to mercy', and noted that after the battle, the Chief of the Marris had sent to Clibborn a letter that stated:

> Tell the Saheb [Clibborn], that all the men the Marris have slain, were slain in fair fight; for the murder of camp followers, wounded men, and prisoners, let the Bugtis [a rival tribe] answer. Our hands have never been red with the blood of unresisting men.[318]

After discussions with Gaumaul Khan, Brown concluded that the Baluchis were

> … the most civil and polite of men! [T]he confidence we placed in their word, by meeting them in the way we did, seemed to please them much, and from having been deadly enemies for 5 long months, became in one hour the best of friends….[319]

With both parties keeping their word, by 1 October 1840 Brown and the remainder of his garrison returned safely to the headquarters of the 5th Regiment at Lehree.

The accounts of the Battles of Sartaf and Nafusk contrast markedly with Pottinger's accounts of Baluchi military capabilities. Despite dedicating *Personal Observations on Sindh* to Pottinger, and despite his own prejudices about the implications of Baluchi religious beliefs, Postans challenged Pottinger on a number of points, which again reinforces the argument made in chapter one that narratives of non-European cultures were not always reproduced in a hegemonic fashion by successive military officers or colonial administrators (nor were they necessarily internally consistent). Postans claimed that the Baluchis were in fact skilled in the use of weaponry, particularly the swordsmen, who

[317] Discussions on the ethics of war on both sides of such colonial conflicts is further explored in chapters four and five of this dissertation.
[318] Eastwick, *Dry Leaves from Young Egypt*, p. 152.
[319] Brown, *Private Journal*, p. 23.

favoured 'hand-to-hand combat, rushing in on their foe under shelter of their large shields'. He also argued that they demonstrated bravery in battle, and that 'although late events have proved, in addition to former instances, that they cannot cope with the steady discipline of our troops, they have now fairly earned a name for courage, which was not formerly conceded to them…'.[320]

Furthermore, Postans found it appropriate to quote an 'admirable despatch', written by Sir Charles Napier in the aftermath of the Battle of Miani (17 February 1843), which concluded in a British victory, despite the fact that they were overwhelmingly outnumbered by the Baluchis.[321] Rather than claiming the Baluchis to be inferior as warriors in strength and skill, Napier emphasised the technologically asymmetrical nature of the conflict, and commented upon the bravery of the Baluchis who

> … first discharging their matchlocks and pistols, dashed over the bank with desperate resolution, but down went these bold and skilful swordsmen under the superior power of the musket and bayonet. At one time, my Lord, the courage and numbers of the enemy against the 22nd, the 25th, and the 12th regiments, bore heavily in that part of the battle.[322]

To be mentioned in despatches (MiD) was considered a great honour by those serving in the British armed forces, and as these despatches were made known to the public through their publication in *The Gazette* (the official public record), a further significance is conferred upon Napier's praise of the Baluchis. Despite being characterised as an aggressive and impatient military figure, whose justifications for the engagement of warfare in Sind were seriously questioned by other military practitioners and the wider public,

[320] Postans, *Personal Observations*, p. 46.
[321] The British force amounted to some 2,800 men, while the Baluchis were at an estimated strength of over 20,000. See: 'The Battle of Meeanee', *The Bombay Gazette*, 27 February 1843, in *Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse* (2 vols, 1856), i, pp. 11-14.
[322] Major-General Sir C.J. Napier, K.C.B., Commanding in Sinde and Beloochistan, to Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General of India, &c., Meeanee, 6 miles from Hyderabad, February 18, 1843, *The London Gazette*, 9 May 1843, p. 1506.

Napier would not refuse to recognise the accomplishments of his 'savage' enemy combatants.

It is therefore evident that that the courage, resilience and ethical behaviour of the Baluchis were certainly acknowledged in the aftermath of the Battles of Sartaf, Nafusk, and Miani – as the campaign narratives of Brown, Eastwick, and Postans have revealed. The actions of Brown were widely publicised amongst the regiments of the Bombay Army at the behest of J.P. Willoughby, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, who, after receiving a copy of Brown's journal, circulated an official order detailing Brown's defence of Kahun which was read to each regiment during a 'special parade' organised for that purpose. Willoughby also noted in his order that he felt great 'satisfaction in giving publicity to [Brown's journal]'.[323] As was the case with the work of Postans, Eastwick's *Dry Leaves* had a wider audience, and was favourably reviewed in liberal-leaning periodicals such as the *Calcutta Review* and the more moderate *The Athenaeum*.[324] In light of the exposure of Eastwick's account, his admission that the Marri Baluchis sought to reassure the British of the justness of their cause, and upheld ethical norms such as giving quarter to prisoners of war, is significant, and challenges the notion that Western campaign narratives of colonial wars only sought to reinforce distinctions between the 'savage' enemy warrior and the 'civilised' British soldier.

Distinctions between 'savagery' and 'civilisation' were not only questioned in the public sphere through the publication of campaign narratives (such as those discussed above) and were not only debated in relation to characterisations of the enemy. A painting by the British artist Edward Armitage (1817-1896) which was first exhibited in June 1847 at the Westminster Hall competition[325] caused great controversy due to its unfavourable depiction

[323] 'Notification, Secret Department, Bombay Castle, 29 March 1841', in Brown, *Private Journal*, pp. 1-2.
[324] 'Recent Works on Scinde', *Calcutta Review*, October 1851, pp. 383-411; 'Dry Leaves', *The Athenaeum*, 17 July 1852, pp. 767-8.
[325] The competition was instituted in 1843 during the ongoing reconstruction of Westminster Palace, much of which had been destroyed by fire in 1834. The Royal Fine Art Commission wished to adorn the Palace with frescoes, and the works submitted by artists for consideration were exhibited at Westminster Hall in

of British conduct at the Battle of Miani. Through his painting, Armitage portrayed the British soldier exhibiting traits traditionally associated with the notion of 'savagery' – as chaotic, coldly ruthless, and without mercy towards a fallen foe. The first section of this chapter concludes with a discussion of the reception of Armitage's painting and the emergence of an alternative interpretation of British conduct during the same battle in a painting by the artist George Jones (1786-1869).

Contrasting Artistic Representations of 'Savage Warfare'

During the mid-nineteenth century, understandings of the constitution of 'appropriate' British battle paintings were contested by both critics and the art establishment. As J.W.M Hichberger noted, opinions differed as to whether depictions of battle should conform to representations of 'fact', or whether they should ascribe to the 'Reynoldsian' notion of 'History' painting where figures and events were to be 'abstracted' and 'idealised'.[326] At the 1847 Westminster Hall competition, Armitage's painting won a prize of £500, and was much-admired by Queen Victoria.[327] Yet despite praise from the establishment, critics and commentators not only challenged the work's association with the genre of 'History' painting; they also harshly criticised its subject matter: in the midst of animated scenes of fierce fighting, reflecting the chaos and confusion of the battle, the foreground of the painting depicts a British infantry soldier bayoneting a fallen Baluchi enemy (Figure 10). One critic expressly challenged the focus of Armitage's painting, claiming that 'instead of

competitions held annually until 1847. See: T.S.R. Boase, 'The Decoration of the New Palace of Westminster, 1841-1863', *JWCI*, 17:3/4 (1954), pp. 319-58.

[326] J.W.M. Hichberger, *Images of the Army: The Military in British Art, 1815-1914* (Manchester, 1988), p. 43.

[327] 'The Exhibition at Westminster Hall', *The Art-Union*, 1 August 1847, p. 265. In a journal entry for Friday 25 June 1847, Queen Victoria wrote: 'After luncheon we went with Uncle & Louise, &c – to the Exhibition at Westminster Hall, the 4th which has now taken place. It is an exhibition of oil paintings, amongst which were some very fine ones… [including] a Battle Picture, size of life, by Armitage, a beautiful picture, which I should much like to buy, but am not rich enough!' VIC/MAIN/QVJ (W) 25 June 1847 (Princess Beatrice's copies), Royal Archives (retrieved 7 February 2015). Hew Strachan and Michael Barthorp have noted that the painting was bought by Prince Albert, in 'The Battle of Meanee', *JSAHR*, 55 (1977), p. 127.

illustrating a glorious event, [it] will hold up the British Army and Sir Charles Napier to the reprobation of mankind'. He followed:

> We must protest against this misapplication of the Fine Arts. … Was there nothing to deserve admiration in the battle of Meeanee? Nothing to select but 'single combats, where no quarter was given, none called for, none expected'? English soldiers, themselves in absolute disorder, bayoneting a fallen foe! Was there no generalship, no humanity, no 'true courage' on that day in Englishman's breasts to animate an artist's genius?[328]

Public discussion and debate over the conquest of Sind continued well into the 1840s and 1850s, due to the animosity that arose between Sir Charles Napier, and the former Political Agent of Upper and Lower Sind, Sir James Outram (1803-1863). In 1845, Charles Napier's brother William published an account of the conquest which aimed to appease critics of Charles' actions.[329] A year later, Outram published a 'commentary' on Napier's book, arguing fervently that,

> Nearly a month before the battle of Meeanee, I not only clearly foresaw the sad events that were to follow, but I declared to Sir Charles Napier my conviction, 'that every life which might hereafter be lost in consequence, would be a murder.' Admiring him as a gallant soldier, and giving him credit for his professed anxiety to maintain peace, I could not disguise my regret at his persisting in what I deemed unjustifiable proceedings, and my sorrow that his should be the hands to work results so disastrous – disastrous, I mean, not in a military, but in a political and moral sense.[330]

Armitage could not have been unaware of the details of this ongoing public controversy, and due to his financial independence, he was free to express his own opinion on the invasion – hence his willingness to portray the British armed forces in an unfavourable

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[328] H.G. Clarke, 'A Critical Examination of the Pictures at Westminster Hall', 1847, quoted in Hichberger, *Images of the Army*, p. 46.

[329] William Francis Patrick Napier, *The Conquest of Scinde* (1845).

[330] Outram, *The Conquest of Scinde*, i, p. 4. Richard Napier published his own response to Outram's work: *Remarks on Lieut.-Colonel Outram's Work, Entitled 'The Conquest of Sinde, A Commentary'* (1847), and wished to emphasise that he had not been influenced by his brother to do so: 'Sir Charles Napier has never seen these remarks; nor is he, up to this moment, in the slightest degree aware of my intention to publish these or any other observations upon this subject', p. i.

light.[331] Due to his representation of the British behaving dishonourably in battle, Armitage's painting clearly provided broader visual propaganda to those inclined to view Napier's annexation of Sind as an act of injustice.

The public controversy over the annexation of Sind developed in visual debate, and this particular painting provoked the creation of a contrasting perspective on the Battle of Miani. The artist George Jones, a former Captain in the Militia who served under Wellington in the Peninsular War,[332] painted his own impression of the battle which was undoubtedly influenced by his friendship with William Napier (Figure 11). Through his correspondence with William, it is evident that Jones expressed sincere admiration for his brother Charles, believing him to be 'a great warrior', and that 'his desire to protect and aid by good regulations the poorer classes of society is a glory to him and the greatest benevolence to mankind'.[333] In reference to a sketch made for William Napier prior to his undertaking of the Battle of Miani painting, Jones wrote: 'you gratify me much by accepting the finished sketch which I did (I believe) with a spirit congenial with your own, noble deeds, warlike, and pacific…'.[334] In a following letter, Jones justified his understanding of the elements required of an effective battle painting by explicit contrast with Armitage's approach:

> The General commanding and the principal movements, which led to Victory should be depicted, and made distinctly apparent to the Spectator otherwise one battle will serve for all, where great guns, muskets, and bayonets have been used – accessories should remain such, and the field of heroes *should not be made the slaughter [at the] hand of savages*.[335]

[331] Strachan and Barthorp do note that Armitage received assistance from William Napier on the details of the battle, 'The Battle of Meanee', pp. 127-8. However, as this painting was not commissioned by either William or Charles, this early communication seems to have had little effect on his interpretation of the battle.
[332] 'Obituary - George Jones, R.A.', *The Art Journal*, November 1869, p. 336.
[333] George Jones to William Napier, 9 June 1851, Napier Papers, MS.Eng.lett.d.242 a (fol. 1), BodL.
[334] Ibid.
[335] George Jones to William Napier, 3 June 1852, Napier Papers, BodL. Emphasis added.

Charles Napier evidently found Jones' composition agreeable, as he purchased the painting, and placed it prominently on display at his home in Oaklands, Hertfordshire. An account of his funeral in 1853 in the *Illustrated London News* suggests the significance of the painting for Napier as it hung prominently in the background of an image of his coffin lying in state at his home (Figure 12). The commentary noted: '… the head of the coffin [was positioned] immediately beneath the fine picture of "Meanee," by Jones; and the glorious colours of the 22nd hanging over it. On each side of the corpse is an Indian spear, and around are Belooch shields, sabres, matchlocks, and other trophies taken in battle'.[336]

Displayed at the Royal Academy in 1852, the painting met with a relatively indifferent response from the moderate periodical *The Athenaeum*, who remarked: 'The parti-coloured Beloochee crowds, the camels, the elephants, the turbans, &c. convey a sufficient idea of the multitudinous Xerxes' armies of India… but the stern reality and tug of war are wanting'. *The Art Journal* was more favourable: 'The work is admirable in all its arrangements of composition, drawing, and colour. The artist has here erected a monument to the soldier, and given a painted page to the history of his country'.[337] While Armitage's painting placed the spectator in the midst of the chaos and violence of battle, Jones chose to focus his work on the role of the commander, who stands elevated to the right of the painting, and along with his staff, observes the surrounding action. The energy and dynamism of Armitage's work is lacking in Jones' depiction; a criticism that Jones was made well-aware of as he wrote to Napier, '… I must and will paint battles in my own way, without borrowing from the "dashed off" style of Vernet'.[338] While it is clear that for Jones the painting was a work in response to Armitage's depiction of the battle, and was intended as an apologia for Napier, contemporary reviews of the work were limited to discussing its

[336] 'Funeral of Lieutenant-General Sir Charles James Napier', *ILN*, 17 September 1853, pp. 229-30.
[337] 'Royal Academy', *The Athenaeum*, 15 May 1852, pp. 549-51; 'The Exhibition of the Royal Academy, 1852', *The Art Journal*, 1 June 1852, p. 165.
[338] Jones to Napier, 3 June 1852. Emile Jean-Horace Vernet (1789-1863) was a French painter known for his striking battle paintings of the Napoleonic Wars.

style and content and did not make reference to Armitage's earlier piece. This may have been due to the fact that five years had elapsed since the exhibition of Armitage's work, although Jones had exhibited a preparatory drawing of his representation of the Battle of Miani at the Royal Academy in 1849.[339]

Although scholars have claimed that the Crimean War presented an important turning-point in British battle painting (portrayals of heroism giving way to the depiction of the hardship and destructiveness of warfare),[340] the work of Armitage shows that contemporary criticism of the British armed forces was expressed visually prior to this period. Furthermore, Armitage's work can be understood as a clear challenge to the notion of a 'civilised'/'savage' divide. Protests against such a challenge were indirectly articulated through aesthetically-based critiques and commendation of traditional, idealised battle paintings.

While the first section of this chapter has focused upon the ways in which colonial administrators, military practitioners, and war artists presented ambivalent views of the 'savage' warrior and 'savage warfare' in their works, the second part explores the practical methods of General John Jacob, one of the figures of the mid-Victorian period who argued that 'savage' opponents such as the Baluchi warriors of Sind should be fought in accordance with 'civilised' rules of warfare. In order to gain a greater understanding as to why Jacob's approach to the Sind Frontier was so distinctive, this section analyses his approach in light of his broader opinions on race, religion and moral understanding. As this section demonstrates, his ideas further complicate the professed distinction between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare'.

[339] Strachan and Barthorp, 'The Battle of Meanee', p. 131.
[340] Peter Harrington, 'The Battle Paintings of George Jones, R.A. (1786-1869)', *JSAHR*, LXVII (1989), p. 244.

Part II

General John Jacob and the Doctrine of 'Moral Force'

In his highly-critical three-volume account of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80),[341] Colonel Henry Bathurst Hanna (1839-1914), a keen admirer and collector of Indian art, chastised Lord Frederick Roberts (1832-1914) for permitting the burning and looting of villages, and ordering his cavalry charge to take no prisoners during the invasion of the Khost Valley, 7-8 January 1878.[342] Hanna argued that any justifications put forward by Roberts for his actions, including the argument of 'military necessity', deviated from 'the honourable traditions of the Army to which he belonged'.[343] In response to Roberts' claim that his column of '2,300 men was insignificant in comparison with the numbers we might find arrayed against us', that his troops 'were separated by many miles of difficult country from our nearest supports', and that therefore 'severe punishment' was necessary against the tribes that had attacked his camp, Hanna claimed that Roberts had

> … neglected the first duty of a commander in failing to acquaint himself with the conditions under which his projected operations would have to

[341] The work was considered to be highly-polarising at the time due to Hanna's severe critique of British imperial policy, and the actions of figures such as Lord Frederick Roberts. With regard to the third volume of Hanna's work, the moderate-conservative periodical *The Saturday Review*, for instance, argued that: 'There has been much pains to get at facts, a praiseworthy industry is shown, and yet as one closes the volume one feels that an element of personal prejudice and political partisanship has been allowed to creep into pages that should have been entirely devoted to military principles collected from an accurate narrative of a very famous war…. Nor is the author fair on Lord Roberts when he accuses him of cruel and bloodthirsty vengeance on the Afghans'. 'Book Reviews', 21 May 1910, pp. 662-3.

[342] In his defence, Roberts did admit to 'caus[ing] "numerous villages [11 in total]" to be "looted" and burnt' and believed that 'their punishment in this manner [was] both deserved and necessary...' because these villages 'had harboured the enemy'. Roberts claimed this to be 'an act of retributive justice which I considered necessary for the safety of the troops under my command'. With regard to taking no prisoners, Roberts also believed this order to be justified as the charge against the enemy village led by Major J.C. Stewart, 5th Punjab Cavalry, was too small to attempt to take enemy prisoners. According to Roberts, 'between 30 and 40 of the enemy were killed'. East India (Khost Valley) Copy of papers relating to the proceedings of Maj-Gen Roberts in the Khost Valley on the 7th and 8th days of January 1879, pp. 2-3, IOR/L/MIL/17/14/35, TNA.

[343] Colonel H.B. Hanna, *The Second Afghan War: Its Causes, its Conduct, and its Consequences* (3 vols, Westminster, 1899-1910), ii, p. 213.

> be conducted – or, else, that knowing what lay before him, he deliberately chose to run risks so great….[344]

In order to demonstrate his own unwavering belief in the justice, integrity and humanity of the British Army, Hanna contrasted the actions of Roberts with the heroic achievements of a number of military figures throughout British history, including General John Jacob (1812-58). Jacob was an officer of the East India Company, who died at the young age of forty-six in his namesake town of Jacobabad (formerly Khanghur). Described by *The Spectator* as 'a martyr to his devotion to duty', whose 'death is an irreparable loss to the Empire', Jacob's innovative approach towards the warrior tribes of the North-West Frontier established his reputation as 'a man of great military genius entirely free from the lust of personal distinction,'[345] who 'insisted on applying the rules of civilized warfare to the savage and troublesome tribes of Sind, and their no less savage and troublesome neighbours'.[346]

Jacob was a vocal advocate for military reform, particularly of the British Indian Army, and his early writings foretold the coming of the 1857 Indian Rebellion.[347] In 1853, *The Times* in London and Bombay published a letter to the editor in which he disparaged the inefficiencies of the British Indian Army. It caused such controversy that Jacob was singled out and criticised in Bombay General Orders by the Commander-in-Chief, who argued that his 'observations and sentiments [were] of a most objectionable nature'; and that whilst 'officers have a perfect right to form opinions on the organisation and order of the army…

[344] Ibid.
[345] Shand, *General John Jacob*, p. 313.
[346] Hanna, *The Second Afghan War*, ii, p. 215.
[347] G.W. Forrest, *Sepoy Generals: Wellington to Roberts* (1901), p. 269. Jacob wrote in 1853, 'There is more danger to our Indian Empire from the state of the Bengal Army, from the feeling which there exists between the native and the European, and thence spreads throughout the length and breadth of the land, than from all other causes combined. Let Government look to this; it is a serious and most important truth', Shand, *General John Jacob*, p. 207.

they are not to publish their opinions in their official capacity'.[348] An analysis of Jacob's private papers and published works reveals a man who was not deterred by such constraints. Throughout his military career, Jacob was intensely preoccupied not only with army reform, but also with questions related to moral development and evolutionary theory. He was particularly distinctive in his conviction that troops under his command should demonstrate their willingness to abide by the rules of warfare, no matter which enemy they were fighting against, 'savage' or 'civilised'. In order to emphasise Jacob's revolutionary approach towards the marauding tribes of the North-West Frontier, this section first briefly outlines how this area was managed by his predecessor, Sir Charles Napier.

A Challenge to Napier's Frontier Policy

Jacob's familiarity with the North-West Frontier began in 1838, when in preparation for the First Anglo-Afghan War, Sind was chosen as the base for operations due to the refusal of Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780-1839) to allow British-Indian forces to pass through the Punjab on route to Afghanistan. Jacob set sail for the fishing village of Kurrachee, and then accompanied the Bombay column of the Army of the Indus, commanded by Sir John Keane, to Sukkur in Upper Sind. Here he would first come across the mountain tribes inhabiting the frontier of Sind, who 'attacked his line of communication… cut off his envoys and murdered his *kāsids* [messengers]'.[349] Jacob claimed that although appeasing gestures were made towards the tribal chiefs, these were rejected, and so force was to be used. For four years Jacob was engaged in a number of battles against the tribes in Upper Sind and Baluchistan, and by 1842 he was commander of the Sind Irregular Horse (Figures

[348] John Jacob, 'Native Troops of the Indian Army', *The Times*, 26 December 1853, p. 9. Bombay General Orders by the Governor in Council and the Commander-in-Chief 1854, IOR/L/MIL/17/4/424, BL. See also: Shand, *General John Jacob*, pp. 202-4.
[349] Forrest, *Sepoy Generals*, p. 270.

13 and 14) which was placed to guard the frontier of Cutchee.[350] Upon leaving Sind, the Political Agent Captain James Outram, wrote of Jacob's efforts in November 1842, concluding that:

> For the first time within the memory of man, Kutchee and Upper Sind have been for a whole year entirely free from the irruptions of the hill-tribes, by which villages were annually destroyed, lives and property sacrificed, and the whole country kept in a state of fever.[351]

In the aftermath of the official annexation of Sind by the British in 1843, Sir Charles Napier began to institute his frontier policy, which aimed to suppress the marauding hill tribes exclusively through the use of military force. In response to continual attacks, Napier built fortifications, and detachments of troops were posted to vulnerable areas of the border. The troops were isolated from the local population, fed and supplied by the commissariat, and an atmosphere of mutual distrust prevailed. Raids did not cease: on 10 December 1846, 1,500 armed men of the Boogtee tribe entered Sind, and with 500 followers, drove away 15,000 head of cattle to the hills, seventy-five miles away from the British encampment.[352] In a letter to his brother Philip (dated 19 January 1853), Jacob frankly concluded: 'Sir Charles Napier in spite of his bravery and energy in the face of an enemy, etc., is a perfect charlatan in all else, and the state of the Scinde border was infinitely more lamentable during his administration from 1843 to 1846 inclusive than it had ever been under the Amirs of Scinde'.[353]

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[350] Sir Bartle Frere's biographer noted: 'In 1846, a second regiment of Sind Horse was raised, but so completely had Jacob identified himself with the force, and so unwilling was he to let any part of it pass from under his immediate command, that, at his special request, and by a very unusual arrangement, he was made commandant of both regiments'. See: Martineau, *Sir Bartle Frere*, i, p. 139.

[351] 'Letter from the Political Agent in Sind and Beloochistan to Lieutenant Jacob, Commanding Sind Irregular Horse, dated 9th November 1842', *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government*, No. XVII (Bombay, 1855), pp. 148-9.

[352] John Jacob, *The Views and Opinions of Brigadier General John Jacob*, Captain Lewis Pelly (ed.), (Bombay, 1858), pp. 294-6. Hereafter, *Views and Opinions*.

[353] Quoted in Lambrick, *John Jacob of Jacobabad*, p. 220.

With the departure of Napier in 1847, Jacob was appointed Political Superintendent and Commandant of the frontier of Upper Sind, establishing his centre of operations at Khanghur. Jacob described the country as 'a dreary waste of sand, swept for eight months in the year by burning and noxious winds, and was almost wholly deserted'.[354] Initially, he too exclusively used force against the marauders ('[o]ur first year on the border was one of enormous bodily labor; we had, literally, to lie down to rest with our boots and sword on, for many months together').[355] However, in contrast with Napier's policy, Jacob believed that the use of such force was a means to an end – physical force was to be used to inspire respect in the marauders. Once such respect was gained, it would be possible to 'excite men's better natures', and inculcate the notion that the prevention of violence was needed for the good of the community. This he understood to be the result of utilising such 'moral power'.[356]

The Distinction Between 'Force' and 'Violence'

While Jacob did not completely abandon the use of force, he believed in the supremacy of moral power due to its sustainable nature. In his discussion on 'The Control of Predatory Tribes', he wrote: 'Justice, honesty, high principles, unswerving firmness, and *force without violence*, succeed best with these men, as with others. If we imitate their crimes, on pretence of retaliation, we only perpetuate the evil'.[357] An analysis of his writings reveals that in order to justify his early actions, Jacob was careful to establish a distinction between the use of 'force' which was considered to be a necessity to create order, and the use of 'violence' by the frontier fighters, whose actions were considered to be 'criminal'. Jacob was especially conscious of the need to delegitimise the conduct of the frontier fighters:

[354] Jacob, *Views and Opinions*, p. 325.
[355] *Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse*, ii, p. 188.
[356] Jacob, 'Memorandum on the Principles of Procedure on the North-West Frontier of Sind' (1854), in *Views and Opinions*, pp. 322-3. Hereafter, 'Memorandum'.
[357] Jacob, 'The Control of Predatory Tribes' (1856) in *Views and Opinions*, p. 6. Emphasis added.

> The power of the border marauder does not wholly consist in the damage he is able to cause, or in the terror he is able to inspire, but in the fact that his name and deeds are associated, even in the minds of those he injures, with chivalric daring, and attributes not altogether bad. But if the trade of marauder be proved to be unsuccessful, and disreputable, it soon receives the ridicule and contempt of all.[358]

Jacob was aware that the marauders could gain sympathy from the local community, and thus believed adamantly in undermining his opponents' motivations. In keeping with his strategy to discredit the use of violence, he condemned retributive punishments. He noted that under Napier's command '[w]hen the men of Kutchee plundered in Sind, the only remedy applied was to encourage the Sindhees to plunder in Kutchee. Both parties then were equally guiltless or equally criminal; no idea of moral superiority was thought of'.[359] Jacob took pride then in stating that due to his efforts

> [t]he barbarians now feel… that strength, courage, and activity may be possessed in the highest degree by those also influenced by gentle and benevolent motives. Under the influence of this growing feeling, the character of the border plunderers has been changed; whole tribes… amounting to more than twenty thousand souls, have totally abandoned their former predatory habits, and taken to peaceable pursuits.[360]

Although the numbers suggested are unverifiable, and may have been exaggerated in order to burnish his own reputation, for Jacob it was clearly the use of moral power which most effectively inspired a change in the character of his enemies – a change that could not have been achieved exclusively through the constant threat and enactment of physical force. By the early 1850s, he would incorporate such ideas into his official principles of procedure on the North-West Frontier, to which this chapter now turns.

'Principles of Procedure on the North-West Frontier'

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[358] Ibid.
[359] Jacob, 'Memorandum', p. 324.
[360] Ibid., p. 325.

In 1854, Jacob composed two communications: a 'Memorandum on the Principles of Procedure on the North-West Frontier of Sind' and a 'Summary of Arrangements Made on the North-West Frontier of Sind' where he elaborated upon his approach against the warrior tribes. Fortifications and other defensive measures were to be 'destroyed or abandoned', so that British troops were 'always freely exposed' in order to avoid a tense, conflict-provoking atmosphere. Patrolling of the frontier was the key to his system. The free movement of troops would assist in their ability to respond to potential threats swiftly. Jacob believed that isolating troops from the local population in fortifications – as Napier had done – incited a mutual mistrust and undermined any potential for the establishment of peace and security. He also believed that the predatory tribes saw defensive measures as a sign of fear and weakness, and therefore were encouraged to attack. An open, unguarded community would be a show of moral force to the depredators.[361]

Disarmament was considered to be of the utmost importance in order to establish a sense of local justice, although possession of arms in a private dwelling was not prohibited:

> Its simple operation is to draw a clear line of distinction between the armed servants of Government and all other persons. It thus helps a people, long used to obtain redress for themselves, to understand that there are such things as public wrongs, and a public agency to redress them.[362]

In building infrastructure, communications between British posts were improved, and through the excavation of canals, previously infertile lands became cultivated – a demonstration of the positive impact of the British presence.[363] Jacob reiterated his belief that '[t]he highest moral ground' should 'always be taken in all dealings with the predatory tribes'. It was only if they continued to attack Jacob's garrison that they were to be treated

[361] Ibid., p. 322; Shand, *General John Jacob*, p. 133.
[362] Jacob, 'Disarming of the North-West Frontier of Sind', in *View and Opinions*, pp. 334-5.
[363] Jacob, 'Summary of Arrangements Made on the North-West Frontier of Sind' (1854), in *Views and Opinions*, p. 328.

> as of an inferior nature… as mere vulgar, criminal and disreputable persons, with whom it is a disgrace for respectable persons to have any dealings, and whom all good men must, as a matter of course, look on as objects of pity, not of dread – with hatred, possibly, but never with fear.[364]

To treat them as such was a measure of last resort; Jacob sought rather to encourage local development and prosperity.

Jacob's 'Principles of Procedure' were all indicative of a practical objection to a 'civilised'/'savage' divide, as ultimately, they challenged the notion that 'savages' only responded to brute force. Furthermore, Jacob's unique doctrine of 'moral force' was not limited to his approach towards the marauding enemy; he also believed it essential to inculcate a specifically English conception of moral behaviour in his own British officers. After exploring this particular theme in Jacob's work, this chapter analyses how such ideas related to his wider intellectual interests, in order to demonstrate why his approach to the warrior tribes of Sind differed in many respects from the initiatives of Napier, as well as the British approach to the neighbouring Punjab Frontier, which was chiefly characterised by its use of 'punitive expeditions'.[365]

The Maintenance of an 'English' Character

Jacob's discussions on the need to maintain a high moral standard in his British officer corps can be found in his works that criticised the Bengal Army. During the mid-nineteenth century, competing discourses arose with regard to the military abilities of Indian soldiers in general. While some considered high-caste sepoys to possess 'gentleman-like' qualities, and drew upon the notion that Europeans and North Indians shared an affinity due to their common 'Aryanism',[366] others began to fear that accommodations over

[364] Jacob, 'Memorandum', p. 322.
[365] *The Cambridge History of India*, H.H. Dodwell (ed.), (6 vols, Cambridge, 1932), vi, p. 452.
[366] Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 81-8.

religious practices led to a lack of respect for British officers and commanders, and therefore a disintegration of regimental cohesion. Such latter sentiments particularly arose in the aftermath of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-6), where initial British losses were attributed to disloyal sepoys, and the Barrackpore Mutiny of 1824.[367] Jacob argued that preoccupations with caste led to the overlooking – or in some cases dismissal – of recruits who embodied soldier-like qualities – courage, obedience, resolve – but were not of the appropriate social/religious class. Considerations of caste were therefore ruinous to military authority and discipline.[368]

As well as arguing against the recruitment of high-caste sepoys, Jacob believed that one of the accompanying defects which he considered vital to remedy was '[t]he absence of the highest moral tone, and of a simple and vigorous Anglo-Saxon honesty in dealing with Asiatics on the part of the English officers of the army of Bengal'.[369] In discussing this particular issue, it is notable that Jacob conflated the notions of 'race', and 'character', or 'culture', and that he established a distinction between what he perceived to be an 'English' and an 'oriental' morality. Jacob argued that the character of English officers who settled in Bengal was 'lowered' due to such individuals 'insensibly adopting Asiatic habits, manners, and feelings'. According to Jacob, when a British soldier became accustomed to the luxuries of servants and 'lazy habits of Hindoostan', he also lost 'part of the manliness of the Anglo-Saxon character' and adopted what he considered to be an inferior 'oriental morality'. As a 'remedy' to this problem, Jacob wrote:

> [L]et it be the fashion to be English. … Let the young man never enter a palkee [palanquin], but go about on the back of his poney; let him not fear the sun, – it may tan his cheeks, but it will not hurt him. It is your effeminate gentlefolk, who live in dark houses artificially cooled, with a dozen Hindoos at work, with fans and flappers to beat the flies off them,

[367] See: David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj* (Basingstoke, 1994), pp. 32-4; Douglas M. Peers, '"The Habitual Nobility of Being": British Officers and the Social Construction of the Bengal Army in the Early Nineteenth Century', *Modern Asian Studies*, 25:3 (1991), p. 547.
[368] Jacob, 'The Defects of the Bengal Army' (1851), in *View and Opinions*, p. 101.
[369] Ibid., p. 95.

> who suffer by exposure, – not the hardy young Englishman, who, if not intemperate, soon becomes acclimated; and the more readily so the less he regards the sunshine, which is healthy enough in moderation; *experto crede*.[370]

Although scholars have argued that early to mid-nineteenth century conceptions of manliness were predominantly identified with 'the life of the mind (heavily overlaid by conscience) rather than the body',[371] Jacob saw a direct relationship between manliness, nationhood (Anglo-Saxon/Englishness), morality, and the state of the body. Manliness and upright ethical behaviour would be assured through the maintenance of a body resilient to the Indian culture and climate. Officers who kept themselves hidden in cooled, darkened rooms would lose their Anglo-Saxon resilience, and therefore succumb to an 'oriental morality', and subsequently lose their manliness:

> The state of the body will often affect the mind; habits and manners will act on, and be reacted on by, morals and religion. Let us then be English in all things, to the utmost of our power, internally and externally, – in morals, in habits, and in feelings, allowing absolute freedom of opinion and fair play to all men, – and all will be well.[372]

The consistent manifestation of such moral Englishness would command respect. Yet, in order to be effective, this needed to be distinguished very clearly from the imposition of English/British customs. This seemed to Jacob to be particularly important in relation to religion. He wrote:

> It seems to me unwise to carry our State religion to India at all, even as respects Englishmen in this country. In our public capacity, as governors of hundreds of millions of men, of twenty different faiths and sects, we cannot, with justice or propriety, exclusively patronise *any* religion. Absolute freedom should be allowed to all so long as they do not annoy others.[373]

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[370] Ibid., pp. 97-8.
[371] John Tosh, *Manliness and Masculinities in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Harlow, 2005), p. 32.
[372] Jacob, 'The Defects of the Bengal Army', p. 98.
[373] Jacob, 'On Missionaries; and the Interference of the State in Matters Appertaining to Religion' (1857), in *Views and Opinions*, p. 10. Emphasis in original.

Jacob believed that by maintaining an 'English' character, and merely observing the customs of Indian natives, rather than engaging with them, Britons would establish an authoritative position in the eyes of the local population. This could be enhanced by reconfiguring furlough regulations:

> The continual return to England, and reflux into India, of the tide of Europeans, would be to the body, moral and politic, exactly what the circulation of the blood is to the animal body. England would be our lungs: the old blood would be there aerated, and new life, health, and strength thereby sent flowing vigorously to every corner and extremity of our Empire.[374]

Yet this was also a part of a wider strategy to retain India for the British Empire:

> We may lay it down as an absolute certainty, that the millions of natives which a handful of Englishmen govern in this vast continent will not consent to be governed by a handful of their equals. Our power consists in our being essentially different from them, and in their belief in our moral superiority only. The only thing which can endanger the existence of this power, is the destruction or weakening of that belief.[375]

Jacob therefore believed in tolerating local customs – acknowledging difference – for the broader purpose of maintaining an elevated sense of British ethical behaviour. His development of the doctrine of 'moral force' and his emphasis on the inculcation of morality in his British officers – rather than relying on the threat of courts martial or governing through fear – is further clarified through an engagement with his broader intellectual background. His writings were not limited to military matters; indeed, he was particularly fascinated with contemporary discussions and debates on theories of science and evolution. Such thoughts can be found in a series of letters written to an anonymous female companion, which Jacob privately published in 1855. In these letters, Jacob outlined his own position on the evolution of humankind, and provided a parallel critique of

[374] Jacob, *Views and Opinions*, p. 189.
[375] Jacob, 'The Defects of the Bengal Army', p. 98.

theology, as well as the role of the Church in British life. This chapter now analyses these writings in order to shed light upon how they informed his doctrine of 'moral force', before concluding this chapter with an examination as to why this particular approach was not employed in other frontier districts during the same period.

Evolution and Moral Understanding

Although these letters were considered private and only printed for circulation to a number of close friends, to his astonishment, Jacob began to receive severe criticism from the wider public, particularly on his controversial views regarding the interrelationship between science and religion. In a defiant move, Jacob decided to publish the letters in 1858, which included a sequence of correspondence with an unnamed 'Reverend', highlighting the accusations levelled against him. The Reverend charged Jacob with forcibly circulating the book, and of expressing 'very severe and contemptuous opinions of the clergy', which had the deleterious effect of 'sapping the foundations of faith and morality'.[376] In his response, Jacob emphasised that his views were not initially intended for public circulation. He also found it amusing that he was now considered a 'corrupter of youth':

> But I am in good company, at least; for this is precisely the crime for which Socrates suffered death. I am most ready and most willing to share his lot or that of others whose fates have been similar as to crime and punishment.[377]

Published under the title *Letters to a Lady on the Progress of Being in the Universe*, the letters were divided into five sections, and they did not include the responses of the 'lady' in question, nor was her identity revealed. In writing the letters, Jacob was deeply influenced by a number of liberal works, including the German theologian David Friedrich Strauss' *Das Leben Jesu, Kritisch Bearbeitet* (1835) and Charles Francois Dupuis' *Origine de tous les Cultes, ou la*

[376] Reverend, 'Letter No. I, 23 July 1857', in John Jacob, *Letters to a Lady on the Progress of Being in the Universe* (1858), pp. 73-5. Hereafter, *Letters to a Lady*.
[377] 'Letter No. II, 22 September 1857', in ibid., pp. 75-8.

Religion Universelle (1795). Jacob was particularly indebted to the works of the social reformer, antiquarian and religious historian Godfrey Higgins, including his *Anacalypsis* (1833).[378] Although Jacob made no mention of figures such as Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, or the anonymously published sensational book *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation* (1844), his ideas bear a striking resemblance to such works on evolution which preceded Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*.

In his first letter Jacob argued that in science, as in religion, there were 'two distinct lines of doctrine, the one for the initiated, and the other for the people generally'. Scientists such as Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) and Michael Faraday (1791-1867) were privy to the truth, yet their published works shrouded the laws of nature with a 'theological screen'.[379] Jacob claimed that in knowing Nature's laws, and understanding the sequences that occur in the development of all living things, one would come to the conclusion that the 'theological impertinences of Priests and of Churches' were 'base', and 'contemptible'.[380] In his support of the idea of evolution, he challenged the 'vulgar idea of creation', as well as the resurrection, which he saw as contrary to Nature's laws. For Jacob, the doctrine of the Churches was 'merely slightly altered Paganism'. The union between the Church of England and the British state was 'the most enormous evil which ever existed in the world'.[381]

In Jacob's view, all life – plant, animal, and human – advanced gradually throughout the ages. The appearance of humankind too, followed such steady development:

> Even now, the difference between a highly cultivated European and a New Hollander seems as great as that between the latter and some of the lower animals; while the comparison between a beautiful and intellectual

[378] In this work Higgins argued that there was an antediluvian form of religion from which all religions have arisen, and also claimed the Christian faith to have an oriental origin.
[379] 'Letter I', in Jacob, *Letters to a Lady*, pp. 20-1.
[380] 'Letter II', in ibid., p. 27.
[381] 'Prefatory Apology', 'Letter IV', in ibid., pp. 15, 69.

> English lady and a Bushwoman of South Africa, appears even more unequal.[382]

Jacob was also an advocate of polygenesis, arguing that:

> Different species or varieties have, evidently, appeared independently in different parts of the earth, and have proceeded to very different stages of development; probably appeared at different eras; and New Holland is certainly younger than the rest of the world in all its organic being.[383]

Jacob believed not only that physical characteristics were the result of differing stages of development; this was also the case for intellectual abilities and moral understanding. He claimed that in a highly developed human brain, only a small proportion is 'concerned [with]… the support and production of mere animal life', while the majority is concerned with 'elaborating mental matter, and relates to perception, and to moral and intellectual powers'. In 'savage nations', Jacob believed that prior to development, this 'animal part' of the human brain was much larger and therefore 'the mental manifestations exactly corresponded: such men were little better than clever and cruel animals'.[384] Jacob argued that this notion could still be evidenced in populations such as the indigenous peoples of South America.

Jacob may have been highly critical of the Church of England as an institution, yet he believed that there was an inextricable link between God's laws and the laws of Nature. Humans were to be encouraged to ascend the scale of being, and to attain a higher consciousness,

> … towards the centre of all excellence. *This* is to fulfil the indications of Nature – to follow God's laws; and this only – all other courses are erroneous, the creations of man's imagination only. To follow them, is to wander from Nature's truth, to leave the true God, and to bow before idols, the work of men's hands or heads. … Our highest aim, our

[382] 'Letter III', in ibid., pp. 43-4.
[383] Ibid., p. 44.
[384] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

> continual study should be to discover Nature's laws, to follow them, and to teach others to do so; and this Jesus undoubtedly felt and expressed.[385]

Jacob certainly felt a personal obligation to educate others in the discovery of Nature's laws, and his writings on the development of his garrison at Khanghur reflect such high ambitions. However, in light of his thoughts on evolution, and his earlier discussions on the morality of his own British officers, it is clear that Jacob believed there to be a hierarchy of races, and that it was only under the patronage of the British that Sind and its inhabitants would flourish. In a short paper titled 'The Secret of Our Rule in India', written in 1854, Jacob reiterated his belief in the 'natural superiority' of the British due to their ability to 'hold' the country. He claimed that if the British were a 'morally superior race, governed by higher motives, and possessing higher attributes than the Asiatics, the more the natives of India are able to understand us, and the more we improve their capacity for so understanding, the firmer will become our power'. He continued: 'Away, then, with the assumption of equality; and let us accept our true position of a dominant race'.[386]

Race not only informed Jacob's understanding of moral and intellectual development; he also believed there to be an association between the hierarchy of races and martial abilities. While he recognised ethical Baluchi behaviour when they fought against the British during the Cutchee campaign of 1839-40,[387] his views of the Baluchis as potential recruits for the British Indian Army were less favourable. In a short extract written in 1853, he criticised the military attributes of the Afghans and Baluchis, questioning whether they could be implicitly trusted to fight on the British side ('we can never feel a just confidence that they

[385] Ibid., p. 51. Emphasis in original.
[386] Jacob, 'The Secret of Our Rule in India' (1854), in *Views and Opinions*, pp. 3-4.
[387] See his *Memoir of the First Campaign in the Hills North of Cutchee under Major Billamore, in 1839-40* (1852), p. 20.

will be true in the hour of need').[388] In contrast, he articulated very high praise for Muslim Indian troops whom he would later to refer to as 'highly-civilised beings':[389]

> The Affghans are more ferocious, but have far less real courage than the Hindoostanee; they have more cunning and less intellect; they have more muscular development with *far less* endurance. … Whatever may be thought of these people by those who do not know them well, it is certain that the Mussulmans of Hindoostan are altogether superior beings in every way to the Affghans and Beloochees, and are incalculably better adapted by nature to make good soldiers.
>
> In my opinion, not rashly formed, one good Hindoostanee soldier carries as much military power with him as any three of the best of the others.[390]

However, Jacob qualified his praise for Indian Muslim recruits by stating in another short extract that they were 'the best materials for our soldiers *in proper hands*'.[391] As noted in discussions on the Khoi in chapter one, according to Jacob the moral development of native officers of the British Indian Army could best be achieved under the guidance of European commanders:

> The Native Officers feel the greatest devotion and gratitude towards their European Commanders, who most succeed in raising their character and position. The more the European is able to improve them, the greater does he appear in their estimation. They cannot govern themselves, they are too proud to submit to an equal, but they will all, with the greatest delight and pride, submit to the English Gentleman whom they all acknowledge and feel to be their superior. … The better example we set them, the more we make them feel the value of truth and honesty, the more we can raise their moral and intellectual powers, the firmer must we stand as their rulers.[392]

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[388] Studies on the concept of 'martial race' including Streets' *Martial Races* have generally focused upon the concept's incarnations as related to Sikhs, Gurkhas and Scottish Highlanders. Jacob's writings reveal that such ideas can be found prior to the Indian Rebellion, and related to other warrior cultures including the Baluchis, Afghans and Muslim Indians. See: Jacob, 'The Brahooees, Affghans, and Patans (Being a Popular Appellation of the Affghans) Considered as Recruits for Our Armies' (1853), in *Views and Opinions*, pp. 342-5.
[389] Jacob, 'Military Rules on High Caste Men' (1854), in *Views and Opinions*, p. 199.
[390] Jacob, 'The Brahooees, Affghans, and Patans', pp. 343-4. Emphasis in original.
[391] Jacob, 'The Obedience of Soldiers not to Depend on their Own Pleasure' (1854), in *Views and Opinions*, p. 194. Emphasis in original.
[392] Major John Jacob, *Remarks on the Native Troops of the Indian Army* (Bombay, 1854), pp. 13-14.

