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ABSTRACT

TURKS, ARABS AND JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE: 1882-1914

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ABSTRACT

It is commonly maintained that prior to World War I all was well between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. According to this view, the Jews were too few and the Arabs too inarticulate for discord to have manifested itself. Amongst the Arabs there was, at most, only rudimentary opposition to Jewish settlement in the country, and the general harmony was not broken until the British promised national sovereignty to both the Arabs and the Jews in the course of the Great War.

This study seeks to do three things. It attempts to trace the development of the Ottoman Government's position regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine between 1882 and 1914, to describe how this policy was translated into practice by the authorities in Palestine, and to discover how the Arabs reacted to this influx of Jews in the light of Ottoman official policy and practice. This study, which is based mainly on diplomatic and Jewish records, reaches the conclusion that the popular notion of Arab-Jewish harmony in Palestine prior to 1914 has little grounding in fact.

The period under review opens in 1882 because this is the year when Jews from Eastern Europe began to immigrate in significant numbers into Palestine as a result of the first major pogroms in Russia the previous year; it closes with the entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I in November 1914. This period embraces the foundation of the

Zionist Movement in 1897, the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 and the emergence of the Arab nationalist movement. Much of this study is taken up with the clash of Arab and Jewish national aspirations, set against the background of a Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) Government in Constantinople which was trying to enforce its policy of "Ottomanising" the Empire, a policy which ran counter to the nationalist endeavours of many groups within the Empire.

The Ottoman Government from the very outset could not approve of the increasing numbers of Jews seeking to settle in Palestine from 1882 onwards - and this for two principal reasons. First, as a result of its series of unfortunate experiences with national groups (especially in the Balkans) from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Government feared the possibility of nurturing another national problem within the Empire. Second, the Government had no wish to enlarge Great Power influence in the Empire (which already was considerable) by increasing the numbers of foreign subjects enjoying Capitulatory privileges within its domains, particularly if these aliens sought to concentrate themselves in as sensitive an area as Palestine, with its Holy Places which had already been the ostensible cause of a major war earlier in the century. Restrictions were therefore imposed on Jews reaching Palestine, so that by 1884 Jewish "pilgrims" alone were permitted to enter the country for a period of no longer than thirty days. Attempts were also made to prevent Jews from acquiring land in Palestine. However, these restrictions were ineffective despite the

efforts of the provincial governors, because (i) most of the Great Powers refused to acquiesce in them on the grounds that they contradicted the terms of the Capitulations which afforded their subjects the rights to purchase real estate and to move freely within the Empire (except in the Hijaz), (ii) the lower Ottoman officials were amenable to bribery, and (iii) the Jews found ways of by-passing the restrictions.

The Jewish population of Palestine therefore rose with relative rapidity. Thus, in 1891 there were about 25,300 Jews in Jerusalem in contrast with some 13,900 a decade earlier, and Jaffa's Jewish population in 1893 had reached 2,500 after having been virtually non-existent in 1880. Moreover, eight agricultural settlements were founded in Palestine by Jewish immigrants during the 1880's.

To an extent, the reactions of the local population in Palestine to the newcomers were but an extension of the negative attitudes they already entertained towards Europeans in general and Jews in particular. At first the presence of the Jewish settlers was resented by the few fellaheen who came in contact with them. The Jews' ignorance of Arabic and local custom led to ill-feeling, but conflicts were most serious over questions of landownership. Gradually the initial resentment among the fellaheen gave way to resignation to the fact that the new Jewish settlements could not be deflected and then to outward reconciliation. Whatever the fellaheen may have felt in their hearts, day-to-day relations were generally close and good, especially as the fellaheen tended to gain economically from

a Jewish colony in their midst. In the towns, a tiny group of landowners rejoiced at the incoming Jews who seemed prepared to buy any land at almost any price; other Arab notables, however, were alarmed at the Jews' avidity for land. In addition, the small class of merchants and craftsmen were alarmed at the probable economic competition which would arise with continued Jewish immigration. In consequence, a telegram was dispatched to the Sublime Porte in 1891 signed by notables in Jerusalem petitioning for the prohibition of further Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine.

This telegram coincided with an increase in the numbers of Jews migrating from Russia on account of the recent expulsion of the Jews from Moscow and rumours of other repressive measures to be taken by the Czar's Government. The Porte therefore renewed the restrictions against Jews entering Palestine and even tried to close the whole Empire to Jewish immigrants. In 1892-3 instructions regulating the purchase of land by Jews in Palestine were also issued. However, these extended restrictions were no more effective than those of the 1880's for the same reasons as those mentioned above.

In 1896 Theodor Herzl's pamphlet, Der Judenstaat, was published. In the summer of that year, Herzl came to Constantinople and thus his ideas were quickly brought to the attention of the Ottoman Government and Abdülhamid, at a moment when the Empire was troubled with a financial crisis and by disturbances in Armenia, Crete and the Hauran.

Alarm was caused by the support Herzl's ideas were seen to gain among the Jews and then by the Zionist Movement's programme which was worked out at the first Zionist Congress (held in Basel, 1897), calling for a "home in Palestine" for the Jewish people "secured by public law". Evidence of the seriousness with which Abdülhamid regarded the Zionist Movement is shown by the fact that shortly after the first Zionist Congress he sent secretaries from the Yildiz Palace to act as Mutasarrifs in Jerusalem in place of men who previously were appointed from the ranks of the regular provincial administration. However, although Abdülhamid had no use for the Zionist Movement, he did have some use for Herzl, whom he appears to have utilised as a convenient foil to groups of European financiers who were negotiating for the consolidation of the Ottoman Debt.

Between 1897 and 1900 the authorities in Palestine were confronted with various administrative problems which had arisen as a result of the unchecked Jewish settlement in the country. Instructions from different ministries at the Porte multiplied, often contradicting previous orders or those from another ministry. In view of the confusions, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was obliged to consolidate the regulations governing Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine at the end of 1900. These consolidated regulations stood with little modification until the end of the period reviewed.

The prohibition on Jewish land purchase was strictly enforced in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem after 1897, so

that thereafter Jewish endeavours were forced to the north of Palestine which formed part of the Vilayet of Beirut. However, with more pliable Mutasarrifs in Jerusalem after 1901, Jewish colonisation activities were resumed in the south of the country where the Zionist Movement gained a foothold through the Anglo-Palestine Company, a bank whose first branch in Palestine was opened at Jaffa in 1903. Only at the end of 1906 did a Mutasarrif arrive in Jerusalem who enforced the restrictions against the Jews to the letter until he was transferred elsewhere shortly after the Young Turk Revolution.

Throughout this period, anti-Zionism proper was a sentiment scarcely known to the Arabs in Palestine. Anti-Jewish feeling, on the other hand, did increase. It was prompted by the constant flow of immigrants whose numbers increased still further after the pogroms in Kishinev in 1903. European prejudices against Jews were conveyed to the Arabs by the several European elements active in Palestine and Syria at this time.

With the Young Turk Revolution, a new era dawned. Arab feelings which had been smouldering for the last twenty-five years could be voiced in the press and Parliament. Portents of the future were quickly to be observed. Leaders of the CUP made it clear to the Zionists that whilst they were not opposed to Jewish immigration into the Empire in general, they were opposed to national groups with separatist tendencies and to the concentration of large numbers of Jews in any single part of the Empire. In the north of Palestine,

anti-Government elements assured peasants that the Constitution guaranteed their right to make claims against Jewish settlements with which they were at odds. In spring 1909 colonies in the Kaza of Tiberias were subjected to attacks from local fellaheen.

The counter-Revolution in April 1909 was quickly quashed and the CUP, now firmly in power, began to apply its policy of Ottomanisation. In May, Arab nationalists in Paris accused the Government of being dominated by Freemasons and Jews who sought the collapse of the Empire in order to re-establish the Kingdom of Israel on its ruins. In June, an Arab deputy from Jaffa to the Ottoman Parliament inquired whether Zionism was compatible with the interests of the Empire. Thereafter attacks on the Zionists in Christian Arab newspapers became more frequent. The press campaign against the Zionists, led by Najib Naṣṣar (editor of al-Karmal in Haifa), spread so that by mid-1910 four important Muslim newspapers in Beirut and Damascus had joined in the attacks. The Jews were principally accused of wishing to buy up the whole of Palestine, but it was not long before other arguments against the Zionists were also worked out. Central to these arguments was the charge that the Zionists wished to establish an independent Jewish state in Palestine and the allegation that the CUP Government was helping them in this. Anti-Zionist activity increased among the Arabs towards the end of 1910, and prominent in this were certain Muslim notables from Jerusalem as well as Shukri al-ʿAsali of Damascus, then Kaymakam of Nazareth and later hanged by

Cemal Paşa for his Arab nationalist activities.

By this time the CUP Government had become unpopular among many groups on a number of scores and rifts had appeared within the Committee itself. The suggestion that the CUP was in the hands of Freemasons and Jews had gained sufficient ground for the Cabinet to be attacked in March 1911 by Turkish and Greek deputies in the Chamber for following "the same course as Zionism". The discontented deputies within the CUP were successful in unseating some Cabinet ministers who belonged to the "Salonika group" which, it was felt, dominated the Government. In May, two Arab deputies from Jerusalem and Shukri al-'Asali led a debate against Zionism and called for effective measures against Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine. They received assurances that the existing restrictions would be strictly enforced but failed to achieve more, because when they raised the issue those Turkish and Greek deputies who had affected so much anxiety about Zionism just two months earlier were no longer concerned now that certain members of the Salonika group had resigned from the Cabinet.

In Palestine and the surrounding provinces anti-Zionist activities among the Arabs quickened. An anti-Zionist society was formed in Jaffa; the first descriptive and analytical work on Zionism and the first fictional story about the Zionists were published by Arabs. With the outbreak of the Turko-Italian War and the formation of an opposition party, the "Liberal Union", the attentions of editors of Arabic newspapers appearing beyond the borders of

Palestine were drawn away from the Zionist issue, but those of editors of Palestinian newspapers never could be thus diverted. In the summer of 1912, a newly arrived Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, Muhdi Bey, made an indiscreet speech on a Jewish settlement which greatly disturbed Arabs in the Mutasarriflik, because it appeared from the manner in which the speech was reported in the Arabic press that the new Mutasarrif had promised the Jews special privileges of self-administration and self-defence.

Shortly before this the CUP Government had been replaced by a cabinet sympathetic to the Liberal Union. That autumn the first Balkan War broke out and had the effect of constituting what may be regarded as a watershed. The war was a great strain on the Empire's unsound Treasury and the new Cabinet, although avowedly anti-Zionist, turned to Zionist representatives in Constantinople in the hope of receiving financial and press support from European Jews. In January 1913, Enver Bey led a coup d'état which restored the CUP to office, but the overtures to the Zionists did not cease, for the CUP too hoped that Jewish financiers in Europe would come to the Empire's assistance. The Balkan War was also a great spur to Arab nationalism, and at the same time as the CUP was soliciting the support of Jews in Europe through the Zionists, the more radical of the Arab nationalists, members of the Decentralisation Party in Cairo, formally invited the Zionists to make an entente with them. At the end of April, Sami Hochberg, who edited the Zionist supported Jeune-Turc, was sent to Cairo, where an entente verbale was drawn up

between himself and the Decentralisation Party. He then proceeded to Beirut, where the entente verbale was also accepted by the Beirut Reform Committee, a more moderate Arab group. The terms of this entente verbale said that the Decentralisation Party favoured an Arab-Zionist rapprochement for which it undertook to work, while Le Jeune-Turc undertook to support the cause of the Arab movement and to try to gain the support of European newspapers for it, so long as it remained compatible with the "unity and integrity" of the Empire. The "First Arab Congress" was held in Paris in June and again Sami Hochberg was in attendance. However, there is room to suspect that the Arab nationalists had encouraged him and the Zionists in order to strengthen their position in negotiating with the Ottoman Government. The latter acceded to the Arab nationalists' demands at the end of June and, for the time being, the proposal of an Arab-Zionist entente was shelved.


The Zionists informed the Government that it could not expect financial support from the Jews of Europe until the restrictions against the Jews in Palestine were annulled. The Cabinet was apprehensive about taking such a step for fear of Arab opinion; it suggested therefore that the Zionists reach an agreement with the Arabs. In the meantime - from autumn 1913 onwards - it cautiously began to relax the restrictions against the Jews. In consequence, Arab opinion in Palestine and elsewhere became highly alarmed, so that by spring 1914 the suspicion that an alliance existed between the CUP and the Zionists had become a firm conviction.

As the Government was slow to honour its promises to fulfil Arab demands, Arab nationalist leaders again came round to the idea of an Arab-Zionist entente and in April and May discussions took place with Zionists in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and Constantinople. A wide range of Arabs evinced an interest to meet the Zionists, for a variety of motives (among which there seems also to have been the desire on the part of some to seek a "show-down" with the Zionists). An Arab-Zionist meeting to be held at Brummana in the summer of 1914 was projected, but the plans fell through and the outbreak of World War I in August put an end to the possibility of such a meeting.

Even if this meeting had taken place and somehow an Arab-Zionist entente had been reached, it is scarcely conceivable that this would have affected subsequent Arab-Zionist relations. Responsible Arab opinion in Palestine was set against the Zionists; (mainly Muslim) Arab youth had founded anti-Zionist societies in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus, Haifa, Beirut, Constantinople and in al-Azhar (Cairo). Certain Arab nationalists, who were considering taking up arms against the Turks, were also contemplating violent means of combating the Zionists. The course of the future was set.

TURKS, ARABS AND JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE: 1882-1914

Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine in 1914



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A Thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the
University of Oxford

By

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Trinity Term
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St. Antony's College,
Oxford.

FOR

MY MOTHER AND BROTHERS

PREFACE

It is commonly maintained that prior to World War I all was well between Arab and Jew in Palestine. According to this view, the Jews were too few and the Arabs too inarticulate for discord to have manifested itself. Amongst the Arabs there was, at most, only rudimentary opposition to Jewish settlement in the country, and the general harmony was not broken until the British promised national sovereignty to both the Arabs and the Jews during the course of the Great War.

> "Le conflit judéo-arabe avait théoriquement commencé avec la déclaration du ministre anglais lord Balfour sur le 'foyer national juif' en 1917 et pratiquement avec le début du mandat britannique sur la Palestine en 1920."1

> "The Arabs reacted to the announcement of the Balfour Declaration with consternation.
>
> "Once the Zionists actually began to exert their influence in Palestine, the Arabs reacted with a violent and united opposition. In April, 1920, the traditionally friendly relations between the Arabs and the Jews of Palestine gave way to Arab hatred and rioting in Jerusalem."2

In reference to the period after 1917, Christopher Sykes contends that "Zionist spokesmen have tried to persuade the world that the Arabs of Palestine had in reality no hostility to Zionism and welcomed, rather than otherwise, the immigration of other people into their native land".[3] Jacob Shim'oni, an Israeli expert on Arab affairs, puts the boot on the other foot: "Spokesmen of the Arab movement generally hold that

1. A.R. Abdel-Kader, Le Conflit judéo-arabe (Paris, 1962), p.49.
2. A.R. Taylor, Prelude to Israel (New York, 1959), pp.32-3.
3. C. Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel (London, 1965), p.104.

the Jews and Arabs lived in peace and quiet until the Balfour Declaration and Zionist political ambitions came and disturbed the peace".[1]

Wherever this view originated, it prevails today because as yet no systematic examination utilising primary source material has been made into the Arab response to the first three decades of modern Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine between 1882 and 1914. Analyses of the "Arab-Israel conflict" barely touch on these years.[2] One or two discriminating scholars have indicated that before 1914 the Arabs were more alive to Jewish national aspirations than is commonly supposed; but even they have come to recognise this only as an indirect result of other research on which they were engaged. Moshe Perlmann, for example, gave a little attention to the question in his article entitled "Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy: 1918-1922",[3] while P.A. Alsberg uncovered some important material in the course of his research into the policies of the Zionist Executive from 1904 to 1914.[4] But for the rest, the Arab attitude to the Jewish immigrants, even after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, was "im allgemeinen eine freundliche".[5]

1. J. Shim'oni, 'Arabe erez yisra'el (Tel Aviv, 1947), p.269, n.1. Shim'oni goes on to note that there were however signs of opposition to the Zionists in the Arabic press before 1914.
2. E.g. ESCO Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies (New Haven, 1947); R.E. Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict (Geneva and Paris, 1959); & Abdel-Kader, op.cit.
3. M. Perlmann, "Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy: 1918-1922", Jewish Social Studies, vi, 2 (1944), pp.124-54.
4. See P.A. Alsberg, "ha-She'elah ha-'arabit bi-mediniyyut ha-hanhalah ha-ziyyonit lifne milhemet ha-'olam ha-rishonah", Shibat Ziyyon, vol.iv (1956-7), pp.161-209.
5. A. Böhm, Die Zionistische Bewegung (Tel Aviv, 1935),i,402.

The aim of this study, when it was begun, was simply to investigate the Arab reactions to the Jewish immigrants who entered Palestine between 1882 and 1914. It was very quickly found that the Arab responses could not be understood without reference to the official Ottoman policies regarding these Jews (any more than the Arab position during the British mandatory period can be understood without reference to official policies emanating from London). Moreover, it soon became apparent that there were discrepancies between the Ottoman policies as formulated in Constantinople and the way they were put into practice in Palestine. In consequence the scope of this study grew; it now seeks to do three things. It attempts to trace the development of the Ottoman Government's position regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine after 1882, to describe how this policy was translated into practice by the authorities in Palestine, and to discover how the Arabs reacted to this influx of Jews in the light of Ottoman official policy and administrative practice.[1]

The period under review opens in 1882, since this was the year in which modern Jewish settlement in Palestine began, and it closes with the Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I in November 1914. The Great War seals off these

1. No research has been done into the parallel question of the Jewish immigrants' attitude to the Arabs in Palestine from 1882 to 1914, because this question was being examined by John Rau, a research student at the Hebrew University, when the author began this study. Mr. Rau's work, Yaḥas ha-yishshub el ha-ʿarabim: 1880-1914, is now complete and has been relied upon at various points in this study.

years hermetically, as it were, from the events of the period after the McMahon Correspondence and the Balfour Declaration, events which have tended to eclipse everything that preceded them. And yet, when these years are examined, it can be seen that they were not empty years and that the popular notion of Arab-Jewish harmony in Palestine before 1914 has little grounding in fact. It can be seen too that these years were critical to what is today called the "Arab-Israel conflict", for during this period the Arab case against the Zionists was worked out and the roots of all the bitterness which manifested itself after 1917 can be traced back to it.

The author has sought to present but not to criticise the positions of both the Ottoman Government and the Arabs. He has at all times relied on documentary evidence (mainly diplomatic and Jewish), even though he was often very conscious of the limitations of this evidence. A coherent picture emerged, and the author has preferred to leave the facts to speak for themselves rather than indulge in wordy analyses which were seldom called for. He hopes that his work will contribute at least to the understanding, if not to the solution, of a problem which today affects intimately the lives of many million human beings.

Although the author has concentrated his attentions on the three topics outlined above, he was aware that his research threw light on other aspects of Ottoman history as well. The question of Jewish immigration into Palestine gained much of its prominence because after the Young Turk Revolution it became an issue in the conflict between the

Committee of Union and Progress and its political opponents. In a way, therefore, it serves as something of a measure of this conflict, coming to the fore and receding into the background with the changes in the Ottoman political scene. The Young Turk rulers inherited a weak Treasury which they did little to strengthen; from 1912 onwards they hoped that Jews in Europe might help them financially in exchange for some concessions in Palestine. This study helps to illuminate the straits to which the Empire was reduced in the years before its final collapse. Central to this thesis is the fact that the Jewish immigrants were foreign nationals who enjoyed special privileges through the Capitulations; from the beginning to the end of the period reviewed, the inability of the Ottoman Empire to act freely against subjects of European Powers stands out vividly (as does the grip which the Powers had on the Empire, implicit in this inability to act freely). The Jews who settled in Palestine sought to acquire land and in so doing were confronted with all the associated questions of landownership, registry and tenancy peculiar to the Empire and, more especially, to Palestine itself. Historians of this period generally identify two main intellectual trends among the Arabs which they label conveniently "Ottomanism" and "Arabism". Advocates of Ottomanism may be said to have urged continued Arab allegiance to their Turkish rulers within a reformed Empire, while proponents of Arabism strove for Arab independence from the Empire. This thesis corroborates the existence of these ideologies and demonstrates how neither could accommodate

within it a (European) Jewish nationalism. Much of this study is taken up with the clash of Arab and Jewish nationalisms. Morroe Berger has observed how "nationalism is a sentiment that reduces differences among those who share it but magnifies the contrasts between those who adhere to varying national groups".[1] The working of this process comes out clearly in the course of this study. Arab nationalism would have emerged in any event, but it may well be asked if it would have advanced as far as it had by 1914 without the arrival of the Zionists in Palestine. Almost all the most prominent Arab nationalist leaders of this period were greatly concerned with the Zionist question. Zeine N. Zeine maintains that "there is no satisfactory historical evidence" for the contention that "the Arabs experienced a national awakening as a result of the impact of the West on them in the nineteenth century".[2] Without wishing to exaggerate the importance of Jewish settlement in Palestine at the turn of the century, it may reasonably be suggested that this was one very tangible European force in the midst of the Arabs whose influence on the Arab movement has generally been overlooked.

* * * *

1. M. Berger, The Arab World Today (London, 1962), p.263.
2. Z.N. Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1958), pp.121-2.

At this point the author must slip off the clumsy jacket of the third person to express his gratitude to those many, many people who helped him in the course of his work.

My greatest debt is to my supervisor, Mr. Albert Hourani of St. Antony's College, Oxford. Mr. Hourani did more than guide this study from start to finish: he also introduced me to scholarship and for this, more than anything else, I am profoundly grateful. He encouraged me at all stages of my work, quietly and with unusual kindness, never imposing his views and at the same time never letting the smallest unsatisfactory detail slip by. At the risk of using a well hackneyed phrase (which in this case could not be more sincerely meant), it was a privilege to work with him over the last four years.

Four people in particular contributed to make my visit to Israel in 1962-3 the success I feel it was. Dr. Meir Vereté of the Hebrew University kept a watchful eye on my research. John Rau, who was working on a subject parallel to mine, not only shared the results of his work with me but also made me feel like a member of his family throughout my stay in Jerusalem. Dr. Michael Heymann charted my course through the Central Zionist Archive and has since attended without delay to inquiries and requests for microfilms. Gabriel Cohen, a fellow member of St. Antony's, remained in the background but at all times was available to give advice and render assistance whenever it was called for. On my return to Oxford, Mr. Richard Repp and Drs. Afaf Marsot, Geoffrey Lewis and David Patterson put up with endless

pestering whilst my thesis was in preparation and then, as if this were not enough, found time to criticise parts of it once it was written. To all these I must extend my grateful thanks. There are still others, too numerous to mention by name both in Oxford and in Israel, who took a lively interest in my work and to whom I am indebted. Knowing them well, I am sure that they will not take it amiss if I thank them collectively. And although these kind and wise people helped me greatly in my work, I must be careful not to implicate them in the opinions expressed in this study, still less in the unwitting mistakes and errors of judgement which are entirely my own doing.

I owe debts of gratitude of another kind to the Scottish Education Department and the Carnegie Trust who financed my work, and to my brother, Edwin, who at a sad and difficult moment in our lives undertook responsibilities which properly were mine: were it not for him, this study could never have been completed. Finally, I must thank my typist, Mrs. Majorie Edwards, who persevered with my manuscript twice, and Miss Ruth Fraenkel, who did more than just read the final proofs.

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MAPS AND PLATES

Maps

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Al-Ḥimara, i, 23 (7.4.1911)	p.227

1. The author is indebted to the Directorate of the Military Survey for granting him permission to reproduce this map.

ABBREVIATIONS

Admin. Council	Administrative Council
AIU	Alliance Israélite Universelle
APC	Anglo-Palestine Company
Consple.	Constantinople
CZA	Central Zionist Archive
CZA (A)	Central Zionist Archive (Austro-Hungarian material)
Damas.	Damascus
Dir. Gén.	Direction Générale
EI^2	Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd edition)
Encl.	Enclosure
FO	Foreign Office
F.O.	Foreign Office
ISA (G)	Israel State Archive (German material)
ISA (T)	Israel State Archive (Turkish material)
JCA	Jewish Colonization Association
Jerus.	Jerusalem
JNF	Jewish National Fund
Kay.	Kaymakam
Min.	Minister
Mutas.	Mutasarrif
OFA	Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PJCA	Palestine Jewish Colonization Association
Pres.	President
PRO (G)	Public Record Office (German material)
Q d'O	Quai d'Orsay
RMM	Revue du Monde Musulman
S.P.	Sublime Porte
Tel.	Telegram
T£	Turkish [Ottoman] pounds
ZAC	Zionist Actions Committee[1]
ZCO	Zionist Central Office
ZDPV	Zeitschrift des deutschen Palaestina-Vereins

1. The Zionist Executive was divided into a "Greater" and a "Smaller" Actions Committee. Letters from Zionist representatives in Constantinople and Palestine could be addressed to either of these committees, depending on the circumstances. However, as the distinction was irrelevant for the purposes of this study, all letters to and from the Zionist Executive have been cited in the notes as to or from "ZAC".

NOTES ON TRANSCRIPTIONS, ETC.

Transcriptions

1. Arabic has been transcribed according to the system used by the Encyclopaedia of Islam - with some minor modifications:

   i. "j" has been used in place of "dj",
   ii. "q" has been used in place of "ḳ",
   iii. the digraph "ay" has been used in place of "ai",
   iv. the digraphs "dh", "gh", "kh", "sh" and "th" have not been underlined, and
   v. vowel quantities have not been marked.

2. Hebrew has been transcribed according to the system used by the Jewish Encyclopedia - again, with some minor modifications:

   i. vowels have been rendered as they are pronounced in modern Hebrew and not in accordance with the "Continental" pronunciation of the Jewish Encyclopedia,
   ii. modern Hebrew pronunciation has been employed to determine the vocalisation of the shewa (thus toldot and not toledot), and
   iii. the prepositions "be", "ke", "le" and "mi" have been attached directly to the word they qualify and not separated by a hyphen.

3. Turkish has been transcribed according to official Turkish orthography; but, in accordance with modern Turkish usage, the Arabic ʿayn and hamza have not been marked and circumflexes have been retained only in association with the consonants "g", "k" and "l" to indicate palatalisation. Because of difficulties in typing, no differentiation has been made between the dotted and undotted "i".

Proper Nouns

1. The names of Turks and of members of all non-Turk groups (except Jews and Arabs) in the Ottoman Empire have been rendered in transcription according to the official Turkish orthography (with the qualifications enumerated above). This has been done even in cases when:

   i. the author appreciated he was creating a verbal anachronism (thus Batzariya and not Batzarıa),
   ii. when the name of the personage in question might have a popular or familiar rendering in English (thus Abdülhamid and not Abdul Hamid), and
   iii. when the personage in question was writing in French or another European language and signed himself differently (thus Feyzi and not Féizi).

2. The names of Arabs have been rendered in transcription according to the system in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (with the qualifications enumerated above).

3. The names of Jews have been treated variously.

   i. The names of "Turkish" Jews have been rendered in transcription according to the rules for Turks (thus Karasu and not Carasso).

   ii. The surnames of Palestinian Sephardi Jews have been rendered according to the rules for the transcription of Hebrew.

   iii. The surnames of European Jews have been retained in their (most likely) European orthography, irrespective of the language employed by those Jews (thus Kalvarisky, whether he was writing in English, French, German or Hebrew).

   iv. The given names of Palestinian Sephardi Jews and European Jews have been rendered according to the usual English form of the name (thus Jacob, Chaim, etc.).

Place names

1. Well known place names have been rendered according to their accepted English spellings (thus Constantinople, Jerusalem, etc.).

2. Place names in Palestine, both Arabic and Hebrew, have been rendered according to the spellings in the Survey of Palestine, Index Gazetteer (no place, 1948). Because of the usefulness of this Gazetteer, its spellings have been followed without modification, even when they were inconsistent or somewhat grotesque (thus Rishon le Zion, but Nes Tsiyona). Names of Arab villages in Palestine which have disappeared have been transcribed according to the system employed by this Gazetteer.

3. Names of less known places in the Ottoman Empire (except in the Arab provinces) have been transcribed according to the rules for Turkish (with the qualifications enumerated above - thus Çatalca).

4. Names of less known places in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire have been transcribed according to the rules for Arabic (with the qualifications enumerated above - thus Brummana).

5. Place names contained in the titles of books have been rendered according to the rules for the language in which the book was written, but the place of publication has been rendered according to the rules for place names enumerated above (thus Smilanski's Nes ẓiyyonah, published in Nes Tsiyona).

6. Jewish settlements in Palestine have been referred to by their Hebrew place names and not by their former Arabic place names, except in cases where the latter was significant (thus Fula, and only later Merhavya).

Ottoman religious and administrative terms

1. Muslim religious terms have all been treated as Arabic words (thus mufti, waqf, etc.); other Ottoman religious terms have been treated as Turkish words (thus Haham Başi).

2. Ottoman administrative terms (except terms for Muslim religious institutions) have been treated as Turkish words (thus kaza - but, in accordance with rule 1 above, qaḍi).

Dates

All dates, irrespective of their original calendar (Muslim, Jewish, Ottoman financial or Russian "old style") have been harmonised and presented according to the Gregorian calendar, except in cases where the original date was significant; in these cases the Gregorian equivalent has usually been given alongside the original date. In biographical references to Hebrew books, it has been convenient to assume that the year of publication was the later of the two years in the Gregorian calendar covered by the Jewish year (thus a book published in the Jewish year 5724 has been assumed to have appeared in 1964), unless more precise dating could be achieved.

Footnotes

First references to any publication or document in the footnotes have been given in full, but subsequent references have been given in a truncated form. The initials and locations of the writers and recipients of letters have been stated in the first reference in every chapter mentioning that writer or recipient; thereafter the initials have been omitted and the locations have not been repeated (it being implied that the location is the same as that in the

first reference). If, however, the location of a writer or recipient did change subsequent to the first or previous reference, the new location has, of course, been indicated. (Thus a first reference in every chapter takes the form "D. Wolffsohn (Cologne) to D. Levontin (Jaffa)", and subsequent references take the form "Wolffsohn to Levontin", until one of the parties changes his location and so the reference becomes "Wolffsohn (London) to Levontin").

General observation

The author has tried to abide by this long series of rules which he set up for himself. Nevertheless, there were points at which he felt compelled to depart from them. Thus, for example, Albert Antébi's surname (as a Sephardi Jew in Palestine) should have been transcribed "ʿAntebbi"; however, his name has been rendered in the text as he spelt it, for two reasons: first, Antébi was thoroughly "Francophied" and never wrote in any language but French and, second, Antébi recurs both in the text and the notes more than any other personality and to recast his name so frequently seemed to the author to be an abuse or, at best, a pedantic fabrication. Similarly, though conversely, certain names occuring very rarely have been retained as they appeared in the sources (usually because they were the names of Jews whose origin was unknown). The author believes that the reasons for these exceptions to his rules will in most cases be apparent to the reader who, it is hoped, will sympathise with the espousal of common sense in favour of fanatical consistency.

MUTASARRIFS OF JERUSALEM: 1877-1914

May 1877 to 1889[1]	Mehmed Şerif Rauf Paşa
May 1889 to 1890	Reşad Paşa
Nov.1890 to 1897	Ibrahim Hakki Paşa
Nov.1897 to 1901	Tevfik Bey
Jne.1901 to 1902	Mehmed Cavid Bey
Feb.1902 to 1904	Osman Kâzim Bey
Aug.1904 to 1906	Ahmed Reşid Bey
Dec.1906 to 1908	Ali Ekrem Bey
Sep.1908 to 1909[2]	Subhi Bey
May 1910 to 1911	Azmi Bey
Jly.1911 to 1912	Cevdet Bey
Jly. to Dec.1912	Muhdi Bey
Jan.1913	Tahir Bey
Mch.1913 to 1914[3]	Mecid Şevket Bey

1. The exact dates of departure are not known in some cases. A Mutasarrif's successor usually arrived within eight weeks (but often in less) of his departure, during which time another high official in the Mutasarriflik was appointed to act as Mutasarrif "pro tem". The dates of departure can therefore be assumed to have been up to two months prior to the arrival of the next Mutasarrif.
2. Subhi Bey left Jerusalem in December 1909 and during the relatively long interregnum following his departure the Military Commandant in Jerusalem took charge of affairs in the Mutasarriflik.
3. It is not known when Mecid Şevket Bey left Jerusalem. He was still in office in June 1914 and it may be conjectured that he was replaced shortly after the outbreak of World War I in Europe.

INTRODUCTION

Recent research has thrown much light on the state of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century,[1] and on the emergence and ideologies of both the Arab and Zionist movements.[2] The author therefore feels it unnecessary to devote space to sketching these topics, each of which is vast in itself, and wishes instead to restrict this introduction to the very minimum required for the purposes of the study in hand.

In 1882 the Ottoman Empire had barely recovered from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and its settlement as arranged by the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin. Abdülhamid II became Sultan in 1876 and, after a brief constitutional period during the first two years of his reign, governed the Empire as an autocrat for the next three decades. Europe and many of his own subjects judged him harshly, regarding him as a tyrant of the blackest kind. The Young Turk Revolution took place in 1908 and less than a year later Abdülhamid was deposed. Thereafter the Empire was ruled by the Committee of Union and Progress, except for a few months during 1912. The Committee's rule was in many

1. E.g. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1961); S. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, 1962); R.H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 1963); & R. Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period (Baltimore, 1963).
2. E.g. A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939 (London, 1962); S.G. Haim, Arab Nationalism (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1962); A. Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea (New York & Philadelphia, 1960); & B. Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, Mass., 1961).

ways no less despotic than that of Abdülhamid, despite the outward trappings of the Constitution, Parliament and press. Throughout this period the Empire was faced with many problems, both internal and external. From the beginning of the nineteenth century it had suffered territorial losses, particularly in the Balkans. The Treaty of Berlin was no more than a temporary solution and did little to prevent further unrest in the Balkans which were eventually lost in their entirety in 1913 after two Balkan Wars. Military operations, a recurrent feature of the Empire's history in the last century, were a heavy drain on the Ottoman Treasury, which was reduced to virtual bankruptcy by 1876 on account of them and through a combination of other causes, including an unfavourable balance of trade over an extended period and a spendthrift Sultan between 1861 and 1876. In 1881, the Great Powers, on whom the Empire was dependent for loans, obliged the Ottoman Government to accept the presence of the "Council of the Public Debt" to administer the Ottoman Public Debt. This body gave the Powers partial control of the internal affairs of an Empire which they believed would collapse without their support and which they preferred to preserve rather than let a rival Power or group of Powers disturb the "balance of power" by annexing Ottoman territory. The Empire was very sensitive to the hold it rightly felt Europe had upon it, a hold which was made all the greater by the extra-territorial privileges enjoyed by subjects of the Powers residing or moving within Ottoman domains. These special rights were embodied in a series of treaties

called the "Capitulations" which conferred:

> "exemption from certain forms of taxation, protection from arbitrary arrest, liberty of religion, inviolability of domicile, immunity from the jurisdiction of the local courts in criminal matters, and subjection to special courts in all civil cases in which the other party is of a different nationality, on all foreigners who, as a natural consequence of the condition of extra-territoriality set up, can be dealt with by their particular Consuls in whatever manner the latter choose".1

Of special importance in the present connection was the law of June 16th, 1867 with its protocol of June 6th, 1868 (7 Safer 1285). This guaranteed the inviolability of the European's domicile and granted him the right to acquire both urban and rural property in all parts of the Ottoman Empire (excluding the Hijaz) on equal terms with Ottoman subjects acquiring land.[2]

Recurrent reference is made throughout this study to the Ottoman distrust of separatist national groups (as a result of the Empire's experience since the beginning of the nineteenth century), to the weakness of the Ottoman Treasury and its consequent need for financial support, and to the Capitulatory privileges enjoyed by the Jewish immigrants which made it all but impossible for the Ottoman Government to enforce the measures it wished to take against these Jews.

* * *

1. The Near East, v, 113 (1913), p.242, referring in the first instance to the Capitulations in Egypt but also to the Capitulations throughout the Ottoman Empire in general.
2. See G. Young, Corps du Droit Ottoman (Oxford, 1905), i, 334-45.

In 1882 Palestine lay wholly within the Ottoman Empire. On the west bank of the River Jordan, it comprised the independent Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem to the south and part of the Vilayet of Ṣam ("Syria") to the north. In 1888, the large Vilayet of Ṣam, with its administrative centre at Damascus, was re-organised; and the northern part of Palestine, embracing the Sanjaks of Acre and Nablus, was made part of the new Vilayet of Beirut.[1] To the local population the concept of an area called "Palestine" was meaningful (witness the existence of a newspaper in Jaffa after 1911 named Falasṭin),[2] even though no such territory existed as a single administrative unit. The administrative divisions of the country were of lasting importance because on account of them the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine was immediately brought to the attention of the authorities in Damascus and Beirut and thus of Arabs in these cities who often worked as Ottoman officials, especially in the lower ranks of the administration. Moreover, since Palestine was not governed as a single unit, there were differences between the administrations in the north and the south of the country. The relatively compact Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem was easier to contain and therefore more strictly controlled by the authorities than the outlying districts of the Vilayet of Beirut to the north (after 1888). The effects

1. For the administrative divisions of Palestine after 1888, see the map at the end of this study.
2. Cf. an early definition of Palestine (on the publication of the Palestine Exploration Fund's map of the country) in al-Muqtaṭaf, vol.iii (1878), p.154: "from 'Dan to Beersheba' in the words of the Torah, and from the Jordan to the Mediterranean (the land of the Children of Israel)".

of these differences make themselves felt in the course of this study.

In 1895, Vital Cuinet estimated the population of Palestine at rather less than half a million;[1] other authorities are inclined to a higher figure, reaching almost 700,000 in 1914.[2] According to Cuinet, more than three-quarters of the population was concentrated in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem - reflecting the rocky, mountainous nature of the land in the north of the country where arable tracts are fewer than in the south, despite the north's superiority in water resources. The population, although mainly Sunni Muslim, was not a homogeneous group. In addition to the old-established inhabitants, there were recently settled groups of Egyptians, Algerians, Circassians and Bosnians (all Sunnis). There were also small numbers of Shi'is (Mutawalis) and Druzes, and about 16 per cent of the population were Christians (mainly Greek Orthodox, Latin and Greek Catholics).[3] Most of these groups were to be found in the north of Palestine and some of them, the Druzes and Circassians for example, were of an unruly disposition which tended to heighten the insecurity already remarked upon in these outlying districts of the Vilayet of Beirut. There were numbers of Beduin in Palestine as well, but since for the most part they were to be found in the more arid areas to the south of the country and since they

1. This approximate figure of "rather less than half a million" was arrived at from V. Cuinet, Syrie, Liban et Palestine (Paris, 1896), passim.
2. J.B. Barron, Palestine: Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922 (Jerusalem, [1923]), p.3, giving the total population of Palestine in 1914 as 689,275 (based on Turkish sources).
3. Cuinet, Syrie, Liban et Palestine, passim.

were not a settled group, they were little affected by the incoming Jews and so figure only marginally in this study. There were of course other divisions within the indigenous population of Palestine, the most important of which being that between town- and country-dwellers. The various reactions of these two groups and of other groups on different levels (Arab landowners, notables, intellectuals, etc.) are dealt with in the course of this thesis.

* * *

Jews, in small numbers, had been making their way for centuries unimpeded into Palestine. However, in the 1880's there was a radical change in the nature and volume of this immigration. The condition of the Jews of Eastern Europe had deteriorated sadly during the nineteenth century, so that there was aroused in many of them a desire to migrate, especially from Imperial Russia. Most Jews moved westwards, ultimately to America, but a small proportion of them contemplated migration to Palestine. These were, very often, university students or young, disillusioned graduates, well versed in the nationalist theories of their era. They founded the "Lovers of Zion" ("Hibbat Ẓiyyon") Movement, in the belief that the "Jewish problem" could not be solved except by "self-emancipation", that is, by building up a normal - or, in their terms, an agriculturally based - society in what they conceived to be their nation's homeland, in Palestine. In 1881, the first major series of pogroms against the Jews of Russia took place, and a year later, the first small group of Jewish settlers (the "Biluyim") arrived in

Palestine. Other members of the Lovers of Zion Movement ("Ḥobebe Ẓiyyon") were not long in following the Biluyim. Almost from the outset, the Ḥobebe Ẓiyyon were supported by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, and from 1896 Baron Maurice de Hirsch's "Jewish Colonization Association" began to interest itself in Jewish settlement in Palestine. In 1897 Theodor Herzl gave more concrete form to Jewish national aspirations by founding the Zionist Movement, whose programme (worked out by the first Zionist Congress at Basel that year) called for a "home in Palestine" for the Jewish people. In 1903, pogroms at Kishinev and elsewhere stimulated a further wave of Jewish emigration from Russia and correspondingly the numbers of Jews reaching Palestine increased. This second wave of immigrants was distinguished from the wave of the 1880's and 1890's in that it contained many elements who had been close to the Russian revolutionary movement and who were imbued with socialist ideologies.

In 1882 there were about 24,000 Jews in Palestine, living with few exceptions in the four "Holy Cities" of Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias and Safed. Between 1882 and 1903, some 20-30,000 immigrants entered the country (forming a group called the "First ʿAliyyah"); from 1904 until 1914, some 35-40,000 immigrants entered (i.e. the "Second ʿAliyyah"). Of these immigrants, many departed again after a short while (because of difficult local conditions and other reasons discussed in this study), so that the net increase in Palestine's Jewish population through immigration and natural growth was in the region of 61,000,

bringing it up to a total of approximately 85,000 in 1914.[1] Many of the immigrants were devout Jews who still came to join the old, pious communities, but rather more than half of those who remained were determined young men, dedicated to rebuilding their nation's patrimony in Palestine. It is this second group (called the "New Yishshub") which is of interest in the present context. In 1914 the New Yishshub perhaps comprised 35,000 souls, of whom some 12,000 lived on over forty recently established agricultural settlements, while the remainder were not confined to the four "Holy Cities" but were also to be found in fair numbers in Jaffa and Haifa.

* * *

In some ways the reactions of the Turks and Arabs to the Jewish immigrants were but natural extensions of attitudes they already entertained towards Europeans in general and Jews in particular. This is taken up in the course of this study, and only a few historical points need be made here. In the Ottoman Empire Jews and Christians, as dhimmis in a Muslim state, were free to practise their religion and enjoyed a degree of autonomy through the millet system; they were "tolerated" groups but, as Professor von Grunebaum has pointed out, not in the same sense as in the West where "toleration implies an equal footing before the law and participation in civil and political life on terms of equality".[2] The "Imperial Rescripts" of 1839 and 1856

1. These figures, or rather estimates, are taken from the article on the demography of Palestine and Israel by Professor Roberto Bachi in ha-Enziklopedyah ha-'ibrit (Jerusalem & Tel Aviv, 1957), vol.vi, cc. 666-74.
2. G.E. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam (Chicago, 1961), p.179.

accorded Jews and Christians in the Empire this equality. But, as Roderic Davison has shown, the Muslim Turks resented these shows of liberality because they were felt to have been forced upon them by the Great Powers.[1] Over the centuries the Jews and Christians had become the "sole representatives of infidelity" in the Islamic world and the Muslims looked down upon them with disdain.[2] Moreover, as the Empire began to decline "the Ottoman Moslems, instead of merely despising Europeans as heretofore, came to fear and so to hate them .... in so far as the Dimmîs cultivated especially close relations with the foreigners, therefore, the small esteem that they enjoyed in Moslem eyes was still further diminished".[3] Nonetheless, "throughout Muslim history ... the tension ... between Christians and Muslims was much more marked than that between Jews and Muslims, probably on account of the backing the Christians were likely to receive from the West".[4] However, this could not hold in the case of the Jews entering Palestine after 1882, first because they were Europeans arriving at a time when the European was regarded with distaste and, moreover, precisely because they were seen to receive strong backing from their consuls, the powerful representatives of the West.

In Islamic tradition as well as in Turkish and Arab folklore the Jew is not looked upon in too complimentary

1. R.H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century", The American Historical Review, vol.lix (1953-4), pp.844-64.
2. H.A.R. Gibb & H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (London, 1957), I, ii, 208.
3. Ibid. p.258.
4. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, pp.180-1.

a light. There are many Quranic passages and ḥadiths which are unfavourable to the Jews,[1] while the image of the Jew as reflected in Turkish and Arabic proverbs is far from flattering.[2] This layer of unconscious conditioning could hardly have predisposed the Turks and Arabs to view the incoming Jews in a detached, neutral manner.

In Palestine, the majority of the Muslim fellaheen probably had had no contact with Jews before 1882, since the latter were almost entirely an urban group. If they entertained any attitude towards Jews at all, it must have been a blurred abstraction of the traditional image, which cannot be called positive. Peasants in the vicinity of the "Holy Cities" would have seen Jews of the old communities (the "Old Yishshub") who in most cases had come to Palestine from Eastern Europe to die in prayer and study. These Jews were contemptuously called "awlad al-mawt" by the fellaheen,[3] who even taunted cowards among their own ranks with the epithet "siknag", a distortion of "Ashkenazi" (European Jew) and a term of the highest abuse.[4] There is ample evidence

1. G. Vadja, "Juifs et Musulmans selon le Ḥadīṯ", Journal Asiatique, vol.ccxix (1937), pp.57-127.
2. For the Jew in Turkish proverbs, see A. Galanté, Le Juif dans le proverbe, le conte et la chanson orientaux (Istanbul, 1935), pp.11-18; for the Jew in Arabic proverbs, see J.L. Burckhardt, Arabic Proverbs (London, 1830), pp.20, 100 & 125.
3. D. Ḥabib-Lubman, Missipure ha-rishonim leẓiyyon (Tel Aviv, 1934), p.15.
4. E.A. Finn, "The Fellahheen of Palestine", Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement (1879), p.42.

that the Muslims in the "Holy Cities" had no greater respect for the Jews of the Old Yishshub than had the neighbouring peasants.[1]

The Eastern Christians were doctrinally more disposed than the Muslims to harbour antipathy towards the Jews. Moreover, although divided amongst themselves by inter-denominational strife, they vied as a group with the Oriental Jews ("Sephardim") in the Ottoman Empire as clerks, bankers, merchants and interpreters. In Palestine this rivalry was accompanied by religious prejudice which, in some cases, amounted "to a fanaticism"[2] that could lead, for example, Greek Orthodox Arabs in Jerusalem to raise the "Blood Libel" against the Jews in 1847.[3]

It is against the background of these negative attitudes shared by Muslim Turks and Arabs and also (for different reasons) by Eastern Christians that the subject of this thesis must be viewed.

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1. For many documents covering the four and a half decades before 1882, see A.M. Hyamson (ed.) The British Consulate in Jerusalem in relation to the Jews of Palestine: 1838-1914 (London, 1939 & 1941).
2. Ibid. p.8, being FO 78/368, encl.1 to no.13 (19.4.1839), W.T. Young (Jerus.) to P. Campbell (Alexandria).
3. Ibid. p.96, being FO 78/705, no.12 (13.3.1847), J. Finn (Jerus.) to Lord Palmerston (F.O.).

"Be it known unto the king, that the Jews which came up from thee to us are come unto Jerusalem, building the rebellious and the bad city, and have set up the walls thereof, and joined the foundations. Be it known now unto the king, that, if this city be builded, and the walls set up again, then will they not pay toll, tribute, and custom, and so thou shalt endamage the revenue of the kings. Now because we have maintenance from the king's palace, and it was not meet for us to see the king's dishonour, therefore have we sent and certified the king; That search may be made in the book of the records of thy fathers: so shalt thou find in the book of the records, and know that this city is a rebellious city, and hurtful unto kings and provinces, and that they have moved sedition within the same of old time: for which cause this city was destroyed. We certify the king that, if this city be builded again, and the walls thereof set up, by this means thou shalt have no portion on this side the river."

Ezra, 4, xii-xvi,
letter from the Samaritans to the
King of Persia, [ca. 445 B.C.].

"[A question] from Beirut: 'Were the Jews called Syrians in the days of Christ and before him?' Answer: 'Yes; Herodotus had already called them thus.'"

Al-Muqtaṭaf (July, 1882),
after increased numbers of Jewish
immigrants had begun to pass through
Beirut on their way to Palestine.

"Le juif serait-il dans notre Turquie constitutionelle, le bouc expiatoire pour la réconciliation de ces concurrents du pouvoir."

Albert Antébi (9.7.1909),
shortly after the counter-Revolution
in Constantinople.

"Shall a defenceless weakling hold rule,
when the swords are athirst and the
birds of prey go hungry -

One who, were he to see me as water, would
die of thirst, and were I to appear to
him in sleep would never sleep again?

The appointed day for every two-edged sword
is tomorrow - and for every ruler, Arab
or other, who disobeys.

If they respond, I take no issue with them
by the sword; but if they turn their
backs, then I shall not be contented
with putting them alone to the sword."

Al-Mutanabbi, proposed by Khalil
al-Sakakini as the Arab national
anthem in February, 1914.

CHAPTER ONE

FIRST RESPONSES: 1882-1895

The Entry Restrictions: 1882-1884

In April 1882 the Ottoman Consul-General in Odessa sent a telegram to the Sublime Porte, seeking instruction about Jews who wished to settle in Palestine. He was concerned, it may reasonably be assumed, at the large numbers of Russian Jews who in recent months had applied to him for visas with this purpose in mind. The Sublime Porte's reply was posted as a notice outside the Consul-General's office on April 28th; it read as follows:

> "The Government of Turkey informs all [Jews] wishing to immigrate into Turkey that they are not permitted to settle in Palestine. They may immigrate into the other provinces of Turkey and settle as they wish, provided only that they become Turkish subjects and accept the obligation to fulfil the laws of the Empire."[1]

This announcement, the first public statement of the Porte's attitude towards Jewish immigration into Palestine, had not been anticipated by the Jews. To them it seemed impossible that the Imperial Government, with its long history of hospitality to the Jews, should now proscribe their settling in Palestine.[2] In Jerusalem itself reports of this notice were simply not believed, since increasing numbers of Jews from Odessa were seen to be entering the

1. Ha-Meliz, xviii, 16 (9.5.1882).
2. S. Yavne'eli, Sefer ha-ziyyonut: tekufat hibbat ziyyon (Tel Aviv, 1961), i, 66.

country without hindrance week by week.[1]

At the time when this announcement was made, Laurence Oliphant, the English writer, traveller and mystic who had interested himself in schemes to restore the Jews to Palestine, was inspecting the condition of Jewish refugees in Brody and Lemberg on behalf of the Mansion-house Committee, a relief organisation in London concerned with the resettlement of persecuted Jews from Russia and Rumania.[2] The Jews whom he met believed him to be an English aristocrat of considerable wealth and influence; they prevailed upon him to proceed to Constantinople with a view to ascertaining more precisely the Sublime Porte's policy on Jewish immigration into the Ottoman Empire and also, if possible, to gain permission for numbers of Jews to settle in Palestine.[3] At the same time, though independently of Oliphant, the Bilu society's "Bureau Central" was transferred from Odessa to Constantinople in the hope of acquiring a grant of land in Palestine for three-hundred settlers.[4] Shortly thereafter, at the beginning of June, Jacob Rosenfeld, the editor of Razsvet (a Jewish paper in St. Petersburg which sympathised with the "Lovers of Zion" Movement) came to Constantinople to investigate the situation as well.[5]

In Constantinople, Oliphant found about two-hundred Jewish refugees. He also discovered that on entry into the

1. Habazzelet, xii, 30 (28.5.1882).
2. The Times, no.30,521 (31.5.1882).
3. Yavne'eli, Sefer ha-ziyyonut, i, 209-14.
4. C. Chissin (trans. S. Herberg), Miyyomam ahad ha-biluyim (Tel Aviv, 1925), p.9 (24.7.1882).
5. Yavne'eli, Sefer ha-ziyyonut, i, 209.

Empire they were required to sign a form by which they adopted Ottoman nationality and in which they declared that they submitted without reserve to the laws of the Empire and that they would not settle in Palestine.[1] Oliphant approached General Lewis Wallace, the American Ambassador at the Porte, to see if he would make enquiries on behalf of the Jews; Wallace was agreeable but indicated that he could only take the initiative if a request came from the Jews themselves.[2] Thereupon Oliphant sent a telegraph to Jews in Bucharest and thus another delegation seeking permission for Jews to settle in Palestine hastened to Constantinople.

On June 6th Wallace met this last delegation; six days later he had an audience with Said Paşa, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs. Said informed him that:

> "The subject had been under consideration by His Majesty's [Abdülhamid's] Council, which had decided to allow colonization by those people [Jews], provided they did not settle on lands within the limits of Palestine .... They might settle about Aleppo and in Mesopotamia, and in the region of the Orontes River.... in groups of two hundred or two hundred and fifty houses....".[3]

Said told Wallace that since there existed a general law covering this form of immigration, no special firman from the Sultan was required; Wallace was at liberty to notify

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1. The Times, no.30,521 (31.5.1882), letter (dated 23.5.1882) from Oliphant (Consple.).
2. United States (Dept. of State), Papers relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States, 1882 (Washington, 1883), pp.516-17, no.319 (11.7.1882), L. Wallace (Consple.) to F.T. Frelinghuysen (Washington).
3. Ibid. pp.518-19, encl.2 to no.319 (13.6.1882), Wallace to Said Paşa (S.P.).

the interested parties "that they could begin the movement immediately".[1]

As Said indicated, the Imperial Government was familiar with the question of Jewish immigration into the Ottoman Empire. This is evident from the catalogues to the archives of the former Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where there is listed, under Russia, a file entitled "Situation faite aux Israélites; Question de leur émigration en Turquie: 1881".[2] Moreover, in recent years at least two direct approaches had been made to the Porte in connection with Jewish settlement in the Empire. In 1879 Laurence Oliphant himself had submitted a scheme to instal Jews in an area on the east bank of the River Jordan;[3] and in 1881 a group of English and German businessmen, headed by Edward Cazalet, began negotiations with the Porte for a concession to build a railway from Smyrna to Baghdad, along the length of which they planned to settle Jews.[4] In autumn 1881 this group sent James Alexander, a Jew from Düsseldorf, to Constantinople to treat with the Porte. Alexander met Said Paşa who, according to Reuter reports, favoured the settlement of Jews in the Ottoman Empire;[5] the matter was therefore brought to the attention of the Council of Ministers and in November it was announced that:

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1. Loc.cit. For a translated copy of the immigration law referred to by Said Paşa, see ibid. pp.519-20; significantly, the first clause of this law required immigrants to become Ottoman subjects at the outset.
2. OFA Carton 208, Dossier 139; this file cannot now be found.
3. L. Oliphant, The Land of Gilead (London, 1880), pp.502ff.
4. Ḥabaẓẓelet, xii, 41 (1.9.1882).
5. Jewish Chronicle, no.652 (23.9.1881).

> "The [Jewish] immigrants will be able to settle as scattered groups throughout Turkey, excluding Palestine. They must submit to all the laws of the Empire and become Ottoman subjects."[1]

This announcement was re-affirmed in the notice outside the Odessa Consulate-General in April 1882 and by Said Paşa in his conversation with General Wallace a few weeks later. All amounted to the same thing: immigrant Jews were welcome in the Ottoman Empire, but not in Palestine; they could settle in small groups, on condition (i) that they relinquished their foreign nationality to become Ottoman subjects, and (ii) that they did not seek any special privileges, but were content to remain bound by the laws currently in force in the Empire.[2] It is significant that these principles were established by the Ottoman Government before the first group of Jewish colonists set sail for Palestine and, moreover, that they were maintained with scarcely any modification until Palestine was lost in 1917.

* * *

In the circumstances, Oliphant advised these prospective settlers already assembled at Constantinople to postpone their embarkation for Palestine, but his advice was not accepted.[3] On June 29th, 1882, the first tiny group of "Biluyim" sailed from Constantinople for Jaffa;[4] and on the

1. Ḥabaẓẓelet, xii, 41 (1.9.1882), cf. The Levant Herald iii, 444 (24.11.1881).
2. Cf. FO 78/3394, no.1155 (30.12.1882), H. Wyndham (Consple.) to Earl Granville (F.O.).
3. A. Druyanow, Ketabim letoldot ḥibbat ẓiyyon (Odessa and Tel Aviv, 1919-1932), i, 40 (2).6.1882), Agence du bureau central de l'Emigration en Palestine, Bilu (Consple.) to Bilu society (Nikolayev).
4. Yavne'eli, Sefer ha-ẓiyyonut, i, 69.

same day, the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem received a telegram from the Sublime Porte, instructing him "not to permit any Jew, coming from the cities of Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria, to set foot in any of the Holy Cities: Jaffa, Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias, Hebron and Haifa; they shall return to another of the coastal cities in Turkey aboard the ship they come on".[1]

This prohibition was wide and unconditional; it was also in contradiction ~~with~~ to the Capitulations which assured Europeans of unrestricted travel throughout the Ottoman Empire (except Arabia). The Mutasarrif was therefore obliged to seek clarification from Constantinople, whereon he was directed to expel all Jews who had settled in the country within the last four months and to grant only a brief stay to Jews coming to the Mutasarriflik for religious or commercial reasons - other Jews (i.e. prospective settlers) were to be prevented from landing.[2] After a little vacillation (and possibly further communications with Constantinople), the police controls at Jaffa were made more stringent.[3] The distinction between Jewish settlers on the one hand and pilgrims or businessmen on the other was noteworthy, as was the fact that the prohibition seemed to be

1. Ha-Maggid, xxvi, 28 (19.7.1882): despatch from J. Rivlin (Jerus., 29.6.1882). Jaffa and Haifa were not, of course, regarded as "Holy Cities", and this suggests that ha-Maggid's version of the telegram is slightly inaccurate; a more plausible reading (which would assume that ha-Maggid overlooked one word in Rivlin's Hebrew despatch) would be "in any of the cities of the Holy Land: Jaffa, etc.".
2. ISA (G) A III 9, no.858 (12.7.1882), von Tischendorf (Jerus.) to Reichskanzler (Berlin), [draft]; cf. Habazzelet, xii, 35 (7.7.1882).
3. Habazzelet, xiii, 1 (27.9.1882).

aimed primarily at Russian and Rumanian Jews, for they alone were refused entry, while Jews of other nationalities were not interfered with.[1]

Laurence Oliphant, on his way to Constantinople in May 1882, had visited the Ottoman Consul-General at Odessa who had assured him that the prohibition applied solely to the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem.[2] This proved not to be the case, for the entry restrictions were soon enforced elsewhere with even greater rigidity than in the Mutasarriflik. In October, a group of Russian settlers supported by the Syrian Colonization Committee in London was prevented from landing at Latakia,[3] where the Mutasarrif was later ordered by the Vali of Şam, Hamdi Paşa, to obstruct by all possible means the establishment of a Jewish colony sponsored by that committee.[4]

Irregularities were not long in arising. Knowing that they would be refused visas for Palestine since their intention to leave Russia permanently was obvious, some Jews applied for visas to Constantinople, where they then requested permits ("tezkeres de route") to travel within the Ottoman Empire. Thus they would arrive at Palestine with valid papers, but as prospective settlers they were refused entry. This led to complaints and at the end of 1882 the Ministry of Police in Constantinople was ordered by the

1. Ḥabaẓẓeleṭ, xiii, 1 (27.9.1882).
2. Ha-Meliẓ, xviii, 19 (30.5.1882) & Ḥabaẓẓeleṭ, xii, 32-3 (23.6.1882).
3. FO 195/1410, no.86 (24.10.1882), G.J. Eldridge (Beirut) to Lord Dufferin (Consple.).
4. FO 195/1410, encl.1 to no.97 (29.11.1882), N. Vitale (Latakia) to Eldridge.

Council of Ministers to cease issuing any "tezkeres de route" more to Russian Jews until the Imperial Government took a decision in the matter.[1] The reason given for this order was that the Jewish immigrants were not fulfilling the first obligation required of them, i.e. to become Ottoman subjects.[2] In spring 1883 it was reported that at Beirut and Haifa a complete bar was being imposed on the entry of all Jews without distinction,[3] whilst it was still possible for Jews from countries other than Russia and Rumania to disembark at Jaffa; and even in the case of Jews from these two countries only prospective settlers (and not pilgrims or businessmen) were precluded from landing.[4] However, by July, sufficient numbers of Jewish "pilgrims" and "businessmen" from Russia and Rumania had entered the Mutasarriflik for the Porte to remind the authorities there to prevent the entry of Jews from these countries.[5] The port officials at Jaffa took immediate action and tried to stop Jews with valid papers from landing.[6] One such Jew - from Russia - complained to his consul in Jerusalem who brought the case to the notice of the Mutasarrif. The latter admitted the mistake and instructed the officials at Jaffa to admit Russian Jews whose papers were in order.[7]

1. FO 78/3506, encl. to no.48 (22.1.1883), Wyndham to Granville: "Notification officielle" (n.d.).
2. Loc.cit.; cf. Ḥabazzelet, xiii, 9 (16.2.1883).
3. FO 195/1447, no.3 (16.1.1883), Eldridge to Dufferin; & Ḥabazzelet, xiii, 9 (16.2.1883); cf. The Times, no.30,730 (30.1.1883), letter (dated 12.1.1883) from Oliphant (Haifa), enclosing order (dated 26.12.1882) from Vali (Ṣam) to Kay. (Haifa) prohibiting absolutely entry of all Jews.
4. Ḥabazzelet, xiii, 9 (16.2.1883); cf. ibid. 15 (6.4.1883) & ibid. 16 (15.4.1883).
5. Ibid. 28 (3.8.1883).
6. Ibid. 30 (17.8.1883).
7. Loc.cit.

However, the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem recognised that it did not accord with the Porte's real purpose to admit those Jews who claimed that they came for prayer or business but in fact came to settle; he therefore turned to Constantinople for advice. A correspondence ensued; the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs conferred; and the opinions of the legal advisers to the Porte were sought. Eventually the whole dossier on the issue was placed before the Council of State, which considered it in March, 1884.[1] The legal advisers were of the view that the Porte was entitled to take various measures to make the entry restrictions more effective: pilgrimages could be limited to a short visit of, perhaps, thirty days; a temporary permis de séjour could be issued to those admitted; and businessmen could be obliged to declare the nature of their business and also be prohibited from bringing their families with them. These suggestions were supported by the Minister of Internal Affairs who took steps, even before the Council of State's meeting, to try to have them put into effect.[2] The Council of State, however, believed that as long as Palestine was open to Jewish "businessmen" from Russia, the restrictions would be valueless, because every Jew would enter for "business purposes", take up permanent residence and later import his family. The Council of State therefore accepted their advisers' first suggestions and, having taken further legal counsel, also decided to prohibit the entry of Russian Jewish businessmen into Palestine, since it was held that

1. ISA (T) no.89 (4.3.1884): copy minutes of this meeting (sent to Jerusalem). 2. Loc.cit.

the Capitulations, which provided for free trading by Europeans within the Ottoman Empire, applied exclusively to areas "appropriate for trade"; the Council of State did not consider that Palestine was such an area.[1] One month later the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem enquired whether he should admit six Jewish businessmen from Austria and was instructed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to exclude Jews of all nationalities seeking to enter Palestine for trade.[2] In accordance with these decisions, it was announced at the beginning of May that Jewish pilgrims alone would be admitted to Palestine; their passports were to be properly visaed by Ottoman consuls abroad; their visit was to be limited to thirty days; and they were to leave a deposit on entry guaranteeing their exit at the expiry of this period.[3] These extensions of the entry restrictions were interpreted in Jerusalem to embrace Ottoman Jews as well. Within a few weeks, the Haham Başi in Constantinople protested to the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Justice; he was told that although the recent order was framed to include Ottoman Jews, it did not concern them but applied solely to foreign Jews, especially from Russia and Rumania.[4] The position was

1. ISA (T) no.89 (4.3.1884): copy minutes of this meeting (sent to Jerusalem).
2. ISA (T) no.84 (8.4.1884), Ministry of Internal Affairs (S.P.) to Mutas. (Jerus.).
3. Ḥabaẓẓelet, xiv, 23 (2.5.1884). The size of this deposit is not known; in 1888 it was T£50 - see G. Young, Corps du Droit Ottoman (Oxford, 1905-06), ii, 156.
4. AIU I.C. 6 (15.7.1884), S. Fernandez (Consple.) to Pres., AIU (Paris); cf. Ḥabaẓẓelet, xiv, 31 (4.7.1884) & ibid. 32 (11.7.1884).

quickly righted vis-à-vis Ottoman Jews, but the regulations regarding all others remained unchanged.[1]

* * *

In June 1882 Said Paşa enunciated to General Wallace the conditions governing Jewish immigration into the Ottoman Empire, but he did not indicate the reasons for them. At the time, Laurence Oliphant suggested that they derived from Muslim sentiments concerning Palestine, anti-Jewish influences and the strained relations between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain on account of the crisis then current in Egypt.[2] However, these explanations, even if accepted and considered together, barely suffice to justify the Sublime Porte's immediate and rigid opposition to Jewish immigration into Palestine. Oliphant himself had tired of the Ḥobebe Ziyyon,[3] and thus the last of these reasons - seemingly the most substantial - furnished him with an acceptable excuse to exonerate himself for withdrawing his active support from the "Lovers of Zion" Movement,[4] and also makes intelligible why he turned to General Wallace in preference to the British Ambassador at the Porte. The events in Egypt may have compromised Oliphant's personal position, it is true; but - serious as they were - they were best peripheral, if not wholly irrelevant, to the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine, because, as has been shown above, the

1. Ḥabaẓẓelet, xiv, 40 (12.9.1884).
2. Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 37-8 (24.6.1882), Oliphant (Consple.) to D. Gordon [Lyck].
3. P. Henderson, The Life of Laurence Oliphant: Traveller, Diplomat and Mystic (London, 1956), p.225.
4. Ha-Maggid, xxvi, 27 (12.7.1882), apologetic letter from Oliphant (6.7.1882).

principles of Ottoman policy in the matter were already fixed in November 1881, well before the Anglo-Egyptian crisis had become acute. The suggestion of anti-Jewish influences perhaps carries a little more weight, for in April 1882 Greek newspapers in Constantinople were already writing articles opposing the idea of restoring the Jews to Palestine.[1] Muslim religious sentiments about Palestine cannot be measured and in subsequent years they were seldom raised as a serious political consideration (although they may certainly have played an unconscious part in predisposing the views of many Turks and Arabs who later came to consider the question).

