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Utpaladeva's Doctrine of Recognition

David Allport

Wolfson College

D. Phil. Thesis, Trinity Term, 1982 MT

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Abbreviations

APS.....Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi of Utpaladeva.

ĪPK.....Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās of Utpaladeva.

ĪPKV.....Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvimarśinī
of Abhinavagupta.

ĪPKVV.....Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvivṛtivimarśinī
of Abhinavagupta.

KSTS.....The Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies

NDPKS.....The Non-Dualistic Philosophy
of Kashmir Śaivism of J. Kupetz.

PH.....Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam of Kṣemarāja.

PV.....Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti.

ŚD.....Śivadṛṣṭi of Somānanda.

ŚDV.....Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti of Utpaladeva.

SP.....Saṃbandhaparīkṣā of Dharmakīrti.

Sp.K.....Spandakārikās of Kallaṭa.

SS.....Saṃbandhasiddhi of Utpaladeva.

TĀ.....Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta.

TĀV.....Tantrālokaviveka of Jayaratha.

V.Bh.....Vijñānabhairavatantra.

WZKSO....."Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-
und Ostasiens".

Oṃ Śrī Gaṇeśāya Namaḥ

Introduction

Much has been written on the connections between philosophy and religion in ancient India. Most has been written on the connection between orthodox Hindu religion and orthodox Hindu philosophy, or Buddhist religious practice and Buddhist philosophy.

But the religious tradition of which Utpaladeva was a member was not orthodox and its sacred scriptures, the non-dualist Śaivite Tantras, were taught only in secret initiatory sects. And Utpaladeva is one of the very few Tantric philosophers who does not propound his views in the form of a commentary upon one of the Tantras themselves.

Utpaladeva's philosophy is not intended solely for members of his own esoteric cult, it is written "for the benefit of mankind"[1], to convince those of differing religions and philosophical persuasion that the world view expounded in the non-dualist Śaivite Tantras is the only correct one. Thus although Utpaladeva quotes from the

1 IPK I.1.

Tantras in his Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās[1], he attempts to establish the identity of the self with Śiva by independent philosophical argument (tarka).

The principal philosophical view which Utpaladeva is concerned with refuting is that of the Buddhist Dharmakīrti[2]. Dharmakīrti's views were expounded in Kashmir c.800 A.D. by Dharmottara, who founded the "Kashmir School" of Buddhist commentary[3]. Even the orthodox brahmin Ānanandavardhana, author of the Dhvanyāloka treatise on poetics, wrote a commentary on Dharmottara's Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīka[4].

The other important expositor of Dharmakīrti's views in Kashmir was Śaṅkaranandana[5], also a brahmin, who is said (by the Buddhists) to have been converted to Buddhism by Dharmakīrti's brilliant logic. Abhinavagupta refers to Śaṅkaranandana several times in his commentaries

1 And we must note that although Utpaladeva does not give references to specific Tantras in his Āgamādhikāra, he uses the terminology of dualistic Śaivism, and in his Vivṛtivimarśinī, Abhinavagupta supports Utpaladeva's exposition with quotations from dualist Tantras; Matańga, Kiraṇa, Svacchanda, Netra, as well as the non-dualist Mālinīvijaya.

2 Dharmakīrti is Utpaladeva's pūrvapakṣin.

3 See T. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic Vol.I pp.40-42. Dharmottara wrote commentaries on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu and Pramāṇaviniścaya, now surviving only in Tibetan.

4 See ibid. p.41 fn.5

5 Who started a massive commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika which was never finished and now survives only in Tibetan.

on Utpaladeva's work, accepting Śaṅkaranandana's refutation of the philosophical views of the other schools[1].

Moreover, in several cases both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta quote Dharmakīrti's verses in approval[2], and we shall show in this thesis that the Doctrine of Recognition owes much to the Buddhist analysis of perception.

There was no doubt a considerable interchange of ideas between the various philosophical schools in Kashmir at the end of the first millenium A.D. Utpaladeva criticises the major Buddhist doctrine concerning the non-existence of the self, but he also adapts the Buddhist theory of ʂvalakṣaṇa to suit his own purposes.

There was also a transmission of ideas from Utpaladeva's school to the Buddhists. J.Naudou notes[3]that two Śaivite texts, the Svarodayatantra and the Svarodayalagnaphalopadeśa[4], are adapted into the Tibetan Buddhist corpus, and the lineage of masters (āmnāya) said to have transmitted these texts is: Maheśvara, Hayagrīva, Brahman, Somānandanātha, Utpalanātha, Guhyalakṣmaṇa,

1 See e.g. ĪPKV I p.181

2 See e.g. SS p.9, translated below p.50, and below p.107

3 Les Bouddhistes Kaśmīriens au Moyen Age, pp.102-103

4 Neither of these texts are known in Sanskrit.

Mantrabhaṭṭa, Abhinavagupta and Śaṅkarabhadra,[1] followed by five Tibetan Buddhists. It is significant that the first human master in this line is the author of the Śivadṛṣṭi, Utpaladeva's guru.

Concerning Utpaladeva's sectarian affiliations, Somānanda tells us in his Śivadṛṣṭi that he (Somānanda) is an initiate of the Tryambaka school[2], and Jayaratha tells us that this school transmitted the teachings of the Trika[3], and also notes that the same line of masters, Somānanda etc., taught Abhinavagupta the (Krama-system's) Devīpañcaśatika[4]. This line of gurus runs: Somānanda (c.925 A.D.), Utpaladeva (c.950 A.D.), Lakṣmaṇagupta (c.975 A.D.), Abhinavagupta (c.1000 A.D.).

Utpaladeva wrote a series of devotional hymns to Śiva, but these do not mention any kind of ritual worship, and indeed Utpaladeva says nothing about Tantric religious practices in any of his works. Hence we shall concentrate in this thesis upon an analysis of his philosophical views as expressed in his Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās and Vṛtti, where appropriate supplementing this with material from

1 Note that Naudou cannot be correct in suggesting that Śaṅkarabhadra might be the same person as Śaṅkarānanda (=Śaṅkaranandana). We have noted that Abhinavagupta quotes the latter, and he would surely not quote his own pupil.

2 ŚD 7.121c-122b

3 TĀV I p.28 ll.7-9

4 TĀV IV p.194 ll.8-9

his Ajaḍaprāmatṛsiddhi and Saṃbandhasiddhi.[1]

Hitherto only one scholar has devoted a work of any length to the Doctrine of Recognition, Dr.S.J. Kupetz[2]. Unfortunately, Dr. Kupetz has completely misunderstood both Utpaladeva and his commentator Abhinavagupta, as I shall show in Chapter Four. This present thesis is therefore intended as an introduction to Utpaladeva's philosophy.

I hope to render Utpaladeva's views intelligible not only to Sanskritists, but also to interested non-Sanskritists.

Direct translation from Sanskrit is not always the best way of explaining a Sanskrit work, since Sanskrit philosophers characteristically write with obmutescent brevity, and a simple translation often leaves us no closer to an understanding of the author's meaning. A classic example of this is K.A. Subramania Iyer's translation of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya III 3.8-11:

1 Utpaladeva's own long commentary on the ĪPK, the "Vivṛti", has been lost, although fragments remain in Abhinavagupta's ĪPKVV.

2 The Non-Dualistic Phiosophy of Kashmir Śaivism

"It has been traditionaly handed down from the elders that Relation is beyond the characteristics of all things (padārtha), that it is made known by everything (sarvalakṣaṇa) and that it favours that power called inherence (samavāya) by virtue of which the production of things (previously non-existent [sic] is restricted to a particular (cause) by which the effect is never separated from such a cause, there being no difference (from conjunction) in the matter of juxtaposition, by which the essence of something is cognised as that of something else, by which neither distinction nor identity of something is perceived, which renders assistance to other powers, which is beyond identity and difference and which is established differently from other things."[1]

Unless one already knows the basic arguments Bhartṛhari is putting forward here, and recognises the structure of the sentence by bearing in mind the structure of the Sanskrit, the non-specialist reader will not gain much from this translation.[2]

A similar problem confronts us when explaining the meaning of Utpaladeva's Kārikās. These verses are intended to be read with a commentary, and Utpaladeva wrote two commentaries of his own to explain the meaning of his verses. Moreover, Abhinavagupta also wrote two commentaries, one on Utpaladeva's verses (ĪPKV), and one

1 K.A. Subramania Iyer, The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, Chapter III, pt.i, Poona 1971

2 We do not intend this as a criticism of Prof. Iyer, simply to point out the difficulties of understanding such passages without commentary.

on Utpaladeva's own long commentary (ĪPKVV). However, although these prose commentaries are longer, they are in many places no less complex than the Sūtras, and again a simple translation will not suffice to make their meaning clear.

Therefore I have adopted the policy of giving not only translations, but also paraphrases of Sanskrit passages. In some cases I give first a translation of verses and then a paraphrase, including information from the commentaries, where the latter are sufficiently clear. But in instances where the commentary is so dense that it would need a further paraphrase to elucidate its meaning, I have simply given a translation of the verse and a paraphrase of the commentary. Moreover, as an aid to making the translations themselves more intelligible, I have occasionally inserted Sanskrit words from the text, and additional words necessary for English syntax in round brackets (), and my own explanatory notes in square brackets [].

In accordance with this translation policy in Chapter Five, where I am concentrating on the structure of Utpaladeva's argument from memory, I have simply paraphrased the verses in the chapter, and given a translation of the full passage in Appendix A.

Furthermore, in the early Chapters I have concentrated upon an exposition of the general character of Utpaladeva's metaphysics, and once I have established this, I move in the final two Chapters to a detailed critique of particular problems in the system, and here translations of commentaries occupy a more central position. I focus more upon the particular meanings of Sanskrit words, giving a detailed exegesis of passages which demonstrate the coherence or otherwise of a particular theory which I have outlined in the earlier Chapters.

Since non-specialists in Indian philosophy may be acquainted only with the views of the most famous Indian philosopher, the Advaitavedāntin Śaṅkara, and since Dr. Kupetz also makes (erroneous) comparisons between Abhinavagupta and Śaṅkara, I begin in Chapter One by pointing out a major distinction between the non-dualism (advaita) propounded by Śaṅkara and Utpaladeva respectively regarding their usage of the term "one".

In Chapter Two, I take several passages from the ĪPK which indicate the nature of Utpaladeva's philosophical undertaking and the relation he sees between philosophical thought and spiritual development.

Consciousness is of central importance to Utpaladeva's philosophy, and he defines it in such a way that it includes objects, which we normally consider to be unconscious. Chapter Three explains the basic categories of Utpaladeva's metaphysics, and shows how he understands consciousness to have a hierarchial structure, and to be constantly active in manifesting itself in different forms, oscillating at every instant from omniscient omnipotent awareness to unconscious isolation in space and time.

Chapter Four examines the work of Dr. Kupetz[1], and demonstrates that his claim that Abhinavagupta's philosophical position differs from Utpaladeva's is entirely false.

Utpaladeva's arguments against his Buddhist opponent centre upon an analysis of memory, and in Chapter Five we examine this argument, showing how deeply rooted it is in Utpaladeva's assumptions about the nature of time and the identity of the individual with Śiva.

Chapter Six gives a detailed analysis of Utpaladeva's explanation of objectivity, and pinpoints the difficulties in reconciling Utpaladeva's views on perception with his views on ontogeny.

1 <u>The Non-Dualistic Philosophy of Kashmir Śaivism</u>.

The way in which Utpaladeva's metaphysics depend upon a particular view of relations is analysed in Chapter Seven, and we see here how Utpaladeva's theories of relation affect his theory of illusion and the reality of the everyday world.

By conducting the analysis of Utpaladeva's system solely on the basis of Utpaladeva's own texts and Abhinavagupta's commentaries thereon, it becomes clear in exactly which areas the influence of other philosophers is most apparent, and which comparisons of Utpaladeva's Doctrine of Recognition with other philosophical systems will be most fruitful for further research.

Chapter One

It Is All One

> "Paradox is the poisonous flower of quietism,
> the irridescent surface of the rotting mind,
> the greatest depravity of all!"
>
> Thomas Mann

According to the post-Christian materialism which now predominates in the Western world, there is only one unquestionable source of certain knowledge; science. Initiates of the mystic cult of quantum physics know that science does not reveal "objective" truths, but merely formulates interpretations of observed phenomena. However, the favourite myth of the twentieth century is that of the "objective world".

This objective world is known through a single mode of cognition, that of rational scientific exploration, and it appears as a multiplicity of diverse elements, some of which are linked through relations such as cause and effect, or mutual or one-way dependence.

In contrast to this unambiguous reality, there existed, at least in the minds of Śaṅkarācārya and others like him in ancient India, a reality whose essence was

not at all objective. It was composed of a single element, "brahman", whose nature appeared different when known through two contrasting modes of cognition; the enlightened and the unenlightened.

The paradox in Śaṅkara's reality consists in the extraordinary fact that he denies not only any duality of elements within it, but also the duality inherent in the contrasting modes of cognition which apprehend it. The apparent dualism of the enlightened and unenlightened modes of cognition is caused, Śaṅkara claimed, by ignorance (avidyā).

Opponent's of Śaṅkara's view asked to whom this ignorance belonged, for Śaṅkara denied that it belonged to Brahman. And if it belonged to the individual self, then this individual self as distinct from Brahman would constitute a second element in Śaṅkara's reality. Śaṅkara simply replied that ignorance belonged to the questioner who asked to whom ignorance belonged.

The unsuspecting Westerner, when at first confronted by Utpaladeva's Doctrine of Recognition, might well imagine that he has here yet another specimen of ancient Indian equivocation. I believe he would be mistaken in this rather hasty judgement.

We must concede that there are, on the face of it, remarkable similarities in the general character of Śaṅkara's and Utpaladeva's realities. Utpaladeva's reality also consists of a single element, which he variously

designates as Śiva, Pramātā (the knower) and citi (consciousness). Again Utpaladeva distinguishes between two contrasting modes in which this single element is cognised; the enlightened and the unenlightened. The addition of a third mode of cognition, the "enlightened - cum - unenlightened"[1], would not, I think, do much to persuade our critical Westerner that we have here a radically different view.

Furthermore, Ms. Smith (we will name our newcomer to Utpaladeva for the sake of convenience) would no doubt swiftly point out that Utpaladeva's view coincides with Śaṅkara's, in that when the single element which comprises reality is seen through the unenlightened mode of cognition, it appears to be a multiplicity of elements, but that when the participant in this exotic reality attains the enlightened mode of cognition, this apparent multiplicity disappears.

Ms. Smith may be forgiven for her error here, which we may readily correct by pointing out that whereas Utpaladeva and Śaṅkara mean the same thing by multiplicity (anekatā), they mean very different things by unity (ekatā).

A brief reflection will reveal to Ms. Smith that she herself uses the word "one" in a variety of senses. Let us

1 i.e. cognition in the parāparāvasthā.

consider a few examples. We may start by assuming that Ms. Smith is a music teacher, and responsible for organising the Annual Clapham High School Concert. Let us further assume that one of the prospective performers at the concert is Johnny, a wildly enthusiastic guitar player who knows nearly fifty songs, all of which he plays very badly. His mother insists to Ms. Smith that Johnny be allowed to play at the concert, and Ms. Smith agrees on the condition that Johnny plays only one song. She wishes, naturally, to subject the audience to only one example of Johnny's defective technique.

Ms. Smith has another pupil, Freddy, a conscientious guitar-player whose entire repertoire is exhausted by the performance of "All You Need Is Love", which he nevertheless plays extremely well. In writing "One song by Freddy" in the Concert Programme, Ms. Smith is doubtless thinking of the paucity of his repertoire, and would probably have no objection if he played "All You Need Is Love" again as an encore, if the audience were sufficiently enthusiastic.

If, on the other hand, little Johnny wilfully interpreted "One song by Johnny" as four renditions of "Back in the U.S.S.R.", Ms. Smith would be doubtless most annoyed.

Furthermore, in subsequently describing the concert in the school magazine, Ms. Smith might well refer to the school choir, rather poetically, as "singing in one voice", though only a few of its members had been completely stage-struck.

There is yet another sense of "one" which Ms. Smith would readily recognise; it refers to the unity of a complex object. If Clapham High is a small school, it may have only one football team, as opposed to the two fielded by larger schools. Despite its comprising eleven more or less autonomous members, who sometimes support each other and at other times indulge in in-fighting, it is nevertheless regarded as "one" team.

For our philosophical purposes, we may designate the four senses of "one" with which Ms. Smith is familiar as follows:

A) The "one" of numerical singularity (Johnny's projected performance).[1]

B) The "one" of class-type, often described as the universal apparent in many particulars (Freddy's repertoire).[2]

C) The "one" of unification (the "one" voice of the choir).[3]

D) The "one" of the complex object (the team).[4]

We are now in a position to see why it is an error to suppose that Utpaladeva and Śaṅkara mean the same thing when they say that reality is multiple when seen from the unenlightened point of view, but single when seen from the enlightened point of view.

1 Cp. for example Utpaladeva's use when he states that there is one moon in the sky, not two.

2 jātau ekavacanam.

3 Cp. the "one" unified Śiva and Śakti (below pp.29-30).

4 Cp. the "one" complex svalakṣaṇa, below p.73.

Let us examine first what Utpaladeva means when he claims that reality is "one".

Certainly he does not mean "one" in what we have called sense A). He is by no means suggesting that the unenlightened man sees a multiplicity of realities, whereas the enlightened man sees only one of these. Quite the reverse, Utpaladeva holds that the unenlightened man has a perspective which is limited to only one aspect of Śiva, whereas the enlightened man sees all aspects of Śiva (not to say, all possible worlds).

There may, however, be some nuance of sense B) in Utpaladeva's claim that reality is "one". I say "nuance", because it is not immediately apparent that Utpaladeva is speaking of a plurality of realities which have a similar structure. However, we have mentioned already that for Utpaladeva reality consists solely of Śiva, the knower (pramātā), consciousness (citi). It is the purpose of Utpaladeva's Doctrine of Recognition to point out that the individual subject is in fact identical with Śiva, who is consciousness. Utpaladeva readily admits that there are a multiplicity of individual subjects who are capable of realising their identity with the knower (pramātā) who is Śiva. It is possible, therefore, to regard each of these individual subjects as numerically different, but essentially similar "renditions" of the consciousness of Śiva[1], just as there may be a multiplicity of numerically

1 Cp. ĪPKV I p.30 ll.15-19, where Abhinavagupta tells us that the subject is not different whether omnipotent or with limited power.

different renditions of one song. We shall be constantly returning to this theme of the unity of a multiplicity of phenomena throughout this thesis.

There is no doubt at all that when Utpaladeva asserts that Śiva is "one", he also means what is implied by sense C) of the word "one", i.e. that there are a multiplicity of elements which are unified by participating together in Śiva.[1]

Most importantly, however, Utpaladeva's Śiva is "one" in the sense of being a complex object. For Utpaladeva, therefore, reality is somewhat analagous to a football team; it contains apparently autonomous elements, which may co-operate with or antagonise each other, yet whose behaviour expresses some single purpose (or lack of purpose) and whose overall conduct conforms to certain behavioural rules whose nature is not immediately apparent to the uninitiated.[2]

We hope that the reader will now have some impression of what Utpaladeva means when he says that the unenlightened man sees reality as multiple, but that the enlightened man sees it as one. What, then, does Śaṅkara mean by the same phrase?

Śaṅkara would be forced to reject all the above senses of "one". For his reality, brahman, is "one" in a fifth and entirely different sense: it is undifferentiated, without any qualities (nirguṇa). All the senses of "one" with which

1 Cf. ĪPK I.22-23

2 Cf. ĪPK I.59

our hypothetical Westerner is familiar imply a contrasting "many", either as the exclusion of a plural number (A), the similarity of a plurality of phenomen (B), the unification of diverse elements (C), or the complexity (the "possessing-multiple-qualities-ness") of a single phenomenon (D).

For Śaṅkara, however, the assertion that reality is "one" amounts to the negation of duality of any kind, even, as we have seen, the duality inherent in the possibility of being either enlightened of unenlightened. It is clear, therefore, that when Śaṅkara says that "the enlightened man sees reality as one, whereas the unenlightened man sees reality as multiple", his statement is either a paradox, or else the statement of an unenlightened man.

But having considered what Utpaladeva means by "the enlightened man sees reality as one, but the unenlightened man sees reality as multiple", we can readily see that this statement is not neccessarily either paradoxical or the statement of an unenlightened man.

Utpaladeva may sometimes overlook the implications of his own assumptions, and more frequently fail to see that his attacks on rival philosophers carry no weight, given his opponent's assumptions. But, as we shall show throughout this exposition of his Doctrine of Recognition, he is never guilty of Śaṅkara's kind of paradox.

Chapter Two

A Proof of the Existence of the Self?

Polo:....Perhaps the terraces of this garden overlook only the lake of our mind.....

Kublai....and however far our troubled enterprises as warriors and merchants may take us, we both harbour within ourselves this silent shade, this conversation of pauses, this evening that is always the same.

Polo Unless the opposite hypothesis is correct: That those who strive in camps and ports exist only because we two think of them, here, enclosed among these bamboo hedges, motionless since time began.

Kublai Unless toil, shouts, sores, stink do not exist; and only this azalea bush.

Polo Unless porters, stonecutters, rubbish collectors, cooks cleaning the lights of chickens, washerwomen bent over stones, mothers stirring rice as they nurse their infants, exist only because we think them.

Kublai To tell the truth, I never think them.

Polo Then they do not exist.

Kublai To me this conjecture does not seem to suit our purposes. Without them we could never remain here swaying, cocooned in our hammocks.

Polo Then the hypothesis must be rejected. So the other hypothesis is true: they exist and we do not.

Kublai We have proved that if we were here, we would not be.

Polo And here, in fact, we are.

Italo Calvino

We have so far acquitted Utpaladeva of the charge of propounding a metaphysical paradox. But before we can examine his metaphysical system in detail, we must first

defend him against another criticism: Is he not contradicting himself by propounding the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās in the first place? For so it would seem from a first reading of the opening verses of the Kārikās, which run as follows:

> "Having somehow attained the service of the Great Lord, and wishing to be of service to mankind, I shall now expound the Recognition of Him, who is the cause of the attainment of all perfections.(1)
>
> What conscious person would give either a denial or a proof of the agent, the knower, his own self, the pre-established Great Lord? (2)
>
> However, due to delusion, although He is seen, He is not noticed. The recognition of Him is explained here, by an exposition of (His) powers. (3)
>
> Thus the establishment of inanimate things depends upon animate beings. Knowledge and action are said to be the life of living beings. (4)
>
> Of these, knowledge is proven by itself, and action, being located in the body, can be seen by others, and by this means we guess that others possess knowledge." (5)

These five verses constitute the introduction (upodghāta) to Utpaladeva's work. They assert his principal views, as a prelude to the attack by his philosophical opponent (the next eleven verses outline the pūrvapakṣa).

Unless Utpaladeva is implicitly contradicting himself, it would seem from verse two that he does not intend to prove the existence of Śiva, and that the purpose of the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās is simply for Utpaladeva to publicize his own personal convictions on the matter. However, the situation is more complex than this.

Let us first take a closer look at the meaning of these five verses. In his own Vṛtti on verse one, Utpaladeva explains that it is due to the grace of the Supreme Lord that he has gained the great fortune of becoming a servant of the Lord. Abhinavagupta, with greater respect for propriety, adds in his Vimarśinī that "somehow" means through devotion to the feet of his guru (Somānanda), which was brought about by the Supreme Lord.[1]

Abhinavagupta also comments[2] that the word "service" suggests the great benefits that derive from the recognition of the Lord. A servant, he says, is one who is given everything he desires by his master.[3]

We must note also here that the compound "samasta-saṃpatsamavāptihetum" may also be taken as a bahuvrīhi, i.e. as meaning "whose cause is the attainment of all perfections". In other words, Utpaladeva is suggesting here that whenever one experiences perfection in one's life, one is recognising the Lord.

In verse two, "Ajaḍātmā" means not only "a being whose essence is conscious" but also "a person who is not a fool", since jaḍa means not only "unconcious" but also (and more usually in non-philosophical contexts) "a fool". In

1 ĪPKV I p.12 l.8-10
2 ĪPKV I p.14 l.5-8
3 dīyate asmai svāminā sarvaṃ yathābhilaṣitam iti dāsaḥ

his Vṛtti Utpaladeva brings out the first meaning by asserting that to undertake the activity of establishing anything at all, one must first have a self which is already established, and whose capacity for knowledge and action (aiśvaryam) is proven by self-awareness (svasaṃvedana-siddham).

Utpaladeva brings out the second meaning of "jaḍa" in his Vṛtti by concluding that " the proof or refutation of the Lord is an undertaking only for fools".[1]

On the basis of Utpaladeva's claim that the Lord is "ādisiddha" and His power is "svasaṃvedanasiddha", we may deduce that a proof of the Lord is pointless not because it is impossible, but because it is unnecessary: the Lord must be siddha before any thing else can be siddha, and his existence is self-evident, verifiable by anyone through simple introspection.

We may also be tempted to think that when Utpaladeva says "ādisiddha" he means "proven a priori". He does not. To understand the purpose of the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās, it is essential to understand what kinds of argument Utpaladeva is using. We shall discuss this in detail later in this Chapter, but we may conclude our discussion of verse two by noting that "siddha" does not

1 teneśvarasya siddhau nirākaraṇe ca jaḍānāmevodyamaḥ

mean here "established" in the sense of "cognitively proven" but "established" in the sense of "ontologically secure". In other words, Utpaladeva is claiming that it is necessary that the Lord must exist before we could attempt to prove or deny Him, but he is not claiming that it is necessary that we should know that he exists before we attempt to prove or deny Him. In asserting that the Lord is "ādisiddha", Utpaladeva is making a metaphysical, not an epistemological claim.

Verse three gives Utpaladeva's justification for writing the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās. Although a proof is unnecessary, and the Lord is seen everywhere, nevertheless delusion clouds men's understanding, and they are not aware of what it is that they are seeing. Utpaladeva undertakes to explain to them what it is, so that they will recognise their experience of themselves and of worldly objects as being experience of the Lord.

Utpaladeva reinforces this point in 1.64-65:

> "And this non-sequential intelligence (pratibhā) overlayed with a succession of various objects, is the knower whose form is endless consciousness, the Great Lord. (64)
>
> Affinity [between entities] occurs when entities are established[1], by means of various distinct cognitions, in the one knower." (65)

1 See my remarks on "pratiṣṭhā" pp.48-49 below.

Utpaladeva's comment on vs. 65 is that various entities become connected in what we know as the relations of cause and effect etc., when after passing "through the mouths of the streams of many consciousnesses, they come to rest in the ocean of the one knower."[1]

Utpaladeva is here putting forward the view of the Mālinīvijayatantra, that at every instant consciousness unfolds and becomes a variety of objects (unmeṣa), and then closes in upon itself to become pure consciousness (nimeṣa). Thus every cognition is a movement from subject to object and back to subject, in accordance with the classical Indian view that the senses go out from the self and grasp the object, and then return to the self.

We shall return in Chapter Six to the question of the nature of objects for Utpaladeva. We may conclude our notes on verse three by repeating that for Utpaladeva, the Great Lord is perceived at the start and finish of every cognition, whether the perceiving subject is enlightened or unenlightened.

1 "anekasaṃvitsrotomukhairekapramātṛsindhumupalīya bhāvabhedāḥ kāryakāraṇatādivyavahārasamanvayaṃ bhajante"

Verse four speaks of the "establishment" (pratiṣṭhā) of inanimate objects as depending upon living beings, and verse five claims that the existence of knowledge is "proven" by itself (svataḥ siddham), though the knowledge of others is only guessed at. Here we must turn our attention to the problem first encountered in verse two: when is Utpaladeva claiming that the existence of something is logically demonstrated, and when is he merely claiming that something exists? There are few people who would claim that the existence of objects is demonstrable without living demonstrators, but many who would staunchly defend the proposition that objects are capable of existing without the existence of living beings. Similarly, many people would accept that their own cognitive processes unquestionably demonstrate the existence of knowledge, but very few would accept that the existence of knowledge has no cause, or depends on nothing but knowledge itself.

Our purpose in this chapter is to clarify whether the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās are an attempt to prove the existence of the Lord, or merely an assertion of the existence of the Lord. In order to decide this, we must be clear as to when Utpaladeva is using words like "pratiṣṭhā" and "siddhi" in a metaphysical sense, and when he is using them in an epistemological sense.

We have already seen that Utpaladeva believes that a proof of the existence of Śiva is unnecessary, and even foolish. However, this does not by any means rule out the possibility that the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās do in fact attempt to prove the existence of Śiva. The most powerful argument for the hypothesis that Utpaladeva is trying to prove the existence of Śiva in this work, is that he subsequently wrote a work entitled "The Proof of the Conscious Subject" (Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi).

This latter work is clearly not a simple assertion of a metaphysical position, but a series of arguments intended to demonstrate the logical necessity of the existence of the knower. There is no doubt that the knower whose logical necessity Utpaladeva is claiming to prove is none other than Śiva. A.P.S.vs 16 states:

> "This very self is twofold; limited and unlimited. The limited self is the aṇu[1], constrained by prāṇa etc.; the unrestricted self is the Supreme Self."[2]

1 "Atom" - a technical term in Kashmir Śaivism, denoting the jīva or puruṣa, the individual subject.

2 "dvidhā sa eṣa evātmā mito 'parimitastathā
prāṇādinā niruddho 'ṇuḥ paramātmā tvakhaṇḍitaḥ"

We return, then, to the problem posed at the beginning of this Chapter: If the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās are a proof of the existence of Śiva, then in the light of verse two, is Utpaladeva implicitly contradicting himself by writing the rest of the work, or is he deliberately making a fool of himself?[1]

We have seen that there is a powerful argument for supposing that Utpaladeva is trying to prove the existence of Śiva. But the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās themselves contain passages in which the author seems to deny that his purpose is to give any such proof. Let us examine these.

First, in II 30-31 Utpaladeva explicitly denies the utility of the accepted means of gaining valid knowledge (pramāṇa):

> "What use is the means of establishing knowledge (pramāṇa), which is (always) a newly-produced Appearance[2], in the case of the Lord, who is present in every cognition, the primordial knower, whose form is eternally manifest, who is ultimately real and untouched by non-existence, like the surface of a smooth wall upon which the various colours in the picture of the universe are painted."

1 See my notes on verse two, above pp. 21-22.

2 navābhāsaḥ Cp. ĪPK II.16 "prāmāṇaṃ svābhāso 'bhinavodayaḥ", and our note on "ābhāsa" below, pp. 73-75

Utpaladeva comments in his Vṛtti that "in so far as one can give instruction on matters of existence and non-existence, thus far He remains as subjectivity. In the absence of one who desires to be taught, instruction is inappropriate."[1]

These passages would seem to suggest that reasoning cannot reach any conclusions about Śiva, and that a faithful and devoted student with mystical aptitude is needed to arrive at the truth of the matter.

The above two verses are followed by another disclaimer as to any intentions Utpaldeva might have as regards proving the existence of the self. ĪPK II 32 states:

> "All that is being introduced here is the usage of the terms "Lord" etc. (to refer to the self), which due to stupidity have not been used before, by illustrating the powers (of this self)."[2]

Once again in his Vṛtti, Utpaladeva suggests that the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās have a religious, rather than philosophical, aim:

> "The usage of the terms "Śiva","Lord" etc. as refering to this self, the knower, is being established for the purposes of instruction in meditation etc."

1 "...yāvadupadiśyeta bhāvābhāvābhyāṃ tāvatsa eva pramātṛtāṃ bhajate upadidikṣorabhāvādu padeśānupapattiḥ"

2 apravartitapūrvo 'tra kevalaṃ mūḍhavaśāt
śaktiprakāśeneśādivyavahāraḥ pravartyate

This last statement in the Vṛtti must be understood in the light of ĪPK I.47 and its Vṛtti, where Utpaladeva states that the Lord freely manifests Himself in various forms under the concepts of "The All-Powerful" (prabhu), "Lord", etc, for the purposes of meditation (although his essence remains unchanged by being variously apprehended in this way, see ĪPK I.48 & Vṛtti).

Abhinavagupta gives some clues as to what "the purposes of meditation" might be in T.Ā I.67-74. We may summarise these verses as follows:

The different qualities of the Lord, such as being all-pervasive (vibhu), all-powerful (prabhu), eternal (nitya) etc. are not in fact different from one another. He has one[1] quality, that of being the entire universe, and this implies all His other qualities. But nevertheless, one may speak of His having different qualities, since by the power of His own autonomy (svātantrya) He emphasises different aspects of Himself in varying manifestations. Similarly, one may speak of Him as having many powers (śaktis) but really they are all just different functions of His one supreme power of autonomy. Moreover, we may make a conceptual distinction between a power (śakti) and the wielder of that power (śaktimat), but Śiva's natural form is

1 In this passage, our notes on Utpaladeva's use of "one" in Chapter One apply also to Abhinavagupta.

energetic, and in distinguishing between Him and His śakti, we must remember that there is no real duality here. Śiva and Śakti are eternally united in sexual bliss, and it is from the bliss of this union that the universe unfolds. There can be no more separation between Śiva and his powers than there can be between fire and its various capacities for burning, heating, lighting, etc. Nevertheless, differences in Śiva's functions do appear in the world, and these differences are not illusory, since everything that manifests is a mode of Śiva. Therefore we may say that a particular śakti performs a particular function, and when Śiva creates, He freely manifests Himself through these various śaktis, and appears in these different capacities in meditation etc. In other words, when the meditator contemplates Śiva as eternal, His power of time appears in the meditator's awareness. When Śiva is contemplated as omnipotent, His power of agency (kriyāśakti) suffuses the meditator's awareness.

Abhinavagupta concludes this section of his Tantrāloka by remarking that the various aspects from which the partless Śiva can be contemplated corespond to his various energies, hence these śaktis are the means (upāya) to realising Śiva (who is upeya).

The relevance of this to our question of whether Utpaladeva is proving the existence of Śiva or not may not be immediately apparent. But we must investigate further this issue of śaktis in meditation, in order to reply to one of the strongest arguments for the hypothesis that Utpaladeva is proving the existence of Śiva in the ĪPK.

This argument runs as follows: "You (the "no-proof" apologist) say that Utpaladeva is denying the ability of pramāṇa to prove anything about Śiva, and that his purpose is merely to encourage the use of the names "Lord" etc as applying to our everyday selves. But if the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās are essentially a profession of religious faith, then not only are all Utpaladeva's arguments unnecessary, but also his exhortations to call ourselves God carry no weight: there are numerous Tantras which use the appellations "Lord" etc. as applying to the self, and these Tantras are far more deserving of the devotee's respect, since they are the word of Śiva himself."

Any attempt to rebut the above argument must hinge upon the importance of ascribing names to things, since the "no proof" hypothesis claims that the sole purpose of the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās is to encourage the application of the concepts "Lord, All-pervasive, All-powerful" etc. to the self which we know through introspection.

On the subject of names, it is almost certain[1] that Utpaladeva, like Abhinavagupta, subscribed to the general theory of mantra expounded in all the Śaivite Tantras. The basic elements of this theory are the same as those of the ancient Vedic mantra-theory. The mantras recited at Vedic rituals were believed to be sounds which inherently contained the power to make the ritual effective. This was because the Sanskrit language was believed to be perfect, in that there was a natural bond between the referent of a Sanskrit word and the word itself. This meant that the recitation of the names of Vedic deities was equivalent to the evocation of the deities themselves, provided there was no error in recitation.

The Śaivite mantra theory, propounded by Abhinavagupta (and, as we have noted, most probably accepted by Utpaladeva also) contained an additional element. In this later theory, it is not the sounds themselves which contain power, but the consciousness of the Yogi who contemplates them.

Kallaṭa explains in his Spandakārikās[2]:

> "The mantras, full of the strenth of omniscience, bestow [magic] authority upon men, like the senses, when they [the mantras] draw upon that strength."

Kallaṭa glosses "that strength" as unrestricted consciousness (nirāvaraṇacit), and Kṣemarāja glosses it as

1 Given his membership of the Krama and Trika sects. See above p.4

2 Vs. 26, = 2nd Niṣyanda vs.1, or 2nd Niṣyanda vs.10 according to Rāmakaṇṭha.

"that potency in the form of prāṇa whose essence is vibrating consciousness" (spandatattvātmakaṃ prāṇarūpaṃ vīryam). Moreover Utpaladeva's pupil Rāmakaṇṭha states[1] that "the mantras achieve their powers (only) when the meditators (sādhakas) have made their own the awareness of that "I"-state which is their [the sādhakas'] ultimate identity".

The point of the simile about the senses is that they allow men to perform limited cognitive and active functions[2]. The mantras also render man cognitively and actively capable, but the capacities bestowed by the mantras are unlimited.

The Śaivite emphasis on the meditating consciousness rather than the mantra as the source of power is important, since it reinforces the importance of initiation. If a mantra is used by someone uninitiated, i.e. who does not have the correct form of consciousness, it will either be totally ineffective, or else (and we are warned that this is the more likely outcome) they will have the opposite to the desired effect, and plunge the illegitimate meditator into the lowest hell.[3]

1 Sp.K. Vivṛti p.82 ll.11-13

2 The "senses" concerned are both the buddhīndriyas and the karmendriyas.

3 We must note that these dire consequences of illegitimate mantra-recitation also applied to Vedic recitation. But in the latter case, recitation by non-brahmins was more clearly a socio-religious crime. In the Śaivite tantric theory, meditation by the uninitiated is what we might call a "magic crime", and the agent of retribution for this crime is the form of consciousness produced by the mantra itself. Moreover, Kaula Tantra in particular admits as legitimate practitioners all manner of impure persons by Vedic orthodox standards.

Abhinavagupta clearly accepts the view that the syllables which comprise Tantric mantras have metaphysical significance. Kaśmir Śaivism is well-known for its ingenious interpretations of the Sanskrit alphabet as a representation of the ontogeny of the cosmos (see e.g. Śivasūtravimarśinī II.7, TĀ III.67-85 and Jayaratha's viveka). Abhinavagupta implies that Utpaladeva also accepts this view (see TĀ III 85a-b). However, whilst the metaphysical status of mantras (at least when they are evoked by appropriate consciousnesses) is a necessary postulate in order for the Śaivite Tantric claims of magic to be believed, it is by no means necessary that every Sanskrit word be a mantra. Thus Utpaladeva may accept the view that there is an inherent connection between the mantra "sauḥ" and the power of creativity which is its referent,[1] such that the recitation of this mantra brings about an experience of this divine power. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Utpaladeva believes that there is anything more than a conventional relationship between the word "nauḥ" and a boat.

Let us now turn to the implications of Utpaladeva's mantra theory for our main theme. Supporters of the hypothesis that Utpaladeva is not offering a proof of the existence of Śiva may well argue that on the basis of IPK II.30-32[2] we may conclude that he regards the usage

1 See TĀ III 187-188

2 Translated above pp.27-28

of the terms "Īśa" etc. as referring to ourselves as efficacious in bringing us to a state of divinity. This would be because Utpaladeva regards the use of these terms "in meditation etc"[1] as having the same effect as mantras, possibly because he regards all the names of Śiva as mantras.[2]

Following this line of thinking, we can now understand why he has no interest in giving a proof of the existence of Śiva, since the latter will be revealed to the meditator simply by using the recommended names in appropriate meditations. What remains unclear, however, is why Utpaladeva should have written an apparently philosophical work in order to give directions in meditation.

Someone acquainted with Abhinavagupta's Tantrāloka might point here to T.Ā.IV.15a-b, which reminds us that

> "It is stated in the Mālinīvijayatantra that reasoning is the supreme limb of Yoga" (śrīpūrvaśāstre tatproktaṃ tarko yogāṅgam uttamam).

Thus the following resolution of our difficulty presents itself: The ĪPK is intended to encourage the practice of contemplating ourselves under the concepts "Īśa" etc. in meditation. This practice is the śāktopāya described in T.Ā.IV. An important procedure on this cognitive

1 See Vṛtti on ĪPK II.32

2 Cp. V.Bh. vs.130 and vs.132

spiritual path is the elimination of doubt, which becomes progressively less profound until one arrives at certainty.[1] Thus the purpose of the ĪPK is to eliminate philosophical doubts as to whether we are justified in using the terms "Īśa" etc. to apply to ourselves. As this process of meditation and discrimination develops, we become able to recognise ourselves as God immediately, without the necessity for conceptually debating with ourselves. Abhinavagupta gives a good analogy for this process at T.Ā.IV.280-229, when he describes a jeweller, who during his apprenticeship must carefully study and conceptualise the attributes of each new stone he sees, in order to know what kind of stone it is. But an experienced jeweller can tell at a glance, without conceptually debating with himself, the true nature of any stone he looks at.