Throughout his work, it remains ambivalent as to whether Jacob considered the use of moral force more effective simply on a practical level, or whether he thought such an approach was right in itself. However, his Prefatory Apology to *Letters to a Lady* suggests that toward the end of his life he believed to a greater extent in the latter. Jacob wrote: 'real nobility of mind consists in being and doing good and right, *for good and right's sake only*; that our rank in the universe depends on what we are, not on what we appear to be, or on what we believe, or fancy we believe'.[393] Jacob's approach to the administration of Sind was driven by a sense of paternalism and, as has been shown, he clearly embedded this in his views of British racial and cultural superiority. Although his discussions on evolution reveal that he believed there to be a hierarchy of races which encompassed differing stages of moral and intellectual development, and his belief in British superiority remained clear, Jacob never claimed that the attainment of a higher level of being was limited by race. However, his intellectual endeavours reveal a tension often recognised by post-colonialist scholars; namely that although the British were tasked to 'improve' the subjects of colonial lands, they understood such improvement to be limited and never likely to lead to an equivalence between the coloniser and the colonised. The prospect of such an equivalence would undermine a belief in British superiority and the process of 'self-legitimation' that the 'civilising mission' entailed.[394] Indeed, as Jacob wrote in his 1854 Memorandum:

> It appeared to me that the thing of the first importance… was to make it apparent to every one that it was intended to make this country habitable…. So long as the Government officers and the troops were in a wild, unsettled state, and demeaned themselves as if in a hostile country, it could not reasonably be expected that the poor people could feel secure or tranquil. I therefore proceeded to build a large house as a residence [for] myself and lieutenants, to plant a garden in the desert, and

[393] Jacob, *Letters to a Lady*, p. 5. Emphasis in original.
[394] As Michael Mann has noted: '… once the colonized peoples were equal and in consequence could justly demand emancipation… the basis of colonial rule would vanish, likewise destroying the foundation of self-legitimation. This ultimately explains why the colonizers could never admit similarity, let alone equality, between themselves and the subject peoples in the colonies', in Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann (eds), *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India* (2004), p. 5. This theme is further explored in chapter four of this dissertation.

> to make all other arrangements for myself, officers, and men, *as if they were to remain on this frontier for the remainder of their lives*.[395]

Ultimately, Jacob believed in the existence of an 'oriental morality'. Whilst he claimed that indigenous religious beliefs should be tolerated, he sought through his writings and practical measures to assert that the inferior morality of 'savages' could only be 'raised' through the *persistent* example of what he perceived to be the dominant British race. Jacob underlined the critical significance of 'civilised' behaviour against his 'savage' opponents, which gave the perceived 'civilised'/'savage' divide a different inflection, and in turn, had practical benefits, contributing to the cultivation of peace in the region. Yet on closer analysis it seems that Jacob was primarily concerned with the reputation, and therefore morality (or 'character'), of his own *British* officers. It is clear that 'savage' marauders, indigenous inhabitants of Sind, and native military officers of the British Indian Army were to be *guided* by British example, yet there is a sense of ambiguity with regard to whether Jacob in fact wished them to adopt British morals and values, or merely 'perform' them. This is primarily due to the fact that in discussing the need to raise the character of his own British officers, Jacob distinguished between an 'English' and 'oriental' morality, and emphasised the need to refrain from a 'merging' between the two. It seems that Jacob considered it imperative to maintain a separation between the coloniser and the colonised – and therefore ultimately a limitation on the latter's moral uplifting – in order for the British to assure control over their Empire. At the same time, lapses in the expression by his troops of true British morality would fatally undermine their effectiveness.

Jacob's Legacy on the North-West Frontier

Jacob ruffled many feathers throughout his military career, and his outspoken views on military reform and what he considered to be the inappropriate policies of the Punjab

[395] Jacob, 'Memorandum', pp. 326-7. Emphasis added.

Frontier certainly compromised his influence and wish to extend his approach of 'moral force' to other frontier districts.[396] In the aftermath of the annexation of the Punjab (1849), the perceived inapplicability of his policies to this frontier was constantly re-affirmed by successive Viceroys of India, including Sir John Lawrence (1811-1879) and Lord Dalhousie (1812-1860), who argued that the Punjab Frontier tribes could only be met with the use of force due to their exceptionally aggressive nature, despite British efforts to maintain friendly relations; a re-assertion of a rather straightforward 'civilised'/'savage' distinction.[397] In a letter responding to criticisms raised by Jacob with regard to how his approach was portrayed in a report on the Punjab Frontier, Richard Temple (1826-1902), Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab, wrote:

> … it may be doubted if the system in force on the Sind border would answer generally to the Punjab border. The Chief Commissioner cannot believe that small detachments of Cavalry, however excellent, could hold open posts close under the hills with impunity. … If this be the case, it follows that the Tribes on the Sind Frontier are not so warlike as the majority of those on this side, or that there are circumstances which prevent their being able to make their attacks with the same facility as can be done on this Frontier.[398]

This support of what was somewhat inaccurately portrayed as a policy of 'masterly inactivity' was not abandoned until the appointment of Lord Lytton in 1876.[399]

Despite this lack of recognition from the Government of India, Jacob's frontier policy in Khanghur garnered respect and admiration from a number of fellow colonial officials, including Major General Sir William Merewether (Commissioner of Sind, 1867-77), Sir

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[396] In a critical memorandum and accompanying note written in 1854 at Frere's request Jacob outlined what he believed to be the key features distinguishing both approaches. He saw the Punjab approach as encompassing 'measures strictly defensive… attacks on neighbouring tribes… encouraged by the British authorities… [m]oral influence over the predatory tribes within and beyond our frontier not even thought of'. See: *Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse*, ii, pp. 187-9.

[397] Hugh Beattie, *Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan* (Oxford, 2013), p. 33. The conciliatory methods of the British included the abolition of the Sikh capitation tax, free trade and medical provisions, and the encouragement of tribal *jirgas* (councils) in British territory. See: *The Cambridge History of India*, p. 451.

[398] See: 'Addendum, Letter R. Temple, Esq. to G.F. Edmonstone, Esq., 8 October 1855', pp. xxiv-xxv in *Selections from the Records of the Government of India (Foreign Department)*, no. XX (Calcutta, 1856), p. 88.

[399] For details on both systems see: Martineau, *Sir Bartle Frere*, i, pp. 164-7.

James Outram and Sir Bartle Frere (1815-1884). In 1876, the Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook requested Frere, who was Commissioner of Sind from 1857-9, to outline Jacob's approach in order to understand the differences between British colonial policy in Sind and the Punjab. After describing Jacob's methods, including the strict observation of 'civilised rules of war', 'no burning of villages or destruction of crops', and the disarmament of civilians, Frere concluded:

> The result was, after a very few years, entire freedom of the frontier districts from raids and perfect security of life and property. The Bolan and other trade routes were open for travellers: there was greater general security through the Khan's territory than had been known for ages.

Frere believed wholeheartedly in Jacob's frontier policies, and in addressing why the frontier had descended into disorder again by the 1870s, he claimed this to be 'because we have forsaken the old [Jacob's] system'.[400] Like Jacob, Frere acknowledged the importance of establishing and maintaining trust among British and Indian citizens; in the aftermath of the Indian Rebellion when the future of the British Indian Army was under serious review, Frere raised the issue of consent. He argued that Britain was not justified in maintaining an Indian Empire if this was achieved only through an occupying British Army. Indian soldiers were not to be 'overawed' but rather to be efficiently organised, given state-of-the-art weaponry and responsibilities.[401] Such policies may not have been implemented by the committee tasked with the re-organisation of the British Indian Army; however, they were fully realised by Jacob and his Scinde Irregular Horse, who, despite having connections to the mutineers, maintained their faith and loyalty.[402]

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[400] Sir Henry Bartle Edward Frere, 'Memorandum: Sind and Punjab Frontier', 22 March 1876, IOR/C/139, ff. 100-103, BL. For a brief discussion on the complex shifts of British policy on Sind in the aftermath of Jacob's death see: Lambrick, *John Jacob of Jacobabad*, pp. 388-92.
[401] Quoted in Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour* (1974), p. 318.
[402] For more detail on the particularities of the Scinde Irregular Horse (or the 'Sind School'), see ibid., pp. 320-5.

Although discussed intermittently by colonial officials in the decades after his death, it would not be until the very late nineteenth century that Jacob's status would be elevated to that of other 'imperial heroes' of the nineteenth century such as Sir Henry Havelock (1795-1857) and General Charles Gordon (1833-1885).[403] This relative neglect is most likely due to his vocal criticism of the British Indian Army, his controversial views on the Church of England, as well as his loss of the opportunity to command the Central Indian Field Force.[404] Due to the British Minister Sir Charles Murray's (1806-1895) request for Jacob to remain in Persia in the aftermath of the Anglo-Persian War (1856-7), and an acute need for command following the Indian Rebellion, Sir Hugh Rose (1801-1885) was assigned to the post by Lord Elphinstone.[405] Nevertheless, in his biography of Jacob – published forty-two years after his death – Alexander Innes Shand portrayed him as a figure whose character embodied the elements of the heroes of the Romantic Age: a gentleman of 'derring-do', who was challenged, and often misunderstood by many figures in the British military establishment, and whose isolation and self-sacrifice led to an untimely death.[406] Jacob was particularly characterised by his willingness to endure the challenges of the forbidden Sindian environment, and the extreme physical exertion he underwent in striving to establish moral order throughout the region.[407]

By the end of Jacob's involvement in the Anglo-Persian War (1856-7) where he led the cavalry brigade and took charge of the expedition after Outram was sent to relieve

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[403] John M. MacKenzie, 'Heroic Myths of Empire', in *Popular Imperialism and the Military*, p. 112-13. Such a re-appraisal is also evident in the manner in which Sir Samuel White Baker's role in supressing the slave trade was discussed in the very late nineteenth century. This development will be further contextualised and elaborated upon in chapters four and five of this dissertation.

[404] He was also burdened with a 'hesitation in his speech', and Martineau suggested this may have played a role in Jacob's wish to remain on the frontier and thus '[see] little or nothing of English society', *Sir Bartle Frere*, i, p. 140.

[405] If Jacob had been appointed to the position, it would have most likely led to his attainment of the prestigious position of Commander-in-Chief, India. See: ibid., pp. 251-2.

[406] In discussing Shand's biography *The Saturday Review* noted: 'A wider personal intercourse with other men of ability and learning would have moderated the intolerance of mind which his isolation only encouraged'. 'Jacob of Jacobabad', *The Saturday Review*, 30 June 1900, pp. 814-5.

[407] Shand, *General John Jacob*, pp. 44-5. Jacob also partook in his own process of myth-making. See, for instance, his letter to a friend nine months prior to his death, p. 309.

Lucknow, Jacob returned to Sind, where he was tasked to raise three regiments (1st, 2nd and 3rd Sind Horse), while marauding on the border resumed. With a lack of senior military figures to assist in training new recruits, he reached a period of unparalleled physical and mental exertion. Shand's narration of the scenes leading up to his death elevated Jacob to a legendary status. Discovered in the desert of Kurrachee by Captain Pelly, Jacob was

> … suffering from sleeplessness and weakened by frequent bleeding…. When the more acute symptoms showed themselves, he consented to go back, but refused to be carried. He insisted on riding to Jacobabad – a distance of twenty miles – though often bent double in the saddle. … His officers entreated him to have medical assistance, but he refused, declaring that all he needed was rest.
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> [On the day of his death Sir Henry Green[408]] summoned to the antechamber the European and native officers of the station, the Belooch chiefs who happened to be in the town, and the envoys of the Khan of Khelat. At midnight, when the end was evidently near, he brought them into the death-chamber, and the picturesque assemblage at the closing scene suggests a noble subject for an historical picture. It is said there was not a dry eye in the company, and the old troopers of the Sind Horse mingled their tears with those of the leaders of the robbers whose strength they had broken.[409]

Through his narrative, Shand depicted Jacob as a martyr who sacrificed his own wellbeing – and ultimately his life – for his garrison at Khangur. Although challenged by critics and overlooked for promotion by his superiors, the coming together of his Sind Horse and Baluchi leaders to mourn his death, as well as his lasting legacy in Jacobabad,[410] symbolised the triumph of his own personal imperial project.

Shand's biography played an important role in burnishing Jacob's posthumous reputation. The reviews of his work – in moderate and more conservative-leaning periodicals alike – extolled Jacob's virtues and his practical achievements on the imperial frontier. Of the

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[408] Green would become Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier after Jacob's death.
[409] Shand, *General John Jacob*, pp. 309-10.
[410] Jacob has maintained a significant reputation in contemporary Jacobabad. His tomb is considered to be a shrine by the locals, and is often decorated with flower garlands and votive lamps. It is even said to possess mystical healing qualities. See: Mark Tully, 'Karachi to the Khyber Pass', *Great Railway Journeys*, BBC Documentary Series, 1994.

former, *The Athenaeum* felt Jacob to be 'unquestionably a man of mark, conspicuous among those distinguished men who have watched over the frontiers of India', and despite the delay of the publication of Shand's work, 'his biography… should still be… valuable to students who desire to learn from his experience and possibly to follow in his steps'.[411] Of the latter, *The Outlook* claimed Jacob to be 'of the race of Clive and the greatest English administrators', and *The Saturday Review* wrote:

> Jacob… was a product of the times when military and civil power had to be combined in the same strong hands. … The disorders engendered by native misrule required the stern control of the trained soldier who could make his own troops as well as lead them, while to the disarmed and tranquilised people he could present the aspect of a beneficent and sympathetic administrator. Such men work by the magnetic influence of indomitable character and tireless energy. These qualities Jacob possessed in a remarkable degree. … To Upper Sind Jacob was everything – Providence included.[412]

Jacob would be included in the pantheon of imperial heroes of the British armed forces with the publication in 1901 of G.W. Forrest's *Sepoy Generals: Wellington to Roberts*. Forrest selected nine figures, yet reserved significant praise for Jacob, claiming him to be '[a]mong the illustrious men… [who] have raised and civilised the warlike tribes on our border', a group which included Outram, Major-General Herbert Edwardes (1819-1868) a solider and administrator in the Punjab, and Brigadier-General John Nicholson (1822-1857) who led the Storming of Delhi during the Indian Rebellion.[413] However, Jacob was further singled out in his association with other imperial figures who sought to cultivate local development and garnered the general respect of the indigenous population, including Major-General Sir Thomas Munro (1761-1827), Governor of Madras (1814-1827)[414] and Augustus Clevland

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411 'Book Review', *The Athenaeum*, 30 June 1900, p. 808.
412 'Jacob of Jacobabad', *The Outlook*, 7 July 1900, p. 729; 'Jacob of Jacobabad', p. 814.
413 Forrest, *Sepoy Generals*, p. 310.
414 In a review of Munro's posthumously published biography *The Asiatic Journal* wrote: 'The funeral, from necessity, was suited to the intrinsic character of the deceased; devoid of pomp and parade; he was interred amongst a people by whom he was beloved, and in a country where he needed no other epitaph than the

an East India Company administrator in Bengal (1754-1784).[415] A well and rest-house in Madras built in honour of Munro, a monument to Clevland established in his memory in the Bhagalpur District in Bengal by the locals, and Jacob's tomb on the Sind Frontier were all said by Forrest to 'bear witness how by justice and conciliation the loyalty of vanquished races has been won'.[416] As will be further discussed in the final chapter of this dissertation, the valorisation of such figures during the very late nineteenth century emerged in a context within which the British armed forces were consolidating their understanding of the character of 'savage' wars, and striving to counteract a concurrent growing insecurity over the precarious nature of British imperial rule.

Conclusion

Through the case study of the Baluchis of Sind, this chapter elaborates how ambiguous ideas of 'savage' warriors and 'savage warfare' were in the nineteenth century. This chapter shows that although narratives reinforcing understandings of 'savagery' – including assumptions such as a lack of military discipline and order; inefficient training and proficiency in manufacturing and utilising weapons of warfare; religious fanaticism; and not adhering to acceptable moral standards or the laws of war – can be found in the work of Sir Henry Pottinger, when the British began to engage with this particular warrior culture on the battlefield, and particularly when they suffered defeat, the notion of the 'savage' became quite dynamic, and open to associations such as courage, perseverance, skill and undaunted bravery. The accounts considered here further reveal that perceived distinctions between the 'civilised' and the 'savage' warrior were not as inflexible as one might initially

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well-known inscription: "Si Monumentum Quæris, Circumpice [If You Seek a Monument, Look Around]."" 1:2 (1830), p. 133.

[415] In his obituary published in the *The Asiatic Annual Register* it was noted that 'the principal natives, who had been subject to this control, solicited permission to give some public testimony of the sense they entertained of the beneficence which he had invariably shown towards them, by erecting also a Monument to his memory, which was accordingly done, and the expenses of it were defrayed by voluntary subscription on their parts'. 'On the Death of Augustus Clevland, Esq' (1800), p. 199.

[416] Forrest, *Sepoy Generals*, p. 239. See also the commemorative silver statuette of Jacob made in 1905-6 by Goldsmiths and Silversmiths Company Ltd. currently in the collections of the NAM (Figure 15).

assume; narratives and visual representations of colonial warfare often undermined such distinctions, portraying the British as demonstrating 'uncivilised' behaviour, and conceding that 'savages' sought to abide by norms of warfare, fought with bravery and resilience, and protected prisoners of war.

The frontier policy of General John Jacob uncovers the existence of military figures who did not believe that fighting 'savage' opponents predestined a disregard for what were to be understood as the 'rules' of 'civilised warfare'. Indeed, Jacob was one of the first vocal exponents of inculcating in his officers the notion that one should utilise 'moral power', rather than brute force in frontier and colonial conflicts, a notion primarily reflected in his practical measures on the North-West Frontier. However, as this chapter has also demonstrated, Jacob still considered there to be a distinction between an 'English' and 'oriental' morality; while he sought to raise the 'character' of his 'savage' foes and indigenous inhabitants of Sind, there was a limit to the 'civilising mission' as the British were considered by Jacob to be the 'dominant race'. Although Jacob thought highly of Muslim Indian recruits, his discussions on race and evolution foreshadow a coalescing of ideas that were evidenced in chapter one, and which would regain greater authority as the century progressed. In the mid-to-late nineteenth century onwards, theorists and military practitioners made overt associations between race and cultural and intellectual progress. In particular, the development of means of warfare would also become charged with discourses on evolution. In order to trace this particular development, the next chapter will follow closely the work of General Pitt Rivers who would utilise the 'savage' collections of the RUSI Museum to advance the notion that the development of weapons could be understood in relation to contemporary evolutionary theories. Pitt Rivers' work especially contributed to the fortification of a distinction between 'savagery' and 'civilisation' during this period.

Chapter Three: A Hierarchy of Races

Pitt Rivers and the Theorisation of 'Savage' Military Arts

Introduction

In the early 1850s, a subaltern officer of the Grenadier Guards named Augustus Henry Lane Fox (1827-1900) was appointed to a recently established small arms committee at Woolwich Arsenal. The committee was tasked to undertake a number of experiments in order to distinguish the most suitable firearm to replace the Brown Bess smooth-bore musket for the British Army.[417] By the late nineteenth century, Lane Fox, who was now known as Pitt Rivers (Figure 16),[418] had become a reputable anthropologist and archaeologist,[419] who cultivated a particular fascination with the development and composition of what he termed 'primitive' or 'savage' weapons. In a private letter written in May 1882 to Henry Acland, Regius Professor of Medicine at the University of Oxford, Pitt Rivers credited the experiments undertaken at Woolwich as being one of the primary influences on his work: '[My collecting] … commenced in 1852 with a series showing the development of small arms in which I was officially engaged. At that time we had not the advantage of Darwin's writings. … [E]volution which is in everybody's mouth now was almost unheard of then'.[420]

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417 Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, p. 15. On the history of the reform of the British infantry see: Hew Strachan, *From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology, and the British Army, 1815-1854* (Cambridge, 1985), chapter 2.

418 He would inherit the name upon the death of his uncle in 1880. For consistency, this chapter will refer to him as Pitt Rivers throughout.

419 This chapter will not focus on Pitt Rivers' interest and practice in the field of archaeology, as this has been the focus of a number of existing academic works. See, for instance: Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, chapters 5-7, 9 and Evans, 'Soldiering Archaeology', pp. 1-20.

420 'Pitt Rivers to Henry Acland', 21 May 1882, MS.Acland.d.92, fols. 75-76, BodL.

As a key figure in the theorisation of what was understood to be the 'savage', 'uncivilised' warrior, this chapter focuses on the intellectual development of Pitt Rivers, and clarifies how his writings and theories drew on his own interpretation of contemporary racial and evolutionary concepts. This chapter argues that ultimately, the ideas exemplified by Pitt Rivers reveal an important mid-nineteenth-century shift from viewing non-European means of warfare primarily as an accompaniment to live exhibitions of warrior cultures (such as the displays of the San examined in chapter one), to explicitly and regularly associating military productions with racial understandings of human development, and suggesting a correlation between the form and material of such objects and certain stages of cultural progress. To date, there has been limited examination of Pitt Rivers' work on what he understood to be 'primitive' means of warfare, and therefore his contribution to the broader debate on the 'uncivilised' warrior has thus far been unexamined. This chapter demonstrates how through his particular synthesis of works by a wide range of contemporary scholars and theorists including Charles Darwin (1809-1882), John Lubbock (1834-1913), and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Pitt Rivers articulated a discourse which established particular markers distinguishing 'savage' and 'civilised' military arts, which had the effect of reinforcing distinctions between 'civilisation' and 'savagery', and provided a theoretical underpinning of the view that the British were at the forefront of the craft and manufacture of the most effective weapons of warfare.[421]

In order to understand the context within which Pitt Rivers' own collecting practices and theories on the evolution of the military arts were inspired and advanced, this chapter begins by discussing further developments in the fields of anthropology and sociology in Britain, as well as in the associated mid-to-late nineteenth-century institution of international exhibitions, focusing primarily on the discussions and debates raised by

[421] It is important to note that Pitt Rivers rarely provided footnotes in his published works. Therefore it is, at times, difficult to determine unequivocally whether he had been influenced directly by contemporary authors, or whether he had reached certain conclusions on the basis of his own research.

British innovation in the field of military technology, examples of which were displayed prominently in the International Exhibition of 1862.

The Development of Anthropological and Sociological Research in Britain

As discussed in chapter one, from the early to mid-nineteenth century, British imperial expansion and exploration inspired a burgeoning public and academic fascination with non-European histories and cultures.[422] Understandings of the origins of humankind were influenced predominantly by a debate between supporters of the theories of monogenesis and polygenesis.[423] While a number of global political events, including the Indian Rebellion of 1857 and the American Civil War (1861-5) augmented the cause of polygenesis, this debate was abruptly overshadowed by the Darwinian and archaeological revolutions of the day, which both propagated the concept of biological evolution, and broadened temporal understandings of human history.[424]

By the 1860s, figures involved in the field of anthropology were acutely aware that information was frequently gathered by members of the British armed forces, missionaries, and adventurers in a disorganised manner, often reflecting the personal interests and curiosities of the collectors themselves, rather than for expressly 'scientific' purposes.[425] In 1869, as Honorary Secretary of the Ethnological Society of London, Pitt Rivers proposed in a memorandum the establishment of a 'classification committee' whose functions would include the examination of evidence; determining the terminology used by anthropologists; the institution of a classification procedure; and the registration of material evidence. Importantly, his memorandum emphasised the need for evidence to be 'subject to careful

[422] Fredrik Barth, 'The Rise of Anthropology in Britain, 1830-1898', in *One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, French, and American Anthropology* (Chicago, 2005), p. 3.
[423] For a detailed history of this intellectual debate that moves beyond the British context see: Colin Kidd, *The Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600-2000* (Cambridge, 2006).
[424] Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, pp. 63-76; Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, pp. 44-5.
[425] Sera-Shriar, *The Making of British Anthropology*, pp. 8-9.

scrutiny, and not left to individual judgement'.[426] In 1871, the Ethnological Society merged with a rival group colloquially known as the 'anthropologicals' in order to form the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. The 'anthropologicals', led by the polygenecist James Hunt (1833-69), had separated from the Ethnological Society in 1863; however, due to animosity from the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the group was marginalised from academic discourse.[427] With the reunification, and the appointment of the archaeologist and evolutionary theorist John Lubbock as President of the new Institute, future research was driven by interests previously associated with the Ethnological Society, although it would later shift focus towards archaeology and physical anthropology.[428]

In parallel to the development of anthropological research, a flourishing interest in the sociological development of humankind arose, a field in which Herbert Spencer was at the forefront. Spencer formulated his own notion of evolution prior to the publication of Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace's (1823-1914) paper 'On the Tendency of Species to Form Varieties; and On the Perpetuation of Varieties and Species by Natural Means of Selection', published in the *Journal of the Proceedings of the Linnean Society of London* in August 1858.[429] One of Spencer's earliest accounts of his understanding of evolution was published in 1857 in the radical *Westminster Review* where he argued that the scientist and explorer Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1876) had 'established the truth that the series of changes gone through during the development of a seed into a tree… constitute an advance from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure', and that such a

[426] 'Classification Committee', *JESL*, 1 (1869), pp. 333-6.
[427] Chapman, 'Arranging Ethnology', pp. 29-30; Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, p. 46.
[428] Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, pp. 46-7.
[429] See: 'The Law of Evolution', in Michael Taylor, *Philosophy of Herbert Spencer* (2010), pp. 57-75; Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace, 'On the Tendency of Species to form Varieties; and on the Perpetuation of Varieties and Species by Natural Means of Selection', *Journal of the Proceedings of the Linnean Society of London*, 3:9 (1858), pp. 45-62.

> … law of organic progress *is the law of all progress*. Whether it be in the development of the Earth… in the development of Society, of Government… of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this same evolution of the simple into the complex, through successive differentiations, holds throughout.[430]

In the aftermath of the publication of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*, Spencer was pressured to associate his own understanding of evolution with Darwin's theory of natural selection; however, ultimately, a distinction between their ideas remained. While Darwin's theory of natural selection suggested an element of 'chance', Spencer, influenced deeply by the French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck's (1744-1829) notion of 'use-inheritance' (that to survive, organisms adapted their behaviour, which was inherited by their offspring),[431] considered his laws of evolution to lead towards a pre-determined idea of 'human perfection'.[432] With regard to the ideas espoused by Pitt Rivers, this distinction is of paramount importance: ultimately, Pitt Rivers erroneously claimed there to be an analogous relationship between Darwinian biological evolution and cultural evolution. As this chapter shows, Pitt Rivers' understanding of the evolution of culture, and his theorisation of the development of primitive weapons of warfare were not Darwinian, but distinctly Lamarckian/Spencerian.[433] Pitt Rivers in fact synthesised the Darwinian notion of 'gradualism' with Spencerian 'cultural evolution' to establish his belief in the law of continual progress, and the importance of typology to demonstrate such progression. This chapter now turns to discuss the origins of his collecting practices, as well as his first public articulation of his belief in the theory of progress.

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[430] Herbert Spencer, 'Progress: Its Law and Cause', quoted in Taylor, *Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, pp. 60-1. Emphasis added.

[431] The giraffe, for instance, was understood by Lamarck to have developed their long neck over time. It was posited that smaller-necked giraffes gradually stretched their necks to reach for food, and this continual action (or 'use') led to the development of a longer neck, which would be inherited by the giraffe's offspring, and would continue, as an action favourable to survival, throughout future generations. On Lamarck see: Conlin, *Evolution and the Victorians*, pp. 46-9.

[432] Taylor, *Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, pp. 73-5.

[433] This point was noted by Bowden in his biography of *Pitt Rivers*, however he does not explore Pitt Rivers' intellectual development in detail, nor does he examine his writings on the development of weapons of warfare. See: Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, p. 162.

Early Collecting

Although it is unclear precisely when Pitt Rivers began to collect objects of personal interest, it is known that his first collection comprised early firearms which he began to accumulate during his time on the small arms committee at Woolwich.[434] After the Minié rifle was adopted for general use by the British Army, Pitt Rivers was requested to establish a code of instruction which he taught at the Hythe School of Musketry. This manual was published as the *Instruction of Musketry* in February 1854, and as principal instructor, his collection of firearms was used to illustrate lectures on the history of weaponry to recruits.[435] His collection was to be greatly enhanced while he was on service during the Crimean War (1853-6), and during his time spent as a musketry trainer in Malta (1854, 1855-7).[436] Upon his return to London in August 1857, Pitt Rivers began to foster a relationship with the RUSI, where he became involved in the reform of its departments. His collecting habits were expanded to include weapons of non-European origin, which he gathered from auctions, galleries, and contacts made through local societies and institutions.[437] By the late 1850s, due to disagreements regarding his infantry training methods, Pitt Rivers' military career was temporarily suspended, and as he awaited a decision on his future, he engaged more fully with London's scientific community.[438] Joining the Royal Geographical Society in 1859 and the Ethnological Society in 1861, Pitt Rivers took a serious interest in broadening his intellectual understanding of contemporary theories of science and philosophy, reading the works of John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte,

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434 Chapman, "'Like a game of dominoes'", p. 139.
435 Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, p. 15; Strachan, *From Waterloo to Balaclava*, p. 51; Chapman, "'Like a game of dominoes'", p. 139; War Office, *Instruction of Musketry* (1855).
436 Chapman, "'Like a game of dominoes'", p. 140. For more detail on his military service see: Thompson, *General Pitt-Rivers*, pp. 15-16, 22-30.
437 Chapman, 'Arranging Ethnology', pp. 18-19.
438 Chapman, "'Like a game of dominoes'", pp. 140-1. Colonel Hay, Commandant of the Hythe School of Musketry, harshly criticised Pitt Rivers' methods in Malta where he was stationed in 1854, and during the years 1855-7. After an enquiry, he was exonerated in 1860 by Sir James Lindsay, Commander of the Grenadier Guards. See: Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, pp. 18-20.

Herbert Spencer, and eventually, Charles Darwin, whose work in particular – he argued – confirmed his own understanding of human evolution.[439]

The Evolution of the Rifle

Pitt Rivers presented his first lecture to the RUSI in 1858 – a detailed history of the development of the rifle, which drew upon his experiences and notes made during his time at Woolwich, Hythe and Malta.[440] It was received positively by the Institute's members, with Deputy Quartermaster-General Colonel Hon. A. Gordon remarking that '[i]t is a very dry matter, but it is evident that… Colonel Fox has paid great attention to the subject'.[441] Pitt Rivers began his lecture by stating that:

> … out of all the numerous contrivances which in successive ages have been put forward for the improvement of the musket, some few may be taken to serve as links in the chain of progress, whilst others have branched out of the main line, and contributed nothing of permanent utility. In tracing the history of the rifle through its various phases, I therefore propose to confine my remarks to what may be considered the main chain of improvement, disregarding all those varieties which, however ingenious in themselves, have embodied no principle of practical benefit to our own times, nor served as the stepping-stones to further improvement.[442]

This lecture was Pitt Rivers' first public articulation of his belief in the inevitability of progress. Although he conceded that an object might in some cases develop qualities that would not enhance its overall usefulness, his later lectures reveal that he did not believe that progress could be marred by such superfluous diversions.[443] In this lecture, Pitt Rivers did not elaborate upon the theory underpinning this belief, but rather focused upon

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439 Chapman, 'Arranging Ethnology', pp. 19-21.
440 Lieut.-Colonel Lane Fox, 'On the Improvement of the Rifle as a Weapon for General Use', *JRUSI*, 2:8 (1858), p. 455; 'Ten Notebooks on the Archaeology of Weapons', NAM (1968-07-343).
441 Lane Fox, 'On the Improvement of the Rifle', p. 488.
442 Ibid., p. 455.
443 Pitt Rivers mentioned this explicitly in 'Primitive Warfare: Illustrated by Specimens from the Museum of the Institution', *JRUSI*, 11:47 (1867), p. 614. Hereafter, 'Primitive Warfare I'. Later, he would concede that in some cases, progressive forms became less complex, but this was the exception to the rule. See his 'Typological Museums, as exemplified by the Pitt-Rivers Museum at Oxford, and his Provincial Museum at Farnham, Dorset', *Journal of the Society of Arts*, 18 (1891), p. 117.

illustrating the 'evidence' of such progress. A remark made by Colonel Dixon of the Royal Artillery after the lecture illustrates how resonant such ideas were in the mid-nineteenth century: 'Everything is, I believe, in a state of progress, but nothing like perfection has been attained, I believe, yet'.[444] This notion that Britain could achieve 'perfectibility' in the military arts was articulated on numerous occasions during this time; most significantly in relation to the Great International Exhibition of 1862.[445] By analysing the discourse inspired by this exhibition, this chapter next demonstrates why it was that development in military technologies became a matter of such significant interest for the public imagination in general, and for Pitt Rivers in particular.

The Great International Exhibition (1862) and the Ideology of Progress

The mid-nineteenth-century institution of international exhibitions – exemplified first in Britain by the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition in London – has been understood by scholars as an articulation of a British commodity culture; a platform for liberal international cooperation and cosmopolitanism through the promotion of free trade; and a vehicle through which the imperialist agenda was sustained and furthered through its creation of a spectacle of objects originating from non-European cultures.[446] Underlying all of these interpretations is the notion that such exhibitions were the ultimate expression of the ideology of progress, and this is particularly evident when the organisation of the Great International Exhibition of 1862 is considered in relation to its 1851 predecessor.[447] For the organisers of the 1862 Exhibition, progress was not only to be reflected through examples of original innovations in technology and manufacturing techniques; it was also to be shown through the display of materials that had improved since their original showcasing

[444] Lane Fox, 'On the Improvement of the Rifle', pp. 486-7.
[445] 'Selections from the Great International Exhibition of 1862', *The London Journal*, 24 May 1862, p. 328.
[446] Purbrick, *The Great Exhibition of 1851*, pp. 7-21. For further analysis of the Great Exhibition of 1851 and its multiple meanings see: Auerbach, *The Great Exhibition of 1851*.
[447] The pursuit of progress as embodied in the form of the exhibition was not a uniquely British phenomenon; between the years 1851 and 1862 international exhibitions were subsequently held around the world, including, among others, New York (1853), Munich (1854), and Paris (1855).

in 1851. As an article in the London newspaper *The Globe* proclaimed: 'It must be a Progressive Exhibition, and should include specimens of articles for which prizes were awarded in 1851, in order that the improvements effected and advances made since that date may be more readily seen'.[448]

This desire to witness visual evidence of material and cultural progress was similarly indicated by a resolution proposed by the Council of the Society of Arts in preparation for the 1862 exhibition. Works selected were not to be arranged geographically, but rather according to 'classes'. The resolution was clear in its determination that the exhibition 'ought not be a repetition of the Exhibition of 1851, which must be considered an exceptional event, but should be an Exhibition of works selected for excellence, illustrating especially the progress of industry and art, and arranged according to classes, and not countries…'.[449] Support for such a classification system was reflected in *The Globe*. In emphasising its didactic purpose, and wishing to compare, for instance, 'the porcelain of Sèvres, Belgium, Austria, Dresden, Berlin, and Prussia, with that of Staffordshire, Worcestershire, and other parts of the United Kingdom', the article observed: 'It should be an educational exhibition, enabling us by comparison, in classes, to see wherein we are deficient as a manufacturing nation, and in what direction to look for improved appliances or raw materials, thereby enabling us the better to compete with foreign producers'.[450]

Although supported by public commentators,[451] this form of arrangement was not implemented consistently throughout the Exhibition hall; due to the size of the building it was considered impractical, and contributors from each nation wished to maintain some

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[448] 'The Exhibition of 1861', *The Globe*, reprinted in *The Canadian Journal of Industry, Science, and Art* (Toronto, 1859), iv, p. 239. *Fraser's Magazine* noted, '[O]ne great use… of Exhibitions is to be able to test man's social progress by comparing one Exhibition with another', 'The International Exhibition', November 1862, p. 632.
[449] Ibid., p. 236.
[450] Ibid., p. 238.
[451] The author of *The Popular Guide to the International Exhibition of 1862*, Edward McDermott, Esq. further wished: 'It would have been much more easy and agreeable, if the visitor could have gone by a series of progressive steps through the whole Exhibition, … if he could have seen by the side of the rough stone from the quarry the almost breathing figure of the sculptor's art', 4th edition (1862), p. 5.

control over their own individual exhibition spaces, rather than allow their materials to be dispersed among those of other nations.[452] Thus while most of the objects of British origin submitted to the exhibition were shown in classes (including mining, military engineering, naval architecture, silk and velvet, pottery, musical instruments, among many others), most of the 'foreign' objects were displayed in relation to geographical areas, with a central avenue demarcating a 'Foreign Nave' to the right of the entrance hall and a 'British Nave' to the west (including objects from the British colonies situated above the 'Eastern Dome').[453] This growing interest in a classificatory/progressive arrangement, however, is important to highlight, particularly as this was a system advocated by Pitt Rivers in his own lectures and collections of anthropological and archaeological objects. Although it is unknown whether Pitt Rivers attended the 1851 Exhibition, he was involved in the organisation of the 1862 Exhibition; as a member of the RUSI he was given the opportunity to assist with the creation of the military exhibits, the display of which polarised public opinion.[454]

Mid-Nineteenth-Century Military Innovation

Although representations of the military arts were displayed at the 1851 Exhibition, public commentaries tended to minimise their significance. The French polymath Baron Dupin (1784-1873), who reported on the Naval and Military Class went as far as to claim that, 'since it is the main object of the Exhibition… to promote the arts that add to the comforts and enjoyments of life, [rather] than the powerful and destructive engines employed in war,

[452] Colonel Tal. P. Shaffner and Revered W. Owen, *The Illustrated Record of the International Exhibition of the Industrial Arts and Manufactures, and the Fine Arts, of all Nations, in 1862* (1862), p. iv. Shaffner and Owen further noted: 'In the arrangement of the present Work, the geographical classification will not be strictly adhered to, and thus the reader will be afforded greater facilities for comparing the productions of all countries, and the skilled industry of the various exhibitors who have claimed favourable awards, than he could even obtain in the courts of the Exhibition itself', p. v.

[453] For detailed maps of the Exhibition Hall see: *ILN*, 13 September 1862, pp. 293-7. Geographical areas displayed a variety of objects including porcelain, ivory and wood carving, silks, tapestries, and medicinal drugs. See: McDermott, *The Popular Guide*, pp. 153-4.

[454] Pitt Rivers' name is listed in *The International Exhibition of 1862: The Illustrated Catalogue of the Industrial Department* (Cambridge, [1862] 2014), p. 60.

such engines are not in place here'.[455] Such sentiments had held sway since the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars when European statesmen convened at the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) with the wish to resolve international issues by means of consensus and diplomacy, rather than the use of armed force.[456] By the 1850s, public opinion in Britain too reflected a general understanding that the Great Exhibition was to act as a means by which nations would gather together and attain – in the words of Prince Albert – 'the realisation of the unity of mankind'.[457] In 1850, prior to the exhibition's opening, a letter to the editor published in *The Art Journal* challenged the soundness of the adage '*Si vis pacem, para bellum* [if you wish peace, prepare for war]', and proposed with great conviction,

> … that no weapon of international warfare shall be admitted into the coming Exhibition, one great aim of which is allowed to be the promotion of international union, brotherhood, and peace. Such an exclusion would indeed gladden the hearts of thousands who rejoice in believing that the number does increase of those who have a growing faith in the powers of moral force; and in the subduing efficacy of Christian principle.[458]

By the later 1850s, two events played an important part in shaking the foundations of such international idealism in Britain and influenced a public re-appraisal of the British armed forces – the Crimean War and the Indian Rebellion.[459] Public concern over the plight of British troops in the Crimea was heightened by media coverage detailing the suffering of the sick and wounded, the lack of necessary provisions, warm clothing and shelter, and

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[455] With regard to small arms, Baron Dupin noted that 'several of them… are used for war, but by far the greater number [are used]… for sporting purposes', *Reports by the Juries on the Subjects in the Thirty Classes into which the Exhibition was Divided* (1852), p. 220.
[456] See for instance: Mark Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy* (2013).
[457] *Prince Albert's Golden Precepts: Or, the Opinions and Maxims of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort* (1862), p. 45.
[458] M.C.J., 'The Great Exhibition - Weapons of Warfare', *The Art Journal*, June 1850, p. 192.
[459] See: MacKenzie (ed.), *Popular Imperialism and the Military*, pp. 1-3; Some scholars have argued that the development of religious reform in the British Army which paralleled a growing tradition of British 'Christian militarism', also played an important role. See for instance, Kenneth E. Hendrickson, *Making Saints: Religion and the Public Image of the British Army, 1809-1885* (1998) and Michael Snape, *The Redcoat and Religion* (New York, 2005). On the impact of the Crimean War in particular see: Olive Anderson, 'The Growth of Christian Militarism in Mid-Victorian Britain', *English Historical Review*, 86:338 (1971), pp. 46-72.

rumours of military disorganisation and maladministration.[460] Such accounts propelled the cause of those who supported army reform (arguments for which could already be found prior to the outbreak of the war),[461] yet, importantly, they also signified the necessity to continue to professionalise the armed forces by investing in the development and manufacture of weapons technology.

The Crimean War presented British artisan gun manufacturers with a sudden increase in demand, yet this came at a time during which they struggled to adjust to the methods of ironworking required to manufacture the newly adopted Minié rifle. A crisis ensued, and an alternative method of production was sought and ultimately discovered in the United States – in mass-producing automated milling machines which were capable of creating interchangeable component parts.[462] In 1854, the Parliamentary Select Committee on Small Arms had endorsed the establishment of a plant at the Royal Small Arms Factory (Enfield) which would use this new automated means of manufacture; however, the machinery required was not installed completely until the aftermath of the Crimean War, in 1859.[463] Such forms of mass production were subsequently adopted by the Woolwich Arsenal and independent contractors who formed the Birmingham Small Arms Company in 1861, and the London Small Arms Company in 1867.[464] Reports of the Crimean military campaigns also inspired innovations in artillery manufacture, including the 'Bessemer process' of steel production, and the creation of muzzle-loading guns by William Armstrong and Joseph

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460 For a detailed history of the war see: Trevor Royle, *Crimea: The Great Crimean War, 1854-1856* (1999).
461 See, especially, Hew Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of the British Army* (Manchester, 1984).
462 The results of this method of production had been demonstrated to the British at the 1851 Exhibition by the gun maker Samuel Colt. In discussing his new invention, *The Times* called it 'the most terrible implement of destruction ever delivered into the human hand', yet justified its military use by claiming that '[w]e are bound to take care that our soldiers are supplied with the most efficient means of destroying any enemy with whom they may be brought into contest'. See: *The Times*, 27 May 1851, p. 5.
463 William Hardy McNeill, 'The Initial Industrialization of War, 1840-84', in *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society Since A.D. 1000* (Chicago, 1982), pp. 232-4; The Report stated: 'The advantages of producing muskets by machinery are said to be, cheapness in the manufacture, and exact similarity in the several parts, so that they may be readily interchanged and replaced, and above all, the facility of rapidly producing muskets, and of increasing or reducing the supply according to the requirements of the time'. See: Report from the Select Committee on Small Arms, *HCPP*, 1854 (236), XVIII.1.
464 Emrys Chew, *Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean During the Age of Global Empire* (Basingstoke, 2012), pp. 68-72.