The real reasons lay elsewhere. They were essentially two. First, the Sublime Porte feared the possibility of nurturing another national problem within the Empire; and, second, it had no wish to increase the number of foreign subjects in its domains. Both these considerations were composite and they should be examined in detail as they are fundamental to this study.

Towards the end of 1882 the President of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Constantinople was told of the first of these reasons. Ottoman ministers informed him that they were determined "to resist firmly the immigration of Jews into Syria and Mesopotamia, as they [did] not wish to have another nationality established in great numbers in that part of the Empire".[2] A year later, the Minister

1. Habazzelet, xii, 41 (1.9.1882).
2. FO 78/3394, no.1155 (30.12.1882), Wyndham to Granville.

of Internal Affairs and others explicitly indicated to the President of the Alliance in the capital that they regarded Jewish colonisation of Palestine as a political question, and "ils ne veulent pas, après la question bulgare, roumeliste et autres, avoir une nouvelle question sur les bras".[1] In the light of their long series of misfortunes with national minorities since the beginning of the nineteenth century (which had led to considerable territorial losses in the Balkans), the apprehensions of the Ottoman ministers were understandable. As mentioned above, the Porte was familiar from the beginning of the 1880's with the condition of the Jews in Russia; Jews who visited Constantinople in 1882 confirmed this by reporting that Ottoman representatives abroad had sent cuttings from the Jewish press to the Porte.[2] In this press, advocates of the restoration of the Jewish people to Palestine had taken to loud propagandising and had indiscriminately exaggerated the numbers of their supporters.[3] To the Ottoman ministers, these proclamations and assertions seemed to have been substantiated in spring 1882 when there was a marked increase in the numbers of Jews journeying to Palestine and in the summer of that year when half-a-dozen groups of delegates representing Russian and Rumanian Jews arrived in the capital. One of these delegations - from Rumania - bore a petition which spoke of no less than

1. Letter of 20.12.1883, Fernandez and S. Bloch (Consple.) to S. Hirsch (Miqve Yisrael), published in I. Margalith, Le Baron Edmond de Rothschild et la colonisation juive en Palestine, 1882-1899 (Paris, 1957), p.204.
2. Yavne'eli, Sefer ha-ẓiyyonut, i, 66; I. Klausner, Ḥibbat ẓiyyon berumanyah (Jerusalem, 1958), pp.137ff.; K.W. Wissotski, Ḳebuẓat miktabim (Warsaw, 1895), p.62; (5.4.1885), Wissotski (Consple.) to L. Pinsker (Odessa).
3. Yavne'eli, Sefer ha-ẓiyyonut, i, 65.

"hundreds of thousands of people [who were] awaiting with the utmost anxiety information upon which they [could] safely act".[1] The Bilu representatives were acting in the first instance on behalf of five-hundred university students, but also for potentially many more if their movement was encouraged. Furthermore, Jacob Rosenfeld, editor of an important journal which supported the "Lovers of Zion" Movement, was at hand, as well as many individual Jews who had come to Constantinople by themselves in search of travel papers to Palestine. Somewhere behind them all stood Laurence Oliphant who, it should be mentioned, had become persona non grata in 1879 when he had presented his scheme to settle Jews on the east bank of the River Jordan, for even then this project had been viewed "as a British attempt to penetrate [Abdülhamid's] dominions and become possessed of Asia Minor".[2] The Jewish delegations enlisted the aid of the American Ambassador at the Porte, who had spoken to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; after this they had also approached prominent Jews in the capital;[3] and (perhaps with the help of these Jews) they had contacted the Ottoman Ministers of Internal Affairs and of War.[4] Little wonder, therefore, that the Porte became apprehensive about what

1. U.S., Foreign Affairs, 1882, p.518, encl.1 to no.319 (6.6.1882), Rumanian delegation's petition to Wallace.
2. Henderson, Laurence Oliphant, p.209.
3. Yavne'eli, Sefer ha-ziyyonut, i, 214-17.
4. Chissin, Miyyoman, p.9 (24.7.1882).

was afoot.[1] The Jewish immigrants, having been recognised by the Porte to be Jewish nationalists as well, were at a further disadvantage since most of them were Russians. Russia, the "arch-enemy" of the Ottoman Empire, was regarded by the Porte as the instigator and supporter of the nationalist groups in the Balkans. The Porte had no wish to have another, Russian educated and possibly Russian inspired, nationalist movement to contend with.

In addition, as stated above, the Ottoman ministers did not view with favour the prospect of a large influx of foreign subjects into the Empire. By the latter half of the nineteenth century the European was viewed with dislike and distrust by the Turk, he was a projection of Great Power influence and a parasite on the Ottoman Empire. Through the Capitulations he enjoyed special privileges and also, because of the Capitulations, he afforded the Great Powers the opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of the Empire. Thus the Porte insisted that the first condition for Jewish immigration into the Empire was that the immigrants must relinquish their foreign nationality and become Ottoman subjects; when, at the end of 1882, the Council of Ministers sought to justify its restrictions in public for the first time, it did so by reference to the fact that the Jews were not fulfilling this primary

1. From the end of 1882 onwards the Porte's suspicions about the size and power of the Jewish nationalist movement were heightened by the fact that Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris had begun to support the new Jewish settlements in Palestine. In Constantinople, "the Baron" endeavoured through his agents to influence the Ottoman Government in favour of the Jewish immigrants - see Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 169 (26.5.1884) Gordon to S.P. Rabinowitsch [Warsaw]; but his efforts only stiffened the Porte's resistance - see Wissotski, Miktabim, p.55 (2.4.1885), Wissotski to M.L. Lilienblum (Odessa).

obligation (see above, p. 8). It was suggested in September 1882 that Russia had requested the Porte not to tolerate the settlement of Jews in Palestine because of the Christian Holy Places there. Although difficult to prove, this suggestion does not sound unreasonable, for if Imperial Russia did not grieve the emigration of her Jews westwards, she was firmly opposed to the consolidation of any group in Palestine which was liable to unbalance the status quo over the Holy Places. Russia's action in this direction was first reported by James Alexander (Cazalet's representative in Constantinople), who cannot of course be regarded as the strongest of authorities,[1] but in the next years others too, including Oscar S. Straus, the American Ambassador at the Porte from 1887 to 1889, also remarked upon it.[2] Moreover, Russia's ready acceptance of the restrictions, in contrast with the refusal of other Powers to acquiesce in them, also tends to give substance to this suggestion (see below, p.26).[3]

In a sense, both these objections to Jewish immigration into Palestine - fear of another national problem and the

1. Klausner, Hibbat Ziyyon, p.138, on basis of a report from J. Alexander (Consple.) to Dr. Lippe [Jassy?]; Klausner cites as his source "Dr. A. Salvendi, list no. 46 (17.9.1882)" - loc.cit. n.5.
2. O.S. Straus, Under Four Administrations (Boston, 1922), p.80; (Straus was again American Ambassador at the Porte from 1898 to 1900 and from 1909 to 1910). Cf. Wissotski, Miktabim, pp.71-2 (2.4.1885): report of conversation with Haham Başi (Consple.); ibid. p.64 (5.4.1885), Wissotski to Pinsker; & Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 280 (26.5.1885), A. Veneziani (Consple.) to Pinsker.
3. Cf. OFA A/346, Note Verbale, no.19 (14.1.1887), Russian Embassy (Consple.) to S.P., finding Porte's request to publicise the entry restrictions "parfaitement juste".

desire to limit the numbers of foreign subjects settling in the Empire - can be seen in this instance to have been interdependent, and when compounded they produce a further objection which is graver than each of its parts taken separately. Both another national problem and more foreign subjects were unwanted, but a national problem where almost all the members of that nationality were foreign subjects could not be countenanced in any circumstances.

* * * *

Rauf Paşa and the Renewed Restrictions of 1887-1888

Since 1877 the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem had been governed by Mehmed Şerif Rauf Paşa. From an old Turkish family, Rauf Paşa had completed his studies in Paris after a private education at home.[1] Affable, gentle in manner and very energetic, he was something of an exception in the Ottoman provincial administration.[2]

> "There are few men like him in Turkey. He possesses a sound mind [and] an iron will; he hates injustice [and] is a zealous patriot who stands guard over the interests of his homeland with all his power and makes no concessions at all .... He bears down on bribery, loves the Turk and Arab and hates the Europeans, whom he regards as parasites on his homeland."[3]

He retained his governorship in Jerusalem for twelve years (until 1889), unlike his predecessors who had seldom remained at this post for twelve months.[4]

1. S. Whitman, Turkish Memoirs (London, 1914), p.95.
2. Ibid. p.98.
3. Chissin, Miyyomanı, p.84 (14.5.1886); cf. E. Cohn-Reiss, Mizzikronot ish yerushalayim (Jerusalem, 1934), p.151.
4. After leaving Jerusalem in 1889, Rauf Paşa served as Governor at several other posts, including Beirut, Damascus, Bitlis, Harput, Erzerum, Smyrna and Salonika. After the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, he served for a short while as Minister of Internal Affairs and at the end of 1909 was appointed Ottoman Commissioner in Egypt - see The Near East, ii, N.S.5 (1909), p.135.

Rauf Paşa tried hard to ensure that his instructions from Constantinople were carried out. Whenever directives were received, they were communicated to the heads of the Jewish community and published in Ḥabaẓẓelet for the attention both of Jews illegally domiciled in the Mutasarriflik and of those abroad contemplating immigration to Palestine.[1] Police officers were frequently prompted to see that the regulations were complied with;[2] and attempts were made to correct the registers of Ottoman Jews resident in the Mutasarriflik, with the intention of expelling non-Ottomans whose presence was unlawful.[3] As a corollary to preventing prospective Jewish settlers from entering Palestine, Rauf Paşa also endeavoured to check land purchases made by them.[4] By law, Ottoman Jews, like all Ottomans, could purchase land: but when some newcomers tried to become Ottoman subjects (so as not to remain under threat of expulsion and also that they might buy land), they found the authorities dilatory and reluctant to accept them.[5] Formerly Ottoman nationality could be acquired without difficulty, but after


1. E.g. Ḥabaẓẓelet, xii, 35 (7.7.1882); ibid. xiii, 28 (3.8.1883); ibid. xiv, 23 (2.5.1884); etc.
2. Ibid. xiii, 1 (27.9.1882); ibid. xiv, 40 (12.9.1884); ibid. xv, 44 (20.8.1885); etc.
3. Ibid. xiv, 24 (9.5.1884); ibid. xv, 20 (25.2.1885).
4. E.g. Z.D. Levontin, Le'erez abotenu (Tel Aviv, 1924-28), i, 56: re. purchase of land for Rishon le Zion, 1882; Y. Ya'ari and M. Charizman, Sefer ha-yobel petaḥ tiḳwah (Tel Aviv, 1929), pp.174-5: re. land near Petah Tiqva, 1882-83.
5. Druyanow, Ketabim, iii, 690 (31.1.1885), E.M. Altschuler (Suwalki) to S. Mohilewer (Bialystok), after a short visit to Palestine.

the entry restrictions it was not long before "a very high tax" was imposed on Jews seeking the privilegesof Ottoman nationality.[1]

But in spite of his zeal, Rauf Paşa did not succeed in stopping Jewish immigrants from entering and settling in Palestine - perhaps he could not. Jews came with falsified papers, stating that they had been born in the Ottoman Empire,[2] or they landed at Port Said and proceeded overland, or - more often than not - they resorted to the common expedient of bribing the port authorities and anyone else, short of Rauf Paşa himself, who tried to block their way. They could always enter the Mutasarriflik as pilgrims and outstay their welcome; should the police attempt to expel them, they appealed to their consuls. The consuls regarded the Ottoman position as a contravention of the Capitulations, and so would always uphold the Jews' claim to remain in the country. As a result, the Jews continued to come, and come for good. They also by-passed other obstacles and continued to buy land. Although in 1867 Europeans had been permitted by law to acquire land in the Empire,[3] after this date the Ottoman authorities were still disinclined to authorise sales to them.[4] Europeans (and Jews among them) had therefore

1. Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, 1888, p.21: C. Schick (Jerusalem, 26.11.1887). In 1888, colonists from Gedera were charged 30 francs each to become Ottoman subjects - see Druyanow, Ketabim, ii, 488 (10.2.1888), Y.M. Pines (Jaffa) to Pinsker.
2. Druyanow, op.cit. iii, 690 (31.1.1885), Altschuler to Mohilewer.
3. F. Ongley and H.E. Miller, The Ottoman Land Code (London, 1892), pp.168-71.
4. See J. Yellin, Zikronot Leben-yerushalayim (Jerusalem, 1924), pp.64-70: his difficulties in trying to buy land at Jericho, 1872; also J. Brill, Yesud ha-ma'alah (Mayence, 1883), p.155: same incident.

Hobebe Ziyyon settlements founded during 1880's



resorted to their consuls and bought land through them, often understating the value of the property in the bills of sale.[1] In the 1880's, when immigrant Jews were hampered by the Ottoman authorities in their attempts to purchase land, they continued to employ these means of circumventing the difficulties in their way[2] - again, not without the aid of bribes as the occasion demanded. Thus there were founded in Palestine, after the first wave of immigration in the early 1880's, eight colonies, constituting the basis of the "New Yishshub". These were, in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem, Petah Tiqva, Rishon le Zion, Nes Tsiyona (all 1882),[3] Eqron and Gedera (both 1884); in the Vilayet of Şam (where the situation was little different from that in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem), Zikhron Ya'aqov and Rosh Pinna (1882) and Yesud ham Ma'ala (1883).

* * *

If Rauf Paşa could not effectively hinder Jews from entering Palestine and acquiring land there, he could at least impede the progress of their colonies. Most of the land purchased by the Jews was miri (there being only small parcels of mülk land in the Mutasarriflik, mainly in the towns). Technically, the colonists held their land as tenants, paying üşür to the Government; according to the law, permits from Constantinople were to be obtained before

1. Yellin, Zikronot, pp.31-3.
2. So, e.g. Levontin, Le'erez, p.56: the documents for the purchase of Rishon le Zion were made out in the name of H. Amzalak, the British Vice-Consul in Jaffa.
3. Petah Tiqva was originally established in 1878 by Hungarian Jews resident in Jerusalem, but was soon abandoned. It was re-established in 1882 with additional land.

tenants on *miri* land could build houses or plant trees and vineyards[1] - and such permits were not granted without the approval of the local governor.[2]

The settlers at Petah Tiqva were the first to experience what obstacles Rauf Paşa could put in the way of Jews wishing to build on their land.[3] Having ascertained that Rauf Paşa would not support their application to Constantinople for building permits, they decided to risk illegal building.[4] With the help of a Jew in Jerusalem, they obtained a building permit from the Municipality, on the strength of a false claim that their land at al Yahudiya was *mülk*, thereby obviating the need to go to Rauf Paşa. The buildings were begun in haste, but not completed before police officers arrived from Jaffa, who arrested the builders, noted the names of those involved and made a report of what had been constructed. They then released the builders, who resumed their task and speedily completed it. Shortly afterwards J.M. Salomon and D. Gutman (in whose names the land at al Yahudiya was registered) were summoned to court in Jerusalem for illegal building. One of the judges, a friend of Salomon, told him that they were under orders from Rauf Paşa to find the accused guilty and to impose the

1. Ongley and Miller, *Land Code*, pp.13-14 & 16-17.
2. Druyanow, *Ketabim*, iii, 690-1 (31.1.1885), Altschuler to Mohilewer.
3. *Ibid.* iii, 427-8 (23.7.1882 [= 10.8.1883]) *Petaḥ Tikwah* Council (Jerusalem) to *Ḥobebe Ziyyon* (Warsaw); concerning this erroneous date, see G. Kressel, *et al.*, *Em ha-moshabot: petaḥ tikwah* (Petah Tiqva, 1953), p.121, n.14.
4. Ya'ari, *Petaḥ tikwah*, pp.227-43 [account based on J. Salomon's diary (*ibid.* p.243, n.)].

maximum penalty: demolition of the buildings with expenses to be borne by the accused;[1] there was to be no appeal against the verdict. When this verdict was duly delivered, Salomon complained to the German Consul. The latter was angered by Rauf's determination to demolish the houses; he remonstrated with Rauf, who replied that the Capitulations did not extend to questions of real estate and therefore he was at liberty to act as he thought fit. At the German Consul's threat to inform Bismarck of (a) illegal demolition, (b) denying the right to appeal against a verdict, (c) illegal trespass on foreign subjects' houses without the prior agreement of their consular representatives, and (d) touching the honour of Germany, Rauf apologised and suggested that the Consul misunderstood his motives: he appealed to the latter to assist in limiting the growth of Russian influence in Palestine. The Consul did not yield and Rauf was forced to give way a little - he agreed to entertain an appeal against the court's verdict. But Rauf Paşa now ensured that things would be made difficult for the accused. All the lawyers in the Mutasarriflik were forbidden to handle the case, so that the colonists at Petah Tiqva were compelled to bring a lawyer from Damascus to defend them. The judges found excuse after excuse to postpone the hearing (whilst the Damascus lawyer had to linger in Jerusalem). Then they informed the colonists that they would all have to inspect the buildings at al Yahudiya, but as they could not give an exact date for the excursion, they required two carriages

1. Cf. Ongley and Miller, Land Code, p.16.

to stand ready for a twelve-day period. At the last moment one of the judges demanded that they ride on horseback instead of going by carriage. The German Consul was informed of these manoeuvres and of the costs involved, and a detailed report of the affair was dispatched to the Embassy in Constantinople. After further temporisation on Rauf's part, the appeal was ~~quashed~~ dismissed and the original verdict upheld, with the sole dissenting voice of the qadi of Jerusalem (who was appointed from Constantinople, unlike the other judges who were appointed by the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem). The German Consul protested again and the matter was put in the hands of the Embassy in Constantinople where representations were made to the Porte. A few months later the colonists were told that the final decision had gone in their favour and the houses could stand. Petah Tiqva was not the only colony to suffer in this manner; settlers at Eqron and Rishon le Zion were brought to court on the same charges.[1] In this respect, the colony at Gedera was more unfortunate than most, for the other colonies were located at distances from the nearest Arab village and so could proceed with their building unnoticed for some while;[2] Gedera, on the other hand, was situated close to the Arab village of Qatra where the fellaheen had been ordered by the Kaymakam of Gaza to report any building activities on the colony as soon as they began.[3]

1. Duyanow, Ketabim, iii, 690-1 (31.1.1885), Altschuler to Mohilewer.
2. Chissin, Miyyomam, p.75 (9.12.1885).
3. Loc.cit. and Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 848 (21.9.1886), E. Rokeah (Jaffa) to Pinsker.

But, as with entry and land purchase, Rauf Paşa could only hamper building on the Jewish colonies; he could not stop it altogether. He was defeated by the European consuls who were insistent upon their Capitulatory rights and who would refer such questions to Constantinople where higher authority could be brought to bear. He was tripped up by the venality of his own subordinates who could not resist the bribes offered by persistent Jews. And finally he was foiled by the Jews themselves, who found loopholes in the laws, allowing them to erect temporary structures (later to take on a more permanent form), or to roof in "dug-outs" (as an alternative to building above ground).

* * *

The Jewish settlers in the Mutasarriflik believed, naïvely, that all the tribulations they experienced derived from Rauf Paşa, whom they regarded as their sole enemy.[1] They thought his hostility stemmed from a petty incident at the end of 1882 when Joseph Kriger, Rauf's Jewish secretary and interpreter, committed a breach of protocol while greeting General Lewis Wallace who had come to visit Jerusalem.[2] Unable to see beyond their own ranks they also suggested that other Jews had been responsible for influencing Rauf's opinions; they blamed local Sephardim who had no

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1. Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 189-92 (n.d. [May, 1884]), D.O. Lifshitz (for Hobebe Ziyyon, Jerus.) to Pinsker; also ibid. i, 319 (13.11.1884), J. Rivlin and J.M. Pines (Jerus.) to Gordon; and ibid. i, 671 (15.11.1885), A. Muyal (Jaffa) to Pinsker.
2. Ibid. i, 319 (13.11.1884), Rivlin and Pines to Gordon; also Cohn-Reiss, Mizzikronot, p. 150.

particular liking for Ashkenazim,[1] and they suspected members of the old community in Jerusalem who lived on alms ("ḥalukah") and who feared that their incomes would be threatened by the increased numbers of Jewish immigrants, since the latter might also have to be supported from the same funds.[2] Many also claimed that the Governor was personally ill-disposed towards Jews - a typically Jewish response to opposition, which incriminated Rauf as satisfactorily as it absolved his accusers from looking further. He is alleged to have said:

> "I know that these people, subjects of Russia, Austria, Rumania and the other countries where they are called 'Ashkenazim', are distinguished everywhere by their craftiness, their deceit and their disloyalty. It is not for nothing that these countries - Russia and Rumania - are spewing them out, for is not Czar [Alexander III] a gracious monarch? But these people are the guilty parties; and they have convinced themselves that our country will accept these knaves - God forbid!"[3]

But these imputations are unnecessary. Rauf Paşa was a shrewd and efficient governor; he was opposed to everything which lent itself to increasing European influence in Turkey.

1. Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 318-23 (13.11.1884), Rivlin and Pines to Gordon.
2. A. Druyanow, Pinsker uzemano (Jerusalem, 1953), p.191. Cf. Brill, Yesud, p.66: Brill claims S. Hirsch, the director of the Alliance Israélite Universelle agricultural school at Miqve Yisrael, who was unsympathetic to the Ḥibbat Ẓiyyon movement, had told Pauf Paşa that the Ḥobebe Ẓiyyon wished to establish a Jewish republic in Palestine. However, in view of Brill's deep personal feud with Hirsch, this suggestion, though not impossible, must be treated with reserve. Cf. and contrast AIU I.C.3 (2.11.1887), S. Hirsch (Miqve Yisrael) to Pres., AIU (Paris), where Hirsch suggests that all efforts in Jerusalem to influence Rauf Paşa in favour of the Jewish immigrants only make him more severe, because he is afraid of compromising himself. In the light of Rauf's character, this is very reasonable - see immediately below.
3. Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 321 (13.11.1884), Rivlin and Pines to Gordon; all other statements attributed to Rauf Paşa are of the same genre; cf. Ya'ari, Petaḥ tikwah, pp.174, 238 & 240.

Furthermore, he was acting at all times under strict orders from Constantinople.

* * *

It was recognised by the Sublime Porte that its aim - to prevent foreign Jews from settling in Palestine - could not be achieved while the consuls there actively supported Jews who wished to remain in the country. The Ministry of Internal Affairs therefore appealed twice through Rauf Paşa to the consuls in Jerusalem for their cooperation. At the beginning of 1885 they were merely reminded of the regulations and were asked to communicate them to their Jewish nationals who desired to visit Palestine.[1] However, in September 1887 the consuls were invited to aid the Ottoman police in the expulsion of Jews after thirty days had expired.[2] As usual, following such a communication from Constantinople, the police and port authorities in the Mutasarriflik were prodded into greater activity by Rauf Paşa;[3] but, on this occasion, the consuls - with the exception of their Russian colleague[4] - being unsure whether they were obliged to take part in the expulsion, wrote to their respective embassies in Constantinople for advice.[5] The view taken by the

1. Habazzelet, xv, 18 (13.2.1885): text of Ministry of Internal Affairs' circular to foreign consuls in Palestine.
2. ISA (G) A XXII 16 (10.9.1887): Rauf Paşa to consuls (circular, Turkish original); independent English translations in FO 195/1581, encl. to no.20 [published in A.M. Hyamson, The British Consulate in Jerusalem (London, 1939-41), encl. to no.322], and in U.S., Foreign Affairs, 1888, pt.ii, pp.1546-7, no.1053.
3. Habazzelet, xviii, 3 (28.10.1887).
4. Ibid. 2 (21.10.1887).
5. FO 195/1581, no.20 (23.9.1887), N.T. Moore (Jerus.) to Sir W.A. White (Consple.), [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.322]; cf. ISA (G) A XXII 16, no.829 (11.11.1887), von Tischendorf (Jerus.) to Radowitz (Consple.), [draft], & AIU I.C. 3 (2.11.1887), Hirsch to Pres., AIU.

British Ambassador was shared by most:

> "The right of British subjects to go and come within the Ottoman dominions is secured by the Capitulations and confirmed by all subsequent treaties. The special regulation above referred to [requiring the expulsion of Jews after thirty days] is therefore ipso facto null and void as far as it regards persons enjoying British protection.
>
> "British subjects enjoy alike the same rights and privileges and no creed or other distinction can be admitted as regards British subjects or protegés [sic] whatever religion they profess."[1]

After receiving notes to this effect from various embassies and a personal visit from the American Ambassador, Mr. Oscar S. Straus, the Ministry of Internal Affairs made a nominal concession by extending to three months the period permitted to Jews visiting Palestine.[2] But, in March of the following year, the Porte required that the passports of Jews "should expressly state that they are going to Jerusalem in the performance of a pilgrimage, and not for the purpose of engaging in commerce or taking up their residence there".[3] Their passports were to be visaed by an Ottoman consul and on arrival in Palestine they were bound to supply themselves with a permis de séjour for three months, issued by the

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1. FO 195/1575 (19.10.1887), White to Moore, [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.324].
2. ISA (T) no.47 (15.12.1887), Ministry of Internal Affairs to Mutas. (Jerus.). This concession was not communicated officially to the Foreign Missions until a later date: ISA (G) A XXII 16 (16.2.1888), Note Verbale from Ottoman Ambassador (Berlin) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Berlin); the British Ambassador seems not to have been informed until even later: see FO 195/1607 (3.5.1888), White to Moore, [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.326].
3. U.S., Foreign Affairs, 1888, pt.ii, p.1627, no.1104, (2.3.1888), A. Mavroyeni Bey (Ottoman Ambassador, Washington) to Secy. of State Bayard; cf. FO 195/1607 (3.5.1888) White to Moore, [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.326].

port authorities and couched in terms of the above. Russia and Germany acceded to the latest requirements from the Porte,[1] but Britain, France and America found them unacceptable. They therefore dispatched notes expressing their inability to acquiesce,[2] and some months later the Porte intimated that the regulations only applied to groups of Jews immigrating "en nombre" to Palestine and that no obstacles would be put in the way of individual Jews.[3] In reality, this was no concession at all. It was the entry of Jews from Russia, the one power whose Jews were emigrating in large numbers, that the Ottoman Government desired to check; and Russia had accepted the regulations. The Porte could afford to mollify the other Powers, whence insignificant numbers of Jews were travelling to Palestine.[4]

* * *

In 1882 and 1883 the Ottoman Government was unsettled by the "Lovers of Zion" Movement and its ministers confessed their fear of encouraging another national problem within the Empire. However, as they regained their composure, they tried to explain the restrictions - publicly at least - in

1. FO 195/1612, no.15 (29.5.1888), Moore to White, [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.329].
2. Texts of American, French and British notes in U.S., Foreign Affairs, 1888, pt.ii, pp.1588-91, dated 17th, 23rd and 24th May, 1888, respectively.
3. Ibid. p.1619 (4.10.1888), translation of Note Verbale from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (S.P.) to American Embassy (Consple.); cf. FO 195/1607 (6.10.1888), White to Moore, [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.331]; French text of this note, delivered in Berlin on 15.10.1888, in ISA (G)A XXII 16.
4. Although the criterion of Jews arriving "en nombre" was not applied officially until 1888, the Porte had recognised the numbers of Jews in any group as a relevant consideration as early as spring, 1883 - see FO 78/3507, no.139 (4.3.1883), Wyndham to Granville.

non-political terms. Also, under pressure from most of the Great Powers who refused to accept any discriminatory treatment between their subjects wishing to enter Palestine, the Sublime Porte felt constrained almost to apologise for its regulations:

> "Tout le monde sait qu'à une époque où les Israélites étaient expulsés de certaines parties d'Europe, ils trouvaient la sécurité et une liberté entière de conscience en Turquie. Aujourd'hui encore, un grand nombre d'Israélites vient chercher refuge sur le sol ottoman, sans que leur religion soit considérée comme un motif d'exclusion. Excepté la Palestine, les Israélites sont libres, en effet, de s'établir dans l'empire et d'assurer leur industrie sans la moindre entrave.
>
> "Si le Gouvernement Impérial a cru devoir se préoccuper de leur agglomération dans cette province, c'est à cause de certaines considérations économiques et d'ordre public qui lui ont imposé la nécessité de mettre obstacle à l'immigration en masse, surtout des juifs de Roumanie et de Russie dans un centre dont les ressources actuelles ne suffiraient pas aux besoins d'une population plus nombreuse."[1]

Under the head of "economic considerations" it was argued that the majority of the immigrants were without means and thus added to the widespread poverty already prevailing in Jerusalem.[2] "Public order" was explained in at least two ways; first, it was suggested that the aged and sick among the immigrants were a danger to public hygiene in Jerusalem,[3] and, second, Kâmil Paşa (who was Grand Vezir in 1888) alleged that the Jews were a threat to public security in the city on account of the "spirit of religious fanaticism" among the Christians which, he claimed, rose to such a

1. Young, Corps, ii, 156-7: extract from Note Verbale (23.2.1888), Sublime Porte to Foreign Missions (Consple.).
2. FO 195/1581, no.9 (5.3.1887), Moore to White, [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.316]; cf. Wissotski, Miktabim, pp.71-2 (2.4.1885), report of conversation with Haham Başi.
3. FO 195/1581, no.9 (5.3.1887).

pitch during Easter that the Jews were compelled to remain indoors lest the Christians attack them and even murder them in the streets.[1]

However, the well-informed were not deluded by these pretensions. In 1887, the British Consul in Jerusalem remarked with justice that "besides these considerations, a certain feeling of uneasiness must have entered the minds of the authorities at the large influx of Jews into the country within recent years, with their rights and privileges as foreign subjects ...".[2] And in 1888 Kâmil Paşa gave as "another reason" for the restrictions "the report that had spread abroad that the Jews throughout the world intended to strengthen themselves in and around Jerusalem with a view, at some future time, of re-establishing their ancient kingdom there".[3] These two factors were surely much more to the point than "certaines considérations économiques et d'ordre public".

* * * *

The Arabs in Palestine and the Ḥobebe Ẓiyyon: 1882-1891

Most of the Jews who succeeded in settling in Palestine in the 1880's came to join the old, pious communities in the four "Holy Cities"; only a small part of the immigrants were members of the "Lovers of Zion" Movement who intended to settle on the land. And in the event, not all of them

1. U.S., Foreign Affairs, 1888, pt.ii, pp.1559-60, no.57 (28.1.1888), O.S. Straus (Consple.) to Bayard; cf. ISA (T) no.47 (15.12.1887), Ministry of Internal Affairs to Mutas. (Jerus.).
2. FO 195/1581, no.9 (5.3.1887).
3. U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1888, pt.ii, p.1559-60, no.57 (28.1.1888).

went to live on the new colonies: some of them too chose to live in the towns and even more decided to leave the country after a short period, partly because of the measures taken by the Ottoman authorities and partly because of difficult local conditions. In 1893 the combined population of the eight colonies founded in the 1880's was 2,026 souls.[1] Their numbers a decade earlier, in the mid-1880's, cannot be precisely known; perhaps they comprised between five-hundred and a thousand souls. But whatever the exact figure, it is clear that they were a minute group within Palestine's total population of about 500,000, making their presence felt (outside of administrative circles) only to their immediate Arab village neighbours and to a few passing Beduin.

In certain ways the Jewish settlers were unexceptionable to the Arab peasants; but since, in the long run, these inoffensive aspects were unimportant to later attitudes and events, they need be mentioned here only briefly. At the beginning, the Jewish settlers were objects of curiosity to the fellaheen: in their clothing, language and comportment they were quite unlike the Jews of the Old Yishshub whom the peasants may have seen. The dedication with which they worked caused surprise;[2] their "newfangled" machinery evoked interest;[3] and their strange methods (or, more often, their inexperience) could be amusing - as, for example, when colonists at Rishon le Zion tried to coax camels into

1. G.H. Dalman, "Gegenwärtiger Bestand der jüdischen Colonien in Palästina", ZDPV, vol.xvi (1893), pp.199-200.
2. Druyanow, i, 744 (n.d. [March, 1886]), J. Ossovetzky and J. Herzenstein (Rishon le Zion) to Hirsch.
3. Miyyamim rishonim, vol.i (1934-5), p.9: (19.6.1885), I. Belkind (Rishon le Zion) to Z. Dubnow [address not given], telling of crowds of Arabs who came to see the colonists' harvester and of 'Abd al-Qadr from Sarafand who hired it for a few days.

pulling carts like horses.[1] But there were also sides to the newcomers which rankled with the fellaheen and, as these soon led to friction, they should be considered at some length.

The Jewish settlers caused offence because they were ignorant of Arabic and of Arab ways; inadvertently they flouted local custom. For example, usage had it that everyone shared natural pasturelands, which were regarded by the fellaheen as a "gift from God" - "hadha min Allah". The Jews, unfamiliar with this custom and fearing for their first small crops, regarded the incursions of Arab shepherds with their flocks as trespass and expelled them forcibly. When they found that the Arabs repeatedly sent flocks and cattle to graze on their land, the Jews organised guards (often local Arabs) whose duty it was to round up the offending animals and corral them. Their owners were made to pay fines to redeem the animals or were punished bodily.[2] The colonies were a temptation to the Arabs to steal and, again, the Jewish settlers were forthright in restraining them.[3] Accidents, personal quarrels over matters of no great import, and ignorance of other local customs also brought Arabs and Jews

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1. Chissin, Miyyoman, p.41 (17.12.1882); & Levontin, Le'ereẓ, i, 78; this experiment was soon given up!
2. Miyyamin rishonim, vol.i (1934-5), pp.7-8, re. Rishon le Zion, its guards, fines, punishment of fellaheen from Sarafand al Kharab and as Safiriya, resentment of the latter; cf. Levontin, Le'ereẓ, i, 75-8, and D. Ḥabib-Lubman, Missipure ha-rishonim leẓiyyon (Tel Aviv, 1934), p.15.
3. A. Samsonow, Zikron ya'akob (Zikhron Ya'aqov, 1943), pp.68-9.

to blows from time to time.[1] In their brushes with the Arabs, the Jewish colonists were apt to use a heavy hand, for they were tough young men, unaccustomed to being able to hit back with impunity and determined not to yield to anyone.

The first collision of any consequence in the history of the New Yishshub took place at Petah Tiqva on March 29th, 1886.[2] It involved fellaheen from the large Muslim Arab village of al Yahudiya about four miles south of Petah Tiqva. This village did not have sufficient pasture of its own and was accustomed to graze its animals on Petah Tiqva's land,

1. Ha-Maggid, xxvii, 6 (7.2.1883) and D. Shub, Zikronot lebat dawid (Jerusalem, 1937), pp.86ff: re. Arab accidentally killed in Rosh Pinna on 12.12.1882 while being shown a revolver; ibid. pp.101-2, re. disagreement over water-wells between Zanghariya Beduin and Rosh Pinna; Miyyamin rishonim, vol.i (1934-5), p.39: letter from Belkind to Z. Dubnow [address not given], (2.9.1885): re. quarrel between Rishon le Zion's Arab shepherd and a shepherd from Sarafand; Habib-Lubman, Missipure, pp.20-22, re. Beduin who tried to take revenge on S. Hadad who had previously beaten them off when they waylayed him; Dob Ari'el (Lubawitsch) "ha-Moshabah gederah", Luah erez yisra'el, vol.vi (1900), p.100, re. disgruntled Arab creditor in October 1888; and cf. Samsonow, Zikron ya'akob, p.101, re. misunderstanding over water-flask.

2. A.L. Frumkin's diary (entry for 29.3.1886), facsimile reproduced in Ya'ari, Petah tikwah, p.345, and also in B. Z. Dinur, Sefer toldot ha-haganah (Jerusalem, 1954-64), I. i, 95; Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 746-54 (4.4.1886), Hirsch (Jaffa) to Pinsker and ibid. i, 761-5 (12.4.1886), Rokeah to Pinsker: two long letters analysing the incident; ha-Maggid, xxx, 16 (29.4.1886): report from Petah Tiqva by an eye-witness [A.L. Frumkin]; ha-Zebi, ii, 35 (2.7.1886): article by M. Lubman. The incident is recounted (based on these sources) in Ya'ari, Petah tikwah, pp.361-4; Kressel, Em ha-moshabot, pp.153-60; and Dinur, ha-haganah, I, i, 93-4. There are minor differences in detail between the various accounts of this incident. The following account and analysis of the incident are based principally on the letters of Hirsch and Rokeah, (although Hirsch's figure of 500-600 Arab attackers has been disregarded in favour of Frumkin's eye-witness estimate of 50-60).

a practice which the Jews had tried to prevent. The fellaheen, on their side, also provided a source of friction, for they had ploughed up a road to the north of the colony, claiming that it was not a public highway and demanding that the settlers use other routes to reach their outlying tracts of land. This caused inconvenience and the settlers felt they could not comply. On March 28th, Joshua Stampfer rode down the old road on his way to one of these tracts of land and was relieved of his horse by the fellaheen. On the same day, the Jews rounded up ten mules belonging to the fellaheen which they found grazing on their land. On March 29th it rained heavily and most of the colonists went to Jaffa to settle personal affairs rather than work in the muddy fields. Fifty to sixty villagers from al Yahudiya, seeing that the colony was virtually empty, attacked it, smashing windows and destroying household goods. They injured five persons (one of whom later died from her wounds) and led away all the cattle and mules on the colony to the court in Jaffa, alleging that they had found the animals on their land and claiming an indemnity for the damage thus caused. In Jaffa news of the incident reached Joshua Ossovetzky, the administrator of Rishon le Zion, who immediately went to the Kaymakam, Musa ibn Salim Effendi al-Ḥusayni. Thereupon the latter sent some soldiers to the colony with the public prosecutor and the town doctor. On the following day, Hirsch (the director of the Miqve Yisrael agricultural school) and several consuls went to the Kaymakam and extracted a promise that he would do everything in his power to

punish the guilty. As a result more soldiers and a commission of inquiry went again to Petah Tiqva. A day later thirty-one Arabs from al Yahudiya were imprisoned in Jaffa.

This affair startled the Ḥobebe Ẓiyyon in Europe who at once imagined that a pogrom had broken out. Responsible men in Palestine were quick to write, analysing the reasons for the attack; they stressed that it went deeper than its immediate causes and denied that it in any way resembled a pogrom. Their analysis, which is summarised below, warrants attention, because there was not a single Jewish settlement which did not at some time come into conflict with its neighbours and behind every serious incident lay one or several of the many factors which led to the attack on Petah Tiqva in 1886. Almost in the nature of things, it was perhaps inevitable that this incident should have arisen primarily out of grievances over land ownership.

In the Ottoman Empire consuls dealt with all points of law between foreigners, excepting questions of land purchase and transfer. These were handled by the Ottoman authorities whose cadastral registers were ill-kept and confused, with the result that it was almost impossible to specify the precise delimitations of any land changing hands. Where a tract of land was held jointly, the registers did not indicate which shares or what proportions of the land were held by each party; this too gave rise to frequent disputes. Furthermore, the Jews were ignorant of the details of the land laws and the obscurities of the language in which contracts were written. In consequence they were unavoidably

in the hands of land-agents - who received their commission from the sellers; in their eagerness to complete the sales these agents did not care if the buyers (the Jews) fell into traps which better-advised men would have avoided.[1]

The land at Petah Tiqva had been bought in three stages. The original purchase of 1878 was made from an Arab in Jaffa called Qaṣṣar; in 1882 a supplementary tract was bought nearby from another Arab in Jaffa named Tiyan. Both Qaṣṣar and Tiyan were money-lenders and they had acquired the land in question from debtors in al Yahudiya who were unable to meet their obligations. They had entered these holdings into the cadastral registers vaguely, with the intention of assuming more land than rightfully was theirs. By this device Qaṣṣar and Tiyan "sold" the Jews more land than was theirs to sell. The fellaheen at al Yahudiya still harboured grievances against Qaṣṣar and Tiyan because of their first losses to these men, and the latters' last malpractice only aggravated the sense of injustice already felt. The land between these tracts had belonged to the villagers of al Yahudiya as well, but since they had not paid the land-tax on it for five years, the peasants had forfeited their legal right to this land, and the authorities sold it to the colonists at Petah Tiqva. Had the latter been more expert in land-purchase, they would have known to shun this category of land, as its former owners invariably found pretexts to cause trouble.

1. For a good summary of these and other problems connected with land and land ownership in Palestine at this time, see A. Cohen, Yisra'el weha-'olam ha-'arabi (Tel Aviv, 1964), pp.63-5.

Qaṣṣar and Tiyan had not worked their land themselves, but had rented it back to the villagers at al Yahudiya. Similarly, prior to the Jews' arrival, the local authorities were content to take baksheesh from the villagers rather than expel them whilst their forfeited land was up for sale. Legally the land did not belong to the fellaheen in both cases, but remaining in situ they had continued to regard it as theirs. This feeling was reinforced even after the arrival of the Jewish colonists who, unable to work all the land they possessed, had also leased some of it back to the fellaheen. In 1884 the Jews began to take up all their holdings, with the result that some fellaheen were left without any land of their own, and so their existences were threatened for the first time. It was then that the first serious clashes had taken place.

Besides flouting local custom over free grazing on natural pasturelands, the settlers at Petah Tiqva had committed an even graver mistake of a similar kind. In Palestine, the man who prepared a piece of land for the summer crop also had the right to that land ("kirab") for the subsequent winter season. The Jews, in the process of working more and more of their own land themselves, denied their Arab tenants this right and so caused further bitterness and disputes. Moreover, the colonists had dealt individually, and summarily, with the villagers' protests, because at that time the colony lacked a central administrator who might, with a knowledge of the Arabs' language and manners, have prevented much ill-feeling.

In attacking Petah Tiqva, the fellaheen at al Yahudiya had acted with the encouragement of their shaykhs who, in default of effective policing and control by the Ottoman authorities, were prone to take the law into their own hands or to disregard it, should this better suit their purpose. In this instance, they had hoped that a blind eye would be turned to their action, since they knew that the Ottoman authorities, especially Rauf Paşa, disapproved of the Jewish colonies.[1]

As mentioned above, the case of Petah Tiqva was not untypical. Reuben Lehrer bought the first 2,000 dunams of land at Nes Tsiyona from a German Templar named Reissler

1. The colonists at Petah Tiqva were eager that the fellaheen should be severely punished so that they would be discouraged from attacking again; it was therefore decided to see the matter through the courts. Properly the case was the business of the criminal courts which meant that the file would ultimately reach Constantinople. Rauf Paşa was anxious that this should not happen so that his reputation would not suffer. Accordingly he ordered the case to be heard by the financial courts which could handle it completely within the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem. In May 1886, Rothschild's agent, Elie Scheid, came to negotiate with Rauf Paşa. He agreed to a compromise whereby the fellaheen from al Yahudiya were let off lightly and in return Rauf Paşa agreed to drop the proceedings against Petah Tiqva and Rishon le Zion for illegal building. (None of the published documents state explicitly that such a bargain was struck, though it seems quite clear that this is what happened; the question of the villagers' punishment is always discussed separately from the illegal building issue.) See Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 761-5 (12.4.1886), Rokeaḥ to Pinsker; ibid. i, 782-5 (1.6.1886), Ossovetzky to Pinsker; ibid. iii, 852 (6.6.1886), M. Erlanger (Paris) to Pinsker; ibid. i, 788-9 (24.6.1886), Ossovetzky to Pinsker; ibid. i, 803-7 (12.7.1886), Rokeaḥ to Pinsker; & ibid. i, 845-9 (21.9.1886), same to same; etc.

whom he met in Odessa. When Lehrer arrived on his land in 1882, villagers at Sarafand al Kharab claimed Reissler had stolen the land from them. They took the matter to court and Lehrer lost 572 dunams.[1] A Frenchman, called Ferdinand Filibert, sold some land to the founders of Gedera which had been surrendered to him by peasants at Qatra to pay off debts. The peasants harrassed the colony which was set up on their former holdings for years in the hope of dislodging it.[2] Larger colonies, such as Rishon le Zion and Zikhron Ya'aqov, were able to defend themselves and make their neighbours think twice about attacking, so that the latter soon had to accord such colonies a grudging acceptance or, as at Petah Tiqva, express their grievances in a single planned assault.

Once the fellaheen had reconciled themselves to the fact that the Jewish colony was permanent and could not be deflected, a modus vivendi was struck. Whatever the fellaheen may have felt in their hearts, day-to-day relations were generally close and good, especially as most colonies employed five to ten times as many Arabs as Jews,[3] and the former were relatively well paid for their labour.[4] For the

1. M. Smilanski, Nes Ziyyonah (Nes Tsiyona, 1953), pp.18-19.
2. Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 670-1 (15.11.1885), Muyal to Pinsker, plus many subsequent documents ibid.; also Ari'el, Gederah, passim; and Chissin, Miyyoman, p.75 (9.12.1885) and passim.
3. M. Braslawski, Po'alim we-irgunehem ba-'aliyyah harishonah (Tel Aviv, 1961), p.73. In 1889, 1,200 Arabs worked alongside 150-200 Jews on Zikhron Ya'aqov - ibid. p.81; in 1892, there were over 1,000 Arabs on Rosh Pinna in comparison with about 200 Jews - ibid. p.168; and in the same year there were fifty permanent Jewish workers and some five-hundred Arabs on Yesud ham Ma'ala - loc.cit.
4. Cf. C.M. Kalvarisky, "Ha-yahasim ben ha-yehudim wehaarabim lifne ha-milhamah", She'ifotenu, vol.ii (1931), pp.52-3.

colonists, there were a number of advantages in Arab labour: the supply of Jewish workers was inadequate, whilst the fellaheen were at hand in large numbers;[1] and, unlike Jewish workers, they could be economically employed as day-labourers as the season demanded, without requiring special lodgings since they returned to their villages in the evenings. Furthermore, by supporting the majority of the colonies almost from their inception, Baron Edmond de Rothschild unintentionally nurtured a class of Jewish "gentlemen-farmers" who relied heavily on Arab labour, especially as most of these "gentlemen" were none too experienced in their new-found calling. The Arab fellaheen profited from the Jewish colonies in other ways as well: the settlers were in need of their produce which was sometimes bought at specially arranged "Arab markets" within the colony itself;[2] even the discarded heaps of manure outside the Arabs' villages became sources of income;[3] and as the colonies grew in size, local Arabs were engaged on a permanent basis to help guard them.[4] The colonies, especially those to the south of Jaffa, attracted Arabs to establish themselves nearby. By 1889 there were forty Jewish families on Rishon le Zion; and besides them, over four-hundred Arab families had come to settle in the neighbourhood:

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1. Druyanow, Ketabim, iii, 543 (6.6.1888), J. Eisenstadt (Odessa) to M. Ussischkin [Ekaterinoslaw (?)].
2. Chissin, Miyyoman, p.96 (18.10.1886).
3. Ibid. pp.90-1 (10.8.1886).
4. Druyanow, Ketabim, ii, 660 (5.3.1889), Pines to Pinsker. The colonies and the guards on them had the side-effect of improving public security in their vicinity - Chissin, Miyyoman, pp.59-60 (2.5.1883); Habazzelet, xv, 7 (28.11.1884); ibid. xix, 6 (26.10.1888); & ibid. xxi, 23 (13.3.1891).

> "The village of Sarafand which stands to the south of [Rishon le Zion] used to be wholly destroyed - 'Sarafand al Kharab' the Arabs called it; now it has become a big, expansive village, because there have settled in it many families of Beduin, Egyptians and of those who had deserted the village, since [now] there is work for all of them ... and for their wives, sons and daughters ...."[1]

According to this report, the same also held there for the Arab villages of Beit Dagan, Yazur, Safiriya, Sarafand al 'Amar, 'Aqir and others.[2]

* * *

In the towns, the broad divisions of the Arab population did not react to the Jewish immigrants in quite the same way as the fellaheen. A handful of wealthy landowners rejoiced at the Jews who were eager to buy land at almost any price; while the large uneducated "lower class" appears to have been indifferent to the newcomers. But the small, predominantly Christian, class of tradespeople and professional men had apprehensions about the probable economic competition which was to follow. It was they who organised the first Arab protest against Jewish immigration.

In the decade between 1881 and 1891, the Jewish population of Jerusalem had almost doubled (from 13,920 to 25,322 souls).[3] In Jaffa the relative increase in the number of Jews had far exceeded that in Jerusalem, for in 1893 Jaffa's Jewish population had reached 2,500 after being virtually non-existent in 1880.[4] Moreover in Jaffa an

1. Druyanow, Ketabim, iii, 66-7 (18.12.1889), J. Grazowski (Rishon le Zion) to Eisenstadt.
2. Loc.cit.
3. Dalman, "Jüdischen Colonien", p.196.
4. D. Trietsch, Palaestina Handbuch (Berlin, 1912), pp.41-4.

exaggerated impression of the numbers of Jews coming to settle in Palestine must have been gained. As the main entry-port to the Mutasarriflik, it was now always full of Jews coming and going, for, as mentioned above, of all those who arrived, perhaps half ~~to three-quarters~~ departed again after a short while. The Jews themselves heightened the impression of great numbers by assembling in large crowds to greet every ship arriving at Jaffa,[1] by their own over-confidence on disembarkation,[2] and by the many delegates whom they sent in advance to buy land.[3] The behaviour of the colonists did not pass unnoticed by Arabs in the towns either. In 1891, the concessionaire of the Régie des tabacs in Jaffa, Muḥammad Effendi, explained to Elijah Lewin-Epstein, one of the founders of Rehovot, that the ill-will among the Arabs which the Jews were beginning to incur arose because

> "... we [Ḥobebe Ẓiyyon] have come to [Palestine] and are doing everything that occurs to us as if we did not know at all that there is a government in [Palestine], or that there are certain laws prevailing in the country which we are all obliged to respect. Thus we build our houses without permits, and plant vineyards without asking the Government if it is permitted for us to do so, and in general we do everything our heart desires without asking permission."[4]

It was not until Rauf Paşa left Jerusalem in 1889 to become Vali of Beirut that there were indications among the urban population in the Mutasarriflik of disquiet at the rapidly growing numbers of Jews; presumably, while Rauf

1. Ḥabaẓẓelet, xxi, 38 (17.7.1891).
2. Ibid. xx, 45 (14.9.1890).
3. A. Ginsberg, "Emet me'ereẓ yisra'el" (30.6.1891) in Kol kitbe Aḥad ha-'Am (Jerusalem, 1961), p.27.
4. E.Z. Lewin-Epstein, Zikronotai (Tel Aviv, 1932), p.255.

was in control, it was felt that he was doing his utmost to keep the numbers down. His successors, however, did not inspire the same confidence. Rauf was replaced by Reşad Paşa, formerly Mutasarrif of Serfice (in the Vilayet of Manastir). Like Rauf, Reşad Paşa had also studied in Paris, where he had obtained a law degree; but, unlike Rauf, he was not ill-disposed to Europeans. On the contrary, he encouraged them: he allowed the Russians, Germans and French to build churches in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Jaffa and elsewhere; and he permitted the settlers at Rishon le Zion to construct a very large winecellar on the colony.[1] His leanings were not shared by notables in Jerusalem, who protested to Constantinople against him in May 1890.[2] At the end of the year he was replaced by Ibrahim Hakki Paşa, an upright but, it seems, unintelligent man who in Jerusalem was nicknamed "Ibrahim Tays" - "Ibrahim the Fool".[3]

In 1890 it was rumoured in Russia that anti-Jewish measures were to be taken shortly; as a result Jewish emigration from Russia increased. In the following spring the Jews were expelled from Moscow and correspondingly the emigration movement gathered still greater force. In Palestine this was reflected in the numbers of Jews coming into the country,[4] especially as the entry restrictions

1. ISA (G) A III 14 (24.5.1890), Murad (Jaffa) to von Tischendorf; cf. ha-Meliz, xxx, 27 (13.2.1890) reported that Reşad was liberal in outlook and well-disposed towards Jews.
2. ISA (G) A III 14 (24.5.1890).
3. Literally "Ibrahim the Goat" -- see Cohn-Reiss, Mizzikronot, p.177.
4. Habazzelet, xx, 45 (14.9.1890).

had ceased to be applied rigidly since Rauf Paşa had left Jerusalem.[1] In mid-1891 news reached Jerusalem that still larger numbers of Jews were to be expected.[2] At this, on June 24th, a telegram was sent from Jerusalem,[3] begging the Grand Vezir that Russian Jews should be prohibited from entering Palestine and from acquiring land there.[4] This petition was organised by notables in Jerusalem. The British Consul in the city reported that it was dispatched by "leading Moslems",[5] and the German Vice-Consul in Jaffa also observed that local Muslims were concerned at the growing number of Jews.[6] On the other hand, ha—Or wrote that it was signed by both Muslims and Christians, and that certain Muslim notables had withheld their signatures since they recognised "all the benefit which the Jews are bringing the country".[7] However, there was no disagreement among contemporary observers about the reason for this telegram: local merchants and craftsmen feared the economic competition which would undoubtedly follow if Jewish immigration continued.[8] It is significant that this first protest against

1. Cf. Druyanow, Ketabim, iii, 238, n.2.
2. FO 195/1727, no.25 (16.7.1891), J. Dickson (Jerus.) to E. Fane (Consple.), [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.347].
3. Loc.cit. 4. Loc.cit. & ha—Or, vii, 34 (3.7.1891).
5. FO 195/1727, no.25 (16.7.1891).
6. ISA (G) A III 14 (10.8.1891).
7. Ha—Or, vii, 34 (3.7.1891); cf. F.E. Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine Relations (Washington, 1949), pp.71-2, mentions Christians as well as Muslims (based on a report by the American Consul in Jerusalem, "Jews and Jewish Colonies in Palestine", 3.10.1891).
8. Loc.cit.; FO 195/1727, no.25 (16.7.1891); & ISA (G) A III 14 (10.8.1891).

modern Jewish immigration into Palestine was initiated by Muslims (even if some refused to sign it) and that it spelled out the two basic demands which Arabs never left off thereafter: the prohibition of Jewish immigration and land purchase in Palestine.

* * * *

The Land Purchase Restrictions and the Close of the "Lovers of Zion" Era: 1891-1895

At the end of May 1891 - in anticipation of the telegram from Jerusalem three weeks later - Said Paşa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, received word from Odessa of the greatly increased numbers of Jews applying for visas to enter the Empire.[1] When the protest telegram from Jerusalem was received at Constantinople, action was swiftly taken by both the Grand Vezirate and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former immediately sent a telegram to the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, renewing the entry restrictions against the Jews in Palestine[2] (- in his turn, the Mutasarrif pressed the port officials at Jaffa to act more conscientiously,[3] and also issued a circular to the consuls reminding them of restrictions,[4] which was rejected by most of them on the

1. OFA A/346, no.6682/1022 (30.5.1891), Dikran Effendi (Odessa) to Said Paşa (S.P.).
2. Ḥabaẕẕelet, xxi, 36 (3.7.1891): telegram arrived from Consple. on 1.7.1891; also ibid. 37 (10.7.1891).
3. FO 195/1727, encl. to no.28 (2.8.1891), H. Amzalak (Jaffa) to Dickson, [= Hyamson, Consulate, encl. to no.348]; Ḥabaẕẕelet, xxi, 41 (12.8.1891); ibid. xxi, 43 (28.8.1891); ibid. xxi, 44 (4.9.1891); and later FO 195/1765, no.6 (14.2.1892); Dickson to Fane plus encl. (11.2.1892), Rev. A. Ben Oliel (Jerus.) to Dickson [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.360 and encl.].
4. ISA (G) A III 14 (6.7.1891), Ibrahim Hakki Paşa to Consuls (Turkish original); English translation of this circular in FO 195/1727, encl.1 to no.25 (16.7.1891), [= Hyamson, Consulate, encl. 1 to no.347].

same grounds as previously).[1] Then, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ordered the Ottoman Ambassador at St. Petersburg to have strict attention paid to the formality of affixing a special "pilgrim's visa" (valid for three months only) to the passports of Jews wishing to visit Palestine.[2] Shortly thereafter, at the beginning of August, Said Paşa recommended that visas should be refused to Jews seeking to travel to ~~some~~ any point within the Empire whence they could proceed to Palestine; he also asked that shipping companies should be invited not to take on board Jews wishing to settle in Palestine.[3] On receiving these orders, the Ottoman Consul-General in Odessa requested Said Paşa for more precise instructions because, as he pointed out, he had no means of ascertaining the real intentions of Jews emigrating from Russia and thus he saw no legal way of refusing them visas to Constantinople and parts of the Empire (other than Palestine).[4] Taking the point, Said Paşa thereupon closed the entire Ottoman Empire to Russian Jews: no visas were to be issued to them; shipping companies should not receive them on board and port officials throughout the Empire were ordered not to let them disembark.[5] On October 19th,

1. FO 195/1727, encl.2 to no.25 (13.7.1891), Dickson to Ibrahim Hakki Paşa (Jerus.), [= Hyamson, Consulate, encl.2 to no.347].
2. OFA A/346, no.100791 (13.7.1891), Said Paşa (S.P.) to Husni Paşa (St. Petersburg).
3. OFA A/346, no.100954/126A (1.8.1891), same to same.
4. OFA A/346, no.6790/1049 (8.8.1891), Feyzi Bey (Odessa) to Said Paşa.
5. OFA A/346, no.101693/170 A (18.8.1891), Said Paşa to Husni Paşa.

a Note Verbale closing the Empire to Jews of all nationalities was sent to the Foreign Missions at Constantinople.[1] This step was justified by reference to the alleged dangers to public health in the Empire from an agglomeration of destitute Jews. Such a sweeping demand, so violently in contradiction ~~with~~ to the Capitulations could not but be rejected by the Powers, for, as the British reply put it, although the Porte was entitled "to obviate all danger to public health arising from the crowding together of a number of destitute aliens at any particular port or place", the present measure went "beyond the necessities of the case".[2] Rebuffed, Said Paşa continued to press Russia for the next two years to prevent shipping companies from giving her Jews passage into the Empire.[3] His efforts were unsuccessful, perhaps because the shipping companies were unwilling to forgo an important element in their traffic and perhaps because Russia had come to realise that the value of increasing the number of her subjects in Palestine outweighed the "threat" they constituted to the Holy Places.

And again, the renewed restrictions against Jews entering Palestine had nothing to do with safeguarding public

1. OFA A/346, Note Verbale, no.701718/82 (19.10.1891), S.P. to Foreign Missions (Consple.); cf. ibid. (26.10.1891), Said Paşa to Ottoman Representatives (European capitals and Washington).
2. FO 78/5479, encl. to no.473, being Note Verbale, no. 103 (19.11.1891), British Embassy (Consple.) to S.P.
3. OFA A/346, many despatches and telegrams from end 1891 to end 1893, between Said Paşa and Ottoman representatives in Russia; finally, evasive reply from Russia - ibid. Note Verbale, no.836 (29.11.1893), Russian Embassy (Consple.) to S.P.

health in the Empire. The Minister of Police disclosed shortly after they were re-issued that the Porte feared another Armenian problem and also sought to limit the number of foreign subjects enjoying Capitulatory privileges, especially in Palestine.[1]

* * *

The desire evinced by Ḥobebe Ẓiyyon to purchase land in Palestine brought about an immediate rise in the cost of land, and then, later, led to speculation in real estate. From the outset the mere mention of a Jew prospecting for land was sufficient to make Arabs in the district elevate their prices.[2] Rauf Paşa had done his best to prevent Jews from acquiring land, and to an extent this had kept a rein on prices as well; but his successor, Reşad Paşa, took no such steps. As a result, local Jews rushed to buy land, immigration societies abroad sent representatives for the same purpose, and in their wake wealthy Arabs also hastened to buy up land intending to sell it at a handsome profit to the Jews. By 1891 prices were grossly inflated and speculation was commonplace. In 1890, the naqib al-ashraf in Jerusalem readily agreed to help Joshua Yellin in the purchase of some land at Motsa on being promised half of the profit when the land was resold.[3] Asher Ginsberg ("Aḥad ha-'Am") visited Palestine in 1891; he was horrified at the numbers of Arab and Jewish land agents and at their mercenary

1. H. Joffe, Dor ha-ma'apilim (Tel Aviv, 1939), p.1.
2. Chissin, Miyyoman, p.39 (25.11.1882).
3. Yellin, Zikronot, pp.171-2.

attitude which had been encouraged by the Jews' eagerness to obtain land.[1] In that year some land north of Haifa fetched 16,000 Napoleons from Jewish purchasers; the estate, of which this land was just a small part, had been bought some twenty years earlier for 5,000 Napoleons.[2] Similarly, a property at 'Atlit (south of Haifa) which cost T£1,500 in 1886 realised eight times this sum six years later when sold to Baron Edmond de Rothschild.[3] The Jews expected the Arabs to be pleased at the increase in land values; those Arabs who held land probably were, but others apparently were not - they took fright at the Jews' willingness to buy any land at any price. Thus it was not surprising that the telegram from Jerusalem urged the Grand Vezir to prohibit land sales to Jews in addition to forbidding their entry into the country. The Porte took longer to respond to this second demand, since it was not simply a matter of reactivating existing, though disregarded, orders, but it required special legislation.

On November 26th, 1892, Ibrahim Hakki Paşa, the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, received orders from Constantinople prohibiting sales of miri land to all Jews, irrespective of nationality.[4] This order immediately provoked loud protests from Ottoman Jews and, more especially, from numerous foreign nationals - both Jewish and Gentile - who had

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1. Ginsberg, "Emet me'erez yisra'el", Kol kitbe, p.26.
2. FO 195/1723, no.45 (10.8.1891), H. Trotter (Beirut) to Fane.
3. FO 78/5479, no.50 (25.10.1901), J.H. Monahan (Haifa) to Sir N. O'Conor (Beirut).
4. FO 195/1765, no.35 (30.12.1892), Dickson to Sir F.Clare-Ford (Consple.), [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.362].

invested large sums in land purchases.[1] These latter, dispossessed of their market, faced the prospect not of profit but of considerable losses. As always, they complained - this time with unusual vehemence - to their Consuls who notified their superiors in Constantinople. Notes clamouring against "une dérogation manifeste" of the Capitulations were delivered to the Porte early in 1893,[2] to which a reply was received on April 3rd.[3] The Porte explained that the last measures were not meant to deprive foreigners of their Capitulatory rights but were designed with the purpose "d'empêcher l'établissement définitif en Palestine d'émigrés israélites qui malgré la défense existante ont réussi ou réussiraient à pénétrer dans ce pays".[4] The Porte felt that Powers which had accepted its Notes of 1888 forbidding the immigration en masse of Jews into Palestine could not now object to a measure which was aimed at strengthening this prohibition.