There is much to be said for the above interpretation of Utpaladeva's purpose, and the emphasis it places upon religious goals. There is also much to be said against it. First, the advocate of the "proof of the existence of Śiva" hypothesis may object that if Utpaladeva expects to justify philosophically the application of the words "Īśa" etc. to the self, how can he do this unless he first of all proves that not only Śiva, the self, but also our individual selves, with which He is supposed to be

1 See T.Ā. 248-257.

identified, exist? Utpaladeva is surely not advocating meditation upon the identity of two non-existent things. And Utpaladeva is also quite clear that the main philosophical doubt that he must dispel before any wavering devotee can feel justified in his meditations is exactly this doubt as to the existence of the self. For does Utpaladeva not use the Buddhist Dharmakīrti as his pūrvapakṣin?

The advocate of the "no-proof" hypothesis may well reply to this that a justification is not necessarily a proof, and we shall return to this point later because it merits a detailed consideration.

But the attacker of the "philosophically justified method of meditation" interpretation has another (and this time crushing) blow to deliver: Utpaladeva explicitly states that he is proclaiming

> "a new and easy path (to identity with Śiva) as was described by our great guru (Somānanda) in the Śivadṛṣṭi"[1]

The "no-proof" champion may try to argue that using the terms "Īśa" etc as mantras, together with philosophical reflections upon the nature of knowledge and action, does in fact constitute a new path. He may add that

1 ĪPK IV.16

the fact that Somānanda mentions nothing about using "Īśa" etc. as mantras is not a grave objection, since it is traditional for disciples to claim that they are merely expounding the views of their gurus, when in fact they are advancing completely new ideas.

But having made this valid point, our "no-proof" apologist has no further evidence to support his view. We must agree with his opponent that if Utpaladeva's main purpose was to introduce a new kind of meditation, then it is rather strange that he did not explicitly say so, and indeed only mentions meditation at all in a few places in his Vṛtti[1], and never in his verses[2]. Moreover, the "usage of the terms "Īśa" etc."[3] as applying to the self is, as noted above, hardly an innovation in Kaśmir Śaivism, nor is the kind of śāktopāya meditation[4] postulated by our "no-proof" champion. The absence of any statement regarding mantra theory, or reference to "Īśa" etc as mantras, also weighs heavily against the "no-proof" view. It seems clear that if Utpaladeva is making any innovation as regards spiritual practice, then it must be in the realm of "tarka" or reasoning, which is , as we have mentioned, the "supreme limb of Yoga"[5].

1 e.g. on II.32, the verse under discussion, and on I.47.

2 It is also important to note that his commentator Abhinavagupta did not interpret his purpose in this way.

3 See ĪPK II.32.

4 Śāktopāya is defined in the Mālinīvijayatantra.

5 See p.35.

We have accepted the contention that a reasonable justification of the use of the terms "Lord" etc as referring to ourselves is not necessarily the same as a proof of the existence of the self and the Self. Could it be that Utpaladeva's purpose in the ĪPK is to justify the practice of Kaśmir Śaivite meditation philosophically, and that he himself sometimes regards this justification as a proof of the existence of the Self, and sometimes does not?

Let us now return to the question that brought about our original uncertainty as to whether Utpaladeva thinks he is proving the existence of the Self, or whether he is simply claiming that it exists: What does Utpaladeva mean by terms such as "siddhi" and "pratiṣṭhā"?

Our "no-proof" advocate may well claim that the reason Utpaladeva wrote the "Proof of the Conscious Subject" (Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi) some time after the ĪPK was that he had not attempted to prove the existence of the self in his earlier work. However, Utpaladeva's remarks about the futility and foolishness of such a proof would no doubt still apply at the time of the later work (unless the nature of reality and/or thought had somehow changed in the meantime), and so we are still left with the problem of whether Utpaladeva is implicitly contradicting himself.

Therefore any explanation of the terms "siddhi" and "pratiṣṭhā" which shows that Utpaladeva was not contradicting himself by writing the Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi will

also explain how it is possible that Utpaladeva was not contradicting himself by giving a proof of the existence of Śiva in the ĪPK. The argument from contradiction does not, therefore, rule out the following possibility: Utpaladeva's motive for writing the APS was not the desire to prove something he had not previously attempted to prove, but simply that he considered that his attempt at a proof in the ĪPK had not succeeded (at least in the opinion of his phiosophical opponents), and that he merely wished to add a few further arguments to his original proof. This might equally be said of his two other later proofs, the "Proof of the (existence of the) Lord" (Īśvarasiddhi) and the "Proof of Relations" (Saṃbandhasiddhi).

A brief study of the APS will throw a good deal of light upon the problem of "proof" in Utpaladeva's works. Verse 12 is particularly important in that Utpaladeva explicitly states how he is using the terms "pratiṣṭhā", "siddhi" and "vyavasthiti". We shall translate the first thirteen verses which not only show what kind of "siddhi" the APS itself is, but also contain several parallel passages to verses in the ĪPK, and are invaluable aids to interpreting the latter. The translation will be followed by a brief discussion of the text's arguments.

The first verse presents Utpaladeva's pratijñā - the assertion that his following argument seeks to prove:

> "We have decided that just as there is no inherent distinction between the existent and the non-existent, similarly there is no such distinction between the conscious and the unconscious." (1)

Utpaladeva's proof of this runs as follows:

> "The appearance (prakhyā) and particular attribution (upakhyā)[1] which are the existence [of an object] and their opposites [aprakhyā and anupakhyā] which are the non-existence [of the object], do not touch the essential form of the object, they depend upon the knower. (2)
>
> Nor can the essence of an object be [that object's] being an object of appearance and particular attribution, because it would then be dependent upon something else, and existence cannot rest in something multiform.[2] (3)

[Opponent:] Let there be no (real) distinction [between existent and non-existent objects]; nevertheless, there is the presence and absence (bhāvābhāvau) of appearance and particular attribution, therefore this distinction [beween existent and non-existent] can be established on the basis of these, as can the function (of the object). (4)

[Utpaladeva:] In this way, existence must properly speaking be reliant upon appearance. Without this reliance, there would be no distinction between presence and absence. (5)

1 In Utpaladeva's view, the object of a cognition appears (prakāśate) because it is identical with Illustration (prakāśa), and has a particular attribution (upakhyā) due to the functioning of Attention (vimarśa), the active aspect of consciousness which is inherently linguistic. This view is discussed in detail below in Chapters Three and Six.

2 naikarūpatve means anekarūpatve.

[Opponent:] How can there be no distinction here, since when an object is existent, it can perform effective action (arthakriyā), and not otherwise? [Utpaladeva:] Even so, there is no inherent distinction in the object. (6)

In this way, there may be an object which appears as performing effective action, and (hence) becomes distinguished by this attribute, but nothing in its own nature distinguishes it from something non-existent. (7)

[For] here also, effective action is not evidenced [simply] when an object's existence is established.[1] Therefore the same applies to both [existence and effective action]; their establishment rests upon consciousness. (8)

And if consciousness had no Apprehensions,[2] then it too would be in itself the same as the unconscious or the absent. (9)

For if consciousness were like this (evaṃbhutā i.e. aparāmarśarūpā) it would not be established even by its own self, so how could it (being itself unestablished)[3] establish anything else?[4] (10)

That Illustration of consciousness whose normal form is "this" is what establishes[5] something else, whereas the (consciousness) "I" establishes itself. (11)

1 tatrāpyarthakriyā siddhasattākārthe na varṇitā. See my notes on this verse below p.46-47

2 saṃvidaparāmarśarupā. Parāmarśa is the explicit linguistic activity of consciousness. I translated it as "Apprehension". Through parāmarśas, the individual consciousness apprehends its own nature in various ways (see e.g. IPK I.47-48), and also the nature of its cognitions (see below p.78)

3 alabdhaparinisṭhitiḥ

4 anyasya bhāvasya pratisṭhāspadatāmiyāt

5 pratisṭhātmakatāṃ gacchet

> The determining of what is the self and what is some other unconscious thing is done through positive and negative concomitance (vyatireketarābhyām), "vyavasthiti", "pratiṣṭhā", and "siddhi" are said to be conclusions (nirvṛtti). (12)
>
> Thus [existent] unconscious things are in essence like the non-existent. They exist only for Illustration. There is only Illustration of self as self and others. (13)

Let us briefly summarise the argument presented in these verses. Verse two puts forward Utpaladeva's view as to the nature of existence. He claims that for something to exist means that it must appear to a perceiver, with its own particular attributes. Its appearance is engendered by Illustration[1] (prakāśa) and its particular form is defined by Attention (vimarśa). Thus Attention determines whether the object appears as a pot or a cloth and whether it appears as present or absent, and Illustration determines whether it appears at all. Illustration and Attention are the two faculties which define consciousness for Utpaladeva. Since in his view consciousness is the knower, and the object's existence or non-existence depend upon consciousness, they therefore depend upon the knower.

1 prakāśa and vimarśa are technical terms discussed in Chapter Three.

Verse three argues that it cannot be the essence of an object to be perceptible to individual subjects, because the object's essence (ātmā) must be independent of the particular subjects who cognise it, and therefore must be defined independently of them. Moreover, the definition of an object's existence as "perceptibility" would imply that to exist means to be sometimes perceived and sometimes not, and Utpaladeva rejects this definition on the basis that a definition of existence must not have this "optional" character.

In verse four, a (Buddhist) opponent objects that even if we conceded that there is no inherent distinction between an existent and non-existent object, we would still be able to establish such a distinction on the basis of the way the object appears or fails to appear in cognition, and on the same basis we may say whether an object performs a particular function or not.

Utpaladeva replies in verse five that even given this Buddhist view, the existence or otherwise of the object must depend upon its appearance or otherwise to particular subjects, for without reference to a particular subject we cannot speak of the presence or absence of an object's appearance and attributes. Thus if we simply defined

existent objects as those which appear, without distinguishing between their presence or absence for particular subjects, then all existent objects would have to appear to all subjects, and we could not say that some objects were existent but not present to us.

However, if the Buddhist claimed that existent objects were those which were capable of appearing as present to us, one could say that there were some objects which were existent but not appearing, because they were absent. This would not, however, constitute a definition of any distinction between existent and non-existent objects inherent to the objects themselves, for we saw in verse three that Utpaladeva rejects such a definition as referring to an object's essence, dependent as this definition is upon individual perceivers.

In verse six, the Buddhist opponent offers his solution to the problem. We can define existent objects as those which perform effective action; a useful definition for practical purposes, which does not commit the Buddhist to saying that there is any intrinsic distinction between existent and non-existent objects.

In verse seven Utpaladeva argues that since this definition of an object's existence again depends upon the way objects appear to us, it again does nothing to define

any <u>inherent</u> distinction in the object itself from a non-existent object.

I understand verse eight to be an expression of Utpaladeva's view that

> "The performance of effective action is not innate to objects, for it is determined by the Lord's will. Therefore an object does not become different because of the non-performance of its effective action."[1]

As Abhinavagupta argues in his Vimarśinī on ĪPK II.15, an effective action is established as connected with an object by perception of positive and negative concommitance of the object and the effective action.[2]

The same basic meaning will be conveyed by the alternative translation, reading "tatrāpyarthakriyā + asiddhasattākārthe" - "effective action is not evidenced in an object whose existence is not already established...".

I understand the second half of verse eight to mean that since more than the establishment of an object's existence is neccesary to establish that it performs an effective action, one cannot simply define existent objects as those which perform effective action, and that the further establishment of the fact that an object performs an effective action also depends upon consciousness. Hence

1 arthakriyāpi sahajā nārthānām Īśvarecchayā
niyatā sā hi tenāsyā nākriyāto 'nyatā bhavet. ĪPK II.27

2 See below p.208

even if the Buddhist claims that an object's existence is established by its performance of effective action (which Utpaladeva denies), the latter itself must be established by consciousness.

Verse nine makes the point that if consciousness were not active and able to apprehend itself and the contents of its cognitions, then it might as well be another unconscious object, or not in the presence of objects at all.

Verse ten clearly indicates that Utpaladeva is here discussing the epistemological question of how we can know that objects exist; he claims that we must first know that we ourselves exist. And in verse eleven he states that the two forms of awareness "This [is X]" and "I [am]" give the basis of our certain knowledge of the existence of objects and ourselves respectively.

Verse twelve claims that the process through which we distinguish between our conscious selves and objects is simple: that which is present in all forms of consciousness is the awareness of "I", which is our conscious self, and that which is sometimes present and sometimes absent in awareness is the particular form, such as pot, which is the unconscious object appearing in the awareness "this is a pot" (or "this pot exists").

Verse thirteen concludes that there is no intrinsic distinction between existent and non-existent objects, because their existence and non-existence depend upon consciousness, which manifests both as conscious and unconscious.[1] Thus the argument from verses two to twelve concludes with the position that was asserted in verse one.

But most important for our discussion of the purpose of the ĪPK is Utpaladeva's statement that "vyavasthiti", "pratiṣṭhā" and "siddhi" (all of which I translate as "establishment") are all "conclusions" (niṛṛtti). This suggests that when Utpaladeva uses these words in the ĪPK, he is not merely making metaphysical claims about the existence or otherwise of entities, but discussing how we can know that things exist.

We noted earlier, during the discussion of ĪPK 1.2 (pp.22-23), that it is by no means always the case that words such as "siddhi" refer to philosophical conclusions about the existence of objects, since "ādisiddhe" in verse two does not imply that we know that God exists before we know anything else. However, as regards the words "pratiṣṭhā" and "siddhi" in ĪPK 1.4 and 5 respectively, we have seen parallel passages in the APS which show that in these cases Utpaladeva does imply "known with certainty" by these words.

In the case of ĪPK 1.4, the claim that "The establishment of inanimate things depends upon animate beings" (tathā hi jaḍabhūtānām pratiṣṭhā jīvadāśrayā), must

be compared with the assertion in APS 8 that "The same applies to both [the existence and effective action of objects]; their establishment depents on consciousness" (samam evānayostena pratiṣṭhā samvidāśrayā). Thus although it is in fact Utpaladeva's view that objects are dependent on consciousness in a metaphysical sense, we may confidently claim that in ĪPK 1.4 his main intention is simply to point out that certain knowledge of objects depends upon living beings.

In the case of ĪPK 1.5, the claim that "knowledge is self-established" (jñānaṃ svataḥ siddham) must be interpreted in the light of APS 10-12, particularly noting the phrase "(the consciousness of) "I" establishes itself" (ahamity (ucitaḥ samvitprakāśa) ātmanā pratiṣṭhātmakāṃ gacchet (11)). Here again, it is in fact Utpaladeva's view that knowledge is self-established in a metaphysical sense, i.e. that consciousness is autonomous, and its powers of knowledge and action <u>create</u> objects, they do not depend on those objects for their content. However, by comparing ĪPK 1.5 with APS 10-12, we can deduce that Utpaladeva is again primarily considering what we can reasonably know to be the case, rather than simply stating what he believes to be the case.

Before leaving the APS and returning to our main theme for this chapter, we may add a few remarks about the general character of Utpaladeva's argument in this text.

The latter half of the text, which we have not translated, goes on to claim that this active consciousness which arrives at conclusions about objects is the self, and has two forms, limited and unlimited[1]. It is "one" because it unifies all cognitions (ekaiva cānusaṃdhānāt sā proktā sarvasaṃvidām (25a-b)) and another name for this entity which is the knower is "self-consciousness" (svasaṃvedana-paryāyamātṛtattvam (25c-d)). We may note here that Utpaladeva makes the same identification between self-consciousness and the self in Saṃbandhasiddhi p.9.

In this latter text he quotes Dharmakīrti:

> "And that knowledge (jñānam) appears as extroverted, with the appearance of an object, and the knowledge (buddhi) which grasps that knowledge (buddhi) is always introverted in essence (ātmani)."

Utpaladeva himself comments on this verse, claiming that "introverted" and "in essence" indicate that it is self-consciousness, without objective content, undivided. He then quotes his own verse ĪPK 1.64[2]

> "And this non-sequential intelligence (pratibhā) overlayed with a succession of various objects, is the knower whose form is endless consciousness, the Great Lord."

Utpaladeva implies that what Dharmakīrti calls self-consciousness is in fact the self, but whereas Dharmakīrti views self-consciousness as a function of

1 See above, p.26

2 Cp. above p.23

consciousness which continually repeats itself in each cognition, Utpaladeva regards it as an eternal, unchanging awareness. The difference is simply between a continual awareness and a continuous awareness.

The argument in APS repeats many points made in the IPK, such as the necessity for an active as opposed to passive consciousness (compare APS 9 and 14 with ĪPK 1.42), and the lack of necessity for postulating objects separate from consciousness (compare APS 18 with ĪPK 1.37 and 1.40). But the main argument for the necessity of the self is slightly different in these two texts.

The basis of the APS argument is that there must be an active consciousness which draws conclusions about the existence of itself and of objects. We may note here that the functions of unifying different cognitions and forming conceptual conclusions which are performed by kalpanā in Dharmakīrti's system, are performed by the self in Utpaladeva's system. We may also note that Utpaladeva fails to give any arguments in the APS to show that an eternal self is necessary rather than Dharmakīrti's kalpanā.

The argument for the self in the IPK, however, is based upon a theory of memory, and we shall discuss this in detail in Chapter Five.

Finally, we may remark that Utpaladeva's assumptions about what would constitute the essence of an existent object necessarily exclude the possibility that such an object could exist.

For he demands that if an object has an essence of its own which determines whether it exists or not, this essence should be knowable. This demand is based upon the assumption that to exist is always to appear to exist (see APS 2), and hence to be known to exist. But he further assumes that if something is defined in terms of being known by consciousness, it must depend on consciousness. The crucial move in this argument is the assumption that if our knowledge of a thing depends upon the perceiving subject, then the thing itself must ontologically depend upon the perceiving subject, and hence have no independent essence (ātmā).

For Utpaladeva, therefore, if an object appears to us as existent, that is because we see it as existent, and not because of anything intrinsic to the object. He is, therefore, denying the distinction between what exists and what we know exists, because he is assuming that all the contents of consciousness depend ontologically upon consciousness.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we have had difficulty in deciding whether Utpaladeva is claiming that we know that Śiva exists, or simply that Śiva exists. Because for Utpaladeva, these two claims are ultimately identical.

Let us review what we have established so far in this chapter. We started with a question about Utpaladeva's purpose in the ĪPK, viz. is he trying to give a philosophical proof of Śiva, or is he writing an essentially religious text extolling the greatness of Śiva and/or encouraging a new method of meditation?

We have seen that Utpaladeva rejects the formal means of knowledge (pramāṇa) as being applicable to Śiva. If, therefore, he is giving not a formal proof of Śiva, but a philosophical justification for belief in Śiva, then his work is a form of tarka, the "reasoning" which is said to be the highest limb of Yoga. Apart from this suggestion, however, we have so far given no account of the "new spiritual path" which Utpaladeva is proposing in the ĪPK, beyond concluding that it is <u>not</u> a form of meditation using the words "Īśa" etc as mantras. It would be impossible to reach final conclusions about Utpaladeva's argument in the APS simply on the basis of the existing verses. For as with his other two short "siddhis", the bulk of the argument was probably contained in the prose commentary (which in this case has been lost), and the verses were probably used simply as a kind of mnemonic technique for remembering the gist of the prose argument.

As to our dilemma over the meaning of "siddhi", "pratiṣṭhā" and "vyavasthiti", we have seen that Utpaladeva intends them primarily in an epistemological sense, but that given his metaphysical views, this is often indistinguishable from their ontological sense. Hence we will continue to translate all these terms simply by the word "establishment". Let us now see how we can interpret ĪPK 1.2 in the light of our findings.

It seems to me that we have two options as to how we interpret this verse. The first is to interpret it as a denial that Utpaladeva is giving a proof of the existence of the self in the ĪPK. His reasons for not giving such a proof are, as we have noted, that it would be both foolish and unnecessary. It would be foolish, because the accepted means of gaining knowledge (pramāṇa) are useless to establish anything about the eternal Śiva, and it would be unnecessary, because we must have a self in order to be able to prove or deny anything at all. These points have been discussed already, but having considered the APS, we may now add that the proof is also unnecessary, because although "ādisiddhe" in ĪPK 1.2 means primarily "pre-established" in an ontological sense, given Utpaladeva's views about the

relation between knowledge and existence, we may also conclude that for Utpaladeva the existence of the self is "pre-established" in the sense of "already known with certainty".

As we have noted in our discussion of ĪPK 1.3 and 1.64-65 [1], the existence of Śiva, who is our self, is known (though pre-discursively) at the beginning and end of every cognition. Following this interpretation, the purpose of the ĪPK is to propound a process of reasoning (tarka) which will lead us to the recognition of the fact that we already know that God exists and we are identical with Him, though due to delusion we do not realise that we know this. The reasoning which leads us to this recognition is not a "proof", if we interpret the latter in the narrow sense, of "argumentation which formally uses pramāṇas". For the process by which Utpaladeva leads us to this recognition is "an exposition of His powers"; we may interpret this exposition as a kind of description which will jog our memories and cause us to recognise the Lord whom we already know but forget at each moment of cognition.

On this first interpretation of ĪPK 1.2 we still have the problem of why Utpaladeva should then compose a text which explicitly tries to prove the existence of the self, namely the Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi.

1 See above, pp.23-24.

Our "no-proof" hypothesist can only admit that the text is unnecessary and perhaps its arguments are foolish, but that it is aimed at converting Buddhists (who do not believe in the existence of a self) from their even more foolish views, and that one must, so to speak, fight fire with fire.

However, this last point leads us to look more closely at $\bar{I}$PK 1.2 and formulate another interpretation, which accounts for a proof of the self not only in the APS, but also in the $\bar{I}$PK.

On this second interpretation, verse 1.2 must be interpreted in the light of verses 1.1 and 1.3, placing heavy emphasis on the "kiṃtu" (<u>but</u>) which begins the latter verse. This interpretation yields the following explanation of Utpaladeva's intentions in the $\bar{I}$PK:

Utpaladeva realises that a proof of the self is unnecessary, but the $\bar{I}$PK is written "for the benefit of mankind", and whilst an enlightened man realises that the existence of the self is already proven at every instant in his cognition, the majority of mankind is "deluded", and hence <u>for them</u> a proof is necessary. Hence Utpaladeva's statement in his commentary on 1.2 that such a proof is "an undertaking only for fools" does not mean that it is a task which only fools undertake, but that such a proof is undertaken by a wise man such as Utpaladeva solely for the benefit of fools.

Thus there is no problem as to why Utpaladeva should have later composed the APS ; his earlier message had simply not sunk into the minds of his philosophical opponents, and he was trying another approach.

We may still derive some useful conclusions from the arguments of the "no-proof" hypothesists, however. First of all, we may say that in order to "establish" the existence of the self, Utpaladeva regards pramāṇas as insufficient. It is important to note here that the pramāṇas include the testimony of āgama, sacred scripture. The recognition of the Lord which Utpaladeva is trying to establish comes about through the "new path"[1] outlined in the ĪPK, and this path uses an "exposition of the Lord's powers"[2] as its means.

We may also agree with the "no proof" hypothesist that Utpaladeva's purposes in the ĪPK are essentially religious. For the goal of Utpaladeva's "new path" is not simply to bring about an intellectual or philosophical conviction about the existence of the self; the sacred scriptures should be enough to make men believe in the existence of the self (which is God). Utpaladeva is concerned with developing this belief into an experienced truth, and he claims that this experience is brought about by recognition.

1 "navo mārgaḥ", see ĪPK 4.16

2 See ĪPK 1.3

Utpaladeva believes that each individual is already God, but even for individuals who believe intellectually in the existence of God, and in their own identity with Him, belief may not truly penetrate their hearts, such that it is an experienced truth for them (māyāvyāmohādahṛdayaṃgamatvād , ĪPK 1.3 Vṛtti). However, when through Utpaladeva's new path they truly recognise their identity with God, they actually come to have His infinite powers:

> "Seeing himself, and his powers of knowledge and action correctly in this way, he knows and does whatever he wants". ĪPK 4.15

What, then, is this extraordinary recognition which Utpaladeva is propounding? He gives an analogy for it, that of the love-stricken woman and her suitor.[1]

It was no doubt relatively common in ancient India, with far stricter seclusion of women than is normal in our modern West, to have the following situation: A young woman hears about a handsome young man who possesses all the good qualities she could possibly desire. She never sees this man, but elementary communication between them is established by means of messengers, and she soon comes to fall in love with him. The more she hears about him, the more she loves him, and her yearnings for him become so intense that she begins to waste away physically.

1 See ĪPK 4.17

Then one day a man enters her pleasure-garden, and though she sees him in front of her, in her debilitated condition she fails to take much notice of him, and he makes little impression upon her. However, after a short time she either notices some of his qualities, or has them pointed out to her by a friend, which lead her to recognise that this man is in fact the lover she has been pining for all this time, and her heart blossoms with joy and love.

In Utpaladeva's view, the spiritual situation of mankind is similar to the situation of this love-stricken lady when confronted by her lover. We have God (the lover) constantly in our presence, but our minds are suffering a debilitation whose original cause is this lover himself (it is Śiva who causes the contraction of consciousness which is ignorance and delusion). Because of this mental stupor, we fail to recognise God. Recognition comes about when we realise that the qualities of the self constantly in our awareness are in fact the same as the qualities of God which we know from the scriptures (here the āgamas correspond to the lady's information about her lover received via messengers, and messages from the lover Himself).

Upon recognising the identity of our self with God, our heart[1] expands fully, and we experience the full bliss and power of being God.

1 "heart" (hṛdaya) is often synonymous with consciousness (cit) in Kaśmir Śaivite texts.

In the light of this analogy, we can now see why the ĪPK contains what it does. First, the scriptures alone are not enough to bring about the spiritual recognition that Utpaladeva describes, since, like the lady's information about her lover, it has no effect unless it is understood as applying to what is before us, namely our own self (the man in the garden).

We can also see what role proof plays in Utpaladeva's new path. In order for the lady to make the equation "this man = that lover", she must first perceive qualities in the man in the garden which are identical to those of the lover she has pined for. Similarly, in order for us to recognise that our selves are identical to the God spoken of in the scriptures, we must first have a clear understanding of the qualities of our selves. It is for this reason that the ĪPK's road to recognition is paved with an exposition of the powers of the self. We must first establish that we have a self, and that its qualities are those of possessing the powers of knowledge and action, and then we may equate this self with God.

If the lady is not convinced that the man in the garden has the qualities of her lover, then recognition cannot take place, and hence in the analogous situation there is room for a proof of the existence of the self. Utpaladeva proceeds by analysing our everyday experiences, and concluding that we have an active, knowing self. The

role played by the ĪPK in the spiritual salvation of mankind is like that of the lady's friend who points out the qualities of the man in the garden, and dispels her doubts as to his identity.

This second interpretation, whilst asserting that Utpaladeva is giving a proof of the existence of the self, is also capable of explaining why Utpaladeva should claim that he is "merely establishing the use of the words "Lord" etc as applying to ourselves".[1] For just as the lady's friend makes her realise that the man in the garden is her lover, by telling her his name and pointing out his qualities, similarly Utpaladeva is pointing out the appropriate names for our self.

If the lady had not been mentally debilitated, she might have recognised her lover straight away, and similarly it is only because people are deluded that Utpaladeva expounds the ĪPK. It is interesting to note that even the sequence of the ĪPK Chapters reflects the sequence of psychological processes in recognition. In the First and Second Chapters (jñāna- and kriyā- adhikāras), Utpaladeva analyses the qualities of the self we know through introspection (we may even say, the self which is introspection, see above p.50). Then in the Third Chapter (āgamādhikāra) we are reminded of the qualities of God described in the sacred scriptures. In the Final Chapter (tattvasaṃgrahādhikāra), a synthesis is made of the preceding Chapters, and we end with the recognition that our self is in fact God.

1 ĪPK II.32, see above pp.28ff.

Thus although the ĪPK includes a philosophical "establishment" of the existence of Śiva and the self, by means of reasoning (tarka), its final aim is an "establishment" of a metaphysical kind. Utpaladeva claims that it is true already that we are identical with God, but when we recognise this, we become identical with Him in another sense; we gain the use of the infinite powers of knowledge and action which we might say are our "birthright" (nijavaibhava, see ĪPK 4.17).

This means of gaining an experienced identity with Śiva clearly is a "new and easy path" (ĪPK 4.16) not previously expressed in the scriptures. We cannot say with certainty that this is the "anupāya" which Abhinavagupta describes in T.Ā.II, since Abhinavagupta does not mention "Pratyabhijñā" in this context. However, the path of recognition, whilst it may include some forms of meditation (which would correspond to the lady's dawning realisation that the man in front of her is in fact her lover), is in essence a path of intellectual understanding. Progress on this path may occur spontaneously, without any of the traditional means of spiritual development described in the Tantras.

We have seen that the success of this "new and easy path" depends upon the success of establishing that the self known through introspection does in fact have the qualities we are looking for. Utpaladeva seeks to convince us of the existence of this self and the nature of its qualities by an argument from memory, which we shall examine in Chapter Five.

Chapter Three

Consciousness?

Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone.

"But which is the stone that supports the bridge?" Kublai Khan asks.

"The bridge is not supported by one stone or another", Marco answers, "but by the line of the arch that they form."

Kublai Khan remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds: "Why do you speak of the stones? It is only the arch that matters to me."

Polo answers: "Without stones there is no arch."

Italo Calvino

If Ms. Smith has borne with us this far, and we have succeeded in dispelling her initial doubts as to the paradoxical nature of Utpaladeva's assertions about the cosmos and his own writings, she may still be left with a feeling rather like an intellectual sea-sickness, due to our use of terms such as consciousness (citi) self (ātmā), Śiva (God), the knower (pramātā) and intelligence (pratibhā) with what may seem an excessive interchangeability. Her plight will be in no way helped by the application of the terms "autonomy" (svātantrya) "Lordship" (aiśvaryam) "the power of unification and diversification" (saṃyojanaviyojanaśakti) and "the

highest (level of) speech" (parāvāk) to Śiva's Śakti, which we have seen[1] is no more different from Śiva, the knower, etc., than the capacity to light and heat is different from a flame.

Remedies often appear worse than the disease, and no doubt it will certainly seem so in this case for Ms. Smith, for we propose to restore her to intellectual ease by introducing two more terms to apply to this complex entity which is Śiva-Śakti. These are the terms prakāśa and vimarśa, which we encountered briefly during our discussion of the APS.[2]

Prakāśa and vimarśa are Utpaladeva's favourite terms for characterising consciousness when he is engaging in ontological argument. The Sanskrit word prakāśa is usually translated as "illumination', but as a technical term in the Doctrine of Recognition it is best rendered as "Illustration", since the latter may mean not only the process of "throwing light upon" (pra+kāś) but also the pictorial elucidation of something; an "Illustration" may also be something objective.[3]

This objective connotation is essential to the Pratyabhijñā view of consciousness: consciousness does not throw light upon something other than itself, it simply gives pictorial

1 Above pp.29-30

2 Above pp.41-43

3 "Illumination" may also, of course, have an objective sense as in the embellishment of manuscripts, but this meaning is less common, and less suitable for the idea of self-manifestation.

"examples" of itself - it manifests itself in the diverse forms which appear as objects in a limited consciousness such as Ms. Smith's. Thus whilst we normally think of consciousness as consciousness <u>of</u> something other than consciousness, for Utpaladeva consciousness is always consciousness of an aspect of <u>itself</u>.[1] From Ms. Smith's point of view, however, it does indeed seem that her consciousness "throws light upon" objects which are external to her, and this is due to the second aspect of consciousness: vimarśa. The latter connotes consideration and critical examination, and as a technical term in the Pratyabhijñā system I translate it as "Attention". It is the ability of consciousness to focus on particular things.

Utpaladeva's view is that the consciousness of an individual is a manifold, united by the awareness of "I". In its pre-discursive form, this consciousness is identified with its contents, to the extent that there is no distinction between subject and object. It is as if there are only "objects which are appearing". But Utpaladeva asserts that the only reason that these objects appear at all is because they are present in the subject, and the only reason that the objective content appears to be predominant in awareness is that the individual form of consciousness is a contracted form, and its contraction consists of the fact that the subject (the self, consciousness) is not predominant in it.

1 See ĪPK I 46, translated below p.91

Utpaladeva also holds that there is continual linguistic activity in an individual's consciousness, and that this linguistic activity is the means through which Attention (vimarśa) focuses upon particular objects, and distinguishes them from others which appear in the original pre-discursive form. The alternation from pre-discursive to discursive is a movement which occurs during every instant of consciousness. Not even the minutetest change of content in awareness takes place without a movement from the pre-discursive subject-object unity (in which, as we have seen[1], there is the awareness of Śiva, the eternal and omniscient Self) to the discursive awareness of an object as distinct from the subject. This constant activity of consciousness is meditated upon in the twelve-Kāli system of the Krama, and is the subject of Kallaṭa's Spandakārikās (Verses on Vibration).

Moreover, it is a defining characteristic of Attention that it is able to focus upon whatever it wishes (it is svatantra). In doing so, it distinguishes not only between the object focussed upon and other objects in the manifold (just as Ms. Smith may focus upon the table in front of her, whilst still maintaining an awareness of other parts of her room), but also between the object focussed upon and the focussing subject (just as Ms. Smith may be

1 Above pp.23-24

aware that "I am looking at this table", thereby distinguishing between herself and the object).

Attention also performs a unifying function: it links the concept "table" with the phenomenon appearing in Ms. Smith's awareness, and may also provide her with the experience that "this table in front of me is the same that I saw in front of me a minute ago", thus unifying two temporally separate cognitions.

Utpaladeva explains that this power of Attention is inseparable from consciousnes at ĪPK I.44:

> "The essence (ātmā) of consciousness is Attention, the supreme speech, essentially arisen (svarasenoditā). This is the autonomy of the supreme Self, it principal lordly power (aiśvaryam)."

We must note that there is no justification for Pandey's translation of "pratyavamarśa" as "self-consciousness". Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta use the words "vimarśa" and "pratyavamarśa" as synonyms (see, e.g. ĪPK I.42 Vṛtti, where Utpaladeva glosses "vimarśa" as "pratyavamarśa"). Pandey is no doubt influenced in his choice of translation by Abhinavagupta's gloss of pratyavamarśa as "svātmacamat kāralakṣaṇa" (ĪPKV I p.204 1.2) (characterised (or defined) by relish of its own self).

However, this self-consciousness is simply the form that vimarśa takes at the highest level of consciousness. Ultimately, <u>all</u> forms of consciousness are forms of self-consciousness, since consciousness and its object are both manifestations of the knower.[1]

> "When one cognises that "This was seen by me", "this is seen", or (simply) "this", (in all these cases) two things appear in the knower, divided into subject and object." ĪPK I.31

Abhinavagupta explains the principle of Attention further in his commentary on ĪPK I.44. We may paraphrase some of his comments as follows:

A pot doesn't relish its own self, it does not apprehend itself[2]. Therefore it is not illustrated in itself[3] and does not appear as unrestricted (in the way that consciousness does). Hence it is not said to be conscious.

An individual such as Ms. Smith, however, internally relishes her own existence, apprehends herself,[2] and is illustrated in herself.

1 See ĪPK I.46 (translated below p.91) and ĪPK I.31 (translated in Appendix A).

2 Cp. APS vs.10 above p.42, and below pp.78.

3 i.e., as Utpaladeva states in APS Vs. 2, objects are nothing in themselves, and only appear or fail to appear for consciousness.

Moreover a "this" appears in her awareness, and this objective aspect of her awareness is comprised of innumerable phenomena such as colours, feelings of pleasure or suffering, etc. and hence she is said to be conscious.

Abhinavagupta rejects the view that with regard to the objective aspect of consciousness, the Attention rests in itself and the non-Attention (the hypothetical inert body of the object) rests in itself (i.e. the view that there is no direct contact between subject and object). He remarks that "this view is unestablished" (asiddham).[1]

Abhinavagupta continues with a description of the nature (svabhāvaḥ) of Attention. He says it is capable of everything [or, "supports everything", sarvasaha], it identifies with what is other than itself (paramapyātmīkaroti, i.e. when the individual consciousness identifies itself with the body), it makes itself into something different (ātmānam ca parīkaroti, i.e. when the individual conceives of God as something separate from himself), it unifies both (self and other, i.e. in the experience "I am this entire universe"), and it distinguishes itself from this unified pair (in the void, śūnya, where there is no awareness of self or other).

Moreover, the nature of Attention is an internal verbalisation (of experience), and this verbalisation is independent of convention (i.e. consciousness is free to choose how it represents itsef), being essentially an

1 We shall concentrate on Utpaladeva's refutation of the existence of objects without consciousness in Chapter Six.

unrestricted aesthetic enjoyment, like an internal acknowledgement, though this verbali sation uses the constructed, conventional sounds of language, since it takes linguistic forms such as "I am John, this is blue".

"Essentially arisen" implies a metaphor comparing the supreme speech to the sun. Abhinavagupta notes that whereas the sun only shines during the day, the supreme speech is always shining, because it is its nature to always shine as consciousness, at rest in itself, in the awareness of "I". This speech is "supreme" because it is complete, it expresses the entire universe, and it is "speech" because it encapsulates[1] the universe by (verbal) Attention. After some comments on the lower levels of speech Abhinavagupta concludes that:

> "the final truth is that bliss, lordliness, autonomy and awareness are simply 'not being reliant on (any) other'" [2]

1 It is difficult to translate the force of "apalapati" here. M.W. gives the meanings "explain away, deny, conceal". It is not a common word in Pratyabhijñā discourse, and in so far as its use can be distinguished from the use of the common "abhilapati", I take it to mean that there is a verbal pigeon-holing of aspects of experience, the "apa" indicating that the contracted forms of Attention are lower and less pure.

2 anyanirapekṣataiva paramārthata ānandaḥ, aiśvaryaṃ, svātantryaṃ caitanyaṃ ca. This last I have translated as awareness, to convey the sense of active consciousness, (see Kṣemarāja's Vimarśinī on Śivasūtra I.1, "caitanyam ātmā"). However, since it is the essential nature of consciousness to be active (svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśam, ĪPK I.42), it is neither necessary nor possible to maintain a rigid distinction between "consciousness" and "awareness" throughout the Doctrine of Recognition, and I have not done so in this thesis.

In order to discuss the lower levels of speech, and the Śaivite system of categories of consciousness, we must introduce two more technical terms. We encountered the first of these, the "Apprehension" (parāmarśa) in the APS.[1] The second is the Appearance (ābhāsa).[2] Both these terms are essential to an understanding of Utpaladeva's epistemology, and no discussion of his views on consciousness can be complete without such an understanding. Utpaladeva examines the process of everyday cognition by which we arrive at certain knowledge at ĪPK II.16-32 (Abhinavagupta calls these 17 verses the "Description of the object, means and end of cognition" (mānatatphalameyanirūpaṇam)). We have already seen how he concludes this passage (see above p.27). Let us now look at the beginning of this section of the Kārikās.

> "That, due to which an entity (vastu) is established as "this" or "thus"[3], is a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). It is its own Appearance, continually renewed." (16)

1 Above p.42

2 This word has no overtones of falsity for Utpaladeva, though other Indian philosophers did use it with the implication of falsity.

3 Note that the pramāṇa does not establish that "This is such-and-such", as in "this is eternal", since it operates on one word only, and does not establish complex perceptions. See Vṛtti on this verse "sa eva cābhāso 'yamiti nitya iti vā tathaiva pṛthaktayā 'bhinavatvena....".

"If it is not contradicted, [then] this (pramāṇa) is internal, essentially that kind of Attention [i.e. awareness of "this" or "thus"]. It [then] has as its object an entity which is denoted by a single word and is not delimited by time and space, and is knowledge (miti). (17)

"An Appearance may be classified (bhidyate) according to (individual) taste, (individual) purpose, or tradition, when it is a case of [the Appearance of] a single thing composed of a unification [of multiple Appearances]."[1] (18)

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta accept much of Dharmakīrti's view of everyday perception as a perception of a unique particular, the svalakṣaṇa (See ĪPKVV I.p.208 l.5-8 "bahu tāvat pūrvapakṣavādyoktaṃ siddhānte 'ṅgīkāryam. sāṃkhyakāṇādādidarśane jñānaṃ na upapadyate iti hi yaduktaṃ śākyena tat saṃmatameva". Also ĪPK Vṛtti on II.21 "ekasminneva svalakṣaṇe...." etc). However, Dharmakīrti's view is that the svalakṣaṇa cannot accurately be represented as a unification of diverse phenomena (rūpam ekam anekaṃ ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ, quoted by Utpaladeva at SS.p.4), although for the purposes of everyday interactions we do represent them as such.

