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Does electoral violence affect voting choice and willingness to vote? Evidence from a vignette experiment

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Abstract

Many new democracies experience electoral violence. Though this form of political violence is common, there is little understanding of how violence affects vote choice and turnout. This article draws on a vignette experiment that is embedded in a nationally representative survey in Kenya, where electoral violence has occurred several times since the 1990s. We show that voters strongly sanction candidates who are rumored to have used violence, even if the candidate is a coethnic, a copartisan, or has performed well in office in the past. This sanctioning effect, however, is not consistent across voters. Victims of past electoral violence and those in poverty are less likely to sanction candidates that use violence. Rumored use of violence also depresses turnout, even among a violent candidate's core constituents, when voters do not possess countervailing information about the violent candidate's past performance in office.

Keywords: Experimental Vignette, Violence, Voting, Turnout, Corruption, Ethnicity, Kenya

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Introduction

Electoral violence is a persistent problem in many new democracies, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. An estimated sixty percent of African elections between 1990 and 2008 were marked by violence either before or after polls (Straus and Taylor 2012, 23). In some cases, electoral violence led to temporary disruptions of the democratic process, as in Madagascar in 2002 and 2009, or to civil war, as in Cote d'Ivoire in 2011 or the Republic of Congo in 1997. Even where it did not lead to regime change, episodes of electoral violence resulted in large-scale population displacement, thousands of deaths, and protracted political crisis in Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. Electoral violence can also impose important economic costs on ordinary citizens. Trade is often negatively affected, both through the displacement of workers and the disruption of transport networks, and food and fuel prices tend to rise substantially during these periods (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012).

Despite the significant economic and social costs of electoral violence, voters do not consistently sanction politicians who are associated with violence. In Kenya, for instance, President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto were elected in 2013 with the overwhelming support of their respective coethnics, even though both were under indictment from the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their alleged involvement in the 2007-2008 Kenyan electoral violence that left over twelve hundred dead and more than a quarter of million displaced.¹ In India, politicians and party officials are often implicated in the organization of communal

¹ The ICC withdrew the charges against Kenyatta in December 2014 and against Ruto in April 2016 due to insufficient evidence.

riots, but these riots often pay electoral dividends (Wilkinson and Haid 2009). Cross-nationally, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) find that politicians who use illicit electoral practices –including electoral violence– remain in office three times longer than their clean counterparts.

What explains the apparent effectiveness of violence as an electoral strategy? Do voters simply discount reported violence if it implicates a politician they support? Or do they find themselves “cross-pressured,” in the sense that they wish to sanction violent politicians but pay attention to other cues as well? Much of the theoretical literature assumes that electoral violence is used by politicians to depress voting by likely opponents but does not trigger significant sanctioning or defection by those politicians’ core constituents (e.g., De Figueredo and Weingast 1999; Chaturvedi 2005; Collier and Vicente 2012). The assumption of electorally “costless” use of violence – when it comes to core supporters – is reflected in empirical work as well. For instance, Hafner-Burton et al. (2014, 155-156) argue that incumbents’ use of pre-electoral violence is effective due to its depressing effect on opposition support, but the authors do not even consider effects on incumbent support. Wilkinson and Haid (2009) suggest that violence may boost ethnic solidarity and further increase the support of core constituencies for politicians associated with violence. But the continued support of core constituencies is almost certainly contingent. Voters sometimes differentially punish right-wing and left-wing governments for violence (Arce 2003), and individuals’ own identities and attitudes toward out-groups can be shaped by factors as disparate as place of residence, election cycle timing, and past experience of violence (Eifert et al. 2010; LeBas 2010; Kasara 2013). Personal experience of violence can also have contradictory effects on political participation, boosting it in some contexts (Blattman 2009) while depressing it in others (Bratton

2008). Put simply, we know relatively little about the reactions of core supporters to information about a candidate's use of electoral violence.

Because vote-buying and other irregular election practices often occur alongside electoral violence, it is not possible to isolate the effect of violence on vote choice using election results or other observational data. To address this challenge, we employ a vignette experiment that is embedded in a nationally-representative survey in Kenya, where violence has been a consistent feature of elections since 1992. Vignette experiments of this kind have become a common means of analyzing how voters respond to ethnic cues (Dunning and Harrison 2010; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Carlson 2015; Chauchard 2016), corruption and criminality (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013; Banerjee, et al. 2014), vote-buying (Kramon 2013), and violence (LeBas 2010; Rosenzweig 2015).

Our vignette experiment specifically addresses two separate questions. First, is electoral violence “costless” for politicians when it comes to their own core supporters, or might rumored involvement in violence depress support or turnout even among these voters? In particular, we focus our attention on how ethnic and partisan loyalties influence the evaluation of violent politicians, as these factors have occupied a central position in analysis of both violence and voting in the developing world. Second, how do voters' own characteristics, such as their economic conditions or past experience of violence, affect sanctioning behavior? As we detail below, the existing theoretical literature does not yield consistent predictions about which factors are likely to influence voters' sanctioning of violence, nor is there agreement about the likely direction or size of these effects.

In order to explore these questions, our survey-embedded experiment presents respondents with choices between two rival politicians, randomly varying their

reported use of violence alongside other candidate attributes. This experiment then allows us to directly assess the degree to which a strong affective tie to a politician, such as coethnicity, accounts for weak or inconsistent sanctioning of violent politicians. It also allows us to probe how weaker positive cues, such as shared partisan identity and past positive performance in office, affect sanctioning behavior. The design of the experiment allows for some presumption of secrecy of ballot, and respondents have the option of refusing to cast a ballot. As closely as possible, our design resembles the kinds of choices that ordinary voters make in real elections in many parts of the developing world.

The article has three notable findings. First, we find strong evidence that voters, including a politician's core constituents, sanction candidates who are associated with past use of violence. These findings suggest that the use of violence imposes costs on politicians when it comes to their core constituencies, including both coethnic voters and those who are ethnic or partisan allies. Second, voter characteristics substantially mediate the effect of rumored use of violence on sanctioning behavior. The most vulnerable voters – those who were past victims of election violence and those living in poverty – are less likely to respond to allegations of violence with sanctioning behavior, and these voters are especially sensitive to information about a violent candidate's good performance record. This suggests that vulnerable populations may prioritize other factors, such as clientelistic rewards or ethnic group defense, when evaluating violent politicians. Finally, we find that rumored use of violence increases the likelihood that respondents will refuse to cast a ballot in our vignette experiment, though this reduction in "turnout" disappears if the violent politician has performed well in office in the past. These findings challenge some of the literature's core assumptions about the electoral costs of violence when it

comes to core constituencies and therefore helps increase our understanding of how violence shapes vote choice and turnout.

The next section draws on literature on vote choice in new democracies to develop hypotheses about the response of core constituencies to rumored violence. Then, we move on to discuss the country setting, vignette experiment design, and results. The last section presents conclusions.

Violence and Voting

The empirical literature on electoral violence has largely focused on identifying conditions when electoral violence is more likely to occur. In contexts of weak state institutions, electoral violence has been found to be more likely when incumbents are unpopular and face a credible threat of electoral loss (Hafner-Burton et al. 2014), if elite patronage systems are not sufficiently inclusive (Arriola and Johnson 2013), or in contexts of group-based exclusion and competition (Boone 2011). Individual voter response to violence, however, has been rarely examined. Consistent with general approaches to the study of vote choice in the developing world, we focus on the effect of shared identity (e.g., coethnicity, partisan alliance) and voters' own qualities (e.g., poverty, past experience of violence) on the evaluation of candidates who are rumored to have used violence.

Individuals often rely on heuristics, easily observed candidate characteristics like ethnicity or party identity, as informational short-cuts when evaluating political candidates. Identity-based heuristics, such as ethnicity or caste, are presumed to be even more powerful in low-information contexts, as in Sub-Saharan Africa, where voters have few other sources of information about candidate quality (Posner 2005; Chandra 2007). Recent experimental work had provided further evidence that voters

discriminate in favor of politicians with whom they share an ethnic or other affective tie (e.g., Conroy-Krutz 2013, Adida 2015, Carlson 2015).

