

PROLEGOMENA TO A CRITICAL EDITION OF
THE ARISTOTELIAN MAGNA MORALIA


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TEXTUAL DISCUSSION¹

The Title

Our manuscripts unanimously attribute M.M. to Aristotle, but whilst ζ knows the text as we know it, as the Magna Moralia, α knows it as Moralia Nicomachea Magna. The latter title is twice attested in the sixth century in the Alexandrian neo-Platonist, Elias² - τὰ Μεγάλα Νικομάχεια. But earlier references to M.M. do not contain the epithet ‘Nicomachean’ - it is likely that Andronicus of Rhodes (first century B.C.) influenced the catalogue of Ptolemaios³ which calls M.M. simply ‘itikon magln’ (ἠθικῶν μεγάλων), Atticus⁴ (second century A.D.) calls M.M. Μεγάλων ἠθικῶν and Simplicius⁵ (sixth century A.D.) refers to M.M. as ἠθικὰ μεγάλα.⁶ It is thus misleading (though strictly true) to say as Kenny⁷ does, that ‘in antiquity the Magna Moralia was known as ‘The Great Nicomachean Ethics’.

The two manuscripts (C and P) which call M.M. ‘Nicomachean’ call E.N. Ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν νικομαχείων μικρῶν. Elias is an earlier witness to the tradition that saw E.N. and M.M. as a pair.⁸ Indeed, E.N. and M.M. appear together in the manuscript tradition three times as often as do E.E. and M.M. Given the respective lengths of the two works (E.N. is 87 and M.M. is 32 Bekker pages long), the adjectives ‘big’ and ‘small’ cannot refer to the length of the treatises. This is not the place to speculate on the reason for the adjective ‘big’ in the title.⁹ It is worth saying, though, that if the hypothesis of Moraux¹⁰ - that ‘big’ describes the size of the individual books, rather than the length of M.M. - were

¹ I do not include in this section orthographical changes which I advocate above, pp.169-180, nor will I list again the misprints in Susemihl (see p.116), except those that may render the reader perplexed.

² Both passages are cited by Dirlmeier, pp.98, 105.

³ Cited by Dirlmeier, p.100.

⁴ Cited by Dirlmeier, p.103.

⁵ Cited by Dirlmeier, p.104.

⁶ There is, in fact, one suggestive piece of evidence for M.M. being known as ‘Nicomachean’ at Cicero de Finibus V.12. See Kenny [1978] 15-17, and his [1992] 118-19.

⁷ Kenny, [1992] 139.

⁸ See Dirlmeier, p.105. Elias provides his own explanation: M.M. was dedicated to Nicomachus, Aristotle’s father, E.N. was addressed to Nicomachus, Aristotle’s son.

⁹ See Dirlmeier, pp.97-9, for a survey of views. See Kenny, [1992] 139-40 for a new suggestion.

¹⁰ Moraux, [1951] 87. Moraux is anticipated by Amerbach. See above, p.103.

correct, then the title would almost certainly be later than the work itself.¹¹ For the division of M.M. into two books is a haphazard division, as Dirlmeier correctly notes¹² - one dictated more by the length of papyrus on the roll than by editorial judgement.¹³

For the first chapter of M.M. see, in addition to the secondary literature cited by Dirlmeier: Donini, [1965] 1-26; Furley, [1983], Becchi, [1977], Cooper, [1973], Rowe [1975], Gadamer [1986] 147-50.

1181a24-5 Given the stemma, 81b26 and 97b28, read ἠθῶν. Dirlmeier's argues (p.155) that we need to read ἠθικῶν in a24 because the unease expressed by the author in 81b27-8 only makes sense if the word ἠθικά has been used before. Although we do not know what title M.M. was given by its author, any title that included some form of the word ἠθικά would most easily provide the previous mention that Dirlmeier rightly insists on. Elsewhere Dirlmeier characterises M.M. as 'ein Traktat Περὶ ἠθῶν' (p.426, cf. pp.420, 429, 431). η has a tendency elsewhere to add -ικ- in the middle of words (e.g. 89b13, 89b25, 89b26, 97a13, 97b26, 12a19).¹⁴ Here the addition of -ικ- would be a natural correction, given the title.

Bonitz (316b11) understands ἠθος in 81a25 to mean ἡ περὶ τῶν ἠθῶν πραγματεία and Dirlmeier (p.155) and Donini, [1965] 7n.10, accept this, whilst acknowledging that the language is peculiar. If ἠθος cannot mean this, then we could emend (following a suggestion by Prof. Frede) to ἠθικόν. I have not been able to find a use of the adjective in the neuter meaning 'ethics', 'enquiry into ἠθος'.

1181a24 See my note on 1187b38 for confusion between πρῶτον and πρότερον. Read πρῶτον here.

1181a26 For ἄν see p.166.

¹¹ The most obvious case of a late title is the Metaphysics, so-called only because that treatise followed the Physics.

¹² Dirlmeier, p.357, and Donini [1965] 62n.4, 122n.26.

¹³ A variation on Moraux's explanation (arrived at in informal discussion with Jonathon and Jennifer Barnes) might be that M.M. was an 'outsize' work in a library, and so shelved separately.

¹⁴ See also note on 1189b6 below.

1181a27 γὰρ is a late reading, but is necessary.

1181a27 Read ποιόν, the reading of the mss. It is to Bas.³ that we owe ποιόν. Cf. Bonitz Index 611a28. Compare E.N. 1099a29-31, E.E. 1247a8.

1181b25 σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος occurs at E.N. 1152a8; τὸ ἦθος σπουδαῖος occurs at M.M. 12a12; σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχὴν is at Pol 1286b3. We should not add κατὰ with α and Γ. Compare the manuscript deviation at E.N. 1094a13. Cf. Kühner-Gerth II, 1, pp.316-17.

1181b27-8 Here ἄν must be taken with ἔχειν, but there is no need to move it nearer to ἔχειν.

1182a3-6 In 82a1-3 M.M. has claimed that it is not enough to know what virtue is. If the present enquiry is to be useful, we need to learn also about how virtue arises. In 82a3-6 the transmitted text is awkwardly unbalanced. The combination οὐ μόνον... ἀλλὰ καὶ... normally connects two similar ideas, but here we do not have a combination of motives¹⁵ (οὐ μόνον ὅπως... ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως...), nor a combination of issues to be discussed (οὐ μόνον τί ἐστὶ... ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τίνων). Rather, we find οὐ μόνον ὅπως... ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τίνων. Before continuing to explore this problem, and suggesting a possible solution, we need to raise three questions.

First, the mss. offer alternatives in 82a3. Some have ὅπως + future indicative, others have ὅπως + subjunctive. Depending whether ὅπως is the indirect interrogative or the final particle, the mss. offer us significantly different interpretations.

Interrogative + subjunctive: ‘investigate how we are to know’

Interrogative + indicative: ‘investigate how we shall know’ (= Armstrong) (cf. de Caelo 285a32)

Final particle + subjunctive: ‘investigate so that we may know’ (standard construction)

¹⁵ I defend the status of ὅπως as a final particle below.

Final particle + indicative: 'make sure that we know'¹⁶

The problem with the first two is that the project of M.M. becomes excessively epistemological. On either of those readings, M.M.'s intentions here will not be lived up to - we are not going to learn about how we know what virtue is, but we are going to try to find out what it is. It is thus preferable to take ὅπως as the final particle.

Second, is there a difference in sense between σκοπεῖσθαι (a4) (present middle of σκοπέω) and σκέψασθαι (aorist of σκέπτομαι)? If not, then why repeat the verb?¹⁷

Third are the indirect questions in a4 and a5 dependent on εἰδήσομεν or on σκοπεῖσθαι and σκέψασθαι?

If there is a small lacuna after καὶ in a5, the problems raised are solved. If we read ἄλλὰ καὶ <ὅπως γενησόμεθα σπουδαῖοι πῶς καὶ> ἐκ τίνων ἔσται σκέψασθαι, balance is restored to the οὐ μόνον... ἄλλὰ καὶ... combination; σκέψασθαι in a5 is less awkward: now that σκοπεῖσθαι is further away, it is helpful for the reader to have the verb (still dependent on δεῖ). The indirect questions now depend on σκοπεῖσθαι and σκέψασθαι (cf. 82a32). We can translate 82a3-5: 'For it is not only in order to acquire knowledge that we must examine what virtue is, but also in order to become good that we must examine how or whence it arises'.

The combination of πῶς καὶ ἐκ τίνων has occurred already in 82a3 and will recur in 82a7 and 82a9 - it is natural for it to be in a5 too. For the thought that knowledge alone is not the goal in ethics, see E.N. 1103a27-9, 1095a4-6, 1179a35-b2, E.E. 1216b11-25. The insertion of these words also makes the connection with 82a5-6 more smooth. Since it is false that anyone who wants to understand what vice is, wants to be vicious, it helps to have an adjective, before τοιοῦτοι, so that the claim in 82a5-6 is made more specific.

¹⁶ The construction of σκοπεῖσθαι ὅπως + future indicative is found in Demosthenes 2.12 (cited in Kühner-Gerth II, 2, 373). Bonitz (520a25-8) gives similar examples in Aristotle.

¹⁷ Cf. E.N. 1103b28-9 for the appearance of σκεπτόμεθα in the same sentence as ἐπισκέψασθαι. There is some doubt about the text there, but the combination of present and aorist of σκέπτεσθαι is certain. We need the verb (in whatever form) to be repeated there.

M.M. uses σκοπεῖν in the active frequently, and the present middle at 84a30, 84a33, 95b36, 96b36. σκέπτομαι is used more often (including instances of ἐπισκέπτομαι and συνεπισκέπτομαι): 82a32, 84a24, 86b33, 87a6, 87b38, 88a28, 90b10, 90b21, 91a18, 97b25, 00b23, 08b36, 12a1, 13b18, 13b29.

1182a7 Spengel and Susemihl have flirted with the idea that we need to read a contrastive particle after ἀναγκαῖον. Although M.M. has just pointed out the necessity of understanding καὶ ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς ἔσται [sc. ἀρετή], he has also pointed out the need to understand what virtue is (82a1-2, 82a4). (That need could be derived from something other than ὄφελος (82a2).) There is no contrast with that.

1182a9 η read ἔσται after τίνων, and so presumably did ζ. But α omits. The sentence reads much better if we delete ἔσται¹, and we can see how ἔσται could have got in.

1182a11 The pluperfect of ἐρῶ is not only exceptionally rare (it does occur in Origen and Galen), but it is also the wrong tense in this context.

1182a22 A full stop after ψυχῆς eases the change of construction.

1182a25 Dirlmeier (p.165) follows Spengel, [1866] 624, in reading ἐκάστῳ τὰς. ω read simply ἐκάστου. Certainly the genitive is impossible, and we need to follow L in reading a dative. (Cf. 99a15, 99a17 ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι.) But the definite article is unnecessary. Dirlmeier draws attention to parallel passages in Plato, but they are not so close as to be able to say that M.M. is using a set phrase. Note, in particular that Plato uses the singular (τὸ προσήκον, τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν).¹⁸

Dirlmeier (p.163) has already noted the problems of M.M.'s attribution of bipartition (not tripartition) of the soul to Plato.¹⁹ If M.M. can misrepresent Plato philosophically, we should be wary of following Dirlmeier in reading τὰς (a late correction) in order to conform to 'festen platonischen Sprachgebrauch'. Demote τὰς to the apparatus.

¹⁸ Gadamer, [1986] 127-8n.3, takes 82a25ff. to allude to Republic IV.

¹⁹ See now Vander Waeldt, [1985] 286, who argues that M.M.'s attribution of bipartition to Plato is 'a fundamental but most influential misrepresentation of Plato's psychology that obliterated the differences between Platonic tripartition and Aristotelian bipartition'. On p.302 it is suggested that 94a6-9 'reads back into the Republic' Aristotle's doctrine of proportionate justice. In 82a25-6 he is reading back into Plato Aristotle's attribution of moral virtues into one part of the soul, and intellectual virtues into the other. For another misrepresentation of Plato in M.M. (94a7-27), see Finley, [1977] 145n.16.

1182a27 καταμ(ε)ίγνυμι + acc. + εἰς is the standard construction (See L.S.J. (s.v.)), whereas συζεύγνυμι takes acc. + dative, or acc. + πρὸς, or acc. + καὶ + acc. (See L.S.J. s.v.²⁰) One can see both how καὶ συνέζευξεν might have dropped out in α. Since there is very little difference between συζεύγνυμι + εἰς and συζεύγνυμι + πρὸς, and Aristotle himself uses the second construction,²¹ there is little to object to on linguistic grounds to the author using both verbs before εἰς. The hypothesis (suggested, but rejected by Dirlmeier) that καὶ συνέζευξεν could have been a gloss, inserted in ζ to explain the un-Aristotelian verb, καταμίγνυμι, is made less likely by the fact that the sense of κατέμιξεν, although not used by Aristotle, is obvious and is hardly explained by the metaphorical use of συζεύγνυμι. Restore καὶ συνέζευξεν.

1182a28 οὐ δὴ is right, but we need a full stop after τὰγαθοῦ. See 87b22, 00b29.

1182a29 Dirlmeier (p.166) wants to insert τῆς before ἀληθείας, but his parallels (Met. 983b2, Protr. 44 (Düring)) will not convince those who take M.M. to have been written by someone other than Aristotle. The addition is a case of normalisation, which should be resisted.

1182a36 βέλτιστον is certainly right. See my note on 1184a24 for references to corruption of βέλτιον and βέλτιστον. The comparative could not be used in a superlative sense.

1182b2 Dirlmeier (p.169) is tempted to follow the many scholars who have wanted to emend this line. ‘After picking out the highest ranking capacity, he [M.M.] cannot say that its goal is ‘a good’’. But he tries to show that M.M. can use the word ἀγαθόν to be mean ἄριστον (‘so daß seine Geltung = ἄριστον war’) and in his translation translates ἀγαθόν by ‘das höchste Gut’.²² The passages he cites from M.M. in support of this are 83a23 and 84a14. But 83a23

²⁰ It is not clear how Dirlmeier (p.166) can maintain that συνέζευξεν ‘certainly requires a dative’ (‘allerdings verlangte den Dativ’), and also that we should read this word, when there is no dative to be seen. In fact, the verb does not require a dative.

²¹ At Pol. 1269b28-9: συζεδῆσαι τὸν ἄριστον πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην.

²² Allan, [1966] 146, criticises Dirlmeier for translating ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ by ‘Idee des höchsten Gutes’.

is certainly not what Dirlmeier needs. 84a14 is a more relevant passage, but the text there is unreliable. If we accept the mss.' reading there, reading ἀγαθόν instead of Rassow's τἀγαθόν, it is at least possible that ἀγαθόν is adjectival 'good' not 'a good'. Certainly the best thing, by virtue of being the best, must be good. But ἀγαθόν never means 'best', although what it describes may be best. Here the transmitted ἀγαθόν - if accepted - must be adjectival because of βέλτιστον in 82b36.

The problem with the transmitted text, then, is that after picking out the highest ranking capacity, M.M. cannot say that its goal is good: if all that M.M. wanted to do was to show that the end of politics is good, he need only to have pointed out that politics is a δύναμις. But he especially says that it is the best δύναμις, and his reason, we can see from 82a36, was to be able to specify that its end is not just good, but the best good. Becchi, [1977] 159, argues that Bonitz' insertion of τὸ ἄριστον should be rejected because it seems to repeat ('appare ripetitiva di') 82a36 (βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη). But that is the virtue of Bonitz' conjecture. M.M. can move from the claims:

The end of the best δύναμις is best (82a36)

Politics is the best δύναμις (82b1)

to a conclusion, signalled by ὥστε:

The end of politics is best (82b1-2)

Becchi wants to insert πολιτικόν instead, but how does that logically follow from what has preceded? He takes ἄρα in b2 to support his conjecture, but the connection between τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς [sc. πολιτικῆς] (82b1-2) and 'good for us' is as clear as it is without Becchi's πολιτικόν.

In fact, I think that we should leave the transmitted text and not accept any emendations. Note how the text continues: ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα... (b2) (cf. b6, b7, b8). M.M. is not careful in distinguishing between 'good', 'the good' and 'a good' in his discussion of pleasure either. See my note 1204a31-b3.

1182b4 See Furley, [1983] 160-1, and Sharples, [1983] 149, for a discussion of Arius Didymus' (Stobaeus, p.134,12) understanding of the genitive θεῶν. Dirlmeier too (p.170) provides parallels from Aristotle which secure the reading.

1182b4-5 The two καὶ-s show that M.M. is making two separate points. α's ὁ after ἄλλος should not be accepted.

1182b5-6 The three families offer widely different readings here. We can, by comparing the readings of α, β and η try to establish what ζ wrote. Ignoring the word ἀγαθοῦ, whose position in ω and ζ is impossible to establish, ζ wrote ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄρα ἡμῶν λεκτέον. (η omitted πολιτικοῦ *ex homoeot.*, whilst β omitted τοῦ.) The other principal family, α, read: ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἡμῶν ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ λεκτέον.

In 82b2-3 we find ἡμῶν being used in two ways: first with λεκτέον, and then in the phrase, τὸ ἡμῶν ἀγαθόν. ζ places ἡμῶν next to λεκτέον in b5 and this is preferable to Spengel's insertion of τοῦ before ἡμῶν. We must now address ἀγαθοῦ. Where should it be positioned in the sentence ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄρα ἡμῶν λεκτέον? The natural positions would be after πολιτικοῦ.²³ No manuscript has it here, though. The fact that all three families put ἀγαθοῦ in different positions shows that ω had probably originally omitted it, but that it was added above the line or in the margin in such a way that readers were uncertain where in the sentence it was to be read. I suggest that we either omit ἀγαθοῦ altogether (it can easily be mentally supplied) or place it after πολιτικοῦ.

Ashburner, [1917] 53, wants to excise the sentence altogether, as a repetition of 82b2. But it is not simply a repetition - here we find the phrase τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθόν which was not in 82b2.

1182b8 Furley, [1983] 164n.1, refers to E.E. 1218a31 and thinks that we should read ὄν (α) for ἐν (ζ). We then have 'Good is spoken of either as what is best *for* each of the things that are...' (Furley) rather than 'Good is spoken of either as what is best *in* each of the things that

²³ ἄρα normally comes second or third in M.M., but is later at 83a23 (ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα), 84b26-7 (διὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν ἄρα), 85b30 (ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα), 88a32 (οὐδ' ἢ βούλησις ἐκούσιον ἄρα) etc.

are...'. The dative, Furley argues (p.161), will later (83a7) be replaced by ἡμῶν, when M.M. moves from a 'level of generality appropriate to this stage of the argument' at 82b8 to a specific application of the earlier division at 83a7. My reservation about this is that ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν has already occurred at 82b3. Dirlmeier (p.171) cites parallels in which Aristotle uses ἀγαθὸν + the preposition ἐν (Topics 146b10, 149b37, Met. 982b7) in the same sense as ἀγαθὸν + dative (E.E. 1227a20). If ἐν is taken not to mean 'spatially located within', but 'in the case of', then ζ's reading will yield the same sense as α's, and so the choice in reading becomes philosophically unimportant.

1182b14 δὴ must be right. M.M. can hardly appeal to the fact that the common good is not the same as the separated good to show that the two are different. Full stop after ὑπάρχει.

1182b16 Read ἄπασιν. See above, pp.178-9.

1182b19 Stock is right to read ὅ τι for ὅτι twice in this line: 'Now the aim of defining is to state the substance of each thing, either what good is or what evil is, or whatever else it may be' (Stock). We now have ms. support for this, for what it is worth. The alternative (the conjunction, ὅτι) yields 'that it is good or bad or whatever else'. That, however, does not sit well with the first part of the sentence, in which it is said that definitions aim to give the definiendum's οὐσία.²⁴

1182b20-1 This sentence contains two late readings. τὸ (b20) is a late insertion in P, and in b21 ω read δὲ ἐάν, where Susemihl follows Z in reading δὲ ἔν.²⁵ τὸ should be excised.²⁶

Clearly δὲ ἐάν is impossible, but one might consider ἐάν as a rival conjecture for Z's δὲ ἔν. M.M. is imagining a definition of 'generally good' like that in 82b7-9. X is generally good if X is choiceworthy in itself. This definition helps us to judge particular candidates for

²⁴ Of course the division of words would not have been an issue for the author. It is only modern convention that decides how to write the word.

²⁵ Cf. my note below on 1182b35.

²⁶ See Kühner-Gerth II, 1, pp.630-1.

the description ‘generally good’: ‘But the definition says that such and such is good generally when it is choiceworthy in itself’.

1182b28 Read αὐτή - ‘she too (politics) is a science among the rest’ (Armstrong) rather than ‘it is itself only one science among the rest’ (Stock).

1182b30 Bonitz’ τέλος is obviously right, and now is found in some recentiores.

1182b33 First, add κατὰ before μέρος, which it seems that Susemihl accidentally left out. Then read καὶ which editors have excised: it could easily have been omitted (in ζ) accidentally or intentionally.

1182b35 Bekker follows Valla and reads ὁ ὄν, and Susemihl follows this suggestion. The mss. have ἔάν. The indefinite construction is not necessary. The antecedent of ὁ, on Bekker’s text, is τοῦτο, but then why not just have ὁ βουλόμεθα δεῖξαι? Moreover, it is not clear that we need further specification of τοῦτο, since we already know from b32 that M.M. is talking about particular goods. The mss.’ ἔάν is grammatical and makes better sense: ‘because when we want to prove one of the particular goods, we either show through definition that the same account fits the good and the good in question, if we want to show that it is good, or...’. The need for the conditional clause is to cater for the possibility that one might have different ambitions: one may want to prove that a particular good is, say, bad. In that case, one would have to see whether the same account as one gives of ‘bad’ fits the particular good thing that is being investigated. If it does not, then the proof has failed.

1183a11 Unless M.M. is himself an ‘unkundiger Leser’ of Aristotle, we must excise καὶ τινί. See Dirlmeier, p.177.

1183a16 Excise τῆ. This is supported by the mss., matches the phrase in 83a13 and balances 83a17-18 where there is no definite article before ἰατρικῆ.

1183a19-20 Standardly Greek uses κοινὸς + dative, as we find in 82a30, 83a20, 05b30, 11a13,²⁷ or + genitive, as we read in 08a28. There are cases where authors use a preposition. Bonitz (s.v. κοινός) records the fact that Aristotle uses ἐπὶ and κατὰ after κοινόν, and L.S.J. do not give any other possible prepositions after κοινόν. Presumably in an attempt to restore consistency of usage, A adds ἐν after μὲν in a20, which would give the same expression as in a19. The more obvious way to restore consistency and standard Greek, if the author means ‘common to all the sciences’, would be to excise ἐν in 83a19.²⁸

1183a22 Armstrong’s deletion of πότε is sensible. Why would the author, who has just generalised a discussion of ἀγαθὸν πότε, to ἀγαθόν in all the categories (83a20), revert to ἀγαθὸν πότε?

1183a27 Delete καὶ on stemmatic grounds.

1183a27 Read φανερώτατα with all independent mss. except A. The point is not that τὰ αἰσθητὰ are more ‘manifest’ than τὰ νοητά, but that they are the most ‘manifest’ thing in the world.

1183a29-30 For repeated δεῖν see my note on 1196a1-2.

1183a31 τὸ is absent in two late mss., and has to be deleted.

1183a35-6 Retain the sentence at 83a35-6. See Dirlmeier, p.181.

²⁷ I take the ἐν in 82b11 (τὸ κοινὸν ἐν ἅπασιν ὑπάρχον ἀγαθόν) not to be a case of κοινὸν + ἐν, but of tmesis of ἐνυπάρχον (cf. 82b13-14, 82b15-16, 82b17).

²⁸ See Rowe, [1975] 165-6, for a discussion of this passage.

1183a36 ζ had ὡς ὅτι, which gives us evidence to there being a stage at which ὡς was read without ὅτι. ὡς is a possibility given 82b11, 82b30, but would require a further change: we would need to read ἀγαθοῦ for ἀγαθόν. So leave ὅτι.

1183a38-9 One of the two families has two verbs of saying in this sentence: ζ had φησι in a38 and ἐρῶ in a39. α did not have φησι, but did have ἐρῶ. Since ἐρῶ is secure in the tradition, and the author of M.M. cannot himself be the subject, we need to retain the φησι that we find in ζ. The conjecture in P², ἐρεῖ, was necessary once φησί had dropped out.

ἀλλ' ἴσως, φησίν, τούτῳ ἀγαθῷ ἀρχῇ χρησάμενος, ὑπὲρ τῶν
καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐκ τούτου προβάς, ἐρῶ.

Translate: 'But perhaps', an objection runs, 'using this good as a starting point, I will move on from that and talk about the particular goods'.²⁹

Dirlmeier (pp.180-1) defends the reading ἐρεῖ. He argues that since M.M. has in mind a group of opponents (cf. 83a29-32), he cannot here introduce a single opponent. He also takes the subject of ἐρεῖ to be ἡ πολιτική. This is grammatically impossible, since we would need to have feminine participles in a38-9. When M.M. singles out one objector, words can be put into his mouth which any of the plural opposition could have said.

1183b5 Move εἶναι after ἀθάνατον for stemmatic reasons.

1183b7-8 The text that Susemihl prints does not make sense. The emendation of διὸ to διὰ τὸ occurred thrice, independently of each other.³⁰ But I am not convinced that it is the solution. It is not *because* the ideal good is not an appropriate starting point that one can investigate particular goods. Rather, the fact that it is possible to investigate particular goods provides reason to see that the Form is not the right place to start. This was the way in which

²⁹ Spengel, [1866] 624 rightly compares E.N. 1096b35, for an objection in direct speech in the same context.

³⁰ A further question arises for those who emend διὸ to διὰ τὸ: is it further necessary to change τούτου ἀγαθοῦ to τούτῳ ἀγαθόν? Bonitz and Armstrong answer Yes, Ellebodus and the brown corrector of Laur. 81,12 say No. I think that it would not be necessary to make this further change. We would translate: 'on account of the fact that the starting point consisting in this good is not appropriate'.

M.M. was thinking in b4-6, in the parallel case of the triangle. Thus διὸ is preferable to διὰ τό.³¹ In which case διὸ must start a new sentence.

Can the Greek in 83b7-8 yield the sense: ‘the Form of the good is not an appropriate starting point in an inquiry into the other goods’? Let us start with the infinitive, εἶναι, in b8. Casaubon, Spengel and Stock all introduce a word (δῆλον or λέγομεν) to account for the infinitive εἶναι. Dirlmeier (p.181) thinks that the ellipse is tolerable, and points to 82b10-12 for another passage where the author speaks elliptically.

Now let us look at τούτου ἀγαθοῦ. Scholars have taken the genitive to be possessive, and hence have seen a need to emend the text here - M.M. is not talking about the starting point of the Form of the good, in the sense of the place to start in an investigation of the Form of the good. Dirlmeier wants to read <τὴν ἐκ> τούτου ἀγαθοῦ, so that the Greek means ‘starting point from the Form of the good’. Casaubon inserts a possessive genitive τῶν ἀγαθῶν to show that it is the starting point of those goods that M.M. is talking about. But there is a perfectly legitimate use of the genitive in Greek which M.M. can be using here. The constitutive genitive (‘the starting point consisting of this good’) makes good sense.

Although the omission of the problematic sentence, διὸ — ἀγαθοῦ, in α could be accounted for by an omission *saut du même au même*, I am inclined to go for Bekker’s solution and to excise the sentence. One conclusion that M.M. has been trying to reach since 82b10, and the conclusion that M.M. has been working towards since the objection at 83a38-9, is that there is no need, in a discussion of ethics, to discuss the Form of the good. That conclusion is reached satisfactorily by ἀγαθοῦ (b8). The sentence could have intruded from the margin. One imagines an annotation reporting in indirect speech the progress of the argument: ‘Hence <he argues> the starting point consisting in this good is not appropriate’. Indirect speech would explain the infinitive.

On a completely different tack, following a lead of Brandis,³² it could also be that there is a lacuna between ἀγαθοῦ and διὸ, in which an account was given of how the Platonic hypothesis of the existence of such a thing as the Form of the good was itself the result of not

³¹ Gadamer, [1986] 150, is convinced by Dirlmeier’s defence of διὸ.

³² See my note on 1183b8-18.

working from an appropriate starting point. M.M., on this view, would be criticising those who think that one ought to start to investigate ethics from an analysis of the Form of the good (83a37-8) first on the grounds that one can start elsewhere and so should (83a39-b7), and secondly on the grounds that the positing of the Form of the good was mistaken, mistaken because it rested on the false Socratic claim that virtue is knowledge, and so to base any ethical discussion on something whose own status is decidedly vulnerable is methodologically mistaken. One cannot rule out a lacuna, but Bekker's excision is a simpler story.

1183b8-18³³ Susemihl puts asterisks around this passage, but notes in his addenda (p.100) that Brandis may be right to explain the connection between this passage (on the Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge) and what has preceded (criticism of the Form of the good as irrelevant), as lying in the thought that it was from Socrates' view that Plato's Form of the good grew.³⁴

Dirlmeier (pp.182-3) thinks that the link between what has preceded and this section is the concept of uselessness. Just as the Form of the good was useless for an investigation of particular goods, so the Socratic view of virtues is useless 'für das konkrete sittliche Handeln'. Now, it is true that M.M. is interested in 'usefulness' in the sense of helping us to act morally (see 82a2-6). But the link that Dirlmeier tries to establish between 83a39-b8 and the paragraph on Socrates is contrived. The ways in which the Form of the good and Socrates' conception of virtue are useless are completely different. Inappropriateness, the important concept in 83a39-b8, is something completely different from uselessness. It is also very difficult to understand why Dirlmeier finds the paragraph on Socrates a useful link to the following section (83b19ff.). 82a32-83b8 have been about the good (or goods), and the next two chapters continue this theme. Why should a discussion of a mistaken view of virtue - one which has already been shown on other grounds to be mistaken (82a15-23) - be reintroduced here?

³³ On this section see Fiedler, [1978] 232-6.

³⁴ See Aristotle Met. A. 987a29-b15.

If there is no good justification for 83b8-18 belonging here, where do they belong? It would be impossible to move the paragraph to the earlier discussion of Socrates' view that virtues are ἐπιστήμῳ (82a15-23), since in both passages Socrates is introduced. οὐδ' οὗτος (82a16) could not be followed by οὐδ' ὁ Σωκράτης (83b8). There is, in fact, no natural home for the paragraph as it stands. Nor is there anything to suggest that the paragraph was not written by the author. Leave it where it is.

1183b9 D omits δεῖν, but see Dirlmeier, pp.278, 308.

1183b14 Insert ἐπί after καί (misprint in Susemihl).

1183b23 Dirlmeier (p.189) thinks that Spengel's conjectures in this line stem from a misunderstanding of M.M. But if so, Arius Didymus (Stobaeus, 135,22) also misunderstood: as examples of τίμια, he gives θεόν, ἄρχοντα, πατέρα. This is, however, not to say that Spengel's conjectures ought to be accepted.

1183b23-4 The particles in this sentence, γάρ and δέ, need to be discussed. In ω both particles are δέ. If this is unacceptable, we are faced with a choice. Should we follow a late correction in P (and modern editors) and read γάρ for the first δέ, or follow Coraes in reading γάρ for the second δέ? I prefer the second option. The sentence in b23-4 is not a justification for what has preceded, but the beginning of an argument to show that virtue is τίμιον.

1183b25 δὴ is omitted by α. The combination γε δὴ has an 'emphatic limitative' force here (Denniston, p.245), which is appropriate because whilst from the perspective of being a cause, virtue is τίμιον, from another perspective (b26-7) it is ἐπαινετόν.

1183b24-6 Dirlmeier (p.189) has an important note on these lines. When virtue is a cause of someone's having become good, then it is τίμιον (b24-5). Dirlmeier rightly says that ἤδη —

ἦκει (b25-6) ought to explain this claim, but he cannot make sense of the transmitted text in b25-6, and so emends οὔτος to οὕτως and ἀρετῆς to ἀρχῆς.

First it must be noted that ἦδη (b25) picks up ὅταν (cf. 95a27-30, and for the equivalent, ὅταν... τότε, see 08a9-11, 08a19-20, 11a29). In which case Dirlmeier's οὔτως is redundant. Next, Dirlmeier may be right to take σχῆμα to be synonymous with τάξις (b35), but from 83b19-35 the reader is only aware of three τάξεις: τὰ τίμια, τὰ ἐπαινετὰ and αἱ δυνάμεις. We would need a different kind of ranking (albeit one that M.M. does use at 92a28) if, following Dirlmeier's emendations, M.M. is to claim here that virtue is to rank as a cause. Rather, if M.M. is sticking to the original threefold division, we expect to be told that ὁ σπουδαῖος is to be ranked as τιμίος or, less precisely, as reaching the rank of honour (τιμῆς).

In fact we can understand the transmitted sentence in b25-6. The notion of virtue as a cause is only present in ἀπό (b25). The sentence has the same function as that at 81a28-9 - it establishes the link between being σπουδαῖος and having the virtues. In the previous paragraph I raised doubts about σχῆμα being synonymous with τάξις. One well-established meaning of σχῆμα is 'appearance', and in a good sense it can mean 'air' or 'bearing' (See L.S.J. s.v. 2 and 3). The point of the sentence may, then, be to allude to the connection between τίμη and other people's perceptions. Translate b25-6: 'for then this man has come to have the appearance of virtue'. If he did not seem to be virtuous, he would not be honoured.

If this is right, we should take σπουδαῖός τις γένηται (b25) not to mean 'someone becomes good' but to mean 'behave like a good man' or 'display good characteristics'.³⁵

1183b27 D's reading, ἐπὶ for ἀπό, looks good at first glance (cf. 83b23), but 00a19-20 show that we should keep ἀπό.

1183b29 Why ἄν + subj.? This is grammatically possible if ἄν = ἐάν. But the combination καὶ... καὶ makes it look as though the form of the sentence is not: protasis - apodosis.

³⁵ See Frede, [1988] esp. p.45.

Spengel, supported by Dirlmeier (p.190), conjectures an optative, δύναιτο, and there is some support for this in Stobaeus 135,5-8. But there is no obvious reason why M.M. would want to speak so vaguely. He is entitled to the much stronger claim: that ὁ σπουδαῖος is able to use these goods well and ὁ φαῦλος is not (see 99b9, b14-15).

1183b32 Misprint. Read τούτοις.

1183b39-84a2 Dirlmeier (p.191) objects to von Arnim's conjectures, inspired by Stobaeus 135,17-19, that we read πάντι for πάντη thrice in these lines.³⁶ The evidence in Atticus and Alexander of Aphrodisias (see Dirlmeier pp.103, 186-7) strongly suggests that Arius Didymus and Atticus were not directly dependent on M.M. here.³⁷ It is thus risky to base conjectures on the text of Stobaeus here.

Dirlmeier's rejection of von Arnim's conjectures are not based on the relationship between Arius, Atticus and M.M., and I do not think that they are good arguments. He argues that M.M. is using a set-phrase ('gängige Floskel', 'traditionelle Wendung', p.191) which should not be tampered with. If it is true that πάντη καὶ πάντως is a set-phrase, M.M. does not use the phrase, and in fact does use a dative of πᾶς in combination with πάντως several times.³⁸ It could be part of the explanation of the corruption, if von Arnim is right, that πάντη καὶ πάντως (or something close to it) is a standard phrase.

In fact Dirlmeier cites only Theophrastus de Igne 8 for this precise phrase.³⁹ Related phrases are used: Plato has πάντως καὶ πάντη (Philebus 60c2-3); Plato and Aristotle use πάντη πάντως (Phaedrus 246a4, Laws 781e2, 801a1, Timaeus 29c5, Parm. 160b1, Epist. 354e3; Cat. 4a35, E.N. 1100b20, 1101a18, Met. 1010a9, de Sensu 440b3, G.C. 323b19) and this phrase is used by Epicurus (Ep. ad. Herod. 58,3), and is common in the commentators. Aristotle does not, however, use πάντη καὶ πάντως.

³⁶ Giusta, [1967] 122, also argues that we should retain the mss.' reading in these lines.

³⁷ See von Arnim, [1926] 54; Giusta, [1967] 121-2; Becchi, [1977] 162-4, Sharples, [1983] 144-5. The relevant part of Atticus is fr. 2 in E. des Places Atticus: Fragments (Paris, 1977) lines 122-145.

³⁸ 88b15-16 οὐ πάντως οὐδ' ἐν πάντι, 91b30 πάντι καὶ πάντως, 91b31-2 οὔτε πάντι... οὔτε πάντως, 92b35 πᾶσι καὶ πάντως, 93a9 ἐν πάντι καὶ πάντως. See my note on 1191b30, where we find corruption in one family of πάντι to πάντη.

³⁹ It is used also in Theophrastus at de Sensu 13,15 and fairly often by Simplicius and Alexander of Aphrodisias.

M.M. 99a27-b23 provide better evidence for von Arnim. There we find the antithesis ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν/ἀγαθόν τι. The set of goods that are δυνάμεις (83b27-35) looks to be very similar to that of those that are not πάντη καὶ πάντως αἰρετά (83b39-84a2). In 99b5-7 we are told that the unjust man chooses τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ, οὐ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ, and the sort of thing M.M. has in mind are wealth and power. Since wealth and power are not good for the unjust man, it follows that they are not good for everyone (πάντι).

If we were to read πάντι in 83b39-84a2, then the set of what are not πάντι καὶ πάντως ἀγαθὰ will be the same as the set of δυνάμεις which makes it strange that the author introduces this division as a new one (83b38). It would, in fact, be a reformulation of an earlier one. I do not think that this can be ruled out. The divisions are dry. If we are surprised to learn of the fourth ‘and final’ division (83b38) after being led to expect just three (83b20-1), we are more surprised to find the list continuing at 83b38 and then again at 84a3.

πάντι would give the author a further point. The author would not simply be claiming that some goods are utterly and in every way choiceworthy, but that they are utterly choiceworthy for everyone. To read πάντι gives a more interesting text, and the corruption of πάντι to πάντη is easily explainable. I would read πάντι, but not because Stobaeus has πάντι.

1184a10 M.M. must include a word for ‘alone’, as Dirlmeier (p.193), comparing 84a37 and E.N. 1097b14, recognises. It has to be made clear not just that justice is present, but that nothing else is. Bekker excised μόνον, and except for the fact that μέν and μόνον are often confused in mss., there seems no reason for the excision of μόνον but not also μέν, since α omits both words, whilst ζ had both words. If we accept that M.M. wrote a word for ‘alone’, how would we explain the omission of μὲν μόνον in α? The answer is that it would be quite difficult. Far easier to explain would be the omission of μὲν μόνης. We would then have a case of omission *ex homoeoteleuto*. The hypothesis that M.M. wrote μὲν μόνης thus explains the readings of the three families of manuscripts, and gives good sense.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ See Kühner-Gerth II, 1, pp.275-6 for the difference, not always adhered to by authors, between the adverb μόνον and the adjective μόνος. Note that in 84a37 M.M. uses the adjective.

1184a14 There is a misprint in this line. Insert τὸ after καί. It is coincidental that β omits the same τό.

Susemihl's text includes two conjectures by Rassow. Let us look at the reading of the first part of the sentence: τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλειον τέλος ἀγαθόν (τἀγαθόν Rassow) ἐστὶ. Dirlmeier raises doubts about the necessity of adopting Rassow's conjecture here.⁴¹ M.M. certainly believes that all ends are good in 82a32-b2, and so that the complete end is good, but this is a remarkably weak assertion for M.M. to make. Rassow's conjecture is the neatest way of giving M.M. a stronger assertion.

If we are right so far, M.M. begins the sentence by saying that the perfect end is the good. How does he continue? In the mss. he says καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀγαθόν. Rassow reads τῶν ἀγαθῶν for τὸ ἀγαθόν, anticipating 84b8. But at 84b8 there is no suggestion that the phrase τέλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν has been used before - rather M.M. seems to be introducing a new point.

Another solution might be to excise καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀγαθόν. A marginal correction of the transmitted τέλος ἀγαθόν earlier in the line - one anticipating Rassow - may have intruded. We can imagine a scribe reading τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστὶ and thinking, like Rassow, that we need the definite article, and writing τέλος τὸ ἀγαθόν in the margin. It would then be easy for καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀγαθόν to get into the text.

But in fact I think that the transmitted καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀγαθόν can stand. Translate the sentence: 'so the complete end is the good and the good is the end'.

1184a21 Susemihl, following Spengel, [1866] 625,⁴² prints αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιστον ἐστὶν. But α has αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιον ἔσται, and ζ has αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιστον ἔσται. Can we retain ἔσται? The future could only be explained as a logical future. The four-word-sentence in a21 will give a reason for eudaimonia being better than itself if it is συναριθμουμένη. The status of

⁴¹ I take him eventually to reject Rassow's first conjecture. He says (p.193) that Susemihl rightly ('mit Recht') accepted Rassow's version, but later in the same note gives an interpretation whereby Rassow's insertion of the definite article is 'unmöglich'. Earlier (p.169) he cited the passage without Rassow's first conjecture.

⁴² Spengel gives no reason for his conjecture. One imagines that he was influenced by 84a22-3: βέλτιστον δὲ ἐστὶν ὑγίεια.

eudaimonia as τὸ βέλτιστον has already been declared (a16-20), so the reading of ζ seems impossible. It is not a consequence of eudaimonia being συναριθμουμένη that it is best.

The reading of α does provide an argument. ‘For it will turn out that it is better’. If, per impossibile, one were to ‘count eudaimonia together with the other goods, and compare eudaimonia on the one hand with eudaimonia + the other goods on the other hand, and then ask which is better, one would reach a strange result. It would turn out that eudaimonia (conceived of in one way) is better than eudaimonia (conceived of in another way). This is the missing step in the argument that is required. From here the absurdity that eudaimonia is better than itself is reached. The future tense is there because M.M. is following the consequences of such a thing as a συναριθμουμένον good. He does not actually believe that it is better.⁴³

The superlative can be used in the sense of a comparative (see my note on 1184a24), and it is thus difficult to decide between the two here. But ἔσται is right.

1184a23 M, a very late manuscript, is the only authority for τοῦτο in this line. Is ω’s τούτων possible? Whilst τούτων πάντων in the previous line is a partitive genitive (‘which of all of these is best’), the genitive αὐτοῦ at the end of a23 has to be the genitive of comparison (no matter whether we read βέλτιστον or βέλτιον in a24), as Dirlmeier (p.194) notes.⁴⁴ What kind of genitive would τούτων be in a23? The answer is that, grammatically, it could be either partitive or the genitive of comparison: ‘it is the best of them all’ or ‘it is better than all of them’. But since the genitive in the apodosis (καὶ— βέλτιστον (a23-4)) cannot be partitive, and the apodosis is meant to follow from the protasis, we should take τούτων (a23) to be the same kind of genitive as in the apodosis - as the genitive of comparison.

We are left without a subject in the protasis if we read τούτων rather than τοῦτο, but this is not problematic. Translate: ‘if it is better than all these, it is also better than itself’. There is an ambiguity here. Is ὑγεία being compared to the ὑγιενὰ taken individually or taken collectively? The thought is compressed in a21-4. One reconstruction of the thought would be the following: compare health with τὰ ὑγιενά, and one finds that health is best

⁴³ See Brink, [1933] 31n.37.

⁴⁴ See Rhet. 1371b30ff. and other references in Bonitz 403a3-8.

(a21-3). (Health is better than medicine, better than surgery etc.) But if we now take health to be the set of ὑγιεινά, and health itself to be ὑγιεινόν, the absurd conclusion is reached that health is better than itself.

Read τούτων.

1184a24 Peripatetic Greek can use a superlative with comparative force. See Bonitz 403a15-19, and add E.N. 1108b27.⁴⁵ Although the comparative and superlative are often confused by scribes (in M.M. see the apparatus at 82a36, 83b22, 84a21, 84a22, 84a28, 89a14), and so there is a certain licence to emend even though the mss. are unanimous, it is difficult fully to justify such emendations. See Dirlmeier (p.194). We certainly do not need anything as radical as Susemihl's suggestion (edition, p.100).

1184a24 γε should be placed before οὕτως on stemmatic grounds. ἴσως γε is found at 97b30.

1184a25-9 Is our account of τὸ ἄριστον to be conceptually divorced from the goods out of which it is composed? There are several details to be decided in this section. The best place to start is in a28-9. The close resemblance between the readings of α and β should take us away from the reading of η. The reading of α is χωριστὸν ὑφ' ὧν, and the reading of β is χωρὶς τῶν ὑφ' ὧν. The reading of β is good: 'separate from the things by which it is constituted'.

We can now turn back to 84a25. Since αὐτοῦ is impossible, Bonitz, [1844] 8, conjectures, with some hesitation, αὐτό for αὐτοῦ. Stock⁴⁶ came up with the same solution independently, and the corruption from αὐτό to αὐτοῦ is plausible. This is necessary.

In a27 α β and K do not punctuate after σύγκειται. This helps us to understand the sentence. τό is to be taken with σκοπεῖν. So, Dirlmeier (p.194), rightly. Literally, we can translate: 'To examine from what goods it [sc. eudaimonia] is composed, whether it [sc. eudaimonia] is better [sc. than the goods], is absurd'. In Greek the phraseology is more

⁴⁵ See my note on 1201b26.

⁴⁶ Stock suggested another way out: we could read αὐτῶν for αὐτοῦ, but we would have to go back to 84a19 for the antecedent. Becchi, [1977] 165, suggests another possibility - to read χωριστοῦ αὐτοῦ. The genitives would be easier if there were a preceding ὡς, as in 84a15.

natural than in English. In better English we could translate: 'To examine whether it is better than the goods from which it is composed is absurd'. The text can be understood, once we repunctuate, without any of the conjectures that have been proposed, so keep it.

Finally, in 84a28 we again have a choice between comparative and superlative, though βέλτιστον is better attested. See my note on 1184a24, for reasons to be conservative. Its sense must be comparative.

1184a29 ἀλλ' is poorly attested in this line. It probably got into the text after ὄρα had become ὄρα. Since ὄρα cannot stand first word, a particle was needed and was supplied from 84a25. Another family (α) solved the problem of having ὄρα by not punctuating after ταῦτα. Omit ἀλλ'. Cf. 95b35, 08a31 for questions beginning ὄρα γε.

1184a34 Delete τῶν which is a late reading, although it could easily have dropped out here.

1184b3 Spengel, [1866] 625, wants to add οἶον after ἐκτός. But M.M. makes it clear that his list of external goods is not exhaustive.

1184b7 The definite article seems to point to an established order of exposition. Compare 87b32 and the similar phrase at E.E. 1218b31-2: περὶ τῶν ἐπομένων λεκτέον.

1184b9 τὸ] τῷ. Misprint.

1184b11 There is nothing objectionable, grammatically or philosophically with the words ἐστὶν ἡ ὄρασις. Cf. de Anima 426a13-14 ὄρασις γὰρ λέγεται ἡ τῆς ὕψεως ἐνέργεια, E.E. 1219a16 τῶν δ' ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οἶον ὕψεως ὄρασις and the parallels cited by Dirlmeier (196-7). Read it.

1184b12 Susemihl's γὰρ is a necessary change to the mss.' δέ.

1184b15 After ἄρα, α has ἡ χρῆσις καὶ ἕξις
 L has ἡ χρῆσις καὶ ἡ ἕξις
 A has καὶ ἡ χρῆσις καὶ ἡ ἕξις
 η has καὶ ἡ χρῆσις καὶ ἕξις

None of these are as neat as Bekker's καὶ χρῆσις καὶ ἕξις. In 84b32 M.M. will refer back to this line, and there he writes ὦν γὰρ ἦν ἕξις καὶ χρῆσις... That passage points to a different solution: to omit καί¹ with α and L: ὦν ἄρα [ἡ] χρῆσις καὶ ἕξις. The καί, which seems attractive because we need to find cases where there is both χρῆσις and ἕξις, is not actually necessary.

1184b17-21 The double occurrence of τοῦτο in b17 is rather ugly.⁴⁷ If we are to retain both, since M.M. seems to be moving on from a discussion of ἕξις and χρῆσις/ἐνέργεια, we must take τοῦτ' to be proleptic.

εἶδ in b21, which is a correction in P should be excised. This correction wrongly anticipates a move that M.M. will only make later (b24ff.). The sentence in b20-1 is very closely paralleled by b23-4: 'we say that the soul does the same thing as its virtue'. There there is no εἶδ.⁴⁸

I take b18-19 to claim that making houses (i.e. the activity of house-building) and making good houses (i.e. the virtue/ἕξις of house-building) are both parts of the science of house-building. There are not two different sciences.

1184b21 Demote καὶ to the apparatus. See my note to 1195a34.

1184b21 α has τῶν ἄλλων τῶν λοιπῶν ὁπάντων, which cannot be right, but is a sign that our text may not be secure. Probably τῶν λοιπῶν was a gloss.

⁴⁷ The delay of τοῖνον to third position (compare 84a15, 85a36; contrast 84b1, 84b7, 84b22, 86a9, 86b4) could have led to a scribe trying to normalise the word-order. Note the ms. deviation in 84b22.

⁴⁸ The argument against P's insertion of εἶδ is also an argument against Jackson's σπουδαίου.

1184b25-6 Here we do need εἶ in order for the inference in b27 to be drawn. But where should it be put? We would normally expect εἶ ποιεῖ rather than ποιεῖ εἶ, but that would be the harder order to explain the omission in ω. It must have been the similarity of εἶ to οἶ that led to Spengel's suggestion that the adverb be placed after the verb. The easier word-order should be preferred. We could explain the omission of εἶ before ποιεῖ perhaps by saying that τοῦτ' εἶ ποιεῖ became τοῦτ' οἶ ποιεῖ which became τοῦτο ποιεῖ.

1184b30 The reading καὶ in this line arose late. It is not needed and should be replaced with a comma. τοῦτο (b30) refers to τὸ εἶ ζῆν (b29) which has just been identified with τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν (b29-30). In b30 we are told that *this* is the end, eudaimonia and the best thing. We might expect a definite article before τέλος, which is what L has, but in this section M.M. repeatedly uses τέλος without the definite article: 84b12, b16, b33, b34, b37, 85a2.

1184b31-6 Stock refers in a footnote to his translation here to 84b15 and says that the bracketed passage 'belongs in sense to that context'. But the imperfect ἦν (b32) picks up the earlier passage.⁴⁹ (Cf. Bonitz Index 754a40-3, M.M. 85a13, 89a36). We should not, thus, transpose the passage to an earlier position. Nor can I see any grounds for excising it. See Dirlmeier, p.200.

1184b34 Donini, [1965] 46-7, defends the mss. reading in this line: ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν. He rightly notes that strictly the conclusion reached in b28-30 is illegitimate. M.M. is not entitled to the conclusion that τὸ εἶ ζῆν is 'in' τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν but that it is 'in' τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Donini takes b31-6 to support the move to the plural phrase. He translates 'e l'attività e l'uso di essa sono opera propria delle virtù', which does makes decent sense. αὐτῆς refers to the ἔξις of the soul, which is virtue. If this is right, then we do not need to consider the merits of Bonitz' Spengel's, or Susemihl's corrections in this line.

⁴⁹ 90a34-5 also refers back to 84b15.

1185a10 See my note on 1193b1 for εἰ + optative. The unreality of the protasis is well brought out by the optative.

1185a14 Whilst α has οὔτε λίαν δόξειεν ἄν, ζ has an extra ἄν: οὔτ' ἄν λίαν δόξειεν ἄν. Although ἄν is sometimes repeated in Peripatetic Greek (see my note on 1198a18 for repeated ἄν in M.M.), the -αν in λίαν probably contributed to the mistake in ζ.

1185a16-23 Where to put the brackets? Bonitz, [1844] 12-13, takes τοῦτο (a16) — αἰτία (a19) to be parenthetic, but Susemihl's extension of the bracketed passage to a23 is an improvement since a19-23 only continue to establish that there is such a thing as the nutritive part of the soul. Lines a16-23 as a unit support the claim made in a15-16 that the nutritive part exists. Then the apodosis in a23 follows.

1185a30 α and η (and hence ω) read ἐκείνω. The verb ἐμβάλλειν can take an accusative (what is thrown) and a dative (to whom/what it is thrown). Here that construction makes good sense: 'for in its case too, whatever you throw to it, it will devour'. The καὶ shows the similarity which M.M. is trying to bring out between fire and the nutritive part of the soul. Neither, M.M. is saying, 'have an impulse' unless thrown something, but both will act when thrown that thing.

1185a34 Read οὐδὲ on stemmatic grounds: 'does not even contribute'. K wrongly adds a nu at 87b30, 89b2, 89b17, 90b35, 09b26. See my note on 1189b2.

1185b9 The wide divergence in the manuscript readings in this line is probably due to ω bearing alternative readings. If ω had written τὸν instead of τοῦ (by assimilation to λόγον), but τοῦ had been restored above the line, we can see how the manuscripts should diverge as they do. α carried two readings side by side: τὰς τὸν λόγον ἐχούσας (resulting from a conscious attempt to make the participle agree with τὰς), and τὰς τοῦ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντος which incorporates the τοῦ that we are imagining to have been supra lineam in ω. L shares

the first of α 's readings. Our only reliable testimony for what was in η is what the first hand of K wrote. K puts the $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ that we imagine was above the line in ω before $\tau\omicron\nu$ to give $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu$.

The expression for the rational part of the soul in M.M. is normally $\tau\omicron$ $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$ $\xi\chi\omicron\nu$ [sc. $\mu\omicron\rho\iota\omicron\nu$] (82a24, 85b4, 85b5, 96b14, 96b15-16, 00a2), but at 85b12 there is strong manuscript support for the definite article before $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$. I would follow Susemihl in deleting $\tau\omicron\nu$.

1185b10 See my note on 1194b12 for $\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon$... $\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon$... $\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}$.

1185b11-12 Bonitz' excellent conjecture wins the support of Dirlmeier (p.209).

1185b12 The stemma demands that we read $\tau\omicron\nu$. Only L and B of the independent mss., omit $\tau\omicron\nu$.

1185b14-16 This passage has played an important role in discussions of the authenticity of M.M. The text which Susemihl prints is, excepting the insignificant omission of the second η in b14 in A, the text that is unanimously transmitted in the manuscripts. Yet we have no fewer than six different conjectures made in these lines. Why?

Before looking at what has prompted earlier scholars to want to change the transmitted text, it will be helpful to write out several key passages - which will enter into the discussion. Let us start by looking at the passage in Stobaeus:

p.137, 24 Ταύτας [sc. $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$] δὴ φασιν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς
 p.138, 1 φθείρεσθαι. Πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τούτου τοῖς ἐκ τῶν
 p.138, 2 αἰσθήσεων μαρτυρίοις χρῶνται, βουλόμενοι <ὑπὲρ>⁵⁰ τῶν
 p.138, 3 ἀφανῶν τὴν ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν παρέχεσθαι πίστιν. Αὐτίκα
 p.138, 4 ὑπὸ τῶν γυμνασίων πλειόνων τε γινομένων καὶ ἔλατ-

⁵⁰ The addition is Spengel's.

p.138, 5 τόνων φθείρεσθαι τὴν ἰσχύν.

Next let us quote an earlier passage in M.M. (1183a24-7):

ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲ δεῖ βουλόμε-
 νόν τι δεικνύναι τοῖς μὴ φανεροῖς παραδείγμασι χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ’
 ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς
 αἰσθητοῖς. ταῦτα γὰρ φανερώτατα.

And finally E.N. 1104a11-14:

πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι
 τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ’ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρε-
 σθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις
 χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὀρώμεν.

The methodological point that one should use clear things to cast light on the unclear is a commonplace in Greek thought. For a list of parallels see Dirlmeier (p.179), to which one can add Anaxagoras, DK 59.B.21a, Eurpides, fr.574 N², Isocrates, ad Dem. 34.

Let us start with Stobaeus’ record of Arius Didymus. The passage cited above has been taken by Spengel to give us an alternative reading to ἠθικῶν in 85b15, namely αἰσθήσεων. Now, comparison of 85b14-16 with Arius Didymus shows quite clearly that Arius was not quoting M.M. Note, first of all, that he introduces the peripatetic view with a plural - φασιν (137, 24). Further, 138, 1-3 are not a direct report of peripatetic beliefs, but rather a commentary on their method - an explanation of how they arrive πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειξιν, how they provide their πίστιν. I think that a close comparison shows that it is mistaken to see αἰσθήσεων in Stobaeus as good evidence that Arius did not read ἠθικῶν.⁵¹ Once this is

⁵¹ Contrast Cooper, [1973] 348n.39. Chandler, [1866] 12, rightly says ‘If Stobaeus is to determine the emendation, we must read τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων [or: αἰσθητῶν] μαρτυρίοις... [which] would certainly be unwarrantable’.

recognised, there is no warrant to use the text of Arius Didymus to emend the text of M.M. to read αἰσθήσεων here.

But let us continue to look at the passage preserved in Stobaeus. Does Arius go on to give us an example of evidence from the senses? The answer is surely ‘No’. Why, then, does Arius use the word αἰσθήσεων? I propose that Arius did write αἰσθήσεων, and that he did so (i) because he felt that his text of M.M. was unclear, and seemed to be stressing vision (ιδεῖν 85a15, ἴδοι 85a17), and (ii) because he had in mind either E.N. 1103a28 (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον)⁵² or M.M. 83a24-7 (quoted above)⁵³ (or some text based on one of these). This is my account of the text preserved in Stobaeus.

I am not, thus, in favour of importing its reading, αἰσθήσεων, into M.M. as Spengel proposed, nor of basing any conjecture on this reading as Susemihl, Armstrong, Cooper, [1973] 348n.39, and Düring, [1961] 551, would, in reading αἰσθητῶν.⁵⁴

We are back to where we started - to the transmitted reading of the manuscripts in M.M. The phrase ιδεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν has been taken in two ways. Allan, [1957] and [1966], observes that δεῖ — χρῆσθαι is, except for a particle, identical to E.N. 1104a13-14, and argues that M.M. is quoting E.N.: ‘we can see this from The Ethics’.

The other way that the phrase has been understood was first formulated by Pansch,⁵⁵ and Pansch has been followed by Stock and Dirlmeier (pp.145-6, 210): ‘that defect and excess destroy can be seen from moral instances’. We then have to take δὲ in 85b15 to be adversative (and delete the brackets⁵⁶), for what follows are not ‘moral instances’ but parallels in the case of health and strength.

⁵² Here the case of perception is used, albeit in a negative way, to make a point about the acquisition of moral virtue: the capacity to perceive is prior to the activity of seeing, whereas virtuous activity precedes the capacity to be virtuous. Cf. θεωρητέον, ὁρῶμεν E.N. 1104a11, 14. Aristotle does not mean that we actually *see* people who eat properly getting healthy, or that we *see* those who go to the gym getting stronger. He just means that it is obvious that this is what happens. Cf. Dirlmeier, [1970] 14-19.

⁵³ If Stobaeus was thinking of 83a24-7, it would be tempting to read αἰσθητῶν for αἰσθήσεων in Stobaeus 138.2.

⁵⁴ I have not discussed the proposal by Becchi, [1975^b], that we read τεχνῶν for ἠθικῶν. The conjecture is based on E.N. 1104a8-14 where Aristotle does turn to medicine and helmsmanship (τέχναι), but M.M. does not. In addition M.M. uses ἐπιστήμη where Aristotle normally uses τέχνη. For this last point see Fiedler, [1978] 229-51.

⁵⁵ Pansch, [1841] 6, suggests an interpretation of ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν (which he prefers) whereby it means ‘quae ad mores pertinent’.

⁵⁶ As Stock suggests.

A third option which nobody has yet espoused is that M.M. is loosely quoting itself (83a24-7, quoted above).

Allan, [1966] 143, claims that although ιδεῖν ἐκ is not a standard way to introduce citations, it is sufficiently close to Pol. 1296a20 ($\delta\eta\lambda\omicron\iota\delta' \text{ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως}$ = ‘show from his poetry’) to allow it to be used in this sense here. Dirlmeier (pp.145-6) points out that Aristotle does use θεωρεῖν ἐκ + book-title (see Bonitz Index 96b54-97a3, 104a4-17), but does not allow that ιδεῖν means θεωρεῖν . Donini, [1965] 168n.31, - an advocate of Allan’s thesis - is unconvinced, and thinks M.M. can use ‘la locuzione ιδεῖν ἐκ non lontanissima dall’ usuale θεωρεῖν ἐκ ’. This view is refuted by Dirlmeier, [1970] esp. pp.20-4.

Donini [1965] 168-9n.31, however, makes an important objection to Allan’s view. Allan had seen the reference to The Ethics as introducing not just a quotation here, but a string of quotations spanning five Teubner pages. Donini objects that the only explicit quotation of E.N. - if we read ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν - is that at 85b14-23, corresponding to E.N. 1104a11-19, because M.M. 85b14-15 only claims to extract from E.N. the reasoning that shows that ‘excess and deficiency destroy’. The other passages which Allan alleges are also taken from E.N. - being unrelated to this specific issue - are not, therefore announced as quotations. Why should M.M. announce his dependence on E.N. here and not later? It can be added that M.M. II, 13 and 14 which are ‘Nicomachean’ rather than ‘Eudemian’ do not contain any acknowledgement that E.N. is being used. However impressed we are by the alleged quotations, we do not have to believe that M.M. would acknowledge his debt.

Dirlmeier, [1970] 12, raises another objection against Allan’s view, namely that the introduction to the quotation would imply that one could read E.N., whereas normally Aristotle says not ‘I have written in’ + book title, but ‘I have said in’ + book title. The original readers or listeners to M.M. would be the first to be referred to a written work of Aristotle if we read ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν .

Dirlmeier, [1958] 145-6; [1970] 14-18, points to several passages in M.M. to show that the use of language within M.M. precludes a reference to another book here. The most persuasive of the passages he refers to⁵⁷ are: 85a9 ($\text{ἴδοι ἄν τις καὶ ἐντεῦθεν}$), 85b17 ($\text{ἴδοι$

⁵⁷ Dirlmeier also gives examples of $\text{ιδεῖν} + \text{ἐπὶ}$, and $\text{ιδεῖν} + \text{ἐν}$. But these will be less impressive to someone holding Allan’s view.