1. Loc.cit. (encl., 22.12.1892 from Isaac Yahuda); FO 195/1806, encl.s 1 and 2 (22 and 23.3.1893) to no.19 (29.4.1893), Dickson to Clare-Ford; and ISA (G) A III 4 (16.12.1892), I.Frutiger & Co. (Jerus.) to von Tischendorf.
2. CZA (A), (25.1.1893), Note Verbale, Italian Embassy (Consple.) to Sublime Porte; ibid. (7.2.1893), Note Verbale, Austro-Hungarian Embassy (Consple.) to Sublime Porte; German Note sent 1.2.1893 [not seen].
3. ISA (G) A XXII 18 (3.4.1893), Note Verbale, Sublime Porte to German Embassy (Consple.); same Note received by Italian Embassy (Consple.): see FO 195/1789, encl. (3.4.1893) to no.278 (23.7.1893), [= Hyamson, Consulate, encl. to no.368].
4. Loc.cit.; cf. Said Paşa had indicated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador on receiving the latter's Note Verbale that, in line with all previous restrictions, the latest regulations concerned solely the "Verhinderung der Einwanderung der aus Russland u. Rumänien zuströmenden Juden" - see CZA (A), minute dated 8.2.1893, on copy of Note Verbale (7.2.1893), Austro-Hungarian Embassy (Consple.) to S.P.


"Du reste, l'interdiction d'acquérir des immeubles en Palestine frappant les israélites indigènes aussi bien que leurs coreligionaires étrangers, ces derniers ne sauraient se plaindre d'une inégalité de traitement."

The illogicality of this defence is evident: why should Ottoman Jews be made to suffer inequality with Ottoman Muslims and Christians on account of foreign immigrant Jews? The reason was ~~because~~ *that* the Porte had anticipated that if foreign Jews were forbidden to acquire land, there would be a marked increase in the practice, already current, of Ottoman Jews purchasing land on behalf of their European brethren. As if to make a concession, therefore, to the interests of foreign Jews legally resident in Palestine, the Porte assured the latter that they could purchase land, provided they present at the Land Registry Office in Jerusalem a certificate issued by their consulate and ratified by the Mutasarrif stating that they did not belong to those categories of Jews whose residence was forbidden and provided they made a declaration that they would not let prohibited Jews dwell in their property (if it was in a town) or let Jewish colonists settle on it (if it was in the country).[1] This Note is of particular

1. Independently of the regulation regarding land purchases by Jews, the Porte at this time also ordered that non-Jewish foreigners were to sign a declaration that they would not, without prior permission from the Ottoman Government, erect hospitals, churches, schools or similar institutions on land bought by them in Palestine; they were to consent to the demolition by the Ottoman administration of any buildings put up in contravention ~~with~~ *of* this declaration. This order clearly came in response to the earlier complaints against Rosad Paşa who had freely permitted such building. To the terms of this declaration was now added, in the case of non-Jewish foreigners, a further clause giving an assurance that the land bought by them would not be transferred later to a Jew. An example of such a combined declara-

(Cont'd p.52) ....

Ḥobebe Ziyyon settlements founded during 1890's



importance because it was later interpreted to mean that certain categories of foreign Jews already resident in Palestine prior to April 1893 were permitted to purchase land, whereas no Jews arriving after that date or Jews living abroad were entitled to acquire land.[1]

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Nevertheless, despite the renewed entry prohibitions of 1891 and the land purchase regulations of 1892-93, the New Yishshub in Palestine continued to expand. In the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem were established Rehovot (1890), Motsa (1894), 'Artuf (1895) and Beer Tuvya (1896). (It should be mentioned that the last three named were founded on land already in Jewish possession prior to the 1892-93 regulations.) In the newly-constituted Vilayet of Beirut, Mishmar hay Yarden (1890), Hadera, Shefeiya and 'Ein Zeitim (all 1891) and Metulla (1896) made their appearance.

The reasons for this continued growth in the face of the restrictions were the same as those which had allowed the first wave of immigration in the 1880's to establish itself in Palestine. Most of the Great Powers rejected the restrictions and instructed their consuls in Palestine to defend their subjects' rights to enter the Ottoman Empire and buy land there in accordance with the Capitulations. As remarked

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tion is to be found in ISA (G) A XXII 18 (Arabic copy, referring to land bought in the village of Lifta, near Jerusalem). See also ibid. (12.5.1893), Note Verbale, German Embassy (Consple.) to Sublime Porte, protesting about this regulation.

1. FO 195/1940, no.1 (20.1.1896) Dickson to Sir P. Currie (Consple.), [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.379]; see also Ch.II.

on above, even Russia, which probably had a part in inspiring the first entry restrictions in the 1880's, had begun by the beginning of the 1890's to insist on her rights in Palestine in common with the other Powers. Secondly, the lower Ottoman officials' amenability to bribes helped defeat the restrictions. Everything had its price: entry and release of baggage at the ports, permits to buy land and to put up buildings of every kind could be contracted.[1] "Your interests and the interests of the Sultan: yours come first", the Ottoman officials used to say.[2] The Jewish immigrants from Russia were familiar with such conventions and fell in with them easily; the administrators of the settlements, with Baron Edmond de Rothschild's funds at their disposal, could afford to be liberal, whilst the Ottoman officials, with their miserable salaries, could scarcely afford to refuse the bribes offered. The despatches of the consuls are full of accounts of Jewish immigrants being harried by Ottoman officials on reaching Palestine; this is precisely because the Jews made full use of their consuls' protection. And there were very few obstacles which could not be overcome by reference to the Capitulations, if a bribe had not worked already. These factors were sufficient to undermine the restrictions, if not to render them wholly ineffective.

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1. References to Ottoman officials taking bribes are numerous; for a few contemporary references, see, e.g. Chissin, Miyyoman, p.77 (9.12.1885); Druyanow, Ketabim, i, 847 (21.9.1886), Rokeah to Pinsker; & AIU I.C.3 (4.10.1887), Hirsch to Pres., AIU; in 1887 the renewed entry restrictions were reported to have inflated the "backsheesh rate" - see Druyanow, Ketabim, ii, 312 (22.9.1887), Rokeah to Lilienblum.
2. Lewin-Epstein, Zikronotai, p.261.

This held true not only for the period from 1882 to 1895, but indeed for all the years until the outbreak of World War I.

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The Arab fellaheen in the villages around the nine new colonies listed above reacted in exactly the same manner as the Arab neighbours of the earlier colonies had done. The founders of Rehovot, taking a lesson from others' experience, persuaded their Arab neighbours to put their signatures to a map defining the correct borders of the colony at the time of purchase.[1] However, this could not avert disputes over grazing rights and unexpired leases taken by Beduin to the north of the colony with the land's former owners; and still less could it deter fellaheen from pilfering.[2] In the spring of 1892 villagers from Zarnuqa attacked Rehovot in circumstances recalling the al Yahudiya/Petah Tiqva incident of 1886. Trespass on Arab land by a settler, an unintentional insult by a young Jew, and an empty colony occasioned an attack by about a hundred fellaheen who smashed windows and stole what they could quickly lay their hands on before the Jews came running back from the outlying fields in response to a warning-bell. The villagers, like others elsewhere, were aggrieved at the colony's policy of forcing them to pay fines to redeem animals found grazing on its land, and the attack was no more than an expression of their vexation.[3]

1. Lewin-Epstein, Zikronotai, pp.129-30. 2. Ibid. pp.240ff.
3. Habazzelet, xxii, 24 (22.4.1892): detailed report from A.L. Horowitz (27.3.1892, Rehovot); Lewin-Epstein, Zikronotai, pp.246-51; & Smilanski, Rehobot, p.31.

Again, the most serious conflicts arose over questions concerning land. Like Petah Tiqva, Hadera was at first unable to work all of its holdings and so part of it was let out to Arab peasants.[1] Dislodging them later was by no means easy.[2] It was equally difficult to rid a colony's land of peasant or Bedüin "squatters", who ~~may~~ might have tilled the land (which they did not own) for years before it was sold to the Jews or who ~~may~~ might have encroached on the land before the settlers had had time to cultivate it.[3] Boundaries were usually ill-defined, and complicating these problems still further was the fact that landowners most often sold only part of their holdings to the Jews, leaving their tenants or sharecroppers on the adjacent land undisturbed: a legal division ("mefruz") of the land was seldom made at the time of sale and until this process was gone through - which might not be for several years[4] - wrangles over boundaries were frequent.[5] In the meantime, fellaheen might assume part of the colony's territory, placing the settlers in the quandary of whether to take the matter to court (which was invariably costly and did not guarantee

1. JCA 272/[no number, n.d.], memorial, signed by 45 colonists at Hadera, to Pres., JCA (Paris). The colonists were obliged to rent out land they could not cultivate themselves, because were they to let it lie fallow for more than three successive years, they would have forfeited it - see Ongley and Miller, Land Code, p.37.
2. JCA 255/no.139 (15.9.1899), D. Haym and J. Niégo (Miqve Yisrael) to Pres., JCA.
3. Loc.cit.
4. E.g. Hadera (founded 1891) still had not legally divided its land in 1902 - see JCA 259/no.116 (8.4.1902), S.I. Pariente (Beirut) to Pres., JCA.
5. JCA 279/[no number], (26.11.1896), Niégo to Pres., JCA: re. problems at Mishmar hay Yarden.

that their rights would be upheld),[1] or of proceeding with the mefruz of the land (which might lead the authorities to recognise the peasants' incursion as a fait accompli).[2]

Gradually these difficulties too were overcome and the "pattern of reactions" among the rural population of Palestine towards the new colonies, which was described at greater length earlier in this chapter, re-asserted itself. In brief, it was a pattern of initial resentment, suppressed or open hostility, giving way in time to resignation and outward reconciliation. It was to be observed up and down the country almost every time a Jewish colony was founded and thereby the fellaheen within its "sphere of influence" came in contact with the settlers.

From the towns, in the years until the end of 1895, there were no more recorded incidents of telegrams or petitions against Jewish settlement in Palestine.[3] Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that the renewed entry restrictions and the regulations governing land sales to Jews

1. JCA 280/no.51 (6.4.1898), Niégo to Pres., JCA, reporting loss in court of 400 dunams of Mishmar hay Yarden's land to peasants from Teitaba.
2. JCA 254/no.15 (28.3.1898), Haym to Admin. Council (Paris).
3. The earliest literary response by an Arab to Jewish immigration into Palestine was not found; it was written in 1896 in Turkish by Ḥusni Bey Baqi Zade, a notable from Aleppo who had been a deputy in the first Ottoman Parliament and who was Kaymakam of Haifa from March 1894 to March 1895 - see Muḥammad Raghib al-Ṭabbakh, A'lam al-nubala' bi-tarikh ḥalab al-shahba' (Aleppo, 1923-26), vii, 547-51. Part of this work was printed in al-Muqtabas on 24.5.1911, where it was explained that Ḥusni Bey wrote a detailed report for the Sublime Porte on Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine, having been dismissed from his post, as he claimed, for endeavouring to enforce the restrictions against the Jews rigourously, to the disapproval of his immediate superiors who were accepting bribes from Baron Edmond

(Cont'd p.57) .....

gave the business element among the urban population more than temporary ~~rest~~ respite to their fears. At the end of 1895, al-Muqtaṭaf, an important monthly journal appearing in Cairo, reported a Dr. Mendes in "a north American newspaper" who expressed the view that the only way to put an end to war in the world was to restore Palestine to the Jews. Al-Muqtaṭaf commented sensibly that "it may be if [Dr. Mendes] had consulted the Jews about their return to Jerusalem, he would have found many of them who do not wish this".[1] By this date, al-Muqtaṭaf might reasonably have queried the thoughts of Arabs - especially in the towns - about the return of the Jews to Palestine as well.[2]

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de Rothschild - see ha-Ḥerut, iii, 105 (16.6.1911), where extracts from al-Muqtabas are reprinted. According to al-Ṭabbakh (op.cit. p.550), this report was forwarded to the Sultan's palace where it was favourably received.

1. Al-Muqtaṭaf, vol. xix (1895), p.795. "Dr. Mendes" may possibly have been Henry Pereira Mendes or his brother, Frederick de Sola Mendes; both were leading rabbis in New York at this time and the former later took a prominent part in the Zionist Movement.

2. Perhaps an echo of their views was heard in the Cairo newspaper, Abu al-Hawl, whose editor, Najib al-Ḥajj, visited Palestine in the latter half of 1895 and thereafter began to allege that the immigrants had taken over all means of livelihood from the local population - see ha-Meliẓ, xxxv, 281(2.1.1896). The attacks in Abu al-Hawl, which were confined to economic issues, continued for some years - see E. Saphir, "ha-Sin'ah le-yisra'el ba-sifrut ha-'arabit", ha-Shiloaḥ, vol.vi (1899), pp.231-2. Najib al-Ḥajj is believed to have been a Christian - see S. Haim, "Arabic Antisemitic Literature", Jewish Social Studies, vol.xvii (1955), p.307. He had translated Georges Corneilhan's Juifs et Opportunistes: Le Judaisme en Egypte et en Syrie (Paris, 1889) into Arabic; his translation was published in Egypt in 1893 under the title of Fi al-zawaya jinaya: kashf asrar al-yahud. It could therefore be argued that al-Ḥajj's attacks were no more than an expression of his own anti-Jewish bias. On the other

(Cont'd p.57(a))...

hand, al-Ḥajj came to Palestine in 1895 to seek subscriptions to his paper and in doing so he must have talked to many members of the local Arab business community in Jerusalem and Jaffa. In consequence there may be grounds to suggest that his attacks, which began after this visit, were inspired through these meetings. Al-Ḥajj's allegations appear to have been believed by the editors of al-Muqtaṭaf - see Ch.II. This chain (if it is one) - of a Frenchman (Corneilhan) infecting an Arab (al-Ḥajj) with European prejudices and thus predisposing him to accept murmurings against the Jewish settlers heard in Palestine which were, in turn, passed on to affect others (al-Muqtaṭaf) - is of importance; the question is discussed below - see Ch.III.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PORTE, THE PALACE AND POLITICAL ZIONISM: 1896-1904

The Porte

Theodor Herzl's famous pamphlet, Der Judenstaat, was published in February, 1896.[1] In it, Herzl did not specify where his "Jewish State" was to be established, but he did suggest that it might be created in either Palestine or Argentine, the two territories in which there had been some measure of Jewish agricultural settlement in recent years.[2] He insisted that wherever the Jewish State was founded, the Jews must not enter by "infiltration" (as they were doing in Palestine), or through the aid of philanthropists (as in Argentine).[3] The Jewish State, he wrote, would be legally recognised and, he hoped, would enjoy Great Power protection;[4] it would be set up by "the Jewish Company", which was conceived as a joint-stock company, registered in London and "partly modelled on the lines of a great land-acquisition company".[5]

In the latter half of the nineteenth century Ottoman finances were extremely weak.[6] A cumulation of causes had reduced the Empire to virtual bankruptcy and in 1881 the Great Powers had compelled the Porte to accept the presence of a European council to administer the Ottoman Public Debt.

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1. T. Herzl, Der Judenstaat (Vienna, 1896); subsequent references are to S. d'Avigdor's translation: The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question (London, 1946).
2. Herzl, Jewish State, p.29.
3. Loc.cit.
4. Ibid. pp.29-30.
5. Ibid. p.33.
6. C. Morawitz, Les Finances de Turquie (Paris, 1902).

In 1895, the Treasury was under particular strain,[1] and thus in Der Judenstaat Herzl was prompted to write:

> "Supposing His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could in return undertake to regulate the whole finances of Turkey."[2]

In the summer of 1896, after rebuffs from Barons Maurice de Hirsch and Edmond de Rothschild and a mixed reception from various segments of European Jewry, Herzl resolved to proceed directly to Constantinople to put his scheme to Abdülhamid. As a result, the latter and his ministers very quickly became acquainted with the founder of the Zionist Movement (even though it took five years of promising to ameliorate the Empire's finances before Herzl actually gained an audience with "His Majesty the Sultan" - see below).

* * *

In spring 1896 Herzl was introduced to Philipp Michael de Newlinski, a Polish aristocrat who had worked in the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Constantinople and who subsequently edited an evening paper in Vienna called Correspondance de l'Est.[3] Newlinski enjoyed Abdülhamid's confidence and also was on good terms with leading Ottoman statesmen. Following the disturbances in Armenia in 1895 Abdülhamid sent Newlinski on a mission in May 1896 to negotiate with Armenian Committees in Brussels, Paris and London.[4] This

1. C. Morawitz, Les Finances de Turquie, p.420.
2. Herzl, Jewish State, p.30.
3. For Newlinski, see two articles by N.M. Gelber: "Herzls 'diplomatischer Agent' Newlinski", Jüdische Rundschau, xxiii, 53 (6.7.1928), and "Philipp Michael de Newlinski: Herzl's Diplomatic Agent", Herzl Year Book, vol.ii (1959), pp.113-52.
4. T. Herzl (ed. R. Patai), The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New York and London, 1960) i, 345-6 (7.5.1896).

mission was unsuccessful; and while passing through Baden on his return to Constantinople, Newlinski advised Herzl that the moment was "not propitious for the trip to Constantinople; the Sultan thought of nothing but the [current] Cretan riots, etc.".[1] As Herzl could not be swayed, Newlinski agreed to accompany him as "directeur du protocole".[2] Newlinski proved his worth immediately, for aboard the Orient Express he introduced Herzl to Tevfik Paşa (the Ottoman Ambassador at Belgrade), Karateodori Paşa and Ziya Paşa (both "elder statesmen"), who were returning to Constantinople after the coronation of Czar Nicholas II.[3] Herzl elaborated his project to Ziya Paşa, who granted that "the benefits in money and press support which you promise us are very great", but, he warned, "no one is even likely to have pourparlers with you if you demand an independent Palestine".[4]

Herzl spent the last two weeks of June 1896 with Newlinski in Constantinople. While he was there, reports of further bloodshed in Crete and Armenia were capped by a Druze uprising in the Hauran. Herzl's reputation as a leading journalist attached to an influential Viennese newspaper (the Neue Freie Presse), together with his hints of assistance for the Empire's finances[5] and Newlinski's contacts

1. Herzl, Diaries, i, 361 (8.6.1896).
2. Cf. ibid. ii, 592 (23.9.1897).
3. Ibid. i, 366ff. (17.6.1896); Ziya Paşa was erroneously called "Ziad" by Herzl.
4. Loc.cit.
5. See ibid. i, 365 (15.6.1896) for Herzl's first scheme "to straighten out the Turkish finances"; for T£20,000,000 Palestine was to be bought and the Empire was to be freed of the Council of the Public Debt.

enabled him to meet several personages. Abdülhamid refused to receive Herzl, ostensibly because of a personal attack made upon him in the editorial columns of the Neue Freie Presse;[1] nevertheless, he did communicate with Herzl indirectly through Newlinski (see below). Herzl's appraisal of his reception (based on his own impressions and hearsay from Newlinski and others) was that the Grand Vezir, Halil Rifat Paşa (whom he met twice) was averse to his scheme, whereas officials of the second rank - ʿIzzat Paşa al-ʿAbid (Abdülhamid's Second Secretary),[2] Mehmed Nuri Bey (Chief Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Ibrahim Cavid Bey (the Grand Vezir's son and a member of the Council of State) - were favourably inclined, though each was not without his reservations.[3] The Grand Vezir's opposition and the general reserve elsewhere were soon to make themselves felt. It was first apparent in February 1897 when the entry restrictions against Jewish immigration into Palestine were again renewed after Henri Frank of the Jewish Colonization Association made approaches to the Porte for

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1. Herzl, Diaries, i, 384 & 386-7 (21.6.1396).
2. Although technically ʿIzzat Paşa was not an official or minister of the highest rank, his influence may have been greater than many above him.
3. Herzl, Diaries, i; for Halil Rifat's opposition, pp. 375-6 (19.6.1896), p.383 (21.6.1896), pp.400-1 (29.6.1896); ʿIzzat Paşa al-ʿAbid was "bluntly negative" at first, p.371 (18.6.1896), but later warmed to the idea in a modified form, pp.383 (20.6.1896) and 394-5 (26.6.1896), cf. p.400 (29.6.1896); Ibrahim Cavid's interest and reservations, pp.371-2 (18.6.1896), and then "categorically ... in favor", p.401 (29.6.1896); Herzl also met Davud Effendi Molho, the First Dragoman in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was "visibly afraid" of the project (being a Jew), pp.377-8 (19.6.1896), and who later adopted an assiduously neutral position, p.401 (29.6.1896).

permission to settle foreign Jews in the Hauran.[1]

Within the Jewish world support for Herzl grew, especially in student circles and among Ḥobebe Ẓiyyon ranks; in February 1897, Dr. D'Arbela, the director of the Rothschild hospital in Jerusalem, informed Herzl that "all Palestine talks about our nationalist plan".[2] This did not fail to attract the attention of the Ottoman authorities.[3] In April, a visit to Palestine by a group of distinguished British Jews, including Israel Zangwill and Herbert Bentwich,[4] followed in May by news of a rally in New York in support of the first Zionist Congress (to be held that summer) alarmed the Mutassarif of Jerusalem, Ibrahim Hakki Paşa.[5] As it was originally planned to hold the Zionist Congress in Munich, the Mutasarrif conferred with the German Consul in Jerusalem, who expressed the view that the press reports about this congress were very exaggerated, although he felt that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine should not be considered utterly remote. Speaking carefully in a private capacity, the Consul regretted that Jews had continued to

1. JCA 279/[no letter number], (15.2.1897), J. Niégo (Miqve Yisrael) to N. Leven (Paris); cf. Herzl, Diaries, ii, 518 (21.2.1897): Newlinski informed Herzl that 250 Jewish families had been denied entry into Palestine; Newlinski apparently did not know of, or did not mention, the renewed restrictions.
2. Ibid. ii, 517 (20.2.1897).
3. PRO (G) K 692/Türkei 195, no.49 (19.6.1897), von Tischendorf (Jerus.) to Reichskanzler (Berlin), [draft in ISA (G) A III 15, i].
4. The group did not travel to Palestine as supporters of Herzl; see Herbert Bentwich's letter, dated 27.1.1897, to the Editor of the Jewish World, copied by Herzl into Diaries, ii, 513 (29.1.1397). About the group, see N. Sokolow, History of Zionism: 1600-1918 (London, 1919), i, 246-7.
5. PRO (G) K 692/Turkei 195, no.49 (19.6.1897).

settle in Palestine despite the restrictions, since the immigrants increased poverty in the towns and were a potential political danger, because they "frequently inclined towards the Social-Democrat Party".[1] Ibrahim Hakki Paşa reported this post-haste to the Porte and at his prompting the restrictions against the Jews in Palestine were again renewed, one month before the first Zionist Congress.[2]

* * *

The Congress was held at Basel and not in Munich, as originally planned. The Zionist Movement's programme, worked out at this Congress, began by declaring that:

> "The object of Zionism is to establish for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law."[3]

Although the German text spoke equivocally of a "Heimstätte" in preference to the more explicit "Judenstaat",[4] this public statement of Zionist ambitions could not but have alarmed the Ottoman Government. The favourable coverage which the European press accorded the Congress,[5] and the ensuing enthusiasm, especially among the Jews of Eastern Europe, for the Zionist Movement, can only have added to the Porte's disquiet. In October 1897, the Grand Vezir authorised the President of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Constantinople to deny formally that Herzl had been given hope of support for his ideas.[6] In May 1898, Tevfik Paşa, the

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1. Loc.cit.
2. JCA 279/no.26 (5.8.1897), Niégo to Pres., JCA (Paris).
3. Sokolow, Zionism, i, xxiv.
4. See A.Bein, Theodore Herzl: A Biography (Philadelphia, 1940), p.238.
5. Jewish Encyclopaedia, xii, 674.
6. AIU I.G.1 (29.10.1897), I. Fernandez (Consple.) to AIU (Paris).

Minister of Foreign Affairs, received a long despatch from Washington about the Zionist Movement and its activities in America;[1] and on the 17th of that month, the new Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, Tevfik Bey, was ordered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to revert to the unambiguous instructions of April 1884, which had been based on a decision of the Council of State: no classes of Jews of any nationality were to be admitted into Palestine other than bona fide pilgrims, who could remain there no longer than thirty days (see above, p.10).[2]

When Tevfik Bey began to apply this order strictly, the consuls in Jerusalem protested.[3] Tevfik Bey notified the Porte that the Consuls of Great Britain, France, America, Italy and Spain claimed not to have received copies of the latest regulations; the German Consul admitted that he knew of them but queried if they applied to individual Jews as well.[4] In the meantime, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had sought and received further intelligence about the Zionist Movement from his ambassadors in London, Vienna and Berlin, which gave him a fair picture of the Zionists'

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1. OFA 332/17, no.9550/63 (29.4.1898), Ali Ferruh Paşa (Washington) to Tevfik Paşa (Consple.).
2. ISA (T) no.86 (9.7.1898), Admin. Council (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir and Min. of Internal Affairs (Consple.), referring to order dated 17.5.1898 from latter to Mutas. (Jerus.).
3. FO 195/2028, no.33 (23.6.1898), J. Dickson (Jerus.) to M. de Bunsen (Consple.), [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.392].
4. ISA (T) no.14 (20.8.1898), Mutas. (Jerus.) to Grand Vezirate.

activities to date.[1] Then, shortly after the second Zionist Congress that August, the Sublime Porte responded to the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem's request that the latest restrictions be clearly communicated to the local consuls by sending carefully worded Notes Verbales to the various embassies in Constantinople. These Notes referred to the earlier restrictions but once again extended to three months the period permitted for Jewish pilgrims to remain in Palestine.[2] As on previous occasions, the Notes were rejected, because they were seen to violate the Capitulations;[3] while at Jaffa, in conformity with their instructions, the port authorities continued to obstruct the entry of Jews who came to settle or who were unable to give a cash deposit guaranteeing their intended departure after the permitted period.[4] The British

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1. OFA 332/17, no.23598/216 (8.6.1898), Antopulos (London) to Tevfik Paşa; ibid. (9.7.1898), nos. 28858/74 & 28859/96 (9.7.1898), Tevfik Paşa to Mahmud Nedim Paşa (Vienna) and Ahmed Tevfik Paşa (Berlin); & no.23612/189 (28.7.1898), Mahmud Nedim Paşa to Tevfik Paşa.
2. FO 78/5479, encl.1 to no.542, Note Verbale (19.9.1898), S.P. to British Embassy (Consple.), [= Hyamson, Consulate, encl.1 to no.405]; specially framed Note Verbale of same date to meet German inquiry in ISA (G) A XXII 18, S.P. to German Embassy (Consple.).
3. French rejection, see Documents Diplomatiques Français, 2nd Series, i, 187, no.146 (19.3.1901), T. Delcassé (Paris) to J. Constans (Consple.), refers to Note Verbale (24.9.1898), French Embassy (Consple.) to S.P.; German rejection in ISA (G) A XXII 18, Note Verbale (28.9.1898), German Embassy (Consple.) to S.P.; British rejection in FO 78/5479, encl.2 to no.542, Note Verbale (30.9.1898), British Embassy (Consple.) to S.P. [= Hyamson, Consulate, encl.2 to no.405].
4. FO 195/2028, no.51 plus encls. (4.10.1893), Dickson to de Bunsen; FO 195/2028, tel. (7.10.1898), Dickson to British Ambassador (Consple.); and FO 195/2028, no.54 (12.10.1898), Dickson to Sir N. O'Conor (Consple.), [= Hyamson, Consulate, nos. 400, 402 & 404].

Embassy in Constantinople complained to the Minister of Foreign Affairs;[1] and obstacles put in the way of a group of Jews from the United States led Oscar Straus, the American Ambassador at the Porte, to call on him personally.[2] Tevfik Paşa told Straus that:

> "There is no intent to prevent American citizens, be they Jews or Christians, individually, as distinguished from en masse, to visit Syria or Palestine as travelers, or who come as visitors; the only object is to prevent the further colonization of Palestine by Jews, as the settlement there of religious bodies in preponderating numbers may lead to political complications, which it is the purpose of the Ottoman Government to avoid."[3]

The Porte had already re-extended the permitted period for Jewish pilgrims to three months; now, by re-allowing the distinction between Jews arriving individually and en masse, Tevfik Paşa tacitly conceded that, under pressure from the Great Powers, the Ottoman Government had been forced back to the status quo ante May 1898.[4] Straus had no doubts about the quarter from which "political complications" were feared - it was, quite plainly, the Zionist Movement.[5]

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1. FO 78/5479, no.542 (13.10.1898), O'Conor to Marquess of Salisbury (F.O.), [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.405].
2. For the vexations put in way of this group, see U.S., Foreign Affairs, 1898, pp.1087-95, many despatches, commencing 27.8.1898 and concluding 19.12.1898.
3. Ibid. p.1093, no.25 (22.11.1898), O.S. Straus (Consple.) to J. Hay (Washington).
4. Corroborated in FO 195/2026, tel. (27.12.1898), O'Conor to Dickson, and FO 195/2028, tel. (28.12.1898), Dickson to O'Conor, [= Hyamson, Consulate, nos. 412 & 413].
5. U.S., Foreign Affairs, 1898, p.1093, no.25 (22.11.1898), Straus to Hay; cf. FO 78/5479, no.7 (9.2.1899), Dickson to O'Conor, and FO 78/5479, no.83 (24.2.1899), O'Conor to Salisbury, [= Hyamson, Consulate, nos. 421 & 424].

Since 1882 the Sublime Porte had reasoned that European Jews could not cause political problems in Palestine, if they were prevented from settling there. When Herzl initiated the Zionist Movement, this logic was maintained; it was considered imperative (and sufficient) in Constantinople to reissue once again strict orders to ensure that no foreign Jews remained in Palestine for more than a short period. But this slightly naïve approach overlooked the fact that since 1882 the entry restrictions had never been properly enforced and that exceptions or modifications had been made in the restrictions by the Porte itself on account of protests from the Great Powers and in response to approaches from the Jews themselves.[1] Moreover, no single department in the Porte was designated to attend to problems arising out of Jewish settlement in Palestine - because, technically, there should have been no settlement at all. The provincial administration addressed itself to at least four ministries (Grand Vezirate, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Cadastre). These ministries do not appear to have worked in collaboration with one another; instead they each tended to multiply the instructions relating to Jews, frequently modifying and often contradicting their previous orders or those from another ministry. This led to inconsistencies in the regulations and as a result thousands of Jews had become domiciled in Palestine who, in turn, presented the local authorities with

1. E.g. the Ministry of Internal Affairs had given Elie Scheid, Baron Edmond de Rothschild's agent, permission to have 240 houses built on Gedera and Rishon le Zion in 1887 - see Druyanow, Ketabim, ii, 418-20 (n.d. [December 1887]), S. Kalmanowitz [Consple.?] to L. Pinsker (Odessa); for other exceptions, see below.

difficulties which they did not always know how to solve. These problems related to questions of entry, residence, land purchase and building. After 1897 the difficulties became acute, so that by 1900 the Porte was compelled to set things in order by consolidating its directives to the provincial authorities.

When, in May 1898, the Ministry of Internal Affairs ordered the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem to revert to the entry restrictions of 1884 (see above, p.64), problems which typify the situation arose immediately. In July the Administrative Council in Jerusalem wrote to the Porte to explain its difficulties.[1] In 1888, directives had been received to admit individual Jews, and to deny entry solely to those arriving en masse; later, in 1891, entry had again been restricted to Jewish pilgrims, who were to depart after a fixed period. Therefore, Jews who had entered and settled in Palestine as individuals between 1888 and 1891 were regarded as legal residents. Jews who had settled in Palestine before 1891 were also regarded by the provincial administration as having the right to acquire miri land, because the amended prohibitions of 1893 against land purchases by Jews applied only to those illegally domiciled in the country after 1891. Thus by 1898 there were many Jews in Palestine who had arrived after 1884 and were legally resident landowners. Furthermore, a local commission which was set up to enforce the latest restrictions discovered that "somehow" groups of Jews had managed to settle in the Mutasarriflik

1. ISA (T) no.86 (9.7.1898), Admin. Council (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir and Min. of Internal Affairs.

even after the restrictions of 1891; what was to be done with these Jews? The Grand Vezir replied in August that henceforth all Jews, without exception, were to be prohibited from settling in Palestine.[1] When the Mutasarrif tried to obey this order, the consuls informed their superiors in Constantinople, so that, as explained above, by the end of the year the Ottoman Government was forced back to the status quo ante May 1898.

Equally vexing, from the point of view of the authorities in Palestine, were problems which arose as a result of the regulations governing land sales to Jews, which in 1899 the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem tactfully described as "vague".[2] It will be recalled that in 1892 sales of miri land to all Jews, including Ottoman subjects, had been forbidden. After protests, foreign Jews regained the right to acquire land under special conditions (see above, p.51). Ottoman Jews also were again permitted to purchase real estate; but the provincial authorities were only entitled to grant them preliminary titles to land, and the transfers could not be executed locally.[3] As these regulations, for both foreign and Ottoman Jews, had proved unsatisfactory, the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem began in 1898 to press the Grand Vezir for more precise instructions to replace the existing ones.[4]

Jewish land-ownership brought problems too. In 1893 Baron Rothschild had made an agreement with the Porte limiting the number of houses to be erected on his colonies and the

1. ISA (T) no.15 (10.8.1898), Grand Vezirate to Mutas. (Jerus.).
2. JCA 263/encl.2 to no.9 (14.7.1899), Mutas. (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir. 3. Loc.cit. 4. Loc.cit.

number of families to be installed in them; in return, building permits had been allocated for the agreed number of houses.[1] In 1898 the Baron's representative in Jaffa applied for permission to put up supplementary buildings to accommodate the natural increase in the colonies' population and the needs of their expanding agriculture. The Administrative Council in Jerusalem thereupon asked the Minister of Internal Affairs if the agreement made by the Baron precluded such constructions; if it did not, what buildings could the Administrative Council authorise without first seeking the Minister's ratification?[2] As replies from the Ministers of the Cadastre and of Internal Affairs were not forthcoming, five Ottoman Jews on the small colony of 'Artuf lodged a complaint with the former in 1899,[3] whilst the Baron's representative in Jaffa turned to the latter.[4] These matters were brought to the notice of the Grand Vezir, who immediately demanded detailed information and statistics relating to the Jewish colonies from the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem.[5] The Mutasarrif began collecting the required data earnestly;[6] but in the meantime an incident characteristic of Ottoman

1. This agreement is referred to in JCA 263/encl. to no.26 (14.11.1899): Resolution of Admin. Council (Jerus.) sent on 16.11.1899 to Min. of Internal Affairs.
2. Loc.cit.: asks this question, and refers to two previous inquiries on the same points, dated 15.8.1898 & 17.12.1898.
3. JCA 263/encl.1 to no.9 [n.d. (ca. July 1899)], Min. of Cadastre (S.P.) to Mutas. (Jerus.), in response to this complaint.
4. JCA 263/encl. to no.26 (11.11.1899), Mutas. (Jerus.) to Min. of Internal Affairs, explaining the complaint from the Baron's representative.
5. JCA 263/encl.3 to no.9, tel. (11.7.1899), Grand Vezir to Mutas. (Jerus.); and again, JCA 263/encl. to no.12, tel. (15.8.1899), same to same.
6. The Mutasarrif asked his subordinates in Jaffa and Gaza for information on 20.7.1899; JCA 263/encl. to no.12

(Cont'd. p.71) .....

provincial government occurred. The Mutasarrif of Acre had an argument with his superior, the Vali of Beirut; and in order to embarrass the latter, he reported to the Grand Vezir that the Vali had accorded illegal facilities to the Baron's colony at Zikhron Ya'aqov.[1] An order, couched in the strongest terms, was dispatched forthwith by the Grand Vezir, wherein the Vali of Beirut was directed to expel within a year all Jews in excess of the agreed number at Zikhron Ya'aqov; their houses were to be demolished and the surplus land was to be distributed to Muslims.[2] The Minister of Internal Affairs presumably thought this was an adequate reply to the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem's inquiries about further building on the Rothschild colonies in the Mutasarriflik, so a copy of this order was sent to the Mutasarrif.[3] This view was not shared in Jerusalem, and the Mutasarrif together with the Administrative Council continued to request instructions on their specific queries.[4] Only afterwards did the Mutasarrif supply the Grand Vezir with the information he had sought about the colonies.[5] But in the next months no new instructions were issued and the queries from Jerusalem were left unanswered.

* * *

[n.d. (ca. 15.8.1899)]; reply and statistics from Kaymakam (Gaza); JCA 263/encl. to no.24 (21.8.1899): reply and statistics from Kaymakam (Jaffa).

1. JCA 263/no.17 (23.10.1899), A. Antébi (Jerus.) to Pres., JCA (Paris).
2. JCA 263/encl. to no.17 [n.d. (ca. October 1899)], Grand Vezir to Vali (Beirut).
3. JCA 263/no.17 (23.10.1899), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
4. JCA 263/encl. to no.26 (16.11.1899), Admin. Council (Jerus.) to Min. of Internal Affairs.
5. JCA 263/encl. to no.26 (24.11.1899), Mutas. (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir.

The constant flow of Jewish immigrants wishing to settle in Palestine and other parts of the Ottoman Empire drew most of the Porte's attentions - first, because its representatives abroad continued to write about the numbers applying for visas and, secondly, because many Jewish emigrants from Russia and Rumania could be seen arriving at Constantinople whence they proceeded on their way. In January 1899, Tevfik Paşa sent a circular to his ambassadors in Europe and Washington requiring them to instruct their subordinates to ask Jews making for Palestine if they were leaving their homes without intending to return; if they replied in the affirmative, the officials issuing visas were to inform the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem by telegraph.[1] Mahmud Nedim Paşa, in Vienna, observed that this would be costly and therefore made the suggestion (which was accepted) that where Austro-Hungarian Jews did not intend to return home, their passports should be marked with a distinctive sign, recognisable to the authorities in Palestine.[2] Austro-Hungarian passports indicated the holder's religion and in the latter half of the year more and more Jews were refused visas for Palestine.

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1. OFA A/346, no.31536/2 (28.1.1899), Tevfik Paşa to "Ottoman representatives" (European capitals and Washington).
2. OFA A/346, no.23920/30 (5.2.1899), Mahmud Nedim Paşa to Tevfik Paşa; latter's acceptance of Nedim Paşa's suggestion, ibid. no.32859/72 (18.5.1899), Tevfik Paşa to Mahmud Nedim Paşa; the sign adopted was to underline in red ink the destination stated in the visas of Jews not intending to return home, ibid. no.24115/143 (29.5.1899), Mahmud Nedim Paşa to Tevfik Paşa.

In October the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at the Porte protested against this,[1] only to be informed yet again that access to Palestine was prohibited to Jews wishing to settle or engage in trade there.[2]

Bad harvests and anti-Semitic outbreaks in Rumania led to an increase in Jewish emigration from that country in 1899.[3] Thereupon the Council of Ministers cut back to one month the period permitted to Jewish pilgrims reaching Palestine, and also added to the instructions sent to the authorities there that henceforth an official record was to be made of the details contained in Jewish pilgrims' visas as they entered the country.[4] That winter it was rumoured that the Ottoman Government was making land available to Jews in Anatolia; consequently fifteen-hundred Rumanian Jewish families (as well as two-hundred and thirty Jewish families from Bulgaria) applied to the Porte for concessions of land.[5] The Porte responded in May by notifying the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem that "following inquiries made by Jewish emigrants from Rumania and other countries", Muslim immigrants alone

1. CZA (A), Note Verbale (2.10.1899), Austro-Hungarian Embassy (Consple.) to S.P.
2. CZA (A), Note Verbale (26.10.1899), S.P. to Austro-Hungarian Embassy (Consple.).
3. Z. Szajkowski, "Jewish Emigration Policy in the Period of the Rumanian 'Exodus': 1899-1903", Jewish Social Studies, vol.xiii (1951), pp.47-70; the official Rumanian figures (which are unreliable and minimised) show an increase of Jewish emigrants from 3,375 in 1899 to 16,678 in 1900 (ibid. p.56).
4. Ikdam, no.1898 (16.10.1899), [cutting in ISA (G) A XXVIII].
5. JCA 280/[no letter number], (13.2.1900), Niégo (Smyrna) to Prees., JCA: (Niégo had been sent to Constantinople to investigate this rumour).

were to be allowed to settle in the Mutasarriflik.[1] A month later, the Porte sent the Foreign Missions a Note Verbale informing them that Jews would no longer be allowed to disembark at Constantinople and inviting the Powers to request their respective shipping companies not to book passages for Jews travelling there with the intention of settling in the Empire.[2] The Powers rejected this Note in the same way as they had disposed of a similar request a decade earlier (see above, p.47).[3]

When the entry restrictions into Palestine had been reissued in 1897, a special commission was set up in Jerusalem to look to their enforcement; and in September 1899 it presented a report to the Administrative Council in the city.[4] The members of the commission found that "in some way" the 1891 restrictions had been limited to Jews from Russia, Rumania, Austro-Hungary, Greece and Persia, but even these Jews had not been seriously barred from entering Palestine; other Jews had been admitted freely. In 1897 the restrictions were enforced more strictly, but Jews could always enter as pilgrims, and once in the country it was virtually impossible to make them leave. It was difficult to identify them, since the registers were in such disorder that no Jew's

1. AIU IV.E.11 (3.7.1900), Antébi to Pres., AIU, enclosing copy of "ordre viziriel", sent to Mutas. (Jerus.) on 18.5.1900.
2. FO 78/5479, encl. to no.230, Note Verbale (27.6.1900), S.P. to British Embassy (Consple.), [= Hyamson, Consulate, encl. to no.433].
3. Powers' Notes of rejection (including Russia's) in OFA A/346.
4. A synopsis of this report is enclosed in ISA (T) no.93 (28.4.1908), Mutas. (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir; the report is dated 30.9.1899.

recent arrival could be proved, and moreover the consuls resisted the expulsion of their protégés. There were so many points at which Jews could enter Palestine - by sea or overland from the north and south - that it was not possible to detect which officials were accepting bribes; and there was little point in searching out the offenders if they were not punished, as at present. The commission offered various suggestions to make the restrictions effective (cooperation of the consuls was absolutely essential, an enlarged police force, full-time paid immigration commissions in Jaffa and Jerusalem, compulsory registration of all foreigners in the country, and cash rewards for revealing illegally resident Jews and corrupt officials); alternatively, Jews wishing to settle should be allowed to do so, provided that they take up Ottoman nationality on arrival. The commission reiterated that the old question, first raised in August 1898, concerning treatment of Jews illegally resident for many years in the country had not yet been answered. At all costs an end must be put to the chaos in Palestine without delay.

With growing numbers of Jews reaching Palestine, a synopsis of this report with a covering letter was sent by the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem to the Grand Vezir in April 1900.[1] Thereupon, in June, a "committee of inquiry" made up of three high officials from the Ministries of Internal Affairs, the Cadastre and War, was sent from Constantinople

1. ISA (T) no.93.

to Palestine.[1] Officially this commission came to investigate Jewish land purchases and building, but Aaron Aaronsohn, the agronomist, who testified before the commissioners, was alarmed at their inclination to overstep the boundaries of their formal mandate. Aaronsohn warned that their report could be of historic consequence to the New Yishshub.[2]

It may be asserted with confidence that their report was indeed of consequence, for in the autumn of that year the Council of Ministers consolidated the regulations governing Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine with a view to solving all the problems which had troubled the provincial administration in recent years.[3] On October 18th, the Minister of Internal Affairs sent copies of the revised directives to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of the Cadastre; in November the provincial authorities and the Foreign Missions at the Porte were circularised with these directives, which were to take effect from January 28th, 1901.[4]

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1. FO 195/2075, encl. to no.51, "Report for Quarter ended June 30, 1900" (1.7.1900), J.H. Monahan (Haifa) to Sir R. Drummond-Hay (Beirut).
2. Letter (2.7.1900) from A. Aaronsohn (Zikhron Ya'aqov) to Dr. H. Joffe, published in Samsonow, Zikron ya'aḳob, pp.261-3.
3. JCA 264/no.58 (14.10.1900), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
4. JCA 264/encl. to no.76 [n.d. (ISA (T) no.30 gives date as 29.11.1900)], Min. of Internal Affairs to Provincial Governors: copy of Turkish text plus French translation of directives, which are in two parts, (a) directives regarding:- (i) status of foreign Jews long resident in Palestine, and (ii) land purchase and building by same; (b) directives regarding Jewish pilgrims visiting Palestine. In part (a) it is stated that these directives were first sent by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of the Cadastre on 18.10.1900. ISA (T) no.94 is a copy of part (b).

(Cont'd p.77) .....

Ottoman and foreign Jews "long resident" in Palestine and those "whose residence is not prohibited" were henceforth to enjoy the same rights as other Ottoman subjects, i.e. to buy miri land and build on it according to the Land Code. Thus, the disabilities previously suffered by Ottoman Jews because of the recent immigrants were removed; and, in addition, the status of Jews illegally resident for many years in Palestine was thereby rectified: they were to be treated like Ottoman subjects, and they, like all Ottomans, could build on their land. However, it was still forbidden for any property owner to assist Jewish immigrants to remain in Palestine. Jewish pilgrims were now not required to pay a cash deposit guaranteeing their exit after one month as previously; instead, all Jews (including Ottoman subjects) were to leave their passports on entry with the port officials and in exchange they were to receive at the cost of one piastre a permis de séjour allowing them to stay in Palestine for three months. This permis de séjour was to be of a distinctive form and colour from other certificates given to foreigners entering Palestine, and was to be handed

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Copies of part (b) were sent by the Porte to the Foreign Missions in Constantinople, enclosed with a Note Verbale dated 21.11.1900; the Missions were not sent part (a), which was only found in JCA 264. Many copies of part (b) are to be found; for English translation, see FO 78/5479, encl. to no.34 [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.440]; copy of Turkish text plus translations in German and French in ISA (G) A XXII 18. Ibid. circular (9.1.1901), Mutas. (Jerus.) to Consuls (Jerus.), announcing that the directives take effect on 28.1.1901. The Note Verbale of 21.11.1900 plus an abstract of the directives ~~was~~ were later published in Young, Corps, ii, 157-8.

"Red Slip"

(This facsimile approximates to the colour of the Red Slip, but is reproduced on a grade of paper heavier than that of the original. Other Red Slips were found measuring 30 x 40 cms. & 29 x 45 cms.)

مهاجرین ممنوعه موسویه ایچون اخیراً تحدید وتعیین یوریلان اوچ ای مدت اقامت طرفنده معمول به طوتلمق
وبومدتك خاتمنده حکمدن ساقط اولمق اوزره اوه قومیسیونلدن ویریلان اقامت تذکره سیدر

اسم وشهرت	اشکال صفت وعلامات فارقه	صنعت وتابعیت	محل ورودی	مقصد سیاحتی	حامل اولدیغی پساپورتك نومرو وتاریخیله ویرلدیکی محلك اسمی ویزه سی	حامل اولدیغی مرور تذکره سی تاریخ ونومروسیله محل اعطاسی	مدت سیاحت ویا اقامت	معاملات
شوادیه حاطوله	اردنه الی بغداد قوال قیافه اد	تجار خانیا الخانیا	جبوده	تجارت	۱۹ [illegible] تاریخ ۱۴ انون اول جبوده یه سفارتنه رکنله	//	اوچ ماه	وقوم شهادتنه حامل اولدیغی مذکور نومرو وتاریخلی پساپورطی عودتنده کوسترمك اوزره اولنمشدر

اشبو رخصت تذکره سی طلب اولندقجه مأمورین انضباطیه یه ابراز اولنه جق واوچ ایدن عبارت اولان مدت اقامت وسیاحت ایچون ارض فلسطین داخلنده معمول به اوله جق وبومدتك خاتمنده عودت ایتمیانلر جبراً چیقاریله جقدر

فی [illegible] سنه

back when the pilgrim departed, so that a check could be kept on Jewish pilgrims visiting Palestine.[1] Detailed statistics were to be compiled at the end of each month to aid the authorities in expelling those pilgrims whose permis de séjour had expired. Ottoman officials were admonished that failure to enforce these orders would be severely punished.

However, the consolidated directives, carefully prepared as they were, contained loopholes and they too were to prove no more effective than the earlier ad hoc legislation had been for the past two decades - not least because of the fact that they were promptly rejected by the Great Powers.[2] One might add at this point a fitting observation made in quite another connection by William Miller:

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1. This "permis de séjour" soon became known as the "Red Slip" because of its colour; frequent reference is made to it in subsequent chapters.
2. FO 78/5494, no.34 (27.1.1901), O'Conor to Marquess of Lansdowne (F.O.) states that the Foreign Missions in Constantinople decided to ignore these directives rather than send an identic note rejecting them; according to O'Conor, only the Italian Ambassador had replied - in the negative - to the Porte's Note Verbale of 20.11.1900 [= Hyamson, Consulate, no.440]. Copy of Italian reply to the Porte in CZA (A), [= no.784/61 (10.12.1900), Italian Embassy to S.P.]. However, despite O'Conor's despatch cited above, Italy was not alone in replying to the Porte's Note. The German Embassy rejected the directives in a Note Verbale to the Porte, dated 16.1.1901 (copies in ISA (G) A XXII 18 & A XXVIII). Cf. U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1901, pp.517-18, no.354 (28.2.1901) and Documents Diplomatiques Français, 2nd Series, i, 187, no.146 (19.3.1901), Hay and Delcassé, both instructing their respective embassies in Constantinople not to comply with the latest directives.

> "Yet the evils of the Ottoman empire have rarely proceeded from lack of good laws, but from the want of their application. Nowhere are theory and practice so far asunder as in Turkey, and nowhere is the saying of the Roman historian truer, that the state is most corrupt, when the laws are most numerous."[1]

Evidence in support of this will be brought in the next chapter.

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The Palace

The Ottoman Council of State and various ministries at the Sublime Porte (for the most part under the Grand Vezirates of Said Paşa and Kamil Paşa) had dealt - nominally at least - with the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine since 1881. But politics and policies in the Ottoman Empire during this period were largely influenced, if not wholly controlled, by the Sultan, Abdülhamid. His presence and personality cannot be ignored. It is likely that he knew of the desire among many Jews to settle in Palestine well before Herzl visited Constantinople in 1896. The Rumanian delegation, which came to Constantinople in June 1882 (see above, p.3), is reputed to have been received by Abdülhamid later that summer (although the evidence for this is weak).[2] In 1892 Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) was informed by Muhtar Paşa, the Ottoman Commissioner

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1. William Miller, The Ottoman Empire: 1801-1913 (Cambridge, 1913), p.151.
2. Klausner, Ḥibbat ẓiyyon, pp.110-11 (based on newspaper reports in ha-Maggid and the Jewish Chronicle) & Samsonow, Zikron yaʿaḳob, p.25 (where no source is cited).

in Egypt, that Abdülhamid was very disturbed by an attempt to settle Jews on the east coast of the Gulf of Aqaba.[1] Abdülhamid certainly knew that Jews were emigrating in large numbers from Eastern Europe, for in 1893 he intimated to the Haham Başi, Moses Levi, that he was willing to offer Russian and other oppressed Jews refuge in his domains; he proposed to settle them in Eastern Anatolia so that they, together with Ottoman Jews, would furnish him with a force of one-hundred thousand soldiers, to be attached to the Fourth Army. This proposal was welcomed by the Haham Başi and his Rabbinical Council, but nothing came of it because, according to Abraham Galanté, the Council of Ministers considered it ill-advised.[2]

A day after Herzl and Newlinski arrived in Constantinople in June 1896, Abdülhamid told the latter that:

> "If Mr. Herzl is as much your friend as you are mine, then advise him not to take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me, but to my people. My people have won this empire by fighting for it with their blood and have fertilized it with their blood. We will again cover it with our blood before we allow it to be wrested away from us. The men of two of my regiments from Syria and Palestine let themselves be killed one by one at Plevna. Not one of them yielded; they all gave their lives on that battlefield. The Turkish Empire belongs not to me, but to the Turkish people. I cannot give away any part of it. Let the Jews

1. FO 78/4450, no.34 (9.2.1892), E. Baring (Cairo) to Salisbury; see J.M. Landau, "Te'udot min ha-arkiyyonim ha-briṭiyyim 'al nissayon ha-hityashshbut be-midyan bi-shenot 1890-1892", Shibat Ziyyon, vol.i (1950), pp. 169-178; and J. Fraenkel, "Paul Friedmann's Midian Project", Herzl Year Book, vol.iv (1961-62), pp.57-117.
2. A. Galanté, Recueil de nouveaux documents inédits concernant l'histoire des Juifs de Turquie (Istanbul, 1949), pp.36-40.

> save their billions. When my Empire is partitioned, they may get Palestine for nothing. But only our corpse will be divided. I will not agree to vivisection."[1]

However, Abdülhamid had second thoughts as he learned more about Herzl and his proposals. Eight days later he questioned Newlinski about the possibility of ceding Palestine to the Jews in exchange for some other territory,[2] a suggestion which had first been made to Herzl by ʿIzzat Paşa.[3] On the day of Herzl's departure from Constantinople, Abdülhamid presented him through Newlinski with the Commander's Cross of the Mecidiye Order; Newlinski also conveyed a message that the Sultan wished him to influence the European press towards a more favourable view of the Empire and to procure a loan of T£2,000,000.[4] Abdülhamid, it seems, was willing to explore Herzl's worth.

In January 1897, however, Herzl learned that the Porte was "angry" with him because the promised press support had not been forthcoming.[5] But then, six months later, Herzl was flattered to receive news that his project was "again being discussed in the Yildiz Kiosk".[6] He was not aware

1. Herzl, Diaries, i, 378 (19.6.1896). Abdülhamid's words were probably reported accurately by Newlinski, for cf. A. Vambéry, The Story of My Struggles (London, 1905), ii, 373, where Abdülhamid is said to have exclaimed in 1882 in connection with the crisis in Egypt: "What! do you think I shall give up for a price the land which my forefathers conquered with the sword?".
2. Herzl, Diaries, i, 394-6 (26.6.1896).
3. Ibid. i, 383 (20.6.1896); at this suggestion from ʿIzzat Paşa, Herzl had thought of Cyprus as a possible territory to exchange for Palestine.
4. Ibid. i, 401 (29.6.1896).
5. Ibid. ii, 508 (7.1.1897); indeed the Neue Freie Presse had published anti-Ottoman articles - see ibid. ii, 481 (13.10.1896) & 491 (22.10.1896).
6. Ibid. ii, 573 (22.7.1897).

that what was apparently being discussed was the renewal of the restrictions against the entry of Jews into Palestine, issued in response to reports from the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, one month before the first Zionist Congress (see above, p.63). Evidence of the seriousness with which the Sultan regarded this congress is to be seen in the fact that shortly after it, Abdülhamid replaced the Mutassarif of Jerusalem (who had been trained in the regular provincial administration) with a member of his own Palace Secretariat; Abdülhamid continued the practice of sending members of his own secretariat to govern Jerusalem until the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 (see below, Ch.III). At the beginning of 1900, after the increase in Jewish emigration from Rumania, Riza Paşa, the President of the "Commission of Immigrants" at the Porte told Isaac Fernandez, President of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Constantinople, that:

> "En règle générale, à Constantinople, dans toutes les administrations officielles, dans tous les bureaux ministériels et au grand Vizirat, on n'ose prendre la plus petite mesure en faveur des israélites (surtout en ce qui concerne la Palestine) la plus petite initiative à leur égard, sans avoir au préalable avisé au Palais-Impérial. Le Sultan a fait de la question juive une question personnelle. Toutes les affaires juives se concentrent au Palais. Tous les avis des ministères et des Conseils d'Etat les plus favorables aux intérêts juifs n'ont pas franchi la porte du Yildiz une fois qu'ils y ont pénétré."[1]

And a month before the consolidated directives regulating Jewish pilgrimages and land purchase in Palestine were issued in November 1900, Fernandez learned that the whole dossier on the latter subject had been transferred to the Yildiz Palace by the Council of Ministers.[2]

1. JCA 280/[no letter number],(13.2.1900), Niégo to Pres.,JCA.
2. JCA 264/no.58 (14.10.1900), Antébi to Pres., JCA.

Herzl had set an audience with the Sultan as a major objective, believing - perhaps rightly - that all the power in the Ottoman Empire was concentrated in Abdülhamid's hands. In 1898 the latter acknowledged a telegram sent to him by the second Zionist Congress. However, such encouragement as this gave was dissipated later that year when Palace officials visibly snubbed Herzl who had come to Constantinople in the wake of Kaiser Wilhelm II.[1] Hopes of an early meeting with the Sultan in 1899 were destroyed by the death of Newlinski whilst in Constantinople on a mission for Herzl.[2] In the summer of that year Newlinski's place as Herzl's agent was taken by Nuri Bey of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whom Herzl had met on his first visit to Constantinople in 1896.[3] Nuri convinced Herzl that in the Palace "money talks";[4] and that he, Nuri, had the necessary contacts to obtain an audience for Herzl with Abdülhamid.[5] Although it soon became obvious that Nuri Bey was a fraud,[6] Herzl nevertheless gave credence to a communication from Nuri's associate, Edouard Crespi, in October 1900, that the Ottoman Government had "un besoin pressant de 7-800 mille Ltqu". If Herzl were to appear as a *deus ex machina*, then the Sultan would receive him once the business was completed.[7]

1. Herzl, *Diaries*, ii, 712 (15.10.1898).
2. *Ibid*. ii, 813 (2.4.1899). 3. *Ibid*. i, 376 (19.6.1896).
4. *Ibid*. iii, 854 (4.7.1899), *cf*. *ibid*. iii, 847 (17.6.1899).
5. *Loc.cit*., and *ibid*. iii, 867 (29.8.1399).
6. *Ibid*. iii, 901 (30.1.1900), and 949 (15.5.1900).
7. *Ibid*. iii, 985 (15.10.1900).

Herzl immediately offered a loan of T£700,000;[1] and in the midst of the period of agitated waiting which followed he read about the November directives. Little wonder he wrote angrily to Crespi telling him of his "astonishment, not to say ... disappointment".[2]

Some months previously Arminius Vambéry, the Hungarian Jewish traveller and scholar, had offered to help Herzl.[3] Vambéry knew Constantinople well; he warned Herzl against relying on Nuri Bey who was "notorisch wegen seiner Geschäfte",[4] and Crespi with whom "Vorsicht ist sehr zu empfehlen"[5] - both men were "absolute Nullitäten in Yildiz".[6] Vambéry, on the other hand, did have influence with the Sultan. It was he who secured for Herzl an audience with Abdülhamid in May 1901.[7]

The interview lasted over two hours; Herzl records in his diary that he "got everything in".[8] He suggested to Abdülhamid that he and his Empire were like a lion in whose side was stuck a thorn - the Public Debt; and, alluding to the parable, Herzl presented himself as Androcles who would draw the thorn from the imperial lion's side - by relieving him of the Public Debt and foreign control. In return, Herzl asked for no more than "some measure particularly friendly to the Jews."[9] Abdülhamid made a show of interest;

1. Herzl, Diaries, iii, 985 (15.10.1900).
2. Ibid. iii, 1037 (10.1.1901).
3. Ibid. iii, 961 (17.6.1900).
4. CZA H VIII 870 (29.12.1900), Vambéry (Budapest) to Herzl (Vienna). 5. Ibid. (18.12.1900), same to same.
6. Ibid. (8.9.1901), same to same.
7. Herzl, Diaries, iii, 1092 (8.5.1901); cf. A. Vambéry, "Personal Recollections of Abdul Hamid II and his Court", The Nineteenth Century and After, lxv, 388 (1909), p.987.
8. Herzl, Diaries, iii, 1110ff. (19.5.1901).
9. Ibid. iii, 1114 (19.5.1901).

he promised Herzl to keep their discussions secret, to furnish him with a detailed presentation of the Empire's financial situation and to make a "pro-Jewish proclamation" at a moment designated by Herzl.[1] Herzl departed from Constantinople well satisfied (even though two days after his audience with the Sultan he fell foul of ʿIzzat Paşa in the mesh of Palace intrigues).[2] He had been deceived by Abdülhamid's affability and histrionics, whilst the latter had taken accurate measure of Herzl:

> "This Herzl looks completely like a prophet, like a leader of his people. He has very clever eyes; he speaks carefully and clearly."[3]

Only in subsequent months, after all the letters and memoranda detailing his proposals for the consolidation of the Public Debt were ignored, did Herzl sense that something was amiss. He was recalled twice to Constantinople (in February and July of 1902), and on both occasions he conversed indirectly with Abdülhamid through various Palace officials.[4] These "discussions" had the outward form of genuine negotiations, although the Sultan could not be induced to modify the established conditions for Jewish settlement in the Ottoman Empire, and Herzl too gave no ground: "A Charter without Palestine! I refused at once."[5]

1. Herzl, Diaries, iii, 1117 (19.5.1901).
2. Ibid. iii, 1131ff. (21.5.1901).
3. A. Vambéry, "Meine Erinnerungen an Dr. Herzl", Die Welt, xiv, 20 (1910), p.479.
4. Herzl, Diaries, iii, 1215-33 (15-18.2.1902); and ibid. iv, 1313-42 (25.7.-2.8.1902).
5. Ibid. iii, 1222 (17.2.1902).

Herzl was not alone in volunteering to ameliorate Ottoman finances and to consolidate the Public Debt; other groups, both private and national, sought to gain concessions from the Sultan. When the Rouvier project for the consolidation of the Debt was approved in 1902, Herzl realised sadly that Abdülhamid had engineered his visits to the Palace merely to obtain the best possible terms from the French group.[1]

Not infrequently, Herzl's contacts in Constantinople informed him of prominent Ottomans whom they had interested in Zionism; in 1902 Edouard Crespi even claimed to have gained the support of the Shaykh al-Islam.[2] But they also spoke of Herzl's opponents in the city - doubtless with greater veracity. Among these were Baron Heinrich de Calice (the Austrian Ambassador at the Porte),[3] the Haham Başi,[4] and the representatives of Baron Edmond de Rothschild;[5] to these could also be added a number of Turkish ministers,[6] not least of whom was Halil Rifat Paşa, the Grand Vezir from 1895 to 1901,[7] as well as the supporters of rival groups seeking to consolidate the Public Debt.[8] The voice of Herzl's adversaries must surely have outweighed that of the ~~straw men~~ men of straw supposedly devoted to Zionism.

1. Herzl, Diaries, iii, 1256 (14.3.1902); iv, 1319 (27.7.1902); 1331 (31.7.1902); & 1341 (2.8.1902).
2. CZA H VIII 898 (9.11.1902), Dr. Weber [=Wellisch], (Consple.) to Herzl.
3. CZA H VIII 162 (15.7.1901), E. Crespi (Consple.) to Herzl; and CZA H VIII 870 (27.7.1901), Vambéry (Mühlbach) to Herzl.
4. CZA H VIII 870 (19.8.1901), Vambéry (Budapest) to Herzl.
5. CZA H VIII 162 (22.7.1901), Crespi to Herzl.
6. Herzl, Diaries, iii, 1223 (17.2.1902).
7. Halil Rifat Paşa was opposed to Herzl's scheme from the very beginning; see above, and Herzl, Diaries, i,375-6 (19.6.1896), 383 (21.6.1896) & 400-1 (29.6.1896).
8. CZA H VIII 870 (27.7.1901), Vambéry (Mühlbach) to Herzl.