1 idametādṛgityevam yadvaśādvyavatiṣṭhate
vastu pramāṇaṃ tatso 'pi svābhāso 'bhinavodayaḥ

so' ntastathāvimarśātmā deśakālādyabhedinī
ekābhidhānaviṣaye mitirvastunyabādhitā

yathāruci yathārthitvaṃ yathāvyutpatti bhidyate
ābhāso 'pyartha ekasminnanusaṃdhānasādhite

Utpaladeva's view, on the other hand, is that the svalakṣaṇa is really a unification of numerous Appearances,[1] and the everyday objects, such as pots, which appear in the svalakṣaṇa-perception, are in fact simply arrangements of Appearances.[2] Thus in the complex Appearance (svalakṣaṇa) of "This pot", which occcurs in a particular perceiver's consciousness, there is the unification of the Appearances of existence, roundness, clayness, extendedness, time, thisness,[3] etc.

However, this unification of Appearances of roundness, clayness etc. which forms the Appearance "pot" may also be regarded as a single Appearance[4], and the function of complex Appearances such as pots is performed by the pot as a whole, and not by the collected functions of the constituent Appearancees (see ĪPK II.21 and commentaries).

Each Appearance corresponds to one word (śabdaśca ābhāsāntaraih deśakālādirupair anāmṛṣṭe ekatraiva ābhāsamātre pravartate, ĪPK II pp.70-71). Thus when an individual Appearance, such as "pot" is considered apart from the Appearances of particular place and time (which always accompany it in a particular perception), it appears as a universal (deśakālābhāsayoḥ svalakṣaṇatvārpaṇa-

1 See below pp.78-79

2 "yena yena mukhenārtho vicāryate, tena tena ābhāsamātrataiva" ĪPKVV II p.93

3 See ĪPKV II p.71: "niyate 'pyayamityeva parāmarśaḥ puraḥsthite sarvabhāvagatedantasāmānyenaiva jāyate."

4 "tadābhāsasāmānādhikaraṇyābhāsarūpam ābhāsāntaram ekam anyadeva" ĪPKV II p.72

pravaṇayoḥ anāmiśraṇāt sāmānyāyamāne ābhāse pramāṇam pravartate).

It is this "universal" that is the object of all pramāṇas (the valid means of cognition). We shall discuss these universal Appearances further in Chapter Six below, but we must note here two important points:

1 These Apppearances are <u>not</u> like qualities which exist in an objective substance. They are simply forms which appear in consciousness. It is consciousness which unifies them, and is their substratum.

2 The valid means of knowledge operates <u>only</u> on these "universalised" Appearances corresponding to one word, and not upon the svalakṣaṇa, which is a unification of a number of these single-word Appearances (tatra ca pṛthageva ca pramāṇam, tatparaṃ miśrīkāreṣu teṣu ābhāseṣu [=svalakṣaṇeṣu] gṛhītagrāhi na pramāṇam. ĪPKV II p.72-73). The form of consciousness which cognises the svalakṣaṇa is the Apprehension (parāmarśa).

We have seen, then, that the Attention which brings Appearances to life focuses upon each Appearance separately, since the words which designate Appearances, and which are like the life of consciousness, designate each Appearance separately (yo'pi ābhāsasya prāṇabhūto vimarśaḥ so'pi pratyābhāsam eva - śabdasya abhijalpātmano bodha-jīvitaprakhyasya pratyābhāsam eva viśrānteḥ). However, we must bear in mind that there is no objective criterion for deciding what a "single" Appearance is. All the familiar

objects of the world, such as pots, tables and clothes may be regarded as "single" Appearances, or they may be regarded as unifications of many Appearances, all of which we may cognise separately (such as the legs of the table). These elements again may be regarded as unifications of further subsidiary Appearances, and for the Doctrine of Recognition ther is no objective limitation upon this process of subdivision of Appearances. The constituent Appearances are produced (as we shall soon see) by the focussing of Atttention, and the only limit to this process of increasingly minute analysis is formed by the desire of the analysing subject. When he is satisfied, the analysing stops.[1]

Corresponding to this ability of consciousness to divide Appearances into increasingly large numbers of elements (viyojanaśakti), is the ability to cognise diverse Appearances as unified (saṃyojanaśakti). These abilities provide us with the experiences of various kinds of relation, such as cause and effect, part and whole, which we shall discuss in Chapter Seven. We may note here, however, that for Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, the spiritual development of man consists in the development of the faculty for perceiving unity where ordinary men perceive diversity.

1 Note also that there are many meditative processes in the Saivite Tantras which involve exactly this kind of analysis into infinitesimal units, especially involving contemplation of time and the movement of the breath.

Returning to Utpaladeva's verse II.17, we must make a few general remarks about his view of the relationship between certain knowledge and perception. It will come as no surprise to the reader to learn that Utpaladeva regards these as being essentially the same. This is because he believes that the objects of perception are produced by Śiva's (=consciousness') powers of knowledge and action[1].

However, there are forms of knowledge which contain verbal information about our perceptions. Thus we may have a perception of a bright metallic object, and know that "this is silver", or to use Utpaladeva's example, we may have a perception of something bright and silvery and know that "this is not silver, it is mother-of -pearl". The commonsense view of this kind of knowledge is that it involves some kind of proposition about the nature of our experience, and this proposition may be correct or incorrect, depending on the actual nature of our experience. Thus we may believe that we are looking at silver, whereas we are in fact looking at mother-of -pearl. According to

1 Jñāna śakti and kriyāśakti. I have adhered to the tradition of translating jñāna as "knowledge", but in doing so must emphasise that jñāna is a verbal action noun, and hence means primarily "knowing". It refers to a cognitive process, rather than a result of cognition. Thus when Utpaladeva identifies pramāṇa with pramiti, the emphasis is upon the former, since knowledge, in the sense of the result of cognition, is also a <u>function</u> of the knower: "...pramitiḥ pramātṛvyāpāraḥ " Vṛtti on ĪPK II.17.

Utpaladeva, the only means we have of judging the correctness or otherwise of a particular knowledge is to compare it with other knowledges. Given certain conditions, the later knowledge that "I am seeing mother-of-pearl" will reveal the previous knowledge "I am seeing silver" to be false. This is what Utpaladeva means by "it is knowledge (miti) as long as it is uncontradicted" (ĪPK II.17). He is implying that the only kind of knowledge which really deserves the name knowledge (miti) is that which is correct, i.e., not subsequently contradicted by another knowledge.

However, this "propositional" knowledge is <u>not</u> revealed by the pramāṇa, which only operates on "silver" dissociated from any particular place or time. This raises a serious problem, which we shall treat in our later discussion of Illusion, as to how it is possible for the pramāṇa to ever be contradicted. Certainly, we may realise that we were mistaken in thinking that we were looking at silver at a particular time and place, but how can the perception of a universalised silver, dissociated from space and time, be contradicted by any subsequent experience? For the pramāṇa "is its own Appearance, continually renewed" (vs. 16). It is self-revealing, in that it does not require any independent entity to make it appear[1].

1 In the Sāṃkhya view, a cognition of this form would be a function of Buddhi (the intellect), and would require the independent witness, puruṣa, to make it conscious. Utpaladeva rejects this dualism. See above p.72, and below pp.123-124.

In the "propositional" knowledge such as "This is silver" Attention takes a particular form known as "Apprehension" (parāmarśa). Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta use the term "Apprehension" to refer to an explicit linguistic activity in consciousness which applies a verbal interpretation to the Appearance in consciousness. I say explicit, because we have seen that all forms of Attention are implicitly linguistic (above pp.69-71).

An Apprehension may be the application of a single word to a single Appearance[1], or of a single word to a number of Appearances[2], or of a number of words (forming a sentence) to a single complex Appearance (e.g. a svalakṣaṇa). This latter kind of Apprehension takes the form "This is such-and-such".

Abhinavagupta explains in his Vimarśinī on ĪPK II.21 (ĪPKV II p.94) that when a number of Appearances are united in a complex Appearance (such as a pot) there is one Appearance which predominates, upon which all the others rest, and this is their common location (samānam adhikaraṇam). The relation of the constituent Appearances to this dominant Appearance is called "collocation" (sāmānādhikaraṇyam).

1 See, e.g., SS p.7 l.13-15 "iha tu rājño hastī cāśvaśca rathaśca padātiśca ityanekaparāmarśaviṣayatve 'pi yāvanto hastyādīnām parāmarśās tāvanta eva rājñaḥ"

2 See, e.g., SS p.7 l.3-4 "te 'nekasaṃkhyā eva ekaparāmarśagocarāḥ".

The svalakṣaṇa appears as a collocation, i.e. a relationship between several Appearances. Thus when there is an Appearance of a single particular pot, it may be apprehended by a single word "pot", since all the constituent Appearances rest in this one complex Appearance, the svalakṣaṇa, which is manifesting the particular pot. But the form of Attention which "gives life to" (samanuprāṇayati) the collocation of all the various Appearances in the one particular pot is a sentence. Thus this form of Attention apprehends the meaning of a sentence such as "Here and now this pot exists". When we consider the function of any Appearance in the everyday world, it is always in terms of this complex Appearance, which although we may simply describe as a "pot"[1], is in fact consituted by an association of the "pot" Appearance with those of time, space, existence etc. According to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta the function of the pot is related to this complex unity of Appearances corresponding to an Apprehension in the form of a sentence.

One final comment on vs.17: There is for Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta no significant distinction between the means of valid knowledge and the knowledge

1 The individual is free to apprehend Appearances in whatever manner he wishes, see vs.18 (above p.72)

itself (abhedas pramāṇatatphalayoh. ĪPKV II p.69 l.9-10). Both are functions of the knower (pramatṛvyāpārah, ĪPK Vṛtti), though the former is extroverted, being directed towards the object, and the latter is introverted, resting in the subject.

We have seen, then, how Illustration and Attention form the basis of an individual's awareness, the former being the appearance of a complex manifold of undifferentiated subject and objects, the latter being the capacity to cognise this manifold in different ways.

However, Illustration and Attention form the basis not only of the individual's particular cognitions, but also of the entire manifold of experiences which is the universe. An investigation of the cosmic nature of Illustration and Attention will reveal the basis of Utpaladeva's metaphysics, and explain why he uses terms like "self" and "consciousness" with such forthright synonymity.

On the macro-cosmic scale, consciousness functions in a manner similar to that of individual cognition. The Illustration which is the basis of all cognitions is that complex entity, the universal Self.

It is composed of (or rather, it composes) all the Appearances which are ever percieved by any knower.[1] In itself it is timeless and infinite, since time and limited form are only produced by cosmic Attention. The experience of a particular place and time which is the form of an individual's awareness, is produced by a narrowing of cosmic Attention to only one aspect of universal Illustration. Just as Ms. Smith may focus upon her table, whilst the rest of her room is only in the periphery of her awareness, similarly universal Attention focuses upon a particular place and time (Ms. Smith's room at the time of her table-cognition), and the rest of the cosmos remains in the background, excluded by this process of focussing.

Ms. Smith is ignorant of the fact that not only her room is appearing on the periphery of her awareness, but also, at the beginning and end of each cognition, the entire unverse which is contained in Śiva's awareness. It is "due to delusion" (ĪPK I.3) that she does not recognise that her awareness is simply a focussed form of Śiva's awareness.

Śiva's awareness contracts itself to become Ms. Smith's awareness of her table by a process outlined in the āgamādhikāra (the chapter on scripture) of the ĪPK. As we have seen the purpose of this chapter is to inform people such as Ms. Smith about the

1 See e.g. Utpaladeva's equation of "prakāśa" with "avabhāsa" in ĪPK I.42 and its Vṛtti, and ĪPKV II p.166, translated below p.222.

nature of their own consciousness, and if Ms. Smith's analysis of her own awareness, conducted along the lines of Utpaladeva's first two ĪPK chapters, conforms to the view presented om the āgamādhikāra, then she will recognise that she is in fact Śiva.

So let us examine the view of consciousness depicted in the āgamādhikāra. It is, in brief, a presentation of the view that Śiva's consciousness produces the limited awareness of particular objects (such as the table) by adopting successively forms corresponding to thirty-six categories (tattvas).

These tattvas are described in detail in part II of Chatterji's Kashmir Śaivism,[1] so we shall content ourselves with a brief exposition here.

1 I have one disagreement with Chatterji's exposition. He claims that "as the number of puruṣas.. ..is unlimited, ...similarly the prakṛtis are also infinite in number, one for each puruṣa...." (p.91). To support his claim, he refers us to Jayaratha's viveka on T.Ā. 9 vs.214 (p.172). This verse ends "Kalā emanates prakṛti as manifest, divided, mere object" (vedyamātraṃ sphuṭaṃ bhinnaṃ pradhānaṃ sūyate kalā). Jayaratha comments on the word "bhinnam" by saying "It is divided, i.e. multiple because (differently) delimited by (or for) each subject (tacca bhinnaṃ pratipuṁniyatatvādanekam iti yāvat). This seems to me to mean only that the different subjects will perceive the same prakṛti in different ways, and hence there will appear to be many forms of prakṛti. If Abhinavagupta were making the major departure from the Sāṃkhya view which Chatterji claims he is, I would have thought it more likely that he would have made it clear that a plural number of prakṛtis was involved by saying "kalā bhinnāni pradhānāni sūyate" (unless there is also a plural number of Kalās, each of which produces a single prakṛti. But as far as I am aware, this is not explicitly stated by Abhinavagupta in T.Ā.). /cont.

The highest forms or categories (tattvas) which consciousness adopts are those of Śiva (36th) and Śakti (35th).[1] Śivatattva is the pure experience of "I" (aham) and śaktitattva is the experience "I am" (aham asmi). However, Utpaladeva regards these categories as inseparable; "I" always implies "I am", and we have seen that it is the (sexual) union of Śiva and Śakti which gives rise to the bliss (ānanda) from which the world emanates.[2]

The 34th tattva is called "sādākhya" or "sadāśiva", and corresponds to the awareness "I am this". In this form of consciousness, the "this" refers to the entire collection of phenomena in the universe. Attention has only focussed from the

/....cont. It is possible that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta did accept that there is a different prakṛti for each puruṣa, since the references to the tattvakrama in ĪPK and T.Ā. could be interpreted in Chatterji's way, but we do not have unambiguous evidence to support Chatterji's unusual claim. Chatterji does refer us to Appendix V of his work for further evidence. Unfortunately, neither the original 1914 edition nor the 1962 reprint of Kashmir Shaivism contains any Appendices.

1 Pandey notes (Abhinavagupta,p.363) that Abhinavagupta follows the Kula system in adding a 37th tattva, "anuttara" or "paramaśiva", which both Somānanda and Utpaladeva subsume under the 36th category, "Śiva": "ata evecchāśaktimayaḥ śivo yāvaccit-svātantryaśaktimān paryante paramaśivaḥ" ŚDV on 2.1 (p.37)

2 See above pp.29-30

original non-differentiated subject-object unity of Prakāśa to the extent that it is aware of its own existence. Hence the emphasis in the sādākhya experience "I am this universe" is upon the "I".

In the 33rd category "Īśvaratattva"[1], consciousness also takes the form "I am this entire universe", but here the emphasis is upon the objective aspect. Consciousness has focussed to become aware of what it is; it realises that it is universal consciousness.

The 32nd category is called "śuddhavidyā" or "sadvidyā" (pure or true knowledge). Here the experience is of the form "I am this, this is me" (aham idam idam aham). Equal emphasis is placed upon the "I" and the "this"; they both refer to the entire universe[2], the collection of phenomena which appear in Illustration.

The Śiva and Śakti tattvas (35th and 36th) constitute the "superior level" (parāvasthā) of consciousness. This supreme form of consciousness is present in all other forms of consciousness.[3] In other

1 Utpaladeva calls it "pārameśvara" (derived from paramaśiva) at ĪPK III.2. This form of consciousness is God's omniscient awareness of His own creation.

2 "idam viśvam aham iti viśvātmano matiḥ śuddhavidyā" ĪPKvṛtti on III.3

3 See ŚD I.3-5 and Utpaladeva's commentary.

words, at the parā level there is not only the consciousness "I am this entire universe" corresponding to the 33rd category, there is also, and simultaneously, the awareness of limited objects which involves the twenty-five lowest forms of consciousness.[1] The "superior" consciousness, then, has true omniscience - knowledge not only of the universe as a whole, the kind of "universal object" perceived by Īśvara, but also knowledge of each and every particular in the universe. It therefore performs "simultaneously"[2] the infinite number of possible acts of focussing in consciousness; the whole of Illustration, together with all possible forms of Attention, constitute paramaśiva's awareness. This form of consciousness rests in itself, enjoying the bliss of unity with its own powers (śaktis. There is usually a sexual connotation when the unity of power (śakti) with the powerful (śaktimat) is described). There is nothing outside of this awareness such as an independent, inert objective world, to which it could direct its Attention, and hence it is said to be "at rest" (nivṛtta, see ŚDV on I.4.).

1 See ŚDV on I.30-33 "sarvatattvamayatayā śivatattvāvasthānam āha".

2 As Chatterji notes (op.cit. p.63 fn.2) such expressions as these are only metaphorical. There is, however, a logical, if not temporal sequence of forms of consciousness as Attention becomes increasingly focussed upon more and more limited aspects of Illustration.

We have seen[1] that Śiva's Śakti may be described as one or many according to its different functions. Somānanda tells us that the three principal powers of Śiva are will (icchā) knowledge (jñāna) and action (kriyā). He describes the superior level of consciousness (Śiva and Śakti tattvas) at ŚD I.3-4:

> "When He remains absorbed in the experience of bliss alone, then this (experience) is the extent of His will, knowledge and action, and He dwells in the fusion of the triad of the three most subtle powers, intent on the bliss of consciousness, without divisions, supreme."

The next three lower tattvas, vis. sādākhya, Īśvara and sadvidyā, constitute the "superior - cum - inferior" level of consciousness.[2] Here Śiva's energies take on a more gross form and objectivity appears, albeit a universal objectivity identified with the universal subject. Whereas at the superior level of consciousness the power of will predominates,[3] in sādākhyatattva the power of knowledge predominates, and in Īśvaratattva the power of action.[4]

1 Above pp.29-30

2 Parāparādaśā, see ĪPK III.5

3 See ŚD I.30-31 and comm, and ŚDV on II.1

4 Both Chatterji (op.cit.p.65 fn4) and Pandey (op.cit. pp.362-366) state that according to Abhinavagupta the powers of cit (consciousness) ānanda (bliss) icchā (will) jñāna (knowledge) and kriyā (action) predominate in the Śiva, Śakti, Sādākhya, Īśvara and sadvidyā tattvas respectively. Neither of them give a reference to support this claim though I do not doubt its validity.

The "inferior" (aparā) level of consciousness is constituted by the 31 tattvas from Māyā to kṣiti (earth). Māyā is best translated by "construction" in Utpaladeva's system, since it creates artificial distinctions between subject and object but these distinctions are not illusory (Māyā in Śaṅkara's system, however, is best translated as "Illusion"). Māyā has five "coverings" (kañcuka) which bring about the limitation of five aspects of consciousness which were unlimited in the preceeding categories of consciousness. These Kañcukas form the 30th-26th categories of consciousness, and are as follows:[1]

30th tattva: Kalā. Here the agency of consciousness is limited, so that whereas before (i.e. in 36th-32nd tattvas) there was omnipotence, in the lower tattvas consciousness only has restricted powers of action.

29th tattva: Vidyā. Here the omniscience of the higher forms of consciousness is obscured, and perceptions focus upon limited Appearances.

28th tattva: Rāga. Whereas at the superior and superior-cum-inferior levels consciousness is "full" (pūrṇa), and experiences no dissatisfaction due to a lack of anything, the covering of Rāga produces

1 Note that the enumeration of the order of the five kañcukas varies in different tantras, and Utpaladeva does not give any particular order in ĪPK or its Vṛtti.

the sense of incompletenes, and desire for self-completion by possession, knowledge or experience of something other than itself.

27th tattva: Kāla. Here the eternality of consciousness is obscured, and Attention focuses upon particular times.

28th tattva: Niyati. Here the all-pervasiveness of consciousness is obscured, to produce consciousness of particular place. Also, and more importantly, the Autonomy (svātantrya) of consciousness is restricted, and fixed relations of cause and effect between Appearances come into being.

The twenty-five lowest categories of consciousness correspond to the twenty-five Sāṃkhya tattvas. Puruṣa is the "aṇu" (atom), the limited individual subject, and from prakṛti evolve the antaḥkaraṇa (intellect, mind and ego) and the organs of perception and action, together with the subtle and gross objects of perception (tanmātras and mahābhūtas).[1]

1 In The Non-Dualistic Philosophy of Kashmir Śaivism Kupetz states (pp.33-34) that "The subjective aspect of world experience, puruṣa, develops as: intellect, ego, mind, the five powers of sense perception and the five categories of action. The objective aspect, prakṛti, appears as the five subtle elements, and then the five gross ones.....The twenty-three categories, beginning with intellect and ending with earth, are not only common to both Sāṃkhya and Kashmir Śaivism, but are defined by the two schools in essentially the same manner." ...../cont.

The general term for subjects whose consciousness belongs to this "inferior level" (aparādaśā) is "māyāpramātṛ" (knower of construction). As individuals, they identify themselves with a particular form of consciousness, believing this to be their self. Such subjects are typically identified with their bodies, their intellect, their life-breath (prāṇa) or the void (śūnya, nabhas or avakāśa).[1] Although their real self is consciousness, and the body etc. are not the self[2], they regard the latter as "I", the self. Hence Utpaladeva often refers to human subjects as "knowers of the void, etc." (śūnyādi-pramātāraḥ).

/.from previous page: Kupetz is mistaken in claiming that "puruṣa develops as....". Utpaladeva explicitly states in ĪPK III.10-11 and their vṛtti that pradhāna (=prakṛti) is the cause (mūlakāraṇam) of all the lower categories. Neither is it true of Sāṃkhya to say that "puruṣa develps as...." etc, since in Sāṃkhya it is only prakṛti which undergoes pariṇāma; puruṣa never changes at all.

Kupetz's error may derive from a misinterpretation of Abhinavagupta's Tantrāloka, where during the exposition of the Tattvakrama (9th Ahn.) Abhinavagupta notes an alternative (older) Sāṃkhya view that prakṛti evolves <u>first</u> into the gross and subtle elements (Utpaladeva's "kāryas") and <u>then</u> into the antaḥkaraṇa and indriyas (Utpaladeva's "kāraṇas"). But even here there is no question of <u>puruṣa</u> evolving, it is merely an alternative view of the sequence of tattvas into which prakṛti evolves.

1 See e.g. ĪPK I.56-57 & III.8,9 (below p.92 & fn.3) etc. Kṣemarāja explains at PH.8 that the Carvākas identify with the body, the Mīmāṃsakas and some Buddhists consider the functions of Buddhi to be the self, some Vedāntins regard prāṇa as the self, and other Vedāntins and the Mādhyamika Buddhists consider themselves to be void.

2 anātman, see ĪPK III.8

The common unenlightened man or woman is subject to the three impurities (malas).[1] These are 1) the "atomic impurity" (āṇavamala), which results from being individualised, and hence seeing objects as separate from oneself (bhinnnavedyaprathā), 2) the "impurity derived from construction" (māyīyamala) which gives rise to birth and death, and 3) the "impurity of (conditioned) action (karmamala), which makes the unenlightened individual responsible for his actions, and bound to experience the good or bad results of his good or bad actions. The state of individual limitation and bondage is known as the "state of the beast" (paśubhāva) in Siddhānta Śaivism, and Utpaladeva also uses this term at ĪPK III.7. He adds that within this limited form of consciousness, the development[2] of śuddhavidyā (above p.84) brings about the recognition of identity with the Lord, and it is māyā which obscures this identity.

We saw during the discussion of APS that for Utpaladeva the self (ātmā) of something must be independent of all other things. Now that we have seen

1 ĪPK III.16

2 We must bear in mind that in the non-dualist interpretation of the tattvakrama, "sarvam sarvatra" - each category of consciousness is present in all the others, but in different forms of Attention, particular categories predominate. Thus even the most ignorant man has some śuddhavidyā in his awareness; enlightenment consists in the development of this.

how the entire universe is dependent upon consciousness, since the former is merely a manifestation of cosmic Illustration and Attention, it will be clear how, for Utpaladeva, the self of everything (not only individual subjects but also objects) is consciousness. Moreover, if consciousness were <u>not</u> the self of objects, and there existed an object independent of consciousness, the Autonomy (svātantrya) of consciousness would be impaired:

> "Therefore this (supreme self) makes Himself into an object, but there is no object with a separate existence [from consciousness], since to be directed towards that would impair His Autonomy" (ĪPK I.46)

Returning to our example of Ms. Smith's perception of her table, we may interpret this event in accordance with Utpaladeva's views in the following way: The entire universe is present in the superior level of consciousness from which this perception begins. However, as the Attention of consciousness focusses upon increasingly limited forms, almost all of the universe is obscured by māyā and its five coverings. Ms. Smith's awareness of a particular place and time develops, and with an increasing reification of consciousness, her Attention focusses upon the

Appearance which she perceives as an inert table, entirely distinct from her own identity. Ms Smith identifies with what is really not herself (e.g. her body). Her identity as such is merely a concept, since she conceptually distinguishes between herself and the rest of the universe (i.e. the rest of consciousness):

> "When, due to construction (māyā) the (superior)[1] category of consciousness has been abandoned, that Attention which appears as a separate "I", conceiving the body, intellect, life-breath or void to be the knower by a rejection of other (Appearances), (that identity) is just a concept (vikalpa eva),[2] derived from other contrary Appearances." ĪPK I.56-57

In fact, as an individual (isolated from the autonomy of universal consciousness), Ms. Smith is more like an object than a subject.[3] However, because she is also a manifestation of Śiva's universal consciousness, she has a valid knowledge of the

1 Utpaladeva comments "cittatvasyaiveśvarasya māyāsaktyā....."

2 "Like "this is a pot" (ghato 'yamitivad)" Vṛtti.

3 See ĪPK III.9 "And that knower of the void etc, who cognises objects (as) separate from himself, is an object (meya), envelopped by the pentad of Kāla etc (the kañcukas)":

yaśca pramātā śūnyādiḥ prameye vyatirekinī
mātā sa meyaḥ sankālādipañcakaveṣṭitaḥ

Appearance "table", and she may have a variety of Apprehensions related to the complex Appearance (the svalakṣaṇa) in her awareness, e.g. "This is my table", "This table is old", "This table is green" etc.

Both Ms. Smith and the table are Appearances in consciousness, whose activity is the creation of a variety of modes of limited experience. Thus Utpaladeva states at ĪPK I.43 that:

> "Therefore the self is active consciousness (caitanyam), described as such in view of the agency of consciousness, which is the action of consciousness[1]. It is, therefore, quite different from the inert."

The final phrase is "jaḍāt sa hi vilakṣaṇah". The point of this remark is to distinguish the active consciousness Utpaladeva is describing from the inactive (śānta) consciousness postulated by philosophers such as Śaṅkara. It is the latter which is compared to the "inert" in the previous verse:

1 "sā cetanakriyā citikartṛtaiva", Vṛtti. i.e., whenever consciousness acts, it is the agent. It is never caused to act by something else. Since Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta share the grammarians' view that "svatantraḥ kartā" (the agent is autonomous), endowing it with metaphysical significance they hold that active consciousness is always autonomous.

"They [the wise] know Attention to be the essential nature of Illustration[1], otherwise, even if Illustration were coloured by an object, it would be like an inert crystal etc."[2] I.42

However, the final remark of verse I.43 does also raise the question "if everything is active consciousness, how can there be an inert for the self to be different from?" We shall see what Utpaladeva means by the "inert" in Chapter Six.

1 Or, "Appearance". The Vṛtti glosses "prakāśasya mukhya ātmā pratyavamarśas....."

2 The etc. refers to mirrors and other reflectors such as pools of water.

Chapter Four

The Non-Difference of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta

"Santyasyāpyanuvaktāra iti digvyāpakaṃ tamaḥ"

Dharmakīrti

Throughout the preceding exposition of Utpaladeva's views on consciousness, I have not hesitated to refer to Abhinavagupta's commentaries on ĪPK to explain Utpaladeva's remarks. Moreover, in the following discussions of memory, objectivity and relations, I shall continually use Abhinavagupta's commentaries, in the firm belief that these represent a faithful and accurate representation of Utpaladeva's position.

According to Dr. S.J. Kupetz, this method of explaining Utpaladeva's doctrines would render my thesis worthless, since his thesis "The Non-Dualistic Philosophy of Kashmir Śaivism" attempts to show that there is a difference between Utpaladeva's metaphysics and those of Abhinavagupta:

> "Surprisingly, the assumed homogeneity of the Pratyabhijñā system was sharply brought into question by Abhinava's numerous divergences from the theories of his predecessors Somānanda and Utpala." Op.cit. p.10
>
> "Any assessment of Abhinava which does not take into account his illusionistic theories is clearly invalid" ibid. p.12

In order, therefore, to defend my thesis against the criticism that it is methodologically unsound, I shall devote this chapter to demonstrating that Dr. Kupetz's distinction between Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta is entirely spurious.

In the introduction to his thesis, Dr. Kuptez states that

> "Since most of our understanding of Somānanda's single extant work, Śivadṛṣṭi, is based upon Utpala's commentary on it, no effort will be made to distinguish between these two Pratyabhijñāvādins. Thus, Abhinava will be contrasted with Utpala alone even when Śivadṛṣṭi is being considered." (p.12).

The problem with this approach is fundamental: Somānanda is <u>not</u> a "Pratyabhijñāvādin", since the Śivadṛṣṭi is not a work of the Pratyabhijñā school. Mādhava's <u>Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha</u>, describing the Pratyabhijñā school, states:

> "The Sūtras, the Vṛtti, the Vivṛtti, and the long and short Vimarśinīs; this pentad of text and commentaries forms the Pratyabhijñā corpus."[1]

It seems that Dr. Kupetz has failed to understand the nature of a Sanskrit commentary; it is an exposition of the views in the mūla text. Thus when

1 "sūtraṃ vṛttirvivṛttirlaghvī brhatīṭyubhe vimarśinyau prakaraṇavivaraṇapañcakamiti śāstraṃ pratyabhijñāyāḥ."

Utpaladeva comments on Śivadṛṣṭi, his aim is primarily to explain Somānanda's view. Moreover, Abhinavagupta's aim in the Tantrāloka and Tantrasāra is to explain the views of the Mālinīvijayatantra, which is far from being a "Pratyabhijñā text". It is even more absurd to suggest that

> "Among other post-Abhinava Pratyabhijñāvādins there is Yogarāja, who came next after Kṣemarāja and who wrote a commentary on Paramārthasāra; Jayaratha (ca. 1200 A.d.), author of the Viveka commentary on Tantrāloka;....." (op.cit. p.23).

Dr. Kupetz's arguments are based almost entirely upon selected quotations from Utpaladeva's ŚDV and Abhinavagupta's TĀ. Even if these showed that there was a difference between Somānanda's view and the Mālinīvijaya view, this would in no way demonstrate that Abhinavagupta's long and short Vimarśinīs were unfaithful to Utpaladeva's Kārikās and commentaries. However, even the arguments Kupetz gives for making a distinction between the metaphysical views of the Śivadṛṣṭi on the one hand and Tantrāloka on the other are entirely fallacious.

I would not wish to burden the reader with a detailed critique of Kupetz's work here. To point out all the errors it contains would necessitate a work almost as long as Kupetz's original.

We must, however, refute the main elements of Kupetz's argument concerning the

> "Differences between the philosophies of Utpala and Abhinava, all of which involve instances where Abhinava adopts theories similar to those found in Advaita Vedānta and very much different from those of Utpala".[1]

Chapter III of <u>The Non-Dualistic Philosophy of Kashmir Śaivism</u> attempts to show that

> "Utpala argues that everything is equally real.... [and].....denounces the use of reflectionist analogies to describe world manifestations. Abhinava uses reflectionist analogies (mirror-images, etc.) to distinguish the appearances of the world ("mere reflections") from the reality of the Supreme as the substratum of world reflections."[2]
>
> Let us consider these claims individually.

First "Utpala argues that everything is equally real".

In support of this claim, Kupetz quotes Utpaladeva's commentary on ŚD I.48 as saying:

> "All objects from Paramaśiva to a pot, because of their identity with perfect consciousness, are indistinguishably of the nature of Śiva." (Kupetz's translation).
>
> I have two remarks to make about this;

First: a more accurate translation would be "Śivahood is established[3] "in exactly the same way"[4], i.e. neither more nor less, for (all) referents from Paramaśiva even to pot etc., since they are not separate from full consciousness".[5]

1 ibid. p.iv

2 ibid.

3 The ŚD phrase upon which Utpaladeva is commenting is "evaṃ sarvapadārthānām samaiva śivatā sthitā"

4 This is a quotation from Somānanda.

5 "paramaśivātprabhṛti ghaṭādyantānāmapi padārthānām samaivanyūnā anatiriktā ca śivatā pūrṇacidrūpānatirekānniyatā".

Second: To say that everything is equally of the nature of Śiva is <u>not</u> to say that "everything is equally real", for Śiva is free to manifest Himself as real or unreal. When Kupetz uses the term "real" he seems to have in mind the Sanskrit term "sat"[1], and thus his assertion that "everything is equally real" for Utpaladeva amounts to the assertion that Utpaladeva regards everything as equally "sat".

But there are two possible ways in which something may be said to be "asat". The first is when a thing is non-existent (like televisions in the 10th century), and the second is when it is said to be an illusion (bhrānti, like the silver we perceive in mother-of-pearl). Kupetz assumes that for Utpaladeva everything which is not "sat" is an illusion (bhrānti). This is not, however, the case.

We have evidence of Utpaladeva's views about what is "asat", in his discussion of the Buddhist view of causation, viz. "asminsatīdamasti" (When A exists, B exists). Utpaladeva comments:

> "For the meaning of the locative case cannot be attributed to [objects which are] merely self-contained, devoid of connection (with others) whether they are existent or non-existent." ĪPK II.47

1 See op.cit. p.44 l.11-12 "not real (na satyarupatva)" and ibid. l.24 "unreal (asatya)". Unfortunately, Kupetz gives no Sanskrit equivalent of what he means by "everything is equally real".

In his vṛtti, Utpaladeva uses the phrase "whether the effect is existent or non-existent..... (sadasadvā kāryam)". Utpaladeva's own view of causation, which we shall discuss in chapter nine below, is that when, for example, a seed produces a sprout, we may regard the sprout as either existent or non-existent before it develops from the seed. But it is always existent in consciousness, and causation is simply a case of making externally manifest what exists in consciousness.[1]

This posibility of regarding the sprout as existent or non-existent is merely a result of Utpaladeva's view, discussed during our examination of the APS, that in themselves objects are neither existent nor non-existent, but existence or its opposite are attributed to them by the knower. Kupetz's assertion that Utpaladeva regards everything as equally real (contrasting this with Abhinavagupta's alleged view that the objects of the world are illusory) makes the erroneous assumption that both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta believe that objects are in themselves either real or unreal.

Dr. Kupetz has also overlooked the distinction that Utpaladeva makes between objects which are "sat" and those which are "asat" at ĪPK II.4:

1 Cf. ĪPK II.34-36 and below pp.160-164.

> "Sequence depends upon difference, and difference depends upon the existence and non-existence of Appearances. The existence and non- existence of Appearances depend in turn upon the Lord, who creates varied Appearances."

Here "existence and non-existence" is equivalent to "existence and non-existence in particular perceptions".

There is, however, one sense in which "everything is real" for Utpaladeva, since all Appearances exist eternally in consciousness:

> "The external presence and absence of Appearances [i.e. their presence and absence for limited cognitions] is an attribute (of these Appearances), not their essence. Therefore they always have existence, since they always exist internally [in the self]"
>
> ĪPK I.82

However, this does not mean that all Appearances are "equally real", since they appear in limited perceptions in differing ways. Utpaladeva states that some perceptions are illusory; the perception of two moons in the sky is said to be "false" (mithyā, see ĪPK II.28 and Vṛtti). Although Utpaladeva does not explicitly say during this passage that one of the two moons is non-existent, he clearly accepts the distinction betweeen an entity which is

illusory and therefore non-existent, and an entity which is non-illusory and therefore real. He says of action, universal, whole, space and time that they are "real, because enduring (i.e. not contradicted) and useful" (.....satyāḥ sthairyopayogābhyām, ĪPK II.9), and again that

> "Thus a knower who wishes to perform a certain function achieves his aim with the aid of something united in diversity[1], hence this is not an illusion"[2] ĪPK II.15

We may summarise the preceeding as follows:

A) Utpaladeva makes distinctions between Appearances which are sat and those which are asat.

B) Utpaladeva also makes distinctions between Appearances which are illusory and those that are not illusory.

C) In considering the nature of objects per se, one could say that for Utpaladeva "everything is equally real", but it would be just as true to say he holds that "everything is equally unreal", and both statements would be gross oversimplifications.

Kupetz also makes the extraordinary remark that

1 i.e. with the aid of action, relation, space, time etc.

2 evamarthasiddhiḥ syānmāturarthakriyārthinaḥ
bhedābhedavatārthena tena na bhrāntirīdṛśī

> "In his arguments Utpala fails to furnish us with any means of distinguishing the way in which the highest reality of Śiva differs from the reality of even shell-silver or hare-horns, let alone how it differs from the everyday world" (op.cit.p.126).

Kupetz thus ignores completely Utpaladeva's exposition of the Tattvakrama, which we described in Chapter Three. His only comment on this subject is that

> "Utpala, for example, mentions them [the tattvas] only briefly in ĪPK at the very end of the work in a chapter (āgamādhikāra) which is rather like an appendix of āgama lore"(ibid.p.34).

As to this latter remark, we must note that the āgamādhikāra is not at the very end of the work, but is the third of four Chapters. Neither is it exceptionally brief (it contains 31 of the total of 190 verses in ĪPK). And we have already pointed out its importance of the doctrines of the āgamādhikāra for the process of recognition (above pp.59-61).

Let us turn to the next of Kuptez's assertions, that

> "Utpala denounces the use of reflectionist analogies to describe world manifestations" (ibid. p.iv),

and that

> "He [Utpaladeva] also claims that any comparison of the the manifest world to a reflection is tantamount to declaring the world to be unreal or illusory" (ibid. p.44)

Kupetz gives no references to any such denunciation or claim in Utpaladeva's works. Whilst it is true that both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta state

that consciousness is different from an inert mirror,[1] Utpaladeva does use the analogy of a mirror to describe the way that a single consciousness contains multiple Appearances.

One example comes from Utpaladeva's commentary[2] on ŚD 1.17:

> "Or one may say that wherever there is absence of will etc., there is no real grossness in consciousness, since it is not augmented by entities,which are like reflections" (icchādyasadbhāve vā anyatra kva cit vastuto na sthaulyaṃ cidātmanaḥ pratibimbakalpair bhāvair anādhikyāt).