ἄν τις), 87a30 (καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἴδοι), 95b36 (ἐκ μὲν δὴ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς σκοπομένῳ), 98a32 (ἴδοι ἄν τις ἐντεῦθεν), 99b20 (δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ νομοθέτου),⁵⁸ 06b22 (ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν παιδιῶν). Other parallels which Dirlmeier does not mention are the frequent δῆλον ἐκ/φανερὸν ἐκ (88b28, 96b17, 97b3, 05a16)⁵⁹ and δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν/φανερὸν ἐντεῦθεν (86a35, 95b13, 98a23, 01b24, 02b4). Passages from Aristotle cited by Dirlmeier are Pol. 1326b12 ('it is easy to see the limit of the state from experience': ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἰδεῖν ῥόδιον); E.N. 1128a22 ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν.

Dirlmeier's alternative is to translate 'from moral instances'. Cooper, [1973] 348n.39) objects to Dirlmeier that what follows are not 'moral instances', and that it makes a nonsense of trying to use what is clear to shed light on what is not clear, since even if we could stretch the concept of gymnastics so as to be something ἠθικόν,⁶⁰ moral instances would be being used to shed light on other moral instances.

This objection can be overcome, but at some expense. It would be possible to maintain - and this is in fact Dirlmeier's position (pp.210-11) - that M.M. believes (i) that excess and deficiency generally destroy (b14) and (ii) that this is true in ethical cases (b14-15). Lines b15-16, on this view, give a reason why M.M. should not look straightaway at τὰ ἠθικά (we take δέ adversatively): in order to elucidate τὰ ἀφανῆ we need to use clear evidence. We now have two ἀφανῆ: (i) the general proposition that excess and deficiency destroy (b14) and (ii) moral instances (b15), which can be elucidated by examining instances from γυμνασία and food and drink - which is what we find in b16-21. Lines b21-32 return to τὰ ἠθικά - to the way in which excessive and deficient πάθη destroy virtue.

If this were the structure of the paragraph - an inductive argument that excess and deficiency (generally) destroy - one would reasonably ask why it is that M.M. wants to prove the general thesis. Far more likely, in a work on ethics, is that if he mentions the general principle, it would be in order to show that it applies to the destruction of virtues. One

⁵⁸ Dirlmeier (p.366) refers to Met. 995b24 σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι ἐκ.

⁵⁹ It may not be coincidental that Dirlmeier does not treat these phrases as parallel: if he did, passages like E.E. 1221b34 (δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν διαιρέσεων...) which do refer to an earlier work, would be awkward evidence for someone trying to show that M.M., on linguistic grounds, cannot be referring to a book in 85b15.

⁶⁰ Dirlmeier, [1970] 9-10, argues that strength and health belong to the 'Bereich des Ethischen'. But he only shows that they have a history in the theories of eudaimonia, qua external goods. That strength has anything to do with character (ἦθος) he does not show.

obviously cannot set out to show that it applies to virtues by appealing to the fact that it applies to virtues.⁶¹

Further, on Dirlmeier's view, 85b13-16 become stuttering. We start with a specific assertion about moral virtue (b13); we then have a general claim that excess and deficiency 'auf verschiedenen Gebieten' destroy (b14), and are told that this can be seen in one sphere ('ethics') (b14-15), but then immediately warned away from looking there (b15).

What M.M. is interested in is the specific claim in b13, not the general claim in b14. Now, it is standard practice in M.M. to appeal to extraneous subject-matter for support. To show that εὐδαιμονία is an activity he directs our attention to sleep (85a9); to show that man is the begetter of his acts M.M. turns to nature (87a30) and geometry (87a36); to show that φρόνησις is πρακτική he looks at house-building (98a32) etc.⁶²

The most straight-forward interpretation of the passage at 85b14-16 is that M.M. wants to show that excess and deficiency destroy virtue, and that he does so by appealing to the truth of the general assertion in b14 in the realm of γυμνασία (b16). Here we have to introduce another conjecture, that of Chandler, [1866] 12, - he reads ἐκτός for ἐκ and deletes τῶν. This is very attractive. 'Outside the sphere of ethics' will be made more precise in b16: 'in the case of training'. Similar are the instances of the unspecific formula ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον (vel. sim.) which are followed by a sentence beginning γάρ (85a9, 87a30, 95b13, 98a23-4, 02b4-5). I think that Chandler's conjecture generates the right sense. But ἔξω (not ἐκτός) is the *mot juste* for this sense: Rhet. 1354a15, a22, b27, 1355a2, 1415b6 have ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος to mean 'outside the subject-matter', Rhet. 1415b5 has ἔξω τοῦ λόγου in the same sense. I suggest that we read ἔξω for ἐκ, but retain τῶν.

If this is right, we can get rid of the brackets in b15-16. δεῖ — χρῆσθαι add a restriction on what sort of things it will be profitable to discuss: we should not look at any old thing outside τὰ ἠθικά, but at clear examples.

The unspecific phrase ἔξω τῶν ἠθικῶν may have been a factor in Arius' decision to make it more specific - to name the senses as the source of clarification.

⁶¹ Another objection to Dirlmeier's view is that he is forced to posit a common source for E.N. and M.M. (pp.211-12); [1970] 19-20.

⁶² The examples of ἰδεῖν ἐκ or δῆλον/φανερὸν ἐκ cited above are followed by an extraneous subject-area.

1185b22 Although ἐπι² is omitted by α and A, the first καὶ in this line makes it awkward to omit it. Keep it.

1185b26 Bonitz' ταῦτ' should also be read at Stobaeus 138,15, where Wachsmuth prints: ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ αὖξιν καὶ φθείρειν τὴν ἀρετὴν.

1185b27 Read πάντος for πάντες with Spengel (and Armstrong). Dirlmeier (p.211) objects to this, referring to 91a31. But I do not understand how that passage licences us to take πάντες to mean οἱ περὶ πάντος.

1185b38 I offer two explanations of the plural (which neither Dirlmeier (p.212) nor I understand). First, M.M. may be using ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ as a genus (Bonitz 490b17-31) - he may be explaining whence courage has the epithet ἠθικὴ, whence generosity has the epithet ἠθικὴ etc. Secondly, perhaps M.M. is trying to offer us derivations for two different words: ἦθος comes from ἔθος; ἠθικὴ comes from ἐθίζεσθαι. I am not very confident about either of these explanations. It is not absolutely certain that the preposition διὰ in a2 is to be taken as a synonym for ἀπό (a1). To us it seems fairly clear that ἠθικὴ comes from ἦθος, but in fact M.M. is reluctant to call itself ἠθικὴ, despite the fact that it is about ἦθη (81a24, b28). The γάρ in 86a2 seems to suggest that it is because ἠθικὴ is derived from ἐθίζεσθαι that ἦθος is derived from ἔθος. But what kind of 'because' are we dealing with?

1186a8 Restore καὶ on stemmatic grounds. See my note on 1195a34.

1186a12 τῖ only appeared in the 1539 Basel edition. The mss. have τις. Since πάθος is neuter and the three candidate answers to the question τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ (86a9-10) are πάθος, δύναμις and ἕξις we need the neuter, τῖ in a12. Compare E.N. 1105b19-21.⁶³

⁶³ See my note on 1206b35.

1186a16 ζ omits καί,⁶⁴ and a parallel in a13 could be drawn to defend its excision. But the list in a15-16 is shorter than that in a12-13. τὰ τοιαῦτα (a16) refers to more items than τὰ τοιαῦτα in a13, and the καί (which could have dropped out after -σαι) would show the reader that the list is longer. Retain καί.

1186a20 ἔχειν is a late reading. ω had ἔχον. We need the infinitive to correspond to the two infinitives later in the sentence. In a29-30 we have a very close parallel.

1186a22 Walzer, [1929] 214n.3, wants to excise ὁμοίως — ὅμοια, but gives no reason. The problem seems to be that having defined ἔξις as that in virtue of which we are well or badly disposed with reference to passions (a16-17), M.M. illustrates how this definition would be filled out if we examine one particular πάθος: ὀργή. If the point of the suspected sentence in 86a22 is to tell us that we could substitute any other πάθος into the account to understand what the corresponding ἔξις is, then we will be surprised that M.M. continues (with the particle γάρ, a22) to talk about ὀργή.

Dirlmeier (p.214) defends the transmitted text, but takes γάρ (a22) to mark a connection between the sentence in which it appears and the sentence ὅταν οὖν — διακείμεθα (86a21-2). I think this is correct, and would prefer to put ὁμοίως — ὅμοια in parentheses.

1186a22 Restore καί. See my note on 1195a34.

1186a24 Again, restore καί. ζ has been unreliable in the previous twenty lines. See my note on 1195a34.

1186a29 Full stop after ἔχειν¹.

⁶⁴ It is striking that on one page of Susemihl's edition ζ or η omit καί four times, and is followed on each occasion by Susemihl.

1186a34-5 Several scholars have wanted to add ὅτι in these lines. A late corrector in P adds ὅτι before ἡ (a34), Sylburg adds ὅτι (or ὡς) before ἐστίν (a35), and Bonitz, [1844] 17, suggests that we read ὅτι instead of ἐστίν. The last suggestion has won the most support - Breier, Bussemaker, Armstrong and Dirlmeier (p.216) all follow Bonitz. The problem that has inspired conjectures is how to integrate καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐστὶ δῆλον. One family (β) omits the phrase altogether.

Fewer (Bekker, Susemihl and Allan, [1966] 143) have been happy with the transmitted text. But I think that there is nothing wrong with the text without ὅτι. Let us start in 86a32. We start with a pair of subordinate clauses (premises). I paraphrase: ‘Since (i) virtue is a mean of these passions and (ii) the passions are related to pleasure and pain...’ (a32-4). We then expect a conclusion and ἄρα (a35) confirms our expectations. The conclusion is ‘virtue involves pleasure and pain’. If we are not worried about the move from οὐκ ἄνευ (a34) to περὶ (a35), the conclusion follows. Up until ἡδονῶς (a35) everything seems to be fine, if we delete Susemihl’s colon in a34.

The last four words can be taken as a self-contained unit: ‘Also from this argument it is clear’. The καὶ connects the argument just given that virtue involves pleasure and pain to an earlier argument to the same effect (85b33-7). The argument just given in 86a32-5 not only reaches the same conclusion as the earlier one, but it provides an obviously true conclusion.

Allan, [1966] 143-4, takes ἡ ἄρα ἀρετὴ ἐστίν περὶ λύπης καὶ ἡδονῶς (a34-5) to be a quotation by M.M. (‘a pupil of the third or fourth generation’) of Aristotle’s ‘now famous aphorism’ at E.N. 1104b15-16, and argues that to insert ὅτι ‘sweep[s] important evidence under the carpet’. Allan thinks that if we do not read ὅτι it becomes clear that M.M. is quoting E.N. This is unconvincing since the status of a proposition as a quotation is unaffected by the presence of ὅτι (see 88b17, 02a25), and Allan’s translation (“[The truth that] virtue is concerned with pains and pleasures is plain from hence also”) betrays by its insertion of ‘the truth that’ that he understands ὅτι even if he would not read it. I do not think that we need to explain M.M.’s words by saying that he is quoting anything, though the καὶ does ask the reader to remember 85b37. This is not to deny that E.N. 1104b13-16 lie behind

M.M. here. But in no way can M.M. be said to be trying to reproduce the philosophy of E.N. here. (It is significant that M.M. does not talk about actions. See Dirlmeier p.216.)

1186a36-86b2 There is no connective particle in the sentence οὐκ — διαφθείρων (a38-b1). One way to avoid this would be to place a full stop after μοιχεία (a37), delete the colon after μοιχός, and insert a colon after οὗτος. This is along the lines of Spengel's suggestion in 1866 (p.626).

But let us pause here and look at the mss. In a37 we need to add ἦ (which α and β have) before μοιχεία. This balances the ὁ before μοιχός. It is a characteristic of M.M. to join abstract noun and personal noun (e.g. justice and the just man). See my note on 1193b9 for this. If this is right, should we tolerate the asyndeton? An obvious way of avoiding it would be to read οὐ γὰρ for οὐκ. Then, if the sentence οὐ γὰρ — διαφθείρων is parenthetical, justifying the previous sentence, it becomes easier to see how M.M. reverts back to the πάθος of μοιχεία (b1).⁶⁵

1186a38 Dirlmeier (p.217) says that we have to supply ἢ δεῖ after μᾶλλον. μᾶλλον can be used without ἢ (or a genitival phrase) expressing the measure according to which there is an excess. Compare Plato Phaedo 63d8, mentioned by L.S.J. (s.v. μάλα II) and Aristotle Pol. 1295b10. μᾶλλον on its own can mean 'too much'.

1186b1-3 Susemihl calls lines 86b2-3 'haud integra'. The difficulty lies in ἦ καὶ ὁ ἐν (b2). Those four words are the reading of α. It is impossible to establish what ζ read. In place of these four words we find ἦ in L B, ἦ δ καὶ in A¹, ἦ δ καὶ ἐν in A², and ἦ καὶ in K.

ὁ ἐν in b2 is secured by ὁ ἐν in b3. What about ἦ καί? This is the reading of the less corrupt family here, and if it is possible, we should keep it. M.M. often joins 'excess' and 'deficiency' with conjunctions 'both... and' or 'neither... nor', rather than with a simple 'and' or 'or' (86a29-30, 86b12, 89b29, 91b2-3, 91b34-5, 91b36-7). This, then, gives us a way to understand καί in b2: 'both what is in deficiency and what is in excess'. Now this phrase

⁶⁵ For the status of adultery as a πάθος see Dirlmeier, p.216.

needs to be joined to what precedes with a conjunction. καὶ is impossible, because καὶ καὶ is impossible. What is wrong with ἤ? I cannot see anything wrong with it. Keep ἤ καὶ ὁ ἐν, and translate ἤ by ‘and’.

1186b7 Only K has the definite article after οὐχ, and it should be omitted. ω had a different word-order: οὐχ ὑπερβολὴ θρασύτης οἶσα. This seems fine. ‘[the opposite] of courage is not excess, i.e. rashness, but cowardice which is a deficiency.’ The expression is chiasmatic.

The temptation to reverse the order of θρασύτης ὑπερβολή (besides the fact that this is the order in B) is twofold. First, at E.N. 1109a2-3 we have a very close parallel - and there we read θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οἶσα. Secondly, in M.M. 87b8-11 the feminine participle οἶσα has as a predicate μεσότης (b8), ἔνδεια (b8, b10), ὑπερβολή (b10), rather than examples of means, deficiencies or excesses.

Neither reason is good enough to overrule ω. Even if M.M. is using E.N. here (as I think he is), there are minor differences of presentation, and we cannot rule out the possibility that he we have such case in 86b7. Note that E.N. uses ἔλλειψις (1109a1, a3) where M.M. has ἔνδεια (86b5, b8), and that M.M. adds a clause (μεσότητι οὔση — ἡδονὰς) in 86b8-9 to the sentence in E.N. 1109a4. It would be incautious to think that M.M. must have expressed himself in the same way as E.N. in 86b7. If we turn our attention away from E.N., and focus on M.M. on its own terms, the absence of the definite article in ω is a sign that M.M. did not intend to speak as ‘neatly’ as scholars have wished that he did.

1186b14-15 Read ἀνελευθερίους... ἀνελευθέριοι. See my note on 1192a3.

1186b17 α omits δὴ altogether, but a late corrector in P adds δὲ after δύο. At the corresponding part of E.N. we read διὰ δύο δ’ αἰτίας (1109a5), but the corrector in P probably just wanted the sentence to have a particle, and was not using E.N. to help. The omission in α is easily explained by the identical sound of the starts of the words: δι-, δὴ, δυ-. It seems, from Bekker’s apparatus, as though Bekker thought that M^b had δύο δὴ, and was not intending to make a conjecture. According to Susemihl’s report, M^b has δύο δέ. It would

thus be lucky if δύο δὴ were what the author wrote (cf. Susemihl's remark that δύο δὴ is 'perhaps right'). I can see nothing suspicious about διὰ δὴ δύο. Leave the text as Susemihl has it.

1186b22 We have to decide about the definite article thrice in this line. Before ἐλευθεριότης only α has ἡ, before ἀσωτία Bonitz adds ἡ, and before ἀνελευθερία ζ had ἡ, but α had ἡ ἡ. We should follow ζ (and Dirlmeier p.220) and leave out all three articles, which will conform to what we find in b20-1.

1186b31 The genitive of the mss., μεσότητος, is suspicious. There would be two ways to understand it: as genitive of comparison ('more opposed than the mean'), or with ὑπερβολή ('excess of the mean'). The first possibility is excluded because M.M. is not concerned with comparing the degree of opposition of the mean, but to the mean (86b4-12, b17-19). The only thing that the mean could be opposed to would be excess or deficiency. In b31 opposition to the excess is ruled out (since excess cannot be opposed to excess), and opposition to the deficiency has not been talked about, and so is ruled out by ὥστε.

The second way of taking the genitive gives better sense, but μεσότητος is redundant. An excess (in the technical use of the word) is an excess of the mean. Previously M.M. has not thought fit to give the extra specification, but has spoken simply of excess.

Should we read μεσότητι, the dative expressing what the opposition is to? In b17-19 we are told that there are two perspectives from which one can look at whether the excess or the deficiency is opposed to the mean. From 'the thing itself' the deficiency is more opposed [sc. to the mean] (b24-5). From the perspective of our natural inclinations the excess is more opposed (b31). (Cf. also the dative at E.N. 1109a19.)

1186b33 Full stop after ἐπέσκεπται. And delete the brackets.

1186b38 Retain καί. See my note on 1195a34.

1187a3 μὲν περιέχον is supported by the stemma and should be read. Bonitz only records ἐμπεριέχειν in one other passage in the corpus: in the spurious de Mundo 392a9. It also appears in the same work at 395b18. The verb περιέχειν has been used in 86b2, but in a different sense. There it meant ‘to class under’, here we need a verb which means ‘surround’. περιέχειν is used by Aristotle ‘sensu locali’ (Bonitz 581a5) as well as ‘logice de ambitu notionum’ (Bonitz 581a38). The first usage is the one we need here. M.M. is still influenced by the comparison with finding the middle of a circle. He is imagining a centre of a two dimensional object, whereas the notion of virtue as a mean would be more easily represented on one dimension:

vice—mean—vice

The particle μὲν is answered by δέ, later in the line. Note μὲν... δέ in 86b37, 87a1. This is a case where the easier reading is right.

1187a5 Dirlmeier (p.224) is right that there is no lacuna here.

1187a8 Casaubon (and subsequent editors) read ὄντιναοῦν, without any note in the apparatus. All mss. have ὄντινοῦν. This is the form that we should print, and the only form found elsewhere in the corpus (de Caelo 309b31; E.N. 1160a6, 1174a14; S.E. 170b28; Met. 1005b24; Rhet. 1356b9; G.C. 328a3). Editors of Plato normally print the form in -οῦν (28 times), but we do find the form in -αοῦν at Theages 126d7, Gorg. 456c3, Laws 871a2. The last two dialogues also have the form in -οῦν (Gorg. 480e6, Laws 807e6).

1187a10 The duplication of thought in ὁμοίως... ὡσαύτως would be avoided if we were to read κἀπί for καί².

1187a11 We have disagreement in the manuscripts here. ἀεὶ is in η, εἴη in α, and nothing in β. Retain ἀεὶ. Although M.M. uses the phrase ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως at 97a34 and 07a3 of

permanence and uniformity, here the thought must be that across the range of virtues (and vices), virtues are preferable.

1187a13 Susemihl's δέ is not required. Translate δή: 'Now,...'. Compare 82a28, 83a32, 84a24, 87b22. In the last three of these passages someone (Spengel twice, a scribe once) has thought that δέ is needed instead of δή.

1187a19 οἱ ψόγοι (β) or ψόγοι (η) or οἱ ψόγοι οἱ (α)? We need the definite article before ψόγοι to balance that before ἔπαινοι. We also need the second οἱ.

1187a21 Omit οὐκ and replace ἀκουσίους with ἐκούσιους with the stemma. η must have erred in writing ἀκουσίους,⁶⁶ and then οὐκ would naturally have been added on grounds of sense.

1187a26 The stemma points to τοῦτο (α β) for τό (η). In 09b29-30, however, M.M. writes τὸ δ' οὐ δυνατόν. τὸ is the demonstrative pronoun (L.S.J. s.v. ὁ, ἡ, τό A.VIII.3), and would naturally lead to a gloss of τοῦτο. At 09b29 we find τοῦτο δ' οὐ δυνατόν in β.

1187b1 Bekker and Dirlmeier (p.228) want to excise καί, presumably because they take εἰ (87a38) — τέτταρσιν (87a39) to be the protasis and the apodosis to begin in 87b1. We have been told (a36-8) that our choice of ἀρχαί affects τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. Bekker and Dirlmeier, I take it, think that the geometrical example beginning οἶον gives us two ἀρχαί - (i) the sum of the interior angles of a triangle = two right angles and (ii) the sum of the interior angles of a quadrilateral = four right angles.⁶⁷ But we can make sense of καί (b1) if we take the apodosis to be τὸ δὲ τετράγωνον τέτταρσιν.⁶⁸ It is a consequence of taking the starting point (that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle = two right angles) that the sum of the interior angles of a quadrilateral = four right angles (cf. E.E. 1222b31-34). Once the ἀρχή

⁶⁶ See apparatus at 87a28, 87b39, 88b25 for this corruption.

⁶⁷ Stock also translates as though the apodosis begins in b1.

⁶⁸ For this kind of apodotic δέ, see Bonitz, 166b55-8; 167a19-24; 167a34-9.

and τὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν have been given, M.M. can make the important new point about a change in ἀρχή causing a change in τὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν (b1-2). καὶ introduces the new point and should be kept.

1187b3 Armstrong wants to move ἀντιστρέφει γάρ after ἴσας (b3). But there are cases where the clause containing γάρ precedes the clause it explains. See Denniston, pp.68-70.

1187b6 The stemma suggests that we omit τῶν. The sentence is clumsily written, whether or not we read τῶν. πρόξεων is dependent on γεννητικόν (cf. b9).

1187b9 Omit ὁ with the stemma (and in accordance with the use of language in b6, b8).

1187b17 Bonitz' δέ is necessary for the mss. γάρ.

1187b17 Dirlmeier (p.230) wants to excise καί, but I do not understand why.

1187b18 Testimony for καί² is as strong as for its omission. It should be omitted because the ἀρχή is not something different from προαίρεσις. The first καί stops the second being expegetic. Dirlmeier (p.230) cites 00b16 for M.M. using a similar apposition. See also 07b22-3.

1187b19 Unless there is a lacuna in 18-19, we need to excise γάρ.

1187b19 There is some evidence that ζ read καὶ after ὅτι, and this would be possible.

1187b21 Read ἐν (for ἐπ') with ω. See Dirlmeier (p.231). Even if Aristotle would use ἐπ' here (Dirlmeier doubts this), why should M.M.?

1187b32-4 One wonders whether one of the redundant occurrences of τὸ ἐκούσιον in these lines are the result of a heading entering the text,⁶⁹ or of a scribal gloss on τοῦτο. ὑπὲρ ἐκούσιου (b32) is secured by 85b2, 93a39, 98b25, 08b3. τὸ ἐκούσιον (b32-3), although superfluous, should be retained (compare the repetition of ἡ ψυχὴ in 85b1-2⁷⁰). τὸ ἐκούσιον (b33-4) is dispensable, since the referent of τοῦτο (b33) is absolutely clear. Excise τὸ ἐκούσιον (b33-4).

1187b33 Excise τό¹, which is not in α or β. The voluntary does not have to be the most important thing.

1187b38 Confusion between πρῶτον and πρότερον occurs at 81a24, 82a10, and 93b1. πρῶτον must be right here. See Bonitz 652b1-3.

1187b39 Susemihl is right to delete οἶον. We cannot tell on stemmatic grounds whether ω had it.

1188a2 πράττομεν is only in the Aldine. ω reads ποιοῦμεν, and should be read. See Dirlmeier (p.238) and Bonitz 608a21-2, 610a27-8. We find ποιεῖν where we would expect πράττειν also at 88b30.

1188a19-20 D's κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν fits in with the expression in 87b38, 88a9, 88a11⁷¹, but κατὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν (88a16), κατὰ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν (88a18), and παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν (88a20, 88a21) are sufficient to guarantee the reading of ω: κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.

1188a22-3 Read κατὰ τὴν with ω - see my note on 1188a19-20.

⁶⁹ See my note on 1206b30 for this type of error.

⁷⁰ But note that the noun is not repeated in 93a39, 98b25, 08b3.

⁷¹ See my note on 1188a22-3, which provides further support for reading τὴν in a20.

1188a31 There is no manuscript support for writing εἰδῶς before τὰ κακὰ. Only the Aldine and later printed editions have the order we find in Susemihl. η omits εἰδῶς, α and β rightly reads τὰ κακὰ εἰδῶς.

After τὰ κακὰ εἰδῶς α adds πρῶττει ὅτι κακά ἐστίν. εἰ δ' ὁ ἀκρατής τὰ κακὰ εἰδῶς which is a repetition of a30-1 except that instead of ὁ δὲ this second version has εἰ δ' ὁ.

1188b1 α reads ἐκόστω which has a good chance of being right. For the singular + genitive compare 82b8, 86b35, 87a2, 91a11, 94b13, 96b5, 07b19. On the other hand for the plural + genitive see 11a11.

1188b8 βιαζομένου Misprint.

1188b10 Rav. is the first source of the reading φήσει, but this must be right. We need the future after ἀντεπεῖ. (See same corruption in 08a27).

1188b18 ἄτοπον, the reading of α and B is attractive. Compare 82a11 for the same variation in mss. The neuter is more likely to have been adjusted to a masculine in both these passages than *vice versa*.

1188b19-20 ὃς ἄν is a conjecture of Bekker. ω had ὃς ἐόν, but there may be a trace of Bekker's conjecture in K which read (before correction) ὄσαν ἐόν.

1188b32 α omits τινα, which is a possibility. Note that the other court-story in M.M. begins οἶον υἱόν ποτέ φασι... (02a23).

1188b32 For the same error in P see E.E. 1238b8.

1188b33 The preposition ὑπό (in A and K) is normal: κηφήνες θνήσκουσιν ὑπὸ τῶν μελιττῶν H.A. 625a16. ἀπέθνησκον ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ Thucydides I.126.10 etc. But ἐκ is also possible: ἀποθνήσκουσι ἐκ τῶν τρομάτων Herodotus II.63.3, and if so, why not ἀπό (in α B L)?

1188b34 The only manuscript deviation in this line is in α, which adds οἷ after δι', but a corrector in P deletes this. The line has attracted attention and various solutions have been proposed. Four problems have been detected with the transmitted text. First, we are twice told that the woman was acquitted: ἀποφυγεῖν... ἀπέλυσαν. Secondly, why should M.M. add the trivial detail that the accused woman was present at the hearing - a perfectly normal, and so unremarkable, feature of the case. Thirdly, παρεῖναι + genitive is unparalleled. Fourthly, the switch to the indicative, ἀπέλυσαν, is awkward, since the reason for the acquittal ought still to be part of the story.

Scaliger deletes οἷ and ἀπέλυσαν which would solve the first, third and fourth difficulties. Bernays [1858] would read φυγεῖν ('to be accused') for ἀποφυγεῖν which would avoid the first difficulty.

The solution of Michael, [1917] 702, solves the first, second and third problems. He deletes the colon after ἀποφυγεῖν and reads ἐκλιπαροῦσαν for οἷ παροῦσαν. The verb ἐκλιπαρέω means 'entreat earnestly' and is found in Philo, Apollonius, Strabo and Plutarch. The text would then mean 'but the woman who urgently begged to be acquitted in (the court of) the Areopagus the judges acquitted for no other reason than...'

Wallies, [1917] 1605-6, replied to Michael. He objects to Michael (a) that the structure εἶτα τὸν ἄνθρωπον... τὴν δ' ἄνθρωπον (b32-3) makes it awkward to take the infinitive ἀποφυγεῖν as dependent on ἐκλιπαροῦσαν. More likely is that ἀποφυγεῖν is dependent on φάσι (b31); (b) that the verb ἐκλιπαρεῖν is unaristotelian. Wallies, going one stage further than Scaliger, wants to excise οἷ παροῦσαν and ἀπέλυσεν. He thus provides a text immune to any of the four problems. His ingenious account of the transmitted text is that a scribe misunderstood ἀποφυγεῖν (b34), thinking it meant 'escape', and wrote a note in the

margin: οὐ παροῦσαν ἀπέλυσαν, which was then integrated into the text (in a not very straight-forward way).

If παροῦσαν is secure, we need a verb meaning ‘acquit’, otherwise δι’ οὐθὲν ἄλλο — προνοίας will give the woman’s motive for turning up at the court, which would be absurd. Scaliger’s text, then, is impossible, and Bernays’ emendation badly motivated.⁷²

At some point M.M. has to move from the story itself to the moral that he wants to draw from it. Why can it not be after ἀποφυγεῖν that the author switches rather than after προνοίας? This would account for the indicative ἀπέλυσαν (b34). Although it is true that we are told twice that the woman was acquitted, the point of the sentence in b34-5 is to tell us the reason for the acquittal, not that she was acquitted.

How serious is the objection that to specify the woman’s presence at the trial is such a trivial piece of information that M.M. would not mention it? Could M.M. himself not add this detail to avoid any possible misunderstanding of ἀποφυγεῖν?

Kenny has suggested to me that we should take οὐδ not with παρεῖναι, meaning ‘being present there...’, but with ἀπέλυσαν, meaning ‘they freed her of the charge’.

I do not think that any change is necessary in b34.

1189a1 Among the uses of the connective, ἔτι, M.M. uses ἔτι on its own nine times and together with the particle δέ seventeen times. At four of the seventeen occurrences of ἔτι δέ in Susemihl’s text at least one manuscript omits δέ - here (om. α L), 06a31 (om. ζ), 08b20 (om. η) and 10b8 (om. C). Bonitz (291a13-18) shows that Aristotle uses these two interchangeably in close proximity. There is good stemmatic reason to follow Susemihl at 08b20 and 10b8 and read ἔτι δέ. At 06a31 it is a toss up. In this line ἔτι on its own is slightly preferable on stemmatic grounds, so excise δέ.

1189a5 The formula ἄλλ’ ἄρα γε...; is found at 84a25, 84a29, 00b38, 07a6, but at each of these passages the manuscripts deviate. In all four passages a candidate answer has been rejected and the author raises the possibility of an alternative answer, just as happens here. In

⁷² Note that ἀποφυγεῖν appears later (02a25) in a similar context. This is a good reason not to tamper with it in 88a34.

the first and last of these parallel passages the newly suggested answer is itself rejected with a sentence beginning ἦ, as here.

But why do α and β both have an extra word after ὅλλ’? To read ὅλλ’ ἦ (with α) would be possible, grammatically, if we punctuate with a comma after εἴη: ‘so prohairesis is not orexis, unless it is boulesis’. There would be an implicit claim that one type of orexis (viz. rational orexis) is boulesis. (In 89a31-2 it does turn out that prohairesis is an orexis after all.) But ἄρα would be awkward. The reading ὅλλ’ εἰ ἄρα (in β) could be supported by 1212b4⁷³ (where there is again variation in the mss.): ὅλλ’ εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ τὸ καλόν. Again, the reading is not free from problems because the γε now becomes difficult to account for.

Perhaps the conglomeration of diacritics in ὅλλ’ ἄρα caused the confusion in α and β . Retain what Susemihl prints.

1189a9 Change τὸ to τὰ - for τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος is the standard phrase, already introduced in our treatise at 89a8 and recurring at 89a25 (with a reference back to this passage) and 90a9-28. It is also found in the plural in the parallel passages - in E.N. 1112b12 and E.E. 1226a7 - in neither of which cases is there manuscript deviation reported. Moreover, in the example which the author of the M.M. uses to illustrate one of the maxims about προαίρεσις, he gives two, rather than one, examples of ‘things towards health’ which we choose to do. Hence we should adopt the plural of the definite article, which is what the stemma suggests anyway.

1189a13 τοῦνομα (misprint).

1189a14-15 Both occurrences of βέλτιον are late. The mss. in each case have βέλτιστον, but Rav. has βέλτιον in a14 and Bonitz conjectures βέλτιον in a15. Bonitz (403a3-19) cites instances where Aristotle is not as logical as we might hope in keeping the superlative conceptually distinct from the comparative.⁷⁴ Here, strictly, we need a comparative because there are only two options in the equation (τόδε... τοῦδε a13-14, τοῦτο... τοῦτο 89a27). But what is better out of a choice of two may actually be the best out of many, and the presence

⁷³ See Bonitz, 90b16-19.

⁷⁴ See my note on 1184a24.

of οἶον (a14) allows the retention of βέλτιστον in a14. Then an inference is drawn in a15 and we should again read βέλτιστον: ‘So when we take the best in exchange for the worse option available,...’.

1189a23 δῆ should not be in the text, even in square brackets.

1189a27 Read the comparative, αἰρετώτερον, given the demands of the stemma.

1189a30 Comma after πρόπτοντες to show that κατὰ προαίρεσιν goes with πρόπτειν rather than πρόπτοντες. L’s transposition in a31 achieves the same effect, but is not necessary.

1189a33 Armstrong wants to read τὸ before προαιρετόν, but gives no reason. Probably his reason is just that K has it. He sees no need to emend 89b1 where the same phrase occurs.

1189a36 Full stop after διανοηθῆναι.

1189b2 Nothing is wrong with the reading suggested by the stemma: ἃ γὰρ προαιρούμεθα. The reading of K is possible: ἄν + subjunctive in the protasis is followed by present indicative in the apodosis at 85a32-4, 87a15-16, 91a35, 10b38-9, 13a5-6, 13b13. (We also find ἐάν used in this way at 90b27⁷⁵, 90b37-91a1, 91a27, 94a32-3, 06b26-7, 10a32-3, 12a14, 13b8-9.) It is a characteristic of K to add unnecessary nus to the ends of words, as Bywater, [1892] 14-15, has pointed out with regard to K’s version of E.N. For instances of K having nu wrongly in M.M. see p.170 and my note on 1185a34. Once ἃ became ἄν, the mood of the verb would need to be changed and an object for πρόπτειν would need to be inserted.

1189b3 τινες ὀλίγοι. Dirlmeier (p.258) defends the manuscript reading τινες ὀλίγοι against Susemihl’s conjecture by reference to instances of ὀλίγος τις in Plato. There are, however, plenty of occurrences of the combination τις ὀλίγος (in that order) in Aristotle (e.g. H.A.

⁷⁵ See my note there.

550b15, 601a29, Met. 1078b21, P.A. 689a7, S.E. 177b36), Plato (e.g. Rep. 498a7, 531e2, 564e2) and Thucydides (e.g. III.7.5.1; IV.46.5.1; IV.113.2.3). Probably this use of $\tau\upsilon\varsigma$ is an extension of the type that Kühner-Gerth distinguish (II, 1, p.664) in which the quantity is appositional: ‘some law-makers, admittedly not many’.

1189b6 Only twice out of the fourteen times that Susemihl prints $\pi\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ (add 12a19 to his index for a complete list) are the mss. unanimous in their reading. On the remaining twelve occasions at least one manuscript offers the form in $-\iota\kappa-$. However, in nine of these twelve cases the stemmatic picture points to what Susemihl prints. (The exceptions are 99a8, 12a25, 12a26.) By contrast, $\pi\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ is printed by Susemihl fifteen times and not once does an independent manuscript read $\pi\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$. For some reason scribes frequently added $-\iota\kappa-$ in the middle of words. See my note on 1181a24.

1189b13 Read $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$ with the stemma. Perhaps $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\beta\omicron\nu$ arose in η , as a first person singular (rather than as third person plural as translators take it), because of a feeling that the author ought to speak of himself in this way.⁷⁶

1189b16-17 There is strong stemmatic reason to read $\acute{\omicron}\rho\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$ (omitting $\acute{\alpha}\nu$)... $\beta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\tau\iota\omicron\nu$. But we would then need to read $\tau\omicron\delta\tau\omicron$ for $\tau\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\alpha$ ¹ in b17, and $\phi\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ in b16-17. If we read $\acute{\epsilon}\xi$ (b16), the text would mean ‘on the basis of the consequences, he chooses whatever action appears better...’. If we omit $\acute{\epsilon}\xi$ (b16) with α (and delete the comma after $\sigma\upsilon\mu\beta\alpha\iota\nu\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omicron\nu$), the text would mean ‘He chooses whichever of the consequences appears better...’. The asyndeton becomes more palatable if we omit $\acute{\epsilon}\xi$.

1189b18 Normally the verb $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ takes $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ or $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho$. (See Bonitz s.v.). There are instances of it taking an accusative (see L.S.J.). The only example of this I have found in Aristotle is E.E. 1226b12 (where there is some uncertainty in the tradition). I would construe

⁷⁶ See my note on 1196b13 for the author using first person plural.

this sentence by understanding an infinitive βουλευέσασθαι after δεῖ:⁷⁷ ‘...deliberating is deliberating how one ought to do things’.

1189b23 A similar sentence, without the definite article is at 85a28. Omit ἦ with α. To read it would commit M.M. to thinking that there could be mistakes elsewhere.

1189b23 οὔτε, the manuscripts’ reading in this line, could be defended by comparison with 03b10 (see my note there). But I am unconvinced that these two cases are similar enough for them to justify each other. There is frequent confusion in this text between οὔτε and οὐδέ and οὔτι. In the following lines either the manuscripts diverge or a conjecture has been made that we abandon the mss.’ unanimous reading: 85b11, 89a21, here, 92a19,⁷⁸ 93a8, 94b12, 02a18, 03b7, 03b10, 03b28, 08b29, 09a29.

1189b25 πρακτοῖς is approved of by Bonitz, [1844] 19, and Breier. See my note on 1189b6.

1189b32 No need for the dash (see Dirlmeier p.261).

1190a1 The definite article in α and conjectured by Ellebodus is necessary. Susemihl and Bekker did not know of this reading. It could easily have dropped out by haplography in ζ. Read διὰ τοῦτο, τὸ βουλευέσθαι.

1190a4 ἄλλ’ ἤδη occurs elsewhere in M.M. at 88b19, 91b12, 92a20, 95a25, 96a38, 07a23. Scaliger’s suggestion is ruled out by the close similarity between the first two of these passages and that here.

1190a4 For πρὸς we must read κατὰ. Cf. 89a8, 89a9, 89a25, 90a5. See p.11 for confusion in V where πρὸς was in the exemplar. (This may have been a misprint in Susemihl, since Bekker has πρὸς, but the Aldine has κατὰ.)

⁷⁷ Stock takes τὸ πῶς δεῖ as accusative of respect: ‘deliberation is as to the how’.

⁷⁸ Where Spengel wrongly wants οὔτε δὴ for mss. οὐδὲ δὴ.

Dirlmeier (p.262) rightly says that Spengel's περί, reported in Susemihl's apparatus, is not necessary, since it can be understood from 90a2. Spengel himself, [1866] 627, had seen this and it is misleading to attribute the addition of περί to Spengel. He raises the possibility of the addition, but rejects it: 'Coniicias... ἤδη περί τὰ, sed ex superiore οὐ περί τὰ τέλη praepositio hic repetenda est'.

1190a9-28 It is difficult to see how the background of the sciences and, in particular, of house-building (90a9-15) helps the author establish his contention that virtue aims at τὸ τέλος more than at τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος (a16-17, a26-7, a29). M.M. claims that the cases of virtue and ἐπιστήμη 'would seem to be alike' (a15-16), and yet his description of the σκοπός of house-building is a long way short of establishing that it looks to the end more than (μᾶλλον... ἢ a16-17, a27, a29, cf, a33)⁷⁹ to the 'things towards the end'. The importance of proposing (τὸ προθέσθαι) the 'end' is underplayed, in a conditional clause (a12-13) which leaves open the possibility that something else could play that role - in fact, in 98a32 we learn that it is the architect who comes up with the plan, and his junior, the οἰκοδόμος, who gets his hands dirty⁸⁰ - whilst the importance of the execution of the proposal is stressed (οὐκ ἄλλος τις... ἢ (a13-14)).⁸¹ How, then, does the evidence of the sciences help M.M.'s case?

Not only is the characterisation of the house-builder 90a11-15 difficult to reconcile with the inference he seems to make from that case, if we see M.M. as putting forward the

⁷⁹ There is an ambiguity in the phrase μᾶλλον... ἢ. Armstrong and Dirlmeier translate it as 'more... than', 'cher... als', whilst Stock translates it as 'rather than'. Both meanings can be paralleled in M.M.: the first e.g. at 11b21, the second e.g. at 10b13. On the first interpretation, virtue can focus on both, but one to a greater extent; on the second the alternatives are mutually exclusive. (E.E. 1227b23-4 and b35, b40 see the alternatives as exclusive, and so does M.M. 1198a6-7 where φρονήσις, in the terminology of the current chapter proposes the ends and the virtues execute the plan.) But in the section under discussion M.M. eventually says that the task of virtue παντελῶς is τὸ καλὸν προθέσθαι (90a33). Dirlmeier (p.265) thinks that this line 'lässt keinen Zweifel, daß das Finden der Mittel sekundär ist', or, its corollary, that setting the goal is 'die Hauptsache' of virtue (pp.267-8). The reason for thinking that παντελῶς cannot mean 'completely' is that the objector in 90a34-7 sees virtue as having two σκοποί, one finer than the other (κάλλιον a36), and M.M. does not correct the objector. I thus take μᾶλλον... ἢ to mean 'more than' throughout this passage.

⁸⁰ Also, in 90a30-2 one can be a good artist even if the σκοπός is not fine. In the case of γραφικὴ ἐπιστήμη, the execution of the plan, rather than the proposing of a good design, is what the proficient artist has to do. Only the praiseworthy artist needs to propose the design.

⁸¹ Contrast Fiedler, [1978] 238-9, who thinks that the τέλος 'als Gegenstand der Techne den Vorrang hat, insofern es die Voraussetzung bildet für das Finden und Bereitstellen der Mittel zum Ziel, bzw. dieses teilweise impliziert'. There is no sign in the text that the kind of primacy would be temporal. I think that the primacy is the other way round, because it is at least conceivable that a house-builder is not make the man who draws up the design, yet it is inconceivable that it is not he who executes the plan.

view that the builder has the end rather than ‘the things towards the end’ as his principal concern, but if we turn to E.E. 1227b25-8, we find Aristotle saying that the doctor does not σκοπεῖ whether one ought to be healthy or not, but whether one ought to go for walks, and that the trainer does not σκοπεῖ whether one ought to be fit or not, but whether one ought to exercise. This becomes generalised: ‘no other science is περὶ τοῦ τέλους’ (1227b28).

It looks, then, as though M.M. ought to say that the case of virtue and of ἐπιστήμη are importantly different. Before seeing how it is possible that M.M. did actually think that the cases were different, it is important to note a crucial ambiguity in the word σκοπός (a16). It can be synonymous with τέλος (see Bonitz s.v. σκοπός), but it could also mean its immediate focus of attention, its scope. (‘Focus on’ would be a good translation of ἰδεῖν in a12, cf. σκέψασθαι in a similar context in 97b25.) A house-builder aims to build a house - in the first sense of σκοπός his σκοπός is a well-built house. But what he worries about are questions like whether this material or that are going to achieve his end, or what tools to use. His immediate σκοπός is how to achieve his remote σκοπός.

If we are right to see M.M. as thinking that in the case of the sciences, τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη are what the scientist is immediately involved with,⁸² we should expect him to draw attention not to the similarity between science and virtue, but to the difference.⁸³ For he clearly thinks that virtue aims at the end more than at the things towards the end (a27-9, a33).

If this is right, the answer to the question is that house-building looks to τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. When Susemihl punctuates a πότερον... ἢ question with a γάρ near the start of the next question, it is always to the second alternative, i.e. what comes after the ἢ, that M.M. is giving support. (Contrast Dirlmeier (p.265) who thinks that the answer is the first alternative.) See above p.165.

It is important, I think, that M.M. makes the inference (ἄρα a15) from the case of the sciences to that of virtue with a guarded ‘δόξειεν ἄν’. In E.E. 1227b14 the view that it is

⁸² Thus avoiding an inconsistency with 82b22-7, which Armstrong observes in his note on 90a13.

⁸³ Sometimes M.M. uses ἐπιστήμη as a positive model, at other times as a negative one. Examples of the second sort: 05a18 ἐπιστήμηαι do not differ εἶδει, unlike pleasures; 11b30-3 house-building not an example of an activity with no further end.

reasoning (towards the end) with which virtue is concerned is more clearly distanced from the author: ὡςπερ δοκεῖ τισί.⁸⁴ The same distance is present in M.M.'s δόξειεν ἄν.

By two minor adjustments to the text in a17 we can achieve consistency and good sense. If we retain the manuscripts' πρὸς in a16, deleted by Rieckher, but add τὰ before it and delete τὰ πρὸς later in the line, a15-17 will read:

ὡσαύτως ἄρα δόξειεν

ἂν ἔχειν καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῆς, μᾶλλον εἶναι αὐτῆς τὸν σκοπὸν

<τὰ> πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὃ δεῖ ὀρθῶς προθέσθαι, ἢ [τὰ πρὸς] τὸ τέλος·

An alternative, suggested to me by Bonitz' note (684a55-6),⁸⁵ would be to read:

ὡσαύτως ἄρα δόξειεν

ἂν ἔχειν καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῆς, μᾶλλον εἶναι αὐτῆς τὸν σκοπὸν

πρὸς <τὰ πρὸς> τὸ τέλος, ὃ δεῖ ὀρθῶς προθέσθαι, ἢ [τὰ] πρὸς τὸ τέλος·

The second suggestion is palaeographically more plausible: τὰ πρὸς could have dropped out *saut du même au même*, and then the addition of τὰ later in the line would be natural, especially if the house-building example is read carelessly. A couple of times Aristotle says that we look towards a σκοπός: Pol. 1341b15, E.N. 1138b22 and we find the expression used in Plato Gorg. 507d6.⁸⁶ Dirlmeier (p.269) is happy with σκοπὸς πρὸς in M.M. 90a16-17.

Both versions can be translated: 'Likewise it would seem to be the case with virtue, namely that its focus is more on what contribute to the end, the proposal of which needs to be correct, than on the end'. The next sentence (a18-19) supports such a reading: 'the materials for this [viz. the end] will be provided for, and the requirements for this will be discovered by, none other [than the virtuous man]'

⁸⁴ M.M. gives us what E.E. does not - an argument why people might believe that the σκοπός of virtue is the means. The view is clearly Socratic.

⁸⁵ Bonitz glosses τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι by τὴν ἀρετὴν σκοπεῖν.

⁸⁶ Parallels for σκοπεῖν πρὸς: G.A. 731a34, Rhet. 1354b33, Pol. 1296a36, Plato Laws 627d2.

If we do not emend the text in a16, this sentence fits awkwardly with what has preceded: here it is τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος which are being stressed (again note οὐθεις ἄλλος, a18). Yet the previous sentence, as printed by Susemihl, had made these secondary. The abrupt change from a16-17 advocating the importance of τὸ τέλος to a17-18 advocating the importance of τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος led Armstrong, quite naturally, to translate καὶ (a18) by ‘yet’. If we adopt the changes in a16, καὶ can naturally mean ‘and’, or can explain the previous sentence.

There follows an argument (a19-26) which, according to the new text, shows that there is reason also to think that virtue is concerned with the proposal of the end more than with τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Those who hastily based their assessment of the role of virtue on the way things are with the sciences, have to take into account an opposing argument. καὶ εὐλογον δὲ (a19) introduces another perspective. It turns out, on this argument, that virtue τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ στοχαστικὴ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος (a27-8).⁸⁷

1190a19-21 The stemma suggests that we place a comma after ἀρετὴν (a20), excise γάρ (a20), place a full stop after ἐστίν (a20), and add γάρ after ἕκαστον (a21):

καὶ εὐλογον δὲ τούτου εἶναι προ-
θετικὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐν οἷς [γάρ] ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐστίν.
ἕκαστον <γάρ> καὶ προθετικὸν καὶ ποιητικόν.

‘But it is also reasonable that virtue should propose this [sc. the end] wherever the ἀρχὴ is of the best. For each (ἐπιστήμη and ἀρετή) is designer and executor.’

1190a19-21 On stemmatic grounds keep the order which Susemihl prints, *pace* Dirlmeier (p.269). οὖν (a21) introduces new point - it does not draw an inference.

⁸⁷ Fiedler, [1978] 239: ‘Die Begründung des Vorrangs der Festsetzung des Zieles geschieht im übrigen ohne Zuhilfenahme des Analogiebereichs’.

1190a23-6 Scaliger's multiple suggestions for these lines are, just by being so extensive, unlikely to be correct. Dirlmeier (p.267) objects to Scaliger's attempt to simplify, and himself sees no need to alter the text that Susemihl prints (p.266).

1190a26 It is inelegant that we should have ὡς in this line and ὅτι in the next, but there is no need to alter the text, as Scaliger suggests. In 82a36 we find δῆλον ὡς, and the move from ὅτι to ὡς is not unexpected in this author. Jaeger, [1948] 442n.1, collects passages where '[the author's] slovenly habit of redundantly repeating words, especially after a parenthetic subordinate clause' is exhibited. Aristotle himself is not exempt from the charge. See Met. 1091a15-17 λέγουσιν ὡς... ὅτι and Bonitz 538b33-9. For a further instance of δῆλον ὡς... ὅτι: Phys. 260a23, and of φανερόν ὡς... ὅτι see Phys. 190b17, 233a13.

1190a29 Restore ἡ ἀρετή, which dropped out late.

1190a30 Ellebodus, Susemihl and Rieckher propose conjectures so that the sense is 'Otherwise it seems absurd'. Dirlmeier (p.268) rejects these suggestions, and would translate the existing text: 'that the domain of virtue is *exclusively* the means is absurd'. M.M. supports the claim in a30-3: the implicit argument is that since i) praise is only bestowed where the σκοπός is fine, and ii) virtue is praised, ∴ virtue's σκοπός must be fine. It follows that there must be more to virtue than executing the plan: it must also propose finely.

τε δὴ is suggested by the stemma and should be read. Compare particularly Met. 1076b28 where another argument is rejected with the sentence ἀτοπός τε δὴ γίνεται ἡ σώρευσις. The combination appears in E.N. 1156a17 - see Stewart's helpful note, [1892], ad loc.

1190a32 βέλτιστα is confirmed by 99a11. Cf. the apparatus at 86b36 for μ/β confusion in C.

1190a33 There remains a difficulty (which is not affected by whether we follow my suggestion in a17 or not): in 98a32-b7 it is difficult not to see φρονήσις, which is said to be

‘like an architect’ (98b5), described as what proposes the end and virtue as what executes the bequests of φρονήσις. If so, there is a contradiction with 90a33. Perhaps the explanation is that virtue has yet to be distinguished from φρονήσις.

1190a35 Armstrong and Stock translate τὴν ἕξι τὴν αὐτήν, the reading of α, by ‘the corresponding possession of it’ and ‘the corresponding state’ respectively. ὁ αὐτὸς, however means ‘the same’. The objector is referring back to 84b15-16, 84b33-5. The three families of manuscripts offer different readings. ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτήν in η is impossible. See Dirlmeier (p.270). β offers ἢ τὴν ἕξι αὐτήν, ‘than the state itself’, which makes reasonably good sense. It is likely that ζ read this and that, in η, τὴν ἕξι was glossed by ἀρετὴν.

We thus have one side of the stemma (ζ) reading ἢ τὴν ἕξι αὐτήν and the other side (α) reading ἢ τὴν ἕξι τὴν αὐτήν. (This is sufficient to undermine Dirlmeier’s conjecture.). I prefer the reading of ζ: ‘than the state itself’ i.e. ‘than the state alone’.

1190a35 I see nothing wrong with the mss.’ ὦν in this line. Cf. a18, a29. Dirlmeier (p.268) correctly says that the activity (a36) consists in different ways of bringing about the means, i.e. in different actions. The singular ἐν ᾧ (a37) led Valla (and all subsequent editors) to suppose that we should have a singular in a35. But the phrase ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνέργεια refers to τὸ τέλος καλῶς προθέσθαι (a11-12), which is a single activity, but not an action. ‘Why’, the objector is asking, ‘did the author not avoid inconsistency, and make the role of virtue an active one, rather than an intellectual one?’.

1190b7-8 What is objectionable about the sentence that Susemihl brackets? Susemihl (p.125) raises the problem that καταριθμεῖν cannot be stretched to mean ‘adduce examples’. M.M. has adduced examples, but καταριθμεῖν means ‘to enumerate’. Dirlmeier (pp.271-2) counters this, saying that the word is appropriate, refers back nicely, and is unobjectionable on grounds of vocabulary. We do not need to posit a lost table of virtues such as we find in E.E. 1221b38. The presence of τινός in b7 shows that M.M. is not claiming to have made an extensive list. He has told us that courage and temperance are means (85b21-32, 86b4-12,

86b32), that gentleness is ‘in’ a mean of anger, that ἀλήθεια is a mean (86a16-27) and that generosity is a mean (86b20-1).

The first thing to note about these two lines is the weakness of the manuscript support for ἐπεὶ δέ. It is clear that ω started the sentence with μεσότητάς and that ἐπεὶ δέ arose conjecturally in V, just as ἐπεὶ οὖν and ἐπεὶ δὲ later arose conjecturally in D and P. We certainly need a particle to introduce the new sentence and we also need a conjunction to introduce the subordinate clause (protasis), and any of these three suggestions would do the job.

The connection between b7-8 and the immediately preceding discussion is abrupt. It is important to note that the start of E.E. III is also abrupt. Both texts move from the discussion of how we judge a man from his actions, rather than from his intentions, to a programmatic remark about what has been said and what needs to be discussed next. The similarity between M.M. and E.E. here itself suggests that the lacuna before μεσότητάς contained no more than a couple of words, like ἐπεὶ δέ.⁸⁸

So retain b7-8, but print <ἐπεὶ δέ> to show the conjectural origin of these words. The next sentence follows on easily enough - the author begins to follow the programme he has set himself. Note δὴ in E.E. 1228a28 in the same context. Cf. also M.M. 87b36 οὖν after λεκτέον, 88a38 τοίνυν after λεκτέον.

1190b11 ζ had the aorist tense ἀποβόλη it seems (we do not know who deleted a lambda in K - it could have been the original scribe). The stemma is thus equally split, and both readings could be defended. The aorist has the advantage that the fear would be of a sudden loss.

1190b20 οἱ πάντες is rare. It occurs at Pol. 1290a34 alone in the corpus Aristotelicum, and there before a number: ‘altogether 1,300’. The reading of α is also problematic, since M.M. never uses ἅπας after a vowel. Comparing Rhet. 1363a22 ἅ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοί, or Rhet.

⁸⁸ Gotthelf, [1983] 234n.6, tentatively suggests what could have been in a longer lacuna. Von Arnim [1924] 82, 130, wanting to find a mention of ὀρθὸς λόγος to which 96b4-6 can refer, suggested that there may have been such a mention in the lacuna. Donini, [1965] 104n.4, is sceptical that anything is missing before 90b9. See Kapp, [1927] 74-8, and Dirlmeier (pp.270-3, 339) for arguments against von Arnim.

1373a27 ἅ πάντες ἢ πολλοί, perhaps we should consider reading ἢ ἅ πάντες in M.M. 90b20? ἅ became ἄ in one family and οἱ in the other. The repetition of ἅ provides a strong antecedent for the emphatic ἐν τούτοις.

The stemma suggests that, pace Dirlmeier (p.274), we normalise the word order. Read ὁ ἐν τούτοις ὄν...

1190b21 οὖν is about eight times as frequent as τοίνυν in M.M., but which to print here? We cannot be sure, but I would keep τοίνυν, as the harder reading.

1190b27 L's future, ὑπομενεῖ, could be paralleled by cases of ἐὼν / ὄν + subj. + future in the apodosis: 82a6, 84a19, 84b17, 85a30, 87b2, 87b21 87a24, 87b29, 90a12, 91a12, 00a18, 04a8, 05a19, 06a13, 06b14, (10a19), 10a21 (but see my note on 1189b2). The logical future is characteristic of this text⁸⁹ and, since the mss. are no guide, I would read ὑπομενεῖ.

1190b28 I agree with Dirlmeier (p.275), who supports the manuscripts' δέ. A new but, as we shall see, related conception of bravery is about to be discussed - that bravery is ἐπιστήμη. δέ introduces the new conception. It is by linking the concept of ἐπιστήμη with the already discredited concept of bravery-through-experience that the Socratic view is attacked. The occurrences of οὐδὲ δὴ in this section (90b34, 90b37, 91a10, 91a15) stand, by contrast, after the respective candidates for the title of bravery have been introduced.

1190b31-2 First αὐτοῖς should be omitted, on strong stemmatic grounds. Spengel thought that the words οὐδ' ἐροῦσιν were 'haud sana', and we now know that β omits these words. Dirlmeier (p.275) comments that the phrase is without parallel, but defends it on the grounds that it is rhetorical and in keeping with the tone of this part of the M.M. He explains the future tense by reference to authors from the 2nd century B.C. and Athenaeus (2nd century A.D.) who use ἐρῶ 'präsentlich' for variation. The lateness of the parallels make the explanation unconvincing.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ See Brink, [1933] 30-1.

⁹⁰ So, Düring, [1961^b] 252.

I do not think that it is necessary to excise οὐδ' ἐροῦσιν with β. Translating the future as a future and making οὐδ' ἐροῦσιν parenthetic, we have: 'We do not say, and nor will people say, that those who.... are brave.' M.M. is making the important point that his view that the so-called brave-from-experience-men are excluded from the title 'brave', is not just an ad hoc device to suit his theory, but because ordinary people would not (and will never) agree that such people are brave in the strict sense. It is crucial that the author allays the suspicion that he is artificially debarring this type of man from the description 'brave'. The fact that his view ties in with ordinary intuitions bolsters his case. In 91a2-3 the same appeal to ordinary usage is found in the general formulation: οὐκ ἂν τις εἴποι.

1190b32-5 There is a problem in this section which was detected by Demetrios Chalcondyles. The other candidates for the title 'bravery' - bravery-through-experience (90b23), bravery-through-passions (90b36), political bravery (91a5), bravery-from-expectation-of-a-future-good (91a14) - are all introduced quite clearly as *candidates* for the title, with τις (90b23), or a part of δοκεῖν (90b35, 91a5, 91a14). But in the introduction of the new candidate (πάλιν 90b32) there is no such caution. In fact the opposite of what M.M. will actually say in b34-5 is asserted in b32-3.

This was the motivation for Demetrios Chalcondyles' insertion of οὐκ after αῶ. However, γάρ in b33 either provides a reason for people believing that those who lack experience are candidates for the title brave - they do not get frightened - or explains the phrase in the preceding clause ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τῆς ἐμπειρίας. I cannot see how the γάρ would justify or explain the preceding sentence if we add οὐκ in the preceding sentence.⁹¹

Any account of b32-5 is going to find it difficult to explain the grounds by which the bravery-from-inexperience is disqualified from the title 'brave'. M.M. does not tell us here, despite δῆ (b34). We have to wait until 91a20 to see why.⁹²

⁹¹ This problem would also arise if we pursued a more palaeographically conceived conjecture and read οὐκ not after αῶ but instead of αῶ.

⁹² It may be significant that E.E. 1229a11-31 mentions bravery-from-inexperience as one of five εἶδη ἀνδρείας... λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοιότητα (1229a11-12) but never tells us explicitly why it is debarred from being real bravery. (Something like it makes a brief appearance at 1229b26-30.) We can, though, easily see why it is not going to qualify because we have just read 1229a1-11.

One way to avoid this difficulty, would be to take *πάλιν* as introducing a further reason to deny that the brave-from-experience candidate is properly brave: how can he be, if his opposite is also brave? Such a reading demands no insertion of a negative in b33. On this interpretation we would treat the discussion of Socrates' view in b28-32 as parenthetical, and take *τούτους* (b35) to refer to the men who are brave-from-experience. But *οὐδὲ δὴ τούτους* is used uncontroversially in 90b37 and 91a15 (cf. 91a10) to mark another group of people disqualified from the description 'brave'. This suggests very strongly that the *πάλιν* served to introduce a new candidate, which ties in with E.E. 1229a16.

Bearing in mind the good motivation for Chalcondyles' emendation, I suggest that we read *δοκοῦσιν* for *δ' αὖ εἰσιν*.⁹³

One wonders whether *ἀγνοία* or a part of *ἀγνοεῖν* did not feature in b33-4 (cf. E.E. 1229a17, E.N. 1117a22ff.). The very possibility of people being *ἐμπειροὶ τῶν ἐκβησομένων* seems absurd, since experience must be of things in the past, whereas it is conceivable that people should *ἀγνοοῦσιν τὰ ἐκβησομένα* as a result of *ἀπειρία*.

1190b37 A corrector of K suggests that we add *ἀπ'*. Bonitz (126a50-2) cites H.A. 508b33, E.N. 1132a33, 1132b7 as examples of *ἀφαιρεῖσθαι + ἀπό* ('to be removed from'), and only offers E.N. 1118b5 as an example of *ἀφαιρεῖν + gen.* But there is a close parallel in M.M. at 09b39-10a1. Another construction that is possible is that *αὐτῶν* is possessive rather than separative ('Our own face' is *αὐτῶν τὸ πρόσωπον* in M.M. 1213a20.) Either way, we do not need K's *ἀπ'*.

1191a4 Dirlmeier (p.277) wants to retain the *τό* which Bekker and Susemihl omit. Aristotle more usually has no definite article between *διὰ* and *πάθος* (or between *διὰ* and *θυμόν*) in E.E. and E.N.. The stemma suggests that in 91a4 we excise *τό*. And this fits in with 13a19, the only other occurrence of *διὰ + πάθος* in M.M.

⁹³ *πάλιν* does not need another particle (cf. 84a7, 88a10, 88a24, 91a5, 94a2 etc.). Prof. Frede has suggested to me reading *δοκοῦσιν* for *εἰσιν*, which has the advantage that *αὖ*, which appears in b35 is preserved.

1191a5 Both οἱ and εἰ make sense grammatically.⁹⁴ The first καί in a7 makes οἱ slightly preferable: ‘those who... also seem to be brave’. καί connects this type of supposedly brave man with the other types who have been rejected. The text printed by Susemihl forces us to read καί as connecting ὑπομένουσι with δοκοῦσιν: ‘if men endure... and appear brave’, which is superfluous as we already know that we are meant to be being given an example of another seemingly genuine (δοκοῦσα a5) type of courage. It would be possible to retain εἰ, but to punctuate with a comma after κινδύνους, so that καὶ δοκοῦσιν becomes apodotic: ‘for example, if men endure..., they too seem to be brave’. The closest parallel within M.M. for οἶον οἱ is 88b19 οἶον ὃς ἄν... There are many parallels for οἶον εἰ...: 85a10, 87a38, 90b16, 92b2, 94b33, 10a30. For this reason I would follow Susemihl in reading εἰ, but would punctuate with a comma after κινδύνους.

