Revising Supply and Demand:

Women's Electoral Participation and Performance Where Parties are Diverse, Personalism Prevails, and Corruption is Commonplace

Word count: 99,899
Student number: 683360

Trinity, 2019

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford.

Abstract

This dissertation has two ambitions. First, it presents renovations to the Supply and Demand Model for analysing variation in women's descriptive outcomes in elective office. It advances these by demonstrating their utility in assessments of Brazilian mayoral elections. Second, by clarifying that the model should be considered porous to external influence, the project pursues the empirical ambition of bringing spatial econometrics to the study of women's representation in a context with thousands of contiguous voting districts, and a diversity of party institutionalisation on par with global variation.

My main revisions to the Supply and Demand Model are the inclusion of proportional comparison with the represented (whereas the original framework began with party voters), and the redefinition of stages of recruitment prior to candidacy in de facto terms, by what is routinised. Defining stages by routinisation elasticises the model, enabling the nature and number of stages to vary, and to exist outside of the party. This perspective brings out a distinction between the single route towards candidacy of highly institutionalised parties—whether these parties adhere to written recruitment rules or not—and the multiple, parallel recruitment pathways of weakly institutionalised parties. The revised model is sensitive to shifts in gendered voter demand, which can affect outcomes in candidate-centric systems.

By analysing data from randomised, municipal government audits, I find that the scale of violations by a male incumbent who is seeking re-election predicts female candidates' vote share and women's proportional candidacies, but only in municipalities with AM radio stations in certain later stages of an electoral cycle. A novel dataset of rerun elections adds weight to the argument that the activation of the female incorruptibility stereotype among voters is driving these changes. I then demonstrate that women's candidacies and incumbencies generate interdependence and spillover effects, respectively, using various spatial model specifications.

Acknowledgements

The chapters in this thesis reflect the kindness of many people. My friends, some also researching dissertations and writing up, have been wonderfully supportive and fun with their solidarity, and their WhatsApp hug, rainbow and coffee, coffee, coffee icons. My family, Mum and Dad, Sarah, Mark and, recently, Charlie—all residents of English villages with no particular interest in political science—have learned far more than they ever wanted to about Brazilian mayoral elections, and pretended not to mind. My students at Oxford University's School of Government have kept me smiling and focused on ultimate goals, even as I worked full time as a lecturer alongside this project during its final months.

The biggest thank you by far is reserved for my supervisor, Timothy Power. Tim is simply the best supervisor than any thesis student could ever have. His supervision played a large part in my decision to continue from MPhil to DPhil, rather than move to London and get a job. He has read some terrible early chapter drafts, put up with me missing deadlines as I juggled teaching commitments, and always been an incisive, caring, and inspiring with his constructive criticism.

Anna Petherick, June 2019

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

Trends

For decades the global disparity in the descriptive representation of men and women in formal politics has been shrinking, a pattern that, although steady, is perhaps the most dramatic trend within the remit of political science. The world did not know an elected female president until 1980[1]. Now 74 countries have elected a woman as head of state or head of government[2]. At the turn of the millennium, the world's legislatures were composed of just 13.1%[3] women, on average. In 2019, this percentage has nearly doubled; it stands at 24.3%[4]. Information about subnational levels of government is harder to come by, though in Latin America, at least, the proportion of women mayors and local councillors has also increased over the same period. The broad trend of rising women's descriptive representation[5] is inextricable from the symbolic

[1] The first elected woman president was Vigdís Finnbogadóttir of Iceland. Previously, Isabel Martínez de Perón, as vice-president, succeeded to the presidency of Argentina upon the death of her husband in 1974. The world's first female prime minister was Sirimavo Bandaranaike of present-day Sri Lanka, in 1960.

[2] As of July 2019. The most up-to-date list is regularly updated on Wikipedia. 'List of Elected and Appointed Female Heads of State and Government'. Retrieved 27 July 2019, from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_elected_and_appointed_female_heads_of_state_and_government

[3] 'Women in National Parliaments. Situation as of 25 January 2000'. Retrieved 27 July 2019, from: http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/world250100.htm

[4] 'Women in National Parliaments. Situation as of 1 April 2019'. Retrieved 27 July 2019, from: http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/world010419.htm

[5] Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation,* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). Note that I use the phrase 'descriptive representation' in a somewhat restrictive sense compared to Pitkin's definition. Unless otherwise stated, in this dissertation I employ it—as does much of the literature—as a shorthand way of referring to the composition of elected representatives vis-à-vis the composition of the represented. There are more expansive ways of thinking about descriptive representation, such as the extent to which members of a social group 'speak as' representatives of a group, using words or phrases that invoke group membership. Symbolic representation 'brings a corresponding notion', in Pitkin's words, of what is being represented.

communication of expanding opportunity for women[6] and girls[7]—a signal that is, quite obviously, directly relevant to slightly more than half of the world's population.

Some symbolic benefits of this pattern are thought to accrue to men, as well[8]. Men who lack titles, wealth and connections, or who are not part of the dominant religious or ethnic group, usually encounter poorer odds of standing in and winning elections. For these men, observing women doing better implies that, over time, lacking traditionally favoured descriptive traits is becoming less of an impediment to participation in formal politics. For both men and women there are reasons to expect that the trend encourages sentiments that political systems are becoming fairer[9], and more effective at delivering representation in a substantive sense[1011].

[6] Lonna Rae Atkeson and Nancy Carrillo, (2007) 'More Is Better: The Influence of Collective Female Descriptive Representation on External Efficacy', *Politics & Gender*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 79–101.
[7] Christina Wolbrecht and David E. Campbell, (2007) 'Leading by Example: Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 921–939.
[8] To the extent that men assess the legitimacy of formal politics sociotropically. See: Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and William Mishler, (2005) 'An Integrated Model of Women's Representation', *The Journal of Politics,* vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 407–28.
[9] Jeffrey A. Karp, and Susan A. Banducci, (2008) 'When Politics Is Not Just a Man's Game: Women's Representation and Political Engagement', *Electoral Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 105–15.
[10] Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 'An Integrated Model of Women's Representation', pp. 407–28.
[11] Susan A. Banducci, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp, (2004) 'Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 534–556.

Indeed, data from Argentina[12][13], Colombia[14], Costa Rica[15], Honduras[16], the United States[17-21], and Scandinavia[22] show that the more women in a parliament, the more laws are initiated that pertain to women's interests[23]. To be sure, there is less convincing evidence that this leads to changes in policy outcomes—given the institutional complications of working within congresses[24-26] and bureaucracies[27]—though some studies have found a link[28-30]. Because of the consequences of increasing women's descriptive representation[31], a flurry of international initiatives seek to

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[12] Mark P Jones. (1997) 'Legislator Gender and Legislator Policy Priorities in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and the United States House of Representatives', *Policy Studies Journal*, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 613–29.
[13] Susan S. Franceschet and Jennifer Piscopo, (2008) 'Gender Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina', *Politics & Gender*, vol. *4*, no. 3, pp. 393-425.
[14] Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, 'Still Supermadres? (2006) Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 570–85.
[15] Ibid. pp. 570–85.
[16] Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson and Roseanna Michelle Heath, (2003) 'Do Women Legislators Have Different Policy Priorities than Their Male Colleagues?: A Critical Case Test', *Women & Politics*, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 77–101.
[17] Michelle Swers. (2005) 'Connecting Descriptive and Substantive Representation: An Analysis of Sex Differences in Cosponsorship Activity', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 407–33.
[18] Jones, 'Legislator Gender and Legislator Policy Priorities in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and the United States House of Representatives', pp. 613–29.
[19] Michele Swers, (1998) 'Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women's Issue Bills than Their Male Colleagues?' *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 435.
[20] Kathleen A Bratton, (2005) 'Critical Mass Theory Revisited: The Behavior and Success of Token Women in State Legislatures', *Politics & Gender*, vol. 1, pp. 97–125.
[21] Arturo Vega and Juanita M. Firestone, (1995) 'The Effects of Gender on Congressional Behavior and the Substantive Representation of Women', *Legislative Studies Quarterly,* vol. 20, pp. 213–22.
[22] Torild Skard and Elina Haavio-Mannila, 'Women in Parliament', in Elina Haavio-Mannila, ed., *Unfinished Democracy: Women in Nordic Politics* (New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1985).
[23] Note that often whether scholars have demonstrated this link hinges on what exactly they define 'women's interests' to be. See: Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, 'Representing Women', in Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, eds., *Representation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 205–24.
[24] Yann P. Kerevel and Lonna Rae Atkeson, (2013) 'Explaining the Marginalization of Women in Legislative Institutions,' *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 75, no. 4, pp. 980–992.
[25] Lena Wängnerud, (2009) 'Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation', *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 51–69.
[26] Franceschet & Piscopo, 'Gender Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation', pp. 393-425.
[27] Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 21.
[28] Kathleen A. Bratton & Leonard P. Ray, (2002) 'Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day Care Coverage in Norway', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 46, no. 2, pp.428–37.
[29] Vega and Firestone, 'The Effects of Gender on Congressional Behavior and the Substantive Representation of Women', pp. 213–22.
[30] Bratton, 'Critical Mass Theory Revisited', pp. 97–125.
[31] Leslie Schwindt-Bayer and William Mishler find that" 'descriptive representation, rather than substantive representation, emerges [from their analysis]… as the keystone to the representation of women…the glue that binds the several dimensions of representation together into something

accelerate the trend. Organisations including the United Nations[32], World Bank[33], and OECD[34] to name but a few, have programmes to mobilise, train, and connect women, hoping to shrink the gender disparity in formal politics even more.

Yet, while global averages show clear, positive gradients, this 'view from the moon' conceals widening variation around the mean. Women are making it into legislatures and executive offices in some wealthy countries far more than in others—as they are in some developing countries far more than in others. There are many reasons to think that democracy should make it easier for women to become political representatives[35], and a quick correlation analysis confirms the association[36]. But the story is far from straightforward: in 2018, for example, China was in the 91st percentile globally for the proportion of women in the national legislature—the National People's Congress—and the 33rd percentile for electoral democracy.

Leaving executive roles aside for a moment, one plausible explanation on which to hang the expanding divergence in countries' percentages of national-level female legislators might be the

representing a coherent whole'. Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and William Mishler, 'An Integrated Model of Women's Representation', pp. 422.

32 UN Women runs many training events in different countries. For example, in the run up to Kenya's 2013 elections, UN Women provided training to nearly 900 female candidates in all 47 counties in the country and ran a Campaign for Women in Leadership to encourage voters to vote for women. 'In Brief: Women's Leadership and Political Participation', 2013, New York: UN Women.

33 World Bank has a Global Parliamentary Engagement team that conducts surveys of the experiences and perspectives of women in parliaments. 'Survey of Female Parliamentarians Around the World', 8 March 2019. Retrieved from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2019/03/08/survey-of-female-parliamentarians-around-the-world

34 OECD Middle East and Africa section in particular runs events aimed at 'empowering and strengthening capacity and skills of women parliamentarians'. See: 'OECD Gender Equality in the MENA Region'. Retrieved 28 July 2019, from: http://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/gender-equality-in-public-life/

35 For example, Andrew Reynolds argues that liberal tradition of fairness, pluralism, and tolerance facilitates the entry and permanence of women in key political positions. See: Andrew Reynolds, (1999) 'Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling', *World Politics*, vol. 51, pp. 547-72.

36 The correlation coefficient of the variables 'electoral democracy index' and 'the percentage of lower chamber female legislators' for all years in the V-Dem dataset is 0.34 ($p<0.0001$); for 1998 to 2018, it is 0.28 ($p<0.0001$).




Figure 1.1. Change in the national average proportions of women elected to national legislatures worldwide. Means refer to averages of national averages (in %). Variances refer to variances around the average of national averages (in $\%^2$). Data source: V-Dem[38].

introduction of gender quotas. More and more states have instituted these in recent decades, such that today more than half of the world's countries[37] have a gender quota on the books—even if it is painless for political parties to ignore the rules in a good number of them. But this does not explain the pattern: the variance around the mean of women's parliamentary presence is rising in both states with gender quotas and in those without. Figure 1.1 shows this for the 179 countries in the V-Dem dataset.

[37] More than 130 countries have gender quotas. Mona Lena Krook and Pär Zetterberg, *Gender Quotas and Women's Representation: New Directions in Research,* (Routledge, 2017). For an updated list, see: http://www.quotaproject.org.

[38] Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, et al, 'V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9' Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2019.




Figure 1.2. Change in the national average proportions of women elected mayor and local councillor in Latin America. Means refer to averages of national averages (in %). Variances refer to variances around the average of national averages (in $\%^2$). Data source: CEPALSTAT. The data about women elected to subnational legislatures in Latin America refers to 26 countries[41]. The data for women elected as mayors in Latin America refer to 28 countries[42].

No one has yet collated global data detailing percentages of women in elected subnational roles[39]. However, in Latin America variance is rising around both the average percentage of female mayors, and the average percentage of elected female local councillors[40]—and again, the trend for these legislative positions is true among countries with gender quotas and among those that lack them (Figure 1.2).

[39] UN Women recently advertised a new position to gather such data, towards the fuller evaluation of the Sustainable Development Goal 5. See: 'Indicator 5.5.1b: Proportion of Seats Held by Women in Local Governments', Retrieved 4 August 2019, from: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/files/Metadata-05-05-01b.pdf

[41] Retrieved from: https://oig.cepal.org/es/indicadores/mujeres-concejalas-electas

[42] Retrieved from: https://oig.cepal.org/es/indicadores/mujeres-alcaldesas-electas




Figure 1.3. Four-yearly snapshots of the distribution of the percentages of female mayors in 28 Latin American countries. Data source: CEPALSTAT.

It is the core business of academia to make sense of variation. And scholarly endeavour in this field is often justified in terms of the potential for downstream, normatively positive impacts on the lives of women and girls. Yet most of the literature on women's descriptive representation focuses on patterns in elections to national parliaments[43]—not on subnational elections, nor on executive contests. This is curious given that growth in variation among countries—at least among Latin American countries—is happening more rapidly at the subnational level, and even more rapidly for local executive posts than it is for local legislative roles[44]. Figure 1.3 depicts the shifting distribution of national average percentages of women mayors in Latin America over the past two decades, and shows that rising variance is not due to one or two outlier countries.

[42] Retrieved from: https://oig.cepal.org/es/indicadores/mujeres-alcaldesas-electas

[43] Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon and Kendall D. Funk, 'Chapter 6: Women's Representation in Subnational Governments', in Leslie A., Schwindt-Bayer, ed., *Gender and Representation in Latin America*, (Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press, February 2018), p.1.

[44] The standard deviation for the percentage of women in various elected positions between 1998 and 2018, has grown 1.40 times for national legislatures worldwide, compared to 1.81 times for local legislatures in Latin America, and 2.16 times for local executives in Latin America over the same period. If only the last decade is considered, the differences are more dramatic.

If the point about making sense of variation were not enough to encourage scholars to plough more time and energy into studying alcaldesas and prefeitas—and the incentives and institutional structures with which they grapple—there is also some evidence that women in executive roles are especially well positioned to deliver substantive policy change promoting women's interests[4546]. Meanwhile, these are the political jobs that women don't seem to get: averages and medians of women's descriptive representation are lower for local executives than for local and national legislators. Moreover, executive roles are typically more powerful[47], stereotyped as more masculine[48], and, from a research point of view, mayoral elections are comparatively easy to make sense of, since they are simple, unipersonal contests.

Making Sense of Trends

A fruitful way of understanding why women achieve very different levels of electoral success in different contexts is to study processes behind the trends. At least in democracies and hybrid regimes, for anyone to become a candidate and get elected, they must navigate the internal workings of political parties and then win votes. Political science's standard model for assessing outcomes in women's political recruitment—the Supply and Demand Model, developed by Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski[49]—is rooted in the experience of the United Kingdom, and so

[45] Kathleen A. Bratton and Leonard P. Ray find that variation in the proportion of women elected to the council in 400 Norwegian local governments, over the years 1975 to 1991, predicts the provision of childcare for under-sevens by those governments. Bratton and Ray, (2002) 'Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day Care Coverage in Norway', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 428-437.
[46] Kendall D. Funk, Thiago Silva and Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, (2017) 'Leading toward Equality: The Effect of Women Mayors on Gender Equality in Local Bureaucracies', *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 21, pp. 1–20.
[47] Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and Catherine Reyes-Housholder, (2017) 'Citizen Responses to Female Executives: Is it Sex, Novelty, or Both?', *Politics, Groups and Identities,* vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 373–398.
[48] Ibid. pp. 373–398.
[49] Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

comes with various assumptions bound up in thinking about highly institutionalised political parties, and about voting districts with a preponderance of safe seats (in such circumstances, a party selectorate effectively operates as a job interview panel)[50]. In such a setting, de facto stages along a path to becoming a candidate, and what is involved in moving across stages towards that goal, tend to be a reasonably close match for the de jure rules that are recorded in party statutes. The original formulation of the Supply and Demand Model envisions the process of political recruitment as stepwise progression from an initial stage of voting for a particular party, to membership of that party in the local constituency, to an official application for candidacy, to then becoming a candidate, and finally to representing the party in elective office. By comparing the composition of these stages one by one, in terms of the proportion of members of a traditionally under-represented group, Norris and Lovenduski argue that their 'comprehensive'[51] explanatory framework allows for the identification of discriminatory choke points in the recruitment process.

There are logical shortcomings to this standard framework even when it is applied to the UK's main political parties, which I expand upon in later pages. But only those particular shortcomings would require fixing if the primary task facing academics who study women's descriptive representation was to explain variation in countries with formal, highly institutionalised political parties[52]. This is not the case. Instead, more substantial revisions are required to make the standard model generalisable to the diversity of political parties in the world's democracies. This assertion is underscored by asking whether the degree of

[50] In 1992, about 75% of British MP seats were 'safe' in the sense that they had majorities greater than 10%. Norris and Lovenduski, *Political Recruitment*, p. 14.
[51] Ibid. p. 194.
[52] This is to use a vocabulary of discussing the vast diversity of political parties that is also used by Flavia Freidenberg and Steven Levitsky. They use the broad categorisations of formal and highly institutionalised parties, informal and highly institutionalised parties, and informal and weakly institutionalised parties. See: Flavia Freidenberg and Steven Levitsky, 'Chapter 9: Informal Institutions and Party Organization in Latin America', in Steven Levitsky and Gretchen Helmke, eds., *Informal Institutions in Latin America*, (Washington DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2006).

institutionalisation of countries' main political parties predicts the change in women's descriptive representation that those countries have witnessed over time. If it does—and if more institutionalisation goes hand in hand with higher proportions of women—then there would be an argument that fixes to the standard model need not be too concerned about the habits of political parties that are wildly different from those found in the UK. The job of making sense of change in women's descriptive representation, broadly speaking, could be approached by detailing how women make their way through highly institutionalised parties, and understanding how parties become more or less institutionalised. However, if party institutionalisation does not predict women's descriptive representation, there is a bigger theoretical challenge. That would mean that interesting and important change is also occurring where parties are weakly institutionalised beasts—perhaps barely recognisable as parties[53] to those who go to work in the Palace of Westminster—and any standard, explanatory framework would need to be generalisable to these parties.

Table 1.1 shows the results of simple fixed effects[54] regression models when different measures of women's relative presence in parliaments and city halls are regressed on an index of the degree of institutionalisation of countries' main political parties. The models all use data from 1998 to 2018[55], the full range for which it is available across the outcomes in the table. In not one of them is the party institutionalisation variable significant at even the 90% level. This means that, within countries, whether political parties are becoming more or less internally organised, doing a

[53] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
[54] Fixed effects models are theoretically more appropriate than random effects models here, as within-country variation is of interest. Nonetheless, Haussman tests were conducted to underscore the appropriateness of this choice. For almost all of the models listed in the table, these tests were significant at the $p<0.001$ level, with the only exceptions being the 'Subnational Legislatures – All' model (for which the Hausmann test gave a non-significant result at the $p<0.05$ level, and the equivalent random effects model also reported a coefficient for party institutionalisation with a p-value of 0.455), and the 'Subnational Executives' model (for which the Hausmann test yielded a chi-squared statistic with a p-value of 0.06, and once again, the random effects model was not close to significance at the $p<0.1$ level).
[55] The CEPAL dataset begins in 1998 for subnational government data.

better or a worse job of maintaining local branches, and whether they are cementing or losing legislative cohesion, appears to have little to do with women's prospects for achieving elective office. Therefore, political science needs to make a decision. Either the standard model is simply too brittle to aid understanding of how women fare in settings that have little in common with the UK—and should be put aside when seeking to make sense of outcomes involving weakly institutionalised parties. Or it can and should be revised somehow to embrace the absence of adherence to formal rules, the clientelism, the cults of personality, and the seeming disorder that often characterise parties with much lower levels of institutionalisation.

Table 1.1. Country-level fixed effects models using an index of party institutionalisation to predict change in women's descriptive representation over a two-decade period.

DV: Percentage of Women Office Holders	**Elective Office**					
	National Legislatures - Countries with Quotas	National Legislatures - Countries without Quotas	Subnational Legislatures - All	Subnational Legislatures - Countries with Quotas	Subnational Legislatures - Countries without Quotas	Subnational Executives
Party Institutionalisation	1.0370 (1.6784)	4.8081 (3.8330)	0.8513 (7.9553)	-6.1763 (13.3848)	-5.7830 (8.7235)	-10.8432 (7.5508)
Constant	14.8653*** (1.0473)	19.1766*** (2.3295)	23.1401*** (5.3781)	30.7585*** (8.4225)	24.6543*** (6.3129)	17.3552** (5.1860)
N	2,571	983	413	209	204	461
Data	Global	Global	Latin America	Latin America	Latin America	Latin America

Significance codes: p<0.05 = *; p<0.01 =**; p<0.001 = ***. Data sources: The percentage of women office holders in national legislatures, information on presence a gender quota, and the party institutionalisation index are drawn from the V-Dem dataset[56]. This party institutionalisation index captures the proportion of a country's main political parties that reach a threshold of minimal institutionalisation and a measure of the links these parties establish with voters and elites[57]. The subnational data was downloaded from CEPALSTAT.

[56] Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, et al, 'V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9' Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2019.

[57] Fernando Bizzarro, Allen Hicken and Darin Self, 'The V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index: A New Global Indicator', V-Dem Working Paper Series 2017:48.

There are various considerations about the standard model's construction that are thrown up by weakly institutionalised parties. One is porosity. The Supply and Demand Model is impermeable in a partisan sense when it comes to the model's stages. Other than the first stage—the stage of voting for a particular party—stages are internal to the formal structures of the party[58]. Contrast this with what it means to move probabilistically closer to candidacy representing a weakly institutionalised party. That process can occur outside of any party; in some systems citizens pass though contingently defined stages towards becoming local notables, and then act as free agents in the decision to align with one political party over another in fielding a candidacy[59]. The stages of the Supply and Demand Model are also generally presented as located within the same voting unit, but Norris and Lovenduski point out that recruitment within a party can be more centralised or regionalised than is the case in the UK[60].

Porosity considerations relate to influences on progression across stages, too. In this sense, Norris and Lovenduski's field of view is again focused on intramural effects, though they accept that influences can emerge from inside and outside of the party, and from inside and outside of the voting district[61]. Here, however, there is an awkward fit with empirical research that investigates links between symbolic and descriptive forms of women's representation. It is typical for qualitative assessments of these connections to take it for granted that shifts in symbolic representation flow through partisan boundaries[62]. There is no conflict here with what

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58 Norris and Lovenduski, *Political Recruitment,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 15.
59 Lucas M. Novaes, (2018) 'Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties: Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 84–98.
60 In a chapter of *Political Recruitment,* they discuss centralized/regionalized/localised categorisations. Elsewhere in the book they state that over time the UK's political recruitment processes have become 'more formalised and slightly less localised', see p. 14.
61 Throughout *Political Recruitment*, discussion is mostly focused on intramural influences on progression. However, there are instances where the authors cast a broader vista. On p. 110, for example, they write, 'The parties operate within a broader political system, where opportunities to become a candidate are influenced by the legal system, the electoral system, legislative turnover, and the wider political culture'.
62 For example: Jennifer M. Piscopo, (2016) 'When Informality Advantages Women: Quota Networks, Electoral Rules and Candidate Selection in Mexico', Government and Opposition, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 487–512.

Norris and Lovenduski would accept. The mismatch between the Supply and Demand Model and the literature that empirically assesses ties between symbolic and descriptive forms of women's representation becomes evident when one examines assumptions of quantitative research about the porosity of voting-district borders to external influences. In contrast with Norris and Lovenduski's view, these studies commonly presuppose that influences on progression across stages are limited to within the voting district—even though it would seem nonsensical in everyday, casual discussions about female role models, for example, to take for granted that people can only be inspired by others within the same, rigidly defined area. Sometimes this quantitative body of work assesses whether proportional change in female representatives at the national level[63] has within-country symbolic effects at the local level[64]. The way that this is operationalised is often to assume that an overall increase in female MPs will have the same symbolic impacts whether the MPs represent constituencies only in an unrepresentative, far corner of the country, or across the map. Rather than make these assumptions, it would seem more realistic to expect that there are graduations of influence, contingent on how exposed or connected people are to role models, and other external sources of influence.

It is possible to improve quantitative work in this area, and in doing so, to better align it with explanatory frameworks. Often scholars familiar with the tools of spatial econometrics note how suited they are to assessing the impacts of symbolic change. This makes the paucity of studies of the spatial dynamics of women's participation and success in elections surprising[65]. Spatial

[63] For example: Tiffany Barnes and Stephanie Burchard, (2013) 'Engendering' Politics: The Impact of Descriptive Representation on Women's Political Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 46, no. 7, pp. 767–790.
[64] The literature describes this distinction as dyadic versus collective representation.
[65] I am aware of three studies that seek to assess connections between women's symbolic and descriptive representation spatially. Just one of these uses spatial econometric tools: Fabrizio Gilardi, (2015) 'The Temporary Importance of Role Models for Women's Political Representation', *American Journal of Political Science* vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 957–70.

econometric tools offer a means to identify traces of processes that occur across proximate units (voting districts), which would not occur if the units were far apart.

There are many possible mechanisms that might affect who becomes a candidate and who has a greater chance of getting elected, which may arise because voting districts are neighbours. Elites, who would never otherwise meet, may rub shoulders at social gatherings. A new factory in one town might offer jobs and help local economies within commuting distance, encouraging the misleading view that incumbent mayors of commuter towns have been good managers. Local media might straddle districts. If a radio station covers two municipalities, A and B, residents of A might grow concerned about rising burglaries and consequently shift their voting preference to the 'hard on crime' candidate, even though the news reports that prompted this response were only about crimes in B. People in C, also next to B, may be similarly sensitive to information about rising home thefts, but stick with their existing candidate preferences if their local station covers news from C, D and E. Spatial contagion effects such as these have been shown to occur in studies of electoral campaign contributions[66], and even in analyses of growing support for the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany[67]. But to this day, analyses of women's representation that deploy the tools of spatial econometrics are extremely rare.

This Project

This project aims to fill some gaps in scholarship about variation in women's descriptive representation. It has two ambitions. This first is to advance some modifications to the Supply

66 Wendy K. Tam Cho, (2003) 'Contagion Effects and Ethnic Contribution Networks', *American Journal of Political Science,* vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 368–87.
67 Colin Flint, (1998) 'Forming Electorates, Forging Spaces: The Nazi Party Vote and the Social Construction of Space', *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 41, no. 9, pp.1282–1303.

and Demand Model that fix its main inherent shortcomings, appropriately elasticise the model, and make it more explicitly porous. These revisions are intended to create an explanatory framework that is generalisable to the diversity of political parties within which women are actually succeeding at achieving candidacy and elective office. The second ambition is to demonstrate the empirical relevance of influences from outside of the voting district to women becoming candidates. This second ambition, unlike the first, is not generalisable to the full diversity of democracies in the world today. However, I provide the first spatial econometric analysis of women's representation of which I am aware to demonstrate contagion effects over a large expanse of geographically connected units, and the first such analysis of a context where diverse party types compete in elections.

I change two things about the Supply and Demand Model and add a clarification. First, I add a prior stage that is not connected to support for the party. It is composed of the represented. Adding this stage serves as a tool to check for the presence of feedback effects that propagate across all stages of recruitment. When the proportion of women among the represented is compared with the stage of recruitment with the highest proportion of women, and a difference is revealed, process-wide distortions to political recruitment are at play[68].

My second and main modification is to how stages of recruitment prior to the candidacy stage are defined. I argue that they should be defined by what is routinised. By this I mean that they should be understood as shared, stable expectations among local actors about what are considered to be signifiers, or markers, of increased odds of becoming a candidate. The terms

[68] This is not intended a normative prescription of gender parity across all pathways of political recruitment, merely an analytical tool that takes into account that feedback effects can simultaneously depress all stages as outlined by Norris and Lovenduski.

'signifiers' and 'markers' are used here as opposed to 'attainments', because gaining a signifier of increased odds of candidacy does not always require effort.

In highly institutionalised parties, stages will often be attainments. In a formal and highly institutionalised party, an example of a routinised stage might be passing a pre-selection interview with a local review board. In an informal, highly institutionalised party, a routinised stage might be becoming known as a safe pair of hands when it comes to negotiating a pledge of the votes of a small neighbourhood in exchange for particularistic benefits. Both of these examples are effortful. But being a family member of a charismatic leader is also likely to be a signifier of increased odds of becoming a candidate, especially in informal and weakly institutionalised parties. In mapping out the stages of recruitment to elective office, I propose that researchers should begin with the two formal stages that are common to all parties: candidacy (which is formally defined because candidates must be registered with the electoral authorities), and successful election. Prior stages should then be added by making sense of what are commonly understood to be the established signifiers of increased odds of candidacy. Frequently these will be ordered in a single chain, but in weakly institutionalised parties pathways of increased odds of candidacy exist in parallel.

Defining stages of recruitment prior to candidacy in terms of routinisation has several implications. One implication is that it elasticises the model: the nature and number of stages becomes variable, as, in theory, does their order. By making stages variable in type, this revision implies that stages may exist outside of the party. In the political recruitment processes of 'modular'[69] parties, this is crucial. Another implication comes from the process of building backwards from a starting point of the two universal, formal stages of political recruitment:

[69] Novaes, 'Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties: Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties'.

candidacy and election. Starting from these two stages draws attention to processes affecting progression between them. In other words, it makes the explanatory framework more sensitive to changes in voter demand, as is appropriate for the realities of personalistic—or more precisely, 'candidate-centred'[70]—systems. Voter demand receives almost no attention in the original formulation of the Supply and Demand Model, and is not given prominence in proposed modifications to the model, such as those put forward by some feminist institutionalists[71]. However, in candidate-centred systems, moving between these two universal stages of progression to elective office will be gendered in so far as voters perceive of the office in question as requiring characteristics that they gender. Hence greater attention to voter demand is an important adjustment in generalising the revised model to different contexts of heuristics about gender bias. One 'pan-cultural'[72] gender heuristic that if activated under specific circumstances might be expected to cause a sudden shift in voter demand for women candidates, is what I will refer to as the female incorruptibility stereotype. It features prominently in this thesis.

Finally, I add a clarification that is not a change to the original model's structure, but a statement that the framework should be porous to external influences. The spatial econometric chapter of the thesis underscores the importance of this clarification.

As with any elasticising endeavour, there is a danger of going too far. In physics, Hook's law defines the point at which a spring is stretched to its elastic limit—to the point beyond which it no longer returns to its original shape when a tensile force is removed. In this project, breaking the Supply and Demand Model's elastic limit would be to produce an 'anything goes' framework

[70] David Samuels, (1999) 'Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-centric Electoral Systems: Evidence from Brazil', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 487–518.
[71] I expand on this point in Chapter 2.
[72] J. E. Williams, R. Satterwhite, and D. L. Best, (1999) 'Pancultural Gender Stereotypes Revisited: The Five Factor Model', *Sex Roles*, vol. 40, no. 7/8, pp. 513-525.

with reduced explanatory usefulness compared to the original model. If that is the case, it would be better for political science to put aside a stagewise framework altogether when seeking to make sense of outcomes involving weakly institutionalised parties. However, by deploying the model in a case study with many weakly institutionalised parties, I make the case that parallel, routinised pathways towards recruitment tend, in practice, to be limited in number.

The empirical content of this project addresses mayoral elections in Brazil, rather than attempting to make sense of variation across countries, which I will leave for another adventure. This choice focuses the research on an under-studied type of election. These subnational, executive contests result in some the lowest levels of women's office holding of any elections in Latin America. They are also appropriate for reflecting on the usefulness of my revised framework. They take place amidst in an ecosystem of parties that exhibits great variety in degrees of formality and institutionalisation, and in which the personal vote frequently carries the day. Corruption scandals involving incumbents are commonplace, and voters have been shown to engage in female incorruptibility stereotyping. Brazil is also an unusually data-rich environment with which to study my outcome of interest quantitatively. Its 5,568 municipalities that hold elections are spread over an expanse of land of continental scale, and are contiguous except for two, which greatly helps the assessment of spatial contagion effects. The low percentage of female mayors and female mayoral candidates in Brazil suggests that the rare few may exert demonstration effects on neighbouring districts.

Structure of the Thesis

The chapters of this dissertation are laid out as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 set up the subsequent empirical chapters. Chapter 2 begins by explaining the original formulation of the Supply and

Demand Model, and some of the criticisms that have been levied at it. Other scholars' suggestions about how to alter this standard model are discussed, as well as Mona Lena Krook's effectively alternative analytical framework for understanding changes in women's descriptive representation as emerging from shifting configurations of systemic, practical, and normative institutions. I then lay out the benefits of retaining a stagewise framework of analysis, and explain what I perceive to be more appropriate modifications to the Supply and Demand Model, as summarised above.

Having described my renovations, the latter part of Chapter 2 discusses how the revised framework may be usefully deployed. At this point I introduce the value of leveraging corruption scandals involving male incumbents as a means to assess the usefulness of my framework. There are several advantages to this strategy. Such scandals are commonplace throughout the world, and, when they appear, they might reasonably be expected to prompt fairly rapid adjustments in women's rates of progression towards elective office[73]. This is also an intriguing topic to investigate theoretically because different literatures in political science offer opposing expectations about the outcomes that will emerge, depending on whether they privilege the stickiness of institutions or the instability of public opinion. A feminist institutionalist perspective sets up the expectation that new information about male incumbent corruption will cause reductions in the candidacies and votes going to women, whereas the literature on heuristics and voting behaviour instead predicts that it will lead to a boost in these variables.

Feminist institutionalist expectations arise from studies of corrupt institutions. These institutions are often found to be strongly gendered and also frequently bound up with candidate

[73] Jana Morgan and Melissa Buice, (2013) 'Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics: The Influence of Elite Cues, Female Advancement, and Individual Characteristics', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 107, no. 4, pp. 644–62.

recruitment processes. As a result, new information detailing male incumbent corruption should lead to actors updating their priors about the additional barriers that women face, relative to men, along the path to elective office. Female aspirants, for example, might downgrade their own assessments of their odds of success. Deterred, they might decide that the investment of time and effort in striving towards elective office is not worth it. Influential individuals, closely aligned with one party or another, may adjust their view of local politics as a man's game, and withhold encouragement for women that they would have otherwise expressed. These expectations contrast with those of scholarship about the role of heuristics in voting behaviour, which anticipates that voters, as boundedly rational beings, will draw on stereotypes of incorruptibility in assessing alternatives to the corrupt incumbent. In a context where the personal vote counts for a lot, widespread stereotyping of women as innately honest, risk-averse, and outsiders to 'old boys' networks, will raise voters' willingness to support female candidates.

In theory, various mechanisms could propagate as feedback effects across some or all stages of women's political recruitment. But the shifts in voter demand that drive them will only occur if voters learn the new information about the male incumbent's corruption. This point may seem self-evident but it is not problematised by the heuristics and voting behaviour literature, which, I argue in Chapter 2, tends towards a 'dissemination assumption'. Feminist institutionalism, on the other hand, tends to take for granted that parties so strongly determine women's descriptive outcomes that voter demand is more or less ignorable. In Chapter 2, I propose how to navigate these arguments by forming expectations based on who knows about male incumbent corruption. I also discuss the component parts of the female incorruptibility stereotype, and explain how disaggregating them can help to anticipate how voters may draw on the stereotype to different extents when faced with identities that intersect with gender.

Chapter 3 explains the advantages of the selection of Brazilian mayoral elections for the empirical chapters of the dissertation. The decision to work with a country with electoral units that have symmetrically distributed responsibilities provides a host of internal controls that aide in the evaluation of hypotheses in later parts of the thesis. In many respects, the selection of Brazilian mayoral elections offers a microcosm of the personalism and variation in party institutionalisation that I seek in a first deployment of my revised framework. Brazil's percentage of female mayors has remained remarkably stable over the past two decades, meanwhile the degree of institutionalisation among the country's main political parties, although low, has varied substantially over time[74]. This stable percentage of female mayors has also been low, which implies that the few women who make it to city hall may generate demonstration effects that propagate outside of the immediate municipality, into neighbouring voting districts. Finally, Brazil ticks the necessary boxes to evaluate my ideas about the role of informational asymmetries in responses to male incumbent corruption. Not only are these elections candidate- as opposed to party-centric, but the bulk of the evidence assesses the female incorruptibility stereotype as pervasive among Brazilian voters.

I take the opportunity in Chapter 3 to offer helpful background to subsequent chapters, by summarising what is reported in the literature about the processes of candidate recruitment of Brazilian political parties. I also explain why I employ a mixture of quantitative and qualitative tools in the empirical part of the dissertation, and provide baseline information about the datasets used and the illustrative case studies included.

Chapter 4 presents quantitative analyses that test the dissemination assumption. It first lays out the scope conditions of the argument, then draws from the literature to show that these

[74] Novaes, 'Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties: Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties'.

conditions are generally met, and presents evidence that they are specifically met in Brazil. To be motivated to seek a less corruptible candidate, voters must believe corruption accusations levied at the incumbent, and understand his corruption to run counter to their interests. They must also be unwilling to entirely trade off their rejection of him due to corruption, against other advantages that his officeholding might bring them. In addition, voters must perceive their voting district to not be systemically corrupt, else there would be no point in replacing the incumbent. This is because anyone in the job will have to become embroiled in corrupt practices to get anything done.

The regressions in Chapter 4 leverage a unique policy experiment by the Brazilian Comptroller General's Office, which, since 2003, has randomly selected municipalities for immediate audit using televised lotteries. I use the proportion of audited funds recorded in these publicly available auditors' reports to predict changes in women's proportional candidacies and vote shares, comparing elections before federal audits to subsequent elections. I find that only municipalities with AM radio stations to disseminate local news saw a change, and only if a scandal occurred during part of the electoral cycle. The estimated increases in the proportion of women candidates and in their vote share were stronger as the next election drew closer, aligning with the expectations of recency bias. For the change in the proportion of votes going to women candidates, this continued right up to the next election. However, the significance of the corruption interaction term predicting the change in women's proportional candidacies falls away in approximately March of the election year, which, although I am cautious about reading too far into detail, happens to correspond with when parties pick candidates.

Chapter 5 explores electoral campaigns in three municipalities that had received one of the randomised federal audits. These illustrative case studies feature municipalities with and without AM radio stations and female candidates in the election directly following a federal audit, and

show variation regarding whether federal auditors reported corruption by an incumbent male mayor. The chapter analyses how the campaigns of women competing for elective office might knowingly or otherwise deploy shallow information about the candidate, or deep information that communicates congruent, neutral or incongruent gender stereotypes, in a strategic fashion so as to benefit from incorruptibility stereotyping, depending on the context. The case without a local radio station or woman candidate in the election that followed the federal audit, where a male incumbent had engaged in a lot of corruption, probes why women there did not compete at that juncture. I find, contrary to some themes in the literature, that politically engaged and qualified women were encouraged by shadowy figures behind the scenes to stand as candidates, and were ostensibly invited into networks that might facilitate a successful candidacy. However, these women chose not to take up the opportunity because they sensed that an implicit requirement to deliver unsavoury, probably corrupt, favours. These women were also concerned about local residents applying to them injunctive gender stereotypes.

In the discussion of Chapter 5, I draw together information from many interviews across the three cases and reflect upon the task of deploying my revised framework in the field. I sketch how I understand the routinised recruitment pathway of a highly institutionalised party, PSOL, and the routinised parallel pathways of the weakly institutionalised parties, such as the PFL, that operate as modular parties.

Chapter 6 adds support to the conclusions of the earlier empirical chapters, and tests some of my points about disaggregation of the female incorruptibility stereotype. The regressions in Chapter 6 analyse a dataset that was coded by hand, by Googling the reasons for regional electoral courts voiding the results of all 283 mayoral elections that were rerun in Brazil between 2004 and 2016. I find that vote buying is associated with an increase in female candidates' competitiveness in rerun elections, compared to original elections in the same municipalities. This is also the only

reason among a handful of categories for rerunning an election, which is a clear-cut example of corruption. Adding further support to my interpretation that the activation of the female incorruptibility stereotype among voters explains this outcome, I also find that when a disqualified male mayor whom the electoral courts have recorded as having been involved in vote buying is nonetheless a candidate in the rerun election, this effect disappears. I argue that, to voters, his participation in the election communicates that the accusations levied against him are not true or not serious. The analyses in Chapter 6 also consider how the wives of disqualified male incumbents fare in rerun elections that were called because of their husbands' misdemeanours. Unsurprisingly, I find that these women's candidacies have the effect of abating female candidates' overall competitiveness[75]. Through a discussion of illustrative case studies of two rerun elections, both with a female candidate, I describe how incorruptibility stereotyping was used to the advantage of a woman seeking mayoral office who had no familial ties to the disqualified, male, vote-buying incumbent. But voters were not convinced that a candidate who was the wife of an equivalent individual would behave any differently to him.

After several empirical chapters that explore the usefulness of the revised model in terms of its retention of a stagewise framework (though with greater attention paid to far-reaching feedback affects and to shifts in voter demand than the standard framework), and in terms of its definition of stages as routinised signifiers towards candidacy, I turn to my clarification about the model's porosity. Chapter 7 presents the results of spatial econometric models with different specifications, selected for the purposes of probing the causal pathways through which contagion effects that influence women's candidacies might flow. Although these statistical analyses cannot identify whether external influence is affecting progression across recruitment stages, or remoulding stages themselves—or, indeed, more precise mechanistic details—the use

[75] Often these women are the only women running.

of multiple spatial specifications does allow for interdependence and spillover pathways to be assessed. In other words, although I cannot say exactly by what means, I can conclude that women's proportional presence among mayoral candidates in a municipality appears to directly influence the same variable in neighbouring municipalities (interdependence), and that, with every new election period, these influences ripple around the map until an equilibrium is reached. Similarly, I can conclude that when women win mayoral elections in Brazil, the results are consistent with these women promoting increases in women's proportional presence among mayoral candidates in contiguous districts (spillover) in the next election—although, again, without data pertaining to the content of shifts in women's symbolic representation, I can only speculate as to exactly why.

I start my journey through these chapters with a detailed description of my revisions to Norris and Lovenduski's Supply and Demand Model.

Chapter 2:

Theory and Literature Review

"Each political party is a team of *men* who seek office solely in order to enjoy the income, prestige, and power that go with running the governing apparatus…[1]

…it is rational for every individual to minimize his investment in political information, in spite of the fact that most citizens might benefit substantially if the whole electorate were well informed."

Anthony Downs in the Journal of Political Economy, 1957

Introduction

In the first chapter I argued that political science needs to make a decision. Change in women's descriptive representation has been happening across the world irrespective of the degree of institutionalisation of countries' main political parties. Yet the Supply and Demand Model—the standard framework in political science for analysing variation in this dependent variable—is attuned to contexts with highly institutionalised parties, wherein stages and influences on progression across stages are a close (although by no means perfect) match for de facto realities of political recruitment. Therefore, either a replacement explanatory framework is required to make sense of change where parties are weakly institutionalised. Or the standard model needs adapting to accommodate the

[1] Emphasis added.

broad range of realities of political recruitment that exist in the world's democracies. In this chapter I attempt to do the latter.

This is a chapter of two parts. In the first and longer part, I describe the original formulation of the Supply and Demand Model, traverse some the critiques levied at it by other scholars, and then outline the renovations that I see as appropriate. In the second part, I discuss how I draw upon my revised model throughout this project. I review relevant literatures along the way, in building towards and justifying my renovations, and in navigating conflicting expectations about change in women's descriptive representation in response to altering circumstances, such as corruption by male incumbents.

My modifications to the standard model are responses to its main pathologies. While a few recent publications by feminist institutionalist scholars have struck a more appreciative tone[2] towards the ambitious intentions of Norris and Lovenduski's book, *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*, in which the model is described, there have been vigorous criticisms over the years. The model has been disparaged for excessive formalism, for insufficient attention to feedback effects that may propagate across stages of recruitment, and for failing to place gender at the heart of the analysis.

To make more obvious the existence of feedback effects that may diminish women's participation across all stages of recruitment, I suggest adding a prior stage for the purposes of analysis using proportionality tests. The relevant population in this new

[2] For example: Meryl Kenny and Tània Verge, (2016) 'Opening Up the Black Box: Gender and Candidate Selection in a New Era Government and Opposition', vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 351–369.

'stage' is 'the represented'. Comparing compositional proportions of the represented to the stage with the highest percentage of women should reveal the existence of process-wide distortions. When this is done for multiple parties, comparison of the relative strength of process-wide distortions, such as various gender norms, becomes possible.

My most important alteration to the structure of the Supply and Demand Model is a redefinition of stages of recruitment prior to the stage of formal candidacy according to what is routinised. In the pages that follow, I explain how this perspective shifts attention away from discussions of formality versus informality, and towards whether actors share expectations of one path of signifiers of increased odds of candidacy, or multiple, parallel paths. Defining stages prior to candidacy in this way allows for the number, type and even the order of stages of political recruitment to vary, and relocates stages to outside of the party where that is what actually occurs.

As the two final stages of political recruitment—candidacy and election—are constrained across parties, I propose understanding the process of candidate recruitment by building backwards from these, and adding stages as they are revealed in the research process. In grounding recruitment pathways in this way, the revised model becomes more sensitive to the personal vote, which may be gendered, and which is relevant to variation in rates of progression across those two stages. As a consequence, it also becomes more appropriate to political systems where party labels offer far weaker cues than in Norris and Lovenduski's archetypal system, the UK. Moreover, defining stages by what is routinised also brings gender into the revised model by requiring the researcher to investigate what is routinised, and thereby the potentially gendered processes by which stages are constructed and maintained.

The revised model is intended as a framework for picking up the possible presence of mechanisms that affect women's descriptive representation in elective office. It does not identify causal processes, and so should be thought of as a tool to motivate further qualitative enquiry. Nonetheless, plausible mechanisms can be highlighted by stagewise analysis, especially where proportional change can be pinpointed to occur between certain stages of recruitment.

The second half of the chapter outlines why the revised framework assists in navigating an apparent disagreement between two literatures. Opposite expectations for how women's descriptive representation will change in the wake of new information about male incumbent corruption emerge from feminist institutionalist studies into organisations that commit and facilitate corrupt acts, and from the literature on heuristics and voting behaviour. However, by referring to a stagewise explanatory framework of progression towards elective office, and reflecting upon what I call the 'dissemination assumption', the expectations of these two literatures are revealed to in fact be congruent. I then add nuance to these arguments by discussing opposite expectations of how the descriptive representation of different categories of women with change when new information emerges and the dissemination assumption is satisfied.

The second half of the chapter also adds an important clarification to the revised model. The original formulation of the Supply and Demand Model did not preclude influences on progression that originate from outside of a voting district. However, it did preclude the idea that external influences might remould stages themselves. Both of these aspects of porosity are theoretically important, and yet, as mentioned in Chapter 1, many studies of connections between symbolic and descriptive forms of women's representation operationalise quantitative investigations by delimiting potential effects to within voting

units. In the final pages of the chapter, I discuss why porosity, or openness, in terms of both extra-party and extra-district influences on progression across stages, and extra-party and extra-district influences on the routinisation of stages, matters.

The Standard Model

The Supply and Demand Model is the dominant framework[3] for analysing women's political recruitment. It seeks to explain changes in the proportions of different descriptive groups attaining elected office—primarily men and women, but also individuals of different social classes and ethnic minorities. It does this by considering the stages of recruitment sequentially[4]. Individuals enter the first stage when they become party voters, after which they may join the pool of constituency party members, then the pool of applicants for candidacy, then candidates. Some make it to the final stage and become elected representatives. The model is often represented as a pyramid, a chain, or a ladder, with each layer, link or rung equivalent to one of five[5] stages of political involvement, indicating membership of an increasingly restricted group.

As is evident from its name, the model divides the variables influencing recruitment into factors affecting supply and factors affecting demand. 'Supply' concerns those variables that influence the willingness of individuals to come forward to try to become elected

[3] Mona Lena Krook, (2010) 'Beyond Supply and Demand: A Feminist-Institutionalist Theory of Candidate Selection', *Political Research Quarterly,* vol. 63, no. 4, , pp. 707–20.
[4] Joni Lovenduski, (2016) 'The Supply and Demand Model of Candidate Selection: Some Reflections', *Government and Opposition,* vol. 51, no.3, pp. 513-528.
[5] As shown on ibid p16. Note that summaries of the model sometimes describe it has having four stages by collapsing the constituency party member stage and applicant stage into one, as per the following two examples. Krook, Beyond Supply and Demand, pp. 707–20. Jeanette Ashe and Kennedy Stewart, (2012) 'Legislative Recruitment: Using Diagnostic Testing to Explain Underrepresentation', *Party Politics* vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 687–707.

politicians; 'demand', those variables that affect party selectors' choice of candidate[6]. The former includes resource constraints like personal income, union sponsorship, time, political experience, and support networks, as well as motivation[7]; the latter, selectors' perceptions of applicants' abilities, qualifications and experience[8].

Norris and Lovenduski argue in *Political Representation* that the stage or stages responsible for the UK House of Commons' low descriptive representation of women, ethnic minorities and members of the working class can be pinpointed using proportionality tests: for each political party, if the descriptive characteristics of the individuals who moved from one stage to the next are identical, then no mechanisms of distortion operate at that stage. Applying this analytical approach to the UK's Conservative and Labour Parties in the 1992 General Election, Norris and Lovenduski conclude that supply factors were collectively the main reason for the Conservative Party's low number of female MPs (since the proportion of Conservative female applicants was low and yet about the same as Conservative female candidates), while demand factors were the primary cause of the Labour Party's low number of female MPs (in this case women were coming forward, but men were more likely to be selected to become candidates—at least in part because union connections were viewed favorably by Labour Party selectors)[9].

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[6] The phrase 'party selectors' is specifically used in this context in *Political Recruitment* (e.g. p. 14). Later in this chapter I discuss how voters feature in the original theory, and frequently refer to 'voter demand'.
[7] Norris and Lovenduski, *Political Recruitment*, p.143.
[8] Ibid. p. 107.
[9] Ibid p.188. According to follow-up interviews. Notice how voter selection among candidates does not feature in these diagnoses.

The Supply and Demand Model was intended to be nothing less than 'a comprehensive theoretical model'[10] of political recruitment. Yet with hindsight, the framework seems excessively mechanical and misses many of the subtleties that new institutionalism has brought to light. It was developed in the late 1980s[11], at about the same time as Douglass North's broad conceptualisation of institutions as both formal and informal humanly devised constraints on interactions[12], and not long after March and Olsen put forward their descriptions of institutions' capacities to impose historical, temporal, endogenous, normative and symbolic order on the world[1314]. Moreover, in the period since the publication of *Political Representation*, the two literatures that Norris and Lovenduski sought to integrate—those on political elites and party organisations—have also set about incorporating the realities of more recent democracies. For example, in post-Communist countries, Herbert Kitschelt examines the power of 'old elites' vis-à-vis 'new elites', who may not even be formal party members[15]. Javier Auyero has scrutinised the 'fictive kinships'[16] in Argentina that tie *referentes* or *punteros* (brokers) to voters in networks of reciprocal favours, which Steven Levitsky aptly considers part of an 'organised disorganisation'[17]. This scholarship examining 'on the ground' realities of political

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[10] Norris and Lovenduski, *Political Recruitment*, p. 194.
[11] The model drew on studies about the representation of women in Britain published during that decade by Vicky Randall and Jill Hills, both of whom used the idea of supply and demand factors metaphorically. See: Vicky Randall, *Women and Politics,* 2nd edn. (London: Macmillan, 1987). And: Jill Hills, (1981) 'Candidates, the Impact of Gender', *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 34, pp. 221-8.
[12] Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 3.
[13] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, (1983) The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, *American Political Science Review,* vol. 78, no. 3, pp. 734-749.
[14] As well as Skocpol's view of states as 'configurations of organization and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups'. Theda Skocpol, 'Introduction', in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 28.
[15] Herbert Kitschelt, (1995) 'Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions', *Party Politics* vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 447–72.
[16] Javier Auyero, *Poor People's Politics. Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita,* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), p91.
[17] Steven Levitsky, (2001)'An "Organised Disorganisation": Informal Organisation and the Persistence of Local Party Structures in Argentine Peronism,' *J. Lat. Amer. Stud.* vol. 33, pp. 29-65.

recruitment in recent democracies makes even more evident the Supply and Demand's Model's formalist assumptions.

In response, in recent years, feminist scholars have brought the conceptual tools of institutional analysis to bear on studies of women's political representation[18]. This has fostered strong and more specific criticisms of the Supply and Demand Model, and a handful of attempts at adaptation that assist the purpose of this chapter: to develop a generalisable analytical framework of political recruitment that is able to serve as a coherent and robust explanatory tool that assists in the project of making sense of changes in women's descriptive representation that diverge markedly from the Westminster example. In the next section, I examine critiques of the standard model in more detail, and discuss recent theoretical progress arising from these insights. I then describe the revisions that I consider appropriate.

Criticisms and Adaptations of the Standard Model

Not all admonishments of the Supply and Demand Model have been stated fairly. Several works take issue with *Political Representation* for concluding that a shortfall in the supply of female candidates is the core reason for low levels of female descriptive representation in general[19], for example, when Norris and Lovenduski clearly state that

[18] In particular, historical institutionalist and sociological institutionalist approaches. As Lovenduski points out, this 'permits a focus on process and offers a conceptual toolkit that includes formal and informal institutions, critical junctures, path dependence, feedback mechanisms, logics of appropriateness, and, more recently, institutional convergence and layering.' See: Joni Lovenduski, 'Foreward', in Mona Lena Krook and Fiona Mackay, eds., *Gender Politics and Institutions: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. viii.

[19] This is a complaint made in recent years by Lovenduski. See: Lovenduski, 'The Supply and Demand Model of Candidate Selection: Some Reflections', p. 515.

both supply and demand matter empirically[20]. The formalist critique is also often slightly overstated. Even though Norris and Lovenduski fail to clearly operationalise the influence of informal institutions in their quantitative approach[21] and to represent them in visual depictions of the model, they are cognisant of variation in adherence to formal rules. They devote a considerable amount of Chapter 10 to this point[22], however the systems that they describe as informal reveal the truly limited scope of their purview[23]. The excessive formalism of the standard model—as a post-hoc explanatory framework of changing outcomes—is the main reason why it is far from generalisable.

The most troublesome criticism of the internal logic of the original formulation is its tendency to underplay the importance of feedback mechanisms, whereby dynamics that affect progression between a pair of stages influence progression between at least one other pair of stages[24]. As a consequence, the model can turn attention away from causal

[20] Moreover, Lovenduski explains the motivation for the book: 'We were interested in the processes of recruitment in UK political parties in part because of frequent claims that women were absent from parliament (at the time of our initial study before the general election of 1987 only 3.7 per cent of MPs were women) because they did not come forward to be selected as candidates. Such commentary blamed the victims. We did not think it was true. Both of us frequently met women who did want to be MPs, who told stories of bitter struggles within parties and unions, of undemocratic and sexist blocking of their efforts.' See: Ibid. p. 518.
[21] For example: Meryl Kenny, 'Chapter 2: Gender and Institutions of Political Recruitment: Candidate Selection in Post-devolution Scotland', in Krook and Mackay, *Gender Politics and Institutions*, p. 22.
[22] Indeed, Chapter 10 is book is a comparative discussion of different countries' candidate recruitment processes, with example countries divided according to whether these processes are largely formal or informal, localised or centralised.
[23] The informal systems discussed in Chapter 10 of *Political Recruitment* are France and Canada. These countries have reasonably strongly institutionalised parties. For example, in 1995, the year that *Political Recruitment* was published, France and Canada ranked 22nd and 24th, respectively, in the index of party institutionalisation that I frequently referred to in Chapter 1. The index is calculated for 166 countries in 1995. Fernando Bizzarro, Allen Hicken and Darin Self, (2017) 'The V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index: A New Global Indicator', *V-Dem Working Paper Series*, no. 48.
[24] This is my interpretation of a point frequently made in the literature. Lovenduski agrees that the original formulation of the model did not pay sufficient attention to evidence for these mechanisms. See: Ibid, p. 520.

mechanisms with foremost explanatory power. Feedback mechanisms are where I focus the analysis in this section.

A classic example of a feedback mechanism is when anticipated gender bias on the part of the party selectorate[25] discourages female aspirants from putting their names forward as applicants. This might happen when a masculine construal of the party's hypothetical ideal candidate is revealed in some way, and propagates as a 'logic of appropriateness'[26]. The range of potential feedback mechanisms is much more diverse than *Political Recruitment* considers, yet this particular mechanism is articulated in the book's prose[27]. Still, *Political Recruitment* misses the analytical problem. This logic of appropriateness may feed further backwards, over several stages, affecting incentive structures at the very bottom of the ladder, or it could even flow in multiple directions, and not necessarily among stages in the sequence that the model outlines. The problem is, more precisely, that proportionality tests fail to locate the cause or causes of distortion that depress supply and demand over multiple stages, and are completely blind to process-wide distortions[28]—to those that simultaneously affect all rungs of the ladder, such as

[25] 'Selectorate' is a term that Norris and Lovenduski use interchangeably with 'party selectors' to refer to party members charged with selecting candidates among applicants.
[26] Explained as: 'Rules [often informal, that] are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices, and expectations of its institutions'. See: James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Logic of Appropriateness', in Robert E. Goodin, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*, (Oxford, OUP, July 2011), p. 478.
[27] For example, Norris and Lovenduski discuss how Conservative Party committees tend to look for candidates in their own image. See: Norris and Lovenduski, *Political Representation*, p. 126-7.
[28] Jeanette Ashe and Kennedy Stewart have adapted the supply and demand model by replacing supply-side proportionality tests with tests based on raw numbers (though leaving demand-side proportionality tests unchanged), and proposing a battery of 10 'interval tests' that progress from the end of the candidate recruitment process to the start. In changing the evaluation of supply to the question of whether raw numbers at every stage meet the number required for the group to have its demographic proportions reflected in the legislature, this adaptation makes the model inapplicable in a straightforward sense to executive elections. Whereas the stagewise proportionality tests of the original formulation suffer less from this problem. (Because including for the final stage of progression from candidate to winner of an executive office can be analysed in the case of *local* executives if the contests for many local executive positions are analysed

overarching ideologies of gender. A closely related accusation is made by Mona Lena Krook when she suggests that the terminology of 'supply' and 'demand', given such clear analogy in economic theory, falsely implies a logic that their interactions will eventually generate an efficient equilibrium solution[29].

Krook addresses process-wide distortions head-on in her theory building. Her preference is to 'reformulate'[30] the Supply and Demand Model, although effectively she puts it to one side. Krook's approach involves the mapping of conflicting or re-enforcing configurations of what she calls as 'systemic', 'practical' and 'normative' institutions. These categories of institutions are gendered. Krook defines systemic institutions as formal rules that affect women's descriptive representation, such as electoral systems or gender quotas. Practical institutions are what parties use to choose candidates. These include procedures and criteria, both of which are composed of formal (e.g. citizenship) and informal institutions (e.g. within-party views of the desirable attributes of a candidate). Normative institutions are ideas that inform the goals of political life. For example, an ideal of representation—whether held by voters, party selectors or both—creates pressure on political parties to descriptively balance candidate lists in many proportional representation systems[31].

Krook picks up effects that depress all stages of supply and demand by placing gender at the centre of the analysis[32], instead of considering it, as Norris and Lovenduski do, as one

together. For Ashe and Stewart's method, interval tests of supply at every stage would have to be rethought in this way.) Ashe and Stewart's operationalisation also suffers from the same larger problem as Norris and Lovenduski's: it is hard to see how interval tests could identify distortions that affect all stages of candidate recruitment simultaneously. See: Ashe and Stewart, 'Legislative Recruitment: Using Diagnostic Testing to Explain Underrepresentation', pp. 687–707.

[29] Krook, 'Beyond Supply and Demand', p. 710.

[30] Ibid p. 707.

[31] Ibid. pp. 712-3.

[32] Instead of interval tests between stages, Krook locates impediments to increasing women's

factor among many that could affect progression between stages[33]. Her approach is not without shortcomings, however. The first is that, in the context of institutionalised party organisations, it risks throwing away information that could motivate inquiry into stage-specific causal mechanisms—or rule them out. Even if proportionality tests miss multi-stage distortions, they nonetheless provide valuable information. To be sure, a finding that a smaller proportion of women are selected to be candidates than apply can prompt a researcher to focus efforts on evaluating mechanisms that operate at that specific part of the recruitment process[34]. But, on the other hand, a finding that these proportions are the same across multiple stages of recruitment also usefully restricts the possibilities. The logical alternatives are that no distortions operate between those specific stages—as *Political Representation* assumes—or, that multi-stage distortions exist. Helpfully, though, stage-specific mechanisms of discrimination can be ruled out. This reasoning can be extended to propose my first modification of the standard model: the addition of a prior 'stage' composed of 'the represented'. If the proportion of women among the represented is compared to the stage with the highest proportion of women, gendered, process-wide distortions can be uncovered. Moreover, comparing these effects across different parties can lay bare the relative strength of process-wide distortions in parties' recruitment processes.

descriptive representation by evaluating whether women-friendly changes in one of the three kinds of institutions alter the gendered content of the other two. When a temporary policy of reserved seats for women changed the gendered content of systemic institutions in Pakistan, women became no more able to win non-reserved seats because the gendered content of practical and normative institutions remained untouched. Hence, when that quota policy ended in 1988, the proportion of women in the lower house dropped from 10% back to less than 1%.

[33] Meryl Kenny, *Gender and Political Recruitment: Theorizing Institutional Change*, (New York, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 19.

[34] It may take time for information to transfer and incentives to be affected—for feedback effects to play out and become process-wide phenomena.

The second disadvantage to Krook's approach, although thoroughly percipient to the influence of informal institutions, is that it implicitly presents formal and informal institutions as binary, mutually exclusive categories[35] when a continuum of processes of formalisation and informalisation may be a more fruitful approach. This tendency probably arises because Krook's independent variable of interest, gender quotas, is so clearly formal. Her analysis of candidate recruitment is sensitive to variation in informal institutions in the sense that it does not take as a premise that a single, linear pathway exists to becoming a candidate[36], and acknowledges that practical and normative institutions are frequently unwritten. Yet, Krook does not go on to explore gradations in how ingrained different informal practices have become. With that, she does not thoroughly examine fixedness and fluidity among informal institutions[37].

In this sense, Meryl Kenny makes progress. Her 2013 book recounts Scottish Labour's attempts to embrace the opportunity afforded by incumbent-free elections for the Scottish Parliament in 1999. The party sought to bring bigger proportions of women into its candidate line-up than British political parties had historically managed. Kenny's analysis leads her to make four points about how the Supply and Demand Model may be adapted. First, she recommends that gender should be integrated more fully into the dynamics of supply and demand. Her next two recommendations can be bracketed as

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[35] For example, when Krook discusses normative institutions, she creates two clear categories. She writes: 'these ideas may be enshrined formally in constitutions, legal codes, electoral laws, and party statutes as well as more informally in public speeches, political ideologies, and voter opinions' (Krook, 'Beyond Supply and Demand', p. 712). Then when she analyses the rejection of gender quotas by political parties in Sweden until the 1980s, writes: 'many preferred more informal policies, like goals or targets, with the threat of instituting formal quotas if these goals and targets were not met' (Ibid, p. 715).

[36] As will be elaborated further in the next section, although versions of these steps may exist in informal, organized parties, such as clientelistic parties, where membership obligations and processes of advancement within the party are heavily routinised, they may be paid only lip service on the path to candidacy in informal, weakly institutionalized parties.

[37] This results in a tendency to diagnose the category of institutions that are to 'blame' rather than to identify exactly what may be more or less easily changed.

interrelated suggestions as to how to do this: by focusing of the gendered nature of formalisation and informalisation, and on 'nested newness' in the sense of gendered legacies of the past. Her final point can be broadly interpreted as a recommendation of temporal sensitivity: greater attention should be paid to incremental processes. In the paragraphs below, I explain how Kenny's argument that a strict distinction between formal and informal institutions is distracting[38]. This point provides inspiration for my main revision to the standard model.

Kenny examines Labour Party candidate recruitment in the urban constituency of City North and Greenside, a Labour safe seat. She shows how the implementation of newly introduced formal procedures gradually eroded over time: after 1999, written Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) job descriptions and standard candidacy application forms[39] were no longer distributed to constituency Labour Party members[40]. Meanwhile, pre-existing informal institutions were drawn upon by those who wished to resist the implementation of another new formal procedure, Labour's centrally enforced 'twinning scheme'[41], which they reframed as an outside intervention as opposed to a gender equality measure[42]. The reframing was a factor shifting many actors' views of the ideal

[38] Norris and Lovenduski were attuned to the existence informality party systems. On p. 14 of *Political Represenation* they articulate six types of party system: all possible combinations of informal or formal, and centralised, regionalised or localised. However, their example of system with generalised informal party recruitment is Canada, and their discussions of comparative cases limited to developed countries. As such they do not embrace the full range of informality that is widespread in candidate recruitment in many countries, including Brazil, the case on which the empirical chapters of this focus.

[39] These changes initially brought about a 'gender coup'. However, despite these formal procedures officially remaining in place, Scottish Labour witnessed a steady decline in its proportion of female MSP candidates in subsequent elections.

[40] Kenny, *Gender and Political Recruitment: Theorizing Institutional Change*, p. 105.

[41] This scheme sought to ensure gender balance in candidate line-ups. The top female applicant would be selected for one of a pair of constituency seats that were equally matched for 'winability', and the top male applicant would be selected for the other seat in the pair. The next-best female and male applicants would fill the next pair, and so on. Ibid. p. 80

[42] Interference in local matters by a centralized authority was known to be unpopular. Ibid. p. 155.

candidate back to the 'local man' who sought to provide patronage opportunities[43] for the local area. Over successive elections, these dynamic processes of informalisation led to a reduction in female Labour MSP candidates.

It was not the strategic shift between formal and informal processes per se that provided the essential ingredient in re-gendering candidate recruitment in Kenny's case study. Rather, it was the nest of gendered institutions to which they were new: the previously routinised alternative recruitment processes, sufficiently recent as to be established in the mind's eye of local actors, offered strategic possibilities for resisting change by those who feared losing out. Put differently, the options for countering a policy that sought to increase women's descriptive representation were defined by how institutionalised[44] these pre-existing norms and practices were—and by whether those pre-existing norms and practices were strongly gendered.

This insight resonates closely with several works by prominent scholars of Latin America, not themselves gender specialists, who equate the process of institutionalisation, or the embedding of the rules, codes and norms of the game, with routinisation. In various ways, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell in his 1994 essay *Delegative Democracy* relates the institutionalisation of formal and informal interactions to the process of regime consolidation[45]. Steven Levitsky writes in *Transforming Labor-based Parties in Latin America*, that 'routinization limits the capacity of organizations to respond quickly to environmental challenges, and that weakly institutionalized organizations may

[43] Ibid. p. 159.
[44] Here defined as a 'process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted', as per p4 Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America, in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995)
[45] O'Donnell, Guillermo A. (1994) "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 59.

be better equipped to adapt to rapid environmental change than highly routinized organizations'[46]. This conceptualisation of institutionalisation as routinisation contrasts with the 'value infusion' view of Samuel Huntington[47] and James McGuire[48], who take the concept to mean by the process by which an organisation gains value for its own sake, separately from the functions that it performs. As Levitsky points out, the conceptual distinction is important because some political parties, such as the Justicialista Party in Argentina, would be characterised as highly institutionalised according to the value-infusion conceptualisation, but as weakly institutionalised using the routinisation definition[49]. Levitsky understands the substance of routinisation from two perspectives[50]. First, that of the rational actor, whereby individuals invest in learning skills, developing strategies and in creating organisational structures that are appropriate to the rules of the game. These investments incentivise actors to preserve the status quo, and provide them with the organisational capacity to do so. The second perspective is cognitive. Shared, stable expectations form around rules, roles and procedures that have been repeated and reinforced, and there are social and psychic costs in departing from shared, stable expectations. I draw heavily on these perspectives in developing my revised framework.

So far, my discussions of political science's standard model for making sense of changes in women's descriptive representation have identified a number of pathologies, and

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46 Steven Levitsky, *Transforming Labor-based Parties in Latin America,* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 18. Note that having cited the Justicialista Party as an example of a weakly institutionalised party according to a conceptualization of institutionalization as routinisation in his 2003 book, *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America*, Levitsky, refers to the same party as an example of an informally institutionalised party in his chapter with Flavia Freidenberg in the 2006 book that he edited with Gretchen Helmke, *Informal Institutions in Latin America.*

47 Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven, CT: Tale University Press, 1968), p. 17.

48 James McGuire, *Peronism without Peron: Unions, Parties and Democracy in Argentina*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 7-8.

49 Levitsky, *Transforming Labor-based Parties in Latin America,* p. 17.

50 Ibid. p. 19.

solved one of them. A pathology internal to the logic of the original model is its blindness to process-wide feedback effects. My first modification—the addition of a prior stage of the represented—raises the sensitivity of the framework to the existence of such effects. However, there are various pathologies left unresolved. The model is still excessively mechanical, and although Norris and Lovenduski did attempt to bring in some degree of informality, their efforts were insufficient to make the model generalisable to the party systems of many democracies. The standard model also fails to place gender at the core of its analytical approach, viewing it as one factor among many that might affect progression across stages, rather than integral to the construction of the political recruitment process[51]. In the next section, I draw upon the aforementioned contributions of Kenny and Levitsky in particular, in thinking about how to understand variation in institutionalisation, and thus in how to fix outstanding pathologies.

Problematising Recruitment Stages

A further clarification must be made about the concept of institutionalisation in the context of political recruitment. There are two dimensions of institutionalisation in this realm: the routinisation of influences on progression between stages, and the routinisation of stages of recruitment themselves. In City North and Greenside, although formal and informal institutions competed to influence progression between stages, the stages of recruitment remained stable and uncontested: all actors shared a common understanding of these stages, and the stages matched what was written in party statutes.

[51] In Jill Vickers's terminology, it does not delve into how 'gender makes institutions' and how 'institutions make gender'. See: Jill Vickers, (2013) 'Is Federalism Gendered? Incorporating Gender into Studies ofFederalism', *The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 1–23.

