
FIRST CAST THE BEAM FROM THINE OWN EYE: THE CONDEMNATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS 1241/4

Deborah Grice, Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford.



COPY OF CONDEMNATION MANUSCRIPT, NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD.[1]

Hugh of St.-Cher, *In evangelia secundum Matthaeum* vii:3-5:

'Romans ii:19-21: "If you are confident that you yourself are a guide of the blind, a light of those who are in darkness, an instructor of the foolish, a teacher of infants, you therefore who teaches another teaches not yourself"'.[2]

[1] The Warden and Scholars of New College, Oxford, MS 109, f. 1r.

[2] Hugh of St.-Cher, *In evangelia secundum Matthaeum* (*Opera omnia in universum Vetus et Novum Testamentum*, 8 vols., Venice, 1703), vi, p. 27q.

SHORT ABSTRACT

FIRST CAST THE BEAM FROM THINE OWN EYE: THE CONDEMNATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS 1241/4

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D.PHIL. DEGREE, HILARY TERM, 2017

In 1241/4 the theology masters at the university at Paris, their chancellor, Odo of Châteauroux, and bishop, William of Auvergne, condemned ten propositions against theological truth. Unlike other such condemnations, particularly at Paris in 1277, modern scholars have largely ignored it. This study attempts to remedy this neglect. It aims to view the condemnation in its contemporary context, concentrating on contemporary texts or those available in the period. The study's main focus is not the condemnation itself. Instead it seeks to set it against the background of wider doctrinal, intellectual, institutional and historical developments within the emerging 'university'. The study's conclusions are three-fold. First, the period 1200-1240 combined a developing focus of Paris theologians on using their learning for preaching (fostered by their faculty's inclusion of the mendicant orders) with a rapid and sometimes divergent development of doctrine. This latter was based on long-term biblical enigmas and patristic discussions, now sharpened by external 'threats', including from newly-translated Aristotelian texts and the views of groups deemed heretical. There were also increasing concerns over Greek theology and the Jews. Second, while no single influence appears dominant in the choice of articles, they follow closely the major statement of catholic principles in the first canon of Lateran IV in 1215. The content and order of the propositions is too close to be coincidental. Read in this light, the condemnation served to cement Lateran IV within the theology faculty. Third, however, this was not just for internal self-discipline. 1241/4 was the point when the faculty itself 'came of age' - it aspired to leadership in catholic doctrine according to Lateran IV's principles, seeing its role as external as much as internal. For this, it needed 'to cast the beam from its own eye before seeing clearly to remove the mote from its brother's'.

LONG ABSTRACT

FIRST CAST THE BEAM FROM THINE OWN EYE: THE CONDEMNATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS 1241/4

DEBORAH GRICE, LADY MARGARET HALL, OXFORD

D.PHIL. DEGREE, HILARY TERM, 2017

The thirteenth century saw several major condemnations at the university at Paris, from the banning of the teaching of new Aristotelian texts in 1210 to the issuing of 219 propositions condemned in the faculty of arts in 1277. However, the condemnation issued from the theology faculty in 1241/4 has been largely overlooked. Containing only ten propositions against theological truth - covering the vision of God, the Trinity, angels, creation, and the fall of humankind - it has been viewed from different perspectives, or simply side-lined, in modern scholarship. Most, if not all, modern scholars have seen it as a miscellany of unconnected ideas. As regards its derivation, some scholars have seen it as an attack on Neoplatonic philosophy, others primarily as a further retreat from the newly translated Aristotelian texts and the learning of Arab and Jewish philosophers that accompanied them. Only a few scholars have recognised the mixture of influences it represents. Most often, however, it is simply ignored altogether. And yet the condemnation occurred at a formative period in the university's development. While the details of its imposition are sketchy, and even its date or dates are disputed, it therefore has much to tell us about the intellectual and institutional history of the university. Although the different manuscripts which include the condemnation contain some minor variations in the wording and order of the articles, these do not affect its substance, and this study is not intended to provide a critical edition of its text. Instead the condemnation provides a lens through which to look at the broader intellectual and institutional context which produced it.

The primary purpose of this study is historical, not philosophical or theological, although the latter two are naturally important given the subject-matter involved. The aim is to assess the condemnation as an event at a particular moment of time and as a particular stage in intellectual history, and to do this with contemporary early thirteenth-century eyes, not with the benefit of hindsight and from the perspective of later condemnations. The main doctrinal sources are contemporary texts from theologians at Paris in the 1240s and preceding decades, together with the works on which they themselves drew, whether the Church Fathers and other early texts, twelfth-century scholarship still being read, or the external

philosophical material they now had access to, be it Neoplatonic, Aristotelian or from elsewhere. In addition, the thesis looks at other kinds of external sources, including, for example, heretical writings, papal records, and records of ecclesiastical discussions, such as between the mendicants and representatives of the Greek Church in 1234 at Nicaea.

The study draws on four broad groups of secondary literature. First, there are a number of articles on the condemnation itself, especially, but not exclusively, by French Dominican scholars writing in the second half of the twentieth century. These provide invaluable information, particularly on areas such as the dating of the condemnation and the identification of the views of some individuals which appear to have contravened what was, or was to become, required doctrine. Second, and in much greater number, there are books and articles, mainly by modern philosophers and theologians, with in-depth discussion of the topics covered in the individual articles, although seldom explicitly discussing their presence in the condemnation. Third, there is scholarship on the nature and process of institutional academic condemnations more generally in this period. Finally, although again seldom focusing directly on the condemnation itself, there is copious and wide-ranging specialist literature on heresy, the dispute with the Greek Church, the development of the university, the trial of the Talmud, and other possible or probable influences. For all this literature, this study provides a critical commentary on the influences which may have been behind the condemnation. It also offers new perspectives on the development of the university and its theology faculty.

The study looks to answer two main questions: why the condemnation took place at all, and why at this particular time? To do so, the choice of propositions is key, and the factors that could have influenced this particular selection. These include, first, institutional developments within the emerging university at Paris and its theology faculty - including perhaps the development of a more collaborative approach between the chancellor and the theology masters in the late 1220s and the 1230s - and also papal aspirations for the wider role of its theologians. These developments followed the reform movement in the years preceding 1215, which saw preaching, pastoral care and spiritual leadership outside the academic environment as equally (or more) important than academic learning - service to the church and Christian community was now the priority. Other institutional factors included the increasingly strong presence of the Dominicans and Franciscans in the theology faculty and their view of their own role both within the university and beyond. Their presence served to reinforce and foster the role now expected from Paris theologians as the twelfth-century

schools developed into a university. There were also externally imposed institutional requirements, including the university's regulations and freedoms granted in its 1215 statute and the papal bull, *Parens scientiarum*, from 1231; and, more generally, the need to comply with and enforce the statement of faith enacted in Lateran IV from 1215, which represented a defining moment for catholic doctrine.

Second, and alongside such institutional factors, is the environment outside the university. The early thirteenth century was a period of continuing acrimonious debate with the Greek Church, known to members of the university not least through the involvement of some of its members. The views of the Greek Church on subjects such as the Trinity (the focus of article three of the condemnation) may well have added an element of toxicity to internal long-running academic theological debates; and the increasing Latin hostility to the Greek Church - especially from the pope - could have hardened views on the vexed issue of whether God's essence could be seen (article one), on which the two churches disagreed. Other major issues which may have contributed to the choice of articles within the condemnation include the bitter and unresolved battle against heresy, particularly dualism - this was again well-known in Paris, with the active involvement of the Dominicans, in particular, in opposing Catharism, and with the interaction of Paris theologians with the university at Toulouse founded to combat it. Whatever the truth about Catharism, concerns over dualism appear to underlie several articles in the condemnation, perhaps in particular the fall of the angels (the subject of article five). There was also growing concern over the Jews. The contemporaneous condemnation and burning of the Talmud in Paris in the early 1240s, with the same people involved in the judgment as in the condemnation, has been largely ignored by modern commentators; but the timing makes some connection beyond doubt, even if more as a demonstration of a hardening of views over doctrine across the board than in the detail of the articles. Looking further afield, the incursion of the Mongols may also be part of the underlying context, with an increasing awareness of their different beliefs, including the presence of Nestorianism, and the consequent missionary activity (led by the mendicant orders) to convert them.

The third area of influence is doctrinal. This comes from three main sources. First, much theological debate formed a continuation of internal discussions within the Latin Church on intractable issues of theology derived from biblical interpretation, including (as perhaps the outstanding example) how God can be both three and one, a subject on which Christians were under attack from both Jews and Muslims for an alleged polytheism. Second,

Neoplatonic philosophy was at the heart of much Christian thought from the earliest Church Fathers onwards, despite being only partially compatible with Christianity. Third, Aristotle's views, and those of the non-Christian commentators on him, were a major factor influencing discussions, and in two ways: Aristotle's works on logic, known from Boethius' Latin translations, provided the analytical tools for much subsequent theological debate; but his scientific works, reaching Paris in translations in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, together with those of his commentators, were both exciting and dangerous in themselves. This is particularly evident in discussions on, for example, the first moment of time (the subject of article eight of the condemnation). However, a neat division between these three influences can be too clear-cut. For example, the internal discussions within the Latin Church were themselves imbued with concepts from early Greek philosophy, especially from Neoplatonism but also from Aristotle. In turn, Neoplatonism included core principles unacceptable to catholic dogma, not just the absolute unknowability of God but also the existence of intelligences acting as a medium between God and creation, with sub-creative powers and sometimes equated by non-Christian or even Christian writers with angels. While some Neoplatonic works, such as those by pseudo-Dionysius in the sixth century, were revered, others which reflected many Neoplatonic views were viewed with deep suspicion or banned - as was the case with Eriugena's *Periphyseon* from the ninth century, comprehensively banned in Paris by Pope Honorius III in 1225 (and possibly earlier, in 1210). In addition, Aristotle was seen as the author of some Neoplatonic works, such as the *Liber de causis* (a work of uncertain origin but based on Proclus' *Elements*), which had been translated in the twelfth century and which was highly respected. Finally, the views of the non-Christian commentators on Aristotle, such as Avicenna in the eleventh century, and Maimonides in the twelfth, represent in themselves a mixture of different influences.

This study seeks to highlight the innovative nature of the 1241/4 condemnation. Unlike all previous such instruments, its focus was on doctrines, not specific individuals or specific works. This demonstrates a change of approach and attitude, especially with regard to the newly translated Aristotelian material where whole works had previously been banned, together with the works of those of theologians believed to have incorporated them, or other unacceptable ideas. Second, the identification of those individuals whose doctrines contravened the condemnation is not the main aim of this study; but it challenges the previous general assumption that the only individual named in the condemnation - and then in only one from over twenty manuscripts and other accounts - was its main target, or even that

his identification with the Dominican, Stephen of Venizy, is secure. It also, briefly, considers the condemnation's possible application to the arts faculty as well as the faculty of theology.

The study's main conclusions are three-fold. First, in respect of the doctrinal climate underlying the condemnation, no single influence dominated. The period was one of developing views for theologians in Paris, based on long-term issues arising from the Bible and discussions going back at least to Augustine, which had been sharpened by the perceived threat of external influences, such as the new learning from the east, Greek Orthodoxy, heresy, and Judaism (itself perhaps beginning to be viewed in a similar light to heresy). This sharpened focus is particularly visible in texts from the 1230s and 1240s, with discussions drawing on the new learning in ways that could seem dangerous and which appear to have led to the closing-down of several previously fluid areas of debate (for example on what and how God knows) and stricter definitions of permissible belief. The concern generated by the new learning and other external influences should be seen against the background of the presence of the mendicant orders at the university, with their wider anti-heresy and missionary role, and indeed the broader role that many of the theologians involved had (or would go on to take up) in the church. Papal interest in the university, including its anti-heresy role, also forms part of this overall background. Theologians needed a clear, doctrinally proper, script to deliver.

Second, as regards the choice, order, and possible grouping of articles, article one reflects the underlying incompatible principles of the Latin and Greek Churches over whether God's essence can be seen. It is also the main article on which there were clear contrary views within the theology faculty, including some of its major figures. This study therefore sees it as, perhaps, the leading article. It is implicitly covered in the opening words on God's incomprehensible and ineffable nature in the statement of faith at the beginning of Lateran IV, but not articulated explicitly there. However, following article one, the remaining articles in the condemnation appear to follow closely the doctrine set out in Lateran IV's statement of faith, starting with the Trinity and then covering the creation story, including the creation and fall of the angels, the beginning of the world, good and evil, and finally the fall of man. The content and order seems too close to be coincidental; and the argument the condemnation's articles are linked to the sequence in Lateran IV is thus a compelling one. In addition, articles four to ten appear to form a group with a common theme of their own, again reflecting that in Lateran IV - namely of creation, with angels providing its major thread. A case-study on the theme of angels is accordingly included.

Given the doctrinal pressures facing the theology faculty at the university at Paris in the 1230s/1240s, and the condemnation's reflection of Lateran IV's opening principles, this study contends that the theologians involved saw a need to cement Lateran IV's doctrinal principles within their faculty, to internalise them, and thereby put their own house firmly in order. But, as the study's third and major conclusion, this was not merely for internal self-discipline. The university and its faculties, and earlier the Parisian schools, had worked increasingly as a guild of self-regulating teaching masters in administrative and legal matters since the end of the twelfth century. Papal expectations for the university and its independence meanwhile, particularly for its theology faculty, with its potential for delivering the papal agenda, had been apparent since at least 1215, if not earlier. But the doctrinal drivers had been external, and largely from the pope or from his bishops, for example the restriction on the new Aristotelian texts in 1210 and subsequently, and the banning of Eriugena's *Periphyseon* in 1225. While Amaury of Bène was censured internally by the university in 1204, this was only ratified after his appeal to the Pope in 1206, and it was at this point that his recantation was required by the university. This was a very different scenario from that demonstrated in the 1241/4 condemnation. This study argues that 1241/4 was the point at which the theology faculty itself 'came of age': it aspired to leadership in the formulation and development of catholic doctrine according to the principles laid down in Lateran IV; and it saw its role as external, preaching, combatting heresy and converting unbelievers, as well as internal pre-eminence in its scholarship and teaching. It was to achieve this wider role that it needed, 'to remove the beam in its own eye before being able to see clearly to cast out the mote from its brother's' [Matt. vii:3-5].

PREFACE

My interest in the 1241/4 condemnation of ten propositions against theological truth at the university at Paris originated from my study of Byzantine history for my Masters degree. There I encountered the beginning of the disagreement between the Greek and Latin Churches over the procession of the Holy Spirit with Patriarch Photius in the ninth century, becoming increasingly cemented as firm dogma on both sides from then on. So why did theologians at Paris need to be corrected, or at least reminded of, this in a condemnation at the theology faculty at Paris in the 1240s, after the fall of Constantinople to the Latins in 1204 and with Latin doctrine now clearly ascendant? This question led me to the 1241/4 condemnation as a whole, with the dual procession just one of the numerous enigmas revealed in it. My study has only scratched the surface of this significant but largely neglected instrument, but I hope it may inspire deeper excavation in the future.

My thanks are owing to many people, on both the academic and domestic side. I will, therefore, single out only a few. First and foremost must be my supervisor, Matthew Kempshall, who has helped and encouraged me throughout the process, with constructive criticism and the ability to restore my faith in the work when I was feeling wholly daunted by the task ahead. His eye for detail was also both helpful and enviable, and his deep and encyclopaedic knowledge formidable. I am also grateful to Cecelia Trifogli for her invaluable help in explaining the mysteries of medieval arguments on the first moment of time; to Brenda Bolton for sharing with me some research she had done on Gregory IX, especially in the period before he became pope; and to Görge Hasselhoff for help on the chronology of Latin translations of the Talmud and of Maimonides.

Second, my family have been a constant support. In particular, my husband, Joe, has put up with nearly four years of a preoccupied and often absent wife. He has also shown great interest in the reasearch itself which has been a stimulus to keep going. And my three adult children have been my constant, and patient, advisers on the mysteries of IT, even at long distance, with one now resident in the USA. I have trespassed on both their expertise and their hospitality, and my thanks go out to all three and their families.

Finally, the friends I have made at Oxford and beyond, both in the medieval field and elsewhere, have made the four years both enjoyable and stimulating. I hope such friendships will continue for many years ahead.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations 1-3

Introduction. 4-20

Chapter One: The Condemnation 21-73

Imposition. 21-31

The Ten Articles. 31-73

Chapter Two: Causes and Influences 74-156

Institutional Influences. 77-90

Doctrinal Influences. 90-154

Conclusion. 154-156

Chapter Three: Evaluation of Influences 157-229

Doctrinal Influences on Individual Articles. 158-227

Institutional influences. 227-229

Conclusion 230-252

Appendix A: The Condemnation text and Associated Tables 253-259

Appendix A1: Annotated Condemnation Text (Latin and English) 253-256

Appendix A2: Tables on article arrangement. 257

Appendix A3: Table of influences. 258

Appendix A4: Condemnation Flowchart. 259

Appendix B: Lateran IV, Canons 1-3 (Latin and English) 260-267

Bibliography 268-292

Abbreviations

ACG: *Acta Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum*, ed. B.M. Reichert (9 vols., Rome, 1894-1904).

ACP: *Acta Capitulorum Provincialium Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum*, ed. C. Douais (Toulouse, 1894-1895).

AFH: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* (Rome, 1908-).

AFP: *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* (Rome, 1931-).

AHR: *American Historical Review*.

Alexander, *Glossa*: Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quattuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (4 vols., Florence, 1951-7).

Alexander, *Quaestiones*: Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater*', ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (3 vols., Florence, 1960).

Alexander, *Quaestiones universitatem*: Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae quae ad rerum universitatem pertinent*, ed. H.M. Wierzbicki (Rome, 2013).

Alexander, *Summa*: Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (4 vols., Florence, 1924-48).

'Appendix B': Trizio, M., Gutas, D., Burnett, C., Demetracopoulos J.A. and Zonta, M., 'Appendix B - Medieval Translations', in R. Pasnau (ed.), *Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy* (2 vols., Cambridge, 2014), ii, pp. 792-832.

Aquinas, *Summa*: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome, 1862-), iv-xii.

'Aristoteles Latinus': Dod, B.G., 'Aristoteles Latinus', in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (eds.), *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 45-79.

Auvray: *Les registres de Grégoire IX*, ed. L. Auvray (4 vols., Paris, 1896).

Barnes: Aristotle, *The Complete Works: the Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. J. Barnes (2 vols., Oxford, 1984).

BF: *Bullarium Franciscanum*, ed. J.S. Sbaraleae (4 vols., Rome, 1759-68).

BMGS: *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*.

Borgnet: Albertus Magnus, *Opera omnia*, ed. A Borgnet (38 vols., Paris, 1890-99).

Cambridge Companion: K. Seeskin (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides* (Cambridge, 2005).

Cambridge Medieval Philosophy: R. Pasnau (ed.), *Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy* (2 vols., Cambridge, 2014).

CCCM: *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis.*

CH: *Church History.*

CHR: *Catholic Historical Review.*

CHS: *The Church Historical Society*.

CUP: *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain (4 vols., Paris, 1889-97).

Décretales: *Décretales de Gregorio IX*, ed. J.M. Puigarnau (3 vols., Barcelona, 1940-3).

Ecumenical Councils: *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. N.P. Tanner (2 vols., London and Washington, 1990).

EHR: *English Historical Review.*

Eriugena, *Periphyseon*: John Scotus Eriugena, *Periphyseon (De divisione naturae)*, books I-II, ed. I.P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin, 1968, 1972); book III, eds. I.P. Sheldon-Williams and L. Bieler (Dublin, 1981); book IV, ed. E.A. Jeauneau (Dublin, 2009); book V, ed. E.A. Jeauneau (Turnholt, 2003).

Guiliemi Alverni: William of Auvergne, *Opera omnia* (2 vols., Paris, 1674).

JAOS: *Journal of the American Oriental Society*.

JEH: *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*.

JIP: *Journal of Islamic Philosophy.*

JJS: *Journal of Jewish Studies*.

JMH: *Journal of Medieval History*.

JML: *Journal of Medieval Latin.*

JMRS: *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*.

JQR: *Jewish Quarterly Review*.

JSQ: *Jewish Studies Quarterly*.

JTS: *Journal of Theological Studies.*

Lombard, *Sentences*: Peter Lombard, *The Sentences*, trans. G. Silano (4 vols., Toronto, 2007-10).

Lombard, *Sententiae*: Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (3 vols., Florence, 1971-81).

Mansi: *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*…., eds. J.D. Mansi et al. (53 vols., Paris, 1758-1927).

MPT: *Medieval Philosophy and Theology*

MS: *Mediaeval Studies*.

PL: *Patrologiae Cursus Completus Series Latina*, ed. J.P. Migne (221 vols., Paris, 1844-64).

RSPT: *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*.

RTAM: *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*.

INTRODUCTION

'THE BEGINNING IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF ANY WORK'[1]

In 1241/4 the regent masters in theology at the university at Paris gathered together under their chancellor, Odo of Châteauroux, mandated by their bishop, William of Auvergne, to condemn ten propositions against theological truth.[2] This was a significant historical event. It was notable institutionally, intellectually, doctrinally and politically. The preceding period was one of rapid change for Paris theologians, and the years 1241-1244 themselves saw major upheaval, uncertainty, and opportunity. Modern scholars have paid relatively little attention to the condemnation itself, and even less to its historical context and importance.[3] This study aims to address this gap.

Two separate but linked questions lie at the heart of this study: the background to each of the ten articles, why each of them caused concern in the 1240s in Paris; and why

[1] Plato, *Republic*, ii.

[2] *CUP*, i, no. 128, pp. 170-2. Hereafter, 'condemnation' refers to that of 1241/4 unless otherwise stated. Odo (†1273) was a theology master in Paris from c.1229, chancellor of the university, 1238-44, cardinal from 1244. His surviving works mainly comprise sermons, with around 1,200 extant (only two of the quodlibets once attributed to him are now considered to be his). Odo was heavily engaged in action against the Jews in the 1240s, the condemnation of John of Brescain and master Raymond in 1247 (below, p. 25), and the crusades (in particular Louis IX's, from 1248-54). Both Gregory IX (whose favour he gained in preaching and supporting the university in its 1229-31 strike) and Innocent IV (who promoted him to cardinal) favoured him. See *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* (17 vols., Paris, 1937-95), iv, 2, pp. 1675-8; A. Callebaut, 'Le sermon historique d'Eudes de Châteauroux à Paris le 18 Mars 1229', *AFH*, 28 (1935), p. 97; S.E. Young, *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris* (Cambridge, 2014), p. 217; M.M. Davy, *Les sermons universitaires de 1250-1251* (Paris, 1931), pp. 201-5. For Odo's career, see A. Charansonnet, 'L'université, l'Eglise et l'Etat dans les sermons du cardinal Eudes de Châteauroux (1190?-1273)' (Lyon University, Ph.D. thesis, 2001). For Odo's quodlibets, see 'Quodlibase', http://quodlibase.ehess.fr (10 January, 2014). William of Auvergne (†1249) was a theology master in Paris by 1223, bishop of Paris from 1228-49. He wrote his major work, the *Magisterium divinale et sapientale*, from the early 1220s to the 1240s. William was intermittently in favour with Gregory IX (as when elevated to his bishopric), but also heavily criticised by him (as during the 1229-31 strike). He was involved in most events in Paris involving the university, including the actions against the Jews and against John of Brescain and master Raymond. William frequently advised Louis IX and the papacy, for example, on reforming monasteries in France for Pope Honorius III, 1224-5, and in providing diplomatic help to Louis IX in Brittany, 1230. See N. Valois, *Guillaume d'Auvergne, évêque de Paris, 1228-1249, sa vie et ses ouvrages* (Paris, 1880); R.J. Teske, 'William of Auvergne: an Overview', in idem, *Studies in the Philosophy of William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris (1228-1249)* (Milwaukee, c.2006), pp. 17-28; J. Berlioz, 'La voix de l'évêque', in *Autour de Guillaume d'Auvergne (+1249)* (Turnhout, 2005), pp. 11-33; L. Smith, 'William of Auvergne and the Jews', in D. Wood (ed.), *Christianity and Judaism* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 107-17; T.B. de Mayo, 'The Demonology of William of Auvergne' (University of Arizona, Ph.D. thesis, 2006), pp. 59, 64-7.

[3] For example, F.-X. Putallaz, 'Censorship', in *Cambridge Medieval Philosophy*, i, pp. 99-113, does not mention the condemnation.

these specific ten articles were chosen, out of so many potentially contentious issues across the theological/philosophical spectrum. Within these two questions there are three areas to examine. The first area concerns the facts: the condemnation's date; its targets; the process; and what its articles cover. Some work has already been done on this, on which this study builds. The second area concerns why the condemned beliefs may have been held and why these specific issues were seen as critical. There are some studies on this, but little analysis of the group's intellectual and wider historical context as a whole. The third area concerns the condemnation's immediate and long-term effects. This study concentrates on the second area - why the beliefs were held and why tackling them was seen as crucial - with the first as essential background; the third is ground for future study. In short, the condemnation is treated here as a window through which to look at broader intellectual, historical and institutional contexts; it is not itself the only, or even the primary, object of the research.

There is no properly edited text of the condemnation. The *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, however, contains the version commonly accepted, including the order of articles, while its footnotes specify some of the variants found elsewhere.[4] William Courtenay cited twenty-three different manuscripts containing the list of articles, and further ones may yet be identified.[5] The complete list is also found in contemporary accounts, in particular Matthew Paris' *Chronica majora* (at the end of his entry for 1243), Bonaventure's commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* (c. 1250-2), and the 1256 record of the Dominican Provincial Chapter of Provence. The condemnation is referred to

[4] *CUP*, i, no. 128, pp. 170-2. The *CUP*'s footnotes are not wholly clear and the manuscript list lacks precision and is incomplete (J-G. Bougerol, 'A propos des condamnations parisiennes de 1241 et 1244', *AFH* 80 (1987), p. 462, n.3). L. Bianchi, 'Gli articoli censurati nel 1241/44 e la loro influenza da Bonaventura a Gerson', in F. Morenzoni and J.-Y. Tilliette (eds.), *Autour de Guillaume d'Auvergne (+1249)* (Turnhout, 2005), p. 156, n.3, describes an edited text as needed 'particolarmente urgente'. However, while acknowledging its limitations for the 1241/4 condemnation, W.J. Courtenay, 'The Registers of the University of Paris and the Statutes against the *Scientia Occamica*', *Vivarium*, 29 (1991), pp. 14-15, describes the *CUP* as 'a work of the highest scholarship' which mostly 'obviates the need to consult the manuscripts that lie behind it'. A better text is thus desirable, but the versions are insufficiently different to prevent the condemnation's study without it. This study adopts the *CUP*'s ordering of the articles. The Latin and English text of the articles with the main variations taken from the *CUP* is at Appendix A1; tables with the various orderings are at Appendix A2.

[5] W.J. Courtenay, 'Dominicans and Suspect Opinion in the Thirteenth Century', *Vivarium,* 32 (1994), pp. 186-90.

in numerous texts, for example by Roger Bacon and Odo Rigaud, and in the records of the 1243 Dominican General Chapter at Paris; and it is included alongside those of 1277 and others in collections of condemnations, such as the *Collectio errorum in Anglia et Parisius condempnatorum*.[6]

The 'facts' about the condemnation, as far as they are known or generally agreed, are discussed in chapter 1. As well as the date, the process and the people involved, this chapter includes an initial analysis of the articles and the issues within them. It also includes summaries of passages in works from scholars in the period of the condemnation apparently containing the aberrant propositions which illustrate the range of issues that the articles cover. Chapter 2 discusses the broader institutional, historical and doctrinal developments across the period. Chapter 3 assesses their influences on the condemnation, including the questions why the condemned propositions might have been held in the first place, why these particular ten propositions might have been chosen for censure and correction, and the connections between them.[7]

My conclusions are three-fold. First, in respect of the doctrinal and institutional climate underlying the condemnation, no single influence dominated. The period was one of developing views for theologians in Paris, based on long-term issues arising from the Bible and discussions going back at least to Augustine but now sharpened by the 'threat' of external influences. The concern this generated should be seen against the background of a developing focus among theologians on using their learning for teaching and preaching, not merely for furthering their own reputation or intellectual fulfilment; the introduction of the mendicant orders to the university from 1217 with their wider anti-heresy and missionary role; and the positions that many of the theologians involved had

[6] Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, ed. H.R. Luard (4 vols., London, 1877), iv, pp. 280-3; Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, 23.2 (*Opera omnia*, ed. A.C. Peltier, 15 vols., Paris, 1865, iii), pp. 151-2; *ACP*, pp. 65-8; *ACG*, i, p. 27; *Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus*, ed. C. du Plessis d'Argentré (3 vols., Paris, 1724-36). The *Collectio* dates from the late thirteenth century, with subsequent additions. Although its original status is unknown, evidently it acquired some official standing (J.M.M.H. Thijssen, 'What Really Happened on 7 March 1277?', in E. Sylla and M. McVaugh (eds.), *Texts and Contexts in Ancient and Medieval Science* (Leiden, 1997), pp. 85-6, 106-14).

[7] A table and a flowchart illustrating the various probable influences and contexts are at Appendix A3 and A4 respectively.

(or would go on to take up) outside the university. Papal interest in the university, not just at Paris but also (from 1229) Toulouse, also forms part of this overall background.

Second, as regards the choice, order, and possible grouping of articles, article one of the condemnation on the beatific vision appears to be the leading article, possibly the catalyst for its formulation, given the increasingly sensitive and controversial nature of the underlying issues. It is implicitly covered in the opening words on God's ineffable and incomprehensible nature in the statement of faith at the beginning of Lateran IV (1215) but not articulated explicitly there. However, following this, the articles appear to follow closely the doctrine which was set out in Lateran IV, starting with the Trinity and moving to creation, including the angelic creation and fall, the beginning of the world and of good and evil, and finally mankind's fall.[8] The content and order is too close to be coincidental - the argument that the articles are linked to the sequence in Lateran IV seems compelling.

Given the articles' reflection of Lateran IV's core principles, coupled with the doctrinal pressures facing theologians at the university in the 1230s and early 1240s and evidence of lapses from the statement of faith in many of their works, the condemnation was clearly needed to cement Lateran IV within the faculty and the groups represented there. They needed to internalise it, and thereby put their own house in order. But, as my third and major conclusion, this was not merely driven by internal self-discipline. 1241/4 was the point at which the faculty of theology itself 'came of age' and embraced responsibility for its own affairs: it aspired to leadership in the formulation and development of catholic doctrine according to the principles laid down in Lateran IV; and it saw its role as external, combatting heresy and converting unbelievers, as well as internal excellence in learning. It was to achieve this wider role that it needed 'to remove the beam in its own eye before seeing clearly to remove the mote from its brother's'.[9]

[8] The text of Lateran IV's statement of faith, together with canon two and extracts from canon three, is at Appendix B. Hexaemeral treatises were common, sometimes free-standing, and may be reflected in the ordering of topics in both Lateran IV and the condemnation.

[9] Matt. vii:3-5. This study uses the terms 'Catholic', 'catholic' and 'Latin' interchangeably, depending on context, with 'Latin' always used when contrasted with the Greek Church.

Sources[10]

This study aims to understand the condemnation of 1241/4 with contemporary eyes, not with the benefit of hindsight or retrospective extrapolation.[11] Its main sources are therefore contemporary texts or those which theologians in the period would themselves have read.[12] These texts fall into four main groups. First, there are the writings of scholars, primarily based at Paris. Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* formed an increasingly important part of the theological curriculum in the thirteenth century, becoming the standard text-book before the 1240s and providing a common structure for theological thought both at the university and within the mendicant schools. I have therefore taken as three 'control' texts, first, the *Sententiae* themselves, second, Alexander of Hales' *Glossa* on them from the 1220s and, third, Albertus Magnus' commentary on them from the 1240s.[13] These demonstrate a chronological progression of thought during the period and give a picture of the impact of the new learning. They also represent three groups: Peter Lombard, a secular master; Alexander, a secular master who became a Franciscan; Albertus, a Dominican. These works on the *Sententiae* are complemented by other contemporary theological works, most notably by William of Auvergne, secular, and the Dominicans Guerric of St.-Quentin (†1245) and Hugh of St.-Cher (†1263).[14] My choice here has been influenced by their subject matter (whether they cover the issues in the

[10] Where books and articles provide translations, I have used these with any significant changes noted. Otherwise, translations are my own.

[11] D. Salman, 'Note sur la première influence d'Averroès', *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie*, 40 (1937), p. 204: 'L'époque antérieure [prior to 1270/77] n'étant guère connue, faute de documents, les historiens du XIII^{e} siècle ont été tout naturellement amenés à la lumière des témoignages postérieurs'.

[12] Collections such as the *CUP* (the essential reference work for the university at Paris), papal documents, and records published by the mendicant orders, contain some of the documents forming the primary sources.

[13] The earliest surviving statutes of the theology faculty at Paris stipulating the study of the *Sententiae* date from c.1335-6, but most historians agree procedures were in place for at least 100 years previously - although the scarcity of extant commentaries prior to the mid-1240s suggests writing a commentary on the *Sententiae* was not compulsory earlier (N. Spatz, 'Approaches and Attitudes to a New Theology Textbook', in N. van Deusen (ed.), *The Intellectual Climate of the Early Universities* (Kalamazoo, 1997), pp. 27-52, citing Peter Comestor's metaphor of the *Sententiae* creating a path through the forest of patristic literature).

[14] The uptake of the new learning varied not just over time but between theologians and depending on the topic. B. Smalley, 'A Commentary on Isaias by Guerric of Saint-Quentin, O.P.', *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* (6 vols., Rome, 1946), ii (offprint), p. 8, contrasts Guerric of St.-Quentin's commentary, pre-1242, which uses Aristotle's four causes from his *Physics* and *Metaphysics* (translated in the late twelfth century), with Hugh of St.-Cher's only slightly earlier postilla, probably from c.1230-5, which still reflected Stephen Langton's 'moralising' approach.

condemnation) and author (whether they had a role in the condemnation or were writing in the period immediately around it). In addition, I have examined the list of questions in Douai, MS 434, both for individual questions relevant to the condemnation and for an overview of the main issues exercising theological minds in the period: with 572 entries in two volumes, dated by Palémon Glorieux mainly between 1230 and 1235-7 and apparently originating in Paris, the list is an invaluable source for the relative weight and range of current issues in the theology faculty. 510 of them comprise actual questions rather than major works of scholarship, and thus represent topics viewed as important in the 1230s, although not, perhaps, with the immediacy of quodlibets.[15]

The second group of texts is linked to the first. It comprises the documents that contemporary theologians at Paris themselves would have studied or been acquainted with, directly or indirectly. They include the Bible (and references to the various glosses on it cited by theologians); the works of the Church Fathers, both Latin (with Augustine heading the list from the fourth century) and Greek (notably pseudo-Dionysius, from around the late fourth/early fifth century, and John Damascene, from the eighth); Latin authorities such as Boethius from the late fifth/early sixth century; previous Latin works, for example by the ninth-century John Scottus Eriugena, and texts by twelfth-century Latin theologians, including Gilbert of Poitiers and Alan of Lille, still read in Paris; and, a crucial group, texts available in the Latin west from the ancient Greek philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle, and the commentaries on them by Arab and Jewish philosophers/theologians such as Avicenna (†1037), and, in the immediate run-up to the condemnation, Averroes (†1198) and Maimonides (†1204). The reception of Greek philosophical texts, starting with Boethius, and then the translators in the twelfth/thirteenth century, is critical for understanding the condemnation's context, as is the sometimes amorphous influx of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought they represent which had a major influence on the development of Latin thinking.

[15] P. Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions du manuscript de Douai 434', *RTAM*, 10 (1938), pp. 123-5, 253-65. The 572 entries include 16 sermons, the transcription of a passage from Isidore and one from Praepositinus of Cremona (†1210), and a series of 43 questions copied from Stephen Langton (†1228) or his school (Questions 339-381). 162 of the 510 remaining entries offer the name of the author.

The third group of texts comprises other contemporary texts, including those written by or against those deemed heretics, Jews, Greeks, and others outside the Catholic Church. The fourth and final group includes official or quasi-official texts, such as records of councils, papal records and letters, accounts of debates (notably with the Greek Church, 1234, and the trial of the Talmud at Paris, 1240), records of condemnations and censures, and other records related to the university at Paris, its scholarship, development and role.

Historiography

There are four main groups of secondary sources for the condemnation. The first relates to the condemnation itself, including what lay behind it and its ten articles, as well as its timing, process and contents. This is the area where the present study aims to make its first main contribution. The condemnation itself has been relatively under-researched compared to its predecessors and successors, perhaps partly because it has generally been seen as a miscellany of disjointed provisions with no obvious allure to attract scholars - such as the condemnation of major individuals or works found in earlier proscriptions, or the magnitude and clear significance of the 1277 condemnation. However, although I have found no books dedicated to it, there are a number of important articles discussing various aspects, especially by French Dominicans and others in the second half of the twentieth century but also more recently. Most of these concentrate on one or more of the condemnation's articles, in particular on who the culprit or culprits might be, or on its date and the number of times it was issued, but its derivation is also discussed in a few, and is also touched on in passing in a number of books.

The seminal study on the condemnation's derivation remains Marie-Dominique Chenu's 1947 article, 'Le dernier avatar ...', which provided the starting-point for much subsequent research. This analysed the various articles, concluding they were rooted in 'la théologie orientale', largely inspired by the Neoplatonism of the Greek Fathers.[16] While accepting this proposition as a starting point, more recently Luca Bianchi, in his 2005

[16] M.-D. Chenu, 'Le dernier avatar de la théologie orientale en Occident au XIII siècle', in *Melanges Auguste Pelzer* (Louvain, 1947), pp. 159-81.

article, 'Gli articoli censurati …', noted this 'teologia orientale' intertwined and interacted with other 'platonismi cristiani', including pseudo-Dionysius, Boethius and Eriugena, and with 'pensiero avicenniano'. Chenu postulated that some of the theories resulting from this complicated mixture of theological traditions were widespread among Dominicans in particular.[17] Other views include those of Richard Schenk in 2011, who viewed the condemnation in the context of 'a wider reaction around 1241 against the new Aristotelian influence … at the university, since several of the theses suggest a tendency to reduce salvitic-historical theology to philosophical-sapiental theology'.[18] There is thus no agreed view. This present study aims to take a fresh look at the condemnation's derivation, based on a detailed study of all ten articles, although it accepts that, especially with the lack of any information on the masters' discussions preceding the condemnation's issue, this will not be the final word but merely a contribution, hopefully to inspire further debate.

However, the main focus of scholarship specifically on the condemnation so far has centred on its date and the number of times it was issued, with different manuscripts variously dating it to 1241 and 1244. The debate originated with André Callebaut in 1927, who argued that it was imposed twice, in 1241 and 1244, followed by Auguste Pelzer who disagreed, arguing instead for 1241, the date contained in the manuscript adopted by the *CUP*. Victorin Doucet re-ignited the debate in 1247, supporting Callebaut on a double imposition, followed by Jacques-Guy Bougerol in 1987. This view is now generally, although not universally, accepted, including by William Courtnenay in 1994 and Chenu in 2005. Discussions on date have also touched on the process of condemnation, for example, whether its issue in 1241 was as a censure with no penalties attached, with that in 1244 a more judicial event. The most substantive discussion is that of Courtenay in 1994, supported by Chenu in 2005.[19] The present study reviews the evidence on both

[17] Bianci, 'Gli articoli censurati', pp. 158-9.
[18] R. Schenk, 'Analogy as the *discrimen naturae et gratiae*', in T.J. White (ed.), *The Analogy of Being* (Michigan, 2011), pp. 184-7.
[19] V. Doucet, 'La date des condamnations parisiennes dites de 1241', in *Mélanges A. Pelzer* (Louvain, 1947), pp. 183-93; A. Callebaut, 'Alexander de Halès, O.F.M. et ses confrères en face de condemnations parisiennes de 1241 et 1244', *La France Franciscaine*, 10 (1927), pp. 189-272; Bougerol, 'A propos des condamnations parisiennes', pp. 462-6; Courtenay, 'Dominicans', pp. 186-90; Bianci, 'Gli articoli

counts. It argues that the evidence for a dual imposition is compelling. On process, firm conclusions are impossible given the lack of direct evidence, but the study takes the view that the condemnation's main aim was the establishment of correct doctrine, not the pursuit of individual culprits, even in its second imposition, although this may well have been a more formal issue with penalties attached. It also questions the generally held assumption that Stephen of Venizy was the key 'offender'.

The remaining three groups of secondary sources provide crucial scholarship to set the condemnation in context and illuminate the issues within it. The first of these comprises research on medieval condemnations generally, their nature, use, process, and other issues. Discussions include that of Hans Thijssen in 1998.[20] However, with the exception of the articles referred to above, especially that of Courtenay in 1994, the 1241/4 condemnation is ignored or receives only passing reference. The discussions thus serve primarily to position the condemnation within the overall development of medieval condemnations. The second group comprises numerous philosophical and theological works on the areas covered in the condemnation, such as the beatific vision, medieval views of the Trinity, and angels. Major works include, for example, Christian Trottmann's detailed study of the beatific vision in 1995.[21] While most do not refer to the condemnation's articles, they form essential background to their understanding. They include the introductions to edited or translated texts, for example Roland Teske's invaluable introductions to his translations of William of Auvergne's works and his articles on them. These are referenced where cited.

The final group comprises works looking at the period historically - at key events, people, controversies, Lateran IV and issues around the papacy (including Pope Gregory IX's quarrel with the Emperor Frederick II), heresy, relations between Christians and Jews and between the Latin and Greek Churches, and pressing threats such as the Mongols. The

censurati', pp. 156-7. See also P. Glorieux, 'Les années 1242-1247 à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris', *RTAM* 29 (1962), pp. 234-49.

[20] J,M.M.H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris 1200-1400* (Philadelphia, 1998).

[21] C. Trottmann, *La vision béatifique des disputes scolastiques à sa definition par Benoît XII* (Paris, 1995).

issue of heresy is particularly controversial and is discussed in more detail in chapter two, together with the role played by theologians at Paris in the period of the condemnation in shaping the agenda.[22] This fourth category also includes institutional developments, both that of the university at Paris and of bodies such as the Franciscans and Dominicans, whose existence and role became a major influence institutionally and doctrinally within the university. Here the works of John Baldwin in 1970, Stephen Ferruolo in 1985, Ian Wei in 2012 and Spencer Young in 2014, are particularly notable in their analysis of the gradual development of the twelfth-century Parisian schools into a university in the thirteenth.[23] The 1230s and 1240s are a critical period within this development, and, as its second main contribution, the present study aims to throw further light on this through analysis of the maturing role and increasingly collegiate approach of the masters of theology which it argues the condemnation demonstrates.

Methodology

While this study aims to see the condemnation with contemporary eyes, its focus is not on the attribution of the condemned propositions to individual theologians. This is clearly of interest and, where possible, this study includes such attributions from its own findings or drawn from earlier research. But the primary aim is broader, to set the condemnation in the context of wider doctrinal, intellectual, institutional and historical trends at the university at Paris.

The evidence of the primary sources needs, as ever, a cautious approach. They are written by individuals or bodies with their own perspectives, selectivity and misunderstandings, and with their own points to make. This has been much discussed in the context of heresy texts, but is true more generally. The study therefore tries to look at them in context, rather than at face value. Moreover, the amount of material is formidable, with many texts unedited. Since my aim is to look at trends rather than individual

[22] Below, pp. 136-8.
[23] J.W. Baldwin, *Masters, Princes and Merchants* (2 vols., Princeton, 1970); S.C. Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University* (Stanford, California, 1985); I.P. Wei, *Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris* (Cambridge, 2012); Young, *Scholarly Community*.

attributions, my selection has been made on that basis, with a focus where possible on edited texts. Finally, to avoid viewing the 1240s through later perspectives, I have concentrated on primary texts only up to c.1244, the last probable date for the condemnation. The exception is works in the years immediately following this, where they still reflect the perspectives of that period, albeit with the requisite adjustments to doctrine. However, I have not looked at the impact of the condemnation. This would be a fascinating study in itself, but impacts are often unintended and could distort contemporary assessment of the underlying issues, particularly as theologians continued to develop their understanding of the newly translated material and would have viewed the condemnation's articles in the light of their new perspectives.

I have used the secondary sources primarily for the information they provide, but, where they discuss the influences behind the condemnation, my study provides a critical commentary on their conclusions. In particular, as discussed above, it seeks to moderate the tendency to distinguish between discrete intellectual traditions, as well as endeavouring to throw new light on the development of the university at Paris and the theology masters within it at a critical stage of its development.[24]

An example of the caution needed in trying to reach a contemporary understanding of the condemnation comes from the issue of academic freedom. As is demonstrated by the collective approaches to the pope by the masters in the late twelfth/early thirteenth century - which concerned only status, not intellectual freedom - academic freedom meant the freedom of an academic body to regulate itself (not, as now, freedom of teaching or learning).[25] Moreover, the vast majority of scholars would be unwilling to transgress a doctrinal 'orthodoxy' that was being refined throughout this period. As Godfrey of Fontaines argued in the aftermath of 1277, truths required for salvation were distinct from truths that were neutral to faith: only where the truth affected matters of faith, since

[24] Above, pp. 10-13.

[25] Below, pp. 15-17. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy*, pp. 90-93. Augustine condemned inner intellectual freedom as *curiositas*, corrupting the mind through indulging the senses and grouped with pride and lust as the three categories of sin (E. Peters, '*Libertas inquirendi* and the v*itium curiositatis* in Medieval Thought', in *La notion de liberté au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1985), pp. 90-1).

salvation was at stake, should they be pursued by speaking out against improper condemnation.[26] Regulation of doctrine formed part of the developing exercise of authority by the theology masters, together with their growing perception of their role as reformers and teachers, stemming from the criticisms of the early reformers and encapsulated in the 1215 university statutes which gave them the right to design and enforce their own rules.[27] Indeed, by demonstrating their adherence to catholic principles, the masters' acceptance of, and participation in the exercise of, such authority could strengthen their confidence in the importance of their collective leadership in doctrinal matters and support the emerging position of the faculty as a trusted source of learning and specialised knowledge at the highest intellectual level.

The condemnation in context[28]

The condemnation took place in a turbulent period politically, and at an early period in the development of a university at Paris. The disparate twelfth-century Parisian schools had enjoyed differing legal status and fell under different academic disciplines, some with self-appointed charismatic teachers or masters, some connected with institutions. Students were largely free to manage their studies as they wished and the masters could choose what to teach and the texts to follow, although informal lists existed.[29] These schools

[26] Godfrey of Fontaines, *Les Quodlibets V, VI et VII*, in *Les philosophes Belges*, eds. M. de Wulf, J. Hoffmans and O. Lottin (15 vols., Louvain, 1904-37), iii, quodlibet VII, Q. 18, pp. 402-5 (cit. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy,* pp. 91-2, 156). Thirteenth-century cases demonstrate academic debate allowed considerable flexibility, with apparently heretical ideas permitted in argumentation. Censured propositions provided guidelines for debate - but became critical when conclusions were drafted, with a status approaching that of conciliar statements. The way a scholar was treated depended on whether he continued to maintain views contrary to catholicism once corrected, whether he promulgated such views outside the university, and, if so, whether he was politically protected (W.J. Courtenay, 'Inquiry and Inquisition: Academic Freedom in Medieval Universities', *CH*, 58 (1989), especially p. 181). Johannes Teutonicus' apparatus of glosses on Lateran IV, composed almost immediately afterwards in 1215, stated (on Joachim of Fiore): 'Si paratus erat corrigi, non debebat dici hereticus, licet erraret in fide …' (cf. *Constitutiones concilii quarti Lateranensis una cum commentariis glossatorum*, ed. A. García y García (Rome, 1981), p. 188).

[27] Below, p. 83.

[28] For the political background of the period, see below, pp. 74-5. For the development of the role of theologians at the university, see below, pp. 77-80. J. Van Engen's introduction to idem (ed.), *Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval University* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 2000), pp. 1-4, contains a brief summary of the development of modern scholarship in this area. For the condemnation's process, see below, pp. 25-8, and for earlier censures, pp. 17-20, 92-101.

[29] For discussion of the nature of the twelfth-century Parisian schools, the early years at the university at Paris and the implications of institutionalization in terms of the transition to a community of masters,

attracted students from across Europe with their illustrious teachers; but they gradually developed into a more corporate but equally prestigious body in the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, with statutes granted to the emerging organisation in 1215.[30] However, the statutes were only part of a process of the embryonic university's institutional formulation and refinement both before 1215 and subsequently - involving its successful struggle for rights, including corporate status, protection from the French monarchy, the right to treat in the papal court, and limitations on the chancellor's powers over the conferral of licences to teach. Such achievements must have increased the masters' belief in their collective power. This was accompanied by an increasing coherence within the university as a whole. The decision to go on strike in 1239, alberit with the exception of the mendicants, and its successful result (with the papal bull, *Parens scientiarum*, providing additional securities) demonstrates this growing institutional self-confidence. The institutionalization also led to the increasing imposition of rules on the progression and methods of study, the curricula and the texts to be taught (and those prohibited) from 1215 onwards. It was as part of this development that the study of philosophy per se, in the emerging arts faculty, became subordinated in status to that of theology, and implicitly increasingly under its control.[31]

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collective decision-making, compulsory rules and statutes, and uniformity in ways of teaching, see J. Verger, 'The First French Universities and the Institutionalization of Learning: Faculties, Curricula, Degrees', in Van Engen (ed.), op.cit., pp. 5-19. See also W.J. Courtenay, 'The Institutionalism of Theology', in Van Engen (ed.), op.cit., pp. 247-9; Ferruolo, *Origins of the University*, passim; Wei, *Intellectual Culture*, pp. 88-9; G. Post, 'Parisian Masters as a Corporation, 1200-1246', *Speculum*, 9 (1934), pp. 430-443. This evolution was attributable at least in part to an emerging professional identity based on common values and consciousness of responsibilities. S.E. Young, 'Queen of the Faculties: Theology and Theologians at the University of Paris, c.1215-c.1250' (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Ph.D. thesis, 2009), pp. 42-59, argues that, as well as corporate unity, a standardised curriculum and internal discipline were key to creating the theology faculty's reputation and helped the masters to establish themselves 'as definitive arbiters of Christian orthodoxy' (see also Young, *Scholarly Community*, pp. 57-8). A letter from Innocent III to the bishop of Paris in 1207 (*CUP*, i, no. 5, p. 65) restricting the number of theology masters in Paris to eight can be seen as an early step in the institutionalization of theology in Paris generally and the emerging university.

[30] The 1215 statutes were a landmark - although mainly regularising the status quo, for the first time they defined the masters' powers and limitations statutorily, with more independence from the chancellor and bishop (G. Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (New York, 1968), pp. 25-27).

[31] Verger, 'First French Universities', pp. 11-3; M.J. Jordan, '*Philosopica disciplina*: Learning to Teach Philosophy in a University', in Van Engen (ed.), *Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval University* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 2000), p. 113.

The development of discrete faculties at the university at Paris formed a piece of this picture. Contemporay documents for the early period are inconclusive on the relationship between the faculties and the university - indeed the term 'facultas' to mean a body not merely an academic discipline only became standard in the middle of the thirteenth century, although it is clear that the groupings later regularised as faculties existed much earlier, with masters in the different disciplines comprising specific groups.[32] The arts faculty was established as a legal corporation by the middle of the thirteenth century, while the three higher faculties of theology, canon law and medicine remained without formal status until the second half of the century. However, while as the largest faculty and the first to acquire legal status, the rector of the faculty of arts increasingly took on the role of head of the university, it remained the junior discipline. Indeed, it appears that the theology masters kept a careful eye on developments there, and first the pope and later the theology masters, with the bishop of Paris, acted to restrain its activities. This may, perhaps, have been because, with the exception of the mendicants, all the theology masters had graduated through the arts faculty - the texts both studied and produced there formed the foundation for their later studies and thus gave them a vested interest in the contents of its syllabus.[33]

It is as part of this gradual and incremental development of a university at Paris that the 1241/4 condemnation should be viewed. It represented a further step in the theology faculty's institutionalization and increasingly collective approach. Moreover, as this study argues, it may possibly be the first example of the theology faculty exerting control over that of the arts, if in fact its provisions covered members of both.[34]

Finally, in respect of both content and process, the condemnation should be seen in the context of other proceedings to deal with problematic teaching, in particular in the

[32] For the use of the term 'faculty', see O. Wiijers, *Terminologie des universités au XIII^e siècle* (Rome, 1987), pp. 52-5. For the first clear use, in 1253, of 'facultas' to mean university faculty, see *CUP*, i, no. 219, pp. 242-4. For earlier evidence of masters being treated as specific groups, see, for example, *CUP*, i, no. 108, pp. 157-8, from 1235.
[33] Spencer, *Scholarly Community*, pp. 20-32; Wei, *Intellectual Culture*, pp. 110-4.
[34] Below, pp. 28-30.

aftermath of the university statutes of 1215 and Lateran IV. The condemnation was the first such process to focus, not on a particular individual or individuals, but on a group of doctrines, probably from a range of sources and of perpetrators. This became a precedent to be followed, most notably in 1270 and 1277.[35] The significance of this departure can easily be obscured when viewed in the light of such developments; but it is striking that all earlier censures and prohibitions were targeted at specific works or individuals and their followers, albeit sometimes with the aberrant doctrine specified, rather than primarily at the doctrines themselves. Moreover, the anonymity of any censured individuals in the 1241/4 condemnation (with one exception) was a notable departure from previous practice which needs explanation.

Of the specific earlier actions, the first known academic censure recorded at the university at Paris was within the theology faculty, against Amaury of Bène in 1205-6, probably started by some of its members prior to Amaury's unsuccessful appeal to the pope.[36] An episcopal synod at Sens in 1210 followed - this banned all reading in public or secret of Aristotle's works on metaphysics and natural philosophy, together with retrospective action against Amaury, a ban on David of Dinant's works, and the handing-over of some theological tracts written in French to local bishops. This synod may also have banned Eriugena's *Periphyseon*, but this is disputed. Subsequently, at Rome, as well as its statement of faith and action generally against heresy, Lateran IV condemned Joachim of Fiore's Trinitarian doctrine (and endorsed Peter Lombard's) together with Amaury's theories, with his teachings viewed as more mad than heretical. In the run-up to Lateran IV, Robert of Courson, papal legate, formulated the first statutes for the university at Paris - these reinforced the ban on teaching Aristotelian texts on metaphysics and natural philosophy, or summaries of them, and the works of Amaury, David of Dinant and

[35] Doctrines, not individuals, were similarly in the dock in the contemporaneous Talmud Trial, below, pp. 145-8 (Y. Schwartz, 'Authority, Control, and Conflict in Thirteenth-Century Paris', in E. Baumgarten and J.D. Galinsky (eds.), *Jews and Christians in Thirteenth-Century France* (New York, 2015), p. 96).

[36] For the differences between condemnations against heretics and Amaury's academic censure and its successors, see J.M.M.H. Thijssen, 'Master Amalric and the Amalricians', *Speculum*, 71 (1996), pp. 43, 48-9, n. 18. For details on this and the following censures, see below, pp. 92-101.

'Mauricius Hispanus', although this ban appears now to have been restricted to the arts faculty.

The next significant ruling on reading and/or teaching specifically at the university came in 1225, when Pope Honorius III commanded the archbishops of France to search out and burn copies of Eriugena's *Periphyseon* (mentioning, possibly erroneously, that it had been condemned earlier by the Archbishop of Sens), and specifically and comprehensively prohibiting it for those in monasteries and elsewhere ('aliis locis') and those in cloisters or studying and too keen on new ideas. Finally, in 1231, and again relating primarily to texts and authors, Pope Gregory IX's bull, *Parens scientiarum*, reiterated for the arts faculty at Paris the 1210 ban imposed on Aristotle's natural philosophy until the books had been examined and purged, and ordered the theology masters not to appear as philosophers but keep to theological works and those of the Fathers, together with other self-restraints. This was accompanied by the pope's letter to 'Master W.' and others, asking them to examine and expurgate the banned books on nature to exclude those texts which were erroneous, scandalous or offensive and allow study of the rest.

It is notable that, except for the initial censure of Amaury of Bène, all these condemnations were externally imposed by the pope or his legates or bishops, even if triggered by concerns voiced from within the university. This was even the case with the 1215 university statutes, imposed by Robert of Courson, although he was previously a student and briefly chancellor at Paris.[37]

The 1241/4 condemnation thus emerges as an important step in the development of the identity of a university of teaching masters at Paris. This was both in its targeting of

[37] Ferruolo, *Origins of the University*, pp. 288-295. Earlier papal interventions included those by Innocent II (at Bernard of Clairvaux's instigation) against Peter Abelard, 1140, and Gilbert of Poitiers, 1148, and those of Alexander III in 1164 (condemning various theological doctrines - including some from Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* - and requiring Maurice of Sully, bishop of Paris, to prohibit their teaching throughout France). For Alexander's follow-up actions in 1170 and 1177, see *CUP*, i, no. 3, p. 4, no. 9, pp. 8-9. For the Trinitarian positions of Peter Lombard and others, see F. Robb, 'The Fourth Lateran Council's Definition of Trinitarian Orthodoxy', *JEH*, 48 (1997), pp. 22-43.

doctrines rather than texts or individuals, with its required beliefs, or 'truths', picking up a positive, not merely preventive, role, and in the internal nature of its imposition. This new approach fits the context that this study envisages for the condemnation. It demonstrates a new, more ambitious, attitude among Paris theology masters, eager to assert their own authority and serve the Church but who were also masters of their own affairs. The different affiliations and views between mendicants and seculars, as well as other divisions which emerged subsequently in the 1250s, may have been present in embryo, but the early 1240s were a period of relative unity for a theology faculty keen to develop its influence and role. If the formation of 'the university' in 1215 was itself a response to a recognised need to clarify the organisational and doctrinal complexity of a plethora of individual schools and masters, the events of the 1230s and 1240s need to be seen as part of the same process. The period from 1215 to the end of the 1240s needs to be treated as a continuum - a formative time, with the 1241/4 condemnation a defining moment within it.

CHAPTER ONE: THE CONDEMNATION

'I'LL TELL THEE EVERYTHING I CAN; THERE'S LITTLE TO RELATE'[1]

This chapter sets out what is known or generally agreed about the condemnation - its imposition, dating, contents, and the issues that the ten articles cover. The aim is to provide as firm a basis as possible for the subsequent critical assessment of its significance.

Imposition

Date and number of times imposed

The date and number of times the condemnation was imposed are disputed, but the majority of modern scholars favour a double imposition, with a quasi-advisory imposition or censure on 13 January, 1241, probably with no penalty attached, and a quasi-judicial action on 5 January, 1244, with the sanction of excommunication. The manuscripts are divided on the date, but 1241 cannot be eliminated: it cannot easily be explained away as a palaeographic error in those manuscripts in which it appears (the year could be an error, but a scribe could not realistically have confused 'in octava epiphanie' with 'nonis ianuarii'); and a reference in the Dominican General Chapter, in Paris at Whitsun 1243, to 'errores condempnatos per magistros Parisienses' is clear evidence that something of this nature happened prior to that date. But against this, the manuscript evidence taken as a whole supports 1244, and this is also the date given by Matthew Paris, who specifies the date as after the festival of St. Michael, 1243, i.e. after 29 September 1243, the start of the academic year, in an account which sets out the ten articles accurately.[2] Both dates cannot be right without envisaging some sort of double imposition.

[1] Lewis Carroll, 'The Aged Aged Man', *Alice through the Looking Glass* (London, 1872), p. 225.
[2] *MOFP*, i, p. 27; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, iv, pp. 280-3. On dating, see Bianci, 'Gli articoli censurati', pp. 156-7; Bougerol, 'A propos des condamnations parisiennes', pp. 462-6; A. Callebaut, 'Alexander de Halès', pp. 189-272; Courtenay, 'Dominicans', pp. 186-90; Doucet, 'La date', pp. 183-93; Glorieux, 'Les années', pp. 234-49.

There is also some literary evidence for a dual imposition. These include an intriguing passage from Roger Bacon, writing in the 1260s:

> 'For with the university of Paris in convocation ('universitate Parisiensi convocata'), I twice saw and heard ('bis vidi et audivi') … William [of Auvergne] bishop of Paris … in the presence of all pronounce ('sententiare') that the agent intellect cannot be part of the mind; and … Robert [Grosseteste] bishop of Lincoln and brother Adam of Marisco [Marsh] and his elders/superiors affirmed this same thing …'.[3]

Bacon gives no dates, but 1241 and 1244 are both possible, as Bacon was probably at the university in Paris at this time. However, the condemnation does not include the agent intellect. There are thus three possibilities: first, Bacon was referring to two different, otherwise unknown, formal or quasi-formal events, which seems unlikely, even given the relative scarcity of records; second, his memory was wrong and the events never took place in that form or he has confused the topic, possible but again unlikely; third, there was something William said which directly or indirectly related to the agent intellect and which Bacon remembered since it was relevant to his studies. Given the wide agenda this study envisages underlying each article in the condemnation, this is possible. There may be a link with article seven on eternal truths which appears to include the issue of how God and, by extrapolation, humans know, and hence the intellect's functioning; or article eight on the eternity of the world - an eternal world could imply an infinity of souls; or, since the agent intellect's role, including whether it was separate from the soul and whether it remained in souls after death and their continued individuality, was problematic, article one on the beatific vision could be in the frame.[4] If so, Bacon's

[3] Roger Bacon, *Opus maius,* ed. J.H. Bridges (3 vols., Turnhout, 2010), iii, 2.5, p. 47. 'Universitate Parisiensi convocata' implies a formal or quasi-formal occasion; 'sententiare' implies a verdict or judgment.

[4] Bacon must have been in Paris by 1245, probably earlier (A. Power, *Roger Bacon and the Defence of Christendom* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 37-8). Given he studied the agent intellect at Paris in the 1240s (Salmon, 'Note', pp. 203-12), he should have recalled anything William of Auvergne said on this subject accurately. See also T.N. Noone, 'Roger Bacon and Richard Rufus on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*', *Vivarium*, 3 (1997), pp. 256-7; R.C. Dales, 'Robert Grosseteste's Place in Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World', *Speculum*, 61 (1986), pp. 557-8. For the agent (or active intellect), see below, p. 115, n. 102.

comment sheds light on the formal process of the condemnation and suggests that more than the bare articles may have been discussed at a convocation of university masters.

The commentary on the *Sententiae* by the Franciscan and one time student of Alexander of Hales, Odo Rigaud, written probably c.1243-5 when in Paris, also supports a double imposition.[5] In commenting on distinctions 1 and 10 of the first book, Odo stated in both passages: 'Sed hec opinio recessit ab aula' (literally, 'left the hall'). Articles one and three of the condemnation respectively reflect these distinctions. Odo's commentary on the second book, distinction 9, which reflects article nine, used a different formulation:

> 'To the next question, whether greater graces are given according to greater natural goods, we should say that 'according to' can be mean causal, or fitting, or dispositional. If causal, it is completely false, and was condemned among the articles which were condemned by the masters with the bishop of Paris ('reprobatum inter articulos qui reprobati sunt a magistris cum episcopo Parisiensis')'.

This last formulation clearly indicates a formal condemnation. But the wording 'recessit ab aula' in the first two suggests a different process - it simply meant that the opinions were prohibited, with teaching them at the university forbidden. The most likely scenario is that Odo's references refer to two different phases in the condemnation.[6]

Finally, a number of passages in works by Alexander of Hales, Guerric of St.-Quentin and others contained the banned propositions and were then corrected, a process which fits nicely with a double imposition. The original passages are unlikely to have been written following a formal condemnation carrying excommunication without stronger action against the authors than simply correction. However, their correction does not necessarily entail the existence of a previous censure - arguably the passages, written before a formal condemnation, could have been corrected in anticipation of its single

[5] For the date, see W.C. Jordan, 'Archbishop Eudes Rigaud and the Jews of Normandy 1248-1275', in S.E. Myers and S.J. McMichael (eds.), *The Friars and Jews in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (Leiden, 2004), p. 41.

[6] For this interpretation, see Doucet, 'La date', pp. 188-90. Doucet notes it was the difference between Bacon's two descriptions (Bruges, MS 208, ff. 8va, 45va-b, contrasted with f. 231ra) that first made him question a single imposition.

imposition if the results of the masters' deliberations were discussed and known in advance (although there is no evidence whether this was common practice), or immediately on its issue to comply with it. A stronger argument for a double condemnation comes from a reference by the Dominican Gerard of Fracheto in his *Vitae Fratrum*, written c.1255-60. This refers to a certain very religious brother ('frater quidam valde religiosus') who nevertheless fell into novel opinions ('novas opiniones') which were judged erroneous and dangerous. However, he did not accept his error or correct his work.[7] This has been interpreted as referring to 'Frater Stephanus', the only person named formally in any manuscript containing the text of the 1241/4 condemnation.[8] If the attribution to Brother Stephanus is right, and also the identification of this individual with Stephen of Venizy, then, given Stephen's untarnished future career (he became a master and was one of the signatories to the Talmud's condemnation in 1247/8), his intransigence seems unlikely in the face of a judicial condemnation. There is also the case of John Pagus, connected with the condemnation through a fourteenth-century marginal annotation to one manuscript 'Errores Pagi'. Two contemporary references to Pagus' 'errores' reflect articles three and five of the condemnation, and an unexplained break in his lectures on the *Sententiae*, probably in early 1244, could reflect his failure to observe an initial 1241 censure and might have contributed to its subsequent formal re-imposition in 1244.[9]

Taken together, this adds weight to a dual process, but such a hypothesis still demands caution - there is no explicit reference to a double imposition as might have been expected somewhere among extant documents, and the evidence in its favour is circumstantial and inconclusive. However, the lack of any explicit reference to a dual

[7] Gerard de Fracheto, *Vitae fratrum*, ed. B.M. Reichart (2 vols., Rome, 1896), i, p. 208.
[8] For example, Doucet, 'La date', p. 463, n. 8, assumes this equation.
[9] H. Hansen, *John Pagus on Aristotle's Categories* (Leuven, 2012), p. 20, n. 23, citing and dating Vat., Lat., MS 692, f. 179v (the fourteenth-century manuscript), and Anon, *Tractatus de fide secundum diversos magistros* (Münster, Universitatätsbibl., MS 257, ff. 72vb-73va) and Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat., MS 15652, f. 54rb (the two contemporary manuscripts). For the argument on Pagus, see Glorieux, 'Les années', pp. 234-249. Gregory IX wrote to Louis IX in 1231 about 'master John Pagus' (*CUP*, i, no. 90, pp. 145-6). Hansen argues Pagus was an arts master then, but subsequently became a theologian, with his lectures on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* dating to c.1243-5. M.-D Chenu, 'Maîtres et bacheliers de l'Université de Paris v. 1240', *Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du XIII^e siècle*, 1 (1932), p. 34, suggests Pagus' lectures on the *Sententiae* could have started as early as 1240 - but the break could still follow the condemnation's first imposition. See also Alexander, *Summa*, iv, p. ccliii.

process would not be unprecedented. A condemnation of the errors of John of Brescain and master Raymond in 1247 by Odo of Châteauroux, now papal legate, acting with the chancellor and theology masters at Paris and with the consent of the bishop, William of Auvergne, who was indisposed, was clearly a second hearing - the *CUP* entry refers to their earlier failure to mend their ways (for John, it states he had abjured under oath the errors which he had propounded in logic and for which he was well known and stood accused, whereas Raymond had at one time been transferred to prison by the Parisian master - presumably the bishop - according to the advice of the masters of theology for his uncorrected errors). However, there is no extant record of any earlier process (although the 1241/4 condemnation itself is not impossible).[10] The most likely scenario, therefore, and probably the only one to make sense on present evidence, is a two-stage condemnation, an initial censure in 1241 followed by a formal condemnation in 1244.

If so, two consequences follow. First, it throws the spotlight on the intervening years, 1241-4. In the case of John of Brescain and master Raymond, the second event states why it was needed - both had failed to submit to the previous rulings. Some explanation is therefore required - such as the failures of those originally targeted, or of theologians at Paris more generally, to comply, or outside events or developments which could have increased sensitivities. Second, two identical processes seem improbable. This leads to the second question, the imposition process and those involved.

Process

The facts relating to the tribunal imposing the 1241/4 condemnation and its authority are not specified in contemporary records. However, it appears from its introductory lines that it fell within the disciplinary consistory of the chancellor, one of four tribunals probably existing at the time.[11] As regards the authority under which the chancellor

[10] *CUP*, i, no. 176, pp. 206-8. It is certainly tempting to see the first process where John was rebuked as the 1241/4 condemnation (the timing fits, but too little is still known about John and his errors - see below, pp. 25, 28-9). Raymond's exact errors are unspecified.

[11] Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy*, pp. 5-19, while stressing the need for caution in extrapolating backwards, distinguishes four tribunals for dealing with charges of false teaching, largely based on fourteenth-century cases: 'the [disciplinary] consistory of the chancellor and masters of theology of the University of Paris, the

acquired this role, an oath taken by bachelors of theology, first recorded in 1364, set out rules on prescribed doctrines and proper morals - the bachelors were required to report anyone contravening the oath to the bishop or chancellor within seven days. While this may not have been in place as early as the condemnation, in particular for the mendicants, the same principles of morality and doctrinal conformity were encapsulated in the 1215 university statutes and in *Parens scientiarum*. *Parens scientiarum* also specified the roles to be taken by the different authorities - it required the chancellor to satisfy himself on the worthiness of any candidate for a licence to teach theology before bestowing it; it gave authority to the masters to legislate their own 'constitutions ('constitutiones)'' and 'ordinances ('ordinationes')' and punish those contravening these; and it gave the bishop the right to punish miscreants to preserve the honour of the scholars ('scholarium servetur honestas').[12] Thus, from the early thirteenth century, theology masters at Paris took on a formal role as guardians of proper doctrine. They operated under the bishop's authority and the chancellor's direction, but the masters' collective expertise and identity was critical. The contrast here with the 1225 ban on Eriugena's *Periphyseon* is significant. In 1225 the pope took the lead, instructing archbishops and others to comply. In 1241/4 the bishop of Paris, its chancellor, and the theology masters, shared in the decision, with separate roles but a self-regulatory, collaborative approach.[13]

The developing role of the chancellor supports this overall picture. Freeing the masters from his restrictive practices when awarding teaching licences etc., was a major preoccupation as the twelfth-century schools developed into a university. But chancellors

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episcopal court, the papal court, and a [disciplinary] forum of the minister general of a religious order and his advisers'. Courtenay, 'Dominicans', pp. 193-4, argues that where an allegation was first reported was important in the tribunal choice, but that any supposed jurisdictional conflict between chancellor and bishop has been exaggerated, since both could involve the same process, with the chancellor, under the bishop's authority, engaging the theology masters in the assessment. Any resultant censure could issue as an episcopal letter, or, as in 1241/4, as an edict of the chancellor and theological faculty, under the bishop's authority or in his name. Lateran IV, canon 8 (*Ecumenical Councils,* i, pp. 237-9), legislated for a process of 'inquisitio' for 'irregularities' of clerics, triggered by 'complaint and report' reaching their superiors (rather than specific accusation, 'accusatio'). Courtenay's reconstruction (below, pp. 27-8) assumes the 1241/4 process started with an 'accusatio' - but it could have been an 'inquisitio'.

[12] *CUP*, iii, no. 1299, pp. 120-1 (c.f. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy*, pp. 9, 126-7, nn. 44, 46-7); Courtenay, 'Dominicans', pp. 186-190, 193-195; *CUP*, i, no. 20, pp. 78-9, no. 79, pp. 136-9.

[13] Courtenay, 'Inquiry and Inquisition', p. 173.

themselves appear to have responded by developing their own role, consciously or unconsciously, becoming more collaborative with the theology masters. Philip the Chancellor (chancellor 1217-36) supported the university in the 1229-31 strike. He was also, unusually, a leading theologian, as was Praepositinus of Cremona (chancellor 1206-9). Odo of Châteauroux was involved in doctrinal issues with the masters throughout his chancellorship (1238-44), not just the 1241/4 condemnation but, perhaps most notably, action against the Jews in the 1240s. Moreover, his sermon output was prodigious, many aimed at university scholars, and his name is associated with the banning of Eriugena's *Periphyseon*.[14] The relationship between theology masters and chancellor, in other words, seems to have become more collective, although tensions would certainly have remained.