Whitworth.[465] By the Indian Rebellion, public hysteria surrounding the event reinforced the views of those who believed in the necessity of continuing to excel in the development of military technologies in order to protect British citizens at the imperial periphery.[466] Such sentiments were strengthened by fears of an imminent invasion by France's Louis Napoleon in 1859, and prompted the institution of the British Volunteer Forces.[467]

The decision to form a Military Class in the International Exhibition of 1862 was thus inspired by a mid-century climate of feverish military innovation. Yet fascination with military technologies was not confined to inventors and engineers. As a reflection of the British public's profound interest and curiosity in industrial and technological developments, the *Illustrated London News* in three issues with accompanying engravings provided its readers with detailed accounts of the processes by which the Armstrong gun was manufactured at the Woolwich Arsenal.[468] The most striking image was an etching entitled 'The Beehive' – a metaphor for British industrial society (Figure 17).[469] In the image the viewer is presented with seven rows of men energetically manufacturing the components of the Armstrong gun. The eye is drawn towards the seemingly endless overhead line shafts distributing power amongst the workers. The metaphor of 'The Beehive' served to reinforce the legitimacy of the existing class-based social order in Britain; such a form of order and hierarchy which functioned flawlessly in nature could be replicated – with positive moral effect – through the progress of industry. Indeed, the commentary of the *Illustrated London News* noted that the building itself where parts of the Armstrong gun were manufactured contributed to the wellbeing of the workers – it was

[465] McNeill, 'The Initial Industrialization of War', pp. 237-9.
[466] For a history of the Rebellion see: Clare Anderson, *The Indian Uprising of 1857-8: Prisons, Prisoners, and Rebellion* (2007).
[467] Anne Summers, 'Militarism in Britain before the Great War', *History Workshop Journal*, 2:1 (1976), pp. 106-7. Summers is keen to note, however, that during this period there was 'the deepest antipathy between popular and professional militarism, an antipathy vividly expressed by the refusal of the mid-Victorian Volunteer corps to wear uniforms of a regimental scarlet colour', p. 108.
[468] 'Manufacture of the Armstrong Gun', *ILN*, 1 March 1862, p. 224; 'The Manufacture of the Armstrong Gun', *ILN*, 5 April 1862, p. 352; 'The Manufacture of the Armstrong Gun', *ILN*, 12 April 1862, p. 381.
[469] 'Manufacture of the Armstrong Gun at Woolwich Arsenal: The Beehive', *ILN*, 5 April 1862, p. 351.

appropriately 'lighted, warmed, and ventilated, … giv[ing] evidence of the consideration which has been bestowed upon the health and comfort of the numerous workmen who are constantly employed under its roof'.[470] Working as an arms manufacturer was thus presented not only as a contribution to the protection of the nation – in both a physical and economic sense – but also as an industry that was providing security for its workers. Such commentary responded to a growing concern over the consequences of factory work, which led to the institution of industrial legislation through a series of factory acts, all of which were consolidated in 1878.[471]

Although the editorial policy of the *Illustrated London News* certainly indicates a mid-to-late nineteenth-century interest in military technologies in Britain, contemporary public reflections on the military displays at the 1862 Exhibition reveal that such innovation provoked conflicting sentiments. This chapter now explores in detail the public commentaries that emerged in relation to these military displays before moving on to discuss their place in contemporary debates about race, progress and civilisation.

Military Displays at the 1862 Exhibition

In *The Illustrated Record of the International Exhibition*, a detailed commemorative work published in 1862 which provided a historical and comparative account of both the 1851 and 1862 exhibitions, the authors found it relevant to remark upon a marble sculpture positioned near to the military engineering exhibit entitled 'Armed Science' (Figure 18). The sculptor John Bell (1811-1895) poignantly captured the mood of those who felt a sense of reluctance toward progress in the military arts, as the sculpture's downcast,

[470] 'The Manufacture of the Armstrong Gun', ibid., p. 352.
[471] Stephen J. Lee, *Aspects of British Political History, 1815-1914* (New York, 1994), pp. 153-4.

melancholy gaze was described as 'speaking but too faithfully of the sad uses to which so much of the practical science of our age is applied'.[472]

This perspective was reiterated in the review of the military engineering exhibitions in the South Courts of the exhibition hall. It noted:

> It would, in some degree, have mitigated the uneasy feelings with which this display was contemplated, if all nations had agreed to a full and unreserved exhibition of the weapons with which they proposed to conduct the work of mutual destruction, as such a representation might tend to the settlement of international disputes by the exercise of reason, and better application of skill than for forging weapons of war.[473]

While the authors argued that the full display of military technologies as developed by all nations had the potential to overwhelm audiences, and encourage them toward a recognition of the absurdity of warfare, the seeming paradox between the attainment of peace and investment in military technologies was famously satirised in a *Punch* cartoon and accompanying 'chorale' published on 3 May 1862, two days after the opening of the International Exhibition (Figure 19).[474] In the cartoon, titled 'Peace - Mr. Punch's Design for a Colossal Statue, Which Ought to Have Been Placed in the International Exhibition', the female representation of peace sits upon the Armstrong gun, her left hand steadying her balance (suggesting her misplacement or unfamiliarity with 'Bellona's iron car'), while her right hand holds the stem of a single delicate flower. The reason for her forlorn gaze, which is transfixed directly at the viewer, is illuminated by the final lines of the chorale: peace expresses feelings of 'woe' as 'Ten years have past, since first ye reared a hallowed temple in my name, And at its altar I appeared, And men to do me homage came'. Yet now,

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[472] Shaffner and Owen, *The Illustrated Record*, p. 18.
[473] Ibid., p. 53.
[474] 'Peace - Mr. Punch's Design for a Colossal Statue, Which Ought to Have Been Placed in the International Exhibition', *Punch Magazine*, 3 May 1862, xlii, p. 177.

> … in Europe, nations arm,
> In sullen, dim, unshaped alarm;
> The huge steam-hammers rise and fall,
> To forge the great ship's armour-wall,
> The workshops ring with eager toil,
> The cannon grows of welded coil;
> The shell, the fuse, the rifle – these
> The produce of men's industries?
> And I, invited here to-day,
> Reluctantly, at home must stay,
> Or change seats, from my dove-drawn car's,
> For this, politely lent by Mars![475]

Despite such criticism, the military displays at the 1862 Exhibition drew immense crowds, and many commentators noted the curiosity – rather than unease, or concern – with which such objects were considered by members of the public.[476] Of particular interest in the exhibition were the Armstrong and Whitworth Guns. The *British Quarterly Review*, one of the journals established to express the views of nonconformists, reported that:

> [O]n Whit Monday, and during the Whitsun week, when the number of visitors averaged, to speak in round numbers, to near upon fifty-two thousand daily, the great centres of attraction for both sexes were the courts containing the civil, military, and naval engineering and appliances. Nothing excited so much attention as the Armstrong and Whitworth one-hundred-pounder, Blakeley's five-hundred-pounder, and the Mersey Steel Company's six-hundred-pounders. These Whitworth guns, whether we consider the metal or the carriages, are the finest specimens of engineering handicraft, mechanical and artistic skill, the world has yet seen. As specimens of forging, polish, smoothness, strength, these death-dealing implements are quite perfect. So bright and clean are they in every part, whether in the wood or iron, so shining and lustrous, that they might be placed in a lady's boudoir or drawing-room.[477]

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[475] 'The Opening of the Great Exhibition - Mr. Punch's Chorale', ibid., p. 179.

[476] The progressive periodical *Fraser's Magazine* commented: 'We may well lament that the course of events should force such men as Whitworth and Armstrong to devote their genius and abilities to the construction of great war-engines, but it is clear that England cannot remain still while all other nations are arming for defence, or, it may be, battle', 'The International Exhibition', November 1862, p. 639.

[477] 'Synopsis of the Contents of the International Exhibition of 1862', *British Quarterly Review*, July 1862, p. 211. The article too noted that such positive sentiments were shared across the lower, middle, and upper classes, p. 212.

While critics of the development of the military arts sought to remind the public of the destructive purpose of such weapons, supporters were keen to abstract these objects from their intended use. In emphasising the Armstrong and Whitworth guns' smoothness of form, and refined technical qualities – qualities far removed from the dirt, desolation, and death of the battlefield – their true purpose was overshadowed by visions of their professed purity and perfection of composition. While the penny weekly *The London Journal* noted that 'the moralist and the philosopher' would regard a weapon such as the Armstrong gun with 'feelings of sadness', they argued that a love of England was sufficient justification to sanction the manufacture of weapons that would assist in maintaining her authority on the world's stage. Rather than supporting the cause of Tennyson's "'white-winged peace-makers"… [who] fly ever so joyously on the errands of humanity', the attainment of the perfection of armaments was considered to be the best way for Britain to enact her role as the pre-eminent advocate of order and civilisation.[478] The now progressively-leaning periodical *Fraser's Magazine* expressed disapproval that 'the Utopian dream of 1851 has not come to pass, and that we are still very far distant from the day when we shall be in a condition to "break our mailed fleets and armed towers"', yet wholly supported British development in the military arts due to its role in 'making war as scientific, and, therefore, as short as possible'.[479]

Justification for the development of weapons of warfare, therefore, came in many guises – as an expression of British patriotism; as a means by which wars could be made less lethal; and even as a means by which war could be deterred altogether through the understanding that the 'perfection' of such weapons would establish an atmosphere of mutually-assured

[478] 'Selections from the Great International Exhibition of 1862', p. 328.
[479] 'The International Exhibition', p. 638.

destruction.[480] Significantly, the supporters of the advancement of military technologies in Britain during this period often prefaced their justifications with an admission that resonated with Mr Punch's chorale – peace and the development of the military arts were understood to be discordant bedfellows. However, an anonymous author of an article titled 'Rifled Guns at the Exhibition' and published in *Colburn's United Service Magazine* in 1862 presented a contrasting perspective. The Armstrong and Whitworth guns, alongside other military innovations, were held to 'find a place in the Exhibition quite harmoniously beside the most refined utilities and luxuries of peace'. Furthermore, the author suggested an alternative way of understanding the role of warfare:

> … by eliminating from consideration all its admirable qualities, by fixing attention on its horrors, and on its horrors alone, it has come to be looked on with an exaggerated aversion; whereas really we have to be grateful for wars, which have, from the cradles of nations to the culminating points of their prosperity purchased these blessings.[481]

As well as being 'the scourge of the earth,' war was seen by the author as a 'civiliser' – an agent that propelled progress, without which innovation in science, mechanization, and metal-work would become idle, or even cease to prosper.[482] Yet the anonymous author's comments also touched upon the question as to *why* such military displays were considered to be important: they acknowledged that in gazing at such 'implements of death' the viewer 'feels an intense curiosity, a kind of breathless and fearful curiosity'.[483] General public inquisitiveness, as well as providing an opportunity to educate spectators on the mechanical

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[480] For instance in his report on the 1862 Exhibition, Benjamin Pierce Johnson wrote, 'the greater the perfection attained in the art of destruction, the greater will be the likelihood of averting the calamity of war'. See his, *Report on International Exhibition of Industry and Art, London, 1862* (Albany, 1863), pp. 132-3.
[481] 'Rifled Guns at the Exhibition', *USM*, 2, 1862, pp. 377-86.
[482] A similar concession was often made in reviews of books on the development of military technologies. In a review of John Scoffern's *Projectile Weapons of War and Explosive Compounds* (1852) in the moderate-conservative periodical *The Saturday Review*, the author wrote: 'In an age when anticipations of eternal peace have been succeeded by an almost unprecedented number of wars and rumours of wars, such speculations are at once interesting and well timed; and, though it is impossible to repress a feeling of regret that so much science should be applied to the process of slaughtering and mutilating human beings, the scientific principles involved in the matter are of the deepest interest, and are expounded by Mr. Scoffern with singular force and plainness', 20 March 1858, p. 295.
[483] 'Rifled Guns at the Exhibition', p. 385.

details by which the technology functioned, was referred to by other public commentators. Such military displays also assisted the British military establishment to assert their place as an essential, professionalised national institution, at the forefront of scientific and industrial developments of the period. Indeed, the author sought to encourage readers that the British 'have no reason to fear': in terms of manpower, raw materials and skill they comfortably surpassed all other nations and potential foes.[484] This lesson could not have been lost on spectators who were overshadowed by the sheer size and heavy composition of the Armstrong gun towering above them (Figure 20).

The international nature of the exhibition also suggested a further purpose for the display of British military might – to assure other nations of Britain's pre-eminence in this field and therefore pre-emptively dissuade potential enemy attacks or invasions. Public commentaries often racialised such observations by arguing that high standards of technological development were confined to particular races who also excelled in the art of war on the battlefield. In their review of the 1862 Exhibition, for instance, the *British Quarterly Review* noted that:

> It is impossible, of course, in the bird's-eye glance taken in a single sheet of a review, to give an idea of the stupendous commercial, manufacturing, and artistical resources of our country; but this is manifest to any unprejudiced observer, that no people has invented so much that is useful and necessary to man as the British race.[485]

The interrelationship between excelling in the development of the military arts and a higher level of civilisation was further affirmed in the works of authors who chose to elucidate the history of the development of weapons of warfare, including in the inventor Henry Wilkinson's (1794-1861) *Engines of War* (1841), the polymath John Scoffern's *Projectile Weapons of War and Explosive Compounds* (1845), and Colonel Francis Rawdon Chesney's

[484] Ibid., pp. 385-6.
[485] 'Synopsis of the Contents of the International Exhibition of 1862', pp. 215-16.

(1789-1872) *Observations on the Past and Present State of Firearms* (1852).[486] While Wilkinson claimed one of the societal 'advantages' of gunpowder to be 'that it has given a decided superiority to civilised over barbarous nations, by intimately connecting the progress of science with improvements in the art of war',[487] Scoffern similarly wrote:

> … whilst the lion and the tiger are still obliged to meet their enemies at close quarters, and savages, by their rude missiles, scarcely gain a point in civilization, we, of more refinement, bring to the conflict every accessory of modern science, and kill our foes according to the most approved laws of mathematics and chemistry.[488]

When a military development was admitted to have emerged in the East, such admissions were regularly qualified in order to maintain the superiority of European civilisational development. A review of Chesney's *Observations* in *The Examiner* which was more conservative in tone than the journal's broadly progressive editorial standpoint, stated that his work was 'a volume full of interesting facts and shrewd remarks on the history and present state of fire-arms – those weapons that have altered the history of man, given civilization a mastery over barbarism, and made it impossible for the latter ever again to keep down the former'.[489] With regard to the originators of gunpowder it claimed:

> From the great abundance with which nitre, the principle ingredient of gunpowder, is found, and almost naturally produced, in the hot countries of Asia, it is natural to believe that the more civilised inhabitants of that portion of the globe had fallen on the invention. It is asserted by both the Hindus and Chinese that they had made the discovery.[490]

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[486] Henry Wilkinson, *Engines of War; Or, Historical and Experimental Observations on Ancient and Modern Warlike Machines and Implements* (1841); Scoffern, *Projectile Weapons of War*; Colonel Francis Rawdon Chesney, *Observations on the Past and Present State of Firearms* (1852). For sympathetic review articles see: 'Book Review - *Engines of War*', *The Literary Gazette*, 10 April 1841, pp. 232-33; 'Book Review - *Observations*', *The Examiner*, 31 January 1852, p. 69; 'Book Review - *Observations*', *The Athenaeum*, 21 February 1852, pp. 216-8; 'Book Review - *Projectile Weapons*', *The Literary Gazette*, 27 March 1852, p. 302.
[487] Wilkinson, *Engines of War*, p. 133.
[488] Scoffern, *Projectile Weapons of War*, p. 1.
[489] 'Book Review - *Observations*', p. 70.
[490] Ibid.

While the reviewer conceded that it was 'highly probable that the Chinese had very early invented the compound', in order to accommodate the view that it was predominantly the Europeans who excelled in such developments, he claimed that the initial purpose for which gunpowder was used by the Chinese was 'the blasting of rocks and as pyrotechnics', rather than primarily for military purposes. The condescension of the reviewer is evidenced in their comment that gunpowder was utilised in the same manner as the compass, which was also considered to have been invented by the Chinese: 'that is, they trifled with it, and made no masculine use of it'. The reviewer continued: 'Both gunpowder and fire-arms were first made known to Europeans by the Arabs of Spain; and as they were far more advanced in essential civilization than any oriental people, it is just as likely that they were themselves the real inventors of both….'[491] While the reviewer introduced a sense of ambiguity with regard to whether the Chinese did indeed originally invent gunpowder, their belief in a superior European civilisation was upheld through the assumption that Europeans *swiftly* realised the military applicability of gunpowder as soon as it was in hand, whilst the Chinese were said to have initially utilised it for the allegedly 'feminine' purposes of pleasure and entertainment.

Chesney's book was in actual fact rather more nuanced in his account of the originators of gunpowder – he quoted a broad range of historical sources, including the work of Sir George Staunton (1737-1801), an employee of the East India Company who became Secretary to the British diplomatic mission to China in the late eighteenth century,[492] and considered gunpowder to have 'been applied at all times to useful purposes' by the Chinese, including 'as a defence, by undermining the probable passage of an enemy, and

[491] Ibid.
[492] Stephen Wheeler, 'Staunton, Sir George Leonard, First Baronet (1737-1801)', rev. Anne Bulley, *ODNB*, Oxford University Press, 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/26324, accessed 22 September 2015.

blowing him up'.[493] While the reviewer for *The Examiner* chose to emphasise the spirit of Staunton's latter point that the Europeans used gunpowder more effectively '*soon after* they had discovered that composition',[494] their wish to reinforce the expertise of Europeans overlooked the fact that Chesney had concluded: 'receipts for the mixture of sulphur, saltpetre, and charcoal which have been found amongst the Arabs… *were obtained by this people from the east*… [when] commercial intercourse existed between China and the Arabs through the Persian Gulf'.[495]

While figures such as Chesney were therefore willing to concede important military developments to have originated from the East, and works of the Orient were viewed by some commentators as possessing a quality and artistic merit that could rival and even surpass British artistic manufacturing,[496] as scholars have recognised, those seen to be 'savage' productions were considered almost exclusively in relation to the raw materials they were composed of, rather than their quality, or cultural context.[497] In *Tallis's History and Description of the Crystal Palace* (1851) it had been noted: 'all men, differ as they may in other important points, more especially the uncivilised from the civilised, nevertheless obey at least one law in common: they all, without exception, but in very different degrees of intensity, *labour*.'[498] However, the outcomes of labour of those designated as 'Aborigines, or the less civilised races' were to be understood as 'substantially the inferior fruits of human

493 Staunton quoted in Chesney, *Observations*, p. 20.
494 Ibid. Emphasis added.
495 Ibid., pp. 38-9.
496 The polymath William Whewell (1794-1866) noted: 'The silks and shawls, the embroidery and jewellery, the moulding and carving, which those countries [of the Orient] can produce, and which decorate their palaces and their dwellers in palaces, are even now such as we [the British] cannot excel'. Whewell, 'The General Bearing of the Exhibition on the Progress of Art and Science', in *Lectures on the Results of the Great Exhibition of 1851* (1852), p. 17.
497 It has been argued that this 'drive to strip non-European communities of cultural and historical significance' was effected 'in order that they might be easily and profitably assimilated into a global economy', see Paul Young, 'Mission Impossible: Globalization and the Great Exhibition', in Auerbach and Hoffenberg (eds), *Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851*, p. 16.
498 'Chapter XVIII - Foreign and Colonial Departments, Aboriginal States', in *Tallis's History and Description of the Crystal Palace* (2 vols, 1851), ii, p. 128. Emphasis in original.

industry'. *Tallis's History* touched briefly upon a significant consideration, which foreshadowed Pitt Rivers' own understanding of cultural development:

> … the productions of those who are commonly called Aborigines, or the less civilised races… illustrate the primitive elements, out of which the most advanced nations have elaborated their gorgeous and graceful, their eminently useful productions. The most polished nations may in them trace their own perfection backward to its sources.[499]

The notion that the development of cultural objects ran along a forward continuum, and that the objects of early man could be discerned by the study of the productions of those deemed 'less civilised' was an argument that Pitt Rivers would develop in greater detail in a series of lectures on 'Primitive Warfare' at the RUSI.[500] The exhibitions of 1851 and 1862 and their associated commentaries broadened public awareness of the cultural and technological creations of the non-European; Pitt Rivers was one of the first figures to theorise the production of the military arts in particular, and explicitly associate such innovation with his own understanding of the existence of a hierarchy of races. This chapter now explores in greater detail Pitt Rivers' theories, in order to understand how they were informed by and characterised broader intellectual trends of the mid-to-late nineteenth century, and draws particular attention to the ways in which these ideas led him to develop distinguishing traits between 'civilised' and 'savage' means of warfare.

'Primitive Warfare' and the Theory of Cultural Evolution

In his first 'Primitive Warfare' lecture presented to the RUSI on 28 June 1867, Pitt Rivers began by commending the institute for its astonishing collection of non-European weapons of warfare. He raised the notion that through the material evidence found in the

[499] Ibid.
[500] Pitt Rivers presented three lectures to the RUSI; this chapter will predominantly focus upon the first two of those lectures – where his 'general principles' are articulated – and will not discuss the third: 'Primitive Warfare - Section III. On the Resemblance of the Weapons of Early Races, their Variations, Continuity, and Development of Form - Metal Period', *JRUSI*, 13:56 (1869), pp. 509-39.

collections of the institute's museum – including objects of an anthropological and archaeological[501] nature – scholars were assisted to theorise upon the manner in which implements of warfare had developed from prehistoric times:

> [T]he fact of your possessing in three large apartments that are devoted to your armoury, one of the best assortments of semi-civilised and savage weapons that are to be found in this country, or perhaps, in any part of the world, is sufficient to prove that it is not foreign to the objects of the Institution that the science of war should be ethnographically and archaeologically, as well as practically, treated.[502]

Pitt Rivers was one of the first figures to term the collections of the RUSI Museum an 'ethnographic military department', which was an association appreciated by certain figures of the military establishment who wished their profession to be seen as contributing to understandings of human difference.[503] He did not consider that the collections of what he termed 'savages' in the museum were there to assist British military practitioners in improving their own weapons; rather, he believed such objects to be invaluable for the reconstruction and understanding of the customs and creations of prehistoric man. In a later lecture, Pitt Rivers explicitly stated that his research was primarily guided by 'the orthodox scientific principle of reasoning from the known to the unknown'. This principle led him to argue that the arts of primeval man which had not survived over time due to their creation from perishable materials, could be deduced by examining the objects of what he termed primeval man's 'nearest congener, the modern savage'.[504] In arguing so, Pitt Rivers was most likely influenced by the work of John Lubbock. Lubbock first articulated the idea that the life and culture of prehistoric man could be determined by observing the

[501] Pitt Rivers played a prominent role in the field of archaeology, and as Christopher Evans has demonstrated, his military career influenced the manner in which he undertook his own archaeological excavations. See: Evans, 'Soldiering Archaeology', pp. 1-20.
[502] Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare I', p. 612.
[503] This development can be traced from the late 1820s, in the original discourse surrounding the establishment of the museum. See: An old Egyptian Campaigner, 'To the Editor of the United Service Journal', *USJ*, 1, 1829, p. 239; A North Coaster, 'To the Editor of the United Service Journal', *USJ*, 1, 1830, p. 367.
[504] See: A. Lane Fox, 'On the Principles of Classification Adopted in the Arrangement of His Anthropological Collection, Now Exhibited in the Bethnal Green Museum', *JAI*, 4 (1875), p. 295.

customs of modern 'savages' in an article published in the *Natural History Review* in 1861. In this article he argued that an account of the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego written by Darwin provided 'a vivid and probably correct idea of what was passing on the shores of the Danish fjords several thousand years ago'.[505] This idea was more fully developed in his book *Prehistoric Times* (published in 1865), the more probable source which further inspired Pitt Rivers.[506]

Before discussing in detail his theories of the development of weapons of warfare, Pitt Rivers began by briefly remarking on his understanding of the creation of humankind, which challenged contemporary theological views that man was placed on the earth as an exceptional being, separate from the general laws of nature. Although Pitt Rivers rarely discussed his own personal faith, his intellectual interests suggest an inquisitiveness and open-mindedness towards orthodox religious understanding.[507] His willingness to critique a privileged view of human creation is evident in his comments below:

> The more comprehensively the subject is viewed, the more restricted appear to be those limits over which the free will of mankind is permitted to range, and the more evident it becomes, that in his social advancement, his laws, arts, and wars, he moves under the influence and development of those same laws which have been in force from the very first dawn of creation. … The great law of nature, 'natura non facit saltum', was not broken by the introduction of man upon the earth.[508]

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[505] John Lubbock quoted in Mark Patton, *Science, Politics and Business in the Work of Sir John Lubbock* (Aldershot, 2007), p. 55.
[506] John Lubbock, *Prehistoric Times, As Illustrated by Ancient Remains and the Manners and Customs of Modern Savages* (1865). See especially Chapter XIII, 'Modern Savages - Concluded'. This idea also underpinned the work of E.B. Tylor who argued: 'By comparing the various stages of civilization among races known to history, with the aid of archaeological inference from the remains of pre-historic tribes, it seems possible to judge in a rough way of an early general condition of man, which from our point of view is to be regarded as a primitive condition, whatever yet earlier state may in reality have lain behind it. This hypothetical primitive condition corresponds in a considerable degree to that of modern savage tribes, who, in spite of their difference and distance, have in common certain elements of civilization, which seem remains of an early state of the human race at large'. See: Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom* (2 vols, 1871), i, p. 19.
[507] Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, pp. 10-12.
[508] Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare I', pp. 613-4.

Pitt Rivers applied this idea of 'natura non facit saltum' – that natural species developed through small and measured changes – to the development of cultural objects, which in his view, included weapons of warfare.[509] Pitt Rivers would articulate more fully his notion that the cultural and physical sciences were alike in a meeting at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in 1875 where he argued that 'science' could be defined as 'organized common sense', and thus, in his view, 'all those things which call forth the exercise of our common sense are capable of being scientifically dealt with'.[510] 'Culture' was understood by Pitt Rivers to be a historical science; 'historical' in the sense that it was driven by progress. In developing theories such as variation and natural selection, the work of evolutionary biologists such as Charles Darwin had in Pitt Rivers' view 'established a bond of union between the physical and culture sciences which can never be broken'. He continued,

> History is but another term for evolution. … [O]ur position with regard to culture has always been one which has forced on our comprehension the reality of progress, whilst with respect to the slow progress of external nature, it has been concealed from us, owing to the brief span of human existence and our imperfect records of the past. The distinction, therefore, between the sciences, as historical and non-historical, is but a subjective delusion, and not an objective reality; and herein, I believe, lies the secret of most of those errors that we have to contend with.[511]

It is this theory of cultural evolution, and the inevitability of progress, that would underpin Pitt Rivers' own views on race, which were introduced most unequivocally in his first Primitive Warfare lecture, and to which this chapter now turns.

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[509] Pitt Rivers did not attribute this idea to any particular figure in his first 'Primitive Warfare' lecture. In his work *Primitive Culture*, Tylor attributed it to the philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), who referred to this maxim – which he termed the *Law of Continuity* – in an article published in 1698 in the journal *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*. The most probable source for nineteenth century thinkers was his *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, a critique of John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690). Leibnitz's work was finished in 1704, yet not published until 1765. See: Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, i, p. 2; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, Alfred Gideon Langley (trans), (1896), p. 50.
[510] Colonel A. Lane Fox, 'On the Evolution of Culture', *Notices of the Proceedings at the Meetings of the Members of the Royal Institution of Great Britain*, 7 (1875), p. 496.
[511] Ibid., p. 499.

Race and Civilisation

For Pitt Rivers, continual progress was an unalterable fact of life; despite 'many halts and relapses, and a very varied rate of movement in the different races, the march of the human intellect has always been onward'.[512] In order to support this supposition, he made the claim that the progress of those considered to be in a 'barbarous state' had been arrested at a point in time.[513] Using an example derived from the indigenous inhabitants of Australia (whom he believed to be the most 'barbarous'), he argued:

> If the Australians, for example, were the degenerate descendants of people in a higher phase of culture, then, as all existing ideas are made up of previous ideas, we must inevitably find amongst their arts traces of the forms of earlier and higher arts… but the reverse of this is the case: all the forms of the Australian weapons are derived from those of nature.[514]

Civilisations could, in some cases undergo a 'relapse', as in the case of Egypt and Assyria where Pitt Rivers argued that 'we see the remains of ancient and formerly populous cities, where now the nomadic Arab pitches his tent or wanders with his flocks'. However, he claimed that such civilisation did not 'expire', but rather 'was transferred thence to other places', such as to Greece, Rome, and finally Britain.[515] Pitt Rivers' contemporary, E.B. Tylor, would explore more fully the dialectic between what he identified as the 'progression theory' and the 'degradation theory' in his work *Primitive Culture* (1871), concluding that 'so

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[512] Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare I', p. 614. In a later lecture to the Society of Arts in 1891, he revised his view by claiming that degeneration and progressive growth 'have gone on side by side', 'Typological Museums', p. 116.
See also the qualification of Henry Balfour in *The Evolution of Culture and Other Essays by the Late Lt.-Gen. A. Lane-Fox Pitt-Rivers*, J.L. Myres (ed.), (Oxford, 1906), p. xvi.

[513] In order to support this argument, he referred to Charles Lyell's *Antiquity of Man*, where in comparing flint implements discovered in the Somme he argued that 'the state of the arts in those early [prehistoric] times remained stationary for an almost indefinite period'. Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare I', p. 614; Charles Lyell, *The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man with Remarks on Theories of the Origin of Species by Variation* (1863), pp. 376-7.

[514] Lane Fox, 'On the Evolution of Culture', p. 508.

[515] Colonel A.H. Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare, Section II. On the Resemblance of the Weapons of Early Races; Their Variations, Continuity, and Development of Form', *JRUSI*, xii, (1868), pp. 402-3. Hereafter, 'Primitive Warfare II'.

far as history is to be our criterion, progression is primary and degradation secondary'.[516] In articulating their adherence to the theory of progression, Pitt Rivers and Tylor were challenging the theological argument that 'civilization was bestowed on man by divine intervention'.[517]

Although Pitt Rivers accepted the theory of monogenesis, he argued that abilities to wage war and to develop tools for the art of warfare became varied amongst different races. Utilising the analogy of the growth of a tree, he wrote:

> Assuming the whole of the human species to have sprung originally from one stock… several races appear to have branched off at various and remote periods…. Each race, after separation, shows evidence of arrested growth. … [T]he existing races of mankind may be taken to represent the budding twigs and foliage, each in accordance with the relative superiority of its civilization, appertaining to branches higher and higher, placed upon the great stem of life.[518]

Pitt Rivers introduced his own division of races, which he saw as corresponding to certain historical ages. Aside from the 'Caucasian races of modern Europe' there were the: 'semi-civilised Chinese and Hindoos' who were to be 'classed with the races of ancient Assyria, Egypt, and other nations immediately prior to the first dawn of history'; the 'Malay, Tartar, and African negro nations, which though now in an age of iron, may, by the state of their arts, and more especially by the form of their implements, be taken as the best representatives of the pre-historic bronze period of Europe'; and finally 'the still more

[516] Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, i, p. 34.
[517] Ibid., pp. 33-4. In contrast to the ambiguous nature of the role of faith in Pitt Rivers' life, scholars have recognised that as Tylor developed his intellectual interests he began seriously to question his belief in Christianity. However, although he officially resigned from Quaker membership in 1864, as Timothy Larsen has noted, elements of Quaker thought can still be traced in his later anthropological work. See: 'E.B. Tylor, Religion and Anthropology', *British Journal for the History of Science*, 46:3 (2013), p. 472.
[518] Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare I', p. 615.

barbarous races of our times, the Australian, Bushman, and hunting races of America', who were representative of the stone age of Europe.[519]

With regard to the mid-century schism between the ethnological and anthropological societies of London, Pitt Rivers has been associated with the more liberal-minded, nonconformist ethnological group.[520] Yet it seems that his views on race were rather more complex than is usually acknowledged.[521] He argued that 'civilization' was only 'confined to particular races whose function it has been by means of war and conquest to spread the arts amongst surrounding nations', and invoked his belief in what he understood to be a 'law which consigns to destruction all savage races when brought into contact with a civilization much higher than their own', a view illustrated by the extermination of the indigenous peoples of Tasmania and New Zealand whom he considered to be 'fast disappearing'.[522] Due to this, he expressed a sense of urgency in the need to collect and preserve the arts and objects of such cultures. Although admitting that the destruction of 'uncivilised' communities had been a consequence of the spread of European diseases and 'vices', he was not necessarily confident in the avowed 'civilising mission' of the British philanthropist and missionary movements.[523]

He argued that:

> The labours of the missionary, if they have produced no other benefit, have been useful in teaching us the great truth, that notwithstanding the philanthropic efforts of the intruding race, the law of nature must be vindicated. The savage is morally and mentally an unfit instrument for

[519] Ibid., p. 616. Bradley notes that Pitt Rivers was inspired by Thomas Huxley's lecture to the International Congress of Prehistoric Archaeology in 1868 on 'The Distribution of the Races of Mankind as Bearing on their Antiquity', where Huxley outlined four 'distinct races': Australioid, Negroid, Mongoloid and Xanthochroic. Bradley, 'Archaeology, Evolution and the Public Good', p. 5.
[520] Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, p. 48. Bowden has claimed that although Pitt Rivers' racial views were 'conventional in the light of Victorian modes of thought', he held particularly prejudiced views against the Irish, p. 10.
[521] Chapman has noted that Pitt Rivers had actually joined the Anthropological Society in 1865, on a return visit from Ireland. See: '"Like a game of dominoes"', p. 146.
[522] Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare I', p. 619. For a detailed history on the 'discourse of extinction' and 'self-destruction' of 'savages' see: Brantlinger, *Dark Vanishings*, *passim*.
[523] Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare I', p. 615.

> the spread of civilization, except when, like the higher mammalia, he is reduced to a state of slavery; his occupation is gone, and his place is required for an improved race.[524]

Rather than suggesting faults in the methods of the British missionary movement, criticism of which had emerged by the 1850s and 1860s,[525] Pitt Rivers seemed to suggest that those whom he understood as 'savages' were incapable of being 'civilised' – echoing earlier arguments of 'irreclaimability' noted in the context of the Cape. Such a perspective reinforced Pitt Rivers' view that the productions and activities of prehistoric man could be deduced from observing what he believed to be their modern 'equivalent'. In claiming that prehistoric man exhibited an 'inane' quality which rendered him unable to create objects spontaneously, Pitt Rivers argued that the first tools created by man were inspired by looking towards, and thus imitating, nature.[526] By looking at nature, the first lesson learnt by early man was the need to gain a proficiency in the art of warfare.[527] In his second lecture at the RUSI, presented on 5 June 1868, he would articulate more fully the qualities and traits that he claimed distinguished such 'savage' productions of weaponry with those considered to be 'civilised', by focusing on their form, composition, and use.

Characteristics of 'Civilised' and 'Savage' Weaponry

Pitt Rivers began his lecture by claiming that the 'civilised' or 'barbarous' state of a human depended upon 'the accident of our birth which places us in a position to build upon the experience of our ancestors, adding to it the experience acquired by ourselves'.[528] He argued against the view that the first stages of human progress were aided by 'supernatural

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[524] Ibid., p. 619.
[525] Andrew Porter, *Religion Versus Empire?: British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700-1914* (Manchester, 2004), p. 189.
[526] Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare I', p. 619.
[527] Pitt Rivers concluded his lecture by providing an illustration of offensive and defensive weaponry from numerous cultures ranging across a great expanse of time, many of which were found in the collections of the RUSI Museum. Illustrations of some of the objects were included in the published version of the lecture in the institute's journal.
[528] Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare II', p. 400.

agency'. Rather, he believed in the importance of education; each innovation made by man was an adaptation of 'contrivances already existing', or was 'produced by applying to one branch of industry the principles or the contrivances which have been evolved in another'.[529]

In a 'lower' stage of human existence tools such as weapons took on various forms and improvement was reached only by chance. The creation of tools was driven not by contemplative design, but rather, in Darwinian terms, by 'unconscious selection':

> By degrees some forms would be found best adapted to one pursuit, and some to another; one would be used for grubbing up roots. Another for breaking shells… modes of procedure accidentally hit upon in one class of occupation, would suggest improvements in another, and thus analogy, coming to the aid of accidental variation, would give an impulse to progress.[530]

Aside from developing form through accidental selection, 'primitive' advancement of the military arts was also driven by imitation of the natural form, an idea mentioned in passing in his earlier lecture.

Once having established the initial developments of form, Pitt Rivers argued that there were further defining traits which distinguished 'civilised' and 'uncivilised' weapons of warfare. Although suggesting in his earlier works that in the grand scheme of development, 'variation' was considered to be a progressive force, in this particular lecture, Pitt Rivers utilised the same term in a different sense, and argued that 'variation' was in fact a mark of 'savagery'. Such inconsistencies demonstrate that although Pitt Rivers sought to establish a perception of intellectual rigour, his ultimate wish to assert a 'civilised'/'savage' distinction

[529] Ibid., p. 401.

[530] Ibid., p. 404. Although this general theory was mentioned in his 'Primitive Warfare II' lecture, it was not fully developed until 1875 in a lecture presented to members of the Anthropological Institute at the Bethnal Green Museum. See: Fox, 'On the Principles of Classification', pp. 299-300.

accommodated theoretical flexibility. He chose to demonstrate his new conception of 'variation' through an anecdote:

> A Sheffield manufacturer informed me, that he had lately received a wooden model of a dagger-blade from Mogadore, made by an Arab, who desired to have one of steel made exactly like it. Accordingly, my informant thinking that he had found a convenient market for the sale of such weapons, constructed some hundreds of blades of exactly the same pattern. On arriving at their destination, however, they were found to be unsaleable. Although precisely of the type in general use about Mogadore, and all of which to the European eye would be considered alike, *their uniformity rendered them unsuited to the requirements of the inhabitants*, each of whom piqued himself upon possessing his own particular pattern, the peculiarity of which consisted in having some almost imperceptible difference in the curve or breadth of the blade.[531]

Pitt Rivers understood the 'uncivilised' form of 'variation' as being related to differences that were not associated with the utility of the object itself, such as ornamentation, or the material of the handle. Those deemed contemporary 'savages' in Pitt Rivers' view (as the inhabitants of Mogadore illustrated in the anecdote above), held on to the more 'primitive' desire to possess weaponry that reflected, in form, an earlier stage of art noted for its uniqueness. This was the result of their alleged resistance to change, and thus preference for tradition, which was held to inhibit their capacity to progress.

Pitt Rivers also argued for the existence of an arresting element which caused the advancement of human cultural creation to be continuous, yet measured. He did not expand upon this element in great detail, but argued briefly that the reason for such measured progress in 'savage' races was due in part to a number of factors including 'prejudice', 'force of habit', and 'principles of conservatism', an idea taken from the work of E.B. Tylor, which emerged alongside progressive influences.[532] His earlier lecture included examples which clarify this argument. Using Herodotus' description of spears carried by

[531] Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare II', p. 404. Emphasis added.
[532] Ibid., p. 405. Tylor argued that: 'The savage is firmly, obstinately conservative. No man appeals with more unhesitating confidence to the great precedent-makers of the past; the wisdom of his ancestors can control against the most obvious evidence of his own opinions and actions', Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, i, p. 156. See also: Lane Fox, 'On the Evolution of Culture', p. 505.

Ethiopians in the army of Xerxes, Pitt Rivers wrote that Consul John Petherick (1813-1882),[533] a Welsh explorer of East Central Africa, had

> … found still in use by the Djibba negroes more than two thousand years after, these identical spears, armed with the straightened and sharpened horn of the antelope, and their other weapons also resembled in character those described by Herodotus, although they had passed from the stone weapons then used, into an age of metal.[534]

Pitt Rivers wished to further demonstrate his belief in the resistance of the 'savage' warrior to adapt to change by claiming that '[w]hen during the American war, the English endeavoured to utilise the Indians by arming them, they were compelled to construct for them tomahawks after their own pattern, having a pipe in the handle'. Similarly, '[w]hen the Purus Indians of South America receive a knife from Europeans they break off the handle, and fashion the knife according to their own ideas placing the blade between two pieces of wood, and binding it round tight with a sinew'.[535] Rather than considering that such changes were made by the Indians and South Americans to conform to their own personal understanding of the most effective form of weaponry that had been cultivated through their own practical experiences, Pitt Rivers claimed such 'savages' to be 'passive spectators', who would choose to hold on to their own customs rather than seek development and

[533] During his travels, John Petherick entered the service of Mehmet Ali in 1845. In 1865 he returned to England and published his *Travels in Central Africa and Explorations of the Western Nile Tributaries* (1869) in two volumes.

[534] The passage in Herodotus reads: 'The Ethiopians were clothed in the skins of leopards and lions, and had long bows made of the stem of the palm-leaf, not less than four cubits in length. On these they laid short arrows made of reed, and armed at the tip, not with iron, but with a piece of stone, sharpened to a point, of the kind used in engraving seals. They carried likewise spears, the head of which was the sharpened horn of an antelope; and in addition they had knotted clubs'. *Herodotus, The Persian Wars*, George Rawlinson (trans), Bruce J. Butterfield (ed.), (New York, 1942), Book VII - Polymnia, 7.69.

[535] Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare I', pp. 616-7. This latter example was drawn from the work of the German anthropologist Gustav Klemm (1802-1867), *Werkzeuge und Waffen*, the translation of which Lane Fox commissioned for his own research.

adaptation. While the materials of such objects might undergo change due to the influence of outsiders, their form remained the same.[536]

The final principle which Pitt Rivers claimed was a key sign of development in the arts was the creation of objects for specific tasks. While one of the hallmarks of civilisation was considered to be the division of labour, at an early stage of mankind, 'when all men were warriors', tools were used interchangeably for the purposes of both peace and war.[537] Such a point could be discerned in Lubbock's *Pre-Historic Times* where he argued that:

> Numerous and specialised as are our modern instruments… the primitive savage had no choice of such [an array] of weapons; we see before us perhaps the whole contents of his workshop; and with these implements, rude as they seem to us, he may have cut down trees, scooped them out into canoes, grubbed up roots, attacked his enemies, killed and cut up his food, … prepared firewood, etc.[538]

Through the use of historical examples, Pitt Rivers argued that contemporary wars of liberation had often been fought with weapons that were also used for other, chiefly domestic, reasons. Among other examples, the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865 was mentioned. Quoting a proclamation made by Paul Bogle (1822-1865), a Jamaican Baptist deacon who led the protest which spiralled into the rebellion,[539] Pitt Rivers claimed that Bogle had called for his fellow Jamaicans to take cutlasses that were used to cut sugar cane, to fight against the British.[540] Although Pitt Rivers argued that the use of tools of husbandry as weapons of war was the marker of the 'uncivilised', he did concede that such tools were still effective: had the rebellion 'not been ably and powerfully put down, [it] would have led to the destruction of the whole white population'.[541] The notion that the

536 Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare I', p. 617.
537 Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare II', p. 406.
538 Lubbock, *Pre-Historic Times*, p. 280.
539 On the Morant Bay Rebellion see: Thomas C. Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938* (1992), pp. 295-310.
540 Lane Fox, 'Primitive Warfare II', p. 407.
541 Ibid.

'civilised' British could still be challenged by the 'savage' with their 'un-progressive' tools reflects a broader contemporary anxiety of western degeneration, and fears of imminent invasion by external enemies.[542]

In contrast to the earlier accounts of Wilkinson, Scoffern and Chesney who concentrated their attention on elucidating the historical development of weaponry throughout the ages, Pitt Rivers chose to focus upon identifying specific characteristics that in his view rendered particular productions of the military arts markedly inferior. Pitt Rivers' four defining traits of the means of the 'savage' warrior – variation, conservatism, un-adaptability, and interchangeable use – provide a unique example of the coalescence of ideas on race, imperialism and cultural progress during this period. In presenting such theories to members of the RUSI it is clear that Pitt Rivers was partaking in a form of self-reflexive reassertion of Britain's pre-eminent strength in the military arts. The decision to analogise the prehistoric warrior with what he considered to be present-day 'primitive' man may also suggest that in his discussions with military figures at the RUSI the notion of 'knowing' the imperial enemy was raised. Ultimately, however, the focus of his lectures was not to enlighten his audience on the particular customs and characteristics of non-European cultures, but rather to demonstrate how far in relation to these creations the *British* had advanced. His theories on the development of weaponry were designed to further reinforce a 'civilised'/'savage' divide; Pitt Rivers provided unambiguous indicators that defined cultural productions on the lower scale of civilisation which could be effortlessly contrasted with the development of mass-produced weaponry in Britain inspired by the industrial revolution and deemed a marker of the 'civilised' warrior class.

[542] Such fears came to be expressed more fully through the imperial Gothic literature of the latter nineteenth century. See: Brantlinger, *Rule of Darkness*, p. 230.

An Eclecticism of Influences

In essence, Pitt Rivers' understanding of cultural evolution ought to be seen as a constellation of the theories of a number of past and contemporary scholars, as well as his own practical observations. His underlying world view was driven by his belief in the notion of gradualism (Leibniz/Darwin); alongside his work at the Woolwich Arsenal, Spencer's claim (inspired by the work of Lamarck) that evolution could be discerned in all aspects of human life moved him towards considering a corresponding relationship between biological and cultural evolution; while in the work of John Lubbock he recognised the appropriateness of analogising the present-day 'savage' with prehistoric man. Although Pitt Rivers explicitly utilised terminology associated with biological evolution in his lectures (such as 'natural selection' and 'survival of the fittest'), this chapter shows that his theory of cultural evolution must be seen predominantly as derived from the ideas of Lamarck and Spencer.

It is evident that Pitt Rivers' understanding of cultural development was clearly informed by race – indeed, he was one of the first figures to theorise the interrelationship between race and the development of weapons of warfare. In claiming to isolate specific characteristics distinguishing 'savage' weaponry from 'civilised' weaponry (variation, conservatism, un-adaptability and interchangeable use), Pitt Rivers charged existing interest in the development of the military arts with contemporary understandings of an imagined hierarchy of races. Significantly, his insistence that the cultural productions of prehistoric man could be discerned by examining contemporary 'savages' demonstrates what the anthropologist Johannes Fabian referred to as a 'denial of coevalness' which further exacerbated the notion of difference between contemporary anthropologists and their

subjects.[543] Although Pitt Rivers later determined, '[t]o what extent the modern savage actually represents primeval man is one of those problems which anthropology is called upon to solve. … Analogy would lead us to believe that he presents us with a traditional portrait of him rather than a photograph',[544] such 'analogising' can be seen as one step beyond the refusal of commentators to differentiate amongst particular indigenous tribes and their unique cultural and military characteristics. Furthermore, this process clearly contributed to the fortifying of distinctions between the present day 'civilised' and the 'savage' warrior. Pitt Rivers' ideas illustrate a shift in the manner by which discussions and debates on the 'uncivilised' warrior developed during the mid-to-late nineteenth century in Britain. While material representations of 'savage warfare' in the early nineteenth century functioned predominantly as a form of 'spectacle' – displayed in military museums and seen alongside the live exhibitions of those considered to be 'savage' peoples – the work of Pitt Rivers signifies the development of an explicit association between race, cultural evolution, and military effectiveness.