Herzl endeavoured to regain the Palace's attentions during the two years before he died in 1904 by elaborating new financial schemes and affecting to hold out to the Ottoman Empire its last opportunity for redemption before he concluded alternative schemes for Jewish colonisation in the Sinai Peninsula and East Africa.[1] But all his coaxing went in vain - it could scarcely have been otherwise. Abdülhamid was in no position to relinquish any part of his empire, autocrat as he was. With violent disturbances in Armenia, Crete, Macedonia and the Hauran, and with Young Turks abroad denouncing him for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, it was no time to cede Palestine to the Jews. That Herzl was careful to request a very limited form of autonomy and at all times asserted the Jews' loyalty to the Sultan was of little consequence. Furthermore, Abdülhamid posed as Caliph as well as Sultan in an effort to rally the loyalty of his Muslim subjects and of Muslims beyond the Empire's borders; as Caliph he could scarcely hand Jerusalem over to the infidel Jews. Finally, Herzl's "golden egg" - his proposals to consolidate the Ottoman Debt - lacked substance and practicability: he did not command the funds necessary for this task and it was not conceivable that the Great Powers would have surrendered the administration of the Debt (which gave them partial control of the Empire's internal affairs), let alone tolerate its consolidation by a Jewish group to be recompensed with a foothold in a territory which they, the Powers, coveted themselves.

1. E.g. Herzl, Diaries, iv, 1617-19 (12.3.-4.10.1904); cf. Levontin, Le'erez, ii, 85.

Herzl and Zionists made much of his audience with Abdülhamid and the exchanges which followed. It was necessary to do so in order to enhance the Zionist Movement's stature and to maintain popular support. But there is no evidence that Abdülhamid treated with Herzl save as anything more than a convenient foil to more serious financial negotiations. This is not to imply that Abdülhamid and the Sublime Porte regarded the Zionist Movement lightly. On the contrary, as has been shown above, they kept well informed of Zionist activities. They renewed the restrictions against the entry of Jews into Palestine before the first and second Zionist Congresses, and in 1900 consolidated all legislation regarding foreign Jews in Palestine. A month after Herzl's audience with Abdülhamid, an inspector of the secret police was sent to Palestine to create a branch of the service there; this, it seems, was the most palpable result of Herzl's interview.[1] Six months later, the Breslauer Local Anzeiger wrote that Herzl had told the fifth Zionist Congress (December 1901) of his audience with Abdülhamid who was reported to have given Herzl assurances that everything would be done to permit the Zionists to settle in Palestine;[2] within a few days, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs authorised his ambassador at Berlin to make an official denial of this report.[3] Perhaps the most that can be said

1. AIU IV.E.12 (17.6.1901), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
2. OFA 332/17, no.242 (30.12.1901), Ahmed Tevfik Paşa (Berlin) to Tevfik Paşa (Consple.).
3. OFA 332/17, no.45624/5 (9.1.1902), Tevfik Paşa to Ahmed Tevfik Paşa.

is that Abdulhamid had some use for Herzl, but none for his movement.[1]

* * * *

The Arabs and Political Zionism

The Arabs, no less than the Turks, knew of the Zionist Movement almost from its inception. It will therefore be appropriate to conclude this chapter with a brief description of three early Arab responses to political Zionism. The Syrian Christian editors of al-Muqtaṭaf proved themselves to be chary of Zionism from the beginning: they doubted if its aims would be realised, but nevertheless were apprehensive about the economic implications of continued Jewish immigration into Palestine. Although Rashid Riḍa (later to become the most influential Islamic thinker of his time) quickly perceived that the Zionists sought to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, it appears from the journal, al-Manar, that for him the Zionist Movement in its early years was more a model than a menace. On the other hand, Yusuf al-Khalidi, one of the most distinguished men in Jerusalem, viewed the Zionist Movement with grave concern: he recognised the existence of a "Jewish problem" in Europe and gave

1. In autumn 1907, David Wolffsohn, Herzl's successor as President of the Zionist Movement, also visited Constantinople and negotiated indirectly with Abdülhamid through his First Secretary, Tahsin Paşa, and other officials; but these tentatives were no more successful than Herzl's had been - see CZA W 35/4 (Wolffsohn's diary of his journey, 25.10.-13.11.1907 [the diary only goes up to November 3rd]) & CZA W 35/5 (notes about the negotiations made by Wolffsohn and his companion, Dr. N. Katzenelsohn). The possibility of real changes in Constantinople did not offer itself until the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 - see Ch.IV. The Porte's handling of questions relating to Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine until 1908 is treated in the next chapter (Ch.III).

due weight to the propriety of Jewish national aspirations; but he also foresaw that a Jewish state could not be established in Palestine without hostilities and bloodshed, because of Arab opposition kindled by Christians.

These early Arab responses to the Zionist Movement are too isolated to admit of generalisations. The number of Arabs who read al-Muqtaṭaf and al-Manar was very small, and the few articles which appeared at this time could have made little, if any, impression; Yusuf al-Khalidi, for his part, was not typical of Arab society (see below). Nonetheless, these responses are not without importance, for in retrospect there can be seen in them indications of what was shortly to follow among the Arabs, be they Christians or orthodox Muslims, nationalists or Ottoman loyalists. It is significant also that from the outset the Zionist Movement was believed (in at least two cases) to be bent on establishing an independent Jewish state and, equally, that no instance was recorded even at this stage of an Arab speaking out in favour of Zionism.

* * *

Six months after the first Zionist Congress the editors of al-Muqtaṭaf were asked by a reader in Frankfurt what ~~had~~ the Arabic press had to say about Zionism and also what did al-Muqtaṭaf think of it.[1] The editors replied that the Arabic press had simply mentioned the Zionist Congress among its other news-items without paying special attention to it. Al-Muqtaṭaf's view of the recent Jewish immigration into

1. Al-Muqtaṭaf, xxii, 4 (1898), pp.310-11; the reader's name and origin are not given.

Palestine seems to have been coloured by the reports in Abu al-Hawl (see above, pp.57-57(a),n.2). It claimed that the Jews who had come up till now were capitalists and that they had already taken over most of the trade and commerce in Palestine; if their numbers increased, they would monopolise business there. Al-Muqtaṭaf did not believe that the Jews would concentrate in agriculture because they possessed no farming background. Although there was room in Palestine for many times its present population, land purchases and the mass transfer of poor Jews to the country would not be easy, even for wealthy men like Baron Hirsch (whose Jewish Colonization Association had begun to take an interest in Palestine - see Ch.III). The Ottoman Empire "for its own good" was not content to let the Great Powers interfere and grant Capitulatory protection to immigrant Jews; this represented a great obstacle in the way of the Zionist Movement. "Therefore we believe the success of the Zionists is remote"; the amelioration of the lot of Jews in Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria was a more attainable goal.

Two weeks later Rashid Riḍa re-printed this article in al-Manar, and commented upon it in a very different vein.[1] Rashid Riḍa was both affronted and inspired by the national revival of the Jews; he also deplored the indifference and disunity of his compatriots (rijal biladina).

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1. Al-Manar, i, 6 (1898), pp.105-8.

> "You complacent non-entities ... look at what peoples and nations do .... Are you content for it to be reported in the newspapers of every state that the penniless of the weakest of peoples [i.e. the Jews], whom all governments are expelling, have so much knowledge and understanding of civilisation and its ways that they can take possession of your country and colonise it, and make its masters into hired labourers and its rich into poor men? Think about this question, and make it the subject of your conversations ... then, when it is clear to you that you are restricted in the rights of your homeland (huquq awtanikum) and in the service of your umma and milla, ... examine and deliberate ... matters like this, for it is more worthy of consideration ... than slandering your brothers and accusing them of sinning."[1]

The germs of Rashid Rida's nationalism and, more especially, of his political ideas are already in evidence in this early rejoinder to al-Muqtataf;[2] they are more fully developed in a long article on Zionism which appeared in al-Manar in January 1902.[3] This article was occasioned by distorted reports of the fifth Zionist Congress in December 1901 when Herzl gave an account of his audience with Abdülhamid. Although in this second article it is clear that Rida's opposition to Zionism had intensified since 1898, his main interest in the Zionist Movement was that it served as a vehicle to illustrate his political beliefs. The title of the article is telling in itself: "The Life of a Nation after its Death" ("hayat umma ba'd mawtiha"). Rida began with an exhortation, supported by a verse from the Quran, that Muslims should be politically aware. We fear, he wrote,

1. Al-Manar, i. 6 (1898), p.108.
2. For Rashid Rida's views, see A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939 (London, 1962), Ch.IX, especially pp.227-30.
3. Al-Manar, iv, 21 (1902), pp.801-9.

that some day we may become as abject as the Jews, but we do not understand them or ourselves; we do not recognise our superiority over them - they have been dispossessed, whilst some of our land is still under the control of our leaders. But, he pleaded, would that we looked to see if our present leaders are following the ways of the salaf or of the salaf's tyrannical successors who reduced the domains of Islam to the remnant wherein we heedlessly suffer foreign oppression. Would that we also paid attention to the Jews of today. They do not languish in the "blessing of the Torah" in order to succeed; instead they have preserved their language and religious unity despite their dispersion, they have supported one another, mastered the useful arts and sciences of the age and distinguished themselves in amassing capital which, Riḍa added, is the basis of power and strength in the present day. Nothing prevents them from being the mightiest nation on earth except [national] sovereignty (mulk), and they are striving towards this in "the natural way"; namely, through great national organisations (jam'iyyat milliyya) - "and nations have no success but through organisations". At this point Riḍa indicated his objection to the Zionist Movement: originally it appeared that the Zionists merely desired a refuge for persecuted Jews under the Sultan's protection; but now, with a stronger movement, they seek national sovereignty in Palestine.[1] Riḍa reported that recently

1. Cf. al-Manar, vi, 5 (1903), pp.196-200, "al-Yahud wal-masuniyya, wa-ḥadath al-waṭaniyya"; ibid. p.196, Riḍa put the following into the mouth of a Jew: "Do you not see that [these Jews] whom [other] states are persecuting and expelling from their land do not in the main

(Cont'd p.94) .....

Israel Zangwill had come to Constantinople to negotiate the purchase of Jerusalem and was received warmly by Abdülhamid.[1] Zangwill afterwards told the Zionist Congress that by the end of the twentieth century two million Jews will have returned to their ancient kingdom, which would be an example and guide to all nations. The Jews, Zangwill was quoted ~~to have~~ as having said, had already collected one million dollars from poor Jews (without contributions from the rich) for the purchase of Palestine. The Muslims in Egypt are numerically equal to the Jews of the world, but what enthusiasm do they exhibit for the common good in collecting one million piastres to build a university in Egypt, Riḍa asked his readers sardonically. He then printed a Zionist circular calling on the Jews of Alexandria to follow the lead given by their European coreligionists and inviting them to attend a Zionist meeting; by way of reply, he re-printed the passage from his first article on Zionism quoted above, exclaiming that if this was what we wrote four years ago, then a fortiori today. Riḍa concluded as he began, urging Muslims to be mindful of their leaders, to acquire technical skills and capital, so that they may become a true nation (umma ḥaqiqa) with public opinion bound by Islamic law and a process of consultation (al-shar' wal-shura). This, it may be noted, was none other than the political doctrine which Rashid Riḍa kept returning

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find a refuge except in the lands of the Sublime Porte, even in Palestine, which they covet to be independent there and to restore their kingdom in it anew."

1. Riḍa mistakenly attributed Herzl's audience with Abdülhamid and his Congress speech to Israel Zangwill.

to in the columns of al-Manar.

The Zionist Movement was taken much more seriously by Yusuf Ḍiya al-Din Paşa al-Khalidi of Jerusalem.[1] In 1899, at the age of seventy, "un devoir sacré de conscience" made him write a carefully reasoned letter to Zadoc Kahn, the Chief Rabbi of France and an associate of Herzl.[2] Yusuf al-Khalidi had a long record of public service; he had been Ottoman Vice-Consul in Poti, a deputy in "Midhat's Parliament" and President of the Municipal Council in Jerusalem. He had travelled in Europe and taught Arabic in Vienna for some time. He was an eloquent speaker, fluent in French and English as well as Turkish and Kurdish; he held liberal views and was well-known for his religious toleration;[3] he was critical of Abdülhamid's régime and his forthright speeches in the first Ottoman Parliament had brought expulsion from Constantinople when the second session was prorogued in 1878.

His letter to Zadoc Kahn was a unique, and in some ways prophetic, document.[4] It was written by a well-meaning and responsible man of mature judgement, who was in no way bitter

1. Khayr al-Din al-Zirakli, al-Aʿlam ([no place], 1954-1959), ix, 310; also R. Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period (Baltimore, 1963), passim. (Ḥabaṣṣelet, viii, 4 (6.12.1877), states that Yusuf al-Khalidi completed his studies in Oxford, but the University Registry has no record of his attendance, nor is this distinction mentioned elsewhere.)
2. CZA H III d. 14 (1.3.1899), Youssuf Zia Alkhalidy (Consple.) to Chief Rabbi Zadoc Kahn (Paris).
3. L.S. Amery, My Political Life (London, 1953), i, 69-70.
4. Yusuf al-Khalidi (who died in 1907) also inspected the Jewish colonies in Palestine and wrote an account of his tour; this account, in Arabic, is to be found in Beirut but was not made available for this study.

or disparaging. In theory, wrote Yusuf al-Khalidi, the Zionist idea was "completely natural, fine and just".

> "Qui peut contester les droits des juifs sur la Palestine? Mon Dieu, historiquement c'est bien Votre pays!"

But the "brutal force" of reality had to be taken into account: Palestine was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire and was inhabited by non-Jews. What "forces matérielles" did the Jews possessto acquire the Holy Places which were common to 390,000,000 Christians and 300,000,000 Muslims as well? Yusuf al-Khalidi feared that despite Jewish capital the Holy Places could not be obtained without "autres coups, plus formidables, ceux des canons et des cuirassés". He suspected that not even Britain or America, the two nations most favourably inclined towards the Jews, would be willing to fight for such a cause. In general, the Turks and Arabs were well disposed to Jews, but there were also some of them who were infected with racial hatred against the Jews, just as among the "most civilised nations". Moreover, in Palestine there were Christian "fanatics", especially among the Catholics and the Orthodox, who resented the recent progress of the Jews and "ne laissant passer aucune occasion pour exciter la haine des musulmans contre les juifs". He predicted a popular movement against the Jews which the Ottoman Government with "the best intentions in the world" could not quell. Even if Abdülhamid's consent be gained, it was folly on Herzl's part to think that the day will come when the Zionists would become masters of Palestine.

"Il faut donc pour la tranquillité des juifs en Turquie, que le mouvement zioniste, dans le sens géographique du mot, cesse.... Mon Dieu, la terre est assez vaste, il y a encore des pays inhabités ou [sic] l'on pourrait placer les millions d'israélites pauvres, qui y deviendraient peut-être heureux et un jour constitueraient une nation. Ça serait peut-être la meilleure, la plus rationnelle solution de la question juive. Mais, au nom de Dieu, qu'on laisse tranquille la Palestine."[1]

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1. Chief Rabbi Kahn passed Yusuf al-Khalidi's letter on to Herzl. The draft of Herzl's reply is in CZA H III d.14 (19.3.1899), and this has been published a number of times; e.g., see Herzl, Kol kitbe Herzl (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1957), iii, 309-10, for Hebrew translation; (Yusuf al-Khalidi's letter is treated summarily in a footnote, loc.cit.). Herzl replied that the Jews are and will be very good friends of Turkey, as they have been since the time of Selim I; they are not belligerent, and wish only to live in peace, contributing to the Empire's material well-being; the Holy Places would become a symbol of universal peace in the light of the fraternal entente which would be made over them; Herzl discounted difficulties from the Arab population; the latter stood to gain, land values would rise five to ten times. He concluded that if the Sultan did not take this last chance to ameliorate the Empire's finances and regulate its economy, the Zionists would indeed find another territory, as Yusuf al-Khalidi suggested.

CHAPTER THREE

PALESTINE: 1897-1908

The Ottoman Administration

Shortly after the first Zionist Congress an important change was made in the selection of those sent to govern the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem. Rauf, Reşad and Ibrahim Paşas - the Governors from 1877 to 1897 - were men who had seen regular service in the provincial administration; Rauf and Ibrahim were both reputed to be of scrupulous integrity, while the only shortcoming held against Reşad was his marked sympathy for Europeans. In November 1897 Ibrahim Paşa was replaced by Tevfik Bey;[1] it can be no coincidence that the latter and the four Governors who succeeded him until the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 came not from the ranks of the provincial administration but from the Yildiz Palace, where they had served as secretaries to Abdülhamid. A letter from Jerusalem published in L'Indépendance Arabe in 1907, which is severely critical of the Mutasarrifs in Jerusalem after 1897, admitted that Tevfik's honesty was above suspicion;[2] while Albert Antébi, the Jewish Colonization Association's representative in Jerusalem and (from 1900) the Director of the

1. The opportunity for Ibrahim Paşa's replacement was provided by complaints from Russia about an unsettled incident in the Cave of Nativity which had occurred the previous Christmas - see Q d'O N.S. 130, no.497 (3.11.1897), La Bouliniere (Therapia) to Min. of Foreign Affairs (Paris).
2. L'Indépendance Arabe, i, 2 (1907), p.27.

Alliance Israélite Universelle school there, described Tevfik as being "very liberal, but inflexible regarding the existing laws".[1] His three immediate successors, however, were neither honest nor inflexible; they brought to Jerusalem the corruption which they had doubtless witnessed in Yildiz. In June 1901 Tevfik Bey was replaced by Mehmed Cavid Bey, whom local notables tried to influence in the conduct of the Mutasarriflik's affairs, but their efforts failed because, according to Antébi, Cavid was "well-disposed" to the Jews,[2] whereas according to the letter in L'Indépendance Arabe, he was "incredibly venal".[3] Antébi and the contributor to L'Indépendance Arabe again judged the next Mutasarrif, Osman Kâzim Bey, from their opposing points of view, and each characterised him in the same terms as Cavid Bey.[4] In 1904 Kâzim Bey was followed by Ahmed Reşid Bey who, on his transfer from Jerusalem in 1906, was reported by the British Consul to have openly favoured Jewish settlement in the Mutasarriflik, having recourse "to the plausible argument that both the Government and the inhabitants would be benefitted";[5] however, there is good reason to believe L'Indépendance Arabe's correspondent who claimed that Reşid Bey was the most venal Palace Secretary to have come to Jerusalem.[6] At the end of 1906 his place was taken by

1. JCA 263/no.17 (23.10.1899), A. Antébi (Jerus.) to Pres., JCA (Paris).
2. JCA 265/no.119 (7.7.1901), same to same.
3. L'Indépendance Arabe, i, 2 (1907), p.27.
4. Loc.cit.; and JCA 265/no.10 (31.3.1902), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
5. FO 195/2225, no.54 (27.12.1906), J.G. Freeman (Jerus.) to G. Barclay (Consple.).
6. L'Indépendance Arabe, i, 2 (1907), pp.27-8.

Ali Ekrem Bey, a man of a different stamp, and for the first time since Tevfik Bey's departure in 1901, the Porte's instructions were enforced in the Mutasarriflik to the letter (see below).

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The successive orders from the Sublime Porte after 1897 did not succeed in preventing Jews from entering the Mutasarriflik, but they did curtail land sales to Jews there. The Mufti of Jerusalem, Muḥammad Ṭahir al-Ḥusayni, had evinced an antagonism to Jewish settlement in Palestine, during the 1880's and 1890's;[1] from 1897 he presided over a commission which scrutinised applications for transfers of land in the Mutasarriflik and so effectively stopped all purchases by Jews for the next few years.[2] After Beer Tuvya was founded in 1896 (on land already held by Jews

1. E. Yellin, Le-ge'eza'ai (Jerusalem, 1938), p.77 (concerning 1880's); ISA (G) A XXII 18 [n.d. (ca. March, 1893)] J. Frutiger & Co. (Jerus.) to von Tischendorf (Jerus.).
2. ISA (G) A XXII 18 [n.d. (1897)], unsigned memorandum by consular official, concerning Mufti's prevention of land sales to Jews. ISA (T) no.100 (28.12.1905), Reşid Bey (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir and Min. of Internal Affairs (S.P.), gives statistics of land acquired by Jews in the Mutasarriflik under his predecessors; Reşid states that during the tenure of Tevfik Bey (1897-1901) no land was transferred to Jews. This is probably true, because Reşid Bey had reason to exaggerate the figures (see below), and certainly would have accused Tevfik Bey of permitting land transfers, if there had been the slightest evidence of this. Cf. same statistic in AIU VIII. E. 21 (8.11.1906), Antébi to Pres., AIU (Paris); also cf. JCA 261/encl. to no.338 (30.8.1904), Antébi to Dir. Gén., JCA (Beirut): "On parle même d'une interdiction totale de la vente des terrains miri aux juifs, c'est le retour au régime d'arrêt absolu d'avant 1900" [italics mine], (see below).

prior to the land purchase restrictions of 1892-93), no more colonies were established in the south of Palestine for another decade. Consequently, if colonisation was to continue, other territories had to be found.

The Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) had begun to interest itself in the Palestinian colonies in 1896. At first, it confined its activities to aiding the few colonies which did not enjoy Baron Rothschild's financial support. In 1897 JCA sent Joseph Niégo to inspect Baron Rothschild's land in the Hauran, where 74,000 dunams had been acquired in the early 1890's. On his return, Niégo also inspected properties in the north of Palestine belonging to the Sursuq family of Beirut. Niégo dismissed the possibility of colonisation in the Hauran, first, because the Baron had given an undertaking when he had purchased the land neither to settle foreign Jews on it nor to dislodge the local peasant population, and, secondly, because the area suffered annually from depredations by ʿAnaza Beduin.[1] On the other hand, most of the Sursuq estates were eminently suited for colonisation.[2] Furthermore, land purchase in the Sanjak of Acre - where these estates were located - was not as difficult as in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem.[3] Niégo's views were shared by JCA's first full-time official in

1. JCA 279/no.6 (23.5.1897) and 280/no.53 (17.4.1898), J. Niégo (Miqve Yisrael) to Pres., JCA. Between 1895 and 1898 an unsuccessful attempt was made to set up a small colony in the Hauran - see Klausner, Ḥibbat ẓiyyon, pp. 296-301, where further references are also given.
2. JCA 279/no.7 (31.5.1897), Niégo to Pres., JCA.
3. JCA 279/no.8 (20.6.1897), same to same.

Palestine, David Haym, who explained that in the Mutasarriflik the Ottoman officials were opposed to Jewish settlement and referred any questions directly to Constantinople, whereas the authorities in the Sanjak of Acre were more flexible and were apt to present their superior, the Vali of Beirut, with faits accomplis.[1] Accordingly, JCA's attentions were turned northwards,[2] and in autumn 1900 head-quarters were opened in Beirut.

However, land purchase in the Vilayet of Beirut was by no means simple. Arab land-owners were willing to sell property to JCA, but even those who were expert in conveyancing were hesitant to conclude the sales themselves for fear of the Ottoman authorities.

> "Tout le monde vous dit la même chose: 'Voilà mes titres de propriété, faites le nécessaire, arrangez-vous avec les autorités pour le transfert au nom de qui vous voudrez et, le moment venu, je déclarerai que je vous ai vendu mon terrain."3

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The existence of the consolidated directives of November 1900 relating to Jewish entry and land purchase soon became known to the Arabs. In Jerusalem they were viewed with disfavour by local-born officials,[4] who felt that, by

1. JCA 255/[no number], (22.1.1899) and no.79 (16.2.1899), D. Haym (Miqve Yisrael) to Admin. Council, JCA (Paris).
2. JCA 257/no.73 (9.6.1899), S. Sonnenfeld and T. Adler (JCA., Paris) to Haym and Niégo, requesting information about Sursuq land. JCA 255/no.116 (27.6.1899), Haym and Niégo to Admin. Council, JCA., giving details of Sursuq land. Then further information about lands in Tiberias region in JCA 255/no.148, e (20.10.1899) and no.148, g (31.10.1899), both Haym to Admin. Council, JCA.
3. JCA 255/no.93 (11.4.1899), Haym and Niégo to same.
4. JCA 264/no.75 (17.12.1900), Antébi to Pres., JCA.

regularising the status of immigrants illegally long-resident in Palestine and by granting them the same rights to purchase miri land as Ottoman subjects, the directives were an advance for the Jews.[1] These officials therefore began collecting signatures to protest to the Sublime Porte.[2] In the Vilayet of Beirut the authorities appeared reluctant to disclose the terms of the new directives,[3] perhaps because they too were dissatisfied with them. As a result, a rumour spread throughout the Vilayet that the Sublime Porte had authorised unrestricted Jewish settlement in Palestine, excluding Jews from Russia; this rumour, although unfounded, quickly gained acceptance.[4] Then, one week after the new directives were issued, an exception was made in them in favour of Narcisse Leven, the President of JCA. The authorities in Beirut had notified the Minister of Internal Affairs that landowners wished to sell properties in the region of Tiberias to a French Jew named Leven; and the Council of Ministers in Constantinople decided that, in accordance with the Land Code, Leven, as a foreigner, was entitled to acquire land in the Ottoman Empire, provided he

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
1. Indeed, in Jerusalem it was believed by some that the new directives had been invited by certain influential Muslim notables who wished to sell at high prices their land which the earlier prohibitions had caused to depreciate in value - see Q d'O N.S. 138, no.5 (4.2.1901), Auzépy (Jerus.) to Min. of Foreign Affairs (Paris).
2. JCA 264/no.75 (17.12.1900).
3. FO 195/2097, no.19 (7.3.1901), J.H. Monahan (Haifa) to Sir R. Drummond-Hay (Beirut).
4. Loc.cit.

gave an assurance that he would not instal foreign Jews on it.[1] This was in contradiction and quite out of spirit with the revised directives which specifically prohibited the sale of land to Jews resident abroad. Under this concession JCA acquired 31,500 dunams of land near Tiberias in the early part of 1901 from the Sursuqs,[2] mostly through Joshua Ossovetzky who bought land on both JCA's and his own account. The rumour of free immigration and these large land purchases combined to arouse the apprehensions of Arab peasants in the Tiberias region. Fellaheen from several villages (Lubiya, 'Abbadiya, Dala'ika, 'Arab as Subeih, etc.) attacked JCA's surveyor, Treidel, on a number of occasions when he came to measure lands up for sale.[3] When the Circassians at Kafr Kama heard that JCA was negotiating for Umm Jubeil, they petitioned the "Tribunal de Première Instance" at Tiberias for a first option on the land. They explained that for the last fifteen years they had rented this land as their own holdings were insufficient for their needs. They asked the Court to ascertain the true value of the land, because otherwise they would be obliged to pay the

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1. JCA 265/encl. to no.113 (8.12.1900), Min. of Cadastre (S.P.) to Director of Cadastre (Jerus.), informing him of Leven's right to acquire land in the Tiberias region. Cf. FO 195/2097, encl. to no.33 (26.4.1901), Drummond-Hay to Sir N. O'Conor (Consple.), "Notes on the Trade and Shipping of Syria during 1900", mentions Irade to JCA in name of Leven "to purchase land in Syria and Palestine".
2. CZA Z2/635, encl. to letter dated 28.5.1911: "Aufstellung über die jüdischen Kolonien in Palästina".
3. JCA 258/no.57 (3.5.1901), S.I. Pariente (Beirut) to Pres., JCA; & JCA 259/no.85 (30.8.1901), C. Dreyfus (Beirut) to same.

JCA settlements founded in the Vilayet of Beirut: 1899 - 1904



same inflated price as Leven.[1] This petition was not sustained by the Court. Chaim Kalvarisky, one of JCA's administrators in the north of Palestine, later held Ossovetsky responsible for much of the unrest among the fellaheen in the region, because he made the purchases from absentee landowners in Beirut (i.e. the Sursuqs) without consideration for the tenants.[2] The peasants were supported by the Kaymakam of Tiberias, (Amir) Amin Arslan Bey;[3] and on account of the prevailing disquiet, the Leven concession was abrogated by the Porte at the end of 1901.[4] On the lands acquired by JCA between 1898 and 1901 were established Sejera and Mahanayim (both 1899); Mas-ha, Milhamiya and Yavneel (all 1902); and Beit Gan (1904).

The Leven concession referred only to lands in the Kaza of Tiberias, but Albert Antébi pressed for the extension of this privilege to the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem, arguing that Leven had been permitted to acquire land in Jerusalem in 1889, and if today he could purchase land in Tiberias, then there was no reason why he should not also enjoy the same privilege again in Jerusalem.[5] The Administrative Council in the city asked the Sublime Porte to elucidate

1. JCA 262/no.56 (9.6.1901), Sonnenfeld and E. Meyerson (Paris) to Pariente, enclosing French translation of Circassians' Arabic petition, a copy of which had been sent to Paris by the latter.
2. Kalvarisky, "ha-Yaḥasim ... lifne ha-milḥamah", p.53. Cf. JCA 255/[no number], (17.5.1900) & ibid. [no number], (10.6.1900), Haym to Admin. Council, JCA; also JCA 258/no.48 (19.4.1901), Pariente to Pres., JCA, all blaming Ossovetzky.
3. Kalvarisky, op.cit. pp.53-54.
4. JCA 265/no.134 (11.11.1901), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
5. JCA 265/no.113 (26.5.1901), same to same.

this point; but, as no reply was received, the Council was obliged to reach a decision itself. The matter became the subject of a correspondence between the French Consul in Jerusalem, the Mutasarrif, the Directors of the Archives and the Cadastre, and the "Special Commission for the Prevention of Jewish Immigrants from Settling in Palestine".[1] A "tempestuous" session of the Administrative Council was held on May 26th, 1901, at which "the Qadi and the Mufti were very violent".[2] After consulting the French Consul a second time, the Council accorded Leven the right to purchase land in Jerusalem. However, protests from Jerusalem could not have ceased, because when the Porte abrogated the Leven concession for the Tiberias region, all transfers made to his name in Jerusalem during 1901 were also annulled (Leven being described by the Porte as "president of the society secretly charged with bringing Jews into Palestine").[3] A little while later orders were received not to transfer to any foreigner tracts of miri land measuring more than one-hundred dunams without the Porte's authorisation.[4]

* * *

1. JCA 265/no.115 plus encls. (3.6.1901), Antébi to Pres., JCA; Antébi enclosed a copy of the complete file on the question from the archive of Mutasarriflik, containing the texts of letters exchanged and brief minutes of the Administrative Council's meetings in Jerusalem. The "Special Commission for the Prevention of Jewish Immigrants from Settling in Palestine" was set up after the directives of November 1900 were received in Jerusalem - see AIU V.E. 14 (19.5.1903), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
2. Encl. to JCA 265/no.115; minutes of meeting, 26.5.1901.
3. JCA 265/no.134 (11.11.1901), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
4. JCA 265/no.10 (31.3.1902), same to same.

The Valis of Beirut continued to be men trained in the provincial administration, who did not have "puissants protecteurs" at Yildiz to rely on, like the Mutasarrifs of Jerusalem after 1897.[1] Following the abrogation of the Leven concession, the Valis were conscientious in applying the restrictions against the Jews. Indeed, there were occasions when the Valis would seem to have been excessively zealous, perhaps in order to win the approval of the Palace. For instance, late in 1902, the Vali of Beirut, Reşid Bey, tried to evict the colonists from Mishmar hay Yarden.[2] About two years before, Joshua Ossovetzky had been declared bankrupt; in September 1901, he demanded that JCA in Paris pay him 50,000 francs. It is not clear from the JCA records whether this was a just claim for a genuine debt; but it is clear that Ossovetzky's methods were suspect and that he resorted to blackmail. In 1897 Ossovetzky had purchased the land at Mishmar hay-Yarden for JCA from the previous owner, a Russian Jew named Lubowsky; unknown to JCA, Ossovetzky registered the purchase in his own name instead of in that of JCA's nominee. In 1901 he transferred the titles to the land to an associate in Beirut, Elstein. In September 1902, in order to force JCA to pay him the money he was claiming from them, Ossovetzky requested Reşid Bey to evacuate the colony at Mishmar hay Yarden, because, he said, Elstein wished to take possession of the land now

1. JCA 261/no.292 (2.1.1905), Pariente to Admin. Council, JCA.
2. Details of this episode in JCA 259 & 260, many letters commencing no.151 (22.9.1902), and concluding no.203 (8.6.1903), Pariente to Admin. Council, JCA.

registered in his name. Although the legal documents supported Ossovetzky and Elstein, the suggestion was an undisguised attempt to extort money from JCA. Despite this, in October, Reşid instructed Najib Bey, the Kaymakam of Safed, to expel the colonists. Najib Bey temporised, while Isaac Fernandez (now also JCA's representative in Constantinople) secured an order from the Minister of Internal Affairs to suspend the expulsion. Nevertheless, Reşid Bey persisted, in defiance of the Porte, and, it may be assumed, with an eye to the Palace. The affair ended only after Sir Robert Drummond-Hay, the British Consul-General in Beirut, intervened in February 1903 to arrange a settlement between JCA and Ossovetzky.[1]

* * *

With conscientious Valis in Beirut and more pliable Mutasarrifs in Jerusalem, Jewish attentions were re-directed back to the south of Palestine after 1901. In March 1902 Antébi reported that he had managed to persuade Kâzim Bey to suppress the "Committee for the Prevention of Jews from Settling in Palestine";[2] twelve months later he indicated

1. JCA 260/no.184 (13.2.1903), Pariente to Admin. Council, JCA.
2. JCA 265/no.10 (31.3.1902), Antébi to Pres., JCA. A year later, with the arrival of a new kaymakam in Jaffa, some notables in that town pressed successfully for the re-establishment of this commission - see AIU V.E. 14 (19.5.1903), Antébi to Pres., AIU. However, in September 1903, Antébi reported that the head of this commission had been dismissed and that the entry restrictions were no longer being applied - ibid. (14.9.1903), same to same.

that the moment was very opportune for the purchase of real estate in Jerusalem, as he had learned that Kâzim Bey was changing the status of certain lands outside Jerusalem from miri to mülk: because of the restrictions on land sales to Jews, not only was mülk land cheaper than miri, but also it could be transferred without reference to the Sublime Porte.[1]

In the summer of 1903 David Levontin arrived in Jaffa to open the Anglo-Palestine Company (the APC); this bank was the first Zionist institution, properly speaking, to be established in Palestine. Since the APC was registered in London, Levontin was introduced by the British Consul in Jerusalem, John Dickson, to Kâzim Bey.[2] The latter received Levontin coolly, but at the Consul's request furnished him with a letter of introduction to the Kaymakam of Jaffa where the Company's offices were to be set up. In spite of this, the Kaymakam challenged the APC's right to trade, and on August 20th he announced to all the muhtars in Jaffa that:

> "As there was opened here an 'Anglo-Palestine Bank' and the said Bank is not provided with a licence, therefore we notify you to give information that no man shall have [anything] to do with it, and he who will have anything to do with it, we will fine him."3

Three weeks later the Kaymakam told Levontin that if he would agree to make "certain outlays", Kâzim Bey could obtain

1. JCA 266/no.50 (17.3.1903), Antébi to Pres., JCA; cf. ISA (T) no.33 (9.7.1907), Asaf Bey (Kay., Jaffa) to Ali Ekrem Bey (Mutas., Jerus.), reporting that miri and waqf land had in previous years been converted into mülk by corrupt officials and sold to Jews.
2. CZA W/124/I (7.7.1903), D. Levontin (Jaffa) to D. Wolffsohn (Cologne); cf. Levontin, Le'erez, ii, 48.
3. FO 195/2149 (20.8.1903), APC (Jaffa) to J. Dickson (Jerus.); and CZA W/124/I (24.8.1903), Levontin, "Report II".

the necessary licence from Constantinople for the APC.[1] Levontin concluded from this encounter that the difficulties put in his way were merely a ruse to induce him to gratify the authorities; he therefore refused and begged the British Consul to have action taken in Constantinople.[2]

The issue, however, seems to have been more complicated. Kâzim Bey's "bonnes dispositions" (as Antébi called them) towards the Jews were undoubted; but, likewise, the APC'S connection with the Zionist Movement was known from the moment Levontin reached Palestine. (John Dickson at his first meeting with Levontin called the APC "the Zionist Bank which has the aim of carrying out the plans of Dr. Herzl".)[3] On September 1st, Dickson informed Sir Nicholas O'Conor in Constantinople that Kâzim Bey's suspicions that the Zionist Movement stood behind the APC had "no doubt been further excited ... by rival bankers and traders already doing business at Jaffa"; Kâzim, he learned privately, had reported the matter to the Sublime Porte which had ordered him to obstruct the APC's opening.[4] Clearly, the Porte was wary of a Zionist bank in Palestine. Pressure from the British Embassy in Constantinople alone made the Porte relent in November 1903;[5] in December Levontin was informed that "the Company would be permitted to conduct its affairs

1. CZA W/124/I (13.9.1903), Levontin to T. Herzl (Vienna); cf. Levontin, Le'erez, ii, 53-4. 2. Loc.cit.
3. CZA W/124/I (1.7.1903), Levontin to Wolffsohn.
4. FO 195/2149, no.46 (1.1.1903), Dickson to O'Conor; cf. CZA H VIII 898 (15.8.1903), Weber [= Wellisch],(Consple.) to Herzl, reporting that Crespi had been told of an Irade which forbade the establishment of a Zionist bank in Palestine. 5. CZA H VIII 898 (7.10.1903), Weber to Herzl, reporting British Embassy's approaches to Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

without hindrance so long as it confined its operations to commercial matters".[1]

No sooner had the Porte authorised the APC's right to do business than Kâzim Bey requested a loan of 20,000 francs in favour of the Mutasarriflik.[2] This was the first of a series of loans to the local administration in Jerusalem which amounted to T£56,000 by the end of 1904.[3] Money was borrowed against the security of uncollected taxes and promises from Kâzim Bey that he would obtain an Irade (Imperial Decree) sanctioning the loans;[4] later Kâzim also talked of a Firman "in which the Turkish Government would recognise that [the APC] has rendered it services and contributes substantially to the prosperity of the country".[5] Levontin's eagerness for such credentials was understandable; but Kâzim's blandishments never materialised: no Irade or Firman was forthcoming. The only benefits which the APC obtained from its association with the local government in Jerusalem were those which were within Kâzim's power to bestow. These were not inconsiderable. By lending to the Mutasarriflik, the APC's prestige was enhanced publicly; no difficulties

1. CZA W/124/I (26.12.1903), Dickson to Levontin; and FO 195/2149, no.63 (28.12.1903), Dickson to O'Conor; cf. FO 195/2255, no.35 (27.8.1907), E.C. Blech (Jerus.) to O'Conor, giving date of Porte's instruction to the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem to permit the APC to trade as 24.11.1903 [= 7.12.1903?].
2. CZA W/124/I (4.1.1904), Levontin to Wolffsohn; cf. Levontin, Le'erez, ii, 56.
3. CZA W/124/II & Z1/541, Levontin, "Palästina Bericht" (1904); cf. Levontin, Le'erez, ii, 95. For detailed information of the various loans throughout 1904, see CZA W/124/I-II & Z1/531.
4. CZA Z1/531 (7.2.1904), Levontin to Herzl; copy in W/124/I, Levontin to Wolffsohn; & ibid. (16.2.1904), Levontin to Wolffsohn.
5. CZA Z1/531 (29.5.1904), Levontin to O.Kokesch (Vienna).

were met in dealing with the authorities, particularly in regard to land purchases by Jews.[1] However, in June 1904 orders were received from Constantinople prohibiting land sales to all foreigners without authority from the Porte, and a month later Kâzim was transferred to Aleppo.[2] Kâzim told Levontin that the Jews had brought this upon themselves by publicising the conditions in Jerusalem in their newspapers, especially in the official Zionist journal, Die Welt (which Kâzim himself received).[3]

His successor, Ahmed Reşid Bey, was disinclined to conclude a number of land transfers to Jews which had been interrupted by Kâzim's departure.[4] One of his first actions was to send a circular to the consuls in Jerusalem reminding them of the regulations vis-à-vis foreign Jews wishing to acquire real estate.[5] However, one month later, when Reşid was pressed by the Porte for the immediate payment of revenues due, he found it convenient to take a short-term loan from the APC - and therewith the relationship between the latter and the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem was re-established.[6]

1. W/124/II [June, 1904], Levontin, "Bericht zur Bilanz für das Semester Januar, Juni 1904"; cf. Levontin, Le'erez, ii, 58.
2. "No.7 (12.5.1904), Yusuf Ziya Paşa (Min. of Cadastre, S.P.) to Directors of Cadastre", enclosed in AIU VI. E. 16 (13.6.1904), Antébi to Pres., AIU; cf. CZA Z1/545 (17.6.1904), Levontin to Kokesch.
3. CZA W/124/II (1.7.1904), Levontin to Wolffsohn.
4. CZA W/124/II (13.10.1904), same to same.
5. ISA (G) A XXII 18 (15.9.1904), Mutas. (Jerus.) to Consuls (Jerus.), [= original circular]; copy of Turkish text with English translation enclosed in FO 195/2175, no.64 (12.10.1904), Dickson to O'Conor.
6. CZA W/124/II (13.10.1904), Levontin to Wolffsohn.

In place of Irades and Firmans, Levontin now explored the possibility of obtaining commercial concessions from the Sublime Porte as a means of strengthening the APC's position in Palestine. Tenders were put in for the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway and for an electric tramway in Jerusalem.[1] The most adventurous project was a scheme to develop the Sultan's private lands (çiftlik) in the region of Jericho and the Dead Sea. Towards the end of 1904 the administration of these lands in Palestine and Syria was re-organised; Reşid Bey was put in charge of çiftliks in the Jordan area.[2] A draft concession was worked out by Levontin and Reşid to form a "Société de la Mer Morte, et de sa navigation".[3] The Society would take a lease in perpetuity of 150,000 or more dunams of çiftlik on both sides of the River Jordan and would settle on them two- to five-hundred Muslim and Jewish agricultural families; the Society would enjoy unlimited rights to develop the area, exploit the minerals in the Dead Sea and navigate the Jordan. Reşid Bey recommended this proposal to ʿIzzat Paşa, the President of the "Commission of the Civil List", stressing the material benefits which would

1. CZA W/124/II (6.12.1904), Levontin to Wolffsohn; CZA L5/11/II contains tenders for concessions, draft contracts, surveyors' reports, etc.
2. CZA W/125/I (5.1.1905), Levontin to Reşid Bey (Mutas., Jerus.); and ibid. (9.1.1905 & 13.1.1905), Levontin to Wolffsohn.
3. FO 195/2199, no.10 (15.4.1905), Dickson to O'Conor, enclosing French translation of draft concessions and contracts between "Commission of the Civil List" in Jerusalem and Levontin; copies of these drafts in CZA W/125/I; Hebrew translation of same in Levontin, Leʾerez, ii, 100 ff. [January 1905].

accrue if large capital investment was made in these lands and if they were cultivated by expert farmers.[1] However, the Zionist Executive felt that such independent approaches to the Porte interfered with its own political activities; and in March 1905 David Wolffsohn firmly instructed Levontin to desist from this venture.[2] It is also unlikely that Abdülhamid or his ministers would have agreed to the scheme; no tender placed by the APC for any concession in Palestine was ever accepted by the Ottoman Government.[3] Reşid Bey, like Kâzim before him, could do no more than unofficially relax the existing restrictions - to his personal advantage.[4]

In 1905, the seventh Zionist Congress - the first after Herzl's death in 1904 - resolved that its efforts must be directed entirely towards Palestine; alternative schemes, such as the East Africa project, were no longer to be considered. This decision was reached after heated debate, mainly between Menahem Ussischkin for the "Ziyyone Ziyyon" (Palestine-orientated Zionists) and Israel Zangwill for the "Territorialists".[5] Reports of this debate in The Times, L'Indépendance Belge and in Zionist journals, alarmed the Sublime Porte as well as the local administration and Arab population in Palestine.[6] The Porte immediately ordered

1. Levontin, Le'erez, ii, 105-6: text of Reşid Bey's letter to 'Izzat Paşa, President of the "Commission of the Civil List" (Consple.); slightly abbreviated French translation of same enclosed in AIU VII. E.19 (16.7.1905), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
2. Levontin, Le'erez, ii,106; cf. I. Lévy, "ha-Bilti yadu'a 'al Herzl", Hed ha-mizrah, ii, 15 (1944), p.13.
3. Levontin, Le'erez, ii, 171.
4. CZA W/125/I [n.d. (May, 1905)], Levontin to Wolffsohn; cf. FO 195/2225, no.54 (27.12.1906), Freeman to Barclay.
5. Jewish Encyclopaedia, xii, 680-1.
6. JCA 267/no.129 (25.8.1905), Antébi to Pres., JCA.


the suspension of all land transfers to Jews then in process and the stringent implementation of the existing restrictions.[1] Reşid Bey had long conversations about the Congress with Albert Antébi and David Levontin.[2] Why, he asked Levontin (who had attended the Congress), did you, with your knowledge of local conditions, allow a resolution to be adopted which focuses Zionist aims exclusively on Palestine; moreover, why this talk of autonomy, why so much publicity and why appeal to the Great Powers to induce the Ottoman Government to accede to the Zionists? And what truth was there ~~to~~ in the rumour that Ussischkin would be the "Prince of Jerusalem"?[3]

In Palestine, it was fully expected that sales of miri land to Jews would soon be totally prohibited, thus reverting to the pre-November 1900 situation.[4] In autumn 1904, when Reşid Bey had been pressed from Constantinople for revenues due to the Ottoman Treasury, he had taken the opportunity of writing to the Minister of the Cadastre, pointing out that the requirement to seek the Porte's authority before transferring any miri land to foreigners had led to conflicts and had brought land sales to a standstill; since this resulted in losses to the Treasury he suggested that transfers of land measuring less than five-hundred dunams should be

1. JCA 261/encl. to no.338 (30.8.1905), Antébi to Dir.Gén., JCA.
2. JCA 267/no.129 (25.8.1905); & CZA Z2/598 (4.9.1905), Levontin to Wolffsohn; cf. Levontin, Le'erez, ii,115-16.
3. Loc.cit.
4. JCA 261/encl. to no.338 (30.8.1905).

Second 'Aliyyah settlements

founded in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem: 1906 - 7



executed locally, after appropriate inquiries had been made.[1] In October 1905, following the stir caused by the seventh Zionist Congress, the Minister of Internal Affairs replied that Reşid's suggestion had been rejected by the Council of State, since it would defeat the Government's object of preventing land passing into alien hands and foreign immigrants settling on it.[2] In effect, this communication did not alter the status quo; it merely maintained it. In consequence, the older Jewish colonies in the Mutasarriflik continued to expand and another two were founded: Beer Ya'aqov (1906) and Ben Shemen (1907).[3]

As a result of further pogroms in Russia, the volume of Jews seeking to settle in Palestine increased during and after 1905. In 1906, 3,450 Jewish settlers entered the country - almost three times as many as in the previous year and more than any other year between 1905 and 1913.[4] Even Reşid Bey expressed concern at the numbers involved, claiming, like his predecessors, that it was impossible to restrain

1. Q d'O N.S. 131, no.76 (27.10.1904), F. Wiel (Jerus.) to T. Delcassé (Paris), enclosing translation of Reşid Bey's letter to Min. of the Cadastre, dated 17.11.1904 [= 17.10.1904?].
2. FO 195/2199, no.56 (15.12.1905), Dickson to O'Conor, enclosing Turkish copy and English translation of Memduh Paşa (Min. of Internal Affairs) to Reşid Bey (2.10.1905).
3. Cf. L'Indépendance Arabe, i, 2 (1907), pp.27-8, alleging that Reşid Bey formed a syndicate to despoil the Arab peasants of their land and to sell it to the Zionists; & E. Jung, La Révolte Arabe (Paris, 1924), i, 17 (both these accounts are exaggerated, but they do contain more than a grain of truth).
4. Ha-ʿOlam, viii, 9 (19.3.1914): statistics of Jewish immigrants into Palestine from 1905 to 1913, as collected by the Information Office of the Odessa Committee. It is not known how reliable these statistics are, or if they include Jews joining the Old Yishshub - they probably do not.

Jews from settling in Palestine without the cooperation of the consuls.[1]

However, vigorous complaints against Reşid Bey now reached the Porte, accusing him of illegal transfer of land to Jews.[2] Reşid defended himself as best he could,[3] but was posted to Manastir at the end of 1906. On his departure he submitted a report in which he emphatically opposed continued Jewish immigration into Palestine.[4] The Jews, he said, sought autonomy in Palestine. To prove this he quoted from Ussischkin's pamphlet, Our Programme, which was central to the debates at the seventh Zionist Congress.[5] He summarised Ussischkin's thesis as follows:

> "[The following are required] in order to establish national sovereignty (which is the Zionists' aim):
> (a) financial and educational progress in Palestine,
> (b) consolidation of the economic forces of Jewish wealth,
> (c) strengthening and spreading of national feeling among the Jews,
> (d) a declaration regarding the necessity for diplomatic 'efforts'"[6]

1. ISA (T) no.100 (28.12.1905), Secretariat of Admin. Council (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir (no.29) and to Min. of Internal Affairs (no.87).
2. ISA (T) no.36 (11.7.1906), Reşid Bey to Grand Vezir [personal letter of defence]: Reşid says that the charges against him were brought by the former Director of the Cadastre in Jerusalem, whom he dismissed for irregular practices. L'Indépendance Arabe, i, 2 (1907), p.28, states that the Director of the Cadastre was dismissed in 1905 for opposing an illegal appropriation of land by Reşid. Cf. AIU X.E.29 (4.1.1911), Antébi to S. Loupo (Miqve Yisrael), re. another official whom Reşid Bey dismissed for complaining to Constantinople about his land sales to Jews.
3. ISA (T) no.36 (11.7.1906).
4. ISA (T) no.23 (28.11.1906), [Reşid Bey] to Grand Vezir.
5. M.M. Ussischkin, Nasha Programma (Vilna, 1905); Reşid Bey had presumably read extracts in translation from this pamphlet in the Zionist or general press.
6. ISA (T) no.23 (28.11.1906).

Though a little crude, this is a fair résumé of Ussischkin's programme; it was not calculated to appeal to the Porte. Reşid reported that although the Jews brought economic prosperity to the Mutasarriflik, they also caused administrative and political difficulties. He concluded by recommending the expulsion of those Jews already in Palestine (whom he had admitted so willingly); should this be impossible, he suggested they be harrassed, physically if the Government thought fit, so that others would be discouraged from coming.[1]

* * *

Reşid Bey was replaced by Ali Ekrem Bey [Bolayir], son of Namik Kemal, the famous Turkish poet and Young Ottoman protagonist. After two years' attendance at a rüsdiye school and some years with a private tutor for Turkish, Arabic, Persian and French, Ekrem Bey entered Abdülhamid's secretariat in 1888 at the age of twenty, where he remained until appointed Mutasarrif of Jerusalem in December 1906.[2]

1. After the Young Turk Revolution an investigation was initiated into Reşid Bey's activities - see AIU VIII.E. 25 & IX.E.26, many letters, beginning 22.10.1908. The results of the inquiry were favourable to Reşid Bey, thanks to efforts on his behalf by the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, Subhi Bey - see AIU IX.E.26 (3.3.1909), Antébi to Pres., AIU. Reşid Bey later became Minister of Internal Affairs - see Ch.VIII.
2. ISA (T) no.178 [bearing two discrepant dates: A.H. 5 R. Akhir 1310 (= 27.10.1892) & Maliye 24.10.1308 (= 5.11.1892)] & ISA (T) no.130 (5.10.1909): Ali Ekrem Bey's curriculum vitae of official service. See I.A. Gövsa, Türk Meşhurlari Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, n.d.), pp.111-12, "Ekrem, Kemalzade Ali Ekrem Bolayir", where Ekrem's career after leaving Jerusalem in August 1908 is also sketched: Ekrem continued for some time in the Ottoman provincial administration and then returned to teach literature and philology at the Darülfünun and the

(Cont'd p.119) .....

He had a commendable record of service with Abdülhamid, and was a friend of ʿIzzat Paşa and Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa (a future Grand Vezir).[1] He also knew Isaac Fernandez in Constantinople,[2] to whom he wrote in April, four months after his arrival in Jerusalem:

> "As for the business which you call political - the business of land sales - it is incontestable that it is taking on day by day an unmeasured proportion which is contrary to the spirit of the Government .... The Jews, as well as other groups, can buy land, but they must not appear to want to conquer Palestine .... So counsel your coreligionists moderation, equity and, above all, honesty. You know me enough to be convinced that I shall do all I can to prevent a [land] sale in which I suspect some illegitimate interest."[3]

In the same month, L'Indépendance Arabe attacked the Ottoman Government for hindering Egyptian companies, made up of both Syrian and foreign financiers who wished to develop untapped resources in the Arab provinces.[4] In May, a correspondent from Jerusalem to L'Indépendance Arabe asserted that Ali Ekrem Bey "semble vouloir adopter définitivement la ligne de conduite de son prédecesseur".[5] Ekrem Bey

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Military Academy in Constantinople. He also published a number of works, among them, Ruhu Kemal, Baria, Anavaten, Ordunun Defteri, Lisani Osmani, Şiir Demeti, Namik Kemal and Recaizade Ekrem.

1. ISA (T) no.92 (29.8.1907), Ekrem Bey (Jerus.) to [confidant at S.P.], indicating friendship with ʿIzzat Paşa; & ISA (T) no.149 [wrongly dated as 7.10.1894; correct date not known] Hüseyin Hilmi [Damascus?] to Ekrem Bey (addressed to "My child, light of my eyes" and signed "Your little brother, Hüseyin Hilmi").
2. AIU VIII.E.22 (23.5.1907), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
3. AIU IX.E.22 (25.4.1907), Ekrem Bey to I. Fernandez (Consple.), [copy].
4. L'Indépendance Arabe, i, 1 (1907), p.3.
5. Ibid. i, 2 (1907), p.28.

immediately wrote a letter to Abdülhamid's First Secretary, explaining that he had frustrated the activities of the British companies in Egypt because they were in league with the Jews,[1] and another to the Grand Vezir stating that the entry restrictions required the support of the consuls to be effective.[2] He also took measures to demonstrate that he had no intention of following in Reşid Bey's footsteps. He re-opened a question shelved by previous Mutasarrifs concerning some land at Miqve Yisrael on which no tax had ever been paid;[3] he stopped all planting and building operations on the Jewish colonies,[4] and pushed up the üşür on their crops.[5]

A personal letter from a confidant in Constantinople informed Ekrem Bey that the Grand Vezir had read his letter sympathetically and that only the question of Jewish settlement in Palestine seemed to require investigation.[6] Thereupon Ekrem Bey instituted a thorough inquiry into the matter. He gathered memoranda from his principal subordinates on the present state of affairs and their suggestions to remedy it.[7]

1. ISA (T) no.20 (16.6.1907), Ekrem Bey to First Imperial Secretary [Yildiz].
2. ISA (T) no.42 (23.6.1907), Ekrem Bey to Grand Vezir.
3. AIU VIII.E.22 (22.5.1907), Loupo to Antébi; plus many subsequent letters in AIU VIII.E.23 & VIII.E.24.
4. AIU VIII.E.23 (3.7.1907), Antébi to Loupo.
5. CZA Z2/598 (25.6.1907), Levontin to Wolffsohn; & AIU VIII.E.23 (3.7.1907), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
6. ISA (T) no.80 (4.7.1907), [confidant (S.P.)] to Ekrem Bey.
7. ISA (T) no.91, i (29.6.1907), Passport Officer (Jaffa) to Ekrem Bey; ISA (T) no.24 (30.6.1907), Chief of Police (Jaffa) to same; ISA (T) no.91, iii (10.7.1907), Director of Registry Office (Jerus.) to same; ISA (T) nos. 33 (9.7.1907), 25 (25.7.1907), 56 (29.7.1907), & 107 (29.8.1907), Kay. (Jaffa) to same; & ISA (T) nos. 28 & 101 (14.7.1907), Director of Cadastre (Jerus.) to same.

The Kaymakam of Jaffa, Asaf Bey, wrote that the Jews were mainly Russians and Austrians, and that they were streaming into Palestine "in their hundreds every week and perhaps every day".[1] Asaf Bey had been informed by the Dragoman of the Russian Vice-Consulate in Jaffa that the Jews were anarchists and revolutionaries, similar to the bands in Armenia and Bulgaria; their intention was to set up an independent government in Palestine with the help of the Great Powers; for this purpose they had established the Zionist Congress which aimed at raising the number of Jews beyond that of the Muslims, or at least to equal the Muslims in Palestine, whereafter they would initiate their treacherous activities.[2] On the basis of these memoranda and other documents in the archives of the Mutasarriflik, Ekrem Bey prepared a detailed analysis of the situation which he sent to ʿIzzat Paşa for delivery to the Grand Vezir "if it be suitable for that".[3]

He gave a lucid, uncompromising account of the Sublime Porte's instructions since 1884.[4] He attributed the inconsistencies in these and their ineffectiveness to the Porte's irresolution before the Great Powers. Ekrem Bey was irked by the consuls who supported protégés whom in private conversation they called "dirty Jews".[5] He drew attention

1. ISA (T) no.33. 2. Loc.cit.
3. ISA (T) no.92 (29.8.1907), Ekrem Bey to [confidant (S.P.)] telling him of the report which he had sent to ʿIzzat Paşa.
4. ISA (T) no.21 [no date, mid-August, 1907] is copy of the first part of Ekrem Bey's report, mentioned in ISA (T) no.92.
5. ISA (T) no.21: "Even now a Jew who has not freed himself - in private conversation with the Consuls - from the derogatory epithet "dirty Jew" ... [takes advantage

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to the "strange content" of the 1900 directives which were still in force but which had not and could never be applied. The Jews ignored the "absolute requirement" to bear a passport or equivalent indicating inter alia the purpose of their voyage, and there was no hint in the directives on how to deal with such cases. On the other hand, Article 17 of the "Ottoman Law regulating Foreign Passports" stated that voyagers reaching Ottoman ports without the necessary papers must obtain a passport or equivalent from their consul within forty-eight hours of arrival, paying a fine of forty piastres;[1] this provision opened the way for Jews to enter Palestine. The Jews welcomed the three-month permit de séjour (the "Red Slip") which they received on entry in exchange for their passports, because it guaranteed their admittance, while their expulsion was impossible; they had found various ways of retrieving their passports at a later date. Moreover, the Minister of Internal Affairs had himself deprived the directives of all practical force by instructing Reşid Bey in 1904 "not to permit a situation wherein problems arise with foreign embassies".[2] Ekrem Bey explained at length

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of his status as a foreign national]. The protection [received from the Consuls] extends not only over the genuine rights of the Jews but also over their imaginary rights, [being accorded] earnestly and stringently, and, if need be, with insults and force".

1. Cf. Young, Corps, ii, 267.
2. ISA (T) no.34 (8.9.1904), Min. of Internal Affairs to Reşid Bey.

the difficulties which former mutasarrifs had already reported to the Sublime Porte, adding a note that unpredictable seas at Jaffa made rapid disembarkation imperative and consequently the two or three officials on duty in the port were incapable of handling the rush.

The Israel State Archive is in possession only of the first part of Ekrem Bey's report, as described here. At the beginning of this document, Ekrem indicated that the other sections covered by the Jews' aims, information concerning the local Ottoman officials, a review of "harmful" land purchase and building by Jews, and recommendations for measures which should be taken henceforth.[1] To judge from his own statements and from the suggestions submitted by both the Kaymakam and the Chief of Police of Jaffa,[2] it may be conjectured that Ekrem Bey recommended scrupulous attention to the validity of the Jewish pilgrims' papers, an enlarged police force to keep track on these pilgrims, the revocation of titles to land illicitly transferred by former mutasarrifs, and perhaps even the demolition of building illegally erected by Jews over the previous decade. Ekrem Bey must also have had something to say on how to by-pass the non-cooperation of the consuls in Palestine.

The arrival of Ekrem Bey's report in Constantinople coincided with the receipt of a long account of the eighth Zionist Congress prepared by the Ottoman consul at the Hague (where the Congress was held from August 14th to 21st).[3]

1. ISA (T) no.21. 2. ISA (T) no.33 & ISA (T) no.24.
3. OFA 332/17, no.1205/30 (26.8.1907), Nisak Effendi (Hague) to Tevfik Paşa (Consple.), enclosing report, dated 22.8.1907, on the eighth Zionist Congress.

Before the month was out, the British Consul in Jerusalem had reason to suspect that Ekrem Bey had been sent "secret instructions" to hamper the APC's activities in Palestine;[1] then, at the beginning of September an order arrived from Constantinople prohibiting transfers of miri land to Ottoman Jews.[2] If Ekrem Bey did receive "secret instructions", they were speedily translated into practice. At the end of August the President of the Mixed Commercial Court in Jaffa refused to hear a case brought by the APC against a bankrupt Ottoman subject on the ground that "without an Imperial Iradé the [APC] could not be recognised".[3] The case was eventually heard after the intervention of the British Consul,[4] although Ekrem Bey had declared beforehand "that he was perfectly prepared to admit the Company's existence when desirous of borrowing money from it, but that this did not preclude him from refusing to acknowledge it whenever it suited him".[5]

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Ekrem Bey was well supported by the Kaymakam of Jaffa, Mehmed Asaf Bey, whom Ekrem had transferred from Beersheba to Jaffa in June 1907. Asaf Bey warned that if the Jews

1. FO 195/2255, no.35 (27.8.1907), Blech to O'Conor; on two subsequent occasions Blech reiterated his suspicions of "secret instructions" from the Porte, viz. FO 195/2287, no.1 (11.1.1908) & no.18 (25.3.1908), both to O'Conor.
2. AIU VIII.E.23 (11.9.1907), Antébi to Fernandez.
3. FO 195/2255, no.35.
4. FO 195/2255, no.59 (12.11.1907), Blech to O'Conor; cf. CZA W/126/I (19.1.1908), Levontin, "Bericht zur Bilanz per 31 Dezember 1907".
5. FO 195/2255, no.35.

were not stopped from purchasing land they would buy up the whole province.[1] Ekrem Bey was of the same opinion and thus in 1907 the APC managed to acquire just 1,600 dunams near Lydda[2] (whereas, in contrast, it had purchased 19,000 dunams throughout Palestine plus 8,000 square yards in Jaffa under Kâzim and Reşid in 1904[3]). At the end of 1907 the authorities began to refuse to permit land transfer formalities to proceed even when both the buyer and seller were non-Ottoman subjects, which the British Consul observed was a "new departure".[4] Asaf Bey energetically prevented further illegal building on the Jewish colonies,[5] and imposed what were felt to be "incredibly heavy" taxes upon them.[6] In January 1908, Ekrem Bey, on Asaf's advice, declined to accept a life-boat which an English lady of means wished to put at the disposal of the port in Jaffa for fear "that he may be accused of facilitating the disembarkation of Jews and especially of favouring British interests unduly".[7]

However, Asaf Bey's zeal led him to exceed his instructions as well. On March 16th, 1908 an incident occurred in Jaffa in which one Muslim and thirteen Jews were wounded.

1. ISA (T) no.17 (22.10.1907), Asaf Bey to Ekrem Bey.
2. CZA W/126/I (19.1.1908), Levontin, "Bericht zur Bilanz per 31 Dezember 1907".
3. CZA W/124/II (15.1.1905), Levontin, "Jahres-Bericht zur Bilanz 1904".
4. FO 195/2287, no.1 (11.1.1908), Blech to O'Conor; cf. CZA W/125/III [n.d., received 8.12.1907], Antébi to Levontin.
5. Cf. ISA (T) no.46 (24.10.1907), Asaf Bey to Ekrem Bey, seeking permission to demolish illegal building.
6. CZA W/125/III (27.12.1907), Levontin to Wolffsohn.
7. FO 195/2287, no.2 (18.1.1908), Blech to O'Conor, and no.18 (25.3.1908), Blech to Barclay.

The accounts of the incident differ significantly, but they concur in the following general outline.[1] At about 8 o'clock on the eve of the Jewish festival of Purim, five young Jews quarrelled and brawled with a Muslim shopkeeper, who received multiple stab wounds in the mêlée which involved other bystanders as well. The Jews fled to a nearby Jewish hotel, Hotel Baruch, while the police were summoned. About an hour later, the police appeared accompanied by a kavas from the Russian Vice-Consulate (since Hotel Baruch belonged to a Russian subject). The police entered the hotel, and with the kavas's permission arrested five Jews. They then proceeded with the kavas to a second hotel, Hotel Spector, where large numbers of Jews were assembled for a Purim celebration, but no arrests were made there. About a quarter of an hour later, the Chief of the Gendarmerie broke into Hotel Spector with soldiers and some Muslim Arabs; shots were heard and thirteen Jews sustained bullet wounds, some of them severe.