1191a10 Full stop after ἀναθήσει, following ω.

1191a17 In 90b22 M.M. had said that he would turn his attention to the question ὁ ποῖος ἀνδρεῖος. His procedure between then and here was to eliminate those who only seem to be brave. Now he needs to turn to a positive characterisation.

Bonitz, [1844] 20-1, who does not get a mention in Susemihl’s apparatus, has a good note. Commenting on Bekker’s text (οὐδένα οὖν τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρεῖον θετέον εἶναι τὸν ὀπιονοῦν ἀνδρεῖον, καὶ τίς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος σκεπτέον), he says ‘Quid sibi velint verba τὸν ὀπιονοῦν ἀνδρεῖον per appositionem adiecta ad ἀνδρεῖον, equidem non assequor, nec dubito quin puncto maximo posito post εἶναι proxima sit scribenda sint: τὸν ὀπιον οὖν ἀνδρεῖον (sc. θετέον εἶναι), καὶ τίς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος σκεπτέον. Ita Valla: *qualis igitur et quisnam fortis <sit>*⁹⁵, *hinc considerandum*’. This is surely right and, moreover, it is, ignoring diacritics, exactly what α, β, η read.

1191a21 Only Γ and B and its descendants have παρῆ. Susemihl’s apparatus does not even report its omission, which was accepted by Bekker and is surely right.

⁹⁴ See 95b22 for the same corruption.

⁹⁵ Valla in 1496 and 1831 has sit. Bonitz cites Valla without the verb.

1191a28 For ἄν see p.166.

1191a34 L clearly found the construction difficult. Plato Hip. Maj. 286b5 uses εἰς τρίτην ἡμέραν to mean ‘on the third day’, i.e. the day after tomorrow. Aristotle de Int. twice has εἰς τὸ μυριοστὸν ἔτος (18b33, 18b39) - ‘ten thousand years beforehand’.

1191a38 Support for τὰς is as strong as support for its omission. On the basis of 86b9 omit.

1191b5 β omits a redundant sentence μεσότης — τούτων, probably intentionally.⁹⁶ But there are many places where we could make M.M. more elegant, for example 89b19-21, 93b25-6, 96b29-31, 02a2-5, and from within the section currently under discussion 91b1-3. Perhaps b4 stress the fact that σωφροσύνη is a mean, whilst b5 stresses what it is a mean of. Retain Susemihl’s text.

1191b9-10 Does the ἀλλὰ in this line answers the οὐ in 91b7 or the phrase οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς περὶ πάντα in 91b6. Is M.M. telling us in 91b9-10 (ἀλλ’ ἐν ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ ἀφήν καὶ γεῦσιν) that pleasures of touch and of taste are the kind of pleasures with which the ἀκόλαστος man has to do (so, Stock, Armstrong) or with which the temperate man has to do? An answer to this question will affect how we punctuate the passage.

M.M. believes that temperance, like ἀκολασία and ἀναισθησία, concerns the pleasures of taste and touch (91b21-2). The ἀνάσθητος man does not enjoy sex or food all (91b11-12). The σώφρων man πάσχει but οὐκ ἄγεται (91b12-13).

Bonitz, [1844] 11, inserts ὁ at the end of b10. He points to E.E. 1231a26 to support the suggestion. But grammatically it is not required, and the sense is distorted. Taking the participle ἔχων (b11) to be conditional in force, we can translate the text without ὁ: ‘Nor then will a man be temperate about these things if he is in such a state that he does not...’. (Cf. 92b7, 95b24, 98b36 and maybe 92a7 - see note ad loc. for participle without definite

⁹⁶ It also omitted a difficult phrase at 90b31.

article.) Although M.M. continues in b12-13 to characterise the temperate man with a clause consisting of definite article + participle, the parenthetic remark in b12 gives sufficient interval for the change in construction.

M.M. is interested not in who the temperate man about these things is, but in conditions which disqualify one from being temperate.

1191b12-16 Until πάρεργα (b14) the text is clear. ὥστε — πάρεργα (b13-14) tell us the extent to which the temperate man is not 'led on' (b13). He enjoys food and sex, but not to the extent that everything else is ignored. After πάρεργα, all independent manuscripts except A, which does not punctuate at all, place a full stop. Breier, [1845] 844, would place a colon. However we deal with the next two lines, we do need a stop here.

Two sorts of solution to b14-16 have been offered. The problem which scholars have tried to solve is that the transmitted text contains neither main verb nor subject. One solution (Spengel, Bonitz, Rieckher, Ellebodius) has been to add a verb of saying after σώφρονα: 'we call the man who acts... 'temperate''. Another type of solution has been to change the accusatives to nominatives (Scaliger, Spengel): 'he who acts..., is temperate'.

I am not sure that the insertion of a verb of saying at the end of the sentence is a good enough remedy on its own: αὐτὸν in b14 is still awkward. Perhaps we could try φατέον for αὐτόν⁹⁷?

1191b19 The plural αἰροῦνται gives us no clue whether to read δοκιμάζοντα with P or δοκιμάζοντες with C and ζ because M.M. frequently uses neuter plural + plural verb.⁹⁸ Does M.M. say that the reason for not calling animals temperate is that 'they do not have reason with which to test the fine and to make choices' or that 'they do not have reason with which <men> test the fine when they make choices'? The stemma strongly suggests the second, and the Greek makes sense. Susemihl's text means that animals make choices, but do not use reason in making those choices. But animals do not choose (89a3), and they have no conception of τὸ καλόν. Read δοκιμάζοντες.

⁹⁷ φατέον has occurred six times in 90b13-91a15.

⁹⁸ See p.167.

1191b20 Cf. E.N. 1135a25 for omission of ἔνεκα.

1191b23 Omit καί, on stemmatic grounds.

1191b24 Retain μέν. The combination μέν οὖν does not need a δέ afterwards. See Denniston, pp.31, 474, for this usage in answers.

1191b26 The origin of ἴδοι in β was probably conjectural. The construction ἄν τις ἴδοι + ὅτι has already been used at 83a8 and, even more closely, at 85a9 in the same way, introducing reasons which might persuade the anonymous somebody of the author's view. M.M. often uses ὁρᾶν to mean 'to see' not in a visual sense, but, like in English 'to see the truth'. Cf. 85b15, b17, 98a32, 05a-7-8, 06b22.

The sense of ἴδοι εἰ would not be satisfactory. There is a difference between 'seeing whether' and 'seeing that': the first expression is neutral in tone - the author would be adopting an unbiased stance, suggesting that he does not know, in advance of the argument, whether it will turn out that virtues are means or not. Reading ὅτι, however, there is a certainty that virtues are means, which is appropriate given the previous sentence.

Retain ὅτι... εἴποι. Translate 'One might argue that they are means in this way as well'.

1191b28 Retain the premise which Rasso excises. See Dirlmeier, pp.288-9.

1191b30-8 There are two fairly trivial strictly textual matters in this section to note, before looking at the punctuation of the passage. First, in 91b30 manuscript evidence is equally split between πάντη and παντί. The phrase πάντη καὶ πάντως has occurred at 83b39, 84a1, 84a2,⁹⁹ but is not correct here because of 91b31 (παντί) and 91b33 (μηθενί). Secondly, in 91b32 there is a misprint. We should read οὐδ' αἶ.

⁹⁹ See my note 1183b39-84a2.

The punctuation of this passage is not good in Susemihl. Paraphrasing, I take M.M. to be saying that since a) the ὀργίλος man is blameworthy (b30-1) and b) it is not the case that one ought never to be angry (b32-3) - these two premises are recapitulated in b34-5 - ∴ i) the mean person is gentle and praiseworthy (b35-6) and ii) gentleness is a mean between the two πάθη (b38).

This structure is signalled by ἐπειδὴ (b30)... ἐπεὶ τοίνυν (b34)... ἂν εἶη (b35)... καὶ... ἂν εἶη (b38). However, both premises (a) and (b) are supported by a sentence with γάρ. It is easiest to show how I would repunctuate b30-8 and then to say why:

Ἐπειδὴ γάρ ἐστιν ὀργίλος ὁ παντὶ καὶ πάντως καὶ ἐπὶ
 πλεῖον ὀργιζόμενος, καὶ ψεκτὸς δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος (οὔτε γὰρ παντὶ
 δεῖ ὀργίζεσθαι οὔτ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οὔτε πάντως καὶ ἀεί), οὐδ' ἀδ
 πάλιν οὕτως ἔχειν δεῖ, ὥστε μηθεὶς μηδέποτε (καὶ γὰρ οὗτος
 ψεκτὸς, ἀνάληγτος γε ὢν)· ἐπεὶ τοίνυν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
 ψεκτὸς καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, ὁ μέσος ἂν τούτων εἶη
 καὶ πρῶος καὶ ἐπαινετός (οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐλλείπων τῇ ὀργῇ οὔτε ὁ
 ὑπερβάλλων ἐπαινετός, ἀλλ' ὁ μέσος ἔχων πρὸς ταῦτα. οὗτος
 πρῶος) καὶ ἡ πραότης δὲ τούτων τῶν παθῶν μεσότης ἂν εἶη.

Susemihl may have misunderstood Bonitz' suggestion, [1844] 14. Bonitz had thought that ἐπειδὴ γάρ (b30) — πρῶος καὶ ἐπαινετός (b36) was a complete sentence and that while the protasis 'explicationibus intercepta resumitur per particulas ἐπεὶ τοίνυν', the apodosis 'continetur verbis ὁ μέσος — ἐπαινετός [b35-6]'. It is consistent with what Bonitz says that he thought that the protasis is complex and that each part of the protasis is 'explained'. This is certainly preferable since οὐδ' ἀδ — μηδέποτε (b32-3) cannot 'explain' what precedes; it must introduce a new point. Moreover, we need a reference to the deficient man in way that is not just parenthetical, in order for the 'resumptive' ἐπεὶ τοίνυν (b34) to be resumptive. There are thus two reasons why the brackets should close after ἀεί (b32).¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Armstrong saw, independently of Bonitz, that the first parenthesis should end after ἀεί.

Where I depart from Bonitz is in thinking that the sentence ends at ἐπαινετός (b36). I cannot see any way of accounting for καὶ... ὃν εἶη (b38) other than as connected grammatically to ὃν... εἶη (b35).

Important too is Stock's suggestion that a full stop be placed after ταῦτα (b37). We thus supply 'is praiseworthy' as the verb, rather than (with the punctuation Susemihl prints) treating 'is gentle' as the main verb. Stock's proposal means that we take οὗτος πρῶτος as a self-standing sentence. Compare the similar sentence in 92a34: οὗτος δ' ἔστιν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος.

1192a3 Sylburg's conjecture in this line was motivated by the τε in a1. But Denniston (p.536) and Bonitz (750a2-17) discuss the combination τε γάρ, and the passages cited from Aristotle show that a subsequent τε or καί is not needed. A very close parallel from within M.M. is 92b31-4 ὃ τε γὰρ αὐθάδης... ὁ δὲ ἄρεσκος..., where Spengel, [1866] 628, wrongly suggests that we read τε for δέ. (In 93a12-13, however, there is a second τέ.)

A second question in this line is the spelling of ἀνελεύθερος. In 86b14 the adjective appears twice. The first time all the mss. give the form in -ιος, and the second time all mss. except K again give the form in -ιος. In 92a3, however, all the manuscripts except K originally have the form in -ος. So 86b14 points to -ιος and 92a3 to -ος. But our author will have used the same form in both places, we can presume.

Aristotle and Plato use the form in -ος. Aspasius¹⁰¹ and Themistius (21, 249c1)¹⁰² use the form in -ιος. The form in -ιος is clearly a later form, originating by assimilation with ἐλευθέριος. Dirlmeier (pp.219, 291) wants to read -ιος in both places, contra Susemihl, aptly citing the fact that M.M. coins ἀνελευθεριότης rather than using the normal ἀνελευθερία. We should 'die Rarität im Texte... stehen lassen' (p.219).

1192a7 α, half of our evidence, omits τίς οὖν ἐστίν; ὁ. Stylistically, M.M.'s penchant for questions could explain the presence of a question here, whilst 91b10-11 would be a close enough parallel to the text here, if the four words are not read. Nor do we get help from

¹⁰¹ See Dirlmeier (p.219) for the references.

¹⁰² Though the manuscripts are not unanimous there.

what is likely palaeographically. It is no more likely that τίς οὖν ἐστίν; ὁ should have dropped out than that it should have intruded. One can see why a scribe should have inserted the words - objecting to the participle tacked on to the end of the sentence - but one could also see that if τίς οὖν ἐστίν was not read as a complete question, there would be reason to excise these words and the next word. The answer, I think, lies in the fact that M.M. has already answered the question 'Who is the generous man?' in a3-4, and the rhetorical question, while it would be in keeping with the tone of M.M. if it introduced a new development (cf. 91a18, 96b11, 06b35), is here quite out of place. Omit τίς οὖν ἐστίν; ὁ.

1192a19 Dirlmeier rightly wants to retain οὐδέ. See Denniston p.193, who shows that οὐτε... οὐδέ is possible.

1192a20 It might be possible to defend ἡ δὲ χρηματιστική, the reading of the mss., if we were mentally to supply something like χρήματα παρασκευάζεται. But ἀλλ' ἤδη (in the sense we find here) is so frequent in M.M. (cf. 88b19, 90a4, 91b12, 96a38, 07a23), that it is certain here. ἡ δὲ will have arisen after the genitive had become a nominative.

1192a23 Testimony for the first τῶν only appears in the fourteenth century, and it should be excised. If M.M. wants simply to contrast the different sources of honour - one can be honoured by the masses or by the morally elite - then we need a definite article.¹⁰³ But the thought may be different: if we follow the manuscripts and omit τῶν before πολλῶν, the contrast would be between quantity and quality. The province of the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία is honours that are bestowed from people who judge correctly (a25) and so honour him when it is appropriate (a26). Whilst it is no doubt true that οἱ πολλοὶ are not, as a class, the sort to discriminate well who deserves honour and who does not, M.M. can be understood, without the τῶν, to make a much more general point. Even if a poll were held and he was voted most deserving of honour, winning the poll would not be the important thing, but that all σπουδαῖοι voted for him.

¹⁰³ See Kühner-Gerth II, i, 635-7. M.M. uses the definite article before πολλοί at 85a6, 90b19, 99b18, 06b31, 09b18, 11b23, but not at 12a2.

E.N. 1124a5-11 contrasts honour bestowed ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων with honour παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων. E.E. is closer to the text of M.M. without τῶν when the magnanimous man is described as paying attention to the views of one σπουδαῖος man rather than (μᾶλλον... ἢ) to the views of many ordinary men (τί δοκεῖ... πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν) (E.E. 1232b5-6, cf. b18). What makes honour μεγάλη is not a function of the number of people praising (1232b19-20).

1192a23-4 Susemihl's text has M.M. saying: not p, but q. μᾶλλον q. 'μᾶλλον q' could mean 'it is more true that q (than that p)'; it could also mean 'q to a greater extent (than p)'. Either interpretation of 'μᾶλλον q' conflicts with the assertion 'not p'.¹⁰⁴ Faced with a contradiction, Rieckher emends in a23, inserting μόνον after οὔ, and Susemihl (followed by Armstrong and Barnes) conjectures ἢ for καὶ and γε for δὲ in a24: ἢ would correct what has preceded. 'Not p, but q, or, better, q more than p'.

Dirlmeier (p.294) defends the text of Susemihl partly on the grounds that Aristotle 'so "widersprüchlich" ausdrückt' in E.E. 1232b4-7. But E.E. 1232b16-25 explicitly dissolves a contradiction which people might spot. Paraphrased, the possible objection (1232b14-15) that Aristotle imagines raised against his analysis of magnanimity is: how can the magnanimous man a) be concerned with honour and b) not be concerned with honour from everyone? That Aristotle's preceding account is not open to the charge of being self-contradictory is made clear by the restriction in 1232b5 that the magnanimous man is concerned with few things, viz. μεγάλα things. He does not regard the views of the many at all since honours from them are not τιμίαι and hence not μεγάλα (1232b19-21).

M.M.'s contradictory assertion is far more serious than the slightly paradoxical presentation in E.E.. In 92a23-4 the magnanimous man both is and is not concerned with honours παρὰ πολλῶν. I am thus reluctant to accept Dirlmeier's defence.

But nor do we need recourse to conjecture. C L K have δεῖ where Susemihl has δῆ. If we read this, there is no infelicity in M.M.'s presentation: '[magnanimity] is to do with honour and dishonour - not with honour from many people but with honour from good men.

¹⁰⁴ It could also mean 'Rather, q', but that would be tautologous.

And it ought rather to be with the latter because (γάρ)...’ (a22-4). The corrector of P, who adds ὀρθῶς after δὴ was thinking along similar lines.

Parallels for μᾶλλον δεῖ are to be found in E.E. 1215a24-5 (δεῖ μὲν..., μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖ...), E.E. 1234a22-3 (ὁ δ’ ὅρος οὗτος βέλτιον ἢ... μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ...), M.A. 698a12-14 (ὡςπερ... ἐν αὐτῷ... δεῖ..., οὕτως ἔτι μᾶλλον ἔξω δεῖ...), Pol. 1266b29, 1333a42-b3.

1192a31-2 α offers a different construction (ἀξιοῦσι, προσηκόντων αὐτοῖς μειζόνων, μικρόψυχοι), which makes perfect sense. The genitives could either be a genitive absolute (‘when greater things are appropriate’) or genitive of comparison (‘than the greater things that are appropriate’). Spengel, [1866] 628, is right to see the reading of α as an explanation of the slightly difficult ἢ προσήκον αὐτοῖς. See next note and my note on 1192b10.

1192a33-4 Both occurrences of ἢ in a33 are grammatical. There is equally good manuscript support for ἢς, though, as there is for ἢ before προσήκει. The first ἢ in 92a33 is supported by the reading of ζ in 92a31 - ἢ προσήκον αὐτοῖς - both if we read those words in 92a31 and if we do not. If the author wrote ἢ προσήκον αὐτοῖς in 92a31 then we have a genuine parallel, but if the words are conjectural, then they could well have been conjectured with reference to what was read in 92a33. Retain ἢ προσήκει.

1192a34 μήτε πάσης seems strange. Perhaps the author means not ‘of all honour’, which is already included in the phrase μήτε μείζονος ἢ ἄξιος ἐστίν, but ‘of every type of honour’?

1192a38-b1 Dirlmeier (p.297) thinks that the text needs to be changed. τῷ πρέποντι cannot, he thinks, be taken adverbially, nor can it mean ‘on fitting objects’ (what the expenditure is on), nor can it mean ‘man of eminence’ because of γίνεσθαι. Dirlmeier suggests that we add ἐν after ὅς and that we mentally supply καιρῷ after πρέποντι. But it would be odd for M.M. to omit καιρῷ here and feel it necessary to write it in 92b5, b10.

Can we make sense of the transmitted text, which is what Susemihl prints? The dative τῷ πρέποντι could be taken with γίνεσθαι (Kühner-Gerth II, i, p.416), meaning ‘have’, but

does one 'have' expenditures? Or it could be taken with προσήκει (as in 92a1-2, 07a11, 12a37). But 'it is appropriate to be to the fitting man' seems as senseless.

The scholion on Plato, Republic 468a8 (cited by Dirlmeier p.106) offers an alternative - to read ὡς τῷ <μεγάλῳ καὶ τῷ> πρέποντι γίνεσθαι προσήκει. The omission of μεγάλῳ καὶ τῷ could have been an omission saut du même au même, but I cannot see that it helps with the sense. Perhaps the scholiast had an eye on b9-11, where the author discusses the etymology of μεγαλοπρέπεια, to interpret 92b1.

I suggest that we retain the transmitted text and explain the cumbersome expression by noting a) that the impersonal προσήκει requires an infinitive; whereas we can say in English 'which are appropriate', Greek has to say 'which it is appropriate for there to be', b) that M.M. may be straining the language and already be thinking of the etymology of μεγαλοπρέπεια. I think that τῷ πρέποντι (without ἐν) could mean 'at the right occasion'. Dative (without ἐν) expressing 'time when', even in cases where the precise time is not given, can be paralleled (Kühner-Gerth II, i, p.446n.6).

1192b1 δαπανῶ. Misprint.

1192b5-7 The δέ in b5 answers the μέν in b1 (cf. 92b2-3, 93a29-31). Place a full stop after τούτῳ (b5). The construction of the next sentence, ὅς (b5) — μικροπρεπής (b8), is like that 98b27-30, 08a2-4.

Susemihl (p.100) prefers the conjectures of Valla,¹⁰⁵ Casaubon and Spengel (transposing μὴ after μεγαλείως in b5-6, reading μέν for μή in b6, and adding δ' after ἀξίως in b7) over Bonitz' addition of ἡδέως in b6. Rassow, [1858] 15, supports Casaubon's conjectures in b6 and b7 by appealing to Valla's translation, but it is not the 1496 translation of Valla, but the revised 1590 translation that Rassow is quoting.¹⁰⁶

It seems clear that the omission of μή in b5 by L and K arose intentionally once οὐδ' had become οὐ,¹⁰⁷ because a) the future tense in b6 would need to be changed to an aorist

¹⁰⁵ Susemihl is wrong about Valla in b6 (see p.91, above).

¹⁰⁶ See above, p.94.

¹⁰⁷ μή was probably added above μεγαλείως and A mistook μή to be a correction for μεγαλείως rather than to be read alongside it.

infinitive (as Armstrong suggests) if we were to follow L and K, b) οὐ μὴ δεῖ in b1-2 is nicely picked up by οὐ δεῖ in b5, and c) the phrase printed by Susemihl has good ms. support and makes sense. The first part of the sentence in b5-7 in Susemihl's text reads 'Whoever, when he ought to, does not spend lavishly...'. Keep this.

The next phrase - ἢ τοῦτο μὴ ποιῶν - is a problem. It means 'or not doing this', but does 'doing this' mean (a) not spending lavishly, (b) spending lavishly or (c) spending? If (b), there would be a repetition of the thought - i.e. no alternative would be given after ἢ, which would be absurd. Before looking at whether (a) or (c) is intelligible, we should note how difficult it is to see how μὴ ἀξίως ἀλλ' ἐνδεῶς (b7) are to be taken with τοῦτο μὴ ποιῶν (b6), which is what Susemihl's punctuation suggests we should do. The adverbial phrase μὴ ἀξίως ἀλλ' ἐνδεῶς looks as though it belongs with δαπανῶν (b7): 'for example, spending not appropriately but too little on a wedding feast or drama festival'.

Let us return to ἢ τοῦτο μὴ ποιῶν. Does (a) (above) work? If it means 'or not not spending lavishly', then that means 'or spending lavishly'. For this to work, there would have to be a contrast between 'not lavishly' and, in the context of a wedding or putting on a play, 'not appropriately but deficiently'. Casaubon and Spengel¹⁰⁸ bring out the contrast with a μὲν... δέ, but surely this kind of occasion is one where the appropriate amount to spend is large. Lavish expenditure is appropriate expenditure, in these two cases. So (a) also seems impossible.

(c) is what we need. '...who does not spend lavishly when necessary or does not spend at all'. The illustration in the οἶον clause is an example of the first alternative - someone who does not spend a lot when he should.

1192b10 Bonitz (Index 168a48-54) cites possible cases of Aristotle using δέον for δέον ἐστί or for δεῖ. If those were legitimate, then δέον εἶναι, which Bekker prints in this line, could be defended, he says. But Bonitz has reservations about two passages where Aristotle had been alleged by Rasso to use this construction (E.N. 1107a32, 1145b28). There is, though, a good parallel in 92a31, if the text there is correct, where M.M. uses προσῆκον for

¹⁰⁸ Armstrong applies more drastic surgery, but along the same lines.

προσῆκον ἐστὶ or for προσήκει. I prefer δέον εἶναι here on the grounds that it is more difficult than δεῖ εἶναι. Bonitz' motivation to emend is almost the same as mine to be conservative - the text with δέον εἶναι gives us a text with 'eine viel compliciertere Ausdrucksweise... als er [der Verfasser] sonst zeigt.' The expression is not so much complicated as unusual.

1192b28 τοιοῦτος is the reading supported by the stemma, and is unobjectionable. 'Of this sort' means 'such as to be pained regardless of merit', cf. ἀπλῶς... ὁμοίως (b25-6) or, perhaps, 'an extreme such as these'. Parallels at 89b36 ἡ δὲ διανοία οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ..., 03b26 ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ'...

1192b28 K has μέσος. Normally M.M. describes virtues, rather than virtuous people, as μεσότητες. But at 93a6-7 οἰδῶς and ὁ οἰδήμων is a μεσότης. Read μεσότης with all mss. except K.

1192b30 The omission of τε in β gives an easier text. M.M. usually says 'X is a mean of Y and Z', not 'X is a mean of both Y and Z' (cf. 91a36-7, 91b24-5, 91b39, 92a21, 92a35-6, 92a37, 92b18, 93a1, 93a11, 93a20, 93a28-9). But passages like Topics 158b7 ἀνὰ μέσον αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, Theophrastus H.P. VI.4.6.13 ἀνὰ μέσον... τῆς ἐκφύσεως τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ σπέρματος τελειώσεως, H.P. VII.13.8.8 ἀνὰ μέσον... τοῦ τε ἐδωδίου τοῦ ἐντὸς καὶ τοῦ ἔξω (cf. Theophrastus de Causis III.6.1.5; Plato Phaedo 58c) are sufficient support for the transmitted τέ.

1192b32 Aorist infinitive of διαλλάττομαι (to be reconciled) or of διαλέγομαι (to converse)? Theophrastus, Char. 15,3, says that the αὐθάδης man, when addressed, μὴ ἀντιπροσειπεῖν. This parallel, together with the fact that διαλλάττομαι does not quite have the right sense, compels us to accept διαλεγῆναι. Perhaps the non-standard version of the infinitive (parallels at Topics 154a34, 159a5, Alexander of Aphrodisias In Arist. Top. 546,17,

547,21 (M. Wallies)) - usually we read διαλεχθῆναι - led to the reading found in α, as it led to the normalisation by a corrector in A.

1192b34 δὲ is correct. See my note on 1192a3.

1193a5 Restore πρὸς on stemmatic grounds.

1193a7 Omit τις, on stemmatic grounds. There are parallels for the indefinite article (86b33, 91b4, 92b12, 92b28, 93b25¹⁰⁹), but there are fourteen instances of μεσότης + gen. without τις.

1193a9 Perhaps K stopped himself writing the normal future form εὐλαβήσεται found in Plato Rep. 410a and Aristotle E.N. 1127b6. L.S.J. record the form εὐλαβηθήσομαι only in late authors Origen (3rd C A.D.), Diogenes Laertius (3rd C A.D.), Galen (2nd C A.D.). However, the passage in which Diogenes Laertius uses the word is thought by von Arnim (SVF 431,4) to be a quotation of Chrysippus (3rd C B.C.). We should retain the unusual form and add this to the long list of linguistic peculiarities of M.M.

1193a12 δὲ is confirmed by the scholion on Plato's Rep. 563a8, cited by Dirlmeier, p.106. It is also paralleled by 92a1, 92a22, 92a38, 92b31, 93a2, 93a20.

1193a12 τῶ, which only appears in B and its descendants, should not even be in square brackets, but demoted to the apparatus.

1193a14 Susemihl was right to see βουλόμενος δεῖν as 'haud sana', and both Rasso's suggestion that we read οἰόμενος δεῖν and Bekker's that we excise δεῖν would provide the required sense. We have good testimony that Bekker's conjecture is right. The last part of the scholion on Plato's Rep. 563a8 (cited more fully in Dirlmeier, p.106) reads: βωμολοχία

¹⁰⁹ Spengel wants to excise this one. See my note ad loc.

δὲ ἢ πάντα καὶ πάντας οἰόμενη δεῖν σκώπτειν· ἀγροικία δὲ ἢ μήτε σκώπτειν μήτε σκωφθῆναι βουλόμενη, ὀργιζομένη δὲ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν. The scholion is admittedly not a quotation but a paraphrase, but it is close enough to be used. Excise δεῖν.

1193a16 Dirlmeier (p.308) wants to retain the mss.' αὐτὸς against Spengel's conjecture, αὐδ. Spengel, [1866] 629, probably had his eye on 93a26, but there is nothing wrong with αὐτός (cf. E.N. 1128a7-8), and the same degree of emphasis that we would have with Spengel's αὐδ is present in the text with αὐτός.

1193a16 Ammonius, a grammarian of the first - second centuries A.D., says (Diff. 5) that there was a difference in meaning between ἄγροικος and ἀγροῖκος, the first meaning 'boorish', the second 'dwelling in the country'. L.S.J. (s.v) are very sceptical.

1193a19 Stock and Armstrong take the last four words to round off the topic of wit:¹¹⁰ 'Such, then, is wit', 'Such is the nature of urbanity'. But it seems more likely that the author is claiming that just as it is true that ὁ εὐτρόπελος is διττῶς πως λεγόμενος (a17), so is εὐτροπελία. So Dirlmeier, rightly: 'Auch die gesellschaftliche Gewandtheit ist von solcher Art'. Leave the punctuation as Susemihl has it in the text. Dirlmeier (p.307) criticises Susemihl's suggestion that we repunctuate.

1193a22 ὄντων is not as well testified as προσόντων. As Dirlmeier (p.309) notes, there is a parallelism in expression between chapter XXXI on φιλία and chapter XXXII on ἀλήθεια. There we find πλείω τῶν ὑπάρχοντων in 93a30, 93a34, just as we also find in 93a25 (see also 86a25). In Rhet ad Al. 1422a4-5 ὑπάρχειν and προσεῖναι are used synonymously. Could M.M. have written what is to an English ear inelegant: ὁ πλείω τῶν προσηκόντων καὶ προσόντων προστιθείς;? The sense is right: 'the man who adds more than is appropriate, i.e. more than there is'. The flatterer inappropriately credits qualities to his acquaintance, and the inappropriateness lies just in the fact that the acquaintance does not have those qualities. (In

¹¹⁰ Cf. 93a28, where the particles μὲν οὖν... δὲ show that one topic is being ended and a new one begun. See p.165, for a discussion of punctuation in this kind of case.

a24-6 the thought is slightly different.) The repetition of sounds προσ- thrice, -όντων twice may jar for us, but M.M. is fond of it. The jingling of different forms of πῶς in 93a9-10, a13, a16, the repetition of τε in 93a12-16 (six occurrences), the repetition of δεῖ in 93a10, the repetition of σκώπτειν in 93a13-18 (six occurrences) are testimony on this page to the lack of concern for variation in sound. Read προσόντων.

1193a29 Given the way that M.M. has spoken so far - very formulaically and with stylistic variation not a high priority (see my note on 1193a22) - we expect δέ, not δή. Repeatedly M.M. has introduced a virtue by saying: ‘X is a mean of Y and Z. ἔστι δὲ περὶ...’ (91b39-92a1, 92a21-2, 92a37-8, 92b18-20, 92b31, 93a2, 93a11-12, 93a20-1). We now know that δέ is in C (13th C). Susemihl only knew of δέ in a sixteenth century printed edition. I would print δέ against the stemma.¹¹²

1193b1-2 εἰ + optative is right. There is a close parallel at 08b36: εἰ δὴ τις... ἐπισκέψαιτο τί ἐστι τὸ φιλητόν, ἔστιν οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰγοθόν. There is some compression of thought both here and in 08b36. That ‘justice’ is δικτὸν is not dependent on the truth of the protasis in 93b1-2, nor does the claim that τὸ φιλητόν is τὰγοθόν in 08b36 depend on whether someone investigates τὸ φιλητόν. The full thought in both cases is: ‘If we were to investigate X, we would find the following: X is...’ (Cf. Plato Meno 75d2-4 for εἰ + optative + apodotic δή. For apodotic δή see Bonitz 172b42-9.) Retain εἰ λόβοιμεν... δή against Spengel.

When εἰ + optative occurs in M.M., and there is an apodosis,¹¹³ the apodosis has ἄν + optative at 87a8-10, 96b8-9, 99b24-5, 07b36-7, 08b31 and has the indicative at 85a11 (present), 03a8 (fut.), 07b1-3 (present), 09a31 (present).

¹¹² See pp.168-9.

¹¹³ Sometimes there is no verb in the apodosis e.g. at 83b1-2, 02a26-7 and sometimes there is no apodosis e.g. 96a17, 96b5-6, 96b9, 03b16. Cf. also 13a10.

1193b9 The position of δικαίους was thought strange by an ancestor of B (V?). Probably the author placed it where it is to make it clear that the adverb goes with σπουδαίως ἔσται rather than with ἐμμενῶν.

Let us turn to τελείως and the well attested alternative in this line, τέλειος. First, it is important to note that the adverb is usually written as τελέως in Aristotle.¹¹⁴ In M.M. 02b9, 07b22, b24 we read -έως in all mss., at 98a2 there is manuscript divergence, but -έως is more likely. M.M. always uses the adjectival form in -ειος, rather than in -εος. Cat. uses both forms of the adverb in quick succession in 13a26-9 in Waitz' edition (Leipzig, 1844), but Minio-Paluello (Oxford, 1949) writes -είως in both places, without any note in the apparatus.

The v.l. τελείος is thus more in keeping with our author, since the adverb would be written as -έως. But (i) the adjective would be exceptionally hard to construe; (ii) it would make the position of δικαίους harder to account for (see above); (iii) the expression τελέως σπουδαίως occurs again in 07b22, b23.

So read τελέως. The form in -είως arose by assimilation to the adjectival ending in b6, b10.

1193b9 Spengel wants to read τὸ δίκαιον, given b11-12, b18, b24, b35 (see also his suggestion for b33), but Dirlmeier (p.314) aptly points to passages where the author links a virtue with a virtuous man with the conjunction καί: 91a36, 92b24, 98b26. (He could also have pointed to: 86a37-8, 93a6-7, 94b29, 97b15, 97b19, 98b34, 01a35-6, 02b34.) But we need a more precise parallel, where what is said of the two is only appropriate to the latter. In 98b26 M.M. says 'Equity and the equitable man is he who...'; in 02b34 he says 'softness and the soft person is he who...'. These parallels allow him to say here 'the just man and justice is a sort of complete virtue', although, of course, he does not think that the just man is a virtue. The particle ὥστε in b9 shows us that an inference is being made from what has preceded. Given the

¹¹⁴ A search of the Aristotelian corpus in T.L.G. shows that there are 29 instances of τελέως and 10 of τελείως. The proportion is the same for Theophrastus: τελέως 22 times, τελείως 8 times.

appearance of ὁ τοῖς κατὰ νόμον ἐμμένων δικαίοις in the previous line, it is natural that the conclusion includes a mention of him.

1193b14-15 Delete Susemihl's brackets. This sentence is not parenthetical, but integral. See next note.

1193b14 The second and third ὁ should be deleted on the authority of ζ. M.M. is not talking about three different men (cf. 93b7-9, 95b37-96a4, 07b22-08a4), but about ὁ τελέως σπουδαῖος, the man who has the virtues: the temperate, brave and continent man. This explains why the phrase (ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος, b15) is in the singular. Stock, who reads ὁ three times in this line takes ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος to mean 'is each of them so'. I.e. the temperate man is temperate, when alone, the brave man, brave when alone etc. If we delete the second and third ὁ, then ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος means 'is temperate, brave and encratic', which, in turn, means 'is legally just'.¹¹⁵ One can obey the law that one should not hit people (cf. E.N. 1129b2), and so be legally just, by sitting at home. But this is not sufficient to be just in the other sense, because in that sense justice necessarily involves someone else.

In my note on 1200a37-8 I argue that M.M. did see ἐγκρατεία as a virtue of an unusual sort. The possibility of the same man being both σώφρων and ἐγκρατής is not as silly as it sounds - see the difficult passage 1203b12-23. Its sounding silly was what led to the insertion of the definite articles, and to them appearing there in Bekker's and Susemihl's texts.

1193b16 α has τὸν before νόμον. Since there is no definite article in b2-3, b8, not here either.

¹¹⁵ Cooper, [1973] 342-3, defends the claim that universal justice is non-relational, saying: 'the temperate man, who will of course also be just in the broad sense, need stand in no particular relation to others in doing (at least some of) his temperate actions (1193b12-17)'. This is not evidence that universal justice is non-relational, but that it need not be relational. Cooper is, however, right to see 93b14-15 as relevant to the legally just man. M.M. is not (pace Stewart, [1892] Vol. I, 393) discussing the temperate man 'quâ temperate man', but the virtuous man qua 'legally just' man.

1193b22 Since the subject of νέμωσιν (b21) is not the same as the subject of οἴονται (b23) - the distributors would not characterise themselves as unjust - we should punctuate with a full stop after ἐστὶ (b22).

1193b22 οὕτως ἀδικοῦν was the reading of ζ, οὐ δίκαιον of α. Both readings could be defended. If we read οὐ δίκαιον, then the subject of οἴονται would be the people who have received an unfair allocation of goods: 'they think that it is not just and that they have been treated unjustly'.¹¹⁶ If we read οὕτως ἀδικοῦν, then the subject of οἴονται would be, more broadly, people: 'people think that it is in these cases (οὕτως) that doing injustice and being unjustly treated takes place'.¹¹⁷ This latter reading is preferable on the grounds that M.M. would do better to appeal to people generally to support a view which he himself endorses than to a group of wronged people who are unlikely to be objective in their moral assessment.

1193b23 Spengel's suggestion that we read οἶόν τε is palaeographically neat. In 83a32 and 08b27 B and V mistakenly write οἶόν τε where οἴονται is correct. Stewart, Vol. II, p.418 cites E.N. 1099b22, 1112b26, 1114b9 for the corruption of οἶόν τε to οἴονται and 1122b22, 1174a3 for the reverse corruption. Moraux¹¹⁸ notes that the scribe of the famous Paris gr. 1853 confuses the two.

Against Spengel's suggestion, it should be noted a) that M.M. does not use οἶόν τε elsewhere; b) that the sense of οἶόν τε is not as appropriate as the sense of οἴονται: M.M. is trying to capture the link between τὸ ἴσον and τὸ δίκαιον, and if he only says that it is possible (οἶόν τε) for injustice to occur in these situations, the link is too weak. It remains possible that injustice occurs in other types of situation and that in the given situation there is no injustice.

¹¹⁶ In E.N. 1131a24-5 Aristotle says that fights and accusations come about in cases where equals receive unequal amounts or unequals receive equal amounts.

¹¹⁷ There is a similar appeal to pre-philosophical intuition at E.N. 1131a13-14.

¹¹⁸ Moraux, [1965] CLXXIII.

1193b25 Rasso, [1858] 16, argues and Susemihl accepts that we should be moved by Stobaeus' testimony for ὑπεροχῆς, when the mss. are equally split. ὑπεροχή is also about four times less frequent in M.M. than ὑπερβολή, and so should be preferred as being the harder reading.

It is not so clear that we should also follow Stobaeus in omitting τις. Arius Didymus is giving a dry list of means which all have the following form: X is a mean of Y and Z. He has just listed nine virtues in this way, and to write τις in the tenth would ruin the pattern. 92b12 is a good parallel for the τις in this line. All means are between excess and deficiency; justice is one such case. Cf. also E.N. 1126a28-9.

1193b29 The position of ὄν here is to be defended on the grounds that it is the harder position. A scribe could easily move it nearer εἴη, but the reverse process is less likely. In fact, it is not as far from εἴη as it appears since πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος is a unit.

1193b33-6 Let us first of all look at the text which the tradition suggests. Getting rid of the two changes that Rieckher suggests in b34, and omitting ἔν at the end of the line, on stemmatic grounds, we have (b33-6):

Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐν δικαίῳ καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ ἐν μεσότητι,
τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἔν τισι λέγεται δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἴσον [ἔν]
τισιν ἴσον, τὸ δὲ μέσον τισὶ μέσον· ὥστε ἡ δικαιοσύνη
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἔσται καὶ πρὸς τινος καὶ ἐν τισίν.

This is the text that Dirlmeier (pp.316-17) defends. He rightly notes that whereas E.N. 1131a10-24 carefully distinguishes 'just for people' from 'just for things' by using the dative on its own for the first and ἐν + dative for the second, M.M. is not so punctilious. The result, if it is to be excluded that M.M. leaves it ambiguous whether τισί is neuter or masculine in each of its four occurrences in these lines, is that they

each refer to both men and things.¹¹⁹ But if we are not helped by E.N., we can still be helped by looking at what M.M. has said in b19-32.

We need to look in detail at what the author says. Lines b33-6 begin by telling us three things that ἡ δικαιοσύνη is 'in'. It is in δικαίῳ, in ἴσῳ and in μεσότητι (b33). Then (b34-5) each of these three terms are described as relational. Finally b35-6 draw a conclusion from what has preceded about justice. That conclusion is unproblematic in so far as it concludes that justice is ἐν τίσιν, but it is not immediately obvious how the conclusion that it is πρὸς τινὰς is reached.

Let us go back to b33 and see how the author can think that justice is ἐν the three things. That justice is ἐν μεσότητι is confirmed by 91b27-9, where it is explained how all virtues are ἐν μεσότητι, and by 93b25. That justice can be said to be ἐν ἴσῳ is confirmed by 93b23-4. But to say that justice is ἐν δικαίῳ seems odd. And the oddity provoked Spengel to emend ἐν δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, and then to excise δίκαιον ἔν τισι λέγεται δίκαιον, τὸ δέ (b34).

But let us stop here and look at the parallel passage at E.N. 1131a16-18. The text there is, unfortunately, not certain in several respects. But there is one claim that E.N. makes in 1131a18 which suggests that to follow Spengel's drastic changes in these lines would be a mistake. Aristotle says that justice, ἡ δίκαιον, τίσιν. In the same sentence Aristotle has drawn conclusions about justice qua ἴσον and qua μέσον. The same thing happens in M.M., though in a different order. Although ἐν δικαίῳ sounds strange, I think that M.M. has been led to write rhetorically, with a triple repetition of ἐν.

From three points of view justice is relational (b34-5). Can we determine from what M.M. has said in b19-32 what gender each of the three occurrences τισι in b34-5 are? If the conclusion in b34-5 is to be reached, we need to find at least one masculine τισι.

¹¹⁹ Dirlmeier translates the last τίσιν as though it were neuter, but raises the possibility in his note (p.316) that it is masculine.

From b19 we know that the relevant kind of justice is πρὸς ἕτερον, and from b23-4 we know that justice is ἐν ἴσοις. There are thus two ways in which τὸ δίκαιον is relational, one relative to other people (masculine) the other relative to fair dealings (neuter). From b30-1 we know that τὸ ἴσον is ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσίῳ, which is then called πρὸς ἕτερον. Here we find good reason to take τισιν in b35 as masculine. From b25-6 we know that justice is a mean between excess and deficiency, between much and a little. In b35, then, there is good reason to take τισι to be neuter.

The same keenness to present his philosophy rhetorically (at the expense of clarity) explains the dative τισί in b35, where we should expect a genitive (which is what Spengel¹²⁰ suggests we read).¹²¹

Now that we have some idea of the genders of the different uses of τισι, we can look at the uses of ἐν in b34. Given that ἐν¹ is transmitted in b34, and we can make sense of it, we should retain it. When M.M. says that τὸ δίκαιον is τισι, it is easiest to see him talking about justice existing in fair dealings (neuter). ἐν² is not well attested. Again we can make sense of M.M. saying that τὸ ἴσον is τισι ἴσον, once we realise, as I have argued, that this τισι is masculine. Here τισι stands for πρὸς ἕτερον.

It is natural to see the conclusion in this paragraph beginning at ὥστε (b35),¹²² because the truth of τὸ μὲν δίκαιον — μέσον (b34-5) does not depend on the protasis. In order to make these words fit in as premises we need Rieckher's καὶ at the start of b34.¹²³

In b34, I would read:

¹²⁰ Armstrong compares E.N. 1131a17 and supports this conjecture.

¹²¹ Cf. Dirlmeier's defence of τὰ in 93b39 (p.318). 'Daß kein attischer Redner hier den artikel setzen würde, ist klar'.

¹²² When M.M. uses ἐπεὶ, the conclusion is usually expressed with the idea of necessity. We find the -έον ending at 88a36, 90b10, 95a25; ἄν + optative at 87a5, 91b35, 93b37, 94a26, 98b7, 04a29, 05b24, 07b18; a particle meaning therefore (οὖν) at 13a16, (ἄρα) at 86a35, (ὥστε) at 05b7, 11a35-6, (δὴ) at 06b7; ἀναγκάτιον at 87b31, 89a23; δῆλον ὅτι + ἄν + opt.; logical future at 94b28.

¹²³ Of the passages mentioned in the previous note, 05b2-7 is the best parallel for an argument with several premises, concluding with ὥστε. I do not understand Dirlmeier's reason (p.317) for rejecting Rieckher's καὶ.

<καί> τὸ μὲν δίκαιόν ἐν τισι λέγεται δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἴσον [ἐν]¹²⁴

but otherwise leave the text as Susemihl prints it.

The conclusion in b35-6 is in fact over-determined. That justice is πρὸς τινος is given by its being τισιν ἴσον, but that it is ἐν τισίν is given both by its being τισι δίκαιον and by its being τισι μέσον.

1193b37 τὸ τῷ is an excellent conjecture in P. The reading in α, τούτῳ, was the first stage in corruption and ζ tried to make sense of this by adding τὸ before τούτῳ. H.A. 487a5 has τὰ τούτοις ἀνάλογον. But τούτῳ here is impossible: it could only refer back to ἴσον, and ‘the equal proportional to equal is just’ is plain nonsense.

1193b39 L and V have καί after B. E.N. uses ὡς... οὕτως in 1131b1, 1131b5-6, and this is the construction M.M. uses at 94a3-4, 93a5-6, 94a13, but E.N. has neither οὕτως nor καί in 1131b6-7, and this is the construction used in 93b39.

1193b39-94a1 Dirlmeier (p.318) satisfactorily defends τὰ (b39), which Spengel wants to excise. The same defence applies to the τὰ in 94a1. Cf. 94a4-6.

1194a5 M.M. gives two examples of τὸ τῷ ἀνάλογον ἴσον of the form ὡς τὸ A πρὸς τὸ B, τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Δ (93b38). In the first illustration (93b39-94a2):

A = the person with a lot of possessions

B = big taxes

Γ = the person with few possessions

Δ = small taxes

The second illustration is more difficult. To begin with it is easy (94a2-3):

A = the person who has worked hard

B = big earnings

¹²⁴ In fact, ἐν should be demoted to the apparatus.

Γ = the person who has worked a little

Δ = small earnings

Then (94a3-4) M.M. makes the legitimate move from A:B as Γ : Δ to A: Γ as B: Δ . Note that M.M. switches to using \acute{o} πεπονηκῶς (not \acute{o} πολλὰ πεπονηκῶς, 94a2), and \acute{o} μὴ πεπονηκῶς (not \acute{o} ὀλίγα πεπονηκῶς, 94a3). Further, M.M. ceases to mention earning (λαμβάνειν) in 94a5-6. B and Δ are no longer quantities of pay, but, simply quantities. If this is a correct account of 94a3-4, then 94a5-6 must be understood to be a restatement of A:B as Γ : Δ (94a2-3), except that the new terminology of 94a3-4 (no ‘earnings’, no ‘degree of hard work’) is used.

Another possibility would be that 94a3-6 are a different case altogether from 94a2-3. One might think that M.M. moves from A being the man who works a lot, to him being the man who works, and from B being the man who works a little to him being the man who does not work at all. But the reason to reject this view is that it is not clear how the man who has not worked at all should stand in any relation to ὀλίγα. He will surely not earn anything.

Given, then, that \acute{o} μὴ πεπονηκῶς (94a4) must mean ‘the person who has not worked much’, rather than ‘the person who has not worked at all’, and that 94a5-6 is a re-ordering of 94a3-4, we need to read μὴ in 94a5, rather than μηδέν.

1194a7 Capital letter for Πολιτεία. In a16 M.M. is not talking of the Republic, but of ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία (a25). See my note on 1194a16.

1194a13-14 Once proportion is attained, and it is realised that the housebuilder’s product is worth one thousand times more, say, than the farmer’s product, the two men can be ‘made equal’ (ἰσασθῆναι, E.N. 1133a18), and dealing can take place.¹²⁵ It is true that, if this is right, M.M. leaves quite a lot unsaid, but we can make sense

¹²⁵ See Stewart, [1892] vol. I, 462.

of the transmitted text, and so the multiple suggestions to emend can be left in the apparatus.

1194a16 Dirlmeier (p.319) approves of Spengel's alteration. 'This' is better than 'the same'.

1194a16 The plural, τὰς πολιτείας, found in α, would avoid any possible confusion with Plato's Republic (a6) It is also supported by the plural in a17.

1194a16-17 M.M. always places ἔοικεν before its verb, so retain the word order Susemihl prints.

1194a17-18 Armstrong would put a full stop after πολιτείας, and this is what the mss. do. He also suggests that we read δὴ in this line, but the suggestion was made under the misapprehension that δὴ is found as a v.l. in two manuscripts. Armstrong misread Susemihl's apparatus: it is over the other δὲ in this line that there is variance in the mss.

1194a18 ἐπειδὴ (α) cannot be right because, except in the very first sentence of M.M., whenever ἐπειδὴ appears first word, there is another particle.

1194a20 καί, found only in η, should be demoted to the apparatus, although it would make good sense.

1194a21-5 In a22 the stemma marginally suggests πάντα ταῦτα 'all these', and this is the more usual word-order. At 10b25, 10b28 and 11a4 πάντα ταῦτα is given without significant manuscript deviation.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ In 01a37, however, we find ταῦτα πάντα. It is striking that A has a different order from that in L at 94a22, 10b25, 11a4. But there is no pattern: neither A nor L follow one order consistently.

Again, in a22 α omits $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\delta$ and has $\text{καί } \tau\iota$ instead of ἐστίν . (β appears to have a contaminated reading: $\text{ἐστὶ καί } \tau\iota$.) We see traces in L of an attempt to make sense of this: $\text{ἐστὶ καί } \tau\iota\text{νες}$). Before looking at the reading of α in a22, we need to look at a21-5.

To understand this section we need to be clear on the grammar, in particular on the infinitives χρη̄σθαι (a23), ποιε̄σθαι (a24), συνέχειν (a25). Stock translates ἐνόμισαν by ‘they had recourse to...’, and takes the first two infinitives to be governed by this: ‘... using something for which all these things are purchasable, to wit silver... and to effecting their mutual exchanges by each paying the worth of each product...’, but continues ‘...and thereby holding the political union together.’ Similarly, Armstrong translates ἐνόμισαν by ‘the practice became current of’,¹²⁷ and continues: ‘using, as common means of buying, the silver which was therefore termed "currency"; and for every purchaser to effect the exchange by giving the value of his purchase’, but once again the third infinitive is treated differently: ‘...which thus became the bond of social unity’. Both Stock and Armstrong thus avoid translating συνέχειν as dependent on ἐνόμισαν - ‘they had recourse to holding the political union together’. They each translate the infinitive as though it were an imperfect, συνε̄ιχον . The translators did not translate the Greek in front of them presumably because they objected to the sense. The original house-builder and shoe-maker did not hold the political community together, and their motive for inventing currency was not to hold it together.

In order to avoid the unwelcome dependence on ἐνόμισαν , we need first to punctuate with a full stop after ἀλλήλων in a24. There is testimony in A and L for συνέχει , and this is essential. (The infinitive arose just because of the preceding infinitives.) It is also tempting to follow β in one more detail and to read τοῦτο for τούτω (a24). Rather than having an impersonal subject (‘And through this one holds

¹²⁷ This nicely captures the link in Greek between νομίζω and νόμισμα . νομίζω does not mean ‘decide’ here - See L.S.J. (s.v.) I.

the political community together’), we need ‘And this holds the political community together’.

In a24 ἀλλήλων is the reading of α and V, but β has ἀλλήλους and K has ἀλλήλου. We certainly need a plural. There is one instance of παρ’ ἀλλήλους in the corpus - at Prob. 915b38, but there the meaning is ‘next to each other’. The genitive is found in Pol. 1268b41 ‘they bought their brides παρ’ ἀλλήλων’.

Let us return to a22. α reads: ἐνόμισαν [οὔ] πάντα ταῦτα ὠνητά. καί τι ἀργύριον προσαγορεύσαντες νόμισμα, τούτω χρῆσθαι... The only way to take this would involve an awkward change of construction: ‘they thought, "all these things are buy-able" and, calling some silver "currency", they decided to use this...’. Retain the οὔ of ζ, which is easily construed with the following τούτω (a23).

1194a27 Dirlmeier (p.320) defends the dative τῇ ἔξει by saying ‘Den Dativ verstehe ich so wie wenn dastünde ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶν καθ’ ἣν ὁ δίκαιος ὁρμὴν ἔχει (vgl. E.N. 1134a1)’. This cannot be right. It is a vital part of Aristotelian ethical theory that virtuous actions stem from a stable disposition. Non-virtuous people can have virtuous ὁρμαί. What is important is that virtuous people’s ὁρμαί are to virtuous actions in virtue of their ἔξις.

So the dative remains difficult. We could only make sense of it if we read something like: ἡ... δικαιοσύνη ἂν εἴη <ταῦτόν> τῇ ἔξει ὁρμὴν ἐχούση. But I prefer Ellebodius’ and Spengel’s independently conjectured τις ἔξις.

1194a29 E.N. 1132b21 (Δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἀπλῶς δίκαιον) provides support for Susemihl’s reading: ἔστιν δὲ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός.

A and the first hand in K have: ἔστιν δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ἀντιπεπονθός.

α has: ἔστιν δὲ καὶ δίκαιον ἀντιπεπονθός.

We must guard against the possibility that the reading Susemihl prints is not the result of scribal correction of M.M. to accord with E.N. It is unclear what ζ read.

1194a31 Susemihl's conjecture, δέ, could again be supported by reference to the δέ in E.N. 1132b23. Dirlmeier (p.321) wants to retain the mss.' δῆ here on the grounds that all our witnesses have it. But what would the sense of δῆ be? The contrast between the Pythagoreans' position and our author's is best expressed by δέ.

1194a32 The omission of ταῦτόν in Rav. is one of many thinking improvements that we find in that manuscript. Susemihl's text, it has been thought, has to be supplemented: 'justice between slave and freeman is not the same <as...>. Armstrong supplements: '<as that between freemen>'. Stock translates loosely: 'the same thing is not just for a servant as for a freeman'.¹²⁸ Dirlmeier has 'das Recht ist für den Sklaven im Vergleich zum Freien nicht dasselbe'.

None of the published translations are satisfactory. First, the words οἰκέτη πρὸς ἐλεύθερον are paralleled by ἐλευθέρῳ πρὸς ἐλεύθερον (a35-6), οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην (94b5, b11, b18), υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα (b5-6, b10), τῷ ποδὶ τῷ ἐμῷ πρὸς ἐμέ (b12), γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα (b27).¹²⁹ M.M. has stressed that justice is two-place - it is πρὸς ἕτερον. It is thus natural to understand οἰκέτη πρὸς ἐλεύθερον in 94a32 to mean 'between slave and freeman' (here only Armstrong is right). The second mistranslation (of Armstrong and Stock) is that ἐστὶ δίκαιον most naturally means 'is just', rather than 'justice is'. Thirdly, if we supplement the text as Armstrong suggests, we are led to expect to be told how justice between slave and freeman differs from justice between freemen.

The excision of ταῦτόν yields 'it (i.e. the Pythagorean principle that one should suffer in return what one has done (a30-31)) is not just between a servant and a free man.' This makes good sense of the γάρ (a32). Dalimier seems to translate a text without ταῦτόν: 'ce n'est pas juste en effet pour un domestique par rapport à un homme libre'.

¹²⁸ If this were the literal meaning, M.M. would write οὐ γάρ ἐστὶ δίκαιον οἰκέτη καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ ταῦτόν. Cf. 05b8-9.

¹²⁹ See also 11a8-10.

M.M. has outlined the Pythagorean principle and said that it does not apply to all cases (a30-31). Now he says that in the case of the slave/freeman relation it does not work (a31-2), and appeals to our intuitions (a32-4) to show that in such a case the Pythagorean principle falls short. In a34-6 M.M. gives his revised version of the Pythagorean principle, crucially adding the requirement that the reciprocation must be proportional. Then (a36-9) M.M. again turns to applying the unrevised Pythagorean principle to the case of justice between freemen and says that there too (ὁμοίως, b36) it fails. In the remaining lines of the paragraph reasons are given for the requirement that the person who knocks out the eye suffers more in return than simply having his own eye knocked out.

If this account of the structure of the paragraph is right, M.M. ought not in a32 to be explaining how justice in slave/free relations differs from justice in free/free relations. Indeed, in a36, he appeals to their similarity. Rather he ought to be pointing out obvious cases where the Pythagorean principle does not work. In E.N. there is the same procedure: the Pythagoreans' principle of justice is said not to fit either distributive or corrective justice (1132b23-4), and instances of the failure of the principle are given in 1132b28-30. It happens that E.N. picks the case of the master striking the slave - in which case the Pythagorean principle will be too harsh - and the case in which the slave strikes the master - in which case it will not be harsh enough. But what matters, in this ad homines argument, is not that different kinds of justice are involved, but that there are a wealth of counter-examples to the Pythagorean view.

We have seen, then, a motivation for Rav.'s excision of ταύτόν. But I think, in fact, that it should be retained. We need to understand the word in a different way from the way that translators have understood it. It means 'the same thing', in the sense of 'suffering in return whatever one did' (a30-1). In the next lines we are precisely told that the servant who hits his master deserves more than just to have the same thing done to him.

1194a32 ὁ is excised by Spengel in order to allow γάρ to stand in second position. Dirlmeier (p.321) cites a prose parallel for γάρ coming third (Herodotus, V.92), but there are closer parallels to hand: at 05a19 γάρ comes third (but the later manuscripts alter the text to avoid this). Cf. also 07b33 ὁ τοιοῦτος γάρ, 12a31 αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ γάρ.

1194a33 δίκκιον is certainly easier. If we accept the masculine, it must be the slave who is just in being hit back, which is absurd. This is a case of the lectio difficilior being harder because it is wrong.

1194a33 If we were to read ἄποξ, it ought to be inserted before ἀλλά, rather than where Spengel suggests, because the anonymous commentator on E.N. V sticks more closely to the text than Michael of Ephesus and so outweighs the testimony for its earlier position in the sentence. What is more, Bartholomew has semel sed. But, in fact, we should not add it. It seems that Bartholomew's translation was made from V, which survives. The text not only makes sense without it, but is marginally better without it. There is no need for the author to restrict ἀντιπληγῆναι to striking back just once. If the slave had hit (πατόσσειν) the free man more than once, presumably ἀντιπληγῆναι would mean 'to hit back (more than once)'.

1194b5 Bonitz' emendation of τι for τό is supported by Breier. Dirlmeier (p.322), however, defends the ms. reading by appeal to b27. I do not know of any passage where a definite article is separated from its noun by a parenthetic clause like ὡς φασιν.

1194b9 πολιτικοί is considerably better attested than πολῖται in this line. It is true that in a similar context (b17) we read πολῖται. The term πολιτικὴ κοινωνία has been used in 94a25, and will be used in b26, b28. But there are other types of κοινωνία - in 94b23 between husband and wife, and in 11a11 the broadness of the term is evident.

There is no parallel in E.N. for this parenthetic remark. (E.N. 1133b3-4, 1134a26-30 have similarities.) ὁ πολιτικός most often means ‘the statesman’, but it can mean ‘citizen’ (Pol. 1277b4, 1277a15 (though Congreve’s conjecture, πολίτην, is accepted by Ross (Oxford,1957)), and cf. E.E. 1215b3, 1216a25). ‘Citizens are a sort of partners’ is Stock’s translation. The position of τινες is odd,¹³⁰ but this must be the meaning.

πολιτικοί is the harder reading, and should be accepted. We can explain the author’s use of this word rather than πολῖται by his wanting to stress the connection between citizens (πολιτικοί) and political justice (πολιτικὸν δικαίον).

How does the claim that citizens are a sort of partner support the claim that political justice (τοῦτο (b8)) consists especially in equality (b8-9)? The answer is that M.M. claims that there is a relationship between citizens. Their equality lies not in having the same character, but in natural similarity. See Pol. 1287b33, 1288a1, 1295b25 for equality and similarity, and Pol. 1261b1 for natural equality of citizens.

1194b12 οὔτε... οὔτε... οὐδὲ is not rare (Denniston, p.193). From the passages Denniston cites, Plato Rep. 499b2 (οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ’ ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτε γένηται τέλος...) is closest. But from M.M. itself we find οὔτε... οὔτε... οὐδὲ at 85b10-11. Retain the reading that will have been in ω, οὐδέ. It is interesting that at 85b10-11 one manuscript, A, has οὔθ’.¹³¹

1194b13 ὁ is omitted in α and β. It should thus be excised. Cf. Pol. 1305b8-9 οὐ γὰρ ἄρχουσιν ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν ἅμα πατήρ τε καὶ υἱός. Translate: ‘son would seem to be similarly related to father’.

¹³⁰ Kühner-Gerth, vol. II, 1, 665-6): ‘Sehr häufig wird es [τις] durch ein oder mehrere Wörter von dem Worte, zu dem es gehört, getrennt’. But the examples given do not involve cases in which τις, as it were, has to jump over a word with which it grammatically agrees to another word.

¹³¹ For a list of passages where there is such ms. discrepancy, see my note on 1189b23.

1194b15-16 There is an unfortunate misprint in Dirlmeier's commentary (p.323): read ὑπὸ for ἀπὸ in the first line. Bekker's conjecture ἀπὸ is now known to have been made some centuries earlier. If we read αὐτοῦ in b16 then it is certainly right: 'separated from him'. But ὑπὸ αὐτῆς is strongly attested, and it makes good sense. When the child reaches adulthood he is separated (from his father) by his status as adult.

1194b19 There is no way to choose between αὐτῷ ἐστὶν and ἔστιν αὐτῷ.

1194b23 In b24, b27, 11a10, 11b10, 13b25-6 the order is: woman, man. Aristotle uses both orders (Bonitz 163b6). Leave the text as Susemihl has it.

1194b28 The addition of καὶ in α and β - the emphatic 'both...and' - is in place here.