Conclusion

Through an examination of the theories of General Pitt Rivers, this chapter shows that by the mid-nineteenth century the discourse on the 'savage' warrior became more overtly associated with contemporary racial and evolutionary concepts of the period. While international exhibitions and the works of Henry Wilkinson, John Scoffern and Colonel Francis Rawdon Chesney broadened an interest in both European and non-European technological military innovations, figures such as Pitt Rivers strengthened the association of the ideology of progress encapsulated in such exhibitions and historical accounts with physical representations of the military arts, developing theories which claimed that cultural

[543] Fabian quoted in Raymond Corbey, 'Ethnographical Showcases, 1870-1930', *Cultural Anthropology*, 8:3 (1993), p. 361. Fabian famously critiqued the 'allochronic' (not temporally contemporaneous) nature of the field of anthropology in his *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object* (New York, [1983] 2014).
[544] *Catalogue of the Anthropological Collection lent by Colonel Lane Fox for Exhibition in the Bethnal Green Branch of the South Kensington Museum* (1874), p. 84.

creations varied with regard to the racial characteristics of their inventors. The discourse articulated by Pitt Rivers in particular presented a unique approach to reinforcing a 'civilised'/'savage' divide; the characteristics he claimed to be indicative of 'savage' military weaponry were used by Pitt Rivers to provide further justification for the view that it was the 'civilised' British that especially excelled in the advancement of the military arts.

By the early 1870s, a number of British explorers and military practitioners were beginning to consider the interrelationship between race and military effectiveness in order to address the tactical and strategic challenges raised when fighting against non-European opponents on the battlefield. The next chapter focuses on these early theorists of 'savage warfare' – including the British explorer and adventurer Sir Samuel White Baker, Colonel John Cox Gawler and Colonel Charles Callwell – in order to clarify to what extent practical military measures were informed by the understanding that colonial wars of the nineteenth century were undertaken by the 'civilised' British against 'uncivilised' opponents. Furthermore, this chapter examines the extent to which 'savage' wars were the focus of public discussions on the issue of military ethics. Through the example of Baker in particular, this chapter demonstrates that criticisms of the manner in which he undertook his military campaigns clearly had an impact upon how they were re-framed in his revised published works. Despite undertaking wars against 'savage' enemies in Equatorial Africa, Baker discussed his military actions in moral terms, which presented a challenge to perceived distinctions between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare'.

Chapter Four: Doctrine and Public Opinion on 'Savage Warfare'

Part I

The Development of Practical Guidelines against the 'Savage' Warrior

Introduction

Between the aftermath of the Crimean War and the outbreak of the First World War, Britain was exclusively engaged in a series of imperial wars. Despite this fact, it is astonishing to note that the key texts prescribed at Sandhurst and the Staff College in the last quarter of the century – Cornelius Francis Clery's *Minor Tactics*,[545] and Edward Bruce Hamley's *The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated*,[546] respectively – drew their examples almost wholly from continental military operations, particularly of the Peninsular and Franco-Prussian Wars. In the first edition of Clery's work (1875), the list of additional military works published by Henry S. King & Co. reflected this partiality towards European warfare. Major-General Shadwell's *Mountain Warfare* was 'illustrated by the Campaign of 1799 in Switzerland, being a translation of the Swiss Narrative compiled from the works of the Archduke Charles, Jomini, and others', while translations of the works of Prussian military figures including A. von Schell (Major in the General Staff), Colonel Count

[545] The only discussions on imperial warfare in Clery's text were the case studies of General Pollock's advance on the Khyber Pass (1842), and General Sale's advance on the Khoord Cabul Pass (1841) as examples of 'Forcing a Mountain Defile Defended at the Entrance' and 'Forcing a Mountain Defile Defended in the Interior', respectively. See: Cornelius Francis Clery, *Minor Tactics* (1875), pp. 241-44.

[546] Edward Bruce Hamley, *The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated*, 3rd edition (1872). One of the few comments by Hamley on irregular wars can be found in relation to his discussion on the importance of organisation and discipline, p. 6. For an analysis of Hamley's work see: 'The Strategic Pedagogue - General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley', in Jay Luvaas, *The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940* ([1964] 1970), pp. 140-51.

Hermann von Wartensleben (Chief of Staff of the First Army), and Captain Hoffbauer (Instructor in the German Artillery and Engineer School) predominated. In the third edition of Hamley's *Operations of War* (1873), the first work listed under the heading of 'Recent Publications' (which acted as a frontispiece to the book) detailed the winner of The Wellington Prize Essay, written by Lieutenant F. Maurice of the Royal Artillery, whose subject was 'The System of Field Manoeuvres Best Adapted for Enabling our Troops to Meet a Continental Army'.[547]

While such 'continentalist' works found an audience of military practitioners profoundly fascinated with Prussian victories during the war with France in 1870-1 (who espoused the view that Britain should look to Prussia for guidance and emulation and tailor her organisation in order to prepare to fight a future *European* foe), two further 'schools of opinion' on the purpose of the late Victorian Army also found supporters – the 'traditionalists', and the 'imperial school'.[548] The traditionalists were essentially critical of the recent reforms instituted by the Secretary of State for War (1868-74) Edward T. Cardwell, including the abolition of purchase, the institution of training reform, the improvement of educational opportunities for officers, and short service.[549] Those sympathetic towards the imperial school, including Viscount Garnet Wolseley (1833-1913) and the soldier and military author G.F.R. Henderson, considered the primary roles of the British Army to be home defence and imperial policing. Such a view was reflected in an 1877 Prize Essay entitled 'The Duties of the Royal Engineers in Time of War, and the Best Organisation for Enabling them to carry out those Duties', in which Lieutenant-Colonel R. Harrison asked,

> Shall we then analyse the duties of the German Engineers in the last great war? Such a course would, no doubt, be most valuable and

[547] Hamley, *The Operations of War*, frontispiece.
[548] Howard Bailes, 'Patterns of Thought in the Late Victorian Army', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 4:1 (1981), pp. 29-45. As Bailes has noted, these 'schools of opinion' should be seen as rather flexible, as supporters of reform whose views can be identified with the 'imperial school', also looked (albeit critically) toward the development of continental armies for ideas on improvements for the British Army.
[549] For a detailed analysis of the Cardwell reforms see: Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, pp. 2-28.

> instructive. Shall we take the German organisation as the model for our own? *To do so to the exclusion of other experience would be to ignore the peculiarities of our Empire, and to assume that Great Britain would, for the future, only engage in a European conflict, and such an assumption would be an extremely presumptuous one.*[550]

Although it has often been assumed that it was not until 1896, with the publication of Colonel Charles Callwell's *Small Wars*, that the particularities of imperial or 'savage' wars were brought to the attention of British military practitioners and the wider public, this chapter argues that discussions on the distinctive nature of such warfare can be traced much earlier in Victorian literature.[551] While some members of the British military establishment viewed colonial wars as 'inferior' to continental conflicts, the highly publicised activities of figures such as Sir Samuel White Baker in Equatorial Africa brought the nature of 'savage warfare' to the attention not only of those who attended lectures at the RUSI, but also of the broader public, through popular published narrative accounts of such expeditions. As Baker was one of the first figures to discuss his experiences and explicitly utilise the notion of 'savage warfare' in public, this chapter focuses upon his work and the reception of his ideas on the ethics and practice of fighting against 'uncivilised' opponents. This chapter begins by analysing the themes on 'savage warfare' that arise in his work *Ismailia: A Narrative of the Expedition to Central Africa for the Suppression of the Slave Trade*,[552] the first edition of which was published in two volumes in 1874 – including the 'civilising' of native troops and the metaphor of 'the hunt'. It continues by investigating

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[550] Lieutenant-Colonel R. Harrison, R.E., 'Paper XIV: Prize Essay for 1877', *PPCRE* (1882), p. 256. Emphasis added.

[551] Spiers has noted that Victorian officers had '[f]rom the early 1870s onwards… [written] essays and delivered lectures before the Royal United Service Institution and the Royal Artillery Institution upon the lessons of particular wars and the impact of new technologies tested in colonial combat', yet he does not examine this particular literature in great detail, nor does he discuss the experiences of Sir Samuel White Baker. See: Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, p. 279. Rather than viewing Callwell as the first figure to theorise colonial warfare, Daniel Whittingham more accurately notes that 'Callwell's writings represent the first real synthesis of the experiences of the British Army in its imperial wars… *Small Wars* therefore represents the most complete codification of the principles of nineteenth century colonial campaigning'. See his 'Warrior-Scholarship', p. 18.

[552] The title of the book was a tribute to Ismail Said Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt (1863-79) for whom Baker undertook his mission.

what Baker considered to be the appropriate tactical methods, as well as means, to be used against 'savage' opponents as found in both his narrative account and public lectures. By drawing comparisons between Baker's ideas and the work of contemporary figures who also wrote on 'savage warfare' – Colonel John Cox Gawler and Colonel Charles Callwell – and demonstrating that these accounts often converged on the practicalities of 'savage warfare', this chapter argues that the lack of comprehensive theoretical attention to such warfare by the British military establishment cannot exclusively be attributed to the existence of a bias favouring continental models of warfare, nor to their sheer diversity. Four other factors seem to have contributed to this oversight: the general challenge of theorising warfare due to its amorphous nature; the lack of British defeats in imperial conflicts prior to the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879; the structure of the British armed forces, and the notion that such wars challenged the ideal standard of the British Army.

The second part of this chapter demonstrates that despite the fact that Baker was understood to have fought against 'savages' in Equatorial Africa, public criticism of his forceful methods was widespread and explicitly addressed in British periodical literature, both in terms of the overall justice of his military campaigns, and the methods used in their undertaking. As Heather Streets has recognised, in the latter half of the nineteenth century ambitious military officers often sought to cultivate relationships with newspaper and periodical editors, and actively attempted to sway public opinion with regard to the conduct of their military campaigns through their own published accounts; developments which occurred parallel to the rise of popular imperialism and militarism in Britain.[553] Through a comparative analysis of the original edition of Baker's work (published in 1874), and the revised edition (published in 1879), this section shows that public criticism of Baker's

[553] Streets writes: 'They were, in short, active participants in Britain's rapidly expanding media culture and sought no less than to mould public opinion in their own favour', yet such connections between the armed forces and the media were cultivated covertly, without knowledge of the broader public. They included Garnet Wolseley and Frederick Roberts. See: *Martial Races*, pp. 116-7, 120-1.

methods had a clear impact on the manner in which he re-framed his activities in Equatorial Africa in the second edition of his narrative account. Prior to engaging with Baker's work in greater detail, this chapter begins by briefly outlining the experiences of the Punjab Irregular Force (PIF), as it was in discussions by British colonial officials on the strategies used by the PIF, that one of the earliest articulations (and defences) of a distinction between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare' can be found.

Experiences of the Punjab Irregular Force

As T.R. Moreman has demonstrated, in the aftermath of the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849, British police and military forces were pressured to adapt to the unique logistical and tactical difficulties of 'hill' warfare against the marauding Pathan tribes. In order to meet such demands the Punjab Irregular Force (PIF, later known as the Punjab Frontier Force) was raised by Sir Henry Lawrence (1806-1857).[554] Between 1849 and 1855, fifteen 'punitive expeditions' were undertaken by the PIF and the regular forces of the Peshawar District against numerous border tribes. Facing an enemy who capitalised on their knowledge of the terrain, their speed and freedom of movement, their greater ability to withstand local weather and disease, as well as the offering of sanctuary by neutral neighbouring tribes, the PIF recognised through practical experience that the irregular terrain of frontier warfare precluded the use of close-order infantry formations, and that a more successful tactical approach encompassed the employment of flexible light infantry skills. Troops were urged to express initiative and self-reliance, alongside a swiftness of movement despite the burdens of arms and equipment. The two over-arching principles of most importance were the undertaking of a strategic offensive and ensuring the security of

[554] While the Force included recruits from the defeated Sikh Army, there was general opposition to the recruitment of Sikh soldiers into the regular regiments of the Bengal Army for reasons including 'professional jealousy, suspicion of Sikhs, and ongoing assertions from some British authorities on the necessity of demilitarising the Punjab', Daniel Marston, *The Indian Army and the End of the Raj* (Cambridge, 2014), p. 8.

a column, especially the safeguarding of the supply train while on the march.[555] One of the essential principles later espoused by Callwell – adaptability to local conditions – was recognised early in the century by the troops of the PIF.[556]

The PIF not only engaged the Pathan tribes on the battlefield; they also utilised means that were considered appropriate in the undertaking of 'uncivilised warfare' – the destruction of villages, seizure of grain and crops, and the temporary occupation of lands. In a government report published in 1856 justifying the use of such strategies written by Sir Richard Temple (1826-1902), Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, Sir John Lawrence (1811-1879), Temple provided clear distinctions between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare'. The former entailed the use of force 'against the armed enemy and his defensible positions, but not against his country and subjects, who may be morally unconcerned in the hostilities and innocent of offence'. In 'uncivilised warfare', '… the enemy does *not* possess Troops that stand to be attacked, *nor* defensible posts to be taken, *nor* innocent subjects to be spared. He has only rough Hills to be penetrated, robber fastness to be scaled, and dwellings containing people, *all of them to a man, concerned in hostilities*'. He continued:

> *There is not a single man of them who is innocent,* who is not, or has not been, engaged in offences, or who does not fully support the misconduct of his Tribe, who is not a member of the armed banditti. The enemy harasses the Troops as they approach threading the defiles and leave the village carrying off every thing that can be carried… what are the Troops then to do? Are they to spare these crops and houses, losing the *only* opportunity they are ever likely to have of inflicting damage on the enemy? … These villages and grain are the resources and sinews of guerrilla warfare and the basis of operations. … To spare these villages would be about as responsible as to spare the commissariat supplies or arsenals of a civilized enemy.[557]

[555] Moreman, *The Army in India*, pp. 5-20; For examples that move beyond the experiences of the PIF see: Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, pp. 272-300.
[556] For an analysis of Callwell's principles as relating to numerous colonial wars see: Hew Strachan, 'Colonial Warfare, and its Contribution to the Art of War in Europe', in *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (1983), pp. 76-89.
[557] Partly quoted in Moreman, *The Army in India*, p. 9; Selections from the Records of the Government of India (Foreign Department), No. XII: Report Showing the Relations of the British Government with the

Although the experiences of the PIF raised a general awareness of the unique operational difficulties of mountain warfare, their isolation from regular troops in India meant that their knowledge and practical skills were seldom passed on; nor were they developed into an official operational manual.[558] The regular relief of troops in the regiments of the Bengal Army and British units who were garrisoned in Peshawar District also precluded the distribution of localised knowledge, as military thought and practice in India was predominantly influenced by the lessons of conventional warfare.[559] The Umbeyla Campaign (1863) did inspire a number of lectures and the publication of books which discussed the practicalities of mountain warfare, including Lieutenant Charles MacGregor's *Mountain Warfare* (1866), Colonel John Adye's *Sitana: A Mountain Campaign* (1867) and Major George Fosbery's lecture at the RUSI 'The Umbeyla Expedition' (1867), yet military thought was still overwhelmingly concerned with conventional European operations.[560] While the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1) inspired further study in India on the strategies and tactics used against a continental foe,[561] a growing public discussion in Britain on the need to develop detailed operational strategies when fighting against 'savage' or 'uncivilised' opponents was encouraged by the emergence of a voice outside the traditional military establishment – the British explorer and adventurer Sir Samuel White Baker.

Sir Samuel White Baker and 'Savage Warfare'

Sir Samuel White Baker (1821-1893) delivered his first lecture entitled 'Experience in Savage Warfare' at the RUSI on 15 December 1873. Baker was a British explorer, most famously known for his discovery of Albert Nyanza (Luta N'zigé), Africa's seventh-largest

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Tribes Independent and Dependent on the North-West Frontier of the Punjab, 1856, IOR/R/20/G/227. Emphasis in original.

[558] As Moreman notes, however, such isolation was an advantage for the PIF's own professional development.

[559] Moreman, *The Army in India*, pp. 20-1.

[560] Ibid., pp. 25-6.

[561] Ibid., p. 30.

lake, in 1864, during his first Nile Expedition.[562] Between 1869 and 1873, he was appointed Governor-General of the Equatorial Nile Basin by the Khedive of Egypt, Ismail Said (1830-1895), and given the task of leading an expedition to that area to extend the influence of the Khedive, 'with the object of opening those savage regions to legitimate commerce and establishing a permanent government', as well as suppressing the ongoing slave-trade. Although not professionally educated in the military arts, Baker was granted the rank of *Pasha* and Major-General in the Ottoman Army.[563]

Baker's understanding of 'savage warfare' was drawn primarily from his experience in annexing Gondokoro, a trading-station situated south of Khartoum on the east bank of the White Nile, and its surrounding southern lands. Upon arrival in Gondokoro on 15 April 1871, Baker and his troops were met with indifference by the indigenous Bari tribe who, led by their leader Sheik Allorron, refused to acknowledge the Khedive's mandate. During a discussion with Allorron over the justice of Baker's initial settlement on Bari land as a representative of the Khedive, Baker acknowledged that: 'There can be no doubt that in the abstract of people's rights any annexation of the territory of another is an infringement'. However, he qualified this statement by emphasising the 'necessity' of his actions due to his belief that '[s]avages of all countries are prone to strife; and a state of chronic warfare with neighbouring tribes is the example of African politics'.[564]

After a number of failed verbal contracts, Baker proceeded to annex the area and was met with a fighting force of local Bari people who had allied themselves with Abou Saoud, the chief of the Egyptian trading firm Agad & Co. (which Baker referred to as a 'slave hunting

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[562] It was on this expedition that Baker met Speke and Grant in Gondokoro, who had recently discovered the Victoria Nyanza, understood to be the source of the River Nile. For his relief of Speke and Grant and the discovery of Albert Nyanza, Baker received the Royal Geographical Society's prestigious Gold Medal, and was awarded a Knighthood by the Queen. See: 'Sir Samuel and Lady Baker', *ILN*, 11 October 1873, pp. 345-6.

[563] Sir Samuel White Baker, *Ismailia: A Narrative of the Expedition to Central Africa for the Suppression of the Slave Trade*, 2nd edition (1879), preface. Baker was commissioned by the Khedive during the Prince of Wales' visit to Egypt in 1869.

[564] Baker, *Ismailia*, p. 115.

company') who paid £3000 per year for a trading monopoly of the Nile basin region to the government of the Sudan. Saoud was involved in the slave trade, employing kidnappers and bribing officials at government stations to ensure the smooth transport of slaves on the river Nile. In *Ismailia*, Saoud was established as the 'villain' of Baker's narrative, and in a review of the book published in the moderate periodical *The Athenaeum*, his character was compared to that of Satan in *Paradise Lost*.[565] Indeed, upon a confrontation with Abou Saoud, Baker distinctly feared that the morality of his own *native* troops would be compromised by the presence of Abou Saoud's men, whom he 'ordered [to]… camp on the west bank of the river….'[566] Scholars have demonstrated that British narratives of the colonial encounter often expressed an 'anxiety… about the degeneration allegedly caused not only by direct encounters with natives, but by the proximity to savage passions, or simply by the malign influence of the alien environment'.[567] Baker's alarm over the potential moral 'contamination' of native soldiers under his command complicates the view that such 'mutation' could only occur across differing cultures.

Baker's views of the Bari were influenced by their alliance with Abou Saoud against the Khedive, as well as the abandonment of the area by a group of Austrian missionaries who had founded a station in 1850, yet had deserted it over a decade later.[568] All that was left of their efforts, Baker emphasised, were a few lemon trees, and destroyed mission houses. He wrote:

> I preached morality hopelessly to the Baris; they were mere ruffians, and they longed for the arrival of Abou Saood, who would once more give them an opportunity of joining his people to plunder and enslave the tribes of the interior. … It was utter folly to attempt negotiations with these people; they

[565] 'Ismailia', *The Athenaeum*, 7 November 1874, p. 602.
[566] Baker, *Ismailia*, p. 136.
[567] See: Elleke Boehmer, *Colonial and Postcolonial Literature: Migrant Metaphors*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 2005), pp. 66-7.
[568] Sir Harry Johnston, *The Nile Quest: A Record of the Exploration of the Nile and its Basin* (New York, 1903), p. 97.

> were the most brutal and obtuse savages. They had been abandoned by the missionaries as hopeless, and they would acknowledge nothing but force.[569]

After a number of failed communications with the leaders of local tribes over the withholding of cattle from Baker's settlement by the native population (which Baker believed to be a deliberate act to starve his own troops in order to instigate a retreat),[570] on 1 June 1871 he issued a General Order which stated:

> The natives of the Bari having disobeyed the summons of the government, and having refused compliance with the regulations established, it has become necessary to compel them to obedience by force. In the event of hostilities, I specially forbid the capture of women, or children of either sex. Any officer or soldier disobeying this order will suffer death.[571]

While it is unclear whether any men under Baker's command were actually punished by death for this particular offence, through his General Order, Baker began to establish his parameters of 'civilised' and 'uncivilised' behaviour, the latter of which would become more apparent in his discussion on plunder in wartime; while the enemy and slave hunters were understood to see the captivity of women and children as a form of recompense, a 'civilised' party to the hostilities would go to lengths to punish such behaviour. However, it is highly likely that Baker's claim to enforce the death penalty for the harbouring of captives was only a *deterrent* threat. This becomes evident in his brief account of the punishment of a black soldier for desertion. At the very moment a firing squad was preparing to shoot the prisoner, Baker had

> … ordered the firing party to retire, and I summoned the prisoner, who was brought up in charge of the guard. In the presence of all the troops I

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[569] Baker, *Ismailia*, p. 126.

[570] Initially, the local population refused to trade cattle with Baker, and began to take their cattle to graze on what was considered by Baker to be the land of the Khedive ('the forbidden pasture'). After a number of warnings, Baker seized the cattle, which prompted a deputation. A verbal contract was agreed to by leaders of the local tribes and Baker that they would cooperate with one another. The Bari reneged on this contract, and in response Baker seized the cattle, driving them to their head-quarters in Gondokoro. A second meeting and promise of goodwill was followed by retaliation by the Baris who attempted to re-appropriate the cattle. Baker considered these acts, as well as an attack on his troops, to be a 'breach of the peace', ibid., pp. 120-8.

[571] Ibid., p. 127.

> then explained to him the necessity of strict discipline, and that the punishment of death must certainly follow desertion, at the same time I made such allowance for his youth and ignorance that I determined to reduce the punishment to that of flogging, which I trusted would be a warning to him and all others. I assured him, and the troops generally, that although I should never flinch from administering severe punishment when necessary, I should be much happier in rewarding those who should do their duty.[572]

In his account, however, Baker claimed that '[n]o person except Lieutenant [Julian] Baker and the colonel, Raouf Bey, had been in the secret that *I had never intended to shoot the man.* I had merely arranged an impressive scene as a *coup de théâtre*, that I trusted might benefit the *morale* of the men'.[573] While Baker briefly noted an instance when in his absence Raouf Bey had shot a soldier for desertion, according to his published narrative, disobedience was much more regularly punished by flogging.[574] Emphasising the use of this form of punishment sat more easily with Baker's self-perception as a benevolent, though strict, 'civilised' military commander.[575]

By early June the Bari had allied themselves with the locals of the neighbouring area of Belinian, enacting joint attacks on Baker and his settlement.[576] It was these continual attacks that motivated Baker to begin to theorise on the distinctiveness of 'savage warfare'. Prior to engaging with the practical military details of his expedition which were discussed in his lecture at the RUSI, this chapter addresses two primary themes related to the notion of 'savage warfare' in *Ismailia*, a narrative account of Baker's expedition published a year after his return to England in 1873 – the 'civilising' of native troops through military service, and the metaphor of 'the hunt'.

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572 Ibid., p. 41.
573 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
574 Ibid., p. 454. For examples of this form of punishment see: pp. 41, 51, 81, 105, 123, and 172.
575 While questions were being raised with regard to the appropriateness of this form of punishment for members of the British armed forces since the mid-1840s, flogging was not abolished until 1881, while in colonial armies, it was not abolished until 1946. Spiers, *The Army and Society*, p. 90; David Killingray, 'The "Rod of Empire": The Debate over Corporal Punishment in the British African Colonial Forces, 1888-1946', *Journal of African History*, 35:2 (1994), pp. 201-16.
576 Baker, *Ismailia*, p. 130.

'Civilising' the 'Forty Thieves'

Although Baker played an important role in reducing the influence of slave-hunters in the region, his motivations have been questioned by scholars who have argued that he expressed great disdain towards non-European customs and cultures.[577] Indeed, in response to Governor Eyre's (1850-1901) excessively harsh reprisals against black Jamaicans in the aftermath of the Morant Bay Rebellion (1865), a response which polarised public opinion in Britain,[578] Baker published a letter to the editor in *The Times* which was characterised by racial discrimination. He claimed that,

> … the negro… [has] little in common with the white man beyond the simple instincts of human nature. There is a limit to his intellectual capacity…. Indolence is a vice inherited by the entire negro race… unless the negro is compelled to work, he will squat and become a savage.[579]

Yet a closer examination of Baker's writings on his expedition to suppress the slave trade, published almost a decade after these remarks, reveals a man who expressed contradictory opinions with regard to the skills of what he understood to be the 'savage' warrior. These ambiguities were heightened due to the fact that Baker's soldiers and aide-de-camp – on whom he greatly relied throughout his expedition – were of African or Egyptian origin. As well as claiming to bring 'civilisation' to the heart of Africa through the suppression of the slave trade, it is clear from Baker's account that he expressly believed that service under his command would engender a 'civilising' effect on the native African and Egyptian troops. Although he believed that they would gradually attain discipline and a sense of honour,

[577] See, for instance: Brantlinger, *Rule of Darkness*, p. 183; Peter Rigby, *African Image: Racism and the End of Anthropology* (Oxford, 1996), p. 52.
[578] Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, pp. 295-310.
[579] Samuel White Baker, 'To the Editor of the Times', *The Times*, 19 September 1866, p. 10.

Baker's remaining prejudice can be evidenced by his qualification that this could be achieved 'even with a material of so low a reputation as the negro'.[580]

The initial expedition to Gondokoro comprised 1,645 troops, and a corps of 200 irregular cavalry. There were two infantry regiments – a Soudani regiment and an Egyptian regiment – whom Baker identified as 'for the most part convicted felons who had been transported for various crimes from Egypt to the Soudan'.[581] From these two regiments Baker personally selected 46 men who were to become his 'special' corps, ten of whom were designated as 'body-guards':

> Their numbers were equal black and white, as I considered this arrangement might excite an *esprit de corps*, and would in the event of discontent prevent a coalition. The men having been well chosen were fine examples of physique, and being armed with the snider rifle and carefully drilled, such a body of picked troops would form a nucleus for further development, and might become a dependable support in any emergency. This corps was commanded by an excellent officer, my aide-de-camp, Lieut.-Colonel Abd-el-Kader [Abd al-Qadir Hilmi, 1837-1908], but owing to the peculiar light-fingered character of the men, I gave it the name of 'The Forty Thieves'.[582]

Baker took great effort to inculcate this corps with a sense of superiority over the other regiments. The group was differentiated by their own scarlet uniform which comprised '[a] simple red flannel shirt, worn outside their Zouave trousers, and secured by a belt, with ammunition pouches, round the waist. This uniform, with linen gaiters, and with a head-dress of the scarlet fez, bound by a turban of cobalt blue, looked remarkably well.'[583] To this corps, Baker expressed an assured paternalism by claiming that their superiority had been achieved through his personal attentiveness:

> I never forgave a fault until after punishment had been received; I never allowed the doctor to attend them when ill, but invariably attended to them myself…. I actually succeeded in establishing a code of honour

[580] Baker, *Ismailia*, p. 145.
[581] Ibid., p. 8.
[582] Ibid., p. 15.
[583] Ibid., p. 145.

> throughout the corps, until it was considered a disgrace to 'The Forty' that a theft should be committed.[584]

In his book, an illustration of 'The Forty Thieves' standing in a neat formation and accompanied by their Lieutenant-Colonel Abd-el-Kader was captioned with the following: 'They were named the "Forty Thieves" at the commencement of the expedition on account of their thieving propensities, but they *eventually became the perfection of morality*…' (Figure 21).[585] While Baker made distinctions between the Egyptian and Soudani soldiers under his command (the former possessing low morale, while the latter were considered 'far more valuable as soldiers'[586]), the 'valour' and 'fidelity' of the 'Forty', as well as his Egyptian Lieutenant-Colonel Abd-el-Kader, were emphasised throughout *Ismailia*. It was this unique corps which was to be 'a nucleus for an extension of military morality' throughout the rest of the troops; an elite corps, to be admired and emulated.[587] However, despite his consistent praise for the 'Forty Thieves', Baker emphasised his belief that the moral character of his troops was engendered fundamentally by military life under *his* command and discipline, rather than through the influence of his aide-de-camp. By doing so, Baker not only strengthened his own self-characterisation as a paragon of moral force; he also introduced the effective trope of the 'civilising mission' into his narrative to give further justification for his activities in Equatorial Africa. Furthermore, Baker's continual reference to his troops as the 'Forty Thieves' reveals that despite considering these men as an elite corps, they would never attain equivalence to their European counterparts.

Such perceived limitations of the 'civilising process' were particularly evidenced in Baker's discussions of the topic of plunder in wartime. In the aftermath of Baker's first offensive attack on the Bari of Belinian on 30 August 1871, he observed that his troops had suddenly

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[584] Ibid., p. 144.
[585] Ibid., p. 15. Emphasis added.
[586] Ibid., pp. 29, 37.
[587] Ibid., p. 146.

become overwhelmed with a 'spirit of disaffection', which, in his view, was caused by the fact that he had expressly forbidden women and children to be taken as captives, and yet according to 'Mohammedan rules' such captives were considered to be 'lawful prizes'. His soldiers had apparently argued that '[i]t was not slave-hunting: they were simple prisoners of war that God had delivered into their hands; and it was a hard case that, after all the trouble and difficulties which had been encountered, they should be debarred from taking a few prisoners'. Yet Baker claimed to have held his resolve and adhered to 'the strictest discipline' by refusing to concede to their demands.[588]

Although his 'Forty' troops were an exception, Baker lamented that '[a]t the commencement of the Bari war, the conduct of the troops, both black and white [Egyptian], was disgraceful. I have seen them, in the presence of the enemy, rush into a village and commence indiscriminate pillage: the officers mingled with their men in a race for plunder'. Colonel Abd-el-Kader allegedly reiterated to Baker that his troops would expect a reward after victory; thus pillage could not be prevented. Yet Baker was keen to administer punishments for such disorderly conduct. Once caught,

> I had the principal actors seized and laid down on the instant in the centre of the men, and administered fifty apiece with a stout bamboo. The Soudani soldiers quickly perceived that the reins were tighter than formerly; and I followed up the principle of stern punishment until I obtained an absolute control, without the slightest attempt at resistance to my authority.[589]

Despite the fact that the troops had developed a sense of discipline, Baker still claimed that 'they would have much preferred the good old times of plunder and prisoners'.[590] While Baker's comments suggest a belief in the view that although allies of the British, an imminent relapse to 'savagery' was an enduring threat, he, along with other figures

[588] Ibid., pp. 170-2.
[589] Ibid., p. 172.
[590] Ibid., p. 173.

discussed in this dissertation, argued that 'civilisation' of the native inhabitants of the Empire – whilst a struggle, and perhaps limited – was possible. While some post-colonialist scholars have suggested that colonial subjects were only deemed capable of 'mimicking' British habits or values, and the 'impersonation'[591] rhetoric of Baker could easily be generalised, it is important to recognise the richness and multidimensionality of discourses on 'civilisation' in the nineteenth century. Such tensions can also be also be traced in Baker's discussion of 'the hunt', to which this chapter now turns.

The Metaphor of 'The Hunt'

The historian John MacKenzie has explored the existence of a nineteenth-century British 'hunting cult' which, as the Empire expanded, 'was transferred overseas, often searching for a genuine wilderness, and generated an entire ethos which distinguished certain characteristics of the Hunt as markers of civilisation and gentlemanly conduct'.[592] Baker was an enthusiastic big game hunter, and during his nine years in Ceylon (1846-55) he partook in many hunting expeditions, the stories of which he published in *The Rifle and the Hound in Ceylon* (1853). In this book, Baker derided what he called the 'foreigner's notion of the chase; he hunts for the pot; and by Englishmen alone is the glorious feeling shared of [a] true, fair, and manly sport'. Baker's notions of the appropriate ways in which a hunt should be undertaken echo in many respects what were understood to be the rules of 'civilised' warfare, particularly the ideas of 'fair play' ('who would hit a man when down?') and honour.[593]

[591] The argument of 'impersonation' rather than becoming 'civilized at source' is presented by Boehmer, *Colonial and Postcolonial Literature*, p. 111.
[592] John M. MacKenzie, *The Empire of Nature: Hunting, Conservatism and British Imperialism* (Manchester, 1988), p. 26.
[593] Sir Samuel W. Baker, *The Rifle and the Hound in Ceylon*, revised edition ([1853] 1874), pp. xv, xvi.

Baker's account of his expedition abounds with anecdotes of stalking and killing antelope, hippopotamuses, elephants and local exotic birds.[594] Significantly, once at war with the Baris, Baker began to equate his enemy with his hunting prey by consistently referring to them as wild animals: 'It seemed almost impossible to clear the country of these people, as to purge Africa from snakes. Patrols were of little service, as the natives lay as closely concealed as hares in form'.[595] While the Bari were referred to as animals such as hares, or 'irrepressible vermin', and were claimed to have associated traits such as 'cowardice' and the ability to attain advantages only by deceit, Baker's native troops were considered to possess contrasting traits of courage, masculinity, power and swiftness. Observing an ambush enacted at Belinian, he described it in the following terms:

> I now saw natives running at full speed to the left. Another and another puff of smoke issued from a different quarter, as the astonished Baris in their hasty retreat stumbled over the next ambuscade. I now saw a native running like a deer, but chased like a good deerhound by one of the 'Forty Thieves.' The native was so hard pressed by this good runner, who was encumbered with clothes, rifle, and ammunition, that he had been obliged to throw away his bow and arrows, together with his lance. He now gained upon the soldier slightly, but they were not five paces apart when they disappeared into the high dhurra. That soldier was Ali Nedjar, of the 'Forty Thieves,' the strongest man, the best shot, and the fleetest runner of the force.[596]

In the account above, Baker was clearly drawing analogies between the hunt and the nature of 'savage warfare'. His soldier, Ali Nedjar is characterised as a loyal 'deerhound' coursing his Bari 'game'. While traditional 'civilised' warfare entailed the combatant to 'fight', here, in 'savage warfare', the enemy is de-humanised; transformed from 'combatant' to 'prey', relentlessly pursued and caught effectively through the performance of animalistic qualities and characteristics – stealth and speed.

[594] See, for instance: Baker, *Ismailia*, pp. 197-201.
[595] Ibid., p. 166.
[596] Ibid., pp. 168-9.

Yet the hunt also acted for Baker as a means by which to achieve an affinity between indigenous populations and the colonial British. While setting up a fort at Fatiko, inhabited by the Acholi (referred to in Baker's work as the 'Shooli') tribe, Baker claimed that through co-participation in hunting expeditions he had previously 'won their hearts' and trust.[597] The Acholi were praised by Baker as their hunting expeditions were 'conducted by general rules under an admirable organization', and he also 'admired the pluck of the Shooli natives, who attack every animal with the simple hunting-spear, which of course necessitates a close approach'.[598] However, significantly, in Baker's account of the hunt, the distinction between the Acholi as allies and prey becomes obscured – both textually and visually. As the Acholi concealed themselves within the local environment, in his account, Baker noted that his aide-de-camp Abd-el-Kader had accidentally 'hit a native in the leg with a bullet, while aiming at a galloping antelope'.[599] Baker too experienced a close encounter when seeking to shoot a lion:

> I was just going to take the inviting shot, when, as my finger was on the trigger, I saw the head of a native rise out of the grass exactly in the line of fire; then another head popped up from a native who had been concealed, and rather than risk accident I allowed the lion to pass.[600]

An engraved illustration in *Ismailia* entitled 'Driving the Prairie with Fire' further obscured the distinction between ally and prey (Figure 22). In the background of the image, Baker is positioned standing tall behind an ant-hill successfully shooting down an antelope. In the left-hand front corner three antelope are bounding away, and in the foreground a lion is making its escape. In the far right-hand corner of the image an Acholi native is also portrayed as running away from the scene; their stance resembling the flight of the hunted animals, suggesting their cowardice when confronted with an imminent threat. In a further

[597] Ibid., p. 435.
[598] Ibid., pp. 435, 441.
[599] Ibid., p. 440.
[600] Ibid., p. 439.

image entitled 'Charge of a Lioness', a roaring lioness is presented mid-pounce, struck by Baker's shot (Figure 23). Baker is positioned standing firm, with his nephew Lieutenant Julian Baker standing directly behind him clutching his rifle. As in the earlier image, the Acholi are presented as running away from the scene. While a young Acholi still holds on to their spear, the rest are abandoned on the ground near to the lioness. Although Baker praised the Acholi for their 'pluck', the effectiveness of their method of spearing their hunting prey is clearly undermined in this visual representation. Ultimately, success is achieved through the use of British technological innovation: 'I was within twelve yards of her', Baker wrote, 'and I immediately put a bullet in the back of her neck, which dropped her dead'.[601]

The themes discussed in the preceding analysis – the 'civilising' of native troops and the metaphor of 'the hunt'– further demonstrate the ambiguous nature of discussions on non-European warriors – as both allies and enemies – in British accounts of colonial warfare. While Baker acknowledged the high moral character of his 'Forty Thieves', associating their actions with 'civilised' traits such as courage, strength and masculinity (which distinguished them from Abou Saoud and his men, by whom they might yet be corrupted), and the Acholi allies were also praised for their hunting exploits, ultimately a distinction between the 'civilised' British and the 'savage' indigenous inhabitants of Equatorial Africa remained. This can be evidenced in Baker's persistent naming of his bodyguards 'The Forty Thieves', his suggestion that his men would willingly plunder without the threat of punishment under his authority, and the manner in which the Acholi were visually and textually portrayed as akin to his hunting prey, who fought with ineffectual weaponry. This chapter now turns to examine the content and reception of two of Baker's public lectures, highlighting the broader implications for the tactics and means of 'savage warfare' of the issues that he raised. These are contrasted with the works of his contemporaries, in order

[601] Ibid., p. 444.

to begin to illuminate why no official manuals on 'savage warfare' were produced prior to the publication of Callwell's *Small Wars* in 1896, despite the existence of public discussion and debate on the nature and practicalities of this particular form of warfare prior to this period.

Baker's Return to England – 'Experience in Savage Warfare'

Only a few months before Baker's return to London hysteria erupted over rumours of his and his wife's murder at the hands of 'savage tribes'.[602] By this period Baker was a well-known and respected figure, and kept the British public informed of his actions through despatches which were published regularly in local newspapers; a method that other renowned officers of the period utilised to encourage public sympathy and support for their campaigns.[603] On 18 April 1873 *The Leeds Mercury* reported that:

> Intelligence received in London last evening tends unfortunately to strengthen the report that Sir Samuel Baker and his lady have been murdered. The news is not yet absolutely confirmed, but there is strong reason for fearing the worst. Private messages from Cairo are of a very gloomy tenour.[604]

The sensationalist reports, though in the end unfounded, clearly had an effect upon Baker's reception once he returned to England. Although he fell seriously ill upon his arrival and was forced to cancel a number of public engagements, when he was able to present himself before the public in late 1873, his lectures were attended by rapturous crowds who praised him for overcoming all odds and surviving such a treacherous expedition.

Baker's first lecture – 'A Short Narrative of his Adventures' – was presented at an event organised by the Royal Geographical Society at London University in December 1873, and

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[602] The *Echo* quoted in 'The Rumoured Murder of Sir Samuel and Lady Baker', *The Leeds Mercury*, 18 April 1873, n.p.
[603] For example, Streets has noted that '[w]hen on active service,… [Wolseley] actively cultivated the good graces of war correspondents in the hopes of getting good press. … Many other officers also sought to use the popular media for their own purposes'. Streets, *Martial Races*, p. 121.
[604] 'The Rumoured Murder'.

was attended by dignitaries such as the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Edinburgh and the Lord Chancellor. A reviewer in *The Times* observed: 'there was hardly an inch of space to spare in the theatre'. Comparing the audience to those who had sat eagerly before the crusaders of medieval times, Sir Bartle Frere, President of the Royal Geographical Society was met with resounding applause when he stated that Baker's triumph showed 'we still belonged to a race fitted to command others – that the power of Empire had not departed from us, and was not likely to depart from a people whom Sir S. Baker so well represented'.[605] The importance of the event is shown not only by its attendees; it is also reflected through the publication of a half-page engraving of Baker presenting his lecture to an enthralled crowd which was accompanied by a detailed account of the proceedings in the *Illustrated London News* (Figure 24).[606] Two reviews were also published in the same edition of *The Times*, and both articulated great praise.[607] The second review stated: 'Sir Samuel Baker... will retain in history the honour of having opened a way, at immense personal risk and by the exhibition of the highest qualities of his race, to the introduction of civilization in one of the most unhappy regions of the globe'.[608] Essentially, Baker's military exploits were re-framed as acts driven by what was considered to be the honourable purpose of the imperial 'civilising mission'; Baker's personal endeavours were appropriated by the press as a victory for the Anglo-Saxon race in darkest, 'savage' Africa. Significantly, Baker's celebrity and the positive publicity surrounding his expedition contrasts markedly with the pessimism that emerged in the mid-to-late 1840s over the potential of indigenous Africans to be 'civilised' (evidenced in chapter one), which further demonstrates how complex chronologies of anti-humanitarianism and colonial racism were throughout the nineteenth century.

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605 'Sir Samuel Baker on Central Africa', *The Times*, 9 December 1873, p. 5.
606 'Sir Samuel Baker's Lecture', *ILN*, 20 December 1873, pp. 605-6.
607 *The Times*, 9 December 1873, pp. 5, 9.
608 Ibid., p. 9.

Baker's second public lecture was presented on 15 December at the RUSI, and focused upon the peculiarities of fighting against 'savage' opponents. He emphasised that it had not been his idea to present such a lecture; rather, he had been solicited to do so, as he made clear in his opening remarks: '… I hope you will understand that I never sought this honour, it has been pressed upon me, and therefore I appear before you as a matter of duty'. Apologising that he was an 'amateur in the art of warfare', Baker made a number of generalisations about the advantages possessed by his opponents, and outlined the most effective means and tactics to be used in 'savage warfare' by British troops to achieve victory over the enemy.[609] Although his use of such a modesty *topos* could be seen to correspond with his persistent efforts at self-promotion and wish for the public to sympathise with his efforts, his disclaimer could also be accepted as a necessary expression of humility. As Baker was not professionally educated in the military arts, nor a seasoned member of the British armed forces, to be presenting such a lecture before Prince George, The Duke of Cambridge (who was also Commander-in-Chief of the Forces) was an undoubted challenge.

The Tactics and Means of 'Savage Warfare'

Baker began his discussion by emphasising what he believed to be the advantages held by the enemy in 'savage warfare'. With a thorough knowledge of the terrain and a speed and agility which Baker likened to that of a 'wild beast', the 'savage' was said to act on two primary principles – treachery and surprise. Baker conceded their skill and precision in the use of the lance and bow, yet overall, native tactics were understood by Baker to be inferior or illegitimate methods of warfare. They included: attacking in large numbers under the cover of nightfall; ambushes and sudden retreats into the cover of the bush or jungle; sudden attacks on stragglers or posted sentries during marches; and the employment of

[609] Sir Samuel White Baker, 'Experience in Savage Warfare', *JRUSI*, 17:75 (1873), p. 904.

local guides or interpreters to act as spies in order to deceive the British and lead them into an enemy ambush.[610]

In discussing Bari tactics, Baker never explicitly articulated in *Ismailia* nor in his lecture to the RUSI that the asymmetrical nature of the conflict had influenced the enemy to utilise acts of stealth and surprise during their night raids for pragmatic reasons. Such a recognition would have undermined Baker's overall need to justify his own actions through the de-legitimisation of the enemy. Instead, Baker argued that such tactics were representative of the inherent character and values of the Baris. According to Baker, their acts of concealment were indicative of their 'cunning', 'treachery', impatience and inability to organise.[611] Nevertheless, he did indirectly acknowledge that the Baris used their terrain to their own advantage by commenting: '[t]here is no covert [thicket] so much in favour of native warfare as the high dhurra, which perfectly conceals their movements… [and] is easily passed through at speed'.[612] However, this concession was presented not as a recognition of pragmatism, but rather as a belief that the topography of the land itself conspired against Baker and his men to the advantage of the Baris.