Why the preference for coethnic politicians? The literature suggests that ethnicity shapes voters' expectations of future clientelistic rewards, making them more likely to support coethnics in the absence of other information about likely candidate performance in office (Chandra 2007). Because of these expected future benefits, voters may be more likely to forgive a coethnic or copartisan politician for criminality or corruption than would be the case for a politician with whom they do not share an affective tie. Literature in this vein often focuses on the language of "trade-offs" or strategic calculation to discuss this balancing of expected benefits alongside other negative signals (Vaishnav 2011; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). In a context of violent conflict between groups, individuals may not even face "trade-offs" or cross-pressure when determining whether to support a violent politician. In these settings, violent politicians may be seen as providing protection to their coethnics, and violence may be seen a positive rather than a negative informational cue.

Alternatively, voters may prefer coethnic candidates due to emotional appeals or out of a sense of group loyalty. The idea here is that communities create order and identity through the creation of distinctions between "us" and "other." Competition between groups can sharpen these distinctions, heighten the salience of the boundary between groups, and reinforce individual attachment to group identities (Tilly 2004). Episodes of violence may further harden identities or reinforce ethnic solidarity (Petersen 2002; Wilkinson and Haid 2009), or election campaigns may boost the salience of ethnic identity (Eifert et al. 2010). According to this perspective, respondents are not weighing their dislike of violence versus the expected benefits of

electing a coethnic or copartisan candidate; instead, they discount or disregard allegations of violence when leveled against a politician to whom they have an affective tie.

Regardless of whether we view coethnic bias as driven by strategic or emotional considerations, it can be powerful in shaping vote choice. Several experimental studies have shown that voters positively discriminate in favor of politicians with whom they share an ethnic or other affective tie (Conroy-Krutz 2013, Adida 2015, Carlson 2015). Voters are also more reluctant to sanction politicians for corruption or criminality when they are members of the same ethnicity or political party (Vaishnav 2011; Anduiza et al. 2013; Banerjee et al. 2014). But the strength of these effects is affected by context and by the availability of other information cues. Respondents' reliance on ethnicity weakens once individuals are given more information about candidates' past performance in office, popularity, or level of education (Conroy-Krutz 2013; Carlson 2015). In some studies, improved information about past candidate performance has resulted in reduced support for low-quality and/or criminal candidates (Chang et al. 2010), though this finding has not borne out in all contexts (Humphreys and Weinstein 2012). The contingency of coethnic bias suggests the need for greater examination of how coethnicity interacts with other information about candidates, both positive and potentially negative.

In the analysis below, we examine whether core constituents are less likely to sanction their preferred candidates if they are poor or have experienced violence in the past. There are good reasons to believe that vulnerable populations could be more susceptible to clientelism or to emotional appeals that trigger memories of past episodes of group violence. But the existing literature does not provide consistent findings about the effects of poverty or past experience of violence on sanctioning of

low-quality and criminal politicians. Wealthier and more educated voters may be more likely to sanction politicians for criminality and corruption (Anduiza et al. 2013), but other studies have found that the lowest-income respondents sanctioned corruption that their wealthier counterparts were willing to forgive (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). Other research finds no association between socioeconomic status and sanctioning criminal and violent politicians (Banerjee et al. 2014).

With regard to voters with direct experience of violence, these individuals may also be expected to be less likely to sanction politicians who are associated with electoral violence. They may view this violence as a means of regaining their rightful property or guarding their communities against rivals (Boone 2011; Lynch 2014). Or those exposed to electoral violence may become habituated to its use and therefore more tolerant of violent politicians. For instance, using panel data from Kenya collected before and after the disputed 2007 elections, Gutiérrez-Romero (2014) finds that victims of the electoral violence were more likely to express agreement with the idea that violence is acceptable in support of a just cause. These expectations are not borne out by all research, though. Experiments conducted in Kenya and Pakistan find that victims of violence were either less likely to express coethnic bias or less likely to express political support for violent actors, perhaps precisely because these individuals had borne the direct costs of past violence (LeBas 2010; Blair et al. 2013).

This discussion leads to the following three hypotheses.

H1: Voters prefer coethnic over non-coethnic candidates. In the absence of a coethnic, voters prefer a candidate with whom they share a partisan or other affective tie.

H2: Voters are less likely to vote for violent candidates. They may vote for a rival candidate (sanctioning) or simply decline to vote entirely (reduced turnout).

H3: Past victims of violence and those living in poverty are less likely to sanction politicians who are rumored to have used violence.

Research Setting

Kenya is a good context in which to examine the effects of rumored violence and other countervailing cues on voter evaluations of candidates. Violence and forced displacement has been a fairly common feature of elections in Kenya, particularly since the reinstitution of multiparty elections in 1992 as described below. This means that questions about politicians who are rumored to use violence are not purely hypothetical or distant from the lived experience of our respondents: many Kenyan voters would have encountered and perhaps even voted for similar kinds of politicians in the past. Moreover, ethnicity has been highly salient in Kenya due to its association with electoral violence, as well as government's biases toward particular groups in provision of public services and access to economic opportunities (Adar and Munyae 2001).

Like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the developing world, Kenya is not a full democracy, and features of its authoritarian past continue to shape current politics. Since independence in 1963 until its removal from power in 2002, the former ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), was the dominant political actor in Kenya. For the first two decades of independence, electoral competition was nominally open to multiple parties, although no new opposition

parties were formed after the banning of KANU's primary party competitor in 1969. In 1982, the legislature amended the constitution to make Kenya a *de jure* one-party state. In the early 1990s, due to pressure from both domestic actors and foreign donors, this constitutional amendment was removed. Kenya returned to multiparty electoral competition, but the 1992 and 1997 founding elections were not fought on a level playing field due to state-sponsored violence and forced displacement. In the 1990s, violence leveraged local disputes over land to remove ethnic groups suspected of opposition loyalties from areas of the Rift Valley Province (Human Rights Watch 1993; Boone 2011). This violence early in the multiparty period spurred the creation of ethnic militia (Mueller 2008) and the rise of a political discourse that presented violence as legitimate means of ethnic self-defense (Klopp 2002).

In 2002, KANU nominated current President Uhuru Kenyatta as its candidate, but he was defeated by a fellow Kikuyu, Mwai Kibaki, who was backed by a broad opposition coalition that captured cross-ethnic support. The peaceful transfer of power from KANU did not, however, substantially change Kenya's political culture nor did it end the use of violence to win elections. Prior to the 2007 elections, the ethnic coalition that elected President Mwai Kibaki unraveled, and Kibaki ran against his former ally, prominent Luo politician Raila Odinga. Support for the two candidates was split on ethnic lines: Kikuyus supported their coethnic Kibaki, as did most northerners, while Luos, Kalenjins, and western Kenyans lined up behind Odinga, who was a Luo. In a nationally representative survey conducted immediately prior to the polls, a third of respondents reported that political intimidation had occurred in their communities, and a similar number witnessed incitement to violence by politicians (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012). After the Electoral Commission announced Kibaki as the winner, Odinga claimed the election was stolen, and

supporters of both sides flooded into the streets. In rural and urban areas alike, political protest quickly gave way to large-scale violence motivated by ethnicity, land, and other grievances. By the time Kibaki and Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement in February 2008, approximately thirteen hundred had been killed and up to half a million displaced.

Because of evidence that politicians organized and subsidized both the pre- and post-electoral violence in 2007-2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued several indictments. Among those indicted were Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto. At the time, Kenyatta and Ruto belonged to opposing political alliances.² They later formed a partisan alliance and ran on the same ticket – an “alliance of the accused” - in the 2013 general elections. Perennial opposition challenger Raila Odinga ran against Kenyatta for the presidency, and he again attracted the support of his Luo ethnic base and other western Kenyans.

