


**The British in India and their Domiciled Brethren:
Race and Class in the Colonial Context, 1858-1930**

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Abstracts

Abstract 1.

This DPhil dissertation aims to delineate an ambivalent construction of 'Britishness' in late British India by paying special attention to certain discourses and practices that regulated the lives of both colonial elites and of their impoverished and/or racially mixed kin. Peculiar racial self-anxieties of the colonial ruling classes, - namely those over hygienic / sexual degradation and cultural hybridisation, the increased presence of indigent and/or racially mixed white populations, and the undesired consequences of the last - are examined through a close and analytically coherent analysis of colonial representations and practices.

An important feature of this research is to bring the internal-cum-class distinctions of metropolitan society to the fore in order to circumscribe a peculiarly class-specific constitution of British racial identity in the colonial context. Broadly speaking, in two related senses can the (re)production of white racial prestige in the British Raj be regarded as a class-conditioned phenomenon. First of all, colonial Britishness can be said to have been characterised by class because not all persons or groups of British descent living in the colony were recognised as 'European enough': only those from the upper or middle classes were considered as so

'European' as to be capable of ruling the 'subject races' of India. The remaining people of British racial origins, including the so-called 'poor whites', the 'domiciled Europeans' (those whites permanently settled in India), and the mixed-decent 'Eurasians', were not regarded as 'British enough' (although they were not seen as 'Indian', either). Especially, 'domiciled Europeans' and 'Eurasians', often collectively referred to as 'the domiciled class', were not treated as 'British' but only as 'Native' in socio-legal terms: the 'domiciled' differed from 'Indians' in terms of racial and cultural identification, but were supposed to be no higher than the latter by constitutional status and socio-economic standard.

Secondly it was because of its recourse to 'bourgeois philanthropy' that the construction of Britishness in late British India may be said to have been bound by aspects of Victorian or Edwardian class culture. Although the British excluded their domiciled brethren from the sphere of their social and economic privileges, the former also 'included' the latter within limited frames of philanthropic and educational care. For, their exclusion from the elite white community notwithstanding, the domiciled were still regarded as one part of the European (as opposed to Indian) body politic. Thus the colonial authorities feared that an unregulated destitution of 'poor whites', domiciled Europeans, and Eurasians might present itself as a political menace to the prestige of the British race as a whole: in a sense, the authority of Britishness also depended on how 'European pauperism'

could be solved before it had disorderly effects on the colonial hierarchies of race and class. It was in this context that the philanthropic management of pauperism emerged as a negative but no less unimportant measure for reproducing British prestige in the colonial context. And central to this was a specific, colonial application of a politics of class that the bourgeoisie played against the indigent and various 'unfit' populations in the metropole.

Abstract 2.

This DPhil dissertation aims to delineate an ambivalent construction of 'Britishness' in late British India by paying special attention to certain discourses and practices that regulated the lives of both colonial elites and of their impoverished and/or racially mixed kin. Peculiar racial self-anxieties of the colonial ruling classes, - namely those over hygienic / sexual degradation and cultural hybridisation, the increased presence of indigent and/or racially mixed white populations, and the undesired consequences of the last - are examined through a close and analytically coherent analysis of colonial representations and practices.

The thesis first examines a range of colonial discourses on racial, environmental and cultural differences especially in ways that establish connections

between the Victorian ideology of racial difference and the construction of European colonial identity in the post-rebellion period (from 1858 onwards). Colonial ideas on such matters as racial hygiene, miscegenation and socio-educational 'milieu' are discussed. This analysis of British selfhood in the colonial context is followed up by a study of the attitudes of colonial elites towards so-called 'poor whites', who were originally from Europe but were too 'lowly' to be regarded as genuine members of the ruling race. Especially important here is to consider how the colonial authorities tried to minimise the political effects of the existence of these 'poor whites' by both immigration control and repatriation. And even more importantly, the thesis points out that certain sections of the poor-white population did remain in India on a permanent and cross-generational basis; and that these people were often pauperised, and often, if not always, became racial mixed. These 'domiciled Europeans' and the already substantial mixed-race 'Eurasians' (with whom the former merged) came to form an ambiguous and yet distinctive colonial social category: 'the domiciled class'.

After thus circumscribing the historical conditions, out of which British India's 'domiciled class' emerged, the research moves on to describe how both state and private agents of colonial philanthropy and education came to terms with so-called 'European pauperism'. Through analysing the British perspective on European pauperism, the research explores the reasons why this particular case of pauperism

involving their domiciled brethren came to be loaded with such immense political implications. Then the dissertation analyses a set of concrete measures of philanthropic intervention, including housing, hygienic improvement, disciplinarian training, and geographical relocation through migration (both domestic migrations and emigrations). These studies on the nature of philanthropic interference are further deepened by thoroughly examining British attitudes towards their domiciled brethren as manifested specifically in educational discourses and practices. A heterogeneous set of documents are discussed here with a view to demonstrating the extent to which the dramatic pauperisation of domiciled Europeans and Eurasians triggered a chord of anxieties among missionary headquarters and successive Governments.

Finally, the research considers the social and material limits of Britishness by concentrating on how both imperial and colonial authorities responded to the long-standing claim of the domiciled community to be recognised as 'British'. Analysis of the community's associational movements is central, but rather than tracking all activities of political leaders indiscriminately, the research focuses on how domiciled leaders insisted on the right to a guaranteed European (as opposed to indigenous) standard of living. And by interrogating how the authorities rejected such a claim for material equality, it explores the class and racial criteria of being 'British enough' under imperialism.

An important feature of this research is to bring the internal-cum-class distinctions of metropolitan society to the fore in order to circumscribe a peculiarly class-specific constitution of British racial identity in the colonial context. Broadly speaking, in two related senses can the (re)production of white racial prestige in the British Raj be regarded as a class-conditioned phenomenon. First of all, colonial Britishness can be said to have been characterised by class because not all persons or groups of British descent living in the colony were recognised as ‘European enough’: only those from the upper or middle classes were considered as so ‘European’ as to be capable of ruling the ‘subject races’ of India. The remaining people of British racial origins, including the so-called ‘poor whites’, the ‘domiciled Europeans’ (those whites permanently settled in India), and the mixed-decent ‘Eurasians’, were not regarded as ‘British enough’ (although they were not seen as ‘Indian’, either). Especially, ‘domiciled Europeans’ and ‘Eurasians’, often collectively referred to as ‘the domiciled class’, were not treated as ‘British’ but only as ‘Native’ in socio-legal terms: the ‘domiciled’ differed from ‘Indians’ in terms of racial and cultural identification, but were supposed to be no higher than the latter by constitutional status and socio-economic standard.

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The thesis shows that the aforementioned attention to bourgeois class culture is indispensable for understanding British attitudes towards their domiciled brethren in India which, at first glance, look immensely complicated. The exclusion of the domiciled was often accompanied by demeaning stereotypes regarding racial

degeneration, cultural hybridisation and miscegenation. But what *ultimately* determined the distinction between the British and their domiciled counterpart was neither (im)purity of descent nor place of upbringing *as such*. Rather, such a distinction was a disguised but definite consequence of internal hierarchies within British bourgeois society. By the mid-nineteenth century, both processes of colonial domicile and racial hybridisation were phenomena largely confined to those who did not belong to the ruling classes, whether at home or in the colony. These people became rooted in India and/or absorbed into the mixed-race population because of their *already* subordinate status even prior to their emergence in the colonial context: domiciled Europeans and Eurasians did not always become pauperised *because of* their alleged 'degeneration' (as was often argued by British commentators). Moreover, close attention to the 'bourgeois' language of class in Victorian and Edwardian Britain reveals that such a recourse to the idea of 'degeneration' was as much a reflection of domestic hierarchies as that of colonial ones. The emerging bourgeoisie represented the 'unfit' populations of the British nation in a crude language of 'degeneration' couched on notions of social evolution. But this discourse of 'degeneration' was not simply exclusionist. Rather it was linked up with social-reform initiatives that sought to deal with the problem-ridden populations in order to save the British race from internal decay. It was this bourgeois will for social-hygienic reform that triggered philanthropic measures to

counter the 'degeneration' of domiciled-European and Eurasian paupers in late British India. Of course, the metropolitan politics of poverty was not simply replicated in the colonial context, where it was racial difference that was the primary index of social ordering and differentiation. My point is that, precisely because of its concerns with racial order, the colonial context ended up highlighting class difference, instead of pushing it to the background. In the British-Indian context, the question of racial integrity was even more pressing than at home because it was the very basis of political order. Accordingly, the perceived responsibility of the ruling classes to aid the impoverished members of the national body politic was even more urgent in the colonial outpost. At this juncture, it was no surprise that British India witnessed an incredible enthusiasm for this peculiar kind of philanthropy whose aim was not to 'civilise' indigenous subjects but to discipline the internal contradictions of the colonising community itself.

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Coming neither from British nor Indian society with which this research is concerned, I went through various difficulties in the course of writing this DPhil dissertation. I would like to thank the following mentors and friends, without whose cordial support I would not have been able to complete this work: Dr. David Washbrook for patient supervision; Christopher Hawes for advising me on primary sources at the initial phase of this research; Dr. Rajeswari Sunder Rajan and Professor Robert Young for giving me an opportunity to present a paper at their Postcolonial Theory Graduate Seminar (Oxford, December 2002); Alpa Shah, for kindly inviting me to her seminar, South Asia Post-Graduate Seminar (LSE, February 2003); Harald Fisher-Tiné for encouragement and intellectual exchanges; Professor Judith Brown for chairing my presentation at South Asian History Seminars (Oxford, February, 2004); Dr. Ann Waswo of Nissan Institute (Oxford) for supporting me variously ever since I arrived at St. Antony's College in 1999; New Century Scholarships, Oxford Kobe Scholarships, the Beit Fund, and the Matsushita International Foundation for financially enabling me to continue my research; Hayden Bellenoit, Robin Newnham, and Guy Turlamain for reading this thesis with me; and finally all my friends in Oxford and elsewhere for their warm moral support.

For My Parents

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List of Abbreviations

AIDEA	Anglo-Indian and Domiciled-European Association
AIUC	Anglo-Indian Unemployment Committee
CDCEC	Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee
CEDCI	Conference on the Education of the Domiciled Community in India, Simla
EAIA	Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association
EEC	European Education Code
GOI	Government of India
ICS	Indian Civil Service
PC	Pauperism Committee
PCS	Provincial Civil Service
PSC	Public Service Commission
PWD	Public Works Department
SCCS	Select Committee on Colonisation and Settlement

1. Introduction: Perspective, Scope and Limits of the Research

Perspective

This research lays bare how the British constructed their racial identity in colonial India, by paying special attention to the class-specific discourses and practices that regulated the lives of both their own and of their impoverished and/or racially mixed brethren. British colonialism in India has been known for its multifaceted ideologies of racial difference, and researchers from diverse disciplines have already examined them closely. But the 'Britishness' of British colonials in actual social contexts has been neglected, not least because scholars have taken its ideological premises for granted instead of critically examining its possible internal contradictions. This study comes to terms with the social construction of British identity by highlighting colonisers' own racial anxieties, especially those over hygienic / sexual degradation and cultural hybridisation; the increased presence of indigent and/or racially mixed white populations; and the undesired 'political consequences' of the last. Through addressing these anxieties, this dissertation will demonstrate the extent to which British racial identity in India was invented through certain cultural conventions and social politics that may well be called 'bourgeois'.

Broadly speaking, the construction of colonial Britishness can be regarded as a class-specific phenomenon in two related ways. First of all, it was far from the case that all the people of British descent who lived in the colony were recognised (socially, economically or legally) as 'British'. Only certain privileged sections of the British race were considered as so 'European' as to be capable of ruling indigenous subjects. The remaining people of British descent, including so-called 'poor whites' and mixed-descent 'half-castes', were regarded as not 'British enough'. Among these were 'the domiciled', composed of those Britons permanently living in India (often referred to as 'domiciled Europeans') and people of mixed British descent ('Eurasians' [or 'Anglo-Indians' since 1911]). The domiciled were not treated as European-British subjects but as 'Statutory Natives'; they differed from 'Indians' in terms of race and culture, but were supposed to be no higher than the latter in terms of constitutional status and socio-economic standard of living. Secondly, the construction of Britishness was related to class in that the 'bourgeois' management of pauperism among these domiciled populations emerged as a negative but no less important measure for reproducing British prestige. And central to this was a specific, colonial application of a social politics that the bourgeoisie in the metropole played against the indigent and various 'unfit' populations. This research will especially elaborate on these class-specific limits of British racial prestige by discussing a diverse range of social processes and cultural representations that concerned both the elite British in India and their poorer brethren in their ambiguous relationship with one another.

A distinctive, analytic feature of this thesis is to bring class-cum-internal differences to the fore for circumscribing a historical formation of both 'British' and 'domiciled' identities. In bringing class to the centre stage of analysis, however, my research will not at all claim to privilege class distinctions over those of race. Rather, the point is to demonstrate that, in certain important aspects of social relations in the British Empire, these two modes of difference were not mutually exclusive but were closely intertwined and even complemented each other. In any case, some preliminary cautions might as well be given here to avoid possible misgivings. First of all, it is primarily out of its analytic concerns that this research puts more emphasis on the gap between the British and their domiciled brethren than on the racial difference within the latter group. The generic category of 'the domiciled class', which the research will frequently use, includes both racially-unmixed Europeans of poor standing and racially mixed Eurasians. It should be noted that by drawing attention to this categorical juxtaposition, this research is not claiming that the differences between the two were in any ways negligible. Some racial distinctions within the domiciled community *were* kept alive. For instance, the differences in terms of skin complexion could easily bring uneasy differentiations within the community and sometimes within the family. There were instances where persons of a fairer complexion had better chances of obtaining employment. It is not because these racialised phenomena are considered less historically important that this research does not discuss them. Rather the omission is due to the fact that the concern of this

research lies not so much in the social history of the domiciled community *per se* as in the implications of the existence of such a community for the colonial ruling classes and for their effort to preserve racial order. Second, this dissertation's specific attention to the internal-cum-class hierarchies within British society should not be taken as trying to undermine the significance of racial precedence in colonial social relations. On the contrary, my point is precisely to show the extent to which it was as a way of preserving the coloniser / colonised boundaries that the British authorities found it necessary to control the contradictions of internal disorder.¹

Period, Region and Source Materials Covered

This research covers a seven-decade period between 1858 and 1930, and mainly discusses events in the Bengal context, especially Calcutta. The period has been chosen for several reasons. First, the post-revolt era is interesting both for its sharply

¹ It is for similar reasons that this research does not deal with the attitudes of Indians towards the domiciled community. Of course, one may reasonably ask the extent to which the Indian as well as European perspective was historically significant, especially with regard to the Eurasian population whose members possessed Indian as well as European blood. Two things may be pointed out here. (1) Indians did not generally regard the domiciled community as part of their body politic, but saw the latter as an appendage to the British community. This was partly due to the fact that the domiciled community saw itself as a British, not Indian, community. Also, it was partly because of the colonial policies regarding education and internal security: though British did not give their domiciled brethren none of their European privileges, they educated the latter as Christian and used them as 'British' in security matters (for instance, for the suppression of railway strikes). These policies pitted the domiciled against their Indian fellows. (2) By the mid nineteenth century, the mixed-race community was large enough to marry within themselves. It is probable that some poorest men of the community did marry Indian Christians and Luso-Indians (pure or mixed descendants of Portuguese settlers), but as these latter groups were not Indian in the conventional sense, the relations should not have incited racial feelings among Indian nationalists. Thus the community was rather aloof from indigenous society.

racialised social atmosphere and for its increased scale of European pauperism. How did an ever-increasing problem of internal class disparities manifest itself in the white community's racialised relations with its non-white counterpart? Secondly, this period has been selected because it includes events that can be considered of substantial historical significance. For understanding British attitudes towards both themselves and towards their impoverished and mixed-race brethren, it is indispensable to cover some of the historical events and social trends that occurred particularly during this period. These events include: the Select Committee on Colonisation and Settlement (1858); the setting of two commissions on European pauperism, the Pauperism Committee (1891) and the Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee (1918); the European Code of Education (1883) and the Conference on the Education of the Domiciled Community in India at Simla (1912); the political representations of the domiciled community in the Public Service Commission (1886-7); the Deputations to Lord Curzon (1900), and to the Secretary State (1925); the community's representation to the Indian Statutory Commission (1930). The period before 1858 remains important for this research especially in matters concerning the historical decline of the mixed-race community and it will be discussed, wherever necessary, via secondary sources. The period between 1930 and 1947 was significant for the domiciled community in many respects, but will not be discussed in this research. It can be said that these last years of colonialism were relevant more to the position of the domiciled community in the post-colonial 'Indian India' than to that in

‘British India’, and it is with that latter that this dissertation is concerned.

The reasons why the Bengal region is chosen as the primary object of research are that Calcutta had the largest European population, and that the question of European pauperism there was addressed by colonial authorities more urgently than anywhere else. The choice is also due to the fact that most of the primary sources discussed in this research, including the reports of the two pauperism commissions and the journals (such as *The Statesman*, *The Englishman* and *The Calcutta Review*) were all published in Calcutta. Madras is also interesting and important, but its treatment in this dissertation will be limited.² Bombay, Burma and other regions will not be ignored but likewise subjected to only limited treatment.

This research tries to cover as much ground as possible in terms of official discourse and policy and, as such, the official reports of the aforementioned events will provide the core set of primary sources. At the same time, this study will also make extensive use of non-official sources, especially *The Statesman* and *The Calcutta Review*. Articles published in these media proved indispensable for reconstructing the social atmosphere and historical details of a history that has long been long neglected by the historical profession. Moreover, the sheer quantity of reports, letters and polemic exchanges inscribed in the pages of these public media has helped me to realise how critical the control of European pauperism was in negatively constructing British racial prestige in the colonial context.

² Madras has been discussed thoroughly by Lionel Caplan’s anthropological works. See Ch. 2

Chapter Layout

The dissertation will be presented over seven chapters. The historiographical implications of this research will be discussed in Chapter 2, where its relevance and uniqueness in relation to past and ongoing research will be spelled out. The chapter will be followed by four main chapters (Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6), which are ordered thematically, rather than chronologically. Broadly speaking, the first and last of these main chapters concern the question of criteria for being recognised as ‘British enough’ in the colonial context, while the two chapters in the middle have more to do with colonial social control over the disadvantaged populations of British descent.

Chapter 3 starts with an examination of various discourses on racial, environmental and cultural ‘difference’. This will be done in ways that trace connections between the ideology of racial difference and the construction of the British colonial identity in the wake of the indigenous revolt in 1857. The key primary source here will be the *Reports of the Select Committee on Colonisation and Settlement*, where British ideas on matters such as racial hygiene, miscegenation and cultural environment were intensively discussed, specifically in relation to the question of colonial residence. Also crucial are medical and/or ethnological treatises, such as those by James Hunt, which characteristically emphasised the correlation between colonial residence and racial degeneration. These sources will be analysed

particularly with a view to delimiting the social and material conditions which determined who should be allowed to settle and, by extension, who should not. This analysis of the rather self-conscious construction of British colonial identity will be followed by a focused discussion about those who did not meet these criteria, the most significant example of whom were subordinate soldiers of the British Army. Various texts, both official documents and otherwise, will be examined to show how the colonial authorities sought to prevent the contradictory existence of such people within the coloniser / colonised relation. The chapter will conclude with a study of how certain sections of these undesired populations became permanently fixed to colonial society and came to form 'the domiciled class'; an ambiguous and yet distinctive colonial social category.

Chapter 4 discusses how both state and private agents of colonial philanthropy came to terms with the increasing pauperisation of certain white and mixed populations. Of central importance will be a close reading of the reports of two committees on European pauperism, namely those of the Pauperism Committee and the Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee. Through analysing the British discourses on European pauperism that appeared in these reports, the chapter will explore the reasons why the pauperism in question came to be regarded as a subject requiring special care and control. The chapter will then discuss each of the proposed measures of intervention, including better housing, hygienic improvement, disciplinarian training (especially military and marine training) and geographical

relocation through migration.

Chapter 5 follows the preceding chapter in exploring the nature of philanthropic intervention, this time confining the discussion to educational policy. Partly drawing on Chapter 3, it first tries to identify the attitudes of British middle-class parents towards rearing their own progeny. For the latter to grow up so ‘sufficiently British’ as their parents, how should their bodily and moral development be supervised and promoted, and what educational qualifications would be necessary? The chapter then explores British attitudes towards those children who came from the lower classes. A number of administrative documents will be examined, the most important ones of which include the numerous *Reviews of Education* (especially those published by the Governments of India and of Bengal), and the *Report of the Conference on the Education of the Domiciled Community in India at Simla*. In addition, a wide range of published sources (periodicals, newspapers and pamphlets) will be consulted to reconstruct the debates on European pauperism among both official and private circles of the colonial educational establishment. The reading of these materials will demonstrate the extent to which the existence of impoverished whites triggered a chord of anxieties at missionary headquarters and among successive Governments.

Chapter 6 reconsiders the social and economic limits of British identity, some dimensions of which will already have been addressed in Chapter 3. But the former are different from the latter in that it will study ‘Britishness’ by concentrating on how it was shielded against direct political challenges. Within this dissertation, this chapter

is particularly unique in discussing the politicised confrontations between the British and their domiciled brethren, instead of addressing the one-way attitudes of former to the latter in the way the other chapters do. Analysis of the associational movements of the domiciled community is central, but rather than simply tracking all activities of political leaders, the chapter focuses sharply on how the domiciled community insisted on the right to a guaranteed 'European' (as opposed to 'Indian') standard of living. To this end, the numerous reports of communal meetings, deputations and petitions (many of which were published in newspapers such as *The Statesman*) are looked at in conjunction with relevant official discourses concerning state-related employment, such as in the Public Service Commission and the Indian Statutory Commission. By analysing how the British rejected the domiciled claim for material equality, this chapter explores the class and racial criteria of being 'British enough' in the age of empire

2. Historiography: the Research in Context

The aim of this chapter is to explain this research's relevance to recent inter-disciplinary debates on race, class and gender under modern imperialism. The first section will briefly survey the past writings on certain groups of people of British origin in India, including the colonial elites, 'poor whites', 'domiciled Europeans' and mixed-descent 'Eurasians'. It will demonstrate how and to what extent these groups have emerged as objects of academic discourses in the past few decades. The second half of the chapter will explain the historiographical significance of the present research by locating its core arguments within broader theoretical perspectives on the racial, class and gendered constitutions of imperial social formations.

Past Research

Communal perspective

The first published works on the mixed-descent population of India were produced by the intelligentsia of the Eurasian (later Anglo-Indian) Community. Herbert Stark, who wrote *Hostages in India: or the Life of the Anglo-Indian Race* (first published in 1908)

was a foremost leader of the Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association at Calcutta. His book mirrored the political stance of Eurasian leaders, especially that of those based in Calcutta who usually emphasised the racial and historical connections of their community with the colonising British.¹ Another well-known Eurasian writer before Independence was Cedric Dover who was known for such publications as *Half-caste* (1937) and *Know this of race* (1939).² Dover was a sharp critic of scientific racism which he vehemently argued to have disadvantaged his community unjustly. In his writings, he made every effort to refute the prevalent 'scientific' view that mixed-race populations were racially inferior: as he wrote, 'The advocates of biological disadvantage arising from mixture have never proved their theory, though they have often made themselves look ridiculous in trying'.³ Frank Anthony's book, *Britain's Betrayal in India* (1969), has been one of the most substantial works ever published on the history of British India's mixed-descent people.⁴ Anthony was a well-known lawyer and politician, making contributions mainly, but not exclusively, in the area of education. As the president of the Delhi-based All-India Anglo-Indian Association in the post-World War II period, he fought strenuously for the communal rights of the people he represented. Some parts of the book are more to do with the post-Independence situation of the community, while the rest contains a substantial amount of informative facts and discussions about the community's social, economic,

¹ H. A. Stark, *Hostages to India, or the Life of the Anglo-Indian Race* (Calcutta, 1936)

² Cedric Dover, *Half-Caste* (London, 1937); Cedric Dover, *Know this of race* (London, 1939)

³ Dover, *Know this of race*, p.36

⁴ Frank Anthony, *Britain's Betrayal in India* (Bombay, 1969)

political, cultural, psychological aspects in the days of British rule. As the title of his book suggests, much of Anthony's argument amounted to an explicit critique of British racial attitudes towards their mixed kin, which he claimed to have served the degradation of the latter's social and economic conditions. And while accusing British racism, Anthony also sought to chronicle the fortunes of the community, by listing its prominent members who had risen to fame in the past.⁵

Sociological approach

The mixed-race population in India has stimulated the sociological imagination before and after the end of British colonial rule. In 1928, Robert E. Park published an article entitled 'Human Migration and the Marginal Man' in *The American Journal of Sociology*.⁶ Park was, along with Ernest Burgess, the central figure in the first wave of the Chicago School of Sociology, whose immense influence was felt in the 1920s and 30s in the fields of both research and teaching in American sociological circles. Park took an interest in the identity formation of racially mixed people in colonial India because it seemed to him to offer an exemplary specimen for a sociological paradigm

⁵ The importance of drawing attention to more positive aspects of the community has been recognised by certain Anglo-Indian writers. See, for instance, Megan S. Mills, 'Some comments on stereotypes of the Anglo-Indians, Part 1', *The International Journal of Anglo-Indian Studies*, 1 [No.1] (1996), Sep. 2004 <<http://www.alphalink.com.au/~agilbert/jmills1.html>>, and 'Some comments on stereotypes of the Anglo-Indians, Part 2', *The International Journal of Anglo-Indian Studies*, 1 [No.2] (1996), 1 Sep. 2004 <<http://www.alphalink.com.au/~agilbert/mills1.html>>; G. J. Moore, *The Anglo-Indian Vision* (Melbourne, 1986); G. J. Moore, 'A brief history of the Anglo-Indians', *The International Journal of Anglo-Indian Studies*, 1 [No.1] (1996), 1 Sep. 2004 <<http://www.alphalink.com.au/~agilbert/jjean1.html>>

⁶ Robert E. Park, 'Human Migration and the Marginal Man', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 33 (1928), pp.881-893

which he was advocating from Chicago. In the article in which he elaborated his theory, Park cited the mixed-race person of India as an example of a sociological ideal type, the 'marginal man'. The 'marginal man' denoted a personal type, which was permanently split between two different social groups without becoming assimilated to either. Along with the immigrant 'Jew' in the United States, it was in the 'Eurasian in Asia' that Park identified such a trait of great sociological interest.

The clash of different cultural systems may cause those in-between them to go through psychological conflicts, but these conflicts, according to Park, would normally be resolved into productive ends, bringing the society as a whole to an enrichment of cultural values and to historical progress. But when and where irreconcilable racial or cultural differences are at stake, a different picture appears. Park thought that racial difference hinders the process of cultural assimilation not because of any biological instinct, but because of its physical effect on the visual perception of social relations. Here, contradictions are not levelled but remain stationary, making different racial groups isolated from one another, whilst turning those in-between into 'marginal men'.

It is doubtful whether his knowledge of the 'Eurasian of Asia' was ever substantial, but in any case, Park's identification of the mixed-race people of India with the 'marginal man' soon found its influence in the works of his followers. The most explicit expression of this was observed in an *American Journal of Sociology* article which appeared in 1935. The author, Everett V. Stonequist, had been directly influenced by Park as the title of the essay, 'The Problem of the Marginal Man',

suggests.⁷ Coming from the Chicago School himself,⁸ Stonequist endorsed the basic ideas of Park's theory of the 'marginal man', and also drew on the case of the mixed-race identity in the colonial Indian context. He wrote:

'In India, for example, the Eurasian cannot enter either of the parent-group. Each of the two main races is contemptuous of mixed-individuals. The Eurasian clings to the coat of the aloof but retreating Englishman, despises the Indian, and is hereditarily despised in turn'.⁹

Following Park, Stonequist insisted that the mixed-race person found himself in an anomalous situation in-between two different groups from both of which he was excluded. Through a life-long process of psychological conflict, he would develop a unique personality, which is characterised by a hyper racial consciousness.

The dissemination of the 'marginal man' theory continued to make steady progress within American sociological discourse, and, in this paradigmatic development, the question of mixed-race identity in India played an important role.¹⁰

It was believed that the correlation between social condition and psychological development found in the mixed-race type would bring to the fore a sociological understanding of the society in question, particularly a society divided along racial and

⁷ Everett V. Stonequist, 'The Problem of the Marginal Man', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 41 (1935), pp.1-12

⁸ This article had been based on his doctorate thesis, for which he was awarded a PhD degree from the Sociology Department of Chicago University in 1930.

⁹ Stonequist, 'The Problem of the Marginal Man', p.5

¹⁰ The influence of the 'marginal man' thesis can be seen in the following well: Elmer L. Hedin, 'The Anglo-Indian Community', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 40 (1934), pp.165-179. Hedin characterised the mixed-race community as an alienated in-between group. According to him, the mixed-race person was pathetically parasitic to the white establishment, while at the same time dreading to be identified with the indigenous populations of India. (pp.176-177). See also the following article which discussed the mixed-race people of Shanghai. Herbert Day Lamson, 'The Eurasian in Shanghai', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 41 (1936), pp.642-648

cultural lines.¹¹ When British imperialism was still at work in India, the mixed-race question also found itself outside the imperial context as a point of reference for sociological theorisation. Its proclaimed merit was that it detached the issue of race from the imperial ideologies of scientific racism, which had been theorised through interrelated developments of biology and anthropology since the mid-nineteenth century. Within the framework of the ‘marginal man’, race was to be understood as a matter of *social relations*, which would be accounted for by the interpretive method of urban sociology.¹²

The tradition of interpretive sociology has found its way into the recent academic discourses on the Anglo-Indians of India. From the early 1970s, the sociologists, Noel P. Gist and Roy Dean Wright, have approached the question of mixed-race identity in India from an analytic perspective of what they have called ‘marginality’.¹³

¹¹ For an additional example of this thinking, see Paul F. Cressey, ‘The Anglo-Indians: A Disorganised Marginal Group’, *Social Forces*, 14 (1935), pp.263-268. This brief sociological essay was dedicated to the journal’s special forum entitled, ‘Race, Cultural Groups, Social Differentiation’. See also a review article which appeared in *The Journal of Negro Education*. Praising Park’s work, it said:

‘The development of “ideal types” in social research has enhanced the interpretation and understanding of social phenomena by providing for them convenient “frames of reference”. In further elaborating the characteristics of the “marginal man”, the author has clearly defined the Gestalt of a particular group of social objects in which readers of the Journal of Negro Education are much interested’.

D. A. Wilkerson, *The Journal of Negro Education*, 5 (1936), pp.138-142, p.142

¹² Of course, this does not mean that this American sociological discourse was free from any ideological implications. After all, Park’s theorisation of the ‘marginal man’ could have easily functioned as a rhetorical vehicle for the US ideology of the ‘Melting Pot’. The ‘marginal man’ theory did not take into account the political and legislative processes that regulated immigration in racial terms. Assimilation was not a neutral ‘sociological’ process but was historically characterised by a state-led discrimination which prevented ‘blacks’ and ‘Asians’ from gaining fuller citizenship on a par with white immigrants.

¹³ Noel P. Gist and Roy Dean Wright, *Marginality and Identity: Anglo-Indians as a Racially-Mixed Minority in India* (Leiden, 1973); Roy Dean Wright, ‘Reinforcing Marginality through an Invisible Culture: The Anglo-Indian Community of India’, *The International Journal of Anglo-Indian Studies*, 5 [No.1] (2000) < <http://www.alphalink.com.au/~agilbert/wright00.html>>; V. R. Galikwad’s book should

Gist and Wright have criticised Park / Stonequist for their over-emphasis on personal-psychological aspects and their consequent neglect of social and cultural factors. But, in the main, their concept of 'marginality' remains strongly influenced by the American sociological discourse. Both theories of the 'marginal man' and of 'marginality' commonly presuppose certain distinct traits of mixed-race individuals, through an interpretive analysis of which the sociologist can draw inferences about the society in question. Through studying the social, cultural and socio-psychological characteristics which are supposedly unique to the mixed-descent people of India, Gist and Wright identified a sociological condition of 'marginality'. On the one hand, India's mixed-descent people are marginal in relation to the British because they are socially, economically and politically discriminated against by the latter. On the other, they are also marginalized by the Indians on account of an unbridgeable cultural incompatibility with them. It is out of this double process of marginalisation that the mixed-race people emerge as a 'racially mixed minority'.¹⁴

Colonial Studies and Postcolonial Criticism

Compared to sociologists, professional historians were relatively slow in taking up the question of hybrid identity in colonial India. One of the earliest historical works was

also be noted as a major contribution to the sociological literature. V. R Galikwad., *The Anglo-Indians: a study in the problems and processes involved in emotional and cultural integration* (London, 1967)

¹⁴ The influence of 'marginality' is found, for instance, in Kuntala Lahiri Dutt, *In Search of a Homeland: Anglo-Indians and McCluskiegunge* (Calcutta, 1990)

A. A. D'Souza's *Anglo-Indian Education* (1976), which meticulously described the institutional evolution of 'European education' (i.e., education intended mainly for people of British descent) in India from early colonial times.¹⁵ Discussing the history of the mixed-race community in nineteenth-century colonial India, Lal Bahadur Varma's book *Anglo-Indians* (1979) was among the first comprehensive attempts to explore the equivocal position of the community, social, economic and political.¹⁶ And it was with David Arnold's short but well-researched articles that the histories of the white and mixed-race populations were directly brought in touch with historiographical debates on an ambivalence of British racial identity in the colonial context. Arnold should also be noted as probably the first to write anything substantial about the so-called 'poor whites'. Two of his articles, 'European Orphans and Vagrants in India in the Nineteenth Century' (1979) and 'White Colonisation and Labour in Nineteenth-Century India' (1983), have served to the present day as a standard reference for working historians who are interested in the relevance of class problems to colonial social relations in the British-Indian context.¹⁷ These seminal works by Arnold have been appreciated not only for their accurate reconstruction of the little known existence of impoverished whites and/or racially mixed persons but also for their cogent discussions of its broader implications for the racial and class

¹⁵ A. A. D'Souza, *Anglo-Indian Education: A Study on its Origins and Growth in Bengal up to 1960* (Oxford, 1976)

¹⁶ L. B. Varma, *Anglo-Indians* (New Delhi, 1979)

¹⁷ David Arnold, 'European Orphans and Vagrants in India in the Nineteenth Century', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 7 (1979), pp.104-127; David Arnold, 'White Colonisation and Labour in Nineteenth-Century India', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 11 (1983), pp.133-158

complexities of British rule. For similar reasons, Kenneth Ballhatchet's work, *Race, Sex and Class under the Raj* (1980), has also established itself as a classic text. Its historical analysis of the colonial regulations on sex (policy regarding British soldiers' use of prostitution, for instance), has paved the way for addressing the complexities of class and gender relations within racialised social processes under colonial rule.¹⁸

It took a while for Arnold and Ballhatchet's efforts to attract serious follow-up studies. The 1980s was a time when Edward Said's, *Orientalism* (1978) started to make its phenomenal influences felt internationally. In this period, the burgeoning literature on race and colonialism in the British-Indian context characteristically revolved around the racialisation (i.e., racial subordination and representation in colonial discourse) of indigenous subjects under imperial rule.¹⁹ Consequently, the theme of white 'social' identity and the related questions of marginalised whites and mixed-descent people were somewhat obliterated. Nor were these topics thoroughly discussed by the emergent *Subaltern Studies*. Raymond Renford's book, *The Non-Official British in India to 1920* (1987), was the first systematic attempt to recount the social and political lives of British 'non-official' population in India (including merchants, planters and missionaries), but only passing references are made in this book to the poorer and mixed-descent sections of colonial British society.²⁰

It is probably fair to argue that it was with Ann Stoler's writings since the end of

¹⁸ Kenneth Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex and Class under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes and Policies and their Critics, 1873-1905* (London, 1980)

¹⁹ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978)

²⁰ Raymond K. Renford, *The Non-Official British in India to 1920* (Oxford, 1987)

the 1980s that the questions of both class ambivalence and racial hybridity in the colonising context were firmly contextualised within the historiographical trends of imperial and colonial studies.²¹ Her empirical studies in these writings are mostly about the European communities in Dutch Indochina, but Stoler has been known for her ingeniously elevating empirical studies into elaborate historiographical mediations on Western imperialism in general. Her arguments have exerted seminal influences in many directions, the most relevant among them to our present concern being her demonstration of how the ‘bourgeois’ politics of social control was played out in the colonial context as well as in European home societies. Observing that the domestic class disparities of bourgeois society were not levelled in colonies but were as pathetic as in Europe, she shows how the colonial ruling classes were preoccupied with the control of various white populations who were regarded as too ‘unfit’ to be authentic members of the ruling race. Racial boundaries were to be maintained not simply by ‘othering’ indigenous subjects but also by regulating the lives of the ‘internal enemies’ of the white body politic. Such a perspective has enabled historians of colonial India to examine the social constitution of British society in ways that addressed their internal contradictions and how such contradictions were dealt with in order to maintain colonial racial order. Since the 1990s a number of historical studies have

²¹ See especially, Ann Stoler, ‘Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 13 (1989), pp.134-161; Ann Stoler, ‘Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 34 (1992), pp.514-551; Ann Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire* (Durham, 1996); Frederick Cooper & Ann Stoler, ‘Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda’ in (eds.) A. Stoler & F. Cooper, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997), pp.1-56

appeared that aimed to interrogate various colonial policies of social control. Philippa Levine (1994) and more recently Harald Fisher-Tiné (2003) have explored how the presence of European prostitutes emerged as a menace to the gendered and class-specific structure of colonial racial order.²² Indrani Sen's essay on white women in India (1997) indicates how the gender and class differences within the late nineteenth-century white population influenced British racial attitudes.²³ Taking the points pointed out by Ballhatchet further, Douglas Peers (1998) reconsiders the question of sexuality concerning British subaltern soldiers, paying particular attention to how their lives were governed by institutional means so that they would not cause social disorder.²⁴

Also notable in these historiographical debates is the influence of the notion of 'hybridity', promoted most remarkably by such literary theorists as Homi Bhabha and Robert Young, who have acquired a number of followers in historical studies too. Following Edward Said, Bhabha's interest is in a discursive relationship of colonialism, where the 'West' figures as those who *represent* and the 'East' as those who *become represented*. Central to Bhabha's theoretical concern is the extent to which colonial

²² Philippa Levine, 'Venereal Disease, Prostitution, and the Politics of Empire: The Case of British India', *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 4 (1994), pp.579-602; Harald Fisher-Tiné, "'White women degrading themselves to the lowest depth": European networks of prostitution and colonial anxieties in British and Ceylon ca. 1880-1914', *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 40 (2003), pp.165-192

²³ Indrani Sen, "'Between power and 'pudah': The white woman in British India, 1958-1900", in *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 34 (3), 1997, pp.355-376

²⁴ Douglas Peers, 'Privates off Parade: Regimenting Sexuality in the Nineteenth-Century Indian Empire', *The International History Review*, 20 (1998), pp.823-854

discourse had been ridden with linguistic and psychic uncertainties, all the more for its appeal to reason and universality. Bhabha (1995) argues, for instance, that colonial discourse was internally split over the representation of those who were 'white but not quite', such as westernised Indian elites in Bengal who were racially Indian but whose intellectual and cultural identification was increasingly close to the British.²⁵ Bhabha's point is that such a mode of identity was not an exceptional, but a necessary and inevitable, creation of colonialism. The white colonisers justified their colonial project as a 'civilising mission', thereby aiming to transform the indigenous subjects into their 'doubles'. But, of course, the possible completion of such a transformative project would mean an end of colonialism itself, which, however, was unacceptable from the coloniser's perspective. Hence, colonial discourse was, *by nature*, always ambivalent and paradoxical. Drawing on this notion of discursive ambivalence, Robert Young in his influential work *Colonial Desire* (1995) has argued that the British imperial discourse on race and culture was paradoxically characterised by *both* the sexual desire for *and* repulsion against the colonised subjects.²⁶ For this reason, the issues of miscegenation and of the resulting hybridised offspring had a haunting impact on the West's self-definition. The existential ambivalence of certain colonial groups, such as elite Bengalis and mixed-descent populations, provides theorists of 'hybridity' with important moments for critical intervention. Ambivalence here is tantamount to

²⁵ 'Of mimicry and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse', in Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London, 1994), pp.85-92

²⁶ Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London, 1995)

a radical otherness which 'hybrides', or deconstructs, the Eurocentric 'reason' of colonial discourse.

It is in Laura Bear's work 'Miscegenations of Modernity: constructing European respectability and race in the Indian railway colony, 1857-1931' (1994) that the characteristic ambivalence of India's domiciled community becomes construed as the aforementioned kind of postmodern alterity. According to Bear, the railways in British India had been ideologically loaded with the colonial mission of development-cum-progress that should make the indigenous world infinitely more 'modern' and by extension 'European'. She takes this representation of colonial railways seriously and attempts to deconstruct its Eurocentric 'metaphysics' through introducing the ambivalent position of domiciled-European and Eurasians employees within the railway system. Like other discourses of colonialism, the discourse of railway modernity had been typically ridden with logical contradictions. It was characterised by two competing impulses for transcendence *and* repulsion. Its modernising impulse would seek to level out pre-modern obstacles (racial and religious bases of the Indian traditions). At the same time, the railways themselves had to remain 'European', and never 'contaminated', or by inference, not 'owned', by the peoples and traditions of the colonised land. The problem in this context was how the British character of the railways was to be preserved whilst still relying on non-British subjects for labour. Bear's argument is that the colonisers tried to preserve the British character of the railways by using the domiciled community which was both

ambiguously both British and native. In this account, the British created 'railway colonies' for employees of British racial descent where they were inculcated with 'European respectability'. It was only by way of the ambiguously 'European' existence of the domiciled community nurtured through these colonies that the colonial metaphysics of progress was to be made possible. In turn, by addressing the ambivalent Europeanness of domiciled Europeans and Eurasians, we are supposedly enabled to deconstruct how colonialism sought to make the rhetoric of modernising mission survive its inherent logical bankruptcy.²⁷

The aforementioned growth of relevant historiographical discussions has served to gradually bring British India's subordinate-white and mixed-descent peoples towards the centre stage of academic debates. From the late 1990s till the present day, the complex histories of these people have been considered in ways that address the issues of race, class, gender and sexual difference.²⁸ Firmly based on the methods and presentation of contemporary historiography, Christopher Hawes' book *Poor Relations* (1996) presents a lucid, well-researched account of the colonial attitudes and policies towards the Eurasian population under the rule of the East Indian Company.²⁹ Since

²⁷ Laura Gbah Bear, 'Miscegenations of Modernity: constructing European respectability and race in the Indian railway colony, 1857-1931', *Women's History Review*, 3 (1994), pp.531-548

²⁸ Discussions have been promoted also on the world wide web. An Australia-based internet site, Anglo-Indian Homepage (1. Sep. 2001, <<http://www.alphalink.com.au/~agilbert/>>) was set up in 1996, publishing a number of informative essays in *The International Journal of Anglo-Indian Studies* and *The Anglo-Indian Wallah*.

²⁹ C. J. Hawes, *Poor Relations: The Making of a Eurasian Community in British India, 1773-1833*, (Richmond, 1996)

the mid-1990s, Lionel Caplan has contributed a number of densely argued essays on various aspects of the mixed-race community of India, including the implications of pauperism, the place of women within the community as well as the complexities of racial and cultural identification. Caplan is an anthropologist, but all his works seriously inquire into the extent to which the post-Independent condition of the Anglo-Indian Community has been affected by the legacies of colonialism. The community, for Caplan, were nothing but the 'children of colonialism'.³⁰ Indrani Chatterjee's essay 'Colouring Subalternity' (1999) was the first to discuss the racially mixed community of colonial India from the perspective of the *Subaltern Studies* collective. The contribution of this essay is to show the extent to which Eurasian orphans were entrapped in histories of racial and sexual subordination under British rule.³¹ Elizabeth Buettner's recent series of essays are equally concerned with mixed and white subaltern identities in colonial India but are unique in bringing to the fore the attitudes of the British bourgeois elites, demonstrating why and how they positively avoided the colonial milieu in which the domiciled community were educated and

³⁰ His numerous articles on these subjects include: L. Caplan, 'Creole World, purist rhetoric, Anglo-Indian cultural debates in colonial and contemporary Madras', *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 1 (1995), pp.743-62; L. Caplan, 'Dimensions of Urban Poverty: Anglo-Indian Poor and Their Guardians in Madras', *Urban Anthropology*, 25 (1996), pp.311-349; L. Caplan, 'Giving and Receiving: Anglo-Indian charity and its beneficiaries in Madras', *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 32,(1998), pp.410-431; L. Caplan, 'Iconographies of Anglo-Indian Women: Gender Constructions and Contrasts in a Changing Society', *Modern Asian Studies*, 34 (2000), pp.863-892. And his *magnum opus* is L. Caplan, *Children of Colonialism: Anglo-Indians in a Postcolonial World* (Oxford, 2001)

³¹ Indrani Chatterjee, 'Colouring Subalternity: Slaves, Concubines and Social Orphans in Early Colonial India', in Gautam Bhadra, Gyan Prakash & Susie Tharu (eds.), *Subaltern Studies X: Writings on South Asian History and Society* (Oxford, 1999), pp.49-97

socialised.³²

The Significance of Current Research

Anglo-Indian aloofness from Indians can also be ascribed to the fact of class consciousness in English society. [...] To expect that people who made class distinctions among their own race in the own country would accept the subject people of a different race as their equal is taking idealism beyond the point of common sense.

Khursheed K. Aziz³³

we have yet to develop as sustained, various, and subtle a critique of class as that which now exists for race and gender.

Teresa Hubel³⁴

Class limits of the British racial identity

Mrinalini Sinha points out that feminist historiographies in the past have long left

‘men’ un-historicised:

‘To be sure, almost the entire corpus of historical scholarship that does not specifically allude to “women” is, and always has been, about the doings of men. Yet, these have not been histories of men as *men*’.³⁵

Sinha thinks that feminism has successfully uncovered the histories of gender

³² Elizabeth Buettner, ‘Parent-child separations and colonial careers: the Talbot family correspondence in the 1880’s and 1890’s’, in (eds.) A. Fletcher & Stephan Hussey, *Childhood in Question: Children, Parents and the State* (Manchester, 1999), pp.113-132; Elizabeth Buettner, ‘Problematic Spaces, Problematic Races: defining ‘Europeans’ in late colonial India’, *Women’s History Review*, 9 (2000), pp.277-297; Elizabeth Buettner, ‘From Somebodies to Nobodies: Britons Returning from India’, in (eds.) M. Danton & B. Rieger, *Meanings of Modernity: Britain from the Late-Victorian Era to World War II* (Oxford, 2001), pp.1-56

³³ Khursheed K. Aziz, *The British in India: A Study in Imperialism* (Islamabad, 1976), p.252

³⁴ Teresa, Hubel, ‘In Search of the British Indian in British India: White Orphans, Kipling’s Kim, and Class in Colonial India’, *Modern Asian Studies*, 38 (2004), pp.227-251, p.227

³⁵ Sinha, Mrinalini, ‘Giving Masculinity a History: Some Contributions from the Historiography of Colonial India’, *Gender and History*, 11 (1999), pp.445-460, pp.445

subordination, where men appear as a conscious oppressor of their female counterparts. But she argues that the feminist critique of history has not fully studied how men have acquired their own sense of being masculine, let alone the possible ambivalences and self-contradictions that had to be suppressed. Similar problems may be said to hover round the studies of racism. Ruth Frankenberg, a leading figure in the 'whiteness studies' collective, argues that, whilst white people's racialisation of non-white people has long been subjected to research, the 'whiteness' of white persons themselves has often escaped critical examination. What is needed, as she argues, is 'racing' the every-day lives of white individuals and groups precisely because their power rests on their seeming to be racially non-problematic: in Frankenberg's words, 'whiteness makes itself invisible precisely by asserting its normalcy, its transparency, in contrast with the making of others on which its transparency depends'.³⁶

This concomitant failure to displace the unmarked status of whiteness is also common with the modern scholarship on colonial racism. Ann Stoler observes that studies of colonialism have long construed European communities exclusively as 'an abstract force' of political and economic agency for colonialism.³⁷ Europeans have been studied mainly for what they 'did' to indigenous peoples but rarely for what they 'were' or how they organised their social lives. Their existence as a 'super race' has been taken for granted rather than examined for its possible contradictions to be

³⁶ Ruth Frankenberg, 'Introduction: Local Whitenesses, Localizing Whiteness', in Ruth Frankenberg (ed.), *Displacing Whiteness: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism* (Durham, 1997), pp.1-33, p.6

³⁷ Ann Stoler, 'Rethinking Colonial Categories', p.135

suppressed. This research aims to supplement this blind spot. Just as Sinha did in her study of the colonial invention of masculinity, it seeks to study Europeans *as European* or to give Europeanness a history.

It is out of the aforementioned concern with European identity that the present research will study British attitudes towards subordinate-white and mixed-descent peoples of colonial India. Both lower-class whites and mixed-race people constituted mutually distinctive groups in the sense that the former were purely of European (and mostly British) descent while the latter were only partially so. However, as David Arnold points out, for elite colonials, these differences were often inconsequential and the two groups were seen as constituting the same problematic.³⁸ In spite of their having British blood, both were equally regarded as incapable of representing imperial racial prestige to the indigenous subjects of the Raj. Subordinate whites may have been purely British but were regarded to be far too indigent to be called authentic members of the ruling race. Meanwhile, an overwhelming majority of the mixed-race community had been severely impoverished by the late nineteenth century. Both were too poor to be regarded as 'British', and it is in this sense that this work argues that Britishness stood on definite class criteria. It is specifically by interrogating this class specificity that the research will explore the colonial construction of white identity in later British India.

³⁸ Arnold, 'European Orphans and Vagrants', p.106

Benedict Anderson has argued that colonial racism was inspired by the feudal or early modern iconography of class difference in Europe, in which the social distance between the aristocracy and the common peoples was understood to be so absolute as to be 'racial'.³⁹ In British India, as David Cannadine notes, this colonial appropriation of feudal hierarchy went hand in hand with an arbitrary understanding of the Indian caste system. The British did racialise the different indigenous populations into a subordinate status, but did not always rebuke the caste order of Indian society itself. On the contrary, British imperialists (especially those inclined towards romanticism) often admired its stable pyramidal order which appeared to contrast with an emerging 'modern' order of metropolitan society that seemed ridden with uneasy challenges to their 'bourgeois' hegemony. Thus, in a 'pre-modern' India, the British elites liked to see themselves as a sort of feudal or upper-caste master who stood aloof from the rest of colonial society.⁴⁰

But the class aspect of colonial racism was more than a matter of this 'analogical sociology at work'.⁴¹ Despite its aristocratic mockery, not every member of the British community in India was so rich as to pass as petit-aristocrats. As David Arnold points out, among 150,000 or more British by the end of the nineteenth century, nearly half could be called 'poor whites'.⁴² Thus in reality, some significant portion of the colonising community was as 'lowly' as it was 'aristocratic', and this internal

³⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London, 1991), p.150

⁴⁰ David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism* (London, 2001), pp.41-57

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.43

⁴² Arnold, 'European Orphans and Vagrants', p.104

division manifested itself in ways that called into question the community's exceptional status as the ruling race. As Kenneth Ballhatchet observes:

'English class attitudes are transformed into racial attitudes in an imperial setting. The official elite lived in an aristocratic manner, and the ideal of the gentleman was greatly treasured. The maintenance of a proper distance between them and the populace seemed not only socially appropriate but politically necessary. Those who threatened to bridge that distance aroused great concern. But the ruling race also included many who did not live like gentlemen, and, as we shall see, this was a source of perplexity to the official elite'.⁴³

In order to maintain their prestige as colonial masters, the colonial elites had to come to terms with a disorderly presence of subordinate members of their own race, who had been increasingly pauperised and racially mixed. The existence of these people was considered problematic because it was seen as jeopardising the external-cum-colonial relation between the British with their 'subject races'. By examining the attitudes of elite Britons towards their impoverished and/or mixed kin, this research discusses how the social gaps within the white community had bearing on the racialised social borders of colonial society. Or, to paraphrase Ann Stoler, it will bring to the fore how these internal divisions 'augmented the intensity of racist practice, affected the terrains of contest, and intervened significantly in shaping social politics'.⁴⁴

⁴³ Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex and Class under the Raj*, p.121-122

⁴⁴ Stoler, 'Rethinking Colonial Categories', p. 138

British self-anxieties

Recent scholarship on colonial Indian society has intensively discussed ideologies of 'race'. Historians have demonstrated how the British deployed racial ideologies for governing their Indian subjects. Racial thinking, developed and systematised by biological and anthropological sciences, not only stereotyped Indians in crude essentialist terms but also served to 're-invent' their social relations for practical colonial governance. Various scholars of South Asian history, including Bernard Cohn, Ronald Inden, and C. A. Bayly to name but a few, have pointed out how central racial-anthropological thought was for the British efforts of classifying indigenous subjects for administrative purposes.⁴⁵ This synthesis of racial knowledge and colonial governance was most explicitly seen, for instance, in Hubert Risley's theory of caste and its application to the Census of India. Risley maintained that castes were essentially the same with 'races', each of which being constitutionally different from the others. Thus in his Census, Risley divided and classified the entire population of India into numerous categories, showing that Indian society had been so infinitely fragmented. Such a racial theory, as many point out, easily functioned as an ideological justification for foreign rule. For its emphasis on racial diversity implied that the indigenous peoples had no common ethnic base and thus were unable to rule

⁴⁵ See for instance, C. A. Bayly, *Empire and information: intelligence gathering and social communication in India, 1780-1870* (Cambridge, 1996); Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge* (Princeton, 1996); Ronald Inden, *Imagining India* (Oxford, 1990)

their own country through a nation-state: they needed a foreign ruler who could govern the mutually incompatible populations.⁴⁶ In these accounts of colonial racism, British colonials tend to figure predominantly as the subject of knowing and thus of racialising colonised 'Others', while the racial selfhood of the former has been pushed to the background. Whilst fully acknowledging the importance of critiquing Europeans as an unmarked subject of racialising non-European peoples, this research seeks to show the extent to which the colonial lives of the former had themselves been racialised in specific ways.