Yet paradoxically, and despite beginning his lecture with the insistence that a distinction lay between the British 'soldier' and the savage 'warrior', as would be argued in *Ismailia*,[613] Baker's practical experiences compelled him to accept that 'the best plan for carrying on a native war is to combine native tactics with the general manoeuvres of regulars'.[614] Although expressing disapproval against such strategies in battle, Baker argued that the inability to fight against the enemy 'fairly' (with the engagement of, for instance, a flying column) had pressured him to adopt similarly 'deceitful' tactics.[615] Overall, British tactics

[610] Ibid., pp. 904-5.
[611] Baker, *Ismailia*, p. 165.
[612] Ibid., p. 157.
[613] Ibid., p. 167.
[614] Baker, 'Experience in Savage Warfare', p. 906.
[615] Baker, *Ismailia*, pp. 167-70.

were to centre upon using the native skills of 'secrecy' and 'rapidity of movement' to discover a concealed enemy:

> The natives never expect that you will attack them on their own principles. Thus, ambuscades may be met with ambuscade, their positions may be carried before daybreak by a silent night march, and a sudden rush; and arrangements may be made for secretly occupying a large area by detached parties of riflemen in line so concealed in grass or bush, that the wily natives must inevitably fall into the snare when endeavouring either to reconnoitre or to attack the position.[616]

Although British soldiers were understood to excel in discipline, organisation and professionalism, as well as possessing more effective and reliable weaponry, the disadvantages presented to British troops in 'savage warfare' included fatigue caused by the intense climate, relentless marches, as well as enemy night attacks which disturbed rest. Baker also reiterated with a hint of vexation that in 'savage warfare', 'there will not be the satisfaction of a fair stand up fight in the open to prove the superiority of the troops'.[617] Furthermore, he concluded that '[t]here is no quarter given in such warfare. A victory gained by the savages implies the massacre of every one of their opponents'.[618] This observation heightened the necessity to engage in any tactics – 'civilised' or 'uncivilised' – that would assure victory to the British. In effect, practical exigencies shattered perceived distinctions between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare'.

In summary, Baker's lecture raised a number of points of reference that, as this chapter shows, can also be found in other contemporary accounts on 'savage warfare': while 'savages' partook in military actions that were considered to be 'treacherous' and cowardly, and gave no quarter to prisoners, the British were required in some circumstances to be adaptable, and themselves utilise 'uncivilised' tactics in return. By emphasising that they were *adapting* their manner of warfare figures such as Baker were reinforcing a belief that

[616] Baker, 'Experience in Savage Warfare', p. 906.
[617] Ibid., pp. 905-6.
[618] Ibid., p. 914.

the British were innately 'civilised' in their military behaviour – no matter what actions they undertook their moral principles would remain resolute. The use of such tactics suggested tensions with the 'civilising' role which British forces could play, and as this chapter will show, led to wider criticism and discussion of British 'uncivilised' actions in colonial conflicts. Prior to drawing comparisons between Baker's work and the work of his contemporary Colonel John Cox Gawler, this chapter now turns to examine the reception of Baker's lecture which introduces an important theme with regard to the lack of a codification of rules of 'savage warfare' prior to the publication of Callwell's work – the argument of 'diversity'.

Reception of Baker's 'Experience in Savage Warfare': Diversity Precluding Universal Rules?

Baker's lecture was commended by members of the military establishment in attendance at the RUSI. The Duke of Cambridge commented: 'I think we may have confidence that not only one, but many Englishmen, will endeavour as far as possible to emulate the doings of our distinguished traveller'.[619] Some commentators, including the Duke, expressed grievance at the fact that Baker had not been approached by the War Office and the Horse Guards to discuss his experiences of warfare in Africa, as it was considered that his expertise would have been of great use during the recently initiated Third Anglo-Ashanti War.[620] Accompanying a review of Baker's lecture in *The Times* was a letter to the editor written by the politician Francis Wemyss-Charteris-Douglas, known as Lord Elcho. He had attended Baker's lecture and reported that he along with a number of other attendees believed that it should have been presented sooner, as 'it would have given valuable information to Sir Garnet Wolseley and his companions as to the warfare and character of

[619] Ibid., p. 921.
[620] The Duke of Cambridge said: 'I only regret that many of the valuable hints which you have been able to instil into the minds of those who are sitting round you, cannot be at once carried to a distant land, there to be made use of, no doubt with great advantage, where now they are so much required', although he also conceded that he gave 'the fullest credit to those who are on the spot', ibid.

the African savage, and the proper armament, equipment and tactics wherewith to fight them'.[621]

Yet Baker's lecture was not universally met with praise. One particular article published in *The Times* argued against the broader applicability of Baker's experiences to other colonial wars in Africa, particularly the Third Anglo-Ashanti War:

> The cool-headed judgement and perseverance with which Sir Samuel Baker brought to a successful issue the difficult enterprise which he undertook are much to be admired, and it was natural that a popular lecture on the subject should lead to regrets being expressed that Sir Garnet Wolseley could not profit by the good advice and experience of the eminent traveller. But on consideration it will be seen that Sir Samuel Baker's experience of savage warfare was derived from ordinary bush-fighting, accompanied by certain tactics, peculiar to the race of men with whom he found himself engaged, as well as by certain difficulties peculiar to the organization of the *corps d'armée* of which he was the chief.[622]

The reviewer also criticised Baker's suggestion of the unsuitability of the use of artillery – while Baker was confined to the use of four 2.5 inch howitzers, the author argued that the lighter 7 pounder had been used in similar circumstances to great effect. With regard to Baker prioritising the use of the smooth-bore breech-loader to the musket[623] it was claimed that in Abyssinia, for instance, the terrain 'was comparatively open' and therefore 'smoothbores and buckshot would have been utterly out of place'.[624] For the reviewer, the varying environments within which 'savage warfare' was understood to be waged also precluded any clear-cut answers with regard to the appropriate weapons that should be used.

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[621] Lord Elcho, 'To the Editor of The Times', *The Times*, 16 December 1873, p. 7.
[622] 'Savage Warfare and Ashantee Tactics', *The Times*, 25 December 1873, p. 8.
[623] Breech-loader smooth bore muskets, as well as sword-bayonets which could be affixed to the gun were considered invaluable by Baker in order to clear away bush or grass while on the march or during the setting up of a camp. See: Baker, 'Experience in Savage Warfare', pp. 906-8.
[624] 'Savage Warfare and Ashantee Tactics', p. 8.

Baker responded to the author's complaints in a letter to the editor, published on 27 December 1873. In his response, he argued that he had not suggested the complete abandonment of the rifle, but rather that the smooth-bore was more effective in close combat through jungle and bush terrain, 'where the quick movements of natives render ball firing extremely uncertain'.[625] Significantly, he also argued against the author's insinuation that he had suggested his experiences were applicable to all 'savage warfare':

> … I have found it advisable in savage warfare to adapt weapons according to the peculiarities of the country and the uses of the enemy. All men of practical experience must know that *it is impossible to lay down absolute rules for bush warfare among African savages*. The country changes in its features; the tribes differ in their habits…. No universal law can be laid down for negro tactics.[626]

Through his response – and in line with the underlying sentiments of his critic – Baker was clearly establishing a perception of the character of 'savage warfare' as highly uncertain, fought against enemies who were undisciplined and challenged what was perceived to be the predictable and reciprocal nature of 'civilised' warfare. As Callwell would later argue: 'when the trained soldier of Europe meets the Asiatic or the savage, the whole system of war undergoes an organic change…'.[627] Callwell's notion of a 'system of war' and use of the term 'military science' reflected an assumption that 'civilised' Continental warfare – as opposed to 'savage warfare' – encompassed a set of principles by which it could (and should) be enacted, and in accordance with which opposing forces fought. Ultimately, by emphasising the 'diversity' of 'savage warfare' and arguing against its generalisability, Baker, the anonymous reviewer and Callwell were all re-asserting a distinction between 'civilisation' and 'savagery'.

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[625] Samuel W. Baker, '"Savage Warfare"', *The Times*, 27 December 1873, p. 7.
[626] Baker, '"Savage Warfare"', p. 7. Emphasis added.
[627] Captain Charles E. Callwell, 'Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British Forces have been Employed Since the Year 1865', *JRUSI*, 31:139 (1887), p. 362. Hereafter, 'Lessons'.

The argument of diversity precluding the applicability of Baker's experiences to other conflicts may in part suggest one reason why Sandhurst and the Staff College did not consider commissioning a handbook which was exclusively devoted to the practical realities and training needs of soldiers and officers engaged in 'savage warfare' prior to the publication of Callwell's guide. However, this attitude did not prevent the publication of comparative accounts which either drew upon Baker's experiences, or importantly, substantiated them through an analysis of other conflicts. Prior to proposing further reasons as to why no such manuals were produced, this chapter now compares and contrasts Baker's ideas on 'savage warfare' with those presented by his contemporary, John Cox Gawler (1830-1882) of the 73rd Regiment. The similarities of the two accounts – and with the early work of Callwell – suggest that further reasons must be found beyond the argument of diversity.

Colonel John Cox Gawler

In the same year in which Baker presented his lecture on 'savage warfare' to members of the RUSI, John Cox Gawler, a military figure who drew upon his own experiences serving in the Eighth Xhosa War (also known as the War of Mlanjeni, 1850-3),[628] published in 1873 *Sikhim: With Hints on Mountain and Jungle Warfare*, which detailed his experiences commanding a punitive expedition into Sikhim, a strategically important state in north-west India in 1861. Although not as popular as Baker's *Ismailia*, the book was reviewed favourably by *The Athenaeum* who believed the lack of published works on the topic of 'savage warfare' to be unusual, in light of extensive British engagement in frontier campaigns. Although claiming that such warfare was of a lesser standard than conventional warfare, the reviewer concluded that:

[628] As Tim Stapleton has noted, the use of the term 'war' may be considered unsuitable for a 'conflict that was essentially a rebellion against Cape colonial rule by a number of different groups in and around British Kaffraria', '"Valuable, Gallant and Faithful Assistants": The Fingo (or Mfengu) as Colonial Military Allies During the Cape-Xhosa Wars, 1835-1881', in Stephen Miller (ed.), *Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850-1918* (Boston, 2009), p. 26.

> [N]o British soldier can be said to be thoroughly [a] master of his profession unless he is skilled in the art of fighting savages in their own wild countries. We hail, therefore, with pleasure the publication of a few remarks on this subject by one who from his experience at the Cape and in Sikhim is thoroughly qualified for the task. Our only regret is that he has not given to the world a monograph on the subject.[629]

A month after the publication of this review, Gawler presented a lecture to members of the RUSI titled 'British Troops and Savage Warfare, with Special Reference to the Kafir [Xhosa] Wars', a paper which also included references to his experience in the Himalayas.[630] It is unclear whether the RUSI commissioned Gawler to speak on the subject of 'savage warfare', or whether he approached them on his own behalf; however, due to the favourable reviews of his work, and the generally positive reception of Baker's lecture, the former is highly likely. Delivered on 22 December 1873, Gawler's lecture began with a recognition of 'the great difficulties' that Sir Samuel Baker 'had to contend against', and abounded with tactical recommendations for fighting against 'savage' opponents. Due to Gawler's extensive military training and practical experience in the British Army, his recommendations were of a more comprehensive nature. Furthermore – and in contrast to the argument of the diversity of colonial conflicts – Gawler did explicitly recognise similarities between his and Baker's experiences, and understood one of his objectives to be to 'show the *principles* of savage warfare'.[631]

A 'War of Stratagem'[632]

Gawler argued that in preparation for 'savage warfare' the British should not neglect strategy.[633] As Hew Strachan has recognised, the concept of 'strategy' was relatively new during this period; a product of the late eighteenth century Enlightenment and not

[629] 'Bush Fighting', *The Athenaeum*, 22 November 1873, pp. 655-6.
[630] Colonel Gawler, 'British Troops and Savage Warfare, with Special Reference to the Kafir Wars', *JRUSI*, 17:75 (1873), pp. 922-39. Hereafter, 'British Troops'.
[631] Ibid., p. 921. Emphasis added.
[632] Ibid., p. 926.
[633] Ibid., p. 924.

commonly referred to by military practitioners until Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Antoine-Henri Jomini (1799-1869) sought to illuminate the manner in which Napoleon conducted his campaigns.[634] This context in part explains why Baker – a civilian explorer – did not use the term at all in his published work or public lectures. As a member of the British armed forces, Gawler did use the term 'strategy', and his conception corresponds with the distinction between tactics and strategy articulated by Clausewitz in his work *Vom Kriege* (*On War*), the complete English translation of which had been published in Britain in 1873: 'tactics teaches *the use of armed forces in the engagement*; strategy, *the use of engagements for the object of the war*'.[635] Clausewitz's influence on Gawler is suggested in certain comments made in the latter's lecture to the RUSI: Gawler noted, for instance, the significance of 'discover[ing] wherein… lies the strength of the enemy, and his power to maintain the war'; in *On War* Clausewitz argued that 'to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. *the total means at his disposal* and *the strength of his will*'.[636]

Gawler did not explicitly claim that 'savages' also fought in terms of an overall military strategy; instead, throughout his article, he identified the advantages that they possessed including their lack of 'impediments' which made them 'as slippery as eels'.[637] As Baker had done in his *Ismailia* narrative, Gawler equated 'savage' enemies – such as the Xhosa – with 'wild animals', thus emphasising their instinctual responses.[638] 'Savage' enemies did not

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[634] Hew Strachan, 'How is War Directed? The Problem of Strategy', *Humanitas Visiting Professorship in War Studies Lecture*, The University of Cambridge, 3 February 2011; Strachan has further noted: '[t]he meaning of strategy has now changed. Conventional strategy was a strategy of action; it prepared for war and then implemented those preparations'. In its modern sense '[s]trategy is designed to make war useable by the state, so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfil its political objectives', 'War and Strategy at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century', in *The Direction of War*, pp. 37, 43.

[635] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds and trans), (Princeton, 1984), p. 128. Emphasis in original. As Christopher Bassford notes, however, Clausewitz's work appeared much earlier in Britain in the nineteenth century; a review of *On War* (read by the author in its original German) was published in the *Metropolitan Magazine* as early as 1835. See: *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945* (Oxford, 1994), p. 37.

[636] Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 77. Emphasis in original.

[637] Gawler, 'British Troops', p. 925.

[638] Ibid., p. 926.

enact 'strategy' but rather 'stratagem'; *responsive* schemes to outwit and evade the British, including 'waylaying and surprises'.[639]

Due to the dispersal of the enemy, British strategy was to centre upon the offensive; drawing the enemy together and out of concealment, and inflicting a devastating 'blow':

> The best system under such circumstances is rapidly to seize by forced or secret marches, if practicable, any passes or lines of retreat, and to sweep the country, in columns of from 300 to 500 men, operating in connection with each other on parallel or convergent main lines, upon some obstacle, as the sea, a deep river, or towards more favourable ground, as open country; for concealment is really the mainstay of the savage.[640]

With regard to tactics, the enemy was said to capitalise on their individualism, ease of concealment, rapid movements, and knowledge of the terrain. Like Baker, Gawler emphasised the enemy's lack of courage by arguing that the 'savage prefers the bush because he would rather not meet his foe in the open. … [H]e will, *if the chance be given him*, waylay you, with great sense and judgement, from behind a narrow strip of almost impenetrable thicket…'.[641] However, his account still reflected a sense of ambiguity, and an uncertainty of emphasis with regard to his appraisal of their military characteristics: while conceding that the enemy was 'individually brave' and devoted to their chiefs, Gawler also charged the enemy with disloyalty towards their fellow comrades, as well as 'selfishness and want of discipline'.[642]

The most expedient British tactics were said to be skirmishing in small numbers in rapid forward movements towards an enemy who was under cover; engaging in reconnaissance missions at night; the use of patrols; and stealth, silence and flexibility of movement in order to overcome the difficulties encountered in the dense terrain of jungle and bush

[639] Ibid., p. 928.
[640] Ibid., pp. 925-6.
[641] Gawler, *Sikhim*, pp. 5-6; Gawler, 'British Troops', p. 926. Emphasis in original.
[642] Gawler, 'British Troops', p. 926.

warfare. Modern scientific developments in the military arts were considered to be an unnecessary encumbrance, and limits were to be placed on stores. Mounted men would assist in rapid movements and instil fear in the enemy due to their alleged distress caused by horses, a point also noted by Baker.[643] Gawler acknowledged that targeting enemy cattle could be effective, but due to the enemy's acclimatisation, their knowledge of the terrain with its ample sources of water and opportunities for concealment, and the possibility of their taking refuge within neighbouring tribes ('ignoring the duty of neutrals'), 'entrapment' was considered to be more effective. Dashing straight at the enemy was considered by Gawler to be the most successful way to instil a sense of fear and respect.[644]

Gawler's observations accorded with many of the issues raised by Baker, including the importance of adaptability; the use of tactics generally considered to be 'uncivilised' such as deception and the employment of ambushes and spies; the most appropriate and effective weapons to be used; and engaging the enemy through an offensive attack (a sudden and severe 'blow') in the bush or jungle, rather than waiting for them to approach in open country.[645] Although Baker had claimed in his response to the reviewer of *The Times* that it was not possible to present general guidelines on how best to undertake 'savage warfare', both his and Colonel Gawler's experiences – in Equatorial Africa, the Himalayas and the Cape Frontier, respectively – clearly coincided on a number of points, even though they were undertaken in very different geographical terrains, and against culturally diverse enemies.

Importantly, many of the observations raised by Baker and Gawler can also be found in Charles E. Callwell's article published in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* in 1887: 'Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British Forces have been

[643] Ibid., pp. 923-9, *passim*; Baker, 'Experience in Savage Warfare', p. 912.
[644] Gawler, 'British Troops', p. 929.
[645] Similar concerns including the need to engage in flexible skirmishing tactics, self-reliance, initiative and the offensive were also raised in the experiences of the PIF in the mid-nineteenth century. See: Moreman, *The Army in India*, pp. 14-17.

Employed Since the Year 1865', one of the precursors to his *Small Wars*.[646] Illustrating his arguments with various recent engagements of the British (including the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, the Third Anglo-Ashanti War, the Second Anglo-Afghan War, among others), Callwell argued that 'fearless adversaries' such as the Sudanese, Ghazis, and Zulus possessed 'strategical advantages' ('elasticity and freedom' as opposed to the British whose movements were often constrained by their bases and exposed lines of communications); however, they lacked the innate skills to capitalise on these advantages.[647] He argued that the 'circumstances of… [such wars] invariably force offensive strategy on the civilized Power at the outset' especially due to 'the disinclination shown by undisciplined warriors to commit themselves to a general engagement'.[648] He summarised:

> An enemy who sets fundamental principles of strategy at defiance, whose tactics are ill-defined and unintelligible, whose organization lies merely in the bond of union that will band together individuals for some common end, tends to drag down those opposed to him to his own level. We find ourselves unwillingly compelled to resume the discarded formations of the past. We feel the keen edge of military science in a manner blunted by contact with the savage.[649]

Although Callwell demonstrated that infantry tactics often varied according to the particular conflict discussed (during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, for instance, dispersed skirmishing was abandoned in favour of a close-order line formation to succeed against amassed Afghan swords-men)[650] the overall importance of flexibility and adaptability in 'savage warfare' – as emphasised by Baker and Gawler – was reinforced in his writings.[651]

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[646] Callwell had discussed the particularities of 'small wars' in two articles published in the *Minutes of the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution*, Volumes 12 (1884), pp. 531-52 and 13 (1885), pp. 403-20.
[647] Callwell, 'Lessons', pp. 365-6.
[648] Ibid., pp. 363-4.
[649] Ibid., p. 362.
[650] Moreman, *The Army in India*, p. 38.
[651] Callwell, 'Lessons', pp. 371-9.

It remains to further investigate why the work of Baker, Gawler and Callwell, among others,[652] did not inspire the publication of an official manual on irregular warfare in Britain prior to Callwell's *Small Wars*, which was itself only recognised as 'semi-official' by the British Army.[653] This chapter now turns to suggesting a number of factors that contributed to this reluctance to theorise 'savage warfare' by the British military establishment, despite the fact that discussions on the nature of such conflicts can be traced from the late 1840s.

General Guidelines for 'Savage Warfare'?

Despite the existence of a discourse claiming that '[t]heorising never has been the characteristic of Englishmen; it is held, perhaps, in too great disrepute',[654] British military practitioners were clearly influenced by the works of what are often understood to be the most pre-eminent European military theorists of the period – Clausewitz and Jomini – to differing degrees.[655] Both theorists predominantly focused their analyses on continental warfare,[656] and this may have acted as a contributing factor in the oversight of the development of an official British manual on irregular warfare in the nineteenth century. Prussian victories in 1870-1 clearly strengthened the interest of certain military figures in analysing the lessons of conventional continentalist wars. The ongoing threat of Russia to the Indian Empire also inspired some military practitioners to argue that the British Indian Army in particular should 'be prepared to meet the best troops of civilized Europe' rather than learn the tactical lessons of imperial campaigns.[657] However as Edward Spiers has

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[652] Due to limitations of space, this section is unable to address the works of other military figures whose writings explored the particularities of 'savage' wars. Generally, they concurred in their conclusions on the most effective ways and means by which to fight such wars. See, for instance: Lieutenant Charles Metcalfe MacGregor, *Mountain Warfare: An Essay on the Conduct of Military Operations in Mountainous Countries* (1866) and Lieutenant Reginald da Costa Porter, R.E., 'Warfare Against Uncivilised Races; Or, How to Fight Greatly Superior Forces of an Uncivilised and Badly-Armed Enemy', *PPCRE*, 6 (1882), pp. 305-60.
[653] Whittingham, 'Warrior-Scholarship', p. 20.
[654] This was a comment made by an anonymous officer in the *United Service Magazine* in the late 1840s. Quoted in Luvaas, *The Education of an Army*, p. 18.
[655] Luvaas' exceptional study indicates this throughout. For the influence of Jomini and Clausewitz on, for instance, Sir William Napier, see: pp. 10-11, 25-7.
[656] See, for instance: Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (2005).
[657] Moreman, *The Army in India*, p. 40.

noted, during the mid-to-late 1870s, military practitioners favouring continentalist theory – including Captain F.N. Maude (1854-1933), Colonel Francis Clery (1838-1926) and Sir Edward Hamley (1824-1893) – 'had a fairly limited influence upon the thinking of the late Victorian army'.[658] Therefore, the notion that there existed an inherent partiality against theorising 'savage warfare' due to the existence of practitioners who favoured the continentalist role of the British Army does not fully explain why no general manuals were produced. Four additional factors seem to have further influenced the lack of officially sanctioned doctrine on 'savage warfare' in the nineteenth century.

Firstly, in practice, opponents considered by the British to be 'savage' did not always engage in military behaviour which conformed to cultural expectations (and thus abstract ideas of 'savage warfare'), but were rather influenced by the amorphous and reciprocal nature of warfare itself. As Hew Strachan has noted, during the Second Maratha War (1803-5), the British commanders Gerard Lake (1744-1808) and the future Duke of Wellington Arthur Wellesley (1769-1852) anticipated an irregular opponent, yet they were met on the field of battle by the Maratha Army which was well-versed in technologies that were considered to be the mainstay of Europeans.[659] Similarly, during the initial operations of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British were met with Afghan regulars whose actions conformed more greatly to conventional warfare, yet these gave way in the latter part of the conflict to those considered more appropriate for irregular warfare.[660] Some theorists of the period claimed that the 'divergence of method' of opponents in irregular warfare (and their occasional adoption of 'regular' tactics) precluded any application of prescriptive rules of war. Indeed, when discussing 'Strategic Operations in Mountains', Jomini himself wrote:

> To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies,

[658] Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, p. 246.
[659] Strachan, 'A General Typology of Transcultural Wars', p. 92.
[660] Moreman, *The Army in India*, pp. 36-7.

> would be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the best school for this kind of warfare.[661]

However, as the preceding analysis reveals, ideas of 'savage warfare' did coincide on a number of general points, and those who claimed diversity – such as Baker and Callwell – still attempted to provide guidelines for its undertaking.[662] Furthermore, officers such as Henry Brackenbury (1837-1914) even went as far as to suggest that lessons from colonial wars could be applied to continentalist wars. In discussing a memorandum written by Garnet Wolseley on jungle fighting in the Third Anglo-Ashanti War, Brackenbury wrote:

> Let those who think that warfare of this kind is not calculated to teach lessons useful for warfare on a grander scale read this order, and see whether it does not breathe in every line the spirit of the teaching of the war of 1870. It recognizes, amongst other points, the vital importance of giving independence of action to small units, and proposes to carry out on this system exactly what had been done by our fathers… in the Peninsula….[663]

This general ambiguity with regard to the ability to theorise irregular wars can be further demonstrated in the preliminary remarks of those who sought to theorise warfare in general during this period. In the preface to the second edition of his *Reflections on the Art of War* (first published in 1894), Brigadier-General Reginald Clare Hart (1848-1931) claimed that '[a] separate chapter on savage, mountain, or jungle warfare has been suggested to me, but is not given, because the principles are the same in all kinds of warfare'. Hart continued by emphasising the great diversity of savage wars (in terms of conditions, terrain, customs and tactics of the enemy), and quoted Jomini's argument that specific precepts could not be established. Nevertheless, Hart concluded by arguing that there was 'one precept for this kind of warfare: – *The enemy should be brought to battle as soon as possible, and, within limits, much*

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[661] Baron de Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War*, Captain G.H. Mendell and Captain W.P. Craighill (trans), (Philadelphia, 1863), p. 169.
[662] Callwell, *Small Wars*, p. 29.
[663] Brackenbury quoted in Bailes, 'Technology and Tactics in the British Army', p. 35.

more may be risked than in civilised warfare'.[664] British military practitioners continued to grapple with the question as to whether the nature of warfare lent itself to principles or prescriptive guidelines, and what those guidelines should be, well into the early twentieth century and beyond.[665]

Secondly, it is likely that a belief in technological superiority – 'arms of precision' such as the Snider and Martini-Henry Rifle – and a lack of serious defeats prior to the victory of the Zulu at Isandlwana (1879), the Afghans at Maiwand in 1880, and high British casualties during the First Boer War (1880-1) may have limited earlier receptiveness to theorising irregular warfare by the British military establishment.[666] Conflicts which undermined British views of their own military prowess may have stimulated a more serious interest in analysing irregular wars in the very late nineteenth century, a process which was encouraged by reformers such as Garnet Wolseley, who as Adjutant-General to the Forces (1882-90) supported changes that improved the effectiveness of the British Army in imperial, rather than European, conflicts.[667]

Thirdly, taking a broader perspective, it is important to recognise that the structure of the army itself contributed to an overall lack of a development of British military doctrine during this period, regardless of the nature of the conflicts themselves – continental ('civilised') or imperial ('savage'). The British Army's first official doctrine – *Field Service Regulations* – was not published until 1909, yet, importantly, it included a section on 'Warfare in Uncivilized Countries'; the general principles of which resembled the concerns of figures writing on irregular warfare in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, especially with

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[664] Brigadier-General Reginald Clare Hart, *Reflections on the Art of War*, 2nd edition ([1894] 1897), pp. ix-x. Emphasis in original.
[665] See, for instance: Alaric Searle, 'Inter-service Debate and the Origins of Strategic Culture: The "Principles of War" in the British Armed Forces, 1919-1939', *War in History*, 21:1 (2013), pp. 4-32.
[666] Moreman, *The Army in India*, p. 40.
[667] Wolseley 'contended that more time should be devoted to practical training, that drill movements should be reduced in number, and that annual inspections should focus upon fighting proficiency and not parade ground precision', quoted in Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, p. 251.

regard to the importance of adaptation, 'beating the enemy at his own tactics', employing a 'vigorous offensive', rapid movements, and sanctioning the use of ambushes as having 'a very deterrent effect,' particularly against snipers.[668] The absence of an entrenched General Staff (which was not established until 1906),[669] and the regimental system (which diverted allegiance away from the British military establishment as a whole), contributed to the ambiguity surrounding the primary role of the British Army, and therefore limited any sustained focus upon the development of theoretical guidelines for both forms of conflict.[670] Indeed, senior officers wished for a clear statement of purpose for which the army existed from the early 1870s, yet it was not until the 1888 Memorandum that Edward Stanhope (1840-1893), the Secretary of State for War, formulated a list of the priorities of the British armed forces; due to the influence of Wolseley, the garrisoning of India and the colonies was prioritised over potential action in a European conflict.[671] Nevertheless, the uncertainty of the nature of future conflicts – European or imperial – certainly contributed to the limited development of doctrine.[672]

The final factor can be attributed to the notion that such irregular wars challenged the ideal image of the British Army as representing a concert of norms often referred to as 'gentlemanly behaviour'.[673] Rod Thornton has identified a number of influences which coalesced in the nineteenth century to form an understanding of British military culture that remains to this day: a British liberalism which emphasised the individual; the Common Law notion that you should 'do what you ought' (also derived from Protestantism); a

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668 *Field Service Regulations*, pp. 171-9.
669 Strachan, 'War is War: Imperial Legacy and Current Conflict', pp. 194-5.
670 Hew Strachan, 'The British Way in Warfare', in David Chandler and I.F.W. Beckett (eds), *The Oxford History of the British Army* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 408-15.
671 Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, pp. 60-1, Appendix 3.
672 Although writing on the role of doctrine in the British Army of the twentieth century, Strachan's observation that in contrast to European armies, 'the British army could not anticipate with any accuracy against whom it might next fight or where it might next be deployed', and that '[t]his was the reason why it could not develop, and in the eyes of many should not have developed, doctrine', is also a relevant observation for the nineteenth century. See: Strachan, *Big Wars & Small Wars*, p. 4.
673 Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, p. 103.

renaissance of the ideals of medieval chivalry; and a developing understanding that the Empire could only be maintained 'in ways that were compatible with high ideals of honour and duty' rather than brute force.[674] As Jeffrey Richards has recognised:

> The image of the gentleman was reformulated as a latter-day version of the medieval knight, the embodiment of the virtues of bravery, loyalty, and courtesy, modesty, purity and honour, and endowed with a sense of *noblesse oblige* towards women, children and social inferiors. … By the middle of the nineteenth century the language and imagery of chivalry had been so far absorbed into the fabric of Victorian life and thought that it was automatic to see the gentleman, the hero and the soldier exclusively in terms of the medieval paladin.[675]

In stark contrast to these ideals, the notion of irregular warfare was considered by many to be 'of inferior dignity to those grand operations which form texts for our military lecturers and writers'.[676] As demonstrated above, in theory, the 'savage' enemy was expected to employ underhanded tactics (such as engaging in ambushes) and avoid an open and honest fight, while the British emphasised that they were pressured to engage in kind through the employment of military actions that challenged the virtues and values of the gentlemanly tradition. Some members of the military, such as Major General Thomas Bernard Collinson (1821-1902) a naval surveyor of the Royal Engineers, indeed raised fears that fighting in irregular conflicts had a detrimental effect on the 'discipline and steadiness' of regular troops of the British armed forces.[677] Theorising 'savage warfare' could itself be understood as a recognition of the existence of a common military culture between Britain and the unruly 'savage' enemies of her Empire; a recognition that many military practitioners were

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[674] Rod Thornton, 'The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 15:1 (2004), pp. 85-88.
[675] Jeffrey Richards quoted in ibid., p. 88. See also: Mark Girouard, *The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman* (1981).
[676] 'Bush Fighting - Sikhim', p. 655.
[677] Gawler, 'British Troops', pp. 936-7. This view was, however, challenged by Major Dundas of the 12th Regiment who argued that in the aftermath of the Eighth Xhosa War (1850-3), during which a number of British troops had been stationed in the bush for two to three years, aside from their dishevelled appearance and the attendant consequences of drunkenness (due to accumulated pay), living in the bush had inspired a close camaraderie; '[they] had been so accustomed to look up to us, that we had more control over them than if they had been in barracks'. Gawler, 'British Troops', p. 937.

not willing to concede. Underlying this particular perspective was a belief in the need to uphold a distinction between the 'civilised' British and her 'savage' foes.

Despite the fact that the work of Baker and Gawler did not inspire the development of a general manual on the nature of 'savage warfare' during the early 1870s, due to Baker's public celebrity, *Ismailia* did generate a significant volume of public commentary and debate. In order to demonstrate that the designation of the term 'savage' did not preclude serious discussion on the morality of such conflicts, the second part of this chapter explores in greater detail the influence of Baker's work, and in particular, the arguments that arose over what some commentators believed to be the unethical conduct of his military campaigns against the indigenous populations of Equatorial Africa. Through a comparison of the first and second editions of *Ismailia*, this section demonstrates that public criticism of Baker's expedition had an impact upon the manner in which he presented his military exploits; he particularly wished to emphasise not only that he perceived his measures to be 'necessary' but also that he only undertook the use of force in self-defence. This apparent need for Baker to justify his actions in moral terms when fighting against 'savage' opponents suggests another challenge to perceived 'civilised'/'savage' distinctions. This section begins by examining one of the most vocal critiques of Baker that arose quite by chance in the aftermath of a series of letters published in *The Times*. This correspondence was initially inspired due to Baker's concerns over the employment of his adversary, Abou Saoud, to assist General Charles Gordon who had entered the services of the Khedive in 1873 after Baker's departure, and was later appointed Governor-General of the Sudan (1876-9).[678]

[678] Samuel W. Baker, 'The Slave Trade in Egypt', *The Times*, 24 July 1874, p. 10.

Part II

Public Disapproval of Sir Samuel White Baker's 'Civilisade'

Baker's initial letter to *The Times* – published 24 July 1874 – inspired reproach by figures who supported Gordon's choice to employ Abou Saoud, and criticised Baker's policy of conquest, believing it to have been inappropriate to the task at hand, and to have created discord and a sense of hostility amongst the local populations towards the Khedive. James Shaw (1836-83), a colleague of Gordon, criticised what he saw as Baker's shameless self-promotion:

> Sir Samuel Baker's policy was one in which we heard of nothing but the magnitude of his powers and of his office, of conquests here and battles and victories there, with all the pomp and circumstance of war attached to his despatches. This was carried so far that when the famous telegram arrived, shortly before he arrived himself in Cairo, announcing the battle and victory in which about 200 of his army were engaged and an immense territory added to the Khedive's dominions, a suppressed laugh was visible in all our countenances; but it was no laughing matter to the Khedive's Government who regretted exceedingly the courses which Sir Samuel had pursued.[679]

Shaw closed his letter by coming to the defence of Abou Saoud's character, claiming on the authority of Gordon that Abou Saoud 'denied dealing in slaves' and that

> … his family are extremely wealthy and greatly respected in Cairo. Abou Saoud is a young man of remarkable energy for his race; and he stated it was because Sir Samuel had confiscated the ivory belonging to his people, and because his rule was merciless towards the people, that he offered him all the resistance in his power.[680]

Baker immediately responded to Shaw in a letter published the following day on 27 July 1874. He argued against Shaw's claim that Saoud was not a slave-trader, stating that he had

[679] James Shaw, 'Sir Samuel Baker and Colonel Gordon', *The Times*, 25 July 1874, p. 5.
[680] Ibid.

'numerous witnesses in England who will prove that the last act of the expedition was to overtake three vessels laden with slaves, about 700, belonging to Abou Saood'.[681] Published directly after Baker's response was a letter from his nephew, Julian Baker, a Lieutenant of the Royal Navy who had joined Sir Samuel's expedition. Julian Baker claimed to 'bear witness to the atrocities committed by Abou Saoud', and argued that he had 'caused much of the misery and loss of life' due to 'his intrigues and rebellious connexions with the enemies of the Government'. In closing his letter, Julian Baker expressed his willingness to give further evidence to support the views of Sir Samuel against the actions of Abou Saoud.[682]

Shaw's second letter in response to Baker was understandably defensive, though it was in a letter published on 1 August 1874 by J. McWilliam, Baker's chief engineer of steamers on the expedition, that an unanticipated and rather damning account of the expedition was revealed to the public. Describing himself as an 'unfortunate survivor' of the expedition, McWilliam claimed that Baker had, at times, cooperated with the slave-traders, rewarding them, for instance, on an occasion where they were assisted to pass through the *sudd* (swampland) in the Bahr el Zeraf river. Referring ironically to his usefulness as an eye witness, McWilliam wrote:

> If Sir Samuel Baker wishes at any time for my testimony as to the barbarous manner in which the expedition was conducted, the wholesale murders, pillage, and ruin of the country, he is welcome to it; or should the Royal Geographical Society or any body of gentlemen wish for any information respecting that futile expedition I shall be glad to give it….[683]

Julian Baker came to the swift defence of Sir Samuel, responding that Sir Samuel had 'always wished and endeavoured to maintain peace'; however, once the Bari war

[681] Samuel W. Baker and Julian A. Baker, 'The Slave Trade in Egypt', *The Times*, 27 July 1874, p. 5.
[682] Baker and Baker, 'The Slave Trade in Egypt', p. 5.
[683] J. McWilliam, 'Sir Samuel Baker's Expedition', *The Times*, 1 August 1874, p. 12.

commenced 'the only chance of success depended upon military vigour'. He continued, '[t]he ruins of Coomassie are no disgrace to the British troops, neither are the deaths occasioned in warfare to be avoided. If a military expedition is sent to annex an extensive country, war is a natural consequence, as the history of the world will testify'.[684] By associating Baker's military actions with those of Garnet Wolseley during the Third Anglo-Ashanti War, which had concluded with the destruction of King Koffee Kalkalli's Royal Palace by mines until 'Coomassie was left a heap of smoking ruins',[685] Julian Baker was eager to draw attention away from Shaw's emphasis that Gordon was instructed by the Khedive to utilise a different, peace-oriented policy based on 'patient conciliation' in order to win allegiance towards the Khedive's government. The suppression of the slave trade under Gordon's command was to be undertaken not by force, but rather through the promotion of legitimate commerce and the facilitation of alternative means of trade.[686]

Julian Baker's strategy failed. In McWilliam's response, published on 11 August 1874, he agreed with the remark that 'the ruins of Coomassie are no disgrace to the British troops'; however he insisted that 'any comparison between the British expedition to the West Coast of Africa and Sir Samuel Baker's Central African expedition is odious in the extreme'. The scenes witnessed by McWilliam were in his view 'not to be met with in modern history', but were rather comparable to instances 'from sacred history'.[687] In this letter, he narrated in detail what he considered to be objectionable and unethical actions undertaken by Sir Samuel during the expedition. Within his critique he argued that the local populations were left 'in a state of starvation' after the expedition assumed control of their grain supplies, and that:

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[684] Julian A. Baker, 'Sir Samuel Baker's Expedition', *The Times*, 5 August 1874, p. 8.
[685] Henry Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War: A Narrative Prepared from the Official Documents by Permission of Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley* (2 vols, 1874), ii, p. 244.
[686] Shaw, 'Sir Samuel Baker and Colonel Gordon', p. 5.
[687] J. McWilliam, 'Sir Samuel Baker's Expedition', *The Times*, 11 August 1874, p. 11.

> Orders were issued at the same time that all natives found near the camp were to be shot down irrespective of age or sex. This was strictly carried out. The brutal details of these cold-blooded murders I would rather not relate. Out of the numerous raids made upon the unoffending natives near Gondokoro, many of them were led by Sir Samuel in person and cattle and sheep to the number of over 30,000 captured and their houses plundered and wantonly burnt down. Their cattle was not stolen solely for the use of the troops in camp, but were to be given to various tribes up the country on condition of their serving Sir Samuel. Naturally, the poor creatures resisted as well as they could, but what could they do against firearms?[688]

McWilliam claimed that Baker had made war upon less powerful tribes, 'massacring them in great numbers and burning up their country' in order to demonstrate that resistance was not to be tolerated. Lastly, McWilliam challenged Baker's protest against the employment of Abou Saoud by Colonel Gordon's expedition by stating that Baker himself had enlisted the support of Mahomed Wat El-Mek, who was allegedly described by Baker in his book on the Albert Nyanza 'as a most bloodthirsty villain, steeped in crime, and the great curse of the country'.[689]

This heated exchange between Baker and McWilliam further reinforces the argument that views on the appropriate methods by which to undertake 'savage' wars were often open to discussion and debate, even by members of the same expedition. However, prior to the publication of the first edition of *Ismailia*, which would generate a significant response with regard to Baker's use of military means, the only periodical to highlight the disagreements aired between Baker and McWilliam was the progressive weekly *The Examiner*, which had developed a reputation for being in the vanguard of promoting freedom of expression in the press in the early part of the nineteenth century.[690] Indeed, only four months earlier, *The Examiner* had published a critical account of the Third Anglo-Ashanti War written by the

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[688] Ibid.
[689] Ibid.
[690] John Strachan, 'Satirical Print Culture', in Francis O'Gorman (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Victorian Culture* (Cambridge, 2010), p. 163.

literary critic Leslie Stephen (1832-1904);[691] while commending the bravery of Garnet Wolseley and the men under his command, the costs of the campaign – both financial and moral – were condemned, as was the government's decision to undertake the war:

> We can understand the appeal to arms when every other kind of appeal has failed and when the alternative is dishonour or national effacement. We can readily believe that, for nations as for individuals, there are circumstances from which there is no wholesome or endurable issue save that of war. But war without an attempt at conciliation – war without justice or honour – war with undisciplined savages – aggressive war! This, we confess, is a matter which, whatever its results, it is very difficult to feel a pride in, or to make a boast of. … Not even the ceaseless treachery and savagery of the savages are sufficient to turn the gigantic blunder into a genuine subject for congratulation.[692]

While emphasising his support for the undertaking of *just* wars as a last resort, Stephen articulated a growing discomfort with the inferior class of conflict which required the 'civilised' British Army to fight against 'savage' opponents, who – it seems to be suggested here – were irreclaimable. This particular view reflected an underlying disillusionment with the 'civilising mission' which, as chapter five shows, would re-emerge with greater intensity in the final decades of the nineteenth century. In an article published five months later which was more sardonic in tone and referred to expeditions such as Baker's as 'civilisades', the anonymous author questioned whether or not Britain gained any 'permanently valuable results' from such 'adventures':

> Civilisades have lately become very fashionable amongst us. … The latest form of this modern sport… is to send an army of irregular troops, under some enterprising European soldier or explorer, to bring some recalcitrant barbarians within the shelter of civilised institutions. If the latter are blindly obstinate in refusing the invitation, our civilisaders were, in the approved fashion of their models, the crusaders, to 'compel them to come in.' We have, of course, got very far beyond the morality of the

[691] Alan Bell, 'Stephen, Sir Leslie (1832-1904)', *ODNB*, Oxford University Press, 2012, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36271, accessed 24 September 2015. Stephen's family was involved in the anti-slavery movement, as well as the Clapham Sect of evangelicals. He had renounced his own Anglicanism by the late 1860s, a change that was in-part inspired by his reading of the works of Darwin, Spencer and Comte.

[692] L.S., 'The Moral of the Ashantee War', *The Examiner*, 7 March 1874, pp. 224-5.

> warlike nobles who propagated Christianity by the sword, yet, when we come to think of it, our methods of compulsion are of the rude old fashion after all.[693]

The exchange between Baker and McWilliam was used with great effect by *The Examiner* to highlight the paradox of undertaking a 'civilising mission' through the use of 'uncivilised' means: the article further argued that when the benefits of civilisation (law, order and free trade) were not accepted by local populations, 'civilisaders' would employ the use of violent means due to their belief that 'castigation is an argument that the least illuminated of savages can understand'.[694] Baker was aware of this tension and used the publication of the second edition of *Ismailia* to re-emphasise with greater force the necessity – and therefore justification – of his use of military means. This chapter now explores how such issues were discussed in both editions of *Ismailia* before analysing the reception of this particular work, in order to further demonstrate that reflective public discussions on the ethics of 'savage warfare' in the nineteenth century were more common than has been hitherto recognised by academic scholarship.

Civilisation Achieved 'At the Point of the Bayonet'[695]

Baker did not dwell upon the ethics of his military engagements in his initial two-volume publication of *Ismailia*, published in 1874. This suggests that he not only indisputably believed that his use of force was always undertaken as an act of self-defence, but that he also anticipated that his readers – members of the British military establishment, fellow explorers (including Henry Morton Stanley, 1841-1904, and James Augustus Grant, 1827-1892), and the broader public – would share a similar understanding. In his first edition of *Ismailia*, he referred to the issue of self-defence on three occasions. The first instance was

693 'Civilisades', *The Examiner*, 22 August 1874, p. 896.
694 Ibid.
695 Baker, *Ismailia*, p. 158.

during a narration of an unprovoked attack on his messengers by Abou Saoud's men. Baker emphatically stated:

> I mention these circumstances, as the European and American public will be the judges whether I erred on the side of leniency or severity throughout this expedition. In Egypt and the Soudan I have no doubt that my name is hated, as a Christian that shed the blood of Mohammedans; but I trust the civilized world will acquit me of any blood-shedding *except in the act of lawful self-defence*.[696]

In these comments Baker was establishing his own geographical lines of 'civilisation': the public of 'civilised' Europe and America would be pronouncing judgement on his actions – not the 'uncivilised' inhabitants of Egypt and Equatorial Africa, who were directly facing the repercussions of his use of force. Significantly, this particular paragraph was omitted from the second edition of *Ismailia*, published in 1879. An analysis of Baker's discussion on the issue of self-defence in this second edition reveals that he wished to quell uncertainties on the legitimacy of his use of force that were raised in critical reviews of the first publication. Rather than permitting readers to make their own judgement on the 'leniency' or 'severity' of his approach towards the native tribes of Equatorial Africa, Baker chose only to retain passages that afforded no uncertainty as to the morality of his use of armed force. In narrating an account of his interaction with King Kabba Regga of the land of Unyoro – who wished Baker to assist his men in attacking Rionga, the King of neighbouring Uganda – Baker commented:

> In my former journey I had accomplished a long and difficult exploration without firing a shot at a human being; and I had studiously avoided meddling in native politics, which is certain to involve a traveller in difficulty. It had always been a source of great satisfaction when I looked back to my past adventures, and reflected that I had never pulled a trigger at a native; thus the arrival of a white man in these countries would be regarded without suspicion.