The pending ICC cases shaped much of the debate of the 2013 presidential campaign (Lynch 2014). Both Kenyatta and Ruto argued that their indictments were unjust punishment for “protecting” their communities from rivals (Lynch 2014; Chaudoin 2015). Rather than costing Kenyatta and Ruto votes, the ICC issue seems to have solidified the support of each candidate’s coethnic voters, as reflected in the final vote. Kenyatta won the presidential election with a bare 50.5% of the vote, and the Kenyatta-Ruto alliance won 48 percent of the National Assembly seats to Odinga’s alliance’s 40 percent. The turnout in this general election was the highest ever

² Ruto was a former ally of Raila Odinga in the 2007 election, when the majority of Kalenjins voted for Odinga and the ODM. When Ruto defected to Kenyatta’s ticket in 2007, he took the vast majority of the Kalenjin vote with him.

achieved (85.9%), even though the campaign was characterized by voter intimidation and violence that cost approximately 500 lives (Human Rights Watch 2013, 1).

Discussion of both the ICC cases and the possibility of creating domestic legal tribunals to investigate the 2007-2008 violence continued through 2013. In the survey we conducted for this article (further described below) we found Kenyans have complicated views about political violence. When asked about the credibility of the allegations of violence against Kenyatta, Ruto, and Odinga, respondents were likely to discount allegations of violence when it implicated their coethnics or allied politicians (as shown in Figure A.1 in appendix), while they were more likely to view rivals as responsible for violence. Nearly a quarter of our survey respondents believed that politicians must intimidate their opponents and hire gangs if they want to win elections. A majority of our respondents (55%) believe that rivals spread rumors about candidates' use of violence in order to divide the electorate. Put simply, this is a context in which we would expect little sanctioning of politicians for their involvement in violence from their core constituencies. If we find evidence of violence-sanctioning responses by core constituents in our vignette experiment, this should increase our confidence that politicians' use of violence imposes real electoral costs when it comes to the votes of coethnics and ethnic allies.

The Vignette Experiment

Our vignette experiment was embedded in a nationally representative survey conducted in December 2013, roughly nine months after the general elections. The nationally representative sample consists of 1210 respondents who were randomly

selected in 80 of 290 parliamentary constituencies across the country.³ Sampling was stratified by province and by urban and rural setting yielding a distribution of respondent's characteristics similar to the most recent Kenyan census in terms ethnic distribution, urban/rural split, and other basic demographics. Respondent characteristics are reported in Table 1.

In our vignette experiment, we asked all survey respondents to imagine there was a vacancy for a Member of Parliament in their constituency with two candidates contesting the seat. Respondents then had the opportunity to select between these candidates in two ballots. In the first ballot we presented all respondents with the same pair of candidates only stating the candidate's name (hence implied ethnicity) and partisan information. We then randomly assigned respondents to varying information about candidate's performance records and rumored involvement in the past, after which we asked respondents to vote for one of these candidates again. The full script and ballots are included in the Appendix B.

The first of the candidates is identified as "John Onyango [who] is running for the ODM party" and the second as "John Kamau [who] is running for the TNA party." Onyango and Kamau are very common surnames associated with the Luo and Kikuyu ethnic groups, respectively, and would be transparently recognized as such by most Kenyans. The partisan information in the script is consistent with the ethnic prime: the ODM and TNA ran presidential candidates in 2013 that were Luo and

³ Primary sampling units (PSU's) were selected using the Kenyan Census. Within each PSU, interviewers selected randomly a sampling start point and randomly selected respondents using the method used by the Afrobarometer detailed at <http://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles>.

Kikuyu, respectively. As discussed above, Kenyan parties largely operate as evanescent ethnic alliances, and ethnic and partisan identities are overlapping rather than cross-cutting. Joint priming of ethnicity and partisanship in this context produces clear expectations about voters' baseline candidate preferences.⁴

To equalize the qualifications of the two candidates in our hypothetical by-election, we explain that both candidates served as Members of Parliament from 2008 to 2013 in “constituencies similar to [the respondent’s own constituency]” but did not run in the most recent elections. There was an extensive redistricting exercise prior to the March 2013 elections, making it plausible that Onyango and Kamau could serve as MPs concurrently and still face each other in a by-election in December. After this explanation, respondents were then presented with a voting ballot, which included the candidate’s name as well as the name and official logo of his party. Respondents cast votes by placing their marked folded ballots into a see-through bag along with other ballots. Respondents were reassured that their votes were private and would not be revealed to others or matched to their names.⁵

After the first ballot was cast, respondents were randomly assigned to one out of nine possible “treatments” which consisted of providing additional information

⁴ The design could have primed these identities separately, but this would have increased the number of treatments and rendered interpretation more difficult without a clear theoretical payoff.

⁵ Ballots were pre-printed with the serial number of the questionnaire and were later matched. Enumerators were not involved in matching ballots to questionnaires.

about the two hypothetical candidates contending in the election.⁶ These treatments randomly varied two conditions that are of theoretical interest: (a) information on a candidate's past record of violence (3 conditions: violent; nonviolent; no information) and (b) information about a candidate's past performance while in office (2 conditions: good performance; no information). Permutations of these different cues for each of these candidates yield nine distinct treatments, which are summarized in Table 2. In terms of the provided cues on violence, the respondent was either informed that the candidate had never used violence, was told that the candidate was rumored to have hired gangs and ordered a murder during the 2007 elections but had not been arrested, or was provided with no information about violence. For the performance cue, we provide positive information about a candidate's use of his Constituency Development Fund (CDF) when he served as MP in his prior constituency. The CDF is one of Kenya's main poverty reduction strategies, and it gives MPs discretionary funds that they can use to sponsor projects in their constituencies. It has the reputation for being subject to abuse, which has been documented by independent audits that have been made public and extensively covered in the press.⁷ The respondent was either informed that an independent audit had found that the candidate had used the CDF "for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, [and] for good quality projects" or was not given any information about the

⁶ We randomized these treatments by asking each respondent to select a number between one and nine, which indicated to the interviewer the script to read out loud.

⁷ Kenyans are highly aware of the CDF and 37% claim they reelected their MP primarily on the basis of their past management of the CDF (Gutiérrez-Romero 2013: 83).

candidate's use of the CDF. For treatments in which only one candidate was assigned a positive performance cue, respondents were told that for the other contending candidate: "we do not have any information about how this candidate used the CDF ... because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited." This is realistic, since independent audits have not been conducted for all MPs.

Once respondents were randomly assigned to one of the nine potential treatments, they were asked to vote and cast another ballot in secrecy. Table A.2 in appendix provides further details on the balance of treatment assignment according to particular respondent characteristics and Figure A.2 shows the number of respondents that cast valid ballots.

Results

In the analysis that follows, we analyze separately the behavior of those respondents for whom one of our hypothetical candidates was a coethnic (Kikuyus and Luos: 386 respondents) and those belonging to other ethnic groups (815 respondents).⁸ For the respondents who did not have a coethnic candidate contending in our election, we grouped them as core constituents or allies of one of the candidates if they belong to an ethnic group that was in political alliance with that candidate's ethnic group in the 2013 elections, since coalitions had not shifted between the time of the election and the time of our survey. As mentioned above, these elite-level political alliances are the primary means of assembling electoral constituencies in Kenya. In order to make this assignment, we rely on voting patterns for the respondent's ethnic group in the 2013

⁸ We restrict our analysis to the 1201 of 1210 respondents to whom an ethnic identity could be assigned.

election. Since the official electoral results were not released by ethnicity, we determined the preferred presidential candidate of each ethnic group using the 2013 exit poll results reported in Ferree et al. (2014). By this coding logic, we identified Embu, Kalenjin, Meru, and Pokot respondents as allies of the TNA candidate Kamau, and Kamba, Kisii, Luhya, Maasai, Mijikenda, Somali, Taita, Teso, or Turkana respondents were coded as allies of the ODM and Onyango.

Coethnic and Ethnic Ally Voting in the First Ballot

In the first ballot, which provided no information beyond candidate names and partisan affiliation, respondents cast ballots that were strongly consistent with our expectations about coethnic and ethnic ally support. Of those who cast a valid ballot and had the opportunity to vote for a coethnic candidate, 87 percent voted for their respective coethnic candidate, which is quite similar to how these individuals' self-reported vote choices in previous presidential elections as shown in Table 3. The results of the first ballot validate our expectations regarding the strength of ethno-political alliances in Kenya, as well as the coding rules we follow above in placing respondents of other ethnicities into one of the two candidates' core constituencies. Over 70 percent of the non-Kikuyu and non-Luo respondents voted for the candidate we identified as their preferred "allied" candidate.