In his books on the issues of hygienic health and influence of tropical climate, Mark Harrison demonstrates that British scientists did not always regard the European race as naturally more robust than Indians. Rather, they often emphasised how fragile the racial constitution of European colonials was, especially that of women and children.⁴⁷ And, as Dane Kennedy shows, it was especially in the plains, with their tropical climate and inimical sanitary conditions, that the racial constitution of Europeans was considered to be in danger. Many scientists recommended that the British should reside in the northern hill ranges to maintain their delicate racial constitution.⁴⁸ Whilst representing their indigenous subjects as 'backward' and

⁴⁶ See for instance, Nicholas B. Dirks, 'The Policing of Tradition: Colonialism and Anthropology in Southern India', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 39 (1997), pp.182-212, p.184

⁴⁷ Mark Harrison, *Public Health in British India: Anglo-Indian preventive medicine 1859-1914* (Cambridge, 1994), pp.36-59; Mark Harrison, *Climates and Constitutions: Health, Race, Environment and British Imperialism in India, 1600-1850* (Oxford, 1999) See also, David Arnold, 'India's Place in the Tropical World, 1770-1930'. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 26 (1998), pp.1-21

⁴⁸ Dane Kennedy, *The Magic Mountains: Hill Stations of the British Raj* (Berkeley, 1996)

'inferior', European colonisers were not necessarily self-assured about their own racial vigour. To prove Harrison's observations, my research will reveal the extent to which colonisers were ridden by anxieties over a moral and physical 'degeneration' of their own race. Their racial vigour was not taken for granted but was seen as something that could be preserved only by certain prohibitions and socio-cultural norms that strictly regulated their lives in the colony.

My research will further elaborate on these discussions on British racial self-awareness by analysing how these norms of settlement 'othered' non-elite members of the white community. As Arnold's work on European vagrants demonstrates, the colonial authorities were eager to sweep the existence of 'unfit' Europeans out of the colonial scene by repatriating them back to the metropole.⁴⁹ Not all subordinate whites, however, were sent back or voluntarily returned to Europe. Many, in fact, were too impoverished even to afford their journey back, thus eventually becoming permanent residents of India. Moreover they often, if not invariably, married their way into the mixed-race 'Eurasian' community as they continued their colonial residence across successive generations. British attitudes towards these 'domiciled Europeans' and 'Eurasians' were often starkly exclusionist. The British thought that these people had been immersed in the natural and social environments of India for far too long. They had become de-Europeanised, ultimately because they did not spend their infancy in

⁴⁹ Arnold, 'European Orphans and Vagrants', pp.114-124

the climate and social milieu of the British Isles. My point is that such an attitude of exclusion indicated how materially conditioned the reproduction of Britishness was: in order to remain 'British', one had to be sent to the metropolis for education, the costs of which would only be met by certain elite colonials with commensurate socio-economic privileges. Unable to pay for such education, the rest were educated in special schools located in the colony, whose graduates, as Elizabeth Buettner rightly claims, were not generally recognised as legitimately 'British'.⁵⁰

Racial boundaries and colonial sexual relations

As Linda Bryder's review essay indicates, there has recently been a burgeoning literature on colonial sexuality. The issue of inter-racial sexuality has offered various sites of debate and research concerning colonial racism.⁵¹ A number of historians cite sexuality as having been one crucial key to the making, preservation and disruptions of racialised social relations between the coloniser and colonised. Being concerned with the British perception of both miscegenation and mixed offspring, my research naturally touches on some of these fundamental questions about race and colonial sexuality.

It has been a while since Robert Hyam controversially argued that the sexual

⁵⁰ Elizabeth Buettner, 'Problematic Spaces, Problematic Races'

⁵¹ Linda Bryder, 'Sex, Race and Colonialism: An Historiographical Review', *The International History Review*, 20 (1998), pp.806-822

liaisons between colonising men and colonised women served to improve racial relations. According to his account, the practices of prostitution and concubinage in Britain's colonies in Africa and Asia did not always incite racial animosities but actually harmonised coloniser-colonised relations. He contends that cross-racial liaisons not only had the power to undermine racial antagonism but also benefited British men and colonised women equally. These arrangements, we are told, provided British colonials with necessary sexual outlets, whilst offering economic opportunities to colonised women. Sex brought coloniser and colonised into a relation of equilibrium of demand and supply, maximising the happiness of both parties. Hyam thinks that it was the notorious Victorian sexual morality that jeopardised this otherwise 'healthy' economy of racial and sexual exchanges.⁵²

Hyam's theory of 'sexual opportunities' has been thoroughly criticised for its characteristic neglect of the oppressive and exploitative nature of the colonial appropriation of non-European sexuality.⁵³ His critics have rightly argued that prostitution and concubinage did not generally level the racial and gender hierarchies of empire, even though they may have provided colonised women with occasional economic gains. The low regard with which non-European women were treated was observed also in European attitudes towards their mixed offspring. For example, Indrani Chatterjee's work shows that 'half-caste' children in early-nineteenth-century

⁵² Ronald Hyam, *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience* (Manchester, 1992)

⁵³ The most direct criticism has been; Mark Berger, 'Imperialism and Sexual Exploitation: A Response to Ronald Hyam's 'Empire and Sexual Opportunity', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 17(1988), pp.83-89

India were not elevated to their European fathers' privileged status, but were exploited in what may be characterised as a form of sexual slavery.⁵⁴ Contra-Hyam, many have argued that sexual contact did not subvert racism but rather operated firmly within its bounds.

For Robert Young, a foremost theorist of 'hybridity', it is for the sake of understanding the discursive and psychic boundaries of race that colonial sexuality should be taken seriously. Unlike Hyam, Young does not see inter-racial sexual liaisons as a liberating force, but follows the former in accepting the importance of sexual desire as motivating colonial expansion: imperialism had been triggered by a desire for sexual as well as economic and political domination. But, on the other hand, miscegenation between Europeans and their colonial subjects had been taken not only as morally wrong but as a contradiction to the most basic premises of a racialised global order. Rather paradoxically, imperialism entertained both a desire for racial transcendence by sex *and* a perceived need for preserving social hierarchies by racial exclusion. For Young, this ambivalence is of vital importance. He skilfully reads it into colonial discourses on racial and cultural difference, with a view to deconstructing their seeming objectivity and universality. Such a reading would reveal the extent to which the questions of miscegenation and of its hybrid products were not marginal to but always haunted the psychic and discursive configuration of Western racial thought. For Young, therefore, addressing the subject of hybrid identity assumes a special

⁵⁴ Indrani Chatterjee, 'Colouring Subalternity'

importance within Postcolonial Criticism.⁵⁵

The current research wishes to enrich the aforesaid debates on sexuality, especially through its unique reference to the internal-cum-class discrepancies within British society. It will firstly show how the European anxieties over racial degeneration were explicitly associated with their attitudes to colonial sexual relations. By the late nineteenth century, the fear of racial degeneration and that of miscegenation had become almost interchangeable. Colonial miscegenation was feared as a possible cause of the degeneration of the British body politic. Mixed offspring were seen as inferior to their European masters, and were only thought of as emblematic of sexual misconduct. In the late colonial period, when there were a sufficient number of eligible white women, European men were supposed to break from the often miscegenous relations with Indian and Eurasian women in the past.

But this retreat from miscegenation was far from the entire picture because the question of miscegenation involved not just white 'gentlemen' and non-white women. As noted earlier, many members of the white community were not 'gentlemanly' at all, and the non-elites had their own reasons in relating to non-white women. Inasmuch as they ignore the class dimension of European sexuality, the aforementioned debates on inter-racial sexuality can be said to be rather insufficient. Kenneth Ballhatchet's study on the sexual health of subordinate British soldiers remains an indispensable starting block for supplementing this indifference to class. His book shows how the

⁵⁵ Robert Young, *Colonial Desire*

sexuality of these soldiers became a major problem for the colonial authorities. They were certainly 'white' but their lower class origins meant that their sense of morality was not generally trusted by their elite counterparts. Left unsupervised and uncontrolled, they were feared to engage in unsettling liaisons with indigenous or Eurasian women, resulting in violence, disease and illegitimate offspring.⁵⁶ The historiographical works on European prostitutes, especially those by Philippa Levine and Harald Fisher-Tiné, illuminate how the colonial authorities worried themselves over the possible social disorder the presence of poor and 'licentiousness' European females would bring to the colonial context.⁵⁷ It is important to note that the presence of working-class white women was feared as a possible cause of an even more inimical form of miscegenation wherein the European women were 'conquered', and their progeny fathered, by colonised men. At these junctures, the problem of inter-racial sexuality was neither simply about a hypocrisy of Victorian morality (Hyam) nor about the ambivalence of its logic (Young). Rather it was also about those whose sexualities were not seen as so prudent or puritan as those of their 'bourgeois' kin. My own work on British attitudes towards the domiciled elements of their own race in India should serve as a point of reference for considering these problematic connections between colonial sexuality and class. It suggests, for instance, that the colonial authorities were rather attracted by a plan to increase marriage rates among subaltern white

⁵⁶ Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex and Class under the Raj*

⁵⁷ Philippa Levine, 'Venereal Disease, Prostitution, and the Politics of Empire: The Case of British India'; Harald Fisher-Tiné, "'White women degrading themselves to the lowest depth". European networks of prostitution and colonial anxieties in British and Ceylon ca. 1880-1914'

soldiers, but eventually decided against it for certain 'class' reasons. They feared that marriage would lead to the latter's permanent settlement in the colony. But, in principle, the authorities wanted to open up India only to elite and well-off classes: the presence of low-class soldiers and their equally low-class families would only create more trouble than virtue. With little positive demand for white workers in the labour market, the ex-soldiers would soon become impoverished (as they actually did), and eventually swell the ranks of the mixed-race community. It was by providing state-regulated prostitution that the colonial rulers attended to the soldiers' needs, because such an institution was considered to bring the minimum amount of contact between the British working class and non-white women.

Race and the ambivalence of bourgeois philanthropy

As Ashis Nandy succinctly puts it, 'Colonialism minus a civilisational mission is no colonialism at all'.⁵⁸ The philanthropic mission of imperialism has long been central to studies of racialised social relations in the colonial context. And for some while, it has also been an important theme for addressing the gendered dimensions of social relations under imperialism. And more recently, imperial philanthropy has started to be researched with regard to its ambiguous relation to class. The present research will seek to make a contribution mainly within this last category.

⁵⁸ Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (Oxford, 1983), p.11

In the age of the nation's overseas expansion, British missionaries travelled around the globe, with a mission to 'civilise' the empire's 'heathen subjects'. But this global turn of philanthropy did not necessarily imply that these missionaries had accomplished all their work in Britain whence they originated as though left with nobody to civilise. Susan Thorn argues that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the philanthropic mission of the church operated abroad and at home simultaneously. Missionaries returned from their colonial fields only to 'rediscover' indigent populations in the metropole that appeared as depressed as colonised subjects. Interestingly, these missionary returnees used the language of colonial racism to describe these impoverished people in the British Isles, labelling them as heathen or undeveloped.⁵⁹ Such representations mirrored not just the growing influence of colonial experiences on domestic culture but also a depth of class alienation in the emerging bourgeois order of a rapidly industrialised Britain. At a time when it was building the grandest empire in history, Britain embraced an ambiguous otherness within its national borders. As Benjamin Disraeli commented, the country had 'two nations', those of the rich and the poor, that had little contact or commonalities with each other.⁶⁰ And, as Gertrude Himelfarb's book on British ideologies of class show, in mid-century, the indigent populations in London were represented often as 'a

⁵⁹ Susan Thorn, "The Conversion of Englishmen and the Conversion of the World Inseparable": Missionary Imperialism and the Language of Class in Early Industrial Britain', in (eds.) A. Stoler & F. Cooper, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997), pp.238-262

⁶⁰ Benjamin Disraeli, *Sybil or The Two Nations* (London, 1853)

separate race'.⁶¹ Towards the end of the nineteenth century these forms of 'class racism', as Etienne Balibar calls it,⁶² became more systematised, crystallising in the forms of social evolution theory and eugenics. Works on Social Darwinism and eugenics by Bernard Semmel and by Anna Davin are particularly insightful in their sharp articulation of the relation between 'class racism' and empire. By this time, it was not just the putative superiority of the British race that invoked debates on British national identity: rather, it was also the fear of its degeneration from within that preoccupied the social and political thinking about the British body politic.⁶³ In such an instance, colonial racism served to articulate social alienations within the nation, instead of simply as a justification for its 'civilising mission' of colonialism abroad. The contribution of the current research is to show that the problem of these internal alienations also haunted the ruling classes in a colonial outpost of their empire.

As noted earlier, the British community in India had been divided along class lines and had 'degenerate' populations of its own and just as at home, the elites were always worried about the social consequences of their presence. And in fact, their anxiety was even acuter in the colonising context. For, as this dissertation will amply demonstrate, a visible pauperisation of whites and Eurasians in the face of indigenous

⁶¹ Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age* (London, 1984); Anne McClintock, in her book, *Imperial Leather* (1995), also points out this racialisation of the discourse on the poor, and shows that it was closely related with the socio-cultural effects of industrial capitalism. The bourgeoisie stigmatised working classes, females, and the so-called 'unfit' in the metropolis as a 'degenerate race' from which 'whiteness' had to be guarded against. Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context* (New York, 1995)

⁶² Etienne Balibar, 'Class Racism', in Etienne Balibar & Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation and Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London, 1991), pp.204-227

⁶³ Anna Davin, 'Motherhood and Imperialism', *History Workshop Journal*, 5 (1978), 9-57; Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and social reform: English social-imperial thought, 1895-1914* (London, 1960)

subjects was considered politically dangerous. Impoverished as they might have been, the domiciled were still 'European' by descent (white, whether purely or partly), language (English) and religion (Christianity). They may not have been so 'civilised' as their non-domiciled brethren, but they were emphatically not 'Indian' either, especially from the perspective of indigenous leaders who actually tended to label the former as an appendage to the colonial masters. Their pauperisation, therefore, was perceived as a threat to the prestige of European colonials as a whole. The legitimacy of colonial rule rested on a racial principle in which such phenomena as 'European pauperism' was contradictory: the European always had to appear as a saviour of the indigent and ostensibly not as poor and 'degenerate' him/herself. Throughout the later colonial period, the British elites, both public and private, were sharply alarmed by this contradiction and, in order to contain it, set up various measures of control. The way in which Christian social reformers coped with this problem is particularly interesting. At the heart of colonialism, they found themselves 'civilising' those who were already Christian (if sometimes 'nominally') instead of converting 'heathen races'.

Recent studies on British attitudes towards colonised subjects show the extent to which the idea of a philanthropic mission of imperialism was multi-faceted, instead of being uniformly or simply 'Orientalist'. Imperial philanthropy had different meanings for different sections of British society. Historians of Victorian feminism, such as

Antoinette Burton and Barbara Caine among others, have revealed how Victorian feminists created an alternative version of ‘civilising mission’ in order to advance their own gender politics within British society.⁶⁴ Catherine Hall’s work on the British debates on the abolition of slavery shows that the discourse of emancipation covertly served abolitionists in advancing their relative positions within their own society.⁶⁵ These works are of special importance in demonstrating the extent to which the discourse of imperial philanthropy (or imperial humanism) shaped social relations within British society. The present research seeks to examine further the ‘internal’ implications of philanthropy by alluding to its ambivalence over the ‘uncivilised’ populations *within* the British body politic. Within both Colonial Studies and Postcolonial Criticism, critiques of philanthropy tend to reproduce the crude racial dichotomy in ways that underestimate internal contradictions of class and gender.⁶⁶ On the other hand, from the perspective of British national history, the issue of philanthropy tends to become exclusively about class. But philanthropy in the age of modern imperialism was both global and domestic, relating to colonial and domestic social relations simultaneously. This research explores these intersections by exploring how the bourgeois control of the indigent was conducted in the racialised

⁶⁴ Antoinette Burton, *Burdens of history : British feminists, Indian women, and imperial culture, 1865-1915* (Chapel Hill, 1994); Barbara Caine, *English Feminism: 1780-1980* (Oxford, 1997)

⁶⁵ Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867* (Oxford, 2002)

⁶⁶ Bart Moor-Gilbert argues that the deconstruction of the West / East dialectic of history has tended to be done in a way that ‘makes only the most token reference to the parallel process of Othering of women and subordinate classes in the domestic sphere within the discourses of the Enlightenment’. Bart Moor-Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics* (London, 1997), p.129

context of colonial society. It will show how the colonial elites ambiguously sought to maintain racial order through a bourgeois politics of philanthropic control.

Writers of the Eurasian community tended to cite racism as most fundamental to British attitudes towards their mixed kin. But racism, as this research will show, was not always promoted but at times even opposed by the British themselves, especially by those in the philanthropic circles. For them, Eurasians were undesired not so much for their mixed origins as for their ‘uncivilised’ state of being *in spite of their European descent*. Instead of racialising their mixed brethren, the British had to bring the latter from the depths of indigence towards a more ‘civilised’ state of being. In this context, what was needed was not racial exclusion but a particular politics of ‘inclusion’, though by inclusion it meant nothing like an intra-communal transmission of privileges. In fact, one important aspect of this unique ‘civilising mission’ was its argument that both Eurasians and domiciled Europeans should *unlearn* to aspire to a ‘European’ standard of living and to mimic the lifestyles of elite Britons: their trying to become ‘European’ was part of their problem, rather than their legitimate goal. The domiciled had to be civilised not into a high-class status but into the position of the ‘respectable poor’. And much invoking the metropolitan theories of social evolution, the improvement of racial hygiene and the inculcation in the ethics of ‘self-help’ were said to be the only way for their communal regeneration.

Rather than discussing the domiciled community’s ‘in-between-ness’ *in abstracto*, this

research focuses on the historical problem of the community's pauperisation and the 'bourgeois' attitudes of the British thereto. In locating 'in-between-ness' exclusively in cultural and psychological alienations, the sociological theory of marginality tends to overlook its ideological implications for the colonial authorities. Many of the 'sociological characteristics' of the Eurasian 'marginal man' (above all, mimicry and/or hyper-racial sensitiveness) were not neutral factual variables but were invented, to a degree at least, by British social reformers as points of reformative intervention. The post-structuralist treatment of 'in-between-ness', as seen in Laura Bear's work, radically differs from this sociological approach: unlike the former, it certainly offers a powerful means to read such ambivalence into colonial ideologies with a view to finally deconstructing them. But Bear's line of argument is more relevant to cases where, as in the railway establishments, the domiciled community can be said to have been more or less sufficiently integrated in the European body politic. By contrast, the present research is much more about those domiciled Europeans and Eurasians who were explicitly excluded from any European labour and consequently were not even in-between the Europeans and Indians, but often poorer than the latter. By analysing colonial attitudes towards these people specifically, this research will address the historical dilemma of European pauperism and its implications for the construction of colonial social order.

3. Colonial Settlement, Miscegenation and the Emergence of the 'Domiciled Class'

Introduction

This chapter will examine various ideas and practices relating to the questions of colonial settlement, white labour, and miscegenation. By this, it will aim to explain how the colonial ruling classes circumscribed the nature of their colonial enterprise and invented a corresponding self-image of 'British' identity. Then it will seek to demonstrate why and how such an invention of colonial Britishness served to generate an ambiguous and essentially reluctant category of the 'domiciled class'.

The first section will interrogate the British approach to colonisation and settlement, with a view to delineating what kind of colonial white identity they were intending to construct. A heterogeneous set of discourses, both official and otherwise, will be discussed insofar as they were suggestive of the emerging perceptions about colonial governance, white colonial settlement, acclimatisation, miscegenation and so forth. The following section will shift attention from the positive creation of a British sense of self to the contradictions posed thereto by the much disparaged existence of so-called 'poor whites'. It will then observe the consequent colonial counter-measures by paying focused attention to certain policies that regulated the

presence of such 'poor whites'. The final section of the chapter will consider the attitudes of middle-class settlers towards the existence of those of British descent who made India their land of domicile, including the mixed-descent 'Eurasians'. It will elucidate the social dynamics where an exclusionary attitude on the part of the British caused these 'domiciled' people to figure as a highly ambivalent social category.

Middle-class Colonials and their 'Britishness'

It is not as a labourer but as a Captain of labour that the European must attempt to colonise. It is by the union of his intelligence and enterprise with the patience, industry and numerical power that the improvement of India is to be secured.¹

When a man begins to sink in India, and is not sent Home by his friends as soon as may be he falls very low from a respectable point of view. By the time that he changes his creed, as did MacIntosh, he is past redemption.

'To be Field for Reference'
Rudyard Kipling²

The British elites in late colonial India entertained what appears to have been an ambivalent attitude towards the racial identity of their own. On the one hand, they firmly believed that they, as a group, were racially superior to their Indian subjects. But on the other hand, these elites were also concomitantly worried of possibly losing their European sense of self by residing in the midst of India and its indigenous peoples.

¹ 'Indian Colonisation', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 29 Ap. 1858, pp.388-9, p.388

² Rudyard Kipling, 'To be Field for Reference' (1888) in Rudyard Kipling, *Plain Tales from the Hills* (Oxford, 2001), pp.234-241

My aim in the immediate following is to reveal both of these chauvinistic and anxiety-ridden attitudes, with a view to describing the social-cum-economic, as well as ideological, bases of British colonial identity.

'Racial superiority'

The revolt of 1857 and the subsequent handover of power from the East Indian Company to the Crown urged the British to formulate an official guideline for European colonial settlement. Accordingly, in 1858, a Select Committee on Colonisation and Settlement (SCCS, hereafter) was appointed. By and large, the SCCS shared with the Company a view that a reckless policy of immigration of 'non-official' Britons to India would create more social problems than virtues.³ And yet, with regard to the economic contribution which the non-official classes could possibly make, the SCCS differed from the Company's Directors. Unlike the latter, the former did recognise an immense potential in the economic activities of the private sector, and thought it promising to colonise certain parts of the Subcontinent as the bases of such activities. In the wake of the Company's abolition, the colonial

³ The East Indian Company had been notorious for its stubbornly hostile attitudes to the idea of allowing any private elements, or 'interlopers' as they were called, to operate in British India. The Company wanted to monopolise all affairs of colonial Indian society. The interlopers were feared because they might; (1) problematically interfere with the indigenous systems of land entitlement and taxation which, for pragmatic reasons, the Company sought to preserve; (2) cause trouble as military adventures, or aspire for a settler nationalism; (3) become impoverished and increase the number of 'poor white' and 'mixed-race' populations. See David Arnold, 'White Colonisation and Labour in Nineteenth-Century India', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 11 (1983), pp.133-158, pp.137-138

officials withdrew their characteristic dislike of non-official settlers and portrayed themselves as the guardian of their interests.⁴ Liberated from the top-down control of the official class, the non-officials entertained high hopes, and some of those interviewed by the SCCS did not hesitate to voice their belief in 'colonising India'.⁵ This new liberal attitude towards private enterprises, however, did not necessarily imply that the Crown government allowed an indiscriminate immigration of British subjects. It is important to keep in mind that the SCCS's support for private enterprise was expressed chiefly in reference to the business operations of the capitalist class only. The non-official cluster should consist *not* of run-of-the-mill labourers, but only of capitalists who employed indigenous labourers. One of the interviewees of the SCCS, Major-General G. B. Tremenheere, made this point rather explicitly. Asked by the Committee members of his own vision of colonisation, Tremenheere, who used to work for Bengal Engineers, replied;

⁴ The Company's stringent check on the free economic activities of private British enterprises had become a source of discontent already in the early nineteenth century. British traders and planters appealed directly to Parliament to dissuade the Company from clinging to its monopolistic policies. In 1833, the Company's Charter was redrawn so that their economic activities were guaranteed, but even then the Company generally remained unsympathetic to private economic operations. By the time of the Mutiny, a substantial body of British traders and planters outside the Company had come to organise themselves as a pressure group. As Francis Hutchins observes, the abolition of the Company was to an extent a response to the pressure of private businessmen. And this was reflected by the very fact that the London Government soon appointed the SCCS to explore the possibilities of white colonisation which would open up industrial and commercial opportunities. See Francis G Hutchins, *The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India* (Princeton, 1967), p.96

⁵ For instance, Captain John Ouchterlony favoured the idea of a permanent European settlement and opposed governmental regulations. To be sure, India was not the same with Britain's settler colonies such as Australia or New Zealand, with certain unique obstacles to colonisation. But Ouchterlony believed that these could be circumvented, so that capitalists and descendants of soldiers could establish themselves in the hills permanently, much contributing to the consolidation of British rule. And, to make colonisation possible, he argued, the discouragement that had been given to European settlers by the Government functionaries had to be eliminated urgently. *Third Report of the Select Committee on Colonization and Settlement* (hereafter SCCS) (London, 1958) (in *British Parliamentary Papers, 1857-58, VII Pt.I*), pp. 35, 42, 46-47

'it must spring from the upper, rather than the lower ranks of society, by the settlement of capitalists; that is, from the capitalist rather than from the labourer'.⁶

Such a vision was eventually adopted by the SCCS itself, which concluded: 'The inducements to a settlement of the working classes of the British Isles are not generally to be found in India'.⁷ A large white labouring class would be of no use for a colonial territory like British India, which, unlike Britain's settler colonies such as Australia, was so densely populated by millions of indigenous peoples who could be turned into labourers. As the Committee observed, 'India cannot compete with the boundless regions of America or Australia, as a home for the labouring emigrant'.⁸ In the Indian context, the presence of a white working class was not only useless but was regarded as politically undesirable, and this was partly because such people were not expected to command the respect of colonised subjects. Only official, capitalist, and professional classes were to be allowed to enter the colonising context, because only these elites were seen as the essential and legitimate members of the dominant race. Those who were allowed to immigrate to India should only be 'a class of superior settlers; who may, by their enterprise, capital, and science, set in motion the labour, and develop the resources, of India'.⁹

The official circles had a well-defined self-image of British colonial identity.

⁶ *First Report of the SCCS* (London, 1858) (in *British Parliamentary Papers, 1857-58, VII Pt.I*), p.1

⁷ *Report of the SCCS (General)* (London, 1859) (in *British Parliamentary Papers, 1859, V*), p.iii

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ *ibid.*

Ideally, all settlers should originate from the upper or middle-class strata of British society and, in the colony, should subsequently belong within limited occupational categories of the most prestigious order. Concretely, they should comprise: a small group of governors and high-ranked civil servants who ran what was known as the most elite bureaucracy in the world; capitalists including merchants and planters; professionals such as scientists, doctors and lawyers; and finally those missionaries and philanthropists who belonged to various ecclesiastical establishments. According to the SCCS, these groups alone would be able to uphold the 'dignity of our own more advanced civilisation, of our institutions, and of our religion'¹⁰. In their respective domains of activity, administration, capitalism, science, and spiritual uplifting, these selected members of British society were to realise the proclaimed imperial mission to modernise and civilise this allegedly 'backward' part of the globe.

Moreover, the SCCS had a well-defined idea as to the moral as well as professional standard of a model British colonial. The Committee exhorted that it was not simply by way of military power, institutional control or order of law, that the British could fully govern the colonised subjects: the racial prestige which each of the individual settlers embodied would be just as indispensable. In actuality, it was *not* always the case that, simply on account of their bourgeois standing, all these 'gentlemanly' colonisers were naturally free from misconduct. Indigo planters, for instance, had been known for their particularly cruel treatment of indigenous

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p.xxx

labourers.¹¹ Therefore, it was actually as an 'ought' that cultural refinement was counted as an essential quality of the coloniser. When it was lacking, the bourgeois respectability of each 'civilising' agent had to be cultivated by self-conscious effort. Thus, according to the SCCS, the British settler in India should not only possess the right social background but also wilfully cultivate his own respectability, or his 'character of firmness, justice and forbearance'.¹² In the colonial context, such cultivation of European respectability was to be loaded with national significance of an urgent sort. As the Committee observed:

'Every Englishman should go to India with a deep sense of his responsibility, not only to those whom he is about to govern or among whom he is about to reside, but to his own country'.¹³

The chosen architects of colonial rule should have an appropriate stance towards their assigned roles in governing, employing or studying the colonised Indians. Especially in the context of ruling such a vast, culturally distinct and potentially rebellious populous, each colonial settler should possess a moral quality which inspired awe and respect among the Indian subjects. As the SCCS expressed, it would be with 'such a dignified maintenance of what is only due to ourselves', embodied by these men of respectability, that 'the natives, instead of resisting, would respect us'.¹⁴ Only

¹¹ This often ended up creating much political unrest. See Michael Edwards, *Bound to Exile: the Victorians in India* (London, 1969), pp.133-145; also, Raymond K. Renford, *The Non-Official British in India to 1920* (Oxford, 1987), p.40

¹² *Report of the SCCS (General)*, p.xxxi

¹³ *ibid.*, p.xxxi

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.xxx

by their 'silent but certain influence of manners', what may be called 'the dominion of the mind' would be procured out of the colonised subjects.¹⁵ The following extract from *The Calcutta Review* is a vivid example of how the British wished their colonial agents to be like. The colonisers, it said, had necessarily to be so civilised as to find themselves as:

'the centres of civilization from whence enlightenment and knowledge shall radiate standing forth like beacon lights to illumine the darkness of a benighted land; an ever present example of the wonders which English justice, probity and independence can achieve'.¹⁶

The aforementioned fashioning of British colonial identity as a 'civilising agent' of modernity was duly consistent with the contemporary Victorian notion of racial difference. In the post-rebellion era, the idea of 'civilising' acquired an explicitly racial-cum-chauvinistic tone which outmoded (if not superseding) the more liberal template of the bygone Company era. The atmosphere of intense racial antagonism following the native revolt of 1857 exerted a decisive impact on the British perception of 'race' both in the colony and metropole. As Thomas Metcalf rightly notes, '[T]he ideas forged in the crucible of 1857 were hammered into shape on the anvil of racial and political theory'.¹⁷ In the aftermath of the revolt, it was not only the rebels but the Indian subjects as a whole that the British came to regard with distrust and contempt. This hardening imperialist attitude did much harm to the philosophical ideal of

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.xxxi

¹⁶ Anonymous, 'The Indigo Blue Book', *The Calcutta Review*, 34 (1860), pp. 355-377, pp. 375-376

¹⁷ Thomas Metcalf, *The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870* (Oxford, 1965), p.310

utilitarian liberalism which the Directors of the Company, J. S. Mill among them, had officially pursued. Company rule freely availed itself of a rhetoric that British colonialism in India was all about experimenting with a utilitarian way of maximising individual happiness among as many colonised subjects as possible. To be sure, utilitarianism did not actually transform Indian society on a British model in any drastic ways. Nor was the ideal of liberal reform the only principle of colonial governance: it hardly needs to be pointed out that an unmistakable sense of racial superiority, crude economic calculation, and military dominance were always behind the benevolent gesture of liberal reformers. But, at least, and rhetorical as it may actually have been, the liberals advocated a government for the Indians, and even a possible realisation of future self-government. By the end of the 1850s, however, the majority of the British people, at both the metropole and the colonial ends of empire, became disillusioned with the liberal ideals of freedom and progress.

In the metropole, the kind of colonial revolts seen in 1857 and also in the rebellion of free-slaves in the West Indies (the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865) invited a passionate call for a more repressive stance towards 'darker races'. Colonial liberalism, which had been defended by J. S. Mill most notably, was losing out to a racial conservatism which steadily gained support through the efforts of such popular voices as Thomas Carlyle, Alfred Tennyson, John Ruskin and Charles Dickens.¹⁸ In the colony, the liberal attitude was not so overtly replaced by a high-handed policy of

¹⁸ *ibid.*, pp.52-53

oppression and revenge: the colonial administrators knew that it was not politic to allow racial sentiments to jeopardise the political order of colonial society that had to be based on conciliation and rule of law as well.¹⁹ But even so, the decline of liberal thinking was also undoubtedly apparent in the colonising context too. For instance, the political theory of colonial liberalism changed its face substantially in the hands of James. F. Stephen. In 1873, after coming back from his service in India as a law member of the Viceroy's executive council for three years, he published an influential essay on political theory, *Liberty, Equality and Fraternity*. This work soon became popular among the civil servants in India, who opposed both 'sentimental liberals' and the increasing influence of 'Bengal Babus', and it firmly served to shape the post-Mutiny colonial ideology of racial difference. Stephen's liberalism was substantially different from those of James and J. S. Mill, even though it appeared to frame itself within the range of the Benthamite ideas. Stephen became the most influential exponent of what was called 'authoritarian liberalism'. He asserted that the 'subject races' of the British Empire would permanently be dominated by the sway of passion and superstitious beliefs and would never be agents of rational thinking. Of course, what was implicit in such an assertion was an essential inferiority of the

¹⁹ Lord Canning, the first Viceroy of India, never succumbed to the popular passions for indiscriminate vengeance and coercive domination. He understood that peace and order were the key to successful government. The British were only a handful amidst a vast native population. Caution and conciliation should remain a principle to handle British-Indian relations. And, neither was liberal reform completely eliminated from the political and administrative strategies. S. Gopal, *British Policy in India: 1858-1905* (Cambridge, 1865), p.7

Indians.²⁰

The chauvinistic turn in political thought was closely related with the mid-century evolution of scientific racism. Stephen's discourse did not put forward anything original but merely expressed what had already been said in racial theory. Before Stephen, variants of racial theory had already come to play a prominent role in Europe, with important racial theorists such as Robert Knox and Arthur Gobineau exerting their influences widely. By claiming a scientific objectivity in their ideas on account of their reliance on the methods of hard science (such as anatomy and biology), these theorists argued that the inequalities that existed between different peoples on the earth were explained more or less exclusively in terms of 'racial difference'. Under the influence of this scientific thought, by 1860 the British were ready to understand British-Indian affairs through a racial prism.

In the colonial-Indian context, racial theory was notoriously used as a way of classifying diverse indigenous populations.²¹ On the other hand, as far as the British understanding of their own racial position in relation to Indians was concerned, evolution theory played a central role. British Indologists had two competing or mutually exclusive claims concerning similarity and difference. Their racial view had been marked not just by a typical conviction in European superiority but also by a

²⁰ On Stephen's authoritarian liberalism, see, Metcalf, *The Aftermath of Revolt*, p.319; and also his *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge, 1995), pp.57-59

²¹ One explicit example of the introduction of racial theory to India can be seen in Hubert H. Risley's theorisation of caste difference. See Ch. 2.

Romanticist yearning for common 'Aryan' origins.²² But the rise of authoritarian racism naturally injected more weight to racial difference: now, there ought to be a theoretical justification as to how and why, in spite of their shared origins, Europeans and Indians had grown so different, with the former in a position to colonise the latter. It was through an emerging notion of the 'evolution of races' that this paradoxical tension of similarity versus difference was resolved into a contemporary relation of superiority versus inferiority. It was as an indication of a stagnation of the 'Indian branch' of the Aryan race that the relative 'inferiority' of Indians was explained. While the 'European Aryans' evolved smoothly into higher stages of civilisation, their Indian counterpart *degenerated*. And this degeneration of the Aryans in India was supposed to have grown inexplicably fundamental. It followed then that the racial commonality between the British and the Indians was only of ancient nature, and as such, the 'difference' between them had by now become much more relevant. As Thomas Trautmann succinctly observes, these two notions, 'often combined in an unstable and volatile mixture, forming the attitude that said to the people of India, "Admire us; emulate us; become like us", then added, "but you can never be one of us"'.²³ The SCCS's construction of an ideal self-image of British coloniser stood on the notion of racial difference that characterised the post-Mutiny British attitudes

²² It was linguists and philologists who studied Sanskrit that were excited to find connections between Europeans and their 'Aryan' brethren in India. This excitement was further promoted by 'Aryan racial theory'. Aryan racial theory, originating and much appreciated in the German romantic tradition, helped British scholars in India to recognise common, 'Aryan' origins of the British and Indians. For political expediency, British rulers had chosen to conciliate with the Indian ruling classes, and therefore, the recognition of the common origins was not necessarily incompatible with colonial rule.

²³ Thomas R. Trautmann, *Aryans and British India* (New Delhi, 1997), p.188

towards Indian society. The picked men of Britain would come to India to colonise a people who, by being permanently 'backward', needed the former's permanent guidance.

Acclimatisation

The ideological assertion of British racial superiority, however, was far from sufficient in constructing an ideal colonial identity. Definite as it was, the British belief in their own pre-eminence was constantly supplemented by an equally sharp sense of anxiety: anxiety that they might 'fall' from their racial grace at any moment unless appropriate hygienic and cultural care were provided. This concern essentially derived from a growing conviction that India and her indigenous peoples had mesmerising influences on the body and mind of the Europeans who lived in and among them. According to such a view, Indians were not only inferior but had a power to drag the otherwise 'evolved' Europeans down to the state of stagnation and degeneration. This implied that it was only by definition that Europeans were safely said to be 'superior' to Indians. In practice, the former had to organise their bodily care and social lives in ways that maintained their supposed superiority. Interaction with the environment and peoples of the Subcontinent would have to be minimised in order to prevent the members of the ruling race from being affected by these very objects they were colonising. Among other things, the effects of tropical climate and of miscegenation caused urgent

concerns.

The influence of environmental changes on the European body was a key concern in British debates about colonial settlement. Whether British colonials became accustomed to the change or, as it was frequently called, 'acclimatised', became a question of imminent importance. In the post-Mutiny era, there were some who tried to soften down all the acknowledged difficulties of acclimatisation as they clung to their dream of large-scale white colonisation.²⁴ But it soon became obvious that India would not be regarded as a colony in the conventional sense, and, accordingly, voices against colonisation which exaggerated the difficulties of climate became a dominant force. The role of scientists was crucial in the formation of opinions against acclimatisation. James Hunt, a renowned anthropologist, is particularly relevant here both for his broad influences and for the explicitness with which he concerned himself with the question of colonial settlement. Hunt declared that his pursuit of what he termed 'ethno-climatology' came out of a self-assigned mission to correct what appeared to be a reckless policy of colonisation going on in British India. His 'scientific' treatise should lead the British nation to 'a correct and physiological system of colonization'.²⁵ What was especially necessary, according to Hunt, was to call public attention to 'the powers of acclimatization possessed by the races of man in general, and by Europeans in particular'.²⁶ All superstitious

²⁴ Arnold, 'White Colonisation and Labour in Nineteenth-Century India', p.133

²⁵ James Hunt, 'On Ethno-Climatology; or the Acclimatization of Man', *Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London*, 2 (1863), pp. 50-79, p.51

²⁶ *ibid.*

speculations on the possibility of acclimatisation must be replaced by 'the deductions from that branch of our science'.²⁷

In British India, Hunt argued, there had been highly questionable efforts undertaken to acclimatise Europeans by, for instance, using cinchona bark and quinine as prophylactics. There was even a proposal to transfuse a small quantity of blood taken from the natives into the veins of British colonists. Hunt saw these artificial measures for acclimatisation as not just pointless but as positively dangerous.

Slamming the idea of inoculation by blood transfusion, he said:

'I would only beg to express a hope that in transfusing this blood they will not also transfer any of the mental or moral characteristics of these indigenous races into the European'.²⁸

Such attempts to acclimatise Europeans must inevitably fail. They would end up making Europeans like native populations, blatantly contradicting the logic of the fact that '[I]t is only possible to hold India as long as Europeans remain the superior race'.²⁹

Therefore, neither presupposing the European ability to acclimatise nor acclimatising Europeans by artificial methods was a correct way of colonisation. For Hunt, the effects of tropical climate were far too fundamental to be overcome. If they were long exposed to India's tropical climate, Europeans were bound to change into some 'degenerate' being, instead of being able to adapt and remain as 'superior' as they were before. In Hunt's words, '*We have exhaustion and degeneracy, but no real*

²⁷ James Hunt, *Farewell Address, delivered at the Fourth Anniversary of the Anthropological Society of London, January 1, 1867* (1867) [British Library, 7350.de.8], p.20

²⁸ Hunt, 'On Ethno-Climatology', p.69

²⁹ *ibid.*, pp.70-71

acclimatization'.³⁰

This line of reasoning was widely replicated by other scientists who were likewise concerned with the health of Britons in India. They generally believed that a prolonged, cross-generational exposure to India's climate would cause the British race to degenerate. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, prominent authorities on tropical medicine such as S. Mair, J. Fayrer, W. J. Moor, E. Birch, G. Y. Hunter, and E. J. Tilt did much to authenticate such theory. The anti-acclimatisation views of these medical men, expressed often in the form of health advice, were widely circulated through newspapers and periodicals as well as in their academic discourses. W. J. Moor, for one, argued that in India the British race was naturally prone to deterioration and would not survive beyond the third generation: instead of becoming adapted through acclimatisation, the race as a whole would either become extinct or be irreversibly changed into a lower type.³¹ S. Mair also argued in much the same vein. Such a passage as follows articulated his strong sentiment against the whole idea of acclimatisation at the time:

'[if the British failed to leave India soon enough] the process of physical and mental deterioration, for such it unquestionably is, proceeds, and becomes still more marked in the generation which succeeds him. His children are, as a rule, comparatively feeble in mind, as well as body; they are pale, flabby, and have an unhealthy appearance, whilst the prospects of another generation are very remote indeed [...] It is rare to find a third generation of pure Europeans in India, that is, of those of pure, unmixed blood, who have, since the first generation landed in India, never quitted the plains for a temperate climate'.³²

³⁰ *ibid.*, p.60 (italics original)

³¹ R. S. Mair, 'Medical Guide for Anglo-Indians' in Edmund C. P. Hull, *The European in India; or Anglo-Indian's Vede Mecum - A Handbook of useful and practical information, To which is added a Medical Guide for Anglo-Indians* (London, 1871), p. 277

³² *ibid.*, p.215 (my parentheses); see also, Edward John Tilt, *Health in India for British Women: on the*

While the racial superiority of the British over the Indians was assumed as an infallible truth, a deep anxiety over the possible transformation of the British body was concurrently held. The British in the metropole liked to toy round with the image of a robust 'conquering race', but those at the peripheral end of empire were at least more ambivalent about their supposed racial superiority. The latter were more aware than the former of the devastating influences of the colonial environment which, ironically, could conquer back the conquering race.

Miscegenation

Another perceived menace to British racial prestige was miscegenation, a racial mixture, by marriage or cohabitation, between white and non-white persons. It had not been so stigmatised at least until the late eighteenth century, when the Company authorities often preferred to turn a blind eye to liaisons between their men and indigenous or mixed-race women. But towards the turn of the century, attitudes against miscegenation hardened, one of the reasons of which being the rise of a certain religious restriction on inter-racial sex. According to C. J. Hawes, there emerged,

Prevention of Disease in Tropical Climates (London, 1875), p.3; Joseph Fayrer also remarked, 'I have seen the third generation of Europeans reared in Calcutta, but such are rare, and though there was no marked physical degeneration, yet there was that which would make one look with great misgiving on the prospects of a race so produced'. Joseph Fayrer, *Tropical Dysentery and Chronic Diarrhoea* (London, 1881), p.345

especially after 1813 when Christian missionaries were allowed into the country, a new philosophy of racial identity predicated upon the puritan movement that had developed both in India and at home. With the revival of Protestantism at home, the ecclesiastical circles made their influences felt also among the British in India. Both company chaplains and missionaries saw miscegenation as, in Howe's words, 'the most glaring contradiction between what should be expected of a disciplined Christian people and their actual behaviour'.³³

In the wake of the Mutiny, such an abhorrence of mixture of blood was perceived and articulated through a more explicit idea of 'racial difference'. As India came under the direct control of the Crown, the question of miscegenation became even more pressing. In 1858, *The Calcutta Review* published an anonymous article which expressed popular anti-miscegenation feelings in graphic form:

'The unmistakable hand of nature having separated and dissociated the black race from the white, terrible and portentous effects might be expected to flow from their unnatural union. It is to be feared that in the fatal *melange* which would be thus produced, the European stock would shortly lose all its virtue and pre-eminence.'³⁴

Such a passage reveals the extent to which it was increasingly under the influence of the post-revolt racial antagonism that miscegenation came to be perceived. In addition, the British discourse of anti-miscegenation also borrowed authority from scientific racism. John Crawfurd, a well-established anthropologist, remarked that the

³³ C. J. Hawes, *Poor Relations: The Making of a Eurasian Community in British India, 1773-1833* (Richmond, 1996), pp.14-15

³⁴ Anonymous ('Maxwell'), 'Colonisation of India', *The Calcutta Review*, 30 (1858), pp.163-188, p. 181

kind of miscegenation whereby a European and non-European race were united would degrade the former, whilst improving the latter, and the resultant mixed population would be an equivocal race, inferior to the former but superior to the latter.³⁵ Such an obvious racist presumption was perfectly in harmony with the sharp racial consciousness that accentuated Victorian imperialism. But this typical racialist assumption notwithstanding, Crawford was actually regarded as too optimistic regarding unfavourable consequences of miscegenation. His point had been that the effects of miscegenation were bound to be short-term, and would ultimately be insignificant to both races involved. He believed that miscegenation was only a transitional process which produced no distinctive mixed-race populations: after about four generations, the mixed-race group would disappear, as they became assimilated into either of the two races from which they sprang.³⁶ Against this view of miscegenation as ultimately inconsequential, James Hunt made a pointed protest. What was problematically implicit in Crawford's theory was a confidence in a resilience and permanence of the European racial constitution even in miscegenous circumstances. Hunt found such a belief in racial buoyancy irreconcilably wrong, especially as it seemed to imply that the British could actually be allowed to miscegenate freely. Hunt's counter-argument was that miscegenation could

³⁵ As he observed, '[T]he union of the highest and lowest species of the human race yields an intermediate progeny, inferior to the first, and superior to the last. [...] The offspring of an Englishman and an Australian degrades the Englishmen, and somewhat improves the Australian'. John Crawford, 'Classification of the Races of Man', *Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London*, 1 (1861), pp.354-378, p.356

³⁶ *ibid.*, p.357

permanently leave an anomalous mixed-race population which must necessarily be weaker than the 'pure European race', both mentally and physically. Moreover, a racially hybrid population would cause the British race to sink with it in lingering and injurious ways.

Hunt's harsh stance towards colonial miscegenation can be seen explicitly in his negative remarks about the Spanish-Portuguese model of colonisation. Crawford seemed to imply that the Britain could extensively miscegenate with their colonial subjects, just as the Spanish and Portuguese had done in their own territories. In fact, Crawford was known for citing the Spanish colonisation of South America as successful and exemplary of his conviction that a European race was capable of living and procreating in a tropical climate.³⁷ This meant that it would be possible for Britain to send its subjects not only to its settler colonies with more temperate climates, such as Canada and Australia, but also to India, a land with a hot climate and a vast native population. Hunt contrasted himself with Crawford in counter-posing his theory of racial degeneration, which made his own view of the Spanish colonisation of South America diametrically opposed to that of Crawford's. Hunt argued that the Spanish rule in South America represented a failure of colonisation policy *par excellence*, because of its mismanagement of 'racial breeding'. He maintained that the Spanish settlers in Latin America had been weakened and were on the verge of extinction, because of their prolonged isolation from the fresh European blood and its

³⁷ John Crawford, 'On the Effects of Commixture, Locality, Climate, and Food on the Races of Man', *Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London*, 1 (1861), pp.76-92, pp.88-89

mixture with the native blood:

'All recent observations show that the Indian blood is again cropping out in a most remarkable manner. Instead of the Spaniards flourishing, there seems every prospect of their entire extinction, unless fresh blood is sent from Europe. The extinction of the Spanish race in America was likewise predicted more than twenty years ago by Dr. Knox. There is no doubt that this result has been greatly owing to the mixture of Spanish and Indian blood'.³⁸

In describing the Spanish case as an example of disastrous failure, Hunt's concern lay with how to prevent his British readers from having any optimistic ideas in favour of miscegenation. The Spanish example should be understood as an inevitable path to disaster from which the British should positively try to stay away. What Hunt indirectly insisted was that the racial authority of British colonisers in colonial India would be preserved only by sealing off any possibilities of miscegenation.

Many other scientists shared Hunt's view on miscegenation. W. J. Moor, for instance, asserted:

'Not a single reliable fact has been produced to show that our race can be continued even through a few generations without Asiatic mixture. The children of Europeans born in the plains of India grow up weakly, the progeny seldom attain maturity, their generation never have children. All authorities agree in stating that not one descendant of the Portuguese can be found without admixture of native blood. [...] The question, however, is not yet decided if a *healthy and vigorous* European stock can be propagated and maintained'.³⁹

Moor's fear was that miscegenation might be conceived of by some as a positive measure for adaptation. He was strongly compelled to disavow an idea which some Britons appeared to adhere to: namely that the infusion of native blood might enable

³⁸ Hunt, 'On Ethno-Climatology', p.71

³⁹ W. J., Moor, *Health in the Tropics; or Sanitary Art Applied to Europeans in India* (London, 1862), p.280

the white race to continue to exist in India across generations. Certainly, miscegenation might ensure settlement, but, in Moors view, such a way of settlement risked racial degeneration, and the hybrid, degenerate Britons were not what British colonialism required.

Given their distinctive dislike of miscegenation, it was only natural that the British views of mixed offspring were pessimistic. In the increasingly racialised atmosphere after the Mutiny, the notion that mixed-race offspring were hereditarily inferior became a commonly accepted belief. For instance, E. J. Tilt, an internationally known medical scientist⁴⁰, argued that miscegenation between the higher classes of the British and Indians may lead to a good 'Eurasian breed', but that 'even their children clearly show early signs of degeneration of both body and mind, like the lower caste of Eurasians'.⁴¹ Tilt also observed that Eurasians could not bear the tropical climate so well as their Indian counterparts and consequently were more liable to consumption.⁴² Miscegenation ended up producing a group of unfit persons, benefiting neither of the original races. Tilt crudely remarked, 'when we cross our breed with the Hindoo, the Eurasian, instead of exhibiting the good points of both stocks, often exhibits the vices of both races in a debilitated body'.⁴³ Eurasians were also thought to enjoy higher mortality rates. *The Calcutta Review* observed that the

⁴⁰ As of 1875, Tilt was a late president of the Obstetrical Society of London, was a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Medicine of Turin and of Athens, of the Academy of Medicine of New York, and of the Obstetrical Society of Philadelphia.

⁴¹ Tilt, p.108.

⁴² *ibid.*, p.109

⁴³ *ibid.*, p.3

Eurasian class which occupied the lower sections of the military and civil services subscribed to a system of early marriages, and that it explained their relatively higher mortality rates.⁴⁴ Even more problematic still was the personal character of mixed-race progeny. An anonymous article in *The Calcutta Review* wrote that the mixed-race offspring embodied an undesirable trait of hybrids in which '[T]he worst points of both the European and native character are not unfrequently combined'.⁴⁵ Another article in the same journal also talked of certain 'hereditary qualities' of the Eurasian character. It pronounced:

'along with the qualities which they get from their European ancestry, the great majority of them also get by their birth, the qualities peculiar to the native. If they have some of the English energy, which often turns into over-bearingness, they also have much of the native suppleness, which, when exaggerated, becomes cringing and deceitful'.⁴⁶

At any rate, all those ideas about the alleged inferiority of mixed-race descendants were constitutive of the attempts of the colonial elites to construct an ideal British colonial identity according to a carefully prescribed approach to the question of white settlement. For example, a *Calcutta Review* article aptly entitled, 'Can India

⁴⁴ P.M. Tait, 'Mortality of Christian Females in India', *The Calcutta Review*, 32 (1859), pp.162-171, pp. 170-171

⁴⁵ Anon., 'Review of the Progress of Sanitation in India', *The Calcutta Review*, 50 (1870), pp.94-158, p.157

⁴⁶ Anonymous ('P. K. '), 'The Anglo-Indian Question', *The Calcutta Review*, 69 (1879), pp.382-391, pp.387-388. As the subsequent two chapters will demonstrate fully, the idea that mixed-descent people were psychologically misfit emerged as a key idea for British to comprehend the identity of their mixed-race brethren. It emerged as a practical discursive tactic for the efforts of colonial authorities to come to terms with Eurasian pauperism. The economic plight of the mixed-race and poor-white populations was attributed to their possessing a false racial pride which prevented them from engaging in honest labour. It then followed that their regeneration would be possible only by eradicating the psychological pathology by educative training. See Ch. 4 and Ch. 5.

be colonised by Europeans?', addressed the question of mixed-race progeny specifically in relation to colonisation policy. Drawing on the opinions of such scientific authorities as James Hunt and Theodore Waitz, it argued that, as a rule, mixed-race populations in Europe's colonies were physically unfit, as high mortality rates showed, and morally and intellectually debased, as characterised by their sickening vanity and laziness. In India, the article went on, the mere exposure of Britons to the tropical climate was enough to make the latter racially degenerate. In such a context, miscegenation was simply out of the question, only producing inferior descendants whose very existence would be contradictory to British rule. 'Colonisation' in the conventional sense should be 'absolutely forbidden', to say nothing about miscegenation.⁴⁷

In addition to the notion of racial degeneration, the increasingly influential concept of the 'mother of the nation' also informed the British objection to colonial miscegenation. From the mid-nineteenth century, the role of white women assumed an unprecedented importance. British India saw a sharp rise in the number of European women, largely solving the vexed question of chronic lack of marriageable women for middle-class men. In addition to making miscegenation practically unnecessary, their arrival brought about a notion of racial motherhood, which was relatively absent in the earlier Company period. In the starkly racialised context of post-Mutiny Indian society, the

⁴⁷ Anonymous, 'Can India be colonised by Europeans?', *The Calcutta Review*, 39 (1869), pp.143-166, p.163

increasingly large presence of European women was represented as the core of an emerging white racial purity. Both their biological and social functions were elevated to the basis of an imperial social apartheid. Both symbolically and in practice, European men identified their women with the domestic sphere in order to defend their prestige over native men. The white racial backlash of British colonials often justified itself in a rhetoric of defending European women from Indian men. For instance, in their agitation over the 'Ilbert Bill' (1883), which attempted to endow Indian magistrates with a power to preside over legal cases involving Europeans, a covert politics of gender was at work. It was through a gendered logic of racism, namely that Indian men were not manly or civilised enough to try European women in the court, that the British agitators advanced their protest. Simultaneously, male Britons were also anxious to control the sexual behaviour of their own women, and such racial conflict as in the Ilbert Bill controversy gave them an opportunity to restrict white women's assigned gender roles to a degree that was even narrower than in Victorian Britain.⁴⁸ Thus, as the 'mother of the race', British women were given a national mission of their own. A consequence of this rise of white femininity and motherhood in the colonial context was an increasingly strong social precept that tabooed miscegenation. For elite British men, miscegenation with non-white women became not just unnecessary but considered as a sin, violating the advocated purity of the European race. Whilst controlling the lives of their women, British males also

⁴⁸ Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: the 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester, 1995), p.47

had to restrict their own sexual conduct. Some of them either married or cohabited with Indian women but in doing so they jeopardised their honour and position.⁴⁹ As *The Statesman* observed, miscegenation became an 'unholy connection', inflicting an injury on the racial morality of a new imperial age.⁵⁰

Metropole / Colony

The recently-arrived presence of white women was certainly crucial in preventing miscegenation, but it was not without problems of its own. Same-race marriage produced white families in the colony, but exactly how was the 'whiteness' of these family members, now including wives and children, to be maintained against the supposedly devastating influence of the Indian environment? How was their contact with India and its indigenous subjects to be minimised? A possible solution was creating secluded European settlements in the northern, mountainous regions of India, which had a much colder climate and were geographically removed from the infamous plains. There was a strong belief in the possible usefulness of hill stations as a social site where white women and children, as well as their male, middle-class guardians, could become permanent settlers. These stations were expected to guarantee a more stable and 'healthy' British presence. By the mid-1830s the three major hill stations of Octacamund, Darjeeling and Simla had already been established. Up until

⁴⁹ Frank Anthony, *Britain's Betrayal in India* (Bombay, 1969), p.356

⁵⁰ 'Marriages and Other Matters', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 11 May (1871), pp.538-539, p.538

mid-century, these hill stations were mainly for military use, but, since the implementation of Crown rule, they took on a greater significance as residences of British colonials. And, especially after 1865, when John Lawrence made Simla the regular summer capital of British India, the hill stations became a much idealised locale.⁵¹ The hills were frequently referred to as a 'Little England' with their cool climate and picturesque scenery, including quaint Tudor-style houses, tea shops and churches, all of which resembled the best of sorts found in the British Isles. The Anglicisation of Indian territories seemed to indicate that the reproduction of a homogenous community of respectable Britons could be possibly realised.