1194b34-6 We have an awkward combination of neuter plurals and feminine singulars in the mss. If ἀριστερὰ (b34-5) is feminine singular, it would be easiest to follow Armstrong, who suggests that we read ἡ δεξιὰ ... βέλτιων in b35. In this way the whole discussion (b32-9) will be about hands. Alternatively, ἀριστερὰ (b34-5) might be neuter plural. In which case Dirlmeier's suggestion¹³² (p.325, though he would not adopt it) that we read τῶν ἀριστερῶν (neuter plural) in a35-6 would make the text neater. The discussion of hands would be interrupted by a remark in b34-6 on left and right generally.¹³³

Armstrong's feminine singulars are much better. The point of the κἄν clause (b36-7) is that the use of one's left hand does not affect the status of right hands as naturally superior. It would be awkward if the point was that the use of one's left hand does not affect the status of right things generally as naturally superior. It is also

¹³² Anticipated by Sylburg.

¹³³ P.A. 648a12 says that the parts of the body on the right are superior to those on the left. Cf. P.A. 665a22-5, de Incessu Animalium 706a20, Prob. 958b16-27,

much easier, given the discussion of hands in b33-4, to take ἀριστερὰ in b34-5 to be feminine singular.

1194b38 α omits τό. The same choice faces editors at Phys. 196b11, where some mss. offer ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ, and others ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.¹³⁴ The second is by far the more usual formulation, and is found, a few lines below, at 95a3. At Topics 117a3 Ross (Oxford, 1958) prints ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ, but Wallies (Leipzig, 1923) and Brunschwig (Paris, 1967) print ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. None of these three editors have a note in the apparatus about what the mss. read. In M.M. we find ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ in 95a3, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ in 06b39, but ἐπὶ πολὺ, meaning ‘far’ in 13b7, b8. Retain τό.

1195a1 εἰ + optative μεταβάλλοι is well-attested in α and β. See my note on 1193b1.

1195a3 Bonitz (654b38) had put a question-mark after his citation of this use of προφανές. Dirlmeier (p.325) proposes that we read ὅτι for τοῦτο, which makes things considerably easier. But τοῦτο is guaranteed by 98a14. We could add ὅτι before τοῦτο, but the motivation would only be to make M.M. more elegant. Other things could be naturally just, but this type is conspicuously so.

1195a8-9 ζ appears to have read εἶναι οὐ ταῦτό, οὐκ ἔστι δέ. In η οὐκ ἔστι δέ was understandably deleted. (In V a further change occurred: οὐ ταῦτό was omitted.) α and L read what Susemihl prints. M.M. clearly thinks that τὸ ἄδικον is different from τὸ ἀδίκημα, as he thinks that τὸ δίκαιον is different from τὸ δικαιοπράγημα (95a11-12). It might be possible to read the reconstructed version of ζ. We would translate οὐκ ἔστι δέ not ‘but it is not’, but ‘and it is not’. However, οὕτως is probably right, and is slightly more difficult. It may be that ὁμοίως... οὐ ταῦτόν (95a11-12) led to the change of οὕτως to οὐ in ζ.

¹³⁴ Similarly, Thucydides I.12.2.

1195a9 In a closely parallel sentence (a13) all mss. have τὸ τῷ νόμῳ ὁρισμένον. Should we print τῷ here too? In 94b30 and 95a7 there is no definite article (though β wrongly has τῷ in a7). In those two passages M.M. is talking about ‘legal justice’. In 95a9 and 95a13, however, the dative is a dative of the agent - ‘defined by the law’. We should probably be swayed more by the agreement between α and K than between V and β. ω probably did not have τῷ, and it could have been added on the analogy with a13. Leave τῷ out.

1195a10 Bekker’s suggestion that we excise τὴν could be defended by appeal to Rhet. 1383b21, Prob. 950a28, 950b28 and M.M. 96a19, 96a21, but E.N. 1135b4, b7 use the phrase τὴν παρακαταθήν ἀποδιδόναι.

1195a19 Read ἔνεκεν. (See above pp.175-6)

1195a19 Since the stemma points neither one way nor the other, the harder order should be printed: εἰδὼς τούτων.

1195a21 Only K has the present infinitive, ἀποκτείνειν. All the other independent mss. read the future infinitive, ἀποκτενεῖν (except L which has ἀποκτένειν). There is a difference: did this son think that he would (i.e. intend to) kill his enemy or think that he was killing his enemy? In a similar passage in E.N. 1135b14-15 editors face a choice between a present infinitive (βάλλειν, read in K and printed by Bywater) and a future infinitive (βαλεῖν, read in the rest, printed by Bekker and Susemihl). In both E.N. and M.M. I favour the future infinitives, which is what is stemmatically suggested. In E.N. the expressions οὐδ ἔνεκα and ἵνα (1135b13) show that it is not just the agent’s beliefs about what he was doing that is relevant, but also what he is

trying to do. If X means only to graze Y, but actually wounds him, this is a *ἄμαρτήμα*.

1195a21-2 μέν τι is certainly right here, although it is certain that μέντοι was in *ω*. The reading μέν τι may have been written as a correction in *β* - for we see L adopting the better reading, while A writes μέν τι instead of the second μέντοι.

1195a22 ἄδικεῖν is used transitively in a26: 'he will not wrong the man whom he hurts', as in 96a2. But in a23 ἄδικεῖν is used intransitively. The reading οὐθέν in a22 would be taken (as in 94b11) adverbially: 'he does not commit injustice at all', whilst οὐθένα would yield 'he does not wrong anyone'.¹³⁵ Lines a20-22 support (γάρ) the preceding sentence (a19-20), which claimed that in the case where X, through ignorance of some particular, performs τι ἄδικον, he is not ἄδικος, but unfortunate. Lines a20-22 give an example of someone who intends to kill his enemy, but kills his father. It is claimed that such a person has done something unjust (a21-22) - i.e. has transgressed a law (a9). If M.M. wants strictly to continue his illustration of a19-20, he ought next to say ἄδικος μέντοι οὐ. But he uses the verb ἄδικεῖ rather than the adjective ἄδικος. Nevertheless, ἄδικεῖ μέντοι οὐθέν is synonymous with ἄδικος μέντοι οὐ.

Spengel's reasons for reading οὐ are arguments for reading οὐθέν, which is palaeographically easier.

1195a22-23 Editors before Susemihl printed ὥστε where Susemihl prints ἐπεί. Spengel, [1866] 630, comments on ὥστε οὐν: 'alibi non inveni'. The only place in extant Greek literature that we find this combination is in Cratinus fr.109 (Kock). But recent editors of this fragment (fr.116, Kassel, Austin) no longer print this. Before looking at whether ἐπεί in a22 is any better, it will help to look at τοῦτο in 95a23.

¹³⁵ There is a good example of both usages together in Xenophon *Anab.* VII.6.22: οὔτε γὰρ ἠδικήσαμεν τοῦτον οὐδέεν.

X consists in Y is expressed in Greek by X ἐστὶ ἐν Y (cf. 94b8, 99b11-12). One way to take 95a22-3 would be to see this construction. X would be τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὰ ἀδίκᾳ πράττοντα and Y would be τῷ ἀγνοεῖν. What would the extra τοῦτο be doing? Stock takes it as an object of ἀγνοεῖν. But this results in an awkward change in construction. We expect an appositional clause, listing the sorts of thing which the agent does not know: ὃν βλέπτει καὶ ᾧ καὶ οὐ ἕνεκεν. But in fact we get a ὅταν clause (in which we supply πράττη). V tries to soften the change in construction by writing τούτῳ for τοῦτο: ‘in this ignorance’. Against this construal of 95a23, it should be noted that M.M. ought not to restrict the possibility of not committing injustice when one does things that are unjust to actions performed in ignorance. Forced actions should also fall into this category.

Another way to take 95a23 would be to take ἐν τῷ ἀγνοεῖν as part of the subject, rather than as part of the predicate: ‘not committing injustice when one does things that are unjust in ignorance is...’. This makes much better sense of the τοῦτο. We can continue to translate: ‘...what we mentioned before, namely when...’. This reading of the text frees us from the unwelcome oversight of forced actions, but leaves us with a cumbersome subject.

Both interpretations of 95a23 face a further problem. The first word of the sentence (95a22) is, in Susemihl’s text, ἐπεὶ, but there is no main clause in the sentence. In a22 I suggest that where ζ has ἐπεὶ, and α has ὅστε, we read ἔστι(v), and that we start a new sentence after ἀγνοεῖν:

ἔστιν οὖν τὸ μὴ

ἀδικεῖν τὰ ἀδίκᾳ πράττοντα ἐν τῷ ἀγνοεῖν. ἔστι τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ
μικρὸν ἐπάνω ἐλέγετο, ὅταν μὴ εἰδῶς μήθ’ ὃν βλέπτει μήθ’
ᾧ μήθ’ οὐ ἕνεκεν.

‘Not committing injustice when one does things that are unjust, then, lies in ignorance. This is, as we mentioned just before, when one acts...’.¹³⁶ It would be

¹³⁶ M.M. uses ἔστι... ὅταν in 08a9: acting in accordance with right reason is when...: ἔστιν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, ὅταν... (See my note on 1208a9.) In 09a8 he says that friendship between

possible to conjecture δὲ after ἔστω in a23, but the asyndeton would be tolerable. ἔστω τοῦτο means τουτέστω: 'i.e.'. We are left with no reference to force (to correspond to E.N. 1135a27, a33, 35b6), but there is no sign of M.M. being concerned with that in this section.

1195a24-5 The formulaic expression μήθ' ὄν βλάπτει μήθ' ᾧ μήθ' οὐδ' ἔνεκεν has occurred in a positive form in a17, a18-19 (cf. 99a20). In closely parallel passages in E.N. 1135a25, 1135b13 μήτε is repeated three times. It is the formulaic nature of the phrase which suggests that Denniston's parallels (p.193) for οὔτε... οὔτε... οὐδέ should not dissuade us from returning to the mss.' μηδ' in a25.

1195a25 ζ omits καὶ here. We should probably keep it. The καὶ answers the need expressed in 94b3 (διοριστέον) to determine the relevant sort of justice.

1195a29 Should we read τι? πράττειν + adverb + object is found in 95a11; πράττειν + adverb alone at 95a15. Marginally I prefer to excise τι. It is not important that something is done, but that he acts κατὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.

1195a31 Vettori's conjecture is rightly supported by Rassow, [1858] and [1874], and Dirlmeier (p.328).

1195a33 πιεῖν (aorist infinitive) is more appropriate than the present infinitive, πίνειν. Both readings are equally well attested. M.M. is thinking of a group of people who hit their fathers when drunk. Neither their lifestyle of drinking (cf. 05b15) nor the duration of their drinking matters for the example. What matters is that they hit their fathers when drunk. They could have not drunk (cf. 88b32).

good people is when...: ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν σπουδαίων φιλία ἐστίν, ὅταν... The same construction (although ἔστω is omitted) is used in 83b24: ἡ ἀρετὴ τίμιον, ὅταν... and at 07b24 καλὸς κάγαθος γάρ, φασίν, ὅταν... Compare also 93b17-18 and 95a4.

1195a34 Susemihl rightly excises καὶ in this line. It is only found in β. Exactly the same thing (addition of καὶ between ὁμοίως and ἐπί in β) happens in 84b21. There is strong support for καί in 86a8, 86a22 and 86b38 where only η omits καί. In 92a18 there is no connective. In 97a7 L wrongly adds καί. In 11b2 Susemihl wrongly suggests that the connective δὲ should be added. In 86a24 the manuscripts are equally divided.

1195a35-6 Colon after ἀγνοίων (a35), comma after ἄδικοι (a36).

1195b4 Full stop after αἰτία, as in all independent mss.

1195b4 V and Rav. have οὐκ instead of οὐδέ. But cf. 85a34, 91a2, 99a9, 12b3 for διὸ οὐδέ at the start of a sentence.

1195b15 Read ἢ τι ἄλλο with α β. For the ordering cf. 96a20, but note 90b17.

1195b17 The text of K - εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖται, οὐδὲ ἐκὼν ἄρα - makes excellent sense. It is closely parallel to 95b24. This line is the only line in which K offers what seems to be a better text than all the other manuscripts. This fact suggests either that K was made from a corrected manuscript - corrected from a manuscript bearing an otherwise lost part of the tradition, or that its extra words originated conjecturally.

Can we understand the text of the other mss, which have only εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀδικεῖται? 'If not,¹³⁷ then he is wronged.' If not what? What verb is understood with μὴ? Clearly ἀδικεῖται, the nearest option (b16), is out of the question. If we understand ἀντικαταλλάττεται τι (from b14-16), though, we get reasonable sense. The view that it is possible to be wronged willingly was based, M.M. alleges, on a

¹³⁷ For εἰ δὲ μὴ, with the verb omitted cf. 88b9, 96a25, 13b23.

misdescription of the sort of case where some harm is undergone but in exchange for something beneficial. Once that sort of case is dismissed (and if we excise οὐδὲ ἐκὼν ἄρα, we can understand without actually being told, that it follows from the claim that the candidates for the description ‘voluntarily wronged’ are going to fail because they are not even wronged, let alone willingly), there only remains the other type, namely where one is wronged without taking some benefit in return.

If X takes (λαμβάνειν, b14) less than his due, X makes an exchange. But there will be cases where X has no choice in the matter - no exchange takes place - and is given less than his due. If what he is given is unfair, he has been wronged.

I have tried to find a way of reading what will have been written in ω. It is an additional argument against the reading of K that it would be hard to explain how these words were omitted.

1195b19 Dirlmeier (p.329) notes that ἐπὶ + genitive is ‘singular’. In b22 and b23 we read the dative. Rav., a source of some good conjectures, reads τοῖς τοιοῦτοις in b19, and Bekker and Bussemaker adopt this reading on the authority of a descendant of Rav., M^b. Sometimes late readings are easier because they are correct. But I would retain the reading of ω here. We have to take the verbs καλλωπίζονται and σεμνύονται absolutely: ‘they show off¹³⁸ and think highly of themselves’, whilst the phrase ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων does not give the object of their haughtiness but tells us *when* they are like this - in such situations.¹³⁹ In b22, b23, on the other hand, we translate, following Stock ‘But if they do not pride themselves upon suffering acts of injustice and do pride themselves on such things,...’.¹⁴⁰

1195b20 Susemihl’s quotation marks impose an interpretation on the text which is not necessarily correct. Stock takes ἦ (b21) to be outside the quotation marks. If the

¹³⁸ L.S.J. cite *Rhet. ad Al.* 1421a4 and Xenophon *Eq.* 10.5 for this absolute use.

¹³⁹ L.S.J. s.v. ἐπὶ A. III, 3.

¹⁴⁰ Dirlmeier (p.329) cites two parallels in the *corpus* for σεμνύνεσθαι. The same verb (with prefix ἀντι-) is found at *Pol.* 1314a7, and (with prefix ἀπο-) at *Poet.* 1449a21.

imperfect, ἐλάμβανον,¹⁴¹ is conative, the boast would be even more boastful: ‘although it was possible for me to take my share, I did not try to take it, but...’. Such a reading would demand an authorial ἦ in b21, since if a particular case is envisaged, he will have yielded his share to one person - there will not be any doubt about who it was. Another possibility is that the imperfect is iterative, and that the imperfect conveys the idea that that was how he habitually behaves. In this case ἦ will be part of the quotation. Here it would be better not to have quotation marks,¹⁴² but to punctuate with a colon after φασίιν (b20).

1195b25 Susemihl’s δέ, now attested in L, is right.¹⁴³

1195b25 Susemihl prints τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις, which is not found in any manuscript. His apparatus suggests that he thought that he was following the Aldine, but the Aldine reads τοῖς ἐν τοιούτοις λόγοις. Bekker, Bussemaker, Stock, Armstrong and Dirlmeier (p.329) rightly retain the reading of the mss.: τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους.

1195b26 Print ἐαυτάν. See pp.173-4.

1195b28 α adds δ’ after βλάπτει. The only occurrence of δ’ ἄρα in M.M. is at 85a27. How does βλάπτει — εἰδὼς contribute to the argument? The conclusion ἐκὼν — ἀδικεῖται follows from b26-7, so βλάπτει — εἰδὼς is parenthetic, just as in the parallel passage τὸ δ’ ἐκόντα εἰδόντα καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὡς (E.N. 1136a32) is parenthetic.¹⁴⁴ I marginally prefer to add δ’ in M.M. with α.

1195b29 Stock and Dirlmeier (p.329) rightly retain the mss.’ ὁ.

¹⁴¹ Stock translates as though it were aorist, which is what β had.

¹⁴² See pp.165-6.

¹⁴³ See pp.168-9.

¹⁴⁴ T. Irwin (Indianapolis, 1985) brackets these words in his translation of E.N. .

1195b29 Dirlmeier (p.329) defends the verb κωλύειν, but notes that it is unusual in this sense. The more usual word would be λύειν, as we find in the parallel sentence at E.N. 1136b23 and later in M.M. at 04b5.¹⁴⁵ One might consider reading καὶ λύει, but there is a parallel at Topics 161a1 which justifies a conservative approach: ἔστι δὲ λόγον κωλύσαι συμπεράνεσθαι τετραχῶς: ‘it is possible to prevent an argument being concluded in four ways’. It is a peculiar fact that at 95b29, 01a31-2, 08a19 and 09b10 the tense of κωλύειν seems to have become corrupt in at least some manuscripts. Here the present tense makes sense and we should read it on stemmatic grounds, although the future could be paralleled by 91a11.

1195b31 Omit γε on stemmatic grounds.

1195b34 See p.166 for ἄν.

1195b36 αὐτὸς is read in α and η instead of αὐτόν, which is in β. E.N. 1136b1 reads εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἁδικεῖν. In M.M. 96a6-7, a13, a15, a17, a33 we again find ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἁδικεῖν. The verb ἐνδέχεσθαι can be used impersonally with an accusative and infinitive (Bonitz 249a60-b3)¹⁴⁶ as well as personally (Bonitz 249b9-12).¹⁴⁷ The combination αὐτὸς αὐτόν is found at 95b26, b28, b32, b34, 96a21, 11b1, 12b15, b17, b19, b21, b22, 13a4, a5, a6, a15-16, a17, a22, a26. Read αὐτὸς here.

1195b38 Dirlmeier (p.331) notes the ugliness of πράττειν τάττει. Comparison with 93b3 suggests that we should consider reading προστάττει for πράττειν τάττει here.

¹⁴⁵ In 01a24 (cf. 08a10) the sense is different.

¹⁴⁶ For this construction, see 96a7, a11, 01b35, 04a7, a16, a18, 06b17, 06b34, 08b18, 08b31.

¹⁴⁷ There are no indisputable examples of this construction in M.M. 12b32 and 13b1 may be examples.

In 93b3 η wrongly has *πρόττει* for *προστίττει*.¹⁴⁸ It is not, however, the jolting sound of the words that poses the most serious threat to the transmitted text, but the use of the verb *τάττειν*.

Elsewhere in M.M. the main verb, *τάττειν*, is used with a noun - 87a15 *ζημίαν*, 89b6 *τὸς ζημίας*. There are no examples of *τάττειν* + infin. in Bonitz. L.S.J. (s.v. *τάττειν*, III, 2) mentions Plato Laches 199a2-3 (as an example of *τάττειν* being used absolutely), and this is the closest parallel: *ὁ νόμος οὕτω τάττει, μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως*. M.M. has itself said that the law orders one to do certain things (*κελεύει... πρόττειν* + acc., 93b4; *κελεύει ποιεῖν* + acc., 93b7). Probably these parallels are sufficient for us to be conservative and retain the reading of the manuscripts, *πρόττειν τάττει*.

1196a1-2 In these lines we have *εἰ* twice, and a corrector in K deleted the second, only for a later corrector to reinstate it. Jaeger, [1948] 442, notes this as an instance of the author's 'slovenly habit of redundantly repeating words'. Kühner-Gerth (II, 2, 367-8) notes that certain authors repeat a conjunction when it 'durch einen eingeschalteten Zwischensatz von seinem Satze getrennt wird'. Xenophon Anab. 3.2,35 is the passage mentioned as an example of repeated *εἰ*. But Xenophon is writing in that passage in rhetorical direct speech, and the intervening subordinate clause makes the repetition allowable. Bonitz gives no examples.¹⁴⁹

But examination of the thought behind these lines allows us to see why M.M. should repeat *εἰ*. There are two conditions which have to be fulfilled in order for X to wrong Y. First there has to be a law enjoining one to behave in a certain way to others; secondly, in a particular case, X has not to do what the law enjoins him to do

¹⁴⁸ The same corruption occurred in B at 93b8, in α and L at 00a6. Cf. E.N. 1130b23, 1149a28, Maas' conjecture in the scholion (recorded in Dirlmeier p.355) and Dirlmeier's conjectures at 00a6 for the same thing.

¹⁴⁹ See von Arnim, [1929] 23-5, who cites (with the wrong reference) Topics 153a15-21, as an example of repetition of a conjunction with a subordinate clause intervening. A similar thing happens in 83a29-30 (*δεῖν* repeated), 83a33-4 (*οὐχ* repeated), 06b26 (*οὐκ* repeated). Other instances of repetitions of negatives in Susemihl's text which the stemma shows not to exist are 98a8, 04b21-2. In these two passages there is no subordinate clause intervening. See also Dirlmeier, p.179.

to Y. Whilst we could construct a more elegant way in Greek to express what M.M. wants to say, the two εἰ-s have a point. He is saying if (A → (B → C), but there is relative attraction in the formulation of A and B (πρὸς ὄν... πρὸς τούτων).

1196a2 The comma after ὀδikeî is due to Casaubon and Bonitz, [1844] 14. The manuscripts punctuate with a full stop.

1196a6 Read τὰ τοιαῦτα for ταῦτα, on stemmatic grounds.

1196a10 Susemihl (p.100) replaces the full stop in this line with a colon.

1196a27-8 ἐστὶ in a28 is a late addition. Before looking at τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, let us look at a27-8. Stock translates εἴ τι ἐγγίνεται τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ ὀδίκημα: ‘if there is any act of injustice within the soul’. But what about τῶν? Dirlmeier (p.332) compares Rep. 444d8 and E.E. 1224b25, where τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ means ‘things in the soul’. So we have, literally, ‘if there is any unjust act of things in the soul’, i.e. ‘if there is any unjust act of one thing in the soul against another’.

η had ὀδικημάτων, which would yield ‘if any of the unjust acts in the soul occur’, but we have not been told what the unjust acts in the soul could be. K and V’s text could not mean, what is more sensible: ‘if any of the unjust acts occur in the soul’. Susemihl is right to have a comma between ὀδίκημα and τῶν.

Let us return to ἐστὶ. Of the occurrences of ὅστ’ εἰ in M.M., the apodosis is almost always expressed by ὄν + optative (96a14-15, 96a23-4, 98a29-31, 02a16-18, 05b36, 07b13-5, 11a22-3). Once there is an inferential particle - ἄρα - instead (95b11). Only at 06a15-16 is the indicative used in the apodosis. ἐστὶ in 96a28 is almost certainly conjectural. A conjecture more in keeping with M.M.’s usage and more plausible palaeographically would be to add ὄν εἴη ὀδίκημα before τῶν² - but the omission of the verb is perfectly tolerable. Delete ἐστὶ.

1196a29 Susemihl's abandonment of the mss.' γάρ is rightly criticised by Dirlmeier (p.332).

1196a29 τῶ, only known of in the first Basel edition, must be right.

1196b4-6 Dirlmeier's list of passages (p.339) in which the concept of right reason, as opposed to the actual expression κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, has already appeared in M.M. does not solve the problem that M.M. has not said (εἴρηται, 96b4) what he claims to have said about each virtue (b5-6). See footnote to my note on 1190b7.

1196b5-6 The sentence b4-9 is a long one: it splits into two parts - an ἐπειδὴ clause (b4-6) and a main clause whose subject is τὸ μὲν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, which is glossed as τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν. 'Since it has been said that..., the phrase 'acting in accordance with right reason' is like...'. Let us concentrate on the ἐπειδὴ clause (b4-6). M.M. claims to have said four things about the virtues. The first three are unproblematic: (a) τίνες εἰσίν (b4); (b) ἐν τίσιν [sc. εἰσίν] (b5); (c) περὶ ποῖα [sc. εἰσίν] (b5). The fourth (καὶ περὶ... βέλτιστον (b5-6)) is the difficult one. In b5-6 the three families of manuscripts give different readings: εἰ πράττομεν is the reading of α, ἦ πράττομεν of β, and εἰ πράττομεν of η. The agreement between α and η in reading εἰ suggests strongly that ζ read what η reads.

The problem with reading εἰ, however, is that there is no obvious apodosis. Armstrong resorts to paraphrase: 'showing that each of them consists in acting in the best possible way in accordance with the Right Principle'. So does Barnes: '[saying] about each of them in particular, how we must do the best in accordance with right reason.' Neither of these can be good renderings of the text. Dirlmeier faces the problem of the missing apodosis and takes τὸ βέλτιστον not as object of πράττομεν, but as object of an apodotic πράττομεν that we have to supply mentally: in English: 'if we act in accordance with right reason, <we do> the best thing'. Dalimier supplies not πράττομεν in the apodosis, but a part of εἶναι: 'nous avons dit que le mieux était

d'agir selon la raison droite'. Either of these versions do translate the words in Susemihl's text. (The structure would be clarified if both commata in b6 were deleted, and one inserted after λόγον.)

96b8-9 give an explicit parallel (ὅμοιον, b7): εἴ τις τὰ ὑγιεινὰ προσφέροιτο (b8-9) parallels εἰ πρόττοιμεν... λόγον (b6), and hence we should read πρόττοιμεν in b6.¹⁵⁰ And ὑγίεια ἄριστ' ἂν γένοιτο (b8) parallels τὸ βέλτιστον (b6). Which suggests that we should mentally supply ἂν γένοιτο or ἂν εἴη after βέλτιστον (b6).

1196b7 If the previous note is right, and τὸ βέλτιστον is not the object of πρόττοιμεν in b6, it was probably a mistaken belief that it was that led to βέλτιστον being added in α after πρόττειν in this line.

1196b8 For ὡςπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι see e.g. E.N. 1132a31, G.A. 754a6. Pol. 1265a30 and E.E. 1249b5-6 are relevant parallels in which the manuscripts do not give a unanimous picture. See too Bonitz 872b55-8.

1196b9-10 Von Arnim, [1929] 16-17, repunctuates with a comma after ἀλλ', a colon after μοι and commas before and after διασάφησον: ἀλλ', ἐρεῖ μοι· τὰ ποῖα, διασάφησόν, ἐστιν ὑγιεινά. It remains strange that the remark should be addressed to the author rather than to the imagined theorist on health (τις, b8). Von Arnim says that the author assimilates himself to the doctor, and that it is from the doctor, and only very indirectly from the author, that the patient asks for clarification. Is there any way to avoid the unwelcome assimilation?

Could μοι be part of the objection? Although it is an enclitic, it can stand first word after parenthetic ἐρεῖ.¹⁵¹ The actual words of the patient could be 'ἀλλὰ μοι τὰ ποῖα διασάφησόν ἐστιν ὑγιεινά? (We could take μοι to be an ethic dative = 'please',

¹⁵⁰ See note on 1193b1 for parallels for εἰ + opt.

¹⁵¹ Compare Plato Theaet. 145a6 ὦρα ποῖνον, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ...; Parm. τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοι...; Rep. 467e8 ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν; Laws 702b4 ἐγὼ τινα, ὦ ξενε, μοι δοκῶ κατανοεῖν. The accentuation of the enclitic in cases like this is a big problem. See Chandler, [1881] 282.

or with the imperative ‘explain to me’.)¹⁵² This would rid us of the assimilation, which von Arnim notes, and would incidentally also overcome the objection that Jaeger, [1948] 441, raises against the treatise’s authenticity, namely that Aristotle does not refer to himself as ‘I’.

1196b13 M.M. often uses the first person plural (e.g. 90b7, 93b1, 93b12, 93b18, 95a6, 96a29-32, 07b20 and often). The reference to what has been said before may lead us to expect a personal construction, διωρίσθημεν, as in 90a34. But M.M. also refers impersonally to what he has said (e.g. 83b9, 90a8, 96b4, 96b34 and often). The particle μέν is attractive because it provides a good balance for the δέ in b15. A preliminary division of the soul has been made, but we need to make further divisions. The same thought is present in E.N. 1139a3-5: πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη..., νῦν δὲ... διαιρετέον.

1196b14-16 Susemihl prints what was a correction in V: λόγον ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον μόριον (b14-15). It is pretty certainly wrong. Note how redundant the words μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς are in b15. The words τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς..., τὸ δὲ... in b14 already convey the concept ‘part of the soul’.

The reading of α and, we can presume, of β was λόγον ἔχον τὸ δ’ ἄλογον. καὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος μορίου. It is now easy to see how, if ζ also had this reading, η should have written only λόγον ἔχοντος μορίου. η will have made an omission ex homoeot. of ἔχον τὸ δ’ ἄλογον καὶ τοῦ λόγον. It thus seems to have been the case that ω read what α has: λόγον ἔχον τὸ δ’ ἄλογον. καὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος μορίου. This must be our starting point. It provides a good ending to the sentence that begins διωρίσθη μὲν (b13-14):

διωρίσθη μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς ὡς τύπω

καὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἐστὶ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ δ’ ἄλογον.

¹⁵² ἀλλά μοι + imperative is frequent in Plato. Cf. Hippias Major 296b3, 302c7; Hippias Minor 364d1; Meno 82a8; Euthyd. 296c1; Euthyph. 6b3, 14d6, Rep. 528d2.

This is grammatical, elegant, and true. In 85b3-4 M.M. had said:

ἔστιν δ' ἡ ψυχὴ, ὡς φοιμέν, εἰς

δύο μέρη διηρημένη, εἷς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον.

A new sentence begins in 96b15. We have seen that in ω that sentence begins καὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος μορίου... In b16 η made another mistake and where Susemihl prints λόγον (on the late authority of B), and α and β have ἐν λόγον, η has ἔλλογον. It is clear that ἐν λόγον was the reading of ω . ω , then, will have read (b15-17):

καὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς ἔστιν δ'¹⁵³ εἰς δύο τὴν διαίρεσιν ἔχον τὸ ἐν λόγον ἔχον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν βουλευτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἐπιστημονικόν.

As it stands this is nonsense. What more does M.M. need to say, besides that the rational part of the soul can be divided into two? The words τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς are probably a doublet of τὸ ἐν λόγον ἔχον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς. The genitival phrase would work if ἔστιν ἔχον meant 'it is possible that there is' (a twofold division of the rational part of the soul). But the neuter phrase is more idiomatic: 'the rational part of the soul has a twofold division'. (Compare 83b38). We now have:

[καὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς] ἔστιν δ' εἰς δύο τὴν διαίρεσιν ἔχον τὸ ἐν λόγον ἔχον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν βουλευτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἐπιστημονικόν.

This now looks sensible. For ἔστιν ἔχον = ἔχει, cf. 85b13, Parva Naturalia 465a2, in addition to the parallels cited by Dirlmeier (p.341). τὸ ἐν λόγον ἔχον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς is an emphatic way of referring to the rational part of the soul. Unless there is irrecoverable corruption in M.M., the construction in E.N. 1139a6-8 (ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν $\hat{\omega}$ θεωροῦμεν..., ἐν δὲ $\hat{\omega}$...) is not being used in M.M.

¹⁵³ Or δὴ - see next note.

1196b15 δῆ (in ζ) is not as good as δ' (in α), which answers μέν.¹⁵⁴

1196b18-19 Read ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶν with α and β.

1196b19 χρωμά τε is another late reading. ω read χρώματα. The singular is supported by the singular in b22. Moreover the particle τε here is consistent with M.M.'s usage elsewhere: M.M. uses τε... καὶ... καὶ at 09a20-21, 09a28-9. In 89b5 and 04a14 two things linked by τε... καὶ are said to be different (ἕτερον). But τε is not essential in contexts in which the author says that X and Y are different, as 96b25 shows. In De Insomniis 458b6 Aristotle lists examples of proper sensibles (ἴδια): χρωμά, ψόφος, χυμός. It is, in the end, only an argument from symmetry - symmetry with the other singulars in b19 and with those in b21-22 that makes the singular χρωμά tempting here, since the genus 'colour' can be expressed in Greek by either a singular or a plural. Dirlmeier (p.341) cites H.A. 533a15, which shows that a plural makes sense. See Bonitz 490b17-21 (which is more relevant than 490b38-41 where Poetics 1456b1 is cited as a possible case in which nouns of different number are joined together). But given the easy corruption from χρωμά τε to χρώματα, follow the corrector of V.

1196b23-4 Retain ἐπεὶ δ' of α and β. M.M. moves from the general claim that τὰλλα are to be understood in the way that perception is understood (b22-3) to a specific application of the principle that different ὑποκείμενα means different capacities in the soul. The reason for thinking this (rather than that the sentence ἐπεὶ... γνωρίζομεν (b23-4) is dependent on δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν (b23)) is the addition in b24 of δεῖ after εἶναι, in α and β. Add δεῖ in b24 and place a full stop after ὑπολαμβάνειν.

¹⁵⁴ Further examples of διαίρεσιν ἔχειν (besides those in Bonitz and Dirlmeier (p.341): Plato Polit. 262b4, Aristotle P.A. 642b11, 647b17, 667a6, Phys. 237b8, Pol. 1292b35, Top. 121b20, ps-Aristotle L.I. (a dozen times), Theophrastus C.P. I.16.9.1; V.1.1.3; VI.16.2.2.

1196b25 Susemihl's suggestion that we read γάρ for δ' in this line is attractive. The reasoning was that since it has already been claimed that the ὑποκείμενα are different, what is needed is a justification of that claim. Susemihl's other solution was to read εἰ for ἐπεὶ in b23, which diminishes the status of ἕτερα ὑποκείμενα ἐστὶν (b23) from a claim to a hypothesis.

There is a temptation to retain δ' (b25) and to see M.M. amassing premises in one big sentence: the protasis would begin in b23 (ἐπεὶ δὲ...) and the apodosis finally reached in b26 (ἕτερον ἄρ' ἂν εἴη...). I do not think that this is possible, because it would be syntactically difficult for b24 to be a premise (we would expect ἕτερα <δὲ> καὶ...), and it would be illegitimate for M.M., who is trying to show that there are two rational parts of the soul, to assume it.

Read Susemihl's γάρ (b25).

1196b27 Having distinguished two parts of the soul, one περὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, and the other περὶ τὰ νοητά, M.M. focuses on the first. We expect a further reference to τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, after b17. We can thus see Ellebodius' motivation for adding καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν περὶ τὰ νοητά (which could easily have dropped out) after νοητά in b27, and which provides a nice balance to b27-9. But we should be beware of tidying up the text too much.

1196b29-32 Rasso, [1858] 16, suggests that a full stop be placed after προελομένοις (which is the punctuation in α), that δ' be added before ἐστὶν (b30), and that we read a comma after πρόξαι² (b31). Susemihl does not record this in his apparatus. This is an excellent suggestion because at little cost we avoid what Armstrong finds odd in περὶ α... μὴ πρόξαι : it is, he says, 'a curiously redundant clause'. For the δ' in b31 see Bonitz 166b58-167a6 and Denniston p.178.¹⁵⁵ Translate

¹⁵⁵ There are no other instances of this type of δὲ whereby a demonstrative pronoun + δὲ follows a relative pronoun in M.M.

the new version (b29-32): ‘For we deliberate about those things which are up to us to do or not to do, and for us to choose. And whatever are the objects of deliberation and choice, as to whether or not to do them, are sensible objects...’. It is not on grammatical grounds that we should accept Rassow’s suggestion - the appositional clause beginning with a preposition (i.e. Susemihl’s text) could be paralleled in M.M. by 84b5, 85b4, 97a25, 97b12, 98b35¹⁵⁶ - but on grounds of sense.

1196b31 Where α has καί, β has ή and η has nothing. Demote καί to the apparatus. The infinitival τοῦ πράξει η̄ μη̄ πράξει is dependent only on προαίρεσις.

1196b34-7 The sense of these lines is not clear.¹⁵⁷ Should we place a colon after λεκτέον ἂν εἴη (b34) or is περὶ — ἐστὶν (b37) dependent on λεκτέον? Dirlmeier (p.342) says that ὑπὲρ τᾶληθοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος means ‘the discussion is about truth’,¹⁵⁸ but he does not explain why the author would say this here. M.M. is about ethics, and only concerned with truth in so far as every inquiry is concerned with truth.¹⁵⁹ In E.N. 1139b14-17 Aristotle lists five states in virtue of which the soul grasps the truth (ἀληθεύει). But if Dirlmeier is right, the reader is not sure what the list in b36 is a list of.

It would conform with the sense of E.N. 1139b14-17 if b34-6 meant ‘Now that we have made these distinctions, we must say, since reason has to do with truth, and we are examining how it [reason] has the truth, <by which states reason has truth>. They are... With what, then is each of these concerned?’. To achieve this we do not need to change περὶ for ὑπὲρ in b35,¹⁶⁰ but we do need to add something like <ἐν οἷς τᾶληθὲς ἔχει> after σκοπούμεθα (b35).

¹⁵⁶ For the late position of προελομένοις, compare 89a29.

¹⁵⁷ See Donini, [1965] 105-14.

¹⁵⁸ Von Arnim, [1924] 83, thought that ὑπὲρ... ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος could mean ‘reason is about...’.

¹⁵⁹ Donini, [1965] 105.

¹⁶⁰ 83a26, 99a23, 99b5, 12a3 justify ὑπὲρ.

A slightly neater solution would be to punctuate with a colon after εἴη (b34), a comma after λόγος (b35), to read ἐν οἷς (or οἷς?) for ὡς (b35), and σκοπῶμεθα for σκοποῦμεθα (b36). We would then have: ‘Now that we have made these distinctions, we must say the following: since reason has to do with truth, let us actually examine in what it [reason] has truth. They are... With what, then is each of these concerned?’.

A solution along these lines seems to be required. I would put asterisks around καὶ — σκοπούμεθα (b35-6).

1196b36 No manuscript has δ’. Read δὲ rather than δὴ or δ’ ἢ.

1197a1 Ellebodus would read ἤδη δεικνόμενον for διατεινόμενον. The idea was probably inspired by 97a25. Armstrong wants to read διατεινόμενων: ‘when we strive <to know it> by means of demonstration and reasoned discourse’, and is followed by Dalimier. But it would be odd for the genitive absolute to be introduced with καὶ (96b38). That knowledge is something we strive for is a salient enough feature to deserve a mention (cf. *Met.* A, 980a22). Perhaps we could understand διατεινόμενον passively (‘something striven for’), but L.S.J. offer no parallels for this.¹⁶¹ Other options would be δεικνόμενον or διατεινόμεθα (‘we strive for’).

1197a1 See my note on 1189b6 for πρακτά.

1197a4-5 Susemihl follows the text of K:

ἔστι τι παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τέλος

But A has ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τὸ τέλος

and L and V have ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τέλος

and α will have read: ἔστι παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τὸ τέλος

¹⁶¹ See Dirlmeier, [1939] 224-5.

K is the only manuscript to have the indefinite $\tau\iota$. In 11b28, a similar context, we find $\sigma\upsilon\kappa$ ἄλλο $\tau\iota$ παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τέλος.¹⁶² In M.M. ἄλλο $\tau\iota$ appears often and so does $\tau\iota$ ἄλλο. Usually they appear side by side (83b37, 84a28, 84b4, 86b1, 88b20, 90b17, 91b8, 91b17, 95b15, 96a20, 97a37, 02a8, 02b35, 05b4, 08b37, 11b28, 12a18, 13a2, 13a3), occasionally they are separated by one word (82b20, 85a22) and by two words only at 05a36.

We might, then, consider: ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν ποιήσιν ἄλλο $\tau\iota$ τέλος in 97a4. If this were right, α and A err in writing $\tau\omicron$ for $\tau\iota$, ζ omitted $\tau\iota$, K adds it in the wrong place and β and V add $\tau\omicron$ before παρὰ. There must have been some confusion in ω .

1197a7 See my note on 1195a34 for L's addition of καί.

1197a14 Stobaeus 145,19-20 reports Arius Didymus' paraphrase of M.M. 1197a14-15: φρόνησιν δὲ ἔξιν βουλευτικὴν καὶ πρακτικὴν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἢ <ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ>¹⁶³ καλά. Although it is a paraphrase it helps us to determine the order of words in M.M. Read πρακτικὴ καὶ προαιρετικὴ with α . The *husteron proteron* could easily have been reversed by a scribe.

1197a19 The neuter αὐτό is fine. See Bonitz 484a59-b5.

1197a26 Bekker prints αὐτή (itself), the mss. have αὐτή (it). Susemihl is wrong to credit P and M with reading αὐτή. Although the manuscripts are no guide at all, I prefer their αὐτή, rather than the emphatic αὐτή.¹⁶⁴ Wallies, [1917] 1606, rightly criticises the conjecture of Michael (to read ταύτη for αὐτή), on the grounds that ταύτη would be placed before τοῦ νοῦ. M.M., it has long been recognised, favours the pronoun αὐτός.

¹⁶² β wrongly adds $\tau\omicron$ before τέλος.

¹⁶³ The addition is Spengel's.

¹⁶⁴ Dirlmeier (p.346) notes the frequency of the redundant demonstrative pronoun.

1197a28 We should read τε, which is only in α. In a23-4 there was no τε, but there is an emphatic καὶ... καὶ in b29-30.

1197a29 Susemihl asks us to compare 99b34, but he means 98b34. In 98b34 Susemihl thought ταὐτὰ was attested in good manuscripts, when, in fact, it is not. ταῦτα should be read in 97a29. The construction is the same as in 97a24-6, except that in the earlier passage there are nouns, whereas here a pronoun is used. (See my note on 1198b34-5.)

1197a34 Donini, [1965] 120n.23, objects that M.M. here contradicts 97a21-9 (and E.N. 1141a2). There M.M. had allowed ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι as objects of σοφία, on the grounds that σοφία partakes in νοῦς. In 97a34, however, Donini alleges, the objects of σοφία are restricted ('limitat[i]') to those that are μετ' ἀποδείξεως. But this criticism is unfair, because in 97a34 M.M. is not concerned to define σοφία, but to characterise it in such a way that the difference between it and φρόνησις becomes apparent. M.M. is not limiting the objects of σοφία to things that are both μετ' ἀποδείξεως and ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως (if he were, there would be a contradiction), but pointing out that such things are within the province of σοφία, but not of φρόνησις. Donini's solution to the 'contradiction', the addition of τὰ before ἀεὶ, is thus not required.

1197a36 No manuscript has the word ἀεὶ in this line. It is found as a correction in M and in Ellebodius a century later. This is a much better correction of the mss. than that of Casaubon who proposes 'and such things as are of this sort', because Casaubon ignores the structural indicators μὲν... δέ, which show that we need ἔστιν to be a main verb, the subject of which is εὐθὺς ἢ καμπύλον καὶ κοῖλον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Only η offers grammatical sense: again $\epsilon\delta\theta\delta$ — $\tau\omicron\iota\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$ is the composite subject, but what is said of them is that they are $\tau\omicron\iota\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha$, which we would have to understand as $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota$ $\acute{\omega}\sigma\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma$ $\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha$ (a34). If we could attribute more worth to η , we could accept this reading, but the eta which we find in α and β after $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ (b36) - which, if the stemma were different, we could explain as a misplaced correction of η for $\kappa\alpha\iota^1$ (b36) - is likely to be the remnants of $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota$. So leave Susemihl's text.

1197a37 $\tau\hat{\omega}$ is in α and β and should be read instead of $\tau\acute{\omicron}$. M.M. uses $\tau\hat{\omega}$ + infinitive (without a preceding $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$) in a parallel way at 93b26 (modal), b27 (modal), 94a35 (modal), 98a9,¹⁶⁵ 98b36 (causal), 00b38,¹⁶⁶ 01b6 (modal), 01b7 (modal), 03b27 (modal), 04b11 (causal), 04b30 (causal), 09a25 (causal), 09a26 (causal), 09a27 (causal), 11a38 (causal).¹⁶⁷

1197a37 Read $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\lambda\alpha$ for $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron$ $\tau\iota$ on stemmatic grounds.

1197b3 All manuscripts and editions before Susemihl have $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$, (A has $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\acute{\omicron}\tau\omega\nu$ (sic)). Bekker and Bussemaker print $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$ and Susemihl makes no entry in his apparatus. The phrase $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ means 'therefore' and is hard to justify. If we read $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$, however, the demonstrative pronoun will look forward to the reasons in b5 nicely.¹⁶⁸ Very similar is 05a16, where M.M. uses $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omicron$.¹⁶⁹ Bonitz, [1844] 21-2, is right to see $\acute{\epsilon}\xi$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\phi\rho\omicron\nu\eta\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ as in apposition to $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$. Translate 'from the following considerations'.

1197b3 The position of $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is difficult to determine.

¹⁶⁵ See note ad loc.

¹⁶⁶ See my note ad loc.

¹⁶⁷ At 93b26, 01b6, 01b7, 11a38 some manuscripts read $\tau\acute{\omicron}$ for $\tau\hat{\omega}$.

¹⁶⁸ There are many parallels for this use of $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$: e.g. Pr. An. 41a23, G.A. 726a30, E.E. 1226a14.

¹⁶⁹ Compare, for example, Pr. An. 41a22-3 $\acute{\omicron}\tau\iota$ $\delta\grave{\epsilon}$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\omicron\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}$ $\acute{\alpha}\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$, $\delta\grave{\eta}\lambda\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$; or E.E. 1226a15 $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$ $\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$ $\acute{\omicron}\tau\iota$ $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\eta\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$; G.A. 726a30 $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ $\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$...

1197b5-6 Donini, [1965] 121n.24, raises two problems with b5-6: first, although it is true (for an Aristotelian) that φρονήσις is a virtue of one part of the rational soul, that fact is not used in this argument (and σοφία is not said to be the corresponding virtue); secondly, in 98a22 the question is raised again whether φρονήσις is a virtue ‘senza che l’autore ricordi minimalmente il problema delle virtù proprie delle due parti dell’anima razionale’. Donini suggests that in order to avoid what seems to be mindless borrowing of E.N. 1140b24-6 (or 1143b14-17), the phrase τοῦ μορίου — ἐχόντων be excised (as a marginal gloss from a reader who was thinking of E.N.).

The first objection is not serious. To specify that φρονήσις is a virtue of one of the rational parts of the soul helps to show that φρονήσις is not just one of the moral virtues. The parenthetic ὡς φαμέν does not refer back to something already claimed in M.M., but points to the fact that the view that φρονήσις is a virtue of one of the rational parts of the soul is something accepted in the school.¹⁷⁰ The second objection is more worrying. But Donini’s analysis of I, 34 (pp.103-128) shows that there are other serious problems with the chapter corresponding to E.N. VI.

1197b13 Spengel, [1866] 630, compares 99b19. He could also have referred to 86a15, 07a20 or 12a8 for δυνατὸς εἰμί. The reading of β, if permissible, is a simpler solution than Spengel’s addition of εἶναι. δυνατῶς would balance ὀρθῶς later in the line. In 98b36 we read τῷ μὴ ἀκριβῶς διώρισθαι. Aristotle does not use the adverb δυνατῶς, but L.S.J. cite Aeschines 2.48, Plato Rep. 515d and Herodotus VII.11. (See also Michael of Ephesus in E.N. p.574, 32, Plutarch Caesar 8.1.2.) βουλευέσθαι is dependent on δυνατῶς, and although I know of no parallels for λεγέται τῷ without infinitive,¹⁷¹ we can mentally supply εἶναι. We do not need actually to read it.

¹⁷⁰ Similarly in 97b8 σοφία has not been said to be about τὸ αἰδίων καὶ τὸ θεῖον.

¹⁷¹ The infinitive is present in 09a25-6: τὸ μὲν μαχαίριον τῷ χρήσιμον εἶναι... λέγεται.

1197b14 δέ, now found as a correction in P, is preferable to τε, which leaves the sentence without a connective. (Contrast 97b27.)

1197b26 See my note on 1189b6 for πρακτά.

1197b27-8 Spengel wonders whether we should change one of the demonstrative pronouns to conform with the other. τοιούτοις — τιαῦτα is preferable, if we have to choose between the two.¹⁷² Aristotle often broadens the reference of τοῦτο with τοιοῦτον. At Met. 1048b36 and P.A. 650b3, for instance, he writes: ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ‘from these (considerations) and other such ones’ (cf. G.A. 788b29). But I have not found an example of the opposite. Nevertheless we should leave the text as it is transmitted. Perhaps the author means that the clever man is involved in working out how to achieve aims of different sorts (ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις) and that his province is, precisely, τὰ πρακτά (περὶ ταῦτα).¹⁷³

1197b28 Full stop after ταῦτα. K starts a new paragraph after ταῦτα, as does the Aldine. P, who marks his major divisions of the text with a mark like an English colon also sees a natural division in the text here. ταῦτα is retrospective, not prospective as Susemihl takes it.

1197b28-35 The position of this paragraph is difficult to defend. Not only has M.M. not been talking about σοφία immediately before, but line b36 follows on well from ταῦτα (b28). The reference back to 97b20 in 97b36 is made that much easier if 97b27-35 did not intervene. Moreover, this paragraph corresponds to nothing in

¹⁷² Susemihl's apparatus is unclear. Since τοῖς τούτοις is impossible, I take Spengel to have conjectured τούτοις for τοῖς τοιούτοις.

¹⁷³ M.M. uses the phrase ἐν... καὶ περὶ at 93b1, 93b11, 93b27, 96b5, 98b25, 99a21, 01a36, 06b35-6, 08b4.

E.N., with which M.M. is parallel before (97b18-26 corresponds to E.N. 1144a23-b3) and immediately after (97b36-98a21 corresponds to E.N. 1144b1-30).¹⁷⁴

1197b33 Spengel's addition in this line is not right. M.M. is talking generally about what philosophers do. They examine, in addition to the subject strictly under discussion, whatever happens to be 'in the same thing', i.e. in the same area. It is only in the next sentence that this is applied. The area which M.M. has been discussing is the soul, and there is thus a requirement on him qua philosopher to discuss everything in the soul.

1197b34 ὑπὲρ is in all the manuscripts, not περί. This is the well-known use of ὑπὲρ after verbs of saying which we find in M.M.¹⁷⁵

1197b35 αὐτῆς (instead of ψυχῆς) is a certain conjecture of Spengel. For an example of another gloss getting into the text in some manuscripts, see my note on 1190a35. It is preferable to Vettori's σοφίας simply because αὐτῆς would have been susceptible to being glossed - it is hard to see palaeographically how σοφίας could have become ψυχῆς. For the middle ποιῆσθαι + λόγους ('hold a discussion') compare Met. 981b27 (ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον) and the similar expression at M.M. 98b24, τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ποιήσασθαι, for which Dirlmeier (p.359) cites parallels.

1198a1-2 Susemihl follows Spengel, [1866] 630, who conjectures εἰσὶ for ἔσσι. If we read εἰσὶ, then we take ἀρετὰν to be the subject. Spengel's conjecture is supported by Rassow, [1885] 313, and Donini, [1965] 179. The mss.' ἔσσι is defended by Dirlmeier (p.350), on the grounds that the preceding neuters cause the third person singular, and that we can easily supply ἐγγινόμενα.

¹⁷⁴ Dirlmeier (p.348) suggests that the paragraph be placed after 97a29 or 97b10. I assume that he means 97a30 rather than 97a29.

¹⁷⁵ See Dirlmeier, pp.149-54, 185.

Accepting Spengel's conjecture, we seem to have a threefold division of virtues into φύσει (97b38), ἔθει (98a1), προαιρέσει (98a2). But E.N. VI, 13 offers a twofold division (ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ, ἡ κυρία ἀρετὴ, 1144b3-4, b15-16) and E.E. 1234a29 again distinguishes between two sorts of virtue, one φύσει, the other μετὰ φρονήσεως. M.M. itself does not again mention three types of virtue.

Where we get a threefold division is in Stobaeus 118, 5-6: ἐκ τριῶν δὲ συβεβηκέναι τὴν ἀρετὴν τελειοῦσθαι, φύσεως, ἔθους, λόγου.¹⁷⁶ What is important here is that ἔθος and λόγος are ways in which virtue is completed. In E.N. VI, 13 νοῦς is the capacity that sets adult humans apart from animals and enables us, as opposed to the other animals, to achieve full virtue (1144b8-14). E.N. 1103a24-6 also claims that virtues are 'perfected' διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.¹⁷⁷ It is thus Aristotelian doctrine that natural virtues are completed by habit and by νοῦς.

In fact M.M. may be presenting just two kinds of virtue. We can take ἔθει καὶ προαιρέσει together.¹⁷⁸ Follow Spengel and Donini¹⁷⁹ in reading εἰσί, which is required because of 97b37.

1198a2-3 Rasso's transposition of ἐπιγινόμενοι (a3) to a position after προαιρέσει (b2) is not required by the sentence in a1-2, but by the peculiarity of the sentence in a2-3. Does τελέως go with ἀρεταὶ (so, Armstrong, Dirlmeier, Dalimier) or with ἐπαινεταὶ (so, Stock)? How do we take the two participles, οὔσαι and ἐπιγινόμενοι? ω had the sentence exactly as Susemihl prints it.

ἀρεταὶ arouses suspicion by its unusual position. If it were subject with αἱ, would it not come before τελέως? If it were the complement of εἶσιν, would it not come after εἶσιν? I suggest that ἀρεταὶ is a marginal gloss, supplying the noun with which αἱ agrees. If it is excised, it becomes open what noun to understand with αἱ.

¹⁷⁶ It is difficult to understand how nature can complete a virtue.

¹⁷⁷ Donini's conjecture in a1 is thus not required.

¹⁷⁸ Stock correctly translates 98a1-2: 'and there are also excellences due to custom and choice'. The lack of clarity in M.M. will have been the source for Arius Didymus' threefold division.

¹⁷⁹ Donini, [1965] 179n.2.

The most obvious choice would be ὁρμῶν (a38), and this is supported by 98a20. M.M. allows rational ὁρμῶν (cf. 91a23, 98a7). We would now have (a2-3):

αἱ δὲ δὴ μετὰ λόγου οὐσαί τελέως [ἀρεταί]
εἰσιν ἐπαινεταὶ ἐπιγινόμεναι.

The participle ἐπιγινόμεναι is still awkward. Dirlmeier refers to 06b24 to defend the transmitted prefix ἐπι- which Spengel wanted to delete, and which is omitted in V. In 06b24 M.M. says that irrational ὁρμῶν τῶν παθῶν occur in children and then, later, λόγος ἐπιγίνεται. 06b24 justifies the prefix, but more needs to be said. If 98a2-3 expresses the same thought as 06b24, λόγος ought to be what ἐπιγίνεται in 98a3. But, as the text stands, it is αἱ μετὰ λόγου οὐσαί which ἐπιγίνονται, which is not the same thing. It is likely that there is more corruption than can be undone in this sentence. So rather than giving free rein to conjectures,¹⁸⁰ I would print the text as Susemihl prints it, but place asterisks around οὐσαί — ἐπιγινόμεναι to mark the fact that the passage is corrupt.

1198a7 Rasso, [1885] 313, thinks that the claim that ἡ φυσικὴ ὁρμὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν is οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου contradicts 97b38-9, 98a3-6, 98a17. He raises two possibilities to absolve the author of the contradiction, and prefers to add ἐπαινετή, rather than ἀρετή, after ἔστιν. Donini, [1965] 180n.4, accepts the addition, but is motivated not by there being a contradiction, but by the fact that a7-8 ought to follow from what precedes (διό, 98a6). Becchi, [1980] 204-5, follows Dirlmeier (p.351) in thinking that the transmitted text of a7-8 is consistent with what precedes and what follows, and would not tamper.

Habit and choice can act on irrational impulses to virtue (ὁρμῶν ἄνευ λόγου, 97b38-9), with the result that they become ‘not without reason’ (οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ

¹⁸⁰ Excising ἀρεταί, and reading ἐπιγινόμενου after λόγου, we would have:

αἱ δὲ δὴ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιγινόμενου οὐσαί τελέως [ἀρεταί]
εἰσιν ἐπαινεταί.

Spengel's addition of καὶ in a3, supported by Rasso, cannot be defended by appeal to 98a31. See my note ad loc.

λόγου, 98a7). Line 98a4 makes it clear, if we interpret χωριζομένη temporally, that the irrational ὁρμή is not always separated from λόγος. So Donini is right that there is no contradiction. (Dirlmeier (p.351) is mistaken in seeing a reference to the rational ὁρμή of 91a23, because that type of ὁρμή is not φυσική.) What is more, a6-8 follow from what has preceded. The subject is ἡ φυσικὴ ὁρμὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν. We are told first that it works with λόγος (a7), which follows from a5-6, and then that it is not without reason - which expresses, in a paradoxical way, the same idea. This interpretation demands that ἄνευ λόγου (97b39, 98a4) means ‘irrational’ and that ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου (98a7) means ‘unaccompanied by reason’. It is possible for something irrational to be accompanied by reason - it could listen to reason or be developed by reason.

1198a8 Read ὁ δ’ αὖ for οὐδ’ αὖ ὁ. See my note on 1204b22.

1198a9 Becchi, [1980] 205-6, defends the transmitted reading against Rasso’s conjecture of ὥστ’ for τῷ. Becchi cites Rhet. 1409b8: δεῖ δὲ τὴν περίοδον καὶ τῆ διανοίᾳ τετελειῶσθαι ‘but the period must be completed with (my means of) the sense’. On the basis of this parallel he takes the dative τῷ εἶναι in 98a9 to be an instrumental dative: ‘nor do reason and choice achieve perfection by means of being a virtue detached from the natural impulse’. I cannot make sense of this.

The author has been at pains to stress how natural virtue on its own falls short of being full virtue (98a3-5), but when joined to reason gives full virtue (98a5-6). αὖ in a8 marks a certain parallelism in thought. Just as natural impulses to virtue require reason to be complete virtue (98a7-8), so reason requires natural virtue to be complete virtue (98a8-9). If we look in L.S.J. not at the verb τελειοῦσθαι, but at the adjective τέλειος (I,3), we find helpful references. Plato often uses γίγνεσθαι τέλειος πρὸς ἀρετὴν. At Laws 678b3 he writes: τελέους πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ πρὸς κακίαν γεγονέναι ‘became perfectly virtuous or perfectly vicious’. At Laws 647d1 he writes: τέλειον γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν ‘to become perfect in respect of courage’, i.e. ‘to

achieve perfect courage'.¹⁸¹ I take the dative in 98a9 to be like the Platonic πρὸς and would translate: 'reason and choice do not completely achieve the status of being perfect virtue, without natural impulse'.¹⁸²

1198a10-11 E.N. 1144b28-9 characterises Socrates' position: Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι. ζ has λόγους where α has λόγον, and in L we find τὰς ἀρετὰς instead of τὴν ἀρετὴν, which would be a necessary change if λόγους were accepted. But leave the text as Susemihl has it.

1198a15 Susemihl suggests that we read a contrastive particle, either δὲ or μέντοι, where the mss. have μὲν. But the idea of contrast to what has preceded is included in the word οὐδέ. μὲν in this line is answered by ἀλλὰ in a19, just as ἀλλ' οἱ νῦν βέλτιον (a13) answers οὐκ ὀρθῶς Σωκράτης (a10) and οὐκ ὀρθῶς (a13). We should also read οὕτως for οὔτοι in this line, following the stemma. Compare 83a39.

1198a15 πρόξει is a conjecture of Bekker. We need an optative, but at 99b37, the only place where the aorist optative of πρόττειν occurs, the form used is πρόξειεν. ω read πρόξει and it is as easy palaeographically for an epsilon to be omitted as for an alpha to become an epsilon. To use the form that the author uses is preferable. Print πρόξειε.

1198a17 ὀρμη. Misprint.

1198a18 ζ will have had a second ᾶν, after κελεύσειεν. Bonitz (41a59-b4) records the fact that examples of ᾶν repeated in the same clause are 'non rara'. On the grounds that there is some confusion in the same family over the ᾶν in the following

¹⁸¹ For similar expressions see Aristotle E.N. 1174b22, G.A. 740a29, 750b14, 750b27, H.A. 494a34, Plato Laws 708d7, ps-Plato Alcibiades 120e4, Theophrastus H.P. VI.4.6.9.

¹⁸² In 11b36 M.M. uses the adjective εὐνοῦς + πρὸς and in 12a9-10 uses εὐνοῦς + dative.

line, trust α and leave Susemihl's text. α ν is repeated in M.M. at 84b38. See also my note on 1185a14.

1198a21 Donini is himself wary of adopting his suggestion - to add a sentence to which 00a3-4 can refer back. There is a similar failure of back-reference at 96b4-6.

1198a23 Susemihl wants to read γίνοιτο, but in 97b4 he was happy with γένοιτο. (Compare also 88a13, 96b18, 01b24.)

1198a25 Omit καί, which is poorly attested and makes it less obvious that εἰσὶν belongs to the εἴπερ clause rather than the διότι clause.

1198a26 Rasso's τ is certain.

1198a29 Should we read ἀρετὴ for ἀνδρεία? The generalisation in a28-9 would be more apt if M.M. spoke of virtue generally, rather than the specific virtue of bravery. φρονήσις is going to instruct virtues other than bravery (cf. 98b6).

1198a29 Read αὐτὴ at the end of the line with Spengel and β.

1198a31 Omit both καὶ-s in this line. Only η has the first, and only K has the second. Translate: 'practical wisdom is a completely praiseworthy virtue'.

1198a32-b7 See my note on 1190a33 and Dirlmeier (p.266).

1198a37 ἐποίει at first sight seems odd. We could perhaps explain the imperfect by saying that the author wants to bring out the fact that the design of the house precedes its construction. More worrying is the vacuity of saying 'insofar as he produced the house, he is productive of a house'. Do we not need a word that means

‘designs’, rather than the transmitted ‘made’? However, once we realise that οὗτος refers not to the architect but to the builder, things become clear. The imperfect conveys the thought ‘as has just been said’.

1198b1 Misprint: ἀρχιτέκτων.

1198b1 Misprint: τινος.

1198b2 Dirlmeier (p.354) calls Bonitz’ emendation ‘evidente’. It would be obviously right if ὁ is not read before ὑπηρετικός, because otherwise M.M. would be committed to the thought that the architect is ὑπηρετικός. But if, unlike Bonitz who read Bekker’s text, we read ὁ - and its omission is late - there is no need to add οὗ earlier in the line. The first καὶ in b2 is epexegetic of ποιητικός... τινος (b1). The second καὶ is to be taken closely with τοῦ αὐτοῦ - ‘the same as’. Translate: ‘i.e. is productive of the very same thing as his subordinate’.