The British Consul in Jerusalem, Edward Blech, reported that there had been growing bitterness in Jaffa against the

1. British reports in FO 195/2287 and German reports in ISA (G) and PRO (G) K 692 corroborate and complement one another; letters in the CZA files are also helpful. The official Ottoman authorities' account and that of Jewish leaders in Jaffa (both enclosed in FO 195/2287, no.18 (25.3.1909) Blech to Barclay) are described as "grossly exaggerated" and "unreliable" respectively. An Arab account of the incident was published in al-Ahram, no.1282 (10.4.1908) which bears little relation to what actually happened; while a Jewish account published in ha-Poʿel ha-Ẓaʿir (March, 1908), follows the official Jewish version mentioned above, but gives its own analysis of the reasons for the episode. Part of the al-Ahram report is contrasted with a pro-Jewish account in RMM, v, 7 (1908), pp.514-20, "Un incident à Jaffa: double version".

inrush of Jews in recent years.[1] Both Blech and the German Vice-Consul in Jaffa, Rössler, felt the Russian Jews were themselves partly at fault, because they were "turbulent and aggressive, saturated with socialistic ideas";[2] David Levontin went further than this, reproaching certain of the recent Jewish immigrants for publishing indiscreet articles in their journal, ha-Poʿel ha-Zaʿir, which were read in translation by Ottoman officials and Christian intellectuals.[3] However, Rössler agreed with Jewish observers in associating the particular tension between Arabs and Jews in Jaffa which had precipitated the incident with Asaf Bey's appointment in June 1907.[4] According to Rössler, Asaf Bey had openly voiced anti-Jewish sentiments, and had influenced his subordinates and some of the Arab population.[5] Blech had little doubt that "when the affray and the arrest of the guilty Jews were reported to the Kaïmmakam [sic] he expressed strong resentment against the Jews; his hearers [the soldiers under the Chief of the Gendarmerie] thereupon took this as an authority to go and give [the Jews] a good lesson".[6] Asaf Bey later claimed he had dispatched soldiers to the scene because the Jews were plotting a revolution; the soldiers had merely returned the Jews' fire. Rössler discounted

1. FO 195/2287, no.18 (25.3.1908), Blech to Barclay.
2. FO 195/2287, no.16 (19.3.1908), Blech to O'Conor.
3. CZA Z2/599 (7.4.1908), Levontin to Wolffsohn.
4. PRO (G) K 692/Türkei 195, no.32/369 (20.3.1908), Rössler (Jaffa) to Reichskanzler (Berlin), [copy in ISA (G) A III 15, ii].
5. Loc.cit.
6. FO 195/2287, no.18.

Asaf's statements, pointing out that there were only 6,000 Jews in Jaffa among a total population of 44,000, and that Jews alone were wounded in the tumult.[1]

One of the most noteworthy aspects of the whole incident was the part played in it by the Russian Vice-Consul, Leonid Piper. Asaf Bey had acknowledged his reliance on the Russian Vice-Consulate for his information about the Jews in a memorandum to Ekrem Bey in July 1907.[2] Rössler emphasised that his Russian colleague was an anti-Semite, who regarded every additional Russian Jew as an unwelcome burden to be treated with bureaucratic unpleasantness. Rössler blamed Piper for authorising the entry into both hotels which had resulted in the injury of thirteen innocent Jews.[3] After the incident Piper sought to exculpate the Ottoman authorities in Jaffa,[4] and he was loth to help a delegation of his Jewish protégés, declaring "dass die Unruhe wohl vorauszusehen war, denn es kämen sicher Leute, die in Russland Bomben geworfen haben und auch hier provozieren".[5] (The significance of the Russian Vice-Consul's influence is taken up in the second part of this chapter, below).

On account of Jewish and consular pressure in Palestine and at the Sublime Porte, Asaf Bey was summoned to Constantinople

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1. PRO (G) K 692/Türkei 195, no.32/369; cf. AIU I.C.3 (27.3.1908), E. Astruc (Jaffa) to Pres., AIU.
2. ISA (T) no.33 (9.7.1907), Asaf Bey to Ekrem Bey.
3. PRO (G) K 692/Türkei 195, no.32/369.
4. FO 195/2287, no.16.
5. CZA Z2/632 (20.3.1908), J. Thon (Jaffa) to Wolffsohn.

about two weeks later,[1] Ekrem Bey was greatly affected by the whole incident.[2] Albert Antébi told him plainly of the distaste with which he was regarded by the Jews in the Mutasarriflik,[3] thus moving Ekrem to reverse his policies

1. FO 195/2287, no.18, & PRO (G) K 692/Türkei 195, no.32/369: the Russian Consul-General in Jerusalem as well as Blech and Rössler felt that Asaf Bey should be dismissed; CZA Z2/599 (24.3.1908), Thon [to Wolffsohn] reporting that a Jewish delegation had demanded Asaf's dismissal of Ekrem Bey; CZA W/62 (29.3.1908, 6. & 17.4.1908), Wellisch (Consple.) to Wolffsohn reporting Jewish pressure in Constantinople; cf. AIU VIII.E.24 [n.d. (ca. 15.4.1908)], M. Dizengoff (Consple.) to H. Frank (Jaffa), re. same; FO 195/2287, no.20 (2.4.1908), Blech to Barclay reporting Asaf Bey's summons to Constantinople as a "great success for the Russian Consul-General". In Constantinople, Asaf Bey submitted a report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, listing the steps he had taken to combat Zionist progress in the Kaza of Jaffa and arguing that the Jews, having come to regard him as their arch-enemy, arranged the Purim incident in order to "frame" him; the Ministry of Internal Affairs forwarded Asaf's report to the Palace, coupling with it a memorandum explaining the ineffectiveness of the November 1900 directives and recommending that the problem be re-examined to prevent further difficulties in the future; the Palace Secretariat acknowledged receipt of these documents and passed on an order from Abdülhamid instructing the Council of Ministers to discuss the question and to submit the results of their deliberations to him; copies of all these documents were obtained by Isaac Fernandez and sent through Albert Antébi to Paris - see AIU VIII.E.24 (20.5.1908), Antébi to Pres., AIU; cf. CZA W/126/II (21.5.1908), Levontin (Jerus.) to Wolffsohn. Meanwhile Ottoman representatives abroad were circularised with a reminder that Jews travelling to Palestine could only be issued with visas valid for no more than three months - see OFA A/346, no.72148/30 (24.5.1908), Tevfik Paşa (Consple.) to Ottoman representatives. Shortly thereafter, Asaf Bey was found innocent for his part in the Jaffa incident and appointed Kaymakam of Cebel Bereket in July 1908 - see CZA Z2/7 (18.9.1908), V. Jacobson (Consple.) to Wolffsohn. In July 1909 he was arrested and later found guilty for his part in assaults on the Armenians in his kaza following the April counter-Revolution in Constantinople - see The Times (24.4.1909, 16.7.1909 & 5.10.1909), and ha-Mebasser, I, 5 (1910), p.80.
2. AIU VIII.E.24 (3.4.1908), Antébi to Frank.
3. AIU VIII.E.24 (5.4.1908), same to same.

in an effort to efface the impression that he was an "anti-Semite". He began by denouncing his ex-favourite, Asaf Bey, in public,[1] and then by ordering the Director of the Cadastre in Jerusalem to facilitate land transfers to Jews "during these critical moments".[2] A couple of days later he had a Jew co-opted on to the Administrative Council in Jerusalem and he told Antébi that he intended to confer with him (Antébi) on all Jewish matters.[3] At the end of April Antébi reported that although Ekrem Bey's "repentance" was not voluntary, it was real; and he therefore advised that no pressure should be brought to bear in Constantinople to have him removed from Jerusalem.[4] Ekrem Bey remained at his post for the next three months until he was transferred to Beirut shortly after the Young Turk Revolution.

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Between 1897 and 1901 it was less difficult for Jews to settle in the Vilayet of Beirut than in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem. After 1901 the position was reversed. This reflected the background and character of the men sent to govern the two provinces, and determined the trends in Jewish colonisation for the decade 1897-1907. In the first part of this decade JCA concentrated its attentions on the

1. AIU VIII.E.24 (5.4.1908), Antébi to Frank.
2. Loc.cit.
3. AIU VIII.E.24 (7.4.1908), same to same; cf. AIU VIII.E.24 (10.4.1908), Antébi to Loupo, describing an inquiry from Ekrem Bey about the most politic way of implementing an instruction from Constantinople regarding the untaxed land at Migve Yisrael.
4. AIU VIII.E.24 (26.4.1908), Antébi to Frank.

north of Palestine, whilst in the second part of it, the Zionist Movement, through the APC, gained a foothold in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem, where Abdülhamid had defeated his own purpose by appointing Palace secretaries as mutasarrifs. However, while corrupt mutasarrifs could be replaced, the local Arab population remained - but not impervious to what it saw happening in its midst.

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The Arabs in Palestine

On January 1st, 1900, Baron Edmond de Rothschild placed under JCA's direction all the colonies which he had supported since 1882. Thereby JCA became responsible for almost every Jewish colony in Palestine.[1] Prior to the transfer, Emile Meyerson from JCA's head office in Paris inspected the Baron's colonies; it can be seen from his report and subsequently from the annual reports of the JCA administrators in Palestine that Arab peasants in the vicinity of these older colonies had grown to accept them (after the initial resentment and friction described in Ch.I).[2] The new colonies established between 1899 and 1907 were treated by the fellaheen in much the same way as the earlier ones and thus little need be added here, except to remark that tensions were greater in the north of Palestine with its mixed unruly population and where vacant arable land was harder to find (see Ch.IV).

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1. JCA 257/no.115 (29.12.1899), Sonnenfeld and Adler to Haym and Niégo, announcing cession of Baron Edmond de Rothschild's colonies to JCA.
2. JCA 273/[no number], (5.10.1899), Meyerson to Pres., JCA: report on Rothschild colonies; annual reports for colonies in south of Palestine for years 1900 to 1912 in JCA 256, 261 & 276 (somewhat out of chronological order).

In Jerusalem Albert Antébi observed that the public announcement of the Zionists' objective - "a home in Palestine" - soon affected the relations in the towns between Arabs and the Jewish immigrants. The Mufti of Jerusalem's antagonism to Jewish settlement in Palestine has been mentioned above; in 1899, when this question was being discussed by the Administrative Council in Jerusalem, he proposed that "the new arrivals be terrorised prior to the expulsion of all foreign Jews established in Palestine since the [1891] law of prohibition".[1] This proposal, however, was not carried.[2] In 1900, Antébi reported that the Zionists had made the Muslim population ill-disposed to all progress accomplished by the Jews.[3] A year and a half later, illiterate Muslim peasants asked him "Is it true that the Jews wish to retake this country?";[4] and early in 1902 he noted that the ill-will had spread to the Administrative Council, the law-courts and government officials[5] - many of whom, especially at lower levels, were drawn from the local population.

The growing rancour was not unnatural. The number of Jews in Palestine had been increasing steadily for the last twenty years, against the wishes of the Sublime Porte whose lead, in this instance, the local population probably followed. Arab feelings for Europeans were not unlike those of

1. JCA 263/no.17 (23.10.1899), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
2. Loc.cit.
3. JCA 263/no.37 (8.1.1900), same to same.
4. JCA 265/no.114 (27.5.1901), same to same.
5. JCA 265/no.4 (28.2.1902), same to same.

the Turks; as the proverb put it: "The foreign hand destroys the well-conditioned house".[1] And Muslim sentiments in Jerusalem were reflected in the following statement made in 1903 by a young (and, it is reported, not very fanatical) Arab:

> "We shall pour out everything to the last drop of our blood rather than see our ḥaram sharif fall into the hands of non-Muslims "[2]

The deepening antipathy for the Jews can also be regarded as developing from the attitudes towards the Jews already prevailing in Palestine before the arrival of the new immigrants, as described in the Introduction to this study (see above pp.xxviii-xxxi). The changing relationship in the towns was no doubt a function of all these factors; but, in addition, Albert Antébi was too familiar with local conditions in Palestine to be disbelieved when he reported in 1902 that "la malveillance des autochtones coincide avec la création du sionisme".[3] Perhaps one qualification ought to be appended to this observation: in these early years it is unlikely that the Arabs in Palestine differentiated between members of the Old and the New Yishshubs; their antipathy can be expected to have been directed at all foreign Jews. It was not until the Young Turk Revolution that a conscious distinction was made between "Jew" and "Zionist" (see Ch.IV).

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1. J.L. Burckhardt, Arabic Proverbs (London, 1830), p.35; "al-yad al-ghariba tukharrib al-buyut al-ʿamira".
2. AIU I.G.2 (1.3.1903), H. Calmy (Jerus.) to Pres., AIU.
3. JCA 265/no.4 (28.2.1902), Antébi to Pres., JCA.

Arab Christians were soon to take a leading part in moulding Arab opposition to the Zionists. In 1896 there were 70,800 Christians in Palestine, mostly Greek Orthodox, Latin and Greek Catholics (representing 16% of the total population). Unlike the Muslims, they were in the main neither a rural nor an agricultural group. 51% of them lived in the towns (whereas only 32% of the Muslims were town-dwellers).[1] As a group they were better educated than the Muslims, predominating in trade and offices; a few of them owned large quantities of land and a handful were professional men. Ample proof that certain educated Christians were well informed about Zionism and the Jewish colonies is to be found in an article entitled "Die jüdischen Kolonien und Niederlassungen in Syrien und Palästina" by Dr. Lamec Saad, the chief quarantine officer in Jaffa.[2] As a brief factual description of the colonies and of the activities of Baron Edmond de Rothschild, the Jewish Colonization Association and the Zionist Movement, this is one of the best contemporary accounts available in any language.

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1. These statistics are taken from V. Cuinet, Syrie, Liban et Palestine (Paris, 1896), passim.
2. Dr. A. Petermanns Mitteilungen, xlix, 11 (1903), pp. 250-4; Lamec Saad was born in al-ʿAbbadiyya, Lebanon, in 1852. He studied medicine in Germany and contributed regularly to Dr. A. Petermanns Mitteilungen and other European journals. He also wrote two books: 16 Jahre als Quarantänearzt in der Türkei (Berlin, 1913); & Palästina-Erinnerungen: 14 Jahre Quarantänearzt in Jafa (Berlin, 1929).

The Arab Christians' fears of economic competition from the Jews have already been alluded to (see above, pp.44, 57-57(a),n.2, & 90-1); but, in addition, it is clear that they were not entirely free from that type of anti-Jewish prejudice usually thought to have been restricted at this time to certain groups in Europe. Both Sylvia Haim and Moshe Perlmann[1] ascribe the penetration of European anti-Semitism into the Arab world to the "anti-Dreyfusard clergy so well represented among the missionaries".[2] However, this would put the blame too severely and too indiscriminately on but one of the several foreign elements present in Syria and Palestine, all capable of conveying European biases to the Arabs. It is more probable that these various elements, none of which may have had great individual influence, combined to infect the Arabs, consciously or otherwise, with modern anti-Semitism.

As early as 1899, Elie Saphir, a Palestinian Jew and a good Arabist, observed that foreign missionaries and priests were inclining Arab sentiment against the Jews.[3] Protestant missionaries, aiming at conversion, indirectly disseminated anti-Jewishness. Saphir cites as evidence the Arabic translation of Ben Hur, an evangelical novel with a passage at the end about Jesus' death at the hands of the Jews, made by Dr. Cornelius van Dyke, the influential

1. Haim, "Arabic Antisemitic Literature"; and M. Perlmann, "Comment on Sylvia G. Haim's Article", Jewish Social Studies, xvii, 4 (1955), pp.313-14.
2. Ibid. p.314.
3. Saphir, "ha-Sin'ah le-yisra'el".

missionary and educator at the Syrian Protestant College.[1] Much more damage, Saphir said, was being done by Catholics, especially Jesuits, through their literature and in their schools. He instances three books and also implicates al-Bashir, the important Jesuit newspaper published in Beirut.[2] These publications in themselves are meagre proof of what Haim and Perlmann call the activities of the "anti-Dreyfusard clergy"; however, weightier evidence may be adduced from writings by Père Henri Lammens, the Belgian scholar who taught at the Jesuit University of Beirut. An early article by him, entitled "Le 'Sionisme' et les colonies juives", appeared in the Jesuit journal Études;[3] its tone, which is as anti-Jewish as it is anti-Zionist, was set in the opening paragraph describing the first Zionist Congress:

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1. Saphir, "ha-Sin'ah le-yisra'el", pp.228-9; C. van Dyke, Buzugh al-nur ʿala ibn ḥur (Egypt, 1897).
2. Saphir, op.cit.p.231, giving titles as Ṣawt al-bariyya and Aṣḥab al-ukhdud. It seems that Saphir quoted the titles from memory, as neither appear in Y. Sarkis, Muʿjam al-maṭbuʿat al-ʿarabiyya wal-muʿarraba (Cairo, 1928). Saphir states that the first dealt with the "Blood Libel" and that the Ottoman Government had ordered it to be burnt. He may have had in mind Ḥabib Faris' Ṣarrakh al-barr fi buq al-ḥurr (Egypt, 1891), which, according to Sarkis, op.cit. i, 741, dealt with the murder of Henri ʿAbd al-Nur in Damascus; ha-Or, viii, 37 (19.8.1892), reported that this book, which raised the "Blood Libel" against the Jews, had reached a number of the Ottoman officials in Palestine and had been condemned by the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem. The second work, Aṣḥab al-ukhdud, was a play about the Jews of Himyar murdering the Christian "Martyrs of Najran" in the sixth century - see Quran, lxxxv, 4-7; & EI2, p.692. The third work Saphir alludes to was a book "translated from French" some years ago "whose name is no longer known". op.cit. p.231. He was probably thinking of Najib al-Ḥajj's Fi al-zawaya jinaya - see above, pp.57-57(a), n.2.
3. Études, vol.lxxiii (1897), pp.433-63.

> "Comme dans une vulgaire réunion des goyim presque tous ces délégués étaient en habit et en cravate blanche; très clair-semées apparaissaient les houppelandes rabbiniques ".[1]

According to Lammens, the Jews of Jerusalem were "reconnaissables ... à leur repoussante malpropreté et surtout à ce fameux nez sémite, qui n'est pas, comme le nez grec, un pur mythe".[2]

Saphir stated that among the Greek Orthodox Arabs a dislike for the Jews was not noticeable.[3] However, by 1909 it had become noticeable - as Yusuf al-Khalidi warned it might (see Ch.IV). To some extent the Russian Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society must be held responsible for this. This Society supported over one-hundred Greek Orthodox institutions (mainly schools) in Syria and Palestine, and its attitude towards the Jews was an extension of that of the Czar's government in Russia: thus, for example, the Society's clinics were open to all sections of the local population, save the Jews.[4]

Moreover, some members of the consular corps in Palestine were not above passing on European prejudices to the local Arabs and the Ottoman authorities. In 1905, David Haym reported that "le Consulat ~~de Autriche~~ d'Autriche à Jaffa s'est permis

1. Etudes, vol.lxxiii (1897), p.433.
2. Ibid. p.440; cf. also pp.443, 450-1, & 452; a shortened version of this article appeared in Arabic in al-Mashriq, vol.ii (1898), pp.1089-94; cf. ibid. pp.406-8, another article by Lammens, "al-Yahud al-ta'ih". Lammens' mixed anti-Jewishness and anti-Zionism is also apparent in "Le Sionisme et la Turquie", Etudes, vol.lvi, (1919), pp.438-58.
3. Saphir, op.cit., p.230.
4. Otchet, vol.i (1896), p.39.

de transmettre à l'autorité locale turque une dénonciation contre la population juive, émanant d'un protégé autrichien".[1] Leonid Piper's rôle in the incident in Jaffa in 1908 shows that the Russians were guilty of this as well (see above, p.128). Foreign banks and traders, such as the Crédit Lyonnais and the Deutsches Palästina Bank, did not welcome Jewish incursions into their fields and so, for example, they tried to oppose the opening of the APC in Jaffa in 1903 (see above, p.110). Nor did the 1,200 German Templars in Palestine rejoice at the Jews;[2] they too feared economic rivalry and also the possibility that the restrictions against the Jews might be made to embrace themselves as well.[3] In 1900 Antébi wrote to Paris that "Jérusalem possède déjà son club antisémite allemand".[4]

It is impossible to measure in any precise way how much these various foreign elements influenced the urban Christian Arabs in the first instance and then the rest of the indigenous population. But in hindsight, it can be sensed that their combined influence was considerable and that it extended beyond the Christian community. In Jaffa, two Latin Catholic landowners (both of whom sold land to Jews) are named in connection with anti-Jewish approaches to the Mutasarrifs of Jerusalem during this period. After the seventh Zionist

1. CZA Z1/545 (6.6.1905), Haym (Jaffa) to Dr. Soskin [Berlin?].
2. This figure of 1,200 Templars is given by N. Verney & G. Dambmann in Les Puissances Etrangères dans le Levant, en Syrie et en Palestine (Paris, 1900), pp.39-40.
3. PRO (G) K 692/Türkei 195, no.49 (19.6.1897), von Tischendorf (Jerus.) to Reichskanzler (Berlin), [draft in ISA (G) A III 15, i]; cf. Levontin, Le'erez, i, 81, referring to early 1880's; & R. Gottheil, Zionism (Philadelphia, 1914), p.158, referring to 1900's.
4. JCA 263/no.37 (8.1.1900), Antébi to Pres., JCA.

Congress in 1905, Anṭun Qaṣṣar is reported to have denounced the Jewish immigrants before Reşid Bey;[1] and in 1907, both he and Iskandar Ruk are mentioned as having helped to influence Ekrem Bey against the Jews.[2] In 1909, a young Muslim in Jerusalem, Isʿaf al-Nashashibi, who was beginning to make his name in the Arab literary world, prefaced an early story about a saintly wizard and an impious Jew with an acknowledgement to Drumont and his followers - "great Frenchmen", his "masters and teachers".[3] His real masters and teachers were surely the foreign missionaries and priests, the consuls and merchants, the German Templars and representatives of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society who had informed the prevailing animus against the Jews among the urban population of Palestine with a new and distinctive colouring.

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The case of Négib Azoury is of special interest. Azoury was a Syrian Maronite,[4] who had been brought up in Paris.[5] He had studied at L'Ecole des sciences politiques before

1. CZA Z2/598 (4.9.1905), Levontin (Jerus.) to Wolffsohn; cf. Levontin, Le erez, ii, 115.
2. AIU VIII.E.22 (23.5.1907), Antébi to Pres., AIU; CZA W/125/II (18.12.1907), Levontin to Wolffsohn; & AIU I.G. 2 (17.8.1908), Frank to Antébi. Iskandar Ruk was appointed Mayor of Jaffa in 1910 - see ha-Or, ii, 22 (14.11.1910); in 1902, his brother, Alfred, had killed a settler on Rishon le Zion while drunk - for details, see PJCA 23/152, many letters.
3. Ha-Zebi, xxv, 129 (15.3.1909), reporting Isʿaf al-Nashashibi's tale, "The Wizard and the Jew", which had appeared in al-Aṣmaʿi, a newspaper in Jaffa.
4. Q d'O N.S.109, no.14 (8.2.1905), F. Wiet (Jerus.) to Delcassé.
5. Jung, Révolte Arabe, i, 10-11.

entering the mülkiye school in Constantinople. In 1898, at ~~about~~ about the age of twenty-five, he came to Jerusalem to serve in the Ottoman administration where, according to the French Consul, he did not distinguish himself for one of two reasons: he was a Christian or he simply lacked talent.[1] In Jerusalem, he married the daughter of the "sous-agent des Messageries Maritimes"; his wife's sister was married to Bishara Ḥabib Effendi, the Mutasarrif's secretary and interpreter. Azoury is reported to have been over-ambitious and to have coveted Bishara's post; but, failing to obtain it, he tried to be appointed concessionaire of the Régie des tabacs in Jaffa.[2] Unsuccessful in this as well, he began to intrigue against the Mutasarrif, Kâzim Bey,[3] and also, according to Albert Antébi, against his in-laws.[4] Kâzim Bey was incensed and Azoury, fearing reprisals, fled to Cairo in May 1904,[5] where he attacked Kâzim Bey in al-Ikhlaṣ for his corruption and for his deference to Antébi.[6] From Cairo he travelled to Paris where he founded his Ligue de la Patrie Arabe, only to be condemned to death by imperial decree on July 31st "for having left his post without permission and having proceeded to Paris

1. Q d'O N.S. 109, no.14 (8.2.1905); in 1903 Azoury was an assistant of the fourth grade (maiyet memuru), the lowest ranking official listed in the Salname [Ottoman Year Book], (Constantinople, A.H.1321 [= 1903-4), pp.810-11. Cf. PJCA 23/152 (14.12.1902), Antébi to I. Lévy (Jerus.): "Azoury est inoffensif grâce à son imbécillité".
2. Q d'O N.S. 109, no.14 (8.2.1905).
3. Loc.cit.
4. AIU VII.E.18 (16.2.1905), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
5. Loc.cit. & Q d'O N.S. 109, no.14 (8.2.1905).
6. AIU VI.E.16 (22.6.1904), Antébi to Pres., AIU; & Q d'O N.S. 131, no.39 (30.6.1904), A. Boppe (Jerus.) to Delcassé.

where he has devoted himself to acts compromising the existence of the Empire".[1] In December 1904 and January 1905, Azoury's Ligue issued two manifestos, both headed "Les Pays Arabes aux Arabes", the first addressed to "Tous les Citoyens de la Patrie Arabe asservie aux Turcs", and the second to the "Nations éclairées et humanitaires de l'Europe et de l'Amérique du Nord".[2] A month later, Azoury published Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe,[3] in which he called for the complete detachment of the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire.[4]

In his first chapter, Azoury elaborates the "géographie politique" of Palestine "qui constitue une miniature achevée du futur empire arabe".[5] In doing so, he touched on Jewish activities in Palestine. His statistics are not always accurate or unbiased: there were only 200,000 Arabs in Palestine, whilst an equal number of Jews was already there.[6] He is at pains to prove from the Bible that the Hebrews never subdued the whole of Palestine and so their kingdom, being

1. L'Indépendance Arabe, i, 7-8 (1907), p.97.
2. Specimens of these manifestos are to be found in ISA (G) A III 1, i.
3. Azoury appears to have relied on the works of Alphonse d'Alonzo - La Russie en Palestine (Paris, 1901); Cardinal et Ministre générale: Congrès Eucharistique de Jérusalem et état des missions françaises en Orient (Jerusalem, 1902); & Les Allemands en Orient (Brussels, 1904); cf. Q d'O N.S. 109, no.14 (8.2.1905).
4. For Azoury's place in the Arab nationalist movement, see Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp.277-9; and S.G.Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), pp.29-30 & 81-2.
5. N. Azoury, Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe (Paris, 1905), p.iv.
6. Ibid. p.22.

vulnerable, was destroyed;[1] the Zionists now wish to avoid this error by occupying the "natural frontiers" of the country - no less than Mount Hermon in the north, the Suez canal and the Arabian Desert in the south-west and east.[2] Circumstances favour the Zionists because they can exploit the corruption and disorder of the local administration as well as the ignorance of the consuls.[3]

Azoury was violently attacked a year later by Farid Kassab, a Greek Orthodox Arab from Beirut, then studying dentistry in Paris.[4] Kassab's pamphlet is not so much a logical refutation of the call to Arab independence but invective against Azoury, the Catholic Church and the Jesuits.[5] The Pope conspires to make Jerusalem his second seat, and Azoury is his agent.[6] Kassab challenges the existence of an "Arab nation" and Azoury's definition of it;[7] he reviles the treachery of the Christians in the Balkans and Asia Minor and the designs of the Great Powers;[8] he exonerates the Ottoman authorities of corrupt government and extols life within the Empire.[9] Kassab reserves special praise for the recent Jewish settlers in Palestine: they are peaceable and inoffensive, belonging to the same race as the Arabs; they are no more

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1. N. Azoury, Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe, pp.3-6.
2. Ibid. pp.6-7.
3. Ibid. pp.44-7.
4. F. Kassab, Le Nouvel Empire Arabe: La Curie Romaine et le Prétendu Péril Juif Universel - Réponse à M.N. Azoury bey. Little is known about Farid Kassab; he wrote another pamphlet three years later, entitled Palestine, Hellénisme et Cléricalisme (Constantinople, 1909), also from a staunchly Ottomanist point of view.
5. Kassab, Empire Arabe, passim.
6. Ibid. p.23.
7. Ibid. pp.28-9.
8. Ibid. pp.31ff.
9. Ibid. pp.34ff.

commercially minded than those around them, whereas they are more devoted to industry and agriculture than anyone else; they do immense good in reviving their own barren land, thereby benefiting the Empire as well as themselves; moreover, the Jews are not foreigners either morally or politically; they become loyal Ottoman subjects, without ambitions of national independence in Palestine.[1] Azoury is a "catholique bigot, membre de la société jésuitique", believing that the Jews are deicides and therefore eternally damned;[2] Azoury is "non seulement anti-juif au point de vue religieux, mais aussi anti-sémite".[3]

There is substance to this last accusation. As Albert Hourani has pointed out, the Ligue de la Patrie Arabe "clearly echoes ... the anti-Dreyfusard Ligue de la Patrie française".[4] Moreover, the Ligue enjoyed the patronage of such distinguished conservatives as Charles-Alexandre Dupuy, Alexandre Ribot and Paul Doumer,[5] who had held high governmental office during the Dreyfus Case. Azoury intimates in his preface that his book is intended to complement a larger work to be published shortly, Le Péril juif universel, Révélations et études politiques;[6] those who have dealt with the Jewish question until now have not taken its universal character sufficiently into account.[7] Azoury anticipates and disclaims possible charges of exaggeration, by asserting that

1. Kassab, Empire Arabe, pp.38ff.
2. Ibid. p.40.
3. Ibid. p.39.
4. Hourani, Arabic Thought, p.277.
5. Jung, Révolte Arabe, i, 18.
6. Azoury, Nation Arabe, p.iii.
7. Ibid. p.vi.

he has based himself on Jewish sources, though he adds that he only accepts his own church's interpretation of the Bible, which is infinitely superior to "l'interprétation matérielle et littérale qu'en font les Juifs, [et qui] rend ce livre [Bible] dangereux et immoral, et constitue pour eux la plus terrible condemnation".[1] Farid Kassab's rejoinder to Azoury is cast in the tradition of Arab polemics. It is exaggerated and vituperative; Azoury's character and his religion are execrated more than his thesis is assailed. Kassab's remarks about the Jewish settlers in Palestine are therefore not to be taken at face value. On the other hand, Azoury's book (aside from its significance within the literature of the Arab movement) does represent a departure from other writings by Arabs at this time: Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe is permeated with European anti-Semitism, which Azoury probably picked up as a student in Paris.

Azoury's experience as an Ottoman official in Palestine gave him the distinction of being the first Arab publicist to warn that Zionist and Arab nationalist aspirations would come into conflict. Azoury had worked in Jerusalem at a time when two corrupt Palace secretaries (Cavid Bey and Kâzim Bay) had governed the Mutasarriflik. He had witnessed the ineffectuality of the entry restrictions against Jewish immigrants, the Jews' steady land purchases and the opening of a Zionist bank in Jaffa (which very quickly established branches in Jerusalem and Haifa).[2] No doubt in trying hard

1. Azoury, Nation Arabe, p.vii
2. Cf. L'Indépendance Arabe, i, 1 (1907), p.3.

to carry out his duties as an Ottoman official, his ambitions had been frustrated at every turning by the Jews' constant reliance on their consuls and their Capitulatory privileges.[1] Indeed, it is tempting to suggest that this experience embittered Azoury and led him to the conclusion that continued allegiance to the Ottoman Empire would deprive the Arabs of their homeland,[2] with the result that he came to advocate total Arab independence from the Turks. Of the potential Arab-Zionist conflict he wrote:

> "Deux phénomènes importants, de même nature et pourtant opposés, qui n'ont encore attiré l'attention de personne, se manifestent en ce moment dans la Turquie d'Asie: ce sont, le réveil de la nation arabe et l'effort latent des Juifs pour reconstituer sur une très large échelle l'ancienne monarchie d'Israël. Ces deux mouvements sont destinés à se combattre continuellement, jusqu'à ce que l'un d'eux l'emporte sur l'autre. Du résultat final de cette lutte entre ces deux peuples représentant deux principes contraires dépendra le sort du monde entier "[3]

There is reason to believe that other Arabs, less articulate than Azoury, shared or at least were affected by his views.[4] Copies of Azoury's manifestos entered Palestine; and in May and June of 1905 the German Vice-Consul in Jaffa reported that, in an effort to counter the influence of these manifestos, the Ottoman authorities had imprisoned or put under arrest a number of Arab notables in Jaffa, Gaza and

1. Cf. Chissin, Miyyoman, p.85 (14.5.1886), where Chissin even at this early date had observed that because of the Jews' reliance on their consuls, the Ottoman authorities could not fulfil any of their duties and thus "every small official bears bitterness in his heart at this situation".
2. Cf. Azoury, Nation Arabe, pp.44-7. 3. Ibid. p.v.
4. Cf. JCA 265/no.114 (27.5.1901), Antébi to Prés., JCA: "Les Chrétiens ... craignent la rapacité ottomane pour réaliser l'espoir des sionistes."

Ramle.[1] But even before this, a petty incident had occurred in Jaffa which was worthy of note. In February, a member of the Ḥusayni family was affronted when David Levontin replied sharply to his rudeness on being refused a payment in advance by the APC. The Ḥusayni was so wounded by Levontin's retort ("Sie sind doch ein gebildeter Mann und verhandeln mit uns wie ein Fellach vom Dorf"),[2] that he complained in English to the President of the APC in London. His choice of words was not without significance. He introduced himself as a member of the best and most respected family of Jerusalem and, also, as one of the few individuals who had tried to smooth down "the 'Anti-juife' [sic] feeling in this country".[3]

> "I have been working with Ica for three years with the most sincere and honourable intentions.
>
> "But in face of my loyalty to the sons of Israël I am very sorry to say that yesterday I was, <u>with all my race, the Arabes</u>, insulted by your representative <u>Mr</u> Leventine, in your bank and before your employees [italics mine].

1. ISA (G) A III 15, ii (25.5. & 15.6.1905), Rössler to von Bieberstein (Consple.). One of these notables was Ḥafiẓ Bey al-Sa'id of Jaffa (whose house was searched); in 1908, Ḥafiẓ Bey was elected as the deputy from Jaffa to the reconstituted Ottoman Parliament - see Ch.IV.
2. CZA W/125/I (13.3.1905), Levontin to Wolffsohn.
3. CZA W/125/I (10.2.1905), H.H. el-Husseini (Jaffa) to Pres., APC (London). The author of this letter cannot be identified. In 1910 Ḥusayn Hashimi ibn Salim al-Ḥusayni was appointed Mayor of Jerusalem - see CZA Z2/634 (2.3.1910), A. Ruppin (Jaffa) to Pres., ZAC (Cologne). He too used to sign himself "H.H. el-Husseini" - see Q d'O N.S. 133, encl. to no.59 (18.10.1911): document signed by the mayor of Jerusalem, "H.H. el-Husseini". However, other details known about this notable make it unlikely that he addressed himself to the President of the APC in this manner - see Chs. IV & IX.

> "So as you see that Mr Leventine thus abused, painfully, our welcome and sincerity to the Jews. Such a sad behaviour, that could not come out but of a man like Mr Leventine, shall never [sic] be forgotten by me nor by my friends."[1]

Although no direct connection can be demonstrated between Azoury's manifesto and el-Husseini's remarks, nonetheless it can cautiously be suggested that the faintest tremors of a new force - Arab nationalism - were making themselves felt.

* * *

The incident in Jaffa in March 1908 was interesting for another reason, not mentioned above. There can be little doubt that certain of the Jewish immigrants from Russia who arrived after 1905 (the Second ʿAliyyah), in adhering to revolutionary ideologies, aggravated the existing antipathy among the Arabs in Jaffa ~~for~~ towards the Jews. Nevertheless, only very few Muslims chose to take advantage of this incident to join the Chief of the Gendarmerie and his soldiers in the raid on Hotel Spector (the official Jewish account put the number at five). Moreover, in spite of Asaf Bey's known feelings and a rumour that an order from the Sultan was awaited to drive all Jews from the country and to distribute their land amongst the Arabs,[2] there were no more serious disturbances in Jaffa after the event. This would seem to indicate that anti-Jewish feeling in Jaffa - and it may be assumed in the other towns of Palestine - had not yet deeply infiltrated the masses of the Muslim lower class, who would

1. CZA W/125/I (10.2.1905).
2. CZA W/126/II(26.3.1908), Levontin to Wolffsohn.

otherwise have exploited the opportunity to vent their animosity, had it existed to a significant degree. The hostility towards the Jews in the towns remarked upon by various observers (the Consuls, Antébi, Levontin, el-Husseini, et al.) appears therefore to have been confined to Arab Christians and the more conservative among the Muslims. To these must be added some Ottoman officials both in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem and the Vilayet of Beirut (who were often recruited from the two aforementioned categories of Arabs).

Thus, after twenty-five years of modern Jewish immigration into Palestine and a decade after the first Zionist Congress, anti-Zionism proper was a sentiment barely known to any section of the indigenous population. On the other hand, anti-Jewish feeling had intensified among the two most influential segments of the Arab population and was latent among fellaheen who had had contact with the Jewish settlers (especially in the north of Palestine - see Ch.IV). The new situation created by the Young Turk Revolution galvanised many minor revolutions throughout the Empire - not least of them in the Arab attitude to Jewish settlement in Palestine.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE NEW RÉGIME: 1908-1909

The Young Turks

A number of Young Turks had met Zionists before the Revolution of July 1908. In 1903, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet Bey met Theodor Herzl in Vienna,[1] and in Paris Dr. Ahmed Riza Bey and other prominent Young Turks had conversations with Dr. Max Nordau, Herzl's closest collaborator.[2] Ahmed Riza's journal, Meṣveret, spoke of the Jews in the same terms as the Armenians: if persecuted Jews settled in the Empire as loyal Ottomans, they would be made very welcome; but, if they sought separation and autonomy, they would be combatted as would all revolutionaries who wished to destroy the unity of the Empire.[3] "Autonomy," Ahmed Riza said in 1906, "is treason".[4]

In August 1908 Dr. David Pasmanik (a Russian Zionist) talked in Geneva with some Young Turks who were returning to Constantinople from Paris after the Revolution; their conversations were published in the Viennese Jüdische Zeitung.[5] One of the group told Pasmanik that they were

1. Herzl, Diaries, iv, 1417-18 (16.2.1903).
2. A. & M. Nordau, Max Nordau: A Biography (New York, 1943), p.193; cf. (for reference to Ahmed Riza) B. Netanyahu, Max Nordau el ʿamo (Tel Aviv, 1937), ii, 238.
3. Y. Rabinowitz, "Ṭurḳiyyah ḥadashah, ha-yehudim wehaẓiyyonut", ha-Shiloaḥ, vol.xix (1908), p.456.
4. E.E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton, 1957), p.93, quoting J. Macdonald, Turkey and the Eastern Question (London, 1913), p.55.
5. Subsequently re-printed in ha-Ẓebi, xxv, 6 (3.9.1908).

familiar with Zionism through the French Echo Sioniste and they appreciated that the Zionist programme had been modified variously since 1897. He adhered to the position taken by Mesveret: a Zionism producing loyal Ottoman Jews was acceptable; a Zionism aiming at autonomy was anathema. This Young Turk (whose name is not given) was clearly a supporter of Prince Sabaheddin's "League for Private Initiative and Decentralization", as he assured the Zionists of a large measure of administrative independence through the local government in Palestine, which he felt was a more than ~~an~~ adequate substitute for autonomy. An Arab among the group also made some interesting statements to Pasmanik. The Arabs ~~have~~ had not studied the Zionist question in detail, but he believed that relations between Jews and Arabs could be very friendly, because the Arab nation's centre was Syria, not Palestine. This informant (who presumably was not a Palestinian Arab) had visited Jewish colonies and had been annoyed by the settlers who spoke of Palestine as their homeland but did not become Ottoman subjects. He was also concerned at the settlers' attitude to the fellaheen whom, he felt, they treated unnecessarily as inferiors.

In autumn 1908 Ahmed Riza and Dr. Nazim Bey (another leading Young Turk) visited Paris and Max Nordau had the opportunity of meeting them again. Because of others present, he was unable to talk freely with Ahmed Riza, but he did manage to converse privately with Dr. Nazim. The latter told him that Prince Sabaheddin was politically "dead": there would be no decentralisation; the Empire

would be united with Turkish schools, administration and law.[1] The Young Turks, he said, were not opposed to Jewish immigration; indeed, they welcomed it and had made arrangements with the Jewish Colonization Association and the Alliance Israélite Universelle to settle as many as one-hundred thousand Jews in each of the Empire's thirty-two provinces.[2] But, he emphasised, these Jews must establish themselves in scattered groups; nowhere were they to become a majority to form another national entity in the Empire.

* * *

When David Wolffsohn visited Constantinople in 1907 (see above, p.89, n.1), he initiated arrangements with some Ottoman Jews to open a Zionist-sponsored bank.[3] Shortly after the Revolution, Dr. Victor Jacobson (an early Russian Zionist and later a member of the Zionist Executive) came to Constantinople from the APC branch in Beirut. Although his official function was to direct the Anglo-Levantine Banking Company (which commenced business operations on October 1st), Jacobson's main concern was to act as the Zionist Movement's political agent in the Ottoman capital.

In autumn 1908 the Young Turks were confronted with a number of severe set-backs: Bulgaria declared its independence, Austro-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

1. CZA W/96(25.11.1908), M. Nordau (Paris) to D. Wolffsohn (Cologne); cf. Netanyahu, Max Nordau, ii, 238.
2. Nordau recognised that this large figure, totalling 3,200,000 Jews, was rather inflated.
3. CZA W 35/4, Wolffsohn diary (1.11.1907).

Crete announced its union with Greece. These and other major pre-occupations made it difficult for Jacobson to meet the new rulers. However, he gathered that in general leading Turkish circles in the capital were opposed to Zionism.

> "Sie betrachten uns, als Separatistch[sic], wenn nicht von heute, so auf jeden Fall, von morgen. Und sie wünschen es nicht Leute ins Land einziehen zu lassen, die ihnen 'eine neue armenische Frage bereiten werden'."[1]

Vladimir Jabotinsky (afterwards the Zionist Revisionist leader) also came to Constantinople at this time. He had been sent there by the Moscow newspaper, Russkiye Vedomosti, and at the beginning of 1909 he analysed with greater precision the attitude of Young Turk leaders to Zionism. They approved of large Jewish immigration because they recognised a need of primary importance to introduce men and money into parts of the Empire which were under-inhabited. Jews were a favoured category of immigrants for "understandable reasons". However, the Young Turks were suspicious of the increased numbers of Jews settling within the limits of Palestine because of a natural Ottoman tendency to regard all nationalist movements as separatist and also because they were out of sympathy with movements which did not wish to assimilate into a strong Turkey ruled by Turks.[2] The last point made by Jabotinsky was crucial.

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1. CZA L2/34/I (13.10.1908), V. Jacobson (Consple.) to A Ruppin (Jaffa).
2. V. Jabotinsky, "ha-Maẓab he-ḥadash be-turkiyyah", ha-ʿOlam, iii, 3 (1909), pp.1-2.

The Young Turks had been made up of diverse groups having in common a desire to regenerate the Ottoman Empire by restoring the constitution and representative institutions. If Abdülhamid were not to be deposed, they wished that he should at least be reduced from being an autocrat to a constitutional monarch. Thus far all Young Turks were in agreement. They split, however, over the envisaged nature of the rehabilitated Empire for which they were striving. The Turkish Young Turks, led by Dr. Ahmed Riza Bey in the "Committee of Union and Progress"(the CUP), looked forward to a strong unified Empire in which the non-Turkish elements would be fused with the Turks. "Our Christian compatriots shall be Ottomanized citizens. We shall no longer be conquerors and slaves, but a new nation of freemen."[1] However, the non-Turkish elements tended to reject this view. They grouped themselves behind Prince Sabaheddin who championed an Empire in which the various ethnic and religious groups would administer their own provinces on a decentralised basis. After the Revolution much of the political strife which racked the Ottoman Empire until its final dissolution can be traced to the struggle between these two conflicting views.

By the end of 1908 the Young Turk position vis-à-vis Jewish immigration into the Empire was clear. It did not differ in any of its essentials from that of the Imperial Government under Abdülhamid. Jewish immigrants were

1. Ramsaur, The Young Turks, p.93, quoting Macdonald, op.cit. p.55.

welcome, but they must become loyal Ottomans without any separatist national ambitions. If the CUP were to gain control, there was no question of Jewish administrative independence in Palestine; if the League for Private Initiative and Decentralisation were to come to power, there was some hope of this. What was not yet clear (to the Zionists) was which group would gain the ascendancy.

* * *

Dr. Jacobson quickly made contact with prominent Ottoman Jews and later with Jews in the re-constituted Ottoman Parliament. Hayim Nahum, who was elected to the office of Haham Başi immediately after the Revolution, told him that he was not a Zionist in the full sense: he did not believe that it was possible to demand or obtain special privileges for the Jews in Palestine; on the other hand, he would do everything possible to ensure that Jews enjoyed the same rights as other groups in Turkey. For their part, immigrant Jews must become Ottoman subjects and fulfil all the obligations incumbent upon them as such.[1] In the next years the Haham Başi honoured his promise to defend Jewish rights in the Empire. Behor Eşkinazi was the only Jew in the Senate (upper house of Parliament). In December, Jacobson found him sympathetic to Zionism, but of the opinion that the time for action was not yet at hand.[2] There were four Jewish deputies in the Chamber (lower house). Two of them,

1. CZA L2/34/I (1.10.1908), Jacobson to Ruppin.
2. CZA Z2/7 (18.12.1908), same to Wolffsohn.

Emmanuel Karasu and Nissim Mazliah, were very favourably inclined towards the Zionist cause and were willing to try to influence Young Turk leaders in this direction.[1] Vitali Faraci was reserved, for fear of setting the Turks against the Jews;[2] he later carefully defined his position which approximated to that of the "spiritual Zionists": he favoured "un centre juif" in Palestine to establish links between the Jews of the Empire and the Diaspora based on Jewish history and the Hebrew language and literature; this centre should be set up by all representative bodies of Jewry (Anglo-Jewish Association, Alliance Israélite Universelle, etc.) in conjunction with the Zionists.[3] The fourth deputy, Sasun Effendi from Baghdad, could not be won over to the Zionist cause. The difficulty was, wrote Jacobson, that Sasun was "ein arabischer Patriot": the Arabs would be opposed to a large Jewish immigration, and the very argument with which the Zionists could appeal to the Turks - that Jewish immigration would be an asset to the Empire - was repellent to the Arabs.[4] In March 1909, after further discussions with Jacobson, Vitali Faraci and Sasun Effendi conceded that in principle they were not opposed to the official aims of Zionism (which were not separatist);[5] but they considered that it was then (in March) even less politic

1. CZA Z2/7 (10.12.1908), Jacobson to Wolffsohn, re. Karasu; & ibid. (22.12.1908), same to same, re. Mazliah.
2. CZA Z2/7 (18.12.1908), same to same.
3. CZA Z2/7 (4.2.1909), same to same.
4. CZA Z2/7 (22.2.1909), same to same.
5. Towards the end of 1908 the Zionists began to emphasise the non-separatist character of their aims. See, for example, N. Sokolow in Die Welt, xiii, 4 (1909), p.75, arguing that a "Heimstätte" (as demanded in the Basel Programme) was not to be confused with an independent state.

than before for the Zionists to work openly, in view of upheavals which had taken place in February (see below).[1]

Jacobson was also introduced to Nissim Ruso, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa's young Jewish secretary. Hilmi Paşa had been appointed Minister of Internal Affairs and Ruso was prepared to speak to him on behalf of the Zionists.[2] Karasu reported in December that he had had the opportunity to discuss Zionism with the most important Young Turk leaders. He found they took offence at two things: the name "Zionism" itself, and the Zionists' desire to settle exclusively in Palestine.[3] In February 1909 he proposed that a committee be set up to promote the "enriching of Turkey" by Jewish immigration throughout the Ottoman Empire, because he believed that he could easily persuade influential Young Turks to support such a committee.[4] Meanwhile Nissim Mazliah and Nissim Ruso suggested that the Zionists should try to win support in three ways: by personal approaches to Turkish leaders, by an official memorandum to the Government emphasising the non-separatist character of Zionism, and by publishing a high quality weekly review in French.[5] Karasu's plan of a committee to encourage regional settlement by Jews was not accepted; instead, the Zionists adopted the tactics suggested by Mazliah and Ruso, which did not require the major change in policy implied in Karasu's proposal.

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1. CZA Z2/8 (2.3.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
2. CZA Z2/7 (1.1. & 18.2.1909), same to same.
3. CZA Z2/7 (10.12.1908), same to same.
4. CZA Z2/7 (18.2.1909), same to same.
5. CZA Z2/7 (24.12.1908), same to same; & ibid. encl. to letter dated 1.1.1909, being minutes of meeting held 31.12.1908.

Nissim Ruso informed Jacobson that Prince Sabaheddin was said to be very much in sympathy with plans to settle Jews in Palestine.[1] In February 1909 Jacobson met Ahmed Fazli Bey [Tung], the leader of Sabaheddin's parliamentary party, the Ahrar ("Liberals"). After initial reserve, Fazli Bey became so enthusiastic about Zionism that he began to advise Jacobson on how the Zionists should proceed to realise their ambitions.[2] However, this verbal encouragement, which was wholly in keeping with the Ahrar party's political views, came to nothing. A few days later, the more nationalist elements among the Young Turks, members of the CUP, ousted the Grand Vezir, Kâmil Paşa, from office and installed Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa whom they regarded as more amenable to their views. Jacobson, Jabotinsky, Mazliah and Ruso spoke separately with Ahmed Riza (President of the Chamber), Talât Bey (Vice-President), Dr. Nazim and Enver Bey (another leading member of the CUP).[3] All were reported to have thought that Jewish immigration into the Empire was desirable, especially in Macedonia, but not however in Palestine where, in Nazim's opinion, a large concentration of Jews could and would be a political danger.[4] Dr. Jacobson was understandably despondent about what concessions the Zionists could now look forward to.[5]

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1. CZA Z2/7 (5.12.1908), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
2. CZA Z2/7 (12.2.1909), same to same.
3. CZA Z2/7 (8 & 15.2.1909), same to same. Cf. V. Jabotinsky, Ketabim (Jerusalem, 1947), i, 80.
4. CZA Z2/7 (8.2.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
5. CZA Z2/7 (15.2.1909), same to same.

The Ottoman Administration in Palestine

A fortnight after the Young Turk Revolution the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, Ali Ekrem Bey, requested that he be appointed to a responsible post in Constantinople.[1] Though not recalled to the capital, he was promoted to become Vali of Beirut in August and shortly afterwards was transferred elsewhere. On his departure from Jerusalem he submitted a report reiterating, among other things, the dangers of Jewish immigration into the Mutasarriflik.[2] The British Consul in Jerusalem wrote that:

> "His probity has never been assailed and he is the only Governor of Palestine who has held firm against the offers and temptations of the Jews and has consistently opposed their acquisition of landed property in the Sanjak ".[3]

Ekrem Bey was replaced in September by Subhi Bey who, significantly, had not been a secretary at the Yildiz Palace but was previously "Directeur du Commerce" in one of the ministries at the Porte.[4] He had read Ekrem Bey's final report from Jerusalem, and when he was visited by both Isaac Fernandez and Victor Jacobson in Constantinople prior to his departure for the Mutasarriflik, he indicated that the new régime had not yet studied the question of Jewish

1. ISA (T) no.8 (6.8.1908), Ali Ekrem Bey (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir (S.P.).
2. ISA (T) no.11 [n.d., résumé], same to Min. of Internal Affairs (S.P.).
3. FO 195/2287, no.42 (10.8.1908), E.C. Blech (Jerus.) to Sir G. Lowther (Consple.). Blech would have been more correct if he had written that Ekrem Bey was the only Mutasarrif to stand firm against the Jews since Tevfik Bey's departure in 1901.
4. AIU VIII. E. 25 (7.9.1908), A. Antébi (Jerus.) to H. Frank (Jaffa.).

activities in Palestine and that he reserved his judgement.[1]

When he arrived at Jaffa, Subhi Bey made a speech in which he said that he would not make any difficulties for individuals, be they Ottoman or foreign subjects, who wished to acquire land; on the other hand, he would oppose land purchase by immigration or colonisation societies.[2] However, at the end of 1908 Levontin reported that land transfers still could not be registered in the name of foreign Jews.[3] In January 1909, Eliezer ben Yehudah, the editor of ha-Ẓebi, obtained an interview with Subhi Bey, to whom he complained about the practice of giving Jews a three-month permis de séjour ("Red Slip") in exchange for their passports when they entered Palestine.[4] Subhi agreed that the measure did not prevent Jews from settling in Palestine and told ben Yehudah that he was going to recommend its abolition. Ben Yehudah received the impression that Subhi Bey had already instructed the port officials at Jaffa to stop issuing Jews with Red Slips; but, as with Subhi's promise about land purchase by foreign subjects, there were no immediate changes: it was soon noted that the port officials were continuing to act as before.[5]

1. CZA Z2/7 (10.9.1908), Jacobson to Wolffsohn; Z2/632 (15.9.1908), ZAC to Ruppin; & Z2/7 (23.9.1908), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
2. CZA Z2/632 (29.9.1908), Ruppin to Wolffsohn.
3. CZA W/126/II (28.12.1908), D. Levontin (Jaffa) to O. Warburg (Berlin).
4. Ha-Ẓebi, xxv, 74 (8.1.1909).
5. Ibid. 76 (11.1.1909).

At the end of 1908, Dr. Jacobson learned that the file on Zionism and Jewish colonisation in Palestine had been laid before the "Conseil des Légistes" at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[1] In March 1909, Nazim Paşa and Ali Paşa, two high officials from the Ministry of Justice, arrived in Palestine charged with the task of investigating Jewish affairs there.[2] But before they had completed their work in the country, Subhi Bey was ordered to comply with a decision taken in 1904 prohibiting sales of land to foreign Jews, even if they be resident in Palestine, because the sole object of such sales was to instal Jewish immigrants on the lands acquired.[3] Since coming to Jerusalem, Subhi Bey had been favourably impressed by the Jewish colonies;[4] and, according to Albert Antébi, he preferred not to make public this latest order but instead intended to take the matter up verbally with the Government, when he went to Constantinople on leave in the near future.[5] In the meantime, he decided to continue the transfer of land to the names of Ottoman Jews;[6] and, at Antébi's request, he

1. CZA Z2/7 (29.12.1908), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
2. AIU IX. E. 26 (3.3.1909), Antébi to Pres., AIU (Paris).
3. AIU IX. E. 26 (10.3.1909), Antébi to I. Fernandez (Consple.), enclosing copy of a decision taken by the Council of Ministers and issued by the Grand Vezir, Mehmed Ferid Paşa, on 11.10.1904. A copy of this decision was sent to Subhi Bey by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, on 11.2.1909. (Three days later Hilmi Paşa was appointed Grand Vezir - see above, p.157.) This order, when it was first issued in 1904, referred to a specific foreign Jew resident in Jerusalem, Edmond Lehman; but when it was re-issued in 1909 it was extended to all foreign Jews resident in Palestine.
4. Cf. ha-Ẓebi, xxv, 74 (8.1.1909).
5. AIU IX. E. 26 (10.3.1909).
6. Loc.cit.

abolished the practice whereby foreign Jews purchasing land were required to make a special declaration that they would not instal Jewish immigrants on their property (see above, p.51).[1]

Disturbances in the Orthodox Church in Jerusalem prevented Subhi Bey from going to Constantinople, and so he initiated a "correspondance très suivie" on the question of Jewish land purchase and its implications in Palestine.[2] In Constantinople Nissim Ruso spoke with the new Grand Vezir, Hilmi Paşa, about Zionism.[3] It seems that he advocated the Zionist position with some success, because at the end of March Hilmi Paşa sent Subhi Bey a letter in which he admitted the advantages which would accrue to the local population and the Ottoman Treasury from Jewish settlement in Palestine; but he also pointed to the difficulties which would arise from "the constant intervention of a foreign government such as Russia" in favour of its protégés concentrated in the Mutasarriflik.[4] He ended by indicating that if Subhi could submit a practicable plan which guaranteed all the legal rights of Ottoman Jews while at the same time checked Jewish immigration from Russia and Rumania, "we shall willingly encourage the economic development of Ottoman Jews [in Palestine] and abolish the

1. AIU IX. E. 26 (5.4.1909), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
2. AIU IX. E. 26 (2.5.1909), same to same.
3. CZA Z2/8 (16.3.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
4. AIU IX. E. 26 (5.4.1909), quoting extracts from Hilmi Paşa's recent letter to Subhi Bey; cf. CZA Z2/8 (16. & 22.4.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.

restrictions".[1] At this, Antébi set about helping Subhi Bey to prepare an appropriate scheme.[2]

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The Arabs in Palestine

In Palestine, news of the Revolution was greeted with disbelief, quickly giving way to jubilation.[3] In September, ha-Poʿel ha-Ẓaʿir reported that relations between Arab and Jew in Jaffa were greatly improved - "there is not the same cold attitude which manifested itself after the incident [last] Purim".[4] In Jerusalem, Muslims, Christians and Jews participated in founding a branch of the Committee of Union and Progress and also a literary, political society called Kudüs cemiyet-i vatanisi.[5] David Yellin, a Palestinian-born teacher in Jerusalem, observed that "nous voyons dans ces Sociétés pour la première fois des Musulmans (et de classe supérieure) s'associer à des Isr.[aélites] et des Chrétiens".[6] Notables in Jerusalem encouraged peasants in the surrounding district to create a society to defend their interests, which Jewish settlers also joined; and, according to Yellin, the fellaheen were "très contents" to draw ~~from~~ on the latter's experience.[7] At the end of 1908, Albert Antébi formed "La Société Commerciale de Palestine",

1. AIU IX. E. 26 (5.4.1909), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
2. Loc.cit.
3. Rabinowitz, "Ṭurkiyyah ḥadashah", p.280.
4. Ha-Poʿel ha-Ẓaʿir, i, 12 (1908).
5. Ha-Ẓebi, i [xxv], 6 (3.9.1908).
6. CZA A/153, i (7.9.1908), D. Yellin (Jerus.) to P. Nathan [Berlin].
7. CZA A/153, i (6.10.1908), same to same.

a joint-stock company with the Anglo-Palestine Company as its bankers, in which five thousand of the six thousand subscribed shares were held by non-Jews, including Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi and Sa'id Bey al-Ḥusayni (see below).[1]

But signs of the future were also close at hand. In Jaffa, David Levontin observed with distress the indiscretions of some recent Jewish immigrants who marred the general celebrations after the Revolution by parading a Zionist flag in the streets and proclaiming that political Zionism must be the basis of Jewish activity in Palestine and that the Jews must elect deputies to the Ottoman Parliament to demand that the country be given to them. Levontin reported that the Arabs had restrained the feelings of anger which this behaviour provoked and had merely remarked:

> "Demand what you wish; we shall not grant your wish. Indeed, you are not fit to receive what you want, so we shall not spoil our celebration, even to exchange words with you".[2]

The founders of the CUP branch in Jerusalem invited four Jews to join them - on condition, however, that they made conciliatory statements regarding their attitude to Zionism and that they were not holders of the Zionist "shekel" (membership and voting rights in the Zionist Movement).[3]

> "Diese Jung-Tuerken fassen den Zionismus nur als eine politische Bewegung auf, die bezweckt, Palaestina ausschliesslich unter eine juedische Autonomie zu stellen."[4]

1. CZA W/126/II (17.1.1909), Levontin to Wolffsohn.
2. CZA W/126/II (25.8.1908), same to same.
3. CZA Z2/632 (24.8.1908), Ruppin to same.
4. CZA W/126/II (21.8.1908), Levontin to Directors, APC (London).

And, evidently, they too, like the Young Turk leaders in Constantinople, made a distinction between "Jew" and "Zionist".

* * *

Prior to the Revolution there was no Arabic press in Palestine, except for an official gazette - scarcely a newspaper - published by the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem in Turkish and Arabic.[1] Immediately after the Revolution, al-Quds in Jerusalem and al-Aṣmaʿi in Jaffa began to appear, both edited by Christian Arabs.[2] The forthcoming elections to the revived Ottoman Parliament were the main topic of interest. The "programmes" of most candidates talked of the need for economic and administrative reforms; the amelioration of the peasant's lot was also widely canvassed. Al-Aṣmaʿi, discussing these programmes in one of its first editorials, contrasted the standard of living in Arab villages which owned many dunams of land with that in Jewish colonies which had the same population but worked much less land. The fellaheen eked out a mean living, mainly because of their ignorance and the mushaʿ system of rotating land ~~between~~ among the villagers; on the other hand, the Jewish settlers worked their land intensively and prospered. Therefore, al-Aṣmaʿi concluded, their techniques were to be emulated.[3] The Arabs of Palestine had to employ the methods of the Jews (essentially through educating the younger generation) in order to resist them successfully, for:

1. RMM, vol.vi (1908), pp.570-1, "En Palestine".
2. Ha-Poʿel ha-Ẓaʿir, ii, 1 (1908), p.14.
3. Loc.cit. pp.14-15, where al-Aṣmaʿi's editorial is reprinted in extenso.

"They harm and do evil to the indigenous population, by relying on the special rights enjoyed by foreign powers in Turkey and on the corruption and treachery of the local administration. In addition, they are free from most of the taxes and heavy impositions on Ottoman subjects; they compete with the native population with their labour, and create their own means of sustenance, and the [native] population cannot stand up to their competition."[1]

Al-Aṣma'i proposed that its readers buy local rather than foreign products;[2] and subsequently called upon wealthy Arabs to support the development of native commerce and industry.[3]

* * *

Elections for the Ottoman Parliament, based on an indirect system of voting, were held in autumn 1908. In the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem three deputies were to be elected. The Christian and Jewish minorities realised that their own candidates were not likely to be elected unless they received support from beyond their own communities. With this in view, various coalitions were struck between the different denominations.[4] Nógib Azoury had returned from

1. Ha-Po'el ha-Ẓa'ir, ii, 1 (1908). Al-Aṣma'i's statement that the settlers were free from most taxes was not correct in the case of those settlers who had become Ottoman subjects. Foreign subjects, however, only paid land taxes; and on account of the Capitulations the Ottoman Government could not impose any other taxes upon foreigners without their respective Government's prior consent - see André Mandelstam, Le Sort de l'Empire Ottoman (Lausanne and Paris, 1917), p.6.
2. Ha-Po'el ha-Ẓa'ir, ii, 1 (1908), pp.14-15.
3. Ha-Po'el ha-Ẓa'ir, ii, 3 (1908), p.10.
4. The Jews rejected an approach to align themselves with the Greek Orthodox candidate against his Latin Catholic opponent - see CZA Z2/632 (4.9.1908), J. Thon (Jaffa) to Wolffsohn. They preferred to support the candidatures of Ḥusayn Effendi Hashimi (H.H. el-Husseini - see above, p.146, n.3) of Jerusalem and Ḥafiẓ Bey al-Sa'id of Jaffa - see CZA Z2/632 (6.10.1908), Ruppin to Wolffsohn.

Paris to stand as a candidate in Jaffa where he took care to speak publicly in the most general terms, avoiding all reference to his nationalist programme and to the "péril juif universel".[1] The agreements between his Muslim, Jewish and even Christian adversaries (rather than political opponents) deprived him of all votes in the second ballot.[2] However, these coalitions were not sufficient to defeat the large Muslim majority in the Mutasarriflik and thus three Muslims were elected: Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi, Sa'id Bey al-Ḥusayni and Ḥafiẓ Bey al-Sa'id.

Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi was a grandson of Yusuf al-Khalidi (see above, pp.95-7).[3] He was forty-five years of age and had studied in Paris at both the Ecole des sciences politiques and the Sorbonne after an elementary education at schools in Jerusalem, Beirut and Tripoli, and senior schooling in Constantinople.[4] He had returned to Jerusalem after the Revolution, somewhat a stranger to the city, having served for almost ten years as Ottoman Consul in Bordeaux where he had been made an Officer in the Légion d'Honneur.[5] He had written a book entitled Tarikh 'ilm al-adab and used to contribute to such journals as al-Hilal under the pen-name of al-Maqdisi. He was a member of the

1. CZA Z2/632 (29.9.1908), Ruppin to Wolffsohn.
2. CZA Z2/632 (19.10.1908), same to same.
3. The Near East, iii, 57 (1912), p.138.
4. For good outline biography of Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi, see his al-Muqaddima fi al-mas'ala al-sharqiyya (Jerusalem, n.d. [published posthumously]), pp.1-5; also 'Umar Riḍa Kaḥḥalah, Mu'jam al-mu'allifin (Damascus, 1957), iv, 174-5, where further bibliographical references are given.
5. Q d'O N.S. 134, no.27 (4.5.1912), G. Gueyrand (Jerus.) to R. Poincaré (Paris).