The Anglicisation of northern hill tracts not only pointed to an environmental resemblance but also ideologically reinforced the mid-century discourse of racial difference. The supposed difference between the European and Indian races was transposed, if not so overtly, to a hill versus plain contrast.⁵² The periodical retreat into the hills served to augment the aloofness of British society from India and accordingly informed the construction of an ideal British colonial identity. Such an identity had to both physically and symbolically define itself against all things 'Indian', which the plains and their inhabitants represented *par excellence*. It would be in the hills that the British could release their aspirations as 'colonisers'. Planters, for one, found the climate of the hills quite suitable for their physical constitution. They

⁵¹ From the 1860s until the early 1940s, many British wives and children visited the hills regularly each summer while their husbands remained in the plains, soldiering and otherwise. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, p.183

⁵² *ibid.*, p.182, 184

thought that, compared to the infamous heat and humidity of the Indian plains, the hill climate was extremely accommodating. Moreover, they liked the fact that they could have easy and exclusive access to unspoiled native populations, whom the former could employ at extremely cheap rates. Indeed, the contrast between the hills and the plains was drawn not just in terms of climate but also according to the presumed 'nature' of different native populations. As Thomas Metcalf has noted, the British tended to idealise the natives in the hills, such as the Lepchas of Darjeeling and the Paharis of the Simla hills, as a simple, honest and open people, despite the obvious diversity within them, both geographical and cultural. This was largely due to the fact in the hills natives could be turned into docile employees more easily than in the plains, where the population was dense and the structure of communal and religious networks was more difficult to untangle.⁵³

With a favourable climate and an exploitable native labour, the hills certainly did contribute to the new imperial economy of late colonial India. But this should not lead us to assume that the colonial ruling classes identified the hills as a site to actually reproduce the ruling race over generations. Although their climatological and geographical advantages were certainly appealing, the British hill stations in India did not in fact rise beyond the status of a secondary substitute for the real 'Britain'. In actuality, British colonials sent their offspring to the metropole as soon as they reached the age of five or six. First of all, the dominant medical opinion suggested that British

⁵³ *ibid.*, p.184

offspring were more vulnerable to the 'degenerative effects' of the Indian environment than their parents. Even the favourable environments surrounding the hill stations could not be fully trusted. The British also believed that the cultural as well as physical influences of Indian over their children, especially the influence of native servants, would inevitably find their way as far as into the north. The only way to check these influences completely, it was thought, was to send children back home and subject them to the proper process of domestic discipline and school education. These views led British parents to regard schools in India, including those for white and mixed children, as a hardly-recommendable alternative; the use of which could compromise their children's Britishness.⁵⁴ Neither was permanent residence in a hill station supposed to improve the career prospects of the British youth. As the late nineteenth century proceeded, the imperial authorities increasingly demanded educational qualifications from metropolitan (and not colonial) institutions. Those positions in the government service which were reserved exclusively for British subjects were taken by those candidates who graduated from British technical colleges or prestigious universities. Several schools in the Indian hills prided themselves on being modelled on the English public school, but, in practice, were never regarded as equal to their British counterparts. They instead catered to the needs of poor European and Eurasian children whose occupational prospects were severely limited

⁵⁴ These points are discussed in detail in Ch. 5

from the outset.⁵⁵

The northern hill stations may have provided a sanatorium either for soon-to-depart British middle class or for injured soldiers. But they were not generally conceived of as a home base for the British to rear and educate their offspring. These children had to be properly inculcated in English culture, and such was considered available only in the metropole. Residence in India was rather a source of prejudice because of its perceived isolation from the moral and cultural influences of all things British. The point made by George Yeates Hunter, who was a military surgeon of the Bombay army, illustrated this point vividly. He argued that those Britons who returned to Britain from India needed to 'de-Indianise' themselves, because their prolonged isolation from the homeland which had made them mentally degenerate:

'they find themselves lost in the sea of English life. Although their special interests are little understood, they are too prone to talk shop and to prose about their service grievances, and their Indian experiences; and when they discover that they do not interest, but rather bore, they retire within themselves and mope. As the illusion of their importance is dispelled their self-esteem is shocked, and they grow crotchety, peevish, and irritable'.⁵⁶

Such a view attests to a prevent stigma that had been attached to colonial residence and acculturation. At the same time, it indicated the extent to which the construction of Britishness ultimately depended on the will and material capacity to remain in touch

⁵⁵ Throughout the late colonial period, the lifting of this discrimination was one of the most pressing demands of domiciled-European and Eurasian activists. See Ch. 6

⁵⁶ G. Y. Hunter, *Health in India: medical hints as to who should go there; and how to retain health whilst there and on returning home* (Calcutta, 1873), p.90

with contemporary British society. For individual Britons, residence in the colonial outpost had necessarily to be a temporary passage. And for the architects of colonial rule, the rootedlessness which characterised the respectability and refinement of elite colonisers was a necessary ingredient in the recipe of racial politics. It would be through their distant and discrete sense of racial self that the British would govern, develop and civilise.

Settlement and Miscegenation among Subordinate Whites

...there is no country in the world where a European without means of subsistence has so little chance of a livelihood as in India.⁵⁷

If the inferior European did not occupy himself in honest self-sustaining toil, he would fail of subsistence, he would become vicious, brutal, degraded. Such a colony, or rather a colony projected on principles, could never erect itself into existence – or if it did, it would very speedily expire.⁵⁸

For the British in India, the requirements of moral and hygienic care were high even for its well-to-do members of the community, making their colonial construction of an authentic racial self never a secure project. And this difficulty of creating a racial authenticity was also due to the fact that the British community included those of lower class origins whose attitudes and ways of living were almost completely different from their 'bourgeois' counterparts. In spite of the SCCS's warning, nearly half of the

⁵⁷ 'Vagrancy in India', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 17 Oct. 1872, pp.1198-9, p.1198

⁵⁸ 'Colonisation of India', pp.178-179

British population in late British India were those who would be categorised as 'poor whites'. Most of these came from the Army, the mercantile marine or the railway companies, which discharged their subordinate white men whenever they were found no longer necessary. Poor whites were seen as not having the right manners, superior intelligence and/or professional skills whereby to make a positive impression on the colonised subjects. As there were no positive inducements on the part of the colonial government to create employment for them, this class of Britons often found themselves being not just poor but miserably pauperised.

Subaltern soldiers

In the aftermath of the Mutiny, British soldiers were in demand like never before. Now, the British Raj had to defend itself not just from the external but also from the possible internal threat of another indigenous revolt. The colonial ruling classes regarded a substantial presence of white soldiers as vital to colonial rule, and thus considered various measures to upkeep the latter's health and strength so that British martial prowess would be secured.⁵⁹ But, as will be pointed out shortly, the same

⁵⁹ The Mutiny reminded the British of the inherent precariousness of their Indian rule: their overwhelming numerical inferiority in the face of a potentially insurgent population would make their position constantly insecure, were it not for a demonstrative power to prove their supposedly incontestable dominance. Consequently the imperial authorities adjusted the proportion of the number of British soldiers in relation to native sepoys. Before then, there were some forty thousand British soldiers, with six times as many Indian sepoys. The proportion changed to some sixty thousand British troops and only twice as many sepoys, so that the former now seemed less heavily outnumbered. Metcalf, *The Aftermath of the Revolt*, p.297

ruling classes were at the same time alerted to the very presence of these soldiers and their families because of the possible social problems they would bring to the colonial racial order.

It was particularly about the behaviour of subordinate white soldiers off their military duties that the British ruling classes were acutely concerned. These soldiers had been drawn mostly from the working classes of British society, and the colonial elites, who were themselves of upper or middle-class background, did not expect the former to possess an equal moral standard. Especially worrying was their possible sexual misconduct outside the military cantonment. Both the absence of working-class white females and the alleged lack of morals on their own part were considered to ensure that white soldiers were prone to make problematic contact with non-white women. And such sexual contact involved socially undesirable forms such as rape, concubinage and mixed marriage. As observed above, the elites themselves had retreated from miscegenation, and now its thorough prevention would depend on how soldiers could be discouraged from having liaisons with non-white women. The regulation of sexual conduct also had an immediate, practical importance: especially by way of venereal disease, it presented a real, more physical threat to military power. There was a concern that the strength of the Army had been diminished by the highly prevalent rates of venereal disease amongst white soldiers. Soldiers easily contracted venereal disease as they frequented brothels, and the toll of venereal disease was

actually as damaging as the casualties in military operations.⁶⁰ Thus, prostitution had been condemned not just from a moral but also from a practical point of view. In spite of these problems, the colonial authorities were also aware that they could not simply deprive white subaltern soldiers of all sexual opportunities. Sexual health was considered particularly important in order that soldiers remained in good shape both mentally and physically. Complete deprivation of sex would lead, for instance, to homosexuality, which was regarded as a taboo not simply because of Victorian prejudice but because it was against the masculine culture upon which the military ethos stood. What was needed, therefore, were certain controlled forms of sexual conduct that allowed white soldiers to practice 'healthy' heterosexuality, while at the same time involving lesser dangers of venereal disease, of violence, and of miscegenation.⁶¹ It was in this context that the idea of marriage as an institution to regulate white soldiers' sexuality intrigued many British. As an anonymous article published in *The Calcutta Review* observed, marriage would save what was seen as the 'extreme licentiousness' of prostitution which India incurred on white soldiers.⁶² It would also impose Christian restrictions on lust; the 'purer feelings' of the wife would 'moderate the grossness of rough natures, induce self-control and self-abnegation'.⁶³

Many Army authorities, Sir John Lawrence among them, certainly found marriage

⁶⁰ The proportion of venereal cases constantly in hospital amounted to usually 20 – 25 % of the total sick. *Report of the Royal Commission on the Sanitary State of the Army in India: vol.1* (Government of India, London, 1863), p.lxii

⁶¹ For a good overview of these points, see Douglas Peers, 'Privates off Parade: Regimenting Sexuality in the Nineteenth-Century Indian Empire', *The International History Review*, 20 (1998), pp.823-854

⁶² Anon., 'The British Soldier in India', *The Calcutta Review*, 34 (1860), pp.378-414, p.404

⁶³ *ibid.*

appealing. It would put an end to prostitution and thus reduce the risk of venereal disease. They also believed that married soldiers possessed better moral and physical qualities. At the Royal Commission on the Sanitary State of the Army in India, marriage was generally regarded as a key to the sexual health and hygiene of soldiers. In support of Sir John Lawrence, Colonel E. H. Greathed and Colonel H. M. Durand argued for an increase in the marriage ratio from the current 12% to 25%.⁶⁴ And in the much racialised context of post-rebellion India, it mostly meant same-race marriage. The preference for same-race marriage is demonstrated by the fact that the Army assisted soldiers with white wives more generously. The subsistence money doled out to wives and offspring of mixed marriages was only half of that paid to those of same-race marriages. An anonymous article in *The Calcutta Review* suggested that a smaller allowance would discourage soldiers from marrying Indian women. By adjusting married allowances, white soldiers essentially had been, 'bribed, to marry European women, and fined for marrying coloured women'.⁶⁵

Marriage as a method against ill-health and against miscegenation was taken a step further by those who advocated an idea of 'military colonisation'. Many were in favour of gathering white soldiers into a 'military colony', where they were encouraged not just to marry white women but to establish themselves as permanent settlers.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ *Report of the Royal Commission on the Sanitary State of the Army in India: vol I.*, p.144 , 199, 209, 286

⁶⁵ 'Colonisation of India', p.182

⁶⁶ See, for instance, 'Military Colonization', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 17 Jun. 1858, pp.556-557;

Even though the idea of such colonies was eventually abandoned, the debates involved questions that are highly relevant to our analysis of British attitude towards white working classes.

In no way, we should be reminded, did the British proponents of military colonisation propose populating whatever parts of India with white soldiers and their families. The idea of military colonisation was duly consistent with the spirit of the SCCS; namely that no substantial white working classes should be encouraged to come and 'colonise Indians'. Military colonisation was expected precisely to remove the presence of these people from the densely-populated plains. It was only in the hill tracks, which were completely detached from the plains, that the proposed colonies were to be created. In addition to the advantage of having a milder climate, which would improve the physical health of white soldiers,⁶⁷ the northern location of military colonies was appreciated because it would prevent its inhabitants from interacting with Indians. In a military colony, white soldiers' social and sexual activities would be bounded within an isolated white enclave. And to this racially homogeneous space,

'Military Colonisation in India', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 18 July 1861, pp.786-787; 'Hill Sanitaria and Our Railway System', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 3 Oct. 1861, pp.1096-1097; H. M. Knollys, 'Military Colonization in India', *The Calcutta Review*, 36 (1861), pp.220-235

⁶⁷ One major concern of the advocates of military colonisation had been the hygienic health of soldiers. Military colonies were desired as they would offer a better climate and living environs. As William Curran, one of the enthusiastic supporters of military colonisation wrote,

'we would hear no more of the horrors of cholera, and there would be stop to that drain of time-expired men which one daily witnesses during the cold weather in the persons of robust, well-fed, disciplined men, who are in the prime of life, and in the very flush and vigour of their manliness'.

William Curran, *Further Evidence in favour of a Hill Residence for European Soldiers in India* (1871), p.24

white women would be brought for the soldiers. The couples could then produce non-mixed offspring, whom the colonial authorities could mould into further generations of colonial soldiers.

The perceived need for military colonisation was well articulated in a dialogue between the SCCS and one of the interviewees, G. B. Tremenheere. He was strongly opposed to letting the British working classes into India, but also believed in possibilities of a special 'all-white' militia created and managed by the colonial state. Tremenheere argued that as long as there was a continual need for European (as opposed to Indian) agents within the Army, it would be essential to reserve in India a certain number of whites from which to regularly recruit. This would counterbalance the cost of importing new recruits from Britain.⁶⁸ With military colonies dotted around in the northern hills, he argued, colonialism would be 'enabled to draw soldiers from the progeny of an unmixed race', which 'would be a decided advantage'.⁶⁹ And Tremenheere also represented the characteristic dislike of miscegenation shared by most British. He argued that more soldiers should be allowed to marry because it would improve their moral and hygienic constitution, but that marriage must take place strictly within the bounds of the British race. What was necessary was to 'take every precaution possible to prevent the mixture of races'.⁷⁰ Mixed marriages would produce only degenerates who were racially inferior:

⁶⁸ *First Report of the SCCS*, p.13

⁶⁹ *ibid.*

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p.11

'I think the character they produce degenerates. Although the half-castes possess occasionally many qualities of the European, still they have many of the vices of the natives. Probably that arises from defects in early training; but certainly the half-caste in India cannot be compared with the pure European for any purpose whatever'.⁷¹

Such a view was endorsed by another interviewee of the SCCS, James Ranald Martin, who was an influential ex-surgeon in the Bengal Army. As a prominent advocate of military colonisation, he had been frequently consulted by the imperial authorities about the sanitary state of British soldiers abroad.⁷² His enthusiasm for military colonisation was based on his conviction that its climatory advantage would improve the hygienic constitution of soldiers.⁷³ And his interview with imperial authorities at the SCCS also brought his view concerning miscegenation to the fore. When asked whether he preferred to have a soldier bring a wife from home to marrying a native woman, he replied 'I should say [it is] greatly preferable'.⁷⁴ Martin asserted that it was disadvantageous to have a large mixed-race population in India: 'I do not consider that it is of advantage to increase very largely the race of Indo-British'.⁷⁵ Removing British soldiers from the plains by way of military colonies was to benefit both the state and the individual.⁷⁶ Miscegenation was undesirable not just because it would produce an 'inferior race' but also because it would make men more 'Indian',

⁷¹ *ibid.*, p.12

⁷² Martin had been established as an authority about acclimatisation for his book *Influence of Tropical Climates on European Constitutions* published in 1856. In 1857, he had submitted to the Court of Directors of the East Indian Company suggestions for promoting the health and efficacy of troops in India, by relocating them in the mountain ranges, and these suggestions were responded favourably by Alexander Grant, surgeon to the Governor-General. See, Joseph Fayerer, *Sir Ranald Martin* (London, 1897), p.153

⁷³ *First Report of the SCCS*, pp.20-22

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p.25

⁷⁵ *ibid.*

⁷⁶ *ibid.*

especially in the chaos of the plains. Asked if soldiers would make a moderate living with their native wives and mixed-race children, Martin said:

'They do, but it spoils the soldier; he becomes domesticated in Indian habits; he volunteers to remain in India when his regiment comes home; he becomes an old Indian; in fact, an indolent man, and too much domesticated in India'.⁷⁷

The idea of military colonisation did not see fruition. One of the reasons of which was that the military authorities found family life to be incompatible with the masculine ethos of the Army.⁷⁸ Another reason, more relevant to our discussion here, was that the colonial ruling classes were too prejudiced against the 'weaker' members of their own race (whether they be subaltern soldiers, women or children) to allow them to stay on even in the confines of military colonies. *The Statesman*, for instance, strongly opposed military colonisation on the grounds that it would not solve the problem of 'poor whites' but would actually perpetuate it:

'The wild schemes for colonising the Hills with poor Europeans are not worth two minutes' attention. [...] There is not one of the Hill colony schemes that would not prove a source of very heavy expenditure, while increasing the evil in almost geometrical progression, by leading the class to propagate itself in the country'.⁷⁹

Even the geographical distance of military colonies from the plains would be insufficient to prevent such individuals from causing social disorder and from

⁷⁷ *ibid.*

⁷⁸ As Peers insightfully argues, the institution of the family was not always regarded as an addition of strength, because matrimonial and familial comforts were not consistent with the military ethic, of which hardship was an important part. See Peers, 'Privates off Parade'

⁷⁹ *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 2 Sep., 1876, p.795

scandalising the British community. If there was anything that could be done, it would be to repatriate them back to Britain. Subaltern British soldiers should not be allowed to live permanently in India, with or without their wives and children.

Ultimately, the colonial authorities viewed the mere presence of working class families as a disturbing element. Even their white enclaves within military colonies could easily disintegrate. Certainly, soldiers could be kept to military duties, but what about their women and children especially when they were widowed or orphaned? As far as women were concerned, the British were worried that their presence could have demoralising influences on regimental life. Even those military officers who advocated marriage were concerned about such possibilities.⁸⁰ And worse comes to worse, these women might find their way outside the cantonment, committing undesirable liaisons with non-white men. And such liaisons would be most devastating to the racial and gender hierarchies of colonial society.⁸¹ Also worrying

⁸⁰ Although he was in favour of marriage, Colonel Greathed admitted that there would be 'a very great objection to increasing the number of women' (p.209). Given the high mortality rates of soldiers, the introduction of white wives ran the risk of creating a large number of widows. And the idea of witnessing adrift women wandering round without provisions was appalling. Even Sir John Lawrence, the major proponent for marriage, acknowledged that widows were dangerous:

'If you trace back the history of a woman, who has perhaps become a nuisance in a regiment, you will often find that she was a decent body when she began her career, and before misfortune overtook her; and I do think that the practice of abandoning their wives when a regiment is going on service is very bad indeed and produces terrible results' (p.200).

Report of the Royal Commission on the Sanitary State of the Army in India: vol.1

⁸¹ Miscegenation did not simply concern working-class white men. It had also to do with working-class white women, with even greater political implications. Their presence, though not substantial in number, was constantly a source of anxiety. The anxiety over destitute British women was acute, fears of their falling into prostitution being constant. Therefore, the mere idea of poor white women wandering about in the colonised land was appalling. On these points, see Philippa Levine, 'Venereal Disease, Prostitution, and the Politics of Empire: The Case of British India', *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 4 (1994), pp.579-602; Harald Fisher-Tiné, "'White women degrading themselves to the lowest depth". European networks of prostitution and colonial anxieties in British and Ceylon ca.

was the presence of soldier's children, especially those who had been made fatherless. The British feared that military orphans were more likely to grow up weak than becoming fit enough to take soldiering. Many disregarded the existence of such children of lower origins as an additional source of military strength. In fact, it was seen as more potentially troublesome than anything else. For instance, a letter to the editor of *The Statesman* opposed the idea of military colonisation on the grounds that the next generation of soldiers created thereby would be inherently inferior and would do more harm than good:

'nothing short of sending to England the children of soldiers on their attaining the age of 4 or 5 will ever save these little things from filling our church yards as they now do. Look around the Barrack Squares of any Regiments; you will see no children of any age, or if you do perchance, what are they? Lanky, attenuated, fit only for Printer's devils or Telegraph clerks from having no stamina in them. I see them now, mooning along listless and apathetic, spindle-shanked, and with their nether garments well tightened over that part which it is alike unbecoming to present to friend or foe, presenting in fact every reason why they should never assist in colonising India'.⁸²

The introduction of marriage, family life, and procreation within military colonisation might have prevented disease and miscegenation, but it risked other problems. The presence of the wives and children of soldiers could pose a social problem in its own right. How else, then, did the British in India try to solve the issue of white soldiers' sexuality? In the end, they chose a form of prostitution initiated and carefully controlled by the military authorities themselves. One of the merits of controlled prostitution was that by containing the sexual drive of soldiers to selected native sex

1880-1914, *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 40 (2003), pp.165-192

⁸² Anonymous ('Z'), 'Letter to the Editor: The Mortality and Training of Soldier's Children in India', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 28 Sep. 1865, p.1140

workers. Of course, the greatest problem of prostitution was venereal disease, but the Army used prostitution precisely to eschew its spread. It created ad hoc brothels for its soldiers and ran them under its strict control. Not only were prostitutes selected by the Army, but they were subjected to periodical medical examinations, so that every one of them would be free of venereal disease, thus without any risk of transmission. Controlled prostitution, as Kenneth Ballhatchet has argued, also served to confine the lives of British soldiers within an ordered environment of the cantonment. It shielded British soldiers from Indian life and discouraged them from having unsettling contact with non-white women.⁸³ Elite Britons wanted to keep white subaltern soldiers tightly attached to their military duties, while allowing them as little contact as possible with Indian society. After they finished their service, they should retreat to the metropole, instead of staying on in India permanently.

'Poor whites'

As we have just seen, one important reason why the policy of controlled prostitution was adopted was that it restricted the lives of white soldiers to the socially secluded arena of regimental life. However, the reach of authorities over regimental confinement was far from sufficient to prevent white soldiers from causing social disorder. For after their services ended, these soldiers tended to remain in India and

⁸³ Kenneth Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex and Class under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes and Policies and their Critics, 1873-1905* (London, 1980), pp.166-167

leap onto the social scene. There was no dearth of those soldiers discharged without little material means to support themselves. In 1860, for instance, of the 80,000 British soldiers stationed in India, approximately 20,000 were entitled to claim a free discharge.⁸⁴ Between 1858 and 1862, the Indian Navy and its departments discharged 2,703 British soldiers, and between 1860 and 1861 alone, the Army discharged 329 soldiers with hardly any pensions.⁸⁵ These soldiers had been expected to leave for Britain unless they had a special permit based on their having found employment. But in practice, after their discharge from military service, a significant number of white soldiers did remain in India.

And soldiers were not alone responsible for increasing the number of poor Britons in the colonising context. There were, for instance, merchant seamen, many of whom did not return home but became 'wonderers' in India: as the increasing of navigation traffic between Britain and India brought more and more sailors to India's shores. Captains of the mercantile marine were often in the habit of discharging the crew. For instance, of these 27,500 seamen who entered Calcutta in 1864, about 5,500 became, by discharge or desertion, part of the 'floating population of the town'.⁸⁶ Moreover, added to these soldiers and sailors were construction workers, artisans and engineers who were brought to India in response to the increasing amount of imperial investments in public works, typified by the extensive construction of railways, which

⁸⁴ 'Soldier's Museums', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 9 Aug. 1860, p.748

⁸⁵ 'Light on the Loafers', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 7 Feb. 1967, p.151

⁸⁶ Anon., 'Sailor Life in Calcutta', *The Calcutta Review*, 40 (1865), pp.452-466, p.461

required a significant number of British mechanics and artisans. The end of the Mutiny coincided with the introduction of railways workers from Britain to Bombay and Calcutta. By the mid-1860s, the number of railway employees amounted to about 8,000, many of whom did not go back home.⁸⁷

The problem with these subordinate classes remaining in the colony was that they usually ended up unemployed. It was only in very limited amounts and kinds, that European employers, both state and private, needed subordinate white labour. As we have seen, the basic view of the colonial rulers was that India was no place for lower-class white workers. As the Report of the SCCS clearly indicated, India had two conditions that worked against the use of the British labouring classes. The first one of these was the problem of land control. The colonial state, since the early days of the Company, had traditionally chosen to conciliate native landlords, instead of dispossessing them. This made it difficult for British labourers to find lands or other properties that could be purchased and used at their disposal.⁸⁸ Another factor was India's vast population. White workers were not needed because of the abundant supply of cheap native labour. Even though imperial economic activities were intensified under Crown rule more than ever before, India was not to become a colony of the white working classes, with its land cultivated or its factories and bureaucracy staffed, by the latter. British colonialism in India was totally different from that in Australia and Canada, where working-class settlement was a driving force. Naturally,

⁸⁷ 'The Great "Loafer" Difficulty', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 6 Aug 1868, p.907

⁸⁸ David Arnold, 'White Colonisation and Labour in Nineteenth-Century India', pp.137-138

once they were discharged from their respective services, soldiers, sailors, and railway workers found it hard to obtain alternative employment and not infrequently were they reduced to paupers, wandering round in search of charitable relief. For the colonial elites, the recently discharged white labourer was not only unnecessary but positively obstructed British rule, being 'infinitely worse off than he could possibly be in England'.⁸⁹

The increasingly impoverished state of subordinate white men caused great anxiety among their bourgeois counterparts. Freed from the disciplined lives to which they had formerly been subjected, these 'loose' white men were feared to be prone to temptations of various sorts, of which Indian society offered plenty. Drinking, drug-taking and prostitution were tempting and were readily available. As *The Statesman* observed;

'But it is greater still in India where public opinion is weak, where the desires are stimulated by the climate and the people, where companionship is limited, where vigorous out-door exercise is impossible. If the better part of the community do not supply these wants, they will find means of gratification in pleasures which are illicit and pursuits which are debasing [...] Drunkenness, prostitution, low theatres, obscene gardens, gambling houses have all flourished because no substitute for them could be provided'.⁹⁰

These vices made them 'hopelessly degraded and irreclaimably vicious', reducing them into 'a necessary evil, a moral nuisance, and a social pest'.⁹¹ Ever increasingly, it was as a collective perpetrator of the 'evil of loafer crime' that these people were

⁸⁹ 'Pauperism in India', an article first published on *The Standard*, and reprinted in *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 19 Jun. 1862, pp.685-686, p. 686

⁹⁰ 'The Change and Want of Anglo-Indian Society', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 8 Nov. 1860, 1060-1

⁹¹ 'Sailor Life in Calcutta', p.466

recognised by Europeans and Indians alike.⁹²

The new colonial authorities of the late nineteenth century had denounced the erstwhile Company's tendency to interfere with all private activities. But this did not mean that the former were ever less tolerant to the presence of poorer white people than the latter. One of the reasons why Company officials were so strictly opposed to the immigration of non-official elements had been that they feared that a resultant increase of 'poor whites' in the colonial scene would erode racial prestige and authority. The colonial government had been alerted to how indigenous people despised 'poor whites', possibly stifling the dream of British elites to exert an uncompromised and unrestrained influence.⁹³ And, as far as this dislike of 'poor whites' was concerned, the colonisers of the post-Company era concurred with their predecessors. *The Statesman* had been a foremost critic of the Company's policy of tight official control, but it remarked:

'No one has more strongly condemned the anti-interloping policy of the East India Company during the last twenty years than ourselves. But it is only just to the Company to say that that policy was beneficial up to a comparatively late period, in a political sense; and the fear on which it was based – that India may be flooded with Europeans as uneducated as they are poor and as unchristian as they are uneducated – is one we would do well still to entertain'.⁹⁴

A visible presence of 'poor whites' was conceived of as politically dangerous. In the words of the same newspaper, 'nothing can be more sad to the Christian or alarming to

⁹² 'The New Colonist Danger', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 1 Mar. 1866, pp.244-245, p.244

⁹³ Arnold, 'White Colonisation and Labour in Nineteenth-Century India', p.140

⁹⁴ 'The Southern Colony', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 6 Mar. 1862, p.257

the statesman', than their presence at the heart of the colonial context.⁹⁵ Steadily 'increasing in shamelessness',⁹⁶ they eroded British racial prestige, and constituted 'not only a scandal but a danger'.⁹⁷ As Sir William Mansfield, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army said, they attached 'a serious stigma on the character of our Government, which must suffer in Natives eyes accordingly'.⁹⁸

It was at this juncture that the British felt compelled to take concrete measures to control or eliminate the presence of white subalterns. Such was considered as urgently necessary to maintain the British community's 'high refinement and assert [sic] its dignified purity'.⁹⁹ An obvious way for this was to minimise the demographic number of poor whites. The removal of the 'loafer' was necessary not just to save him from his miseries but also to 'protect society from him, and to defend its own honour and prestige from the wounds inflicted on both'.¹⁰⁰ Warning against the problem of sailors settling down in the colony, a *Calcutta Review* article observed that the number of seamen discharged in Calcutta was beyond all proportion to the number both entering and leaving India. The writer argued that seamen should go back home and the Government should involve itself in this matter: '[C]an Government, really philanthropic and paternal at heart, rest content?'¹⁰¹ And, in cases

⁹⁵ 'The Change and the Want of Anglo-Indian Society', p.1060

⁹⁶ 'The New Colonist Danger', p.244

⁹⁷ 'Light on the Loafers', p.151

⁹⁸ Quoted in David Arnold, 'European Orphans and Vagrants in India in the Nineteenth Century', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 7 (1979), pp.104-127, p.114

⁹⁹ 'The Change and the Want of Anglo-Indian Society', p.1060

¹⁰⁰ 'The Great "Loafer" Difficulty', p.907

¹⁰¹ 'Sailor Life in Calcutta', p.461

where these subordinate Britons had already been drawn into the underworlds of pauperism, the colonial authorities were soon convinced of the necessity of coercive measures. This took the form of the introduction of the European Vagrancy Acts of 1869, 1871, and 1874.¹⁰² Under this legislation, Britons and other Europeans who were identified as 'vagrants' could be apprehended, institutionalised and/or deported.

Repatriation remained an alternative policy for a long time to come. The Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee (1918) which sharply addressed the question of European pauperism, drew attention to the Europeans who 'for some reason or other become stranded here utterly unfitted and incapable of earning sufficient to maintain an European in respectability in an Asiatic climate'.¹⁰³

Although their number was small, their existence could have disproportionate effects.

The Committee cited a following example:

'It is of a man 28 years old, born and educated (he left school at 14) in Manchester. His previous employment is put down as "stroker on the sea" and his present employment as "seasonal" on Rs. 100 a month. At the end of the form he makes the remark, "Where can I settle down for life *ex* India, Sir". From such data what appalling conclusions must be drawn! Repatriation is the obvious and only remedy and the Sub-Committee [of Employment] recommend the institution of a fund for this purpose'.¹⁰⁴

Such men needed to be removed out of the colonising context. During the 1920s' economic distress,¹⁰⁵ the common strategy of the colonial authorities was to repatriate

¹⁰² See Arnold, 'European Orphans and Vagrants in India in the Nineteenth Century', p.120

¹⁰³ *Report of the Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee, 1918-19* (Calcutta, 1920) [*Report of the CDCEC hereafter*], p.135. The Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee is discussed extensively in Ch. 4

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p.136

¹⁰⁵ See Ch. 4 on this economic distress.

whoever Britons that were unemployed at the time and flocked to big cities like Calcutta for charitable rescue. The British found it imperative to remove these people from Indian soil before the latter disgraced the national name. As *The Statesman* declared:

'their ultimate fate is not difficult to conjecture; they are liable, unless saved, to drift into the lowest strata of society, shun their fellow countrymen, becoming derelicts in every sense of the word. [...] They discredit their own race and injure the cause of genuine distress'.¹⁰⁶

Institutions such as the Calcutta Rotary Club, the European Unemployment Relief Committee, and the Ex-Services Association all repatriated a particular number of unemployed British. Between March and September 1925, for instance, the Ex-Services Association spent Rs. 6,300 for repatriation out of the total budget of Rs. 17,000. Out of the 500 cases it dealt with, the Association repatriated 23 Europeans to Britain.¹⁰⁷

The British willingness to eliminate the 'poor white' elements of their own community was also reflected in their expressed concern over any further importation of white labours to India. Even those who championed the cause of impoverished whites in India showed a strong dislike to the idea of their increased numbers – these 'unfit' whites were already too many. The Rev. Joseph Baly, who was Archdeacon of Calcutta and known as the architect of European education in India, argued that the British community should not just take care of its poorer members but also make sure

¹⁰⁶ 'European Unemployment in India', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 10 Sep 1925, p.17

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*

not to increase their numbers. As Baly observed, yearly importations of fresh Europeans were not adding strength to British rule. With their children and descendants becoming rooted in the colony, they would only 'swell the mass of European pauperism to a larger bulk, and aggravate the evil we now idly lament'.¹⁰⁸

In the same vein, the Pauperism Committee (1891) argued that, while it was necessary to come to terms with the issue of already-existent poor Europeans, they, first and foremost, had to try and prevent their further increase. As its Vagrancy Act

Amendment Sub-Committee stated:

'owing to the special conditions of life in this country, Europeans of low degree are on public grounds undesirable immigrants, and are from the force of circumstances unable, even should they find their way here, to lead useful and honest lives'.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ J. Baly, 'The Employment of Europeans in India: A Paper Read Before the Bengal Social Science Association on Thursday, May 1st 1879' (Calcutta, 1879), p.38

¹⁰⁹ *Report of the Pauperism Committee* (Calcutta, 1892) [*Report of the PC hereafter*], p.119

The 'Domiciled Class': the Emergence of a Reluctant Colonial Community

It matters little whether this large number of people be of pure European, or of mixed, descent. [...] The definition of an Anglo-Indian, in the writer's opinion, is that he is one who has made India his home in which to live and in which to bring up his children, and who at the same time wishes, for himself and his children, a degree of comfort, an amount of the necessaries and luxuries of life, superior to that enjoyed by the native Asiatic. [...] What makes Anglo-Indians one class, and separates them, on the one hand from the European who comes to this country for the sake of earning, so that he may return to his own country to enjoy his earnings, and on the other from the native of the country, is that he is one with the latter in making India his country, while he is one with the former in his manner of living, and in his demand for a higher income than is enjoyed by a native of the same rank.¹¹⁰

Despite their continuous efforts at repatriation and other measures, the British authorities could never completely wipe away the prolonged presence of 'poor whites' from the colonial context. Those subordinate white persons who escaped the measures of removal made India their adopted home, or became 'domiciled in India', frequently, if not invariably, intermarrying with non-white women (mostly mixed-descent women). Instead of returning to the metropole, they lingered in the colony over generations. The descendants of these 'poor whites' who stayed on were to be commonly referred to as 'domiciled Europeans'. Even if they were 'purely white' by descent, they were usually forced to occupy a social category fundamentally different from that of their 'non-domiciled' counterparts. In addition to domiciled

¹¹⁰ 'The Anglo-Indian Question', pp.382-3

Europeans, people of mixed-descent formed a distinctive communal group and had been commonly called 'Eurasians', who were related to yet sharply distinct from their British brethren. Domiciled Europeans and Eurasians tended to share similar living conditions and social status: as will be demonstrated below, despite their racial differences, these two groups came to constitute a single, undifferentiated category within an imperial order of social relations.

'Domiciled Europeans'

As they were born and bred in India, 'domiciled Europeans' were legally made a part of the colonised country; unlike non-domiciled Britons, they were defined as 'colonial', (and not as 'British') subjects. The colonial authorities could repatriate 'poor whites', but not domiciled Europeans, because the latter were a constituent part of British India, and as such, were not governed by the Vagrancy Act.¹¹¹ This presented the colonial elites with the problem of how to come to terms with the phenomenal pauperisation of their domiciled-European brethren without resorting to repatriation.¹¹²

Pauperism was a major characteristic of the domiciled-European population.

¹¹¹ 'Appendix IV.; Report of the Vagrancy Act Amendment Sub-Committee', *Report of the PC*, p.lxxx

¹¹² I will discuss these alternative ways in the next two chapters. Though British did or could not repatriate domiciled Europeans to Britain, they tried to assist the latter in emigrating to certain other colonies of the British Empire or in migrating to the northern districts of India where they would establish themselves as farmers.

This is not to say that there were not any members of this population who led a decent, 'respectable' life: some at least managed to find their ways into the subordinate positions of state-related services. But it remained the case that neither the civil nor military services of Government enthusiastically sought after domiciled-European employees: whether as imperial or local agents of colonial rule, the labour of domiciled Europeans was generally not required. Certain Departments such as Telegraph and Customs, as well as the railway companies, were somewhat keen on recruiting domiciled Europeans for their lower-grade positions. But such demand was far from sufficient in accommodating the bulk of the community. The less fortunate members of the community, who increasingly constituted a majority, found minimum wage labour or unemployment. Many of the domiciled-European men, for example, worked in the docks which gave them the lowest means of existence. And since such low-wage labour was not always in demand, they could easily be out of work. Over generations, pauperism was reproduced and made a permanent feature of the domiciled Europeans. Only a small number of parents could send their offspring to relatively prestigious schools in the hills, and still fewer could afford to educate their children in Britain. The overwhelming majority could not afford any of such educational expenses, and had no choice but to educate their children in the schools of the plains, many of which were either low-fee or free. Still many were so poor that they could not provide their children with any education at all.¹¹³

¹¹³ This made British take special educational measures to eschew illiteracy. This point will be

'Eurasians'

But the domiciled Europeans were not the only permanent community of persons of British descent in India. 'Eurasians', racially mixed persons with British blood on the paternal side, were another such community. From as early as the early nineteenth century, the Eurasians formed a distinctive ethnic community, largely marrying among themselves. Well into the later part of the century, the community remained unassimilated into India's indigenous populations, claiming themselves to be 'British' in language, religion and national belonging.

Until the end of the eighteenth century, British attitudes towards persons of mixed descent were not necessarily negative. Many mixed-race persons had more or less been unproblematically integrated into the privileged British establishment. It was not uncommon for high-ranked colonials to have mixed offspring with Indian women. Mixed marriage or concubinary arrangements were generally tolerated if not positively encouraged. High-ranked British men provided for their mixed offspring well, often sending the latter to the metropole to educate them into 'gentlemen'. Their sons would come back to the colony to follow the paths of their fathers, taking superior positions in both the civil and military services. But, by the end of the century, the situation changed much to the disadvantage of mixed-descent individuals. The

discussed extensively in Ch. 5.

Company expelled many of its mixed-descent men from its superior positions, which were to be filled up only by those 'unmixed' British, of whom the shareholders at home (often their family relations) approved.¹¹⁴ The British Army in India, which had formerly employed a large number of mixed-race persons, followed suit and executed similar discriminatory practices. And another reason for such discriminations was a loss of trust. Around this time, there had been a number of uprisings in the Spanish and French territories in the Caribbean, with mixed-race 'mulattos' as well as black slaves protesting against their colonial masters. The Company was worried lest the same thing should happen in British India: these uprisings appeared to British rulers in India to have demonstrated how dangerous it could be to endow mixed-race persons with too much power and status.¹¹⁵

Changing British attitudes towards mixed-race persons was also informed by a rising sense of white racial chauvinism and a corresponding dislike of miscegenation and of mixed offspring. Excluded from the European establishment in India, persons of mixed descent gradually formed a marginalised ethnic group, steadily increasing their numbers as they married amongst themselves. This group of people were socially shunned by Europeans and Indians alike. By mid-century, they were collectively marked out by derogatory nomenclatures such as 'half-caste', 'Indo-Britain', 'East-Indian' or 'Eurasian', and were recognised often negatively as a

¹¹⁴ A. A. D'Souza, *Anglo-Indian Education: A Study on its Origins and Growth in Bengal up to 1960* (Oxford, 1976), pp.15-16

¹¹⁵ Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex and Class under the Raj*, p.99

racially and culturally distinctive community. As has been demonstrated, the 'gentlemanly colonisers', at least from the late nineteenth century onwards, defined their racial prestige partly through their retreat from miscegenation. It was only natural, then, if British officials did not want to see a further increase in the mixed-race population. In theory, the existence of a large mixed-race population was itself a contradiction. It was small wonder that that these 'Eurasians' were stigmatised by a straight-jacket of class and racial stereotypes in the post-Mutiny India. They were typically represented as having inherited the inimical aspects of both Europeans and Indians: they were too proud of their being partly European, while mentally and physically feebler on account of having Indian blood. This perceived inferiority of the mixed-descent community was made official when the SCCS took a vote on the possible usefulness of a mixed-race population for colonial government: the vote read,

'[T]he Eurasians or Indo-Britons bear an excellent character, and deserve to be more liberally and extensively employed; especially as they are steadily 'true to the English cause'.¹¹⁶

Of this, only one voter, Mr. A. Mills approved. All the others, Sir. E. Perry, Mr. D. Seymour, Mr. J. B. Smith, Mr. Gregson, Mr. Lowe, Mr. Wm. Vansittart, Colonel Sykes, emphatically said 'no'.¹¹⁷

On top of the rise of racism, the hardening of the British attitudes towards mixed-race

¹¹⁶ *Report of the SCCS (General)*, p.xxxiv

¹¹⁷ *ibid.*

people had a lot to do with the fact that the former found little use for the latter as an intermediary or collaborating class. In several cases of European colonialism, colonial rulers used mixed-race populations as an intermediary class in order to facilitate colonial administration. In such cases, mixed-race people were made into a loyal and efficient local agent of imperial rule. But in the British-Indian context since the early nineteenth century, this was clearly not the case. Even after they were excluded from the higher positions of the colonial services, colonial officials still used Eurasians as subordinate clerks in the bureaucracy. But even this was to end soon, when the Company began to employ Indians in the lower grades of the civil service. In order to rule a densely populated territory like the Indian subcontinent, the British found it necessary to operate the administration of the colonial state in ways that both utilised (though simultaneously extending control over) their colonised subjects. This was made explicit by Lord Macaulay's famous Minute on Education (1835), which envisaged the creation of a substantial native element within the administrative staff. Governor-General William Bentinck endorsed Macaulay's minute and commenced a policy of 'Indianising' the subordinate section of the services. The Government promoted this policy of 'Indianisation' as a way of combining a reduction in administrative costs with a more ramified control over colonised subjects, and they often articulated it as a realisation of British 'utilitarian' ideals. This policy added a further injury to the exclusion of mixed-race persons, because now the lower as well as higher grades were gradually filled by others. The predicament of the Eurasian class,

as Christopher Hawes has succinctly put it, was one in which: '[F]or the last fifty years Eurasians had not been British enough. After 1835 they were not Indian enough'.¹¹⁸

The post-Mutiny was a period of continued hardship for Eurasians. Many of them had fought alongside the British during the 1857 uprising, which did generate a degree of sympathy for their socio-economic predicament. But the British offered little help, except in educational-philanthropic arenas.¹¹⁹ During this period, the Government further promoted the policy of 'Indianisation', and, moreover, the subject of public appointment became sharply politicised in ways that brought negative consequences for the Eurasian community. An emerging group of educated Indian elites demanded that the native peoples of India should be allowed to participate more in government: a demand that colonial authorities could not simply ignore. To satisfy educated indigenous elites, a statutory rule was made within the Government of India Act (1870),¹²⁰ conferring to all 'non-European' subjects of the Empire a right to participate in the administration of the British Raj. This statutory rule was meant to legally enable all subjects born and educated in India to compete with those who came from the United Kingdom for the higher administrative posts in the colonial state. In practice, however, it was not that the indigenous subjects of the Raj were allowed to go for *any* superior positions of the colonial civil service. After the Public Service

¹¹⁸ Hawes, p.153

¹¹⁹ In 1859, Bishop Cotton, the Metropolitan of the Anglican Church in British India, eulogised the heroic deeds of certain Eurasians who fought on the British side during the Indian Mutiny. But Cotton's public address was intended not much to praise as to draw attention to the *problem* these people were causing to the British Empire. See Ch. 5.

¹²⁰ Victoria 6, Chapter 3.

Commission (1886-7), the civil service was divided into central and provincial branches, the former called the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the latter the Provincial Civil Service (PCS). On the one hand, the ICS was to become the most prestigious bureaucracy in the world and was almost entirely staffed with British elites from the metropole. On the other, the PCS, which was much larger in size, was in principle meant for 'Natives of India'. What is important here is that Eurasians, being born and domiciled in India, had been designated by the 1870 statute as one of such 'Natives of India', and thus were now duly eligible for employment in the PCS. From the British perspective, this was a 'rescue' measure. Now Eurasians were legally 'Indian enough' so that they could equally benefit from the policy of 'Indianisation'. Eurasians should have no legal disadvantages in competing for public positions open to them.

From the Eurasian perspective, however, the above recruitment policy proved to be unsatisfactory chiefly for two reasons. First of all, despite its universalistic appeal, the recruitment policy was implicitly based on racial criteria. In practice, 'Statutory Native' was often synonymous with 'Indian', excluding the Eurasians who were not 'Native of pure Asiatic descent'. For this reason, along with domiciled Europeans, Eurasians were often virtually excluded from 'Indianisation'. In 1882, for instance, the Government decided to give preference to 'Indian' engineering students in recruitment to the Public Works Department. The Thomason College at Rurki was an engineering college, preparing its students for entry into this Department. By this so-called 'Rurki resolution', the Government would guarantee posts in the Department

to the 'Indian' students only. Candidates from the Eurasian as well as domiciled European communities would not be given these posts unless there was a lack in the number of qualified Indians, who the Government found to be underrepresented. In an 1882 dispatch, the Government of India had consulted the Secretary of State for India, to which he replied that the 'Natives of India' should in this case be interpreted as referring to 'persons of Asiatic origin rather than persons of Europeans or mixed blood', and all this, in spite of the statutory sense of the meaning which permitted no racial distinctions to be made among the subjects of the Empire.¹²¹ Though the 'Rurki resolution' was finally dropped, it indicated the extent to which Eurasians were excluded from the policy of Indianisation.¹²²

The second reason why Eurasian leaders did not whole-heartedly appreciate Indianisation was that they generally did not really wish to be regarded as 'Natives of India', so long as this category implied 'Indian'. Eurasian and domiciled-European elites always insisted that their communities were more 'British' than 'Indian', and should be given an opportunity to enjoy a commensurate standard of living. It was not that Eurasians demanded access to the ICS, which had been filled almost entirely by Oxbridge-educated Britons. Rather, they wished that certain higher positions in the PCS be reserved especially for them. The problem was that the British authorities

¹²¹ *Proceedings of the Sub-Committee, Public Service Commission, Public Works Department, India* (Government of India, Calcutta, 1887), p.3

¹²² As Ch. 6 shows, leaders of the poor European and mixed-race community made a strong protest against the 'Rurki resolution'. The resolution was finally withdrawn through the intervention of the Government of India, which thought that the view of the Secretary of State was incompatible with the statutory definition of 'Natives of India'. This was done by a dispatch in 1883 in which the Government of India recommended the Secretary of State to re-open the case. *ibid.*, p.4

decided to 'Europeanise' these very positions that Eurasians and domiciled Europeans wanted, in order to counterbalance the increasing employment of Indians in the lower sections of the civil service. In this policy of 'Europeanisation', persons who were bred and educated in the metropole would be sent out to India to be entrusted with jobs that involved tasks of management and supervision. To their fury, Eurasians (along with domiciled Europeans) were excluded from this category on the grounds that they were born, bred and educated in the colonial periphery.¹²³

Thus, the reorganisation of the colonial services ever since the 1830s tended strongly to disadvantage the Eurasian community. Subordinate positions were increasingly taken by educated Indians who claimed lower wages and who had political justification for increased recruitment. In the mean time, higher positions were reserved for those educated in the metropole. Consequently, except in certain departments such as the Customs and the Telegraph, the proportion of Eurasian clerks experienced a phenomenal decline. By 1890, the proportion of Eurasian clerkships within the civil service had declined to 18%: a phenomenal decline from almost the total monopoly (99%) in 1840.¹²⁴ And what was tragic with Eurasians was that they had grown dependent on the colonial state for employment. When they lost their former positions in the colonial state, they were at a loss as to where else to find employment.¹²⁵ What awaited them was a quick entry to the world of pauperism.

¹²³ See Ch. 6 for full details.

¹²⁴ *Report of the PC*, p.6

¹²⁵ It may well be noted here that, though temporarily, the Government sanctioned the Eurasians to form special military regiments to support the British in suppressing the mutineers during the revolt of 1857.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, nearly one-fourth of the Eurasians in Calcutta had to live on charity.¹²⁶ As *The Statesman* noted, the Eurasian community had been trapped in a historical impasse:

'The disadvantages of the Eurasian community are so numerous, that it is almost impossible to think of this community at all, without at the same time recalling them. Situated as the Eurasian is, between the upper and the nether millstone, between the European on the one hand and the native on the other, he has everything to depress, little to cheer him; and if he succeeds in elevating himself, it is almost a miracle.'¹²⁷

'Domiciled class'

In post-Mutiny India, domiciled Europeans and Eurasians were often found to have in common particular social conditions and problems. The two groups were of British descent but were commonly designated as 'Natives of India', instead of as 'British'. Within these shared definitional complexities, both ended up experiencing similar difficulties in finding employment in the colonial labour market, and were equally subjected to the constant threat of unemployment. And unemployment, for that matter, often resulted in disaster. Whether he be a domiciled European or a Eurasian, a subordinate white person could easily run through the condition of poverty into that of pauperism. As the Pauperism Committee pointed out, in the special context of

For a long time to come, leaders of the community were to often referred to the commitment during the revolt as the proof of both the military fitness and sense of loyalty of Eurasians. But by 1870 the Government had disbanded all those Eurasian regiments. Throughout the rest of the colonial period, the imperial authorities rejected the demand of Eurasian and domiciled-European activists to sanction the re-establishment of special regiments. The imperial authorities were essentially sceptical of the 'fitness', military or otherwise, of the Eurasians of India.

¹²⁶ See Ch. 4 for details.

¹²⁷ 'The Eurasian Community', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 27 Nov. 1883, p1662-3, p.1662

colonial Indian society, he:

'who is already on the margin of his class cannot fall any further; he cannot become an agricultural labourer or a cooly. If he sinks, he has nothing but pauperism to sink into'.¹²⁸

Domiciled Europeans and Eurasians shared similar living conditions as well. In Calcutta they often inhabited the same slum quarters. Moreover, through intermarriage, the two groups could easily merge with one another physically. The Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee recorded how domiciled Europeans lived among their Eurasian fellows:

'In addition there are a number of pure European British families who, through straitened circumstances, are compelled to live among the poorer class of Anglo-Indians [i.e. Eurasians]. Children of these parents who by misfortune, ill-health, or often the death of the bread-winner, are brought up in a strange land, have to contend with circumstances which even the more Anglo-Indian children find extremely difficult'.¹²⁹

Furthermore, these two groups often shared the same educational institutions, the so-called 'European schools'. These schools included a few schools of higher order in the hills but a large number of them were low-fee or free charitable schools and orphanages designed for the poor. They were meant for children of British descent growing up in India, and in principle excluded Indian pupils. But ironically, the British themselves avoided educating their own progeny in these colonial schools, which they regarded lowly: instead they usually sent their own children to middle-class schools in Britain. They supported these colonial schools only as a

¹²⁸ *Report of the PC*, pp.7-8

¹²⁹ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.141

counter-measure against the perceived threat of illiteracy and indigence prevailing in the two groups we are discussing here.¹³⁰

In late British India, both domiciled Europeans and Eurasians became economically dispossessed and socially marginalised, and it was partly this material condition that served to put them together into one single social category. The two groups may have been ethnically different, but in the eyes of the colonial authorities this was often inconsequential. What mattered was that they were 'British' only by descent while characteristically 'un-British' legally, economically and/or socially. They were permanent residents of India (and not of Britain) with commensurate living standards. This domiciliary factor made both groups equally distinct from their 'British' brethren whose national identity rested precisely on the fact they were never 'domiciled in India' even if they lived there for certain years or decades. R. Carstairs, a retired ICS officer, expressed this contrasting creation of both 'British' and 'domiciled' categories in the following way:

'In the non-domiciled section are most of the able-bodied men in the prime of life; in the domiciled, comparatively few of those, and more non-efficients – women, children, the aged, the infirm, the weak-minded, paupers, and loafers- its own inefficients; and the failures, the wastrels, the waifs, and deserted children of the non-domiciled who drift into it'.¹³¹

The British were never prepared to accept their 'domiciled' brethren as a part of their

¹³⁰ See, Ch.5 about the British attitudes towards these schools.