William Courtenay combines the different opening lines of the 1241/4 condemnation, which refer variously to William of Auvergne, as bishop of Paris, Odo of Châteauroux as chancellor, and the theology masters (often mentioning Alexander of Hales), to offer one possible reconstruction. This appears to apply specifically to the formal process - its probable second stage - although he is sympathetic to the theory of a double imposition. He envisages William delegating the judicial process to Odo and the theology masters, with Odo in charge. William then approved the result and imposed excommunication on anyone maintaining the banned propositions. However, as Courtenay notes, from the limited information available, the exact process cannot be determined, nor who brought an accusation against 'Brother Stephanus' - the only named culprit in only one manuscript - or compiled the propositions.[15] Nevertheless, Courtenay concludes that the faculty of theology had now become the main judicial forum in Paris for such cases; and, albeit judging from later practice, he argues the Dominican convent of St.-Jacques probably provided the venue with university members assembled there, or anyway its masters, although there would not have been room for all.[16]

[14] Young, *Scholarly Community*, p. 74. For the Jews and for Eriugena, see below, pp. 145-6 and 92-5.
[15] Paris, BN., Lat., MS 16360, f. 3r.
[16] Courtenay, 'Dominicans', pp. 186-90. For the use of St.-Jacques for university business, see M.M. Mulchahey, *First the Bow is Bent in Study* (Toronto, 1998), pp. 26-7. The equation of 'Frater Stephanus'

Courtenay's reconstruction seems largely persuasive. However, whether single or double, I am dubious about too close an association of Stephen of Venizy, or any 'Frater Stephanus', with the proceedings. This is for four reasons. First, there is only one reference to him, and he is not mentioned by, for example, Matthew Paris. Second, for any one person to have advocated all ten very different propositions seems unlikely.[17] Third, numerous others were implicated and not mentioned. They could have been too famous to be publicly shamed or their views not yet identified, but Matthew Paris clearly knew more theologians were involved, principally Dominicans and Franciscans, and, even if subsequently, some of these culprits were in fact identified.[18] Finally, in contrast to the proceedings against other individuals, such as John of Brescain, where the culprit is clearly associated with specific errors, this does not apply to 'Frater Stephanus'.[19]

Individuals and faculties

This raises the question whether any individuals were in fact inculpated. The answer must be yes. 'Frater Stephanus' is named in one manuscript, John Pagus, also by then in the theology faculty, is also associated with the banned propositions, and numerous others

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with Stephen of Venizy is generally accepted, as no other Dominican or Franciscan is identifiable at the university in 1241/4. However, most friars studying at Paris were not supposed to aim for a degree, so the number of known masters is misleading (D.L. d'Avray, *The Preaching of the Friars* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 134-5). An unrecorded Stephen is therefore possible. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy*, pp. 9-12, extrapolating backwards from the 1360s, suggests that initially such cases may have been evaluated privately by a disciplinary tribunal of masters and the chancellor, with the suspect allowed to correct his errors and recant. A public recantation before the whole university would then follow.

[17] T. Kaeppeli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi* (4 vols., Rome, 1970-1993), i, p. 360: 'Articuli reperti in expos. *I sent*. Fr. Stephani, ab Univ. Paris. condemnati (13.1.1241)', citing: '*Mss., ed*.: Chart. Univ. Paris. I, 170-2, n. 128'. However, Paris, BN., Lat., MS 16360, f. 3r, the manuscript used in the *CUP*, does not contain the reference 'in expos. *I sent*.'

[18] Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, iv, p. 280: 'magistri theologiae, praecipue tamen praecipui Praedicatorum et Minorum lectores'. Roger Bacon's and Odo Rigaud's descriptions of the pronouncements (above, pp. 22-3), if they indeed refer to the condemnation, make no reference to individuals or individual censures. However, double jeopardy (i.e. the need not to prejudice subsequent judicial proceedings) could have been an issue in the apparent anonymity of the 1277 condemnation (Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy*, pp. 43, 48, 141, n. 41); and this could also have applied in 1241/4.

[19] Thijssen, 'What really happened', pp. 85-7, 106-14, summarises the opening passages from the various condemnations in the *Collectio errorum in anglia et parisius condemnatorum*. He provides two examples of lists, one from a late fourteenth-century manuscript (Auxerre, Bibl. Mun., MS 243), the second from an early printed edition. Thijssen comments that, unlike all the other condemnations from Paris in the list, the Paris 1277 condemnation is the only one which does not specify the culprit. However, Auxerre, Bibl. Mun., MS 243 does not specify 'Frater Stephanus' or anyone else as guilty (although the 1241/4 condemnation figures in it twice), and the early printed list does not include the 1241/4 condemnation.

had to be corrected. John of Brescain, from the arts faculty, may also be in the frame.[20] But if so, was the condemnation imposed to correct such individuals? Simplistically, again the answer must be yes. Had no scholars erred, there would have been no underlying problem to trouble the theology faculty. But this ignores both the range of errrors, many as yet unidentified with individuals, and, more important, the strong arguments supporting the internal coherence of the articles and their link to Lateran IV - if, as this study contends, the condemnation's contents reflected concerns across the broad spectrum of teaching in areas seen by Lateran IV as crucial to proper catholic doctrine and to the faculty's (and, perhaps, Dominican school's) reputation and mission.[21] The individual errors were merely a symptom of a more fundamental need to 'repair' doctrine at Paris to allow its theologians properly to fulfil their role.

Finally, the condemnation preambles do not specify to whom its prescriptions applied. However, the evidence that they applied to the theology faculty at Paris is overwhelming - including the people involved in its application (not in itself conclusive), the subsequent actions by the Dominicans, the texts by theologians reflecting the banned propositions, Matthew Paris' account referring to 'magistri theologiae …', etc. Whether it

[20] The inclusion of Stephen's name in one manuscript suggests that he was known as guilty, probably named during the process, and with a more formal association than John Pagus, who is mentioned only in a manuscript annotation, not in any manuscript preamble. John of Brescain's errors were committed while studying logic - he was a 'clericus', condemned by the bishop, chancellor, and theology masters at Paris. He argued: 'lucem creatam minimum in genere substantie et habere has tres propritates: infinitatem, immensitatem et essentiam', together with other errors 'que fere ad Arianam heresim'. The reference to 'lucem creatam' may link to discussion on the nature of bodily vision of the divine light, relevant to article one (the beatific vision). For Greek views on the divine light, see G. Geréby, 'Hidden Themes in Fourteenth-Century Byzantine and Latin Theological Debates', in M. Hinterberger and C. Schabel (eds.), *Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204-1500* (Leuven, 2011), pp. 200-3. The reference to the Arian heresy concerned the Trinity, potentially relevant to articles two and three. Du Plessis D'Argentré (†1740) noted that Gregory Palamas 'stated falsely [in 1330] that [there is] a certain light uncreated and coeternal with God ('increatum et coaeternum Deo'), which is visible to our eye' and that 'those very virtues of God are in reality distinct from his essence ('ipsas virtutes Dei ab essentia revera distinctas esse')' (C. du Plessis D'Argentré, *Collectio Judiciorum*, i, 322, cit. M. de Wulf, *History of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. P. Coffey (London, 1909), section 361, n. 1). D'Argentré connected the second error with both John of Brescain and Gilbert of Poitiers. John of Brescain's errors could thus also have related to article seven (eternal truths).

[21] The genesis of the 1270 Paris condemnation may throw further light on the process. Initially a Dominican student sent to Albertus Magnus a list of fifteen views being taught in the Paris schools by reputed philosophers. Albertus considered all of these contained errors and, when the list reached Stephen Tempier, the bishop condemned thirteen of them (Courtenay, 'Dominicans', pp. 191-2). This suggests the trigger was opinions being taught generally, rather than individual suspects, and, if transposed to 1241/4, would explain the lack of official attribution to any individuals (with the one manuscript exception).

also applied to those in the arts faculty is less clear, but in any case, it must have been known throughout the university.[22] Moreover, where their discussions related to the areas it covered, those in the arts faculty must surely have been expected to comply, given the strictures imposed on them, for example in the 1215 university statutes, and the fact that many of them would advance to studying theology subsequently (or indeed simultaneously).[23] The fact that their works did not tarnish the theology faculty's reputation, and were of less interest to the ecclesiatical authorities, could have meant that they could be ignored, but, given the connections between the two faculties and the progression of students between them, coupled with their inclusion in other, earlier, prohibitions, this seems unlikely.[24]

Conclusion

Given the present state of the evidence no firm conclusions are possible, but the identity of those imposing the condemnation and their likely roles is relatively certain, as is its probable double imposition.[25] Whether any specific culprits were formally identified and censured is less clear. However, with the articles themselves covering such a wide range of areas, it is likely that, whether or not the process was one of individual censure, the condemned propositions were ones that were being widely discussed both in the theology faculty and also at the Dominican school at Paris (given the heavy Dominican

[22] Roger Bacon's reference to 'universitate Parisiensi convocata' (above, pp. 22-3) supports this. Moreover, he was himself a master of arts at the time.

[23] Arts masters often studied in the theology faculty, continuing their teaching to finance their studies (W.J. Courtenay, *Teaching Careers at the University of Paris in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988), p. 22). The quadrivium, for example astromony, included issues related to areas such as time (one of the issues in article eight). Indeed, Richard Rufus wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, relevant to article eight, probably as an arts student, c.1235.

[24] If John of Brescain's 1247 condemnation can be linked to that of 1241/4, since he was studying logic and thus should be in the arts faculty, the application of the condemnation to that faculty would be confirmed.

[25] It is unclear whether the faculty of theology as a whole, or an individual, took the initiative. Given that so many Dominicans were incriminated, and that the order subsequently took such direct action, another candidate could be the Dominican Master General. Raymond of Peñafort (master 1238-40) and John of Wildeshausen (master 1241-52) both favoured strict discipline. However, Raymond was absolved from his position at the General Chapter at Whitsun 1240, and John, who endorsed the condemnation at the General Chapter at Whitsun 1243, only became master in May 1241, i.e. after the probable date of its first imposition. He could, however, have inspired the second imposition.

representation among those inculpated and the fact that Dominicans figured so strongly in Matthew Paris' account).[26]

The ten articles

Chapter two discusses the influences that lie behind both the individual condemned propositions and the condemnation's overall formulation and production. This chapter concentrates on what the articles actually say.[27] It includes passages in works from theologians in the period of the condemnation which apparently contain the aberrant propositions. These illustrate the issues the articles cover.

Article one

> *Primus* [error], quod divina essentia in se nec ab homine nec ab angelo videbitur.
>
> Hunc errorem reprobamus et assertores et defensores auctoritate Wilhermi episcopi excommunicamus. Firmiter autem credimus et asserimus, quod Deus in sua essentia vel substantia videbitur ab angelis et omnibus sanctis et videtur ab animabus glorificatis.

The first condemned proposition concerns the beatific vision, stating that this will not be seen in itself by humans or angels. Some manuscripts are more specific, with references to glorified souls and the use of the present as well as the future tense. The proper doctrine, or truth, states that God will be seen in his essence or substance by angels and all the saints and is seen by glorified souls. Some versions add 'or nature'. More significantly, one variation in several manuscripts omits the present tense from the truth.[28] This makes more sense, as it seems odd for glorified souls to be vouchsafed the vision before both angels and saints. While not spelt out, the truth clearly implies the vision is direct, with no medium intervening.

[26] The 1240 Dominican General Chapter, *ACG*, i, p. 16, provided for prisons to confine the outrage ('insolenciam') of the corrupt ('perversorum'). This suggests both strong central discipline and its necessity.
[27] The *CUP* version serves as the base text. Manuscript variants (Appendix A1) are discussed where significant.
[28] For example, Paris, BN., Lat., MS 15820, f. 193ra; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, iv, p. 281.

The doctrinal issues fall into three main groups.[29] In broad terms, the first concerns the *object* of the vision, including whether this is Christ or God, whether God's 'essence' or his 'energies', whether this 'essence' can be seen but only as 'power', and whether 'essence' equates with 'nature'. The second concerns *when* the saints, glorified souls and, where relevant, angels might see or know God: in this life, immediately after death, or only after Judgment Day. The third concerns *how* we might see God, including what is meant by biblical references to 'face-to-face', the question of whether a medium intervenes or we see from 'under the altar', and how the beatific vision is activated. The three groups are interdependent: for example, the answer to the question 'what is the object of the vision' may (or may not) differ according to whether it refers to before or after Judgment Day.

The main problem over the beatific vision arose from conflicting biblical texts - coupled with sometimes conflicting patristic interpretation of them - on whether God's essence could ever be seen. Within this, there are three specific periods: on earth (with body and soul combined, although out-of-body experiences were a major topic); after death but before Judgment Day (with souls disembodied); and after Judgment Day (with the body, now purified, and soul re-united).[30] Issues included, for those accepting the beatific vision was of God's essence but denying its possibility before Judgment Day, what vision existed earlier. For those asserting saints achieved such vision immediately on death, what enhancement, if any, happened on Judgment Day was unclear; but conversely, if one factor preventing vision of God's essence on earth was the body, arguably those between death and resurrection were better off before Judgment Day when bodies were re-acquired. Then there was the difficulty in a created being ever seeing an uncreated one; and, a debate that developed over the course of the thirteenth century, a finite being seeing an infinite one, especially since the infinite God was without parts and indivisible, so could not be seen partially. Added to this was whether *seeing* differed from *knowing*, and whether knowledge was confined to universals (while God was a particular). These and

[29] Trottmann, *La vision béatifique*, pp. 5-8, also makes this distinction.
[30] A fourth period, that of prelapsarian Adam, falls outside article one's scope.

other questions resulted in numerous permutations. Vladimir Lossky summarises the overall dilemma succinctly: 'If the essence of God is unknowable by definition, how will we be able to know God as He is, according to the word of St. John [1.Jn. iii:2]. On the other hand, if in the age to come His essence is to be an object of beatific knowledge for created intellects, in what sense must we conceive the unknowable nature of God as affirmed by the Scriptures?'.[31]

Douai, MS 434 offers an idea of the scale of discussion on the vision of God in the 1230s. Out of its 572 entries, the manuscript contains around twenty-three questions bearing on the beatific vision, a small but significant proportion, and their wide-ranging contents demonstrate the open and fluid nature of debate before the condemnation.[32] Indeed the ruling seems to have 'caught out' several major theologians, including Alexander of Hales, in both his 1220s *Glossa* on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* and his pre-1236/7 *Quaestiones Disputatae 'Antequam esset Frater'*. His *Glossa* contains perhaps the most significant example - among other points potentially contravening article one, he identified three ways to see God's essence: 'through itself, through appearance/splendour, through likeness ('per se, per speciem, per similitudinem')'.[33] In the first way, it seems only God sees the divine essence, for he is 'lux inaccessibilis'. However 'light' can be understood in two ways, as in the air, where the eye can see it, or as in the sun, where it is invisible, and it is in this sense that the divine essence is invisible in itself; but as in each of us it is 'per gloriam', thus it is visible, and this is called 'species'; or it can be seen 'per similitudinem', which is creation. Alexander cited Augustine [*De Trinitate*, i, 8.16] saying that the dispensation of likenesses ('dispensatio similitudinum') is necessary for this, so

[31] V. Lossky, *The Vision of God*, trans. A. Moorhouse (Aylesbury, 1973), pp. 9-10.
[32] Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions'.
[33] Medieval theologians used 'per speciem' ambiguously, with its meaning apparently including 'per essentiam' as well as 'through appearance/splendour' (the probable meaning here), and 'through its likeness'. For example, Peter Lombard (*Sententiae*, i, 1.3, p. 57) may refer to essence when he wrote of the future 'sed ibi proprie, perfecte et plene, ubi per speciem videbimus quo fruemur', contrasting this with 'hic autem, dum in spe ambulans, fruimur quidem, sed non adeo plene'. Albertus Magnus, *In IV Sent.*, 49.5 (Borgnet, xxx), p. 670, stated that God may not be seen through a 'speciem' which is him himself, but through a 'speciem' received from him (perhaps demonstrating a dual usage within one sentence, or a finessing of language). Aquinas may have used 'per speciem' to stand for 'representation' or 'likeness', not identical with the thing to be known, but 'of similar structure to some aspect of the object', the 'indirect representative means' (R.T. Lambert, *Self knowledge in Thomas Aquinas* (Bloomington, 2007), pp. 87-8).

that we may see God, which will not be [the case] in heaven'.[34] Subsequently he discussed the reference in 1.Cor. xiii:12 to vision on earth 'through a mirror, in an enigma ('per speculum, in aenigmate')', with further definitions.[35]

Alexander's analysis is confusing, but his limitation of the vision of the divine essence to God alone, with humans seeing only 'per speciem' or 'per gloriam', departed sufficiently from proper doctrine to cause concern among Franciscans in the 1250s. Richard Rufus tried to re-interpret the passage, and it disturbed 'pseudo-Rigaud', who contrasted Alexander's words with those of 1.Jn. iii:2, that 'we will see him as he is' ('videbimus eum sicuti est')' and the *Glossa Ordinaria*. Indeed, one anonymous author felt he had to rectify Alexander's suspect position, adding that we will also see the divine essence 'in se'.[36]

Moreover, in his pre-1236 *Quaestiones* Alexander appears to vouchsafe for 'glorified souls' a less complete vision than for angels - our vision, even in heaven, will still be 'by way of the light existing proportionally ('sub ratione luminis proportionaliter')' - which may, or may not, be a weaker caveat than 'per gloriam' in his *Glossa*. Alexander argues prophetic vision is through a mirror, not face-to-face, because

> '[even] when vision will be in eternal ways ('rationibus aeternis'), when the intellect will not have an impediment from the part of the body, for which it now has desire, namely when there will be vision face-to-face, then the soul itself will still see it by way of the light existing proportionally. For just as the light of the sun in rotation is not proportionate to our vision according to itself, but according to what is in the air,

[34] Alexander, *Glossa*, i, p. 16, paragraph 18.
[35] Ibid., p. 17, paragraph 21.
[36] For this analysis, see H.-F. Dondaine, 'L'objet et le medium de la vision béatifique chez les theologiens du XIII siècle', *RTAM*, 19 (1952), pp. 79-82. Dondaine cites Oxford, Balliol, MS 62, f. 16rb (Rufus); Bruxelles, Bibl. Roy., MS 1542, f. 250 and Troyes, MS 1862, f. 218va ('ps.-Rigaud'); and Vat., Lat., MS 691, f. 62va (anon.). The anonymous text reads: 'Et tamen si dicitur videri *in se*, id est in sua essentia, non est vera distinctio: quia in patria videbimus eum secundum essentiam sive eius essentiam. Si dicitur *in se* videri, id est a se comprehendi, sic verum dicitur. Cum ait videri *per speciem*, est ipsum videre existentem in nobis secundum possibilitatem recipientis, non secundum modum recepti. Et sic fruentes Deum vident immediate, sed non totaliter'. While Alexander is not named, the passage clearly reproduces his argument.

so that divine light is not proportionate in itself, but according as it falls upon this or that intelligible thing'.[37]

A second major theologian who seems to have strayed was the Dominican, Hugh of St.-Cher. While he generally adhered to the line to be prescribed in article one, in his *Postilla* on John's Gospel, a work circulating before 1240, Hugh used John Chrysostom's homilies to explain the words 'no-one ever sees him ('nemo vidit umquam')' [Jn. i:18], as against 'we will see him as he is ('videbimus eum sicuti est')' [1.Jn. iii:2]:

> 'God is seen in many ways … in heaven face-to-face ('facie ad faciem'): in none of those ways is he seen in his substance ('in substantia sua') but he is known by his own action ('actu suo') … But why does 1 John say: … "We will see him as he is"? The answer must be that John did not mean to say we would in any way see God's substance in heaven, for this is impossible for any creature … Therefore John meant mirror and enigma ('speculum et enigma') because in heaven we will see God openly through the unmediated receipt of light, but not his essence, but as glory, goodness, truth ('per immediatam acceptionem luminis aperte ..., non tamen essentiam, sed ut gloriam, ut bonitatem, ut veritatem')'.

This is unambiguously inconsistent with article one of the condemnation. Hugh's *Postilla* was accordingly corrected after the general and provincial Dominican chapters in 1243, 1244 and 1256.[38]

Hugh's fellow Dominican, Guerric of St.-Quentin, also clearly shows the condemnation's impact. This is in his *quaestiones*, not his quodlibets which are unexceptionable. Dating the texts is difficult, but several of the quodlibets probably pre-dated 1230, with at least one, quodlibet three, later.[39] Of the *quaestiones*, the first two

[37] Alexander, *Quaestiones*, i, p. 301.
[38] The authenticity of Hugh's *Postilla* on John's Gospel is certain from its colophon, but not whether Hugh wrote it all, given his multiple other roles (Dondaine, 'La Vision', pp. 82-4). Smalley, 'Commentary on Isaias', p. 13, describes Hugh as 'a great exponent of the paste-and-scissors method', who probably did not think through 'the implications of his interpretation of the prophecies'.
[39] Guerric of Saint-Quentin, *Quaestiones de quolibet*, ed. W.H. Principe, intr. J.-P. Torrell (Toronto, 2002), pp. xvi-xxxv, 21; B.-G. Guyot and H.-F. Dondaine, 'Guerric de Saint-Quentin et la condamnation de 1241', *RSPT*,

must pre-date the 1241/4 condemnation, or at least knowledge of what the required line would be, with question two corrected after this and question three post-dating question two.[40] This prompts the speculation that discussions among Dominicans and at the university caused Guerric to move from an orthodox position in his quodlibets to the position later to be condemned, and could indicate that aberrant views were becoming more prevalent within the order and at the university. But the dating is not sufficiently firm to make this more than a possibility, and indeed the first two *quaestiones* could predate the quodlibets.

The *quaestiones* form a sequence. In the first, Guerric stated:

> 'The essence will be seen, just as the *Glossa* says and the passage seems to imply, in the direction of Bernard [of Clairvaux]'s "to know etc." and Augustine. But it will not be seen as essence, because essence will not be the way ('ratio') of understanding, but power ('potentia') … Love and faith are impressed forms and therefore seen through themselves. But God is the impressing form, not impressed; hence he will not be seen through himself but through the impressed form'.

Guerric then backtracked. The second two versions of the *quaestio* each contained a different solution. Moreover, on one of the many manuscript copies, a scribe added the marginal note on the first version: 'note that this question has been retracted and rejected by brother Guerric ('... questio ista retractata est et reprobata a fratre Guerrico')', and the solution has 'it is void ('vacat')' inserted after it. However, the corrections to the second question, whether by Guerric himself or by a copyist or reader, rendered it incoherent. Guerric therefore apparently rewrote the question in a third version which goes as far as renouncing infinity as an attribute of the essence, albeit implying his uneasiness with the reservation 'without prejudice ('sine praeiudicio')', i.e. without prejudicing the truth. Guerric stated that 'the essence will be seen in itself as has been shown through authorities':

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44 (1960), pp. 225-242; B.-G. Guyot, 'Quaestiones Guerrici, Alexandri et aliorum magistrorum Parisiensium', *AFP*, 32 (1962), pp. 5-125.

[40] Guyot and Dondaine, 'Guerric et la condamnation', pp. 225-9; Guyot, 'Quaestiones Guerrici', pp. 5-125.

> ‘To the objection: “How will God be seen in himself since he is simple”, I reply without prejudice that it is true that God is simple and infinite, but his simplicity and infinity are not in the same way ... Hence [from earlier discussion] while simplicity is in respect of the part of the essence, infinity is not in respect of that part; and therefore infinite does not stop essence from being seen in the whole way of essence (‘in ratione essentiae tota’). And this is what the *Glossa* said: “Act that you may be holy and you will comprehend all”, that is the whole essence in the way of essence, not however in the way of strength/power (‘ratione virtutis’)’.[41]

It also appears William of Auvergne himself may once have held the aberrant doctrine, in an early work, *De retributionibus sanctorum* (the last chapter of his *De virtutibus*), probably written c.1227 and superseded by his later views.[42] In it, William appears to envisage that we will see God as an image imprinted on one mirror which reflects onto the surface of the second, which is an individual’s intellect. Thus, in expounding 1.Cor. xiii:12 ‘We now see through a mirror in an enigma, but then face-to-face (‘nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem’)’, William stated:

> ‘For the face of our mind (‘facies … nostri intellectus’) to the face of the said mirror (‘faciem dicti speculi’) which is both the face of God (‘Dei facies’) and the outward countenance of God (‘Dei vultus’), as we say, applied and adjusted (‘applicata et coaptata’), will make present that face through impressed likeness (‘expressa similitudine’)’.

This implies William saw face-to-face vision in heaven, just as vision by faith on earth, as effected through a reflected image, but on earth, as in 1.Cor. xiii:12, as an enigma only. Indeed, all knowledge which is outside our souls, and which is neither the very

[41] For this analysis and the texts, see Guyot and Dondaine, ‘Guerric et la condamnation’, pp. 232-3, 226, 240-2. See also below, p. 159, n. 6.
[42] P.-M. de Contenson, ‘La théologie de la vision de Dieu au début du XIII^e^ siècle’, *RSPT*, 46 (1962), pp. 409-444.

essence of the soul nor part of it, neither a disposition nor an accident of it, is only apprehended by our souls through the impression of its own likeness.[43]

William continued with a reference to Aristotle's discussion of how the image of a lion can be viewed in two ways, as an image and as the lion itself:

> 'Therefore, observing thus something in respect of a thing, he sees not what he has in his eye but the thing itself through it; thus, looking at itself, the human mind in that glory properly sees not itself but God whose image is both a likeness and representation, perfected in accordance with the way that is fitting for it'.[44]

One final example comes from Douai, MS 434.[45] Question 480 noted that, because 'God is infinite ('infinitus') in both essence and strength/power ('et essentia et virtute')', therefore 'between God and the created mind there is no proportionality ('inter Deum et intellectum creatum nulla est proportio')'; therefore 'no created mind can comprehend ('intelligere') God'; therefore 'neither human nor angel can comprehend God'.[46] If God's essence was infinite and a finite mind could not comprehend the infinite, then some intermediary was needed, preventing the direct vision implicit in article one. Alternatively, God's essence could not be infinite, or the finite human mind could somehow raise itself with divine help.[47]

Articles two and three

> *Secundu*s, quod licet divina essentia una sit in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, tamen ut in ratione forme una est in Patre et Filio, sed non una in hiis cum Spiritu Sancto, et tamen forma hec idem sit quod divina essentia.
>
> Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod una est essentia sive substantia in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto et eadem essentia in ratione forme.

[43] William of Auvergne, *De retributionibus sanctorum* (Guiliemi Alverni, i), pp. 315-328, in particular p. 317, 1 A-C, p. 318, 1 F; Contenson, 'La théologie', pp. 411, 416-7.
[44] Contenson, 'La théologie', p. 420; William of Auvergne, *De retributionibus sanctorum*, p. 318, 1H and 2E. Contenson postulates Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscentia*, i, 1, as William's likely source.
[45] Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', p. 239.
[46] Dondaine, 'L'objet et le medium', p. 94.
[47] Sweeney, *Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought* (New York, 1992), pp. 337-63.

Tertius, quod Spiritus Sanctus, prout est nexus vel amor, non procedit a Filio, sed tantum a Patre.

Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod prout est nexus vel amor, procedit ab utroque.

Articles two and three both concern the Trinity and, because they may well be symbiotic, they need to be considered together.

Article two appears self-contradictory: the offending proposition states that the divine essence is one in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but as regards form ('in ratione forme') it is one in the Father and Son but not the Holy Spirit; but this form is the same as essence. The truth states that the essence or substance (or, as added in some manuscripts, nature) is the same in all three persons and the essence is the same as regards form. The article is one of the most complex in the condemnation, reflecting the intractability of the underlying debate. It derives from attempts by theologians to understand the seemingly impenetrable problem of how the three persons of the Trinity can be different yet all one undivided essence, in this case focussing specifically on the Holy Spirit. The problem gave rise to numerous discussions on the single essence, on the notions (for the Father, innascibility, paternity and common spiration; for the Son, sonship and common spiration; for the Holy Spirit, procession), and on the three persons (where the main options for distinguishing them were based either on their inter-relationships or their origins).[48]

[48] Catholic doctrine limited the notions to five. For the origin of the discussion, see S.M. Hildebrand, 'The Trinity in the Ante-Nicene Fathers', in G. Emery and M. Levering (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity* (Oxford, 2011), pp. 105-6. Tertullian established important definitions and distinctions within the Triniy. He described the three persons ('personae'), the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as three 'not in condition ('statu'), but in degree ('gradu'), not in substance ('substantia'), but in form ('forma'), not in power ('potentia'), but in aspect ('specie'); yet of one substance, and of one condition, and of one power' (*Against Praxeas* 2, cit. Hildebrand, ibid.). Most Latin theologians in the twelfth and first half of the thirteenth century held that relation distinguished the persons. However, other Latin theologians held instead that it was the origin of the persons which distinquished them, i.e. the Son's generation by the Father and the Holy Spirit's procession from both - thus relations become the result of the differences between the persons as established by their origins, not their principle (G. Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford, 2010), p.122). The predominant Dominican view in the later thirteenth century relied on relation to distinguish the persons, while the Franciscans favoured emanation, although without denying the dual procession (R.L. Friedman, 'Medieval Trinitarian Theology from the Late Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries', in Emery and Levering (eds.), op.cit., p. 198).

Much of the discussion took as its starting-point the distinctions made by Boethius, building on Aristotle's *Categories*. Boethius argued that, for all things that exist apart from the completely simple divinity, there is a distinction between 'that which is ('id quod est')', which represents the subject for accidents, and 'being ('esse')'. Boethius listed the ten categories that can be universally predicated of all things: 'substantia', 'qualitas', 'quantitas', 'ad aliquid ('relation')', 'ubi', 'quando', 'habere ('condition')', 'situm esse ('situation')', 'facere ('activity')', 'pati ('passibility')'. However, as a substance God is 'ultra substantiam'. The remaining predicates either do not apply, or, if they do, this is not as accidents - God is not a subject and accidents cannot apply to him. But relation is not a predicate in the same way - it does not change anything in its subjects. So, for the Trinity:

> 'The substance preserves the unity, the relation makes up the Trinity ('substantia continent unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem'). Hence only terms belonging to relation may be applied singly and separately ('sola singillatim proferuntur atque separatim quae relationis sunt')'.[49]

However, this explanation, although it might appear satisfactory, does not necessarily solve the problem of establishing a real difference between the persons which would not be liable to collapse into different aspects of God. The Holy Spirit's position presented particular problems.[50] Anselm of Canterbury's solution entailed the dual procession of the Holy Spirit (article three) - he argued that things are only differentiated by opposing, not merely differing, relations, i.e. by relations in reciprocal opposition: 'unity should never lose its consequences except when a relational opposition stands in the

[49] Boethius, *De Trinitate* (*Theological Tractates*, trans. H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand and S.J. Tester, Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 42-3; Boethius, *Quomodo substantiae* (*Theological Tractates*, op.cit.), pp. 10-11, 18-31; J. Marenbon, *Boethius* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 66-95.

[50] One of Abelard's purported heresies was that the Holy Spirit was not from the same substance as the Father and Son (C.J. Mews, 'The lists of heresies Imputed to Peter Abelard', *Revue Bénédictine,* 95 (1985), pp. 73-110). Gilbert Crispin (†1117) highlighted the problem of the difference in form ('species') between the Holy Spirit, on the one hand, and the Father and Son, on the other: 'Quaerunt aliqui de spiritu sancto, non id an deus sit: nam omnes Christiani credunt quia deus est pater, deus est filius, deus est spiritus sanctus: sed qua relatione seu habitudine sanctus spiritus dicatur patris et filii esse spiritus. quicquid enim id quod est alterius dicitur esse, aliqua specie habitudinis ab eo necesse est id quod esse. sub persona igitur interrogantes magistri et respondentis discipuli tractetur, quaeso, haec nostra disceptatio' (cit. J.A. Robinson, *Gilbert Crispin Abbot of Westminster* (Cambridge, 1911), pp. 70-2).

way, nor should the relations lose what belongs to them except when the indivisible unity stands in the way'.[51] Thus, Father and Son are distinguished by the opposing relations of paternity and sonship, but to differentiate between the Holy Spirit and the other two persons, both need to be in an opposing relationship with it and hence it must proceed from both. Peter Lombard argued that 'the properties are in the three persons ('proprietates esse in tribus personis'), and they are the persons themselves and the divine essence ('et ipsas esse personas atque divinam essentiam')', a position criticised by Gilbert of Poitiers and Joachim of Fiore as creating a fourth person in the Trinity, but which Lateran IV established as the official catholic doctrine.[52] These views all relied on internal and interdependent relationships, and, hypothetically, none was wholly sufficient to distinguish the three persons, at least without risk of multiplication.

An alternative approach was to maintain, as Gilbert of Poitiers did, that the three persons are distinguished by their individual properties ('proprietates'), 'by the opposition of things attached from outside ('extrinsecus affixarum rerum oppositione a se invicem')', ensuring their separate identity.[53] In this context, the *Treatise on the Trinity*, a work

[51] Anselm of Canterbury, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, in eds. B. Davies and G.R. Evans, *The Major Works* (Oxford, 2008), p. 393. Anselm's definition had to specify that, to distinguish between two persons, the relationship must be of opposites, since otherwise the Father, since he had different relations with the Son and the Holy Spirit, would be two persons. However, this meant that the Holy Spirit and the Son must be similarly opposed or they would be the same (B.D. Marshall, 'The deep things of God', in G. Emery and M. Levering (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity* (Oxford, 2011), pp. 403-4, 407-8, 410).

[52] Lombard, *Sententiae*, i, 33.1, p. 241.

[53] Gilbert of Poitiers, *Commentaries on Boethius*, ed. N.M. Häring (Toronto, 1966), p. 108, paragraph 33, p. 148, paragraph 43. Gilbert argued (ibid., p. 109, extracts from paragraphs 37-8, p. 147, extracts from paragraphs 38-9) that, when 'the words "God, God, God" are said' about each of the three persons respectively, 'then an enumeration ('enumeratio') is made of those who are God: but a repetition ('repeticio') of that by which they are God'. In natural things ('naturalibus'), the 'quod est' is one thing, the 'quo est' another; but, in theological matters, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are each different ('alius'), but they are all one in essence. Moreover, the rules on natural persons, whereby a person could not be part of a person and nothing could be a person unless 'no other person is what it is by any of those things by which it is itself' do not apply. According to J. Marenbon ('Gilbert of Poitiers', in P. Dronke (ed.), *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 343-5, 348), Gilbert distinguished between two kinds of 'rationes', or 'self-evident arguments' in the disciplines of natural science and theology: common 'rationes', applicable in all disciplines; and 'rationes propriae', particular to each. Hence apparently contradictory propositions can be true if they depend on 'rationes propriae' and are used in different disciplines. This is 'proportionate transumption', which allows the three persons in the Trinity to be one, while three men are three. Man's composite 'quo est' is different from God's simple 'quo est'. Marenbon demonstrates that Gilbert used this 'proportionate transumption from the arguments of natural science' to elucidate the Trinity: 'analysis into *quo est* and *quod est* provides a way of explaining the proportion, but only if these are what really constitute things, not just a way of talking about them'. Gilbert then used a

attributed to Gilbert, is helpful, even if it may not fully reflect his views but rather how his followers understood them. This argues that 'since the Father is a substance by his divinity, a Father by relation … and since the *paternitas* is a relation, it follows that neither the Father is the *paternitas* nor the *paternitas* the substance, for … a relation must be distinguished from that which is related'. Then: '*paternitas, filiatio,* and *spiratio* are the *propria* [personal properties] distinguishing the persons from all eternity. Therefore none of them is the person whose *proprium* it is, for a *posterior ratio* [secondary/empirical premise] distinguishes the *proprium* from that whose *proprium* it is'. Moreover 'the divine persons' are 'the result of a *proprium* which is eternal, but not God, otherwise we should be compelled to admit that *paternitas, filiatio, spiratio* or the corresponding names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are, as it were, synonyms'. 'One can say something of a person, but the person itself is never predicated … Therefore, it is outside the essence and the persons that you must find something that makes the persons differ and makes them more than one'. This 'something' is the 'id quo' [that by which something is what it is], which for the Father is *generatio,* for the Son *nativitas,* and for the Holy Spirit, *connexio*. These 'are not natures' but 'theological reasons … not temporal but eternal, and oppose each other so much that each person is truly distinct from the other'.[54] In Gilbert's terminology, the persons are distinct 'in ratione formae', the 'id quo' exterior to the essence.

However, Gilbert's discussion of properties runs, in turn, into difficulties of its own, as the unity of the three persons is jeopardised - their differences are external, not internal (as for relationships), conceptually a very different structure with quasi-freestanding individuality. Chenu accordingly argues that, in order to achieve the reduction of the three persons to a substantial unity, Gilbert's followers, utilising Gilbert's concept of 'forma', accomplished this, for the Father and Son, through the concept of their reciprocal relationship ('generatio' and 'nativitas'), rendering them fully complementary 'in ratione formae'. But the reduction cannot take place in the same way for the Holy Spirit, whose

complex theory of parts, coupled with his 'proportionate transumption', to demonstrate how God was both three and one.

[54] Extracts taken from N.M. Häring, 'A Treatise on the Trinity by Gilbert of Poitiers', *RTAM*, 39 (1972), pp. 21-50.

'id quo' is 'nexus/connexio', since 'connexio' does not have a reciprocal relationship with 'generatio' or 'nativitas'. The Holy Spirit is therefore different in form ('in ratione formae'). However, he is the same in essence - the proposition condemned in article two - the apparently self-contradictory position resulting from the identity of 'id quo' with essence in God, as established by Boethius.[55] Moreover, while this was not a conclusion Gilbert himself drew, if 'processio' is dual, the Holy Spirit would be a double recipient which would not match the single procession issuing from the Father and Son respectively - hence the problem would be compounded even if the simpler, arguably largely semantic, position that procession does not relate reciprocally to generation and birth is ignored. Thus the doctrine of the dual procession (the *filioque*) is jeopardised and the proposition condemned in article three follows. But, if, to avoid this, the Father and Son act as a single source for the Holy Spirit, they risk losing their own identities.

The issue underlying article three is much simpler. The condemned proposition states that the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father, while the truth states it proceeds from both Father and Son. Both proposition and truth include the Holy Spirit's role as the love or connection between the two, reflecting Augustine's doctrine, incorporated into catholic orthodoxy on the dual procession. This element is absent from Greek doctrine and was the source of the long-standing *filioque* controversy.

There are no straightforward candidates among contemporary theologians who might have perpetrated article two's offending proposition. However the related issues were discussed extensively and it is far from impossible that some works strayed in this direction or indeed crossed the line.[56] For example, in his pre-Franciscan *Quaestiones*, Alexander of Hales, like many others theologians, drew a distinction between the Father and Son, on the one hand, and the Holy Spirit, on the other:

[55] Chenu, 'Le dernier avatar', pp. 73-4.
[56] Out of the 572 entries in Douai, MS 434, there are around seventy-three questions linked to the Trinity, together covering a wide range of issues (Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', passim). This is a significant proportion and demonstrates both the importance and the difficulty of the subject.

> ‘When I say “the Son is the image of the Father”, an undifferentiated species is meant: for the Son is “the species of the Father” (“species Patris”) and “undifferentiated”; hence he is his image. But the Holy Spirit, even if he is undifferentiated from the Father, is not however the species [of the Father]. And Richard [of St Victor, *De Trinitate*, vi,11] says that, because the Son has from the Father that he is a first principle of the Holy Spirit, he is the image of the Father; which is not fitting for the Holy Spirit’.[57]

Similarly, in one of his quodlibets Guerric of St.-Quentin distinguishes between the way the Son sees the Father and the way the Holy Spirit does:

> ‘The Holy Spirit sees the Father and the Son [sees the Father], but in a different way, because the Son sees the Father in himself because [he sees] the whole essence and the whole mode (‘modum’) of the Father, who is seen because he is from himself. But the Holy Spirit, even though he may see in himself the whole Father and the whole essence, however does not [see] the whole mode: but the Holy Spirit sees this in the Son’.[58]

In his commentary on the *Sententiae*, written in the 1240s shortly after the condemnation and hence reflecting issues current when it was imposed (and with the subject-matter - procession - showing a link between articles two and three), Albertus Magnus noted:

> ‘The Holy Spirit proceeds equally immediately from both, although some say otherwise; for the Saints speak jointly, that he proceeds from them inasmuch as they, being distinct in their own persons, are one in substance; and it is understood that substance and essence are not meant here in the absolute sense; but just as in the mode of potentiality which is joined to actuality as if a middle path (‘medium’) is made in the mind (‘secundum intellectum’) between pure essentialness and pure person-ness; and thus in such comparison there is one nature in the Father and Son

[57] Alexander, *Quaestiones*, i, p. 468.
[58] Guerric , *Quaestiones de quolibet*, pp. 239-40.

as distinct beings because in this no relation of opposition divides them; and according to this, what proceeds from them as they are one, proceeds equally and immediately from both'.[59]

Earlier in the same text, Albertus had called the question of whether the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and Son as they are one or more a 'difficult question'. He explained there that saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son as they are one meant that he proceeds from them in the plural - by saying one proceeds from two, so two are one in spiration. This appears to indicate the duality of the Father and Son, with the Holy Spirit set apart. Albertus further commented that, although there is one essence of the three [persons], there is not however the same relationship ('comparatio') of essence to 'notiones' and 'relationes' in the three.[60] A similar discussion comes in Question 245 of Douai, MS 434, attributed to 'G.', again in the context of the procession of the Holy Spirit. This asks why, since the Father and Son are the one principle/starting-point of the Holy Spirit, they are not the same.[61]

While none of the above passages reflect article two's exact wording, they demonstrate the struggle to make sense of this area and the risks involved. Moreover, and equally significant given article two's relationship with article three, those supporting the single procession of the Holy Spirit may well also be suspects for article two. Even for article three, however, there are few candidates. The obvious culprit is John Pagus, with a reference - in a manuscript probably contemporary with him - explicitly linking him to the proposition condemned in article three:

'Otherwise according to Pagus: … the Holy Spirit can be considered in two ways, as the outside/limit or as the connection of the Father and Son ('vel prout est extremum vel prout est nexus Patris et Filii'). As he is the connection, thus he is constituted by way of one between ('sic se habet in ratione medii') … For love in the way of one between does not proceed from the Father and Son, but proceeds from the Father

[59] Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 12.1 (Borgnet, xxv), p. 355.
[60] Ibid., 11.3-4, pp. 339-42.
[61] Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', p. 145.

> into the Son as from one loving into one loved ('in ratione medii non procedit a Patre et Filio, sed procedit a Patre in Filium ut ab amante in amatum'), and according to this way the Holy Spirit … is the Spirit of the Son, but not from the Son ('Spiritus Sanctus … est spiritus Filii, sed non a Filio')'.[62]

This is the only known text explicitly adopting the view condemned in article three. However, many works discuss the question in a constructive way, trying to accommodate both Latin and Greek positions and thus sometimes straying into dangerous territory. For example, Alexander of Hales, in his pre-Franciscan *Quaestiones*, distinguished between the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Son as a beginning ('ab origine'), which is acceptable, and as something caused from a cause ('causatum a causa'), which is not. This is because cause implies, in itself, order in respect of duration, therefore cause is before what is caused; but beginning does not denote order in respect of actuality, but the order of nature.[63]

Finally, in his quodlibets Guerric of St.-Quentin noted the argument that 'the Holy Spirit is *of* the Father in relation to ('in') the Son and *of* the Son in relation to the Father. Therefore it is not [right] to say that he would be *from* both in this way, because he would not be *of* the former in relation to the latter and vice versa' (my italics); and 'the Holy Spirit sufficiently proceeds from the Father, so making procession from the Son superfluous'. Guerric did not address the first argument. On the second, he stated, in an argument that is close to acknowledging belief in the single procession could be justified,

> '… according to all [people] the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father sufficiently as far as his complete being ('ad esse totum') but not as far as mode, and the mode is that he is shown [to be] the concord of the Father and the Son or the harmonious equality ('concors aequalitas'), which is understood from his procession from both. His procession certainly could be understood to be from the Father and not from the

[62] Anon, *Tractatus de fide …* (cit. Hansen, *John Pagus*, pp. 18-22, above, p. 24, n. 9); Glorieux, 'Les années', pp. 234-49.
[63] Alexander, *Quaestiones*, i, p. 77.

Son, and through this they could have realised concord, but an equality of concord is not realised unless he is understood to proceed from them each in common'.[64]

Article four

> *Quartus*, quod anime glorificate non sunt in celo empireo cum angelis, nec corpora glorificata erunt ibi, sed in celo aqueo vel cristallino, quod supra firmamentum est, quod et de beata Virgine presumitur.
>
> Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod idem locus corporalis, scilicet celum empireum, angelorum et animarum sanctarum erit et corporum glorificatorum.

This article is curious. The condemned proposition expels glorified souls and bodies from the empyrean heaven where angels reside, placing them instead in the aqueous or crystalline heaven above the firmament. The Virgin Mary's inclusion (in most, but not all, the manuscripts) goes against the normal trend of her potential elevation closer to God - most discussion either raises her to the heaven of the Trinity (above the empyrean), or to an elevated position within the empyrean itself.

As regards the underlying issue, the truth, but not the proposition, specifies the empyrean heaven is a 'locus corporalis', which suggests the problem of mixing corporeal with incorporeal substances may have been the concern, and that implicit in the proposition is the nature of the empyrean heaven itself. Although contemporary texts do not appear to contend that the empyrean heaven is incorporeal, several discuss how angels - its original and established inhabitants - could exist in such a place, given their incorporeality. For example, William of Auvergne, with others, noted a difficulty in the statement of 'theologians, saints and doctors … that heaven, as soon as it was created, was filled with angels', since 'if that heaven is a bodily place, it could only be filled with bodies of substance. For spiritual substances, just as they also do not have corporeal magnitude, thus neither could they fill a place'. William contended that such arguments from 'the unlearned ('imperiti')' mocked 'genuine and divinely revealed holy words and

[64] Guerric, *Quaestiones*, pp. 236-8.

writings', noting human souls live in bodies, which themselves inhabit houses, etc., with no difficulty.[65]

The hypothesis that the issue of corporeality underlies article four is supported by the variant reading of the truth found in some manuscripts and in Matthew Paris' version: '… that the same corporeal place ('idem locus corporalis'), namely the empyrean heaven of the angels and the souls of the saints, will be both the same [place] of glorified humans and similarly the same common spiritual place of humans and angels ('similiter locus idem communis spiritualis hominum et angelorum')'. This emphasises the empyrean heaven's dual nature, corporeal and spiritual, and role (for angels and humans). However, while this makes sense, it is perhaps salutary to note Albertus Magnus' apparent bafflement:

> 'Some have said (I do not know why, because no reason supports it) that men will be in the aqueous heaven, and angels in the empyrean heaven: but this is nonsense ('nihil'): because our bodies will be at that time ennobled exceeding ('ultra') the nobility of the empyrean: and therefore there is no objection in respect of the body'.[66]

Perhaps not surprisingly, despite copious discussion of the number and nature of the various heavens, their ordering, positioning and inhabitants, a subject of apparently unending fascination, and including, for example, whether the outermost heaven can have a boundary, this study has found no texts which appear to contain the condemned proposition.[67]

Articles five and ten

> *Quintus*, quod malus angelus in principio sue creationis fuit malus, et nunquam fuit nisi malus.

[65] William of Auvergne, *De universo* (*Guiliemi Alverni*, i), pp. 628, 2H-631, 2C.
[66] Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, iv, p. 282; Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 9.8 (Borgnet, xxvii), p. 208.
[67] Purgatory is also theoretically relevant. Where the souls of the dead resided if they did not rise to heaven immediately, and the timing of such ascent, was much discussed. However, timing was not the main issue in article four.

> Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod bonus creatus sit et post peccando factus sit malus.
>
> *Decimus*, quod malus angelus nunquam habuit, unde stare posset, nec etiam Adam in statu innocentie.
>
> Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod uterque habuit, unde posset stare, non tamen, unde posset proficere.

Article five concerns whether the evil angel was created evil or was created good and became evil through sin. Although the context is different, the issue is related to that in article ten, whether the evil angel or Adam in his state of innocence had a place to stand before they fell. Both cover the question of evil, its origin, and whether it could have been avoided. Both were often discussed together in contemporary texts.

There are no significant textual variations in either article, although one manuscript adds the words 'ab initio' before 'unde' in article ten's truth. Nor is the underlying agenda complex, including, for article five, whether God created sin, and if not, its origin; and, for article ten, why God withheld his grace, allowing first Satan and then Adam to fall, and whether, without grace, they could have remained good. These are vast questions, with the area as a whole generating significant discussion and different views. However, fewer than ten questions in Douai, MS 434 cover issues directly related to either article, although the question of sin generally, and specific sins in particular, was an overriding concern, with around eighty-two entries dealing with appetites, vices and sins (albeit sixty-seven of these concerned the individual vices). Only two (Questions 226 and 227) appear to relate specifically to the fall of Satan and the angels, and six (Questions 17, 151-3, 446 and 563) to Adam's temptation and first sin.[68]

There are two particular individuals in the frame for article five. First is John Pagus, with the second of the two errors attributed to him:

[68] Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', pp. 144, 130, 140, 246.

> ‘And it/he mentions Pagus’ opinion, that some became evil at once (‘quod quidam fuerunt statim mali’). But this is an error’.[69]

The second suspect is Alexander of Hales, or more precisely the author of the relevant passages in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, a work started by Alexander but with other Franciscans contributing to, and completing, it. The texts in question come from the *Summa* and two questions attributed to Alexander, *De libertate in angelo et homine* (from which the *Summa* passage is drawn) and *De peccato primi angeli*.[70] The *Summa* and *De libertate* discuss whether the evil angel was created bad. Unlike Peter Lombard, who envisaged a brief delay (‘morula’) between creation and fall, Alexander (or the author of the relevant passage in the *Summa*) denied the brief delay and argued that the first angel, created good, sinned immediately afterwards:

> ‘We therefore say that in one instant they began to be and in another they fell (‘in alio instanti inceperunt esse et in alio se verterunt’), nor was there necessarily an intermediate time or duration between the two instances (‘nec oportet inter illa duo instantia fuisse tempus medium vel durationem’)’.[71]

Moreover, in *De peccato primi angeli*, Alexander stated ‘statim cecidit’. However, the original text of the question *De libertate in angelo et homine* was recast, with the copyist also adding a note in the margin:

> ‘If it should be supposed there was any delay or intermediate duration (‘aliqua morula vel duratio intermedia’), and it was asked how he spent it, it could be said that at that time he was moved through the mind and not through disposition (‘per intellectum et non … per affectum’), namely by the motion in respect of which real goodness or conversion [to/from good/evil] is defined (‘motu scilicet penes quem determinatur bonitas actualis vel conversio’). For it would not be contradictory to

[69] Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat., MS 15652, f. 54rb (cit. Hansen, *John Pagus*, pp. 18-22, above, p. 24, n. 9).
[70] Alexander, *Summa*, ii, Q.2.a1, pp. 208-10 (and ibid., iii, Q.2.a2, pp. 106-11); *De libertate in angelo et homine*, Vat., Lat., MS 782, f. 46va-47vb; *De peccato primi angeli*, Paris, BN., Lat., MS 16406, f. 26ra. Doucet (‘La date des condamnations’, pp. 190-2) identified these four texts - his article forms the basis for this analysis.
[71] Alexander, *Summa*, ii, Q.2.a1, pp. 209.

say he was moved through disposition by natural motion, not by grace ('per affectum motu naturali, non gratuito'), through which motion he was neither deserving nor not deserving ('per quem motum nec merebatur nec demerebatur')'.[72]

The copyist of *De libertate* then gave further reasons to show that the angel did not sin 'in ipso instanti creationis'. The whole question, in its recast form, was then included in *Summa* ii, Q.2, almost verbatim, including the marginal addition. Consequently, in a second limb to his response, the *Summa*'s author appears to contradict his first solution:

'Solution: we allow that they did not become bad in the same instant that they came into existence ('non sit simul in ipso instanti, in quo fuerunt angeli, fuerunt mali')'.[73]

Finally the author of the *Summa* stated at the end of the passage: 'The statements ('sententiae') of the Master of the *Sententiae* who said there was then a delay ('qui dicit fuit ibi morula') should be adhered to'.[74] This same observation comes in the same position in *Summa* iii, Q.2 which discussed the delay in the context of the reasons for Satan's fall.[75] Clearly the author felt it necessary to leave no doubt on the issue and to demonstrate the correctness of his revised position.

This study has found no contemporary texts from Paris theologians directly reflecting the proposition condemned in article ten.[76] However, those advocating article five's banned proposition may also implicitly have inclined to article ten's position.

Article six

Sextus, quod angelus in eodem instanti potest esse in diversis locis et esse ubique si voluerit.

[72] The above text is from the *Summa*, ii, Q.2.a.1, pp. 209. However, it is almost identical to the copyist's marginal note in *De libertate*.
[73] Alexander, *Summa*, ii, Q.2.a.1, pp. 210.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Alexander, *Summa*, iii, Q.2.a.2, p. 107. According to Doucet, 'La date des condamnations', pp. 190-2, such a reference to Peter Lombard is unusual.
[76] Curiously, Andreas de Castro's fourteenth-century commentary on the *Sententiae*, i, 45, reproduces article ten, alone from the condemnation, verbatim, showing that the 1241/4 list was still being consulted in the fourteenth century (R.L. Friedman, 'Andreas de Novo Castro (fl. 1358) on Divine Omnipotence and the Nature of the Past', *Cahiers de L'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin*, 64 (1994), p. 127).

> Hunc errorem reprobamus, credimus enim, quod angelus est in loco per diffinitionem, ita quod si est hic, non est alibi in eodem instanti; impossibile est enim quod sit ubique, hoc enim proprium est solius Dei.

Article six, at first sight, might appear relatively unimportant. However, the concern is not primarily about angelic movement and location, fascinating though contemporary theologians found this subject, but about the potential effect of angelic omnipresence on God's omnipotence - only God can be everywhere at once. In Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* this issue is therefore positioned in the context of God's nature, not the discussion on angels.

While angels must not encroach on God's omnipresence, equally they are not corporeal and so do not suffer the same constraints as humans in motion and location. This gave rise to long discussions about the movement of incorporeal substances, in particular simple ones like angels, where problems, such as that a simple entity cannot move through space because movement involves parts sequentially, arose. On location, two bodies cannot occupy the same space, but a body and incorporeal substance can (as body and soul), and an uncreated spirit (the Holy Spirit) and created spirit (as the soul), so what about two created spirits? Other questions included the proper place of angels, which is in heaven worshipping God, and how they, or a particular aspect of them, can therefore be present on earth. There was also an issue over Christ's eucharistic presence on the altar.[77] Whether two angels, or created spirits, can be in different places at the same time was part of this menu of issues, but the one with, perhaps, the most serious implications for God's omnipotence if answered incorrectly.

[77] Alexander, *Glossa*, i, 37, pp. 364-5: 'God is properly everywhere, but a pure creature here or there; but a creature united to the divine nature [i.e. Christ's human body] is properly in the middle between extremes, wherefore it conforms to the pure creature in one way and the Creator in another. For in what it is to sit at the Father's right hand in heaven, it conforms to the pure creature, namely in having a determined place. But in what is everywhere sanctified sacramentally, it imitates divine being, because the divine being is everywhere; but it is lacking in this, because divine being is everywhere, but the being of the body under the sacrament is being in many places...'. Alexander thus offered a threefold hierarchy: divine being; Christ's human body; and all creatures, corporeal or incorporeal. Medieval theologians' concerns over how to explain Christ's real presence at the altar at the Eucharist could have increased interest in the frequently discussed question of the location of angels (I. Iribarren and M. Lenz, 'Introduction - The Role of Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquity', in Iribarren and Lenz (eds.), *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry* (Aldershot, 2008), p. 2).

Discussions on angelic movement were profuse and wide-ranging in this period. Douai, MS 434 includes around thirty-two discussions on angelic powers and roles. Although only four are identifiable from the list as discussing angelic movement specifically (and none on the exact issue contained in article six), this may have been a sub-topic in some. Indeed Albertus Magnus' commentary on the *Sententiae* demonstrates that the aberrant view was held by some people in this period. In discussing angelic movement, Albertus refers to 'others, who say that the angel is at the same time in many places' which 'is held to be heresy, since he should have substance according to the words of the saints'.[78]

One possible suspect for the article is Guerric of St.-Quentin. Angelic movement and the implications of their incorporeality generally figured prominently in his quodlibets. On the specific issue in article six, drawing on the different status and roles of angels in the pseudo-Dionysian hierarchy (which divided them into nine ranked orders in three ranked groups with decreasing powers and functions from highest to lowest), he stated:

> '*Version V*: Some are in charge of the country generally ('praesunt generaliter provinciae'), some [are in charge of] some person specifically - hence we can say he [an angel] can operate in many places not by elicitation ('elicitive') but by order. When therefore he operates by elicitation, he is in that place, not when he operates by order. About the second [angel] who is present specifically to someone, we say that he cannot operate in very many places at the same time ('simul') either by elicitation or by order'.

While 'simul' refers explicitly to the second angel, negating it for him implies it applies to the first. A second version, *P*, omits the critical word 'simul', but it is unclear if this is significant or which version came first.[79] The passage may suggest Guerric held the

[78] Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 37.24 (Borgnet, xxvi), p. 266.
[79] Guerric, *Quaestiones*, pp. 289-91. Not just Guerric but also the Church Fathers distinguished between guardian angels, who were familiar medieval figures, and a higher category of angels with much greater

condemned view. Moreover, in a further quodlibet, Guerric's discussion included some arguments which may suggest that the respondent advocated the view to be condemned in article six - such a proposition is implicit in an argument Guerric imputed to the respondent on the sun's rays:

> 'Wherefore he [the respondent] conceded that an angel remaining in heaven in respect of his substance operates on earth according to his own will and God's command ('nutum'), like the sun remaining in its own orb operates everywhere on earth. Therefore the angel also, since he is more powerful than the sun, while remaining in the empyrean heaven could operate on earth.
>
> Against. The power of an angel is limited. Therefore his power [is limited], if it is here it is not there. But wherever/whenever an angel operates, he operates through power. Therefore the power of an angel by which he now operates in England and his power by which he now operates in another place, if it is the same [power], changes place….
>
> Again, God, because [he is] everywhere through essence, operates everywhere ... Therefore an angel will not operate except where he is through essence'.

On the specific objection about the sun, Guerric stated:

> '[I]t can be said, as [John] Damascene said, that the sun is either greater than or equal to the earth … and its strength can be diffused through everything. The angel is different because he does not have dimensional quantity according to which his strength could be stretched forth, but his strength is only where his essence is'.[80]

Guerric's position overall is unclear. But he appears at least to entertain the idea that an angel, albeit only one with a superior nature, can be in more than one place at the same

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competence, who oversaw the world (J.-P. Torrell, 'Introduction historique et théologique', in Guerric, op.cit., p. 57, n. 98).

[80] Guerric, *Quaestiones*, pp. 379-82. However, the respondent's view could simply be part of standard scholastic argumentation. Why England was chosen as an example remains unclear.

time, if God sanctions this. This seems dubious in the light of article six of the condemnation.

Article seven

> *Septimus*, quod multe veritates sunt ab eterno, que non sunt Deus.
>
> Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod una sola veritas sit ab eterno, que est Deus.

There appear to be at least three, possibly four, different agenda which underlie this article. Three are discussed in a *quaestio* attributed to Alexander of Hales, probably from the second half of the 1230s, which is headed 'About the eternal truth of things ('De veritate eternal rerum')' and is one of a set of questions on the eternity of the world. They contain the actual or approximate wording of the banned proposition. The fourth, least likely, candidate comes in a quodlibet on many truths from eternity attributed to the Dominican Godefroid of Bléneau, probably from the early 1240s. This quodlibet, otherwise, concerns 'stateables' - the second topic in Alexander's *quaestio*, together with a brief reference to God's knowledge (Alexander's third topic).[81]

Taking the four agenda in the order they appear in Alexander's *quaestio* and in Godefroid's quodlibet, the first two are relatively straightforward. The first concerns mathematical concepts or Platonic ideas (although Alexander does not describe them as such). The *quaestio* makes a link between truths and mathematical concepts, with Alexander citing Augustine as saying that nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle. However, the nature of a circle is not God, so there are things from eternity that are

[81] Alexander, *Quaestiones universitatem*, pp. 215-8, 240-3; P. Glorieux, '1. Godefroid de Bléneau et son Quodlibet', *RTAM*, 23 (1956), pp. 321-3; [Godefroid of Bléneau], 'Quodlibeta Holmensia', ed. F. Stegmüller, *Divus Thomas*, 27 (1949), pp. 201-22. Godefroid was Dominican regent master in theology at Paris from 1235-42 (P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle* (2 vols., Paris, 1933-4), i, pp. 59-61). The *CUP* (p. 172, n. 21) notes that all the condemnation's manuscripts add 'and there was no truth from eternity which is not that truth', but it does not include the words, perhaps because their purpose seems merely emphatic. However, they may indicate the level of concern over this proposition and the desire for precision in its articulation.

not God. Mathematical concepts such as a perfect circle are Platonic ideas, in addition to truth, goodness etc.

The second in Alexander's list, and also discussed by Godefroid, is a logical/grammatical argument on stateables or *enuntiabilia*. Alexander summarises the issue:

> 'All truth which does not begin to be is uncreated truth; but the truth of this proposition, 'antichrist will exist', never began to be, since it was always true to say 'antichrist will exist', even from eternity, and, if God had said this from eternity, he would have said the truth, therefore this truth is uncreated truth, therefore it is from eternity; but it is not the same as God himself, therefore there are many truths from eternity'.[82]

Alexander's third point concerns God's knowledge, and how a perfectly simple God can know multiple things. Part of the underlying issue concerns whether everything in God *is* his essence (i.e. there is only one divine idea, which is identical to God's essence, so he is everything he knows), or instead the ideas are *in* God's mind but not identical to the divine essence. Augustine favoured God having many ideas (*in* God), while Anselm preferred a single idea (which *is* God). The underlying issue is perhaps best encapsulated in Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, where he appears to follow Augustine:

> 'God's cognition is certainly his essence, and his presence, in which are all things, is his cognition; and yet not all things which are in his presence or cognition should be said to be in his essence. For if this were said, these things would be understood to be of the same essence with him. For that is said to be in God through essence which is the divine essence, which is God. And so God has before himself, in his presence, things which he does not have in his nature'.[83]

[82] Alexander, *Quaestiones universitatem*, pp. 215-6.
[83] Augustine, 'Question 46', in *Responses to Miscellaneous Questions*, trans. B. Ramsey (New York, 2008), pp. 59-60; Anselm, *Monologion*, in eds. B. Davies and G.R. Evans, *The Major Works* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 26-8, 52; Lombard, *Sentences*, i, 36.1-5, pp. 197-202.

The issue of God's knowledge forms the second limb to Alexander's discussion on stateables which God had 'said' ('dixisset') from eternity: Alexander moves from what God had 'said' to what he 'knew ('novit')' from eternity:

> 'This same thing is clear, since God only knew from eternity what is uncreated and is from eternity; but he knows this truth from eternity, therefore it is an uncreated truth and is from eternity'.

The aspect of the third issue which specifically concerns whether what God knows is *in* the divinity is picked up by Godefroid in his brief account, again linked to stateables:

> 'Again: it is one thing to be in the divinity and of that which it is, therefore to be in God is to be in the divinity and of that which it is. Which is nonsense ('nihil')'.[84]

Article seven appears to address both aspects of the issue: the numerical question whether, given there are clearly multiple ideas of things on earth, God has multiple ideas in his mind/essence or identical with his mind/essence when he knows; and the ontological question, whether whatever God knows is *in* his mind/essence or *is* his mind/essence.

The final issue relates to the Trinity and, while not raised by Alexander in his *quaestio*, is the first issue mentioned in Godefroid's quodlibet. It reproduces half of article seven's wording: that from eternity there are three beings or truths, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. These three are clearly all God, but the wording suggests a multiplicity of truths.[85]

The first strand was perhaps potentially the most subversive doctrinally.[86] However, the second and third strands seem to have caused particularly complex problems for theologians, especially since article seven's wording refers to truths 'from eternity' without qualification. This possibly closed what could otherwise have been a loophole for some scholars who saw a difference between something being from eternity and God knowing it from eternity, with the element of eternity stemming from God, not from the

[84] Alexander, *Quaestiones universitatem*, p. 216; [Godefroid of Bléneau], 'Quodlibeta', pp. 211-3.
[85] [Godefroid of Bléneau], ibid.
[86] Below, pp. 186-92.

thing known. However, given the article's compressed wording there may have been some leeway here. The complexity and contentious nature of the issues underlying the second and third strands is clear from Douai, MS 434, where at least sixteen questions have truth as their single main issue. For example: Question 443 principally concerns whether there are more truths created which are in things or only one truth created, which is not in things; the summary notes: '*Expl.*: just as the truth of intellectual reason ('rationis') is in speech ('oratione') according to the Philosopher'; Question 550 asks about human nature, including, as its third and fourth questions, whether truth is changeable and whether there are many truths or one; Question 559 principally concerns whether there are many created truths which are in things or only one truth, namely, uncreated truth, which is not in things; and Question 560 discusses whether truth is eternal or created - it notes that Anselm proved it was eternal.[87]

Turning to those theologians who might have advanced any of the positions underlying article seven, William of Auvergne was clear that there were many who held, or had held, the aberrant view on stateables, although he did not identify them by name. However, while he did not specify that the people he referred to were at the university, there is nothing to suggest they were not, something he often made clear.[88] Indeed, as demonstrated by Roger Bacon's criticism of Robert Grosseteste and others, complying with the letter of article seven's truth was far from straightforward. Robert Grosseteste's *De veritate*, probably from the early 1230s - followed by Richard Rufus in his *Metaphysics* commentary, from the 1230s or 1240s - argued that 'you cannot say many truths or all truth unless many truths have been presupposed ('suppositae')', and that 'therefore in such expressions the truths of things ('veritates') should be presupposed which conform to the principles of things in eternal truth ('rationibus rerum in aeterna veritate')'. Thus created things are only true when they conform to the principles of eternal truth, i.e. of God. It follows that there are many truths from eternity, but not many eternal

[87] Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', pp. 236, 245-6.
[88] William of Auvergne, *The Providence of God Regarding the Universe*, trans. R.J.Teske (Milwaukee, 2007), pp. 112-3.

things: their eternal nature depends on God's mind to exist, and, ultimately, their multiplicity relates to created things.[89] In response, Roger Bacon, in a passage from his *Quaestiones primae* covering both stateables and concepts, probably written in the 1240s, before he became a Franciscan, and apparently referring to Grosseteste's views, stated:

> 'Certain men deny plurality and none the less say that there are truths from eternity; for they say that such truths are only true insofar as they are known and they are only known by the Truth that is the First Cause - and [in this way] they disallow a plurality. Others claim that they are true absolutely, yet they [too] deny plurality, since the truth of things is subject to the divine knowledge and that is one … [O]thers assert that there are truths in the ideal reasons but not in the proper natures of things or in those things' proper entity'.

Bacon contrasts these positions unfavourably with his own view that, while there may be truths from eternity, this cannot be the case with propositions, since these can only exist in an intellect and depend on non-eternal angels or humans. But, as Bacon himself then continues with the observation that 'I say that there are many true things from eternity

[89] A letter in 1239 from Grosseteste to William of Auvergne suggests he knew and liked William (*The Letters of Robert Grosseteste*, eds. F.A.C. Mantello and J. Goering (Toronto, 2010), pp. 270-1, no. 78). Grosseteste also followed developments in Paris in 1240, as his redesign of the Oxford curriculum to match that of Paris shows (*CUP*, i, no. 127, pp. 169-70). Moreover, his position on several issues in both articles seven and eight was intriguingly similar to William's. For *De veritate*'s date, see R. Southern, *Robert Grosseteste: the Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe* (2nd edn., Oxford, 1998), p. 113. For the passage from Grosseteste's *De veritate* and explanation of his view, see Noone, 'Roger Bacon and Richard Rufus', pp. 259-60. Rufus was in Paris early in his career. The attribution of the *Metaphysics* to him is disputed. R. Wood, 'The earliest known surviving Western Medieval *Metaphysics* Commentary', *MPT*, 7 (1998), pp. 39-49, argues strongly for its attribution to Rufus, but, in her review of *Richard Rufus of Cornwall. In Physicam Aristotelis*, E. Sylla expresses reservations - https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23840-richard-rufus-of-cornwall-in-physicam-aristotelis-auctores-britannici-medii-aevi-xvi/ (26 January, 2016). Noone, 'Roger Bacon and Richard Rufus', p. 253, dates Rufus' *Metaphysics* commentary to the late 1240s in England, but R. Wood, 'Richard Rufus of Cornwall on Creation ', *MPT*, 2 (1989), p. 3, places it before 1238 in Paris. Wood also dates a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, almost certainly by Rufus, to Paris pre-1235 (ibid., p. 4). See also T.B. Noone, 'An Edition and Study of the *Scriptum super Metaphysicam* book XII, d. 2' (University of Toronto, Ph.D. thesis, 1987), pp. 309-10; C.H. Lawrence, 'The Letters of Adam Marsh and the Franciscan School at Oxford', *JEH*, 42 (1991), pp. 234-5, 237. For Rufus' commentary on the *Sententiae*, see R. Wood, 'Distinct ideas and Perfect Solitude', *Franciscan Studies*, 53 (1993), pp. 18-21.

('plura vera ab aeterno')', he is himself far from wholly in the clear; moreover he may have been in Paris in the 1240s and thus subject to the condemnation.[90]

Turning to the question of God's knowledge itself, Richard Rufus is in the frame.[91] Three of the works by or attributed to him - *De ideis*, his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* - demonstrate an alternating sequence of thought that makes connection with the condemnation tempting. In Paris, where he probably was when writing *De ideis* and possibly his *Metaphysics* commentary, he would have been subject to the condemnation's dictates, but this might not have applied in Oxford when he returned to England and could revert to his original view in his commentary on the *Sententiae*. However, this is not verifiable since both the chronology of Rufus' works and his location is disputed, as is the attribution to him of the *Metaphysics* commentary in particular.[92] Nevertheless, with that caveat, it appears that his view, at least initially, was likely to have been incompatible with article seven, and this was the position he held in his final discussion on the issue.

In *De ideis*, probably written c.1236 when a secular arts student in Paris, Rufus departed from what was perhaps the more common thirteenth-century view that God had a single idea which is God. The context of *De ideis* was philosophical rather than strictly theological - whether separated intelligences, and in particular the First Cause, understand sensible individuals; but the Christian equation of the First Cause with God meant that God's simplicity and unchangeability was the underlying issue.[93] Rufus claimed that the First Cause knows sensible things because it is the first cause of the idea of each:

> 'And who doubts created nature to be truly and completely known [by him], if its individual appearance and idea ('propria species et idea') was known? Moreover he

[90] Roger Bacon, *Quaestiones primae*, ii, VII.41-2 (cit. Noone, 'Roger Bacon and Richard Rufus', pp. 260-2); Power, *Roger Bacon*, pp. 37-8.
[91] For what follows, see Wood, 'Distinct ideas', pp. 7, 14.
[92] Above, pp. 59-60, n. 89.
[93] For the First Cause and Neoplatonism, see below, pp. 107-8.

is the first cause of the individual idea of all singular created things ('causa prima singulorum creatorum ideae propriae')'.

Rufus argued that God knows each individual creature and that all those who expound sacred scripture supported this position. The species of all things God will create are present to him so he knows them each individually. Moreover, if they have individual natures, separated intelligences must be able to understand individual things if they are to know themselves. Such self-knowledge must exist, since, for separated intelligences, act and substance are the same: they are what they understand. Rufus stated:

'[I]t is improbable that they do not know themselves since … their act is their substance ('sua actio sua substantia est')'.[94]

Rufus believed that there was an idea for each individual and for prime matter. However, what God understands is one. On the question of how something can be both one and many, he denied that one idea 'consignifies' many things, seeing this as semantics. So God must understand what is one and also many in some miraculous way ('miro modo'). In effect, God understands all things in one act of understanding, possible because they are all united in what is, ultimately, one simple species. Thus the unity of God's understanding comes from his single act and is unaffected by the plurality of the things understood.[95] This goes beyond the claim that the nature of things is only eternal through God's knowledge of them: it potentially leaves a plurality of ideas whose status is independent of God's knowledge although caused by him; and, unless a full pantheism is envisaged, it is difficult to see how they can all 'be God'. Hence, Rufus' theory may have fallen foul of article seven.

This was Rufus' view in c.1235, but, in an intriguing twist in the context of the condemnation, it Sentencesapparently changed radically a few years later. In his *Metaphysics* commentary, he argued that plurality comes only from created things:

[94] Wood, 'Distinct ideas', pp. 7, 14.
[95] Ibid., pp. 16-19.

> ‘To another question it should be said that God is one idea and not more (‘una idea tantum et non plures’) … In another way it should be said that he is many ideas (‘ipse est plures ideae’), that is there are many principles (‘plures rationes’) in him. That plurality of principles (‘pluritas rationum’) is from the relation of his own substance to the many created things (‘ex relationae suae substantiae ad plura creata’). Hence the whole plurality comes from the part of created things (‘ex parte creatorum’)’.