There is another example from ĪPK Vṛtti. During the discussion of cause and effect (ĪPK II.33-35) Utpaladeva argues that something inert cannot have causal efficacy, because causation is a kind of action, and action involves the unification of diverse elements, which can only be performed by a conscious agent:

> "The idea of action, (as in "Devadatta cooks rice in the pan using firewood") has as its referent something both single and multiple, due to the external diversity and internal connection of the firewood, pan, Devadatta and rice in "he cooks"".[3]

1 See ĪPK I.42 (translated above, p.94) and Vṛtti, and Abhinavagupta's Vimarśinī on this verse.

2 Utpaladeva uses this analogy, but Somānanda does not in the mūla text.

3 "kāṣṭhasthālīdevadattodanānāṃ pacatītyantaḥ-samanvayādbahirbhedāccaikānekaviṣayā kriyāmatiḥ" Vṛtti on ĪPK II.14

Continuing this argument Utpaladeva claims:

> "And thus it [action] is not applicable to something inert, because of the contradiction of diversity and non-diversity, but it is applicable in one case only, to that whose essence is consciousness, due to the diversity of Appearances" ĪPK II.51

The idea here is that an object cannot be both single and diverse, because it is "self-contained" (svātmamātraniṣṭhitaḥ)[1], whereas active consciousness can appear as both single and multiple. The Vṛtti on this verse runs as follows:

> "(Action) is inapplicable to the inert, because of the contradiction of something non-divided (i.e. the object) being established as divided. But it is applicable in this way to the single pure self which is consciousness [or, "that whose self is consciousness", cidātman], because of the non-contradiction of (consciousness) supporting multiple reflections"[2]

1 See e.g. ĪPK I.66 "This (relationship, jñāteyam) between objects which are in the sequence of space and time and are self-contained, is established by that single Appearance (the eternal pratibhā), otherwise, how could there be any connection (between them)? The Vṛtti on this verse states that the essential form and Appearance of (objective) entities is completely self-contained (svasvarūpamavabhāsanaṃ ca bhāvānām svātma-pariṇiṣṭhitam eva).

2 jaḍasyābhinn ātmano bhedenāvasthiteḥ virodhād ayuktaṃ svacche cidātmanyekasminnevamanekapratibimba-dhāraṇenāvirodhādyujyate.

Abhinavagupta quotes several phrases from the Vivṛtti on this verse which clearly show that Utpaladeva is comparing a mirror to consciousness. e.g. ".....because of the extreme purity of consciousness, in the same way as a reflection" (cidātmano 'tyantanirmalatvāt pratibimba-nyāyena ĪPKVV III p.237), "ādarśābhyantare", "ādarśarūpeṇa" (ibid. p.241) and "darpaṇākārasya", "darpaṇasyeva" (ibid. p.243)

Utpaladeva's argument is that although the mirror is an inert object (jaḍa), because of its purity (nairmalyam) it displays a quality of consciousness, viz. that of appearing as divided and undivided. From the fragments of the Vivṛtti remaining in ĪPKVV, we can see that after using this analogy, Utpaladeva points out that the limited knower (māyāpramātā, who is really an object[1] and hence jaḍa, like the mirror) also sustains multiple Appearances in his awareness; he is ultimately of the nature of (contracted) consciousness (citsvarūpatvāt, ĪPKVV p.244), as indeed is the mirror and every other inert object.

Having belied Kupetz's claim that Utpaladeva "denounces the use of reflectionist analogies", let us consider his next contention;

1 See ĪPK III.9, translated above p.92 fn.3

"Abhinava uses reflectionist analogies (mirror images etc) to distinguish the apearances of the world ("mere reflections") from the reality of the Supreme as the substratum of world reflections" (op.cit. p.iv).

Kupetz speaks of "Abhinava's reflectionist theories" (p.50) and "Abhinava's relectionism" (p.42ff), but his entire exposition of Abhinavagupta's alleged "reflectionism" is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of Abhinavagupta's commentary on ĪPK II.51. We translated Utpaladeva's verse and Vṛtti above (p.105). Abhinavagupta's commentary is as follows:

> ""Thus", i.e., since we have said that agency in the action of evolving is characterised by autonomy in the distinguishing of numerous diverse qualities in a continuous sequence, on the part of an undivided possessor of qualities, therefore this (agency) is not applicable to prakṛti, since prakṛti is inert. For that which is inert is by nature self-contained, it is [consciousness which has] descended to the state of being an object, and is established as distinguished by its separate form, such as blue, yellow etc. And since it possesses only one essential characteristic, it is undivided, like blue. But this same essential characteristic cannot be both divided and undivided, because of the contradiction of asserting and denying (the quality of dividedness) in the same thing at the same time. If one says "One esential characteristic is divided, but one is undivided", then these two essential characteristics would apply to a single essential characteristic, and this is unacceptable, according to the dictum "In this way, the state of being divided and non-divided is rejected for all objects".[1]

1 N.B. this is a quotation from Dharmakīrti's refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine in his PV pratyakṣ° vs.277.

"Thus this kind of essental characteristic (i.e. being simultaneously divided and non-divided) is not possible when there is singularity of an inert object, which has fallen to the state of being an object and appears as a fixed Appearance, distinguished on all sides (from other Appearances). But that which has not descended to the state of being an object, but is pure, its nature being consciousness alone, its ultimate nature being Illustration as consciousness, to that (and that alone) the form of being divided and non-divided is applicable. For we actually have the experience of a form divided into thousands of forms of elephants, mountains etc. on a pure mirror etc., whose essential characteristic is to be undivided. And this Appearance of the mountain etc. in the mirror does not occur, as in the case of (false) silver, two moons, etc., by the obscuration of the true nature of mother-of -pearl or the single moon, since the mirrorness of the mirror is clearly revealed when it appears in this way, because we think "this mirror is spotless, it is excellent". Now the external mountain does not move onto that (mirror), since that would result in its abandoning its original position, nor does it appear on top of the mirror, since that would result in the non-appearance of the mirror, nor does it appear within the mirror, because of the impossibility of its entering something whose essential nature is resistant, hard and compact. Nor does the mountain apppear behind the mirror, since it appears far-off,[1]

1 ĪPKVV, glossing Utpaladeva's "anyatra" says "(nor is the mountain) within the mirror, behind it, at the back of it or in some other separate place" (ādṛśasya madhye pṛṣṭhe paścādbhāge svatantre deśāntare vā). As I understand it, all these possible locations refer to a hypothetical position of the physical mountain. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta reject all these positions, and explain the phenomenon of the mirror-image in terms of <u>non-physical</u> Appearances. See also T.Ā. III.11-20, discussed below pp.111-112.

"nor do the rays of the eyes, falling on the mirror and springing back again,[1] grasp the actual mountain, because we see both the mountain and its reflection when there is the Appearance of the mountain and the mirror next to it.[2]

Therefore this is the greatness of purity, that there can be both an endless diversity of Appearances and unity (at the same time)[3]. Again there is the Appearance of the thousands of things in a city in a single awareness, for someone standing on the top of a mountain. Thus agency is applicable to consciousness alone, because there is the possibility of being invested with the power of action for something non-divided which is capable of sustaining division."

It will be clear to anyone who reads this passage that Abhinavagupta is not trying to explain what consciousness is by comparing it to a mirror. His use of the mirror analogy merely follows Utapaladeva's use of the same analogy, and the point of it is to show how something that is pure can sustain unity in

1 As noted above, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta subscribe to the classical Indian view that the eyes are active in sending out rays to the objects which they grasp, and not passive receptors.

2 Abhinavagupta seems to regard this as sufficient evidence to show that one of the objects thus cognised must be the actual mountain, and the other must be something else. Although he does not explicitly mention it here, he may have in mind the fallacy of "gṛ hītagrāhaṇam" (grasping the grasped), i.e. one cannot perceive the same object twice at one time (cp. ĪPKV II p.73, translated above p.74)

3 "That is purity, which displays something not different from itself as if it were different." (tat nirmalatvaṃ yat svātmānatiriktasya api atiriktasya iva avabhāsanam, ĪPKVV III.p.243). Thus the purity of the mirror consists in the fact that the reflections are not different from it, even though they appear to be so.

diversity. This unity in diversity is a prerequisite for the ability to act, but there is no suggestion that the only quality of consciousness is purity. Abhinavagupta emphasises that "A mi_rror is not a sort of autonomous inert object" (na ca ādarśo 'pi nāma svatantraḥ kaścid jaḍaḥ ĪPKVV p.239 l.7-8). Consciousness is not only pure like a mirror, it is also autonomous, and whilst purity is a prerequisite for the ability to act, it is by no means the only requirement. Both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, after using the mirror analogy, compare it with the situation in which a limited (and to this extent niḥsvatantra, see above p.106) human subject cognises multiple Appearances. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta do, therefore compare a mirror to consciousness in the course of an argument about what is capable of action, but they do not compare consciousness to a mirror.

Nor do any of Kupetz'z other quotations from Abhinavagupta's works show that he holds "a reflectionist view of consciousness". The only other evidence Kupetz gives for his view is a few examples from Tantrasāra and Paramārthasāra in which Abhinavagupta uses the analogy of reflections to describe the Appearances in the world. Even if we assumed that Abhinavagupta is expressing the metaphysical view of the Doctrine of Recognition (an erroneous assumption, as noted above pp.96-97) we would

still be bound to interpret these analogies in the light of Abhinavagupta's statements at TĀ III. 11-20, where he discusses reflections in detail.

Abhinavagupta begins his description of reflections by arguing that they are not the same as an illusion [cp. the Vimarśinī passage just quoted and Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's long commentaries on ĪPK II.51]. A reflection (pratibimba), is something real (vastu), the mere establishment of a form divorced from touch, smell, taste etc.[1] Verses 17-18 note that only the mountain's form is present in the mirror, not its weight etc., because the mirror simply aids the perception of form. Verse 19 says that the mirror is the substratum (ādhāra) of the reflection because the latter does not appear as separate from the mirror, and that although consciousness, light, and sense-contact also aid the perception of the reflection, they are not its principal substratum.

Abhinavagupta replies to an objection that the reflection is just as non-different from the light, sense-contact and consciousness which cognise it as it is from the mirror and hence these too should be described as supporting the reflection, by pointing out

1 rūpasaṃsthānamātraṃ tatsparśagandharasādibhiḥ
nyagbhūtair eva tadyuktaṃ vastu tat pratibimbitam

that the mirror is solid, and hence there appears to be both unity and difference between the mirror and the reflection, but the light, rays of the eyes and consciousness are not solid, separate entities in the same way; they are all "pure" (nirmala) but not solid as well.

Verses 21-22 state that "the compassionate Lord" has pointed out (in the Tantras) for the enlightenment of fools that the reflection is a real thing (vastu)[1] but does not exist on its own apart from the mirror, is not independent (svatantra) or impervious (i.e. it is not solid), and is neither stable nor unstable (its stability or otherwise depending upon the mirror). This is the greatness of something pure.

Abhinavagupta concludes:

> ""In (the reflection) itself there is no place, no form, no time, no dimension, there is no mutual connection (between the contents of the reflection) nor is there lack of it; there is no solidity, and yet no unreality, and no kind of essence of its own" - in this way, delusion will be dispelled, and therefore He (the Lord) gave the teaching of the mirror (niradiśaddarpaṇavidhiḥ)."
>
> TĀ III.23

1 And hence by comparing entities to reflections, neither Utpaladeva nor Abhinavagupta imply that they are unreal, as Kupetz supposes.

As Jayaratha notes at the end of his viveka on the previous verse, this analogy of the mirror has been given to enlighten the minds of those who believe there is an external object, since "there is nothing that will dispel the delusion of duality if one accepts an external object." The point of Abhinavagupta's comparing the objects of the world to reflections, then, is <u>not</u> to compare consciousness to a mirror, but to show that the objects have no essence of their own; they are merely manifestations of consciousness, and not things-in-themselves. In expounding this view, Abhinavagupta is in complete agreement with Utpaladeva, as we have seen in our discussion of APS.

Moreover, Abhinavagupta clearly states what distinguishes consciousness from a mirror at ĪPKV I p.198-199:

> "even though crystal etc. take on reflections, they depend upon a separate knower to establish that they are as such (i.e. that they are supporting reflections), hence, due to their lack of Attention, they are inert" (sphaṭikādi hi gṛhīta-pratibimbakamapi tathābhāvena siddhau pramātrantaram apekṣate, iti nirvimarśatvāt jaḍam).

We may summarise our criticisms of Kupetz's third chapter by saying that his presentation both of Utpaladeva's position and Abhnavagupta's position is entirely misleading. Utpaladeva does <u>not</u> "argue that

everything is equally real" nor "denounce the use of reflectionist analogies"[1]. And Abhinavagupta's comparison of Appearances in consciousness to reflections in a mirror in no way differs from Utpaladeva's use of the same comparison.

It seems to me that Dr. Kupetz has read Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's works carelessly, and having seized upon a few phrases in Abhinavagupta's works in which the latter uses the analogy of a mirror, erroneously claims that Utpaladeva does not use this same analogy. He then proceeds to characterise Abhinavagupta's use of this analogy as a "theory", and to see in this "theory" the influence of Śaṅkara's metaphysics. We can only comment that there is no textual evidence to support Kupetz's view, and that his perception of difference from Utpaladeva and similarity to Śaṅkara in the works of Abhinavagupta is an illusion brought about by his own superimposition of Advaitavedānta terminology onto Abhinavagupta's texts. The cause, no doubt, is avidyā.

In the remainder of this chapter, I shall confine myself to pointing out the major errors in the Fourth Chapter of The Non-dualistic Philosophy of Kashmir Śaivism. Having done so, we can dispense with

1 See above, p.98

the notion that Abhinavagupta is not a faithful commentator upon Utpaladeva.

In this fourth Chapter, Kupetz attempts to show that Abhinavagupta expounds a doctrine of superimposition which Utpaladeva does not. I have the following criticisms to make of his argument:

One "Utpala never treats limited consciousness as anything other than supreme consciousness which is seen from a different view-point" (op.cit.p.52).

There is no question of "different view-points" of supreme consciousness, as if a limited consciousness could regard the supreme consciousness as an object. The universal consciousness of Śiva does take limitations upon itself, as we have shown above (Chapter Three), and in this process it manifests limited subjects and objects. But "to see from a different point of view" from supreme consciousness is precisely to have a limited form of consciousness, and hence to be different from supreme consciousness. Abhinavagupta's views on this in no way differ from Utpaladeva's.

Two "Like Utpala, Śaṅkara also declares the world to be vikalpa" (ibid. p.54).

For Utpaladeva, the world consists of Appearances (ābhāsa). These may or may not be

Apprehended by concepts (vikalpa), but are not in themselves concepts.

Three ""The Self remains non-dual", says Abhinava, "even when imagined (parikalpita) to be endowed with power"" (ibid. p.57)

This quotation comes from TĀ I.69, part of the section summarised above (pp.29-30). I prefer the translation "conceived of as" for "parikalpita", since the point is not that we imagine something which is not there, but simply that we use conceptual distinctions when we describe a complex unity, for the purpose of communicating its complexity. Two verses later, at TĀ I.71, Abhinavagupta states:

> "And this (dualism between power and the powerful) is not ultimately nothing, because it appears, and apart from Appearances nothing exists. Therefore the division between power and the powerful is real (vāstavaḥ).[1]

Thus when Kupetz quotes Abhinavagupta as saying

> "Division is not really possible, and thus it is called "mere appearance" (avabhāsamātram)" (ibid. p.57)

and then goes on to say that

> "since there is no <u>real</u> possibility of division, the appearance of diversity (or the masking of unity) is declared by Abhinava to be illusory", (ibid. p.58)

it is an unforgivable manipulation of the text to omit the sentence which immediately follows the phrase

1 na cāsau paramārthena na kiṃcidbhāsanādṛte nahyasti kiṃcittacchaktitadvadbhedo 'pi vāstavaḥ.

"avabhāsamātram". For Abhinavagupta qualifies his remark in the same way that he qualifies the similar remark in the Tantrāloka. He states:

> "And yet it (the division) is not thereby ultimately false (apāramārthikam) because the ultimate truth of all created things is just this (that they are avabhāsamātram)".[1]

Four Kupetz follows this textual distortion with another. He quotes Pandey's translation of ĪPKV I.p.249

> "And the cause of obscuration of that pure consciousness is that power which is called māyā. It is the freedom to bring about the obscuration of unity, which is of the nature of illusion (bhrānti)" (NDPKS p.58)[2]

Kupetz uses this as evidence to show that Abhinavagupta believes that "the diversity of the world is an illusion" (ibid), and that he is therefore "at obvious variance with Utpala" (ibid).

However, according to the Doctrine of Recognition, consciousness is a complex entity, it contains unity in diversity. If its unity is obscured by illusion, this by no means implies that its diversity is illusory.

Moreover, the view expressed by Abhinavagupta at IPKV I.p.249 is expressed in almost identical words

1 The full passage from ĪPK I. p.110 runs: ".....na ca vicchedanaṃ vastutaḥ saṃbhavati, iti vicchedanasya avabhāsamatrām ucyate. na ca tat iyatā apāramārthikam, nirmīyamānasya sarvas ya ayameva paramārtho yataḥ."

2 "tad- (śuddhaprakāśarūpa-) apahastane tu parameśvarasya svātmapracchādanecchārūpābhedāprakāśānaṃ bhrāntirūpaṃ prati svātantryarūpā māyāśaktirhetuḥ"

by Utpaladeva in his commetary on ŚD I.11b-13a.

Utpaladeva states:

> "Even at the inferior level, in the dualistic perceptions "I know this pot" or "this is a pot", the illustratedness (of these cognitions) would not be possible without identity with consciousness, and so these (inferior cognitions) also are of the same kind (i.e. based upon and therefore one with the superior level of consciousness). It is simply due to the power of māyā that non-duality is not apprehended. The (Lord's) own form always unfolds in just this way, so how can there be vileness (here)?[1].
>
> Vileness is really just the non-Apprehension of non-division, in the form of illusion (bhrāntirūpam), and that is nothing, since it is merely a kind of non-appearance. It is not the manifestation of some new thing. That which is consciousness is the identity of the universe (viśvātmatvam) because phenomena (bhāva) are established as having the same real nature as pure conciousness, just as reflections (in a mirror) are ultimately the mirror itself. All of this has been carefully examined in the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāṭīka [=°Vivṛtti]."[2]

We need say no more on the subject of reflections and illusions. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are in complete agreement here.

1 The ŚD verse Utpaladeva is commenting on here is a reply to an objector who has claimed that Śiva, who is pure, would not wish to create the impure objects of the world.

2 "aparāvasthāyāmapi ahaṃ ghaṭamimaṃ vedmi ghaṭo 'yamiti vā dvaitadṛṣṭau cidātmakatām vinā prakāśamānataiva nopapadyate iti tadrūpataiva, kiṃtu māyāśaktivaśādabhedaparāmarśa iti sarvadā svarūpaprasaraṇameveti katham garhitatvam. abhedāparāmarśanameva bhrāntirūpaṃ kutsitaṃ, tacca na kiṃcit, akhyātirūpamātratvāt. na tvapūrvasya kasyacitprathā. viśvātmatvaṃ ca cinmayasya pratibimbānāmiva darpaṇaparamārthatvena bhāvānām svacchacinmātrasatattvatayāvasthānāt. etacca sarvamīśvarapratyabhijñāṭīkāyām nipuṇamālocitam.

Five

"In Abhinava's scheme, however, the erroneousness of the Māyā-world does not consist only of the view- point of multiplicity, there is also a false unification of Self and non-self, whereby the limited self thinks itself identical with that which is non-self" (NDPKS pp.59-60)

".....the superimposition of Self on non-self constitutes a defilement of a different sort ..... which is not acknowledged by Utpala" (ibid. p.61)

We need only refer the reader to Utpaladeva's statement at ĪPK III.8:

"But the power of Māyā unfolds when pure diversity appears, and the void, intellect or body, which are not self, are regarded as self."[1]

There is no better way of refuting Kuptez's fourth Chapter on "Superimposition" than by quoting the words of Abhinavagupta himself:

"If this everyday world isn't real, then we don't know what else is - thus one should not be deluded into thinking it is an "illusion""[2]

1 bhede tvekarase bhāte 'hantayānātmanīkṣite
śūnye buddhau śarīre vā māyāśaktirvijṛmbhate
ĪPK III.8

See also ĪPK IV.2:

tatra svasṛṣṭedaṃbhāge buddhyādigrāhakātmanā
ahaṃkāraparāmarśapadaṃ nītam anena tat

2 ĪPKV II.p.59 : yadi eṣa vyavāharo na satyaḥ, tarhi na anyasya satyatvaṃ vidmaḥ iti na atra "bhrāntiḥ" iti bhramitavyam

It will, by now, be abundantly clear to the reader that Kupetz's arguments do not merit any further consideration. The briefest mention of the aim of his fifth Chapter will suffice. In this latter, he attempts to explain "Utpala's refutation of sublation" (p.63) and "Abhinava's distinction between levels of reality". We have already seen that Utpaladeva makes the same distinctions as Abhinavagupta does between levels of reality.

Kupetz translates the term "bādha" as "sublation", and interprets Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's usage of it as if it were identical to Śaṅkara's usage. This interpretation is entirely inappropriate for the Doctrine of Recognition. It is indeed true that in his commentary on Śivadṛṣṭi Utpaladeva (following Somānanda) attacks Śaṅkara's notion of sublation. But it is <u>not</u> true to say that he is "attacking the notion of bādha"[1] per se. For we have seen above (pp.71-72 and 77) that for Utpaladeva a cognition is only a pramāṇa if it is "abādhitam" (not contradicted). Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta both hold the view that the erroneous perception of silver may be contradicted by the subsequent perception of mother-of- pearl, but neither of them <u>ever</u> applies this

1 Kupetz, op.cit. p.64

contradiction theory to the recognition of the existence of Śiva,[1] for as we saw in Chapter Three above, Śiva cannot be known by means of pramāṇas, and Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta's notion of contradiction is strictly limited to the context of pramāṇas.

To conclude, then, Dr. Kupetz's presentation of the Pratyabhijñāvāda is misleading from its initial confusion about what a Pratyabhijñā text is to its final conclusions about the "differences" between Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Abhinavagupta's Vimarśinī and Vivṛttivimarśinī are not faithful and accurate expositions of the views of Utpladeva. We shall, therefore, continue to refer to Abhinavagupta's commentaries throughout our exposition of Utpaladeva's Doctrine of Recognition.

1 Unlike Śaṅkara, for whom the illusory world of Māyā is bādhita by the realisation of brahman.

Chapter Five

The Argument from Memory

"For time is not to be laid out endlessly like a row of bricks. That straight line from the first hiccup to the last gasp is a dead thing. Time is two modes. The one is an effortless perception native to us as water to the mackerel. The other is a memory, a sense of shuffle fold and coil, of that day nearer than that because more important, of that event mirroring this, or those three set apart, exceptional and out of the straight line altogether."

William Golding

Utpaladeva seeks to establish the existence of the self by demonstrating that if it did not exist, then memory would be impossible. The basis of this argument is that unless there was something (the self) which endured from the past into the present, there would be nothing to establish a connection between the present act of memory and its past referent.

The arguments of Utpaladeva's (Buddhist) pūrvapakṣin, given in ĪPK I 6-16, claim that it is unnecessary to postulate a self either as experiencer, rememberer, or as the agent of action. This argument may be summarised as follows:[1]

1 A complete translation of the section of the Kārikās discussed in this Chapter, ĪPK I.6-31, is given in Appendix A.

There are two kinds of knowledge, a) the non-conceptual knowledge of a unique moment of consciousness (the experience of a svalakṣaṇa) and b), conceptual knowledge. We do not experience any permanent knower as the substratum of these knowledges, and the intuition of "I" is based upon the body, intellect, etc. Those who postulate a self may argue that when an experience is over, unless there is a permanent self as experiencer, there will be nothing to remember it. But even if there is a permanent self, it cannot be the cause of particular memories, since it is unchanging. Therefore the "self"- apologists must explain memories as caused by saṃskāras, the residual traces left by previous experiences (which is exactly the explanation of memory given by the Buddhist who denies the existence of the self). Hence the self is unnecessary as rememberer.

The view of knowledge proposed by the Sāṃkhya doctrine (which argues for the existence of the self as knower) is also unacceptable to the pūrva pakṣin. We may note that the Sāṃkhya dualism between the conscious puruṣa and unconscious knowledge is similar to the dualism asserted by some modern Westerners to exist between consciousness and brain-states.

The Buddhist argues that if the brain-state is (buddhijñānam) itself conscious, then consciousness will be impermanent, and hence cannot be a permanent self. If, on the other hand, brain-states are unconscious, they will not be able to illustrate objects. The Sāṃkhyavādin replies that

just as the intellect (buddhi) takes on the form of the subject (i.e. the brain-state is conditioned by the perceptual content), similarly it takes on the consciousness of the self.[1] The Buddhist remarks that in that case it really becomes conscious (in which case the problem remains about consciousness being impermanent and hence not the self). For if it remains unconscious, it will be unable to illustrate objects.

(To continue the summary of the pūrvapakṣa:)

Action, such as the action of walking, is not seen to be anything other than the occurence of the body etc. in different places and times, nor can it be said to be one sequential thing belonging to one agent. For the only relation we observe is that "when A occurs, B occurs" (which we call causation), and there is no relation other than this. Indeed, there cannot be such a relation, because something which occurs in two different circumstances cannot be single, because something established does not rely on any other thing, and because relations such as "other-dependence" are inappropriate in explaining action.

1 The analogy used by the Sāṃkhyavādin to explain this process is that of a mirror (buddhi) taking on the reflections of both the object and of consciousness (puruṣa). Abhinavagupta remarks in his Vimarśinī on ĪPK I.16 that consciousness cannot become a reflection in this way, since it is purer than the medium in which it is supposed to be reflected [one might as well suggest that a pure crystal could be reflected in a stone]. Elsewhere, Abhinavagupta attacks this same Sāṃkhya view, arguing that even if consciousness were reflected in buddhi, it would still not have the capacity to illustrate objects, any more than a fire reflected in a mirror has the capacity to burn.

Hence the self as agent, like the self as rememberer, is merely a conceptual construct, it is unnecessary for the explanation of our experience.

We shall discuss Utpaladeva's argument against the latter section of the pūrvapakṣa, in Chapter Seven. In the present Chapter, we wish to focus on Utpaladeva's argument against the Buddhist's assertion that the self is unnecessary as rememberer.

In ĪPK I 17-23, Utpaladeva argues that the saṃskāra (residual trace) explanation of memory is inadequate. Utpaladeva contends that although memory arises from saṃskāras, these latter do not produce an awareness of the previous experience.

Thus if in the afternoon I remember eating toast for breakfast, the saṃskāras produced in my mind at breakfast-time are awakened in the afternoon, and due to them my memory is a memory of toast and not eggs. However, the conscious experience of eating toast cannot be cognised by the mental impression which is the saṃskāra, for the latter relates only to toast, and not to my experience of toast.

Utpaladeva argues that each perception is its own appearance,[1] and that one perception cannot be perceived

1 Cp. ĪPK II.16, translated above p.71, and p.77 fn.1

by another, any more than a visual perception can perceive a perception of smell. Thus the saṃskāra operates in my afternoon memory by making the content of that memory similar to the content of my morning's experience, i.e. toast, but the memory-perception aided by saṃskāra does not perceive the morning's perception of toast.

In ĪPK I.19 an opponent to Utpaladeva's argument accepts that the toast that I remember in the afternoon is not the same as the toast I ate in the morning, but argues that since I decide[1] that I am remembering the actual morning's toast, I therefore do perceive it, but in an illusory manner. Utpaladeva rejects this view, saying that such an illusion cannot be called memory, nor can it establish what was actually the case (i.e., in this way, I wouldn't know what I actually ate for breakfast, I would merely be imagining something I could have had for breakfast), nor would there be any reason to take saṃskāras into account.

Utpaladeva is perhaps being unfair to his opponent here, in assuming that this "memory-illusion' would be no different from any other kind of illusion, but he presses his point home in vs. 21. As Abhinavagupta explains in his Vimarśinī, a knowledge is illusory not because it misinterprets what appears in consciousness, but because what appears in consciousness does not correspond to

1 tadavasāyataḥ. In what follows, I translate "avasāya" as "decision".

the object. Thus an illusory perception of silver in mother-of-pearl is unconscious of the mother-of-pearl. If memory is unconscious of its (true) object in this way, it cannot make its object known, and I cannot therefore know what I had for breakfast by an illusory perception.

On the other hand, the Buddhist might point out that the illusory knowledge is at least aware of what it appears to know, and hence as I am aware of "silver" in an illusory perception, I may be aware of "toast" in my afternoon perception.

But Utpaladeva argues that in this way I am only conscious of my afternoon perception, and this no more reveals the content of my morning's perception than a perception of the smell of sandal-wood reveals the colour blue.

Utpaladeva concludes that sense perceptions are islolated from each other in this way, and never perceive each other. Since memory cannot be explained by saṃskāras alone, then all human interaction, which is based upon the synthesis of diverse perceptions, would cease were it not for the existence of a self. This self is the One Great Lord, who contains all the infinite forms of the universe within himself, whose nature is consciousness, and who has the powers of knowledge, memory, and distinguishing (apohana).

To reach Utpaladeva's conclusion from his rejection of the mental-impression explanation of memory requires several large leaps of logic, not to say imagination, but before considering what other conclusions we might draw from Utpaladeva's arguments, let us look at his own explanation of memory, expounded in ĪPK I 24-31.

Utpaladeva's view is that the self who is Śiva cognises the toast in the morning, and it is that same self who in the afternoon freely turns his attention to the morning's toast. He then cognises it as "that" toast, whereas in the morning he explained it as "this" toast. Because of this difference in the way he directs his attention to the same toast, in the afternoon case he is said to "remember".

Moreover, in the afternoon the self manifests the morning's experience[1] in whatever way it wishes, so I may simply remember that what I had for breakfast was toast, and the Appearance which is the content of my memory will be a universalised, unqualified "toast", a word with only vague sensory connections. Or I may remember the entire experience of eating the toast: its texture, taste, smell, colour, the crunching sound of the crust, my own emotional state at the time, etc.

1 i.e. the previously manifested svalakṣaṇa. "pūrvābhāsitam ..... svalakṣaṇam" ĪPK I.25

For Utpaladeva, then, my afternoon's memory of my breakfast is in a real sense a "re-living" of the morning's experience, but this time in conjunction with my experience of being a remembering subject in the afternoon. If there were no unification of my afternoon's experience with my morning's experience, the former would not be a memory, since if the morning's experience appeared separately from the afternoon's, then I could not know what the former had been in the afternoon; it would not appear in my afternoon's awareness.

Since as we have seen, Utpaladeva rejects the idea that my afternoon's experience can perceive my morning's experience, he concludes that it is the permanent self which unifies these two temporally separate experiences, and knows both of them together.

In $\bar{I}$PK I.27 Utpaladeva re-asserts his view that the morning experience does not appear separate from the afternoon experience like an object (I don't see my experience of eating toast in the morning in the way that I see a table in front of me), since the previous experience subsequently appears as based upon the self, in the form "I previously experienced (toast)". Thus the two experiences take the form "I am experiencing this toast", and "I experienced that toast", respectively.

Utpaladeva, like the majority of classical Indian philosophers, believed that yogi's could know what was going on in other people's minds. However, for Utpaladeva, these "mind-readers" do not read others' minds "like a book", (to use common English expressions). They do not experience other peoples' experiences like objects. Utpaladeva states at vs.28 that even in the case of yogi s, other people's experiences appear as unified with their own (i.e. they know others' thoughts in the same way that ordinary people know their own past thoughts). This kind of transferrence of identity from one body to another is quite in keeping with Utpaladeva's view that the self of everything is consciousness, which is in turn the entire universe. Just as autonomous consciousness limits its Attention to one body (e.g. that of a yogi), the same consciousnesss limits its Attention to the body of other human beings. Since a yogi is one who has realised his identity with the supreme consciousness, he has the same autonomy as Śiva as regards identifying with various human bodies. But in all cases, the real self is unrestricted consciousness, which always appears as "I".

However, Utpaladeva accepts that some hold the view that yogi's perceive others' experiences like objects. This can be explained without assuming that these experiences actually do appear as objects. Utpaladeva compares this yogic knowledge of others' experiences to the form of memory which judges "My perception was like that".

Utpaladeva claims that although the former experience is described as if it were an object (compare: "the moon was bright") the expression "my experience was like that" is simply an alternative verbal analysis of the memory "(This) was seen by me". In vs.30-1 Utpaladeva claims that whatever form of verbal expression we use to describe an experience, whether it be "I see this pot" or "this is a pot," we are simply expressing an experience we are having. The two things, subject and object, both appear in the knower.

In the light of these last verses, it is clear that when Utpaladeva claims that "we do not perceive experiences as objects, because our memory may always be expressed in the form "I experienced that"", he is not claiming that it is simply the possibilty of expressing our memories as a relationship between a subject and object which demonstrates that they are not separate from ourselves. Nor does Utpaladeva's argument that the expression "my experience was like that" can be re-formulated as "that was experienced by me" imply that he believes the latter to be a more correct expression of the memory experience. He is merely claiming that the fact that a yogi says "His experience is like that" does not imply that the yogi sees the other person's experience like an object, but simply that he may choose to express his experience of unification with the other's experience in various ways.

ĪPK I.30-1 make it clear that in Utpaladeva's view the way that I Apprehend an experience (which as we have seen, depends only upon my free choice) does nothing to alter the fact that my experience is simply an Appearance in consciousness, which is the knower, and both the limited subject (I as opposed to Ms. Smith) and the limited object (toast as opposed to eggs) appear in the universal consciousness of the Great Lord, the self.

Perhaps the most striking thing about Utpaladeva's theory of memory is that he believes it is a kind of "re-living" of experience. Thus when in the afternoon I remember my breakfast, I actually become directly aware of the events of the morning. If Utpaladeva's theory did not require a direct awareness of past experience, then there would be no need for a self who is present at all times, and who, through his free Attention, may therefore be aware of any particular time whenever he chooses.

However, by rejecting the saṃskāra theory of memory, and hence the view that in the afternoon I am aware of my morning's toast indirectly, Utpaladeva is coming dangerously close to rejecting an explanation of how I, as a limited subject, can remember at all. It is clear that in so far as I am Śiva, I can remember anything, but it is also true that in so far as I am Śiva, I have no need of

saṃskāras to aid my memory of past experiences, nor is there any restriction upon my ability to know what will happen in the future. We must, therefore, examine Utpaladeva's statements about saṃskāras more closely.

Utpaladeva does not make clear in ĪPK or its Vṛtti exactly what he believes the "memory knowledge" (smṛtijñānam) to be. It would appear from vs.17-18 that when in the afternoon, I remember my breakfast, the fact that toast appears in my mind and not eggs is due the impression of toast which was left on my mind after my experience of breakfast. But the fact that I <u>know</u> that I had toast for breakfast, and can therefore be said to <u>remember</u> my breakfast toast, is due to the presence of my self, which unifies my afternoon "memory-knowledge" with my breakfast experience. (saṃskārajatvaṃ tu tattulyatvaṃ na tadgatiḥ, ĪPK I.18). It therefore seems that the self is only necessary in Utpaladeva's system to verify that my afternoon "memory-knowledge" of toast is <u>correct</u> and not an illusion. The self is not necessary to produce the thought "I had toast for breakfast", because the saṃskāra of toast may be associated with other saṃskāras indicating the time of my breakfast.

It seems to me that Utpaladeva is being unfair in dismissing his opponent's argument that "although the toast which appears in my mind isn't the <u>actual</u> toast I ate,

it is similar to it (the similarity being produced by saṃskāras) and since I regard the toast as being the same in both experiences, I may be said to experience the morning's toast in a kind of illusory perception."

Utpaladeva is taking a very hard line here against any interpretation of our everyday experiences as illusory, but the opponent dismissed so readily is not necessarily arguing that the "memory-illusion" is as false as the illusion of the snake when I perceive a rope. In his Sambandhasiddhi, Utpaladeva outlines the Buddhist view that relations are illusory. But Utpaladeva himself represents the Buddhist as saying that "this illusion, like the illusion of a whole, is not im-permanent like the illusion of the snake. Therefore, even though it's an illusion, is it given the technical name "conventional (truth)".[1]

The present argument about memory reflects the same issue. It is quite possible for the Buddhist to say that although I don't experience the actual toast I ate when I remember it later, nevertheless my subsequent cognition of toast is similar to my previous experience of toast, and even if I mistakenly think that the two toasts are the same, this illusion is not dispelled by any of my subsequent experiences, and I am quite capable of carrying on my daily affairs in the belief that I really can remember exactly what happened yesterday. This kind of illusion is indeed

1 See also below p.227ff for a full translation of Utpaladeva's presentation of Dharmakīrti's views on relation.

useful, and therefore deserves the name "conventional truth".[1]

Utpaladeva may reply to this that if my afternoon's experience of toast is an experience of something different from what I ate in the morning, then I cannot know what I did eat in the morning. But unless Utpaladeva rejects the utility of saṃskāras altogether (in which case, as we have noted, he cannot explain individual memories; he will be reduced to saying that I as Śiva can know or choose not to know anything), Utpaladeva must accept that the operation of saṃskāras guarantees the accuracy of my memory, even though that memory experience itself has no access to any previous experience. Nor can Utpaladeva object that unless I could be aware of what I actually had for breakfast, I would have no means of establishing that saṃskāras did faithfully reproduce my breakfast experiences. For if we accept the Buddhist view that what is conventionally true is what is useful for carrying out our everyday affairs, I would never need to know what I had

1 asya bhramasyāvayavibhramasyevānivṛttiḥ sarpabhramavat. tata eva bhrānterapyāsyāh saṃvṛttisaṃjñayā vyapadeśa iti. SS p.4. The "illusion of the whole" is compared by the Buddhist to the illusion that there is a complete circle of fire when a fire-brand is whirled in a circle. This illusion is connected with the functioning of the senses, and cannot be removed like the illusion of the snake when one realises it is a rope. Thus although for the Buddhist there are no wholes, since there appear to be wholes, and society is capable of functioning efficiently using these illusory wholes, they are called "conventionally true".

actually eaten for breakfast. As long as my illusions about the past coincided with other people's (and this coincidence could occur due to similarity of mental impressions), no more need be said about it. Indeed, from the Buddhist point of view, no more can be said about it.

Even Utpaladeva's own theory of true cognition does not necessitate verification of previous experiences by comparing these actual experiences with later ones: The valid cognition is, as we have seen, that which appears in the mind and is not contradicted by subsequent cognitions. Utpaladeva might claim that a subsequent experience, e.g. of mother-of pearl, cannot contradict a previous one, e.g. of silver, unless one could remember our previous experience of silver. But this argument cannot be used to show that memory cognises the actual previous experience, since it is not necessary that we remember the actual experience of silver, but only that we have appropriate mental impressions (i.e., saṃskāras) of having experienced silver at a particular time and place.

In Utpaladeva'a view, the synthesis of past and present experiences, either in memory or in the process of contradiction, is made across time by a permanent knower. For a Buddhist such as Dharmakīrti, this synthesis is performed by kalpanā (conceptualisation) simply on the basis

of saṃskāras in the mind and present sense perceptions.[1]

We may conclude, then, that whereas Utpaladeva regards the Buddhist view of memory (i.e. the saṃskāra view) as inadequate because it doesn't show how the memory-knowledge knows the previous knowledge (smṛtijñānam..... .... nādyanubhavavedakam, ĪPK I.17), the Buddhist would not see this as a lack at all, because in his view the subsequent experience does <u>not</u> know the previous experience either directly as an object or indirectly as unified in the subject.

As to Utpaladeva's own theory of memory, we repeat that this is only a theory of how a subject who contains the entire universe within himself can remember past experiences. We have made a distinction between, on the one hand, the "indirect" theory of memory advocated by Utpaladeva's opponent, which claims that in memory we are only aware of mental impressions from past times, and, on the other hand, Utpaladeva's "direct" theory of memory, which claims that the self can be aware of two times, past and present, simultaneously.

The divergence between these two views stems form a divergence between implicit assumptions about the nature of time. In the case of the Buddhist, who holds the

1 Note that Dharmakīrti also regards the mind (manas) as a sense.

view that time is an endless series of unrepeatable instants, the progress of time is an objective process, independent of our subjective perceptions of time.

For Utpaladeva, however, time is a subjective category, produced when consciousness contracts its Attention, and adopts the limitations of the lower (aparā) level, the thirty-one lowest tattvas from Māyā to kṣiti. Thus there is no time for the superior (parā) form of consciousness. At the beginning of the kriyādhikāra of ĪPK, Utpaladeva states that the sequential appearance of worldly actions is due to the power of time (manifested in Māya's Kāla kañcuka, the 27th tattva), but that the Lord's eternal actions[1] are not sequential. After explaining that sequence depends upon difference, and this difference is due to the Lord's manifestations of varied Appearances, he states at ĪPK II.6.:

> "But in all cases this difference in Appearances which causes temporal sequence occurs (only) for the knower-of-the-void etc (śūnyādipramātuḥ) whose Appearance is limited, but not for that knower who appears once and for all (bhātasya no sakṛt)."