¹³¹ R. Carstairs, 'Our Kinsfolk Domiciled in India – European and Eurasian', *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 29 (1910), pp.6-23, p.19

community with all the privileges (economic, social and legal) attached thereto. Even if the domiciled possessed British blood and adhered to the linguistic, religious and other cultural norms of British society, they were denounced for lacking a certain 'civility' which alone made one 'British'. Common descent and cultural heritage were necessary but not sufficient criteria for inclusion. The domiciled were *there* in the colony but *not as* agents of colonialism – on the contrary, they were seen as being in India only because they lacked the otherwise requisite capacity to keep a proper distance from India and remain connected to Europe. As Carstairs observed, ultimately what the domiciled lacked was the material means for traversing colony and metropole:

'it [the dividing line between domiciled and non-domiciled] may be crossed at any time in either direction by any person. But by members of the resident British community it is crossed almost invariably in one direction. The domiciled Indian who would exchange for an English domicile must be a prosperous man, and such men are rare; but to exchange his English domicile for an Indian one, a man has only to fail, for then he must settle in India, not being able to get away'.¹³²

British attitudes towards their domiciled brethren were defined essentially by cold detachment. There were some commentators who took the domiciliary distinction to the extreme, arguing that the domiciled people, including both domiciled Europeans and Eurasians, constituted a race apart, and, as such, were of no responsibility to the non-domiciled British. An anonymous article in *The Calcutta Review*, for instance, argued that a domiciled person:

¹³² *ibid.*

'possesses, as a rule, by birth the characteristics both of a European and a native, but in a less degree. He is less supple than a native, less energetic than a European'.¹³³

The author went on that, because of the pride of the domiciled man in being of European origin, '[H]e has, as a rule, great conceit'.¹³⁴ Basically, the people of British descent domiciled in India had departed too far from required European ways of life. They had changed so much that they were 'a separate race', no longer belonging to the white body politic. Thus, Europeans should waste no time and money in trying to reintegrate them:

'The *race*, it seem to me, must ultimately merge into the general population of the country. [...] let him throw off the feeling which prompts this isolation [from Indian society], let him declare himself a fellow countryman to the rest of the people of India' (my italics).¹³⁵

In practice, as the next two chapters will demonstrate, such an extreme exclusionary attitude was not very common, and the British attitudes towards their domiciled brethren were also ambiguously inclusionary. But at any rate, it remained true that most British in India did not only see themselves as different from domiciled Europeans and Eurasians, but also defined themselves pretty much *against* these people of the same British descent. As Thomas Edwards noted in a *Calcutta Review* article, the domiciled elements of the white body politic did more harm than good to colonial rule, remaining in India as 'a disgrace to Englishmen and cancer in her rule'.¹³⁶

¹³³ 'The Anglo-Indian Question', pp387-8

¹³⁴ *ibid.*, p.390

¹³⁵ *ibid.*, p.391

¹³⁶ Thomas Edwards, 'Eurasians and Poor Europeans in India', *The Calcutta Review*, 72 (1881), pp.38-56, p.51

And while disparaging the pauperised, 'un-British' existence of these people of common descent, the British themselves continued to maintain their own privileged racial status. This 'bourgeois' aspect never ceased being the core of British attitudes towards their own racial identity and towards their domiciled European and Eurasian brethren. And it was through the distinction in terms of domicile that this internal difference was justified and fixed. Henry Gidney, the prominent political leader of the domiciled community in the 1920s and 1930s, lamented how 'it is still, as it ever has been, the British in India who have insisted on this [domiciliary] distinction'.¹³⁷ This class-cum-domicile criterion had always been so fundamental that those who were 'white' and yet poor were never regarded as genuine members of the British community. Observing such class exclusiveness of Britishness, Gidney remarked:

'It is incredible that the greatest colonizing country and people in the world should be ashamed of and lose identity with the children born of the natives of the country'.¹³⁸

Conclusion

In late colonial India, the British based the invention of their racial authority on a specific kind of 'rootedlessness'. The construction of Britishness was certainly

¹³⁷ Henry Gidney, 'The Status of the Anglo-Indian Community Under the Reforms Scheme in India', *The Asiatic Review*, 21 (1925), pp.657-662, p.658

¹³⁸ *ibid.*

predicated upon an explicit Victorian sense of racial chauvinism, but it was at the same time a subtle and ambiguous process involving almost obsessive self-anxieties. Because India was such a vast country with a gigantic population, it was thought impossible for the British to 'colonise' it or, more precisely, populate it with a mass of white emigrants. India was not to become an adopted 'home' of Britons – rather, India was supposed to provide the British with a 'career' to pursue, the fruit of which they would eventually take back to the metropole. The colonising British may *be* in India for much of their lives, but this never meant that they actually made India their home. They were there only and specifically to 'govern', 'develop' and 'civilise', and ostensibly *not* to root the lives of themselves and of their families permanently. And this characteristic aloofness was itself what made one 'British' in India. To be British did not simply mean to be born of white parents; it was a rather demanding business, requiring both a will and socio-economic capacity to remain connected to the 'civilisation' of the imperial centre. It was only those among white people who could meet this demand that shall become true members of the 'ruling race'.

Given this peculiar rootedlessness of British identity, it is not hard to imagine why the colonial authorities disparaged the existence of white working classes in the colonising context. What is crucial to note here is that the invention of an ideal British racial identity was explicitly 'bourgeois' as well as racist, and, as such, it was always obstructed by those people of white descent who did not originate from the upper or middle class of British society. They may be white, Christian and

English-speaking, but they were not expected to exhibit respectable qualities of the 'ruling race'. Rather, because of their relative lack of refinement and moral restraints, they were considered prone to 'degeneration'. And precisely because they were at least racially and culturally British (or so did they claim themselves), their 'degeneration' was considered problematic; it was feared to cause an embarrassing damage to the collective image of the British race. The fact that there was a certain, limited need for subaltern white employees or soldiers by no means indicated that the colonial ruling classes ever positively wanted their *social* presence in the colonising context. To secure the projected racial authority of the British nation, the colonial elites needed to prevent the unregulated growth of a poor white population. And it was in this context that they so explicitly stressed the need for restricting the emigration of British labouring classes to the Indian Subcontinent. And it was also in this context that miscegenation could not simply be a question of moral restraint on the part of better-off white men, or about the presence (or absence) of white female sex. Rather, the question of miscegenation was typically articulated with a bourgeois anxiety over the condition of subordinate classes. Such an explicit sense of difference in terms of class explained the starkly exclusionary attitude of British towards those impoverished white people who were born and bred in India. In their helpless indigence, domiciled Europeans and Eurasians were too 'rooted', 'mixed' or both. They failed to remain aloof and 'pure', becoming too much a part of the land and peoples Britain ruled. Despite their common white descent, these people came to

constitute a peculiar, reluctant social category, which was socially and legally differentiated from that of the 'authentic' British.

4. Governing European Pauperism: Philanthropic Intervention

Introduction

The last chapter discussed how the British elites in late colonial India excluded both poor-white and racially mixed groups from their privileged community. British colonialism defined India as a land for administrators, capitalists and missionaries, and the social prestige of these people was to be secured partly by positively suppressing the existence of those British with lower social origins. In principle, subordinate whites should not be brought to the colonial context. And those who were already there should be taken home before they became 'degenerate' and 'mixed', swelling the number of an already large mixed-race population. But despite the strenuous efforts to regulate immigration and to repatriate 'undesirable' white immigrants, also existing in the colony were the 'domiciled' whites, who were born, bred, and permanently settled in India, and were often racially mixed. Unlike 'poor whites', they were already part of India, and therefore the colonial authorities could not remove them at will by repatriation. Legally the 'domiciled' were not British - with India as their place of domicile, they were designated as 'Statutory Natives of India'. The British starkly disregarded their domiciled brethren as legitimate members of the select circle

of gentlemanly colonisers. But this chapter will show that such exclusion did not mean that the British completely neglected their domiciled kin and allowed them to become thoroughly assimilated into the indigenous populations.

British attitudes towards their domiciled fellows were not characterised only by exclusionary discourses and practices. Rather they were also ambiguously predicated on another inclusionary premise of a peculiar sort. Whilst firmly rejecting the domiciled materially, their non-domiciled brethren in India also pulled them back towards the British body politic, albeit strictly within the framework of philanthropy-cum-social control. Far from simply labelling the domiciled as a fallen contaminated species and neglecting them as such, the elite colonials developed a keen interest in their social condition and urgently attempted to ameliorate it with special measures. Such an inclusionary stance was demonstrated in the continuous agitation of the British press in favour of such special measures and the quick responses thereto by both Government and missionary establishments. The aim of this chapter is to describe the inclusionary politics of philanthropy that was engaged by both state and philanthropic agents of colonialism, and demonstrate that this peculiar social politics was invoked to secure a projected authority of the British race.

The chapter will discuss various aspects of colonial philanthropy by examining certain key public commissions and policies, most of which formed in Calcutta. The most important among these were the Pauperism Committee (1991), the Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee (1918), as well as several employment

schemes, such as the idea of a special military regiment and of establishing agricultural communes outside the cities. The first part of the chapter will chronologically trace the evolution of policies of philanthropic inclusion, their institutional structures and the practical problems connected therewith. It will seek to explain how and why the colonial authorities interpreted the pauperisation of the domiciled class as a threat to colonial social order. In particular, it will show how the philanthropic circles articulated the whole question as a governmental responsibility. The second part of the chapter will examine, in minute detail, the purpose, scope and limits of each of the proposed philanthropic policies. It will focus on the British perspective on the racial and cultural identity of the domiciled within the bounds of philanthropic inclusion, and attempt to identify what identity and mode of living the inclusive impulse of philanthropy sought to produce.

Ideological and Institutional Foundations

It cannot help the cause of Christianity that Indians shall see a community in India, Christian by birth, suffering from want of education, and including a seriously depressed class which affords a very poor example of practical Christianity.¹

In the wake of the 1857 revolt, Bishop Cotton, the Metropolitan of the Anglican

¹ W. H. Arden Wood, 'The Problem of the Domiciled Community in India', *The Asiatic Review*, 24 (1928), pp.417 -437

Church in India, remarked:

‘it is nothing less than a national sin to neglect a class of persons who are our fellow-Christians and fellow-subjects, whose presence in India is due entirely to our occupation in the country, but who, unless real efforts are made for their welfare, are in great spiritual and moral danger’.²

The Viceroy, Lord Canning, to whom Cotton made this remark, took this view seriously.³ He agreed that the domiciled class had a special claim upon their non-domiciled British fellows, as it was nothing but the colonial presence of the latter which made them come into being in the first place. Or in Canning’s words, ‘[T]he presence of a British Government has called them into being’.⁴ What underlay such a move towards special care was a perceived threat of the community’s poverty which seemed to be growing endemic. What both Cotton and Canning were afraid of were the ways in which this phenomenon of pauperism might emerge as a scandal to British imperial prestige. Like it or not, the domiciled community had been perceived as a part of British society. Certain portions of the community might have acquired darker complexions and succumbed to modes of living that actually appeared more ‘Indian’ than ‘European’. But they had not been assimilated into any of the various Indian communities, Hindu, Muslim or otherwise. Being English-speaking and, moreover, Christian, the domiciled community was usually seen by the rest of Indian society as an appendage to the colonising community. At this juncture, the colonial authorities

² Quoted in ‘Children of the Poor’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 2 Jun. 1864, p.594

³ This passage appeared in Cotton’s call for a European intervention for the education of the domiciled class. See Ch. 5 for details.

⁴ *Review of Education in India in 1886* (Government of India, Calcutta, 1888), p.294

contended that the British in India ought to put their domiciled brethren under their tutelage in order to abate the negative political consequences the latter could cause. The announcements by Cotton and by Canning both left a long-lasting impact on the formation of British attitudes towards the domiciled class. Philanthropy-minded Britons shared their ambiguous sense of responsibility and urged the British community at large to take the plight of its domiciled counterpart as its own problem. *The Statesman* proclaimed that members of the domiciled community ‘may be of bad character, they maybe idle, they may be drunkards – but they are countrymen and they call themselves Christians’.⁵ It would be better, as the paper noted, *not* to conceive of these people as a distinct class, but to integrate them, to some extent at least, into the British community.⁶ For neglecting them had already been:

‘creating a race lower than any other known in India, and that pleases some people, but it is exceedingly dangerous, for it (which cannot be reached on any general principle) reacts on other portions of the same race’.⁷

To prevent such from going further, the affluent British should assume a responsibility for the well-being of their less fortunate kin.

But how in practice could the British save their domiciled brethren pauperism – what could the former do to rehabilitate the latter economically? During the first three decades of Crown rule, educational initiative expanded significantly. By the mid-1870s there was a wide-spread recognition among the colonial educationalist

⁵ *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 28 Ap. 1864, p.451

⁶ ‘East Indians’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 22 Sep. 1864, pp.1067-68

⁷ ‘A Loafer’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 1 Jun. 1871, p.628

circle that the Government should play a central role in trying to reduce European pauperism by aiding the educational efforts of missionaries. Joseph Baly, the Archdeacon of Calcutta, made a crucial contribution for systematising the education of India's domiciled community. His efforts bore fruit in the form of the European Education Code, drafted in Bengal in 1883. Back then there were hopes that education would be able to equip domiciled children with practical knowledge and skills and so enable them to compete successfully with educated Indians. Both government and private employers would be happy to take them; all would be able to find employment one way or another. The new education system, however, was not as effective in countervailing European pauperism as its promoters had hoped. Not only was it impossible to remove illiteracy, but it was also always extremely difficult to find employment even for those who attended school.⁸

By the beginning of the 1890s, it seemed increasingly clear that the British could not solve European pauperism merely by creating schools: an urgent and more specific form of intervention was required. It was the District Charitable Society, a governmental institution to supervise British philanthropic work, that made a move towards such intervention (May 1887). H. Beverley, the Society's President, issued a circular to the parishes of the Church of England asking for cooperation in 'an attempt to procure trustworthy information regarding the extent of pauperism among the

⁸ See Ch. 5. for details.

Christian poor of this city'.⁹ By this time, the British upper and middle classes were convinced that the Government had to commit itself more fully to relieve the further pauperisation of the domiciled class. As *The Statesman* declared:

'The Government has not given the community the least assistance or encouragement. [...] Why should so much be done for the conquered race and literally nothing for those who are the kith and kin of the British?'.¹⁰

To dismiss the domiciled community out of the Government's responsibilities would eventually 'reflect discredit on the national name'.¹¹ It was in this context of a highlighted awareness of national crisis that the District Charitable Society approached the Government on the subject of European pauperism (3 February 1891). Together with the Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association, which also approached the Government in early March, the Society engaged the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to appoint a Commission to enquire into the question of indigence among Calcutta's domiciled community. In response, Resolution No. 479 (18 April 1891) appointed a representative Committee 'to enquire into the extent and nature of the poverty and destitution which prevail in the town of Calcutta among Europeans and Eurasians, and other matters connected therewith'.¹² Thus the 'Pauperism Committee' [hereafter PC] was launched with Sir H. L. Harrison as the chair. The Board of the Committee had

⁹ *Report of the Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee, 1918-19* (Calcutta, 1920) [*Report of the CDCEC* hereafter], p.173

¹⁰ G. T. Potenger, 'Letters to the Editor; The Eurasian Question', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 28 June 90, p.1

¹¹ 'Pauperism in Calcutta', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 24 Jan. 1891., p.3

¹² *Report of the Pauperism Committee* (Calcutta, 1892) [*Report of the PC* hereafter], p.1

prominent figures from the European philanthropic circle, including government officials, educationalists, missionaries, social workers and lawyers. It also had certain representatives of the Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Associations. The PC had five Sub-Committees: Statistics, Avenues of Employment, Education, Charitable Endowment, and Housing. The Committee elicited the support of a number of Britons in Calcutta, such as policemen, missionaries and private employers who had first-hand experience with members of the domiciled class. The findings of the PC, both quantitative and qualitative, were published in *Report of the Pauperism Committee* (submitted to the Government of Bengal on 3 March 1892). In August of the same year, the Government made its formal reply to the recommendations contained in the *Report*.

Pauperism Committee

The PC came to many conclusions and offered specific recommendations. Among other things, it found the impoverishment of the domiciled class singularly alarming. As a whole, 7.9% of Britons of pure European descent were found to be in receipt of charitable relief. The Committee noted that 7.9 was a very large percentage, given that the British community was supposedly predominantly upper or middle class, necessarily precluded from any risks of becoming paupers. What they learnt from this was that Britons who did not belong to the non-domiciled group tended very

strongly to become a pauper; that in India the rate of poor Britons being reduced to pauperism was nearly twice as high as in England and Wales. And even more alarming was the pauperisation of the mixed-race population. 22.3% of Eurasians were found to be dependent on European charitable relief. The Committee lamented:

‘22.3 among Eurasians is an enormous percentage which can scarcely be paralleled in any other community in the world’.¹³

The PC argued that in the face of such a critical condition of their domiciled brethren, the British had a special responsibility to discharge:

‘The circumstances of the Indo-European [i.e. domiciled] community are such as equitably entitle them to special and exceptional consideration at the hands of the Indian Government’.¹⁴

The Committee also claimed that the degree of impoverishment was such as to necessitate urgent state involvement. As its Avenues of Employment Sub-Committee wrote:

‘We think that the condition is such that philanthropic help cannot effect any permanent good. It is an evil of large magnitude, and we would very respectfully remark that the only possible remedy lies in the Government giving the subject their full consideration and taking the action which the case demands. We think that the situation is one that has passed out of the sphere of self-help or the help which any other than the Government can give. To us it appears that when all avenues of employment are closing round a community and the pauperism found among them is represented at least as being 16.57 per cent., or one pauper for every six Europeans and Eurasians taken together, the question becomes a political question, and State interference is necessary’.¹⁵

¹³ *Report of the PC*, p.3

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.12

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.112

What practical measures should the Government take in order to discharge such responsibility to the domiciled paupers? The PC doubted that the Government could easily help the latter to find employment within the British establishments, whether governmental or commercial. In this respect, the Committee's view differed from that of Archdeacon Baly. The Committee acknowledged their indebtedness to the educational efforts of Archdeacon Baly, who after all was *the* person who brought the case of European pauperism before the Government.¹⁶ But, unlike Baly, members of the PC thought that school education offered only a partial solution. Though appalled by the extent to which the domiciled had declined economically, Baly still believed that the British could somehow transform its rising generations into employable youths and save the community as a whole from future unemployment.¹⁷ Members of the PC, however, found this view too optimistic:

‘the difficulty is experienced now more acutely than it was when the Archdeacon was making his enquiries 11 and 12 years ago, but be that as it may, we beg to place on record our dissent from the statement that all steady, sober, honest, industrious and able-bodied Indo-Europeans can find employment in Calcutta’.¹⁸

The PC found, if reluctantly, that European business employers were not generally keen on taking domiciled persons, especially those from poor families. Even the railways, the biggest employer of the domiciled class since the mid-nineteenth century, would not recruit from the impoverished portion of the domiciled class. For example,

¹⁶ *Report of the PC*, p.12

¹⁷ See Ch. 5

¹⁸ *Report of the PC*, p.16

in reply to the Committee's inquiry, the Bombay-Baroda and Central Indian Railway claimed:

'the class of persons in whose interest the Pauperism Committee are enquiring are understood to be principally composed of men without a profession or who have been thrown out of employment, and these men can find no work on Railways'.¹⁹

The company recommended a creation of special 'Homes' where these men could be given adequate disciplinary training.²⁰ Another railway company, the Eastern Bengal State Railway, also dismissed the possibility of employing these men and suggested to train them as domestic servants, postmen, and tailors.²¹ It was certainly true that past governments had made considerable use of the domiciled community for colonial administration and public works, and that, as a consequence, the class had grown dependent on the British for employment. But the Committee found that the present situation surrounding these avenues of employment was blatantly hostile to the domiciled class. Their view was that British should face the fact that the pauperisation of their domiciled brethren had already become a constitutional part of colonial Indian society. The kind of general scheme represented by Baly's education policy would be insufficient in addressing this particular problem of pauperism because the former underestimated the latter's depths and complexities in which the entire community had been entangled. Instead, the British in India should develop policies and institutions more specifically targeting the poorer sections of their domiciled

¹⁹ *ibid.*, p.116

²⁰ *ibid.*, p.116

²¹ *ibid.*, p.118

fellows.²² The best the Government could do would be to sanction and generously support welfare efforts to suppress domiciled pauperism.

The Committee saw that it was with the recognition of this harsh reality that the British effort to regenerate their domiciled compatriots must begin. They should discharge their due responsibility by making the domiciled *unlearn* the latter's dependence on them, whilst providing alternative livelihoods outside British establishments. The PC condemned the ongoing practices of relief aid for its allegedly making many members of the domiciled class habitual dependants, thus increasing the problem of pauperism instead of solving it. And it recommended establishing a new central organisation, the Charity Organisation Committee, which would supervise the distribution of relief aid so that it would not produce any more professional mendicants.²³ The Committee also recommended that the Government should launch special employment schemes to provide younger members of the community with fresh opportunities. The Government should sanction the establishment of a special military regiment composed exclusively of domiciled men. This would inculcate the male youths of the community not just in military skills (possibly opening the prospects of a career in soldiering), but also in endurance and self-discipline. The Government should also establish a training vessel in the river Hooghly. Such would provide them with a disciplined life and a possible career in the

²² It should be noted that, as Chapter 5 shows, European education policy itself increasingly headed towards this direction.

²³ *Report of the PC*, p.9, 17

field of marine piloting.²⁴

The Government's response to these recommendations was not exactly encouraging. Charles Elliot, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, did find that the ideas expressed by the PC possessed the seeds of genuine social reform. But he did not see how the colonial state could justify the spending of public money on policies that targeted one particular community without incurring an accusation of preferential treatment. The domiciled class was certainly an important group but at the same time it was only one of the many 'Native' groups to which the colonial state was equally responsible:

'Government can do nothing more than see that Europeans and Eurasians domiciled in India receive fair treatment, equally with other persons included in the term "natives of India"'.²⁵

Elliot largely denied financing the new schemes which the Committee had proposed. He ordered that the proposed reorganisation of the charity regime, with a central charitable headquarters as its head, was too drastic. Instead of creating a new Charity Organisation Committee, the British could continue to rely on the District Charitable Society for supervising the existing charitable societies available in Calcutta.²⁶ As for the two aforementioned youth-labour schemes, Elliot concluded that the state was not in a position to establish and finance schemes that did not benefit the Indian nation as a

²⁴ For the details of these proposals for a regiment and for a training vessel, see the next section of this chapter.

²⁵ *Report of the PC*, p.3

²⁶ 'General Department, Miscellaneous – no. 2263, Calcutta, the 8th August 1892, RESOLUTION' in *Proceedings of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, General Department – Miscellaneous, Calcutta, September 1892* (OIOC; P/4089), p.4, 9

whole. There were no pre-existing demands, whether military, economic or otherwise, for domiciled regiments or marine pilots.²⁷

The appointment of the PC was undoubtedly significant in that it informed British society of the sheer scale and complexities of European pauperism. It was a vivid illustration of how concerned the British elites in India were about their domiciled brethren. But whilst bringing the question of the domiciled poor to the fore, the Committee fell short of convincing the Government of taking any truly radical measures for its solution.

Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee

After the PC ended, the appeal for the establishment of a communal military regiment and of a special vessel for pilot training continued to be made. But the Government remained committed to the view that such schemes would be unjustifiably costly. At the turn of the century the only substantial aid the Government was making for the domiciled class fell in the category of education. But even that was not making tangible improvements when it came to the immediate relief of European pauperism: in all India there remained about 7,000 domiciled children who received no school education whatsoever.²⁸ Domiciled paupers concomitantly presented their existence to the British as though to condemn the latter for their prolonged failure to bring the

²⁷ *ibid.*, pp.4-7

²⁸ See Ch. 5 for details.

problem under control. By this time, the problem of the domiciled poor had not only remained unsolved but had hardened into a chronic state, making *The Statesman* lamenting; ‘Like the poor, the Eurasian problem is ever upon us’.²⁹ Increasingly, it was not as an appendix to the European colonial enterprise but as a pool of unfit individuals that the domiciled community were noticed. W. Francis, an ICS officer who was in charge of the Madras branch of the 1901 Census, noted that ‘[T]he popular idea that Eurasians are mainly employed as fitters or clerks or on the railways [was] clearly inaccurate’.³⁰ Most, he observed, were living ‘on endowments on their relatives and friends, in convents, in lunatic asylums, in jail or by begging’.³¹ The Conference on the Education of the Domiciled Community in India at Simla (1912) concluded that the problem of domiciled unemployment and pauperism was so deep-rooted that the only educational policies that could possibly effect a genuine solution were compulsory education and institutionalisation of children in special orphanage-type schools.³² As of the late 1910s, nothing about the domiciled class had changed for the better ever since the PC was appointed nearly three decades before, and only the danger seemed to have increased. As a missionary organ, the All-India Committee noted:

‘There is a community of poor Europeans in the city of Calcutta, unrivalled in any slum in the world of misery and degradation. Here the rate of pauperism is higher than in any community in

²⁹ ‘The Eurasian Problem’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 13 Ap. 1899, p.5

³⁰ *The Census of India, 1901: vol. XV.: Madras: Part I – Report* (Government of India, Madras, 1902), pp.204-5

³¹ *ibid.*, p.205

³² Though the Government did not in the end endorse the recommendation for compulsory education. See Ch. 5. for details.

Christendom'.³³

It was out of the above sense of crisis that, in 1918, another committee, the Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee (hereafter CDCEC), was launched. Unlike the PC, this CDCEC was not a Government initiative, but a private one. But it was clearly modelled on the former, with prominent Britons, such as the Right Reverend Bishop Lefroy (Metropolitan of India), J.H. Hechle, and Arden Wood as its founding members. The CDCEC's specific objective was to investigate the living condition of poor Europeans and the people of mixed descent living in Calcutta, and to make recommendations for ameliorating that condition.

The CDCEC reconfirmed that the state of indigence among the domiciled community was at a critical stage. A substantial number within the community lived in poverty and constituted what looked to be an urban 'residuum'. The Sub-Committee on Health and Physique noted that there were great numbers of domiciled persons who:

'live below the poverty line and herd together like animals in unspeakably filthy, undrained slums, Indians and Anglo-Indians living side by side in mud and bamboo huts'.³⁴

What was alarming was that the lives of these impoverished people were so 'un-European' and presented little difference from those of certain poor-indigenous

³³ The All-India Committee, *'The European of India': A responsibility and an opportunity*, in M. B. Turner (ed.), *An alien in his own country* (London, 191-), *Pamphlets* (OIOC P/T/314), pp.3-4

³⁴ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.141

inhabitants of the city. As it was noted: 'This class merges into the pure Indian Christian and a point is reached at which separation is difficult to determine'.³⁵ In the CDCEC's view, faced with this plight of their domiciled brethren in Calcutta, the non-domiciled, wealthy Britons must come to their rescue without any delay. Instead of just minding their own career advancement and commercial profit-making, the British community should acknowledge its historical responsibility for the well-being of its impoverished domiciled relations:

'the community exists because of the coming to India of various European peoples and that it is the obvious duty of the immigrant European community to accept the burden of the troubles to which communally it had given birth. Apart from Government assistance in matters like education, comparatively little of the enterprise, the money, and the brains which are the special characteristics of the home-bone European community, would set in motion forces which would provide as speedy a remedy as so complex a problem is susceptible of. In so urging we include those who have made their money in India and who are now enjoying the fruits of their labour in Europe'.³⁶

But unfortunately, the Committee found that European employers were almost invariably reluctant to recruit members of the domiciled class:

'The accusations levelled against the Domiciled Community by employers are condemnatory to an exceptional degree'.³⁷

Of the 61 firms which replied to the circular issued by the Committee, 21 reported that they employed members of the domiciled class.³⁸ These European managers found that the domiciled were far too undereducated and undisciplined to be recruited. The

³⁵ *ibid.*, p.135

³⁶ *ibid.*, p.2

³⁷ *ibid.*, pp.1-2, p.134

³⁸ *ibid.*, p.138

Committee took this verdict as a fact to be taken seriously. Employment would not be created out of sympathy, as the Committee observed:

‘It is of little use appealing to the employer’s sympathetic consideration; the business man has little time to enquire into the domestic conditions of the individual’.³⁹

The Committee argued that the British sympathisers should *not* work on behalf of the domiciled class to win partial treatments from employers. Rather they should work with the domiciled poor in an effort to improve their mental, hygienic and social fitness, with a view to increasing ‘the earning capacity of the individual’.⁴⁰ After all, ‘[T]he community must apply self-help and improve their capacity for work of the natural demand’.⁴¹

According to the CDCEC, if there was anything that could be asked of British employers, it would be a generous donation of facilities and funds which served to improve the living condition of the domiciled youth, many of whom had been forced to live in dreadful slum environs.⁴² The CDCED put greater weight, than the PC did, on the amelioration of living conditions. For the former, the problem of the domiciled poor was to a large extent one of environment – it was the slum condition of Calcutta that had shaped their social, cultural and racial selfhood. The effort of non-domiciled Britons to save their domiciled brethren had to start by ameliorating this very

³⁹ *ibid.*, p.137

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p.137

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.138

⁴² *ibid.*, p.22, 138

condition.

As for employment, the CDCEC largely followed the PC's view that the labour market within the Europe-related sectors, both civil and commercial, had been structurally closed, and that there was nothing practical to be done about it. The Committee expressed its regret that the Government had repeatedly denied the request for offering help to make domiciled youths into soldiers or pilots. Given the steady decline of employment opportunities, the demand for these special labour schemes had only increased.⁴³ What the British could do was to orient members of the domiciled community towards such occupations as artisanship and low-grade engineering. Employment had to be created in special arenas, as the domiciled were bound to lose both to 'home-born' British elites and to cost-efficient Indian workers.

The CDCEC was only right in observing that it was becoming ever more difficult for the domiciled to obtain state-related jobs. Especially after the reorganisation of the civil service following the Government of India Act (1919), the situation surrounding government and railway employment was disheartening for most

⁴³ The Sub-Committee for Employment was of the opinion that the Government should re-consider the formation of both a special communal regiment and a scheme of marine training in India. Regarding military recruitment, it said:

'all who have the interest of the community at heart regret that Government should have vetoed the proposal. All the arguments brought forward by the Pauperism Committee in favour of military employment appear to have acquired added strength during the laps of years' (ibid. p.138).

The General Committee acknowledged the importance of both schemes but differed somewhat on the question of military regiment. It did find military recruitment useful, but, unlike the Sub-Committee, argued that the recruitment of individuals to the British Army would be better than the formation of a regiment. *ibid.*, p.21, p.138.

of the domiciled community. Political leaders of the community vehemently complained that its members had been cruelly sacrificed in order to make room for their Indian fellows who had been vigorously empowered under the on-going scheme of political reforms, which gradually veered towards 'Home Rule'.⁴⁴ To make matters worse, the 1920s saw an unprecedented problem of unemployment, which hit the already pauperised domiciled class especially hard. The post-war economic boom in 1919 had lured some men of the domiciled class to new businesses. To join these opportunities, which promised them larger salaries, they had resigned their appointments on railways or elsewhere. But when the booming economy collapsed in 1923, they were no longer able to return to their previous jobs and were quickly reduced to pauperism.⁴⁵ The numerous reports in *The Statesman* about this predicament demonstrates how seriously the colonial authorities took European pauperism. As for 'poor whites', who were not yet recognised as domiciled in India, the British tried to repatriate as many of them as possible.⁴⁶ And as far as the domiciled class was concerned, they tried to reach those affected by the crisis through both the organisations such as the Ex-Services Association and the Anglo-Indian Unemployment Committee [AIUC], the second one of which had been run by the members of the domiciled community themselves.

The economic crisis was widely publicised through British papers such as *The*

⁴⁴ See Ch. 6

⁴⁵ 'Unemployment in Calcutta', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 18 Sep. 1924, p.4

⁴⁶ See Ch. 3 for a fuller explanation.

Statesman, which often quoted from the reports of the AIUC. These reports of the AIUC showed that, in the mid-1920s, Calcutta alone witnessed well over 1,000 people of the domiciled class who would not survive without immediate relief measures. The Committee's first report (covering the period since January 1924) indicated that the Committee had about 2,500 people of the domiciled class under its care.⁴⁷ The second report (covering October 1924 – March 1925) revealed that the AIUC had on their rolls about 500 unemployed men. With their wives, children and other families included, the total number of people living in absolute poverty amounted to 1,500. Of these people, about 200 received regular weekly monetary relief.⁴⁸ The third report (April 1925 - December 1925) showed that there were still 300 men and about 600 – 700 of their family members on the list, of whom 200 were in receipt of monetary relief.⁴⁹

The self-help efforts of the domiciled community were manifold. To find jobs for the unemployed men, the AIUC liaised with employers of the railways, of certain government offices such as the Telegraph Department, and of the various European businesses. The Committee made sure to offer railway fares if these men had to travel to take up appointments. It also gave money to them so that they could acquire vocational skills, such as automobile-driving. To the families of unemployed men, the Committee gave a subsistence allowance, food rations and accommodation. The

⁴⁷ 'Living in Poverty', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 4 Dec. 1924, p.19

⁴⁸ 'Anglo-Indians and Unemployment', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 4 Jun. 1925, p.19

⁴⁹ 'Relief of Distress: Anglo-Indian Unemployment Problem', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 11 Feb. 1926, p.24

AIUC also worked closely with European schools to make sure that children of the unemployed were safe and asked them to reduce fees as a special measure against the on-going distress.⁵⁰ The British appreciated these self-help efforts by the domiciled community and supported them by subscribing to the AIUC's fund.⁵¹ But gradually, they grew convinced that the AIUC should be placed on a permanent basis through direct financial assistance from the Government of Bengal.⁵² They considered the financing of employment bureaux as a legitimate function of Government. Thus, when the AIUC was closed in June 1927, the District Charitable Society took over the relief work for the domiciled class. The Society formed a sub-committee for this special purpose.⁵³ In May 1931, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce announced a grant of Rs. 3,500 to the Society, whilst giving Rs. 1,500 to the European Unemployment Relief Association which was in charge of poor Europeans.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ 'Living in Poverty', p.19; 'Anglo-Indians and Unemployment', p.19; 'Relief of Distress: Anglo-Indian Unemployment Problem', p.24

⁵¹ An example of the substantial subscriptions made by the Europeans was a grant received in October 1926 of Rs. 10,000 from Her Excellency the Countess of Reading. 'Unemployment in Calcutta', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 17 Jun. 1926, p.13

⁵² 'Bengal Workless Problem', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 1 Jan. 1925, p.18

⁵³ H. B. Whitham, 'To the Editor: Anglo-Indian Employment', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 8 Sep. 1927, p.6

⁵⁴ 'Aid for Calcutta's Workless', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 21 May 1931, p.11

Nature of Intervention

The domiciled European is commonly charged with want of manly vigour, self-reliance, steadiness, and self-control. He is called imprudent, extravagant, petulant, conceited, and often with good reason.⁵⁵

We have thus far discussed the material and ideological reasons why the British in India included their domiciled brethren in their welfare schemes. The following section of this chapter will focus more squarely on the contents of these schemes. In doing so, it will try and reconstruct the British perception of the domiciled identity, with all the stereotypes ascribed to it. The philanthropic circles believed that in order to salvage the domiciled from their characteristic pauperism, British colonials had to help the latter in eradicating certain physical and mental 'defects'. Let us start from a discussion of British efforts to define categorical limits of the 'domiciled class', and accordingly, to decide who were to be included into (or excluded from) the net of philanthropic care which targeted that category. This discussion will be followed by an inquiry into the alternative modes of identity and ways of living which the reformative measures of philanthropy purported to invent.

⁵⁵ 'The European in India', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 24 Jun. 1879, pp.558-9, p.559

Racial limits of philanthropic intervention

By definition, as the PC noted, members of the privileged European community, or 'non-domiciled' Britons, required no philanthropic support. The majority of them were temporary residents, furnishing very few paupers. They were more than self-supporting and were in a position to assist the domiciled class.⁵⁶ Within the white social body, it was domiciled Europeans and the people of mixed descent who were responsible for the crisis of European pauperism. As the PC defined it, the whole British crusade against European pauperism concerned specifically the 'domiciled European community of Calcutta and Eurasians of all degrees of mixed blood'.⁵⁷ These two groups of British descent constituted what the PC and the CDCEC respectively called the 'Indo-European community' and the 'Domiciled Community'. Whether mixed or not, they posed the same kind of threat to British imperial prestige with their impoverished presence. As the CDCEC made clear, the effort to reduce indigence among the domiciled should recognise 'no distinction between persons born in India of European parents and brought up in India, and persons of mixed-blood'.⁵⁸

To be sure, it was not that all members of the domiciled community were paupers. The colonial authorities usually divided the community into (usually three) different strata in terms of economic position, and identified the poorest group as the

⁵⁶ *Report of the PC*, pp.2-3

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p.2

⁵⁸ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.2

most significant object of their concern. There was an upper-class stratum, made up of certain mixed-race families, often holding positions of high official and occupational prestige. Members of this upper-class section were seen as often living 'outside' the community.⁵⁹ The second stratum was tinted by poverty but showed potentials for economic independence and socio-cultural 'respectability' as people of British origin. This class, in fact, came closest to embody the ideal manner of living which the colonial authorities wished to see.⁶⁰ But the problem lay precisely in the fact that this group of the 'respectably poor' was giving way to the class below it, swelling the rank of European paupers. And it was to this last class that the British felt it necessary to confine their attention. For, it was in this section that 'all the failings levelled against the Domiciled Community as a whole' was found 'in the most aggravated form'.⁶¹

Efforts had also to be made for establishing racial criteria for inclusion. For in Calcutta, there were certain people who were not racially British but resembled and sometimes claimed themselves to be part of the domiciled population. To make their welfare investment effective, it was necessary for British philanthropists to clarify the ground they intended to cover and exclude those who were deemed irrelevant to the specific social problem in question. Census commissioners, police inspectors, charitable workers, pastors and other agents of colonial social control found a group of people who were not of British descent but were almost 'dangerously' similar to

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, p.135-136

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p.135

⁶¹ *ibid.*, p.135

domiciled Europeans and Eurasians. There were two notable peoples of this sort: Indian Christians most of whom descended from low-caste natives converted to Christianity, and Luso-Indians, descendants of Portuguese men who had settled in India before the British came to power. When interviewed by the PC, Thomas McGuire, the Superintendent of the District Charitable Society's Alms-house, said that, even though Calcutta's Indian Christians or their ancestors had adopted Christianity and European names, their habits were 'very little removed from those of the natives', and that they spoke 'chiefly Hindustanee'. After all, they were 'originally drawn from a very low class of natives'. They pretend to be 'European' but they were nothing but 'pure natives'.⁶² Likewise, Luso-Indians were also noted for their being nominally Christian and European. L.S.S. O'Malley, a census commissioner in Bengal, wrote that these people strongly tended to use such Portuguese-sounding names as DeBarros, Fernandez, DeSouza, DeSilva or DeCruz. But, he went on to observe: 'In manners and habits [...] they resemble natives [and] are even darker in colour',⁶³ and would hardly be considered as 'European'. Their Europeanness was superficial - 'Their religion, dress and names are practically the only things that distinguish them from their neighbours'.⁶⁴ They were 'Bengalis in everything but name and religion'.⁶⁵ In fact, it had been an acknowledged fact that some Luso-Indians could claim descant

⁶² 'Appendix I, Report of the Statistics Sub-Committee', *Report of the PC*, p.xvi

⁶³ *The Census of India, 1911: vol. V: Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and Sikkim: Part I. – Report* (Government of India, Calcutta, 1913), p.218

⁶⁴ *ibid.*

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p.219

from British soldiers in the Company. But, as A. Nundy noted:

'the[ir] European blood diminished, till at last very little of it is found in the veins of the present generation [...] in their habits and mode of living they are strongly Oriental. [...] That they have degenerated, and are degenerating still more every day, is an undoubted fact [...]'⁶⁶

It was precisely because Luso-Indians had 'gone native' so completely that what little was left of their British lineage would no longer count. Both Indian Christians and Luso-Indians were considered 'native', and as such were to be excluded from the welfare schemes meant for the domiciled class.

In reality, however, it was often difficult to distinguish between poorer members of the domiciled community on the one hand, and the Indian Christians and Luso-Indians on the other. It was precisely because they were so porous and ambiguous that the boundaries between these two groups had to be kept distinct. Both were under a strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church, as the majority of Eurasians were Catholic. The Bengal census (1911) noted that, in the province, the Roman Catholic Church possessed by far the greatest number of Eurasian adherents, the proportion being 58% in Bengal and 55% in Bihar and Orissa combined. The Church of England followed next with the figures of 32 and 37 % respectively; the rest were either Baptists, Methodists or Presbyterian.⁶⁷ Because of this Catholic influence, it was not uncommon for some domiciled persons to carry such a Portuguese surname

⁶⁶ A. Nundy, 'The Eurasian Problem in India', *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 9 (1900), pp.56-73, pp.59-60

⁶⁷ *The Census of India, 1911: vol. V: Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and Sikkim: Part I. – Report*, p.218

as 'D'Cruz' or 'D'Souza'. This made it difficult for European state and philanthropic agents to tell the difference between certain of the domiciled people, on the one hand, and 'Indian Christians' / 'Luso-Indians', who also bore such names, on the other. As the CDCEC remarked:

'No reliable test of a claim either for inclusion or exclusion merely on the ground of the possession of a Portuguese name can be established'.⁶⁸

In fact, it was observed that among those natives who were willing to adopt 'English modes of life', there were a substantial number actually merging with the domiciled community. The PC recorded the existence of those who had 'virtually joined' the poorer ranks of the domiciled class.⁶⁹ The CDCEC also noted that these people would 'congregate in districts with the Anglo-Indian proper, and mix intimately with them in their religious observances'.⁷⁰ And miscegenation was also an issue. An anonymous essay in *The Calcutta Review* (1905) wrote that the boundaries between the domiciled community and its Indian-Christian and Luso-Indian counterparts had been violated by miscegenation. What the essay called an 'invasion' carried on steadily throughout the nineteenth century and, as it observed, proceeded 'merrily up to this very hour, Eurasia with open arms receiving the invaders and hailing them as brethren beloved'.⁷¹ By this 'influx of Indian blood', it wrote '[T]he genuine Eurasian

⁶⁸ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.39

⁶⁹ *Report of the PC*, p.2

⁷⁰ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.141

⁷¹ Anon. ('Amicus'), 'Our cousins, the Eurasians of India - A plea', *The Calcutta Review*, 121 (1905),

community is being rapidly denationalised'.⁷²

The problem of conflated racial boundaries was further exacerbated by the fact that both Indian Christians and Luso-Indians frequently *claimed to be* a member of the domiciled community. W. Francis, a census commissioner (Madras, 1901), recorded that in Madras, between 1881 and 1891 the number of 'Eurasians' increased at an unusual rate of nearly 21%. This was due, as he noted, to 'Indian Christians who had taken to European ways and dress having returned themselves as Europeans with the idea of enhancing their social position'.⁷³ To prevent this from recurring, the authorities had to appoint Eurasians as census enumerators for places where 'pseudo-Eurasians' were commonest.⁷⁴ The census authorities took with alarm the 'growing tendency' of Indian Christians to pass off as members of the domiciled class.⁷⁵ The census commissioner (Bengal, 1931), A.E. Porter, noted that in Noakhali the number of 'Anglo-Indians'⁷⁶ that year stood at 441, while it was only 23 a decade earlier. The reason for this extraordinary increase was undoubtedly due to the fact many natives claimed to be part of the domiciled community.⁷⁷ Similar problems existed in obtaining information about the Luso-Indian community. J. H. Hutton, the census commissioner (India, 1931), noted that as in the previous decades the inflated

p.382

⁷² *ibid.*

⁷³ *The Census of India, 1901: vol. XV: Madras: Part I – Report* (Government of India, Madras, 1902),

p.134

⁷⁴ *ibid.*

⁷⁵ *General Report: the Census of India, 1911* (Government of India, London, 1914), p.140

⁷⁶ An alternative expression replacing 'Eurasian' (officially in use since 1911).

⁷⁷ *The Census of India, 1931: vol. V: Bengal and Sikkim: Part I – Report* (Government of India, Calcutta, 1933), p.452

numbers of Anglo-Indians were due to ‘a number of the descendants of Portuguese dependants’ as well as those of Indian Christians.⁷⁸

The colonial authorities feared that by passing off as members of the domiciled class, these individuals would manage to find their ways into the inclusive social policies intended primarily for the domiciled class. Social reformers and commentators often insisted that ‘psuedo-Eurasians’ be sufficiently excluded from the welfare schemes for the domiciled. The authorities of European education, for instance, feared that they may disguise their racial origins and claim inclusion beyond the prescribed quota.⁷⁹ Inclusion of too many indigenous subjects would obscure the true purpose of European education, which was nothing but to alleviate European pauperism before it became politically problematic. British philanthropists were frustrated that ‘Europeanised Indians’ were getting in their way of controlling and disciplining the *bona-fide* members of the domiciled community.⁸⁰ As the CDCEC asserted explicitly:

‘It is beyond question that Indians who have adopted European habits of life class themselves as Anglo-Indians, hoping thereby to command higher salaries’.⁸¹

All these efforts at definitional clarifications revealed the extent to which it was for

⁷⁸ *The Census of India, 1931: vol.1- India* (Government of India, Delhi, 1933), p.429; for similar observations, see also *The Census of India, 1901: vol. VI: the Lower Provinces of Bengal and their Feudatories: Part I. – the Report*, p.409; and *The Census of India, 1911: vol. XII.: Madras: Part I – Report* (Government of India, Madras, 1912), p.173

⁷⁹ See Ch. 5.

⁸⁰ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.4

⁸¹ *ibid.*

solving a problem of particular order that British social reformers invented and utilised the category 'domiciled class'. Members of this class were supposed to represent a definite population unit, distinct from any other groups, so that the problem they posed could be effectively scrutinised and contained.

Diagnosis of the problem

Within the frame of the inclusive politics of welfare, concerned British represented themselves as anti-racist. They argued that it was the racial prejudice against people of mixed descent that had served to marginalise the domiciled community. Both the PC and CDCEC urged British society in India to discard stereotypical ideas about domiciled persons. The Secretary of the CDCEC argued it had already been proven that the admixture of blood did not lead to racial degeneration.⁸² But this anti-racist gesture did not mean that colonial philanthropists were ready to admit that all problems relating to the domiciled class were caused by social contingencies external to the latter, such that they themselves had nothing to blame for their own impoverishment. On the contrary, they believed that much of the trouble derived from certain intrinsic traits of the domiciled poor themselves and argued that it was the duty of the non-domiciled British to point out these inimical traits. The PC, for one, argued that genuinely

⁸² Jean Finot's *Race Prejudice* (London, 1906) argued that racial differences were 'almost entirely due to passing social conditions and not to innate racial characteristics', and that the 'scientific' theory that admixture of blood must necessarily read to racial degeneration had already been refuted. *ibid.*, pp.43-44. For a discussion of racial theory, see Ch.3

concerned Britons should not shy away from these 'defects', simply 'owing to the fear of wounding susceptibilities'.⁸³ Negative and painful as it may be, it was a 'duty' of Europeans to address the issue. The CDCEC argued similarly. It was a 'disagreeable task', but 'to enumerate some of the failings' was necessary so long as the employers of labour accused them.⁸⁴

What exactly were these 'defects' and 'failings' commonly ascribed to persons from the domiciled community? The British press, such as *The Statesman*, frequently aired opinions to the effect that the domiciled were 'by nature untrustful and dishonest, and would not work'.⁸⁵ Instead, it was alleged that the domiciled poor wilfully exploited their genealogical kinship to the British in order to 'pray upon the public purse'.⁸⁶ Their false sense of kinship would induce them into becoming dependent on European benevolence. British also criticised the attitude of the domiciled towards their Indian fellows. They were said to entertain a sense of racial superiority over Indians. This allegedly led the former to employ poor Indians as domestic servants, making their children helplessly dependent and spoiled. Growing up, they would develop a prejudice against domestic work and menial labour. These perceptions also found their way into the more official, authoritative views. Members of the PC did their utmost in trying to identify the 'intrinsic traits' of the domiciled person. On the basis of statistical, sociological and anthropological analyses into the minute details of

⁸³ *Report of the PC*, p.8

⁸⁴ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.134

⁸⁵ 'Eurasian Poverty in Calcutta', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 24 Jan 91, p.2.

⁸⁶ 'Pauperism in Calcutta', p.3

everyday lives, the PC asserted the following: because they inherited the blood of Europeans, the domiciled had too much of a 'pride of race'.⁸⁷ It was the 'defects of character more or less connected with this sentiment [of racial pride]' that 'seriously interfere[d] with Indo-Europeans in the struggle for work'.⁸⁸ Since they were too proud of themselves, they characteristically disliked to get their hands on manual labour even when they led an impoverished living. And the poverty just became worse, because they went on spending to satisfy their vanity. In the PC's view, this false pride was built into the psyche of domiciled individuals to the extent that '[I]t is almost impossible to inculcate providence among persons thus circumstanced'.⁸⁹ Such a view of the domiciled person as innately proud and indolent was also found in the academic discourse of Edgar Thurston, a renowned ethnologist and Superintendent of the Madras Government Museum. According to Thurston, the domiciled man was sickly prone to the love of luxury and pleasure. As a result of his characteristic 'want of thrift', there was a 'wide spread tendency to allow expenditure to exceed income'.⁹⁰ Thus the domiciled man became indebted, losing his credibility as an employee and inevitably went unemployed.⁹¹

The above notion of false economic consciousness is nowhere better articulated

⁸⁷ *Report of the PC*, p.5

⁸⁸ *ibid.*

⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁹⁰ Edgar Thurston, 'Eurasians of Madras and Malabar', *Madras Government Museum: Bulletin*, 2 (1898), pp69-164, p.76

⁹¹ *ibid.*

than in the views presented by John MacRae in *The Calcutta Review* (1913). As a missionary based in Calcutta, he was well-known for his enthusiastic commitment to the problem of pauperism among the domiciled community. MacRae's basic idea was that the pauperisation of Calcutta's domiciled class was chiefly due to certain problems in the mental constitution of its members. Their poverty was not a real kind of poverty and the domicile poor not genuinely a poor people: 'It does not seem real poverty. It occasions a strange lack of a sense of the value of things'.⁹² To be sure, there were certain other factors too, such as the harsh climate and bad sanitary conditions, which might have helped to impoverish the domiciled, but these were nothing special, common to any other cases of poverty. When it came to the domiciled community, the real cause of its pauperisation was an incapability of its members of knowing who they really were, and by extension, their tendency to mimic the ways of the British elites. According to MacRae, the domiciled could not recognise their difference from their non-domiciled brethren and, because of their racial connection with them, mistakenly assumed that they too could lead the latter's affluent life-style. Most 'British' in India were (at least by definition) 'bourgeois': they did not include a model working-class people from whom the domiciled might possibly learn an art of honest and humble living. As a result, the domiciled class took as its model what was actually a group of 'temporarily detached fragments of a

⁹² John MacRae, 'Social Conditions in Calcutta – 1: The Problem for Charity among the Anglo-Indian Community', *The Calcutta Review*, 1 (1913), pp. 84-94, p.91

large and complete organisation'.⁹³ The domiciled class ended up emulating the wealthy although they themselves were nothing but the indigent. MacRae wrote:

'It is to organise life on an artificial and not a real basis, it is to live a life out of harmony with the true facts of existence. The roots of the Anglo-Indian are not sufficiently deep in reality [...] He starts from a false position and his life is spent among shadows. He fails, of one thing, to distinguish between necessities and luxuries'.⁹⁴

The 'British' in India and their 'domiciled' brethren occupied fundamentally distinct positions in the social order of colonial society. For MacRae, the only effective remedy for domiciled pauperism was to make the domiciled recognise this distinction. The British, on their part, should not simply assist them by giving aid too readily. They should rather try and discipline the domiciled into embracing the fundamental differences between them. As he said, '[A]ny attempt to help the Anglo-Indian socially or economically must begin by recognising this difference'.⁹⁵

British philanthropists also thought that hygienic negligence fostered in the 'slum condition' had inscribed an inexorable mark on the body and mind of the domiciled. As the Secretary of the CDCEC wrote, 'the children of slum parents will have slum tendencies, irrespective of blood and country'.⁹⁶ One of such inimical 'slum tendencies' was early marriage. British observers were appalled by its degree and

⁹³ *ibid*, p.92

⁹⁴ *ibid*, p.91

⁹⁵ John MacRae, 'Social Conditions in Calcutta – 2: The Problem for Charity among the Anglo-Indian Community', *The Calcutta Review*, 1 (1913), pp. 351-371, p.352

⁹⁶ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.43

understood it as a major contribution to European pauperism. In 1891, *The Statesman* wrote that ‘early and improvident marriages’ were one of the greatest cause of pauperism and;

‘one of the most important services which the Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association and similar societies can perform, lies in discouraging such marriages’.⁹⁷

William Forbes-Mitchell, a self-claimed expert on the problem of the domiciled community, asserted that early marriages had ‘done more to degenerate and abase the race than any other influence’.⁹⁸ Many took early marriage as one of the symptoms of the ‘innate’ improvidence of the domiciled.⁹⁹ Edgar Thurston remarked that the results were too frequently disastrous, with:

‘a plethora of children, brought up in poverty, hunger, and dirt; but little to earn and many to keep; domestic unrest; insolvency; and destitution’.¹⁰⁰

He also attributed early marriage to an ‘innate’ immorality of the domiciled:

‘I may hazard a guess that it is because they have not acquired the power to “subordinate animal

⁹⁷ ‘Pauperism in Calcutta’, p.3

⁹⁸ W. Forbes-Mitchell, ‘Letter to the Editor: The Eurasian Problem and Missionary Employment’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 28 Nov. 1891, p.1. Elsewhere Forbes-Mitchell also said, ‘[I]f the pauperised Eurasian and Anglo-Indian are to rise, they must avoid all selfish indulgences of early and imprudent marriages.’ W. Forbes-Mitchell, ‘The Gospel of the Regeneration of An Anglo-Indian and Eurasian Pauperism. - I.’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 31 Oct 1891, p.1

⁹⁹ For instance, Robert Joseph Carbery, the Vice-President of a charity organisation (St. Vincent de Paul) replied to the PC, saying, ‘[T]hey [Eurasians] marry early now. [...] I do not consider these early marriages as a sign of prosperity, but of improvidence’. ‘Appendix I, Report of the Statistics Sub-Committee’, *Report of the PC*, p.xiv

¹⁰⁰ Thurston, ‘Eurasians of Madras and Malabar’, p.75

appetite to reason, foresight, and prudence”¹⁰¹.