[696] Baker, *Ismailia*, 1st edition, ii, pp. 407-8. Emphasis added.

> *In my present expedition I had always endeavoured to preserve peace, but, as this work will show, I was in every instance forced to [wage] war in absolute self-defence.* I was therefore determined not to attack Rionga, unless he should presume to defy the government.[697]

Furthermore, in his revised account, Baker tellingly altered sentences that originally presented his indiscriminate use of force in a cavalier manner. While narrating an ambush against the Bari, Baker had originally stated that the Forty's 'fire of the sniders kept the enemy at a respectful distance'.[698] The account of this action in the first edition continued: 'and I took a few shots myself at long range to teach them the real value of a snider rifle'.[699] This was omitted in Baker's revised work.

The third occasion of Baker's use of the term self-defence could be found in the conclusion to both editions.[700] Here Baker put forward an explicit defence of his entire expedition by arguing that his fight against the slave trade was a cause that unequivocally justified his use of military force. Baker's use of the term 'necessity' also precluded any notion that his objectives could have been achieved by alternative means:

> The first steps in establishing the authority of a new government in a tribe hitherto savage and intractable were of necessity accompanied by military operations. War is inseparable from annexation, and the law of force, resorted to in self-defence, was absolutely indispensable to prove the superiority of the power that was eventually to govern. The end justified the means.[701]

Baker's claim that the 'end justified the means' especially inspired discussions in a number of British periodicals reviewing the first edition of *Ismailia*. Some reviewers chose to accept Baker's argument and presented the use of military force as a necessary consequence of the

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[697] Ibid., p. 192; 2nd edition, p. 312. Emphasis added.
[698] Baker, *Ismailia*, 1st edition, i, pp. 274-5.
[699] Baker, *Ismailia*, 2nd edition, p. 133.
[700] Baker used the term 'self-defence' on only one other occasion in the re-printed edition of *Ismailia,* in a footnote: 'In self-defence, Niambore and my few men returned the attack, and my soldiers were killed', p. 154.
[701] Ibid., pp. 471-2.

civilising project. Writing for *Macmillan's Magazine*, the Christian socialist Thomas Hughes (1822-96) chose to quote in full Baker's argument that his ends of quelling the slave trade justified the military means he pursued. Following this quotation, Hughes argued:

> … we do not think any average Englishman, wishing to see right done in the world, and wrong put down – nay, we will go further, we do not think any fair-minded member of the Anti-Slavery or Aborigines Protection Society, whose special aim in life is to raise and protect the inferior races, and see that they get fair play – can doubt that Baker came to a right decision, or would wish that he had never accepted service under the Khedive of Egypt. It is unfortunately a condition of the world in which we live that, as Mr. Biglow[702] bitterly remarks in one of his early poems,
>
> 'Civ'lisation must go forrard,
> Sometimes upon a powder cart.'
>
> It is a blessing for the world when the powder-cart is pulled by men, who, to the strength of will and genius necessary to leaders in such undertakings, add the kindliness, the patience, and the humanity of Sir S. Baker.[703]

The growing tension between anti-slavery humanitarianism and the use of force can be understood in light of the experiences of previous anti-slavery missions to Africa, such as the disastrous Niger Expedition (1841). As Patrick Brantlinger has argued, from the mid-nineteenth century, '[b]lame [for slavery] was increasingly displaced onto Africans themselves for maintaining the slave trade as a chief form of economic exchange'.[704] The failure of 'rational appeals to economic interest', coupled with a growing belief in the racial superiority of the British, paved the way for a greater receptiveness of the view that the slave trade could only be suppressed through the use of forceful means.[705] This was one of the many competing discourses surrounding the issue of anti-slavery throughout the nineteenth century; while David Livingstone (1813-1873) understood that Africans 'could

[702] Mr Biglow was the pseudonym of the American poet and literary critic James Russell Lowell (1819-91).
[703] Thomas Hughes, 'Ismailia', *Macmillan's Magazine*, December 1874, p. 103.
[704] Patrick Brantlinger, 'Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent', *Critical Inquiry*, 12:1 (1985), p. 173.
[705] Richard Huzzey, *Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in Victorian Britain* (Ithaca, 2012), pp. 140-1.

be rescued from "darkness"', a view reflecting his Christian sensibilities, the soldier, explorer and anthropologist Sir Richard Burton (1821-1890), a supporter of the notion of polygenesis and co-founder of the Anthropological Society, believed that they were 'unimprovable'.[706]

Other reviewers, however, adopted a similarly ironic tone to that found in *The Examiner* article 'Civilisades' discussed earlier, in order to highlight the tension between using military means to suppress the slave trade and 'civilise' the inhabitants of Equatorial Africa. *The Examiner* chose to reiterate their initial criticism of Baker, arguing that '[c]onquest is a dangerous method of propagating peace, order, and the blessings of civilisation, and conquest by the agency of the Egyptian Government is not a hopeful design'.[707] The liberal periodical *The Academy* unabashedly questioned whether Baker's expedition was indeed just: 'Nothing whatever is said as to the right of the Khedive to confer such authority with reference to tribes and peoples who did not then recognise his rule, and apparently never had done so. It was probably taken for granted that the proposed annexation would be regarded by all concerned as an unqualified boon'. The reviewer continued:

> The narrative of the stern measures by which the Baris were repressed and of the active share which the leader of the expedition himself took in teaching them the accuracy of the Snider rifle is, however, the least pleasant reading in the book; we do not wonder that the wretched natives had some difficultly in distinguishing between the tender mercies of the Christian Pacha and the more intelligible cruelties of the Arab slave trader. … [T]he record of the journey, with its chequered accompaniments of constant bloodshed and fighting, reads more like the narrative of the adventures of a Vasco di Gama or a Pizarro, than the progress of an Envoy sent solely with the great objects of pacification, civilisation, and annexation.[708]

[706] Brantlinger, 'Victorians and Africans', pp. 178-9; Jason Thompson, 'Burton, Sir Richard Francis (1821-1890)', *ODNB*, Oxford University Press, 2009, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4136, accessed 21 October 2015. As this chapter argues, the British public would become more receptive to the latter view, particularly in the aftermath of the death of General Gordon.
[707] 'Ismailia', *The Examiner*, 14 November 1874, pp. 1241-2.
[708] Euan Smith, 'Ismailia', *The Academy*, 26 December 1874, p. 680.

While expressing 'regret' that they were unable to 'congratulate Sir S. Baker on having attained the permanent and complete success in the object of his expedition which his ability and resolution amid immense difficulties deserved', throughout their review of *Ismailia* (which was published in two separate issues), *The Times* not only questioned the military means by which Baker sought to achieve his political mandate, but also suggested to their readers that the rights of the native inhabitants should have been considered in reference to Baker's claims. In discussing Baker's indignation against the Bari who refused to sell their cattle, the reviewer noted:

> It must be remembered that the rights of property are as rigidly guarded – in theory at least – in Central Africa as they are in England, and Baker tells us that the native tribes exercise the strictest surveillance over their respective hunting grounds, and have a well-defined custom of the chase and unwritten game laws. It should also be recollected that there are many tribes in Africa which will not sell their cattle on any account. It is necessary to make these observations *because we consider Sir Samuel showed a want of tact and conciliatory power in dealing with the Baris, which led to very serious evils and nearly caused the ruin of his expedition*.[709]

Baker did indeed affirm the existence of property rights in 'savage' cultures in his discussion of 'the hunt'. He wrote:

> The rights of game are among the first rudiments of property. Man in a primitive state is a hunter… therefore the beast that he kills upon the desert must be his property; and in a public hunt, should he be the first to wound a wild animal, he will have gained an increased interest or share in the flesh by having reduced the chance of its escape. Thus public opinion, which we must regard as the foundation of *equity*, rewards him with a distinct and special right, which becomes *law*.[710]

For proponents of the classical liberal tradition the right to property was considered one of the fundamental aspects of 'civilisation', and implied not only a right to material

[709] 'Ismailia', *The Times*, 20 November 1874, p. 7. Emphasis added.
[710] Baker, *Ismailia*, 2nd edition, p. 434. Emphasis in original.

possessions but also an affirmation of individual freedom.[711] Although Baker claimed to acknowledge the existence of property rights of indigenous Africans, it is evident that he also believed that due to the expediencies of 'savage warfare', including the fact that the Bari refused to sell their cattle to sustain Baker's troops,[712] such rights could be waived under the guise of 'military necessity'; an argument that *The Times* sought to overlook in order to maintain their critical position.

Lastly, *The Times* explicitly interrogated Baker's willingness to fight against the Bari as if he were undertaking a hunt, as well as his de-humanisation of the enemy. The reviewer even went as far as to articulate an understanding as to why the Bari chose to avoid combat in open country; a concession which was never made by Baker, nor the other reviewers:

> We are afraid our readers will not think so badly of the Baris as the rifleman does when he tells them that these fellows 'would not stand in the open ground before the Snider,' and that they cleared away out of fire. Now, we cannot presume that this was utterly wanton, but surely Sir Samuel was not in his proper place when he was 'potting' these naked savages as if they were wild beasts. We regret that the instincts of the hunter were not subordinate to the duties of the chief of a civilizing and humanitarian expedition….[713]

The reviews of Baker's first edition of *Ismailia* reveal that contemporary commentators did not shy away from deliberating the ethics of Britain's colonial campaigns, and, despite the prevalence of the rhetoric of the 'un-improvable savage', raised questions with regard to the evident contradiction between enacting the 'civilising process' through 'uncivilised' means. Recognition of an existence of such dissenting voices further complicates the presumed effect of pro-imperialist discourses of figures such as Baker on the British public. It is evident that Baker utilised many of the tropes and techniques recognised by scholars in

711 Whelan, *Enlightenment Political Thought*, p. 9.
712 Baker, *Ismailia*, 2nd edition, pp. 126-7.
713 'Ismailia', *The Times*, 20 November 1874, p. 7.

order to reinforce and re-assert the power and superiority of British rule.[714] Nevertheless, the preceding analysis reveals that such narratives were not wholly accepted – and were even explicitly challenged – by those at the imperial metropole. While some commentators accepted Baker's claim that his use of military methods was justified due to the ends of suppressing the slave trade, this did not prevent a questioning of the right that Baker had to enforce the wishes of the Khedive through military force, nor of his undertaking of unethical ('uncivilised') actions to annex the lands of Equatorial Africa. Significantly, therefore, public criticism presented a clear challenge to perceived 'civilised'/'savage' distinctions; the assumption that 'civilised' norms of war could be disregarded in 'savage warfare' was explicitly and forcefully argued against by members of the British public who affirmed the rights of the casualties of 'savage warfare' and challenged the 'uncivilised' conduct of British military practitioners. It is important to note, however, that in the very late nineteenth century a significant re-appraisal of Baker and his exploits occurred in the aftermath of his death in 1893. This chapter now concludes with an analysis as to why Baker's posthumous reputation often overlooked such criticisms of his approach to suppressing the slave trade and echoed rather the praise that he had received upon his return to Britain in 1873.

'A Loyal and Fearless Englishman'[715]

In the last years of his life, Baker continued to express great interest in British engagement with Egypt and the Sudan. In the lead-up to General Gordon's Expedition to counteract the growing power of the Mahdi, he wrote regular letters to *The Times* advising on what he believed the role of Britain should be in the region. He continued to write such letters until Gordon's untimely death, which Baker foretold as early as April 1884:

[714] See, for instance: Fischer-Tiné and Mann who assert that the paradoxes of Empire 'were not simply irregularities but an integral part of the civilizing mission ideology, which enabled the British to react flexibly to changing colonial parameters and to "improve" the means and mechanisms of self-legitimation', *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission*, p. 24.
[715] *Sir Samuel Baker: A Memoir*, T. Douglas Murray and A. Silva White (eds), (1895), p. 202.

> Some plan of action must be determined upon, and that at once, otherwise the position of General Gordon will become desperate, and aid will be too late. He is not the man to desert his post, otherwise he could steam to Gondokoro and march to Zanzibar, by a secure route; but Khartoum would be sacked, and those who have adhered faithfully to Gordon would be massacred.[716]

While Baker was considered to be a great adventurer in his time, and received numerous accolades from prestigious British institutions, as this chapter shows, he was taken to task not only by figures participating in his own expedition, but also by members of the British public on the issue of his use of military methods to suppress the slave trade. However, after Baker's death in 1893, in reviews of his posthumously published memoirs and obituaries, questions about his use of military measures gave way to admiring character portrayals. Commentators conceded that Baker had indeed failed in his mission to suppress the slave trade, yet it was generally emphasised that this was due to 'the Janus-faced character of Egyptian rule'.[717] Even the generally moderate-liberal periodical *The Speaker* went as far as to argue, '[o]f the slave trade it may be said without extravagance that there is nothing in African human nature which leads us to suppose that this abomination will eventually yield to any argument save force', and concluded, '[t]he successful explorer of the future is the hunter and soldier'.[718] In his biography, Baker was portrayed as a fearless and fervent patriot and pro-imperialist. The explorer Henry Morton Stanley was said to have believed him to be

> a glorious Englishman: typically manly and straightforward. He did his work well: few could have done it so well. … [W]e can only be proud that the race from which he sprang can still show specimens of the heroes about whom bards chanted in the brave days of old.[719]

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[716] Samuel White Baker, 'General Gordon's Position', *The Times*, 30 April 1884, p. 6.
[717] *Sir Samuel Baker*, p. 202. The conservative periodical *The National Observer* agreed with the biographer's assessment that 'it was his misfortune, and not his fault, that, instead of his work being consolidated, strengthened and developed, it was to a great extent overthrown… chiefly through the inaction and mismanagement of others…'. 'Reviews - Sir Samuel Baker', 18 May 1895, pp. 23-4.
[718] 'Sir Samuel Baker', *The Speaker*, 6 January 1894, pp. 12-13.
[719] Stanley quoted in *Sir Samuel Baker*, p. 425.

Reviews of his biography reflected such praise; in an article published in 1894 in *The Academy* the anthropologist and pro-imperialist Augustus Henry Keane (1833-1912) noted that he was 'an energetic administrator, and a ruler of men surpassed by none in our times', who possessed qualities such as 'frankness, independence, and fearless patriotism, which are of the essence of the typical English gentleman…'.[720] In his obituary of Baker published in *The Geographical Journal* the German-English cartographer Ernst Georg Ravenstein (1834-1913) wrote:

> There have been African explorers who covered more ground, or who, favoured by circumstances, have been able to bring home a greater mass of scientific information; but none whose labours were dictated by nobler motives: none who in the pursuit of their work were called upon to exhibit greater courage, circumspection, and resoluteness.[721]

Why did such a re-appraisal occur? As was discussed in chapter two with regard to the posthumous reputation of General John Jacob, the aftermath of General Gordon's death in 1885 coincided with a period during which the British public became acutely defensive of her imperial heroes to the detriment of humanitarian concerns. While the questioning of the 'developmental' potential of British colonial subjects was raised intermittently since the early nineteenth century, such ideas gained particular strength with reports on the nature of Gordon's death; his alleged decapitation inspired impassioned public outrage.[722] Through the influence of the British press, Gordon became 'an imperial martyr, the figurehead of British imperialism and the sacrifices it required'.[723] Such associations were reinforced through visual and material culture produced in the very late nineteenth century, including

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[720] A.H. Keane, 'Literature', *The Academy*, 27 April 1895, p. 349. On Keane see: Bernard Lightman, *Victorian Science in Context* (Chicago, 1997), pp. 224-8.
[721] E.G. Ravenstein, 'Obituary - Sir Samuel White Baker', *The Geographical Journal*, 3:2 (1894), p. 156.
[722] For a detailed analysis of the death of Gordon using Arabic sources (which chiefly claim that Gordon was 'speared' to death) see: Douglas H. Johnson, 'The Death of Gordon: A Victorian Myth', *JICH*, 10:3 (1982), pp. 285-310.
[723] Stephanie D. Laffer, 'Gordon's Ghosts: British Major-General Charles George Gordon and His Legacies, 1885-1960', Florida State University Dissertation, 2010, pp. 37-8.

George William Joy's renowned oil painting 'General Gordon's Last Stand' (Figure 25).[724] Although Baker never reached such a status of martyrdom as Gordon, their lives had already been intertwined in the public imagination due to their shared experiences in acting on behalf of the Khedive to suppress the slave trade, and Baker's appeals in *The Times* to provide an appropriate rescue party for Gordon crystallised their association.[725] In a review of Baker's biography published in the conservative periodical *The Saturday Review*, the author lamented what they believed to be the lack of figures who harked back to Elizabethan times,

> … that lusty old world still in the heyday of its vigour – with its Shakespeare and his circle of Immortals, to represent the life of letters, and its Humfrey Gilbert and Richard Grenville, not to speak of Raleigh and Drake, and Hawkins, to represent the life of adventure.

While Gordon was said by the author to be not only equal, but potentially even superior to the explorer Humphrey Gilbert, Baker was considered 'the noblest figure except Livingstone in the list of our African explorers' who 'is not unworthy of a place among the stout adventurers of Elizabethan England'.[726] In order to sit more easily with such a portrayal of imperial heroism in a period during which British militarism had intensified (a development that will be further explored in the next chapter), it was necessary for the narrative of Baker's exploits in Equatorial Africa to shift in emphasis from his questionable military actions to suppress the slave trade, to the picture of a paragon of Anglo-Saxon heroism shedding light in the darkest corners of the continent.

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[724] See also: Lincoln Hallinan, *British Commemoratives: Royalty, Politics, War and Sport* (Suffolk, 1995), pp. 102-5.
[725] In the aftermath of the fall of Khartoum Baker wrote to a friend: 'Now that poor Gordon is sacrificed, I unstring my bow; and remain a passive spectator of the misery and shame that have been the result of British interference', *Sir Samuel Baker*, p. 342.
[726] 'An Ideal Sportsman', *The Saturday Review*, 20 April 1895, p. 513.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that while it has generally been understood that Callwell's *Small Wars* (1896) presented the first detailed analysis of 'savage warfare', in fact from the late 1840s discussion and debates on the nature of such warfare can be found in British military thought. The publications of Sir Samuel White Baker and Colonel John Cox Gawler reveal that despite a belief by some commentators that 'savage' wars were too dissimilar to be theorised, experiences in fighting such wars did raise similar themes and practical difficulties. Although earnest attempts to discuss the realities of 'savage warfare' in this earlier period do exist, it is notable that the British military establishment did not attempt to codify doctrine on this particular form of conflict until the 1909 edition of *Field Service Regulations*. This chapter has presented further factors that precluded the publication of an official manual on 'savage warfare' during the mid-to-late nineteenth century, including: perceived inconsistencies of 'savage' military behaviour; a belief that the British excelled in military technology and had not faced decisive defeats against a 'savage' enemy until the late 1870s; and the structure of the British armed forces. Although there were figures who supported the notion that the British Army should dedicate time and energy to understanding the unique practicalities of 'savage' wars, at their very heart they challenged the ideal notion that the British armed forces were to represent and conduct themselves in line with values considered to be the mainstay of the 'civilised' world. Practical exigencies forced military practitioners on the ground to compromise, and conventional military means and methods gave way to the need to adapt to local conditions and terrains.

The second part of this chapter reveals that this compromise was discussed and debated publicly, which, in turn, had an impact upon the manner in which Sir Samuel White Baker justified and later re-framed his use of military force. Despite their perceived 'savage' nature, questions on the ethics of colonial wars – including the overall justice of

undertaking such wars, and the means used – can evidently be found in mid-to-late nineteenth-century public discourse. The final chapter continues to develop this argument by examining the moral discourse surrounding a different case study: the Anglo-Zulu War (1879). It focuses on a number of figures – including George William Cox, John William Colenso, Frances Ellen Colenso, John Morley and James Anson Farrer – who dedicated their intellectual energies to deliberating the tensions between attaining the 'civilising process' through 'uncivilised' means, and who considered whether the 'savage' enemy too fought by their own ideas of ethical conduct. It demonstrates that despite the existence of figures who re-affirmed the moral life of 'savage' warriors, by the final two decades of the nineteenth century, the pessimistic discourse traced in the first chapter during the mid-to-late 1840s again resurfaced, and figures in the British military establishment sought to codify the 'rules' that were to be used against 'uncivilised' opponents, not only in Britain, but also on the international stage.

Chapter Five: An Ethics of 'Savage Warfare'

Part I

The Morality of the Anglo-Zulu War (1879)

Introduction

On 23 February 1898, Captain Frederick William von Herbert, an Englishman of Anglo-German descent who had fought with the Turkish Army during the defence of Plevna in 1877, presented a paper to the RUSI titled 'The Ethics of Warfare'.[727] The first section of Herbert's paper focused predominantly on the question of whether war should be considered 'advantageous' or 'disadvantageous'. Herbert believed in the former, concluding that:

> … war is unavoidable…. [t]herefore it is needful firstly, to regulate its conduct according to a firmly-established and universally-accepted code; secondly, it is desirable to conduct it in a manner to minimise its disadvantages and bring out its advantages; never losing sight, however… that it is necessary to win your war, and that by the quickest means.[728]

Herbert illustrated his belief in a gradual development of an ethics of warfare by referring to numerous historical examples. While 'William the Conqueror, in 1069, laid waste the country between Tees and Humber', and Marlborough, in 1704, 'burned and ravaged Bavaria, previous to the battle of Blenheim',

> Now we have changed all that. Prisoners of war are prisoners during war only. Women and children and the helpless ones are not molested – at

[727] W.V. Herbert, Esq., 'The Ethics of Warfare', *JRUSI*, 42:2 (1898), pp. 1021-33.
[728] Ibid., pp. 1028-9.

> least, not officially. Open towns are not shelled. Neutral territory is respected. The flag of the Ambulance is sacred. Poisoned weapons are held in righteous abhorrence.[729]

Despite claiming the necessity for a 'universal' code of ethics, Herbert's observations were generally understood to relate to wars between *civilised* opponents. Indeed, in response to a comment by Lieutenant-Colonel A.T. Wintle of the Royal Artillery who argued that different cultures were driven by principles other than law (such as religion and reason), Herbert replied:

> Of course, a code of ethics in warfare *could obtain only between nations of an equal, or tolerably equal, state of civilisation*; that stands to reason. There can be no code of ethics, for instance, between Zulus and [the] English; but there can be, I maintain, a code of ethics between the Chinese and Japanese. … I remember distinctly my first days in England. It was at the time, I think, of the Zulu War, and there was a most striking instance of the boys calling in the streets one day 'Shocking murder of a whole British regiment' – it was Isandlwana. A few weeks after it was 'Grand slaughter of the Zulus!' That is the ethics of warfare between a civilised nation and a savage tribe.[730]

In Herbert's view, 'savage warfare' entailed the exercise of unbridled violence, where the tension between winning your war by the quickest means possible, yet doing so with restraint and in accordance with ethical norms, could be disregarded due to the perceived nature and customs of the 'savage' enemy warrior.

Colonel Lonsdale Augustus Hale (1834-1914), who chaired the lecture, further remarked: 'the ethics of an army in the field is a reflector of the ethics of the nation to which it belongs, and therefore agreement is possible only between armies of nations whose national ethics is similar in character'.[731] The assumption underlying Hale's response was that inhabitants of 'savage' nations possessed either an incompatible or non-existent

[729] Ibid., p. 1025.
[730] Ibid., p. 1032. Emphasis added.
[731] Ibid., p. 1033.

understanding of ethics in their own social life, character and culture, which was reflected in their national life, and therefore, in their approach to warfare. Hale did not view the military actions of 'savage' opponents as the result of a coherent, pragmatic decision-making process in order to discern a form of action that was advantageous to their position as irregular fighters in an asymmetrical conflict. Instead, he interpreted the actions of the 'savage' enemy – such as, for instance, engaging in ambushes – as a reflection of their 'treacherous' character; a position which reflected the earlier opinions of figures such as Sir Samuel White Baker who had himself articulated, '[t]he treachery of the negro is beyond belief; he has not a moral human instinct, and is below the brute'.[732]

Through an analysis of the case study of the Anglo-Zulu War, the first part of this chapter develops the argument raised in chapters two and four: that although such wars were understood to be fought against 'savage' opponents, the morality of colonial or 'savage warfare' was discussed and debated by members of the British public. It demonstrates that although views such as those espoused by Sir Samuel, Captain Herbert, Colonel Hale and Lieutenant-Colonel Wintle were widespread during the late nineteenth century, and found their ultimate expression in Callwell's *Small Wars* (1896), in the late 1870s and early 1880s a humanitarian counter-discourse can be traced re-affirming the morality of 'savage' life, and challenging perceived distinctions between the 'civilised' and 'savage' warrior. While existing historiography on nineteenth-century anti-imperialism and pacifism recognises the contemporary criticisms raised against what was perceived to be the injustice of the British undertaking the Anglo-Zulu War,[733] such histories are rarely considered from the perspective of the field of military ethics, nor are they analysed in light of nineteenth-

[732] Baker, *Ismailia*, 2nd edition, p. 374.
[733] An invaluable summary on the wealth of existing literature on the Anglo-Zulu War can be found in: Harold E. Raugh, *Anglo-Zulu War, 1879: A Selected Bibliography* (Lanham, 2011).

century discourses on 'civilised' and 'savage warfare'.[734] This chapter begins to address this oversight firstly by examining the discussions and debates that arose on the morality of the Anglo-Zulu War, in both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* senses. With regard to this particular imperial context the first section of this chapter presents three challenges to the clarity of a 'civilised'/'savage' distinction by demonstrating that although the Zulu were considered 'savage' opponents, the justice of undertaking the war was emphasised on the British side; the British were recognised to have undertaken actions considered to be 'uncivilised' during the conflict; and despite considering the military customs of the Zulu – such as the disembowelment of their enemies – as markers of their 'savagery', military practitioners of the period were also willing to acknowledge and articulate their cultural basis. This section further demonstrates that contemporary critics of the conflict – including George William Cox, John William Colenso, Frances Ellen Colenso and John Morley – did indeed assert that a code of ethics existed between the British and a 'savage' foe. It argues that a common thread associates those who criticised the war: they expressly believed in the existence of a moral law in 'savage' life.

The second part of this chapter analyses in closer detail the arguments put forward by the polymath James Anson Farrer (1849-1925), who, despite not being a member of the armed forces, contributed the most detailed discussion on the military ethics of non-European cultures in Britain during the late nineteenth century, and explicitly affirmed their conception and observance of a moral code – both in their social and military life. Through an analysis of the reception of Farrer's work, this chapter demonstrates that a significant turning-point on this issue occurred in the final decades of the nineteenth century. In the midst of the strengthening of British militarism and popular imperialism, and the rhetoric of professionalisation of the fields of science and anthropology, sympathy for the 'savage'

[734] For the Anglo-Zulu War, the exception being Lieven, "'Butchering the Brutes All Over the Place", pp. 614-32.

gave way to the resurgence of an intellectual climate of 'scientific racism' and theories espousing Anglo-Saxon superiority, evidenced during the mid-to-late 1840s and discussed in chapter one. This chapter concludes by arguing that it is this particular intellectual and cultural context in Britain that explains the resonance of the arguments of Colonel Herbert, Colonel Hale, and Colonel Charles Callwell who endeavoured to fortify a distinction between the 'civilised' and the 'savage' warrior; a view that British military representatives sought officially to sanction at the Hague Peace Conference of 1899.

Military Ethics in Practice – The Anglo-Zulu War (1879) and *Jus Ad Bellum*

The Anglo-Zulu War was hastened by the desire of the High Commissioner Sir Bartle Frere to establish a confederation of South Africa. He believed, however, that his wish to unite the disparate groups of the region – including the Boer republics, independent African tribes and the British colonies – was threatened by the strength of the Zulu, a view reinforced by Sir Theophilus Shepstone (1817-1893), the British Governor of Natal and the Transvaal. In December 1878, an ultimatum was sent to Cetshwayo kaMpande (c. 1826-1884), King of the Zulus, insisting (among other stipulations) that he disband his army and accept rule by a British Resident. Despite lack of government approval, Frere embarked upon preparations for the British Army, led by Lord Chelmsford, to invade. On 11 January 1879 the ultimatum expired, and three columns of the British Army crossed the Buffalo River into Zululand.[735]

Although war was being undertaken against an enemy which was perceived to be 'savage', it is significant that the key instigators of military action, Shepstone and Frere,[736] framed their arguments in moral terms to justify to the wider British public their decision to proceed with an invasion. Military engagement by the British was argued by Frere to be of

[735] For a detailed account of the war see: Laband, *Zulu Warriors*, pp. 197-265.
[736] For a revisionist interpretation which views Frere's actions as part of a broader geo-political strategy to protect British imperial interests against the threat of Russia see: Damian P. O'Connor, 'Imperial Strategy and the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879', *The Historian*, 68:2 (2006), pp. 285-304.

a *defensive* nature – the war was said to be undertaken for pre-emptive reasons, although, as some commentaries on the war reveal, it is arguably more appropriate to designate them as preventive measures as there seems to have been no imminent risk of attack by the Zulus.[737] In a despatch to Sir Michael Hicks Beach (1837-1916), Secretary of State for the Colonies (1878-1880), Frere wrote:

> It is, however, clear to my mind that our right to interfere with his [Cetshwayo's] proceedings rests on a different, and I think a higher ground than that of any prescriptive dependence of the Zulu Sovereign on us. It is simply *our own right of self-preservation*.[738]

Frere's notion that the British were undertaking the war as a measure of self-defence was often reiterated in contemporary military narratives. The preface to Major Ashe and Captain E.V. Wyatt Edgell's *The Story of the Zulu Campaign* (1880) – an account whose exaggerated praise for the British Army raised questions about its impartiality[739] – referred to Frere as 'one of England's greatest, wisest, and most humane administrators', who was aware that 'the great and time-honoured law of self-defence sometimes compels a State, like an individual, to resort to arms, and the Appeal of Battle, when all peaceful modes of arrangement have been vainly tried, becomes occasionally unavoidable'.[740]

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[737] For a discussion on Anglo-Zulu relations prior to the outbreak of the war see: [John Morley], 'The Plain Story of the Zulu War', *Fortnightly Review*, 1 March 1879, pp. 330-56, *passim*. Morley concluded that two primary reasons shifted relations between the British and the Zulu from prudence and friendship to conflict: the need to justify the annexation of the Transvaal so that the Boers acquiesced to British power, and Frere's belief in the 'civilising mission'. See, especially, pp. 351-6.

[738] This right was argued by Frere to be a 'first law of nature'. 'Despatch Sir Bartle Frere to Sir Michael Hicks Beach, 2 December 1878', in Major the Hon. Gerald French, *Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War* (Barnsley, [1939] 2014), p. 45. Emphasis added. On the position of Frere, *The Examiner* wrote: 'He was convinced that "an attempt of native tribes to combine to resist the white man and drive him back had long been foreseen." … The temptation was terrible to a statesman who, rightly or wrongly, thought himself in the presence of a great and imminent danger, and who felt that safety lay only in grasping the nettle and forcibly crushing out the sting'. 'History of the Zulu War', 17 April 1880, pp. 502-4.

[739] 'Book Reviews', *The Athenaeum*, 5 March 1881, p. 326.

[740] Major Ashe and Captain E.V. Wyatt Edgell, *The Story of the Zulu Campaign* (1880), p. vi. Edgell lost his life at the Battle of Ulundi, and according to Ashe, he had compiled the book from their mutual correspondence.

Conservative-leaning local newspapers and periodicals often framed the conflict in terms of a defensive fight against the 'savage', war-hungry Zulu. Prior to the outbreak of the war, *The Morning Post* wrote:

> … we cannot submit tamely to encroachments even on the part of a savage. Too little regard has been paid of late to the national prestige, and it is quite time that we should be prepared to uphold it in every part of the globe where the interests or rights of our country and people are assailed. By doing this, our power will be strengthened afresh, and the prestige of the Empire be once more enhanced.[741]

The conservative periodical *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* too argued that the British

> … knew enough of the Zulu character, and of the disposition of the Zulu king, to be aware that no pacific counsels would allay the war-fever which had seized on Cetywayo and his followers…. With the Zulu savage no arguments have force save those that are backed up by a pistol….[742]

In the midst of such pro-imperialist militarism, significant criticisms prior, during, and in the aftermath of the war were nonetheless to be found in periodical literature of a more moderate editorial standpoint. Importantly, what united such critical figures was an outspokenness against the war that was motivated by a sympathy for the cause of the Zulus, as well as a recognition of the existence of moral life in Zulu culture. George William Cox, who was born in India and ordained by the English Bishop Samuel Wilberforce (1805-1873) in 1850, accompanied the theologian and social activist John William Colenso during his first visit to South Africa as Bishop of Natal (1853-4). Cox became an ardent supporter of Colenso and his controversial views on interpreting the scriptures from a liberal standpoint. In Natal, Colenso was estranged from colonial society due to his advocacy for the rights of indigenous Africans, and he outspokenly criticised the

[741] 'The News from the Cape is again Unsatisfactory', *The Morning Post*, 21 February 1878, p. 4.
[742] 'The Zulu War', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, March 1879, p. 376.

attempts made by Frere to stoke fears of Zulu aggression.[743] In an article written by Cox published in the progressive periodical *Fraser's Magazine* (1880) which severely criticised British instigation of the war, Cox argued that Cetshwayo had adhered to his own 'policy of strict self-defence'. He continued, '… if the tales told be true, there have been committed acts of deliberate bad faith and wanton cruelty which must make the British name a byword of scorn to barbarians who still possess some truth and honour'.[744]

Cornelius Vijn, a young Dutch trader who found himself in the midst of the conflict and narrated his first-hand account of the war in *Cetshwayo's Dutchman* (1880)[745] was allegedly told by Cetshwayo after the Battle of Isandlwana: 'It is the Whites who have come to fight with me in my own country, and not I that will go to fight with them. My intention, therefore, is only to defend myself in my own country…'.[746] Such perspectives gained greater resonance in Britain with the election of Gladstone as Prime Minister in 1880. Gladstone, who in discussing the Second Anglo-Afghan War in his Midlothian election campaign tour in November 1879 made a passionate plea to '[r]emember the rights of the savage as we call him… the sanctity of human life in the hill villages of Afghanistan among the winter snows, is as inviolable in the eye of Almighty God as can be your own',[747] had also criticised Disraeli's foreign policy in South Africa three months earlier at a speech delivered at Chester. Gladstone argued that the government had 'embarked the Crown and people in an unjust war…'. He continued:

> … not only did we invade that land of the Zulus, but unfortunately, by that terrible calamity which befell our troops, they practically drove us out of the land… they did not cross the little bright stream which separated their land from ours, but simply *were contented to wait within their*

[743] Jonathan A. Draper, *The Eye of the Storm: Bishop John William Colenso and the Crisis of Biblical Interpretation* (2003), pp. 43, 348.
[744] George W. Cox, 'The English Nation and the Zulu War', *Fraser's Magazine*, February 1880, p. 269.
[745] Incidentally, this book was translated by Colenso.
[746] Cornelius Vijn, *Cetshwayo's Dutchman: Being the Private Journal of a White Trader in Zululand During the British Invasion*, Rev. J.W. Colenso (trans), (1880), p. 31.
[747] Quoted in Rob Johnson, 'General Roberts, the Occupation of Kabul, and the Problems of Transition, 1879-1880', *War in History*, 20:3 (2013), p. 313.

> *own territories for the renewal of our wanton, unprovoked, mischievous, terrible attack.*[748]

One of the most vocal criticisms of British military intervention in South Africa was published anonymously in March 1879 in the now broadly liberal *Fortnightly Review*, which had sought earlier to present an impartial platform for a wider range of political views. Entitled 'The Plain Story of the Zulu War', the article was written by the editor, John Morley, a freethinker and great champion of causes such as women's rights and the need for a national education system. In his article, Morley expressed great dismay that the British had failed to acknowledge the existence of the moral life of the Zulu; a failure which had severe consequences – not only for the Zulu, but also for British national character, which he believed underwent a 're-barbarization' through the pursuit of wars under false pretexts.[749] Morley argued that although the Zulu could be seen as

> barbarous peoples … in spite of their barbarism, [they] have a life of their own and a social system of their own, with unwritten laws, usages, and customs, as strong and as binding as ours, constituting a national life less organic than ours, but not any less real or stable.[750]

He criticised what he considered to be the hypocrisy of British officials who 'recognise neither law nor morality as binding upon us in our dealings with them, yet we will put up with nothing short of the very letter of the law in their dealings with us, under penalty of devastation, annexation, or extermination, as may chance to suit us best'.[751] He concluded his article by arguing that from a *jus ad bellum* sense the British undertaking of the Anglo-

[748] George Barnett Smith, *The Life of the Right Honourable William Ewart Gladstone* (6 vols, 1880-2), iii, p. 387; Gladstone quoted in Cox, 'The English Nation', p. 269. Emphasis added.
[749] [Morley], 'The Plain Story', p. 356.
[750] Ibid., p. 338.
[751] Ibid.

Zulu War was 'one of the worst crimes that has been perpetuated in our history'.[752] In Morley's eyes, the British had embarked upon an unjust war.

The preceding public discussions on the war reveal that professed distinctions between 'civilised' and 'savage' opponents did not preclude an insistence on the moral legitimacy of the undertaking of military action on *both* sides of the argument. While those critical of British actions from a *jus ad bellum* sense – including Cox, Vijn, Gladstone and Morley – sought to re-affirm the humanity and morality of the Zulu, supporters of the war sought to emphasise that the British were embarking upon the conflict for reasons of self-defence, which was considered to be a just cause. As evidenced in chapter four in the context of Baker's wars in Equatorial Africa, although Cetshwayo and the Zulu nation were regarded as 'savages', supporters of the war – including government officials, military practitioners and journal and newspaper editors – sought publicly to re-assert the moral legitimacy of British actions. Furthermore, due to growing criticism, particularly in the aftermath of the Battle of Isandlwana (a decisive Zulu victory where over 1,300 British soldiers were killed), even narratives sympathetic to the decisions made by Frere and Chelmsford emphasised the courage and bravery of the Zulu warrior: in Ashe and Edgell's *The Story of the Zulu Campaign* (1880) the heroism of the attack at Ekhowe by the Zulu Commander Dabulamanzi was compared to that of Marshal Ney at Waterloo.[753] As Michael Lieven has recognised, such re-appraisals were often utilised by military practitioners in their autobiographies and campaign narratives to legitimate the cause of the British, and shift public perception of the war away from the notion that it was an unjust campaign fought by the Gatling gun against a poorly armed, defensive enemy.[754]

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[752] Ibid., p. 356.
[753] Ashe and Edgell, *The Story of the Zulu Campaign*, pp. 166-7, 9.
[754] Michael Lieven, 'Heroism, Heroics and the Making of Heroes: The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879', *Albion*, 30:3 (1998), pp. 436-8.

Jus in Bello – Atrocities Undertaken by the 'Civilised'

A second challenge to perceived distinctions between 'civilisation' and 'savagery' was reflected in discussions on *jus in bello*. Accounts narrating atrocities committed by the British against non-combatants – due, it was argued by some, to the perception that their opponents were 'uncivilised' – were uncovered by commentators at the time. In the *History of the Zulu War and its Origin* (1880) Frances Ellen Colenso, daughter of the Bishop of Natal, narrated the shameful treatment of the women and children of the Ama-Hlubi tribe when the British began to question the loyalty of their chief Langalibalele (c1814-1889) who had taken refuge in Natal, prior to the outbreak of the war.[755] His men were initially accused by the British of possessing unregistered guns, and as tensions escalated, the men of the Ama-Hlubi tribe left Natal, while the women and children took refuge in caves. During the British expedition against Langalibalele, Colenso wrote that 'a series of attempts, more or less successful, to hunt the unfortunate [women and] children out of their hiding-places and take them prisoners' took place. She continued:

> Poor frightened creatures were smoked to death or killed by rockets in caves which they dared not leave for fear of a worse fate at the hands of their captors….
>
> These acts were chiefly committed by the irregular (white) troops and native levies, and are a signal proof of how great a crime it is to turn undisciplined or savage troops, over whom no responsible person has any real control, loose upon a defenceless people.[756]

Colenso's book generated mixed reviews – some charged her with partiality and diminishing the threat of Cetshwayo, while others praised her work as a necessary exposé of the 'long course of chicane, misrepresentation, and double-dealing which brought… [the

[755] Langalibalele was driven out of Zululand in 1848 by King kaMpande, father of Cetshwayo who reigned from 1840-72.
[756] Frances E. Colenso, *History of the Zulu War and its Origin* (1880), pp. 30-1. Emphasis in original. Colenso did note that Major Durnford established a hospital-tent for the injured women and children, yet further argued that 'such humanity was by no means the general rule', pp. 31-2.

Zulu] war about'.[757] Claims of bias were clearly relative to the political sympathies of the publication or the reviewer. The conservative periodical *The Saturday Review* wrote: '… we must say at the outset that her general handling of the subject leaves a strong impression, which we think will be felt by every reader who takes it up without any prejudice, that he is reading a brief drawn up in the interests of one side rather than an impartial narrative'.[758] A conservative review in *The Examiner* agreed, concluding: 'It is rather a brief held by an ardent sympathiser, on behalf of African races… against their oppressors'.[759] The chiefly liberal periodical *The Academy* expressed greater sympathy with Colenso and the Zulu cause: 'We have no hesitation in pronouncing the present work the fairest, the most complete, and altogether the most valuable which has appeared on the Zulu War and its antecedents'.[760] British use of rocket-traps (or 'dynamite tactics') was corroborated by a number of contemporary accounts. *The Manchester Guardian* reported the following first-hand account of the siege at Ekhowe:

> One morning the enemy came down in such force that we had to retire, and they always followed us up in the evening…. We got rather sick of this, so one evening the engineers put down 18 oz. of dynamite at the point we had left off working at with a pole stuck in the ground, and a friction tube connecting it with the dynamite. We had really hardly left it when about 30 Zulus came down, saw the pole with 'Torpedo' written on it, and at once tried to pull it up. It was driven down so tight that one man could not pull it out by himself, so two or three more caught hold of it, and up it came, blowing about six Zulus to atoms and frightening the rest out of their wits. The moral [psychological] effect of this manoeuvre was excellent, as they never again interfered with our work.[761]

This tension implicit in the 'civilised' British undertaking 'uncivilised' actions was further discussed by one of the few British survivors of the Battle of Isandlwana, General Sir

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[757] William Wickham, 'History of the Zulu War', *The Academy*, 8 May 1880, p. 335.
[758] 'Miss Colenso's Zulu War', *The Saturday Review*, 29 May 1880, pp. 699-70.
[759] 'History of the Zulu War', *The Examiner*, 17 April 1880, p. 503.
[760] Wickham, 'History of the Zulu War', p. 335.
[761] 'Besieged in Ekhowa', *The Manchester Guardian*, 10 May 1879, p. 9. See also: 'The Zulu War, With Colonel Pearson at Ekowe: By One Who Was There', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, July 1879, p. 13, though in this case it was said that 'Master Zulu was too crafty though, and let the mysterious stick and hill alone'.

Horace Smith-Dorrien (1858-1930). The son of a colonel, Smith-Dorrien was educated at Harrow, and entered the service of the 95th (Derbyshire) Regiment of Foot. Mentioned in Despatches, and receiving the distinguished South Africa Medal and clasp, Smith-Dorrien provided a candid account of the aftermath of the Battle of Isandlwana, and the military customs of the Zulus.[762] Smith-Dorrien's seemingly more balanced account was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that his memoirs were published in 1920, over forty decades after the event, and at a time during which the Anglo-Zulu War was often romanticised in light of the mechanized nature of the First World War and its accompanying atrocities.[763] However, in the context of existing contemporary criticisms of the war, his work nonetheless introduces an important reflective account from the perspective of a military practitioner who witnessed the campaign first-hand.

