Journal article icon

Journal article

Competition in two-sided markets.

Abstract:

Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,“ where one group's benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform. I present three models of such markets: a monopoly platform; a model of competing platforms where agents join a single platform; and a model of “competitive bottlenecks” where one group joins all platforms. The determinants of equilibrium prices are (i) the magnitude of the cross-group externalities, (ii) whet...

Expand abstract

Actions


Access Document


Authors


Mark Armstrong More by this author
Journal:
RAND Journal of Economics
Volume:
37
Issue:
3
Publication date:
2006
DOI:
URN:
uuid:fa56a6c6-cd2a-4b06-b4ab-4271bcca71cb
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:15251
Language:
English

Terms of use


Metrics



If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP