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Equilibrium selection and public good provision.

Abstract:

Collective action problems arise in a variety of situations. The economic theory of public good provision raises a number of important questions. Who contributes to the public good, and who free rides? How might a social planner exploit the interdependence of decision-making to encourage contributions? Under what conditions will such actions result in public good provision? Using a simple game theoretic framework and recent results from the study of equilibrium selection, this paper attempts ...

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David P. Myatt More by this author
Chris Wallace More by this author
Volume:
103
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2002
URN:
uuid:fb9e44fc-1013-42aa-bbc0-c43ffff68315
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12267
Language:
English

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