Smith-Dorrien recognised that most of his fellow soldiers saw the Zulu as being 'possessed of savagery beyond description', yet he continued by admitting that 'we had no conception then of how civilisation would produce a refinement of brutality and bestiality alongside which our Zulus would be regarded as comparative angels'.[764] In the aftermath of the Battle of Rorke's Drift (22-23 January), Smith-Dorrien, who was placed in charge of the transport depot, arrived to resume charge. Among the dead he noticed that his wagon had been 'riddled and looted' and that the gallows he had set up to make riems (straps of leather) had been used to hang Zulus 'who were supposed to have behaved treacherously the day after the Rorke's Drift fight'.[765] He was accused by Staff Officer Major Francis Clery 'of having given the order'. Smith-Dorrien was, however, 'exonerated… when it was found that it was a case of lynch law performed by incensed men, who were bitter at the loss of their

[762] General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, *Memories of Forty-Eight Years' Service* (New York, 1925). Hereafter, *Memories*.
[763] Lieven, "'Butchering the Brutes'", p. 615.
[764] Smith-Dorrien, *Memories*, p. 19.
[765] Ibid., p. 10.

comrades. Other incidents of the same sort occurred in the next few days before law and order were re-established'.[766]

The controversial claim that the British took no prisoners of war was also made, yet countered, in a number of contemporary accounts written by members of the armed forces. In Captain Henry Hallam Parr's *A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars* (1880), Parr – who was Adjutant and Military Secretary to Frere (1877-1880) – discussed the treatment of Zulu dead and wounded in the aftermath of the Battle of Rorke's Drift. He wrote that:

> Only two or three wounded men were found, and these were taken care of and treated by the surgeons of the force. There were never probably many; but though strict orders were given on the subject, it was impossible to prevent the Natal natives, … killing, according to their custom, any wounded they came across on their way.[767]

Parr argued vehemently against 'rumours' that the British regulars treated captured prisoners of war with calculated cruelty, and provided a nuanced response to such claims. He reasoned that due to the experience of British soldiers being attacked by wounded Zulus, the notion of giving quarter was believed to be a 'considerable danger', which might have led to the existence of the notion that forbearance was not conceded to the enemy. Due to this, he argued that 'some idea will be formed of the difficulty in extending to the brave but savage enemy precisely the same rules that are observed in civilized warfare'.[768]

As the preceding narratives reveal, such unethical behaviour was often dismissed as actions performed by native irregulars who lacked a sense of morality and patriotism, or were acting according to their own customs. When British regulars were implicated in such actions they were understood to have been driven by feelings of retribution through the loss of their comrades, or fear of attack by wounded Zulus; such behaviour was often presented as a *responsive* measure to the realities of fighting against 'savage' and 'uncivilised'

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[766] Ibid., p. 19.
[767] Captain Henry Hallam Parr, *A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars* (1880), p. 263. Partly quoted in Lieven, '"Butchering the Brutes"', p. 623.
[768] Parr, *A Sketch*, pp. 263-4.

opponents, and in turn, the British soldier was often characterised as maintaining their inherent moral understanding under the most trying of circumstances. As Parr articulated:

> Wars against a savage and uncivilized enemy must always be more or less brutalizing, but it may safely be said that as no soldiers in Europe but ours can be made to remain in civil riots under abuse and blows without retaliating, so no soldiers but ours could have come so clean-handed out of a conflict such as has just been concluded in South Africa.[769]

In part, such justifications were clearly used in order to defend the reputation of the British armed forces; however, as chapters one and four show, there was also a growing understanding from the mid-nineteenth century that these were some of the fundamental – albeit lamentable – characteristics of war against those considered to be 'uncivilised' enemies. Frances Ellen Colenso expressed the incoherence of such sentiments bluntly: 'The excuse made by those in authority in such cases is always: "We did not intend these things to take place, but horrors are always attendant on savage warfare."'"[770]

Savage 'Civilised' Conduct

Narratives of the Anglo-Zulu War also revealed instances of Cetshwayo abiding by a code of military ethics by refusing to use poison and insisting on the protection of captured prisoners of war and non-combatants. Such descriptions challenged the characterisations made by contemporary journals and populist newspapers of Cetshwayo's 'savage' nature. The *Illustrated London News*, for instance, published a rather imposing portrait of Cetshwayo on the cover of the issue dated 22 February 1879, referred to his 'savage tyranny', and characterised the Zulu as possessing 'an innate love of fighting' (Figure 26).[771] By contrast, Vijn's account noted that:

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[769] Ibid., p. 264.
[770] Colenso, *History of the Zulu War*, p. 37.
[771] 'The Zulu War in South Africa', *Illustrated London News*, 22 February 1879, pp. 168, 170. The portrait was drawn from life in 1877 by the artist Edward Tilt.

> … a Tonga doctor [came] to the Zulu King, offering his services, viz. for killing the Whites by poisoning the springs of water for them. But the King would not listen to this. He said that 'he would not fight with the Whites in any such inhuman manner, but he would fight in honourable fashion, for he had men enough for this'. Also he gave orders always to his people that, 'whenever they were able to get Whitemen into their hands alive, they were not to kill them, but must bring them to him'.[772]

While not exploring the intricacies of Zulu social and military customs, in his article 'The English Nation and the Zulu War', George William Cox – inspired by Vijn's account – wrote:

> Cetshwayo undoubtedly had his rifles. With these he met us in the open field, and with these, if it be granted that our cause of quarrel was adequate and righteous, we were justified in meeting him. *But he refused on his side to use means against which his conscience revolted.*[773]

Smith-Dorrien too noted that the Zulus adhered to the norm of the protection of non-combatants in warfare. During the Zulus' final charge at the Battle of Isandlwana, whereby they proceeded to envelop the right flank of the British, with the ultimate aim of meeting their two 'horns of the buffalo',[774] Smith-Dorrien made his escape through the 'neck' of a group of 4,000 Zulus on his pony, with 'revolver in hand'. To his astonishment, he made it through the line of retreat, reaching Fugitive's Drift, 'the descent to which was almost a precipice'. Scaling down the rocks to the Buffalo River, he managed to cross to the opposite bank, and fighting off a number of Zulus with his revolver, he made his way to Helpmakaar by sunset, 'having done twenty miles on foot from the river…'. Smith-Dorrien believed that he had been spared during his escape from Isandlwana as the Zulus 'had been told by their King Cetywayo that black coats were civilians and were not worth killing. I had a blue patrol jacket on, and it is noticeable that the only five officers who escaped –

[772] Vijn, *Cetshwayo's Dutchman*, p. 31.
[773] Cox, 'The English Nation', p. 269. Emphasis added.
[774] For a visual depiction of this manoeuvre see: 'The Zulu War, With Colonel Pearson at Ekowe', p. 5.

Essex, Cochrane, Gardner, Curling and myself – had blue coats'.[775] In light of the comments made by Vijn, rather than judging non-combatants by their 'worth', it is likely that Cetshwayo had ordered his men to refrain from attacking non-combatants from a moral standpoint.

Recognition of Zulu Military Customs

Smith-Dorrien's account of the battle is especially noteworthy due to his understanding (or rather, admission of) the reasoning behind Zulu military customs which were interpreted by many commentators at the time of the war simply as a reflection of their 'savage' nature. The Zulu custom of disembowelling their victims was well-known by the British.[776] In his account of the war, special correspondent of the *London Standard*, Charles L. Norris-Newman, wrote in vivid, harrowing detail:

> … how dreadful were those weary hours that followed! [W]hile all had to watch and wait, through the darkness, with what patience we could muster, for the dawn of day; with the knowledge that we were standing and lying amid and surrounded by the corpses of our late comrades – though in what fearful numbers we then but little knew. Many a vow of vengeance was breathed in the stillness of the night; and many and deep were the sobs that came from the breasts of men who, perhaps, had never sobbed before, at discovering, even by that dim light, the bodies of dear friends, brutally massacred, stripped of all clothing, disembowelled, mutilated, and in some cases decapitated.[777]

While Smith-Dorrien conceded that the Zulus 'fought to kill, and undoubtedly killed the wounded and mutilated the bodies', he also argued that they were 'a very noble race', and that the act of disembowelling had an important cultural relevance; it was not an action devoid of purpose: 'a predominant superstition with them', he wrote, 'was that if they did not disembowel a fallen enemy, their own stomachs would swell up when that of their dead

[775] Smith-Dorrien, *Memories*, p. 15.
[776] See, for instance: Chas. H. Allen, 'The Kafirs and Zulus of South Africa', *Golden Hours*, April 1879, p. 252; A.N. Montgomery, 'Isandlwana: A Visit Six Months after the Disaster', *The Leisure Hour*, September 1882, pp. 536-40.
[777] Charles L. Norris-Newman, *In Zululand with the British throughout the War of 1879* (1880), p. 62.

enemy did, and that therefore they must let out the gas'.[778] Although it could be argued that due to the passing of time Smith-Dorrien had sentimentalised his view of the Zulu, the meaning of such customs was also acknowledged in accounts by military practitioners in the late 1870s and early 1880s. Captain Parr, for instance, also noted this custom in his 1880 account:

> … when the sack of Isandhlwana was complete, … [some] Zulu regiments who had been engaged were scattered all over the camp… [and were seen] stabbing each dead man, so that the corpse should not swell (the Zulu superstition is that if this is not done, as the body swells and corrupts, the right hand and arm of its slayer also swells and corrupts)….[779]

This practice was also mentioned by Alexander Nixon Montgomery, formerly a Captain of the Royal Fusiliers, and Commandant of the 1st Natal Native Contingent, for an article in the *Leisure Hour* (1882),[780] as well as Fleet-Surgeon Henry F. Norbury of the Royal Navy in his account *The Naval Brigade in South Africa* (1880). Norbury wrote:

> They never spare a wounded foe, but stab him to death with an assegai, working the blade round in the body, simultaneously making a horrible yelling noise. They usually lay open the abdomen to prevent the corpse swelling from decomposition, for they have a superstition that, were the dead body to swell, they would do so likewise.[781]

Furthermore, some commentators associated Zulu ferocity not exclusively with a 'savage' nature, but rather with the effect of Cetshwayo's social constraints on marriage. Such a recognition gains greater significance in light of the existence of detailed accounts of Zulu military customs which easily lent themselves to propaganda heightening characterisations of the Zulu as a 'savage', bloodthirsty foe. While *Chambers's Journal* noted that 'no man is allowed to marry without the express sanction of the king, which is granted to whole

[778] Smith-Dorrien, *Memories*, p. 19.
[779] Parr, *A Sketch*, p. 235.
[780] Montgomery, 'Isandlwana', pp. 537-8.
[781] Henry F. Norbury, *The Naval Brigade in South Africa During the Years 1877-79* (1880), pp. 48-9.

regiments at once, but almost never until the men are past middle age, and have "washed their spears" in an enemy's blood',[782] Smith-Dorrien wrote:

> It was a rule of their race that no man could marry until he had 'dipped his spear' – in other words, had killed his man in battle. There had not been a war for a long time. … The country was at the time we fought full of young men anxious to qualify for matrimony.[783]

The military practitioners considered here may have presented their own interpretation of the customs of the Zulus; however, what is important to highlight is a willingness to provide a greater context to such customs, and not merely dismiss them as incomprehensibly devoid of cultural significance or purpose. Although it could be suggested that Smith-Dorrien's recognition of the cultural meaning of Zulu military practices correlated straightforwardly with his view that the Zulu demonstrated a 'high standard of morality' and that they were 'a sober and honest race' who had been corrupted by European imperialism (a tone and sentiment reflected in the very-early nineteenth-century discourse on the native inhabitants of the Cape examined in chapter one),[784] such a conclusion did not necessarily follow. Captain Parr also recognised the customs of the Zulus, yet championed the British undertaking of the conflict, and presented questionable and at times highly prejudiced opinions of the Zulu enemy.[785] Indeed, in a severely critical review of Parr's work in *The Academy*, Frances Colenso wrote that Parr '[m]erely repeats in a concise and handy form all those arguments against the Zulu king with which Sir Bartle Frere defended his war…'.[786] Recognition of the moral life of the Zulu was therefore common – yet not essential – for commentators to (at times inadvertently) subvert negative understandings of 'savagery'.

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[782] 'Home-Life of the Zulus', *Chambers's Journal*, 2 August 1879, p. 487.
[783] Smith-Dorrien, *Memories*, p. 19.
[784] Ibid., pp. 19-20. See also: J.A. Farrer, *Zululand and the Zulus*, 2nd edition (1879), pp. 110-12.
[785] See, for instance: Parr, *A Sketch*, pp. 261-2.
[786] Frances Ellen Colenso, 'Book Review - *A Sketch*', 25 September 1880, p. 213.

This chapter has thus far presented three further challenges to the terms of the 'civilised'/'savage' distinction. Although the Zulu were understood to be 'savage' opponents, the war was justified through the use of moral language; accounts of the battle demonstrate that the British – considered to be the 'civilised' opponent – undertook actions considered 'uncivilised', while the 'savage' Zulu demonstrated actions believed to be the mainstay of 'civilised' European opponents. Furthermore, the cultural significance of what some commentators perceived to be their 'savage' military customs was publicly recognised. Significantly, the controversy over the morality of this particular conflict presents a greater bifurcation between the perspectives of members of the British military establishment and liberal commentators, which was characteristic of this later period. As the second half of this chapter demonstrates, this bifurcation strengthened during the very late nineteenth century as a consensus on the operational characteristics of 'savage warfare' became consolidated.

This chapter now turns to examine the work of the polymath James Anson Farrer who contributed the most detailed discussion on the military ethics of non-European cultures in Britain during the late nineteenth century. Farrer illustrated his arguments in light of contemporary conflicts and often referred to the character and customs of the Zulu Army. Indeed, at the outbreak of the war, he published a short book titled *Zululand and the Zulus*, which explored their social customs, military organisation and beliefs. Although his discussion on the Zulu military was very brief, Farrer did question why the army of Cetshwayo was considered to be 'a greater menace to the colony of Natal now than it was before or after the present boundaries were fixed', as the Zulu military system and organisation had not developed in any significant way prior to the British invasion.[787] Despite this, with regard to the overall morality of the war, in the preface to the same edition of the book Farrer articulated his confidence in the British cause:

[787] Farrer, *Zululand*, pp. 107-8.

> The causes of the present war are so well known that it is not necessary to discuss them here. It is difficult now to decide on their merits at so great a distance from the scene of action, though it is scarcely conceivable that war was precipitated without just reason, or without every effort having been made to avert it.[788]

However, by the time his article 'Savage and Civilised Warfare' was presented to the Anthropological Institute in late 1879, Farrer had changed his views considerably. In the article, he wrote:

> … it is probable that the late Zulu war would never have occurred had it been possible for a Christian Commissioner to believe that a heathen nation could do such a thing as keep its word, refraining from invasion or attack so long as it was not invaded or attacked itself, by reason of its confidence in the strict observation by either side of a solemn agreement made between itself and its neighbour. War might have been averted had there not been a slowness to believe that overtures for peace by a savage could be intended as aught else than a military *ruse* or could be expressed in any other language than the diplomatic forms of European warfare.[789]

The second half of this chapter analyses Farrer's work in detail, in order to demonstrate that through his insistence on the presence of moral life in those deemed to be 'savage', he was able not only to challenge the notion that 'savage' warriors did not comprehend or adhere to norms of warfare in practice, but also to further expose the negative consequences that arose when distinctions between 'civilisation' and 'savagery' were perpetuated. Furthermore, by placing the reception of Farrer's later work in the context of the final decades of the nineteenth century, this chapter concludes with a detailed analysis as to why Farrer's more liberal, pacifist standpoint failed to resonate during this period, and outlines the developments that led to the 'triumph' of the discourse of the 'savage' warrior and the fortification of a distinction between 'savage' and 'civilised' warfare at the turn of the century.

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[788] Ibid., preface.
[789] J.A. Farrer, 'Savage and Civilized Warfare', *JAI*, 9 (1880), p. 364. Emphasis in original.

Part II

A Recognition of the Existence of Moral Law in 'Savage' Life

James Anson Farrer (1849-1925) was educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford, graduating in 1871. The son of a clergyman, Farrer was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in 1875, became a magistrate for Westmorland, and by 1897 attained the position of High Sheriff of Yorkshire (Figure 27). He was a prolific writer, and maintained an interest in a diverse range of subjects including religion, politics and criminal rehabilitation. His views on the existence of a moral philosophy in savage cultures can be found in his work *Primitive Manners and Customs*, published in 1879.[790]

Primitive Manners and Customs

In this work Farrer was not afraid to challenge what he believed to be inaccuracies in existing anthropological literature on non-European cultures, as well as the questionable treatment of such cultures by the 'civilised' throughout history. He was deeply sceptical of the effectiveness of British missionary movements, concluding, '[w]hether the welfare and improvement of savage tribes would not be best left to themselves and to time? That they are not incapable of independent improvement there is abundant evidence to show'.[791] Farrer's anti-missionary sentiment would be more forcefully articulated in a chapter on 'Barbarian Warfare' in his later work, *Military Manners and Customs* (1885), where he claimed that missionaries played a troubling role in 'weakening the native political force by the

[790] Farrer, *Primitive Manners and Customs*, pp. xv-xvi.
[791] Ibid.

creation of a division of feeling', and he criticised their mission-stations for facilitating the enlistment of indigenous inhabitants into colonial forces.[792]

Farrer admitted that the question as to 'whether savage life represents a primitive or a decadent condition' was 'vexed', and deferred to the work of his contemporaries such as E.B. Tylor for more detailed analysis. Indeed, Farrer presented conflicting statements in his work on this particular issue. In the introduction to *Primitive Manners and Customs* he noted that: 'whilst the state of the lowest modern savages is taken as the nearest approximation we have of the primitive state from which mankind has risen, it is not pretended that the state of any particular tribe may not be one to which it has fallen', and referred to the existence of *moai* (carved human figures) on Easter Island which he believed demonstrated that it was 'possible for a whole civilisation to vanish, and to leave only the veriest savages on the soil where it flourished'.[793] However, in his concluding section on 'Comparative Folklore' in the same book he argued: '… the history of humanity has been a rise, not a fall, not a degradation from completeness to imperfection, but a constantly accelerating progress from savagery to culture; that, in short the iron age of the world belongs to the past, its golden one to the future'.[794] Just as the figures considered in chapter three – such as Pitt Rivers and Tylor – it seems that Farrer believed progress to be the dominant force. However, in contrast to Pitt Rivers in particular, Farrer hoped that his book would encourage his readers to think 'with more interest or sympathy, of those outcasts of the world whom we designate as savage', as in doing so, 'something at least will have been done to claim for them a kindlier treatment and respect than in popular estimation they either deserve or obtain'.[795]

[792] Farrer, *Military Manners and Customs*, pp. 175-81.
[793] Farrer, *Primitive Manners and Customs*, pp. xx-xxi.
[794] Ibid., pp. 314-5.
[795] Ibid., p. xxiii.

In *Primitive Manners and Customs*, Farrer dedicated a chapter to an investigation of what he termed 'Savage Moral Philosophy'. He began his discussion by criticising contemporary amateur anthropologists, whose accounts, Farrer claimed, 'conflict hopelessly with one another': 'inconsistencies [can even] abound in the accounts of the same writer…'. Farrer believed that the evidence of non-European customs and cultures collected by missionaries, travellers, and adventurers was often of a detrimental quality due to misunderstandings caused either purposefully or accidentally by interpreters, or was 'spoilt by their several temptations to bias'. He continued:

> Whether the temptation be to enliven a book of travel, to inculcate the need and enhance the merit of missionary labours, or to illustrate the uniformity of moral perceptions and the universality of certain moral laws, in any case we are exposed to the error of mistaking for habitual what is really peculiar, and of misunderstanding the indications of facts which are as often anomalous as they are illustrative.[796]

Although scholars have argued that accounts of non-European customs and cultures written by nineteenth-century travellers to the imperial periphery often exaggerated and sensationalised the perceived 'barbarism' of non-Europeans in order to provide a justification for imperialism, or in the case of members of the missionary movement, their conversion to Christianity,[797] Farrer himself could be charged with partiality in his romanticisation of 'savage' life. Nevertheless, his work is significant as it provided a challenge to the view that 'savages' failed to express any kind of conception of social ethics. Although selective, Farrer provided numerous historical and contemporary illustrations of what were generally identified as 'savage' customs and cultures which attested to the existence of an understanding of moral life. Farrer distinguished a broad variety of cultures as 'savage', or 'barbarian', and, as in the earlier work of John Barrow, regularly associated

[796] Farrer, 'Savage Moral Philosophy', in ibid., pp. 103-4.
[797] Brantlinger, 'Victorians and Africans', pp. 178-9; Patrick Brantlinger, *Taming Cannibals: Race and the Victorians* (Ithaca, 2011), chapter one, *passim.*

specific cultures and tribes with their unique moral traditions. These included a fear (or 'spiritual terror') of vengeance in the cultures of Sioux Indians and Samoans; secular laws and punishments to prevent actions such as murder, adultery and theft in the customs of the Kutchin tribes of North America, the Tungusic peoples from Eastern Siberia and the Yuma (Quechan) Indians; and the extension of guilt towards other members of a perpetrator's family by the Alaskan Tlingit Indians, as well as the Sioux. Furthermore, the existence of superstitions, such as fear of angering or disrespecting those who had passed away, were noted amongst the Bodos from North-East India, and tribes in New Zealand. Controversially, Farrer argued that acts such as *suttee* were seen 'from the savage point of view… [as] acts of mercy, being intimately connected with their ideas of future existence, to which it is neither fair nor scientific to apply the phraseology and associations of Christian morality'.[798] Here Farrer challenged one of the tenets of the 'civilising mission' – a belief in the right of the British to reform colonial societal customs.

In concluding his analysis, Farrer argued that for the most part,

> … wherever travellers have explored, or missionaries taught, they have been able to detect customary laws regulating the relations of civil life…. They have found not only punishments for the prevention, but judicial ordeals for the detection, of crimes; nor is it possible to believe that such penal laws can exist without ideas of wrongness attaching to the deeds they prohibit.[799]

Farrer argued that in cases where 'savage' cultures were said to express 'indifference' to the immorality of actions such as murder, theft and adultery, such observations 'either do not rest on good evidence or apply to extra-tribal, that is, to hostile relations'. He concluded that,

[798] Farrer, 'Savage Moral Philosophy', pp. 105-11.
[799] Ibid., p. 128.

> … fundamentally the two extremes of civilisation are ethically united; each having for its standard of morality the idea of its own welfare, and deriving a sense of moral obligation from a more or less vague dread of consequences. The fundamental identity of human emotions, of the operations of the feelings of love, fear, hope, and shame, appear to have produced, in different stages of culture, very similar moral feelings; nor is it conceivable that such feelings, howsoever much weaker, were ever radically different in the most remote antiquity.[800]

It is significant that Farrer's observations were generally not criticised in reviews of his book in contemporary periodicals, suggesting that a broader, more enlightened – albeit paternalistic – notion of the 'savage' can be evidenced during the late 1870s. In an article published in *The Saturday Review* that was strikingly liberal in tone, the anonymous reviewer articulated their support of the notion that a common humanity existed between 'civilised' and 'savage' cultures ('[i]t seems then that, though trustworthy evidence on these matters is hard to get at, the savage is very like the civilised man'), and that 'civilised' practices were merely a development of those discovered in 'savage' life:

> The general conclusion is that far more of our modern institutions are not new things, but an improvement on savage ideas, than people in general suspect. The lowest savages have most of our needs, most of our sentiments, and the germs of most of our beliefs. They invent myths, institutions, customs, which successive generations modify and improve into religion, law, literature, and social etiquette…. This is illustrated by Mr. Farrer's paper on 'Savage Moral Philosophy,' and is, indeed, probable on *à priori* grounds. People do not throw away old institutions and invent others quite different. … Mr. Farrer's book will increase, we feel certain, this sympathy with the savage, which need never degenerate into a blind and one-sided philanthropy. … In parting with Mr. Farrer's book we must again praise its impartiality, urbanity, and acuteness.[801]

A sympathetic review published in *The Academy* by the French anarchist and anthropologist Elie Reclus (1827-1904) supported Farrer's overall understanding that despite some exceptions whereby 'savage' cultures could have descended into savagery from a higher state of civilisation, 'the history of mankind is that of a rise, not of a fall'. He continued:

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[800] Ibid., pp. 128-9.
[801] 'Farrer's Primitive Manners and Customs', *The Saturday Review*, 31 May 1879, pp. 678-80.

> With his statements and conclusions, which are given after mature and sincere consideration, quietly, sensibly, simply, with an unassuming straightforwardness, the reader agrees on the whole, and differs but on questions of detail; and should he differ, it will still be with feelings of high regard, and even of sympathy.[802]

The Reliquary, a journal dedicated to narrating the recent discovery of antiquities, also articulated great praise:

> It is long since we saw, or read, a book so interesting, so entertaining, and so well written as this, and we affirm that its compiler has done more real service in the way of elucidating early customs, and the manners of primitive races, than any other writer has yet achieved. … [I]t's compiler, Mr. Farrer, has treated each of the divisions in so masterly and comprehensive a manner, that but little more can be desired either by the general reader, the patient enquirer, or the accomplished student.[803]

Such positive reviews may have prompted the decision of the Anthropological Institute to present Farrer's paper on 'Savage and Civilized Warfare' to its members in late 1879. The paper was read by E.B. Tylor, the President of the Institute at the time (1879-80), and a faithful adherent to the 'progression theory'. Scholars have identified the period of the late 1870s to the mid-1880s as a time during which the field of anthropology sought to enhance their professional reputation.[804] Tylor's presidency contributed to this agenda, as well as to the distancing of the new organisation from the more controversial views of members of their institutional predecessor, the Anthropological Society, such as Robert Knox. Indeed, Tylor was one of the most prominent and highly influential scholars contributing to the field of human difference, and the interrelationship between race and science. As a cultural evolutionist, Tylor subscribed to the view that all of humankind was unified, yet culture

[802] 'Primitive Manners and Customs', *The Academy*, 15 November 1879, p. 349.
[803] 'Primitive Manners and Customs', *The Reliquary*, July 1879, p. 63.
[804] Lorimer, *Science, Race Relations and Resistance*, pp. 63-80.

defined stages of human progress.[805] While Farrer did not elaborate in any great detail on the theories underpinning his discussion on 'Savage and Civilized Warfare' it is clear that he sympathised with some of Tylor's views; however, as this chapter shows, one fundamental distinction remained with regard to their appraisal of the moral life of 'savage' cultures.

In his paper, Farrer argued that although Europeans were more advanced in planning and executing military campaigns (and later, in line with the ideas of Tylor, he would suggest that '[i]n art and knowledge and religion the distinction between the two is so wide that the evolution of one from the other seems still to many minds incredible'),[806] he provided numerous (although often un-referenced) examples of societies considered 'savage' who demonstrated an adherence to norms of war. One of Farrer's primary purposes was to demonstrate the existence of laws of warfare among 'savage' societies, 'because it is generally assumed that they are only the product of an advanced civilization, only the glory of a so-called civilized warfare'.[807] The Xhosa, for instance, were said to 'consider it shameful to attack their enemy without a declaration of war, and when war has broken out they refrain from seeking to starve him out; they spare the lives of the women and children, and restore them after the war'. The protection of non-combatants was also evidenced in the warfare of Sioux Indians, while the Tongans 'held it as sacrilege to fight within the precincts of the burial places of their chiefs'.[808] Farrer concluded,

> … in war and all that relates to it, the points of analogy between the two [civilization and savagery] are conspicuous, palpable, striking. … [I]n its conduct the difference is rather one of weapons and tactics than of anything else; it has been shown that the laws of war are not a monopoly on civilization, and it is possible that whatever advantage the latter has in this respect is compensated to some extent in savage life by the less frequent occurrence, and the less fatal character of their wars.[809]

[805] 'Edward B. Tylor: The Forging of an Anthropological Orthodoxy', in Wheeler-Barclay, *The Science of Religion in Britain*, pp. 71-103.
[806] Farrer, 'Barbarian Warfare', p. 183.
[807] Farrer, 'Savage and Civilized Warfare', p. 362.
[808] Ibid., pp. 362-3.
[809] Ibid., p. 367.

Farrer was not in attendance at the presentation of his paper to the Anthropological Institute, therefore the conversation in its aftermath was very brief.[810] Tylor appreciated that Farrer had broadened the discussion on the means of warfare (which, as chapter three shows, was a significant research concern during this period) to include issues of ethics and politics. He believed that Farrer had

> … contributed to the problem interesting information, showing that even among very rude tribes war was not mere fighting without rule or restraint, but that on the contrary the practice of declarations of war was general, and other restrictions appeared which showed that the object sought was not merely for one tribe to injure another as much as possible, but to decide a quarrel by ordeal of war.[811]

However, Tylor himself was an adherent to the more popular ethnocentric view – which he had himself discussed in his highly influential book *Primitive Culture* (1871) – that although it was 'not… uncommon to find details of admirable moral and social excellence… [s]avage moral standards… are far looser and weaker than ours'. He continued:

> We may, I think, apply the often-repeated comparison of savages to children as fairly to their moral as to their intellectual condition. … Altogether, it may be admitted that some rude tribes lead a life to be envied by some barbarous races, and even by the outcasts of higher nations. But that any known savage tribe would not be improved by judicious civilization, is a proposition which no moralist would dare to make… the general tenour of the evidence goes far to justify the view that on the whole the civilized man is not only wiser and more capable than the savage, but also better and happier, and that the barbarian stands between.[812]

While Farrer wavered on the issue as to whether the customs of 'savage' societies were the result of a 'degradation' from a higher civilisation or, conversely, experienced an 'arrested' development in the grand scheme of social and cultural evolution, he did earlier suggest

[810] *The Athenaeum* reported that his article was read by the Director of the Institute, and did not comment further on the nature of his paper in their 'Societies' section, 27 December 1879, p. 853.
[811] Farrer, 'Savage and Civilized Warfare', p. 368.
[812] Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, i, pp. 26-8.

that 'average savage morality coincides very much with that of any contemporary remote village of the civilised world', an argument also admitted in his reflections on the existence of an ethics of war in 'savage' life.[813] In contrast, due to Tylor's unequivocal belief in the theory of 'progress', he was seemingly constrained to the view that those considered to be 'savage' could not, at one and the same time, express as high a level of moral life found in 'civilised' societies.[814] This is a particularly significant distinction, which was also raised in chapter one with regard to the views espoused by Robert Knox, Charles Dickens, and E. Elers-Napier in the mid-to-late 1840s. As this chapter shows, it is the resurgence of this particular standpoint that contributed to the critical appraisal of Farrer's next relevant publication, *Military Manners and Customs*, published in 1885. Before placing this publication in the wider intellectual, cultural and military context of the later nineteenth century in order to shed further light as to why Farrer's sympathetic ideas towards the 'savage' warrior failed to achieve wider resonance during this time, this chapter examines Farrer's discussion on the arbitrary nature of the laws of war in European history. It is this discussion in particular that clarifies Farrer's underlying political agenda.

Military Manners and Customs – The Arbitrary Nature of the Laws of War

Although embraced by religious journals and societies,[815] due to Farrer's general conclusion that the viciousness of warfare should not merely be mitigated but rather the practice should be abolished entirely, Farrer was charged with partiality and even a lack of patriotism by a conservative critic in *The Saturday Review*, who disapproved of his coining of the term 'bellology' and concluded the review by arguing:

> Mr. Farrer has a good deal to say on the question of how far war may be humanized, and even – happy, happy vision, foolish, foolish dream! –

[813] Farrer, 'Savage Moral Philosophy', p. 128.
[814] This contradiction was recognised by the Scottish philosopher Henry Calderwood (1830-97) who wrote a review of *Primitive Culture* for the *Contemporary Review*. See: Wheeler-Barclay, 'Edward B. Tylor', p. 100.
[815] See, for instance, the reviews in *The Friend: A Religious and Literary Journal*, 26 September 1885, p. 10; and 3 October 1885, p. 17.

> entirely abolished; but, as his observations depend for their value on the hypothesis that man may suddenly become something quite different from what he has hitherto been, they do not press for immediate consideration.[816]

Farrer responded to the reviewer's criticisms in a piece for *The Gentleman's Magazine*, defending his term 'bellology' – which he further defined as encompassing 'the whole field of military antiquities, military history, military ethics, and international law' – as he believed it contributed to 'treating the matter by the usual scientific methods that have proved so successful in Sociology and Anthropology'.[817] Farrer, in line with many of the military practitioners associated with the RUSI during this time, believed that war 'admits of and deserves accurate and scientific treatment'.[818] While military practitioners sought to undertake such a project to enhance the professionalisation – and therefore success – of the British armed forces, as will become clearer, Farrer expressed faith in evolution as a potential means by which human nature could develop 'in the infinity of time before us… from the curse of war', and therefore, sought rigorous scientific examination of warfare in order to fulfil his pacifist political agenda.[819] This was precisely the issue that critics chose to accentuate in reviews of his work. The now conservative-leaning periodical *The Spectator* wrote:

> Mr. Farrer has collected here a vast number of curious and interesting facts. We do not dispute the general conclusion which he would draw from them, viz., that war is a very horrible thing. At the same time, we must own that we do not see in him a serenely judicial and critical temper. … Mr. Farrer accepts everything that goes towards proving his point, – that *war is a bad business from beginning to end*.[820]

Farrer's general critique of warfare can be clarified through an examination of his first chapter on the laws of war in European history. In essence, Farrer argued that such laws

[816] 'Military Manners and Customs', *The Saturday Review*, 2 May 1885, p. 594.
[817] J.A. Farrer, 'Concerning Bellology', *The Gentleman's Magazine*, July 1885, p. 89.
[818] Ibid.
[819] Ibid., pp. 88, 91.
[820] 'Military Manners and Customs', *The Spectator*, 10 July 1886, p. 921. Emphasis added.

'fluctuate from age to age', at the hands of commanders (such as Wellington, Marlborough, and Blücher), or philosophers and theorists (including Cicero, Grotius and Vattel). Due to the arbitrary nature of the application of the laws of war in practice, Farrer challenged the notion that warfare was becoming progressively more humane: 'Deterioration seems as likely as improvement', he wrote, 'and unless the custom is checked altogether, the wars of the twentieth century may be expected to exceed in barbarity anything of which we have any conception'.[821] According to Farrer, history had revealed that societal condemnation of a particular means of warfare provided no guarantee against its future use under the guise of 'military necessity', or through an appeal that the use of a more destructive weapon could lead to a swifter cessation of hostilities.[822]

Farrer illustrated his belief in the fluctuating nature of the laws of warfare with historical examples. The prohibition of the use of poison in warfare, for instance, was claimed by Farrer to have become an 'accident of tradition'. While the German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754) had claimed in his *Jus Gentium* (1749) that killing an enemy through the use of poison was lawful, the Romans had been against such conduct; as the Roman historian Lucius Annaeus Florus (c. 74-c. 130 AD) wrote in his *Epitome of Roman History*, although such acts 'hastened' the victory of Manius Aquilius during the Asiatic War, it also 'rendered it infamous, since it was done not only against divine law, but against ancestral customs'.[823] The destruction of sacred sites was also discussed by Farrer to demonstrate his thesis; while Vattel (1714-67) argued that '[w]e ought to spare those edifices which do honour to human society, and do not contribute to the enemy's strength, such as temples, tombs, public buildings, and all works of remarkable beauty', during the Nine Years' War (1688-97) in the Palatinate the French had 'set fire to the cathedrals… [and] sacked the

[821] Farrer, 'The Laws of War', in *Military Manners and Customs*, p. 13.
[822] For instance, while the Lateran Council of 1139 forbade the use of the cross-bow, it was revived by Richard I. Farrer, 'The Laws of War', pp. 4-5.
[823] Ibid., p. 14. See: Lucius Annaeus Florus, *Epitome of Roman History* (Cambridge, MA., 1929), XXXV: The Asiatic War, II, 20, p. 161.

tombs of the ancient Emperors at Spiers'.[824] Farrer conceded that history did reveal instances where European rivals followed accepted military norms and treated one another with civility and respect, yet he concluded that 'occasional gleams of humanity in the history of war count for nothing in the general picture of its savagery'.[825] Practical accounts demonstrated that abiding by the ethics of warfare was an 'exception', 'and may be found now, as at all times, in books or in the finer imaginations of a few, far more often than in the real life of the battle-field'.[826]

While Farrer's analysis of the historical adherence to the laws of war presented a generally disparaging outlook, his chapter on 'Barbarian Warfare' not only reiterated his challenge to the perception that an ethics of war did not exist in so-called 'savage' societies, but also questioned the sorts of distinctions usually made between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare'. Unlike his discussion on European laws of war (and in order rhetorically to strengthen his case against warfare *per se*), Farrer did not claim that such norms were arbitrarily applied by 'savage' cultures. As in his paper presented to the Anthropological Institute, he provided further examples which demonstrated that enemies generally designated as 'savage' protected non-combatants and treated enemy captives fairly; that they expressed a preference for peace, rather than war, and engaged in customs such as exchanging symbols of peace and making direct declarations of war. Enemy fruit trees were known to be spared, and the notion that it was necessary to protect sacred sites and buildings was a belief held by many cultures. The inviolability of ambassadors and heralds was recognised and treaties, terms and ceremonies for the conclusion of hostilities were conducted.[827] Farrer reaffirmed the conclusion to his 'Savage and Civilized Warfare' paper by arguing that

[824] Farrer, 'The Laws of War', p. 16.
[825] Ibid., p. 22.
[826] Ibid., p. 21. Farrer's conclusions did, however, overlook the argument considered by other theorists and philosophers that inculcating morality at the level of the individual soldier to act in ways such as upholding the notion of non-combatant immunity, and refraining from pillage and the destruction of sacred sites, could be more effectual than relying on the application of bright-line rules in the heat of combat.
[827] Farrer, 'Barbarian Warfare', pp. 155-85, *passim*.

'[t]he assumption… that savage races are ignorant of all laws of war, or incapable of learning them, would seem to be based rather on our indifference about their customs than on the realities of the case…'.[828]

Farrer's preoccupation with the arbitrary nature of Western societies' adherence to military ethics in practice seems to have been in order to demonstrate his belief that modern developments in military technology and declarations to adhere to norms of war were ineffectual, particularly as they justified the use of harsher means in order to quicken the pace of war, and diverted attention from what he believed to be the only rational perspective: war should not be 'humanised' but rather brought to an end. Furthermore, although Farrer maintained that there was a difference between the weapons and tactics used by 'savage' opponents, he believed firmly that distinctions between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare' were not inherent, but rather were artificially constructed. An analysis of his work also suggests two particular consequences of seeking to uphold such distinctions – the justification of imperialism and unregulated warfare.[829] This chapter now turns to examining these consequences in greater detail before addressing why Farrer's ideas struggled to gain authoritative resonance in the final decades of the nineteenth century.

Consequences of Upholding a 'Civilised'/'Savage' Distinction

Farrer linked the concerns raised by certain military practitioners with regard to the adverse effects of undertaking 'savage' wars with arguments made by anti-imperialists who claimed that the ambitions of Empire and their attendant behaviours (greed, corruption and violence) had a corrosive effect on British society at large. As was established in chapter four, a lack of authoritative doctrine on 'savage' wars can be understood in light of a number of factors, including the view that such wars were considered to be of an 'inferior'

[828] Ibid., p. 164.
[829] Ibid., p. 183.

nature. It is evident that there was also a limited and indecisive discussion in such military circles on the *effect* of 'savage' wars on members of the British armed forces – while some were concerned that they might have a detrimental effect on 'discipline and steadiness', other practitioners with first-hand experience of such wars claimed that they in fact enhanced morale and *esprit de corps* amongst the troops.[830] It is possible that the relative lack of engagement with the effects of colonial wars can also be attributed to the widespread belief that in practice, they challenged the ideal professional military identity of the British armed forces which was chiefly defined by the codes and values of conventional warfare – chivalry, honour and loyalty. Although not explicitly articulated, it is evident that such a view underlaid the contemptuous comment of Colonel Hale in an article on tactics which was published in the *Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution* in 1889:

> An officer who has seen service [in colonial wars] must sweep from his mind all recollections of that service, for between Afghan, Egyptian, and Zulu warfare and that of Europe, there is no similarity whatever. To the latter the former is merely the play of children.[831]

Unconstrained by an affiliation with the British military establishment, Farrer not only argued that a belief in the inherent inferiority of non-European cultures, and, particularly, their lack of standards of military ethics led to the undertaking of unnecessary wars; he also claimed that it was more likely that such wars were conducted without restraint. Furthermore, he argued that this would have an effect beyond the colonial battlefield. Farrer claimed that barbarism in European wars increased after un-restrained engagement in wars against 'savages'. He wrote:

> It is well worthy of notice and reflection that the European battle-fields became distinctly more barbarous after habits of greater ferocity had been acquired in wars beyond the Atlantic, in which the customary

[830] Gawler, 'British Troops', pp. 936-7.
[831] Bailes, 'Patterns of Thought in the Late Victorian Army', p. 32.

> restraints were forgotten, and the ties of a common human nature dissolved by the differences of religion and race.[832]

In discussing the effect of such wars on British society, Farrer claimed that military actions against those considered to be 'savage' nations did not always lead to a successful 'civilising mission'; it rather led to the barbarism of the 'civilised', as well as a 'deterioration of national character'.[833] Such an argument can be linked with the agenda of contemporary anti-imperialists who associated imperial ambition with a broader decline of moral character at the level of British society. While anti-imperialist ideology was diverse,[834] some critics of Empire claimed that its pursuit 'encouraged the ruling classes to act despotically at home as well as abroad'.[835] In a letter to the phrenologist George Combe (1788-1858) dated 16 May 1858, the radical statesman and champion of the doctrine of free trade Richard Cobden (1804-56) had written:

> I am afraid our national character is being deteriorated, and our love of freedom in danger of being impaired by what is passing in India. Is it possible that we can play the part of despot and butcher there without finding our character deteriorated at home? Were not the ancient Greeks and Romans corrupted and demoralized by their Asiatic conquests, and may we not share their fate, though in a different way?[836]

Such radical views would be articulated by Herbert Spencer in the late nineteenth century, a period during which Spencer claimed to be witnessing a 're-barbarization' of British society

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[832] Farrer, 'Barbarian Warfare', p. 168. Hew Strachan has challenged this argument by noting that if there was a link between undertaking colonial wars and excesses in 'civilised' conflicts, the British Army would have demonstrated this 'deterioration' in the First World War. See: Strachan, 'A General Typology of Transcultural Wars', pp. 95-6.
[833] Farrer, 'Barbarian Warfare', pp. 168-70.
[834] For an overview of the complexities of anti-imperialist sentiment in Britain from the mid-nineteenth century and beyond see: Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics*; Porter, *Critics of Empire*.
[835] R. Wallace, 'The Seamy Side of "Imperialism"', *The Contemporary Review*, June 1889, p. 791, quoted in Matikkala, *Empire and Imperial Ambition*, p. 94.
[836] John Morley, *The Life of Richard Cobden* (Cambridge, [1881] 2010), p. 216. This association between the decline of the British Empire and the fall of the Roman Empire accelerated in the Edwardian period of 'imperial anxiety'. See: Emma Reisz, 'Classics, Race, and Edwardian Anxieties about Empire', in Mark Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 210-28.

due to the pursuit of aggressive and violent imperialist policies. Such policies had led to the development of a pervasive militarism which was displayed through the

> … exaltation of brute force in its armed form, as seen in military organizations, secular and sacred [the Volunteer Movement, the Salvation Army], as well as in the devotion of teaching institutions to fostering it, and along with these manifestations of popular passion, showing how widely the trait of coerciveness, which is the essential element in militancy, has pervaded the nation, there has [arisen]… a cultivation of skilled physical force under the form of athleticism.[837]

Spencer sought to argue that there existed an antagonistic relationship between 'militant' imperialist (barbarous) societies where both the individual and nation experienced 'enslavement' (as citizen labour was demanded by the State to maintain the upkeep of the Empire) and 'industrial' societies who were peace-seeking and encouraged individual freedoms. Out of war and conflict societies evolved from 'savage' states towards the industrial stage; hence British relapse into imperialist militarism constituted a form of 're-barbarization'.[838]

While Spencer and Farrer shared a belief in the consequences of imperial militarism, Spencer was not a pacifist – indeed, he believed that war undertaken for the reason of self-defence was not only justified; it was a duty.[839] It is this precise distinction between the positions of Spencer and Farrer that indicate why the latter dedicated greater consideration to challenging 'civilised'/'savage' distinctions in his work. Farrer did so in a number of ways: firstly, by demonstrating that 'savage' nations acknowledged and adhered to norms of warfare; secondly, by highlighting the notion that those considered to be 'civilised' often

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[837] Herbert Spencer, 'Re-barbarization', in *Facts and Comments* (New York, 1902), p. 181.
[838] Spencer, 'Imperialism and Slavery', in ibid., pp. 157-71. However, as David Wiltshire has recognised war and industry can be understood to be 'mutually reinforcing': 'the modern industrial-capitalist state combines the immense technological sophistication, functional integration and economic profusion celebrated by Spencer with the barbarism, chauvinism, and un-freedom of the "militant" stage'. In '"Militant" and "Industrial" Society', in *The Social and Political Thought of Herbert Spencer* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 251-2.
[839] Spencer, 'Patriotism', in *Facts and Comments*, p. 124. He also articulated a scathing critique of soldiers who did not conscientiously object to participating against wars they believed to be unjust: 'When men hire themselves out to shoot other men to order, asking nothing about the justice of their cause, I don't care if they are shot themselves', p. 126.

engaged in tactics that were dishonourable. Farrer criticised the distortion of 'moral vision' when outrage was expressed at the use of an assegai, yet qualms against the use of the bayonet were rarely articulated. He noted:

> We are shocked at the mention of barbarian tribes who poison their arrows, or barb their darts, yet ourselves think nothing of the frightful gangrenes caused by the copper cap in the Minié rifle-ball, and reject, on the score of the expense of the change, the proposal that bullets of soft lead, which cause needless pain, should no longer be used among the civilised Powers for small-arm ammunition.[840]

Thirdly, Farrer challenged the perceived 'civilised'/'savage' divide through his suggestion that some 'savage' cultures not only preferred peace, but sought to avoid conflict, and possessed either no conceptions of warfare (such as the Esquimaux) or did not organise standing armies (such as the Toda people of southern India).[841] Essentially, Farrer believed that in maintaining the notion of 'savage' life as one of incessant war and conflict (as in Hobbes' conception of a violent and bloodthirsty 'state of nature'), the idea that war was a 'necessary evil' rather than an 'optional misery' was perpetuated. Farrer instead supported the 'counter-theory' of Montesquieu 'that a state of peace is really the most primitive, or, as he expresses it, the first *natural law* of society'. Farrer believed that a primary 'advantage' in Montesquieu's theory was 'that it divests war of that species of sanctity which attaches to everything claiming to appertain to the laws of nature or the natural state'.[842] By supporting the theory that 'natural man' was predisposed to peace, and claiming there to be no distinction between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare', Farrer chiefly concluded that a distinction between 'civilisation' and 'savagery' would only come into being 'when all fighting is relegated to barbarism, and regarded as unworthy of civilised humanity…'.[843]

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[840] Farrer, 'Barbarian Warfare', p. 158.
[841] Farrer, 'Savage and Civilized Warfare', p. 366.
[842] Ibid., pp. 366-7.
[843] Farrer, 'Barbarian Warfare', p. 184.