I would also follow Wilson and Spengel in reading ὑπηρετής in this line. The assimilation to ποιητικός would be an easy mistake.

1198b6 α had ὅπως... προστάξει. η had ὅπως... προστάξει. β had ὅπως... ἄν προστάξει, which was conjectured by Spengel. The agreement between α and η in not having ἄν suggests that ἄν arose conjecturally in β. A similar passage is 98a28-9, where we read ὡς ἄν αὕτη προστάτῃ. If M.M. expresses exactly the same thought in b6 as in 98a28-9, we would expect ἄν + subjunctive, the standard construction for indefinite sentences. ὅπως + future indicative is found in Aristotle in indirect questions, after verbs of seeing and taking care and in an imperatival sense (Bonitz 520a23-9, whose classification ties in with Kühner-Gerth II, 2, 372-7). But none of these are appropriate here. So accept the reading of β: ὅπως γὰρ ἄν αὕτη προστάξει. We can explain the state of the manuscripts by saying that once ἄν had dropped out,

α tries to restore the grammar by making the verb future indicative, while β correctly restores the sense.¹⁸³

1198b7 Read οἱ with the manuscripts (and Bekker). The subject of πρόπτουσιν is οἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ οἱ κατ' αὐτὰς [sc. ζῶντες].

1198b11 Add ὅτι with α and β, and delete both commas.

1198b16 The only parallels I know of for the passive of ἐκκλείω + genitive of infinitival noun are Athanasius, Expositiones in Psalmos 27.303,26 (ὅπως ἂν ἐκκλεισθῶσι τοῦ κηρύττειν οἱ κήρυκες) and then much later Eustathius Commentary on Iliad vol.3, p.508,18 (ἐκκλειόμενος τοῦ πολεμεῖν). It is however right here: 'excluded from'. (Compare Herodotus I, 144,3.) The alternative, ἐκλύηται does not have the right sense: 'released from'.

1198b18 Spengel wants to read τοῦ for καὶ τὸ which would make the infinitive dependent on σχολήν: 'rest from doing' (L.S.J. s.v. σχολή I, 2). This is the opposite of what M.M. must mean. If the thought is that φρόνησις allows σοφία leisure to do its own job (i.e. to contemplate), then καὶ τὸ could be excised. The transmitted text, in which it is said that φρόνησις provides σοφία with two things - leisure and the performance of its own job, is not an elegant way of expressing the thought, but from the parallel case (98b13-17), we understand that σοφία is enabled to 'do its job' by being afforded leisure-time (cf. 08a9-20).

BOOK II

There has been some discussion of whether the first three chapters of Book II, on equity (II, i), considerateness (II, ii) and good counsel and five ἀπορίαι (II, iii) are

¹⁸³ See p.166 for ἄν.

transmitted in the correct place. But von Arnim, [1924] 81-95, and Dirlmeier (pp.357-371) have set aside the worries of Ramsauer, [1858] 37-40, and show that there is a connection to φρόνησις, the subject of I, xxxiv. They convince in their defence of the location of these three chapters here (and not after I, xxxiii), but whether they show that E.N. is ‘als Korrektur von M.M. zu verstehen’ (Dirlmeier, p.357, cf. pp.318-19, 358-9, 361, 363), is less obvious.

Clearly, a simple compendium of Aristotle would not relocate paragraphs, but it remains possible that the author of M.M. should have consciously rearranged the order of Aristotle for his own philosophical purposes.

1198b29-30 The augment ἦ- is strongly supported by the manuscripts. L.S.J. say that this form is supported from inscriptional evidence from 300 B.C. onwards, and also say that manuscripts often diverge in the augment of βούλομαι (Thucydides II.2; VI.79). There are two places in the corpus where editors use the augment ἦ- in front of this verb, namely Pol. 1259a16 and Oec. 1352a7. The reading of K, ἐ-, will have arisen conjecturally, being the more correct form. The augment in ἦ- occurs nineteen times in Isocrates, who died before Aristotle, so there is no pressure, if we trust the manuscripts in their orthography, to conclude on this basis that M.M. dates to a time after 300 BC.

In the next line all the mss. give ἡδυνήθη, a similarly illogical augment. This also supports the suggestion that we read ἡβούλετο in the previous line. See Schwyzer, [1953] Vol. I, p.654, for these forms.

1198b30 The closely parallel sentence in 98b27-8 has suggested to various scholars that τῷ is wrong in this line. Casaubon wants to read καὶ instead (matching the reading of α in b27), whilst Spengel wants to delete τὰ (matching the reading of ζ in b27). Rasso supports Casaubon’s conjecture, partly on the grounds that it is independently supported by Valla’s translation. However etiam only occurs in the

1590 revision of Valla's translation and was not part of the original rendition by Valla.¹⁸⁴

Dirlmeier (p.359) defends τῶ on the grounds (a) that its insertion is palaeographically unlikely, and (b) that the sentence is construable if we read it. He offers two possibilities: 'was der Gesetzgeber zwar durch Einzelbestimmungen festlegen wollte, aber nicht konnte' or, understanding λέγειν from b28 after ἐβούλετο and repunctuating: 'was der Gesetzgeber aussprechen wollte, indem er Detailbestimmungen erließ'.¹⁸⁵ This construal has the advantage that it does not attribute to the legislators a desire to legislate for all particular cases. When the legislator speaks in general terms, he does so, according to 98b27-8, because he is unable to cater for every particular case. As Rhet. 1374a26-b1 makes clear, excepting those cases in which the legislator omits to legislate when he does not realise that he should (ὄταν λάθῃ), he consciously recognises that to legislate in such a way that all possible circumstances are taken into account would be impossible, and so makes do with a general rule, recognising that it will be an approximate guide - a rule not to be pressed in all circumstances. E.N. 1137a13-16 makes the same point. M.M. 98b29-30, following Susemihl's text, presents us with a legislator who actually wants to make detailed laws - ones which it is not possible to make. The legislator of Rhet. and E.N. would not want to make over-precise laws.

There are, thus, philosophical grounds for preferring Dirlmeier's second construal. But if we punctuate with a comma after μέν (b29) and not after διορίσαι, the position of δέ becomes impossibly late. It would surely come after τῶ (if we retain it, or after ἕκαστα (see Denniston, p.185). Furthermore to supply λέγειν as the verb dependent on ἐβούλετο is not a natural way of taking the Greek.

Follow Rassow in deleting τῶ. The objection raised above (that a legislator does not want to draw up impossibly specific laws) can be surmounted. He does not

¹⁸⁴ See pp.93-4.

¹⁸⁵ In making διορίσαι dependent on ἡδυνήθη, Dirlmeier achieves what Spengel aims at in his transposition, but at considerably less cost.

actually wish that he had made more precise rules, but that the world were different and that ἡ τῶν πρακτικῶν ὕλη (E.N. 1137b19) admitted of precision, so that it was possible to legislate for all cases.

1198b33 L's παρέλιπεν is interesting because it is the verb used at E.N. 1137b21, which, in turn, is the term used by Plato in Laws 828b5-6.

1198b34-5 All the manuscripts have ταῦτα in b34, but we need ταῦτά. In 98b35 the first καί may be an example of the καί that appears after adjectives conveying the idea of equality or similarity, instead of the more normal dative (which is the construction used in 99a4). See Kühner-Gerth II, 1, p.413n.11. By contrast the καί in 97a29 is linked to the καί in a30. See my note on 1197a29.

1198b34-99a1 Dirlmeier (p.360) rightly says that 98b34-99a1 are unconstruable. His solution - punctuating with a full stop after διώρισθαι (98b36) and adding ὁ μὲν οὖν before κριτικός (8b36), would solve the problem. In 98b28-30 and 03b6-7 there are clauses consisting of definite article + participles precede ὁ τοιοῦτος + adjective. Perhaps ὁ γὰρ?

Another question for an editor of these lines is whether or not we should read καὶ γινώσκων in b37. It is easier to account for these words being added by a scribe than to account for their omission. The fact that the verb κρίνειν takes an accusative and infinitive not a ὅτι clause is an argument in favour of retaining καὶ γινώσκων. Do we need to add ἃ after ὅτι in b37 - 'recognising that *what* has been omitted by the legislator is nevertheless just'?

1199a1 Add τῆς after ἄνευ. Only V, of the independent mss., omits the article. Although Dirlmeier (p.360) rightly draws attention to 00a8, line 99a6 shows that it is not essential to have the article. It is on stemmatic grounds that we should read it.

1199a1 Spengel suggests that we transpose the nouns so that the text reads ‘equity is not without considerateness’. 99a2-3 can be understood to allow the possibility that one can be εὐγνώμων without being ἐπιεικής, which contradicts 99a1 which seems to say that ἐπιεικεία is a necessary condition for εὐγνωμοσύνη.

However there is no contradiction (and hence no need to alter the text). I offer two resolutions of the alleged inconsistency: first, the relationship expressed by οὐκ ἄνευ is vague - it just means that the relata are associated;¹⁸⁶ 99a2-3 just explain how they are related. Secondly, although Aristotle only holds that there is unity of the virtues for the moral virtues and not for the intellectual virtues - φρόνησις is not always found in οἱ δεινοί (97b18-26) - M.M. could be claiming here that ἡ ἐπιεικεία and ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη go hand in hand; that there is no such person as the man who judges correctly (in the restricted sphere of what the legislator has omitted) and does not act in accordance with that judgement.

1199a2 τὸ δ’ ἤδη is the reading suggested by the stemma, and should be accepted. ἤδη is a favourite word of M.M.¹⁸⁷ We find ἤδη between definite article and infinitive at 86b38, 95a11. In 99a2 we should take ἤδη temporally. It is not until ὁ εὐγνώμων has made his judgement that ὁ ἐπιεικής can act in accordance with it.¹⁸⁸

1199a2 καὶ has been excised by editors, but should be retained.

1199a14 Susemihl rightly reads ποτε, when Bekker and Bussemaker had followed M and excised it. Compare 1212b8, where, again a late manuscript objects to the unusual combination πότερον δέ ποτε - this is not found elsewhere in the corpus.) In

¹⁸⁶ As in 98a7.

¹⁸⁷ See Brink, [1933] 33.

¹⁸⁸ Susemihl prints δὲ δὴ at 84a13, 95b5, 98a1, 98a2; he also wrongly prints δὲ δὴ at 90a30, 92a24. See my notes on 1190a30 and 1192a24.

00a12 we read *πότερόν ποτε*, as in E.N. 1136b15, Met. 1001a5, 1059a39, 1064a29, 1064b7 (cf. Phys. 250b11, E.E. 1237a20).¹⁸⁹

1199a14 Spengel wonders whether we should add *ἐν* before *τῆ*. From a17 we might expect *τὴν ἔντευξιν*. In a17 the substantival infinitive *τὸ ἀποδιδόναι*¹⁹⁰ takes a dative *ἐκάστω*, an accusative *τὴν ἔντευξιν*, and an adverbial phrase *κατ' ἄξιαν*. In a14-15 we also have *τὸ ἀποδιδόναι* with the dative *ἐκάστω*. *τὸ ἴσον* is probably to be taken adverbially - 'equally', just as M.M. uses *τὸ ὅλον* to mean 'generally'.¹⁹¹ If a14-15 is to be taken as parallel to a17, there is a strong argument for reading *τὴν ἔντευξιν* in a14. I know no parallel for *ἀποδιδόναι τὴν ἔντευξιν*, and M.M. seems to acknowledge the awkward phraseology by having to explain in a16-17 that the phrase means *ἐντυγχάνειν*.

1199a19 Colon after *τοῦτο*.

1199a20 The mss. are equally balanced in their authority for *ὡς* and *ὅσον*. Armstrong, drawing attention to 95a17, 95a19, 95a24 suggests that we read *ὧ*, and Dirlmeier (p.364) independently makes the same suggestion on the grounds that the phrase is formulaic. I prefer *ὡς*, however. The formula in 95a17-24 'knowing the person, the instrument and the aim' is shorthand for everything that is encompassed by knowing *τὰ ἕκαστα*. The doctor differs from the non-doctor by knowing how to apply his knowledge to particular cases (99a34-5). One thing that the doctor knows is the right time (*πότε*, 99a36, cf. 83a12-14) to apply the remedy, one thing that a soldier knows is where it is safe to be (90b23-4). The expression *εἰδώς καὶ ὄν καὶ ὡς καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα* is not meant to be exhaustive. Since 'how' is one of the things that someone acting voluntarily will know, we should keep it. If we take *ὡς* to be short for *ὡς ἔχοντι* or

¹⁸⁹ Further references to *ποτέ* after a question-word are in Bonitz 627b15-17. Add de An. 424a32-3.

¹⁹⁰ That *τὸ* goes with *ἀποδιδόναι* in a17 is confirmed by parallels in 99a2-3, 99a29-30.

¹⁹¹ See Dirlmeier, p.156.

ὡς διακειμένω, there will have been a special reason for the author to use ὡς here: it is picked up by πῶς διακειμένω (99a36, 99b3).¹⁹² Probably it just means ‘how to apply the cure’ (cf. E.N. 1137a15-16).

1199a32 The spelling of ἐλλέβορος varies in different texts. Sometimes it has a rough breathing, sometimes it only has one lambda. See Bonitz 238a24-9 and L.S.J. s.v.

1199a33-4 The mss. unanimously read ὑγεινῶν in a33 and ω will have read ποιητικῶν in a34. There is an important passage at E.E. 1235b31-36a7 in which a distinction is drawn between τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ and τὰ τινα [sc. ἀγαθὰ], ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐ. Aristotle does not give examples of the first sort, but exercise would be an example of something ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν to the body (cf. Rhet. 1362b15-28). He does give examples of the other type of goods - drugs and surgery. Does M.M. have in mind a similar distinction in a31 - between τὰ ὑγεινὰ ἀπλῶς and τὰ ὑγείας ποιητικά? It seems not, since all four medical treatments (hellebore was a cure for madness,¹⁹³ elaterium was a purgative medicine, recorded by the O.E.D. to have been thought useful against dropsy in 1657) are cures for ailments; cures which have to be administered by an expert. A much closer parallel is E.N. 1137a14-17.

If M.M. had wanted to draw the distinction we find in E.E., he could have done so by describing hellebore and elaterium as ὑγεινῶν (neuter) and surgery and cautery as ποιητικῶν (feminine) ὑγείας. But no distinction is drawn. The connectives are καί. We need the same gender for ποιητικῶν as for ὑγεινῶν, and the neuter is normally used when there is a combination of nouns of different genders (Kühner-Gerth II, 1, p.77ff.). The strong ms. support for the feminine plurals is the result of assimilation. Leave Susemihl’s text.

¹⁹² ὡς could, because of its grave accent, have led to ὄσον, which in turn would suggest ὄσον to any scribe wanting to write sense.

¹⁹³ But was also poisonous: On Plants 820b5.

1199b2 The unjust man is said to know that ἡ τυραννὶς is ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν,¹⁹⁴ but not whether it is good for him. If he knows this, then it must be true. But who thinks that tyranny is ἀπλῶς good? A tyrant may, but a peripatetic philosopher would not. Aristotle cannot mention tyranny or tyrants without an adjective like αἰσχρὸς (E.N. 1110a5), πονηρὸς (E.N. 1122a6), φαῦλος (E.N. 1160b10) μοχθηρὸς (E.N. 1160b11).

ἀρχή and πλοῦτος have already been discussed by M.M., at 83b27-35. In the classification of goods they are δυνάμεις, which means that they can be used well, but in the wrong hands can be abused. Obviously, if a tyrant has ἀρχήν (or wealth), it is going to be put to bad use, but in the hands of a beneficent ruler it will be put to good use. Tyranny, by contrast, is not the sort of command that virtuous person could have; it could not, by definition, be ‘used rightly’.

There are two possible escapes from this unwelcome view. The first would be not to press οἶδεν (b2), but to take it to mean ‘he believes’. This would allow the author to distance himself from the (false) beliefs of the unjust man. But apparently in a22 and certainly in a32 εἰδέναι is used in its normal sense ‘to know’. The second would be not to translate ἡ τυραννὶς by ‘tyranny’, but, following Stock, by ‘autocracy’. It is true that Greek did use the word to mean ‘sovereignty’, but the authors who use it in this ‘good sense’ are earlier poets (Pindar, Sophocles, Archilochus, Euripides). It is inconceivable that a philosopher who has read Plato’s Republic could revert to this sense.

I suggest that καὶ ἡ τυραννὶς be excised, as a gloss on ἀρχή. This rescues M.M. from thinking himself that tyranny is ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, and cures the awkward separation of ἀπλῶς from ἀγαθόν. M.M. has in mind the tyrant when he speaks of the unjust man in a political context (cf. E.N. 1160b2, where Aristotle says that the tyrant τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκόπει, and E.N. 1160b8 τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθόν [sc. ὁ τυραννὸς] διώκει), and this led to the gloss. In the rest of the paragraph ἀρχή and wealth reoccur, but tyranny is not alluded to again.

¹⁹⁴ ἀπλῶς must be taken with ἀγαθόν, rather than οἶδεν, because of 99a28, a31, a37-8, b7.

1199b22-3 How does ὑπάρξαι work? The only possibility seems to be: ‘on the grounds that it is not possible that there is to everyone (i.e. that everyone has) ruling’. But then we should expect the definite article, τό, as in b21. I suspect either that we should read the homophonic ἄρχήν for ἄρχειν in b23 (the noun is found in b2, b7, b9, b14, b18, b31, 00a17, a28, a29), or excise ὑπάρξαι, which could have been an alternative reading for ὑπάρχειν (b22). I prefer the first, which allows the word-play which Dirlmeier (p.366¹⁹⁵) observes to remain intact.

1199b24 We need the reflexive form, αὐτόν, since it is not about a third party that the anonymous man is aggrieved.

1199b31 Delete οὐκ, which only arises late in the tradition, and make b30-3 a statement, not a question.

1199b33-4 τὸ σῶμα is another late reading. The accusative of respect after φαῦλος matches the accusative τὴν ψυχὴν in b34.¹⁹⁶ Is there any way to construe the dative τῷ σώματι, strongly suggested by the stemma? There is a similar use of the dative (Kühner-Gerth II, 1, pp.317n.19, 440) found in some prose authors (Thucydides, Xenophon, ps-Isocrates). I would thus retain the dative.

1199b34 οὕτως is a misprint for οὕτως.

1200a1 Dirlmeier (p.368) approves of Spengel’s excision of δεῖν on the grounds (a) that there was no idea of necessity in 97b36-98a1, the passage to which M.M. refers back at 99b38; (b) that τὴν could have become corrupted into δεῖν (in η), and δεῖν τὴν (in α and β) ‘ist eine Art Dittographie’. But we can see from the stemma that ω

¹⁹⁵ Read ‘1205b32’ for ‘1201b32’ in his note (no. 52,9).

¹⁹⁶ See my note 1181b25.

will have read δεῖν τήν, and η omitted τήν (a kind of haplography). Since M.M. is unreliable in several back references elsewhere (he has not actually said before that ἡ τελεία ἀρετὴ is μετὰ φρονήσεως, 00a4; he has not used the term ὀρθὸς λόγος before 96b6, though he claims that he has), we should be wary about making the author more punctilious than he was. Retain δεῖν.

1200a3 In 1859 Rieckher and Bonitz transposed τὸ and ἄμα, and this change has duly won support from Rasso, [1874], and Dirlmeier (p.368).

1200a3 Demote καί to the apparatus.

1200a6 Bonitz' excision of ἦ is better than Dirlmeier's addition of πρόττειν after προστάττει (p.368), because 'yielding to reason' is not something different from 'doing what reason ordains'.

1200a12 Spengel, [1866] 631, asks: 'Cur futur.?' But, as in 96b9, M.M. is using the rhetorical device of anticipating an objection or a worry from a reader/listener. More worrying is the form of the future. L.S.J., s.v. ἀπορέω, cite only this line as an example of the future middle being used in a passive sense. (The form of the future passive is ἀπορηθήσεται). Retain the unusual form, which is not unknown in other verbs.¹⁹⁷ See Kühner-Gerth II, 1, p.114 and Dirlmeier (p.370).¹⁹⁸

1200a17 'Size' is presumably meant to be an example of a bodily good. Arius Didymus (in Stobaeus, p.136, 12-14) gives, as examples of bodily goods: ὑγίεια, εὐαισθησία, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, ἀρτιότης, καὶ πάντα τὰ μόρια σὺν ταῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ ἐνεργείαις. Spengel, [1866] 631, wonders whether μέγεθος is written 'pro ῥώμης', but prefers to excise it, explaining its presence by appeal to a21, a33 where 'de

¹⁹⁷ If there is corruption ἀπορήσει τις would be another possibility.

¹⁹⁸ See my note on 1193a9.

bonorum magnitudine loquitur'. It should be retained - cf. Rhet. 1360b22, 1361a2, 1361b22, E.N. 1123b7.

1200a19 In 00a17-19 M.M. sets up an ἀπορία in which the problem of excess of virtue is discussed. In the case of external goods and bodily goods, excesses have a bad effect on the person who has too much of them (00a12-17). It is important to be clear that ἀλλὰ — γινομένη (a19-23) present one view, namely that virtue does make people worse, whilst a23-34 present the opposite view, which is the view of the author.

There is a textual problem in a19. Let us look at the transmitted text. If we punctuate with a question mark after ἔσται,¹⁹⁹ a comma after οὐ²⁰⁰ and omit Bonitz' οὐ, we have (00a17-20): 'Is it the case with virtue that if someone has an excess of justice or bravery, he will be worse? 'Surely not', he says, 'but...'. The sentence beginning with ἀλλὰ is a continuation of his reply, as φησὶν (a21) shows.

Despite the great support - Armstrong, Stock and Dirlmeier follow Scaliger and Ramsauer in excising φησὶν in a19 - I think that the transmitted text is fine. The solution lies in seeing ἢ οὐ as the answer to the πότερον question, and not as part of it. See pp.167-8.

1200a19 Excise τῆς with α A K.

1200a22 Spengel's γάρ is not necessary. The sentence τῆς — γινομένη (a22-3) does not actually add anything to the previous sentence. That virtue is a cause of honour (a22) we know from a19-20; that an increase in virtue makes people worse (a23) we know from a22-3. So the sentence τῆς — γινομένη (a22-3) does not justify or even explain what has preceded. Retain the mss.' δέ.

¹⁹⁹ P and B punctuate thus.

²⁰⁰ The mss. do not punctuate at all here.

1200a26-7 The present participle in β is supported by the similar sentence at 07b36, where the mss. are unanimous in reading the present participle.

1200a28 The future indicative is less well attested than the aorist subjunctive. But the subjunctive is grammatically unlikely (See Kühner-Gerth, II, 2, p.474). Susemihl gives us a future indicative, which is also unlikely, since that would convey (quite inappropriately) a threat, and we would expect a future indicative in the apodosis.

From the apodosis and the sense we expect a remote protasis, i.e. an optative: χρήσαιτο. The closest parallels are at 07b36-7 and 08b31 (See my note on 1193b1-2 for further instances of εἰ + opt. in M.M.)

1200a29-30 It is difficult to make a decision on the definite articles in these two lines. All mss. have ἡ in a30. But this should not commit us to reading ἡ before τιμή and before ἀρχή in a29. We should read δὴ τιμὴ οὐτε ἀρχή in a29, which - so long as we are happy with the particle δὴ in a29 - is strongly supported by the stemma. There were no definite articles in 27-8, nor in 99b18-19, b31, 00a17.

1200a30 Rasso, [1858] and [1874], rightly defends the old reading ὅστε against ὅσπερ which Bonitz and Bussemaker had printed.

1200a35 Read μὲν οὖν for μὲν. Susemihl follows the Aldine, but no independent manuscript. For relevant parallel of μὲν οὖν cf. 82a26 μέχρι μὲν οὖν τούτου καλῶς· μετὰ μέντοι τούτου (δὲ ταῦτα α) οὐκέτι ὀρθῶς. (Cf. also 00b6-7.)

1200a36 ποιησαμένους for ποιησαμένοις (Misprint).

1200a37-8 The first half of this sentence was rightly suspected to be corrupt by Sylburg. There is an abundance of nominatives. Neither of Spengel's conjectures are convincing. The second emendation would rule out ἀκρασία and ἐγκρατεία being a

vice and a virtue of what ever sort. The context, however, shows that the author does think that they are virtues or vices of a sort²⁰¹ - unusual²⁰² ones - and that their unusual status means that they cannot be defined in the same way as standard ones. The first conjecture, by introducing an εἰ, again adds a doubt in the author's mind that is not in place.

The first factor to note is the symmetry between the ὡςπερ clause and the ὁσαύτως clause: εἰσιν ἄτοποι (a38) corresponds to ἀτόπους γίνεσθαι (a39). One solution might be to excise καί (with good ms. support) and also the two definite articles in a37. We could then (just) translate: 'Just as these things are virtue and vice of an unusual sort...', but the Greek would be unnatural.

Simpler palaeographically and linguistically would be to read ὡςπερ δέ, ἦ ἄρετή καὶ κακία, ἀδῦται εἰσιν ἄτοποι,... We would then have 'just as, qua virtue and vice, these (sc. continence and incontinence) are unusual, so it is necessary that the account we shall give of them be unusual'. The corruption will have arisen simply: ἦ became ἡ, and then, in an attempt to link the two nominative singulars with the nominative plural, the καί was added in one branch of the tradition. Winterbottom's excision is also attractive - ἡ ἄρετή καὶ ἡ κακία could have been a gloss on ἀδῦται and sense and grammar are restored. But the gloss would have been unnecessary - the antecedent of ἀδῦται is glaringly obvious. I prefer the circumspect ἦ.

1200b1 αὐτή is picked up by ταύτης in 00b3. The reading of α, ἡ τοιαύτη, while perhaps continuing the qualification that continence is not an authentic virtue, would only have a point if there were other such 'virtues' of which similar accounts could be given. But there are not.

²⁰¹ In 11a40-b2 acrasia is implicitly a vice. If I understand 93b14 correctly, a man with all the virtues can be ἐγκρατής. See my note ad loc. Aspasius thinks that ἐγκράτεια is a virtue (1,17) and that acrasia is a vice (96,26).

²⁰² Most often in Aristotle ἄτοπος means 'absurd', i.e. obviously false. This cannot be the meaning here: lines a38-9 cannot propose to give an absurd account.

1200b6 The author has introduced the three ways in which we are bad, and in order to introduce the last two it is only necessary to eliminate κακία. Whether or not virtue has been treated is irrelevant. If we retain καὶ ἀρετῆς (b6), then the statement is, of course, true - virtue and vice have already been treated (84b22-00a34) - but this does not mean it is right. It is tempting to excise καὶ ἀρετῆς which may have got in from 00a37, or may have been introduced by a scribe who wanted to make the reference of the topics which have been treated so far more complete.

The transmitted reading would have to be defended by treating καὶ ἀρετῆς as parenthetic. Although the promise in b7-8 is to treat acrasia and bestiality, in fact the author will also discuss their opposites, continence and the unnamed opposite of bestiality. If we treat the section b4-8 as a compressed way of saying that of the three γινόμενα in the soul according to which we are called bad, one has been dealt with (κακία), and of the three γινόμενα in the soul according to which we are called good, one has been dealt with (ἀρετή), then the passage naturally prepares us for what follows - a discussion of the two remaining states according to which we are called good and of the two remaining states according to which we are called bad.

It may be, then, that the words καὶ ἀρετῆς are a parenthetic reminder to us that the argument has been compressed for the sake of brevity. If we were either to place brackets round these words or to put commata either side of them, the question ‘what is it?’ (τί ἐστὶ)²⁰³ has to jump back past καὶ ἀρετῆς to κακίας. But the defence of the transmitted reading is a little intricate and a scribe’s gloss intruding is a more likely solution.

1200b12 Full stop after ἀνώνυμος (with ω).

1200b13-14 M.M. is less clear than Aristotle (E.N. 1145a15-27) on the question of θηριότης and the unnamed condition which is its opposite. Aristotle and our author

²⁰³ Note that we do not have τίς. This is standard. Cf. my note on 1206b35.

both describe the second as ‘above man’ (ὑπὲρ ἡμῶς, ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον), and further, as a heroic or divine virtue. Thereafter the two treatments separate. In E.N. there follows a) an example from Homer of a mortal (Hector) looking divine, b) the story that mortals become gods by having too much virtue (ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς). These two points justify for Aristotle that the divine type of virtue is not just ordinary virtue but something more honourable (τιμιώτερον) than virtue. In M.M., by contrast, we get ‘This virtue is nameless because god does not have virtue. For god is better than virtue, and it is not through virtue that he is good.’ M.M. differs in two significant ways: first, the condition is described as ‘without a name’, whereas in E.N. this is not explicitly held (but see 45a19 for implicit claim); secondly, in E.N. the fact that god does not have virtue is used to show that the condition being examined is not a virtue, but in M.M. god’s not having virtue is used, in the transmitted text, to explain why that condition is unnamed.

K, alone of the independent mss., has the particle δέ in b13, which given the transmitted text, is certainly an improvement on οὐν. But it will have arisen by conjecture. The readings of K (δέ) and V (om.) will have arisen because in η there was no particle.

The text could be improved by conjecture. We could write ἀλλ’ οὐκ for ἀνόνημος οὐν in b13 (see 86a38 for parallel). Translate ‘But this is not virtue because god does not have virtue’. What follows this sentence is the needed justification for the claim that god does not have virtue, not a reason why god’s not having virtue necessitates that the condition be nameless. If this conjecture is right, the corruption will have happened at two stages: οὐκ will have become οὐν and then, seeing both that the resulting sentence (ἀλλ’ οὐν ἐστὶν αὕτη ἀρετή, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν θεοῦ ἀρετή.) (‘Anyway, this is virtue, because...’) is silly, and that ἀνόνημος is an adjective that is used twice in this paragraph, a scribe tried to restore some sense and changed ἀλλ’ to ἀνόνημος.

That the author of M.M. continues to use the term ἀρετή after this point is unworrying. The very fact that there is no name for it, combined with the need to refer

to it in a concise way, exonerates the strict inconsistency (which is present too in E.N. (1145a19-20, a26)). It is in any case not described as a virtue simpliciter but as the virtue which is opposed to θηριότης.

1200b14 Read βέλτιον as a) the lectio difficilior, b) the reading demanded by the stemma. Cf. Topics 117b34 for identical corruption, where Ross makes the same editorial decision.

1200b16 Retain the second τῆ, given b18. It is also demanded by the stemma.

1200b17 δὴ has strong manuscript support, but P and L's δὲ is preferable.

1200b20 Bekker's ἄν is needed if δέοι is right.²⁰⁴ Parallels in this text for the thought 'First, it is necessary...' are numerous. πρῶτον is coupled with δεῖ + infinitive (82a1, 82a32), with ἀναγκάειον + infinitive (93b12), with -τέον + ἄν εἴη (81a24, 04b4, 08b26), and with -τέον on its own (85b21, 87b38). Never do we find πρῶτον ἄν δέοι. But it would be rash to rule out such a combination on the grounds of such a small sample of text and to read δεῖ for δέοι.

1200b22 Retain καὶ ἐναντιουμένων which will have dropped out by omission ex homoeoteleuto in one branch of the tradition.

1200b25 New paragraph.

1200b31 λεγόμενον is a brave conjecture in L. πιθανός means persuasive, and the most obvious things that can be persuasive are words. Bonitz (s.v.) has examples of arguments, proofs, thoughts, words, speeches, beliefs, people, plots of plays and

²⁰⁴ See above p.166.

evidence, all of which can be *πιθανοί*. On its own in Bonitz' lexicon is the example from M.M. - on its own first because it is the only instance of the adverb, and secondly because it is the only instance of a non-linguistic item being *πιθανός*. What do we make of events being *πιθανά*? Prof. Winterbottom has suggested to me that *φανέρως* would be a more appropriate word than *πιθανῶς*, but how would it have arisen? Retain the transmitted text.

1200b33 L's *καὶ* and D's *ἢ* are not so good as *ἢ*. For *θεωρεῖν* + dative, cf. Pol. 1254b20 *τῷ λόγῳ θεωρήσαι*.

1200b34 Only *η* gives the text as Susemihl prints it. The other four manuscripts omit *οὐκ*, omit the full-stop after *δόξειεν*, and omit *γάρ*. Both readings express the same thought in perfectly idiomatic Greek, but the stemma demands that we read *ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἂν δόξειεν ἄτοπον τὸ κράτιστον...*

1200b37 *οὗτος ὁ λόγος* refers to the argument that has just been advanced - viz. that it is absurd that the strongest and most steadfast thing in us (knowledge) should be overcome by anything. What does this argument 'oppose'? Dirlmeier thinks that the Socratic thesis that the so-called acratik has knowledge is being attacked. *ἐναντιοῦται*, on Dirlmeier's view, stands on its own; the dative *τῷ εἶναι* expresses the way in which the Socratic thesis is opposed.²⁰⁵ Dirlmeier thinks that the transmitted reading can yield the correct sense. He translates in his notes (p.375): 'Er ist ein Gegen-Logos durch das Ergebnis 'μη εἶναι ἐπιστήμην'.' Susemihl's conjecture²⁰⁶ <ὅστ' αὐ>*τῷ*, like the interpretation of Dirlmeier, leaves *ἐναντιοῦται* standing on its own. The text with Susemihl's conjecture incorporated would mean 'Again this argument is opposed with the result that the acratik does not have knowledge'. What

²⁰⁵ For parallels of *τῷ* + infin., see my note on 1197a37.

²⁰⁶ Adopted by Armstrong.

would be being opposed would be Socrates' belief that the so-called acratia has knowledge.

Others have taken the dative not as a dative of manner, but as expressing the indirect object of ἐναντιοῦται, as stating to what the argument (about the steadfastness of knowledge) is opposed. The transmitted text yields 'This argument opposes there not being knowledge (in the acratia)', but this cannot be what the author meant. (The next sentence begins with the assumption that the acratia does not have knowledge.) Hence Spengel omits μὴ in order to reverse the sense.²⁰⁷ We would have 'This argument (about the steadfastness of knowledge) opposes there being knowledge (in the acratia)'. It will not be Socrates who is being attacked, but those who think a) that acrasia exists, b) that knowledge is overruled.

So who is being attacked? Socrates has been disposed of at 00b29-32. The author is now working on the hypothesis that acrasia does exist (00b32-3). The πάλιν in b37 need not introduce a new argument against Socrates, but could signify the fact that we have a second ἀπορία. The author is setting up ἀπορία. We have had Socrates' argument and a reply to it (00b25-32), the suggestion that the acratia man (who exists) has knowledge and a reply to it (00b32-8), and we are just about to have the suggestion that the acratia has belief - not a Socratic thesis²⁰⁸ - opposed by an argument that this is not the case (00b38-01a6). 'Such arguments cause us problems' (01a6). The structure of the passage shows that the argument about the steadfastness of knowledge is directed not against Socrates, but against those who think a) that acrasia exists, b) that knowledge is overruled. This fact weakens Dirlmeier's case.

A further argument against Dirlmeier's interpretation is that the conclusion of the argument about the steadfastness of knowledge would not be made explicit. We would have to supply (simply enough) the conclusion that the acratia does not have

²⁰⁷ Stock translates the transmitted text without a lacuna: 'So that this argument again runs counter to there being knowledge'. But this is not what the Greek means. μὴ is left untranslated.

²⁰⁸ At least, not a thesis presented as being Socrates' in E.N. or M.M.. In Plato's Protagoras Socrates holds slightly different views.

knowledge. This is the conclusion that Dirlmeier thinks the author is using to attack Socrates. Spengel, by contrast, takes the sentence (b37-8) to state the conclusion.²⁰⁹

ἐναντιοῦσθαι can stand on its own, and does not always have a dative. In M.M. 06b27 and Pol. 1307b14 it means ‘resist’, but in both those cases it is obvious from the context what is being resisted. Far more frequently it does take a dative, which expresses what it is that is opposed. In M.M. we see this at 88a6, 95b26, 00a5, 00b3, 00b4, 00b21, 03a4, 03a5, 11b3. (In 88a17 it is not stated but we supply τούτῳ from 88a6). In E.E. and E.N. the dative expressing what is being opposed is always present.

So, on the grounds that a) we need a dative to show what is being opposed, b) the sentence ought to state the aporetic conclusion, c) the transmitted text does not do this, I would follow Spengel’s simple deletion of μή. We do not need the αὐτῷ that Spengel and Susemihl suggest. It is obvious from the context that knowledge in the acritic is what does not exist (cf.01a7). There would be nothing wrong in reading αὐτῷ for μή, except that it is more plausible that a stray negative has entered the text than that μή should have been mistaken for αὐτῷ.

1201a3 The deletion of οὐ in K is obviously right.

1201a8-9 Susemihl’s text in a8 follows a fifteenth century manuscript, M, in reading συμβαίνειν ἐποίουν. In his apparatus he has confused lines 01a8 and 01a9. The word ἐποιοῦν is present in only one branch of the family in a8. The words got reversed in descendants of those manuscripts, presumably to conform with the unanimous ordering of the same words when they occur in the line below. All manuscripts have ἐποιοῦν in a9. Arguments like the ones just given cause ἀπορίας (a6). There then follows an explanation (γάρ a7): some arguments denied that the acritic has

²⁰⁹ Dirlmeier (p.375) uses 98a9 as a parallel passage for τῷ εἶναι being used in the same way. But even Dirlmeier concedes that the text may need to be emended there (p.351). But the parallel is not a good one even if the passage at 98a9 stands. τελειοῦσθαι does not normally take the dative, ἐναντιοῦσθαι does.

knowledge, others denied him belief. There is reason, then, to be at a loss about what the akratic does have.

The γάρ in a7 points to the fact that what follows will explain how ‘such arguments’ cause us to be puzzled. They are puzzling precisely because the views (that the akratic does not have knowledge and that the akratic does not have belief) are motivated (the γάρ in a8).²¹⁰ The two conclusions, that the akratic has neither knowledge nor belief, together form an ἀπορία. Both arguments assumed the truth of a premise, and drew conclusions that were obviously false.

An alternative interpretation would be to take the γάρ in a7 to explain how the two views individually produce ἀπορία: whatever view one takes on the attitude of mind of the akratic - whether he has knowledge or belief - one reaches absurdity, and these are the ἀπορία which the arguments cause (a6). The chief problem with this view is the two γάρ in a8. If the author were presenting the two λόγοι as reaching absurd conclusions, the particles in a8 would be inexplicable.

Rather, the ἀπορία results from the assumption that the akratic has knowledge - it is absurd that the most steadfast thing in us is overcome (00b34-6) - and from the assumption that the akratic has belief - absurdly the akratic will turn out not to be blameworthy. Neither knowledge nor belief seem to be the epistemic state of the akratic.

Before looking at a8, it is best to be clear on the text in a9. It is not clear whether Susemihl intentionally excluded ἐποιοῦν in a9, given the confusion in his apparatus. Dirlmeier thinks that it indispensable here. It is grammatically indispensable. The γάρ at the end of a8 gives the reason for the arguments’ denying that the akratic has belief. ‘Others denied that the akratic has belief on the grounds that they caused an absurdity to result.’²¹¹ They drew the absurd conclusion (that the akratic is not blameworthy 01a5-6) from the premise that the akratic has belief.

²¹⁰ See E.E. 1235b13-15 for this point.

²¹¹ Cf. 84a24, 99a24-5, 06b7-8 for ἀτοπον συμβαίνει.

Let us now look at a8. If we omit ἐποιοῦν in a8, and read συμβαίνει (the reading of β), ἄτοπὸν τι will be nominative. The clause will not be part of what the argument alleged, but will be the explanatory words of the author. The author will be saying what the grounds were for reaching the conclusion. The problem with this reading is that it is undesirable that the author should commit himself to agreeing that the argument is valid. It is important that he distances himself from the argument. He ought not to grant that the argument that the akratic cannot have belief is a good one.

If we omit ἐποιοῦν in a8, and read συμβαίνειν (the reading of P¹ and η, and the reading suggested by the stemma), then the γάρ at the start of line a8 provides an explanation of how the argument that the akratic does not have knowledge was motivated: they stated this because they said that otherwise an absurdity would arise. (The absurdity is that knowledge would be overpowered.) ἔφασαν would govern the accusative and infinitive ἄτοπὸν τι συμβαίνειν. It would be being reported that the conclusion that the akratic does not have knowledge was reached by a reductio ad absurdum. The distancing from the argument is achieved by συμβαίνειν being in oratio obliqua.

If we read ἐποίουν συμβαίνειν in a8 (the reading of C and P²), then the arguments denying knowledge to the akratic are said to have caused something absurd to arise. ἄτοπὸν τι will be accusative, and συμβαίνειν will be governed by ἐποίουν. They have caused something absurd to arise from the thesis that knowledge is in the akratic. This has the same force as if we omit ἐποίουν. That reading says ‘they said that an absurdity arose’, this ‘they caused an absurdity to arise’. In both cases the absurdity arose from assuming that knowledge was in the akratic.

The last two readings canvassed are each grammatically possible and provide good sense. The reading of P¹ and η is preferred because of its difficulty. A failure to understand the infinitive led to the changes we find in C P² and β.

Demote ἐποιοῦν to the apparatus in a8, but retain ἐποιοῦν in a9.

1201a12 δεοίσει, the reading of C is a vox nihili, but διοίσει (the future of διαφέρω) merits attention when the question under examination is whether the encratic and the temperate man are the same or different (01a9-16, 03b12-23). I do not think that it is right, unless there is severe corruption elsewhere in the passage.

1201a14-15 The section 01a10-16 is intended by the author to represent confusing, and thus, presumably, conflicting views (01a9-10). The problem arises from the belief that the temperate man is encratic (a10). Those who confusedly believe this find themselves at a loss about whether the temperate man has strong appetites or not (a11-12). It is a mistake to treat this section as directly raising the question ‘Is the temperate man encratic?’ The section raises aporetic consequences of holding the belief that the answer to this question is ‘Yes.’ The λύσις of the ἀπορία (03b12-23) adds further distinctions - importantly, the moral status of the appetites, and the implicit distinction between states and capacities - but accepts the view that the temperate man is encratic. What, then, are the aporetic consequences of this belief? If the belief that the temperate man is encratic is true (a12), then he will have strong appetites.

Hypothesis: All temperate men are encratic (a12)
 All encratic men have strong appetites (a13-14)
 ∴ All temperate men have strong appetites (a12-13)

But this is counter-intuitive.

The next sentence is the difficult one. First, Rassow’s conjecture of ἐστίν for ἔσται (a15) must be right, and it is right independently of whether his other two conjectures are accepted. The future tenses that have run through a11-15, are not temporal, but logical.²¹² Susemihl’s punctuation in this passage is excellent, and shows

²¹² The same is true of οὐκέτι in a15: there is not a time at which the temperate man ceases to be temperate, but there is a certain description of the temperate man, under which it would not be true to call him ‘temperate’.

the structure well. Even retaining the transmitted readings μή in a14 and οὐ in a15, the future ἔσται cannot express a logical consequence. Whether Rassow is right or not in his other conjectures, adopt his change of the mss. ἔσται to ἐστίν (a15).

The transmitted text, ignoring for the moment Rassow's conjectures - his deletion of μή and addition of οὐ in a14 and a15 respectively - provides a further argument to the effect that the temperate man does have strong appetites. The contrary of what has just been proved (a12-13) is assumed, and an attempt is made to deduce a reductio ad absurdum:

Denial of conclusion at a13-14: The temperate man does not have strong appetites

(a14-15)

Fact (reading οὐ γὰρ... ἐστίν...): The temperate man does have some appetites

(a15-16)

Implicit premise: 'X has some appetites and X does not have strong appetites' is a contradiction

∴ The temperate man is not temperate (a15) - which is absurd

As it stands, this argument is unsound. The implicit premise is false. But the context, and the formulation of what I have called the 'fact' allows us to understand a15-16 more broadly than is literal. For what is actually said is 'The temperate man is not the person who desires nothing and does not feel anything'.²¹³ The transmitted text has four negatives in the sentence. If we understand that emphasis to signify that it is an understatement, and should not be taken literally, that he in fact does have strong appetites, then the argument will go through:

Denial of conclusion at a13-14: The temperate man does not have strong appetites

(a14-15)

²¹³ I take it that μήδε πόσων μηθὲν in a16 is another way of saying 'not subject to strong desires'. (Cf. 03b20-1.) This means that the same thing is said twice, but it would conform with the exaggerative tone.

Fact: The temperate man does have strong appetites (a15-16)

Implicit premise: 'X has strong appetites and X does not have strong appetites' is a contradiction

∴ The temperate man is not temperate (a15) - which is absurd.

The transmitted text, then, started with the belief that the temperate man is encratic and puts forward two arguments to defend such a view. Everything points to the temperate man being encratic. Seemingly, we do not have an ἀπορία.

Rassow's conjectures on a14-15 (deleting μή and changing οὐ to ὁ)²¹⁴ do provide us with a text that states an ἀπορία. On the one hand the temperate man seems to have strong appetites (a10-11), but on the other hand, not to. But the cost of making the changes that Rassow does is that in a15, reading ὁ for οὐ, the author of M.M. asserts here that the temperate man has no appetites or πάθη, which is a direct contradiction of 91b10 where these are the marks of the ἀναίσθητος man. Rassow acknowledges this, but points out that there are other places where the author of M.M. contradicts himself.²¹⁵ So coherence has been gained in the short extract, but at the expense of an inconsistency. Rassow's respect for the author of M.M. was not great, but to emend as he did causes as many problems as it solves. Can we find a way of restoring sense to this passage without making the author of M.M. contradict himself?

Dirlmeier thinks he can (pp.375-6): on the grounds that ἀπορία must state the opposite of what the author himself thinks, and since the author of M.M. later asserts that the temperate man is continent (03b13), he must present the case in 01a9-16 that the temperate man is not continent, and this is what we find, according to Dirlmeier:

²¹⁴ Rassow, [1858] 19; [1874] 106-7. Dirlmeier, who in fact opposes Rassow's conjectures, comments (p.376) that M's ὁ could have been a result of corruption originating in majuscule script where both ὁ and οὐ were written as O. We now know that this is not the case. Rav., the first ms. to carry this reading, was made from a manuscript written in minuscule.

²¹⁵ In 03b20 the πάθη in question are not all πάθη but bad desires as the context makes clear, so the σώφρων man is not confused with the ἀναίσθητος man there: the first does not have base desires, the second does not feel pleasure at anything.

The equation of the temperate man and the encratic man, Dirlmeier thinks, is made in order to show its impossibility: first, the temperate man will have to have strong appetites (which is impossible). Secondly, if strong appetites are not (μή) to be ascribed to the temperate man, it will be impossible to describe him as temperate any more, for the temperate man will (ἔσται) not (οὐ) be a man totally without feeling - will not be the ἀνοίσθητος man.

I do not understand how Dirlmeier (p.375) thinks the γάρ (a15) explains what has preceded. The consequence that the temperate man's nature is destroyed is derived from the temperate man not being like the continent man - the continent has strong appetites, whereas the temperate, according to Dirlmeier, cannot. So Dirlmeier's 'impossibility' does not stem from the equation of the encratic and the temperate man.

I would retain μή in a14 and read the transmitted οὐ in a15. We thus have two arguments for the counter-intuitive thesis that the temperate man has strong desires. It is in the unlikelihood of the truth of the reasoned conclusion that the ἀπορία lies.

1201a16 The mss. split on the position of πάλιν. πάλιν usually occurs in the first four words. Of the 36 times that the word appears in this text (excluding its occurrence here and that at 02a6 which must be excised), eighteen times it comes first word in the clause or in the sentence, eight times second word, five times third, and three times fourth (95b13, 95b35, 06a38). Of the remaining two occurrences (92b22, 01a9) both are emphatic. This survey might suggest that we should print ἔχει δὲ πάλιν καὶ in 01a16. But the formulation ἔχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀπορίαν in 99b10, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπορίαν in 99b36, οὐχ ἦττον δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήσεται in 00a12, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπορεῖται in 08b22-3 outweigh the rule that πάλιν should come early: δὲ καὶ are not split. So, retain the ordering Susemihl has.

1201a17 Rasso's τινων (1874) is unnecessary. His reason was that the arguments follow the announcement that there are arguments. The definite description is thus out

of place, since the reader will not yet be able to pick out what is uniquely satisfied by ‘the arguments’, Rassow thinks. τινῶν, by contrast, leaves the reference indefinite, and what follows (i.e. the arguments) will make it clear which arguments were meant. Rassow refers to E.N. 1146a27 συμβαίνει ἔκ τινος λόγου ἢ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ ἀκρασίας ἀρετή.

But the λόγοι could be one of the ἐναντιούμενοι λόγοι of 00b21. As Dirlmeier says (p.377) ‘Es sind ‘bekannte’ Argumente’. Retain τῶν. Place a colon after ψεκτόν (a18) to clarify. The subject of φησὶν in a19, is one of the two arguments.

1201a22 Rassow’s future tense is tempting. Uniformly, except here, the author writes πρόπτω not the earlier Attic form πράσσω.²¹⁶ A future is required because of ἐάσει (a21), πράξει (a23), κωλύσει (a24). I take the remark in a22 to be part of the current case-study, backed up by the general truth about what acraties are like (τοιούτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ ἀκρατής), rather than itself a general remark about acraties.

1201a22-5 Susemihl places two sentences in brackets, but leaves them in the text. The problem with a23-5 is that the author has already set up (with third person singular imperatives) the psychology of the strange acratie - how we are to imagine that he goes wrong in his reasoning of what is fine (a19-20), and how his appetite is for fine things (a20-1), so ἡ γὰρ — τῶν καλῶν (a23-5) is redundant.

The passage on the acratie man’s psychology (a18-21) is repeated in effect in a23-5:

ἔστω... τις... διαμαρτηκῶς τῷ λογισμῷ	=	διαμαρτανέτω...τῷ
τῶν καλῶν (a24-5)		λογισμῷ (a18-20)

ἡ δ’ ἐπιθυμία ἀγέτω ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ (a20-1) = ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐπὶ ταῦτα

²¹⁶ See above, p.167.

[= τὰ καλὰ] ἀγέτω (a23-4)

And again, in the depiction of the strange encratic man, the same account is given of someone whose reasoning is at fault, but who has an appetite for fine things, and it is given twice.²¹⁷

διαμαρτανέτω τῷ λόγῳ (a27)	= ὁ διαμαρτάνων τῷ λόγῳ (a30)
ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἀγέτω ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ (a28-9)	= ἐπὶ ταῦτα [= τὰ καλὰ] γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἦγεν (a32-3)

There is one difference in terminology between the description of the acratic and the encratic. Each man is said to be in error - the acratic in his reasoning (τῷ λογισμῷ (a19, a24)), but the encratic in his reason τῷ λόγῳ (a27, a31). λογισμός and λόγος are not synonymous. It is, though, a consequence of having reasoned wrongly that one is wrong in one's reason. There is thus a reason for the participle in a19 to be perfect, and that in a27 to be present - reasoning produces a reason, and so comes first.

There is, however, a significant difference between the two 'repetitions'. In the account of the encratic, the imperatives do not occur twice. There is a more coherent ordering: i) Imagine a man who.... (a27-9), ii) given the definition of ἐγκράτεια (a29-30), iii) our man will do bad things (a30-3), iv) and so, strangely enough, will be blameworthy (a33-5).

Read ἦγεν (from a33)²¹⁸ for ἀγέτω in a24, and the ordering, imperative then indicative, will be symmetrical to that found in the presentation of the encratic man. But we would need a past tense of κωλύω in a24 - the attempt to prevent by reason

²¹⁷ Dirlmeier (p.377) uses the length of this ἀπορία, (twice as long as its presentation in E.N.) as an argument against those who think that M.M. is a summary of Aristotle. 'Welche Kompilator würde das Kompilierte gerade in diese Form transponieren?' The length of the ἀπορία is not due to the author saying twice as many things as Aristotle, but to his inconcise formulation.

²¹⁸ See my note ad loc.

will have happened before the action.²¹⁹ ἐκόλυεν would be ideal. Further, the next sentence διαμαρτανέτω... τῶν καλῶν does not, as it stands, contribute to the argument (γάρ, a24) - how can an imperative provide a reason for anything? If we change διαμαρτανέτω to the perfect indicative (διημάρτηκε) (indicative to conform with the argument about the encratic, perfect to conform with a19), the fact that he has made a mistake in his reasoning (λογισμός) will provide, indirectly, an explanation of why his reason (λόγος) is opposed to him acting: he has come to have a λόγος which is opposed to the things for which he has an appetite - fine things - as a result of bad reasoning.

Drastic surgery is thus required to make sense of a23-5. ἀγέτω] ἦγεν, κωλύσει] ἐκόλυε, διαμαρτανέτω] διημάρτηκε. Nothing would be lost if ἡ γὰρ — τῶν καλῶν (a23-5) were not in the text. They do not add a thing. οὐκοῦν in a25 follows from πράξει ἄρα τὰ καλά in a23, as Susemihl saw. In short, these two sentences are not integrated into the text. I therefore suggest that square brackets be put around either ἡ γὰρ — τῶν καλῶν a23-5, or where Susemihl has ordinary brackets in a24-5. Whatever the extent of the interpolation, it will have originated as a marginal gloss.

1201a27 New paragraph after συμβαῖνον.

1201a29 Armstrong's conjecture (δέ γε ἔστω) is unnecessary. The transmitted text can be defended on the grounds that we do not need to suppose that the encratic is as he is - he just is like that. Cf. the corresponding statement of fact in a22.

1201a31 The text cannot be allowed to stand as Susemihl prints it. Susemihl says that there is either a lacuna or corruption. The problem is that ὁ διαμαρτάνων (a30-1) refers to a person but this is not a possible subject of κωλύσει (a31). The depictions of

²¹⁹ κωλύειν (a24) cannot be a success-verb: X can κωλύειν Y from φ-ing, and Y nevertheless φ (cf. E.N. 1147a32). The word must mean 'try to prevent', since, for the acratic, reason does not get its own way. a24-5 then provides a reason why λόγος tries to prevent the agent from doing fine things: he has made a mistake in his reasoning and has reached a reason which is opposed to the desire for fine things.

the strange acratia man (who turns out to be praiseworthy) and the strange encratia man (who turns out to be blameworthy) are similar. Both are mistaken in their reasoning (a19, a27), and so both think fine things are base (a20, a27); both have an appetite for fine things (a20-1, a28-9). They differ in that in the case of the acratia, fine actions are performed, but in the case of the encratia, base actions are performed. The similarity of the language in these two depictions provides a helpful tool with which to work out what the author is saying in the problematic a31.

The sort of thing which prevents (κωλύσει) someone from doing something is λόγος (a21, cf. a24, a30 διὰ τὸν λόγον).²²⁰ This was the motivation for Bonitz' conjecture, [1859] 30, λόγος for τῷ λόγῳ, which is adopted by Armstrong. But the problem with this is that the text will then say that it is λόγος that διαμαρτάνει. In a19, a24 and a27 and in 88b35, 99a29, 02b16 and 04b22, however, it is someone who διαμαρτάνει, not something.²²¹

Rassow's solution is to add some words. A person will be the subject of διαμαρτάνων and λόγος will be the subject of κωλύσει. But the supplement involves a big change, and if a simpler way can be found to restore sense, it should be adopted.

The conjecture, made independently by Amerbach and Dirlmeier (p.378), that we read κωλύσεται for κωλύσει in a31 is neater than Rassow's.²²² The parallel offered by Dirlmeier is Thucydides I.142.1: τῇ τῶν χρημάτων σπάνει κωλύσονται ('They will be prevented by lack of money'). This is certainly a parallel for the future middle of κωλύειν used in a passive sense (as opposed to κωλυθήσεται). But the dative in Thucydides operates in an altogether different way from τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν in M.M. 01a31. This phrase belongs to διαμαρτάνων, as a24 and a27 show, and as Dirlmeier recognises.

²²⁰ Hence Scaliger's addition of αὐτόν in a31 is mistaken. This assumes that the man does the 'preventing', not the λόγος.

²²¹ Bonitz, Index (q.v.), cites Pol. 1293b25 where certain forms of government διημορτήκοσι from the most perfect form of government, but here διαμαρτάνειν takes the genitive. In all Bonitz' other references to the use of διαμαρτάνειν it is people of one sort or another who make mistakes.

²²² Cf. E.N. 1173a24 for manuscript divergence between κωλύει and κωλύεται. See my note on 1195a29 for manuscripts confusing the future and present tenses of this verb.

The construction is κωλύεσθαι + infin. (without μή), which can be paralleled by Meteor. 340b33, 341a4.²²³ Translating the text with Dirlmeier's κωλύεται, we would have 'Therefore the man who is wrong in his reason of what is fine will be kept from doing what he desires'. (A second construal could be κωλύεσθαι + genitive:²²⁴ 'Therefore the man... will be kept from those things which he desires to do'. But the lack of contemporary parallels for this, together with the construction in the following sentence, show that this is not the construction here.)

ὦν on the first reading will be a contraction of ἐκεῖνα ὦν, (the genitive will be the object of ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἐκεῖνα the object of πρόττειν). But we are not told by what the man is prevented as we are in Thucydides. Reason is what prevents him from realising his desires (a30). Dirlmeier's and Amerbach's conjectures are to be incorporated into the text. The sense will be: ὁ διαμαρτάνων τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν <ὐπὸ τοῦ λόγου> κωλύεται..., but it is unnecessary to supplement the text as I have, since it is implicit.

1201a31 Full stop after πρόττειν¹.

1201a32 If κωλύεται is to be accepted in the previous line, the verb must have a passive sense here. Dirlmeier and Amerbach suggest κωλύεται, but would not κωλύεσθαι be better given πρόξει (a23), and the future in the line above?

1201a33 Only one manuscript has the aorist of ἄγω. The imperfect, however, is unobjectionable - the appetite for fine things will have been on-going. It was not instantaneous: it 'was leading him'.

²²³ This will have to be the construction in a32 if the conjecture is accepted there.

²²⁴ This is found in Plato Rep. 621b4-5 (but the genitive is the genitive of the infinitive), Xenophon H.G. 3.2.21, An. 1.6.2 (but in both these passages the verb is in the active). The only proper example of this construction that I have found is in Polybius 6.55.3: οἱ μὲν πολέμοιοι τῆς ὀρμῆς ἐκωλύθησαν.

1201b2 Unless there is severe corruption in b1 (b1 could have been a subordinate clause, in which case ἀναγκαῖον — ἀπορίας would be the main clause), δέ in b2 is required.

οὖν can be paralleled by 82a33, 93b1, 04a31, 04b4, 08b7, 08b26. The οὖν is not inferential but transitional²²⁵ - transitional from the general methodology in the previous line to the application of that method to the case in hand.

1201b6 Read οὐδέν. See p.177.

1201b7 To try to solve the crux in 01b7, the function of the example of Heraclitus must be examined. The words τοιαύτην ἔχει δόξαν in b8 pick up σφοδρά in b6. Lines b8-9 say ‘For example, Heraclitus of Ephesus has such a belief [viz. a strong one] about what he thought.’ There are various interpretations of these words. Since we cannot be sure of what is said in b7-8, a helpful route is to look at E.N. 1146b29-31 where Heraclitus is brought into the same argument. E.N. says: ‘some men trust no less in what they believe than others do in what they know. Heraclitus shows this’ (δηλοῖ δ’ Ἡράκλειτος).

One interpretation of E.N. is that Heraclitus is introduced as an example of someone who puts as much weight on what are beliefs as other people do on what they know. This would be a jibe: Aristotle believes that what Heraclitus thought was false (and hence was δόξα, rather than knowledge), but he is equally aware of the force with which those views were propounded. Heraclitus, on this view, will be an example of someone who has steadfast beliefs, and is just as likely to abandon those as anyone else is to abandon what they know. Heraclitus will be a type for stubbornness.²²⁶ For this reason Aristotle denies that the solution that has been suggested, namely that in the case of the acratik it is not knowledge but belief which is

²²⁵ See Denniston, [1950] 472.

²²⁶ Cf. E.N. 1151b4-17 for stubbornness.

overcome, is adequate. Both knowledge and a certain sort of belief (i.e. that of the stubborn man) are such as not to be over-powered.

The other interpretation of the passage in E.N. is that Heraclitus is being referred to as a theorist on the question in hand; that Heraclitus is presented as defending the view that certainty is something that is not peculiar to knowledge. If this is the meaning of δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος, then Aristotle will not be making fun of Heraclitus, but using the authority of the pre-Socratic to bolster his argument.

The parallel from Aristotle Pol. 1285a10 (δηλοῖ δ' Ὅμηρος),²²⁷ favours the second interpretation. It is not Homer, the man, who is adduced as an example of a particular characteristic in order to defend an Aristotelian view, but rather the authority of something Homer wrote that is brought into the discussion to back up what Aristotle claims. Grant, Stewart, Burnet and Diller²²⁸ have all favoured the first interpretation, but Deichgräber²²⁹, referring to Heraclitus fr.B.17²³⁰, and Gauthier-Jolif²³¹ favour the second.

What about M.M.? Deichgräber, taking the E.N. passage in the second way (Heraclitus as theorist) saw that the M.M. passage must be taken in the first way (Heraclitus as stubborn), and concluded that the author of M.M. had misunderstood Aristotle, and so was not Aristotle. But this is too quick. Diller's response to Deichgräber was to argue that the E.N. passage should be taken in the first way and to state that both texts treat Heraclitus as an example of someone who laid as much trust in his beliefs as others do in their knowledge - not as a theorist. And that hence there is no misunderstanding.

The text of E.N. is not explicit enough to rule out either of the interpretations that have been offered of it. But the M.M. passage is clearly more closely

²²⁷ And similar examples: δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος, Meteor. 351b35, δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς Xen. 976a33, Pol. 1285a37 δηλοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι...

²²⁸ Diller, [1936] 138. Diller points out that Aristotle does not respect Heraclitus' epistemology in the Metaphysics.

²²⁹ Deichgräber, [1935] 106.

²³⁰ οἱ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὅκοσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑαυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι.