To elucidate further the extent to which ethnicity affected vote choice, we estimate the probit regression shown in equation (1).

$$Pr(C=1) = \Phi[\alpha X] \quad \text{eq. (1)}$$

where the dependent variable, C , represents whether the respondents voted for the candidate for whom she would be considered a core constituent, i.e., their coethnic or partisan ally. This variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent voted for her coethnic or ethnically allied candidate, and it takes the value of 0 if the candidate

voted for the rival candidate. Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. X represents the respondent's ethnicity, gender, education, province of residence, rural residence, expressed partisanship, experience of food shortages within the past year, and experience of electoral violence in any election since 1992. To investigate whether individuals living in ethnically diverse areas are less likely to sanction coethnics or allied politicians who use violence, we also include the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization proposed by Alesina et al. (2013) and the polarization index proposed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003).⁹

Table A.1 in appendix present the probit marginal effects of voting in the first ballot. The results strongly support our first hypothesis that, in the absence of other information, ethnicity is strongly predictive of vote choice for those respondents with coethnic hypothetical candidates in the first ballot as well as for those lacking a coethnic candidate. The results also strongly support our intuition about using ethnicity and ethnic alliance position to identify each candidate's core constituents. The Kikuyu and Luos are as likely to vote for their respective coethnic candidates, and other Kenyan ethnic groups are equally likely to vote for their partisan ally. Other factors are also significant. Living in a rural area increases the likelihood of voting for a coethnic, but this variable does not significantly increase the likelihood that

⁹ These indices are estimating using our survey, since there are no official statistics of ethnicity at district or smaller level across Kenya, using following formulae:

$$Fragmentation = 1 - \sum_{g=1}^N s_{gd}^2 \quad \text{and} \quad Polarization_d = 1 - \sum_{g=1}^N \left(\frac{0.5 - s_{gd}}{0.5} \right)^2 s_{gd} \quad \text{where } s_{gd} \text{ is the}$$

share of group g ($g=1\dots N$) in district d . We identify ethnic groups using survey respondents' language.

respondents from other ethnic groups will vote for their presumed partisan ally. For these respondents, living in a more ethnically fragmented area – which we might see as a sign of greater “cosmopolitanism” or exposure to different viewpoints – decreases the likelihood that they vote for the candidate of the party with which their ethnic group is in alliance. Both these findings are consistent with our expectations about the ease of enforcing ethnic and partisan loyalties in more rural and more ethnically homogenous “stronghold” constituencies.

Impact of Violence and Performance Cues on Vote Choice

Prior to casting the second ballot, respondents were read one of nine scripts that provided information about the candidates’ (a) rumored use of violence in a past elections and (b) CDF performance record during their past terms as Members of Parliament. Figures 1 and 2 show that the different treatments were associated with different levels of support for candidates from their core constituencies as well as different voluntary abstention rates when it came to casting ballots. As shown in Table 2, the first treatment provides no violence or performance cue for either candidate, and it therefore serves as a reference group to which we compare other treatments’ effects on vote choice. In this first treatment, 93.9 percent of Kikuyu and Luo respondents voted for their coethnic, while 63.8 percent of the other respondents voted for their ethnic ally. The percentage of people voting for the coethnic or partisan ally differs markedly across the other treatments in the second ballot, suggesting that violence and performance cues do change individuals’ evaluations of their otherwise preferred or “default” candidates. In Treatments 2 and 4, for instance, violent candidates were penalized severely by their ethnic allies, losing their majority support among these voters; in treatment 4, violence sanctioning reduces support from coethnics to close to 50 percent.

To ascertain whether the seeming differences across treatments are statistically significant once we control for other factors, probit regression was employed. The dependent variable in this probit regression takes the value of 1 if the respondent voted for her coethnic or ethnic ally candidate in the second ballot and 0 if she instead voted for the rival candidate. We include the same set of respondent's covariates as before (e.g., respondents' ethnicity, gender, whether poor). We add as control the set of nine different candidate combinations of violence and performance cues, such that the first treatment serves as the reference group against which other treatment effects are compared.¹⁰

Table 4 reports the marginal effects of the violence and performance cues on violence and performance on voting by the politicians' core constituents. Columns 1-5 focus on the Luo and Kikuyu respondents only, as these respondents are able to select a coethnic candidate, whereas columns 6-10 focus on the voting behavior of respondents who have a preferred ally candidate but do not have a coethnic for whom to cast a vote. We first analyze voting patterns in Treatment 2. Coethnics and ethnic allies are faced with a choice between their preferred candidate, who is rumored to have used violence, and a non-violent rival, but these core constituents sanction their preferred candidate for his use of violence. The probability of Kikuyu and Luo respondents voting for their coethnic candidate is reduced by 36.7 percentage points, while the probability of ethnic allies voting for their allied candidate is reduced by 18

¹⁰ We include these covariates to estimate the standard errors more efficiently and alleviate for any biases introduced by chance in the randomization, a practice commonly used in the randomization literature (Duflo et al. 2007). Our results remain unchanged if removing these covariates.

percent in comparison to Treatment 1 in which this candidate is not associated with past violence. It is worth noting that, despite the significant sanctioning, the politician who is rumored to use violence still retains more than 50 percent of the votes from his coethnic core supporters. We see a broadly similar pattern in Treatment 4, which provides the same script as Treatment 2 save for providing the violent coethnic or ethnic ally candidate with a positive CDF performance cue. Despite this positive informational cue, we again see strong sanctioning of respondents' preferred candidate for his involvement in violence when his rival is non-violent. Kikuyu and Luo respondents reduce their support for their preferred coethnic candidate by 48.5 percent, and copartisan or "ethnic allies" reduce their support by a further 21.9 percent from baseline.¹¹

When we reverse the identity of the politician associated with violence, we do see increased solidarity within the non-violent politician's core constituencies. Put differently, the rumored use of violence by a rival shores up a non-violent candidate's support from his core constituents. This effect is especially pronounced when it comes to respondents who are copartisans or ethnic allies rather than coethnics. For instance, in Treatment 3 (column 6), these respondents increase their support for their preferred candidate by 15.5 percent when he is not associated with violence but is facing a rival

¹¹ When assessing the impact of each treatment, we always compare its effect size with respect to the reference group (Treatment 1). If we compare instead the difference in defection from violent coethnics between Treatment 2 and Treatment 4, we see no statistical difference between these two treatments for the Kikuyu and Luo respondents (chi2 test=0.33 and probability=0.5641) or for respondents from among other ethnic groups (chi2 test=0.18 and probability= 0.6685).

candidate for whom we have provided a violence cue. We do not see a similar shift for coethnic core supporters, in all likelihood because coethnic support is already quite high in the baseline treatment. Treatment 5 yields roughly similar results as Treatment 3. Once again, a non-violent coethnic or ethnic ally candidate faces a violent rival, but the violent rival is assigned a positive past CDF performance cue. This performance cue does not diminish the swing of ethnic ally respondents in favor of their non-violent ally candidate. Thus, ethnic allies increase their support for their non-violent ally candidate a further 14.2 percentage points over their support levels in the baseline treatments when he is facing a violent but well-performing rival. These results provide consistent evidence that core constituencies sanction their own politicians for using violence against non-violent rivals but increase their support when violent rivals threaten their own preferred candidates.

There is some evidence that positive information about candidates' past performance may affect candidate evaluations when voters do not have a non-violent choice. In Treatments 7 and 8, both contending candidates are violent. In each treatment, one candidate has a positive performance cue while no information is provided about the other candidate's past performance in office. In contrast to the other scenarios discussed above, a violent candidate does not face any loss of support from his coethnic and copartisan core supporters if he also possesses a positive performance cue (Treatment 7, columns 1 and 6). When voters are faced with a violent coethnic candidate with no performance cue, they defect to the rival – a well-performing candidate albeit also rumored to have used violence – at only marginally lower rates than in the scenarios above (Treatment 8, column 1). In this scenario,

support of the violent, non-performing candidate from his coethnics is reduced by 39.5 percentage points.¹²

As robustness check for consistency in voting behavior in treatments 6 and 9 we provided both candidates with the same set of cues (either: both candidates are rumored to have used violence, or both are rumored to have used violence but are also reported to have good performance records). As expected, we find no change in the probability for voting for coethnic or ethnic ally candidates in these cases.