Despite the existence of a peace movement in Britain during this time,[844] as noted earlier, Farrer's *Military Manners and Customs* was poorly received by most mainstream journals, a response that contrasted markedly with the reception of his earlier work, suggesting an important shift between 1879 and 1885. This is most probably due to the fact that this work undermined contemporary articulations of British racial, cultural and military superiority, as well as the endeavours of Britain's military and imperial heroes – including figures such as Jacob, Baker and Gordon – the reputations of whom (as was demonstrated in chapters two and four) had been the focus of a serious re-appraisal and process of heroic myth-making from the death of Gordon in 1885 – the year in which Farrer's *Military Manners and Customs* was also published – to the turn of the twentieth century. This was a time during which the pessimistic sentiments that overwhelmed British discourse – both settler and metropole – on the status of 'savagery' in the mid-to-late 1840s, as well as the ideas of 'progress' surrounding the work of figures such as Pitt Rivers in the 1860s became, once again, ascendant, further indicating how complex chronologies on 'savagery' were in the nineteenth century.

Furthermore, in contrast to the differentiation noted in Farrer's work (as well as in the writings of early-nineteenth century travellers and colonial administrators such as John Barrow), the manner in which figures such as Charles Dickens sought to essentialise a wealth of non-European cultures under the general terminology of 'savagery' in the early 1850s became even more entrenched during this later period. Alongside his pacifism and anti-imperialism, that Farrer dared to question the status of 'savages' – suggesting, particularly, that they might have equivalent conceptions of morality to the British in their war-making – was a position incompatible with the view articulated in the first section of

[844] On the peace movement see: Ceadel, *Semi-Detached Idealists*; Laity, *The British Peace Movement*. It is important to recognise the diversity of opinion of figures who expressed anti-imperialist and anti-war beliefs in the nineteenth century. As Claeys has noted the Peace Society 'was not anti-imperial as such, at least in terms of the informal hegemony of European Christian civilisation', *Imperial Sceptics*, pp. 27-8.

this chapter by Captain Herbert, Colonel Hale, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wintle at the RUSI in the 1890s: 'a code of ethics in warfare could obtain only between nations of an equal, or tolerably equal state of civilisation; that stands to reason'.[845] Such a perspective flourished within a period of an intensification of British imperial interests, which was inspired by numerous factors both economic and strategic, as well as the broader global context of the partition of Africa and South-East Asia amongst dominant global powers including Britain, Germany and France.[846] This chapter now concludes by elucidating in greater detail the context of the final decades of the nineteenth century, which narrowed receptiveness to the perspective of figures such as Farrer. This was also a period during which the stirrings of general principles on 'savage warfare' that were identified in chapter four became more explicitly codified in British military doctrine, leading to the official sanction of a distinction between the 'civilised' and 'savage' warrior.

The Late-Nineteenth Century Triumph of the Discourse of the 'Uncivilised' Enemy

In the last decades of the nineteenth century commentators sought intellectually to understand and justify British technological, economic and imperial dominance at a time of increased competitive pressure. With a growing rhetoric of professionalisation of the field of science which reinforced scientific debate on race and intellectual and cultural development, this period witnessed a resurgence of theories of 'scientific racism', which were presented as authoritative.[847] The resonance of such theories was reflected in the Anthropological Institute's journal in the 1880s which, as Douglas Lorimer has argued, often published 'sensationalised accounts of African peoples and cultures by travellers, missionaries and officials promoting European penetration of the "Dark Continent"' that

[845] Herbert, 'The Ethics of Warfare', p. 1032.
[846] Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson, 'Empire and Globalisation: from "High Imperialism" to Decolonisation', *The International History Review*, 36:1 (2014), pp. 144-5. For a detailed analysis of the complex nature of British imperialism see: John Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion', *English Historical Review*, CXXI (1997), pp. 614-42.
[847] Lorimer, *Science, Race Relations and Resistance*, p. 65.

fortified negative stereotypes of native inhabitants as 'savages' who were not only un-enlightened but also un-improvable.[848] As a biologist, for strategic reasons the President of the Anthropological Institute between 1883-5, Professor William H. Flower (1831-99) presented the superiority of comparative anatomy for understanding differences of race, rather than the examination of cultural and social institutions, as advanced by Tylor and Farrer.[849]

This period also witnessed a rise in defensive nationalism and Russophobia, as well as a growing romanticisation of the British warrior and their role in garrisoning the Empire. Such 'popular imperialism' could be evidenced in positive images of the military found in battle paintings, novels, military autobiographies, and juvenile literature, as well as the general valorisation of military values – such as honour and chivalry – in public schools and youth groups.[850] Pro-militarist sentiments flourished with the election of the Conservative government of Lord Salisbury (1830-1903) in the year of Gordon's 'martyrdom', and the growing popularity of evolutionary ideas that supported the notion of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race.[851] As their sympathies for the 'savage' challenged such popular attitudes, liberal figures such as Farrer and John Morley were especially criticised for what was understood to be their lack of patriotism. Morley responded to this charge:

> We are as good patriots as they are. We have as much pride as they in the greatness of England, because it has been in the main the greatness of humanity and right. We exult as ardently as they do in the immense realm on which, as they boast, the sun never sets; but we exult in it only because we insist that over the length and breadth of that realm there shall be perpetually shed the beams of the far more radiant and glorious sun of human justice and sovereign beneficence.[852]

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[848] Ibid., p. 77.
[849] Ibid., p. 80.
[850] Michael Paris has identified 'the cultural artefacts aimed at boys and young men – novels, story papers, toys, games and visual images – all teaching that war was moral, legitimate and, above all, exciting and romantic' as the 'pleasure culture of war' which peaked in the late-nineteenth century, *Warrior Nation*, p. 9.
[851] Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, pp. 180-207, *passim*.
[852] [Morley], 'The Plain Story', p. 356.

By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century such sentimental views would be overwhelmed by a renewed scepticism regarding the ability to 'civilise' the savage; a scepticism that was fuelled by an intellectual climate favouring the tenets of Social Darwinism, imperialist propaganda, and a resurgence of frustration in military circles with the continued resistance – and at times successes – of 'savage' opponents challenging invading British armies. In an article written in 1888 by Garnet Wolseley while Adjutant-General to the Forces (1882-90), Wolseley wrote disparagingly:

> … we cannot hide from ourselves the conviction that civilisation has not as yet effected any desirable change in the negro character. It has not only most certainly failed to foster a military spirit in him, but has even succeeded in depriving him of his natural hardihood, and also of the courage which he had acquired in his African home under the severe laws which governed him there. Freedom has not made him brave, nor has civilisation improved his physical strength.[853]

Alongside, and interrelated to, such increasingly strident racial differentiation, was a growing anxiety about the tendencies to degeneration of the 'civilised'. This concern encouraged the development of theories expounding warfare as a means to 'regenerate' the nation.[854] In a discussion on the 'civilising' effects of warfare published in the *United Service Magazine* in 1897, Wolseley, now Commander-in-Chief of the British Army (1895-1900) articulated a discourse that resonated with figures within and beyond the military establishment:

> The training involved in all this preparation for war is an invigorating antidote against that luxury and effeminacy which destroys nations as well as individuals. This national training keeps healthy and robust the

[853] Garnet Wolseley, 'The Negro as a Soldier', *Fortnightly Review*, 1 December 1888, p. 691.
[854] Amidst this militarism, Paul Crook does recognise the existence of 'an anti-war tradition of biological thought'; a 'peace paradigm' which was 'particularly strong in the Anglo-American world, feeding off the "new biology" as well as more conventional respect for Darwin's ecological and co-operationist ideas'. See: Paul Crook, *Darwinism, War and History* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 63.

> manhood of a state, and in saving it from degeneration nobly serves the cause of civilisation.[855]

From a practical military perspective, it is this context that gave strength to the discourse on wars against 'savages' as presented in a number of successive articles and prize essays published in military periodicals between 1884 and 1898, calling for the need to provide specialised training and doctrine for colonial warfare, which was now regularly referred to as 'savage warfare'.[856] The earlier hesitations about theorising such warfare, considered in chapter four, were subdued during this period by military practitioners explicitly arguing for the need for practical guidelines. In an article published in 1884 in the *United Service Magazine* titled 'The Present Position of Tactics in England', Colonel H.H. Knollys, who was also editor of the magazine, wrote:

> Of more immediate and practical use to a British officer than the tactics to be adopted against a well-armed, well-trained enemy, are those suitable for employment against a savage foe… for the reason that regular warfare is with us exceptional, while a campaign against an uncivilized foe in some parts of the world may be considered chronic.[857]

While the concept of 'savage warfare' was officially recognised in the 1892 provisional edition of *Infantry Drill*, in an essay submitted for the 1894 *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* Essay Prize, Captain William Hamilton argued that although '[o]ur troops… have had so much practice in fighting savage tribes… the experience gained by part of the army in India requires to be imparted to the whole'. He continued,

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[855] Garnet Wolseley, 'War and Civilization', *USM*, 1897, p. 564, partly quoted in John Gooch, 'Attitudes to War in Late Victorian and Edwardian England', in Brian Bond and Ian Roy (eds), *War and Society* (1977), p. 95. See also, Herbert, 'The Ethics of Warfare', pp. 1023-4.

[856] They included, among others: Captain F.C. Carter, 'On the Tactical Training in District Concentrations, Best Prepared for Preparing the Army in India for War:- a) Against a Civilized Enemy. b) Against Savage Tribes in Mountain or Jungle Warfare', *JUSII*, 23:117 (1894), pp. 93-147; Major H.C. Simpson, 'Notes on Mountain Artillery Establishments, their Training, and Personal Equipment, *PRAI*, 21 (1894), pp. 257-65; and Major F.C. Carter, 'On Mountain Warfare: India', *JRUSI*, 39:213 (1895), pp. 1071-1100.

[857] Knollys quoted in Moreman, *The Army in India*, p. 41.

> There are no textbooks on the subject and the literature of savage warfare though fairly full is not generally accessible. It would, I think, be of undoubted assistance if the accumulated experience gained in many wars with many kinds of savages were crystallized in the form of a short official textbook; meanwhile the personal knowledge and experience of individuals must be our guide.[858]

In response to military figures persistently approaching the War Office in a bid to receive guidance on the conduct of 'savage warfare', the Intelligence Department published Charles Callwell's *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*.[859] Callwell – whose authority on military subjects was endorsed in part by the RUSI who awarded one of his papers a Gold Medal Prize in 1887[860] – interspersed his writings with claims that resonated with contemporary views of the 'savage' articulated by leading anthropologists of the period. The British excelled against the 'savage' enemy due to their '[s]uperior armament, the force of discipline, a definite and acknowledged chain of responsibility, esprit de corps,' and especially, '*the moral force of civilization*'.[861] 'Uncivilized races' were said by Callwell to 'attribute leniency to timidity… [such] fanatics and savages… must be thoroughly brought to book and cowed or they will rise again'.[862] Strongly underlying Callwell's work was the fear of national 'degeneration' and the weakening of British global influence, which was to gain traction in the aftermath of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and through the Edwardian period.[863] Such fears led to a number of influential anthropologists to petition for their field to establish stronger links with British colonial officials in order to ameliorate 'the ineffectiveness of the colonial officer ignorant of traditional custom, who might

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[858] Hamilton quoted in ibid., p. 50.
[859] Moreman, *The Army in India*, pp. 52-3. In the aftermath of a lecture on 'small wars' by Major W.D. Conner, Professor of Fortifications at the Royal Military Academy, Major-General E.A. Wood commented that 'he was sure all those who had heard [the lecture]… could see how much there was to learn in those little wars… [and] that there had been numbers of applications lately received at the War Office for such works'. Major W.D. Conner, 'Incidents of Bush Warfare', *PRAI*, 23 (1896), pp. 91-5.
[860] Callwell, 'Lessons to be Learnt', pp. 357-412.
[861] Callwell, *Small Wars*, p. 90. Emphasis added. See also: Whittingham, '"Savage Warfare"', pp. 594-5.
[862] Callwell, *Small Wars*, p. 148.
[863] Reisz, 'Classics, Race, and Edwardian Anxieties about Empire', pp. 210-20.

foment revolt through misunderstanding'.[864] The very fact that a manual was still felt to be required to fight against such 'savage' opponents testifies to the precarious nature of Britain's perceived racial and imperial dominance. Callwell in fact conceded that '[n]o rule in war is absolute' and that '[m]an for man, the fanatic or cut-throat, the hardy nomad or the reckless savage, may match or be more than a match for the European soldier'. Yet his overall conclusion was that 'civilized' Britain would always triumph over her irregular 'savage' foe.[865]

The apogee of official military opinion on the status of the 'savage' in the very late nineteenth century can be further evidenced in the comments made by British delegates at The Hague Peace Conference of 1899. During the Third Meeting held on 31 May, General Sir John Ardagh (1840-1907), Director of Military Intelligence at the British War Office (1896-1901) responded to a draft proposal written by delegates from France, Romania and Russia on the prohibition of 'bullets which expand or flatten easily when penetrating the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions'.[866] The British had begun to develop expanding bullets in India in 1896, and they were authorised for use by the Tirah Expeditionary Force in war against the Afridis in 1897-8. Although questions were raised in parliament as to whether such bullets violated the spirit and letter of international law (embodied in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868), these were dismissed by figures such as the Secretary of State for India Lord George Hamilton (1845-1927) and representatives at the War Office, including Sir Henry Brackenbury, now Director-General of Ordnance, who took pains to justify their

[864] Kuklick, *The Savage Within*, p. 196. See also: Richard C. Temple, 'The Value of a Training in Anthropology for the Administrator', *Man*, 14 (1914), pp. 34-6.
[865] Callwell, *Small Wars*, p. 91.
[866] *The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences - The Conference of 1899* (New York, 1920), p. 343. Hereafter, *Proceedings*.

use.[867] Often, such justifications emphasised the 'fanatical' and even 'inhuman' nature of the foes confronted by the British. As Ardagh argued at The Hague:

> In civilized war a soldier penetrated by a small projectile is wounded, withdraws to the ambulance, and does not advance any further. It is very different with a savage. Even though pierced two or three times, he does not cease to march forward, does not call upon the hospital attendants, but continues on, and before anyone has time to explain to him that he is flagrantly violating the decisions of the Hague Conference, he cuts off your head.
>
> It is for this reason that the English delegate demands the liberty to use projectiles of sufficient efficacy against savage populations….[868]

While Ardagh's arguments were met with criticism by Mr. Raffalovich, a technical delegate from Russia who felt that they were 'contrary to the humanitarian spirit which dominates this end of the nineteenth century', and that it is 'impermissible to make a distinction between a savage and a civilized enemy; both are men who deserve the same treatment', it is significant to note that generally criticisms were based on arguments of practicality, rather than a defence of the rights of non-Europeans.[869] Furthermore, the discussion of the applicability of the laws of war to those considered 'savage' peoples during the conference was a peripheral issue to the broader concerns of 'civilised' nations.[870]

In Britain, European criticism of the British Army's use of the expanding bullet was portrayed by some commentators as a form of 'anti-British agitation',[871] and when its use was ultimately withdrawn, this was chiefly due to fears that they might be used in 'civilised' wars against the British, as well as the perceived impracticality of maintaining two stocks of

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867 Edward M. Spiers, 'The Use of the Dum Dum Bullet in Colonial Warfare', *JICH*, 4:1 (1975), pp. 4-7.
868 *Proceedings*, p. 343. Another British delegate, Admiral Fisher, re-asserted Ardagh's opinion by arguing that 'each country wishes to use the best weapon it can procure. Any restriction placed on the freedom of action in this regard would place civilized peoples in a dangerous situation in case of war with less civilized nations or savage tribes', p. 360.
869 *Proceedings*, pp. 343-4; Spiers, 'The Use of the Dum Dum Bullet', p. 7.
870 Frederic Megret, 'From "Savages" to "Unlawful Combatants": A Post-Colonial Look at International Humanitarian Law's "Other"', in Anne Orford (ed.), *International Law and its 'Others'* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 275-8.
871 Alex Ogston, 'The Peace Conference and the Dum-Dum Bullet', *The British Medical Journal*, 29 July 1899, p. 278.

ammunition for both forms of warfare; the protection and effectiveness of the army trumped any moral concerns over the effects of such bullets on 'uncivilised' opponents.[872] Clearly, the British Army sought to maintain flexibility in the face of opponents they considered to be uniformly 'savages', yet at the same time, unpredictable in their actions. Such arguments affirming distinctions between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare' continued into the early twentieth century, finding their ultimate sanction in British military doctrine: the section entitled 'Warfare in Uncivilized Countries' in the first edition of *Field Service Regulations* (1909) was renamed 'Warfare Against an Uncivilized Enemy' in the re-issued 1912 edition.[873] This official manual was first published five years prior to the outbreak of the First World War, and significantly, it is during this conflict that a European opponent of the British sought to make an official legal proclamation against the use of colonial troops due to their perceived 'savage' and 'barbarous' behaviour on the battlefield: it was alleged that they had 'committed atrocities which set at defiance not only the recognized usages of warfare, but of all civilization and humanity'.[874] The legal status of the 'savage' warrior could no longer be ignored, now that they played a significant role in a world war understood to be fought amongst 'civilised' nations.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that in the late 1870s and early 1880s a counter-discourse re-asserting the moral life of 'savages' can be traced, especially with regard to commentaries surrounding the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. Through an analysis of this discourse, three challenges to a perceived 'savage'/'civilised' divide were presented: the British sought to defend their actions in moral terms, despite the determination that their opponents were

[872] Spiers, 'The Use of the Dum Dum Bullet', p. 11.
[873] War Office, *Field Service Regulations, Part 1: Operations* (reprinted, with amendments 1912), pp. 171-89.
[874] German Foreign Office, 'German Memorial Regarding the Employment of Colored Troops' (30 July 1915), in Ellery C. Stowell and Henry F. Munro, *International Cases: Arbitrations and Incidents Illustrative of International Law as Practised by Independent States* (2 vols, New York, 1916), ii, pp. 187-9. Quoted in Simon Harrison, 'Savages on the Frontiers of Europe', in *Dark Trophies* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 117-18.

'savages'; 'civilised' behaviour and adherence to norms of war was recognised in the practical military measures of the Zulus, while the British were criticised for their 'uncivilised' military actions; and British military practitioners acknowledged the cultural significance of Zulu customs, thus undermining pessimistic understandings of 'savagery'. By examining the work of James Anson Farrer, the second part of this chapter demonstrates the manner in which Farrer sought to undermine perceived distinctions between 'savage' and 'civilised' warriors by asserting that the former exhibited moral understanding, and particularly, an adherence to norms of warfare. Furthermore, Farrer's work provides an important exposé of the consequences of the perpetuation of a 'savage'/'civilised' distinction: the justification of imperialism and unregulated warfare. By contextualising the reception of Farrer's 1885 work, *Military Manners and Customs*, this chapter has illuminated reasons why Farrer's liberal pacifism did not gain an authoritative resonance in the final decades of the nineteenth century – a period during which a strengthening of pro-imperialism, militarism and a resurgence of colonial racism led to the official codification of a distinction between the 'civilised' British and their 'savage' opponents in British military doctrine.

In the introduction to this dissertation four themes that thread throughout each chapter were articulated: the 'civilising mission', 'differentiation', 'reciprocity', and 'cultural determinism'. These themes inform the structure of the conclusion, to which this dissertation now turns, which also re-asserts the complexity of chronology with regard to nineteenth-century understandings of 'savage warfare' and the 'savage' warrior, and suggests particular issues that open up avenues for further research.

Conclusion

This dissertation has unravelled the tensions and contradictions that existed in British perceptions of the 'savage' warrior and 'savage warfare' throughout the nineteenth century. In examining the dynamism of understandings of 'savagery' and how they informed and were informed by changing cultural, military and imperial contexts, it challenges conventional chronologies of the development of anti-humanitarian sentiment and colonial racism in Britain during the nineteenth century, and presents a critique of the assumption that military cultures were uncontested, and that 'savage' enemy warriors were straightforwardly and coherently constructed in the Victorian imagination. Furthermore, it challenges the notion that British discourse consistently (and exclusively) reinforced understandings of 'savagery' that included conceptions such as treachery, bloodthirstiness, fanaticism, and an ignorance of military ethics. It argues, rather, that understandings of 'savagery' and the 'savage' warrior were highly context-specific and dependent upon a complex array of interrelated factors, which resulted variously in the fortification or the fracturing of a 'civilised'/'savage' distinction. The conclusion summarises how the following four themes – the 'civilising mission', 'differentiation', 'reciprocity', and 'cultural determinism' – interweave throughout the five chapters, and ends by suggesting areas that could benefit from further investigation.

The 'Civilising Mission'

Firstly, this dissertation shows that conceptions of the British 'civilising mission' – itself a variegated concept – inflected definitions of 'savagery'. In the context of the Cape in the early nineteenth century, adherents to the 'civilising mission' such as John Barrow and Lord Glenelg articulated a more nuanced understanding of the 'savage' warrior – with Glenelg

personally choosing to utilise the term 'barbarian', as, in his mind, this encapsulated his faith in the ability of the indigenous inhabitants to be 'reformed'. This terminology was later used – in a very different cultural climate – by John Morley in his critique of the undertaking of the Anglo-Zulu War. In contrast, figures critical of the 'civilising mission' such as Benjamin D'Urban, Lieutenant-Colonel Elers Napier, Charles Dickens, and General Pitt Rivers were free to emphasise what they perceived to be the 'irreclaimability' of 'savages', critiquing (on diverse grounds) any notion of the 'noble savage' or accommodation of the view that the lives of 'savages' could in any respect be equivalent, or even superior to the 'civilised' British.

Underlying the criticism of such figures were anxieties about whether human evolution was chiefly progressive, or whether it could exhibit instances of degeneration; a question which particularly pre-occupied British anthropologists during the 1870s and 1880s, including E.B. Tylor and Pitt Rivers. Pitt Rivers expressed disdain for the 'civilising mission', and believed wholeheartedly in 'progressivism', while Tylor struggled to accommodate the highly enlightened views of figures such as Farrer as his popular ethnocentric position required him to conclude that 'savage' morals were inferior to those of 'civilised' nations. Although Farrer claimed to have wavered on the issue of progressivism and degeneration in the late 1870s, he did also suggest that 'savages' were capable of their own 'improvement', which further signified his lack of belief in the need for the British civilising mission, and foreshadowed his later, more explicit, critique of imperialism. By the mid-1880s, Farrer presented an uncompromising pacifism and anti-imperialism, which led him to examine the consequences of perpetuating distinctions between 'savagery' and 'civilisation', and ultimately re-assert his belief in the equivalence of conceptions of military ethics in 'savage' and 'civilised' societies.

Faith in the British 'civilising mission' was also articulated by a number of figures discussed in this dissertation through their assertion that certain 'savage' warrior cultures could attain a higher level of 'civilisation' in a role as military allies; through training and discipline under the watchful eye of their British superiors their 'physical and moral qualities' would be 'brought forward'. Narratives on the Khoi, Jacob's Indian and Baker's Egyptian and Soudani troops reflect that the British conceded that the military activities of 'savage' allies did include moments of courage, heroism, strength and obedience, as well as a sense of order and cleanliness in their military clothing, accoutrements and bodies – traits and preoccupations generally considered to be the mainstay of the 'civilised'. These particular 'savage' warrior cultures were considered tractable enough to undergo such transformation, while the San, Baluchis, Afghans, and – after the Indian Rebellion – Bengalis in particular, were not considered to embody the honour and trustworthiness required to fight on behalf of British interests. The 'civilisation' of these 'savage' warriors was, however, never considered to be an absolute process. Underlying Sir Samuel White Baker's narrative was the notion that his Egyptian and Soudani soldiers would regress to their 'savage' state without his superintendence; a similar perspective was reflected in his persistent naming of his close bodyguards the 'Forty Thieves'. Limitations to civilising potential were also evidenced in the discourse of General John Jacob – while he suggested that European commanders could raise the character of native officers of the British Indian Army, this was a process intimately connected with British rule, a rule which needed – therefore – to be indefinite. In order for the British to retain an element of self-legitimation, the 'improvement' of native soldiers would always be circumscribed: a denial of equivalence between the coloniser and the colonised had to be maintained.

Differentiation

This dissertation shows that sympathetic – or more enlightened – portrayals of non-European warriors (such as early nineteenth-century characterisations of the San, Khoi and Xhosa and the later work of Farrer) were often accompanied by a differentiation between the customs and cultures of individual tribes. Critical appraisals (such as the commentary of Dickens), by contrast, often subsumed various non-European identities – and thus denied their individuality – within the broader category of 'savagery'. Although later claiming the use of analogy to be imperfect, through the regular equivalence of contemporary 'savages' with prehistoric humans (especially with regard to their weapons of warfare) figures such as Pitt Rivers went a step beyond a denial of differentiation; while the theory of cultural evolution established a hierarchy of material progress, re-asserting British superiority in the development of the military arts, such analogising contributed to the fortification of a distinction between 'civilisation' and 'savagery' through a more determined denial of temporal equivalence between the 'civilised' British and contemporary 'savages'. Through the case study of Sir Samuel Baker, it is evident that an analogy was also drawn between his 'savage' enemies (and allies) and hunting prey. This process of de-humanisation contributed to the legitimation of British use of tactics and strategies that were often understood to be the mainstay of 'uncivilised' warfare.

Reciprocity

In Lord Glenelg's critique of Benjamin D'Urban's 'irreclaimable savages' speech, Glenelg briefly discussed a third issue that recurred through debates on this theme – reciprocity. The extent to which reciprocity was perceived to be possible between 'civilised' and 'savage' military opponents served to determine views as to whether the 'laws' of 'civilised' nations could be applied against such opponents. While those of a chiefly humanitarian position such as Glenelg further maintained that 'the great principles of morality are of

immutable and universal obligation', which did not depend on the particular enemy encountered, whether 'barbarous' or 'civilised', the discourse evidenced at the RUSI in the very late nineteenth century by figures such as Captain von Herbert and Colonel Hale reflected the view that a code of military ethics could only exist between enemies who were perceived to hold a similar moral understanding. While critics of the Anglo-Zulu War and Farrer's work in particular challenged the basis of this assumption, British representatives at The Hague sought to emphasise the perceived lack of reciprocity between 'savages' and the 'civilised' British by de-humanising the former, and thus diminishing the latter's obligation to abide by norms of warfare when facing such opponents. The earlier case study of General Jacob – who was praised for 'applying the rules of civilized warfare to the savage and troublesome tribes of Sind' – associates this particular issue back to the 'civilising mission'. While Glenelg expressed ambiguity with regard to whether 'civilised' laws could indeed be applied due to the fact that 'savages' might not comprehend such laws, and therefore reciprocate, Jacob believed that by presenting such 'civilised' behaviour, 'savages' would be elevated (albeit to a limited extent) to responding in kind, and would abandon their former, 'predatory', behaviour.

The argument from reciprocity significantly shaped the discourse surrounding the development of doctrine against 'savage' opponents. While figures such as Baker initially sought to maintain distinctions between the 'civilised' British and their 'savage' foes, the claim that the latter refused to meet the former on their terms led to the acknowledgement that the British ought to undertake 'uncivilised' military tactics, deepening the interrelationship between reciprocity and military necessity. Despite reciprocating such 'uncivilised' tactics, figures such as Captain Parr sought to reassure the British public that at heart, members of the British armed forces maintained their inherent morality under duress. Significantly, however, the British public did not consistently dismiss British

'uncivilised' actions as part and parcel of the realities of 'savage warfare'; as this dissertation shows, the commentary on Baker's exploits and the undertaking of the Anglo-Zulu War reveals that the tension between attaining the 'civilising process' through 'uncivilised' means was regularly discussed and deliberated, and that the actions of the British were the focus of criticism (a criticism at times reinforced with the argument that moral understanding was a universal trait), thus challenging perceived distinctions between 'civilised' and 'savage warfare'.

Cultural Determinism

Although the British made concessions in some instances in acknowledging the bravery and strength of their 'savage' foes (as was demonstrated, for instance, in the discourse on the Xhosa in the period prior to the 1840s, and the Baluchis in the aftermath of British defeats at Sartaf and Nafusk), ultimately, a distinction between the two had to remain, as this was integral not only to the self-perception of the British armed forces, but also to the imperial 'civilising mission'. When the British engaged in actions that were deemed to be 'uncivilised', if it was not possible to claim that such actions were undertaken by native irregulars or allies of the British, it was often emphasised by military practitioners (such as Baker, Gawler and Callwell) that the British were *adapting* to the enemy. Significantly, the idea that the British were able to adapt their war-making indicates recognition of the idea that military culture is indeed fluid and malleable. This dissertation therefore reinforces the argument that societies have sanctioned the use of certain military means that challenged their own cultural norms for reasons of expediency and necessity; to protect their own interests and the lives of their civilians by ensuring a swift and decisive victory. Tradition can dictate a preference for a particular means by which to enact warfare (both at a strategic and tactical level); however, the reciprocal relationship between the traditions of a

certain military culture, the pressures of society, political concerns, and the motivations and means of warfare engaged with by the enemy, must also be taken into account.

However, this dissertation has also demonstrated that while the British often justified their own use of irregular tactics in terms of 'necessity' – for instance, by claiming that they were forced to adapt their conventional means in response to the environment or the actions of the enemy – they more rarely conceded that their opponents were driven by similar exigencies. Doing so would have led to the recognition of a common military culture, which would – in turn – make it difficult to sustain perceived distinctions between the 'civilised' British and their 'savage' opponents.

The idea of cultural determinism was influential in upholding the belief that the British naturally engaged in a 'civilised' manner in warfare, and at the same time, justified their out-of-character actions against 'uncivilised' opponents through the belief that those deemed to be 'savage' understood no other form of warfare, or were only willing to fight by such means. As British experiences in Equatorial Africa as well as the Anglo-Zulu War indicate, practical exigencies regularly undermined the perceived 'civilised'/'savage warfare' distinction. Victory was to be achieved by the British through the 'uncivilised' means of ambushes, 'entrapment', silently and stealthily – a chiefly flexible and offensive strategy was of utmost importance. The British were understood to have been pressured to conform and modify their war-making to match their perceived 'inferior' foes. However, this was an uncomfortable position, exposed to debate which was itself bound up with reflection on Britain's imperial identity. In an increasingly competitive imperialist environment, to grant the possibility of cultural fluidity/realism, which could lead to the admission that the British themselves were also predisposed to the undertaking of 'uncivilised' actions, seemed inopportune. Ultimately, concepts of cultural determinism allowed the British to maintain

their faith in the gentlemanly officer tradition. But this was neither an inevitable nor an uncontested discursive process.

A Call for Culturally-Embedded Nineteenth-Century Military History

This dissertation underlines the temporal and geographical fluidity of historical concepts such as 'savagery' and demonstrates the advantages of developing histories that correlate the concerns of military historians with those generally understood to be the mainstay of cultural and intellectual historians. It illuminates the broad-ranging nature of moral discourse on colonial conflicts of the nineteenth century in Britain; a recognition which allows for greater nuance with regard to understandings of the effects of pro-imperialist discourses on the wider British public during this period. It uncovers dissenting voices who argued against the notion that the norms of 'civilised' warfare could be abandoned in wars fought against 'savage' opponents; arguments which were – at times – supported by affirming the moral life and worth of the imperial enemy. Explorations of this theme could be further advanced through a comparative analysis of the commentary surrounding military expeditions undertaken by continental powers such as France and Germany against their colonial enemies.

The significant role that members of the British armed forces played in the production and dissemination of knowledge throughout the nineteenth century has also been highlighted in this dissertation. The military establishment made a concerted effort to contribute to understandings of non-European warrior cultures throughout the period, presenting public lectures, theorising on their means and tactics of warfare, and collecting objects and military accoutrements for display at repositories such as the RUSI Museum. This area will repay deeper study, especially with regard to the role that members of the British Army played in broadening understandings of non-European religious ideas and cultural practices across differing imperial contexts.

II

In the nineteenth century debates on human difference became a matter of great concern, and were facilitated through the proliferation of periodical culture and the expansion of the British Empire. The discourse on 'civilisation' and 'savagery' throughout the period was a rich one, within which questions about the military qualities and capabilities of non-European 'savage' warriors formed a particularly significant and prevalent intellectual dimension. Perceptions and understandings of the 'savage' and 'uncivilised' enemy – including their army organisation, weapons of warfare, battlefield tactics, and articulations and adherence to standards of military ethics – engaged military practitioners, anthropologists, colonial administrators and members of the wider British public. This dissertation has brought to light the texture of these discussions – on the pages of civilian and military periodicals, through personal papers, correspondence and evocative campaign narratives, as well as in sketches, engravings, and lavish battlefield paintings. The demonstrated contemporary attention to nuance and detail complicates retrospective linear teleologies – both of ideas of cultural evolution and of military principle: this was a complex and interwoven set of preoccupations. Knowledge of non-European warrior cultures was passionately articulated, contested, reinterpreted and defended during a century of confrontation, military conflict and cross-cultural exchange. Challenging questions were raised about British self-understandings, to which (even though they were proffered in particular circumstances) there were no effortless answers.

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


Figure 1




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



Figure 3



Figure 4



No. VI.] [NOVEMBER, 1836.

THE

MISSIONARY MAGAZINE

AND

CHRONICLE,

RELATING CHIEFLY TO THE MISSIONS OF

The London Missionary Society.


SUBSCRIPTIONS and DONATIONS in aid of the Funds of this Society will be thankfully received by the Treasurer or Secretaries, at the Mission House, Blomfield-street, Finsbury, and by Messrs. Hankeys, the Society's Bankers, 7, Fenchurch-street, London; in Edinburgh, by Mr. George Yule, Broughton Hall; in Glasgow, by Mr. Risk, 9, Cochrane-street; and in Dublin, by Messrs. J. D. La Touche and Co., or at 7, Lower Abbey-street.

THE HUMANE AND GENEROUS CAFFRE.

Although the social condition of the Caffre Tribes has long been unfavourable to the development of virtuous and humane feelings, they nevertheless often exemplify valuable

VOL. I. H

Figure 5



Aug. 15

EGYPTIAN HALL,
PICCADILLY,

Hours of Exhibition, 11 *to* 1, *and* 3 *to* 5.

EXTRAORDINARY
EXHIBITION!

Bushmen Children
OR PIGMY RACE!

Two Bushmen Children from the interior of Africa, a most extraordinary Variety of the Human Race never before Exhibited in Europe.

The Male Specimen only 44 inches high, though nearly full grown, and 16 years of age, presents a perfect Model of a Man in miniature.

The Female but 32 inches high, most elegant and delicate in proportion, 8 years old, and both characterised by remarkable intelligence and gentleness of disposition.

These interesting Children (not related to each other) have no recollection of their parents, who are supposed to have been murdered by the Kafirs, who pursue and exterminate the Bushmen Tribe with the most unrelenting ferocity, and were rescued by a Trader. (Dutch Boer) and brought into the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and are now submitted to the Public, having recently arrived in this country.

At the same time will be exhibited, a fine and curious specimen of the GREAT URSINE BABOON, with some exceedingly rare varieties of the MONKEY TRIBE, from Port Natal; also, a beautiful Collection of DRAWINGS, illustrative of the various KAFIR TRIBES, HOTTENTOTS, &c., &c., and curious and beautiful Specimens of RARE BIRDS, from the interior of Africa, and IMPLEMENTS OF WAR of different Tribes.

ORDER OF EXHIBITION;

1st—BUSHMEN CHILDREN in the Dress of their Tribe.
The Bushman will throw his Assigai (or Spear) Dance, &c.

2nd—The Bushman representing a Corporal of the Army, will go through the Manual and Platoon Exercise, with wonderful precision.
The Bush Girl appearing as a Soldier's Wife.

3rd—The Bushman as a Gentleman's Servant (Tiger)
The Bush Girl as a Lady's Maid.

This will be found to be the most interesting and extraordinary Exhibition ever seen in Europe.

ADMISSION, ONE SHILLING.

G. Stuart, Printer, 38, Rupert-street, Haymarket

Figure 6



EGYPTIAN HALL.
THE
BOSJESMANS,
OR
BUSH PEOPLE,
THE MOST EXTRAORDINARY RACE OF
HUMAN BEINGS
IN THE WORLD!
Open from Eleven until Nine o'Clock.
BUSH FIGHT
AND
WAR DANCE,
At 4 & 8 in the Evening.
ADMISSION, - - - ONE SHILLING.

Figure 7

THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS

No. 220.—Vol. IX.] FOR THE WEEK ENDING SATURDAY, JULY 18, 1846. [Sixpence.

THE DEPARTURE OF IBRAHIM PACHA.



UR visitor, Ibrahim Pacha, has returned to his own country after his European tour, during which he has seen all that a passing traveller can see of the

Cities and men,
And manners, climates, councils, governments,

of the two great nations of Europe — France and England. He is the first of the rulers of the East by whom the apathy and indifference common to Orientals have been broken through, and exhibited the curiosity with regard to the things and ideas of western civilization, which that apathy often but disguises. It is easy to feign a contempt for men and systems whose superiority is too keenly felt to be almost beyond imitation. This was the old Moslem feeling towards the "Infidel;" it prevailed in the intercourse of individuals, and tinged the policy of their rulers. But time and experience are stern teachers as well as destructive innovators. The Mussulman of the nineteenth century is not what he was in the seventeenth, any more than the European is now what he was at the same date. Notwithstanding the unchangeable character of the dogmas of Islamism, its followers have not escaped the mutations, physical and moral, that time brings with it to all. The fanaticism of the disciples of the Prophet, which, while Europe was weak, threatened to spread over the west, by the teaching of sword and fire, is extinct; and with it has vanished that military prowess that swept from the earth the last relics of the empire of Rome—that seized the capital of the Greek Emperors—and, but for the heroism of Poland when it was still a nation, would have levelled the walls of Vienna.

Surrounded by Christian and civilised States, Turkey has been unable, however willing, to escape the influence that they must always exercise. Superiority in arts, arms, and enterprise, cannot be resisted—as the Porte has learned by many a bitter and humiliating lesson; not one of which has been more effectual than that given it by Mehemet Ali, when, as ruler of Egypt, he declared himself independent of the Sultan, and maintained himself in his position—one of the "rebellious Pachas" who, with "encroaching Giaours," have long been the despair and perplexity of the Government of Constantinople. The talents and energy of Mehemet Ali might not, perhaps, have effected such a revolution, had they not been assisted by the science and discipline of Europe, which he had the sense to appreciate, and the courage to employ, to the surprise and bewilderment of the true believers of the older school. The answer said to have been given by Ibrahim Pacha to an objector of that class, who censured him for employing the impious inventions of the infidel, may be taken as containing the spirit by which both he and his greater father are actuated. He said he could not find any passage of the Koran that proscribed either steamboats or artillery! Owing so much to the skill and science of Europe, it is but natural, then, that the future ruler of Egypt should be anxious to see them at work in Europe itself; and what they have made of the people, among whom the miracles of modern discovery are things of every day, so familiar, that half their wonders pass unmarked and unnoted.

And "what does the Lion think of us?" What has he seen that will mould his opinions?

His first impressions of Europe were derived from France; where, we must confess, he was received with greater courtesy, with more Royal attentions, and more regard of the ceremony that belongs to the Princes and Powers of the Earth, than we have shown him. The heartiness of the reception could not be more sincere than ours, but it was exhibited with more taste and tact. Ibrahim was lodged in a Royal Palace—had a guard of honour—the Royal carriages and a Princely retinue were placed at his disposal—he was accompanied and escorted by members of the Royal Family. We must allow, with an oft-quoted authority, that "they manage these things better in France."


But as the reception, with all its courtliness, does not make the whole worth of a visit, it may be asked, what did the future Ruler of the land of the Pharaohs see? It may be summed up in a single sentence: he saw Paris; and, in those things which London and Paris possess in common, we are not without misgivings as to our place in the Pacha's opinion. After the tasteful magnificence of Paris, where immense wealth has been skilfully bestowed, we should be almost afraid to ask Ibrahim's private judgment of our squirt-like fountains, dull squares, comical statues, and unsightly public edifices, for which the Government has just been enterprising enough to produce, with few exceptions, a complete combination of inconvenience and ugliness. It is only in those things which are peculiar to England that we would boldly challenge comparison.



THE WAR IN KAFFIRLAND.—THE DEATH OF CAPT. BAMBRICK.—FROM A SKETCH BY A CORRESPONDENT.—(SEE NEXT PAGE.)

Figure 8

THE KAFFIR WAR.



KAFFIRS BUSH-FIGHTING.

and the Burgher force has been summoned from every district. Levies of Hottentots are also being made, who will be organised into provisional companies. In the meantime, large parties of Kaffirs are entering the colony above and below us, murdering stragglers and couriers on the roads, driving off cattle, and burning the detached farmhouses. There are constant skirmishes between them and the Burghers.

"The ammunition is the great attraction to them now. The adroitness with which they carry off cattle is almost miraculous; you never know they are near till they suddenly appear in the midst, and then, with a peculiar whistle, they make the beasts follow them with a run. They lie hid, and creep along, so that our sentries can seldom see them; only the Hottentots' eyes can match the Kaffirs, and detect them."



RESCUE OF THE AMMUNITION WAGGONS.


NEWSPAPER

Figure 9



Figure 10

Figure 11



THE REMAINS OF SIR CHARLES J. NAPIER LYING IN STATE AT OAKLANDS, NEAR FURBROOK, HANTS.

FUNERAL OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER.

THE interment of this great and gallant soldier took place at Portsmouth on Thursday, last week. Sir Charles not being in active employment at the time, the funeral was not a military one; but the spontaneous respect testified for his memory by all classes, military and civil, was of so impressive a character as to more than compensate for the absence of military display. The universality of respect bespoke a feeling which has been thus ably characterised by a contemporary:—"That as star after star dies out from among that bright constellation that has irradiated the paths of our army and navy in that 'war of giants' which shook the civilised world, we act as though we felt some regret that while its light was still left to us we did not regard it with greater attention, and pay it a tribute of loftier admiration. The people, so long as its brains are not bound up with cotton-twist, its heart stuffed with calico, and its eyes blinded by steam, knows its great men by instinct, but too often the recognition is made as it beholds their funeral obsequies. War, that terrible necessity which is co-existent with the individualities of states and empires, and which is only to be destroyed by the obliteration of all the geographical definitions which mark their limits, is still the *ultimus ratio* of nations; and he who can best use the weapons of that dreadful and most trenchant rhetoric will so long be invested with the old heroic grandeur in the minds of his fellow-countrymen. We recognize in the warrior who vindicates the honour or defends the liberties of his native land one whom Heaven has gifted with special qualities for the holiest of objects. Whether he be clothed in the steel-plate of

Figure 12



Figure 13



Figure 14



Figure 15




Figure 16


THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS
351
April 5, 1862
MANUFACTURE OF THE ARMSTRONG GUN AT WOOLWICH ARSENAL: THE BEEHIVE.—SEE NEXT PAGE.

Figure 17




Figure 18


PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CHARIVARI.—MAY 3, 1862.
PEACE.
MR. PUNCH'S DESIGN FOR A COLOSSAL STATUE, WHICH OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN PLACED IN THE INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION.

Figure 19





Figure 20



"THE FORTY THIEVES," COMMANDED BY LIEUT.-COLONEL ABD-EL-KADER.

Figure 21



DRIVING THE PRAIRIE WITH FIRE.

Figure 22



CHARGE OF A LIONESS

Figure 23



SIR SAMUEL BAKER AT THE MEETING OF THE ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY.

Figure 24





Figure 25



THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS.

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No. 2071.—VOL. LXXIV. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY, 22, 1879. WITH SUPPLEMENT | SIXPENCE. By Post, 6½d.

THE ZULU WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA: CETEWAYO, THE ZULU KING.
DRAWN FROM THE LIFE IN JUNE, 1877, BY THE LATE MR. EDWARD TILT, DURING HIS VISIT TO ZULU-LAND.

Figure 26



Figure 27