But others thought that early marriage was itself a direct consequence of the slum environment in which the domiciled poor lived. The CDCEC’s Sub-Committee on Health and Physique reported that most early marriages were the inevitable result of over-crowded living conditions:

‘In many cases lads and girls of 14 to 18 years of age are sleeping in the same hut, with the inevitable result that the girls are ruined morally and physically at an early age’¹⁰².

Because of these housing conditions of the slums, immoral sexual relations were said to have often led to incest. As a consequence, the Sub-Committee wrote, ‘we have succeeding generations of weaklings, diseased and weak-minded poverty-stricken people’.¹⁰³ In their view, the question of Calcutta’s domiciled paupers was ‘not only the legacy of bye-gone progenitors, but the consequence of the utterly unwholesome conditions in the recent and present generations’.¹⁰⁴

In order to check these psychological and hygienic tendencies among the domiciled class, a number of suggestions were made. As far as the psychological side was concerned, British thought it necessary to regulate access to charitable relief. The organisation of various European charitable efforts was necessary not just to extend the

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*

¹⁰² *Report of the CDCEC*, p.142

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, p.142

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p.143

ground covered but in order to distinguish between those who were really in need of relief and those who were not. It was as important to exclude from the scheme of charity those who volunteered to live on charity even though they were able-bodied. In fact charity had been criticised for giving relief far too readily and indiscriminately. Such a way of giving out relief did not solve pauperism but increased it by nurturing among the poor a disregard for labour. As MacRae noted: 'to give money is usually not to strike at the roots of poverty but to water them'.¹⁰⁵ Charity did not help the poorer classes of the domiciled to become independent but rather enabled them to live as a 'parasite'.¹⁰⁶ The PC recognised this problem of charitable aid only too well. It warned that pensions or doles had been given in ways that:

'destroy all spirit or love of independence and respect which springs from a person being self-supporting, but not sufficient to obviate the necessity of seeking further help elsewhere, and thereby converting the recipient into a skilful and professional mendicant'¹⁰⁷

The PC identified the psychological factor as the prime cause of pauperism and in that connection criticised the existing mode of charitable relief. By failing to take the psychological factor into account European relief efforts were positively fostering the pauperisation of the domiciled class. What was ultimately thought necessary was to introduce a 'scientific' view of the phenomenon of pauperism. Calcutta was said to be a backward place, where the old conception of poverty, represented in the 1834 Poor

¹⁰⁵ MacRae, 'Social Conditions in Calcutta – 2', p.363

¹⁰⁶ MacRae, 'Social Conditions in Calcutta – 1', p.93

¹⁰⁷ *Report of the PC*, p.10

Law in England, had still been observed. The charitable system of the colonial periphery had to be upgraded to the metropolitan standard, and one vital thing that had to be done urgently was the application of a more strict set of criteria to include only the deserving poor.¹⁰⁸ To counter pauperism, it was imperative not to help those who were just lazy or too proud to stain their own hands. These people had to be disciplined in reformatory and educational ways, instead of being spoiled by charity. And in certain cases, coercive institutionalisation in the alms house or workhouse should be done to subject the paupers to a thorough process of confinement and discipline. Thus both the PC and the CDCEC recommended a stronger degree of the institutional confinement of the domiciled poor in the alms- and workhouses.¹⁰⁹

With regard to hygienic problems, nothing would be more important than European support for the effort to ameliorate living environments. This concern was addressed particularly explicitly by the CDCEC which took housing as the most important of all problems. As its Sub-Committee on Housing observed:

‘If living conditions remain such that physical health and moral family life are difficult or impossible, efforts to raise the community by improved education and other means are bound to be largely infructuous’.¹¹⁰

Such ugly conditions would inevitably cause a hygienic and sexual degeneration of the domiciled class, and for this the poor themselves were hardly to blame.¹¹¹ The

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, p.11

¹⁰⁹ *ibid.*, pp.75-100, *Report of the CDCEC*, pp.26-30

¹¹⁰ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.73

¹¹¹ *ibid.*, p.74

non-domiciled British community should assume responsibility and provide them with better housing. The Sub-Committee especially noted that rents were excessively high even for the relatively well-to-do sections of the domiciled class. At rents within the means of the poor, sanitary and decent accommodation could hardly be obtained. Thus, the Sub-Committee recommended that European capitalists and charities combine their capital and energies to construct new buildings. For this, endeavour should be made to establish a trust or registered association. For the better classes, houses of economical construction should be built on the cheapest land obtainable and rented at Rs. 50 to Rs.100 a month. The Government should exercise compulsory powers for acquiring suitable land in large blocks. For the poorest classes, tenement dwellings should be built by European capital. Charitable funds should help the tenants pay the rents.¹¹²

Alternative ways of living

Along with the organisation of charity and improvement of racial hygiene, colonial efforts to alleviate the pauperisation of the domiciled community pointed to more radical measures as well. British were increasingly convinced that the question at hand would remain unsolved unless they could remove the domiciled poor from the social and economic context of the city altogether. The reasons were multiple.

¹¹² *ibid.*, p.79

Firstly, the psychological ‘trait’ of the domiciled – namely the tendency of mimicking Europeans whilst despising Indians – would not be completely removed so long as they lived among the two groups. Secondly, their hygienic ‘degeneration’ would not be avoided unless the domiciled grew up outside the urban slums of Calcutta or other urban centres. Thirdly, the city did not provide its domiciled inhabitants with any new avenues of employment: social policies would not ultimately solve the question of pauperism so long as no employment was forthcoming. And fourthly, their impoverished existence would not be shielded from the eyes of colonised subjects as long as they lived among them. In view of these problems, British thought it necessary to isolate the domiciled poor from the social and cultural influences of the city. And they also saw it indispensable to somehow coordinate social relocation with education, vocational training and employment. Throughout the late colonial period, British philanthropic circles considered several schemes to realise this synthesis of isolation and labour. Among others, these schemes included military and marine training, agricultural resettlement, and emigration.

Regimental discipline

The idea of creating a military regiment entirely and solely composed of domiciled-class youth derived from a concern that men of this class characteristically lacked discipline and a healthy attitude to labour. A Calcutta mercantile company, Anderson, Wright & Co., wrote to the PC that it had employed several such men but

found them particularly unsatisfactory, and therefore would no longer employ them even on an experimental basis. It supported the idea of forming a military regiment because, it argued, ‘the best chance of making men of them would be to place them under military discipline’.¹¹³ Another company, Whitney Brothers, wrote similarly in favour of a military regiment, as ‘[T]he training they would receive would go a long way in teaching them self-reliance and habits of industry’.¹¹⁴ European capitalists were generally sympathetic to the plight of the domiciled community, but they would not employ the latter for charity. These opinions exercised a decisive influence on the PC’s decision to recommend to the Government the formation of a military regiment.¹¹⁵ Seeing that almost all avenues of employment had been closed, the Committee came to regard the special regiment as ‘the only one remedy at all adequate to the disease’.¹¹⁶ The disciplinary aspect of the regiment scheme would provide a promising philanthropic solution to the question of European pauperism.

An isolated and disciplined environment of regimental life would eradicate from domiciled youth all the undesirable traces of family and communal life. The special regiment would continue to subject them to institutional discipline even after their post-schooling years. As the PC remarked:

‘the pernicious home-influences which have been so often referred to would be intercepted and

¹¹³ *Report of the PC*, p.121

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.128

¹¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.113

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*, p.14

precluded from undoing the effects of school-life'.¹¹⁷

Once institutionalised, they would be taught the ethic of a labouring life, an alleged lack of which had made them unemployable to begin with. It would also prevent early marriages:

'Service with a regiment will check, if not entirely put a stop to, the improvident marriages which young men are now only too ready to contract'.¹¹⁸

A period of discipline and supervision may also reform the minds and bodies of who had already become loafers and paupers.¹¹⁹

The major problem of the proposed system of military discipline was that the philanthropic need did not match other conditions of military recruitment. The authorities did not find a domiciled regiment worth being established and financed, with its members remunerated as professional soldiers. Charles Eliot, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, rejected the possibility of the Government establishing a regiment especially for the domiciled class. From a military point of view, such a regiment was not necessary. British soldiers had been regularly imported from home and, as for native soldiers, there was no dearth of good material in India. Certain native subjects such as the Sikhs were thought to be not only cost-efficient but much more fit as a military force. There was essentially no room or need for a special

¹¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*, p.14

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*, p.15

domiciled regiment. The Government could not establish and finance a military regiment solely for meeting the 'philanthropic' needs of a particular community. Even though the plea was constantly presented till the end of British rule, no regular domiciled regiment was to come into existence.

Although they were not implemented, the ideas of a military regiment as a philanthropic measure are significant. Even Charles Elliot admitted the possible use of such a scheme: 'the Committee are doubtless right in holding that military discipline would be of the greatest advantage to young men of this class'.¹²⁰

Marine training

Along with a special military regiment, the PC thought that the creation of a government-sanctioned training vessel would alleviate the social and economic plight of the domiciled poor. They recommended a scheme for a training-ship on the River Hooghly modelled after institutions of a similar nature found in British waters. Those British concerned with European pauperism thought that the sort of training offered by a training vessel would offer an ideal period of institutional discipline and

¹²⁰ 'General Department, Miscellaneous – no. 2263, Calcutta, the 8th August 1892, RESOLUTION', p.4. But the movement for the creation of a domiciled regiment was not just philanthropic in the ways that have been indicated in this Chapter. By the leaders of domiciled community, many of whom were engaged in political as well as philanthropic projects, it was pressed forward as a material demand. Though well aware of the philanthropic value of the proposed regiment, what these leaders demanded was more than a mere philanthropic institution. It was necessary for them that the proposed regiment would be recognised as a special kind of 'British' regiment, with its members remunerated on a commensurate level. In his reply to the PC's suggestion, Charles Eliot implied that a domiciled regiment might as well be established only provided it was meant as an 'Indian' regiment. Such an arrangement might have satisfied the British proponents but not their domiciled counterparts.

would possibly lead to a related career afterwards. Life on a training vessel would help domiciled youth to acquire self-discipline, and it would also enable a necessary isolation from their families.

But the problem with the proposed scheme was that it was not expected to automatically prepare the domiciled trainees for an employment in piloting. As far as the recruitment policy of the colonial pilot service was concerned, there had traditionally been a more favourable atmosphere towards domiciled pilots than towards their Indian counterparts. But by the late 1870s, the domiciled had been rigidly excluded from this service, due to a policy of Europeanisation whereby the authorities preferred those home-born British trained at a metropolitan institution. Because of the 'inferior' environment and education facilities India offered, the domiciled were regarded as not fit enough for this service. In theory, domiciled youth could still try and join the service by going to the metropole to be trained on a British training vessel, but in practice few of them could afford it.¹²¹ Thus, the proposal by the Committee was rejected by Eliot on the grounds of impracticality. He noted, rightly enough, that it would not guarantee the participants employment opportunities after their training.¹²² After discharge, the trainees would return to the world of indigence whence they came.

Despite the aforementioned problems, the idea of pilot training continued to prove appealing in European philanthropic circles. Aside from the claim for the

¹²¹ See Ch. 6 for further discussions on this point.

¹²² 'General Department, Miscellaneous – no. 2263, Calcutta, the 8th August 1892, RESOLUTION', p.7

state-sanctioned creation of a special ship in India,¹²³ pleas were also made for allowing individual domiciled youths to be trained together with British trainees in British waters. A decade after the PC, the authorities finally made a concession to this plan a scheme for sending, on an experimental basis, a certain number of selected boys to some training-vessels operating in British waters. In 1906-8 about 20 domiciled youths were sent to a British training vessel, *Southampton*, from John Graham's orphanage, and several of them did succeed in obtaining a career in piloting.¹²⁴

It was its philanthropic value that made marine training appear so important. With no employment prepared for them after leaving school, the children of the domiciled community continued to be potential perpetrators of much cursed European pauperism. Even if they had been removed from the slums and subjected to institutional discipline at a boarding school or orphanage, they would inevitably follow the path of their parents. Marine training was expected to prevent this from happening – it would provide yet another occasion for discipline and isolation. This philanthropic value of marine training was well articulated by James Luke, the Secretary of the Marine Association. He noted that the youth of impoverished families would be detached from the slum quarters of big cities, 'instead of growing up to swell the ranks of loafers, already too full'.¹²⁵ Then, by sending them to Europe,

¹²³ The Sub-Committee on Employment of the CDCEC took up the subject of establishing a training ship in the Hooghly as having been suggested before the PC, and expressed its wish 'to bring this proposal forward again as one of their definite recommendations'. *Report of the CDCEC*, p.138

¹²⁴ See Ch. 5

¹²⁵ James Luke, 'A Training-Ship Institution', *The Calcutta Review*, 116 (1903), pp.329-333, p.330

the scheme would deprive the recruited trainees of '[T]he qualities of character which we sometimes deplore amongst them', that were 'largely the result of long hereditary surroundings'.¹²⁶

Agricultural communes

An alternative way of isolation / discipline was the idea of relocating the lives of such domiciled persons in the cities to distant places in or even outside of India. The possible efficacy of agricultural re-settlement in alleviating unemployment and pauperism was recognised from early on, inscribing itself in public awareness at least by the mid-1870s. One of the self-help efforts of the Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association (EAIA) was to promote the agricultural settlement of the poorer members of the community. Concerned Europeans responded to this with a great interest. Many thought that it could (and should) be a field for Governmental support. As a form of philanthropy, it appeared to offer a radical solution to European pauperism. It would permanently remove the domiciled class from their urban dwellings, where all their problems were engendered. In 1876, the newly found EAIA asked the Government to sanction an agricultural scheme in the countryside. This elicited a favourable response from the British community, as it would offer:

'a fair chance of raising the "poor whites" and Eurasian population from the depths of misery and degradation into which that unfortunate class had been allowed to sink'.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ *ibid.*, p.333

¹²⁷ *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 15 Jan. 1876, pp.44-45, p.44

Though the proposed scheme did not see fruition, it did gain certain sympathy within government circles, notably Richard Temple, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. In Southern India, D. S. White, the President of the Madras branch of the EAIA, worked energetically and by the early 1880s created the Whitefield and Sausmond Colonies near Bangalore, and the Southern Eurasian Colony in Mysore. Agricultural settlement was not confined to the hill tracts alone. In 1921, a penal colony on the Andaman Islands was abandoned. It was decided that the Islands would be transformed into a free settlement, with a peasant population now added to native and convict populations. The Ex-Services Association helped a few ex-soldiers of the domiciled class to settle on the Islands as agriculturalists, with monthly doles, servants, free outfits, passages, rations, lodgings and land grants. This 'Andaman Scheme' intended to ease the ensuring pressure of the economic slump in the early 1920s. In addition, in the early 1930s, a 'utopian' colonisation scheme for the domiciled class was started in Bihar, and was named the McCluskiegunge Colony, after McCluskie, a prominent activist of the domiciled community.

But there was a crude observation that the domiciled poor were not fit enough for agricultural settlement. Such a scheme would require a strong initiative on the part of the intending settlers. It was only out of a negative reason (namely, that their lives in the urban areas were shuttered) that domiciled settlers took up an agricultural life. While acknowledging their possible use, *The Statesman* wrote of the domiciled

people who were to be involved in the agricultural schemes initiated by D. S. White:

‘are they, either physically or morally, a class of men who would be expected to succeed in a calling where unremitting labour, hard and often unthankful [...] is required?’¹²⁸

And commenting on the Andamans scheme, *The Statesman* lamented that the settlers had been drawn ‘from too limited a class and subjugated to demoralising influences from the onset’.¹²⁹ On this, even the leader of the domiciled community, Henry Gidney, had to agree:

‘it does not follow, of course, that Anglo-Indians are incapable of sustained physical effort, but it seems that the men selected to take part in these experiments have not all been of the right class’.¹³⁰

Moreover, agricultural schemes were often poorly funded. Writing about such plans in southern India, *The Madras Times* pointed out that a want of funding was an obstacle as the EAIA could not always raise enough capital.¹³¹ Also lacking was a dissemination of knowledge / skills and an organised guidance to use them properly. Cannon Russell Payro, reporting on the 12 men installed in the Andamans said the failure of these makeshift colonists was attributable to a lack of guidance. Material provision was necessary but it was not everything.¹³²

In spite of these difficulties, however, the idea of agricultural settlement

¹²⁸ ‘The Southern Eurasian Colony’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 9 Jan. 1883, pp.46-47

¹²⁹ ‘Anglo-Indian Colonisation Schemes’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 8 May 1924, p.3

¹³⁰ ‘Anglo-Indians in the Andamans’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 14 Aug. 1924, p.3

¹³¹ *The Madras Times [Weekly]*, 26 Feb. 1890, p.5

¹³² ‘Anglo-Indians in Andamans: Lack of Experience’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 3 Ap. 1924, p.10

remained popular among certain colonial philanthropists. Agriculture would give the poorer classes of the domiciled community a chance for a fresh start. The cool climate enjoyed by most agricultural colonies, such as Whitefield, would do much to restore the domiciled from the 'degeneration' of their body, considered inevitable in the plains of India.¹³³ Agricultural settlement would also offer an ideal social context for discipline, especially in the absence of both 'superior' Europeans to ask for help and of 'inferior' Indians to depend on for domestic work. Now they would have to be self-reliant, which would naturally orient them towards a spirit of independence and love of labour. As *The Statesman* observed: 'some of our "loafing" population might honourably redeem the wretched life they lead in our cities'. Through 'humbling themselves to honourable toil' in the upland district, they would come to denounce their 'invincible repugnance' to menial labour.¹³⁴ They would get rid of their 'false pride'¹³⁵ and learn the 'dignity of labour'.¹³⁶

Emigration

Along with agricultural re-settlement, there were attempts to send domiciled youths to other parts of the British Empire, such as South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, and install them as farmers or menial labourers. These were largely 'self-help' efforts by the EAIA, but many British were also involved, sometimes making their own

¹³³ *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 27 Jul. 1899, p.20

¹³⁴ *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 11 Sep. 1875, p.830

¹³⁵ 'Sir Richard Temple and Hill Colonization', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 22 Jan. 1876, p.76

¹³⁶ 'The Southern Eurasian Colony', p.46

initiatives. In Madras, for instance, the Madras Emigration Society was established and run by prominent members of the city's British community. The emigration scheme of the Friend-in-Need Society was also mooted by Europeans.¹³⁷ In Bengal, the Scottish missionary, the Rev. John Graham, enthusiastically encouraged and assisted the child inmates of his Homes to emigrate to British settler colonies, in particular Australia and New Zealand. By the mid-1930s, Graham sent more than fifty to New Zealand, eleven to Australia, four to the United States, one to South Africa.¹³⁸ There were hopes that, in such 'setter colonies', where the land had been tilled by Europeans members of the domiciled class would forget their old dislike of manual labour and start a new life as labouring settlers. As *The Englishman* observed:

'It may be that this prejudice against a person engaged in manual labour which exists amongst all classes of Anglo-Indian society has done a good deal to foster a dislike to it amongst Eurasians who are extremely susceptible to anything like contempt or reproach. In Australia this feeling does not exist'.¹³⁹

In spite of such enthusiasm, the fact remained that many practical problems presented themselves to the idea of overseas settlement. The emigration of domiciled persons was not related to imperial territorial expansion in any positive sense. Nor was it for supplying labour to areas where there were perceived shortages. There was

¹³⁷ Lionel Caplan, *Children of Colonialism: Anglo-Indians in a Postcolonial World* (Oxford, 2001), p.132

¹³⁸ See Ch.5

¹³⁹ *The Englishmen [Weekly]*, 23 Aug. 1884, p.10

no intrinsic economic demand and, as such, there existed rigid barriers in the labour market. Labour competition existed in other British colonies as well, in ways that would disadvantage the domiciled class of British India. In South Africa, the domiciled would not qualify to enter the Imperial British East Africa Company, which was just as selective when it came to recruitment. On the other hand, India's domiciled youths would not be needed as menial labour in a labour market which was already full of working-class labourers.¹⁴⁰ In Australia, there was already a large presence of Chinese labour, which would easily undersell the domiciled workforce.¹⁴¹ And, particularly in Australia, there also existed an issue of racism towards mixed-race persons, whose 'brown-ness' was frowned upon.¹⁴² In any case, it appeared difficult to send abroad members of the domiciled class in large numbers. The CDCEC had read with interest the plan of a proposed scheme for colonisation in British East Africa.

But they thought:

'it would be difficult to make such a scheme, or indeed any other scheme for emigration, successful on a sufficiently large scale to affect the conditions of the Domiciled Community'.¹⁴³

The domiciled class had little capital when they wanted to start out a new farm or an industry of their own. They would be as unfit a labourer abroad as in India, as The

¹⁴⁰ 'The Prospects of Eurasians in Africa', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 23 Aug. 1890, p.2

¹⁴¹ 'Eurasian Emigration', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 26 Sep. 1879, pp.839-840

¹⁴² W. H. Arden Wood & Alex Francis, 'Letter to the Editor: Anglo-Indians and Australia', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 13 Jun. 1912, p.7 The criteria that had been laid down by the Minister of the Interior was that Eurasians of three-fourths white parentage would be allowed to land if they were in sound health, of good character and in possession of a British passport. See, 'Kalimpong Homes Look Ahead', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 10 Feb. 38, p.13

¹⁴³ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.138

Statesman wrote put it:

‘it would be a fatal mistake of any clerks, or persons unaccustomed to work, to venture to either country, as the first [Australia??] requires hardy, sturdy colonists with a little capital; and in the second [S.A.] the labour market is contested, and there is not the slightest opening for a young man without a grade’.¹⁴⁴

The fact that emigration was continually considered as an alternative, in spite of all these foreseeable problems, was itself a testimony to the graveness of the domiciled’s employment situation in India. The fact that British continued to support these ‘self-help’ efforts reflected a sober pessimism that no place in British India could be found for their domiciled brethren: their life had to belong elsewhere. Such perspectives on emigration were well articulated in a pamphlet by the Rev. O. Younghusband, written in wake of the political reforms starting in the late 1910s. He insisted upon ‘abolishing’ the very presence of the domiciled class in India. For him, attacking unemployment and pauperism by philanthropic or educational measures was ultimately insufficient as long as it was done in India. He argued that the issue of European pauperism in India could be solved only by removing the children of the domiciled class from that country and then transferring them to other British overseas territories. As the repeatedly elected President of the Domiciled Community of Northern India, Younghusband attended one of the Committees of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919). Then he realised that the existence of the domiciled community in the post-Reform India found no positive meanings either from

¹⁴⁴ *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 31 Jan. 91, p.3

the European or Indian points of view.¹⁴⁵ In any case, Younghusband thought, the domiciled class was not a self-wanted community; most remained domiciled in India only because they could not afford to leave.¹⁴⁶ He insisted that it was important to educate the new, rising generation of the domiciled class in order to make them suitable for the 'export scheme', which he had undertaken as his own task. Younghusband defined it as a responsibility of the Government to provide necessary conditions for carrying out the actual transplanting of young domiciled youths of British India across the different denominations of the Empire:

'it would be best to take an interest in keenly spirited boys in Hill Schools so that they may not become poor whites, to take an interest in them both for their own sakes and for the future of the British Empire, to give them financial and other encouragement so that they may play a useful and valuable part in the building up of the young Dominions Overseas'.¹⁴⁷

* *

In reality, none of the aforementioned schemes can be said to have been successful, let alone being enough to solve domiciled pauperism. But the very fact that they emerged as possible alternatives at all demonstrated the severity of the problem at hand.

Under these schemes, labour and discipline would complement each other as a

¹⁴⁵ O. Younghusband, 'The Domiciled Community in India', in *Pamphlets*, vol. 72 (OIOC T. 722), pp.4-5

¹⁴⁶ *ibid.*, pp.5-6

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p.7

means to transform the attitude of the domiciled towards labour. And this disciplinary transformation was itself conditioned by a possibility of social and physical relocation, whether by institutionalisation or by migration. What those radical measures would purport to achieve was to remove the domiciled from the labour competition in colonial society, and from the problematic dialectic of coloniser / colonised, out of which they had allegedly developed their characteristic dependency and misguided self-understanding. British believed that in supporting these schemes they were committing themselves to a worthy imperial cause. James Luke, for one, defined the institution of marine training as a 'modest contribution towards the solution of the ['Eurasian'] problem', a problem which 'has long been a puzzle to the Government of India'.¹⁴⁸ And still earlier, in the late 1870s, Richard Temple, acknowledged the effort at internal migration as:

'one of the most important measures' [that can possibly solve] 'a difficulty which has been puzzling the brains of the most astute of Her Majesty's representatives in this country'.¹⁴⁹

Conclusion

Elite Britons in India invented their racial prestige not simply vis-à-vis the Indians they governed. The existence of the domiciled class also played a role. As the previous

¹⁴⁸ Luke, 'A Training-Ship Institution', p.333

¹⁴⁹ 'Sir Richard Temple and Hill Colonization', p.76

chapter showed, 'British' organised their lives in the colony in ways that permitted minimum contact with the land and the peoples they colonised. They disparaged those people of their own racial origin who were seen as having lost their Europeanness, whether by tropical influences or by miscegenation. This chapter, however, has demonstrated that this exclusionary attitude of the 'authentic' British towards these 'inauthentic' ones was only one part of a multilayered picture. The non-domiciled British were fully awake to the fact that the impoverishment of their domiciled brethren would degrade their own collective racial prestige. For even if they belittled them as a 'degenerate race', the domiciled class still belonged to the British body politic by descent, religion and language. If they were 'not European enough', they were never 'Indian' in any positive sense, either. This made the domiciled class, albeit ambivalently, a member of the British community. In order to counter this perceived threat of internal disorder, the colonial authorities re-made the domiciled class into a social category through which state and philanthropic policies could be muscled. As was explicitly seen in the cases of the PC and CDCEC, they created a strange brand of imperial philanthropy. It was often done in the name of Christianity, but differed markedly from the 'civilising mission' of converting the 'heathen races' of the Empire. The aim of this philanthropy was obviously not to spread Christianity through conversion, but to save its name from those who would undermine its prestige. What the ruling British feared was that their racial prestige would be threatened by a contradiction, not from outside, but from *within* the body

politic.

The inclusionary aspect of this construction of the category of the domiciled class was inclusive only in the sense that it provided policy measures which controlled the people in question. It is important to note that inclusion never meant a levelling of material inequalities within the white population of India. The policies of inclusion did not aim at bridging the sharp distinction between the 'British' and their 'domiciled' brethren. If anything, they wished to reinstate and fix such a distinction. As we have seen, the common philanthropic argument was that the domiciled people had to *unlearn* their aspiration to 'live like Europeans'. The regeneration of the community had to start from the realisation by its very members that they were *not* 'British' in the way their non-domiciled counterpart were. And many of the actual policies proposed by European philanthropy positively looked *outside* the mainstream of British Indian society. The philanthropists were in sober realisation that the domiciled community, with their class and racial complexities, had little room in the political and economic life of colonial society. Policies such as military discipline, marine discipline, agricultural resettlement, and emigration, all meant to remove the domiciled class from the colonising context altogether. It would only be in the outside that the problem of European pauperism would be solved. Thus the policy of philanthropic inclusion was simultaneously an imperial politics that pushed 'impure' elements elsewhere.

5. Education of the Domiciled Poor: Containing Illiteracy and Social Disorder

Introduction

In India, it was not the case that the ‘Britishness’ of white residents was shared equally by all people of British descent. Rather, only those Britons with middle- or upper-class origins and commensurate socio-economic power were ‘British’, the rest being ‘domiciled’. It has so far been demonstrated that elite Britons may have defined their interests and authority in positive exclusion of their domiciled brethren, but despite this exclusionary attitude, the former did not ignore the increasing impoverishment of the latter – they feared that the destitution of the domiciled element might degrade their own colonial prestige in the eyes of Indians, and therefore looked after them within the frame of philanthropic aid and care. Britishness was to be invented and maintained through this complex interplay of exclusionary and inclusionary attitudes. This chapter will further elaborate on this complexity by looking specifically at the question of the education of both British and domiciled offspring.

The first part of the chapter will discuss the attitude of colonial elites towards

the education of their own offspring. As has been demonstrated, these colonial ruling classes proved themselves to be extremely sensitive regarding the environmental and cultural consequences of colonial residence. But what exactly were their attitudes towards their white offspring? How did they raise them? What kinds of educational institutions existed and precisely how were the parents supposed to pass their white privileges on to their children? These questions will be addressed by discussing British discourses on the physical, moral and intellectual constitutions of the European child. The texts I discuss will include certain influential medical opinions of the late nineteenth century, including those of W. J. Moor, Joseph Fayer and Edward Tilt.

The second part of the chapter will examine colonial attitudes and policies towards the children of the domiciled class. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, the British made desperate attempts to contain the pauperism which had deeply plagued their domiciled counterpart. This chapter will further elaborate on this point by discussing education, which was doubtless the most crucial component of the British crusade against European pauperism. First of all, the proportion of children among the domiciled pauper population was so extraordinarily high that there constantly was a perceived need for urgent intervention. According to the Pauperism Committee (PC), among those who received charity in Calcutta nearly half (47%)

were children.¹ And this was not all: many others were growing without even receiving any education whatsoever. But, secondly, it was also as a source of what little hope was left for the domiciled community that children were regarded. As a member of the Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee (CDCEC) remarked at the public meeting at Dalhousie Institute in July 1918, '[T]heir characters are so pliable, they are so easily moulded that given a fair chance they will always respond and repay care and expense a thousand'.² This chapter will deal with the philanthropic care of the domiciled youth squarely: how were their lives to be shaped within the bounds of colonial philanthropy in India? This will entail a close examination of ideological and institutional developments in the field of colonial education. The most important policy measures and institutions analysed will include: the 'Bishop's scheme' of education established by Bishop Cotton and Lord Canning in the 1860s; the European Education Code (1883) as the calumination of the long-standing efforts of Archdeacon Baly from the 1870s; the Conference on the Education of the Domiciled Community in India (1912); and the founding and management of the St. Andrew's Colonial Homes (1900) by the Rev. John Graham.

¹ The Committee noted a 'large number of Indo-Europeans who are unable or unwilling to support their children as well as themselves, and gladly avail themselves of charitable education. Of those who were in receipt of charity, about 47% were children (682 adult males, 1,007 adult females, and 1,497 children)'. *Report of the Pauperism Committee* (Calcutta, 1892) [*Report of the PC* hereafter], p.4

² *Report of the Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee* (Calcutta, 1920) [*Report of the CDCEC* hereafter], p.48

By following the two steps of looking at the education of both 'British' and 'domiciled' children, this chapter aims to consider the implications of the sharp contrast in which certain exclusionary and inclusionary aspects of educational measures were cast. To focus on the contrastive, differential operations is of crucial importance because it will tell us which children were supposed to grow up, or be allowed to grow up, to become 'British', entrusted with the task of colonial ruling as legitimate members of the civil and military services, or more generally, as recognised agents of the 'civilising mission' of imperialism. And also who, in contrast, would be subordinated to an inferior social category, included and protected only as an object of education-cum-social-control.

Education of Elite Britons

In late colonial India, the supposed racial superiority of white colonisers was not at all a founding premise that could be taken for granted. Such superiority had to be constructed through intense discourses and practices which oriented the colonising selves towards certain prescribed forms of living and behaviour that alone made them 'remain British'. Naturally, the subject of white colonial settlement invoked a

set of questions regarding the physical and cultural constitution of the British body politic. Who should be allowed to reside in India first of all? Which locations should white residents inhabit? What domestic arrangements should be made in their household? No doubt, sexuality was regarded as a key issue here. In order to define and control the social boundaries of the colonising community, sexual relations had to be controlled by moral inculcation, by institutional arrangements, and by a class-specific politics against 'poor whites', whose sexualities were not to be trusted.³ The presence of white children constituted a related but separate set of questions. During the formative years, the infantile members of the white community were considered to be especially susceptible to the physical and cultural influences of the Indian Subcontinent. Hygienic care and cultural refinement were relevant to the white body politic as a whole, but it was especially in regard to its youngest members that they assumed urgent significance. The bodily and moral constitution of the European child was perceived as dangerously fragile, responding too readily to the physical and social influences which surround them. Because the 'Britishness' of white children was not pre-given, there was a perceived need for thorough hygienic care and proper educational discipline. Both the arrangements of home upbringing and school education were given a fundamental importance, because they were thought to determine the 'character' of children once and for all.

³ See Ch.3 for detailed discussions.

If British children were to follow their parents and become accepted members of the ruling race, how should they be nurtured both mentally and physically? Who should take care of them in the household, and what should be their relation to native servants? Where they should attend school and at what age? In order for the privileged British community to 'remain British', these questions were central because they directly concerned the question of how to transmit both material privilege and social prestige across succeeding generations.

Hygienic health

The British in their Indian colony entertained great doubts about acclimatisation. They would not be able to maintain their racial vigour if they were continually subjected to the climate and environment of the colonised land. What would occur was not adaptation (in a positive sense) but 'degeneration': the race itself would be transformed into something of an inferior order. British elites did not regard India as the land of their domicile. Even if they resided there, the British were not permanent settlers: rather, their life in India was only transient, keeping them connected to the contemporary ideas and social trends of the metropole. Contact with the natives of India was to be limited to that with upper castes and with domestic servants. The European wife, or the *Memsahib*, would rule all domestic

matters and rule out any possibilities of miscegenation. Until the time when they left their land of career, all 'degenerative' influences of colonial residence would be kept out as much as possible.

During their 'sojourn' in India, the elite colonials found the question of the possible 'degeneration' of their progenies as an urgent one. The power of racial degeneration was seen as so quick and effective, that even the most unremitting parental devotion was often considered insufficient. In colonial India, the presence of European offspring was always ambiguous. Because colonial residence was a challenge even for their adult counterparts, the mere idea of white children growing up there was a constant source of anxieties. An anonymous article in *The Calcutta Review* noted that if children were to be reared in the Subcontinent, 'the fire, the courage, the candour, the moral, and physical *fibre* of our vaunted race' would be easily drained.⁴ In turn, they would physically dilute their race as a whole with a 'dull, unmeaning glance', 'flabby arm', and 'sneaking hang-dog gait and carriage'.⁵ And also culturally with 'that prostrate reptile spirit, that double face, that coward, lying tongue'!⁶

Such sentiments were fully endorsed by the scientific authorities of the time.

The question of child bearing attracted due attention from doctors and scientists who

⁴ Anon., ('Maxwell'), 'Colonisation in India', *The Calcutta Review*, 30 (1858), pp.163-188, p.168

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ *ibid.*

were concerned with the racial hygiene of European colonials. The dominant medical opinions credited the common view that white children were more vulnerable to the degenerative effects of Indian society, with the age five or six being the most crucial. For instance, Edward Birch wrote in 1886, 'beyond these ages all are agreed that physical and moral degeneration occur'.⁷ 'So profoundly does the climate, after the period of immediate childhood, influence the constitution that the effect of a more prolonged residence is rendered permanent throughout life'.⁸ To avoid such damage, Birch looked to the hills in the north. In sharp contrast to the plains, the hills had a much cooler climate, and, because of that, had actually been idealised for their semblance of the Scottish highlands.⁹ Essentially endorsing J. Martin's advocating of hill colonisation, he claimed that in the hills, the 'hardy children of the North' may well be nurtured. Birch noted that in military asylums, white orphans were in a very good condition. This made him convinced that '[B]eyond all cavil, European children may be born and brought up in the hills in a state of physical health not inferior to that of those who have been wholly reared in Europe'.¹⁰ Joseph Fayrer also noted the possible usefulness of hill stations. Like Birch, he praised the exceptionally good circumstances in which European orphans

⁷ Edward A. Birch, *The Management and Medical Treatment of Children in India* (Calcutta, 1886), p.14

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ See Ch.3

¹⁰ Birch, p.21

had been raised in hill schools (such as the European Female Orphan Asylum).¹¹ And yet as to whether the hill stations could actually become an alternative site for rearing European children, he was rather sceptical. For Fayrer, there was ultimately nothing better than an upbringing in the metropole: 'The child must be sent to England, or it will deteriorate physically and morally'.¹² The best way to prevent the youngest members of the British community from 'degenerating' was to send them off to England, their true 'native' country. Still earlier this view had been advocated by W. J. Moor. In his book *Health in the Tropics* published in 1862, he wrote:

'No one disputes the desirability, the necessity, in fact, of sending children of British blood to England. Every one who can by any means compass that object does so for his own progeny'.¹³

During their formative years, white children had to be removed from India at all costs. And this was for the best of the British race in India as a whole – as Moor put it, Indian upbringing would enforce British offspring 'to live and become the degenerate race every one laments in the present Portuguese of India'.¹⁴ In Moor's view, rearing children in India would mean to follow the path of the Portuguese and repeating their alleged failure in maintaining the 'Europeanness' of their national

¹¹ Joseph Fayrer, *Tropical Dysentery and Chronic Diarrhoea* (London, 1881), p.344

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ W. J. Moor, *Health in the Tropics; or Sanitary Art Applied to Europeans in India* (London, 1862), p.294

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.295

members. Bringing up white progenies in India was not just ‘against all dictates of humanity and charity’, but ‘render humane and wealthy England centuries to come the compeer of impoverished and bigoted Portugal’.¹⁵ The hygienic and moral care of offspring then was crucial for maintaining the racial integrity of the British body politic.

Also, it was at their mental (as well as bodily) constitution that the aforementioned worries over European children were directed. In his book of 1875, *Health in India for British Women: on the Prevention of Disease in Tropical Climates*, Edward John Tilt, a renowned medical scientist, argued that British parents should send away their progenies to Britain as soon as possible to protect the Europeanness of their mind.¹⁶ Tilt was of the opinion that as far as their bodily health was concerned, children could stay in India up to the age of seven. But he recommended an earlier departure because, by then, children would start developing a mental capacity good enough to understand and interact with the indigenous world around them. Tilt found children’s every-day contact with native domestics as particularly detrimental to their moral training, but this would be inevitable as long as they continued their residence in India. So children should leave, as soon as ‘they can well understand the talk of Hindoo servants; for although they mean

¹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶ Edward John Tilt, *Health in India for British Women: on the Prevention of Disease in Tropical Climates* (London, 1875). Tilt was late president of the Obstetrical Society of London; Correspondent Fellow of the Royal Academy of Medicine of Turin and of Athens of the Academy of Medicine of New York; and Fellow of the Obstetrical Society of Philadelphia.

nothing amiss, it is not what an English lady would call “nice”.¹⁷

In late colonial India, the custom of keeping natives as domestics was something to which most European families were in a habit of subscribing. In the metropole, such a practice was not always affordable even to certain bourgeoisies of lower order. But, India provided the less privileged with an opportunity to mimic ‘aristocratic’ life styles and the possession of servants was a good example of it. As far as colonial upbringing was concerned, this custom was often regarded as the most menacing cultural influence over the moral and intellectual development of British offspring. Even if children lived a life isolated from Indian society, the native influences were nonetheless considered to penetrate them through native domestic servants. For domestic work, their mothers were often heavily dependent on the labour which native servants provided, and it was no exception in the sphere of child-rearing. As in a typical bourgeois family, it was often the domestics, not the mother, who catered to the child’s everyday domestic needs, and this inevitably involved a degree of cross-racial contact between infant and servant. The native domestics were considered indispensable for running the household, but at the same time their mere presence was thought to be contaminating to the fragile and still-developing mind of the British infants. If their exposure to servants lasted too long, their ‘character’ will forever fix to a lower mental type that would be so

¹⁷ *ibid*, p.106

unbecoming a member of the British race.

The problem of native servants is typically articulated, for instance, in an article 'European Children in India' (1882), published in 1882 on *The Statesman*. It pointed out the two consequences that were widely believed to have resulted from the presence of native domestics. One was the contamination of the children's speech. As the article noted: 'Almost the earliest words they utter are those learned from the domestics'.¹⁸ The linguistic contact with natives in the household was thought to affect their speech so that their accent had become 'that of the vernacular and not of English'.¹⁹ Another recognised consequence was an emerging habit of dependency and the consequent loss of self-discipline. Because of the presence of native servants whom they 'lectured' and 'domineered',²⁰ the children tended to acquire a habit of depending on others for many things which they could otherwise perform by themselves. These hard-to-eradicate traits allegedly nurtured in them a marked degree of self-conceit, cultural tastes that were 'quite out of keeping with the social position of their parents',²¹ and characteristic tendency to avert any hard work. The only way to avoid all these hazards of cultural and mental contamination, the article went on, was to send children out of India. If British children were to acquire the European privileges and cultural refinement of their parents, they had to

¹⁸ 'European Children in India', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 2 Jan. 1882, p.11

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ *ibid.*

²¹ *ibid.*

be shielded from any influences of native servants, the only effective measure for which being a period of upbringing in Britain during the formative years. European hill stations in the north did provide a comfortable environment in which British progenies could grow up into a healthy body. But as far as the mental and cultural aspects were concerned, the influence of native servants was considered to find itself there too. Speaking of British hill schools in 1908, the Rev. O. D. Watkins (Former Archdeacon of Lucknow), argued that even the best hill schools in the colony would not match schools in the metropole. Although hill schools were said to have been more or less free from the difficulties of tropical climate, there was 'always the moral effect of the constant presence of native servants, with many an indescribable influence felt to be undesirable'.²²

In the later colonial period, India was never regarded as an appropriate place for raising young British subjects into agents of colonial rule. In fact, education in India was regarded as something to be avoided at all costs. This was shown, for instance, in the following observation by the 1911 Census of Bengal:

'There are no less than 5,007 children of European parentage under 12 years of age, representing one-sixth of the total number of Europeans, but, *fortunately for the vigour of the race*, the number between 12 and 15 who have had to be kept out in this country is very small, the aggregate being only 769'.²³ (my italics)

²² O. D. Watkins, 'The Education of European and Eurasian Children in India', in *Being Problems for consideration at the Pan-Anglican Congress* (1908), contained in *Pan-Anglican Papers* (OIOC, 4108/cc/35), p.3

²³ *The Census of India, 1911: vol. V: Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and Sikkim: Part I. – Report* (Government of India, Calcutta, 1913), p.217

Acute anxieties over the possible degeneration of British racial constitution convinced most elite white parents that their children should not be in India at all. And even after their children matured into the teens, many parents chose to continue the agonising separation from their children and let the latter stay on in Britain for higher education.

It was not merely due to environmental concerns that metropolitan education was considered indispensable. It was particularly for its middle-class education that the metropolitan context was valued. As will be shown later in detail, British India did indeed produce numerous schools which were intended almost exclusively for children of British descent. But these schools, ranging from orphanages to hill schools, mostly catered to the needs of the impoverished domiciled community, and not those of the transient, non-domiciled British community. There were a few schools in the Indian hills that prided itself on being modelled on English public schools, but even these relatively prestigious schools were not expected to fully satisfy the demands of elite colonial parents. Unless there were especial circumstances, these parents almost always wished to entrust their children to their relatives in the metropole and to its prestigious boarding schools and universities.

In order for white children to return to India as 'British' – or as superior civil servants, military officers, or qualified professionals (such as lawyers, doctors or

scientists) – British Indian society increasingly demanded educational qualifications obtained in the metropole. Entry into the higher positions of the colonial civil service was confined almost exclusively to those who graduated from British institutions, including some technical colleges and Oxbridge, which provided a great number of super-elite officers of the Indian Civil Service.²⁴ ‘Home-born’ graduates were increasingly given preference not just in the highest level of the civil service but also in certain less prestigious positions in the Provincial Civil Service. Even the railways, the biggest employer of the domiciled class from the late nineteenth century, increasingly preferred the ‘home-born’ over the ‘country-born’ for their superior personnel. From the late 1870s, leaders of the domiciled community vehemently protested against the preference given to those with metropolitan qualifications. They demanded that the superior grades in the civil, military and railway services be accessible to those who were educated in the colony. However, the government made few concessions.²⁵ This implied that, if the offspring of British colonials wanted to join their parents back in India, and this, not simply for reunion but for coming back as a member of the ‘ruling race’, they had to attend the right schools, and emphatically not schools in the colony.

It was not in the least the case that, even for the affluent classes, the whole

²⁴ For the role played by public schools and Oxford in this respect see, Richard Symonds, *Oxford and Empire: The Lost Cause?* (Oxford, 1986), pp.185-193

²⁵ See Ch. 6

business of educating children in Britain was ever easy. The opening of the Suez Canal (1869) made travel much easier and, by the early 1870s, middle-class schools in Britain had increasingly been made cheaper and thus affordable to British children returning from India.²⁶ But even then, the expenses of educating children in England laid a heavy burden on the parents left in the colony. The financial output not infrequently left less wealthy families with not much on which to live.²⁷ Moreover, parents had to be prepared for the emotional difficulties entailed in separation.²⁸ But at any rate, despite these difficulties, countless British parents did pay the price, and chose not to allow their offspring to grow up in the colonial context. They brought themselves to accepting these circumstances as:

‘penalties which parents pay for a residence in India, and those of them who can afford to send their children home have to bear the separation and all the possible consequences as best they may, in order to save their children from accruing in stronger characters some of the undesirable features of the East’.²⁹

It was only through their absolute absence from India altogether that the colonial elites could ever expect their offspring to become so ‘British’ as they themselves were or claimed to be. Their determined dismissal of colonial schools was well

²⁶ In 1869, *The Statesman* reported favorably the reform of middle-class education which was taking place in Britain. It wished that the lowered cost will fit more British children from India for public schools and universities. ‘Schools for Our Boys’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 20 May 1869, pp.573-4

²⁷ Anon. (‘An English-Woman in India’), ‘English-Women in India’, *The Calcutta Review*, 80 (1885), pp.137-152, p.149

²⁸ For the description and analysis of one case of such family separation, see Elizabeth Buettner, ‘Parent-child separations and colonial careers: the Talbot family correspondence in the 1880’s and 1890’s’, in (eds.) A. Fletcher & Stephen Hussey, *Childhood in question: children, parents and the state* (Manchester, 1999), pp.113-132

²⁹ ‘European Children in India’, p.11

reflected in their negative attitude towards those pupils who actually attended such schools. British parents in India were worried not so much about the small presence of native children in these schools and their possible influence over the children of their own as about the children from the 'domiciled' community. They particularly disliked the idea of their offspring schooling side by side with 'domiciled-European' and 'Eurasian' children, of their acquiring the habits of the latter, and of their sharing the same socio-economic prospects after leaving school.³⁰

In spite of their shared British descent, the children of the domiciled class had been sharply excluded from the sphere of imperial privileges. They were given little hope of taking any superior positions in the civil or railway services. At best, it would be only in the subordinate positions of these services that they could hope to find employment. Also, they were often unemployed because they tended to lose out to natives, whose labour undersold their own in the competition for low-paid jobs. By sending their children to colonial schools, the British elites would have thrown and simultaneously fixed their offspring into a different, distinctly lower category of the imperial social order. Thus, choosing metropolitan schools was imperative, whilst colonial schools could only serve to damage the future of their children.

³⁰ Elizabeth Buettner, 'Problematic Spaces, Problematic Races: defining "Europeans" in late colonial India', *Women's History Review*, 9 (2000), pp.277-297, p.283; see also her 'Parent-child separations and colonial careers', p.117

Education of the Domiciled: Ideological and Institutional Evolution

We will now shift our attention from the education of the 'British' to that of the 'domiciled' community. The elite colonials had a low regard for colonial schools, usually dismissing them as an alternative for their own offspring. But this did not necessarily mean that the British upper and middle classes were simply indifferent to the education of the domiciled community. Rather they accorded to these colonial schools a unique function, which may have been reluctant but certainly no less significant for the British effort to construct their racial prestige.

State intervention

By the beginning of the 1860s, the colonial authorities were aware of an increasing number of children of British descent growing up without receive any education. There was, first of all, the phenomenal impoverishment of the people of mixed-descent from the beginning of the nineteenth century. On top of this, there was an increasing presence of lower-class whites since the mid-century, due to the post-Mutiny augmentation of the European elements of the army and to the

advancement of European private enterprises (especially after the abolition of the Company). Educational institutions were urgently required to contain this menacing increase of non-elite people of British origins. Before the events of 1857, the Directors of the East Indian Company had aided individual European schools, created and managed by private agents, most of whom were Christian missions. But the way in which the aid had been given was far from organised enough. The Rev. George Edward Cotton, the second Metropolitan of the Church of England in India, was determined to change this.³¹

On 28 July 1859, the day of Thanksgiving for the suppression of the Mutiny at St. Paul's Cathedral, Bishop Cotton appealed to Lord Canning for funds to establish schools for the children of the domiciled class:

'[I]f a generation calling themselves Christians and descended wholly or partly from European parents, grow up in ignorance and evil habits, the effect on the Mohamedan and Heathen population will be most disastrous'.³²

To prevent such, Cotton suggested establishing schools in British hill stations in the north of India for the better-off members, and founding schools in the plains for the poorer ones. Lord Canning promptly responded to Cotton's appeal. He was already aware of the rather unfavourable state of these people. In a minute dated 29 October 1860, he described the domiciled class as 'a floating population of

³¹ Before throwing his lot in India, he had worked as an Assistant Master at Rugby with Dr. Thomas Arnold, the father of the English Public Schools.

³² Quoted in 'Children of the Poor', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 2 Jun. 1864, p.594

Indianised English, loosely brought up, and exhibiting most of the worst qualities of both races'.³³ The British community must take care of this ever-increasing population, because otherwise they would soon find themselves embarrassed in all large towns and stations. The presence of such an unmanageable community of British origin right at the heart of colonial domination was politically undesirable.

As Canning famously put:

'It might be long before it would grow to what would be called a class dangerous to the State; but very few years will make it, if neglected, a glaring reproach to the Government, and to the faith which it will, however ignorant and vicious, nominally profess'.³⁴

He proposed that the Government should play a far greater role in providing the domiciled class with educational facilities and aid than hitherto. Government, however, would not be able to undertake all these tasks because of its possibly stifling the initiative of various missionary groups. It should work closely with missionary organisations, morally and financially encouraging their efforts to educate domiciled children. This Minute by Canning was to guide successive Governments and became its own Magna Charta in the post-Mutiny evolution of educational institutions for the domiciled class. It was approved by the Secretary of State in January the following year and the Home Department drew up rules

³³ Quoted in *Review of Education in India in 1886* (Government of India; Calcutta, 1888), p.294

³⁴ *ibid.*

regarding the giving of grants-in-aid to schools for domiciled children.³⁵ In the mean time, to formulate a definite and practical scheme of education policy to solve European pauperism, the Calcutta Diocesan Board of Education was established (1863). The series of education policies following the efforts of Bishop Cotton and Lord Canning were enthusiastically supported by the colonial elites. Reporting on the Diocesan Board, *The Statesman* observed, '[W]e rejoice at the establishment under such auspices of an agency which will remove from the English in India the fast gathering reproach of not providing for their own flesh and blood'.³⁶ This education policy was commonly referred to as the 'Bishop's scheme', with Bishop Cotton generally regarded as the father of European education in India.³⁷ Under the Bishop's scheme, British established a host of schools in their hill stations. These schools, which were primarily meant for the wealthier portions of the domiciled class, were sometimes called 'Bishop Schools'. At the same time, the British also took an initiative in founding schools in the plains, these being more for the poor than for the rich. Those who ran these schools asked Cotton for assistance in order to cope with the increase of domiciled populations in those places.³⁸ By the mid-1860s there were a number of schools in various parts of the plains including Howrah, Allahabad, Seetabuldee, Rangoon, Moulmein, Meerut, Cuttack.