The knower who appears once and for all is the eternal Lord, the self. The limited knower, in the inferior state of consciousness obscured by Māyā, experiences

1 At ĪPKVV III p.3 l.16 Abhinavagupta quotes the verse "kriyā ca p̂rāvāgvṛttyādika....." The Lord's eternal actions come from His power of Attention, His Autonomy in unifying all things. They are His Supreme Speech (see above p.67) etc.

temporal sequence. Utpaladeva characterises temporal sequence in his Vṛtti on this verse: "For that previous time does not appear in the same way then (i.e. later), and that limited subject conventionally determines (vyavaharati) the past and future according to his own present, except in memory" (sa hi prākkālo na tathā tadānīm bhāsate, smṛtiṃ vihāya svavartamānāpekṣayā cāsau bhūtabhaviṣyatte vyavaharati). The clause "except in memory" clearly indicates that Utpaladeva holds the "direct" theory of memory characterised above (p.137).

When I am reading in the afternoon, I experience my reading as "present" and my eating of breakfast as "past", because in the afternoon I define the present as that which is occurring simultaneously with my afternoon sense-perceptions. But when I remember my breakfast, there is a unification of my afternoon experience and morning experience. This unification is produced by the permanent knower, and my toast appears in both times. The "sva vartamānāpekṣā" by which I distinguish between past and present refers to the limited cognitions of the inferior level of consciousness (my limited self in the afternoon).But it is in the permanent self, who experiences no time, that the two temporal cognitions are unified, and it is this permanent self who remembers the toast (see ĪPK I.24 and above p.128).

Thus my morning's toast is present in my afternoon's memory by virtue of the fact that both the experience and the memory are appearing in the Attention of the self who is beyond time. Thus there is a sense in which my toast is appearing in neither time, and hence Utpaladeva excludes memory from the conditions of relative time in his commentary on ĪPK II.6.

Utpaladeva states in his Vṛtti on IPK.25 that it is the actual morning toast which I perceive in the afternoon, "otherwise there would be no Apprehension of what had been (previously) illustrated" (anyathā prakāśitasya parāmarśo na kṛtaḥ syāt). It is no contradiction, Utpaladeva claims, to say that the toast (which I have now eaten) re-appears in the afternoon. If I wish, I may re-experience the entire action of eating breakfast, by concentrating my mind upon this previous experience with great intensity.[1]

Utpaladeva develops this idea in ĪPK 78-82. He states that sometimes Appearances are perceived by the senses at a particular time, and at other times they are not. But there is never any difference in the existence of the Appearances themselves, whether we conceive of them as

1 "tathaivātiśayanirantarāvahitacetasastu dṛṣṭārthapratyakṣīkāra eva", Vṛtti on ĪPK I.25. Note that for Dharmakīrti the svalakṣaṇa is an unrepeatable objective moment. But since for Utpaladeva time is subjectively determined, svalakṣaṇas are, for him, repeatable.

being past present or future from our limited perspectives. They always exist in Śiva. Normally, when a cause of pleasure, such as delicious food, Appears as "past" to an individual, then its effects such as gustatory satisfaction also appear as past. But when one concentrates intensely upon a past pleasure, then the previous satisfaction one derived from it becomes re-established in one's mind, due to this vivid visualisation.[1] Abhinavagupta notes (ĪPKV I.p.325) that "past" in Sūtra I.80 also implies "future". Thus if one concentrates with sufficient intensity upon some anticipated pleasure, the satisfaction and expansion of the heart[2] derived from that future pleasure appear in full in the mind.

It is obvious that Utpaladeva's theory of memory relies heavily upon the view that all objects are contained within consciousness. For if the toast that I eat is a physical object distinct from the toast I perceive myself to be eating (as in an indirect realist metaphysical view) then there can be no question of my deriving nourishment from the morning toast that I intensely concentrate upon in the afternoon. Moreover it is not possible for my morning's awareness to be unified with my awareness in the afternoon,

1 cp. Vijñānabhairava vs.71, which enjoins one to become suffused with bliss simply by remembering sexual union.

2 hṛdvikāsa; note that hṛd also means "awareness". Cp. "samastasaṃpatsamavāptihetum" above p.21.

unless awareness is in some way independent of time. Utpaladeva'a theory of memory involves the supposition that time depends upon awareness, as do all the other contents of awareness such as toast, feelings of nourishment, and physical satisfaction.

It is therefore natural that he should follow his exposition of the power of memory with a series of arguments to show that there is nothing such as an object which is independent of consciousness, and hence nothing which limits the ability of consciousness to focus upon any particular event. Utpaladeva wishes to show that all events are merely events within consciousness, subject to no constraint other than those which consciousness itself adopts. We discuss Utpaladeva's arguments in support of this view in the following Chapter.

However, we may conclude our examination of Utpaladeva's arguments from memory as follows: Utpaladeva takes an interesting and unusual view of what memory is, and since only God is capable of the kind of memory Utpaladeva describes, Utpaladeva regards this as a proof that God exists. However, it is not necessary to explain the phenomenon of human memory in the way that Utpaladeva does, and by laying the emphasis upon the eternal self as the agent of memory, Utpaladeva renders the saṃskāras of the traditional view ultimately unnecessary.

According to Utpaladeva's opponent, mental impressions produce a similarity between the toast of my "memory-knowledge" (smṛtijñānam) and the toast of my morning experience. But since, for Utpaladeva, I remember the same toast that I ate, there is no necessity for similarity between two different toasts. Utpaladeva's argument to establish the existence of a permanent self on the grounds that it is necessary to explain human memory is, therefore, highly problematic.

Chapter Six

The Nature of Objectivity

"Whoever recognizes a symptom of organic disease as an effect of the conscious soul-life of forbidden and hystericized emotions, recognizes the creative force of the psychical within the material - a force which one is inclined to claim as a second source of magic phenomena. Idealist of the pathological, not to say pathological idealist, he sees himself at the point of departure of certain trains of thought which will shortly issue in the problem of existence, that is to say in the problem of the relation between spirit and matter. The materialist, son of a philosophy of sheer animal vigour, can never be dissuaded from explaining spirit as a mere phosphorescent product of mattter; whereas the idealist, proceeding from the principle of creative hysteria, is inclined, and very readily resolved, to answer the question of primacy in the exactly opposite sense. Take it all in all, there is here nothing less than the old strife over which was first, the chicken or the egg - a strife which assumes its extraordinary complexity from the fact that no egg is thinkable except one laid by a hen, and no hen that has not crept out of a previously postulated egg."

Thomas Mann

We have seen in Chapter Three that the Appearances which we perceive as objects are produced by a contraction of Attention of consciousness. This contraction follows the sequence of the thirty-six tattvas, and in its final stage, there is the Appearance of such things as pots.

If Utpaladeva'a view of the development of the twenty-four lowest categories, from puruṣa to earth, were identical to that of Classical Sāṃkhya, then the nature of these evolved objects would be relatively easy to explain. For in the Sāṃkhya view, prakṛti is a material substance, independent of puruṣa, the conscious spirit. Prakṛti evolves into objects like pots by the process of "pariṇāma", which is compared to the transformation of milk into curds. Both the unevolved prakṛti and the evolved pots etc. are in this theory "jaḍa", i.e. unconscious. It is, as we saw in Chapter Five[1], difficult for the Sāṃkhyavādin to explain how the passive puruṣa comes to know objects like pots and tables, but there is no inherent difficulty in explaining how the pots and tables can exist independently of their being perceived by particular puruṣas.

For Utpaladeva, on the other hand, prakṛti is not independent of puruṣa. Indeed the existence of both these entities is entirely dependent upon the activity of cosmic consciousness. Since it is a contraction in consciousness which produces limited objects, we must naturally ask whether limited objects exist independently of limited perceptions. This is equivalent to the old question: "If objects do not exist apart from consciousness, what happens to the table in my room when nobody is perceiving it?"

1 pp.123-124.

Bishop Berkeley answered this question by claiming that the table exists in the mind of God when no human perceives it. But for Utpaladeva, in so far as we make a distinction between Śiva's consciousness and our own, the distinguishing feature of Śiva's consciousness is that it does not perceive objects isolated from all others in space and time, but perceives the entire universe at once.

Thus although Utpaladeva also may answer this question by claiming that the table exists in Śiva's awareness when individuals do not perceive it, we may still ask whether the object is any different when it appears in Śiva's awareness alone, and when it appears both in Śiva's and a human's awareness.

This question has two aspects: a) What is the nature of an object perceived by an individual subject? b) Do such objects exist when not perceived by individual subjects?

Concerning a), we have seen[1] that Utpaladeva believes that human perception is not perception of something independent of consciousness, and that Utpaladeva's reason for rejecting the realist view of independent objects is that they would impair the Autonomy of the Lord.

Concerning question b), Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta make no statements explicitly referring to objects which are not objects of particular perception. All

1 Above p.91

our evidence for their views on this question must be inferred from their general statements regarding the relationship of Śiva to the Universe, and more importantly from their arguments to show that all objects exist in cosmic Illustration.[1]

We noted at the end of the last Chapter (p.142) that Utpaladeva's discussion of memory is appropriately followed by a discussion of the power of knowledge (jñānaśakti, ĪPK I.32-77) during which Utpaladeva outlines his views concerning the objects of perception. It is to this passage of the ĪPK that we now turn.

He begins with the assertion that:

> "The manifestation as external of the entities which are contemporary Appearances [i.e. the limited objects of limited perception] is possible only for [entities which are] internally established."ĪPK I.32

Utpaladeva denies the existence of the external object (bāhyārtha), yet states that objects appear externally (bahirātmanā) in limited perceptions. In order to understand his position, it will help to clarify the various senses which he and Abhinavagupta use the terms "bāhya" and "bahir" (external, outside) and their opposites "āntara" and "antar" (internal, inside). We may distinguish four main senses:

1 Although at the superior level of consciousness, subject and object are as inseparable as Śiva and Śakti, nevertheless prakāśa is the static (and therefore objective) aspect of cosmic consciousness, whereas vimarśa is the active (and therefore subjective) aspect.

One. An object may be said to be external to consciousness if it can exist entirely independently of consciousness, i.e. if consciousness is "externally related" (in G.E. Moore's sense[1]) to the object. If this is the case, then the total destruction of all consciousnes will not necessarily entail any change in the object. Utpaladeva denies that this kind of "external object" (bāhyārtha) exists. It is primarily in this sense in which Utpaladeva is claiming that entities in perception are "internally established".

Two Abhinavagupta notes that any object which is perceived is "external", in the sense that it is differentiated from the perceiving consciousness. (bāhyatvamapi grāhyatārūpam - pramātuḥ vicchedena avabhāsanāt ĪPKV I.p.328). There are differing degrees of this kind of externality.

In the superior-cum-inferior state of consciousness, from Sadāśiva to Śuddhavidyā, there is a kind of "mystical objectivity" (ye 'pyasāmayikedaṃtā- pṛāmarśabhuvaḥ prabhoḥ te vimiśrā vibhinnāśca tathā vicitrāvabhāsinaḥ, ĪPK IV.7) in which there is an object (idam), but it is not perceived as separate (bhedena) from the subject (aham).

In the inferior state of consciousness (māyā-pramātuḥ), however, the subject appears as completely distinct (bhedena) from the subject, and we have the experience "I am Devadetta, this is blue" (aham Devadatto, nīlam idam).

1 G.E. Moore, "External and Internal Relations", Philosophical Studies London, 1922

Even objects which appear only in imagination, and are therefore "internal" in the sense that they are perceived by the internal faculty (antaḥkaraṇa; mind, ego, intellect) alone (sense Four below), are external in this second sense. Utpaladeva states at ĪPK I.85:

> "The delineation of "this" in imagination is also external, appearing as separate. For Internality is unity with the subject, difference from the subject is externality"[1]

The only kind of consciousness in which there is no external object of this kind is the superior consciousness of Śiva, in which all forms of objectivity rest internally in the bliss of consciousness:

> "But Śiva, who is nothing but bliss and consciousness, fully contains within Him the infinite ocean of entities (tattvas), His form being supreme and unchanging (or, "the supreme syllable", paramākṣaravigrahaḥ). ĪPK IV.14

Thus the entire universe is contained in this superior form of consciousness, but it does not appear externally (pūrṇacidānandamātre 'nubhavaḥ prakāśanaṃ na tu bāhye, ŚDV p.6 l.13).

1 vikalpe yo 'yamullekhaḥ so 'pi bāhyaḥ pṛthakprathaḥ pramātraikātmyamāntaryaṃ, tato hi bhedo bāhyatā.

Abhinavagupta's Vimarśinī on ĪPK 4.14 begins "There cannot of course be any talk of object as regards Paramaśiva" (na khalu bhagavati śrīparamaśive prameyakathā kācidasti). This raises the question as to how a limited object (corresponding to a limited form of consciousnes) can be contained in an unlimited form of consciousness.

We may compare the way in which the superior consciousness knows all particular objects even in the absence of external objects, to the way in which a silent Englishman knows the English language. He may not be expressing himself in English at a particular time, but he nevertheless always has the capacity to express himself in this language if he chooses. Likewise in the superior form of consciousness, the universe is not expressed externally, but Śiva always has the capacity to express himself as all the objects of the universe, hence they may be said to be always contained in his awareness.

Three Abhinavagupta also states that the objects of perception such as "blue", are "internal" when they appear in the mind of the perceiving subject. (iha antaḥkaraṇe buddhidarpaṇātmani nīladīnām āntaratvamapyasti, ĪPKV I.p.327-328). He uses the phrase "in the internal faculty, the mirror which is the intellect." This implies that he accepts the terminology of the realist Sāṃkhya-vādin for the purposes of explaining everyday perception.

In this (realist) view, there is an object which is separate from Ms. Smith, viz, her table, and the rays of her eyes go out from her head to grasp this external table, and convey an impression of it to her mind. This impression is like a reflection of the object in a mirror, with her intellect (buddhi) performing the function of reflector. We have seen above that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta believe that the reflections in a mirror are not different from the mirror itself[1], though they appear to be so. Similarly, the table which appears in Ms. Smith's mind is not different from her mind, though it appears to be so. It appears in her internal faculty (antaḥkaraṇa, equivalent to "mind" in a broad sense), and is therefore said to be "internal".

This third kind of "internal", referring to something Appearing within an individual subject's mind, suggests a corresponding third kind of "external", which would refer to the table which exists outside the confines of a particular individual's consciousness, and of which the "internal" object is a reflection. For the realist, whether Sāṃkhya- vādin or Sautrāntikavādin, this "external" object is the "bāhyārtha", the object whose existence is independent from consciousness.

However, we have seen that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta deny the existence of such an external object. They accept that objects <u>appear</u> to be external in this way to an ignorant individual, but not that objects exist outside universal consciousness.

1 See above p.109 fn.3 and p.112

In the common-sense view, the distinction between objects which appear "in the mind" and objects which exist "outside the mind" is necessary to maintain the distinction between objects which I dream or imagine and objects I perceive. For Utpaladeva, the distinction between objects which appear in my mind alone and those which appear in others' minds also derives from a distinction between two aspects of the Lord's creation:

> "The creation which results from clear manifestation is two-fold; intersubjective and otherwise. The state of being the Lord is [attained] gradually through one-pointedness, by the dispelling of [dualistic] concepts." ĪPK IV.11

Abhinavagupta comments that objects such as pots, etc. are intersubjective, whereas two moons in the sky are not. The distinction between these two kinds of creation is maintained only by the ignorance of individuals. If one identifies with one's body, etc., and thinks that objects are separate from oneself, then one's dreams and imaginations appear only in one's own mind. But Abhinavagupta notes that if a yogi rids himself of the concept of duality, and recognises that "I am this entire universe", then his individual mental creations become intersubjective, just as a yogi who has meditated upon powerful mantras is capable of killing or pacifying others by the power of his thought.

Four There is, therefore, a fourth sense in which an object may be said to be "external" from an ignorant individual's point of view. That is, when he perceives it through his "external faculties" (bāhyendriyas), those of sight, smell, touch, taste and hearing. An object which he imagines is perceived by his internal faculty (antaḥkaraṇa) only, as are his subjective feelings of pleasure and pain.

Objects perceived by the external faculties are "internal" in the third sense above, because they appear in the internal faculty, but external in the second sense, because they appear as "this", as separate from the subject. A yogi, however, may make an object which initially appears in his mind alone (and is therefore "internal" in this fourth sense) "external", in that it can be perceived by the external faculties of others, as when a yogi magically creates a pot.

Feelings of pleasure and pain are never "external" in this fourth sense; they are always perceived by the internal faculty alone. We may conclude that by "manifestation as external" in ĪPK I.32 above (p.147) Utpaladeva means external only what I have termed the second and fourth senses.

Having seen the various ways in which an object may appear "in" and "out" of consciousness, we are still

left with the problem of how the Lord creates the intersubjective objects like pots which Appear in individuals' awarenesses. Could it be that for Utpaladeva each individual is a kind of demigod, creating all the objects he imagines and perceives, but whereas his power is sufficient to produce the former on his own, he needs the aid of Śiva to produce the latter, since he falsely believes himself to be different from Śiva? We shall return to this question after we have seen Utpaladeva's arguments for the view that all objects perceived by individuals are inseparable from consciousness.

However, to conclude our analysis of Utpaladeva's four usages of the term "external", we must repeat that for Utpaladeva, an object which is "internal" in the third sense is not a reflection of an object which is "external" in the first sense. The kind of "externality" corresponding to "internality" of the third sense is merely conceptual. It results from the individual's making a false distinction between himself and the object. He believes that consciousness is confined to his body, and since the object is appearing in his mind, he therefore believes that the object must be somehow in his mind. Since it is obviously not the case that a large table can be physically contained in a small head, he therefore believes that some kind of image of the table appears in his mind.

Abhinavagupta accepts that from the point of view of the everyday world of human cognition, the sphere of construction (māyāpade), the explanation of the realist Naiyāyikas is correct (naiyāyikakramasyaiva māyāpade pāramārthikatvaṃ, ĪPKV I p.25), and thus he uses the terminology of interior reflection of an external object in the mind.

But as far as Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are concerned, all the diverse subjects and objects of the everyday world are simply Appearances in universal consciousness. The Pratyabhijñā doctrine is that an individual's consciousness is not confined to his body, in so far as it is also the consciousness of Śiva. The ignorant subject thinks that the table reflection is appearing within the confines of his mind while the real table exists apart from consciousness, but in fact both he and the table are merely appearances in Śiva's awareness, and it is Śiva who knows both these Appearances[1]. Since, therefore, the table does not really appear "within" the individual's mind, but only in Śiva's mind, there is no real "outside" in the sense of something beyond the confines of consciousness.

Abhinavagupta therefore states (ĪPKV I p.328) that the Appearances of "blue" etc. are "within" the mind to the extent that they appear in the individual's internal

1 See ĪPK I.31, translated in Appendix A.

faculty, but the only sense in which they are also "outside" the mind is in sense two (which may be said to include sense four[1]); they appear as objects separate from the limited knower, as "this". Thus the only kind of externality which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta admit to really exist is that of external perceptibility, whether it be the universe appearing as "this" in the yogi's awareness "I am this universe", Ms. Smith's perception of her mood at a particular time, or her perception of the table in front of her.[2]

There is, however, an important issue which remains to be clarified. We have seen that when Ms. Smith perceives her table, she is aware of a unification of numerous Appearances of space, time, shape, colour, texture etc. Considered individually, the Appearances are similar to universals (see above, pp.72-74). But since these objects appear unified in a svalakṣaṇa[3] in an individual's perception, the question arises as to whether these unified

1 Though these objects are grasped by the external faculties, and hence are external in the fourth sense, the individual becomes aware of them when they are reflected as "this" on the mirror of the intellect (buddhi), hence at the time of perception, all objects which are external in the fourth sense are both external in the second sense and internal in the third sense.

2 iha buddhidarpaṇātmani nīladīnāmavabhāsānām āntaratvam apyasti - antaḥkaraṇamadhyebhavatvāt, bāhyatvam api grāhyatārūpaṃ - pramātuḥ vicchedena avabhāsāt, bāhyatvaṃ ca kevalaṃ bāhyapratyakṣatā.

3 See above pp.78-79

collections of Appearances forming worldly objects can exist when they are not perceived by individuals, or whether they dissolve into their constituent universalised Appearances. In other words, can there be a svalakṣaṇa without an individual perception?[1]

We have noted that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta make no direct references to this problem, but that we must infer their position from an examination of their arguments to show that all objects exist within consciousness, i.e. that there is no object which is "external" in sense one above. Let us continue with our examination of these arguments.

Having stated his view of the non-externality of objects in ĪPK I.32 (see above p.141), Utpaladeva advances several arguments in support of his position. The first of these is:

> "If an object were not essentially Illustration, then it would remain unillustrated as before [its cognition by an individual]. And Illustration cannot be divided. The self[2] of the object is Illustration."[3] IPK I.33

1 Note that for Dharmakīrti a svalakṣaṇa is not by definition a perception. Cf. IPK I.6, translated Appendix A.

2 I have translated "ātmā" as "self" here, although in other contexts I use the translation "essence", since in many cases "ātmā" is used as a colourless, impersonal word, being almost equivalent to "rūpa" at the end of compounds. However, in the present context, the argument that an object's metaphysical essence (ātmā) is Illustration is conducted in a distinctly anthropomorphic tone, hence I retain the translation "self".

3 prāgivārtho 'prakāśaḥ syāt prakāśātmatayā vinā
na ca prakāśo bhinnaḥ syād ātmārthasya prakāśatā

Utpaladveva and Abhinavagupta use the term "artha" to refer to the object throughout this argument. Unfortunately, this word is as vague as the English word "thing", and we must assume that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta attach no precise metaphysical sense to it. Thus the following argument must be understood as a discussion of the ordinary objects of ordinary perception, and an attempt to show that their nature is to be Appearances in consciousness.

Abhinavagupta's example for an object is "blue" (nīlam). We must note that the word "nīlam" may be used either as an adjective or a substantive ("blue thing"). Indeed the adjective/substantive distinction does not occur in Sanskrit grammar, there are only "qualifiers" (viśeṣaṇa) and "qualifieds" (viśeṣya) and a tall man with a stick is qualified (in grammatical terms) equally by his height and by his stick.

Abhinavagupta's commentory on ĪPK I.33 begins as follows:

> ""Object" refers to blue etc. If the mere fact of being blue, etc. were the illustratedness of the object, and there were no other identity with Illustration beyond the body of the object, then it would follow that it would be blue either
> a) for everybody (we say this as mere conjecture)
> or b) for no-one
> or c) it would really be blue for itself alone, since it couldn't be established for anyone (or anything) else
> or d) in itself it would be neither blue nor not-blue, since without being favoured by Illustration, it would have no establishment.

"Similarly, this object would appear (i.e. be Illustrated)
e) to everyone
or f) to none but itself alone
or g) not even to itself.

Thus the world would be blind."

It is not immediately obvious that Abhinavagupta's Vimarśinī begins, as it were, half-way through the argument of Utpaladeva's verse. The basic stages of Utpaladeva's argument are:

(i) If the object in a particular cognition were not identical with Illustration, then it would not be Illustrated in that cognition, any more than it was Illustrated before the cognition occured.

therefore

(ii) Illustration is identical either with the body of the object or the 'self' (ātmā) of the object,

and

(iii) Illustration cannot be identical with the body of the object, because Illustration would then be divided in the same way that objects are divided,

therefore

(iv) Illustration is identical with the self of the object.

Abhinavagupta'a commentary starts from stage (iii) in the above argument, and considers the possibility that Illustration could be identical with the body of the object. The major consequence of this identification is, according to Abhinavagupta, that the object would be also identical with Illustration before it was cognised by the individual subject, since Abhinavagupta is assuming that the body of the object, i.e. its "blueness" remains the same before and after its cognition in a limited perception. Thus there would be no difference between the object before and after perception.

Abhinavagupta argues that if it were the case that "to be blue" was identical with "to appear to be blue"[1], then blue would appear as blue whether or not it was perceived by a particular individual, and this, he argues, is impossible.

The Pratyabhijñā view is that "to be blue" means "not to be red, a table, or a cognising subject". In other words, a thing must be blue in relation to something else.

If the Illustration of blue is identical with the mere fact of being blue, Illustration will be divided ("prakāśo bhinnaḥ..." vs. 33) i.e. there will be as many

1 "To be Illustrated" (prakāśate) is the same as "to appear" (avabhāsate) for the Pratyabhijñāvāda. See e.g. IPK I.42 and Vṛtti, where "avabhāsasya" is glossed as "prakāśasya".

different Illustrations as there are different objective Appearances. Thus there will be no relation between blue and not-blue, since Utpaladeva defines relation as "unity-in-diversity" or "non-division-in-division" (ekāneka or bhedābheda; for a detailed discussion of the Pratyabhijñā view of relations, see Chapter Seven).

Thus Abhinavagupta comes to the conclusion that without the relation between blue and not-blue, blue will be blue in relation to itself alone, [possibility c)], or for everyone [possibility a), though Abhinavagupta notes that this is "mere conjecture", i.e., it is meaningless to say that blue will be related to blue alone from everyone's point of view]. Or blue may be blue for no-one [possibility b)], since blue will not be defined in relation to anything but blue; or blue will be neither blue nor not-blue, [possibility d)], since blue will not be blue by virtue of being distinguished from not-blue, nor will not-blue be not-blue by virtue of being distinguished from blue. It will therefore be impossible to distinguish blue from not-blue, since each will be identified with itself alone and distinguished from nothing else.

These possibilities a) - d) may be said to refer to the object independently of its cognition by any subject, i.e. the mere "body of blue". But the identification of this "body of blue" with "Illustration as blue" leads also to possibilities e) - g) with

reference to cognition. If the fact that an object is blue is identical to that object's appearance as blue, then given Abhinagupta's assumption that the "body of blue" does not change before and after cognition, then blue will always be Illustrated, and hence there are the possibilities: e) that blue will always appear to everyone, or f) that it will always appear to itself alone, or g) that it will not even appear to itself (since Illustration would be identical with the mere "body of blue", there would be no "self of blue" for which the "body of blue" could be Illustrated).

Having given this elaborate exposition of what I have characterised as the third stage of Utpaladeva's argument, Abhinavagupta assumes that the fourth stage must follow. He does not give a detailed analysis of the relationship between the "self" of an object and the "body" of an object. Nor does he give any arguments as to why the object must be "identical with Illustration" at the time of cognition.

Concerning the latter point, we must note that the verb "pra + kāś" means "to throw light upon, to shine". Both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta assume that only light can shine, and hence only "prakāśa" can "prakāśate", i.e. only that which is Illustration can be Illustrated. Moreover, since the consciousness of the individual subject is related to the "unconscious" (jaḍa) Appearance in cognition, there must be a unity between subject and object in cognition, given the Pratyabhijñā

view that all relations are instances of unity-in-diversity (see Chapter Seven).

As to the "self-of-the-object" and "body-of-the object", we must repeat that Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's usage of the term "ātmā" here seems to be anthropomorphic, and different from their usage of the same term when they say "(existent) objects are in essence (ātmani) like the non-existent, they exist only for Illustration...." APS 13, translated above p.43)[1].

However, the most important conclusions we may draw from the above passage concerning the nature of the object when not perceived by a limited subject are a) that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta assume that the "body" of the object is unchanged by perception, and b) that they regard the "self" of the object as Illustration. Since it is beyond doubt that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta regard the "self" as more permanent than the "body", we may therefore conclude that when not perceived by me, my table has an identical "body" and an identical "self" to those it has when I perceive it.

The problem remains, however,as to how the 'self' of my table (which is Illustration) is related to the 'body' of my table (its "mere form as table") when I do not perceive it. The relationship is <u>not</u> one of identity, since we have seen that if Illustration were

1 We may say that in the latter case, Utpaladeva is in fact denying that objects have an independent essence related to their own "body"; their identity derives solely from Illustration.

identical with the body of my table, there would be the dire consequences listed by Abhinavagupta above. It is the undivided (na bhinnaḥ), universal illustration which is the self of my table, whether or not it is perceived. This is no more than repeating what we established before, that the table remains in Śiva's consciousness when it is not in mine.

However, if we can establish that by the "body" of the object (artha) Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta mean the unification of Appearances of table, size, colour, space, time etc. that constitute the svalaksana (unique particular Appearance), then it will be true to say that the table exists in exactly the same form whether I perceive it or not, and it therefore does not dissolve into its constituent universalised Appearances when I do not perceive it.

This latter interpretation is consistent with what Abhinavagupta claims when he continues his commentary on ĪPK.I.33 with a refutation of his opponents views of cognition.

In this passage, Abhinavagupta argues against an opponent who accepts stage (i) of Utpaladveva's argument, that the object is identical with Illustration at the time of cognition, but not the assumptions upon which Utpaladeva's following three stages are based, viz that this identity must result from a permanent identity of either the body or self of the object with Illustration.

The Opponent argues:

> "Due to the group of causes, such as senses, light etc. occurring at that instant, this moment of blue takes the form of Illustration, and becomes different. [from its previous un-Illustrated state. Abhinavagupta replies:] This theory has the same consequences as the previous one [that Illustration is divided], and there is the same fault in the [Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsā] doctrine of manifestation (prakaṭatāvāda). If Illustration rests in the body of the object alone, then one can't account for the fact that Illustration is established as linked with a subject, as in "it appears to me".
>
> [i.e., if Illustration is simply a quality of the object, no different from its qualities of size and shape, then there is the same problem of the object being Illustrated for everyone, no-one, etc. But the Opponent claims that although Illustration is a quality of the object, it is different from its other qualities of size, colour, etc. by virtue of the fact that it is conferred upon the object by a subject, and it is for this reason that the object only appears to the subject who confers the quality of being Illustrated upon it. The opponent says:]
>
> But at that time (of cognition) the subject, consisting of senses and object
>
> [i.e. body: Abhinavagupta characterises the opponent's argument in this way in order to weaken it; he implies that the limited subject is jaḍa, see above, p.92 fn3]
>
> becomes the cause of the object's Illustration, just as the seed is the cause of the sprout. [Abhinavagupta replies:] And yet the sprout does not derive its identity as sprout from the seed, therefore if that (object) were not identical with Illustration "as before" [prāgiva, a quotation from Utpaladeva's kārikā] i.e. before cognition arose, then it would remain the same [not identical with Illustration, hence not Illustrated] even when cognition arose."

Abhinavagupta's argument is that the limited subject is unable to cause an object to become identical with Illustration. Since this argument is based upon the view of causation peculiar to the Pratyabhijñāvāda, we must examine the nature of this view of causation in order to assess the validity of Abhinavagupta's refutation of his opponent.

In his Vivṛtivimarśinī on on this verse (=ĪPKVV 1.5.2), he gives two examples of causation, the seed producing the sprout and the potter producing a pot. In both these cases, he argues, the effect is said to be brought into existence by the cause, but the identity of the sprout qua sprout does not depend upon the seed, since it continues to exist and be a sprout in the absence of the seed, just as the finished pot exists and may be used for carrying water etc. independently of the potter.

The Pratyabhijñā view is that although we speak of seeds and potters as causes, in fact the only true cause is Śiva:

> "Therefore, the Supreme Lord is held to be the cause of the sprout; causality in something other than Him, such as seed etc. is inappropriate.
>
> Likewise, that potter may produce a pot by a gradual development of the clay etc. according to the law of God Himself."[1]

1 ĪPK II.40-41

Abhinavagupta, in his Vimarśinī on the latter verse, explains that inert things can never produce causal effects without the aid of a conscious agent as stimulator. This is clearly seen in the case of clay, potter's wheel, string etc. producing a pot with the stimulus from the potter. Hence in the case of seeds producing sprouts, there must also be a conscious agent, who in this case must be Śiva. Moreover, the potter must produce the pot in accordance with the universal law which is laid down by Śiva's power of Determination[1], otherwise how could the inert clay, wheel, etc. obey the will of the potter to become a pot, and why should the threads which (normally) make a cloth not obey the potter's will to form a pot?

Abhinavagupta notes an objection that if in all cases it is Śiva, and not the individual potter who is the agent, then the distinction between moral and immoral acts (dharmādharma) will disappear. He replies that if one

1 Expressed in Niyatitattva (see above p.88). Due to the power of Determination, the phenomenal world behaves in a regular way, and by observing relations between phenomena, such as regular succession, we are able to say in conventional terms that one phenomenon causes another. I prefer the translation "Determination" for Niyati, rather than "fate" or "destiny", since it emphasises the Pratyabhijñā view that all necessity comes from subjective will. Śiva determines that the laws of nature shall be as they are, yet remains free to ignore these self-imposed restrictions, and to perform miracles. Thus when a yogi's awareness rises above this category of consciousness, he is said to be capable of performing miracles.

follows reason (yukti) and scripture (āgama) then this is the case. But nevertheless the Supreme Lord has created among other things the steadfast conceit in the potter that he is the agent. Hence his actions are, from his point of view, moral or immoral. If, however, the Lord wills that the potter should not have this conceit then the potter is not an agent at all.

Utpaladeva gives his own definition of causation in ĪPK II.38-9

> "A thing is said to be the effect of that within which it rests [before being caused] and with regard to which it is external [after being caused]. Both these states of internality and externality are [always] spoken of with regard to the subject. (pramātā) Therefore it is the subject who is the cause, and he is established as one [and the same] in both states of the Appearance of the effect [when the cause is internal and external]. So action belongs to One [only, Śiva]".

For Utpaladeva, causation is simply the manifestation of something that existed within Śiva as perceptible to both inner and outer senses (kārya-kāraṇatā loke sā_'ntarparivartinah ubhayendriyavedyatvaṃ tasya kasyāpi śaktitaḥ, ĪPK II.36) Let us see what this means in terms of the different kinds of "external" described above.

Commenting on ĪPK.II.36, Abhinavagupta notes that "perceptible to both inner and outer senses" implies that the effect attains its full causal capacity.[1] Thus a pot which exists only in the imagination of a potter when he decides he will make a pot is "internal" in the sense that it is perceived only by his internal faculty.[2] As such, no-one can carry water in it. When he actually makes the pot (or rather, Śiva makes it via the potter), then it is "external" because perceived by both the internal and external faculties of the potter and his clients (when they think about their pots and use them), and hence capable of performing their full functional capacity.

The creation of a sensation of pleasure, however, does not require that it be perceptible to the external faculties of anyone (indeed it cannot be so); as long as an individual recognises pleasure in his internal faculty, the pleasure takes its full effect. Hence Abhinavagupta notes that "perceptible to both (inner and outer) senses" in Utpaladeva's verse only means that the effect should be fully functional, and the production of effects such as pleasure which are only perceptible to the inner faculty is included by extension in Utpaladeva's definition of causation.

1 yasya yāvati pūrṇārthakriyāsamāptiriti

2 Sense <u>four</u> described above, p.153

In his Vimarśinī on the same verse, Abhinavagupta makes clear that the effect (kārya) such as pot is not internal in the potter before it is produced as an effect "because he predominantly consists of breath, puryaṣṭaka,[1] intellect, void, and body, and because he is inert (jaḍa, i.e. an unconscious object). It is consciousness, therefore, which manifests as the universe by its diverse powers.[2]

Therefore when a seed is planted, the sprout exists internally in Śiva's awareness (perhaps also in the internal faculty of the seed-sower), and afterwards (when it has grown) exists externally, perceptible to all by their external faculties.

We may clarify the meaning of the Pratyabhijñā doctrine of causation by considering the growth on a mountain-top of a flower which has never been seen or thought of by a human being.

We saw in ĪPK II.38 that the effect is first existent in the cause and then subsequently outside the cause. This would seem to imply that in the winter the flower existed within Śiva's awareness, but in Spring grew to exist outside Śiva's awareness. However, we must say "it exists outside in Siva's awareness.", i.e., before its

1 The antaḥkaraṇa and five tanmātras.

2 ĪPKV II pp.140-141

creation it was not part of the universe which is "external" in the second sense, i.e. it did not appear as part of the "idam" (this) of the universe, but in the spring Śiva manifested it as separate from Himself, as an object.

There are three possible ways of reconciling the Pratyabhijñā view of causation with its general view of the creation of objects:

A) We may say that in the winter the flower rested in the superior level of consciousness alone, not part of the universe of manifestation. Thus it would be internal in sense <u>two</u> above. In Spring, the flower then becomes external in the second sense, differentiated in the superior-cum-inferior level of consciousness, as part of the idam in the "aham idam viśvam" (I am this universe) cognition of a yogi.

B) The following interpretation is also consistent with the Pratyabhijñā texts: the flower which grows on the mountain in Spring is simply a combination of the Appearances of colour, shape, species, etc. which exist externally already in the second sense, that they appear as "this" in universal consciousness. The difference between the Appearances in universal consciousness during the Winter and the same Appearances in the Spring would be

that in the latter case they would be external to consciousness in the fourth sense also, i.e. potentially perceptible to any individual subject (even though no-one might actually notice this particular flower).

C) There is a third possible interpretation: The Spring flower rests in the universal consciousness of the parāparā level as a complete individual, a collection of Appearances associated with the time of Spring and the place of the mountain-top. This is possible because the superior-cum-inferior consciousness is aware of all times (see ĪPK II.6, translated above p.138). Limited knowers who are aware only of the Winter-time will not perceive the flower, but unlimited knowers will eternally see it in its place and time in the Spring.

In this third interpretation, we must note that the flower has no causal efficiency to reflect sunlight, absorb water etc. until it appears in the world of Māyā (corresponding to the inferior level of consciousness). Utpaladeva states at ĪPK.I.82-4:

> "The external presence and absence of Appearances [i.e. their presence and absence for limited cognitions] is an attribute [of these Appearances], not their essence. Therefore they always exist internally.
>
> Effective activity (arthakriyā) is caused by division (bheda), and doesn't occur when these [Appearances] are united with the subject due to internality. It [effective activity] does occur in externality, due to the divisions between different Appearances.

"[But since] Appearances consist of consciousness, they are eternally established within. When they appear externally due to Māyā, they are also established outside."

It is not possible to decide which of the above three interpretations of the Pratyabhijñā view of causation is correct on the basis of these (or indeed any other) verses of the ĪPK. The problem stems from the fact that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta use the term "internal" and "external" in several different senses, and "the subject" (pramātā) can mean consciousness at any of the three levels. We may simply note that the "external" referred to in ĪPK I.84 means "in the world of Māyā", that is, appearing as external in the second sense (as "this") to an <u>inferior</u> level of consciousness and/or as external in the fourth sense (perceived by external faculties) to an inferior level.

Another difficulty in interpretation stems from the ambiguity of the term "Appearance" - it may refer to the complex Appearance which is the particular flower in a particular place, or to a simple universalised Appearance, corresponding to one word such as "flower". It is quite possible that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta mean <u>both</u> kinds of Appearances, for in his Vimarśinī on vs.83, Abhinavagupta gives the following example: Even when the

Appearance of the beloved is external [in the second sense, i.e. appearing as "this" in the mind] if it is not linked with the Appearance of embrace, but linked instead with the Appearance "she is far away" then we see the opposite causal function (arthakriyā) from the previous one of generating joy.

We shall have more to say about this ambiguity connected with the internality and externality of simple and complex Appearances in our conclusion to this Chapter.

Meanwhile let us return to Abhinavagupta's argument concerning the nature of objects in his commentary on ĪPK.I.33.

He has argued that an object must be permanently identical with Illustration, because it is identical with Illustration in cognition. An opponent has claimed that this is not necessary; the object may be different from Illustration before cognition, but its identity with Illustration at the time of cognition may be caused by the individual who perceives it, just as a sprout is caused by a seed.

Abhinavagupta dismisses this argument simply by claiming that "the sprout doesn't derive its identity as a sprout from the seed." We have now seen that according to Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's theory of causation it is the Lord's power of Determination which decides what a sprout shall be, and that it shall be caused by a seed.

The seed is not the real cause, the Lord Śiva is the cause.

Thus there are two possible ways of interpreting Abhinavagupta's "refutation" of his opponent's argument:

A) It may be that Abhinavagupta is simply saying that when a seed performs its causal function, it produces a sprout which exists independently of the seed. Therefore if the individual perceiver caused the object to appear in the same way that a seed causes a sprout, the object would continue to appear after the individual had perceived it.

This seems to be a trivial argument, since although a seed producing a sprout is a standard example of causation, it is by no means the only kind of causation. The opponent may equally give the example of a lamp causing the objects in a dark room to be illuminated, and this illumination ceases when the lamp is removed.