Then, in a further twist, Rufus appears to have reverted to his previous view: in his commentary on the *Sententiae*, probably composed when a theologian at Oxford in the 1250s, Rufus cited Augustine in support of the view that there are infinite things in the wisdom of God and, if looked at from a human perspective, God knows an infinite number of creatures.[96]

Returning finally to Alexander of Hales and his works prior to his *quaestio* on truth in the *Quaestiones … universitatem*, these seem to show a shift from a starting-point comparable to Rufus’. In his 1220s *Glossa* Alexander appears to have held that, while God’s wisdom is single, ‘there are many ideas and principles (‘ideae … plures et rationes plures’)’, citing Augustine in support, and that ‘therefore, just as there are many things known, so are there many ideas (‘sicut res cognitae sunt plures, ita ideae plures’)’. Indeed, he concludes: ‘it is thus in God, that many ideas should be said in respect of the multitude of things known (‘respectu multitudinis rerum cognitarum dicuntur multae ideae’)’.[97] However, his position had hardened even by the time of his pre-Franciscan questions (probably written later but before c.1236). Alexander’s Question 46 does not discuss divine knowledge specifically, but he makes it clear, citing Augustine again despite his slight shift of position, that while there are many principles when considered from the perspective of things, there is only one in relation to God (‘ex parte creaturarum habet

[96] Noone, ‘*Scriptum super Metaphysicam*’, pp. 309-10; Wood, ‘Distinct ideas’, pp. 18-21.
[97] Alexander, *Glossa*, i, 36, pp. 358-9, i, 45, pp. 453-4; Augustine, ‘Question 46’, pp. 59-60.

quod sit "multae", ex parte autem Dei, quod sit "una"). A further pre-Franciscan question, *De scientia divina*, states that any multiplicity in ideas is not in reality.[98]

Article eight

> *Octavus*, quod primum nunc et creatio-passio possit non esse creata.
>
> Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod utrumque et est creatum et creatura.

Article eight is the only article where different manuscripts contain variant readings of substantive significance: in every text except the one used in the *CUP*, 'creator vel' is added to the condemned proposition, which therefore reads: 'quod primum nunc ('the first moment of time') et creatio-passio ('creation' - literally 'undergoing creation') non sunt creator vel creatura', or similar words. The truth then reads: 'quod primum nunc et creatio-passio est creatura'. It is unclear why the *CUP* adhered to its chosen text in the face of all the other manuscripts, whether for consistency or because the addition of 'creator vel' is curious and hard to explain. However, given the almost universal inclusion of the latter, it cannot be ignored.

There are two different ways to interpret 'primum nunc' in the offending proposition if the word 'creator' is included. The first assumes it is the mirror image of the truth, which specifies both 'primum nunc' and 'creatio-passio' as created things/creation. This would imply that 'primum nunc' or, as sometimes described, 'primum instans', refers to the first moment of temporal time. But it is not clear why anyone holding the proposition needed to deny creative powers to temporal time or creation: contemporary works often discuss whether the first moment of time in this sense and creation were created or always existed, and variations on this theme, but they do not appear to suggest that they were

[98] Alexander, *Quaestiones*, ii, pp. 783-811, especially pp. 799-800 (citing Augustine, 'Question 46' again, together with *De Trinitate*, vi, 10); ibid., iii, pp. 1458-68. For the attribution of *De scientia divina* to Alexander, see Wood, 'Distinct ideas', pp. 9-14.

themselves creators, at least in the theological sense of producing something from nothing.[99]

The second interpretation assumes 'primum nunc' is different, and prior, to the beginning of time. This is the way Richard Rufus appears to have viewed it.[100] On this interpretation, 'primum nunc' becomes synonymous with God and thus 'creator'. It would then also stand for 'creatio-actio', again synonymous with God, and thus be integrally linked to 'creatio-passio' in the proposition, with the whole sentence a single aberrant statement asserting the eternity of the world without any action by the creator or recipt of action by the created thing. However, under this interpretation, as arguably with article nine below, the truth does not match the proposition - the truth appears to equate 'primum nunc' with the beginning of temporal time, or anyway not with God or 'creatio-actio', and hence properly to have no creative role.

This possible distinction complicates an already technically complex area. It is not always clear in contemporary discussions on 'primum nunc' whether a specific distinction is being made between the first moment and the beginning of time. Discussions often focus more generally on whether time was created or eternal, for example on whether 'now' can exist without time before and after it, and the difference between eternity, perpetuity and temporality. 'Creatio-passio' covers the process the world undergoes when being created, and hence its effect, the created world, the opposite to 'creatio-actio', the act of creation and hence of its agent, God. But its connotation goes further, implying the passive reception of creation as an on-going process, rather than creation as completed and static. Arguments include the simultaneity of cause and effect, whether a created thing can be temporal if its creator is eternal - there cannot be a creator without something being

[99] One text possibly containing a vestige of this view comes from Aquinas, *Summa theologica*: 'Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both: since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the creature' (*Summa*, iv, Ia. Q.45.a3, pp. 466-8).
[100] Below, pp. 66-7.

created, whether an eternal creator entails creation must be an on-going process to avoid change in God, and similar points.

Discussions on this subject in the decades before the condemnation were wide-ranging. Douai, MS 434 gives a good idea of the range of issues discussed. It includes twenty-five questions on creation generally, with eight of these having the issues in article eight as their single or main topic. For example, Question 147, attributed to the Oxford theologian (and Paris student pre-1229), William of Durham, asked 'what is eternity?'; 'what is the difference between time and uncreated eternity?'; and 'what is in eternity?'.[101] Question 460 asked about eternity, including what it is; whether eternity and God are the same; and whether eternity, time, and perpetuity ('evum') are the same. Question 461, attributed to Pierre de Bar (probably at Paris until c.1230, created cardinal in 1244), asked whether God was the cause of things from eternity, and whether any other things were created before the world. Question 463 concerned God's omnipotence, including whether he could have made the world not to have existed. Question 533 looked at God creating heaven and earth 'in the beginning', and noted three expositions of this phrase, of which one was that 'in the beginning' meant he created it in the beginning of time. Such questions go to the heart of the issues in article eight.[102]

The problem underlying the issue of *creatio-passio* is perhaps best encapsulated by Richard Dales' summary of the third part of Douai, Question 461:

> 'Finally the *opponens* brings up another distinction which will become a commonplace, namely that between creation as an action of the creator, and creation as a passion undergone by the creature. He claims that there must have been some creature to undergo the action. The master's response points out that no passion corresponds to the act of creation, because God does not require anything on which

[101] For William of Durham and the eternity of the world, see R.C. Dales, *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World* (Leiden, 1990), pp. 51-4.
[102] Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', pp. 139, 237, 244.

to act, and thus the *exitus* of the world is nothing other than coming into existence'.[103]

This study has found no evidence of anyone at Paris unambiguously contravening the doctrine in article eight. But Richard Rufus may do so, or come close, in a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* attributed to him, probably as a Paris arts student, c.1235. Rufus argued:

> '[T]he non-being of the world was before its being in one way and yet in itself does not fall before or after … [T]he non-being of creation has its sole existence in the Creator. Therefore the exitus of non-being into being is its flowing from the Creator. We therefore understand the Creator as something indivisible, much as a point here, and the being of creation as a line flowing from the point. And we understand the point thus remaining and the line as flowing, and it will be still [right] to say that in the point does not fall before nor after, and nevertheless the point is before that line or anything of it. And it is in this way that one can say that the non-being of the world is before its being, and nevertheless in itself its non-being is neither before nor after …'.

Thus, non-being existed before being, flowing from it, with no first moment of time. So,

> 'we understand the first being ('ens primum') as indivisible ('indivisibile') and that there is some flowing ('fluxum') of temporal things (temporalium') from it. Hence it appears that the flowing itself is from something else ('ab alio'), that is, it is not said to be first in itself ('in ipso … primum'). Thus it is in the creation or change ('motus') of the world that the thing from which that flowing is, is something indivisible, and in the being ('esse') of those things there should not be said first ('primum')'.[104]

[103] Dales, *Medieval Discussions*, pp. 54-6; Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', p. 237. The opponent's possibly aberrant view could reflect standard scholastic disputation.
[104] For this analysis, see R. Wood, 'Richard Rufus', pp. 7-9, citing Rufus (?), *In Physic. Aristot*. 8.1-2. I am grateful to Cecilia Trifogli for her help on these passages.

Rufus' argument is complex and his position subtle. However it seems to rest on the idea that, if there is a line with two ends, any change occurs within the line with the two end points excluded - the line with its flowing nature itself has no first or last instant. The world and its flow or change starts with God, the 'punctus' or 'ens indivisibile', but God himself is not subject to the flow or to change. As change ('motus') is interdependent on time ('tempus'), with change ontologically but not temporally prior to time, the same applies to time. Thus there is no created first moment of time: this is God. God, in whom no before or after exists, is not before creation in time although he is existentially, and time is continuous from eternity with no first instant.[105] However, Rufus can still argue that the world and time had a beginning, from which they flowed, and he advances six arguments to demonstrate this.

However, as with his position on God's knowledge, and again possibly implying a link with the condemnation, Rufus subsequently changed his view. In his *Metaphysics* commentary Rufus argued that God created the world from nothing and it had a limit within itself (a first moment), not merely outside itself, and he argued explicitly that 'heaven was created in the first instant of time ('in primo instanti temporis')'. Indeed, he describes his earlier view as nonsense ('illud nihil est').[106]

A similar idea may also be present in *Quaestio* 6A of Alexander of Hales' *Quaestiones … universitatem*. Alexander stated:

> 'Therefore, it should be said that time began to be in that "now" which alone is the beginning of the future; and vice versa, it will cease to be in that "now" which alone is the end of the past. Nor is it right that time was in the first "now" in which it began to be, but it sufficed that after that "now" it had being, since successive things are not in their own beginning; therefore, when it is said concerning such things "this began to be", it does not follow that it is that thing [i.e. its own beginning], but

[105] R. Wood, 'Roger Bacon: Richard Rufus' Successor as a Parisian Physics Professsor', *Vivarium*, 35 (1997), p. 229.
[106] Rufus follows Grosseteste here (Wood, 'Roger Bacon', p. 231). See also Wood, 'Richard Rufus', pp. 7-15. For the authorship and date of this work, see above, pp. 59-60, n. 89.

> rather that it is not, but that after this it will be present; for time is from the genus of successive things, therefore, etc. Similarly, it is from the part of the ending: for just as successive things do not have being in their own beginning, so neither in their final ending; and therefore it is not right that time is in the final "now" ('ultimo "nunc"'), in which it will cease to be, but rather that it is not in that, but that it was before'.[107]

Article nine:

> *Nonus*, quod qui habet meliora naturalia, de necessitate plus habebit de gratia et gloria.
>
> Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod Deus secundum quod praelegit et preordinavit, dabit unicuique gratiam et gloriam.

The textual variations to article nine appear clarificatory only. Overall, however, article nine is curious. First, it is unclear if the article covers angels, or humans, or both. Second, there appears to be a mismatch between the proposition, which refers to natural gifts necessarily entailing greater gifts and glory, and the truth, which is couched in terms of predestination. While these are not necessarily incompatible, the normal counterpart to arguments on predestination is free will, not natural gifts; and in any case the term 'necessarily' in the proposition appears to rule out free will from the discussion. However, as Peter Lombard stated in his *Glossa* on the Pauline Epistles [Rom. xi:24], written before his *Sententiae*, 'God is the one who creates and establishes all natures', or again, in his *Sententiae*, 'God placed seminal reasons in all things'. Things 'made according to seminal causes are said to be made naturally'. These therefore lie behind free choices made by humans jointly with God but independently of God's grace.[108] Such seminal causes complement God's 'primordial causes' placed in a creature whereby his free choice is

[107] Alexander, *Quaestiones universitatem*, pp. 193-6.

[108] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 18.6, pp. 79-80. Peter Lombard adapted primordial and seminal causes from Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* (*On Genesis*, trans. E. Hill (New York, 2002), vi, 10, 18, pp. 310-1, 317). See J.W. Wood, 'Recasting Augustine to Look like Aristotle', *Nova et Vetera*, 13 (2015), pp. 817-24. For Robert of Melun's view on God's role in endowing humans with natural gifts combined with free will, see M. Colish, *Peter Lombard* (2 vols., Leiden, 1994), i, pp. 283-4.

caused by God's grace alone. The concepts of free will, predestination, grace and natural gifts are therefore connected - better natural gifts given by God (as seminal causes) result in better choices and hence, since God imparted the gifts originally, he gave them to those who were predestined for grace and glory through a predestined proper use of free will.[109]

The numerous and complex discussions in the second half of the twelfth century and first half of the thirteenth on the relationship between nature and grace suggest two main interpretations for the proposition in article nine.[110] The first relates to angelic hierarchies, derived from pseudo-Dionysius, with his nine ranked orders with decreasing gifts and abilities. In the context of the qualities angels had when first made, and whether they were created equal in essence or spiritual substance, in rational wisdom, and in free will, Peter Lombard stated that they were created different. He concluded:

> '[A]s a result of these differences [in essence, form and power], some were made superior and some inferior to others by the wisdom of God, who confers greater gifts on some and lesser ones on others, so that those who at that time excelled the rest through their natural goods ('naturalia bona') should afterwards be preeminent over them through the gifts of grace'.[111]

This links nature and grace in simple terms. It thus fits the proposition neatly.

However, the terminology of the truth seems to reflect the more complex underlying agenda on the role of free will and predestination within the relationship between natural

[109] B. Lonergan, 'Grace and Freedom - Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas', in idem, *Collected Works* (19 vols., Toronto, 1988-), i, pp. 15-16: '[T]he difficulty was to explain why everything was not grace; after all, what is there that is not a free gift of God? This question more than puzzled Cardinal Laborans [† c.1190] who, defining grace in the strict sense … affirmed it to include everything man either has at birth or receives after birth. Feeling that this definition did not square with common notions, he next attempted to indicate two narrower senses of the term … he took grace to mean more specifically everything that the elect have at birth or receive afterwards, and still more specifically the virtues of the elect. This difficulty with the idea of grace naturally involves an even greater difficulty with the distinction between *naturalia* and *gratuita.* The distinction was a commonplace, but what could it mean? An extreme position was taken by Radulphus Ardens [†c.1200] when he affirmed that before the fall all the virtues were natural but now, because of the fall, they are gratuitous'.

[110] For other possible interpretations and the wider context underlying article nine, see below, pp. 221-5.

[111] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 3.3, p. 13; see also ibid., 9.1-5, pp. 38-41, cited by Odo Rigaud in the context of the condemnation and referring to article nine (above, p. 23). The angelic focus of both distinctions supports an angelic interpretation for article nine.

gifts (albeit given by God), grace and glory. Issues included what 'nature' means, with Philip the Chancellor noting that nature can be understood in many ways ('multipliciter'), including 'a certain possibility ('possibilitas quedam')' that God gives to a created being so that it will do his will, and the 'highest law of nature ('summa lex natura')', which is God himself.[112] While the focus from the 1220s tended to shift from a previous emphasis on Adam's creation and fall to current human nature, discussion was often still connected to Adam - if God created Adam as perfect, how could he have chosen to disobey God? Was God responsible, despite himself being wholly good and omnipotent (an issue related to article ten on Adam's fall)? Some twelfth-century theologians suggested Adam was created with an unrealised potential to be perfect, giving rise to the question whether man could realise this state alone or needed divine grace to exercise his will properly. For example, Alan of Lille's *Anticlaudianus*, from the 1180s, described Nature's plan to redeem her earlier failings by fashioning a perfect man. He would not yield to temptation, but would show that a human could live a perfect life and return to the prelapsarian state. Christ's incarnation and redemptive mission would be redundant.[113] Although such perfection was only possible with divine aid, it would result in its recipient's natural gifts necessarily receiving greater glory. Alan's poem walked a fine line:

> 'Nature, remembering that her work failed in many respects and wishing to undo her failure … by a new … venture, is trying to form a man, to stamp him with happiness, give him complete perfection, create him in virtue in order to cast a veil over her long-standing culpability by giving to the wayward world one man from so many thousands who could make good his claim to righteousness, keep his gaze fixed on virtue …'.[114]

[112] Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, ed. N. Wicki (2 vols., Bern, 1985), i, pp. 468; Wood, 'Recasting Augustine', p. 825.
[113] G.R. Evans, *Alan of Lille* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 146-8, 168-70. For a broad division of scholars at Paris into three groups at the end of the twelfth century, with Alan among the 'Porretani', see Baldwin, *Masters, Princes and Merchants*, i, p. 43. 'Porretani' views may be reflected in article two (above, pp. 41-3) but not article nine, despite Alan's *Anticlaudianus*. See B. Hamm, *Promissio, pactum, ordinatio* (Tübingen, 1977), pp. 26-40 (for the Porretani), passim (for God's freedom and self-binding in medieval doctrines of grace.
[114] Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus*, trans. J.J. Sheridan (Toronto, 1973), p. 144, lines 202 ff.

As regards the first possible interpretation of article nine, angelic hierarchies, in his commentary on the *Sententiae* Albertus Magnus implies Peter Lombard's text may have been its genesis. He argued, unusually treating angels and humans differently, that, while 'it is not generally true that grace is proportionate to nature', for angels 'the quantity of grace is according to the quantity of natural [gifts], because they were created in grace'.[115] Similarly, Bonaventure's commentary on the *Sententiae,* dating from Paris in the early 1250s, noted:

> 'In human beings, however, even when we can determine certain advantage in matters of nature as well as in those of grace, nevertheless the two often fail to correspond to one another. Where nature is better, grace is often less; and who today is rightly called the lesser ('minor') might well be the greater tomorrow'.

Bonaventure commented further, in a passage implying the existence and articulation of contemporary arguments linking hierarchy in nature and grace:

> 'That argument is not convincing which claims that, if there be no hierarchical order in nature, there could be no hierarchical order in grace. For it is not at all necessary that grace match ('adaequare') nature, nor is it necessary that the order of grace presuppose ('praesupponere') any order in nature, although grace presupposes nature in the sense that an accident presupposes a subject. And because our grace corresponds to the grace of the angels, even though our nature is not of the same species as their nature, thus, if by this [the correspondence in grace] there be in us, too, a distinction of [graced] orders, then this [alone] is to be understood as corresponding to the angelic orders'.[116]

However, in favour of the second interpretation, around twenty-seven of the questions in Douai, MS 434 fall into its broad area, although most appear only indirectly relevant. These include Questions 90-95. Question 90 is a complicated question concerning the division of good, including natural and moral good. It referred to the six

[115] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 3.10 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 76-7.
[116] Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, 9.1.9 (cit. Schenk, 'Analogy as the *discrimen*', pp. 184-7).

days of creation and Adam's fall and loss of immortality. This set the context for Questions 91-95. Question 91 discussed whether Adam's original immortality was a natural good or one of grace, an issue developed in Questions 92-95. Other relevant questions include Question 423, which looked at Paul's statement (1.Cor. xv:10) that 'by the grace of God I am what I am', with its third part discussing whether grace is something created in us in respect of the thing to be merited or whether uncreated grace is sufficient with natural things. It cites 'Gilbertus', and the entry notes: '*Expl*.: we cannot merit grace ('gratiam mereri non possemus')'. Question 434 concerned operating and cooperating grace, with its first part relating to whether we can become good from nature alone. Question 436 looked at the conjunction of free will and grace. While not all the discussion related to natural good, the connection between natural good and that granted by grace, together with references to Adam's fall, seem to reflect *Anticlaudianus*' theme and the issues underlying article nine, in conjunction with article ten. Overall, it is clear from Douai, MS 434 that the areas covered in article nine of free will, grace, and predestination were seen as important, contentious and troublesome.[117]

Finally, contemporary theologians whose discussions may have reflected the aberrant proposition include Guerric of St.-Quentin, whose quodlibets reflect Peter Lombard's hierarchical account and seem questionable, although only applying to angels:

> 'To that [point] that angels can be elevated by things merited above others, this can be said in two ways: in one way thus, that as Augustine said, "All spirits are ministering", but nevertheless the greater one through a mediator, the lesser ones without a mediator, because the greater ones influence the ministry for the lesser ones, and therefore all deserve and are rewarded according to their own fitness for acceptance; or thus, that they do not deserve to receive/[earn] anything ('aliud habendum') not received/[earned] ('habitum'), but so that they should receive/[earn] that better thing. Hence there is one reward of substance, but the aureole which shines from things merited [is multiple] because the individual things merited shine

[117] Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', pp. 136, 234-5; for 'Gilbertus' [of Poitiers], see Douai, MS 434, ii, f. 74v.

> out. Thus, it can be varied in them and in this the aforesaid reward is varied among … those ministering. But those who now have more capacity in respect of substance and intellect then likewise will [have more] as far as [reward] of substance'.[118]

Guerric's remarks go further than discussions by many theologians on reward through merit and specifically discuss reward resulting from natural capacity, the territory of article nine.

Conclusion

Chapters two and three assess what influences might have lain behind the condemned propositions - why they were chosen, and what were the historical, institutional and doctrinal implications of such choices. However, it is clear from the analysis above, first, that most, if not all, of the areas were the subject of intense and wide-ranging debate in the period. Second, the texts demonstrate that many, possibly all, of the articles were multi-faceted, with numerous underlying agenda, as shown perhaps most clearly in article seven on eternal truths. Finally, judging by the number of 'errors' identifiable in the selected works, it appears that many theologians, and perhaps also arts scholars, strayed right up to, or over, the line that the condemnation was trying to set. This was not a condemnation issued against a couple of minor miscreants; it went to the heart of theological study at the university.

[118] Guerric, *Quaestiones*, pp. 403-4.

CHAPTER TWO: CAUSES AND INFLUENCES

'WE ARE HERE AS ON A DARKLING PLAIN'[1]

At the beginning of 1241, Gregory IX, 'sponsor' of the university at Paris, had been besieged in Rome for half a year. He was probably over ninety years old and reaching the end of his pontificate. Thirteenth-century theologians at Paris had only known a world dominated by continuous papal leadership, first Innocent III (1198-1216 and Gregory's uncle), then, with Gregory instrumental in his choice, Honorius III (1216-1227), and finally Gregory himself (1227-1241). The imminent election could have suggested Paris theologians needed to prepare for a new pope, an opportunity to express their influence and authority which the subsequent vacancy only served to reinforce. By 1244 Innocent IV (1243-1254), had been pope for under a year, following Celestine IV's sixteen-day papacy at the end of 1241 and the subsequent interregnum. Individually and collectively, theologians at Paris might have wanted to make a timely public statement of their orthodoxy on key doctrinal points. Odo of Châteauroux, chancellor of the university, certainly gained promotion to cardinal in 1244, and others with strong links to the university, such as Hugh of St.-Cher, were similary favoured the same year.

Such ambitions remain a matter of speculation. But the condemnation's immediate historical context is important. The period starting with Lateran IV, November 1215, with its statement of faith a defining moment for catholic doctrine and a triumph for papal ambitions, and finishing with the condemnation in 1241/4, is crucial. Its challenges profoundly affected theologians at the university. Organisationally, this generation saw the development of a university, including its admission of the new mendicant orders. Political and doctrinal threats included heresy, a concern only really diminishing with the fall of Montségur in 1245, but also drawing in unease over Jewish 'aberrance', with the Talmud trial in the early 1240s. This was linked with increasing apprehension over new philosophical learning from the south and east and, perhaps, also with the continuing impasse with the Greek Church, both over its independence from the pope and its

[1] Matthew Arnold, *Dover Beach* (London, 1867), p. 402.

substantive doctrinal differences. There was the dispute with Frederick II, with Frederick's openly aggressive actions in 1240 taking this to a new level. Finally, there was the Mongol threat, at its peak with the invasion of Hungary in 1241, and concerns over other groups, including the Muslims. Latin territories in the east, and Constantinople itself, remained at risk and crusades, such as the failed fifth crusade and disastrous 1239 Syrian expedition, continued. Apocalyptic speculation was rife, including on the possible role of some groups, in particular Jews, Muslims and Mongols, with Frederick II himself painted by Gregory IX as the forerunner of Antichrist.[2] This was potentially a toxic mix.

If the principles of catholic doctrine had themselves been incontrovertibly entrenched, Paris theologians might have been able to view such challenges as external and largely irrelevant to their studies and been confident in their developing roles as preachers and evangelists without the need for internal regulatory action. But the Bible itself contained apparently contradictory statements, such as on the vision of God, and unfathomable mysteries, such as the Trinity; and different views within the Latin tradition itself persisted in the thirteenth century. Some may have stemmed from uncertainties inherited from Augustine's works, with his often-changing views and doctrinal struggles, while others came from disagreements from ninth-century scholars onwards, most notably Eriugena, with his *Periphyseon* banned but still read in the thirteenth century, and twelfth-century theologians, of whom Gilbert of Poitiers was perhaps the most relevant to the condemnation. These earlier Latin writers were themselves influenced - often inspired - by external doctrines, especially from the ancient Greek philosophers and Greek Fathers, but

[2] For example, albeit later than the 1241/4 condemnation, Roger Bacon thought it possible that the Mongols were Gog and Magog, and would thus serve the Antichrist in the days before the Apocalyse and Day of Judgment (M.T. Abate, 'The Reorientation of Roger Bacon', in A. Classen (ed.), *East Meets West in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times* (Berlin, 2013), pp. 555-6; Power, *Roger Bacon*, pp. 173-5). See also Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, iv, pp. 345-6 on apocalyptic events in 1244. For apocalyptic speculation generally (including Innocent III's use of Joachim of Fiore's apocalyptic exegesis following the fall of Constantinople in 1204, Jacques de Vitry's interest in apocalyptic prophecies, and the continuing influence of Joachim of Fiore), see B.E.Whalen, *Dominion of God* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), especially pp. 74-99, 134-43, 149-52; F. Schmieder, 'Christians, Jews, Muslims - and Mongols', *Medieval Encounters*, 12 (2006), pp. 277-82. For Gregory IX's accusation against Frederick II, and whether this was merely rhetorical, see D. Abulafia, *Frederick II: a Medieval Emperor* (London, 1988), p. 318. For evidence of the apolocalyptic traditions of Muslims and Mongols themselves in the thirteenth century, see D. Cook, 'Apocalyptic Incidents during the Mongol Invasions', in W. Brandes and F. Schmieder (eds.), *Endzeiten* (Berlin, 2008), pp. 293-312.

their works were internal to the Latin theology and left an unstable basis which could have been seen by thirteenth-century theologians at Paris as vulnerable to subversion or attack.

This chapter looks at two areas from c.1215 to c.1244 which could have shaped the condemnation - institutional developments and then doctrinal influences. The starting-point for both is the statement of faith from Lateran IV, the first such major declaration of core principles issued by the Catholic Church since the ecumenical rulings of the fourth- and fifth-century Christological controversies. The statement had more than just doctrinal significance. There was also a political context, both diplomatic and ecclesiastical, given the contemporary difficulties with the Greeks (where Innocent III was determined to exert his sovereignty and that of catholic dogma), and the Cathars (who the church claimed posed a threat not merely doctrinally but also to its very organisation).[3] Lateran IV represented the culmination of Innocent III's pontificate, and reflected much of the reform agenda of Peter the Chanter and his circle at Paris, with the statutory incorporation of a university of teaching masters at Paris shortly before, in August 1215, showing the same concern for reform. It represented a major milestone for both church and university and a crucial reference point for theology up to the condemnation and beyond.[4] Together with the university stautes, it shaped the developing institution of the university at Paris and its faculty of theology.

However, despite its authority as official catholic doctrine, Lateran IV did not put an end to the controversies it was intended to address, and the issues covered by its statement of faith surfaced again in the condemnation of 1241/4. Explanations for why they did so, why some theologians at Paris held the aberrant views - or indeed why, if in some cases no Paris theologian appeared to have done so, they were nevertheless included in the

[3] For the modern controversy over the Cathars' existence, see below, pp. 136-8. References to heresy and heretics throughout this study should be read with the caveats there.

[4] Baldwin, *Masters, Princes and Merchants*, i, pp. 315-43. For Lateran IV's continuing importance, see A. Duggan, 'Conciliar Law, 1123-1215', in W. Hartmann and K. Pennington (eds.), *History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140-1244* (Washington, 2008), p. 342; A. García y García, 'The Fourth Lateran Council and the Canonists', in Hartmann and Pennington (eds.), op.cit., p. 370. Immediate recognition of its significance is demonstrated by its three contemporary commentators, Johannes Teutonicus, Vincentius Hispanus and Damasus Hungarus.

condemnation - and why these specific ten articles were singled out, must lie in this period from 1215 onwards, which shaped the doctrines, aspirations and fears of Paris theologians in the early 1240s. The condemnation did not come out of nothing; it had its own historical context, and should not simply be judged in the shadow of subsequent events.[5]

INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES

The role of Paris theologians: the university statutes and Lateran IV

The period from c.1215 to c.1244 saw major institutional developments which had a significant impact on the way theologians at Paris saw their role.[6] Recent scholarship has highlighted the late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century reform agenda of Peter the Chanter and his circle accompanying this. While there were variations in the detail of both the criticisms and proposals of the different groups in this period, the need to reform the schools in order better to support church and society was a belief shared by all. This view shaped the first statutes, prescribed by the papal legate, Robert of Courçon, previously a student under Peter the Chanter, and subsequently remained influential. The statutes were based on the belief that morality was essential to theology and its intellectual pursuit, a major and important change from the climate of the twelfth-century schools. They comprised a 'special mandate ('speciale mandatum')' from the pope for their reform.[7] This demonstrated the pope's interest in the well-being of theologians at Paris and implied he saw them as important to the church. It must have spurred them to assert a preeminent place in leading theology in the church and to accept the need for self-regulation, high moral standards and discipline.[8] This change formed the context for the events of 1241/44.

[5] However, within the overall historical context those involved must have had their own interests and agenda. Older theologians could have been directly influenced by much earlier events. Courtenay, *Teaching Careers*, pp. 32-3, argues that the ranks of theology masters were dominated by senior, secular masters.
[6] Above, pp. 15-17.
[7] *CUP*, i, no. 20, pp. 78-9; Wei, *Intellectual Culture,* p. 100.
[8] The role of theologians as preeminent interpreters of scripture was distinguished from the pope's power over the church. Gratian, *Decretum*, ed. E. Friedberg, *Corpus Iuris Canonici* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1879-81), i, p. 65, distinction 20, described Christ as giving two keys to Peter, one of power, one of knowledge. For the symbolic significance of the key of knowledge for the important status of theologians, see J.C. Wei, *Gratian the Theologian* (Washington, 2016), p. 58.

Peter the Chanter's approach to theology had been practical, with a particular focus on moral and pastoral care. He and his colleagues set out specific advice for the three categories of reading, disputation and preaching which had been identified as the proper functions of theologians and which formed the main teaching methods in the schools. For example, in his *Verbum abbreviatum*, he advised on disputations, advocating a collective approach. His school's standpoint, while not condemning Greek philosophers, can be seen as reflecting the growing separation of theology from philosophy at the university - accordingly, the group believed concepts such as the Trinity could only be approached by excluding human reason and philosophical concepts.[9] Such an outlook was thus ingrained in the developing university from the start and formed an important part of the condemnation's frame of reference.

Four voices are of particular interest, given their roles, then or later, as chancellors of the university. Peter of Poitiers (chancellor 1193-1205) argued that studying the Scriptures by themselves was insufficient: 'one must also demonstrate knowledge in the fruit of good works'. His successor, Praepositinus of Cremona, complained that those studying in monasteries and schools 'study that they might know, that they might be known … not that they might be edified or edify others'. In his early poems, Philip the Chancellor protested that students saw riches as more important than learning, with teaching methods corrupt. Finally, Odo of Châteauroux, in a sermon delivered probably c.1235-7, stated that the doctors and preachers ('doctores et predicatores'), the holy and learned men ('sancti viri and litterati'), now illuminate the whole world much more than previously.[10] Expectation of the role of theologians at Paris is reflected in Innocent III's letter of 1205 to the masters and scholars at Paris asking them to go to Constantinople to reform its university ('*litterarum studium*'). Domestically, Lateran IV, canon eleven,

[9] Baldwin, *Masters, Princes and Merchants,* pp. 18, 99, 103.

[10] Odo saw preaching as essential to restore the church and Christian world, urging students to concentrate on scripture, not philosophy. Theologians expressing similar views included John of Rochelle, c.1230s, whose *Summa de vitiis* set the goal for theology students first to edify themselves, then others - anyone studying with different goals sinned (Young, 'Queen of the Faculties', p. 34). William of Auvergne's treatise on preaching demonstrated the importance given to this skill. William advised cautious use of philosophy, but warned that it should be subordinated to theology (Davy, *Sermons*, pp. 123-4). See also Ferruolo, *Origins,* pp. 231, 220, 110-111; Charansonnet, 'Université et L'Etat', pp. 53-64.

stipulated the appointment of a master in every cathedral church, and other churches, to teach clerics and poor students for free.[11] Paris theologians were thus clearly expected to spread their learning more widely, a message repeated in the dispatch of Paris theologians to Toulouse in 1217.[12]

Following the 1215 university statutes, the religious orders' entry to the university, particularly that of the Dominicans and Franciscans, marked a further important change. The papacy relied on them increasingly in areas such as debates with the Greek Church, and they had a clear and growing external focus as doctrinal experts and papal enforcers. Those involved included Paris theologians. Leaving aside the hostility the orders evoked in the university, especially in the 1250s, such developments must have affected how the masters, including the seculars, viewed their role corporately - at the very least, the role given to the orders by the pope is likely to have increased the reputation and importance of the faculty in which they studied in the eyes of the church and hence, very probably, their own. Moreover, being masters together in the theology faculty probably helped both to ensure the secular theologians at the university were informed about issues outside their curriculum and to foster the external focus that the earlier reformers desired.

However, the role the masters embraced of leading theology was not a passive one. Leading theology meant shaping it, both intellectually and for the church. Given the central importance of the church for all aspects of life, the way the masters did this would have had an impact on all sections of society. Their concerns were not limited to absruse areas such as the composition of the Trinity, but extended to mundane issues with a major impact on people's lives, such as marital problems, trade and usury, and the seven deadly sins. Such moral or ethical topics formed the subject of sermons, and could lead to requests for advice from lay groups outside the university.[13] The masters appear increasingly to have attempted to formalise theological positions and make them coherent,

[11] *CUP*, i, no. 3, pp. 62-3.
[12] *CUP*, i, no. 25, p. 83.
[13] See, for example, Wei, *Intellectual Culture*, pp. 247-355; Young, *Scholarly Community*, pp. 168-207. Young (pp. 206-7) notes an approach by a group of women to a Paris theologian, Raoul of Châteauroux, in 1273, for moral advice following a sermon.

arguably not merely their own but that of the groups with whom they came into contact, as may have been the case with doctrines viewed as heretical.[14]

Dominicans and Franciscans

Dominicans and Franciscans played an increasingly important role in the university at Paris. They were present in their own *studia* from 1217 and 1220 respectively, and gained a first (Dominican) chair in the theology faculty in May 1229, with the Dominicans acquiring a second and the Franciscans a single chair in the 1230s. This step was significant for both the university and the orders. For the university, it brought into its fold or retained some of the period's most eminent theologians, with major figures, such as Alexander of Hales, joining the friars while keeping his theology chair. For the orders, it put them at the centre of theological doctrine, cementing their place in its development and promulgation. The move was apparently supported by Gregory IX and, given his patronage and use of the friars, may have drawn him closer to the university itself.

Both orders were, by design, outward-facing. Successive popes built on the orders' missions to deliver their shared agenda, with Gregory IX relying on them particularly heavily. The Franciscans led debates between the Latin and Greek Churches in 1231-4. Areas where Gregory gave the Dominicans responsibility included monastic reform in the late 1220s; and, in the 1230s, he appointed three Dominican bishops - for Toulouse; Bosnia (mandated to suppress heresy and assert papal supremacy); and the Scottish west highlands. The extent of Gregory's use of the orders can be seen in his correspondence, with numerous letters to both orders related to heresy, negotiations with the Greek Church, expeditions to the Holy Land, and conversion of pagans over a wide sweep of territory.[15]

[14] Below, pp. 136-8. In the context of political theory, J. Miethke, 'Practical Intentions of Scholasticism: the Example of Political Theory', in W.J. Courtenay and J. Miethke (eds.), *Universities and Schooling in Medieval Society* (Leiden, 2000), pp. 214-5, notes that members of all faculties at a medieval university were well equipped to respond to society's interests and needs when theoretical clarification was needed on political matters - every member could define critical contemporary problems with a theoretical approach from his own point of view and respond accordingly.

[15] Gerard de Fracheto, *Lives of the Brethren*, trans. P. Conway (London, 1955), p. I24; *BF*, pp. 27-300; A.R. Roach, *The Devil's World* (Harlow, 2005), pp. 101, 130.

The role of the Dominicans in the emerging Inquisition is particularly notable. Dominic probably helped Gregory before he became pope to tackle Italian heretics. He gave his order a principal aim to fight Catharism in France. The Dominicans led the developing Inquisition and promulgated and helped to organise some crusades. The order's origins lay in combatting heresy in Toulouse, and their inquisitorial role kept them firmly at the centre of this battle - thus, as a result of the order's presence in Paris, Catharism must have been a major topic there.[16] Moreover, Roland of Cremona, the first Dominican-trained theology master at Paris, moved to Toulouse in 1229; and Raymond of Peñafort, Dominican master general 1238-40, was influential in establishing the Inquisition in Aragon.[17]

However, the relationship between the mendicant orders and the university was not straightforward. First, while advanced mendicant students studied theology at the university and both orders had masters there, the majority of their education was separate, with none studying in the arts faculty there, and most of those studying at the university were not expected to finish their degrees. The Dominican school of St.-Jacques existed before 1220, when it was authorised as a 'studium'.[18] Dominicans and Franciscans studied at the university but had different affiliations.[19] However, while their organisations' roles differed, they seem to have worked together with a common purpose in 1241/4; and indeed some, such as Alexander of Hales, given his late move to the Franciscans, must

[16] For the Dominicans at Paris, see Mulchahey, *'First the Bow*, pp. 9-12, 24-36. The first Dominican *studia* were at Toulouse. When Dominic dispersed the friars in 1217 to widen their mission, he targeted university towns. Seven friars went to Paris and recruited students there, facilitating the order's entry to the university and bringing their anti-heresy agenda there. The Dominican General Chapter acted as a major information exchange centre (L.J. Sackville, *Heresy and Heretics in the Thirteenth Century* (York, 2011), p. 55). Thus all Dominicans should have known about current concerns.

[17] D. Smith, *Crusade, Heresy and Inquisition in the Lands of the Crown of Aragon, c. 1167-1276* (Leiden, 2010), pp. 188-93.

[18] The history of St.-Jacques was critical in the order's developing relationship with the university: the Dominicans' move to Paris in 1217 was facilitated by the theology master, John of St. Albans, who - in a move made official in 1221 - offered them the convent of St.-Jacques in return for reciprocal concessions, including its use for John's theology lectures (Mulchahey, *First the Bow*, pp. 26-7).

[19] According to Mulchahey (op.cit., pp. 351-2), many Dominican scholars were 'at the universities, but not of the universities: they operated in proximity to the secular *studia* but were not technically part of them'. Most Dominicans only studied for around three years and most Franciscans for around four years, unless taking a degree (d'Avray, *Preaching*, pp. 134-5). For the friars, study at the university was intended to prepare them for work outside it (Schwartz, 'Authority, Control, and Conflict', p. 18).

have understood and perhaps shared the perceptions of both groups. Members of both orders were implicated in the 1241/4 condemnation.[20]

The pope[21]

Papal involvement in the schools of Paris had been an intermittent feature of the twelfth century. Gregory IX, however, seems to have shown a particularly close concern, with his pontificate covering the critical years preceding the condemnation. An important question is how far Gregory involved himself in doctrinal details and communicated his views to theologians at Paris within the overall context of his pontificate's preoccupations - which included throughout, and especially by the time of the final hostilities from 1239, the escalating dispute with Frederick II, as well as the spread of heresy, the conflict with the Greeks, the crusades, and the broad question of church reform. The evidence comes primarily from the collections of letters, papal bulls, and other documents from Gregory's pontificate, although it is difficult to be sure which emanated directly from the pope and which from his cardinals or curia. However, as he was responsible for the direction of these bodies, the documents should demonstrate Gregory's priorities reasonably accurately.[22] Indeed, all documents in his name would be seen by their recipients as his.

Moreover Gregory's personal hand can be seen in several areas, especially in his dealings with the university at Paris, as demonstrated by his precipitation of William of Auvergne, when approached by him in 1228, to the bishopric of Paris, a position of some authority over the university.[23] He remained closely involved in university affairs

[20] The condemnation's formal convocation may have taken place at St.-Jacques (above, p. 16).
[21] For the use of the universities generally by the popes and how they engaged them in their service, see P. Classen, *Studium und Gesellschaft im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart, 1985), p. 292; J. Miethke, 'Die Kirche und die Universitäten im 13 Jahrhundert', in J. Fried (ed.), *Schulen und Studium* (Sigmaringen, 1986), p. 314.
[22] Notably, several of Gregory IX's appointments as cardinals had studied at Paris, including Rinaldo Conti di Segni, appointed 1227, who was at Paris before 1221, and Jaques de Vitry, appointed 1228, who studied under Peter the Chanter ('The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church', http://www2.fiu.edu/~mirandas/consistories-xiii.htm#GregoryIX (7 May, 2016). Gregory's period as Cardinal Legate is also relevant. He undertook extensive diplomatic work under both Innocent III and Honorius III, including action against heresy in Italy in 1221. Gregory's heavy involvement in the affairs of both preceding popes, and their confidence in him, made his own papacy the third in an unbroken policy succession, from before and including Lateran IV.
[23] For the constant papal engagement with the university, extensively recorded in the *CUP*, see W.H. Principe, 'The School Theologians' Views of the Papacy', in C. Ryan (ed.), *The Religious Roles of the Papacy*

throughout his pontificate, for example in the 1229-31 dispute, when he described the '*studium... litterarum*' as one 'by which … the paradise of the general church is watered and nourished'; and exhorted Louis IX and Blanche of Castille to intervene.[24] With its return to normality in 1231, *Parens scientiarum* gave the university a clearer status, with metaphors concerning the armour of Christian welfare, suggesting he saw the theologians' role as his spiritual warriors fighting for Christianity. Gregory also wrote to Louis IX in 1231 and 1233 to renew various privileges. Moreover, he took a close interest in the university's administration. *Parens scientiarum* included delegated powers for the masters to organise lectures, academic dress, funerals etc. Not everything was new but, combined with the doctrinal measures it contained, *Parens scientiarum* clearly demonstrated Gregory's ambitions for the university and its theologians.[25]

A letter in 1237 from Gregory to the abbot and Augustinian community of St. Victor also illuminates his vision for the university, recording his agreement to their request for a theology master 'in order to expedite the salvation of … [their] souls and the souls of others; and because … [their] brothers, to whom Parisian students often make their way … to receive penance … are often required to dispense the nourishment of the word of God, in … churches which pertain to … [their] monastery…'.[26] This letter demonstrates Gregory's concern for the religious orders, with his agreement to a theology master part of his mission to improve education in monasteries and other such communities. It makes explicit Gregory's belief that theologians from the university at Paris should be utilised for pastoral training outside.[27]

(Toronto, 1989), pp. 88-9. For example, Gregory IX instituted an inquiry into William of Auvergne's handling of a licence in 1237, with a further letter on this in 1238 (*CUP*, i, no. 115, pp. 161-2, no. 121, p. 166).

[24] *CUP*, i, nos. 69-70, pp. 125-8, no. 75, pp. 133-4.

[25] *CUP*, i, no. 79, pp. 136-9, no. 82, pp. 140-1, no. 87, pp. 143-4, no. 96, pp. 148-9. *Parens scientiarum* was designed to encourage the university to transform into a body focussed on preaching and helping the church with its pastoral role (Wei, *Intellectual Culture*, pp. 102-110). The translation of *Parens scientiarum* is from *University Records and Life in the Middle Ages*, trans. L. Thorndyke (New York, 1975), pp. 35-39.

[26] *CUP*, i, no. 111, p. 159.

[27] For the grant of a university master as a papal privilege and Gregory's utilisation of such privileges as part of a strategy for centralisation, see M. Crossnoe, 'Education and the Care of Souls', *MS*, 61 (1999), pp. 137-72, 153-4. Jacques de Vitry, when a cardinal under Gregory IX, saw monastic pastoral functions as better suited to the canons regular (he included the Dominicans in this group), the Franciscans and the secular

Gregory's relationship with the religious orders also demonstrated his zeal for church reform and belief in his papal responsibilities. His close relationship with both the Dominican and Franciscan orders from his period as a cardinal was notable, and he was a personal friend to both their founders, supporting their work, utilising their outward-facing missions, and, for the Franciscans, helping them to reorganise themselves after Francis' death. But he was also involved in reforming the traditional orders to a greater degree than his predecessors. For example, he issued statutes reforming the Benedictines and Premonstratensians in the 1230s. He also reformed the Victorines, though not by statute.[28]

Gregory's decretal collection, published and with a copy sent to the university at Paris in 1234, further demonstrated his commitment to reform, together with his vision of the church's role and his own as its leader. This collection was a landmark - with its papal authority it was the definitive and obligatory collection of canon law for the whole church, covering almost every aspect of life. Significantly, it began with the statement of faith from Lateran IV, demonstrating its continued importance and centrality.[29]

Taken together, these reforming initiatives demonstrate Gregory's ambitions for the church and his regulation of roles within it, as part of a forceful, single-minded and comprehensive plan for its supremacy over ecclesiastical affairs and beyond. The duties of theologians at Paris within his scheme, and their relationship with other bodies, were clear. Gregory had plainly established his remit for Paris theologians - to have and disseminate a clear, cogent, message, conforming to Lateran IV's principles, within and outside the church.

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clery (J. Bird, 'The Religious's Role in a Post-Fourth-Lateran World', in C. Muessig (ed.), *Medieval Monastic Preaching* (Leiden, 1998), p. 218).

[28] For Gregory's particular commitment to monastic reform, see Crossnoe, 'Education and the Care of Souls', pp. 156-163.

[29] Gregory's decretals defined the 'generally binding nature of a papal constitution' (E.A. Reno, 'The Authoritative Text: Raymond of Penyafort's Editing of the Decretals of Gregory IX (1234)' (Columbia University, Ph.D thesis, 2011), pp. 524-9). The decretals (i, 2) contained Joachim of Fiore's condemnation, reproduced from Lateran IV, prefaced by a statement that the union of the three persons is true, 'non collective seu similitudinaria' (*Décretales de Gregorio IX*, ed. J.M. Puigarnau (3 vols., Barcelona, 1940-3), i, pp. 15-6). This brought to the immediate attention of its 1234 readership the issues topical in 1215 in Joachim's thinking, with its possible link to the 1241/4 condemnation. See also G. Silano, 'Of Sleep and Sleeplessness', in C. Ryan (ed.), *The Religious Roles of the Papacy* (Toronto, 1989), pp. 353-6.

Gregory's actions also demonstrate his concerns over the risks to Christian doctrine from outside contamination, and, as head of the church, his views must have influenced the outlook of Paris theologians. His 1239 action over the Talmud and other Jewish books, involving the Paris theology masters, exemplifies this.[30] Moreover, Gregory consistently and vehemently opposed heresy both before and during his papacy. His 1221 legations to Italy included action against heresy in Mantua, Piacenza and Bergamo - they complemented his early friendship with Dominic, active against heresy in Toulouse. His experiences, in particular the difficulty tackling heresy in Italian towns on a local basis, could well have contributed to his decision to establish a centrally-based Inquisition, independent of local interests.[31] This may be dated to April 1227, when Gregory upbraided the Lombard and Tuscan cities, in particular Florence, over failures to act, accusing them of making 'your statutes about expelling heretics … and carrying out these statutes superficially, you banish these heretics, and they return after a brief time …'. He ordered them to adopt Lateran IV's canons on heresy. Crucially, he entrusted the commission to Dominican leadership rather than to the local bishop.[32]

However, the question remains: how far did Gregory dictate doctrinal detail rather than overall direction, and hence were those imposing the condemnation primarily aiming to reflect his specific views? One important question is his attitude to the new Aristotelian and related texts. Gregory's letter to Frederick II, in 1227, may illustrate his approach, with Gregory mixing biblical references with concepts drawn from Avicenna.[33] This

[30] Below, pp. 145-6. Gregory's attitude appears ambivalent. Jews were a protected group and Gregory frequently supported them. However, his 1234 decretals gave canonical force to the doctrine of 'perpetua servitus iudaeorum'. Gregory resissued the *Constitutio pro Iudaeis* (Pope Callixtus II's measure from c.1120, repeated with minor variations by numerous popes), with statutory protections for Jews provided they had not plotted against Christian faith (*Décretales*, iii, no. 145, p.131; Auvray, i, no. 1159, p. 658; S. Grayzel, *The Church and the Jews in the XIIIth century* (New York, 1966), pp. 5, 35, 81, 92-4, 144, 219).

[31] See D. Moczar, 'From Hugolino Conti to Gregory IX: the Making of a Medieval Pope' (George Mason University, Ph.D thesis, 1990), pp. 102-13, 118, 122-3.

[32] Auvray, i, no. 54, pp. 27-30. P.D. Diehl, 'Overcoming Reluctance to Prosecute Heresy', in S.L. Waugh and P.D. Diehl (eds.), *Christendom and its Discontents* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 55-8. The specification of Lateran IV as the authority, as late as 1227, again demonstrates Gregory's reliance on it, seventeen years after its enactment.

[33] Auvray, i, no. 142, p. 79; Avicenna, *Opera* (Venice, 1508), fol. 5ˇ (cit. B. Smalley, 'Gregory IX and the two faces of the Soul', in eadem, *Studies in Medieval Thought and Learning* (London, 1981), pp. 117-20). Gregory's letter to Frederick weaves together references to the two faces of the soul as its two powers

suggests Gregory was happy to use philosophical works when it suited him.[34] It is supported by his 1227 letter to Stephen Langton, asking him, following Pope Honorius III's earlier request, to confer a benefice on Michael Scot, expert in Hebrew and Arabic. The reference to Michael's linguistic prowess demonstrates Gregory wanted his translation work to continue.[35]

Gregory's *Parens scientiarum* also demonstrated his attitude to the new learning, although different interpretations are possible. The bull dealt separately with the arts and theology faculties. For the arts, it decreed the books on nature forbidden by the 1210 Sens Council should not be read at Paris publicly or privately until examined and purged of all errors.[36] Following this, Gregory wrote to 'Magistris W. archidiacono Belvacensi, …' ('Guillemo' in the heading, probably William of Auxerre) and two canons, requiring them to examine the books at their discretion, since they were said to contain both useful ('utilia') and useless things ('inutilia'), so that the useless should not spoil the useful, and remove any errors, scandalous or legally offensive material found so that the rest could be studied safely.[37] The choice of William, with his active use of Aristotle to contribute to theological understanding but subordinated to it, suggests Gregory was open-minded. His letter to the abbot of St. Victor and to the prior of the Dominicans at Paris absolving those scholars and masters disobeying the 1210 injunction supports this.[38] Gregory addressed the theologians differently. He stipulated that the masters and scholars of theology should endeavour to act in a praiseworthy manner, and not to show themselves as philosophers ('philosophos') but strive to become learned theologians ('theodocti'), and not speak in the popular language nor confound the Hebrew vernacular with the Azotic ('Azotica', i.e. profane or common language), but only dispute in the schools over those questions which

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with biblical references. If the latter are removed, the resultant text follows Avicenna's theory of the soul from his *De anima* (Smalley, op.cit., who also supplies some text missing from Auvray, i, 142).

[34] For Gregory's reading of Greek patristics, see, for example, his reference to Gregory Nazianzus in a letter written when cardinal ('Analecta Heidelbergensia', ed. E. Winkelmann, *Archivio della Società Romana di storia patria*, 2 (Rome, 1879), Varietà ii, pp. 363-7). I am grateful to Brenda Bolton for this reference and her translation.

[35] *CUP*, i, no. 54, p. 110.

[36] *CUP*, i, no. 79, pp. 136-9 (*Parens scientiarum*); no. 11, p. 70 (*Sens*).

[37] *CUP*, i, no. 87, pp. 143-4.

[38] *CUP*, i, no. 86, p. 143.

could be decided by theological books ('libros theologicos') and the treatises of the holy fathers ('sanctorum patrum tractatus').[39]

Bianchi comments that Gregory's promise that Aristotle's books on physics and metaphysics could be studied in the arts faculty was a first step to all his works being authorised in 1255. He argues Gregory, unable to distinguish between the valuable and dangerous in the texts, genuinely wanted cuts to render them a 'kind of anthology of "sound" doctrines'. However, he believes Gregory's hasty treatment of the arts faculty, with an inquiry which was never followed up, suggests Gregory's main interest was the theology faculty. He argues: 'Even the regulations concerning the *libri naturales,* though overtly addressed to the arts masters, paradoxically conveyed a message above all to theologians: guaranteeing the *future* monopoly of Aristotelian texts to the arts faculty was … the best way to prevent ... any attempt to introduce some of them into the theological curriculum'.[40] Ensuring the theology faculty's primacy and purity was clearly Gregory's main interest. However, exactly how he thought the theologians should treat philosophical works is questionable. The 1210 and 1215 bans left private study untouched - the concern was these books' subservience to theology and exposure to those less capable of understanding them. Moreover, all theologians outside the religious orders graduated through the arts faculty and thus, once permitted as Gregory planned, they would have studied Aristotle's works, albeit expurgated. Arguably, therefore, Gregory intended an incremental learning process, with everyone mastering and using Aristotle's works, but with the theologians specifically enjoined to subordinate them to theology.

However, after *Parens scientarum,* Gregory appeared to keep his attention more focused on university administration, law and order, and the rights of the university against the bishop in particular, than on the substance of theology actually taught. Moreover, even in 1231 and earlier, his focus was on the curriculum and permitted texts,

[39] *CUP*, i, no. 79, pp. 136-9.
[40] *CUP*, i, no. 20, pp. 78-9, no. 59, pp. 114-5; L. Bianchi, 'Aristotle as a Captive Bride', in L. Honnefelder et al. (eds.), *Albertus Magnus and the Beginnings of the Medieval Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West* (Münster, 2005), pp. 777-794.

not on doctrine. The collection of letters in *Bullarium Franciscanum*, while demonstrating Gregory's major use of the mendicant orders, contains no detailed theological doctrine, although the topics for discussion, for example with the Greeks, were theological, and the battle against heresy was conducted, anyway ostensibly, on theological grounds. No evidence of papal concern over exactly what the friars preached is discernible. But against this, the friars must have gone out with a clear knowledge of their negotiating position, which must have at least been agreed by the papacy.

Again, the documents in *Sacrorum Conciliorum*, a huge collection relating primarily, but not exclusively, to church councils, demonstrate the large amount of activity taking place against heretics, particularly the Albigensians but more widely, with a smaller number on the Greek Church. The numerous entries demonstrate the level of papal concern. As would be expected, given the precedents of Lateran III and IV with their attention to the detail of various heresies and Lateran IV's statement of faith, the documents in this collection showed attention to theological doctrine in the context of the various heresies and the Greek Church. However, they appear limited to issues arising in these two contexts. Or, putting this another way, they provide evidence of involvement in doctrinal issues where there was a challenge to catholic doctrine from outside mainstream church orthodoxy, but not of involvement in other areas of doctrine not externally challenged.

Similarly, taking the four volumes of the registers of Gregory IX, with their 6183 documents from his papacy, the entries demonstrating papal interest in either the university at Paris or theological issues were a tiny proportion of the total and did not deal with theological issues as such, but rather administrative or judicial issues related to theological learning.[41] More generally, however, the registers provide clear evidence that Gregory's interest in Paris, both in the university and more widely, was comparatively

[41] Of those entries which might demonstrate Gregory's interest in education or the dissemination of doctrine, the Dominicans have well over 300 entries. This number includes entries on their presence in various countries and on the running of the order. The Franciscans, on the same basis, have around 125. There are around 180 references to heretics, heresies and directly related issues, around 150 on Constantinople, and around forty-five on the Greeks.

strong. Paris receives around 350 entries, some of them duplicates, contrasting with only nine for Oxford and six for Bologna, with none for either university. The only 'studia' apart from Paris with even a handful of entries are those at Vercelli, Piedmont and Toulouse - indeed, despite Gregory's interest in the university there for combatting heresy, only nine entries are recorded for Toulouse.[42] The most important conclusion to be drawn from the registers, therefore, may be the importance Gregory attached to Paris and all things connected to it - this comparatively large number of entries demonstrates the pope saw the role of Paris and its university in a special, and especially important, light.

This reliance on Paris must have had consequences in terms of papal interest in theological doctrines being developed there - it would be odd if the pope had been content to depend on the university for those he wanted to teach theology to others and spread the gospel, had he not been satisfied that their views were correct. But evidence of direct doctrinal interference, beyond the issue of new Aristotelian texts, is lacking.[43] However, Gregory's prompt despatch in 1234 of his decretals to the university, and his order to comply with them, is notable, demonstrating the importance he attached both to their contents and to the university. Moreover, it is clear the university was relevant in other key areas of papal policy, both on its own account and through the strong mendicant presence there. Gregory's interest in clerical education was strong, and the documents demonstrate he saw the university at Paris as crucial for these purposes. He was passionate in combatting heresy and proselytising, aided by the mendicants, some of whom attended the university. For this he needed to ensure a unanimous clear position on key church doctrines, exactly what the condemnation was in the business of delivering.

Conclusion

The study of theology was not simply an academic pursuit. Theologians had to use their knowledge for the good of the community, whether through preaching or fighting

[42] Vercelli was founded from Padua University in 1228 (J. Verger, 'Patterns', in H. de Ridder-Symoens (ed.), *A History of the University in Europe* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1992), i, p. 53).
[43] Gregory's strictness on Aristotelian learning for Paris - in contrast to Toulouse and Oxford which he apparently ignored, despite concerns over heresy at Toulouse - is still suggestive of wider vigilance.

heresy and aberrant beliefs. This was not an optional part of their role. This external perspective is an important context for the condemnation. As regards Gregory's papacy, examination of the documents has not revealed an identifiable link with the content of the condemnation's articles. But the evidence demonstrates Gregory's mission for the university and the theology masters within it in delivering proper theological doctrine as formulated by Lateran IV. It shows the proselytising zeal of the papacy for which a clear doctrinal position would be required, the need for properly educated and prepared personnel to spread this, and the use of the mendicant orders to achieve this aim. It is against this background that Gregory's position in respect of the condemnation must be viewed.

Taken as a whole, the relevance of the institutional influences appears to be more in the timing and overall purpose of the condemnation than the detailed content of the individual articles. While the pope shared many of the concerns for example, and could have prompted action on some, his importance lay primarily in his vision for theologians at Paris and their role. The condemnation was the first to address a range of doctrines - in a similar way to the start of Lateran IV (and the opening of Gregory's *Decretals*) - rather than those of specific individuals. Both instruments formed key parts of historical and institutional developments of the time.

DOCTRINAL INFLUENCES

Specific doctrinal influences primarily affected the detailed formulation of the individual articles and the underlying issues which needed resolution. They could also have affected the timing and precise coverage of the overall 'package' of articles this study postulates - especially concerns over Greek, Cathar and Jewish beliefs which, whether or not they had any direct influence on it, formed part of the context for the condemnation. While many of the influences were largely external - as from heresy and the new Aristotelian texts - they were also all inter-related. However, the starting-point must be the attempts within the Latin tradition itself to make sense of abstruse and

sometimes apparently contradictory biblical passages, together with the explanations, often confusing, which had been offered by the patristic authorities.

Lateran IV and the Latin tradition

Lateran IV

As well as its institutional significance, Lateran IV's statement of faith (canon one) established the tenets of Christian faith before using these as a measure for other doctrines it condemned as heresies or approved.[44] Canon two started 'We therefore ('ergo') condemn and reprove…', thus referring back to the earlier principles.[45] Canon one itself contained succinct but comprehensive summaries of key catholic beliefs - the 'one true' God and the Trinity, angels and creation, the origin of sin, Christ's incarnation and role, Judgment Day, and the church and sacraments.

A comparison of Lateran IV with the articles of the condemnation demonstrates the close relationship between the two. Article two reflected Lateran IV's initial statement on 'three persons but one simple essence …', and, while article one was not directly reflected, the reference to God's 'incomprehensible and ineffable nature' formed part of theological arguments on the beatific vision.[46] Lateran IV's next statement provided for the dual procession - the subject of article three - followed by God as the one principle of all things (relevant to article seven on eternal truths) and the creator of all things from nothing (article eight). Reference to the devil and other demons being created good followed (article five); together with mankind's sin at Satan's prompting (article ten), with article nine (on grace and glory) arguably connected to it. Article six, angelic location, reflected the idea of God's unique properties, contained in Lateran IV's opening passage. Only article four, the empyrean heaven, was not foreshadowed in the first part of the statement, but heaven's creation was implicitly part of the creation of all things spiritual and

[44] For Lateran IV's institutional significance, see above, pp. 76-9.
[45] *Ecumenical Councils*, pp. 230-1 (below, Appendix B); Sackville, *Heresy and Heretics*, p. 32.
[46] While article one and Lateran IV might seem to conflict, Latin theologians could argue that seeing God's essence did not detract from his ineffable, incomprehensible nature: seeing did not mean full understanding.

corporeal. Thus, either directly or indirectly, all ten of the condemnation's articles were contained in canon one of Lateran IV, covering all its first section.

Canon two provided some of the context for the statement of faith. This singled out Joachim of Fiore's Trinitarian views for detailed censure and endorsed Peter Lombard's position. While it did not refer explicitly to Gilbert of Poitiers, Gilbert was Peter's original opponent and the issues discussed in canon two were those on which they disagreed. Canon two concluded with a total condemnation of Amaury of Bène's views (for which Eriugena was believed to have been responsible). Both Gilbert and Eriugena were being read in Paris after as well as before Lateran IV and their doctrines may well therefore underlie some of the condemnation's articles as well as those of Lateran IV itself.

Eriugena (†877)

The thirteenth-century condemnation of Eriugena's *Periphyseon*, if first imposed in 1225 by Pope Honorius III, post-dated Lateran IV, but its link with the pantheism of Amaury of Bène, whose initial censure predated it, and its early influence from the ninth century onwards - coupled with references to Odo of Châteauroux in the context of its banning - make it particularly significant for both Lateran IV and the 1241/4 condemnation.[47] The comprehensive nature of its ban in 1225 demonstrates the level of threat it was believed to pose. In his letter to the archbishops and other prelates of the Churches banning all reading of the text, Honorius wrote:

[47] For when the ban was first imposed, see A.J. Braid, *Mysticism and Heresy* (York, 2011), p. 199. For the *Periphyseon*'s transmission to, and influence on, scholars up to c.1200, see J. Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 67, 97-8, 111-5; J.J. O'Meara, *Eriugena* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 198-211, 216. While apparently less read in the tenth and eleventh centuries, its appearance in library catalogues, with multiple new copies and old ones annotated, demonstrates its popularity in the twelfth and early thirteenth. Twelfth-century theologians referring to it included Anselm of Laon; William of Malmesbury (who found it helpful but advised caution, although he requested tolerance for its author where his enthusiasm for the Greeks had caused him to deviate from the Latin Fathers and hence had been thought a heretic); Honorius Augustodunensis; and Hugh and Richard of St. Victor. See also B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la Philosophie Scholastique* (Paris, 1872), p. 17; H. Bett, *Johannes Scotus Erigena - a Study in Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1925), pp. 170-96. O'Meara, op.cit., p. 216, describes the 'pre-Scholastic era' as the 'Golden Age of the Eriugenian influence', arguing: '[By] the beginning of the thirteenth century the *Periphyseon* was well known in circles of serious study'.

> ‘In recent years, as … the bishop of Paris signified to us, there is a certain book, entitled the *Perifisis*, found all swarming with the maggots of depraved heresy. Hence it was condemned by a just judgment by our venerable archbishop of Sens and his suffragan bishops gathered together in the provincial council. Wherefore that same book … is held in some monasteries and other places, and monks and schoolmen (‘viri scolastici’), perhaps loving novelty (‘novitatum’) more than is profitable, occupy themselves rather studiously with the said book, thinking it glorious to display its strange/ignorant (‘ignotas’) opinions, although the apostle teaches [us] to avoid profane novelties; we … busy to resist the corrupting influence which a book of this kind can engender, order you individually and collectively … to search everywhere for that book diligently, and whenever it turns out that the book itself or part of it is to be found, you send it to us without delay … to be … burned, or otherwise you yourself publically burn [it] …; very expressly enjoining that whoever of those ones [monks or schoolmen] has or can have in all or in part examples of the same book, should not delay handing them over to you, by bringing forth a sentence of excommunication against all who presume to retain knowingly that whole book or part of it …; and giving notice to the same people that, if at any time they have been legally found guilty to have incurred this sentence, they will not evade the brand of heretical depravity’.[48]

Honorius clearly felt extremely strongly on the issue: to ensure that the *Periphyseon* could ‘be recognised by those who happen upon it’, he concluded by noting its division ‘into five parts’, giving the opening and closing words of each.[49] While the letter stated that the

[48] *CUP*, i, no. 50, pp. 106-7 (nos. 11-12, pp. 70-3, cover Sens and Amaury of Bène). ‘Ignotas’ here could mean ignorant or strange, or imply both.

[49] The preface to Bishop Tempier’s 1277 condemnation includes some citation of first and last lines (R. Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 Mars 1277* (Louvain, 1977), pp. 13-4). However, 1225 may be a precedent. For a translation, see *Medieval Political Philosophy*, eds. J. Parens and J.C. Macfarlane (Cornell, 2011), pp. 322-3.

Periphyseon was banned previously, it is clear that, if so, this had been widely ignored. Indeed, even later, it was clearly still in use, although now a dangerous text to know.[50]

The exact sequence - and number - of thirteenth-century condemnations of the *Periphyseon* and linkages between it and Amaury's doctrines is confused. The primary witness we have to a link between the *Periphyseon* and the Amalricians is Cardinal Henry Hostiensis (†1271), an expert in Roman and canon law, who was recorded in the *Apparatus in Decretali Gregorii I*, c. 1260, as having 'found that the doctrine of the impius Amaury is assembled in Master Johannes Scottus' book called *Periphyseon*, that is, about nature'. Lateran IV and other contemporary texts give no substantial detail on Amaury's beliefs, so Henry is a main source for these. He correctly noted Eriugena was reported 'in the same book to have introduced the authority of the Greek master called Maximus [the Confessor] ('magistri greci nomine Maxime')', suggesting his source had actually read the work.[51] He continued:

> 'Many heresies are contained in this book, which was also condemned through the masters at Paris ('per magistros damnatus fuit Parisius'), three from which are sufficient as examples'.[52]

Henry concluded:

[50] Alexander of Hales, or one of the *Summa*'s co-authors, referred to the *Periphyseon* in terms suggesting he had read it and was aware of Eriugena's theory of ideas/primordial causes (*Summa*, ii, Q. 11.a.43, p. 52). He asked 'An creari sit aliquid creatum ut medium inter Creatorem et creaturam'. The 'contra' argument stated: 'Omne quod est, aut Creator aut creatura; ergo super vacuum est ponere medium inter haec, immo pro damnata haeresi habetur in concilio Senonensi quod dicitur in libro *Periphyseon*, in quo dicebatur quod ideae erant medium inter Creatorem et creaturam; ergo "creari" non debet poni medium'. Compare Eriugena, *Periphyseon,* iii, p. 172, section 683: 'Deinde ex primordialibus causis, quae medietatem quamdam inter Deum et creaturam obtinent …'. For the *Periphyseon's* reception after 1225, see I.P. Sheldon-Williams' commentary (Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, i, p. 24). No manuscripts were produced after 1225, but over six percent of the *Periphyseon* was still read, as anonymous glosses or attributed to Maximus the Confessor, himself translated by Eriugena, or to pseudo-Dionysius, and they indirectly influenced Albertus Magnus and Aquinas.

[51] Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, i, p. 53, section 449A.

[52] The three heresies were: (i) pantheism, where Henry paraphrased Eriugena as saying that 'it is not easy to deny that the creature and the Creator are one' (Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, ii, pp. 12-3, section 528A); (ii) 'that the primordial causes, which are called ideas ('idee'), that is, form or exemplar ('forma sive exemplar'), create and are created'; (iii) that 'after the consummation of the age, there will be a reunion of the sexes …'.

> ‘Our venerable father Odo, bishop of Toulouse [Odo of Châteauroux], from whom we had this doctrine (‘a quo et habuimus hanc doctrinam’), exposed the said book by condemning particular/several errors (‘errores singulos’)’.[53]

The reference to Odo in these terms, and following the reference to condemnation by Paris masters, not the pope (as in 1225) or bishop (as possibly in 1210), is particularly intriguing, given Odo’s role in the 1241/4 condemnation. The picture is confused, but, given the linked references, the 1241/4 condemnation itself must be a strong candidate for Odo’s ‘exposure’ of Eriugena’s ‘errors’.[54]

Eriugena’s doctrines were heavily influenced by Neoplatonism and the Greek Fathers. Three in particular were relevant to the 1241/4 condemnation. On the beatific vision (article one), Eriugena was adamant that this would never be seen by humans or angels. He stated: ‘The Divine Essence is in itself comprehensible to no bodily sense, to no reason, to no intellect, whether of man or angel’. He continued, in an important passage, first referring to Maximus the Confessor and then claiming Augustine’s support:

> ‘Augustine says [*De civitate Dei*, xxii, 29] that ‘“Through the bodies that we shall (have) put on, in every body we see wherever we turn the eyes of our body, we shall contemplate with translucent clarity God Himself.” Note the sense of the words. For he did not say, “Through the bodies that we shall (have) put on we shall contemplate God Himself” (for in Himself He cannot be seen); but he said: “Through the bodies

[53] Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, i, p. 9. G.C. Capelle, *Autour du décret de 1210: III* (Paris, 1932), pp. 93-4, contains the full text of the record of Henry Hostiensis’ entry. For other texts referring to Amaury and linking him to Eriugena, see Capelle, op.cit., pp. 89-111; J.L. Gieseler, *A Compendium of Ecclesiastical History* (5 vols., Edinburgh, 1853), iii, pp. 298-300. The allegation of pantheism may be unjustified (D. Moran, *The Philosophy of John Scotus Eriugena* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 88-9). However, Eriugena’s statements that, for example, ‘we ought not to understand God and the creature as two things distinct from one another, but as one and the same’, for ‘both the creature, by subsisting, is in God’ and ‘God, by manifesting Himself, … creates Himself in the creature’ (*Periphyseon*, iii, pp. 160-3, section 678C), appear to substantiate the accusation, or at least to be sufficient to be viewed as pantheistic in the thirteenth century. See also Bett, *Johannes Scotus Erigena*, p. 176.

[54] Recent scholarship has questioned the alleged link between Eriugena’s and Amaury’s doctrines and also any possible inclusion of the *Periphyseon* in a ban at a Council of Sens (Braid, *Mysticism and Heresy*, pp. 198-9). The only candidate for this is Archbishop of Sens’ decree after the Council of Paris in 1210, which dealt with the Amalricians and also David of Dinant but, like Lateran IV itself, did not refer to Eriugena. Be that as it may, Eriugena’s condemnation was bound up, directly or indirectly, with Amaury’s, and also David of Dinant’s (and perhaps also with Joachim, by Amaury’s association with Joachim in Lateran IV).

> that we shall (have) put on, in every body we see, we shall contemplate God Himself." Therefore, it is through bodies in bodies, not through Himself, that He shall be seen. Similarly, it is through intellect in intellects, through reason in reasons, not through itself, that the Divine Essence shall appear'.[55]

Eriugena also identified God's infinity as a bar to our seeing him, asking 'how can the infinite be defined by itself in anything or be understood in anything when it knows itself (to be) above every finite (thing) and every infinite (thing) and beyond finitude and infinity'. He therefore interpreted 'Upon whom the angels desire to gaze' (1.Peter i:12) as expressing unfulfilled longing for both humans and angels.[56]

Second, Eriugena's position on the Trinity (article two) was complex and could have caused concern, and his denial of the dual procession would certainly have contravened article three. He argued that the Holy Spirit was co-essential with the Father and Son in divinity and subsisted essentially in the nature of both, since he proceeded as substance ('substantialiter') from the Father through the Son. According to Eriugena, there were three substantial causes in one and one in three; and, given the Father was the cause of the other two, there was one preceding cause in the universal cause and the Father was thus the cause of causes. A long discussion of the dual procession followed. Eriugena argued strongly against this, while trying at the same time to accommodate the Latin position and the Nicene Creed. He questioned whether true faith could believe that the Son was born from one cause but the Holy Spirit proceeded from two, arguing that the one Holy Spirit could not have two causes. However, he held this conformed to catholic faith, because the Father was wholly in the whole of the Son and vice versa. On why the Son was not said to proceed through the Spirit (given his conception through the Holy Spirit), he concluded the Greek version of the Creed avoided the problems encountered by the Latin one. But he believed the Latin Fathers who inserted 'who proceeds from the Father and the Son' could

[55] Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, i, pp. 48-56, sections 447C, 449A-B, 450C.
[56] Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, ii, p. 143, section 589B, p. 203, section 615A.

reply reasonably ('rationaliter').[57] But despite this, his discussion and conclusions on the Trinity clearly followed the Greek position and were incompatible with Latin theology.