³⁵ *ibid.*, p.106

³⁶ 'The Calcutta Diocesan Board of Education', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 14 May 1863, p.546

³⁷ *ibid.*, p.101

³⁸ *ibid.*

The Bishop's scheme, however, was not without its problems. By the end of the 1860s certain defects had become too visible to be ignored. Numerous schools had been established but it was increasingly clear that the Government had failed to put them fully under its administrative control. And illiteracy, rather than decreasing, was steadily increasing. Dissatisfied with such a state of European education during the 1860s, the Government appointed a commission to investigate issues concerning education of poorer white children (1871). In 1873, the Government commissioned A. J. Lawrence to submit a report on the conditions of existing European schools. This was the first Government attempt to gather and control information on the numerous European schools, which had formed a rather heterogeneous aggregate in terms of origin and orientation.³⁹ This attempt was followed by another Government order (1874) whereby the Local Governments were asked to submit detailed information as regards the number of non-attending children of British origin. It found that the provision of schooling for the poor was inadequate: 11,582 out of 26,649 children were reported to be out of instruction. The fact, some observed, was nothing but a 'scandal to the English name and English Government'.⁴⁰

The year 1875 saw the active involvement of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir Richard Temple, whom *The Statesman* praised as being 'consumed with

³⁹ *Report on the existing schools for Europeans and Eurasians throughout India*, (Calcutta, 1873), p.1

⁴⁰ *Review of Education in India in 1886*, pp.294-295

zeal for the moral and intellectual, perhaps even spiritual good of those neglected communities'.⁴¹ Keenly aware of the problem of illiterate domiciled children in Bengal, he insisted that a greater degree of state intervention was necessary. He insisted that that the Government should engage itself more squarely in aiding missionary organisations that were supposed to play a central role in running the schools designed for poor children.⁴² In response, the Government of Bengal issued a resolution that endorsed much of Temple's opinion. The resolution (17 July 1876) chiefly concerned itself with the integration of poor domiciled children into schools. The parents of these children had monthly incomes not exceeding Rs. 300.⁴³ The number of such children in the case of Calcutta was reported by the Commissioner of Police as 5, 327.⁴⁴ And it was found that the majority of them belonged to the 'humblest and poorest families'.⁴⁵ It was discovered that among the 3,824 children of a school-age, 1,275 (about 30 %) were not at school; an alarming situation in which 'one child out of every three children of a school-going age might be said to be growing up in ignorance'.⁴⁶ The Bishop's scheme had been unsatisfactory for Temple, because it had failed to solve those exact problems relating to illiteracy:

⁴¹ *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 10 Jun. 1876, p.507

⁴² Expressed in two minutes dated 25 February and 18 May.

⁴³ *General Report of Public Instruction in Bengal, for 1875-76* (Government of Bengal, Calcutta 1876), p.110

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

'it is impossible for the Government to view without serious concern so considerable a proportion of children of European parentage growing up in ignorance, and the Lieutenant-Governor fully recognizes that it is a matter of public policy to find a remedy for this evil'.⁴⁷

Standardisation

Beside Lawrence's Commission and Temple's intervention, the Venerable Joseph Baly, the Archdeacon of Calcutta, also made a significant contribution to the educational programmes for the domiciled community. If Bishop Cotton has been known as the founder of the education of India's domiciled children, Baly should be known as someone who systematised and standardised it. After spending six years in Ceylon, Baly commenced his career in India in 1860, where he arrived as a Chaplain on the Bengal Establishment and twelve years later was appointed as Archdeacon of Calcutta. When Lawrence's Commission was in progress (the early 1870s), Baly took a tour of North and Central India where he made inquiries about domiciled children and interviewed relevant persons of influence. And based on his research, he sent a report to the Government, the gist of which can be found in a paper he read before the Bengal Social Science Association in 1879.⁴⁸ Baly found that the circumstances surrounding poor domiciled children had gone worse even

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p.111

⁴⁸ Joseph Baly, 'The Employment of Europeans in India: A Paper Read Before the Bengal Social Science Association on Thursday, May 1st 1879' (Calcutta, 1879)

after Lord Canning so explicitly warned about them two decades back.⁴⁹ By now the situation had become even more disastrous, such that ‘the still wider evils [...] must inevitably follow within the course of two or three generations’.⁵⁰ Baly shared, with Cotton, Canning and many other British proponents of European education, an acute sense of anxiety that European pauperism threatened British racial prestige. Impoverished members of the domiciled class were, in essence, an internal enemy of British colonialism. As Baly put it, the existence of such people were:

‘even more disastrous a greater and more enduring calamity than a war on the frontier, - in the degeneracy, degradation and ruin, in the very midst of us, of a large section of our own people’.⁵¹

Measures had to be taken urgently before it was too late. Baly foresaw that, if no measures were taken, the proportion of the poor would swell up beyond the control of the Government.

Baly’s remedy for European pauperism was to integrate the rising generations of the domiciled class into a standardised school system. It would be by providing a comprehensive education that the British would empower their domiciled brethren most effectively, and would enable the latter to come out as efficient and

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p.36

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁵¹ *ibid.*

well-qualified as their indigenous competitors. But in order to construct such a regime of organised education, the Government would necessarily have to assume more initiative and responsibility. As he saw it, the difficulties that had plagued the domiciled class were in many respects too deep and complex and beyond any degree of 'self-help'. Only an organised effort by their British brethren, especially at the state level, would be able to remedy these difficulties. Ideally, the Government would provide the lower class with a comprehensive hill-education, which had hitherto been restricted to the elites.⁵²

The proposal Baly presented profoundly influenced the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, who praised Baly's reports for containing 'a mass of information and practical suggestions for which the Government is deeply indebted to him'.⁵³ Baly's influence over Lytton is evident in the views and proposals the latter inscribed in his famous Minute on the education of domiciled children (25 March 1879). Here, the Viceroy stressed the need for the non-domiciled British to discharge;

'a serious and practical endeavour to remove from the Government of India, that "glaring reproach" to which its attention was directed by Lord Canning nearly twenty years ago'.⁵⁴

He was worried that the economic condition of the domiciled community had become worse than Canning could have imagined before and thus suggested that,

⁵² *ibid.*, p.22

⁵³ Lord Lytton's Minute dated 25 Mar. 1879, reprinted on *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 29 July 1879, pp.669-670, p.669

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

whatever measures were taken should concentrate more on the poorer portions of the class.⁵⁵

In order to deal with impoverished children there should be more cheap or free elementary schools in the plains. They should include both day and boarding schools that catered to the needs of orphans and neglected children. There also should be industrial schools to supplement elementary ones, so that children between the ages 12 and 18 could acquire the practical knowledge and skills required for successfully competing in the labour market. Following Archdeacon Baly, Lytton suggested establishing hill schools that were designated especially for poorer domiciled children.⁵⁶ The Bishop's scheme launched by Cotton and Canning in the 1860s had intended hill schools and plain schools for the well-to-do children and the poor ones respectively. Baly and Lytton, however, broke down this distinction, and argued that the existing British hill stations could be suitably used also as a site for educating the poorest class of domiciled children. The concern about illiteracy also led Lytton to consider the possibility of introducing compulsory education. He was aware of the practical difficulties which would be inevitably involved in compulsion. But he thought that such a more rigid system might be necessary especially in cases where parents were either too poor or too indifferent to send their offspring to

⁵⁵ *Review of Education in India, 1886*, pp.295-296

⁵⁶ Lord Lytton's Minute dated 25 Mar. 1879, p.670

school.⁵⁷

Following his minute, Lytton appointed a special Committee to enquire into the education of domiciled children and selected Archdeacon Baly as its Secretary (November 1879). A few months later, Baly submitted to the Government a detailed report in which he described the conditions surrounding the education of white and mixed-descent children in Bengal, and furnished some recommendations. He recommended the Government to introduce a new system of grants-in-aid based on 'results'. This would allow the state to control individual schools more closely and enhance competitiveness among them. Yet at the same time he was well aware that the new grants system alone would be insufficient to achieve full integration, because such would do little when it came to the education of the poorest class. According to Baly, these poorer children failed to attend school not merely because of their disadvantaged economic background but also due to a characteristic negligence and indifference of their unrespectable parents. To deal with this problem, he recommended that the grants-in-aid system should be supplemented by a more direct management of institutions that were meant for poor children, - including free day schools, orphanages, military asylums and vocational colleges. The aim of these schools was not to secure higher academic standards but to reduce illiteracy, and as such, they should be exempted from the grants-in-aid system based

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p.669

on results. Moreover, Baly suggested introducing compulsory education if the minimum level of attendance was not achieved.⁵⁸

The Government of India inquired the Local Governments on Baly's report, then published its results in a resolution (8 October 1881). The Government was especially concerned over the existence of illiterate white children: 'An uneducated European almost necessarily becomes an idle and profitless, and often a dangerous member of the community'.⁵⁹ In the Bengal Presidency, to which Baly's investigations had been confined, some 5,000 out of about 13,500 children of school-going age were found to be growing up in 'absolute ignorance'.⁶⁰ The Viceroy viewed this situation as one 'every point of view lamentable, certain to become in the end, to use Lord Canning's words, a glaring reproach to the Government'.⁶¹ The resolution repeated Baly's observation that the domiciled class of the British Raj had been at a disadvantage from the start, and hence required external assistance. Thus Baly's basic belief that state intervention was indispensable finally secured official recognition.

Following the Archdeacon's recommendations, the resolution recognised the need for some standards, towards which efforts of Local Governments were to be

⁵⁸ *Review of Education in India, 1886*, pp.295-6

⁵⁹ Cited in *ibid.*, p.297

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p.296

⁶¹ *ibid.*, pp.296-297

co-ordinated, and by which the managers of schools should know the terms upon which they could legitimately claim support from the Government. The resolution appointed a small committee to draft a Code that would regulate the educational efforts for the domiciled class in Bengal, and within this Committee Baly became a prominent member.⁶² The European Education Code (hereafter EEC) was drafted in 1883 and was finally introduced in 1887 after a two-year trial period during 1885-1886. Although the EEC was primarily meant to be applied only within Bengal, its influence spread beyond administrative boundaries.⁶³ Around the turn of the century, the authorities set about revising the Code. In 1895, the Code Revision Committee was appointed, one of the proposals of which was the further establishment of new boarding schools for indigent domiciled children into which to take them off the streets.⁶⁴ The Committee was also critical of 'payment by results' in the current system of grants-in-aid.⁶⁵ The Revised Code was approved in 1896, drafted in 1902 and promulgated in 1905.⁶⁶

The EEC did not adopt a policy of compulsory education, and continued to

⁶² *ibid.*, p.298

⁶³ In Madras, its influence was observed in the provision of grants to boarding schools, orphanages and industrial schools, though it did not wholly replace the existing system that had coped with the unique problems of the region. In Madras too, the issue of the unemployment among poor domiciled Europeans and mixed-descent people had been perceived as a very serious problem. Half of the community had been reduced to vagrancy, loafersdom, or dependence on charity. The only solution was thought to be improvement in technical education. The EEC also influenced the grants-in-aid regulations of Bombay, whereby highly liberal grants were allocated to European schools. *ibid.*, p.304

⁶⁴ D'Souza, *Anglo-Indian Education*, p.133

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p.130

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p.143

adhere to the traditional policy of combining the efforts of both state and private agents. It further systematised the grants-in-aid system but at the same time fully recognised that such a system alone would not in itself solve the problem of illiteracy.⁶⁷ Thus, the Code stipulated that special institutions which catered to the needs of the poorest class, such as orphanages and free day-schools, would be exempted from the new grants system based on results, and, instead, would be given special grants. Liberal grants would be given to free schools and orphanages in aid of their boarding charges for children residing in places where there were no schools.⁶⁸

Under the Baly's education scheme culminating in the EEC, integration of poor domiciled-British and mixed-descent children was certainly (if not greatly) advanced. During the ten-year period between 1875-76 and 1885-86, the number of European children at school in all India rose from 15,067 to 22,634, or a little over 50%.⁶⁹ In the case of Bengal, the number of children found at school increased from 8,500 in 1879 to 10,921 in 1886. This was taken as remarkable as it meant

⁶⁷ The EEC replaced the previous system of grants-in-aid based on fixed rates with a carefully devised system of grants-in-aid according to results. Results in this context were in terms of both attendance and performance. If a pupil attended school a minimum number of days fixed by the Code, a grant would be given to that pupil. Grants would also be given to a school according to the numbers and grades of the subjects that were passed by its pupils. But the provision of grants would be both liberal and strict so that it abided by the prescribed goals of the Code. The new grants-in-aid system would standardise, while at the same time stimulating, private enterprise. The shift from fixed quota to results in the allocation of grants would require the Government to develop a scheme for closer assessment and control. Also, all schools would now be placed under the supervision of a European Inspector. *Review of Education in India, 1886*, p.298-9

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p.300

⁶⁹ Not excluding schools in Madras, Bombay, and Burma, to which the EEC was not totally applied. *ibid.*, p.305

that, of the 5,000 children whom Baly's report showed to be growing up uninstructed, nearly one-half had now been brought to school.⁷⁰

Archdeacon Baly's long-standing commitment to the education of the domiciled class and the EEC as its offshoot were certainly epochal. Baly made deep impressions on the minds of the British living in India, who praised him for dealing with a problem which had undoubtedly grown critical but often looked too complex and ambivalent. It was no one but Baly who convinced the Government into taking definitive steps to counter this bewildering problem. Baly, and the EEC he served to create, indicated one possible way whereby the British would be able to control their relations with their domiciled brethren. As *The Englishman's* eulogy put it:

'The Code [...] will form a lasting memorial of the Archdeacon's work on behalf of the poor whites of India. [...] He carries with him the blessings of the poor'.⁷¹

Perceived need for isolating children

In spite of the short-term achievement in terms of increased attendance rate, the EEC cannot be said to have succeeded in stopping the pauperisation of the domiciled class in any fundamental way. It proposed, but was actually unable, to stamp out

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p.305

⁷¹ 'Archdeacon Baly', *The Englishman [Weekly]*, 13 Feb. 1883, p.4

illiteracy. In 1902, according to A. A. D'Souza, there were about 7,000 domiciled children who were not under instruction, whilst there were about 31,000 pupils receiving European education.⁷² Clearly the Department of Public Instruction had not penetrated into the poorest of the domiciled community. Watkins observed in 1908 that the existence of such an impoverished section of the domiciled class was 'a grave anxiety and a standing menace': as such, its educational needs should be dealt with separately where the numbers were considerable.⁷³ The educational authorities of the Government grew even more anxious than before about the presence of a poor domiciled population, or as their *Report of Education* put it, there had emerged a 'very poor population whose claim to European descent is distant and doubtful'.⁷⁴ Despite their British origin, they had become so pauperised and de-Europeanised that they appeared to be beyond the reach of Government. This anxiety over the 'unreachable poor' was well expressed in *Progress of Education in India* (1907):

'the probable conclusion is that a greater proportion of Eurasians of the lower class are growing up outside the reach of our school system than that was the case ten and fifteen years ago. Mr. Hornell [of the Department of Public Instruction] calls attention to the existence of poor Eurasians in Calcutta of whom it is said that "they remain at present most unreached, and some would say unreachable".⁷⁵

⁷² D'Souza, p.143

⁷³ Watkins, p.3

⁷⁴ *Third Quinquennial Report of Education in Bengal [1902-03 to 1906-07]* (Government of Bengal, Calcutta, 1907), p.270

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p.269

During the 1910s, there was a renewed interest taken in European pauperism. Despite the educational and philanthropic regimes that had been launched since the times of the EEC (1883) and the Pauperism Committee (1891), the colonial authorities had failed to wipe out domiciled indigence and to contain its inimical political effects. In an appeal for renewed European support for the education of poor domiciled children, a nation-wide missionary organisation, the All-India Committee,⁷⁶ claimed that the state of impoverishment among the poorer sections of the British population in India was more critical than any other cases of poverty in the Christian world. Yet what troubled these missionaries most was not the pauperism in question *per se* but the symbolic damage it supposedly caused to the authority of the Church. In spite of their 'first-class' poverty, the impoverished whites in India were Christian, albeit 'nominally'.⁷⁷ Such an existence was seen as the undesirable exposition of a contradictory weakness of Christendom *from within itself*, damaging its putative superiority over the non-Christian world on which much of the conversion effort depended:

'... as a community, they [the domiciled] are a reproach to the Church they represent and a stumbling block to the three hundred million non-Christian people of India'.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ The All-India Committee represented the European and Eurasian schools established by the Church of England, the Church of Scotland, and the Evangelical Free Churches of Great Britain.

⁷⁷ The All-India Committee, *'The European of India': A responsibility and an opportunity*, in M. B. Turner (ed.), *An alien in his own country* (London, 191-), *Pamphlets* (OIOC P/T/314), p.4

⁷⁸ *ibid*, p.3

It was nothing but for removing such a 'reproach' that the Committee appealed to the public for educational support. By this time, the recurrence of the theme of imperial prestige had much to do with its very precariousness in the face of indigenous challenges to colonial rule. A retired ICS officer, R. Carstairs, wrote that it would be only by way of securing the integrity of its permanently-settled element in India that the British nation could stand the challenge of anti-colonial nationalism:

'All the various forms of influence which Britain exerts in India may be summed up in one word – *Prestige*. Britain holds India by the power of her prestige; and the HAND with which she holds is the RESIDENT BRITISH COMMUNITY'.⁷⁹

But the problem lay precisely in that in reality the domiciled community was never a group of gentlemanly colonists. The existence of destitute people of British descent was dangerous, especially at a time when the distance between the coloniser and the colonised had increasingly been narrowed, and colonial rule itself was becoming unstable. What Carstairs feared was that the problem of European pauperism might easily give the nationalist leaders good reasons to attack their colonial masters. He expressed this rather clearly:

'An essential condition of the stability of our Empire is that Britain should retain the friendship and esteem of India. [...] one of the tests by which India tries our fitness for the place we hold is the manner in which we deal with our domiciled. [...] A distinguished Indian, writing of the Eurasians, has reproved the "cruel aloofness" of the Europeans towards them, and he broadly hints that it has been noticed and condemned by the great Indian communities, in whose eyes few duties are more sacred than that of caring for one's own kinsfolk. [...] "It is easy enough", says the same distinguished Indian, "to find fault with them, but I do not know that any very

⁷⁹ R. Carstairs, 'Our Kinsfolk Domiciled in India – European and Eurasian', *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 29 (1910), pp.6-23, pp.7-8

serious attempt has been made to help them". In short, Britain's aloofness, and her long failure to solve the problem of the "domiciled", have cause her to slip back in the esteem of India'.⁸⁰

It was nothing other than the fear of losing the putative racial superiority of the British that urged Carstairs to propagate further support for European education.

The aforesaid sense of crisis was shared by a great many British, both in official and private quarters. Disturbed by the critical condition of the domiciled poor, Sir Robert Laidlaw, a rich Calcutta merchant, called a Conference of Protestant Churches (1911) to discuss the education of poorer domiciled children. This initiative by Laidlaw was soon followed up by a more organised public meeting. In July 1912, Sir Harcourt Butler, the new head of the colonial education establishment, summoned a Conference at Simla, which was fully representative of all European interests, including those of the different denominations which Laidlaw's Conference had excluded. The major concern of the Conference on the Education of the Domiciled Community in India at Simla (hereafter CEDCI) was with the state of uneducated domiciled children. Butler drew attention to the fact that there were in India some 7,000 children of the domiciled community who were not enrolled. He was shocked to hear, for instance, that there had recently been about 130 applicants for 5 vacancies in a Roman Catholic Orphanage.⁸¹ Participants of the CEDCI

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p.21

⁸¹ *Report of the Conference on the Education of the Domiciled Community in India, Simla, July 1912* (Calcutta, 1912) [*Report of the CEDCI*, hereafter]

suggested that the principle of free education be extended so that these children could be put into either boarding schools or orphanages.⁸² Ultimately, though, compulsory education would be necessary: these children had necessarily to attend school without any exceptions, for 'their own interests and [for] those of the general public'.⁸³ The Government did accept that the education of such children was of vital importance, but it did not believe that compulsion was necessary – such a problem would be dealt with more efficiently by providing missionary agencies with larger grants-in-aid.⁸⁴ The Calcutta Domiciled Community Enquiry Committee (CDCEC) also took the issue of illiterate domiciled children seriously. It identified the cause of illiteracy in both the destitution and indifference of parents.⁸⁵ One possible way for its solution was to bring the work of the Society for the Protection of Children in India into closer contact with other charities in Calcutta and throw its committee open to some form of public elective control.⁸⁶ Given the difficulties involved in fully integrating illiterate domiciled children, the educational authorities were increasingly inclined towards the idea of physically removing these children from their problematic parents and the equally problematic slum situation in which their lives had been immersed. For example, *The Quinquennial Review of*

Progress of Education in Bengal (1918) noted:

⁸² *ibid.*, p.10

⁸³ *ibid.*, p.41

⁸⁴ D'Souza, *Anglo-Indian Education*, p.150-1

⁸⁵ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.23

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, p.186

'There would seem to be only one solution to the problem of how to elevate and render self-respecting the lower strata of Anglo-Indian society [i.e. domiciled society] and that, to remove entirely the children of this class from their present surroundings and never allow them to return until a healthy disgust of their previous existence has been fostered, and habits of clean living and thinking have become natural and spontaneous'.⁸⁷

Thus, it was increasingly perceived as imperative to remove children from their present social surroundings, including their communal and familial ties. The children should be isolated not only from Indian public life, but also from the very social / environmental conditions which had created and nurtured them. Officials even put forward proposals for the bodily transfer of city schools to better locations, where pupils could be transformed into different beings. It was only due to financial constraints that these proposals were not fully taken into consideration.⁸⁸

The Nature of the Education of the Domiciled

Those British who concerned themselves with the education of the domiciled class were, at different times and in different ways, consciously dealing with a national-cum-colonial crisis – a menace to the collective prestige of their own body politic. To counter the pauperisation of the domiciled class and its negative

⁸⁷ *Review of Education in Bengal [1912-13 to 1916-17], Fifth Quinquennial Review* (Government of Bengal, Calcutta, 1918), p.132

⁸⁸ *Review of Education in Bengal [1912-13 to 1916-17], Fifth Quinquennial Review*, p.192

political consequences, they were compelled to utilise state apparatuses. To their demands the colonial state enthusiastically responded, giving ample material support to European schools through grants-in-aid and other means. For instance, between 1906 and 1907 alone, the Government of India made a total grant of Rs. 246,000. In March 1911 the Government of India gave a non-recurring grant of Rs. 657,000 and out of the 50 lakh grant announced by King George V in Delhi, 3 lakhs were likewise reserved for European education.⁸⁹

As for charitable schools that offered free education, the Government came to assume more direct responsibility. Some advocates of European education claimed that the state should possibly take full responsibility by making it compulsory. We have already seen that Archdeacon Baly and Lord Lytton, for example, expressed the desirability of introducing compulsory education, while the CEDCI also placed compulsion as its first recommendation to the Government. Given the high rates of children who had no choice except for free charitable education, compulsory education appeared to be indispensable. However, the Government did not in the end agree with the idea of introducing compulsion. The authorities reasoned that too much state intervention would run the risk of killing the missionary impulse, which had done much for the instruction of the domiciled community. It was through the philanthropic organisations connected with their churches that the

⁸⁹ *Report of the CEDCI*, p.1

British elites in India had discharged their support for their poor domiciled brethren. There were a number of charitable endowments of educational character to which the non-domiciled British were invited to make donations: these included the Bruce Institution; the Doveton Trust, the European School Improvement Association (founded by Sir Robert Laidlaw); the Church Education League; the D'Souza Trust; the St. Andrew's Colonial Homes; and the Education Solidarity League.⁹⁰ It was against this background that, the Government saw it necessary not in any ways to discourage the initiatives of missionaries: the state should avoid too much involvement as missionaries did not generally like strict Governmental control.

While encouraging missionary activities, the Government also found it important to subdue its natural preference to the missionaries affiliated with the Church of England. Missionaries who concerned themselves with the domiciled poor included not just Anglican but also Roman Catholic and Non-conformist groups. Not to discourage the latter two groups, Bishop Cotton found it necessary that his Bishop's scheme did not unfairly represent the ideals of the Anglican missionaries. Thus he did not forget to insert a 'conscience clause' in the scheme's regulations. The clause read; 'any child may be excused from learning the distinctive formularies of the Church of England on a written application from the parent or guardian'.⁹¹ The Resolution of 1881 also maintained that it should be without reference to

⁹⁰ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.8

⁹¹ As quoted in 'A New Education Scheme', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 12 Feb. 1876, p.134

denominational distinctions that government grants-in-aid must be distributed to private contributions.⁹² Thus the Government supported, at least in principle, all missionary groups equally. Denominational rivalry might manifest itself here and there and, to a degree, the Government would tolerate it. But eventually, all missionary efforts should be united for a higher 'national' goal. As Cotton remarked, there ought to be in India 'a mutual toleration and sympathy, which the bond of a common faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, as opposed to Brahmanism and Mohamedanism, must produce among all Christians'.⁹³ Describing the efforts of the Calcutta Girl's School, *The Statesman* (1876) claimed it would welcome all efforts of any Christian missions to meet the educational needs of the domiciled class. Occasional sectarian jealousies should not discourage the British community of India in supporting the missions: 'these too must be counted among the evils that cannot for some time be wholly cured, and must while that is so, be patiently endured'.⁹⁴ The priority should be placed on encouraging 'every honest attempt to provide an education which shall be religious and yet as far as possible undenominational'.⁹⁵

It was for its 'cheap, plain, but really useful education' that *The Statesman* expressed support for the Calcutta Girl's School.⁹⁶ And this practical mode of instruction was at the same time 'Christian and Protestant but, within these limits,

⁹² *Review of Education in India, 1886*, p.297

⁹³ 'The Calcutta Diocesan Board of Education', p.546

⁹⁴ 'The Calcutta Girl's School', *The Statesman [Weekly]*., 13 May 1876, pp.411-412, p.412

⁹⁵ *ibid.*

⁹⁶ *ibid.*

purely undenominational', and thus without sectarian bias.⁹⁷ British valued the Christian education for domiciled children for its disciplinary function and the moral tone it imparted. Instruction in Christian doctrines was given but it was not supposed lead to an inculcation of domiciled children in any one of the denominational doctrines. Nor should Christian teaching mislead the children to assume that they were as 'elite' as their non-domiciled counterpart. Christianity was valued because of its practical role in teaching children self-discipline and a proper attitude to labour. What motivated the British elites into supporting missionaries was a hope that their religions teaching would eradicate what they saw as the undesirable traits of domiciled children, rather than indoctrinating them with a religious dogma.

Racial bounds

Christian education had a definite racial dimension and it explicitly manifested itself in the state effort to define eligibility for membership. Archdeacon Baly, for instance, declared that his educational scheme would exclude the 'Luso-Indians', or the descendants of Portuguese settlers. He claimed that they were essentially

⁹⁷ The school was managed by a committee composed partly of laymen and partly of Christian ministers. And to make the religious undenominational, ministers of different denominations conducted a service in rotation. *ibid.*

helpless, having 'so little of European energy and manliness'.⁹⁸ Baly went on to

note: the Luso-Indian population

'already approaches so nearly to the natives of the country in habits and mode of life, that except in the external profession of a different faith, and in the partial use of a different language and mode of dress, there is not much distinction between them'.⁹⁹

The British in India tended to argue that the Luso-Indians had already 'gone native', and they should exculpate themselves of any responsibility for the latter's well being.

And after all, the Luso-Indian population was a product not of British but Portuguese colonialism. To be sure, the British colonials were aware that there was, even

within the 'Luso-Indian' population, a small portion of people of British descent, originating in relations between British soldiers or pensioners and native women at

the early stage of British rule. But they thought that such an element was so

negligible that they could safely designate the 'Luso-Indian' community as essentially of Portuguese descent. It was partly on account of this 'ethnic'

difference that Baly argued that his educational scheme should exclude the group of

Luso-Indians:

'any practical effort, which either private or public benevolence can now be expected to make, in order to retain it as a distinct European class, will be found unequal to the task'.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Baly, p.3

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, p.4

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*p.3

They were more 'Indian' than 'European' and therefore should 'find their own level, and support themselves in the same occupations as natives of the corresponding class'.¹⁰¹

The aforementioned racial exclusiveness also manifested itself in the EEC. It stipulated that European education was for 'any person of European descent, pure or mixed, who retains European habits and modes of life'.¹⁰² This was tantamount to saying that it would be predicated upon racial, and not religious, lines. Native Christians and Luso Indians were certainly Christian, but were not of European descent (or not of British descent to be more exact). It would only if their number did not exceed 25% of the total pupils that they could be admitted to European schools.¹⁰³ And, even if admitted, they would be exempted from any provision of special grants.¹⁰⁴

There certainly were some differences of opinion, and an argument actually erupted over whether European education should expound itself into religious inclusiveness as opposed to racial exclusiveness. In 1887, G. S. Gasper argued in *The Calcutta Review* that European education should be provided to all Christians, regardless of their racial differences. He maintained that European and Indian children ought to find themselves in the same class room to appreciate the

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*, p.4

¹⁰² *ibid.*, p.299

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, p.303

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p.209

enlightenment of 'Christian education' together.¹⁰⁵ This view sparked an immediate rebuttal from C.W. D'Cruz, himself an activist of the domiciled community. D'Cruz defended the position of the Government in favour of restricting the access of Native Christians and Luso-Indians. The Government wanted a distinctively 'European' atmosphere, where children of British origin would be educated in isolation from any indigenous influences. The argument for restricted access was justified on the grounds that the parents of children of British descent tended to dislike mixed-education where 'non-white' children schooled side by side with their own children.¹⁰⁶ European and Indian children could not be educated together adequately because of their unbridgeable racial differences.¹⁰⁷

The British architects of European education largely followed D'Cruz's view, and insisted that the racial boundaries be rigorously maintained from any possible illegitimate intrusions. The educational officials of the ICS complained that there were too many Native Christians and Luso-Indians who faked their racial identity and illegitimately found their way into European schools. They were not just Christian but had, or claimed to have, 'European habits and modes of life'. The ICS officers often found it difficult to clarify and discipline the distinction between

¹⁰⁵ G. S. Gasper, 'Bengal European School Code', *The Calcutta Review*, 84 (1887), pp.112-129, p.112

¹⁰⁶ *Review of Education in India, 1886*, p.303

¹⁰⁷ As D'Cruz said, 'Simply because the fact has been realised, that natives and Europeans, Heathen and Christian, under existing conditions, will not, if they can help it, be educated side by side, and cannot, so long as education means the development of the mental, physical and moral constitution'. L.W. D'Cruz, 'The Education Code for European Schools in Bengal', *The Calcutta Review*, 84 (1887), pp.381-391, p.383

the destitute domiciled class and these two Christian groups. All these communities increasingly shared similar socio-economic conditions, habits and modes of life. It was precisely because of these similarities that the educational authorities became acutely vigilant against cross-racial claims for inclusion. As W.W. Hornell wrote in the *Quinquennial Review* of 1908:

‘The educational problem of providing instruction for Europeans and Eurasians here becomes merged in the wider questions relating to the classification of inhabitants of this country as Eurasians or as Indians’.¹⁰⁸

Also it was with regard to the grants which were supposed to be given to ‘European’ orphans that the colonial authorities insisted that much caution was required in defining who was eligible. For applicants had been ‘often sent in for children whose claims to be of European parentage as defined by the Code cannot be sustained’.¹⁰⁹ Racial disguise was so easily done that it had ‘sometimes been represented that it should require evidence of European blood on the father’s side’.¹¹⁰ The ICS officers also thought that it was partly the ambiguities surrounding the phrase ‘European habits and mode of life’ that attracted the attention of Indian parents. These state officials wanted the Government to formulate more definite

¹⁰⁸ *Review of Education in Bengal [1902-03 to 1906-07], Third Quinquennial Report* (Government of Bengal, Calcutta, 1907), p.270

¹⁰⁹ *Review of Education in Bengal [1907-08 to 1911-12], Fourth Quinquennial Review* (Government of Bengal, Darjeeling, 1913) p.130

¹¹⁰ *Review of Education in Bengal [1912-13 to 1916-17], Fifth Quinquennial Review* (Government of Bengal, Calcutta, 1918), pp.185-186

criteria. The rule to allow a small percentage of Indian children could be abused unless there was a clearer measure to ascertain whether the applicants had really adopted 'European modes of life'; thus officers went on to suggest that:

'in future editions of the Code, criteria may be enumerated to help in arriving at an accurate opinion whether European habits of life has been adopted or not.'¹¹¹

What the officials feared was that the agitated definitional confusions were obstructing the true purpose of European education in India: purpose of stopping the further pauperisation of the domiciled community by educating its new generations. The claims for inclusion by 'quasi-Europeans' (as they were sometimes referred to) were getting in the way of the interests of the genuine European children, for whom European education was truly meant. As an administrative report asserted:

'It cannot be disputed that the establishment of such a definition would simplify enormously the problem of the education of the *authenticated* Anglo-Indian community'.¹¹² (my italics)

At the CEDCI, authorities such as Sir Harcourt Butler were also vocal about this point. In Butler's eyes, European schools had been 'invaded by children of purely

¹¹¹ *Review of Education in Bengal, Fourth Quinquennial Review*, p.124

¹¹² *Review of Education in Bengal, Fifth Quinquennial Review*, p.131. In the same vein, it was said, 'It would be well, in the interests of *bona fide* European children, the status of the above classes were clearly laid down by Government'. *Review of Education in Bengal, Fourth Quinquennial Review*, p.124

Indian descent, who pass themselves as Anglo-Indians'.¹¹³ Despite its pan-Christian outlook, European education in India had markedly a racial-cum-religious criterion for inclusion: namely, to be both Christian and of British descent.

Limitations of material uplifting

On top of securing attendance, the British proponents of European education in India had necessarily to tackle the question of unemployment. Education would be useless for solving European pauperism unless it eventually led to some sort of meaningful material gain. Lord Lytton, for one, believed that this was of central importance. He claimed that the colonial state:

‘cannot hope that measures for the education for destitute European and Eurasian children will be successful, if they are undertaken without reference to the means of existence available for such children in after-life’.¹¹⁴

Industrial schools had to be founded and expanded if domiciled children were to find any means of livelihood. British never saw the domiciled people as their equals,

¹¹³ *Report of the CEDCI*, p.2. This reflected a view which had been widely shared both by British and leaders of the domiciled community. An anonymous letter sent to the editor of *The Statesman* in 1914 shows this sentiment well. It read: ‘If a careful inquiry be made it will be seen that fifty percent of the boys who have been admitted in some of our schools as Europeans or Anglo-Indians are pure Indians calling themselves Anglo-Indians’. Anonymous (‘R’), ‘Letter to the Editor: European Schools’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 11 Jun. 1914, p.7

¹¹⁴ Lord Lytton’s Minute, p.669

but certain supporters of European education, Lord Canning and Lord Lytton among them, still believed that they could uplift them to a certain respectable status. Educating the domiciled into labourers as employable as their Indian competitors would enable the former to occupy a humble and yet secure position within the occupational order of colonial society. Canning had already remarked back in 1860 that the domiciled class could 'become a source of strength to British rule and usefulness to India'.¹¹⁵ He believed, more specifically, that an adequate education might possibly transform the domiciled into a useful intermediary class between coloniser and colonised. Such a class would:

'serve the Government in many respects more efficiently than the natives can as yet serve it, and more cheaply and conveniently than Europeans can do so; and they are a class which, while it draws little or no support from its connection with England, is without that deep root in, and hold of the soil of India from which our native public servants, through their families and relatives, derive advantage'.¹¹⁶

Certain European schools of higher order, such as St. Paul's and Doveton, were seen to have students with potential. They could be educated into subordinate local agents of British colonial administration. This was not to say that these students were expected to become as elite as home-bred Britons. But, with a suitable comprehensive education closely backed by the state, these domiciled students would be able to beat their Indian competitors and obtain modest positions in the

¹¹⁵ *Review of Education in India*, 1886, p.294

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*, p.294

colonial civil services. Baly actually insisted that the British community in India should make an effort to 'recycle' their domiciled brethren, instead of allowing them to become destitute. To some extent, at least, the economic decline of the domiciled community was due to the structure of the labour market, about which the community itself could do little.¹¹⁷ Baly argued that the Government should replace the current policy under which it had recruited those 'home-born' youth who were educated and examined in the metropole.¹¹⁸ The Government should open up such services as the telegraph, survey, forest, and medical departments to more of the domiciled youth educated in India. If British could 'recycle' these people of the same descent domiciled in India, they would not have to further import recruits from Britain, which was not only costly but could possibly lead to a further swelling of the domiciled population:

'I consider it infinitely more to the advantage of the whole country as to train and utilise them [the existing domiciled people], than to allow a portion of them every year to sink into the class of vagrant loafers, and idle paupers, and fill up the gap so caused by yearly importations of fresh Europeans from England, whose children and descendants, in the course of another generation or two, will swell the mass of European pauperism to a larger bulk, and aggravate the evil we now idly lament'.¹¹⁹

To obtain employment, what was needed was practical education, which would instruct domiciled children in the knowledge and/or skills required for particular

¹¹⁷ Baly, p.11

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*, pp.32-34

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*, pp.37-38

labours. Purely academic education would be unnecessary. For example, *The Statesman* declared (1883) that the pursuit of the 'academic' line of education exemplified by the teaching of Greek and Latin was doing more harm than good. Misled by the allure of 'high' education, some educational establishments lost sight of the practicalities of education. They allegedly crammed the domiciled children with 'such old world knowledge' that was nothing but a 'superfluity, luxury [and] useless drudgery' for the majority of the children concerned.¹²⁰ In aiming at a high educational standard, the domiciled child would fail to make the most of elementary education, which was by far the most important:

'His so-called classical education failed to qualify him for pursuits of an educated man and he is now labouring in some poor capacity on the railroad. The case is not exceptional; it is we fear typical'.¹²¹

The characteristic privileging of the practical use of education over its academic aspect was also inscribed in the EEC. It repeatedly stressed that preparing pupils for the entrance examination to the university was not the goal of European education. The instruction of the university-entrance standard was therefore made optional, and the decision over its provision, if at all, was to be left to local Government. Instead of the entrance examination standard, what had to be taught to the children of British origin growing up in India was practical knowledge and

¹²⁰ 'The Eurasian Community', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 27 Nov. 1883, p1662-3, p.1662

¹²¹ *ibid.*

skills needed for economic survival after leaving school.¹²² The state should provide practical education in ways that directed the energies of domiciled children into ‘a proper channel from a sufficiently early age’.¹²³ It was by this way that the domiciled would be turned into good workmen. Under the EEC, the number of industrial schools steadily increased, whilst industrial training was incorporated into the general curriculum of normal schools.¹²⁴ The CEDCI also stressed the need for enriching elementary and practical education. Mr. Prior, one of the participants of the Conference, remarked:

‘we must not focus attention too much on higher schools. It is much more important to have the bulk of the lower type schools developed and improved’.¹²⁵

As one of its resolutions, the CDECI presented a view that the ‘great majority of the high schools for boys in India should adopt a more definitely modern and practical curriculum’.¹²⁶

But in spite of its aforementioned emphasis on vocational training, the

¹²² *Review of Education in India, 1886*, p.300 and pp.302-303

¹²³ *Review of Education in Bengal [1897-98 to 1901-02], Second Quinquennial Report* (Government of Bengal, Calcutta, 1902), p. 356-7

¹²⁴ In Bengal, this emphasis on the need for practical education was reinstated by the introduction of what was called ‘higher elementary education’ (1910). This educational grade was situated between elementary and secondary education and was meant for poor white children who tended to leave school without obtaining any secondary educational qualifications. It provided both general and supplementary courses, which comprised commercial, industrial, agricultural and domestic subjects. The ‘higher elementary schools’ gained a popularity among certain educational authorities. *Review of Education in Bengal [1917-18 to 1921-22], Sixth Quinquennial Review* (Government of Bengal, Calcutta, 1922), pp.237-238

¹²⁵ *Report of the CEDCI*, p.5

¹²⁶ *ibid.*, p.41

programme of European education did not generally succeed in solving the problem of European unemployment. By the end of the nineteenth century, there was a reluctant but sober recognition among British society in India that the impoverishment of the domiciled class was inevitable. On the one hand, the preference that had usually been given to those Britons educated in the metropole was regarded as a practical necessity for colonial rule.¹²⁷ In the shadow of their metropolitan counterparts, colonial schools had been labelled as second-rate, their graduates no match for 'home-educated' men. On the other hand, the use of Indians was also a long-standing, irreversible policy of the Government, and was considered as ever the more necessary in order to respond to the political demands of educated Indians. The employment of Indians also had the advantage of providing cheap labour which both colonial bureaucracy and European capital needed.¹²⁸

To be sure, it was not that there were not any individuals among the domiciled community who rose to prominent positions. The domiciled community always managed to have some youths who were sent to the metropole for education and came back as qualified lawyers, engineers or doctors. Also the domiciled community availed itself of several prestigious schools within India, such as St. Paul's College (Darjeeling), the Doveton College (Madras) and La Martinere (Lucknow). These schools were regarded as inferior to schools in Britain, but they

¹²⁷ See Ch.6 for detailed discussions.

¹²⁸ See Ch.3

did manage to find 'respectable' employments for their pupils after they graduated. The problem was that these cases of successful integration were confined to those who sprang from a tiny class of wealthy families that were rather aloof from the rest of the community. Overall, their successes were too few and far between and did not materially uplift the community as a whole. Even the relatively well-to-do members of the community increasingly found it too demanding to send their children to hill schools in the northern mountains or to the prestigious schools in the plains, to say nothing of schools in the metropole. For the majority of the domiciled, the charges of these better schools were increasingly prohibitory. For the parents of the poorer classes, free charity schools were often the only option available. And even at these, many did not attend, growing up illiterate instead.

Total Institutionalisation: John Graham's 'Colonial Homes'

As we have observed, the colonial elites of late British India invented and supported an educational scheme for the domiciled population as a measure to counteract the pauperisation of its increasing majority. To secure its racial prestige in the colonising context, the British community had to save its domiciled counterpart from its characteristic destitution. But it became increasingly clear that a standardised

system of education was not really up to the task. As of the turn of the century, a large portion of the domiciled poor remained unemployed, being forced to lead impoverished lives in slum environs, and their children often did not go to school at all. The primary aim of European education ever since the time of Bishop Cotton – namely, to integrate all children of British descent in school - had not at all been achieved. What was left for the British promoters of European education in the face of these mounting difficulties? In the colonial discourse on European education from the beginning of the twentieth century, we find frequent references to an institution named the St. Andrew's Colonial Homes, and to its founder the Rev. John Graham. How this Scottish missionary sought to solve the vexed question of impoverished domiciled progenies was to provide a model way for dealing with European pauperism.

John Graham opened his St. Andrew's Colonial Homes in 1900. He chose as its site a cool spot called Kalimpong which was located near the Eastern Himalayas, 350 miles north of Calcutta. The Colonial Homes resembled an orphanage – it took poor children of British descent (both pure and mixed) while very young and educated them in complete isolation from the rest of colonial society. Each year, Graham provided 500-600 students with a complete boarding-school education.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ For instance, it had 572, 573, 610 inmates in, 1918, 1933, 1938 respectively. 'Kalimpong Homes', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 15 Mar. 1918, p.18; R. N. Reid & B. C. Studd, 'Letter to the Editor: The Kalimpong Homes: A Christmas Appeal', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 21 Dec. 1933, p.6; 'Kalimpong Homes Look Ahead', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 10 Feb. 1938, p.13

The Homes aimed at orienting the destitute offspring of the domiciled population towards industrial and agricultural pursuits and, where possible, helped them emigrate to British settler colonies such as Australia and New Zealand. In no time after its commencement, Graham's project came to occupy a special place in the history of European education. The British hailed and supported it cordially. In 1927, for instance, the Governor of Bengal (Lord Lytton, the son of the late Lytton) described it as 'the most admirable and successful of all missionary activities'.¹³⁰ R. Carstairs, who insisted that British in India must take care of their domiciled fellows for the sake of colonial racial prestige, recognised Graham's scheme as the very kind of educational arrangement needed for his proclaimed national crusade against the great menace of European pauperism.¹³¹ And Lord Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal, remarked:

'I am convinced that the way in which Dr. Graham is tackling this very difficult problem of the Anglo-Indian community in this country is perhaps the only satisfactory way in which it can be dealt with'.¹³²

As the Governor said, by assisting in the expansion of his work the British in India were 'laying firm a corner stone which will act as a mainstay to any subsequent measures which may be devised for improving the lot of the community as a

¹³⁰ 'Anglo-Indian Boys and Girls', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 24 Feb. 1927, p.11

¹³¹ Carstairs, p. 22. After his retirement from the ICS., Carstairs actively supported Graham from London.

¹³² 'Kalimpong Homes: Splendid Year's Work', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 15 Mar. 1918, p.18

whole'.¹³³ Such praise was not at all rare, echoed by many others. In the rest of this chapter, we examine what ideological and practical roles Graham's scheme played in the first decades of the twentieth century.

Ideological implication

By the early twentieth century, the colonial authorities were aware that the mere combination of grants-in-aid and free charitable education was not enough for impoverished domiciled children. And they identified their parents as the greatest obstacle: the problem of illiteracy was much due to the 'indifference of parents of the lower classes'.¹³⁴ According to *The Review of Education*, many of such parents themselves suffered from an extreme degree of poverty, and were often too ashamed to enrol their children in school because they could not even clothe the latter properly.¹³⁵ The colonial state had already provided a substantial amount of material aid, but because of both the alleged parental negligence and the slum condition, it found it difficult to integrate every target child. The CDCEC's Sub-Committee on the Available Means of Relief revealed that, through charities, material aid had actually been given more than enough. Out of a population of about 4,900 children of school-going age in Calcutta, 3,100 or 63% had been

¹³³ 'Kalinpong Homes: Annual Meeting', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 5 Mar. 1919, p.11

¹³⁴ *Review of Education in India*, 1886, p.305

¹³⁵ *ibid*

assisted by charitable schools and/or educational funds, and of these, 1,300 or over 26% had been instructed free of charge.¹³⁶ The CDCEC's Sub-Committee on Education Generally argued that no child had been debarred from schooling simply because of a lack of public aid. On the contrary;

'no community [other than the domiciled community] exists for which more liberal assistance towards the education and maintenance of its children has been provided by way of Trusts and Charities'.¹³⁷

It was 'because their parents do not appreciate the need' that poor domiciled children had been debarred from education.¹³⁸ At this juncture, British society increasingly felt it necessary to 'reclaim' impoverished children of British descent from their demeaning parents and subsequently institutionalise them.

But attendance was not the only question regarding poor domiciled children. Even if children attended free charitable schools, the problem of unemployment after graduation still remained. Even for those who attended normal schools, employment was extremely difficult. By normal school education, children may certainly be removed from the slum conditions of their lives temporarily. But, without future prospects, they would just add themselves to the group of European paupers whom the special conditions of colonial Indian society easily manufactured.

As the educational authorities warned:

¹³⁶ *Report of the CDCEC*, p.172

¹³⁷ *ibid.*, p.105

¹³⁸ *ibid.*

‘The destitute Eurasian, however deplorable his position or remote his connection with Europe, clings tenaciously to the fact that he is in part European. As such he will not do the manual work of the casual labourer and indeed, as has been frequently pointed out before, the work under Indian conditions is practically closed to him. The climate and the charity of the bazar make the life of the destitute in a town like Calcutta much less physically painful than that of the destitute in a European town. Consequently in the life of the lowest of the half-caste community you have ideal conditions for the creation of loafers’.¹³⁹

The colonial authorities increasingly came to think that the only solution would lie in geographically removing poor domiciled children from their urban dwellings, far away from their impoverished parents. Such children were to be given completely different kinds of employment, which prepared them for alternative ways of life. And it was against this background that British saw Graham’s Homes as an ideal measure for solving both questions of illiteracy and unemployment simultaneously.

The participants of the CEDCI acknowledged a special difficulty in finding employment for domiciled children who graduated from charitable schools. Finding jobs was hard even for those more fortunate ones who received a comprehensive (non-charitable) education. One participant of the CEDCI, Pakenham Walsh, claimed that the solution of this problem of unemployment was the key to ‘the uplifting of the “submerged tenth”’ which he saw as the most important population in connection with the whole question of European pauperism.¹⁴⁰ And it was to Graham’s Colonial Homes, Walsh argued, that the

¹³⁹ *Review of Education in Bengal, Third Quinquennial Report*, p.150

¹⁴⁰ *Report of the CEDCI*, p.11

British could turn in their effort to solve such a vexed question. He said it would be necessary to:

'get the children away from their surroundings to places like Kalimpong where they could have industrial as well as literary education and might pass on to agricultural settlements. etc'.¹⁴¹

According to its Report, the CEDCI generally agreed that the state of the poorer members of Calcutta and Madras' domiciled populations called for urgent attention; provisions should be made for free and low-fee boarding schools. And, where possible, the example of Graham should be followed in connecting charitable education and employment. The Conference maintained that arrangements should be made to let destitute domiciled children pursue agricultural and industrial training in the way Graham's Homes did. Likewise, efforts should be made to get them apprenticeships in Government factories, firms, and mints.¹⁴²

What was so appealing about Graham's institution was that it would not just accommodate the domiciled poor in isolation, but simultaneously make them 'honest labourers'. *The Review of Education in Bengal* (1907) expressed support for Graham's institution by citing Mr. Hallward as he praised the Homes:

'The creator of these Homes set himself deliberately to eradicate in early childhood the seeds of that inveterate vice of the country-born or half-caste, the indolent contempt for honest labour; to breed in a pure air and in a climate where white folk can thrive a race of sturdy, self-reliant, God-fearing, lads and lasses, trained to walk and run and leap barefooted and bare-legged, to work with their hands and think no scorn, and to be wholly independent of the

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*

¹⁴² *ibid.*, p.12

household service of the people of the land'.¹⁴³

Graham's scheme was seen to have all the things necessary for attacking the issue of destitute white children in India.

John Graham himself was also conscious of the political significance of the project only too well. After arriving in India, he came to think that the sight of neglected domiciled children on plantations, in railway junctions and in the Calcutta or Madras slums, was a disgrace to both his nation and religion.¹⁴⁴ His founding of the St.

Andrew's Colonial Homes in 1900 had no doubt been motivated by this fear over European pauperism. He wrote:

'No problem in India – a land of many complex problems – is harder than that of the lowest type of Anglo-Indian; and no class is more derogatory to British rule. For he naturally claims connection with the ruling race and he nominally belongs to the Christian religion. It is not surprising therefore that millions of the more ignorant people of India judge the British power and the religion of Christ by those people, with a result not flattering to the prestige of our

¹⁴³ *Review of Education in Bengal, Third Quinquennial Report*, p.150. These views were also expressed elsewhere. For instance, *The Quinquennial Review of Education in Bengal [1907-08 to 1911-12]* had the following to say: '[at the Homes] The children are got hold of when young, carefully trained among healthy surroundings and in good climate and brought up to useful employment. [...] As Mr. Prothero remarks, India wants more Kalimpongs'. *Review of Education in Bengal, Fourth Quinquennial Review*, pp.236-7 (Prothero was in charge of *Forth Quinquennial Review*).

¹⁴⁴ He first came to India in 1889 as a missionary to bring Christianity to the native people of Kalimpong, namely the Lepchas, the Bhutias and the Nepalese. He had chances to visit tea plantations in such places in the north as Duars, Terai and Darjeeling. It was through these visits that he came to know about 'mixed-blood' children. In the plantations, with the absence of British women, it was not uncommon for young planters to form sexual liaisons with native girls who were employed to work on them. Those liaisons often resulted in the creation of 'half-caste' children. In most cases, the British planters involved left the children and their native mothers behind when they had to return to Britain for good, leaving only some compensation behind. It was these initial encounters that motivated Graham to create a specialised institution to provide for poor mixed-descent and domiciled-European children. J. R. Minto, *Graham in Kalimpong* (Edinburgh, 1974), p.54

country or strengthening to the evidence of our faith'.¹⁴⁵

He thought that the mixed-descent population had to be taken care of and put under control as an integral part of the British body politic in India, especially at a time when British rule had been politically challenged.¹⁴⁶

Graham's concern with racial and religious prestige was clearly reflected in his insistence on the need for transcending denominational and sectarian boundaries in matters relating to educational aid. He admitted that each denominational group had its own special contribution to make to the education of domiciled children, but claimed that petty rivalry would only prove harmful.¹⁴⁷ What was needed was a united endeavour which would bring the different Churches 'closer together in spiritual harmony'.¹⁴⁸ The importance of denominational cooperation should be taken to heart by the Christian Church of all denominations 'in the spirit of a Crusade as being for a great and needy cause'.¹⁴⁹ As for his own institution, Graham made sure that the staff was multi-denominational.¹⁵⁰

Graham found no difficulty in drawing support from the British in India. With their sharp awareness of the danger of European pauperism, they were even

¹⁴⁵ Quoted in *ibid.*, pp.158-159

¹⁴⁶ J. A., Graham, 'The Education of the Anglo-Indian Child', *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, 83 (1934), pp.22-46, p.34

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.* p.39

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ 'The seventy chief "workers" hail from many parts of the world, and at present different sects, and the staff is strengthened by the fusion of nationalities and ecclesiastical outlooks', *ibid.*, p.34

more sympathetic than the Church of Scotland whence Graham originated. In fact, according to J. R. Minto, Graham's own missionary affiliations in Scotland, namely the Church of Scotland Foreign Missions Committee and the Young Men's Guild, were both suspicious of his project in India. For them, education of destitute white children did not seem to matter much because those children were already Christian, thus not needing to be converted. As for the existence of mixed-descent people, it was little known in Britain, and received little attention. Under the racial and sexual morality of Victorian and Edwardian society, the fact of the existence of numerous 'mixed-bloods' would rather be kept unknown.¹⁵¹ Thus Graham found it harder to obtain aid from the metropole, where greater resources were potentially available than within the colonial periphery.¹⁵² In terms of the latter, Graham found little trouble in drawing attention and resources from both Government and private benevolence. He could seek financial support from tea, jute, engineering and other industries run by the wealthy British business men. The Government was extremely liberal, providing Graham with a grant of Rs 5 per month per child.¹⁵³ The construction expenses of most of the various buildings at the Homes were donated by the Queen, the Prince of Wales, and eight Governors of Bengal, as well as British merchants in India and Burma.¹⁵⁴ Prominent members of the Board of

¹⁵¹ Minto, p.56 and pp.155-156

¹⁵² *ibid.*, p.61

¹⁵³ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Graham, p.33. To give some examples: the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam funded

Management included the Lieutenant-Governors of Bengal and Chief Secretaries of Government, as well as other officials, missionaries, planters and merchants.¹⁵⁵

Isolation, discipline and alternative economic lives

Graham and his colleagues at Kalimpong saw that it was of crucial importance that poor domiciled children be wholly uprooted from their dwellings in the cities and railway junctions in other locale. Everything down the plains was against those children: their exposure to the environment, both physical and social, was seen to be so inimical as to 'inevitably lead to their degeneration'.¹⁵⁶ British should get hold of these children at as early a stage as possible and move them to a hill station in the north. This would be the only effective way 'to make them strong, robust and vigorous men and women'.¹⁵⁷ W. W. Hornell, Director of Public Instruction of Bengal, was himself involved in this measure of apprehending domiciled infants. Whenever children not attending school came to his notice, Hornell always wrote or wired from Calcutta to Kalimpong, asking Graham to institutionalise them in his

the building of a Cottage opened in July 1909. 'St. Andrew's Homes, Kalimpong: Opening of Eastern Bengal and Assam Cottage', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 15 Jul. 1909, pp.20-21, p.20; as a gift before his retirement to Britain, a Calcutta merchant helped to found the MacGregore Cottage which was opened in June 1912. 'The Kalimpong Homes: Opening of the MacGregore Cottage', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 27 Jun. 1912, p.18

¹⁵⁵ Minto, p.62

¹⁵⁶ 'Appeal to Mr. Andrew Carnegie', in *St. Andrew's Colonial Homes Magazine*, Oct. (1901), p.26

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*

Colonial Homes. Graham did not refuse a single case.¹⁵⁸ There is no doubt that Graham's 'rescue work' had an element of coercion. His institution was not strictly an 'orphanage', if that description narrowly denoted an institution for 'parentless' children. In fact these parents usually resisted the British efforts to take their offspring away. As Hornell noted:

'it was very disappointing to find many cases in which parents whose children should be sent to Kalimpong refused to allow them to go because they imagined that it was a sort of reformatory where the inmates had to endure all sorts of hardships'.¹⁵⁹

Kalimpong was located near the Himalayas. It had, about 50 miles to the north, the snowy barrier which screened it from Tibet. Once transferred to Kalimpong, Graham's 'sons and daughters' would be given a fair chance to improve their body, which had supposedly 'degenerated' in the plains. Beside this obvious climatological advantage in terms of bodily health, various practices at the Colonial Homes were programmed in ways that sought to thoroughly transform the ways in which their inmates lived and thought. Graham adopted what may be called a family system which aimed at 'uniting the children into one big family'.¹⁶⁰ Such familial unity was not intended as mere mass uniformity but as an organic whole in

¹⁵⁸ 'Kalimpong Homes: Splendid Year's Work', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 15 Mar. 1918, p.18

¹⁵⁹ 'Kalimpong Homes: Annual Meeting in Calcutta', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 18 Mar. 1915, pp.17-18, p.18

¹⁶⁰ Graham, p.32

which ‘the benefits of the divine family unit may be realised’.¹⁶¹ As Graham noted:

‘Upon the “mother” and “aunty” in charge of each cottage largely rests the Herculean task of welding thirty-two children of widely varied origin and age and parts into one family whole. No higher or harder mission could claim the gifts of consecrated womanhood!’¹⁶²

Female staff of the right sort were needed and Graham made sure to maintain their professional standard by recruiting directly from Scotland.¹⁶³ Through their expertise, the lives of the inmates would be supervised in their most minute details.