B) The second possible interpretation of Abhinavagupta's remark is that he is claiming that only the universal subject, Śiva, causes objects to Appear, and hence the individual subject cannot cause an object to appear at the time of cognition. Here again, however, Abhinavagupta's argument seems shallow, since it is quite possible that Śiva's power of determination (Niyati-śakti) should determine that objects are only Illustrated

to a particular subject when in the presence of that subject, just as sprouts only appear where there have previously been seeds.

Moreover, there is no necessity that the laws of causation should be defined by a personal God; the Buddhist view that we simply observe regular sequences of events would quite suffice to explain how the Illustration of an object to a subject is regularly accompanied by the presence of that subject.

In his Vimarśinī Abhinavagupta gives no further substantive arguments in support of Utpaladeva's claim in vs.33. He merely reformulates the argument that the object cannot be divided from Illustration in perception, and that the "body" of the object cannot be identified with Illustration.

Thus another objection is raised to the effect that knowledge consists in the Illustration of Objects, hence how could the object be the same (i.e. Illustration) both before and after cognition? Abhinavagupta replies that if knowledge is separate from the object, then it cannot be related to it (cp. his assumption that there must be subject-object identity for there to be subject-object relation). He claims that whether the opponent defines knowledge as "the Illustration of the object" or as "the cause of the Illustration of the object", he (the opponent) will be identifying

Illustration with the body of the object, and there will be the same consequences [a) - g)] outlined before.

Abhinavagupta concludes that an unillustrated object cannot become identified with Illustration, and that therefore the object must be (always) identical with Illustration. Illustration cannot be divided, he claims, any more than different cognitions can be, and he refers us to the argument from memory, that "the everyday world would perish" without the unification performed by Śiva. Therefore, he concludes, Illustration is One (eka eva prakāśa: see our notes on "one" in Chapter One).

We may ask, however, how it is that if the object <u>is</u> identical with Illustration in the way that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta claim, there are not the same consequences that Abhinavagupta listed as occurring if the object's body is identical with Illustration? How is it, for example, that an object identical with universal Illustration does not appear to everyone? If the Pratyabhijñā explanation depends upon the "ignorance of the knower", and the limitations of consciousness caused by identification with the body, senses, etc., then the Pratyabhijñā explanation of limited cognition does not ultimately differ from that of its opponent: particular cognitions must be associated with particular sense-contacts etc.

Indeed, it is consistent with the general metaphysics of the Pratyabhijñā that the Pratyabhijñā view of everyday perception should not differ from the realist view, since Abhinavagupta accepts that in the sphere of construction the Naiyāyika view is correct (see above p.155). But we cannot say that Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's view of everyday cognition as expressed in IPK I.33 and its Vimarśinī gives us convincing evidence that the realist view of cognition is ultimately incorrect, and that all objects are simply Appearances in the consciousness of the one subject.

However, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta do offer some further arguments to show that there is no bāhyārtha, i.e. no object which is completely independent of consciousness. ĪPK I.34 claims:

> "If Illustration were divided [from the object] and undivided [in itself], there would be confusion in the objective sphere. [Therefore] an object capable of being Illustrated is identical with Illustration, and that which is not Illustration is not established"[1]

Utpaladeva's Vṛtti on this verse points out that if Illustration were identical for a pot and a cloth, then we would have no means of distinguishing one from the other. Therefore he concludes, the establishment of

1 bhinne prakāśe cābhinne, saṃkaro viṣayasya tat
prakāśātmā prakāśyo 'rtho, nāprakāśaśca siddhyati

objects (as particulars different from others) depends upon their identity with Illustration.

Comparing this verse with the previous one, we see that for Utpaladeva Illustration must not be separate from the object (bhinne prakāśe.... vs.34), but nor must it be identical with the object's body. On the other hand, ρrakāśa must not be divided (in the sense that it is entirely different for each object, na ca prakāśo bhinnaḥ syāt, vs.33), yet neither must it be completely undivided (in the sense of being completely the same for each object, (bhinne) .....prakāśe cābhinne, vs.34).

Prakāśa is for Utpaladeva a complex unity, and its nature is to be active in taking various forms of limitation upon itself by its power of Attention (svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśam, ĪPK I.42). But the problem for Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta is to establish how this undivided Illustration comes to be divided, or, to put it another way, how is it the same when it takes different forms?

In his introduction to the next verse, Abhinavagupta remarks

> "We have to bring [the opponent] to the conclusion that the one Illustration has Lordly power (aiśvaryam) in the form of the capacity to display all the various forms of the universe in this way, with sequential effects [i.e the diverse

forms of the universe] and non-sequential cause [the eternal Lord] etc.[1] And he [the opponent] will be brought to this conclusion, if other [possible] causes of diversity in Illustration are refuted. In this [view of another possible cause of diversity], the cause of successive diversity in the homogeneous (avicitra) Illustration is an image (pratibimba) and that which is similar to the image [i.e. that which the image is an image of] is the external [sense one above] blue etc. And even if this (external object) is (only) inferred, nevertheless since we decided through direct sense-perception that "this is blue", and since the establishment of pramāṇa [valid knowledge] depends upon direct perception, it [the decision that "this is an external object, blue"] becomes designated as sense perception (pratyakṣa).

He [Utpaladeva] now expounds this external, inferrable, other possible cause [of diversity in Illustration], anticipating what will be said by the exponent of the view that objects are external."[2]

1 Or "with sequential and non-sequential cause and effect relations, etc." i.e. so that sometimes a potter may make a pot, going through the various stages of moulding the clay, baking etc, and at other times a yogi may create a pot immediately by the power of his will.

2 ekasyaiva prakāśasya evaṃbhūtakramākramakāryakāraṇa-bhāvādivicitravaiśvarūpyapradarśanasāmārthyarūpam aiśvaryam iti tāvat paryavasāyayitavyam. taccaivaṃ paryavasyati, yadi prakāśasya vicitrabhāve hetvantaram apakṛtaṃ tatra prakāśasya avicitrasya krameṇa vicitratā-kāraṇaṃ pratibimbātmakaṃ, tatpratibimbasajātīyaṃ yat tadeva nīladirūpaṃ bāhyaṃ, tacca yadyapi anumeyaṃ, tathāpi idaṃ nīlamiti pratyakṣeṇa adhyavasāyāt adhyavasāyaprāṇita-tvācca pramāṇasthiteḥ pratyakṣavyapadeśyaṃ bhaviṣyati. bāhyārthavādikathitamiti hetvantaram anumīyamānaṃ bāhyarūpam āśaṅkyamānatvena pradarśayati.

The two ĪPK verses which follow are a criticism by the Sautrāntika Buddhist, who believes in the external object, of the view of the Vijñānavādin Buddhist, who does not. The Sautrāntika points out that if consciousness is homogenous (the ālayavijñāna), then we cannot explain the difference between consciousness of pot and consciousness of cloth (see ĪPK I.34). If the Vijñānavādin claims the differences in consciousness are caused by the excitation of different vāsanās (latent impressions in consciousness), then the problem of diversity remains, since what will be the cause of the excitation of different vāsanās? The Sautrāntika therefore holds that the diversity in consciousness must be caused by a diversity of objects which are external to it and whose images appear in it.

Utpaladeva's response to this realist argument is:

> "This may be so. (But) since worldly affairs are decided upon the basis of those Appearances [alone], what is the use of an irrelevant additional external object?" ĪPK.I.37.

In his Vimarśinī on this verse, Abhinavagupta comments that "This may be so" (syādetat) implies a "But" (kiṃtu), suggesting that the opponent's hypothesis will appear weak in the light of the following (pratyabhijñā) view. If understood in the above way, the verse is two

sentences, the first admitting that the opponent could be correct, the second suggesting that there is a better view.

Abhinavagupta notes that "syādetat" may also be taken as one sentence with the rest of the verse. Thus it will not be a commentary on the opponent's view, but will mean "But this [following Pratyabhijñā view] could also be true:" etc.

He continues:

> "You [the Sautrāntika Buddhist] can achieve nothing by these [external objects], with this accursed conception which establishes external objects. For worldly affairs are established simply by those Appearances which are accepted by you. Since no worldly affair is carried on with something which is always inferred [and never directly perceived], what use is the external (object), for which there is no valid means of knowledge which establishes it (sādhakaṃ pramāṇam), and for which there is [a valid means of knowledge] which denies [its] existence. The principal [valid means of knowledge which refutes the external object's existence] is that something which is divided from Illustration cannot be Illustrated even as an inferrable."[1]

1 anayāpi kaṣṭakalpanayā bāhyān arthān prasādhayatā bhavatā taiḥ na kiṃcit kartavyam, ābhāsaireva taiḥ bhavatā abhyupagataiḥ vyavahārasiddheḥ, na hi nityānumeyena kaścit vyavahāra iti kiṃ bāhyena, yatra sādhakaṃ ca nāsti pramāṇam bādhakaṃ ca prakāśat bhede anumeyatayāpi prakāśanābhāva iti tāvat mukhyaṃ.

This principal objection against the inference of an external object is also expressed by Utpaladeva in ĪPK.I.39-40:

> "The inference of something which has not previously appeared is unacceptable. The senses do appear, because of the Appearance of the entities which are causes such as seeds. 39
>
> But the Appearance of an object which was external to Appearance[1] has never ocurred in any way, therefore there can be no establishment of this [external object] by inference." 40

The meaning of the second of these two verses is clear. But the remark about the senses needs clarification. Abhinavagupta's Vimarśinī on this verse notes that the opponent may object that we infer the existence of the senses as one of the causes of perception, but that the senses do not appear as objects in direct perception (pratyakṣa); they are only "perceived in general form (sāmānyato dṛṣṭa)"

Abhinavagupta replies that the conceptual inference of the senses does not reveal them as objects with a particular form, but it does reveal them as the cause of the cognition of something, and we see the characteristic (svabhāva) of being the cause of something (kāraṇatā) in direct perception (pratyakṣa). He gives the examples of the cloth being caused by the threads, and the sprout by the seed.

1 i.e. Illustration, prakāśa.

Abhinavagupta then refers us to the discussion of pramāṇa at ĪPK II.16 (see above, p.71 ff.) and repeats that a mere[1] Appearance is a universal (ābhāsamātraṃ sāmānyam). Thus the Appearance of "cause without qualifications" (kāraṇābhāso viśeṣaśūnyaḥ ĪPKV I.p.189) is known from direct perception.

Thus Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta reason that since the senses are inferred to exist as "causes", and since "causes" are known to exist from direct perception, we are therefore justified in inferring the existence of the senses, even though they do not appear as objects of direct perception.

However, the argument could equally well be used by the opponent who wishes to infer the existence of the external object of perception. Since Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta accept that the senses Appear in a "universal form" (sāmānyatā, i.e. as "causes", without particular objective form), the same analysis may be said to apply to the external object, i.e. that it appears, albeit in a universal form, in direct perception as the "cause" of diversity. Indeed this view, that the external object may be said to be perceived in pratyakṣa, is attributed to the opponent by Abhinavagupta at ĪPKV I.34 (see above p.180).

1 i.e. an Appearance corresponding to one word only, unconnected with space, time etc. See above p.73

The supplementary reasons that Abhinavagupta gives for denying the existence of the external object (abhyuccayabādhaka ĪPK I p.178, see above p.39) are all based upon the notion that an inert object cannot have contradictory qualities[1]. Thus, for example, he claims that the whole (avayavī) object postulated by the Naiyāyika cannot exist, because the one whole would have to be related to many parts, and the Naiyāyika view of relation (samavāya) as an independent category cannot be established. (There would be the same problem as to how the "inert" objective category of samavāya could be related to the whole and the many parts, etc.)

However, even if the opponent accepts Abhinavagupta's arguments that the external object cannot be inferred and is not only unnecessary, but also impossible to adequately explain, the Pratyabhijñāvāda still needs to account for the diversity in Illustration. If it is not caused by external objects, what is it caused by?

Utpaladeva replies to this question at ĪPK.1.38:

> "For it is indeed God, whose essence is consciousness, who by the power of His will causes the external Illustration of the entire collection of objects which is established within Him, [and He does this] like a yogi, without material cause."[2]

1 See above pp.105 and 107

2 cidātmaiva hi devo 'ntaḥsthitamicchāvaśādbahiḥ
yogīva nirupādānamarthajātaṃ prakāśayet

It is worth quoting Abhinavagupta's Vimarśinī on this verse in full:

> "Now although there is the possibility in this case [the manifestation of objects by consciousness] that the diversity of the Appearances of blue etc. in dreams, memories, imagination, conceptualisation etc. occurs quite apart from any external cause of its production [the cause being in consciousness alone] still [the opponent] may have doubts [about the ability of consciousness to produce diversity], thinking "That diversity in Appearances is impermanent, not common to all perceivers, and may possibly arise [simply] from latent impressions of previous experiences, hence it is unreal."
>
> But in this creation of a diversity of cities, armies etc. which we see, and which is due to the mere will of Yogi's - here there is absolutely no possibility of [its diversity] consisting of the diversity of the well known [material causes of such cities and armies, viz.] clay, wood, semen, blood etc. Nor can one say that the omnipresent ultimate atoms [paramāṇu, the constituents of the bāhyārtha of the nyāyavaiśeṣika theory] instantaneously come together and form themselves into the effect [the cities etc.] by the will of the Yogi, because this [nyāyavaiśeṣika explanation of Yogic creation] is formulated in order to establish that the nature of causation well-established in the world is not abandoned [in Yogic creation].[1]

"But it is not well-established that a gross pot etc. is generated simply by (ultimate) atoms. Rather, [it is generated] through the intermediary stages of a bowl etc., and even in these intermediary stages specific accessory causes are required, such as the operation of the hands and feet,[1] connection with particular place, time, duty and capacity (of the potter), and excellence of instruction and practice. If in creating a pot a yogi resorted to all those things, forming a pot after first acquiring the entire collection of causes which are well-established [as neccessary] for the potter, then he [the yogi] would just be a potter. Therefore, if the yogi abandons the well-established causes [when he makes a pot], what is the point of worrying about other material causes such as the untenable ultimate atoms?

In this matter [of magic creation] it is the consciousness of the yogi which has such a power that it causes a collection of objects, in the form of a diversity of Appearances, to be Illustrated. Therefore it is possible that it is consciousness whose Autonomy you [the opponent] have accepted [in the case of the yogi's creation] which causes the (entire) collection of objects which exists within it to appear as "this", i.e. external to the life-breath, intellect, body etc. which are endowed with only limited consciousness, [and it is consciousness which does this] by the power of its special will which is unobstructed and which never leaves [consciousness], being nothing more than the essence of consciousness.[2]

...../cont.

1 The feet move the pedal which rotates the potter's wheel.

2 na ca etat prasiddhaṃ - paramāṇubhya eva sthūlaṃ ghaṭādi jāyate iti, kiṃ tu kapālādivyavadhānena, tatrāpi niyatasahakārisamavalambanaṃ karacaraṇādivyāpāro viśiṣṭadeśakāladharmādhipatyayogaḥ śikṣābhyāsaprakarṣa iti, iyati ca āsrīyamāṇe yogī kumbhaṃ nirmimaṇaḥ kumbhakāra-prasiddhasamastasāmagrīsamarjanapuraḥsaraṃ ghaṭaṃ ghaṭayan kumbhakāra eva syāt, tasmāt prasiddhakāraṇollaṅghane kim asaṃcetyamānaparamāṇvādyupādānakāraṇāntaracintayā iti. tatra yogisaṃvida eva sā tādṛśī śaktiḥ - yat ābhāsavaicitryarūpam arthajātaṃ prakāśayati iti. tat asti saṃbhavaḥ - yat saṃvit eva abhyupagatasvātantryā apratighātalakṣaṇāt icchāviśeṣavaśāt saṃvido 'nadhikātmatāyā anapāyāt antaḥsthitameva sat bhāvajātam idamityevaṃ prāṇabuddhidehādeḥ vitīrṇakiyanmātrasaṃvid-rūpāt bāhyatvena ābhāsayati iti,

"[Since this is possible:] Why not accept what is established by one's own experience, that there is autonomy of consciousness in the (creation of the) diversity of Appearances in the universe? Why exhaust oneself by the effort of searching for another cause?

By "indeed" (eva)[1] (Utpaladeva) expresses the following: "For the consciousness which establishes objects is pre-established,[2] and cannot be denied by any disputant". And this [consciousness] is indeed Autonomous [as Utpaladeva implies] since consciousness is designated [in this verse] by the word "Deva" (God), hence why this addiction to a search for an inferior cause ["apakāraṇa" This may also mean "something which causes injury or offence", hence "Why this addiction to a search for an affront [to the dignity of God, viz. the external object"].

"Hi" (For)[1] means "because it is possible that God causes Illustration in this way, then what use is the irrelevant external object?", [so this word reveals] the connection with the previous [verse]."[3]

Thus Utpaladeva's explanation of the multiplicity of the world is that if a yogi can create permanent multiplicity by magic, so can Śiva. The Pratyabhijñā

1 Quotation from ĪPK I.38

2 Known already from our experience of yogic creation, the production of objects in dreams, etc.

3 tat iha viśvarūpābhāsavaicitrye cidātmana eva svātantryaṃ kiṃ na abhyupagamyate svasaṃvedanasidddhaṃ kimiti hetvantaraparyeṣaṇāprayāsena khidyate. evakāreṇa idamāha - sarveṇa tāvat vādinā viṣayavyavasthāpanaṃ saṃvidrūpam anapahnavanīyam ādisiddhaṃ hi tat iti uktam. tasya ca svātantryameva devaśabdanirdiṣṭaṃ cidrūpatvam iti kim apakāraṇānveṣaṇavyasanitayā. hi yasmāt evaṃ prakāśayati deva iti saṃbhāvyate, tasmāt kiṃ bāhyena anupapattinā, iti pūrveṇa saṃbandhaḥ.

argument that there is no object external to consciousness[1] depends, therefore, upon three things: a) the Sautrantika Buddhist refutation of the Vijñānavādin Buddhist, b) the Sautrāntika's acceptance of a multiplicity of Appearances, and c) that the Sautrāntika, and indeed the protagonists of all the major schools of classical Indian philosophy, accepts that a yogi can create an entire city together with armies etc. by his will-power.

We have seen that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta do not define with any precision the nature of objects when not in human perception. Passages such as ĪPK I.77-79 tell us that Appearances do not change whether in or out of perception:

> "Thus the everyday world, whether pure or impure [i.e. experienced by the enlightened or ignorant man] is experienced in the Lord, who is adorned with the Appearances of objects separated from each other. 77
>
> It is simply that in some cases, these Appearances rely upon being present to the senses [of a particular subject] at a particular time, whereas in other cases, as in blindness and darkness, they do not. 78
>
> But there is never any difference in the existence of the Appearance of the object, whether it is conceived of as connected with a past, present or future object." 79

1 Sense One above

But the problem remains as to what these Appearances are when they are not perceived by individuals. We have seen that an individual Appearance corresponds to one word only (above p.73), and that a particular object such as a table is a unification of Appearances (ibid). Moreover, we can deduce from our examination of the Pratyabhijñā view of causation that although it is the individual who classifies a complex Appearance according to his taste or purpose, (ĪPK II.18, translated above p.72), in fact it is always the Lord who performs all actions, and His consciousness that creates all unifications and distinctions between Appearances.

Thus although it is possible that Śiva creates unifications between limited Appearances idependently of human perception, (and therefore that complete tables exist apart from human perception), there is evidence to suggect that this is <u>not</u> Abhinavagupta's view. His Vimarśinī on ĪPK.I.74 suggests rather that the only sense in which an object exists apart from human perception is that the constituent Appearances, each corresponding to one word, exist eternally like universals, and that the Lord only combines them into complex objects when they appear in human perception. Abhinavagupta states:

> "In such cases as "I see this blue," "I conceive of (it)", "I imagine (it)", "I remember (it)", "I make (it)", "I know (it)", etc. this Appearance of blue is in itself (svarūpato) neither more nor less [in each case]. Similarly, the (Appearance) "I see", when connected to "yellow" etc., [is neither more nor less]. But when these Appearances are united and separated by the Lord's Autonomy, then there is this worldly [distinction between] clarity and unclarity etc. When the Appearance of "blue" is separated from other Appearances of "I imagine" etc., and is conjoined with the Appearance of "I see", then there is worldly clarity. In this way the diversity of the three worldly times arises.[1] But when the Appearances are within Paramaśiva's own form, there is no division anywhere, nor is there conjunction with anything."

This does not <u>necessarily</u> imply that Abhinavagupta believes that all complex Appearances dissolve into the state of neither union nor division from each other when they are not perceived by a human individual. Because "Paramaśiva" represents consciousness at the superior level, and we have seen that there is no object which is even external in sense <u>two</u> at this level of consciousness (above, pp.149-150). It is possible that in the final sentence of the above passage Abhinavagupta is contrasting the objects which appear in a particular perception with objects which do not exist in the world (such as pots before the potter makes them). But it is

1 Presumably, the present is the most clear, the past less so and the future least clear.

also possible that he is contrasting the nature of an object in perception with the nature of the same object not in perception, and this would lead to the view that the object dissolves into Paramaśiva's awareness when not perceived by an individual.

The problem for the Utpaladeva in explaining the multiplicity of the world is that given his view that reality is in fact only one, Śiva, multiplicity must somehow be caused by Śiva. We noted above (pp.171-173) that there are three possible ways of interpreting the Pratyabhijñā view of causation in the light of its theory of the creation of objects, and that we could make no definite decision as to which of these interpretations was correct, due to the ambiguity of the terms "Appearance" (one word /sentence) "external and internal" (four kinds) and "subject" (individual/Śiva).

There are correspondingly three possible interpretations of Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's statements concerning the nature of the objects when not perceived by an individual.

1) The "object" exists only in the superior level of consciousness. Here there are in fact no complete objects, such as particular tables, only Appearances which are neither joined with nor separated from each other. Thus the complex object may be said to dissolve into the immaterial consciousness of Paramaśiva.

As we noted above (p.150) the way in which objects are within Śiva's awareness, in which no object such as a particular table exists, may be compared to the way in which the English language is contained in the awareness of a silent Englishman. Each Appearance corresponds to one word, and just as the words of the English language do not appear distinctly as separate from each other in our Englishman's (let us call him Peter) head, similarly the Appearances in Śiva's awareness are not distinct from each other. Yet neither can it be said that the words in Peter's awareness are conjoined with each other. Indeed, each word gains its individual meaning by being distinguished from other words, and even when Peter is not speaking about giraffes, we may said that the distinction between the word "giraffe" and the word "bicycle" is not lost in his awareness.

But when Peter actually speaks, and says "a giraffe cannot possibly ride a bicycle" the meanings of various words are combined to give a complete and meaningful sentence. We may compare this linguistic combination[1] with the combination by Śiva of various

1 Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta do not enter into detailed discussion of the nature of language. We must note, however, that they may accept Bhartṛhari's view, that words do not have individual meanings as distinct from sentences. The present analogy must be understood in terms of a view of language that claims that individual words have individual meanings.

Appearances in a worldly perception such as "I see this table". The Appearances are conjoined into a particular svalakṣaṇa appearing in an individual's awareness, and are here clearly distinguished from other Appearances, such as "I remember", "red" and "pot".

2) The second possible interpretation of Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's statements about the existence of Appearances when not perceived by individuals is as follows: The Appearances of shape, size, colour, space and time which form a table are all "external" in the second sense when not perceived by an individual, because they are perceived by consciousnesses at the superior-cum-inferior level. But they are not combined by a particular perception into a svalakṣaṇa.

If this were the case, the constituent Appearances of a non-perceived table would be quite distinct from each other, and those of shape and size would not be associated with any colour or place or time. According to this interpretation also, there are, therefore, no objects in the normal sense of complete tables etc, except when individuals perceive them.

3) It would also be consistent with Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's statements to state the following: As

long as Śiva maintains the universe in existence, he manifests diversity by His power of construction (Māyā). And as long as there are individual subjects, the power of construction is in operation. Thus as long as at least one limited subject is perceiving one limited object, all the complex objects of the universe in their particular places and times will be in existence. The unification of Appearances necessary to constitute particular objects from universal Appearances will be performed by Śiva, through his Power of Determination (Niyatiśakti),[1] thus complex objects such as tables will always be external in the fourth sense, in as much as they will always be capable of being perceived by the external sense-faculties of a limited subject who is in their vicinity, and they will be capable of performing their effective actions (see ĪPK I.82-4, translated above p.172-173).

We may repeat that if it is not the case that complex objects remain "external" (sense two) when they are not perceived by limited individuals, then a pot which contains water will only be able to do so when limited subjects perceive it, and both the pot and water will dissolve into individual Appearances when not perceived by limited individuals.

1 See ĪPKV II p.116, translated below p.222

It is, as I have said, impossible to say which of these interpretations is correct - there are passages which might be cited in support of all three of them. I believe that this imprecision in the Pratyabhijñā view of objectivity derives from the fact that Utpaladeva's view is a combination and adaptation of two radically different views.

The first is that of a dualist Śaivism, which asserts that there is a hierarchy of tattvas, and that there is in fact an "external object" in the first sense, because Śiva is only the efficient but not material cause of the universe. In this sense, not only the dualist Śaiva tattvakrama but also the Pratyabhijñā tattvakrama is simply a development of the dualist Sāṃkhya view, that a conscious self becomes aware of an independent (external) unconscious object in perception.

The second view which is incorporated into Utpaladeva's doctrines concerning objectivity is that of a Buddhist pluralism, deriving ultimately from the Vijñānavāda. But Utpaladeva adapts the terms svalakṣaṇa and ābhāsa to his own metaphysical view, treating the svalakṣaṇa as a unification of multiple ābhāsas (see above, p.72), and the ābhāsa as an Appearance resulting from Śiva's activity of manifestation. Moreover,

Utpaladeva uses the word ābhāsa in his system to cover simple phenomena described by one word, complex svalakṣaṇas, particular causal effects[1] and even cognitive activities.[2]

Utpaladeva attempts to reconcile these two views by adding a third metaphysical model, that of Illustration and Attention. The tattvakrama may be explained using the prakāśavimarśa terminology, by describing the increasing limitations of consciousness in the lower categories in terms of a contraction (saṃkoca) caused by autonomous Attention.[3] The problem with this is that whereas in the dualist conception of the creation of the world, the evolved objects are independent of the particular consciousnesses which cognise them, according to Utpaladeva's Illustration/Attention explanation, the created objects only exist because of the particularisation of consciousness, and since contracted consciousness is by definition individual consciousness associated with a body, mind etc., the problem arises as

1 See ĪPKV I p.330 "arthakriyābhāso 'pi ca ābhāsāntaram eva"

2 See Vimarśinī on ĪPK I.74, translated above p.191

3 Since prakāśa may be equated with avabhāsa, and the tattvas may be explained as combinations of particular Appearances, formed by Niyatiśakti, an aspect of the Lord's Autonomy which is vimarśa. (See ĪPKV II p.116, translated below p.222, and ĪPK I.44, translated above p.67)

to how objects can exist when not perceived by individuals.

Utpaladeva seeks the solution in the theory of Appearances, which are universals, and always exist "within" consciousness even when not perceived externally.

We have seen that when refuting the Sautrāntika theory of the inferability of external objects, Abhinavagupta remarks that "worldly affairs are established by those Appearances alone, which are accepted by you" (ābhāsaireva taiḥ bhavatā abhyupagataiḥ vyavahāra-siddheḥ ĪPKV I p.178). The problem here is that whereas for the Buddhist the diversity of Appearances is beginningless, since the diversity of external objects is beginningless, the non-dualist Utpaladeva has to find a cause for the diversity of Appearances. And he cannot explain how a multiplicity of Appearances may exist in a completely non-divided consciousness.

Once again, Utpaladeva cannot rely on the Illustration/Attention model, since we have seen that Illustration "cannot be divided" (ĪPK.I.33, see above p.157), and particular vimarśas are always associated with particular subjects.

Moreover, given that for Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta the simple Appearances are "like universals", and must be combined together to form complex objects, there is another problem as to how the particular

unifications are formed. If there are no unifications apart from those of the svalakṣaṇa in the individual's perception, then there are no particular tables when no-one is perceiving them. But if there are complex Appearances apart from individuals' perceptions, then there will be svalakṣaṇas, which Utpaladeva regards as complex individual Appearances in consciousness, without limited consciousnesses. Thus once again the Illustration/Attention model fails to bridge the gap between realism and idealism.

We may conclude, then, that it is indeed necessary for Utpaladeva to explain the existence of permanent objects as a magical creation by God.

Chapter Seven

Relations: Do they Exist?

"From now on, I'll describe the cities to you", the Khan had said, "in your journeys you will see if they exist."

But the cities visited by Marco Polo were always different from those thought of by the emperor.

"And yet I have constructed in my mind a model city from which all possible cities can be deduced", Kublai said. "It contains everything corresponding to the norm. Since the cities that exist diverge in varying degree from the norm, I need only foresee the exceptions to the norm and calculate the most probable combinations."

"I have also thought of a model city from which I deduce all the others", Marco answered. "It is a city made only of exceptions, exclusions, incongruities, contradictions. If such a city is the most improbable, by reducing the number of elements, we increase the probability that the city really exists. So I have only to subtract exceptions from my model, and in whatever direction I proceed, I will arrive at one of the cities which, always as an exception, exist. But I cannot force my operation beyond a certain limit: I would achieve cities too probable to be real."

Italo Calvino

Utpaladeva's affinity with his opponent, the Buddhist Dharmakīrti, is even more clearly evident in his treatment of relations (saṃbandha). The topic of relations is particularly important for Utpaladeva, since as we have seen, his proof of the existence of self rests upon the theory that the self unifies diverse cognitions

in memory. Moreover Utpaladeva uses the term "relation" in a very broad sense, to cover all instances of division-in-non-division, (bhedābheda) or unity-in-diversity (ekānekatā), and in this sense the relation between the diverse Appearances that, for Utpaladeva, form a particular object, is also a "saṃbandha", an instance of unity-in-diversity.

Abhinavagupta states in his Vivṛtivimarśinī[1] introducing ĪPK.II.12:

> "Thus it is established that there is indeed a conventional reality (saṃvṛtisattvam) to the universals (sāmānya) etc. which appear in the conceptual notions of the everyday world (saṃvṛtau vikalpabuddhau); we have shown that they are not unreal, like the two moons etc. In this matter [i.e. in the various relations in action, universal etc], consciousness manifests itself in the following manner: [genitive case-] relation, universal etc. are all displayed by the [Lord's] power of action (kriyāśakti), characterised by Autonomy and Attention. And in all these cases, their real form (tāttvikaṃ rūpaṃ) is relation, defined as unity in diversity, but when this [general form of relation] is acompanied by another unique form, it is given another name. [Thus] the relation whose essence is the unity of a group of many particulars to which it is possible to apply a certain designation such as "cows", is given the name "universal".[2] .../cont.

1 Vol.III p.51

2 evamiyatā saṃvṛtau vikalpabuddhau sphurataḥ sāmānyādeḥ saṃvṛtisattvaṃ nama sattvaviśeṣa eva avatiṣṭhate, na dvicandrādivadasatyateti upapāditaṃ. tatra ayamavataraṇakramaḥ saṃvidaḥ - sarvamidaṃ svātantryāmarśanalakṣaṇāyāḥ kriāśaktervijṛmbhitaṃ yat saṃbandhasāmānyādi. tatrāpi saṃbandharūpataiva anekaikarūpatālakṣaṇa sarvatra tāttvikaṃ rūpaṃ tatra tu asàdhāraṇarūpāntarayoge nāmāntaram. anekavyaktigrāmasya yā ai kyātmā saṃbandhaḥ, tatra gāva iti vyapadeśāntara-sahiṣṇutvaṃ [delete semi-colon] tatra sāmānyavācoyuktir[,]

"[Likewise] we use the term "action" due to the force of the designation "it is reverberating" (spandate), [i.e.] when there is a series of numerous moments which are unified in a single substratum. We use the term "whole" (dravya) when there is a unity of threads such that we can say "this is a cloth", and when there is a unification of the stages of childhood [youth, adulthood] etc. [the stages of a man's life], we speak conventionally of an "incumbent" [avasthātṛ, i.e. the individual self who passes through three stages[1]]. Likewise in other cases. But [in all these cases] we speak of relation in exactly the same way, since the application of a different designation has no effect. Everything that goes beyond the meaning of a noun-stem [i.e. everything other than a simple Appearance corresponding to one word] is in fact a relation.

Therefore [Utpaladeva] says in his [first verse of the] Saṃbandhasiddhi:

"The affairs of the world, which are accomplished with the aid of all those things which bear relation whose essence is division in non-division ..... [are the activity of that Śiva whom we praise due to His will]"[2]

[and this same idea is expressed] even by the propounders of separate universals when they accept the relation of inherence (samavāya) according to [the dictum] "Relation favours.."[3], or [when they accept] something favoured (anugṛhīta) by relation. And relation,[4]../cont.

1 We shall discuss the full implications of this remark below, p.251.

2 The latter part of the verse is not quoted here by Abhinavagupta. Compare IPK II.15 (translated above, p.102)

3 Quotation from Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya, saṃbandha-samuddeśa vs.11

4 anekakṣaṇapravāhe āśrayabalādekībhavati spandate iti vyapadeśabalāt kriyāvyavahāraḥ, tantūnāmaikye paṭo 'yamiti dravyavyvahāraḥ, bālyādyavasthānāmaikye avasthātṛ-vyavahāraḥ. evamanyatra. vyapadeśāntaragranthivandhyatāyāṃ tu nirviśeṣa saṃbandhābhāsaiva, prātipadikārthāt tu yadatiriktaṃ bhāte, tat saṃbandha eva sarvam. tata eva

"bhedābhedātmasaṃbandhasahasarvārthasādhita
lokayātrā....."

iti uktaṃ saṃbandhasiddhau bhinnasāmānyavādibhirapi samavāyasya saṃbandhasya "anugṛhnāti saṃbandhaḥ" iti nityā saṃbandhena vā anugṛhītasya aṅgīkāraṇāt. saṃbandhaśca ....

"consisting of unity-in-diversity, is due to the greatness of the power of action whose essence is the autonomy of the subject. Therefore it is relation which is the basis of the establishment [or "proof", siddhi] of the unity of the subject, since it is stated [in Vijñānabhairava Tantra vs.106]:

> "[The consciousness of subject and object is the same for all embodied beings, but yogi's have this distinction, that they have] awareness of relation"[1]

It is clear, then, how important relations are to the Pratyabhijñā metaphysics. But there are two further points we must note in connection with Abhinavagupta's above statement.

First, Utpaladveva uses the term "saṃbandha" in a general sense to cover all kinds of relations, but also in a specific sense, when it refers to the relation expressed by the genitive case. The tradition of Sanskrit grammarians recognises three types of relation 1) The word-meaning relation (the subject of the saṃbandha-samuddeśa of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya[2]), 2) the Kāraka

1 ekānekatāmayaḥ pramātṛsvātantryātmakakriyāśakti-mahimnā. tataḥ saṃbandha eva pramātraikyasiddhau mūlam,
"[grāhyagrāhakatāsaṃvittiḥ sāmānya sarvadehināṃ
yogināṃ tu viśeṣo 'yaṃ,] saṃbandhe sāvadhānatā"
ityukteh.

(Abhinavagupta quotes only the last two words of the Vijñānabhairava verse).

2 This relation is not discussed independently by Utpaladeva in his SS.

relations, between the elements of an action[1], and 3) all other kinds of relation, which are expressed by the genitive case.[2]

The second point to note is that when Abhinavagupta remarks that the unity of the subject is established by relations, and that it is an awareness of relations which distinguishes the yogi's (superior-cum-inferior)[3] consciousness, this must be understood in the light of Utpaladeva's statements about relations in the three levels of consciousness. He says on p.6 of S.S.:

> "There is the existence of the category of Relation only in the realm of construction which predominantly consists of division and non-appearance of non-division. But in the essence (ātmā) of the universe there is only full unity and no kind of Relation. There may sometimes be a Relation in a secondary sense, at the superior-cum-inferior level, in so far as it concerns the inferior aspect."[4]

1 Referred to as a specific category of relation in ĪPK II.14

2 e.g. the relation between a man and king expressed in "the king's man" (rājño puruṣaḥ). This is what Utpaladeva means by saṃbandha when he uses the term in a narrow sense.

3 The Vijñānabhairava quotation refers to "embodied beings" (dehinām). There is no external (sense two above) object such as a body in the superior level of consciousness, nor are there any relations (see below).

4 "māyādaśāyāmevākhyātibhedapradhānāyāṃ saṃbandha-padārthasadbhāvaḥ, viśvātmatāyām punaḥ pūrṇaikataiva na tu saṃbandhārthaḥ kaścit. tatrāpi kadācitparāparādaśāyām-aparabhāgāpekṣaṇādgauṇavṛttyā saṃbandhārthaḥ saṃbhavet"

As we have seen, Utpaladeva defines Relation as a "unity in diversity", thus since there is no diversity in the superior level of consciousness, there is no relation. In the superior-cum-inferior state, when the yogi realises "I am this universe", there is primarily unity between subject and object, but in a secondary sense there may be said to be diversity, since the yogi apprehends the universe in two ways, both by the parāmarśa[1] "aham" and by the parāmarśa "idam". The relation between these two Apprehensions is one of sāmānādhikaraṇyam ; they have the same locus, the universe.

In the inferior level of consciousness, diversity predominates, but there are also unifications between Appearances and individual cognitions, since without these the everyday world could not function.

Thus when Abhinavagupta quotes the Vijñānabhairava as saying that yogic consciousness is distinguished by the awareness of relation, we must understand this to mean in the context of the Pratyabhijñā that yogis are aware of the particular relation of "identity of locus" between the Apprehension of "I" and the Apprehension of "this (universe)". The "careful attention" (sāvadhānatā) which constitutes the yogi's awareness of relations is, therefore, an awareness of the unity underlying all relations, which is evidence of the one unifying consciousness.

We have seen that Utpaladeva's major opponent in the $\bar{I}$PK is a Buddhist who argues that the self as knower, rememberer, or agent is merely a conceptual construct (kalpitaḥ). Since Utpaladeva is seeking to prove the existence of the self by demonstrating its necessity as the producer of unity in the various forms of relation necessary for the conduct of the everyday world, it is therefore also important to prove that these relations themselves are not mere conceptual constructs.

The section of Utpaladeva's Kārikās devoted to relations begins:

> "The notions of action, Relation, Universal, whole, space and time are real (satyāḥ), since they are persistent and useful. They are based upon unity and multiplicity."[1] $\bar{I}$PK.II.9

and ends

> "Thus a knower who wishes to perform a certain function achieves his aim with the aid of something united in diversity, hence this is not an illusion."[2] $\bar{I}$PK II.15

Abhinavagupta's commentary on the latter verse characterises the distinction between real and unreal things as follows:

1 kriyāsaṃbandhasāmānyadravyadikkālabuddhayaḥ
satyāḥ sthairyopayogābhyāmekānekāśrayā matāḥ

2 evamevārthasiddhiḥ syānmāturarthakriyārthinaḥ
bhedābhedavatārthena tena na bhrāntirīdṛśī

"The existence of phenomena (bhāva) cannot be [defined in terms of] "relation to existence"[1] because this [definition] is too narrow,[2] and has the faults of infinite regression and meaninglessness, etc.[3] Nor can existence be [defined in terms of] "effective action" (arthakriyā) because this is quite different [from existence]. Nor can it be "the performance of effective action", because we don't always see the [existent object] entering into the performance of effective action, for as [Utpaladeva] states "effective action is not innate to objects"[4]. Moreover, we know that an object performs an effective action by positive and negative

1 This probably refers to the Vaiśeṣika view that the categories (padārtha) of substance, quality and action are inherently related to existence (sattāsamavāyin). "sad iti yato dravyo guṇakarmasu sā sattā" Vaiśeṣikasūtras 1.ii.7

2 Pdt. M.K. Shastri, the editor of the KSTS edition of IPKVV vol.II explains this as follows: if a pot is not related to existence before it is created by the potter then it would be as equally non-existent as a hare's horn, etc. And if this is the case, then hare's-horn etc. would be equally capable of becoming existent. Abhinavagupta argues that the definition of existence must somehow account for the difference between phenomena which are capable of becoming existent [and therefore must be capable of being included in the definition of existence] and those which are not. The definiton "relation to existence" is therefore too narrow because it doesn't include pots etc before their creation.