²³¹ [1970] Vol. II, 604-5.

aligned to the Heraclitus-as-holder-of-strong-beliefs than to Heraclitus-as-theorist. Deichgräber and Diller agree on this. Heraclitus is introduced as an example (οἶον 01b8). We might expect Heraclitus to be mentioned as an example of someone who believed very strongly in what he believed. (This would be consistent with the first interpretation of E.N. passage described above). But the Greek apparently does not say this. It says that he had²³² such a belief (viz. a strong belief that could not be dislodged) about (ὕπερ 01b9²³³) his own beliefs. He believed, apparently then, that his own beliefs were as entrenched as other people's knowledge. This would be remarkably odd. Heraclitus would, in effect, be characterising himself as stubborn. He would also implicitly be describing himself as having false beliefs, otherwise he would say that he has knowledge.²³⁴ In E.N., on the second interpretation, Heraclitus is cited as someone whose beliefs (about whatever subject) were as unshakeable as other people's knowledge, while in M.M. he is cited as someone who has an unshakeable belief about his own beliefs.

However the E.N. reference to Heraclitus is understood, whether as a jibe at Heraclitus' stubbornness - an example of someone who has stubborn views - or as philosophical support - someone who also realised that 'immovability' was not peculiar to knowledge - M.M.'s reference to him appears to function in neither of these ways. Unless an interpretation can be found whereby the Heraclitus example can be made sense of, it will be tempting to see this is an instance of the author of M.M. misunderstanding E.N. (but not in the way that Deichgräber thought).

Let us turn to the textual problem in b7-8. The authority for Susemihl's reading in this line is a series of corrections in V, but Dirlmeier rightly points out

²³² The transmitted present tense ἔχει is consistent with Heraclitus being dead. A natural way of referring to an earlier author's work in Greek is with the present tense, just as we naturally say in English 'Aristotle says...'. Cf. Rhet. 1373b14 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει, De An. 404a1 Δημόκριτος... φησιν, 404b1 Ἀναξαγόρας... διασαφεῖ, 404a31 [Δημόκριτος] οὐ... χρῆται, 410a3 φησὶ... Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, E.N. 1116a22 Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ. This cannot have been the motivation for Spengel's conjecture. Rather, it is the past tense of ἐδόκει (b9) which will have been the worry.

²³³ For δόξα ὑπερ... see Bonitz 203b20-3, b27, b41-3, bearing in mind the use of ὑπερ for περί in this treatise.

²³⁴ See Pr. An. 89a6 for this point.

(p.379) that this cannot be right, linguistically or philosophically. Dirlmeier defends the reading of η, before it was corrected and reads δόξας ἔχουσι τῶ. He takes ἔχουσι as dative of the participle,²³⁵ which would yield (paraphrasing Dirlmeier's translation of οὐθὲν... αὐτῶ ἐδόκει (b6-9)): 'stable belief will be no different, in the eyes of those who have opinions, from knowledge - no different in the conviction each has that things are as they seem. Heraclitus of Ephesus, for example, has such a belief concerning his thoughts'. Dirlmeier renders δόξας ἔχουσι by 'in der Augen derer, die Meinungen haben'. Such a translation fits in well with the interpretation of the Heraclitus example, offered above. But the (relevant) sameness of belief and knowledge becomes relativised. It is no longer said, as it is in E.N. 1146b29, that they are (relevantly) the same, but that some people who have beliefs think that they are (relevantly) the same. E.N. says quite simply 'Some people trust no less in what they believe than others do in what they know'. This is an objective claim. We need an objective claim if the argument is to work. The fact that Heraclitus believed that his own beliefs were as reliable as knowledge would not support the argument of M.M.: Heraclitus may have been wrong. Dirlmeier's translation of the participle could easily be revised so as to yield an objective claim: 'stable belief will be no different *in those* who have beliefs, from knowledge - no different in the conviction each has that things are as they seem...'. Both believers and knowers, M.M. will be saying, are convinced that what they think is true. This would now conform with E.N. in giving an objective claim, and a claim which will undermine those who suppose that the akratic must have belief, on the grounds that it is absurd that the akratic should have knowledge. However, the Heraclitus example, as discussed up until now, does not fit well with the 'objective' interpretation of b7-8.

One distinction which needs to be drawn here is between two ways in which the word 'belief' can be used. It can mean the psychological state of the person who believes or the proposition which is believed.²³⁶ The mistake in the discussion of 01b8-

²³⁵ M.M. does not require a definite article before the participle. See 91b29.

²³⁶ An excellent modern discussion of some aspects of belief is Williams, [1973].

9 above was to see ἃ αὐτῶ ἐδόκει as the states themselves rather than as the contents of those beliefs.

The preposition ὑπὲρ can mean ‘about’ or ‘in’. At Met. 1078b13 for example it means ‘in’, while at E.N. 1140b27 it means ‘about’. A belief can be ‘about X’ in the sense that when someone has political beliefs, he can be said to have beliefs about politics. He may believe, for instance, that democracy is flawed. A belief can be ‘in X’ in two ways: first in the sense that some people believe ‘in’ Platonic Forms or ‘in’ other unlikely entities. The preposition conveys the notion of existence. Someone who believes in X believes, simply, that X exists. While someone who believes in Platonic Forms will have beliefs about Platonic Forms, it is not necessarily the case that someone who has beliefs about Platonic Forms believes that they exist. One can also be said to believe ‘in X’ when one puts trust in the truth or the value of something, not just in its existence. In this sense one can believe in certain articulated codes (e.g. the Labour party’s Clause 4 or the First Amendment of the American Constitution).

With these distinctions in place we can reinterpret b8-9. We need no longer take these lines to mean ‘Heraclitus has a strong belief (i.e. psychological state) *about* his beliefs (i.e. psychological states). That interpretation, we have seen, leads to M.M., in effect using a characterisation by Heraclitus of himself as stubborn, which is not pertinent to the argument.

There are other options for interpretation. Heraclitus could have a strong belief (i.e. attitude): a) about his beliefs (i.e. the contents of his beliefs), b) in his beliefs (i.e. believes that the contents of his beliefs are true).

The phrase ‘strong belief’ goes equally well with ‘belief in’ as with ‘belief about’. Julia has a strong belief in the Bible, while John has a strong belief about politics - his belief is that democracy is flawed. In fact both (a) and (b) are going to absolve M.M. of any infelicity.

Heraclitus is introduced as an example of someone who, by (a), has strong beliefs about, say, philosophical issues or, by (b), has a strong belief in the truth of his philosophical views. On either of these interpretations M.M. is no longer presenting us

with a characterisation by Heraclitus of himself as stubborn, but with a characterisation by M.M. of Heraclitus as stubborn - as firmly convinced of the truth of what he believed. Such an interpretation is attractive and concords with the ‘objective’ interpretation of the participle offered above. It is also in line with one interpretation of E.N. *Print δόξας ἔχουσι τῷ.*²³⁷

1201b9 Spengel’s δ’ is right. The sentence is defended by what follows, and does not follow from what precedes.

1201b21 Susemihl’s δὴ ἢ is the best reading here, and is followed by Armstrong and Stock.

1201b23 Read ἄτοπα with α A.

1201b24 Susemihl’s punctuation makes it look as though the infinitives γίνεσθαι and εἶναι in b25-6 are governed by φανερόν. But φανερόν takes ὅτι, not the infinitive. The alternative is that ἔφαμεν governs the infinitives. If this is right a colon should be placed after φανερόν,²³⁸ and no comma after Ἀναλυτικοῖς in the next line.²³⁹ If this punctuation is accepted, then we need a connective particle in the next sentence. This is most easily achieved by changing ὥσπερ to ὡς γάρ (b24-5).

Compare the following passages in M.M.:

95b13 ἀλλ’ ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον πάλιν ὅτι οὐχ ἐκῶν. πάντες γάρ...

96b17-18 ὅτι δὲ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἂν γένοιτο. ὥσπερ γάρ...

98a23 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον ὅτι ἀρετή. εἴπερ γάρ...

99b20 δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ νομοθέτου· ὁ γάρ...

²³⁷ See my note on 1197a37 for τῷ + infin.

²³⁸ With C K β.

²³⁹ With L K.

02b4 δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι περὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἀκρασία· ἐπεὶ γὰρ...

05a16-17 ἄμα δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τούτου ὅτι... διάφοροι γὰρ...

It is true that ὥσπερ ἔφαμεν is a well-used parenthetical phrase in M.M., (87b13, 11a24, cf.87a6, 89a25, 91a30, 11a17, 13a14), and it would be possible, on these grounds, to conjecture ὥσπερ <γὰρ>. But the corruption of ὥσπερ to ὡς γὰρ is simpler, and is paralleled at 04a26-7 in A.²⁴⁰ ὡς φαμέν is also found frequently: 85b3, 97b10, 97b31, 98a34, 05a1, 08a36, 11a31.

If this change is adopted, then the sentence will peter out without a main clause if we retain Susemihl's punctuation in b29. But the ὡς γὰρ clause is picked up by οὖν in 01b29. (For οὖν introducing the second clause in a sentence in M.M. see 85b23, 08b37, 10a7, 13a16.²⁴¹ For ὡς picked up by οὖν after an intervening example, see E.N. 1170b5-7.) The passage from 01b25-29 consists of theory, and an example from medicine to illustrate the theory. It is only at b29 that the lessons from the Analytics (how the syllogism is constructed) is applied to the case of acrasia - where the syllogism goes wrong.²⁴² This will become clearer if οἶον — ποιῆσαι (b27-9) is placed in brackets, not because they are unimportant, but because all of that is still material from the Analytics, or direct illustration of that theory.

The passage will look like this (incorporating the changes I argue for below):

Ἄλλὰ πάλιν ἐντεῦθεν ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν· ὡς γὰρ
 b25 ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς ἐκ δύο προτάσεων γίνεσθαι
 τὸν συλλογισμόν, καὶ τούτων εἶναι τὴν μὲν πρώτην
 καθόλου, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν ὑπὸ ταύτην τε καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους (οἶον
 ἐπίσταμαι πάντ' ἄνθρωπον πυρέττοντα ὑγιῆ ποιῆσαι· οὐτοσὶ
 δὲ πυρέττει· ἐπίσταμαι ἄρα καὶ τοῦτον ὑγιῆ ποιῆσαι), ἔστιν οὖν
 b30 ὃ τῆ μὲν καθόλου ἐπιστήμη ἐπίσταμαι, τῆ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους.

²⁴⁰ At 08b4 Bonitz conjectures γὰρ for the mss.' περ.

²⁴¹ See also Bonitz 540b12ff.

²⁴² The example given in M.M. is less satisfactory than the example in E.N. 1147a5-7 (dry things are beneficial to all men, he is a man (or this sort of thing is dry), or that in E.N. 1147a29-31 (one must taste everything sweet, this is sweet). In M.M. the example is of knowledge how, in E.N. it is of knowledge that.

1201b25 Ἀναλυτικοῖς, whoever wrote it.

1201b26 Spengel's προτέρων is attractive (cf. Post. An. 86a24), but Poetics 1460a23 and Topics 119a23 are instances of τὸ πρῶτον where you would expect τὸ πρότερον (cf. Bonitz 652b31). In the very first line of M.M. and at 82a10, one family of mss. has πρῶτον, the other προτέρων, so corruption is possible. But retain πρῶτον.²⁴³

1201b30 The οὐ in this line is only present originally in L and V, but it has been added as a correction in A, K and P. The addition will have been made simply from 01b38-9. Without it, the author will be stating the two kinds of propositions that are known - the general and the particular - in a successful syllogism. This naturally follows (οὐν) from the first person example in b27-9 (cf. ἐπίσταμαι in b30). He has not yet embarked on the question of which premise it is that the akratic will not know. ἐνταῦθα in b31 will look forward, rather than backwards. Stick to the original reading in the mss., and leave out οὐ.

'It is rather awkward,' says Armstrong who does read οὐ, 'to take ἔστιν ὅ first as the object of general knowledge, and then as the (different) object of particular knowledge as the sense seems to demand.' Armstrong's οὐδ (for ὁ) would make the sentence more easily construable, and given the way that these letters were confused,²⁴⁴ should be accepted if οὐ is accepted at the end of the line. But if οὐ is excised, ἔστιν οὐδ, meaning 'there are cases where' is inappropriate. The author will no longer be picking out the deviant cases of the syllogism, but the standard successful ones. The ὅ remains slightly inelegant, but I would leave it.

1201b32 Given the attestation in the mss. for οἶδα in the next line, Susemihl's ἐπίσταμαι must be right rather than Spengel's ἐπίσταται.

²⁴³ See my note on 1181a24 for confusion between comparatives and superlatives.

²⁴⁴ See above, p.323n.214, for an explanation of how this error will have arisen.

1201b33 οἶδα is demanded by the stemma. C significantly agrees with the other family in giving οἶδα.

1201b35 μέν is needed to balance μέντοι in the next line. τοῦδ is unlikely, given its absence in b27, 30, 38, and also in E.N. 1147a3, a4, a25, a31, b4, b14.

1201b37 In E.N. the particular premise is of the form τόδε τοιόνδε (1147a7), τουτί δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἔν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον (1147a29-30), τουτί δὲ γλυκὺ (1147a33). In M.M., however, the particular premise was also a proposition with a singular term in 01b28-9: οὐτοσί δὲ πυρέττει. But in b37 the manuscripts, with some variation, offer the plural, which seems inappropriate for a particular premise. But the adverbial ἐπὶ μέρους, if it can be understood to mean 'in particular cases',²⁴⁵ would allow the text to yield a set of particular premises: X is φαῦλον, or Y is φαῦλον... etc. But, permitting this for the moment, the example is still mistaken. ταῦτα refers to something different from the referents of τὰ τοιαῦτα (or else he would know that ταῦτα are base). The syllogism is:

Universal: all instances of φ-ing are base and harmful

Particular: these instances of χ-ing are base

This is not a syllogism even if someone knew both. The akratic, who ex hypothesi does not know the second premise (b38), goes wrong, not because he does not know the second premise, qua second premise, but because he does not know the second premise qua universal premise. To make the syllogism conform to Aristotle's syllogism in E.N. we need to incorporate Armstrong's conjecture:

Universal: all instances of φ-ing are base and harmful

²⁴⁵ Armstrong, who translates the sentence with his conjecture incorporated: '...and yet not to know in particular that this or that belong to such a class', appears to take ἐπὶ μέρους in this way. Stock takes ἐπὶ μέρους with ταῦτα: 'these particular things', but the word-order is against this. Dirlmeier, implicitly taking ἐπὶ μέρους as τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους = the particular premise, and changing the plural to the singular, translates 'dagegen [hat] eben nicht das spezielle Wissen, daß dies da schlecht ist'.

Particular: these instances of χ-ing are instances of φ-ing

It is only if we read Armstrong's τοιαῦτα for φαῦλα that ignorance of the second premise, qua second premise, can be the cause of someone going wrong.

I am unconvinced that ἐπὶ μέρους can be integrated into the sentence. Dirlmeier's translation (see n.245) implicitly translates <τῆν> ἐπὶ μέρους, and treats the words as being in apposition to the proposition which is the minor premise. I suggest that ἐπὶ μέρους be excised. It is neither required (the next sentence tells us that the second premise is the particular premise), nor does it make sense. It could easily have intruded, if it were originally a marginal annotation.

So read ὅτι ἐστὶν ταῦτα <τοιαῦτα> [ἐπὶ μέρους] εἰδέναι, if it is thought that the author had understood the practical syllogism, but if he had not understood it read ὅτι ἐστὶν ταῦτα φαῦλα [ἐπὶ μέρους] εἰδέναι.

1202a3-5 It is odd that the passive of ἀπαλλάττειν is used first of wine (a3), and then of those who are intoxicated with wine (a4). When the illustration of drunkenness is applied to acrasia, the passive is again used (a7) and here the subject is not the acratic but his πάθος. The word ἀπαλλαγέντες (a4-5), therefore, stands out as the exception. L.S.J. only quote this passage and Sophocles Antigone 422 (of a whirlwind ending) as examples of the passive of ἀπαλλάττειν being used absolutely and with a thing rather than a person as the subject.

α omits ἀπαλλαγέντες — εἰσίν (a4-5). The whole phrase is redundant. It has already been expressed in 02a2-3 ὅταν — εἰσίν in unusual language. This omission also stands out as a rare example of omission that is not ex homoeoteleuto. a4-5 is, I suspect, a paraphrase (using the more usual passive, where the subject is a person, and the verb is not used absolutely) of the unusually expressed a2-3, and thus entered one branch of the tradition.

1202a5-6 Retain πάλιν which Spengel excised in a6, and excise οὖν in a5. οὖν originated only as a correction in P. Once the passage in a4-5 is excised, the over-use

of the word *πάλιν* in 02a3-7 is reduced. The *πάλιν* in a6 is the connective in this sentence, and *οὖν* is thus not required. Cf. 95b37 (*καὶ πάλιν οὕτως*) and 88a24 (*πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμοίως*), where *πάλιν* is the transitional particle.

1202a9 The future participle looks back to the futures in 01a25 and 01a34. *ὥς* + genitive absolute is found e.g. in Pol. 1294b20. Concerning the Spartan state, Aristotle says: *πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὥς δημοκρατίας οὔσης...* Cf. also Topics 112b18-20, M.M. 02b1-2. Without *ὥς* the genitive absolute would be understandable, but more abrupt. Retain it.

1202a11 The perfect corresponds to the perfect *δημορτικῶς* in 01a19. The aorist of *α* and *V* will be a coincidental error.

1202a12 L's *οὐ* springs from taking *κρίνειν* to govern two objects - to judge of *x* that it is *y*. But it need only take one object - to judge (correctly) base things, and (supplied in the second clause) to judge (correctly) fine things.

1201a15-16 The choices the editor has to face in these lines depend on whether it is thought that a14-16 develop the point that has been made in the first part of the paragraph - that the acratia and the encratia have *ὀρθὸς λόγος* - or make a different point. Dirlmeier (p.381) argues that the second is the case. 'Mit οὐδὲ [b14] wird nochmals ein Argument vorgebracht im Sinne der Aporie, wenn auch nicht in Form einer Aporie, und dann wird mit ὥστε [b16] abgeschlossen.'

Dirlmeier makes no attempt to explain *γάρ* in a14, which does have the look of a connecting word. But the strongest argument against the second view is that the text will turn out to be irrelevant: reading Susemihl's text, which is what Dirlmeier defends, we have, in effect, a picture of someone who, by Aristotelian psychology, does not exist: the person in the example does not think that it is shameful to hit his father, desires to hit his father, and yet abstains from hitting him. Why on earth would

this man abstain? Trivially it is true that this (non-existent) man is not encratic. But it is very unlikely that anyone would think that he was. The aporia that Dirlmeier thinks is being addressed is not an aporia.

If we excise οὐ in a15, following α, we have a picture of someone who (correctly) believes that it is shameful to hit his father, desires to hit him, but does not hit him. The author of M.M. denies that this man is encratic. But he is a paradigm of an encratic (cf. a13-14). So this is not right either.

If a14-16 are an illustration of the claim that the encratic must have ὀρθὸς λόγος, then the illustration of someone who is not encratic, but seems to be an example of a blameworthy encratic, needs to be of the man who does not have ὀρθὸς λόγος, who desires to do the right thing, but sticks to his original conception and so does something bad. (It is important that the example be of the most likely candidate for being a blameworthy encratic for the τοιοῦτων to have weight in a17.) To achieve this we read οὐ in a15, as Susemihl does, and add a negative (Susemihl's or Wilson's) at the end of a15. Wilson's ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ μὴ is better because it expresses the thought that the encratic has a desire not to hit his father. Susemihl's conjecture expresses the weaker thought that he does not have the desire to hit - he may, on this reading not have the desire not to hit, either.

The force of οὐδέ in b14 need not be to introduce a further argument as Dirlmeier supposed. It means 'not even', and this is appropriate. The author chooses an example of someone who appears to be a blameworthy encratic, but it turns out that he is not encratic at all. If not even this particular person is a blameworthy encratic, who is? The answer, of course, is that there is no such person.

1202a15 A and a corrector in V make the participle agree with ᾧ τινι, but this is unnecessary. The impersonal construction moves to the personal.

1202a20 The omission of οἶον in the central family is tempting, but should be resisted. Exactly the same thing - redundant οἶον not in the central family, but in the other two - occurs at 87b39 and 99a15.²⁴⁶

1202a20 Met. 983b27, Pol. 1301b2 and E.N. 1151b17 do have εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἷ... without deviation in the mss. We find it in our treatise at 95b10. And the phrase is also found in Aristophanes Wasps 1284, Isocrates Hel. I.1, Lysias Or. 13.17.2, Hippocrates de Arte 1.1.

The inclusion of τινες in L η, however, is most easily explained by τινες having been a gloss on εἰσὶν οἷ. This is a more likely scenario than that τινες was conjecturally omitted as being redundant, or was omitted accidentally in error in both α and in A. οἷ, if this is right, is the relative pronoun and should be accentuated as such. Omit τινες.

1202a21 The definite article before τρίχας is not required as Susemihl's comparison with E.N. 1148b27-8 shows.

1202a21 Dirlmeier is right (p.382) that Thomas' and Susemihl's additions, while making the text say something more sensible (chewing one's nails happened and still happens, but chewing one's plucked hair less obviously happened or happens), probably do so at the expense of bad grammar. The two sets of people that Thomas, Susemihl (and Aristotle) imagine - the hair-pluckers and the nail-biters are not referred to in the same way. The first are described with a participle, the second with a main verb. This would be odd in a sentence, divided into two halves: 'Some... others...'. τίλλοντες would have to be changed to τίλλουσι, or διατρώγουσι to διατρώγοντες, I think. The participles can be paralleled by εἰσὶ οἱ ἡγούμενοι..., εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἱ γινώσκοντες..., Plato, Meno 77d. The indicative can be paralleled by εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ

²⁴⁶ See my note on 1203a30.

κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἴους σὺ λέγεις, Plato, Gorgias 503a2-4.

Since conformity with E.N. 1148b27-8 would demand further changes in the grammar of the sentence in M.M., I suppose it to be more likely that the author of M.M. invented the example of eating one's hair (possibly by misunderstanding E.N., or having a bad copy of E.N., or by having inadequate notes of the lectures given by Aristotle), than that such pervasive corruption should have taken place in M.M.

1202a22 οὐκ] οὐκ misprint. ἔπαινετός] ἐπαινετός misprint.

1202a26 The infinitive is fine. The judges' decision to acquit the defendant is part of the story people tell (φασί, a23).

1202a28 The emphatic οὐδέ γε can be found frequently in Plato, and also in Demosthenes and Xenophon (See Denniston, p.156). If γε were originally written, the combination of gammas and epsilons in οὐδέ γε ἐγκ- or in οὐδέ γ' ἐγκ- would invite error. But dittography is as likely as haplography, and it is safer to stick to the reading of two independent families. Leave out γε.

1202a31 L's τὸ is not needed. Cf. 00a14.

1202a31-4 The problem in the transmitted text is καὶ οἶον αἰ σωματικά in a34, which is out of place. Part of Rasso's solution overlaps with that of Dirlmeier and Ellebodius. Both solutions leave the sentence ending δόξειεν εἶναι (a33) next to the sentence beginning καὶ ἦν... If this transposition is made, the text will read:

a30 Ἔστιν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐκτός, οἶον πλοῦτος ἀρχὴ τιμῆ
φίλοι δόξα, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα καὶ περὶ σῶμα ἐστίν, οἶον ἀφή
τε καὶ γεῦσις καὶ οἶον αἰ σωματικά. ὁ οὖν περὶ ταῦτα ἀκρατής,
οὗτος ἀπλῶς ἂν [καὶ] ἀκρατής δόξειεν εἶναι, καὶ ἦν ζητοῦμεν

a34 ἀκρασίαν, ἤδη περὶ ταῦτα δόξειεν <ἄν> εἶναι.

Thereafter the two solutions separate. Rassow emends οἶον αἰ to ἡδοναί, Ellebodius and Dirlmeier (p.383), slightly differently, excise the phrase. Dirlmeier's explanation of how the error arose is that the phrase οἶον αἰ σωματικά was an old variant on ἀφῆ τε καὶ γεῦσις and was incorporated into the text at the wrong point. Dirlmeier's solution is easier because it only involves one stage of corruption. But by mistake, I think, Dirlmeier has forgotten the first καί in a33.

This makes Ellebodius' excision of καὶ — σωματικά preferable to that of Dirlmeier. But Ellebodius' excision cannot be explained so simply as Dirlmeier's. The gloss would have to have begun with the word καί. This is not a way to introduce a gloss. The corruption would have to have happened in two stages. First the gloss οἶον αἰ σωματικά was included in the wrong place, and then an extra καί would have to have been conjecturally inserted. I think that this is still simpler than Rassow's postulation of corruption from οἶον αἰ to ἡδοναί and (unexplained) change in the word-order. So excise καὶ οἶον αἰ σωματικά with Ellebodius.²⁴⁷

1202a32 καί² is pointless. Only K, presumably conjecturally, and its descendants are right.

1202a34 If ἄν is to be added,²⁴⁸ there is no way to decide whether Bekker's positioning is correct or Susemihl's. ἄν δόξειεν εἶναι and δόξειεν ἄν εἶναι both occur frequently; the first e.g. at 94b11, 99a18, 03a29, 11a12, the second e.g. at 82b12, 86b24, 99b17, 11a31. We could explain why ἄν should have fallen out from either position.

1202a34 Change δέ to γάρ. The sentence explains ζητοῦμεν.

²⁴⁷ Armstrong's larger excision is unjustified.

²⁴⁸ For ἄν see p.166.

1202a35 The omission of οὖν after μὲν by L is for some reason frequent in the part of this manuscript that contains E.N.

1202a37 ἐστίν is as well attested as its omission. The omission of the verb can be paralleled by 90b18, and it is more likely to get added than to drop out. Demote it to the apparatus.

1202b5 Instead of K's ψεκτὰ εἶναι δεῖ read δεήσει ψεκτὰ εἶναι. η omitted δεήσει, as we can tell from V's omission, and the scribe of K conjectured δεῖ.

1202b9 ἄν] ὄν misprint.

1202b11 L has the comparative at the end of the line,²⁴⁹ but the rest have the superlative. Sometimes the superlative can have the force of a comparative in Aristotle (see Bonitz 312a50-4, 403a3-12), but the only instances that Bonitz gives of superlative + ἢ are of πλείστον ἢ and of πρῶτον ἢ and of μάλιστα + adjective + ἢ. If a word with comparative sense is required, therefore, accept the highly conjecturable ψεκτοτέρα. The confusion will have arisen as a result of the superlative two words before.²⁵⁰

Most of the mss. punctuate after ὀργήν in b12, and then take ἢ not to mean 'than', but to mean 'or'. πότερον... ἢ... is a common formulation in this text. If two separate questions are asked - Is anger-acrasia most blameworthy? Or is pleasure-acrasia [most blameworthy]? - then the comparison is still made between the most blameworthy type of one sort of acrasia and the other sort of acrasia. But it remains the case that only two things are candidates for being most blameworthy, so even with this punctuation, we need the comparative. Cf. 03a6 for parallel.

²⁴⁹ Valla does not. See p.92.

²⁵⁰ See my note on 1181a24.

1202b13-14 ὅμοιον takes the dative. So why is τῶν παιδῶν in the genitive?²⁵¹

It is strange that here a state, *acrasia* about anger, is likened to a type of person, but the personification of the ἐπιθυμία and the λόγος of this *acratia* in a18ff. - the *acratia* hears 'he has done wrong', his anger incites him to take vengeance, and he acts on this instruction without listening (to reason) for more detailed evaluation of what the right response would be to the injustice he has suffered - makes the comparison permissible. The *acratia* has master-like desires: they instruct him inadequately. The *acratia* is like the slave, and so is the mind of the *acratia* like the slave.

The solution to the syntactical problem is to delete τῶν παιδῶν which could have been a marginal annotation which became inserted in the wrong place. διακονεῖν is a rare enough word - it is only in Pol. 1333a8 in the corpus - to need a gloss to tell the reader what type of person the author is imagining. But for someone who knows the meaning of the word, the type of people who 'serve' is obvious, viz. servants.²⁵² The author did not, therefore need to give a noun. For these reasons I prefer excision to emending τῶν παιδῶν to τοῖς παισί.

1202b17 The reading τοῦτο in D is possible, but can we explain the transmitted dative? If it is dependent on ὅμοιον, this leaves a peculiar word-order. The word cannot be masculine because the over-zealous slaves were more than one in number. It must be neuter. Stock gives: 'Something like this is the case with the man who cannot control his anger', Dirlmeier: 'Etwas diesem Ähnliches passiert bei dem, der im Zorn unbeherrscht ist'. Both these translators add an indefinite which is not in the Greek, and they do so because the transmitted text does not supply an object for πέπονθε. (cf.

²⁵¹ Dirlmeier does not address the issue. He translates: 'Die Unbeherrschtheit im Zorn nun ist vergleichbar mit dem Diensteifer der Hausklaven.' But προθύμως ἔχουσιν is a participle phrase and cannot take the genitive of those who are very zealous. Armstrong translates: 'Now indulgence in temper may be compared to those servants who are over-eager to be of use.' Stock translates: 'Now incontinence with regard to anger resembles servants who are eager to minister to one's needs.'

²⁵² In Pol. 1333a8 we are told who does the serving - free young men - but Aristotle is illustrating a philosophical point by an example precisely of people not doing what they normally do.

Meteor. 381b29 for a similar sentence with the indefinite article, and less closely, but as relevantly, E.N. 1105b14, 1115a16, 1123a5 etc.)

To read Chalcondyles' τοῦτο does provide such an object. The cost of this is that ὅμοιον does not have a dative, and would have to be read adverbially and absolutely, 'in a similar way'. I know of no such use of this word in peripatetic philosophy. L.S.J. (s.v., C II) do offer one instance from a third century papyrus. I do not think that this is adequate testimony for the construction that Chalcondyles' τοῦτο would demand. I therefore prefer to add τι after δέ. τι in majuscule looks like a capital π. It may then be the case that we should read τι ἔπαθε. Once the τι was read as a π (πέπαθε) the further change to πέπονθε would be easy. The aorist will be gnomic and will be translated by an English present. The aorist in this line will then match the aorist ὄρησαν in b19. The delay in the sentence of the dative that is the object of ὅμοιον τι can be paralleled by E.N. 1105b14.²⁵³

1202b21 For ἦ read ἦ. To equate a particular ὁρμή with a type of akrasia would be a mistake. The possession of a particular ὁρμή is a necessary condition for having a particular sort of akrasia, but it is not itself akrasia. Translating the emended text: 'Such a propensity towards anger, by which anger-akrasia seems to exist, is not to be censured too much...'

1202b22 Demote τὴν to the apparatus.

1202b25 The preposition παρά in b25 has insecure manuscript authority. It is present as a correction in P. All independent manuscripts (including P originally) had διό which is clearly impossible. All occurrences of ἀλλ' ὅμως in M.M. are followed by the negative οὐ in some form (98a19, 99a34, 05a32, 07a26). A rival to the corrector of

²⁵³ But see my note on 1205b16.

P's change of *διὰ* to *παρά* is to read *οὐ διὰ* (cf. 05a32). This is palaeographically more likely and conforms more easily with the expression elsewhere in M.M.

1202b33 New paragraph after *ἐστίν*.

1202b35 *ἀναγκάϊως* is very odd. Dirlmeier renders it by the straight-forward 'notfalls'. But what kind of necessity is in play? Armstrong translates 'with resignation' and cites Marchant's translation of Thucydides II.64, to defend this. Stock takes the word conditionally: '...not all of them, but such as anyone would undergo, if he had to'. The two English translations seem rather strained, and I wonder whether the word is corrupt.

1203a1 Of the two solutions of Bonitz, [1844] 24, to the clearly faulty text, Rasso, [1858] 20-1, argues for the retention of *ἀκροατής* and the replacement of *ὁ αὐτός* with *ἀκόλαστος*. He defends this a) by affirming that E.N. 1145b14-17 inspired the line in M.M., b) by noting the repetition of the question in this form in M.M. 03b24, c) by saying that the sense will be 'accommodator' in so far as it raises two questions rather than one. But Bonitz, [1859] 30, rightly responded with the observation that at 03b24 the question is not introduced as a resumption of a question that had already been raised.

Bonitz' other solution, which we now know was anticipated by Weit Amerbach, can be supported by 02b29, 02b33. Retain the text Susemihl prints.

1203a2 At 04a5 *τοιούτός τις οἶος* is transmitted in the same manuscripts that offer these words here, while α omits *τις*.

Of the occurrences of *τοιούτος... οἶος...* in M.M., excepting that here and that in 04a5, a part of the verb *εἶναι* intervenes six times (*τοιούτος ἐστίν οἶος* 92b32, 03b33, *τοιούτος ὦν οἶος* 03b15, 07b38, *τοιούτος εἶναι οἶος* 03b16, *τοιούτος ἦν οἶος*

04a1), and on two occasions there is no intervening word (92b35, 13a11). Whilst *τις* is thus only supported by 04a5, I would keep it in 03a2 and 04a5.

1203a4 The transmitted reading *ἔχει* is unobjectionable, and a full-stop needs to be placed after *συμφορώτατα*. The very late reading, *ἔχειν*, makes the construction slightly awkward. The infinitive would have to be taken as a second infinitive governed by *οἷος* (a2).²⁵⁴ But the intervening infinitival construction, governed by *οἶσθαι*, would lead an unwary reader to take the infinitive with *οἶσθαι*.

1203a6-7 *α* offers *οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ὁ ἀκρατής*. This flatly contradicts the next sentence. Two different correctors in P tried to remedy this conjecturally. One changes *εὐιατώτερος* in the preceding line to *ἀνιατώτερος*,²⁵⁵ the other placed a reference mark after *ἂν*, and wrote *ἴσως* : οὐκ in the bottom margin. Now, *ἴσως* is the standard way of signifying a conjecture and is found in the margins of P frequently (e.g. on 03b9 where *ἀνήνατο* is suggested for *ἀνήατο*, the reading in the body of the text of P; on 03b20 where the conjecturer writes in the top margin: *ἴσως, καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής, σώφρων*). But the conjecture in P, including the *ἴσως*, was incorporated into the text of Rav. *in linea*, and thence into M^b, and thence into Bekker's²⁵⁶ and Susemihl's text.²⁵⁷

No manuscript not descended from P has *ἴσως*, and the first stage in restoring the text here is thus to excise *ἴσως* (a7). Of the manuscripts on the other side of the stemma (excluding K, which makes a large omission *ex homoeot.*) V and L do give the negative that the two correctors in P saw was required, but the position of their *οὐ* is after *οὖν*, but A does not have a negative.

²⁵⁴ For the construction see Dirlmeier, pp.304-5.

²⁵⁵ The conjecture is not made in a8, as Susemihl's apparatus states.

²⁵⁶ Bekker, who used M as one of two manuscripts to constitute the text, had to rely on M, given that the other manuscript he used, K, omits the sentence altogether.

²⁵⁷ Susemihl records the reading as a conjecture in P, but was not aware that M is a descendent of P.

The context in fact shows that an οὐ is not required in this sentence, but εὐιατότερος must be changed to ἀνιαιτότερος, which was another correction in P. For otherwise the progression of the argument is nonsensical: μὲν οὖν²⁵⁸ introduces the conclusion for which the author is to argue (prospective οὕτω, a6), and in the next sentence the γάρ (a7) gives the reason for the conclusion. So the argument, reading οὐ in a7, would be: the acratia does not seem to be more easily curable [than the intemperate] because the intemperate man is more easily curable [than the acratia]. The reason given is no reason at all for the conclusion but a denial of the conclusion. Far more sensible would be (reading ἀνιαιτότερος in b6 and no negative in b7, the following argument: the acratia is harder to cure [sc. than the intemperate] because the intemperate is easier to cure [sc. than the acratia]. If the reason for the conclusion can be justified, which it is in a8-9, then the conclusion is established: the acratia is harder to cure. The section ends in a10 with ‘the acratia appears to be incurable’, which is a direct response to the question in a6 (reading ἀνιαιτότερος).

Read ἀνι- in a6 and omit Susemihl’s ἴσως οὐχ in a7.

1203a9-10 Full stop after πράξει (a9) and πράττει (a10).

1203a11-13 The formulation of this question is linguistically most similar to 03a22-4. Both have πότερος... ἢ δῆλον ὅτι... The word ἐκεῖνος (a13, = ‘the former’) corresponds to οὗτοι (a24 = ‘the latter’). But the sentence at 03a22-4 itself has textual difficulties. See below.

ἐκεῖνος (a13) refers to the intemperate man (cf. a17, a29). A reference to the acratia man must therefore occur in between the reference to the intemperate man and ἐκεῖνος, if ἐκεῖνος is to mean ‘the former’. We also need two candidates to be assessed for the badness of their respective διαθέσεις. Bonitz’s conjecture, [1844],

²⁵⁸ Compare 87b38-88a1.

adding ἢ ᾧ ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι ὑπάρχει achieves this.²⁵⁹ Dirlmeier's objection to this supplement is that τὰ κακὰ ταῦτα do not belong to the acratice man but to the intemperate man. But Dirlmeier's delimitation of κακὰ ταῦτα to 'das Tun des Schlechten auf Grund der Wirksamkeit des falschen Logos', on the basis of a22, a26, b27, is unnecessarily restrictive. It would be incredible for ταῦτα to look forward to a22 (κακὰ ποιεῖν) or a26 (πράττειν φαῦλα), which phrases are found in the treatment of a separate question, or, even worse, to the distant phrase πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα in b27.²⁶⁰ There is a far simpler explanation of τὰ κακὰ ταῦτα, which does not differentiate arbitrarily between the intemperate man and the acratice man: in the previous sentence (a8-10), we supply τὰ φαῦλα as the object of πράξει (a9), and as the object of πράττει (a10). τὰ κακὰ ταῦτα (a12) will then pick out bad actions, no matter what the psychology of the agent which led to those actions was. Both the acratice and the intemperate man do bad things (for the acratice cf. 00b32, 01a1, 01b10-11, b16, 02a1). Bonitz' conjecture is thus unobjectionable (reading τε²⁶¹) and it is also simpler to explain how such a phrase should have dropped out than Dirlmeier's supplement.

1203a11 L's re-ordering once again shows intelligence. Jaeger, [1948] 442n.1, and von Arnim, [1929] 25, had objected to the redundant τ in this line, but Dirlmeier's parallels from Herodotus are enough to set aside doubt that the transmitted text is what was written.

²⁵⁹ Note the particle μὲν. I do not know where Susemihl got the τε from. I prefer the τε which links up nicely with the καί. I assume that the τε is Susemihl's.

²⁶⁰ a22 and a26 does not do the work Dirlmeier wants, anyway: first because it is not denied that the acratice does things which are bad - that is not the issue at stake there -, and secondly the addition of the psychology behind the intemperate man's performance of bad actions is specified in a27; the author clearly does not think that πράττειν φαῦλα ὄντα is definitionally doing bad things from not having ὀρθὸς λόγος, but has to add the extra clause about the intemperate man's psychology. b27 also is not evidence for the claim that Dirlmeier (implicitly) makes, namely that πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα is something that only intemperate people do. The point in b27 is that the acratice has a conflict while the intemperate man has no conflict. No distinction is drawn between the type of thing the different men do.

²⁶¹ See n.259.

1203a13 A part of τιμίος is guaranteed by 03a16. The occurrence of ὅτι in two different families, in A and α suggests that ω may not have had a good text here.

Spengel's suggestion of the superlative in this line should be resisted. Cf. E.N. 1150a2 τὸ βέλτιον (although there is manuscript divergence there).

1203a18 New paragraph.

1203a18 Leave out καί with α. Comma after κακίας. The word-order is strange - the delay of κακίας. The noun we supply with οἴσαν is ἀκολασίαν. The word has not appeared since 91b4, but is not awkward to supply from the context.

1203a20 The 'Why?' asks not about the name 'Bestiality', but about the reason for animals not being intemperate. Instead of Susemihl's dash in this line, bracket ἡ γάρ... κακία (a19-20).

1203a21 The ἡ after ὅτι is well-attested. Susemihl's suggestion of adding a further ἡ before φαύλη, is made in order to avoid the sentence meaning 'the ἀρχή in an animal is not base' (the adjective will be predicative rather than attributive). If this was what was meant, there would be an acknowledgement that animals do have an ἀρχή, which is denied in a25. But in a24 the author writes ἡ ἀρχὴ φαύλη, where the adjective is attributive. There is no need, therefore, to add Susemihl's ἡ: ἡ ἀρχὴ φαύλη..., can be translated 'there is no base ἀρχή in animals', which is consistent with there being no ἀρχή in animals at all.

The next sentence - ἔστιν δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ ὁ λόγος. - is most naturally read to assert that the animal's ἀρχή is λόγος. The parallel passage is E.N. 1150a3-5:

ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν
πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ
φαυλότης αἰεὶ ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή.

If the author of M.M. had wrongly taken the comparison here to be between animals and humans, he would conclude that animals do not have an ὄρχή. This he asserts in a25. He cannot, then, think that the ὄρχή of animals is λόγος, as he seems to, given the transmitted text, in 03a21. If ἡ is deleted before ὄρχή (a21), then we can save the author from saying that the ὄρχή of animals is λόγος, which contradicts 03a21. He can be making the same claim as E.N. 1150a5: λόγος is an ὄρχή.

1203a22 The ἐπεὶ makes the sentence unconstructable. There is no main clause. There is no parallel for the combination ἐπεὶ πότερος in Greek literature, although ἔπειτα πότερος can be found in Pol. 1337a4, but there ἔπειτα picks up an earlier πρῶτον. Amerbach's supplement ἐπεὶ <ζητήσεϊέν τις> does not help, but his conjecture of ἔτι is good and should be accepted. Cf. 08b20.

1203a23 Εὐμόθης is given as an extra name in α. Kenny, [1978] 217n.2, conjectures Ἐπιάνθης, who wanted to destroy Athens after Aegospotami (405 B.C.). But Kenny's search for names ending -ωνθης was misguided. The ν originated late.

The obscurity (to us and to scribes who transmitted the text) of Eumathes is at once a reason why the name should have dropped out in one branch of the tradition (perhaps it was mistaken for the adjective ('learned') which would be most inappropriate), and a sign that the name was not added by some scribe as a further example of a wicked man.

To hold that Εὐμόθης is an interpolation would have to be defended in one of the following implausible ways:

i) Clearch in this line is most likely to be the tyrant of Heraclea from 364/363-353/2. But there are three other well-known people called Clearch. The first was the Spartan who lived from 450-401 B.C., the second was a middle-comedy poet (in the fourth century B.C.), and the third was a peripatetic living in Cyprus (340-250 B.C.). This last Clearch was a polymath. At an early point in the transmission there could

have been a marginal annotation in which the Clearchs were distinguished. What better adjective with which to describe the third Clearch than εὐμάθης?

ii) A fragment of Isaeus' ὑπὲρ Εὐμάθης (fr.16), quoted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus de Is. 5, links an Athenian banker with a Dionysius. An absurd amount of misunderstanding of marginal clarification would have to have taken place if the Dionysius in 03a23 was distinguished in the margin from the banker, and that caused a copyist to add ἢ εὐμάθης in his new copy.

iii) A scribe read Xenophon and decided to pick one of the Thirty Tyrants at random.

There is another unlikely explanation, which is that the author wrote Εὐμάθης Φαληρεύς, and that the demotic name of the tyrant of 404 B.C. was changed to Φάλαρις, a more famous figure of wickedness in Aristotle. But this would not account for the word order we have here, nor for the fact that both branches of the tradition have Φάλαρις.

Print ἢ Εὐμάθης.

1203a23 ἢ τις τούτων τῶν μοχθηρῶν adds nothing to the question that has already been put. To read τῶν τοιούτων for τούτων τῶν would broaden the question appropriately. Cf. 85b11, 88b30, 91b8, 95b15.

1203a25 Read ἔνεστιν with α. This conforms with 03a24 ἐνοῦσα, a26 ἔνεστιν, a28 ἔνεστιν.

1203a28 The conclusion suddenly brings in the acratie man. The corrector in K introduces a clause to make a reference to the acratie in order to provide an extra premise so that the conclusion is not so random. οὐχ in a28 is a late addition. The acratie's ἀρχή can well be described as ὑγιής: the acratie has ὀρθὸς λόγος (02a12-13), his λόγος εὖ διακείται (03a16). What we need before διὸ is two claims - that the acratie's λόγος is healthy and that the intemperate man's is unhealthy. I suggest we

read: ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἔνεστιν <φασὺλη· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἢ ἀρχὴ> ἔνεστιν ὑγιῆς in a29. The δὲ answers μὲν (a25). This is close to K's supplement, but I take the agreement between A and α to be significant, and so use their reading as the basis from which to start. Clearly, corrections had taken place in ζ.

The supplements proposed in K and by myself are palaeographically neater than the οὐχ which Susemihl adopts. οὐχ ὑγιῆς, it can be added, is an unnecessarily weak description of the intemperate man's λόγος.

1203a30 The manuscripts vary on whether or not οἶον should be read in this line and again in a34, but all mss. have οἶον in a31 where it is essential.²⁶² Both sorts of acrasia are described by an adjective + τας, and then are given further specification by the author. We should expect οἶον either to appear in both cases or in neither. The manuscripts point strongly to the presence of οἶον in a34, and are equally divided on its presence in a30. For this reason read οἶον in a30. οἶον will be translated in a30 and a34 as 'viz.', which is its sense in 85a15, 86b26. In a34 it means 'for example'.

1203a30 προτρεπτική is the word transmitted, but two correctors, Ramsauer and an unknown corrector in P, independently suggested προπετική. The suggestion was made to conform with E.N. 1150b9-28, where two types of acrasia are distinguished: προπέτεια and ἀσθένεια. Dirlmeier, however, puts up a stout defence of the transmitted reading (p.390).²⁶³ Dirlmeier continues to call the acratia who is not the weak one 'impulsiv-unbeherrschte', and, without begging any questions I shall call him 'impulsive-acratia'.

The first argument Dirlmeier alleges is that the temptation to emend on the basis of E.N. is misplaced, because M.M. was written first. This is controversial, but

²⁶² The word οἶον is peculiarly apt to be problematic in this text. On fourteen occasions there is disagreement in the mss. about whether or not the word should be included: 84b3, 87b39, 89a10, 9019, 91a5, 92a9, 99a15, 99b38, 02a20, 03a30, 03a34, 07b9, 07b30.

²⁶³ The two candidates for what we should read here are both words which do not appear in writings by Aristotle. προτρεπτικόν does appear in Rhet. ad Al. 1421b9, pace Dirlmeier. προπετική does not exist anywhere in Greek literature.

even if true, a later work by Aristotle might be expected to use the same term as the earlier.

The second argument is that the corruption from *προπετική* to *προτρεπτική* is palaeographically unlikely. But, since the word *προπετική* does not appear in Greek literature at all, it would be a most natural (conscious) change by a scribe.²⁶⁴

Thirdly, Dirlmeier alleges a symmetry between *ἀποτρέπων* in a34 with *προτρεπτική* in a30. Certainly, the verbs *προτρέπειν* and *ἀποτρέπειν* are used symmetrically in Aristotle. *Rhet.* 1358b21, for example, explains how the end of the deliberative speaker is the beneficial or the harmful: *ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χειρὸν ἀποτρέπει*. But in 03a34 (and in 02b24) it is *λόγος* that *ἀποτρέπει* (reason turns the agent away from doing something bad), whereas in a30, reading *προτρεπτική*, it is *λόγος* that *προτρέπει* (impulsive-intemperance would urge one to act).²⁶⁵ So the symmetry would not be not made at all clear. In fact, I do not think that there would

²⁶⁴ Dirlmeier, later in the same paragraph, calls *προτρεπτική* the *lectio difficilior*. But how a word which does not appear in Greek literature can be 'easier' than a word which is well attested, Dirlmeier does not say. Were it not for the survival of *E.N.*, *προπετική* would undoubtedly be the *lectio difficilior*. The existence of *E.N.* makes *προπετική* the easier reading, only in the sense that *M.M.* and *E.N.* will then agree. But as that agreement is controversial, and denied by Dirlmeier, it is illicit for him to appeal to the principle '*praestat lectio difficilior*', in the way that he does. That principle ought not to be used in weighing up a conjecture against a ms. reading, but between rival ms. readings.

²⁶⁵ Dirlmeier (p.390) thinks that the impulsive-acratic has a bad *λόγος*, and that it is this *λόγος* which is *προτρεπτικός*. Leaving aside the difficulty that *M.M.* does not say that his *λόγος* is *προτρεπτικός*, but that the type of acrasia is *προτρεπτική*, it is mistaken to suppose that any acratic has anything other than *ὀρθὸς λόγος* (cf. 02a11-12, 03a14). The impulsive-acratic, Dirlmeier thinks, will have a bad *λόγος* in him just as the intemperate does. Dirlmeier goes on to say that when *λόγος διδάξων* (03a8) gets in him, he will act virtuously, and that the impulsive-acratic is less blameworthy than the weak-acratic because he does not follow *λόγος*. Dirlmeier notes the apparent contradiction between 03b2-11 and 03a7-9, but denies that there is a contradiction on the grounds that 03b2-11 is purely hypothetical. The impulsive-acratic would not stick to the results of his deliberation if he deliberated, but he does not deliberate, Dirlmeier says.

All this is very forced. The reason why the impulsive-acratic is to be blamed less than the weak acratic has nothing to do with the possibility of removing a bad *λόγος*. He is blamed less, the author says, because good people are susceptible to impulsive-acrasia (03a36, b8). The important difference between the impulsive-acratic and the weak-acratic is that the second disobeys his *λόγος*, whereas the second has no *λόγος* at all at the time. Anticipation of the arrival of the beautiful woman will stop the impulsive-acratic being impulsively acratic. The fact that reason can prevent the *πόθος* (03b4), does not mean that he originally had a bad *λόγος*. The adjective *ἀπρονοήτος* (03a31) conveys the point precisely that the impulsive acratic is not acting as the result of deliberation, not, that is, acting as a result of bad *λόγος*. He acts without having thought about it at all. So Dirlmeier's equation of the intemperate man and the impulsive-acratic man is false, both with respect to the possession by each of bad *λόγος*, and with respect to their respective blameworthiness on account of educability.

be any symmetry, not because the sort of thing which προτρέπει is different from what ἀποτρέπει, but because προτρεπτικόν means not simply ‘encouraging to act’, but ‘encouraging to act well’. Dirlmeier cites 06a24 for support that what one is urged to do is simply to act. But at 06a24 the sort of action which pleasure urges one to perform is virtuous action. (cf. E.N. 1113b26-9, 1172b6, 1179b7, b10, 1180a7 in all of which cases the encouragement is to good things).²⁶⁶ Far more often, on the basis of the examples L.S.J. offer of the word, is the object to which one is encouraged a good thing, and while there are instances of the object being bad (Isocrates 7.46 has προτρέπειν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀδικίας) one feels that unless the object is stated to be bad, it will be good. Moreover, Aristotle’s Protrepticus, whose title may not have been his own, was nevertheless an exhortation not to act simpliciter, but to philosophise, very much a virtuous activity.

Fourthly, Dirlmeier says that the two adjectives ἀπρονοήτος and ἐξαίφνης would be unnecessary if προπετική were right because the two concepts would already be included in the word, whereas it is appropriate for the adjective προτρεπτική to have further specification. But the adjective προπετικός is used metaphorically. It literally means ‘fallen forward’. It is thus quite in place for two further adjectives to be given in addition. Also, it is not at all clear that the concept of lack of foresight is included within προπετική.

Retain προπετική.

1203a34 Excise τοῦ¹ with C and β. The tradition does not point one way or the other, but the usage of μετὰ + gen. in this treatise is decisive. At 82a18, 89a3, 96b38, 98a2, 98a20 the phrase is μετὰ λόγου. There is admittedly an adjective in 03a34, which makes the parallels not exact, for in each of those cases cited there is no adjective. But there is no set rule for the conjunction of noun + articles + attributive participle in Greek. In the immediate text can be found i) article + noun + article + participle (cf.

²⁶⁶ Cf. also Plato Euthyd. 275a, 307a; Isocrates 2.8; and Aeschines 3.154 cited by Dirlmeier.

03b18), ii) article + noun + participle (03a24), iii) noun + article + participle (cf. 03a8). The last is sufficient to parallel for excluding τοῦ¹ here.

1203a35 λίων is guaranteed by the comparative in 03b7. The word-order of α and K is unparalleled in M.M. and must be a coincidental error.

1203b1 I am convinced by Grant's argument,²⁶⁷ cited by Armstrong and Dirlmeier (p.390) that there is no need for Spengel's transposition.

1203b2 τῷ λόγῳ προλάβειν occurs in Demosthenes Proemia 29, meaning 'to capture with an argument'. It is tempting to read προκαταλαβόντα given b4, b9.

1203b3 Full stop after εὐπρόσωπος.

1203b7 Susemihl's conjecture, οὐδέ, in this line is unnecessary. Denniston (p.508) quotes prose examples of οὐτε... τε... οὐ from Thucydides I.5.2; I.126.6. Bonitz (546a16f) quotes Pol. 1272b19 which gives οὐτε... τε..., but no negative follows.

1203b8-9 The independent manuscripts are unanimous in ending the verb -ατο, and it is thus reasonable to suppose (with Casaubon and Scaliger) that the first two letters are the separate word ἄν. It is also a reasonable assumption that the verb will be aorist optative to balance γένοιτ' in the first part of the sentence.

The reading of V, ἄν εἴσατο, gives the aorist middle optative of οἶδα, which is extremely rare (only found in Homer, Iliad II.215) and anyway inappropriate. The reading of K and A is nonsense as it stands but is the same, barring diacritics and word division, as that of V. The reading of 24¹ gives a standard part of οἶδα, the future, but this is a) ungrammatical - we need the optative- and b) as inappropriate as the reading

²⁶⁷ Grant, [1866] vol. II, p.223.

of V - the λόγος προκοκαλαβών does 'know'. The reading of C P², ἀνήαιτο is a vox nihili, and even if the words are divided so that ἀν is at the beginning, there is no obvious word resembling ηαιτο which I can see that will fit the context. The correction in P, ἀνήνατο, the aorist of ἀναίνομαι ('I reject, refuse, deny'), is mistaken not only because it is not optative, but also because the α and the ν have been included in the verb. If the corrector of P has the right verb then we would need to print ἀν ἀνήναιτο.

There is one remaining reading, that proposed by Scaliger, and now known to have manuscript authority from L: ἀν ἐάσαιτο (aorist middle optative of ἐάω, 'to allow'). But we would translate b7-10: 'Neither will the good man ever become this type of akratic, nor will anticipating reason allow him [the good man] [sc. to do the sort of things that the weak akratic does]. For this [sc. anticipating reason] is present in him (the good man), and he does not obey it, but surrenders to pleasure...' This is impossible because the good man does not disobey his anticipating reason. Further, the aorist middle optative of ἐάω is not found in Greek literature. (The aorist active optative does exist in Plato's Laws 642a7, Meno 92b8, Republic 534d4, Demosthenes in Stephanum 45.2, Xenophon Hellenica VI.v.47.1.)

Casaubon proposed two changes to the text in these two lines. Susemihl adopts the last, ἀν ἰάσαιτο. But this results in absurdity. The suppressed object of ἰάσαιτο in b9, in Susemihl's text, is the σπουδαῖος man. This cannot be right. The σπουδαῖος man does not need to be cured. This was the motivation for Casaubon's moving of the article in b8 after ἄν - the akratic becomes the subject of γένοιτ'. The akratic is in need of a cure. And the movement of the article also facilitates the reader's understanding of the reference of αὐτῷ in b10 to the akratic. Accept Casaubon's emendation in b9, but also accept his transposition of ὁ in b8.

1203b10 Dirlmeier (p.392) defends the manuscripts' οὔτε on the grounds that Denniston allows that οὔτε... δὲ... is legitimate Greek. Dirlmeier thinks that οὔτε...

ἀλλὰ... is similar to that.²⁶⁸ But the examples which Denniston cites from prose authors (p.511) are passages where both particles occur in main clauses. So even if the equation by Dirlmeier of ἀλλὰ with δέ were legitimate, there are no parallels for οὔτε in a relative clause on its own, and then an adversative particle in the main clause in Denniston. Bonitz (546a21-31) offers examples of οὐ... οὔτε... ἀλλὰ..., but that is not what we have here. Rieckher's οὔτι 'not at all' is much better than the corrector of P's οὔτοι 'indeed not'. The corruption is also easier from οὔτι to οὔτε. This has happened in M.M. itself at 89a21, the only other occurrence of οὔτι in Susemihl's text. But see my note on 89b23.

οὔτι is not a word that Aristotle uses often. It occurs only at Cat. 6a2, Post An. 98a18, Phys. 254a26, Cael. 271a18, Meteor. 350b32 (always: οὔτι γε).

1203b15 Dirlmeier (p.392) does not account, in his reply to Spengel's criticism of the 'inept' way the author speaks here,²⁶⁹ a) for the fact that the genitive absolutes in b14 and b15-16 contain a noun (ἐπιθυμιῶν) which is not grammatically distinct from the main clause (in b14 ταύτους = ἐπιθυμίας, and in b16 ἐπιθυμίας are the subject of ἐγγένοιτο), b) the repetition of τοιοῦτος οἶος. 'To be such as to be such as' is as inelegant in Greek as it is in English.

Spengel suspected that the passage was corrupt, and if this sentence were found in a work of Aristotle, we would be tempted to accept Armstrong's conjecture. But it is not.

1203b16-18 Quite how the encratic 'follows' the temperate man is not at all clear in Susemihl's text. b13-20 evidently are meant to show how the temperate man is encratic (b13, b19-20). In between b13 and b20 Susemihl's text presents us first with a definition of the encratic man (b13-16), then with a definition of the temperate man (b16-18), and then another definition of the encratic man (b18-19). The second

²⁶⁸ He could have pointed to 89b23-4. See my note there.

²⁶⁹ Note that Susemihl wrongly attributes Spengel's criticisms on b15-16 ὁ — κατέχειν to b14-15.

definition of the encratic man, as Armstrong noted, is inconsistent with the conclusion.²⁷⁰ Armstrong's excision here is, however, too far-reaching. We need ἔστιν δὲ σώφρων... ταῦτα ὀρθόν (b16-18) in order to make it clear why the encratic 'will follow' the temperate. Excising ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς ὁ ἐπιθυμίας φαύλας τὸν τε λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν (b18-19), the passage sets out how the temperate man is similar to the encratic. Both can be without base desires, and both have ὀρθός λόγος. From this it is alleged that the encratic 'follows' the temperate man: i.e. the temperate man is encratic. They are indistinguishable when the encratic does not have base desires. The temperate man is everything the encratic is, plus a bit more. An extra condition has to be added to the conditions that they share to differentiate the temperate man from the encratic, viz. that the former never has base desires (b17). E.N. 1151b32-5 makes the same point but with much more caution.

The sentence containing the misplaced definition of the encratic (b18-19) is not present in one family, α, and nor is it present in L. Dirlmeier (p.393) alleges that the omission in a descendant of P is the result of omission ex homoeot., but I suspect the reverse. A gloss in the other part of the tradition has been included in three out of four manuscripts in the text. Excise ὁ τ' ἐγκρατῆς — περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν (b18-19).

1203b20-1 Accept Bonitz' additions in b20-1. γάρ (b21) must be the beginning of the justification for the conclusion that the encratic is not temperate (b23), and yet the transmitted text, καὶ ἔσται σώφρων (b20), says that he is.

1203b22 γε is well-attested, and affects the sense drastically. οἷός τε means 'able', οἷός γε means 'such as at least'.²⁷¹ The second is much better, and picks up the distinction earlier (b15-16) in which the encratic is said not necessarily to have base

²⁷⁰ Hence the conjectures by Ellebodus and Amerbach in b20.

²⁷¹ Armstrong renders 'or is at least able to feel them', Stock by 'or is at least capable of feeling [passion]', both of which appear to translate a τε and a γε, Dirlmeier by 'oder der so geartet ist, daß er affiziert werden kann', which seems to translate οἷος twice.

desires. Reading γε, translate a21-2: ‘but the encratic is the man who is affected and overcomes these <desires>, or rather <does so> inasmuch at least as he is affected’.

This not only makes sense, but is an important qualification for the author to make. Once γε is in place there is no temptation to supplement the text as many have tried. For the frequent combination ἦ... γε see 02a23, 02b20, 04a21, 06b32, 13b12.

1203b28 Denniston (p.510) cites four cases of οὔδε... οὔτε, including one from Plato and one from Hippocrates. Bonitz (539b54) quotes Prob. 956a40. These are sufficient to allow the reading of the manuscripts, οὐδέ, to stand: ‘And so the acratic is not like the intemperate, nor...’. The first part of this sentence answers directly to b26 ὁ δ’ ἀκόλαστος οὐ τοιοῦτος, and then the second part is tacked on. Place a comma after ἀκρατῆς in b28 to make this more obvious.

1203b30 I see no reason to prefer the Aldine’s aorist participle over the unanimous testimony of the independent mss. Read γινομένων.

1203b32 Armstrong’s conjecture ὅτι springs (I imagine) from unease at the lack of connection between the two clauses in the sentence. By adding ὅτι, Armstrong not only links the two clauses, but also escapes having to explain how the force of διὰ τοῦτο and ἀπὸ τούτου differ because διὰ τοῦτο becomes redundant.

A simpler solution is to place a full stop after εἶναι (which is what the mss. do). 90a1 is a parallel for this. The repetition of thought in διὰ and ἀπὸ is emphatic.

1203b35 The second οὐ is poorly attested and should be excised. None of C P A K had it originally. The acratic’s reason is good (implicit in b26, explicit in 02a11-13, 03a14, implicit in the counterfactual in b36-7). The author is concentrating on the origin of the λόγοι of the intemperate and the acratic respectively. The intemperate has a bad λόγος by nature, the acratic has a good λόγος by habit.

With the corrector in K, I take αὐτὸν in b36 to be the acratice's λόγος, but, on the basis of b33-4, I take αὐτὸς in the same line to be the acratice himself. (Stock takes both to refer to the acratice. But the counterfactual φαῦλον γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔδει εἶναι, on this reading, is no longer counterfactual in 04a2 - the acratice is base. Cf. also 00b5.²⁷² If we read αὐτῷ in b3 with C P the same problem arises.)

1204a1 Dirlmeier (p.393) wants to retain οἶν. Jaeger²⁷³ had used the combination to cast doubt on the authenticity of the treatise, and von Arnim²⁷⁴ would not read οἶν. The tradition suggests strongly that οἶν and ἄρα were variants in ω: some have οἶν alone, some ἄρα alone, and some both. This is more likely to have happened if in that ancestor one of the words was placed above the other: some scribes took the word above the line to be an addition, some as a correction, and some ignored it. The parallel from Plato which Dirlmeier cites, Theat. 149b10, is not a precise parallel, (ἄρα picks up φασίν in the previous line). Campbell's commentary²⁷⁵ translates ἄρα 'according to this tale'. There is no such explanation here. The passage from Plato is the only one I know of in any author to have the collocation μὲν οἶν ἄρα. Leave οἶν in square brackets.