CUP and reputed to be a "liberal" in his political views.[1] Sa'id Bey al-Ḥusayni was about thirty years old and was said to be an "Arab nationalist".[2] He had been educated in Jerusalem and had studied for a time at the local Alliance Israélite Universelle school, where he appears to have acquired some knowledge of Hebrew, because under the old régime he had acted as censor of Hashkafah, a Hebrew newspaper. In this capacity he had become a well-informed opponent of the Zionist Movement and Jewish immigration into Palestine.[3] His active opposition to the Zionists dated back at least to 1905 when, as President of the Municipal Council in Jerusalem, he had tried to ~~arrest~~ check land transfers to Jews at Motsa after the seventh Zionist Congress.[4] Ḥafiz Bey al-Sa'id of Jaffa was in his seventies and was thus much older than his two colleagues from Jerusalem.[5] He had been the last Mufti of Gaza and in 1905, as part of the Ottoman authcritics' campaign against the influence of Négib Azoury's manifestos, he had been put under police surveillance while his house and papers were searched (see above, p.146, n.1).[6] He was reputedly well-disposed towards the Jews (who accordingly had supported

1. Al-Hilal, vol.xvii (1908), pp.181-2.
2. CZA Z2/7 (13.11. & 5.12.1908), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
3. CZA Z2/632 (11.11.1908), Ruppin to Wolffsohn.
4. JCA 261/encl. to no.338 (30.8.1905), Antébi to S.I. Pariente (Beirut).
5. Q d'O N.S. 132, no.4 (26.5.1909), French Vice-Consul (Jaffa) to S. Pichon (Paris), giving Sa'id Bey's age as seventy-one; whereas in CZA Z2/632 (11.11.1908), Sa'id is reported to be "about sixty years old".
6. ISA (G) A III 15, ii (25.5.1905), Rössler (Jaffa) to von Bieberstein (Consple.).

his candidature), but Jewish observers thought that he would be dominated by Ruḥi Bey and Sa'id Bey, since he was less educated and a poorer speaker than they.[1] In the north of Palestine Shaykh Aḥmad Effendi al-Khamash of Nablus and Shaykh As'ad Effendi Shuqayr of Acre were elected to represent their respective Sanjaks. The first named was a Muslim of very conservative tendencies, and the second, also a Muslim, had recently been released from prison where he had been held by the old régime which, according to a correspondent in the Revue du Monde Musulman, had looked upon him with suspicion.[2]

The Ottoman Parliament was inaugurated on December 17th, 1908. About a quarter of the deputies in the Chamber were Arabs; and Dr. Jacobson in Constantinople appreciated that the Turks could not afford to alienate the Arab "bloc" by treating the Zionists with special deference.[3]

* * *

In November it was reported that peasants in the region of Haifa and Tiberias were adopting an aggressive attitude towards Arab landowners with large estates (Mustafa Paṣa, Fu'ad Sa'd and the Sursuq family) and also towards the Jewish colonies.[4] In December, villagers from Kafr Kanna tried to seize some land belonging to JCA in the Kaza of Tiberias.[5]

1. CZA Z2/632 (11.11.1908), Ruppin to Wolffsohn.
2. RMM, vol.vi (1908), pp.525-6, "Les Elections législatives dans le Vilayet de Beyrouth". No details are given of why As'ad Shuqayr was regarded with suspicion or how long he had been held in prison by the old régime.
3. CZA Z2/7 (5.12.1908), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
4. AIU VIII. E. 25 (8.11.1908), H. Frank (Jaffa) to Antébi: cf. CZA Z2/632 (11.11.1908).
5. AIU IX. E. 26 (30.12.1908), Antébi to Frank.

It is not surprising that the first signs of unrest in Palestine under the new régime should have manifested themselves in the north of the country. In the rough mountainous area between Nazareth and Safed there were, in addition to the long established peasant population, numbers of recently settled Algerians and Circassians, who were of an unruly disposition. Theft and highway robbery were commonplace in these outlying districts of the Vilayet of Beirut, in contrast with the compact Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem where the local administration maintained firmer control on the more docile inhabitants. Nor was security in the north enhanced by the movements of Beduin tribes which raided villages freely as they passed by every year. Since the Ottoman authorities provided little protection, the Arab villagers were armed and looked to themselves. After the Revolution the lower officials in these areas were not replaced;[1] while, at the same time, it appears that some peasants thought that under the new dispensation, which they called ḥurriyya ("liberty" or "political freedom"), Ottoman subjects were free to act as they liked.[2] As a result, public order deteriorated. "Il est donc tout prématuré de juger le nouveau régime," wrote the Jewish administrator on Sejera in March 1909, "ce régime n'est pas encore venu, nous sommes encore dans l'ancien".[3]

1. JCA 271/no.289 (25.3.1909), E. Krause (Sejera) to JCA (Paris).
2. Cf. Mandelstam, L'Empire Ottoman, p.20.
3. JCA 271/no.289 (25.3.1909); cf. CZA Z2/633 (24.5.1909), Thon to Pres., ZAC.

The unrest caused in 1901 by the Jewish Colonization Association's land purchases in the region of Tiberias was mentioned in the previous chapter (see above, pp.104-5). The first settlement actually set up in the area by JCA was Sejera, halfway between Tiberias and Nazareth; it was made up of a training farm and a number of independent or share-cropping farmers who had acquired their land from JCA.[1] In 1898 JCA had negotiated with the liquidators of a firm in Beirut called Epstein et Cie. for 18,000 dunams of land. Ash Shajara, an Arab village with the main source of drinking water in the area, constituted an enclave of 800 dunams on this property.[2] JCA realised that this might lead to difficulties, but nevertheless bought the land in January 1899.[3] A waqf of some seventy-five dunams was found on the land when the process of mefruz was begun. Joshua Ossovetzky, one of Epstein et Cie.'s liquidators, would not let JCA's agent, David Haym, inspect the waqf, asserting that Haym's presence would jeopardise a successful mefruz.[4] Much to JCA's annoyance, Ossovetzky forced Haym to accept a fait accompli which did not accord with any of the latter's suggested plans of

1. For the early history of the other colonies set up by JCA in the Tiberias region, see ʿEber ha-Dani [A. Feldman], ha-Hityashshbut ba-galil ha-taḥton (Ramat Gan, n.d. [1955?]); and also Y.L.[uria] "ha-Moshabot be-maḥoz ṭeberyah", ha-ʿOlam, iii, 24 (3.7.1909), & ibid. 25 (13.7.1909). The experiences of the other settlements in the region were not dissimilar from those of Sejera.
2. JCA 254/no.27 (28.6.1898), D. Haym (Miqve Yisrael) to Admin. Council, JCA (Paris).
3. JCA 255/no.74 (30.1.1899), Haym and J. Niégo (Miqve Yisrael) to Admin. Council, JCA.
4. JCA 255/no.107 (29.5.1899), Haym and Niégo to Admin. Council, JCA.

division: the peasants at ash Shajara retained the water supply and JCA was left with the waqf.[1] The peasants at ash Shajara (who were mostly Orthodox Christians),[2] accepted this distribution, but for different reasons three other villages - Tur'an (Muslims), Kafr Kanna (Christians), and Kafr Sabt (Muslims from Algeria) - were as dissatisfied with Ossovetzky's division as was JCA.[3]

By the end of 1901 the boundaries were still not fixed, and there was "bitter feeling" amongst the neighbouring peasants against the Jewish colonists;[4] the dispute with Kafr Sabt was not settled until November 1904.[5] In 1903 the colonists began to take possession of some of their land which previously had been leased out to the adjoining village of Lubiya; this sparked off a series of raids on Sejera and in August 1904 a settler, Chaim Courdi, was murdered by the son of a shaykh from Lubiya.[6] The peasants at ash Shajara caused the colonists most discomfort. They were hostile from the settlers' arrival, and presently they too challenged the mefruz which they had agreed to with Ossovetzky.[7] In 1904 they were encouraged by the Orthodox

1. JCA 257/no.72 (9.6.1899), E. Meyerson [?] and A. Adler (JCA, Paris) to Haym and Niégo.
2. JCA 259/no.138 (4.8.1902), Pariente to JCA (Paris).
3. JCA 255/[no number], (31.1.1900), Haym (Sejera) to Admin. Council, JCA.
4. FO 195/2097, encl. to no.84 (12.10.1901), J.H. Monahan (Haifa) to Sir R. Drummond-Hay (Beirut); also FO 195/2117, encl. to no.13 (January, 1902), Monahan to Drummond-Hay.
5. JCA 270/no.7 (24.11.1904), Krause to Pariente.
6. JCA 260/encl. to no.279 (25.8.1904), & encl. to no.280 (8.9.1904), Krause to Pariente.
7. JCA 259/no.138 (4.8.1902), Pariente to JCA (Paris), plus encl. (28.7.1902), Krause to Pariente.

Archbishop of Nazareth and the priest at Tiberias to claim the waqf on Sejera.[1] The Archbishop accepted 2,388 francs to drop this claim; litigation with the peasants in January 1905 cost 685 francs.[2]

The initial tensions around the new Jewish colonies in the region of Tiberias had barely subsided when it was revived after 1905 by the arrival of Jewish "workers", members of the Second ʿAliyyah. Although the socialist ideas of these newcomers must have been meaningless to the Arab peasants and probably escaped them, the latter were still not attracted by the demeanour of men who had often participated in the Russian revolutionary movement and in the Jewish self-defence units formed in Russia to protect Jews during pogroms.[3] At the end of 1907 some Jewish workers, who called themselves the "Bar Giora Group" came to Sejera. Shortly after its arrival, this group held a meeting at which "the need to raise the [Arab] neighbours' respect for the Jews" was discussed; to this end it was decided that Jews must take over the guard of the settlement and its flocks, which previously had been in the hands of Circassians

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1. JCA 261/encl. to no.297 (26.1.1905), & encl. to no.303 (12.2.1905), Krause to Pariente.
2. JCA 261/no.321 (2.6.1905), Pariente to JCA (Paris).
3. Cf. M. Smilanski, Perakim be-toldot ha-yishshub (Tel Aviv, 1943), iii, 127.

from Kafr Kama.[1] They persuaded the administrator of the settlement, Elie Krause, to entrust them with the guard and also to provide them with arms. David ben Gurion, a member of the group, has described the delirium with which the arms were received:

> "... Our joy knew no bounds .... We played with them like little children; we never put them down for a moment .... [In the evenings] one would be cleaning the barrel [of his rifle]; another testing the sights; one loading and unloading; another filling his pouches - comparing weapons, enumerating the virtues and vices of each, hanging them on the wall and taking them down again, slinging them over their shoulders and taking them off again - and so on until it was time for bed "[2]

The Circassians from Kafr Kama, deprived of the income from guarding Sejera and incensed by the "Bar Giora Group's"

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1. Dinur, ha-Hagannah, I, i, 205. At this time the Jewish colonies were almost entirely guarded by local Arabs, often the biggest brigands in the area who were employed on the principle that it was necessary to buy them off and that in doing so their reputation would deter other would-be thieves or raiders. However, this system was not without its inherent dangers. If, for any reason, the colony angered its guards - for example, should it fall behind in paying their wages or dismiss them - they were liable to resume their former rôle as brigands and become a threat to the colony they knew intimately - see Smilanski, Rehobot, p.69. Many instances of vexations from dismissed or unpaid guards are recorded - see e.g. re. Hadera in 1895, Joffe, Dor ha-ma'apilim, p.161; re. Mishmar hay Yarden in 1896 or 1897, JCA 275/[no number, n.d. (ca. 1896-97)], Dr. Klein [report to JCA (Paris)]; re. Mas-ha in 1905, Hashkafah, vii, 16 (13.12.1905); & re. Beer Tuvya in 1908, CZA Z2/632 (4., 7. & 9.5.1908), Thon to Wolffsohn. Incidents like these were commonplace and of no real importance until, as at Sejera, the Jews tried to take over the guard of their colonies as a matter of principle.
2. David Ben Gurion, Rebirth of Israel (London, 1959), p.18, "In Judea and Galilee" (essay first published in 1917).

aggressiveness, responded in kind.[1]

When JCA founded Sejera, it intended that exclusively Jewish labour should be used on the colony.[2] However, in the early years, the financial situation of the settlers was none too good, and virtually all of them could only afford to employ local fellaheen, despite the latters' animosity towards the Jews. In March 1908, Elie Krause warned that Sejera was, as he put it, "enriching its enemies" who would turn against the settlement at the first moment.[3] This moment came shortly after the Young Turk Revolution.

In February 1909, the Christian peasants at ash Shajara again claimed part of the land which had been allotted to Sejera when the mefruz was made in 1899.[4] Krause reported that the fellaheen had acted at the prompting of outside elements who were discontent with the new régime and with the connivance of the new Kaymakam of Tiberias, Ertoğrul Şakir Effendi who, he wrote, was ill-disposed towards Jews.[5] According to Krause, these discontented elements had joined the Tiberias branch of the CUP, through which they worked to rouse the Arab villages against the Jewish colonies;[6] they had persuaded fellaheen at ash Shajara that the Constitution would guarantee the success of their claims against the settlers.[7] The Kaymakam tried to have

1. David Ben Gurion, Rebirth of Israel, p.17.
2. JCA 257/no.100 (10.11.1899), S. Sonnenfeld and Adler (JCA, Paris) to Haym and Niégo (Migve Yisrael).
3. JCA 270/no.271 (1.3.1908), Krause to JCA (Paris).
4. JCA 271/no.284 (7.2.1909), same to same.
5. Loc.cit.
6. JCA 271/no.285 (19.2.1909), same to same.
7. Ibid. no.289 (25.3.1909), same to same.

the claim heard by the Administrative Council in Tiberias, but this was ruled ultra vires by the Mutasarrif of Acre who ordered the matter to be brought before a tribunal.[1] Meanwhile, in March, the settlers retaliated by making the peasants suffer financial losses through a boycott on their labour and produce.[2] By the beginning of April, the peasants had been forced to drop their false claim to the land because of the high legal costs incurred in bringing the case before a tribunal.[3] In vexation, a certain Shaykh 'Isa Sahu tried to unite the neighbouring Arab villages against Sejera:[4] peasants from ash Shajara molested individual Jews in the fields;[5] they also robbed the colony; and, on April 3rd, beat up some Kurdish Jews (who worked at Sejera but lived in ash Shajara).[6]

In the midst of this strained atmosphere an Arab from the nearby Christian village of Kafr Kanna was killed by a Jew.[7] A conference of the Po'ale Ziyyon (the Marxist party to which many of the Second 'Aliyyah workers belonged) was to be held on Sejera during the Jewish festival of Pesah (Passover). On April 5th, the eve of the festival,

1. JCA 271/no.285; & ibid. no.288 (20.3.1909), Krause to JCA (Paris).
2. Ibid. no.289.
3. Ibid. no.290 (12.4.1909), same to same.
4. Ibid. no.294, where the shaykh's name is rendered (in French) as "Issa Sahou"; the transcription employed here is conjectural. From the context in the source referred to, it is not clear whether Shaykh 'Isa was a villager from ash Shajara or a well known Beduin chief of the same name.
5. Ibid. [miscellaneous papers], (3.4.1909), Krause to Kay. (Tiberias).
6. Ibid. no.290.
7. For a romanticised and inaccurate account of the following incidents, see Ben Gurion, op.cit. pp.21-7.

a Russian Jewish photographer, named Chaim Doubner, made his way on foot from Nazareth to Sejera, accompanied by an Arab porter who was carrying his photographic equipment. About two miles from Sejera, they were attacked by four villagers from Kafr Kanna which they had passed through just fifteen minutes before. Doubner fired at and wounded one of the robbers who then fled, taking Doubner's photographic equip- with them.[1] The wounded man, Raḍi Ṣafuri, was a well known outlaw in the district, and not wishing to disclose how he had been injured, at first said that he had inflicted the wound himself by accident. The next day, however, when it was clear that he was going to die, his parents made him swear before a magistrate ("juge d'instruction") that he had been shot by two Jews from Sejera.[2]

On the afternoon of April 7th, one day after Ṣafuri's death, villagers from Kafr Kanna stole some animals from Sejera,[3] in accordance with local custom which allowed the family of a dead man to pillage the murderer's property during the first week after the killing; if the dead man's family were resisted, they could avenge his death with another life. Some gendarmes had come to Sejera to investigate the recent attacks by fellaheen at ash Shajara on the Kurdish Jews; they pursued the villagers from Kafr

1. JCA 271/[misc. papers], (6.4.1909), Krause to Kay. (Nazareth); & ibid. [misc. papers], (8.4.1909), Krause to Antébi.
2. Loc.cit.
3. Loc.cit.; ibid. [misc. papers], (7.4.1909), Krause to Kay. (Nazareth); & ibid. [misc. papers], (7.4.1909), Krause to Antébi.

Kanna and retrieved all but three of the stolen animals.[1]

Kafr Kanna now demanded "blood money" to expiate Ṣafuri's death. The administration at Sejera was not prepared to pay: first, because Ṣafuri had been killed in self-defence and not in cold blood; and, secondly, because they declined to take responsibility for actions on the highway of Jews who had no connection with the settlement - were they to admit responsibility once, they feared that advantage would be taken of this precedent.[2] On April 9th, about fifty villagers from Kafr Kanna entered Sejera's fields and began to destroy the plants, but were chased off by gendarmes from Tiberias.[3] On the following day they returned with some cattle and trampled down a field of barley.[4] On the next day about thirty fellaheen again raided the settlement to steal eight heads of cattle,[5] while ten others severely wounded two Jews who were returning to Sejera from Tiberias.[6] A day later, Israel Korngold, a worker at Sejera, was killed by some peasants from Kafr Kanna, and shortly afterwards, Simon Melamed, a share-cropper on the settlement, who had set out in pursuit of Korngold's assailants, was killed by some peasants from ash Shajara.[7]

1. JCA 271/[misc. papers], (8.4.1909), Krause to Antébi.
2. Ibid. [misc. papers], (9.4.1909), Krause to Kay. (Nazareth); & ibid. no.290 (12. & 15.4.1909), Krause to JCA (Paris).
3. Ibid. [misc. papers], (10.4.1909), Krause to Kay. (Tiberias).
4. Ibid. no.290.
5. Loc.cit.; ibid. [misc. papers], (11.4.1909), Krause to Kay. (Nazareth); & ibid. [misc. papers], (11.4.1909), Krause to Antébi.
6. Ibid. [misc. papers], (12.4.1909), Krause to Kay.(Nazareth); & ibid. no.290.
7. Loc.cit.; ibid. [misc. papers], (12.4.1909), Krause to Kay. (Tiberias); & ibid. [misc. papers], (12.4.1909), Krause to Antébi.

These murders and the incidents before them were ostensibly the outcome of the death of an Arab from Kafr Kanna, Raḍi Ṣafuri. However, Krause felt that they had been incited from outside.[1] He placed the responsibility with the same discontented elements in the Tiberias branch of the CUP who had encouraged the peasants at ash Shajara to claim back some of the land at Sejera and to attack settlers when their claim failed. Krause named the principal instigators as Najib Naṣṣar from Tiberias who edited al-Karmal in Haifa (of whom mention will be made in subsequent chapters), a priest from Nazareth called ~~Nicolas~~ Nicula, and Shaykh Ibrahim ʿId from Kafr Kanna.[2] The facts that without the connivance of Lubiya, the villagers from Kafr Kanna could not have led away Sejera's cattle, and that villagers from ash Shajara had killed Melamed were regarded by Krause as evidence that these outside elements had succeeded in uniting the Arab villages in the vicinity against Sejera.[3]

On April 12th, the night of the double murder, a counter-Revolution broke out in Constantinople. Immediately thereafter, the Kaymakam of Tiberias was very alarmed by exaggerated reports of the massacres of Armenians in Adana, lest reactionaries in his own district should organise similar insurrections, using Jewish colonies as the butt of their attacks. An additional factor threatening security

1. JCA 271/no.294.
2. Loc.cit. where Ibrahim ʿId is rendered (in French) as "Ibrahim Yid"; the transcription employed here is conjectural.
3. Loc.cit.

in the area was the arrival of thousands of Bani Ṣakhr and other Beduin who on account of a prolonged drought had been forced into the area from the east bank of the Jordan in search of pasturage.[1]

On April 12th a meeting was held on the Jewish colony at Mas-ha, not far from Sejera. Conscious of the prevalent unrest but ignorant of the death of two Jews the same day, the meeting decided to establish an organisation which they dubbed "ha-Shomer" ("the Guard") to protect Jewish settlements from incursions. With the approval of the Jewish Colonization Association's administration in the north of Palestine, an application was made to the Kaymakam of Tiberias to form a unit of ten Jewish guards. In view of the current tension, this application was granted, with permission to enlarge the number of Jewish guards if necessary.[2] Since all the Arab villages in the area were armed, Elie Krause remained fearful of more attacks. He therefore made loans to farmers at Sejera to enable them to buy rifles.[3]

These weapons were not called into use. Timely rains helped to calm the atmosphere.[4] The authorities at Nazareth returned two mules which had been stolen from Sejera on April 7th, and arrested five villagers from Kafr Kanna.[5] Not long afterwards, five more villagers together with Shaykh Ibrahim ʿId were arrested and Doubner's photographic

1. JCA 271/no.294.
2. Ibid. no.291 (25.4.1909), Krause to JCA (Paris); ibid. no.294; & CZA Z2/633 (24.5.1909), Thon to Pres., ZAC.
3. JCA 271/nos.291 & 294. 4. Ibid. no.291.
5. Ibid. no.292 (9.5.1909), Krause to JCA (Paris).

equipment was recovered.[1] Careful inquiries removed all doubts about Kafr Kanna's guilt, so that a delegation of priests from the village and from Nazareth came to Sejera to sue for peace.[2] However, terms could not be agreed upon and the matter was taken to court in Acre.[3]

* * *

The disturbances at Sejera took place twelve months after the "Purim incident" in Jaffa the previous year. There were more significant differences between the two episodes than the simple contrast between their urban and rural settings. In Jaffa, external influences had come from the Russian Vice-Consul in the town, but reached little further than the Kaymakam; the latter and his gendarmerie

1. AIU IX. E. 26 (27.5.1909), Krause to Antébi; & JCA 271/no.293 (28.5.1909), same to JCA (Paris).
2. Loc.cit.
3. In November, Chaim Doubner and his porter were found guilty in absentia of Radi Şafuri's death and were condemned to fifteen years hard labour - see JCA 271/no. 301 (12.2.1910), Krause to JCA (Paris). In February 1910 the peasants from Kafr Kanna were found not guilty of murdering Korngold and Melamed (since, according to Krause, they had bribed two of the judges) - loc.cit. When the Jews appealed against this verdict, it was revised four months later: two peasants were condemned to fifteen years and two others to three years in gaol - JCA 271/no.306 (6.6.1910), same to same. The peasants in turn appealed against this revised sentence and succeeded over a year later in having it reversed - JCA 271/no.330 (20.11.1911), where Krause reported to JCA (Paris) that the Melamed case had been lost through the influence of the Greek and Latin Bishops who had swayed the Christian members of the Tribunal in Acre; cf. CZA L2/50/I [no signature, n.d. (ca. end 1911)] "Note sur l'état d'insécurité dont souffre la population israélite agricole dans les [sic] Caza de Tibériade", where it is stated that all Korngold's assailants were acquitted by the corrupted Tribunal at Acre, while only one of Melamed's four assailants remained condemned after the peasants appealed against the revised sentence mentioned above.

were almost the only individuals involved in the incident. On the other hand, locally-born Arabs - a newspaper editor, a priest and a village shaykh - had encouraged the peasants' raids on Sejera. In Jaffa, a few Muslims had joined the gendarmerie when they broke into Hotel Spector and injured some of the Jews there; whereas the principal actors in the raids on Sejera - Najib Naṣṣar, ~~Nicolas~~ Nicula and the peasants of Kafr Kanna and ash Shajara - were all Christians. On this occasion, the Ottoman gendarmerie tried to ward off the attacks, but failed because it acted feebly and because several Arab villages were supporting one another. While the incident in Jaffa had been devoid of political implications, the series of raids, which began in March 1909 and ended on April 12th with the murder of two Jews, had been initiated, according to Krause, by agitators who were discontented with the new régime. It soon became apparent that Najib Naṣṣar (whose newspaper supported the CUP) had committed himself to work against the Zionist Movement and Jewish advances in Palestine (see Ch.V). Nonetheless, in the light of subsequent developments (when there is little doubt that opponents of the CUP exploited the peasants' hostility ~~for~~ towards the Jews in an attempt to embarrass the Government), Krause's allegations cannot be dismissed out of hand. In May, "serious members" of the CUP branch in Jerusalem told Albert Antébi that the Committee had recently enlarged its cadres, taking in members "of all kinds"; views had been exchanged with other branches and the latter, as well

as some new members in Jaffa and Jerusalem, had requested that attention be given to "the danger which menaces the country and the peasants from Jewish immigration"; the branches most emphatically opposed to this immigration, Antébi was informed, were those in the north of Palestine, at Haifa, Nazareth, Tiberias and Beirut.[1] Two years later many Arabs deserted the CUP, taking their opposition to Jewish immigration with them as it were, to attack the CUP from outside. The raids on Sejera in spring 1909 can therefore be regarded as portents of two trends which did not emerge fully for some while: first, the attachment to the CUP of Arabs who were opposed to Jewish immigration and, second, the merging or even coincidence of interests between the CUP's political opponents on the one hand and the opponents of Jewish settlement in Palestine on the other. This second trend, once evolved, played an important part in the whole pattern of events to follow.

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1. AIU IX. E. 26 (12.5.1909), Antébi to A. Bril (Jaffa); cf. AIU I.G.1 (14.6.1909), A. Benveniste (Consple.) to Pres., AIU, reporting that he had been informed by Nahmias Bey (a high official in the Banque Ottomane) that the CUP branches in "Syria" would openly declare themselves opposed to Zionism and that they would combat mass immigration energetically.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CUP IN POWER: 1909-1911

The CUP and the Zionist Movement

The counter-Revolution in Constantinople of April 13th, 1909, was quashed within two weeks by General Mahmud Şevket Paşa and his "Army of Deliverance". By the end of the month order and Young Turk - essentially CUP controlled - government were restored in the capital. Abdülhamid was deposed and the new cabinet, again headed by Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, took purposeful steps to prevent further insurrection. They were careful to exhibit their respect for the shari'a (since one of the slogans of the counter-Revolution was that the shari'a was in jeopardy), and also adopted an undisguised policy of "Ottomanising" the Empire: dissident national groups, especially in Albania and Macedonia, were harshly repressed.

On May 16th, Dr. Ahmed Riza Bey, the President of the Chamber, called upon the Haham Başi to intimate that the Government was eager for a large number of Jews from Eastern Europe to settle throughout the Empire.[1] A month later it was reported that Ahmed Riza had mentioned this wish to the Haham Başi a second time.[2] A recent request from the Jewish Territorial Organisation for permission to instal Jews in the Empire, particularly in Iraq, may have aroused

1. CZA Z2/8 (17.5.1909), V. Jacobson (Consple.) to D. Wolffsohn (Cologne); & ha-Herut, i, 6 (28.5.1909).
2. Ha-'Olam, iii, 22 (22.6.1909).

Ahmed Riza's interest and so led him to turn to the Haham Başi;[1] but as Ahmed Riza had already indicated his support for Jewish immigration into the Empire to Dr. Jacobson at the beginning of 1909 (see above, p.157), it seems probable that he turned to the Haham Başi in May and June with a definite aim in mind. That purpose was later revealed by Dr. Nazim Bey who in December reiterated and amplified Ahmed Riza's invitation, pointing to Macedonia as a suitable area for settlement,[2] and also by the Government's attempts to encourage Muslim immigration there. In 1910 The Times hit the mark when it reported that the Government sought "to alter the racial 'balance of power'" in Macedonia,[3] where Christians seeking union with Greece were a troublesome majority.

Ahmed Riza's approaches to the Haham Başi were reported in the Turkish press,[4] where they presumably provoked comment, because at the beginning of June Ḥafiẓ Bey al-Sa'id, the deputy from Jaffa, submitted a question to the Presidium of the Chamber, asking what Zionism implied and if the national movement of the Jews was compatible with the interests of the Empire;[5] he also demanded that the port of Jaffa be closed to Jewish immigrants.[6] At the time of his

1. Cf. CZA Z2/8 (7.6.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
2. L'Aurore, i, 27 (26.12.1909); see below, p.195.
3. The Times, no.39,237 (4.4.1910).
4. RMM, vol.viii (1909), p.250, "L'Immigration juive en Turquie".
5. CZA Z2/8 (7.6.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
6. AIU IX. E. 27 (2.7.1909), A. Antébi (Jerus.) to H. Frank (Jaffa); cf. Jewish Chronicle, no.2,098 (18.6.1909); ha-Ẓebi, xxv, 213 (6.7.1909); & ha-Ḥerut, i, 24 (23.7.1909).

election, Ḥafiẓ Bey had been regarded by the Jews as the most well-disposed of the three deputies from the Mutasarriflik.[1] The views of the other two deputies became known publicly that autumn when they were interviewed by Eliezer ben Yehudah, the editor of ha-Ẓebi. Sa'id Bey al-Ḥusayni took the (by now) common position of favouring Jewish immigration into the Empire at large while opposing the mass entry of Jews into Palestine, on the grounds that the country could not contain them (although he did allow that Jews in small numbers would be beneficial).[2] Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi was much more forthright and original in formulating his view; he introduced arguments against the restoration of the Jews to Palestine which, as far as is known, had not yet been used by the Arabs:

> "In general I think that fraternity and close relations between Jews and Arabs are the most natural and desirable thing. Are we not really brethren through family ties, in spirit, in religion, in language and also to an extent in history? However, I am sorry that I do not see an inclination on the part of the Jews, especially the Ashkenazim, to draw close to us .... The Jews, especially the Ashkenazim, are completely a world unto themselves, and they do not have contact or truck with us.... For individual Jews the gates of the country [Palestine] must certainly be open, without any hindrance. But, to found Jewish colonies - that is another question. The Jews have the financial capacity; they will be able to buy many tracts of land and displace the Arab farmers from their land and their fathers' inheritance. [But] we conquered this land not from you; we conquered it from the Byzantines who ruled it then. We do not owe anything to the Jews. The Jews were not here when we conquered the country."[3]

1. CZA Z2/632 (25.10.1908), A. Ruppin (Jaffa) to Pres., ZAC (Cologne), describing Ḥafiz Bey as "entschieden judenfreundlich".
2. Ha-Ẓebi, xxvi, 28 (1.11.1909).
3. Ibid. xxvi, 29 (2.11.1909).

Since Ḥafiẓ Bey al-Sa'id took no real part in subsequent Arab moves against Jewish immigration into Palestine, it seems likely that in raising the issue in the Chamber he was acting under the influence of his colleagues, as the Jews had feared he might (see above, p.168).

An immediate response to Ḥafiẓ Bey's initiative was published in the Constantinople daily, Stamboul, on June 10th, in the form of an anti-Zionist article by one J. Cohen from Salonika.[1] Cohen was at pains to represent himself and "a good number" of his fellow Ottoman Jews as loyal patriots; he maintained that "l'oeuvre des Sionistes, Palestiniens ou Territorialistes est absolument néfaste"; Jews throughout the world, and especially Ottoman Jews, were faithful to their countries of origin, and would never become citizens of a "nouveau royaume de Judée". This article, which concluded "A bas le sionisme! Vive la patrie ottomane", gave voice to the concern among certain Ottoman Jews who feared that the Zionists would compromise them before the new régime at a time when the CUP was intensifying its efforts to suppress all nationalist groups.[2] However, not all Ottoman Jews were so sensitive and a number of them responded in the Constantinople press with articles in defence of Zionism.[3] Of greater note were two articles by a Turk, "Nedjmy", entitled "Sionisme et Turquie" which appeared in

1. Stamboul, xliii, 139 (10.6.1909).
2. Cf. CZA Z2/7 (15.11.1908), J. Freiman (Consple.) to ZCO (Cologne).
3. Stamboul, xliii, 141 (12.6.1909); ibid. 143 (15.6.1909); La Turquie, iv, 138 (12.6.1909); ibid. 141 (16.6.1909); Le Courrier d'Orient, i, 46 (12.6.1909).

Le Courrier d'Orient.[1] Nedjmy denied that the Zionists had ever dreamt of re-establishing the ancient Kingdom of Israel; they simply sought a refuge; and since their talents, energy and finances would be great assets to the Empire's material development, they should be allowed to settle in Palestine. Le Courrier d'Orient was edited by Celâl Nuri [Ileri], and this provides a clue to the pro-Zionist tone of Nedjmy's articles. Celâl Nuri was a spokesman of the "moderate Westernisers" among the Young Turks who believed that the Empire's borrowings from the West should be limited to aspects of what they called "technical civilisation".[2] He had visited Dr. Jacobson on two or three occasions before Nedjmy's articles appeared and, according to Jacobson, had lent a sympathetic ear to what he was told[3] - perhaps because he saw in Jewish immigration a vehicle by which the technical side of the West might suitably be conveyed into the Empire.

Consequent to Hafiz Bey's question in the Chamber, a commission, consisting of four Jews and two Muslims, was set up to investigate the matter.[4] But at the beginning of July, Subhi Bey, the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, received inquiries from various ministries about means of making the existing restrictions effective,[5] because, according to

1. Le Courrier d'Orient, i, 47 (14.6.1909), & ibid. 48 (15.6.1909). Copies of these newspapers and those cited in the preceding note are enclosed in AIU I.G. 1 (17.6.1909), A. Benveniste (Consple.) to Pres., AIU (Paris).
2. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1961), p.230.
3. CZA Z2/8 (15.6.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
4. AIU IX. E. 27 (2.7.1909), Antébi to Frank; & Jewish Chronicle, no.2,098 (18.6.1909).
5. AIU IX. E. 27 (2. & 16.7.1909), Antébi to Frank; cf. Q d'O N.S. 132, no.41 (27.7.1909), G. Gueraud (Jerus.) to S. Pichon (Paris).

information received by Subhi, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ferid Paşa, sympathised with the demands of the Arab deputies,[1] and wished to deal with the issue more expeditiously than regular parliamentary processes would allow.[2] It will be recalled that in March Hilmi Paşa had invited Subhi Bey to prepare a scheme which would guarantee the rights of Ottoman Jews in Palestine whilst checking Jewish immigration from Russia and Rumania (see above, pp.161-2). Subhi replied to the latest inquiries by dispatching a project drawn up with the aid of Albert Antébi,[3] in which he counselled limited Jewish immigration provided that the Jews become Ottoman subjects, after which they should be allowed to settle on vacant lands in Palestine.[4] Apparently on account of divisions within the Cabinet,[5] Subhi Bey was thereupon summoned to Constantinople to give his evidence in person.[6]

On his return to Jerusalem in October, Subhi Bey informed Antébi that Ferid Paşa had urged that Ottoman Jews (as well as foreign Jews) be prohibited from settling in Palestine and that foreign Jews be deprived of their Capitulatory privileges to acquire land.[7] Subhi had been

1. AIU IX. E. 27 (9.7.1909), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
2. AIU IX. E. 27 (11.7.1909), same to same. When the parliamentary commission eventually submitted its report, it opposed mass Jewish immigration into the Empire so long as Jews could not become Ottoman subjects before they had resided in the Empire for five years - see The Levant Herald, xl, 52 (2.3.1911).
3. AIU IX. E. 27 (2.7.1909).
4. Loc.cit. & ibid. (11.7.1909).
5. Loc.cit.; cf. Q d'O N.S. 132, no.41 (27.7.1909).
6. AIU IX. E. 27 (9.7.1909); & Q d'O N.S. 132, no.41 (27.7.1909); cf. CZA Z2/8 (28.9.1908), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
7. AIU IX. E. 27 (18.10.1909), Antébi to Frank.

consulted and he had suggested that such measures would only be to the country's detriment.[1] Whatever the Cabinet may have thought of this view would appear to be irrelevant, for in fact the Government was caught in a double dilemma: first, it was aware that under the new constitutional régime special laws could not be passed which deprived any section of the population of its legal rights,[2] and, second, it knew full well that it could not meddle with the Capitulations without provoking the Great Powers. As a result, on September 28th, the provincial Governors were sent a circular by Talât Bey (now Minister of Internal Affairs) informing them that new legislation was being prepared but was not likely to be ready before the end of the current session of Parliament; therefore:

> "Given the urgency of the matter ... and since we now have capable officials, we consider that the instructions communicated [at earlier dates] and the decisions taken to this end [of checking Jewish immigration] can well be put into practice now."[3]

Since new legislation was virtually impossible, this was perhaps as much as the Government could do.[4]

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1. AIU IX. E. 27 (18.10.1909), Antébi to Frank.
2. Cf. Hilmi Paşa's letter to Subhi Bey, quoted in AIU IX. E. 26 (5.4.1909), Antébi to Pres., AIU - see above, pp.161-2; also cf. ha-'Olam, iii, 40 (10.11.1909), giving text of a draft law regulating Jewish immigration into Palestine which had been dropped because some of its clauses were unconstitutional.
3. AIU IX. E. 27 (19.11.1909), Frank to Antébi, enclosing text of Min. of Internal Affairs to Vilayet (Beirut), dated 28.9.1909; a copy of the same order is to be found in CZA L2/24/VI.
4. Talk of new legislation persisted until the end of 1909 - see ha-Zebi, xxvi, 26 (29.10.1909); ibid. 32 (5.11.1909); CZA Z2/8 (6. & 13.12.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn; even though on November 7th Talât Bey had flatly denied that it was being drafted - see CZA Z2/8 (8.11.1909), same to same.

In October, Cavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, told Jacobson coldly that the Government did not trust the Zionists and that negotiations between them were impossible.[1] Although ignorant of the instructions issued at the end of September,[2] this snub could not have taken Jacobson by surprise because the Zionists had learned of the restored Young Turk Government's attitude towards them much earlier. At the end of May, Jacobson had found Hilmi Paşa full of reserve when he talked to him in general terms about Jewish immigration into the Empire.[3] After Hafiz Bey's inquiry in the Chamber, Jacobson secured interviews with Ahmed Riza, Ferid Paşa and Cavid Bey. All three staved Jacobson off with protests that they were overburdened with work and could not give thought to the Zionist question at present; Ahmed Riza repeated that the Government was opposed to concentrations of Jews in any single part of the Empire.[4]

In July an Ottoman parliamentary delegation visited England. The Jewish Chronicle interviewed Sasun Effendi and Nissim Mazliah, who were members of the delegation. Sasun Effendi, whom Jacobson had been unable to win over (see above, p.155), firmly voiced his opposition to the

1. CZA Z2/8 (26.10.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
2. The latest instructions did not become known until November when copies of them were obtained in Acre and Jaffa - see AIU IX. E. 27 (12.11.1909), J. Starkmeth [Acre?] to Frank [extract]; & ibid. (17.11.1909), Frank to Antébi.
3. CZA Z2/8 (30.5.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
4. CZA Z2/8 (7.6.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn; cf. AIU I. G. 1 (14.6.1909), Benveniste to Pres., AIU, reporting from Nahmias Bey that the CUP were little disposed to Zionism because of its claims to Palestine.

Zionist cause: he did not believe that an autonomous Jewish Palestine could remain loyal to the Ottoman Empire; it would create suspicion - "and suspicion would be a bad thing for the Jews in Turkey".[1] Nissim Mazliah's former enthusiasm for Zionism had waned: the Jews of the Empire would become "Ottomanised" politically; immigrant Jews must not come with any political ambitions and must diffuse themselves geographically "so as to hasten the amalgamation of the various races in the Empire".[2] The Jewish Chronicle also spoke to Dr. Riza Tevfik Bey, a deputy from Adrianople and a highly respected Young Turk, who was a considerable linguist and an expert on sociology and economics with a philosophic bent towards the views of Herbert Spencer.[3] As a child he had attended an Alliance Israélite Universelle school in Adrianople, where he acquired fluent Judaeo-Spanish as well as a warm regard for the Jews.[4] In February 1909 he had indicated his sympathy for Zionism to Mazliah and Jacobson.[5] On the 20th of that month, he had declared at a Jewish meeting in Constantinople that "Palestine is your land more than it is ours"; he, too, was a "Zionist" - since Zionism was "fundamentally nothing more than the expression of the solidarity which characterizes the Jewish people"; its aim was "a humanitarian one" and its methods were "exclusively peaceful".[6] In July, shortly before the Ottoman delegation

1. Jewish Chronicle, no.2,103 (23.7.1909).
2. Loc.cit.
3. The Near East, ii, 16 (1909), p.30.
4. Jewish Chronicle, no.2,103 (23.7.1909).
5. CZA Z2/7 (12. & 22.2.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
6. Ha-ʿOlam, iii, 7 (10.3.1909); & The Times, no.38,905 (12.3.1909).

left for England, he addressed another Jewish gathering in Smyrna on the same subject. Still professing to be a Zionist, he expressed the hope that persecuted Jews would find relief by immigrating into Turkey, but he did not single out Palestine as the rightful or sole object of their endeavours; indeed, he cautioned the Jews against translating Zionism into a political ideal.[1] In London, he repeated the burden of this speech to the Jewish Chronicle, emphasising that "the proper aim of Zionism is the happiness and welfare of the majority of the Jewish nation, but there is a kind of Zionism which may defeat that object and achieve the opposite".[2] On July 24th, Sir Francis Montefiore, the Honorary President of the English Zionist Federation, held a luncheon for five of the Ottoman delegation: Talât Bey, Dr. Riza Tevfik Bey, Ruḫi Bey al-Khalidi, Sasun Effendi and Nissim Mazliah. The main speech was delivered by Riza Tevfik, who abided by the substance of his conversation with the Jewish Chronicle and explicitly warned that "the political aims of Zionism were not likely to evoke approval in the Turkish Empire, especially at the present moment, when there were so many internal political problems to solve".[3] Talât Bey (who became Minister of Internal Affairs on his return to Constantinople) associated himself with Riza Tevfik's remarks; Ruḫi Bey al-Khalidi is not reported to have spoken.[4]

1. L'Aurore, i, 6 (16.7.1909); cf. a little earlier, ha-ʿOlam, iii, 22 (22.6.1909); Rīza Tevfik quoted, but no reference to the occasion on which the statement was made.
2. Jewish Chronicle, no.2,103 (23.7.1909).
3. Ibid. no.2,104 (30.7.1909).
4. Loc.cit.

In February 1909 both Nissim Mazliah and Riza Tevfik had openly supported a Palestine-orientated form of Zionism; by July they had radically qualified their support. The shift in their positions is in line with and indicative of the hardening of CUP policy against all national groups demanding autonomy. Among the Muslim Turks, the Zionists could not have hoped for a wiser or more esteemed supporter than Riza Tevfik, with as deep an understanding as his of the history and modern predicament of the Jews. He had now practically withdrawn his support. It is just possible that during the first months of the new régime there were other CUP politicians who shared Riza Tevfik's original views about Zionism but who somehow had not become known to Dr. Jacobson. However, it may be assumed that by mid-1909 they too had modified their opinions in the same direction as Riza Tevfik, thus leaving the Zionists bereft of support in Ottoman governing circles.

In December 1909 the ninth Zionist Congress was held in Hamburg. As this was the first Congress since the Young Turks had come to power, the aims and methods of the Zionist Movement were discussed in the light of the new political conditions. Max Nordau took a leading part in the debates; he convinced the delegates that Herzl's aim of a chartered company, legally recognised by the Great Powers and charged with organising Jewish settlement in Palestine, had ceased to be an appropriate objective for the Zionist Movement. The Zionists were no longer confronted with an autocrat who could dispense favours at will or make concessions under

Great Power pressure; they now had to negotiate with a constitutional régime, answerable not to the Powers but to the Ottoman people. On the other hand, he persuaded the Congress to retain unamended the Basel Programme with its declared aim - "a home in Palestine"; the Zionists must continue to work patiently towards this end and await the moment when "their elucidations, the effect of time, political developments, and greater maturity will have changed the attitudes of authoritative Turkish circles".[1]

Days before this Congress, Dr. Nazim Bey had told the Jewish editors of the Journal de Salonique that he had had discussions with the Jewish Colonization Association in Paris ~~who were~~ chief was disposed to support a scheme to settle several thousands of Rumanian Jewish families on the banks of the River Vardar at the gates of Salonika.[2] Two weeks later Dr. Nazim was angered by despatches from the Zionist Congress shown to him by the editors of the Journal de Salonique:

> "Vos sionistes effrayent la masse Turque. Quant à l'élite, elle ne permettra jamais une concentration juive en Palestine. Jamais, au grand jamais, tant que nous vivrons et je crois que nous n'avons pas le pied dans la tombe "[3]

1. Quoted by B. Halpern in The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), p.269, from the minutes of the ninth Zionist Congress.
2. Dr. Nazim's interview with Journal de Salonique was reprinted in L'Aurore, i, 27 (26.12.1909); cf. FO 371/1010/20761, [no number], (29.5.1910), Sir Gerard Lowther (Consple.) to Sir Charles Hardinge [F.O.].
3. Dr. Nazim's second interview with Journal de Salonique was also reprinted in L'Aurore, ii, 30 (14.1.1910), whence it re-appeared in Die Welt, xiv, 3 (21.1.1910).

He denounced the Zionists for not only desiring to settle in Palestine but also wishing to impose the conditions of their entry - "avec une nationalité et des revendications toutes faites".[1] Once again, he declared that Jews would be welcomed in Macedonia, but the Zionists, as Nordau said, must wait.[2] He continued:

> "Nous ne les empêchons pas d'attendre. Ils ne peuvent pas nous empêcher aussi de penser qu'ils ont tort. Ils ne peuvent pas empêcher Ebuzia, par exemple, d'attaquer le sionisme. Ils ne peuvent pas empêcher les Juifs ottomans d'être d'un avis contraire aux congressistes de Hambourg ".[3]

The attitude of the CUP, and thus of the Government, towards the Zionist Movement had been stated unequivocally.

* * *

Dr. Nazim Bey's remarks about "Ebuzia" and Ottoman Jews are of interest. Ebüzziya Tevfik was an Albanian who had been one of the first Young Ottomans in the 1860's.[4] He was influential as a veteran journalist and after the Revolution was elected deputy for Antalya.[5] In 1305 A.H. [1887-88], he had written a book entitled Millet-i Israiliye, which so defamed the Jews that the Haham Başi spoke to the Grand Vezir twice because of it - in the first instance to request that its sale be forbidden, and then, in 1898,

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1. L'Aurore, ii, 30 (14.1.1910).
2. In March 1910 Dr. Nazim again extended his invitation to Jewish immigrants to settle in Macedonia in the course of an interview with M.I. Cohen in L'Aurore, ii, 39 (18.3.1910).
3. Ibid. 30 (14.1.1910).
4. S. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, 1962), p.10, n.1, et passim.
5. The Near East, ii, 16 (1909), p.30.

to ask that a second edition be prevented from appearing.[1] After visiting England as a member of the Ottoman delegation in the summer of 1909, Tevfik "began to develop what may be called anti-semitic symptoms, and has since, in his paper 'Tasfir-i Evkiar' [sic], published several articles warning his countrymen against the dangers to be anticipated from the would-be exploitation of Turkey by unscrupulous Jewish financiers".[2] His attacks, as Dr. Nazim indicated, also extended to the Zionists, making him their earliest Muslim opponent of note in the Turkish press.

In the Jewish press, Ebüzziya Tevfik's attacks on the Zionists were matched by those of David Fresco, another veteran journalist who edited the Judaeo-Spanish El Tiempo. Fresco had been acquainted with Jewish nationalists long before the inception of the Zionist Movement, for in 1885 he had met K.W. Wissotski, a representative of the Moscow Ḥobebe Ziyyon who visited Constantinople in that year.[3] His attacks on Zionism had begun at least as early as 1901 when Herzl was received by Abdülhamid.[4] He was the spokesman of those Ottoman Jews alluded to above, who feared that

1. Ha-Ẓebi, xiv, 29 (10.5.1898).
2. FO 371/992/177, no.992 (27.12.1909), C.M. Marling (Consple.) to Sir Edward Grey (F.O.); cf. ha-Ḥerut, i, 40 (30.8.1909), & L'Aurore, i, 19 (31.10.1909); also CZA L2/167 (10.3.1910), S. Harari (Beirut) to A. Ruppin (Jaffa); & ha-Ḥerut, ii, 98 (25.5.1910).
3. Wissotski, Miktabim, pp.75-9.
4. AIU I.G. 1 (7.6. & 2.7.1901), both A. Eskénazi (Consple.) to Pres., AIU, enclosing translations of articles which had appeared in El Tiempo on June 6th and 13th respectively.

the Zionists would compromise them before the Turks and who therefore endeavoured to demonstrate their patriotism and loyalty to "Ottomanism" by vilifying the Zionist Movement.

Until the end of 1909 Ebüzziya Tevfik and David Fresco were almost alone in fulminating against Zionism in the Turkish press. But in January 1910, after the ninth Congress, anti-Zionist articles appeared in Itilâf, Sabah and Ikdam, adhering to the Government's position of taking exception to the Zionists while inviting Jews to settle throughout the Empire, excluding Palestine. "At present we cannot worry our head with a Jewish question too," wrote Ikdam.[1] Such articles, however, were infrequent in the Turkish press until the latter half of 1910 when anti-Zionist articles of a rather different nature began to appear (see Ch.VI).

At such times as anti-Zionist articles did appear, words in defence of Zionism were published in Le Jeune-Turc. In December 1908 Nissim Mazliah and Nissim Ruso had advised the Zionists to publish a high quality magazine in French (see above, p.156), a view which Dr. Jacobson had shared.[2] In August 1909 a group of prominent Zionists met in Constantinople to discuss the creation of a pro-Zionist press in Turkey.[3] Celâl Nuri, mentioned above as favourably disposed

1. Ha-Herut, ii, 50 (21.1.1910), article from Ikdam reprinted in extenso.
2. Cf. CZA Z2/7 (21.10.1908), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
3. CZA Z2/8 (2.9.1909): minutes of meeting attended by D. Wolffsohn, N. Sokolow, J. Rosow, M. Ussischkin, V. Jabotinsky and V. Jacobson.

to the Zionists, had collaborated with Ebüzziya Tevfik who, in addition to editing Tasvir-i Efkâr, owned Le Courrier d'Orient. However, in the summer of 1909 Celâl Nuri dis-associated himself from Ebüzziya Tevfik after a disagreement with the latter[1] (not inconceivably on account of their conflicting attitudes towards Jews and Zionists). The Zionists therefore invited him to edit a daily paper - Le Jeune-Turc - which they would subsidise but which would concentrate its attentions on Ottoman and world affairs, coming to the Zionists' aid only in times of need. Nuri accepted and Le Jeune-Turc began to appear in autumn 1909. When Zionism was attacked in other Ottoman newspapers, Nuri regularly printed signed articles in defence of the Zionist Movement, or wrote more generally in favour of Jewish immigration into Palestine and other parts of the Empire.[2]

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The Arabs and the Zionists in Palestine

In the Turkish press, articles about Zionism began to appear for practical purposes only after the ninth Zionist

1. FO 371/992/177,no.992 (27.12.1909), Marling to Grey.
2. An early example of an article written by Celâl Nuri from Le Jeune-Turc is enclosed (without date) in Marling's despatch cited in the preceding note. This article, entitled "La colonisation intérieure", pointed to the Empire's unsatisfactory finances and advocated Jewish immigration into Iraq, a scheme which had recently been put to the Government by Alfred Nossig of Berlin - see Marling's despatch & cf. CZA Z2/8 (8.11.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn. In this article Nuri argued that "une fois les Juifs [sont] intéressés au sort de l'Iraq, les financiers israélites seront obligés de venir en aide de notre trésor."

Congress at the end of December 1909; and even then these were mostly written not through genuine interest in or suspicion of the Zionist Movement, but, as will be explained below, in order to attack the CUP (see Ch.VI). Not so, however, in the Arabic press, where articles about Zionism and Jewish immigration into Palestine started to appear regularly after the counter-Revolution in April 1909 and thereafter gradually became a topic of constant attention and mounting importance.[1] In the twelve months after the counter-Revolution four papers in particular were observed to be especially opposed to Jewish settlement in Palestine; they were Nahḍat al-ʿArab (Paris), al-Ahram (Cairo), al-Aṣmaʿi (Jaffa) and al-Karmal (Haifa).[2]

Nahḍat al-ʿArab was the journal of Rashid Muṭran's "Syrian Central Committee". This Committee was based in Paris, where Muṭran had lived for a number of years, and it had addressed a manifesto to Abdülhamid in December 1908, urging that "self-government" be granted to "Syria".[3] Nahḍat al-ʿArab commenced publication at the beginning of April 1909, under the editorship of Yusuf Durighallu [Duriguello].[4] Shortly thereafter a number of anti-CUP

1. CZA L2/167 (5.8.1909), S. Muyal (Jaffa) to Zionist Office (Jaffa); cf. ha-Zebi, xxv, 240 (9.8.1909).
2. Cf. ha-Herut, i, 24 (23.7.1909), & ibid. ii, 98 (25.5.1910); in both these cases, ha-Herut adds a fifth paper, al-Inṣaf (Jerusalem), but no real evidence was found that this paper took an anti-Zionist position, other than one or two spiteful articles against Jews - see ha-Herut, ii, 72 (14.3.1910), & ibid. 73 (16.3.1910).
3. Copy of this manifesto, dated 25.12.1908, in FO 371/561/45494 [no covering despatch]; cf. The Times, no. 38,852 (9.1.1909).
4. The Times, no.38,928 (8.4.1909).

journalists whom the Government had tried to implicate in the April counter-Revolution arrived in Paris as exiles from Constantinople. Hence Paris became a centre of opposition to the CUP, voiced through existing papers, such as Nahḍat al-ʿArab, and others, such as General Şerif Paşa's Mèchéroutiette, published by the fugitives themselves.[1] Towards the end of May, an unsigned letter was printed in the sixth number of Nahḍat al-ʿArab, alleging that the CUP's success derived from its links with the Jews and Freemasons.[2] Its author claimed that Jewish influence amongst the Freemasons was very great; the Freemasons had created the CUP and had been responsible for the counter-Revolution in order to hasten the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, so that they (or rather the Jews who stood behind them) might establish the "Kingdom of Israel" in Palestine anew.

> "The Jews say as follows: the [orthodox] Muslim Turks and Arabs will not be able in any circumstances to live in peace and quiet and enjoy freedom and equality in a [constitutional] state based on a system of a Muslim Caliph. And what will happen then? The Muslim Turks and Arabs will rise up against the free-thinkers, quarrels and strife will break out between them, and then the Great Powers will intervene and protect Jewish interests. This will cause conflicts and hatred between the diverse elements in the Empire; order will become disarray; the rulers will be lost; and the Jews will finally achieve their desire."[3]

1. A. Emin, The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press (New York, 1914), p.99; cf. Mandelstam, L'Empire Ottoman, p.34.
2. Reprinted in toto in ha-Ḥerut, i, 20 (14.7.1909).
3. Loc.cit.

The writer had read that most of the soldiers in the "Army of Salonika", [i.e. the "Army of Deliverance"?] were Jews; there had been two Jews in the deputation of four which informed Abdülhamid of his deposition;[1] the New York Herald and the Berliner Tageblatt had reported that all the leaders of the CUP were disciples of Karasu. Therefore, the writer put to his readers, "Do you not see that [the Jews] have already taken the reins of government in their hand, and that shortly they will unfurl the Jewish flag?"[2]

Not long after this letter appeared, N. Nicolaïdès published his book, Une Année de Constitution: 11/24 juillet 1908 - 11/24 juillet 1909, in which he too detected similar Judaeo-Masonic machinations behind the CUP in a chapter entitled "L'Absolutisme du Comité - Le Rôle de la Franc-Maçonnerie et des Juifs dans la Révolution".[3] Within a short while this phantasy was taken up by various anti-CUP groups and, as will be shown below, later played a part in Ottoman politics (see Ch.VI).

The dominant rôle ascribed to Freemasons and Jews within the CUP has been dismissed as "trash" by Ernest E. Ramsaur,[4] and, in more tempered language, has been disproved by Bernard Lewis.[5] Before the Revolution the Young Turks

1. Their names are given as Karasu and "Salamon Abran". Karasu was, in fact, the only Jew in the deputation; the other members were General Esad Paşa [Toptani], Arif Hikmet and Aram Effendi.
2. Ha-Ḥerut, i, 20 (14.7.1909).
3. N. Nicolaïdès, Une Année de Constitution: 11/24 juillet 1908 - 11/24 juillet 1909 (Brussels, 1909), pp.129-56.
4. Ramsaur, The Young Turks, p.106.
5. Lewis, Modern Turkey, pp.207-8, n.4.

met in Masonic Lodges to ensure secrecy; Jews had been members of the Young Turks, though not disproportionately so. In August 1908 a Young Turk named Refik Bey described the secret meetings held in Masonic Lodges in Le Temps;[1] and in the same month Harry Lamb, the British Consul-General in Salonika, remarked that Emmanuel Karasu, "as the introducer of freemasonry into Macedonia and head of the Salonika Masonic Lodge, ... has rendered important services to the Young Turk cause".[2] However, the letter which appeared in Nahḍat al-ʿArab is apparently the first published instance where these two strands were combined by the CUP's enemies to produce a double-edged charge against the Committee, which exploited associations in popular imaginations about Freemasons and Jews. Freemasonry in Turkish ("farmasonluk") signified "atheism of the most condemnable character"[3] - an accusation which had frequently been levelled against prominent Young Turks; and the myth of the grasping, cosmopolitan Jew was not unknown among the Turks and other peoples in the Empire.[4]

After the counter-Revolution, the Government suppressed a number of papers which were opposed to the CUP. Consequently, the claim that the CUP was dominated by Freemasons

1. Ramsaur, The Young Turks, p.107.
2. FO 371/549/30972, no.114 (24.8.1908), H.H. Lamb (Salonika) to Lowther (Consple.).
3. Ramsaur, op.cit. p.111, quoting J.P. Brown, The Dervishes (London, 1927), p.64.
4. See A. Galanté, Le Juif dans le proverbe, le conte et la chanson orientaux (Istanbul, 1935), pp.11-21, for popular sayings in Turkish and Greek.

and Jews could scarcely be mentioned by newspapers within the Empire which wished not to be suspended by the authorities, or even by some Arabic newspapers published in Egypt, desirous of continued circulation within the Arab provinces. It was therefore some time before the anti-CUP press within the Empire dared to make use of this particular allegation (see Ch.VI).

However, this did not prevent Arabic newspapers, both pro- and anti-CUP, from discussing Zionism and, not infrequently, speaking out against Jewish immigration into Palestine. Al-Aṣmaʿi's early murmurings against the Jewish settlers have been described in the previous chapter (see above, pp.164-5). Shortly after Ḥafiẓ Bey al-Saʿid raised the Zionist issue in the Chamber, ha-Ẓebi received a report from Alexandria that interest in Zionism had increased noticeably in the Arabic and French press in Egypt.[1] In August, al-Ahram's Jerusalem correspondent accused the Jews of coming to Palestine with "hidden, secret aims which the Jews of the whole world are helping them to realise", namely, to establish an independent kingdom in their ancient homeland.[2] In October, al-Ahram repeated this accusation and reported that the local population in Palestine was disturbed by the fact that the immigrant Jews had begun to dominate trade in the towns.[3] Al-Ahram's correspondent

1. Ha-Ẓebi, xxv, 240 (9.8.1909); report from Alexandria dated 5.8.1909, referring to the "last three weeks".
2. Article from al-Ahram (no date), entitled "The Jews and Palestine" reprinted in extenso in ha-Ḥerut, i, 24 (23.7.1909).
3. Article from al-Ahram ("in one of its last editions") reprinted in extenso in ha-Ẓebi, xxvi, 20 (22.10.1909).

also claimed that the Jews were avoiding military service to devote themselves wholly to colonisation, while Muslims and Christians were fulfilling their national duty.[1] In both these articles the writer appealed to his readers not to ignore what was happening:

> "Let us not slumber; let us raise our voice like a trumpet to awaken our Government and demand that it puts an end and a stop to these ambitions [of the Jewish immigrants], the outcome of which will be bitter ".[2]

These papers' strictures against the Jewish immigrants were mild in comparison with the sharp attacks which appeared in al-Karmal from the end of 1908. This paper was edited by Najib al-Khuri Naṣṣar, who was named by Elie Krause as one of the instigators of the raids on Sejera in March and April 1909 (see above, p.178). Naṣṣar, a native of Tiberias, was a Protestant of Greek Orthodox origin.[3] He had worked for fifteen years in the hospital run by Dr. David Torrance, the Free Church of Scotland's missionary in Tiberias[4] (under whose influence Naṣṣar conceivably changed his religious denomination). Naṣṣar had also worked for some years with the Jewish Colonization Association as a land-agent.[5] According to two Jewish accounts, he had founded al-Karmal after a disagreement with the

1. Article from al-Ahram ("in one of its last editions"), reprinted in extenso in ha-Ẓebi, xxvi, 20 (22.10.1909).
2. Ha-Ḥerut, i, 24 (23.7.1909).
3. Q d'O N.S. 123, no.37 (20.9.1913), Grappin [?], (Haifa) to Pichon. There is a photograph of a "Najib Nassar" in J. Davies-Smith, Palestine Portrayed (London, n.d.), p.39.
4. Ha-Ḥerut, iv, 158 (7.7.1912).
5. AIU I.C. 1-2 (8.8.1911), I. Mahon (Haifa) to Pres., AIU; & ha-Po'el ha-Ẓa'ir, iv, 22 (1911), pp.12-13. E.g. Naṣṣar had helped in the transfer of land at Dala'ika and in purchasing building sites at Tiberias - see CZA L4/276/IIB (1.6.1919), C. Kalvarisky, [notes].

Jewish Colonization Association (over payment or terms of employment), with the express purpose "of writing against the Yishshub in Palestine so that the Arabs would not continue to sell land to the Jews".[1] If this disagreement was the sole reason for founding al-Karmal, it must have been very serious indeed. It would seem more probable that on account of his whole experience as a land-agent for the Jewish Colonization Association, Naṣṣar had reached the conclusion that continued sales of land to the Jews would undermine the position of the Arabs in Palestine and that one day the country might in fact be completely sold to the Jews (much in the same way as it was suggested that Négib Azoury reached an anti-Zionist position as a result of his experience in Jerusalem - see above, p.145). But whatever the cause, Naṣṣar became the most vocal and most persistent publicist among the Arabs before World War 1 to write and work against the activities of the Zionists in Palestine.

Complaints from Jews against articles which appeared in al-Karmal resulted in its temporary suspension in the early summer of 1909,[2] and again in the winter of that year.[3] In February 1910 Naṣṣar wrote an article entitled "Settlement or Devastation?",[4] which led the Haham Baṣi in Constantinople to demand that Naṣṣar be brought to

1. N. Malul, "ha-'Itonut ha-'arabit", ha-Shiloaḥ, vol. xxxi(1914), p.446; & ha-Ḥerut, iii, 6 (4.11.1910).
2. Ibid. i, 13 (22.6.1909).
3. L'Aurore, i, 12 (30.9.1909); & ha-Ḥerut, ii, 57 (7.2.1910).
4. Al-Karmal, no.50, referred to in ha-Ḥerut, ii, 60 (14.2.1910); cf. ha-Ḥerut, ii, 89 (4.5.1910).

court charged with founding al-Karmal "solely to excite discord and sow dissension between the Jews and other Ottomans" and with "explaining the Torah as it suits [him]".[1] On May 30th, the public prosecutor in Haifa acquitted Naṣṣar on the grounds "that he attacks Zionism alone, rightly so; and that all these trivial words in his articles are of no consequence".[2]

As no set of al-Karmal is extant, it is impossible to judge whether Naṣṣar attacked "Zionism alone" - the Jews certainly felt that he went further than this.[3] But it clearly was not the case that his words were "of no consequence". By decrying Jewish settlement in Palestine through his columns, Naṣṣar was giving positive form and expression to a popular mood which had been smouldering for some years and which by the end of 1909 was patent to the British Vice-Consul in Haifa who reported that "the natives, chiefly the Christians, do not relish [the Jewish immigrants'] strengthening their hold on the land".[4] In the next years Naṣṣar more than any other journalist helped develop the Arabs' awareness and distrust of the Jewish settlers. By May 1910 he had already influenced at least some of the local population to take active steps against Jewish land purchase.