The Effect of Victimization and Poverty on Violence Sanctioning

We next assess whether there are heterogeneous effects for two types of voters that may have substantially different views about violence and about politicians: actual victims of past electoral violence and those living in poverty. In terms of the first group, about 20 percent of our respondents stated that they had been directly affected by electoral violence since 1992, suffering either personal injury, destruction of property, economic loss, or forced displacement.¹³ Supporting our third hypothesis, these victims of violence are less responsive to violence cues than other respondents. For instance, in Treatments 2 and 4, in contrast to the results presented above, victims of violence *do not* penalize their violent coethnic candidate (column 2 in Table 4) or their partisan ally (column 7 in Table 4) for the use of violence when paired with a non-violent rival. Findings for other treatments are also distinct for victims of violence. In the full sample, we found no evidence that candidates won greater

¹² There are no differences in the sanctioning effect between Treatment 2 and Treatment 8 for the Kikuyu and Luos (chi 2 test = 0.03 and probability= 0.8675).

¹³ This figure coincides with the one found by another nationally representative survey conducted in Kenya in 2008 by Gutiérrez-Romero (2014).

support from coethnics when they faced violent rivals, possibly because levels of coethnic support were already quite high. But we find that respondents who were victims of violence increased their support of coethnic candidates in Treatments 3, 5, 6, and 7 still further in comparison to the reference group (Treatment 1). These are all treatments in which a respondent's coethnic candidate faces a violent rival, though his own reported past use of violence varies across these treatments.

There are two mechanisms that might explain these findings, as discussed earlier. First, it may be that these individuals are simply less sensitive to violence or less likely to view violence as unacceptable. Second, those who have borne the past costs of violence may view violent politicians – with whom they share an ethnic or a partisan identity – as potential defenders. For respondents who have experienced violence and share an ethnic identity with one of the candidates, the findings seem to favor the latter “ethnic defense” interpretation. For the most part, respondents do not sanction violence associated with their coethnic but do increase support for their coethnic in the presence of a violent rival. The only outlier is Treatment 8, where support for a violent coethnic diminishes when he faces a violent rival who also has a good track record in delivery of constituency development projects. For victims of violence who were merely ethnic allies of the candidate rather than his coethnic, the ethnic defense mechanism seems less plausible than the habituation or reduced sensitivity mechanism. These individuals did not sanction their ethnic ally candidate for violence, but they also did not increase their support for this candidate when he faced a violent rival.

Do other vulnerable populations react similarly to victims of past violence? We investigate differences in response among food deprived respondents, who could potentially be more sensitive to the performance cue as they have greater need for and

would be more likely to be targeted by poverty alleviation programs. Roughly half of our respondents reported having gone without food at least once in the prior year. Generally, as with victims of electoral violence, these food deprived respondents are less responsive to violence cues than the rest of population (columns 4 and 9, across all Treatments, in Table 4). The food deprived do not penalize their coethnic candidate for his rumored involvement in violence *so long as he is also well-performing* (column 4, treatment 4). We observe a similar failure to sanction violent but well-performing ethnic ally candidates among the food deprived (column 9, Treatment 4).

The Possibility of Self-Selection Bias

So far we have focused on those respondents who cast valid ballots, as is typically in vignette experiments. One concern we might have with this approach is that results may be biased if specific types of respondents chose not to vote or “self-select” out of the experimental game. For instance, actual victims of previous electoral violence could have chosen not to play in our experiment once they heard that the involved hypothetical candidates were rumored to have used electoral violence.

The percentage of people who refused to vote in the second ballot was noticeably different across the nine treatments analyzed, thus suggesting that we face the possibility of self-selection bias (Table A.3). To detect and correct for this possible self-selection into our respondent pool we ran a two-step Heckit regression model. In the first step, we estimate the probability of a respondent refusing to play the election game, as shown in equation (2).

$$Pr(R=1|Z)=\Phi[Z\gamma] \quad \text{eq. (2)}$$

where R indicates if the respondent agreed to vote for one of the two candidates in the second ballot or not. Z explanatory variables include respondent’s ethnicity, gender,

experience of food deprivation, direct experience of electoral violence, rural residence, the ethno-linguistic fragmentation index and provincial fixed effects. Crucially, we also included the candidate's response regarding the use of violence and performance, our nine treatments. As external instruments, we use the number of years of the person who conducted the interview, and his/her randomly assigned identification number. These instruments assess whether respondent's abstention is associated with interviewers' characteristics. Respondents might have felt more at ease with more experienced interviewers, thus increasing their willingness to participate in the voting game yet unlikely to have affected how they voted.

We then run the Heckit probit regression which estimates the probability (marginal effects) of whether respondents voted for their coethnic or partisan ally candidate, as shown in equation (3). This regression corrects for the potential bias in self-selection by adding as an additional explanatory variable a transformation of these predicted individual probabilities of response, λ , known as Inverse Mills Ratio,. If this inverse mills ratio is found statistically significant it would suggest self-selection. That is, those who refused to vote were significantly different from those who cast valid ballots.

$$Pr(C=1)=\Phi[\beta X+\rho\sigma_u\lambda(Z\gamma)] \quad \text{eq. (3)}$$

where ρ is the correlation between the unobserved determinants of respondents agreeing to playing the election game, u is the unobserved determinants of voting for their coethnic candidate, and σ_u is the standard deviation of u .

We find no evidence of self-selection for Kikuyu or Luo respondents in the second ballot (Table A.4). For ethnic allies, we do find evidence of self-selection for

those victims of violence and food deprived only (columns 7 and 9), but correction for this self-selection bias does not appreciably impact the results presented above.¹⁴

The Effect of Violence Cues on Turnout

In real elections, violence typically dampens turnout due to forced displacement, the intimidation of those likely to vote for rivals or voters' fear or anticipation of disruption at the polls (Collier and Vicente 2012). It is also possible, that core constituents may express their displeasure with the use of violence by their preferred candidates by just staying home from the polls, even though they are not the targets of violence. In our vignette, as shown in previous sub-section, although we do not find a self-selection bias affecting vote choice, we do observe differentially dampened ballot-casting across treatments suggesting that the rumors of violence affected what might be termed as "voluntary" or "non-coerced" turnout (Figure 2). To assess whether rumors of violence dampen voluntary turnout, we use a probit model where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent refused to vote in the second ballot or left the ballot in blank and 0 otherwise.

Table 5 shows the marginal effects of treatments on respondents' refusal to cast a ballot. We find that ethnic ally respondents are less likely to cast a ballot in most of the treatments in which both candidates are rumored to have used violence

¹⁴ As robustness check, we also estimated the Heckit regression model to our first ballot since 17.8 percent of our respondents refused to vote in the first ballot or left it blank, and a further 0.9 percent of respondents marked the ballot for both candidates. As shown in Table A.1 (columns 3 and 5), we found no evidence of self-selection bias in the first ballot. Thus the findings reported earlier for first ballot are an accurate depiction of the drivers of individual vote choice in the vignette.

(Treatment 6 and Treatment 8, column 2). Contrary to theoretical expectations, which would predict that coethnic voters would increase support for their own candidates when the group is under threat, Kikuyu and Luo respondents are less likely to cast ballots in Treatments 2, 3, and 8. In Treatment 2, Kikuyu and Luo respondents express their disapproval of their violent coethnic candidates by refusing to cast a ballot. In Treatments 3 and 8, a violent rival candidate – who is also assigned a positive performance in Treatment 8 – reduces the likelihood that Kikuyu and Luo respondent will cast a ballot. This seems to suggest that, for some voters, the intimidatory effect of a violent rival outweighs any other motivations to vote, such as ethnic self-defense.