Finally, Eriugena's arguments conflicted with the condemnation on the subject of eternal truths (article seven) and, indirectly, article eight (creation). He asserted the existence of primordial causes and identified them explicitly with 'ideas' as found in Plato, holding that they were 'eternal species or forms and immutable reasons after which and in which the visible and invisible world is formed and governed'. He argued:

> 'The things that are to be have been made in them before the ages, and therefore they are said to be the principles of all things because all things … subsist by participation in them, while they themselves are participations of the one Cause of all things, … [the] Trinity; and they are said to be through themselves for the reason that no creature is interposed between them and the one Cause of all things; and while they subsist immutably in it they [are] the primordial causes of other causes which come after them … Therefore, the primordial causes which the divine sages call the principles of all things are Goodness-through itself, … Truth-through-itself, …, and all the powers and reasons which once and for all the Father made in the Son and after which the order of all things is woven … For whatever things are good are good by participation in the Good-through-itself … And the same applies to the rest. For there is not found in the nature of things any power … which does not proceed by an ineffable participation from the primordial causes'.[58]

Eriugena argued explicitly that such principal causes were eternal, stating: 'God the Father and the Word and the causes created in it, are co-eternal', although 'they receive the beginning of their being not from themselves but from their Creator'. But, 'whatsoever is substantially in God the Word, since nothing but the Word Itself is eternal, must (themselves) be eternal, and therefore we conclude that the Word Itself and the multiple and most primary reason of the whole created universe are one and the same thing'. This

[57] Ibid., p. 89, sections 564C-565A, pp. 166-91, sections 599B, 600A-B, 601A-B, 602B, 609D-610B, 612B-C.
[58] Ibid., pp. 204-7, sections 615D-617A.

last point appears to deny such causes were separate from God, but Eriugena's approach remains problematic and also arguably pantheistic - hence the alleged link to Amaury of Bène. The fact that Eriugena's primordial causes are both created and create was also wholly unacceptable to catholic theology.[59]

Amaury of Bène, Joachim of Fiore and David of Dinant

While Eriugena's *Periphyseon* dated from the ninth century, three later theologians who caused concern at the university at Paris in the early thirteenth century were Joachim of Fiore (†1202), Amaury of Bène (†1206), and David of Dinant (†c.1217). All three appear to have been influenced, at least partly, by Greek theology and Neoplatonism, and there are possible connections between the doctrines of all three and Aristotelian natural philosophy. They therefore fall to be considered together. The views of both Amaury - as alleged by Henry Hostiensis - and David of Dinant may have been influenced by Eriugena, while Joachim's views resembled those of Gilbert of Poitiers in some respects. Their writings largely pre-dated 1215 but all of them figured in the events of that year. Their impact can be seen as contributing to the nervousness over Aristotle and over pantheistic ideas in the crucial period from 1215-1241/4.

Amaury's teaching practices and doctrines came under censure at the university early in the thirteenth century, and in 1206 he applied to Pope Innocent III for vindication. This was denied and the university then compelled his recantation. He died soon afterwards. David of Dinant's *Quateruli* was ordered to be burnt in the Archbishop of Sens' decree following the Council of Paris in 1210, the council which also prohibited teaching Aristotle's works of natural philosophy and ordered Amaury's excommunication and exhumation. Robert of Courçon's university statute in 1215 included a ban on reading Amaury's and David's works, together with those of an unidentified Mauricius of Spain (possibly Avicenna) and Aristotelian texts on metaphysics and natural philosophy, or summaries of them; and some theological tracts in French were required to be handed over to local bishops. Finally, Amaury and Joachim were both named in Lateran IV, with

[59] Ibid., pp. 80-3, sections 561B-562A.

heretics more generally. However, while Amaury's teachings were condemned utterly, only Joachim's Trinitarian views and his attack on Peter Lombard were censored.[60]

Joachim does not appear to have been directly connected with the university at Paris. His relevance to the condemnation may be primarily as a conduit through which Gilbert of Poitiers' views reached thirteenth-century theologians there; indeed, Chenu sees his influence as critical in Gilbert's revival, although any very close affinity between Joachim's and Gilbert's views is now viewed as suspect.[61] Joachim appears to have focussed on the Trinity and the meaning of history. On the Trinity, his *Psalterium decem chordarum* attacked the Arians and Sabellians, possibly referring to contemporaries. It contained Joachim's main attack on Peter Lombard's position; and it is the extant work most closely resembling the views accredited to Joachim in Lateran IV. Joachim's *libellum sive tractatum … de unitate seu essentia Trinitatis*, referred to in the second canon of Lateran IV, is lost - it may have been a version of the *Psalterium*, but equally it could be separate and could contain a clearer account of Joachim's own position. Either way, Lateran IV remains a crucial guide to his views. This stated that Joachim viewed the persons of the Trinity as many in one 'collective ('collectivam')' unity - similar to many faithful people constituting one Church. It thus implied a more substantial difference than merely relational and resembled the overall direction, but not detail, of Gilbert's thought.[62]

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[60] *CUP*, i, no. 11, pp. 70-1 (Council of Paris), no. 20, pp. 78-80 (the university's statutes); *Ecumenical Councils*, pp. 231-2. For a possible identification of Mauricius with Avicenna, see Braid, *Mysticism and Heresy*, pp. 262-70. G. Théry, *David de Dinant: etude sur son panthéisme matérialiste* (Paris, 1925), p. 10, suggests papal favour may lie behind David of Dinant's omission from Lateran IV.

[61] An anonymous *Liber de vera philosophia* may be where Joachim encountered Gilbert's Trinitarian theories (Chenu, 'Dernier avatar', p. 166). For the differences between Gilbert's and Joachim's views, see Robb, 'The Fourth Lateran Council's Definition', p. 30. See also L.O. Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century* (Leiden, 1982), p. 60; A. Patschovsky, A., 'Prophetie und Politik bei Joachim von Fiore', in M. Kaufhold (ed.), *Politische Reflexion in der Welt des Späten Mittelalters* (Leiden, 2004), pp. 27-43.

[62] *Ecumenical Councils*, pp. 230-1 (below, Appendix B). The identification of the *De essentia seu unitate Trinitatis* and whether it is part of the *Psalterium* remains uncertain (Robb, 'The Fourth Lateran Council's Definition', p. 26). For earlier discussion of the attribution of *De essentia* to Joachim, see M.W. Bloomfield, 'Joachim of Flora', *Traditio*, 13 (1957), pp. 254-6, 260-4, 271-3, 285-6. Although previous scholars have seen the *Psalterium* as generally conformist, Robb argues cogently that Joachim's attack on Peter Lombard in the *Psalterium* demonstrates his disagreement went beyond misunderstandings or semantics (Robb, op cit., pp. 23, 29). For earlier views, as cited by Robb, see S. Otto, *Die Funktion des Bildbegriffes in der Theologie des 12. Jahrhunderts* (Münster, 1963), pp. 297-9; S. Otto, 'Die Denkform des Joachim von Floris und das Caput "Damnamus" des 4. Laterankonzils', in idem, *Materialen zur Theorie der Geistesgeschichte*,

Amaury of Bène was a theologian at the university at Paris. His followers, the Amalricians, although initially probably restricted to theologians at the university, appear subsequently to have extended throughout the province of Sens and the dioceses of Paris, Troyes and Langres - indeed their arrests in 1210 occurred outside Paris. The doctrine for which Amaury was condemned was pantheism - a doctrine underlying the 1241/4 condemnation, for example, in the world's creation (article eight). The official account states that the Amalricians' beliefs included: the 'Father worked from the beginning without the Son and the Holy Spirit'; and 'All things are one, for whatever is, is God'.[63]

Finally, David of Dinant also probably taught at Paris. However, little is known of his life, and his theories are largely known through the later accounts by Albertus Magnus and Aquinas, though some fragments remain which reveal his pantheism. David brought some of Aristotle's works to France and drew on them, in particular the *Physics* and *Metaphysics.* Although his interest seems to have been primarily scientific rather than theological, his use may have contributed to the measures against Aristotle's works in 1210. David also used Neoplatonic concepts. He discussed the separation of all things into three categories - bodies, souls and eternal substances - concluding: 'these three are one and the same; from which it follows that all things are one in their essence ... It is clear, therefore, that there is only one substance, not only of all bodies but also of all souls, and this substance is nothing other than God himself'. Albertus Magnus linked David's views with Plato's, and ridiculed them.[64]

Munich, 1979, pp. 106-15; G. di Napoli, 'Gioacchino da Fiore e Pietro Lombardo', *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, 71 (1979), pp. 654-7). Although Joachim supported the dual procession, often mentioning the Greek dispute, some scholars believe he followed Greek tradition in starting his understanding of the Trinity with the three persons as one essence, rather than the converse (E.R. Daniel, 'The Double Procession of the Holy Spirit in Joachim of Fiore's Understanding of History', *Speculum*, 55 (1980), pp. 469-472); others, such as Robb (op.cit., p. 30) disagree. Before Lateran IV, interest apparently centred on Joachim's historical biblical exegesis, but an anonymous 1220's poem, and a 1230's reference by Roger Wendover (in the context of Lateran IV), show interest after 1215 in his Trinitarian views (M.W. Bloomfield and M.E. Reeves, 'The Penetration of Joachism into Northern Europe', *Speculum*, 29 (1954), pp. 772-93).

[63] Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, ed. J. Strange (2 vols., Cologne, 1851), i, 304-7; *Heresies of the High Middle Ages*, trans. W.L. Wakefield and A.P. Evans (Columbia, 1969), pp. 259-63; *CUP*, i, no. 12, pp. 71-72; Braid, *Mysticism and Heresy,* pp. 154-168.

[64] Théry, *David de Dinant*, pp. 126-45; Braid, *Mysticism and Heresy,* pp. 257-60. For Albertus Magnus, see below, p. 208.

Gilbert of Poitiers

The final theologian linked, implicitly, to Lateran IV was Gilbert of Poitiers, the likely inspiration for article two's offending proposition.[65] Gilbert's views, like Eriugena's, were heavily influenced by Greek theology, an area on which he was accounted an authority. The censured work, nearly a hundred years before the condemnation, was his commentary on Boethius' *Opuscula sacra*.[66] However, it appears that this text, and also the works of his followers or those misattributed to Gilbert, were still being read and their contents seen as dangerous in the 1230s. Gilbert's conflict with Bernard of Clairvaux, which Bernard recorded, was reported in detail by, for example, the Cistercian Helinand of Froidmont (†after 1229) and the Dominican Vincent of Beauvais (†c.1264). Second, numerous extant manuscripts survive, showing his work remained popular. Finally, several thirteenth-century theologians knew his works, directly or indirectly, including Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus who, like many others, reached him through Bernard of Clairvaux, while Stephen Langton, theologian at Paris until 1206, seems to have read Gilbert's actual works.[67] Such texts would probably have been uncorrected. Others citing his works included Guerric of St.-Quentin, who referred to 'Porretanus' in his quodlibets in a discussion on the personal properties or notions. At least two questions in Douai, MS 434 referred to him, one (Question 34) concerning his 'primus error' about the divine nature, the other (Question 423) in the context of grace and merits. Gilbert's views appear to have been discussed, even if without attribution, by other major theologians, including William of Auvergne in his *De Trinitate*, who probably took one of the three different, but not wholly inadmissible, positions on the role of the notions (paternity, etc.) from Gilbert's doctrine.[68]

[65] For Gilbert's views and articles two and three, see above, pp. 41-3.

[66] Gilbert's theory was vehemently opposed by Bernard of Clairvaux and he was forced to recant it partially following two councils (or their subsequent consistories) before Pope Eugenius III, at Paris in 1147 and at Rheims in 1148. However, he appears never to have rewritten the offending passages.

[67] Gilbert, *Commentaries*, pp. 3-7, 14-5. Bernard himself complained that people had continued transcribing and reading what Gilbert had condemned with his own lips.

[68] Guerric, *Quaestiones*, p. 326; Douai, MS 434, i, f. 39v; ibid., ii, f. 74v; Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', pp. 132, 234; William of Auvergne, *The Trinity, or the First Principles*, trans. R.J. Teske (Milwaukee, 1195), pp.

Conclusion

The events of 1241/4 had their main roots in 1215 and Lateran IV's statement of faith. But the issues reflected in the condemnation - and indeed in Lateran IV itself - had their genesis in Latin debates stretching back long before 1215.[69] This was not merely part of a trend of reverence for previous authorities and a backward-facing tradition in theology, but rather because, although apparently settled and the aberrant views declared heretical, the issues were complex, at the heart of Christian doctrine, and insoluble by reason alone.

The impact of philosophy

Lateran IV focused on establishing catholic theology and refuting erroneous catholic views. But the period immediately preceding it, and between Lateran IV and 1241/4, contained other critical events which also formed part of the context for Lateran IV and the condemnation. Successive popes were clearly concerned over perceived threats from the influx of newly translated philosophical texts, in particular Aristotle's works of natural philosophy and metaphysics, translated in Sicily/Southern Italy or Spain and accompanied by commentaries mainly by Arab philosophers.[70] These were not written by Christians - thus any 'theology' they contained, whether Aristotle's unmoved mover or Arab beliefs,

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188-90 (below, pp. 163-4). For the Porretani and the School of Chartres, see M.-D. Chenu, 'Nature and Man - the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century', in idem, *Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century* (Toronto, 1997), pp. 31, 36. According to Chenu, 'Dernier avatar', pp. 166-7, at the end of the twelfth century the Porretani were a compact, intelligent and determined group, the greatest popularisers of Boethius, Eriugena, and pseudo-Dionysius after the school of Chartres, with whom they had a close kinship and derived some of their inspiration. However, according to N.M. Häring, 'The Porretans and the Greek Fathers', *MS*, 24 (1962), pp. 203-9, in the thirteenth century the Porretani were no longer an organised group (a change explicable by the passage of time). For Gilbert's reputation and the use of his works in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Gilbert, *Commentaries*, pp. 4-13.

[69] Many of the issues dated from the fourth century onwards. Arius (for whom, in summary, Christ was two persons) and Sabellius (for whom the persons of the Trinity were the different faces of God), both indirectly relevant to article two, were still being discussed and refuted in the thirteenth century. The position was similar for inter-Trinitarian relationships generally (articles two and three); Pelagius on predestination (article nine); the beatific vision (article one); and dualist views.

[70] See D.C. Lindberg, 'The Transmission of Greek and Arabic Learning to the West', in Lindberg (ed.), *Science in the Middle Ages* (Chicago, 1978), pp. 52-90; R. McKitterick and J. Marenbon, 'Philosophy and its Background in the Early Medieval West', in Marenbon (ed.), *Medieval Philosophy* (London, 1998), pp. 97-108. For the dates of the Latin translations, see 'Aristoteles Latinus', pp. 45-79 (as updated in 'Appendix B', pp. 792-832).

could be ignored; but the metaphysical and logical arguments underpinning them, such as Aristotle's arguments for the eternity of the world, could not. Actions at Paris included those taken to ban or restrict such works at Sens in 1210, in the 1215 university statutes, and in *Parens scientiarum* in 1231. Significally, while the 1210 and 1215 bans applied to both faculties at Paris, they were limited to teaching ('legere'), while the 1231 ban, for the arts faculty only, banned all use ('uti'), suggesting increased concern, although theologians were evidently seen as more able to deal with the threat.[71] While there are indications that the banned works were seen as potentially useful, as in Gregory IX's support for Michael Scot, these cannot detract from the overall impression of the deep suspicion.

The new texts, and their detailed content, are thus important for understanding the issues in the condemnation and why they were troublesome. However, they form a complex category. In simple terms, there were three periods of influence from Greek philosophy and associated commentaries. Up to the twelfth century, Latin theologians were restricted to a handful of texts, mainly translations by Boethius, comprising part of Plato's *Timaeus* and many of Aristotle's logical works.[72] Following small-scale translation activity in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the twelfth, especially its second half, saw an influx of new texts, including most of Aristotle's works of natural philosophy and metaphysics and commentaries based on them, in particular by Avicenna. Finally, the

[71] The fact Richard Rufus almost certainly wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, probably when in Paris in the arts faculty, c.1235 (above, pp. 59-60, n. 89), shows that arts students were reading such works. William of Auvergne, whose own use of the new learning was prodigious, instructed theologians in the 1230s on philosophy's uses: 'But I have digressed … [to] make clear to you to … the profundity and truth of philosophical speech, lest you should think it itself is to be spurned, just as is the case for certain stupid fools, to whom it seems nothing has been said wisely unless they have seen it armed in proofs and adorned with rhetorical flourishes, and, what is more foolish, whatever they do not understand, they think an error. Those few things, therefore, which you have heard about such difficult things, so far distant both from your knowledge and your practice, are sufficient for you for now, until you may reach the investigation of the spiritual part of the universe, and until the nature of spirituality is clear to you and its distinctions are named to you, and enumerated, and the relations, then the species, orders, grades, and the duties of the spiritual substances, and what authentic utterances may contain or have about them, which are the utterances of the prophets, nay rather, the utterances of … God, and after this the opinions of philosophers, and also those skilled in occult learning ('magorum')' - William of Auvergne, *De universo*, p. 649, 1C-D.

[72] For Plato, see A. Kenny, *Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 45-64. The three Platonic dialogues available in Latin before 1241/4 were part of the *Timaeus*, with Calcidius' commentary, and, from the end of the twelfth century, the *Phaedo* and *Meno*, although these two last texts were hardly read, if at all.

1220s onwards saw a second wave of translations, many by Michael Scot, bringing Averroes' works to the west, including his more accurate translations of Aristotle. This was also the period when the *Guide for the Perplexed*, by the Jewish philosopher, Maimonides, was probably translated into Latin.

This general sequence, however, ignores the underlying connections. First, the early Church Fathers, especially Greek, but also Latin Fathers such as Augustine, and subsequently Boethius, had far greater access to ancient Greek texts, and these naturally permeated their works.[73] Subsequent Latin theologians thus had indirect knowledge of Platonic (and Neoplatonic) and Aristotelian learning through those writing in Latin as well as through the limited early Latin translations of the texts and of the Greek Fathers. Second, any description of the texts as 'Aristotelian', or as based on his philosophy, ignores the combination of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian views they included. The early translations of Aristotle's own works were sometimes patchy and tended to be read through the distorting lens of the Arab philosophers commenting on them. The much read *Liber de causis*, translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona (†1187), was believed by most contemporaries to be by Aristotle, but was in fact largely Neoplatonic; and the *Liber de causis primis et secundis et de fluxu qui consequitur eas*, from the late twelfth or early thirteenth century, offered an extraordinary mixture of the ideas of Proclus, Eriugena and Avicenna.[74] It was not until the translations and commentaries of Averroes that Aristotle's doctrines could be clearly identified, but this was a process that was only just beginning in the 1230s. All this meant that many of the ideas coming in with the translations in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries would not have been completely new. However, there can be no doubt that the new works had a major impact. In particular, although some of Aristotle's works remained untranslated, and despite any Neoplatonic overlay, they

[73] A. Bertolacci, 'On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* before Albertus Magnus', in D.N. Hasse and A. Bertolacci (eds.), *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics* (Berlin, 2012), p. 205.

[74] Below, pp. 107-10, 118-21. According to M.-Th. d'Alverny ('Une rencontre symbolique de Jean Scot Érigène', in J.J. O'Meara and L. Bieler (eds.), *The Mind of Eriugena* (Dublin, 1973), pp. 171-2), late twelfth-/early thirteenth-century naturalists were seduced by Eriugena's interpretion of the totality of the universe, both divine and created, using not only Augustine and Boethius, but also the Greek Fathers.

presented his views on natural philosophy and metaphysics as complete theories for the first time - their full implications could therefore be realised. Moreover, Aristotle's authorship gave them authority.

Aristotle

By the end of the twelfth century many of Aristotle's scientific works had been translated into Latin, giving scholars a fairly comprehensive picture of his views. Crucially Aristotle's *Physics,* large parts of the *Metaphysics* (lacking book xi which dealt with the impossibility of infinity existing), and *De anima*, all now became available in their entirety, together with works such as *De generatione et corruptione* and *De animalibus.*[75]

Four areas of Aristotle's philosophy were particularly relevant to the condemnation. First, his conviction that a physical medium existed between the thing seeing and the object seen was relevant to article one (the beatific vision). He argued:

> '[I]t is not true that the beholder sees, and the object is seen, in virtue of some merely abstract relationship between them …'.
>
> 'Seeing is due to an affection or change of what has the perceptive faculty, and it cannot be affected by the seen colour itself; it remains that it must be affected by what comes between. Hence it is indispensable that there be *something* in between - if there were nothing, so far from seeing with greater distinctness, we should see nothing at all'.[76]

Second, Aristotle's view of knowledge was potentially relevant to the issues underlying several articles in the condemnation, including article seven (eternal truths) and nine (gifts, grace and glory). In his *Posterior Analytics*, he argued the soul's highest part was occupied by mind, or reason, the place for thought and understanding. Thought

[75] For the dates of translations into Latin for those of Aristotle's works relevant to the 1241/4 condemnation, see'Appendix B', pp. 793-7: *Sense and Sensibilia*, late twelfth century; *The Soul*, c. 1125-50; *Posterior Analytics*, c.1150; *Metaphysics,* books i-iv, c.1125-30, all books - except xi - c.1220-35; *Physics*, c.1125-50.

[76] Aristotle, *Sense and Sensibilia*, 6 (Barnes, i), p. 708; Aristotle, *The Soul*, II.7 (Barnes, i), p. 667. See D.C. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler* (Chicago, 1976), pp. 6-7.

allowed intellectual knowledge only of universals, whereas sensation concerned particulars. He stated:

> '[I]f the propositions from which a deduction proceeds are universal … it is necessary for the conclusion of such a demonstration … to be eternal. There is no demonstration of perishable things, nor any understanding of them *simpliciter* but only incidentally, because nothing holds of them universally …'.

Knowledge was possible where the universal was instantiated in only one object - for example, an eclipse, since all individual instances had the same cause. Thus, individual humans and their actions would not be knowable, as implicit in article nine. This part of Aristotle's theory was also potentially relevant to the beatific vision (article one) since God was particular; but since he had only one instantiation, he should be knowable (although, for example, William of Auvergne saw this as a major problem). Moreover, the actuality of the Intellect was the same thing as the Intellect's object. This was relevant to whether God knew multiple things and whether multiple truths existed (article seven).[77]

Third, Aristotle believed in universal causation and that creation from nothing was impossible. This was relevant to article eight, and whether the world was created. There could be no uncaused motions, and nothing was independent, or chaos would result. However, an infinite regression was impossible - as was infinity itself, since it could not be traversed. There must therefore be an unmoved first mover, lacking matter and potentiality, as the mere power to move or change the world would not ensure its eternal motion. It was therefore pure actuality. It could not be an efficient cause or active creator - this would involve a change in itself - but rather a final cause, an object of love that the universe strove towards and depended on. But, despite references to his eternal nature, goodness and love, Aristotle's God had no care for the universe.[78] Although Aristotle's main discussion on infinity was unavailable, much of it was discernible in his other works

[77] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I.7 (Barnes, i), p. 122; Aristotle, *The Soul*, III.5, p. 684. For Aristotle's rationale, see Adamson, *On Knowledge of Particulars*, https://www.academia.edu/3197513/On_Knowledge_of_Particulars (5 April 2016), pp. 274-5.
[78] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII.7 (Barnes, ii), pp. 1694-5.

or commentaries on them. Other parts of his theory came in his *Physics*, where he argued that, for matter to exist,

> 'something must have existed as a primary substratum from which it should come and which should persist in it; but this is its own special nature, so that it will be before coming to be … And if it ceases to be it will pass into that at the last, so it will have ceased to be before ceasing to be'.[79]

Fourth, on the beginning or first moment of time, the 'tempus nunc' of article eight, Aristotle asked whether 'there was some time when motion came to be, not existing before then', and whether 'it will cease to be again in such a way that nothing is moved, or did it neither come to be nor will it cease to be'. He replied that time must be eternal - 'now' links the past and future and is inextricably part of time, so time can have no beginning or end. There can be no 'now' without another 'now' before and after it.[80]

Finally, Aristotle's scientific works contained some key concepts which appeared frequently in arguments by Christian theologians in the first half of the thirteenth century relevant to the issues in the condemnation, sometimes drawn from Arab or Jewish texts. These therefore provide helpful indications of the use of the new learning and the complexities it brought with it. They include Aristotle's forms of causation: material, formal, efficient and final. Change was the movement from potentiality to actuality, involving three factors: an underlying thing (often matter); privation (the underlying thing could not already have the new feature); and form (the aspect the thing took afterwards).[81]

Neoplatonism and the Liber de causis

While Neoplatonic theories were not part of the new Aristotelian learning, they were often confused with it, in particular the text perhaps most influential in the period before

[79] Aristotle, *Physics*, I.9 (Barnes, i), p. 328.
[80] Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII.1, pp. 418-9; J. McGinnis, 'Time and Time Again' (Pennsylvania University, Ph.D. thesis, 2000), pp. 347-58.
[81] On actuality, see, for example, Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX, pp. 1651-61; on causation, Aristotle, *Physics*, II.3, pp. 332-4, *Metaphysics*, V.2, pp. 1600-1. Causation may have been relevant to article nine and the relation between nature and its objective (below, pp. 220-1). See also *Classical Arabic Philosophy,* eds. J. McGinnis and D.C. Reisman (Indianapolis, 2007), p. xxi.

the condemnation, the *Liber de causis*.[82] The *Liber*'s use by Parisian scholars was prolific, probably starting with Alan of Lille, under the name *Aphorismi de essentia summae bonitatis*. Many others followed, including William of Auxerre in his *Summa aurea* (c.1215-20), William of Auvergne in his *De bono et malo* (1220s), Philip the Chancellor in his *Summa de bono* (probably 1230s), and Alexander of Hales (or his collaborators) in their *Summa theologica* (probably from c.1236). These authors all attributed the work to Aristotle. Roland of Cremona was probably the first to use the title *Liber de causis* (in his *Summa*, probably soon after 1233); and Bonaventure, Roger Bacon and others cited it frequently. Finally, although later than the condemnation, the *Liber* was included, c.1250, in the faculty of arts' curriculum at Paris as the textbook on the metaphysics of divine substances as principles of being, mistaken for the final part of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[83]

The *Liber*'s doctrines were relevant to three articles of the condemnation. First, on time and creation (article eight), its discussion of the 'First Cause', 'Intelligence' and 'Soul' envisaged a trinal deity existing before time. It identified the 'First Cause' with 'Pure Goodness', 'the First Pure Infinite', and 'the being that is before eternity ('ante aeternitatem')'. The *Liber* stated: 'All eternity is being, but not all being is eternity. Therefore, being is more common than eternity, because eternity is its effect ('aeternitas est causatum ipsius')'. Combined with Neoplatonic tripartite structure and spirituality, this could have been attractive for Christian theologians as a philosophical basis for theology. But the temporal differentiation that followed was problematic. 'Intelligence', it argued,

[82] The Neoplatonic trinitarian model itself was already used by twelfth-century theologians, including Abelard, but rejected by Peter Lombard (Colish, *Peter Lombard*, i, pp. 254-63). For the background to, and contents of, the *Liber de causis*, see the *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques* (Supplément, Paris, 2003), pp. 599-647; T. Gregory, 'The Platonic inheritance', in P. Dronke (ed.), *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1998), p. 79; P. Pasquale, 'The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century', in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 276-8; the introduction to *The Book of Causes*, trans. D.J. Brand (Milwaukee, 2012). The alternative numbering of the *Liber*'s later chapters reflects differences in the Arab and Latin versions. For the Latin text, see *Liber de causis,* http://www.hs-augsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lspost12/DeCausis/cau_libr.html (12 February 2016). The *Liber*'s provenance was disputed from the outset, but since Gerard of Cremona first translated it, it must have been written in Arabic. Most extant manuscripts attributed it, or its propositions, to Aristotle, but other attributions included Gilbert of Poitiers, al Fārābī, Proclus, or a Jew 'David'. For example, Albertus Magnus (*De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, a work which paraphrased the *Liber*'s second part) saw the author as Jewish, writing in Latin and reassembling extracts from Greek and Arab sources.

[83] J.A. Aertsen, *Medieval philosophy as Transcendental Thought* (Leiden, 2012), pp. 201-5.

was ‘coexistent with eternity (‘parificatur aeternitati’) and not in time, because it was the second being’, and ‘Soul’ was ‘after eternity (‘post aeternitatem’)’, albeit still beyond time (‘supra tempus’), because ‘it is on the horizon of eternity from below and beyond time’. Moreover, on their natures and functions, the *Liber*’s role for Intelligence and the intelligences, with sub-creative powers, whereby the First Cause ‘creates Intelligence without an intermediary and creates Soul and Nature and the rest of things by mediation of Intelligence (‘mediante intelligentia’)’, was, at least, dubious.[84] Indeed, Bonaventure specifically condemned the doctrine of creation ‘mediante intelligentia’, arguing that it attempted sacrilegiously to limit divine power.[85]

Second, again on the nature and role of the First Cause, Intelligence and the intelligences, there were implications for article seven (eternal truths). The *Liber* stated:

> ‘Every intelligence is full of forms (‘plena est formis’); however, among intelligences are those that contain fewer universal forms, and among them are those that contain more universal forms.’

Moreover, every ‘divine intelligence’ knew things ‘inasmuch as it is an intelligence’ and governed them ‘inasmuch as it is divine’, because ‘the property of intelligence is knowledge’.[86] Indeed, following Aristotle,

> ‘since Intelligence is both what understands and what is understood … it sees its own essence. And when it sees its own essence, it knows that it understands its own essence by virtue of its own cognitive act. And, when it knows its own essence, it knows other things that are under it, because they come from it. Nevertheless, they

[84] *Liber*, pp. 6, 9, 2; *Book of Causes*, p. 27 (ch. 8[9]), p. 33 (ch. 15[16]), p. 21 (ch. 2); C. d’Ancona, ‘Pseudo-“Theology of Aristotle”’, *Oriens*, 36 (2001), pp. 101-2, 106. L. Sweeney, ‘Doctrine of Creation in *Liber de Causis*’, in C.J. O’Neil (ed.), *An Etienne Gilson Tribute* (Milwaukee, 1959), pp. 282-3, suggests the *Liber*’s position on creation ex nihilo was arguably more helpful to Christian doctrine than its Neoplatonic sources, since, for Plotinus, ‘the production of an item involves two atemporal moments - the *over-flowing* of the cause and, secondly, the *self-completion* of that which has overflown by turning back to its source’; in contrast, while the *Liber* did not refer to ‘creatio ex nihilo’ explicitly, it talked of creation, not over-flowing.
[85] D’Ancona, ‘Pseudo-“Theology of Aristotle”’, p. 102.
[86] *Liber*, pp. 6-7, 7, 38; *Book of Causes*, p. 28 (ch. 8[9]), p. 29 (ch. 9[10]), p. 38 (ch. 22[23]).

> are in it in an intelligible mode. Therefore, Intelligence and the things understood are one ('intelligentia scit essentiam suam et scit res intellectas simul')'.[87]

This doctrine was problematic for article seven for two reasons. If intelligences were equated with the universal forms they contained, potentially they could represent eternal truths which, while divine, were not God. Second, the equation of things known with the one knowing could entail multiple eternal truths if the one knowing was itself eternal.[88] Moreover, Intelligence was created, but the role given to it was arguably divine.

Finally, in a passage relevant to article nine (natural gifts, grace and glory), the *Liber* discussed the relationship between the amount of gifts a created being receives and its ability to receive and take delight in the One, directly equating the two. It argued that those receiving 'perfections' did not receive them equally. The First Cause existed in everything 'according to one and the same disposition', but everything did not similarly exist in the First Cause. However, this diversity came from the recipient, not the First Cause. This meant that things were able to receive and delight in the First Cause in proportion to their proximity to it and their capacity to receive it.[89]

Avicenna

The various bans issued in Paris prior to the condemnation covered not only Aristotle's new works but the commentaries with which they were accompanied.[90] These were numerous, by both Arab and Jewish philosophers. Of those translated and read by Latin scholars in the period of the condemnation and influencing them, either in their own right or as secondary sources for Aristotelian or Neoplatonic views, the three whose works seem most relevant to its contents were Avicenna (†1037), many of whose works were available in translation from the late twelfth century; Averroes (†1198), influential to a

[87] *Liber*, p. 8; *Book of Causes*, pp. 30-1 (ch. 12[13]).
[88] For the equation by some philosophers of Platonic forms/ideas with angels, exacerbating the issue, see below, pp. 188-92.
[89] *Liber*, pp. 11, 13; *Book of Causes*, p. 36 (ch. 19[20]), pp. 38-9 (ch. 23[24]). This passage was also relevant to how the 'First Cause' could know all things but remain simple (an issue underlying article seven).
[90] For the dates of Latin translations, see 'Appendix B', pp. 814-22. For the transmission of classical and Arab texts to the Latin world, see D. Gutas, 'Origins in Baghdad', in *Cambridge Medieval Philosophy*, i, pp. 11-25.

lesser extent, since translation of his works only started with Michael Scot in the 1220s; and Maimonides (†1204), whose *Guide for the Perplexed* may not have been properly available in translation until the early 1240s, although parts reached Latin theologians earlier, either directly or indirectly.[91] As with Aristotle himself, while the theology could be safely ignored by catholic theologians, the underpinning metaphysical and logical arguments could not. Moreover the issues discussed, such as God's knowledge and the world's eternity, were already on the Latin agenda, and where plausible or even compelling arguments from Avicenna and others resulted in conclusions contrary to Christianity, this was a matter of concern.

Avicenna was the major Arab influence before the condemnation, frequently cited by, among others, William of Auvergne. His views were complex. Five inter-connected areas - God's knowledge of particulars, individuation by matter for souls after death, vision, angels and the eternity of the world - were relevant to the condemnation.

The question whether God knew particulars or universals troubled Muslim and Jewish, not just Christian, theologians.[92] Aristotle's limitation of knowledge to universals and individuals instantiated by only one object, coupled with the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian concepts of his self-contemplation, was the starting-point and sub-text of medieval discussions on how God and, by extrapolation, human souls (especially when separated from their bodies and hence sensory perceptions), knew things. Issues included, for God, the need to ensure his knowledge did not cause any change in himself, and whether he knew multiple things. The problem of how, and what, God knows underlies article seven. Avicenna's development of Aristotle's views reworked some elements, but the result remained dubious. He first established that God's knowledge was intellectual:

> 'Thus the First [sometimes called by Avicenna the 'Necessary Existent' or 'God'], with respect to having a quiddity denuded [of matter as an object of knowledge] for

[91] The translation and use of Avicenna's works was continuous, with Averroes' criticisms improving understanding of Avicenna rather than eclipsing him (Bertolacci, 'Latin Reception', pp. 199-201).
[92] See J. McGinnis, *Avicenna* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 172-7; M.E. Marmura, 'Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars, *JAOS*, 82 (1962), pp. 299-312.

> some thing, is an intellectual apprehender. And, with respect to [the fact] that His [own] quiddity denuded [of matter is an object of knowledge] for some thing, He is an intelligible. This thing is His essence'.[93]

Thus, God could not know matter, and was limited to self-knowledge of his own essence. However, by knowing himself, God knew the totality of existence coming from his essence, and hence knew the whole world he emanated. Since he knew his own essence, which was identical to his existence, and since all things flowed from his existence, he knew all existence in a single timeless instance. Moreover, since God's knowledge preceded everything both ontologically and causally, creation resulted from his knowledge. But, as for Aristotle, this knowledge was limited to universals - to the principles of the existents proceeding from him and what they generated, including 'particular things inasmuch as they are universal'. Nevertheless, such knowledge was arguably of multiple things. They included the celestial spheres as well as angels - angels were intellects with no matter to differentiate them, so only one could exist at any given time.[94] This last point was also potentially relevant to article six (angelic location) - when combined with Avicenna's Neoplatonic-based view of the role given to each intellect, in particular the tenth intellect entrusted with directing things on earth, the angel as a single instantiation must be able to be everywhere at once.[95]

Moreover, Avicenna's restriction of God's knowledge to universals compelled him to restrict God's knowledge of humans on earth to their existence and inclusion in the species 'man'. This logically applied both in respect of individual embodied human souls and individual human acts or events, including those justifying celestial reward or punishment - to know a specific act or event it needed to be attributed to something which could itself be known as an individual. This was unacceptable theologically. Avicenna was himself aware of the problem, commenting that 'this is one of the wonders whose

[93] Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, trans. M.E. Marmura (Provo, Utah, 2005), p. 285.
[94] Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, pp. 217-9, 287-90; K. Lim, 'God's Knowledge of Particulars', *JIP*, 5 (2009), pp. 77-80; Marmura, 'Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory', pp. 300-2. Earth was included if all things ancillary to it were ignored.
[95] McGinnis, *Avicenna*, pp. 175-6; Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, pp. 288-90.

conception requires the subtlety of an inborn, acute intelligence'.[96] The doctrine was incompatible with article nine.

The second issue, conversely, concerned human knowledge of God. It resulted from Avicenna's view on individuation by matter. Avicenna believed objects were individuated essentially through matter, but his views were unclear and contradictory on the human soul when it was no longer combined with matter.[97] Logically his theory meant he should believe there was only one soul after death.[98] But denial of a soul's individuality after death and bodily separation negated any future individual relationship with, and vision of, God (article one). Moreover, no individual residence of glorified souls in the empyrean heaven (article four), and no individual rewards (article nine) would be possible. Avicenna himself struggled with the issue. He was driven to conclude the soul remained individual, although his own arguments had to be mangled to support this. In *De anima*, he explained:

> 'Someone could say … that this problem forces you to address the issue of the souls when they separate from the body. Either (1) [the souls] pass away - but you do not maintain this; or (2) they become one - but this is the very thing you found repugnant; or (3) they continue to be many individual souls when they are separated from their matter … - but then how could they continue to be many? We say that after the souls are separated from the bodies, there is no question that each one will have existed as a singular thing by reason of the difference of the matters they were

[96] Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, p. 287-8; Marmura, 'Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory', pp. 309-12; Adamson, *On Knowledge of Particulars*, pp. 289-91.

[97] Most medieval Aristotelian and Neoplatonic Arab philosophers believed that souls lost their individuality after death, with immortality and eternal rewards coming from assimilation to the active intellect (S. Stroumsa, '"True Felicity": Paradise in the Thought of Avicenna and Maimonides', *Medieval Encounters*, 4 (1998), pp. 56, 67, 73).

[98] Avicenna (*De anima*, v, 3.224, cit. *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, p. 193) stated the difference between souls is 'due to what receives the essence, or that to which the essence is properly related, and this is the body'. However, the Latin translation of Avicenna referred to accidents when discussing individuation, and Averroes' criticisms implied this was Avicenna's view. Early thirteenth-century Latin theologians apparently either interpreted Avicenna correctly - in his *De universo*, William of Auvergne (pp. 852, 2H-853, 1A) stated that Aristotle, al-Fārābī and Avicenna all agreed that 'all diversity, all number from matter, is due to the body' - or never mentioned him in this context. However, some later Latin scholars thought Avicenna believed accidents responsible. For the various thirteenth-century Latin interpretations of Avicenna on individuation, see M. Pickavé, 'On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Theory of Individuation', in D.N. Hasse and A. Bertolacci (eds.), *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics* (Berlin, 2012), pp. 343, 345-51.

> in … Next, we are certain that what makes the universal account exist as an identifiable individual cannot make it exist as an individual unless it adds to it (over and above what species it is) one of the individual factors … that attaches to it at its orientation by which it becomes an individual and which our knowledge of it requires or we do not know'.

However, Avicenna continued, he knew the soul was not singular when joined with the body: otherwise all knowledge would be the same. Therefore it had to be individuated subsequently, but not through its imprinting in matter, since that would be lost on death, but 'rather that thing belonging to the soul is a certain configuration, or a certain potentiality, or a certain accidental incorporeal quality, or the sum of them together [that] collectively individuates the soul, even if we do not know what it is'.[99]

Third, Avicenna's theory of vision, based on Aristotle's, was relevant to article one as it interposed a medium between the viewer and the object seen. He argued that we see,

> 'when the intervening transparent body becomes effectively transparent by light shining upon it, then an impression of the outspread (flattened) individual of such sensible objects as are seen is effected in the crystalline lens of the eye, just such a pictorial impression as is effected in mirrors; indeed the two effects are so similar that were mirrors possessed of a seeing power they would perceive the form imprinted in them. This is Aristotle's way; and it is the sound reliable opinion'.[100]

The analogy of mirrors was often used by medieval theologians.[101]

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[99] Avicenna, *De anima*, v, 3.225-6 (cit. *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, pp. 194-5). Another potential problem for Avicenna in the individuation of souls was his belief in an infinite number of souls. Avicenna held such infinity could exist because souls were not ordered spatially or in ontological priority. But for God to know individual souls, they would need to be subject to such ordering, since God would need to know the principle of individuation setting each soul apart from other souls, the level of perfection each had achieved, and its individual relation to other souls - souls would, therefore, need to be organised by their relative value. This would mean there would need to be order within infinity, which Avicenna believed was impossible (Marmura, 'Avicenna's Theory', pp. 309-12).

[100] Avicenna, *A Compendium on the Soul*, trans. E.A. van Dyck (Verona, 1906), pp. 51-2. This was translated into Latin c. 1160-90, as was Avicenna's fullest version of his vision theory in *Kitab al-Shifa* (*The Cure*), vi.4 ('Appendix B', pp. 818-9). See Lindberg, *Theories of Vision*, pp. 49, 234, n. 70, pp. 236-7, nn. 108-11.

[101] For its use by William of Auvergne, see above, pp. 37-8.

The fourth issue concerned angels, which Avicenna equated with celestial intelligences or intellects. In addition to the implications for article six, the role of angels was directly relevant to the issues in article seven, with potential application to several others, including article eight, if they were assigned creative powers. Following Neoplatonic emanation theory, Avicenna placed angels next to the 'First', or the 'One'. The closest to humans was the last of the 'separate intellects', 'from which there emanates, in participation with the celestial movements, something having the configuration of the forms of the lower world', the 'giver of forms ('dator formarum')', from which the 'forms [the substantial forms of the physical world] emanate'.[102] Averroes criticised al-Fārābī and Avicenna, arguing that they agreed with Plato's theory in the *Timaeus* that forms were given by the second gods. It appears that Latin theologians in the 1220s and 1230s therefore tended to conflate the views and often used the term 'creare' for both Plato's second gods and Avicenna's giver of forms. This conflation, in fact, misrepresented Avicenna, whose giver of forms did not create forms but interacted with matter: when this was ready, a form or new form flowed upon it from the 'giver of forms' as a necessary process of nature - necessary through another, possible through itself.[103]

[102] Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, pp. 358-9, 335-7. Avicenna himself never appears explicitly to equate the 'giver of forms' with the last of the celestial intelligences, the active intellect, sometimes called the active intelligence or, frequently, agent intellect - terms which all attracted different interpretations. However, such identification is implicit. Thirteenth-century Latin theologians differed in interpreting this equation, and over whether the 'giver of forms' (active intellect/intelligence or agent intellect) was a separate substance, as Avicenna himself believed, followed by, for example, the *Summa Theologica* attributed to Alexander of Hales. In contrast, Averroes (*Long Commentary on the De anima*, translated into Latin in the 1220s), argued that both the active/agent intellect and the material intellect were positioned in the soul. Averroes' views, and Avicenna's opposite position, were major topics in medieval debate from at least the 1230s, with opposing positions taken by theologians. While Averroes' position was welcomed initially as an antidote to Avicenna's, Richard Rufus objected to it. The doctrine was condemned in 1252 by Bonaventure and Robert Kilwardby - R.C. Taylor, *Averroes*, http://bartholomew.stanford.edu/authors/averroestext.html (2 April, 2016). Roger Bacon and others identified the active/agent intellect with God, while other theories included that of Albertus Magnus, that forms pre-existed somehow in matter (D.N. Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West* (London, 2000), pp. 188, 203-4). The active/agent intellect as an issue in its own right did not feature in the 1241/4 condemnation, but it could have been indirectly relevant to several of its articles. For Roger Bacon (and whether the active/agent intellect figured in William of Auvergne two pronouncements of the condemnation), see above, p. 22. See also D.N. Hasse, 'Avicenna's "Giver of Forms" in Latin Philosophy, especially in the Works of Albertus Magnus', in W. de Gruyter (ed.), *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics* (Berlin, 2011), pp. 225-49.

[103] Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, vii, 31, xii, 18 (cit. Hasse, 'Avicenna's "Giver of Forms"', pp. 230-2). For the conflation of Avicenna and Plato, see, for example, Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, 7.2.1, and Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, ch. 4 (both cit. Hasse, op.cit.).

The final major issue related to article eight - both whether there was a first moment of time and whether a 'creator' entailed simultaneous creation. On these questions, Avicenna adopted many Aristotlian principles, with his own variations. He summarised his position as follows:

> 'It has … become clear to you … that there exists an infinite incorporeal power and that is the principle of primary motion. It became evident to you … that the circular [heavenly] motion is not temporally generated [literally, 'not formed in a temporal way', i.e., with no beginning in time]. It … became … evident to you that [this] is a principle permanent in existence. After this, it became evident to you that the Existent Necessary in Himself is a necessary existent in all His aspects and that it is impossible for a state which did not exist previously to commence for Him. With [this], it became evident to you that the cause in [terms of] itself necessitates the effect, so that, if it is permanent, it necessitates the effect permanently'.[104]

Avicenna stressed the consequences of the Necessary Existent's unchangeable essence, arguing that 'what proceeds from the Necessary Existent is necessary. Otherwise, [the Necessary Existent] would have a state which did not [previously] exist' and would thus have suffered change.[105] Thus, if the one essence were to remain unchanged, and if nothing had come into existence from it, nothing could do so and the world must be eternal. This kind of argument was central to the dilemma many Latin theologians tried to address on creation and 'creatio-passio' (the second limb of article eight).

> As part of his argument, Avicenna saw the relationship of cause to effect as critical:
>
> 'For that which is possible to exist or not to exist does not become actual, and existence for it is not rendered preponderant, except through a cause. If this essence belonging to the cause [remains] as it had been and is not rendered preponderant, and [if] this preponderance does not ensue necessarily from it … then there must be a new occurrence that necessitates preponderance in this essence, if it is the efficient

[104] Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, pp. 300, 417.
[105] Ibid., pp. 302-4.

> cause. Otherwise, its relation to that which is possible remains as it had been before, no new relation occurring for it - the matter remaining in the same state, the possibility would [remain] a pure possibility in the state [as it had been]'.

Thus the First Cause and First Effect must be simultaneous in time although ontologically cause precedes effect. In particular, if the First Cause preceded his creation by time as well as essence, 'there would have been an existence that had passed before He created creation, that existence being finite. There would therefore have been time before motion and time'.[106]

This last point also touched on the concept of 'primum nunc', the first limb of article eight. However, Avicenna's main arguments on the impossibility of a first or last moment of time came in his *Physics*. He argued that, although an instant of time, or 'the now', appeared to relate to time, this was only our perception: 'it would be actual only if time were, in some way, severed'. But the continuity of time could not be severed, because, if so, 'that severance must be either at the beginning of time or at its end'. As regards the beginning, he argued:

> 'If it is at the beginning of time, it necessarily follows that that time has no before. Now, if it had no before, it could not have been nonexistent and then existed. [That] is because, when it is nonexistent and then exists, it exists after not existing, and so its nonexistence is before its existence. In that case, it must have a before, and that before is something different from the nonexistence describing it … So the thing of which this species of before-ness is predicated would be some existing thing, while not being this time. So before this time, there would be a time that is continuous with it - that [time] before, this [time] after - where this division would be what unites the two; but it was posited as what divides [the two]. This is a contradiction'.

Avicenna then turned to the position if such an instant were at the end of time, with an argument based on his concepts on necessity and potentiality:

[106] Ibid., pp. 302-6.

> ‘Likewise, if it is posited as what divides in the way of an endpoint, then something’s existing after it is either possible or not. On the one hand, if it is not possible that something exists after it - not even what exists necessarily, such that it would be impossible for something to exist with the nonexistence that is reached at the endpoint - then necessary existence and absolute possibility would have been eliminated. Necessary existence and absolute possibility, however, are not eliminated. If, on the other hand, there is [the possibility of something’s existing] after that, then it has an after, and so there is a before, in which case the instant is something connecting, not dividing. So time does not have an instant existing as something actual in relation to [time] itself, but only as potential (I mean the potential proximate to actuality). In other words, time is so disposed that the instant can always be posited in it, whether by someone’s simply positing [it as such] or the motion’s arriving at some common indivisible limiting point … That does not really create a division in the very being of time itself, but only in its relation to motions, just as it is created from the relational divisions in other magnitudes’.[107]

Finally, on the question whether God created the world from nothing, implicit in both limbs of article eight, Avicenna’s argument that the First Cause existed prior to the world in essence, not temporally, bypassed this to some extent - as the world had no temporal beginning, the issue faced by those viewing creation sequentially did not arise in the same form. However, as the world’s existence depended wholly on God, Avicenna could argue that creation was from nothing, a point made explicitly in his *Metaphysics*.[108]

The Liber de causis primis et secundis et de fluxu qui consequitur eas

A work from the late twelfth or early thirteenth century which drew heavily on Avicenna, the anonymous *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, bears directly on several

[107] Avicenna, *Physics of the Healing*, trans. J. McGinnis (Provo, Utah, 2009), pp. 237-8; McGinnis, *Time*, pp. 351-2.
[108] Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, pp. 272-3; R. Acar, ‘Creation, Avicenna’s Metaphysical Account’, in D.B. Burrell, C. Cogliati, J.M. Soskice and W.R. Stoeger (eds.), *Creation and the God of Abraham* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 77-80.

issues in the condemnation. It also demonstrates the amorphous mixture of different influences present in many works from the period, whether by Latin theologians (as its own author probably was), or those they read. It amalgamated the systems in the *Liber de causis*, Eriugena and Avicenna, with other borrowings including from Augustine and Boethius, and testifies to the entry of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* to western philosophy.[109]

The *Liber*'s use of its sources was problematic, going beyond normal medieval appropriation. This was partly because it concealed its reliance on the *Liber de causis*, Eriugena and Avicenna, while Aristotle, Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa and pseudo-Dionysius were cited openly as authorities, sometimes hiding the fact that the passages were in fact borrowed, for example, from the *Periphyseon*.[110] The author was thus able to claim his work represented authoritative truth, when in fact it was a conflation of theories, some with authority in the Latin world, others not. Moreover, he ensured his borrowings did not contradict each other and all supported the same conclusion by various devices, such as arbitrary reconciliation of different words or concepts. But, more serious in terms of falsification, the author appeared sometimes deliberately to alter the import of what his authorities had said. Examples included replacing Eriugena's 'Filius' by 'sapientia' in a passage from the *Periphyseon*, thus removing its religious connotation, and abridging a quotation from Augustine in a passage on the beatific vision.[111]

In terms of the *Liber*'s content, God was first, indivisible unity and pure simplicity. The prototypes of all things existed in God's wisdom and were eternal in an unchanging God - God's immutable knowledge resulted from the presence of the causes of all being in him. Thus, creation was a manifestation of divine ideas. The book went so far as to assert:

[109] D'Alverny, 'Une rencontre symbolique', pp. 171-2; Gregory, 'Platonic inheritance', p. 79.
[110] Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa only figure via the *Periphyseon*, and, while the *Liber* paraphrases parts of *Periphyseon*, i and ii (the primordial causes), with some direct quotations, it only names Eriugena once. R. de Vaux, *Notes et textes sur l'Avicennisme Latin* (Paris, 1934), pp. 64-140, describes the *Liber* as a 'mosaic' and 'a fraud'.
[111] Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, ii, pp. 82-3, section 561C; de Vaux, *Notes et textes*, pp. 92, 133. For the *Liber*'s use of the passage from Augustine, see further below pp. 120-1.

> '[T]he divine essence, which existing through itself is above all intellect, in those things which were made through it and in it and in respect of it, is rightly said to be created ('sic divina essentia … recte dicitur creari')'.[112]

This has a direct bearing on the issue of eternal truths (article seven) and 'creatio-passio' (article eight). The account of creation following it was, moreover, heavily Neoplatonic.

The *Liber* also discussed how, and what, humans could know. In a passage relevant to article one (and also illustrating its unattributed borrowings and misrepresentations), it stated that the 'first light' ('lumen primum') of the prime cause was above understanding:

> 'Next we shall show… how the prime cause is above all reason and understanding, and that any understanding of the human mind is only illuminated by the light of the prime cause, so that we may know that the first light is above understanding and that the perfection of understanding is only from the light itself … God, undoubtedly, is intelligible. But the intelligible observations of those intelligible disciplines [i.e. the sciences] are very different. For both earth and light are visible; however, earth can only be seen if illuminated by light. Therefore … those things treated in the sciences … cannot be understood unless illuminated by some other sun, as it were their own, in the mind. Therefore, as in this sun [i.e. the sensible sun] we may note three things: that it exists, that it shines, that it illuminates, thus in that most secret god there are three things: that he exists, that he understands ('quod intelligit'), and that he causes other things to understand. Behold our meanings are open which proceed from the authority of Augustine which we used ….
>
> Therefore the first cause is above them, since it itself is first pure infinity, but the rest are limited ('terminantur').[113]

[112] De Vaux, *Notes et textes*, p. 92.

[113] The last two lines appear to be borrowed from Eriugena (*Periphyseon*, i, p. 128-9, section 482C): 'Solus itaque Deus infinitus est; cetera ubi et quando terminantur'. The two subsequent lines explaining the 'active intellect ('intelligentia agens')' exemplify the *Liber*'s unattributed use of Avicenna (*De anima*, i.5). The misquotation from Augustine is from *Soliloquies*, I, 8.15 (cit. De Vaux, *Notes et textes*, pp. 128-9, 133-4).

The curtailment of Augustine's position - the passage omits the words 'that he [God] is comprehended ('intelligitur')' - is relevant to the condemnation. It gave bogus patristic support to the doctrine condemned in article one, that God's essence cannot be seen.

The circulation of the *Liber de causis primis et secundis* remains unclear. But it provides a striking example of how different influences could be manipulated into one amalgam allegedly representing a single authoritative view. This kind of treatise could well have perturbed theologians with its spurious authenticity in controversial areas.

Averroes

Averroes' views were not as well-known or influential as Avicenna's before the 1241/4 condemnation, but they were becoming increasingly important and would have been among those covered in the 1231 dictates of *Parens scientiarum* and earlier pronouncements. They set out Aristotle's views, previously overlaid by Avicenna's interpretation, more accurately. Theologians using Averroes in the 1230s and 1240s included Richard Rufus, who drew heavily on Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *De anima* (on the agent intellect), and *De caelo* (on heavenly movement).[114] Robert Grosseteste cited him by name in c.1235; and William of Auvergne and Philip the Chancellor showed evidence of reading him, although, in contrast to around forty references to Avicenna, William only named Averroes twice, referring to him as 'a most noble/renowned philosopher'.[115]

While Averroes' doctrine on the agent intellect, perhaps the area most debated by medieval theologians, did not figure explicitly in the condemnation, two of his views related directly to it.[116] The first was the beginning of time (article eight). Averroes' *Incoherence of the Incoherence* was not available in Latin, but he also discussed the eternity of the world in his commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Physics*, and *De*

[114] Noone, *'Scriptum super Metaphysicam*', pp. 78-81.
[115] Ibid., pp. 81-2; Dales, 'Robert Grosseteste's Place', pp. 552-3; R.C. Dales, 'Robert Grosseteste's Treatise *De finitate motus et temporis*', *Traditio* 29 (1963), pp. 261-2; R.J. Teske, 'William of Auvergne on the Individuation of Human Souls', *Traditio*, 49 (1994), pp. 77-93.
[116] For the agent intellect (or intelligence), see above, p. 115, n. 102.

caelo. Basing his arguments on the premise that any motion must be preceded by previous motion, or change, or a mover, Averroes followed Aristotle in arguing that, for there to have been a beginning in time, the mover must have been motionless and must have started to move at a specific point prior to any other mover. But this entailed a preceding motion to cause the mover to move. There could not therefore have been any previous movement in time, but rather an eternal movement previous in nature.[117] The second theory was Averroes view on knowledge, relevant to article seven. Unlike Avicenna, Averroes believed that God knew neither particulars nor universals. Instead he saw God's knowledge as prior to, above, and the cause of, all other forms of knowledge. While his main account of this was in his untranslated *Treatise on Divine Knowledge*, it also figured in his *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, translated into Latin in the 1220s.[118]

Maimonides

The extent of Parisian medieval scholars' access to Maimonides' *Guide for the Perplexed*, his major philosophical and theological treatise, is unclear. However, it appears any early translations, probably from no earlier than the 1220s, were partial and inaccurate, although as far as they were known they would have been covered by the various prohibitions and restrictions. Görge Hasselhoff argues translation of the entire text of the *Guide* followed the 1240 condemnation of the Talmud and was made in Paris, perhaps by one of the Dominicans examining Jewish texts subsequently or by the Jewish convert, Nicholas Donin, who instigated the attack and was probably working with them.[119] However, this remains subject to debate, as does the degree of Latin readership of

[117] Averroes, *In Physica*, viii, 1 (cit. L.X. López-Farjeat, 'Aquinas on the Eternity of the World', http://academic.mu.edu/taylorr/Aquinas_and_the_Arabs_Project_Essays/2._Lopez-Farjeat,_Aquinas_on_the_Eternity_of_the_World.html (16 May, 2016), pp. 4-6).

[118] Taylor, *Averroes*, passim. On the difficulties that medieval theologians experienced in the 1230s/1240s in understanding Averroes' doctrine, see Salman, 'Note sur la première influence', pp. 203-12.

[119] The position on the translation of Maimonides and his use prior to the 1240s is unclear. For a summary of the early known use of Maimonides' works and dates of reception in the Latin west, see G.K. Hasselhoff, *Dicit Rabbi Moyses. Studien zum Bild von Moses Maimonides im Lateinischen Westen vom 13. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert* (Würzburg, 2004), passim; G.K. Hasselhoff, 'Maimonides in the Latin Middle Ages', *JSQ*, 9 (2002), pp. 6-8, 18; G.K. Hasselhoff, 'The Reception of Maimonides in the Latin World', *Materia giudaica: Rivista dell'associazione italiana per lo studio del giudaismo*, 1/2 (2001), pp. 258-79. The following account is largely drawn from these works. The first dateable Latin reference to an (anonymous) work by

the *Guide* before the 1240s. But, even if only partially known before the 1240s, his influence cannot be discounted.[120]

Four of Maimonides' theories were particularly relevant to the condemnation. First, he explicitly equated angels and Neoplatonic intelligences. This had implications for their role, especially as creators or sub-creators. Moreover, while Maimonides did not call his intelligences Platonic forms or exemplars, for medieval theologians this would have been part of their baggage, and this was dangerous territory in respect of article seven (eternal truths). The enhanced role Maimonides granted such intelligences could also appear to encroach on God's preeminence, the issue underlying article six (angelic location). To have angels and intelligences equated by a Jew could have been particularly worrying given the shared Jewish and Christian Old Testament, with the Jews viewed as its expert literal interpreters.

Maimonides stated that angels existed, were incorporeal, and, interpreting *Elohim* (Exod. xxii:8), were judges under God as supreme judge:

> 'This agrees with the opinion of Aristotle: there is only this difference in the names employed - he uses the term "intelligences", and we say … "angels". His theory is that the intelligences are intermediate beings between the Prime Cause and existing

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Maimonides, the *Liber de parabola* (mainly containing Maimonides' explanations of biblical laws) comes in a letter to Cardinal Romanus (who visited Paris in 1229). This can be dated to 1223-4. Michael Scot appears to have known Maimonides' works. William of Auvergne neither named nor quoted from Maimonides directly, but his *De universo* and *De legibus* include passages echoing him. The *Summa Theologica* attributed to Alexander of Hales refers twice to Maimonides, but his other edited works contain no explicit references. Other Latin scholars naming Maimonides include Roland of Cremona in his *Summa*, c. 1233, although his references are imprecise, suggesting he did not have the full text. However, by 1240, Moneta of Cremona clearly knew the *Guide*, while Albertus Magnus was the first who can clearly be seen to use Maimonides extensively. Both Moneta of Cremona (*Adversus Catharos et Valdenses libri quinque*, ed. T. Ricchini (Rome, 1743), p. 483b) and Albertus Magnus (*De resurrectione*, i, 23 (*Opera omnia*, ed. W. Kübel, Münster, 1958), xxvi, p. 244) use the term 'quidem' for Maimonides, which may suggest he was not well-known. The lack of explicit reference to Maimonides by, for example, William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales, can, however, be explained through convention, because his death in 1204 made him a near contemporary (B. Smalley, 'William of Auvergne, John of La Rochelle and St. Thomas Aquinas on the Old Law', in eadem, *Studies in Medieval Thought and Learning* (London, 1981), p. 140). It is, therefore, likely that he was known more widely than the few texts naming him suggest. For Roland and Moneta of Cremona, see W. Kluxen, 'Maimonides and Latin Scholasticism', in S. Pines and Y. Yovel (eds.), *Maimonides and Philosophy* (Dordrecht, 1986), pp. 225-6.

[120] A.L. Ivry, 'The *Guide* and Maimonides' Philosophical Sources', in K. Seeskin (ed.), *Cambridge Companion*, pp. 55-81.

things, and that they effect the motion of the spheres, on which motion the existence of all things depends. This is also the view … in all parts of Scripture; every act of God is described as being performed by angels'.

Maimonides continued:

'Furthermore, we desire to show that the ruling power emanates from the Creator, and is received by the intelligences according to their order; from the intelligences, part of the good and the light bestowed upon them is communicated to the spheres, and the latter … transmit forces and properties unto the beings of this transient world … The creative act of the Almighty in giving existence to pure intelligences endows the first of them with the power of giving existence to another, and so on, down to the Active Intellect, the lowest of the purely spiritual beings. Besides producing other intelligences, each intelligence gives existence to one of the spheres, from the highest down to the lowest …We have already mentioned that these theories are not opposed to anything taught by our Prophets or by our Sages'.[121]

Second, Maimonides' belief that God's essence was unknowable ran counter to the doctrine in article one (the beatific vision). For example, explaining God's appearance to Moses (Exod. xxxiii:22), Maimonides commented:

'In asserting that God withheld from Moses [the higher knowledge] I mean to say that this knowledge was unattainable, that by its nature it was inaccessible to Moses; for man, whilst able to gain perfection by applying his reasoning faculties to the attainment of that which is within reach of his intellect, either weakens his reason or loses it altogether as soon as he ventures to seek a higher degree of knowledge … unless he be granted a special aid from heaven, as is described in the words, "And I will cover thee with my hand until I pass by"'.

[121] Maimonides, *Guide*, pp. 295-7, 305-6.

Maimonides described Moses asking God to let him know his true essence and his attributes, with God replying that he would grant this for his attributes which were simply his actions. However his 'true essence could not be perceived'.[122]

Third, there was Maimonides' long and comprehensive discussion on the world's creation, the issue underlying article eight and 'creatio-passio'. A key point was his conclusion that whether creation was from nothing could not be conclusively proved - a point he argued that Aristotle himself accepted, as was also argued by many Paris theologians. Maimonides identified three different theories on creation: that of Moses (that 'everything was brought by God out of nothing, including time'); Plato (that 'a certain substance co-existed with God from eternity, but this did not detract from God's greatness … for God was the cause of its existence and it was for God as clay was to a potter'); and Aristotle and his followers (that a corporeal substance could not be created from no such substance, and that the heavens, time and motion were wholly indestructible and unchangeable, with no beginning or end). Maimonides concluded that, while the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of the world was incompatible with the 'foundation of our religion', the Platonic view would be compatible. He implied that the arguments of some rabbis supported the Platonic, or even Aristotelian, view, but asserted that he himself followed Moses, albeit as a tenet of faith, not through demonstrable proof. Modern scholars are divided over whether, despite Maimonides' stated adherence to the principle of creation from nothing, he secretly believed that Aristotle was correct. However, thirteenth-century Christian theologians are unlikely to have shared this scepticism - Maimonides' arguments would almost certainly have been taken at face value. But his reference to differing rabbinic views could have inflamed anti-Jewish sentiment.[123]

Fourth, Maimonides' figurative approach to the Old Testament, particularly Satan's identity and the creation story, conflicted with the literal account in article ten and could

[122] Ibid., pp. 122, 181-2. See also p. 136: 'A boundary is undoubtedly set to the human mind which it cannot pass. There are things [beyond that boundary] which are acknowledged to be inaccessible to human understanding'.
[123] Ibid., pp. 224-66, 281-348. Maimonides criticism, pp. 310-3, of Gen. i:1, 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth', implied time existed before the creation.

have offended Latin theologians. Maimonides praised Jewish biblical interpreters and commended their instruction, which 'makes clear that which appears doubtful, and reveals that which has been hidden, and discloses most of the mysteries of the Law'. He continued:

> 'They say in the Talmud as follows: … "The adversary (*satan*), evil inclination (*yeẒer ha-ra'*), and the angel of death, are one and the same being" … It has thus been shown to you that one and the same thing is designated by these three different terms, and that actions ascribed to these three are in reality of one and the same agent … According to our Sages the evil inclination, the adversary, and the angel [of death], are … identical; and the adversary being called "angel", because he is among the sons of God, and the good inclination being in reality an angel, it is to the good and evil inclinations that they refer in their well-known words, "Every person is accompanied by two angels …"'.

This passage is particularly important as it identified the Talmud with doctrines rather than simply representing Maimonides' own interpretation.[124] Such interpretation appears incompatible with the literal biblical account.

Finally, Maimonides' discussion on the possible attributes of God is worth noting, although, given the standard Jewish rejection of the Christian Trinity, this seems unlikely to have caused concern. However, his remarks have some bearing on the issues in article two. Maimonides noted: '[It] would seem that they [relations] may be employed in reference to God, but ... we are convinced of their inadmissibility'. Maimonides argued there could be no relation between God and time or space or any correlation between him and creatures. But he conceded such attributes, 'are the most appropriate of all attributes to be employed … in reference to God, because they do not imply a plurality of eternal

[124] Ibid., pp. 309, 370-2, 479-80. Maimonides identified 'evil inclination' with imagination, asserting 'all our defects in speech or character are … the … work of imagination' (S. Klein-Braslavy, 'Bible Commentary', in *Cambridge Companion*, pp 261-6, 271). For Maimonides' anthropological approach to the Genesis account, see S. Klein-Braslavy, *Maimonides as a Biblical Interpreter* (Boston, 2011), pp. 21-86.

things exists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, when those things change to which God is in relation'.[125]

Conclusion

Four points emerge from this summary of some of the main philosophical texts included in, or associated with, the Paris bans on Aristotle's natural philosophy and other works. First, all the authors from Aristotle onwards offered a multi-faceted picture. Despite the explicit reference in many of the pronouncements to Aristotle, a major strand appears to have been Neoplatonism, present even in those claiming to follow Aristotle. However, increasingly the logical and metaphysical arguments in Aristotle's natural philosophy and associated texts sharpened the focus on specific issues of concern. Second, while both Averroes and Maimonides were becoming influential, the dominant interpreter of Aristotle up to the condemnation appears to have been Avicenna. Third, while this study has concentrated on the issues visible in the ten articles, examination of the philosophical texts containing relevant discussions show they formed part of much larger debates on creation, the knowability of God, knowledge itself, angels, and other issues. While the articles may not have had their genesis in the new learning, the debates it generated clearly had aspects that alarmed some theologians sufficiently for the various restrictions placed on its use or outright bans. By the 1240s, while blanket prohibition was no longer seen as appropriate, concerns over particular areas remained.[126] Finally, while

[125] Maimonides, *Guide*, pp. 171-2, 176-7. Maimonides also commented (pp. 296-7) on Jewish exegetical interpretation of God as plural in the Old Testament - he stated that this referred to God acting with, or in contemplation with, angels. Maimonides criticised this, asserting: 'God acts through, not with, the angelic host'. However, if this kind of wording was in texts examined in Paris in the 1240s (below, pp. 146-50), it could have seemed a dangerous misinterpretation of the Old Testament. Other areas relevant to the 1241/4 condemnation which could have offended Paris theologians include Maimonides' views on the immortality of the individual soul, which he appeared to reject, although some modern scholars question this (A.L. Ivry, *Maimonides' "Guide of the Perplexed"*: *A Philosophical Guide* (Chicago, 2016), pp. 215-7). Articles one, four and nine all require the soul's immortality.

[126] Odo of Châteauroux may be an exception to the position on blanket prohibition. In his letter of 1247 to Innocent IV, who had favoured re-examination of the Talmud as it was not wholly to be condemned (below, p. 146, n. 174), he cited Jerome's statement that 'there is no perverse doctrine that does not contain some truth'. He argued: 'These are books that contained errors, and hence, no matter how much good they contained, they were nevertheless condemned by the authority of the councils, in the same way that heretics are condemned, although they do not err in everything' (cit. Grayzel, *Church and Jews*, pp. 275-8). See also Odo's connection with the *Periphyseon*'s banning, above, pp. 92-5.

arguments relating to some of the specific issues in the condemnation can be seen in the works of Avicenna and others, Roger Bacon's reference to the agent intellect, probably in the context of William of Auvergne's pronouncememt of the condemnation, suggests less directly related points may have been part of its context and discussed in its formulation. His reference reflects their widespread use in the period, the concern they generated, but also, again, that such concern was targeted at specific theories, not at large. The 1240s was a different period from the 1220s, with the complete outlawing of Eriugena's *Periphyseon*, and the 1230s, which started with the 1231 total ban on Aristotle's works of natural sciences for arts scholars and comprehensive warning for theologians. Instead, the condemnation took the line in Gregory IX's 1231 letter to 'Master W' and others, to preserve the useful and eradicate the useless; it did not follow earlier precedent and attack works in their entirety.

Threats from outside the Latin Church

The three main potential doctrinal threats from outside the Latin Church between c.1215 and c.1244 came from a combination of alternative beliefs, two from within the Christian Church (Greeks, and professedly Christian groups deemed heretics), and one from outside it but whose interpretation of the Old Testament was respected, the Jews. A final group, the Muslims and Mongols, were less of a doctrinal challenge, but their physical and ideological threat added to the nervousness of the period.[127] Moreover, this last group presented a conversion opportunity - as demonstrated by Gregory IX's attempts to convert them, both in diplomatic correspondence with various sultans and in his remit to Franciscans to undertake missions to the east (although such diplomacy was combined

[127] William of Auvergne may have seen the threat from Muslim theology as serious. In a discussion of Muslim law, he described Muhammad's views as nonsense and inane (William of Auvergne, *De legibus* (Guiliemi Alverni, i), p. 49, 2D). Such ridicule may represent an attempt by William to defuse the peril (L. Smith, 'William of Auvergne and the Law', in T.J. Heffernan and T.E. Burman (eds.), *Scripture and Pluralism* (Leiden, 2005), pp. 138-42). However, this study has found little evidence that their doctrinal threat was seen as comparable to the other three groups - concerns over Arab translators seem to have been focused on their philosophy.

with his crusading zeal against the Muslims in particular).[128] The early thirteenth century saw significant confrontations with each of the groups outside the Latin Church, all involving theologians with connections to Paris, some at the university at the time. The first three could all potentially have influenced the 1241/4 condemnation's timing or contents - and in any case formed part of the context for its formulation and issue. For the Jews, the coincidence of dates for the Talmud trial and subsequent examination of Jewish texts in the 1240s and the 1241/4 condemnation needs scrutiny. Dealing with heretics was a dominant concern for the Dominicans, with the period seeing the start of the Inquisition, c.1227, under their leadership and the heavy presence in Toulouse of Paris theologians, again especially Dominicans. Discussions with the Greeks in the 1230s were challenging, involving both mendicant orders.

Greeks

The Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204 changed the context of discussions with the Greek Church over doctrinal differences which otherwise dated back to the ninth century. The Latin Church had long held that the pope was the supreme authority in the church, not, as the Greeks believed, the first among equals; but after 1204 those taking forward discussions with the Greeks believed they were in a position to dictate doctrine. Lateran IV illustrates the impact of Constantinople's fall on the Latin attitude to the

[128] For papal views, in particular those of Gregory IX, on Islam as both a conversion opportunity and a physical threat, see E.A. Synan, 'The Pope's Other Sheep', in C. Ryan (ed.), *The Religious Roles of the Papacy* (Toronto, 1989), p. 390. The church's initially optimistic attitude to the Mongols (some believed them Christian, possibly Nestorian, led by the mythical Prester John, and destined to overthrow Muslim power) changed when they attacked Europe, culminating in their invasion of Hungary in 1241. For example, in 1238 Matthew Paris (*Chronica majora*, iii, pp. 488-9) described them as a 'monstrous and inhuman race of men'. Gregory's diplomatic correspondence with various sultans included a letter to the Almohad Caliph al-Rashid 'to acknowledge the way of Truth' with references to Christian emissaries already despatched, and he told the sultan of Damascus: 'We … are obliged to seek the salvation of all' (*Die Beziehungen der Päpste*, ed. K-E. Lupprian (Vatican City, 1981), no. 7, p. 120, no. 13, p. 124, no. 14, p. 130, no. 15, p. 133 - cit. Synan, 'Pope', pp. 399, 403-4). Entries in the *Bullarium Franciscanum* illustrate Gregory IX's combination of military action and missionary zeal. One, from 1234, urges Louis IX to crusade against the infidels, while numerous entries concern Franciscans travelling to the east, to both Christian and non-Christian areas. For example, in 1238 Gregory gave special rights to Franciscans going to the lands of the Saracens and pagans. The last letter of the series, in June 1241, commended the Franciscans for their suffering for Christ and refers specifically to those 'in excommunicatorum terris' (*BF*, no. 148, pp. 141-2, no. 215, p. 231, no. 345, pp. 298-9). Mongols and Muslims were also seen as playing a role in the Apocalypse (above, p. 75, n. 2).