1204a2 Susemihl's δῆ is surely right.

1204a5 Retain τις. See my note on 1203a2 and Dirlmeier, p.394.

1204a8 Bonitz 85a24 only gives Meteor. 339a2, 355b24 as examples of ἀπορεῖν + acc. It is unclear whether τὰ εἰρημένα are the words of the question just asked, or the discussion before the question, the relevant points of which are given in the

²⁷² That the acratice is base is also implicit in the assertion that the intemperate is baser than the acratice (03b29-30).

²⁷³ Jaeger, [1948] 442.

²⁷⁴ Von Arnim, [1929] 25-6. Von Arnim slips when he says that P does not have οἶν.

²⁷⁵ Campbell, [1883] ad loc.

subordinate clause within the question. Either way it is a mistake to place a colon after εἰρημένῳ. What follows is the beginning of the reply to the question, not the ἀπορία itself. Punctuate with a full stop.

1204a13 ὁ φρόνιμος is redundant. Its position also makes the identification of τοιοῦτος with the acritic less easy. It could have intruded from a (mistaken²⁷⁶) marginal gloss on τοιοῦτος.

1204a13-18 First, replace the colon in a15 with a comma. The first μὲν in this line is answered by ἀλλ', instead of the usual δέ, because the second clause itself has a μὲν... δέ. Cf. Herodotus VIII.46.1: ἦσαν μὲν σφι καὶ ἄλλοι πεπληρωμένοι νέες, ἀλλὰ τῆσι μὲν τὴν ἐωυτῶν ἐφύλασσον, τριήκοντα δὲ τῆσι ἄριστα πλεούσησι ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ἐναυμάχησαν; Plato Laches 191E οὐκοῦν ἀνδρεῖοι μὲν πάντες οὗτοί εἰσιν ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς, οἱ δ' ἐν λύπαις...

In a17 the manuscripts offer δεινός. If they are right there, then Casaubon's conjecture in a16 is attractive. The φρόνιμος man and the δεινός man's spheres are the same (περὶ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτά, a15). The φρόνιμος man can act in the sphere of what one ought to do, the δεινός man does not act.

The expression πρακτικός + περὶ is not found in Aristotle, who uses πρακτικός on its own (e.g. E.N. 1146a8, 1152a9), or + gen. (e.g. E.N. 1134a2 τοῦ δικαίου, E.E. 1222a6 τῶν βελτίστων, E.E. 1247a8 τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, E.E. 1248b36 τῶν καλῶν). But E.N. 1140b5 φρονήσις is a ἕξις ἀληθῆς μετὰ λόγου πρακτικῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. And in 1140b20-1 it is a ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικῆ. But in neither of these formulations must the περὶ phrase be dependent on πρακτικῆ, and the difference in formulation suggests that it is not - it can, like the other adjectives, be dependent on ἕξις or directly on φρονήσις.

²⁷⁶ But understandable. In 97b20 the φρόνιμος man is δεινός.

In E.N. it is said that it is possible for clever people to be acratia (1152a10). These clever people will know what the right thing to do is, but they are not such as to have the *ἔξις* of *φρόνησις*.²⁷⁷ People confuse the *φρόνιμος* man and the *δεινός* man, and hence, spotting a clever man being acratia, they wrongly attribute acratia to *τοῖς φρονίμοις*.

In 04a13ff. we get the following: the acratia is *δεινός* (04a13). The *φρόνιμος* does do what he ought to do (a15). The *δεινός* does not act (a16). The *δεινός* does not act in the way that he ought (a17). Therefore the *φρόνιμος* cannot be acratia.

The chief problem in the passage in M.M. revolves around *ὁ δ' οὐ πρακτικός* in b16. *ὁ μὲν* referred to the *φρόνιμος* man, *ὁ δὲ* refers to the *δεινός* man. The former does what he ought, but what does the latter do? The Greek appears to mean that the latter does not act at all (*οὐ πρακτικός*). Armstrong, who reads *δεινός* with the mss. in a17, does take the passage to deny that the clever man as such acts. He takes the role of *δεινότης* in 97b25-6 to be deliberative rather than executive. But if that is what the author means in 04a16, then it is unclear how the *δεινός* can be acratia. Certainly, neither (as such) will do what they ought to, but that in itself is not good enough grounds to say that the *δεινός* can be acratia. Otherwise a paralysed person would count as acratia, simply on the basis that, in virtue of the fact that she performs no actions, she does not do what she ought to do.²⁷⁸ In addition, I cannot see how Armstrong on the one hand thinks that the *δεινός* is not *πρακτικός* (04a15), and yet does think that his province is *τὰ πρακτά* (a15).

πράττειν and its cognates can (and do, according to McDowell) have a more refined sense than just 'act' in Aristotle's ethical theory, a sense restricted to actions 'undertaken as constituent means to eudaimonia'.²⁷⁹ This fits E.N. 1152a9 *ὁ δ' ἀκρατής οὐ πρακτικός*. The acratia does not do what he thinks it is best to do, he does not act in accordance with his choice, but he does do things. If this is the sense in

²⁷⁷ See Stewart, [1892] vol. II, 213-14.

²⁷⁸ Armstrong's translation, with its inclusion of what is not in the Greek, arouses suspicion.

²⁷⁹ McDowell, [1980] 364.

M.M., then there will not be a denial that the δεινός man does not act (in the broad sense), which would be absurd, but a denial that he acts-with-a-view-to-eudaimonia. Our acratc δεινός will have a good conception of what he ought to do, but not do it. The problem with the passage, on this reading, is that πρακτικός includes the notion of doing what one ought to do, but the specification περὶ ὃ δεῖ is added redundantly by the author (a15-16).

The translation of Stock is: ‘the one [the φρόνιμος] does what he ought and the other [the δεινός] does not’. Stock tacitly supplies περὶ ὃ δεῖ after πρακτικός (b16), or does not translate πρακτικός (b16), or takes περὶ ὃ δεῖ as conceptually present in the term πρακτικός. The cost of doing this is that there is a contradiction between this line and 97b20, where the φρόνιμος man is said to be δεινός. The δεινός man does do what he ought to do in 97b20, but in 04a16 he does not.²⁸⁰

It is thus difficult to see how the author uses the concept of cleverness to illustrate that the φρόνιμος man cannot be acratc. It is striking that whereas E.N. says that ὁ ἀκρατής οὐ πρακτικός, M.M. does not. But he seems to rely on both the δεινός man and the acratc man not being πρακτικός to conclude (οὐδὲν a16) that one can be both at the same time.

The thought in a15-18 is most unclear. I prefer to retain the reading of the mss. in a17. Burnet (p.328) calls the corresponding passage in E.N. 1152a10-14 ‘one of Aristotle’s longest parentheses’. Our author seems not to have understood the structure of the passage in E.N., and to have thought Aristotle was talking about the δεινός man’s being πρακτικός. This is an example of our author writing nonsense as a result of misunderstanding Aristotle.

²⁸⁰ The earlier discussion of δεινότης (97b18-28) says that the φρόνιμος man is δεινός (97b20), and the base man too is said to be δεινός, but not φρόνιμος (97b20).

1204a19-26 There are some problems with this passage.²⁸¹ First, how is it consistent to say on the one hand that everyone includes pleasure in their account of εὐδαιμονία (a20-2), and on the other that some people do not even think that it is to be reckoned as a good (a22-3)? M.M. establishes a link (proximity) between painlessness and pleasure in a24, but if the οὖν in that line is correct, the argumentation will be: since everyone includes pleasure in their account of happiness, and some people say that painlessness is important for happiness, but deny that pleasure is, these people must, when they talk of painlessness, be talking about something close (ἐγγύς, a24) to pleasure. The closeness that is established will have to be of such a sort that it does not matter if M.M. never returns to discuss painlessness, given the importance M.M. here places on the determination of the objects of his own enquiry by previous enquiries. It would be a lot to grant a philosopher that painlessness is pleasure, and yet the sort of closeness which M.M. would need if he were being rigorous is identity. If we were to grant this to M.M., then the problem raised about consistency at the start of this paragraph would be dissolved. The people who are disgusted by pleasure, it will turn out, are actually quite fond of it, although they would not admit it.

Another way of taking the passage is to follow Susemihl's lead in a24 and emend οὖν to δέ. The (conceptual) proximity of pleasure to painlessness can, in this way, be taken not as a conclusion, but as an undefended claim. This has its attractions given the implausibility of anyone seriously advancing an argument such as the one I offered in the previous paragraph. But the interpretation that I would support necessitates not only that we change οὖν to δέ in a24, but also that δέ in a22 is emended to γάρ. Let us start with a22. A γάρ can be closely paralleled by 06b31-4 (esp. b33), where there is a similar appeal to other people's beliefs. In that passage the second alternative (ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ γε + gen.) is defended with a γάρ-sentence. So here, the fact that even (καί, a22) those who are hostile to pleasure, admit its brother,

²⁸¹ From the large amount of important literature on pleasure in Aristotle published since Dirlmeier's commentary the only detailed treatment of pleasure in M.M. is Gosling/Taylor, [1982] 455-71.

painlessness, in their account of εὐδαιμονία is advanced in defence of the claim that some people give a role, if not an essential role, to pleasure.

The adoption of Susemihl's δέ in a24 and my γάρ in a22 allows a more sensible interpretation than can be got from the text Susemihl prints. M.M.'s discussion of pleasure is in part justified by the importance predecessors have attached to it. Even those who concentrate on τὸ ἀλύπως <ζῆν>, rather than on pleasure, the author hopes, will find the discussion of pleasure that is to follow of interest, related as the concepts of pleasure and painlessness are. Those that do not identify εὐδαιμονία with pleasure, i.e. living with pleasure (a21), do give some place to pleasure. To say that εὐδαιμονία 'is not without' pleasure, is not yet to say that it is 'with' pleasure - the phrase 'not without' can express a weaker relation. In this case, the second group of theorists, who hold that happiness is not without pleasure, have an account which, according to M.M., though the theorists would not say so themselves, involves pleasure. The involvement is weak, and depends, I suppose, on the fact that painlessness and pleasure have in common the absence of pain. M.M. does not investigate the relationship between pleasure and painlessness, but he does not need to for his present purposes. He has established, by a25, that all (πάντες b21) theorists attach some role to ἡδονή in their accounts of happiness, albeit that the role attached varies from the essential to the tangential.

The use of ἀλλὰ δὲ in a26 is striking. Denniston (p.242) says 'ἀλλὰ δὲ, in all its senses, almost invariably follows a strong stop'. In M.M. 94b19, b22, 05a26, 06a28, the only occurrences of this combination in this text, the rule is followed. Denniston quotes three exceptions to the rule, but none closely parallel the usage in M.M. 04a26. The more usual combination of particles after οὐ μόνον is ἀλλὰ καί, and it could be that καί became corrupted into δὲ. A simpler account is possible - not to see ἀλλὰ δὲ as answering οὐ μόνον in this way. We could punctuate with a full stop after δεῖν (a26). 'Hence we must speak about pleasure - and not only because others think we should. But indeed it is necessary for us to speak about it'. The contrast between οἱ ἄλλοι and ἡμῖν is brought out by the emphatic ἀλλά.

1204a26-30 M.M., on its own terms, requires pleasure to be dealt with. The conclusion is given in a29-30 ὑπὲρ ἡδονῆς ἂν εἶη ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν. There are three premises to the argument that precede the conclusion (a26-9), and then, tacked on after the conclusion, another premise (a30). This last premise encapsulates, though in an unnecessarily weak form, the second and third ones (a27-9). It is also stylistically inelegant, and makes punctuation of the passage difficult. But these are not good enough reasons to excise ἐπειδήπερ — ἡδονῆς (a30).

1204a31-b3 The paragraph starts by promising to set out the reasons that those who deny that pleasure is to be understood ἐν ἀγαθοῦ μέρει put forward. I take the phrase τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἐν ἀγαθοῦ μέρει λαμβάνειν (04a32) to mean the same as τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐναριθμεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (04a23), i.e. taking pleasure as a good, as something good. 04a32-b3 present five arguments attacking the claim that pleasure is good. We have to translate τὸ ἀγαθὸν (04a34, a35-6, a38, 04b2) by ‘what is good’, not as ‘the good’. i.e. to take τὸ ἀγαθὸν as an elliptical expression for τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὄν. In this way the promise in a32 is kept: we have five arguments that pleasure is not a good.²⁸² We also have consistency in the way the arguments are presented here and later referred back to. In the replies to the arguments M.M. repeatedly takes the arguments he has enumerated to attack the claim that pleasure is good, (not *the* good). M.M. says at 04b19, 05a5-6 (cf. 05b17-20) that the γένεσις-argument aimed to establish that pleasure is not good (no definite article); at 05a26 (cf. 05b14) that the ‘existence of base pleasures’ argument also sought to establish that pleasure is not good (no definite article); the ‘commonness’ argument tried to show that pleasure is not good, M.M. says at 05b30-7 (no definite article); the ‘hindrance’ argument attempted to prove that pleasure is not good (no definite article), says M.M. at 06a2. The

²⁸² This is Dirlmeier’s solution. He translates the first three occurrences of τὸ ἀγαθὸν by ‘ein Gut’, but the fourth by ‘das Gut’. Stock translates the first four by ‘the good’. Armstrong has ‘what is good’ four times, correctly.

κράτιστον argument also defended the view that pleasure is not good (no definite article) at 06a35.

The only difficulty with this interpretation is in 04b1-2: it would be absurd if this meant ‘pleasure is not the best, but what is good is best’. To change without warning the sense of τὸ ἀγαθόν from ‘what is good’ in the first three arguments to ‘the good’ in the fourth would be intolerable. Better would be to understand κράτιστον not as a synonym for ἄριστον,²⁸³ but to mean ‘most powerful motivationally’.

Dirlmeier (p.398) is right to object on palaeographical grounds to Spengel’s supplements to the text in 04a35 and 04b1. Untidiness by an author who does not stick strictly to his project of listing the λεγόμενα one by one, and then addressing each one in order, is an easy explanation of the transmitted text.

1204a31 One might have expected ἄ τινες λέγουσιν οὐκ οἴομενοι δεῖν... But to read that would be to normalise.

1204b8 Susemihl’s addition is mistaken. See Dirlmeier, pp.400-1.

1204b18 μέν should not be in the text. It is only in K, and may or may not have been in η. δὲ (04b19) introduces a second premise, and ought not to answer an earlier μέν.

1204b22 Omit οὐκ. Although von Arnim, [1929] 24-5, has found parallels for οὐδὲ... οὐκ, and of particular importance is that at 98a8-9, the stemma demands that the more usual single negative be accepted both here and in 98a8.

1204b26 Comma after ἡδόμεθα rather than after ἐνδεεῖς. (This seems to be the punctuation that Stock would read.) The ἐπειδή clause must end after ἡδόμεθα and the ἅμα clause belong with the τοῦτο — κινεῖται clause. It is while the eating is

²⁸³ So, Dirlmeier and Stock and Armstrong.

taking place that the part of the soul is active and moves (cf. b28-9, b34-5). As Susemihl's text stands, we are not told when the relevant part of the soul is active. It even looks as though it is permanently active. (See Armstrong's translation.) Repunctuating as I have suggested, and reading ἦ before ἐνεργεῖ (which I will defend in the next note), translate: 'Since there is a part of the soul with which we feel pleasure, this part of the soul, at the same time as the eating of what we lack, in so far as it is active, also moves...'. A good parallel for this use of ἅμα + dative + main verb is 12a20: ἅμα τῷ ταῦτόν νοεῖν προαίρεσιν ἔχουσιν περὶ ἃ νοοῦσιν ἐπὶ ταῦτά. Of the two things that happen at the same time, the first is given with the dative of the infinitive, the second with a main verb. In our passage we do not have an infinitive in the dative, but syntactically τῇ προσφορᾷ = τῷ προσφέρεσθαι.

1204b27 Add ἦ with mss. before ἐνεργεῖ. Excision of this word only occurs late in the tradition. Inclusion is the *lectio difficilior*. See previous note for a translation.

1204b28 Full stop instead of a colon in this line. M.M. moves from his argument that pleasure is an activity and process to an explanation of how his opponents were misled. The transmitted reading at the start of the next sentence (διὰ τὸ δὴ ἅμα...) is impossible, and Scaliger's transposition is rightly accepted by Susemihl.

1204b29 τὸ² is not needed (cf. 82a22, 85a32, 04b27) and is not present in any of the independent mss. Delete.

1204b32 ὁμοίως, attested in L, is not necessary.²⁸⁴ 01b17, ὅμοιον γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς περ τῶν καθευδόντων, is the nearest parallel in this text for the neuter. By that model we should mentally supply 'it is'. I have not found a parallel in Aristotle for ὅμοιον εἰ, though he uses ὅμοιον ὡς εἰ at S.E. 176a13, ὅμοιον ὥστ' εἰ at Meteor. 377b13, and ὅμοιον κἄν εἰ at De An. 408b12, E.N. 1145a10.

²⁸⁴ L makes the same type of error in its version of E.N. 1103b9: ἀνάλογον] ἀναλόγως.

1204b33 The transmitted ἡ makes sense in this line: ‘But the soul also exists’ (and therefore ought not to be ignored in an enquiry into what man is). Rieckher’s deletion of the definite article yields: ‘But man is also soul’ (and therefore the analysis of those who look just at the visible is has been unwarrantedly restricted). There is nothing wrong with the transmitted text, so keep it.

1204b37 The same easy error of taking the adjective to agree with φύσιν is found in K at E.N. 1152b13, in the same context. It is important that the restoration is perceived.

1204b37 The combination of γάρ and the negative in this line is worrying. μή in this line suggests that the characterisation of M.M.’s opponents is being contradicted by M.M., but the γάρ leads us to believe that a reason is being given for the opponents’ view. I do not think that the text can be right as it stands. Stock and Armstrong translate γάρ by ‘but’,²⁸⁵ whilst Dirlmeier adds ‘Nein’ before translating γάρ by ‘denn’. Both these tacks, making M.M.’s reply start in this line, give good sense, but they do not translate the text.

Can we determine where the exposition of the view to be attacked ends, and where the reply to that view starts? The next sentence (b38-a2), which is itself tied to this sentence with a γάρ, breaks naturally into two parts, of which the second is clearly part of M.M.’s reply. The first part, τὸ γάρ — γενέσθαι, could be part of M.M.’s attack - cashing out the formula of the opposition -, or part of the opponents’ own elucidation of their view. If the second option is accepted, it will be necessary to punctuate with a full stop after γενέσθαι in 05a1.

²⁸⁵ Denniston, pp.109-10, notes that καὶ γάρ stands often in answers. But all the passages he cites (from Plato), whether in answers or not, are assentient. In M.M. καὶ γάρ does not elsewhere have a dissenting tone. There is one passage which could be stretched to give this particle combination an adversative sense, namely at 02a25, where the man who has assaulted his father defends himself saying καὶ γάρ οὐτός τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα <ἔτυψεν>. But even this conforms to the standard assentient use, if we imagine the previous sentence to have been ‘You cannot blame me’ (said by the defendant) rather than ‘You are guilty’ (said by the prosecutor).

An editor can change the text in a variety of ways: first, following the lead of Dirlmeier in his translation, we could add a short sentence after αἰσθητή, namely ἔστι δ' οὐ (cf. 04b25). Secondly, following the translations of Stock and Armstrong, we could emend γάρ so that it is adversative - perhaps δέ. Thirdly, and this solution will delay the response of M.M. to ἔστι δέ (05a1), we can delete μή in 04b37. The second solution is neatest: 'But pleasure exists even in those not restored to nature'.

1205a3 πρὸ λύπης is the transmitted reading. It is odd that no one has queried it. In fact the omission of καὶ πρὸ λύπης in η and its descendants will, I think, not have been accidental, but editorial. The translations of 05a2-3: 'we assert that we feel pleasure apart from pain and before pain' (Armstrong), 'we say that there is pleasure without pain and prior to pain' (Stock), 'wir aben sagen, es gibt Lustempfindung auch ohne Unlust und vor der Unlust' (Dirlmeier) are good translations of Susemihl's text. The problems are a) that M.M. has not claimed that pleasure precedes pain, so we must take the φομὲν in a3 as general and not looking back to an earlier passage, b) there is no reason to suppose that M.M. would hold this view, which is surprisingly like his opponents - they think that pleasure ensues from pain, whilst M.M. would think, reading Susemihl's text, that pain ensues from pleasure,²⁸⁶ c) the claim that pleasure comes before pain is of no help to M.M.'s argument against the ἀποκατάστασις theorists.

The text can be neatly mended if we read not καὶ πρὸ λύπης but καὶ πρόλυπης, which would be translated: 'we say that pleasure is without pain and²⁸⁷ without previous pain'. This has the advantages a) that φομὲν in a3 can look back accurately to an earlier passage, 04b14-17, and hence b) that M.M. says something that we can believe that he believed, and further, c) that this claim is pertinent to the attack on the ἀποκατάστασις theorists. The claim is now part of the justification for the assertion in 05a1-2 that it is possible to feel pleasure without lacking: if lacking is

²⁸⁶ Certainly the two views, that pleasure follows pain and that pain follows pleasure, are treated together in Plato Rep. 584b2-c2.

²⁸⁷ Or, καί may be epexegetic: 'we say that pleasure is without pain, i.e. without previous pain'.

understood in terms of pain (05a2), and pleasure does not involve pain (05a2-3), then the definition of M.M.'s opponents, whereby pleasure is 'perceived restoration of what is lacking to nature', is undermined.

The chief objection to this conjecture is that the noun πρόλυπη does not exist. Plato had used the noun προλυπήσις at Rep. 584c10 which means 'anticipatory pain', in the sense of a pain one has at the expectation of some future harm. That is not the appropriate word here. We need a word that means 'previous pain'. The verb προλυπέομαι, meaning 'I feel pain previously' was coined by Plato (cf. Rep. 584b6, Phaedrus 258e3, Philebus 39d4) and is used in M.M. 04b15-17 (and E.N. 1173b15). Similar is Plato's use of the word προχαίρω in Philebus 39d4. On the same model Aristotle coins the word προήδομαι at E.N. 1167a5 meaning 'I feel pleasure previously'. We find the adjectives περίλυπος at E.N. 1124a16 and ἐπίλυπος at E.N. 1110b19, 1111b17, 1117a33, 1175b18. I cannot see why M.M. cannot coin the noun πρόλυπη.

1205a6 The omission of the definite article is as well attested as its inclusion. Keep it on the strength of 04b18.

1205a7 Who thinks that not all pleasure is good? The manuscripts attribute the view to someone unnamed or to an unnamed λόγος. I favour Bonitz' emendation of φησίν to φασίν because (pace Dirlmeier p.146; p.403; Allan, [1957] 10-11) the section 05a7-15 is a first treatment of the λεγόμενον mentioned in 04a35. It will be treated again in 05a26 - note καί twice in that line and αὐτοῖς in 05a27. Dirlmeier's reason for denying that 05a7-15 are a treatment of that λεγόμενον is that it is not argued but asserted that every pleasure is a good. But I do not understand this. The particles, however we reconstruct the text in this section, clearly show the structure of an argument. Further, the words μετὰ ταῦτα (a7) signal a move to a different topic. If a7 were an objection to the previous sentence, we would not expect this transition

formula (cf. e.g. 84a15, 84b1, 84b7, 84b17, 84b22, 85a14, 96b34, 00a35, 04a19, 13b18).

1205a12-15 The text given by Susemihl in a14-15 is translated by Stock as ‘so that since the goods and pleasure are in these, and the pleasure that comes from goods is pleasure, every pleasure will be good’. This is obviously ludicrous. The second premise is a truism, and the conclusion does not follow.²⁸⁸

Can we restore sense more economically than Rassow²⁸⁹ or Dirlmeier²⁹⁰? After being told that a pleasure attends every actualisation of good in a10-11, M.M. makes an inference (ὥστ’, a12). This begins: ‘Since the good is in all the categories’, and is something that M.M. has already claimed at a8-9. Until κατηγορίας (a13), everything is fine. M.M. is now entitled to say that it follows from this that pleasure is in all the categories too. The words ἡδονὴ ἂν εἴη can mean precisely this. The problem is ἀγαθόν (a13). We need either to delete it or to follow Rassow’s or Susemihl’s proposals and read the Greek for ‘in all (sc. the categories)’. Deletion is easier palaeographically. A scribe may have been over keen for the conclusion to be reached and inserted ἀγαθόν.

²⁸⁸ The argument hardly makes sense as it stands, says Cooper, [1973] 349n.40. Gosling and Taylor, [1982] 463-4, are similarly at a loss to provide a coherent account of the argument.

²⁸⁹ Rassow takes the train of thought to be: 1) good appears in all the categories (a9, a13), 2) pleasure appears in all the categories (a13, reading ἐν ἀπάσαις for ἀγαθόν), 3) good and pleasure appear in the same things (a14 reading τοῖς αὐτοῖς for τούτοις), so 4) all pleasure is good. It is not sufficient, as Dirlmeier thinks it is (p.404), that both pleasure and the good appear in all the categories for the conclusion to be reached that all pleasure is good. They must always appear together. This led Rassow to conjecture τοῖς αὐτοῖς for τούτοις.

²⁹⁰ Dirlmeier adopts two changes to the text printed by Susemihl. First he excises a12-13 ὥστ’ ἐπειδὴ — ἀγαθόν εἴη, thinking that it is a doublet of a14-15, and then he emends ἡδονή to ἀγαθόν in a15. For the second proposal we now have manuscript authority in β. If we adopt ἀγαθόν in a15, we will have a text that means: ‘so that since the goods and pleasure are in these, and the pleasure that comes from goods is good, every pleasure will be good’. But still the argument is not good. We would need to know that every pleasure comes from goods, for the conclusion to be reached. In a11-12 M.M. had said that pleasure follows all ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργείας, but the possibility that pleasure follows κακοῦ ἐνεργείας has not been excluded. Whilst the thesis that ὥστ’ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τούτοις μὲν τάγαθὰ καὶ ἡδονή, ἢ δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡδονὴ ἡδονή, ἀγαθόν ἂν εἴη πάντα ἡδονή could have been ‘explained’ in the margin by ὥστ’ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, καὶ ἡδονὴ ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν is attractive in so far as the note would attempt to provide a reference for τούτοις (a10), the subject of the first clause in the text was τάγαθὰ καὶ ἡδονή, but this would have been changed in the note to τὸ ἀγαθόν. We would expect an explanatory note to have read: ὥστ’ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ ἡδονή, <ἡδονή> ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν.

M.M. is trying to reach the conclusion that every pleasure is good (a15).²⁹¹ Not only must pleasure attend every good, but pleasure must never attend anything not good. Pleasure and good must always appear together. Take the premise ἡ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡδονὴ ἡδονή (a14-15) to mean 'pleasure is pleasure from goods', and there is no need to make any change in a12-15 except to excise ἀγαθόν in a13.

1205a16 αἰ is only in K. Comparing 05a22, 05a25 and E.N. 1173b28 it is tempting to keep it, but it should be excised. 05a22 and 05a25 may have been the very reason for a scribe who wanted a tidier text to include it.

1205a17 Although the stemma would suggest that αἰ should be excised, it could easily have dropped out independently in α and in A and V by haplography after κοί in a17. Retain it.

1205a16-25 Unlike γραμματική or other ἐπιστήμαι, pleasures differ τῷ εἶδει. Two people having, for example, γραμματικὴν have the same ἐπιστήμην, whereas two people having ἡδονήν need not have the same εἶδος of ἡδονή.

The most radical proposal for this part of the text is by Becchi.²⁹² He proposes that the names Lampros and Neleus/Ileus in 05a19-23 are not names at all. We are to read the adjective λαμπρός in a19 (meaning 'noble'), λάμπρω in a22, and again an adjective (like ἀγεννεῖ) for Ἰλεῖ in a23. In addition, we are to read ὁ before λαμπρός in a19 with Utin.²⁹³ and excise ὁ in a21, which I will come to.

It is not fair to argue, as Becchi does (pp.250-1), that the name, Neleus, has been accepted by critics in 05a23 because of the 'esigenza di individuare sul piano

²⁹¹ A conclusion which will be contradicted by 05b1-2.

²⁹² Becchi, [1979] 249-54.

²⁹³ Becchi does not make it clear whether Utin. has γάρ or not. If it follows L, as we would expect from the stemma, then it omits γάρ. This reading is objectionable because the sentence needs a connective. If it reads γάρ ὁ, then we must suppose that the scribe of Utin. had a further exemplar available to him, from which he manufactured the composite reading. See pp.43-4 for remarks on the position of Utin. in the stemma. See my note on 1194a32 for the temptation to alter the text when γάρ appears in third position.

storico le personalità che si celano sotto i nomi, per noi del tutto oscuri, di Ileo (o Ileo) e di Lampro.' Even if it were true, we now know that $\nu\eta\lambda\epsilon\hat{\iota}$ is excellently attested in α . It is unlikely that any scribe who copied M.M. should have known his Strabo (XIII. 608) so well as to have conjectured the name Neleus.

As well as arguing that the motivation for reading Neleus was misguided, Becchi argues that since the pleasures of wine and the pleasures of sex are both bodily pleasures, they do not differ $\tau\hat{\omega}$ εἶδει, and so we need to reinterpret $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ to mean not 'sex' but 'conversation' (p.252). The pleasure from wine is a typical pleasure of one sort of person, the plebeian, the other of another sort, the noble person, Becchi thinks.

But there are inconsistencies in Becchi's argument. He accepts that the received text suggests that Lampros is young and Neleus not young.²⁹⁴ On the basis of this age-difference he thinks the pleasures of wine and of $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ should reflect these different types of people - the young and the not-young. Young people drink wine, while old people have conversations. (I had not noticed that the two pleasures are enjoyed by different sets of people. Doesn't anyone do both, and enjoy both? Cf. E.N. 1154a17-18) Granting this for the sake of argument, it is ludicrous for Becchi to maintain, after his conjectures are incorporated into the text, that the pleasure from conversations is specifically for the noble, and the pleasure from wine for the untitled.

I also do not see how Becchi can think (p.252) that if we read Lampros, there is evidence that he is young - someone who may or may not be able to write -, and yet on the other reading, $\lambda\alpha\mu\pi\rho\acute{\varsigma}$, not be committed to the idea that noble people, as a class, are such that they too are on the verge of being able to read and write, while the ignoble can, and have been able to, read and write for some time.

It should also be noted that Aristotle does not use the adjective $\lambda\alpha\mu\pi\rho\acute{\varsigma}$ of people, and when L.S.J. cite instances of the adjective being used of people it does not mean 'noble' but 'famous'. Becchi could have come up with a Greek word meaning

²⁹⁴ In this he follows Donini [1966] 146n.28, against von Arnim, Dirlmeier and Düring.

‘unheard of’²⁹⁵ and conjectured that word in a23. But it is not only the famous who enjoy conversations nor only the unheard of who like drinking wine.

There is no need, in fact, to see any link between the people (whether named or unnamed) in the discussion of writing and any people who enjoy different things (whether wine and sex, or wine and conversation). It is clear from the text that X and Y are different εἶδει if and only if they ‘dispose one differently’ (05a20, 05a24). There is, thus, no need to follow Becchi in wanting M.M. to give us an example of a bodily pleasure and an example of a non-bodily pleasure. After I have suggested the ways in which I would change the text of Susemihl, I will return to a discussion of the philosophy of the passage.

Two changes to the text printed by Susemihl are essential. In a23 instead of *Ileus*²⁹⁶ we should rather read *Neleus*, as advocated by Wilamowitz.²⁹⁷ Secondly, the definite article in a21 should be excised. (Donini, [1965] 146, and Becchi follow editors before Susemihl in wanting this excision). Susemihl is wrong to say that Valla read *ὁ* in a21, and thus Rasso’s conjecture was falsely based.²⁹⁸ It occurs in V and its descendants, but not in other mss. The absence of the definite article, however, points us to another correction to the text of Susemihl. Bekker²⁹⁹ rightly excised *γραμματικός* in a21. It is suspicious because of its position in the sentence, because the verb already has a subject (*Λάμπρος*), and because it is the sort of marginal gloss that often enters a text. A note guessing who *Lampros* was - a grammarian - has entered the body of the text. (The two words, *γραμματικός* and *ὁ* will have got into the text at different times.) In fact the guess was mistaken. Someone who has *γραμματικήν* is not a grammarian, but someone who can read and write (cf. Aristotle

²⁹⁵ Valla renders 05a22-3: *quae in splendido quaeque obscuro*. (See p.97). The only Greek word that I can think of which could yield the translation *obscurus* and has some palaeographical resemblance is *ἀνήλιος* (‘sunless’), but this is rare and only found in poetry.

²⁹⁶ *Ileus* does exist as a name. It appears in *Suda* who just comments: *ὄνομα κύριον*. It also occurs in *Hesiod* fr.235 (Merkelbach/West). See West, [1985] 97n.148.

²⁹⁷ Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff [1927]. For the spelling of *Neleus*’ name see my note on 1205a23 below.

²⁹⁸ See pp.90-1, 93.

²⁹⁹ Followed by Donini, [1965] 146.

Topics 142b31-5).³⁰⁰ The construction of the protasis ἐὼν + subjunctive suggests that Lampros does not yet have this skill. When he does, he will be disposed (διακείσεται) in the same way...

The next important textual questions are also in the sentence a19-23. Is there one sentence here or two? What is the apodosis in the conditional sentence? Susemihl's text makes the apodosis composite: if p, then q and r. But the problem with this is the change in the tense of the two verbs in the apodosis (διακείσεται a20, εἰσὶν a22³⁰¹). The future tense is normal after ἐὼν + subjunctive. If the apodosis ends at γραμματικὴν in a21 (the δὲ in a20 can be apodotic, and need not be excised), then where Susemihl writes οὐ<δὲ> δύο,³⁰² a new sentence will begin. In any case, I do not think that οὐ<δὲ> δύο εἰσὶν διάφοροι αἱ γραμματικάι means 'there are not two different skills of writing'. (The αἱ makes the translation unnatural.) That thought would be more naturally expressed by οὐ<δὲ> δύο εἰσὶν γραμματικάι. (cf. e.g. E.N. 1144b14-15 δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη)

Let us assume, then, that a new sentence begins at a21. We would need a connective, and διὸ - the reading of η - would be perfect. It follows from the fact that two people ὁμοίως διακεῖνται by E, that the E of the first person is the E of the other. In favour of reading διὸ is the fact that in the move from similarity of disposition to difference in a24-5, the conclusion is given by διὸ. In this way the phrase εἰσὶν διάφοροι αἱ γραμματικάι in a22 is precisely paralleled by a16 (διάφοροι ... αἱ ἡδοναὶ εἰσὶν) and a17 (διάφοροι ... αἱ κατηγορίαι) and b3 (φύσεις τῶν ζώων εἰσὶν διάφοροι), cf. b9-10.³⁰³ But the negative is needed, and Rassow's reading διὸ οὐκ is achieves this well. Another option would be to follow a note in the margin of K at this point, and read διὸ εἰσὶν ἀδιάφοροι. See appendix p.426.

³⁰⁰ For this point see von Arnim [1928] 104; Dirlmeier pp.404-5.

³⁰¹ Stock translates εἰσὶν by 'there will be'.

³⁰² After Spengel, and with the approval of Donini, [1965] 146.

³⁰³ An additional argument against δύο is that M.M. should not here be concerned with difference in number, but difference in kind.

In 05a22 Sylburg's proposal (probably suggested by Valla's rendition,³⁰⁴ supported by Donini, [1965] 146, and now found in L), that we read ἦ in this line is necessary. If M.M. had wanted to refer to the one γραμματική that both Lampros and Neleus have, the τε would appear after ἐν, not before, or else would have been omitted.

Adopting the changes of previous scholars that I have defended the passage will read (05a19-23):

ἐὰν ἔχη γὰρ Λάμπρος τὴν γραμματικὴν,
 ὁμοίως δὲ διακείσεται ὑπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ταύτης
 [γραμματικὸς] ἄλλω ὄψωδον ἔχοντι γραμματικὴν. διὸ <οὐκ>
 εἰσὶν διάφοροι αἱ γραμματικάί, ἢ τ' ἐν Λάμπρῳ καὶ <ή> ἐν
 Νηλεῖ.

M.M. clearly thinks that pleasures occur in different categories (a17), whereas particular ἐπιστήμαι do not. The science of writing (or any other science (a19)) will always be in the same category, no matter who has it. The pleasure of sex is in a different category from that of wine (presumably the first is in the category of ποιεῖν, the second of πάσχειν: Cat. 1b25-2a4). M.M. could have said that no ἐπιστήμη changes τῷ εἶδει depending on its object, whereas pleasures do change τῷ εἶδει depending on the category in which they are found. He does not do so because the object of γραμματική is by definition γράμματα, of οἰκοδομική is an οἰκία etc.

1205a23 The question of the orthography of the names, Neleus and Lampros, remains. R.E. XVI, 2 records different spellings for Neleus, son of Codrus and legendary leader of Ionian settlements (on whom cf. Aristotle fr.76 (R³)): Νηλεύς, Νειλεύς and Νεΐλεως.³⁰⁵ Could the dative of Neleus of Scepsis' name have been Νειλεῖ? Could this be the explanation of the iota that we find in one family but not in the other? The nu at the beginning of the name (however spelt) will have dropped out

³⁰⁴ See above, pp.96-7.

³⁰⁵ The most recent treatment of the orthography of this name is Moreschini, [1989].

by haplography, coming as it would have after ἐν. (Note that K significantly does not have a breathing). That would leave ειλεῖ. But ειλεῖ is as senseless as ιλεῖ and one would have to imagine a further *mistake* in that side of the family, by which the epsilon dropped out. Further, if Νειλεῖ were right, we would have to explain (albeit easily) a case of normalisation in the other side of the family. A simpler course of events is that Νηλεῖ was what was written originally: ENNHAEI. If the eta had been written in the majuscule exemplar, ω, too close to the preceding nu, so that their upright strokes were touching, then the eta could have been mistaken in ζ for an iota, but read correctly in α. Such a reconstruction would account for what the manuscripts read. We should read Νηλεῖ (α).

1205a25 The stemma suggests that we read δόξειεν (present), rather than δόξαιεν (aorist).

1205a28 Both ἴδιός (η) and ἴδιόν (α β) are possible readings grammatically. ἴδιος can be an adjective of two terminations,³⁰⁶ and would have to be feminine here, agreeing with the nearer of the two nouns. Equally, the neuter, ἴδιον, is possible, given that the two subjects are abstract. Although the stemma supports ἴδιόν, I would read ἴδιός as the lectio difficilior. Two scribes could easily have taken ἴδιος to be masculine and adjusted the ending to avoid the grammatical error they found.

1205a28 My inclination is to add τῆς (with α) (cf. 99a24). The manuscripts do not diverge on the whole in their inclusion or exclusion of the definite article before ἡδονή, and if their report is correct, M.M. has the article, (picking a random section) at 04a22, a23, a24, a25, a32, a33, b18, b30, but not at 04a19, a21, a22, a25, a26, a29, a30, b1, b24, b28, b38. When ἡδονή is nominative singular, the article could easily drop out by haplography or intrude by dittography.

³⁰⁶ Aristotle uses both forms of the feminine.

1205a35 The τίς which α omits is redundant, but is confirmed by a37.

1205b1 Excise ἐστίν which is more likely to have found its way into the text than to have dropped out. In the parallel passage, 05a33-4, there was no main verb, and there we mentally supplied ἐστίν.

1205b3 καί¹ should be excised. The stemma is equally divided. But the emphatic ‘both... and’ is inappropriate here.

1205b8 I prefer the attested reading, omitting ἡ altogether.

The (probably conjectural) omission of καί in this line is not necessary. It means exactly the same to say ‘It is not the same thing for both a horse and a man’ as it does to say ‘It is not the same thing for a horse as it is for a man’.

1205b12 C L V offer the present of καθίστημι. P and A offer the imperfect. K offers a word that does not exist, but points, palaeographically, to the imperfect. The imperfect ἦν in the previous line may have given rise to the imperfect here. The imperfect of εἶναι was used to remind the reader/listener that the identification of pleasure with restoration has been made before (05b6, cf. 04b36).³⁰⁷ However the second clause in the sentence, with its parenthetical φασίν does not need an imperfect. We expect either the present tense of καθίστημι or the imperfect without φασίν. The present tense is fairly well supported by the tradition, but the omission of ἦν in V betrays a disquiet with the imperfect tense used to refer back to something that is true (not was true) that had been stated earlier. In 04a36-05a5 it was argued that at least some pleasures are not restorations, and yet at 05b6-28 the identification of pleasure with a particular sort of restoration is accepted. I suggest that the word φασίν in a11 was added by a reader who saw the discrepancy and wanted to distance the author of

³⁰⁷ See Bonitz Index 754a42: ‘Imperfecto interdum respicitur ad ea quae antea disputata sunt, τοῦτο δ’ ἦν ἀλλοίωσις (i.e. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἀλλοίωσις, ὡς πρότερον ἐλέγομεν) G.C. 314b25’. Bonitz gives other examples too. From M.M. note 09a11 (referring back to 09a7), 09a14 (referring back to 09a1).

M.M. from the doctrine of pleasure as restoration. We could then excise φασίμ and retain the imperfect καθίστη that Susemihl has. It now becomes unproblematic to explain how the manuscripts vary, not according to their families, as they do. The correction of the imperfect to the present could quite easily have happened independently several times.

1205b13-14 Susemihl makes the same mistake as the scribe of Rav. The corrector in P adds μή (not μὲν) in b13, and thus achieves the same sense as β which has οὐ in the next line. We clearly need a negative and β's is paralleled by οὐκ ἀγαθόν in b17 and οὐ σπουδαίως in b19 (see my note ad loc.), and should be read.

1205b16 I wondered whether to propose adding τι after ὅμοιον as we find in 08b13 ἔχει τι τῆ κεραμίδι ὅμοιον ἢ κύων (and e.g. E.N. 1151b6). But there are parallels in M.M. which make this unnecessary: 02b17 ὅμοιον δὲ πέπονθε τούτω ὁ τῆς ὀργῆς ἀκρατής;³⁰⁸ 07b3 ὅμοιον πάσχειν τοῖς ἐνθουσιάζουσιν.

1205b19 No manuscript has μή in this line and nor do Bekker or Bussemaker. Earlier editions, Bas.³, Sylburg and Casaubon did have μή, but did so because the Aldine had omitted οὐ and it was seen that a negative was required. The construction with οὐ is standard. And οὐ is given by one family (α) and half of the other family (β). So read οὐ.

1205b25 Susemihl's δέ (see his apparatus), now with manuscript authority in V, is not needed, if we punctuate with a comma rather than a colon in a26. The reason why one sort of pleasure is better than another is that the value of the activity with which one type of pleasure is associated is greater than that of the activity of the other. The value of the pleasure is parasitic upon the nature of the activity enjoyed. There is a

³⁰⁸ The text at 02b17 is questioned in my note ad loc.

suppressed premise to the effect that ἀναπληρώσεις (eating, sex) are less valuable activities than what we would call mental pleasures (seeing, hearing, thinking).

1205b30 δῆ is fine. M.M. begins to clarify the position of his opponents before beginning his reply proper in b34. Exclusivity is something which is a characteristic of honour - it would be demeaned if everyone had it - and so one can see why someone might think that exclusivity is a requirement for anything to count as good. Translate δῆ: 'Now'.

1205b33 Casaubon's γ' ἀγαθὸν is palaeographically neater than Rasso's ἀγαθόν. In majuscule Γ and Τ are not dissimilar. γε would also convey the thought that M.M.'s opponents do not think that pleasure μέλλει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.

1206a2-3 I cannot see what sense the genitive τοῦ would have in a2. Wannowski, [1835] 84-5, tries to defend this reading and paraphrases τοῦ — αὐτοῖς as: τοῦ δὲ φάσκειν... ἢ μὴ ὀρθῆ σκέψις αἰτία. He acknowledges a change in construction by the time we read φαίνεται αὐτοῖς, and cites G.A. 788a16 to defend τοῦ in 06a2. Spengel, [1866], is not convinced.

1206a5 Full stop after πράττειν.

1206a10 The corruptions in 06a10 of ἀπ' αὐτοῦ to ἀπάτη in β and in a25 of ἀπ' αὐτῆς to ἀπάτης in β and C was an easy corruption palaeographically, and may have been helped by recollection of a sentence in E.N. 1113a33-b2: ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ οὕσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται or E.E. 1227a36-8 ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὴν ἀπάτην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία γίνεσθαι... αἴτιον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν. But the misleading tendency of pleasure to appear better than it is out of place here.

1206a11 The definite article seems to be required to provide an antecedent for τοῦτο later in the line and to conform with a17-18. But the stemma suggests that τὸ was not in the archetype. We can make sense of a text without τὸ and should omit it, as the lectio difficilior.

1206a21 Read καὶ not ἤ. Susemihl (p.100) accepts that Valla may have read καὶ in his Greek exemplar, and thinks that the vel which he read in the 1831 edition of Valla's translation was a happy conjecture of Valla. But the first edition of Valla's translation read et. It was in a later edition (1522) that vel was substituted for et. I doubt that we should treat the correction of Valla's translation as a conjecture - it is, rather, a much better translation of καὶ than Valla's et. Cf. 85b37, 86a35.

1206a26 What is strange in this line is the word-order. The strangeness also struck those who made the transposition of ποιεῖ and ἐπιστήμη which we find in A V. If we were to read οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ ἐπιστήμη, the word-order would be normal and, what is more, the denial in a27-8 of the claim that nobody makes pleasure by skill would be a direct denial: certain sorts of people do produce pleasure. The loss of the iota subscript would easily lead a scribe to change οὐδεὶς to οὐδεμία.

The phrase τέχνη ποιεῖν is found in Plato Sophist 234b6, Io 534b8, Aristotle Phys. 199a21.³⁰⁹ But there is a good parallel for ἐπιστήμη ποιεῖ at M.M. 06a7-8 (cf. also Plato Gorgias 453a1, 454e5) and the word-order of M.M. is often quite jarring. Retain Susemihl's text.

1206a27 Editors' deletion of οἱ² in this line (although Dirlmeier (p.411) would retain it) is confirmed by the stemma.

³⁰⁹ For the indiscriminate use of ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη as synonyms see Dirlmeier, pp.342-4. Fiedler, [1978] 248, cites E.E. 1216b17, 1221b5 E.N. 1094a18, 1106b8 as instances of Aristotle using the words interchangeably.

1206a28-30 Dirlmeier (p.411) rightly objects to Susemihl's transposition. We could perhaps put ἀλλὰ δὴ — ἡδονῆς (a28-30) in parentheses. Its force is concessive: M.M. acknowledges that there are some sciences which do not have pleasure as their end, and so are not productive of pleasure, before inferring from a27-8 that there is such a thing as an ἐπιστημὴ which makes pleasure.

1206a29 What does the emphatic addition τε καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς contribute? The omission of τε in L is attractive, but should be resisted. I know of no parallel for μετὰ... τε καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ... E.N. 1198b25 has μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, on which see Stewart, [1892] vol. I, p.122.

1206a31 Cf. my note on 1189a1 for the difficulty of deciding whether to read δέ.

1206a31 ἄλλως, the reading of the mss. in this line, is a favourite word of M.M. (cf. 84a3, 86a5, 86b26, 88a13, 91a14³¹⁰), and should be read here. Spengel could appeal to 88a5 (ἄλλος λόγος), 88a16 (ἄλλος λόγος), but a) to supply λόγος as the subject of ἐλέγετο is slightly awkward; b) οὕτως later in the line nicely answers ἄλλως.

1206b5 Delete Susemihl's brackets and place a full stop after χρῆσθαι.

1206b5-6 Armstrong, with good reason, wants the subject of χρήσεται to be the man rather than his principle. He thus advocates reading λόγῳ φαύλως for the mss.' λόγῳ φαύλῳ. The adverb φαύλως, proposed by Spengel must be right. And the dative λόγῳ would help to explain the corruption of φαύλως to φαύλῳ. Follow Armstrong.

1206b16 Delete Susemihl's brackets and place full stop after λόγου.

³¹⁰ In 91a14 Spengel also conjectured ἄλλοι for ἄλλως.

1206b23-4 Comma after τούτοις (b23) to make it more obvious that ἄνευ [τοῦ] λόγου goes with ὁμοί (cf. ἄλογον in a20) rather than the small children and animals. The τοῦ should probably be excised with α and L. Cf. 97b39, 98a4, 00a1, 06b22, 07a36. (Contrast 98a7, 99a12.)

In b24 retain πρότερον (with α) - its position, away from the verb, is emphatic (cf. b19-21) - but read ὕστερον for ὕστερος with L V. The ending -ος will have originated by assimilation with the nominative masculine singular terminations on either side. We need the adverbial neuter rather than the adjectival -ος, which would suggest, wrongly, that there was a πρότερος λόγος. This alteration to Susemihl's text will also align the sentence to the expression in b19-21.

1206b30 Presumably the chapter heading in the exemplar has been misunderstood by the scribe of L, which reads περὶ εὐτυχίας before ἔχομενον. L has incorporated the heading into the body of the text. (A has the heading but in the margin.) Cf. ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη τούτου λέγειν ὑπὲρ προότητος (91b23).³¹¹

1206b32 Bf and Λ seem to have read τὴν εὐτυχίαν εἶναι: 'many people think that the happy life is good fortune'. There is something to be said for this reading. Elsewhere M.M. often uses the phrase ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ X (vel sim.) in sentences in which X has already been mentioned. Compare 86a34, 98a7, 99a6, 04a21, 06a29. Note also E.N. 1099a8, 1153b22, E.E. 1214a25 for the identification by some theorists of εὐδαιμονία with εὐτυχία.

However the presence of βίος makes the reading of the Greek manuscripts preferable: 'many people think that the happy life is the fortunate life'.

1206b35 The main verb, ἐστίν, which is absent in Bf and Λ, is not required. Cf. e.g. 82b28, 83a4, 84a24, 85b1, 90b13, 90b28. But retain it.

³¹¹ On the chapter on εὐτυχία see now, in addition to Dirlmeier pp.419-25, Donini, [1965] 79-102; Kenny, [1992] 56-85.

1206b35 τί is the reading of α and β, τίς of η and Bf Λ. τι is the harder reading since the subject is masculine. But M.M. has frequently asked ‘τί ἐστὶ,’ of things that are masculine and feminine (ἀρετή (82a8, 85a36, 86a9), ἐπιστήμη (83b12), ψυχὴ (85b2), πραότης (91b24), δικαιοσύνη (93a39), λόγος (96b11), σύνεσις (97b11), ἐπιεικεία (98b25), φιλία (08b4), 13a10 (ὁ φίλος)), as well as of things that are neuter ((τὸ ἐκούσιον (87b32), τὸ φιλητόν (08b36)). M.M. frequently introduces a new subject with the question, τί ἐστὶ, followed other questions (καὶ ἐν τίσι καὶ περὶ ποῖα, 93a39, 96b5, 98b25; καὶ ἐν τίσι καὶ περὶ τί 08b4; καὶ ἐν τίσιν 91b24³¹²; ἢ περὶ τί 97b11). The only uncontroversial instance in M.M. of the question τί ἐστὶ being asked of someone (rather than of something) is at 13a10. Read τί 06b35 on the basis that it accords with the language of M.M. and is the *lectio difficilior*. Note that at 85a36 η reads τίς instead of τί, at 96b11 L reads τίς instead of τί, at 07a13 α reads τις instead of τι. These are parallels within M.M. for scribes simplifying concordance. See also my note on 1186a12.

1206b38-9 ἀεὶ is positioned after φύσις in Bf and all the Greek mss. Λ has it after αἰτία (b38). The parallel passage in Aristotle (E.E. 1247a32-3) reads: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε φύσις αἰτία ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἢ δὲ τύχη τοῦναντίον. The same pair - τὰ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως and τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ το πολὺ appear in the other major treatment of τύχη (Phys. 196b10-13, cf. 197a19, a31-2). The neatest solution is Susemihl’s transposition in of ἀεὶ (a38) to before ὡσαύτως (a39), which also fits with 07a3. We do not also need ἢ before ὡς at the start of the line.

1207a4 Scaliger conjectures οὐδὲ for ἢ and is supported by Spengel and Armstrong. Scaliger is wanting M.M. to say: ‘here (in νοῦς) there is order..., but wherever there is chance, there is no order’. But M.M. can be expressing himself differently: ‘here there

³¹² Cf. 00b6-7.

is order... but not chance', i.e. there is no chance in intelligence. So there is no need to tamper with the text.

1207a5 Susemihl was right to excise καί, which was absent in ζ and Bf Λ.

1207a6 For θεῶν read θεοῦ with α β Bf Λ. It is 'god', not 'gods' that we get in 07a7, a10, a12, a15, a17. Similarly, we get the singular at E.E. 1247a24, a27, a28, 48b4. Whilst it would be possible to defend the plural, the stemma should guide us to the right reading.

1207a11 Retain τῷ (with ζ). Cf. 07a7, a10, a15.

1207a15 Add ἡ after εὐνοια, which is what the stemma suggests. This makes it clearer that παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ belongs to the preceding nouns, and not to εὐτυχία in the following line.

1207a16 There is some doubt about καὶ and ἐν in this line, but both are necessary. ἐγγίνεσθαι usually takes ἐν in M.M. (e.g. 85b1, 89a3, 97b38, 11b19), and καὶ stresses the point that it is not just deserving people (07a8) who are lucky.

1207a23 Read ἐν for ἐπί. See p.84 above.

1207a23 We should not read οἰκείοτατον (with Bf Λ: convenientissime). M.M. has given us some people (virtuous people) to whom the epithet εὐτυχῆς does not apply (a20-3), but even the next group of people is not κυρίως called εὐτυχῆς (07a26).

1207a30-1 We need ἐν in a30, because of ἐν in a31. This was conjectured by Bessarion, by Bonitz and is in Bf and Λ. See above, p.84.

In a31 α V Bf and Λ have ὑπόρξει, but K and β have προῶξει. The stemma thus supports ὑπόρξει. We can understand this. M.M. gives us three types of εὐτυχία: (i) having a good, against reasonable expectation (a30-1), which corresponds with a25-6; (ii) not getting a κακόν that one could reasonably expect, which corresponds with a29-30; (iii) getting a good (contrary to one's reasoning) (a32-3), which corresponds with a27-8.

It is important to recognise that παρὰ λόγον 'against reasonable expectation' (a31)³¹³ is not to be confused with παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν (a27-8) 'beyond his reasoning'. It was the belief that these two phrases meant the same thing, I suspect, that helped the corruption of ὑπόρξει to προῶξει in a31.

Leave Susemihl's text as it is.

1207a34 For ἄν see above, p.166. Here the η in α may have been due to a symbol for ἄν: a common abbreviation for αν was \downarrow and this could easily be read as \hookrightarrow which was a standard way of writing η .

1207a37 Full stop after ἐπιτυγχάνων.

1207a38 Susemihl prints ἔνεστιν τῆ φύσει. P errs in writing ἐν ἐστι, but in the margin is the note ἕως, ἔνεστι τί. It is ambiguous whether ἔνεστι τί φύσει is being proposed or ἔνεστι τί τῆ φύσει. A offers ἔνεστί τι φύσει in the body of its text. Λ seems to have read τοιοῦτόν τι. The sense requires an indefinite article, since what it is by which we move has not yet been specified. Cf. Stock's translation 'For there is in the soul by nature *something* of this sort whereby we move...' (my italics).

The best place to put it is after ἔνεστι. The cause of the omission of τι is omission ex homoeot. Getting rid of the superfluous movable nu in Susemihl's text, we have ἔνεστί τι.

³¹³ Cf. Phys. 197a18 (παράλογον τι ἢ τύχη) and E.E. 1247a33, E.N. 1135a15-16.

Should we retain the τῆ? φύσει simpliciter is the standard Greek for ‘by nature’, ‘naturally’. In M.M. the dative of φύσις appears twenty-four times excluding here. Seventeen times there is no definite article (cf. 94b30-95a7 for a cluster of φύσει). Of the seven occurrences of τῆ φύσει, the meaning is not ‘by nature’ or ‘naturally’ at 05b8, but τῆ φύσει does bear this meaning at 87b26, 94b10, 96b2, 03b33, 03b36, 05a1. We cannot thus rule out τῆ on the grounds of language. However, the sound of -τι τῆ is objectionable.³¹⁴ At Met. I. 1052a22 τι φύσει has become corrupted in some mss. to τῆ φύσει. Read ἔνεστί τι φύσει.

1207b3 See my note on 1193b1 for parallels for the present tense (φησίν).

1207b8 Full stop after ἐστίν.

1207b8-16 Lines b8-10 have suffered in transmission, and it is easiest to set out what I think we should do with b8-10 after looking at what follows. In b11 M.M. infers from what has preceded that the two types of εὐτυχία are different. Although α reads ἀδιάφορος in a11, the comparative in b14 points to two εὐτυχία being in play. Further, the stemma supports διάφορος. So retain διάφορος in b11. We are now in a position to see that the referent of ἡ τοιαύτη εὐτυχία (b11) αὕτη (b12) is the kind of luck we find both in avoiding reasonably expected harm and in hitting upon good against reasonable expectation. These two εὐτυχία are being taken as one. We can see why this form of εὐτυχία should be said to ‘result from the way in which things fall out’ (b12, trans. Stock). There are causes which result in a six being thrown in dice - the laws of physics determine how the die will fall if it has a certain starting point in relation to the table and is released with a certain amount of spin. Here the cause is outside of the agent.

Now, though, we need to find another kind of εὐτυχία which M.M. differentiates this type from. What, we have to ask, is the referent of ἐκείνης (b11)?

³¹⁴ An additional argument against τῆ is that E.E. 1247b20-1 does not have τῆ.

We know from what follows that the true type of εὐτυχία is that ‘whose starting-point of impulses towards the attainment of goods is in the man himself’ (07b15-16). This is the kind of εὐτυχία which M.M. discussed in 07a35-b5. In this kind of εὐτυχία the cause is in the agent.

Moving on from the sentence in b11-13, let us look at that in b13-16. In b13 we have to choose between εἰ καὶ in the Greek mss. (‘although’³¹⁵) and καὶ εἰ in Bf and Λ (et si) (‘even if’). Since M.M. does not doubt the truth of ἡ τριαύτη ἐστὶν εὐτυχία, we should prefer the Greek mss.’ εἰ καί.

Still in b13-14 the repetition of τριαύτη is suspicious. If my account above is correct, M.M. is talking about two different εὐτυχίαι. The first τριαύτη (b11) refers back to the κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐτυχία, the second (b13) to the type whose origin is in the agent. Although we do have variants in the mss. and a conjecture by Ellebodus to avoid the repetition of τριαύτη, I think we should leave it.

In b15 Scaliger and - we now know - a Florentine manuscript written by Ioannes Rhosos in the fifteenth century would read ἐν αὐτῇ. Spengel, [1866] 634, approves of Scaliger’s conjecture. I imagine that these scholars would take αὐτῇ to refer to εὐτυχία. But ἥς already conveys the idea of the ὁρμη being that of εὐτυχία. Much better is the masculine αὐτῷ. Although there is no immediate antecedent, the agent is the type of man mentioned in 07b1-2.

We can now turn back to b8-10. We have seen that causation plays an important role in M.M.’s analysis of the different types of εὐτυχία. Of one type the agent with his irrational ὁρμη is the cause of his good fortune, of the other type events out of his control - not caused by anything in him - are the cause. M.M. has said in b7-8 that ‘cause’ is an inappropriate term with which to describe good fortune. We can now see why. There are causes of εὐτυχία: it is itself not a cause, but a consequence.

Our Greek manuscripts offer little significant variation in b8-10. We have variants in b9 (ἦ or ἧ) and in b9 and b10 (τὸ or τοῦ). The problem with καὶ — λαβεῖν (b8-10) is that there is no main verb. Supplements have been proposed before καί

³¹⁵ L.S.J. s.v. καί B.8.

(b8): Rassow, [1885] 314, suggests that we add ἔστι δὲ before καί, and read εὐτυχία for αἰτία, and von Arnim, [1927] 123, suggests that we add εὐτυχία δ' ἐστὶν before καί. Both think that it is at this point that the second type of εὐτυχία is introduced. Λ offers after ἄλλο ἐστὶν (b8):

Propter impetum ergo solum bene operanti recte fortuna ut causa dicitur esse operationis.

Just where scholars have suspected a lacuna Λ adds a sentence. Reconstructing the Greek we would have: διὰ ὁρμὴν οὖν μόνον τῷ εἶ πράττοντι ὀρθῶς τύχη αἰτία λέγεται εἶναι τοῦ πράττειν.

Are these (or something like them) the words of M.M.? I think that they are not, but are the words of a marginal annotator of an earlier version of Λ. Earlier (p.82) I noted the tendency of Λ to incorporate such notes.

Von Arnim's supplement in b8 is neater than Rassow's.³¹⁶ If we do not need to insert the noun, εὐτυχία, and can understand it from αὐτήν (b7), as Dirlmeier (p.424) supposes, then we could simply punctuate with a full stop after ἄλλο (b8), and the new sentence would start ἔστιν καὶ... However, I think that we do need to insert εὐτυχία in b8, and would follow von Arnim in punctuating with a full stop after ἐστὶν, and reading <εὐτυχία δ' ἐστὶν> καὶ... in b8.

Rassow and von Arnim independently suggest a further change, adding κακὸν οἰόμενον λήψεσθαι after τοῦ in b9 on the basis that there should be a symmetry with b10. But this is unnecessary. We remember from 07a29-35 that M.M. is talking about not getting κακά which one could reasonably expect to get.

³¹⁶ Dirlmeier (p.424) prefers Rassow's <ἔστι δὲ> on the grounds that the corruption is plausibly explained as a case of haplography of ἐστὶν. But the corruption has to be more complicated if the δὲ also dropped out. Von Arnim's longer supplement has the advantage that the cause of the corruption is a case of saut du même au même. Moreover, Rassow also has to alter αἰτία to εὐτυχία in b9, which Dirlmeier (p.424) rightly criticises - 'εὐτυχία τοῦ λαβεῖν scheint mir untragbar, während αἰτία τοῦ λαβεῖν ohne Anstoß ist'.