Violence does not dampen turnout consistently across all treatments. For instance, turnout was not affected for neither group in Treatment 9, which pairs two violent yet similarly well-performing candidates. It may be that these candidates are the most likely to trigger expectations of clientelistic reward in the minds of coethnic and ethnic ally voters, preserving turnout despite the fear or distaste that violent elections may induce in respondents' minds. This could explain why in Kenya the turnout has remained high, despite frequent electoral violence.

Conclusion

This article used a survey-embedded vignette experiment to better understand how electoral violence affects people's voting choice and turnout. The design counter-balanced allegations of wrong-doing – here, rumored past violence - with potential benefits that the candidate might bring, as signaled by his past good performance in delivering anti-poverty projects when in office. We find strong evidence that candidates rumored to have used electoral violence lose electoral support from voters

with whom they share a partisan tie. Moreover, these candidates also face defection of some of their coethnics, especially when facing non-violent or well-performing rivals. This is a surprising result for Kenya, as electoral violence has often been characterized as a form of ethnic self-defense.

The tendency to sanction violence is, however, not consistent across all voters. Vulnerable groups, such as respondents living in poverty or those who were previously victims of electoral violence, are less likely to sanction violent politicians, and they increase their support for violent coethnic politicians when those politicians face violent rival candidates. These findings suggest that the vote choice of vulnerable populations may be shaped to a greater extent by the promise of clientelistic rewards, or these voters may be more likely to view violent coethnic politicians as possible defenders of group interests and worthy office-holders.

An advantage of our experiment is that it allows us to assess to what extent rumors of violence affect turnout in the extreme case of voters having zero cost in casting their votes, such as going to the polls, while controlling for other confounding factors. We found rumors of candidates using violence do reduce the turnout, but only when there are no associated cues on the candidate's performance. Turnout remains unaffected once the contending violent candidates have a good performance record, perhaps as the performance cues increase the opportunity costs of not voting. Overall, our experimental findings help explaining why politicians might risk using electoral violence despite of losing some support of their electorate and why electoral violence has done little to harm to the careers of prominent politicians.

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Figures and Tables

Table 1. Respondent's Characteristics

	Percent
Aged 18-26	32.9
Female	47.8
Secondary or higher education attainment	76.8
Victim of electoral violence	20.2
Food deprived	48.75
Member of an association	48.5
Feels close to a political party	41.1
Living in rural area	57.9
Ethnicity	
Kikuyu	17.04
Luo	15.05
Luhya	14.71
Kamba	10.22
Meru	7.9
Kisii	7.56
Kalenjin	10.14
Maasai	1.66

Mijikenda	6.07
Taita	2.66
Somali	3.41
Pokot	0.17
Turkana	1.66
Teso	0.25
Embu	1.33
Ethnicity not stated	0.74
Province	
Nairobi	7.2
Central	8.6
Eastern	16.2
Rift Valley	24.0
Nyanza	15.1
Western	12.7
North Eastern	3.2
Coast	13.0
Observations	1210

Table 2. Treatments in Second Ballot

	Coethnic (Ally) Candidate	Rival Candidate
Treatment 1 (Reference Group)	No additional cue	No additional cue
Treatment 2	Rumored to have used violence	Never used violence
Treatment 3	Never used violence	Rumored to have used violence
Treatment 4	Rumored to have used violence & good performance	Never used violence. No cue on good performance
Treatment 5	Never used violence. No cue on good performance	Rumored to have used violence & good performance
Treatment 6	Rumor to have used violence	Rumor to have used violence
Treatment 7	Rumored to have used violence & good performance	Rumored to have used violence. No cue on good performance
Treatment 8	Rumored to have used violence. No cue on good performance	Rumored to have used violence & good performance
Treatment 9	Rumored to have used violence & good performance	Rumored to have used violence & good performance

Table 3. Voting in First Ballot and Self-Reported Voting in Previous Presidential Elections

	First Ballot of Vignette Experiment		2007 Election		2013 Election	
	John Kamau (Kikuyu origin)	John Onyango (Luo Origin)	Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu origin)	Raila Odinga (Luo origin)	Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu origin)	Raila Odinga (Luo origin)
Kikuyu	85.2	14.8	90.7	6.2	87.7	8.0
Luo	11.6	88.4	15.2	81.1	6.8	91.2
Luhya	26.1	73.9	37.3	42.9	28.8	60.2
Kamba	29.1	70.9	19.0	42.1	14.9	79.3
Meru	80.7	19.3	92.6	6.2	89.5	4.7
Kisii	30.3	69.7	41.7	53.3	35.1	52.7
Kalenjin	69.1	30.9	32.5	58.8	73.0	13.5
Maasai	73.7	26.3	30.0	70.0	47.1	41.2
Mijikenda	18.6	81.4	25.5	67.3	9.6	80.8
Taita	40.0	60.0	27.3	68.2	30.0	65.0
Somali	46.7	53.3	21.2	63.6	35.7	64.3
Turkana	50.0	50.0	64.3	35.7	40.0	53.3
Embu	85.7	14.3	92.3	7.7	84.6	7.7
Others	28.6	71.4	40.0	60.0	28.6	42.9
All Groups	44.7	55.3	46.2	43.3	45.3	47.5




Figure 1. Votes in Second Ballot (only Valid Votes)




Figure 2. Refused to Vote in Second Ballot

Table 4. Marginal Effects of Violence and Performance Cues on Probability of Voting for Coethnic or Ally Candidate in Second Ballot

Sample:	Kikuyu/Luo only					Ethnic allies only				
	All Probit (1)	Victims of violence Probit (2)	Non-victims of violence Probit (3)	Food deprived Probit (4)	Non-food deprived Probit (5)	All Probit (6)	Victims of violence Probit (7)	Non-victims of violence Probit (8)	Food deprived Probit (9)	Non-food deprived Probit (10)
Treatment 1: Reference group neither candidate had a cue on performance or violence										
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumored violent, the other candidate no rumor on violence	-0.367* (0.217)	-	-0.451* (0.254)	-0.410* (0.209)	-0.515 (0.417)	-0.181** (0.080)	-0.059 (0.213)	-0.219** (0.091)	-0.110 (0.116)	-0.248** (0.119)
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent, other candidate is rumored violent	-0.035 (0.106)	0.194** (0.088)	-0.057 (0.127)	-0.059 (0.154)	0.014 (0.146)	0.155* (0.083)	0.275** (0.103)	0.147 (0.099)	0.191** (0.081)	0.198* (0.105)
T4: Co-ethnic rumored used violence but good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	-0.485*** (0.145)	-0.437 (0.271)	-0.561** (0.236)	-0.071 (0.163)	-0.745*** (0.156)	-0.219** (0.080)	-0.307 (0.246)	-0.217** (0.105)	-0.169 (0.116)	-0.210* (0.120)
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumored violent but good performance	-0.143 (0.150)	0.124** (0.056)	-0.177 (0.171)	-0.108 (0.174)	-0.164 (0.241)	0.142** (0.069)	-0.137 (0.253)	0.181** (0.077)	0.125 (0.100)	0.161* (0.096)
T6: Both candidates rumored used violence, no mention on performance on either of them	-0.110 (0.133)	0.127** (0.048)	-0.179 (0.181)	-	-0.373 (0.277)	-0.016 (0.084)	0.026 (0.227)	-0.001 (0.102)	0.063 (0.081)	-0.097 (0.131)
T7: Co-ethnic rumored used violence but good performance. The other candidate rumored used violence, no cue on performance	-0.181 (0.171)	0.122* (0.072)	-0.217 (0.196)	-	-0.438 (0.267)	0.058 (0.093)	0.093 (0.273)	0.054 (0.105)	-0.011 (0.105)	0.109 (0.140)
T8: Co-ethnic rumored used violence, no cue on performance. The other candidate rumored used violence, but good performance	-0.395** (0.177)	-0.747** (0.355)	-0.403** (0.176)	-0.500* (0.293)	-0.607** (0.201)	-0.024 (0.090)	0.192 (0.185)	-0.044 (0.105)	0.100 (0.125)	-0.073 (0.162)
T9: Both candidates rumored used violence and both were good performers	-0.012 (0.124)	-0.009 (0.242)	-0.027 (0.175)	0.040 (0.111)	-0.127 (0.313)	0.023 (0.104)	0.113 (0.190)	0.032 (0.125)	-0.072 (0.158)	0.129 (0.123)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R2	0.196	0.379	0.222	0.142	0.303	0.099	0.169	0.127	0.157	0.124
Observations	246	58	188	94	131	608	102	500	291	313

Notes: Dependent variable equal to 1 if voted for coethnic candidate in second ballot 1 and equal to 0 if voted for rival candidate in second ballot. Controls used, but not shown in table: ethnicity, food deprived, education, gender, living in a rural area, feels close to a party, ethno-linguistic fragmentation and polarization indices at district level. “-” Predicts success perfectly thus coefficient not reported. Significance Level * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level.

