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Supervision and project performance: a principal-agent approach.

Abstract:

This paper applies and extends principal-agent theory to analyze the performance of donor projects. As in many situations, there is variation in the degree of divergence between the interests of the donor (the principal) and the recipient government (the agent). Further, the effort expended on supervision of the agent is a control variable. We first present a principal-agent model that shows that conditional on optimal contracting, the marginal effect of more precise supervision on the likeli...

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Lisa Chauvet More by this author
Paul Collier More by this author
Andreas Fuster More by this author
Publication date:
2006
URN:
uuid:fbec6f5f-e552-46d9-a712-537f38f7a924
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:13635
Language:
English

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