* * *

1. Ha-Ḥerut, ii, 98 (25.5.1910); cf. CZA Z2/634 (29.5.1910), Ruppin to Pres., ZAC (Cologne).
2. Ha-Ḥerut, ii, 103 (6.6.1910).
3. E.g. ha-Ḥerut, ii, 89 (4.5.1910).
4. FO 195/2342, encl. to no.7 (12.2.1910), H.A. Cumberbatch (Beirut) to Lowther.

In spring 1910 the Zionists opened negotiations with Ilyas Sursuq of Beirut for a tract of the best agricultural land in Palestine, embracing the villages of Fula and 'Afula, about halfway between Nazareth and Jenin. At the beginning of May, Sursuq was assailed in the Arabic press,[1] and two telegrams were dispatched from Haifa and Nazareth to the Central Government protesting against Jewish land purchase.[2] A copy of the first telegram was also sent to Ebüzziya Tevfik's Tasvir-i Efkâr, whence it was re-printed in La Turquie.[3] The signatories (whose names were not given) claimed that the press "of the West and of the Orient" testified to the efforts of the Zionists since the Constitution to acquire extensive lands in Syria and Palestine, and that recently about 100,000 Jewish immigrants had entered the country, disrupting harmony and exposing the Empire to political dangers.

> "A peine délivrés du régime de l'absolutisme, nous devenons victimes des aspirations du Sionisme qui, 'en nous faisant des prêts hypothécaires, finit par s'approprier nos fermes et nos champs'."[4]

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1. Ha-Ḥerut, ii, 97 (23.5.1910).
2. CZA Z2/9 (11. & 13.5.1910), Jacobson to Wolffsohn; & ha-Mebasser, i, 19 (14.5.1910).
3. Cf. Emin, The Development of Modern Turkey, pp.94-5: after the Young Turk Revolution Ottoman subjects acquired a "new diversion of holding public meetings, listening to fervid speeches, and wiring to the competent authorities, and to the press their resolutions of protest".
4. Cutting from La Turquie (6.5.1910), enclosed with Jacobson's letter of 13.5.1910, cited in the penultimate note. La Turquie appears to have paraphrased the telegram, retaining the part in single quotes from the original. Ha-Ḥerut, ii, 97 (23.5.1910) reported that the substance of this telegram was published in al-Maḥrusa (Cairo), no.408; and ha-Or, i, 73 (2.6.1910) read in the "foreign press" that a circular had been distributed in Jaffa with almost the same content as the above quotation from La Turquie.

A copy of the second telegram, from Nazareth, was received by Yeni Ikdam. Le Jeune-Turc published a translation of the text which it obtained from the Ministry of Internal Affairs:

> "L'arrivée en grand nombre en cette région des émigrés israélites venant de l'étranger est une cause de grands préjudices politiques et économiques. Il leur était défendu, dans le temps, de s'installer ici.
>
> "Toute la presse est unanime à avouer que les Sionistes nourrissent l'intention d'exproprier nos propriétés. Ces intentions sont pour nous une question de vie ou de mort. Nous y attirons l'attention du département compétent.
>
> "(LL.SS.) Le moukhtar Anthos (orthodoxe); Nassara Saïd, (musulman); Nassara Halil, (protestant); Nassara Pathon, (latin); Nassara Sélim (catholique); Nassara Anthos, (catholique); Nassara Aaréj [sic] "[1]

Significantly, both these telegrams made reference to the press. Moreover, both echoed Naṣṣar's leading theme: that the Zionists sought to deprive the local population of its land. A further hint of Naṣṣar's influence is disclosed in the telegram from Haifa which mentioned the forfeiture of lands mortgaged to the Zionists. When a branch of the Anglo-Palestine Company had opened recently in Safed, al-Karmal admonished Arab peasants not to borrow a single piastre from it because this endangered their lands and property: "it is better for the fellah to sell his cattle and horses if he needs money than to put his fields on pledge with his creditors".[2]

At the end of 1909, the Government had sent the Minister of the Awqaf, Ḥammadah Paṣa, on a tour of inspection to

1. Cutting from Le Jeune-Turc (7.5.1910), enclosed with Jacobson's letter of 13.5.1910, cited above.
2. Ha-Ḥerut, ii, 98 (25.5.1910), quoting al-Karmal.

Syria, Palestine and Yemen. Ḥammadah Paşa was an Arab and one of his tasks was to consider Jewish immigration into Palestine.[1] The nature of his report is not known, but in it Ḥammadah Paşa presumably made a point which he raised with Jacobson in Constantinople before his departure and with Antébi in Jerusalem: there was reason to suspect the Zionists of wishing to establish an independent state in Palestine in view of numerous declarations by the Zionists themselves.[2] Then, in the middle of May, not many days after the protest telegrams from Haifa and Nazareth reached Constantinople, a group of Arab deputies demanded an assurance from Talât Bey that Jews would not be permitted to take possession of the local population's land and that mass Jewish immigration into Palestine would not be tolerated.[3] Thereupon telegrams to this effect were dispatched by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the authorities in Beirut and Jerusalem,[4] where the Government's position was simply put by the new Mutasarrif, Azmi Bey, who had arrived to replace Subhi Bey on May 4th:

> "We are not xenophobes, we welcome all strangers; we are not anti-Semites, we appreciate the economic superiority of the Jews; but no nation, no government could open its arms to groups making proclamations everywhere and aiming to take Palestine from us. The political dominance of the Jews in this country belongs to the realm of childish dreams, but as long

1. CZA Z2/8 (30.10.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
2. CZA Z2/8 (8.11.1909), same to same; & AIU IX. E. 28 (16.5.1910), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
3. CZA Z2/9 (1. & 7.6.1910), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
4. CZA L2/34/I (8.6.1910), Jacobson to Ruppin.

> as they talk in these terms we shall not tolerate their economic advancement. Were they to abandon these utopias and give proof of their [dedication to] Ottomanism, then all these difficulties and restrictions would fall away like magic".[1]

On May 21st, the British Consul in Jerusalem reported that foreign Jews long resident in Jerusalem were now being prevented from buying land;[2] at the beginning of June, David Levontin wrote from Jaffa that it had also become impossible for Ottoman Jews to acquire land;[3] and shortly afterwards the British Vice-Consul in Haifa informed his superior in Beirut that foreign Jews were finding great difficulty in purchasing land.[4] When G.H. Fitzmaurice, the Chief Dragoman in the British Embassy at Constantinople, spoke to Talât Bey about the renewed restrictions, he was told that they were "the outcome of complaints of the local inhabitants who feared a foreign Jewish invasion, that though they were based on [an] old régime decision[,] Constitutional Turkey had not yet seen its way to remove them and that the whole question was under consideration at the Council of State".[5] The nature of the Council of State's decision may be inferred from two orders re-confirming the restrictions, sent to the Vali of Beirut by the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs on September 22nd

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1. AIU IX. E. 28 (16.5.1910), Antébi to Pres., AIU.
2. FO 195/2351, no.25 (21.5.1910), H.E. Satow (Jerus.) to Lowther; cf. ibid. (8.6.1910), same to same [telegram].
3. CZA W/127/I (2.6.1910), Levontin to Wolffsohn.
4. FO 195/2342, encl. to no.31 (16.6.1910), Cumberbatch to Lowther. (An additional difficulty, according to this report, was the "exorbitant prices" demanded by the Arabs for their land.)
5. FO 195/2351, minute on folder to no.25 by G.H. Fitzmaurice, dated 13.6.1910.

and October 3rd respectively,[1] and from instructions issued by the Minister of the Cadastre to convert all mülk land on the periphery of Jerusalem into miri.[2] That these orders were obeyed can be gathered from a Note Verbale Identique presented to the Ottoman Government by the various embassies at Constantinople on January 20th, 1911,[3] requesting that foreign Jews be permitted to acquire land in Palestine and Syria without hindrance in accordance with the law of "7 Séfer 1284" [= 1285].[4] The Porte replied to this note on April 20th, stating that land transfer was "une question d'Administration intérieure que la dite loi n'a pas eu pour objet de trancher et au sujet de laquelle la libre appréciation du Governement Impérial, déjà reconnue, ne saurait être discutée".[5]

* * *

After the Young Turk Revolution, the new régime gave thought to the question of rehabilitating the Empire's finances. The sale of Abdülhamid's lands ("çiftliks") was considered as one means of raising funds.[6] In October

1. CZA L2/24/VI (24.11.1910), E. Auerbach (Haifa) to Pres., ZAC.
2. Q d'O N.S. 133, no.44 (23.10.1910), Gueyraud to Pichon.
3. OFA A/346, where these Notes are preserved; cf. FO 371/1245/12028, no.198 (28.3.1911), Lowther to Grey, enclosing copy of British Note (20.1.1911).
4. See Young, Corps, i, 341-45, being protocole, dated "7 Sef. 1285" [= 9.6.1868], appended to the "Loi concédant aux Etrangers le droit de posséder des Immeubles dans l'Empire Ottoman" - ibid. pp.337-41.
5. OFA A/346, Note Verbale, no.6787/37 (20.4.1911), S.P. to Foreign Missions (Consple.); cf. FO 371/1245/16048, no.271 (24.4.1911), Lowther to Grey.
6. CZA L2/21/I (29.11.1908), B.A. Goldberg (Vilna) to O. Warburg (Berlin), [per M. Dizengoff (Jaffa)]; & AIU IX. E. 26 (8.4.1909), Antébi to Pres., AIU; cf. CZA Z2/8 (30.5.1909), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.

1908 the Jewish Colonization Association submitted a request to purchase such lands in Iraq;[1] in the following spring it also made a bid for some half a million dunams of çiftlik in the region of Jericho in the Jordan Valley,[2] and Baron Rothschild tendered an offer for about a million dunams at Beisan (also in the Jordan valley, to the south of Lake Tiberias).[3] In July, the Grand Vezir rejected these Jewish bids for çiftliks in Palestine, but the Cabinet decided to permit JCA to survey certain lands in Asia Minor and Iraq.[4]

Quite independently of JCA and Baron Rothschild, a Maronite from Beirut named Najib al-Aşfar was negotiating with the Ottoman Government for the purchase of all Abdülhamid's lands in the Vilayet of Şam and in Palestine, with the intention of leasing them out profitably to tenants.[5] In the middle of 1910, about twelve months after al-Aşfar had initiated his project, it was rumoured that he was an agent for the Jews. This rumour was without foundation, since the terms of al-Aşfar's proposals stipulated that prospective non-Muslim tenants must have been Ottoman subjects for three generations.[6] (Indeed, these clauses

1. CZA L2/34/I (24.10.1908), Jacobson to Ruppin.
2. AIU IX. E. 26 (15.3.1909), Antébi to Pres., AIU. David Levontin of the APC had tried to secure a concession on the same lands in 1905 - see above, pp.113-14.
3. AIU IX. E. 26 (15.3.1909); cf. Q d'O N.S. 132, no.41 (27.7.1909), Gueyraud to Pichon.
4. AIU IX. E. 26 (16.7.1909), Frank to Antébi; cf. Q d'O N.S. 132, no.41 (27.7.1909); & AIU IX. E. 27 (15.9.1909), Antébi to Frank.
5. CZA Z2/9 (28.10.1910), Jacobson to J. Kann (Hague).
6. CZA Z2/9 (7.10.1910), same to Wolffsohn.

had moved Calâl Nuri to write a number of articles against the scheme in Le Jeune-Turc.[1]) The rumour was accepted by the editors of al-Muqtabas (Damascus), al-Mufid, al-Haqiqa and al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm (all Beirut) - though according to one Jewish account, not without persuasion from Najib Naṣṣar.[2] The first Arabic newspapers to speak out against Jewish settlement in Palestine had all been edited by Christians. Of these, al-Ahram alone enjoyed wide circulation and influence; Nahḍat al-ʿArab entered the Arab provinces surreptiously and was distributed in secret, while al-Aṣmaʿi and al-Karmal were local Palestinian papers whose limited readership scarcely extended beyond Jaffa and Haifa, the towns where they were published. By noteworthy contrast, the four papers which joined them in the summer of 1910 were edited by Muslims and each commanded considerable influence both in and beyond Beirut and Damascus, cities where previously no anti-Zionist voice had been raised.[3]

* * *

1. CZA Z2/9 (28.10.1910).
2. Malul, "ha-ʿItonut ha-ʿarabit", p.466; cf. ha-Herut, iii, 6 (4.11.1910). The newspapers are said by Malul to have made an agreement called the "Four-sided Covenant"; and are identified by name in CZA L2/50/I "Note sur l'état d'insécurité dont souffre la population israélite dans les [sic] Caza de Tibériade [no signature, n.d. (ca. end 1911)]. The suggestion of Najib Naṣṣar's influence is substantiated by Muḥammad Kurd ʿAli, the editor of al-Muqtabas, who recalls in his memoirs that Naṣṣar was one of the men who did most to warn his readers of the dangers of Zionism - see M. Kurd ʿAli, al-Mudhakkirat (Damascus, 1948-51), iii, 914.
3. Al-Muqtabas was the most important of these papers. For its influence, see A. Almaliah, "ha-Tenuʿah ha-ʿarabit be-suriyyah wehe-meʾoraʿot ha-aḥoronot ba-mamlakah", ha-Poʿel ha-Zaʿir, vi, 1 (1912), p.9.

In the latter half of 1910 Jews in Palestine noted an increase in anti-Zionist activity among the Arab population. This coincided with the arrival of a new Mutasarrif, Azmi Bey, who rigidly applied the restrictions against Jewish land purchase in the south of the country,[1] and with the attacks on Jewish settlement which appeared in the columns of important newspapers in the north.

In October 1909, Albert Antébi had observed that a group was being formed among the local population to prevent sales of land to Jews;[2] at the beginning of 1911 he wrote of it again, stating that it had been promoted by the Nashashibi family in Jerusalem.[3] At about the same time it was reported that a similar society had been formed in Haifa to appeal to the Government to annul Jewish land purchases; a Muslim of Egyptian origin, Khurshid Effendi Wahbi, had donated 20,000 francs to this society and also was supporting al-Muqtabas financially in its campaign against al-Asfar.[4] An open letter by a Haifa notable was published in al-Karmal urging Aḥmad al-Rimawi, the Muslim editor of al-Najaḥ in Jerusalem, to "look around and see what has happened".[5]

> "You are sensitive and jealous of [the honour of] your country and people. How can you remain silent, hands clasped, without doing anything? How can you stand and watch with equanimity this movement of neighbours [i.e. Jews] taking on from day to day a form progressively less pleasant and less acceptable to you and your country? Rise,

1. AIU IX. E. 28 (3. & 28.6.1910), Antébi to Pres., AIU; cf. AIU X. E. 29 (21.6.1911), Antébi to Haham Başi (Consple.).
2. AIU IX. E. 27 (18.10.1909), Antébi to Frank.
3. AIU IX. E. 29 (4.1.1910 [= 1911]), Antébi to S. Loupo (Miqve Yisrael).
4. Ha-Herut, iii, 6 (4.11.1910); cf. ibid. 25 (19.12.1910).
5. Ibid. 6 (4.11.1910).

> al-Rimawi, sound your polished horn; sound it early, sound it until the slumbering hearts awake, until the frozen spirits become warm and see how their homeland is being destroyed and their position demolished."[1]

In reply, al-Rimawi complimented al-Karmal for publishing this call and invited Naṣṣar to see how Jerusalem and the surrounding area were falling into the hands of the Jews and other foreigners.[2]

> "We have no alternative but to accept your words, to adhere to your summons, to thank you for your alertness and to say to nationalists [waṭaniyyin] in Jerusalem: 'Wake up, slumberers, wake up!'"[3]

On November 11th, al-Karmal printed a telegram from Isʿaf al-Nashashibi in Jerusalem (see above, p.139), reporting that a reception had been held in honour of Eliezer ben Yehudah in the "Zionist Club" at which the Zionist flag was raised, the Zionist anthem was sung, and a great number of Zionist texts were sold.[4] Naṣṣar, in commenting upon this telegram, demanded that the authorities investigate what took place in Jerusalem, and appealed to the citizens of Haifa, Beirut and Damascus to unite "in order to stand against the foreigners and to prevent [Arab] children from being sent to the foreigners' high-schools".[5] In December

1. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 6 (4.11.1910).
2. Ibid. 26 (21.12.1910). 3. Loc.cit.
4. Ibid. 10 (14.11.1910); & ha-Or, ii, 26 (18.11.1910); cf. N. Naṣṣar, al-Ṣihyuniyya (Haifa, 1911), p.51 (see below, Ch.VI). A reception was held on October 20th in Jerusalem to honour Eliezer ben Yehudah for thirty years of literary contribution to the Hebrew language. The Hebrew press reported this gathering as being quietly dignified - see ha-Ḥerut, iii, 2 (26.10.1910).
5. Ha-Or, ii, 26 (18.11.1910). In urging that the local population be restrained from sending their children to "foreign high-schools", Naṣṣar probably had in mind the new Jewish high-school then being built in Haifa by the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden (which is today the Haifa "Technion"). "Foreigners" ("ajanib") was used by Naṣṣar as a synonym for "Jews".

the Zionists and Najib al-Aṣfar were lampooned in al-Ḥimara, a humurous review appearing in Beirut,[1] while al-Ḥaḍara, an Arabic newspaper in Constantinople, published a more serious attack on them by a writer who signed himself "Ṣalaḥ al-Din al-Ayyubi" [Saladin] and who was later identified as Shukri al-ʿAsali, the Kaymakam of Nazareth (see immediately below).[2] Shortly thereafter a further article appeared in al-Ḥaḍara by Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm of Damascus, accusing the Zionists of disloyalty to the Empire and of wishing to restore the Kingdom of Israel.[3] The significance of this extension of the Arab anti-Zionist polemic to Constantinople was heightened by the fact that Shukri al-ʿAsali, Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm and one of al-Ḥaḍara's editors, ʿAbd al-Ḥamid al-Zahrawi, were soon to distinguish themselves as prominent Arab nationalist leaders who were much concerned with the Zionist question (see Ch.s VI, VIII & X). In February 1911 it was reported that Najib Naṣṣar was contributing articles to other newspapers,[4] and also that Fuʾad Saʿd, a Christian

1. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 27 (23.12.1910). Cf. Emin, op.cit. p.89, discussing the publication of humorous reviews, which were generally vulgar in tone and appealed to people "who could not even follow or understand the daily papers".
2. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 27 (23.12.1910), where the article by "Ṣalaḥ al-Din al-Ayyubi" is reprinted in extenso.
3. Ibid. 59 (1.3.1911). Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm's article is not reprinted; however, Rafiq Bey was answered by Solomon Yellin in Lisan al-Ḥal, no.6550 [ca. mid-January, 1911], (Beirut), and it is clear from Yellin's reply (which is reprinted by ha-Ḥerut - loc.cit.) that Rafiq Bey's main charges against the Zionists were disloyalty and a wish to restore an independent Kingdom of Israel in Palestine.
4. See ha-Ḥerut, iii, 59 (1.3.1911) for an example of a long article by Naṣṣar which appeared in al-Mufid.

landowner in Haifa, had donated several subscriptions to al-Karmal for distribution among pupils at Catholic schools in the city.[1]

Throughout this period the Zionists were principally accused of attempting to take physical possession of Palestine. For this reason the rumour that Najib al-Aṣfar was a Jewish agent could easily be exploited by Arab opponents of Zionism. But, in addition, many other arguments against the Zionists were also developed by Arab publicists in the latter half of 1910. In December of that year most of them were marshalled by "Ṣalaḥ al-Din al-Ayyubi" (i.e. Shukri al-ʿAsali) in an open letter addressed to Sami Paṣa al-Faruki, the Turkish general who was then engaged in quelling disturbances in the Hauran.[2] Shukri Effendi opened his letter with an apt Biblical text (Jeremiah xxxii, 44), where God promises redemption to Israel:

1. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 48 (8.2.1911), & ibid. 53 (17.2.1911).
2. Ibid. iii, 26 (21.12.1910), where Shukri Effendi's open letter is reprinted in toto from al-Karmal of 8.12.1910. According to ha-Ḥerut, this letter was first published in al-Muqtabas, whence it re-appeared in al-Karmal. Two months later part of it was incorporated into an unsigned article (possibly by Muḥammad Kurd ʿAli), entitled "Fi arḍ al-jalil" - see al-Muqtabas [monthly review], vi, 2 (1911), pp.121-2. The versions in ha-Ḥerut and al-Muqtabas [monthly review] differ in a few details. The author of "Fi arḍ al-jalil" does not indicate by opening inverted commas that he is quoting Shukri Effendi directly (although he acknowledges him in a footnote). It may be therefore that the writer slightly modified Shukri Effendi's original text to suit the purposes of his article. Some years later, Kurd ʿAli quoted part of this open letter in his Kitab khiṭaṭ al-sham (Damascus, 1925-28), iii, 131-3.

> "Men shall buy fields for money, and subscribe evidences, and seal them, and take witnesses in the land of Benjamin, and in the places about Jerusalem, and in the cities of Judah, and in the cities of the mountains, and in the cities of the valley, and in the cities of the south: for I will cause their captivity to return, saith the LORD ".

The Zionist Movement in conjunction with the Jewish Colonization Association, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the "faʿulim" [i.e. the Jewish workers] and others were endeavouring to bring this prophecy to fulfilment by purchasing land in Palestine. Shukri Effendi next made a revealing, though inaccurate, contention: Abdülhamid's régime had prevented Jewish settlement, but now, under the new régime, corrupt officials and treacherous Arab landowners had enabled the Jews to gain mastery over wide expanses of territory. These areas were listed as "three-quarters of the Kaza of Tiberias, half of the Kaza of Safed, more than half of Jerusalem and of the Kaza of Jaffa, as well as the vital part of Haifa plus some of its villages". And today, it was stated, "they are trying to enter the Kaza of Nazareth to gain mastery over the Valley of Sharon and Jezreel" (see immediately below).[1] Shukri Effendi then continued:

> "They do not mix with the Ottomans and do not buy anything from them. They own the Anglo-Palestine Bank which makes loans to them at a rate not exceeding 1% per annum. Every village has set up an administrative office and a school, every kaza a central administration, and every district has a general administrator. They have a blue flag in the middle of which is a "Star of David",

1. Ha-Herut, iii, 26 (21.12.1910), & al-Muqtabas [monthly review], vi, 2 (1911), p.121.


> and below that is a Hebrew word meaning "Zion", because in the Torah Jerusalem is called the "Daughter of Zion". They raise this flag instead of the Ottoman flag at their celebrations and gatherings; and they sing the Zionist anthem. They have deceived the Government with lying and falsehood when they enrol themselves as Ottoman subjects in the registers, for they continue to carry foreign passports which protect them; and whenever they go to the Ottoman courts, they produce their passports and summon foreign protection; they settle their claims and differences amongst themselves with the knowledge of the administrator, and they do not turn to the Government. They teach their children physical training and the use of arms; you see their houses crammed with weapons, among them many Martini rifles. They have a special postal service, special stamps etc., which proves that they have begun setting up their political aims and establishing their imaginary government. If the Government does not set a limit to this torrential stream, no time will pass before you see that Palestine has become a property belonging to the Zionist Organisation and its associates or the aforementioned nation [the Jews]."[1]

These arguments did contain certain elements of truth though, clearly, the Zionists would have maintained that they were put in a very tendentious manner.[2] However, tendentious or not, it was along these lines and in these terms that the Arab case against the Zionists was being prepared. Some of Shukri Effendi's points merit special attention. Emphasis was put on Jewish land purchases

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1. Al-Muqtabas, vi, 2 (1911), p.122. The version in ha-Herut differs slightly - see p.217, n.2.

2. In their own defence, the Zionists would have pointed out, for example, that the Alliance Israélite Universelle was opposed to them; that they had by no means acquired the extent of land alleged; that they were reliant on the local population for many basic commodities; that their bank offered loans (to everyone, including Arabs) at European rates and not at the customary local rates which were much higher; and that the Arab population was also armed.


SANJAK OF BEIRUT
VILAYET OF BEIRUT
SANJAK OF ACRE
SAFED
ACRE
Migdal
HAIFA
Mitspa
TIBERIAS
Kinneret
'Atlit
Deganiya
SANJAK OF NABLUS
NABLUS
JAFFA
Khulda
JERUSALEM
MUTASARRIFLIK OF JERUSALEM
HEBRON
GAZA

apparently because it was felt that land, once sold, was irredeemable; the owner's rights to his land were inviolable.[1] The fact that the Jewish immigrants did not integrate with the local population but preferred to set up their own, exclusive institutions was frequently held against them at later stages.[2] The Arabs, like the Turks, objected to the Jews' reluctance to become Ottoman subjects and thereby forfeit the advantages alien status afforded them. And, finally, the new régime - or rather (as it soon became evident) the CUP - was open to attack for doing no more than Abdülhamid's régime to halt the progress of the Jews in Palestine.

* * *

This growing intellectual opposition (especially in the north of Palestine) to Jewish activities did not, of course, evolve in a vacuum. Between 1908 and 1910 six new Jewish colonies had been established, one in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem and five in the Vilayet of Beirut (of which four were again located in the region of Tiberias); and the negotiations between the Zionists and Ilyas Sursuq

1. Cf. Kassab, Empire Arabe, p.41, confirming this by arguing the obverse against Négib Azoury: the Jews "ont bien quelques droits sur les terres qu'ils occupent, car, ils les ont achetées et ... quand on achète on a le droit de posséder".
2. The Central Government also held similar views about Jewish exclusiveness - see AIU T. E. 29 (20.12.1910), Antébi to M. Dizengoff (Jaffa), reporting a new order to the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem forbidding the transfer of some land near Beer Sheba to Jews and also prohibiting the creation "of separate Jewish villages" like Petah Tiqva, Zikhron Ya'aqov and Rishon le Zion, because "such isolation is dangerous for the political future" of the Empire.

for Fula and 'Afula had proceeded in 1910, despite the protest telegrams from Haifa and Nazareth in May. These negotiations were the background to much that was written in the press in the latter half of the year. The land in question was situated at the head of the Valley of Jezreel (where as yet there were no Jewish settlements) and, lying just to the north of the Haifa-Damascus railway line, it fell within the Kaza of Nazareth, which was administered by Shukri al-ʿAsali.

Shukri Effendi was forty-two years old and scion of a distinguished family in Damascus.[1] After an early education at home and administrative training in Constantinople, he had occupied various posts in the Ottoman provincial administration since his middle twenties, having acted as Governor of Latakia before taking up his post in Nazareth.[2] In January 1911 the British Consul in Damascus described him as a man "of superior intelligence".[3]

> "... He knows both Turkish and Arabic, and law remarkably well; and in the offices he has held, ever acted with justice and energy. His views are liberal and wide minded, ..., a man of high character, and of opinion strongly progressive and possibly even ultra-radical, but who has always gained for himself universal esteem and sympathy."[4]

The British Consul was not wrong in believing that Shukri Effendi's opinions were "possibly even ultra-radical", because (unknown to the Consul) he was a member of al-Qaḥṭaniyya, the secret Arab nationalist society which

1. Al-Zirakli, al-Aʿlam, iii, 250.
2. FO 195/2370, no.5 (25.1.1911), G.P. Devey (Damascus) to Marling (Consple.).
3. Loc.cit.
4. Loc.cit.

ʿAziz ʿAli al-Miṣri had foundod in 1909.[1]

In 1908 the land at both Fula and 'Afula had been leased by Salim al-Rayyis for a period of six years from the Sursuq family; al-Rayyis in turn sub-let the land to Muslim peasants. 'Afula was held jointly by three of the Sursuqs, whereas Fula was wholly owned by Ilyas Sursuq. In April 1910 Salim al-Rayyis consented to relinquish his lease of Fula, whilst retaining 'Afula as previously agreed.[2] Ilyas Sursuq was thus enabled to prepare a contract with Joshua Hankin, the Jewish land agent, for the transfer of 9,515 dunams at Fula to the name of a certain Ephraim Leib Krause.

The transfer of title-deeds, which should have taken place in October, was held up by Shukri al-ʿAsali in spite of an order from the Vali of Beirut, Muḥammad Nur al-Din Bey, authorising the sale.[3] Shukri Effendi maintained that the transfer was illegal as it was being made to Krause's name on behalf of the Zionists and he had received orders from Constantinople to prevent the latter from acquiring land.[4] This was, at best, a loose interpretation of the orders sent by the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs on September 22nd and October 3rd, forbidding land sales to foreign Jews (see above, pp.210-11). But Krause was an Ottoman subject, and the Zionists decided to press for the

1. Antonius, Arab Awakening, p.110, n.2.
2. CZA L18/275 (22.4.1910): copy of declaration by Salim al-Rayyis, relinquishing lease of Fula.
3. CZA L1/102 (23.10.1910), Ruppin to JNF (Cologne), [unsigned copy of same in CZA L18/275].
4. Loc.cit.

transfer. Dr. Ruppin, director of the Zionist Office in Jaffa, wrote that they wished to test whether Ottoman Jews were also being prohibited from purchasing land, as this carried implications for all Zionist work in Palestine.[1]

There were three stages in the process by which land changed hands: the departure of the old tenants, if any; the installation of the purchaser's tenants (at which moment the land had changed hands de facto); and the actual transfer of the title-deeds. Shukri Effendi, being resolved to prevent the sale of Fula, first tried to keep the Muslim peasants on the land as long as possible.[2] He therefore induced them to bring an action against Ilyas Sursuq, claiming a share in the land and buildings at Fula. However, in the middle of October, they dropped this claim and agreed to leave at the end of the harvest season.[3] Thereupon, Shukri Effendi ordered the peasants not to vacate the land;[4] but after strict instructions from Beirut, they duly left in December, so that Shukri Effendi's next concern was to prevent the Jewish settlers who had arrived from installing themselves and beginning work.[5] (It was at this point that Shukri

1. CZA L1/102 (23.10.1910), Ruppin to JNF (Cologne), [unsigned copy of same in CZA L18/275].
2. CZA L1/102 (23.10.1910), Ruppin to JNF.
3. CZA L18/275 (15.10.1910), Muhtar and elders of Fula to President, Tribunal (Nazareth). The peasants may have dropped their claim because they realised that to proceed with it would be costly and unsuccessful, since there was no basis to it. Furthermore, they probably received assurances from Salim al-Rayyis that they would not be displaced from 'Afula; cf. ibid. (22.12.1910), Salim al-Rayyis (Haifa) to [Joshua] Hankin [Haifa], guaranteeing that peasants from 'Afula would not trespass on land at Fula and undertaking to be responsible for them "morally and physically".
4. CZA L18/275 (25.12.1910), [Ruppin] to JNF [unsigned copy].
5. CZA L18/275 (23.12.1910), E.[=J.] Hankin (Haifa) to Ruppin.

Effendi wrote his open letter to Sami Paşa al-Faruki and his article for al-Ḥaḍara.) He had posted four gendarmes at Fula, on the pretext of ensuring that no foreign Jews settled on the margin of the Hijaz Railway[1] (although the Haifa-Damascus line was not really a part of the Hijaz Railway). Shukri Effendi now ordered the gendarmes to expel the Jews, although he had received instructions from Beirut to let them remain. When three Ottoman Jews stayed behind to guard their cattle and equipment, Shukri Effendi sent six horsemen to evict them forcibly.[2] Towards the end of December, Hankin appealed to Rahmi Paşa, the Mutasarrif of Acre, to make Shukri Effendi comply with his instructions and, on receiving no more than ineffectual promises, Hankin threatened to bring both Rahmi Paşa and Shukri Effendi to court for disobeying their superior and interfering with the rights of Ottoman subjects.[3]

In view of the protests which had been raised at the proposed sale of Fula, the Vilayet of Beirut had consulted the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the autumn of 1910,

1. CZA L18/275 [24.12.1910], Hankin to Rahmi Paşa (Acre) and Shukri al-ʿAsali (Nazareth) [" ʾiḫṭar" (warning notice of intended summons)]. Cf. B. Ḥabbas, Sefer ha-ʿAliyyah ha-sheniyyah (Tel Aviv, 1947), p.416. In July 1910, ha-Ḥerut had reprinted a news item from al-Karmal stating that it [al-Karmal] was informed that "the authorities have received an order not to sell estates and tracts of land on the margin of the Hijaz Railway to foreign Jews" - see ha-Ḥerut, ii, 118 (11.7.1910).
2. CZA L18/275 (25.12.1910), [Ruppin] to JNF [unsigned copy]; & ibid. [24.12.1911], Hankin to Rahmi Paşa and Shukri Effendi [" ʾiḫṭar"].
3. CZA L18/275 (23.12.1910), Hankin to Ruppin, enclosing copy of " ʾiḫṭar" [24.12.1910], cited in two preceding notes.

inquiring if the Government would appropriate the land or allow the local inhabitants to exercise a right of priority to acquire it. The legal advisers to the Council of State ruled that Ilyas Sursuq was entitled to dispose of his land to any Ottoman subject. This decision was communicated to Beirut on November 29th, but the Vali was absent from the city and it did not become known until the end of December.[1] On January 2nd, 1911, the Vali transmitted this decision to Rahmi Paşa in Acre, coupled with orders to allow the Jews to work the land.[2] The latter began work towards the middle of January, but Shukri Effendi now withheld information relating to the land's tax liability and refused to accept the conveyancing fees due to him in a final effort to prevent the ~~execution~~ completion of the transfer.[3] According to Ruppin, he harangued the Anglo-Palestine Company's official who came to pay him this money. When the official replied that the Jews were not disloyal to the Empire and remarked that he had a brother in the Ottoman army, Shukri Effendi said that "he was sure [the Jew] had become a soldier only to acquire proficiency in shooting, so that later he could shoot the Arabs".[4]

Shukri Effendi's pseudonym, "Ṣalaḥ al-Din al-Ayyubi", was well chosen; it conjured up memories of the Muslim hero who had routed the Crusaders when they tried to conquer

1. CZA L1/102 (30.12.1910), Ruppin (Haifa) to JNF.
2. CZA L18/275: copy of decision from Ministry of Internal Affairs (S.P.) to Vali (Beirut), dated 29.11.1910, with minute of its transmission to Acre, dated 2.1.1911.
3. CZA L18/275 (22.1.1911), [Ruppin] to JNF [unsigned copy].
4. Loc.cit.; cf. ha-Or, ii [xxvii], 91/266 (5.2.1911).

the Holy Land. With this foreign invasion and its implied modern parallel in mind, Shukri Effendi now published in a Beirut newspaper an article, entitled "The Fortress of Fula", in which he alleged that there was a fortress, built by Ṣalaḥ al-Din, on the land to be sold to the Jews. Although manifestly untrue, this article occasioned further protests against the sale.[1]

In the middle of January, Shukri Effendi vacated his post to stand as a candidate in a by-election to the Ottoman Parliament held in Damascus following the death of Muḥammad al-ʿAjlani. His departure facilitated the transfer of the title-deeds to Fula. On February 8th, the Vali of Beirut sent a final instruction to the Mutasarrif of Acre, enclosing all the documents necessary to ratify the transfer and ordering that it be completed forthwith.[2] Eight days later Ruppin reported that the formalities had been concluded.[3] Such a stir had been caused in the Vilayet of Beirut by this protracted and highly publicised affair that the Vali found it necessary to rebut publicly the allegations in Shukri Effendi's article "The Fortress of Fula". On February 21st

1. CZA L18/275: newspaper cutting in French [with no details of paper's name or date; from other news reported, ca. mid-January 1911]: "Les inhabitants musulmans de Nazareth protestent contre la vente de la fortresse de Fouleh qui fut élevée par les musulmans sous Salah Eddin."
2. CZA L18/275 (11.2.1911), Hankin to Ruppin (Jaffa), enclosing copies of all the relevant documents sent by Vali to Mutasarrif, including Vali's covering letter to latter, dated 8.2.1911 - these copies also in CZA L18/275.
3. CZA L1/102 (15.2.1911), Ruppin to J. Fischer (Antwerp).

عدد ٣٤ | جريدة هزلية انتقادية فكاهية اسبوعية مصورة | السنة الاولى

الحمارة

صاحب الجريدة ومحررها
توفيق جانا

اشتراك الحمارة
في بيروت عن سنة مجيدي واحد
في الممالك الاجنبية عن سنة فرنك ١٠

الحمارة حرة في نشر وعدم نشر ما يرد اليها من الأسائل

الاعلانات يتفق عنها مع الادارة

المدير المسئول
نجيب جانا

اشتراك الحمارة
في الممالك المحروسة عن سنة مجيدي وربع
عن ستة اشهر ثلاثة اوراق مجيدي

جميع المحاورات يجب ان تكون باسم ادارة جريدة « الحمارة »
في بيروت

يا للجمائز ما احلى براعمها فكم اماتت واحيت فيه من كدش * يرى الاديب بها طباً ومعرفة ولا تراها ذوات الاعين العمش

بيروت الجمعة في ٧ ربيع الثاني ١٣٢٩ و٢٥ اذار سنة ١٣٢٧ ش و٧ نيسان سنة ١٩١١

٤ . ٤ . ١٩١١



ص . — ابعد عن هذه القلعة ياخداع والا سلطت عليك جنود احفادي ولا تقرب قلعة فتحتها بدماء المسلمين .

خ — وانا ماذا يهمني طالما في جيبي البسابورط وورائي خمسة عشر مليوناً من الليرات اشبع بها بطون اعيان البلاد الجائعة واداوي بها معدة كبار المأمورين من الجرب فكل يوم لي قوله .

ص . — حيله كار تلكي بو قلمه يه ياقلاشمه يوقه احفادمك عسكريني سكامسلط ايدوم بو قلمه بي مسلمانلرك قانيله فتح ايتدم .

خ . — بكانه جيبمده بسابورطارقه مده ده اون بش مليون ليرا وارايكن اعيانناهالينك آج قارنلرينى طويورر (واويوزه) مبتلا اولان يوك مأمورلرك معده لرينى تداوي ايده يلدكجه هركون برقوله ايرم

Al- Ḥimara, i, 23 (7.4.1911).

The caption reads, both in Turkish and Arabic:

"Ṣ [alaḥ al-Din] 'Keep away from this fortress, you swindler, or else I shall set upon you the armies of my descendants and you will not come near a fortress which I conquered with Muslim blood.'

"H [ankin] - 'What does that matter to me, as long as [my foreign] passport is in my pocket and behind me [there are] fifteen million pounds with which I shall sate the hungry bellies of the notables of the country and with which I shall cure of the itch the high officials' stomach? And every day I'll have a Fula.'"

an open letter, signed by the Vali, appeared in Ḥadiqat al-Akhbar in Beirut, setting out the steps which led up to the transfer and emphasising its legality in terms of the constitutional rights of Ottoman subjects.[1]

* * *

The Fula "affair" constitutes a marking point in the development of the Arab attitude, at least in the north of Palestine, towards Jewish settlement in the country.[2] The view, held in certain Jewish circles at the time, that antipathy towards the immigrants was confined almost entirely to Christian Arabs,[3] was made untenable by the statements of Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi and Sa'id Bey al-Ḥusayni in

1. Ḥadiqat al-Akhbar (21.2.1911), reprinted in toto in ha-Ḥerut, iii, 60 (3.3.1911).
2. This "affair" continued to be talked about in the Arabic press for some months after the land had finally been transferred to the Zionists - see ha-Or, ii [xxvii], 310/135 (4.4.1911); & CZA L2/167, Arabic press report [n.d.], giving details of an article which appeared in al-Ḥaqiqa on 15.6.1911. Cf. also the cartoon on the facing page which is a facsimile of al-Ḥimara, i, 23 (7.4.1911); it will be observed that this cartoon incorporates many of the elements which have been discussed above: Ṣalaḥ al-Din al-Ayyubi, his "fortress", the Hijaz Railway, a treacherous Arab hand (Sursuq) accepting money from a grossly caricatured Jew (Hankin), etc.; the caption (translated opposite) is also worthy of note. The Fula "affair" was curiously paralleled in the 1920's by further sales in the same region by the Sursuqs to the Jews - see C. Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel (London, 1965), pp.115-19..
3. See e.g. CZA L2/44 (6.2.1911): minutes of a meeting held in the Zionist Office, Jaffa, to discuss the attitude of the Arabs in Palestine towards the Jewish immigrants, plus many other contemporary documents in CZA files touching on the question.

1909, by the growing number of anti-Zionist articles in Muslim newspapers in Beirut and Damascus in 1910 and by Shukri al-ʿAsali's determined attempt to frustrate the sale of Fula at the end of that year. In addition, both Muslim and Christian Arabs were steadily becoming disenchanted with the CUP. This dissatisfaction with the Government was imperceptibly being made to converge with the Arabs' antagonism towards the Jewish settlers, whose activities could readily be drawn to the attention of the politically immature masses by the CUP's adversaries and could be fashioned into a weapon to attack the Government. Moreover, unknowr even to well-informed observers, the Arab nationalist movement was gaining ground. The first of these forces, popular discontent with the CUP, was to reveal its potency almost immediately; the second, the Arab national movement, was not to show its hand for some while.

When Shukri al-ʿAsali rejected the conveyancing fees due to him for the transfer of Fula, he told the official from the Anglo-Palestine Company who had come to pay him that he would fight the purchase of the land by Jews "to his last drop of blood".[1] A few days later he was elected a deputy for Damascus to the Ottoman Parliament,[2] whither the Zionist question was conveyed in real earnest.

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1. CZA L18/275 (22.1.1911), [Ruppin] to JNF [unsigned copy]; cf. ha-Or, ii [xxvii], 91/266 (5.2.1911).
2. FO 195/2370, no.5 (25.1.1911), Devey to Marling.

CHAPTER SIX

TWO DEBATES: MARCH AND MAY 1911

The First Debate: March 1st, 1911

Zionism was discussed in the Ottoman Parliament on March 1st, 1911. Among the Turks, distrust of the Zionist Movement had spread and, at the same time, had grown in intensity during the previous year, thus facilitating reference to the issue, which was raised primarily as a result of dissension within the CUP itself. The increased distrust of the Zionists and the dissension within the CUP must be reviewed if the background to the discussion on Zionism in the Ottoman Parliament is to be appreciated.

In January 1910 Jacobus Kann, a member of the Zionist Executive ("Smaller Actions Committee"), sent copies of the newly-made French translation of his book, Erets Israël - Het Joodsche Land, to various Turkish politicians, newspaper editors and intellectuals.[1] This book had first been published in Holland in 1908 before the Young Turk Revolution,[2] and was in large part a description of a visit to Palestine made by Kann in 1907. To this Kann appended a chapter on Zionism in which he wrote that Palestine was barely populated and was of no great importance, either strategically or commercially, to the Ottoman Empire.[3] He therefore urged that

1. J.H. Kann, Erets Israël - Le Pays Juif (Brussels, 1910).
2. J.H. Kann, Erets Israël - Het Joodsche Land (Leiden, 1908).
3. Kann, Erets Israël - Le Pays Juif, p.136.

the millet system be extended to give secular Jewish leaders "an autonomous Jewish government [in Palestine] which would recognise as suzerain His Majesty, the Sultan";[1] he also called for a Jewish majority in the country backed by a Jewish army and police force.[2] Clearly deriving his ideas from Herzl, Kann advocated a Jewish Palestine "guaranteed by public law",[3] and a carefully organised immigration system,[4] in exchange for a large loan from Jewish financiers to the Ottoman Government.[5] This form of Jewish autonomy in Palestine had been totally unacceptable to Abdülhamid; still more was it anathema to the CUP in 1910. Although Kann had written his book in a private capacity before the Revolution, the Turks to whom he sent copies could not but regard the views expressed in it as those of the Zionist Executive, and thus of the Zionist Movement, as endorsed by the ninth Zionist Congress of December 1909 (which, it will be recalled, had retained the "Basel Programme" unamended).[6] Indeed, the Haham Başi, Hayim Nahum, commented that it was impossible to regard Kann as a private individual; "the author sent us this book himself; he wants people to speak and write about his book - and obviously he wants Zionism to be understood in this and no other way".[7] Dr. Jacobson reported at the

1. Kann, Erets Israël - Le Pays Juif, p.136.
2. Ibid. p.144.
3. Ibid. pp.135-6.
4. Ibid. pp.137-8.
5. Ibid. p.142.
6. CZA Z2/9 (29.1.1910. & 15.2.1910), V. Jabotinsky (Consple.) to D. Wolffsohn (Cologne).
7. CZA Z2/9 (12.2.1910), minutes of an interview with the Haham Başi. Thereafter the Haham Başi felt constrained to disassociate himself from everything connected with the Zionist Movement, although he continued to work for what he considered legitimate Jewish rights in the Ottoman Empire (see Chs. VIII & IX).

end of April that although the book had not yet been used in public against the Zionists, it had in all probability been shown confidentially to those who wielded power in the Empire.[1]

When Alfred Nossig had visited Constantinople in 1909 (see above, p.198, n.2), he had denied ~~this~~ being a Zionist and had claimed that his proposals to settle Jews in Iraq had nothing to do with the Zionist Movement. True as this was, it had the effect of raising further the Turks' suspicions about the Zionists.[2] In the summer of 1910 Nossig re-appeared in Constantinople with a pamphlet in Turkish explaining the aims of the Allgemeine Jüdische Kolonisationsorganisation, a society founded by himself, which sought Jewish settlement throughout the Ottoman Empire.[3] This pamphlet was distributed privately among Turkish sympathisers of Jewish immigration into the Empire; it emphasised that the Allgemeine Jüdische Kolonisationsorganisation was not a Zionist society and desired neither a charter nor Jewish national autonomy - implying, thereby, that the Zionist Organisation did.[4]

It is not surprising therefore that in August Jacobson reported a spreading notion in various Turkish circles that "der Zionismus doch die verräterischen, separatischen Pläne verfolgt" and that the Turks were beginning to think that the Jewish Colonization Association was a Zionist society in disguise.[5] In September both the Haham Başi and Dr. Nazim

1. CZA Z2/9 (30.4.1910), V. Jacobson (Consple.) to Wolffsohn.
2. CZA Z2/8 (8.11.1909), same to same.
3. FO 371/992/32231, no.621 (31.8.1910), Sir G. Lowther (Consple.) to Sir E. Grey (F.O.).
4. A translation of this pamphlet is enclosed with the despatch cited in the preceding note.
5. CZA Z2/9 (1.8.1910), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.

Bey confirmed this estimate of opinion among the Turks.[1] It was reflected at the end of the month in the Council of State's decision to renew the existing restrictions against the Jews in Palestine, as described in the foregoing chapter (see above, pp.210-11).

This unintentional damage done to the Zionist cause in Constantinople, on the one hand by the indiscretions of both the Zionist Congress and a member of its executive, and on the other by the efforts of non-Zionist colonisation societies, derived entirely from non-Ottoman Jews; but, in addition, some Ottoman Jews were consciously working against the Zionist Movement at the same time. Most of these anti-Zionist Ottoman Jews lived in Salonika, where Jews and Dönmes (members of a Judaeo-Islamic syncretist sect) constituted a majority of the city's population. Dr. Jacobson visited Salonika in February 1911 and analysed the anti-Zionist elements there, dividing them into three categories.[2]

The first group was made up of supporters of the Alliance Israélite Universelle which, as it were, represented French "interests" among the Jews of Salonika and which was firmly opposed to the Zionist Movement. German "interests" were "represented" among the Jews by a rival organisation, the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden. In Salonika the Zionist Movement was reckoned to be a German "interest" because its headquarters were located in Cologne and its leaders were either Germans or bore German-sounding names.

1. CZA Z2/9 (7.9.1910), Jacobson to J. Kann (Hague).
2. CZA Z2/11 (14.2.1911), same to Wolffsohn.

The Zionist Movement was in turn identified with the Hilfsverein, whose leaders were believed to be Zionists, almost without exception, and whose schools - unlike those of the Alliance - emphasised the Hebrew language. Thus, within the Jewish community of Salonika, the Alliance faction, being sympathetic to France, was ranged against the Hilfsverein and the Zionist Movement which were held to be at once interrelated and representative of German interests.[1] It suited the French Consul in the city, Max Choublier, to encourage this division. At the beginning of January 1911 Kâzim Nami, a writer and prominent member of the CUP in Salonika, told Impacial, a local Judaeo-Spanish paper, that the CUP would never permit the realisation of the Zionists' projects in Palestine, be they political in intention or not.[2] Choublier took advantage of this to supply Kâzim Nami with material which enabled him to write a series of anti-Zionist (and anti-German) articles in Rumeli, a CUP organ in Salonika.[3] Zionism, he wrote, represented at the very least a Jewish national renaissance, even if it had no political aims - which, according to Kâzim Nami, was difficult to believe.[4] Since the object of "a home in Palestine

1. CZA Z2/11 (14.2.1911), Jacobson to Wolffsohn; cf. The Times, no.39559 (14.4.1911).
2. Reported in Osmanischer Lloyd (6.1.1911).
3. Q d'O N.S. 137, no.33 (10.2.1911), Max Choublier (Salonika) to S. Pichon (Paris).
4. The first four of Kâzim Nami's articles appeared in Rumeli on January 30th, February 1st, 3rd & 6th; translations of them are enclosed in Choublier's despatch cited in the preceding note. A translation of a fifth article, which also appeared in February, is enclosed in FO 371/1244/7151, no.121 (22.2.1911), Lowther to Grey. The first four articles gave, as Kâzim Nami put it, "brief but ... fairly useful information as to the

Cont'd p.234 .....

secured by public law" (italics mine) had been retained at Nordau's insistence by the ninth Zionist Congress, the Zionists were charged with seeking Great Power interference in the internal affairs of the Empire. The material gains to the Empire which the Zionists claimed could be expected from large Jewish immigration into Palestine were offset by the dangers inherent in such an influx; the national movement of the Bulgarians also had had small beginnings: the latter had not scrupled to blandish the Turks when they desired an Exarch and then had not hesitated to seek independence after he was appointed. Why should the Jews revive the Hebrew language, if they did not have national independence in view? Then, with Germany in mind, Kâzim Nami wrote, "Our Zionists, whether wittingly or unwittingly, are or will become the tools of foreign politics". He concluded by declaring that Zionism could never be favoured by the Turks and warned its supporters among Ottoman Jews to eschew a movement which ran counter to Ottomanism and would provoke anti-Semitism in the Empire.

According to Jacobson, the second and third groups of anti-Zionist Jews in Salonika were followers of the city's Haham Başi on the one hand and members of the "Club des Intimes" on the other.[1] Jacobson did not explain the reasons for the Haham Başi's anti-Zionism, but they may be

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honesty of Zionism, the phases through which it has passed, and the object of its opponents" - F.O. 371/1244/7151, no.121 (22.2.1911), Lowther to Grey. The summary of Kâzim Nami's position which follows is a résumé of the fifth article - loc.cit.

1. CZA Z2/11 (14.2.1911), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.

assumed to have been similar to those of the Haham Başi in Constantinople and of those Ottoman Jews mentioned in the preceding chapter who as loyal, but sensitive, Ottoman subjects feared that the Zionist Movement would undermine their position in Ottoman society. The Club des Intimes favoured the Government's policy of "Ottomanism" and Dr. Nazim Bey, one of the most chauvinistic of CUP leaders, had been nominated an honorary member of this club.[1] There were, therefore, powerful anti-Zionists among the Jews in Salonika and, as Jacobson was aware, this was all the more detrimental to the Zionist Movement's prestige among the Turks because the CUP's headquarters were located in the same city and the Jewish community there was in close contact with the Committee's leaders.[2]

Furthermore, the Arabs had also made their opposition to the Zionist Movement known in Constantinople during 1910. It will be recalled that in May 1910 protest telegrams, sent from Haifa and Nazareth to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as to Arab deputies and newspapers in Constantinople, had compelled Talât Bey to order that the restrictions against the Jews in Palestine be strictly enforced; and in December, anti-Zionist articles had been published in al-Hadara, an Arabic newspaper appearing in Constantinople. This too had the effect of heightening the Turks' distrust of the Zionists.

1. CZA Z2/11 (14.2.1911), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
2. Loc.cit.

In February 1911, the CUP was itself in the throes of an internal crisis. Many of the Committee's deputies in Parliament felt that the Government had fallen into the hands of a "clique" from Salonika.[1] In the Cabinet this group was represented by Talât Bey, Cavid Bey and the Minister of Public Works, Halaciyan Effendi.[2] These ministers, especially Talât and Cavid, had been thought for some time to be "the only members of the Cabinet who really count".[3] The CUP's headquarters were located in Salonika, and Emmanuel Karasu, "the Ulysses of the Committee",[4] was reported to be particularly active behind the scenes.[5] The discontented CUP deputies were grouped around the Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa who had had serious differences of opinion with Cavid Bey in October and who, it was thought at that time, might have led a military coup d'état against the Salonika group.[6]

The Salonika group was especially vulnerable on two counts. First, it espoused progressive views which could be branded as "atheistic" by the more conservative, a suggestion bolstered by the fact that some of the group, including (or perhaps notably) Talât Bey, Cavid Bay and Emmanuel Karasu, were high-ranking Freemasons. Secondly, since the CUP's headquarters were in the city, it could easily be suggested that the Committee was dominated by Jews and

1. FO 371/1070/40442, no.800 (2.11.1910), Lowther to Grey.
2. Loc.cit.
3. FO 371/1010/20761, [no number], (29.5.1910), same to Sir C. Hardinge (F.O.).
4. FO 371/1070 (2.11.1910).
5. Loc.cit.
6. Loc.cit.

Dönmes. Moreover, as Karasu was one of the initiators of Freemasonry in Macedonia and many other Jews and Dönmes were Masons, it was a short step to ascribe to the Jews a commanding influence in the Masonic lodges and then to link this with their alleged pre-eminence within the CUP: the Jews controlled the Masonic lodges through which they controlled the CUP.

This claim had been made as early as May 1909 in a letter published in Nahḍat al-ʿArab, an Arab nationalist, anti-CUP organ appearing in Paris (see above, pp.200-1). Since then the notion had gained considerable ground in popular imaginations. Not only many Ottomans but also some Foreign Missions in Constantinople, including the British Embassy, were persuaded of its truth. At the end of 1909 the British Chargé d'Affaires, Charles M. Marling, adduced various signs from which "it would appear that the Jews have rendered enormous services to the Young Turks".[1] He then gave the argument its point:

> "... As [the Jews'] quid pro quo they not unnaturally aspire to the economic capture of Young Turkey, and the realisation, especially in Palestine and Mesopotamia [,] of their 'national' projects."[2]

Five months later, a remarkable private letter from the British Ambassador, Sir Gerard Lowther, to Sir Charles Hardinge at the Foreign Office, illustrates the extent to which the belief that the Jews and Dönmes controlled the

1. FO 371/992/177, no.992 (27.12.1909), C.M. Marling (Consple.) to Grey.
2. Loc.cit.

CUP through the Masonic lodges had advanced.[1] Jewish and Dönme Masons were omnipresent and omnipotent; the most influential non-Jewish Committee members were also Masons and some (Dr. Nazim, for example) might even be of Jewish extraction. Karasu had induced Young Turks, officers and civilians, to become Masons "with a view to exerting an impalpable Jewish influence over the new dispensation in Turkey".[2] Several Muslim religious leaders (ʿulamaʾ) had also been persuaded to become Masons, and their example was being used to overcome the prejudices against Freemasonry among the masses: "a Turk described it as a process of 'drugging the latter with Jewish hashish'".[3] This insight into Turkish opinion is illuminating in itself; to it may be added another observation made by Lowther in the same letter that in view of the rôle of the Jews before and after the Young Turk Revolution "people [i.e. Ottoman subjects] began to remark that the movement was rather a Jewish than a Turkish revolution".[4] That November, Lowther noted that Jewish influence "in business and banking, in the press, and in Government offices has been very noticeably on the increase".[5] And, by then:

> "Large bodies of Turks in the capital secretly call the present Government the 'Government of Jews', a state of mind which does not enhance its popularity".[6]

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1. FO 371/1010 (29.5.1910), Lowther to Hardinge.
2. Loc.cit. 3. Loc.cit. 4. Loc.cit.
5. FO 371/1070 (2.11.1910), Lowther to Grey.
6. Loc.cit.; cf. FO 371/1010/45663, no.899 (14.12.1910), Marling to Grey, enclosing a translation of an article, entitled "Freemasons in Constantinople", which appeared in Muahedə (an anti-CUP organ) on 12.12.1910.

Although the increased distrust of Zionism and the opposition within the CUP to the Salonika group can and, properly, should be distinguished as two distinct trends, it is clear that because of the form which the latter took, both trends tended to interact upon each other and indeed they were presented in a manner which made them inter-dependent.[1] As Marling had suggested in December 1909, the Jews strove to dominate the CUP and the economy of "Young Turkey" in order to realise their national ambitions in Palestine and elsewhere in the Empire.[2] This sounded all the more convincing since the Minister of Finance, Cavid Bey, was a Dönme and Freemason from Salonika and his chief secretary, Nissim Ruso, was Jewish. Thus, in March 1911, Lowther could report that "Zionism has in fact become one of the main undercurrents of the political situation".[3]

On February 10th, 1911 Talât Bey resigned his post as Minister of Internal Affairs, apparently in the hope of placating the Committee's internal opposition.[4] A few days later his course was followed by the Ministers of Public Works and Public Instruction, who were both in sympathy with the Salonika group. Bearing in mind the general disfavour into which the CUP had fallen among large segments of the Empire's non-Turk population and the strains it was experiencing within its own ranks, it is readily comprehensible why Haci Adil Bey, the Secretary-General of the Central

1. PRO (G) Turkei No.195, K 692/II, no.202 (26.7.1911), Miquel (Consple.) to Reichskanzler (Berlin).
2. FO 371/992 (27.12.1909), Marling to Grey.
3. FO 371/1245/9105, no.146 (7.3.1911), Lowther to same.
4. FO 371/1244 (22.2.1911), Lowther to Grey.

Committee of the CUP in Salonika, should have told Dr. Jacobson in the middle of the month that the Committee could not afford to incline towards the Zionist Movement for fear of putting another weapon into the hands of its opponents, who might accuse it of having been bribed or even bought over by the Jews.[1]

* * *

When the General Budget debate began on February 22nd, Sir Gerard Lowther predicted that Cavid Bey would be subjected to severe attack and that he too might be dislodged from office.[2] The opposition deputies were not long in taking the lead in this attack. On February 27th Kosmidi Effendi, a Greek deputy from Constantinople, claimed that Jews were being granted most of the commercial concessions and accused the Cabinet of acting like "wild beasts of prey".[3] He was followed by Lûtfi Fikri Bey, of Dersim, who "all but openly charged the Minister of Finance with being a Zionist by referring to his relations with Jacques Menasche ..., M^e Salem and the Minister's 'chef de cabinet', Nessim Rousso".[4] Two days later, the leader of the "People's Party", Ismail Hakki Bey from Gümülcüne, arraigned Cavid Bey in a long speech, lasting several hours. The

1. CZA Z2/11 (16.2.1911), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
2. FO 371/1244 (22.2.1911), Lowther to Grey.
3. PRO (G) Turkie No.195, K 692/II, no.57 (3.3.1911), von Marschall (Consple.) to Reichskanzler (Berlin); cf. Stamboul, xlv, 50 (28.2.1911); & The Levant Herald, xl, 50 (28.2.1911).
4. FO 371/1245 (7.3.1911), Lowther to Grey. In this despatch Lûtfi Fikri Bey is simply referred to as "one of the non-committee deputies"; but he may be identified from reports in Stamboul, xlv, 50 (28.2.1911); The Levant Herald, xl, 50 (28.2.1911); & ha-Herut, iii, 71 (30.3.1911).

first part of his speech, in which he took exception to specific points in Cavid's policies, is not of comparable interest with the second part, in which he tried to show that it was "beyond all possible doubt" that "the Cabinet followed the same course as Zionism".[1] Ismail Hakki Bey declared that the Zionists' aim was to found a Jewish state in Palestine once they had established a Jewish majority there through immigration. After "protests from all sides" and observations from Karasu and Nissim Mazliah, Ismail Hakki Bey stated that the Jews had acquired vast lands in Palestine; he then read some of the resolutions adopted by the recent Zionist Congress "at Berlin".[2] At this point Talât Bey interrupted to remark that the speaker talked as if the Zionist Congress were a secret, when in fact it was held openly and was known to all. Ismail Hakki Bey now alleged that the loan negotiated the previous summer from a group of French banks - of which one, La Banque Louis Dreyfus, was a Jewish house - proved the Government's complicity with the Zionists. Moreover, the Government was not discouraging the Zionists who were trying to achieve their aim by "cornering" finance and industry in the Empire.

1. Stamboul, xlv, 52 (2.3.1911); cf. reports in The Levant Herald, xl, 52 (2.3.1911), & La Turquie, vi, 52 (2.3.1911). The summary of the discussion which follows is based on these reports. Further reports (which corroborate but do not add to the aforementioned) are to be found in Le Jeune-Turc, iii, 51 (2.3.1911), L'Aurore, iii, 106 (3.3.1911), & The Times, no.39,523 (3.3.1911). Cf. also CZA Z2/11 (2.3.1911), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
2. Ismail Hakki Bey apparently made a slip; the ninth and most recently held Zionist Congress had taken place in Hamburg.

To this end, Sir Ernest Cassel had founded the National Bank of Turkey and Emmanuel Salem (a Jewish lawyer from Salonika) was one of his agents. There were more protests from the floor at these allegations. "It's a fine tale; under the old régime a better one could not be imagined", commented the Grand Vezir,[1] who begged the speaker to change his views and stop adducing the acts of some Zionist "fools" ("budala")[2] as proof which implied that the loyal Jewish population of the Empire could be deceived by them. Returning to his theme, Ismail Hakki Bey concluded by claiming that the other banks in the French group from whom the loan had been obtained were Zionist organs,[3] and that another loan, from the Deutsche Bank, had been made at Zionist instigation through Jacques Menaşe.

Although the Grand Vezir, Ibrahim Hakki Paşa, had interrupted Ismail Hakki Bey to call the Zionists "fools", he certainly did not consider that the charges made could be treated lightly. He therefore set about answering Ismail Hakki Bey point by point immediately he had finished. The Grand Vezir admitted that some European Jews wished to augment the Jewish population in Palestine and establish a Jewish state there. On the other hand, most European Jews and all Ottoman Jews laughed at the dreams of this group

1. The Levant Herald, xl, 52 (2.3.1911).
2. Stamboul, xlv, 52 (2.3.1911).
3. The other banks in the group were Crédit Mobilier, Banque Bérard et Jarislowsky and the French "Syndicate of Provincial Bankers"; for details of the loan, see The Near East, iii, N.S. 13 (1910), p.87.

who were a "handful of charlatans", incapable of establishing a Jewish government in Palestine.[1] To implicate all Jews in this "chimera" was a figment; if there was one practical people in the world ~~which~~ that would not let itself be abused by such reverie, it was the Jews. An immigration commission had been set up to prevent Jews from settling in Palestine and on entry into the country they were required to exchange their passports for a temporary permis de séjour which allowed them just a short stay there. "Perhaps some wealthy [Jews] have been able to acquire land, but that is all."[2] To illustrate the Government's attitude towards the Zionist Movement, the Grand Vezir repeated an interjection made by Talât Bey during Ismail Bey's speech to the effect that a "Zionist representative", Dr. Nossig, had recently been told that the Government could not accept the Zionists' demands and that Cavid Bey had declined to receive this man.[3] Ibrahim Hakki Paşa had little difficulty in demolishing the core of Ismail Hakki Bey's thesis that the loans contracted by the Government were proof of its complicity with the Zionists. He pointed out that Sir Ernest Cassel had enriched Egypt by creating the National Bank of Egypt and that he had not installed a single Jew

1. Stamboul, xlv, 52 (2.3.1911).
2. Loc.cit.
3. In making this interjection, Talât Bey had made a slip, since Nossig was not a "Zionist representative" - as he had been anxious to make clear. The slip (if it was one) perhaps confirms Jacobson's report after Nossig's last visit to Constantinople that Turkish leaders were beginning to regard all Jewish organisations working in Palestine as Zionist societies - see CZA Z2/9 (1.8.1910), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.

in it. After the Young Turk Revolution, Sir Ernest had been approached by the Ottoman Government to found a similar bank, which he did whilst Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa was Grand Vezir and thus the National Bank of Turkey was quite unrelated to the Zionist Movement. The Grand Vezir was very doubtful if Sir Ernest could be a Zionist, because he was a member of the English "High Church" and, as one of the biggest financiers in England, he was in fact a precious friend of "Ottomanism".[1] Ibrahim Hakki Paşa also pointed out that only one of the French group of banks was a Jewish firm and that the Deutsche Bank, the largest establishment of its kind in Germany, was motivated by business considerations and not Zionist or religious sentiments when it offered a loan to the Ottoman Government (although, no doubt, some Jews had an interest in this bank). Emmanuel Salem, who had been named by Lûtfi Fikri Bey as well as Ismail Hakki Bey as a Zionist agent, was an honourable man who had nothing to do with the loan; he was a director of La Banque de Salonique which had consented to make an advance of T£500,000 to the Government. Similarly Jacques Menaşe, also named as a Zionist agent, was not involved in any business other than that of the Rouvier group which had concluded the French loan.