Greeks. Canon four made clear the abhorrence with which the Latin Church viewed Greek 'impiety' and disobedience in the context of Greek rebaptisms, while canon five specifically claimed Rome as the 'mother and mistress of all the faithful in Christ'. The seriousness with which successive popes viewed what they perceived as Greek intransigence cannot be overestimated.

However, Greek theology had long influenced Latin thought, for example through Eriugena's translation and use of pseudo-Dionysius.[129] Moreover, while the two traditions developed separately, this happened gradually, and the Greek Fathers, many of whose works were available in translation, had long been considered by the Latins as equal or near-equal to their own. Twelfth-century Latin theologians quoted extensively from both Greek and Latin Fathers. Their sources included Gratian's twelfth-century *Decretum*, where seven per cent of the Fathers cited were Greek; the *Glossa ordinaria*, which cited various Greek authors in the patristic glosses; and Abelard's *Sic et non*, the prologue to which set out rules for using patristic authorities, their potential errors and how to reconcile them, with Pope Gelasius' fifth-century decretals on authentic books, many by the Greek Fathers, appended. Finally, Peter Lombard's extensive use of patristic authors, including John Damascene, John Chrysostom and Origen, was highly influential. The Greek theological outlook thus permeated Latin thought, consciously or unconsciously.[130]

[129] Indeed, pseudo-Dionysius was probably viewed as much a Latin authority as a Greek, and, until the twelfth century, was sometimes confused with St. Denis of France (Peter Abelard, *Letters of Peter Abelard, Beyond the Personal*, trans. J.M. Ziolkowski (Washington, 2008), pp. 133-5). For the importance of pseudo-Dionysius in the works of theologians closely associated with Aristotelianism, in particular Albertus Magnus, see A. Speer, 'Lichtkausalität. Zum Verhältnis von dionysischer Lichttheologie und Metaphysik bei Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin', in *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter* (Turnhout, 2000), pp. 343-5.

[130] For the use made by of the Greek Fathers by Latin theologians, see J.-G. Bougerol, 'The Fathers and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard', in I. Backus (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West* (Leiden, 1997), pp. 113-64; E.A. Matter, 'The Church Fathers and the *Glossa Ordinaria*', in Backus (ed.), op.cit., pp. 83-111; J. Werckmeister, 'The Reception of the Church Fathers in Canon Law', in Backus (ed.), op.cit., pp. 51-83; B. Pranger, '*Sic et Non*: Patristic Authority between Refusal and Acceptance', in Backus (ed.), op.cit., pp. 165-93; M.L. Colish, '*…Quia hodie locum non habent* …: Scholastic Theologians Reflect on their Authorities', *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, 15 (Villanova, 1991), pp. 3-4; A.J. Minnis and A.B. Scott, *Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 67-9, 87-105. Latin scholars did not develop the traditional group of four Latin Fathers until the early 700s - previously, both Latin and Greek major Christian writers were described as, for example, 'Defenders of the Faith', with varying lists (B.M. Kaczynski, 'The Authority of the Fathers', *JML*, 16 (2006), pp. 2-3, 10-12).

Indeed, respect for the Greek Fathers continued long past the 1241/4 condemnation.[131] Thirteenth-century theologians would have been fully aware of this joint tradition which the condemnation, while not outlawing, certainly approached more divisively.[132]

Major debates were held between the two sides, in particular at Nicaea, 1234, involving both Franciscans (Rodulphus of Reims and Haymo of Faversham, minister general of the order, 1240-4) and Dominicans (a prior, Petrus of Sezane, and a brother, Hugo). While discussions focussed on a few specific issues, in particular the *filioque* (article three), the *azyma* (communion bread), and, towards the end, purgatory, the new context may have served to harden the Latin stance on the more fundamental issue of whether God could be perceived or known (article one). In contrast to earlier, if uneasy, tolerance, by the 1240s Latin doctrine was prepared to assert that God's essence could be seen, repudiating the Greek view that it was wholly unknowable.[133] This hardening of attitudes could have had some of its roots in the superiority now felt by the Latins over the Greeks, coupled perhaps with concern that their views were nevertheless still attracting Latin adherents and frustration that the Greeks had still not accepted their subservience.

There are two areas to consider: first, the *filioque* controversy, given its possible link with article three; and second, the attitude of influential individuals such as the pope, in particular whether this progressed from seeing the Greeks as in error to seeing them as heretical and a danger to the Latin church. The likelihood that theologians in Paris would not only have known the Greek position but seen it as a doctrinal threat is also relevant.

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[131] For example, Gregory of Nazianzus had a major influence on Latin thought (C. Simelidis, *Selected Poems of Gregory of Nazianzus* (Göttingen, 2009), p. 60). Aquinas considered Gregory had such great authority that no one ever slandered him; his opinion must not therefore be rejected out of hand (L.J. Elders, 'Thomas Aquinas and the Fathers of the Church', in I. Backus (ed.), The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West (Leiden, 1997), p. 340).

[132] For the use of patristic authors by thirteenth-century theologians, see N. Lewis, 'Robert Grosseteste and the Church Fathers', in Backus (ed.), op. cit., pp. 197-229; J.-G Bougerol, 'The Church Fathers and *Auctoritates* in Scholastic Theology to Bonaventure', in Backus (ed.), op.cit., pp. 289-335.

[133] The issues relevant to the condemnation were only a small percentage of the total - each side composed lists of 'errors' (T. Kolbaba, *The Byzantine Lists* (Urbana, Illinois, 2000), pp. 1-2). Greek theological tradition was not simplistically or slavishly Platonic or Neoplatonic. The fourth-century Cappadocian Fathers, and later pseudo-Dionysius, imposed Christian theology onto this while using its concepts and methods. However, an unreachable incomprehensible God, and a distinction between the unknowable essence and the energies or operations that went out from him, remained fundamental to Greek thinking (Lossky, *Vision of God*, pp. 99-102).

The *filioque* controversy dated back to the ninth century and figured in numerous subsequent debates between the two sides.[134] Until the thirteenth century, Latin arguments against the Greeks had largely centred on two factual areas. First, they disputed the authenticity of statements by the authorities, in particular the Greek Fathers, with which the Greeks supported their position. Second, they argued that the ruling in canon seven of the Council of Ephesus, 431 (which forbade anyone to write or compose any creed other than that prescribed at the First Council of Nicaea, 325, and endorsed and set out in full at the First Council of Constantinople, 381), nevertheless allowed additions to it. In contrast, although these points were also covered in the Greek arguments, they focused as much on logical issues. Conversely, in the debate at Nicaea, 1234, the Latins adopted the more logical approach. Both sides also produced biblical references to support their cases.[135]

The meeting was a Greek initiative, with the Greek team including their patriarch, Germanos II, appointed by Emperor John III Vatatzes, who also attended, and Nikephorus Blemmydes, a scholar and cleric.[136] The Greeks wanted a council but the friars asserted they had simply come to talk to the patriarch. The Greeks, but not the Latins (who wanted to prioritise discussion on the *azyma*) saw the *filioque* as the primary issue, insisting it was

[134] The numerous twelfth-century debates over doctrine were often acrimonious, with the Latins increasingly present in the east and the papacy demanding that the unity both churches wanted was contingent on the Greek Church acknowledging the supremacy of the pope and the Latin Church (J.M. Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire* (Oxford, 1986), p. 168). The period after 1204 formed a continuation of earlier discussions, but the Fourth Crusade had fundamentally changed the balance of power. See also S. Neocleous, 'Byzantine-Muslim Conspiracies against the Crusades', *JMH,* 36 (2010), pp. 253-274.

[135] Patristic and conciliar arguments figured large in, for example, Peter Lombard's twelfth-century discussion of the Greek position, with arguments from logic treated separately. Although Alexander of Hales' 1220s *Glossa* also used arguments from Anselm of Canterbury's *De processione Spiritus Sancti* (written after he attended a debate with the Greeks at Bari, 1098, and dealing with the arguments there), it also kept many of the logical arguments separate. For Anselm's account of the Bari debate, see G.R. Evans, *Saint Anselm* (London, 1989), pp. 41, 60-6. Anselm assumed resolving the issue would need a joint meeting of, and agreement by, bishops on both sides, since their common consent was essential for any counciliar decrees to be official - a position demonstrating a very different negotiating atmosphere to that after 1204. The original Greek arguments were heavily syllogistic - see Photius, *On the Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit,* trans. Holy Transfiguration Monastery (New York, 1983).

[136] Both the full official Latin report of the debate (*Disputatio Latinorum et Graecorum*, ed. G. Gulabovitch, *AFH,* 12 (1919), pp. 418-470) and Blemmydes' Greek account (Nikephorus Blemmydes, 'A Partial Account'*, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense. Études et documents*, 48 (Leuven, 1988), pp. 106-114) are extant. Exchanges in 1228 between Gregory and the patriarch Germanus on church unity and the *filioque* suggest that the patriarch saw such theological issues as matters for the papacy itself. Germanus accepted the Holy Spirit proceeded through the Son because all that the Son had, he had from the Father. However, the compromise evidently failed (Mansi, xxiii, pp. 62-6).

debated first.[137] Among various permutations, the Greeks contended that the Latin logical arguments were inappropriate to first principles - Christ had not used syllogisms in stating that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father. However, the Greeks also used logic, including that if the Father and Son shared the procession of the Holy Spirit the persons would lose their individuality; and the Trinity was either a single principle, or the three persons, but the dual procession created a duality, making the first principle twofold. These arguments were at the heart of the issues underlying article three.[138] The discussions concluded with both sides declaring the other side's views heretical with mutual anathematisation. The Greeks also gave the Latins a letter for the pope and a long statement on the *filioque*.

Shortly afterwards the issue of purgatory, possibly indirectly relevant to article four on the empyrean heaven, was debated, inconclusively and apparently for the first time. The Latins argued purgatory was an intermediate state for the imperfect awaiting judgment between paradise (the immediate place for the just) and hell (where the damned went immediately). The Greeks believed this negated the notion of eternal punishment.[139]

Turning to papal attitudes to the Greeks, Gregory IX's response to the archbishop of Bari, 1231, concerning Greek baptismal practices, shows these had hardened even since Lateran IV (when his predecessor, Innocent III, had banned the Greek practice of rebaptising those baptised under Latin rites). Gregory ruled Greek baptisms to be invalid, stipulating that anyone baptised this way and then ordained, must be re-baptised and re-ordained. Since the condemned rite was universal among the Greeks, this invalidated all

[137]The Latins' prioritisation of the *azyma* suggests they might have felt that this was stronger ground for them and that they could not counter Greek arguments on the *filioque* (Chadwick, *East and West*, p. 241).
[138] Blemmydes, 'Partial Account', pp. 106-14; H. Chadwick, *East and West: the Making of a Rift in the Church* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 238-43; J. Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy 1198-1400* (New Brunswick, 1979), pp. 42-44, 64-72; N.G. Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece* (Turnhout, 2012), p. 95; A.E. Siecienski, *The Filioque - History of a Doctrinal Controversy* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 125-6.
[139] Chadwick, *East and West*, pp. 244-45. The Greeks viewed purgation with bodily punishment which offered expiation as Origenist belief in ultimate salvation for everyone.
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their ordinations.[140] A further escalation in Gregory's attack on the Greeks came with his 1238 bull, *Postquam Graecorum*, which explicitly accused the Greeks of heresy. It stated:

> 'After the Greek people turned away from obedience to the Roman church, they both encouraged schisms against the same church and degenerated so from son to step-son and by vain and various bonds of diverse heresies ('vanis ac variis diversarum heresum nexibus') advanced themselves that they infected Greece almost entirely with the thistle of heretical depravity ('heretice pravitatis zizania infecerunt')'.[141]

Richard Spence argues that an attempted expedition sponsored by Gregory, in 1236, to safeguard the Latin Empire in the Holy Land originally included plans for attacking the Greeks, and that Gregory upgraded the Greeks to heretics simply to bring this attack 'within the definition of the just war', demonstrable as mere pretext since he did not establish the Inquisition there.[142] He believes 'the terms heretic and its canonical baggage were the devices he [Gregory] employed to divest the supporters of heretics … of their land'. However, given the history of bad blood on both sides over the first three crusades and the precedent of the fourth, such a device seems unnecessary. The schism was real, with the *filioque* a doctrine of substance which Gregory probably saw as heretical, or quasi-heretical - on a par with those of Amaury of Bène and David of Dinant, treated, with their followers, as heretics (or mad). Moreover, other documents establish Gregory's growing exasperation, including a letter to Frederick, again in 1238, comparing the Greeks to asps blocking their ears to warnings to rejoin the Church and transgressing orthodoxy. In 1239 he wrote to the Franciscans carrying out conversions in the lands of the 'Saracenorum, Paganorum, et Graecorum, Bulgarorum, Cumanorum, aliorumque Infidelium'. This implied that, by his pontificate's end, he had grouped the Greeks with

[140] Auvray, i, no. 740, pp. 460-1; T.A. Lacey, 'Gregory IX and Greek Ordinations', *CHS*, 33 (1898), pp. 3-16. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa* xii, III. Q.66.a.5, pp. 67-8, later defended Greek baptisms, stating: '[Their] sacrament is validly conferred'. Subsequent popes abandoned the ruling which was doctrinally dubious.
[141] Auvray, ii, no. 4154, p. 918. See also ibid., no. 4155, p. 919, no. 4605, pp. 1171-2; N.G. Chrissis, 'The City and the Cross', *BMGS*, 36 (2012), pp. 22-3; R. Spence, 'Gregory IX's Attempted Expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople', *JMH*, 5 (1979), pp. 166-9.
[142] Spence, 'Gregory IX's Attempted Expeditions', pp. 168-9; Chrissis, 'City and Cross', pp. 22-5.

actual unbelievers.[143] However, establishing the Inquisition against such a long-established sister church was arguably inconceivable.

It is likely that theologians in Paris in the period preceding the condemnation knew something of the debates and issues discussed - many of their works contained specific references to the Greeks. However, what information reached them, when and how, is important in assessing how far the Greek position influenced article three's inclusion in the condemnation. Of the numerous discussions between the Greek and Latin Churches, Anselm of Canterbury's account of the debate at Bari in 1098 was known to Alexander of Hales and others.[144] Further examples likely to have filtered back to the west include a theological debate in Constantinople in 1136 involving Anselm of Havelberg. Anselm later met Pope Eugenius III in 1144 and wrote a report for him, including on the *filioque*, listing, among those attending the debate, 'three wise men skilled in the two languages and most learned in letters, … James a Venetian, Burgundio a Pisan, and the third, most famous among the Greeks and Latins … for his knowledge of both literatures, Moses …, an Italian from … Bergamo …'. Burgundio's translations, including of John Damascene, John Chrysostom and Basil of Caesarea, reached theologians such as Peter Lombard in Paris, proving highly influential.[145] The bilingual Pisan and later cardinal, Hugo Etherianus, was in Constantinople between c.1165-1182, following study in Paris. He acted as adviser at the court of Emperor Manual I Comnenos, engaged in theological discussions, and wrote a book on the errors of the Greeks, sending copies to Patriarch Aimerikos of Antioch and Pope Alexander III.[146]

[143] Auvray, ii, no. 4110, p. 902; *BF*, i, no. 296, pp. 269-70.
[144] Alexander, *Glossa*, i, 11, pp. 136-7.
[145] C.H. Haskins, 'The Greek Element in the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century', in idem, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1924), pp. 144-5; C.H. Haskins, 'North-Italian Translators of the Twelfth Century: Italy and Byzantium in the Twelfth Century', in idem, op.cit., pp. 196-209; C.H. Haskins, 'Versions of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*', in idem, op.cit., p. 207. See also D.J. Geanakoplos, *Greek Scholars in Venice* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p. 16; Hussey, *Orthodox Church*, pp. 176-7.
[146] Hugo Etherianus' book included full refutations of Byzantine theologians, for example Photius (from the ninth century), Theophylact of Ochrid (from the tenth) and Nicetas of Maroneia (from the early twelfth), as well as works by both Latin and Greek Church Fathers, for example Athanasius, Cyril, Basil and Augustine. His aim was both to provide a patristic basis for the Latin position on the *filioque*, and to answer Greek accusations that the dual procession meant there were two principles (a duality) within the Trinity

Second, the Dominicans and Franciscans had extensive contact with the Greeks in the thirteenth century, with bases around Constantinople. Initially the Franciscans were the main group, firmly established in Constantinople by 1220, as demonstrated by references to a 'dilecto filio Fratre Luca magistro fratrum Minorum …' in a 1220 letter from Honorius III to his legate in Constantinople. Dominican involvement was less, although they, too, had a base in Constantinople at least from 1234.[147] Finally, other groups included monks, with monasteries established in the Holy Land after 1097. The main group were Cistercians, with a first abbey, in Syria, in 1157, and others subsequently, including in Constantinople. In the thirteenth century, the Syrian abbots were required to attend the Chapter-General of the order at Cîteaux every few years. There was also frequent exchange of letters between monasteries. Thus, the abbeys retained their contacts with the northern European houses.[148]

Heretics

Controversy continues over whether an organised group or groups of dualists with a set of defined beliefs existed in the west in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries at all - and, if so, the extent to which they were homogenous either in doctrine or organisation, the degree of their organisation, the extent to which their beliefs were defined, their connection, if any, with eastern dualists, and even what they were called.[149] This study

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(Siecienski, *Filioque*, p. 121). Etherianus met Gilbert of Poitiers' disciple, Hugh of Honau, in Constantinople, helping him to obtain Greek patristic documents for Gilbert's case at Rheims (M.-Th. d'Alverny, 'Translations and Translators', in R.L. Benson and G. Constable (eds.), *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century* (Toronto, 1991), p. 431).

[147] R.L. Wolff, 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Franciscans', *Traditio,* 2 (1944), p. 214; M. Angold, 'Greeks and Latins after 1204', in B. Arbel, B. Hamilton and D. Jacoby (eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London, 1989), p. 70; M.D. Jordan, 'Theological Exegesis and Aquinas Treaty "Against the Greeks"', *CH*, 56 (1987), p. 449. See also N.I. Tsougarakis, *The Latin Religious Orders in Medieval Greece* (Turnhout, 2012), p. 208.

[148] Despite the Cistercians' contemplative role, they probably engaged in outside disputes. The popes used them as agents in the crusader states, charging them to bring Greek monasticism into the catholic faith and to preach the Fourth Crusade (B.M. Kienzle, *Cistercians, Heresy and Crusades in Occitania 1145-1229* (New York, 2001), pp. 71-2). See also A.J. Andrea, *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade* (Boston, 2000), pp. 19-21, 268, 277-8; B. Hamilton, 'The Cistercians in the Crusader States', in *Monastic Reform, Catharism and the Crusades, (900-1300)* (London, 1979), pp. 405-22; M. Angold, *The Fourth Crusade* (Harlow, 2003), pp. 178-9 ; A.E. Lester's review of Kienzle, *Cistercians, CHR*, 90 (2004), pp. 758-9.

[149] For a comprehensive account of the modern debate, see A. Sennis, 'Questions about the Cathars', in idem, A. Sennis (ed.), *Cathars in Question* (York, 2016), pp. 1-20. See also R.I. Moore, *The Formation of a*

adopts 'Cathars' as a convenient label, and as used by Moneta of Cremona in his treatise *Adversus Catharos*, without prejudice to the position.

Disagreement is perhaps sharpest for the second half of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.[150] However, anyway by the time of Lateran IV and probably earlier, even if no such established group or groups existed initially, these had almost cetainly emerged with clear doctrines, even if only in reaction to earlier persecution. Either way, given their increasing role in leading and organising doctrine, scholars at Paris writing on the Cathars may well have played a part in the systematisation of Cathar beliefs, whether deliberately or unconsciously. This, in itself, could have influenced the very 'heretical' doctrines they described and attacked, helping to crystallize them, and possibly, by taking perhaps disjointed and unformed views to their logical conclusions, exercising a creative role. However, since the focus of this study is the 1241/4 condemnation and the concerns of those formulating its propositions, the beliefs of theologians at Paris, not what Catharism really was, or its origins, are the issue. Moreover, it appears that, by c. 1250, and certainly before 1254, the *Liber de duobis principiis* existed - a significant text composed by one group of self-professed dualists which not merely set out an extreme dualist creed but also exposed differences with a more moderate dualist sect.[151] Thus, while Catharism may have

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Persecuting Society (Oxford, 1987); B. Hamilton, 'Wisdom from the East', in P. Biller and A. Hudson (eds.), *Heresy and Literacy, 1000-1530* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 38-60; M.G. Pegg, 'The Paradigm of Catharism; or, the Historians' Illusion', in Sennis (ed.), op.cit., pp. 21-52; J.H. Arnold, 'The Cathar Middle Ages as a Methodological and Historiographical Problem', in Sennis (ed.), op.cit., pp. 53-78; J. Feuchter, 'The *heretici* of the Languedoc: Local Holy Men and Women or Organized Religious Group? New Evidence from Inquisitional, Notarial and Historiographical Sources', in Sennis (ed.), op.cit., pp. 112-30; B. Hamilton, 'Cathar Links with the Balkans and Byzantium', in Sennis (ed.), op.cit., pp. 131-84; R. Rist, '"Lupi rapaces in ovium vestimentis": Heretics and Heresy in Papal Correspondence', in Sennis (ed.), op.cit., pp. 229-41; R.I. Moore, 'Principles at Stake: the Debate of April 2013 in Retrospect', in Sennis (ed.), op.cit., pp. 257-73.

[150] For example, at one end of the spectrum, Mark Pegg (*A Most Holy War: the Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 39-40) argues that heresy was created by those in the church, starting from the mid-eleventh century, possibly to meet the need for its existence as a precondition for the apocalypse at a time of intense speculation about the millennium and the end of the world. Pegg cites a French monk, Rodulphus Glaber (†1047) quoting St. Paul that 'there must be heresies … so that they who are of the faith must be proved'. In contrast, Peter Biller ('Goodbye to Catharism?', in A. Sennis (ed.), *Cathars in Question* (York, 2016), pp. 288-95) holds that dualist heresy, linked to eastern dualism, had a strong presence in southern France from at least the third quarter of the eleventh century.

[151] For the date, see *Livre des deux principes*, ed. C. Thouzellier (Paris, 2008), p. 31. For discussion of the *Liber de duobus principiis*, see D. d'Avray, 'The Cathars from Non-Catholic Sources', in A. Sennis (ed.), *Cathars in Question* (York, 2016), pp. 177-84. See also P. Biller, 'Northern Cathars and Higher Learning', in

been at its outset a clerical construction, with Paris theologians involved in this exercise, and perhaps still in their writings indirectly influencing its thinking, well before the condemnation there appears to have existed in substance a dualist doctrine that caused such theologians and the church genuine concern.[152]

Historically, Pope Lucius III's 1184 decretal, *Ad Abolendam*, and Lateran III, 1179, heralded increasingly severe measures taken against dualists and other heretics in church decrees and papal bulls, together with punitive action by the German emperors and, from c.1227, the beginnings of the Inquisition. These included Lateran IV's dictates. Scholars at Paris were closely bound up in such efforts from the outset, with the Dominicans' links to Toulouse - the heart of French Catharism, where they were first established - ensuring their anti-heresy agenda was entrenched at Paris from their arrival in 1217. Pope Honorius III's call, also in 1217, to Parisian scholars to go to Toulouse to lecture and preach to bring the people back to God, possibly linked to a petition by Dominic for a school to combat heresy, shows both the close university involvement in tackling heresy and the papal efforts to combat it by any means, intellectual persuasion as well as punishment. The move of Roland of Cremona, the first Dominican theology master at Paris, to Toulouse in 1229, demonstrates the same concern.[153]

Theologians at Paris in the run-up to the condemnation were thus well aware of the requirement to rebut dualism. They would have had access to the increasing number of documents produced by those active against the heretics.[154] This does not mean they

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P. Biller and B. Dobson (eds.), *The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life* (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 40-9.

[152] See L.J. Sackville, 'The Textbook Heretic: Moneta of Cremona's Cathars', in A. Sennis (ed.), *Cathars in Question* (York, 2016), pp. 208-28, for an analysis of the Dominican Moneta's *Summma adversos Catharos*. This argues convincingly that, while Moneta's description of the Cathars should not be read back to the twelfth century, irrespective of whether they existed then, this does not apply to the thirteenth century, where Moneta, possibly an inquisitor, 'is describing and refuting what he found on the ground: an intellectually driven, textually orientated, connected group of thinkers'.

[153] *CUP*, i, no. 25, pp. 83-4; P.O. Lewry, 'Papal Ideals and the University of Paris 1170-1303', in C. Ryan (ed.), *The Religious Roles of the Papacy: Ideals and Realities, 1150-1300* (Toronto, 1989), p. 367.

[154] Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima*, p. 34; Sackville, *Heresy and Heretics*, p. 10. The strong Dominican presence in Toulouse, and the anger their severity against heretics caused there, is also clear from their expulsion in 1235, probably returning in 1236 (*The Chronicle of William of Puylaurens*, eds. W.A. and M.D. Sibly (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 93).

always focused on current Cathar arguments, rather than simply revisiting discussions of historic dualism, going back to Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, or the patristic authorities he used, especially Augustine.[155] However, the doctrines discussed included those found in contemporary writings associated with thirteenth-century Catharism. Peter Biller's analysis of the discussions of heresy by William of Auxerre (a place where the Cathars had a strong presence and executions took place), provides a case in point. There are textual parallels between William's *Summa aurea* and the *Adversus Catharos* of Moneta of Cremona. Moreover, William referred to 'Master Prévostin' and his time among the Cathars. Indeed, if the attribution of the *Summa Contra Haereticos* to the chancellor of Paris, Praepositinus of Cremona, is correct, then a treatise specifically discussing the Cathars (and written by a major university figure) would have been available in Paris in the early thirteenth century. This is important as many statements attributed to 'Manichees' by later authors come from William of Auxerre's work.[156]

Moreover, as is implied by their reported use of Aristotle, together with the complexity of their arguments, many Cathars were not uneducated peasants but presented a real theological threat.[157] Indeed, they may possibly have infiltrated the university itself, although this is far from certain - the only evidence comes from Matthew Paris who noted in 1243, admittedly second-hand, that the Cathars of Como told Ivo of Narbonne, that 'from almost all the cities of Lombardy and some of Tuscany they had sent apt scholars

[155] Texts such as Augustine's *Contra Faustum* offered ample anti-dualist material to draw on (and could have been partially behind article nine, below, pp. 223-5).

[156] Biller, 'Northern Cathars', pp. 25-40, 52-3, compares William's *Summa aurea* with Moneta of Cremona's *Adversus Catharos*, identifying similar descriptions of Cathar doctrines in both, sometimes almost verbatim. Both contain a maxim from Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione*, unlikely to have been available in Latin before the twelfth century: 'The principles of contraries are contraries' - see Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione - translatio vetus,* ed. J. Judycka, *Aristoteles Latinus,* 9.1 (Leiden, 1986), pp. 74 (lines 1-20), 75 (lines 8-9). See also William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea,* ed. J. Ribailler (4 vols., Paris 1980-7), ii, I, pp. 172, 168; Moneta, *Adversus Catharos*, p. 23b. For the date of the *Summa contra haereticos*, see Praepositinus of Cremona, *The Summa contra haereticos ascribed to Praepositinus of Cremona*, eds. J.N. Garvin and J.A. Corbett (South Bend, Indiana, 1958), pp. xiv, 4. The *Summa contra haereticos* stated: 'Hereticus … qui hoc dicit antiquitus Manicheus, nunc vero Catharus appellatur', a derivation also discussed by Moneta, *Adversus Catharos*, p. 411b. Moneta may have included historic arguments, but many of his sources would have been contemporary (*Heresies of the High Middle Ages*, p. 307).

[157] Sackville, *Heresy and Heretics*, pp. 39-40.

('dociles … scholares') to Paris, some to study the sophistries of logic ('logicis cavillationibus'), others the discourses of theology ('theologicis dissertationibus')'.[158]

The threat that Cathar doctrines were believed to represent in the first half of the thirteenth century is demonstrated by William of Auvergne, under whose authority the condemnation was issued, in particular in his *De universo*, probably from the 1230s. William devoted all the first part of its first principal part to attacking, under the banner of the Manichees, what he stated 'was and still is not only the most destructive, but also the most pestilential [error], and for this reason [the Christian religion] does not cease to pursue it with sword and fire and to exterminate it right up to today'.[159] His main argument focused on the logical impossibility of two 'coeval and eternal principles', each of them 'necessary ('necesse esse'*)* through itself and, for this reason, simple in the ultimate degree of simplicity'.[160]

The dualist *Liber de duobus principiis* contains numerous passages relevant to the condemnation. It started with arguments in favour of two first principles, or creators, based on logic and biblical quotations. It refuted belief in only one principle, using analogies, such as that a tree could not produce both good and evil fruit.[161] Turning the arguments of its opponents against themselves, it argued that, were there only one principle, God must have created and arrayed his angels freely as he wanted, even though he must have known they could not remain good but would sin, since whatever he foresaw must happen. Hence, God himself must have been the cause and origin of all evil. The

[158] L. Paolini, 'Italian Catharism and Written Culture,' in P.Biller and A. Hudson (eds.), *Heresy and Literacy, 1000-1530* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 96; Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora,* iv, p. 271. The restrictions on reading the newly-translated works of Aristotle on natural philosophy in 1210 and 1215 may have been partly in reaction to concerns over Catharism (Biller, 'Northern Cathars', p. 49). It is arguable that, had Cathars in fact been present at the university at Paris, their existence would be recorded more fully, and indeed they would have been denounced; but lack of evidence is not a conclusive argument. Given the 1241/4 condemnation did not name the sources for its propositions, no specific references to Cathars would be likely there.

[159] William of Auvergne, *Universe of Creatures,* pp. 33-4.

[160] Ibid.*,* pp. 31-60. Many of William's arguments mirror those in the dualist *Liber de duobus principiis*.

[161] Ibid., pp. 54-7. William identified as the first argument 'which seems to have led the Manichees into error', 'that from one of two contraries the other cannot arise'. Responding, he gave examples of both good and evil coming from a single source, such as drunkenness coming from (good) wine, and discussed various Manichaean arguments on the nature of contraries, in similar terms to the *Liber de duobus principiis*.

argument that this resulted from angelic misuse of God's gift of free will could be countered: God made angels as they were, and could have made them otherwise. Further arguments included that humans could not succeed by free will to do anything of which God was not the cause and principle. They had no powers of themselves - all good came from God. But evil did not come from God.[162] These issues were directly relevant to articles five and ten (the angelic and human fall).

In a further argument, again related to article five, the *Liber* asked how angels were able to hate goodness which existed from eternity and love its opposite, evil, which did not yet exist, if no separate cause for evil existed - angels would have chosen good, not evil, if evil and Satan did not yet exist. But something that began must have had a cause; and nothing could have an effect before existing.[163] In an intriguing passage, the *Liber*'s author stated that a 'Master William', whom it claimed to have heard and described as appearing 'wise in many things ('sapiens in pluribus')', believed:

> '[A]ngels were not made perfect by God from the beginning, because their God could not make them perfect. The reason for this is that God could not and cannot make anyone like Himself or coequal with Himself … and although God himself may be called almighty by many, yet this He cannot do … And thus, in so much as they were inferior to God in beauty and greatness … these angels could be found wanting to the extent that they could covet His beauty and greatness. So, one reads of Lucifer in Isaiah: "I will exalt my throne above the stars. I will be like the Most High". And thus, such a one would perhaps say that on this account we cannot reasonably blame God for not making the angels so perfect that they could not have coveted His beauty and greatness at all, because their God could not do so …'.

The *Liber* suggested another possible argument from 'Master William' would be:

[162] *Livre des deux principes*, ed. C. Thouzellier (Paris, 2008), pp. 160-203.
[163] Ibid., pp. 203-17.

> ‘Those who were saved could not covet any more or sin, because they were enlightened and subtly warned by the punishment of the other angels, who became demons through their covetousness’.

However, this would mean that the good, holy and just God would have caused his angels to fall and be punished, with no reason or justice, because he could not create them as perfect so that they would not covet his beauty, and they were created earlier than the other angels who saw their example and so did not fall. This was inconceivable for a good God.[164] William’s identity is unknown; he may be fictitious, but if some catholic theologian really argued in this way, undermining God’s omnipotence, then it suggests rebutting Catharism was pushing some ‘wise’ people, into dangerous counter-arguments.

Book II of the *Liber* turned to creation, with arguments relevant to article eight. It noted that its opponents might contend its earlier arguments were invalid, alleging they were based on human views and philosophy, not the Bible which only referred to the one true God and claimed he created all things. In refutation, it argued that the words ‘create (‘creare’)’ and ‘make (‘facere’)’ had three meanings in the Bible. First, God created when he added something to those already good to help those destined for salvation. Thus ‘to create’ or ‘to make’ meant to do this from something, as from some pre-existing matter. Second, ‘to create’ meant when God added to those who had become evil to help them reform. Finally, it meant when God allowed an evil person to do something which would be impossible otherwise, and thus was said ‘to make’ the evil which he permitted under sufferance, so that he could punish the wicked and reward those to whom he showed mercy. In this sense, Satan and evil could be said to be created by God. Hence God did not directly and completely create evil, still less do so from nothing, which the *Liber*'s opponents claimed ‘to create’ meant.[165]

[164] Ibid., pp. 218-22; *Heresies of the High Middle Ages*, pp. 531-2.
[165] *Livre des deux principes*, pp. 228-73, 363-89, especially p. 364. A further treatise, *Against the Garatenses*, refuted the arguments of the moderate or ‘mitigated’ dualists who believed in one good creator.

The *Liber* also contained a compendium for the instruction of beginners. This argued against 'the faith of the ignorant' who believed the vision of God (article one) was possible on earth, using the same conflicting biblical quotations as theologians at Paris preceding the condemnation.[166] Part of a Bogomil text, *The Ascension of Isaiah*, could also be relevant to article one (and perhaps article four, the empyrean heaven). Its second half, *The Vision of Isaiah*, reached the west in Latin translation around 1200.[167] It described Isaiah's vision of the levels of the heavens, from the first (lowest) to the seventh (highest). Isaiah progressed through each, escorted by an angel. In the seventh, he saw some of 'the righteous who, stripped of fleshy robes, were in heavenly robes and standing in great glory …'. Isaiah saw there the archangel Michael, and 'the Lord in great glory', and 'another most glorious one, like unto Him in all things' … the 'angel of the Holy Spirit'. All glorified Him 'whose glory I [Isaiah] could not behold … And the angel said to me: "He is the One Living Eternal, living in the highest eternity and resting among the holy ones; we cannot endure to name or see Him …"'.[168]

Numerous polemical and other anti-heretical texts also discussed Cathar views, in particular Cathar belief in two first principles and their theories on creation (article eight). These discussions reflected many points from the *Liber de duobus principiis*, often accurately. For example, Rainerius Sacconi noted that John of Luigo, leader of a second group of Albanenses, believed 'to create is to make something from some pre-existent matter … never to make from nothing'. Rainerius cited their belief that 'all creatures exist from eternity, good creatures with the good God and evil with the evil God. Creators do not precede creatures in eternity except causally. Creatures are from God from eternity, like the splendour or rays of the sun which does not precede its rays in time, but only as cause or by nature', together with the *Liber's* three meanings of create.[169]

[166] Ibid., pp. 298-337, 359-61.
[167] It was referred to (c.1222) by Durand of Huesca (formerly a Waldensian), and (c.1240) by the Franciscan Jacopus Capelli and by Moneta of Cremona.
[168] *Heresies of the High Middle Ages*, pp. 61, 447-94, 634-5, 470. For Bogomil literature, see pp. 450-6, 459.
[169] Ibid., pp. 214-7, 289-96, especially pp. 291, 307-13, 339-40. The argument on causal priority resembles Avicenna's, above, pp. 116-7. Rainerius, once a heretic, was a Dominican inquisitor by c.1245.

A further persistent allegation in anti-heretical texts (and reflected in Rainerius' *Summa*) was that absolutist dualists 'do not believe that either the Son or the Holy Spirit is God by nature, but each is only a creature of Almighty God. They also believe the Father is greater than the Son and different from Him and the Holy Spirit in substance, and the Son is greater than the Holy Spirit and different in substance'. This was indirectly relevant to article two. The 'mitigated' dualists agreed with the 'absolutists' on the hierarchy in the Trinity, but believed that the Son and the Holy Spirit were God by nature, denied by the first group. Moneta of Cremona further described the absolutist Cathar doctrine on the Holy Spirit itself, together with the spirit and the soul. He argued the Cathars distinguished

> 'between soul and spirit. They also make a distinction between the Holy Spirit (*spiritum sanctum*), the Spirit Paraclete (*spiritum paraclitum*), and the Perfect Spirit (*spiritum principalem*). They call each spirit which … God the Father gave to those [heavenly] souls as custodian a holy spirit ... The Paraclete they call the consoling spirit … and they assert there are many Paracletes created by God. The Perfect Spirit they say is the Holy Spirit. To Him they believe they refer in the words: "We adore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit". Moreover, they call Him greater than all other holy spirits and therefore designate Him as Perfect. They declare that He is of such ineffable beauty that … the angels desire to look upon Him'.[170]

The anti-heretical texts also discussed Cathar views of heaven, relevant to article four. Rainerius Sacconi noted that the Church of the Cathars of Concorezzo believed that the Virgin Mary's soul and those of the apostles and of all the saints 'are not yet in glory, nor will they be until the Day of Judgment, but are in that ether, in the same place as the body of Jesus Christ'.[171]

Many of the points in such polemical texts also appeared in positive terms in lists of scriptural passages collected for sermons warning against dualist teachings or for face-to-face disputations with heretics. For example, a *Summa against Manichaean heretics*,

[170] Ibid., pp. 310-1, 313, 337-8, 343.
[171] Ibid., pp. 338, 344.

c.1225-50, contained statements of correct doctrine including: 'the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one substance and one God' (article two); 'God, who is triune in person and one in essence, is the creator of all things visible and invisible…' (articles two and eight); and 'no man hath seen God at any time', and '… God appeared to Abraham and spoke to him…' (article one).[172]

Jews

The timing of the examination of the Talmud in Paris and its condemnation and burning in the early 1240s, contemporaneous with the 1241/4 condemnation, with the same people involved in both, is surely too close to be entirely coincidental. The question is whether this merely reflected a climate of increasing apprehension and conservatism in Paris in the face of doctrinal threats or if the theological issues in each were linked.

Following an approach by a Jewish convert, Nicholas Donin, to Gregory IX, the pope wrote to William of Auvergne in June 1239, asking him to transmit various letters to numerous archbishops and kings requiring them, if the allegations were true that the Jews had supplanted the Old Testament with the Talmud and thus continued 'obstinately perfidious', to seize all the books of those in their districts and hand them to the Dominicans and Franciscans. A further papal letter to William and the priors of the Paris Dominicans and Franciscans followed later in June, ordering them, if the allegations were true, to burn any books with such errors. A formal disputation before Louis IX and Blanche of Castille, took place in Paris in June 1240. The Latin dossier on the event, compiled later in the 1240s by order of Odo of Châteauroux, now a cardinal, recounted that 'all the books of the Talmud were collected throughout France and taken to Paris' and burnt (probably in June 1241, although other dates, including 1244, are candidates).[173] What is critical, however, is that the Jewish episode took place in exactly the same period as the 1241/4 condemnation, with the formal Jewish disputation preceding it, and the

[172] Ibid., pp. 296-300.
[173] P.L. Rose, 'When was the Talmud burnt in Paris?', *JJS*, 62 (2011), pp. 324-39, argues for 1241. See also J. Friedman, J.C. Hoff and R. Chazan, *The Trial of the Talmud* (Toronto, 2012), p. 22.

examination of Jewish documents possibly falling into the period between its two impositions (if the hypothesis that the 1241/4 condemnation was imposed twice is correct).

William of Auvergne and Odo of Châteauroux, then chancellor, together with the masters of the theology faculty, who included Dominicans and Franciscans, formulated the 1241/4 condemnation. The initial papal correspondence from Gregory IX on the Talmud condemnation and burning involved William, and the Talmud was referred to the Franciscans and Dominicans for examination. Moreover, when Pope Innocent IV took up the issue in 1244, his letter to Louis IX identified William and the doctors teaching theology in Paris as burning the Talmud alongside various other texts with all their glosses. After Innocent's change of heart in 1247, there was subsequent correspondence between Odo and the pope, with Odo identifying himself as heading the original inquiry. Finally, Odo led a further formal condemnation of the Talmud in 1248, with counter-signatories including William of Auvergne and various Franciscan and Dominican theology masters (including Albertus Magnus).[174]

There are three areas to consider. The starting-point is the Paris disputation itself, for which we have fairly full, although not impartial and very different, accounts, from both Christian and Jewish sides.[175] The main focus in respect of specific aberrant doctrines

[174] *CUP*, i, no. 131, pp. 173-4, nos. 172-3, pp. 201- 5, no. 178, pp. 209-11; Courtenay, 'Dominicans', pp. 187-90; Grayzel, *Church and Jews*, pp. 239-43. Odo's letter to Pope Innocent IV, 1247, stated: 'I have … asked the Jewish masters to show me the Talmud and all their other books; and they have exhibited to me five most vile volumes which I shall have carefully examined in accordance with your command' (cit. Grayzel, *Church and Jews*, pp. 275-8). His judgment in 1248, stated: 'Certain books by the name of Talmud having been presented by the Jewish masters to us; armed with apostolic authority, we have examined these books and caused them to be carefully examined by men of discretion, expert in these matters … Whereas we found that these books were full of innumerable errors, abuses, blasphemies, and wickedness … to such an extent that these books cannot be tolerated … without injury to the Christian faith, therefore, with the advice of those pious men … we pronounce that the said books are unworthy of tolerance, and that they are not to be restored to the Jewish masters, and we decisively condemn them. We are also possessed of full knowledge as to the place and time of other books not shown to us by the Jewish masters nor by us examined, although we have often made demands for them; and we shall do what there is to be done with regard to them ... ' (cit. Grayzel, *Church and Jews*, pp. 278-9).

[175] Friedman, Hoff and Chazan, *Trial of the Talmud*, passim. As well as his primary target, the Talmud, Donin also occasionally referred to other postbiblical Jewish texts to support his case, including the Jewish liturgy, commentaries on the Bible and the Talmud by various rabbis, and homilies on the Bible ('midrashim') (S.R. Eisenberg, 'Reading Medieval Religious Disputation' (University of Michigan, Ph.D. thesis, 2008), pp. 12-13. See also A. Funkenstein, 'Basic Types of Christian Anti-Jewish Polemics in the Later Middle Ages', *Viator*, 2

appears to have been alleged attacks on Christian beliefs about Jesus and Mary. However, even if the wording in the Talmud was objectionable, Jewish views on such beliefs were well-known, and why a text long established in the Jewish world suddenly became a serious target for condemnation is unclear, notwithstanding the accusations made against it by Donin and, more generally, rising antagonism against the Jews.[176] The only alleged Jewish belief listed which could be relevant to the 1241/4 condemnation was that Eve lay with the serpent and Adam with animals and with Lilith and sired demons, possibly implying creative powers, which could indirectly relate to articles eight (creation) and ten (Adam's fall).[177] But any connection is tenuous at most.

Second, there are the texts examined subsequently. These included the Talmud itself - it is likely its examiners looked at the whole text not just, as probably for the disputation, Donin's accusations.[178] It also included other Jewish texts.[179] However, it appears the texts translated into Latin and listed by the Christian side consisted primarily of the Talmud or commentaries on it, and liturgical texts.[180] While, therefore, those studying the Talmud

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(January 1971), pp. 373-4. For the sources of Christian knowledge of Judaism, see Friedman, Hoff and Chazan, *Trial of the Talmud*, pp. 6-8; *The Talmud - a selection*, ed. N. Solomon (London, 2009), pp. xx-xlix.

[176] The Latin account is in Paris, BN., Lat., MS 16558. While Peter the Venerable attacked the Oral Torah in the twelfth century with a new criticism of Jewish preference for the Talmud over the Bible and authentic teachings, he did not link the Talmud with Jewish blasphemy. Donin's attack thus exemplifies a new departure in the way Christians viewed the Talmud (Friedman, Hoff and Chazan, *Trial of the Talmud*, pp. 12-16). There were internal Jewish divisions over the degree of authority of some Jewish works, such as the Talmud, and it appears several converts from Judaism to Christianity worked together to gather evidence for the trial, adding new charges to the ones originally gathered (J.M. Rosenthal, 'The Talmud on Trial', *JQR*, 47 (1956), pp. 67, 69). For the rising antagonism against the Jews, see below, pp. 150-4.

[177] Friedman, Hoff and Chazan, *Trial of the Talmud*, pp. 46, 123, 164-5.

[178] Northern Europe Jewish copyists did not see the aim of copying as reproducing the original text, but as an editorial operation, involving amending the text and adding their own interpretations and views. Hence the exact text examined is uncertain (Eisenberg, 'Religious Disputation', p. 19).

[179] The prosecution against the Talmud can be seen as an attack on all Jewish religious works composed after the Bible (Funkenstein, 'Basic Types of Christian Anti-Jewish Polemics', p. 374).

[180] I. Loeb, *La controverse sur le Talmud sous saint Louis* (Paris, 1881), pp. 4-5; Friedman, Hoff and Chazan, *Trial of the Talmud*, pp. 16-17, 93-168. There were two records of the controversy: the Latin (the *Extractiones*), and the Hebrew. The *Extractiones* had two parts: the first grouped the extracts from the Talmud under headings (the Talmud's authority, blasphemies, etc.); the second, whose author was assisted by two Christians, 'very learned in Hebrew' and with Donin probably present, was composed after the Talmud's burning and followed the order of treatises in the Talmud, starting with texts from the Mishna largely related to Jewish law and courts. The Mishna included references to numerous Jewish sages including Eliezer (Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, †c.120). Maimonides' comment, *Guide,* 2.26, illustrates the kind of views such documents might have contained which could have caused catholic alarm. (Maimonides believed Eliezer's views on creation 'would imply an admission of the eternity of the universe, though only in the form taught by Plato', commenting that the passage 'greatly confuses the notions of all intelligent

and associated texts would have been aware of other Jewish works, the texts they considered may have been limited, although they may have included some of Maimonides' works.[181]

This links to the third area, whether Maimonides' works (with their possible relevance to the 1241/4 condemnation) contributed to Christian concerns over the Talmud.[182] Apart from their possible inclusion in the mendicant investigation, there was also, probably, an incident at Montpellier, in c.1232, where two of Maimonides' works (the *Guide for the Perplexed* and the *Book of Knowledge*) were allegedly condemned and burned by the Dominicans and Franciscans.[183] This was instigated by elements of the Jewish community in southern France who were apparently divided over Maimonides, with some denouncing his works as rationalist and leading to heresy. A leading anti-Maimunist there, Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham, had secured some anti-Maimonidean measures from rabbis in northern France. However, he encountered opposition in Provence and Spain, and hence sought Christian support. The documents on this are almost entirely from pro-Maimonidean sources and possibly highly embellished, with critical facts in doubt. However, it seems likely some such incident occurred. For example, a contemporary circular letter to Jewish communities in Spain from the rabbis of Lunel and Narbonne described the 'heretical evil-doers of Montpellier' as collaborating with the Baal of Peor' (a reference to the Christian God from Numbers xxv:5). The letter continued:

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and religious persons. I am unable to explain it sufficiently. I quoted it in order that you may not be misled by it'.) Theobald of Sézanne, a Jewish convert and later Dominican, was probably one of the authors of the *Extractiones*, and the excerpts of Jewish errors which circulated with his copy contains the only known Latin compilation from the commentary on the Bible by Rashi (Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac, a leading Rabbinic sage, †1106), probably selected precisely for the purpose of demonstrating Jewish errors (D.C. Klepper, *The Insight of Unbelievers* (Philadelphia, 2010), pp. 50, 16, 153). The second part of the Latin account also included an introduction to, and glossary of, rabbinic literature and terms, ending with documents relating to the trial and the Latin correspondence. See also J. Olszowy-Schlanger, 'The study of the Aramaic Targum by Christians in Medieval France and England', in A. Houtman, E. van Staalduine-Sulman and H.-M. Kim (eds.), *A Jewish Targum in a Christian World* (Leiden, 2014), p. 234; J. Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews* (London, 1982), p. 65.

[181] G.K. Hasselhoff, 'The Persian Talmud Trials and the Translation of Rashi's Bible Commentaries', *Henoch*, 37 (2015), pp. 29-30.

[182] Above, pp. 145-6.

[183] For what follows, see Cohen, *Friars and Jews*, pp. 52-60.

> 'For they turned to men of power and deceit; they went to the deceiving Minorites, the squeaking and gibbering Preachers. Scoffing … they revealed to them the hidden secrets of the Torah, and they turned over the holy books for burning at the hands of the Christian authorities'.

Other contemporary Jewish letters described Solomon urging the Christians to exterminate Jewish heresies like Christian ones, and burn Maimonides' books, referring again to the Franciscans and Dominicans.[184] While the Talmud was not itself part of the incident, Maimonides' works may have been viewed as Jewish by the mendicants involved, rather than philosophical, and the distinctions between the different Jewish texts may have been blurred.

However, it seems impossible that the church simply accepted the Jewish request and condemned Maimonides' books without its own reasons, perhaps drawn from the Jewish accusations.[185] A letter from a Jew, Samuel ben Abraham, in c.1245, argued a misreading of the *Guide* had led Jews unjustly to maintain Maimonides denied demons existed (a misreading apparently also in the Latin text). Another accusation concerned prophecy, where, in a later Jewish/Christian debate in Barcelona in 1267, Nahmanides, a Spanish rabbi and scholar, alleged Maimonides had reduced the historic nature of the Bible to dreams and imaginings, and had argued that angels could be seen with real, albeit special, vision, unconnected to prophetic vision. Angelology was at the heart of medieval Christian theology and Maimonides' views went against Christian beliefs.[186] In the

[184] The letters include references to the papal legate, Cardinal Romanus, whose involvement against the Albingensians indicates his concern over heresy. A late thirteenth-century rabbi, Rabbi Hillel, believed there were only forty days between the burning of Maimonides' works and that of the Talmud, which may demonstrate that contemporary Jews connected the two events - although they are not linked in other records (Cohen, *Friars and Jews*, pp. 53-60).

[185] J.L. Teicher, 'Christian Theology and the Jewish Opposition to Maimonides', *JTS*, 43 (1942), pp. 68-76.

[186] Nahmanides' view was similar to that of thirteenth-century Latin theologians, since by denying the historical nature of Old Testament events, Maimonides undermined the Christian belief that these events foreshadowed the New Testament (Teicher, 'Christian Theology', pp. 70-2). For example, Aquinas explicitly rejected Maimonides' view, that 'all the things that we read in sacred Scripture about apparitions of angels happen in the vision of prophecy, namely, in imaginary vision, sometimes when awake and sometimes when asleep'. Aquinas included among his reasons that 'since the Son of God assumed a real body, not an imaginary one, as the Manicheans said, it was fitting that angels by also assuming real bodies appeared to human beings' (Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei*, Q.6.a.7, trans. R.J. Regan (Oxford, 2012),

context of the condemnation, allegorical interpretation of Genesis was inconsistent with the literal focus of article ten.

But the controversy over the Talmud, and over Maimonides' works if linked, should not be seen in isolation from concerns over Judaism more generally - the Talmud's condemnation was a critical milestone, suggesting that the early 1240s saw a crystallization for Christian theologians of concerns over Jewish biblical exegesis, and, as with the Greeks, an increasing tendency to view this as connected to, or even approaching, heresy. There are two strands to Christian perceptions here. First, contacts between Jews and heretics could have fuelled suspicions. These were limited, but there is evidence that Jews were aware of heretical doctrines linked to Christianity.[187] For example, a thirteenth-century French Jewish polemicist attacking orthodox Christianity on the grounds that God entered a woman or was overcome by men, i.e. they had power over him, referred explicitly to Christians becoming Albigensians and Bogomils out of shame. Moreover, Jacob ben Reuben's *Milhamot Hashem* (*The Wars of the Lord*), written in southwest France c.1170, appears to contain elements of Catharism.[188] It took the form of a dialogue between a Christian and a Jew, with the Christian offering two philosophical arguments against Judaism from a 'friend' called Paul. The first concerned the Jewish belief that God existed and created everything, so must be the principle of both good and evil, a Cathar argument applying to both Christians and Jews and suggesting Paul might have been a heretic trying to subvert Christianity while pretending to focus on Judaism.[189] The second argument had a possible read-across to article seven (eternal truths):

> 'Paul … said: I … know … the Jews believe in him who is the Lord, God, Almighty, true, and living … Now, I know … he is not true by partaking of truth, so that truth

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pp. 182-3). However, it seems from the defences raised at the Talmud disputation that Maimonides was not alone among Jews in treating some Old Testament stories as non-literal passages.

[187] D. Berger, 'Christian Heresy and Jewish Polemic in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', *Harvard Theological Review*, 68 (1975), pp. 297-303; D. Berger, *Judaism and Jewish Life: Persecution, Polemic, and Dialogue* (Boston, 2010), pp. 99-100.

[188] Berger, 'Christian Heresy', p. 297. The *Milhamot* account appears to have represented a real discussion, although with Paul concealing his actual doctrinal position (Berger, *Judaism and Jewish Life*, pp. 99-100).

[189] Berger, 'Christian Heresy', pp. 298-300.

> would be something other than [him] … The creator … is not that way. Rather, his essence is truth … and the same is true of all the names that apply to him. Moreover, we certainly know that the principle of strength is not merciful, and the principle "merciful" is not strength, and the principle of life is not truth; even though truth cannot exist without life, life exists as a principle without truth. Thus, each of them is a principle in itself, and each one is the basic essence of the creator … Since this is so, it follows that the one in whom you believe is more than one, for his basic essence includes all these things. Now, there is no one who does not believe that he is the Lord, God, Almighty, merciful, compassionate, and living; and each of these is a principle in itself. This is the truth'.

This argument applied to both Christianity and Judaism, and its appearance in a dialogue written by a Jew, and ostensibly between a Christian and a Jew, could again represent a covert attempt by Cathars to undermine Christianity - in this case Christian Trinitarian belief, with multiple principles replacing the three persons - through their contacts with the Jews.[190]

The second strand is Christian perceptions of Jewish views as approaching the heretical themselves. The first half of the thirteenth century witnessed an increasing tendency to portray Jewish views in this way.[191] Such linkage can be seen in various Christian texts and art. Textual examples classifying Jews next to heretics as damned include Odo of Châteauroux, involved in both condemnations, who preached at the university at Paris in 1231 that 'through craftiness the world conquers heretics, Jews, and Gentiles', and, in another sermon in 1231, compared heretics, Jews, Gentiles, and lustful people to the animals excluded from Noah's ark.[192] Comments by William of Auvergne -

[190] Ibid., pp. 300-3.

[191] The Jews had long been suspected of malign influence on other groups. For example (Andrea, *Contemporary Sources*, pp. 115-126), Innocent III wrote in 1204 to the priests accompaning the army to Constantinople, quoting from Joachim of Fiore's *Expositio in Apocalypsim*: '[W]hy is it that the Greeks have not yet learned to believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son just as from the Father. It can only mean that they basely received instruction from the Jewish people …'. See also Berger, *Judaism and Jewish Life*, p. 85; Berger, 'Christian Heresy', pp. 287-303.

[192] S. Lipton, *Images of Intolerance* (Berkeley, 1999), p. 83; Davy, *Sermons*, pp. 201, 182.

again involved in both condemnations - demonstrate a possible progression in thought. In *De universo*, dating from the early 1230s, William argued that, apart from a few Jewish philosophers in Muslim territories, the Jews had been led astray from their faith by their rabbinic tradition and fables. However, a few years later, in his *De legibus*, he argued they had been led into heresy by Aristotelian philosophy, a point reflecting how the various different strands of external influences on Christianity could be conflated, anyway for polemical purposes, under one pejorative umbrella of 'heresy', albeit remaining discrete.[193] This sort of thinking could well have coloured the way the contents of the documents examined by the mendicants were viewed and interpreted - they were deliberately looking for evidence of thinking that approached the heretical. As regards art, the *Bible moralisée*, an illuminated Bible made for Louis IX of France, c.1225, and therefore of particular interest given Louis' role in the Talmud trial, included identifiable Jewish figues depicted as heretics or pagans, evidently equating the two groups, as well as random references to Jews and heretics together.[194] Maimonides' assertions that 'man's shortcomings and sins are all due to the substance of the body…', and that 'it was necessary that the very noble form of man, which is in the image and likeness of God, … should be joined to the substance of dust and darkness, the source of all defect and loss', could both raise the spectre of Catharism in its condemnation of the body.[195]

Finally, medieval heretics, in particular Cathars, often used the Bible to justify their own views. Jewish apparent misinterpretations of the Bible could thus well also have been

[193] William of Auvergne, *De universo*, pp. 805, 2C-806, 1G, pp. 18, 1H-29, 1B, p. 14, 2F; William of Auvergne, *De legibus*, p. 24, 2E-G, p. 46, 2H-47. William states (*De legibus*, p. 24, 2E-F) 'Hinc est quod facti sunt in lege erronei, & in fide ipsius Abrahae haeretici, maxime postquam regnum Sarracenorum diffusum est super habitationem eorum. Exinde enim aeternitatem mundi et alios Aristotelis errores secuti sunt, multi eorum. Hinc est quod pauci veri Judaei, hoc est, quia non in parte aliqua credulitatis suae Sarraceni sunt, aut Aristotelicis consentientes erroribus in terra Sarracenorum, inveniuntur de his, qui inter philosophos commorantur'. Cohen, *Friars and Jews*, p. 62.

[194] Maimonides, *Guide*, pp. 251-2, 254-5, 263-4, 190-2, 430-8; Lipton, *Images*, pp. 83-8. Theologians may also have believed the Jews corrupted students - the legend of Theophilus, where a cleric sold his soul to the devil through a Jewish sorcerer, was popular c.1220, with the danger of ambition, pride and intellectual independence a frequent warning to students in sermons and elsewhere (Lipton, *Images*, pp. 91-8).

[195] Maimonides, *Guide*, pp. 251-2, 254-5, 263-4, 190-2, 430-8.

seen in a similar light.[196] However, although Gregory IX clearly took Jewish issues seriously, of the 6183 letters he issued, only forty-six dealt with the Jews, and only four of these related to the Talmud investigation. Similarly, for Innocent IV, of his 8352 letters, thirty-two referred to the Jews, and, of these, fewer than four related to the Talmud. It therefore seems likely that any possible identification of Jews with heretics was kept alive and fostered by the Dominicans, Franciscans, and Paris theologians rather than by the popes themselves.[197] This view is supported by Innocent IV's change of heart in 1247. It also suggests that, by the 1240s, Paris theologians saw themselves as their own masters, a conclusion relevant to the context for the 1241/4 condemnation.

The condemnation of the Talmud in Paris in the 1240s thus marked a significant change of approach to Jewish literature from a previously hostile, but more permissive, position - that works such as the Talmud were wrong, but ultimately a Jewish issue. The thirteenth century was the first period when the church, led by the mendicants, systematically examined Judaism and rabbinic literature and attempted publically to prove it undermined the Old Testament, and potentially threatened catholic faith.[198] This formed part of a broader, concerted attempt to eradicate erroneous ideas, apparently seen by some as an unholy trinity of Judaism, Catharism and philosophy. However, while the increasing tendency to view Jews as in a group alongside heretics is an important context for the

[196] Regulation 14 of the Council of Toulouse, 1229 (Mansi, xxiii, p. 197, cit. E. Rembaum, 'The Talmud and the Popes', *Viator*, 13 (1982), pp. 203-23): 'Prohibemus etiam, ne libros veteris testamenti aut novi, laici permittantur habere'. This regulation may well have reflected concern over the development of interpretations of the Bible outside the authorities sanctioned by the church, leading to local lay groups forming around such unauthorised views and asserting their independence from the church. Such developments, particularly given their potential to lead to heresy, disturbed the church hierarchy. The attack on the Talmud was arguably part of this wider picture (Eisenberg, 'Religious Disputation', p. 5).

[197] Rembaum, 'The Talmud and the Popes', p. 215.

[198] The contrast between Augustine's belief in Jewish ignorance over Jesus' nature in the crucifixion with the view of thirteenth-century theologians, especially the mendicants, that they acted in full knowledge that he was the Messiah and Son of God may also have increased aggression. If the Jews had acted knowing Jesus was the Messiah, then post-biblical Judaism was based on a deliberate distortion of the events in the Bible and its text. The Jews should therefore no longer be treated tolerantly but should be viewed as the greatest danger to Christianity (J. Cohen, 'The Jews as the Killers of Christ in the Latin Tradition, from Augustine to the Friars', *Traditio*, 39 (1983), pp. 1-27). Moreover, an increasing concern with the imminent end of the world and the Last Judgment, which had to be preceded by the conversion of the Jews to Christianity, may have led to increased fervour and aggression, on the part of the mendicants in particular, in confounding the errors of the Jews (Cohen, *Friars and Jews*, p. 76). This concern also extended to other non-Christian groups, such as the Mongols (above, p. 75, n. 2).

1241/4 condemnation, indicating the kind of hardening of attitudes behind it, specific connections between the Talmud examination and the ten articles are slender or non-existent, although if Maimonides' *Guide* was part of the subsequent examination the linkages could multiply.

Conclusion

While, apart from the physical threat, the Muslims and Mongols primarily represented an opportunity for conversion rather than a doctrinal danger, Greeks, Cathars and Jews all posed doctrinal threats but in different ways. Jews and Greeks threatened the proper interpretation of the Old and New Testaments respectively. For the Cathars, the questions they posed, in particular the origin of evil, were real ones which had troubled Christians since Augustine and earlier. Such issues, and those such as the procession of the Holy Spirit and the vision of God, with the differing views between Greeks and Latins, were inherent in Christianity itself, irrespective of any external influences, and hence any contrary views from outside catholic doctrine were doubly unhelpful, if a unified catholic position was to be secured. Moreover, in assessing influences behind the condemnation, whatever the particular issues posed by each group, one critical point must be the linkage between Greeks, Jews and Cathars in the mind of the pope and of Paris theologians. Both Greeks and Jews appear increasingly to have been linked with heretics, anyway in polemical texts, both political but also doctrinal, and all three groups were seemingly also linked with philosophers. The cumulative weight, and perhaps confused connections, must be seen as part of the context behind the decision to cement the key doctrinal principles enshrined in Lateran IV for theologians in the 1240s.

CONCLUSION

The condemnation of 1241/4 reflects what could be described as a 'confusion' of influences from numerous different sources, both internal (from Augustine onwards), and external (not just Neoplatonic or just Aristotelian). Some, such as the early Greek philosophers, informed both the internal debate from the outset and also the new learning,

coming in via the twelfth- and thirteenth-century translations of texts not previously available. Distinctions between different philosophies were blurred, with some Neoplatonic views accredited to Aristotle. Groups such as Jews and heretics, and indeed Muslims, also drew on such sources. Their arguments were in the context of non-catholic faith but their metaphysical and logical arguments were often compelling and applicable to catholic doctrines. The issues were long-standing; but the unacceptable conclusions drawn on them by those outside the catholic faith using common philosophical arguments - whether Cathars, Jews, or even Greeks - may well have increased their apparent threat. In particular, Cathar dualism brought to the fore the process of creation and number of creators, the role and powers of angels, where evil originated and who would merit reward in heaven - issues directly or indirectly underlying articles five to ten. Greek beliefs on the Trinity and also the knowability of God highlighted the issues in articles one to three. Finally, Jewish interpretation of the Old Testament was seen as tainted and dangerous. All three groups used sophisticated arguments which needed to be countered. This doctrinal mixture formed the context for the condemnation.

However, the organisational influences and events were equally important. This was a period of change and uncertainty, seeing the development of new bodies, including the universities and the mendicant orders, and the embracing of the externally-focussed agenda of the early reformers. Critically, the university at Paris was a different place in the 1240s from its beginnings in the second half of the twelfth century. It was shaped by events leading to and following 1215 and Lateran IV, including escalating concern over heretics and the beginning of the Inquisition, together with increasing frustration with Greek intransigence and the Jews. How the university's theologians - seculars, mendicants and other orders - saw their roles and their mission in the face of these concerns, and how they related to each other and to major figures, in particular the pope, directly affected their actions, not least in the aftermath of the 1229-31 strike and *Parens scientiarum*. Such developments form part of the explanation for the condemnation's issue in 1241/4 and why, out of many possible tenets, the ten it contained were chosen. It also provides the

backdrop for conjecture on who might ultimately have been its specific instigator - the pope; the masters collectively, wishing to cement their authority and put their own house in order; the Dominicans, conscious that their brothers were going astray and needed to be checked; or individuals - William of Auvergne, concerned over the apparent increasing credence given by theologians to dangerous views and exerting his authority as bishop, or Odo of Châteauroux as chancellor, seeking to cleanse doctrine from ungodly and erroneous speculation.[199]

Chapter 3 aims to identify the most likely influences underpinning the condemnation as a whole and its individual articles both doctrinally and institutionally. Despite Lateran IV's clear dictates, different views on key catholic doctrines, such as the relationships within the Trinity, were still being discussed and promulgated in 1241/4. Lateran IV's statement of faith in 1215, reiterated in Gregory's decretals in 1234, was the product of the same threats to doctrine as existed in the 1240s, but the intervening period had seen their escalation. This intensification, together with organisational influences internal to the university, provided the immediate historical context for the condemnation.

[199] In *De legibus*, p. 50, 18.2.E, William of Auvergne expressed strong concern that in his time the strongest and most holy people were viewing the arguments of philosophers, heretics and blasphemers as credible. Reasons for William's concern could include the Fifth Crusade's failure, heresy, Christian attraction to Jewish biblical interpretation, and a preference for using dialectic in theology among Paris theologians (Smith, 'Wiliam of Auvergne and the Law', p. 127). For Odo's concern over speculative theology, see, for example, C. de Courrèges d'Agnos' analysis of his sermons, 'Sainte Dominique et les Dominicains dans les sermons du Cardinal Eudes de Châteauroux (1190?-1273)' (Lyon University, M.St. Thesis, 2014), p. 20.

CHAPTER THREE: EVALUATION OF INFLUENCES

'THE SAME THING MAY HAVE ALL THE KINDS OF CAUSES'; 'NOW MAKE YOUR CHOICE'[1]

This chapter assesses the probable and possible influences behind the individual articles and the condemnation as a whole. The first part links the issues identified for each article in chapter 1 with the aberrant theories discussed in chapter 2 by examining the sources used by theologians prior to the condemnation. This analysis includes developments over time, to identify any changes which might have increased concern. For example, whether the world could have been created from nothing (article eight) had been an issue since Augustine or indeed earlier, but new Aristotelian texts and Arab commentaries appear to have concentrated scholars' attention. This chapter accordingly compares three 'control' texts - Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* from the 1150s, and the commentaries on them by Alexander of Hales in the 1220s and then Albertus Magnus in the 1240s - complemented by their other writings and works by other theologians.

The second part considers the choice of articles as a whole and the condemnation's purpose and timing. Specific concerns may explain individual articles, but not why others were omitted. Thus, if the main concerns revolved around the infiltration of heretical or Jewish views into catholic doctrine, an obvious omission is Christology. There are around twenty-one questions out of the 572 in Douai, MS 454 specifically on Christ, including his conception, two natures and glorified body, with many more linked to him, such as on his knowledge (considered independently from God's).[2] Institutional developments and external events remain firmly in the frame, as does the continuing importance of Lateran IV's statement of faith, reiterated in Gregory IX's decretals.

[1] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III.2; William Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act II, scene 7.

[2] Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', pp. 135, 145, 234, 236, 240. Christ's knowledge was a frequent subject for discussion in the first half of the thirteenth century (W.H. Principe, 'Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century', *MS*, 50 (1988), p. 1).

DOCTRINAL INFLUENCES ON INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES

Article one: beatific vision

Chapter 1 noted the problem posed by biblical texts - and patristic interpretations - which appeared to contradict themselves over whether God's face (or essence) could ever be seen. Augustine's own position changed over time, and the Latin and Greek traditions developed in different directions.[3] Related philosophical issues included the difficulty of a created being seeing an uncreated one, or a finite body seeing an infinite one. For those believing in the resurrection of the body, a second-order issue was the role of the body, since if this was linked to worldly concerns, its reunion with the soul after Judgment Day should make seeing God more difficult.

It is tempting to view the combination of biblical interpretation, overlaid with Latin and Greek patristic interpretation, in turn coloured by Neoplatonic beliefs, as wholly responsible for article one. Expounding scriptural texts was certainly a major preoccupation for Peter Lombard and then thirteenth-century theologians, while interest in Greek theology and Neoplatonism appears to have increased between the 1150s and the 1240s, with Latin translations of works such as the *Liber de causis*. Peter Lombard relied extensively on the Bible and on Augustine, together with other mainly Latin authorities such as Jerome, Isidore and Gregory the Great. Alexander of Hales cited both Latin and (more heavily than Peter Lombard) Greek Fathers in his *Glossa*. The list included Augustine, Anselm, John Damascene, Isidore, pseudo-Dionysius, and Aristotle (often the *Liber de causis*). In his commentary on the *Sententiae*, just after the condemnation,

[3] Catholic doctrine was fluid before the condemnation, although increasingly the position which Augustine seems to have held finally - that God's essence could be seen in heaven though not on earth - was accepted. In 'Ep. 147', Augustine argued that God dwells in 'light inaccessible', with an invisible and unchangeable nature, although after the resurrection we will see him as the angels do, although with difficulty, and that he preferred to attribute the vision of God's invisible being 'to clean hearts, not to bodily eyes, even at the resurrection' (Augustine, *Letters, Volume 3 (131-164)*, trans. W. Parsons (Washington, 1953), pp. 187-8, 190-3, 195, 199, 205, 214-7, 220-1). See also Augustine, *De civitate Dei* [*City of God*], trans. H. Bettenson (London, 2003), xxii, 29, pp. 1081-7. This contrasted with the prevailing Greek belief on God's unseeability. However, that view dated back at least to the fourth-century Cappadocian Church Fathers and was embedded in Latin theological debate before the churches split. For the Latin and Greek traditions on the beatific vision, a central doctrinal dilemma even after 1241/4 (as Pope John XXII's intervention, 1333, shows), see Geréby, 'Hidden Themes', pp. 183-211.