Table 5. Marginal Effects of Refusing to Vote or Leaving Ballot in Blank in Second Ballot

	Kikuyu/Luo only Probit (1)	Ethnic allies only Probit (2)
Treatment 1: Reference group neither candidate had a cue on performance or violence		
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumored violent, the other candidate no rumor on violence	0.296** (0.138)	0.076 (0.070)
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent, other candidate is rumored violent	0.267** (0.102)	0.039 (0.061)
T4: Co-ethnic rumored used violence but good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	0.277 (0.175)	0.005 (0.058)
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumored violent but good performance	-0.068 (0.111)	-0.124** (0.053)
T6: Both candidates rumored used violence, no mention on performance on either of them	0.193 (0.122)	0.124* (0.073)
T7: Co-ethnic rumored used violence but good performance. The other candidate rumored used violence, no cue on performance	0.242 (0.198)	0.092 (0.068)
T8: Co-ethnic rumored used violence, no cue on performance. The other candidate rumored used violence, but good performance	0.366** (0.169)	0.163** (0.080)
T9: Both candidates rumored used violence and both were good performers	0.192 (0.165)	0.111 (0.102)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R2	0.209	0.118
Observations	369	770

*Notes: Dependent variable equal to 1 if refused to vote leaving second ballot in blank and equal to 0 if voted for one or two of the contending candidates in the second ballot. Controls used, but not shown in table: ethnicity, food deprived, education, gender, living in a rural area, feels close to a party, ethno-linguistic fragmentation and polarization indices at district level. Significance Level * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level.*

Appendix A




Figure A.1 Believes President Uhuru Kenyatta is Responsible for the Violence of 2007 Elections




Figure A.2. Vignette's Two Ballots

Table A.1. Marginal Effects of Voting for Coethnic Candidate in First Ballot

	Sample:	Kikuyu/Luo only		Ethnic allies only	
	Probit (1)	Probit (2)	Heckit (3)	Probit (4)	Heckit (5)
Ethnicity (Kikuyu reference group)					
Luo	0.033 (0.053)	-0.031 (0.062)	-0.033 (0.057)		
Luhya				0.087 (0.288)	-0.049 (0.283)
Kamba				0.069 (0.279)	-0.047 (0.277)
Meru				0.084 (0.266)	-0.111 (0.231)
Kisii				0.001 (0.310)	-0.131 (0.266)
Kalenjin				0.013 (0.305)	-0.134 (0.273)
Maasai				-0.309 (0.330)	-0.398 (0.276)
Mijikenda				0.119 (0.250)	-0.014 (0.276)
Taita				-0.059 (0.344)	-0.191 (0.253)
Somali				0.383*** (0.021)	1.347*** (0.328)
Turkana				-0.126 (0.331)	-0.255 (0.285)
Embu				0.164 (0.232)	-0.131 (0.377)
Pokot					-2.955*** (0.154)
Food Deprivation		0.078 (0.048)	0.075 (0.046)	0.057 (0.042)	0.058 (0.042)
Secondary school or more		-0.056 (0.041)	-0.059 (0.056)	0.024 (0.041)	0.021 (0.039)
Female		-0.015 (0.037)	-0.016 (0.034)	0.006 (0.037)	0.007 (0.034)
Rural		0.103*** (0.030)	0.094** (0.033)	-0.044 (0.044)	-0.052 (0.039)
Victim of electoral violence		0.005 (0.039)	-0.003 (0.038)	0.054 (0.047)	0.055 (0.049)
District ethnic fragmentation index		0.133 (0.161)	0.164 (0.149)	-0.430** (0.139)	-0.414** (0.129)
District ethnic polarization index		0.173 (0.215)	0.156 (0.208)	0.125 (0.127)	0.165 (0.126)
Feels close to a political party		-0.015 (0.025)	-0.024 (0.024)	0.041 (0.037)	0.045 (0.037)
Province fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R2	0.003	0.096		0.077	
Observations	309	298	374	653	708
Inverse Mills Ratio			-0.453 (0.635)		0.472 (0.501)

*Notes: Controls used in the first stage of Heckman selection model: respondents' ethnicity, gender, food deprivation (poverty), whether had been victim of electoral violence, residing in a rural area, feels close to a political party, ethno-linguistic fragmentation index of district where respondent lives, province fixed effects. Instruments: interviewer's randomly assigned identification number, years of experience and mother tongue. Significance Level * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level.*

Table A.2. Percentage of Respondents Randomly Assigned to Each Treatment in Second Ballot

Treatment randomly assigned	Kikuyu/Luo	Ethnic allies	Food deprived
T1: Reference group neither candidate had a cue on performance or violence	41.3	58.7	47.5
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumored violent, the other candidate no rumor on violence	32.0	68.0	57.0
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent, other candidate is rumored violent	41.6	58.4	47.5
T4: Co-ethnic rumored used violence but good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	38.0	62.0	46.7
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumored violent but good performance	34.0	66.0	45.7
T6: Both candidates rumored used violence, no mention on performance on either of them	36.9	63.1	47.8
T7: Co-ethnic rumored used violence but good performance. The other candidate rumored used violence, no cue on performance	37.4	62.6	44.7
T8: Co-ethnic rumored used violence, no cue on performance. The other candidate rumored used violence, but good performance	34.3	65.7	53.0
T9: Both candidates rumored used violence and both were good performers	46.8	53.3	43.2
Average	38.0	62.0	48.3

Table A.3. Valid Votes and Refusals in First and Second Ballot

	First Ballot	Treatments in Second Ballot								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
%Voted for Onyango (Luo candidate)	44.9	51.9	52.3	60.9	24.9	32.1	33.6	28.4	38.0	40.7
%Voted for Kamau (Kikuyu candidate)	36.4	33.1	20.7	24.4	44.3	37.1	36.6	53.0	27.0	30.9
%Voted for both candidates in ballot	0.9	1.3	1.8	1.7	0.5	0.6	1.5	1.5	1.0	2.5
%Left ballot in blank	4.0	3.1	5.4	3.5	5.4	13.8	8.4	3.7	9.0	9.9
%Refused to vote, said was indifferent between both candidates	5.9	3.8	14.4	4.4	10.3	8.8	10.7	5.2	11.0	9.9
%Refused to vote without giving any reason	7.9	6.9	5.4	5.2	14.6	7.6	9.2	8.2	14.0	6.2
Number of observations	1,201	160	111	115	185	159	131	134	100	81