A truly generalisable model of political recruitment needs to consider variation in the institutionalisation of stages. This poses a particular challenge for adapting the Supply and Demand Model. In this section, while recognising that institutionalisation is a continuum[52], for simplicity, I consider stages as signifiers of probabilistic progress towards candidacy. I refer to 'highly institutionalised' parties as those with a single pathway of routinised stages of candidate recruitment, which is taken for granted by actors involved in the recruitment process. 'Weakly institutionalised' parties are those for which multiple series of stages of candidate recruitment exist in the mind's eye of such actors. For weakly institutionalised parties, stagewise progression occurs, but the multiple pathways of stages exist in parallel. The second and most important modification in my revised explanatory framework is to define stages of recruitment prior to candidacy in terms of what is routinised.

Highly Institutionalised Parties

Depending on the party in question, highly institutionalised recruitment stages towards candidacy might closely match what is written in party statues, or may not. Highly institutionalised stages may even exist outside of the official party organisation—and yet be understood by all actors involved in the recruitment process to clearly signify much increased odds of becoming a candidate. Where routinised stages differ from what is written in party statues, the Supply and Demand Model can be adapted by replacing[53]

[52] Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal, Chapter 18: Party System Institutionalisation and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization, in Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty, eds., *Handbook of Party Politics*, (London: Sage, 2006), p. 207.
[53] Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, (2004) Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. *Perspectives on Politics,* vol. 2, no. 4, p. 729. Helmke and Levitsky describe

formal stages with de facto stages. To adapt the model, the prescribed labels applied to stages of recruitment can be re-imagined so that the model becomes bespoke as to what is routinised. In this way, the number as well as the nature of stages is allowed to vary[54]. Note that introducing flexibility into the types of recruitment stages prior to candidacy implies that the locus of selectorate decision-making need not lie within the party's official hierarchy[55], or even within its membership. At least two formal stages are constants on all political recruitment processes: that of candidacy (which must be registered with electoral bodies in order for a candidate to compete in elections), and that of becoming an elected official.

Flavia Freidenberg and Steven Levitsky refer to parties for which highly routinised recruitment stages differ from their written rules as 'informally institutionalised' parties[56]. These parties may not issue candidacy application forms, nor hold scheduled interview panels that methodically work through a list of applicants, yet, because the stages are routinised, all actors share a common understanding of the steps along a multi-stage career path towards representing the party in an election. Often, progressing from one stage to another involves considerable effort. In practice, for example, the process of

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informal party institutions as either 'competing', in which case they structure incentives in ways that are incompatible with formal rules, or 'complementary', whereby informal institutions are compatible with formal rules and procedures that are not implemented or enforced.

[54] Joni Lovenduski has argued that the stages of the supply and demand model were always intended to be flexible. See: Lovenduski, 'The Supply and Demand Model of Candidate Selection: Some Reflections', pp. 513-528.

[55] This may lie within individuals who do not hold titles in the party leadership, yet they hold de facto power in candidate-selection decisions.

[56] Flavia Freidenberg and Steven Levitsky, 'Chapter 9: Informal Institutions and Party Organization in Latin America', in Steve Levitsky and Gretchen Helmke, eds., *Informal Institutions in Latin America*, (Washington DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2006). These authors point out that: 'many of the most highly institutionalized parties in Latin American history, including the Mexican PRI (Party of the Institutional Revolution), the Colorados in Paraguay, and traditionally dominant parties in Colombia and Honduras, are predominantly informal' (p. 180); and that: 'although both informally institutionalized parties (e.g., patronage-based machines) and weakly institutionalized parties (e.g., personalistic or charismatic parties) are informal, in that their formal structures are largely decoupled from the real organization, the two types are very different and should not be conflated' (p. 181).

candidate recruitment might involve de facto membership, instead of Norris and Lovenduski's formal party membership stage. This may be gained by participating in party activities, ranging from obviously political acts, such as joining protests, to regularly turning up in arenas of party organisation that may not seem to be overtly political, such as football supporters clubs and church meetings where party members regularly interact. Once membership is demonstrated and accepted by established members, subsequent signifiers of stagewise advancement towards candidacy might equate to taking on and successfully managing ever more weighty responsibilities within a clientelistic machine. For example, moving up from delivering day-to-day particularistic benefits such as getting someone to fix a client's leaky roof, to negotiating employment opportunities for a neighbourhood with the community leader in exchange for the neighbourhood's votes. After attaining a certain level in the network's hierarchy, an individual might be considered by the 'selectorate' to be an 'applicant' of sorts. In this sense, the selectorate consists of those who garner sufficient authority to make decisions about how gets to be a candidate. As previously mentioned, they may or may not be formal party members. Similarly, 'applicants' are those who have become candidacy options in the eyes of the selectorate through their participation in the routinised stages of advancement.

Crucially, in parties that are both informal and highly institutionalised, actors involved in the recruitment process share clear understandings of sticky constraints that structure political behaviour. Even though structures that lie formally within the party may be weak, and stages may operate through organisations outside of the party, from the perspective of individuals seeking office, and that of the selectorate, there are stages of recruitment along a pathway that must be passed through, and these stages are defined by what is routinised.

Frequently, the literature conflates the informality with weak institutionalisation. For example, in her analysis of the gendered candidate recruitment process of the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP)—the party that has dominated Samoan politics for the past thirty years—Kerryn Baker refers to the HRPP as weakly institutionalised, then describes a recruitment process in which 'the fono [village council], not the political party, is the key institutional space in which women's access to politics is negotiated'[57]. In this process of recruitment, only leaders of extended family units, called matai, who are selected by consensus within the family, are permitted to stand for Parliament. Therefore, only matai can approach the various fono in a constituency to seek endorsement to run as the HRPP candidate[58]. Each fono holds meetings to select this individual by consensus. On election day, villagers essentially always vote for their fono's recommendation, except when a family member is competing with that candidate. Here, the stages of political recruitment are not written in HRPP statues, but they are clear and entrenched through routinisation, and there are no alternative pathways that lead to HRPP candidacy. HRPP candidate recruitment is therefore, in my view, highly institutionalised; weakly institutionalised parties, as I discuss below, can be more clearly conceptualised as those with no single routinised pathway towards candidacy.

[57] Kerryn Baker, (2018) 'Gender and Candidate Selection in a Weakly Institutionalised Party System: The Case of Samoa', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 53, no. 1, p. 65.
[58] Baker describes how gender operates in progression towards each stage of recruitment. In some villages, women are not allowed to be matai (overall, about 5% of matai are female). The fono is understood as a 'male domain' and women are commonly not allowed to sit on it. Moreover, the fono seek to select a preferred candidate by consensus, which tends to 'give greater weight to the views of those at the helm of the village hierarchy'. Ibid p. 60-62.

Weakly Institutionalised Parties

While it may be straightforward to adapt the Supply and Demand Model to account for recruitment in Freidenberg and Levitsky's 'informally institutionalised' parties, this is not the case for parties that they term 'weakly institutionalised'. The recruitment processes of these parties are similarly constrained by two formal stages: that of becoming the officially sanctioned candidate representing the party, and that of being elected. Yet if one were to retrospectively sketch out a stagewise recruitment process up to this point for the candidate of a weakly institutionalised party, and compare it to the process that led to the candidacy of the same party's candidate in the prior and subsequent elections, these processes will not necessarily match.

An initial impression of recruitment in such a case may be one of disorder. However, all of those who became the party's candidate in different elections had already acquired sufficiently strong signifiers of suitability for candidacy. From the perspective of local actors' understandings, signifiers of progression towards candidacy therefore do exist in these cases, but pathways with increasing probabilities of candidacy attached to them—stages—exist in parallel.

Prior to becoming a candidate, for example, individuals who are seen as viable political competitors will most likely have had to become locally prominent[59]. Sometimes this will have involved many effortful stages. Setting up and running a community organisation might be one way to achieve this. Founding, growing and managing a business that employs more and more people, and perhaps produces enough profit to sponsor a local

[59] Lucas M. Novaes, (2018) 'Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties: Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 84–98.

football team, might be another established route. Sometimes the only apparent signifier prior to candidacy might be membership of a locally famous family. In which case the signifier is not an 'attainment' if one is born into the family; such a signifier does not require effort in the same sense as the other pathways described (although no doubt instances of proving oneself within the famous family may feature prominently in probabilistic progression towards candidacy along that particular pathway). Especially for women, marrying into the family is likely to increase odds of candidacy, which indeed may require effort.

When all pathways of signifiers are grouped together and viewed as one inconsistent and conflicting track towards candidacy, these parties have weakly institutionalised stages of political recruitment. However, within any single pathway among the parallel pathways, stages of progression may be consistently reinforced over time and widely understood by local actors as pathways of increasing odds of candidacy. Thus, in the weakly institutionalised parties that Freidenberg and Levitsky describe, a charismatic leader's family members and long-time personal friends frequently bypass actual party members to gain de facto top positions and compete in elections[60]. To be sure, new ways of becoming locally prominent may emerge over time. But these should be viewed as parallel pathways being added, circumventing existing understandings of the options available as to how to probabilistically make progress towards becoming a candidate.

Routinisation is an inherently dynamic concept. Even in highly institutionalised parties the effortful pathway of attainments towards candidacy is actively reinforced over time, and can evolve. For this reason, defining stages of recruitment by what is routinised is a

[60] Freidenberg and Levitsky, 'Informal Institutions and Party Organization in Latin America', p. 185.

means of more fully incorporating gender into the model; conceptualising stages in terms of what is constructed and reinforced draws attention to those processes—and thus to gendered content of the stages themselves[61]. The revised model is also made more sensitive to gendered processes than the standard framework by focusing attention on the final two stages of recruitment—as the next section explains.

Incorporating the Personal Vote

Garnering the personal vote is relatively unimportant in becoming a Member of Parliament in the UK, while in elections elsewhere in the world it frequently carries the day. Where that is the case, and in so far as voters perceive of an electoral office as requiring characteristics that they consider to be gendered, it is reasonable to expect the personal vote to affect women's descriptive outcomes. In other words, when voters pay little attention to party labels, and understand a political office to require qualities that they preferentially associate with men or women, they may consciously or otherwise more readily vote for a male or female candidate in accordance with these associations. Such gender biases in voter demand are likely to generate feedback effects, potentially over the entire process of political recruitment.

The personal vote can be an important influence on progression towards elective office in highly institutionalised and weakly institutionalised parties. However, there are reasons to expect it to be especially relevant to outcomes in weakly institutionalised parties, as it should weigh more heavily on candidate selection. To explain why, it is necessary to

[61] Karen Beckwith, (2005) 'A Common Language of Gender', *Politics and Gender*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp.128–37.

delve into the balance of selectorate priorities in different kinds of parties.

The personal vote refers to an individual's electoral capital. It can be defined as 'that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record'[62]. It is distinct from the related concepts[6364], personalism and charismatic linkage, though the overlap of these concepts with the personal vote makes relevant the literatures pertaining to them. Much of the personalism literature is centred around party-independent institutional incentives set up by different electoral systems to cultivate the personal vote[65], as opposed to variation between parties that compete in the same elections in how much their representatives actually do this[66]. Scholarship on charismatic linkage is helpful here. Charismatic individuals—those most able to form charismatic linkages with voters—will be especially adept at garnering a personal vote. Therefore, compared with parties that have other linkage strategies[67], parties that rely predominantly on charismatic linkage will be especially dependent on personal votes.

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[62] Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*, (Harvard, MT: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 9.
[63] As the unbridled following of a leader, personalism is a style of politics. Charismatic linkage is a connection to voters of which the substance is the Weberian concept of charismatic legitimacy—a right to rule founded upon making others feeling powerful in one's presence. These concepts are distinct as, for example, a personalistic leader can intimidate or rule by fear, whereas a charismatic leader does not need to do that, because people want to follow him or her.
[64] Tatiana Kostadinova and Barry Levitt, (2014) 'Toward a Theory of Personalist Parties: Concept Formation and Theory Building', *Politics & Policy*, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 490-512. These authors refer to personalism as the 'more mild-mannered cousin' of charismatic linkage (p. 494), and argue that while 'all charismatic leadership is personalistic, not all personalism is necessarily charismatic'.
[65] John Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, Matthew, (1995) 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas', *Electoral Studies*, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 417-435.
[66] David Samuels, (1999) 'Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-Centric Electoral Systems: Evidence from Brazil', *Comparative Political Studies,* vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 487–518.
[67] Noting that any party's linkage strategy is rarely a pure type.

Herbert Kitchselt argues that there is a reason why charismatic linkage is ubiquitous among parties that lack a robustly organised internal structure, as is the case for weakly institutionalised parties, as described in the previous section. These parties do not have the necessary resources to form and sustain alternative linkage strategies[6869]. A degree of internal organisation, which tends to accompany the maintenance of a single, routinised pathway of candidate recruitment, is a prerequisite for hashing out internal programmatic consistency, and, in a different sense[70], for delivering clientelistic benefits and monitoring recipients where these exchanges are organised via networks within or closely associated with party structures[71]. Therefore, unable to make consistent policy promises (or making implausibly all-encompassing ones), and without the ongoing delivery of particularistic benefits in a manner that is consistently attached to the party label, parties lacking internal organisation can put forward little else for voters to evaluate than their candidates' personal qualities.

The selectorate of a party that relies heavily on charismatic linkage should therefore choose as their candidate the individual who they believe stands the best chance of being

[68] Herbert Kitschelt, (2000) 'Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 33, no. 6–7, pp. 845–79.
[69] To be sure, linkage mechanisms are rarely of pure types and there are many examples of a personalistic appeals delivered alongside programmatic or clientelistic ones. See: Ibid. pp. 845–79.
[70] The internal organisation necessary to hash out internal programmatic consistency involves procedures to express and work through ideas, whereas this is far less necessary to execute clientelism, for which a mechanistic organisation is required.
[71] 'Modular parties', as described by Novaes, are clientelistic parties where the structures that organise clientelistic exchange exist separately from structures closely associated with the party. These are discussed further in Chapter 3.

perceived by voters as possessing the appropriate personal attributes for the position[72][73]. Selectorates of programmatic parties and of parties that have an ongoing association with a clientelistic network will also be subject to these pressures in personalistic environments, but the concern will be balanced against whether potential candidates possess additional skill sets. This is because if elected, individuals representing parties that seek to maintain programmatic and clientelistic linkages must also have the capacity to deliver on policy and patronage promises.

I have already argued that the standard model is not sufficiently attentive to candidate recruitment processes in weakly institutionalised parties. Neither does it adequately incorporate the personal vote in so far as it can be relevant in the recruitment of elected

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[72] The results of Goldberg Paradigm experiments provide general support for the view that voters in personalistic systems will select the candidate they perceive to have most appropriate personal attributes for the electoral office in question—because, in these contexts, voters see themselves as voting for the individual whom they think would be best at doing a job, rather than selecting a representative of a party. Goldberg Paradigm experiments are common in the management science literature, and are analogous to the vignette experiment set-up in political science that varies a single attribute such as candidate sex alongside identical candidate profiles. The difference is that, in Goldberg Paradigm experiments, candidate profiles are replaced with identical curriculum vitae. When participants are asked whether they would hire job candidates based on CVs alone, the participants are on average more willing to employ men for positions that they anticipate will require masculine characteristics (such as a CEO), and women for positions that they anticipate will require feminine characteristics (such as a nurse)—even though candidate qualifications and experience have been equated. For a meta-analysis of 49 publications of Goldberg-Paradigm experiments, see: Marilyn Davidson and Ronald Burke, (2000) 'Sex Discrimination in Simulated Employment Contexts: A Meta-analytic Investigation', *Journal of Vocational Behaviour*, vol. 56, pp. 225-248.

[73] In the 1990s, vignette experiments performed by Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen similarly showed that depending on how voters gender-type the characteristics they see as required to successfully execute a political role, voters will favour either men or women on average for that role. The participants in their experiments assumed greater issue competency of male political candidates on military and economic matters, and greater issue competency of female candidates on 'compassion issues' (see: Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, (1993) 'Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates', *American Journal of Political Science,* vol. 37, no. 1, p. 119). Because military and economic policies tend to be high-level government responsibilities, the participants favoured male candidates for higher levels of office. Female candidates gained an advantage for local offices, since education, healthcare and poverty alleviation were largely understood by voters to lie within the remit of local government (see: Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, (1993) 'The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office', *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 503–25).

representatives of both highly and weakly institutionalised parties[74]. Indeed, in *Political Representation* Norris and Lovenduski's discussions of their model rarely end with the successful election of a candidate, but instead with the prior step of candidate selection from a group of applicants. Throughout the book, the authors use the term 'demand-side pressures' as shorthand for selectorate demands; they reference voter preferences only in terms of how party selectors' choices may be shaped by anticipating them[75]. Feminist institutionalism also tends to dismiss the empirical relevance of gendered variation in voter demand[76]. Krook writes, for example, that: 'although some early work found that the public was reluctant to vote for female candidates, most studies find that voters… vote for male and female candidates at equal rates'[77]. As such, according to both the feminist institutionalist and the supply and demand literatures, the level of women's descriptive representation that an election will produce will be effectively fixed on the last day that candidacies can be registered with the electoral authorities (indeed, if all campaign resources provided by parties were to be also set then.)

This rule of thumb that voting populations tend to be equally willing to elect male and female candidates may be borne out generally. But the idea, mentioned at the start of this

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[74] This is most likely because a large majority of UK constituencies are safe seats.
[75] This is given the term 'indirect discrimination', which the authors explain as occurring when party selectors would choose a particular candidate, but perceive the choice to be risky based on how they expect voters to apply group stereotypes to the individual. It is somewhat understandable that voter preferences are almost written out of the *Political Recruitment*. Their theory is developed with a British general election in mind in which 75% of seats were safe (in the sense that the incumbent party could expect to win by more than 10% of the vote). As they write, party selectors were most of the time effectively hiring someone for the job of MP.
[76] Anne-Marie Goetz, in her paper expressing concern at the potential for 'myth-making' in overstating the causal evidence for women as less corruptible than men, makes no mention of voters in the context of their preferences. Instead she locates all influences on women's descriptive representation on the forces that affect whether women become candidates, for example writing: 'For the large number of women who are interested in political participation if not directly in leadership, parties limit access because of the masculinity of party cultures and the sexual dangers that this represents'. Anne-Marie Goetz, (2007) 'Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-Corruption Force?' *Development and Change*, vol. 38, no. 1, p98.
[77] Krook, 'Beyond Supply and Demand', p. 708.

section, that where the personal vote is influential in electoral outcomes, voter-held gender stereotypes are likely to influence women's descriptive representation in so far as voters perceive of an electoral office as requiring characteristics that they consider gendered, is supported by the empirical findings of Melody Ellis Valdini[78]. In her analysis of election results in 23 countries over a two-decade period, Valdini finds that the presence of system-level institutional incentives to cultivate the personal vote are not, on their own, a significant predictor of women's descriptive under-representation. However, the relationship becomes significant when a measure of the strength of these incentives[79] is interacted with citizen bias against female politicians[80].

In practice, the extent to which gender stereotypes operate as heuristics in voting decisions will depend on the information that voters have to work with. There may be limited candidate information available, and voters, as boundedly rational beings with constraints on their resources such as time and attention, are likely to partially absorb and process it. In the absence of complete knowledge of political candidates on which to base a voting decision, gender stereotypes are especially likely options for the kind of heuristics that voters will employ. This is partly because identifying male and female candidates and learning the commonplace heuristic judgments to attach to sex categorisations are extremely low-cost exercises[8182]. Anyone who turns out to vote will either read the candidates' names or see the candidates' pictures on a ballot paper or

[78] Melody Ellis Valdini, (2013) 'Electoral Institutions and the Manifestation of Bias: The Effect of the Personal Vote on the Representation of Women', *Politics & Gender,* vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 76–92.
[79] To calculate scores from 0 to 6 Ellis Valdini uses classification system created in Carey and Shugart, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas', pp. 417–39.
[80] Indicated by the proportion of citizens who say that they agree with the statement 'men make better political leaders than women do' on contemporaneous waves of the World Values Survey.
[81] Monika L Mcdermott, (1998) 'Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections', *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 51, no. 4, p. 900
[82] Ellis Valdini, 'Electoral Institutions and the Manifestation of Bias', 76–92.

voting screen—activities which, filtered through voters' own assumptions, will automatically inform the voter of candidates' genders. So, without investing any additional time or energy than the act of voting itself, all voters will have available to them a near-complete or fully complete categorisation of the alternatives along a dimension of presumed gender. Although some demographic categorisations other than gender may be similarly cheap—such as race and age—these are usually far harder or impossible to discern from candidates' names alone, and arguably harder to discern from photographs[83]. Therefore, when the median voter sees a 'feminine' name on a ballot paper, without further information, she is likely to attribute to that individual a set of gendered expectations[84]. Supplied with no additional information, she may ascribe a social construction of femininity that is a midpoint among femininity's plural forms as she understands them—the female gender stereotypes that she holds. As more individual

[83] Although the non-demographic category of party labels will, like candidate sex, be available in full to citizens who turn out to vote, the costs of learning appropriate heuristics to associate with different political parties is far higher—often requiring a conscious learning effort—than the costs of acquiring gender stereotypes, which tend to be absorbed gradually and unconsciously over one's lifetime.

[84] The feminist institutionalist literature treats gender—the social meanings given to biological differences between men and women—as an attribute of political institutions in the sense that constructions of masculinity and femininity are intertwined in the daily culture or logic of these institutions. Some feminist institutionalist scholars argue that gender cannot be an applied to individuals. (See: Helena Stensöta, Lena Wängnerud and Richard Svensson, (2015) 'Gender and Corruption: The Mediating Power of Institutional Logics: Gender and Corruption', *Governance,* vol. 28, no. 4, p. 476. For a summary of how feminist scholars have used the term 'gender' differently, see Mary Hawkesworth, (2005) Engendering Political Science: An Immodest Proposal, *Politics & Gender*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 141-156.) It is perfectly possible to apply gender to individuals if one conceives of gender as a set of expectations that individuals can internalize, and next to which individuals can compare themselves and others. Indeed, if gender is an institution (as Patricia Yancey Martin argues), and, in Douglass North's words, institutions are 'the rules of the game in a society… the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction', then genders can be understood as sets of constraints regarding how individuals appropriately interact with others. Men and women are broadly expected by others to conform to constructions of masculinity and femininity—and where a particular hue of masculinity pervades an institution, men who do not conform it, and women in general, find themselves failing to meet this institutional ideal. The constraints regarding how individuals appropriately interact with others will not only capture the behaviours displayed, but competencies and the issue stances that individuals reveal. See: Patricia Yancey Martin, (2004) 'Gender As Social Institution', *Social Forces*, vol. 82, no. 4, pp. 1249-1273. And: Douglass North, (1991) 'Institutions', *Journal of Economic Perspectives,* vol. 5, no. 1, p. 100.

candidate information is made available and taken in by the voter, the influence of stereotypes on her voting decision should dwindle[85].

Inserting greater sensitivity to gendered voter demand into the revised model does not require adding a new stage; becoming an elected official is already the final stage in diagrams of Supply and Demand Model. Rather, it requires avoiding the trap of discussing and deploying the model as though progression from candidacy to elective office were an afterthought. The revisions to the model that I have described predispose it to highlight differences between the proportion of women who become candidates and those who get elected. This is because in using the revised framework to make sense of variation in women's descriptive representation, one must necessarily start with the two formal stages of candidate recruitment—candidacy and elective office—and with the proportion of women among the represented. Then, through qualitative enquiry, one can work backwards, adding prior stages according to what one learns to be routinised—a process that should also investigate how those stages were constructed, how they are reinforced or contested, and, subsequently, proportionally how many women compose each stage. Because the starting point for deploying the model is to focus on the two final stages of political recruitment that are common for all parties, more attention is necessarily focused on what affects progression across those stages.

[85] Mcdermott, 'Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections', pp. 895–918.

The Revised Framework

As previously noted, my two modifications to the structure of the standard model address its chief pathologies. The revised model is able to detect the existence of process-wide distortions[86] via proportionality testing with 'the represented'. By defining stages as routinised signifiers of increased odds of candidacy, which exist in a single pathway or in parallel pathways, it does not privilege de facto stages of recruitment that match de jure stages over those that do not, nor stages that occur within the party over those that do not, and it provides a means of theorising recruitment in weakly institutionalised parties. In these ways it responds to needs articulated by prominent voices in the field of women's political recruitment. It is far more sensitive to informality than the standard model[87-89]. In prompting investigators to assess what is routinised, it encourages attention to incremental change[90], and to the role of gendered processes[91] in characterising institutions of political recruitment[92][93]. It is also more sensitive to the potential influence of voter-held gender biases, which are more likely to affect outcomes

86 Krook, 'Beyond Supply and Demand'.
87 Elin Bjarnegård and Meryl Kenny. (2016), 'Comparing Candidate Selection: A Feminist Institutionalist Approach', Government and Opposition, 51(3): 370–92.
88 Kenny and Verge Opening Up the Black Box. pp. 351–369.
89 Hinojosa, Magda, and Ana Vijil-Gurdia. (2012.) 'Alternate Paths to Power? Women's Political Representation in Nicaragua.' Latin American Politics and Society 54 (4): 61–88.
90 Meryl Kenny, *Gender and Political Recruitment: Theorizing Institutional Change*.
91 Beckwith. A Common Language of Gender? pp. 128-137.
92 Kenney explains that to say an institution is 'gendered' is to express that constructions of masculinity and femininity are intertwined in the daily 'logic' of political institutions, rather than 'existing out in society or fixed within individuals which they then bring whole to the institution'. See: Sally J. Kenney, (1996) 'New Research on Gendered Political Institutions', *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 49, no. 2, p. 456.
93 Kenny and Verge write, for example: 'those few works [of within-party recruitment processes] that do take women into account tend to fall back on the dichotomous variable of sex, rather than integrate gender more systematically into their analysis. In doing so, most party politics scholars have failed to acknowledge the extent to which parties' ideologies, organizational structures, procedures and practices are 'saturated with gender', as well as the ways in which the experiences of actors within political parties also vary according to both sex and gender.' Kenny and Verge, Opening Up the Black Box, p. 355.

in candidate-centric systems[94] than in party-centric ones, and to do so in particular among parties for which limited internal organisation necessitates a predilection for candidates who can summon large personal support bases[95].

The revised framework keeps proportionality testing as an analytical tool for use where such data can be uncovered, acknowledging that this is an ideal scenario. It does not, therefore, throw away information with the potential to eliminate or highlight possible stage-specific distortionary mechanisms—as focusing only on configurations of formal, practical and normative institutions risks. Indeed, there is no reason to consider the revised framework to be incompatible with Krook's preferred approach to making sense of variation in women's descriptive representation. My intention is to renovate the standard framework so that it is globally generalisable, and as such is better able to detect change in women's political recruitment where party institutionalisation is highly variable, personalism is rife, and disorder—for example, in the fuzzy delineation of party boundaries—seemingly commonplace. While the revised model can detect the existence of gendered distortions, causal process identification is beyond it, which is why it is intended as a tool to motivate and guide further qualitative investigation.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the revised framework. The two panels in this figure are intended to refer to one another down the page, such that any point along the x axis in Panel A can be traced vertically to corresponding stages of recruitment in Panel B. Panel A traces the changing probability that any individual in the recruitment process is female, which may also be thought of as the changing proportions of women among those at different

[94] Ellis Valdini, 'Electoral Institutions and the Manifestation of Bias'.
[95] Novaes, 'Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties: Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties'.

stages of recruitment. It does this for four imaginary parties, each with their own numbered line.

Panel B illustrates recruitment pathways corresponding to increased probability of winning elective office as a party representative. The upper part of Panel B shows this for highly institutionalised parties, which have a single recruitment pathway. The multiple, parallel recruitment pathways of a hypothetical, weakly institutionalised party are shown just below. In these pathways, stages prior to candidacy are indicated by dotted rather than solid lines, as it is not strictly necessary to pass along any particular route over another[96]. The arrows in Panel B indicate the direction of progression towards increasing odds of winning elective office, not influences on progression. As such, the stage denoted by an 'r', 'the represented', is not connected by arrows to subsequent stages[97]. Routinised stages of candidate recruitment in highly institutionalised parties are depicted as variable in number (s_n). For the hypothetical, weakly institutionalised party, the 'o' indicates moving in the orbit of the selectorate and presenting attributes that indicate readiness for candidacy. The final two, universal stages, are denoted by 'c' for candidacy, and 'e' for election.

Figure 2.1 suggests advantages to analysing political recruitment using the revised framework. A difference in the strength of process-wide distortions between two parties' political recruitment processes, which both lack stage-specific distortions, is illustrated by the lines in Panel A that represent Parties 1 and 2. The revised model is sensitive to this


[96] This does not mean that all pathways are equally open to all aspirants. For example, the optional pathway at the bottom of Panel B in Figure 2.1, with just one circle prior to candidacy, could refer to membership of the charismatic leader's family.

[97] Note that comparison with the represented in not always necessary in practical terms when deploying the revised framework, as women are almost always 50% of the represented. The exercise has value where this is not the case, and where it is, as a reminder that even parties with 30% women representatives are not descriptively representative.

difference, and the level of these lines should also be compared to the proportion of women among the represented. Paying attention to differences in the proportion of women across stages distinguishes patterns in the recruitment processes of Parties 3 and 4—patterns that could subsequently motivate inquiry into factors influencing progression at specific stages of recruitment. Parties 3 and 4 have equal probabilities of women being associated with the party early on, and of women being elected. But pro-male bias up to the point of candidacy is stronger in the recruitment pathway of Party 4. Meanwhile some mechanism or mechanisms reduce voter support for women candidates representing Party 3, but do not exert the same effect on women candidates for Party 4.

Feedback effects on recruitment within the same electoral cycle may be constrained by the electoral calendar. As I pick up in later chapters, this may happen if voter demand for female candidates suddenly changes after selectorates have made final candidacy decisions. In such circumstances, only progression across the final two stages of recruitment—from candidacy to election—can be affected in the run up to the next election. Had the same change in voters' willingness to support a woman occurred before candidacies were decided, then feedback effects could have propagated across some or all stages of parties' pathways leading to candidate recruitment for that election, affecting the proportion of women at other stages. In Panel A, line 2a—the dotted line that branches off Party 2's line—illustrates a scenario where voter demand for women candidates suddenly changes after party selectors have made their decisions. In this example, voters become more willing to vote for a woman.

PANEL A



PANEL B




Figure 2.1. A visual summary of political recruitment in highly and weakly institutionalised parties. Panels A and B are to be read in vertical alignment. Dotted circles indicate possible stages, solid-line circles indicate necessary stages, 'r' = 'the represented', 's' = a routinised stage, 'o' = 'a selectorate option' (presenting attributes that indicate readiness for candidacy), 'c' = 'candidacy', 'e' = elected.

The next section introduces the context for which this argument is further explored. It discusses corruption scandals involving a male incumbent as scenarios that could prompt a shift in distortions as illustrated by line 2a (Figure 2.1). As I explain, this is the expectation of the heuristics and voting behaviour literature, in which the female stereotype of incorruptibility is widely discussed. This literature anticipates that women's descriptive representation will increase in response to new information about male incumbent corruption, but it generally fails to connect these arguments to considerations of potential feedback effects in political recruitment. Feminist institutionalists have also studied the gendered impacts of corruption in so far as they have analysed how institutions that are both influential in political recruitment and facilitate or commit corruption tend to be strongly gendered. Their studies suggest that new information about male incumbent corruption will instead reduce women's descriptive representation, as it will reveal the extent of male-bias that is woven into the logic of these institutions. I argue that opposite expectations set up by these two literatures can be navigated by attention to what I call the 'dissemination assumption', and by reference to my revised model. In the final part of the chapter, I add a clarification to my model that underscores the importance of considering it to be porous to influences that emerge from outside the voting district.

Applying the Revised Framework: Corruption

In several chapters of this dissertation, I demonstrate the advantages of the revised framework by analysing the effects of new information about male incumbent corruption on women's descriptive representation. I selected these contexts because they provide an exogenous force that has the potential to rapidly alter gendered influences on political

recruitment, and because they are commonplace among democracies with very different levels of institutionalisation among their main political parties. Moreover, how new information about male incumbent corruption is likely to affect women's descriptive representation would seem to be a foundational issue in the emerging field of gender and corruption, yet it prompts opposite answers when different literatures in political science are interrogated for expectations. The little-recognised dichotomy emerges when one compares feminist institutionalist scholarship, wherein research findings suggest a reduction in women's descriptive representation, and the heuristics and voting behaviour literature, which predicts an increase. In the paragraphs below I explain the disjunction, and how it can be navigated. *Who* learns about the corrupt acts and *when* they learn about them are key considerations in developing hypotheses consistent with both literatures. The scope conditions of the argument are addressed only briefly here; they are explored further in Chapter 4.

Feminist Institutionalist Expectations

Taken together, feminist institutionalist studies about corruption lead to the expectation that any new information about a male incumbent's involvement in corrupt acts will result in lower descriptive representation of women. These studies report that corruption tends to squeeze the opportunity structures that women seeking political office are presented with since institutions of political recruitment and corruption are often interlinked[98]. Therefore, new information about a male incumbent's role in a network that has committed or facilitated corrupt acts should clarify the weight of the gendered

[98] Goetz, 'Political Cleaners', pp. 87–105.

challenges that women face on recruitment pathways to attaining elected office. Actors will update their priors accordingly, and incentives will shift. For example, female aspirants may view their odds of selection more pessimistically, and may reappraise whether investing time and effort in progression towards candidacy is worthwhile. Individuals who provide electoral finance to the party might learn how their money could be 'invested' more efficiently[99], and become less enthusiastic about using it to promote a women's candidacy.

Feminist institutionalist scholars who have worked in this field have primarily focused on the interweaving of patriarchal structures and clientelist and patronage networks. A study of Iceland provides a rare examination of how gender and corruption operate in a context where political parties have highly institutionalised recruitment stages that have long been a close match formal rules[100]. In the years spanning the 2008 financial crisis, Iceland dropped from 1st to 13th[101] place in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. Janet Elise Johnson, Þorgeður Einarsdóttir, and Gyða Margrét Pétursdóttir describe how, as the economy began to slide in 2007, the country's

[99] For example, illegal favouritism in the receipt of highly profitable public works contracts.
[100] De facto stages leading up to candidate selection that closely adhered to party statutes have not always been evident in Iceland—the main political parties in the years after independence from Denmark in 1944, the Centre Party and the more dominant Independence Party, were frequent coalition partners run through a logic of state patronage that informed candidate selection[100]. See: Janet Elise Johnson, Þorgerður Einarsdóttir, and Gyða Margrét Pétursdóttir, (2013) 'A Feminist Theory of Corruption: Lessons from Iceland', *Politics & Gender,* vol. 9, no. 2, p. 182. But, reforms in the 1970s[100], 1980s and 1990s[100] shriveled local party machines, reduced the influence of informal institutions in political recruitment, and opened up political space for other parties. More specifically, voter distrust of political parties' methods of selecting candidates led to reforms in the 1970s that saw all parties select their candidate lists at conventions held in the eight electoral districts. Three parties introduced nomination rules that allowed all voters to participate in party primaries. However, with the names of the candidate lists decided through open primary at the nomination level, the parties kept closed party lists for the elections—and with that tight control on who would represent the party in the Alþingi. See: Svanur Kristjánsson, (2004) 'Iceland: Searching for Democracy along Three Dimensions of Citizen Control', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, vol. 27, no. 2, p. 157.
[101] 1st place in 2005; 13th in 2012. Johnson, Einarsdóttir, and Pétursdóttir, 'A Feminist Theory of Corruption', p. 178.

governance started to resemble what they call a 'dual state' in which important decisions were made outside of democratic institutions and procedures, and the decisions themselves reflected 'shadowy arbitrary arrangements'[102]. Concurrently, the masculinising of elite politics that had been set in play as Iceland embraced neoliberalism in the years leading up to the crisis became accentuated. The shift towards a 'dual state' gradually excluded all but a group of powerful, hyper-masculine men with jobs spanning government, business and the media[103].

Elin Bjarnegård would make sense of the regendering of political power in Iceland through the concept of homosocial capital, which she has constructed by combining the concept of homosociality—preferring the company of one's own sex, typically because you hold gendered expectations that lead to you perceive members of your own sex as

[102] For example, this authors cite the assessments of 'less restrained observers': "as the collapse gathered speed, Oddsson, as Central Bank governor, moved to peg the krona at close to the precrisis rate, a crazy move by all economic counts [and which was decided without consulting or even informing the Central Bank's chief economist], but it might have allowed cronies in the know to spirit their krona into safer currencies in the few hours that the rate lasted". Ibid. p. 184.

[103] Highly gendered norms acted as entry requirements into this group. In the years leading up the crash, the authors describe evolution of norms of inclusion within a group that they call the 'intricate spine'. This is a club of elites in government and business with its roots in an old boy's network that had been around since at least the 1970s, The Locomotive Group. Adherence to a certain selection of hyper-masculine norms among men with similar backgrounds became a de facto requirement for membership of the intricate spine: 'Gender is complicit in Iceland's corruption… complicit business elites paraded their plunder…flaunting their luxury cars… The gender capture and performance were justified [in an important 2005 speech by president Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson] by calling upon nation-centric masculinity ideals [of Iceland's Viking heritage and the requirement for aggressive risk-taking in globalized capitalism]… Those who did not fit the new masculine ideal were undermined and derided… A heteronormative, ethnocentric, neomasculinity was, in the language of the analysis here, the cerebrospinal fluid of the various networks of elites who formed the intricate spine…. Femininity was also reconstructed [in a country with a historically strong women's movement] … Tourism was promoted… with images of stunning Icelandic women ready and willing to "party" for men.' Although the authors of this paper do not discuss how political recruitment was affected in the years leading up to and in the thick of the crisis, one can imagine process-wide distortions emerging, such as the masculinisation of the ideal candidate imagined by aspirant women and sought by party insiders who were entrusted to decide the order of closed party lists in Iceland's proportional representation elections. Framed in Krook's terminology, a more masculinised ideal probably altered practical as well as normative institutions. See: Ibid. pp. 188-189.

more similar to yourself[104]—and Robert Putnam's 'bonding social capital'[105]. Bonding social capital cements ties in a small network, often through strong common norms that help to ensure the network's closure; it is a kind of social capital that facilitates particularised, in-group trust and, consequently, simplifies coordination[106]. As such, Bjarnegård argues that the accumulation of homosocial capital is an investment in predictability, which, almost always in the context of politics, is only available to men. Given a starting point of male dominance in existing power structures, politically ambitious women benefit more from heterosocial behaviour than from homosocial behaviour; whereas: 'men can find both the perceived similarities as well as the strategically positioned individuals [such as those with influence on progression across stages of candidate recruitment] among people of their own sex'[107]. Therefore, as a political environment becomes increasingly uncertain, men who seek to acquire or maintain power face strengthening incentives to adhere to and display norms informed by a culturally dominant ideal of masculinity[108]. Because corrupt acts involve risk, uncertainty, and demand the secrecy afforded by a closed network, they are accompanied by strong incentives of this nature. In this way, women and men who do not conform to the hegemonic masculinity are excluded from trusted in-groups.

That clientelism and patronage involve networks of individuals exchanging particularistic benefits, which sometimes take the form of illegal exchanges such as vote buying,

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104 Elin Bjarnegård, Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment. Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 27.
105 Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), p. 23.
106 It stands in contrast to bridging social capital, which maintains a large number of weak ties, encouraging societal trust and inclusiveness.
107 '… for women, homosocial capital is simply not a valid currency with which to attain political power'. See: Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment*, pp. 28-29.
108 Which can take various forms depending on the context, for example, paternalism or authoritarianism.

therefore suggests that men—as the traditional holders of power in those networks—could use homosocial capital to sustain a trusted group of insiders and to rise within the network's hierarchy. In the Thai case—the focus of Bjarnegård's research—informal clientelist networks are non-partisan, in the sense that they are not associated with recruitment processes of one party over another. The selectorates of both the Democrat party, one of the oldest political parties in Asia, and the much newer Thai Rak Thai party, evaluate potential candidates based on the anticipated number of votes that individuals can attract through these networks. Candidacy is by invitation only, though a politically ambitious person can substantially improve the odds of being chosen by moving up through the ranks of the network, and by visibly maintaining and expanding the network. Because acquiring homosocial capital is crucial to advancement, progression across de facto stages of recruitment—as Bjarnegård lists, from village-team member, to village-level broker, to tambon- (sub-district) level broker—is strongly gendered.

Although the specific features of clientelist structures vary across context, a clear analogy can be drawn to Argentine clientelism[109]. In this context, Mariela Swarzberg-Daby shows that women make up smaller proportions of each of three stages signifying increasing odds of attaining the role of municipal councillor[110]. Swarzberg-Daby explains the micrologics of gendered progression not in terms of bonding capital, but through unequal divisions of labour in the distribution of the problem-solving tasks that underpin clientelistic exchange[111]. Women tend to participate in the network as solvers of problems that require female-stereotyped competencies and a lot of time investment—

[109] Unlike the non-partisan networks in the Thai case, Swarzberg-Daby describes active members of the network as 'party supporters'. Mariela Szwarcberg Daby, (2016) 'Género y Clientelismo: Lecciones del Caso Argentino*', Revista SAAP*, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 124.
[110] These stages are: 1) interest in eventual candidacy, 2) 'weight' of qualifying responsibilities in the clientelist network, 3) electoral success. Ibid. p. 126.
[111] Indeed, clientelism is generally defined as 'the exchange of personal favours for political support'. See: Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment*, p.20.

such as providing care for children and the elderly. Yet fulfilling these tasks does little to demonstrate the skill set required for progression. Low-ranking men, however, are typically assigned to resolving problems that require male-stereotyped competencies, which more often leads to opportunities to display a readiness to take on the responsibilities of more senior positions in the network[112].

It makes sense, therefore, that women who attain elected office in Argentina have often done so after carving out alternative careers[113] that have greater value within programmatic parties (that are likely to have highly routinised stages of recruitment and procedures for advancement that are a close match for party statutes) and charismatic parties (often, though not always, weakly institutionalised, with thus with multiple recruitment pathways), than within clientelistic parties. Indeed, Susan Franceschet and Jennifer Piscopo demonstrate this: over the course of whole careers, women's exclusion by clientelist machine parties is apparent in the types of parties that women predominantly represent in Argentina's federal Congress, and in the positions that women attain within different parties' closed candidate lists[114]. Female legislators were

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[112] Szwarcberg Daby, 'Género y Clientelismo', p. 124.

[113] This has been demonstrated in Mexico, where female politicians are more likely to have a background in social movements. See: Victoria E. Rodríguez, *Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics*, (University of Texas Press, 2003). Note that at the local government level in Mexico, corruption (as measured by a survey of bribe-paying frequency) is associated with less women's descriptive representation on councils, even controlling for local levels of political competition, transparency, and judicial independence. See: Lena Wängnerud, (2010) 'Variation in Corruption between Mexican States Elaborating the Gender Perspective', QoG Working Paper Series, no.18.

[114] After categorizing the political parties that held Congressional seats between 1999 and 2009 as large, medium, and small, Franceschet and Piscopo showed that legislators representing both of the large (traditional) parties—the Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the Union Civic Radical (UCR)—were far more likely to have held previous posts with access to pork than legislators representing medium or small parties[114]. Furthermore, the gender gap—in terms of career paths involving positions with strong clientelist possibilities—was widest among these large parties[114]: Among UCR and PJ legislators, 10% of women and 32% of men had previously held posts considered advantageous to a clientelist network, compared to 4.5% of women and 7% of men in the midsized PRO (Propuesta Republicana) and ARI (Acción por una República Igualitaria) (p. 100). Control over clientelist resources was also a more valued career asset for men than for women[114], in a system where provincial party leaders control the order of names on closed lists. It was more than twice as valuable: 60% of men who had held 'high pork' posts attained the top list position,

most likely to represent the more programmatic, mid-sized parties of the right as well as the left (the Propuesta Republicana, PRO, and the Acción por una República Igualitaria, ARI, parties), than large, traditional, clientelist parties. Women were approximately equally likely to represent small parties as they were these large ones[115]—these 'smaller third parties…many of which are new players… [and] are fluid alliances of individuals,'[116] constitute the category in this study that best illustrates parties with weakly routinised stages of recruitment, as outlined earlier in this chapter.

Without multi-stage feedback mechanisms, the pattern of women's progression across stages in clientelist parties is illustrated by the downward gradient of line 4 in Figure 2.1. This is essentially what Swarzberg-Daby observes. Presumably a descending gradient might be sustained over time in the face of potential feedback mechanisms if women gain some benefit from participating at early stages of recruitment, aside from the possibility for future candidacy. Any new information that updates actors' priors as to how gendered the process of becoming a candidate is, and of the pro-male bias of the networks that one is likely to have to interact with if elected, should act only to lower women's descriptive representation.

compared with just 25% of women (p. 103) The paper does not delve into whether the women were more likely to have entirely self-made reputations with the network, or instead were more likely to be wives or daughters of prominent men in the network, as I consider in Chapter 6. See: Susan Franceschet and Jennifer Piscopo, (2013) 'Sustaining Gendered Practices? Power, Parties, and Elite Political Networks in Argentina', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 85-110.

[115] The gender gap, as described in the above footnote, was smaller in these parties than in the large, traditional parties.

[116] Franceschet and Piscopo, 'Sustaining Gendered Practices? p. 94.

Expectations of the Heuristics and Voting Behaviour Literature

The literature about the use of heuristics in voting behaviour predicts the opposite to feminist institutionalist studies: in response to new revelations of male incumbent corruption, women's descriptive representation should rise. The microfoundations of this expectation are distinct from ideas about homosocial capital and gendered labour division of clientelist problem-solving tasks, as is how the proposed mechanism would operate within the logic of the revised model. This literature argues that because voters are boundedly rational, they fall back on mental shortcuts, including gender stereotypes, when making voting decisions. Voters who learn that an elected incumbent is involved in corruption should employ heuristics of incorruptibility as they seek to replace the incumbent with the least corruptible alternative. In so far as voters hold the female incorruptibility stereotype and elections are candidate-centric, voter support for female candidates should increase, all things equal.

Research into the heuristics of honesty, trustworthiness, and incorruptibility[117] has several strands, not all directly related to gender[118], although gender features prominently in it. Experiments often find that both men and women trust women more than men, for example when an online panel of 88,000 people played an investment game and were

[117] Trustworthiness, honesty and corruptibility are overlapping but distinct concepts. I take trustworthiness to mean someone's perceived propensity to cheat on a mutual agreement. Such an agreement could be to not steal from the public purse if it is between voters and an elected official. Or it might be to behave reciprocally between bribe-payer and bribe-receiver. 'Trustworthiness' and 'corruptibility' can therefore be at odds: the intricate spine in Iceland trusted each other to behave reciprocally and not renege on that understanding. I take 'honesty' and 'corruptibility' to overlap more where they both refer to propensity to behave in a corrupt manner.

[118] Laboratory experiments generally show that individuals are more willing to trust someone who demonstrates high affiliation to their group: where ethnic politics is the norm, this tends to be a member of an individual's ethnic group (perhaps because close social network ties make such an individual easier to track down and sanction if they defect).

informed of their playing partner's sex[119]. In this setting, both male and female Player As sent more money to Player B—who had the option of returning some of the money after it tripled in value—on learning that Player B was a woman. In separate experimental settings, when participants have been provided with faces and asked to make decisions based on the faces' trustworthiness, sexual dimorphism as a cue to variation in femininity and masculinity has appeared to matter: the more masculine a male or a female face, the more is it associated with dishonesty[120][121].

Work on the use of incorruptibility heuristics in the context of voting behaviour rarely mentions these experimental studies[122]. One of the best-known demonstrations of voters' use of the female incorruptibility stereotype is by Monika McDermott[123]. She writes that maintaining an honest and ethnical government is one of the 'core few' trait stereotypes that voters hold about women candidates and that 'turn up in almost all analyses on the subject'. The respondents to her 1990 Los Angeles Times Poll who chose 'ethics in government' as one of the most important problems facing California were especially likely to say they would vote for a female candidate for governor; the association was stronger than that between ideology and candidate sex.

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119 Ellen Garbarino and Robert Slonim, (2009) 'The Robustness of Trust and Reciprocity across a Heterogeneous U.S. Population', *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 226–40.

120 This has been shown for both Caucasian and Japanese faces. See: Perrett, D. I. et al, (1998) 'Effects of Sexual Dimorphism on Facial Attractiveness', *Nature*, vol. 394, no. 6696, p. 885.

121 Continuing the point in footnote 118, it is worth noting that across this literature, concepts such as 'trustworthiness', 'dishonesty' and 'incorruptibility' are often used synonymously in this literature, even though trustworthiness in particular implies a broader set of attributes—and in theory could also be conflated with loyalty, which could bring it into conflict with 'incorruptibility'. Here I use the terms as reported in these studies, but elsewhere revert to the more specific concept of 'incorruptibility'.

122 Anthony C. Little et al, (2007) 'Facial Appearance Affects Voting Decisions', *Evolution and Human Behavior*, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 18–27.

123 Mcdermott, 'Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections', p. 900.

Scholars working outside of the US also frequently note voters' attribution of the incorruptibility stereotype to female political candidates[124][125]. Some work—such as Williams and Best's survey of the degree of similarity in the attributes ascribed to men and women in 25 countries—argues that this gender stereotype is 'pan-cultural'[126]. Jerome Black and Lynda Erickson propose that this gender stereotype may have been relevant in an electoral context of low trust in incumbents in Canada. In their analysis of the 1993 federal elections, when citizens demanded a break with politics-as-usual, Black and Erickson write: 'If anything, the data lean towards the conclusion that women candidates have an outright, albeit slight, advantage over men. Part of this may indeed be due to the perception by voters of women as being more honest and trustworthy political actors at a time when there is so much discontent with the traditional politicians…'[127]

I am not aware of any research that has sought to directly test whether the female incorruptibility stereotype benefits women candidates at the ballot box after male incumbent corruption has been revealed, using either quantitative or qualitative evidence[128]. The argument that it should rests on a series of premises, or scope conditions that I list here and elaborate further in Chapter 4. The assertion that voters

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[124] For example: Deborah Alexander and Kristi Andersen, (1993) 'Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits', *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 46, pp. 527-45.
[125] Tiffany D. Barnes and Emily Beaulieu, (2014) 'Gender Stereotypes and Corruption: How Candidates Affect Perceptions of Election Fraud', *Politics & Gender*, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 365–91.
[126] Williams, J. E, Satterwhite, R, C. & Best, D. L. (1999). Pancultural Gender Stereotypes Revisited: The Five Factor Model. *Sex Roles* vol. 40, no. 7/8, p.513
[127] Jerome H. Black and Lynda Erickson, (1993) 'Women candidates and voter bias: do women politicians need to be better?' Electoral Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, p. 94.
[128] In two papers, Justin Esarey and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer seek do link women's representation to corruption through the moderating pathway of electoral accountability. In both papers they are not interested in progression towards becoming an elected official, but rather the propensity of male and female politicians to engage in corrupt behaviour once already in office. See: Justin Esarey and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, 'Gender, Corruption, and Accountability: Why Women are (Sometimes) More Resistant to Corruption', Working paper presented at University of Tennessee, Knoxville, April 11, 2014. And: Justin Esarey and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, (2018) 'Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies', *British Journal of Political Science,* vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 659-690.

sometimes draw on gender stereotypes when they seek to rectify corruption at the ballot box assumes that voters receive information about the corruption that has taken place. Voters must also believe it. They must consider incumbent corruption to be counter to their interests. If a voter is willing to engage in implicit trading, other issues must not completely outweigh the importance of reducing government corruption. Finally, voters must consider it to be possible to complete the tasks of government and engage in less corruption than did the incumbent, else there would be no incentive to select an alternative to the incumbent. Empirically, the latter premise is related to whether this individual is likely turn out to vote and cast a valid ballot[129]. Only if the above list of scope conditions is satisfied should the voter seek to kick out a corrupt incumbent and transfer electoral support to the least corruptible challenger. In the case that this list is satisfied, the literature on voting and heuristics anticipates that women's descriptive representation will increase in response to new revelations of male incumbent corruption.

Navigating the Disagreement

This apparent disagreement can be navigated by considering what I call the 'dissemination assumption' of the heuristics and voting behaviour literature, and by reference to the revised model. The dissemination assumption is simply the point that scholars writing about the activation of heuristics tend to take voter knowledge for granted. Monika McDermott, for example, leaves out of her discussions whether voters'

[129] It is empirically related in the sense that where corruption is perceived by voters to be systemic, voters have no incentive to seek a less corruptible alternative because they believe that anyone who replaces the incumbent will have no option than to operate within the established, corrupt system. This has been described by scholars such as Monica Bauhr to voter 'resignation', indicated in her models by lower voter turnout. See Chapter 3 for a fuller explanation.

different policy concerns could be driven by different amounts of information relevant to policy areas[130]; Black and Erickson, in the above quote, present voters across Canada as sharing the same reaction against 'traditional politicians'—and thus, presumably, as also sharing understandings of the problem to be acted upon at the ballot box. This contrasts with feminist institutionalism, which, rather than make such assumptions, pays scant attention to voter knowledge because it takes this to be of little importance for outcomes in women's political recruitment[131].

Placing voter knowledge at the core of theorising how women's descriptive representation is likely to change in response to new revelations of male incumbent corruption therefore offers a way to generate expectations in accordance with both literatures. In the world of feminist institutitionalist studies, party insiders know to various extents how corruption operates. But in the world of research into heuristics and voting behaviour, corruption is common knowledge among voters as well. Therefore, if new revelations of male incumbent corruption generally fail to reach voters, the expectations of the feminist institutionalist literature should be borne out. Yet if the revelations do reach the masses, a different mechanism will be triggered, namely the activation of the widely held female incorruptibility stereotype, and this will inform vote choice. In other words, women's descriptive representation should decrease in response

[130] She writes: 'Based on trait stereotypes, voters who are especially concerned about the issues of education, health care, government ethics, and helping the poor should be more likely to choose women candidates over men candidates as they should stereotype the women as more competent on these issues. At the same time, voters who do not care about these issues should have no reason to prefer women candidates. Mcdermott, 'Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections', p. 900.

[131] There are a few clues in feminist institutionalist work. Although it is not central to the paper, Johnson and colleagues describe how the ideologies of gender informing Iceland's political recruitment shift back after the crash, and as details of what had happened became widely publicized. Women's descriptive representation leapt up such that women made up 40% of the parliament for the first time in Iceland's history, a change that the foreign media has portrayed as a kind of feminist revolution. See: Johnson, Einarsdóttir, and Pétursdóttir, 'A Feminist Theory of Corruption', p. 192.

to new revelations of male incumbent corruption unless the (necessary) scope conditions of the heuristics argument are met, and if they are, women's descriptive representation should gain a boost to the extent that voters associate women with incorruptibility and elections are candidate-centric.

While the microfoundations of the mechanisms described by both literatures originate over different sections of pathways towards recruitment to elective office, feedback effects are likely to generate process-wide changes. If so, new revelations of male incumbent corruption that are restricted to political insiders—because they are not widely disseminated—may shift patterns of women's presence in recruitment from line 1 to line 2 in Figure 2.1. Conversely, if voters at large learn of the corruption, and the consequent activation of the female stereotype of incorruptibility is anticipated by individuals with influence over progression across stages, the pattern may shift in the opposite direction, from line 2 to line 1. As previously mentioned, process-wide distortions can be constrained, however, and this is where reference to a stagewise framework is especially helpful. This could happen if the timing of broad dissemination of corruption revelations prohibits feedback within the same electoral cycle—that is, it occurs after candidate selection[132] (line 2a).

The kinds of parties found in a system, and how they link to voters, are relevant to this theory. Because the strength of gendered opportunity structures seems to be notably strong in clientelist parties, systems with many such parties—and in which new

[132] Parties with weakly institutionalised stages of recruitment are likely to feature faster feedback processes in this regard. The selectorate of these parties has more flexibility in determining who becomes the candidate, and can therefore pick a previously unlikely choice—a woman—if the context shifts even close to the deadline by which candidacies must be registered with electoral authorities. Parties with routinised stages of recruitment are stuck with the individuals who have made it through to the stage prior to candidacy.

revelations of male incumbent corruption are restricted to political insiders—will be especially sensitive to mechanisms promoting a decrease in women's descriptive representation. Candidate-centric settings[133], and in particular parties that rely on charismatic linkages, will be especially sensitive to the mechanism promoting an increase. These points are relevant to Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Adding Variation

The perception of women's greater 'commitment to honest and ethical government', as in McDermott's study, belies the complexity of the female incorruptibility stereotype. In perceiving of women in this way, voters may consider women to be more ethical than men for essentialist reasons: given equal opportunity to engage in corruption, voters may expect women to forgo the chance more often than men because women are innately more honest. Another possibility—also invoking essentialism—is that voters perceive of women to be more risk-averse than men. Engaging in corruption is usually risky because being caught entails some sort of sanctioning. According to this view, women are less likely to become embroiled for any given level of risk[134]. It is also possible that voters stereotype women as less corruptible than men because they understand, all things being equal, that women are outsiders to traditional politics. In other words, voters see women as less corruptible than men not because, given various opportunities to engage in corruption, voters perceive women to be innately endowed with a sense of moral

[133] This expectation is in line with findings from Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, who demonstrate that the correlation between greater women's representation and lower perceived corruption is strongest in democracies with personalistic electoral rules. See: Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 'Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies'.
[134] Clearly this is also linked to an injunctive stereotype of incorruptibility: for any given corrupt act, because voters think women should be less corruptible, they may sanction women more harshly than they do men.

obligation, nor because they believe women do not like taking risks, but instead because voters see women as having been socialised differently to men, and to lack opportunities to become involved in corruption.

Tiffany Barnes and colleagues recently disaggregated the female incorruptibility stereotype in this way and measured the strengths of its sub-parts using an embedded survey experiment, which probed why participants believed that adding more women to Mexico City's traffic police would cut bribery rates[135]. All three sub-parts of the stereotype were found to be statistically significant at the 5% level, with the risk-aversion treatment generating—by a small margin—the largest effect size[136]. This suggests that all subparts of the incorruptibility stereotype may contribute to greater voter demand for female candidates following a corruption scandal involving a male incumbent.

Disaggregation is theoretically important for two reasons. First, because other relatively cheaply categorised challenger groups may be associated with individual sub-parts of incorruptibility stereotyping: young and ethnic minority candidates, for example, may be stereotyped as outsiders to traditional ways of doing politics, and thus understood by voters to have not been given opportunities to participate in corrupt networks. Second, disaggregation facilitates thinking about how intersections of other candidate categorisations, alongside gender, could alter the strength of incorruptibility stereotyping[137]. In this sense, it opens up theory about gender and corruption to broader

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[135] Barnes, T. D., E.Beaulieu & G.W. Saxton. (2017) 'Restoring Trust in the Police: Why Female Officers Reduce Suspicions of Corruption.' *Governance*, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 143-161.
[136] Barnes et al note that other stereotype sub-parts may be relatively more important in other contexts, for example, 'outsider status' may be more relevant when it comes to demand to clean up corruption that operates within patronage networks in Uganda. Ibid. p. 4
[137] Many scholars are now pointing to the importance of incorporating questions of intersectionality. See: Mona Lena-Krook and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, Chapter 22: Electoral Institutions, In Georgina Waylen, Karen Celis, Johanna Kantola and S. Laurel Weldon, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics*, (Oxford, OUP), p. 555.

considerations of intersectionality.

A party label that conveys an ideological commitment to ethical government may inflate voters' perceptions of a female candidate's incorruptibility if she represents that party. Or—since voters tend to already stereotype female candidates in this way—the party label may be superfluous, adding little to her perceived incorruptibility[138], while it may raise the perceived incorruptibility of men who represent the same party. Similarly, a well-known family name that indicates relatedness to an established politician is likely to depress voters' incorruptibility stereotyping of a female candidate because the political outsider sub-part will be contradicted[139].

I explore this nuance in incorruptibility stereotyping in Chapter 6 by comparing female candidates who are wives of male politicians whose mandates were cut short by the electoral authorities, to other women standing in rerun elections. All things equal, in seeking a less corruptible alternative to the disqualified incumbent, boundedly rational voters, who are nonetheless aware of at least indicators of the incumbent's involvement in corruption—and of any marital tie between a female candidate and the disqualified male incumbent—should stereotype women candidates without such a tie to be less corruptible than those with this tie.

If the absence of a disqualified incumbent among the candidates in a rerun election is an indication of the seriousness of this individual's corruption, or of the veracity of rumours

[138] But it may boost that of male candidates of the same party because the label contradicts voters' impressions of male candidates having generally less commitment to ethical government.
[139] This way of thinking about how intersectionality might be related to incorruptibility heuristics is similar to McCall's description of the 'intercategorical approach' to analysing intersectionality, which places the emphasis on explaining relationships between categories. Leslie McCall, (2005). The Complexity of Intersectionality. *Signs*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 1771-1800

about it, then voters will only be motivated to seek a less corruptible alternative after the full list of candidate options is made available to them. This is a specific circumstance in which feedback effects from changes in voter demand will be constrained, such that they cannot affect candidate recruitment for the rerun election. In such contexts, and when the disqualified incumbent is male, women who are not his spouse should fair better in the polls than a woman who is. Here the dissemination assumption is satisfied where voting is compulsory. I pick up these arguments in Chapter 6.

External Influence

As well as modifying the structure of the standard model, my revisions include a clarification. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the standard model is impermeable in a certain, partisan sense: its stages from membership onwards occur inside of the party's structure. It is less impermeable in a geographical sense: the achievement of its stages towards candidacy may require individuals to leave the voting district—in other words, recruitment stages can be placed outside of it. Indeed, Norris and Lovenduski categorise a small group of countries' political recruitment pathways as more regionalised, and others as more centralised, than the UK's localised recruitment pathways, partly on this basis[140].

The standard model is also permeable when it comes to the origin of influences on progression across stages. Norris and Lovenduski do not imagine walls around voting districts barring an inflow of ideas. But, given how they define recruitment stages, their

[140] As previously noted, this is the subject matter of Chapter 10 of their book.

worldview is blind to some of the ways in which external influence can create descriptive distortions in political recruitment. It is precisely because I define stages by what is routinised that my clarification—that the revised model should be considered porous to external influence—generates a distinction on this matter. Simply put, the revised model allows for external influence to shape the content of recruitment stages, as well as affecting rates at which different descriptive groups progress across stages[141]. The standard model only permits the latter.

There are many kinds of external influence that, hypothetically, could lead to the remoulding of routinised stages of progression. In Chapter 7, I draw an example from a recent paper about informal women's networks in Mexico[142], which was not written with these arguments in mind but exemplifies the point. For the purposes of illustration, I briefly describe its themes here, but from a notional, provincial perspective, looking from afar at the goings on in Mexico City.

In this example, women's networks in and around the capital pressured federal electoral regulators in such a way that these institutions transferred pressure onto political parties to make good on their internal rules to hold primaries. Hundreds of miles away from where this activity was occurring, this influence flows into a state. Parties that feature prominently in politics in this state consequently start to hold primary elections. Most of them already had the de jure stage of a primary election on their statutes, but it was ignored. From the perspective of local affiliates of one of these parties, it therefore appears that a new stage has being inserted into an existing recruitment pathway; it is not

[141] By altering what is widely understood by local actors as a marker of progression towards candidacy, external influences in the revised model can also mould how stages are gendered.
[142] Piscopo, 'When Informality Advantages Women'. pp. 487–512.

what has, until this point, been routinised. But through the consistent holding of primaries, the 'new' stage may become routinised over time. This may affect the proportions of men and women who become candidates for the party. If doing well in a primary election requires money and connections that male aspirants tend to have or have access to, but female aspirants often lack and struggle to access, then the insertion of the new stage is likely to reduce the women's candidacies. But if, as is perhaps as or more likely, a primary election's most important effect is to incorporate into the selectorate individuals with, on average, greater inclination to support women to represent their party than was the tendency of those who used to make party selections behind closed doors, then the insertion of the new stage should increase women's candidacies.

The ideas in this chapter are drawn upon throughout the empirical chapters of the dissertation. In particular, the revised model's sensitivity to variation in women's rates of progression across the final two stages of recruitment, as well as its sensitivity to process-wide distortions that may result from widely propagating feedback effects, form a core element of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. I reflect up on the revised model's definition of recruitment stages in terms of what is routinised in the case studies of Chapters 5 and 6. The final empirical chapter, Chapter 7, takes forward the arguments about external influence.

Chapter 3:

Case Selection, Methods and Data Overview

Introduction

Whereas the previous chapter described the explanatory framework that I consider to be theoretically appropriate for making sense of changes in women's descriptive representation, this short chapter previews how I go about deploying it in this thesis. My first task is case selection. In the paragraphs below, I explain the main advantages of choosing to work on Brazilian mayoral elections. I then provide some background for later chapters by outlining what is known about recruitment in the most important political parties in Brazil, about mayoral career paths, and I summarise research findings pertaining to gendered incorruptibility stereotyping. In the latter part of this chapter I turn to the theoretical advantages of a mixed methods approach, and to various practical issues relevant to the dissertation as a whole: I explain how I constructed various databases, and present an overview of my qualitative work.

There are many reasons to focus on women's recruitment to local executive posts in Brazil. I seek to study elections in which a great diversity of political parties compete. The selected elections should also be candidate-centric, in order to evaluate potentially influential variation in voter demand, and there should be widely held gender stereotypes of which the activation could drive such change. Picking elections with few female candidates, which subsequently result in low levels of women's office-holding, makes the investigation of barriers to change sensible, and suggests sensitivity to facilitators of change—such as to shifts in women's symbolic representation. These elections hit 'peak

woman' (their highest levels yet in terms of women's descriptive representation) in 2012, when 12.03% of victors were female[1]. As well as all of these requirements, I need reliable and abundant data. In all these ways, Brazilian mayoral elections fit the brief.

The arguments about Brazil's political parties, personalism, and gender stereotypes will be addressed in more detail. First it is worth noting that selecting a single country brings a series of advantages in and of itself. Brazilian federal units have symmetrically distributed responsibilities, meaning that administrative, fiscal and policy duties are essentially identical for all municipal governments. Although there are clear differences in the complexity of these tasks for large and small cities, this fact implies a host of internal controls that would not be achieved by selecting several countries[2], nor by choosing an asymmetrical federal country.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, working on local executive races is a good choice if the aim is to make sense of changes in descriptive representation. More than 98% of Brazilian municipalities choose their executives via single-round plurality vote[3], implying a straightforward strategic logic of competition—unlike the open-list proportional representation elections for legislative positions in the country. Working at the municipal level in Brazil presents an opportunity to analyse a vast number of political units; 5,568 municipalities hold mayoral contests every four years[4]. There are so many mayoral elections in Brazil that it is possible to conduct regression analysis on those that fail to meet legal standards of proper process, and, as a consequence, the state electoral courts

[1] A play on 'peak oil'.
[2] A. Majeed, R. L. Watts, D. Brown, *Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).
[3] Municipalities with more than 200,000 voters hold a second-round race for mayor, if no candidate achieved the majority of votes in the first round.
[4] This number has varied slightly over the years 2000 to 2012. In 2000, there were 5,564. In 2004 and 2008, there were 5,563. And in 2012 there were 5,568.

decide to rerun. Moreover, all but two of Brazil's municipalities are connected over a contiguous geographical space, which is necessary for any assessment of spatial contagion effects.

Even though the selected case has many benefits, no case selection is without shortcomings. Existing published research into how Brazilian political parties' recruit candidates is heavily biased towards processes and practises that lead towards legislative candidacies, and also on recruitment inside São Paulo state. Generally speaking, though, this kind of shortcoming is commonplace in comparative work in this area; highly variable degrees of insight about candidate recruitment processes are offered to researchers working on women's representation in different contexts—and often the degree of insight is low[5]. Indeed, it is frequently written political recruitment is a 'black box'[6] or 'secret garden'[78]; even the most transparent, formal, highly institutionalised parties rarely (if at all) publish quantitative data that would make the job of proportionality tests unproblematic across all stages of recruitment.

The reality of deploying any explanatory framework to make sense of the real world is that one must work with the information available. An ideal approach to the empirics of this thesis would have started by laying the groundwork for proportionality tests all along the process towards becoming mayor in different locations in Brazil. It would have employed ethnography to get to grips with the stages towards candidacy that are

[5] Elin Bjarnegård and Meryl Kenny, (2016) 'Comparing Candidate Selection: A Feminist Institutionalist Approach', *Government and Opposition*, vol. 51, no. 3, p. 372
[6] Kenny, M., & Verge, T. (2016). Opening Up the Black Box: Gender and Candidate Selection in a New Era. *Government and Opposition, 51*(3), 351-369.
[7] Gallagher, M. and Marsh, M. (eds), Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics (London: Sage, 1988).
[8] Bjarnegård, E., & Kenny, M. (2015). Revealing the "Secret Garden": The Informal Dimensions of Political Recruitment. *Politics & Gender, 11*(4), 748-753.

routinised at the local level, and to understand to what extent they signify increased odds of becoming a candidate for different political parties. Unfortunately, the ideal approach was beyond the resources available for this dissertation. Instead, in the empirical chapters, I conduct proportionality analyses using publicly available data about women's presence in the two formal and universal stages of political recruitment, candidacy and election. In-depth participant interviews—as the most promising means of shining a torch inside the black box of recruitment, and to understanding what is routinised—then form the basis of illustrative case studies[9]. For these, the primary aim was to assess the empirical plausibility of mechanisms that were highlighted by approaching the quantitative element of this research with the stagewise, revised framework in mind.

Brazilian Political Parties and Candidate Recruitment

Brazil's party system is frequently described as weakly institutionalised, or inchoate, and 'under-developed'[10]. The primary reason for this diagnosis is the internal, or organisational, frailty of Brazil's modal party[11][12]. But while this is true of the modal party,

[9] Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, (1980) 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 174–97.
[10] Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
[11] Klašnja, Marko, and Rocío Titiunik. (2017) 'The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability'. *American Political Science Review* 111, no. 1, pp.129–48.
[12] Here is how Brazil fairs on the elements other than the internal organisation of political parties that contribute to the diagnosis. Patterns of competition between Brazilian political parties have been largely stable for the presidency since the middle of the 1990s, the 2018 elections being an exception. But this has not been the case for gubernatorial elections. More relevant for this thesis, Pedersen's index of electoral volatility[12] applied to mayoral elections yields a score of 31[12], which is high compared to most other party systems in Latin America. (This is according to calculations by Klašnja and Titiunik, covering the period 1996 to 2012. The index reflects the net percentage of voters who changed their votes from on election to the next. Its range is 0 to 100, with 0 indicating that no parties saw net gains and none saw net losses, and 100 indicating that all parties that won votes in the previous election received zero votes in the subsequent one.) In other words, 31% of the votes received by the parties in one election are allocated differently in the following election, as a value of zero means that all parties receive the same vote percentage

Brazilian many[13] parties fair unevenly in their internal organisation. I leverage this variation in my case selection. At the same time, the average level of institutionalisation of Brazil's main parties is reasonably close to the global mean, supporting the choice of Brazil for a first deployment of an explanatory framework that is intended to be globally generalisable. Figure 3.1 shows the gap between Brazil's party institutionalisation, the global mean of this variable, and the party institutionalisation scores of the OECD and U.K., included as the system that Norris and Lovenduski had in mind when they developed the original Supply and Demand Model.