Albertus Magnus explicitly referred to Greek theology, apparently trying to make it conform to the truth of article one. Albertus argued that John Chrysostom's concerns about the unknowability of God could be resolved through his own words: Chrysostom said that we all know God; but only the one begotten from him knows also what he is ('quid est'); so Chrysostom did not deny God's substance was seen, only that it was not seen as perfectly by created intellects as by itself.[4] Theologians whose views partly reflected the Greek and Neoplatonic tradition included Guerric of St.-Quentin and Hugh of St.-Cher.[5]

A related concern - whether created, finite creatures could see the infinite, uncreated God - added a further dimension to interpretation of the biblical texts. For the Bible and, indeed, for Plato, something infinite could be viewed as lacking an end and hence as imperfect, rather than being beyond any limitation. Peter Lombard referred to God's infinite nature but this may have implied God's limitless power, eternal nature, and similar attributes such as goodness, rather than that his essence itself was beyond limitation. Although apparently not picked up until the end of the twelfth century, Neoplatonism changed this, interpreting infinity as above being and without limit or form - this is the concept found, for example, in the *Liber de causis* and in some thirteenth-century Latin debate.[6]

The question of God's infinity figured in Questions 454 and 480 of Douai, MS 454. Question 454 argued for some proportionality between human and angelic intellects in respect of God, while, conversely, Question 480 denied any such proportionality, arguing

[4] Lombard, *Sentences*, iv, 48.1-2, pp. 261-2; Alexander, *Glossa*, i, 3, pp. 37-74; Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 1.15 (Borgnet, xxv), pp. 34-7.
[5] For the movement of views away from those of the Greek Fathers (long embedded in Latin theological thinking but also present in the Neoplatonism implicit in new learning), see B.G. Bucur,'The Theological Reception of Dionysian Apophatism in the Christian East and West', *Downside Review*, 125 (2007), p. 135. This led Albertus Magnus and others to try to salvage the reputations of the Greek Fathers. Bucur argues this shift of views lay behind the 1241/4 condemnation, and it must certainly form part of the picture.
[6] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII.7, p. 1695, stated that the unmoved mover is without magnitude or parts 'and indivisible (for it produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power ...)'. This may lie behind Guerric of St.-Quentin's limitation of infinity to God's power (above, pp. 36-7). For the development of the concept of infinity in Latin thought, see Sweeney, *Divine infinity*, pp. 320-36.

that neither humans nor angels could comprehend God.[7] The Dominican Richard Fishacre struggled with the question in his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* in the early 1240s; and the Franciscan Odo Rigaud, writing after the 1241/4 condemnation, noted the problem of reconciling the infinite and finite, offering his own solution, that if the finite could not act on the infinite, it could at least receive from it, and it could receive it whole.[8] Alexander of Hales' views fluctuated: in his *Glossa* he argued that finite minds always start with finite things, while in a quodlibet attributed to him he asserted a kind of quasi-infinity for humans so that, raised up, they could see the infinite deity.[9] After much discussion, however, the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* concluded God's essence was infinite; and, although it could be argued that such an attribute attached to his power, not his essence, since these could not be divided, it must be attached to both.[10] Albertus Magnus, perhaps wrestling with the condemnation's imposition of the view that the divine essence must be visible, believed that, in some respects, God was infinite and always beyond understanding. However, he tended also to see God's infinity only in terms of his external effects. He was clear that the concept must not be viewed in its privative sense. John Chrysostom and John Damascene both figured in his discussion, supporting the likely derivation of the issue from the influence of the Greek Fathers and their Neoplatonic heritage, complemented by later works.[11]

The aberrant views held by Paris theologians on the beatific vision discussed in chapter 1 all showed evidence of similar issues relating to biblical interpretation and God's infinite and unknowable nature. However, other influences on the article's inclusion cannot be discounted. William of Auvergne connected two theories he attributed to Plato, or to Aristotle and his followers, with the vision of God - both, in fact, derived from the

[7] Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', pp. 237, 239.
[8] Dondaine, 'L'objet et le medium', pp. 94-7.
[9] Alexander, *Glossa*, i, 19, p. 193; Dondaine, 'L'objet et le medium', p. 96; Guyot and Dondaine, *Guerric de Saint-Quentin*, pp. 232-42.
[10] Alexander, *Summa*, i, Q. 1.a.1-2, pp. 54-8.
[11] Albertus, *In II Sent*., 4.1 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 102-4, argued, against pseudo-Dionysius' definition of angels receiving the whole beauty of god-like form, that no uncreated intellect could be circumscribed by a created intellect. See also R.F. McCaslin, 'Divine Infinity in Some Texts of Hugh of Saint Cher', *The Modern Schoolman*, 42 (1964), p. 69.

new Aristotelian texts and from Avicenna, as William interpreted him. These were: that separated souls lose their individuality; and that neither the intelligence, nor separated souls, could grasp particulars and thus could not grasp God. The first theory's connection was indirect: William believed it meant that only one soul would be able to praise God in heaven (and thus, presumably, see his essence there).[12]

The second theory's connection was direct. William devoted an entire chapter of his *De anima* to show that souls in heaven knew particulars, i.e. God. He argued:

> '[T]he intellective power … is not ignorant of particulars if it is intent on knowing them. Otherwise, since the blessed creator is singular and individual in the highest degree of singularity and individuality, the human intellective power would be prevented by a natural impossibility from the intellectual understanding and cognition of him … [O]n this view the human soul would be prevented by a natural impossibility from a true and proper knowledge of the creator … Whatever, then, the human soul may know or understand about universals or common features, it is … not on this account truly and properly able to know the creator … [T]he law and doctrine of the Christians has this as its most noble and chief promise, namely, concerning the vision of the creator, for the lawgiver himself … says, "Blessed are the clean of heart because they shall see God" (Mt. v:8), and again he says, "This is eternal life: to know you, the true God ... There are … other promises … Such are the following: … "When he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is" (1.Jn. iii:2), and elsewhere, "We see now through a glass in an enigma, but then we shall see face to face" (1.Cor. xiii:12). Moreover, what is the glory of the saints and blessed spirits but the continuous, most lucid, and most enjoyable sight of the beauty of the creator? For the very lawgiver of the Christians explicitly

[12] William of Auvergne, *De universo*, pp. 816, 1F-819, 2D. On Plato's world-soul, William (ibid., 1D-2D) stated: '[Some] … believed that a numerically single soul of the world animated whatever is ensouled in the world and the soul of Socrates is not something other than the soul of Plato in essence and in truth …'. William saw the theory as meriting severe punishment. He appears to attribute the view to Plato and Platonists, not Aristotle and his followers. For the argument that William was referring to Christian Platonists, possibly from the school of Chartres, see Teske, 'William of Auvergne on Individuation', pp. 90-2.

says, speaking and talking about the little ones, "Their angels always see the face of my father who is in heaven" (Mt. xviii:10)'.[13]

The biblical quotations William used in this passage replicated those used in other discussions on the beatific vision, and there can be no doubt William saw Aristotle's and Avicenna's view as part of the same issue. William's association with the condemnation's imposition, coupled with the dating of his *De anima* to around 1240, means this must have formed at least a contributory strand to the article's inclusion. Moreover, similar points were made by Albertus Magnus in his own commentary on the *Sententiae*.[14]

Finally, again based on Aristotle's views, especially as refined by Avicenna, the physical theory of vision was an issue, with the idea of sight through a medium, such as a mirror, troubling numerous theologians. Perhaps most notable was, again, William of Auvergne, who used the theory in his *De retributionibus*, but others, for example Albertus Magnus, discussed the mechanics of vision - what an 'image' consisted of, the difference between seeing someone in a mirror or copy and face-to-face, and, more generally, the difference between vision through the senses and the intellect.[15]

Thus, compounding the intrinsic problems over apparently contradictory biblical texts, there seem to have been three periods when works would have reached Paris theologians which could have influenced the article's inclusion, and three inter-linked sources. First were the divergent Latin and Greek traditions, dating back to the Fathers and manifested in works not merely by, for example, Augustine but also by pseudo-Dionysius, his translator Eriugena, and others, widely read throughout the twelfth century and known earlier. This was augmented in the early thirteenth (and possibly late twelfth) century by specific concerns over whether finite beings could see an infinite God, with the likely source being works such as the *Liber de causis*. Finally there were concerns over the limitation of knowledge to particulars, visible much more clearly once Aristotle's works,

[13] William of Auvergne, *The Soul*, trans. R.J. Teske (Milwaukee, 2000), pp. 250-5; De Vaux, *Notes et textes*, pp. 33-4. William appears to have ignored Aristotle's theory on universals with a single instantiation.
[14] For example, Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 3.16 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 93-5; *In IV Sent.*, 49.5 (Borgnet, xxx), p. 670.
[15] Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 3.19-22 (Borgnet, xxv), pp. 115-23; Contenson, 'La théologie de la vision', p. 440.

for example the *Posterior Analytics*, were properly available, and through Avicenna. All these influences are visible in Latin texts in the 1220s and 1230s - all appear to have contributed to article one's inclusion.

Articles two and three: the Trinity

While the vision of God was an issue for any theology based on some higher entity, however designated, the Trinity and relationships within it were specific to Christianity, although wider philosophical principles and logical techniques also applied. Although the offending proposition in article two could be said to stem indirectly from Aristotle's *Categories*, this was because the conundrum of three different persons as a single essence needed solving - a question for which, with Boethius as intermediary, Aristotle provided the tools. The challenge was to square logical argument with theology.

Much of the debate relevant to article two centred on different views of the notions and relations, skirting round the territory but not directly referring to it. William of Auvergne's *De Trinitate*, probably from the early 1220s, contained perhaps the most important discussion for identifying the various strands and, while without explicit attributions, these can still be reasonably inferred.[16] William set out four contemporary views, straightaway dismissing the first - 'these comparisons or differences or notions are more than the persons of which they are the comparisons ... that is, whether they have their own being (*esse*) that is joined or added to the person'.[17] However, William took the remaining three views seriously and tried to reconcile them. Accordingly he dealt with a second theory, probably held by Praepositinus of Cremona, which he reported as stating: 'when one says that paternity is in the Father or that the Father is distinguished from the Son by paternity, these are ways of speaking …'. William viewed this as true but facile,

[16] For what follows, see William of Auvergne, *On the Trinity*, pp. 188-219.

[17] Ibid., pp. 188-90. William's reference might be to Ulgerius, bishop of Angers (†1149), thought to have been the contemporary master whom Abelard (*Theologia Christiana*, iii, 167-8; iv, 77), alleged believed that 'the properties of the person were things other than God and the persons …', and that 'these properties by which the persons differ are things diverse from the divine substance' (Teske's introduction to William of Auvergne, *On the Trinity*, p. 36). This is similar to Gilbert of Poitiers' position, but differs in holding the properties were other that God, not merely external.

since ‘no one ever said that his paternity is really something other than the Father’. Similarly, he interpreted a third view, that the notions are not (‘esse’), but are related (‘adesse’) to the three persons, as correct but superficial. He stated: ‘[T]hose ‘who say the notions are relative (‘adesse’) assert … this correctly and truly. Relatives are, of course, for each other, but they are not in each other’. William probably believed this was Gilbert of Poitiers’ view, and his comment shows that, although condemned in 1148, this theory was still current and not inadmissible, at least in this form. Finally, on the fourth theory, probably reflecting the ruling at the Rheims consistory of 1148, William noted some people believed that notions ‘can in God truly name only the person or the essence because there seems to be absolutely nothing else there in any way whatsoever’. But William saw difficulties even in this view. He clearly did not accept the Rheims ruling had fully resolved the underlying difficulties in differentiating the persons of the Trinity.[18]

What remains so notable for article two is the apparent lack of any substantial new influences to transform it or increase its urgency. Although new arguments had appeared - for example, William of Auvergne followed Avicenna’s thinking on relation quite closely - they did not fundamentally affect the underlying position.[19] Discussions seem to progress logically over the centuries, albeit becoming more complex as the differences between the relationship between the Father and Son, on the one hand, and the Holy Spirit, on the other, were explored with increasing intensity, and with some new concepts applied. Augustine saw the apparent difference in the Holy Spirit’s relationship with the Father and Son from that of the Father with the Son as primarily semantic:

> ‘Nor should the reader be worried by our saying that the Holy Spirit … is said relationship-wise, on the grounds that there does not seem to be a corresponding

[18] Ibid., pp. 190, 215-6, 211-2, 218, 191. William himself (pp. 231-5) apparently favoured notions to distinguish the persons. If William believed the third view belonged to Gilbert of Poitiers, it appears to be a reduced version of it.
[19] Ibid., pp. 55-6.

> name to which this one is referred … But this happens in many relationships, where we cannot find two corresponding words to be referred to each other'.[20]

Peter Lombard wrote: 'Some believe that the Holy Spirit is not so called relative to the Father and Son, because the terms do not correspond reciprocally; but this is false'. He cited Augustine's interpretation, explaining that 'although we say "the Gift of the Father … ", we cannot say "Father of the Gift" …; but in order that these may reciprocally correspond, we say "Gift of the giver" and "giver of the Gift" …'.[21] Alexander of Hales' approach was more complex, exposing clear differences between the Holy Spirit as against the Father and Son:

> 'I say therefore that the Son proceeds from the Father according to the whole substance of the father and according to his whole principle ('ratio'); the Holy Spirit proceeds … from the whole substance of the Father, but not according to the whole principle'.

Moreover, 'the Holy Spirit, even if he is undifferentiated from the Father, he is not ... the species [of the Father]'.[22] Albertus Magnus, in turn, introduced the concepts of actuality and potentiality from the new Aristotelian learning to explain how the Father and Son remained distinct persons but one in substance, albeit in the context of the Holy Spirit's procession.[23]

Although new arguments therefore clearly surfaced, they do not appear to have provided support for the condemned proposition in article two, or have changed the nature of the debate significantly. Indeed, the influence of Gilbert of Poitiers was clearly visible

[20] Augustine, *De Trinitate* [*The Trinity*], trans. E. Hill (New York, 1991), v, 3, pp. 199-200. Augustine's discussion (ibid., p. 192) of the difference between substance and relation in the context of the Father and Son sets out his approach: 'With God … nothing is said modification-wise, because there is nothing changeable with him. And yet, not everything that is said of him is said substance-wise. Some things are said with reference to something else ('ad aliquid'), like Father with reference to Son ... and this is not said modification-wise, because the one is always the Father and the other is always the Son … Therefore, although being the Father is different from being the Son, there is no difference in substance, because they are not called these things substance-wise but relationship-wise; and yet this relationship is not a modification, because it is not changeable'.
[21] Lombard, *Sentences*, i, 26.6-8, pp. 144-6.
[22] Alexander, *Quaestiones*, i, pp. 66, 268.
[23] Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 9.1 (Borgnet, xxv), pp. 334-5.

throughout. In his *Sententiae*, Peter Lombard refuted, without attribution, the views of 'some adversaries of the truth' who 'grant that Father, Son and Holy Spirit, or the three persons, are one God and one substance', but 'refuse to grant that the one God or one substance is three persons. They say that the divine substance is predicated of the three persons, not the three persons of the divine substance'. Alexander of Hales' *Glossa* noted that their reason, as exemplified by Boethius, was that 'the divine essence is subject to no one', explaining that the place of the essence was in the predicate while that of the substance was in the subject. While, like Peter *Lombard,* Alexander did not attribute the theory, in commenting on the same passage Albertus Magnus referred explicitly to the 'Porretani, namely Gilbert and his followers', again offering an analysis of the use of subject and predicate.[24] Moreover, it is clear that the same questions, dating back at least to the fourth century which troubled Gilbert were still on the agenda. Replying to a question whether his personal characteristic added anything to God over and above his hypostasis, Guerric of St.-Quentin referred to Sabellius, noting that, if it added nothing, in divine matters there would be no distinction according to reality ('rem') but only according to name, as Sabellius posited.[25]

The above extracts, while not directly relating to article two of the condemnation, demonstrate that related issues, the views of Gilbert of Poitiers, and indeed the earlier fourth-century controversies, were topical in Paris in the period preceding and surrounding the condemnation. But there were no obvious new threats to explain article two's inclusion in the condemnation in its own right. The reason seems likely, therefore, to be primarily its link with article three, with Gilbert's theory, however mangled in transmission, seen as entailing the single procession of the Holy Spirit, although he himself opposed this view.[26]

[24] Lombard, *Sentences*, i, 4.2, pp. 28-9; Alexander, *Glossa*, i, 3-4, pp. 74-9; Albertus, *In I Sent*., 4.8-10 (Borgnet, xxv), pp. 168-72. Peter Lombard's dispute with Gilbert of Poitiers in the 1140s would have been well known.

[25] Guerric, *Quaestiones*, p. 385. This could derive from Joachim of Fiore's arguments against Peter Lombard.

[26] However, Avicenna or Maimonides possibly helped to keep the issues in the theological spotlight. According to William of Auvergne (*Trinity*, pp. 181-2): 'whatever is essential is essential to the essential, since whatever is inseparable is inseparable to the inseparable. Thus every relation is necessarily accidental to that which it denominates'. This seems to follow Avicenna's argument that all relations are accidents

In contrast, the dispute with the Greek Church over the dual procession of the Holy Spirit gave article three its immediate, pressing relevance and, as thinking developed from Peter Lombard to Albertus Magnus, the Greek elements became more pronounced and integrated into the discussions. In other respects, however, the position was similar to article two. It was clearly a 'home-grown' issue, irrespective of Greek views, arising from problems inherent in the Trinitarian structure, and was often discussed separately from the Greek position - or, if the context was Greek doctrine, the main concern was frequently with John Damascene, and other much revered Greek Fathers, rather than the contemporary dispute.

Peter Lombard set the agenda. Following analysis of the relation of generation and procession to essence and substance, he turned to Augustine's argument on the Holy Spirit as the bond of love between the Father and the Son, then moving to the Greek position on the procession, where he focused mainly on arguments over conciliar decisions about the Creed. However, Peter Lombard asserted that, in fact, the Greeks agreed with the Latins on meaning, if not on words, since they confessed the Holy Spirit to be 'of the Son', in the same way that he was of the Father, which equated to saying 'from' each of them. He also argued that Greek patristic authorities supported the dual procession. However, his subsequent discussion on other issues on the procession and status of the Holy Spirit did not refer to the Greeks, although covering topics - such as the equality between the persons - which formed part of that debate.[27]

Alexander of Hales' *Glossa* followed a similar pattern, first discussing the Spirit's role as love and then turning to the debate with the Greek Church. However, in contrast to Peter Lombard, his account of the Greek arguments relied heavily on Anselm of Canterbury's *De processione Spiritus Sancti*. Alexander also cited John Damascene, although stating he should not be followed on this topic since he described the Holy Spirit

(Teske, ibid., citing Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, pp. 116-23). Conversely, Maimonides (*Guide*, pp. 171-2, 176-7) argued that if any concept could properly be applied to God, it would be relation (above, pp. 126-7).

[27] Lombard, *Sentences*, i, 5-34, pp. 30-193. For Peter Lombard's interest in defining the Holy Spirit's position in the Trinity generally, not just in the Greek context, see Colish, *Peter Lombard*, p. 252.

as proceeding from the Father and resting in the Son ('in Filio requiescens').[28] Alexander's subsequent analysis included many arguments relevant to the Greek position but without explicit reference to it.

Comparison of Alexander's discussion in his *Glossa*, dating before 1227, with that in his pre-Franciscan *Quaestiones*, written before 1236 and very possibly the later text, suggests the issue had increased in sensitivity.[29] Alexander devoted his eighth question to the Greek controversy on the dual procession, arguing that 'to proceed' had many meanings and supporting the Greeks on one of these. He explained his understanding of the Greek position as follows:

> 'Let us understand the Holy Spirit as the common love of the Father and the Son: that love proceeds from the Father into the Son; hence it rests in him ...: it is brought to a conclusion in that one as it were in the one loved, because the other way round it does not proceed from the Son into the Father, although ... "the Son loves the Father". When therefore "the Spirit of the Father" is said, the meaning is: love proceeding from the Father into the Son; but when "the Spirit of the Son" is said, the meaning is: the love of the Son loving the Father, not as proceeding from him into the Father. Hence they [the Greeks] have not conceded "the Spirit proceeds from the Son", because that love does not proceed into the Father … This was the Damascene's reasoning, why he said: "We say the Spirit of the Son, not proceeding from him".'

Similarly, the Greek position on God as the source from which two rivers flowed meant that the Holy Spirit as the reciprocal love between Father and Son could not proceed from both - the Father's love could flow into the Son, but not vice versa. The use of the concept of reciprocal love in this way seems to misrepresent the Greek position, but it allowed Alexander to maintain the Latin but justify the Greek view. This could suggest concern

[28] Alexander, *Glossa*, i, in particular 11, pp. 136-7; John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* (versio Burgundionis), ed. E.M. Buytaert (New York, 1955), ch. 7, p. 26; Anselm of Canterbury, *De processione*, pp. 390-424.
[29] For its date, see Alexander, *Glossa*, i, pp. 110*-6*.

over the Greek arguments had increased since his *Glossa*, with theologians increasingly anxious to preserve the authorities they revered in the face of increased papal hostility to the Greeks and accusations of heresy.[30]

The Greek question had certainly become more integral to the overall debate in Albertus Magnus' commentary on the *Sententiae* from the 1240s. Albertus followed Peter Lombard's account, but dealt with the Greeks more comprehensively, presenting and refuting thirteen arguments on their side. These included several from pseudo-Dionysius, including, in similar vein to Alexander earlier, that the Father was the source of the deity, and the Son and Holy Spirit sacred rivers - no river arose at the same time from a source and from a river, so the Holy Spirit could not proceed from the Son, and vice versa; and from John Damascene and Gregory Nazianzen.[31] Albertus concluded that denying the dual procession was an error and defending it was heresy: the saints who were the fathers of the councils said this, reason compelled it, and the Gospel approved it.[32] This statement was much stronger than any by Alexander of Hales or Peter Lombard. It may reflect a tightening of doctrine in the university following the condemnation, or indeed Gregory IX's description of the Greeks as heretics. Following Peter Lombard and Alexander, Albertus' continuing discussion included other issues independently on the Latin agenda, such as whether the Holy Spirit proceeded earlier from the Father than from the Son. However, unlike his predecessors, he periodically reverted to the Greek arguments, out of the immediate context of Peter Lombard's discussion. This could, again, suggest that the

[30] Alexander, *Quaestiones*, i, pp. 37, 68-77, iii, pp. 1386-7; John Damascene, *De fide*, pp. 26-7; John Damascene, *Writings*, trans. F.H. Chase, Jr. (Washington, 1958), p. 175. Alexander's arguments in his *Quaestiones* may suggest he held some unorthodox views. Alexander's second discussion specifically on the dual procession (Appendix 1, question five) misquoted John Damascene's *De fide*, appearing to imply John favoured the dual procession. However, a comparison of the texts from *De fide* and question five shows Alexander's use of John Damascene's text was complex - given the mixture of quotations, verbal explanations etc., in both texts, exactly what Alexander attributed to John and what was his own gloss is unclear, but the implication was that John believed the Holy Spirit proceeded from both the Father and Son. However, the text could be a misreporting of the session by a student - the editors include question five among possible *reportationes, redactiones* and *abbreviationes*. See also Hansen, *John Pagus*, pp. 21-2.

[31] Albertus, *In I Sent*., 9.6 (Borgnet, xxv), pp. 345-9. Albertus also noted John Damascene's position that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and rested in the Son, and, like others, tried to make this compatible with Catholicism. His arguments included that Peter Lombard had said in the *Sententiae* that John Damascene's book was catholic and Pope Eugenius had him copy it out (Albertus, *In I Sent*., 11.1, pp. 335-8).

[32] Albertus, *In I Sent*., 11.6 (Borgnet, xxv), pp. 345-8.

Greeks were more of an issue in the 1240s than previously. For example, Albertus commented that Ambrose's words, as reported by Peter Lombard - that, 'according to his divinity, the Spirit is not upon Christ but in Christ' - seemed to indicate that the Greeks' opinion was true, that the Spirit was of Christ i.e. resting in him and proceeding immediately ['indistanter'] from the Father. Peter Lombard had expressed no such reservations, and Alexander did not pick the reference up.[33]

In conclusion, articles two and three both appear to originate in internal Latin debate. Aristotle's *Categories*, and works based on them, in particular Boethius' *Theological Tractates* and Gilbert of Poitiers' commentary on these, were the main sources for article two. Later arrivals, particularly new Aristotelian concepts, could have influenced the debate, but the article's inclusion may well depend primarily on its link to article three. The picture for the latter is confused, with a strong internal debate in which the controversy with the Greeks over the dual procession figured, sometimes integrated, sometimes not, and to varying extents. However, Albertus Magnus' strong statement that not to defend the dual procession was heresy, together with continuing attempts to separate John Damascene from association with the Greek view, even to the extent of misrepresenting him, are evidence that hostility to the Greek interpretation of the Trinity was firmly on the Paris agenda by the time of the condemnation.

Article four: the empyrean heaven

Article four's antecedents are obscure. The issue itself clearly baffled Albertus Magnus and no texts directly reflecting its contents have emerged. Peter Lombard did not see where glorified spirits and bodies might dwell as a problem, although he discussed the composition and positioning of the various heavens.[34] Alexander of Hales' discussion showed that, by his time, the issue of corporeality was firmly on the agenda - the incorporeal nature of angels, with the corporeal empyrean as their place of creation which

[33] Ibid., 12.2, pp. 355-7, 15.10, p. 424. William of Auvergne's discussion of the dual procession in his 1220s *De Trinitate* was fairly brief, with no reference to the Greeks. Guerric of St.-Quentin's discussion (*Quaestiones*, pp. 236-8), probably from c.1240, similarly did not mention the Greeks.
[34] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 2.4, p. 11.

they filled as soon as it was made, and their compatibility with corporeal humans, needed resolution. By Albertus Magnus' time, these were serious concerns. Albertus was also the only one of the three to discuss Mary's place in heaven, but the concern was over her elevation, not downgrading.[35] In his earlier *De resurrectione,* Albertus noted that the empyrean heaven was a place common for all the blessed.[36]

It is clear that the thirteenth century saw increasing discussion of the corporeal nature of the empyrean heaven, becoming linked to issues of time and motion and intensified in turn by the new Aristotelian texts and by Avicenna. Peter Lombard had discussed whether angels were circumscribed in time and place. Alexander of Hales developed this theme in his 1220s *Glossa*, citing John Damascene's definition of place and also using the concepts of potentiality and actuality:

> 'John Damascene: "place is the corporeal limit of a thing which is contained"; but an angel does not have a corporeal limit; wherefore it will not be in a place. Against this, Augustine, in his book *De anima et spiritu* [c.18]: "Therefore we call intellectual natures corporeal, because they are circumscribed in place" … [A] spirit and a body are in a corporeal place differently, for a body is in a corporeal place according to passive potentiality, and a spirit according to active potentiality'.[37]

Albertus Magnus in his 1240s commentary on the *Sententiae* asked three questions about the empyrean heaven: whether it was a body; if so, whether it was uniform or mobile ('mobile' i.e. moveable/changeable); and, if not mobile, its relationship with lower spheres.[38] Arguments in favour of it being a body included various points on place, uniformity, and movement, and, conclusively for Albertus, the words of the saints as revealed to them by the Holy Spirit. But the counter-arguments, while including Augustine

[35] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 2.8 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 57-8. The downgrading of the Virgin's status is particularly remarkable given her increasingly exalted status from the twelfth century onwards (M. Lamy, *L'immaculée conception* (Paris, 2000), especially pp. 49-52).
[36] Albertus Magnus, *De resurrectione*, ii, 9.5, p. 288.
[37] Alexander, *Glossa*, i, 37, p. 378.
[38] 'Mobile' can mean both moveable and changeable, both appropriate here. This study therefore translates 'mobile' as mobile, to allow for both meanings.

saying, and Bede implying, that the empyrean heaven was God, were heavily influenced by the new learning, starting with Aristotle's view, probably drawn from his *Physics* [VIII, 9-10], that place and the thing located in it share the same nature, because 'the Philosopher willed that there would be the same movement in respect of place and form, and the same mover. But only the spiritual substance is located in the empyrean heaven, and so the empyrean must be a spiritual not a corporeal substance'.[39]

Corporeality and its implications for the positioning, construction and inhabitants of the various heavens had also been a concern in Philip the Chancellor's 1230s *Summa de Bono*, with Philip likewise applying the principles from the new learning to his discussion. Issues included whether that heaven, which he stated John Damascene called the holding place of visible and invisible creatures, containing the intellectual virtues of angels and all sensible things, was mobile. If it was mobile, then everything mobile was mobile because of something. But the firmament was mobile because of the need of those contained in it; likewise heaven would be mobile from the need of those in it. But separated substances (as Philip called angels) did not suffer need. Again, everything below the firmament which was mobile was mobile in time. Therefore if heaven was mobile, the sempiternal substances which were properly contained by it would be in time and not in the aevum. Moreover, quantity ('quantitas') properly existed because of mobility. But if existence was dependent on mobility (which was temporal), to the extent that heaven was immobile it could not exist. In response, Philip accepted that all quantity existed because of mobility, but to varying extents. He distinguished different types of quantity, of which the fourth could not be mobile as itself, but the mobility of things belonging to it might be distinguished - and he asserted that the empyrean heaven was of this kind. Mobility might therefore be said to belong to it and it could contain, not just spirits, but spiritual bodies.[40] This convoluted argument demonstrates the problems caused by the issue of corporeality for the empyrean heaven's inhabitants.

[39] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 2.3 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 50-2.
[40] Philip the Chancellor, *Summa*, ii, pp. 61-4. 'Quantitas' apparently refers to something corporeal, with the connection between quantity and mobility stemming from Aristotle.

William of Auvergne's discussion in his 1230s *De universo* also focused on issues related to corporeality. During a long discussion on the various heavens, he noted:

> 'But if anyone says that heaven would be immobile, I have already told you ... one use of this very thing, namely the most joyous habitation of men … another, indeed, the completion/fulfilment, or perfection of the bodily universe. Some adduce a third [use] from theologians, saints and doctors, namely, the habitation of angels, saying that heaven, as soon as it was created, was filled with angels. And truly this involves a difficult question. For if that heaven is a bodily place, it could only be filled with bodies of substance. For spiritual substances, just as they also do not have corporeal magnitude, thus neither could they fill a place. Further, how can substances of this kind pertain to a corporeal habitation? For just as bodies have no relation to spiritual habitations, so spirits, or spiritual substances, have no relation to corporeal habitations. Because of arguments of this kind the unlearned ('imperiti') mock at the holy words and writings, which are genuine and drawn from divine revelations … [T]he fourth use of the empyrean heaven is the manifestation of glory and of the magnificence of creation …'.[41]

The reference to the 'unlearned' is tantalising. If William was intening to ridicule his unidentified targets, it could refer to heretics (although William often identified these by name), or perhaps to Parisian arts students beguiled by philosophy.

If man's intrinsic corporeality was the issue, Catharism, with its belief that the body was evil, was certainly a candidate for article four's derivation - glorified bodies could never qualify for heaven. Cathars would also support downgrading the Virgin Mary. Moreover, one sect (from Concorezzo, north Italy) was believed to have held that the souls of Mary, the apostles and the saints would not be in glory until Judgment Day. However, there appears to be no evidence that this belief was widespread, and the aqueous and

[41] William of Auvergne, *De universo*, p. 630, 1E-H. William believed celestial paradise was both God and the empyrean heaven. His concerns over the empyrean may have also stemmed from his vehement opposition to Muhammad's promises about the corporeal joys of paradise (W. Black, 'William of Auvergne and the Dangers of Paradise', *Traditio*, 68 (2013), pp. 233-58).

crystalline heavens did not figure as alternative residences in any heretical texts found in this study. Moreover, it would be odd for Albertus Magnus not to name them, when expressing his bafflement in his commentary on the *Sententiae*.[42]

The location of souls prior to Judgment Day was also an issue in discussions on whether Purgatory existed. Initially the question seems to have resulted from differing interpretations of biblical texts which could suggest a delay before wholly good souls reached heaven. Guerric of St.-Quentin noted:

> 'Angels have a double place, the meritorious and those without merit, namely the empyrean heaven and the dark and gloomy ('caliginosum') ether … But man only has one place of merit and demerit … the earth; and therefore immediately when he is deprived [of life] ('exutus'), if his soul craved earthly things … so the mind will be drawn together to belong to it; similarly … the good soul [arises] to heaven after the gates were opened by Christ'.

Guerric argued that the souls of the blessed were able to ascend immediately because of Christ's redemption. He continued:

> 'To that which seems the opposite in Dives and Lazarus [Luke xvi:19-31], we say that very many books do not have that gloss. If however it is [true], we say that it makes a simple account since the bosom of Abraham, in which Lazarus was, is called bosom ('sinus'), that is, protection from all evils, that is, a secure place although it lacks reward … Hence those in security will be in a similar secure place'.[43]

Purgatory also featured in Albertus Magnus' *Commentary*, but, in contrast to Guerric, the context was Greek doctrine and eastern philosophy. Albertus argued the idea of the souls of the damned living on earth until Judgment Day was an error of the modern Greeks. He considered it heretical to say that human souls should remain on earth, but he

[42] Above, pp. 144, 48.
[43] Guerric, *Quaestiones*, i, pp. 399-404, esp. 401-2.

accepted they might appear without remaining. Moving to philosophical views, the theory that human souls did not descend into hell as their perpetual residence was a heresy held by many people of the east, deriving ultimately from Pythagoras and Plato. Albertus described such views as simply and totally errors, providing opportunities for idolaters purporting to summon the souls of men through demons. He commented that Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* was founded on such an error.[44]

A Greek connection to article four, to match that for article three, is attractive. However, it seems unlikely, as their objection of purgatory was to any interim location - souls go immediately to either heaven or hell. Moreover, they would have rejected the future exclusion of glorified bodies. Equally, a connection with classical philosophy or indeed idolatry is unconvincing.

In conclusion, given the lack of contemporary texts containing the proposition in article four, the reason for its inclusion in the condemnation is particularly difficult to pin down. None of the texts cited above address the issue squarely, although a Cathar connection is possible. However, many theologians were clearly fascinated by the location and constitution of the various heavens, or layers of heaven, both their nature (whether corporeal or incorporeal, fiery, identical to God, etc.) and their inhabitants. Discussions on the empyrean heaven and its inhabitants took place in this wider context. More specifically, corporeality, and hence - despite the article's apparent focus on humans - the nature of angels, was clearly important, with the empyrean's explicit description as 'locus corporalis' significant. William of Auvergne identified this as a major issue, referring to the 'unlearned' in a way that implied they were contemporary, and Albertus Magnus' remark that he did not know the reason why some people, possibly contemporaries, favoured the aqueous heaven for humans could be disingenuous. However, the most that can safely be said is that, while such concerns were long-standing, the new Aristotelian texts raised scientific and philosophical issues that exacerbated the difficulties and could have contributed to the article's inclusion.

[44] Albertus, *In Sent. II.*, 6.6 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 134-5.

Articles five and ten: the origin of evil and Satan's and Adam's fall

Although separated in the condemnation by four intervening articles, the issues underlying articles five and ten were very similar. Both tackled the origin of evil, article five in respect of angelic creation and article ten the fall of both angels and humans. Both raised fundamental issues, including free will in the face of a prescient God; how an all-good, omniscient and omnipotent God could create something he knew would turn to evil; and whether (and, if so, why) God withheld his grace from some, or all, of the angels.

The starting-point for discussion of both articles was, once again, biblical interpretation. The predominantly 'home-grown' nature of the debate is clear. Augustine was a prime authority, although his statements were sometimes themselves problematic. For example, Peter Lombard cited his argument that 'not without cause it may be held that the devil fell from the beginning of time and never stood in the truth', and that this had led some to think the devil 'was created in [a state of] wickedness, albeit by God'; while others believed all angels were created good, and there was a small delay between creation and fall, during which they could stand firm but not progress without the superaddition of grace.[45] Citing Origen, Peter Lombard favoured a small but very brief delay:

> '"The enemy serpent is opposed to truth, but he was not so from the beginning … Just as Adam and Eve did not immediately sin, so also the serpent was for a while not a serpent, when he remained in … paradise ... For God did not make wickedness"'.

Peter Lombard's interpretation of Jn. viii:44 then linked Satan and Adam in terms very similar to article ten:

> 'And he [Satan] did not *stand in the truth* because he was never in it, but he committed apostasy *from the beginning* of time, that is, from the moment of the

[45] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 3.4, pp. 14-5, citing Augustine, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, xi, 16, 19-20, pp. 440, 442-3. See also Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 3, p. 37, citing Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, xi, 13, p. 445: 'from the beginning the devil sinned'. This frequently-used quotation appeared to assert Satan fell immediately.

making of man, whom through envy he cast into death and seduced by deceit. And so … it is clear that all angels were created good, and that, after their creation, some fell away from the good which they would have had, if they had remained steadfast'.[46]

Alexander of Hales' *Glossa* followed similar lines to Peter Lombard's, but used Greek authorities such as John Damascene, as well as Augustine, Origen (again), Boethius (for the distinction between 'id quod' and 'id quo'), Isidore, Anselm and many others.[47] For example, on whether some angels were created evil, Alexander cited John Damascene saying:

> 'The devil was not made bad by nature, but existing as good and born in the good, and by no means having in himself the path of evil from the Founder … was turned by the choice of his own free will from that which is according to nature to that which is beyond nature ('praeter naturam')'.[48]

The reference to 'beyond nature' may have reflected the patristic and Neoplatonic idea of evil as outside nature, not existing in its own right, although Alexander did not describe it specifically as the deprivation of good.

Alexander also added Aristotelian concepts. These included the categories of causation - for example, Alexander described the reasons for Satan's sin as his elevation (the formal cause), quietude without service (the final cause), his beauty and strength (the material cause), and his likeness to God (the efficient cause). On whether a state of

[46] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 3.4, pp. 17-8, citing Origen, *In Ezech., Hom*. i, 3. Peter Lombard's use of Origen in an area where some of his views (on angelic redemption) were proscribed shows theologians could 'cherry-pick' even from his censured views. Peter Lombard's argument (that angels needed operating and cooperating grace working with their free will in order to progress beyond their original state to one of virtue, not merely to remain as they were) used the same terms, 'stare' and 'proficere', that were later used by Alan of Lille (and others) and in article ten itself. Peter Lombard was a pioneer in focusing on the definition of free will with grace added to the equation (M. Colish, 'Early Scholastic Angelology', in eadem, *Studies in Scholasticism* (Ashgate, 2006), pp. 85-9).

[47] Alexander's discussion of angelic nature may have targeted Aristotle's argument on the structure of being (Colish, 'Early Scholastic Angelology', pp. 106-7).

[48] Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 3, p. 33.

innocence existed for angels when first created, he noted as one opposing argument, possibly based on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> 'But against, it seems there will not be a state of innocence at that time; and this seems false, because both in their nature there is a middle between good and bad, and [there is a middle] in the very nature of good and evil, as is said in the *Moralia* [*on Job*] …'.[49]

Albertus Magnus' discussion focused on whether angels were created in grace or in simple nature, concluding that 'the opinion of the saints is that angelic creation was in grace'. He questioned whether God could in fact have created the angel as evil, and if the evil angel could have sinned in the first moment of time - and he noted the view that the angel, if he did not have grace, immediately inclined to evil, and therefore sinned from the first moment of his creation, although 'it seems this is heresy'. While more sophisticated, and set in a wider context (for example, the difference between angels and separated substances, where he strongly opposed the equation made by Maimonides and others), Albertus' specific discussion on the issues in articles five and ten again relied heavily on earlier Latin authorities. But the influence of both Aristotle and Neoplatonism is visible. For example, on when angels became evil, Albertus offered one argument favouring this being immediate:

> 'The state-of-having-been-made ('factum esse') itself is measured by the indivisible now: therefore everything made is in the now, and is made and moved in time; if therefore at any time someone evil was made, and that state-of-having-been-made is also in the indivisible now: either therefore the state-of-having-been-made and the angelic state-of-having-been-made are in the same indivisible [now], and then I understand the proposition ('habeo propositum'). Or they are in different [nows], and then, since between any two nows is an intermediate time, there will be some time in which he himself [i.e. the angel] was made and is neither good nor bad. But

[49] Ibid., 2-4, pp. 15-43, especially pp. 33, 19-20, 40-1. For the reference to a medium, see Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, II.6 (Barnes, ii), pp. 1747-8 - not Gregory's *Moralia* (*Glossa*, note, p. 41).

> … this could not be: since every creature is from nothing: therefore it inclines to nothing by its own weight and weakness/need ('defectu') unless lifted up by grace; therefore he [the angel] inclined to nothing, and therefore he sinned since this is to incline to nothing'.

This argument appears to be based on Aristotelian views on time, coupled with a Neoplatonic belief that evil was the deprivation of good and therefore nothing. On this, Albertus argued:

> '[E]vil is from nothing: but man can incline to evil, and not incline, because it is voluntary, not natural; and nature itself, although it is from nothing, nevertheless does not have everything from nothing which is the beginning/principle of its own existence, but has its whole essence from God, and therefore can stand in him'.[50]

Albertus also noted and rejected Aristotle's view that, whereas an intellect was always right, a phantasm ('phantasia') could be right or wrong. This would mean that an angel, only moved by intellect, not appetite, could not sin.[51] More generally, Albertus' arguments on all the issues, including the related ones of free will and grace, indicate the intractability of the issues and that there was no unified view on them. His discussion suggests the whole debate was still very much alive at the university even some years after the date of the condemnation, with new arguments added but more or less stuck in the same groove.[52]

In contrast, William of Auvergne focused his arguments on the issues in articles five and ten firmly on dualism, demonstrating that, for him at least, while the arguments went back a long way, the more immediate concern was over contemporary heretics (who he usually called Manichees). His attack on dualism occupied all the first part of the first principal part of *De universo*. William argued that, if evil people acted through necessity,

[50] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 3.14 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 86-8.
[51] Ibid., 5.1, pp. 110-1.
[52] Ibid., 3.12-18, pp. 82-98. Guerric, *Quaestiones*, i, pp. 382-3, discussed whether sin corrupted or diminished demonic nature. Guerric was possibly the only theologian before Aquinas to try to explain evil's effect on angelic nature (J.-P. Torrell, editorial note, ibid., pp. 68-70).

not choice (as under his interpretation of dualism), they should not be blamed; that the 'first evil was the privation or lack of the first natural good, that is, of being'; 'the first gratuitous evil, that is, one opposite to grace, was the lack of first grace'; and that 'in angelic substances … the first grace is that noble knowledge of God … and in this way the first evil, that is harm, in intelligent substances is a turning away of thought or of knowledge from the creator'. William's arguments established to his satisfaction that evil could come from good and provided the basis for arguing, in the case of 'the bad angel' that he was created good but became evil - anything else would necessitate that God created evil, that Satan was bad through necessity, not choice, and that evil could be a first principle in itself.[53] His specific discussion of 'the malice of the bad angels' followed later, in the third part of the second principal part of *De universo*. The whole question of angels and demons clearly fascinated him. However, throughout these various passages, his treatment of the bad angel and the angels' move to evil appears almost a side issue to his primary concern over the Cathar belief in two first principles.[54] Peter Lombard's earlier treatment of the angels' fall, and his discussion of a (minimal) delay between creation and fall, was more direct.

In conclusion, there can be no doubt that dualism was directly relevant to articles five and ten, and it seems likely that it influenced their inclusion. As well as William of Auvergne's total focus on the rebuttal of contemporary dualism, other theologians also referred explicitly to it in the context of their analyses. For example, commenting on Augustine's discussion on John's saying [1.Jn vii:44] that 'the devil sins from the beginning', Alexander of Hales argued that anyone who did not know that the devil rejected justice from the time of his making shared the ignorance of those heretics, the Manichaeans, who believed the devil was the first principle of evil. Although Augustine was referring to dualists of his time, Alexander's equation with contemporary heretics is

[53] William of Auvergne, *Universe of Creatures*, pp. 31-60.
[54] William of Auvergne, *De universo*, p. 1016, 1E-F. For William's view on the psychological effect of their fall on demons, see de Mayo, 'Demonology of William of Auvergne', pp. 175-6.

clear.[55] Moreover, the possible presence of Cathars at the university raises the prospect that rebutting their ideas was an internal, not merely an external, need, with the Dominicans also alerted to and familiar with the danger in Toulouse.

However, while dualism represented one solution to the origin of evil, it was a symptom of the issue, not its cause - the perceived doctrinal threat from the Cathars might have sharpened the debate, making it more aggressive, but it did not create it. Indeed, dualism does not seem to have figured to any major extent, if at all, in discussions specifically on Adam's fall, the issue in article ten.[56] Articles five and ten represented major issues for Christianity, and the debate underlying them clearly had its own internal momentum, without necessarily requiring an external stimulus. It is not surprising, therefore, that the area received extensive coverage in thirteenth-century texts, sometimes as an attack on dualism, but also frequently in its own right as a fundamental issue of faith with no explicit reference to dualism. While no texts suggest that theologians at the university at Paris were dualists, some evidently denied any gap between angelic creation and fall. The complexity and difficulty of the discussion in the various texts, with differing views expressed, suggests the underlying issues were internal, albeit made more pressing by the need to combat heresy.

Given the use of the new learning from Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* to inform the debate, it is possible they also influenced the articles' inclusion in the condemnation. However, they do not seem to have made a decisive difference. Where Aristotle's views could have caused more concern was their use by dualists to support

[55] Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 3, p. 37, citing Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, xi, 13, pp. 444-6.

[56] Discussion on Adam's fall seems to have focussed on Adam's creation in grace, to stand fast but not proceed, together with free will and whether standing fast was meritorious (Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 24, 1-2, pp. 107-9). Alexander of Hales' discussion (*Glossa*, ii, 24, pp. 206-13) expanded on this but added little. Albertus Magnus (*In II Sent.*, 24.1-4 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 395-400) illustrated the difficulties faced, noting John Damascene's view that everything capable of creation was capable of being turned and this must be for the worse - thus without God's help humans, once created, would be turned to the worse, and could only stand fast if they received some grace (the view Augustine had held). Albertus commented: 'it seems he could not stand fast by himself'.

their case, but this brings the issue back to dualism and only indirectly the new texts themselves.[57]

There is one final potential factor. Article ten referred to Adam, reflecting the literal Genesis account. Eriugena offered a lengthy allegorical interpretation, including paradise as 'human nature made in the image of God', 'the tree of mixed knowledge' as 'the undiscriminating or confused hankering of the carnal senses …', man as 'mind …', woman as 'the sense, to which if mind incautiously consent, it is lost', and the serpent as 'the forbidden pleasure …'. Maimonides' *Guide* was likewise allegorical and was criticised by both some Jews and Christians on this basis (although some Jewish sages took a similar approach, as Maimonides' comments demonstrated). Moreover, as debated at the 1240 Talmud trial, the Talmud evidently contained an interpretation of the story, including Adam's relationship with Lilith, which Christians found objectionable.[58] Such allegorical or embellished interpretation clearly offended theologians at Paris. While this is unlikely in itself to have generated article ten's offending proposition, it could have provoked argument and fuelled concern, thus increasing the topic's sensitivity.

Article six: angelic movement and location

Article six ostensibly concerned angelic placement, but Peter Lombard's discussion of this issue in the context of God's primacy (in the first book of his *Sententiae*) rather than within his discussion on angelic nature (in the second), suggests God's primacy was the real issue. Peter Lombard relied mainly on Latin authorities. He cited Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, that 'a man, or something similar, when he is in one place, will not be in another place, because what is in one place is contained in that place where its bodily form is …'. He also cited Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto*, who contrasted a creature 'bounded by the certain limits of its own nature', with that of the Holy Spirit, 'who does not have a circumscribed and determined power, who is always in all things and everywhere'. Peter Lombard concluded:

[57] For Cathar use of Aristotle's maxim 'The principles of contraries are contraries', see above, p. 139, n. 156.
[58] Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, iv, pp. 170-275, sections 814A-860C, especially pp. 206-7, sections 829B-830A; Maimonides, *Guide*, pp. 479-80. For the Talmud trial, see above, pp. 145-7.

> ‘On the created spirit: that in one way it is neither local nor circumscribable, and in another way it is [both]; but the body is entirely local and circumscribable, and God is entirely un-local and un-circumscribable. And so each body is entirely local; but a created spirit is local in one way and not local in some other way. It is said to be local because it is bounded by a definition of place since, when it is entirely present in one place, it is not found elsewhere; but it is not local in the sense of taking on a dimension that separates [itself] off in space’.[59]

These statements may have set the parameters for subsequent debate. However, with increasing access to texts beyond the Latin authorities, the issue became both more complex and more problematic. Alexander of Hales introduced Greek authorities, in particular John Damascene, as well as Aristotle’s theory that only things with parts could move through place. He commented:

> ‘John Damascene …: “The angel is said to be in a place, because he is present and will be circumscribed intelligibly (‘intelligibiliter’) where he works. For he cannot operate in different places in respect of the same thing”. From this it seems that the spiritual creature is moved not only through time but also through place. I reply: he is said to be moved not through place, because what is moved properly through place has parts, of which one is in its starting place but the other in its destination. Hence, since the angel is simple, it is not said to be moved through space; nonetheless, it is moved from place to place. For “through” (“per”) reflects the middle through which it is passed right through; “from” (“de”) and “to” (“ad”) reflect the termini’.

In an argument illustrating some of the related complexities, Alexander explained why a created spirit could not share a place with another created spirit - it was not because it was a spirit (otherwise an angel or the Holy Spirit could not share a place with a soul), nor because it was created (otherwise a soul could not share with its body, or a created spirit or body with an uncreated one). Created spirits could not share with other such spirits, or

[59] Lombard, *Sentences*, i, 34.8, p.189, 37.1, p. 203, 37.5-6, p. 208.

bodies with bodies, because 'they are constituted according to a single mode in respect of being in a place'.[60]

The complications multiplied with Albertus Magnus. He picked up the same arguments as Alexander and added new ones - and he frequently cited both John Damascene and the new Aristotelian texts. His discussion on angelic movement referred explicitly to Aristotle:

> '[I]n angels movement is not of this kind …: since, as can be understood from the Philosopher in *Physics* VIII, the thing generating and the thing moving are the same in respect of place; because the thing generating gives its own form to the thing generated, it gives to the latter all the accidents that follow that form; and the foremost among those accidents is local movement …'.[61]

Albertus' discussion whether an angel's movement was in time, which incorporated the issue in article six, is particularly important in assessing the underlying influences. His references included Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes and Maimonides. Albertus concluded:

> '[B]ecause of its inherent difficulty there are many opinions on the question, of which some heretical ones are now held by the moderns. For certain philosophers, in explaining the Old Testament in respect of the sending forth of angels, such as Rabbi Moyses [Maimonides], Rabbi Eliesur and Rabbi Joanna, say angels are moved, but all powers ('virtutes') obey them as far as their command; and therefore they say they are moved through the effect of those powers obeying; and this (because it is contrary to sacred Scripture) is heresy. There are others, who say that the angel is at the same time in many places … and even to be in all places [at the same time] if he wishes; and this is held to be heresy, since he should have substance according to the words of the saints, and could not be in many places at the same time. There are others who say that his movement is through his own will, and he is moved in the now if he wants, and he is moved in time if he wants. Others say that he is moved,

[60] Alexander, *Glossa*, i, 37, pp. 377, 368-9; Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII.5, pp. 428-32.
[61] Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 37.14, 37.22 (Borgnet, xxvi), pp. 246-8, 257-60.

> not in the now, but in imperceptible time, which is to be moved instantaneously ('repente'); and therefore … he is moved in the now. Others say that he is moved in one now according to two ways: and therefore to be moved and to have been moved are simultaneous. And some say otherwise, thus there are no two [views] perfectly in agreement on this question'.[62]

Albertus' reference to 'moderns', some of whom believed angels could be in different places at the same time, suggests that, even after the condemnation, this proposition still had its adherents, although now considered heretical.

In conclusion, the citations - from Peter Lombard onwards - of Latin authorities such as Ambrose of Milan demonstrate the issue's origin in Latin debate, influenced by the Greek Fathers and representing long-standing concerns. The fact that angels were incorporeal, and so did not suffer the same constraints as humans in motion and location, generated discussion about the movement of such substances which went back long before the arrival of any new texts. This was also the case with the ostensibly innocuous distinction made by the Church Fathers between low-level guardian angels and higher ranking ones whose remit involved their multi-presence to do God's will - a distinction picked up by, for example, Guerric of St.-Quentin. However, angelic issues appear to have gathered momentum and complexity after Peter Lombard, with angelic movement, location and existence in time becoming tantamount to text-book topics for thirteenth-century theologians - the subject presented new pitfalls arising from Aristotle's *Physics* and the works of Maimonides, Avicenna and Averroes.

Moreover, the question why this one aspect of angelic nature was chosen out of a much longer potential list may be significant. It appears to have been less discussed than some of the other angelic conundrums. However, if combined with the equation of angels with intelligences by Avicenna, Maimonides and others, and the concern, stemming largely from Neoplatonism, that they encroached on God's own powers, the choice makes

[62] Ibid, 37.24, pp. 262-6. Rabbi Joanna may refer to Rabban Johanan ben Zakkai (†c.90 CE), Rabbi Eliesur to his pupil Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus (†c.120), both leading rabbinic sages.

sense. It was not only the technicalities that were the issue, although they remained important, but the theological implications for God's unique nature. Although Peter Lombard appeared to recognise this, the newly translated texts could have increased concerns considerably.

Finally, apart from the combination of Neoplatonist and Aristotelian theories, dualism is another candidate for article six's inclusion. However, no specific Cathar doctrines on this have emerged in this study, although Satan's elevation by extreme dualists to equality with God, and hence presumably usurping his omnipresence, could have increased concerns, even if subliminally. Avicenna's argument that an angel had only one instantiation at any given time could also be relevant, but it did not figure directly in any of the texts examined in this study, although Alexander of Hales' reference to their constitution 'according to a single mode in respect of being in a place', is intriguing.[63] Last, how to explain Christ's real presence in the Eucharist caused problems - for example, Alexander arged for a separate classification for Christ's body - and this issue was sometimes linked to angelic location.[64] However, while these three additional contexts could all be relevant, it seems unlikely they were dominant concerns.

Article seven: eternal truths that are not God

Chapter 1 listed four inter-linked strands potentially underlying article seven, as set out in Alexander of Hales' *quaestio* and Godefroid of Bléneau's quodlibet. These were: mathematical concepts or Platonic ideas, with a read-across to angels; stateables; God's knowledge (an issue implicit in, and underpinning, the first two strands); and, possibly, the multiplicity of the Trinity.

Mathematical concepts or Platonic ideas

This issue had a long history in Latin thought, with Alexander quoting both Augustine and Anselm in his *quaestio*, and it figured in many patristic and contemporary

[63] Alexander, *Glossa*, i, 37, pp. 368-9; above, pp. 112, 171.
[64] Above, p. 52, n. 77.

discussions.[65] It concerned ideas as truths *per se*, existing outside God, and their role. The way the theory developed throws light on how the concerns behind article seven grew. First, Augustine equated mathematical concepts, which must be eternally true, with Plato's ideas, preferring to translate them as 'rationes' (the Greek 'logoi') rather than 'formae' or 'species'. Plato's ideas, as the eternal, original, independent and principal forms of things, comprised, with the so-called demiurge and matter in his *Timaeus*, the three sources for creation. However, whether they existed in a higher mind was open to interpretation. Augustine placed them in the divine intelligence - God - and this view was carried across to the works of some medieval theologians as being Plato's own, together with their equation with mathematical concepts.[66] For example, in his commentary on the *Sententiae* Albertus Magnus expanded on Peter Lombard's discussion of Plato's three principles, implying Peter thought Augustine's view came from Plato and stating that the proposition did not seem absurd:

> 'For in the first book of the *Sententiae* it was said that Plato placed the ideas ('ideas') in the divine mind, as Augustine said in his *83 Quaestiones*: whoever denies these, denies the existence of the Son of God: therefore it seems this position is not inconsistent. Again, Boethius in the introduction to his *Arithmetica*, book I, said: 'That founder God had first the science of numbers of this human mass as the exemplar of his own principle/reason … But it is agreed that the thing referred to cannot be understood in respect of mathematical number; therefore it must be understood about the ideal number which precedes all ideas/prototypes ('ideata')…'.[67]

Plato's ideas, and what they consisted of, figured large in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Christian theological works. Peter Lombard spent considerable time stressing

[65] Alexander's references included Augustine, *Soliloquies*, ii, and Anselm of Canterbury, *De veritate*, 13.
[66] Augustine, 'Question 46', pp. 59-60. This was the main source for medieval theories on divine ideas, part of the wider controversy over how the relationship between Plato and Aristotle should be understood and framed (V. Boland, *Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden, 1996), pp. 21-2, 44-5, 47). For the main discussion on whether the ideas were in God's mind, see below, pp. 195-9, under God's knowledge - but the issue is also relevant to the nature of the ideas themselves.
[67] Albertus*, In II Sent.* 1.3-5 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 11-19.

God's role as sole creator with no separate eternal entities alongside him. He was particularly concerned to dispel any notion that angels could create, but the linkage of ideas with angels, which became a dominant concern later, was not yet articulated. Similarly, Alexander of Hales' *Glossa* discussed in detail the meaning of the various terms 'create' etc., making clear that only God could create, not angels. However, he did not specifically discuss Plato's view or link angels with ideas, although his concern over the threat that misinterpretation of the nature of angels posed to Christian orthodoxy seems stronger than Peter Lombard's. Nonetheless, both Peter and Alexander remained troubled by the common belief that wisdom, one of the Platonic ideas, referred to the angelic nature. Moreover, Alexander specifically asked whether creation was through an 'exemplar' and what an exemplar was, although he quickly concluded that this title was properly given to the Son.[68]

By the 1240s both the nature and level of concern had changed significantly. This appears to have stemmed from the equation of Platonic ideas first with Neoplatonic intelligences or intellects, and, following this, even more perilously for Christian belief, with angels. The equation with angels was made by Arab and Jewish philosophers, who gave an enlarged role to such intelligences, including quasi-creative and controlling powers (as found in works such as the *Liber de causis*). Albertus Magnus accordingly first wanted to emphasize that Platonic ideas were not eternal forms distinct from God. He accused Plato of four errors:

> 'First, he thought God's knowledge, as that of other things, to be caused from those things, and that there are forms in God distinct from God's intellect, which Aristotle disproved in book XI of his *Prima philosophia* [*Metaphysics*]. Second, he thought those things not only were in God, but also generated beings with him according to nature in their own particular forms. And he posited them to be from eternity with

[68]Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 1-3, pp. 3-5, 2.1, pp. 8-9, 7.8, p. 31; Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 1, pp. 1-3, 5-7; 2, p.16. Passages from the Bible implying the independence of wisdom from, and its co-existence with, God include Job xxviii:20-23. This asks where wisdom comes from, replying that it 'is hidden from the eyes of all the living', but 'God understands the ways of it and knows the place thereof' (see also Prov. i-ix, Ecclus. xxiv:1-16). This fits well with Platonic theories (Boland, *Ideas in God*, p. 18). See also below, pp. 235-6.

> God: because he did not see how the proximate causes could give birth to another form which would not be of its own species. Third, because he said not only that it was thus, but also that mathematics were within those things which were abstracted from natural things, and they are the beginning of knowledge in these things which have knowledge of things ... Fourth, because he himself posited that those forms remained in bodies, even with the particulars destroyed in which they are; because it must be one thing to be a particular and another to be of those forms. And these things are collected from different books of Aristotle who imputed them to him; and it seems to be drawn forth from the *Timaeus*, as is clear to someone looking at the chapter[s] [30-52] about *gods of the gods*'.

Albertus concluded that 'to posit ideas in this way from eternity is heresy, and so Plato sinned by positing exemplars or ideas'.[69]

Albertus's concern over Platonic ideas came across even more strongly when discussing their possible equation with intelligences or angels, with all that this entailed. This concern was clear in the first book of his commentary on the *Sententiae*, when he noted some philosophers, including Jews, believed that 'all the powers ('virtutes') obey them', describing this as heresy.[70] But his main discussion came in the second book. First, Albertus accused philosophers of maintaining that intelligences were eternal and had a role in creation, either in their own right or as God's agents - often equating them with angels - sometimes in the context of Platonic forms, sometimes at large. On the specific question of their identification with angels, he stated:

> 'Thus Avicenna said that intelligences are those things which the people and those speaking in law call angels. Again, Algazel said the same before the end of his *Metaphysics*. Again, Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] said this in his … *Dux neutrorum* [*Guide for the Perplexed*] … Fourth, the philosophers posit intelligences as

[69] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 1.5 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 15-19. In the same passage, Albertus also referred to David of Dinant's pantheism in discussing Platonic exemplars - although the context was the eternity of the world (article eight, below, p. 208). Plato, *Timaeus*, trans. B. Jowett, London, 1970), especially pp. 235-57.
[70] Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 37.24 (Borgnet, xxvi), pp. 262-6.

> separated substances, and we call angels spiritual separated substances: therefore we mean the same by angels as they mean by intelligences … Fifth, the intellectual substance does not have anything before it in the order of the universe according to the philosophers except the prime cause; but we say the same about angels; therefore it seems that we understand the same by angels as they do by intelligences'.[71]

Moreover, Albertus noted that, according to the *Liber de causis*, 'it seems that an intelligence is full of forms, and therefore the same would be the case with angels, although according to our interpretation ('intentio'), an intelligence is not an angel'. Albertus' preferred solution was that 'the angel in the beginning of his own creation received the species of the whole order of natural causes, both specific and general, and those are applicable to everything which is made in nature; and thus with those things as intermediaries he knows everything he wishes, except only what is retained in the free will'. Albertus favoured this view because he 'understands it better' and, 'although containing difficulties, it has fewer unsuitable consequences'. At the same time, he also warned:

> 'Care should be taken, because philosophers talking about intelligences posit them to be causes; for intelligences are full of forms which are able to be displayed through the motion of whatever orb, inasmuch as it is full of forms, is desired by the mover of the orb, and moves itself as the desired thing [moves] the thing desiring; and therefore the intelligence of the prime order has forms more universal and simple ... and an intelligence of the second order will be full of forms which can be displayed by the twofold circular oblique motion and less universal, and so on'.

But, Albertus continued, 'we say this is ridiculous: because we do not speak thus ('sic') about angels, but we rather posit them as separated substances, not determined in respect of anything mobile; and we therefore say that they have forms which the Creator gave them to know the things of this world …'. Such forms were similar but not the same as

[71] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 3.2-3 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 61-6. On the equation of angels with creators, Albertus (ibid., 1.7, p. 21) noted that those philosophers (probably Neoplatonic adherents) did not mean to say 'angels were creators, but rather the illuminators of things under them, and movers in a certain way'.

ideas: similar, because, for example, 'they are the principles of the things which are known through them'; but different because, for example, 'they are not operative as ideas in God'.[72]

Outside the *Sententiae* and associated commentaries, concern over the precise role of ideas had previously surfaced in Philip the Chancellor's discussion of Plato's exemplar in his *Summa de bono* from the 1230s. Philip argued that Plato did not posit an eternal principle which was a form (such as the world soul), but rather an eternal exemplar and thus not from the genus of form. He explained that Plato, when he divided ideas from images, called idea ('ydea') eternal, but he did not call image ('ydon') eternal which he called the world soul'. Philip cited Augustine's statement:

> '"It would not be fitting for reasons/principles ('rationes') or ideas ('ydee') which are eternal and immutable, participation in which happens so that something exists, in whatever way it is, to be posited except in God, and except as they are received by things themselves." And from this it seems that there are many ideas, since there is a multitude of things containing ideas ('ydeatorum').

But Philip denied there were many ideas, given the utter simplicity of God's essence.[73]

In conclusion, there appear to have been three stages underlying the first limb of Alexander of Hales' *quaestio*, with escalating concern. First, there was the identification of numerical concepts or truths with Platonic ideas, possibly separate from God. Second, there was the question of what such ideas represented, or could represent, first in classical Greek philosophy and then in Christian doctrine. Finally, by the 1230s and 1240s, with a

[72] Ibid., 3.15, pp. 91-2; see also 1.12, p. 34: '[T]hey [Averroes etc.] differ on Avicenna's supposition, that every form was given by an intelligence from which all forms flow, and that [intelligence] was filled with forms, and had influence over nature, since through the movement of the sky and the proximate causes matter was prepared: and it [the intelligence] even had influence over the potential intellect in us … And he [Avicenna] calls this intelligence the intelligence of the tenth order …'. Averroes believed that Aristotle thought 'all forms were potentially in matter and drawn out from it through the nearest movers', a view Albertus favoured.

[73] Philip, *Summa de bono*, ii, pp. 54-6; Augustine, 'Question 46', pp. 59-60. Philip also noted that Seneca [*Epist.* lxv] discussed the genus of form which was a [Platonic] idea, positing five genera of causes - four general with a fifth as the exemplar's cause. Philip's arguments are also relevant to God's knowledge, below, pp. 195-9.

backwards look at the classical tradition, and a sideways look at theories coming from Neoplatonism and Jewish and Arab philosophy, there was the potential extrapolation of such ideas into intelligences or even angels, threatening God's role as the sole eternal being and the sole creator.[74]

Stateables ('enuntiabilia')

This was the second argument listed in Alexander's *quaestio* and referred to by Godefroid of Bléneau. William of Auvergne's complex and wide-ranging discussion on truth in relation to stateables included the specific issue of whether they were eternal truths that were not God. The concern here focused on the alleged eternal nature of 'stateables' as grammatical concepts and the implications for God if their truth-values could change. Attributing such changes in knowledge to God would insult him, as William explained:

> 'But another most stupid ('stultissima') opinion … gave cause and occasion to this error - that by which they held that stateables, that is, all truths and falsities, existed from eternity, and have their manner of existing by themselves apart from creatures and from all works of God, and were not made or created by the creator, but are eternal and existed from eternity and, for this reason, owe nothing to the creator in terms of their being or their well-being. But how were such [stateables] composed of subjects and predicates, which are certainly temporal and for the most part began in time? And how did they precede their parts not only in time, but by eternity, especially since they were composed - and not [composed] by the creator nor by themselves'.[75]

The issue in this form dated back at least to the twelfth century, and appears to have resulted from divisions between realists, who believed something must actually exist behind words and concepts, and nominalists, who did not. The nominalists believed God, whose knowledge was unchangeable, knew 'stateables', which therefore could not change

[74] As well as texts such as the *Liber de causis*, Eriugena's *Periphyseon* must have exacerbated concerns.
[75] William of Auvergne, *Providence of God*, pp. 112-3.

from true to false (or vice versa), and had no temporal differentiation between past, present and future. In contrast, the realists believed 'stateables' could change their truth-value. Some of them accordingly appear to have accepted that God's knowledge could therefore change. William accepted that some 'stateables' had been true from eternity, but not that they were therefore eternal entities. Among the twelfth-century authors who raised this issue were Robert of Melun (†1167), John of Salisbury (†1180), Peter of Poitiers (†c.1215), Alexander Nequam (†1217), and the anonymous author of a logic text, the *Ars meliduna*, written c. 1170-80.[76]

The *Ars meliduna* may, perhaps, be the direct source of William's discussion, since it contained much of what William claimed its proponents believed (including the existence from eternity of 'voces' as well as 'enuntiabilia'). It argued:

> 'Some simple utterances ('voces'), i.e. elements ('elementes'), always existed just as also skills ('artes'), since they have their being from nature, not from the position of men; for they existed from eternity ('ab eterno'), just as also some true stateables ('enuntiabilia vera') … [T]his does not mean they are the same as God, since only God is from eternity, because being or being from eternity ('ab aeterno') are said in one way about God, in another about utterances, in another about substances'.[77]

While the author did not expand significantly on this point, the resemblance with William's account, although not identical, is strong.

How William might have come across the theories in the *Ars meliduna* and from the nominalist and realist controversy is unclear, but it could have been while studying logic

[76]For the issue's twelfth-century antecedents, see N. Lewis, 'William of Auvergne's Account of the Enuntiable', *Vivarium*, 33 (1995), pp. 113-36, citing Robert of Melun, *Sententiae*, i, 5.57-8, from c.1150: 'it is possible for there to be many truths even though no things ('rebus') at all exist'. John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, iv, 37, referred, again c.1150, to 'those forms that the logicians imagine are not dependent on the Creator'; and he looked at the view of some, unidentified, people that certain truths ('vera'), i.e. 'enuntiabilia' signified by true propositions, were not God nor creature (John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, ed. J.B. Hall, *CCCM,* 98 (Turnhout, 1991), pp. 93-4, 176). For earlier discussion on the truth-value of future statements, going back to Aristotle, see J. Byrd, 'The Necessity of Tomorrow's Sea Battle', *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 48 (2010), pp. 160-7.

[77] For the argument that the *Ars Meliduna* was William's source, see Lewis, 'William of Auvergne's Account', p. 134, citing Oxford, MS Digby 174, f. 211ra.

as an arts student at Paris. This leaves the question whether his concern when writing *De universo* was historic or whether such views persisted in either the arts or theology faculties (or both) in the period immediately preceding the condemnation. It is also unclear to whom William's reference to 'another most stupid opinion' applied. However, similar discussions by other thirteenth-century theologians demonstrate that stateables were seen as a significant and difficult contemporary issue. These include Robert Grosseteste in two early works, *De veritate* and *De libero arbitrio*, probably both written at Oxford in the early 1220s. His arguments influenced Richard Rufus, who quoted from *De libero arbitrio* in his *Metaphysics*, prior to 1228.[78]

William's solution to the issue - which set out his understanding of the basis of both the error and the correct view - was long and complex, involving Aristotle's causes, the distinction between potentiality and actuality, and Avicenna.[79] However, while it relied on arguments drawn from the new learning, these represented ways to solve the problem; they did not create or exacerbate it. William set out six meanings of truth. The sixth stated:

> '[T]hose things that have been enunciated and are called true or propositions are true, and this, Avicenna says [*Metaphysics*, I.6], is the adequation of speech and things, that is, of affirmation and negation [and things] … An utterance, therefore, is true by which what it is, is said to be, or what is not, is said not to be … The agreement or concordance of the stateable and the statement is the truth of both, and the contrary or its privation is the falsity of both … [so] it is evident that truth and falsity according to these intentions are like relations or comparisons of compositions and divisions with their affirmations and negations, and the truth and

[78] Noone, *'Scriptum super Metaphysicam*', pp. 309-10. Rufus' commentary on Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, i, 36, revisited the issue, c.1250. Given both Grosseteste's and Rufus' association with Paris, their views were probably known there. However, the argument that article seven of the 1241/4 condemnation demonstrates that the concerns were contemporary (Lewis, 'William of Auvergne's Account', pp. 131, 136) is somewhat circular - it pre-supposes the issues in the condemnation were all currently held views. See also N. Lewis, 'The Problem of a Plurality of Eternal Beings in Robert Grosseteste', *MPT*, 7 (1998), pp. 17-38.
[79] For William's argument that if 'true stateables were true by the first truth', this must have been 'either formally or effectively', see Teske, William of Auvergne, *Providence of God*, p. 23.

> falsity of affirmations and negations are comparisons or relations or references to the compositions and divisions of the things they signify'.[80]

A critical argument William advanced was that when stateables were 'said to be true, what was said about their affirmations or negations was not understood in terms of act, but in terms of potency'.[81] His position is perhaps best summarised when - in what might appear a self-contradictory assertion but which, despite allowing that there have been many independent truths from eternity, designated these as merely 'contingent' and confirmed that only the creator *existed* from eternity - he stated:

> '[I]t is evident that there have been from eternity many diverse and varied truths that are completely independent of each other. I mean many contingent truths about the future. But nothing existed from eternity except the creator'.[82]

In conclusion, the debate on whether stateables were eternal truths seems largely to date back to the twelfth century, and no one advocating such a view in the thirteenth century appears to have been securely identified. However, the attention that William of Auvergne and others devoted to it suggest they saw it as a continuing threat, and developed arguments to rebut it from the new Aristotelian, and related, texts.

God's knowledge

This was the third argument in favour of eternal truths which were not God, and the last on Alexander's list in his *quaestio*. Godefroid of Bléneau's quodlibet on truth also touched on this area. It covered two issues. First, there was was the numerical issue - whether, given there are multiple ideas of things on earth, God had multiple ideas in his mind/essence or identical with it. Second, there was the ontological issue - whether what God knew *was* his mind/essence or *within* it. While, for all the options, the ideas were ostensibly part of God, any version positing multiple ideas could imply their eternal

[80] William of Auvergne, *Providence of God*, p. 148.
[81] Ibid., p. 150.
[82] Ibid., p. 146.

separate or quasi-separate existence, and thus underpinned arguments both on ideas and on stateables as eternal truths.

The number of Christian texts from Augustine onwards which discussed God's knowledge - what it was and how he knew - was huge, involving the critical issue of how God could be entirely simple while at the same time knowing and caring for every individual. There were three main strands influencing Paris theologians, divisible roughly into three periods (although, as ever, the access of the early Church Fathers to a wider range of classical texts confused the position). First, from Boethius onwards, there was the Platonic view of ideas and the demiurge in the *Timaeus*. Second, from the late twelfth century, Neoplatonic interpretations of Plato's view became influential, with a single being from whom all things emanated and reverted. Finally, the new texts from the end of the twelfth century onwards brought with them Aristotle's First Mover and the limitation of knowledge to universals, together with interpretations of both positions by Arab philosophers. Aristotle's identification of thought and the object of thought in his *Metaphysics* was particularly influential.

Early medieval theologians can be conveniently divided into two broad traditions on whether ideas were *within* God's mind or *were* God's mind: Augustine followed Plato on ideas being *within* God's mind, while pseudo-Dionysius (and later Anselm) followed Plotinus in holding they *were* God's mind.[83] Augustine and Anselm also differed on the question of whether God knew all things separately or had only one single idea, with Augustine favouring God having many ideas while Anselm preferred a single idea. By the thirteenth century, Anselm's view seems to have become dominant. The exception was Richard Rufus (still a secular in the 1230s and probably studying in Paris) in his *De ideis*, which went against the position gradually being developed by Alexander of Hales and other Franciscans.[84]

[83] For this division, see Boland, *Ideas in God*, pp. 17-91.
[84] For this assessment, see Wood, 'Distinct ideas', p. 7.