Table A.4. Second-Stage Heckit Marginal Effects of Table 4

Sample:	Kikuyu/Luo only					Ethnic allies only				
	All Heckit (1)	Victims of violence Heckit (2)	Non-victims of violence Heckit (3)	Food deprived Heckit (4)	Non-food deprived Heckit (5)	All Heckit (6)	Victims of violence Heckit (7)	Non-victims of violence Heckit (8)	Food deprived Heckit (9)	Non-food deprived Heckit (10)
Treatment 1: Reference group neither candidate had a cue on performance or violence										
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumored violent, the other candidate no rumor on violence	-0.214 (0.176)	0.594** (0.280)	-0.196* (0.116)	-0.185* (0.109)	-0.437 (0.270)	-0.169** (0.069)	-0.044 (0.160)	-0.158** (0.073)	-0.081 (0.098)	-0.239** (0.098)
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent, other candidate is rumored violent	-0.017 (0.076)	0.324** (0.152)	-0.024 (0.088)	-0.029 (0.083)	-0.128 (0.175)	0.147* (0.085)	0.218 (0.145)	0.125 (0.094)	0.196** (0.098)	0.163 (0.118)
T4: Co-ethnic rumored used violence but good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	-0.274* (0.149)	-0.212 (0.142)	-0.224** (0.106)	-0.034 (0.101)	-0.640*** (0.183)	-0.198** (0.069)	-0.226 (0.182)	-0.157** (0.080)	-0.122 (0.086)	-0.215** (0.099)
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumored violent but good performance	-0.106 (0.091)	0.233 (0.166)	-0.129 (0.099)	-0.073 (0.087)	-0.207 (0.171)	0.149** (0.073)	-0.095 (0.184)	0.145* (0.081)	0.117 (0.083)	0.160 (0.098)
T6: Both candidates rumored used violence, no mention on performance on either of them	-0.072 (0.087)	0.220 (0.146)	-0.091 (0.102)	0.689* (0.366)	-0.378** (0.182)	-0.009 (0.078)	0.028 (0.177)	-0.007 (0.086)	0.066 (0.066)	-0.075 (0.109)
T7: Co-ethnic rumored used violence but good performance. The other candidate rumored used violence, no cue on performance	-0.115 (0.104)	0.163 (0.120)	-0.102 (0.094)	0.773** (0.302)	-0.416** (0.175)	0.055 (0.089)	0.089 (0.233)	0.030 (0.091)	0.017 (0.076)	0.055 (0.132)
T8: Co-ethnic rumored used violence, no cue on performance. The other candidate rumored used violence, but good performance	-0.228* (0.136)	-0.334 (0.286)	-0.167* (0.095)	-0.209 (0.133)	-0.457** (0.184)	-0.026 (0.081)	0.178 (0.180)	-0.012 (0.081)	0.091 (0.118)	-0.081 (0.134)
T9: Both candidates rumored used violence and both were good performers	-0.003 (0.105)	-0.007 (0.181)	0.015 (0.123)	0.020 (0.114)	-0.231 (0.287)	0.029 (0.098)	0.119 (0.174)	0.011 (0.104)	-0.039 (0.067)	0.108 (0.121)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Inverse Mills Ratio	-0.272 (0.922)	0.059 (0.706)	-0.883 (0.498)	-0.554 (1.244)	0.641 (0.661)	0.592 (0.579)	1.00** (0.000)	-1.00*** (0.000)	1.00** (0.000)	1.00*** (0.00)
Observations	368	100	269	187	181	670	110	560	312	358

*Notes: Controls used in the first stage of Heckman selection model: respondent's ethnicity, gender, food deprivation (poverty), whether had been victim of electoral violence, residing in a rural area, feels close to a political party, ethno-linguistic fragmentation index of district where respondent lives, province fixed effects. Instruments: interviewer's randomly assigned identification number, years of experience and mother tongue. Controls used in second stage Heckit regression (not shown in table): ethnicity, food deprived, education, gender, living in a rural area, feels close to a party, province of residence, ethno-linguistic fragmentation and polarization indices at district level. Significance Level * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level.*

Appendix B

We are now going to play an elections game.

Imagine for a moment that there is a vacancy in your constituency for a Member of Parliament. So there will be a by-election held in a few weeks time. Only two candidates will be competing for the MP seat in your constituency.

Imagine that both candidates have equal experience in politics, both have been elected MPs before, but in other constituencies similar to this one during the 2008-2013 administration. They did not contend in the 2013 elections in the constituencies they used to be MPs due to the administrative changes of boundaries that some areas had. Both candidates are promising to improve the economy of your community. They are:

Candidate 1 is John Onyango, and he is running on the ODM party.

Candidate 2 is John Kamau, and he is running on the TNA party.

1.A Remembering that they will be the only candidates contending in this imaginary election, I am going to ask you to secretly cast your vote in this ballot for the person you would vote for between these two candidates.

Your vote will be placed in this bag mixed with other ballots. Your vote is private, we will respect your confidentiality and no-one will identify your name with your vote.

A	Refused to vote, respondent said was indifferent between candidates > Go to Q1.B	5
B	Refused to vote without giving any reason > Go to Q1.B	6
OPTIONS C, D, E, F WILL BE FILLED BY ENUMERATOR'S SUPERVISOR		
C	Respondent voted for Candidate 1, John Onyango in the ballot.	1
D	Respondent voted for Candidate 2, John Kamau in the ballot.	2
E	Respondent voted for both candidates in the ballot .	3
F	Respondent did not vote for either of candidates, left voting ballot in blank.	4

1.B Now I'm going to tell you a little bit more about these candidates. But first I would like you to pick any number between one and nine.

1	Neither John Onyango nor John Kamau has ever used violence to try winning elections.
2	John Onyango has never used violence to try winning elections. John Kamau is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes.
3	John Kamau is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when John Kamau was an elected MP, he was among the few MPs that were randomly and independently audited about how MPs used the CDF fund, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audit found that Kamau spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects.

	John Onyango has never used violence to try winning elections. We do not have any information about how Onyango used the CDF back when he was an elected MP because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited.
4	<p>John Onyango is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs in the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes.</p> <p>John Kamau has never used violence to try winning elections.</p>
5	Both John Onyango and John Kamau are rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. They have not been arrested for these alleged crimes.
6	<p>John Kamau is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when John Kamau was an elected MP, he was among the few MPs that were randomly and independently audited about how MPs used the CDF fund, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audit found that Kamau spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects.</p> <p>John Onyango is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs in the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. We do not have any information about how Onyango used the CDF, back when he was an elected MP because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited.</p>
7	<p>John Onyango is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when John Onyango was an elected MP, he was among the few MPs that were randomly and independently audited about how MPs used the CDF fund, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audit found that Onyango spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects.</p> <p>John Kamau has never used violence to try winning elections. We do not have any information about how Kamau used the CDF back when he was an elected MP because he, as the majority of other MPs, was not audited.</p>
8	<p>John Onyango is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when John Onyango was an elected MP, he was among the few MPs that were randomly and independently audited about how MPs used the CDF fund, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audit found that Onyango spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects.</p> <p>John Kamau is also rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs in the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested either for these alleged crimes. We do not have any information about how Kamau used the CDF back when he was an elected MP because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited.</p>

9	John Onyango and John Kamau are both rumoured to have ordered one murder and to have both hired gangs in the 2007 elections. They have not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when Onyango and Kamau were elected MPs, both of them were among the few MPs that got randomly and independently audited about how they managed their CDF funds, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audits found they both spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects.
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2. With this new information, I am going to ask you to secretly cast your vote in this ballot again for your preferred candidate between these two. Again, your vote will be placed in this bag and be mixed with other ballots. Your vote is private, we will respect your confidentiality and no-one will identify your name with your vote. As before you can tick in this ballot for your preferred candidate between these two.



A	Refused to vote, respondent said was indifferent between candidates> GO TO Q3	5
B	Refused to vote without giving any reason > GO TO Q3	6
OPTIONS C, D, E, F WILL BE FILLED BY ENUMERATOR'S SUPERVISOR		
C	Respondent voted for Candidate 1, John Onyango in the ballot.	1
D	Respondent voted for Candidate 2, John Kamau in the ballot.	2
E	Respondent voted for both candidates in the ballot .	3
F	Respondent did not vote for either of candidates, left voting ballot in blank.	4

Voting ballot design

Identical ballots were used in the first and the second votes.

VOTE FOR ONE CANDIDATE ONLY



Candidate: John <u>Onyango</u> ORANGE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (ODM)	Tick here if vote for this candidate
	
Candidate: John <u>Kamau</u> The National Alliance (TNA)	Tick here if vote for this candidate
	

Once you finish voting, please fold the voting ballot and place it in the bag provided by the interviewer. Thank you.

Q1 Survey KEN				
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Once you finish voting, please fold the voting ballot and place it in the bag provided by the interviewer. Thank you.