'Internal strength' is a way of describing the degree of enduring order within a party, encompassing the persistence of a de facto hierarchy, and routinised processes of advancement within that hierarchy among other things[14]. Hence, the modal Brazilian

in both elections. Alongside volatile party competition, ties between political parties and society are tenuous for most parties in a country where sociological cleavages are considered weak, yet there are irrefutable exceptions, most notably that of the Workers' Party (PT). When it comes to legitimacy, survey data suggest that Brazilians have confidence in the country's electoral institutions, although there are mixed indications about the how citizens view the legitimacy of political parties. In the 2006 Latinobarometro, 65% of respondents expressed some or a lot of confidence in the electoral court, the third highest percentage in the whole sample. In 2001, the only year that same survey asked if parties are necessary, 71% of the Brazilians answering said yes. (See: Zucco, Cesar, (2010) 'Stability Without Roots: Party System Institutionalization in Brazil' Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2002359). However, in 2013, 34% of Brazilian voters believed that democracy could work without parties—and during the demonstrations that year, 89% of protesters did not feel represented by the parties (See: Pedro Ribeiro, Joining a Political Party: Paths to Membership and Activism in Contemporary Brazil. Working Papers 26/2015. Instituto de Iberoamerica, Universidad de Salamanca, 30 Dec, 2015).

[13] Brazil has an unusually large number of registered political parties that enjoy some electoral success, including eight that were formed in a recent four-year period during Rousseff's second term. Three of these parties were formed during or before 2012, the period with which I am concerned in this thesis. They are the PSD (formed in 2011, after a split within DEM); PPL (formed in 2011 from a group that broke off from the PMDB); and PEN (formed in 2012, a 'new right' party).

[14] This is close to Mayhew's definition. See: Mayhew. Barry Ames considers weak parties those that are unable to impose discipline on legislators. See: Barry Ames, *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*, (University of Michigan Press, 2002). Note that Tavits defines strong party organisations in broader terms, as: 'those with visible and active presence in local life via participating in local politics, being associated with locally known leaders and activists, and having local structures and membership'. See: Margit Tavits. (2011) 'Power within Parties: The Strength of the Local Party and MP Independence in Postcommunist Europe: Power Within Parties.' *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 4, p. 923.

political party, being internally weak, is understood to have fluid or inconsistent patterns of career development towards candidacy, and to garner personal votes. The recent work of Lucas Novaes adds useful detail to understandings of weakly institutionalised Brazilian parties. Kitchselt's classic overview of a heavily organised clientelistic machine closely aligned to a particular party, noted in Chapter 2 as having informal yet highly institutionalised recruitment, is what Novaes considers a particular organisational format of clientelism, the dominant clientelistic machine[15]. Novaes characterises many Brazilian political parties as 'modular'[16]. This encompasses parties that Kitchselt would understand as employing charismatic and clientelistic linkage mechanisms.

In a modular party, municipal-level politicians are part of the lower tier of the two independent tiers that comprise the party's top-to-bottom organisation. In the lower tier, local leaders build modules of personal voter support by catering to supporters' individual, often material, needs. Local leaders try to grow these modules as much as possible, and then act as free agents in attaching their module, usually temporarily and in response to patronage promises, to the upper tier of a party. The upper tier operates at the state level and above[17]. Novaes's characterisation fits well with the porosity modifications of my revised model, with routinised stages towards recruitment conceptualised as existing inside or outside of the party.

[15] Lucas M. Novaes, 'Modular Parties: Party Systems with Detachable Clienteles', PhD Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2015.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Lucas M. Novaes, 'Modular Parties: Party Systems with Detachable Clienteles', PhD Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2015.




Figure 3.1. Variation in an index of party institutionalisation between 1990 and 2018, for Brazil, the UK, and annual means among OECD countries and among all countries in the V-Dem dataset[18].

Local leaders with modules are motivated run for elective office as a means to demonstrate the size of their modules, which is otherwise hard to prove, to their upper-tier options—the upper-tiers of different parties. Their aim is to gain the greatest amount of patronage that the upper-tier market has to offer, and grow their module even more. The mayoral candidate recruitment process is not a focus of Novaes's work, but the implication is that parallel chains of stages towards candidacy, external to any particular party, are common. In these, routinised stages are comprised of relevant signifiers on parallel paths to achieving different sorts of local leadership. To the extent that growing a

[18] Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, et al, 'V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9' Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2019.

module depends on striking patronage deals, feminist institutionalism suggest that women are likely to be disadvantaged as they try to negotiate within gendered structures. This may be one reason, in the absence of sudden shifts in voter demand due to the activation of particular gender stereotypes, that female mayoral candidates in Brazil struggle to win elections.

The best-known and best-studied contrast to the modal Brazilian party is the Workers' Party (PT). Its strong adherence to highly institutionalised processes and practises that are written in party statutes justifies the adjective 'bureaucratic' in Levitsky's view[19]. The party emerged as Brazil's transition to democracy began, and has grown its membership and partisan identification substantially over the years[20] by tapping into existing civil society networks at the local level and encouraging social activism by its branches[21]. Margaret Keck and David Samuels have described how the PT party hierarchy is structured and how posts within it are filled using bottom-up rules of contestation, which are always followed[22]. In each municipality, PT members hold regular meetings to elect a Municipal Directorate[23], which then elects a Municipal Executive Committee[24]. Municipal party members also elect delegates to the state meeting, who, along with the other state-level delegates, then elect those who will attend the party's national meeting as well as the

[19] He refers to the PT as a 'mass bureaucratic' party. Steven Levitsky. (2001) 'Organization and labor-based party adaptation: The transformation of Argentine Peronism in comparative perspective.' *World Politics*, 54, pp. 27-56.
[20] By 1989 about 5 % of Brazilians identified as 'petistas,' but that proportion is now about 25 %, corresponding to almost two of every three partisan identifiers. Since that year only two other parties - the PSDB (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy), and the PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement) – have ever commanded the sympathy of more than 5 % of voters. David Samuels and Cesar Zucco, (2014) 'Crafting Mass Partisanship at the Grass Roots', *British Journal of Political Science,* vol. 45, no. 4 p. 764.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Samuels writes that the 'rules are always followed' See: David Samuels. (2004) 'From Socialism to Social Democracy: Party Organization and the Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil'. *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 9, p. 1008.
[23] Made up of 45 or fewer members.
[24] Of up to 15 members. See: Samuels, 'From Socialism to Social Democracy. pp. 999-1024.

National Directorate[25] (mirroring the process at the municipal level, the National Directorate goes on to elect an Executive Committee[26]). All internal elections operate through proportional representation, which, as Keck[27] notes, has promoted ideological pluralism, and, over time, the institutionalisation of factions within the PT, just as it has frustrated 'behind-closed-doors' leadership selection[28].

Hence the existence of the PT alongside parties that warrant the adjectives informal, charismatic, clientelistic, and modular implies that Brazil meets the basic requirement of my case selection—that of diverse party types[29]. In accordance with Kitschelt's expectations of the organisational underpinnings of programmatic linkage[30], the PT, while it has moderated its rhetoric over time[31], has remained reasonably ideologically consistent and maintained a strong party label; occasionally, it has followed through on threats to expel elected officials who have gone against the party line[32]. Moreover, the

25 Of 84 members.
26 With 28-members.
27 Margaret Keck, The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil, (Yale University Press, 1992), p.113.
28 In this way, the preferences of the PT's rank-and-file members percolate up through the party's ranks, and its overall strategy remains responsive to the grassroots.
29 Over the 1996-2012 period, eight parties won more than 5% of all mayoral elections.
30 'In comparative perspective Brazil appears to be infertile territory for the cultivation of affective attachments to parties among voters, as social cleavages such as class, ethnicity, religion, or region are comparatively shallow and historically have never provided the basis for party competition.' See: Samuels and Zucco, 'Crafting Mass Partisanship at the Grass Roots'. pp. 767.
31 Samuels writes that this was enabled by the greater strategic flexibility afforded by shifting patterns of union membership. The 1990s saw union membership declines in some sectors, including those from which the PT drew much early support, but also saw public-sector union growth in areas such as education and heathcare that changed the composition of Brazil's largest labour organisation (the CUT, Central Única de Trabalhadores). See: Samuels, 'From Socialism to Social Democracy, pp1006-8.
32 Samuels and Zucco, 'Crafting Mass Partisanship at the Grass Roots', pp. 763. They write that another mechanism the PT uses to ensure internal programmatic commitment is to require all elected officials and political appointees to donate 2% to 20 % of their salary to the party (the percentage is determined on a sliding scale).

party was electorally relevant throughout all of Brazil[33] over the period of analysis in this thesis.

While the PT is frequently presented in the literature as an isolated counterexample[34] to the modal Brazilian political party, in recent years several scholars have added nuance to this perspective[35]. Some much smaller parties on the left, notably the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL), which emerged out of the PT, have adopted many of its operating logics. Though the PT remains 'the main outlier', results from a 2013 survey of members of the ten main parties from 22 municipalities in São Paulo state suggest that the PSDB enjoys a somewhat comparable intensity of activist participation as the PT[36]. Rachel Meneguello and Fernando Bizzarro Neto report similar findings in their analysis of survey responses from delegates at the PT's national congresses in 2007 and 2010, and PSDB delegates attending the party's São Paulo state meeting in 2013. They find alike patterns of partisan activity between periods of electoral mobilisation, with 55% of PSDB delegates stating that some organised, local party activity, such as membership registration campaigns and political education courses, occur once or more per month in their cities[37]. What differs between the PT and PSDB, according to these authors, is the

[33] Although, until the mid-1990s, about 60% support base was concentrated in the Southeast, the PT expanded its geographical roots the South and Centre-West in the second half of the 1990s. (See: Oswaldo Amaral. (2011) 'Ainda conectado: o PT e seus vinculos com a sociedade.' *Opiniao Publica*, Campinas, vol. 17(1), pp.1-44). Thereafter, the party grew strongly in the Northeast in the mid-2000s. (See: Wendy Hunter, Timothy J Power. (2007) 'Rewarding Lula; Executive Power, Social Policy and the Brazilian Elections of 2006.' *Latin American Politics and Society* 49 (1), pp. 1-30.)

[34] Heythor Santana de Oliveira. Relação da Origem no Desenvolvimento de sua Organização, Participação Eleitoral e Atuação Parlamentar. Thesis, Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2017.

[35] Indeed, based on the results of these surveys, Rachel Meneguello and Fernando Bizzarro Neto claimed in 2014 that 'the exceptionality of the PT should be taken with a grain of salt'. See: Rachel Meneguello and Fernando Bizzarro Neto, (2014) 'The Similarities of Adversaries: The profile of middle-level elites of the PT and PSDB', Conference paper.

[36] With a quarter of its activists devoting more than 40 hours a month to the party. Pedro Ribeiro. 2015. Joining a Political Party: Paths to Membership and Activist in Contemporary Brazil. Working Papers, no. 26.

[37] Meneguello and Bizzarro Neto, 'The Similarities of Adversaries.

kinds of pre-existing networks that delegates report mobilising; 'petistas' were largely associated with labour unions, while 'tocanos' tended to engage with religious organisations, popular urban movements, and NGOs[38].

Samuels and Zucco suggest that aspects of comparability between the PT and PSDB's grassroots activity translate into the meaning of party labels in voters' minds. Tocanos show a similar strength partisan bias to petistas when cued experimentally to assess whether they favour a policy, in light of information about their preferred party's support for it[39]. However, in other work they argue that similarities fade when it comes to candidate recruitment; in this sense, they view the PSDB as more like the clientelistic PMDB[40]—from which it originally emerged—in having extensive municipal party branches that 'are largely vehicles for local politicians to formalise their candidacies'[41].

A rare, in-depth comparative analysis of candidate recruitment by different Brazilian political parties has been conducted by Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga[42]. Even though her focus is on the state of São Paulo, and on candidate selection for state lower-house elections, her research provides an insight into the range of formality, routinisation of consistent recruitment stages, and progression criteria that exist among Brazilian political parties. Interviews with party members and analysis of party statutes lead Braga to place

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38 Ibid.
39 These findings are from a convenience sample with respondents from all Brazilian states and relevant demographic groups—as opposed to focusing on Sao Paulo state as many of the other studies mentioned in this section that compare the PT and PSDB. See: David Samuels and Cesar Zucco Jr. (2014)The Power of Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 212-225.
40 The PMDB is historically a loosely organized federation of state and local leaders who led clientelistic machines. See: Frances Hagopian, *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil.* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 215. PMDB identification has plummeted over the years. Samuels and Zucco, 'Crafting Mass Partisanship at the Grass Roots'.
41 Samuels and Zucco, 'Crafting Mass Partisanship at the Grass Roots'. p. 763.
42 Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga. (2008) 'Organizações partidárias e seleção de candidatos no estado de São Paulo.' *Opinião Pública*, vol. 14(2) pp. 454-485.

the PT in its own category. The PT is separate from the PSDB, PMDB, PP and PFL, which she groups together. Whereas these latter four parties formally demand membership of at least a year before candidacy is a possibility (although it is unclear the extent to which parties adhere to this rule), the PT additionally requires aspirants to meet national standards laid out in a document that was created by the party's National Directorate[43]. These include an ongoing financial[44] and programmatic commitment to the party, and evidence of support for the candidacy from other party members.

Braga separately categories these five parties according to the operations of their selectorates in preparation for state legislative elections, dividing the parties into three groups. Again, the PT sits apart from the rest, having the most transparent and inclusive processes of selection that begin with an indication phase, followed by consultation with Municipal Directorates in a pre-nomination process[45]. The party's Election Committee then accepts nominations and invites civil society to participate in a period of negotiation over the names for potential inclusion on the candidate list. Subsequently, at the state convention, delegates vote on the names proposed by the Election Committee. The PP and PFL form a group at the other extreme, their selection processes being characterised by opaqueness: even though these parties officially make candidacy decisions at a party convention, there is no discussion or approval process at the conventions of the names put forward by party leaders. Braga finds that the PSDB and PMDB have intermediate levels of selectorate transparency. In these cases, party-convention delegates participate in the candidate approval process, but party leaders substantially whittle down the options in advance, via processes that are unclear[46]. Moreover, there is no assembly

[43] This is called the 'Compromisso Partidário do Candidato Petista'.
[44] Technically this is a requirement of office holders who represent the PT.
[45] do Socorro Sousa Braga. Organizações partidárias e seleção de candidatos no estado de São Paulo. pp. 454-485.
[46] Ibid.

discussion.

While the details of Braga's study refer to candidate recruitment for different elections than those that I analyse, her findings can be thought of as a guide to the relative demands on aspirants and the relative levels of selectorate transparency of different parties in the run up to mayoral elections. To be sure, parties face disparate incentives when fielding a single candidate in a contest for an executive role, including differing formal institutions (such as the absence of gender quotas[47]), and differing normative institutions (such as incentives to demonstrate descriptive representativeness), to use Krook's terminology. Indeed, the fact that parties negotiate to form coalitions[48] that back one coalition member's mayoral candidate could intensify pressures to field a traditional candidate, as has been noted in Chile[49], although I am unaware of any assessment of this possibility in the Brazilian context. The much smaller scale of municipal party organisations also implies that party elites are more likely to have close personal associations outside of the party[50]—through business and family interactions, for example—which one would expect to increase the relevance of opaque processes affecting progression towards candidacy in relevant parties, including the probability of back-room candidate-selection agreements by selectorates.

47 A 30% minority sex gender quota applies to parties fielding candidate lists in Brazilian legislative elections, although this is routinely flouted.
48 There tend not to be enduring municipal coalitions over time, and the PT and PSDB tend to not form coalitions with one another. See: Meneguello and Bizzarro Neto, 'The Similarities of Adversaries.
49 Magda Hinojosa and Susan Franceschet. (2012) 'Separate but Not Equal: The Effects of Municipal Electoral Reform on Female Representation in Chile.' *Political Research Quarterly* 65(4) 758–770.
50 Klašnja and Titiunik write that 'Brazilian parties have low levels of institutionalization and, *particularly in local elections*, political networks are highly personalistic.' See: Marko Klašnja and Rocío Titiunik (2017). The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability.' *American Political Science Review, 111*(1), pp. 129-148.

In summary, Brazil meets my case selection requirement of bringing a diversity of pathways of recruitment to the stage of candidacy. Even though the details of these pathways and processes of progression outside of São Paulo state and for executive elections in general are little investigated across Brazil, women who compete in mayoral elections will have progressed through both highly and weakly institutionalised, and differently structured, recruitment pathways.

Mayoral Career Paths

Given this diverse array of party profiles, how do men and women who seek to become mayor navigate the political ecosystem? In various ways some commonalities of political career structures that emerge from scholarship developed in the US and Europe have been shown to be amiss when applied to Brazil. For example, it is often loosely assumed that candidates in municipal elections have worked their way to prominence solely through local activities. Yet, even though mayoral aspirants in Brazil almost always concentrate their ambitions on a single municipality over the course of their careers[51]—as opposed to testing their electoral fortunes in different cities—their career paths up to that point sometimes include what would seem to be higher political office. This is particularly true among individuals who contest large municipalities. In these instances, Samuels argues that the office of local executive is not a demotion[52]; instead, federal deputies engage in pork-barrel politics in order to maximise the odds of realising 'progressive' municipal ambition. Eduardo Leoni and colleagues provide evidence of this

[51] Klašnja and Titiunik The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability. p. 134.
[52] David Samuels, Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil, (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), p. 2.

phenomenon for those who were elected in the 1994 elections, of whom 18% competed in municipal elections in 1996 with a 30% success rate. They report that these federal legislators received higher on-average vote shares in the 1994 elections than the 82%[53] who did not run for mayoral office in 1996, underscoring the point that some mayoralties are highly valued and available only to the more competitive legislators.

The attractiveness of local executive posts is a function of their unusual power. Municipalities in Brazil have a constitutionally enshrined degree of autonomy that far exceeds that of municipalities in other Latin American countries[54]. Mayors do much of the hiring and firing of government-paid jobs[55], and are largely responsible for executing a broad range of public policies and for implementing public works[56]. Many, in Samuels's words, 'continue to act as local 'bosses', transforming the rural coronel based on ownership of land to a 'municipal coronel' whose power is based on the personal 'ownership' of the municipal government'[57].

Another way in which assumptions about political career structures drawn from older democracies do not apply to Brazil is the norm of remaining loyal to a single, national party. Instead of charting a long-term career course within a party, Brazilian politicians often represent one party in one election and another in the next[58]. Positive incentives to

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53 Eduardo Leoni, Carlos Pereira and Lucio Renno, (2014) Political Survival Strategies: Political Career Decisions in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1, p. 123.
54 R. Andrew. Nickson, *Local Government in Latin America.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). The policy responsibilities of municipalities in Brazil include the provision of public transport, education and health services.
55 Ibid, p86
56 ibid p86
57 ibid, p80
58 Scott Desposato, (2006). 'Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies.' *American Journal of Political Science.* 50(1): 62-80. Desposato notes that 'More than a third of deputies switch party during their terms, some as many as seven times' p. 63.

change parties emerge in the form of available campaign workers and financial support, and other factors that weigh on the odds of individual electoral success; such are the considerations of local leaders seeking to maximise the enumeration of their module[59]. Negative incentives that pressure politicians into partisan loyalty are meagre: most parties do little to discipline their representatives, as doing so requires organisational strength[60]. Hence party switching has been demonstrated to be less common among PT candidates than those of other parties[6162]. The norm of party switching also implies that an ambitious individual who wishes to stand in an upcoming election, and fails to convince a selectorate to choose him or her, can shop around for consideration by other parties—provided that they fulfil the requirements of aspirants that Braga has detailed, to the extent that these are enforced.

Little is written about gender's intertwining with the curiosities of career progression towards mayoral candidacy in Brazil. Samuels's depictions of 'municipal coronels' obliquely emphasise the masculine construal of mayoral office in Brazil. And yet, particularly in the more oligarchic northeast of Brazil, women gain access to mayoral candidacy more often than elsewhere, and often as 'seat warmers'—by standing in place of a male family member who has already served the constitutionally stipulated limit of two consecutive terms[63].

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[59] Novaes draws on data about the rate at which local politicians switch parties as evidence for his modular 'free-agent' model.
[60] This contributes to politicians' incentives to shirk any programmatic or clientelistic commitments that they may have made prior to election. Klašnja and Titiunik. 'The Incumbency Curse.' p. 145.
[61] Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga and Bruno Wilhelm Speck, (2014) 'Organisacao Partidaria e Carreiras Politicas no Nivel Local', Presentation to the Brazilian Studies Association.
[62] Klašnja and Titiunik. 'The Incumbency Curse.' pp129. They show that after two terms representing one party as mayor, only a 12% to 25% (among those who seek re-election) stand for that same party again four years later, following a term out of office.
[63] As has been studied, for example, in the context of the state of Bahia. See: Ana Alice Alcantara Costa and Andrea Cornwall. (2014) 'Conservative Modernization in Brazil: Blocking Local Women's Political Pathways to Power.' *Revista Feminismos* vol. 2(2), pp. 83-93.

Several scholars' findings fit well with feminist institutionalist insights from other contexts. Among candidates for mayor across the country, Braga and Speck have shown that women are more loyal to parties than men who achieve this stage of recruitment[64]. Fernanda Brollo and Ugo Troiano have found women's re-election rates as mayoral incumbents tend to be worse than men's—over and above the general incumbency disadvantage that has been separately demonstrated for Brazilian mayors[65]. They suggest that this is because female mayors hire fewer temporary public employees during electoral years and attract fewer campaign contributions[66]. Put together with Novaes's work, it may be that female mayors may struggle to be re-elected because they are disadvantaged in growing modular parties once in power. To do so requires successful navigation of institutions that manage patronage—with upper tiers of parties—and those institutions may be biased against women. These are all relevant considerations that may help in the interpretation of empirical results in later chapters.

64 Female candidates switch less than male candidates, controlling for other factors, such as age and party, although this finding is significant only at the $p<0.1$ level. See: Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga and Bruno Wilhelm Speck, 'Organisacao Partidaria e Carreiras Politicas no Nivel Local'.
65 Klašnja and Titiunik, 'The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability'.
66 Fernanda Brollo and Ugo Troiano, (2016) 'What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil', *Journal of Development Economics,* vol. 122, p. 28.

The Personal Vote and Gender Stereotypes

In addition to diverse pathways of candidate recruitment, an appropriate case selection for this thesis should feature candidate-centric elections and widely held gender stereotypes relevant to my empirical analyses. As discussed, party labels in Brazil generally offer weak cues[67]. This implies that heuristics based on demographic attributes may yield influence, explaining variation in voter demand as circumstances change.

Brazilian elections, including mayoral races[68], are widely regarded as elections in which the personal vote is extremely important. Pointing to assessments of how comparatively strong the personal vote is in Brazil is not straightforward, because measures of the personal vote, and measures of de facto personalism as a style of doing politics that involves the development and nurturing of a cult of personality, do not exist for Brazil. Instead, indicators of de jure institutional incentives for personalism, based on a model developed by John Carey and Matthew Shugart[69], offer the best available means of assessing how relatively candidate-centric Brazilian elections are.

There are several sources to draw upon here. Ellis Valdini's paper predicting women's descriptive representation using personalism interacted with citizen bias against female politicians, which was discussed in Chapter 2, operationalises personalism by assigning points for several of Carey and Shugart's variables. This gives Brazil a score of four out

[67] Taylor C. Boas,(2014) 'Pastor Paulo vs. Doctor Carlos: Professional Titles as Voting Heuristics in Brazil', *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 39–72.
[68] For example, see: Paulo Spada and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães. (2013) 'Investigating Elite Behavior through Field Experiment in Brazil: do candidates answer more to core or swing voters?', *Brazilian Political Science Review*. vol 1, no. 1, pp. 56-73.
[69] John Carey and Matthew Shugart, (1995) 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Forumas' *Electoral Studies*, vol 14, no. 4, pp. 417-439.

of six[70]. Of the 22 countries in her analysis, only one—the United States—scores higher[71]. This scale captures incentives acting on legislative races[72], and Brazil's open-list proportional representation with high district magnitude is notoriously encouraging of personalistic politics. In a recent book chapter[73] by Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, Justin Esarey and Erika Schumacher, Brazil is evaluated as comparatively less personalistic. They deploy John and Wallack's scale, which in turn is based on Gaviria et al's Database of Particularism[74]. Brazil's score of seven out of 13, with 13 indicating the most personalistic of party systems, illustrates the difficulties of working with institutional incentives for personalism rather than de facto measures of voter behaviour[75]. A score of seven ranks Brazil's party system as less personalistic than the those of France, the UK, Germany, New Zealand and Canada, which all receive a score of 10 out of 13[76]—although Gaviria et al point out that their scoring method fails to incorporate informal norms[77]. Again, this score of seven is based on legislative elections[78]. If anything, mayoral elections should be more personalistic because citizens cast votes for a individuals (and their running mates)[79].

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70 Ellis Valdini, 'Electoral Institutions and the Manifestation of Bias', pp.76–92.
71 Note that Brazil receives a less personalistic assessment (seven out of 13, with 13 indicating the most personalistic systems) in a recent book chapter by Schwindt-Bayer using John and Wallack's 2005 scale, which in turn is based on Gaviria et al's Database of Particularism. Unintuitively, Brazil's score is less than those of France, the UK, Germany, New Zealand and Canada, which all receive 10. Luxembourg receives the same score as Brazil. See: Gender and corruption book chapter.
72 This is evident from the fact that Ellis Valdini assigns points for the presence of 'vote pooling' and 'ballot composition'.
73 Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, Justin Esarey and Erika Schumacher, 'Gender and Citizen Responses to Corruption among Politician: The U.S. and Brazil', in Helen Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud Eds. *Gender and Corruption: Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research.* (Palgrave, 2018), p. 64.
74 Alejandro Gaviria et al. (2003) Particularism around the World Dataset. *The World Bank Economic Review.* vol 17, no.1, pp.133-143.
75 Or perhaps of the exhibited content of electoral campaigns.
76 Luxembourg receives the same score as Brazil.
77 Alejandro Gaviria et al. Particularism around the World Dataset. p. 139.
78 Ibid. p. 139.
79 This is why the Database of Particularism, and Carey and Shugart, place the UK as more personalistic than Brazil; never are citizens' votes to be shared out among candidates from the same party.

In the absence of an uncomplicated measure of candidate-centricism of Brazilian mayoral elections, there are indications other than de jure institutional incentives that the personal vote is very important. Ticket splitting is widespread at the municipal level[80], and the five most successful parties in mayoral elections shift their coalitional arrangements substantially from one election to the next[81]. These five parties, which also fielded the most candidates in mayoral races between 1996 and 2012, put forward a candidate in consecutive elections only 53% of the time[82]. More anecdotally, in interviews, voters commonly recall the name of the person for whom they voted, and struggle to remember the party or coalition.

The personal vote matters for women's descriptive representation, according to Ellis Valdini's work, only if voters are strongly gender biased. The predicted marginal effects graphs in her paper suggest that the level of gender bias against female leaders in Brazil, given the country's personalism score in the legislative arena, has a very near-significant effect (at the $p<0.05$ level) on the proportion of women elected to the federal Chamber of Deputies[83]. For her gender bias score, Ellis Valdini uses the proportion of respondents recorded in the World Values Survey who say they agree with the statement 'men make better political leaders than women do'; this proportion is 25.8% among Brazilian respondents in the 1996–1998 and 2005–2006 waves. There are problems with taking

[80] Klašnja and Titiunik, 'The Incumbency Curse'. p. 134.
[81] Ibid. p. 134.
[82] Ibid. p. 134.
[83] Her marginal effect graph 'Effect of personal vote on percentage of female legislators, by bias', on page 87, shows 95% confidence intervals that are very, very slightly above the zero-effect line at the x-axis position of 25.8%. Significance at the $p<0.05$ level is reached when 32% or more citizens demonstrate a bias against female leaders. However, given that the 95% confidence intervals in this chart only very slightly dip below the zero-effect line at 32% citizen bias and all higher proportions, the substantive difference in statistical significance between Brazil and countries with citizen bias percentages that meet the $p<0.05$ cut-off is tiny.

this percentage as the measure[84], but in any case, as the political office is left unspecified in the question, this measure of voter bias against women in politics may call to mind leaders in positions that are understood by voters as requiring less masculine characteristics than the office of local executive.

Overall, therefore, it appears reasonable to understand the case selection of Brazilian mayoral elections as providing electoral contests in which the combination of the personal vote and gender stereotypes in general could directly act on the odds of women's progression between the final two stages of recruitment, and feed back to affect progression across prior stages. Unlike the U.K. parliamentary elections that Norris and Lovenduski examine in *Political Recruitment*, most mayoral elections in Brazil are highly competitive. Therefore, shifts in either the content or strength of gender stereotypes (such as the unusual case of a successful female mayor of a neighbouring city eroding traditional views about women's inappropriateness for executive roles), or changes in the political context that alters the salience of particular gender stereotypes (such as a corruption scandal involving a male incumbent), stand a chance of having a measurable effect on frequencies of women's candidacies and on votes for women.

As outlined in Chapter 1, several empirical chapters of this dissertation consider the effects of a particular gender stereotype—the female incorruptibility stereotype. Survey and experimental results about Brazilian voters' incorruptibility stereotyping have not

[84] Oddly she does not sum the proportion of respondents who agree and strongly agree—and instead leaves out the latter group. For Brazil this means that voters are recorded as having a gender bias of 25.8%, and the 5.9% of voters who strongly agree must either be ignored, or potentially worse, grouped with those who disagree and strongly disagree. This is evident from comparing the numbers for Poland in Table 1 of the paper (p. 82) and the reference to Poland in the discussion of marginal effects on p. 87. See: Ellis Valdini, 'Electoral Institutions and the Manifestation of Bias'.

always yielded consistent conclusions, though the weight of the evidence falls on the side of many Brazilians holding this gender attitude. In a vignette experiment that tested whether Brazilian voters perceive of male and female governors as equally likely to be embroiled in a corruption scandal during their term, and where subjects were told the state has a history of female governors, female respondents said that the male governor was the more likely to be involved[85], while there was no significant difference among male respondent. The suggestion of more commonplace female incorruptibility stereotyping comes from the 2014 Americas Barometer survey. In this, Brazilian participants were directly asked whether men or women make more corrupt politicians; 70.4% answered men, 4.3% said women, and 25.3% said both[86]. Similarly, a survey conducted in late 2017[87] of the positive attributes that Brazilians perceive as most important for politicians to possess, and the negative attributes they perceive as most important for politicians to lack, found that 'honesty' and 'corruption' were the most commonly selected of 25 words in each category[88]. When respondents were asked to assess these words for gendered connotations, 'corruption' was the most masculine-gendered attribute of all 50 attributes included in the survey—and considered as such by both sexes. 'Honesty' was judged to be a weakly feminine attribute[89].

Variation among relevant empirical findings is to be expected for a country large enough to furnish my quantitative analyses with thousands of cases. Overall, the available

[85] Significance was lost (although the substantive difference remained) when only those who correctly answered political knowledge questions were analysed.
[86] Belizeans were the only other respondents to receive the same question.
[87] Malu Gatto and Anna Petherick, 2019, forthcoming.
[88] Not only were these the most popular selections overall, but they received the top ranking within all main demographic subdivisions, including when men and women's responses were considered separately (whether the word rankings were compared across age groups, respondent sex, family income level categories).
[89] With men perceiving it to be slightly masculine, and women perceiving it to be slightly feminine—though more gendered than the male respondents judged it.

evidence presents Brazilian mayoral elections as candidate-centric, and Brazilian voters as holders of the female incorruptibility stereotype, setting the stage for testing whether a shift in voter demand for female candidates rises in response to corruption scandals involving a male incumbent. Having laid out the advantages of working with these contests—the contiguousness of voting districts, the rarity of female victors, the diversity of Brazil's political parties, the presence of the personal vote and gender stereotyping among voters—all important considerations of my case selection, the remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the information analysed in Chapters 4 to 7.

A Mixed Method Approach

My explanatory framework was outlined in Chapter 2 in such a way that it might be drawn upon to make sense of changes to women's descriptive representation in any democracy. My revisions to the standard model emphasise the importance of qualitative work in understanding changes in women's descriptive representation, as qualitative approaches are required to map out routinised stages prior to candidacy. As previously noted, the resources available for this project precluded a more ideal research design whereby I would have spent significant time in the field laying the groundwork for proportionality tests all along the process towards becoming mayor in different locations in Brazil. Quantitative analyses of shifts in the proportions of women in the final two stages of recruitment to elective office—the formal and universal stages of candidacy and successful election—were nonetheless possible, although it should be noted that I take a broader approach to assessing proportional shifts across stages than did Norris and Lovenduski. I focus on these in Chapters 4 and 6.

Both quantitative and qualitative work form an important part of this project. General explanatory frameworks, as my revised framework is intended to be, naturally suggest quantitative tests to evaluate hypotheses about average effects. Yet there are well-rehearsed theoretical limitations to the causal traction that observational quantitative data alone can offer. These analyses can only demonstrate that average effects are consistent with one or several possible causal processes. Control variables may be added to regression models, which in the Brazilian context is unusually beneficial for the precision of model estimation[90] given the country's almost global range of values for variables that the literature documents as empirically important influences on women's descriptive representation, such as HDI[91]. Nonetheless, the scope for robust causal inference remains logically limited since the influences of relevant unmeasurable and unrecognised variables on women's descriptive representation remain unaccounted for[92]. Qualitative techniques have the potential to provide better causal leverage. But, on their own, they can say little about the macro-scale prevalence of the patterns and mechanisms that they reveal—especially in a context such as Brazilian mayoral elections where the universe of possible cases is so large. Moreover, in studies of variation in women's descriptive representation, qualitative investigation is often necessary to move beyond the hamfisted assumed equivalence of sex and gender that is forced upon researchers who work with sex-disaggregated data.

Throughout later chapters, I therefore use a mixed methods approach and aim to profit from the advantages of quantitative and qualitative techniques. My proportionality

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[90] Especially where colinearity is a concern. See: Neima Brauner and Mordechai Shacham. (1998) 'Role of Range and Precision of the Independent Variable in Regression of Data.' *AIChE Journal* 44, no. 3, p. 603.

[91] Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. *Rising Tide. Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. (*Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003)

[92] For various reasons, such as uncertainty as to whether models are biased by omitted variables (of which many potential candidates may be unobservable).

analyses using publicly available data about women's presence in the candidacy and election stages of recruitment highlight the potential importance of particular mechanisms behind average effects, and enumerate effects operating across these stages. In-depth participant interviews then attempt to probe the earlier stages and mechanisms operating prior to candidacy, and the plausibility of mechanisms that quantitative analyses imply. The interviews are brought together into illustrative case studies—three case studies comprise Chapter 5 and two constitute the second half of Chapter 6.

The Datasets

The case selection of Brazil makes for a data-rich environment in terms of candidate information, voting data, and the availability of relevant control variables at the municipal-level. For the quantitative elements of the project, I draw material from a variety of Brazilian government websites. Early in the research process I put together a main dataset, from which I could extract data to combine with additional sources, and so create separate smaller datasets to facilitate the analyses in each of Chapters 4, 6 and 7[93]. The main dataset contains information about 1.4 million municipal election candidacies, candidate attributes, and vote tallies over the years 2000 to 2012, inclusive; of these candidacies slightly fewer than 60,000 were for the office of mayor. Candidacies for municipal councillor were included to make possible the calculation of variables pertaining to the local political context, such as the proportion of women who had been elected to the city council in the previous election. Thus, the main dataset was arranged such that its rows refer to unique cases of municipality—year—candidate combinations.

[93] The much-reduced size of these datasets compared with rather unwieldy main dataset, was less demanding of computing power to execute statistical analyses.

Control variables specific to municipality-years were replicated across candidacies in the same election. Where these variables were based on census data, they were interpolated linearly for all intervening years between 2000 and 2010[94], and extrapolated linearly to 2011 and 2012.

Data pertaining to vote tallies and candidate attributes[95] came from the Superior Electoral Court's (henceforth TSE, for Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) website[96]. For the analyses in Chapter 4, data were drawn in municipality-year format from the main dataset, and combined with a dataset of coded CGU audit reports, which Fernanda Brollo of the University or Warwick made available on her website[97]. For the analyses in Chapter 6, data pertaining to elections that had been rerun were extracted from the main dataset. These finalised TSE-approved results referred to the outcomes of elections after

[94] The years of the most recent Brazilian censuses.
[95] Brought together by appending 156 separate .csv files.
[96] These first had to be tidied, since they are often formatted differently—for example, in some of the files containing candidate information, a candidates' date of birth might be inputted as 03031969, or 3030069, or 03mar1969, which were taken to be the same thing—and then cleaned. Where dates of birth could not be corrected by the straightforward assumption that years beginning 00— should begin 19—, or corresponded to nonsensical candidate ages, I recoded the candidates' ages as missing. I decided nonsensically aged candidates are those over 100 years old, a decision which in practice capped the age of mayoral candidates at 86. Approximately a thousand candidacies for mayor or city councillor positions in the dataset were registered with nonsensical ages, out of 1.5 million in total. One of the main difficulties in cleaning the raw TSE data was deciding how to deal with candidates who fall under an eclectic list of categories other than 'deferido' (meaning that a candidacy has been legally approved) or 'indeferido' (refused approval for whatever reason). Sometimes candidates are recorded as having won votes even though they are also listed as dead, ineligible, or as having their candidacies cancelled, substituted, null, or pending court decisions. Conversely, but rarely, approved candidates receive zero votes, which at least in the case of mayoral candidates invites speculation as to whether they actually ran or not. Hence the dataset is restricted to approved candidates who won at least one vote. I also decided that multiple candidacies that share the same registered name, electoral year, municipality, sex, and age were erroneous duplications, and unless their vote totals were identical (implying that this information had also been mistakenly duplicated), their vote tallies should be summed (in these instances, the 'nome urna' tended to vary slightly, implying the same candidate had been officially recorded as two people). These decisions were taken after substantial exploration of the data. Duplications of different combinations of candidate variables were then tabulated and inspected where they occurred in the same municipality-year. A series of decisions were then made about the plausibility of duplications. For example, it was judged that two genuinely different candidates could have the name, but not the same name and age.
[97] http://https//sites.google.com/site/fernandabrollo/

rerunning. To identify elections that had different original (or voided) results, I therefore first had to create another dataset from sources elsewhere on the TSE website, where voided voting outcomes are available. To this, I further added information about the reasons for the rerun and familial connections between candidates in original and rerun elections, by Google-searching news articles pertaining to each rerun election. Finally, for the analyses of spatial effects in Chapter 7, the municipality-year dataset drawn for Chapter 4 was deployed, with some modifications[98]. Spatial weight matrices that were created from a further dataset, for which I collated coordinate and other information available from the Brazilian Institution of Geography and Statistics, IBGE.

The Illustrative Case Studies

The case studies described in this thesis are based on 75 semi-structured interviews with mayoral candidates, mayors, party members and other stakeholders in municipal politics. Except for those who had stood for city council or mayor, whose names appeared in my main dataset, individuals were identified for interview through 'snowballing'[99]. Exploring topics with interviewees as opposed to running through a pre-determined set of questions created more space for them to express concerns, motivations, attitudes and beliefs about municipal politics.

Given Brazil's large number of municipalities—and enormous geographical distances between many of them—my selection of individual municipalities for close examination was logistically strategic, as well as theoretically strategic. My theoretical selection was

[98] Unlike the analyses in Chapter 4, those in Chapter 7 included races where a second round is possible if no candidate wins a majority in the first round.
[99] By asking for names of others I should speak to at the end of each interview.

based on the advice of Jason Seawright and John Gerring in their evaluation of seven options of case-selection procedures for within-case analysis[100]. For Chapter 5, I selected the municipalities of Itapeva and Salto as 'diverse cases'[101], with clear variation on the most relevant independent variable, the level of corruption, and that of Itapuí as a 'deviant case'[102], which satisfies Mahoney and Goertz's 'possibility principle', for the purpose of exploring possible missing variables[103]. In choosing these cases, I sought limited variation along a range of independent variables, and locations within the same state. This provided additional controls relating to the state-level political context—and, more practically, facilitated both travel between them. Analogous considerations went into the selection of the municipalities of Goiatuba, and Pires do Rio, as described further in Chapter 6. By selecting different states for within-state case selection if different chapters, I gain a broader view of mayoral elections across Brazil. Even though my qualitative analyses tend to be focused on a single electoral cycle, in all cases, I evaluated processes occurring over a much wider period. This facilitated exploration of the relevance of sequences of events both leading to, and emerging out of, the electoral cycle of primary interest. Further specifics of the selection of individual mayoral races for qualitative exploration are discussed in those chapters.

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100 Jason Seawright and John Gerring. (2008) 'Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options.' *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2: pp. 294–308.
101 Ibid. p300.
102 Ibid. p302.
103 Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. (2004) 'The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research.' *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 4: pp. 653.

Chapter 4:

What Happens When Male Incumbents

Are Found to be Corrupt?

"In Rousseau's conception, for instance, this unfitness [of women for government] comes from their 'natural' role as caretakers and custodians of affectivity, desire, and the body in the home. If appeals to personal connections and desires were allowed to move public debates, the principles of universality, impartiality, and justice would be subverted, as too would the convenient separation between the private and the public realms."

Goetz in Development and Change, 2007

"To question the central finding of this paper, one needs to argue that the results of careful analyses of several distinct data sets have, by sheer fluke, all been biased in the same direction. Our conclusion, that there is indeed a gender differential in tolerance for corruption, is more plausible… Women, who are typically more involved in raising children, may find they have to practice honesty in order to teach their children the appropriate values. Women may feel more than men—the physically stronger sex, that laws exist to protect them and therefore be more willing to follow rules."

Swarmy et al in the Journal of Development Economics, 2001

Introduction

This chapter is the first of three concerned with the empirical effects of male incumbent corruption on women's descriptive representation. Research on gender and corruption to date has predominantly been drawn to the question of whether women are less corrupt than men, and—as the quotes that open this chapter illustrate—during different periods in the development of political science as a discipline, scholars have cited the very same, apparently essential qualities of women, alongside traditional

gender roles, to make opposing arguments[1]. Whether the sexes are equally corrupt remains a prominent debate in some academic[23] and policy circles[45]. Meanwhile an unrecognised dichotomy has emerged: that of the divergent expectations of two literatures—feminist institutionalism and the heuristics and voting behaviour literature. These literatures offer opposite ideas about women's prospects for achieving formal political power when corruption by a male incumbent is revealed.

This chapter elaborates and tests expectations put forward in Chapter 2, which draw on both of these literatures. By considering what I referred to in Chapter 2 as the 'dissemination assumption', it places *who* knows about the incumbent's corruption at the centre of the argument. Rather than contend that one literature's insights should be privileged over the other, I focus on their differing assumptions. This leads me to propose that the effect of male incumbent corruption on women's representation will

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[1] Goetz, Anne Marie, (2007) 'Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-Corruption Force?, *Development and Change,* vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 87–105.

[2] Eg. Stensöta and Wangnerud. 'Chapter 1: Why expect a link between gender and corruption?', in Helena Stensöta and Lena Wangnerud, eds, *Gender and Corruption: Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p9.

[3] Note that Bendahan et al recently moved this discussion beyond binary categories of biological sex, to a continuous biological category using varying testosterone levels among men. The authors manipulated the amount of power that leaders had in an experiment, and found that leader power interacted with the participants' testosterone levels predicted how corruptly the 'leaders' chose to behave. See: Samuel Bendahan, Christian Zehnder, François P. Pralong, and John Antonakis, (2007) 'Leader Corruption Depends on Power and Testosterone', *The Leadership Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 101–22.

[4] For example, both the Lima and Mexico City police forces have all-female units in an effort to reduce bribe taking by those units. Commander Pedro Montoya, once in charge of training a female motorcycle brigade in Lima, has explained the rationale for this in terms of women being "more honest and morally firm" than men due to their role as heads of the family. *Lima police Peru's women cleaning up traffic chaos, corruption.* AP in CNN. August 21, 1998. Available at: http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/peru/policewomen.htm In a 2016 news article about Mexico City's policy, the director of Transit Police for Mexico State, Rosalba Sanchez Velazquez, is quoted as saying, 'There were lots of complaints about corruption so the governor took the decision to create this unit made up just of women. For every 100 complaints that there used to be, now there's one or two.' See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-38077422

[5] Even in the 19th century, such policies were proposed by supporters of women's suffrage, such as Henry Ward Beecher who wrote how women could help reform government by correct men's tendencies to resort to 'force, passion and fraud' in politics. Kathleen Dolan and Timothy Lynch, (2016) 'The Impact of Gender Stereotypes on Voting for Women Candidates by Level and Type of Office', *Politics & Gender*, vol. 12, no. 03, pp. 573–95.

primarily depend on whether voters at large are informed about the corruption that has taken place, and on whether certain scope conditions are met. I propose that where voters do not know about the violations, or where they know yet certain scope conditions are not met, the proportion of female candidates and their votes should decrease, as per expectations drawn from feminist institutionalism[6]. Yet where voters at large become aware of male incumbent corruption and additional, necessary criteria are fulfilled, both the proportion of female candidates and their vote share should increase, as per the expectations of the heuristics and voting behaviour literature.

Given that this chapter is concerned with quantitative analyses, I begin by reviewing relevant studies that take this approach. I then formally outline four hypotheses, and elaborate the scope conditions of the argument with a discussion of the extent to which they are met in different contexts, and specifically in the context of Brazilian municipal elections. The question of whether voters receive information about incumbent corruption—the dissemination assumption—is given special consideration since it lies at the core of the argument. Based on previous work by Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan[7], and on other scholarship about the role of different media outlets in spreading local political news in Brazil, I use the presence or absence of a municipal AM radio station as the main gauge of at-large voter knowledge during the years of this analysis.

Note that the empirical approach in this chapter is to numerically compare variation in the proportion of women at different stages of political recruitment, though I do not conduct proportionality tests in same way that Norris and Lovenduski did in *Political*

[6] There are a few exceptions to this argument, according to how the scope conditions are not met, as will be detailed later in the chapter.
[7] Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan, (2008) 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 123, no. 2, pp. 703–45.

Recruitment. Their focus was to compare recruitment in two parties that always field candidates in every voting district in the UK. As explained in Chapter 3, the Brazilian context is different; Brazil has more than 30 parties, and typically two or three mayoral candidates per municipal election. As such, here I consider women's recruitment across all parties together, and leave probing differences between parties and party types to Chapter 5[8]. In this sense, the percentage of women in 'the represented' relevant to this chapter is self-evidently 50%, or extremely close to it. Having noted this, my focus here is on influences across the final two stages of recruitment, and on feedback effects that these prompt.

The analyses in this chapter were made possible by a policy experiment that began in Brazil in May 2003. It is unique to my knowledge in corruption research because it generated independently and expertly assessed data about the extent of corruption in electoral units—Brazilian municipalities—that were selected entirely at random[9]. As I describe in the 'Empirical strategy' section of this chapter, Brazil's Comptroller General's Office (CGU) carried out lotteries to pick municipalities for immediate audit over several electoral cycles. While a few scholars have deployed the information in these audit reports to assess whether or not voters in Brazil really do kick out corrupt incumbents who seek re-election, no one, to my knowledge, has sought to probe whether this lost incumbent support is distributed evenly among challengers—or, instead, whether a particular group disproportionately realises the benefits.

[8] Although I do include controls for the PT in this chapter.

[9] I conducted fairly exhaustive balance tests to verify this, including T-tests to assess whether differences exist between audited and non-audited municipalities for a long list of variables, and a survival analysis to assess whether municipalities with PT mayors tended to be selected for audit earlier in the electoral cycle than non-PT mayors. The results were not significant at the $p<0.05$ level.

The results of the regressions that follow reveal that in municipalities with AM radio stations, depending on the timing of the audit, both the proportion of women among mayoral candidates and the proportion of votes going to female mayoral candidates increase in elections that follow an audit in which a male incumbent seeking re-election was found to be corrupt[10]. Moreover, during relevant periods, the extent of these increases is associated with the amount of corruption (indicated by the proportion of audited funds involved in violations of the law), such that the more corruption that occurred, the greater these increases.

If corrupt acts were publicised early in the incumbent's term, there was no impact on women's candidacies and received votes. However, just prior to the midpoint of the term onwards, boosts to the proportion of women's candidacies and to their vote share become significant and the estimated effect size grows stronger over time. This is to be expected from a purported mechanism of shifts in voter demand, and the feedback effects that it prompts, as voters are likely to exhibit recency bias. The models predict a significant rise in the proportion of female candidates if a report of male incumbent corruption is released prior to the period when candidate selection typically occurs, and not afterwards. Meanwhile, the predicted increase in the proportion of votes for women competing in these elections continues until the next election.

These findings demonstrate the usefulness of a revised model of political recruitment that does not dispense with a stagewise approach. They are consistent with a narrative of the empirical relevance of change in how voter demand is gendered, and so underscore the benefits of a model that does not consider factors affecting progression

[10] Note that I use the term corruption rather loosely in this chapter. Given the data I have to work with, I have no choice other than to take the CGU's assessments of legal violations as equivalent to corrupt acts. There are obvious problems with this in light of a substantial literature that explores definitions of corruption. However, in this sense I follow other scholars who have worked with the same CGU audit reports.

between the two final stages—candidacy and election—as an afterthought. The data hints that there is a period late in the electoral cycle when rates of women's candidacy are no longer responsive to the dissemination of information about male incumbent corruption (because candidates have already been selected), meanwhile the release of new information about male incumbent corruption continues to influence female candidates' electoral success. Together, such dynamics point to the importance of feedback mechanisms from shifts in voter demand, and to theorising the conditions under which they will be stymied.

The analyses of change in municipalities with AM radio stations are consistent with the expectations of the heuristics and voting behaviour literature. However, expectations derived from feminist institutionalist studies do not find convincing support from the analysis of municipalities without an AM radio station. In the latter case, when voters at large remain in the dark about male incumbent corruption after a CGU report has been released, I assume that political insiders will nonetheless make it their business to find out what was in the report, and update their priors about the extent to which corruption that linked to local politics is gendered. While the results show an extremely slight shift in the direction predicted—towards a reduction in the proportion of women candidates (and, concomitantly, in the overall proportion of votes that they receive)—the trend never reaches significance at the 5% level, and in any case the model fit is poor. The lack of a statistically discernable decrease in the dependent variables in these models could be for a number of reasons. It is possible that political insiders never became aware of the CGU's findings, for example, or that the CGU reported nothing that these actors did not already know or expect to be true.

There are, of course, limitations as to what patterns of statistical significance can imply about causal explanations. In separately analysing municipalities with and without AM radio stations, the exogeneity of the audit variable is removed. However, I carefully evaluated systematic differences between municipalities with and without radio stations (see Appendix) and included relevant controls. The question of causal mechanisms is taken forward into Chapters 5 and 6.

Previous Findings

As noted in Chapter 2, I am not aware of any quantitative analysis that seeks to ascertain whether women receive a boost at the ballot box in the wake of publicised male incumbent corruption. This is the case even though a rise in voter demand for female candidates is the logical consequence of highly cited work on incorruptibility heuristics, such as that of Monica McDermott[11].

At the same time, feminist institutionalism pays little attention to the potential role of voter preferences in political recruitment, as also highlighted in Chapter 2. Quantitative analyses of the role of corruption in women's participation and success in formal politics that draw on feminist institutionalist theory therefore typically fail to incorporate explanatory variables relating to voter demand. Instead, the mechanistic focus of these studies is squarely directed at the barriers that male-dominated networks associated with corruption may present to women's candidacies. For example, Daniel Stockemer's quantitative analysis of factors predicting the descriptive representation of

[11] E.g. Monika McDermott, (1997) 'Voting Cues in Low-Information Elections: Candidate Gender as a Social Information Variable in Contemporary United States Elections', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 270–83.

female deputies in African parliaments includes corruption as an independent variable, which he justifies with the phrase 'corruption, should prevent women from gaining office, because corrupt political and economic processes often deny them the opportunities to seek and hold public office'. Yet he includes no variable to indicate the extent of voter knowledge of incumbent corruption, nor voter sentiment towards corruption[12].

Where quantitative work based on feminist institutionalist insights does consider citizen's awareness of corruption in some form, it is not with the expectation that this would affect the probability that voters will kick out corrupt rascals. A recent paper by Aksel Sundström and Lena Wängnerud illustrates the point. It reports analyses of women's descriptive representation on regional councils in 18 European countries[13]. The authors put forward two mechanisms to explain their finding that fewer women are elected in regions with higher levels of corruption. The first mechanism—as described in much feminist institutionalist literature that pertains to corruption—is the existence of closely-knit male-dominated networks that exert control over the political recruitment process where corruption is rife, which the authors summarise as 'the shadowy arrangements that benefit the already privileged, which in most countries tend to be men'. The second proposed mechanism involves female citizens receiving indirect signals, such as a generalised lack of an impartiality norm witnessed by women interacting with 'a broad range of government authorities'. These signals, Sundström and Wängnerud argue, indicate to women that if they were to come forward and try to become political representatives, they would not receive equal treatment to men in that

[12] Daniel Stockemer, (2011) 'Women's Parliamentary Representation in Africa: The Impact of Democracy and Corruption on the Number of Female Deputies in National Parliaments', *Political Studies*, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 693–712.
[13] Aksel Sundström and Lena Wängnerud, (2016) 'Corruption as an Obstacle to Women's Political Representation: Evidence from Local Councils in 18 European Countries', *Party Politics*, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 354–69.

process. Hence, if one were to place this mechanism within a model of stagewise progression to candidacy, it would operate early in the political recruitment process, rather than across the final two stages, from candidate to elected representative.

In stark contrast to both feminist institutionalism and the literature on heuristics and voting behaviour, the variable 'extent of voter knowledge' occupies a central place—usually through assumption—in quantitative research into voting and corruption. Indeed, it has become something of a cliché in the field to recount Adam Przeworski and colleagues' phrase: on learning that elected representatives have behaved corruptly, rational voters should 'throw the rascals out'[14]. Put plainly, where politicians are democratically accountable, those who divert tax receipts away from the provision of public goods and services and towards private gain should lose the next election.

Studies that do probe voter knowledge of incumbent corruption conclude that it can be causal factor in voters' rejection of corrupt incumbents. Elena Costas-Perez et al, for example, consider the two municipal elections prior to the financial crisis in Spain, held in 2003 and 2007, and calculate a mean vote share loss of 4% after a corruption scandal, which rose to 9% according to the degree of newspaper attention[15]. Eric Chang, Miriam Golden and Seth Hill's comparison is over time rather than space[16]. In Italy, from 1984 onwards, the ratio of articles in the country's only national newspaper, *Corriere della Sera*, that mentioned corruption and party funding relative to those that mentioned the mafia, remained low. This changed in 1992, when the mani pulite scandal received huge coverage. Only with this rise, in the Eleventh Legislature of 1992

[14] Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p42.
[15] E. Costas-Pérez, A. Solé-Ollé, and P. Sorribas-Navarro, (2012) 'Corruption Scandals, Voter Information, and Accountability', *European Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 469–84.
[16] E. Chang, M. Golden, and S. Hill, (2010) Legislative Malfeasance and Political Accountability, *World Politics,* vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 177-220.

to 1994, was a charge of serious corrupt malfeasance negatively associated with the probability of re-election. Voter punishment of incumbent corruption that hinges on media coverage has also been shown to occur in elections in the US[17], Israel[18] and Slovakia[19], to name but a few countries. These studies can be viewed as describing contexts in which a series of scope conditions, which were briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, were met, making these contexts empirically sensitive to varying proportions of voters updating their priors about incumbent corruption, and those voters then acting on that information at the ballot box.

Hypotheses

Taking the dissemination assumption into account, and bringing together the perspectives of feminist institutionalism and of the literature on heuristics and voting behaviour, sets up two initial hypotheses. The proportion of female candidates should decrease where voters in general have no knowledge of male incumbent corruption, yet some of the insiders who influence candidate recruitment update their priors about the gendered realities of corruption related to political officeholding. This expectation is based on the feminist institutionalist perspective. Moreover, the proportion of votes that female candidates receive should increase where voters gain information and update their priors about male incumbent corruption. This expectation is based on the heuristics and voting behaviour perspective.

[17] C. R. Berry and W. G. Howell, (2017) 'Accountability and Local Elections: Rethinking Retrospective Voting', *The Journal of Politics,* vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 844-858.
[18] A. Brender, (2003) 'The Effect of Fiscal Performance on Local Government Election Results in Israel: 1989–1998', *Journal of Public Economics*, vol. 87, no. 9–10, pp. 2187–2205.
[19] M., Klašnja, J. Tucker, and K. Deegan-Krause, (2016) Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting, *British Journal of Political Science,* vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 67-94.

However, two additional hypotheses can be derived by placing these propositions within the revised framework developed in Chapter 2 that pays attention to feedback mechanisms that may operate across entire political recruitment pathways. First, in contexts where voters remain in the dark about male incumbent corruption, the proportion of votes that female candidates receive should decrease concomitantly with the drop in the proportion of female candidates. This is because voters' willingness to support for female candidates will remain the same as it was prior to the discovery of corruption. Hence the change in the proportion of votes for female candidates should mirror the decrease in the proportion of female candidates.

Second, where voters are alerted to male incumbent corruption and consequently become more willing to vote for women because they hold a female incorruptibility stereotype, and elections are candidate-centric, the proportion of female candidates can be expected to increase concomitantly with the proportion of votes that female candidates receive. This is because multiple feedback mechanisms will likely operate. Selectorates should have their fingers of the pulse of public opinion, and may sense a contextual advantage to the party's prospects in fielding a woman. Women who have been vaguely considering seeking political candidacy may also be emboldened by a sense of opportunity, and put more time and effort into impressing decision-makers at various stages of the recruitment process. However, as previously pointed out, such feedback mechanisms will be interrupted within the current electoral cycle if the deadline for registering candidacies has passed.

The two initial hypotheses and the two additional hypotheses will be tested in this chapter. They are listed below. In stating these hypotheses, I use the term 'insiders' as I do in the paragraphs above—as shorthand to denote both individuals who exert

influence over the odds of willing individuals becoming candidates, including aspirants themselves.

Hypothesis 1a: Where voters do not learn about male incumbent corruption, but some insiders do, the proportion of female candidacies will decrease with the extent of corruption revealed.

Hypothesis 1b: Where voters do not learn about male incumbent corruption, but some insiders do, the proportion of votes for female candidates will decrease with the extent of corruption revealed.

Hypothesis 2a: Where voters learn about male incumbent corruption, the proportion of female candidacies will increase with the extent of corruption revealed.

Hypothesis 2b: Where voters learn about male incumbent corruption, the proportion of votes for female candidates will increase with the extent of corruption revealed.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b hinge on the series of scope conditions initially listed in Chapter 2. They are not stated in the above hypotheses for brevity. These scope conditions demarcate the necessary circumstances for voters to rescind support for a corrupt incumbent and become motivated to seek a less corruptible alternative. These are: in addition to receiving information about incumbent corruption, voters must also believe it, perceive the corruption to run counter to their interests, not engage in implicit trading to the extent that corruption ceases to guide their voting behaviour, and consider possible the execution of tasks of government whilst engaging in less

corruption than did the incumbent. All of these scope conditions must be satisfied in Hypotheses 2a and 2b.

Hypotheses 1a and 1b require further elaboration. There are specific instances when, rather than decreases, no change would be expected in the proportion of female candidates or in their vote shares in response to some insiders (though not voters at large) learning about corruption. This would occur if party insiders do not update their priors about incumbent corruption, as would be the case if insiders already know the information in the CGU report, or do not believe the new information, or are unaware of the CGU's findings. Generally speaking, if voters learn about incumbent corruption (as stated in Hypotheses 2a and 2b) and the scope conditions are not met, the expected effects of this information on the proportion of female candidates and their votes should either be as per the situation where voters lack the information (as stated in Hypotheses 1a and 1b), or there should be no effect[20].

Although in this chapter I test the four hypotheses with data from Brazilian mayoral elections only, the expectations that the hypotheses capture apply to all contexts where elections are candidate-centred, where women are viewed as less corruptible than

[20] One way to reflect on this statement is to consider each scope condition at a time. If voters receive new information about a male mayor acting corruptly, but do not believe it, voting behaviour will be unaffected. But if insiders still believe the information and update their priors about the gendered realities of local corruption, then the expectations postulated in Hypotheses 1a and 1b still hold. If neither voters not insiders believe the CGU findings, however, there should be no change. Similarly, if voters receive the new information, believe it, yet wish to maintain the incumbent's corruption because they perceive it to benefit them, they should not change their behaviour at the ballot box. Meanwhile insiders who have gained information about the gendered realities of corruption, and view this as inevitably bound up in backing a suitable candidate, should respond in ways that will reduce the odds of the party selecting a female candidate. The same outcome would also be expected if voters dislike the corruption but believe the incumbent to be uniquely capable of delivering public goods. In the situation where voters know, all other scope conditions are satisfied, but corruption in local government is systemic, voters will lack incentives to seek a less corruptible alternative. They may stay at home rather than shift support to another candidate. Or they may still vote but consider the issue of corruption irrelevant to their candidate choice.

men—which according to the global survey data, is almost all countries[21]—and to contexts in which institutions that are associated with corruption are gendered in some way that leads to the lower involvement of women than men in corrupt activities. Because these contexts appear to be globally commonplace, I take a deep dive into the evidence as to whether the scope conditions are widely realised empirically in the next section. Subsequently, I consider the extent to which the scope conditions are satisfied in Brazil.

Scope Conditions

Not every empirical evaluation of voter response to new information about incumbent corruption has led to voters kicking out rascals[22]. Typically studies that do not find an effect fail to fully examine which of a series of logically required additional premises to the argument are not met. Once voter knowledge is established, the first scope condition requires that voters believe corruption allegations to be true. In the Spanish municipal elections of 2003 and 2007, voters were sensitive to whether corruption allegations were founded: there was no electoral punishment when corruption cases were judicially dismissed[23]. The literature finds that voter acceptance of the veracity of corruption reports often depends on partisan loyalties. Afrobarometer respondents

[21] The World Values Survey does not have a question about whether men or women are perceived to be more corruptible. However, Williams, Satterwhite and Best's (1999) survey of the degree of similarity in the attributes ascribed to men and women in 25 countries—argues that the female honesty stereotype is 'pan-cultural'. In the 2014 Americas Barometer survey, respondents in only two countries were directly asked whether men or women make more corrupt politicians; in both, a large majority stated men. The percentage of respondents who stated that women make for more corrupt politicians was no more than 9.5% for either country. See: Williams, J. E, Satterwhite, R, C. & Best, D. L, (1999) Pancultural Gender Stereotypes Revisited: The Five Factor Model*, Sex Roles*, vol. 40, no. 7/8, pp. 513-525.
[22] For a review, see: Catherine E. De Vries and Hector Solaz, (2017) 'The Electoral Consequences of Corruption', *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 391–408.
[23] Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé, & Sorribas-Navarro. 'Corruption Scandals, Voter Information, and Accountability.' pp. 469–84.

whom Eric Chang and Nicholas Kerr call 'identity insiders'—those who share partisan or ethnic ties with the incumbent—actually perceive of incumbent corruption as lower than do 'identity outsiders'[24]. Indeed, from the particular case of the US Congress's House Bank scandal in the early 1990s[25] to the results of survey data from Chile, Mexico and Costa Rica[26], opposition party supporters have frequently been found to understand corruption levels to be higher than the estimations of supporters of the incumbent's party. Partisan loyalties also appear to increase willingness to forgive[27][28] corrupt acts by incumbents, perhaps as a means to reduce cognitive dissonance[29]. Political sophistication may reduce partisan forgiveness bias[30] (although in practice politically sophisticated individuals may be more strongly partisan, leading to less straightforward effects[31]).

For voters to seek to kick out a corrupt incumbent, they must not merely know about and believe reports of incumbent corruption, they must also perceive of the corruption as counter to their interests. Even though corruption is broadly understood in the literature to undermine the functioning of democracy[32], sustain or increase economic

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[24] Chang, Eric C. C. and Nicholas N. Kerr. (2017). "An Insider–Outsider Theory of Popular Tolerance for Corrupt Politicians." *Governance* 30(1): pp.67–84.
[25] M.A. Dimock & G.C. Jacobson.(2015) Checks and Choices: The House Bank Scandal's Impact on Voters in 1992. *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 57:4, pp.1143-1159
[26] Davis, C.L., R. Ai Camp, & K. M. Coleman. (2004) 'The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America.' *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 6, pp.677–703.
[27] M. Klašnja, & J.A. Tucker. (2013) 'The Economy, Corruption, and the Vote: Evidence from Experiments in Sweden and Moldova.' *Electoral Studies* 32, no. 3: pp. 536–43.
[28] Anderson, C. J., & Y. V. Tverdova. (2003) 'Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies.' *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 1, pp. 91–109.
[29] Dimock & Jacobson, Checks and Choices. pp. 1143-1159.
[30] Anduiza, E., A. Gallego,& J. Muñoz. (2013) 'Turning a Blind Eye: Experimental Evidence of Partisan Bias in Attitudes Toward Corruption.' *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 12: pp.1664–92.
[31] M Klašnja, (2017) 'Uninformed voters and corrupt politicians', *American Politics Research*, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 256-279.
[32] Dahlberg and Holmberg, 'Democracy and Bureaucracy. pp. 515–37.

inequalities[3334], constrain economic growth[3536], erode public health[37], and exacerbate environmental degradation[3839], these aggregate negative outcomes often become evident over a longer period than the remaining window of an electoral cycle[40]. To be sure, egregious acts of theft or fraud that shrink the government purse occur, and such instances can quickly reduce the possibilities for provision of anticipated goods and services. In the short term, corruption can also reduce social[41] and institutional trust[42]. But because of the temporal lag between the occurrence of corrupt acts and many of corruption's negative consequences, voters' perception of corruption as counter to their interests will not necessarily stem from experienced impacts. Frequently, it will be a reaction to the ethical violation per se, or to the signal that the incumbent is of a type who would exploit their privileged position for private gain—i.e. a signal of negative outcomes yet to be felt—and presumably, may act similarly again in the future[43].

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33 Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002) 'Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?', *Econ Gov*. vol. 3, pp. 23-45.
34 Note that corruption also drives up economic inequality. See: J-S You, and S. Khagram. (2005) 'A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption." *American Sociological Review* 70, no. 1, pp. 136–57.
35 Miriam Golden and Ray Fisman, *Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know*, (Oxford: OUP, 2017), p2.
36 J. S. Bentzen, (2012) 'How Bad Is Corruption? Cross-Country Evidence of the Impact of Corruption on Economic Prosperity?', *Review of Development Economics*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 167–84.
37 Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein, (2011) 'Dying of Corruption', *Health Economics, Policy and Law., v*ol. 6, no. 4, pp. 529–47.
38 This relationship is complicated, since environmental degradation and income tend to be related nonlinearly, as an environmental Kuznet's curve. Hence the net results of cross-sectional data tend to vary by countries' income levels. Welsch (2004) summarises this as corruption having two relevant effects: (a) a direct effect in the form of reduced stringency of environmental laws and their enforcement, and (b) an indirect effect via reduced levels of per capita income. See: Heinz Welsch, (2004) 'Corruption, Growth, and the Environment: A Cross-Country Analysis', *Environment and Development Economics*, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 663–93.
39 M. A. Cole, (2007) 'Corruption, Income and the Environment: An Empirical Analysis', *Ecological Economics* vol. 62, no. 3–4, pp. 637–47.
40 Heinz Welsch, 'Corruption, Growth, and the Environment', pp. 663–93.
41 Nicholas Charron, Lewis Dijkstra and Victor Lapuente, (2014) 'Regional Governance Matters: Quality of Government within European Union Member States', *Regional Studies*, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 68–90.
42 Monica Bauhr and Maria Grimes, (2014) 'Indignation or Resignation', *Governance*, vol. 27, pp. 291-320.
43 James Fearon, Electoral accountability and the control of politicians: selecting good types versus sanctioning poor performance, in Przeworski A. et al., Eds., *Democracy, accountability and representation*, (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press: 1999).

Certain varieties of corruption can generate direct benefits[44] for significant proportions of the electorate in the short run. This may overturn any concurrent incentive these voters have[45] to replace an incumbent with a less corruptible alternative[46]. In the Spanish municipal elections of 2011, for example, mayors seeking re-election who were involved in credible corruption scandals that generated positive economic externalities for their communities, saw no significant change in their vote shares[47]. By contrast, mayors whose corruption scandals failed to contribute to the short-term welfare of the electorate lost 4.2% of the vote, on average. Many of the corrupt mayors who economically benefited their communities in the short run did so by disregarding regulations that restricted the use of certain types of land for construction, perhaps even accepting bribes in the process. Their actions facilitated the creation of jobs when Spain was two years into the doldrums of the global financial crisis[48].

Voters may understand an incumbent's corrupt activities as intimately tied to short-term, direct benefits that they receive as part of a clientelistic exchange. Luigi Manzetti and Carole Wilson[49], for example, report that in 14 countries World Values Survey respondents, who perceive high levels of government corruption, tend to be more satisfied with their current government the worse it scored on a measure of

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44 P. Fernández-Vázquez, P. Barberá and G. Rivero, (2016) 'Rooting Out Corruption or Rooting for Corruption? The Heterogeneous Electoral Consequences of Scandals', *Political Science Research and Methods*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 379–97.

45 Bo Rothstein argues that people who partake in corruption in systemically corrupt environments often consciously disagree with their own corrupt acts, but see no practical alternative. For example, see: Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, (2013) 'Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail-Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem', *Governance* vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 449–71.

46 Manzetti and Wilson find that, in countries with strong clientelism, voters support corrupt leaders to a much greater extent, simply because they expect to benefit materially. See: L. Manzetti and C. Wilson, (2007) 'Why do corrupt governments maintain public support?', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 40, pp. 949–970.

47 Indeed, the coefficient in Fernandez-Vazquez et al's regression is positive for these mayors. See: Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá and Rivero, 'Rooting Out Corruption or Rooting for Corruption? pp. 379–97.

48 Oftentimes this grew the population, fueling local demand for goods and services.

49 Luigi Manzetti and Carole J. Wilson, (2007) 'Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?' *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 40, no. 8, pp. 949-979.

effectiveness developed by Daniel Kaufmann et al[50]. The authors make sense of this counter-intuitive result by equating ineffective, or weak, government institutions with strong patron-client relationships. Hence they conclude that 'those who perceive high levels of corruption are significantly less likely to punish the government in countries where government effectiveness is low than in countries where government effectiveness is high because they are likely to be beneficiaries of patronage'[51].