The merit of this rigid system of supervision was that it would eradicate the children’s dependency on domestic servants. It had been commonly held that, even when they were poor, the domiciled community depended on Indian servants, which left the children of the former helplessly spoiled and lazy. Julius Smith, headmaster of a similar institution in Burma, went as far as to say, ‘Anglo-India demands the servants. [...] India would lay all possible on a servant and do a minimum for self. Just here is the secret explanation of the whole matter’.¹⁶⁴ Strict supervision would ensure that the children of the Homes took up domestic work by themselves. As Graham observed:

‘Domestic lore is one of the most important branches of human knowledge, and the spirit of

¹⁶¹ *ibid.*

¹⁶² *ibid.*

¹⁶³ ‘The Leut-Governor: Unveiling the Victoria Memorial’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 14 Nov. 1901, p.17; ‘St. Andrew’s Colonial Homes: Annual Meeting’, 30 Mar. 1905, pp.18-19,

¹⁶⁴ Julius Smith, ‘Correct Education for Anglo-Indians and Eurasians in India’, *St. Andrew’s Colonial Home’s Magazine*, Jan. (1902), pp. 45-46, p.46

mutual service in the organisation of the home represents one of the best training grounds for life'.¹⁶⁵

Close inculcation of children in domestic self-discipline would be indispensable for eliminating their supposedly characteristic 'disinclination and a shame of labour.'¹⁶⁶

It would prevent them from acquiring an 'overbearing spirit' which was allegedly generated by 'bossing' native servants.¹⁶⁷

Graham's effort to transform poor domiciled children would be completed by setting them in certain special careers. The newly acquired self-discipline and love for honest labour must have practical fields of application. The Colonial Homes offered curricula which emphasised industrial and agricultural knowledge for boys and domestic skills for girls. These instructions of practical nature were carried further by affiliating the Colonial Homes with specialised institutions such as the Slbpur College for engineering¹⁶⁸ and the Kalimpong Demonstration Farm.¹⁶⁹

Armed with knowledge and skills for agriculture, industry and domestic service, the children were to become agricultural settlers both in India and abroad, soldiers,¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ Graham, p.32

¹⁶⁶ 'Appeal to Mr. Andrew Carnegie', p.26

¹⁶⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ By 1908, Kalimpong's affiliation with the Slbpur College was sanctioned and the first batch of boys were prepared for the engineering curriculum. 'St. Andrew's Colonial Homes: Annual Meeting of the Calcutta Committee', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 26 Mar. 1908, pp.11-12, p.12

¹⁶⁹ 'St. Andrew's Colonial Homes', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 5 Nov. 1908, p.20

¹⁷⁰ In his article of 1934, Graham mentioned the heroic deeds of some Kalimpong pupils who served for the military during WWI. 123 pupils served in it. Graham, p. 36

sailors,¹⁷¹ and so forth. Graham worked strenuously to open up opportunities, negotiating with authorities and employers,¹⁷² and asking the public for understanding and support.¹⁷³

Aside from improving their lives within India, emigration was another significant option available for the graduates of the Homes. One of the most important aims of the education there was to prepare domiciled children for emigrating to Britain's settler colonies, so that they would become a fit immigrant, duly acceptable to the people of such colonies.¹⁷⁴ The instruction in agricultural know-how, for example, would help them in making successful colonial settlers in the vast unspoilt fields of Australia or New Zealand. In reality, there were many obstacles which the children of the Homes met in the countries of adoption. In Australia, for example, there was a colour-bar against people of mixed parentage, and the market for low-wage labour had often already been closed.¹⁷⁵ But Graham did manage to send a number of his pupils abroad, of which the following are some

¹⁷¹ Other attempts included the launching in 1932 of a bakery shop called 'Kalimpong Home Products' entirely staffed and run by children from the Homes. This project would aim at solving 'the increasingly difficult problem of setting the youths in suitable employment after they leave the Homes' by 'finding new sources of absorption'. 'New Venture by the Kalimpong Homes', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 10 Nov. 1932, p.12

¹⁷² For instance, he wrote that the 'stereotyped prejudice' that domiciled children were mentally and physically unfit to become seamen should be removed. He argued that the marine authorities should give to the inmates of the Homes more opportunities to prove their capacity, to which they had responded generally well. Graham, pp. 35-36

¹⁷³ For instance, in 1912, Graham published an appeal letter on *The Statesman* to ask the public to donate cloths for the five boys who were about to emigrate to New Zealand. 'St. Andrew's Colonial Homes: An Appeal', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 26 Sep. 1912, p.20

¹⁷⁴ 'Appeal to Mr. Andrew Carnegie', p.26

¹⁷⁵ See Ch. 4

examples. In 1907 two boys went to take up farming in New Zealand. In 1908 two boys and a girl emigrated to Virginia (United States) with Ms. Brown, the late Agricultural Superintendent of Kalimpong.¹⁷⁶ In 1928, the biggest party ever emigrated to New Zealand, comprising six girls and ten boys.¹⁷⁷ By the mid-1930s, more than fifty had emigrated to New Zealand, eleven to Australia, four to the United States, and one to South Africa.¹⁷⁸ Graham also struggled to send his pupils to a career in marine piloting. Certain British had regarded marine piloting as one possible solution to European pauperism,¹⁷⁹ with which Graham was in full accord. He sent his students to training-ships in Britain in the hope that they would later qualify as sailors in the mercantile marine or the navy. By 1909, the Marine Society of India sent twenty five boys from Kalimpong to the training ship *Southampton* at Hull.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ 'St. Andrew's Colonial Homes: Annual Meeting in Calcutta', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 25 Mar. 1909, p.17

¹⁷⁷ 'Kalimpong Homes' Work', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 18 Feb. 1926, p.19

¹⁷⁸ Graham, pp.36-37; Emigration from the Colonial Homes continued towards the end of British rule. In October 1939, for example, 14 boys and girls emigrated to New Zealand. 'Dr. Graham on Outlook for Anglo-Indians', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 9 Feb. 1939, p.16

¹⁷⁹ See Ch. 4

¹⁸⁰ 'Kalimpong Homes Progress', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 5 Oct. 1933, p.16

Conclusion

The colonial elites of late British India were usually prepared to bear the heavy financial and psychological burdens that were inevitably entailed in educating their offspring in the far-off metropole. These parents had been deeply prejudiced against the educational institutions available in the colony and against the children of the domiciled community who were the majority in these schools. But, at the same time, they were also aware that the collective prestige of the British community had to be defended against a threat of pauperism which prevailed in its domiciled counterpart. In order for the British in India to maintain their racial prestige, it was not sufficient, although necessary, simply to send their own progeny to the safety of metropolitan upbringing and education. In order to secure their collective 'superiority' in the presence of Indian subjects, they had to somehow cope with the vexed question of European pauperism. And for this, they found education as the most crucial measure. Both state agents and missionary-educational circles of diverse sorts cooperated closely in trying to create an organised regime for integrating pauperised domiciled children in school. The nature of the education in question was always more philanthropic than academic, and this was increasingly so into the early twentieth century. With the immense difficulties in finding employment, the only effective remedy for European pauperism seemed to be a

removal of the domiciled community's new generations from the social and environmental milieu in which they had been immersed. Albeit in varying degrees, almost all British educationalists searched through the possibilities of 'reclaiming' domiciled children from both their neglecting parents and the slum environment. And it was in John Graham's project that such policy finally saw itself flourishing to its full capacities. British could now apprehend the children of their domiciled brethren at an early age, remove them from their families and living environments all together, and prepare them, through institutional discipline, for wholly different prospects.

6. Britishness and its Discontents: the Claim of the Domiciled for Material Equality

Introduction

The preceding chapters have discussed the construction of colonial racial prestige in India by analysing British attitudes towards their domiciled brethren. Such attitudes were both exclusionary and inclusionary, reflecting a certain 'bourgeois' (as well as 'Orientalist') dimension of the (re)production of racial boundaries. This class-specific construction served to exclude poorer portions *within* the white population from the sphere of imperial privileges, whilst at the same time reducing the latter into a docile object of bourgeois philanthropy intended to make their pauperised existence less racially problematic. The present chapter will further probe this complex attitude, but from a different vantage point. It will bring to the fore the question of what the domiciled themselves had to say about the identity and living standard of their own, and about their relation to their non-domiciled brethren. Leaders of the domiciled community were far from content with the prescribed philanthropic answer to their plight, and strongly argued for a material equality with

the British. Such a move naturally conflicted with the bourgeois construction of Britishness which, by both definition and convention, prohibited the inclusion of the domiciled class. This chapter will focus on this political tension, and will further elaborate upon how the boundaries of Britishness were drawn, redefined, and fixed.

The chapter will set out with a section which briefly discusses the composition and orientation of the domiciled community's leadership. The community's political attitude was not necessarily uniform: its leadership was not always united but was often fraught with internal ideological discrepancies that were perpetuated by regional differences. But, at the same time, when it came to the question of the community's standard of living, leaders had a more or less unified view: they insisted that the domiciled community could not subsist on 'Indian' wages and had to be given a chance to be recognised and employed as 'British'. This first section will be followed by three others, arranged in chronological order, all of which will specifically analyse the imperial policies and debates regarding the recruitment of 'British' men in the civil service. For leaders of the domiciled community, the question of civil employment was of exceptional significance: they thought that, in order to regenerate their community from its characteristic pauperisation, it would be indispensable to improve its living standard as well as to ameliorate its social and hygienic condition. And employment in certain grades of the civil service was considered to be one of the only means left for this material improvement. This

made them fight against the growing tendency of the colonial and imperial headquarters to recruit only non-domiciled Britons for these grades that the domiciled wished preserved for themselves. Thus the aim of the chapter's last three sections will be to highlight political negotiations that took place specifically over the question of civil recruitment. The second section of the chapter will cover the period from the late 1870s, examining, most importantly, how domiciled leaders represented their demands to the Public Service Commission (1886-7). The third section will discuss the debates in the last years of the century, which culminated in the heated exchanges with Lord Curzon during 1900-1. The fourth section will cover the period up to 1930, in which Indian society saw a dramatic change in the political relation between the coloniser and colonised.¹

The reason why this chapter more or less exclusively focuses on the question of civil recruitment is largely analytic, constrained by its particular concern with the colonial construction of British racial prestige. It was over the question of who were qualified for certain public positions that the aforementioned political tension over Britishness most sharply articulated itself. It was here that the 'qualities', or

¹ With its concern limited to the self-asserted Britishness of the domiciled community under imperialism, this chapter will not probe into debates on Home Rule and decolonisation that were increasingly predominant themes from the 1920s till the end of British rule in 1947. These debates are, of course, of vital importance, especially in considering the position of the 'Anglo-Indian community' in the post-colonial period. But it is specifically with the Britishness of the domiciled community under colonial rule, and not directly with its 'Indianness', that this research is primarily concerned. Therefore, the present chapter will stop at the Indian Statutory Commission (1930), and will only briefly discuss the series of constitutional reforms that took place in the early 1930s, namely the Indian Statutory Commission, the Round Table Conference and the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, which finally culminated in the Government of India Act of 1935.

criteria, of being recognised as 'British' were brought to public attention, so that the racial, class and domiciliary hierarchies of colonial society were severely contested. And it is in order to keep our discussions focused on these points that this chapter will purposefully omit certain topics. For instance, it will not directly discuss the question of representative politics in the legislatures, preferring to confine its attention to memorials, deputations and special commissions where the exchanges between domiciled leaders and their British counterparts were most explicitly observed. The subject of military recruitment will also be omitted, but for different reasons. My preliminary research indicates that leaders of the domiciled community demanded the government, throughout the later colonial period, to sanction the formation of a special communal regiment, which would be recognised, and therefore remunerated, as a 'British' one. British authorities, however, repeatedly rejected this claim on the grounds that the domiciled were 'not British enough' to form such a regiment. I decided to omit the debates over military recruitment not because they are in any ways irrelevant to this research: on the contrary, they were important in having raised similar problems of race, class and domicile. In fact, beside the issue of civil recruitment, the question of military recruitment was another major arena where the meaning of Britishness was called into question. The omission here is simply due to a lack of space and to a judgement that the same arguments need not be repeated, with the discussion on civil

employment sufficiently representative of the problems I wish to address in this dissertation.

Association Politics and Its Claim for a European Standard of Living

The activists of the domiciled community based their political and social activities upon the Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association (EAIA), the first branch of which was established in Calcutta (1876), with E. W. Chambers as its president. A second branch was soon founded in Madras, followed by a third in Bombay. Many others also mushroomed across India, including Alahabad and Burma. The colonial elites were not enthusiastic about the EAIA as a platform of racial politics, especially the sort that expressed strong political identification with the British establishment. Instead, they expected the latter to act specifically as a local agent of their own philanthropic scheme that aimed to control the lives of their domiciled-European and mixed-descent relations. The domiciled community should not depend for assistance either on the colonial elites or on the state. Instead, as *The Statesman* maintained, it should orient itself towards 'a spirit of self-help and independence the want of which has been the source of so many of the evils'.² The primary function

² 'The Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 5 Jun. 1877, p.662-3, p.662

of the EAIA should be to foster ‘a spirit of enterprise and admiration for honest labour’.³ By concentrating on the amelioration of the community’s pauperised condition, it ought to inculcate self-reliance and effect the ‘process which Hubert Spencer calls “super-organic evolution”’.⁴ By the time the EAIA was established, the pauperism of domiciled Europeans and mixed-descent people had been perceived as a threat to colonial racial prestige, as it eroded the native respect for the white population as a whole. But instead of simply discriminating against the domiciled as an inferior being, British sought to integrate them through a network of philanthropic and educational policies.⁵ It was in this context that they expected the newly founded EAIA to engage in practical ameliorative work, instead of making claims on account of their British racial descent.

To be sure, there *were* some occasions where the British community in India did actually recognise its domiciled counterpart as an ally in its racial politics to preserve white interests. Between 1882 and 1883, India witnessed a storm of white racial backlash. A good number of British settlers were ferociously opposed to Lord Ripon’s proposal to allow senior Indian magistrates to preside over cases that involved ‘European-British’ subjects: for them, such legislation meant an unbearable disorder to the racial hierarchy of imperial society. In this infamous

³ *ibid.*

⁴ ‘The Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 27 Ap. 1878, pp.754-5, p.755

⁵ For these points, see Ch. 4 and Ch.5

'Ilbert Bill' controversy, British agitators hailed the support given by Calcutta-based domiciled leaders, such as W. C. Madge, who had demonstrated a determined commitment to the British cause.⁶ According to *The Englishman*, there was a 'perfect solidarity between the European and the mixed races'.⁷ Thus, in the context of defending their foreign jurisdiction, certain Britons recognised their domiciled brethren as a possible political ally.

Another area wherein the domiciled class would be useful was in certain arenas of colonial administration and industry. Certainly, the economic decline of the domiciled community was greatly due to the fact that colonial rulers increasingly preferred either Europeans or Indians in public employment. But in the so-called 'security services', namely the Customs, Telegraph, and Railways, British wished to retain a particular number of domiciled personnel, the reason being that in the age of a growing anti-colonial nationalism, it was necessary to safeguard communication and transportation means from possible occurrences of internal security threats, such as weapon smuggling or labour strikes. Because of their racial origin, members of the domiciled community were regarded as intently 'loyal' to colonial rule. In the Railways for example, British made it virtually compulsory for domiciled employees

⁶ See, 'Memorial of the Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association', *The Englishmen [Weekly]*, 13 Mar. 1883, p.22; 'The Great Meeting in the town Hall', *The Englishman [Weekly]*, 25 Aug. 1883, pp.14-15, p.15; and W. C. Madge, 'Moral Aspects of Trial by Peer', *The Calcutta Review*, 81 (1885), pp.165-170.

⁷ 'The Feeling Against Mr. Ilbert's Bill', *The Englishmen [Weekly]*, 13 March 1883, p.2. Whether or not there was indeed such a racial solidarity is of course open to question since not all Britons and domiciled men were involved in the agitation.

to enlist in the volunteer corps. One of the crucial functions of this corps was to crack down on railway strikes. The secure management of the railways had been considered vital for preserving the strategic and commercial interests of the Empire, and the colonial authorities sought to defend these interests by pitting domiciled employees against their Indian fellows within the same company. Such policy had its origins in a feeling of insecurity generated by the numerically insignificant European presence in the midst of a potentially hostile native population. British rule, after all, was foreign domination, and it was considered instrumental to use racial ties, when the question of internal security was at stake.⁸ Thus, British did manage to find particular uses for their domiciled brethren. But none of their appropriations of racial ties served to narrow the pre-existent social gaps within the white population. And the EAIA was never given a chance to advance its political claims to be recognised as 'British' rather than 'Indian'. In fact, the British elites wanted domiciled activists to abstain from any political and/or racial affinity. Even at a time when racialist ideas and practices had become so firmly entrenched in colonial society, the former thought it politic not to incite otherwise avoidable racial hostilities. The colonial rulers tended to see the EAIA's political stance as naturally pro-imperial and racially chauvinistic, and feared that such might easily harm both Indian feelings and colonial liberalism. For example, *The Statesman* accused the

⁸ Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: the 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester, 1995), p.15

EAlA's Calcutta branch's position towards the early nationalist movement of being positively anti-Indian. This accusation was concerned with the decision of S. B. Taylor, the President of the EAlA at Calcutta, not to throw its lot in with the Indian National Congress. The paper described Taylor as a 'mischievous agitator', exhibiting an undesirable sort of racial sentiment which was allegedly characteristic of the whole domiciled community.⁹ Taylor denied this accusation, arguing that his decision was not ideological but derived from a practical need for safeguarding the community's elective strength. What he opposed, he said, was not the political representation / empowerment of Indian subjects *per se*, but the proposed introduction of the principle of elective representation, which would virtually disenfranchise the numerically precarious domiciled community.¹⁰ Yet *The Statesman* continued its accusation, likening Taylor's decision to a 'thinly veiled dislike of pure natives'.¹¹ Taylor, it argued, only wanted to get the needs of the domiciled community recognised in a 'special or privileged way'.¹²

Such British reactions were consistent with the predominant stereotype that domiciled persons were predisposed to a psychological anomaly in which they mimicked British whilst simultaneously looking down on Indians. What the domiciled ought to do for regenerating their community, it followed, was to

⁹ S. B. Taylor, 'Letter to the Editor: Eurasians and the Congress', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 14 Jun. 1890, p.1

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² 'Eurasians and the Congress', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 21 Jun. 1890, p.5

recognise their unbridgeable difference from their non-domiciled British brethren, and learn to appreciate an Indian standard of living (if not an Indian way of religion or culture). An important objective of colonial philanthropy would be to inculcate this alternative sense of self through discipline, both moral and behavioural. What the colonial elites wanted from the EAIA was to assist their philanthropic effort, which involved an acceptance of the community's status as one of India's native communities. Taylor's decision had to be disparaged as it was taken to represent a covert desire to wilfully forget their Indian domicile and see itself as a British community.

The attitudes of domiciled leaders themselves, however, were far more complex than simply being pro-European, or privilege-seeking. They were duly mindful of the seriousness of pauperism within their community, and of the need to implement ameliorative measures. Throughout the later colonial period, they organised various social schemes such as agricultural settlement and emigration as measures of 'self-help'. They often cooperated with the British promoters of these social measures, at times jointly appealing to the government circles for funds and institutional provisions. The appointment of the Pauperism Committee (1891) was done partly thanks to a petition by the EAIA, and the Committee heard the opinions of domiciled leaders by including in its board several EAIA leaders, as well as

British representatives. S. B. Taylor was one of the selected members of the Committee, and his views in the Committee's Report demonstrate the extent to which he himself had internalised the prevalent stereotype of the domiciled. He wrote:

'The want of energy is a graver effect [than the want of education], due in some measure to a debilitating climate, but still more to inherited and acquired habits which the better portions of the community may be expected to overcome, but which will scarcely be eradicated from the rank and file in the present generation. The leaders of the community may do much to raise the *morale* of the rising generation of their subordinates by inducing them to co-operate in associations, to continue for the protection of their interests, and regard private and personal gain as of less value than the general good. In other words, the hope of the community lies in the gradual development of a healthy public opinion in regard to premature marriages and the consequent multiplication of the species beyond the means of subsistence, and a greater disposition to adapt individual capacities to the environment of life in this country. There should be no envy of the sturdy European on the one hand, or the supple Hindu on the other, but a patient and sustained effort to study the exact position of Eurasians, and the best means of directing their powers to profitable ends in the limited area in which they are compelled to work'.¹³

Here, Taylor reproduced the classic account of pauperism among the domiciled, namely that it was substantially caused by a culture of degeneration, which had to be cured through a process of psychological and physical discipline. Such a passage, coming from the leader of the community itself, indicates that domiciled leaders did recognise their community's problems as those of philanthropy.

In yet another sense were the attitudes of domiciled leaders complex. Their community was not only small numerically, but was also scattered geographically. There were regional differences which could cause differences in terms of political

¹³ 'Annexure D, Appendix III' of *Report of the Pauperism Committee* (Calcutta, 1892), p. lxxvi

inclination. In fact, the already-small leadership was often torn apart ideologically. Several branches of the EAIA in Southern India showed a more flexible approach to Indian politics than the one in Calcutta (which was the most influential among all branches). Leaders down south insisted on regional autonomy and opposed amalgamation or central control, and they often emphasised the non-political character of their activities. They sought to concentrate, in contrast to their Calcutta counterpart, on social and economic problems.¹⁴ During the Ilbert Bill controversy, the leadership in Madras did not follow Calcutta's lead to ally with British agitators. D. S. White, the President of the Madras branch, was even in favour of the Bill. This caused friction within the domiciled community itself as well as with those Britons who welcomed the community's participation in the agitation.¹⁵ Nor was the political attitude of the domiciled community so simply pro-European in its relation to the Indian National Congress. Again, those in

¹⁴ In fact such internal discrepancies were so endemic as to lead to an institutional break-up of the EAIA. In 1909, those leaders based around Madras established the Anglo-Indian Empire League. Calcutta tried to dissuade this move only in vain. This was how there emerged an anomalous situation where there were two associations in Calcutta, presenting 'an unpleasant and unprofitable rivalry' (W. H. Arden Wood, 'Letter to the Editor: Anglo-Indian Unity', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 12 July 1918, p.7.). Calcutta argued for a centralisation of associational work for a greater political unity, and blamed the League for getting in the way of amalgamation ('The Domiciled Community: One Combined Body to be Formed', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 23 Jul. 1919, p.20). The League was not against communal solidarity at the all-India level but maintained that it should take the form of federation and opposed to amalgamation on the grounds that it would only empower powerful bodies like Calcutta, stripping other minor bodies of the right to handle their own financial and other matters ('Anglo-Indian Unity Efforts', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 15 Ap. 1926, p.15). Such disparities continued towards the end of colonial rule and to the present day. As in as late as 1937, for instance, the Madras branch showed its readiness to 'fight' against what it saw as a 'hostile and unreasonable attitude' of Henry Gidney and resist his efforts which 'trespassed' the regional autonomy of Madras ('Future of Unity Negotiations: Anglo-Indian Discord', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 15 Jul. 1937, p.18). On Henry Gidney see the last section of this chapter.

¹⁵ See, 'Public Meeting of the European and Anglo-Indian Communities', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 25 Aug. 1883, pp.1220-1221.

Madras tended to support the liberal impulse of the Government. Although it did not wholeheartedly commit itself to the Congress movement, the EAIA at Madras did send its representatives (D. S. White and later W. S. Ganz) to several of its meetings.¹⁶

But there was one point on which domiciled leaders seemed to have had a more or less unified view, namely on the question of the community's living standard. There was often disagreement over ideological issues of racial politics but the leaders generally agreed that their people were more 'British' than 'Indian' not just culturally, but also materially speaking. Their community might be a poor one in reality, but its members could never accept Indian standards of living. In order for the domiciled community to maintain its cultural distinctiveness, they argued, it had to be given employment which could guarantee a more British standard of living. Unless these employment needs were secured, the domiciled would not be able to adhere to European modes of life and would be barely distinguishable from the rest of indigenous society. However impoverished it might have become, the domiciled community was still Christian and European, and as such always needed more material resources than lower-caste Indians, who could subsist on 'one-fifth of what

¹⁶ See, 'Mr. Crole, C.S. On Eurasians and the Congress', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 12 Oct. 1889, p.5

Europeans can'.¹⁷ For the domiciled community, such an Indian level was nothing but a 'starving point'.¹⁸

Thus, against the philanthropic view held by their British masters, leaders of the EAIA claimed that the domiciled community had to be recognised as a British community in the sense that its members should at least be given a chance to compete for employment, especially with regard to certain positions in the civil and military services. This did not mean that they wanted their community members to rank among the colonial super-elites. Rather, what they sought was a guaranteed portion in the middle range with salaries between Rs. 250 and Rs. 600 per month. Or, in the case of the military, it meant the right to form a communal unit paid at the British level. Domiciled leaders thought that these European levels of remuneration alone would effect a genuine improvement. Given the abundance of domestic (and cheap) labour in India, government employment was almost the only hope for the domiciled's economic recovery. Moreover, they thought that the domiciled community had legitimate historical ground for insisting on such inclusion, especially on account of its cross-generational contribution to the building of the colonial services, particularly before the advent of the policy of 'Indianisation'.¹⁹

What was significant about such material claims was that they sharply

¹⁷ *The Englishman [Weekly]*, 24 April 1883, pp.12-13, p.13

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ See Ch. 3

contrasted with imperial ideas and practices concerning British identity, especially in terms of race and class. In advancing their special claim on public employment, EAIA leaders had to directly challenge the inequalities within the white population in India, particularly those between the non-domiciled and domiciled portions. They turned this domiciliary distinction into a contested site of political negotiations. In short, the rhetoric of domiciliary difference, fundamental to the construction of Britishness in the colonising context, was to be explicitly challenged. By investigating the politics over the criteria for assuming European public positions, the following sections will analyse how the limits of Britishness were actually formulated, redefined and guarded.

Exclusionary Policies in Civil Recruitment

One cause for the domiciled community's loss in appointments in the colonial civil service was the Government's policy of 'Indianisation', which had its origins in Lord Macaulay's Minute on Education (1830). The idea of Indianisation was to educate or 'anglicise' certain classes of the colonised population and utilise them as intermediaries between British rulers and their Indian subjects. For the sake of both effective political control and cost-efficient administration, the imperial authorities

found such a policy indispensable. In any case, one consequence of Indianisation was that the domiciled class, though 'Anglicised' in its own ways, would inevitably be marginalised. By the late nineteenth century, the position of domiciled people had markedly declined, socially, politically and economically. The colonial authorities were aware of this, and argued that it was not their intension to have the domiciled replaced by their indigenous neighbours. Born and bred in India, Eurasians and domiciled Europeans were defined as lawful colonial subjects whose rights for public employment were duly protected. Under the Government of India Act (1870), the domiciled community was designated, along with other Indian communities, as 'Statutory Natives of India'. By this arrangement, the domiciled community should be able to equally benefit from Indianisation.²⁰ And, as will be amply demonstrated below, British insisted that by this constitutional arrangement, their responsibility towards their domiciled brethren were fully discharged.

Despite its recourse to universal equality, however, the policy of Indiansiation was often racially coded. One explicit and controversial example was the so-called 'Rurki resolution', which concerned the appointment of engineering students to posts in the Public Works Department. In 1882, the Government decided that Indian students of the Thomason College at Rurki would be given a priority for public employment over domiciled students. By 'Indian', the British authorities referred

²⁰ *ibid.*

to 'Natives of pure Asiatic blood', explicitly excluding therefrom the domiciled pupils who were 'Native' by law but 'foreign' on account of blood. Against this resolution, leaders of the domiciled community made fierce protests, until the resolution was finally dropped one year later.²¹ In the EAIA's annual meeting in 1883 at the Town Hall of Calcutta, they condemned the Rurki resolution for deliberately favouring Indians, whilst breaching the principle of racial equality under the law.²² This reproach to the Government for its 'illegal' application of racial criterion was carried further at another EAIA meeting, which was held in the following year 'for the purpose of protesting against the exclusion of Europeans and Anglo-Indians from the service of the Government'.²³ The chairman of the meeting, the Rev. Bray, remarked:

'there were natives in this country, not Bengalis, not Sikhs, or Parsis, but people in the country, declared by a Government resolution to be natives of the country, who were heavily handicapped such as in that we (sic.) known in the Rurki resolution, and they wished they plainly and yet respectfully, to put before the Government the reasons why those natives of the country have fair play. They asked no favour, but they did ask that they have fair play, that there should be no handicapping of those who were also natives of the country'.²⁴

The domiciled community was as 'Native' as any other in India, and should not, on account of their racial origins, be excluded from Indianisation. In its protest,

²¹ *ibid.*

²² 'Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 13 Feb. 1883, pp.239-40

²³ 'Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association: Exclusion of Europeans and Anglo-Indians from Government Service', *The Englishman [Weekly]*, 9 Aug. 1884, pp.22-25, p.22

²⁴ As summarised by *The Englishman*. 'Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association: Exclusion of Europeans and Anglo-Indians from Government Service', *The Englishman [Weekly]*, 9 Aug. 1884, pp.22-25, p.22

the Association called for a rigid observation of the statutory rule. During examination by the Public Service Commission, E. W. Chambers (as a delegate from the EAIA at Calcutta) remarked that the statutory definition of 'Native' was 'very good' and 'sufficiently comprehensive', and that it required 'judicious application' to prevent the 'Rurki type' exclusion from ever recurring.²⁵ The domiciled community feared that, with racial tensions already so high, Indianisation could readily become an exclusionary mechanism that specifically marked out the domiciled community. The problem of 'Indianisation' for their community was that, without gainsaying its legal status as 'Native', none of the three parties involved – the British, Indians, and the domiciled themselves – regarded it as 'native' in the every-day understanding of the term. After all, they were not as 'Indian' as Bengalis, Sikhs, and Parsis, even if the law had defined them as 'Natives of India'.²⁶

²⁵ *Proceedings of the Public Service Commission, vol. VI – Proceedings Relating to the Lower Provinces of Bengal (Including Assam)* (Government of Bengal, Calcutta, 1887), p.111

²⁶ This became ever more problematic in the twentieth century when Indians gained more political power. In the interview of the Indian Statutory Commission, Henry Gidney, the then leader of the domiciled community, described the difficulty as follows:

'we instance a Government member making a statement in the Legislative Assembly in which he creates a cleavage in as far as he calls Anglo-Indians one community and he calls the rest of the other communities "Indian communities", and he intensified this further on by saying: "I have reduced the number of Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and those posts have been given to Indians". If, as an Anglo-Indian, I am a native of India, how can you Indianise an Indian? If I am an Anglo-Indian and a native of India, why should I be replaced by another Indian. [...] You do not make it between Parsis and other Indians. This is the insecurity of my position. [...] though by statute we are Indians, the Indian refuses to recognise this and looks upon us as aliens. This is our fear'.

Indian Statutory Commission, vol. XVI, Selections From Memoranda and Oral Evidence by Non-Officials, Part I (London, 1930), p.311

But in its protest against the 'Rurki' type of Indianisation, the EAIA's attitudes to their status were in fact highly ambiguous. Domiciled leaders rightly complained that British were unjustly sacrificing their domiciled brethren to satisfy Indian demands. But their objection to the policy of Indianisation did not necessarily mean that they wanted domiciled persons to be promoted in that policy, or to be employed and remunerated in the civil service as 'Indians'. The bulk of positions in the civil service guaranteed low salaries, in cases not even exceeding Rs. 50 per month: and such were clearly not what the EAIA aimed to gain in its effort to improve the condition of the domiciled community. The EAIA's politics over civil employment had more to do with securing a British standard of living, rather than securing equality before the law. Accordingly, the EAIA's attitudes towards the community's statutory status of 'Native' were equivocal: it did not want the legal definition to mean that the domiciled community had to accept lower standards of living. What domiciled leaders wanted instead was a fixed presence of certain European positions in ways that were available to their community, and not just to its non-domiciled counterpart. They might have agreed with educated Indian opinions upon the desired ends of making the system of recruitment more accessible to non-Europeans, but they disagreed as to its means. Whereas educated Indians tended to demand a gradual Indianisation of the structure of the bureaucracy, representatives of the

domiciled community argued for retention of its European character on a permanent basis.

The EAIA's most urgent political agenda related to a policy whereby Europeans increasingly secured the higher levels of colonial civil administration in ways that virtually excluded other communities in India. Precisely because of the increasing number of Indians in the lower levels of administration, British rulers saw it necessary to cement their command within the superior positions of the civil service. In some services such as mint and military finance, nearly the entire personnel were recruited in the metropole. Their policy most explicitly manifested itself in the cases of the Pilot, Forest and Public Works Departments. No sooner was the first EAIA established in 1876 than did its leaders start to voice concerns over the Government's policy of restricting certain public recruiting to the metropole. The Pilot Service was one of the most debated sites of this political confrontation between domiciled leaders and their British brethren. In a letter to the Marine Department of the Government of India (GOI) (No. 161, 19 January 1876), Sir Richard Temple, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, proposed a plan to reconstitute the service into a more centrally-controlled one. He observed that the pilot service on the River Hughli possessed a high degree of strategic and commercial importance. In order to secure the safety of ships, cargo, and the lives of passengers, the very best men had to be assigned as pilots. Temple argued that it was only by confining the

source of recruitment to Britain that the men of appropriate quality would be procured. He thought that all potential pilots must undergo a course of professional training in the metropole, so that they were thoroughly versed in Western manners and way of thinking. Candidates should be educated on training ships moored on British waters, and with the recommendation by the committee of these training ships, should finally be nominated for the pilot service by the Secretary of State. Temple's proposal was accepted and the first recruits for the reconstituted service arrived from England the following year. On average, three appointments were to be made annually by the Secretary of State among the trainees recommended by the committee of the training ships, *Conway* and *Worcester*.²⁷ This policy suggested that young men of the domiciled community could no longer apply from the land of their birth and abode. And, to rub salt in their wounds, the policy also implied that domiciled youths were not considered fit enough for this branch of the civil service.

In May 1879, the EAIA submitted a protest memorial to the GOI complaining that the new policy was undoubtedly discriminatory against men from the domiciled community. In reply, Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, expressed his sympathy with the petitioners, saying that it was certainly difficult for the domiciled community to send its youths to the required training in the remote metropole.

²⁷ In a letter to the Government of India, the Marine Department; No. 161, dated 19th January 1876. *Public Service Commission: Proceedings of the Sub-Committee, Pilot Service* (Government of India, Simla, 1887), p.4

However, albeit 'reluctantly', he decided to continue with the new policy since, in India, there was no sufficient training available for the pilot service²⁸ Remaining dissatisfied with Lytton's reply, the EAIA then brought their cause to London (1883). In a memorial, the Association addressed the Secretary of State and noted that domiciled men had in the past made great contributions to the service, which should be taken as proving a sufficiency of local-colonial training to supply suitable pilots. Furthermore, it went on to argue, British men should not be exempted from such local training. With its emphasis on practical knowledge and skills, training in India was what made efficient pilots. If the imperial authorities found any defects in its present condition, they should try to improve it with more funds and facilities, instead of replacing it with metropolitan training.²⁹

It took some time for the authorities to consider this memorial. Before forwarding it to the Secretary of State, the GOI tried to achieve a general consensus within India. It consulted the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Augustus Rivers Thompson, who in turn asked the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and the Port Officer for opinion. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce was rather sympathetic to the petition. It approved of the suggested maintenance of a training brig in Indian waters. It also suggested the foundation of a scholarship scheme as a means of

²⁸ *ibid.*, p.4

²⁹ *ibid.*

enabling domiciled youths to be trained in Britain.³⁰ The Port Officer did concur on the scholarship scheme but was rather pessimistic about the whole question. He thought that experience had firmly demonstrated that 'boys trained in India were wanting in energy and ability'.³¹ The Lieutenant-Governor considered these proposals and came to a conclusion that neither an Indian training-ship scheme nor a special scholarship could ever be provided by the Government. The colonial state would not be justified in spending public expenses on what would appear as non-cost-effective and partial policies. The Governor's view was then approved by John Wedehouse, the Secretary of State for India (No. 85, 12 June 1884).³² These series of rejections were followed by the move by the Government of Bengal to furnish the directors of the EAIA with the draft rules for admission into the Bengal Pilot Service. It asked the latter to submit any suggestions or remarks to the proposed rules. One such rule had stipulated that if youths from India wanted to be recruited, they must have already served two years at sea in a merchant sailing ship, employed in the foreign trade, as a seaman or apprentice, and produce satisfactory certificates from the Masters under whom they sailed.³³ The EAIA dismissed this drafted rule on the grounds that it was not fair that only the domiciled community had to undergo such training abroad: those who were trained on the *Conway* or the

³⁰ *ibid.*,p.5

³¹ *ibid.*,p.4

³² *ibid.*,p.5

³³ *ibid.*,p.32

Worcester were not required to pass any period of actual sailing experience at sea. Domiciled youths, they argued, were as fit as their non-domiciled counterparts and did not require additional training in sailing. If such training was to be made a condition at all, then nominations to the service should be given to domiciled youth *before* they proceeded to that training.³⁴ Ultimately, the EAIA proposed that a fixed proportion of not less than one-third of the vacancies should be filled by appointment in India, thereby giving the domiciled community a fair chance.³⁵ But the Government of Bengal did not take these proposals. As for the proposed quota, it adopted the Port Officer's view that the assignment of a fixed proportion of vacancies could lead to the admission of 'unfit' candidates.³⁶

The kind of conflicts observed above were not unique to the Pilot Service. The Europeanisation of certain positions of the Forest Department was also done in ways that practically debarred domiciled youths, and gave rise to similar antagonism and disagreement. The department did recruit and train staff locally: it was undoubtedly more cost-efficient that way, as importing personnel from Britain was known to be a costly business. But the imperial authorities in London wished to have the service more centrally controlled and deemed it appropriate to staff the higher positions only with professional men directly brought from home. The

³⁴ *ibid.*, p.33

³⁵ *ibid.*, pp.32-33

³⁶ *ibid.*, p.6

Secretary of State was determined to increase the supply of trained recruits from Britain, claiming that qualified and able candidates were not forthcoming from schools in the colony.³⁷ Youths from the domiciled community, who were educated in those colonial schools, were to be effectively denied prospects for entering the superior grades of the service.

D.S. White, the President of the South Asian branch of the EAlA, opposed this decision, sending a memorial to the Secretary of State. In sharp contrast to those recruited in Britain, all those who entered the forest service from India had to start from the lowest grade of forest rangers which paid a mere Rs. 50 per month. A community of British descent would never be able to accept such low (and in a sense degrading) salaries. But, in forwarding the memorial in a despatch to the Secretary of State, the GOI noted:

‘for the superior grades of that service it is essential that we should have more professionally trained officers, and these can at present only be secured in Europe’.³⁸

Recruitment in India was to be done mainly for the purpose of filling the subordinate ranks. The Forest School at Dehra Dun, which those recruited in India were obliged to attend, was adequate only for providing a practical training suitable for subordinate positions. To employ those ‘un-European’ recruits in the higher

³⁷ Despatch No. 49, 3 June 1880, *Proceedings of the Sub-Committee, Public Service Commission, Forest Department, India* (Government of India, Simla, 1887), p.8

³⁸ No. 55, 3 October 1884, *ibid.*

positions would risk a loss of efficiency.³⁹ In the despatch of 1885, the Secretary of State for India expressed its agreement with the GOI (No.8, 29 January);

‘the question of recruitment in India for the superior grades of the Forest Department must depend to a great extent on the facilities afforded for technical education’.⁴⁰

It was only in the imperial centre that the European agency of the forest service would be nurtured. Those who were educated in the colonial periphery, including the domiciled community, were not considered fit or ‘European enough’, even if they had British blood in their veins.

Public Service Commission

Within a decade of their birth, the political activities of the domiciled leaders transformed the question of civil recruitment into a political debate over the definition of Britishness. What their transformation did was to ultimately challenge the notion that ‘British’ positions would only be given to the home-born. The criterion of domicile had direct implications for the position of the domiciled community within the civil service, and by extension, for its social status at large. Their claim to be recognised as British, or as so British as to be employed as such in the civil service, explicitly inscribed itself into public debates during the Public

³⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁰ *ibid.*,p.9

Service Commission (PSC, 1886-7). Herein, the domiciled community did express its concern over the rapid Indianisation of the civil service. But for leaders of the EAIA, the community's exclusion from Indianisation was not the most pressing issue. It was the question as to whether their community was essentially British, or whether it should be treated as such in matters relating to civil employment.

As already demonstrated, the issue of the Pilot Service had generated sharp tension between the domiciled community and British authorities. This tension resurfaced during the course of the PSC. The authorities' view regarding the admission of non-domiciled men was put forth by A. J. Milner, a Branch Pilot of the Pilot Service:

'I beg to state, with reference to the question as to whether the Natives of India could qualify for the pilotage of the River Hughli, that in my opinion, collectively, they are deficient in nerve, judgement, decision of character, &c., to carry on such duties; and considering the risk to life, the valuable property entrusted to the charge of Pilots, and the large amounts paid by the mercantile community for such service, I think merchants are entitled to the best talent procurable'.⁴¹

Considering that most 'Native' employees had actually been of European descent, Milner's characterisation was undoubtedly ascribed to the domiciled community. L. W. D'Cruz and C. A. Tweeddale, both from the community, countered such objections. They asked the authorities to remove the rule that domiciled youths had to undergo a two-year period in overseas waters before they were considered for admission. According to these two, their training in India should be regarded as

⁴¹ *Public Service Commission: Proceedings of the Sub-Committee, Pilot Service*, p.37

sufficient. If such a training vessel could not be provided in India, then they should come up with an alternative measure for training them, instead of simply imposing the condition of extra experience in overseas waters. One thing they could do, as Tweeddale suggested, was to recruit domiciled men *first*, and give them training in India together with those men brought from the metropole.⁴²

What D’Cruz and Tweeddale essentially tried to do in the PSC was to convince the British authorities that domiciled men were actually more suited for the pilot service than any others. The Government should rid itself of the unfounded prejudice that, because of their colonial birth and upbringing, domiciled youths were inevitably less fit than non-domiciled British youths. As Tweeddale observed:

‘during the early stages of the discussion on the question of throwing open this Service to Indian [i.e. domiciled] lads, certain uncharitable remarks were passed as to their want of nerve and energy, or as it was facetiously represented at the time, their “want of backbone”’.⁴³

The fallacy of such an exclusionary policy was obvious, Tweeddale and D’Cruz both claimed, by the fact that a number of domiciled men had rendered good service before the exclusionary policies of the Government began.⁴⁴ The chances of getting efficient men might certainly be greater in the metropole than in the colony, but this did not in the least mean that they were non-existent in the latter.⁴⁵ D’Cruz

⁴² *ibid.* p.34.

⁴³ *ibid.*, p.33

⁴⁴ *ibid.* p.31, 35

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p.32

and Tweeddale claimed that their men were not only equal, but even more useful than their home-born counterparts. The acclaimed training in British waters was impractical and the trainees would run into stumbling blocks once in duty, owing to their lack of 'real' experiences.⁴⁶ Those nominated home-born men were chosen not because they were able, but simply because the authorities had been partial to them for no good reason. Also, the Government had to be convinced of the enormous waste of the policy of Europeanisation. According to D'Cruz and Tweeddale, it would be more practical and, more importantly, cost-efficient to employ domiciled men. They had the advantage of knowing India first-hand, and were already acclimatised to India's harsh climate. Men from Britain, by contrast, would have to be constantly 'learning' about India and would not fare well in India's climate, thus requiring otherwise avoidable care. Such a double cost would be avoided if the service had employed and trained staff in India. In addition, it was more costly to employ home-born men because the state had to bear the cost of their passages to India plus the furlough and leave allowances: none of which would be inflicted if the state chose to employ the domiciled.⁴⁷ Thus, from the EAIA's perspective, using British men would impede, rather than maintain, efficiency. The idea that the domiciled were less able or reliable because of their colonial backgrounds was simply prejudicial. Rather, it was precisely *because of* their

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p.34, 35

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p.34

Indian domicile that both domiciled Europeans and Eurasians were useful for this branch of imperial service. As Tweeddale put it:

'the Indian Government will, by throwing open the whole of such nominations to Indian lads, be served, not only more economically, but more speedily with a staff of Pilots fitted in every respect for the profession'.⁴⁸

Similar resistance by the EAIA to the policy of Europeanisation was observed in the PSC's inquires into the state of recruitment in the Public Works Department (PWD). F. T. Atkins, one of the interviewees of the Commission, was a very active member of the EAIA at Allahabad. Although he did not formally represent the EAIA on this occasion (he came as President of the United Railway and Government Servants Association), in many ways he spoke for the domiciled community whence he originated. Atkins complained that the promotion of domiciled employees had been obstructed by an increasing introduction into the superior grades of the department of 'men trained at Cooper's Hill'.⁴⁹ The Royal Indian Engineering College at Cooper's Hill had been opened in Britain (1870), the function of which being to provide professionally trained men for the higher grades of the colonial public-works service in India. Atkin's complaint concerned the imperial policy to promote the use of the men educated at this college over that of those who came

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p.33

⁴⁹ *Public Service Commission: Proceedings of the Sub-Committee, Public Works Department, India* (Government of India, Calcutta, 1886), p.86

from engineering schools located in India such as the Thomason College at Rurki.⁵⁰

There was a growing consensus among British that 'Cooper's Hill men' or 'Royal Engineers' were superior to 'Rurki men', and this was explicitly seen in the opinions expressed by British PWD officers during the PSC. R. B. Buckley, Under-Secretary of the PWD's Irrigation Branch, compared the best men of the Cooper's Hill and of the Rurki Colleges, and remarked that the former undoubtedly had 'the great advantage of an English training which certainly gives a higher tone to their character'.⁵¹ Henry Irwin, the Superintending Engineer in the Simla Imperial Circle, found the recruits from Cooper's Hill as 'more reliable'.⁵² Colonel Robert Home, Deputy Secretary to the PWD and Inspector-General of Irrigation, described the Royal Engineers as generally more fit: 'no doubt [...] the Royal Engineers are very picked men, the cream of a service'.⁵³ In view of these opinions, the sub-committee of the PSC confidently concluded that:

'the weight of opinion seems to be in favour of the Royal Indian College at Cooper's Hill. The professional education received there is, it is said, superior to any obtainable in India'.⁵⁴

Just like D'Cruz and Tweeddale in the case of the Pilot Service, Atkins

⁵⁰ The Thomason College at Rurki was established in 1847, and began to furnish engineers to the PWD in 1850. Other colleges established in India included the Poona College of Science in Bombay and the Madras Civil Engineering College.

⁵¹ *Public Service Commission: Proceedings of the Sub-Committee, Public Works Department, India*, p.110

⁵² *ibid.*, p.106

⁵³ *ibid.*, p.108

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, p.7

condemned the authorities for their prejudicial views and for their overlooking the potentials of his community. He argued that India's civil engineering service had already been self-sufficient of capable 'British' elements as it had enough personnel who were both of British origin and of good quality. Atkins' point was that the authorities may bring men from home but should do so without substituting them for those staff of British descent already found in India. According to Atkins, the domiciled community was duly capable of producing high-ranked officers, and this was obvious from the past experiences in which domiciled men rose to prominent positions, just as had happened in the locomotive and traffic departments of the railways.⁵⁵

The aforementioned protests during the PSC demonstrated the extent to which EAIA leaders wanted the domiciled community to be counted as a British community, such that it would not be excluded from opportunities to take up higher positions in the colonial civil service. What they wanted, essentially, was not the Indianisation but the Europeanisation of the civil service, and this view was most sharply articulated by W.C. Madge, one of the most influential leaders of the EAIA in the late nineteenth century. He asserted that:

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p.86

'it is absolutely necessary to maintain an English character and tone by means of agents imbued with English principles and bred in English traditions, it frankly killed two birds with one stroke by selecting "Natives of India" of the right kind'.⁵⁶

This passage is perfectly emblematic of the typical ambivalence with which the domiciled community waged its identity politics. First of all, despite its statutory status as 'Native', the domiciled community should not be taken as 'Indian'. Certainly, it was a community which was based in India but it was not Indian: rather, the community consisted of people who had British ways of life and, by right, demanded an appropriate standard of living. Domiciled men were so 'British' as to be utilised for maintaining the European character of the civil service. Their legal designation as 'Native', therefore, should be understood only as a technical arrangement, and not in any ways as one actually fixating a social-economic distinction between them and their non-domiciled British brethren. Madge made this point explicitly:

'I do not underestimate the value of an English education [i.e. education at schools in the United Kingdom] for Anglo-Indian and Eurasian youths, but no such gulf separates Anglo-Indians and Eurasians educated in India from Englishmen coming out to the country as that which separates English-educated from Indian-educated Natives [...] in most essentials, English society in India is the same as English society in England – men brought up and living in either, being subject to much the same moral and social standards, and preserving the same national traditions'.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ *Proceedings of the Public Service Commission, vol. VI – Proceedings Relating to the Lower Provinces of Bengal (Including Assam)* (Government of India, Calcutta, 1887), p.103

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p.102 (my parentheses)

What was so devastating about the on-going policy of Europeanising the civil service's higher positions was that it elevated the admission criteria to standards that were practically unattainable for the majority of the domiciled community. The domiciled were generally too improvised to send their younger generations to the metropole for education. Therefore it was necessary to persuade the authorities of certain unique merits of domiciled men *on account of their Indian domicile*, not in spite of it. Their status as 'Native of India' was certainly inimical when it was taken to imply an Indianness of the domiciled community, but it was of some use when it was understood as meaning a *localness* of positive sort. Being born and educated in India, domiciled Europeans and Eurasians had an advantage over the home-born Britons – namely that they naturally knew the land better and had been accustomed to the climate and environment of India. As Madge observed, the domiciled community were 'Natives of India' of the right kind: not only just British in character and education but also 'local' in the best sense of the term. Such view sharply contrasted with the official construction of British identity in India based on the idea that Britishness was represented only by those who were domiciled in the metropole. What Madge and his fellow EAIA men opposed in the PSC was this domiciliary basis of Britishness.

Late Victorian Imperialism and Lord Curzon

To suggest that the Government of India and the India Office are engaged in a deep and malignant conspiracy to deprive of your birth right, that they desire, or that any one else desires, to stamp upon you the brand of inferiority or subordination, or that as a community you are hunted down and proscribed – phrases which very fairly represent the spirit of some of your publications – is in my judgement, very ill-judged and quite untrue. Such statements are sufficient to set people against you. Your object should be to attract, not to alienate, public support; and you will do this by sober reasoning, not by angry rhetoric.

