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Hedonic diversity games

Abstract:

We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from the well-studied Schelling's model in that some agents may prefer homogeneous coalitions, while others may prefer to be members of a diverse group, or a group that mostly consists of agents of the other type. We model this setting as a hedonic game and inve...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Sub department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author, Author
Publisher:
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Host title:
AAMAS '19: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Pages:
565-573
Publication date:
2019-05-08
Acceptance date:
2019-01-23
Event title:
AAMAS '19
Event location:
Montreal, Canada
Event website:
http://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2019/
Event start date:
2019-05-13
Event end date:
2019-05-17
EISSN:
1558-2914
ISSN:
1548-8403
EISBN:
978-1-4503-6309-9
ISBN:
9781510892002
Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1047192
Local pid:
pubs:1047192
Deposit date:
2020-02-28

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