Luís De Sousa and Marcelo Moriconi make the same argument through a comparison of most similar cases— four southern European countries: the Iberian democracies, plus Italy and Greece—that all saw their position in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index drop over the past decade[52]. Furthermore, unlike those who Chang and Kerr' call 'identity insiders', individuals whom they label 'patronage insiders', whose 'cost instrumentality [of government corruption] comes down on the benefits side', have both high perception of corruption and high tolerance of it.

Despite these examples, many varieties of corruption provide no immediate direct benefit to more than a handful of voters, and have only negative long-term consequences for the vast majority. Nonetheless, voters who perceive incumbent corruption to be bad for them may engage in implicit trading. This occurs when voters' punishment of corrupt incumbents is weighed against the indirect or direct benefits that an incumbent may be understood to provide, and is thus theoretically distinct from an act of corruption itself benefiting voters.

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[50] This is the 1996 Government Effectiveness measure, which 'combines responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies'. Ibid. p. 959.
[51] Ibid. p. 962.
[52] L. de Sousa and M. Moriconi, (2013) 'Why voters do not throw the rascals out?— A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption' *Crime Law Soc Change,* vol. 60, pp. 471–502.

The most widely cited reasons for implicit trading are public goods provision, and economic growth. However, since the publication of Barry Rundquist, Gerald Strom and John Peters's 1977 experiment—in which 44% of participants who were informed of a candidate's views against Richard Nixon's Vietnamization policy were still willing to vote this candidate after learning that he was corrupt, compared to 0% who only learned about the candidate's corruption—it has been clear that the group benefits of implicit trading need not be material. Nonetheless, material trade-offs matter. Across 107 subnational regions in 19 presidential systems surveyed by Americas Barometer in 2010, Elizabeth Zechmeister and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga find that voters have more punitive attitudes towards a president if national economic conditions are poor, than if than if the economy is in a decent state[53]. Eunjung Choi and Jongseok Woo make similar claims in reporting that economic performance mediates electoral punishment in a sample of 115 developing countries[54]. However, where corruption is rare it may supersede economic considerations in voters' minds. Swedish voters have been found to punish corruption regardless of the economic context, yet Moldovan voters, who routinely exposed to higher pocketbook and sociotropic corruption, only do when the economy is bad[5556].

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[53] E. J., Zechmeister and D. Zizumbo-Colunga, (2013) 'The Varying Political Toll of Concerns About Corruption in Good Versus Bad Economic Times', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 46, no. 10, pp. 1190–1218.

[54] Eunjung Choi and Jongseok Woo, (2010) 'Political Corruption, Economic Performance, and Electoral Outcomes: A Cross-National Analysis', *Contemporary Politics*, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 249–62.

[55] Klašnja and Tucker, 'The Economy, Corruption, and the Vote.' pp. 536–43.

[56] Evidence for willingness to engage in implicit trading was recently reported from an experiment in Catalonia. Spain was placed 41st out of 176 countries by Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in 2016, which whilst high in the overall list is low relative to most Western European countries. See: Munoz et al, (2016) 'Why do voters forgive corrupt mayors? Implicit Exchange, Credibility of Information and Clean Alternatives*', Local Government Studies,* vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 598-615.

My final scope condition is that corruption must not be systemic. Even if voters become aware of an incumbent's corrupt acts, believe them to be true, perceive of the corruption as counter to their interests, and are not prepared to engage in implicit trading, they should not be expected to seek the least corruptible alternative among the incumbent's challengers unless they also believe it possible to carry out the duties of public office whilst engaging in less corruption than did the incumbent. If this latter scope condition is not empirically the case, voters, as principals, have no incentive to be principled in their selection of agents—i.e. politicians—to represent them. For these reasons, Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell conceptualise systemic corruption as a collective action problem, as opposed to a principal agent problem[57][58][59].

How are these theoretical developments relevant for a theory whose microfoundations rest on voters being incentivised to transfer support from a corrupt incumbent to another candidate? In systemically corrupt contexts, where all possible agents are assumed to be similarly corruptible, citizens have less incentive to turnout to vote, *ceteris paribus*. If the state has made voting compulsory, as it has in Brazil, citizens in systemically corrupt contexts have stronger incentives turn out (so as to avoid punishment), but may spoil their ballots or select candidates based on issues other than corruption.

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57 Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 'Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail', pp. 449–71.
58 More specifically, systemic corruption can considered a second order social dilemma, according to Eleanor Ostrom's classification of types of collective-action problems: because all parties involved in corrupt transactions seek to keep them secret, sanctioning free-riders who profess to be fighting corruption but in practice engage in corrupt acts when it suits them is especially challenging. See: Elinor Ostrom, (1998) 'A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997', *American Political Science Review,* vol. 92, no. 1, pp. 1–22.
59 Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett E, (2019) 'Business unusual: collective action against bribery in international business', *Crime Law Soc Change*, vol. 71, pp. 151–170.

Several studies by Monica Bauhr have demonstrated that the predictions of the collective-action perspective are borne out. With Nicholas Charron, she has analysed responses of 85,000 survey participants in 24 European countries, who were asked how they would vote if their preferred party were involved in a corruption scandal. Where corruption is common, 'insiders' (in this study defined as potential beneficiaries of the corruption) continue to support a corrupt incumbent from their own party meanwhile 'outsiders' (who have no prospects of receiving material benefit from corruption) tend to abstain from voting instead of transferring their vote to another party. Bauhr and Charron find that this situation is markedly different to contexts where corruption is rare, in which both insiders and outsiders shift their support to an alternative party. In another paper, Bauhr and Marcia Grimes show that abstention in contexts where corruption is commonplace is most likely due to feelings of resignation, as opposed to the indignation that might prompt corrective action: they find evidence in World Values Survey data that increasing transparency in highly corrupt contexts leads to reductions in political interest, political involvement, and in institutional trust[60]. More broadly, the collective-action perspective offers a means of explaining why various other scholars have noted reductions in turnout[61-64] following new information about incumbent corruption in systemically corrupt places—notably Alberto Chong et al's

[60] Bauhr and Grimes, 'Indignation or Resignation', pp. 291-320.
[61] A. Simpser, 'Does Electoral Manipulation Discourage Voter Turnout? Evidence from Mexico', *Journal of Politics*, no. 74, 3, pp. 782–795.
[62] Birch finds that electoral fraud is associated with lower turnout across 31 countries. See: S. Birch, (2010) 'Perceptions of Electoral Fairness and Voter Turnout', Comparative Political Studies, vol. 43, no. 12, pp. 1601–1622.
[63] J.A McCann, and J. I. Dominguez, (1998) 'Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior', *Electoral Studies*, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 483–503.
[64] Across 72 democracies, Stockemer et al. estimate that a one point increase in corruption control measured by the International Country Risk Guide index is associated with two percentage points higher turnout, controlling for a range of political and economic variables. D. Stockemer, B. LaMontagne and L. Scruggs, (2013) 'Bribes and Ballots: The Impact of Corruption on Voter Turnout in Democracies', *International Political Science Review*, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 70–92.

experimental finding[65] from Mexico of reduced turnout for both the accused incumbent party and for the challenger party.

This short review demonstrates that each of the scope conditions attached to the hypotheses in this chapter should not be assumed, and that when voters fail to kick out corrupt rascals, a rational choice perspective that understands voters as boundedly rational should not be abandoned. Overall, despite the intricacies of the scope conditions, the consensus in the literature is that the typical vote share an incumbent loses as a result of a corruption scandal is small, often in the a single-digit-percent range[6667]. Therefore, given that it is this vote share that becomes newly available to challengers of all stripes, in testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b, I anticipate that the boost to women's candidacies and vote shares will be small.

The Brazilian Context

To what extent are the premises of my argument satisfied in the context of Brazilian municipal elections? Several studies use data from the CGU's lottery audits to assess whether voters in Brazil kick out corrupt mayors who seek re-election[68-70]. These invariably find an effect, implying that, on average, all of the scope conditions detailed

65 A. Chong et al., 'Looking Beyond the Incumbent. The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes', *CEPR discussion paper, No. 8970, Centre for Economic Policy Research.* Available at: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP8790.asp.
66 For a discussion, and points about how these percentages tend to be slightly higher in personalistic systems, see: Andrew C. Eggers, (2014) 'Partisanship and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from the UK Expenses Scandal', *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, vol. 9, no. 4 pp. 441-472.
67 Golden and Fisman, *Corruption.*
68 Ferraz and Finan, 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians.' pp. 703–45.
69 Fernanda Brollo, (2010) 'Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program', *IGIER Working Paper* n.336.
70 Yves Zamboni and Stephan Litschig, (2018) 'Audit Risk and Rent Extraction: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Brazil', *Journal of Development Economics*, vol. 134, pp. 133–49.

above should logically be met. Nonetheless, I consider each premise individually in the paragraphs that follow.

Whether Brazilian voters believe the news in question has three components. First voters must consider AM radios to be a reliable source of information. Second, they must trust the accuracy and independence of the CGU audits. Third, their own partisan biases should not strongly affect who they believe to be corrupt. On the first point, Taylor Boas has demonstrated that city councilors[71] and federal deputies[72] in Brazil often own community radio stations[73]. By extension, this is probably also the case for AM radio stations and for mayoral ownership, although Boas's work omits them[74]. However, the available evidence suggests that Brazilians strongly trust local radio[75].

There is also good evidence that Brazilian voters trust information from federal auditors. Matthew Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro directly test this in more than one study. They use 'a federal audit' (by which they mean one by the CGU) in their vignette experiments as the archetypal source of reliable information about corruption in the minds of Brazilian voters—and find that politically sophisticated citizens consider this source to be far more credible than information supplied by an opposition party[7677]. Citizen trust in CGU audits seems to be well placed. CGU

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[71] Taylor Boas and Daniel F Hidalgo, 'Controlling the Airwaves: Incumbency Advantage and Community Radio in Brazil*', American Journal of Political Science,* vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 869-885.
[72] Taylor Boas, 'Media Barons on the Ballot: Politically-Controlled Broadcasting in Brazil', *Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association*, 2014, p. 7.
[73] For example, by comparing council candidates who barely won or barely lost an election using a regression discontinuity design, they show that incumbency more than doubles the probability of an application's approval by the Ministry of Communications. Taylor Boas and Daniel F Hidalgo, 'Controlling the Airwaves: Incumbency Advantage and Community Radio in Brazil*'* pp. 869-885.
[74] Taylor Boas, (2014) 'Media Barons on the Ballot: Politically-Controlled Broadcasting in Brazil', *Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association*, p. 9.
[75] Ferraz and Finan, 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians', pp. 703–45.
[76] Matthew S. Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, (2016) 'Can Citizens Discern? Information Credibility, Political Sophistication, and the Punishment of Corruption in Brazil', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 79, no.1., pp. 61.

auditors are highly trained and paid good salaries[78]. And the CGU scores well among Brazilian federal government institutions in Katherine Bersch, Sérgio Praça, and Matthew Taylor's assessment of the technical capacity and political autonomy of these organisations' employees[79].

On the matter of partisan bias in the processing of new information about corruption, there is one paper, to my knowledge, claiming that partisan cleavages weigh on the importance that Brazilian voters place on new information about a candidate's corruption[80]. However, gender scholars would consider its conclusions indeterminate because it does not consider that the expected effect would also be the outcome of injunctive gender stereotyping. In this study, PT supporters were more critical of their candidate when provided with corruption allegations levied at their candidate (a woman) than were supporters of the DEM when supplied analogous information about their candidate (a man).

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[77] Note that these authors also show that Brazilian citizens punish mayors whose administrations—as opposed to the mayors per se—are linked to corruption, as well as mayors who are directly linked to corruption by a reliable source. See: Matthew S. Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, (2016) 'Who's in Charge Here? Direct and Indirect Accusations and Voter Punishment of Corruption' *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 207–219.
[78] Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 'Can Citizens Discern? pp. 65.
[79] Katherine Bersch, Sérgio Praça, and Matthew M. Taylor, (2016) 'State Capacity and Bureaucratic Autonomy within National States: Mapping the Archipelago of Excellence in Brazil', *Governance,* vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 105-124.
[80] This is a field experiment was conducted during the 2008 mayoral run-off election in São Paulo, and compared the responses of supporters of the incumbent, Gilberto Kassab (DEM), and the challenger, Marta Suplicy (PT). The paper reports that Suplicy's supporters are more willing to punish their candidate on learning about allegations of corruption. The literature on gender and corruption would suggest, however, that in failing to pay attention to the potential for injunctive gender stereotypes—the instinct that may have been felt by supporters of both candidates that women should be less corruptible—this result cannot reliably be said to indicate partisan differences in willingness to punish politicans for corruption. See: Miguel de Figueiredo, Daniel Hidalgo, and Yuri Kasahara, 'When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Brazil', *Working Paper*, May 29, 2012, available at: https://www.academia.edu/889139/When_Do_Voters_Punish_Corrupt_Politicians_Experimental_Evidence_from_Brazil

Contrary to these authors' claims, Fernanda Brollo reports that Brazil's central government took steps to protect mayors who were politically aligned to the president throughout the 2003 to 2009 period. Brollo finds that municipalities in which the CGU found high levels of local government corruption that also had a PT mayor moved through the process of fiscal punishment (a period of reduction in federal government transfers) more quickly than equivalent municipalities with mayors from other parties. Similarly, municipalities that the CGU found to be clean, with PT mayors, received a boost in federal government transfers that was not provided to clean municipalities with non-PT mayors[81]. Such differentials in federal government funding affected voter behaviour in the next mayoral election only if an audit occurred 15 months or more before the electoral cycle was up[82]. This was the time required for changes in federal government provisions to be felt. Because it is the PT in these studies that is the exceptional party—and historically the PT has had a consistent, strong programmatic line against corruption[8384]—I conducted robustness tests to explore whether my main results in this chapter change substantially when the incumbent or a female challenger represents the PT. They do not.

Three scope conditions remain: Brazilian voters in mayoral elections must perceive the incumbent's corruption as counter to their interests, their engagement in implicit trading must be limited, and they must believe that an alternative to the incumbent could do the job in a cleaner fashion. Numerous surveys report that Brazilians perceive

[81] Brollo, 'Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program'.
[82] Ibid .p. 27
[83] Timothy J. Power and Cesar Zucco., (2009) 'Estimating Ideology of Brazilian Legislative Parties, 1990–2005: A Research Communication', *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 218–46.
[84] In spite of the mensalão scandal that broke in the middle of the period of interest. The PT has also been linked to the women's movement over the years.

corruption to be the most important issue facing their country[85]. And while vote buying—a corrupt act that directly provides immediate benefits to some citizens—is commonplace in much of Brazil, there was a groundswell of civic action against the practice in the late 1990s, with more than a million citizens signing the petition that led to country's first law by popular initiative (Law 9840) [86]. This suggests that non-permissive attitudes towards the practice were geographically widespread at least at the time. Indeed, Simeon Nichter reports that the process of gathering signatures involved civil society organisations from every state in Brazil[87][88].

That Brazilians engage in implicit trading is almost a national myth, captured by the well-known phrase 'rouba mas faz' ('he steels but he gets things done')[89]. Some studies have claimed to find evidence of this in voting data[90], or speculated that implicit trading might be partially responsible for electoral outcomes[91]. However, in 2010, Matthew Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro ran a vignette experiment that generated results 'sharply at odds with the idea that most Brazilian voters are willing to overlook

85 Timothy J. Power and Matthew M. Taylor, Eds, *Corruption and democracy in Brazil. The Struggle for Accountability,* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), p. 4.
86 Nichter reports a national survey in Brazil in which over 13% of respondents admitted voting for candidate in exchange for a [material] benefit. See: Simeon Nichter, (2011) 'Vote Buying in Brazil: From Impunity to Prosecution', Paper presented at the Harvard conference, 'Ruling Politics: The Formal and Informal Foundations of Power in New Democracies', pp. 3.
87 Ibid. p. 13
88 However, he also found substantial regional variation in the extent of civic action against vote buying. Unsurprisingly, there was less rejection of the practice where more voters are understood to benefit from it.
89 First applied to a governor of São Paulo in the 1950s, Adhemar de Barros, the phrase is trotted out to describe many politicians who dole out the spoils of patronage. For example, according to an urban legend, a well-known congressman and former mayor of the city of São Paulo, who is famously for corrupt, Paulo Maluf, took maluf@masfaz.com as his e-mail address.
90 Carlos Pereira and Marcus André Melo, (2015) 'Reelecting Corrupt Politicians in Exchange for Public Goods', *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 50, no. 4., pp. 88-115.
91 Wendy Hunter and Timothy J. Power, 'Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Policy, and the Brazilian Elections of 2006', *Latin American Politics and Society*, vol. 49, no. 1, Spring, 2007, pp. 1-30.

corruption in exchange for service delivery"[92]. They found an anti-corruption response—a refusal to vote for a hypothetical corrupt mayor—of similar size among survey respondents who were told that the mayor had delivered a large number of public goods, as they found among survey respondents who were told that the mayor had completed few public works[93].

Finally, the question of whether Brazilians consider corruption to be systemic in local government administrations meets mixed findings in the literature. As an average effect across the whole country, Ferraz and Finan's and Brollo's findings strongly imply that Brazilian voters do distinguish between the corruptibility of mayoral candidates and base their voting decisions of this. However, discussions that emerged from 17 focus groups run by Nara Pavão in the cities of Recife and São Paulo reach different conclusions. Together these papers suggest that Brazil—as one might expect from the country's extreme diversity—has pockets of perceived systemic corruption[94]. The existence of such pockets features in the illustrative case studies in this thesis. However, the quantitative analyses in this chapter are concerned with average effects, and on this basis there is strong evidence that the final scope condition—as per the other scope conditions—is satisfied.

AM Radio as an Indicator of Voter Knowledge

To test the stated hypotheses, I select as the key indicator of voter knowledge the presence or absence of an AM radio station. The primary reason for this is Ferraz and

92 Matthew S. Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, (2013) 'Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption. When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?' *Comparative Politics*, pp. 419.
93 Ibid. p. 423.
94 Nara Pavão, 'Corruption As An Only Option: The Limits to Electoral Accountability', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 80, no. 3, 2018, pp. 996-1010.

Finan's finding that voters' rejection of incumbents who were identified by the CGU to have engaged in or, by virtue of their office, overseen corruption was much more pronounced in the 2004 Brazilian mayoral elections among municipalities with an AM radio station than among municipalities without one. This implies that many more voters knew about the outcome of the CGU lottery audit in those locales. In other words, the dissemination assumption was satisfied in these contexts. Although these authors find a low level of voter rejection of corrupt incumbents in municipalities lacking an AM radio station, Brollo reports that this rejection is in fact entirely due to fiscal punishment by the federal government[95]. And, as previously mentioned, among municipalities without a radio station, a lower probability of incumbent re-election is only found if the audit report is released more than 15 months before the next election. Ferraz and Finan justify their choice of AM radio stations by stating that 'since the redemocratization of Brazil in the early 1980s, local AM radio stations have emerged as the central source of information for local politics in smaller municipalities. They write that only 8% of municipalities broadcast local TV, whereas 34% of municipalities have local AM radio stations'[96]. They test for an effect of TV on corrupt incumbents' electoral prospects, but find none.

There are additional reasons to select AM radio stations as the indicator of voter knowledge. The diffusion of radio news tends to be especially open—in taxis, cafés, hairdressers, and other public spaces. If a news item is a prominent feature of coverage, it is hard for residents to avoid learning about it. By comparison, TV is more typically consumed within a family unit, and newspapers—among the literate only[97]—on an individual basis. Municipal newspapers are of limited importance for disseminating

[95] Brollo, 'Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program', p. 5.
[96] Ferraz and Finan, 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians' pp. 703–45.
[97] Literacy is low in Brazil compared to many countries in Latin America.

local political news in Brazil since they are generally only found in the largest cities[9899]. Even though case studies in Chapter 5 demonstrate that the outcomes of CGU audits were sometimes conveyed by other means, including online, smart phones were far from widespread in Brazil during the years of my analysis, and social media was not then commonly used. Ferraz and Finan do not discuss the possibility of using FM radio stations instead of AM stations in their work, however, other sources report that FM radio stations only started becoming a prominent source of news in Brazil from 2009 onwards, when many AM stations started migrating to FM as part of a process of digitalisation[100].

While I am not aware of any source that documents how consistently outcomes of the CGU's lottery-selected audits were reported by AM radio stations in Brazil, interviews conducted for the preparation of Chapter 5 show that, at least anecdotally, it did occur, and the aforementioned studies by Ferraz and Finan and by Brollo provide additional examples. Marcia Vidal Nunes, who has probably contributed most to scholarship about local radio in Brazil, writes of radio's importance in conveying municipal politics to citizens[101]. Many local radio hosts, for example, become key political figures in the community in the own right[102]. They run talk shows where listeners call in and complain on air about acts of corruption and the state of public services[103]. As such,

98 Ferraz and Finan state that they are seldom read, and are essentially only important in the largest cities. See: Ferraz and Finan, 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians' pp. 709.
99 Brazil has one of the lowest levels of newspaper penetration in the world. See: M. P. Porto, 'Mass Media and Politics in Democratic Brazil', in M. D. A. Kinzo, and J. Dunkerley, Eds., *Brazil since 1985: Economy, Polity and Society*, (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2003).
100 Entenda a migração do rádio AM para o FM. Set News, (20/01/2017), Available at: http://www.set.org.br/set-news/entenda-a-migracao-do-radio-am-para-o-fm/
101 M. V. Nunes, (2004) 'As rádios comunitárias nas campanhas eleitorais: exercício da cidadania ou instrumentalização (1998-2000)' *Rev. Sociol. Polit.* no.22.
102 Indeed, in Nunes describes attempts by political candidates to win over and take advantage of these hosts' support. See: M. V. Nunes, 'Rádio e política: do microfone ao palanque: os radialistas políticos em Fortaleza, 1982-1996' Doctoral thesis submitted to the Universidade Federal do Ceará, 2000.
103 Ferraz and Finan, 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians, pp. 709.

while the presence of an AM radio station is certainly not a perfect indicator of voter knowledge about the outcome of CGU audits, without survey data providing a direct measure of this, or media content analysis, it appears to be the best available option.

Data and Empirical Strategy

To test the four hypotheses outlined, as explained in Chapter 3, I drew from my main database information about every mayoral and city council candidacy in Brazil from 2000 to 2012 (some 1.4 million candidacies), as well as various demographic and economic variables. A list of data sources can be found in the Appendix relating to this chapter. Since the start of the CGU's lottery audits in 2003, some 2,144 municipalities have been randomly selected and audited. Fernanda Brollo's coding of a random sample of these audit reports was then added to this database to facilitate the analyses that follow. The CGU's policy and Brollo's method of coding the audit reports are described below.

The Corruption Data

The first CGU lotteries selected 23 municipalities for audit. Subsequent lotteries increased this number to 50 and then 60, as Figure 4.1 shows. The essential details of the selection process have otherwise been invariant since the program's start. All lotteries have been held at 10am on a Monday morning in the auditorium of the Federal Savings Bank in Brasília. They have been conducted on behalf of the CGU by the staff of a pre-existing national sweepstakes in which Brazilians can win cash prizes.

The same revolving turbines, filled with ping pong-like balls (see Figure 4.2), and operated by the same group of employees, are used for the CGU lotteries as for these cash sweepstakes. The CGU lotteries are open to the public, and are typically attended by members of the press, who have been quick to publicise the list of newly selected municipalities[104]. Occasionally, the CGU has invited notables to watch the draw, such as the minister of the Superior Court of Justice, and commanders of the armed forces[105].

Once a municipality has been selected, auditors arrive there about a week later. During the intervening days, mayors of selected municipalities receive a letter stating that their municipality has been picked[106], and federal government departments compile details of all of the fiscal transfers dating back to 2001, and in a minority of cases, to 1997, from the department to the selected municipalities. The audits cover both constitutionally mandatory transfers and discretionary, politically negotiated transfers, which together make up the bulk of municipal budgets[107]. After receiving details of the fiscal transfers, the CGU's head office in Brasília generates service orders that specify audit tasks for its representatives who travel to the selected municipalities[108]. This means that the auditors do not need to rely on municipal records for their work; each team arrives carrying all the documentation required for a full audit[109].

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104 E.g. 'CGU sorteia 60 municípios para fiscalização de repasses federais', *G1 Globo 4*, March 2013, available at: http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2013/03/cgu-sorteia-60-municipios-para-fiscalizacao-de-repasses-federais.html

105 Zamboni pers comm., 2 February 2015.

106 Ferraz and Federico Finan, 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians', pp. 703–45.

107 Brollo, 'Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program'.

108 Ferraz and Finan, 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians', pp. 703–45.

109 In the case of the municipality of São Francisco do Conde, in Bahia, thieves even broke into a city council's building shortly after the municipality was selected in lottery 6, and stole cell phones, diskettes and documents relating to the activities of two ex-mayors already suspected of misappropriation of public funds. See: 'Municipio sorteado pela CGU tem arquivos roubados', *Agencia Nordeste*, 21 October 2003.




Figure 4.1. Lottery selections to the end of 2012. The blue lines indicate the occurrence of municipal elections in October 2004, 2008 and 2012.



Figure 4.2. A press photograph of lottery balls being added to the turbines in the CGU lotteries[110].

[110] 'CGU sorteia mais 60 municípios para fiscalização', *Agência Brasil,* 1 March 2010

Approximately 10 auditors, including a supervisor[111], are sent to each selected municipality, where they spend roughly a fortnight gathering information. The auditors are drawn from the CGU office in the municipality's state capital, though sometimes auditors attached to the Brasília office make up numbers[112]. The service orders generated in advance help to ensure consistency in rigour and detail among audits[113]—and in cases where municipal finances are especially complex, the size of the audit team is increased. The investigations are comprehensive; auditors go into hospitals to see if equipment was purchased, they interview residents, and sometimes even measure the size of recently constructed public toilets to ensure these are not smaller than was contractually stipulated.

The CGU sends a preliminary report to the mayor of each investigated municipality about a month after its auditors have returned from the field. This details the violations of the law that were uncovered. Mayors then have about 10 days[114] to respond to the findings, and their explanations are included in the final report, which is published on the CGU's searchable website[115] and sent to government institutions that manage federal transfers within their respective purviews. As Brollo has found, some federal transfers are temporarily halted[116] in response to reports of serious malfeasance. The reports may also be sometimes sent on to the federal police, the attorney general, state public prosecutor, or to the state court of accounts.

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111 Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan, 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes, pp. 703–45.
112 Zamboni pers comm., 2 February 2015.
113 Zamboni pers comm, 18 August 2014.
114 J. Castro, 'Pelo menos 75% dos municipíos fiscalizados pela CGU apresentam problemas graves em licitações' *Jornal O Globo,* 6 October 2011.
115 All of the audit reports are available here: http://sistemas.cgu.gov.br/relats/relatorios.php
116 Brollo, 'Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program', pp. 8-9. Brollo separately estimates mayoral support that is lost due to corruption revelations, from mayoral support that is lost due to the lower provision of goods and services that may result from a decision to cease some kinds of federal transfers to a municipality. They find that corruption on its own still has an effect.

Brollo's coding of the audit reports covers municipalities selected in lotteries up to and including the 29th draw, which was held in August 2009. This data is available in the material accompanying her coauthored 2013 paper[117], and the online appendix of that paper explains the coding process. Brollo coded a random selection of the published reports for a long list of types of violation[118]. Her coding included the amounts attached to these violations, and so her dataset contains the proportion of audited funds that were involved in violations of one sort or another over the full period that the audit covered. For the analyses that follow in this chapter, I extracted this proportion for only the electoral cycle when auditors visited, to provide a variable for the economic extent of corruption that occurred under the incumbent mayor. Because voters may show recency bias, unlike Ferraz and Finan, I interact my corruption variable with a continuous timing variable, 'months', which is the number of months between the start of the incumbent's term and the estimated publication date of the audit report on the CGU's website[119]. Without information on exact publication dates, these were estimated by adding three months to the known date of selection in the CGU lotteries, as advised by a chief advisor to the director of the CGU[120] during the period in question.

[117] Fernanda Brollo, Tommaso Nannicini, Roberto Perotti and Guido Tabellini, (2013)'The Political Resource Curse', *American Economic Review*, vol. 103, no. 5, pp. 1759-96.
[118] These include illegal procurement practices, fraud, favoritism in the receipt of goods, severe over-invoicing, diversion of funds, substantial expenses paid without any proof of spending.
[119] This is why the marginal effects graphs in the results section start in month 4. The election is in October; mayors take office in January (month 1), and three months later, in April of his first year in office (month 4). The next election is in October of his fourth year in office (month 46). The marginal effects graphs therefore finish at month 45.
[120] Zamboni, pers. comm., 10 February 2015.

The Dependent Variables and Estimation Approach

To test Hypotheses 1a and 2a, I calculated the change in the proportion of female mayoral candidates in each municipality between the election that proceeded a CGU audit and the election that followed it. Analogously, to test Hypotheses 1b and 2b, I calculated the change in the proportion of votes received by female mayoral candidates in each municipality across the same elections. Given the temporal range of the audit reports that Brollo coded, the relevant electoral cycle was either 2000-4, or 2004-8. Data from these two electoral cycles was combined in the analyses and a dummy variable added to account for secular change from one electoral cycle to the next.

I restricted the analyses to municipalities in which a male incumbent was seeking re-election in the election that followed a CGU audit[121], and to races in which no run-off could occur[122][123]. Ordinary least squares regression was chosen following consideration of alternatives, as detailed below.

Initially, I conducted balance tests to confirm that the selection of municipalities was fully random[124], but subsequently rejected an intention-to-treat approach for two reasons. First, because the logic of intention-to-treat would have considered municipalities in which corruption was found to be the treatment, 'never treats'—units that always experience the control condition—would therefore have included two categories of municipality: audited municipalities in which no corruption was found by

[121] Mayors in Brazil cannot serve for more than two consecutive terms.
[122] As noted elsewhere, run-off mayoral elections are triggered when a municipality's voting population rises above 200,000.
[123] The models were run using both data from municipalities audited once only through the CGU audit lottery, and also using data from the small number of repeat audits that occurred through this policy experiment. Since the results are essentially identical, those that include the repeat audits are reported in this chapter.
[124] As previously mentioned, these included extensive testing for balance in covariates between audited and non-audited municipalities.

CGU auditors, and municipalities that the CGU had not audited. Both Ferraz and Finan's finding that a CGU report of no corruption raised the probability of incumbents' re-election in 2004 relative to incumbents whose municipalities were unaudited at that time[125], and Brollo's finding that clean PT mayors gained extra fiscal resources after an audit, suggest that such an assumption of equivalence between these two categories could be erroneous[126]. Second, the decision to consider the timing of the release of audit outcomes relative to the next election, which implied interacting the corruption variable with 'months', automatically excluded never-audited municipalities from the analysis. In the interaction term, these municipalities have a value of zero for the 'months' variable.

A multilevel modelling approach was also rejected. Typically, in the case of a hugely diverse country like Brazil, and over a period that witnessed substantial change in many indicators, taking account of the nested structure of data through the use of hierarchical models would be necessary to correct standard errors of coefficients of interest. Yet here the potential for ecological fallacy is reduced because my dependent variables—and consequently many predictors of them—are changes that occurred within municipalities[127] from one electoral cycle to the next. Thus the between-municipality component—or random-effects component—of hierarchical models

[125] Indeed, 53% of incumbents eligible for re-election in 2004 who received a clean audit were re-elected. The re-election rates of incumbents in 2004 audited after that election was 40%. Hence, Ferraz and Finan write: 'at corruption levels of less than one, voters' prior beliefs appear to have overestimated the incumbent's corruption level'. See: Ferraz and Finan, 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians' pp, 723.

[126] Ferraz and Finan's original evaluation of the lottery program found no significant effect for CGU reports containing just one violation on the odds of incumbents' re-election, leaving open the possibility that Brazilian voters do not expect their mayor to be completely clean. If very occasional irregularities are expected, then none may be a surprise. Ibid.

[127] The variables 'the change in municipal HDI over the electoral cycle', and 'the change in the proportion of female voters over the same period'—take on values between -1 and +1, like the dependent variables. The other controls (except the categorical audit outcomes) are straightforward proportions.

should be far less pertinent than it would be if the variables of interest were static measures. A Hausman specification test confirmed this[128].

OLS regression models were run using data from municipalities with and without AM radio stations. As described below, variables were added to control for other factors that might affect the supply of and demand for female mayoral candidates, and to control for differences in municipalities with and without an AM station (a table of descriptive statistics of municipalities with and without AM stations can be found in the Appendix to this chapter, with the outcomes of T-tests of differences in group means)[129]. Given the relatively small number of Brollo-coded CGU audits in municipalities with AM radio, and thus the potential for over-fitting, a minimal model was first run, and variables added sequentially in Models 2, 3 and 4. This approach enabled me to check for consistency in the estimation of the corruption interaction effect (the product of the corruption variable and the incumbent's months in office), as more variables were included.

Model 1 thus tests the significance of the corruption interaction term in isolation from all variables except those that indicate the potential role of a local TV station in disseminating the audit report findings, and the 2008 year dummy. Model 2 adds controls for the size of the challenge that the incumbent presents to challengers of all types. Specifically, it includes 'incumbent dominance'—the incumbent's margin of

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[128] Even though the difference in the coefficients calculated by fixed and random models for one variable, the change in municipal HDI, was quite large, the overall test was highly significant ($p<0.001$), implying that the random intercept model should be abandoned in favour of OLS regression. See: S. Rabe-Hesketh and A. Skrondal, *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata. Volume 1: Continuous Responses. Third Edition.* (College Station, Texas: Stata Press), p. 158.

[129] Bonferroni corrected T-test results detailed in the Appendix indicate that municipalities with radio stations are systemically different from those without in a number of ways. For example, they have larger populations and higher HDI scores. Aware of the potential for overfitting the models, I included as many as possible of these variables in the full model. (Note that altering the variables in the model did little to change the results of the corruption interaction.)

victory over the runner-up in the previous election as a proportion of all votes cast, and the change in municipal HDI over the electoral cycle. The latter was selected to provide an indicator of how much citizens' lives improved (or deteriorated) under the incumbent.

Model 3 seeks to account for the size of the pool of female aspirants. The main indicator is the proportion of city councilors who are female and were elected in the last election[130]—an indicator that may warrant some criticism. This is because many elected city council members harbour no desire to become mayor, and prospective mayoral candidates need not have prior experience on the city council. However, in the absence of a direct, aggregate measure of all upstream contributors to the size of the pool, this indicator is likely to reflect the fraction of women in a municipality who pay close attention to municipal politics and who can be confident of having a non-negligible constituency of support to build upon. Interviews in later chapters confirm that many female candidates were previously legislators who won their seats handsomely.

Model 3 adds two more variables: the resident population and the change in the dependency ratio over the electoral cycle in question. Population is included because larger cities are often understood in the literature to provide more diverse avenues or activities that might be considered by party selectorates as relevant experience for candidacy, and consequently are argued to be more facilitating of female candidacies[131]. And the change in dependency ratio is likely to be a relevant upstream contributor to

[130] The elections for city council members employ an open-list proportional representation system. In this variable I therefore specifically only count those female city councillors who earned their seats by attracting votes themselves, rather than those that owe their positions to votes won by others in their party. The TSE raw data includes this information.
[131] Amy C Alexander, (2011) 'Mayoral Selection and the Demand and Supply of Women Mayors" *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 116.

women's availability for involved engagement in municipal politics because women in Brazil, as elsewhere, tend to provide most of the care required by dependents.

I consider Model 4 to be the full model. It adds three indicators of voter demand for female candidates: change in turnout, change in the proportion of young voters (scored as the proportion of the electorate under the age of 35), and a 'progressiveness' interaction term (explained below). Including change in turnout is important because, even though voting in municipal elections is compulsory in Brazil, Miguel de Figueiredo et al have demonstrated that turnout nonetheless varies in Brazil response to information about corruption[132]. This variable should go some way towards controlling for the extent to which corruption is systemic, because, as previously discussed, turnout and systemic corruption tend to be correlated[133].

Change in the proportion of young voters and the 'progressiveness' interaction term are intended to capture the general willingness of a municipality's voters to support a female candidate. As elsewhere, young people in Brazil have been found to hold more positive attitudes towards women's appropriateness for political office[134]. The progressiveness interaction is the proportion of female voters in a municipality multiplied by municipal HDI. Overall, women hold surprisingly more liberal[135] political

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132 In their field experiment, turnout decreased by 1.2% among those who received a flier detailing corruption allegations levied at the PT candidate, Marty Suplicy, relative to the control group. See: de Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara, 'When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians?'.

133 Indeed, change in turnout is the primary measure of voter indignation in quantitative assessments that consider a collective action logic to citizen responses to new information about incumbent corruption. E.g. Nicholas Charron, Lewis Dijkstra, and Victor Lapuente, (2014) 'Regional Governance Matters: Quality of Government within European Union Member States" *Regional Studies*, vol. 48, no. 1, 2 pp. 68–90.

134 Malu Gatto and Anna Petherick, forthcoming. In a representative survey in Brazil that measured voters' implicit gender biases, we find that younger voters are more positive towards female elected officials.

135 In Inglehart and Norris's dataset, the gap between male and female voters' views on the role of government (1990 to 2001) is greater in Brazil than in almost all of the rest of the world. Only in two countries are women even more left wing compared to men from the same

opinions than men in Brazil, and the direction and size of this gap is likely to be conditional upon local levels of human development. This is because cross-national patterns of the effects of industrialisation find that women hold more conservative opinions than men in low-HDI settings, but more liberal attitudes than men in high-HDI settings. This appears to be the case for classic left-right issue cleavages[136] (such as how far the government should go in providing a welfare state), and when it comes to adhering to the ideological stance that traditional gender roles should be maintained. Hence, if Brazil follows the global pattern, in wealthier, healthier and better educated parts of the country, women will be more willing than men to vote for women, and the opposite will be true for less developed regions of the country. Specifically, interaction term is composed of the estimated municipal HDI for the year at the end of the electoral cycle and the proportion of voters who are female in the same year.

Finally, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 include a fifth model with all of the same variables as Model 4, except for the corruption interaction. This is to assess whether that interaction improves model fit.

Robustness Checks

Standard robustness checks were performed to evaluate the assumptions of OLS regression. All of the results reported in the next section are for models using robust standard errors after Breusch-Pagan tests revealed heteroskedasticity, particularly in models predicting change in the proportion of votes received by female candidates.

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nation—Uganda and Ghana—than is the case in Brazil. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, *Rising Tide. Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World,* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 82.

136 Ibid, p. 81.

Given the small N for the analyses with municipalities with AM radio stations, particular attention was paid to outliers and high leverage observations[137]. Furthermore, and following the recommendations in a recent working paper by Jens Hainmueller, Jonathan Mummolo and Yiqing Xu[138], tercile binning estimators and a kernel-smoothing estimator of the marginal effect were created to check the interaction term's linearity assumption. By fitting the interaction component of the model to each bin separately, as well as estimating a series of local conditional margin effects, this assumption can be verified. Specifically, this tests if the effect of the proportion of audited funds involved in violations on the two dependent variables varies with the timing of the publication of audit reports at a constant rate.

As an additional check, all of the models were rerun using as dependent variables the change in the proportion of mayoral candidates under the age of 36, and the change in the proportion of votes for these candidates. As expected given my proposed mechanism of shifts in voter demand that results from activation of the female incorruptibility stereotype, the corruption interaction term was not close to statistical significance over any part of the incumbent's term, in any of these models[139].

[137] I calculated Cook's distances, and ran many versions of the models excluding different combinations of high-influence observations. If anything removing these cases accentuated the significance patterns of the corruption interaction term.
[138] Jens Hainmueller, Jonathan Mummolo and Yiqing Xu, (2019) 'How Much Should We Trust Estimates from Multiplicative Interaction Models? Simple Tools to Improve Empirical Practice', *Political Analysis*, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 163-192.
[139] As discussed in Chapter 2, the absence of similar results for young mayoral candidates and candidacies suggests that a possible subpart or contributing factor to in corruptibility stereotyping—lower opportunities for corruption—may not be relevant here.

Results

The results of Models 1-5 are shown in Tables 4.1 for municipalities lacking an AM radio station, and 4.2 for those with an AM station. The primary results of interest are marginal effects—the extent to which new information about corruption that occurred under a male incumbent is estimated to affect the two dependent variables, as the next election draws closer. These are displayed in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Corresponding effect sizes for audit reports released in different months of the electoral cycle in municipalities with an AM radio station are plotted in Figure 4.5.

The model fit statistics shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 clearly show that the predictors included in the regressions are far better at accounting for changes in both dependent variables in the municipalities with AM radio stations than in those without. Not only are the adjusted R^2 figures much higher for these models, but F-tests are highly significant for the municipalities with AM radio stations, and far from significant for those lacking one[140]. As such, the bulk of the following discussions will focus on the municipalities with AM stations.

The patterns revealed in Figure 4.4 are consistent with the conjectures put forward as Hypotheses 2a and 2b. A comparison of adjusted R^2 results of Models 4 and 5 for the municipalities with AM radio stations, shown in Table 4.2, confirms that including the corruption interaction improves Model 4's ability to explain total variance for both dependent variables, even after controls for other variables that the literature suggests may affect voter demand for female candidates are included. When voters are expected to learn about the corrupt acts of a male incumbent who is seeking re-election, due to

[140] F-test p-values for Model 4 are: 0.3298 (no AM radio, DV= change in candidates); 0.8051 (no AM radio, DV= change in votes); 0.0046 (AM radio present, DV= change in candidates); and 0.0003 (AM radio present, DV= change in votes).

the presence of a local AM radio station to disseminate news about CGU auditors' findings, the results show a positive change in both the proportion of female mayoral candidates and in their vote shares. These effects are not significant throughout the electoral cycle (see Figure 4.4), but they are for its second half, becoming evident in its later part[141].

The middle chart in Figure 4.4, which relates to Hypothesis 2b, shows that Model 4 estimates a significant increase at the 5% level in the proportion of votes for female candidates if a CGU report is published after the 21st month of the incumbent's term—September of his second year in office—until the next election. Specifically, between months 23 (November of his second year in office) and 37 (January of the election year) the estimated increase is significant at the 1% level. Audit reports published in the first 20 months of the incumbent's term may either be forgotten by

[141] As indicated by regions of the charts where the 95% confidence intervals do not cross the dotted zero-effect line.

Table 4.1. OLS regression results for the municipalities without an AM radio station


No AM radio station	Dependent variable: Change in the proportion of female candidates					Dependent variable: Change in the proportion of votes for female candidates				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
% Audited funds, corruption	-0.1970	-0.2690	-0.3528	-0.2316	---	-0.1561	-0.1299	-0.2800	-0.1566	---
Months	-0.0016	-0.0014	-0.0014	-0.0015	---	-0.0020	-0.0020	-0.0014	-0.0013	---
% corruption*months	0.0032	0.0055	0.0081	0.0045	---	0.0019	0.0011	0.0052	0.0018	---
Incumbent dominance	---	-0.1151	-0.1354	-0.1471	-.01440	---	0.0328	0.0023	0.0036	0.0079
Change in HDI	---	-0.9248	-1.5979	-0.7035	-0.8298	---	0.5168	0.1138	0.9324	0.7160
Lag. elected female city councilors	---	---	-0.0793	-0.0754	-0.0773	---	---	-0.0823	-0.0750	-0.0696
Resident population size	---	---	-0.0017	-0.0022	-0.0023	---	---	-0.0034*	-0.0036**	-0.0037**
Change in dependency ratio	---	---	-0.0135	-0.0160º	-0.0154	---	---	-0.0065	-0.0073	-0.0072
Change in turnout	---	---	---	-0.0027	-0.0025	---	---	---	-0.0003	0.0000
Change in % electorate under-35	---	---	---	-0.6715	-0.6274	---	---	---	-0.3867	-0.3138
HDI (a)	---	---	---	-4.1662	-4.4856	---	---	---	-5.9474	-6.1058
Proportion of female voters (b)	---	---	---	-5.0423	-5.5173	---	---	---	-7.2376	-7.4980
Progressiveness (a)*(b)	---	---	---	9.1258	9.8004	---	---	---	12.7830	13.1293
TV station	-0.0064	-0.0043	-0.0088	-0.0152	-0.0193	0.0124	0.0129	0.0214	0.0143	0.0086
2008 dummy	-0.0327	-0.0336	-0.0353	-0.0804	-0.0602	-0.0480	-0.0481	-0.0364	-0.0646	-0.0423
Intercept	0.0534	0.1357	0.1613	2.3956	2.5731	0.0379	-0.0053	0.0341	-1.9592	3.4130
Adjusted R^2	-0.0488	-0.0521	-0.0539	-0.0780	-0.0585	-0.0223	-0.0339	-0.0081	-0.0225	-0.0134
RMS Error	0.1915	0.1918	0.1920	0.1942	0.1907	0.1481	0.1489	0.1470	0.1481	0.1462
N	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	175


All models use robust standard errors and lottery pool controls. Standard errors omitted for reasons of space. Significance codes: p<0.1 = º; p<0.05 = *; p<0.01 =**; p<0.001 = ***.

Table 4.2. OLS regression results for the municipalities with an AM radio station.

AM radio station	Dependent variable: Change in the proportion of female candidates					Dependent variable: Change in the proportion of votes for female candidates				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
% Audited funds, corruption	0.2567	0.1936	0.1931	0.1972	---	0.0389	-0.0246	-0.0329	0.0222	---
Months	-0.0002	-0.0009	-0.0003	0.0013	---	-0.0001	-0.0005	-0.0007	0.0008	---
% corruption*months	0.0071	0.0089	0.0102	0.0082	---	0.0132	0.0146	0.0160	0.0124	---
Incumbent dominance	---	0.1287	-0.0657	-0.0502	0.0094	---	0.0789	-0.0228	-0.0268	0.0170
Change in HDI	---	-1.3915	-6.2387	-9.6557º	-9.3114º	---	1.4272	-1.7910	-5.6884º	-5.4323
Lag. elected female city councilors	---	---	-0.0785	-0.1129	-0.1370	---	---	-0.1117	-0.1088	-0.1219
Resident population size	---	---	0.0027	-0.0022	-0.0021	---	---	0.0001	-0.0037*	-0.0037*
Change in dependency ratio	---	---	-0.0795*	-0.1373**	-0.1368**	---	---	-0.0479º	-0.0976**	-0.0974**
Change in turnout	---	---	---	-0.0106º	-0.0101º	---	---	---	-0.0062	-0.0058
Change in % electorate under-35	---	---	---	-3.5210	-3.6376	---	---	---	-1.7681	-1.7626
HDI (a)	---	---	---	18.9386	21.6594	---	---	---	14.3497	16.5565
Proportion of female voters (b)	---	---	---	34.3852	38.2885	---	---	---	27.6584	30.9854
Progressiveness (a)*(b)	---	---	---	-38.7269	-44.2132	---	---	---	-30.1834	-34.6927
TV station	0.0988	0.0868	0.1038	0.0509	0.0491	0.1207º	0.1304*	0.1315	0.0987	0.0976
2008 dummy	-0.0605	-0.0612	-0.0238	-0.0749	-0.0759	-0.0779*	-0.0828*	-0.0647	-0.0764	-0.0757
Intercept	-0.7915*	-0.7319	-0.8863*	-17.7801	2.7904	-0.5959	-0.6462	-0.6880	-13.9386	-15.0762
Adjusted R^2	0.1622	0.0792	0.3152	0.4853	0.4608	0.4471	0.4283	0.4859	0.6119	0.5804
RMS Error	0.1524	0.1311	0.1378	0.1195	0.1223	0.1113	0.1132	0.1074	0.0932	0.0970
N	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60

All models use robust standard errors and lottery pool controls. Standard errors omitted for reasons of space. Significance codes: p<0.1 = º; p<0.05 = *; p<0.01 =**; p<0.001 = ***.










Figure 4.3. Marginal effects of corruption for Model 4, using data from municipalities without AM radio stations.









Figure 4.4. Marginal effects of corruption for Model 4, using data from municipalities with AM radio stations.






Figure 4.5. Calculated marginal effect sizes for the corruption interactions for Model 4, predicting both dependent variables.

voters by the next election, or they may be deemed less relevant in light of subsequent events, for example if the incumbent somehow acts to redeem himself in the intervening period.

The upper chart in Figure 4.4 shows the marginal effects of the release of CGU audit reports on the predicted change in female candidates. In this case, a significant positive effect at the 5% level is estimated to occur between months 24 and 38 (December of his second year in office until March of the election year), inclusive, and between months 28 and 34 at the 1% level (April of his third year in office until October of the same year). The absence of a significant boost to female candidacies in the first half of the incumbent's term in these municipalities also makes intuitive sense. During this period, parties are unlikely to be keenly engaged in considering who might be their best option for candidacy in the next election, and female aspirants might reasonably find it hard to imagine whether a mayoral office-holding would suit their lives so far down the line. More theoretically, because the purported mechanism underlying the increase in the proportion of female mayoral candidates involves feedback effects emanating from signals of shifts in voter demand, the effects reported in the upper chart of Figure 4.4 should be understood as a response to those reported in the middle chart. Therefore, if voters seem unlikely to be swayed by new information about incumbent corruption that is released early in the electoral cycle, these feedback effects will not operate at that time—and there is no reason to expect an increase in the proportion of female candidates.

The significance patterns of the corruption interaction as the next election draws near require careful consideration, balanced with a general caution against reading too far into these results. Mayoral candidacies in Brazil must legally register before the end of

June of the electoral year, in month 42 of the incumbent's term. But one would not expect the marginal effects to lose significance exactly in that month because candidacy decisions will rarely be made the night before the deadline. This statement is confirmed by interviews with former mayoral candidates, as described in Chapter 5. These reveal that party selectorates tend to make decisions at approximately the start of the election year. January of the election year is month 37 of the incumbent's term. It is therefore clear that a period exists for most of the election year when feedback effects from shifts in voter demand can no longer affect the proportion of female candidates because candidates have already been chosen. During the election year, a rise in voter demand for women prompted by new, disseminated information about male incumbent corruption is not met by the supply of female candidates, as per the pattern illustrated by line 2a in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2.

Looking more closely at the marginal effects for the change in the proportion of votes for female candidates, even though predicted effects sizes increase (as discussed below), there is a reduction of significance in the final few months before the next election. For example, the p-value for Month 42 (June of the election year) is 0.029; for Month 45 (the month prior to the election) it is 0.045. The bottom chart in Figure 4.4 makes clear that this is not due to a paucity of CGU reports published during these months. It is possible to speculate reasons for the pattern. For example, new allegations arising when mayoral campaigns are in full swing may be harder for voters to assess for reliability, especially in races where mudslinging is the order of the day. Alternatively, it could be that in some locales voters have by that point decided which candidate to support, and although new information about male incumbent corruption could have influenced their candidate choice as swing voters, it fails to do so once they have settled upon whom to support.

Both of the marginal effects charts in Figure 4.4 show an upward slope as the incumbent's term progresses, indicating that the strength of the effect of corruption findings on the dependent variables becomes stronger the later in the electoral cycle that a CGU report is released. This is in line with voter recency bias and corresponding feedback mechanisms acting on candidate supply. Calculated effect sizes for different months into the incumbent's term are displayed in Figure 4.5. Comparing the dashed and solid lines of the same colour indicates that factors affecting candidate recruitment are more sensitive to shifts in voter sentiment in month 24 (when the difference between the dashed and solid lines is pronounced) than in month 38 (when the difference is slight). In other words, in month 24 any given level of corruption has a notably larger impact on the change in the proportion of female candidates than it does on the votes they receive, but in month 38 there is very little difference. While the difference is not large, one can speculate reasons as to why this could be the case. For example, female aspirants may be more likely to consider it worth their while to devote resources towards seeking to become a candidate if they perceive party decision makers to be some way off clarifying their preferences. This is more likely to be the case at the start of the period when selectorates consider candidacy options for the next mayoral election, than it is just before the point in the electoral cycle when they typically settle on a candidate.

As was expected from the fact that the voting and corruption literature generally finds only small vote-share shifts away from an incumbent following corruption scandals, the calculated electoral benefits to women of a CGU report of male incumbent corruption are not large[142]. Ferraz and Finan find an average 3.2% vote share loss among incumbents seeking re-election in municipalities audited before the 2004

[142] Unfortunately, Brollo does not calculate average changes in vote shares won by the incumbent in these elections; instead her models predict changes in the odds of incumbent re-election.

election than among those seeking re-election in municipalities audited afterwards[143]. The average proportion of audited funds involved in corrupt violations is 4.49% among Brollo-coded municipalities with an AM radio station (with a range that runs from 0% to 80.11%). Therefore, if a report finding this much corruption were published in month 21, the predicted increase in the proportion of votes for female candidates would be 1.21%; if instead it were published in month 45, the predicted increase would be 2.54%.

A seemingly meagre ballot-box boost to women does not imply, though, that the estimated effects lack the potential to be electorally relevant. The possibility of an impact on the electoral outcome is more evident if one considers the situation where 20% of audited funds were involved in violations—as was the case for about 8% of municipalities with an AM station. In this situation, if a CGU report was published in month 45, the month before the election, the average predicted increase in votes for female candidates is 11.81%, which would typically accrue to one individual because multiple women competing in a mayoral election in Brazil is very rare. This percentage is substantially more than the median margin of victory of incumbents in the previous election (7.85%) among these municipalities[144]—and indeed, that margin of victory is exceeded in months 42, 43, and 44 as well.

Marginal effects charts for the corruption interaction in Models 1 to 3 showed similar patterns to those for Model 4[145], indicating that the patterns described are not overly

[143] Ferraz and Finan, 'Exposing Corrupt Politicians' pp.720.
[144] Note that the root mean squared error (RSME, or the square root of the variance of the residuals) for this model is 0.0932, which is 4.6% of the dependent variable's range.
[145] For Models 1 and 2 the overall pattern is the same for both dependent variables, though the periods of significance are smaller as the confidence intervals are slightly wider. The marginal effects estimated for Model 3 for both dependent variables are essentially indistinguishable from those estimated for Model 4. Thus the main results described are not the outcome of overfitting, even though Model 4 contains many variables for its degrees of freedom.

sensitive to the selection of explanatory variables in the main model. Moreover, the heuristic of partisan affiliation appears to have no discernable impact on the results: the marginal effects estimated for models with either a dummy variable added to indicate that a female challenger represents the PT, or one added to indicate that a female challenger does not represent the PT, are essentially the same as for models lacking a partisan dummy.

Aside from the corruption interaction term, relatively few explanatory variables in Models 1 to 5 are statistically significant at the 5% level. Table 4.2 shows significant coefficients for the change in the dependency ratio, and—for only the full model and for Model 5 predicting the change in votes for female candidates—also for the resident population size. The dependency ratio is the ratio of the number of municipal residents under 15 years old and over 64 years old (the dependents), to the number between 15 and 64 (the working age population). As anticipated, this significant coefficient is negative: a reduction in the caring burden is associated with a rise in the proportion of female candidates and votes for them, and, indeed, the negative coefficient is larger for the model predicting the change in female candidates than it is for that predicting the change in their vote share.

It is hard to understand why models that use the same suite of variables are so poor at explaining variation in the two dependent variables in municipalities that lack an AM radio station[146]. Hypotheses 1a and 1b are formally rejected by the analyses in this chapter, however, they may warrant re-examination with a larger dataset in the future, or perhaps in a context in which the extent of elite and voter knowledge of incumbent can be more precisely elucidated.

[146] F-tests are not significant at the $p<0.05$ level.

Discussion

The analyses in this chapter have gone some way towards evaluating whether a theory that places who learns about corruption at its core explains whether women's descriptive representation rises or falls in the wake of new revelations of male incumbent corruption. By leveraging the presence or absence of local AM radio stations as an indicator of whether voters became aware of corrupt acts by an incumbent's administration, discovered by a reliable source, the results suggest that where voters do receive such news, and the incumbent is a man seeking re-election, voter demand for female candidates rises. In short, the expectations of the heuristics and voting behaviour literature are borne out in Brazilian mayoral elections—but only where there the dissemination assumption is satisfied. These findings fit with recent work that employs a broader lens, and which finds that in Latin American countries where women lack national representation, distrust in the government encourages support for female leadership 'as an alternative to the discredited (male) establishment'[147].

Even though the total number of Brollo-coded audit reports for municipalities with AM radio stations is fairly small, I nonetheless found significant marginal effects in the direction and during the approximate period anticipated. The fact that the period of predicted increase for the proportion of votes for female candidates extends beyond that for the predicted increase in the proportion of female candidates, is suggestive evidence of an emerging point in recent scholarship: that gendered voter demand can

[147] Jana Morgan and Melissa Buice, (2013) 'Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics: The Influence of Elite Cues, Female Advancement, and Individual Characteristics', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 107, no. 4, p p. 644.

be a relevant force affecting women's descriptive representation[148]. This finding also exemplifies the value of working from a stagewise model of political recruitment, which is sensitive to rates of progression across the candidacy and election stages. These insights were not gleaned from exactly the same kind of proportionality tests that Norris and Lovenduski conducted, but my logic is the same.

There are, of course, limitations to the empirical approach pursued in this chapter, and a number of assumptions embedded in reading the results as I have. As previously acknowledged, in the absence of information about the content of radio broadcasts, and radio station ownership data, it may be a strong assumption that AM radio stations disseminate the results of CGU audits accurately and unselectively. Moreover, in analysing the proportions of audited funds involved in violations, I also assumed that radio broadcasts include information about the magnitude of the corruption uncovered, or that at least the amounts involved are reflected in the intensity of coverage. Furthermore, I have not questioned whether voters attribute corruption that occurs in the municipal government to the mayor, or at least consider it to be his responsibility. These are all assumptions that other scholars who have worked with the lottery audits have also made, and I investigate them further in Chapters 5 and 6.

A number of potentially important variables were omitted from the analyses because they were unavailable. First, the change in the proportion of campaign finance spent by female candidates from the election prior to the CGU audit, to the one following it, would have served as a useful control. However, this information has not been made available for the mayoral elections of 2008. Second, it would have been interesting to know whether female candidates were from political dynasties, and separately whether

[148] Melody Ellis Valdini, (2013) 'Electoral Institutions and the Manifestation of Bias: The Effect of the Personal Vote on the Representation of Women', *Politics & Gender*, vol. 9, no.1, pp. 76–92.

they were new to mayoral elections. Without information on the latter it is unclear whether seasoned political operators were those stepping forward in the wake of well-publicised discoveries of incumbent corruption, or whether individuals with less directly relevant experience were freshly motivated to seek local executive office. Although the Brazilian electoral authorities do collect the names of candidates stretching back for many prior elections to those analysed here, the quality of this information erodes as one goes back in time. This, added to the fact that women often change their surnames through marriage, meant that creating the necessary variables to probe candidate histories and dynastic ties in a reliable fashion would have been a very difficult task—and one for which it would be hard to check the accuracy.

Finally, the quantitative patterns reported in this chapter were not intended to assess the kinds of political parties primarily responsible for them, other than to check whether the PT was an exception. I consider types of parties in the next chapter. Chapter 5 interrogates several other points raised—for example, the role of different types of media and temporal constraints on feedback effects from shifts in voter demand for female candidates. This is done by considering election campaigns in three municipalities in São Paulo state, all of which were audited by the CGU between 2004 and 2008.

Chapter 5:

Illustrative Case Studies of Municipalities That Received Lottery Audits

Introduction

This chapter develops the thesis by contributing case studies that allow me to reflect upon the plausibility of my revised theoretical framework for understanding variation in women's political recruitment, and the plausibility of proposing the 'dissemination assumption' to explain the statistical findings of Chapter 4. Exploring the latter argument also implies probing hypothesized, period-specific constraints on feedback mechanisms that emanate from shifts in influences on women's progression from candidacy to election.

The chapter considers women's political recruitment in three municipalities, Itapeva, Salto and Itapuí, all located in São Paulo state, and all audited by the CGU within the same electoral cycle. I reflect on the plausibility of the dissemination assumption explanation indirectly, by dissecting female mayoral candidates' campaigns and relative success in contexts with different levels of male incumbent corruption. As I argue in the next section, this indirect means of seeking evidence about what is going on in the minds of voters, aspirants, candidates, and selectorates, to influence women's political recruitment, is arguably more reliable than asking direct, social desirability-laden questions about individual gender biases and the way in which institutions are gendered.

The information in this chapter is drawn primarily form semi-structured interviews. Where available and relevant, some archival material is also used. The build-up to the

2008 elections is not considered in isolation. Instead, the peculiar histories of former mayors, of prominent women, and the changing influence of various institutions are brought to bear on locally constructed meanings of corruption, corruption's salience, and the relevance of gender stereotyping in mayoral recruitment.

Given that the case studies that follow are illustrative, combining what Theda Skocpol would label parallel and contrast-oriented comparativism[1], they do not rigorously test hypotheses as a process-tracing approach would set out to do[2][3]. Nonetheless, the project of seeking to understand the specific political dynamics of mayoral elections in three municipalities brings value to the thesis by providing a fuller understanding of how my revised framework might operate 'on the ground', and by revealing how unique features can affect outcomes in individual units[4].

In the next section of the chapter, I explain how I analyse mayoral campaigns to make sense of how gender stereotypes may be used strategically and may influence campaign success in a context-specific manner; this discussion is primarily relevant to reflections on the plausibility of the 'dissemination assumption'. Subsequently, I outline how I selected the three cases, and the research methods that I employed in the field. The cases are then described individually. In the discussion, I return to the revised framework, and consider how it might apply to on-the-ground realities of political recruitment to local executive office in São Paulo state.

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[1] Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, (1980) 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 174–97.
[2] James Mahoney, (2010) 'After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research', *World Politics*, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 123-131.
[3] James Mahoney,(2012) 'The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences', *Sociological Methods & Research*, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 570–97.
[4] When the regressions in Chapter 4 could only offer national-average effects.

Campaign Strategies and Contextual Contingency

As described elsewhere in this thesis, I propose that all things equal, rational voters should respond to knowledge that an incumbent mayor is corrupt by seeking information that would enable them to select the least corruptible alternative. Voters are boundedly rational beings, often with limited time to learn about candidates, conscious and unconscious priors about the essential nature and the relative competencies of men and women, and for whom reliable information about an incumbents' corruption is differentially available. These constraints suggest that voters may employ as a heuristic the commonplace female incorruptibility stereotype[567] in candidate-centric elections in which a female candidate challenges a male incumbent whom voters know to be corrupt.

In Chapter 4, I reported results consistent with these ideas: among municipalities with an AM radio station, there was a periodic uptick in the proportion of female mayoral candidates in races where a corrupt male mayor was seeking re-election. But where voters' bounded rationality was additionally constrained by the absence of a local media outlet—meaning that a reliable diagnosis of the incumbent's corruption was not widely disseminated—the release of CGU audits detailing the extent of male incumbent corruption had no discernable effect on the proportion of female candidates and the votes they received. Contrary to expectations emerging from feminist institutionalist studies, there was no reduction in these outcomes in municipalities without local media outlets.

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5 Monika L. Mcdermott, (1998) 'Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections.' *Political Research Quarterly* 51, no. 4, pp.895–918.
6 Kathleen Dolan (2005). 'Do Women Candidates Play to Gender Stereotypes? Do Men Candidates Play to Women? Candidate Sex and Issues Priorities on Campaign Websites.' *Political Research Quarterly* 58, no. 1, p.31.
7 Anand Swamy, Stephen Knack, Young Lee, and Omar Azfar.(2000) 'Gender and Corruption.' *Center for Development Economics, Williams College. CDE Working Paper Series*.

In a simple sense, my theory and the findings in Chapter 4 suggest illustrative case research that straightforwardly asks candidates about their motivations for contesting elections—and questions selectorates, local notables, and ordinary ctizens about how they evaluated the incumbent and his challengers. Their answers would then either be concordant with the above ideas, or not. But such an approach would be an unreliable way to evaluate on the plausibility of my theory not only because of social desirability bias, but because there is no reason to assume that interviewees will have consciously considered that gender might be playing multifaceted roles in political recruitment. For example, a prospective candidate may report that she sensed greater general interest in her candidacy from ordinary voters, based on informal conversations after church or in the hair salon. She may have decided to approach some selectorate members on that basis. But when pushed on the matter of what ultimately caused this encouragement, she may not have any answers—or may link the greater interest shown in that year only to factors unrelated to gender stereotyping, when, in fact, gender stereotyping had played an important role. The voters who seemed so enthusiastic about her candidacy also may not consciously recognise that they did so partly because they associate women with honest-dealing.

This kind of type II error is plausible given experimental evidence of gender stereotypes operating at apparently only a subconscious level, yet nevertheless exerting influence on apparently conscious decisions. Cecilia Hyunjung Mo[8] has found that 'aversive sexists'—people who explicitly claim to have gender-equitable leader preferences, yet record gender-biased leader preferences on an Implicit Association Test—tend to be more likely to vote for a man in the absence of individuating information about candidate quality.

[8] Cecilia Hyunjung Mo (2015)'The Consequences of Explicit and Implicit Gender Attitudes and Candidate Quality in the Calculations of Voters.' *Political Behavior* 37, no. 2, pp.357–95.

Sidestepping these concerns is possible by identifying a way to observe the role of gender stereotypes in political recruitment without relying on explicitly expressed attitudes. With this in mind, I consider the relative success of campaigns that are congruent or incongruent with gender stereotypes, in contexts[9] where a male incumbent mayor is corrupt or not according to the CGU's auditors[10].

The literature on gender stereotyping in electoral campaigns focuses on the policy themes that candidates choose to make prominent. Candidates may run campaigns congruent with gender stereotypes by emphasising and associating themselves with policies that benefit their own sex[11], or with policy areas for which their gender is stereotyped as especially competent[12]. A woman running gender-stereotype-congruent campaign might, for example, claim that her government would increase spending on family planning, or she might state that she is in favour of abortion—both policies that primarily benefit women. Similarly, in emphasising education and healthcare[13], she could be associating herself with two policy areas for which women are widely assumed to have greater competency than men[14]. Conversely, a woman running a campaign that is

[9] Context matters for the potential benefits of gender stereotyping in campaigns. In 1990, as the U.S. prepared for the Gulf War, foreign affairs, a set of issues on which women candidates are given little credibility, were central to political discourse. In 1992, however, when a record number of women were elected to the House and Senate, domestic issues had surged to the fore. While not the sole explanation for the increase in women elected to Congress in 1992, it is clear that voters who were concerned with these issues were more likely to choose women candidates, perhaps because these voters assumed women would give them more attention. Kathleen Dolan (2018) 'Running Against a Woman: Do Female Opponents Shape Male Candidate Behaviors? '*Social Science Quarterly* 89, no. 3, pp.765–79.

[10] For the purposes of the cases analysed, I consider a 'campaign' to refer to the strategically linked activities that a candidate engages in for the purposes of winning support in an upcoming election. This definition is adapted from Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.* (Cornell University Press, 1998)

[11] Herrnson et al (2003) refer to this as 'gender issue ownership'. Herrnson, Paul S., J. Celeste Lay, and Atiya Kai Stokes.(2003) 'Women Running 'as Women': Candidate Gender, Campaign Issues, and Voter-Targeting Strategies.' *The Journal of Politics* 65, no. 1, pp.244–55.

[12] Kathleen Dolan. *When Does Gender Matter? Women Candidates and Gender Stereotypes in American Elections.* (Oxford: OUP, 2014).

[13] Ibid.

[14] Herrnson, Lay and Stokes. 'Women Running 'as Women'.

incongruent with gender stereotypes might align herself with a pro-life group. She might use rallies to talk about military spending, a policy area stereotyped as one of greater male competency[1516]. Some scholars have extended the concept of a gender-stereotype congruity in campaigns to include the assertion of beliefs that are widely considered characteristic (or uncharacteristic) of one's own sex, whether or not they are beneficial to one's own sex—a case in point is Diane Feinstein's emphatic support for the death penalty as she sought the governorship of California in 1990[17].

The central thrust of this literature is that voters form an overall impression of how typical a candidate is of their sex from candidates' communications. If voters do indeed generalise in this way, it follows that a candidate who restricts her policy discussions to female-stereotype-congruent themes like primary education reform and the need for a new medical centre, is obliquely encouraging[18] voters to apply to her the female incorruptibility stereotype, even without mentioning corruption in her campaign.

The literature on voting and heuristics, introduced in Chapter 2, finds that voters rely most heavily on mental short cuts in low information settings[1920]. Again, voters may not consciously realise this: Mo's work on implicit and explicit gender leadership biases also finds that aversive sexists choose to vote for a woman when provided with detailed

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15 Burrell, Barbara. (2006) 'Looking for Gender in Women's Campaigns for National Office in 2004 and Beyond: In What Ways Is Gender Still a Factor?' *Politics & Gender* 2, no. 3.
16 Lawless, J. L. (2004) 'Women, War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era.' *Political Research Quarterly* 57, no. 3, pp.479–90.
17 Herrnson, Lay and Stokes. 'Women Running 'as Women'.
18 Bruer (2014) reports that campaigns can activate gender stereotypes when they otherwise might not be activated. Nichole M Bauer, (2015) 'Gender Stereotype Activation and Support Female Candidates: Emotional, Sensitive, and Unfit for Office?' *Political Psychology* 36, no. 6, pp.691–708.
19 Mcdermott, 'Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections.' pp.895–918.
20 Monika L. McDermott, (1997) 'Voting Cues in Low-Information Elections: Candidate Gender as a Social Information Variable in Contemporary United States Elections.' *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 1, p.270.

information that presents the female candidate as more qualified than a male competitor, meaning their implicit stereotype of men as more appropriate for leadership roles only affects voting choices when they have no more than shallow information about candidates[21]. In summary, what matters for the application of gender stereotyping to an individual candidate is not merely *what* the candidate communicates, but whether she communicates 'deep' information at all. I elaborate this point in the paragraphs below.

A candidate providing shallow information would not impart policy intentions via the media, would choose to make public appearances but avoid debate, and would generally aim to communicate minimal details about herself to as many voters as possible. In a Brazilian mayoral race, this might mean that she ploughs all her campaign resources into posters carrying her picture, plus her name and candidate number; and hire a sound car to drive around town, booming out a catchy, vacuous jingle that features her *first* name (or gendered title, such as 'Mrs') prominently. As heuristics are used primarily in low information settings, a candidate pursuing a 'shallow information' campaign would (intentionally or unintentionally) be encouraging voters' reliance on mental shortcuts.

In the context of a Brazilian mayoral contest, a candidate may provide 'deep' information by seeking public debates and interviews with local media, or by disseminating a pamphlet containing detailed policy objectives. To be sure, all candidates need to make themselves known to voters, and low-information strategies like posters and jingles are frequently employed by those who, whenever possible, also try to get across 'deep' information. What matters in diagnosing a deep-information campaign, therefore, is whether a candidate seeks and accepts opportunities to provide deep information; a

[21] Mo. 'The Consequences of Explicit and Implicit Gender Attitudes and Candidate Quality in the Calculations of Voters.'

shallow-information campaign merely communicates 'shallow' information. Candidates who seek to provide 'deep' information that is absent of gender association on average—a balanced mixture of female-stereotyped and male-stereotyped content, or by avoiding strongly gendered themes—will be eroding voters' reliance on gender stereotypes.