3 Pdt. M.K.Shastri explains this as the alternative if pots etc. are said to be related to existence before they are created. He does not expand upon this remark, but I interpret Abhinavagupta as claiming that if one says that "only those things exist which are related to existence", we may ask which things are related to existence, and the reply will be "those that exist now or might exist in future", i.e. a meaningless, circular definition.

4 Quotation from ĪPK II.27, where Utpaladeva argues that only the Lord's will determines which effective actions will be associated with which objects and whether an object performs an effective action or not ("tatkāritvaṃ hi yasmāt īśvarecchayā niyataṃ bhavane cābhavane", Vimarśinī) and that therefore an object is not different in itself whether it is performing effective action or not.

"concomitance, whose essence is perception and non-perception[1], hence in the absence of perception (of the performance of effective action) even an existent [object] would be unperceived.[2]

> Nor can it [existence] be [defined as] the capacity to cause effective action, because at the time of decision [i.e. inference that this is so] it is difficult to know whether this [capacity] is present in existent or non-existent things.[3] And

1 i.e. when we perceive A, we perceive B, and when we do not perceive A, we do not perceive B. Thus we infer that the effective action of A is to produce B.

2 We may say, if existence were equivalent to the performance of effective action, we could not perceive a seed which was not producing a sprout, even if it existed.

But it seems to me that Abhinavagupta's argument here includes a criticism of the view that an objects's effective action is simply to cause its own perception. Because Abhinavagupta may ask how one could know that a thing always causes knowledge when it exists? We could establish this only if we perceived the object existing and simultaneously experienced knowledge of the object, and failed to perceive the object's existence when there was no experience of knowledge of the object. But when there was no experience of knowledge of the object, then even if the object were existing we would not perceive it, hence it is impossible to establish the negative concomitance, of "no existence" and "not causing perception" necessary for the definition of existence as "causing perception". See also Abhinavagupta's next argument, that the capacity for performing effective action is "difficult to know".

3 i.e. this definition should be based upon the fact that A) we perceive the capacity to perform effective action when we perceive existent objects and B) that we do not perceive the capacity to perform effective action when we do not perceive existent objects. But if the object's existence is constituted by its <u>capacity</u> to cause knowledge of itself, rather than the actual causing of knowledge of itself, it would be impossible to establish A), because there may be an infinite number of entities which have the capacity to cause knowledge of themselves, but are not doing so at the time of our inference, and yet are still existent. It would also be impossible to establish B), because again when we do not percieve existent objects, we cannot know that there is no capacity to produce cognition which is simply not being utilised at that time. Note that Ahinavagupta's arguments here are a development of the idea expressed by Utpaladeva in APS vs.8 (see above p.42 and pp.46-47).

> "since all these [relation to existence, effective action etc.] are not Illustrated, they are like the horns of a man. And there is an infinite regress in the search for some other form of effective action [as the definition of existence], therefore it is simply the fact of being Illustrated which is the existence of a phenomenon [provided this fact of being Illustrated] reverberates in the Attention appropriate to it without being uprooted. And relation etc. in the form of division in non-division do possess this [fact of being Illustrated]. Therefore without any doubt they have existence."

To exist, then, is to be Illustrated without the appropriate form of Attention being uprooted. This "uprooting" is the realisation that what previously appeared to exist did not in fact exist, and is associated with false perceptions such as the perception of silver where there is in fact mother-of-pearl. Utpaladeva states at ĪPK.II.28

> "Even when there is only Attention to silver, there is no establishment of silver in the mother-of-pearl, due to the lack of correspondence with the attributed place. Even in the [case of] two moons, the sky is otherwise [than the perceiver thinks]."

Abhinavagupta has the following comments to make on this verse in his Vimarśinī:

> "[When a person looks at a piece of mother-of-pearl and yet his Attention grasps the object as] "This is silver, enduring, common to all perceivers and capable of effective action"[1], there is no falsity in the "this" aspect, nor the aspects of "silver" etc., nor in the aspect of their combination, due to the power of Attention to Appearances. But....
>
> ...../cont.

1 e.g. one can barter with it.

"that act of Attention[1] which occurs at a later time [in the form] "this is not silver, a real enduring thing perceptible to others and performing its [well-] known function" - does not grasp that form which was associated with the time of the previous act of Attention, and which is grasped by that [later] act of Attention, in the time of that previous act of Attention. But it [that previous form of silver] ought to be graspable [by the later act of Attention]. For the later Apprehension concerning that same earlier time is that "This was not in fact silver (before)". It is not like the case of lightning which arises and (immediately) disappears where the act of Attention [takes the form] "Now this [lightning] is not [present]". Therefore, the nature of illusion is non-appearance (akhyāti) in the form of incomplete appearance (apūrṇakhyāti) since [the illusory object] does not appear (na prakhyāti) to the full extent that it should, to the extent of being an act of Attention."[2]

1 I translate "vimarśa" throughout this passage as "act of Attention", since here it is used as a verbal action noun equivalent to "Attending".

2 Pandey translates the clause "tato yavatā..... tāvat na prakhyāti " as "Therefore, as it does not continue to shine in as perfect a form as it should up to the time of ascertainment, (so it is error)". In taking "vimarśa-paryantam" to refer to the subsequent vimarśa, his translation does not bring out the point we shall discuss below (p.214ff.), that the false perception is not a vimarśa. The full passage is as follows:

"idaṃ rajataṃ sthiraṃ sarvapramātṛsādhāraṇam arthakriyā-yogyam iti idamaṃśe rajatādyaṃśeṣu tatsaṃmelanāṃśe ca ābhāsavimarśanabalāt na tāvat kiṃcit mithyātvaṃ, kiṃtu uttarakālaṃ yo bhaviṣyati vimarśo 'nedam rajataṃ vastu sthiram pramātrantaragamyamabhimatakāryakārī' iti, tadvimarśavimarśanīyaṃ yat tatpūrvavimarśakālasamucitameva rūpaṃ tat tasminn pūrvavimarśakāle naivāmṛśyate, bhāvyaṃ ca tenāmarśanīyena. tatraiva kāle 'nedam rajataṃ hi abhūt' iti hi uttaraḥ parāmarśo, natu uditapratyastamitāyām śatahradāyāmiva idānīmeva 'idam na' iti vimarśaḥ; tato yavatā pūrṇena rūpeṇa prakhyātavyaṃ vimarśaparyantaṃ tavāt na prakhyāti - ityapūrṇakhyatirūpāakhyātireva bhrāntitattvam."

We have seen (above p.71 ff.) that the pramāṇa grasps a single universal Appearance, and that the internal essence of the self-revealing Appearance which is the pramāṇa is an act of Attention, the valid cognition (miti), if it is not contradicted. We noted (p.77) that it is not clear as to how a perception of a universal Appearance unconnected with any time and place can ever be contradicted by another perception. We must now examine this problem more closely.

Utpaladeva claims that the falsity in erroneous perception is due to an incorrect judgement about the nature of the perception. Thus when someone perceives silver when looking at mother-of-pearl, his perception of universal silver is not false, nor is his perception of the universal Appearance "this"[1], nor his perceptions of the universal Appearances of stability, intersubjectivity, and capacity to perform effective action[2], nor even his perception of their combination. For all these Appearances are in fact combined in his perception by the power of his Attention. The falsity of the perception of

1 "niyate 'pyayamityeva parāmarśaḥ puraḥsthite
sarvabhāvagatedaṃtāsāmānyenaiva jāyate"
quoted at IPKV II.p.71

2 See above p.197 fn.1

silver consists in the fact that he attributes the existence of this combination of Appearances to a particular place, that of the mother-of-pearl which he thinks is silver.

Even in cases of optical illusion, such as that of the two moons, the falsity of the perception derives from an erroneous judgment.[1] The individual with malfunctioning senses does actually perceive two moons, but he falsely attributes their existence to a place in the sky which is common to all perceivers, whereas in fact these two moons appear in his mind alone.

Abhinavagupta states in his Vivṛtivimarśinī on this verse

> "Even though the mother-of-pearl-silver is grasped (vimṛśyate) as one with silver, still the establishment of the silver which appears in [the place of] the mother-of-pearl in [the perceiver's] mental awareness is not accepted to be due to its unity with real silver. There is no externality, substantiality and capacity for bartering etc. as common to all [perceivers], because that act of Attention is uprooted. [The uprooting of that act of Attention is] due to the uprooting, i.e. dis-agreement, in the mother-of-pearl, which is the attributed place whose nature is a conditioner [of the false perception, appearing] as a place in the form "here (is silver)". [This disagreement or uprooting is] due to the stability of the act of Attention which contradicts [the] reality [of the silver], viz. "This form is not silver."

1 "dvicandre 'pi buddhir mithyā", ĪPKVV III p.152 ll.7-8

Agreement (samyagvadanam) is an experience whose essence is the [correct] Apprehension of what is Appearing[1]. The opposite of that is disagreement."

In order for one act of Attention to contradict another, it is necessary that they should refer to the same experience. This is why Abhinavagupta distinguishes the case of illusory perception from the case of perception of lightning. In the latter, we perceive lightning, and immediately afterwards perceive no lightning, but the subsequent perception of no lightning only denies the existence of lightning at the later time, not at the earlier time also.

In erroneous perception, however, the later act of Attention not only perceives mother-of-pearl, it also perceives mother-of-pearl to have existed at the previous time.

This kind of contradiction is, therefore, only possible given Utpaladeva's theory of memory, which as we have seen allows that a subject may be aware of a previous experience at a later time.[2] And just as in the case of memory, Utpaladeva claims that our experience of the

1 ? Reading "bhāsanaparāmarśātmakaṃ saṃvedanam". bhāsanaparāmarśatmanā + ātmakam would be unlikely. ĪPKV II p.115 reads "samyagvimarśanānuvṛttyābhāsanaṃ saṃvadanaṃ, vadiḥ atra bhāsanaviṣayaḥ" - agreement is "appearing continuously in accordance with a correct form of Attention.

2 Since Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta do not believe that we have a subsequent perception of mother-of-pearl and infer that the previous perception was also of mother-of-pearl. The contradictory knowledge (bādha) is established by our own self-awareness. See ĪPK I.76

unification of perceptions is evidence for the one eternal self, similarly at ĪPK I.69-76 Utpaladeva argues that contradiction is only possible on the basis of a unification of temporally separate cognitions by the one self.

Moreover, we must note that it is not one pramāṇa which contradicts another. For the pramāṇa acts only upon one Appearance corresponding to one word. In its introverted aspect, the pramāṇa is a vimarśa, a valid cognition, but only if it is not contradicted.[1]

Abhinavagupta makes this clear at ĪPKV II.73-74

> "[Opponent:] Surely if the operation of pramāṇa is a vimarśa, then there is also (a vimarśa) in the case of two moons? [Abhinavagupta:] Not so, for if this (operation of pramāṇa) continued in the self due to saṃskāras, to the extent that it achieved an agreed and well-known effective action[2], remaining stable without being uprooted, then it would be so [i.e. this operation of pramāṇa would be a vimarśa]. But if it can be uprooted in the middle [of its otherwise continuous existence], then it is therefore not a vimarśa. Nor was it a vimarśa[3]
> .../cont.

1 See ĪPK II.17, translated above p.72

2 such as causing astonishment. See ĪPKV II p.74 l.11-13

3 nanu yadi vimarśaḥ pramāṇavyapārah sa tarhi dvicandre 'pi asti? maivam - sa hi saṃskārayogāt ātmānamabhimata-prasiddhārthakriyāpraptiparyantamanuvartayan anunmūlita-vṛttiḥ sthiraḥ san tathā bhavati, madhye punarunmūlanaṃ cet sahate na tarhi asau tathā vimarśaḥ, nāyaṃ vimarśaḥ...

"previously[1] because it was uprooted even before by a single inner form.[2] One's [the mistaken perceiver's] own consciousness is a witness of this, since [when one experiences] "this is not silver", one experiences the de-vimarśa-ising (avimarśīkaraṇam) of that same previously occurred vimarśa."[3]

I freely admit that my translation of "avimarśīkaraṇam" as "de-vimarśa-ising" is highly inelegant, and conveys little sense. However it is my contention that this word is equally incomprehensible in its Sanskrit context. For if the previous perception of silver, two moons etc., was not a vimarśa, then what was it? I can find no answer to this question in any of the five Pratyabhijñā texts. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta certainly do apply the term "vimarśa" to the erroneous perception ("rajate śuktau ca rajatavimarśaikyena...." Vṛtti on ĪPK II.28, "tatpūrvavimarśakālasamucitameva rūpaṃ tat tasmin pūrvavimarśakāle....." ĪPKV II p.113). Perhaps when Abhinavagupta states that the previous perception of silver was not a vimarśa, he means that it

1 i.e. it is not only later that it ceases to be a vimarśa, it was not a vimarśa in the first place.

2 presumably, that of the real moon, or of the real mother-of-pearl in the false perception of silver. See below.

3 pūrvamapi - ekena antarmukhena vapuṣā pūrvameva tasya nirmūlanāt, svasaṃvit atra ca sākṣinī, tadaiva 'na idam rajatam' iti vṛttapūrvasya vimarśasya avimarśīkaraṇam saṃvedyate.

was not a real vimarśa, although it appeared to be a vimarśa at the time. But this would be simply to restate the problem of whether an object was real or not by making it into an issue of whether the vimarśa was real or not.

It is understandable that the silver that one perceives as mother-of-pearl is not in fact there but only in one's mind. Thus we may say, "I thought I perceived silver, but in fact I didn't." But when we say this, it is understood that we did perceive <u>something</u>, it is not that we were mistaken in thinking that we had a perception at all.

We must note that the vimarśa which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are denying to be in fact a vimarśa is the one which apprehends the combination of the Appearances of "silver" "this", "stable", "capable of effective action" etc. with the particular location of the mother-of-pearl.[1] Abhinavagupta states: (ĪPKV.II.p.114)

> "Therefore there is no illusion at all in the individual Appearances of "this" etc., but we have established that the nature of illusion lies only in the aspect of combination [of 'this' etc with the place of mother-of-pearl], since the uprooting of the continuation of the vimarśa (which grasps this combination) acts as a contradictor even from the time of the arising of the [erroneous] vimarśa.[2]
>
> ...../cont.

1 Since each valid pramāṇa, and hence each "valid" vimarśa, corresponds to a one-word Appearance, and Abhinavagupta has said that the perceptions of "this", "silver" etc. are not false.

2 ata śca pṛthak idantādyābhāsesu na kācana bhrāntiḥ, melanāṃśe tu vimarśānuvṛttinirmūlanaṃ vimarśodayakālādeva ārabhya bādhakena kriyate, iti tatraiva bhrāntibhāvaḥ, iti siddham. /cont.

"Even though there is one vimarśa of silver together with mother-of-pearl, nevertheless the establishment of silver in mother-of-pearl given by this knowledge, in "this is silver" does not exist, since the attributed place, in "here (is silver)" is the place of mother-of-pearl, taking the features of silver upon itself."[1]

We must note also that the combination of the Appearances of "silver", "this" etc. with each other is not false, because they do appear in this way to the particular subject.[2] Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta claim that contradiction takes the form of denying that what appeared to a particular subject was an external (sense four above) object capable of effective action and common to all perceivers (arthakriyākārī bāhyaṃ sādhāraṇametat na bhavati - iti bādhasya rūpaṃ, ĪPKVV III p.79 l.14-15).

At ĪPKV III.p.76 an objector claims that since the subject conceives of the object as being external, he therefore validly cognises it to be external (nanu evaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddho nīlābhāsavikalpo bāhye nīle kasmāt na prāmaṇam, iti āha "yataśca" iti, ca śaṅkāṃ dyotayati).

Abhinavagupta explains Utpaladeva's reply as follows:

1 rajatasyasuktikayā saha yadyapi eko vimarśaḥ, tathāpi suktau rajatasya tena jnānena yā dattā sthitiḥ, "idam rajatam" iti, sā na; yata upādhirūpo yo deśaḥ "atra rajatam" iti rajatacchāyām ātmanoparañjayan śuktideśaḥ

2 See the beginning of Abhinavagupta's Vimarśinī above p.209

> "Conceptions are internal, [we know] only [that] "blue appears to me", nothing more; (even) when their [conceptions'] form is extroverted. For in this [latter] case, it is simply awareness that takes the form "this is blue", on the grounds that "it appears to me like this, therefore it is blue". Therefore blue etc. are said to be external because "this is known and grasped by direct perception through [my] external faculties". But it is not said to be known as external by one's own conceptual experience"[1]

As we saw in Chapter Seven, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta claim that in all perceptions the "external" object appears within the subject (ĪPK.I.33, translated above, p.141). Although we conceive of objects as being external, this conception itself manifests within consciousness:

> "A decision (adhyavasā) such as "this is a pot" is the supreme Lord's power, transcending name and form,[2] manifesting in the same way as the self[3], not objectively.[4] ĪPK II.51

1 āntare vikalpe nīlaṃ mama avabhāsate ityetāvanmātram asti na tu bahirmukhākāratve. bodhāvabhāsa eva etat nīlamityevaṃrūpaḥ iha tu asti. yata evaṃ mamāvabhāti tata etat nīlamiti. tataśca bahiṣkaraṇapratyakṣeṇa pramitaṃ gṛhītametaditi nīlādi bāhyam ucyate, na tu vikalpasvasaṃ-vedanapramitaṃ tat bāhyam ucyate.

2 His power of Attention. See ĪPK I.44 (translated above p.67) and I.45

3 ātmevābhedenāvabhāsate, Vṛtti. It appears "in the same way as the self" because not separate from it. See also ĪPK.I.31, translated in Appendix, and above p.131.

4 ghaṭo 'yamityadhyavasā nāmarūpātirekinī
pareśaśaktirātmeva bhāsate na tvidantayā

The cognition of silver in mother-of-pearl is therefore valid to the extent that the silver really does appear in this way to the individual subject, but invalid to the extent that he believes it is appearing externally as perceptible to all subjects.

We see then, that what Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are denying is the reality of the relation between the "this-silver" combination in the perceiver's mind and the external place of mother-of pearl. If "relation" were a universal Appearance like the others, then it would be possible to say that he validly cognises relation too, but just as he cognises silver in his mind alone, he also cognises the relation between silver and the place of mother-of-pearl in his mind alone.

But this is not in fact the Pratyabhijñā view. Utpaladeva states at Saṃbandhasiddhi p.6

> "We must consider the following: relation could be just one, its form mere consciousness, for the multiple different objects. Hence that (relation) of the king to the man would be the same (as the relation) of father to son, and of pan etc. [to the action "he cooks"]. Yet it (relation) should also be multiple. So we say here[1] "It could be one [relation] for all [related things]". This would be [so] if relation were only unity, but relation is unity /cont.

1 A reference to verses 17 and 18 of SS, which this prose passage is commenting on.

2 kevalam iyadvimṛśyate - yadekacinmātrarūptvenānek-ātmano vastubhedasyaika eva saṃbandhaḥ syāt ya eva rājapuruṣayoḥ sa eva pitāputrayoḥ sthālyādīnām ceti, anekaśceṣyate. tadatrāpyucyate - syādeka eva sarveṣām iti. yadyekatāmātrameva saṃbandhaḥ syāt, .../cont.

"..only up to the point of its multiplicity. Therefore the unity coloured by [i.e. of] king and man [in "the king's man"] is one relation, and it is different from that [unity] characterised by the colouring of father and son [in "the father's son"].[1]

Utpaladveva therefore distinguishes his view of relations from that of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school. The latter holds that the inherence relation (samavāya) is an independent entity, a kind of universal relation which is instantiated in all particular relations. But as Dharmakīrti points out in his Saṃbandhaparīkṣā (vs.4), this view of a universal relation involves an infinite regress. For there must be some relation which relates the universal relation to the particular king and particular man. And if this second relation is also the universal samavāya, then there must be a third relation relating the particulars to it, and so forth.

Utpaladeva avoids this problem by saying that Relation is not an independent entity. In so far as all relations consist of unity in diversity, and in all cases the unity is established by consciousness, then relation is the same in all cases. But in so far as the

1 ....yavatānekatāṃśādaṃśenaikatā saṃbandhaḥ. tataśca rājapuruṣoparaktaikatānyaḥ saṃbandhaḥ pitāputroparāgopalakṣaṇavilakṣaṇa eva.
This passage is immediately followed by the one quoted above, p.204

particulars in each relation differ, the relation itself is also different.

We may conclude, then, that the man perceiving silver in the place of mother-of-pearl does not accurately perceive a universal relation, but inaccurately perceives the silver and mother-of-pearl as related to each other. He merely falsely perceives a particular relation (melana) between silver and the mother-of-pearl.

Whereas the mistaken perceiver does correctly perceive silver by the power of his Attention, his perception of silver in the place of mother-of-pearl is contradicted by a subsequent perception, that of mother-of-pearl. Moreover, the mistaken perceiver subsequently realises that it was mother-of-pearl and not silver in which existed the place of mother-of-pearl even at the time of the original (false) cognition. Thus at that time there was a difference between the perceived relation of silver to place and the actual relation of mother-of-pearl to place.[1]

This implies that there are relations between Appearances apart from those formed by individual cognitions, or at least, that in an individual perception some relations may be formed by the individual and others by Śiva's power of Determination (niyatiśakti). And

1 Which is to say, the non-relation of the universal Appearance of silver to any particular place.

indeed Abhinavagupta confirms this in his Vimarśinī on ĪPK.II.28 (ĪPKV.II.p.116):

> "Thus an object (prameya) consists of just this: Appearance[1] and the combination [of Appearances] brought to life by the restriction [of the Lord's Determination]. These same (objects) will be described as tattvas in the āgama [-adhikāra, the third chapter of IPK]. "vastu", "tattva" and "prameya" are synonyms. Thus earth [pṛthvītattva] is the Appearance of "hardness", fire and colour[2] are the Appearance of "red", passion is the Appearance of combination (melana), and arrangement (saṃniveśa) is a form of Determination, for Determination is restriction (niyatir hi niyama). And that [restriction] is brought to life by not-being (abhāvaprāṇa). And it is a manifestation of not-being shining as a metamorphic Appearance of earth [i.e. clay] which is the shape of a broad belly with a base [of a pot]. And Construction (Māyā) is the Appearance of division, and that Śivatattva which appears above it is the Appearance of the real Illustration [or, the Appearance of Illustration of the real satyaprakāśābhāsa]. Enough of this for now. It will come later[3].
>
> As regards objects, it is the Lord who has autonomy in every respect to unify and divide. And in fact the perception of unity-in-diversity of Appearances in the pot can be used as a means of immersing oneself in the perception of ultimate non-duality,[4] [hence] even this conventional world is not an obstruction to entering into [identity with] the Supreme Lord's own form - this has been established."

1 This may be understood as jatau ekavacanam, or as the undivided prakāśa (satyaprakāśābhāsaśca Śivatattvam, below). In the latter case, of course, combination presupposes division due to limited perceptions.

2 The traditional Indian view is that red is the principal colour.

3 In the āgamādhikāra. See Chapter Three above.

4 Cp. "saṃbandhe sāvadhānatā" and my notes, above pp.203-206

We may conclude, then, that the difference between the real mother-of-pearl which is common to all perceivers and is external (sense four above) to the mistaken perceiver, and the illusory silver perceived by the mistaken subject alone, is that the mother-of-pearl is supported by a vimarśa which is in agreement with the relations formed by niyatiśakti, whereas the silver is supported by a vimarśa which disagrees with niyatiśakti's combination of mother-of-pearl and place.

To return, then, to our problem concerning the "de-vimarśa-ising" of the vimarśa "here is silver"; we may note that the vimarśa connecting silver with the particular place of mother-of-pearl is "uprooted" "even before" (at the time of the false perception) by a "single inner form"[1]. On the basis of the additional texts we have now examined, we may postulate the following explanation of Abhinavagupta's meaning:

In order for a pramāṇa to become a valid cognition, it must become a corresponding internal vimarśa. But it only becomes an internal vimarśa if it is not contradicted.[2] And it will be capable of being contradicted if the form of this proto-vimarśa is not in agreement with the form of vimarśa which corresponds to the combination of Appearances created by niyatiśakti. We

1 See ĪPKV II p.74, the passage translated above p.215

2 See ĪPK II.1 . i.e. the vimarśa is the "pramāṇa-phala", which is not produced if the pramāṇa is contradicted. Cp. ĪPKV II p.78 l.2 "ata eva apratihat-ānuvṛttikaṃ vimarśaphalaṃ vidhatte"

may say that this latter vimarśa exists "within", and is the "single inner form" which contradicts the proto-vimarśa, such that it never becomes a vimarśa.

This state of affairs is possible because the limited individual's consciousness is in fact a manifestation of Śiva's awareness, and therefore Śiva's awareness is "within" it. In so far as the self-consciousness of the individual is a consciousness of himself as Śiva, it is also a consciousness of the Lord's intersubjective creation.[1]

Thus at the time of the false perception of silver, there is contradiction between the external form of the individual's perception, and the "inner" awareness that this perception is false, since Śiva's consciousness of the intersubjective world rests "within" the consciousness of the individual. At the time of the individual's subsequent realisation that "this is not silver", he also realises that his previous perception was a perception of mother-of-pearl. And it was not a perception of silver because what was in fact appearing externally (sense four) to him at that time corresponded to an internal (in Śiva's consciousness) vimarśa of the Appearance of mother-of-pearl. Thus a pramāṇa only becomes a vimarśa if it corresponds to Śiva's inter-subjective creation.

1 See above p.152ff. It is also on this same principle that Utpaladeva may explain the omniscience of yogis.

Even though the above interpretation seems consistent with Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's statements, it still leaves unresolved the question of what the perception of silver-in-mother-of-pearl was, if it was not a vimarśa. We may say that according to ĪPK.II.16, it was "a momentary self-manifesting means of cognition" (prāmaṇam tat so 'pi svābhāso 'bhinavodayaḥ).[1] But this implies that there can be a particluar Appearance without a particular (real) vimarśa. Thus we must either say that some particular Appearances are not caused by the Lord's power of vimarśa, in which case Utpaladeva must accept, as the Buddhist does, that some diversity in Appearances is "given", existing in its own right independently of Śiva's power of Autonomy, or else, (as is most likely) we must say that there are, at least from the everyday point of view, vimarśas and pseudo-vimarśas. Thus the Pratyabhijñā must re-express the problem of whether the object is real as a problem of whether the vimarśa is real.

However, the criterion for distinguishing between real and pseudo-vimarśas is that the former appear "fully", whereas the latter do not.[2] But in so far as the

1 Translated above, p.71

2 They are examples of apūrṇakhyāti, see ĪPKV II p.113, translated above p.210

perception of real silver does not occur all the time, at least in the individual's awareness, it too appears "incompletely". This objection is raised at ĪPKV II p.114:

> "[Objector:] But surely even the knowledge [or "perception", jñāna] of real silver is incomplete Appearance. [Abhinavagupta:] So what? [Objector:] It will therefore follow that all this world is illusion. [Abhinavagupta:] Congratulations! Your eyes are opening! For in the sphere of Construction all is illusion, but within this [world of illusion] there is said to be this other illusion, like a dream within a dream, or a pimple on a boil, due to the instability of the [pseudo-] vimarśa which ought to continue [to be agreed with]."

Therefore the "the illusion within the illusion" is called "bhrānti", while the "illusion" which is the everyday world is given the designation "conventionally real" (saṃvṛtisat). It is this conventional reality which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupt attribute to relations (see above pp.201 and 204). But Abhinavagupta emphasises at ĪPKV II p.42 that

> "It may be called conventional reality, but is a kind of <u>reality</u>, it is not unreality like two moons etc."[1]

1 ucyatām saṃvṛtisatyatvaṃ satyasyaiva tu prakāraḥ tat, iti dvicandrādivat na asatyatā

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta distinguish the reality of relations from the unreality of two moons, etc., because the notions of relation etc. are persistent (not contradicted) and useful.[1] But in the Saṃbandhasiddhi, Utpaladeva also argues against Dharmakīrti's view that relations are merely conceptual constructs (kalpitaḥ).

If Dharmakīrti is correct, and relations are merely conceptual constructs, Utpaladeva will find it hard to prove that the self whose existence is proved by relations is not also a conceptual construct.[2]

Utpaladeva characterises his opponent's argument as follows:

> "They say that phenomena (bhāvāḥ) are not in themselves mingled, conceptualisation joins them together."[3] Thus the unity of "blue" and "lotus" in "the blue lotus"[4] is experienced subsequently[5] due to verbal conceptualisation, [its experience does] not [arise] from the pramāṇa, the direct perception which has as its basis the particular svalakṣaṇa of the partless lotus, and which manifests the object. Similarly they say that:
>
> ...../cont.

1 See above p.206

2 See above pp.213-214, and ĪPK I.22 (translated in Appendix A).

3 Quotation from Saṃbandhaparīkṣā vs.5, which Utpaladeva quotes again below (see p.229).

4 Or "this lotus is blue", there being in Sanskrit no means of distinguishing the attributive from assertive sense when two nouns are in apposition.

5 Cp. ĪPK I.6, translated in Appendix A.

""The ultimately real things are neither joined together nor divided, their single and multiple form is a delusion of the intellect."[1]

etc. And it is also not valid[2] to hold that there is a unity of multiplicity which exists simultaneously with the multiplicity, because of the contradictoriness (viruddhatvāt) of the [simultaneous] being and not-being [of multiplicity]. A single thing could arise after a preceding multiplicity (of causes), or a multiplicity after a single (precedent), yet they would not be mixed up with each other, they would be completely self-contained. For example some[3] hold the view of a distinction (vyavasthā) in the stream of consciousness, [between direct sense-perception and conceptualisation, the pramāṇavyavasthā between cognitions of particulars and universals], and in this view a single conceptual knowledge based upon sense-perception occurs after immediately preceding experiences characterised by [sense-] knowledge of sound, touch etc. Or from a single immediately preceding experience five [conceptual knowledges] having sound etc. as their objects arise. But that unity and multiplicity which have the same locus[4] are contradicted by pramāṇa, otherwise there would be not-being of being [multiple or single].

...../cont.

1 This is a quotation from PV Svārth° vs.87, though the Bauddha Bharati edition reads "saṃsṛjyante na bhidyante.." Manorathanandin comments on this verse that the single form which is mistakenly thought to be mixed with various objects is the universal, and the multiplicity which is thought to divide the object is that of qualities and possessor-of- qualities.

2 Utpaladeva continues his exposition of Dharmakīrti's views.

3 I assume this is a remark by Utpaladeva, reminding us that he does not hold this view.

4 Or "which are located in the general" (samānāśrayā); if samāna here means sāmānya, then this would refer to the unity between objects and internal diversity implied by the therory of the object as a possessor of multiple qualities.

"It is simply that in order to maintain the conventional saṃsāric world[1] this form of conceptualisation attributes the forms of cause and effect, which are in fact unreal, to objects which are actually mutually separate. Thus [in "the king's man"] the particular form of the function of king with regard to the man and vice-versa is described, and likewise in such cases as [he cooks rice] "in the pan using firewood". Therefore we accept [the conventional existence of] relation as of universal, even at the time of experience. And yet since this [conventional experience of relations] is contrary to the actual nature of the object, its referent is illusory (bhrāntiviṣayaiva). However, even when a contradictory (pramāṇa) operates, this illusion, like the illusion of the whole, does not disappear like the illusion of the snake, because it is closely attached to the appearance of particular forms of aider and aided.[2] Therefore this illusion is given the designation "conventional [truth]".[3]

> [Utpaladeva responds:] In reply to this, we say that you yourselves actually accept an experience of a form which is unity in multiplicity, in order to describe relations, as when you say:
>
> "thus phenomena are not in themselves mingled - conceptualisation joins them together."[4]
>
> And the fact that it [the experience of unity in multiplicity] is a form of conceptualisation is not a defect. For the concept "this is a pot", [or] "this is a cloth" is also conceptualisation. But in this

1 The Buddhist gives this as the motive, implying that this kind of conceptualisation exhibits a clinging to saṃsāra, from which we should desire to be liberated.

2 The subsidiary and principal elements of the relation. E.g. "man", the principal element, "aided by" i.e. qualified by, his relation to the king. See below p.239

3 Compare Abhinavagupta's Vimarśinī, translated above p.226

4 Quotation from Dharmakīrti's Saṃbandhaparīkṣā, vs.5

"[latter] case [you, the Buddhist claim] the Appearance of sense perception is the same, in just this form of pot, cloth etc., hence there is no conceptualisation [in the form of pot etc. in sense perception]. So how do you come to know that here also, in the case of "the king's man", "rice in the pot" etc. the Appearance of sense-perception is not the same? You certainly must accept that the Appearance of sense-perception is exactly the same in this case [of relations] also, or rather, you do indeed accept this, in as much as you say "this illusion is difficult to dispel, even when contradicted, because it is closely attached to the appearance[1] of the object's form." For in fact [Utpaladeva claims] it is not "[difficult to dispel] even when contradicted because it is closely attached to the appearance of the object" but [difficult to dispel] simply because of the real similarity between the objects [in the relation, e.g. king and man] and their appearance [as related, in consciousness]. Even in the illusion of silver, there is in fact a real similarity with mother-of-pearl,[2] for all illusions involve similarity, and some of them are [also] associated with that close attachment to the appearance of the object which goes beyond similarity.[3] Since the form of the appearance of the object is just like this, it is appropriate for a conventional speaker to speak about it using a concept which is just like this.[4] But if it were the

1 pratibhāsa - I have translated this here as appearance with a small "a". It refers to the way the object appers to the subject.

2 Note that neither Utpaladeva nor Abhinavagupta mentions this in their treatment of illusion in ĪPK and its commentaries.

3 e.g. the illusion of two moons, which are like the one real moon, but due to defective vision, the appearance of the real single moon is distorted. The case of rope and snake, however, is one of simlilarity of appearance of the object, and conceptual error.

4 e.g. for him to speak of mother-of-pearl as "silvery".

"case that the appearances of two objects [e.g. king and man] were established as completely self-contained objects with no reciprocal connection even when they were distorted [by worldly perception], then the only possibility would be that this concept of relation, like the concepts of universal etc., would cease to exist.[1] And concepts are not separate from the appearance of objects, since we have refuted the idea of non-conceptual [knowledge] in the Īśvarapratyabhijñā[2]. Thus we must accept that in "the king's man" etc. even the Appearance has a form which manifests as a unity of the multiple, just as in the appearance of a gross object [a whole composed of multiple atoms]. What we must consider is whether or not this is appropriate [as a description of reality, granted that objects appear to be like this]. In this matter, it is unalloyed consciousness alone (cinmātra-rūpasyaiva), the ultimately real entity, which is the essence of the universe. And the mutual separateness [of objects] arising from the diversity of tattvas, beings, worlds etc. in the universe is due to the rise of the non-appearance of non-division [which occurs] due to the might of the power of Construction (which belongs to) that same unalloyed consciousness. This has been propounded at length in the Īśvarapratyabhijñā, therefore one should look further in that work, it is not dealt with here."

Let us take Utpaladeva's advice and look to the Īśvarapratyabhijñā for a fuller explanation of his meaning here.

1 i.e. at the time of worldly perception, the objects must not only be conceived of as related, they must also appear as related.

2 See below pp.232-234

The basis of the Saṃbandhasiddhi argument against Dharmakīrti is that:

(i) there is no experience without concepts
(ii) concepts always reflect the way that objects appear to the perceiving subject
(iii) we conceive of objects as related [in sense-perception]
Therefore (iv) objects appear as related (in sense-perception).
and (v) the appearance of objects as related is quite in accord with the nature of reality as described in the ĪPK.
Therefore (vi) relations are real.

Regarding point (i), Utpaladeva claims at ĪPK.I.50-52:

> "Even at the instant of direct perception, there is an act of Attention, otherwise, without unification, how would running etc. be possible?"
>
> A decision such as "this is a pot" is the supreme Lord's power, transcending name and form, manifesting like the self, not objectively.
>
> It is simply that due to their association with separately cognised spaces and times, knowledge, memory, decision etc. appear sequentially."[1]

1 sākṣātkārakṣane 'pyasti vimarśaḥ kathamanyathā
dhāvanādyupapadyeta pratisaṃdhānavarjitam

ghaṭo 'yamityadhyavasā nāmarūpātirekinī
pareśaśaktirātmeva bhāsate na tvidantayā

kevalaṃ bhinnasaṃvedyadeśakālānurodhataḥ
jñānasmṛtyavasāyādi sakramaṃ pratibhāsate

We have seen that all forms of Attention are essentially linguistic[1], and that this linguistic activity becomes explicit in an Apprehension[2]. Although at the supreme level of speech the Apprehension of "I" is not a concept (vikalpa)[3], in the sphere of Māyā, the everyday world, perceptions are dualistic and Apprehensions are expressed in concepts.

Utpaladeva's Vṛtti explains that even though there may be no "gross" (sthūla) concept in the individual's awareness when he is running, nevertheless there must be a "subtle" (sūkṣma) act of Attention, and hence a subtle linguistic activity, otherwise there would be no unification in his mind between his perceptions of place etc and the concepts "to be resorted to", "to be avoided" etc., and hence he would not know where to put his feet when he was running. The gross (i.e. explicit) concept "this is a pot" is simply a manifestation of the internal linguistic power of the Lord, which appears sequentially when it asociates with particular times and places, due to the power of Construction.

1 Above pp.67-72

2 Above p.78

3 See ĪPK I.53:

> "This act of Attention [in the form of] "I", which is the essence of Illustration and whose form is [supreme] speech, is not a vikalpa, since the latter is a decision regarding two things [involving distinguishing something from its opposite]."

Thus Utpaladeva does not accept Dharmakīrti's view that a non-conceptual moment of sense-perception in which the svalakṣaṇa appears is followed by a moment of conceptualisation.[1] For the Pratyabhijñā, concepts are always latent, if not expressed, in awareness.

Regarding point (ii) of Utpaladeva's argument against Dharmakīrti we must turn to the Saṃbandhasiddhi itself to see just how close the connection is between concepts and the appearance of objects in Utpaladeva's view.

Let us examine Utpaladeva's statements concerning concepts of relations and their referents. On SS p.3 he lists some examples of the kinds of relation he intends to consider:

(i) The owned/owner relation in "The king's man" (rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ).

(ii) The part/whole relation in "The branch of the tree" (vṛkśasya śākhā).

(iii) The relation of one added thing to another in "The Dhava tree and the Khadira tree" (dhavaśca khadiraśca).

(iv) The generated/generator relation in "The father's son" (pituḥ putraḥ).

(v) The grammatical Kāraka Relations in "Devadatta cooks rice in the pan using firewood" (Devadattaḥ sthālyāṃ kāṣṭhair odanaṃ pacati).

1 See ĪPK I.6, translated in Appendix A.

(vi) The absence/object relation in "absence of pot" (ghaṭasyābhāvaḥ)[1]

(vi) The relation of difference in "This is different from that" (asmādidam anyat)[2]

(viii) The qualifier/qualified relation in "The blue lotus" (nīlam utpalam).

An essential characteristic of all these relations is first, that they exist between <u>two</u> phenomena and not more, and second, that one of the relata is always primary and the other secondary. From the latter it follows that the owned/owner relation in "The man's king" (puruṣasya rājā) is different from the owner/owned relation. All the other relations in the above list are similarly reversible to express different relations. We shall discuss this latter point below[3], but let us consider first Utpaladeva's contention that a relation always occurs between two phenomena only.

1 The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools argued that absences are a group of existents, and that e.g. absence of obstacles is a necessary cause in the production of an effect from a group of causes.

2 By treating this as a relation like the others, Utpaladeva is in a strong position to argue that relations must exist, since the uniqueness of Dharmakīrti's svalakṣaṇas must therefore depend upon relation of difference between them.

3 P.239ff.

He asserts that if there are three or more phenomena. A,B,C, etc., then the relation between A and B must be different from the relation between A and C, and again different from that between A and BC in conjunction. He states his case on SS p.7:

> "And this relation exists for two things only, not more. For if it did exist for more than two, then would it be a relation of each element separately to all the others simultaneously, or would it be a relation of each element separately to every other separately? If there were a relation of each member separately to all others simultaneously, then those "all the others" would be the object of a single Apprehension. You may say that in the case of "The king's man, the king's elephants, horses, chariots and footsoldiers"[1] there is a relation between king and the objects of numerous Apprehensions. But the dvandva compound, although it contains a multliplicity of elephants etc., is just one [word], called a dvandva, because of the singleness of the Apprehension which apprehends it. The words "elephant" etc. are like letters [which comprise this compound word].
>
> For a word which is based on a single Apprehension is itself single, and its referent (artha) is also single, since a single word is applied to it."