The progression of thought from Peter Lombard shows this developing line of thought. Following Augustine, Peter Lombard had argued that not all things that God knows were in his essence since this would wrongly equate them with this. Alexander of Hales' thinking developed gradually. In his 1220s *Glossa* he argued that everything in God was his essence and that 'there are many things from eternity', with the explanation that a point terminating many lines remained one point. But, by the time of the question *De scientia divina* (attributed to him and written perhaps as late as 1235), he argued that the divine ideas were identical to God's essence. To establish their singularity, he argued there was a difference between a multitude of concept ('ratio') and of reality ('res'), with concepts divided into realities or notions ('intellectus'). Concept in the sense of notion was 'from a multitude in things produced from ideas/conceived as ideas in the mind ('ideatis')'. This does not 'make a multitude in the idea but in the understanding of the idea', and thus 'no multitude in the substance of an idea but in what is said in relation to it'.[85] Alexander thus distinguished between many ideas and one idea of many things, using the semantic argument that one utterance did not signify many things - it was denoted more properly as a sign of many signs or an idea of many ideas ('multorum signum sive multarum idea').[86] This final position represented the position subsequently stipulated in article seven. The difference between his two solutions was small but significant, lying in whether plurality and unity both existed in God (his initial view) or whether plurality only existed in created things within time (his final position).[87]

Richard Rufus took a different, and opposing, view. In his *De ideis*, c. 1236, Rufus presented his argument as an attack on Averroes, not Alexander, and targeted his argument against Aristotle's (and Avicenna's) view that God only knew universals:

> 'The first intelligence through its own knowledge is the cause of all causes; therefore also of individuals. Therefore because the true cause is altogether filled before the

[85] Lombard, *Sentences*, i, 36.3-5, pp. 197-202; Alexander, *Quaestiones*, iii, p. 1463. See Wood, 'Distinct ideas', pp. 9-14.
[86] Alexander, *Quaestiones*, iii, p. 1462. See above, p. 62.
[87] Wood, 'Distinct ideas', p. 12.

thing or things caused, individuals were known by the first cause before they existed at all'.

Rufus continued:

> 'Averroes …: those separated intelligences only understand universals in nature. I argue: therefore they do not understand themselves or they are not singular things but universals in nature. But it is highly unlikely that they do not understand themselves since … their own action is their substance'.[88]

It thus appears that both Alexander and Rufus were trying to square God's caring role with Aristotle's views, but Rufus' initial (and, indeed, ultimate solution) involved the existence of multiple entities - known separately by God - before their temporal creation.[89] Subsequent Franciscans initially followed Alexander but then tended to move closer to Rufus' position, with Odo Rigaud arguing, after 1245, that knowing individuals meant there must be distinct ideas as individuals to be known.[90] This suggests an intriguing development of thought within the Franciscan order, first complying with, but then, once the dust had settled, sidestepping, the prescription of article seven.

Finally, in his commentary on the *Sententiae*, Albertus Magnus asked whether there was one idea in God or many ('una idea, vel plures'), concluding that the term 'idea' must be considered in three ways. The first was 'according to substance ('id quod est'), and thus it is the divine essence and the divine intellect and is one alone'. The second was in relation to 'the one understanding or operating through an idea ('in comparatione ad intelligentiam per ideam, vel operantem')', and, again, 'this was not many but only one alone, because the one understanding is one indivisible ('unum indivisibile')'. The third was 'in relation to the works themselves of which it is the idea, and thus the idea has plurality which comes from [the things] which result from it'. Albertus stated that 'it is better to refer to an idea of many things ('multorum idea'), than many ideas ('multae

[88] Ibid., pp. 14-15.
[89] Ibid., p. 21. For the permutations in Rufus' thought, see above, pp. 60-2.
[90] Ibid., p. 30.

ideae')'.[91] Thus, by deconstructing the term 'idea', Albertus was able to bring apparently irreconcilable positions into a coherent theory compatible with article seven, retaining both God's single essence and the apparent multitude of ideas belonging to things.

In conclusion, it is clear that the debate on God's knowledge was long-running, but that the new learning served as a catalyst for concern in the decade immediately preceding the condemnation. Of the two possible approaches, that of Alexander of Hales prevailed, and was reflected in article seven. Indeed, given Alexander's strong views, combined with his involvement in the imposition of the condemnation and the apparent fluidity of the debate on God's knowledge, his personal views may have lain behind the precise phrasing in article seven that there is 'one truth alone, which is God'. The article's emphasis on truth *being* God suggests the whole agenda of how God knows was in the minds of those drafting the article.

Multiplicity of the Trinity

The issue of the Trinity only appeared in Godefroid of Bléneau's quodlibet, where the persons of the Trinity are identified as three truths from eternity (thus representing multiple truths, although all are God). Godefroid's response rejected this because truth belonged to substance.[92] This issue was thus clearly being discussed in the context of eternal truths in the first half of the thirteenth century, but no other texts on it have emerged in this study.[93] However, the idea that the three persons of the Trinity represented multiple truths could have increased Christian vulnerability to accusations of polytheism from other faiths.

[91] Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 35.9 (Borgnet, xxvi), pp. 193-4.
[92] [Godefroid of Bléneau], 'Quodlibeta Holmensia', pp. 201-22.
[93] Robert Grosseteste could have found the three persons problematic in respect of eternal truths had his overall Trinitarian position not prevented this. He believed that, to establish things as eternal, they must be real things (which would apply to the persons), not 'stateables'. However, he also believed that, while the Son was a different person ('alius') from the Father, he was not something other ('aliud') - and he argued statements such as 'A is eternal' and 'A is different from God' could be true without implying that numerous eternal beings existed together, because their truths all depended on only one eternal truth, God, existing. Thus, while each person might be a truth, as they were all God, they were not separate eternal truths (Lewis, 'Problem of a Plurality', pp. 26-7). The dialogue recorded in the *Milhamot HaShem* (above, pp. 150-1) may support the view that the issue of multiple eternal truths was used by non-Christians to attack them.

Conclusion

It is clear that none of the four strands underlying article seven were topics which arose in the thirteenth century simply as a result of the influx of new learning - they had been part of mainstream debate going back at least to Augustine, with discussions continuing throughout the intervening period. Plato's *Timaeus* contained sufficient problematic material on God and truths to ensure the issues were on the Christian agenda from the outset, while Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* guaranteed Plato's views remained firmly on the theological 'syllabus'. The new learning clearly added fuel to the fire, sharpening and refocusing discussion, but it did not create the problem.

The question then arises, which, if any, of the four areas identified was the leading concern? Given William of Auvergne's role in the condemnation, his interest in stateables would probably have ensured it was taken seriously as one on which the proper doctrine needed to be established beyond doubt. However, the issue *per se*, one of logic and semantics as much as theology, while requiring detailed intellectual analysis, had no new features prioritising its resolution. How God knew and the role of ideas, within or identical with God's essence, was a more strictly theological question, important to ensure God's simplicity. But its resolution may have been needed more to support the other strands than in its own right, although it was an issue clearly close to Alexander of Hales' heart. The Trinitarian conundrum, which also formed part of the wider debate on the nature and composition of God, while relevant to article seven, did not figure in Alexander's list. However, if linked to acusations of Christian polytheism, it needed rebuttal.

This leaves the first item in Alexander's list, mathematical concepts or ideas (including their possible creative role), as the main contender for the leading place. This seems likely. The wording of article seven certainly has a Platonic ring to it. Its position, next to article eight on creation (and indeed its inclusion among questions focussed on the creation and duration of the world), suggests a linked concern or at least an association of thought. Arguments for eternal truths as real things, not as propositions, were seen by, for example, Robert Grosseteste, as more difficult to counter and perhaps more dangerous in

their implications. And, finally, the possible extrapolation of ideas to cover angels could have seemed an additional reason to ensure proper doctrine was in place.

Article eight: time and creation

Out of the newly translated Aristotelian and associated texts, those dealing with time and the eternity of the world were the ones thirteenth-century Paris theologians probably found most problematic.[94] Article eight focused on two specific issues - the first moment of time ('tempus nunc') and 'creatio-passio' - but these were part of a much wider debate which included them directly and indirectly, sometimes separately, sometimes together - if the world was eternal, then neither time nor creation were truly 'created'. The escalation of concern can be tracked through comparison of Peter Lombard's 1150s *Sententiae* with Alexander of Hales' 1220s *Glossa* and later questions, and Albertus Magnus' 1240s commentary. Peter Lombard's discussion of creation came in his second book, but the first also contained crucial passages in the context of God's essence and total difference from any created being, and commentators on the *Sententiae* followed the same arrangement.

Starting with the first moment of time ('tempus nunc'), Peter Lombard discussed things said of God in time and relatively, and the use of the term 'lord', which applied to God's action both inside and outside time. He argued: 'Although he [God] did not begin to be lord of time in time, yet he began to be lord of time, because time did not always exist. And he became lord of man himself in time'.[95] This implicitly established a first moment of time. The second book then discussed both creation and time. Peter Lombard started with God's role as sole creator, or principle, of things, not, as 'some have held', many principles, noting Plato's belief in three principles, 'God, the archetype, and matter; that these were uncreated, without beginning; and God was merely an artifex, not a creator'

[94] Roger Bacon, *Compendium studii theologiae*, eds. H. Rashdall and A.G. Little (Aberdeen, 1911), 1.2, p. 33, written c.1292, noted Aristotle's works were banned pre-1237 for reasons including 'eternitatem mundi et temporis' and 'multa eronee translata'. See also Giles of Rome (*Errores philosophorum*, ed. J. Koch, trans. J.O. Riedl (Milwaukee, 1944), pp. 1-2), probably written after 1268, who viewed Aristotle's 'erroneous premise' of rejecting any beginning for motion and time as the cause of his many errors. However, both these views may have been influenced by developments after the 1241/4 condemnation.
[95] Lombard, *Sentences*, i, 30.1, pp. 162-3.

(i.e. someone making something from pre-existing material, not from nothing). He discussed the meaning of 'create', which applied to God alone. But he noted that, when God created, 'it cannot properly be called an action, since any action consists of motion, but in God there is no motion …' (a point potentially relevant to discussions on 'creatio-passio', the logical counterpart to which would be 'creatio-actio'). He also noted Aristotle's position that the world always existed. Otherwise Peter Lombard appears more concerned over when angels were created. He stated:

> '... [N]othing was made before heaven and earth, not even time, for these were created with time but not from them … Not even time was made before the spiritual nature … and the corporeal one … For they [angels] were created with time, not from time, or in time, just as time itself was not created in time …'.

Peter Lombard noted Jerome's *In Titum* implied time existed before worldly time. According to Peter Lombard, Jerome had said:

> 'Not even six thousand years of our time have passed; but how many eternities … shall we adjudge to have passed during which the angels … and the other orders served God without changes and measures of times …'.

Peter Lombard commented:

> 'Some who have agreed with these words have said that worldly time began with the world, but that there was an eternal and changeless time before the world'.

However, Peter Lombard believed this was to misinterpret Jerome.[96] Thus, for him, the issues involved making sense of biblical and patristic discussion, which was often confused or obscure - while aware of Plato's and Aristotle's views, these were not his main concern.[97]

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[96] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 1.1-2.3, pp. 3-10.

[97] For example, Augustine (*De civitate Dei*, xii, 16, p. 492) asked: 'Does God's eternal sovereignty imply an eternal creation for its exercise'. He noted: '[I]f time has not existed for all time, it would follow that there was a time when there was no time' which 'the most complete fool would not say … We can … say, "There

Alexander of Hales' *Glossa*, by contrast, added arguments which were drawn from the new Aristotelian material:

> 'But it is objected that the power of God and his wisdom and will were from eternity, and nothing extrinsic operating will be needed for this, that a thing goes out into actuality/act ('actum'); therefore things existed from eternity. Moreover, if there is a cause, there is something caused; but there was a cause from eternity; therefore there was something caused from eternity'.

Indeed, in commenting on Peter Lombard's account of Aristotle's principles, and in trying to demonstrate the compatibility of his claim that the world always existed with Christianity, Alexander specifically cited Aristotle's *Physics*:

> '*Always…*: without beginning and end. Not so, as Aristotle said the opposite, at the end of *Physics* VI [10]. *Always*: any time in time ('quandocumque tempore'). This is true. Augustine also said this in his *Super Genesim*. And that "always" should be understood from the universality of particular times. In a second mode the soul is said always to be. In a third, God always is. The first always is of time, the second always of perpetuity ('aevi'), the third always of eternity'.[98]

However, Alexander relied primarily on the *Glossa Ordinaria* and patristic authority in his ensuing discussion, particularly Augustine's observation [*De civitate Dei*, xii, 15], that 'for time, since it runs by change, cannot be coeternal with immutable eternity'. He also quoted

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was a time when the world did not exist", if it is true that the world was created not at the beginning of time, but some time after… [S]o, since we say that time was created, while it is said to have existed always, because time has existed for all time, the fact that the angels have existed always does not entail they were not created. They are said to have existed always because they have been for all time; and they have existed for all time because without them periods of time could not exist …'. While this envisaged time as created, it could have been misunderstood. Moreover, in his earlier *De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus*, Augustine confessed difficulty over time's creation: '[H]owever this may be - it is, after all, a most abstruse matter, quite impenetrable to human guesswork - this … has to be accepted in faith, even if it exceeds our habits of thought, that everything created has a beginning and that time itself is something created, and thus time itself also has a beginning, and is not co-eternal with the creator' (Augustine, *On Genesis*, p. 118).

[98] Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 1, pp. 6, 7-8. The first passage probably also came from Aristotle's *Physics*, II.3 (*Glossa*, note, p. 6).

Isidore (*I Sent.*, 10) that 'it must be believed that time was created at the beginning of the world', but this is said 'by reason of the very "now" of time'.[99]

Alexander's coverage of the issues underlying article eight had progressed further by the 1230s. Questions 6 and 9 of his *quaestio De duratione mundi* involved theories attributable to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Physics* and *De generatione et corruptione*.[100] On 'primum nunc', he explicitly tackled Aristotle's argument that if time is not perpetual, it began to be; but 'everything which began to be, began to be in some "now", therefore time began to be in some "now'"; but 'that "now" is time, therefore time began to be in time'. Alexander listed five arguments which, he stated, some philosophers advanced on the eternity of the world, all found in Aristotle's works. They included the argument that if the world was not eternal it must have gone from potentiality to actuality, and hence through change - so some change must have preceded it. But that change was itself not eternal, so must have been preceded, etc. Moreover, if the world was capable of generation or corruption, something must have existed before it to be generated or corrupted - so again, there was an infinite regression if there were no eternal prime matter. Likewise, for anything to start to move anything meant it would undergo change. Similar arguments had been put forward by Maimonides, Avicenna and others, as well as other Latin authors, and dated back at least to the sixth century.[101]

Alexander's *quaestio* also expressly covered the issue of 'creatio-passio' - his is the only text using this exact wording this study has found in this period, except for Douai, MS 434, Question 461 (although the concept was implicit in perhaps the majority of discussions on creation, including by Peter Lombard and Albertus Magnus). Alexander's *quaestio* stated:

> 'The objection: the creation-action [the act of creation] ('creatio-actio') was not throughout all time/always, so it was not from eternity: creation-action is nothing

[99] Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 2, pp. 16-18.
[100] Alexander, *Quaestiones universitatem*, pp. 185-96, 201-15.
[101] Ivry, 'The *Guide*', p. 78.

> eternal; but God is eternal, therefore God is not creation, but also because creation denotes action ('sonat in actionem'), therefore creation, whereby it is action, is the created universe ('creatura')'.

Alexander then cited a further argument, this time with explicit reference to 'creatio-passio':

> 'Creation-passion [the process of being created] ('creatio-passio') is the created universe; but creation-action is opposed relatively to creation-passion, and vice versa; if therefore they are opposed relatively, they cannot be in the same thing, and it is plainly the case that creation-action and creation-passion will not be in the same thing; but creation-passion is in the created universe, therefore creation-action is not in the created universe, therefore it is in God; but nothing is in God which is not God, therefore creation-action is God. From this it can be further concluded that it was from eternity; but when there was creation, there were created things, therefore there were created things from eternity, therefore many things are from eternity'.[102]

Although the terminology was different, the second argument might partly reflect the simultaneity of cause and effect - God's action, the cause, must be eternal, and therefore the created thing, the world, must be eternal. This was Avicenna's argument, with temporal simultaneity for cause and effect but ontological sequencing. Moreover, for creation to take place something must already exist, or the act of creation could result in a change in the creator. In his response, Alexander noted creation-action meant two things:

> 'one which is eternal, signifying the action of God; and the other temporal, signifying something on the part of the created universe … in respect of the first, one must allow that it is God himself and that it is from eternity, nor therefore is it [necessary] to posit things being from eternity … in respect of the second, thus it is not God himself, nor is it from eternity, since things were created in time'.[103]

[102] This argument may also relate to article seven, demonstrating a further link between the articles.
[103] Alexander, *Quaestiones universitatem*, pp. 201-3. For Douai, MS 434, Question 461, see above, pp. 65-6.

By the time Albertus Magnus was writing his commentary on the *Sententiae* in the 1240s, discussion on whether there was any beginning of time had become even more complex, taking the new texts very seriously. Albertus stated the existence of a beginning to time appeared to contradict some philosophers, citing Aristotle's criticism (*Physics*, VIII) of Plato, that he 'alone gave birth ('genuit') to time, and said that time had begun with heaven'. Albertus noted the claim that, if time began, it began either in itself or in something else, deriding both resultant propositions. He noted arguments by both Aristotle and Avicenna that either time began in the divisible or in the indivisible:

> 'If in the divisible: then since before that there was a divisible part, and not itself, time existed before the beginning of time ... which is false. If it began in the indivisible: then time was divisible in the indivisible which is unintelligible. But if ... the beginning of time was the beginning of the now ('nunc') itself. Against: either it began in itself, or in another. If in another: then it was in another: and this was either of time or of eternity, because perpetuity ('aevum') was not before time. If of time: then time was before the first time. If eternity: then time was in eternity as if [with eternity] measuring its inception: and this is false, because eternity measures nothing variable: therefore it seems that in no way did time begin'.

Albertus concluded that the beginning of time was in its own indivisibility, which was the now. He rejected the objection that it was then in the indivisible as not following 'since it is successive', but 'it was continuously after this, and from this it is one: because its continuation began from that'. For 'although time is not in the now, nevertheless it may properly ('bene') be continued to the now, and from the now, as a line from point to point'.[104]

Turning to creation and eternity, Albertus' discussion focused on Plato's views and on pantheism as well as the new Aristotelian material. He first discussed various interpretations of the text 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth' [Gen. i:1]. Of these, the interpretation 'that at the beginning of time he created heaven and earth, i.e.

[104] Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 30.4 (Borgnet, xxvi), p. 93.

angelic and corporeal nature' provided for 'the beginning of time and temporal things' and excluded 'the eternity of the world …'. A second interpretation, that 'angels [were] created with bodies' excluded 'the subtle error of the philosophers, which a few hold, namely the eternity of intelligences and their creation of lower beings'. On matter, Albertus argued it was not eternal, despite many philosophers believing this. He commented:

> '[B]ecause there is nothing for him [the first maker] in potentiality, potentiality was not in him; and therefore, so he [Plato] believed, he could not produce from himself that [potentiality], and therefore gave it to himself from eternity; and this reason/principle forced all philosophers to posit matter to be eternal; but this is wrong, since they proceed as if God works through the necessity of nature … [whereas Christians believe] he works through power, and thus created it [matter] from nothing, and, given this, none of the impossibilities follow that the philosophers fear'.[105]

Second, Albertus was worried about misinterpretation of the basic tenets of Christianity in a pantheistic way and with significant implications for the eternity of matter. He concluded that both statements - 'God is in everything from eternity' and 'God is everywhere from eternity' - were false. The first signified 'the ambit of the divine essence' and 'the effect of the conservation in respect of being; but the effect itself was not from eternity, nor was God himself in everything from eternity'. The second should be understood as 'the effect which is the putting together ('collatio') of a place so that it should have the power to contain; but this effect was not from eternity'; so also God was not everywhere from eternity. Albertus noted: 'God is not said to be in things in the same

[105] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 1,5,4 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 6-9, 18, 13-15. Albertus maintained 'the great philosophers never thought there was one matter for all things': if Avicebron's *Fons vitae* held this about Plato it was not authoritative. Plato could be interpreted as arguing both for and against a beginning of the world - indeed Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron*, eds. R.C. Dales and S. Gieben (London, 1982), pt. i, 11.2, p. 63, commented: 'Plato seems to contradict himself ('sibi ipsi sensisse contraria')'. Whether Plato's ideas were outside or inside time, and whether Plato spoke in terms of time when describing time and heaven as simultaneous (as Aristotle and Augustine thought), or was using an analogy to explain his theory (as Calcidius and Boethius believed), are both unclear (Dales, *Medieval Discussions*, pp. 4-9).

way that things are in him'.[106] In the context of Plato's belief that God was merely an 'artifex', Albertus referred to David of Dinant:

> 'For the artifex is reduced to the efficient [cause], the exemplar to the formal [cause], and matter is posited in its own name. For it seems that the efficient principle and prime matter are reduced to the same thing. And that is the error of David of Dinant'.[107]

Albertus asserted that David of Dinant argued that whatever things existed, and were in no way different, were the same: God and prime matter existed and differed in no way; so they were the same. He condemned this as 'stupid and ridiculous'. It would mean no creation took place. The reference to David of Dinant demonstrates ongoing awareness of David's views, despite their ban at the 1210 Synod of Sens and in the 1215 university statutes, even in an area where, by the 1240s, the new Aristotelian material might understandably have submerged earlier controversies. It illustrates the perils theologians had identified in Plato's theories when applying Aristotelian principles to them, such as on causation, and shows that David's condemnation was still in the mind of at least some theologians in the 1240s.[108]

However, as with his analysis of the beginning of time, much of Albertus' focus on creation and eternity was now on the new Aristotelian material. He asked if, as imputed to him, Aristotle had proved the world was eternal. Maimonides had collected together seven of Aristotle's arguments in his *Guide for the Perplexed*, a text which Albertus used as a 'short-cut' for his inquiry. They included one 'which … all the ancients agree on', that 'the motion of heaven has no beginning', which only Plato opposed. The 'ancients' based this on two propositions: 'the motion of heaven is a beginning and the cause of all that moves and was made after they were not'; and 'whatever is the first beginning of every

[106] Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 37.4 (Borgnet, xxvi), pp. 233-4; *In II Sent.*, 1.3-5, pp. 11-19. Eriugena and Amaury of Bène could be the target here.
[107] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 1.5-6 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 15-20.
[108] Ibid., pp. 16, 18. Albertus referred to David of Dinant at least seven times in his commentary on the *Sententiae*, with numerous references elsewhere in his works (Thery, 'David of Dinant', pp. 127-45).

making and of the beginning of everything, is itself neither made nor begins - because otherwise there would be an infinite regression'. Albertus listed other arguments, including from Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Ptolemy, Aristotle and his Greek and Arab commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and Averroes, as well from Latin doctors such as Boethius. He concluded:

> 'Without doubt nothing is more probable even according to reason than that the world had a beginning, as Maimonides said and this should be held by this faith. But it is impossible that it began through motion and generation, or that it should stop through movement to a different form or corruption to a different matter. The arguments of Aristotle prove only this, and hence they conclude nothing against faith'.

Albertus argued it was not Aristotle but only his commentators who introduced heresy.[109]

On the role of nature as part of 'the cause of the creation of the whole universe's existence', Albertus stated that 'both the views of the philosophers and of the doctors of the sacred Scripture should be noted'. He identified four groups of different philosophical opinions before Aristotle, including the Epicureans, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Plato. Albertus further divided those commentating on Aristotle, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna, Averroes and others, into two groups who agreed on one point and differed on two:

> 'For Avicenna and almost all the others agree on the following, that what is in potentiality only comes into actuality through what is always in actuality. But Averroes denies this, and some others with him'.

Albertus noted the Church Fathers were also divided. A small group held that all forms were created - the act of creation completed all the movement of nature, and nature only made matter by pre-preparation. A larger group held God operated in and with nature.

[109] Ibid., 1.10-11, pp. 24-30.

Albertus favoured the second view: it meant that after the six days of creation from nothing, nature took over the work of propagation.[110]

The progression of discussion from Peter Lombard to Albertus Magnus thus demonstrates a significant increase both in the complexity of arguments and the sources used in discussions on whether there was a first moment of time and whether the world was eternal and no 'creatio-passio' occurred. In particular, Albertus' discussion makes clear that, by the 1240s, the views of Aristotle and his commentators were causing major problems, needing full rebuttal, and that both Averroes and Maimonides were in the frame. However, pantheism, including David of Dinant's views, remained a significant issue.

Three other theologians demonstrate the same progression of thought and the same concerns from the 1220s to the 1240s on the issues underlying article eight. First, in the works of William of Auvergne, with his pivotal role in the condemnation, the errors which William found and rejected in the works of Avicenna (and Aristotle's adherents where these also followed Avicenna) included two relevant to article eight: that the world did not begin in time; and the First Cause operated through necessity, like a natural cause. William was one of the first Latin theologians to realise Aristotle's views could not be squared with Christian ones. He therefore examined in depth the theories of eternity and time, including their inter-relationship. In particular, he identified Aristotle's equation of eternity's essence with that of time as a major problem for Christian doctrine, since it meant time became a subset of eternity. William explicitly linked Avicenna with Aristotle on the resultant doctrine - that eternity was simply time or duration without beginning or end, and the same applied to motion. This meant that eternity only differed from time as a whole differed from its part and as a larger from a smaller entity. It also implied that eternity did not preexist time - since time formed part of eternity, and every part must be before and a cause of its whole, time must precede eternity. Therefore perpetuity (duration with a

[110] Ibid., 1.12, pp. 32-5.

beginning but no end) was half eternity, with its opposite (duration with an end but no beginning) the other half.[111]

The extent of William's concern over both Aristotle's and Avicenna's views on the eternity of the world can be seen by the lengths he went to in examining the issue, first in *De Trinitate*, c.1220, and then, much more fully, in *De universo*, in the 1230s. In *De Trinitate*, he dealt with the views of unspecified 'Peripatetics' or 'some of the better philosophers'; but in *De universo*, the first eleven chapters of which examined whether the world was temporal or eternal, William discussed Avicenna and Aristotle explicitly, starting by examining eternity itself, including Aristotle's definition and some scriptural problems, although attributing some views drawn from the *Liber de causis* to Aristotle.[112]

William's discussion included three arguments from Avicenna on the eternity of the world. First was the argument that the creator must either have preceded the world or not. Avicenna had argued that the creator preceded the world as a cause precedes its effect, not temporally. But the world would then have existed as long as the cause had. The second argument, attributed in *De Trinitate* to the Peripatetics but in *De universo* to Avicenna, related to the inevitable change in God's essence if it existed and then something came from it. Finally, there was the dilemma Avicenna's arguments posed, that the creator could either create a body lasting until the world's creation or not. To say he could not was silly ['frivolum'], so such a prior creation was possible. But if so, its motion would last until the world's creation, and so the creation of the world was not in the beginning of time, since time came before it. William clearly took these arguments seriously, even providing

[111] William of Auvergne, *De universo*, p. 685, 2AB, also credited some 'Italici', including one particular 'Italicus', with the view that time and eternity were the same in essence, with time part of eternity. The 'Italicus' may have been Cicero (R.J. Teske, 'William of Auvergne on Time and Eternity', *Traditio*, 55 (2000), pp. 127-8). However, in the same discussion (*De universo*, pp. 685, 2A, 688, 2E-F), William also attributed the view to Aristotle, saying that Aristotle believed that 'eternity … is only eternal time, that is, a duration infinite in both directions'. William continued: 'If time were, as Aristotle thought, that is, without beginning and without end, perpetuity would really be half of time infinite in both directions; this, however, can be called eternity only equivocally' (cit. Teske, 'William of Auvergne on Time, p. 128). While William did not acknowledge this, the theories he discussed were held by Averroes as well as Avicenna.

[112] William, *De universo*, p. 688, 1B-2E. See R.J. Teske, 'William of Auvergne on the Eternity of the World', in idem, *Studies in the Philosophy of William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris (1228-1249)* (Milwaukee, 2006), pp. 29-52.

further arguments supporting Avicenna's position to ensure he rebutted all the possible points that could be made. He also discussed Aristotle's own arguments in detail, including on the impossibility of an infinite time.[113]

The second theologian who took the 'threat' from Aristotle seriously was Robert Grosseteste. Like William, Grosseteste did not believe Aristotle's position was compatible with Christianity. However, while troubled by Avicenna, Grosseteste focused more on Averroes together with Aristotle, perhaps galvanised by Averroes' clearer Aristotelian translations and starker views.[114] Grosseteste wrote two works soon after 1230, one incorporated into his *Hexaemeron*, the other, *De finitate motus et temporis*, into his commentary on the *Physics*. In these he discussed the arguments of the saints and analysed arguments from reason. These included whether there could be a first or a last instant of time and a beginning of circular movement. Grosseteste argued that Aristotle had really claimed the world was eternal and that for 'certain moderns' not to admit this was heretical. He opposed Aristotle's definition of an instant as the boundary between past and future:

> 'I say that it is false to say that "every instant is the continuation of the past and the future" ("instans … omne est continuacio preteriti et futuri"), but there was a first movement and perhaps there will be a last in time, just as there are points at the end of a line, although Aristotle and Averroes and other commentators hold this to be absurd. But … they do not have a demonstration for it, but only the imagination of the perpetuity and infinity of time makes them posit this falsehood ['falsum']'.[115]

[113] William, *De universo*, pp. 690, 2G-692, 1H; Teske, 'William on Eternity', pp. 45-50; Teske, 'William on Individuation', pp. 78-9. William did not discuss Averroes' views.

[114] Arguments against the eternity of the world discussed by Avicenna (and Maimonides) analysed by Grosseteste included on infinity. Grosseteste (*Hexaemeron*, pt. i, 8.7, pp. 62) held that an eternal world would mean an infinity of souls separated from their bodies, or only one soul for all bodies, or that departed souls returned to other bodies or died, all of which were impossible (cit. Dales, 'Robert Grosseteste's Place in Medieval Discussions', pp. 547, 557-8).

[115] Robert Grosseteste, *De finitate motus et temporis*, II.85-6, 90-3 (cit. Dales, 'Grosseteste's Treatise', p. 261). For *De finitate*'s date and its relationship with Grosseteste's unfinished *Physics* commentary (to which it was once appended), see Dales, op.cit., pp. 245-66. The work may have been unknown throughout the thirteenth century. Grosseteste identified and tried to refute three Aristotelian arguments for the eternity of the world, all from *Physics*, VIII.1, pp. 418-21: (i) whether motion was perpetual; (ii) whether motion was

On circular motion, Grosseteste argued that 'what the commentators on Aristotle say, that in circular motion there is no first, so there is no first in time ('non est primum in tempore'), is false'. For 'in circular motion there is a first, just as in other motions'.[116]

Like William of Auvergne, Grosseteste argued the eternal and the temporal were different in kind. Causality and temporal priority were also different. His *Hexaemeron* discussed philosophers who mistakenly believed cause and effect must be co-temporal, perhaps referring to Avicenna's view on the co-existence of the First Cause and its effect, although Grosseteste might also have had others in mind, since he referred to those who believed this using the example (dating back at least to Augustine and used extensively by subsequent theologians) of a footprint in the dust being simultaneous with the foot causing it. Grosseteste noted such people did not understand the doctrine of the simultaneity of cause and effect only applied if both were of same genus, such as both being in time:

> 'Therefore, if the world was made by him, it has always coexisted with him, and thus the world, like him, is without a beginning. They illustrate this … by the examples mentioned above about the footprint in the dust, a body and its shadow, light and its brightness. They do not understand that the phrase "the simultaneous coexistence of the full effect with the full cause" implies the same kind of measure: either both must be temporal, or both … eternal ... [I]f the cause and effect do not share the same kind of measure of being, this rule does not apply to them, namely that if the cause exists, the effect necessarily coexists. Therefore, since God is eternal, and the world and motion and time are temporal, time and eternity are not the same kind of measure … The eternal God is the cause of the temporal world and

generated; (iii) whether an instant was the indivisible dividing-point between past and future - if so, any instant needed time before and after it, so the earth could not begin or end in an instant, so time must be eternal, and also motion, since time was a *passio* of motion (cit. Noone, '*Scriptum super Metaphysicam*', pp. 94-9). The people whom Grosseteste described as 'certain moderns' who had claimed Aristotle was compatible with Christianity probably included Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure (with reservations), Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus (Dales, 'Robert Grosseteste's Place', pp. 547-50).

[116] Aristotle, *Physics*, IV.10,14, pp. 370-1; VI.3, pp. 395-6; Dales, 'Robert Grosseteste's Place', pp. 552-3; Dales, 'Grosseteste's Treatise', pp. 261-2.

time, but he precedes them, not with respect to time, but with respect to simple eternity'.[117]

More generally, Grosseteste commented:

> 'And that Aristotle and other philosophers prove God's unchangeableness, atemporality, and other such things should move no one to think that Aristotle or the other philosophers understood clearly the simplicity of eternity … A quite similar thing [i.e. starting with firm reasoning but not understanding clearly] … happened to Aristotle and the other philosophers who knew full well through the use of firm reasoning that eternity was simple and nevertheless did not understand clearly simple eternity itself but rather saw it under the appearances of temporal extension …'.[118]

The third theologian, Richard Rufus, numbered Grosseteste among the sources for his works. For example, his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (written in the later 1230s or the 1240s and one of two early works attributed to him discussing the eternity of the world), drew on Grosseteste's works (and through him Augustine and other Church Fathers), as well as Aristotle *Metaphysics*, *Physics*, *De anima*, *De caelo*, *Posterior Analytics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*; Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *De anima* and *De caelo*; and Peter Lombard. In addition, Rufus made minor use of pseudo-Augustine's *De differentia animae et spiritus*, and the Bible, again very sparsely. Rufus' *Metaphysics* commentary may not have been known in Paris prior to the condemnation.

[117] Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron*, pt. i, 8.3-6, pp. 59-62. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, x, 31, pp. 419-20, stated: '[T]he Platonists have discovered a way of interpreting this statement [*Timaeus*, 41B - that the gods had a beginning but no end], by asserting that this refers not to a beginning in time, but to a relation of dependence. "If a foot", they say, "had been from all eternity planted on dust, the print of it would always be underneath; but for all that no one would doubt that the footprint was made by the pressure of the foot; and yet there would be no temporal priority, although one was made by the other. Similarly", they say, "the universe and the created gods in it have always existed, while their maker exists; and yet they have been made"'. Rufus and Richard Fishacre both followed Grosseteste's argument, clarified in *De finitate* (Dales, 'Grosseteste's Treatise', pp. 248-51).

[118] Dales, 'Grosseteste's Treatise', especially pp. 263-4 (lines 135-150).

However, it demonstrates the gradual move away from reliance on Avicenna to Averroes in interpreting Aristotle.[119]

Rufus' discussion in his *Metaphysics* commentary included the subject of creation and divine causality. He covered Aristotle's proofs for eternal time and motion; whether Aristotle or any other philosopher posited creation and, if so, how; and whether Aristotle's God in his *Metaphysics* was the universe's final or efficient cause.[120] Rufus criticised those giving Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, but argued that Aristotle started from false assumptions. His deductions, while sound, were therefore wrong, which was regrettable but not malicious. Rufus believed 'creatio' was a specific, separate, type of a 'mutatio', wholly instantaneous and unique. Unlike generation, non-being and being were simultaneous in the order of creation, with no priority or posterity.[121] His arguments on ancient philosophers and their view of creation included, like Grosseteste, the footprint in the dust metaphor. Rufus continued:

> 'Likewise, if there were light from all eternity, there would also be [its] resplendence; and yet it would only be the resplendence of light … these examples are not rightly applied to the Creator and the creature, because He can make all things [out of nothing]. These examples … are rightly said of the Father and the Son. For John Chrysostom says that the Father is prior to the Son by reason of causality, not nature'.[122]

Rufus' use of John Chrysostom nicely combined contemporary understanding of causality as found in Avicenna with much earlier authorities and demonstrated continuing reliance on the Greek, not just the Latin, Fathers.

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[119] Noone, *'Scriptum super Metaphysicam*', pp. 58-75; Wood, 'Richard Rufus on Creation', pp. 1-30. For Rufus' views on a first moment of time, and their possible inconsistency with article eight's truth, see above, pp. 66-7. For Rufus' sources, see Wood, 'Richard Rufus on Creation', pp. 16-23; Noone, *'Scriptum super Metaphysicam*', pp. 76-83. While the *Metaphysics* commentary resembled Rufus' earlier commentary on the *Physics*, probably from c.1235, it was often less sympathetic to Aristotle.
[120] Noone, *'Scriptum super Metaphysicam*', pp. 88-9, 122, 186.
[121] Ibid., pp. 123-5, 133.
[122] Ibid., pp. 134-5, 209-10.

On Aristotle's first mover as an efficient or final cause, the fact that Rufus felt he had to deal with it in two questions in his *Metaphysics* commentary shows this had become a very complex issue. Rufus referred frequently to 'quidem', implying he was not alone in struggling with the idea of God as the immediate mover of heaven, finally favouring Averroes' theory of the twofold mover. His reasons included one referred to by both Averroes and Grosseteste: the immediate mover could mediate the First Cause's infinite power to the finite heavens, thus ensuring heavenly motion was within time, not instantaneous. Moreover, Rufus argued the First Cause's action was infinite, but if it were identified with the immediate mover, it would be successive or temporal.[123]

In conclusion, discussion on a first moment of time had very early roots, perhaps most notably with Augustine, whose own position was at times confusing. His discussion, and those by other early authorities such as Boethius, ensured the creation of time and its relation to eternity were major, and challenging, topics on the Christian agenda in the Latin world well before the new translations arrived. However, it is clear that the precise formulation of 'a first moment of time' ('primum nunc' or 'instans'), article eight's opening clause, originated in Aristotle's *Physics*. This text was not available in Latin until the second half of the twelfth century - although Aristotle's belief that the world was eternal, however interpreted, was already common knowledge, appearing in Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* and subsequent commentaries, although often explained away. Much of the specific argumentation by theologians immediately preceding the

[123] In discussing the immediate mover of the heavens, Rufus asked: 'quod ponatur quod si nullus sit angelus, per impossibile in substantia. Numquid caelum possit moveri, et, si non, quare non'. His response appears to envisage the angel as the immediate mover, rather than the soul, as Averroes, to whom Rufus referred, believed (Noone, *'Scriptum super Metaphysicam*', pp. 141-3, 269-271). While not attributing this to Rufus, the view that angels were movers of the heavens was criticised by Albertus Magnus in his pre-1248 commentary on pseudo-Dionysius' *Celestial Hierarchy*. Albertus' reference may have been to Philip the Chancellor (S. Piron, 'Deplatonising the Celestial Hierarchy', in I. Iribarren and M. Lenz (eds.), *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry* (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 19, 32-3). This may suggest that Albertus had not read Rufus' *Metaphysics* commentary. For a comparison of Rufus' treatment of the issue in his *Metaphysics* commentary with that of Grosseteste in *De motu*, see Noone, *'Scriptum super Metaphysicam*', pp. 81-2, 111-7, 141-5 For the dating of Grosseteste's *De motu super caelestium* to just before the 1230s, see J. McEvoy, 'The Chronology of Robert Grosseteste's Writings on Nature and Natural Philosophy', *Speculum*, 58 (1983), pp. 644-6. For Philip the Chancellor, see Philip, *Summa de bono*, i, pp. 47-51; R. C. Dales, 'Early Latin discussions on the Eternity of the World in the Thirteenth Century', *Traditio*, 43 (1987), pp. 178-9.

condemnation appears to derive directly from Aristotle's *Physics*, often cited explicitly in texts from c.1230 onwards and complemented by discussion on Avicenna and Averroes.

As regards 'creatio-passio', its exact origin is unclear, and it appears to have surfaced in two different guises in this period. The first issue was whether God's eternal lordship implied an eternal subject, with variants as in Douai, MS 434, Question 461 - whether there must have been some creature to undergo the creative action. This was a long-running discussion, figuring, for example, in Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* and its commentaries - it did not emerge from the newly translated texts and commentaries. Second, there was Avicenna's argument on the temporal simultaneity of cause and effect, meaning that God's creative act must be contemporaneous with the created world, and hence both must be eternal, though one was before the other in priority. Avicenna's statement could well have been a catalyst: it clearly troubled William of Auvergne and was a pressing issue brought to forefront of his attention by the new learning. However, while Avicenna's formulation was new, the concept was not. It dated back in the Latin tradition at least to Augustine, with his example of a footprint in the dust. Patristic and philosophical arguments were juxtaposed by Rufus, and the link was implicit in discussions by other theologians and philosophers.[124]

The picture on the extent that the new translations acted as triggers for article eight is therefore complex. The issues were matters of on-going debate; but the new learning almost certainly brought them to a head, or at least crystallised the terms in which they were now formulated. Peter Lombard's discussion showed no particular concern that philosophical views threatened Christian doctrine, whereas Aristotle's views and those of his commentators increasingly became the focal point of discussion in the 1230s and 1240s. Although responses among theologians varied, their concern was clear and they devoted considerable effort to rebutting the implications for Christianity.[125]

[124] Noone, *'Scriptum super Metaphysicam*', pp. 134-5, 209-10.
[125] Noone, op.cit., pp. 91-2; Teske, 'William on Time', p. 126.

Finally, the Cathar belief that 'to create' entailed pre-existing material, not creation from nothing, and that effect was simultaneous with cause, could be in the frame.[126] However, the discussion on 'tempus nunc' seems to stem directly from the new Aristotelian texts, and the Cathars do not appear to figure in the context of 'creatio-passio'. While their views - and their use of Aristotle to support them - may have added to concerns, they therefore seem unlikely to have been the major factor behind the article.

Article nine: grace, gifts and glory

Article nine is textually problematic, with an apparent mismatch between the condemned proposition and truth. It involved both moral questions on good and evil and cosmological issues related to how God created and ordered the world. Discussions at Paris in the second half of the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth suggest two main interpretations. One derived from pseudo-Dionysius' angelic hierarchies (adopted by Peter Lombard in his *Sententiae*), while the second came from Latin discussions on the relationship of natural gifts ('naturalia') and those of divine origin ('gratuita'). These were linked by one common issue - whether heavenly rewards were somehow predestined - but the underlying agenda developed largely from different traditions. The first came from late fifth/early sixth-century Greek fascination with angels, both as themselves - including their classification - and as exemplars for humans.[127] The second originated in Latin concerns over the nature of humanity and original sin - although a link with angels often remained, as in Philip the Chancellor's discussion on grace in angels which examined the fundamental issues on the relations between nature, grace and merits in the context of angels.[128] Augustine's statement (*De gratia and libero arbitrio*, vi, 15), that 'if God's gifts are your merited goods, God crowns the merited things not as your merits but his own gifts', gave rise to debate on the nature of merit and whether in itself it resulted solely from grace. This included the question why God created

[126] Above, p. 142.
[127] On the view that article nine reflects a Neoplatonic hierarchical approach, see, for example, S.Tugwell, *Albert and Thomas* (New York, 1988), pp. 51-2, who argues that it apportions 'divine illumination strictly according to ontological status'. This also provides an implicit connection between articles nine and one.
[128] Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, i, pp. 462-87.

Adam with the propensity to sin, and, if he was potentially perfect, whether he could achieve this by himself, a question expressed perhaps most clearly in Alan of Lille's *Anticlaudianus*, with its projection of a human perfected by nature.[129] Peter Lombard followed, and elaborated on, Augustine's view that the exercise of good will was the result of grace, rather than leading to it. However, it could also result naturally from properties given to an individual by God which developed organically, allowing the individual to share responsibility for his good act with God.[130]

There are arguments in favour of both interpretations of article nine. First, angels and their hierarchies figured large in the commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*. The interest in pseudo-Dionysius, in particular his discussion of angels, blossomed in Peter Lombard's time and continued strongly in the thirteenth century. Peter Lombard's theory that angelic rewards were necessarily linked to the gifts bestowed on them by God was vehemently disputed, at least in respect of humans if not angels themselves.[131] The stance taken against any link between natural abilities, grace and glory by both Albertus Magnus and Bonaventure suggests Peter Lombard's view on angels was seen as needing rebuttal even in the 1240s. In particular, Bonaventure's reference to an 'unconvincing

[129] Eriugena (*Periphyseon*, iii, pp. 54-5, section 631D) was the first to distinguish properly between natural and 'supernatural' gifts, defining the first as a 'datio' ('"dationes" are … the distributions by which every nature subsists'), the second as a 'donatio' ('"donationes" are the distributions of grace by which every subsisting nature is adorned'). Gilbert of Poitiers and Alan of Lille followed Augustine's view. William of Auvergne and other thirteenth-century theologians developed the notion of condign merit as an obligation imposed on himself by God to reward merit. Other discussions, such as Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, p. 206, focused on whether prelapsarian man was created in nature ('in naturalibus') or in grace ('in gratuitis'). For discussion of the above views and other Latin views on natural gifts and grace in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see A.E. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei* (Cambridge, 2005), especially pp. 55-207. On the different twelfth-century approaches to the relationship between grace and free will, including by Gilbert of Poitiers and his followers (partially underpinned by Aristotle's differentiation between necessity, possibility and contingency in relation to God's fore-knowledge in his *De interpretatione*), see Colish, *Peter Lombard*, pp. 268-9; Chenu, *Nature and Man*, pp. 1-48. On the relationship between the Latin Augustinian tradition and pseudo-Dionysius' hierarchical approach in the Greek, see Chenu, ibid., pp. 49, 79-89. Latin theologians following Augustine generally blamed Eriugena, not pseudo-Dionysius, for the idea of a hierarchically determined destiny. Thus, in his *Expositio in Hierarchiam Coelestem* (*PL*, CLXXV, cols. 923-1154), Hugh of St Victor, while using Eriugena's translation, adapted Augustinian terms and concepts and rejected those views he found to be heterodox. Hugh does not name Eriugena but refutations of him are detectable within the work.

[130] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 18.6, pp. 79-80; Wood, 'Recasting Augustine', pp. 817-23.

[131] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 3.3, p. 13; see also ibid., 9.1-5, pp. 38-41. For the connection with the condemnation made by Odo Rigaud, see above, pp. 19, 69, n. 111. The angelic focus of both distinctions supports an angelic interpretation for article nine.

argument' that, 'if there be no hierarchical order in nature, there could be no hierarchical order in grace', and that 'our grace corresponds to the grace of the angels, even though our nature is not of the same species as their nature' provides evidence of continuing disagreement in this area.[132] On the other hand, arguments on the link between human nature and grace, including Adam's state of innocence before he fell, figured in around twenty-seven questions in Douai, MS 434, while, from the headline descriptions of the questions, any link between angelic hierarchies and rewards seemed largely ignored.

Texts from Peter Lombard and Alan of Lille encapsulate the two alternatives. Discussion in subsequent commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* exposed no new elements (such as the new Aristotelian and related texts) significantly affecting angelic hierarchies. However, theologians who picked up Augustine's arguments on nature and grace and developed twelfth-century discussions on their relationship faced new difficulties after the advent of the new translations. Using the four causes - material, formal, efficient and final - Aristotle had described nature as 'the immediate material substratum of things which have in themselves a principle of motion or change' (the material cause); as 'the shape or form … of things which have in themselves the source of motion' (the formal cause); and as 'that from which and towards which generation and corruption tend' (the efficient and final causes). Crucially, a thing's formal cause (which Aristotle considered was most fittingly called its nature) brought its potency into act. Aristotle argued that 'everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end (for that for whose sake a thing is, is its principle and the becoming is for the sake of the end)'; that 'the actuality is the end'; and that 'it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired' (*Metaphysics*, IX.8). Aristotle's approach thus made nature's actuality the inevitable end for which it had the potentiality, while for Augustine, the outcome for every creature depended on God's will. If translated into theological concepts, this implied a

[132] Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, 9.1.9. Aquinas also discussed the issue, showing that it remained unresolved over twenty years after the condemnation mandated the definitive doctrine. Aquinas argued: 'it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature'. However, 'diversity of natural gifts is one way in angels, who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another way in men, who differ only numerically' (Aquinas, *Summa*, v, I. Q.45.a,6, p. 116).

necessary link between the innate gifts of individuals and their final actuality or perfection, with no divine intervention. Thirteenth-century theologians tackling this dilemma included, most notably, Philip the Chancellor, who attempted to combine Augustine's approach with Aristotle's. Philip modified the two positions to create a new type of potency, a 'potency for obedience ('potentia obedientie') towards every divine work' which was 'created from the beginning, whether nature mediates it as a principle, or whether the will of the Creator does it immediately'. Philip concluded:

> '[S]ince that possibility arises from a creature's obedience, [since] God can make of it what he wills, and since it is a passive possibility ('passiva'), it does not therefore follow that [the possibility] is a potency for the act ('potentia … ad actum')'.[133]

Philip's discussion thus suggests the newly translated material had added fresh problems to an already difficult area underlying article nine.[134]

There are two other possibilities which may have some bearing on article nine's inclusion in the condemnation. First, there could have been concerns related to the unacceptable role given by Neoplatonism to angels from a semantic link between angels and predestination. Eriugena noted the Greeks called the primordial causes or exemplars 'predestinations' ('praedestinationes') or 'divine volitions' ('divinae voluntates'), as well as 'ιδέαι', that is 'species or forms in which the immutable reasons of things that were to be made were created before (the things themselves) existed'. This could have caused confusion and concern, especially with the equation of such primordial causes with angels.

[133] Aristotle, *Physics*, II.1, pp. 329-30; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX.8, pp. 1657-60; Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, i, pp. 483. Philip also drew on John Damascene in discussing natural desire and human happiness. Moreover, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, of which Philip was aware, increased the need to differentiate between the frame of mind which determined a person's free choice of an object and the object he chose. Aristotle defined happiness as 'an activity of the soul according to perfect excellence', and argued: 'moral excellence comes about as a result of habit … none of the moral excellences exist in us by nature'; 'excellence … is in our own power, and so too is vice', or no punishments or rewards would be justified (Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, I.13, II.1, III.5, pp. 1741-2, 1742-3, 1758-60) - see Wood, 'Recasting Augustine', pp. 826-34. This appears to eliminate any divine role, contravening article nine.

[134] Other newly translated texts included Plato's discussion on the genesis of virtue in the *Meno* (although this was apparently little read). Plato's conclusion (*Protagoras and Meno*, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie (Harmondsworth, 1970), pp. 156-7) that 'whoever has virtue gets it by divine dispensation', was compatible with article nine. See also J. Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy* (London, 2006), p. 211.

Moreover, while Eriugena's reference to the Greeks could merely have referred to Greek Neoplatonists, he went on to say that he would support his reasons 'by the testimonies of the Holy Fathers', and, in the following passage on a related issue, the primordial causes, referred specifically to Maximus, so a link with Greek theology was implied.[135]

Any semantic connection between angels and predestination is, at best, tangential. But it could have been linked to Eriugena's own views. This was in two respects. First, through his translations of pseudo-Dionysius' works, he was linked with his theories on hierarchies, problematic in this context, and, more generally, any concerns over pseudo-Dionysius' doctrines tended to be attributed to him instead.[136] Second, it is unclear whether Eriugena's work on predestination, *De divina praedestinatione*, in which he argued against predestination although claiming Augustine's support for his view, was available, far less read, in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Paris. However, it was implicit in his *Periphyseon*. The *Periphyseon* envisaged all things returning to their source, with the Word of God the common end of creation; and, since sin came from will, not nature, and since all shared in the same nature, all would return to God without punishment, although sinners would not share in the same grace.[137] This emphasis on free will put the *Periphyseon* on the wrong side of article nine, and, given the conflation of ideas likely in that article, might have contributed to its inclusion. This aspect of the *Periphyseon* was apparently picked up by Honorius Augustodunensis in his *Inevitabile* (pre-c.1139), and article nine may therefore be added to Eriugena's possible influence on the condemnation.[138]

[135] Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, ii, pp. 145, section 529A-D.
[136] Chenu, *Nature and Man*, pp. 49, 79-89.
[137] D. Carrabine, *John Scottus Eriugena* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 11, 95-101. Moreover, as part of his argument, Eriugena (*Periphyseon*, v, p. 13, section 868B) argued that nature would not be equally blessed for all, and that being well ('bene') and being blessed ('beate') will be the special property ('proprium et speciale') only to those perfect in action and knowledge ('solis actione et scientia perfectis'). Article nine's offending proposition could be could be interpreted as reflecting a similar idea.
[138] Only one manuscript of Eriugena's *De praedestinatione* survives (*Treatise on Divine Predestination*, trans. M. Brennan (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1998), p. xxv). Honorius Augustodunensis' theory of predestination (in the earliest recension of the *Inevitabile*), was traditionally though to follow Augustinian lines. However, it appears to have been largely based on Eriugena's works (W.A. Hannan, 'The *Inevitabile* of

Second, and arguably the main reason underlying the article's inclusion, whatever the precise derivation of the offending proposition, there was the article's connection with article ten. This referred to 'Adam in his state of innocence' never having any place to stand, nor the evil angel. Similarly, there was a connection with article five (the angelic fall). Thus the three articles together covered whether angels and humans were created in grace as well as nature, and, if not, why not - the agenda underlying Alan of Lille's decision to construct the perfect man. Article nine also complemented articles five and ten on whether evil came from God or from free will. The article can thus be seen as playing a role in the creation story directly preceding article ten, where creation entailed sufficient natural gifts and grace to stand fast, but not to progress: it was not greater natural gifts that enabled progression, but standing fast, coupled with the gift of additional grace by God on those on whom he chose to bestow it.[139]

However, while its connection with article ten was arguably the main reason for article nine's inclusion, the wider context is also important. First, even though probably not the immediate concern behind either article, the spectre of dualism would have been present in the background. It is notable that the theory which perhaps most closely reflected the concept of necessity in the condemned proposition comes from the early Christian Gnostic, Valentinus, as denounced by Irenaeus in his *Adversus haereses*, written c.180. Irenaeus claimed Valentinus believed that the races of Cain, Abel and Seth represented three different unchangeable natures, with Seth's descendants (Gnostic Christians, who were essentially spiritual) assured of salvation, while those of Cain (essentially material), doomed to perish. Abel's descendants (non-Gnostic Christians) had some freedom and could be saved by good works. Irenaeus' criticisms were adopted and

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Honorius: a Study in the Textures of Early Twelfth-Century Augustianisms' (Boston College, Ph.D. thesis, 2013), abstract, pp. 38-40, 171-92).

[139] The link between the need for grace for salvation and Adam's fall is particularly clear in Augustine's discussion on the 'magnitude of the first transgression', which made 'liable to eternal punishment all who are outside the Saviour's grace … There is no escape for anyone from this justly deserved punishment, except by merciful and undeserved grace' (Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, xii, 12, pp. 988-9). Moreover, Augustine's belief in the gratuity of grace was reinforced by his battle with Pelagius and his followers. All humans had inherited Adam's sin and were damned without God's unfathomable gift of grace to one individual while denying it to another (J. Marenbon, *Pagans and philosophers* (Princeton, 2015), p. 37).

elaborated first by Clement of Alexandria and shortly afterwards by Origen.[140] Titus of Bostria (†378) alleged the Manicheans, with their affinity to Gnosticism, believed that evil, synonymous with matter, and likewise good, synonymous with spirit, were necessities of nature, with sin resulting from the predominance of evil/matter in an individual. Both these theories, as reported by their opponents, included the concept of nature necessarily determining someone's reward in heaven or hell. Humans are by nature either good or bad.

It is not clear how far thirteenth-century theologians would have known of these theories, although Titus' works were known to Jerome.[141] Moreover, Manichaean texts themselves do little to support the attribution of such beliefs to them. While the view that the body was wholly evil and the spirit good was clearly fundamental to dualism, this did not mean dualists believed someone necessarily possessed a particular nature and could not rectify it, even if this was a Manichaean belief originally - and in any case, the 'greater natural goods' in article nine do not fully equate to the predominance of spirit over evil (or matter). Further, while the beliefs thirteenth-century Parisian scholars attributed to a sect are relevant to the condemnation, not their actual beliefs, combatting such a proposition does not appear to have been the focus of any anti-Cathar texts this study has found. Finally, Augustine's arguments against Manichaeism pre-dated his dispute with Pelagius. He was therefore more concerned to stress human free will in arguments to counter Manichaeism rather than, as later, God's predestination, the message in article nine's truth.[142] Thus, a mismatch between the focus of the offending proposition (on natural gifts)

[140] For Clement's reference to the Valentinian theory that salvation was contingent on nature, see G.P. Luttikhuizen, *Gnostic revisions of Genesis Stories and Early Jesus Traditions* (Leiden, 2006), pp. 83-6. Valentinus' ideas may have been misunderstood by his adherents and misrepresented by his critics, with Clement contributing to turning Irenaeus' attack on Valentinus into an anti-heretical commonplace, to which Origen added further arguments.

[141] Titus was bishop of Bostria. His treatise in Greek was known to Jerome, whose *De viris illustribus* included his short biography (N.A. Pedersen, *Demonstrative Proof* (Leiden, 2004), pp. 17-18, 171-6).

[142] Augustine (*Contra Faustum* [*Reply to Faustus the Manichaean*], trans. R. Stobart (London, 2014), ii, 5, xxiv, 1-2, pp. 7, 291-5) asserted that 'by the just law of God, the free will of man, which chooses good or evil, is under no constraint of necessity'. On Faustus' argument that Paul believed there were two men, the one 'the old' or 'outer' or 'earthy man', the other 'the heavenly', 'the inner or new man' (with the outer man doomed unless reborn in faith), Augustine argued that Paul had rather believed that God created one man, but with an inner and outer part. He rejected what he stated the Manichaeans believed, that 'the

and the truth (on predestination) is still present. However, dualism could well have heightened concern on the issue of who might be granted salvation.

Second, the ideas of Pelagius were still circulating in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, although mainly in works misattributed to Augustine himself, Jerome or various popes.[143] Origen, while not rejecting predestination, also saw a major role for free will, coupled with the belief that God's love was so strong as to ensure all rational beings could ultimately be saved; and his views were still frequently discussed - Alexander of Hales, for example, without naming him, drew from Origen's first homily, *On Ezekiel*, on the delay between the angelic creation and fall.[144] Pelagius' and Origen's ideas, with their affirmation of free will, could have attracted many theologians, but, as well as contradicting Augustine, they could also have been viewed as undermining God's omniscience and omnipotence, areas of concern underlying, for example, article six of the condemnation. In this context, it is notable that Greek theological tradition placed less emphasis on predestination and more on free will. While thirteenth-century Latin authors might not have read the actual Greek texts, the difference in approach could have increased concerns in a climate increasingly hostile to the Greek Church, despite respect for its individual Fathers.[145] But again, while article nine's truth focuses on predestination, its proposition does not promote free will.

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inner man is not formed or created or originated by God, but is part of His own substance sent against His enemies, and instead of becoming old by sin, is through necessity captured and damaged by the enemy'. While Augustine's arguments do not state the Manichaeans believed nature necessitated a person's ultimate reward, he could be in read this way. See Pedersen, *Demonstrative Proof*, pp. 171-6.

[143] J. Morris, 'Pelagian Literature', *JTS*, 16 (1965), pp. 26-7.

[144] Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 3, p. 39. Peter Abelard, *Sic et Non* [*Yes and No*], trans. P. Thorp (Vermont, 2007), question 27, p. 87, cites Origen: '[T]he cause of each person's salvation is not placed in God's foreknowledge, but in one's own purpose and acts'. Origen's views are hard to pin down. He argued that God allowed all rational beings to progress by imitating God or to regress through neglect by the exercise of their own free will. Free will represents the way by which such rational beings are differentiated. God knows in advance what kind of person each individual will be and bestows his love on this basis. He foreknows every individual's affections and purpose and uses their free action and free will to achieve his salvific goals (M. Levering, *Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths* (Oxford, 2011), pp. 38-44).

[145] For example, John Chrysostom appears to have conceived the relationship between God's will and power on the one hand, and human freedom on the other, as one in which God, through Christ, invites all humans to salvation. Predestination refers to God's original design from before the Fall that all humans should be saved. This represents God's absolute will. However, achieving it is limited by the freedom of choice which God himself gave to all humans so that they can either accept God's gift of salvation and

Finally, and unusually, article nine did not specify whether it applied to angels or humans or both. However, each group was tangled up both in discussions of hierarchies - albeit initially focused on angels - and predestination - with the emphasis on humans but with an angel's reward predetermined by its ordained role. While modern readers might assume that humans were the target, given the period's preoccupation with angels, both in their own right and as ways to understand humans, Paris theologians in the 1230s and 1240s might well have understood the context to have been both angels and humans, with angels first in line.[146]

Conclusion

Analysis of the doctrinal influences behind the formulation of the ten articles demonstrates that these were varied. While they can all be linked to doctrinal developments between 1215 and the 1240s, their origins lay in different sources and periods, largely internal to long-running Latin debates arising from biblical conundrums, but with the impetus for some deriving - to varying degrees - from Greek theology or philosophy, Arab and Jewish philosophy, and heresy.[147] The catalyst for some, such as article eight, was clearly the introduction of new texts which needed rebuttal, although these could also prove helpful, as in countering errant views on stateables (article seven). Others, such as article seven again, appear to have combined several strands, none of them paramount. Some, such as article four, remain obscure. However, analysis of article two in particular demonstrates that, while some articles were major current issues in their own right, others may have been more symbiotic with their companions and may have been included as much to complement them as in their own right. Moreover, while the different influences can explain the individual articles, given the variety of sources in both date and

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attain eternal blessedness, or reject it, with resultant eternal condemnation. While grace leads the way, it collaborates with free will - humans start to want and move towards the good with God then acting in support (J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (London, 1958), p. 352; W.R.W Stephens, *Saint John Chrysostom: his Life and Times* (London, 1872), pp. 414-5).

[146] For angels as a theme underlying the condemnation, see below, pp. 234-49. The main reason for arguing article nine's limitation to humans is the apparent acceptability of the link between natural gifts and rewards for angels after the condemnation, as argued by theologians, such as Bonaventure; but this is inconclusive.

[147] See Appendix A3 for a table summarising the various probable influences and contexts.

derivation, they do not explain the condemnation as a whole. There is no single predominant influence to explain its formulation or why some issues were included and others excluded. To answer these last questions, it is necessary to return to other factors, in particular the institutional developments between 1215 and 1240.

INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON CHOICE AND ORDER OF ARTICLES

Two points emerged strongly from the analysis put forward in chapter two: the continuing importance given to Lateran IV's statement of faith; and the external focus of theologians at Paris, particularly mendicants but also secular masters, including, for example, William of Auvergne's emphasis on preaching. This attitude permeated all levels, from the pope as the supreme head of the Church to individual bishops, chancellors and regent masters. Theologians were to be useful: teaching the ignorant; combating heresy, and in all its forms; debating with Christians who had left the true path; converting other faiths; and church reform. Looked at in this context, the condemnation does not appear simply an attempt to tackle some abstruse doctrinal aberrations within the university but rather as a tool for use by its theologians whom Gregory IX, at the time of the 1229-31 dispute, had described as 'wearing the armour of Christian welfare'.[148]

The interpretation of the condemnation as an instrument in this external role is supported by what we know of its imposition. Unlike earlier condemnations aimed at specific individuals or their works, it does not appear to have been directed at individual miscreants (although there were many of these, including the only named culprit - Brother Stephanus - and also John Pagus and others). Instead it was targeted at a collection of doctrines. Moreover, although the articles focused on specific areas, these may well have been the 'headline' for the additional doctrines which underpinned them. This is at least suggested by Roger Bacon's remark on William of Auvergne's discussion of the agent intellect.[149] It implies that the overall remit of the articles was a clean-up of thinking for

[148] *CUP*, i, no. 79, pp. 136-9.
[149] Above, pp. 22-3.

Paris theologians as a whole in the areas it covered, to make the university's teaching generally 'fit-for-purpose'.

Moreover, the timing of the condemnation was not linked to any one specific trigger or development, although there appears to have been a build-up of texts by different theologians which were seen as needing correction. While the process coincided with the Talmud's condemnation, there is no real read-across of issues between the two, with the Talmud mainly offending on Christology, a subject which is striking by its absence from the 1241/4 condemnation. Neither the Greek nor Cathar controversies were new. However, more generally, the late 1230s and early 1240s were a period of uncertainty outside the university and of challenges for it to meet, including the change of pope, the struggle against heresy, and events such as the Mongol invasion of Hungary in 1241. Internally, the period saw increasingly divergent, even perhaps experimental, views at the university, probably especially from the Dominicans (and, to a lesser extent, Franciscans), with their different backgrounds and their answerability to their orders as well as their university roles - this could have brought theologians into disrepute and, indirectly, jeopardised their external mission. In this wider context, leading figures such as William of Auvergne or Odo of Châteauroux could well have seen the time as ripe for refocusing Paris theologians on their core purpose, on doctrine in its fullest sense.

The institutional evidence thus points to the Paris theology masters having both a need for, and an ambition to, sort out their own house to meet their own - and papal - ambitions, as well as those of the mendicant orders. The question remains why these particular areas were chosen for the condemnation. All seem to have generated errors, some much more than others, but they were not alone in this. This is where Lateran IV, with its statement of the principles of catholic doctrine, is significant. The condemnation followed the first part of it closely, covering all its major issues; and, despite variations in order, all the manuscripts show a similar progression of thought.[150] If Paris theologians

[150] Below, pp. 248-9.

wanted to ensure they presented a clear, cogent and theologically correct doctrine to the world, this was the right, indeed the only, template to follow.

The institutional evidence from c.1215 to c.1240, coupled with the diverse doctrinal influences behind the different articles, suggests a clear conclusion. The motivation behind the condemnation was not simply the discovery of some dangerous texts or aberrant trends in thinking. Instead, it represented a more systematic approach aimed at ensuring adherence to the main principles of catholic doctrine. It was necessitated by recent developments, both doctrinal and institutional, and it was designed to cement the message of Lateran IV at Paris for outward dissemination.

CONCLUSION

'WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TREAD'[1]

The condemnation at Paris in 1241/4 was, in its own right, a notable event, or pair of events. It was seen as such both by contemporary theologians and those in the decades following it. But it has been eclipsed by its more famous successors, and largely ignored by modern scholars. By examining the background to each of the ten articles contained in the condemnation - why they caused concern in the 1240s in Paris and why the specific ten articles were chosen - a picture emerges of the evolution and development of the university between its first statutes and Lateran IV in 1215, and the end of Gregory IX's papacy in 1241 and the beginning of Innocent IV's in 1243. Read in this context, the condemnation throws light on the often-neglected years between the university's struggle for its autonomy from civic and episcopal authorities, culminating in the university strike of 1229-31, and the stormy and divisive period it faced from the 1250s, with the disputes between seculars and mendicants and within the mendicant orders themselves.[2]

While the 1230s and 1240s did not see major disputes involving the masters and the university, this was a period not of stagnation, but of fast-moving events, major intellectual advances, and institutional development. Institutionally, the period saw the structure of a 'university' emerge stronger from the 1229-31 strike. It witnessed the continuing rise of the mendicant orders and their deeper penetration of the university. Externally, Muslim presence in the Holy Land remained unfinished business, despite the truce negotiated by the emperor, Frederick II in 1228-9, with the loss of Jerusalem in 1244 imminent and Louis IX's disastrous foray in the seventh crusade, 1248, yet to come.[3] There was also a growing threat from the Mongols in the east, peaking in their invasion of Hungary in April 1241 but already heralded in 1237, and with the threat of further

[1] A. Pope, *Essay on Criticism* (London, 1711), p. 36.
[2] The different climate of the 1230s/40s is shown, for example, by the fact that the Dominican Guerric of St.-Quentin appears to have been friends with several Franciscans (F.M. Henquinet, 'Les écrits de Frère Guerric de Saint-Quentin, O.P.', *RTAM*, 6 (1934), pp. 187-8).
[3] Louis' decision in 1244 to go on crusade was apparently itself a concern in Paris - for example, William of Auvergne, for one, opposed it (Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, iv, pp. 397-8).

advances. The long and increasingly apolcalyptic struggle with Frederick II, excommunicated for the second time in 1239, was reaching its climax, culminating in Gregory IX's abortive summons of a papal council in 1240 to deal with Frederick, Gregory's death in 1241, and the resultant two year papal hiatus. Theologians, including many from the university, were involved in the increasingly bitter struggle against heresy, with the Albigensian Crusade concluded by 1229 but the conflict yet to culminate in the siege of Montségur, 1244, and problems continuing in Germany and Bosnia, as well as the continuing, even escalating, disputes with the Greeks and the Jews. These events were frequently viewed in an apocalyptic light, with groups outside the catholic faith increasingly seen as precursors to the coming of Antichrist and the Day of Judgment. Set against these overlapping currents was the dissemination of new texts and new ideas. Philosophers, but also theologians, had access to previously unknown and exciting Greek philosophical texts and Arab and Jewish commentaries on them - while the theories these contained had to be made consonant with theological truths, they opened up new concepts and lines of argument that could not be ignored. It is in this historical, institutional and intellectual context that the condemnation must be viewed as an event in its own right, a product of its own time, not merely as one of a series of corrective measures culminating in the 1270s and viewed, doctrinally and institutionally, with retrospective eyes.

This study follows the majority view of recent scholarship that the condemnation was imposed twice, in 1241 and 1244, raising the issue of what, if anything, the critical three years between might explain about its second imposition. These years saw a papal 'sede vacante' after the early death of Gregory IX's successor in 1241. Perhaps more significantly, they saw increased inflexibility over doctrines considered threatening, as the Talmud examination and condemnation demonstrates, and also unabated, if not growing, concern over Catharism and other heresies. 1243 saw the Dominican General Chapter explicitly restricting friars to those philosophical books prescribed in their constitutions, together with the requirement to erase any of the errors condemned in Paris from their writings, while their 1244 Acts required them to forsake novel views ('novas opiniones

non inveniant') and follow only approved ones - these measures suggest a tightening of doctrine within the Order, perhaps inspired by their new Master General, John of Wildeshausen, with his militant stance against heresy. Indeed, John could himself possibly even have inspired the condemnation's second issue.[4] Doctrinally, the condemnation may represent a closing down of what appears to have been a more permissive era of debate within the university - not freedom of views, but of a certain licence in more fluid areas of theology. Guerric of St.-Quentin stated, in a quodlibet on virginity, that 'there are many opinions on this, and because nothing had been determined by the saints on it, different views are permitted ('licet diversimodo opinari')'.[5] This suggests a more open attitude, among some contemporary theologians anyway, than is reflected in the condemnation, which dictated doctrine on areas some of which were already well established in catholic theology (such as the *filioque*), but others of which (such as the beatific vision) were not.

At first sight, the condemnation may appear a miscellany of unconnected propositions. As had been the case in the twelfth century, theologians in the first half of the thirteenth needed to develop their arguments and conclusions against an increasingly complex mix of views from influences including Greek theology, Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism, not merely seemingly contradictory or obscure biblical and patristic texts. This led to, or was seen as risking, the development of aberrant views. Given the number of such views, especially on issues such as the beatific vision (article one), it is perhaps unsurprising that the Paris theology faculty - or the bishop or the chancellor, or the Dominican Order - saw the need for action and, individually and collectively, put on record a list of errors and their correction.

But this is not the end of the story. It ignores two crucial elements. First, the challenges Paris theologians faced between 1215 and 1240 - from intractable theological

[4] *ACG*, i, pp. 26-7, 29. John of Wildeshausen had a long history of anti-heretical action, including in the 1230s against the German Stedinger with their non-conformist beliefs, and as bishop of Bosnia in 1233-7 (where he was appointed by Gregory IX to eliminate heresy, following the dismissal of his predecessor) - see C.J. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 12-13, 58-9.

[5] Guerric, *Quaestiones*, p. 266. See also ibid., p. 269 on purgatory. As Guerric ceased teaching in 1242, these texts probably pre-dated the condemnation's first imposition and certainly pre-dated its second.

issues, sometimes exacerbated by the new learning - should be seen in the context of the development of their faculty's external focus. This changed its nature fundamentally - it gave theologians a purpose and mission beyond academic disputation. It should make us look at the condemnation in terms of the way doctrinal challenges were tackled as part of a developing institutional context. Moreover, the condemnation's articles closely reflect the first part of the statement of faith in Lateran IV - on God, the Trinity, creation and man's fall - a statement that served as a 'creed' for the whole Latin Church. This cannot have been by chance.[6] It strongly implies that the condemnation was an attempt to affirm these doctrinal tenets, refocused where necessary on those new or reformulated challenges to doctrine which had emerged since 1215. These two elements together suggest that the condemnation's obvious and ostensible corrective purpose was only part of its overarching aim. Paris theologians were ambitious to cement their leading position within the church, both as doctrinal experts and champions of its message to those outside the university, be they Christian, pagan or heretical. For this, they had to ensure their own collective adherence to fundamental catholic principles. The condemnation was an essential instrument to achieve this, not just a means to correct sometimes abstruse errors.[7] Its production and formulation accordingly throw light on the masters of theology, their perception of their role as a faculty and as theologians within it, at a critical point in their institutional maturation.