I approach one of the main aims of this chapter—to consider the plausibility of my explanations of the statistical findings of Chapter 4—by asking the following question: If the only contextually important variable for the election is the clean or corrupt label associated with the incumbent male mayor, should a shallow or a deep information strategy prove the more successful for a female challenger, all things being equal?

Where there is an opportunity to benefit from the female incorruptibility stereotype, more successful strategies should include a deep-information campaign that emphasises themes congruent with gender stereotypes, and a low-information campaign. Both strategies should result in voters' developing an understanding of the candidate as a typical woman, and apply to her the female incorruptibility stereotype. On the other hand, where a male incumbent mayor's administration is understood by voters to be free of corruption, a female candidate would be better to avoid those two strategies. Portraying herself as a typical woman will not improve her chances of winning because, as discussed in Chapter 3, most of the characteristics and skills perceived by voters as necessary for the job of mayor in Brazil are stereotyped by voters as masculine traits and competencies[22-2728]. The strategic female candidate therefore has two preferable options.

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[22] Sanbonmatsu, Kira. (2002) 'Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice.' *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 1, p.20.
[23] Samuels, D. Reinventing Local Government? Municipalities and Intergovernmental Relations in Democratic Brazil. In Kingstone, P. R. & Power T. J. *Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions and Processes.* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2000).p.80
[24] Schein, V. E. (2001) 'A global look at psychological barriers to women's progress in management'. *Journal of Social Issues.* 57: p.675

First she could seek to reduce the relevance of heuristics in voters' evaluations of her by providing deep information that is gender-stereotype-neutral in its overall message, thereby increasing the probability that Mo's aversive sexists will vote for her[29]. The second option is to provide deep information that is incongruent with gender stereotypes. While the second option may have the best chance of making voters believe that she possesses the male-stereotyped traits and competencies required of a mayor, it likely entails greater risk because social role theory would predict that voters could draw upon injunctive norms[30].

These expectations about successful campaign strategies in disparate contexts of male incumbent corruption offer a means to interrogate the role of gender stereotyping in political recruitment without relying on accurate responses to direct questions about it. Even though the cases are intended as illustrative plausibility assessments, and as such do not seek to test formal hypotheses, the expectations clearly invoke counterfactual

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[25] Huddy, L & Terkildsen, N. (1993) The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office. *Political Research Quarterly*. 46, no. 3):pp. 503-525. p503

[26] Sanbonmatsu. 'Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice.' p.20.

[27] Crowder-Meyer, Melody, Shana Kushner Gadarian, and Jessica Trounstine. (2015) 'Electoral Institutions, Gender Stereotypes, and Women's Local Representation.' *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 3, no. 2, pp.318–34.

[28] Alexander shows that the method of selection of mayors in California impacts the proportion of female mayors. When mayors face a popular vote (as opposed to appointment or rotation), women show less political motivation to compete for mayoral office. Amy Alexander, (2011) 'Mayoral Selection and the Demand and Supply of Women Mayors.' *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 32, no. 2, pp.114–35.

[29] A recent content analysis of the Twitter communications of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Dilma Rousseff between presidential campaigns and during them, found both presidents switched their use of gender-stereotyped policies, effectively switching from gender-stereotype-congruent communications between campaigns, to neutral (or balanced) communications during campaigns. Welp, Yanina, and Saskia P. Ruth. 'Presidentas Twitteras: The Social Media Use of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Dilma Rousseff.' In *Women, Politics, and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Tomáš Došek, Flavia Freidenberg, Mariana Caminotti, and Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, 131–49. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017)

[30] Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. 'Social influence: Social norms, conformity, and compliance'. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology Fourth Edition.* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998) Chapter 21.

reasoning[31]. It is obviously impossible to rerun history and find out how successful a female candidate would have been in exactly the same context had she employed a different campaign strategy. However, it is often possible to observe the fluctuating levels of support that candidates receive throughout a campaign. Where a candidate employs a certain strategy and subsequently loses support, one can cautiously infer that the strategy was unsuccessful. There are, of course, holes in this argument because the reality of electoral campaigns is more complex than this—which should be taken into account in the analysis. For example, a candidate's success over time is likely to be affected by the campaigns of other candidates[32]. Candidates may attempt to direct different campaign strategies toward different tranches of the electorate[3334]. Some will have vast war chests, others only breadcrumbs. In short, the phrase 'all things being equal' is very unlikely to apply empirically.

Considerations of Case Selection

In selecting cases, my aim is to facilitate within-case analysis as well as cross-case comparison[35]. The municipalities studied in this chapter were therefore selected such that taken together they would exhibit variation in features relevant to exploring the

31 Fearon, James. (1991) Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. *World Politics* 43, no. 2, pp.169-9.
32 Chad Kendall , Tommaso Nannicini, and Francesco Trebbi. (2015) 'How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign.' *American Economic Review* 105, no. 1, pp.322–53.
33 P. N. Howard, (2005) 'Deep Democracy, Thin Citizenship: The Impact of Digital Media in Political Campaign Strategy.' *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 597, no. 1, pp.153–70.
34 Galasso and Nannicini find that negative campaigning increases men's turnout, but does not affect women's. Positive campaigning more strongly motivates women's voting. Galasso, V. & Nannicini, T.(2013) 'Men Vote in Mars, Women Vote in Venus: A Survey Experiment in the Field'. IZA Discussion Paper, No. 7483.
35 George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. BCSIA Studies in International Security. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005.) p.18

plausibility of my explanations for the results in Chapter 4. That is, variation in whether a woman ran as a candidate (in a mayoral race in which a male incumbent sought re-election), and whether the CGU had found evidence of corruption or of clean administration (during the incumbent's administration). These criteria generate four case types, shown Table 5.1. The presence of local media is another crucial consideration, as is variation in women standing as representatives of weakly and highly institutionalised parties. But because incorporating these variables into a matrix of case types would increase the number further, I instead invoked these considerations when evaluating the available options for each case type. Within the four types in Table 5.1, three were prioritised: the case types with a woman standing (a and b), which differ according to whether the CGU found corruption, and the single case type where no woman challenged the incumbent even though the CGU did find evidence of corruption (c).

Table 5.1. The four case types according to the initial selection criteria.

a = corruption + female candidate	**b** = no corruption + female candidate
c = corruption + no female candidate	**d** = no corruption + no female candidate

Case type a presents an opportunity to reflect on my expectations of successful campaign strategies. Case types b and c offer deviant cases[36] from the perspective of the voting and heuristics literature, and suggest relevant variables that were omitted from the models in Chapter 4. Self-evidently, the discussion of contextually contingent success of different campaign strategies did not offer a means of evaluating case type c, where corruption has occurred under a male incumbent and no woman runs against him. For this case type, rather than aiming to observe gender indirectly in this way, I instead explored explicit reasons that politically engaged women offered for not having become mayoral candidates. Case type d was considered to be the least important; although it could have added to explorations of the plausibility of my revised framework by providing another example of political recruitment where no woman became a candidate, the case profile offered little in the pursuit of the other purpose of this chapter—to assess the dissemination assumption.

At the same time that my case selection approach prescribed inter-case variation using the criteria of corruption and female candidacy, it proscribes large inter-case variation in other variables found to be statistically significant in Chapter 4. The municipalities chosen for field research were therefore drawn from the same state and were audited during the same electoral cycle. Keeping these details constant helped to guard against the misattribution of between-case differences to my key explanatory variables when other factors were actually responsible—such as different state government policies, peculiarities of regional political culture, or distinct regional secular trends.

[36] Amid wide variation in scholars' perspectives on ideal approaches to case selection, I have followed Jason Seawright (2016) who writes from the perspective of choosing cases following quantitative assessments of theory. Seawright recommends picking cases based on extreme values on the main independent variable—which, in the context of this research is CGU findings of corruption—and picking deviant cases. Jason Seawright (2016)'The Case for Selecting Cases That Are Deviant or Extreme on the Independent Variable.' *Sociological Methods & Research* 45, no. 3, pp.493–525.

Specifics of Case Selection

Picking the electoral cycle and state from which to draw appropriate cases involved conflicting considerations. Interviewees' memories fade. Yet the CGU lotteries have become less frequent over time, such that the electoral cycle with the greatest number of lotteries was 2004 to 2008[37]. Locating examples of inter-case variation in CGU audit outcomes and in women's electoral participation in any one state was, therefore, a more realistic prospect for that electoral cycle than any other.

Another factor weighing on the selection of the electoral cycle was the occurrence of significant political events that may have caused changes within an electoral cycle in voters' perceptions of corruption[38], and perhaps altered the strength or content of gender stereotypes[39]. Where these events occurred in the middle of an electoral cycle they may have affected the implications of CGU audit outcomes thereafter. Comparing municipalities audited before with others audited after such events therefore invites the potential misattribution of prospective and actual mayoral candidates' decisions to aspects of the local context, when, in fact, external factors were more germane. Political events that might have prompted change in voters' perceptions of corruption or shifts in commonplace gender stereotyping occurred during all of the most recent electoral cycles in Brazil; working backwards in time: Lava Jato commenced in March 2014 (in the 2012-

[37] The first dozen lotteries were held between April 2003, when the program began, and the 2004 election; before the 2008 election there were another 14; during the 2008 to 2012 election cycle there were 10; and only 4 more were held before voters when to the polls in 2016.
[38] 'Percepção de corrupção melhora no Brasil, mas problema ainda é endêmico, diz ONG.' BBC Brasil. 5 December 2012. Available via: http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2012/12/121205_transparencia_corrupcao_percepcao_rw
[39] One can hypothesize that together such events could generate a kind of punctuated equilibrium of secular trends, as opposed to a gradualist assumption of secular trends (terms borrowed from evolutionary biology to mean sudden jumps over time versus steady, constant change).

2016 electoral cycle); the country's first female president, Dilma Rousseff, was elected in 2010 (the 2008-2012 cycle); and the mensalão scandal broke in June 2005 (during the 2004-2008 cycle). From this perspective, the benefit of picking the 2004 to 2008 cycle among these three is that the mensalão occurred near one end of it—fairly close to the start—whereas Lava Jato and Dilma's rise to prominence were more temporally central. There is a good chance, therefore, of identifying municipalities for case types a, b, and c, from a single state, which were all audited on one temporal side of the mensalão (i.e. afterwards).

For the above reasons, lists of municipalities by case type were generated for the electoral cycle 2004 to 2008, for the three Brazilian states with the greatest numbers of municipalities: Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Bahia. In working through the options, the date of lottery selection and the municipality's values for all variables that were statistically significant in the analyses in Chapter 4 were noted, as was the presence of an AM radio station—and for the lists of case types a and b, also the political party of the female candidate.

Minas Gerais was quickly eliminated as a source state for the case types because it had no examples of municipalities with a CGU report containing substantial violations, in which a woman ran for mayor in 2008 against a male incumbent. Among three municipalities with a female mayoral candidate in the state in that year, the fraction of audited funds involved in violations was never more than 2.4%.

While Bahia did have example municipalities for each case type, online research into the two examples of case type b (having a clean audit report, and a woman running) revealed them both to be problematic. In one of these examples, the municipality of Coribe, the

eventual winner of the 2008 mayoral election, José Alves Ferreira—known as 'Nino'—was removed office by the Superior Electoral Court in 2012 for vote buying[40] during the 2008 election[41]. In the other option, a municipality called Wagner, the 2005-2008 mayor, Elter Silva Bastos, was accused in the Regional Electoral Court of using public money to pay for private works for local businesses[42]. Neither of these examples would reliably offer insight into voters' perceptions of female mayoral candidacy in the absence of local corruption.

Table 5.2. Case selections from São Paulo state.

a = Itapeva	**b** = Salto
c = Itapuí	

The examples from São Paulo had fewer obvious drawbacks. The only concern was with the two options for case type a (that received CGU reports of substantial violations and had a woman standing in 2008). The available examples of Itapeva and Uchoa were both drawn in lottery 19, in the 13th month of the 2004-2008 electoral cycle, which is earlier than my analyses of municipalities with a local radio station predicts (with 95%

[40] Note that the CGU does not check for any corrupt activities prior to taking office.
[41] Diário Oficial do Município, Prefeitura Municipal de Coribe. IX, no. 866 (30 March 2016). Available via: http://www.coribe.ba.gov.br/diarioOficial/download/215/866/0
and 'Decisão do TSE sobre a cassação do mandato do prefeito de Coribe.' Jornal Folha do Vale. 2 April 2012. Available via: http://www.folhadovale.net/decisao-do-tse-sobre-a-cassacao-do-mandato-do-prefeito-de-coribe.html
[42] Diário Oficial do Tribunal Regional Eleitoral da Bahia 30 May 2014. p20. Available via: http://www.jusbrasil.com.br/diarios/71107304/tre-ba-30-05-2014-pg-20?ref=home

confidence) a boost to the proportion of female candidates. Although this is theoretically not ideal, the problem is at least slight for the change in the proportion of votes going to female candidates (see Figure 4.4, in Chapter 4) and a less concerning issue than the problems of the possible cases in Bahia and Minas Gerais. Crucially, both Itapeva and Uchoa have an AM radio station.

São Paulo state also had two options for case type b (no corruption reported by the CGU, and a female mayoral candidate). Even though its HDI is high even among municipalities in the state[43], Salto was preferred to the alternative, Cabreuva, because Salto's lottery selection occurred further into the electoral cycle (the 17th month as opposed to the 6th). Thus, had the CGU reported corruption in Salto, which has an AM radio station, the quantitative analyses in Chapter 4 would have predicted that an increase in women standing and in their electoral support was close to significantly likely. Internet searches revealed no reports of corruption in Salto between the 2004 and 2008 elections. Having selected Salto, I noted that its 2008 female candidate represented one of the few highly institutionalised parties in Brazil: PSOL. Subsequently, I selected Itapeva over Uchoa because the female candidate in Itapeva in 2008 stood for a more clearly weakly institutionalised party[44]. This decision ensured that I would be able to reflect on the revised framework with examples of women having progressed through very different pathways of candidate recruitment.

São Paulo state has nine examples of case type c in the electoral cycle of interest—municipalities for which the CGU reported corruption and no woman stood as a mayoral

[43] It is worth noting that São Paulo is the wealthiest Brazilian state, a fact that was kept in mind when considering its representativeness of Brazil as a whole.
[44] The candidate in Itapeva, as is described in the case, stood for the PFL. The candidate in Uchoa stood for the PSDB. Braga's study, discussed in Chapter 3, characterises the PFL as the less institutionalised.

candidate. Of these, Itapuí was chosen. Itapuí lacks an AM radio station (as do seven of São Paulo's nine case type c examples), which, admittedly fails to satisfy the possibility principle[45] (whereby the outcome of interest is possible for negative cases) according to my results in Chapter 4. However, the principle is supported in another sense that set it apart from São Paulo state's alternative case type c options: the proportion of female, elected municipal councilors, while within one standard deviation of the state mean, was also higher than this mean[46]—and Itapuí had a different female mayoral candidate in both the 2000 and 2004 elections, suggesting that it was not short of able and ambitious women who could have chosen to compete in 2008. That the municipality lacks an AM radio stations implies that it might offer suggestions as to why the expectations of feminist institutionalist literature did not materialise in the results of Chapter 4.

Table 5.3 Variables of interest for the selected cases for 2008.

Municipality	AM radio station	HDI	Proportion of female, elected city councilors 2004 to 2008.	Est. change in HDI (2004 to 2008).	Incumbent's margin of victory in 2004.	Selection date of CGU lottery
Itapeva	Yes	0.709	0.143	0.045	5.2%	7th Nov, 2005
Salto	Yes	0.763	0.143	0.035	27.3%	23rd Mar, 2006
Itapuí	No	0.703	0.200	0.044	7.7%	19th July, 2006

The data sources are the same as those listed in Chapter 4's section of the Appendix.

[45] James Mahoney and Gary Goertz. (2004) 'The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research.' *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 4, pp. 653.
[46] And indeed the national average, and the value of this variable in both Salto and Itapeva.

Finally, it is worth noting that in my selected cases where a female mayoral candidate ran in the elections of interest, she was the only female candidate. This is important because a recent examination of gender stereotypes held by Latin American voters found that such stereotypes serve as heuristics only in executive elections with viable female candidates whose principal competitors are all male[47]. The case selections of Itapeva and Salto should therefore reveal the influence of gender stereotypes if they are indeed relevant.

Methods Employed

The information that follows is drawn from 24 semi-structured interviews[48] that were conducted in August and September 2016. All interviews but one were conducted on a one-on-one basis to facilitate triangulating information, such as allegations of the misdeeds of former mayors. Occasionally a translator attended as a back up in more formal settings, or when the interviewee had made it clear that they had limited time. In the case analyses that follow, I refer to individuals by the names that other interviewees used in referring to them.

Because my theory matches candidate behaviour to context, I decided to employ a semi-structured approach[49] to deliberately create space for interviewees to link the themes that I introduced into the conversation to local institutions, trends or events of which I was either not previously aware, or did not foresee as relevant to their perspective. The

[47] Amy Erica Smith, Katherine Warming, and Valerie M. Hennings. (2016) 'Refusing to Know a Woman's Place: The Causes and Consequences of Rejecting Stereotypes of Women Politicians in the Americas.' *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, June 21, pp.1–20.
[48] A list of the interviews can be found in the Appendix.
[49] Leech, Beth L. (2002) "Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews." *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 35, no. 4, pp.665–668.

purpose of the research was explained to all interviewees, as well as how the information they provided would be used and stored, in accordance with Oxford University's ethical guidelines.

I arrived in each of the three municipalities with a list of intended interviewees based on local ballot histories and news searches. However, the task of identifying politically engaged women, selectorate members, and local notables is self-evidently harder than that of identifying individuals who registered candidacies. All interviewees were therefore asked to recommend new contacts, and, as such, snowballing proved especially useful for finding key individuals who had not stood for elected office[50]. To ensure coverage of the pool of women who could have stood in 2008 but chose not to, a greater number of interviews (11) were conducted in Itapuí than in either Itapeva or Salto.

[50] Atkinson, R. and Flint, J.(2001) 'Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research Strategies.' *Social Research Update*, 33: 1-4. Available via: http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU33.pdf

Case Type a: The Devil Wears Prada and the Double-edged Sword

Itapeva, in the southwest corner of São Paulo state, but inland of the Serra do Mar, is the largest settlement for at least 50km in any direction. Agribusiness has long been the main game in town, and several hotels near Itapeva's central square are geared towards hosting business guests. The industrial engineering and manufacturing campus of one of the state's three main universities, UNESP, was established in Itapeva in 2003. Despite these symbols of development, the municipality's infant mortality rate was high during the period of interest—in 2004, it was 2.5 times the state average, a multiple that thereafter gradually reduced. The estimated population in 2008 was approximately 89,000, with the vast majority of the municipality's residents living in the town.

Itapeva appears well provided for in terms of a local presence of accountability institutions. A shiny court building, police station, the offices of several law firms, and those of four public prosecutors from the Ministério Público, all lie within a few blocks of one other. Newspapers devoted to current events in Itapeva have come and gone over the years, with varying degrees of independence from the main political actors of the day. One, the Gazeta de Itapeva, was relevant in 2008, but has since shut its doors and archives could not be located. As the largest town in its subregion, Itapeva regularly features in regional papers, such as Folha do Sul, and more occasionally in nationally significant newspapers based in the city of São Paulo. Radio is the staple news source for most residents—specifically the stations FM Cristal and Rádio Clube AM de Itapeva. The most politically engaged residents read a blog, 'República Blog de Itapeva', written

by Itapeva resident, Sebastião Loureiro[51]. It had approximately 500 visitors everyday during the period of interest[52].

The CGU's auditors spent little time in Itapeva; their report states that they arrived on 21 November 2005 and left four days later[53]. For reasons that came to light during field research, this may have been because some of their work had been completed by representatives of Itapeva's city council and a private audit firm. The CGU report lists many violations relating to transfers from different federal ministries, from deviation of resources from PNAE[54], a school meals program, to improper transfers of funds from the municipality's health budget that had not been returned[55]. Although some of the violations identified occurred under Luiz Cavani, mayor after January 2005, at that time representing the PT, many more happened under his predecessor, Wilmar Mattos, the PTB former mayor. The report also details Cavani's often lengthy protestations to the CGU, received on 11 January 2006. Sometimes his comments are an admission of oversight coupled with a promise to correct the problem[56]; other times Cavani squarely directs blame onto Mattos, occasionally stating that he had not had time when the CGU visited to re-organise less-than-ideal practices from the previous administration that inadvertently carried over into his[57].

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51 Sebastião Loureiro, in his 60s, was arrested during the military dictatorship. He is highly respected by local journalists, such as Juliana Oliveira and João Vincenzo (former editor of the now-defunct Itapeva Times): http://republicasim.blogspot.co.uk/2006/08/radiografia-da-politicagem-cgu-aponta.html
52 Loureiro, S. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.
53 Relato Gerencial, Municipío Itapeva SP. Controladoria-Geral da União. (2006) p1.
54 Ibid. p13
55 Ibid. p4
56 Ibid. p58
57 Ibid. p22

The publication of the CGU report was covered by Folha do Sul newspaper, whose article was disseminated further by República Blog de Itapeva[58]. Juliana Oliveira, a radio and print journalist who has lived in the municipality for 20 years, and who was working for Folha do Sul and Rádio Clube AM de Itapeva when the CGU visited, says that both of main local radio stations covered the story[59].

In 2008, Itapeva had one female candidate, Terezinha de Jesus Morais Vasconcelos Silva, who stood for the PFL. She came a distant second to Cavani in that election, for which Cavani had switched to the PSDB. She won 13.8% of the vote to Cavani's 74.5%. A third candidate, Arnaldo Furtado de Medonca (PT) won just 11.7%. With local media to transmit independent findings of corruption that occurred during Cavani's administration to voters, the expectations outlined earlier in this chapter suggest that in 2008 Terezinha would have gained more electoral support by running a low information campaign, or a campaign that provides deep information portraying her as a typical woman, than by running a sex-stereotype-incongruent or -neutral campaign. Polling data for mayoral candidates in Itapeva has been generated throughout mayoral campaigns going back many years[60], facilitating the search for temporal patterns in Terezinha's popularity that correlate with campaign events.

For several reasons, on close inspection, Itapeva contains surprises for my theory. The 2008 mayoral election highlights the pertinence of alternative sources of information about city hall corruption to the CGU, that of local legacies of corruption, legacies of

[58] CGU aponta irregularidades em Itapeva.Folha do Sul. Re-published on 29 August 2006: http://republicasim.blogspot.co.uk/2006/08/radiografia-da-politicagem-cgu-aponta.html
[59] Olivera, J. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.
[60] The original data for the years 2004 and 2008 could not be located. Juliana Oliveira says they were generated by a journalist called Rico, who appears to be an independent actor (in her opinion). I was unable to find out more about Rico. Since I was unable to see the raw data, I asked several interviewees what the polls showed over time, to triangulate this information.

candidates' family members, and legacies of candidate's previous electoral encounters—the pertinence of what came before, as scholars such as Meryl Kenny have pointed out. In voters' minds, Cavani's wrongdoings—if indeed voters knew of any of them—paled against those of Mattos. The common view of Cavani as the mayor who cleaned up Itapeva ensured that voters were not motivated to seek a less corruptible candidate in 2008. These contextual factors mean that the straightforward application of my expectations about the depth of information and the treatment of gender in a successful campaign for a female candidate, following a widely disseminated, reliable reports of male incumbent corruption, do not make sense for Itapeva's 2008 election. However, they are explored in relation to the 2004 election, when Terezinha launched a more concerted attempt to win the office of local executive. Back then she had to navigate the influence of Mattos, an untested Cavani, and a campaign-strategy calculus made especially tricky by an unpredictable informational environment regarding Mattos's corruption. Of note, interviewees in Itapeva never mentioned parties or coalition arrangements without prompting, and often could not recall the parties of the main candidates. All of the aforementioned local politicians switched parties over the period of my analysis[61], without even the exception of PT mayor, Cavani. When asked about the role of parties in local politics, Sebastião Loureiro complained that nobody has a shot at power in Itapeva unless then come from a family 'with a name'[62].

[61] From 2002 to 2006 Terezinha represented the PFL party. In 2008, she switched to the DEM.
[62] Loureiro, S. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.

Introducing Terezinha da Paulina

Terezinha is a qualified lawyer whose online biographies state that she is also a journalist and a 'Dr' in public management[63]. She became state deputy in 1994, and continued in that role until the end of 2002. In 2002, despite winning more votes than in both of her previous state assembly races, she failed to get a seat via the proportional representation system[64]. Nonetheless, she is widely regarded in Itapeva as a successful former state deputy who did well at that time to win votes beyond the immediate surroundings of her home region.

Terezinha is unusual among female mayoral candidates in Brazil for two reasons. The first is a matrilineal political legacy. She has always campaigned as 'Terezinha da Paulina', a name that references her mother, Professora Paulina de Morais, a beloved former mayor of Itapeva. Elected deputy mayor, Professora Paulina (third from the left in the second row of Figure 5.2) took over the top job for less than a year in 1980 following the death of the mayor at the time, Felipe Marinho.



Figure 5.1. Terezinha's official 2008 election photograph

Although I am not aware of any source that summarises the extent of media license holdings among female political candidates in Brazil, Terezinha is probably also unusual because she owns the most important news outlets in Itapeva—radio stations FM Cristal

[63] http://www.al.sp.gov.br/alesp/deputado/?matricula=300325. The title 'Dr' is often used by lawyers in Brazil, without a PhD in law. There is no record of Terezinha being awarded a PhD.
[64] In 1994, Terezinha received about 32,000 votes; in 1998, 46,000; and in 2002, 54,000 of which 16,000 were cast in Itapeva: http://republicasim.blogspot.co.uk/2006/07/terezinha-da-paulina-oficializa.html

and Rádio Clube AM de Itapeva—and has done since long before her two mayoral candidacies[65].



Figure 5.2. Itapeva's mayors. Professora Paulina is second from the right in the second row.

After many communications[66], Terezinha eventually decided not to answer any questions relating to this research, which made it impossible to understand how she saw her progression towards mayoral candidacy. However, was is possible to reconstruct her campaigns using information from other interviewees. Her 2004 and 2008 campaigns were very different in terms of the money and effort that she threw at them. Juliana Oliveira, who went from working at Terezinha's radio stations to working as her campaign manager in 2004, says that the 2008 campaign was not only a half-hearted effort[67] but a hamfisted one: Terezinha switched running mate three times,

[65] João Vincenzo, former editor of the Jornal Itapeva Times, which is no longer in existence, says that Terezinha's family were granted these radio concessions 30 or 40 years ago. Vincenzo, J. 12 September 2016. In-person interview.

[66] Terezinha initially agreed to an interview in early September 2016, then postponed it several times, and requested the questions in advance, which were sent to her three times. She then agreed to answer them first in person, then only in writing. She then decided that her campaign strategies were too personal to discuss. She was the only person in the three case studies to decide not to participate in the research.

[67] In Juliana Olivera's words 'It seemed as though she wasn't even doing a campaign.' Olivera, J. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.

and in response to consistently low polling results, pleaded sympathy with voters for a mystery illness that was made up (and many voters suspected the fib).

Given that in 2004 Terezinha campaigned in a context in which the male incumbent's administration had committed acts of corruption, I have chosen to broaden the analysis to take in Terezinha's unfolding electoral fortunes during both of her mayoral campaigns. This is done cautiously with two critical considerations in mind. First, Terezinha was not, in 2004, facing an incumbent who was seeking re-election. After two consecutive terms, Mattos could not run again, although he could throw his weight behind a candidate. He strongly supported Luiz Cavani, who was at that time largely unknown to voters, thus adding an element of retrospective voting about Mattos's administration to the Cavani's first mayoral candidacy[68]. The second consideration is that there was no CGU report about Itapeva prior to the 2004 elections. Among elites in Itapeva, however, there were strong suspicions of widespread misuse of City Hall finances by Mattos, which were taken seriously within the city council. Some of the more minor offenses by budgetary amounts—for example, obviously doctored receipts for consumables, bearing Mattos's signature—reached the pages of the Folha do Sul[69]; it is hard to imagine that Terezinha was unaware of this during the 2004 campaign.

[68] Olivera, J. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.
[69] Olivera, J. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.

Itapeva's Politics: 2005 to 2008

Almost immediately after Cavani took over City Hall from Mattos, the Itapeva city council set up a Special Commission of Inquiry to investigate deviations in municipal accounts relating to Fundef, a large federal program intended to raise basic educational standards. The deviations that prompted the formation of the Special Commission were large: almost R$ 4.6 million of public money was unaccounted for. The creation and perpetuation of irregularities on this scale would have required coordination between Mattos and the City Hall treasurer, accountant, and chief of cabinet, says Paulo de la Rua, a lawyer who was President of the Câmara at the time, and who became President of the Special Commission of Inquiry[70]. Because of this necessary coordination within City Hall, it would have been impossible for representatives of the city council to complete the same investigations while Mattos was still in office[71].

The Special Commission lasted three months, and contracted an audit firm, Lucro Social Desenvolvimento Ltda, based 190km away in the city of Sorocaba, to provide technical assistance in the analysis of Itapeva's 2004 Fundef accounts. The findings were written up in a bulky report, published in mid-March 2005[72]. It details duplicated payments; many cases where contracts were split multiple times to avoid attaining a threshold value above which a bidding process is legally required; examples of transfers that were passed through five bank accounts, presumably to make the flow of money hard to follow; details of unfulfilled contracts whereby companies were paid large sums but never delivered any goods or services. Moreover, the report notes that R$ 1.2 million of Fundef

[70] Note that Paulo de la Rua lost to Mattos in the 2000 mayoral election.
[71] de la Rua, P. 12 September 2016. In-person interview.
[72] Relatório Final, Comissão Especial de Inquérito do Fundef. Câmara Municipal de Itapeva, published 11/03/2005.

funds had been withdrawn in cash in 2004, and overall, R$ 4.15 million of Fundef funds were invested in municipal expenses other than education. Aurea Aparecida Rosa, a long-serving city councilor who was rapporteur of the Special Commission, believes that the latter figure resulted from political pressure on Mattos after July 2002, when the São Paulo State Court of Justice blocked City Hall's access to much of the municipality's finances until compensation for land expropriated by the municipality in 1986 had been paid[73]. The Fundef accounts were one of the few sources of cash still available to Mattos at the time.

The Special Commission report was given to the São Paulo State Court of Accounts and, by happenstance, to the CGU. 'Just after we finished our Special Inquiry Commission, the CGU was in Itapeva. And because they were present here, we delivered a report to them. It wasn't the CGU that informed the council about complaints, in Itapeva, it was the reverse,' says Paulo de la Rua. While the level of professionalism and thoroughness of the Special Commission report is impressive, de la Rua's statement cannot be completely true; the Special Commission was restricted to investigating the spending of Fundef funds in 2004, whereas the CGU had a broader purview both in terms of the fund types it was responsible for auditing, and the period investigated. Furthermore, Itapeva's CGU report documents more irregularities in the area of health than in education, and as such provides a significant extension to the Special Commission's work.

Because local elites like Paulo de la Rua and Aurea Aparecida Rosa were personally invested in the Special Commission, they had strong incentives to make the contents of

[73] Prefeitura de Itapeva tenta anular precatório de R$ 5,8 mi. Agencia Estado, 22 August 2002. http://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,prefeitura-de-itapeva-tenta-anular-precatorio-de-r-5-8-mi,20020822p19323

its report widely understood. This report was relevant to Terezinha's prospects in 2008, because its appearance at the very start of Cavani's term presented Cavani as a mayor eager to clean up the municipality's administration[74], and made the CGU report, when it appeared in the local news several months later, seem a foregone conclusion. What the CGU identified as Cavani's violations went largely ignored in media reports[75]. In Paulo de la Rua's view, the Special Commission's report had a huge impact on relations between politicians and voters. 'It was a watershed because the former mayor [Mattos] was a populist—and he was still very popular—but after raising all these irregularities, he can no longer be a candidate. He's ineligible with Ficha Limpa[76]. There are almost 100 actions of administrative impropriety against him because of the work of the Special Commission.'

The Special Commission's report provided a politically auspicious first year of office for Cavani. 'The country was up, he had financial resources, and he was a very firm manager… He has an affectionate nickname here [in the city council building]: the peacock. Why? Because he's very centralising,' says Aurea. While some members of the city council complained publicly in late 2006 that Cavani was slow to make changes[77], the population continued to view him as a 'good steward'[78], a competent manager who could apply his experience in business administration to the office of mayor. The earlier publication of the Special Commission's report than the CGU's provided what was

[74] Cavani did not have any direct hand in setting up the Special Commission of Inquiry, but he gave the city council and the audit firm unfettered access to City Hall records, says Paulo de la Rua. Many voters probably assumed that he, though, due to the concurrence of his taking office and the Commission starting its work.
[75] Media reports about the CGU focused on Mattos, and did not mention Cavani. For example: CGU aponta irregularidades em Itapeva. Folha do Sul. Re-published on 29 August 2006: http://republicasim.blogspot.co.uk/2006/08/radiografia-da-politicagem-cgu-aponta.html
[76] A law passed in 2010 that prevents those found to have committed various offenses in public office from running in elections for eight years. See Chapter 6 for a fuller explanation.
[77] Thiago Vitale, J. Em Itapeva, conselheiros sentem falta de preparo**.** Valor Econômico, Especial, p. A14. 13 September 2006,
[78] Vincenzo, J. 12 September 2016. In-person interview.

perceived by voters as an independent and rigorous evaluation of City Hall corruption earlier than the 13th month of the electoral cycle.

Because voters were not seeking a less corruptible candidate than Cavani in the 2008 election, had a shallow information campaign or a female-stereotype-congruent deep information campaign encouraged voters to apply the female stereotype of honest-dealing to Terezinha, it would not have advantaged her over Cavani. A gender-stereotype-neutral or gender-stereotype-incongruent campaign would have struggled to dent Cavani's high polling results by attempting to convince voters that Terezinha was the more competent candidate. Getting such deep information to a sufficient number of voters whose priors about both candidates were informed by the 2004 election campaign would have required considerable effort and spending. Cavani was universally understood by elites[79] in Itapeva to be unbeatable from the outset[80] of the 2008 campaign. He began it with 70-80% approval. Terezinha conserved her resources throughout the campaign period[81], and the polls did not fluctuate significantly at any point. Cavani won, with 75% of the vote. His victory was all the easier because of voters' priors: they recalled his unlikely victory over Terezinha in 2004, and the damage wrought on her reputation by a particular event during the 2004 campaign.

[79] All of those interviewed in Itapeva confirmed this.
[80] "There was no way to defeat a mayor with a positive evaluation of 80% of the population." de la Rua, P. 12 September 2016. In-person interview.
[81] Olivera, J. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.

The 2004 Campaign

By all accounts, Terezinha began the 2004 campaign period as the overwhelming favourite[82]. At that point, her name was easily more recognisable to voters than the other mayoral candidates' because of her mother's legacy and her three previous campaigns for the state assembly. As the 2004 campaign period progressed, polling data reported her odds of winning gradually reducing, and dropping more sharply following a day spent meeting residents in a poor bairro. Shortly before election day, Terezinha and Cavani appeared to have approximately equal chances of victory. They both officially spent R$ 500,000 on their campaigns[83]. Cavani won with 50.9% of the vote; Terezinha garnered 45.6%.

What caused Terezinha's lead to erode? As de la Rua stated, at that time, Mattos enjoyed strong support. Elites in Itapeva strongly suspected his widespread misuse of the public funds, but had no smoking gun evidence of corruption on a larger scale than the petty expense doctoring that had already appeared in the press. Initially, Mattos offered his backing to Terezinha, who, knowing she was already the favourite, turned it down[84]. He then came out in support of Cavani. The decision to reject Mattos's offer incurred opportunity cost for Terezinha, but this hung in the balance against the risk attached to close association with an individual who, at any point in the campaign, could have

[82] 'She lost a winning election in 2004…she had 75% of the voting intentions when she started the campaign.' de la Rua, P. 12 September 2016. In-person interview. Juliana Oliveira recalls the first poll she saw in 2004 reporting in excess of 70% voting intentions for Terezinha.
[83] Source: Superior Electoral Court records. I extracted this information from the dataset that I constructed, as described in Chapter 3.
[84] Olivera, J. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.

become the centre of a corruption scandal. Unlike Terezinha, Cavani at this point had nothing to lose[85].

Without Mattos's support, Terezinha was left to individually negotiate support with leaders of the 20-odd barros in Itapeva. According to Juliana Oliveira, Terezinha refused to get involved in vote-buying:

> 'Already in the first week she had problems with the neighborhood leaders, who are very important components of the campaign. They speak on behalf of the barro. People expect the barro leader to tell them who is best for them. And she, I witnessed, was fighting with them, screaming with them, because she did not want to pay what they were asking. This job is expensive, right?'[86]

Instead, Terezinha solicited the services of a political consultancy in São Paulo city to design her campaign materials. This led to her campaign seeming over-professionalied in the eyes of Itapeva's voters:

> 'I remember that it cost so much money. You could have bought several houses with the money this guy was earning. And wow he made a beautiful campaign. It was very well produced. The jingle was beautiful, it was exciting, everything. But it was not our language. Our population is very simple. This marketer did a beautiful thing, but it did not catch on. Our people have our own characteristic, right? And there are some peculiarities that if you're not from a place you probably won't understand.'[87]

Terezinha's 2004 campaign content consisted of deep information about her achievements in gender-stereotype-congruent policy areas. Associating herself with her mother's legacy—Professora Paulina having been described by interviewees as a 'care-giver', and a 'loving person who would taken the children when other women could

[85] Cavani cut his ties to Mattos the day after his inauguration, implying that he also knew about the suspicions that surround Mattos's administration before the Special Commission began investigating. Olivera, J. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.
[86] Olivera, J. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.
[87] Olivera, J. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.

not'—lent itself to this presentation. However, those close to Terezinha frequently comment that it was at odds with her usual disposition:

> 'The first thing she made me do was make a survey of her achievements as deputy. I had to make a report of all the work, in all the cities of our region. There are about 20. For each one, I had to make a report on education, on health, on culture—everything she did in those areas—to have it archived so we could talk about it [in the campaign]. I spent nights… because everyone was so afraid of her… If you had the chance to talk to her, you'd see. It's *The Devil Wears Prada*. It's her. Meryl Streep [in that film] is the most faithful portrait of Terezinha.'

Had Mattos's corruption suddenly become widely known to voters—as could have happened at any time in the 2004 campaign period—a gender-stereotype-congruent campaign should have benefited Terezinha, since it would have encouraged voters to associate the female stereotype of incorruptibility with her, meanwhile Cavani's very public links to Mattos[88] would have embroiled him in scandal. Yet such a news event never materialised until the following year when the Special Commission report was published. Instead, Terezinha's project of presenting herself in a gender-stereotype-congruent manner, and thus cut from the same cloth as her mother, went awry during a visit to a poor barro. As described by João Vincenzo:

> 'Whether it was a lie or a truth, nobody knows, but someone reported that when Terezinha left a poor neighborhood, she sanitised her hands with alcohol gel. And it spread, in such a way, like, she was a fake, right? She went to visit this poor neighborhood and was disgusted. That was 12 years ago, but it still sticks. It was released, and then she missed the election.'

[88] Mattos would regularly campaign with Cavani. Olivera, J. 13 September 2016. In-person interview. Loureiro, S. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.

Others interviewed confirm this interpretation, and link it more directly to the legacy of Terezinha's mother[89]. This was the event after which Terezinha's voting intentions suddenly dropped.

As such, Terezinha's 2004 campaign can be viewed as a poorly executed gender-stereotype-congruent campaign in an uncertain informational environment that could have swung more to her advantage, but did not. Without wide dissemination of revelations of Mattos's wrongdoings, Cavani benefited from Mattos's support. Because voters' knowledge of Mattos's corruption was incomplete during the 2004 campaign, voters had weak incentives—that could have become stronger with more complete knowledge—to pick a more honest candidate than one who would, by implication, emulate Mattos. Had more evidence of Mattos's substantial misuse of public finances been available earlier, Terezinha would have been a unique position to ensure that it was widely disseminated, through her ownership of two radio stations. Moreover, had it not been for the hand sanitiser episode, Terezinha's gender-stereotype-congruent campaign would not have been undone by apparent disingenuousness, and she may have won. This seems probable because voting intentions on the eve of the 2004 election were roughly equal for her and Cavani, even after the drop that accompanied the hand sanitiser episode.

In this way, Itapeva offers a suggestive corroboration of my expectations. The complications of the 2008 campaign reveals the pertinence of omitted variables from the

[89] "Her leadership comes from her mother. Her mother was a social worker. So it lost her prestige." Juliana Oliveira states that the issue still hurts the electoral prospects of Terezinha's son in 2016: "At the time, she picked up a sweaty person, hugged her… This image, as an arrogant person, it stuck with this rumour. People really believe it, even today. Her son [a candidate for city council at the time of the interview] suffers from it. People talk. "He's her son, his mother washes her hands with alcohol. Will he wash his hands with alcohol too?" Loureiro, S. 13 September 2016. In-person interview.

models in Chapter 4, for which I have no national data source—specifically, sources of information other than the CGU about City Hall corruption, and which voters perceive to be impartial, and legacies of previous electoral encounters between citizens and candidates, as well as between pairs of candidates.

From what was revealed about the process of becoming a candidate in Itapeva, it is clear that parties are organisationally very weak; with every election, the most prominent politicians joined new parties. However, routinised pathways of these weakly institutionalised parties are not absent. Impressionistically, several pathways appear to exist in parallel, all beginning with membership of a well-known political family. That may be sufficient to become a candidate (as was the case for Terezinha's son, a city council candidate in 2016), or may be augmented as a signifier of odds of candidacy by involvement in public-facing local business (as was the case for Cavani, whose father was mayor[90]), or by a degree of success in state-level elections (as in Terezinha's case). That success in legislative, or even federal, elections above the municipal level is effectively a stage in recruitment for mayoral candidacy among many weakly institutionalised parties in Brazil is supported by reports of mayoral career paths presented in Chapter 3. In many ways, Itapeva exemplifies an ecosystem of modular parties and free-agent individuals, who, at each election, are in the market for a candidacy with any party.

[90] Cavani further established himself with a reputation as a good manager in local business. Mattos took the same route towards mayoral candidacy as Cavani.

Case Type b: Homemade Feijoada and Maria da Penha

Salto is wealthier than Itapeva and Itapuí. It is situated much closer to São Paulo city and is more connected to other urban centres, such as its twin city Itu, a tourist draw 8kms away, which is famous in the region for its giant versions of traffic lights and phone boxes. Salto's population in 2008 was approximately 103,000. The economy has a heavy emphasis on manufacturing with some revenue from tourism. Plywood, paints, and paper emerge from the municipality's factories; the latter becomes national currency banknotes in several countries. There is a regional electoral court for São Paulo state in addition to a court of justice; a women's police station in addition to a general one, and four public prosecutors. Salto's newspaper—the Jornal Estância—is 22 years old; it has no direct links to any recent mayor or mayoral candidate[91]. At least one radio station, Rádio Amiga, covers local news.

Even though the two largest factories in Salto are owned by Paulo Maluf, a federal deputy and former state governor whose name has become a byword for corruption in Brazil, the CGU auditors found little wrong with the municipality's administration. They investigated Salto between 31 March and 1 June 2006. The items listed as City Hall's most serious violations since January 2005 were: diverting approximately R$ 12,000 earmarked for fighting communicable disease to a fund for buying basic medicines; a few packets of medicines were stored in inadequate conditions (without air conditioning and on the floor); and the list of recipients of Bolsa Família was not fully up to date (so 44 families continued to receive a cash transfer after their incomes had risen above the program's ceiling, including three families whose children had moved to live with relatives elsewhere). The bulk of the CGU report details minor bureaucratic oversights

[91] Santos, E. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.

down to a missing logo on the side of a mobile health unit. By both the amounts involved and the seriousness of the problems identified, Salto has been far more professionally and cleanly administered than either Itapeva or Itapuí.

In the absence of any noteworthy wrongdoing by the incumbent in 2008, Geraldo Garcia, a PDT candidate in both 2004 and 2004, a woman called Rita Diniz challenged his re-election bid. Rita is a passionate PSOL member and is the only female mayoral candidate in Salto's history. Because voters would have had no incentive in 2008 to seek a less corruptible alternative to Garcia, I would anticipate that Rita's preferable campaign strategies would have been to either erode voters' use of gender-stereotypes as heuristics, or to present herself as an atypical woman. In other words, assuming all things to be equal, she should see her voting intentions improve over time in response to running a gender-stereotype-neutral, deep-information campaign, or a gender-stereotype-incongruent one, than if she were to run a low information campaign or a gender-stereotype-congruent one.

In reality, voters had strong priors about Rita long before the 2008 campaign began. She was known for her close association with two female-stereotyped policy themes, education and women's rights. As such, a gender-stereotype-incongruent strategy would have struggled to come across as sincere, and successfully expanding her message such that it became gender-stereotype-neutral would have required meeting campaign costs commensurate with the task of updating priors held by a large proportion of the electorate. Rita stuck to her female-stereotyped policy themes. Demand for more substantive representation of women benefited Rita in the years leading up to 2006, and probably contributed to co-partisans encouraging her mayoral candidacy, but by 2008

that demand had waned. This was one of several reasons for Rita's poor polling results[92] throughout the campaign.



Figure 5.3. Rita's official 2008 election photograph.

Introducing Professora Rita

Rita's father was a leftist militant. She became interested in politics through his influence as well as through her involvement with ecclesiastical youth organizations in the 1970s. Young Rita was obsessed with news about VAR Palmares, a left-wing guerilla organisation that fought against Brazil's dictatorship, and followed Dilma Rousseff's arrest (as a member of VAR Palmares) closely, even though she was only 11 years old when it happened[93]. In 1979, Rita moved from Ceará, in the northeast of the country, to São Paulo city. Law students at the University of São Paulo led the church movement that she joined on arrival. Through these connections, Rita became involved in the state teachers' union, APEOESP, when she qualified as a primary school teacher. In 1989 she joined the Workers' Party, prompted in part by Lula's electoral defeat to Collor. It was around this time that she moved to Salto.

Rita has remained a primary school teacher and a prominent member of APEOESP ever since. In the 1990s, she often sold homemade feijoada to help fund local Workers' Party

[92] Polls in Salto are conducted by political parties, which obviously are not independent. However, the Jornal Estância collects this research, and compares across the results.
[93] Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview.

candidates' campaigns[94]. In 2000, she took a spot representing the party on Salto's city council[95]. She devoted much of the next few years to organising a Women's Municipal Council in Salto, and to running the sub-regional branch of APEOESP, of which she became director.

A Crescendo of Demand for Women's Substantive Representation

The year that Rita joined the city council marked a watershed in Salto in terms of demand for more substantive representation of women. Given the municipality's high HDI, residents are accustomed to doing well in rankings of municipalities that appear in the press, and that are typically based on studies conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. However, in 2000, a national survey of spousal violence and violence against women was published. Salto received a very poor ranking relative to municipalities of equivalent wealth and municipalities in the subregion:

> 'At the time we had a problem in Salto, which thank God has diminished. That was the issue of violence against women, right? I remember it was a landmark moment [when Salto received a high domestic violence index score]… A big deal for Salto… So from 2000 to today, we have been working to combat violence against women… I do not remember the exact indexes, but there were even surveys of sexual abuse of minors, young girls.'[96]

Rita, as a sitting member of the city council who also had close links to many other politically engaged women through her church and union connections, was one of the leaders of the subsequent drive to reduce the incidence of domestic violence:

[94] Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview.
[95] Superior Electoral Court records.
[96] Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview.

> 'One of the ways we found of fighting domestic violence and violence against women was by bringing women into politics. So we organized various meetings, conferences, in which we discussed the female condition, women's working conditions, the issue of motherhood, the sharing of responsibilities in the home, the sharing of financial responsibilities. [The idea was] To tell women that their place is in politics, in political activism… and to have the nerve to make an accusation if they are ever assaulted. Our campaign was geared towards that.'[97]

Aside from these events, Rita organised the local Workers' Party to demand a reactivation of the women's police station in Salto, which although officially established in the early 1990s was poorly staffed and often closed[98]. Rita also helped formulate and articulate a demand for a safe house for victims of domestic violence. She felt well positioned to do this because she had for some time been a member of the Municipal Health Council, which provided her with additional information about the specifics of the problem in Salto:

> 'At the Health Council they [doctors] said that when a woman arrives with bruises, marks, she usually made out that it was from a fall, an accident. It was never from an aggressor. But there were certain odd situations where it couldn't be hidden. And in those cases she *had* to make a report. So the reports were made only because the hospital really had to do it, right? These women were very afraid of denouncing violence. This is why I asked for… why it's all about… the resources to get a shelter, to house the victims who could not continue living with their aggressor… The women's police station matters so these women may be attended by professionals—because at the common police station there's no such thing. There's still jokes and disrespectful treatment because many of these women are poor, black, and some of them are prostitutes… "You sought it because you were walking in the street wearing sexy clothes. That's why someone raped you." Always blaming the woman for the aggression she suffers, never educating or punishing the men who attack women.'[99]

In 2000, largely in response to Rita's efforts, the mayor elect—a man called Pilzio di Lelli, of the PPS—agreed to established a Women's Municipal Council (a semi-formal working group made up of local women), to report back to him on how to tackle the

[97] Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview.
[98] Costa Pinto, R. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
[99] Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview.

municipality's domestic violence problem. Rita was the group's coordinator. The Women's Municipal Council communicated to City Hall its two key demands: improvements in the working of the women's police station, and a shelter for the victims of domestic violence. The former demand was met quite quickly. The shelter proved a more complicated matter because it required setting up an agreement with another municipality. In Rita's words: 'The Casa Abrigo in Salto will never shelter the women of Salto because an aggressor can easily go there. These guys can be very violent; [if] he goes there he doesn't just beat her up, but the other people who are there, too. That's no use. These women have to go to a shelter in another municipality.'[100]

Salto's Politics: 2005 to 2008

In the 2004 mayoral election Geraldo Garcia beat Pilzio di Lelli and four other candidates by a significant margin[101]. Early in 2005, just after Garcia took office, he received a call from the local prosecutor's office intended to draw his attention to a sewage problem[102]. A treatment plant had been built in the municipality some time ago, but the two previous administrations had not taken steps to get it up and running. The issue became pressing early in Garcia's first term because unusually warm and dry weather contributed, with the pollution, to the river Tietê becoming foul smelling and developing a foamy surface. Back then, untreated sewage was dumped into the river, and the lack of rain meant that industrial effluent from Salto's industries, many of which are

[100] Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview.
[101] Note that this margin was larger than that of 2004 victors in Itapeva and Itapui (Table 3.4). Geraldo Garcia won 57.9% of the vote. Second-placed Angelo Nucci—known in Salto as 'Doutor Angelo'—a plastic surgeon, won 30.6%.
[102] Garcia, G. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.

based along the river banks, were more concentrated than usual. The issue was widely reported in the media, including in Folha do São Paulo[103].

The situation presented an opportunity for Garcia to demonstrate managerial competence to voters, and set the tone of his relationship with the state public ministry. Garcia was well versed in the functioning of municipal government from his experience on the city council. He made a point of always responding to local prosecutors in a respectful manner, he says, and for this reason he believes he received respectful treatment in return: 'After the prosecutor called me about complying with the sewage conduct adjustment term, every time there was a problem, and the prosecutor had to call me again, there was a discussion, which never led to a public civil inquiry.'

There were no other accusations of mismanagement or wrongdoing during Garcia's first term. The Jornal Estância's proprietor, Edemilson Santos, believes the independence of local media in Salto is one of the reasons that City Hall is generally well run[104]. 'Overall, Salto was always a city that never had much involvement in anything, a quiet city in that sense,' he says. 'The City Hall is one of the leanest in the country. There are three vehicles available to 17 councilmen, so if one wants to make a trip to São Paulo to visit a deputy or a public office, it has to be brought up in the assembly. And councilors do not have assistants in Salto.' At one point in Garcia's first term, the city council wanted to take on paid advisors. But the new positions never materialized because of pressure from the local paper. 'The Jornal opposed it because we didn't see it as a productive use of public money,' says Edemilson.

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103 'Sem chuva, cidade do interior de SP sofre com mau cheiro e espuma no Tietê.' Folha do São Paulo. 23 August 2005. Available via: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff2308200506.htm

104 Santos, E. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.

By the end of Garcia's first term, he had taken advantage of the strengthening economy to build a cultural centre and a museum in Salto, a new source of pride to citizens[105]. Those interviewed agree that Garcia was in a stronger position going into the 2008 electoral campaign than when he began his first term.

Rita's Politics: 2005 to 2008

During the 2005 to 2008 period, Rita switched political parties. Her long-membership and dedication to the Workers' Party came to an abrupt end with the mensalão scandal. 'When we used to make feijoada at home, to sell for the party, it was not like that… so it was the denunciations involving José Dirceu and Genoíno, mainly, whom had been in since the founding of the party like me. It was a very big disappointment, right? So I quit… and I went to PSOL to help organise the party.'[106] Corruption was incompatible with Rita's political brand. When Rita joined, PSOL had just been founded by breakaway members of the PT, also disgusted at the party's involvement in the mensalão. These members brought expectations of the PT's deliberative procedures for candidate selection, which were formalised in party statutes.

Soon after switching parties, Rita was involved in several strikes. ('She is the queen strikes,' says city council member Rosanna Costa Pinto, a pediatrician who was also on the Women's Municipal Council.[107]) In October 2005, APEOESP called a strike because of a contract dispute with the state government[108]. As the director of the union's sub-

[105] Garcia, G. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
[106] Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview. Today, Rita sits on PSOL's state board.
[107] Costa Pinto, R. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
[108] 'Professores do Estado entram em greve na 2ª.' Folha do São Paulo. 22 October 2005. Available via: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff2210200519.htm

regional branch, Rita became the face of the strike in Salto, where it was heavily criticised[109]. In 2007, there was a metalworkers strike[110], and again Rita was understood to be involved in the organisation[111]. Rita's new association with PSOL and her more prominent union activity during these years led voters to perceive her ideology as farther left than previously[112].

Meanwhile, in 2006, President Lula enacted Federal Law 1134—domestic violence legislation known as the Maria Da Penha law. The law contains among other things a provision that allows the authorities to remove an abuser from his or her home, and ban the individual from entering into close proximity with those he or she abused. The law is well known in Brazil and beyond[113], in part because of the personal story of domestic violence victim Maria Da Penha and the strong condemnation of the Brazilian justice system by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that led to its creation.

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109 Costa Pinto, R. 15 September 2016. In-person interview. Santos, E. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
110 'Salto: Trabalhadores da Nagel estão em greve há 3 dias por PPR.' Entry dated 29 August 2007. Webpage of the National Confederation of Metalworkers of Brazil. Last accessed on 22 February 2017. Available at: http://www.cnmcut.org.br/conteudo/salto-trabalhadores-da-nagel-estao-em-greve-ha-3-dias-por-ppr
111 Costa Pinto, R. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
112 ibid
113 'Maria da Penha Law: A Name that Changed Society' UN Women website. Posted 30 August 2011. Available via: http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2011/8/maria-da-penha-law-a-name-that-changed-society

The Decision to Run and Rita's Campaign

Rita's decision to run in 2008 was not her own, although she had dutifully expressed to other members that she would do it if required. In a local party meeting, PSOL members in Salto decided to field a mayoral candidate for the first time[114], and by consensus decided it should be Rita. Rita did not immediately embrace the opportunity:

> 'It was not an individual decision. It was a collective decision. If the group had pointed to another person, we would have campaigned and supported that person. The themes of the campaign, the topics covered… were also all built collectively. It was not a Rita thing… I thought Professora Isabel had more qualifications than me. I pointed to her to be the candidate.'[115]

The issues pressed on voters during Rita's campaign were, as Rita recalls, promises that, if elected, she would: organise a women's shelter, reduce childhood obesity by improving school meals, provide free dental care at the health clinics, and introduce participatory budgeting ('Because schools, kindergartens, health centres do not otherwise have a vote, right? Vaccination does not otherwise have a vote[116]). In other words, her campaign was strongly gender-stereotype-congruent—even her 'nome urna'—Professora Rita—emphasised her career in education. To voters who paid ongoing attention to local politics, it also emphasised her union links.

Rita also took up opportunities to provide deep information whenever possible, more so, in her opinion, than the other candidates in 2008. She recalls a debate among mayoral candidates organised by the church. Moreover, the lion's share of her campaign recourses—as before, earned through the selling of homemade feijoada—went on

[114] Presumably to raise the party's profile in Salto. PSOL was, at that time, quite recently formed.
[115] Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview.
[116] Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview.

producing a two-page manifesto that was distributed to homes all over the poorer barrios[117]. This detailed her policy intentions.

Voting intentions for Rita started low and never rose at any point during the campaign[118]. In the end, she won just 1.1% of the vote in a three-horse race[119]. The primary reason given for this, among interviewees, was that her ideology was far to the left of the median voter in Salto, and her involvement in strikes had made her unpopular. For example:

> 'She always had a low vote because, really, what's the point? Thinking about our society as a whole in Salto… especially with the question of the trade union movement. She's always on the streets with this movement. When there's a teachers' strike in the state of São Paulo, it harms thousands of students. So it ends up having a reflex impact for the candidate. Professora Rita is seen in that context.'[120]

But had she run a less gender-stereotype-congruent campaign, might she have done better? Rita's continued emphasis on the need for a woman's shelter seemed misplaced to many voters in the wake of the enacting of the Maria Da Penha law[121]. Because substantial policy progress had been made on the issue of domestic violence, and this was reasonably well known to voters, Rita's insistence on the issue seemed to resonate with, and underscore, the belligerence with which many voters characterised her union activity[122]. Moreover, the woman's shelter was not a demand that had been rejected in principle by the candidates. (Indeed, an agreement with the municipality of Sorocaba was

117 Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview.
118 Santos, E. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
119 In 2008, Garcia won 80.2% of the vote. Another candidate who has entered every mayoral election since 2000, 'Doutor Angelo' who was not available for interview, won 18.7%.
120 Santos, E. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
121 Costa Pinto, R. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
122 Costa Pinto, R. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.

eventually set up in 2011 during Garcia's second term, whereby victims of domestic violence in Salto stay at a shelter there.)

In essence, the demand for increased substantive representation of women that was prompted by the report of Salto's high level of domestic violence waned between 2006 and 2008. The demand for increased descriptive representation of women waned in response because of stereotyped sex-differentiated policy competencies (which Rita herself expressed when she said, 'One of the ways we found of fighting domestic violence and violence against women was by bringing women into politics.'). Other than this particular policy topic, there were no other reasons—including no allegations of corruption by the incumbent male mayor—for female stereotypes to benefit a candidate in a competition that is widely perceived by voters to require competencies that are male-stereotyped. This is one reason, among several, that Rita's voting intentions never rose.

To be sure, Salto's politics are still candidate-centred, but parties appear to play a somewhat different and more prominent role in local politics than they do in Itapeva. The PDT is not understood by scholars of Brazil to be a highly institutionalised party, though Garcia had not switched away from it throughout his political career. The case of PSOL in 2008—the first municipal elections since the party's founding—presents an interesting case for reflecting on a theoretical framework that defines stages of recruitment prior to candidacy by what is routinised. Even as early as 2008, local members of PSOL witnessed a single pathway to candidacy that was highly transparent and procedural. The candidate-to-be had to formally be a member, and had to have expressed willingness to represent the party in the election to members as a group, and in a party meeting; thereafter, all local party members formed the selectorate. Having party members physically present, witnessing the 'stages' of recruitment being established in a

de facto sense, is no doubt a means towards rapid routinisation—a way to quickly creating shared expectations of single pathway towards candidacy.

Case Type c: The Bullying Playboy and his Friends

Encircled by fields of sugar cane, in the very centre of the state, lies the small town of Itapuí. In 2008, the population was a little under 12,000[123], including those living in the dispersed farms within the municipality boundaries. This community is served by no fewer than 30 churches, some Catholic, some Pentecostal[124]. There is no radio station, no newspaper. Instead, Itapuí relies on the larger settlement of Jaú, 25kms to the southeast for reporting of local news, and for state instruments of accountability—police, courts, and local prosecutors, for example. Agriculture aside, Itapuí's economy is powered by a handful of companies gathered in a small industrial district on the outskirts of town.

When the CGU's auditors visited Itapuí between 26 July and 25 October 2006, they found that the PPS mayor at the time, José Gilberto Saggioro, commonly known a 'Pancho', had employed assorted chaotic accounting practices during the first 16 months of his administration. Federal income taxes collected from civil servants had gone amiss or were never collected; on several occasions funds from one federal program were used to cross-finance another, or to pay for a municipal government project; expenses were often duplicated; Bolsa Família had been paid to families well above the income threshold and whose children were not students. The Family Health Program had been particularly poorly overseen. Of more than R$32,000 missing from the Program's

[123]The 2010 census reported the municipal population to be 12,173.
[124] Amantini, J. 20 September 2016. In-person interview.

accounts, R$5,280 appeared to have been spent on home physiotherapy sessions, and unpaid employee indemnities were estimated at R$70,000[125]. Pancho did not respond to any accusations levied at him by the CGU. At the time of fieldwork, in 2016, Pancho had been convicted of administrative impropriety for his handling of transfers from the state government, fined, banned from standing for public office for five years, and prohibited from doing business with the government for three years[126]. When pressed on how common Pancho's misdeeds were among former mayors in the region at that time, Jaú's public prosecutor, Rogério Rocco Magalhães, replied: 'Saggioro had all eight of his accounts disapproved by the State Court of Accounts, which is a rare thing among mayors who have served two terms.'[127]

Despite the egregiousness of Pancho's mishandling of the municipal finances, the only challenger to his re-election in 2008 was José Eduardo Amantini, a man contesting his third consecutive mayoral election in Itapuí, always for the PSDB. The absence of a female candidate in this race cannot be easily attributed to a paucity of supply of politically engaged local women with appropriate experience, nor to a peculiar, scandalous history of a prominent local woman that could have weakened the commonly held female stereotype of incorruptibility among Itapuí's voters.

Interviews with 11 long-time residents of Itapuí, all connected to and engaged in local politics, revealed that the primary reasons for women's absence in the 2008 election were direct intimidation by the incumbent, and a preference, among politically engaged women interviewed, to avoid participation in dirty deals over attaining further political

[125] Relato Gerencial, Municipío Itapui SP. Controladoria-Geral da União. (2006) p1.
[126]'Itapuí: Justiça condena prefeito por falta de tratamento de esgoto. Prefeito foi condenado por impropidade administrative.', Folha de Ibitinga. 7 November 2011. Available at: http://www.folhadeibitinga.com.br/interna.php?id=1360&categoria=Escolha%20uma%20categoria
[127] Magalhães, R. 25 October 2016. Via Email.

power. Although all of these women emphatically agreed that voters in Itapuí view women in politics as more honest than their male counterparts, the absence of local media and the low local salience of corruption has meant that the issue has never featured in a local mayoral campaign. As in Itapeva, interviewees had no instinct to mention parties in semi-structured conversations other than the PSDB, which was discussed without any reference to party organisation, but instead framed as if it were 'Amantini's team'.

Itapuí's Stock of Female Prospective Candidates

Compared to the equivalent periods leading up to the 2000 and 2004 elections, in early 2008, Itapuí arguably had a larger stock of female citizens who were well positioned to contest the mayoral elections later in the year. However, as previously stated, while a female candidate did participate in the 2000 and 2004 elections, 2008 was an all-male contest.

The 2000 election featured Rita Palaro, the first woman to run for mayor in Itapuí. She stood for the PC do B party, and won just 4% of the votes[128] and come fourth out of four. That election was won by Sylvio Rocchi of the PPB, whose running mate, Cleuza de Freitas Nascimento, served the full four years of Sylvio's tenure, becoming Itapuí's first female deputy mayor (2001-2004). Cleuza switched parties to the PTB, to run for mayor in 2004, facing Amantini and Pancho. Like Rita Palaro, she came last, but with a far more respectable 21% of the vote. During the first half of Pancho's first term (2005-

[128] Despite several attempts over Facebook messanger and phone calls, Rita Palaro could not be contacted during the fieldwork period.

2006)—when the CGU came to town—the municipal council was led by a woman, Rita Xavier, of the PDT, again, for the first time in Itapuí's history. Silene Valini, a popular city councilor, of the PSDB, was at the same time enjoying her second term. Thus, in theory, on the basis of prior formal political participation, several women were reasonably well placed to mount a challenge to Pancho's re-election.

Was there any reason to doubt these women's qualifications, or the relevance or value of their political experience? Before agreeing to join Sylvio's campaign at the end of the 1990s, Cleuza had recently retired from her job as the local bank manager. She was well connected in the local community and had a good understanding of the local economy. Sylvio, who was 74 when elected mayor, approached Cleuza in the hope that she'd take care of 'everything social', she says. At the time, she had no party affiliation, and she was not aware of making any other efforts towards her own political recruitment than to agree when Sylvio tapped her on the shoulder.

Her main achievement in office was to launch an educational scholarship, the first of its type in the region. In Cleuza's view, she redefined the role of deputy mayor in Itapuí, by working hard throughout her mandate. More typically, she says, an established name in local politics is added to a mayoral candidate's ticket as deputy, purely to attract votes; after the election, both the electorate's and the mayor's expectations of the deputy are virtually non-existent: a City Hall salary is paid almost in recognition of the deputy's efforts during the campaign, rather than for persevering through the travails of political office-holding.

By all accounts, Cleuza has purposefully encouraged local women to become involved in politics. Some women interviewed reported standing for City Council specifically because

of her encouragement[129]. Cleuza arrived at our interview carrying a typed, 15-page 'call to action', explaining her views on the benefits of more descriptive representation of women, which include essentialist ideas of women as 'much more determined and empathetic' than men; also by nature, she believes, 'we [women] really do not do much 'conchavo' [dodgy deals], so we act for the good of common people'[130]. Cleuza describes events connected to the International Year of Volunteers in 2001, shortly after she became deputy mayor, as the springboard for her rallying of other women because it brought together people involved in a children's charity called Casa Da Criança; a disabled rights organisation, APAE; and Evangelical communities—all institutions in which women have learnt to organise and articulate their preferences.

When Cleuza became deputy mayor, Silene Valini, a school teacher, entered the city council. Silene was 28, and this first candidacy was primarily to appease her father, a trade unionist who had tried and failed to involve her elder sister in politics[131]. Silene admits that she was under-prepared for the responsibilities that greeted her on the city council. 'In my first sessions I thought "What am I doing here? If I tell my father that I'm not going anymore to the city council, he'll hang me." So what did I do? I took courses.' Over the next few years, Silene returned to college to study oratory and public policy. She was subsequently re-elected in 2004, with more votes than any other candidate.

[129] For example, Itapuí's 2017-2020 deputy mayor, Clélia Pichelli, a nurse who was elected to the city council in 2012.
[130] Cleuza believes that every woman in Itapuí should read a 2003 novel about gendered structures of power called 'Painted women' by Dóris Fleury, an author who lives in the nearby city of Bauru.
[131] Valini, S. 18 September 2016. In-person interview.

In January 2005, with Pancho now mayor, Rita Xavier, a public health worker and a close friend of Cleuza, who had just joined the city council, became its president[132]. Rita entered politics mainly because she was encouraged to do so by a cousin, for whom she used to campaign. On the council, Rita helped to establish neighborhood associations, so that local citizens' needs could be better understood and 'because it leads to knowledge about how public power works'[133]. At the time, a low-income neighborhood called Mar Azul had no sewage treatment facilities, nor paved roads. The council heard these complaints in a series of meetings with the Mar Azul neighbourhood association. Eventually, but not until later in Pancho's second term, the Mar Azul sewage problem became the Jaú prosecutor's main bone of contention with Pancho.

Knowledge of Pancho's Misdeeds Prior to the 2008 Elections

Did these politically connected women, or those who might have encouraged these women's candidacies, learn about Pancho's corruption before the deadline for registering mayoral candidacy in 2008? Even as mayor elect, and after confirming to the newspaper in Jaú that Sylvio had left City Hall in good working order, Pancho announced plans to replace everyone who had participated in Sylvio's administration. On taking office, he soon began to swell the payroll[134]. These changes would have been evident to any regular visitor to Itapuí's town square, whence people coming and going from City Hall are

132 City council presidents are elected by other council members.
133 Xavier, R. 19 September 2016. In-person interview
134 City Hall employees numbered about 280 under Sylvio, says Amantini, and more than 500 under Pancho. This led, at the end of Pancho's second term, to a municipal debt of R$ 20 million, equivalent to about two-thirds of the annual public budget. The debt stood at $1 million at the start of Pancho's first term. Pancho had 48 commission positions, to Amantini's 22. 'We do not believe in swelling the public machine, of distributing jobs to people with no technical capacity but just for having been politically supported.' Amantini, J. 20 September 2016. In-person interview. In Silene's words: 'Era muita lambança, né?' ('It was a lot of licking, ok?') Valini, S. 18 September 2016. In-person interview.

easily visible. They certainly were known by then to city councilors, Silene Valini and Rita Xavier.

Pancho's interactions with the local legislature became gradually more hostile over time. While Sylvio had supplied the council with monthly documentation of all City Hall expenses, referred to by the councilors as the 'synthetic' and the 'analytic' balance sheets, Pancho sent only the synthetic version for the first two months of his administration, then neither thereafter. These documents serve different purposes: the 'synthetic' balance sheet provides an overview of City Hall finances; the 'analytic' itemises expenses and includes the names of all of the employees and City Hall suppliers. 'We could not see who he paid, so we could not supervise as the Câmara is supposed to,' recalls Silene. 'We really denounced it. Then he didn't send any more.'

Rita Xavier, then president of the council, remembers that Pancho sent a vast number of projects to the Câmara for approval, and always sent them late on Fridays. On Mondays, when the council was due to review new plans, few council members would have considered the Friday submissions in any detail, and often members would not have opened the files at all.

In these ways, Pancho frequently frustrated the Câmera, but until CGU auditors appeared in Itapuí, the council had no more than suspicions of Pancho's mismanagement of the public coffers. When the CGU arrived, so did representatives of the São Paulo state Court of Accounts. The latter were far more interested in the administration of a huge education program called Fundef, which morphed into Fundeb in January 2006. (The CGU report of Itapuí federal transfers does not contain any references to these programs, even though its reports of other lottery-selected municipalities do. It is

therefore possible that representatives of the two organisations may have decided to avoid duplicating each other's efforts.)