1207b18 Bf's satis may suggest a Greek exemplar that read ἱκανῶς or (most plausibly, palaeographically) ἄλις or ἀρκούντως instead of ἀρτίως. (I can think of no Latin word meaning ἀρτίως from which satis could have arisen from corruption.) E.N. 1096a3, 1102b11 (περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλις), E.N. 1172b7 (τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἄλις), and G.A. 757a13 (ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλις τὰ εἰρημένα), Pr. An. 32a16 (εἴρηται σχεδὸν ἱκανῶς) are all instances of a formulaic way of ending one subject before moving on to another.³¹⁷ But 'enough' would be in a parenthetical clause here, and it is difficult to see what it would mean. The sense would, I think have to be 'as we have said often enough'. We could refer to 06b33-4 for the claim that fortune generates external goods, but we have not been told so repeatedly.

For ἀρτίως + verb of saying Bonitz (s.v. ἄρτιος) cites Met. 1086a17 (a quotation of Epicharmus), Top. 150a18. To these Dirlmeier (p.425) adds E.E. 1217a11, Donini, [1965] 86n.11, adds Rhet. ad Al. 1425a34, and we can add Pol. 1291a39 (διορίζω). ἀρτίως I thus take to be secure.

Bonitz (Index, 502a27) conjectures <ἡ δὲ εὐτυχία> οἶαν ἀρτίως ἔφαμεν, but this has been rejected by Dirlmeier (p.425) and Donini, [1965] 86n.11. The change to οἶαν is brilliant. (Compare 92b9 for the same corruption, and compare 01b10 for the language.) M.M. nowhere else uses οἶον to mean ὥσπερ. But the structure of the sentence shows that Bonitz' δὲ is not right. The inference that εὐτυχία is συνεργὸς τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ is made on the basis of the two preceding premises. The δέ would thus have to be apodotic. Whilst we do find apodotic δέ, far more frequently it is not there. We should certainly not need to add ἡ εὐτυχία before οἶαν. M.M. is claiming that external goods come from the type of good fortune just discussed (viz. the one whose causal origin for attaining goods is in the agent). To insert ἡ εὐτυχία loses part of the virtue of οἶαν, because then it is left unclear in a17-18 which of the two types of εὐτυχία does bring about external goods. The precision introduced by οἶαν³¹⁸ is welcome only if we do not read ἡ εὐτυχία just before it. The question now is whether

³¹⁷ For the rarer ἀρκούντως see E.N. 1102a27.

³¹⁸ It may be that the severe corruption in b8 contributed towards the corruption. The state of our text does not make it absolutely obvious that there are two types of εὐτυχία.

we need a subject for εἴη. If we do, it would be best placed after ἔφαμεν, which is much harder palaeographically. But we do not.

Read οἶον for οἶον, but otherwise leave Susemihl's text.

1207b19 Retain τοσαῦτα with α against ζ's ταῦτα and Bf and Λ's dicta sunt haec. Bf and Λ are trying to end a chapter idiomatically, and τοσαῦτα is the harder reading. For τοσαῦτα compare, e.g., E.N. 1122a17, 1147b17, 1178a22.

1207b20 Add καὶ after εἴη. Susemihl shows no sign of knowing how poorly attested the omission of καὶ is. The only authority for leaving it out is B and its descendants (including the Aldine).

1207b21 The best explanation of the mss.' readings in this line is that ω read:

λοιπὸν ὃν εἴη καὶ

καθόλου συνθέντας καθ' ἕκαστα κεφαλαιωσαμένους εἰπεῖν

but that τα was written above -θέντας as a correction in ω. This would explain why K has συνθέντας τὰ, why A and α read συνθέντα, and why V (and L?) have συντεθέντα. If this is a correct account of the origins of the readings, we are at liberty ourselves to interpret our reconstructed ω. Should we read συνθέντας or somehow incorporate τὰ (definite article) or -τα (alternative ending to -τας)? There is, of course, no way of knowing whether τα was written above the line on the authority of another manuscript or from conjecture. Here we have to appeal to sense. What is M.M. proposing to say? How many stages are involved in the discussion to follow? Are the participles modal or temporal? To which verb do καθόλου and καθ' ἕκαστα respectively belong? E.E. 1248b8-10 is a close parallel: there Aristotle makes a similar programmatic remark. After speaking about each virtue κατὰ μέρος, he must 'make a distinct description' (διαρθρωτέον) of the excellence that arises out of the combination of them (τῆς ἐκ τούτων).

συνθέντα (α A) is not possible. We need a masculine plural (συνθέντας (K ε) if the participle is active, or a neuter plural (συντεθέντα (L V)) if the participle is passive. συντιθέναι must denote the process which M.M. is about to perform: he is going to talk about ὁ τελέως σπουδαῖος (07a22-4). Such a man has the combination of all the virtues (07b24-6; cf. 93b5-15). This makes it look as though we need an active participle, συνθέντας. The neuter passive without a preceding article would, in any case, be difficult to construe.

If this is right, M.M. is promising to do two things, one of which is to ‘put together’ the other is to ‘sum up’, but presumably these are two descriptions of the same process. I would thus leave the text that Susemihl prints.

1207b24 Remarkable is the number of times that φασιν and φησιν are confused in this text. At the following passages either the manuscripts diverge or a modern scholar has conjectured the form that is not transmitted: 87a25, 93b3, 04a33, 05a7, 05b11, 07b24, 07b26, 08b16, 08b17, 08b19, 09a10.³¹⁹

1207b24 ἦ will have been omitted in ω. In 08b17 and 10b14 some manuscripts wrongly add ἦ in a ὅταν clause, which is part of a quotation of Euripides. Would M.M. - not a poet - omit the verb? Bonitz cites only E.E. 1224a29 as an example in Aristotle of omission of the verb after ὅταν, but the text there is very insecure. M.M. 95a17 and 95a24 leave the reader to supply a verb - πράττη. Here too we can mentally supply ἦ just as we have to supply τίς.

1207b28 The stemma suggests that we retain καί. Spengel, [1866] 634 (followed by Susemihl and Dirlmeier (p.427) and von Arnim, [1927] 112), sees a problem with the text, if we read καί. Spengel excises καί (with β); von Arnim swaps καλὰ with

³¹⁹ On the use of φησιν in M.M. to introduce an opposing view, see Bonitz (589b60-590a10), Dirlmeier, pp.180-1.

ἀγαθὰ. What is the problem with καί? What is wrong with M.M. saying (b27-8): ‘Some things are καλὰ, others are [sc. καλὰ] and ἀγαθὰ.’?

Von Arnim and Dirlmeier think that the text with καί implies that there are some καλὰ which are not ἀγαθὰ, which would be impossible. Virtue, something explicitly said to be καλόν (b29), does not fall into the category of a ἀπλῶς good (cf. 83b20-35, 99a27-00a30). But virtue is, presumably, a good οὐχ ἀπλῶς. M.M. cannot, then, be distinguishing in b28 between τὰ καλὰ and τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, since anything καλόν is going to be ἀγαθόν.

Let us look at the following lines. In b28-9 M.M. makes a further (καὶ²) division between goods which are ἀπλῶς good and goods which are not [sc. ἀπλῶς good]. In b29-30 M.M. gives examples of things that are καλὰ and then of things that are ἀγαθὰ. The list of goods in b30-1 is a list of ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ. (We know from 99b1-9 that rule and wealth are ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ, and honour, given its potential to harm (00a20-30) will fit into the same category.) It is, then, open to the author to talk about the combination of καλὰ and ἀγαθὰ in a man - to talk about ὁ καλὸς κἀγαθός (b31-08a4).

The καλὸς κἀγαθὸς is the completely virtuous man (b22-4), and such a man can be characterised as someone (a) for whom τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ are good (07b32, b33-08a4; cf. 99b2-4 where ὁ φρόνιμος is said to know that τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ are good for him, and 00a27-30), and (b) who acts virtuously (07b29-30). The second condition is much less well developed, and M.M. stresses that (a) is a necessary condition for καλοκἀγαθία in 07b33-b39. In 07b39-08a4 condition (a) is not being presented as a sufficient condition. We have to take ἀγαθὰ in 08a1-3 in a broader sense than ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ (i.e. so as to allow virtue and virtuous activity to count as ‘good’) in order that the author still maintains that condition (a) needs to be joined to condition (b). M.M. does in fact make it clear that the sense of ἀγαθὰ is broadened in the closing lines of the section. The τι in a1 and πάντα in a3 make it clear that he is not just talking about τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ, but about all ἀγαθὰ.

In 07b32 M.M. uses the phrase ἀπλῶς καλά, without telling us precisely what he means. The distinction, I suppose, is between virtuous actions done because they are fine and virtuous actions done by the non-virtuous agent; i.e. by the child who is learning to be virtuous, or by the encratic.³²⁰ It is not quite sufficient for καλοκόγροθία that τὰ ἀπλῶς ὀγροθὰ are good for one and that one acts virtuously - we need to add τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκεν (cf. E.E. 1248b34-7).

Let us return to καί (b28). We have seen that there is a problem if M.M. means in b28: ‘Some things are καλά, others are [sc. καλά] and ὀγροθὰ.’ But there is another possibility, that καὶ bears the meaning of αὐ (see Denniston, p.305, section 7, (ii)). ‘Some things are fine, others, in turn, are good’. To omit καί might seem to make it awkward for the author to maintain that there are things which are at once καλά and ὀγροθὰ. This would be a mistaken impression. M.M. does not say that the two classes are mutually exclusive. It could still turn out that all καλά are ὀγροθὰ.

1207b30 Dirlmeier (p.427) would retain οἶον, and, now that we are in a position to see that there is no reason to prefer a reading of ζ over one of α, just because it appears in ζ,³²¹ so would I.

1208a9 Dirlmeier (p.431) follows von Arnim, [1924] 71, in adding τὸ before κατά. The definite article is also found in D and V. X ἔστω ὅταν... is a frequent expression in M.M. (see my note on 1195a22-3), but X is always a noun. The question, then, is whether the infinitive without the definite article can be substantival. Kühner-Gerth (II, 2, pp.3-4) gives parallels from prose authors for this use of the infinitive, and on this basis I prefer to be conservative and not accept the addition. I would not translate ‘it is possible to act.... when...’, but ‘acting in accordance with right reason is when...’.

1208a12-20 The punctuation of these lines is due to Bonitz, [1844] 15.

³²⁰ ἀπλῶς καλόν only occurs at E.N. 116b22, Topics 115b32. In the Topics the status of sacrificing one’s father is discussed. It is a practice that is καλόν τισιν, but not καλόν ἀπλῶς.

³²¹ This is Susemihl’s only reason to excise it.

1208a15 Susemihl restrained himself from following the Aldine in adding εἶ before σῶμα and omitting κολῶς. The addition of εἶ in V was made after κολῶς had dropped out. L's transposition is designed to bring the adverb nearer the verb.

1208a18 ὥστε is nicer Greek than πρὸς τό, but only attested late. For πρὸς τὸ + infinitive cf. 99b30, 08a1, a17.

1208a19 The aorist subjunctive in α is worth consideration. (See my note on 1195b29.) But the present tense is used in 08a10, 08a16, 08a21, and should be retained here.

1208a19 Allegiance to K made Susemihl depart from previous editors' decision to print ἐπιτελεῖν. One can ἐνεργεῖ one's ἐνέργειαν (08a10-11), but one ἐπιτελεῖ one's ἔργον (08a17, cf. Topics 161a20). Print ἐπιτελεῖν.

1208a23 Dirlmeier (pp.430-2) is right to distinguish four interlocutors in 08a5-30. The author tells us what he means by the phrase κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν in a5-20, and he does so by introducing in a7-8 an imaginary objector - someone who has been paying attention to what has preceded but who does not fully understand (ἀγνοῶν, 08a7). The same 'Hörer den Philosophen' is still not satisfied at 08a20-2 (οὐ... οἶδα, 08a22). The author then says that there is nothing more that one can say to make things clearer (08a22-3), and justifies this non-answer by appeal to medicine. We are to imagine a doctor teaching his art to a trainee. Just as the student of M.M. wants to act in accordance with right reason, so the trainee doctor wants to cure patients. But an inappropriate demand is made by both students. The trainee doctor does not know what a feverish patient looks like, and the initiate in ethics does not know what it is for the passions to be in the right condition. Although both students

need to know these things, it is not easy (ρόδιον, a23) for either instructor to help any further. The students need to help themselves.

In a23-4 the subject of εἴπη is ὁ ἰατρός, and the subject of αἰσθάνομαι is the medical student. Jaeger, [1948] 442, makes a suggestion which should be adopted: that we read the subjunctive αἰσθανώμαι, which would fit in with the question in a25-6 where the medical student asks his next question, with the subjunctive. ‘How am I to...?’.

1208a26-7 There are three textual questions in these lines. Rieckher cast doubt on συνιέτω (a26),³²² φησί is not well attested (a27), and οὐκ ἔτι needs to be discussed.

Let us start with οὐκ ἔτι. First, the manuscripts often write this as two words, where Susemihl prints it as one.³²³ The elliptical apodosis is tolerable: we mentally supply εἰδήσεις after οὐκέτι, which Dirlmeier (p.432) suggests that we print. The doctor is replying to the question ‘How am I to know pallor?’. The doctor replies that unless a certain condition is fulfilled, the trainee will not know.

Let us turn to συνιέτω. If we are right to see εἰ γὰρ — οὐκέτι as the doctor’s reply to the student’s question about pallor, we have to ask ourselves what ἐνταῦθα — ἰατρός is doing. One view would be that these are the words of the author. He interrupts the mini-dialogue between doctor and trainee to make a statement of theory, namely that the doctor needs ‘understanding’ in order to ‘know pallor’. But this view is opposed (a) by the resulting awkwardness of the separation of the doctor’s reply to the question, and (b) by the difficulty of taking συνιέτω to mean αἰσθητικὴν συνέσιν ἔχέτω, as Dirlmeier (p.432) proposes. Dirlmeier’s view that ἐνταῦθα — ἰατρός is part of the doctor’s reply overcomes (a), but not (b). Moreover, the change in person becomes odd - why not say ‘you need συνέσιν’? Finally, ἐνταῦθα most probably means ‘at this point’, rather than ‘in this kind of case’ -

³²² Bonitz (*Index*, s.v.) and Susemihl (p.120) are doubtful that the word is right.

³²³ See pp.172-3.

compare 88a10, 94a21, 95b29, 95b35, where ἐνταῦθα marks a new stage of development.

Alternatives to συνιέτω might be συνειπέτω: ‘Let the doctor agree’. L.S.J. note the frequency with which Plato uses the verb σύμφημι in Platonic dialogue;³²⁴ or, neater palaeographically, συνίστω: ‘let the doctor acknowledge the fact’.

Susemihl’s φησί is a misprint for φήσει, (Dirlmeier (p.432)).³²⁵ ζ read φήσει and α the same-sounding φύσει. Natural perception cannot be in place here. The future φήσει is certainly right. Note as parallels for ἐνταῦθα followed by a future: 88a10 and 95b29.

The new text will be translated (a25-7), reading συνίστω... φήσει... αἴσθησιν, οὐκ ἔτι:

‘How am I to recognise pallor?’ Now here let the doctor acknowledge the fact: ‘If you do not have within yourself’, he will say, ‘an ability to spot such things, then you cannot <recognise it>’.

1208a32 Susemihl was unaware of how poorly attested ταῦτα is. P² (see Appendix) takes ταύτας to refer to ἀρετάς, but virtues have not been mentioned explicitly since 08a5, and ταῦτα in a35 makes a neuter here imperative. The addition of the sigma will have been due to assimilation of the ending of the previous word.

What is the reference of ταῦτα in a32? In the preceding discussion (08a5-30) we met an objector who first did not understand what acting κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον was. The author explains that this occurs when the irrational part of the soul (the πάθη) does not impede the rational part. But that reply was not completely satisfactory. The student of ethics has to know that acting κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον is when the irrational part of the soul (the πάθη) does not impede the rational part. But that is not enough. He himself has to contribute something else - namely a certain

³²⁴ For εἰπέτω in Plato’s dialogues, see Phaedrus 273a7, Laches 194e10, Prot. 348b6, Laws 662e3.

³²⁵ Bas.³, Sylburg and Casaubon do print φησί.

conceptual frame-work (a29-30). There are then two epistemological conditions for understanding what acting in accordance with right reason is.

ἔργῳ (a31) is usually the counterpart of λόγῳ in Greek. It is a matter of interpretation whether ταῦτα refers to the theory (that acting in accordance with reason is when the passions are in the right relation to the rational part of the soul) as well as the conceptual ability (to recognise that this man's πάθη are in the right relation), or just to the second. (It cannot just refer to the first, which is just theoretical (λόγῳ) knowledge.) The questioner asks whether it is a sufficient condition for εὐδαιμονία that one actually knows these things. He will be told that one needs to put one's knowledge into practice.

1208a37-8 Dirlmeier (pp.432-3) opposes the conjecture, first made by Amerbach, of ἐν τῷ for ἐκ τοῦ. 'Ein ἔσται nach χρήσθαι (sic) ergänzt sich leicht in Gedanken'.

1208a39 Read the aorist infinitive, παραδοῦναι with all mss. except V.

1208b4 The manuscripts have ἐπειδήπερ. In 04a19-20 and 04a29-30 the author says that he must talk about pleasure, and gives his reason with a clause beginning ἐπειδήπερ. It is tempting, then, to read ἐπειδήπερ and to take the structure to be the same here, and to punctuate with a full stop after ἀγαθόν (b6). The problem with this, though, is that συμπαροληπτέα — εὐδαιμονίαν (b6) is left stranded.

We must punctuate strongly after τί in b4. The question, then, is whether ἐπειδήπερ can stand in first position in a sentence without a particle. In M.M. it is used with another particle when it comes first (84b36). M.M. has ἐπειδήπερ six times excluding 08b4: 84b36, 85a15, 87b20, 00a30, 04a19, 04a30.³²⁶ It is thus a favourite

³²⁶ In the works of Aristotle there are only six other occurrences of this word (An. 66a27, de Caelo 309a3, G.A. 752a27, Meteor. 343a29, S.E. 176a19, Phys. 242a31). The frequency should be taken as a mark of authorship by someone other than Aristotle.

word of the author.³²⁷ If we need a particle, Bonitz' emendation of $\pi\epsilon\rho$ to $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ is superior to P²'s addition of $\kappa\alpha\iota$ before $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\eta}\pi\epsilon\rho$.

1208b10 $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$ is the accentuation editors use at Homer Od. 17, 218. The line of Homer was frequently quoted, but editors have not troubled themselves to record the accentuation in the manuscripts. At E.N. 1155a34, Susemihl-Apelt (Leipzig, 1912³) and Bywater (Oxford, 1894) print $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$; at E.E. 1235a7 Walzer/Mingay (Oxford, 1991) print $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$; at Rhet. 1371b15 Kassel (Berlin, 1976) prints $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$, but some mss. have $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$; at Plato, Lysis 214a6, Burnet (Oxford, 1903) prints $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$.

In 08b10, it is twice written as $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$ by α L V and as $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$ (sic) by A. Never in the ten other occurrences of $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma$ or $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$ in M.M. is $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma$ or $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$ found in the mss. It is remarkable that the Homeric form of accentuation has been preserved (or restored) here (See L.S.J., s.v.), and we ought to recognise this by printing $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$ twice in this line.

1208b10 For L's $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, see W.B. Stanford's commentary on the Odyssey (2nd ed., 1957, Dublin) on Od. XVII, 218.

1208b11-13 The accentuation $\kappa\epsilon\rho\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ (with a circumflex) is the later form, according to L.S.J., s.v. I prefer the earlier form, $\kappa\epsilon\rho\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\varsigma$, which is what Walzer/Mingay print at E.E. 1235a12.

1208b16 Punctuate: , $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ $\phi\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu$.

1208b16-17 If this is a quotation, rather than a paraphrase of Euripides, we need to read $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\iota'$ for $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\iota\alpha$ for the trimeter to scan. (At Athenaeus xii, 600a, where a fuller report of the fragment is found, most mss. have $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\iota\alpha$, but editors print $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\iota'$). If it is not a quotation, then there is good reason to follow α and β in adding $\hat{\eta}$ after $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\delta\omicron\nu$.

³²⁷ This was noted by Eucken, [1866] I, p.68.

The line of Euripides is quoted as such at 1210a14 (see my note there), but here it is introduced with a general ‘one says’ (whether one reads φασίιν or φησίιν). I thus add ἦ here but not in 1210a14.

1208b20 For ἔτι δέ, see my note on 1189a1.

1208b29 Should we read τὸν before θεόν? In b27 there was no definite article, but in b33 there is. There is marginal stemmatic support for leaving it out, with Susemihl.

1208b29-30 There are two separate questions in these lines. First, in a29 the mss. have οὐδέ, not οὐτε. Bekker, Bonitz, Spengel and Dirlmeier (p.437) want to read οὐτε to balance οὐθ’ in the next line. Denniston (p.511) does not give parallels to justify οὐδέ... οὐτε here, and so we could either follow Bekker in reading οὐτε for οὐδέ (b29), or read οὐδέ (b29) and οὐδ’ for οὐθ’ (b30). In favour of the second proposal are the parallel passages for οὐδ’ ἄλλως at 85b11 and 07a21.

Bonitz, Spengel and Dirlmeier (p.437) also want to insert τὸ before ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι (b30), because of the definite article in b30 (τὸ φιλεῖν). But this looks like a case of normalisation.

1208b31 Possibly a Christian scribe in β objected to Ζεός? In 85b24 β has τὸν θεόν when α and η have τοὺς θεούς.

1208b33 δὴ may be an example of the particle being used with ‘adjectives expressing indefinite quantity or number’ (Denniston, p.205). ἢ ἄλλο δὴ is not found elsewhere in the corpus. 90b17 and 95b15 are parallels for Sylburg’s conjecture of τι for δὴ.

1208b34 ζητοῦμεν or ἐπιζητοῦμεν? The form in ἐπι- has only appeared in M.M. at 08a31, whilst the form without the prefix appears at 84a13-38 (five times), 93b12, 93b18, 94b21, 95a6, 96a32, 02a28, 02a33, 08b7, 09a39, 09b31. The compound may

here have the sense of carrying the investigation further, which would be appropriate.

Print the less usual form: ἐπι-.

1208b38 The second καί in this line is perfectly possible, but its lineage is very suspect. Delete it.

1209a2 Print αὐτῶ with A η, as in 09a6. In 99a28 the reflexive form is correct.

1209a2-3 From 09a1-2 we have understood what τὸ φιλητόν and τὸ φιλητέον are. The set of things that are ‘good for someone’ is a subset of the set of things that are ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, we know from 99a28-99b9: wealth, for example, is ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, but is not good in the hands of someone base. Because of this fact, the set of τὰ φιλητά (i.e. τὰ αὐτῶ ἀγαθά) is a subset of τὰ φιλητέα (i.e. τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά). Wealth in the hands of a good man is φιλητέον and is also, qua wealth, ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν and so φιλητόν. But the reverse is not true: wealth is ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν and so φιλητόν, but is not φιλητέον. It would thus be wrong to follow the corrector of P in reversing the sense of 09a2-3.

1209a5 Bonitz and Valla’s addition of ἀπλῶς to qualify τὸ ἀγαθόν is not necessary, given 08b37, 09a15.

1209a7 Susemihl follows correctors of C and P in this line. The construction is simple - τὸ ἡδὺ εἶναι καὶ τὸ συμφέρον is the composite subject, and these two ‘depend on and follow’ the good. The imperfect ἠκολούθει (a11) looks back to a7, and confirms that this is what M.M. means (see also 99b32-3). The mss. (L K² V¹) offer another possibility which is to read τὸ ἡδεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὸ συμφέροντι.³²⁸ This again would be the composite subject and would be translated in the same way that we translate

³²⁸ See Bonitz s.v. εἶναι, 5, for the predicative dative after εἶναι in Aristotle. In M.M. there are examples of the construction at 87a18, 87b20, 87b21, 10a5.

Susemihl's text. The change of τὸ to τῷ twice (as we read in α A K¹ V²) would be a natural unthinking scribal correction, aided by the dative τῷ ἀγαθῷ earlier in the line, but it gives a completely different and inappropriate sense - the words become the indirect object of ἀκολουθεῖ, and so the correctors of C and P tried to restore the sense.

	τὸ ἦδεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὸ συμφέροντι
became	τῷ ἦδεῖ εἶναι καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι
which was corrected to	τὸ ἦδὺ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ συμφέρον

We can go back to the original words.

1209a10 Bonitz, Index 590a9, probably intended to conjecture φασίν in this line, when he does so in 09a8, where φησίν does not occur.

1209a15 Several scribes thought that there should be a pause after γάρ. C, A and K punctuate with a stop, V with a comma. Denniston (pp.31-2) suggests that we punctuate with a comma:

'The passage is virtually a dialogue, as the use of μὲν οὖν [09a11] indicates. The proposition ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ φαύλῳ οὐκ ἔσται φίλος [09a10] is met by the objection ἔσται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. [09a11-13] The counter-objection ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔσται κ.τ.λ. [09a13-15], is met by the rejoinder οὐ γάρ, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. [09a15ff.]: 'No, but it *will* exist on the basis of τὸ φιλητέον'.

This is certainly the structure of the passage. But there is still a problem. In answer to the question 'whether bad people are friends of good', M.M. wants to allow that there can be a certain sort of friendship between these two (cf. 09b6-7). It will not be, as in the case of friendship between two good people, that they are each φιλητοί, since the bad man is not someone who is good, and this is a requirement for being φιλητός (a13-15).

But can it be true that the base man is a friend of the good man κατὰ τὸ φιλητέον, as is claimed in a15-16? Surely the characterisation of τὸ φιλητέον, in 09a2,

as τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν is not going to be broad enough to allow base men to count as ‘appropriate objects of friendship’?

1209a16 Add ἔστιν after φιλητέον, on stemmatic grounds.

1209a23-7 The asyndeton in a24 - there is no connective particle between φαμὲν (a23) and λέγονται (a25) - has led to two proposals to make the Greek more smooth. Susemihl proposes adding εἶ before φαμεν (a23) and Dirlmeier proposes adding δ’ before οὐχ (a24). Accept the second conjecture.

1209a28 Place commata around ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν to make it clear that there are only three types of friendship.

1209a35 Retain κατ’ on stemmatic grounds. It looks as though Susemihl only deleted it because it was not in K.

1209a38 Omit the first ὁ, which only K has.

1209b1 Omit ὁ, which only η has.

1209b5 Rassow’s τὰγαθόν, which conforms with 09a34, is not necessary, says Dirlmeier (p.441), who wants to retain the mss.’ τὰγαθά. If we read τὰγαθά, then καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον cannot be in apposition to πάντα τὰγαθά, because the list of goods would be incomplete - ἀρετή is omitted. Nor can the phrase be additional, since both the pleasant and the beneficial are good (cf. 09a7). Retain Rassow’s τὰγαθόν.

1209b8 φίλοι is a late reading. φίλος is certainly right. When M.M. talks of friendship, most often he says X is a friend to Y, and not that they are friends. Where two sorts of man are involved in the relationship, it is conceivable that X could be kind to Y, but

not *vice versa*, or at least that the grounds of the friendship might be different. A prostitute presumably has her relationship with a client κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον (pecuniary advantage) and the client has his with the prostitute καθ' ἡδονήν (sexual pleasure).

In b6 the good man is a friend of the bad man because of pleasure, i.e. what the bad man values in the good man is not his virtue but, say, his sense of humour. In b7 M.M. asserts that the base man (X) can be a friend of the base (Y). Obviously, the same answer would be given to the question whether the base man (Y) can be a friend of the base (X) (and this is why there are plurals in b9-10), but the way that the sentence in b7 is formulated - we supply φίλος after φαύλω - necessitates that its justification (γάρ, b7) is formulated in the same way. So read φίλος.

1209b10 Armstrong suggests ὡς for ὥστ': 'since nothing will prevent even bad men from having some interest in common'. But ὥστ' is intelligible, and the future after ὥστε is found at 88a25, 93b35, 00a3, 00a32, 01a5, 01b37, 03b19, 11a35, but after ὡς never in M.M.

1209b16 ω had μεταπίπτει, which will not do. We have two decent conjectures to evaluate. The first, adding the prefix συμ-, is by a recent hand in P. While the sense secured by the verb συμμεταπίπτειν is an improvement on the transmitted text, there are two objections to the reading. First, συμμεταπίπτειν is a very rare word, not in Aristotle, and only attested before the third century B.C. in Aeschines.³²⁹ Secondly, it is not an obvious mistake for a scribe to make.

More plausible (palaeographically) is the conjecture of Ellebodius: ΑΛΛΑΜΑ, with the capital mu resembling a double lambda, could easily give rise to ΑΛΛΑ. (cf. M.M. 1199b36, De An. 423b16 for ἀλλά/ἄμα confusion.) The simultaneity of the basis of friendship crumbling and the friendship itself coming to an end is expressed with the word ἄμα in b23 (and cf. E.N. 1156a33-5).

³²⁹ Note that M.M. does have συμμεταβάλλειν at 87b2, however.

1209b25-6 Full stops after φίλω (b25) and after ὑπήρχεν (b26).

1209b27 Read κατ' (misprint).

1209b36 The quotation is of Euripides Bellerophon fr.296 Nauck (revised Snell, 1964). E.E. 1238a34 gives κακὸς κακῶ <δὲ> [suppl. Tauchnitz] συντέτηκεν ἡδονῆ. E.E. 1239b22 gives κακὸς κακῶ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῆ.

It is not clear whether the γάρ is attributed to Euripides or is the author's own. Susemihl takes it in the second way presumably because the context of the line in Euripides rules out γάρ being correct. But γάρ does scan in the trimeter. And is not the delay of the particle to third position a poetic feature,³³⁰ not a peripatetic idiom?³³¹ Of the different reports of the fragment, that at E.E. 1239b22 has δέ third word,³³² whilst Stobaeus (Ecl. 2.33.2, p.255.11) has τε third word. It is true that some manuscripts of M.M. give γάρ second, rather than third, word, and Dirlmeier would follow these. But it is more likely that the move of the particle from its position in Euripides' play should have been made by a scribe who was normalising the word-order than that a scribe should have knowledge of this rare play and, correcting the word-order to accord with that, place the particle third (and get the particle wrong).

M.M. omits ἡδονῆ from the quotation, which is a key word to omit. If we do not follow Amerbach, a commentator on Aristotle in the sixteenth century, in adding the word, we must believe that the author thought that the quotation was so well known that he did not need to give it in full.

συντέτηκεν 'is at one with' is only found in η. L.S.J. s.v. συντήκω II,1. give other instances in tragedy of a metaphorical usage of this verb which normally means 'be fused together'. The other two families have συνέστηκεν which would give good sense too - 'forms a league with' (See L.S.J. s.v. συνίστημι B.III,1). That Euripides

³³⁰ See Denniston, p.188.

³³¹ It is true that the quotation at 08b16 has the author's own γάρ third word, but there is reason here for its delay - viz. to avoid the awkward collocation γάρ μέν. The μέν in that line cannot be separated by an authorial particle from the word that precedes it.

³³² One manuscript there normalises the word order.

wrote the first, we can be pretty sure. συνίστημι in this sense is a far more prosaic word. It looks as though ω had συνέστηκεν, and that η restored the correct word with the help of E.E..

1209b39 γὰρ justifies an affirmative answer to the question. Punctuate: ... εἶναι, ἦ οὐ; δεῖ. ἄτοπον γὰρ... See above, pp.167-8.

1209b39 Dirlmeier (p.444) suggests ἄν γὰρ ἀφέλης on the grounds that the future ἐλῶ only replaces αἰρήσω at the end of the first century B.C. There are other words in M.M. without parallel until dates A.D. (e.g. λυπητικός (92b22), παρεπισκοπεῖν (97b32), προδιανοεῖσθαι (88b30), στεφανοποιός (06a27), φιλάγαθος (12b18)), and we should not normalise here.

1210a12-13 α offers γίνονται οὖν αἰ... φιλία, and β γίνεται οὖν ἡ... φιλία. Leave Susemihl's text. Compare 10a22.

1210a13 Add ὁ before Εὐριπίδης with the stemma. M.M. uses a definite article before a proper name at 08b12, but not, for example, at 82a11, 82a15, 82a24, 90b28, 91a7 (though a late ms. has it), and 09b35.

1210a13 Colon after Εὐριπίδης.

1210a14 See my note on 1208b16-17. Only A and K (originally) omit ἦ. It should be written in the text after πέδον, but put in square brackets.

1210a15 Dirlmeier's addition of οὖν before οὖσιν (p.445) is wrong. We know the context of Euripides' lines (quoted most fully in Athenaeus XIII, 599 and Stobaeus Ecl. I, 9, 1. 270, and also in E.E. 1235a16 E.N. 1155b2-4). A character is justifying the claim that Aphrodite is powerful, and in particular sexually powerful. Both M.M.

and E.N. hint that Euripides was talking about the relationship between rain and dry land by way of illustrating the nature of a particular human relationship or of a type of human relationship. Translate ὡς ‘on the supposition that’.

1210a16 This sentence was thought by Scaliger, Spengel and Susemihl to be unsound. Adding the word ‘even’, Stock translates Susemihl’s text: ‘For <even> if you would like to set down fire and water as the extreme opposites, these are useful to one another’. The καὶ is important: even if the most extreme case of opposites is taken, the thesis that opposites are useful to each other is true. Dirlmeier’s comparison (p.446) of 06a10 is apposite and justifies the transmitted text.

1210a19 For ἄν see p.166.

1210a20 Dirlmeier (p.446) approves of the addition of ποιήσει. I cannot see any neater solution. Scaliger’s φθείρει would be bettered by φθερεῖ. We must bear in mind that the comma after ὑγρὸν may be misleading. Rassow, [1858], [1874], punctuates with a comma after ποιήσης.

1210a21 Read ἄν for ἐόν, to balance ἄν² in b19. Note that Susemihl’s apparatus is wrong in stating that α (Π²) has ἄν where ζ (Π¹) has οἶν.

1210a29 ὦν is a late reading and should be marked as such by placing it within angular brackets.

1210a31 As in 10a35 V seems to have found εὐδηλος, an adjective of two terminations, awkward, so gives a neuter form on each occasion.

1210a32 Full stop after ἑτέρου (with α β K).

1210a32-3 First note that there is a misprint in this line - read ἦ for ἧ. There is an editorial decision in these lines. α does not have the datives μοι... σοι, but accusatives με... σέ.

L.S.J. (s.v. ποιέω, B, 2) say that to convey the sense of ‘doing something to someone’ ποιεῖν + double accusative is more usual than ποιεῖν + accusative *rei* and dative *personae*. Bonitz (609a6) cites only E.N. 1134b5 as an example of ποιεῖν + dative of the person, but in 1134b1 and b5 ποιεῖν does not mean πράττειν, but stands for the earlier verb - τὸ πλεον νέμειν.³³³ But he does cite two uses of the verb with double accusative (609a2-5) from Rhet. I would print the accusatives; με... σε...

1210b1 The infinitive is governed by an understood οἴεται.

1210b6 Delete the dash because b6-8 are closely connected to b3-6.

1210b7 Dirlmeier (p.448) approves of Fritzche’s addition of μεθ’ before ἡδονῆς. But we should be cautious of following them. What matters in the argument is that loving is an activity, whereas being loved is not. What the activity is accompanied by is not to the point.

1210b8 For ἔτι δὲ see my note on 1189a1.

1210b20 ἡδονῆς, in C, is an attractive alternative to ἡδονῶν, which could have arisen by assimilation to the previous genitive plural. Of the twenty occurrences of the word ἡδονή in the section on friendship (08b3-13b30), only this one is in the plural.

1210b21 ὑπερέχοντα: misprint.

³³³ It is probable that we should read πονεῖ here. See Stewart, [1892] vol.I, p.487 for discussion.

1210b23 ‘Such’ cannot refer back to the sort of friendship just discussed. We would need a definite article before *τοιαῦται* (which a late corrector in P adds). Also, the sort of friendships just discussed are not ἐξ ὁμοιοπαθείας. Rather, b23 introduces a new type of friendship (*καὶ* (b23) = ‘also’), and *τοιαῦται* is prospective.³³⁴ Place a comma after *φιλία* and translate (with Dirlmeier): ‘but there are also friendships of the following sort, namely ones arising from sympathy.’

1210b33 Read *αὐτοφιλία* where Susemihl reads *αὐτῷ* [*φιλία*]. The authority for *αὐτῷ* *φιλία* is V (who has a rough breathing) and a late correction in K. Although in 10b39 and 12a28 M.M. does use the term *αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία*, and *αὐτοφιλία* exists nowhere in Greek literature, this should not dissuade us from printing what the mss. offer. M.M. has invented the term *αὐτοόδης* (92b33) which appears nowhere else in Greek literature, and coins another compound word, *φιλάγαθος* (12b18).³³⁵ The *καὶ* (b33) is explicative.

Compound nouns in *αὐτο-* most often mean Platonic forms in Aristotle (see Bonitz, 125a3-14), but there are nouns such as *αὐτοδιακονία* ‘self-service’ (Chrysippus, Stoic. 3.177), *αὐτοκράτεια* ‘power over oneself’ (ps-Plato Def. 412d), *αὐτονομία* ‘rule of oneself’ (Thucydides, Xenophon, Isocrates) which are good parallels for *αὐτοφιλία*.³³⁶

The alternative would be to excise not just *φιλία*, but, as Armstrong suggests, *φιλία καὶ* to fit in with the expression in b39-11a1 and 12a28.

1210b36 Armstrong Stock and Dirlmeier take *τὸ εἶ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ζῆν* as objects of *βουλόμεθα* (b35). Dirlmeier (and Dalimier) takes *τὸ βούλεσθαι* also to be an object of *βουλόμεθα* and translates: ‘wir wünschen für uns... das Wunschen des Guten’. The only sense that can be made of this would be if it is being claimed that people wish to

³³⁴ See Dirlmeier, pp. 451-2.

³³⁵ M.M. also coins the noun, *ὁμοιοπάθεια* (10b23, 11a1).

³³⁶ M.M. and E.N. use the adjective *φίλαντος*, but L.S.J record the first instance of *φιλαυτία* in the second century B.C.

have appropriate wishes. If this were right, M.M. would contain the first reference to second-order desires in Greek philosophy.

Stock, whom I would follow, adopts a different ploy. He translates $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{o}\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu\ \sigma\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\ \tau\iota\nu\acute{\iota}$: ‘and the wishing of the good applies to none so much’. To achieve this place a comma after $\tau\acute{o}\ \zeta\eta\nu$ (b36), and delete the comma after $\tau\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$ (b37). It is easy to see why Stock is reluctant to translate $\sigma\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\ \tau\iota\nu\acute{\iota}$ by ‘to no-one else <except ourselves>’, which is what we should expect given $\sigma\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\ \tau\iota\nu\acute{\iota}\ \eta\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega$ (b32). The reason is that there would be a contradiction with b32. There our wishes for good things were said only to be directed towards our (perfect) friend; here they would only be directed also to ourselves. I take $\sigma\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\ \tau\iota\nu\acute{\iota}$ to be an emphatic way of saying $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega$, and not to exclude the possibility that he might ‘wish the good’ for others. But the expense of doing this is that M.M. does not map the characteristics of the self-lover perfectly onto those found in perfect friendship.

Armstrong - who does not say whether he thinks it unlikely that the author would want to say this or because he wants to make a35-7 a closer parallel to a29-32 - excises $\tau\acute{o}\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$.

1210b39-11a1 Read $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$. This is what Susemihl has in 10b33 and 12a28, (cf. 96a24, a30, 11a16, a27, a30, a31, a36, a37, a39 for $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$).

1211a3 $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ was a conjecture in K, but $\delta\grave{\epsilon}$ is fine. M.M. objects to the disjunction expressed in $\eta\tau\omicron\iota\ \dots\ \eta$.

1211a4 $\kappa\alpha\iota^2$ is omitted by Susemihl. The stemma is equally divided, and I would follow Susemihl.

1211a8 It is to the Aldine that we owe the right reading, $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\omega\acute{\nu}$.

1211a16-b3 Von Arnim, [1927] 251, proposes that this section is not in its right place, and that it should be relocated either to 11b39 (before the section on εὔνοια) or to 12a27 (after the section on ὁμόνοια). His explanation is that a leaf of a manuscript was inserted in the wrong place. It would, however, be amazing if a page break in a manuscript were to have coincided not once but twice with natural breaks in the text.

1211a21 Bonitz' δὲ is required for the mss.' τε.

1211a22 -οίμεθα was what ζ read. Do we need to add ἄν? Either μάλιστ' <ἄν> βουλοίμεθα or <ἄν> μάλιστα βουλοίμεθα. Cf. 10b29, 11a19, 11a23.³³⁷

1211a24 V²'s reading, δῆλον ἐστὶν ὡς ἔστι, is again a late reading. A and η offer a good alternative: δῆλον ἐστὶν ὡς, where we can mentally supply 'is'. This has the advantage that the 'Kakophonie' which Dirlmeier (p.457) notes, is lost. Add ἦ before φιλία with β.

1211a28 ἔφαμεν, which first appears in the Aldine, is right. The present tense - expressing the idea that the author (and those in his circle) often talk about injustice to oneself when dividing the soul - is unlikely to be right. The aorist makes the reference back to 96a25-30.

1211a38 See my note on 1197a37 for τῷ + infin.

1211b2 Susemihl's δὲ should not be accepted. See my note on 1195a34.

1211b15 Read ἴσος (with α and β) for ἴσον². Susemihl did not know of this reading.

³³⁷ See above, p.166.

1211b19 ταῦτα is odd. Should we not read a partitive genitive, ταύτης: ‘and within this (sc. family friendship), in the relation of father to son’?

1211b22 L is the only manuscript to give a main verb in the ὡς clause - λέγουσιν. The rest have the participle, λέγοντες. M.M. uses ὡς + main verb in parenthetical clauses often (e.g. ὡς οἶονται (83a32, 92b14 etc.), ὡς ἔοικεν (81b27, 82a1 etc.), ὡς φασίν (94b5) etc.) When a participle follows ὡς, a reason or motive is often being given (85a8, 87a28, 99b23, 00b11, 08b14, 10a18, 12a37). In 82b11 and 94b31 there is a separate use of ὡς + participle: to speak of something as...

The usage of ὡς in M.M. therefore suggests that L’s λέγουσιν is correct. Bonitz (872a10-31) and Kühner-Gerth (II, 2, 90-6) offer no parallels for the parenthetic ὡς + participle that we find transmitted.

However, I do not think that we should print λέγουσι. There is another construal. We can supply (mentally) a main verb φασι: ‘as some people <say>, speaking rightly at least in the majority of cases’.

1211b22 εὐηργέτηκέ is much better attested than the form in εὐεργ-. L.S.J. (s.v. εὐεργέτω) say that the augment in εὐη- is sometimes found in manuscripts, but that early papyri and inscriptions point to the perfect form: εὐεργέτηκα. Susemihl was unsure which to print. Since mss. are not to be trusted, bow to the early testimony of εὐε-, and leave the text as Susemihl has it.

1211b24 Retain καί. The reason put forward by the popular moralists to explain the disparity between the son’s love for his father and the father’s for his son is also that put forward to explain disparities in relationships κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον.

1211b27 Susemihl is right to excise ἔστιν.

1211b27 Bekker’s ὦν is indisputable.

1211b34 Armstrong's motivation to emend this line is disposed of by Dirlmeier (p.462). Cf. Dirlmeier p.212 for Platonic parallels.

1211b36 In this line all mss. have εὔνοοί εἰσιν, and in 12a4 one family has εὔνοοι, the other εἶνοι. Neither Susemihl nor Dirlmeier (p.462) were aware that α has εὔνοοι in 12a4. We should clearly print the same form in both cases, and the manuscripts now provide very strong evidence that we should, with Dirlmeier, accept their testimony and read the lectio difficilior, εὔνοοι in both lines.

1212a4 Read εὔνοοι. See my note on 1211b36.

1212a7 Read ἡ εὔνοια φιλίας. This word-order is that found in all mss. except V. The only source available to Susemihl to have the more normal order, φιλίας ἡ εὔνοια, was the Aldine, but there is no entry in his apparatus.

1212a13 Amerbach suggests that we should read τῆς εὐνοίας ἢ φιλία. E.E. 1241a12-13 says 'every friend has goodwill, but not all who have goodwill are friends'. M.M. 12a1-6 has tried to show that one can be εὔνουσ to X without being a friend to X. A further psychological requirement is needed for one to be a friend to X (12a7-8). If 12a12-13 mean 'εὔνοια is not without friendship', i.e. any instance of εὔνοια is also an instance of φιλία, then there is clearly a contradiction with what M.M. has just said (and also with E.E.). Amerbach tries to rid M.M. of this contradiction. But χωρίς need not be taken to express such a strict conceptual relation. Here it must be taken more vaguely. M.M. is making a very general claim - namely that both φιλία and εὔνοια are 'in the same sphere' - just as in 12a14 the claim is made that ὁμονοία is σύνεγγυς τῆ φιλία. If someone has φιλία towards someone else, he will also have εὔνοια. One can, thus, make sense of the transmitted text. It is, moreover, to be noted

that if Amerbach's conjecture were accepted, ἡ φιλία would be the natural subject of the next sentence, which, it will quickly be seen, would be absurd.

1212a18 In order to avoid translating, as Stock does, 'Since the same thing would have to hold in any like case', we need to adopt Spengel's addition of τὸ before τοιοῦτον. Both Armstrong and Dirlmeier accept this conjecture. We can then translate: 'since this kind of agreement lies in a different field' (Armstrong). Unless we read τό, τοιοῦτον will be taken as predicate rather than as subject.

1212a19 For -ικ- see my note on 1189b6.

1212a19-20 Having delimited the range of ὁμόνοια to τὰ πρακτά (a18-19), M.M. makes a further restriction in a19-20. The text of a20 is in an awful state in the mss.³³⁸ But the structure of the passage is fairly clear. Just as in a18-19 M.M. had said that ὁμόνοια is not... but..., so in a19-20 there is the same structure: οὐχ... ἀλλὰ.... The structure shows that the first word in a20 should be the same as the fifth, and that the ninth word should be the infinitive of the verb that is the second word. There are two choices for the first and fifth word: εἰ and ἦ, but ἦ is much better attested. The verb which should appear second and ninth, again for stemmatic reasons, is νοεῖν. Susemihl's text, then, is correct. Dirlmeier (p.465), influenced by a high respect for K, wants to read οὐκ εἰ ἐννοοῦσι..., ἀλλ' εἰ... ἐννοεῖν. But twice in a19-21 he has to read what no manuscript reads. Dirlmeier contends that νοεῖν 'paßt zu den νοητά von a19, aber nicht zu den πρακτά', and thinks that the right verb would be ἐννοεῖν. But it is typical of M.M. to have the etymology of the noun in mind when he analyses the concept.

1212a25 For -ικ- see my note on 1189b6.

³³⁸ Dirlmeier's note on these lines (p.465) wrongly suggests that the mss. do not have τῶ after ἄμα in a20. All the independent mss. do.

1212a25-7 Spengel, [1866] 635, expressed unease with the last sentence in the paragraph: ‘nescio cur περὶ ἄρχοντος. conf. Eudem. p.1241,31’. But M.M. is claiming that ὁμόνοια properly-called concerns κατάστασιν of the same ruler. This is not ridiculous.

The problem with a25-7 is the superfluity of ἐν πρακτοῖς and the awkward separation of τοῦ αὐτοῦ from ἄρχοντος (see Dirlmeier, p.465). Ellebodus and Susemihl suggest that ἐν πρακτοῖς (a26) be excised and this should be adopted. Susemihl’s alternative - emending ἄρα (a25) to γάρ - is less good, since a25-7 do not justify a24-5.

1212a26 For -ικ- see my note on 1189b6.

1212a31 The future (ἔσται) is given in ζ. The ‘logical’ future features again at 12a36, a39, b3, b5, b6, but the present tenses in a32-5 swing the balance back to ἐστίν, the reading of α.

1212a35 The mss. are equally divided in whether to place δεῖν before or after αὐτοῖς. In 09b29 M.M. writes τὴν δι’ ἀρετὴν οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, and this suggests that we read δεῖν αὐτοῖς here, with α.

1212b5 Armstrong explains the motivation for Scaliger’s and Sylburg’s conjectures in this line: ‘to avoid the harsh change of construction from the gen. to the acc. in dependence on ἐκστήσεται’. Susemihl thinks that one of their suggestions should be adopted. Leaving b4-5 apart, M.M. uses ἐξιστάναι + dative personae + gen. rei in 12a36, b11, b13, b14. One way in which consistency of construction within b4-5 could be achieved would be if we read τοῦτο (the reading of C and η, not known by Susemihl) for τούτου in b4. But L.S.J. give no parallels for this construction with the accusative + dative, and the passages just mentioned in II xiii and xiv provide good

support for the genitive in b4. I prefer Spengel's solution, and would print τοῦ — συμφέροντος — ἡδέος in b5.

1212b8 For ποτε see my note on 1199a14.

1212b9 Print αὐτὸν. See above pp.173-4.

1212b10 Both in b10 and in b14-15 C and P² have δς when Susemihl and ζ and P¹ read ὠς. ὠς is obviously right in all four cases,³³⁹ but the position of the first ὠς in b10, as Dirlmeier (p.467) was aware, is extraordinary. The obvious solution would be to move ὠς¹ up to b9, after οὖν, which is its position in the parallel sentence in b14.

1212b26 Question mark after τοῦτο.

1212b29-30 Colon after γίγνεται.

1212b37 Susemihl, supported by Donini, [1965] 139n.19,³⁴⁰ suggests that we read δέ for γάρ in b37. But γάρ does make sense if we take τοιοῦτός τις λόγος to be retrospective. M.M. is explaining why the inference in the previous sentence does not go through. An account (λόγος) that is true of god should not be applied to man.

1213a4-5 Bonitz 874a41 compares de Spiritu 475b26 for the anacoluthon we find in the mss. This is probably sufficient to be conservative with Dirlmeier (p.470), who rejects both Casaubon's and Susemihl's attempts to make the grammar smoother.

1213a11 Susemihl's lacuna is best supplemented by Kassel. Add εἴη ἄν before τοιοῦτος.

³³⁹ Pace Dirlmeier (p.467), Aristotle does use ἔστι μὲν ὠς... ἔστι δὲ ὠς. See Bonitz 220b9-12, though in the first three passages cited μὲν is not always in the mss. (nor in editions).

³⁴⁰ Merlan, [1960] 85n.27, would also seem committed to accepting the conjecture.

1213a12-3 Kassel, argues in an important note, given in full in Dirlmeier (pp.470-1) that we add καί, and punctuate differently:

<καί> ὥσπερ, τὸ λεγόμενον, "ἄλλος οὗτος
 'Ἡρακλῆς", ἄλλος φίλος ἐγώ.

I agree with Kassel that the saying ends after 'Ἡρακλῆς, but do not think that καί is necessary. If we take ἄν γε — ποιήσης (a11-12) with what precedes, we can punctuate with a full stop after ποιήσης. The asyndeton is fine. 'If, then, when examining a friend one sees the nature and the qualities of the friend, he would be such as a second I, at least if you imagine a very good friend. Just as in the saying 'he is another Heracles', a friend is another I.

1213a15 ἥδιστον is a late reading, but nevertheless right.

1213b4 Deletion of ἀεί is necessary. See Dirlmeier, p.473.

1213b10 The reading (of P A L B) ἐπὶ πάντων is superior to ἀπάντων (K), and if this is accepted we would need to punctuate as P A L B do with a full stop (or a comma) after ἄλλων. As Susemihl's text stands ὁμοίως is awkwardly placed in an οὔτε phrase, and ἄλλων must agree with ἀπάντων, which is most naturally understood as meaning 'all other methods of perception', which is unsatisfactory because the illustration from sense-perception is not applied to the question in hand - how many friends one ought to have. If we follow the majority of the manuscripts, then ἄλλων will still refer to the other methods of perception, and adding ἐπὶ before πάντων would appropriately generalise further, to make the illustration of the limited capacity of sight and hearing applicable to the matter in question.

1213b27 We need an inferential particle in order to demonstrate the structure of the argument (that the scope of the investigation into how to treat a friend is limited);

Susemihl was confronted by δὲ in all manuscripts he knew about, except the Aldine which has γάρ, Coislin which reads οὖν, and the revised version of Valla's translation (1831) has itaque. He also had in front of him a conjecture by Bonitz: δῆ. Bonitz' δῆ was based on the 1831 text of Valla, though he believed it was the 1496 version.³⁴¹ It is the last of these which Susemihl prints in the text. However collation has revealed that α and β have οὖν. This reading must be the right one. In case it is argued that δῆ would provide a simpler explanation of the way in which the δὲ arose, it is just as easy to suppose that the particle dropped out, and a scribe, seeing the need for one, added the common or garden δέ. Bonitz saw what sense was required and did not know of any manuscripts attesting οὖν.

1213b28 Ellebodius provides a neater solution to b28 than Bonitz. The independent mss. give: ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἴσοις φίλοις καὶ τῇ ἐν αὐτῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημα. Instead of following Susemihl in reversing τῇ ἐν and adding τοι-, we should read αὐτοῖς for αὐτῇ. We can easily mentally supply ἐν before τῇ from the previous line. Lines b29-30 are closely parallel: the enquiry which M.M. is promising is how one ought to treat a friend ἐν τῇ ἐν ἴσοις φίλοις φιλίᾳ (b30). In b28 M.M. could have said ἐν τῇ ἐν ἴσοις φίλοις φιλίᾳ, but since he has just mentioned οἱ ἴσοι φίλοι, he can use a pronoun for these people. Read ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἴσοις φίλοις καὶ τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς φιλίᾳ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημα. The origin of αὐτῇ will have been assimilation to the surrounding feminine dative singulars. Why a scribe should have reversed τῇ ἐν and omitted τοι- would be far less easy to explain.

³⁴¹ See pp.91, 93 above.

Appendix - Marginal Notes in the Manuscripts

There are several marginal notes in P, K, V and A which are worth recording, but which do not merit a place in the apparatus.

1188b25 A note in the top margin of P (= rec.) referring to ὀρμη reads: ἴσως ὀρμηὴν νῦν τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων λέγει· οἶον λί(θων) - I cannot read the end of the last word. The same worry struck those who altered ἐκούσιον to ἀκούσιον, and von Arnim who wants to add μὴ here.

1188b32 P² (= corr.¹) glosses φίλτρον with πόμα.

1188b33 Above ἀρειοπάγω P² (= corr.¹) adds κρίτης (or κρίται) s.l. (as a gloss).

1189a10 τροχάζειν is glossed in the margin by P² (= rec.) with τρέχειν. τρέχειν appears in linea in Rav. and M, (ἢ τροχάζειν in mg. Rav.). Add to the references Dirlmeier (p.254) provides for τροχάζειν Protr. B.71.4 (Düring).

1190a1 ἄλλα is glossed in the bottom margin by P² (= rec.): θέλησασα. So too Rav. in mg. (not in M). Does the gloss mean that διάνοια is desiderative?

1191a19 v² writes in the margin after ὦν: ἀνδρεῖος ὦν, - καὶ γενναῖος καὶ συνετός.

1191a34 Above ἔνιοι P² (= librarius ipse) writes τινές. On f. 133^r Nikolaos has a kind of vocabulary list where synonyms are given some in Latin (μόριον membrum), but most in Greek - among the list is ἔνιοι τινές.

1192b2 In the margin P² (= corr.²) has: ἔρανος τὸ ἐκ συμβολῆς δεῖπνον. (Not in Rav.)

1194a22 In the margin next to lines a21-2 V² and B have: ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς τοῦ ἀργυρίου χρήσεως θαυμαστή.

1196a6 In the margin P² (= rec.) writes: ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν.

1196a25 P² (= rec.) adds in the margin after μὴ: πως ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

1197a36 P² (= rec.) writes in the margin: ὅτι ἡ σοφία οὐ φρόνησις· ἡ φρόνησις, περὶ τὸ συμφέρον· ὃ ἄλλοτε ἐστὶν ἄλλο. καὶ ἄλλω ἄλλο· ἡ σοφία περὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ καμπύλον τὰ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα.

1197b36 A marginal note in V (and in the margins of B and 24) explains the phrase ὡσπερ — φρόνησιν (b36), saying: τῶι (τὸ 24) συνεργεῖν τῆι (τῆ B 24) φρονήσει δηλονότι. This is certainly the feature of δεινότης that the author means (cf. 98a6-8).

1198a2 K² has a note in the margin after οὔσαι: οἶον σωφροσύνη ἢ ἀνδρεία.

1198b18 P² (= corr.¹) glosses σχολῆν with ἡρεμίαν in the margin, and with ἀργίην above the line. Neither gloss is in Rav.

1199a33 P² (= corr.¹) has a note in the top margin (f.15^v) on κλύσεις, which reads: κλυστήρια· κλυστήριον γίνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ κλύω τὸ βρέχ (sic). It is not copied into Rav. The word κλύσις means ‘drenching by clyster’. P² is glossing κλύσεις with κλυστήρια, and then trying to give its etymology. He must have meant κλύζω (‘I wash’), not κλύω (‘I hear’). βρέχειν means ‘to make wet’.

1200a24 P² (= rec.) writes οὐ in the margin, in answer to the question in a23-4. Rav. does not have this.

1203a13 There are two corrections to this line in P. P² (= corr.²) writes: ἴσως, τί, μή, καὶ τί, μειώτερον in the margin. P² (= rec.) has: ὦ γε, ὅτι τιμή, καὶ τιμειώτερον. This then became ὦι γε, ὅτι τί μή καὶ τί μειώτερον in Rav., and then ὦγε ὅτι τι μή, τι μειώτερον M, Venetus 200.

μειώτερον, the comparative of μείων (= less) is only attested (before 100 B.C.) in Apollonius Rhodius, Aratus, an anonymous riddle in the Palatine Anthology (XIV, 41). It is also difficult to see any sense in the different attempts to improve the text. They all originate from a mistake of one letter in the first hand of P.

1203b4 After τῆς P² (= corr.²) glosses s.l.: ἀρτίως γενομένου, but the annotation is not copied into Rav.

1203b20 There are two notes on b20 in the margins of P. In the top margin P² (= rec.) writes: ἴσως, καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατῆς, σώφρων, and in the left hand margin P² (= rec.) has: ὅτι ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατῆς· ὁ δὲ ἐγκρατῆς, οὐκ ἔτι σώφρων. Neither note reappear in Rav. The first of these does not help at all. The second shows awareness of the problem, but is probably to be treated not as a conjecture but as a paraphrase of what ought to have been expressed.

1203b23 After σώφρων P² (= rec.) adds in the margin: ὅτι οὔτε ὁ ἀκρατῆς ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε ἀνάπαλιν. This is not in Rav.

1204a6 In the bottom margin of A, picking up a reference mark after λόγῳ is written: ὅτι ὁ φρόνιμος οὐκ ἀκρατῆς. πρακτικὸς γὰρ τῶν βέλτιστων· ὁ δὲ ἀκρατῆς διανοητικὸς μὲν τῶν βέλτιστων οὐ πρακτικὸς δὲ· καθὼ καὶ ἔοικε τῷ δεινῷ καὶ γὰρ τῷ [...]ασθαι μὲν ἐπιτήδειος ἐκ τίνος ἂν γένοιτο τὰ βέλτιστα προῆξ[.....] Probably an explanatory gloss rather than added to be entered into the text itself.

1204b12 K² (= rec.) adds above the line and in the margin next to ἀφαιρείσθαι: ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀφροδισίων. This is surely right.

1205a22 K² (dating from 1150-1200) has written μή ποτέ μᾶλλον ἀδιάφοροι γραπτέον.

1205a25 A note in the left hand margin by P² (= rec.) refers to a mark in the text by ἡδοναί: πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλως λαμβάνουσι. This is not in Rav.

1205b7 In the margin next to φύσιν V writes ὄρος ἡδονῆς, but it is not a definition that M.M. approves of in 04b37 - 05a4.

1205b36 Francesco Filelfo¹ (1398-1481) writes a note in the bottom margin (f.167^v) of K on this line:

ἔνθεν εἰδέναι ἐστὶ πῶς νοεῖται ἐν τοῖς νικομαχίοις. Διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τὰγαθὸν οὐ πάντα ἐφίεται. πάντα γὰρ τὰ ζῶα νοητέον.

Filelfo does not question the authenticity of M.M. His quotation of E.N. 1094a2 is apt, although it is not clear what light he thinks the passage in M.M. sheds on E.N. Is the neuter πάντα in E.N. explained for Filelfo by the recognition that for Aristotle it is not just man that ἐφίεται the good, i.e. that Aristotle included animals in the referents of πάντα?

1206a13 In the margin P² (= rec.) writes: ὁ λυπούμενος τὰ καλὰ πράττων, οὐ σπουδαῖος; Rav. does not reproduce the note.

¹ Whose hand here Nigel Wilson has provisionally identified for me from the facsimile reproduction of the manuscript. If the identification is right, the note will have been made during the time he lived in Florence (1429-33). See Ashburner, [1917] 35, who rejects the view of R. Schöll that the hand is thirteenth century, and thinks it is 'palpably fifteenth century'.

1206b17 In the margin of P is a note: ση(μαίνεται) ὅτι τῆ ἀρετῆ, οὐχ ὁ λόγος ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡγεμῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ παθῆ εἶδ' διακείμενα. Rav. did not copy it.

1206b33 In the margin P² (= rec.) writes: ὅτι χωρὶς τῶν ἐκτὸς, οὐκ ἔστιν εὐδαιμονεῖν, but Rav. does not have the note.

1207b4 In top margin P² (= corr¹) writes: ἐνθουσιασμά ἐστιν ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ λάμπεται ὑπὸ θεοῦ P². This is not present in Rav.

1208a24 πτισσάνην is glossed by P² (= corr.¹) with κεκομμένη κρίθη. Rav. does not copy the note.

1208a31 In the margin P² (= rec.) writes: εἰ τὸ εἰδέναι μόνον τὰς ἀρετὰς, εἶδ' δαίμονα (sic) ποιεῖ. Rav. does not have this note.

1209a25 In the margin of V is a note: ση(μαίνεται) τὴν διαίρ(εσιν) τὴν πολυθρύλλητον μεταξὺ κειμένην τὴν ὁμωνύμως καὶ συνωνύμως καλουμένην δὲ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν. The note is copied into the margin of B. Compare Michael of Ephesus' comment on this passage (p.461, 12-16, Heylbut, cited in Dirlmeier, p.107).

1210a25 K² (twelfth century) glosses διαφορά with: στάσις μάχη.

1213a26 Filelfo² comments in K: σημείωσαι περὶ φίλου Amicus alter ego.

1213b22 P glosses ἔγκλημα with: αἴτιον.

² See previous note.

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