Utpaladeva's conclusion is equivalent to the assertion that the singleness of an Apprehension determines the singleness of its referent (artha).

There are two possible ways in which this passage may be interpreted, based on two different senses of the word "artha".

1 rājñaḥ hastyaśvarathapadātayaḥ

In the first interpretation, "artha" may be translated as "meaning", i.e. "the speaker's intention". Thus the passage will suggest that a single word expresses a single idea in the speaker's mind. This is merely a statement about the relation between thought and language; it is ineffective against Dharmakīrti's arguments for separating both thought and language from the reality of directly perceived objects.

But in the Saṃbandhasiddhi Utpaladeva is trying to establish that the concept of relations in the speaker's mind corresponds to the appearance of sense-perception, that relations exist somehow in the world, and that our linguistic expression of relations represents them.

If Utpaladeva fails to establish that there are relations among the objects which appear in sense-perception and that these are then <u>expressed</u> in subsequent conceptual cognitions, then his attempt to prove that relations are more real than Dharmakīrti suggests will have failed.

If "artha" in the above passage refers only to the speaker's intention and not to the related objects, it will imply that relations are concerned only with thoughts and not objects. This is exactly the view that Utpaladeva is endeavouring to refute, and hence the second interpretation of the passage is preferable.

In this case, "artha" may be translated as "referent", i.e. an objective state of affairs grasped by sense-perception that corresponds to the linguistic expression. The passage then states that the referent is single when one uses a single word to describe it, and multiple when one uses several words. Thus the dvandva compound hastyaśvarathapadātayaḥ (a single word) will refer to a single object of sense perception, but the expression hastinaścāśvaśca rathaśca padātayaśca (eight words) will refer to multiple objects appearing in sense perception.[1] This implies that the sole criterion for deciding whether an objective appearance is an appearance of one or many things is the individual's conceptual constructions.

The major problem for Utpaladeva here is that, as we have seen above, he has defined relation as a unity of two phenomena. Hence without duality, there can be no relation. But if numerical identity is dependent upon the individual subject, then the presence or absence of duality, and hence of relations, also depends on the individual subject. Given this dependence upon the individual subject, Utpaladeva will have difficulty in refuting Dharmakīrti's view that relations are merely conceptual constructs.

1 In normal Sanskrit usage, both these expressions mean the same thing, viz. "elephants, horses, chariots and foot-soldiers.

But it is indeed Utpaladeva's view that the presence or absence of relations depends upon the individual subject. We saw above (p.235) that each pair of phenomena may be said to be connected by two relations, depending upon which of the two relata is predominant. Thus we can speak of a king qualified by his relation to his man, or a man qualified by his relation to a king. The predominant relata is expressed in the nominative case in Sanskrit, the subordinate relata in the genitive. Utpaladeva explains on p.8 of the Saṃbandha-siddhi:

> "In everyday life we want to know and speak about either the king or the man predominantly, and the predominantly intended one is called the qualified, the other being the qualifier. There is no harm to our theory in this. For the unity of those two, the qualifier [e.g. king] appears as identified with the qualified [e.g man], yet it appears in its own form also, as in "rājñaḥ puruṣah" (the king's man), But in "rājapuruṣaḥ" (the king's man)[1], the king having become the qualifier, has completely lost his own form, and appears as having taken on total identity with the qualified. Thus in this case we don't use the term "relation".

What is significant here is that if we use one Sanskrit word to express "the king's man", we are not referring to a pair of related phenomena, since there is no perceived duality between the qualifier and the qualified, and hence no "unity in duality" (i.e. no

1 These two expressions differ only in that the second is a compound (one-word) way of saying the first.

relation). However, if we use two Sanskrit words to express "The king's man", then there is a relation.

We may conclude from this, that not only is there an intimate connection between the way objects appear in sense-perception and the way we conceive of them, Utpaladeva also believes that our conceptualising activity determines the way objects appear, and not vice-versa.

It is of course true that Utpaladeva's arguments to establish this link between sense-perception and concepts is based upon an analysis of relation in the narrow sense, as expressed by the Sanskrit genitive case, and he does not make it clear how the relation between king and man appears in sense-perception. But as we saw above, he uses his arguments in the Saṃbandhasiddhi to establish the existence of all forms of relation, including the relations between part and whole, the elements of an action, and the "generator and the generated".

There are at least two forms of relation in which not only the diversity but also the unity are conceived of as external. Utlpaladeva states at ĪPK II.13:

> "The concepts [which grasp] the Appearances of universal and whole are based upon a unity which is also external, and a diversity of particulars (vyakti) and parts (ekadeśa) [respectively]."[1]

1 jātidravyāvabhāsānām bahirapyekarūpatām
vyaktyekadeśabhedaṃ cāpyālambante vikalpanāḥ

But even though in these cases the unity is external (sense four above, p.153), and hence the similarity between particular cows or conjunction of the parts of a pot are not constructed solely by individual conceptualisation, nevertheless these "external" unities are also "within" consciousness. As Abhinavagupta tells us:

> "But even externality occurs while internality in the ultimate Illustration is established, thus there is no defect in this unity-in-diversity; it is like the consciousness of a manifold, and because of this the contradiction between being red and not-red[1] is prevented even in a whole. But the internal unity [is established] via relation, and this is true in all other cases (too)."[2]

Unfortunately Utpaladeva does not give us a detailed account of how the unity we perceive to exist in a pot is connected with the unity which exists externally in a pot. If he did, we would be able to solve our problem concerning the nature of objects not in perception, since this kind of external unity (no doubt formed by niyati-

1 The contradictions between the different properties of a whole would arise on the principle that something objective (i.e. something unconscious) cannot be both one and many. Cf. ĪPK II p.177, translated above p.107 and IPKV I p.178-181, where Abhinavagupta states that these issues have been dealt with in detail by Śaṅkaranandana in his Prajñālaṃkāra. See also above p.185

2 kevalaṃ bāhyatvamapi sthite paramārthaprakāśāntarbhāve iti na tatra bhedābhedau dūṣaṇaṃ citrasaṃvedana iva, anena dravye 'pi raktāraktādivirodhaḥ kṛtaprativiḍhānaḥ, āntaraṃ tu aikyaṃ saṃbandhadvāreṇa tadvadeva sarvatra.

sakti) could also be the basis for the existence of an "external" svalakṣaṇa, i.e. a particular unification of Appearances of space, time, shape, colour, texture etc. which forms the pot which we perceive.

But as we noted in our conclusion to the Chapter Six, Utpaladeva gives no account of the relation between perception according to the "Appearance in consciousness" model and the existence of non-perceived objects. Indeed, it is by no means clear that when Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta speak of an "external" unity in ĪPK II.13 and its commentaries they are in fact referring to a unity which exists apart from individual perceptions, as opposed to a unity which is simply conceived of as being externally perceptible.

However, we have seen that in the case of Illusion, Utpaladeva maintains the distinction between Appearances which are perceived by one subject only and those which are intersubjective, on the basis of the difference between the Lord's creation and the individual's creation.[1] The same is true in the case of relation. Abhinavagupta states at ĪPKVV.III.p.53:

> "Therefore it is not a defect [to our system] that the establishment of relation in the variety of relations of phenomena[2] is different for each subject, because not intersubjective, being cognised by the internal faculty because manifested as related to a particular subject by the operation of concepts. On some occasions, the supreme Lord connects [individual] subjects together as regards Appearances [so they perceive the same relations] and separates others [so they perceive different relations]. We have said this many times."

1 See above p.152 and p.224

2 bhāvasya, I take this as jātau ekavacanam

The third stage of Utpaladeva's argument against Dharmakīrti[1] needs no comment, and stage (iv) follows if we accept the first three stages. As to stage (v), we must note that according to Utpaladeva, relations only appear at the lower levels of reality.

Utpaladeva's conclusion, that relations are real, claims to differ from Dharmakīrti's view that they are not ultimately real. In fact, however, the two views are remarkably similar.

First, we may remark that Dharmarkīrti accepts that relations do not disappear like the illusion of rope and snake, and hence they deserve the designation "conventionally real". We saw above that the Pratyabhijñā holds that "all in the sphere of Construction is illusion",[2] but that since the various kinds of relation are useful and the concepts which cognise them are stable, they are conventionally real.[3] It seems to me that the difference between Dharmakīrti and the Pratyabhijñā on the reality of relations is purely rhetorical, in so far as Dharmakīrti emphasises that conventional reality is a kind of illusion[4], whereas the Pratyabhijñā emphasises that conventional reality is a kind of reality.[5]

1 Above p.232

2 Above p.226

3 Above pp.201 and 204

4 See, e.g. Pramāṇaviniścaya II.1d "bhrāntireva saṃbandhataḥ pramā" quoted in Steinkellner, E., "On the Interpretation of the Svabhāvahetuḥ" p.119 fn.8

5 See above p.226

Secondly we may note that there is a structural similarity between Dharmakīrti's and Utpaladeva views of how the ideas of relation, action etc are formed. Utpaladeva states at ĪPK II.9-12:

> "The perceptions (buddhi) of action, relation, universal, whole, space and time are real (satyāḥ), since they are persistent and useful. They are based upon unity and multiplicity. (9)
>
> In these cases, there is a single inner entity, (tattva) and it is that which becomes multiple when it becomes perceptible to the senses, due to space, time and particular character." (10)
>
> The mind, making a secondary judgement, forms these concepts of action etc., which are produced by the subject, and which have this dual basis. (11)
>
> The basis for the idea of relation is [a pair of] entities which are self-contained and appear separately, yet take part in a unity of mutual connection in the one knower."[1] (12)

Dharmakīrti's objection to relations is based on the argument that something cannot be both single and multiple at the same time. Verse 10 here is intended to

1 kriyāsaṃbandhasāmānyadravyadikkālabuddhayaḥ
satyāḥ sthairyopayogābhyāmekānekāśrayā matāḥ. 9

tatraikamāntaraṃ tattvaṃ tadevendriyavedyatām
saṃprāpyānekatāṃ yāti deśakālasvabhāvataḥ 10

taddvayālambanā etā mano 'nuvyavasāyi sat
karoti mātṛvyāpāramayīḥ karmādikalpanāḥ 11

svātmaniṣṭhā viviktābhā bhāva ekapramātari
anyonyānvayarūpaikyayujaḥ saṃbandhadhīpadam 12

Note that in this last verse the reading "viviktābhā" (as opposed to KSTS no.xxxiv's "viviktā vā") is supported not only by the KSTS edition of the Vimarśinī and Vivṛtivimarśinī, but also by the B.O.R.I's Ms. 168 of the Vimarśinī.

counter this objection. In his commentary on this verse[1] Abhinavagupta states that the unity and multiplicity in relations occur in different spheres (viṣaya). Thus for example in the action of "going to the village", the multiplicity is external, due to space/time diversity, but the unity is inner.

The crucial problem is the nature of this inner unity. On ĪPKVV III p.45 Abhinavagupta states two characteristics of the single inner reality mentioned in Utpaladeva's verse. He defines it as (i) one Appearance unmixed with others, and (ii) perceptible only to the inner organ.[2]

On verse 11, Abhinavagupta comments[3] that the mind "produces" (saṃpādayati) the concepts of action, Relation etc., in a conceptual judgement that occurs after the non-conceptual sense-knowledge of the superior-cum-inferior level of consciousness.[4] This sequence of

1 ĪPKV II pp.33-34

2 yattu āntaram ābhāsāntarānāmiśramantaraṅgam, āntaraṃ ca antaḥkaraṇavedyaṃ tattvamekam, tadekam.

3 ĪPKV II p.39: "sa (jīvabhūtaḥ pramātā) viśuddha-svabhāvaḥ śivātmā, māyāpade tu saṃkucitasvabhāvaḥ paśuḥ, tadasya manaḥ samullāsāvasare vikalpabhūmikāyāṃ sphuṭa ullāsaḥ, aindriyake nirvikalpake sadāśiveśvaradaś-ābhyudayāt avikalpakabodhābahirbhūtavimarśavyāpārasya paścādbhāvinaṃ vyavasāyaṃ niścayātmakaṃ vikalpakaṃ anuvyavasāyaśabdavācyaṃ vidadhadantaḥkaraṇam etān kriyā-saṃbandhādivikalpān saṃpādayati"

4 Since the consciousness of every individual is at every instant fluctuating between the superior and inferior levels. See also above p.24

cognitions is similar to that described by Dharmakīrti, in that there is an instant of non-conceptual experience which directly grasps the highest reality, followed by an instant of conceptual experience in which the limited subject "produces" the concepts of Relation etc., even though, as we have seen, there is for Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta a "subtle" form of conceptualisation even in the non-conceptual sense-knowledge.

Moreover, we may compare verse 12 with Dharmakīrti's conclusion in the Saṃbandhaparīkṣā that:

> "Phenomena are not in themselves mingled, conceptualisation joins them together".[1]

Utpaladeva's agreement with the Buddhist analysis of everyday perception is apparent here, in that he does not say that "entities are unified, and conceptualisation distinguishes them", but assumes a prior multiplicity of Appearances, whose anomalous position in the Pratyabhijñā metaphysics we discussed in Chapter Six.

We may conclude, then, that there is no essential difference between Dharmakīrti's and Utpaladeva's views on relations as perceived in the everyday world (māyādaśāyām). But whereas for

1 Quoted above, p.229

Dharmakīrti, relations are not ultimately real (pāramārthika) because there is an ultimate plurality of svalakṣaṇas, for Utpaladeva, relations are not ultimately real because there is an ultimate unity without division in the superior level of consciousness.

This leads to a major problem in Utpaladeva's metaphysics. For we have seen that the Pratyabhijñā maintains the distinction between illusion and conventional reality on the basis of the accuracy or otherwise of perceptions of relations. The perception of silver in mother-of-pearl is false, because the mistaken perceiver falsely attributes the location of the universal Appearance of silver to the particular place of mother-of-pearl. But there must be a real relation of the universal Appearance of mother-of-pearl to the particular place of mother-of-pearl formed by Niyatiśakti, if the perception of silver is to be contradicted. And we have seen that the existence of such a relation must depend upon the uniting of the mother-of-pearl Appearance with that place in a particular <u>perception</u>. This would imply that there must be such a thing as a disembodied perception, since no particular individual cognises this relation when the mistaken perceiver sees silver.

Moreover, the relation between the Appearance of mother-of-pearl and its place cannot be maintained by the superior or the superior-cum-inferior forms of consciousness, since by definition the diversity of place and time necessary for such a relation does not occur at these levels of consciousness.

The same may be said of the svalakṣaṇa, the particular Appearance of an object at a particular place and time. We have seen that the svalakṣaṇa is a form of relation, that of "collocation", the unity of a multiplicity of Appearances.[1] However, both the svalakṣaṇa and the combination (melana) of the Appearance of silver with the place of mother-of-pearl may be referred to as a single Appearance[2], and the latter at least may be said to be cognised by a single vimarśa.[3] But they are only single in the sense that they are the "single inner unity", which "becomes multiple due to space, time and particular character"[4], and to the extent

1 Cf. above pp.78-79

2 See ĪPKV II p.78; "That whose form is an Appearance of the collocation of those Appearances is another single Appearance." (Cf. above p.73), and ĪPKV II p.115 ll.12-16 "taddeśakālābhyām saha tatrāpi asti melanābhāso yadvimarśo 'nuvivṛtsurnirūpyate, dvi tvābhāsacandrābhāsayorapi melanābhāse vimarśānuvṛttivyāvartanaṃ vācyam."

3 Though possibly not the former, cp. above p.74

4 See ĪPK II.10, translated above p.244

that they are single, they are universalised and unmixed with other Appearances.[1] In so far as the svalakṣaṇa constitutes an actual particular object such as a table, or the "melana" actually links the silver-Appearance with the particular place of mother-of-pearl, they are multiple, and this multiplicity is due to "external[2] perceptibility".[3]

Thus if there is to be a world of even conventionally real objects, there must be an infinite number of particular perceptions of places and times which are not associated with particular human beings, perceptions which even Śiva 's consciousness cannot provide.

1 See above p.73

2 Sense four above p.153

3 See ĪPK II.10 (translated above p.244) and Utpaladeva's Vṛtti on the same verse: "a single inner entity (becomes) a unity in multiplicity, because it appears internally and externally, due to the multiplicity of Appearances of single svalakṣaṇas [e.g. places and times in action] which consist of conjunctions with Appearances of diversity whose nature is external space and time."

Conclusion

> "They were all trying to adjust the brute blow of the fist that daily existence dealt them until it became a caress."
>
> William Golding

The aim of Utpaladeva's doctrine of Recognition is to bring us to recognise that our individual selves are identical with Śiva. Just as the love-stricken lady needs to be convinced that the man she eventually sees in her garden is in fact her lover, we need to be convinced that our everyday notion of self refers to Śiva.

In order to dispel our doubts about our identity with Śiva, we might expect Utpaladeva to refute the Buddhist contention that our everyday notion of self is merely a concept with no substantial referent, and to follow this with an argument as to why our real individual self is identical with the universal Self, Śiva.

In fact, Utpaladeva does not do this. His arguments to prove the existence of the self do not prove the existence of an individual self, they attempt to show that the universal self is active in carrrying on the

affairs of the everyday world by synthesising temporally separate cognitions. Utpaladeva offers no specific arguments to demonstrate the identity of the individual self with the universal self, since in proving the existence of the self he makes no distinction between these two. As such, he gives no formal refutation of the view of the Siddhānta Śaivas, that Śiva (the universal self) and paśu (the individual self) are separate categories. Indeed, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta do make remarks which suggest that an individual self per se <u>is</u> merely a concept. We saw above that the individual self, the "incumbent" (avasthātṛ) in the various stages of childhood, adolescence, adulthood etc. is a form of relation, and that we speak coventionally of such a self (bālyādyavasthānāmaikye avasthātṛvyavahāraḥ, ĪPKVV III p.51, translated above p.202). We have seen that the reality which the Pratyabhijñā attributes to all forms of relation is that of "conventional reality", (samvṛtisattvam, ibid.) And at ĪPK I.56-58 Utpaladeva again tells us that the unification of limited Appearances in space and time which gives us the idea of a limited self is a form of conceptualisation:

> "When, due to construction (Māyā) the (superior)[1] category of consciousness has been abandoned, that Attention which appears as a separate "I", conceiving the body, intellect,
>
> ...../cont.

> "life-breath or void to be the knower by a rejection of other (Appearances), that identity is just a concept (vikalpa eva), derived from other contrary Appearances." (56-57)
>
> And that unification of earlier and later Appearances with a temporally limited Appearance appearing as separate [from other Appearances] which occurs due to saṃskāras, is also said to be conceptualisation."[1] (58)

Dharmakīrti would agree enthusiastically with the view that when we conceive of our self as being something which was present in our childhood body and which is also present in our adult body, we are in fact simply forming a convenient concept of permanent identity. But whereas Dharmakīrti would claim further that there is no real identity (ātmā) at all, Utpaladeva claims that this conceptualisation is an activity of the (universal) self, and that it is a kind of recognition: ("pūrvābhāsākhyā-haṃkārānāmaikyayojanā ..... pramātṛvyāpārarūpā kalpanaiva pratyabhijñākhyā", Vṛtti on ĪPK I.58)

For Dharmakīrti, kalpanā (conceptualisation) is a natural objective process in the sense that it is not the operation of any self or knower. Its operations are

1 cittattvaṃ māyayā hitvā bhinna evāvabhāti yaḥ
dehe buddhāvatha prāṇe kalpite nabhasīva vā
pramātṛtvenāhamiti vimarśo 'nyavyapohanāt
vikalpa eva sa parapratiyogyavabhāsajaḥ

kādācitkāvabhāse yā pūrvābhāsādiyojanā
saṃskārātkalpanā proktā sāpi bhinnāvabhāsini

Cf. also above p.92

restricted to concepts, it does not grasp the nature of sense-perception, the svalakṣaṇa. According to Dharmakīrti, the unifications formed by concepts exist only in the conceptual realm, they do not exist in the svalakṣaṇas, which are infinitely numerous and each entirely unique.

For Utpaladeva, on the other hand, Kalpanā is an activity of the self, and the unifications it forms do appear in cognition, and as such are real. Utpaladeva must hold that the unifications formed by Kalpanā are real, if he is to establish that they are produced by the activity of a real permanent self, since all his arguments to prove the existence of such a self depend upon the view that the self provides the unity between the phenomena in our experience.

Thus in the argument from memory, Utpaladeva must assume that there is a real unity between the consciousness of the time of remembering and the consciousness at the time of the original experience. If this unity is real, it will constitute evidence for a consciousness which is beyond time, but if it is confined to the conceptual realm alone, and depends only upon latent impressions from the former experience which are present at the time of the later remembering, then Dharmakīrti may again claim that the eternal consciousness is merely a concept.

Moreover in the argument that the object is identical with Illustration, Utpaladeva assumes that the relation between subject and object in cognition is a relation of unity-in-multiplicity, and that this unity must somehow be part of the essence or "self" (ātmā) of the object. Utpaladeva does not allow for the possibility of external relations[1] betwen consciousness and the objects in cognition, thus when he argues that :

> "There is the Appearance of the Lord and the collection of entities which rest in Him, for without this (Appearance) the Apprehensions of the will would not occur." ĪPK I.41

Utpaladeva assumes that in order for a potter to be able to decide that he will make a pot, this projected pot must be contained in his awareness. We have noted above[2] that it is in fact only Śiva who makes the pot, and in his Vimarśinī on IPK I.41 Abhinavagupta argues that the real pot must be fully contained in Śiva's awareness.

Here again the assumption is that the relation between an object we wish to get (e.g. the pot next door) and the object itself must be based upon an ontological unity, not merely a conceptual unity between the individual consciousness of the object and the object itself, this unity being provided by Śiva.

1 in G.E. Moore's sense.

2 pp.166-168

We saw in Chapter Two that Utpaladeva argues that the existence or non-existence of the object must be "established" by the subject, and since the object's existence must be defined in terms of its appearance to consciousness, it therefore must be essentially related to consciousness - there must also be an ontological dependence. Utpaladeva restricts the notion of what "exists" to what "appears to exist",[1] and hence there is for him no opposite of Illustration:

> "This act of Attention [in the form of] "I", which is the essence of Illustration and whose form is [supreme] speech, is not a concept, since the latter is a decision regarding two things.[2]
>
> For there can be the Appearance of two things which are separate such as pot and non-pot, but there is no Appearance of another thing which is like Illustration yet different from it [i.e. its opposite] " ĪPK I.53-4

Abhinavagupta argues in his Vimarśinī on the latter verse that if we conceive of something which is not Illustration, its non-Illustratedness ceases to exist.

However, when Utpaladeva demonstrates the existence of the self by arguing that the unity between related cognitions and Appearances is provided by the self, Utpaladeva assumes a prior multiplicity of elements

1 Cp. "nāprakāśaśca siddhyati" ĪPK I.34, translated above p.178

2 See also above p.233

which are to be unified.[1]

It is natural that he should start from the view-point of multiplicity and prove the existence of unity, since his aim is to demon strate the ultimate non-duality of Śiva and the world to those who are ignorant and perceive divisions between themselves and objects. However, if Utpaladeva is to show not only that there is diversity and also unity, but further that ultimately there is only unity, he must explain how diversity comes about.

Utpaladeva's ontogenic model of a hierarchical sequence of tattvas is an adaptation of a model which was originated by the Sāṃkhya philosophy. Dualist Śaiva Tantrics added several tattvas beyond puruṣa and prakṛti, and hence had a "pure" and "impure" creation, but the distinction between Śiva and Māyā (which act as a superior kind of puruṣaprakṛti pair), and between these and paśu (the individual self) remained in the "Tattvatraya".[2]

In Utpaladeva's system, the hierarchy of tattvas is interpreted as deriving entirely from Śiva, and hence a non-dualist emmanationist view of the world is maintained. The tattvakrama that Utpaladeva uses explains how we come to have a stable, apparently objective world due to the functioning of Māyā and the powers of

1 Cf. ĪPK I.22 (translated in Appendix A), ĪPK 1.69 and ĪPK I.87

2 The three categories of Siddhānta Śaivism, Pati, Paśu and Pāśa.

Determination etc, and how the presence of malas produces enduring limitations in individual consciousnesses[1]. Using this model Utpaladeva can explain how there can be a real mother-of-pearl existing in an inter-subjective world when we mistakenly perceive silver. But although this model provides us with an explanation of the origin of stable objects in the world, it provides no analysis of the contents of particular limited cognitions, and in order to adapt this essentially dualist model to his views on the identity of everything with consciousness, Utpaladeva must use the model of Illustration and Attention, explaining the reification of consciousness as a contraction of Attention. Thus the whole universe is Illustration (or Appearance), and limited cognitions are limited forms of Attention, which grasp only limited Appearances.

But this explanation of cognition in terms of Appearances is borrowed from a Buddhist analysis of perception, and hence Utpaladeva may use it to explain the contents of particular perceptions, but not to explain how these contents derive from Śiva's consciousness whilst appearing as external objects. Hence the stability of these contents when not in perception becomes questionable. For in the Buddhist view, the multiplicity of Appearances is beginningless, and the multiplicity of svalakṣaṇas is absolute.

1 See ĪPK III.7-16, and above pp.89-90

Thus when the Pratyabhijñā analyses particular acts of memory, true and false knowledge, action and causation, the content of these experiences is analysed in terms of Appearances.

Utpaladeva avoids the problem of an absolute multiplicity of svalakṣaṇas by claiming that they are composed of multiple Appearances, each of which is like a universal. But when Utpaladeva argues for the existence of a permanent self as a rememberer, his adoption of the Appearance explanation becomes a problem.

For if he was using only the (realist) tattva-krama model, and held that a particular external object was perceived at a particular time by a limited cognition, his argument that "in order to remember the experience of the external object we need a consciousness beyond the limitations of time" might be more forceful. But because the Appearance of "toast" is a universal, it is the <u>same</u> toast-Appearance that I cognise in my afternoon's memory. And in so far as "I see" and "I imagine" are <u>also</u> universal Appearances[1], the occurrence of all these may be recorded by saṃskāras at the time of the original perception, and in order to re-experience my breakfast, it is only necessary that these saṃskāras should be evoked in the afternoon - <u>not</u> that my two awarenesses should be unified in an eternal self.

1 See above p.191

But the major problem for Utpaladeva's metaphysics comes in his analysis of true and false perceptions, when he attempts to reconcile his real stable world of the tattva-krama with his idealist analysis of perception: what is perception a perception <u>of</u>?

Utpaladeva states on the one hand that

> "Therefore He [the supreme Self] makes Himself into an object, but there is no object with a separate existence [from consciousness], since to be divided towards that would impair His Autonomy"[1] (ĪPK I.46)

and on the other hand that

> "Thus the everyday world, whether pure or impure, is experienced in the Lord, who is studded with the Appearances of mutually separated objects"[2] (ĪPK I.77)

But the relation between the objects of the tattva-krama and the collections of Appearances in perception is unclear[3]. Nor is it entirely clear how the multiplicity of Appearances rests in Śiva's awareness, given Utpaladeva's assertion at ĪPK II.6:

1 ātmānamata evāyaṃ jñeyīkuryātpṛthaksthiti
jñeyaṃ na tu tadaunmukhyāt khaṇḍyetāsya svatantratā

2 itthamityarthabhinnārthāvabhāsakhacite vibhau
samalo vimalo vāpi vyavahāro 'nubhūyate

3 We have seen above (p.222) that Abhinavagupta gives only a rudimentary sketch of the correspondence between tattvas and Appearances.

"But in all cases this difference in Appearances which causes temporal sequence occurs (only) for the knower-of-the-void etc. [śūnyādipramātuḥ] whose Appearance is limited, but not for that knower who appears once and for all."[1]

We must resolve this apparent contradiction by saying that just as there are various kinds of external (bāhya)[2], there are also various kinds of "difference" (bheda), and that the lack of "difference in Appearances" in Śiva refers to their lack of distinction from Him, i.e. their lack of externality in the second sense[3].

However, even when Appearances are "internal" in Śiva, there is a plurality of them:

> "The external presence and absence of Apperances [i.e. their presence and absence for limited cognitions] is an attribute (of these Appearances), not their essence. Therefore they always have existence, since they always exist internally." ĪPK I.82

The plurality of Appearances in Śiva is clear from the final phrase "sattā tatasteṣām āntarānāṃ satāṃ sadā" Moreover, if it is only the universal Appearances which exist when not perceived by individuals, and not the combinations of these Appearances which constitute complete objects in space and time, such as tables, then

1 sarvatrābhāsabhedo 'pi bhavetkālakramākaraḥ
vicchinnābhāsaḥ śūnyādermāturbhātasya no sakṛt
See also above p.138

2 See above pp.148-153

3 Above p.148

there will be no complete objects other than individually perceived objects, and this will lead to problems with Utpaladeva's theory of illusion. For Utpaladeva does want to say that a real, inter-subjective piece of mother-of-pearl exists when I only perceive silver.

But Utpaladeva also claims that there are no objects which exist independently of consciousness, and we saw in Chapter Six that the Pratyabhijñā argues from the premise that the object is identical with Illustration in a particular cognition. Here once again we see Utpaladeva's reluctance to distinguish between the individual self and Śiva. For if an object can be external to a particular individual, in the sense that the destruction of the individual's consciousness would produce no change in the object, then it will be difficult for Utpaladeva to prove that the object is not independent of Śiva's consciousness also, given his view that consciousness is consciousness, whether limited or unlimited.[1]

1 Compare Abhinavagupta's Vimarśinī on ĪPK I.2: an objector says that a limited knower could attempt to prove the existence of an unlimited knower. Abhinavagupta replies that the word "omni" in "omniscience" and "omnipotence" does not make any difference to the essential nature of knowledge and action. For even in the dualist view [he argues], the Lord's eternal actions of knowledge and will to act are not affected by the presence or absence of limited objects which are not their causes.

"nanu sarvakartṛtvasarvajñatve pramāturna staḥ; na khalu sarvaśabdārtho jñātṛkartṛtvayoḥ svarūpaṃ bhinatti, bhedadarśane 'pi īśvarajñānacikīrṣāyatnādernityasya viṣayeṇa akāraṇabhūtena anādheyātiśayatvāt" ĪPKV I p.30 ll.15-19.

Indeed, Abhinavagupta's argument that the identity of the object with Illustration in perception takes the form "this object is Illustrated to me"[1] implies that the object is indeed "identical" with the individual's consciousness in perception. And we have seen in Chapter Seven that unifications between Appearances depend upon the individual's perception in a similar way. For Utpaladeva has argued that an object cannot be both single and multiple in order to refute the existence of the external[2] object, and given this lack of possibility for unifications of Appearances apart from particular consciousnesses, it will be impossible for a complete table to exist unperceived by an individual.

The fundamental contradiction between the multiple-Appearance model of objects and the tattva-krama model, is that according to the latter an Appearance of colour such as "red", corresponding to the rūpatanmātra-tattva[3], only Appears after consciousness has taken upon itself the limitations of space and time by manifesting Māyā and its Kañcukas[4]. So how can it be a "universal" Appearance, divorced from space and time?[5]

1 Above p.165

2 Cf. above p.185

3 The eighth tattva, one of the last in the sequence of emmanation.

4 See above pp.87-88

5 Cf. above p.73

And we have seen that the problems of reconciling the Appearance ontology with Utpaladeva's Illustration/Attention and tattvakrama metaphysical models is apparent not only with regard to the contents of specific perceptions, but also with regard to the perceptions themselves. We have seen that there is no explanation of the "pseudo-vimarśa" in illusory perception.

Although we have seen that it is difficult for the Pratyabhijñā to give a coherent explanation of the difference between illusory and valid perception, it is nevertheless no more true of Utpaladeva than it is of Abhinavagupta to say that he holds "illusionistic theories".[1] Certainly Utpaladeva wishes to maintain the distinction between everyday reality and illusion, but we could accurately describe his view as claiming that "all is Appearance". This does not imply that all is false, for he claims that there is nothing other than Appearance in comparison to which we could say Appearance was false.[2] If something consistently appears to be real, then it is. But the most real entity is that which appears as real all the time - Śiva.[3]

1 Pace Kupetz. Cf. above p.95

2 Since Śiva is prakāśa.

3 Cp. above p.222

We may conclude that Utpaladeva offers us no convincing refutation of either his Buddhist opponent or his dualist fellow Tantric, and that ultimately Śiva's creation of the world is explained as magic.[1] But we must note that since Utpaladeva accepts that recognition is a form of conceptualisation[2], he will in fact have achieved his purpose if he brings his readers to the belief that he is correct, even if he is not. We may once again use Utpaladeva's analogy of the lady and the man in the garden. If her friend convinces her that this man is her lover, she will immediately fall in love with him, and experience the full expansion of her heart.

The purpose of Utpaladeva's equating our individual selves with Śiva is to elevate our consciousness, to help us to transcend human limitations. He claims that

> "He who sees the Self and its powers of knowledge and action correctly in this way, knows and does whatever he likes"[3] ĪPK.IV.15

But in so far as no <u>objective</u> change takes place in the process of recognition (since Utpaladeva holds that we are already identical with Śiva), but only a change in understanding, even yogis who have realised their identity

1 Cf. ĪPK I.38, translated above p.185

2 See above, p.252

3 evamātmānametasya saṃyagjñānakriye tathā
paśyanyathepsitānarthāñjānāti ca karoti ca

identity with Śiva and gained the powers of magic creation[1] do not in fact become changed as individuals. For as individuals they have no more freedom to act than other individuals - it is simply that the Lord's freedom to magically create manifests through enlightened individuals and not through others.

Ultimately there is no subject other than Śiva, and Śiva's absolute freedom is, from the individual's standpoint, absolute determinism. For there is no agent other than Śiva, and in all cases it is simply Śiva who manifests all the combinations of phenomena in consciousness, and the individual who appears to act. We must not, however, say: "who only appears to act".

1 Cf. above p.152

Appendix A

The Argument from Memory, ĪPK I.6-31

[Buddhist:] "Surely there is one [form of] knowledge, the Appearance of the svalakṣaṇa, and another[1] called "conceptual", which is manifold and contains verbalisation, and neither of these [forms of knowledge] belongs to any permanent perceiver, because such a perceiver does not appear here [in our experience], and this cognition of "I" refers to the body etc." 6-7

[Sāṃkhyavādin:] "But when an experience has ceased to exist, how could there be a memory which corresponds to it, if there were no permanent self as experiencer?" 8

[Buddhist:] "Even if the self existed, how could there be memory of perceived objects after the anihilation of experience [since memory reaches its object[2]] via experience?" 9a-c

[Sāṃkhyavādin:] "But the object of memory is the same as the object of the experience, because memory is possible due to the latent impressions of previous experiences." 9c-10b

[Buddhist:] "If this is so, what is the point of this wormeaten[3] permanent self? 10c-10d

Therefore since the form of this [self] remains unchanged (when) various properties (dharma) [occur], and because saṃskāras [suffice] in the establishment of memory, the rememberer, like the perceiver, is a [mere] concept (kalpitaḥ). 11

1 "param"; this also implies "subsequent". Dharmakīrti's view is that the conceptual knowledge occurs <u>after</u> the moment of sense-perception.

2 yā smṛtiḥ tasyām anubhavo dṛgātmā "dvāram" arthāṃśa-sparśe, ĪPKV I p.63

3 "antargaḍu" lit. "filled with worms", i.e. useless, a source of irritation.

[Buddhist:] "And if knowledge is of the form of consciousness, like the self, then why is it impermanent?" 12a-b

[Sāṃkhyavādin:] "But it is unconscious (jaḍa)" 12c

[Buddhist:] "How can it illustrate objects?" 12c-d

[Sāṃkhyavādin:] "Well, just as buddhi takes on the form of the object, similarly (it takes on the) consciousness of the self." 13a-c

[Buddhist:] "In that case, it is conscious, [but] if it is unconscious, it cannot illustrate objects. 13c-d

And the action of an object such as a body is [simply that object's] arising in various places. It is nothing more than this, because we experience nothing more than this, and it is not one sequential thing belonging to one [agent]. 14

We experience nothing more than such and such occuring followed by such and such, and there is no relation other than that of cause and effect. 15

Because something which has a dual locus is multiform, something which is established does not rely on anything else, and such things as "dependence on another" are inappropriate. Therefore the agent too is a [mere] concept (kalpita)." 16

.....

[Utpaladeva:] "True, but although the memory-knowledge arises from the impressions of previous experiences, it remains in itself, and therefore does not know the previous experience. 17

For perception is self-manifesting, it is not known by another (perception) just as a perception of taste [is not known] by a perception of colour. The arising from latent impressions [produces] similarity with that [previous experience], not the knowledge of it." 18

[Buddhist:] "But even though memory does not have that [previous experience] as its object, because we decide that [i.e., that this is the case], the object of [memory-] perception [the previous experience] is seen by an illusion." 19a-c

[Utpaladeva:] "This is untenable. 19d

Just how can an illusion be memory, and how can it establish its object? And why do you claim that it relies upon the latent impressions of previous experiences? 20

And if the decision is an illusion, the establishment of an object cannot come from what is unconscious. [If you say:] Therefore it is conscious, no establishment of an object can come from that [either] since it remains within its own confines. 21

In this way, the affairs of the world (janasthiti) would cease, since they arise from the unification of knowledges which are separate from each other and do not cognise each other, 22

Unless there were the Great Lord, whose form is the endless universe which is created within Him, whose body is consciousness, and who posseses the powers of knowledge, memory and distinguishing. 23

.....

For it is He who is the cogniser of the previously experienced object, and who, existing later also, freely grasps (vimarśan) "that", and [hence] it is said "he remembers." 24

And He manifests the previously manifested svalakṣaṇa, Apprehending it acording to His purpose in His own [later] time, either as a mere Appearance of pot, or in its entirety. 25

And it is unreasonable [to hold that] the remembered thing appears separately from memory, therefore it is He [the Lord] who is the knower of the unity of consciousnesses of different times. 26

For the previous experience does not appear in memory separately, like an object, since it appears as based upon the self, as in "I previously experienced". 27

Not even for yogis do perceptions appear in other perceptions; they [others' perceptions] appear as one with their own [yogi's] consciousness. Or even if they [others' perceptions] do appear objectively, 28

[as when] one remembers: "The perception I had was like that", this is only a different verbal analysis of the memory: "[It was] perceived by me." 29

And this decision "I see this" or "This is a pot" apprehends a perception which inheres in the decision-maker. 30

Therefore whether one apprehends [the perception] as "It is perceived by me" (mayā dṛśyate), "This is perceived" (dṛṣṭo 'yam), or "That", two things separated into subject and object appear in the [one] knower. 31

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Utpaladeva's Doctrine of Recognition

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This thesis is the first detailed exposition of Utpaladeva's Pratyabhijñāvāda. Dr. J. Kupetz is the only scholar to date who has devoted a full-length work to it.

The present thesis points out that the work of Dr. J. Kupetz, which claims that there is a difference between Utpaladeva's metaphysics and those of Abhinavagupta is founded upon a grave distortion of a few deliberately selected phrases.

In order to give a clear and accurate representation of Utpaladeva's system, we begin with some general remarks concerning the nature of his philosophy, and move later in the thesis to discussion of specific problems.

An examination of the role of proof (siddhi) in Utpaladeva's system, and his view of the relation between philosophical analysis (tarka) and the development of consciousness is followed by a discussion of the basic categories of Utpaladeva's metaphysics - prakāśa, vimarśa, parāmarśa, ābhāsa, svalakṣaṇa and the tattvakrama.

We then analyse Utpaladeva's application of these categories to three problems:

First; the explanation of memory, which Utpaladeva claims is only possible as an activity of a permanent self.

Second; the nature of objectivity. We see here how Utpaladeva argues for the view that there is no object apart from consciousness.

Third; relations - we see how Utpaladeva's metaphysical views are all dependent upon a particular analysis of relations, and that he has difficulty in maintaining consistency in his explanation of true and false perceptions, due to the inherent contradiction between the hierarchical tattvakrama which Utpaladeva uses as his ontogenic model and the ābhāsa/vimarśa model with which he explains particular perceptions.

We conclude that if comparisons are to be made between the Pratyabhijñāvāda and other Indian philosophical systems, the most significant comparisons are to be made not with Śaṅkara's Advaitavedānta, but with the Buddhism of Dharmakīrti and with the Śaivasiddhānta.

c.80,000 words.