Rita Xavier recalls these concurrent visits, and it was certainly staff of the Court of Accounts, not the CGU, who left more of an impression. For one thing, the former asked her to allocate space for them in the city council building, whereas she did not know where the CGU auditors had based themselves[135]. The Court of Accounts were also focused on one objective—the Fundeb accounts—specially, says Silene, R$ 700,000 that was apparently diverted to pay for a metal bridge on 15 de Novembro street[136]. The State Court of Accounts representatives also interacted more with city councilors, and Rita remembers several conversations with a Japanese woman who offered her technical accounting advice: 'From the moment you get in there [as a council member] you see some wrong things…. The Court of Accounts pointed out mistakes, then through these mistakes we started to find a lot of things.'[137] In comparison, Rita says she has never seen Itapuí's CGU report, and mistakenly believes that she could not have. 'I at least, did not have access to this report. [If I had] I might have tried to find out about these things, right? Because it's interesting to us.' Silene has never seen the CGU report either[138].

In February 2007, by which time the presidency of the city council had moved to a man called Valdir Maia (PMDB)[139], Pancho's administration failed to transfer to the council its annual budget because City Hall needed the money to pay salaries and suppliers[140]. This

135 Xavier, R. 19 September 2016. In-person interview.
136 Valini, S. 18 September 2016. In-person interview.
137 Xavier, R. 19 September 2016. In-person interview.
138 Valini, S. 18 September 2016. In-person interview.
139 City council presidents are elected by the other council members for two years.
140 T. Melozo, 'Câmara de Itapuí pede afastamento de Gilberto Saggioro.' Comércio do Jahu. 6 April 2007. Available via: http://www.comerciodojahu.com.br/noticia/1167296/C%C3%A2mara+de+Itapu%C3%AD+pede+afastamento+de+Gilberto+Saggioro

led the council to complain to the public prosecutor in Jaú, who filed a civil suit against Pancho for administrative misconduct that was covered by the newspaper in Jaú[141]. Pancho lost, but City Hall only paid a small portion of the total amount owed, leading to another court ruling in April 2008, demanding payment of the rest[142]. As the 2008 elections drew closer, these issues died down, only for more concerning budgetary matters to arise almost immediately after October, once Pancho was guaranteed another term[143].

As city councilors, Rita Xavier and Silene Valini closely followed these events. But Cleuza, who had been out of office for almost 18 months when the CGU arrived, could not recall the CGU's visit[144]. She had heard that the State Court of Accounts had rejected City Hall's accounts, but did not know why or whether the rejection implied corruption in his case. She was also surprised on learning about the size of Fundeb funds that were misspent under Pancho. ('Oh? When you said "corruption", I thought "But it's just like that in Itapuí… there is so much corruption here in Itapuí, so much wrong, and a lot is unproven.'")

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141 Ibid.

142 R. Recchia. MP pede condenação de prefeito de Itapuí. Comércio do Jahu. 14 August 2009. Available via: http://www.comerciodojahu.com.br/noticia/1042172/MP+pede+condena%C3%A7%C3%A3o+de+prefeito+de+Itapu%C3%AD

143 In November 2008, the public prosecutor in Jaû, brought another case administrative misconduct against Pancho, this time alleging irregularities such as: nondisclosure of taxes collected, a low rate of recovery of loans, irregular cash advances to cover travel expenses, irregular bidding practices, longstanding 'precatórios' (debts the that local government does not have the funds to pay). This time the prosecutor was seeking the suspension of Pancho's political rights and to impose a fine. But the case was slow to move through the courts. However, in 2011, with two other cases against him ongoing, Pancho did lose these rights—pending an appeals process that was not exhausted until 2015—after the court heard that parts of Itapuí had no alternative but to dump raw sewage into two streams of the Tietê River, yet the City Hall had years before been granted R$ 2.8 million to build a sewage treatment plant by the state government. 'Itapuí: Justiça condena prefeito por falta de tratamento de esgoto. Prefeito foi condenado por impropidade administrative.', Folha de Ibitinga. 7 November 2011. Available at: http://www.folhadeibitinga.com.br/interna.php?id=1360&categoria=Escolha%20uma%20categoria

144 de Freitas Nascimento, C. 19 September 2016. In-person interview.

The above quote from Cleuza illustrates how the low salience of corruption in Itapuí is conditioned by expectations, which, in turn, are created through common understandings of recent history. When Cleuza calls to mind a corrupt mayor, it is not Pancho of whom she thinks, but Antonio César Simão, Itapuí's mayor throughout much of in the 1990s.

In 2011, Simão was sentenced in the first instance to 28 years, 9 months and 25 days in prison for fraud. He oversaw a rigged bidding scheme from 1995 to 1999 in which Danro, a local construction company, won 26 of 27 tenders for road repair services in Itapuí[145][146]. All of these services were in fact carried out by the state Department of Roads and by employees of City Hall. Simão approved the payments to Danro, and issued false statements that the company had completed the works. These complaints were first heard in court in Jaú in 2000[147] and covered in the Jaú newspaper. That was five months before municipal government elections. Nevertheless, Simão came a close second to Sylvio in the 2000 mayoral contest, and Cleuza, Sylvio's running mate at the time, insists that corruption did not feature in the campaign. For this reason, it is reasonable to conclude that corruption is less salient in Itapuí than in Itapeva or Salto. Even The Court of Accounts' rejections of Pancho's accounts 'were a grain of sand in the ocean' says the 2013-16 PSDB deputy mayor, Guido Lanza[148][149].

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145 T*eixeira, J. H.* 'Ex-prefeito de Itapuí é condenado a 28 anos de prisão.' Jau News. 22 May 2011. Available via: http://jaunews.com.br/noticias/regiao/541/ex-prefeito-de-itapui-e-condenado-a-28-anos-de-prisao.html

146 Evidence suggests that Simão served little if any of this sentence, since he is now living in Santos (according to his Facebook page).

147 Cunha, J. '*Licitação irregular.' JCNET* 12 May 2000. Available via: http://www.jcnet.com.br/editorias_noticias.php?codigo=20136&ano=2000&p=

148 Guido Lanza. 20 September 2016. In-person interview.

As deputy mayor, Cleuza found that businessmen in Itapuí would arrive at City Hall for discussions about public works with the assumption that the mayor would require an 'incentive' to accept their bid of about 10% of the project costs. Sylvio would leave open his office door, and usher Cleuza inside the room, she says, to try to make it known that he turned these offers down[150]. Back then it was impossible for the municipality to even purchase bus tires on credit, because Simão left City Hall with no credibility in the eyes of regional suppliers[151].

Information Flow in Itapuí

How did politically engaged women perceive voters' understandings of Pancho's misdeeds, and how did they perceive the salience of the violations during the period when these women may have considered running for mayor, given the opportunity? In his first term, say both Silene and Rita Xavier, only Pancho's staff and members of the municipal council suspected some of the violations that were eventually revealed; voters did not[152][153]. The public perception of Pancho as corrupt grew stronger during this second term[154].

Nonetheless, this hurt Pancho's popularity very little. Most voters, says Rita Xavier, see Pancho as a man of "good heart" and blame his advisors for mismanagement of the public purse, noting that one advisor in particular has many companies today. Silene,

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149 In the words of Seline's secretary: 'Corruption falls on people's lips, but it does not influence them.'
150 de Freitas Nascimento, C. 19 September 2016. In-person interview.
151 ibid
152 Xavier, R. 19 September 2016. In-person interview
153 Valini, S. 18 September 2016. In-person interview.
154 ibid.

Cleuza, Amantini, and Maria Clélia Pichelli[155] concur with this view. When pressed as to why this is the case, the answer is not that Pancho provided a compensatory amount of public goods, but because Pancho retains charismatic legitimacy:

> 'People are very cultureless in the interior, it seems the less they know the better. And people do not really care. [In Pancho's second term] He would pack his car full of people to go to Sao Paulo, to the night clubs for two or three days—and the hotels costs, nossa!'[156]

All of the politically engaged women interviewed emphasised word of mouth as the primary route by which voters learn about local politics. But if word of mouth is the main avenue through which information flows in Itapuí, who determines how current events are framed? The answer appears to be powerful local businessmen and the church.

Bianca Giordana Zaniratto, editor of the Comércio do Jahu, and Alcir Zago, the main reporter covering Itapuí, state that they keep an eye on proceedings in the local Court of Justice and the state Court of Accounts. Even they were not aware of the CGU's findings[157]. In Pancho's first term, the paper's only negative coverage of his administration was thus his failure to transfer from the City Hall accounts the lion's share of the Camara's budget. Bianca and Alcir point out that Comércio do Jahu's coverage tends to be selectively amplified in Itapuí. Before smart phones became widespread (which includes the period before the 2008 election), individuals connected to news stories about Itapuí would travel to Jaú to either buy up print copies of the paper for the purposes of destroying them, or, if the news portrayed them favorably, visit a copy shop

[155] Clélia Pichelli is a nurse and prominent member of the community at the time of Pancho's re-election, who in 2016 became deputy mayor. Clélia Pichelli. 19 September 2016. In-person interview.
[156] Xavier, R. 19 September 2016. In-person interview
[157] Zaniratto, B and Zago, A. 20 September 2016. In-person interview.

to augment the possibilities for disseminating the news back in the municipality. The individuals who do this are usually local business owners, presumably receiving some kind of preferential treatment from a political association in Itapuí[158].

Amantini says that criticisms of Pancho are frequently met with the retort that he created many jobs. The priests and pastors of Itapuí's many churches have influence in the framing of local public discourse, and Pancho's prolific job creation resonated (perhaps ironically) with their pre-existing message about the benefits of an honest day's work. Priests and pasters in the municipality pay close attention to whom among the prominent figures in local politics attend their services[159]. The Catholic church has the technical means to highlight activities that benefit these individuals over those who do not attend, via the daily announcements over its loud tannoy system in Itapuí's main square. Every evening at about 6pm, the Catholic church's tannoy system reports upcoming social and religious events; the sound reverberates around the town square. Relative to Pancho, Amantini reports being treated unfavorably in this regard because he does not attend a church, and because his attempts to reduce the municipality's debt 'shows no heart'[160].

Candidacy Decisions

The weak salience of corruption was not the only factor discouraging women from considering challenging Pancho in the 2008 elections. Sileni would have had to stand for a party other than the PSDB, as Amantini essentially owned the local branch, and was determined to run against Pancho himself. But finding a party to represent on paper was

158 ibid
159 Amantini, J. 20 September 2016. In-person interview.
160 Amantini, J. 20 September 2016. In-person interview.

not a significant barrier. Silene felt her management skills were not yet up to the job. Cleuza's choice was determined, she says, by the passing of her husband, primarily because this affected voters' perceptions of her. 'With "widow" there is this label, the woman who is separated, the woman who is… it would not happen to a man.'[161] Cleuza thinks that a man who lost his wife would receive sympathy, and be considered as more empathetic by voters as a result—and while voters are also sympathetic to a woman whose husband has died, a widow's political vigor is assumed to have ebbed with her husband's passing.

Cleuza's mayoral candidacy in 2004 alerted her to the power of economic interests in local elections. She recalls several businessmen from the industrial part of town approaching her, including one who turned up at her home before 8am one morning, and pressed the intercom incessantly. 'He was very vindictive,' she says. 'He said there was a situation in which he could not openly express himself or take sides.' Trying to remain above the fray cost her votes in 2004, she believes.

Rita Xavier considered running in the 2008 mayoral election. But her motivation wavered, in part because she would have had to find the funds for a campaign, and because she learned through her presidency of the city council how difficult Pancho was prepared to make her life if she challenged him[162]:

[161] de Freitas Nascimento, C. 19 September 2016. In-person interview.
[162] In her words: 'A gente até brinca assim, que ganha a eleição quem paga a última pinga, aqui na cidade.' ('The person who wins the election here is the one who buys the last drink.') Xavier, R. 19 September 2016. In-person interview

> 'When I won the council presidency, I went to talk to him. I said, "Gilberto, I'm here…" because I'm always someone who likes to help. And then he was kind of thirsting for revenge, something like that, not with me, but with various things. He said, "Either you follow me or I fuck you." I said that the council would approve things, but that we wouldn't approve projects that were wrong for the town. Imagine… it's public money… He said "Well are you going to play with me? If this is a game, we'll play." And he put me to work in a rural school, about 15km from here. He did it to hurt me. The public official is subordinate the mayor, right? So he does what he wants. He then filed a lawsuit against me, claiming that I could not be both a civil servant and the president of the city council. My lawyer had to make a presentation and I won, but I felt very persecuted. I had 25 years of public service, without even a warning. Several months later, I called Gilberto to say I could not stand being so far away from town, that posting me there was waste of public money. He picked up the phone and said, "Is there a tree there?" It was a rural school so of course there were plenty of trees. "Then talk to the little leaf falling from the tree."

Despite Pancho's intimidation, an owner of the one of the small firms in the industrial district almost convinced Rita to throw her hat into the ring, only he soon demanded favours that she was unwilling to grant.

> 'When I left as president, there was a businessman who came to speak to me. "Rita, come on – you made history! You were the first woman, right? Let's do it – be the first woman mayor!"… People never help you out without some ulterior motive. They give with one hand, take with the other. It started with a little chat. I want something… No, I prefer to stay out of it, for moral integrity.'[163]

Sure that she was not going to register a mayoral candidacy in 2008, Rita Xavier switched political parties to the PSDB, to support Amantini's mayoral bid.

In summary, although political recruitment in Itapuí is clearly gendered in various ways, these women were not primarily discouraged from challenging Pancho in 2008 by the realisation that, as women, they lacked established relationships in networks that negotiate power behind the scenes in Itapuí. Nor did such a realisation discourage locally powerful individuals from encouraging these women to have a go. Rita Xavier was

[163] Xavier, R. 19 September 2016. In-person interview.

invited into such a relationship, as Cleuza had been before. Rather than the mechanisms frequently described in feminist institutionalist scholarship concerning corruption and political recruitment, the main factors in these women's decisions not to run were intimidation by the incumbent, and a preference to avoid such relationships. Perhaps underlying the later was an unvoiced understanding that the local context was one that combined widely held injunctive gender stereotypes and systemic corruption. Such a combination not only suggests that the odds were stacked against women's long run success in mayoral office, but also that a woman who gets the job, and tries to produce public goods and services as mayor through existing networks, risks social shunning.

Discussion

This chapter has provided an opportunity for reflection on both the plausibility of my explanations for the results presented in Chapter 4, and on applicability of the revised framework presented in Chapter 2. Two municipalities—Itapeva and Salto—with female mayoral candidates and AM radio stations, had very different levels of corruption by a male incumbent. They provide impressionistic support for the idea that voter demand for candidates presenting as 'typical women' rises where elections are candidate-centric, voters have incentives to seek a less corruptible alternative to the male incumbent, and voters generally hold traditional gender stereotypes—including the female incorruptibility stereotype.

Intriguingly, the schedule of candidacy decisions conveyed in interviews closely matches the results of marginal effects graphs in Figure 4.4—although it is still wise to interpret the shifts in significance in those graphs cautiously. In Figure 4.4, an increase in the

proportion of votes for female candidates was predicted for the second half of the electoral cycle, which became a stronger and remained significant until the next election. The predicted change in the proportion of female candidates did not perfectly track this pattern; it lost significance in March of the electoral year[164]. And notably, he consensus among actors engaged in municipal politics in the three municipalities discussed in this chapter, was that candidacies are often announced early in the electoral year. As such, selectorates typically make decisions at about that time, or shortly prior.

The case of Itapuí also helped to make sense of the results in Chapter 4. There, elites had little awareness of the CGU's report, and certainly did not know what it uncovered. This offers a suggestion as to why hypotheses articulated in Chapter 4, which were developed from feminist institutionalist studies into corruption and political recruitment, were not reflected in Figure 4.3 (in the marginal effects graphs for municipalities with no AM radio station). It is perfectly possible that in districts where voters remain in the dark about male incumbent corruption, and a CGU report leads to the updating of priors about the gendered nature of local political recruitment and its association with corruption[165], a reduction in the proportion of female candidates does occur. Although in Itapuí this did not happen, other events led political engaged women to update their priors about how intertwined corruption and political recruitment are locally, and this discouraged their participation in mayoral elections. From the information available, these women did have opportunity, but, at least in some cases, anticipated voters' injunctive stereotyping.

[164] And thus several months before the legal deadline for candidacy registration.
[165] In the heads of politically engaged women and / or actors who might encourage women to run.

From what was revealed during the interviews, it is possible to sketch actors' shared understandings of routinised stages towards candidacy. Applying the revised framework to the two illustrative case studies with female candidates suggests pathways of recruitment as in Figure 5.4. Given limited resources available for fieldwork, Figure 5.4 is not offered as a final word on the matter; I am self-consciously working with sparse examples.

For PSOL in Salto, identifying routinised stages prior to candidacy and election was simple, as other party members corroborated the process of selection that Rita explained (see the top panel of Figure 5.4). For Itapeva, with its many weakly institutionalised parties, the process was more challenging. What was commonly understood and accepted by political engaged actors had to be pieced together from many more interviews, and is certainly open to contest.

In an ecosystem of modular parties[166], stages of recruitment prior to candidacy generally occur outside of formal party structures. Just as routinised stages towards candidacy exist in parallel in weakly institutionalised parties, these can be understood as signifiers of increased odds of candidacy for all locally present modular parties. Hence, if one were to sketch multiple, de facto recruitment pathways for several parties together (the bottom panel of Figure 5.4), the stages prior to candidacy would be the same as for one modular party. Note that there are not limitless routes to candidacy for weakly organised parties in Itapeva. It is common knowledge among locally engaged political actors, for example, that civic organisations have not produced mayoral candidates, but that business and legislative politics regularly do—just as these citizens share the understanding that a well-


166 Lucas M. Novaes, (2018) 'Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties: Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 84–98.

known family name with positive connotations is a prerequisite for candidacy for any weakly institutionalised party.

In his thesis[167], Novaes describes how such parties and local notables join up for elections, according to what they each estimate the advantages of the association to be. Local notables interested in candidacy conduct backroom discussions with selectorates, to get a sense of the resources that the party could furnish them with—such that they may maintain and grow their 'module' of personalistic support. Party selectorates survey the field of available free-agents, and estimate how many votes each potential candidate would bring. From this perspective, Terezinha's performance in the state legislative elections of 2002 served as a signifier. Even though she did not win a seat in the state legislature that year, the election enumerated her personal support base among Itapeva's voters to the selectorates of modular parties in Itapeva, who viewed her as an enviable option for candidacy.


[167] Lucas M. Novaes, 'Modular Parties: Party Systems with Detachable Clienteles', PhD Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2015.

PSOL in Salto



m = formal party membership
ex = expression of interest in party meeting

Modular parties in Itapeva



f = membership of a well known local family
leg = winning a substantial number of votes in legislative elections
bus = prominence in local business
c_n = candidacy for any modular party

Figure 5.4. A visual summary of political recruitment in a highly institutionalised party in Salto (PSOL), and the many weakly institutionalised parties in Itapeva (e.g. PFL). 'r' = 'the represented', 's' = a routinised stage, 'c' = 'candidacy', 'e' = elected.

Chapter 6:

What Happens When Elections are Rerun?

Introduction

Chapters 4 and 5 emphasised the empirical relevance of influences on progression between the candidacy and election stages of recruitment, and feedbacks emerging from these influences, which are downplayed by much of the literature about women's political recruitment—yet, as I have argued, often relevant in candidate-centric contexts. In contrast, this chapter probes how generalisable the new framework is by reflecting upon how well it travels to situations where the stages and influences on progression face disruption. This occurs when elections happen outside of the normal electoral calendar.

Off-cycle elections for local executive posts in Brazil are typically rerun elections: they occur after electoral courts decide to cancel election results. The vast majority of rerun elections analysed here—which were held in any year from 2004 to 2016, inclusive, as required after the voiding of the results of 'on-cycle' mayoral contests in the years 2004, 2008 and 2012—were held in response to a court ruling pertaining to improper behaviour, oftentimes some form of corruption, by the disqualified incumbent[1]. As such, this chapter also builds on Chapters 4 and 5 by analysing women's political prospects in the wake of information about male incumbent corruption. However, unlike in the two previous empirical chapters, I do not take local media to be the instrument of voter

[1] As will be expanded upon in the descriptive statistics section of this chapter, for 83.7% of rerun elections in the dataset analysed in this chapter, an identifiable reason for the declaring the original election null and void could be found online. Among these cases, 50.6% pertained to vote buying. Fewer were held for other reasons. For example, 3.9% were deemed necessary due to the cancelled incumbent having been elected for a third term in a row—one more term than is legally permitted.

knowledge about the previous winner's malfeasance. Instead, I argue in this chapter that where voting is compulsory, merely being required to vote at an unexpected time, and for one election in isolation—as distinct from the experience of voting in on-cycle elections, when casting a vote for mayor always accompanies casting one for a municipal legislator—serves as a signal to voters that something is amiss. Thus, I address some of the same questions as in previous chapters without concerns about potential bias in media coverage.

The signal that something is amiss gains probabilistic specificity according to the candidate list for the rerun election. If a disqualified incumbent is a candidate in the rerun, I argue that his or her inclusion serves as a signal to voters. This signal undermines the plausibility or diminishes the seriousness of any rumours of corruption: it communicates that this individual has not been proven to have acted illegally. Yet where a disqualified incumbent is absent from the rerun candidate list, voters assume that he or she was responsible for the electoral authorities' decision to repeat the election, and more often than not, that he or she committed corruption of some sort. Therefore, only the latter scenario brings incentives for voters to elect a less corruptible individual, all things being equal, as long as the scope conditions outlined in Chapter 4 are met. Due to the female incorruptibility stereotype being widely held among Brazilian voters, when a disqualified incumbent who does not stand in the rerun is male, I anticipate that voter demand for female candidates will rise.

The chapter begins with an examination of how the revised framework described in Chapter 2 travels to off-cycle elections, and formally lays out my expectations as to how the rerunning of elections should affect the stages of political recruitment and the influences on progression across them. This chapter does not consider all forms of

corruption on a single scale as Chapter 4 did, by operationalising corruption in terms of relative amounts of monetary value. Here types of improper act involving the disqualified incumbent (and / or his deputy)[2] are considered categorically in the quantitative analyses. Some categories are clearly cases of corruption in the eyes of ordinary citizens, such as vote buying, whereas some are more ambiguous—for example, 'abuse of political or economic power' and 'rejected accounts'.

Furthermore, this chapter goes some way towards disassembling the female incorruptibility heuristic into the possible components outlined by Tiffany Barnes et al[3]—risk-aversion, honesty and outsider status—by identifying a group of female candidates who voters understand as clear-cut examples of political insiders: female rerun candidates who are married to the disqualified male incumbent. My main expectation is that the women who do well in rerun elections in which a disqualified male incumbent is not competing—in contexts where the scope conditions required for a rational actor to seek a less corruptible replacement are met—will not be these women. If this is the case, it will indicate that voters commonly consider gendered opportunities for corruption in their evaluations of female candidates[4].

Using a dataset of rerun mayoral elections between 2004 and 2016 that was constructed especially for the analyses in this chapter, I find that the proportion of female candidates is indeed higher in rerun elections than in on-cycle, original contests. I then consider

[2] Under Brazilian law, whenever either of a mayor or a vice-mayor—and either of a mayoral candidate or a running mate—is disqualified, they both are automatically disqualified.
[3] i.e. those of outsider status (implying few opportunities for corrupt behaviour), and the essentialist qualities of risk-aversion and honesty / purity). See: Tiffany D Barnes, Emily Beaulieu, and Gregory W. Saxton. (2018) 'Restoring Trust in the Police: Why Female Officers Reduce Suspicions of Corruption.' *Governance*, vol. 31, pp. 143– 161.
[4] In other words, in line with the findings of Barnes et al. See: Ibid. Note that this is in spite of the fact that participants in semi-structured interviews who provided material for the case studies in this thesis overwhelming cited essential differences between men and women when they were asked to reflect on their reasons for perceiving women as generally less corruptible than men.

female candidates' competitiveness, by predicting the change in the proportion of votes for female candidates from original to rerun elections, controlling for the change in the proportion of female candidates. I find that vote buying by a disqualified male incumbent who is not a rerun candidate is indeed associated with an increase in female candidates' competitiveness. The coefficients for the other reasons for rerunning an election—all less assuredly cases of corruption in the eyes of Brazilian voters than vote buying—are not significant at the 95% level in these models. As anticipated, these results are found when a disqualified male incumbent is not a rerun candidate, but do not occur when a disqualified male incumbent stands in the rerun. Similarly, the inclusion of the female spouse of the disqualified male incumbent reduces the overall competitiveness of female rerun candidates.

In the latter part of the chapter, I explore the dynamics of how gender features in rerun elections through two short, illustrative case studies of races that were held in the municipalities of Pires do Rio and Goiatuba, both in the state of Goiás. In both of these examples, a disqualified male incumbent was involved in vote buying, and did not stand in the rerun while a female candidate did. In Goiatuba, the female candidate was the spouse of the disqualified male incumbent; in Pires do Rio, she was not. These illustrative case studies offer an opportunity to explore the plausibility of the mechanism that I propose as an explanation of my quantitative results—and they begin to probe how candidacy and voting decisions are made in rerun elections in Brazil.

Rerun Elections

There is very little published, peer-reviewed research that seeks to explore the dynamics and outcomes of rerun elections[5]. While some scholarship does consider by-elections ('special elections', in U.S. English) as a topic of investigation[6], there is some disagreement as to whether the definition of by-elections includes elections held as a consequence of the results of an original election being invalidated[7]. In any case, the vast majority of studies of off-cycle elections of which I am aware focus on countries where the voiding of election results is very rare, and far more typical reasons for holding these contests[8] are incumbent resignations, deaths or retirements[9].

In Brazil, there are many grounds for the electoral authorities to cancel the results of a mayoral election and run it again, which, for the purposes of the quantitative analyses in this chapter, I coded as five categories based on the level of information that is usually available in online reports of rerun elections. These categories are: vote buying, abuse of

[5] The only exceptions to this are occasional accounts of particular rerun elections, though in the few studies I have found the researchers' interest is not the fact that the election is occurring outside of the normal electoral calendar.
[6] For example: Elizabeth Evans, (2012) 'Selecting the 'Right Sort': Patterns of Political Recruitment in British By-elections'. *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 195–213.
[7] The Oxford English Dictionary defines by-elections as 'the choice of a parliamentary representative at a time other than that of a General Election'. It defines special elections in similarly broad terms: 'an election held at an unusual or unexpected time, as when an incumbent resigns or dies'. However, the Cambridge Dictionary offers a narrower definition of a by-election that specifies the reasons for the off-cycle election, and so excludes rerun elections: 'in the UK, an election that happens at a different time from a main election, to choose a Member of Parliament to replace one who has died or left his or her job'.
[8] Note that here I do not consider elections in some parliamentary systems that can be called at the time of choosing of the majority party leadership to be off-cycle elections. In countries where this occurs, the timing of the election will always be somewhat predictable because it should follow a rationale of advantage to the majority party (as is sometimes referred to as 'political surfing')—for example, extending the majority party's period in office by synchronising the election date with the business cycle, or shoring up the size of a parliamentary majority in advance of an important vote. Rerun elections occur without this rationale of anticipated advantage, and so are far less predictable. As a result, parties must at shorter notice adapt their processes of candidate recruitment.
[9] In the case of local executives in Brazil, a vice-mayor is at hand to take over in such situations.

political or economic power, rejected public accounts, too many consecutive terms, and no identifiable reason. Whatever the grounds for the nullification of votes that were previously deemed to be valid, the Brazilian Electoral Code of 1965 states that whenever more than half of the votes cast are voided, a new election must be held within 20 to 40 days[10]. The Superior Electoral Court has since interpreted this to mean more than 50% of the *valid* votes cast, ignoring those originally deemed to be spoiled or blank ballots[11]. Thus, prior to further developments of the law that occurred in 2015, explained further below, a rerun election was automatically triggered in municipalities with more than 200,000 voters if the incumbent's votes were voided, because the provision for a run-off election logically implies that nullifying the winner's votes will invalidate more than 50% of valid votes.

However, the situation was more complex prior to 2015 for smaller municipalities where mayoral elections follow simple plurality rules. In these cases, it is possible for an incumbent's votes to be voided and for more than 50% of the valid votes in the original election to remain valid. In such a situation, the disqualified incumbent was replaced by the runner-up candidate in the original election[12]. In 2015, the law changed in this respect; an electoral reform[13] required that rerun elections be held whenever a mayor is

[10] Article 224 of The Electoral Code (Law 4.737/1965). Note that in Brazil the exact period between the nullification of the original election and the timing of the rerun election usual depends on how long it is until the next first Sunday of the month. By the end of each year, the Superior Electoral Court defines the electoral calendar for the year to come, listing one day each month for the holding of supplementary elections, which is typically the first Sunday of the month. Then, if a Regional Electoral Court decides that a supplementary election is necessary, the election is scheduled for the day is listed in the Superior Electoral Court annual calendar that falls with 20 to 40 days of the nullification. Regional Electoral Courts must announce this date when they announce the requirement to hold the rerun, which they do by issuing a resolution.
[11] Curiously, this implies that if all voters bar one were to spoil their ballots a candidate in Brazil could, in theory, elect themselves. See: Edmar. (29 September 2016). 'Mais de 50% dos votos nulos não anulam uma eleição' [Blog post]. Retrieved from https://edmar-direito.blogspot.com/2016/09/mais-de-50-dos-votos-nulos-nao-anulam29.html
[12] Paula Liga Martins Kurukawa, personal communication, 1 July 2019.
[13] Article 224 of the Electoral Code (Law 4.737/1965).

removed from office, regardless of the percentage of voided votes—in effect aligning the rules for municipalities without the possibility of run-off elections with the rules for municipalities with sufficiently large populations to hold them.

Empirically, none of the broad categories by which I code reasons for the voiding of election results automatically lead—at least not throughout the period of my analysis—to the disqualified incumbent being unable to compete in the rerun election[14]. This fact makes possible the evaluation of the hypotheses in this chapter. Since December 2018, however, which is beyond the period over which my dataset extends, this is supposed to have changed, as the Superior Electoral Court ruled[15] that a candidate who causes the invalidation of a poll cannot take part in the supplementary elections that follow.

Legally, the circumstances under which electoral courts prevent a citizen from contesting an upcoming election are complex. The winner of an election may be retrospectively disqualified from that contest if one of various legal conditions—including literacy, Brazilian nationality, residency in the district in which one wishes to compete—is subsequently found to have been wanting. Depending on the problem and whether it is satisfactorily resolved, the individual may or may not be permitted to compete in a rerun contest. Some circumstances that prompt the invalidation of election results are straightforwardly linked to a disqualified incumbent having the right to run again or not. For example, mayors can lose their political rights if they receive a criminal sentence and have exhausted all appeals. Occasionally, reruns are called in response to shortcomings in the administration of the original election, which are no candidate's fault, yet could have advantaged some over others. Citizens learning the specifics of why a disqualified winner

[14] Table 6.1 later in this chapter details the frequencies of disqualified incumbents competing in rerun elections, for each reason for nullification.
[15] Superior Electoral Court case law reference: REspe 4297.

is or is not a candidate in the rerun does not pose a problem for my theory, as long as the information does not lead voters to understand that having definitely committed serious corruption, the disqualified incumbent is allowed to compete in the rerun—or vice versa, that having definitely done nothing wrong, in some miscarriage of justice, the original winner is arbitrarily barred from the rerun.

Brazilian law saw various developments in this area over the period of my analysis. One of the most significant came in June 2010 with the President Lula's signing of the 'Ficha Limpa' law[16], which led to revisions in the text of the 'Ineligibility Law'[17]. As noted in Chapter 5, Ficha Limpa translates as 'Clean Slate' or 'Clean Record', and prevents anyone who has been impeached in public office, resigned to avoid impeachment, or was convicted of various offenses by more than one judge (and often even if legal appeals are not exhausted), from holding public office for the next eight years. Again, however, there is nuance as to what kind of behaviours prevent an incumbent who was disqualified after June 2010 from competing in the rerun. If a municipality's accounts are rejected by the state electoral court, 'grave irregularity arising from intentional act' on the part of the mayor is the standard for Ficha Limpa to apply. Similarly, convictions in response to 'a crime against public trust', and a 'crime against popular economy' are possible, though only experts—not ordinary citizens—are likely to have an instinct as to whether any particular activity meets the legal threshold. A mayor convicted of abuse of economic or political power may still compete unless the final legal decision on the matter has been taken[18].

[16] Supplementary Law 135/2010. Note that this law came into force on 4 June 2010, despite some debate about whether it could be so quickly applied. As such it was relevant to anyone who sought candidacy in rerun elections after 4 June 2010. Andreia Carmo, personal communication, 16 July, 2019.
[17] Complementary Law 64/1990.
[18] Paula Liga Martins Kurukawa, personal communication, 1 July 2019.

A couple of legal developments have also affected, directly or indirectly, the ability of spouses of prominent politicians to compete successfully in rerun elections. In 2013[19], the deadline by which parties can replace their candidates prior to elections changed, such that modifications to the candidate list could no longer occur within 20 days of the election. This was to prevent campaigning by a popular candidate, who was clearly not allowed to run, and who the party long intended to replace with a less well-known figure, just before the poll. Oftentimes, the replacement was a spouse or other close family member, and would occur too late for electronic voting machines to be updated[20]. In 2015, the Supreme Court set an important precedent in the interpretation of the Constitution with respect to an individual's right to compete in a supplementary election that is because of their spouse's—rather than their own—'abuse of economic power'. The Court ruled that both members of the married couple should not be allowed to compete[21]. Although this decision is likely to have guided how electoral courts evaluate similar cases, it does not straightforwardly prevent someone from standing in a rerun election that was called due to their spouse's behavior[22] (although there are no examples in my dataset of spouses of disqualified incumbents competing in such circumstances after 2015).

Deploying the Renovated Framework in This Context

While there is no scholarship of which I am aware that focuses on rerun elections, the literature on by-elections and special elections reveals some generalities about women's

[19] Law 12.891/2013.
[20] Paula Liga Martins Kurukawa, personal communication, 1 July 2019.
[21] Specifically, this ruling was an extensive reinterpretation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which states that those who cannot compete in a run-off election cannot be replaced by their spouse. Extraordinary Appeal 843455/2015.
[22] Paula Liga Martins Kurukawa, personal communication, 1 July 2019.

participation and success in off-cycle contests. Frequently, when scholars have analysed women's fortunes in off-cycle elections, they have reported that female candidates are rather successful, although the reasons postulated for this vary. In order to generate hypotheses relevant to off-cycle—or 'supplementary', as they are called in Portuguese[23]—mayoral elections in Brazil, I first locate existing explanations for women's success in off-cycle elections within the revised framework. Then, given what is known about the Brazilian case, I consider which of the noted dynamics are likely to apply to my case.

Incumbency and risk aversion are two prominent explanations in the literature as to why women tend to do well in off-cycle elections compared to on-cycle elections. For example, in the United States, where there is a strong incumbency advantage in House races, the success of female candidates in special elections has been attributed to the absence of incumbents, who are disproportionately male[24]. Indeed, between 1979 and 1992, a third of women entering the U.S. House of Representatives arrived through special elections[25]. David Nixon and Robert Darcy note that, during this period, women who stood in these contests were high-quality candidates: they were more likely to have previously held significant elected office than the men who stood. This finding led the authors to propose that the ability to enter an election comfortable in the knowledge that if one were to lose one would retain another elected office, was especially attractive to female candidates—whom they characterise as particularly risk averse[26].

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23 This is a fairly recent term. It was introduced with the 2015 reforms to article 224. Previously they were called 'renovação das eleições'.
24 R. K Gaddie. & Bullock, C. S. I. (1997). Structural and Elite Features in Open Seat and Special U. S. House Elections: Is There a Sexual Bias? *Political Research Quarterly, 50*(2), pp.459-468
25 David L. Nixon & R. Darcy (1996) Special Elections and the Growth of Women's Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives, Women & Politics, 16:4, pp.99-107.
26 'This significantly reduced level of risk should attract greater levels of risk-averse professional candidates, often women,' they write. It is unclear if they view this in essentialist terms, or whether they understand different levels of risk aversion as a rational response to gendered differences in the odds of winning back voter support after a defeat. Ibid. p. 99.

The absence of incumbents has also been cited as a reason for women's success in British by-elections[27], though a study by Jorgen Rasmussen[28] located the influence of risk-aversion differently. In the U.K. over the six decades between 1918 and 1978, women were not only more likely to run in by-elections, but also found more success in these races: they enjoyed a 27.5% victory rate during that period relative to a 21.7% rate in general elections[29]. Rasmussen argues that variation in the risk aversion of party selectorates—as opposed to candidates—was an important cause of this difference. He shows that selectorates were more willing to choose a female candidate for a marginal seat in a by-election than in a general election throughout those six decades, especially in the case of the Labour party[30]. This led to greater odds of women being elected in by-elections because women selected to run in safe seats ('safe', that is, for another party) were commonly 'sacrificial lambs'—they could be 'safe' in the knowledge that the party they represented was very likely to lose in that constituency.

Formal, highly institutionalised parties[31] tend to have special candidate selection rules for off-cycle elections that enable them to maneuver around the time-consuming processes of on-cycle recruitment—which is necessary because off-cycle election schedules tend to be much more condensed. Often, these off-cycle candidate-selection rules curtail local

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27 Pippa Norris, British By-Elections: the volatile electorate, (Oxford: OUP, 1990), pp. 165.
28 I. Crewe, 'By-elections Since 1983: did they Matter?', in Cook, C. and J. Ramsden, Eds., *British By-elections*, (London: UCL Press, 1997). pp. 244–268.
29 Jorgen I Rasmussen, (1981) 'Women Candidates in British By-elections: A Rational Choice Interpretation of Electoral Behaviour', *Political Studies*, 29, pp. 265–274.
30 Because 'perhaps… [party selectorates] feel that less is at stake in a by-election and, therefore, a greater risk can be tolerated'. In other words, a shift in what Norris and Lovenduski would have called 'indirect discrimination'. Note that marginal seats in this context carry higher odds of success for women than safe seats. Rasmussen writes: 'Perversely, this should be regarded as being in a woman's favour, for were she involved in a contest for a safe seat it almost certainly would be as the challenger.' Ibid. pp. 272.
31 To use the means of categorisation referred to in Chapter 2. As per: Flavia Freidenberg and Steven Levitsky, 'Chapter 9: Informal Institutions and Party Organization in Latin America', in Steve Levitsky and Gretchen Helmke, eds., *Informal Institutions in Latin America*, (Washington DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2006).

party institutions' influence up to and including the stage of applying to become a candidate[32]. In the U.K., all political parties adapt their on-cycle candidate selection rules for by-elections to give the party's central office more sway[33]. For example, in the case of the Conservative Party, the central party organisation presents the local association with a shortlist of three names from which it may pick, and at least during a reform period under David Cameron's leadership, the centre saw this as an opportunity to deliberately boost women's descriptive representation[34]. Beyond this, there is little information available about the process by which the Conservative Party generates by-election shortlists[35]. According to Elizabeth Evans, U.K. parties' by-election selection rules often lead to tensions between local and national offices, and to local party activists eliding female candidates with unwelcome meddling from the centre[36], much as Meryl Kenny found for Scottish Labour's twinning scheme[37]. Impacts on women's descriptive representation aside, the literature notes other peculiarities of off-cycle elections, including the tendency for 'insider status' to increase one's odds of winning candidacy[38], and for 'trouble-makers'[39]—candidates who do not represent any established party—to enter and sway the political debate in contexts where traditional parties usually set the agenda.

Two elements are virtually absent from the existing literature on off-cycle elections, which are important to reflect upon for the purposes of deploying my revised

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32 Although, of course, party membership and at least demonstration of interest in being a by-election candidate are required.
33 Elizabeth Evans, Selecting the 'Right Sort'. pp. 195–213.
34 Although the party stopped short of all-female shortlists.
35 Elizabeth Evans, personal communication, 6 July 2019.
36 Elizabeth Evans, Selecting the 'Right Sort' pp. 208.
37 Meryl Kenny, *Gender and Political Recruitment: Theorizing Institutional Change,* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).
38 Elizabeth Evans, Selecting the 'Right Sort' pp. 202.
39 This has been noted in Australian by-elections. See: Nicholas M. Economou, (1999) 'The Trouble-maker's Ballot Box? A Note on the Evolving Role of the Australian Federal By-election', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 239-247.

framework. One is a thorough exploration of the role of timing of an off-cycle election within the electoral calendar. The only publication of which I am aware that directly addresses the relevance of timing is Michael Rush's *Parliamentary Affairs* paper from 1973, which is primarily concerned with strategic choices of the incumbent party's Chief Whip regarding the gap between a vacancy appearing and a by-election being held[40]. However, in most countries, including Brazil, the period elapsing is much more firmly constrained by electoral law than in the U.K. context, and is not responsive to the preferences of the incumbent party. A more relevant concern regarding the timing of off-cycle elections is therefore when, in relation to the next election (which selectorates had been planning towards) an off-cycle election is called. The second gap in the literature is the absence of investigations into how de facto candidate recruitment is adapted for off-cycle elections in diverse party types, as opposed to the adaptations of formal, highly institutionalised parties such as the U.K. Conservative party, for which there are written rules in place.

Taking these two lacunae together, the revised framework outlined in Chapter 2 anticipates that the degree of disruption to on-cycle recruitment practices caused by the timing of an off-cycle election will vary by party type. Moreover, there are reasons to expect that the recruitment processes of highly institutionalised yet informal parties will be most sensitive to when in the electoral cycle an off-cycle contest is called, because, with a single routinised pathway, there is little innate flexibility in the process. Potentially, alternative pathways may need to be temporarily conjured up, without written guidance, and thus he sooner in the regular electoral cycle that this unexpected election occurs, the more these parties' recruitment processes will resemble those of weakly institutionalised parties.

[40] Michael Rush (1973) 'The Timing of By-Elections', *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 27, pp. 44-66.

Adaptations to recruitment processes in informal, highly institutionalised parties should depend on the electoral calendar because off-cycle elections are generally insufficiently frequent for actors to develop common expectations as to the party's playbook for recruitment in such circumstances. If an off-cycle election is called merely a few months before the next on-cycle election, the routinised stages and processes of recruitment within the party will require less adaptation; it is more possible for the latter part of a process that was almost complete to be expedited, with no difference in outcomes. However, if the party is suddenly faced with the need to find a candidate years in advance of when previously envisaged, the requirement may discombobulate the selectorate, and others who influence candidate recruitment. In this instance, once an off-cycle election is called, the brief period available to find a candidate may allow for little option other than to pluck someone who had not fulfilled all of the usual qualifying criteria for candidacy, and so bypass some elements of what has been routinised over regular, on-cycle contests. In other words, it requires creating an alternative pathway of recruitment in a party that is supposed to have only one. Therefore, early timing of off-cycle elections is likely to force informal, highly institutionalised parties to at least temporarily develop recruitment practices that are similar to weakly institutionalised parties.

The recruitment practices of the other two types of political party discussed in Chapter 2 should be less affected. As previously mentioned, formal, highly institutionalised parties will typically have special off-cycle recruitment rules, and if so will stick to them irrespective of when an off-cycle election occurs. For these parties, although off-cycle elections do disrupt normal recruitment processes, the ways in which they do so should not be sensitive to the electoral calendar, as the off-cycle recruitment procedures are the same, whenever they occur. For weakly institutionalised parties, off-cycle elections

should present little change to recruitment. Selectorates of these parties look to several pathways of recruitment and so have options. And as these pathways are especially likely to consist of stages outside of the party, potential candidates are likely to pursue progress along them with less of an eye on the electoral calendar (than if there were a single pathway internal to the party, for example). Unless a selectorate picks as a candidate in a rerun election an individual who has progressed along not one of the routinised parallel paths of candidate recruitment, local actors will have no reason to update their priors.

What do these insights imply for how off-cycle elections are likely to influence women's descriptive representation at the level of Brazilian local executives? General advantages accrued to female candidates due to the absence of incumbents among rerun candidates should not exist. First because any incumbency advantage would not show up as such in the data—my dataset shows that disqualified incumbents run in approximately half of off-cycle mayoral elections in Brazil, in contrast to off-cycle elections in the U.S. and U.K (when they basically never run). And second because there appears to be no incumbency advantage to becoming a mayor in Brazil[41]. So in races in which incumbents are absent there is no reason to anticipate that female candidates will benefit relative to when (overwhelmingly male) incumbents are present, all else equal. It is possible that variation in risk aversion on the part of selectorates may benefit women's chances of becoming a candidate in off-cycle elections, though. For this to be the case, selectorates would have to view female mayoral candidacies as riskier prospects for the party than male mayoral candidates, and also consider the stakes in off-cycle mayoral elections to be

[41] If anything, there is a disadvantage. The most thorough analysis is: Rocío Titiunik, (2011) 'Incumbency Advantage in Brazil: Evidence from Municipal Mayor Elections', *Working Paper*.

lower than in on-cycle contests—which is possible given that the time spent in office by an off-cycle victor is shorter.[42].

There are a few other aspects of off-cycle mayoral elections in Brazil that may affect women's presence and competitiveness in these elections, relative to on-cycle races. The law states that a new election date must be announced within 20 and 40 days of the invalidation of the original election results, and so the campaign period for off-cycle elections is much shorter than it is for on-cycle elections. On the one hand, therefore, overall campaign costs should be lower for off-cycle elections, and thus more affordable to candidates who typically struggle to raise a competitive war chest for on-cycle campaigns, a group that includes women. On the other hand, as there is less time to become known to the electorate, pre-existing local celebrity status is likely to be an even more valuable electoral commodity in supplementary elections than it is in on-cycle campaigns. In so far as men disproportionately occupy such positions at the municipal level, which may or not be the case, this suggests that on average male candidates should draw an advantage, all things equal.

In summary, although there are some reasons to expect that off-cycle mayoral elections in Brazil may promote increases in women's descriptive representation, there are also a

[42] As such, the spoils of office holding should be smaller. There is some evidence of risk-averse behaviour driving candidacy choices among Brazilian politicians, which is not specific to female politicians: the similar proportion of municipal politicians, especially city councillors, to state deputies who enter federal deputy races is explained by Luis Felipe Miguel and colleagues by the non-coinciding timetable of municipal elections vis-à-vis state and federal races. This 30.9% of federal deputy candidates (in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 elections) who at the time were city councillors, knew that they would keep their municipal position if defeated. (Even though the paper from which this information is drawn is about gender and the trajectory of political careers in Brazil, there is no analysis in it of whether the described behaviour is more common among female municipal-level politicians, all things equal, than male municipal-level politicians.) See: Luis Felipe Miguel, Danusa Marques, and Carlos Machado (2015) 'Capital Familiar e Carreira Política No Brasil: Gênero, Partido e Região Nas Trajetórias Para a Câmara Dos Deputados', *Dados*. Vol. 58, no. 3, pp.730.

priori reasons—such as the absence of incumbency advantage—to doubt such an effect, or to doubt its strength. The arguments presented so far, however, do not consider the context in which off-cycle elections are called. My main argument in this chapter is that when this contextual variable is considered, there are commonplace circumstances to off-cycle elections in Brazil that should encourage voters to support female candidates—namely vote-buying by disqualified male incumbents. As previously noted, regional electoral courts deem the vast majority of off-cycle mayoral elections in Brazil necessary because of some type of improper behaviour by an incumbent. If voters understand the context of the off-cycle election to be corruption by a disqualified male incumbent, the forces articulated in the heuristics and voting behaviour literature should operate under the same scope conditions as outlined in Chapter 4.

As such, in the regression analyses in this chapter, I again seek to evaluate the plausibility of the same mechanism as was indicated to be important in Chapter 4: that when elections are candidate-centric, and voters understand that a male incumbent has engaged in corruption, and when the scope conditions of the argument are satisfied, the activation of the commonly held female incorruptibility stereotype will lead to an increase in women's descriptive representation. Here, however, I move away from relying on media as the instrument of voter knowledge. The Brazilian context is particularly helpful in this sense because voting is compulsory. Whenever an off-cycle mayoral election is held, the entire local population of voting age—discounting non-compulsory voting for illiterates, those between 16-18 years of age, and over 70[43]—should, from the act of voting itself if not before, become aware that something is amiss. Not only is an election occurring at a strange time, but it is held when neighbouring municipalities are not engaged in the same endeavour, and, unlike on-cycle contests, there is no concurrent task of casting a vote for

[43] Voting is optional for these groups.

a city councilor. Whether or not local political news is primarily delivered through radio, TV, sound car, or word-of-mouth, these facts are available to everyone who votes.

One more key item of information is available to voters in a rerun election: whether the disqualified incumbent is a candidate. Given that it is rare to find a Brazilian who cannot name the mayor of their municipality, it is highly likely that voters will notice the presence or absence of an incumbent's candidacy. I also expect voters to assume that a disqualified incumbent will stand in an off-cycle election if permitted, especially if his mandate has just been cut short by the election authorities. Therefore, when the disqualified incumbent is not an off-cycle election candidate, voters should take this as a signal that the electoral authorities have for some reason prevented the candidacy, and that the disqualified incumbent did something illegal.

In the Brazilian context, I expect that without further information, many voters will assume corruption to be the reason why a disqualified incumbent would be barred from competing again. And because the female incorruptibility stereotype is widely held among Brazilian voters, and mayoral elections are highly personalistic, I anticipate that this will lead to a rise in voter demand for female candidates. But if the circumstances are slightly different, these effects should not exist: voters will not be motivated to seek a less corruptible alternative if the disqualified incumbent is a candidate in the off-cycle election, because his candidacy will serve as a signal that he has not been found to have done anything illegal. Even if there are rumours about his misdemeanors in office or during the election campaign, the fact that he can run will sow doubt as to the rumours' veracity and / or the seriousness of his wrongdoing.

This proposal as to how voters use the facts available to them requires one more piece of information to set it within the revised or renovated framework, described in Chapter 2. Consideration must be given to when voters may become aware of a disqualified incumbent's participation in a rerun election. This information allows me to form expectations about the potential for feedback mechanisms, emanating from shifts in voter demand for female candidates, to affect women's progression to candidacy for the rerun election.

As previously mentioned, a few specific circumstances of election-result invalidation are strongly predictive of whether a disqualified incumbent will have the right to compete in a supplementary election. If one of these occurs, politically well-informed actors may respond by shifting their willingness to support a female candidate immediately after the male incumbent's disqualification. An attentive selectorate may be able to anticipate changes in demand for female candidates. Moreover, early knowledge of whether the disqualified incumbent will be a candidate is likely to weigh on the decisions of mayoral aspirants—and those who may encourage or discourage them—as to whether throwing their hat into the ring is worthwhile. In other words, various feedback mechanisms could operate to increase women's progression towards candidacy in time to affect who becomes a candidate in the rerun election. If this very frequently happens[44], I may find that any increase in the proportion of votes for female candidates from the original to the rerun election is matched by a rise in the proportion of female candidates.

However, I expect constraints on feedback mechanisms to frequently operate in these contexts. It is likely to be far more typical for the disqualified incumbent's status as a rerun candidate to be unclear essentially to potentially all actors (including the

[44] Indeed, the results of Chapter 4 suggest feedback mechanisms often operate.

disqualified incumbent himself) until close to the date when all rerun candidacies are announced. Even actors who pay great attention to local political developments and have full information about the reason for the disqualification, will, prior to this date—because of complex nuances in the law governing the right to stand as a candidate, as previously outlined—very often be faced with ambiguity as to whether these circumstances permit the incumbent's candidacy. Therefore, even these highly informed individuals among voters, aspirants and selectorates alike are likely to update their priors as to the seriousness of incumbent wrongdoing, or the veracity of rumours about it, when there is little or no time left for them to use it to influence candidate selection. This is why I expect that increases in the proportion of female candidates between original and rerun elections will be on average smaller than increases in voter demand for female candidates. In other words, I anticipate an increase in the competitiveness of female candidates: a rise in women's vote share, over and above any rise in women's proportional candidacies. This focus on women's relative competitiveness informs the hypotheses below:

Hypothesis 1: When a disqualified male incumbent is not a candidate in a rerun election, the competitiveness of female candidates in the rerun election will rise, relative to the original election.

Hypothesis 1 assumes that voters take the mere absence of a disqualified incumbent to indicate corruption, as opposed to some form of non-corrupt illegality that could prevent a rerun candidacy. To be sure, word is likely to get around, even without any local media, as to why the original election results were voided, and the content of local news or street-level narratives may clarify whether corruption or something else prompted the holding of a supplementary election. Where the disqualified incumbent is not a rerun

candidate, and these narratives are widely understood by voters to communicate his corruption, there will be an incentive for voters to seek a less corruptible candidate.

Of the common categories of reasons for voiding election results in my dataset, which pertain to some sort of incumbent malfeasance—vote buying, abuse of political or economic power, and rejected public accounts—I anticipate that vote buying will be most effective at activating the female incorruptibility stereotype. This is because, of the three, I expect it will be most straightforwardly understood by voters to be a form of corruption. And I expect that local news or gossip with often disseminate the reason for rerunning the election.

I chose these three categories for analysis because these phrases are often the full extent of the published information that is available about the circumstances surrounding the voiding of mayoral election results, both in media reports and in regional electoral court announcements stating the need for supplementary election[45]. Therefore, voters facing the decision of whether a disqualified incumbent who is not a rerun candidate because of vote buying actually acted corruptly are essentially assessing whether the phrase 'vote buying' counts as corruption in their minds, rather than assessing the slippery empirical details of individual vote-buying exchanges. In other words, they are not reflecting upon descriptions of targeted favours or goods provision promised to a small group sometime in the future, and then asking themselves whether, if this guarantees electoral support, it counts as corruption as much as a present-day cash payment to an individual much more

[45] Note that 'abuse of economic power' is technically a separate offense under Brazilian law from 'abuse of political power'. Although frequently the type of abuse of power is mentioned in media reports, very often both are mentioned together—as in 'abuse of political and economic power'—and sometimes only the phrase 'abuse of power' is used. This is why I code these offenses as a single category.

clearly does[46]. Moreover, in assessing the phrase 'vote buying' in connection with the need for a rerun election, ordinary citizens will be primed to hear it as an epithet of incumbent electoral lawbreaking—in effect, the context should filter out the wider range of meanings that the practice of vote-buying can have in Brazil[47]. The same points apply to the phrases 'abuse of political or economic power', and 'rejected public accounts'.

Although I not aware of any research that has compared citizen understandings of these three phrases, for several reasons I expect voters to be more certain that vote buying is corruption than the other two. To begin with, interviews conducted in Itapeva, Salto and Itapuí strongly suggested that voters struggle to make sense of 'abuse of power' and 'rejected public accounts'. For example, former deputy mayor Cleuza de Freitas Nascimento did not consider Pancho to have necessarily acted corruptly based on the São Paulo regional electoral court's rejection of Itapuí's accounts in all eight years that he was mayor. Indeed, technically, there are many reasons why a municipality's accounts may be rejected that do not fall within commonly used definitions of corruption, such as Transparency International's 'abuse of entrusted power for private gain'. And although citizens may assume some kind of personal gain upon hearing that a disqualified incumbent engaged in 'abuse of power', without further information this is an

[46] In the context of Brazil, Speck writes: 'The more individual the negotiation, the more material the compensation and the more immediate the exchange, the more evident will be the purchase of votes…the definition loses clarity as we approach long-term commitments, collective benefits, and non-material returns.' See: Bruno Wilhelm Speck, (2003) 'A Compra de Votos: Uma Aproximação Empírica', *Opinião Pública*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 148–69.

[47] This has explored in the ethnographic work of Mariana Borges, who argues that vote buying can follow a logic of largesse rather than the economic logic of efficiency as much of the political science literature assumes. In Sertão, in the state of Bahia, she shows that brokers know to never deny a request from a voter. The purpose of this indiscriminate allocation of particularistic the point of view of a political candidate is the cultivation of impressions of the candidate's power—whether they are a serious contender and an indication of how they would handle citizen demands in office—rather than the straightforward purchase of a vote. The purpose of the exchange from the point of view of the voter is therefore both a material benefit, and information about the cultural competence of a candidate in terms of how well he or she has mastered the local etiquette of how goods should be distributed. See: Mariana Borges, 'Vote Buying and Impression Management: Performing Largess in Northeast Brazil', Working Paper, with permission to cite. 30 July 2018 version.

assumption, and will therefore carry greater ambiguity than learning that an individual gained the prestige and power of mayoral office because they purchased votes.

Demonstrated social desirability bias also works as a counterpoint to studies that have recently expanded academic interpretation of vote-buying[48]: the fact that results of list experiments often report much higher levels of vote buying than do survey responses[49] shows that whatever the broader meanings of vote buying may be, citizens nonetheless associate it with social shame and/or illegality. In the case of Brazil, there are various estimates of the frequency with which citizens sell their votes[50]. In one such study Bruno Speck argues that criminal investigations of vote buying should be not viewed as an indication of vote buying's incidence, but instead of when the secrecy of the transaction has broken down, which may occur as a result of rising social disapproval of the phenomenon[51]. This point is pertinent to the sample of municipalities that have had to rerun elections because it suggests that citizens of these places are perhaps especially likely to see vote buying as a form of corruption. Hence:

Hypothesis 2: When a disqualified male incumbent is not a candidate in a rerun election, and a reason for voiding the original election results was vote buying, the competitiveness of female candidates relative to the original election will rise more than it does when a rerun is called because of abuse of power or rejected public accounts.

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48 Ibid.

49 Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio, and David W. Nickerson, (2012) 'Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 202–17.

50 Speck reports: 'Considering that [my] survey checked only some modalities of the purchase of votes [in Brazil], the number of 13.9%, that is, one in every 7 voters declares receive some type of offer to market the vote, is a cause for concern'. See: Speck, 'A Compra de Votos: Uma Aproximação Empírica', pp. 148–69.

51 Ibid.

Just as I anticipate variation in voters' understandings of the different reasons for holding a rerun election, I also anticipate variation in how voters view different female candidates, specifically in terms of whether the candidate is the spouse of the disqualified male incumbent. There are advantages to a party in fielding a spouse if a disqualified incumbent is not allowed to stand in a rerun election and is still popular[52]. In a personalistic system, and even more so among parties for which the disqualified incumbent acted as a charismatic leader, the most reliable way for the party to maintain voter support is to symbolically avoid attempting to transfer it altogether by identifying a successor who voters will see as offering a continuation of the previous incumbent's mandate. Historically[53], wives of disqualified male incumbents have been especially likely individuals to be seen in this light in Brazil. Even in the U.S., where off-cycle elections are often due to an incumbent's death as opposed to disqualification, widows have been commonly fielded in special elections, and have been remarkably successful candidates, because, in the words of Lisa Solowiej and Thomas Binghamton, 'a spouse can be seen as an extension of the recently deceased incumbent'[54].

Where incentives to seek the least corruptible candidate exist, women who represent a rascal who voters intend to kick out should not poll well. As the wife of the disqualified incumbent often shares a surname with him, her status in this sense is cheaply available

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[52] For example, in a systemically corruption environment where voters consider all candidates as indistinguishably corruptible.

[53] Alterman Blay and Soreiro write that the 1966 mayoral elections saw an increase in the number of women selected; many of the newly elected women were wives of politicians who had been prohibited from standing in 1964. See: Eva Alterman Blay and Susan A. Soeiro, (1979) 'The Political Participation of Women in Brazil: Female Mayors,' *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society,* vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 42-59.

[54] Solowiej and Brunell report that in the U.S. before 1976, 73% of all women Senators, and 50% of Congresswomen, were widows when they became legislators, and that widows 'can circumvent the traditional pools that candidates are chosen from, and likewise get around the structural barriers that stand in the way of most women' (see p. 284). Lisa Solowiej and Thomas Brunell, (2003) 'The Entrance of Women to the U.S. Congress: The Widow Effect', Political Research Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 283–292.

information with which voters can update their priors. In essence, being the wife of the disqualified male incumbent disaggregates the female incorruptibility stereotype into its essentialist components—those of risk aversion and purity or honesty—from the socialisation component—being an outsider to traditional politics—because these candidates will be viewed as having access to the same corrupt networks as their husbands. I expect voters to take into account the perceived opportunities to engage in corruption that insiders have, even if they commonly state in interviews that they only hold essentialist understandings of the female incorruptibility stereotype. Moreover, the wife of the disqualified incumbent may be an impromptu replacement, and as such may be a poorly qualified[55] candidate in the eyes of voters next to other aspirants who have been biding their time for an opportunity. For these reasons, I propose Hypothesis 3:

Hypothesis 3: When a female spouse of the disqualified male incumbent stands in the rerun election, the overall competitiveness of female candidates will decrease relative to the original election.

These three hypotheses also require that a series of scope conditions are met: voters must believe information about incumbent corruption, consider the corruption to be counter to their interests, display no or limited willingness to engage in implicit trading, and understand corruption to not be completely systemic in their voting district—and, as such, that less corruptible candidates exist. Whereas in Chapter 4 I reflected on these assumptions across the whole of Brazil, and drew on studies of incumbent replacement as evidence that they are valid assumptions, here my sample is different: it is the subset of municipalities that have had election results voided.

[55] For example, in the sense that they may be likely to have previously held public office.

I expect voters in this subset to believe rumours of incumbent vote buying and other transgressions because supporting evidence—the absence of the incumbent among rerun candidates—is a self-evident fact. Moreover, the courts in Brazil are widely perceived as independent[56]. However, I have little reason to be as confident as I was in Chapter 4 that the other scope conditions will be met. Vote buying is in the short-term economic interests of those citizens who sell their vote[57]—and so Hypothesis 2 assumes these people are a minority of voters, and that most voters disapprove of the practice[58]. (In working with CGU audits, Chapter 4 dealt with corruption that had occurred in the execution of public office, as opposed to during the campaign—and so ignored vote buying.) Similarly, this sample of municipalities is probably more corrupt than is average for municipalities across Brazil[59], and so the assumption of non-systemic corruption should be interrogated even more closely.

I evaluate the three hypotheses using a dataset that is described in the next section. Then I move on to explain the empirical strategy and results from these regressions, and

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[56] On this point, Brazilians distinguish between the judiciary as a guarantor of the fairness of the electoral process (in which they have high confidence), and the judiciary's role in resolving conflicts in other areas (Brazilian distrust the judiciary in this sense). See: Joaquim Falcão and Fabiana Luci de Oliveira, (2012) 'Poder Judiciário e Competição Política: As Eleições de 2010 e a Lei Da "Ficha-Limpa', *Opinião Pública*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 337–54.

[57] And as discussed, can have more nuanced meanings than just a particularistic, material exchange for ballot support.

[58] Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, and David W. Nickerson, (2014) 'The Conditionality of Vote-Buying Norms: Experimental Evidence from Latin America', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 58, pp. 197-21.

[59] I am not aware of any published analysis of this. When the CGU audit results are merged with the rerun election list, only six municipalities were audited in the same electoral cycle as they held a rerun election—too small a proportion of the total to base any assessment on. Only 30 were audited by the CGU at anytime between 2003 and 2009, and for these there is little difference in the average proportion of audited funds found to be involved in violations, compared to municipalities that did not hold a rerun election. However, some of these audits will have occurred after the electoral cycle with a rerun election, and thus when voters have been motivated to chose a less corrupt mayor. Other scholars have shown that municipalities with supplementary elections tend to have small populations and poor education. See: Bruno Souza Garcia, 'Eleições Suplementares para Prefeito (2013-2015): do perfil socioeconômico dos municípios ao comportamento eleitoral e partidário', Masters Thesis, 2016, Instituto de Filosofia, Sociologia e Política, da Universidade Federal de Pelotas.

discuss various descriptive statistics about off-cycle elections in Brazil. These contribute basic knowledge about contests for which I there is sorely little information otherwise available, as well as assisting with the interpretation of regression results and the characterisation of the two cases in the qualitative part of the chapter.

Data and Empirical Strategy

Brazil is a rare democracy in that off-cycle elections are sufficiently common for quantitative analysis of the differences between off-cycle elections and on-cycle elections to be a worthwhile project. Off-cycle election data is available from the Superior Electoral Court's (TSE) website. This source includes the names and valid vote totals of the candidates, dates of off-cycle elections, and municipality names.

Data for the years 2004 to 2016 were downloaded and merged with on-cycle election data for the years 2004 to 2012 inclusive, by drawing the latter from my main dataset. To identify rerun elections in which a disqualified incumbent stood as a candidate, I matched the two datasets using municipality codes and the full names (as opposed to ballot names) of rerun candidates and previous on-cycle election victors[60]. The reason or reasons[61] given for the invalidation of the original election results, and whether one of the candidates in the supplementary election was the spouse of the disqualified incumbent—my two main explanatory variables—were coded by conducting internet

[60] As there were only 283 rerun elections, I also investigated similar names by conducting internet searches, to ensure that no cases were missed.

[61] Because more than one of my three categories was sometimes cited the reason for a supplementary election, in the coding of the reasons as dummy variables, a rerun election could receive a 1 for vote buying, a 1 for abuse of power, and a 1 for rejected public accounts (indeed, there are 13 elections in the dataset coded in this way, with three reasons, and 26 coded as having two reasons). This is why I chose to use a series of dummy variables rather than a single categorical variable.

searches for court documents and news articles relating to each of the 283 off-cycle elections in the dataset. In 46 of these elections, no reason could be located for the invalidation of the original election results. I found 26 supplementary elections in which the wife of a disqualified male incumbent competed. To be sure, I have no way of knowing whether this is the true number of disqualified incumbent wives. However, where a female candidate was the spouse of the disqualified incumbent, this detail generally appeared in news articles alongside the first mention of her name—implying it is considered information that is of primary importance about the candidate—as opposed to appearing as secondary information about her in later paragraphs. This suggests I coded nearly all, if not all, of the cases of spousal candidacies. Of the 283 rerun elections in the dataset, 185 were examples of rerun elections occurring after a male incumbent was disqualified, for which the reason for the voiding of the original election could be ascertained. I run the models on these cases.

Descriptive Statistics of Rerun Elections

Table 6.1 reveals key differences between municipalities that have held supplementary elections and those that never did between 2004 and 2016. As the literature on off-cycle elections is thin outside of the UK and US contexts, there is value in highlighting here some of the distinguishing features of districts that held rerun elections in Brazil. Table 6.1 clearly shows that municipalities that have had to repeat mayoral elections tend to be smaller by population size than those that have not had to. This is especially true—as the

literature anticipates[62]—for those where vote buying was a reason for the rerunning. These municipalities also have slightly lower levels of human development, on average[63].

Later-disqualified on-cycle election victors have high margins of victory. By comparison, the average margin of victory of rerun elections is much more similar to that of on-cycle elections that did not need rerunning. Curiously, the frequency with which a woman won an on-cycle election among those that were rerun is much higher than the frequency with which female candidates generally win on-cycle elections—a detail that may prompt inquiry in the future, though the number of these disqualified female incumbents is low for quantitative analysis. Similarly, disqualified female incumbents stand more frequently in rerun elections than disqualified male incumbents[64].

Table 6.1 also reveals patterns associated with the reasons for the electoral authorities invalidating the original election results. For example, when wives of disqualified male incumbents are fielded as candidates, they tend to stand when the reason for the rerun was vote buying and / or rejection of public accounts, but not after their husband's votes were voided because he abused his political or economic power. The frequency of supplementary elections varies across the electoral cycle[65], such that they are more common early on[66].

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62 Simeon Nichter, (2008) 'Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot', *American Political Science Review,* vol. 102, no. 1, pp. 19-31.

63 Perhaps surprisingly, there is little overall difference in the proportion that have a AM radio station.

64 Presumably, either they may have engaged in less serious wrongdoing, or the electoral authorities may have more readily received complaints for any given misdemeanour.

65 This pattern is due to cases of vote buying—which, as it must have occurred during the campaign, is unsurprisingly a cause of invalidations early in the electoral cycle—as well as to cases of rejected public accounts. One possible explanation for the left-skew of the distribution of the rejected public accounts (indicating that these cases happen early in the electoral cycle) is that many investigations of public accounts may refer to an incumbent's previous office holding. Abuses of power are distributed evenly over the electoral cycle. Given that original election results can be voided for multiple reasons, it is worth noting that correlation analysis of my three

Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics comparing municipalities that held at least one rerun election between 2004 to 2016, inclusive, to municipalities that did not.

Descriptive Statistics	Municipalities with no rerun election (2004-2012)	Municipalities with a rerun election	Original election cancelled due to vote-buying	Original election cancelled due to abuse of power	Original election cancelled due to rejected public accounts	Original election cancelled due to incumbent 3rd term	No reason located for original election cancellation
N (% of rerun total)	5,285	283	120 (42.4%)	96 (33.9%)	59 (20.8%)	11 (3.9%)	46 (16.3%)
Average population	34092.73 (204162.72)	22597.85 (44834.90)	14487.24 (26367.18)	23508.59 (41902.08)	24647.12 (43556.62)	30903.09 (31056.11)	32066.05 (77338.39)
Average HDI	0.6486 (0.0746)	0.6335 (0.0889)	0.6194 (0.0899)	0.6276 (0.0882)	0.6319 (0.0942)	0.5697 (0.0938)	0.6569 (0.0879)
% with AM radio station	21.58% (41.14%)	21.74% (41.32%)	17.50% (38.15%)	18.75% (39.24%)	16.95% (37.84%)	54.55% (52.22%)	28.57% (45.72%)
% Disqualified incumbents were female	9.45% (29.17%)	20.65% (44.00%)	22.5% (43.89%)	18.75% (44.27%)	33.90% (51.23%)	18.18% (40.45%)	11.90% (39.52%)
% Disqualified female incumbents in rerun	N/A	69.39% (46.57%)	48.00% (50.99%)	64.29% (49.72%)	94.44% (23.57%)	100.00% (0.00%)	66.67% (57.74%)
% Disqualified male incumbents in rerun	N/A	41.26% (49.34%)	40.43% (49.34%)	35.00% (48.00%)	47.50% (50.57%)	33.33% (50.00%)	42.11% (50.04%)
% Rerun elections with wife candidates, when disqualified incumbent husband not standing	N/A	6.87% (25.39%)	7.14% (25.99%)	1.92% (13.87%)	9.52% (30.08%)	0% (0.00%)	9.09% (29.42%)
Average victory margin in original election (%)	17.70% (18.48%)	31.69% (54.86%)	34.98% (46.32%)	38.88% (44.81%)	26.36% (60.96%)	2.53% (57.25%)	17.93% (72.35%)
Average victory margin in rerun election (%)	N/A	18.92% (23.86%)	17.33% (24.15%)	17.73% (21.69%)	19.38% (26.50%)	18.26% (25.80%)	26.95% (29.46%)
Average number of months after original election	N/A	16.73 (10.76)	19.48 (9.45)	21.69 (11.36)	13.67 (10.54)	12.64 (11.23)	11.22 (9.10)
% Change in proportion of female candidates; disqualified male incumbent in rerun	N/A	3.50% (18.30%)	3.57% (20.61%)	-2.98% (18.59%)	1.05% (8.30%)	15.00% (13.23%)	9.69% (22.48%)
No. rerun election candidates as a proportion of no. original candidates; disqualified male incumbent in rerun	N/A	0.9725 (0.5679)	0.9673 (0.5673)	0.8619 (0.5426)	0.8496 (0.4865)	1.2500 (0.7500)	1.1563 (0.7799)
% Change in proportion of female candidates; disqualified male incumbent not in rerun	N/A	4.95% (20.44%)	3.48% (20.75%)	3.11% (17.29%)	2.54% (19.35%)	-5.56% (22.77%)	9.85% (24.48%)
No. rerun election candidates as a proportion of no. original candidates; disqualified male incumbent not in rerun	N/A	1.3188 (0.6118)	1.2420 (0.6064)	1.3061 (0.5857)	1.2341 (0.6099)	1.1250 (0.5420)	1.5591 (0.7042)

To account for secular trends, the numbers for municipalities with no rerun elections have been weighted by the relative frequency with which different original election years appear in the rerun election dataset. Of the 283 rerun elections, 27 were prompted by the nullification of the results of a 2004 original election, 146 were prompted by the nullification of the results of a 2008 original election, and 110 by the nullification of 2012 election results.