Lord Curzon⁵⁸

Following the PSC, the EAIA agitated over the question of public appointment with a renewed frequency. By this time, the economic condition of the domiciled community had grown singularly appalling. The colonial efforts in the field of education had long been going on, culminating in the European Education Code (1883).⁵⁹ British in India had grown deeply concerned about the pauperised state of their domiciled kin, lest it should become demeaning to their collective self-image as the conquering race. The appointment of the Pauperism Committee (1891) was a high point of the British philanthropic interests in the domiciled community.⁶⁰ The EAIA's attitudes towards these philanthropic efforts were ambivalent. They were certainly welcomed as one crucial measure for improving the condition of the poorer

⁵⁸ Lord Curzon, *Lord Curzon in India: Being a Selection From His Speeches As Viceroy & Governor-General of India, 1898-1905* (London, 1906), p.80, p.83

⁵⁹ See Ch. 5

⁶⁰ See Ch. 4

members of the community. But even in the face of such crude realities of indigence as revealed by the Pauperism Committee, domiciled leaders were not prepared to give up on their political claim for their community to be recognised as British and given commensurate job opportunities. In fact, it was all the more for the economic crisis that they adhered to their own 'Britishness'. And accordingly, they were rather discontent with the fact that the only inclusionary policies British imparted had been philanthropic. Whenever it came to the question of the community's demand on higher salaries, British rulers turned defensive, stressing differences rather than commonalities. It was in this context that the closing years of the Victorian era saw numerous protest meetings, memorials and deputations, reaching a climax with the deputation to Lord Curzon (1900).

One instance of the intensified political tension during this period was a confrontation between a school for domiciled children and the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Towards the end of 1896, the Principal of St. Paul's College in Darjeeling, Mr. Cater, criticised the Government's policy on civil recruitment in the school's annual report. The Principal wrote: 'there is no denying that the outlook for the children of those domiciled in India is now of the very gloomiest description'.⁶¹ He argued that this situation had been caused by the policy of

⁶¹ 'Employment of Europeans and Eurasians: Protest by the Rector of St. Paul's, Darjeeling', *The*

importing British men for some superior sections of the PCS. The community's discontent with these impartial treatments cut deep:

'All my contention is that, by closing its doors to the sons of men domiciled in India, Government is doing a gratuitous injustice to men who have done good work in India and to the schools which, like this and others, are doing their utmost, by importing men from England'.⁶²

The Principal pointed out that this policy had been applied to the Departments of Opium, Superior State Railway Traffic, and Superior Accounts; the entry exams for these departments had been moved to the metropole. Such policy was tantamount to giving an irrevocable preference to those educated in the metropole over those who attended such colonial schools as this St. Paul's College. And it was precisely in the colonial periphery that an overwhelming majority of members of the domiciled community had been educated. In addition, the Principal attacked an alleged prevalence of nepotism that facilitated the entry of those British youths who had strong social connections. This made the principle of competitive examination a mere verbiage: it was in fact believed that the nomination for examinations was granted only to those within a particular social circle to which the domiciled had no access. Thus, wherever nepotism was prevalent, the domiciled were effectively denied the right to compete.⁶³

Statesman [Weekly], 18 Nov. 1896, p.16.

⁶² *ibid.*

⁶³ For some accounts of this criticism from the point of view of the domiciled community, see, for

The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir A. Mackenzie, was obliged to respond to the Principal's criticism when he was invited to a prize-giving ceremony held at the school (November 1896). Mackenzie frankly admitted that he had been exposed to certain internal pressures to give preference to those bred and educated in the United Kingdom. In fact, his predecessor as the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Charles Elliot, was of the opinion that the Opium Department should be filled entirely by those educated and examined in the metropole. Mackenzie, however, sought to assuage anxiety, saying that such an extreme inclination towards the Europeanisation of the colonial service had actually been resisted by himself. On the other hand, some positions in the upper grades of the PCS did require certain numbers of persons recruited directly from British institutions, but it was only for some legitimate 'professional' reasons that this had been done. In any case, the number of these 'British' positions was small, leaving plenty of other posts remained easily available to the domiciled community. Mackenzie also refuted the accusation of nepotism, saying that, even if it existed before, it had now been replaced by a more thorough application of the principle of fair competition. Most importantly, the keynote of his reply was that Government had already discharged its responsibility towards the domiciled community by providing what it saw as a

example: Anon. ('C'), 'Letter to the Editor: The Rising Anglo-Indian Generation', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 21 Oct. 1896, pp.10-11; and Anon. ('WALTER DUVAL'), 'Letter to the Editor: Employment of Europeans and Eurasians', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 25 Nov. 1896, p.11

protective legal arrangement. He claimed to have a good understanding of the critical circumstances surrounding the domiciled community's position in civil employment, but attributed it not so much to the exclusionary reproduction of the imperial element but more to the intensity of competition emanating from the increased number of indigenous candidates. And, as to the results of competition, the Government should not be held responsible: 'it was not the fault of the Government if the natives beat the other classes at the examinations'.⁶⁴

The nature of disagreement between the St. Paul's College's Principal and the Lieutenant-Governor can be reduced to a single point. For the former, children of the domiciled community were as 'British' as any other people of British origin including the ones from the imperial centre, and thus, the pro-metropolitan policy regarding superior public appointments was unjust. For the latter, the same policy was justifiable because the domiciled community was 'Native' by definition and thus would not be directly affected by any policies of Europeanisation. Mackenzie thought that the domiciled community should concentrate on their competition with other 'Native' communities. But the EAIA would not come to terms such a view because it implicitly amounted to an acceptance of the 'Native' status and, moreover, a concomitant standard of living.

⁶⁴ 'Employment of Europeans and Eurasians, Speech by Sir A. Mackenzie', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 11 Nov. 1896, p.17

Towards the end of the century, the EAIA further intensified its protest against the exclusion of the domiciled community from the British posts of the civil service. The annual general meeting held at the Dalhousie Institute (March 1897) condemned the policy of recruiting home-educated Britons for the disastrous effect it was thought to have had on the education of youths in India. Against such injustice, 'a united protest should be submitted to the Government of India, and through it to the Secretary of State'.⁶⁵ An opportunity of which was soon availed. An executive member of the EAIA, James R. Wallace, saw himself leaving for England in the early spring of the year. The initial aim of his visit was to attend an examination related to his career in the medical profession. But the EAIA did not fail to take the opportunity to bring its political cause directly to the authorities in London. The EAIA authorised Wallace to officially represent the grievances of the domiciled community, with W. C. Madge's written instruction in his hands. Over the course of half a year, Wallace interviewed MPs and officials in both the India Office and War Offices.⁶⁶ Those whom he interviewed included Lord George Hamilton (Secretary of State for India), Lord Roberts, Sir Richard Temple, Mr. Henry J. Wilson, and Captain Pirie. Wallace endeavoured to rouse interest in the community's cause by appearing in Parliament and sending circular letters to ex-ICS

⁶⁵ 'Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association: Annual Meeting', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 31 Mar. 1897, p.18

⁶⁶ The War Office, because another major claim of the delegates was that the authorities should sanction the formation of a special military regiment composed solely of members of the domiciled community.

officers now retired in the United Kingdom. Wallace's effort was met by Whitehall, which finally authorised a deputation of the domiciled community to the Secretary of State for India.⁶⁷

The deputation took place on 23 July 1897 at the India Office. It was met by Arthur Godley, Permanent Undersecretary of State (who took the place of Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State, who was too busy to make himself present). Wallace led the delegates, which included some other executives of the community such as W. H. Ryland. Regarding the question of civil recruitment, the deputation insisted upon the inclusion of the domiciled community in what was seen as the British preserve of the upper grades of the Provincial Civil Service (PCS). According to the report of *The Statesman*, the delegates demanded:

'the inclusion of domiciled Europeans and Eurasians under the term "European" or "British", in any scheme for the reserving of special appointments in India for the purely British element; this implying definitely that domiciled Europeans and Eurasians shall have the privilege of sharing in all such offices in India which the Government may be pleased to classify as purely British or European, provided always that they shall prove themselves by competition with their co-competitors fit for such posts, without reference to the fact of the education of competitors having been carried out in India or in England'.⁶⁸

Wallace argued that the cultural need of the community to 'live like Europeans' created 'the demand for a class of employment which alone can supply the ordinary

⁶⁷ 'Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association: Annual Meeting', p.18

⁶⁸ As reported by *The Statesman*. 'Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association: Deputation to the Secretary of State', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 25 Aug. 1897, pp.19-20, p.19

needs of life'.⁶⁹ According to the delegates, their community was 'native' in a solely technical sense and could not in actuality bring themselves to accept any lower-cum-Indian standards of living:

'conditions of climate and race [in the colony] make it absolutely impossible for this class to compete with native manual labour in spheres which, though they afford a suitable and congenial living wage to the native, are naturally closed by irremovable barriers to the Anglo-Indian classes'.⁷⁰

The statutory protection brought about certain appointments but they were usually of lesser importance. Otherwise it only restricted the domiciled community from pursuing its rightful economic demands. Ryland, for instance, argued that inclusion in the category 'Statutory Native' had actually been 'of very doubtful benefit'.⁷¹

Coming back from London, James Wallace attended a community meeting held in Calcutta to report on the events in London. There he explicitly reiterated the deputation's position, by declaring that the domiciled community 'should have the acknowledged right to be officially regarded as the domiciled British community of India'.⁷² Only this would enable them to 'compete for the purely British services in India on equal terms with competitors from the Home land'.⁷³

⁶⁹ *ibid.*

⁷⁰ *ibid.* (my parentheses)

⁷¹ *ibid.*

⁷² 'Anglo-Indian Association: Conversazione at the Town Hall', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 30 Dec. 1897, p.14

⁷³ *ibid.*

Their claim for material equality led leaders of the domiciled community to change the title of their association. They thought that the exclusionary attitude of British derived from the derogatory image of the domiciled community much associated with the term 'Eurasian' (as used in 'Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Association'), which usually implied illegitimate sexual liaison and racial degeneration:

'The use of the term "Eurasian" under the circumstances is not only impolite but it is unmanly and ungentlemanly. The word was conceived in infamy; it bears the brand of the "bar sinister"; it was first applied to the illegitimate offsprings of Europeans – nondescript Europeans – by native Indian mothers, and no amount of quibbling can wash out the stain that has for ever branded this detestable name with disgrace and infamy'.⁷⁴

To express the community's genuine and legitimate Britishness, a new nomenclature would be necessary. This issue of association title was addressed at a conference held at Allhabad (December 1899), with delegates from the EAIA branches of Bengal, Bombay, the N. W. P. and Oudh, the Punjab, Mysore and Coorg. At this conference:

'it was *unanimously* resolved that the term "Eurasian" should be dropped and the term "Anglo-Indian" should in future be used as a designation for persons and associations representing those of mixed European or British descent and Indian descent'.⁷⁵

This decision to change the association's name to the 'Anglo-Indian and Domiciled European Association' (AIDEA) was forwarded to the Viceroy, together with a copy of the deliberations of the Allahabad conference, so that:

⁷⁴ James R. Wallace, 'Letters to the Editor: The Domiciled Community Question', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 10 Oct. 1901, pp.12-13, pp.12-13

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p.12

'His Excellency is not in ignorance of the just and sound reasons for which this opprobrious and offensive title is protested against and this use very staunchly objected to'.⁷⁶

The domiciled community was 'British' and should be officially recognised as such.⁷⁷ It was with this strong desire to be regarded as an integral part of the British body politic that the domiciled community brought the case to Lord Curzon. The delegates, consisting of Wallace and his colleges, urged the Viceroy to remedy the virtual disqualification of the domiciled community and its schools from the British preserve of civil recruitment. The domiciled, they argued, should not be discriminated against on account of their mixed descent and/or their colonial domicile.

To the disappointment of the delegates, Curzon's response only mirrored the characteristic ambiguities of British attitudes to their domiciled brethren. His speech started with a typical expression of sympathy towards the kin. According to him, the subject of the condition of the domiciled community had always been his concern: 'I never fail to read, or to study, anything that bears upon the subject, or to converse with those who are qualified to give me useful information'.⁷⁸ In his understanding, the domiciled were part of the British population in India, and the

⁷⁶ *ibid.*

⁷⁷ The first official use of the term 'Anglo-Indian' appeared in the 1911 Census.

⁷⁸ Curzon, *Lord Curzon in India*, p.80. For this speech, Curzon had been informed by A. Nundy, 'The Eurasian Problem in India', *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 9 (1900), pp.56-73

plight of the former should be recognised as a due concern of the latter:

‘These efforts on my part to arrive at the truth, and to analyse the difficult problem of your future, rest upon the double basis of personal sympathy – since no man with a heart can fail to be touched by the misfortunes of *a community, partly, if not mainly, of his own race*, who appear to have fallen upon hard times – and of political interest – since no Viceroy of India can be indifferent to the fortunes of a section of the population, increasing in numbers, but apparently not increasing *pari passu* in wealth, contentment, or opportunity’.⁷⁹ (my italics)

But this inclusionary gesture was supplemented by an equally exclusionary attitude whereby the community’s political desire for inclusion was firmly rejected. For Curzon, it was simply a matter of unchangeable fact that ‘British’ were, by definition, those who were positively *not* domiciled in India, or those who went back to the United Kingdom after they finished their career in British India. The AIDEA’s claim to be both domiciled and British simultaneously was hence illogical. The use of the term ‘Anglo-Indian’ was nothing but a deliberate conflation of existing categories:

‘Anglo-Indian is a phrase which is applied in popular acceptance to a particular individual and society, British as a rule in origin, which spends its life, official, professional, or otherwise, in India, and as a rule finally goes home. Then when we speak of Anglo-Indian officials, judges, clubs, newspapers, opinion, and so on, everybody understands exactly what is meant’.⁸⁰

Curzon was compelled to dismiss the new nomenclature because the whole matter implied more than a simple change in titles. By adopting a new name, the domiciled community was contesting the long-standing domiciliary criterion of

⁷⁹ Curzon, *Lord Curzon in India* p.80

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p.82

'being British'. Curzon's criticism therefore indicated the extent to which he thought the place of domicile and education was fundamental in determining one's place within the imperial order of identities. Despite their shared racial descent, British and their domiciled brethren were endowed with mutually incomparable standards of living and thus occupied distinctly different social positions. Instead of claiming to be what they were really not, the domiciled should come to terms with their assigned position within the imperial society and should seek employment in more modest quarters than in the higher grades of the colonial civil service. Thus, Curzon's critique of the new title was by no means irrelevant to his rejection of the claims about civil employment – they were both intricately inter-related.

Thus Curzon thought it wrong of the domiciled community to aim at higher public appointments, because these posts were meant for 'Britons' whom, the Viceroy maintained, the domiciled were emphatically not. On the other hand, the posts they could duly claim to be their own were plenty. The Government had no objection to the community's inclusion into the civil service, so long as it sought positions commensurate with its legal and social status. Like Mackenzie before him, Curzon countered this accusation of organised exclusion by arguing that the Government had already discharged its responsibility for the economic welfare of the domiciled community by providing constitutional protection. The function of the colonial state was to ensure equal opportunities, and not results, to all of its

'Native' subjects. Within this framework of constitutional equality, Curzon asserted, several Departments had been open to, or even preferentially reserved for, the domiciled community:

'Now, it is no good to represent these proceedings as an evidence of spite or unfairness on the part of Government. They are nothing of the sort. We are more than anxious to employ you. But how is it possible to create special privilege in your favour when you do not even take advantage of those which are already open to you?'⁸¹

All the domiciled could do was to increase their gain within the bounds of their 'Native' status. They may remain British in language, religion and culture but they must accept the assigned colonial status and a corresponding, non-metropolitan standard of living. To claim anything more was not a way towards improvement but a case in self-misrecognition:

'if I am to have any success, I must call upon you to formulate your programme with definiteness and precision, to eschew fallacious rhetoric, to view your position in its true perspective, and to conceive the Government of India that in aiding you they are aiding a community to whom they are not merely bound by ties of race or sentiment, but who are qualified to bear their full share in the work-a-day competition of modern life'.⁸²

And it was ultimately a spirit of self-help, instead of an art of political rhetoric, that the future regeneration of the community should ultimately depend upon. The domiciled community had better things to do than play identity politics:

⁸¹ *ibid.*, pp.89-90

⁸² *ibid.*, p.93

'its members are being gradually bisected into two classes, those who are so near to the European standard, that they have not the slightest difficulty in obtaining lucrative employment, and who, therefore, do not protest; and those who are gradually drifting away from it, and wish to preserve a superiority which they are hardly scarcely competent to maintain'.⁸³

Leaders of the domiciled community should mind themselves to such internal inequalities and succumb to the idea of 'self-help'. In Curzon's view, 'self-help' was exactly what was needed for a healthy development of the domiciled community. In fact, he argued that its importance could not be too strongly stressed, even though he knew that 'there is no more unpopular philosophy to preach to any community than Self-help'.⁸⁴

Domiciled leaders were immediately outraged by the Viceroy's response, which appeared to so graphically represent the classic exclusionary attitude with which the British had long treated their community. At the annual meeting of the AIDEA after the deputation, they accused the Viceroy for a total lack of sensibility. None of the important questions placed by the deputation before him had even been addressed. Wallace was particularly angry that Curzon so straightforwardly dismissed the significance of the new nomenclature:

'Lord Curzon gracefully ridiculed our labour over the question of a name for our people and for our Association. [...] It concerns very materially by what name we are called. We understand our position far better than outsiders. To them it is merely a matter of sentiment whether we associate our origin with the ruling British race or not. To us it is a question of

⁸³ *ibid.*, p.92

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, p.92

national right and privileges, our heritage, our Magna Charta'.⁸⁵

Far from being contended with the results of the deputation, in the February of the following year the IADEA sent a memorial to the GOI, once again arguing that their community was a special kind of British community that required a corresponding standard of living and a range of civil employments. Curzon's reply was communicated to the IADEA through a letter written by the Secretary to the GOI, J. P. Hewett. The GOI was not ready to make any concessions and reiterated Curzon's point, namely that the domiciled community was not British but Native. India's educational intuitions were not expected to produce men of European respectability who would assume superior positions in the civil service, and in this respect the domiciled had no choice but to accept their situation. The schools most domiciled youths attended were regarded as of second-rate quality for the simple reason that they were colonial, and not metropolitan. Some while ago, the plan of holding the examination for higher offices simultaneously in the metropole and colony had already been cancelled. This plan had purported to enable more indigenous candidates to try the exam, but the imperial authorities decided against it on the grounds that such a system might lower the quality of personnel: it would wrongly privilege memorisation while downplaying the importance of 'character'. To create an imperial civil servant with the appropriate forbearance of character and

⁸⁵ 'Imperial and Anglo-Indian Association', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 5 Ap. 1900, pp.20-21, p.21

power of judgement, a course in higher education in the metropole was deemed indispensable. With most of its youths educated in India, the GOI could not regard the domiciled community as a recruitment source for the civil service's higher personnel:

'the assertion of an obvious, though regrettable fact, namely, that the education available in India for the classes represented by the memorialists is defective in the training in life and conduct which moulds the character of those who are educated in the higher Educational Institutions of Great Britain'.⁸⁶

The Government was responsible for protecting the community's right to civil appointment, only insofar as the latter competed with all other 'Natives' in fair play. And, according to the letter of reply, the Government had duly discharged its duties. All questions regarding public appointment had been solved for the domiciled community by the legal regulations that had already evolved. The 1870 statute enabled the domiciled community to participate in the process of 'Indianisation'. The orders of the PSC made sure that the merit of Indianisation, to which the domiciled community was now entitled, would be smoothly realised in the PCS. Within these legal limits, members of the domiciled community were legitimately entitled to whatever they hoped to gain or preserve.⁸⁷ Therefore, the community's claim to be recognised as British was simply irrelevant and misguided:

⁸⁶ 'The Anglo-Indian Association's Memorial: The Government of India's Reply', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 10 Oct. 1901, pp.19-20, p.20

⁸⁷ *ibid.*, p.19

‘The Governor-General in Council [Curzon] regrets that instead of confining itself to definite requests for the consideration of His Excellency in Council, the Association has thought fit to import into the memorial allegation of grievances of so vague and impalpable a nature as to defy examination, or which, when capable of examination, are found to be to a great extent imaginary, as well as abstract statements social, political, and economic conditions which are irreverent to the points at issue’.⁸⁸

Wallace was so unhappy with Curzon’s repeated rejection of the community’s demands that he published a short article in *The Indian Medical Record*, which he himself was involved in editing. Though published anonymously, it was soon found that it was authored by no one but Wallace, causing a controversy especially after it was reprinted in *The Statesman* (October 1901). In this article, Wallace described the Viceroy’s attitude as representing a ‘studied and hateful prejudice towards this class of British subjects’.⁸⁹ Wallace was resentful of Curzon for his policy which appeared to him as ‘markedly one of repression – aggressive, tantalising repression – aggravated by prejudice and despotism’.⁹⁰ Under Curzon’s regime, the domiciled had been sacrificed to make room for their non-domiciled brethren despite their shared British descent:

‘the man of British descent in India, the man whose farther fought the battles that gave India to England, simply because he is born and bred in the land of his adoption, is, by Lord Curzon’s edict, condemned as “moral [sic. original ‘normal’] and intellectual inferior” of the imported material from England – good, bad, or indifferent, as it may be’.⁹¹

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, p.19

⁸⁹ James Wallace, ‘Lord Curzon and the Domiciled Community: Fierce Attack on the Viceroy’, *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 10 Oct. 1901, p.13

⁹⁰ *ibid.*

⁹¹ *ibid.*

According to Wallace, the GOI's concomitant recourse to the principle of fair competition under the law was only rhetorical, concealing a particular kind of discrimination that existed in the margins of the white population in India; a class distinction that unjustifiably divided the wealthier and poorer classes. As Wallace remarked:

'His Lordship endeavoured [...] to emphasise the principle of making no difference in religion or races. But Hindus and Mahomedans are Indians, "Eurasians" – Curzonian Eurasians – are Britishers, and Britishers in India are of two classes – the imported and the domiciled. If Lord Curzon conscientiously desires to hold the balances evenly between the races, he must prove that he and the India Office are dealing justly, holding the balances evenly, between the imperial and the domiciled Britisher. This they most emphatically are not doing'.⁹²

In Wallace's view, the GOI's policy to exclude the domiciled from the British reserve of public appointments demonstrated that not only were Indians victims of colonial exclusion but so were the domiciled.

In discussing Wallace's article, *The Statesman* came to defend Curzon's position. Just like the Viceroy himself, it did acknowledge the domiciled's special difficulties: 'the condition on behalf of whom the Memorial has been submitted bespeaks our warmest sympathy'.⁹³ But the keynote of this article was also typically exclusionist, dismissing the community's desire to be recognised as British by a new nomenclature as 'ill-chosen' and 'absurd', claiming that 'the attitude

⁹² *ibid.*

⁹³ 'The Eurasian Memorial', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 17 Oct. 1901, p.5

adopted in it [Wallace's article] is unfortunately one which it is difficult for any unbiased person to regard with patience'.⁹⁴ What then would be a possibly 'unbiased' point of view? What was the right way to remedy the utterly complex problems of the domiciled community? The diagnosis of *The Statesman* typically reproduced the common British view that the only way to solve the economic problem of their domiciled fellows was to change the latter's 'culture' of indigence through 'self-help' efforts at discipline and hygienic improvement. The role of their British brethren was to assist these self-endeavours by their philanthropic expertise:

'The best advice we can offer to the community whom we do not expect to thank us for it, is that they should endeavour to arrive at a true if not absolutely impartial idea of the degree in which the difficulties, economic and social, under which they labour are traceable to race, to domicile, or to defects of character or training, which are more or less their own control. They will then be in a better position to formulate a scheme for the amelioration of the condition in the promotion of which the Government, consistently with the established principles of its policy, can co-operate'.⁹⁵

The proposals of the memorial to Curzon, *The Statesman* argued, had good reason to be dismissed. They had not only derailed from the spirit of 'self-help' to which British wished the AIDEA to adhere, but also furnished 'a startling example of the extravagance of the pretensions and the depth of the confusion of ideas'.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ *ibid.*

⁹⁵ *ibid.*

⁹⁶ *ibid.*

Political Reform: the Post-Curzonian Era

Sir there is another vitally important consideration to which I shall confine myself almost entirely. That is the question of the minorities. I am sure that you, My Lord, and the Prime Minister must be heartily sick of these words, for they have been dinned into your ears day and night, and all the discussions of this Conference seem to end in a blind alley with the words "communal safeguard" painted on the wall. But, My Lord, what is weariness of the flesh for you is life and death to us of the minorities, and particularly to my community, the smallest and most vulnerable of all.

Henry Gidney⁹⁷

Into the early twentieth century, the civil service question continued to surge as one about Britishness. There were, however, certain shifts in the terms around which this question revolved. British rule in India started to lose its strong imperialistic character. Lord Curzon was generally regarded as the last 'imperialist' Viceroy. And shortly before he quit the Viceroyalty (1905), Britain had also lost the central icon of the 'High Noon' of British imperialism – Queen Victoria.⁹⁸ The first three decades of the new century were an era of rapid political changes, followed by a period of constitutional debates in the first half of the 1930s. In this swift trend of shifting power relations, the reconstitution of the civil service was also accelerated, with the policy of Indianisation more thoroughly promoted. By 1917, for instance, the Cooper's Hill College had been closed so that India was made self-sufficient of

⁹⁷ *Indian Round Table Conference, Second Session* (London, 1932) [in *British Parliamentary Papers, 1931-32, VIII*], p.339

⁹⁸ M.N. Das, *India Under Morley and Minto* (London, 1964), pp.13-14

its civil engineers of higher ranks, thereby making it no longer necessary to rely on the importation of home-educated British engineers. The agricultural and forest services also ceased to recruit from the metropole for higher appointments on the grounds that qualified men were now available in India.⁹⁹ Gradually, the authorities started to take advantage of existing facilities in the colony and went into its open market for higher personnel, instead of confining recruitment to the metropolitan centre. The implications of these changes were immense for the domiciled community: it had long quested to be part of the British preserve in civil-service recruitment, but now that very preserve no longer seemed stable. And to compete with Indians for higher posts appeared as tough (if not tougher) as competition with the home-born British; the former were usually better qualified than the domiciled.

During the Royal Commission on Public Services in India (1913), the position of the AIDEA remained unchanged: it wanted to keep as many higher appointments as possible for the domiciled community. But there were new concerns too. With their place in the civil service being rapidly advanced, indigenous communities presented themselves as an immediate challenge to the domiciled. Indian candidates appeared to overshadow their domiciled counterparts because, unlike the latter, many of the former held degrees from Universities of

⁹⁹ *Royal Commission on Public Services in India: Vol. I. Report* (London, 1917), p.23

Calcutta, Madras or Bombay. W. C. Madge was alarmed by the practical implications of this, and to defend the interests of his community, he sought to impress how unsuitable Indians were for higher appointments despite their superior university qualifications.

'Competition, whether in crude form or when disguised under a university degree, which, being settled by mere marks at an examination based on virtual cramming, is only a veiled form of competition, seems therefore to be discredited in India'.¹⁰⁰

What Madge implied here was that Indian candidates might be better at paper exams than their domiciled competitors, but it was actually the latter who possessed the right 'character'. Thus, in stressing a relative merit of the domiciled, Madge advocated the introduction of an alternative method of examination, which would depend:

'more on carefully guarded nomination or any other method fortified with assurances of character from trustworthy sources, with, of course, some real educational attainment attested by oral examination and impromptu essays on "unseen" subjects written under suitable custody, or otherwise'.¹⁰¹

In Madge's view, such a method was the only fair way for making use of the domiciled community's 'natural' fitness for civil administration.

But apart from his unease over the rapidly-empowered Indian educated class, Madge's politics of identity represented more historical continuity than change.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, p.387

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*

His essential views, in fact, were little changed from the time of the PSC (1886-7).

He continued to advocate the 'Britishness' of his community, with its manners and modes of thinking supposedly very detached from that of the rest of Indian society.

And it was the Indianised Europeans of the domiciled community, not the Macaulay-type Anglicised Indians, who were endowed with a potential to serve as intermediary agents. To his lament, however, the authorities were determined to exclude the domiciled from the bounds of Britishness:

'The ostracism of the domiciled community has resulted from a superstition that no member of this community can, in any circumstances, be superior or even equal in education and character to any European sent out from Great Britain'.¹⁰²

And such ostracism in civil employment was truly devastating to the domiciled community, depriving it of its only opportunity to regain 'its former place in the sun'.¹⁰³ For Madge, the domiciled community was 'a struggling community, all of whom cherish and preserve Christian traditions, and most of whom strive to maintain British standards of living'.¹⁰⁴ However impoverished, the domiciled community nevertheless remained 'British', and it was its legitimate right to be treated as such in matters of employment. Even though Madge believed that the increased use of indigenous agents might be inevitable, the British character of the civil service should nevertheless be maintained. And its superior grades should continue to be

¹⁰² *ibid.*, p.386

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, p.389

¹⁰⁴ pp.389-90

drawn from people of British descent, albeit on the condition that these people included domiciled Europeans and Eurasians.

By the end of the 1910s, however, it was increasingly difficult for the domiciled leadership to sustain Madge's sort of strong claim for the community's Britishness. Identifying solely with the British while at the same time emphasising a difference from the Indians looked increasingly untenable at a time when the latter had been politically empowered and emboldened. This was especially so after the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919). Under the so-called 'Reforms scheme', the pace of Indianisation accelerated, with the British element of the service, into which the domiciled community had so tenuously sought to be included, itself fading away. To be sure, Indianisation had long been an established policy since the early nineteenth century. But its implications in the new context were different in one important sense: the policy would now be conceived of as a definitive step towards a final handing-over of the bureaucracy to Indians. British, who created and owned this huge bureaucracy, would eventually vacate it in a foreseeable future. At this juncture, it did not look so promising for the domiciled leadership to advance its claims solely in the name of their Britishness. The superior positions the domiciled community demanded to be their own were now to be given not just to non-domiciled British but also to Indians.

Henry Gidney, the leader of the AIDEA during this critical period of political reform, was compelled to take immediate action. After an unsuccessful petition in 1923, the AIEDA decided to send a deputation to the Secretary of State for India and also to present the needs of the community before Parliament and the British public. Funds were gathered for this purpose from different branches of the AIEDA scattered all over India. In August 1925, Gidney led the deputation all the way from India, which waited on Frederick Smith, the Secretary of State, at the India Office. Generally, Gidney's approach to the supposed Britishness of the domiciled was more complex than that of his predecessors such as Madge or Wallace.

Gidney was well awake to the fact that the rise of indigenous elites in the civil service and elsewhere was an irreversible historical current. And for the domiciled community to survive such change, it should take its relationship with other 'Native' communities more seriously than hitherto. It was no longer practical to emphasise the 'British' character of the community alone. So far, Gidney claimed, the domiciled had 'clung tenaciously to their British ideas'.¹⁰⁵ And certainly, the community had rendered loyal and useful services to colonial rulers, having left 'proud traditions [...] which the Community never forgets and of which England should certainly never be forgetful'.¹⁰⁶ But, on the other hand, there arose a

¹⁰⁵ Henry Gidney, 'The Status of the Anglo-Indian Community under the Reforms Scheme in India', *The Asiatic Review*, 21 (1925), pp.657-662, p.659

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*

situation where the community's exclusive attention to the relation to its imperial guardian was no longer tenable. Gidney observed:

'For too long have we acquiesced in the decrees of the Powers that created us and of which we have been just the convenience – a Community without any weight or influence. But we can no longer remain unconscious or careless of the magnitude of the changes that are taking place in India to-day, and to the realization of ourselves in the position we shall have to occupy in the new orientation'.¹⁰⁷

Domiciled leaders had long insisted that the designation of their community as 'Native' was only a technical and not a practical definition: the community did find itself *in India* but was *not 'Indian'* in itself. For Gidney, such view was no longer commendable when the British character of the civil service did not appear so permanent. In order to secure the required range of appointments, the community had to consider and express its Indianness as well as its Britishness.

This attitudinal change, however, did not necessarily imply that Gidney thought that his community should (or ever could) completely denounce its Britishness to join forces with its Indian neighbours. All the changing circumstances notwithstanding, the domiciled community remained essentially a British community, especially in regard to its need for a non-indigenous standard of living. In order to maintain its cultural uniqueness, such standard of living was indispensable, and to achieve it, the community must continue to fight for the higher

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*

portions of civil employment. The domiciled did have to come to terms with the fact they were indeed one of the Indian communities, but as to *how Indian* the community was, there was still much room for interpretation. In Gidney's view, the domiciled community had a unique historical claim regarding the state employment sectors. It was like a special minority, or an occupational class, whose collective identity had grown inseparable from the state as its employer.

Gidney's position regarding public employment was that the Government should give special treatment to the domiciled community, not necessarily because it was a non-Indian community but because it was a minority with special material needs for its very survival. If British left their domiciled brethren behind without providing adequate protection, the latter might face possibilities of extinction. As Gidney remarked:

'We realise that now is one of those crucial moments when the wrong step, or the right step taken too late may lay up years of bitterness and hardships for the community, leading, possibly, if not to its total extinction, to its submersion as a depressed class'.¹⁰⁸

To prevent this disaster from occurring, the British in India should discharge their last responsibility to ensure the continual existence of their domiciled kin. It was in this context that Gidney drew attention to the paragraph 346 of the

¹⁰⁸ *Memorandum Relative to the Deputation of the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled Community of Indian and Burma to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, July 30th 1925* (OIOC MSS.Eur.D/925), p.1

Montagu-Chelmsford Report which stated that 'on historic grounds' the domiciled community would have 'a strong claim on the consideration of the British Government'.¹⁰⁹ The Report went on to say that 'Government must acknowledge, and must be given effective power to discharge the obligation to see that their interests are not prejudicially affected'.¹¹⁰ Gidney claimed that such recognition should not remain as a mere pious expression of sympathy but should be given a real, legislative effect:

'unless the special provisions and safeguards, as enunciated in the above paragraph, are observed and more practically applied to our needs, we shall sink into a depressed class'.¹¹¹

The domiciled community was a special occupational class having historically developed with strong connections to state-related employment, especially in the areas of the telegraph, customs and railway services; these were all indispensable to the Empire. And it was because of this that the Government should recognise the domiciled community as a distinct and specific minority.¹¹²

The tenet of British attitudes towards the domiciled community was essentially unchanged. British did express special concerns about the plight of the domiciled

¹⁰⁹ *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms* (London, 1918) [in *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1918, VIII], p.274

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Memorandum Relative to the Deputation of the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled Community of Indian and Burma to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, July 30th 1925*, p.2

¹¹² *ibid.*, p.3, 6

community but these words were rarely matched with actions: from the British perspective, their domiciled brethren had always been Native subjects and were going to remain so under the coming age of political reform. The community should frame its political claims within the bounds of communal rights that were equally accorded to all religious and ethnic groups of an emerging Indian nation-state. Otherwise, the community should mind itself to its own social problems. Such attitude was typically represented by a GOI's report to Parliament (1928) written by J. Coatman, the Director of Public Information. The report, *India in 1926-27*, did acknowledge a unique difficulty that faced the domiciled community, namely that it was sometimes regarded as European and sometimes as indigenous:

'Not a few of the difficulties of the Anglo-Indian community have arisen out of its anomalous status. At different times it has been included in the category of "statutory natives of India", "European British subjects", and, lastly, according to the Railway Budget for 1927-28, as "other classes". This uncertainty of status has undoubtedly helped to render the position of the Anglo-Indian community precarious, and since the inauguration of the Reforms and the consequent Indianisation of the different services, particularly of the Railways which has taken place, the economic conditions of the community have undoubtedly deteriorated. This worsening of their conditions has led the Anglo-Indians to organise themselves for the improvement of their lot'.¹¹³

But this statement may have been rather misleading in that it did not account for the AIDEA's position regarding Indianisation. As we have seen, Indianisation, or more precisely the exclusion of the domiciled community from it, was one reason for its

¹¹³ J. Coatman, *India in 1926-27: A Statement prepared for presentation to Parliament in accordance with the requirements of the 26th Section of the Government of India Act (5&6 Geo, V, Chap. 61)*, (Government of India, Calcutta, 1928), pp.146-147

economic decline. But the goal of the leadership was not for the community to be included in Indianisation but to be given higher public appointments which were conventionally reserved for British. Gidney, for one, had just demanded that the domiciled should be given a communal preference over the rest of Native subjects. Coatman, however, ignored the AIDEA's strong demand for Britishness and its ambivalence about the community's Native status. Instead, he described to his readers in the metropole a rather unproblematic readiness with which the community declared its Indianness:

‘the Anglo-Indians are seeking to identify themselves with the other communities which own India as their mother county, and are claiming the rights and privileges and accepting the duties pertaining to such a status’.¹¹⁴

Such a description was not only imprecise but betrayed a typical British thinking that their domiciled brethren *ought to* see themselves as Native and live their economic lives accordingly. The only effective way the domiciled community could solve its economic plight was to help itself through education. And, according to Coatman, educational efforts were making a great progress in reducing unemployment:¹¹⁵ a view obviously too optimistic given the unprecedented rates of unemployment that hit the community throughout the 1920s.¹¹⁶

Towards the end of the decade, the GOI carried the reforms further by

¹¹⁴ *ibid.* p.146

¹¹⁵ *ibid.*

¹¹⁶ See Ch. 4

appointing a commission for preparing for a new constitution, with Sir John Simon taking charge (the Simon Commission, November 1927). The Commission claimed to take into consideration different communal perspectives, and the domiciled community was counted as one of those communal groups to be summoned for a public hearing. The AIDEA prepared itself by establishing an advisory committee to draw up a memorandum to be presented before Simon. The committee tried to create a unified view by communicating with various organs of the domiciled community scattered all over India and Burma. The enthusiasm of the leadership was unmistakable, but the difficulties the deputation faced were easily foreseen. Only two months before the deputation, the Secretary of State for India had made a long-over-due reply to Gidney's claim for economic protection three years before. In September 1928, the Secretary of State claimed in a despatch to the GOI how impractical it would be to provide the domiciled community with the exceptional arrangements which it sought: the verdict of the Secretary of State was that the community should accept its status as nothing but a purely 'Indian' community.¹¹⁷ This repeated the typical ruling view which Gidney was just about to oppose in the coming meeting. But this did not deter the delegation. The demands that Gidney and his fellow delegates presented in the deputation to Simon (November 1928) can be summed up as follows:

¹¹⁷ *Parliamentary Papers, Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Volume 1 – Survey* (London, 1930), p.44

In order for the domiciled community to be saved from any further pauperisation, certain positions in the civil service should be reserved specifically for the community at least until it was able to try and establish strongholds in other avenues of employment. It was naturally difficult for domiciled persons to find employment outside state-employment sectors, as they had irrevocably grown dependent on the civil service, and were generally too impoverished to venture onto independent vocations.¹¹⁸ Besides, it was also because of a natural demand for a minimum living standard as people of British origin that the community urgently required those public appointments that guaranteed certain levels of remuneration. This point was expressed explicitly in a memorandum submitted by the London branch of the AIDEA:

‘As explained by Lord Lytton, in his Minute of 1878: - “The Anglo-Indian cannot support himself in India by working as a day-labourer, or by adopting the avocation of the native peasant”. Consequently, the Anglo-Indian was so educated as to fit him for the higher avocations of life’.¹¹⁹

But at the same time, it was not simply because of its ethnic origin (i.e. being fully or partly British by blood) that the domiciled community deserved higher appointments. The domiciled community should deserve a special recognition also because of its long-standing contributions to the historical evolution of India’s civil service:

¹¹⁸ *Indian Statutory Commission, vol. XVI, Selections From Memoranda and Oral Evidence by Non-Officials, Part I* (London, 1930), pp.311-2

¹¹⁹ *Indian Statutory Commission, vol. XVII, Selections From Memoranda and Oral Evidence by Non-Officials, Part II* (London, 1930), p.530

'their fidelity, reliability and aptitude as Government servants [...] their almost hereditary tenure of certain classes of posts [...] merit special recognition and special safeguards'.¹²⁰

And finally, it would be indispensable that the protection of the domiciled community in civil employment was legally bound and strictly enforced accordingly. Paragraph 346 of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report should be rewritten into some definite and practical clause and be inserted in the new Government of India Act towards which the Simon Commission was working. Only such a legal guarantee would be able to protect the community from an organised exclusion from the employments within the customs, railways, telegraphs and other services of the state that were essential for its economic survival.¹²¹

Simon and other members of the Commission found it difficult to accept these claims above. Sir Arthur Froom could not just see how something could ever be inserted in any future Government of India Act in order to specifically provide for the domiciled community.¹²² Lord Burnham took the proposed economic protection as asking for a convention that meant something more than equality of opportunity.¹²³ Sir John Simon himself had the same impression that the domiciled leaders were asking for a communal preference which was against the spirit of

¹²⁰ *ibid.*, p.524

¹²¹ *Indian Statutory Commission, vol. XVI*, p.308

¹²² *ibid.*, p.310

¹²³ *ibid.*, p.316

equality under the constitution: a spirit which a constitution should promote, rather than make an exception to. The domiciled community's claim was therefore incompatible with the Commission whose concern rested solely with the constitutional principles of British India. Like other statesmen in the past, including Lord Curzon, Simon wanted to sound sympathetic to the domiciled kin of British coloniser but did not promise any practical help:

'I do not want us to fail to consider very carefully and sympathetically any proposal which you would wish us to examine, and you suggest that something should be inserted by way of amendment into the Government of India Act, and I feel a great deal of sympathy with much of what you say. I think everybody feels sincere sympathy for the difficulties of your community, but I must tell you frankly that I see very great difficulty at present in knowing how to frame a clause in the Government of India Act'.¹²⁴

What the delegates insisted on was that, for the domiciled community, the question of civil employment was not merely one of many problems the community faced. Rather, it was an urgent question which would concern its very existence. Without adequate material means, the community would no longer be what it claimed to be but would become just another example of many indigent populations of India (or the 'depressed classes'). Economic safeguard should not be taken as a case of preferential treatment but a meaningful and necessary act of protecting the rights of a minority to prevent its extinction. But for Simon, such a claim would simply be an irreverent one: in his understanding, the domiciled community had

¹²⁴ *ibid.*, p.309

already accepted a purely Indian status ever since the Secretary of State's despatch in the last September. It should be only within the limits of its Native status that the domiciled community should furnish its recommendations. This was the only way in which the AIDEA would be able to protect the rights of its members 'by proper constitutional provision as such'.¹²⁵ Such discrepancies between the delegates and the Commission were characteristically observed in the following exchange between Simon and Gidney during the hearing:

[Simon] 'The question is not so much a constitutional question as an economic question and a social and official question, is not it?'

[Gidney] 'I frankly admit that my problem is mainly an economic one'.

[Simon] 'I know you admit most frankly?'

[Gidney] 'It is for my life I am presenting this; indeed it is for my very existence'.¹²⁶

The discrepancies between the domiciled community and the Simon Commission indicated the continuation of an age-old disagreement ever since the 1870s: from the British perspective, people of British descent domiciled in India were always 'Natives'. What Simon did was nothing but to re-inscribe this crude reality. *The Statesman* reported Simon's rejection as a right decision, and criticised the domiciled delegates for their alleged willingness to use a public occasion for playing selfish identity politics. According to the paper, the community should accept its assigned designation as Native, and now was the right

¹²⁵ *ibid.*, p.309

¹²⁶ *ibid.*, p.308

opportunity to get rid of its pathetic dependence on the State for employment:

'The worst of all services that Parliament could render would be to create a sense of security in the minds of Anglo-Indians knowing that the paradise into which they were invited to enter would almost certainly be shattered. [...] Conditions are changing to such a degree that Great Britain will not be able to insist on "protection" or "preferential treatment" while the Indian population to which Anglo-Indians will be linked as "statutory natives" will concede nothing except to superior ability and superior equipment for the battle of life'.¹²⁷

To counter the perception that the domiciled community only sought an easy way out of its problems, its leaders registered their protest by sending open letters to *The Statesman*. They argued that the claims made by the delegates were fully legitimate: according to their own reasoning, it was legally possible to weave these claims into a constitutional clause. It was in how the claim was made, and not in its essence, that the problem lay.¹²⁸ Thus, even in the wake of the Simon Commission, Henry Gidney continued to fight for the legal clause for economic protection during all the succeeding debates on constitutional reform in the 1930s, namely the three Round Table Conferences (1930-3), through the Joint Committee for Indian Constitutional Reforms (1934), till the new Government of India Act (1935).¹²⁹ During these years, the confrontation between the imperial authorities and the domiciled leadership largely followed precedent. British rulers repeatedly

¹²⁷ 'The Anglo-Indian Impasse', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 29 Nov. 1928, p.2

¹²⁸ See, W. A. Hobson, 'Letter to the Editor: The Anglo-Indian Deputation', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, p.6 Dec. 1928, p.6; and H. A. Gidney, L. T. Maguire, E. T. McCluskie, C. S. Cameron, & W. A. Hobson, 'Letter to the Editor: The Anglo-Indian Reply', *The Statesman [Weekly]*, 13 Dec. 1928, p.6

¹²⁹ As Gidney put it, '[N]othing but a clause in the Act can be of any practical use to us in our desperate condition to-day', *Joint Committee on the Constitutional Reform*, vol. IIc: *Minutes of Evidence* (London, 1934), p.2398

expressed their special concern over the position of the domiciled community in the new political context but refused to insert a practical clause guaranteeing economic protection on the grounds that such would amount to communal preference.¹³⁰

Conclusion

By drawing on debates between British and their domiciled brethren over public employment, this chapter has demonstrated that the meaning of 'Britishness' was not given but was rather severely contested throughout the later colonial period. It was not necessarily for any explicitly ideological reasons that political activists of the domiciled community insisted that their community was 'British' and hence not 'Indian'. The community's stance on racial politics was complex, partly due to its regional diversity. And the community's claim for its being essentially 'British' derived more directly from its immense economic problems. Throughout the later colonial period, the domiciled community had been pauperised at a phenomenal rate, and one major reason for this was that the labour market of India had been

¹³⁰ For instance, the Services Sub-Committee of the First Round Table Conference declared that 'special consideration should be given to their claims for employment in the services'. Quoted in *Indian Round Table Conference, Third Session* (London, 1933), p.126. Gidney criticised these remarks for being 'nothing but pious expressions of sympathy and goodwill'. *ibid.*, p.177

constituted in such ways as to exclude subordinate people of European descent, who were poor but still demanded more than their indigenous counterparts. The colonial civil service appeared to be one of the very few avenues of employment that promised the domiciled community a level of living high enough to satisfy a people of British descent and culture. That the domiciled community claimed inclusion for this economic reason can be seen from the fact that it was not in the main interested in lower grades of the same civil service. The baseline of the community's demand was that both domiciled Europeans and Eurasians be admitted into the colonial offices as British and remunerated as such. Community leaders advanced this political claim by arguing that the domiciled were potentially the best British material conceivable for the superior grades in the PCS. Not only were they more European and thus more suitable than Anglicised indigenous subjects, but they were also in some ways better than their 'home bred' brethren who either knew little about India or had to engage in 'on-the-job' training (which cost more). In short, the community elites argued that, if the right opportunities were given, the domiciled would make the most suitable 'British' servants serving as efficient local agents of British imperialism.

But the British authorities entertained a rather different perspective. They considered the birth, upbringing, and higher education in the metropolitan context as criteria for certain 'British' positions of the civil service. Where these positions

were concerned, it was not simply blood which made one 'British'. In late colonial India, metropolitan domicile was a crucial criterion for being allowed to work and be paid as British agents of colonial rule. In turn, this meant that colonial domicile emerged as a stigma for domiciled Europeans and Eurasians: they were people of British descent but were domiciled in India. What association leaders essentially challenged in their numerous memorials, deputations and public representations, was this specific mode of differentiation in terms of place of domicile. And the authorities' repeated rejection of these counter-claims attested to how rigidly the meanings and borders of Britishness were disciplined against any disconcerting demands or interpretations. The rigidity of the domiciliary basis of Britishness indicated that the only way for domiciled Europeans and Eurasians to 'become British' was to travel all the way to the metropole and receive expensive education there. But the majority of them had been too economically dispossessed to do so.

It was not simply that the domiciled community became impoverished because of its Indian domicile. What is important to register is that the community's Indian domicile itself had been caused by an acute economic dispossession that affected most less-privileged members of British society who happened to be in India. Instead of being given a free choice regarding their place of domicile, domiciled Europeans and Eurasians were 'stuck' in India, partly because their past and present members were too impoverished to keep aloof from the colonial periphery and

remain always connected to the imperial centre. It was distinctive inequalities *within* British society that had first brought the domiciled community into existence.

In a way, therefore, the domiciliary criterion of Britishness was an upshot not just of the coloniser-colonised encounter but of the internal hierarchies of British bourgeois society. At this juncture, confining the recruitment of 'British' servants of the colonial civil service to the metropolitan context meant a peculiar reproduction of these internal-cum-class distinctions.

7. Conclusion

British attitudes towards their domiciled brethren were essentially of an exclusionary nature. The British community did recognise domiciled Europeans and Eurasians as kin, and sometimes pitted them against the indigenous subjects of colonial rule especially where the matters of internal securities were concerned. But insomuch as it did not always bring substantial economic gains (in the case of railway strikes, for instance), such racial mobilisation can be said to have been more exploitative than inclusionary. Neither can the educational integration of the community be said to have been inclusive. Christian education did not necessarily intend to make the community 'European' in terms of living standards. It may have served its members in alienating themselves from their native fellows but it did not generally make them any higher than the latter by socio-economic standards.

These exclusionary attitudes had much to do with how the British defined their colonialism in the Indian context and constructed a British identity accordingly. The British residents in the Subcontinent did subscribe to a markedly Orientalist world view which endorsed the idea of their fundamental superiority to the Indians. But at the same time they were acutely concerned about the physical and cultural effects of colonial residence on their own racial constitution. A corollary of these mixed attitudes was that the colonising community made every effort to make itself

aloof from India and her indigenous peoples. Thus, the children of colonial elites were sent away to Britain, while the remaining members of the community withdrew to the confines of hill-stations and the secluded social amenities they offered. And, this characteristic aloofness of British colonial agents had a political dimension as well. From the late nineteenth century, it was argued that the 'European respectability' required for colonial ruling was attainable only through an upbringing and education in Britain: however well-qualified they may have been, even the most educated of Indians would not be 'European enough' as long as they were educated in India. Such an ideology had derived from a political need to abate the increasing challenge of educated indigenous subjects, but at any rate, it made metropolitan middle-class education indispensable for the British in India themselves. Only those who came direct from Britain were regarded as 'European enough' to command the respect of Indians. And such a distinctively pro-metropolitan attitude of colonial elites was also constitutive of their view of their domiciled brethren: both in terms of racial constitution and socio-educational standard, the latter were not generally considered fit to be counted as genuine members of the ruling race. Domiciled Europeans and Eurasians were, as a rule, too 'degenerate' and/or 'mixed', and had been reared and educated in a wrong place. Community leaders did protest against such stigmas, but, in response, the British only reminded them of how 'un-British' they had actually been regarded as.

Where there were hints of inclusion and special treatment, it was strictly in the realm of philanthropic aid. Although the British starkly disregarded their domiciled brethren as their equals, at the same time they did not wish the latter's unequal status to lead to visible social problems. To the extent domiciled Europeans and Eurasians were seen by their indigenous neighbours as part of the colonising community, their pauperised state was perceived as a menace to colonial racial order. It was imperative, therefore, that the poverty of this ambiguous population was made less dramatic or possibly eliminated. It was against the background of these racial complexities of colonial Indian society that certain commissions on poverty and education flourished throughout the later colonial period. But despite these commissions, the peculiar circumstances surrounding relevant sectors of labour made the degree of unemployment and illiteracy continually worse. By the turn of the century, what little hope left of 'recycling' the indigent domiciled population into a useful intermediary class had largely waned. Accordingly, an emerging trend of philanthropic intervention concerned itself not so much with the collective empowerment of the community as with individuating its members into self-disciplined, independent workers who no longer depended on the British for employment, while also avoiding competition with cost-efficient indigenous labour. The most the British could possibly do was to turn their domiciled brethren into 'honest labours' who took up agriculture or artisanship in the countryside or possibly

abroad.

At first glance, the attitudes of the British towards their domiciled fellows may appear complex for their blend of inclusive and exclusionary impulses. But by circumscribing how the construction of British identity was conditioned by class as well as racial measures, this dissertation has shown that inclusion and exclusion stood on common ground. The exclusion of domiciled Europeans and Eurasians was often accompanied by degrading stereotypes regarding racial degeneration, cultural hybridisation and miscegenation. But what *ultimately* determined the distinction between the British and their domiciled counterpart was neither (im)purity of descent nor place of upbringing *as such*. Rather, such a distinction was a disguised but definite consequence of internal hierarchies within British bourgeois society. By the mid-nineteenth century, both processes of colonial domicile and racial hybridisation were phenomena largely confined to those who did not belong to the ruling classes, whether at home or in the colony. These people became rooted in India and/or absorbed into the mixed-race population because of their *already* subordinate status even prior to their emergence in the colonial context: domiciled Europeans and Eurasians did not always become pauperised *because of* their alleged 'degeneration' (as was often argued by British commentators). Moreover, close attention to the 'bourgeois' language of class in Victorian and

Edwardian Britain reveals that such a recourse to the idea of 'degeneration' was as much a reflection of domestic hierarchies as that of colonial ones. The emerging bourgeoisie represented the 'unfit' populations of the British nation in a crude language of 'degeneration' couched on notions of social evolution. But this discourse of 'degeneration' was not simply exclusionist. Rather it was linked up with social-reform initiatives that sought to deal with the problem-ridden populations in order to save the British race from internal decay. It was this bourgeois will for social-hygienic reform that triggered philanthropic measures to counter the 'degeneration' of domiciled-European and Eurasian paupers in late British India. Of course, the metropolitan politics of poverty was not simply replicated in the colonial context, where it was racial difference that was the primary index of social ordering and differentiation. My point is that, precisely because of its concerns with racial order, the colonial context ended up highlighting class difference, instead of pushing it to the background. In the British-Indian context, the question of racial integrity was even more pressing than at home because it was the very basis of political order. Accordingly, the perceived responsibility of the ruling classes to aid the impoverished members of the national body politic was even more urgent in the colonial outpost. At this juncture, it was no surprise that British India witnessed an incredible enthusiasm for this peculiar kind of philanthropy whose aim was not to 'civilise' indigenous subjects but to discipline the internal contradictions of the

colonising community itself.

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