The development of the external focus of Paris theologians in the first part of the thirteenth century is well established. It formed part of the evolution of the faculty from its roots in the twelfth-century schools into the major place for theological education and learning in the thirteenth century, imbued with the reform principles of Peter the Chanter

[6] The evidence for such correlation (and the condemnation's chronological - or hexaemeral - theme) renders untenable that the articles were chosen randomly. Moreover, while it could perhaps be argued that both Lateran IV and the condemnation followed similar logic in their chronological approach, with their correlation thus coincidental, this ignores Lateran IV's undoubted importance and its continuing use - an unconnected use of the same theme in a public articulation of principles is unconvincing.

[7] Belief that internal sins and errors needed eradication for external endeavours to succeed is well attested in crusade preaching, where failures, from the second crusade onwards, were attributed to Christian sinfulness (P.J. Cole, *The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095-1270* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 41, 54-7, 63, 151-5).

(and his pupils) and ingrained in the university's first, 1215, statutes. This external perspective was further strengthened by the inclusion of the mendicant orders among the faculty's members from around the 1220s. Paris theologians responded to outside events - to the spread of heresy, the dispute with the Greek Church, and problems with the Jews and other faiths - indeed, as perhaps with heresy, they may have contributed to the very problems they were involved in trying to solve.[8] Successive popes from Innocent III onwards saw a clear role for Paris theologians which, as members of the church and relying on papal support, the theologians themselves both needed and wanted to fulfil. Thus, the theology masters came to see their role, not just as leaders and teachers of theological doctrine, but, equally if not more important, as preachers, as advocates for catholicism and the church, as soldiers against heresy, who could not help but be involved in affairs well beyond confines of the university.

The linkage between the 1241/4 condemnation and Lateran IV's statement of faith can be seen at a formal and at a substantive level. The resemblance between the two texts is certainly striking. This can be traced in the key similarities, visible in almost all its ten articles. It can also be demonstrated by analysing the recurrent theme of angels and their role in creation. Analysis of this particular theme in the condemnation also points up the eclectic mixture of influences behind the various articles, supporting the argument that no single concern, whether differing scriptural interpretation, patristic inconsistency, Greek theology, Neoplatonic or Aristotelian learning or heretical doctrine dominated their choice. An alternative explanation is required and, in formal terms, Lateran IV provides it.

Angels had been part of theological discussions from the twelfth century, with their position cemented by Peter Lombard's extensive coverage in his *Sententiae.* This fascination continued into the thirteenth century.[9] But the reasons underlying the problems

[8] Above, pp. 136-8.

[9] Angels fascinated both medieval scholars and lay people. Good angels acted as individual guardians, God's messengers and servants. Evil angels tempted humans, contributing to their fall. Twelfth-century theologians (such as Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon*, trans. J. Taylor (New York, 1961), pp. 156, 227, n. 3) placed angels within Genesis' creation account. Peter Lombard's influence was crucial - his exhaustive treatment in the *Sententiae*, coupled with their integration within the *Sententiae*'s other main topics,

they caused can be traced to different sources - some 'primary', arising directly from scriptural, theological and philosophical references (or indeed lack of reference) to them; some 'secondary', from their use by others, such as dualists; but all of them underlying thirteenth-century debate. First, there was the biblical problem of their omission from the creation story, which, coupled with their manifest existence in both Old and New Testaments, left scope for them to acquire an uncreated, independent status. This opened the door to dualism.[10] Second, an issue which was again biblical in its origin, was the problem posed by their particular role. Origen, in particular, was believed to have held that they pre-existed time and were the uncreated wisdom of God referred to in Ecclesiasticus, 'Wisdom hath been created before all things' [Ecclus. i:1,4].[11] Alexander of Hales' *Glossa* on Peter Lombard's discussion here is particularly illuminating and merits full citation:

> '"Is understood… [Wisdom is understood to refer to angelic nature]." Against, the *Glossa* on this [Ecclus. i:4]: "[Wisdom] created in respect of humanity … was predestined to be incarnated for the human race's salvation. But Christ, because of the unity of the person, is called both born and created".
>
> "Often life … [Wisdom is often taken to refer to angelic nature, often called life in Scripture]" … the angel is called life, wisdom, light, and such like, as is clear from Augustine, *Super Genesim*. "Life", because he dwells in the God of life; "wisdom", because he dwells in uncreated wisdom; "light", for he shares the eternal light …
>
> "Was made… [Nothing was made before heaven and earth]." Isidore, in … *De Trinitate* [*Sententiae*, i, 10]: "There are two things among creatures to whom the

ensured angelology was put firmly on the agenda (Colish, 'Early Scholastic Angelology', p. 91). Twelfth-century debates included how Genesis should be read, examination of Neoplatonic accounts, similarities between Genesis and Plato's *Timaeus*, and angels as created beings or co-creators. Interest in angels reduced later in the twelfth century but flourished again in the thirteenth - for example, Bonaventure referred to 'plures … philosophi' discussing angelic issues (D. Keck, *Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 18-19). Of the 572 questions in Douai, MS 434, over seventeen per-cent directly discussed angels (Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', pp. 123-52, 225-267). Good angels were exemplars for humans - studying them allowed humans better to understand themselves and their relationship to God.

[10] Almost all Albingensian and Cathar teachings before Lateran IV were made in terms of angels or demons (P.M. Quay, 'Angels and Demons: the Teaching of Lateran IV', *Theological Studies*, 45 (1981), pp. 42-3).

[11] Colish, 'Early Scholastic Angelology', p. 85.

> vicissitude of times do not apply: angels, because they dwell in the unchangeable truth; or unformed matter … Time therefore pertains not to those creatures above the heavens, but below heaven" …
>
> "There was [an eternal and changeless] time [before the world]." Augustine, xi [xii] *De civitate Dei*, chapter 15: "There were always angels, because they were for all time. For where no creature [exists], by whose changeable movements times are accomplished, times cannot exist at all. Nor therefore are they coeternal with the Creator: for time, since it runs by change, cannot be coeternal with immutable eternity"'.[12]

Alexander's commentary shows Ecclesiasticus' reference to 'created' was problematic. Unless it was glossed, it implied that Christ, one of the uncreated Trinity, could not be wisdom, leaving this role entirely for angels, thereby giving them the status of having been always with God and being before time (Ecclus. i:1). It also demonstrates the heavy reliance of theologians such as Alexander, especially on Augustine, but also on other Latin authorities.

A third angelic problem, again originating in the Bible, concerned the empyrean heaven. Medieval theologians generally believed the Bible taught that this was corporeal. Angels, being incorporeal, should not live in a corporeal place. There were numerous discussions on the nature of the empyrean heaven and of angels in the period preceding and around the condemnation. However, while such discussions had biblical roots, they also had wider 'scientific' antecedents in Plato and earlier writers, with Greek, Christian, Jewish and Arab philosophers, theologians, natural scientists and geographers fascinated by the movement and nature of the heavens in all their permutations. This debate continued with increasing sophistication as a result of the newly translated Aristotelian material from the 1150s onwards. Such texts also added complexity to existing debates on

[12] Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 2, pp. 16-17.

issues such as how bodies and spirits move in time and space.[13] Thus, in his commentary on the *Sententiae*, Albertus Magnus cited the Church Fathers and the Bible, but also, without necessarily agreeing with it, Aristotle's *Physics*, among arguments on angelic existence: if something, such as hydromelle, composed of honey and water, consisted of two things, and if one of them existed separately, then the other must do so as well. Since substances were made up of the corporeal and incorporeal, and the corporeal existed separately, so must the incorporeal i.e. angels. Albertus cited Aristotle's *De caelo et mundo* [I.3] for the argument that heaven is a body but immortal - so by how much more must angels, being incorporeal, be immortal by nature. He also referred to commentators on Aristotle, such as al-Ghazālī and Maimonides, as well as the *Liber de causis*.[14]

A further strand within discussions on how to interpret biblical references to angels came, directly and indirectly, from Neoplatonism, sometimes confused with, or combined with, Aristotle's original views. The *Liber de causis* provides especially salient evidence here. In particular, while it identified the First Cause as the sole creative force, the role assigned to Intelligence and the intelligences went beyond Christian doctrine in three - complementary - respects. For the First Cause, creation was through Intelligence as intermediary ('mediante intelligentia'). Moreover, the sub-creative powers given to the intelligences were problematic, since some medieval theologians identified these with Christian angels.[15] Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, and the subsequent commentaries, accordingly went to some lengths to demonstrate that angels (and others, such as Pharaoh's magicians), had no creative powers. Finally, the argument that Intelligence and the intelligences were co-eternal with the First Cause was problematic (unless Intelligence was equated with Christ, which raised issues over other aspects of its role and that of the intelligences subsumed under it).

[13] Innovations in angelology in the thirteenth century appear to have resulted partly from the new Aristotelian material which led to a more systematic approach to the subject, including the place of angels in creation (C. Muessig, 'Heaven, Earth and the Angels - Preaching Paradise in the Sermons of Jacques de Vitry', in C. Muessig and A. Putter (eds.), *Envisaging Heaven in the Middle Ages* (London, 2007), p. 61).
[14] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 3.1, 3.2, 3.15 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 60-1, 63-6, 89.
[15] This connection went back at least to Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, xii, 25, although he equated angels with Plato's lesser Gods (the Neoplatonic henads, replaced by intelligences in the *Liber de causis*).

The sharpest exposition of these issues comes from Albertus Magnus' commentary on the *Sententiae*. According to his own summary: 'philosophers say that angels are the substances which move to being [the substances] of elements and elemental things, and flow over being and the movement of the orbs; therefore they must be before the elements and elemental things and orbs, and must have been created before them'. He noted that many believed, wrongly, that God created the world through the angels, and questioned 'whether we may call angelic substances those separated substances which the philosophers call intelligences, as some contentiously presume to defend'. Albertus accused al-Ghazālī, Avicenna, Maimonides, and philosophers generally of erring by making this equation. Returning later to this critique, he stated: 'it seems through that proposition in the *Liber de Causis* that an intelligence is full of forms; therefore it seems the same would be the case with angels, although according to our interpretation ('intentio') an intelligence is not an angel'. Caution was the order of the day.[16]

These strands of influence could all be described as 'primary', directly creating dilemmas for catholic doctrine. But they had secondary consequences through their impact on other religions and on heresies, notably in both Languedoc and Bosnia, themselves of deep concern. Dualism was still very much a live issue. So also was Judaism, with Maimonides' equation of angels with intelligences - probably known in Paris by the 1240s, together with the condemnation of the Talmud in Paris in the early 1240s. The potentially pernicious threat from both these areas in respect of angels is clear. The dualist elevation of the evil angel to the status of a god with creative powers was fundamental to its creed but wholly unacceptable to catholic doctrine. Angels and their role had become a key doctrinal issue in its refutation. For Jews, while the doctrinal accusations against the Talmud in the 1240 trial mainly concerned subjects such as Christology and the Virgin Mary, one at least touched on angels - or rather, on demons. On a Talmudic statement that Adam begat ghosts and demons, the Jewish response - as set out in the Hebrew narrative,

[16] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 2.1, 3.3, 3.15 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 44, 64-6, 92.

the *Disputation* of Yehiel ben Joseph of Paris (the main Jewish spokesman) - argued that Genesis' failure to mention their creation supported this position:

> 'There are many beings that have a body and soul … such as those called *Lutin* (Goblin) … Those they call *Piash* [?] from whom did they descend? There is no problem with those who were created without a body … However, those that were completed with both body and soul … from whom did they derive? Clearly, Lilith came and lay with him [Adam] while he was unaware, since she had no substance, for she had no body. And when he discharged into her the seed, she was created [with substance: a body] at the outset. And from her came the same ghosts, he-demons, and she-demons, as it says, "When Adam was one hundred and thirty years he became a father in his likeness, according to his image"' [Gen. v:3].[17]

This passage could be seen as undermining Christian beliefs concerning both the creation story and angels.

It is thus clear both that angels were important elements of thirteenth-century theology, and that they caused problems. Their creation, relationship to God (including possible infringement on his omnipotence), role and powers, and link to explanations for good and evil, were all issues in need of clarification. Positioned between God and humans, they illuminated issues such as humanity's vision of God, Adam's fall, human free will and God's gifts of grace, given to both angels and humankind. The debates they triggered were coloured by numerous factors, whether inherent in Christianity or arising from philosophical texts, with a resultant amalgam which was hard even for contemporaries to separate into its component parts. Their problematic intellectual nature was intensified by contemporary real or apparent threats, such as heresy and Judaism.

Angels certainly pervade Lateran IV's initial statement. This began by affirming the existence of one sole God, who 'made from nothing creatures both spiritual and corporeal, angelic … and mundane ...'. It continued with explicit reference to the devil: 'The devil

[17] Friedman, Hoff and Chazan, *Trial of the Talmud*, pp. 164-5.

and the other demons were indeed created by God good by nature but became bad through themselves; man, however, sinned at the suggestion of the devil'. Thus, the issue of creation - God's sole role in this, explicitly including his creation of angels, and the initially good nature of all angels - were made the centre-piece of catholic doctrine. The references to devils and angels demonstrate that both were seen as key to proper catholic interpretation in the face of heresies such as dualism. They formed a marked feature of Lateran IV and, as such, stand in patent contrast to previous conciliar declarations.[18]

While not all the condemnation's articles refer explicitly to angels, they are present - either explicitly or lurking, so to speak, in the wings - in all except articles two and three (on the Trinity where they would be inappropriate, and where they are equally absent from Lateran IV's text). This is not to suggest that the condemnation's whole focus is on angels. Like Lateran IV, however, they provide an important underlying and coherent theme.

Article one, the beatific vision, includes angels alongside humans. Lateran IV referred to God's incomprehensible and ineffable nature, but not explicitly to angels (who shared with humans the ability to see and to know but not to comprehend God). However, the need to affirm vision for both groups necessitated their inclusion in article one - both were threatened by Greek negative theology and Aristotelian theories on knowledge and vision. By 1241/4, the ability to *see* God, not his unknowability, had become a major issue.

Angels are also visible in article four (the empyrean heaven), in which the offending proposition locates them while expelling any prospective human occupants. The genesis for this belief is obscure. But, despite initial appearances, one candidate, or at least a contributory factor, is that the problem was angelic as much as it was human, resulting from the differing natures of the two groups. There are two potential implications here. First, given medieval theologians generally believed that the Bible stated the empyrean heaven was corporeal and that angels were incorporeal, article four was, in its origins

[18] The need to counter dualism is further illustrated by Jacques de Vitry's attempts to discredit duelist angelology - his sermons made clear that angels were inferior to God and that the devil caused the fall of humankind, as specified in Lateran IV (Muessig, 'Heaven, Earth and the Angels', p. 61).

anyway, partially 'home-grown'. Second, if the later parts of the condemnation follow the creation story with angels underlying it, as in Lateran IV, then article four, on the place where the first creatures were created, logically fits in. Its omission from the start of the 1215 statement of faith could simply be because the specific issue causing one or more theologians sufficient concern for its inclusion in 1241/4 (perhaps, if this was the full implication of corporeality, brought into sharper focus by discussion in the new Aristotelian texts) had not yet triggered real alarm.[19]

Article five, on whether the evil angel was created bad, is more straightforward in two respects. Angels are, self-evidently, the main issue (although with the whole issue of good, evil and free will underneath). It also represents a crucial early element in the creation story for both the condemnation and Lateran IV (the obvious overlap with article ten being explained by the focus there on humanity's fall as against Satan's creation and turn to evil).[20] As regards derivation, its origin was clearly biblical and 'home-grown', although against a backdrop of dualism (whether Manichaean or later Cathar). Discussions of this subject show mixed influences, many of them patristic. Setting the agenda for subsequent discussion, Peter Lombard cited Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*:

> 'Not without cause may it be held that the devil fell from the very beginning of time or of his existence, and never stood in the truth. From this, some think that the devil was not disposed to wickedness by his free choice, but that he was created [in a state of] wickedness, albeit by God, according to … Job, who says "He is the beginning of God's work, which God made so that he might be mocked by his angels"'.[21]

Alexander of Hales' *Glossa* followed similar lines to Peter Lombard, with a typical dilemma encapsulated in a quotation, this time from Anselm of Canterbury:

[19] Above, pp. 171-3. The main variant arrangement of articles, Appendix A2, places article four seventh, between articles five and six (both angel-focused) and after seven and eight. This similarly supports its angelic roots.
[20] The main variant order puts creation before the angelic fall, equally consistent with creation chronology.
[21] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, p. 15; Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, p. 443. The passage, Job xl:19 (or Job xl:14) is in the old Greek translation and quoted by Origen (in his commentary on John's Gospel), but I have not found it in the Vulgate or Septuagint.

> ‘Either his [Satan’s] own will was good or bad. If good, how did he fall from so great good because of it? But if bad, either it was something or nothing. If something, either from God or from it/him itself: which is against that saying of the Apostle [1.Cor. iv:7]: “What do you have which you have not received?” But if nothing, how was he damned so gravely on account of nothing’.[22]

These passages from Peter Lombard and Alexander demonstrate the moral core of the issue, but also its potential implications - Alexander’s arguments also echo the kind of argumentation in the Cathar *Liber de duobus principiis*: if evil did not exist, how could angels have chosen it?

Albertus Magnus’ discussion was characteristically complex and wide-ranging. In his commentary on the *Sententiae*, he referred to Aristotle’s argument that an intellect is always right, and angels are only moved by the intellect - hence angels could not fall through sin. However, his references to new Aristotelian and related texts on the specific issue in article five are noticeably fewer than elsewhere in his commentary. Indeed, on the question whether all angels were created in grace or in simple natural goodness, he stated that he would proceed mainly through the authorities, since ‘our reasoning around the state of angels is lacking (‘circum statum angeli deficit nostra ratio’)’.[23] Nevertheless Albertus’ arguments, while not new, have a more contemporary ring to them, both Neoplatonic and Aristotelian. Once again, although dualists are not explicitly his focus, their presence is tangible. Their presence in this context is more explicit elsewhere. William of Auvergne’s sustained attack on them is particularly revealing, dominating, and dictating, his major exposition on the creation of the evil angel as good.[24] Given the Cathars’ own use of Aristotelian principles to support their doctrine, the new texts may well have indirectly contributed to the inclusion of the issue in both the condemnation and Lateran IV. However, the main factor behind both was the need to combat a dualism based on an

[22] Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 5, p. 46; Anselm, *De casu diaboli* (*The Major Works*, eds. B. Davies and G.R. Evans, Oxford, 2008), pp. 204-5.
[23] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 5.1, 3.12 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 110-1, 82-5.
[24] William of Auvergne, *Universe of Creatures*, pp. 31-60.

intractable moral conundrum, coupled with the chronological placement of their origin in the creation story and the fall.

The focus of article six, as for article five, is plainly angelic, but for article six their encroachment on God's pre-eminence was clearly the underlying issue. While angelic location as such does not form a sequential part of the creation story, it fits this part of the account as it relates only to angels, the first creations, and thus fleshes out the role of the first created beings. Moreover, any enlargement of their role potentially impinged on God's unique omnipresence and limitlessness - concepts implicit in Lateran IV's emphasis on God's all-powerful being.[25] Peter Lombard contrasted a creature 'bounded by the certain limits of its own nature', with that of the Holy Spirit, 'who does not have a circumscribed and determined power, who is always in all things and everywhere ...'. Alexander of Hales' discussion followed similar lines, including the mechanics of angelic movement, relying on authorities such as John Damascene for his theological and scientific arguments. Both these accounts avoided giving angels any God-like powers of omnipresence, despite their incorporeality and their special roles. Guerric of St.-Quentin differentiated between different levels of angels, arguing that the highest level could operate in more than one place simultaneously if it were so directed by God.[26]

Up to this point, the arguments on this particular issue appear to have derived primarily from discussion by the Church Fathers. Albertus Magnus, however, brought new perspectives. After a long technical discussion in his commentary on the *Sententiae* on issues such as the meaning of 'place', the components of angelic locomotion and whether it happens within time, Albertus noted numerous different views on angelic movement, including those of Maimonides and other Jews, with some philosophers arguing that angels could be at the same time in many, or even all, places - a view Albertus stated was

[25] Many medieval accounts associated Satan's fall with his envy of God and pride in his own status. Article six could therefore be implicitly connected to article five in exemplifying angelic arrogance and its consequences.
[26] Lombard, *Sentences*, i, 37. 1, p. 203; Alexander, *Glossa*, i, 37, pp. 364-5; Guerric, *Quaestiones*, p. 57.

heresy since it contradicted the saints. Albertus concluded that no two views on angelic movement were identical.[27]

It is thus clear that debate on article six was rooted in patristic authority, with the original error perhaps stemming from distinctions between tiers of angels, as discussed by Guerric. However, it had now been sharpened by the new Aristotelian material, as well as by Arab and Jewish works. Additional sensitivity on angelic powers may have resulted from these texts, as well as from increasing concern over dualism. But, as with so many of the articles, the result seems to be a combination of influences - biblical exegesis, Neoplatonic ideas on angels, heresies, with the new learning increasing the toxicity of the mixture for catholic theology - and hence, perhaps, unlike for Lateran IV, requiring its explicit inclusion in the condemnation.

Article seven is one of the most complex for any assessment of the role of angels within it. The possibility is inherent in the first of three propositions on eternal truths which are not God, in Alexander of Hales' *quaestio* 'About the eternal truth of things'. Alexander cited Augustine, *De libero arbitrio,* for the equation of mathematical truths with Platonic ideas/forms. The angelic connection resulted from this identification, with the subsequent equation of ideas/forms with angels deriving from Neoplatonism.[28] Concern in this area went back a long way, but Albertus Magnus, taking his lead from Boethius, most starkly equated mathematical concepts or truths with Platonic ideas. Moreover, while both Peter Lombard, in his *Sententiae*, and Alexander of Hales, in his *Glossa*, were already concerned over Plato's three uncreated principles, Albertus Magnus' commentary on the *Sententiae* went further in arguing that Plato undoubtedly erred in how he posited exemplars.[29] Albertus frequently referred to intelligences as full of forms (or ideas), thus correlating the two; he also expressed extreme concern at the identification of intelligences with angels made by many Arab and Jewish philosophers.[30]

[27] Albertus, *In I Sent.*, 37.24 (Borgnet, xxvi), pp. 262-6.
[28] Alexander, *Quaestiones universitatem*, pp. 215-8, 240-3.
[29] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 1.3-5 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 11-19.
[30] For example, ibid., 3.2-3, pp. 61-6, 92.

Thus, although only implicit in article seven, the question of angels was clearly not far below the surface. Moreover, their presence can be linked to concern over the possible angelic role in creation, and thus - just as it had done for Lateran IV - it fits a loose creation chronology for this part of the condemnation. This link is also suggested by Alexander's inclusion of the question on eternal truths in his *Quaestiones… universitatem*, a series of discussions primarily on the world's creation and duration. While Alexander noted the question was somewhat misplaced, the individual who originally posed it seems to have thought it fitted the context of those discussions.[31] The extrapolation of Platonic or Neoplatonic ideas (and hence truths) to angels is only one of the issues underlying article seven. But it arguably gave the article immediacy and real 'teeth', given concerns on angels generally in respect of creative powers and other possible usurpations of divinity, many raised by Neoplatonism and perhaps exacerbated between 1215 and 1241/4 by the increasing use of works such as the *Liber de causis* and those by Avicenna and other Arab, as well as Jewish, philosophers.

Article eight makes sense sequentially in both the condemnation and Lateran IV. The creation of the physical world falls logically after articles which concern God's supreme powers and the existence of eternal truth.[32] However, while Lateran IV explicitly includes angels within God's creation, their appearance in article eight is less obvious - the main focus of the article is on Aristotelian and other theories on the eternity of the world, its creation and the creation of time itself. Nevertheless, given the backdrop of concerns over angelic creation (in particular over the issue that they themselves were not created, but creators), their presence must represent an underlying strand. There were numerous discussions on whether angels were created in time or before time, with implications for whether there was a first moment of time. Peter Lombard demonstrated the long-standing difficulties in this issue. He noted Jerome's remark on eternities passing during which

[31] Alexander, *Quaestiones universitatem*, pp. 240-3, noted, in one version, that it was raised 'ex incidenti' and would fit better with questions on truth.

[32] The different order of articles in the various manuscripts of condemnation puts angelic creation and fall either before or after the world's creation, but the creation story is sufficiently flexible to accommodate both variations.

angels served God without measures of time - some people, he claimed, had interpreted this to mean that, although 'worldly time began with the world' there was an 'eternal and changeless time before the world'.[33] Alexander of Hales' *Glossa* showed similar concerns, with ambivalent quotations from both Isidore and Augustine implying that angels existed before time and had always existed.[34] Thus, although arguments in later works, such as Albertus Magnus' commentary on the *Sententiae* and Alexander's *Quaestiones… universitatem*, tended to look more at Aristotle scientific arguments, Albertus's concern over the equation of angels with intelligences or ideas (with creative powers) implies that, even in the 1240s, angels were bound up in article eight, albeit as associated doctrinal perils - just as they were more obviously, and benignly, included in the creation story in 1215.

Angels are, again, not explicitly invoked in article nine, which appears primarily focussed on humans, perhaps concerned with predestination and the dispute between Augustine and Pelagius. However, while the riposte appears Augustinian (with references to pre-selection and preordaining), one explanation for the banned proposition probably lies, at least partly, in Peter Lombard's adoption of pseudo-Dionysius' concept of angelic hierarchy (which linked rewards and natural capacities). This was a much debated passage of the *Sententiae*, with thirteenth-century theologians concerned over applying the same sort of connection to humans.[35] Peter Lombard argued that God gave gifts to angels unequally - those given greater natural goods would later transcend the rest through the gifts of grace.[36] However, he was less clear about humans. Guerric of St.-Quentin also discussed the point, again referring to angels - greater capacity in respect of substance and intellect resulted in greater capacity in respect of reward of substance.[37] Subsequently, and writing shortly after the condemnation, Albertus Magnus and Bonaventure explicitly

[33] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 1.1-2.3, pp. 3-10.
[34] Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 1-2, pp. 1-18.
[35] Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Celestial Hierarchy* (*The Complete Works*, trans. C. Luibheid, New York, 1987), p. 160: 'all the heavenly powers hold as a common possession an inferior or superior capacity to conform to the divine and to enter into communion with the light coming from God'.
[36] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 3.2, p. 13.
[37] Guerric, *Quaestiones*, Appendix 2, pp. 403-4.

treated angels and humans differently, and they both felt the need to justify such a distinction. In a revealing passage, Albertus argued that, generally, grace was not proportionate to nature, but angels were an exception 'because they were created in grace'.[38]

It is therefore clear that angels, however implicit, were a key element in article nine, figuring in many twelfth- and thirteenth-century texts on natural gifts, grace and glory, with potentially unacceptable implications for man. The idea of a Neoplatonic predetermined hierarchy where the level of grace given was linked to natural goods, even though these came from God, undermined the role both of God in predestination and of Christ as saviour, and left the church no real function. Moreover, it can be linked with article ten, the fall from grace, explaining its position in the condemnation - before Adam fell, and had he not fallen, his natural gifts would have ensured his grace and glory.[39] It thus provides a chronological progression in the creation story from God, through angels, to humans - the sequence adopted in both the condemnation and Lateran IV.

Article ten is important in its own right, with its focus on humanity's creation and the ability to stand firm but, like the evil angel, not to profit. However, it involves some repetition with article five on angels being created good. Many texts therefore discussed both issues together, with the role of the evil angel attracting at least as much attention as that of Adam. Indeed, Peter Lombard used the fact that Adam and Eve did not immediately sin to support his position on a brief delay between Satan's creation and fall. He explicitly linked Satan's fall with that of Adam, when he stated that Satan 'promised equality with God to himself and killed his own self, which is called "man" in the Gospel. And he did not "stand in the truth" because he was never in it, but he committed apostasy "from the beginning" of time, that is, from the moment of the making of man, whom through envy he cast into death and seduced by deceit'. A similar connection was made by

[38] Albertus, *In II Sent.*, 3.10 (Borgnet, xxvii), pp. 76-7; Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, 9. 1.9 (cit. Schenk, 'Analogy as the *discrimen*', pp. 184-7).

[39] According to Evans (*Alan of Lille*, p. 158), twelfth-century theologians were the first medieval scholars to attempt a systematic, full-scale reconciliation of the biblical account of creation with an explanation of the beginning of the world based on natural causes as presented by natural philosophers.

Alexander of Hales, when he argued in his *Glossa*: 'If someone says that there was not a delay before the fall, the response should be according to authority, because it is understood about the devil when he was a serpent. But this was when he had been ordained to suggest sin to man, and thus it is not said about the first sin'.[40] This suggests Peter Lombard and Alexander connected the devil's fall with Adam's, as well as earlier. It fits the separation of articles five and ten, but also the importance of angelic action to Adam's fall. Article ten marks the end of the historical account of creation with the fall of both angels and humans. Its importance and derivation mirrors that of article five - both covered fundamental theological problems, with the need to combat dualist influence probably providing strong motivation for the topic's inclusion in both Lateran IV and the condemnation, albeit perhaps more directly for article five.

Angels - along with creation - thus comprise an important sub-text running throughout articles four to ten, just as they had done in Lateran IV's statement of faith. The exact ordering of the articles varies between manuscripts. However, the same underlying theme applies - the main difference concerns whether eternal truths and the world's creation come before or after the angels' fall, the empyrean heaven and angelic location - but the underlying connections remain. Thus, according to the *CUP*'s ordering, the sequence starts with article four, the empyrean heaven, where the issue appear to be as much angelic as human. Articles five and six concentrate on angels, their fall and alleged omnipresence, followed by article seven, eternal truths which are not God, where the evidence that angels are part of the underlying agenda, and are linked to creation, is compelling. These three articles pick up major issues relevant to God's power and nature in respect of angels, the first beings created. Article seven leads naturally into article eight, creation, where angels are implicit, given the putative role assigned to them as creators

[40] Lombard, *Sentences*, ii, 3.4, p. 18; Alexander, *Glossa*, ii, 3, p. 39. Peter Lombard's analysis here implied Satan never stood 'in the truth' at all, with his fall linked to Adam's seduction, rather than from pride (see ibid., 6.1, p. 24). However, earlier (ibid., 3.4, pp. 14-17) he had stipulated a brief gap between Satan's creation and fall.

before time began. The final two articles, while still with an angelic focus, move to look more directly at issues which also involved humans.[41]

Whatever the outside pressures on doctrine, it is clear that thirteenth-century Parisian theologians struggled with numerous fundamental issues of angelology in their own right, arising from the Bible and their own authorities, but also often influenced by the Greek philosophers. How a wholly good God could create creatures who could turn to evil is a problem that lies at the heart of Christianity, irrespective of philosophy; and the complexity and difficulty of the argumentation illustrate this. As for why angels had so strong a presence in a condemnation at this particular time, and, indeed, in Lateran IV earlier, it is clear that aberrant views on them posed two major contemporary risks to catholic faith. First was dualism. For Peter Lombard, this may have been partly historic, with Augustine's works ensuring its presence; but for thirteenth-century theologians, perhaps particularly the Dominicans, it was a live and pressing issue. Second was the insidious belief in angels as intelligences originating in Neoplatonism (albeit confused with Aristotelianism because of the misattribution of the *Liber de causis*). This was an escalating issue made more seductive through both the Greek philosophers and their Arab commentators, and, intriguingly, through a Jewish strand of thought, visible particularly in Maimonides. Both risks - dualism and Neoplatonism - would have been present in 1215 as well as 1241/4, although in 1215 concerns over the new Aristotelian texts would have been less focussed than by the 1240s. In reflecting Lateran IV's priorities, the condemnation also reflected its angelic theme, and although some of the specific concerns in the 1240s went beyond those of 1215, the underlying position and nature of the problem remained the same. Comparison of the explicit and implicit references to angels in the

[41] Below, Appendix A2. The main variants are the movement of articles four (empyrean heaven), five (evil angel's creation) and six (angelic location) to after articles seven (eternal truths) and eight (time/creation). This ordering is closer to that in Lateran IV, which could have prompted the move. Alternatively the differences could reflect increased concern over issues around eternal truths and Aristotelian views on time/creation, raising them up the order. Or, as apparently with the 1277 condemnation, the ordering was simply not fixed. However, while the sequence is different, the adherence to the angelic and creation theme remains: in particular, the progression from article seven to eight survives, and that from article nine (natural gifts, grace and glory) to ten (Adam's fall). The only exception is Matthew Paris who reverses the order of articles nine and ten. Thus the argument on angelic presence within articles eight and nine, where they are most hidden, is preserved.

condemnation with those in Lateran IV illustrates how the mixture of influences behind its different articles, and indeed within the individual articles, while rooted in similar and manifold sources, had developed.

This complex relationship between the two texts is visible perhaps most clearly in an area not directly related to angels - in a comparison of Lateran IV's statement that God created all things from nothing at the beginning of time ('ab initio temporis') with discussion in article eight on a first moment of time ('primum nunc'). A statement of faith issued in 1215 could not have been influenced by detailed discussions on Aristotle's *Physics*, which only started properly in the late 1220s, and gained momentum in the 1230s. Nevertheless, concern over the newly translated works of Aristotle and the commentators on him was already present in 1215, with the first prohibitions on reading such works in force and more to come. So the fact that they potentially increased the risk of heretical theories on the eternity of the world (itself a long standing area of theological and philosophical debate) had already been identified; indeed this might have been part of the reason for the inclusion of the passage in Lateran IV in the first place. Thus, the condemnation reflected the statement of faith in Lateran IV; but the presence of the subject-matter of article eight in each of them was due both to long-running concerns and to the new learning, as yet undigested in 1215 but increasingly appreciated as a significant threat in respect of specific points in the two decades preceding the condemnation. This lies behind the more precise terminology and targeting of article eight when compared with the reference in Lateran IV. It could also explain the specific inclusion of articles in the condemnation, such as article four on the empyrean heaven. This implicitly fell within the scope of Lateran IV but was not explicitly articulated there. The more detailed reading of the new texts between 1215 and 1241/4 could have rendered issues such as corporeality, motion and change much more problematic and therefore in much greater need of clarification.[42]

[42] Similarly, the main issue on the beatific vision had changed between 1215 and 1241/4.

Analysis of the angelic theme provides compelling evidence to support a link between the condemnation and Lateran IV. The statement of faith in Lateran IV, in setting out the principles of catholic faith, was still very much the main point of reference for theological authority. This is clearly demonstrated by its placement by Raymond of Peñafort at the beginning of Gregory IX's 1234 decretals, copies of which were widely circulated across the Latin world.[43] It was undoubtedly the proper instrument for Paris theologians and their bishop to appeal to, and deploy, to fulfil their role. But it needed internal reinforcement within the faculty on both doctrinal principles and detailed, abstruse points, given that some theologians, including leading figures, were evidently attracted to theories that potentially could produce some dangerous results. It was to fulfil this dual function that the condemnation was produced.

This leaves the question why the whole statement of faith from Lateran IV was not covered in the condemnation, but only around the first fifteen lines out of about fifty. The subsequent sections, on Christology and issues relating to the Church and its sacraments were ignored, although both were clearly major areas of debate within the theology faculty and beyond.[44] Two possible answers suggest themselves. First, many of the most pressing doctrinal issues in the 1230s and early 1240s - in particular those arising from dualism or present in Greek theology - fell into the first part of the statement, which could have given the first fifteen lines priority in any commission of inquiry. Second, the condemnation could have been the first in an intended series of such corrective and declarative measures, a programme subsequently overtaken by other events in the 1240s, such as the need to concentrate on the Talmud (where the trial and subsequent examination may itself have been seen as settling Christological issues), or the increasing divisions between mendicants and seculars, or the change of personnel involved (with the new pope established, and major figures such as Alexander of Hales now dead).

[43] For Lateran IV's wide dissemination by those attending the council, and the widespread reiteration of its measures, see Duggan, 'Conciliar Law', pp. 354-66.

[44] Of the 572 questions in Douai, MS 434, the largest group (around 100) covered the church, its laws, sacraments and institutions. Over 20 related to Christology (part of a larger group of over 90 on God and the Trinity, which may contain more sub-questions specifically on Christ).

In institutional terms the 1240s were, despite manifold external troubles, in many ways a positive time for the university, a period of relative calm and fragile unity - at least when compared with the 1220s and the 1250s. The theology masters were involved together in the condemnation, as they were again in 1248 - the list of names signing up to the second prohibition of the Talmud included seculars, Dominicans and Franciscans united in a single cause. Although composed of different groups with different aims and missions, at this point they can be seen as working broadly together and with a common end. The condemnation reveals an apparently eclectic mixture of propositions, perhaps reflecting the particular interests and concerns of individuals within the assembled committee, but which, when taken as a whole, were designed to reinforce the agenda of Lateran IV and secure the public position of the university's theology masters. The theology faculty was still feeling its way, but the condemnation represents a defining moment in its development. In 1229 Gregory IX had described the '*studium ... litterarum*' at Paris as one 'by which, next after the grace of the Holy Spirit, the paradise of the general Church is watered and nourished'.[45] The condemnation demonstrates the Paris theology faculty's growing self-confidence and its determination to fulfil this role. Before tackling the 'mote' in its brother's eye, it had to remove the 'beam' from its own.

[45] *CUP*, i, nos. 69, 70, 75, pp. 125-8, 133-4.

APPENDIX A1: ANNOTATED CONDEMNATION AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION[1]

128. ***Decem errores contra theologicam veritatem reperti in quibusdam scriptis (frat. Stephani[2]) et proscripti Parisiis a Guillelmo Parisiensi episcopo et Odone cancellario de consilio omnium magistrorum theologicae facultatis.***

1241, Januarii 13, Parisiis.

Isti sunt articuli reprobati contra theologicam veritatem et reprobati a cancellario Parisiensi Odone et magistris theologie Parisius regentibus anno Domini M°CC°XL dominica secunda post octabas Natalis Domini.

These are the articles rejected as contrary to true theology and condemned by Odo, the chancellor of Paris, and the regent masters in theology at Paris, in the year of our Lord 1240, on the second Sunday after the octaves of Christmas.

Primus **[error], quod divina essentia in se nec[3] ab homine nec ab angelo videbitur.**

The first [error] is, that the Divine essence in itself will not be seen by any man or angel.

Hunc[4] errorem reprobamus et assertores et defensores auctoritate Wilhermi episcopi excommunicamus. Firmiter autem credimus et asserimus, quod Deus in sua essentia[5] vel substantia videbitur ab angelis et omnibus sanctis et videtur ab animabus glorificatis.

We condemn this error, and by the authority of William, the bishop, we excommunicate those who assert and defend it. Moreover, we firmly believe and assert that God in His essence or substance will be seen by the angels and all saints, and is seen by glorified spirits.

Secundus**, quod licet divina essentia una[6] sit in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, tamen[7] ut in ratione forme una est in Patre et Filio, sed non una in hiis cum Spiritu Sancto, et tamen[8] forma hec idem sit quod divina essentia.**

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[1] This appendix aims to cover the main variations, not all their permutations or those which are contingent on format etc. It reproduces verbatim the text and main footnotes from *CUP*, i, no. 128, pp. 170-2. The English translation is adapted from the *Internet Medieval Sourcebook,* https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/uparis-cond1241.html.

[2] In ms. Paris. 16360, in quo solo auctor nominator, non exprimitur, cujus ordinis fuerit iste fr. Stephanus. Matth. Paris. l. c. loquitur de "praecipuis Praedicatorum et Minorum lectoribus". Habet maximam probabilitatem, praedictum fratrem fuisse *fr. Stephanum de Varnesia*, ord. Praed., qui a Stephano de Salanhac inter primos ord. magistros Paris. affertur (vide *Archiv f. Litterat.-und Kirchengesch.d.Mittelalt*., II, 171, 205) et adhuc anno 1248 Parisius docebat. Errores supra relatos ab aliquibus ex Ord. Praed. fuisse progugnatos concludere debemus ex eo quod Cap. general. an. 1243 et 1256 et Capitulum provinciale provinciae Provinciae anni 1256 fratres obligavit, errores condemnatos "de quaternis" abradere.

[3] In cod. Paris. 16533: "nec a sanctis animabus glorificatis nec ab angelis videtur vel videbitur". In Burghes. 296, et in duobus primis codd. Parisien. etiam "videtur vel videbitur".

[4] "Hunc errorem … excommunicamus" deest ubique, praeter Bibl. Arsen. et Matth. Paris.

[5] Codd. Burgh. et Parisienses addunt: "vel natura".

[6] Cod. Burgh. 296 et tres primi Paris.: "eadem".

The second, that although the Divine essence is one in Father, Son and Holy Spirit, nevertheless that as far as regards form it is one in Father and Son, but not one in these with the Holy Spirit, and yet this form is the same as the Divine essence.

Hunc errorem[9] reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod una est essentia sive substantia[10] in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto et eadem essentia in ratione forme[11].

We condemn this error, for we firmly believe that the essence or substance is one in the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and the essence is the same in regard to form.

***Tertius*, quod Spiritus Sanctus, prout est nexus vel amor, non procedit a Filio, sed tantum a Patre.**

The third, that the Holy Spirit, as it is a bond of affection or love, does not proceed from the Son, but only from the Father.

Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod prout est nexus vel amor, procedit ab utroque[12].

We condemn this error, for we firmly believe that as it is a bond of affection or love, it proceeds from both.

***Quartus*[13], quod anime glorificate non sunt in celo empireo cum angelis, nec corpora glorificata erunt ibi, sed in celo aqueo vel cristallino, quod supra firmamentum est, quod[14] et de beata Virgine presumitur.**

The fourth, that glorified Spirits are not in the empyrean heaven with the angels, nor will the glorified bodies be there, but in the aqueous or crystalline heaven, which is above the firmament; which they also presume to think concerning the blessed Virgin.

Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod idem locus corporalis, scilicet celum empireum, angelorum et animarum sanctarum erit et corporum glorificatorum[15].

We condemn this error, for we firmly believe that angels and sanctified souls and corporeal bodies will occupy the same corporeal place, namely, the empyrean heaven.

***Quintus*[16], quod malus angelus in principio sue creationis fuit malus, et[17] nunquam fuit nisi malus.**

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[7] Burgh. Oxon., Vat. et omnes Paris.: ”tamen ut hec essentia est in ratione forme”.
[8] Codd. citati: “et in his tamen forma idem est quod”, etc.
[9] “Hunc errorem … credimus” in citatis codd. hic et postea deest.
[10] Citati codd. addunt “natura”.
[11] Matth. et Paris. addunt: “eadem est in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto”.
[12] Citati codd. et Oxon. addunt: “scilicet a patre et filio”.
[13] Iste error in citatis codd. ponitur septimo, in Capitulo provinciali Ord. Praed. quinto loco.
[14] Deest apud S. Bonaventuram; in citatis codd. et apud Matth. Paris.: “quod dicere etiam presumunt de beata Virgine”, in Paris. 15702 “etiam b. Virgo”.
[15] Citati codd. et Matth. Paris. addunt: “et similiter locus idem spiritualis sanctorum angelorum (et beatorum hominum)”. Paris. 15702 addit adhuc “scil. Deus”.
[16] Iste error in citatis codd. ponitur sexto, apud Matth. Paris. septimo, in Cap. proviniciali octavo loco.
[17] Arsen. “vel”.

The fifth, that the bad angel was bad from his very creation, and never was anything but bad.

Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod[18] bonus creatus sit et post peccando factus sit malus.

We condemn this error, for we firmly believe that he was created good, and afterwards through sinning he became bad.

***Sextus*[19], quod angelus in eodem instanti potest esse in diversis locis et esse ubique si voluerit.**

The sixth, that an angel can at the same moment be in different places and can be everywhere if he chooses.

Hunc errorem reprobamus, credimus enim, quod angelus est in loco per diffinitionem, ita quod si est hic, non est alibi in eodem instanti; impossibile est enim quod sit ubique, hoc enim proprium est solius Dei.

We condemn this error, for we firmly believe that an angel is in one definite place; so that, if he is here, he is not elsewhere at the same moment; for it is impossible that he should be everywhere, for this is peculiar to God alone.

***Septimus*[20], quod multe veritates sunt[21] ab eterno, que non sunt Deus.**

The seventh, that many truths, which are not God, have existed eternally.

Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod una sola veritas sit ab eterno, que est Deus[22].

We condemn this error, for we firmly believe that one truth alone, which is God, has existed eternally.

***Octavus*[23], quod primum nunc et creatio-passio possit non esse creata.**

The eighth, that the beginning, the present time, the creation-passion may not have been created.

Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod utrumque et est creatum et creatura.

We condemn this error, for we firmly believe that each is both created and creature.

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[18] Cit. codd.: "quod malus angelus aliquando fuit bonus et non malus", etc.

[19] In cit. codd. est octavus, apud Matth. Paris. quintus, in Cap. provinciali septimus, cum differentiis minoris notae.

[20] In cit. codd. et in Cap. provinciali ponitur quarto, apud Matth. Paris. sexto loco.

[21] In mss. citatis: "fuerunt".

[22] Additur ubique: "et quod nulla veritas fuit ab eterno, que non sit illa veritas".

[23] In cit. codd. ponitur quinto, in Cap. provinciali sexto loco. Ubique praeter Arsen.: 'quod primum nunc et creatio-passio non sunt creator vel creatura", et quoad veritatem oppositam: 'Quod primum nunc et creatio-passio est creatura".

***Nonus*, quod qui habet meliora naturalia, de necessitate plus habebit de gratia et gloria[24].**

The ninth, that he who has greater talents will of necessity have greater grace and glory.

Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod Deus secundum quod preelegit et preordinavit[25], dabit unicuique gratiam et gloriam.

We condemn this error, for we firmly believe that God will give grace and glory to each one according to what he has decided and preordained.

***Decimus*, quod malus angelus[26] nunquam habuit, unde stare posset, nec etiam Adam in statu innocentie.**

The tenth, that the bad angel never had ground whereon he was able to stand, nor even Adam in his state of innocence.

Hunc errorem reprobamus, firmiter enim credimus, quod uterque habuit[27], unde posset stare, non tamen, unde posset proficere.

We condemn this error, for we firmly believe that each one had ground whereon he was able to stand, but not anything by which he was able to profit.

[24] "Et gloria" desumptum est ex S. Bonaventura. Cit. codd.: "majorem gratiam et gloriam". "Naturalia" om. Arsen.

[25] Cod. Paris. 16533: "secundum preordinationem et predestinationem". Alii codd.: "secundum quod preordinatum est et predestinatum"; Paris. 15702 "sec. quod Deus preordinavit".

[26] Codd. cit: "diabolus".

[27] Cod. Paris. 16533 solummmodo: "ab initio, unde possent proficere". Apud Matth. Paris. duo ultimi errores transponuntur.

APPENDIX A2: TABLES ON ARTICLE ARRANGEMENT

TABLE ONE: VERSIONS COMPARED WITH *CUP* (BASED ON PARIS ARSENAL 532, f. 219r)

CUP Paris, Ars., 532 Bonaventure Ox., New Coll., 109	Article 1: beatific vision	Article 2: one essence	Article 3: filioque	Article 4: empyrean heaven	Article 5: evil angel bad when created	Article 6: angel places	Article 7: eternal truth	Article 8: time and creation	Article 9: gifts and glory	Article 10: fall of man
Prov. Chapter				5th	8th	7th	4th	6th		
Matt. Paris					7th	5th	6th		10th	9th
Vat., Borgh., 361				7th	8th	5th	4th	6th		
Paris, BN., Lat., 15661				7th	8th	5th	4th	6th		
Paris, BN., Lat., 15702				7th	8th	5th	4th	6th		
Paris, BN., Lat., 15820				7th	8th	5th	4th	6th		
Paris BN., Lat., 16360				7th	8th	5th	4th	6th		
Paris BN., Lat. 16533				7th	8th	5th	4th	6th		
Ox., Mert., 267				7th	8th	5th	4th	6th		
Collectio Errorum				7th	8th	5th	4th	6th		

TABLE TWO: VARIANT ORDERS OF ARTICLES

Paris, Ars. 532 Bonaventure Ox., New Coll., 109	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Prov. Chapter	1	2	3	5	8	7	4	6	9	10
Matt. Paris	1	2	3	4	7	5	6	8	10	9
Remaining manuscripts and Collectio Errorum (as above)	1	2	3	7	8	5	4	6	9	10

APPENDIX A3: TABLE OF INFLUENCES/CONTEXTS POTENTIALLY RELEVANT TO INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES

This table presents the possible influences and concerns that might have contributed to the inclusion of the propositions censured in the condemnation, from the perspective of those studying theology at Paris or the Latin Church. A low or nil rating does not mean the issue was not present in that category, but rather that, even if present, this study has found no significant evidence of its influence in the texts examined. A higher rating means the text was available and likely to have been read prior to the condemnation and contained discussion relevant to the issues, not that it necessarily influenced inclusion of the article. Some influences, for example the Jews, were probably contextual only.

Article	Bible (textual conflict)	Bible (paradox)	Latin Fathers etc.	Greek Fathers	Gilbert of Poitiers	Neoplatonism (inc. Eriugena, Liber de causis)	Aristotle (old)	Aristotle (new)	Arabic commentators	Maimomides	Cathars	Jews	Greek Orthodox
One	H	H	H	H	N/A	H	L	H	H	H	L/M	L	H
Two	L	H	M (Boethius)	M	H	L	L	L	L	L	N/A	N/A	L
Three	H	M	H	H	M	H (Eriugena)	L	L	N/A	N/A	L	N/A	H
Four	M	L/M	M	M	N/A	N/A	N/A	M/H	M	L	L/M	L	L
Five	L	H	H	M	N/A	L	L	M	L	L	H	L	L
Six	L	L	M	L	N/A	M	L	M/H	M/H	M	L/M	L	L
Seven	L	L	H	M	N/A	H (also Plato)	M/H	H	H	M/H	L	L	L/M
Eight	L	L	H	L	N/A	H (also Plato)	H	H	H	H	M	L	L
Nine	L	H	H (Alan of Lille)	M	L/M	H (ps-Dionys, Eriugena)	L	M/H	M	L	M	L	L/M
Ten	L	H	H	L	N/A	L/M	L	L	L	M	H	M	L


Key: H = high; M = medium; L = low; N/A = possibly none

Linkages: articles two and three; articles five and ten; article nine with five and ten

'Latin Fathers' includes all Latin theologians prior to the thirteenth-century whose views were viewed as authoritative. Individuals are only identified if their influence was particularly notable, since authorities such as Augustine and Peter Lombard, discussed all the issues.

APPENDIX A4 1241/4 Condemnation Theology Faculty, University of Paris.

Notes: the theological factors also feed into the institutional ones – not marked;
For detailed theological influences, see Appendix A3.



APPENDIX B: LATERAN IV STATEMENT OF FAITH 1215[1]

Canon 1: *De fide catholica*

‘Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus, aeternus et immensus, omnipotens, incommutabilis, incomprehensibilis et ineffabilis, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, tres quidem personae sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino. Pater a nullo, Filius autem a solo Patre ac Spiritus sanctus ab utroque pariter, absque initio semper et fine. Pater generans, Filius nascens et Spiritus sanctus procedens, consubstantiales et coaequales, coomnipotentes et coaeterni, unum universorum principium, creator omnium invisibilium et visibilium, spiritualium et corporalium, qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis, utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam quasi communem et spiritu et corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et daemones alii a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali. Homo vero diaboli suggestione peccavit.

Haec sancta Trinitas secundum communem essentiam individua et secundum personales proprietates discreta, per Moysen et sanctos prophetas aliosque famulos suos, iuxta ordinatissimam dispositionem temporum, doctrinam humano generi tribuit salutarem. Et tandem unigenitus Dei Filius, Iesus Christus, a tota Trinitate communiter incarnatus, ex Maria semper virgine Spiritus sancti cooperatione conceptus, verus homo factus, ex anima rationali et humana carne compositus, una in duabus naturis persona, viam vitae manifestius demonstravit. Qui cum secundum divinitatem sit immortalis et impassibilis, idem ipse secundum humanitatem factus est passibilis et mortalis, quin etiam pro salute humani generis in ligno crucis passus et mortuus, descendit ad inferos, resurrexit a mortuis et ascendit in coelum; sed descendit in anima, resurrexit in carne ascenditque pariter in utroque, venturus in fine saeculi iudicare vivos et mortuos, et redditurus singulis secundum opera sua, tam reprobatis quam electis. Qui omnes cum suis propriis corporibus resurgent, quae nunc gestant, ut recipient secundum merita sua, sive bona fuerint sive mala, illi cum diabolo poenam perpetuam et isti cum Christi gloriam sempiternam.

Una vero est fidelium universalis ecclesia, extra quam nullus omnino salvatur, in qua idem ipse sacerdos et sacrificium Iesus Christus, cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continentur, transsubstantiatis pane in corpus et vino in sanguinem potestate divina, ut ad perficiendum mysterium unitatis accipiamus ipsi de suo, quod accepit ipse de nostro. Et hoc utique sacramentum nemo potest conficere, nisi sacerdos, qui fuerit rite ordinatus secundum claves ecclesiae, quas ipse concessit apostolis et eorum successoribus Iesus Christus. Sacramentum vero baptismi, quod ad invocationem individuae Trinitatis, videlicet Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, consecratur in aqua, tam parvulis quam adultis in forma ecclesiae a quocunque rite collatum, proficit ad salutem. Et si post susceptionem baptismi quisquam prolapsus fuerit in peccatum, per veram poenitatem semper potest reparari. Non solum autem virgines et continentes, verum etiam

[1] © N. Tanner, 1990, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, Sheed and Ward, used by permission of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc., vol. 1, pp. 230-5.

coniugati, per fidem rectam et operationem bonam placentes Deo, ad aeternam merentur beatitudinem pervenire.'

Canon 1: *On the catholic faith*

'We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immeasurable, almighty, unchangeable, incomprehensible and ineffable, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, three persons but absolutely one simple essence, substance or nature, The Father is from none, the Son from the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit from both equally, eternally without beginning or end; the Father generating, the Son being born, and the Holy Spirit proceeding; consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal; one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal; who by his almighty power at the beginning of time created from nothing both spiritual and corporeal creatures, that is to say angelic and earthly, and then created human beings composed as it were of both spirit and body in common. The devil and other demons were created by God naturally good, but they became evil by their own doing. Man, however, sinned at the prompting of the devil.

This holy Trinity, which is undivided according to its common essence but distinct according to the properties of its persons, gave the teaching of salvation to the human race through Moses and the holy prophets and his other servants, according to the most appropriate disposition of the times. Finally the only-begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, who became incarnate by the action of the whole Trinity in common and was conceived from the ever virgin Mary through the cooperation of the Holy Spirit, having become true man, composed of a rational soul and human flesh, one person in two natures, showed more clearly the way of life. Although he is immortal and unable to suffer according to his divinity, he was made capable of suffering and dying according to his humanity. Indeed, having suffered and died on the wood of the cross for the salvation of the human race, he descended to the underworld, rose from the dead and ascended into heaven. He descended in the soul, rose in the flesh, and ascended in both. He will come at the end of time to judge the living and the dead, to render to every person according to his works, both to the reprobate and to the elect. All of them will rise with their own bodies, which they now wear, so as to receive according to their deserts, whether these be good or bad; for the latter perpetual punishment with the devil, for the former eternal glory with Christ.

There is indeed one universal Church of the faithful, outside of which nobody at all is saved, in which Jesus Christ is both priest and sacrifice. His body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the forms of bread and wine, the bread and wine having changed in substance, by God's power, into his body and blood, so that in order to achieve this mystery of unity we receive from God what he received from us. Nobody can effect this sacrament except a priest who has been properly ordained according to the Church's keys, which Jesus Christ himself gave to the apostles and their successors. But the sacrament of baptism is consecrated in water at the invocation of the undivided Trinity - namely Father, Son and Holy Spirit - and brings salvation to both children and adults when it is correctly carried out by anyone in the form laid down by the

Church. If someone falls into sin after having received baptism, he or she can always be restored through true penitence. For not only virgins and the continent but also married persons find favour with God by right faith and good actions and deserve to attain eternal blessedness.'

Canon 2: ***De errore abbatis Ioachim***

'Damnamus ergo et reprobamus libellum sive tractatum, quem abbas Ioachim edidit contra magistrum Petrum Lombardum de unitate seu essentia Trinitatis, appellans ipsum haereticum et insanum, pro eo quod in suis dixit *Sententiis*: "Quoniam quaedam summa res est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et illa non est generans neque genita nec procedens", unde asserit, quod ille non tam Trinitatem quam quaternitatem adstruebat in Deo, videlicet tres personae et illam communem essentiam quasi quartam, manifeste protestans, quod nulla res est quae sit Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, nec est essentia nec substantia nec natura, quamvis concedat quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt una essentia, una substantia, unaque natura; verum unitatem huiusmodi non veram et propriam, sed quasi collectivam et similitudinariam esse fatetur, quemadmodum dicuntur multi homines unus populus, et multi fideles una ecclesia, iuxta illud: *Multitudinis credentium erat cor unum et anima una*, et *Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est* cum illo; item *Qui plantat et qui rigat unus sunt*, et omnes *unum corpus sumus in Christo*; rursus in libro Regum: *Populus meus et populus tuus unum sunt*. Ad hanc autem sententiam adstruendam, illud potissimum verbum inducit, quod Christus de fidelibus inquit in evangelio: Volo, Pater, *ut sint unum* in nobis, *sicut et nos unus sumus, ut sint consummati in unum*. Non enim, ut ait, fideles Christi sunt unum, id est una quaedam res quae communis sit omnibus, hic modo sunt unum, id est una ecclesia propter catholicae fidei unitatem et tandem unum regnum propter unionem indissolubilis caritatis. Quemadmodum in canonica Ioannis epistola legitur: *Quia tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in coelo, Pater, et Verbum et Spiritus sanctus, et hi tres unum sunt*; statimque subiungit: *Et tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in terra, spiritus, aqua et sanguis, et tres unum sunt*, sicut in quibusdam codicibus invenitur.

Nos autem sacro et universali concilio approbante, credimus et confitemur cum Petro, quod una quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, tres simul personae ac sigillatim quaelibet earundem, et ideo in Deo Trinitas est solummodo non quaternitas, quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia seu natura divina, quae sola est universorum principium, praeter quod aliud inveniri non potest, et illa res non est generans, neque genita, nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat, Filius qui gignitur et Spiritus sanctus qui procedit, ut distinctiones sint in personis et unitas in natura. Licet igitur alius sit Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus sanctus, non tamen aliud, sed id quod est Pater, est Filius et Spiritus sanctus, idem omnino, ut secundum orthodoxam et catholicam fidem consubstantiales esse credantur. Pater enim ab aeterno Filium generando, suam substantiam ei dedit, iuxta quod ipse testatur: *Pater quod dedit mihi, maius est omnibus*, ac dici non potest, quod partem substantiae suae illi dederit et partem ipse sibi retinuerit, cum substantia Patris indivisibilis sit, utpote simplex omnino; sed nec dici potest, quod Pater in

Filium transtulerit suam substantiam generando, quasi sic dederit eam Filio, quod non retinuerit ipsam sibi, alio quin desiisset esse substantia. Patet ergo, quod sine ulla diminutione, Filius nascendo substantiam Patris accepit, et ita Pater et Filius habent eandem substantiam, et sic eadem res est Pater et Filius necnon et Spiritus sanctus, ab utroque procedens.

Cum ergo Veritas pro fidelibus suis ad Patrem orat: volo, inquiens, ut ipsi *sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos unum sumus*, hoc nomen, *unum*, pro fidelibus quidem accipitur, ut intelligatur unio caritatis in gratia; pro personis vero divinis, ut attendatur identitatis in natura unitas, quemadmodum Veritas alibi ait: *Estote perfecti sicut et Pater vester coelestis perfectus est*, ac si diceret manifestius: *Estote perfecti* perfectione gratiae, *sicut Pater vester coelestis perfectus est* perfectione naturae, utraque videlicet suo modo, quia inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda. Si quis igitur sententiam sive doctrinam praefati Ioachim in hac parte defendere vel approbare praesumpserit, tamquam haereticus ab omnibus confutetur. In nullo tamen propter hoc Florensi monasterio, cuius ipse Ioachim exstitit institutor, volumus derogari, quoniam ibi et regularis institutio est et observantia salutaris, maxime cum ipse Ioachim omnia scripta sua nobis assignari mandaverit, apostolicae sedis iudicio approbanda seu etiam corrigenda, dictans epistolam, cui propria manu subscripsit, in qua firmiter confitetur, se illam fidem tenere, quam Romana tenet ecclesia, quae cunctorum fidelium, disponente Domino, mater est et magistra.

Reprobamus etiam et damnamus perversissimum dogma impii Almarici, cuius mentem sic pater mendacii excaecavit, ut eius doctrina non tam haeretica censenda sit, quam insana.'

Canon 2: ***On the error of abbot Joachim***

'We therefore condemn and reprove that small book or treatise which abbot Joachim published against master Peter Lombard concerning the unity or essence of the Trinity, in which he calls Peter Lombard a heretic and a madman because he said in his *Sentences*, "For there is a certain supreme reality which is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and it neither begets nor is begotten nor does it proceed". He asserts from this that Peter Lombard ascribes to God not so much a Trinity as a quaternity, that is to say three persons and a common essence as if this were a fourth person. Abbot Joachim clearly protests that there does not exist any reality which is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit - neither an essence nor a substance nor a nature - although he concedes that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one essence, one substance and one nature. He professes, however, that such a unity is not true and proper but rather collective and analogous, in the way that many persons are said to be one people and many faithful one church, according to that saying: *Of the multitude of believers there was one heart and one mind*, and *Whoever adheres to God is one spirit* with him; again *He who plants and he who waters are one*, and all of us *are one body in Christ*; and again in the book of Kings, *My people and your people are one*. In support of this opinion he especially uses the saying which Christ uttered in the gospel concerning the faithful: I wish, Father, *that they may be one in us*, just as *we are one, so that they may be made perfect in one*. For, he says, Christ's

faithful are not one in the sense of a single reality which is common to all. They are one only in this sense, that they form one church through the unity of the catholic faith, and finally one kingdom through a union of indissoluble charity. Thus we read in the canonical letter of John: *For there are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father and the Word and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one*; and he immediately adds, *And the three that bear witness on earth are the spirit, water and blood, and the three are one*, according to some manuscripts.

We, however, with the approval of this sacred and universal council, believe and confess with Peter Lombard that there exists a certain supreme reality, incomprehensible and ineffable, which truly is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, the three persons together and each one of them separately. Therefore, in God there is only a Trinity, not a quaternity, since each of the three persons is that reality - that is to say substance, essence or divine nature - which alone is the principle of all things, besides which no other principle can be found. This reality neither begets nor is begotten nor proceeds; the Father begets, the Son is begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeds. Thus there is a distinction of persons but a unity of nature. Although therefore the Father is one person, the Son another person and the Holy Spirit another person, they are not different realities, but rather that which is the Father is the Son and the Holy Spirit, altogether the same; thus according to the orthodox and catholic faith they are believed to be consubstantial. For the Father, in begetting the Son from eternity, gave him his substance, as he himself testifies: *What the Father gave me is greater than all*. It cannot be said that the Father gave him part of his substance and kept part for himself, since the Father's substance is indivisible, inasmuch as it is altogether simple. Nor can it be said that the Father transferred his substance to the Son, in the act of begetting, as if he gave it to the Son in such a way that he did not retain it for himself; for otherwise he would have ceased to be substance. It is therefore clear that, in being begotten, the Son received the Father's substance without it being diminished in any way, and thus the Father and the Son have the same substance. Thus the Father and the Son and also the Holy Spirit proceeding from both are the same reality.

When, therefore, the Truth prays to the Father for those faithful to him, saying I wish that *they may be one in us just as we are one*, this word *one* means for the faithful a union of love in grace, and for the divine persons a unity of identity in nature, as the Truth says elsewhere, *You must be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect*, as if he were to say more plainly, *You must be perfect* in the perfection of grace, *just as your Father is perfect* in the perfection that is his by nature, each in his own way. For between creator and creature there can be noted no similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen between them. If anyone therefore ventures to defend or approve the opinion or doctrine of the aforesaid Joachim on this matter, let him be refuted by all as a heretic. By this, however, we do not intend anything to the detriment of the monastery of Fiore, which Joachim founded, because there both the instruction is according to rule and the observance is healthy; especially since Joachim ordered all his writings to be handed over to us, to be approved or corrected according to the judgment of the apostolic see. He dictated a letter, which he signed with his own hand, in which he firmly confesses that he

holds the faith held by the Roman church, which is by God's plan the mother and mistress of all the faithful.

We also reject and condemn that most perverse doctrine of the impious Amalric, whose mind the father of lies blinded to such an extent that his teaching is to be regarded as mad more than as heretical.'

Canon 3 (Extracts): ***De haereticis***

'Excommunicamus itaque et anathematizamus omnem haeresim extollentem se adversus hanc sanctam, orthodoxam, catholicam fidem, quam superius exposuimus, condemnantes universos haereticos quibuscumque nominibus censeantur, facies quidem habentes diversas, sed caudas ad invicem colligatas, quia de vanitate conveniunt in idipsum. Damnati vero saecularibus potestatibus praesentibus aut eorum balivis relinquantur, animadversione debita puniendi, clericis prius a suis ordinibus degradatis, ita quod bona huiusmodi damnatorum, si laici fuerint, confiscentur, si vero clerici, applicentur ecclesiis, a quibus stipendia perceperunt. Qui autem inventi fuerint sola suspicione notabiles, nisi iuxta considerationes suspicionis qualitatemque personae propriam innocentiam congrua purgatione monstraverint, anathematis gladio feriantur, et usque ad satisfactionem condignam ab omnibus evitentur, ita quod, si per annum in excommunicatione perstiterint, extunc velut haeretici condemnentur. Moneantur autem et inducantur et, si necesse fuerit per censuram ecclesiasticam compellantur saeculares potestates, quibuscumque fungantur officiis, ut sicut reputari cupiunt et haberi fideles, ita pro defensione fidei praestent publice iuramentum, quod de terris suae iurisdictioni subiectis universos haereticos ab ecclesia denotatos bona fide pro viribus exterminare studebunt, ita quod amodo quandocumque quis fuerit in potestatem sive spiritualem sive temporalem assumptus, hoc teneatur capitulum iuramento firmare. Si vero dominus temporalis, requisitus et monitus ab ecclesia, terram suam purgare neglexerit ab hac haeretica foeditate, per metropolitanum et ceteros comprovinciales episcopos excommunicationis vinculo innodetur …

Catholici vero qui, crucis assumpto charactere, ad haereticorum exterminium se accinxerint, illa gaudeant indulgentia, illoque sancto privilegio sint muniti, quod accedentibus in Terrae sanctae subsidium conceduntur. Credentes vero, praeterea receptatores, defensores et fautores haereticorum excommunicationi decernimus subiacere, firmiter statuentes ut, postquam quis talium fuerit excommunicatione notatus, si satisfacere contempserit infra annum, extunc ipso iure sit factus infamis, nec ad publica officia seu consilia, nec ad eligendos aliquos ad huiusmodi, nec ad testimonium admittatur … si vero clericus fuerit, ab omni officio et beneficio deponatur, ut in quo maior est culpa, gravior exerceatur vindicta …

"Quia vero nonnulli *sub specie pietatis virtutem eius* (iuxta quod ait Apostolus) *abnegantes*, auctoritatem sibi vendicant praedicandi, cum idem Apostolus dicat: *Quomodo praedicabunt, nisi mittantur?*, omnes qui prohibiti vel non missi, praeter auctoritatem ab apostolica sede vel catholico episcopo loci susceptam, publice vel privatim praedicationis officium usurpare praesumpserint", excommunicationis vinculo innodentur, et nisi

quantocius resipuerint, alia competenti poena plectentur. Adicimus insuper, ut quilibet archiepiscopus vel episcopus per se aut per archidiaconum suum vel idoneas personas honestas bis aut saltem semel in anno propriam parochiam, in qua fama fuerit haereticos habitare, circumeat, et ibi tres vel plures boni testimonii viros vel etiam, si expedire videbitur, totam viciniam iurare compellat; quod, si quos ibidem haereticos sciverit vel aliquos occulta conventicula celebrantes seu a communi conversatione fidelium vita et moribus dissidentes, eos episcopo studeat indicare. Ipse autem episcopus ad praesentiam suam convocet accusatos, qui nisi se ab obiecto reatu purgaverint, vel si post purgationem exhibitam in pristinam fuerint relapsi perfidiam, canonice puniantur. Si qui vero ex eis, iuramenti religionem obstinatione damnabili respuentes, iurare forte noluerint, ex hoc ipso tamquam haeretici reputentur. Volumus igitur et mandamus et in virtute obedientiae districte praecipimus, ut ad haec efficaciter exsequenda, episcopi per dioeceses suas diligenter invigilent, si canonicam effugere voluerint ultionem; si quis enim episcopus super expurgando de sua dioecesi haereticae pravitatis fermento, negligens fuerit vel remissus, cum id certis indiciis apparuerit, et ab episcopali officio deponatur et in loco ipsius alter substituatur idoneus, qui velit et possit haereticam confundere pravitatem.'

Canon 3 (Extracts): *On heretics*

'We excommunicate and anathematize every heresy raising itself up against this holy, orthodox and catholic faith which we have expounded above. We condemn all heretics, whatever names they may go under. They have different faces indeed but their tails are tied together inasmuch as they are alike in their pride. Let those condemned be handed over to the secular authorities present, or to their bailiffs, for due punishment. Clerics are first to be degraded from their orders. The goods of the condemned are to be confiscated, if they are lay persons, and if clerics they are to be applied to the churches from which they received their stipends. Those who are only found suspect of heresy are to be struck with the sword of anathema, unless they prove their innocence by an appropriate purgation, having regard to the reasons for suspicion and the character of the person. Let such persons be avoided by all until they have made adequate satisfaction. If they persist in the excommunication for a year, they are to be condemned as heretics. Let secular authorities, whatever offices they may be discharging, be advised and urged and if necessary be compelled by ecclesiastical censure, if they wish to be reputed and held to be faithful, to take publicly an oath for the defence of the faith to the effect that they will seek, in so far as they can, to expel from the lands subject to their jurisdiction all heretics designated by the church in good faith. Thus whenever anyone is promoted to spiritual or temporal authority, he shall be obliged to confirm this article with an oath. If however a temporal lord, required and instructed by the church, neglects to cleanse his territory of this heretical filth, he shall be bound with the bond of excommunication by the metropolitan and other bishops of the province …

Catholics who take the cross and gird themselves up for the expulsion of heretics shall enjoy the same indulgence, and be strengthened by the same holy privilege, as is granted to those who go to the aid of the Holy Land. Moreover, we determine to subject to excommunication believers who receive, defend or support heretics. We strictly ordain

that if any such person, after he has been designated as excommunicated, refuses to render satisfaction within a year, then by the law itself he shall be branded as infamous and not be admitted to public offices or councils or to elect others to the same or to give testimony … If however he is a cleric, let him be deposed from every office and benefice, so that the greater the fault the greater be the punishment.

"There are some who *holding to the form of religion but denying its power* (as the Apostle says), claim for themselves the authority to preach, whereas the same Apostle says, *How shall they preach unless they are sent?* Let therefore all those who have been forbidden or not sent to preach, and yet dare publicly or privately to usurp the office of preaching without having received the authority of the apostolic see or the catholic bishop of the place", be bound with the bond of excommunication and, unless they repent very quickly, be punished by another suitable penalty. We add further that each archbishop or bishop, either in person or through his archdeacon or through suitable honest persons, should visit twice or at least once in the year any parish of his in which heretics are said to live. There he should compel three or more men of good repute, or even if it seems expedient the whole neighbourhood, to swear that if anyone knows of heretics there or of any persons who hold secret conventicles or who differ in their life and habits from the normal way of living of the faithful, then he will take care to point them out to the bishop. The bishop himself should summon the accused to his presence, and they should be punished canonically if they are unable to clear themselves of the charge or if after compurgation they relapse into their former errors of faith. If however any of them with damnable obstinacy refuse to honour an oath and so will not take it, let them by this very fact be regarded as heretics. We therefore will and command and, in virtue of obedience, strictly command that bishops see carefully to the effective execution of these things throughout their dioceses, if they wish to avoid canonical penalties. If any bishop is negligent or remiss in cleansing his diocese of the ferment of heresy, then when this shows itself by unmistakeable signs he shall be deposed from his office as bishop and there shall be put in his place a suitable person who both wishes and is able to overthrow the evil of heresy.'

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[2] The list in part 2 contains the manuscripts consulted in this study, including those containing the condemnation. To provide a fuller picture in the absence of an edited text, part 1 reproduces the list of the condemnation's manuscripts as described in the *CUP*'s footnotes (no. 128, pp. 171-2) and Courtenay, 'Dominicans', pp. 186-7, with some additions and amendments. It includes some key points on specific manuscripts and some notes to help identify the folios. The list does not include texts such as by Matthew Paris, Bonaventure, and the acts of the 1256 Dominican Chapter.

- Valence Capit. (at end of first part of Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*).
- Vatican, Bourg, 296 (at end of Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*).
- Vatican, Bourg, 361, folio 219v.
- Vatican, Lat., 692, folio 179v (Franciscan origin).
- Vatican, Lat., 4847, folio 66v.
- Vatican, Lat., 9821, folio 128.

Part 2: List of manuscripts consulted

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