The most relevant patterns in Table 6.1 to this chapter's arguments are changes in the proportion of female mayoral candidates. Table 6.1 shows that, on average, this proportion increases in rerun elections relative to the previous on-cycle contest in the same municipality, when the winner of the invalidated election was a man. Moreover, the average increase in the proportion of female candidates is slightly greater when the disqualified male incumbent is not a candidate in the rerun election[67]. It is also worth noting, however, that the number of candidates varies between rerun races with and without a disqualified male incumbent. When this individual does not stand in a rerun election, his absence is associated with a higher total number of candidates—perhaps because the contest is perceived as more open than usual[68]. These patterns inform the estimation approach described in the next section. There, I explain how I leverage the data described above to evaluate Hypotheses 1 to 3, using OLS regression.

The Dependent Variable and Estimation Approach

In the models that follow, the dependent variable is the change in the proportion of votes for female candidates between the original election that was voided, and the rerun election. I consider this to be an indicator of 'competitiveness' by controlling for the

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categories reveals negative correlations that are significant at the 1% level for all pair-wise combinations, indicating that multiple reasons for the invalidation of election results are rare.

[66] The most common combination is abuse of power and vote buying, most likely because under some circumstances vote buying can also be abuse of economic power.

[67] Especially so if the nullification occurred due to abuse of power. One might imagine that this is associated with patronage networks to which women generally struggle to gain access. Thus, in line with feminist institutionalist expectations detailed in Chapter 4, when 'abuse of power' is a reason for rerunning an election and the male original winner is a rerun candidate, women aspirant or selectorates may be put off female candidacy.

[68] Note that my comments ignore rerun elections resulting from the authorities noticing the incumbent had won a third consecutive term, for which some patterns are different. Because of the paucity of these cases (3.9% of the total, see Table 6.1), I leave them out of these broader discussions.

change in the proportion of female candidates across these contests. In the base model, Model 1, I also control for the change in the total number of candidates, having noted in the previous section that when a disqualified male incumbent is not a candidate in the rerun election, the total number of candidates tends to rise. When he does stand in rerun election, this variable thus tends to fall slightly, but more so for some kinds of incumbent wrongdoing—abuse of power and rejected public accounts—than for others. A measure of variation in the number of candidates may also offer some degree of control for variation in candidate quality[69]. All things equal, one might expect that the more candidates in an election, the lower the average level of candidate quality.

Model 1 contains several more variables, all of them binary. The year of the original on-cycle election is included to account for secular change[70]. A 'ficha limpa' dummy variable carries a value of 1 for all rerun elections that occurred after changes in the law lowered the threshold for malfeasance that is sufficient to bar elected officials from competing in future elections for eight years. Similarly, a '2015' variable is included because of the legal example set by the Supreme Court's decision regarding spouses competing in rerun elections, and the electoral reforms of in that year[71].

The estimation approach then proceeds by adding variables that indicate the presence or absence of the incumbent, and interacting his presence or absence with different reasons for calling the rerun election. A 'Reasons for Rerun' model (Model 6) brings together these interactions, along with the presence or absence of the disqualified incumbent's

[69] This is a challenge for these analyses as the data source for supplementary elections contains far less candidate information than the data for on-cycle elections.
[70] I decided against adding a more fine-grained measure as over-specification of the models was concern, given the number of cases in the analysis.
[71] As noted earlier in the chapter, there was a change in the rules for off-cycle elections for municipalities with populations of less than 200,000 where the invalidated votes of the disqualified incumbent amounted to less than 50% of the total. All of the municipalities in my rerun elections dataset have populations under this ceiling.

wife among the rerun candidates. That model includes additional variables, such as the timing of the rerun election with respect to the electoral cycle[72], and the margin of victory of the winner of the original election over the second placed candidate, as a proportion of the total votes. If indeed votes that went to male disqualified incumbents instead go to female rerun candidates due to incorruptibility stereotyping, this variable—'original victory prop.'—should show a significant, positive coefficient when a disqualified male incumbent does not stand in the rerun.

In Full Models in the right-hand columns of Table 6.2 have been included to assess whether rerun context variables contribute to model fit over and above variables that the literature suggests are factors that predict variation in the dependent variable, or that may be associated with both the dependent variable and at least one of the explanatory variables used in other models. The Full Models also enable the assessment of potential changes in the size and significance of coefficients that are relevant to the three hypotheses when controls are added[73]. The variables added in the Full Models relate to: the electoral value of vote buying per voter (which informs the 'population' control), the availability of qualified women (elected, current female city councillors[74]), the availability of individuals who may be probabilistically viewed as outsiders to traditional politics (elected, current under-35 municipal councillors), media presence (AM radio), and population progressiveness (the interaction of municipal HDI and proportion of female voters, as detailed in Chapter 4).

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[72] One of the shortcomings of the TSE's supplementary election data is that is does not include candidates' parties. If it did, I would have explored interacting this variable with parties whose candidate recruitment processes my theory anticipates would be most disrupted by a rerun election called early in the electoral cycle.

[73] Given the potential for over-fitting, the results of the Full Models should be interpreted alongside models with fewer variables.

[74] Note that this variable is different to that used in Chapter 4, which employed the lagged version.

Robustness Checks

Standard robustness checks were performed to evaluate the assumptions of OLS regression for all of the models reported. As in Chapter 4, of particular concern was the potential for high-influence observations to bias average results. After dummying out all observations of concern (see the municipality-labeled leverage plot in the Appendix), and rerunning the models, however, I am confident that my findings are robust. As a result of functional form tests, I logged the variable controlling for the timing of the rerun election within the normal election cycle (which removed the significance of a hat-squared statistic).

The normality assumption was not satisfied in most of the model, although due to mesokurtosis, not because residuals were skewed, and so this was unlikely to severely affect parameter estimates and standard errors. The reason appeared to be the distribution of the dependent variable, with a high peak around zero (meaning that there was no change in the proportion of votes going to female candidates from the original to the rerun elections, often because there were no women candidates in either). I reran all models using only observations for which the dependent variable had non-zero values (N = 64), and found almost the same results[75].

[75] The conclusions regarding Hypotheses 1 and 2 were the same as for the full dataset. However, the coefficient for the dummy variable indicating that the wife of the disqualified incumbent was a candidate lost significance (Hypothesis 3).

Quantitative Results

The first hypothesis considered whether, whatever voters learn from the media or street-level narratives about the reason for the rerun election, the self-evident facts available to them are sufficient to increase their willingness of vote for female candidates. These self-evident facts are that an unusual election is taking place—unusual for its timing, the absence of a legislative ballot alongside the executive one, and for the absence of elections in neighboring municipalities—and that the disqualified incumbent is not a candidate in the rerun election. Hypothesis 1 expressed that because voters surmise from a disqualified male incumbent's absence among rerun candidates that he was involved in some sort of illegal activity—and probably some form of corruption—the competitiveness of women running in the rerun election should rise.

Hypothesis 1 is assessed in Table 6.2 models with the dummy variable 'disqualified incumbent running' (see, for example, Model 2). The coefficient is not close to significant, and as such the evidence is inconsistent with my expectation. The results suggest that, if voters' female incorruptibility stereotypes are to be activated, voters require more information about the circumstances of the original election's nullification than the bald facts listed in the paragraph above.

Table 6.2. OLS Models to evaluate Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.

DV: Change in the proportion of votes for female candidates	Base Model (Model 1)	Rerun Election Context Models							Full Models				
		Original winner (Model 2)	Vote-buying (Model 3)	Rejected Accounts (Model 4)	Abuse of Power (Model 5)	Reasons for Rerun (Model 6)	Wife (Model 7)	Rerun Context (Model 8)	No Wife or Vote-buying (Model 9)	With Vote-buying (Model 10)	Vote-buying and Margin (Model 11)	With Wife (Model 12)	With Rerun Context (Model 13)
Change in prop. female candidates	0.8292*** (0.0484)	0.8289*** (0.0479)	0.8272*** (0.0480)	0.8266*** (0.0486)	0.8382*** (0.0493)	0.8393*** (0.0488)	0.8596*** (0.0496)	0.8458*** (0.0503)	0.8284*** (0.0494)	0.8272*** (0.0487)	0.8038*** (0.0480)	0.8574*** (0.0505)	0.8399*** (0.0507)
Change in number of candidates	-0.0142 (0.0157)	-0.0115 (0.0165)	-0.0102 (0.0163)	-0.0125 (0.0166)	-0.0117 (0.0166)	-0.0114 (0.0164)	-0.0153 (0.0155)	-0.0140 (0.0170)	-0.0152 (0.0162)	-0.0120 (0.0168)	-0.0226 (0.0173)	-0.0170 (0.0161)	-0.0222 (0.0177)
Vote-buying	---	---	0.0585* (0.0227)	---	---	0.0634** (0.0241)	---	0.0523* (0.0241)	---	0.0652** (0.0233)	0.0593* (0.0229)	---	0.0633* (0.0248)
Disqualified incumbent in rerun	---	0.0102 (0.0192)	0.0375 (0.0263)	0.0032 (0.0219)	0.0101 (0.0238)	0.0316 (0.0422)	---	0.0182 (0.0498)	---	0.0409 (0.0267)	0.0116 (0.0369)	---	0.0137 (0.0510)
Vote-buying* Disqualified incumbent	---	---	-0.0500 (0.0352)	---	---	-0.0457 (0.0411)	---	-0.0399 (0.0411)	---	-0.0585 (0.0362)	-0.0529 (0.0354)	---	-0.0551 (0.0426)
Rejected accounts	---	---	---	-0.0440 (0.0293)	---	-0.0233 (0.0299)	---	0.0040 (0.0313)	---	---	---	---	0.0029 (0.0318)
Rejected accounts* Disqualified incumbent	---	---	---	0.0317 (0.0432)	---	0.0324 (0.0498)	---	0.0122 (0.0501)	---	---	---	---	0.0003 (0.0506)
Abuse of power	---	---	---	---	0.0211 (0.0241)	0.0364 (0.0249)	---	0.0095 (0.0260)	---	---	---	---	0.0149 (0.0265)
Abuse of power* Disqualified incumbent	---	---	---	---	0.0035 (0.0373)	-0.0050 (0.0411)	---	0.0199 (0.0410)	---	---	---	---	0.0065 (0.0420)
Wife in rerun	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.0921* (0.0394)	-0.0969* (0.0395)	---	---	---	-0.0896* (0.0404)	-0.0906* (0.0401)
Original victory prop.	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.0501* (0.0239)	---	---	0.0658** (0.211)	---	0.0590* (0.0226)
Original victory prop.* Disqualified incumbent	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.0351 (0.0467)	---	---	-0.0152 (0.0475)	---	-0.0132 (0.0502)
Ln months into electoral cycle	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.0162 (0.0184)	---	---	---	---	0.0121 (0.0188)
2008 original election	0.0062 (0.0334)	0.0076 (0.0336)	0.0112 (0.0334)	-0.0110 (0.0319)	0.0053 (0.0338)	0.0078 (0.0337)	0.0012 (0.0331)	-0.0041 (0.0333)	-0.0088 (0.0366)	-0.0093 (0.0364)	-0.0271 (0.0362)	-0.0115 (0.0362)	-0.0317 (0.0365)
2012 original election	-0.0222 (0.0349)	-0.0227 (0.0350)	-0.0169 (0.0347)	-0.0175 (0.0352)	-0.0254 (0.0352)	-0.0382 (0.0444)	-0.0260 (0.0346)	-0.0200 (0.0347)	-0.0462 (0.0444)	-0.0498 (0.0438)	-0.0632 (0.0433)	-0.0455 (0.0439)	-0.0622 (0.0440)
2015 dummy	0.0464 (0.0376)	0.0517 (0.0119)	0.0618 (0.0387)	0.0407 (0.0397)	0.0410 (0.0409)	0.0382 (0.0444)	0.0382 (0.0373)	0.0322 (0.0432)	0.0447 (0.0394)	0.0611 (0.0402)	0.0588 (0.0392)	0.0350 (0.0475)	0.0315 (0.0443)
Constant	0.0201 (0.0369)	0.0119 (0.0401)	-0.0249 (0.0421)	0.0192 (0.0406)	0.0052 (0.0406)	-0.0343 (0.0444)	0.0300 (0.0366)	-0.0571 (0.0694)	-0.9707 (1.803)	-0.8668 (0.0402)	-1.0317 (1.7412)	-0.6130 (1.7898)	-0.8157 (1.7958)
Adjusted R2	0.6232	0.6217	0.6315	0.6225	0.6202	0.6319	0.6323	0.6474	0.6160	0.6270	0.6453	0.6246	0.6479
N	185	185	185	185	185	185	185	185	185	185	185	185	185

Only cases of rerun elections in which a man won the original election are included. Rerun elections for which 'third consecutive term' and for which no reason for the cancelation of the original election are not included in these models. Significance codes: $p<0.05$ = *; $p<0.01$ =**; $p<0.001$ = ***.

When more information is available to voters, the results suggest that incorruptibility stereotyping may be at work. This is evident from the 'vote buying' constitutive term of the vote buying*disqualified incumbent interaction[76]. In rerun contests prompted by vote buying, when the disqualified male incumbent does compete in the rerun election, female candidates are no more competitive than they were in on-cycle contests (as indicated by the non-significant coefficient of the vote buying*disqualified incumbent interaction term in Models 3, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13). However, the significant, positive coefficient for the vote-buying constitutive term in the interaction suggests that voters do take the absence of the disqualified incumbent as an indication of the weight of the evidence against him: it is only when the disqualified incumbent constitutive term equals zero, that vote buying has an effect. Note that the model fit of Model 2, which adds only this interaction term to the base model, is higher than for the Full Model that lacks this interaction (Model 9).

Comparing the coefficients of the 'vote buying', 'rejected accounts' and 'abuse of power' constitutive terms in their respective interactions with the disqualified incumbent dummy permits the evaluation of Hypothesis 2. This hypothesis proposed that vote buying, because it is most clearly an example of corruption, should have a larger, positive effect on female candidates' competitiveness, than the other reasons for a rerun election being called. The coefficients of the various constitutive terms are consistent with the idea that only vote buying triggers the activation of the female incorruptibility stereotype; it is only this constitutive term (see Model 3) that reaches significance (comparing to constitutive terms for 'rejected accounts' in Model 5, and 'abuse of power' in Model 6, and multiple

[76] Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder. (2006) 'Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses', *Political Analysis*, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 63-82.

constitutive terms in Models 6, 8 and 13). The Full Models[77] (specifically Models 10, 11 and 13) in Table 6.2 demonstrate how hard it is to remove the significance of the vote buying constitutive term when disqualified male incumbents do not compete in rerun elections. Figure 6.1 shows the marginal effect of vote buying on female candidates' competitiveness (change in vote share, controlling for change in women's proportional candidacies), according to whether or not a disqualified male incumbent is a candidate in the rerun election.




Figure 6.1. The marginal effects of vote buying, as a reason for rerunning an election, on the change in women's electoral competitiveness from original to rerun elections. The figure clearly shows the significant increase in women's vote share that only occurs when a disqualified male incumbent is not a rerun candidate. The marginal effects shown are for Model 8, which has high model fit and struggles less with degrees of freedom than the Full Models.

[77] The Appendix contains the complete results of the Full Models. In Table 6.2 in the main chapter, some of the results were left out for reasons of spacing on the page.

Hypothesis 3 proposed that wives of disqualified male incumbents drag down female candidates' overall competitiveness because voters are less likely to apply to these women the female incorruptibility stereotype (as previously mentioned, there is usually just one woman candidate per race). The results in Table 6.2 are consistent with this expectation. Women candidates' total vote share controlling for women's proportional candidacies, drops by 9.2% (Model 7; Model 13 estimates this to be 9.0%), on average, when the disqualified incumbent's wife is a candidate in the rerun, vis-à-vis women's vote-share in voided original elections. This result, in particular, is explored in the short illustrative case studies that follow.

Considerations of Illustrative Case Study Selection

The two illustrative case studies in this chapter were selected for the purposes of reflecting on my results for Hypotheses 2 and 3, as in these cases statistical results were consistent with my theory. In both municipalities selected for qualitative interrogation, rerun elections were called by the same regional electoral court—the court for the state of Goiás—and for reasons of vote buying by the winner of the original election. In both, a disqualified male incumbent did not compete in the rerun contest, but in the municipality of Goiatuba, his wife did.

The two municipalities have mostly typical values for the majority of the variables added to my Full Models in Table 6.2, although my second case, Pires do Rio, has higher HDI levels than most districts that held rerun elections between 2004 and 2016. I found that in both settings, the reasons that the authorities called the rerun election were widely known to ordinary citizens, who were cognizant of the fact that an election had occurred

outside of the usual electoral calendar. Only in Pires do Rio, however, was vote buying salient, as described further below. The interviews for these case studies were conducted in December 2017 using a semi-structured approach.

An Anti-corruption Insider

Pires do Rio sits on the route between the national capital, Brasília, and the spa town of Caldas Novas, in an area of lush green landscapes. The population was approximately 30,000 in 2013, the year of a rerun mayoral election, which, although approximately average nationally for a municipality, makes Pires do Rio the largest population centre among its ten nearest municipalities. Inhabitants of the town are relatively well off, and local businesses in the town centre appeared to be thriving when field research was conducted. The local economy is driven by agricultural processing centres on the edge of the town. These produce vegetable oils from soya and wheat, largely to be sold as biofuels to power motor vehicles within Brazil.

The rerun election of October 2013 is the only rerun election in Pires do Rio's history. It universally recalled as a shocking incident and as a source of local shame[78]. Interviews in different parts of the main town revealed that residents of all stripes recall the reason for the removal of office of the 2012 mayoral election winner, known as Gude, simply as

[78] Judge Luciane Cristina Duarte dos Santos, who ruled on Gude's case Pires do Rio, says, 'It was something historical to people there – there was a feeling of gravity to it… It marked me. The barring of eight years was not a victory for me or the prosecutors. I gave it out with some sadness. We never want to see a mayor dismissed. It's very bad for the municipality, because he is an authority.' Duarte dos Santos, L. C., 16 December 2017. In-person interview.

'vote buying'[7980]. From the moment this rerun election was announced, Cida Tomazini, a woman who had been mayor from 2001 to 2008, was reported to have been widely assumed, by all actors interviewed, to be the probable victor. The regional electoral court barred Gude from competing in the rerun election under the Ficha Limpa law[81], and he fled town almost immediately upon leaving mayoral office, apparently out of fear of loan sharks[82].

Cida is an old hand at 'piresino' politics. She was Pires do Rio's first female mayoral candidate when she stood for election in 1996, and she lost that election by only about 200 votes. In 2009, after completing two consecutive terms as mayor, she waited only the mandatory single term before stepping back into the ring: she challenged Gude in the 2012 election, when he was the incumbent. In that contest, she came second. In all of these elections, Cida represented the PMDB, and used the same public relations firm in Goiânia, the state capital, to design and manage her campaigns.

Cida's plentiful family and business connections have helped in her success in local politics. On her mother's side, her uncles served in the municipal government of Ribeirão Preto, one of the largest municipalities in São Paulo[83]. When she moved to Pires do Rio in the early 1990s, Cida married into a family that owns the Tomazini Group, with businesses such as Nutriza Agroindustrial Alimentos, a major employer of residents

[79] Even the most open of queries – 'Please tell me about events in Pires do Rio in 2013' – elicited this detail without prompting, among both business owners in the centre and unemployed residents of the poorest neighbourhood.
[80] Technically the original election results were voided because of Gude's 'abuse of public office', as well as his vote buying during the campaign. In this case he made promises of illicit favours using public money for continued political support of certain families when he had become mayor, and there were witnesses to this. Duarte dos Santos, L. C., 16 December 2017. In-person interview.
[81] Duarte dos Santos, L. C., 16 December 2017. In-person interview.
[82] Móveis, A, 17 December 2017. In-person interview.
[83] Some were mayors, deputy mayors, and city councillors, Cida says.

of poorer areas of town. By all accounts, Cida has been very active in the business over the years. Ever since the early days of Brazil's transition to democracy, the Tomazini Group has provided campaign financing for state-level politicians representing the PMDB[84]. Cida's husband, Francisco Tomazini, represented this party in the state legislature from 1995-1998. Cida's loyalty to the party, in her words, is motivated by concerns for family harmony as well as obvious opportunity:

> '[When I arrived in Pires do Rio,] I was not really against, but not much in favour of the PMDB. I had a certain issue with some of the politicians of the party. But I was raised in an environment where my father was of one party and my mother another. So as to not have that problem, I decided I would be PMDB, too. And it worked.[85]'

In 2013, Cita was widely regarded in Pires do Rio as having been a very competent mayor, who, unlike many local executives before her, and certainly unlike Gude, prioritised paying public employees in the district on time[86]. Not only was it clear to all politically engaged local actors from the moment the rerun election was called that Cida was the probable victor, it was also clear that she would have a spot open to her as the PMDB representative.

Curiously, the vote buying that contributed to Gude's later disqualification did not occur in the poor parts of the district, but instead in the considerably wealthier area near to the main square. This added to the sense of outrage felt by many, especially elsewhere in the municipality, according to several residents of Primavera, a poor barro. Cida has long enjoyed support in poor districts. She had never won many votes in the centre of town in previous elections, so many interviewees failed to make sense of why Gude needed to

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84 Cida Tomazini, 14 December 2017. In-person interview.
85 Ibid.
86 Widson Ulisses, 10 December 2017. In-person interview

buy votes there to beat her. Her campaign manager, who goes by 'Dr Whashington', summarised the context of the rerun election as follows:

> 'The city had gone through great discomforts. It was even the federal police seizing computers, papers and so on. And it was on a national network—that the mayor was arrested, handcuffed… for his mismanagement of the public resources…. The population was worried about how much public finances had been compromised, especially the city employees, who were behind on pay—and they represent about 40% of voters in the city.[87]'

So clear were her chances of victory that even municipal councillors at the time struggled to recall who her competitors were:

> 'Of course the moods in any municipal election get fierce, but because it was shorter, it felt more intense. I might be mistaken but I think there were two other candidates who entered the rerun race, but they got out or sat back after some time, claiming a lack of support.' — Erika Sampaio de Resende, local PT member. [88]

Dr Whashington adjusted the usual messaging of Cida's earlier, successful mayoral campaigns, to take advantage of the context of Gude's misdeeds. He recalls that Cida gave a speech during the rerun campaign, emphasing her previously demonstrated competencies, and framing them in gendered terms: 'in the same way as a housewife manages the home, [Cida said] she would also administer the city'[89]. Messaging about Cida's honesty and trustworthiness featured prominently in her rerun campaign strategy:

> 'Each campaign is different, right? Now, the slogan of the campaign is defined by the candidate. The great slogans of Dona Cida are the proper application of public resources, that is, the respect for public money, honesty… Society needed a trustworthy figure…And in the jingle and other campaign material in 2013 we emphasised honesty more. Honesty had always had a weight, but that time it was of great importance.[90]'

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[87] Dr Whashington, 19 and 20 December 2017, telephone interviews.
[88] Sampaio de Resende E., 16 December 2017. In-person interview.
[89] Dr Whashington, 19 and 20 December 2017, telephone interviews.
[90] Ibid.

Cida won Pires do Rio's rerun election by a landslide. She also won in the areas within the centre of town, which she had not done previously. However, by her own admission, winning the rerun election was a poison chalice for her future political prospects. She inherited a fiscal situation of such disorder that it was almost impossible for the municipal government to begin new public works before the next election, which is one of the main indications to citizens that the mayor is 'doing anything at all'[91]. Cida ran again in 2016 as the incumbent, and lost.

Reinaldo's Márcia

Goiatuba, like Pires do Rio, is a town that runs off agricultural processing industries. A few hours drive away, it is clearly poorer, larger, and less well connected to other population centres. Goiatuba has seen several rerun elections in recent years. A rerun election punctuated the previous electoral cycle, and the one that I focus on here—in mid-2013, when a female candidate, called Márcia, competed—was swiftly followed by the authorities voiding Márcia's votes[92], and holding a second rerun contest within the same electoral cycle.

Márcia had limited political or professional experience prior to her candidacy[93]. She had been a secretary in administration of her husband, Reinaldo, for a time, but not held any other formal employment[94]. Reinaldo's disqualification prompted the rerun election in

91 Cida Tomazini, 14 December 2017. In-person interview.
92 In her opinion, on a technicality of registration. But also for vote buying.
93 Clifer Lucas Costa, 12 December 2017. In-person interview.
94 Candido, M., 10 December 2017. In-person interview.

which Márcia was a candidate. The local prosecutor in Goiatuba[95] explained the extent of the vote buying operation that temporarily won Reinaldo local executive office, with the aide of photographs of the book keeping that had kept track of votes purchased in different areas of the municipality.

Conversations with residents of Bandeirantes, a poor neighbourhood where many residents had sold their votes to Reinaldo, revealed complex relationships with that decision. Often, residents appeared to be ashamed of what one of them described as their 'complicity'[96] in the city's bad management. But having witnessed so many mayors come and go, with so many scandals, they appeared to have little faith that alternative decisions—not selling their votes—would help to improve things.

Márcia represented 'her husband's party'[97], the PSDB, in the rerun election. Locals in Bandeirantes recall her arriving there with him to hold a rally. Reinaldo even came to our interview, without having been invited (or even, at that stage of the research, contacted). When asked, 'Did your husband appear with you during the campaign?', Márcia replied:

> 'Yes it helped a lot because everyone here knows our family. It is a traditional family in the city. The Candidao family is a respected family, thank God. So we always work together and people have great competence in him—not only in me, but in the couple. He was a companion.'

Corruption did not appear in her campaign messaging. Her campaign strategy can be described, with reference to the terms used in Chapter 5, as a 'shallow information' strategy. She began campaigning quickly after the rerun election was announced, a decision that indicated to other politically engaged actors in Goiatuba—before they

[95] Danilo de Miranda Carvalho, 15 December 2017. In-person interview.
[96] Resident 1 of Bandeirantes (name withheld), 11 December 2017. In-person interview.
[97] Candido, M., 10 December 2017. In-person interview.

learned it through other means[9899]—that Reinaldo would not be a candidate in that election.

In theory, had there been a sense that voters were seeking a less corruptible candidate in the rerun election, this information could have encouraged other female candidacies to emerge in the rerun. However, voters were not looking for a change. A broker called 'Marocino'—described by many interviewees in Bandeirantes as the person who makes sure the community gets at least party of what it needs from the municipal government—and, who no longer supports Reinaldo, recalls:

> 'Reinaldo only had six months of administration. But in those six months, he signaled that he would be a good mayor. If we compare the other mayor, Fernando Vasconcelos, with those six months, Reinaldo was clearly better. He did the social aspect well. He managed in record time to get asphalt on the pavements. He even improved the salaries of public employees.'[100]

This signal that Reinaldo would have been a good mayor for a four-year term was the only reason that people voted for Márcia, Marocino's says.

[98] Vanubia Candido Ribeiro Rosa, 14 December 2017. In-person interview.
[99] Meloviano Ferreira de Assuncao, 9 December 2017. In-person interview.
[100] Marcoino, 11 December 2017. In-person interview.

Discussion

This chapter moves the dissertation forward in a number of ways. By again focusing on variation in women's progression across the final two stages of political recruitment, it provides support for the idea that the activation of the female incorruptibility stereotype can improve women's electoral success, and—at least in the illustrative case of Pires do Rio—suggests this activation can sometimes feed back to further encourage a women's candidacy. Support for this interpretation is provided by the significance of the 'vote buying' constitutive term, and the non-significance of equivalent terms of other reasons for holding a rerun election, which are less straightforwardly examples of corruption.

Early in the chapter I argued that because voting is compulsory in Brazil, the mere act of voting would have revealed—to those who had not already picked up on rumours—that something was amiss because an off-cycle election had been called, and it would have confirmed the disqualified incumbent's presence or absence from the candidate list. Hence, the dissemination of reliable indications of incumbent corruption in these elections did not depend on local media outlets as it did in Chapter 4. The two illustrative cases that I chose to investigate were examples of near-instantaneous clarity as to the disqualified incumbent's right to compete in the rerun election. Therefore, my cases do not support my ideas about voters might logically piece together the reliable information available to them. Nonetheless, these were two cases drawn from a large group, and I made no claims that feedback effects would be constrained in all examples of rerun elections. Such constraints, in my view, still offer a reasonable explanation for the on-average effects reported, and warrant further evaluation.

The chapter also went some way towards considering the subparts of the female incorruptibility stereotype, by testing whether the inclusion of the wife of a disqualified male incumbent—an apparent insider to corrupt networks—reduced women's overall competitiveness in rerun elections. In the regressions I found that this was the case, and my interpretation is that these wives are not stereotyped by voters in the same way as other female candidates are. This raises the question of why parties might run disqualified incumbent spouses at all as candidates. It may be that selectorates lack options, though in the case of weakly institutionalised parties this seems unlikely. Another interpretation within the modular party view, is the intention is that the wife is seen as an extension of her husband, not so much in the eyes of voters, but in the eyes of political operators at the state level, with discretion over patronage resources. Her rerun votes may serve to demonstrate to them that her husband's module—his support base—has not hemorrhaged.

Curiously, Márcia, spouse of Reinaldo in the illustrative case of Goiatuba, did gain the most votes in the rerun contest there, despite widespread voter knowledge of Reinaldo's corruption. I understand this in terms of the scope conditions that must be satisfied if voters are to be rationally motivated to seek a less corruptible alternative. In Goiatuba, there were many indications that voters consider the local political and business context to be systemically corrupt. In their minds, therefore, there is little benefit to installing an incorruptible administrator in city hall, as this person would not be able to operate incorruptibly.

This chapter also provided a further opportunity to reflect upon the revised model. The two women in the illustrative cases followed pathways to candidacy for weakly institutionalised parties that are in keeping with my sketch, at the end of Chapter 5, of

the parallel pathways that operated in Itapeva. They both became members of the 'right' families through marriage. Cida, rather like Cavani in Itapeva, then demonstrated her managerial competence in prominent local business. They both, in other words, became candidates through what appear to be commonly routinised pathways among weakly institutionalised parties in Brazil.

The final empirical chapter takes a different approach to reflecting on the revised model. It focuses on my clarification that the model should be considered porous to external influences.

Chapter 7:

External Influence on Women's Political Recruitment

Introduction

At the beginning of this dissertation, I stated two ambitions. The first was to advance some modifications to the Supply and Demand Model that I described in Chapter 2. So far, the quantitative element of this document has underscored the usefulness of my revised model by examining constraints on feedback effects across the only stages of political recruitment that all political parties straightforwardly have in common: candidacy and election. Rather than continue this theme, or seek examples of constraints across other stages, this chapter takes aim at the second ambition. It demonstrates the empirical relevance of influences on women's progression towards elective office that emerge from outside of the voting district. In doing so, it advances a different element of my renovations to the standard framework: the clarification that the model should be porous to extra-district influences. Having paid considerable attention to the final stage of the recruitment process within a single electoral cycle so far, here I shift the emphasis to the process of becoming a candidate, and I consider effects that occur across as well as within electoral cycles.

The clarification is not a modification to Norris and Lovenduski's model because they did not rule out extra-district influences on progression[1], although they did not examine

[1] Indeed, it would not make sense to if, as they do, one acknowledges that extra-district stages exist.

the issue. A clarification is helpful for the purposes of coherently aligning research that refers to the standard model, in which women's descriptive representation is treated as the dependent variable, and scholarship that seeks to understand connections between different forms of women's representation—in which women's descriptive representation is both a dependent variable and an independent variable. In the latter literature, in the instances where women's descriptive representation is treated as an independent variable, women's symbolic representation is often the dependent variable[2], though the relationship is most likely to be reciprocal. Amy Alexander, for example, has demonstrated a bidirectional relationship between citizens' belief in women's ability to govern (a form of symbolic representation) and in the proportion of women in parliaments (descriptive representation[3]), with cross-national, longitudinal data from 25 countries. The more faith people have in women's competence, the more women get elected, and the more women get elected, the more faith people have in their capacity to succeed in elective office[4].

One might think it possible to neatly summarise the study of how shifts in symbolic representation interact with levels of descriptive representation, and vice versa, by

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2 Many studies explain this emphasis by reference to the findings of Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler. These authors conducted an analysis of different interconnections between Pitkin's four forms of representation, using structural equation methods and data pertaining to those four forms of women's representation from 31 democracies. They report that descriptive representation does directly affect symbolic representation, but that the indirect link by which descriptive representation influences symbolic representation via change in substantive representation is not empirically relevant in their analysis. See: Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and William Mishler, (2005) 'An Integrated Model of Women's Representation', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 407–28.

3 Head counts of women in elective office (or proportions of officeholders who are women) are also just one form of descriptive representation, although admitted in this thesis (as in much of the literature) they are presented as straightforwardly equivalent. Other forms of descriptive representation include the public invocation of gender, for example, when elected representatives 'speak as' a woman to the legislature. See: Magda Hinojosa, Jill Carle and Gina Serignese Woodall, (2018) 'Speaking as a Woman: Descriptive Presentation and Representation in Costa Rica's Legislative Assembly', *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, vol. 39, no. 4, 2, pp. 407–29.

4 Amy C. Alexander, (2012) 'Change in Women's Descriptive Representation and the Belief in Women's Ability to Govern: A Virtuous Cycle', *Politics & Gender*, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 437–464.

reference to the standard model. Symbolic changes could be framed as a suite of cognitive mechanisms that affect progression across recruitment stages, altering the proportion of women attaining elective office. Change in this outcome—in women's descriptive representation—might then feed back via this suite of cognitive mechanisms to affect women's progression across prior stages, as is relevant to descriptive outcomes in future elections. However, many quantitative evaluations of links between symbolic and descriptive representation do not operationalise symbolic change quite as Norris and Lovenduski would have. Rather than think of the borders of voting districts to be porous to external symbolic influence, frequently, quantitative scholars evaluate only 'dyadic' connections between forms of representation. That is, they operationalise their models such that symbolic changes may only exert influence on descriptive representation within the same voting district. In a few studies quantitative scholars have assessed influences on progression from outside of the voting district by modelling 'collective representation', which, as I explain in the next section, also makes unlikely assumptions about how symbolic influence operates.

As noted in Chapter 2, the standard model also sits uncomfortably alongside research into connections between women's symbolic and descriptive representation because its mechanistic tendencies render it too brittle. Changes in women's symbolic representation—which are not merely changes in attitudes towards women but also changes in beliefs about the fairness of the political system—might reasonably be expected to alter stages of recruitment as well as influences on progression across stages, especially in informal settings. Symbolic change may prompt revisions in what actors commonly understand to count as signifiers of improved odds of candidacy, i.e. routinised stages. In this way, symbolic change may adjust the gendered content of signifiers. Because the revised model defines stages by what is routinised, and is therefore

sensitive to the possibility of these effects, it is more consistent than the standard model with the literature on connections between types of women's representation.

This chapter deploys various tools from spatial econometrics to assess *traces* of a dynamic relationship between women's descriptive representation, and women's symbolic representation. The emphasis of the previous sentence is on the word 'traces' because I acknowledge the absence of any direct measure of women's symbolic representation at the municipal level in Brazil[5], and also acknowledge that even though combinations of spatial model specification can usefully shed light on causal pathways, these techniques fall short of identifying causal mechanisms.

I assess whether contagion from two sources of influence—women's candidacies and women's incumbency—occurs across municipalities in Brazil, and find evidence consistent with the idea that both sources matter empirically. I find that the proportion of women's mayoral candidacies is associated with changes in this same proportion in neighbouring districts within the same electoral cycle. An on-average increase of 18% is predicted by the spatial specification with the best model fit, if surrounding municipalities change from having no women candidates, to having one woman among every three mayoral candidates. I also find that women's successful election to mayoral office is linked to the proportion of women candidates in neighbouring municipalities in the next election, via two routes. The empirical associations suggest that it directly influences contiguous voting districts—and indirectly influences them, by prompting an increase in the proportion of women candidates in the same district as the female incumbent, a change that raises the proportion of women running in surrounding voting

[5] Akin, for example, to the one that Alexander (2012) used—which was a question from the World Values Survey asking, 'Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that, on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do?'

districts. This is the first spatial econometric analysis of women's representation of which I am aware to demonstrate contagious influence over a large expanse of geographically connected units, and the first such analysis of a context where diverse party types compete in elections.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the literature on connections between descriptive and symbolic forms of women's representation, and of the potential value of spatial econometric approaches to that field. I then lay out three hypotheses, and explain my empirical strategy. I present the results of three spatial model specifications, including estimated equilibrium effects, in order to gain some insight into the extent of the evidence consistent with the different causal pathways that these specifications model. Drawing on anecdotal material from interviews that I conducted for earlier chapters, I then reflect on these pathways, and sum up.

Symbolic and Descriptive Representation, and Explanatory Frameworks

In 1967, Hanna Pitkin proposed that the concept of representation should be decomposed into four subtypes—formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic forms[6]—which she intended as interconnected concepts[7]. When it comes to women in politics, the concept of descriptive representation[8], as has been discussed widely in this thesis, is generally assessed with compositional comparison between proportions of women among elected representatives and among the represented. I have scarcely

[6] Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967).
[7] Scholars often fail to consider the full extent of relevant interconnections. Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 'An Integrated Model of Women's Representation'.
[8] Pitkin's original definition was broader: 'the making present of something absent by resemblance or reflection'. See: Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, p. 11.

mentioned symbolic representation, or the other two forms of representation in this document so far. Yet much of the literature about women's political representation frames what it seeks to identify in terms of empirical links between Pitkin's types. Among these, some links between forms of women's representation are supported by more evidence than others[9], and a connection between women's descriptive and symbolic representation is frequently reported[10].

In Pitkin's words, symbolic representation brings a corresponding notion'[11] of what is being represented. It is therefore used as an umbrella term to describe a suite of mechanisms that break down psychological barriers to women's political participation, including ideas about the fairness of the political system, and about women's competencies relative to men's. Researchers attempt[12] to measure it using indicators of variation in women's attitudes and behaviours, or gender gaps in these, for example, using interest[13] or participation[14] in campaigns, discussions about politics with friends[15],

[9] Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler find limited evidence of a substantial linear relationship between descriptive and symbolic representation, but on testing different specifications, they 'find lots of support for the general argument that the impact of female legislators accelerates as their numbers in the legislature grow'. Ibid. p. 422. They do not find support for all of the other connections that Pitkin posited.

[10] Although certainly not in every case examined and reported in the literature.

[11] Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, p. 12.

[12] Symbolic representation is therefore hard to quantify. See: Kathleen Dolan, (2006) 'Symbolic Mobilization?: The Impact of Candidate Sex in American Elections." *American Politics Research*, vol. 34, no. 6, pp. 687–704.

[13] For example: Lonna Rae Atkeson, (2003) 'Not All Cues Are Created Equal: The Conditional Impact of Female Candidates on Political Engagement', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 1040–1061.

[14] For example: Jeffrey A. Karp and Susan A Banducci,(2008) 'When Politics Is Not Just a Man's Game: Women's Representation and Political Engagement', *Electoral Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1, pp.105–15.

[15] For example: Christina Wolbrecht and David E. Campbell, (2007) 'Leading by Example: Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 921–939.

and levels of trust in political institutions[16][17]. The causal links between symbolic and descriptive forms of representation are understood to be bidirectional, and if anything, at least one quantitative analysis suggests that symbolic change may have more influence on descriptive outcomes than the other way around[18].

In the introduction of this chapter, and in Chapter 2, I mentioned how influences external to the voting district might shape stages of political recruitment up to candidacy. As such, the revised model is more consistent than the standard model with qualitative studies that find evidence of connections between different kinds of women's representation. This chapter does not assess this argument empirically, but I will add an example here to illustrate my point.

Jennifer Piscopo has described how informal, cross-partisan 'quota networks' of elite women in Mexico strategised to disentangle informal practises within parties that have reduced the effectiveness of Mexico's quota law[19]. She explains out how the quota network's influence runs across and within partisan lines[20], and by effecting change to electoral laws at the national level, the network has necessarily influenced legislative

[16] For example: Lawless looks at whether the presence of women officeholders in the US affects constituents' trust in government. See: Jennifer L. Lawless,(2004) 'Politics of Presence? Congresswomen and Symbolic Representation', *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 81-99.
[17] Hinojosa, Fridkin and Kittilson find that after the election that follows the introduction of Uruguay's gender quota, previous gender gaps in various attitudinal measures dissipate, including trust in elections. Magda Hinojosa, Kim L Fridkin, and Miki Caul Kittilson, (2017) 'The Impact of Descriptive Representation on 'Persistent' Gender Gaps: Political Engagement and Political Trust in Uruguay', *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 435–53.
[18] Amy Alexander finds a reciprocal relationship that operates more strongly from change in women's beliefs in women's ability to govern to change in women's descriptive representation rather than the other way around. See: Alexander, 'Change in Women's Descriptive Representation and the Belief in Women's Ability to Govern' p. 461.
[19] Jennifer M. Piscopo, (2016) 'When Informality Advantages Women: Quota Networks, Electoral Rules and Candidate Selection in Mexico', Government and Opposition, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 487–512.
[20] Ibid. p. 488.

municipal elections in locations where political actors were passive recipients of influence from Mexico City[21]. Piscopo's descriptions also reveal changes to women's symbolic representation affecting descriptive outcomes. The quota network mobilised to convince 'Juanitas'—women who, once elected thanks to the quota, would give up their seat to a man—that they should not feel powerless. In discussing why the network mobilised in this way, Piscopo explains that media commentators denounced these women's candidacies as 'fraud', 'cheating'; the Juanitas were muddying women's symbolic representation.

What is noteworthy for my argument about the potential for external influences to alter de facto, routinised stages towards candidacy, in addition to progression across stages, is that in the early 2000s, as Piscopo states, federal electoral regulators 'simply accepted parties' claims that primaries occurred… explaining "We had no way of verifying what parties did internally"'[22]. Then an institution known as the TEPJF (Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Branch), because of its association with the quota network, transformed into 'a maximum regulator of the internal life of the political parties'[23]. The paper does not describe with specifics how de facto stages of candidate recruitment changed as a result of this pressure, and as a result of direct pressure on parties[24] that emerged out of shifts in women's symbolic representation in Mexican politics. However, it strongly indicates that parties were pushed towards ensuring that de jure primaries became de facto parts of recruitment processes—and Piscopo states that descriptive

[21] As the quota law affects all legislative elections in Mexico, including elections for state and municipal legislatures.
[22] Ibid. p. 499.
[23] Ibid. p. 500.
[24] Women in the network created lists of men within each party who opposed gender quotas, and then set about organising one-to-one meetings between these men and a proponent of quotas with whom the men shared some affinity, such as membership of a legislative commission. The intention was to convince them to change their minds. Ibid. p. 497.

change occurred as a consequence of the aforementioned shifts in women's formal and symbolic representation[25].

This chapter is concerned with offering a quantitative assessment of a flow of influence between symbolic and descriptive forms of women's descriptive representation, using methods that do a better job of operationalising the intensity of influence flows than existing assessments in the literature. I invoke symbolic change even though I have no measure of it[26] because descriptive change cannot logically be a function of descriptive change itself—there must be some mediating change to another form of women's representation. There is no reason to suppose that this mediating form of women's representation is only symbolic[27], although often the literature has this tendency[28], but it is hard to imagine that change in women's symbolic change is not part of the story.

Many studies that report a connection between symbolic and descriptive forms of representation operationalise their analysis as dyadic representation[29]. There are instances where this may be theoretically appropriate, and no doubt a female representative is generally likely to exert much stronger symbolic effects within the district that she

[25] Ibid. p. 506.
[26] As indeed is also true of Gilardi's analysis, which discussed in detail in the next section.
[27] It could very well be change to women's substantive representation as well. For example, Funk and colleagues have found that women mayors in Brazil contribute to the creation of bureaucracies with fewer gender inequalities. If women with expertise in how the local government functions are paid more, as she reports, it may be easier for them to run for office. See: Kendall D. Funk, Thiago Nascimento da Silva and Maria Escobar-Lemmon, 'Leading Toward Equality: The Effect of Women Mayors on Gender Equality in Local Bureaucracies', *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, Forthcoming doi: 10.1080/21565503.2017.1403932
[28] Again here Gilardi's work is an example. He has no direct measure of symbolic change, and yet does not discuss substantive representational change as a mediating factor.
[29] Robert Weissberg, (1978) 'Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 72, pp. 535–47.

represents than elsewhere[30-32]. But often these have the strangely strong assumption that she has zero symbolic influence on people in other constituencies. Such studies may therefore under-estimate total effects. For example, Jennifer Lawless assesses whether female members of US Congress alter women's symbolic representation by analysing whether these women officeholders affect constituents' attitudes and propensity to participate politically[33]. She concludes that there is little evidence for that they do. However, as national legislators, these women are very likely to regularly feature in media reports that reach far beyond their own constituencies—and their presence in office thus stands a good chance of exerting geographically wider symbolic effects than Lawless considers.

Other quantitative studies in the field measure collective representation. These studies typically ask whether percentages of women in national legislatures affect women's symbolic representation across whole countries' populations. Many such studies have

[30] Rikhil R. Bhavnani, (2009) 'Do electoral quotas work after they are withdrawn? Evidence from a natural experiment in India', American Political Science Review, vol. 103, no. 1, pp. 23–35.
[31] Klaus Deininger, Songqing Jin, Hari K. Nagarajan, (2013) 'Can Political Reservations Affect Political Equilibria in the Long-term? Evidence from Local Elections in Rural India', World Bank Working Paper.
[32] Lori Beaman, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova, (2009) 'Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 124, no. 4, pp. 1497–1540.
[33] Lawless, 'Politics of Presence? pp. 81-99.

reported effects[34-39]. However, rarely are surveys of indicators of symbolic change representative of the population[40]. A rising proportion of women in the national legislature may well emerge because women are winning elections in particular corner of the country, while essentially no descriptive nor symbolic change is happening elsewhere. If surveys of symbolic impact are conducted in that area, and interpreted as nationally indicative, then effects will be over-estimated. Perhaps the most persuasive study of the symbolic effects of women's collective descriptive representation comes from Lonna Rae Akteson and Nancy Carrillo. They ask whether women's presence in US state legislatures affects female citizens' external efficacy—that is, the perception that government institutions are responsive to citizens' influence. Crucially, they seek this effect while controlling for dyadic descriptive representation and dyadic substantive representation in their models[41]. However, these authors again assume that female representatives in neighbouring states exert no symbolic influence—that the symbolic effect of a female

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34 Wolbrecht and Campbell report that the percentage of women in the national legislature is associated with adolescent girls and women discussing politics with friends and participating in politics (or, in the case of the girls, intending to participate when they are older). These authors explain their choice to analyse collective representation by the fact that their analysis is cross-national, and therefore it takes in electoral systems with multi-member and party-list voting that obscures the relationship between individual representatives and citizens. See: Wolbrecht and Campbell, 'Leading by Example'.

35 Karp and Banducci, 'When Politics Is Not Just a Man's Game', pp. 105–15.

36 Barnes and Burchard show this in a longitudinal analysis of Sub-Saharan African countries. Tiffany Barnes and Stephanie Burchard, (2013) 'Engendering' Politics: The Impact of Descriptive Representation on Women's Political Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa', Comparative Political Studies, vol. 46, no. 7, pp. 767–790.

37 Barnes and Burchard also find that once the percentage of women in the legislature reaches 25-35%, the subsequent gender political engagement gap virtually disappears.

38 Alexander, 'Change in Women's Descriptive Representation and the Belief in Women's Ability to Govern; pp. 437–64.

39 Scott Desposato and Barbara Norrander, (2008) 'The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 39, no. 1, 12, p. 141.

40 For example, in a recent panel study about the symbolic impact of a gender quota in Uruguay, descriptive representation is the proportion of women national legislators, and the symbolic representation measure is comes from a survey was conducted only in the capital city of Montevideo. Hinojosa, Fridkin and Kittilson, 'The impact of descriptive representation on "persistent" gender gaps', pp. 435-453.

41 Lonna Rae Atkeson and Nancy Carrillo, (2007) 'More is Better: The Influence of Collective Female Descriptive Representation on External Efficacy', *Politics & Gender*, vol. 3, pp. 79–101.

governor (which is their control for dyadic descriptive representation) stops sharply at the state border.

It seems far more probable that, all things equal, the intensity of female officeholders' symbolic influence depends on the extent of citizens' exposure to these women—and that such symbolic effects can flow into and out of voting districts. In the next section, I explain how spatial econometrics offers tools to model gradations of influence, and state three hypotheses that I test in the chapter.

Spatial Econometric Approaches

Bringing spatial econometrics to the study of elections can refine empirical understandings in two ways, depending on the type of model used. One way is by providing a health-check of the relevance of taken-for-granted explanatory variables. The standard errors of straightforward OLS regression can be tidied up[42] by accounting for spatial clustering in model residuals. When political scientists have done this, they have often found that variables that were statistically significant in basic OLS regression lose significance in the spatial model. For example, in 2004, newspaper columnists blamed then-mayor of San Francisco, Gavin Newsom, for the Democrats failing to win the United States presidential election[43]. That year Newsom had allowed gay marriages in San Francisco city hall, making headlines across the country. Anti-gay marriage amendments on 11 state ballots swiftly followed, all to be voted on during the 2004 general election. Initially, OLS regressions of the presidential election results found that state amendment

[42] That is, made more efficient.
[43] Donald J. Lacombe and Timothy M. Shaughnessy, (2007) 'Accounting for Spatial Error Correlation in the 2004 Presidential Popular Vote', *Public Finance Review*, vol. 35, no. 4, p. 480.

votes strongly predicted low support for John Kerry, the Democratic candidate. But the significance of the amendment dummy variable disappeared when the models were rerun to account for spatial autocorrelation in residuals—that is, geographical clustering in factors that were not included as independent variables in the analyses because they were unmeasurable[44] or unknown. Something that was lumpily spread across the map was responsible for the Democrats' poor performance in states with amendment votes, rather than the holding of those votes.

The other way that spatial econometrics can refine empirical understandings of elections is to uncover evidence that interactions between neighbours influence outcomes. Spatial contagion effects such as these have been shown to occur in studies of electoral campaign contributions[45], and even in analyses of growing support for the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany[46]. Between 1924 and 1932, the size of the Nazi Party's vote in the counties of Baden, territory in Southern Germany, was in part a function of the size of the Party's vote in neighbouring counties, as local activists fanned out from their home districts to spread Nazi beliefs[47]. The example is helpful because it illustrates why scholars who are familiar with these statistical tools consider them suited to picking up the impacts of symbolic change.

Depending on the model specification, spatial econometric tools can assess contagion as interdependence, which occurs when change in an independent variable affects the dependent variable within the same spatial unit, and subsequently the dependent variable

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[44] Ibid.
[45] Wendy K. Tam Cho, (2003) 'Contagion Effects and Ethnic Contribution Networks', *American Journal of Political Science,* vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 368–87.
[46] Colin Flint, (1998) 'Forming Electorates, Forging Spaces: The Nazi Party Vote and the Social Construction of Space', *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 41, no. 9, pp.1282–1303.
[47] And to reconfigure social spaces in such a way that made neighbouring counties more receptive to these ideas. Ibid. p. 1288.

in that unit affects the dependent variable in other units. Or models can be specified to assess contagion as spillover. This is when change in an independent variable in one unit affects the dependent variable in neighbouring units, via its effect on itself in those neighbouring units. In short, spatial influence can be geographically 'contagious' because dependent variable values of neighbours directly affect each other, or because dependent variable values are partly determined by the values of independent variables of neighbours directly affecting each other. The very limited attempts to deploy these tools to study women's representation have not explored these details[48].

To the best of my knowledge, only three studies have sought to quantitatively demonstrate a connection between women's symbolic representation and descriptive representation by assessing influence flows to neighbouring voting districts. They were all published in the past five years, have mixed findings, and they model spatial influence differently. Only one study—by Fabricio Gilardi—uses a spatial econometric approach[49].

The first of these studies was published by Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, who considered the surprising success of female candidates in Indonesia's 2009 legislative elections, which she argues can only partly be explained by the introduction of a gender quota[50]. She runs logistic regressions to find out what factors predicted parties nominating women to the highest list positions, and includes as an independent variable the number of female incumbents in contiguous districts, a variable with a range from zero to seven. Shair-Rosenfield's models suggest that, having controlled for various other factors, the

[48] Indeed, Gilardi writes of 'spillover' when the spatial economic literature would suggest that he means to use the term 'interdependence'.
[49] Which I take to mean the creation and application of spatial weights matrices in statistical models.
[50] Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, (2012) 'The Alternative Incumbency Effect: Electing Women Legislators in Indonesia', *Electoral Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 576–87.

probability of a woman being placed at the top of a party list is 9.2% in districts without any female incumbents in their neighbours, and 17.3% in districts surrounded by the greatest number of female incumbents. There are at least two shortcomings of this analysis. First, there is no control for the total number of contiguous units; two female incumbents among five contiguous districts is treated the same as two female incumbents among two. Second, spatial influence is severely limited—it is imagined as only flowing from one municipality to immediate neighbours, rather than disseminating around the map until an equilibrium is reached.

This second point is also a shortcoming of David Broockman's regression discontinuity approach to assessing spatial effects. He tests whether in districts nearby to districts where women have won the previous election by a tiny margin, other women are more likely to run for office or be elected[51]. Broockman does not find significant effects. But compared to many political contests that he could have selected, this is an unlikely case to find these. He analyses legislative races, which are less likely to yield symbolic influence than executive races, and in selecting recent U.S. state-level elections, he selected contests in which women's incumbency is fairly common[52]. While a quasi-experimental design does permit more confident claims to causal identification than regressions using observational data, the design also assumes that weak electoral victories have the same symbolic effects as resounding triumphs. Yet is it possible that substantial vote margins matter much more as they indicate dominance, or perhaps end up having more significant symbolic effects because they linked to impressive terms in office.

[51] David E. Broockman, (2014) 'Do Female Politicians Empower Women to Vote or Run for Office? A Regression Discontinuity Approach', *Electoral Studies*, vol. 34, pp. 190–204.
[52] Ibid p. 203.

The single spatial econometric analysis of women's representation in the literature finds an elegant temporal pattern. For the 168 municipalities in the Swiss canton of Zurich, Fabrizio Gilardi reports that female mayoral incumbency initially had a significant, positive impact on rates of female candidacy among neighbouring municipalities in the elections shortly after women gained the right to the vote, in 1974. But over subsequent electoral cycles, the effect subsides. While Gilardi's models are sophisticated in several respects[53], and he recognises the advantages of spatial econometric tools[54], he leaves a few stones unturned: he neither presents equilibrium effects, nor discusses any testing of spatial autocorrelation that may persist in the residuals of his models. The importance of these points will become apparent when I discuss my selection of spatial model specifications.

The analyses that follow assess the spatial influence of variation in women's candidacies and electoral victories over a far greater expanse of units than the canton of Zurich. In many ways, as noted in Chapter 3, Brazilian mayoral elections offer an ideal setting to analyse these effects, because women mayors are few and far between in Brazil, and female candidacy is also rather rare. In the section that follows, I describe how I use pooled data from the 2004, 2008 and 2012 municipal elections to test three hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: The proportion of female mayoral candidates—the dependent variable—in a given municipality increases, on average, with the proportion of female mayoral candidates in a neighbouring municipality.

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[53] He creates a spatial weight matrix with neighbouring municipalities defined as the 20 closest by driving distance, and applies this in negative binomial models to predict the number of women running for mayoral office.

[54] Summarising on p. 959, for example: 'Descriptive representation in one unit has consequences for women's representation not only in that same unit, but also in other units. In other words, the symbolic dimension of descriptive representation may reach much further than has been recognised in the literature.'

This hypothesis refers to contemporaneous interdependence. That is, it anticipates women standing for office in one municipality is associated with an increase in the proportion of women among the mayoral candidates of neighbouring districts, in the run up to the same election. However, I also expect women's victories and subsequent office holding to yield symbolic influence. Logically, any effects of victories must operate through a lag of one electoral cycle[55]. Hence:

Hypothesis 2: The proportion of female mayoral candidates in a given municipality increases, on average, with female mayoral incumbencies in neighbouring municipalities.

Note that this proposal could operate through both spillover and interdependence forms of contagion, as female incumbency's symbolic influence could flow directly from one municipality to another (spillover), or it could flow through its effect on the dependent variable—or via both pathways. Finally, as some scholars report that successful descriptive examples matter most for change in women's symbolic representation[56], I expect that:

Hypothesis 3: Female incumbencies in neighbouring municipalities exert a stronger influence on the dependent variable in a given municipality, on average, than does the proportion of female candidates in neighbouring municipalities.

[55] Note that it is difficult to elicit the effect of victory vis-à-vis the effect of several years demonstrating the execution of the tasks of mayoral office.
[56] Rae Atkeson, 'Not All Cues Are Created Equal.' pp. 1040-1061.

Data and Empirical Strategy

As previously noted, neither Shair-Rosenfield nor Gilardi[57] mention the potential for spatial clustering in model residuals[58]. This matters as the presence of such clustering implies spatial dependence attributable to unmeasured covariates, and the possibility of a Type II error because the standard errors of coefficients in the model may be inaccurately small[59]. This is a common criticism levied at spatial modelling attempts in the social sciences[60].

More crucial, however, is guarding against the erroneous theoretical assumption that spatial clustering in a variable automatically implies a contagion process at all[61]. Such a pattern may be instead generated through common causation, which does not require any interactions between neighbours—the observed clustering in a dependent variable is merely the result of clustering of the independent variables that contribute to changes in the dependent variable. This is a principal concern for my analysis. As Table 7.1 shows, the ideology and HDI scores of Brazilian municipalities—both variables that are commonly associated with women's political recruitment—are more strongly clustered

[57] Gilardi simply uses robust standard errors.
[58] The same discussion would not be appropriate for Broockman's RDD design.
[59] Hence the gay marriage amendment votes were no longer significant when this was accounted for. In Monte Carlo simulations, Cook et al find that remaining spatial clustering of model residuals (unobservables) leads to the spatial lags that tend to be inflated and coefficients of non-spatial independent variables attenuated. See: Scott J. Cook, Jude C. Hays, and Robert J. Franzese, 'Model Specification and Spatial Interdependence', Paper prepared for the 2015 Summer Methods Meeting, Texas A&M Conference on Innovations in Comparative Political Methodology.
[60] ibid. p. 2.
[61] This is known as Galton's problem. It is widely discussed in the spatial econometrics literature. For example, Cook et al clarify the distinction: 'Clustering differs from both interdependence and spillovers in that changes in covariates and disturbances inside one unit do not cause outcomes to change in other units.' Ibid. p.7. For a more detailed discussion, see: H. Buhaug, and Gleditsch, K. S. (2008) 'Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space.' *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no.2, pp.215-33.

across Brazil than is my dependent variable[62]. The Moran's I values for the proportion of female mayoral candidates in Table 7.1 may be small, but they are almost identical to those reported by Gilardi in the years for which he found significant spatial dispersion. Figure 7.1 shows a map of the proportion of female mayoral candidates across Brazil's during the elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012. Figure 7.2 shows where women were elected mayor in those years.

Table 7.1 Moran's I statistics for the dependent variable, ideology and HDI, using four definitions of what constitutes a neighbouring municipality.

Moran's I	Contiguity neighbours		Neighbours = municipalities with a capital among the five nearest capitals		Neighbours = municipalities with a capital within 80% distance of 10th nearest capital		Inverse intra-capital distance	
Proportion of female candidates	2004	0.0199 **	2004	0.0341***	2004	0.0247***	2004	0.0258***
	2008	0.0569***	2008	0.0473***	2008	0.0206***	2008	0.0232***
	2012	0.0346***	2012	0.0332***	2012	0.0234***	2012	0.0238***
Ideology	2004	0.2673***	2004	0.2748***	2004	0.1378***	2004	0.1324***
	2008	0.1777***	2008	0.1866***	2008	0.0706***	2008	0.0738***
	2012	0.1623***	2012	0.1769***	2012	0.0575***	2012	0.0622***
HDI	2004	0.8153***	2004	0.8147***	2004	0.6998***	2004	0.6975***
	2008	0.8068***	2008	0.8087***	2008	0.6884***	2008	0.6856***
	2012	0.7059***	2012	0.7746***	2012	0.6474***	2012	0.6497***

Significance codes: *** = $p < 0.001$; ** = $p < 0.01$; * = $p < 0.05$. Two-tailed tests; normality assumption.

[62] The clustering of these variables is displayed on maps of Brazil in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 in the Appendix.




Figure 7.1. Proportions of women mayoral candidates elected in 2004, 2008 and 2012.




Figure 7.2. Municipalities that elected a woman mayor in 2004, 2008, and 2012

I avoid conflating spatial correlation with true spatial contagion in several ways. I control for variables that influence women's political recruitment, as would be important in any non-spatial model using observational data[63], and then employ two further strategies. One is to theorise a temporal lag of one electoral cycle between women's electoral victory and the anticipated effect on women becoming mayoral candidates in neighbouring municipalities. If those involved in political recruitment processes update their priors about a woman's ability to win a mayoral election, then logically this change in women's symbolic representation can only occur after the results of the election are in. Following the recommendations of Scott Cook and colleagues[64], who encourage the use of multiple spatial specifications in the testing of spatial hypotheses, I specify more than one type of model that controls for spatial clustering in residuals, and also employ Durbin models rather than only applying a spatial lag to the female incumbency dummy. Durbin models control for potential spatial contagion effects—spillover—of all independent variables. If the spatial lag of my female incumbent variable and the spatial lag of my dependent variable remain significant across the models in which they are included, I can therefore be confident that these findings are not an artefact of clustering in the variables that contribute to common causation.

The estimation approach began with a simple OLS regression. This was not conducted for the purposes of hypothesis testing, but to demonstrate the existence of considerable heteroscedasticity[65] (Non-constant Variance Score Test chi-square statistic =1132.82, $p<0.0001$, for Model 4), and that this heteroscedasticity is partly due to spatial clustering

[63] Tobias Böhmelt, Andrea Ruggeri and Ulrich Pilster, (2015) 'Counterbalancing, Spatial Dependence, and Peer Group Effects', *Political Science Research and Methods*, pp. 1–19.
[64] Scott J. Cook, Jude C. Hays, and Robert J. Franzese, 'Model Specification and Spatial Interdependence'.
[65] Non-spatial linear regression models assume that spatial heterogeneity in the dependent variable is entirely a function of spatial heterogeneity in independent variables.

of residuals (Global Moran I for regression residuals = 0.0112, $p<0.0001$, for Model 4). I then conducted Lagrange Multiplier tests to inform the selection of spatial model specification, although this was primarily guided by theory[6667]. The salient points from these tests are discussed below; full results of Lagrange Multiplier tests of Model 4 can be found in the Appendix.

The testing of Hypothesis 1 requires the inclusion of a spatially lagged dependent variable in the models. This was first done with the simplest spatial autoregressive model that added only this spatial lag[68]. However, based on the highly significant outcome of a *Breusch–Pagan test*, the highly significant and relative similar test statistics for RLMerr and RLMlag tests, and the still significant likelihood ratio test—all indicating remaining spatial clustering in the residuals of this simple spatial lag model—I moved to a SARAR specification (also known as a combined spatial autocorrelation model). This specification includes the spatially lagged dependent variable and removes 'nuisance' spatial autocorrelation in the error term.

The evaluation of Hypothesis 2 requires spatially lagging the female incumbency variable. I generated this by specifying Durbin Error models, which spatially lag all independent

[66] As Cook et al note: 'these tests merely suggest a spatial process and are not otherwise helpful for making specification choices from among the broad class of possible spatial models'. See:. Cook, Hays, and Franzese, 'Model Specification and Spatial Interdependence', p. 10.
[67] A Durbin Watson test also found temporal autocorrelation in the residuals of the OLS models. I began exploring the possibility of specifying a spatio-temporal model, using the recently-developed spml package in R. However, this package can only handle balanced panels, and due to the slight changes over the years in the number of Brazilian municipalities, I have unbalanced panels. This left an option of dropping some recently created municipalities, which is not ideal in spatial models as it generates 'holes' in the map, or proceeding using non-temporal spatial models that include a dummy variable for each electoral cycle. I opted for the latter.
[68] The results of this most simple spatial lag model are not show as they add nothing to the argument that the other specifications do not otherwise assess, and with improved controls.

variables and account for any remaining spatial clustering in the residuals[69]. The Durbin Error specification therefore offers the more efficient estimate of the spatial lag of this variable than a Durbin Lag specification. Yet in evaluating Hypothesis 2 is also worth referring to the latter, which, as previously noted, includes the spatially lagged dependent variable, though it does not control for spatial clustering in residuals. If the inclusion of the spatially lagged dependent variable changes the size and significance of the coefficient of the female incumbency spatial lag, for example, by removing its significance, this would indicate that apparent spillover effects of female victors promoting women's candidacies in neighbouring municipalities are an artefact of omitted variable bias. Instead, the more relevant contagion effects would be interdependence effects—i.e. current female candidacies somehow encouraging more female candidacies in neighbouring municipalities, within the same electoral cycle[70]. Indeed, Hypothesis 3, proposed the opposite of this: that the spatial effects of female victors are stronger than the spatial effects of proportional female candidates. In evaluating Hypothesis 3 it is therefore helpful to compare the two aforementioned coefficients in the Durbin Lag

[69] And as such, guard against inflation in the estimation of spatial parameters (here the coefficients of spatially lagged independent variables).

[70] Note that Cook et al suggest that scholars prioritise the Durbin Error and the SARAR if explicitly aiming to evaluate spatial mechanisms that relate to both dependent and independent variables, as they are somewhat symmetrical in that they apply spatial controls to the error term. As such, the results should be more reliable than those of the Durbin Lag for which the omission of controls on clustering among disturbances can generate a simultaneity bias in the estimates for the spatial lag of the dependent variable, and can induce bias in the estimates for the spatial lags of independent variables. While the SARAR does not include spatially lagged independent variables, the Durbin Error spatially lags all independent variables. As I discuss in the results section, these are important comparisons, yet since I anticipate that the spatially lagged dependent variable could provide an important control in the evaluation of Hypothesis 2, for reasons relating to the chains of influence that it models, I compare the output of all three specifications. In an ideal world, a specification that included both a spatially lagged dependent variable, at least some spatially lagged independent variables, and accounted for any remaining spatial clustering among residuals would be ideal. This does exist, in the form of the General Nesting Spatial Model. However, Monte Carlo simulations show that it is weakly identified: it essentially cannot distinguish between different pathways of influence. See: Cook, Hays, and Franzese, 'Model Specification and Spatial Interdependence', p. 13.

specification[71], noting the differences in the pathways of influence of independent variables that the three spatial specifications suppose, as will be discussed further in the results section. This renders all three specifications potentially relevant for considering Hypothesis 3.

The Spatial Weights Matrix

Table 7.1 showed a variety of ways in which neighbouring municipalities could be defined. It is far from exhaustive[72]. It also showed that these different definitions lead to different levels of clustering among key variables in a global test—and, as such, demonstrates the importance of selecting appropriate neighbour definitions. Specifying spatial interdependencies among the variables of interest is a difficult task in the case of Brazil because the spatial density of municipalities varies enormously from one part of the country to another. In the southeast, municipalities are tightly packed in; the average area of a municipality in the state of Minas Gerais is 686.8 km^2 (the smallest being 3.6 km^2). Whereas, in Amazonas, the mean area is 25,338.7 km^2, which is more than 125% the size of Wales. Therefore, defining a single spatial rule with a reasonable claim to

[71] Noting that they have different scales: a change from 0 to 1 indicates a municipality going from having a male mayor to a female mayor, or, for the dependent variable, a change from 0% female city councilors, to 100%.

[72] Indeed, in the preparation of this chapter, a number of alternative neighbour definitions were explored, including travel time between municipal capitals within the same micro-region. For a discussion of spatial models using non-geographical concepts of 'space', see: Thomas Plumper, and Erik Neumayer, (2010) 'Model specification in the analysis of spatial dependence', *European Journal of Political Research,* vol. 49, no.3, pp. 418-442. A micro-region is a group of municipalities that are particularly mutually dependent in some way, as defined by Brazil's federal geography and statistics institute, IBGE, for example because some are economic satellites of the municipality with the largest town in the area. These results are not included in the chapter for reasons of both brevity and complicating factors relating to the varying quality and availability of such data for different states in Brazil.

capturing the influence range of social and political variables in Brazil is exceptionally tricky.

If a definition involving the distance between municipal capitals is used—for example the inverse Euclidean distance—and the statistical programme, R, which was used for all analyses in this chapter, is set to calculate inverse distances up to 100km from each municipal capital, municipalities in the southeast have very long neighbour lists. But many in the Amazon region have no neighbours (see Figure 7.5 in the Appendix for a map the distribution of no-neighbour municipalities). Increasing the inverse distance calculation upwards of 100km helps in the latter regard, but also adds computational demands, as the neighbour-lists of south-eastern municipalities grow extremely long[73]. While these issues might be solved by running the models on an advanced computer, a more fundamental, theoretical problem nonetheless arises: when inverse distance weights are applied to key variables of interest, the result is to emphasise the role of distance more that seems substantively plausible. For example, if a municipality in the Amazon and another in the southeast have a value of 100 for a key variable, when weighted by inverse distance (say 1/10km and 1/500km), the southeast municipality's variable would take on a value of 10, and the Amazonian municipality's variable would have a value of 0.2. Such a difference seems questionable as a valid means to assess my theories[74].

For these reasons, the spatial models in this chapter stick to using a simple spatial weights matrix using shared municipal boundaries as the definition of neighbours. As is

[73] To avoid the zero-neighbour problem entirely—a challenge given that Brazil's largest municipality, Altamira, has a larger area than England and Wales combined—the threshold distance must be increased to the extent that municipalities in the southeast neighbour almost all others in that region.

[74] To be sure, some kind of non-linear function could be used instead to more sharply attenuate a variable's value as distance increase, but have no basis for knowing what that should be.

standard in the literature, this is a binary matrix, M, in which each municipality is listed in a separate row, and each has its own column. Cell m_{ij} contains a 1 if two municipalities, i and j, are contiguous, and a 0 if they are not. I specified row standardisation when weighting these connectivities to reflect the assumption that all neighbours have equal influence (the weight of each neighbour is therefore calculated as 1 divided by the total number of connectivities in that row). The spatial lag for the independent variable female incumbency is therefore the sum of the row-standardised connectivity fractions for neighbouring municipalities with a female incumbent[75]—which, put plainly is the proportion of mayors among all neighbouring municipalities who are female. A contiguity definition of neighbours does almost entirely do away with the problem of no-neighbour municipalities[76], though it is far from perfect because it most likely ignores relevant inter-municipality interactions between nearby but non-contiguous municipalities in the southeast. However, for ease of interpretation, and because contiguity is the standard spatial weight matrix format in the spatial econometics literature, I consider it sufficient for the purposes of this chapter.

The Dependent Variable and Estimation Approach

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the dataset used in the analyses in this chapter is similar to that used in Chapter 4. Again, I consider mayoral elections that occurred throughout Brazil in the electoral years 2004, 2008 and 2012[77]. However, unlike the dataset used in

[75] Since each row-standardized connectivity fraction is multiplied by 1 for contiguous municipalities with a female incumbent and by 0 for contiguous municipalities with a male incumbent. This variable is included in the Durbin Error and Durbin Lag models.
[76] Brazil has two municipalities that are islands, Fernando de Noronha and Ilhabela. Only the latter holds elections.
[77] Brazil's Supreme Electoral Court is due to release data from the 2016 municipal elections in March 2017. I intend to add rerun the models with this additional data once it is available.

Chapter 4, mayoral contests in municipalities with sufficiently large populations for run-off elections to occur are included, so as to avoid missing data creating 'holes' on the map[78]. Moreover, unlike the analyses in Chapter 4—which used as dependent variables changes over an electoral cycle in the proportion of female mayoral candidates, and changes in the proportion of votes received by female mayoral candidates, here I employ a 'static' dependent variable: the proportion of female mayoral candidates[79]. This is to facilitate the testing of contagion effects of both lagged female victories and contemporaneous proportions of female candidacies.

For each of the model specifications presented in the results section—basic OLS, SARAR, Durbin Error, and Durbin Lag specifications—the same series of variable combinations were used. In all cases, Model 1 adds only the 'female incumbent' and municipal HDI variables, along with electoral year dummies to account for secular change. Model 2 adds variables to account primarily for the supply of female candidates, while Model 3 considers variables primarily conceived as controlling for voter demand for female candidates. Model 4 brings both the supply and voter-demand variables into one model.

The 'female incumbent' dummy takes a value of 1 when a woman won the mayoral contest on the previous occasion[80]. Within the same municipality, whether or not an incumbent women mayor is eligible to stand in the subsequent election is likely to itself impact on the dependent variable. Second-term women mayors, being unable to seek re-election, are likely to therefore be associated with low proportions of within-municipality

[78] Which would prevent the multiplication of variables with spatial weights matrices from occurring properly; potentially the models would not run at all in a statistics programme.
[79] As noted in Chapter 3, the sources of all variables are listed in the Appendix.
[80] Of course, victors occasionally resign, are forced to step down by the courts, or die. However, these are likely to be very rare cases, and so were not sought out for correction in the dataset.

female mayoral candidates relative to first-term female mayors. These issues are not relevant to evaluating my hypothesis testing, however, assuming a random distribution of first and second term women mayors across the three elections analysed, and across space[81]. Because one can reasonably assume that individuals never seek the post of local executive in neighbouring municipalities from one election to the next[82], the female incumbent's term is treated as unimportant[83]. Municipal HDI is included in Model 1 as a basic control, likely to be associated with both the supply and demand for female politicians[84]. Although HDI correlates positively with gender equality globally, in Brazil the correlation is between HDI and women's descriptive representation is negative; more women run for and achieve mayoral office in the less developed northeast, than in the wealthier south[85].

In Model 2, the lagged proportion of elected, female, municipal councillors is the key supply-side variable—an indicator for the size of the pool of prospective women mayoral candidates in a municipality. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is not a perfect indicator because many elected council members harbour no desire to become mayor, and

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81 This is because the spatial diffusion multiplier calculates different equilibrium effects for each municipality based on its spatial characteristics—depending on whether it is close to the centre of the map or at the edge, for example. The equilibrium effects reported are average effects of all of these calculations.

82 Marko Klašnja and Rocío Titiunik, (2017) 'The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 111, no. 1, pp. 129–48.

83 It is possible that symbolic representation effects occur in a non-monotonic fashion over time. Each additional year of female incumbency may have a stronger effect that the former (perhaps as citizens in the neighbouring municipality tell their friends about her, and then those individuals tell their friends)—or particularly in small municipalities, awareness may reach saturation after a certain period. Alternatively, symbolic representation effects may differ in the first and second terms because mayors behave differently when the rules prohibit their re-election. For example, Ferraz and Finan find that second-term mayors are more likely to engage in corruption.

84 Inglehart and Norris. *Rising Tide.* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003) See pp.37 for a correlation coefficient between HDI and gender equality.

85 This is linked to women from oligarchic families in the less developed north and northeastern regions standing for public office as representatives of the family. See: Luis Felipe Miguel, Danusa Marques and Carlos Machado, (2015) 'Capital Familiar e Carreira Política No Brasil: Gênero, Partido e Região Nas Trajetórias Para a Câmara Dos Deputados', *Dados*, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 721–47.

prospective mayoral candidates need not have prior experience on the council[86]. However, it likely indicates the proportion of local women who pay close attention to municipal politics and who have a constituency of political support. The mayoral candidacy decisions of those in this pool of female prospective candidates will presumably hang on symbolic indicators additional to the spatial effects that I seek to test, of how well they estimate they will fare in a mayoral race. For this reason, the lagged ratio of female to male votes is also included as a supply-side control. It is simply the ratio of the average proportion of votes that women mayoral candidates in the municipality won in the previous election, to the average proportion of votes that male mayoral candidates in the municipality won in the previous election[87].

Ideology, vote market coordination and the percentage of female voters in a municipality provide additional controls for voters' demand for women leaders, although each of these variables could also affect supply. Citizenries in which the median voter holds more socially liberal ideas are anticipated to be more willing to vote for a woman[88]. The ideology variable used comes from work by Timothy Power and Rodrigo Rodrigues-Silveira[89]. This variable takes on values ranging from -2 (extreme left wing ideology) to +2 (extreme right wing ideology), and was calculated at the municipal level using votes

[86] Note that this indicator distinguishes between councilors who won their seats because they individually garnered sufficient votes, rather than because, in the proportional representation electoral system, gained seats thanks to the high number of votes won by a copartisan.
[87] It may be possible to improve this control by averaging the ratio over several previous local elections. Note that where there were no female candidates in the previous election, I replaced the value of 0 average votes with 0.0001 to make it possible to calculate the ratio. Note that this variable serves a similar purpose to the 'dominance' (the incumbent's margin of victory in the previous election) variable included in previous quantitative chapters in that it indicates the size of the challenge to a female aspirant. However, it replaces the dominance variable in this chapter as it is a more precise indicator of local impressions of women's capacity to win elections.
[88] Lena Wängnerud (2009) 'Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation.' *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1, pp.51–69.
[89] Timothy J. Power and Rodrigo Rodrigues-Silveira, (2009) 'Mapping Ideological Preferences in Brazilian Elections, 1994-2018: A Municipal-Level Study', *Brazilian Political Science Review*, vol. 13, no. 1, doi: 10.1590/1981-3821201900010001.

cast for each political party in every Brazilian municipality, alongside party ideology scores (that in many cases shift substantially over time) based on the Brazilian Legislative Survey[90]. Vote-market coordination is a measure of how many voters there were per mayoral candidate in a municipality, and is primarily imagined as an indication of the feasibility of vote buying, with lower feasibility assumed to be associated with more available votes for female candidates[9192]. Model 4 also includes the proportion of voters who are female, because, as noted in Chapter 4, some studies find women to be more willing than men to vote for female candidates[93].

Results

Broadly, the results are consistent with of all three of the hypotheses outlined earlier in this chapter. Those most pertinent findings to the evaluation of these hypotheses can be found in Table 7.2. These have been extracted from the various specifications of Model 4, reported in full in Table 7.4. The results of Models 1 to 4 for each of the spatial model specifications, and for the OLS model, can be found in the Appendix. Equilibrium effects, which are explained below, are reported in Table 7.3 in the main chapter.

[90] The Brazilian Legislative Survey tracks the political opinions of Brazilian members of congress
[91] Who likely have fewer resources available for vote buying. Moreover, female mayors in Brazil have been shown to spend fewer resources on temporary workers in the run up to seeking re-election. See: Fernanda Brollo and Ugo Troiano, (2016) 'What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil', *Journal of Development Economics*, vol. 122, pp. 28-45.
[92] To be sure, this is a problematic variable, because a measure of voters per candidate could also reflect the openness of political competition, with fewer voters per candidate implying a more open field. Female mayoral candidates may perceive their odds of success as higher in more open races[92]. See: Barbara Palmer and Dennis Simon, (2001) 'The Political Glass Ceiling: Gender, Strategy, and Incumbency in U.S. House Elections, 1978-1998', *Women & Politics* vol. 23, no. 1–2, pp. 59–78.
[93] Lena Wängnerud, 'Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation', pp. 51–69.

As is standard in spatial econometrics, I refer to the spatially lagged dependent variable as rho, here the spatially lagged proportion of female mayoral candidates. A significant lambda term indicates that there is some spatial dependence in the residuals—that is, some remaining spatial clustering in the dependent variable for which the independent variables included in the model do not account. The specifications of the spatial models are summarised by the equations in the upper row on Table 7.2. These were mentioned previously, though to recap, the SARAR specification reports both rho and lambda, but does not apply a spatial lag to any independent variables. The SARAR specification offers the best model fit, as it minimises the AIC most, relative to an equivalent non-spatial model[94]. The Durbin Error specification estimates lambda but not rho—though does spatially lag all independent variables. The Durbin Lag specification estimates both rho and spatially lags all independent variables, but does not estimate lambda, and as a result, the coefficients of its spatial terms should be less efficient than those of the Durbin Error specification. The different values of lambda in Tables 7.2 and 7.4 indicate that the Model 4 residuals of the Durbin Error specification are far less strongly spatially correlated[95] than those of the SARAR specification. This is to be expected as this remaining correlation should be taken up by applying a spatial lag to all independent variables in the Durbin Error specification (some of which, such as the spatial lag of HDI, are highly significant across models)[96].

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[94] Its AIC is the most negative among the spatial specifications those reported in Table 6.2, and the AIC of its OLS equivalent is the least negative.

[95] Note that although lambda is not significant at the $p<0.05$ level in model 4 of the Durbin Error specification, it is very close to significance ($p = 0.053$). It makes sense that spatial autocorrelation of residuals remains in this specification, as the model omits the spatial lag of the dependent variable.

[96] Curiously, a Breusch–Godfrey *test* indicates that spatial autocorrelation remains in the error term of the Durbin Lag (test *statistic = 589.08, p<0.001)*, even though lambda is not significant at the $p<0.05$ level in the Durbin Error specification. The inclusion of the spatially lagged dependent variable in addition to spatially lagged independent variables appears to induce spatial correlation in the error. It is unclear why this might be.

To summarise what is being modelled by these different specifications, the SARAR specification assumes that a woman winning a mayoral election only influences neighbouring municipalites' female candidacies indirectly, by affecting the proportion of female candidates in the same district as her victory, and the change in this proportion then influences women's proportional candidacies elsewhere. The Durbin Error tests spillover. It assumes that a woman victor can affect neighbouring municipalites' proportion of female candidacies, but not through the mechanism of raising the proportion of women running for mayor in the same district as the victory. The Durbin Lag specification allows for both pathways of influence.

Hypothesis 1 proposed an interdependence effect: that the proportion of female mayoral candidates in a given municipality increases with the proportion of female mayoral candidates in neighbouring municipalities. The positive, and highly significant coefficients of rho in both the SARAR and Durbin Lag models support this. This parameter remains positive and significant at the $p<0.001$ level in models 1 to 4 for these specifications. Moreover, it is clear that the model fit improvement that the models' spatial terms provide (i.e. the AIC values, compared to AIC values of OLS equivalent models) is proportionally greater for the Durbin specification that includes rho—the Durbin Lag specification. This underscores the explanatory value of the spatially lagged dependent variable.

The SARAR's removal of 'nuisance' residual spatial correlation more completely addresses 'Galton's problem' than the Durbin Lag specification, as the SARAR controls for spatial clustering of unobservables. The fact that rho is positive and significant in the SARAR therefore provides more persuasive evidence that spatial clustering in the dependent variable is not driven by common causation of variables that aggregate in

space similarly to the dependent variable. The Durbin Lag specification supports this also[97], though specifically for its spatially lagged predictors, including female incumbency, and the strongly spatially clustered variables, municipal HDI and ideology. The inclusion of one or more of these spatial controls most likely explains why the coefficient of rho is smaller in the Durbin Lag specification than in the SARAR models.

In substantive terms, Model 4 of the SARAR specification estimates that a municipality's proportion of female mayoral candidates would be 54.4% higher if its neighbouring municipalities only had women running for the position (10.6% higher according to the Durbin Lag specification). Blanket female candidates is unlikely—hence, more realistically, if all surrounding municipalities were to go from having zero women running for mayor, to, on average, having one woman and two men competing, then the SARAR predicts that the surrounded municipality would see an 18.2%[98] greater proportion of women competing. In other words, if there were normally five local candidates there, interdependence effects make it approximately probable that one, rather than none, would be a woman[99].

[97] Noting aforementioned issues about the efficiency of coefficients.
[98] 3.5% according to the Durbin Lag specification.
[99] For a guide to this interpretation, see: Michael D. Ward & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 'Spatially Lagged Dependent Variables', pp 35-64, in Spatial Regression Models (SAGE Publications, Inc.)

Table 7.2. Quantities of interest extracted from Table 7.4, for the evaluation of Hypotheses 1-3.

Model 4	SARAR $y = \rho Wy + X\beta + u$ $u = \lambda Wu + \epsilon$	Durbin Error $y = X\beta + WX\theta$ $u = \lambda Wu + \epsilon$	Durbin Lag $y = \rho Wy + X\beta + WX\theta$ -
Spatially lagged dependent variable (rho)	0.5444***	---	0.1064***
Female incumbent mayor	0.2032***	0.2190***	0.2063***
Spatially lagged female incumbent mayor	---	0.0610**	0.1594***
Lambda	-0.6269***	0.0445	---
AIC (AIC of OLS)	-7817.3 (-7666.7)	-7685.6 (-7683.9)	-7791.1 (-7770.4)

Significance codes: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05. Two-tailed tests.

Table 7.3. Equilibrium effects of Model 4 for different spatial model specifications

Model 4 Equilibrium Impacts	SARAR			Durbin Error			Durbin Lag		
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
Female incumbent	0.2094	0.1115	0.3209	0.2103	0.0610	0.2713	0.2100	0.0619	0.2719
HDI	-0.1215	-0.0647	-0.1863	-0.0882	-0.1420	-0.2302	-0.0859	-0.1394	-0.2253
Lag prop. elected female councillors	0.1240	0.0660	0.1900	0.1223	0.0821	0.2044	0.1223	0.0851	0.2073
Lag female : male votes	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.0001	-0.0001	0.0000	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0000
Ideology	-0.0097	-0.0051	-0.0148	-0.0099	0.0004	-0.0095	-0.0162	0.0039	-0.0123
Vote market coordination	0.1323	0.0705	0.2028	0.1367	0.1168	0.2535	0.1514	0.1357	0.2871
% female voters	0.2181	0.1161	0.3343	0.2452	-0.0775	0.1676	0.2364	-0.0667	0.1698
2008 dummy	0.0051	0.0027	0.0078	0.0057	0.0045	0.0102	0.0037	0.0055	0.0091
2012 dummy	0.0327	0.0174	0.0501	0.0317	0.0298	0.0615	0.0298	0.0308	0.0606

Table 7.4. Model 4 results for basic OLS, and three spatial model specifications.

Model 4, Full Results	OLS	SARAR	Durbin Error	Durbin Lag
Female incumbent	0.2122***	0.2032***	0.2103***	0.2063***
Spatial lag female incumbent	---	---	0.0610**	0.1594***
HDI	-0.1851***	-0.0650***	-0.0882**	-0.0687**
Spatial lag HDI	---	---	-0.1420***	-0.0541**
Lag prop. elected female councillors	0.1273***	0.1137***	0.1223***	0.1188***
Spatial lag, lag prop. elected female councillors	---	---	0.0821	0.0356
Lag female : male votes	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
Spatial lag, lag female : male votes	---	---	-0.0001	-0.0002
Ideology	-0.0103	-0.0092	-0.0099	-0.0097
Spatial lag ideology	---	---	0.0004*	-0.0495**
Vote market coordination	0.1422***	0.1243***	0.1367**	0.1669***
Spatial lag vote market coordination	---	---	0.1168	0.0494
% female voters	0.3291***	0.1383***	0.2452**	0.1823***
Spatial lag % female voters	---	---	-0.0775	0.0036
2008 dummy	0.0165***	0.0118***	0.0057	0.0154***
Spatial lag 2008 dummy	---	---	0.0045	0.0601
2012 dummy	0.0469***	0.0360***	0.0317**	0.0320***
Spatial lag 2012 dummy	---	---	0.0298	-0.0623
Rho	---	0.5444***	---	0.1064***
Lambda	---	-0.6269***	0.0445	---
Adjusted R^2	0.0963	---	---	---
AIC (AIC for OLS)	---	-7817.3 (-7666.7)	-7685.6 (-7683.9)	-7791.1 (-7770.4)
N	16503	16503	16503	16503

Significance codes: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05. Two-tailed tests.
Standard errors omitted in order to fit the model results on one page.

To be sure, there are many possible mechanisms behind this interdependence. It is modelled as simultaneous: the contagion occurs with contiguous neighbours within the same electoral cycle. A plausible mechanism that fits the result of a significant and positive value of rho in the SARAR and Durbin Lag models would be, for example, a regional branch of a political party holding events or various outreach efforts aimed at women in surrounding municipalities, such as offering campaign finance and strategy knowhow for those interested in candidacy. Alternatively, a role model effect could operate across party lines, with women's candidacies passively or actively encouraging women in neighbouring municipalities to run. These possibilities are merely speculation, however, as spatial models fall short of causal identification, though they are picked up in the discussions of the next section.

The different pathways of influence that the various spatial specifications model come more sharply into focus when assessing the estimated effect of independent variables, and so in evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3. To explain more fully than before, it would not be accurate to interpret the SARAR specification as one in which the independent variables in municipality i do not affect the dependent variable in municipality j—they do, but only through their influence on the dependent variable in i[100]. Hence, in the SARAR specification, the female incumbency variable in i will be modeled as affecting the proportion of female candidates in i, which in turn will influence the proportion of female candidates in j. Then, as the effects propagate, the proportion of female candidates in j influences that proportion in k, and also feeds back to influence that proportion of female candidates in i—and so generates equilibrium effects (see Table

[100] Indeed, spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of the SARAR specification are also modelled in this way: the residuals of i may influence the dependent variable in j, through the dependent variable in i.

7.3). These must be taken into account in assessing the total impact of the female incumbency variable[101].

In the Durbin Error specification, this logic applies to all of the independent variables. In other words, the HDI of municipality i is modeled as directly influencing the HDI of j (as well as the proportion of female candidates in i). The HDI of i can affect the proportion of female candidates in j, but only via its influence on the HDI of j[102]. Here the effects propagate differently to generate an equilibrium: j's HDI goes on to influence k's HDI (which then influences the dependent variable in k), and j's HDI also feeds back—or 'rebounds'—to affect i's HDI (and, in this way, influences the dependent variable in i). Thus, in the case of the female incumbency variable that is relevant to Hypotheses 2 and 3, the Durbin Error specification estimates the influence of a woman winning the previous election (t = 0) in i, on a woman winning in j at t = 0, and also the effect of a woman winning in i at t = 0 on the proportion of female candidates in i at t = 1, the current election. It does not consider the causal pathway whereby a change in the proportion of female candidates in i at t = 1, that was brought about by a woman winning in i at t = 0, goes on to affect the proportion of female candidates in j at t = 1. In this way, the mechanistic emphases of the SARAR and Durbin Error specifications are distinct.

Hypothesis 2 stated female victories, and women's subsequent terms as mayor, would be associated with increases in the proportion of women standing for mayoral office in neighbouring municipalities. Again, the results indicate that this is the case. The positive

[101] Rather than directly reading off short-run impacts indicated by autoregressive model coefficients.
[102] J.P. LeSage and R.K. Pace, Introduction to Spatial Econometrics (New York: Chapman and Hall, 2009).

and highly significant coefficients of the spatially lagged female incumbency variable in both Durbin specifications suggest that a woman's victory brings about a rise in the dependent variable in neighbouring municipalities, and that this happens in addition to the effect that the victory has on the dependent variable in neighbouring municipalities via raising the proportion of female candidates in the district where the woman won.

In the case of the Durbin Error specification, the coefficients of the independent variables (in Table 7.4) can be interpreted directly (as compared to Table 7.3): they represent spillovers impacting the immediately neighbouring observations. Thus, a women's victory where previously a man was mayor implies an on-average rise in the proportion of women candidates in contiguous municipalities of 6.1%—a percentage that is confirmed by the indirect effects of Model 4 of the Durbin Lag specification (see Table 7.3). The equilibrium effects of the female incumbency variable in the SARAR specification are intriguing, however, as indirect effects contribute a substantial proportion of the total effect. This implies that women's victories exert influence around the map of Brazil by increasing the proportion of women standing in their immediate location in the next election, and that this rise in the proportion of female candidates in the victor's municipality promotes greater proportions of women running in neighbouring municipalities in the same electoral cycle.

In light of these niceties of the evidence consistent with different pathways of female victors' influence, evaluating Hypothesis 3 is not straightforward. Hypothesis 3 stated that women's victories in neighbouring municipalities exert more influence on the proportion of female candidates than do neighbouring municipalities' proportions of women's candidates. It is difficult to evaluate because some of the effect of female incumbency operates through the interdependence effect. However, the total impacts

shown in Table 7.4 suggests that female mayors in Brazil are impressive role models overall. The election of a woman is associated with a net 27-32% increase in the proportion of female mayoral candidates, four years down the line, on average[103]. In the next section, I discuss some anecdotal examples of spatial contagion mechanisms that were mentioned by those interviewed in the preparation of this dissertation. They speak both to spillover effects of female incumbency, and to the pathway of simultaneous flows of influence between proportions of women's candidacies.

The other coefficients and equilibrium effects reported in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 are largely as expected. None of the OLS coefficients lose significance when spatial clustering in residuals is accounted for, although the HDI and proportion of female voters coefficients reduce in size. The lack of significance of many spatial lagged variables in the Durbin models fits with how I expected these factors would affect the dependent variable. The temporally lagged proportion of elected city councillors who are women, symbolic effects in the immediate location (the lag of male : female votes), the proportion of female voters, and the year dummies only exert influence on the value of the dependent variable in neighbouring municipalities via their effect on the dependent variable of the immediate municipality. HDI and ideology stand apart in this regard. HDI appears to exert a stronger influence on the proportion of women's candidacies in neighbouring municipalities via its effect on the HDI of those neighbours[104]. Ideology also operates via spillovers: as the literature expects, women are more likely to run for

[103] This figure should be interpreted with the qualification that it does not consider first and second terms of female incumbents.
[104] As is evident, for example, by comparing the indirect effects of HDI (which is equivalent to the coefficient of the spatial lag of HDI) in Model 4 of the Durbin Error specification (-0.142), to the direct effects (-0.882). As noted elsewhere in this thesis, HDI in Brazil tends to be inversely related to women's descriptive representation.

mayor when voter sentiment moves to the left (when the total effects of ideology in Table 7.3 are negative)[105].

Anecdotes of Possible Mechanisms

By what mechanisms might female candidacies and incumbencies promote female candidacies in neighbouring districts? There are many possible mechanisms that would be consistent with the results of my spatial econometric models. Women who aspire to become candidates could have direct interactions with other women who harbour the same ambitions, with women who have already become candidates, and with female mayors. They might, for example, belong to the same political party and attend regional meetings. They might belong to the same religious group. Or they may have business clients and friends in surrounding towns. Any of these interactions might encourage women to believe that they have a chance of success. Indeed, it seems very reasonable to turn to women in the nearby area for political knowhow; recall, in Chapter 5, how Terezinha de Paulina's expensive jingle that was scored by political consultants, who were not local, failed to resonate with voters in Itapeva—it just was not quite attuned to their tastes.

The interviews conducted for the illustrative case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 were not planned with the intention of exploring mechanisms that might explain evidence of spatial contagion. Nonetheless, anecdotes of these effects emerged in many of them.

[105] The Durbin Error specification has a curious result: when one municipality influences a neighbouring municipality's ideology such that it shifts it to the right, this leads to a slight increase in the neighbour's proportion of women's candidacies.

Interdependence of Women's Candidacies

The interviews revealed several examples of interactions that would appear as contagion flowing through the dependent variable. Professora Rita, who was a mayoral candidate in Salto in 2008, discussed meeting other politically engaged citizens from the same subregion of São Paulo state, at PSOL party meetings—some of them mayoral candidates. The same networks of individuals often interacted at teachers' union events, and through her church. They bonded through mutual assistance in various forms, shared ideas about how to raise money for political campaigns—and about how to run them on a shoestring[106]. Rita met politically engaged women, in particular, through her efforts to bring about a reduction in domestic violence in Salto. As noted in Chapter 5, some of these interactions were necessarily with individuals from outside of the district. To set up a women's shelter in Brazil, municipalities must strike agreements with one another, so that women who move into a shelter can always do so outside of their district, to make it difficult for an abusive partner to locate them.

Extra-district party meetings aimed at women members were described by Amélia Móveis, a long-time city councillor in Pires do Rio, who has switched party several times. She explained that her current party, the PSD (the Social Democratic Party), and others, hold regional events to encourage women's candidacies. Although these meetings are probably aimed at finding women for party lists—as parties are supposed to meet a gender quota for all legislative elections in Brazil—rather than mayoral candidates per se, they function broadly as fora where women discuss politics, and political opportunity in

[106] Diniz, R. 17 September 2016. In-person interview.

the area. While Amélia has not run for mayor, these networks had helped her to rise within the PSD, and to become local party president. In her words:

> 'Recently, we had a PSD woman meeting. It's only for women, right? The organisers had chosen the first lady of Urutaí, someone called Bianca, to get more women to go into politics. It wasn't quite training, more like a motivational speech, right? This happens a year before the election—a year or a year and a half before. Now, when I've been in other parties, sometimes it happened every three months… I always try to go because it's a way of understanding our coexistence. Or at least that's how it works out… there's a lot of exchange of ideas.'[107]

Women's Incumbency, Spillover and Interdependence

Amélia is also an example of how women in a strong position to run as mayoral candidates are keenly aware of female mayors in the local area. In response to the question, 'Are there any women mayors in nearby cities?', she said:

> 'Yes, Ipameri. Ipameri has an excellent mayor. Wow, she's revolutionising the city! It's happening before our very eyes. It's Mayor Daniela. If you have the opportunity go there. She's getting R$ 50 million now for infrastructure to benefit local industries – did you know that?! Orizona does not have a woman mayor. Santa Cruz doesn't. Urutaí has not had one yet—so it's just Ipameri.'

Morevoer, during interviews in Goiatuba, which is several hours' drive from Pires do Rio, Cida Tomazini's name and reputation was familiar to some residents. A local talk-radio host, Gley de Menezes, claimed to know Cida personally, and referred to her as 'the woman who was mayor of Pires'[108]. Whenever he mentioned her name in conversation, he invariably added that she did a great job in the role[109].

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[107] Móveis, A, 12 December 2017. In-person interview.
[108] de Menezes, G, 8 December 2017. In-person interview.
[109] If anything, this anecdote suggests that alternative spatial weight matrices than contiguity might better capture some mechanisms of symbolic representation contagion effects in Brazil, as

The interviews also contained anecdotes of women mayors and vice mayors promoting female candidacies within the same municipality. Cleide Aparecida, who was Pires do Rio's second female mayor after Cida, described what she took away from Cida's mayoral campaign:

> 'I remember helping Cida with her campaign… being the first woman, I think some people even rejoiced when her name was announced… yet, also, I did not know a side of the city until then, for her to suffer prejudice for being the first woman. Sometimes she, who was the candidate, felt it. But, even so, Cida was elected with a very good percentage—and that's the part that I remember when I think of her campaign.'[110]

In Itapuí, Cleuza, who was deputy mayor as opposed to mayor, actively sought out capable, local women and attempted to mould their perceptions of how municipal politics works and the applicability of their existing skill sets to officeholding. The central thrust of her argument was that if she could do it, as a woman, and with no prior background in politics, then so could they[111].

As these anecdotes illustrate, symbolic mechanisms of influence between politically engaged women can involve direct interaction, and can be more passive—mere exposure to role models, perhaps through local media or campaign material, can lead to emulation. Note that interdependence and spillover need not operate through women at all; the statistical traces of causal pathways that I reported in the previous section could primarily result from shifts in women's symbolic representation among male selectorate members. Furthermore, studies have found that voters use as benchmarks the performance of

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Pires do Rio and Goiatuba do not share the same border. Although the aforementioned complications of modeling this across a country with such variation in municipal district sizes obviously remains.

[110] Aparecida, C. 12 December 2017. In-person interview.

[111] de Freitas Nascimento, C. 19 September 2016. In-person interview.

politicians in other jurisdictions to evaluate those in their own[112]; thus, witnessing women do well next door might erode gender bias, and raise voter demand for female candidacies.

Discussion

The results in this final empirical chapter clearly demonstrate the merits of the clarification that the revised model should be considered porous to extra-district influences. They therefore fulfil the second ambition of this thesis. Although these results are not generalisable to the full diversity of democracies in the world today, through findings consistent with contagion effects between Brazilian municipalities, I show that these effects are worth taking into account in a context with huge variation in social and economic indicators, and great diversity of political parties' institutionalisation levels. And thus, I argue that they are worth taking into account in pathways of political recruitment. To the best of my knowledge, this is only the second study to apply spatial econometrics to women's representation. And it is the first to do so over a map that is continental in size, as well as in a context with the aforementioned characteristics.

There are advantages to the various spatial model specifications that I use that make my results particularly robust. First, I use multiple spatial model specifications, and my key findings are consistent across them. Second, my approach is sensitive to the possibility that remaining spatial clustering exists among model residuals, even after spatially lagged variables are included as predictors, and corrects for this. The risk of coefficients of

[112] Mark Andreas Kayser and Michael Peress, (2012) 'Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison', *American Political Science Review,* vol. 106, no. 3, pp. 661–84.

spatially lagged variables appearing to be statistically significant when they would not be in a better specified model, is therefore removed.

Another major advantage of using different spatial specifications is the traction that this offers for understanding the causal pathways that generate contagion. While it is frequently noted in the spatial econometrics literature that these tools fall short of causal identification, the results of the combination of models specified here at least point to routes through which influence flows. Not only does the proportion of female mayors in a Brazilian municipality appear to affect that proportion in contiguous districts, but spillovers seem to be occurring, whereby women's victories, changes in levels of local development, and in left-right ideology, directly flow into next-door municipalities to affect the dependent variable there. These multiple contagion effects disseminate across the country from wherever values of these variables alter, spreading as ever-weakening ripples from one municipality, to the next, to the next, to the next. They spread both forward and back, because the ripples of influence recoil into the municipality whence they came. Eventually, a new equilibrium is reached. This what is modelled in the calculation of equilibrium effects.

To be sure, the insights that the models offer might have been improved with access to data that was either not available or does not exist, and potentially by exploring interaction terms that include the female incumbency dummy variable. Geolocation data for local branches of political parties was only available for São Paulo state. Had it been available for the whole country, I would have explored models predicting women's candidacies by party, using spatial weights matrices that measured a municipality's connectedness in terms of travel time between the municipal capital and the nearest party branch. The model fit of SARAR specifications of these models, relative to the same

models using the contiguity spatial weights matrix, would have suggested how important within-party interdependence effects are[113]. Analogously, knowing the comparative model fit of models that used a spatial weights matrix generated from information about the location and reach of local radio stations, would have given an idea as to how interdependence and spillover spreads. Interacting the female incumbent dummy variable with the incumbent's party, vote share, a measure of performance in office, and whether the incumbent was the first woman mayor in that municipality[114], would, in theory have been worthwhile. However, there is debate within the spatial econometrics community as to the validity of estimates of interaction effects when a diffusion multiplier (the calculation of equilibrium effects) is applied[115].

Even though Gilardi's work on Zurich canton only found interdependence effects for a few elections shortly after women gained the right to vote, and Broockman did not find impacts on nearby districts at all, it is not surprising that contagion occurred in Brazil over recently electoral cycles. In 1979, before Brazil's Superior Electoral Court recorded the sex of political candidates, Eva Alterman Blay and Susan Soeiro calculated that there were 60 women elected mayor during the 1972 to 1976 period[116], which equates to approximately 1.5% of elected mayors—at a time when 44% of voters were female. In 2016, the percentage of female elected mayors was 11.4%, the highest percentage in Brazilian history. A woman winning a local executive election, and even a woman

[113] In theory, cross-party women's networks, and cross-party role model effects might be expected to play a particularly prominent role in Brazil compared to partisan effects. As Brazil's many weakly institutionalised 'modular' parties often share parallel pathways of recruitment up to the stage of candidacy.
[114] Some studies, but not all, show that first descriptive examples generate stronger effects. For a discussion see: Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and Catherine Reyes-Housholder, (2017) 'Citizen Responses to Female Executives: Is It Sex, Novelty or Both?' *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 373–98.
[115] Scott Cook, pers comm.
[116] Eva Alterman Blay and Susan A. Soeiro. (1979) 'The Political Participation of Women in Brazil: Female Mayors.' Women in Latin America, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 42-59.

standing as a candidate for mayor, is still something of curiosity to many Brazilian citizens.

In a paper detailing a cross-national study into the connection between descriptive and symbolic forms of representation, Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci report survey results for each of the countries in their analysis. For Brazil, there was no sex gap found in responses to a question probing whether voters believe that elections ensure that their views are represented by major parties[117], which might be expected given that voting is compulsory for most citizens. But the survey did find that women in Brazil feel significantly less represented than men in terms of their levels of satisfaction with democracy, in terms of how well parties represent their opinions, and in terms of how well leaders such as presidential candidates represent their opinions[118]. In short, the implication is that women's symbolic representation in Brazil has much to gain from improvements in women's descriptive representation. This chapter has shown that female mayoral candidacies and victories appear to be gradually contributing some improvement.

[117] Karp and Banducci, 'When Politics Is Not Just a Man's Game' p. 110.
[118] Ibid. p. 111.

Chapter 8:

Conclusion

I began this project by pointing out that in recent decades women's descriptive representation has been rising around the world. Although descriptive equity with men still appears far-off, the view from the moon is one of rapid change compared to all prior global political history. Women are on average becoming national and local legislators in ever-greater proportions, and more frequently becoming executives at all levels (at least, as far as we can tell from the sometimes-limited data about local government). But, crucially, on closer examination, these changes are uneven; variance in women's representation has also been growing. Moreover—and as is particularly relevant for efforts to make sense of these trends—the gains that have been witnessed have not been restricted to countries where the main political parties have created transparent and unambiguous practices of candidate recruitment through procedures internal to the party. Instead, women have been achieving elective office ever more frequently both as representatives of organisations that assiduously adhere to written rules about how candidate recruitment should be conducted, and as representatives of outfits that are only recognisable as political parties for fact that they compete in elections.

This point presents a challenge because political science's standard theoretical framework for this task, Norris and Lovenduski's Supply and Demand Model—quite aside from its inherent problems—lacks generalisability. I proposed that the discipline therefore has a choice: to put this model aside, and think again; or to attempt a refashioning of the standard model so as to make it applicable to contexts where cults of personality are the order of the day, where votes are frequently purchased, and where parties (if indeed they

do put time, effort and money into setting up local branches) often shut up shop between elections. This second option requires not diminishing the model's explanatory value when applied to bureaucratic, statute-abiding, highly institutionalised parties.

In this thesis, I have pursued the second option. I presented and justified my modifications to the standard model in Chapter 2. The first of my modifications is straightforward to operationalise, as it proposes extending Norris and Lovenduski's proportionality tests to compare the stage of recruitment that has the highest proportion of women, with the proportion of women among the represented. To be sure, the proportion of women among the represented will almost always be very close to half[1]. However, the value of this simple addition is primarily to draw attention to the extent of feedback effects that operate across the full length of pathways of political recruitment.

My second modification is less straightforward to operationalise because it involves becoming familiar with how local actors understand political recruitment, and then making decisions about what understandings are widely shared and actually structure progression towards candidacy. I suggest starting from the two universal stages of political recruitment—candidacy and election—and then working out what comes before through qualitative exploration of local contexts. In this way, stages of political recruitment up to candidacy are defined by what has become routinised in the minds of politically engaged local actors. Routinised stages will often be effortful attainments, but are not necessarily so. And they can vary in number and type. In presenting this view, I also assert that the analytical focus should not be on the distinction between formality and informality, but rather on party institutionalisation. Highly institutionalised parties

[1] Though this is unlikely to be the case were the revised model to be extended to examination of variation in descriptive representation by other descriptors, such as race or class.

are best thought of as those with a single pathway towards candidacy, whether or not they adhere to their own rules. Weakly institutionalised parties should be conceptualised as parties for which one can become a candidate in more than one way.

Given my intention to develop a model with explanatory value for the full range of political parties in the world's democracies, more is required than an injection of elasticity. A point of clarification about the porosity of the model is also theoretically helpful, and, as I demonstrated in Chapter 7, empirically important. The revised model should be understood as porous to external influence. In many ways, this is common sense. For example, one would expect from first principles that role model effects will more likely spread according to patterns of social connections, than according to the confines of voting district boundaries. Similarly, it is well known that economic development and ideas frequently trickle into districts from the outside, creating new jobs and aspirations, often concomitantly, independence for many. One might anticipate that this, in turn, could generate greater change to the opportunity structures that shape women's lives, than to those that shape men's.

The clarification that the model should be considered porous to extra-party influences on progression across stages is consistent with Norris and Lovenduski's original articulation of how political recruitment operates. However, it deviates with what they had in mind when considered alongside my more flexible, de facto-oriented view of recruitment stages. This is because the revised model anticipates that external influences can shape the content of stages of recruitment, in addition to affecting women's rates of progression across them.

As with any attempt to elasticise a theoretical framework, there is a danger of stretching it too far—so much that it ceases to be useful. As noted in Chapter 1, to break the elastic limit of the Supply and Demand Model would be to adapt it into a framework with less explanatory purchase than the original. One concern here might be that in creating space for the multiple pathways of recruitment towards candidacy that characterise weakly institutionalised parties, I have developed an excessively permissive framework. But it is not the case that anything goes. Even though routinisation is a continuous variable, in Itapeva I found that interviewees thought of it in binary terms. They categorised local notables from the 'right' families according to whether these individuals had followed a path that was considered relevant to increasing their odds of mayoral candidacy, or whether they had not. My limited investigations suggest that there tends to be a fairly short list of parallel pathways towards candidate recruitment for weakly institutionalised parties, at last in the Brazilian context.

Another concern might be that by making the stages of recruitment in the model variable, I have made it harder to compare progression towards candidacy across parties. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 2, in *Political Recruitment*, Norris and Lovenduski report that bottlenecks to women's progression occurred at different points in the recruitment pathways of the UK's Labour and Conservative parties. They were able to draw this comparison because they present these parties' recruitment stages as identical. I do not claim to be able to do the same. To pursue a strategy of fitting the diversity of political recruitment pathways found in the world's democracies into a predefined structure, as per the standard framework, was always to try to fit all manner of rectangular pegs into a round hole. Yet comparison is still possible and reasonable if the approach is to first identify the routinised stages that exist for the parties one wishes to compare, and then look for equivalence.

In Chapter 2, as well as describing my renovations to the standard model, I also explained that my revised model's purpose is to detect the existence of distortions in political recruitment, rather than to identify mechanisms of distortion, which is logically beyond any stagewise framework. The revised model is intended as a tool to motivate and guide further qualitative investigation. To detect distortions, it retains the logic of proportionality testing for use where such data can be uncovered. This means that the model's potential to eliminate or highlight possible stage-specific distortions is retained. But I also acknowledge that this is an ideal and uncommon scenario for a substantial section of most parties' recruitment pathways[2].

By building routinised stages of political recruitment from the starting point of the two stages that are common to all parties—candidacy and elective office—the revised model avoids falling into the trap of considering progression across those last two stages as an afterthought, as both the standard model and feminist institutionalist studies tend to do. It is therefore more sensitive to variations in gendered demand for candidates among voters, and to contextual shifts in this. This is important for a theoretical framework that aims to make sense of variation in women's descriptive representation in candidate-centric systems because, in so far as voters perceive of an electoral office to require characteristics that they consider gendered, voters' gender biases are likely to affect women's descriptive outcomes.

Chapter 3 discussed the evidence that Brazilian mayoral elections are candidate-centric, and that Brazilian voters tend to hold traditional gender stereotypes. It explained that, thanks to its diversity of political parties, Brazil is an appropriate choice for trialling an

[2] Indeed, it is rare for studies that base their theory on the standard model to conduct proportionality tests across several stages.

explanatory framework that aims to cater to the full, global range of party institutionalisation. Crucially, this case selection offered plentiful publicly available data about candidates and elections, and a vast number of voting districts joined together on the map as an almost unbroken patchwork.

Having laid the groundwork for empirical investigation, Chapters 4, 5, and 6, set out to assess the stagewise aspect of the revised framework in different ways. Chapters 4 and 6 quantitatively analysed changes in proportions of women reaching candidacy and elective office by comparing contexts where new information suddenly became available about male incumbent corruption. I choose to focus on these contexts because male incumbent corruption is reasonably commonplace in the world, and has the potential to prompt a rapid change in voter demand for female candidates where voters hold traditional gender stereotypes.

In some instances, the evidence is consistent with a shift in women's progression across the final two stages of political recruitment, elicited by news of male incumbent corruption, and that can feed back to affect prior stages. Empirical traces of these proposed feedback mechanisms were evident in Chapter 4, in the results reported for municipalities with an AM radio station for which findings of corruption were released in the second half of the electoral cycle, yet prior to when parties select their next mayoral candidate. In these instances, the proportion of female mayoral candidates increased. In other instances, the results suggest that these feedback effects did not affect candidate selection within the same electoral cycle; being constrained by the temporal rules of the game. Specifically, among municipalities with both AM radio stations and male incumbent corruption, even though the change in the proportion of female candidacies

lost significance as the next election approached, the increase in votes for women remained significant right up to the end of the electoral cycle.

Interviews conducted for Chapter 5 confirmed that the timing of this loss of significance aligns with when candidate selection actually happens, early in the election year. The same dynamics were consistent with the rise in the competitiveness of female candidates, described in Chapter 6. Women's collective vote share, controlling for the proportion of female candidates, only rose between original and rerun elections when the reason for rerunning the election was an apparently unambiguous case of male incumbent corruption, and voters had no reason to doubt the seriousness of the wrongdoing or the credibility of the information. Each of these chapters contributed additional insights to the thesis.

In Chapter 4, I also elaborated an argument originally put forward in Chapter 2 pertaining to a little recognised dichotomy that emerges from the disparate assumptions of two literatures that speak to the study of gender and corruption. The heuristics and voting behaviour literature assumes dissemination. It anticipates a blanket boost to women's descriptive representation in the wake of male incumbent corruption as a result of the activation of the female incorruptibility stereotype, and tends not problematise voters' access to information—nor, for that matter, a series of other crucial scope conditions of the expectation. Feminist institutionalist studies have probed how corrupt institutions tend to be strongly male-biased, and the fact that these networks are often tied up with candidate recruitment sets up the expectation that any updating of priors about the gendered nature of corruption will lead to reductions in women's descriptive representation. Yet feminist institutionalists leave little room in their arguments for changes in public opinion.

By separately analysing municipalities in which the dissemination assumption is valid due to the presence of an AM radio station, and municipalities with no such facility, I demonstrated that the expectations of the literature on heuristics and voting behaviour are contingent upon voters' informational environment. But expectations emerging from feminist institutionalist studies were not evident in the data: rather than a downturn in women's proportional candidacies and a concomitant reduction in women's ballot success, there was no change in these variables in municipalities without an AM radio station.

Chapter 5 helped to shed light on why this might be. In Itapuí—the illustrative case that had plenty of male incumbent corruption thanks to Pancho, and had no AM radio station and no female candidate in 2008—not a single local actor knew the contents of the CGU report. It may be that where the CGU conducts audits and there is no local media, elites are minimally aware of the investigations, as in Itapuí. Consequently there is no dissuading influence from revelations revealing the gendered nature of corruption networks that are bound up with municipal politics. Or it may be that there is little updating of priors resulting from a CGU audit in these contexts, because politically engaged women and those who might affect their chances of candidacy were already aware of the extent to which these networks are gendered.

Chapter 5 had multiple roles. Its three illustrative case studies provided impressionistic support for my explanations of the empirical findings in Chapter 4. They did this by evaluating the extent to which female candidates' campaign strategies, purposefully or otherwise, sought to capitalise on voters' gender stereotypes, and subsequently evaluating how successful the strategies were in informational environments that varied according to the presence of male incumbent corruption and local media. Chapter 5's case studies

also provided an opportunity to apply the revised framework to on-the-ground realities, and to reflect upon the model's usefulness. Although short, this is a crucial section of the thesis, because it assesses the modification that redefines stages by what is routinised. By contrast, the assessments of proportional changes in women's candidacies and vote shares in Chapter 4 and 6 worked with only the portion of the revised model where stages are defined formally and universally.

Chapter 5 showed that incomplete information about the descriptive composition of each stage of political recruitment does not imply that the revised model cannot helpfully structure analysis, and advance explanation. This is an important point because scholars studying political recruitment have to work with whatever they can access in the 'secret garden'[3]. My attempt in Chapter 5 to sketch the parallel, routinised pathways of recruitment towards candidacy among Itapeva's weakly institutionalised parties, illustrated how for individuals from the appropriate families, success in local business or legislative politics increases the odds of becoming a mayoral candidate. Working from the revised framework thus clarified that potential gender bias in the private sector in Itapeva, and Brazil's notoriously gendered open-list proportional representation elections for legislative office, can impact women's descriptive representation in mayoral office—and that an increasing frequency of women leaders of civic organisations in Itapeva would be irrelevant for raising women's candidacies among weakly institutionalised parties.

Chapter 6 extended the analysis in three ways. First, by using a different tool of voter knowledge than the media. The merits of this are evident from Terezinha da Paulina's

[3] Elin Bjarnegård, E. & Meryl Kenny. (2015). Revealing the "Secret Garden": The Informal Dimensions of Political Recruitment. *Politics & Gender,* vol. 11, no.4, pp.748-753.

ownership of all of the local radio stations in Itapeva, exemplifying the potential for politically biased coverage of corruption, and from the sound cars and church tannoy system in Itapuí, which made clear the manifold ways that local news can be spread. Second, this chapter varied the type of male incumbent wrongdoing, to assess how voters respond to acts that are ambiguously versus clearly examples of corruption. As per my expectations, incumbent disqualification due to acts of wrongdoing that are not clearly corruption—that is, acts that constitute abuses of power, and the rejection of public accounts for which one is responsible—were not associated with an uptick in women's competitiveness. Moreover, when the seriousness or the reliability of information about a disqualified male incumbent's vote-buying was undermined by his subsequent candidacy in the rerun election, the rise in women candidates' competitiveness that was otherwise associated with this clear-cut example of corruption, did not occur.

The third way in which Chapter 6 furthered this project was to distinguish between categories of female candidates. The quantitative analyses in the chapter showed that women who stand in rerun elections held as a result of their husband's illegal behaviour reduce the average competitiveness of women candidates in the same municipalities. Marcia, who featured in the illustrative case of Goiatuba, was viewed by voters as an extension of her husband, and did not benefit from voters' incorruptibility stereotyping. However, Dr. Washington, Cida Tomazini's campaign strategist in Pires do Rio, consciously decided to step up the honesty messaging in her rerun election bid, vis-à-vis her previous campaigns in the same district.

The final empirical chapter, Chapter 7, moved on the second ambition of the project, which was to demonstrate the empirical relevance of my clarification that the revised

model should be considered porous to external influence. Using various spatial econometric model specifications, I showed that a proportional rise in women's mayoral candidacies in Brazilian municipalities is associated with a further proportional rise in their neighbours. I also showed that women's incumbencies achieve this too, and that the results are consistent with both direct influence on next-door districts, and with the promotion of a proportional rise in women's candidacies at home. As noted in that chapter, there are reasons to view my results as unusually robust and also unique with respect to the rest of the literature. Chapter 7 contains the first attempt, to my knowledge, to use spatial econometrics to analyse change in women's symbolic representation in a system with diverse pathways leading to political candidacy, and over a large expanse of spatial units. I make no claims that my results travel beyond Brazil, but these advantages to the case selection indicate that spatial interdependence and spillover could be important influences on women's candidacy in many contexts.

Chapter 7 also sought to bring together different theoretical threads in the study of women's political representation. Research that seeks evidence of connections between Pitkin's forms of representation tends to stick to discussion of her four concepts, and does not simultaneously consider how the mechanisms linking them might be framed within other explanatory frameworks—such as Krook's configurations of systemic, normative and practical institutions, or the Supply and Demand Model. It is my view that this exercise should be broadly encouraged, not because understanding variation in the world can only be furthered through the unification of theory, but because the exercise itself tends to illuminate fuzziness within theoretical frameworks, as different world views rub up against each other. This dissertation has attempted to do that, in the hope that ultimately, efforts to encourage gender equality become more effective.

Appendix

Table 4.3. Data sources for Chapter 4.

Data	Source
Voting results	Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
Candidate demographic data (eg sex)	
Candidate party affiliation	
Electorate demographic data (eg proportion of under-35 and female voters)	
Turnout	
Audit data	Fernanda Brollo, University of Warwick
Media data (eg presence or absence of AM radio station, FM radio station, TV station, proportion of households with a TV)	Perfil dos Municipios Brasileiros: Gestão Pública
Municipal HDI	Brazilian Census 2000 and 2010. Data interpolated linearly for the intervening years, and extrapolated linearly or the years 2011 and 2012
Municipal dependency ratio	
Municipal gini coefficient	
Resident population demographic data	

Balance Test 1: Balance of covariates

Table 4.4. Log odds of observable covariates in logistic regression models predicting selection in the second to the 36th CGU lottery.

Variable	Without 'year'	With 'year'
Municipality characteristics:		
HDI	0.0143***	1.3383
Female proportion of the electorate	0.0962*	7.3333
Proportion of the electorate over 70	0.0001***	0.1293
Proportion of the electorate under 25	14607.87***	4.9467
Illiterate proportion of the electorate	4.0874***	1.0333
Per capita income	0.9987***	1.0000
Proportion of households with a TV	0.0544***	1.4884
Vanhanen democracy score at last election	*0.9948***	*1.0010*
Proportion of households with a radio set	3.5968**	1.5096
Local TV station	0.9793	0.9857
Local AM radio station	1.0424	1.0411
Per capita spending on infrastructure and public services	0.9994**	1.0002
Characteristics of the municipal administration:		
Lag. proportion of elected female city councillors	1.1646	1.2347
Characteristics of the ruling mayor:		
Female	0.7918**	0.8512*
Lame duck	1.0845	1.0884*
Education level	0.9997	1.005
Dominance in last election	0.9798	0.9976
Proportion of overall campaign spending in last election	1.0489	1.0491
Age	0.9950**	0.9963
PT	0.8410*	0.9778
PSB	0.8316	0.9457
PMDB	0.9856	0.9893
PFL	1.1471**	1.0256
PPB	1.0017	0.9891
PSDB	0.9540	0.9103
PT lame duck	0.7582	0.9463
PT*dominance	0.5625	0.7015

Significance levels are indicated as follows: $p<0.01$ = ***, $p<0.05$ = **, $p<0.1$ = *. Variables with incomplete data over the full 2000 to 2012-period are indicated with italics.

Basic balance tests of observable pre-treatment covariates typically involve simple difference-in-means tests, here, however, logistic regressions were used in order to take into account the block design of the lottery program. In these, the binary variable 'selected by a lottery' is the dependent variable and dummies are included for the 22 lottery groupings (one per state, with the states of the North of Brazil pooled).

Balance Test 2: Duration Analysis

Table 4.5. Hazard rates for observable characteristics in models predicting 'survival' until lottery selection. Data from the three electoral cycles are tested together.

Variable	Lotteries 2 to 29		Lotteries 2 to 36	
	Without 'electoral cycle'	With 'electoral cycle'	Without 'electoral cycle'	With 'electoral cycle'
Municipality characteristics:				
HDI	0.4496	1.4107	0.1728***	1.4107
Female proportion of the electorate	1.4912	3.8431	0.4422	3.8431
Proportion of the electorate over 70	0.0088***	0.1382**	0.0013***	0.1380**
Proportion of the electorate under 35	10.8053***	4.8050*	30.7315***	4.8050*
Illiterate proportion of the electorate	1.1923	0.7417	1.9034	0.7417
Per capita income	0.9998	1.0002	0.9994***	1.0002
Proportion of households with a TV	0.4422**	1.0717	0.2527***	1.0717
Vanhanen democracy score at last election	0.9880***	0.9934**	n/a	n/a
Proportion of households with a radio set	1.7295	1.1459	1.7136	1.1460
Local TV station	0.9609	0.8961	0.9654	0.8961
Local AM radio station	1.0139	0.9877	1.0090	0.9877
Per capita spending on infrastructure and public services	0.9999	1.0003	0.9994**	1.0003
Characteristics of the municipal administration:				
Lag. proportion of elected female city councillors	0.8654	0.8586	0.8648	0.8586
Characteristics of the ruling mayor:				
Female	1.0160	1.0636	0.9381	1.0636
Lame duck	1.1346**	1.0796	1.0691	1.0796
Education level				
Dominance in last election	1.2876	1.3460*	1.1158	1.3460*
Proportion of overall campaign spending in last election	0.8885	0.7519*	n/a	n/a
Age	1.0081***	1.0068**	1.0057**	1.0068**
PT	0.7592**	0.8123*	0.7888**	0.8124*
PSB	0.8604	0.8766	0.8225	0.8765
PMDB	1.0886	1.0625	1.0462	1.0625
PFL	1.0240	1.0027	1.0653	1.0027
PPB	1.0362	0.9466	1.0481	0.9466
PSDB	1.0270	0.9962	1.0145	0.9962
PT lame duck	0.7000	0.7420	0.7796	0.7420
PT*dominance	0.3913	0.4091	0.4280	0.4092

Significance levels are indicated as follows: p<0.01 = ***, p<0.05 = **, p<0.1 = *. Variables with incomplete data over the full 2000 to 2012-period are indicated with italics.




Figure 4.6. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates showing when over the course of the electoral cycle municipalities are selected, according to the party membership of the mayor. The red line corresponds to PT membership; this line is lower in the second half of the electoral cycle than the others because PT mayors' municipalities tend to be selected somewhat earlier. Black lines correspond to the five other parties tested.

Table 4.6. Difference-of-means tests for municipalities with AM radio station versus those without.

	(a) All municipalities without an AM radio station	(b) All municipalities with an AM radio station	p-value of T statistic, difference in means (a) (b)	(c) Audited municipalities without an AM radio station	(d) Audited municipalities with an AM radio station	p-value of T statistic, difference in means (c) (d)
N	5198	1382	---	412	127	---
Municipal HDI	0.622	0.680	0.000***	0.599	0.660	0.000***
Resident population	13404	51536	0.000***	16498	53178	0.000***
Proportion of the population female	0.490	0.507	0.000***	0.490	0.505	0.000***
Change in HDI over an electoral cycle	0.056	0.046	0.000***	0.056	0.048	0.000***
Incumbent's victory margin in previous election (proportion of total votes)	0.161	0.146	0.003**	0.162	0.162	0.998
Lag. proportion female elected city council	0.124	0.116	0.044*	0.128	0.137	0.471
Change in % turnout	0.859	-0.233	0.000***	1.048	-0.447	0.002**
Dependency ratio	54.449	49.610	0.000***	57.001	51.169	0.000***
Gini coefficient	0.500	0.512	0.000***	0.514	0.526	0.044*
Proportion of female mayoral candidates	0.070	0.065	0.189	0.073	0.075	0.898
Proportion of the mayoral vote to female candidates	0.060	0.048	0.002**	0.059	0.048	0.364
% Population urban	58.832	77.604	0.000***	58.733	76.651	0.000***
Proportion of voters under 35	0.448	0.429	0.000***	0.463	0.441	0.000***
% Audited funds spend on 'violations'	---	---	---	5.277	4.487	0.500

Significance codes: p<0.1 = º; p<0.05 = *; p<0.01 =**; p<0.001 = ***. Note that a Bonferroni correction (alpha / the number of hypotheses = 0.05 / 14 = 0.0036) nonetheless highlights systematic differences in HDI, resident population, female population, change in HDI, dependency ratio, urban population, and the proportion of the population under 35.




Figure 6.2. High influence observations in the analyses of rerun elections, Model 8.

Table 6.3. OLS Models to evaluate Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, as per Table 6.2.

DV: Change in the proportion of votes for female candidates	Full Models from Table 6.2				
	No Wife or Vote-buying (Model 9)	With Vote-buying (Model 10)	Vote-buying and Margin (Model 11)	With Wife (Model 12)	With Rerun Context (Model 13)
Change in prop. female candidates	0.8284*** (0.0494)	0.8272*** (0.0487)	0.8038*** (0.0480)	0.8574*** (0.0505)	0.8399*** (0.0507)
Change in number of candidates	-0.0152 (0.0162)	-0.0120 (0.0168)	-0.0226 (0.0173)	-0.0170 (0.0161)	-0.0222 (0.0177)
Vote-buying	---	0.0652** (0.0233)	0.0593* (0.0229)	---	0.0633* (0.0248)
Disqualified incumbent in rerun	---	0.0409 (0.0267)	0.0116 (0.0369)	---	0.0137 (0.0510)
Vote-buying* Disqualified incumbent	---	-0.0585 (0.0362)	-0.0529 (0.0354)	---	-0.0551 (0.0426)
Rejected accounts	---	---	---	---	0.0029 (0.0318)
Rejected accounts* Disqualified incumbent	---	---	---	---	0.0003 (0.0506)
Abuse of power	---	---	---	---	0.0149 (0.0265)
Abuse of power* Disqualified incumbent	---	---	---	---	0.0065 (0.0420)
Wife in rerun	---	---	---	-0.0896* (0.0404)	-0.0906* (0.0401)
Original victory prop.	---	---	0.0658** (0.211)	---	0.0590* (0.0226)
Original victory prop.* Disqualified incumbent	---	---	-0.0152 (0.0475)	---	-0.0132 (0.0502)
Ln months into electoral cycle	---	---	---	---	0.0121 (0.0188)
Ln population	0.0019 (0.0128)	0.0050 (0.0130)	0.0093 (0.0127)	0.0033 (0.0127)	0.0103 (0.0129)
Elected under-35 councillors	-0.0695 (0.6350)	-0.2551 (0.6310)	-0.4692 (0.6299)	-0.0310 (0.6281)	-0.4389 (0.6425)
Ln elected female councillors	0.0803 (0.0815)	0.0885 (0.0804)	0.1250 (0.0793)	0.0712 (0.0807)	0.1065 (0.0799)
a) HDI	1.2732 (2.9226)	1.0242 (2.8835)	1.2724 (2.8289)	0.6670 (2.9027)	0.8302 (2.9034)
b) Prop. female voters	1.8383 (3.5725)	1.4379 (3.5300)	1.6810 (3.4561)	1.1321 (3.5468)	1.1749 (3.5506)
a)*b)	-2.3127 (5.8774)	-1.7219 (5.8003)	-2.1188 (5.6680)	-1.1277 (5.8359)	-1.2568 (5.8402)
AM radio station	-0.0259 (0.0273)	-0.0337 (0.0270)	-0.0476 (0.0267)	-0.0295 (0.0270)	-0.0466 (0.0272)
2008 original election	-0.0088 (0.0366)	-0.0093 (0.0364)	-0.0271 (0.0362)	-0.0115 (0.0362)	-0.0317 (0.0365)
2012 original election	-0.0462 (0.0444)	-0.0498 (0.0438)	-0.0632 (0.0433)	-0.0455 (0.0439)	-0.0622 (0.0440)
2015 dummy	0.0447 (0.0394)	0.0611 (0.0402)	0.0588 (0.0392)	0.0350 (0.0475)	0.0315 (0.0443)
Constant	-0.9707 (1.803)	-0.8668 (0.0402)	-1.0317 (1.7412)	-0.6130 (1.7898)	-0.8157 (1.7958)
Adjusted R2	0.6160	0.6270	0.6453	0.6246	0.6479
N	185	185	185	185	185

Only cases of rerun elections in which a man won the original election are included. Rerun elections for which 'third consecutive term' and for which no reason for the cancelation of the original election are not included in these models. Significance codes: $p<0.05$ = *; $p<0.01$ =**; $p<0.001$ = ***.




Figure 7.3. Municipal HDI in Brazil in 2004, 2008 and 2012.




Figure 7.4. Municipal ideology in Brazil in 2004, 2008, and 2012. (Data source: Timothy Power and Rodrigo Rodrigues-Silveira, 2019).




Figure 7.5. The distribution of no-neighbour municipalities if neighbours are defined as municipal capitals less than 100km apart. (Credit: Rodrigo Rodrigues-Silveira)

Table 7.5. Models 1 to 4, basic OLS.

OLS	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Female incumbent	0.2151***	0.2127***	0.2144***	0.2122***
HDI	-0.1865***	-0.1692***	-0.2037***	-0.1851***
Lag prop. elected female councillors	---	0.1282***	---	0.1273***
Lag female : male votes	---	0.0001	---	0.0000
Ideology	---	-0.0101	---	-0.0103
Vote market coordination	---	---	0.1631***	0.1422***
% female voters	---	---	0.3812***	0.3291***
2008 dummy	0.0210***	0.0195***	0.0180***	0.0165***
2012 dummy	0.0502***	0.0478***	0.0495***	0.0469***
Adjusted R^2	0.0888	0.0952	0.0902	0.0963
N	16648	16598	16535	16503

Significance codes: *** = $p < 0.001$; ** = $p < 0.01$; * = $p < 0.05$. Two-tailed tests; normality assumption.

Table 7.6. Models 1 to 4, SARAR specification using contiguity neighbours.

SARAR	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Female incumbent	0.2093***	0.2075***	0.2092***	0.2032***
HDI	-0.1250***	-0.1085***	-0.1332***	-0.0650***
Lag prop. elected female councillors	---	0.1231***	---	0.1137***
Lag female : male votes	---	0.0001	---	0.0001
Ideology	---	---	-0.0149	-0.0092
Vote market coordination	---	---	0.1697**	0.1243***
% female voters	---	---	0.2517***	0.1383***
2008 dummy	0.0080*	0.0070	0.0047	0.0118***
2012 dummy	0.0343***	0.0324***	0.0329***	0.0360***
Lambda	-0.4397***	-0.4131***	-0.4010***	-0.6269***
Rho	0.3963***	0.3745***	0.3702***	0.5444***
AIC (AIC for OLS)	-7698.1 (-7652)	-7765 (-7723.9)	-7635.1 (-7635.1)	-7817.3 (-7666.7)
N	16653	16605	16548	16503

Significance codes: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05. Two-tailed tests; normality assumption.

Table 7.7. Models 1 to 4, Durbin Error specification using contiguity neighbours.

Durbin Error	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Female incumbent	0.2125***	0.2104***	0.2120***	0.2103***
Spatial lag female incumbent	0.0666***	0.0622***	0.0637***	0.0610**
HDI	-0.0630*	-0.0608*	-0.0898***	-0.0882**
Spatial lag HDI	-0.2054***	0.1597***	-0.1852***	-0.1420***
Lag prop. elected female councillors	---	0.1224***	---	0.1223***
Spatial lag, lag prop. elected female councillors	---	0.0890	---	0.0821
Lag female : male votes	---	0.0001	---	0.0001
Spatial lag, lag female : male votes	---	-0.0001	---	-0.0001
Ideology	---	---	-0.0156**	-0.0099
Spatial lag ideology	---	---	0.0037	0.0004*
Vote market coordination	---	---	0.1724***	0.1367**
Spatial lag vote market coordination	---	---	0.1769	0.1168
% female voters	---	---	0.2725***	0.2452**
Spatial lag % female voters	---	---	-0.0509	-0.0775
2008 dummy	0.0118	0.0092	0.0069	0.0057
Spatial lag 2008 dummy	0.0027	0.0024	0.0054	0.0045
2012 dummy	0.0351***	0.0324***	0.0331***	0.0317**
Spatial lag 2012 dummy	0.0333	0.0294	0.0343	0.0298
Lambda	0.0532*	0.0468*	0.0498*	0.0445
AIC (AIC for OLS)	-7694.9 (-7691.5)	-7756 (-7753.9)	-7626.5 (-7623.8)	-7685.6 (-7683.9)
N	16653	16605	16548	16503

Significance codes: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05. Two-tailed tests; normality assumption.

Table 7.8. Models 1 to 4, Durbin Lag specification using contiguity neighbours.

Durbin Lag	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Female incumbent	0.2086***	0.2067***	0.2081***	0.2063***
Spatial lag female incumbent	0.1640***	0.1594***	0.1638***	0.1594***
HDI	-0.0552	-0.05416	-0.0699**	-0.0687**
Spatial lag HDI	-0.1223	-0.0937	-0.0829	-0.0541**
Lag prop. elected female councillors	---	0.1205***	---	0.1188***
Spatial lag, lag prop. elected female councillors	---	0.0298	---	0.0356
Lag female : male votes	---	0.0001	---	0.0001
Spatial lag, lag female : male votes	---	---	---	-0.0002
Ideology	---	---	-0.0089	-0.0097
Spatial lag ideology	---	---	-0.0505*	-0.0495**
Vote market coordination	---	---	0.1892***	0.1669***
Spatial lag vote market coordination	---	---	0.0257	0.0494
% female voters	---	---	0.2161	0.1823***
Spatial lag % female voters	---		0.0235	0.0036
2008 dummy	0.0173***	0.0182	0.0176***	0.0154***
Spatial lag 2008 dummy	0.0618	0.0891	0.0915	0.0601
2012 dummy	0.0307	0.0334	0.0332***	0.0320***
Spatial lag 2012 dummy	-0.0993***	-0.0395	-0.0652	-0.0623
Rho	0.1207***	0.1154***	0.1121***	0.1064***
AIC (AIC for OLS)	-7797.4 (-7769.5)	-7850.5 (-7825.4)	-7735.5 (-7712.1)	-7791.1 (-7770.4)
N	16653	16605	16548	16503

Significance codes: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05. Two-tailed tests; normality assumption.

Table 7.9 Data sources.

Source	Data
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-anteriores/eleicoes-anteriores	Vote scores; candidate demographic data, such as sex; electorate demographic data, such as the proportion of female voters.
Fernanda Brollo https://sites.google.com/site/fernandabrollo/home/data	All audit outcome data.
IBGE's Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros: Gestão Pública http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/pesquisas/pesquisa_resultados.php?id_pesquisa=89	Local AM radio station and local TV station data.
Brazilian Census http://www.atlasbrasil.org.br/2013/en/	Municipal-level HDI
Power and Rodrigues-Silveira Provided on request	Municipal-level ideology scores.

Table 7.10 Lagrange multiplier diagnostics for spatial dependence.

Lagrange multiplier diagnostics, OLS, Model 4	Statistic parameter
LMerr	19.091***
LMlag	39.334***
RLMerr	37.146***
RLMlag	57.390***
SARMA	76.481***

Significance codes: *** = $p < 0.001$; ** = $p < 0.01$; * = $p < 0.05$.

Interview List: Individuals Consenting to the Use of Their Name

Sebastião Loureiro, 13 September 2016. In-person interview
Juliana Olivera, 13 September 2016. In-person interview.
João Vincenzo, 12 September 2016. In-person interview.
Paulo de la Rua, P. 12 September 2016. In-person interview.
Santos, E. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
Rita Diniz, 17 September 2016. In-person interview.
Costa Pinto, R. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
Garcia, G. 15 September 2016. In-person interview.
Amantini, J. 20 September 2016. In-person interview.
Magalhães, R. 25 October 2016. Via Email.
Silene Valini, 18 September 2016. In-person interview.
Rita Xavier, 19 September 2016. In-person interview
Cleuza de Freitas Nascimento, 19 September 2016. In-person interview.
Guido Lanza. 20 September 2016. In-person interview.
B Zaniratto, 20 September 2016. In-person interview.
A Zago, 20 September 2016. In-person interview.
Adriano Firmino, 12 December 2017. In-person interview.
Danilo de Miranda Carvalho, 15 December 2017. In-person interview.
Clifer Lucas Costa, 12 December 2017. In-person interview.
Vanubia Candido Ribeiro Rosa, 14 December 2017. In-person interview.
Gley de Menezes, 8 December 2017. In-person interview
Lourdes, 9 December 2017. In-person interview.
Marcia, 10 December 2017. In-person interview.
Reinaldo, 10 December 2017. In-person interview.
Marcoino, 11 December 2017. In-person interview.
Meloviano Ferreira de Assuncao, 9 December 2017. In-person interview.
Supermarket manager, Bandeirantes, 11 December 2017. In-person interview.
Resident 1 of Bandeirantes (name withheld), 11 December 2017. In-person interview.
Vegetable shop owner, Bandeirantes, 11 December 2017. In-person interview.
Resident 2 of Bandeirantes, Resident 3, of Bandeirantes (interviewed together), 11 December 2017. In-person interview.
Resident 1 of Primavera, Resident 2 of Primavera, Resident 3 of Primavera (interviewed together), 14 December 2017. In-person interview.
Gizelia Custodio, 13 December 2017. In-person interview.
Elaine Fernandes, 13 December 2017. In-person interview.
Dona Lourdes, 12 December 2017. In-person interview.
Flavio da Silva de Sousa, 9 December 2017. In-person interview.
Marin Pires, 15 December 2017. In-person interview.
Glauciene Donisete, 13 December 2017. In-person interview.
Nice, 17 December 2017. In-person interview.
Magda Mofatto,18 December 2017. In-person interview.
Evaldo Gonçalves Silva, 16 December 2017. In-person interview.
Judge Luciane Cristina Duarte dos Santos, 16 December 2017. In-person interview.
Gilberto Lobo Paes, 12 December 2017. In-person interview.
Gilberto's father, also Gilberto Lobo Paes, 12 December 2017. In-person interview.

Cida Tomazini, 14 December 2017. In-person interview.
Sampaio de Resende E., 16 December 2017. In-person interview.
Cleide Aparecida Veloso da Costa, 16 December 2017. In-person interview.
Amelia Móveis, A, 17 December 2017. In-person interview.
Lorena da Costa Garcia, 13 December 2017. In-person interview.
Widson Ulisses, 10 December 2017. In-person interview.
Dr Whashington, 19 and 20 December 2017. 2x Telephone interviews.

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