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1. Sir Ernest Cassel was not a member of the Church of England; of Jewish birth, he was by this time a convert to the Church of Rome.

According to newspaper reports, the Grand Vezir's reply was received with approbation. Ibrahim Hakki Paşa was intent on minimising the Zionist Movement's significance and the progress of Jewish colonisation in Palestine. He was equally concerned to demonstrate the falsity of the contention that the Government had played into Zionist hands by allowing Jews to dominate the Empire's finances. The Grand Vezir's second point was valid and he could not easily be challenged on it, but he remained open to attack for dismissing the Zionist Movement so lightly. He was criticised for this immediately.

A noteworthy aspect of this discussion was the fact that no Arab is reported to have participated in it. Ismail Hakki Bey let slip one vague hint that an Arab deputy may have had a part in prompting him to raise the Zionist issue, for in his speech he admitted that he based himself upon a memorandum "which a charitable person charged himself to prepare for him".[1] This person need not, of course, have been an Arab deputy, although, if a name be guessed at, it may not be wholly unreasonable to suggest that of Shukri al-ʿAsali, who had lately arrived in Constantinople as a deputy from Damascus, pledged (after his failure to prevent the sale of Fula) to fight the Zionists to "his last drop of blood" (see above, p.228). The reason for the non-participation of the Arab deputies in this discussion must remain a matter of conjecture: they may not

1. The Levant Herald, xl, 52 (2.3.1911); cf. ha-Or, ii [xxvii], 118/293 (14.3.1911).

have foreseen that the issue might be raised; and, even if they had been forewarned, the Grand Vezir's immediate, emphatic reply to Ismail Hakki Bey probably prevented their intervention in or contribution to the discussion. Shukri Effendi and a deputy from Beirut, Riḍa Bey al-Ṣulḥ, were subsequently reported to have mentioned Zionism again in the Chamber,[1] but a little time was still to elapse before the Arab deputies made a concerted effort to raise the Zionist question in the Ottoman Parliament (see below).

* * *

Quite naturally, this discussion stimulated the Turkish press to take a greater interest in the activities of the Zionist Movement. In the meantime, the CUP's internal crisis was resolved temporarily towards the middle of May. During April many conservative CUP deputies threatened to withdraw from the Committee's parliamentary "bloc". In the latter half of the month they published their demands in the press and on April 22nd a meeting of CUP deputies was held in Constantinople at which the dissidents, finding themselves in the majority, were able to push through all their demands, thus re-uniting the CUP bloc in the Chamber and making it stronger than it had been at any time since 1909.[2]

1. Ha-Or, ii [xxvii], 120/295 (17.3.1911); ha-Herut, iii, 69 (27.3.1911), reprinting an article from Falasṭin [number 13, n.d.] which quoted Riḍa Bey al-Ṣulḥ; & ha-Mebasser, ii, 11 (1911), pp.131-2, re. Shukri al-ʿAsali.
2. FO 371/1244/15114, no.99 (23.4.1911), Lowther to Grey [telegram].

The dissidents continued their campaign and in May, with numbers on their side, succeeded in eliciting Cavid Bey's resignation along with that of the recently appointed Minister of Public Instruction, Ismail Hakki Babanzade Bey, who was also regarded as a nominee of the Salonika group. For the time being, therefore, the dissident members of the CUP were placated. The Committee now had to face attacks from outside, including the charge put by Ismail Hakki Bey that it followed the same course as the Zionists.

The day after the issue had been raised in the Chamber, Hüseyin Cahid Bey, editor of the pro-CUP daily, Tanin, came to the Committee's defence in an editorial, entitled "The Battle of Slander".[1] Cahid Bey denounced the enemies of the Empire who posed as its sincerest friends: they took advantage of the masses' ignorance and political immaturity, they bandied about the "fearful" suggestion that the CUP was "selling the country to the Jews", and whenever a Jewish bank participated in a loan to the Government or whenever a minister appointed a Jewish secretary, these "friends" claimed that thereby their allegation was proved. Cahid Bey denied that the Government wished to sell Palestine to the Jews and branded those reponsible for the notion as malicious trouble-makers.

But the opposition press ~~were~~ was unwilling to concede this or to remain silent. Yeni Gazete took the Grand Vezir to

1. Reprinted in Stamboul, xlv, 54 (4.3.1911), where its authorship is wrongly attributed to "Djavid Bey" (i.e. Cavid); also reprinted in ha-Herut, iii, 67 (22.3.1911), where its correct authorship is given.

task for minimising the Zionist Movement's importance and for calling its leaders "a handful of charlatans".[1] "Zionism", it wrote on March 2nd, "is widely spread, its strength is great, and it cannot be dismissed in this summary manner". Herzl was a man of talent; Max Nordau is considered one of the greatest philosophers of the century. The paper used the proverb "Who knows not the evil, falls into the evil" to urge its readers to think about the Zionists' aims; and in subsequent issues it published a series of articles on the subject to warn of the danger implicit in Zionism.[2] Other papers, including the important opposition daily, Ikdam,[3] and Ebüzziya Tevfik's Tasvir-i Efkâr,[4] also printed anti-Zionist articles; some of them were reported to have quoted passages from Kann's Erets Israël to substantiate their objections.[5]

This campaign produced results which might have been predicted. Two opposition organs, Silâh and Süngü, accused the Jews of Salonika of being Zionists,[6] while some Jews in that city (thought by Dr. Jacobson to belong to the Alliance faction[7]) sent an address to the Grand Vezir, thanking him

1. FO 371/1245/9103, no.143 (4.3.1911), Lowther to Grey, enclosing an article from Yeni Gazete, entitled "The Storm over Zionism: Jewish Immigrants and the Policy of the Government", which appeared on 2.3.1911.
2. See CZA Z2/11 (21.3.1911), Jacobson to the Editors of Die Welt (Cologne), enclosing without date a subsequent article from Yeni Gazete of the same title as that in the preceding note.
3. Ha-Herut, iii, 67 (22.3.1911).
4. Ha-Herut, iii, 72 (31.3.1911). Two of the anti-Zionist articles from Tasvir-i Efkâr were reproduced in al-Karmal; ha-Herut (loc.cit.) reprinted the second of these, which appeared in al-Karmal on 25.3.1911.
5. CZA Z2/11 (15.3.1911), Jacobson to M. Bodenheimer (Cologne).
6. The Levant Herald, xl, 115 (17.5.1911).
7. CZA Z2/11 (27.3.1911), Jacobson to ZCO (Cologne).

for defending them in the Chamber and assuring him that none of them would associate with a "reactionary" movement like that of the Zionists which "could provoke discord between the elements and the enmity of the Government against us".[1] At the beginning of April, Yunus Nadi, the editor of Rumeli and one of Dr. Nazim's collaborators, wrote an article headed "Down with Zionism, Always and For Ever".[2] The author attempted a tactic other than the Grand Vezir's approach of laughing the Zionist Movement out of court. He admitted that "Zionism is a real danger"; moreover, "the reptile character of its spread and contagion" was "a second peril". He linked the proposals made by Nossig and others regarding the settlement of Jews in Iraq with Zionist endeavours and proclaimed that he (the writer) had always opposed such proposals, for behind them "lurked the dream of forming an Israelite realm comprising the ancient states of Babel and Nineveh with Jerusalem at its centre". There was good reason to dread this dream pursued by certain foreign Jews because "behind them there is the strongest power in the world - that of money". Moreover, Zionism was "a sort of advance guard of German influence in the East". Having

1. This address was published in part in Stamboul [supplement, no number], (26.3.1911).
2. FO 371/1245/16048, no.271 (24.4.1911), Lowther to Grey, enclosing a translation of this article which appeared in Rumeli on 6.4.1911; cf. The Times, no.39,559 (14.4.1911). The circumstances in which this article was written appear to have been a little odd - see Q d'O N.S. 8, no.77 (7.4.1911), [illegible (= Acting French Consul, Salonica)] to J. Cruppi (Paris); but, in view of Yunus Nadi's association with Dr. Nazim, the opinions expressed in it must be treated seriously.

conceded part of the opposition's thesis - that Zionism was a force to be reckoned with - Yunus Nadi pledged himself never to remain silent whilst his country's safety was at stake. Shortly thereafter, Halil Bey, Talât Bey's successor as Minister of Internal Affairs, made a statement to David Fresco, the editor of El Tiempo:

> "Whatever its form, the Government will not view Zionism in a favourable light. I cannot approve the least suggestion in this respect. Jews admit that they have never met in any [other] country the sympathy which one witnesses for them here. To follow the course of Zionism is for them to go counter to Ottomanism and the interests of Ottoman Jews. People who, being informed of these matters, combat Zionism, will always be assured of the approbation of those who desire the maintenance of the ties uniting the Jews to the Empire.
>
> "Regarding Jewish immigration, it is the exclusive choice of Palestine which gives ~~place~~ rise to doubts.
>
> "It is because I know the discernment and patriotism of the Jews that I remain persuaded that they will not let themselves take to utopias ".[1]

This statement could be regarded as no more than a polite reply to the Jews' address of loyalty to the Grand Vezir mentioned above. But it left no doubts about the Government's position, and soon found its way into the columns of other newspapers, such as Ikdam and Stamboul.[2]

* * *

1. Stamboul, xlv, 95 (24.4.1911).
2. Loc.cit.; cf. FO 371/1245 (24.4.1911), Lowther to Grey.

The discussion on Zionism in the Chamber provoked similar articles in the Arabic press (some of which are examined in the next chapter). It also drew a number of responses from the Arabs which are worthy of note. First, Rashid Riḍa remarked that he too had noticed when he was in Constantinople in 1910 "that the influence of the Jews in the CUP was great".[1] Second, a telegram signed by some one-hundred and fifty Arabs was sent from Jaffa to the President of the Chamber, the Grand Vezir and various newspapers. This telegram protested against the continual purchase of land by Jews which was registered in the names of Ottoman "straw-men" and against Jews who used their Ottoman or foreign papers as circumstances required; it concluded by demanding that Parliament take steps against Jewish immigration and land purchase.[2] Third, Najib Naṣṣar, the editor

1. Al-Manar, xiv, 2 (1911), p.159.
2. CZA Z2/635 (31.3.1911), A. Ruppin (Jaffa) to ZCO; & CZA L5/22 (31.3.1911), same to Jacobson. Ruppin dismissed the telegram as an intrigue of no significance by "ein gewisser Naschеschibi aus Jaffa" who was trying to buy a piece of land for which Jews were also negotiating; according to Ruppin, this Nashashibi hoped to instigate through this telegram a move against the prospective Jewish buyers. However, Ruppin's view was not shared by J.L.[uria] in ha-ʿOlam, v, 13 (12.4.1911) or by R. Lichtheim in his memoirs, She'ar yashub (Tel Aviv, 1953), p.193, who both regarded this telegram as a direct response to the discussion in the Chamber. If no other reason beyond a private individual's personal interests existed to occasion this telegram, it seems unlikely that one-hundred and fifty people in Jaffa alone would have signed it. A few months later, Albert Antébi named Saʿid al-Nashashibi in Jaffa as distinguished for his anti-Jewish activities - see AIU X. E.29 (13.10.1911), A. Antébi (Jerus.) to Pres., AIU (Paris).

of al-Karmal, was moved to publish the first book on Zionism by an Arab: al-Ṣihyuniyya - Zionism: Its History, Aim and Importance.[1] It was for the most part little more than a slanted translation of the article on "Zionism" in the Jewish Encyclopedia,[2] for Naṣṣar, like Négib Azoury before him

1. N. Naṣṣar, al-Ṣihyuniyya: tarikhuha, gharaḍuha, ahammiyyatuha (Haifa, 1911). Internal evidence suggests that this book was first published in serial form in al-Karmal - see al-Ṣihyuniyya, pp.57 & 60; cf. also ha-Ḥerut, iii, 74 (5.4.1911), & ibid. 83 (3.5.1911). A biographical note on this book appeared in al-Hilal, xx, 1 (1911), p.63.

2. R. Gottheil, "Zionism", Jewish Encyclopedia, xii, 666-86. Gottheil was Professor of Semitic Languages at Columbia University, New York; he later wrote a book, also entitled Zionism, which was published in Philadelphia in 1914. Other sources to which Naṣṣar turned can also be traced. He had read a pamphlet called The Restoration of the Jewish People by a "Mr. Frankel of Strasbourg" - see ha-Ḥerut, iii, 83 (3.5.1911). He had used Alexander McCaul's The Old Paths; or, a Comparison of the Principles and Doctrines of Modern Judaism with the Religion of Moses and the Prophets (London, 1837) to show that the Gentiles' hatred of the Jews was aroused because the latter called themselves the "Chosen People" and because they did not help non-Jews - see ha-Ḥerut, iii, 59 (1.3.1911). The distortions in McCaul's missionary tract had been quickly demonstrated by the Jewish scholar, Isaac Baer Levinson, in his Aḥiyyah shiloni ha-ḥozeh (Leipzig, 1840-41). Furthermore, in al-Ṣihyuniyya, p.59, Naṣṣar referred to two articles which mentioned the "detachment of Palestine" from the Empire, written by Sir Harry H. Johnston (who had held several high-ranking administrative posts in Africa); these articles were: "German Views of an Anglo-German Understanding" and "The Need for an Anglo-German Understanding", both in The Nineteenth Century and After, lxviii, 406 (1910), pp.978-87, and lxix, 407 (1911), pp.82-93, respectively. In the first of these articles Johnston suggested that Germany and Austro-Hungary "might be willing, in agreement with the rest of the world, to create an Eastern-Belgium in Syria-Palestine - perhaps a Jewish state - which, merely by the fact of its being charged with the safe-keeping of the holy places [sic] of Christianity, would require to become undenominationally Christian" (p.983).

(see above, pp.143-4), wished to disarm critics by informing them that he had relied on authoritative Jewish sources.[1] Naṣṣar's starting point was the Grand Vezir's reply to Ismail Hakki Bey's allegations in the Chamber about the CUP and the Zionists. He was at pains to demonstrate that the Zionist Movement was no "chimera" and that its leaders were not deranged ("mutahawwisun").

The first, and major, part of al-Ṣihyuniyya took the form of translated passages from Gottheil's article. All passages in which Gottheil mentioned opposition to Zionism or dissension within Zionist ranks were either severely truncated by Naṣṣar or omitted altogether;[2] passages dealing with possible settlement schemes outside Palestine were treated

1. Naṣṣar explained to his readers that an "encyclopedia" was a book edited by experts on which scholars and researchers could depend - al-Ṣihyuniyya, p.3. He did not explain that the article he was about to translate had been written before the Young Turk Revolution and that since then the emphasis in official Zionist policy had shifted from an autonomous Jewish state in Palestine to a Jewish homeland within the Ottoman Empire. By contrast, the bibliographical reference in al-Hilal, cited in the penultimate note, states that Naṣṣar's work treats on the current situation in Palestine, but deals with the history of Zionism only until 1905 (the relevant volume of the Jewish Encyclopedia having been published in 1906).
2. Thus, Gottheil, "Zionism", p.667, c. i: the paragraph on Reform Jews' rejection of Jewish restoration is omitted; ibid. pp.672-4: the passage on opposition to the Zionist Movement is severely truncated; ibid. p.676, c. ii: Zangwill's criticism of JCA at the fifth Zionist Congress is omitted; ibid. p.679, c. ii: Gaster's criticism of Herzl and other opposition to the latter is omitted; ibid. p.686, cc. i-ii: the passage on "Moral Zionism" ("Aḥad ha-'Am") is severely truncated; etc.

similarly.[1] Indications of the Movement's size and resolutions concerning Palestine were reproduced almost invariably in full.[2] Here and there Naṣṣar subtly changed the original emphasis,[3] or introduced suggestive asides which are not in the English text.[4] Gottheil had portrayed Zionism as an important but complex force in modern Jewish history; he had stressed that not all supporters of the movement were political Zionists and that other Jews rejected Zionism completely. Naṣṣar's rendering of the article suggested that every Zionist desired an autonomous state nowhere on earth but in Palestine and in the lands surrounding it. Naṣṣar's rendering also suggested that opposition to the Zionist Movement among Jews was negligible and that the Zionists enjoyed the support of many influential Christians as well.

1. Thus, "Zionism", p.678, c. ii - p.679, c. i: the passage on the East African scheme is wholly omitted, except for one sentence stating that "Christian friends of the movement" bore most of the expenses incurred by the East African Commission; ibid. p.680, cc. i-ii: the passage on the "Guas Ngishu Plateau" is omitted; ibid. p.685, cc. i-ii: the passage on Territorialism is severely truncated, and the paragraph on Zangwill's "alliance" with Lucien Wolf is omitted; etc.
2. Thus, ibid. p.676, c. i: the table of Zionist societies throughout the world is reproduced; ibid. p.679, cc. i-ii: the account of the congress at Zikhron Ya'aqov is reproduced fully; ibid. pp.680-1: the first half of the seventh Congress's resolution re-affirming the Basel Programme is reproduced, but the second half on the East African Commission is omitted; loc.cit. the seventh Congress's resolution about "proposed work in Palestine" is reproduced in full; ibid. p.684, c. i: the passage on the "wide spread of Zionism" is reproduced in full; etc.
3. Thus, ibid. p.671, c. ii: "Herzl suggested either Argentina or Palestine" reads in al-Ṣihyuniyya, p.19 as "Herzl suggested either Palestine or Argentina"; all the omissions, truncations and careful reproduction of selected passages (as indicated in the preceding notes) also change the emphasis of Gottheil's article.
4. Nassar, al-Ṣihyuniyya, pp.23 & 27, says that Gaster "previously banned the proclamation of Zionism in England"; in Gottheil's article there is no mention of this (since it was not the case).

At a number of points in Gottheil's article Naṣṣar inserted comments of his own. Gottheil had stated at the beginning of his article that since 1896 Zionism has been "dominating Jewish history". Naṣṣar supplemented his Arabic translation of this statement by citing it also in English as incontestable proof of his contention that such a movement could not be considered unimportant nor could its members be deranged.[1] Having listed Biblical references to a Jewish return to Zion, Naṣṣar commented that there were so many passages of this nature that the Jews did not confine their efforts to Palestine alone but also extended them to embrace Lebanon and Iraq; "thus you see them adding the word 'Syria' to Palestine and in some instances 'Turkey in Asia and the East'".[2] After Gottheil's description of the emergence of modern Zionism, Naṣṣar remarked that the Zionist Movement rested on a racial base and its aim was both national and political; "the Jews could find a refuge in a country other than ours and under other régimes more rooted than ours in constitutional government, were their aim not political".[3] He laid particular stress on the fact that the Zionists had a flag and emblem of their own, recalling Isʿaf al-Nashashibi's telegram of some months previous which had reported that the Zionist flag had been raised at a reception in Jerusalem (see above, p.215);[4] although the

1. Naṣṣar, al-Ṣihyuniyya, pp.3-4.
2. Ibid. pp.4-5. 3. Ibid. p.12.
4. Ibid. pp.50-1: Naṣṣar inserted a diagram of a "Shield of David" and a paragraph explaining the symbolism behind this six-pointed star.

Government had been informed of this, it had paid no attention to the matter, in the same way as it did not concern itself with preventing Jewish immigration and settlement, despite declarations by the Grand Vezir that the temporary permis de séjour were still in force.[1]

The second, and perhaps more important, part of the book consists of a short essay by Naṣṣar himself.[2] He began by recapitulating and elaborating the main points which he felt emerged from Gottheil's article. The Zionist Movement was very powerful;[3] it aspired to more than the land of Palestine itself and relied on the ignorance and unsuspecting nature of the Ottomans to succeed.[4] Naṣṣar reproached the Ottoman Government for leaving the Great Powers to look after the Holy Places.[5] He warned of the imminent danger of Zionism which had only failed in Abdülhamid's time through lack of funds; this money was now in hand and he looked with trepidation to what the Jews, who owned "over half the world's wealth", would do to the weak Ottoman Empire with its manifold problems and shortcomings.[6] Naṣṣar stressed the minimal difference between Zionists and non-Zionists, since all Jewish societies active in Palestine had the same eventual object in mind.[7] He noted that the Zionist Movement had already constituted itself like a government through its congresses and committees, its financial and educational institutions and its "para-military" gymnastic societies.[8]

1. Naṣṣar, al-Ṣihyuniyya, p.51.
2. Ibid. pp.58-64.
3. Ibid. p.58.
4. Loc.cit.
5. Loc.cit.
6. Ibid. p.59.
7. Ibid. p.60.
8. Loc.cit.; by "para-military" gymnastic societies Naṣṣar meant the Maccabi sports associations attached to the Zionist Movement.

Naṣṣar accepted wholeheartedly Gottheil's explanation that Zionism was partly a by-product of anti-Semitism.[1] He had commented on this passage of Gottheil's article that since the nations of Europe were more developed than the Ottoman Empire, they would not let the Jews emigrate from their lands, had the Jews been an asset to them.[2] In his discursus of Zionism, Naṣṣar expanded this idea, contending that anti-Semitism was a phenomenon which manifested itself wherever Jews were to be found.[3] If anti-Semitism had appeared in the West where the Jews were weak, why, he asked, should we be blamed if it emerged in some form in the East, the cradle of religious fanaticism, where the Jews were powerful. According to this exposition, the nations of the world supported Zionism because they saw in it a means of divesting themselves of their Jews and the concomitant anti-Semitism.[4] Naṣṣar recoiled at the possibility of the Ottoman Empire inheriting this burden.[5]

Naṣṣar then made his most original contribution to the development of the Arab position vis-à-vis the Zionist Movement. He posed two questions which, as far as is known, had not been put before. He inquired "What do we learn [from the foregoing exposé of Zionism]?"[6] and, moreover, "What do we need?"[7] The "we" whom Naṣṣar has in mind is not completely clear. In talking in the first person plural, Naṣṣar

1. Naṣṣar, al-Ṣihyuniyya, p.59.
2. Ibid. p.17.
3. Ibid. p.59.
4. Loc.cit.
5. Ibid. pp.59-60. There are passages among Naṣṣar's comments which suggest that the anti-Semitism he feared would plague the East if the Jews settled in Palestine had already begun to grip him - see ibid. pp.12 & 17.
6. Ibid. p.60.
7. Ibid. p.62.

conveniently glossed over a difficulty which greater precision would have led him into. He wrote, self-consciously, not as an Arab particularist but as an Ottoman loyalist, intent on demonstrating that the Zionist Movement was a peril to the Empire as a whole. Naṣṣar's ambiguous position, as both an Ottoman loyalist and as a publicist with Arab interests at heart, was further complicated by his loose use of such terms as "bilad", "waṭan" and "shaʿb". Nevertheless, between the lines it can be seen that Naṣṣar wrote at two levels: Zionism was a threat to the Ottoman Empire in general and to the native population of Palestine in particular; however, as Zionism was of immediate danger to the Arabs, the latter were bound to act in their own self-defence, because the Government was taking no action. Thus, when Naṣṣar asked "What do we learn?" and "what do we need?", he was addressing his questions to the Arabs in the first instance and only thereafter to all Ottomans at large.

Naṣṣar replied to both his questions in broad outline. On a close reading of the Jewish Encyclopedia one could learn, he wrote, that Zionist politics were opportunistic; the Zionists conducted their affairs in the capitals of those Powers through which they could gain most influence - for this reason most of their registered companies were domiciled in London and, now that the Ottoman Empire was inclining towards Germany, the Zionist headquarters were located in that country.[1] The CUP did not hinder the Zionists' advance and Ottoman Jews helped them too.[2] The Zionists mocked

1. Naṣṣar, al-Ṣihyuniyya, p.60. 2. Ibid. p.61.

"us" by claiming that they cherished Ottomanism and wished to live under the shade of the Crescent, whilst, in fact, they wanted to take advantage of Ottoman ignorance and disunity to gain mastery "over our country [biladina] and the sources of our livelihood".[1] In Naṣṣar's opinion, unwavering leadership and bold, ambitious plans were required.[2] He took none other than Herzl as the prime example of a leader who had propounded such plans and whose tenacity had welded a dispersed and divided people into unity.[3] But "we" are different from the Jews; we have the Ottoman community (jamiʿa), of which the largest group [i.e. the Muslims] has its Caliph.[4] All Ottomans were bound to respect the Caliphate because it was a religious symbol for two-hundred and fifty million non-Ottoman Muslims and because it was a force and a means to unity, a medium required for the understanding of patriotism (al-waṭaniyya).[5] Moreover, (and, at this point, Naṣṣar was addressing himself specifically to the Arabs): "we need to rely upon ourselves and to stop expecting everything from the Government".[6] We must defend ourselves "by ourselves"; this was legitimate under

1. Naṣṣar, al-Ṣihyuniyya, p.61. 2. Ibid. p.62.
3. Loc.cit. 4. Loc.cit.
5. Ibid. pp.62-3. Cf. C.E.Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology", The Review of Politics, vol.xxiii (1961), p.396, discussing Christian Arabs who by about this time had come to regard Islam as part of their heritage and instancing Naḍra Muṭran who in 1913 held that Christian Arabs should submit to the rule of Muslim Arabs; cf. also Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp.251-2.
6. Naṣṣar, al-Ṣihyuniyya, p.63.

a constitutional régime.[1] "Amongst us" there were many like Herzl, but they required to recognise "their own worth and moral courage" to take the first steps.[2]

> "Let our men arise and let them begin by forming societies for Ottomans which will aim at the Ottoman commonweal [al-ʿuthmaniyya] and which will teach economy and implant the principle of not letting the capital of Ottomans enter the pockets of the colonists who will fight us for our existence and will not return [our money] to us. [Let them begin] by founding companies which will collect capital by the piastre so that the poor and the rich will participate in them, and which will purchase land and will carry out agricultural, industrial and commercial programmes. 'Small things generate large ones.' Let the active and the wise begin; 'Everyone who travels along the road reaches [his goal]'.
>
> "Why do we, who have spent centuries suffering tragedy and misery, not become men and go on the way of freedom and live for our homeland [waṭan] and for ourselves, so that we shall not invoke upon ourselves the curses of our ancestors and our sons by losing the country [bilad] which [our] ancestors acquired with their blood."[3]

* * * *

The Second Debate: May 16th and 17th, 1911

During March and April Dr. Jacobson reported from Constantinople that the Arab deputies,[4] especially Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi,[5] were conducting a campaign for new legislation against Jewish immigration into Palestine. Nor was Dr. Jacobson, for his part, inactive during these months.

1. Naṣṣar, al-Ṣihyuniyya, p.63. This sounds very much like the "line" which, according to Elie Krause, had been used by outside elements in spring 1909 to rouse peasants at ash Shajara against Sejera - see above, p.174. It will be recalled that Krause had reported that Najib Naṣṣar was one of those who took a leading part in inciting the peasants to act against the settlement - see above, p.178.
2. Naṣṣar, al-Ṣihyuniyya, p.63. 3. Ibid. pp.63-4.
4. CZA L2/34/I (13.3.1911), Jacobson to Ruppin.
5. CZA L2/34/I (12.4.1911), same to same.

From the middle of March a series of "Five O'clock Teas" were held fortnightly in the offices of Le Jeune-Turc, to which distinguished Ottoman politicians and men of letters were invited.[1] These gatherings afforded Jacobson and his colleagues the opportunity of meeting a number of personalities with whom they could discuss Zionism in private. One such personality was the deputy for Latakia, (Amir) Amin Arslan Bey, who in 1901, as Kaymakam of Tiberias, had tried to prevent peasants from being displaced on account of land sales to Jews in the Kaza (see above, p.105) and who, as a member of a prominent Druze family, must surely have been familiar with the problems arising out of the displacement of Druze peasants by the establishment of Metulla in 1896.[2] In talking with Jacobson he referred to Kann's book, Erets Israël - Le Pays Juif, and expressed the fear that, through the sale of Arab land to Jews, the peasants in Palestine would be turned into a landless proletariat. Jacobson replied that Palestine's population required augmentation and its land intensive cultivation to raise the country's level of development. Amin Arslan agreed that the Ottoman Empire was in need of immigration, but hardships arising out of the sale of Arab land to Jews must be avoided.[3] Jacobson was more successful with Dimitri Vlahov, a Bulgarian socialist deputy from Salonika,[4] who asked for material about the

1. CZA Z2/11 (27.3.1911 & 10.4.1911), Jacobson to ZCO (Cologne).
2. For details, see I. Epstein, "She'elah ne'elamah", ha-Shiloaḥ, vol.xvii (1907), pp.193-206.
3. CZA Z2/11 (27.3.1911), Jacobson to ZCO.
4. Vlahov attended a "Five O'clock Tea" given on March 26th, 1911 - loc.cit.

Jews in Palestine and statistics showing the economic advantages which they rendered both the native population of the country and the Ottoman Empire generally.[1] As well as Vlahov, Jacobson was also able to win over to the Zionist cause an Armenian Taşnak deputy from Erzerum, Vartkis Effendi,[2] who is not recorded as having attended a "Five O'clock Tea".

* * *

On May 16th, the Chamber was engaged in examining the Empire's "Internal Budget". A remark that the national and religious beliefs of all groups within the Empire must be respected was taken by Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi as a cue to initiate a discussion on Zionism.[3] At the outset, Ruḥi Bey stated that he was not an anti-Semite, but was an anti-Zionist. He spoke at length about the origins of Zionism and read some appropriate Biblical quotations to the Chamber. Reports of his speech in the Constantinople press suggest that he was indebted for much of his material to Najib Naṣṣar's al-Ṣihyuniyya. Ruḥi Bey was followed by the second deputy from Jerusalem, Sa'id Bey al-Ḥusayni, who outlined the main points in Ussischkin's Our Programme, which had come to the attention of the authorities in Jerusalem in 1905

1. CZA 13/23/K: "Draft memoirs of the late Dimitri Vlahov".
2. CZA Z2/12 (19.5.1911), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
3. For reports of this discussion, on which the following account is based, see FO 371/1245/19395, no.346 (17.5.1911), Lowther to Grey; The Levant Herald, xl, 115 & 116 (17. & 18.5.1911); Stamboul, xlv, 115 & 116 (17. & 18.5.1911); L'Aurore, iii, 126 (19.5.1911); & ha-Ḥerut, iii, 96 (29.5.1911).

whilst Sa^{c}id Bey was President of the Municipal Council (see above, pp.117 & 167). He also revived the rumour, current at that time, that Ussischkin had given himself the title of "the Jewish Prince" (see above, p.115). He concluded by affirming, as he had in 1909 to Eliezer ben Yehudah, that he would have no objection to Jewish immigration if the immigrants were to become Ottoman subjects and settled in parts of the Empire other than Palestine (see above, p. 185). When Sa^{c}id Bey had finished, Nissim Mazliah indicated that he did not wish to speak for or against Zionism because he was a Jew, but he proposed that a commission be set up to examine the question as it touched on the honour of Ottoman Jews as well. This proposal was seconded by Vartkis Effendi, who accused the Arab deputies of creating the one thing which had been lacking in the Empire - a Jewish question. He is reported to have said, "Formerly, hatred of the Armenians was created; now you want to inculcate hatred of the Jews into the people".[1] Ruḥi Bey pointed out that the Arabs were opposed only to foreign Jews, which Vartkis countered by replying that the masses were incapable of making the distinction.[2] After

1. The Levant Herald, xl, 115 (17.5.1911).
2. Lowther reported that the deputies from Jerusalem "were somewhat curiously answered" by Vartkis Effendi - FO 371/1245 (17.5.1911). As Jacobson had enlisted Vartkis' support for the Zionist cause, it is not so curious that he replied. If Lowther found the content of Vartkis' speech curious, then it is worth noting that after the first discussion on Zionism in the Chamber an Armenian paper called Azatamart had protested against the attacks on Jews in the Empire for the same reason as that raised by Vartkis Effendi in the Chamber on May 16th - see ha-Herut, iii, 67 (22.3.1911), where a synopsis of the article in Azatamart is given.

a brief digression into Armenian affairs, the Chamber's attention was re-directed to the Zionist question by Shukri al-ʿAsali who distributed "Zionist stamps",[1] and spoke along ~~the~~ lines which, it would appear, closely followed his open letter to Sami Paşa al-Faruki of December, 1910 (see above, pp.217-20).[2] He also claimed that Jews were buying large tracts of land in the region of the Hijaz Railway, a point he had raised while opposing the purchase of Fula (see above, p.224). To this, Talât Bey replied that according to the Land Law foreigners were entitled to acquire land anywhere in the Empire, except in the Hijaz itself. The deputy from Ipek, Hafiz Ibrahim Effendi, complained that the Chamber's time was being wasted on "chimœras": the Empire had an army of one million men; it had nothing to fear from a hundred thousand Jews in Palestine.

On the following day, Dimitri Vlahov, the Bulgarian deputy whom Jacobson had befriended, made a long speech in defence of Jewish immigration into Palestine.[3] Thereafter the President of the Chamber accepted a motion from several

1. The "Zionist stamps" were labels attached to letters as a form of voluntary contribution to the Jewish National Fund. An article, entitled "The First Hebrew Postal Service", in The Holy Land Philatelist, vi, 64/65 (1960), p.1300, gives the earliest date of this service as autumn 1912, on the authority of S. Nissenbaum - for further reference, see loc.cit. Nissenbaum is clearly wrong because Shukri al-ʿAsali had protested against this service two years before this date - see above, p.219.
2. For a fairly full account of Shukri al-ʿAsali's speech, see The Near East, iv, N.S.14 (1911), p.317.
3. CZA 13/23/K. If these draft memoirs by Vlahov are to be believed, this speech caused something of a sensation in the Chamber; the Constantinople press, however, did not take special note of Vlahov's performance.

deputies calling for closure, despite protests from Kosmidi Effendi (see above, p.240) and from Sa'id Bey al-Ḥusayni in the name of the Arab deputies. Then Halil Bey, as Minister of Internal Affairs, replied to all the points which had been raised in connection with the Internal Budget. Concerning Zionism, he assured the Chamber that probably the totality of Ottoman Jews was opposed to its political aims. The Government had no intention of modifying its attitude towards large concentrations of Jews anywhere in the Empire and orders would be given to ensure the strict application of its instructions, which aimed at preventing such an eventuality in Palestine.

This second discussion of Zionism in the Ottoman Parliament differs from the first one in a number of respects. In the first place, it might properly be called a debate, whereas the earlier discussion was at best a duologue between Ismail Hakki Bey and the Grand Vezir. In the second discussion, Arab deputies took the lead, whilst Turks remained silent. The three Arab speakers were well prepared and, while each had a different task to fulfil, they all claimed in the course of their speeches that the Zionists aspired not only to Palestine but to Syria and Iraq as well.[1] The Zionists also had arranged to have spokesmen defend them, and they found unexpected support from Hafiz Ibrahim Effendi from Ipek who accepted the view expressed by the Grand Vezir in the first discussion that the alleged threat from the Zionist Movement and Jewish immigration into Palestine was a phantasy.

1. See press reports cited above in n.3 on p.262.

From the Arab point of view, this discussion was a failure. Shukri al-ʿAsali, in concluding for the Arab deputies, had called for the adoption of legislation which had been drafted in 1909 by the Ministry of the Cadastre with a view to stopping Jewish colonisation in Palestine.[1] However, the Arabs only succeeded in extracting an assurance from the Minister of Internal Affairs that the existing restrictions against the Jews in Palestine would be resolutely applied. They failed to achieve more for perhaps two reasons.[2] First, their three speakers were not very astute. Ruḥi Bey spoke for too long and was too erudite; when pressed, he conceded that public order in the Jewish settlements was perfect.[3] Saʿid Bey praised the Jews' energy and economy in Palestine, admitting also that they had founded superior agricultural and industrial establishments which were of great benefit to the country.[4] Shukri Effendi made a similar tactical error when he referred to the Jewish "postal service"; it functioned, he said, in an exemplary fashion which he wished the Ottoman service would emulate.[5] Secondly, the Arab deputies failed because when they raised the Zionist issue, the Chamber was little interested in the question. According to the Constantinople press, the Arab deputies were listened to "amidst general

1. The Levant Herald, xl, 115 (17.5.1911). Shukri Effendi was probably referring to the proposed legislation which was talked about in autumn 1909 (see above, pp.187 - 9), and which was reported to have been dropped because it was ~~bed~~ unconstitutional (see above, p.189, n.2).
2. Cf. CZA Z2/12 (19.5.1911), Jacobson to Wolffsohn.
3. See press reports cited above in n.3 on p.262.
4. Loc.cit.
5. Loc.cit.

indifference"; at closure on May 16th only about fifty deputies (out of a possible total of about two hundred and fifty) remained in the Chamber.[1] During their speeches several deputies interrupted, protesting against the wastage of the Chamber's time. The reason for this is not difficult to understand. Those Turkish and Greek deputies, who had affected so much anxiety about Zionism just two and a half months earlier, were no longer concerned now that Cavid Bay and other members of the Salonika group had resigned.

Correspondingly, this discussion was virtually ignored by the Turkish press. Indeed the only important comments on it made by a Turk were offered in an interview given to the Jewish Chronicle that summer by Dr. Riza Tevfik Bey, who had come to London to attend the "Universal Races Congress".[2] His remarks may be regarded as a postscript to both debates on Zionism in the Chamber and to the events leading up to them. He denied the truth of reports in various newspapers, including The Times,[3] that the CUP was dominated by Jews: "to accuse the Jews of leading the Turks is childish"; Karasu had been sent to depose Abdülhamid by "a mere accident of the ballot"; "the Jews do not guide Turkish policy".[4] Nonetheless, the new régime had recently been greatly discredited among the masses because of the allegations of CUP complicity in Zionist schemes. Zionist leaders and Israel Zangwill (of the Jewish Territorial Organisation) had

1. The Levant Herald, xl, 115 (17.5.1911).
2. See The Times, no.39,647 (26.7.1911).
3. See ibid. no.39,634 (11.7.1911); and, subsequently, ibid. no.39,658 (8.8.1911) & ibid. no.39,659 (9.8.1911).
4. Jewish Chronicle, no.2209 (4.8.1911).

made statements claiming parts of the Ottoman Empire for the Jews: in Riza Tevfik's opinion, this was injudicious.

> "The Arabs and the Christians are the worst enemies of the Jewish people in Palestine, the former owing to economic reasons and the latter partly on religious and partly on economic grounds. Whatever is said or propagated in Europe as regards Turkey is rapidly brought by interested agitators to the notice of the Arabs and the Christians, who, in their turn, incite the ignorant Turkish masses against the Jews."
>
> ... "Go and tell the Jews, tell the Zionist Congress, and tell Mr. Zangwill, when they wish to encourage us by their motto 'we will give you money and brains, and you give us land', they frighten us. The Turk is afraid of money and brains. He sees behind them European intervention."[1]

* * *

Reports of this debate swiftly reached the Arabs. Eliezer ben Yehudah described a conversation he had shortly thereafter with a notable in Jerusalem whom he found uncritical of, if not fully in accord with, Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi's point of view.[2] Ṭaha al-Mudawwar, the editor of al-Ra'y al-ʿAmm, applauded the initiative taken by the Arab deputies in the Chamber.[3] A Muslim in Haifa told ha-Or's correspondent there that eighteen hours a day he thought of the benefits which the Jews bring the country and six hours a day he suspected them of wanting to establish a Jewish state in Palestine.[4] Albert Antébi reported to the Haham Başi in Constantinople that since accounts of speeches by Ruḥi Bey and Shukri al-ʿAsali had spread among the peasants,

1. Jewish Chronicle, no.2209 (4.8.1911).
2. Ha-Or, ii [xxvii], 186/361 (16.6.1911).
3. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 106 (19.6.1911).
4. Ha-Or, ii [xxvii], 204/379 (9.7.1911).

anti-Jewish feeling had widened.[1] A peasant had asked him if the Jews had really prepared a Jewish king for Jerusulem and if he would be a foreigner or an Arabic speaker.[2] Antébi described an atmosphere in Palestine which, it may be assumed, was the product of the same anti-CUP propaganda as had been spread among the Turks over the last year:

> "Le juif devien [sic] à tous les yeux, l'anti-patriote, le traître prêt à spolier le voisin pour s'emparer de ses biens [;] le chrétien excelle en ces accusations mais le musulman lui emboîte le pas".[3]

By chance, the first reports of the debate revealed the existence in Jaffa of an Arab society whose aim it was to oppose the Zionists. The Ottoman News Agency's first telegraphs stated that "Hafiz" had declared in the course of the discussion that the fear of the Zionists was imaginary.[4] The deputy in question was Hafiz Ibrahim Effendi of Ipek (see above, p.265). However, in Jaffa the news was taken to refer to Ḥafiẓ Bey al-Saʿid, the town's deputy, who in fact is not reported to have taken part in the discussion at all. In protest, an open letter addressed to Ḥafiẓ Bey, was sent to Falasṭin, a paper recently founded in Jaffa.[5] The Arab deputies who spoke against Zionism were commended, whereas Ḥafiẓ Bey was strongly reproached for calling the Zionist danger "imaginary", especially as he, in particular, was familiar with the question at first hand.

1. AIU X. E. 29 (21.6.1911), A. Antébi (Jerus.) to Haham Başi (Consple.); cf. JCA 268/encl. to no.195 (21.6.1911), Antébi to J. Starkmeth (Jaffa).
2. Loc.cit.
3. AIU X. E. 29 (21.6.1911), Antébi to Haham Başi.
4. Cf. ha-Ḥerut, iii, 84 (24.5.1911).
5. Loc.cit. reproducing the text of this open letter; the number and date of the issue of Falasṭin in which it appeared are not given.

> "[Zionism] is the danger which encompasses our homeland; [Zionism] is the awful wave which beats [our] shore; it is the source of the deceitful acts which we experience like a downpour and which are to be feared more than going alone at the dead of night. Not only this; it is also an omen of our future exile from our homeland and of [our] departure from our homes and property."[1]

Open letters and telegrams protesting against Zionism had already been dispatched on a number of occasions; however, this one was distinguished by the fact that it was signed "al-Ḥizb al-Waṭani al-ʿUthmani" - "The Ottoman National Party".[2] In the summer of 1911 al-Ḥaqiqa and al-Mufid announced the aims of this group;[3] among its founders was mentioned Sulayman al-Taji, a blind shaykh who owned property near Jaffa.[4] In September Shimon Muyal, a Jewish doctor in Jaffa, informed the editors of ha-Ḥerut of the existence in Jaffa of another society called al-Shirka al-Iqtiṣadiyya al-Tijariyya - "The Economic and Commercial Company". Muyal named Shaykh Sulayman al-Taji, al-Ḥajj Ḥaydar (a trader from Nablus established in Jaffa) and Muḥammad Amin Ṣihyun (a Jaffa pharmacist) as the Company's principal members. Muyal claimed that Jews were denied membership ~~to~~ of this society and that its object (like that of "The Ottoman National Party") was to oppose Zionism by instilling hatred of the

1. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 84 (24.5.1911).
2. Loc.cit.; cf. AIU X. E. 29 (21.6.1911), Antébi to Haham Başi, indicating that this was the same group whose existence he had remarked upon some months earlier - see above, p.214.
3. Falasṭin, i, 70 (20.9.1911).
4. S. Hochberg, "Li-sheʾelat hitkarbutenu el ha-ʿarabim", ha-Mebasser, ii, 23 (1911), p.281; Hochberg rendered al-Taji's name in Hebrew as Sulayman Naji - a simple slip from the Arabic.

Jews into the hearts of the local population until the latter compelled the Jews to depart.[1] Muyal's letter to ha-Ḥerut was reproduced in Falasṭin,[2] where it sparked off a correspondence in which Muyal and Muḥammad Ṣihyun took part.[3] From this exchange it is evident that both societies did exist and that both were very small. Muḥammad Ṣihyun confirmed that "The Ottoman National Party's" object was to oppose the Zionists, but, he emphasised, legal means alone were to be employed. The only dispute was over the aims of "The Economic and Commercial Company" which Muyal claimed were the same as those of "The Ottoman National Party", being inspired by Shaykh Sulayman al-Taji as well, while Ṣihyun maintained that Muyal had confused the two groups - "The Economic and Commercial Company" was a business society, unconcerned with religious or political questions.

In July ha-Ḥerut also received news of secret anti-Zionist societies in Haifa and Nazareth.[4] In the next months no more information was forthcoming about the group in Nazareth, but more light was thrown on the character of the Haifa society. After the second debate on Zionism Najib Naṣṣar drew his readers' attention to the lax manner in which the "Red Slip" regulations were enforced by the Ottoman authorities in the town. He persuaded them to set up a citizens' watch-committee, which was successful in gaining permission from the Mutasarrif of Acre to supervise

1. Muyal to ha-Ḥerut, iii, 146 (4.9.1911).
2. Falasṭin, i, 69 (16.9.1911).
3. Loc.cit. & ibid. 70 (20.9.1911); ibid. 71 (23.9.1911); cf. also ha-Ḥerut, iv, 10 (20.10.1911).
4. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 121/22 (19.7.1911); & ibid. 122/23 (21.7.1911).

the disembarkation of Jews from all ships docking at Haifa in order to see that the entry restrictions were fully implemented.[1]

Naṣṣar's imagination and energy in campaigning against the Zionists was considerable. On June 7th he published an open letter addressed to all newspaper editors who shared his views, suggesting that they unite to present a common front against the Zionists.[2] Within a few days his suggestion found support from Ṭaha al-Mudawwar of al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm, who proposed the following programme:

> "1. All the newspapers [in the group] must follow one and the same line against [Jewish] settlement in our land.
>
> "2. To endeavour, as far as possible, to prevent [this] settlement.
>
> "3. When the Government sees that all the newspapers in unison oppose [this]settlement, it will of necessity find a different way [to deal with the problem], more appropriate to [the Government's] welfare".[3]

During the summer months, certain Arabic newspapers once again began attacking Najib al-Aṣfar and his project to lease out all çiftliks in Syria and Palestine (see above, pp. 212-13). In August, the British Consul in Damascus reported that al-Aṣfar had sent an agent, a certain Dr. Ḥaydar of Baalbek, to solicit these papers' silence by offering their editors shares in his project.[4] The attacks on al-Aṣfar

1. Ha-Ḥerut, 132/33 (9.8.1911); & ha-Poʿel ha-Ṣaʿir, iv, 22 (1911), pp.12-13.
2. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 105 (16.6.1911), & ha-Or, ii [xxvii], 204/379 (9.7.1911).
3. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 108/9 (21.6.1911).
4. FO 195/2371, no.41 (12.8.1911), G.P. Devey (Damascus) to Lowther; cf; Q d'O N.S. 133, no.27 (14.9.1911), A. Guy (Haifa) to de Selves (Paris).

therefore stopped, but those on the Zionists did not. In September, a contributor to ha-Ḥerut observed that the circle of Arab anti-Zionist newspapers had expanded to include (in addition to those papers mentioned in the foregoing chapter) al-Aḥwal and al-Rashid (both Beirut), Falasṭin (Jaffa) and Ḥuṭṭ bil-Khurj (Damascus).[1]

The first debate in March was followed by Najib Naṣṣar's al-Ṣihyuniyya; six months after the second debate, a young Arab wrote a story about Zionism. He was Maʿaruf al-Arnaʾuṭ, who later became a member of the Arab Academy in Damascus. In 1911 he was nineteen years old and, having been educated in Beirut, he was beginning his literary career as a contributor to various newspapers in that city.[2] His story was called "The Maid of Zion".[3] No copy of this was found; it may be conjectured that it did not appear as a book but was published in one of the newspapers to which al-Arnaʾuṭ contributed (perhaps even al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm).[4] Ha-Ḥerut's Haifa correspondent detailed the story's chapter headings, which provide a clear outline of the plot:

1. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 151 (11.9.1911).
2. A. Daghir, Maṣadir al-dirasa al-adabiyya (Beirut, 1956), pp.107-10.
3. Ha-Ḥerut, iv, 22 (9.11.1911). The title was rendered in Hebrew as "Ha-ʿalmah Ẓiyyon" - literally "The Maid, Zion". In Arabic, the title may have been "Fatat Ṣihyun", on the model of ʿAbd al-Masiḥ al-Anṭaki's al-Yahudiyya al-ʿajiba aw fatat israʾil (Cairo, 1903), or a better known novel by Yaʿqub Ṣarruf, Fatat Miṣr (Cairo, 1905), in which, interestingly enough, Jewish financiers are portrayed as villains and a Jew figures as a Russian spy.
4. See Zirakli, al-Aʿlam, viii, 184: Arnaʾuṭ began his literary career by contributing to al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm, al-Balagh and al-Iqbal.

"The greatness of the Jews in former generations; the destruction of the first Temple; revolt amongst the nations; rebuilding the Temple; the children of Jacob; the destruction of the second Temple, migration; Esther and Moses; feelings of love; the Tiberias incident and Drs. Ḥaydar and al-Aṣfar; Esther speaks at the Zionist Congress; the first kiss; the form of love; interview of the leader of the Zionists with Drs. Ḥaydar and al-Aṣfar; the Four-sided Covenant; the parties to the Covenant; a night in a German hostel; sickness of the Maid of Zion; the uprising of the newspapers; the people arise; a wreath of flowers on the death-bed; the last kiss; Esther in the grave; cursed are ye, O Jerusalem; the voice of God; how pleasant is death; the sealing of the sorrow "[1]

The allegory and intention of this tale are not difficult to perceive. Moses, the Jewish people, is enamoured with Esther, the Land of Palestine. They are momentarily united in love, but their union is opposed and their love ends in disaster. Al-Arnaʾuṭ's hopes are barely concealed. He set his story against a semi-factual background: Najib Naṣṣar was a native of Tiberias; in 1910, when it was first rumoured that Najib al-Aṣfar was a Zionist agent, four Arabic newspapers (al-Muqtabas, al-Mufid, al-Ḥaqiqa and al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm) were reported to have made a compact to attack al-Aṣfar and the Zionists (see above, p.213, n.2). To al-Arnaʾuṭ goes the distinction of being the first to cast Arab feelings about Zionism into story form. It is interesting that he was not yet twenty at the time, younger still than Isʿaf al-Nashashibi who wrote his tale, The Wizard and the Jew, at the age of twenty-seven (see above, p.139).

* * * *

1. Ha-Ḥerut, iv, 22 (9.11.1911).

The Young Turks were, in a sense, Abdülhamid's "offspring"; they inherited his sins and were punished for these sins. Before the Young Turks came to power, they attacked Abdülhamid on many grounds; after the Young Turk Revolution, the CUP swiftly took over the reins of government and, as George Antonius has observed, "established a tyranny which, albeit different in kind from that of 'Abdul-Hamid, was not less despotic".[1] In the course of the next years, Ottoman subjects became conscious of the parallels between the Committee's régime and that of Abdülhamid; accordingly, the CUP's opponents attacked the Committee in the same terms as the Young Turks had attacked Abdülhamid before 1908. Modern Jewish settlement in Palestine had been progressing for a quarter of a century before the Young Turk Revolution; the old régime had imposed restrictions on the Jewish immigrants and the Young Turks were careful to retain these restrictions. However, the local population in Palestine and in the surrounding provinces did not begin - for practical purposes - to express themselves politically until after the CUP had come to power. Thus, they blamed the CUP, and not Abdülhamid, for the Jews' advances in Palestine. Abdülhamid had frequently been accused by the Young Turks of dismembering the Empire; "le Sultan vendait la patrie à l'étranger".[2] In the first discussion on Zionism in the Chamber the CUP was accused of precisely the same crime.

1. Antonius, Arab Awakening, p.105.
2. Mandelstam, L'Empire Ottoman, p.11.

The opponents of the CUP played upon the fact that the Jewish immigrants were foreign subjects and thus, it was alleged, the vanguard of a Great Power invasion. Among the Turks that Power was represented as Germany, while among the Arabs it was said to be Russia, since most of the Jewish settlers were Russian subjects.[1] Political capital was made out of the Zionists' offer of "money and brains", in the knowledge that the Turks shrank from such talk because, as Riza Tevfik pointed out, they saw behind it European intervention (see above, p.268). The Arabs also rejected this offer and the parallel Zionist claim that benefits would accrue to all through Jewish settlement in Palestine. However, the Arabs' point of view was somewhat different from that of the Turks, as is evident in the following extract from a comic dialogue which appeared in al-Ḥimara:

> "Yes, it is true that [the Zionists] are turning waste lands into productive fields; but in their wake they are destroying the Empire and are not bringing any benefit whatsoever to the local population. What does it matter to us [the Arabs] if they have paid money [in taxes, etc.] to the Government at a time when the local population, who are the source of the Government, are being reduced to poverty and annihilated."[2]

During the campaign before the first elections for the Ottoman Parliament in autumn 1908, al-Aṣma'i (in Jaffa) had shown itself to be opposed to Jewish settlement in Palestine, but had suggested that the Jews' methods should

1. Ha-Or, ii [xxvii], 204/379 (9.7.1911), referring to al-Karmal; Falasṭin, i, 53 (22.7.1911) & ibid. 69 (16.9.1911).
2. Ha-Ḥerut, iii, 108/9 (21.6.1911), where article from al-Ḥimara is reproduced; the number and date of the issue of al-Ḥimara in which it appeared are not given.

be emulated (see above,pp.164-5). The current of admiration for the Jews' techniques which flowed alongside Arab opposition to the immigrants revealed itself vividly before and during the second debate on Zionism in the Chamber. In al-Ṣihyuniyya, Najib Naṣṣar, the most outspoken Arab opponent of the Zionist Movement at the time, took Theodor Herzl as his model of the ideal leader. And similarly, the three Arab deputies who spoke against Zionism in the Chamber all moderated their criticism with words of praise for Jewish achievements in Palestine. Though no enigma, this mixed attitude continued to underlie Arab estimates of the Jewish settlers in Palestine, and was to manifest itself most clearly in the relations between Arab nationalists and Zionists which began in the spring of 1913 and lasted until the outbreak of World War I (see Chs. VIII and X).

* * * * *

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE WATERSHED: 1912

The Change of Government

The unpopularity of the CUP Government intensified during the summer of 1911 and the rifts within the Committee which had been patched up in April and May broke open again.[1] Among other charges, the anti-CUP press kept alive the allegation that the Government inclined towards the Zionists,[2] although even anti-CUP Turks and Arabs admitted that this charge was being maintained solely to embarrass the Government.[3] In November a new political party, the "Liberal Union", was formed in Constantinople, which united into a single front almost all groups and individuals opposed to the CUP. Three weeks later, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Memduh Bey, was defeated in a Constantinople by-election by Tahir Bey Hayreddin, a Liberal Union candidate.

The Government, not unnaturally, tried to rid itself of the various charges levelled against it. In November, both the British Ambassador at the Porte and the British Consul-

1. For an analysis of the reasons behind the CUP's unpopularity, see "X" [= S.H. Taghizade (per Lewis, Modern Turkey, p.494)], "Les Courants politiques dans la Turquie contemporaine", RMM, vol.xxi (1912), pp.158-221.
2. Mècheroutiette, iii, 20 (July, 1911), pp.37ff.; ibid. 21 (Aug., 1911), pp.20ff.; ibid. 22 (Sep., 1911), pp. 57ff.; ibid. 23 (Oct., 1911), pp.29ff.; ibid. 24 (Nov., 1911), pp.32ff.; & ha-Ḥerut, iv, 10 (20.10.1911), where a long extract from an article, entitled "The Relation of the Empire to the Zionists", is reprinted from Alemdar (n.d.).
3. "X", "La Turquie contemporaine", p.211; & ha-Ḥerut, iv, 15 (29.10.1911), where an article, entitled "We and the Zionists", is reprinted from al-ʿUmran (Cairo, n.d.).

General in Beirut reported that the Ottoman Government was now "strongly hostile" to the Zionist Movement.[1] At the end of the year, the CUP organised a series of public meetings in Constantinople in an attempt to win back support for itself. One of its spokesmen was Ahmed Agayev, a Muslim from the Crimea, who was a staff writer on Le Jeune-Turc. According to Dr. Jacobson, he convinced his audience at the first of these meetings that the Government's "complicity with the Zionists" was a fabrication emanating from the CUP's enemies.[2]

However, the impact of such meetings was necessarily very small, for it could not have made itself felt upon more than a few individuals in the capital. The Government, recognising this, therefore tried to refute the suggestion of its pro-Zionist leanings by another means. It made public its intention of passing new legislation to regulate Jewish immigration and land purchase in the Empire.[3]

It will be recalled that Azmi Bey was appointed Mutasarrif of Jerusalem in May 1910 when protest telegrams from Haifa and Nazareth had evoked orders from Constantinople requiring the proper enforcement of the restrictions on Jewish land purchase (see above, p.209). At first, these orders were obeyed, but by the spring of the following year the British Consul in Jerusalem observed: "it seems quite clear that there must be a great deal of ... bribery going

1. FO 371/1263/47157, no.829 (18.11.1911), Sir G. Lowther (Consple.) to Sir E. Grey (F.O.), enclosing no.64 (6.11.1911), H.A. Cumberbatch (Beirut) to Lowther.
2. CZA Z3/43 (4.1.1912), V. Jacobson & I. Auerbach (Consple.) to ZAC (Berlin). /911
3. CZA Z3/43 (30.12.~~1912~~), Jacobson & Auerbach to ZAC.

on, as the Jews now seem to experience no difficulties in the acquisition of land whereas last summer [1910] the Authorities steadily refused to allow any transfers to be made to them".[1]

In May 1911, Azmi Bey was summoned from Jerusalem to explain certain irregularities which had occurred in the Mosque of ʿUmar; and shortly after the second debate on Zionism in the Chamber, his place was taken by Cevdet Bey who arrived in Jerusalem with strict orders to check Jewish advances in Palestine.[2] At the same time the Minister of the Awqaf ~~put an end to~~ closed a loophole in the laws by prohibiting the sale of any waqf which had wrongly been registered with the Ministry of the Cadastre.[3] Ruḥi Bey returned to Jerusalem during the summer and before he left again for the reopening of Parliament in the autumn, he instructed the Director of the Cadastre in the city to prevent any sales of land to Jews.[4]

The Zionists had been trying since the beginning of 1911 to acquire some land at Dilb (close to the village of Abu Ghosh, near Jerusalem) in the name of Dr. Masié, an Ottoman Jew.[5] The transfer had been opposed by Fayḍi al-ʿAlami, a former President of the Municipal Council in

1. FO 195/2377, no.24 (31.3.1911), H.E. Satow (Jerus.) to Lowther.
2. AIU X. E. 29 (2.8.1911), A. Antébi (Jerus.) to Pres., AIU (Paris); Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi wrote to friends in Jerusalem informing them of Cevdet Bey's instructions before the latter arrived in Jerusalem - see ibid. (13.6.1911), same to same; ibid. (21.6.1911), same to Haham Başi (Consple.); & JCA 268/encl. to no.195 (21.6.1911), Antébi to J. Starkmeth (Jaffa).
3. Loc.cit.
4. CZA L2/24/VI (9.11.1911), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to ZAC [unsigned copy].
5. CZA L5/22 (19.7.1911), A. Ruppin (Jaffa) to Jacobson.

Jerusalem, on the grounds that the peasants in the region would become destitute.[1] Since no unanimous decision could be reached in Jerusalem the question was referred to the Ministry of the Cadastre.[2] In November, the Ministry of Internal Affairs took the matter up, and laid it before the Council of State in December.[3]

Before leaving Jerusalem that autumn, Ruhi Bey had let it be known that he intended to campaign against Jewish land purchases in Palestine when he returned to Constantinople.[4] He appears to have been true to his word, for it was at this juncture that the CUP tried to demonstrate its active opposition to the Zionist Movement by proposing to pass new legislation against Jewish immigration and land purchase. The American Embassy at Constantinople obtained a copy of this proposed legislation which had been drafted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and which was laid before the Council of State in December.[5] The draft consisted of twenty-two articles, divided into a preamble and two parts. The first part dealt with Jewish pilgrims visiting Palestine for three months and was essentially a recapitulation of the existing restrictions which it sought to strengthen by requiring a closer check on the pilgrim's movements after he

1. CZA L5/22 (19.7.1911), Ruppin to Jacobson.
2. CZA Z3/45 (13.2.1912), J. Thon (Jaffa) to same, enclosing a report by a Jewish lawyer in Jerusalem, Aaron Mani, concerning the exchanges between Jerusalem and Constantinople in connection with the Dilb land.
3. Loc.cit.
4. CZA Z3/1447 (13.10.1911), Ruppin to ZAC.
5. US(T), Reel 62, File 867.55/16, no.162 (27.3.1912), W.W. ~~M.M.~~ Rockhill (Consple.) to Secretary of State (Washington), enclosing a translation of the draft legislation.

had entered Palestine. The second part dealt with foreign Jews coming to the Ottoman Empire to take up permanent residence: again the various clauses were mainly a recapitulation of existing restrictions. Great stress, however, was put on two points: first, Jewish immigrants were absolutely prohibited from settling in the Vilayets of Beirut and Şam and in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem; and, second, no large compact groups of Jews were to be permitted to establish themselves anywhere in the Empire.[1]

This move was reported in the press, both in the Empire and abroad.[2] At the same time, the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the CUP in Salonika, Haci Adil Bey, frankly admitted to Ahmed Agayev "that the proposed legislation has only been elaborated for reasons of party politics", at a moment when the Committee was exposed to "fearful attacks" because of "its alleged friendliness with the Zionists".[3]

Dr. Jacobson suggested to the Zionist Executive that all organisations having an interest in Jewish settlement in Palestine should request their governments to seek information about the proposed legislation through their respective embassies in Constantinople as a means of warning the Porte that any new law would be viewed by the Powers with disfavour.[4] Jacobson paid a personal visit to the British

1. US (T), Reel 62, File 867.55/16, no.162 (27.3.1912), encl.
2. FO 195/2416/589, no.3613 (17.1.1912), Lord Swaythling (London) to Grey [copy].
3. CZA Z3/43 (4.1.1912), Jacobson & Auerbach to ZAC.
4. CZA Z3/43 (5.1.1912), Jacobson to ZAC.

Embassy in the city[1] (and, it may be assumed - although no evidence was found - to other embassies as well). As a result, the Foreign Missions sent the Porte a Note Verbale Identique in January 1912 rejecting a previously ignored claim, made on April 24th, 1911, that land transfer to Jews was a matter of internal administration in which the Ottoman Government reserved its liberty of action (see above, p.211).[2] Jacobson also wrote to Hüseyin Zade Ali Bey, a member of the CUP's Central Committee in Salonika with whom he was acquainted, intimating that new restrictions against Jewish immigrants would be "a jolt to the press and finance of world Jewry".[3] It must be borne in mind that Italy had declared war on the Ottoman Empire in September 1911 and this war was straining the Empire's shaky Treasury. Furthermore, although most Powers disapproved of Italy's action, none of them had protested against it, each for reasons of its own; Sir Edward Grey at the British Foreign Office had even prevailed upon The Times to moderate its criticism of Italy.[4] For the last two years, the CUP's enemies had exaggerated the Jews' influence in European press and finance. Consequently, Jacobson's letter, coupled with the Foreign Missions' Note, "made an impression". On January 28th, Hüseyin Zade Ali Bey authorised Ahmed Agayev to inform Jacobson that his letter had been laid before the Central

1. FO 195/2416, undated minute on folder to File 589.
2. These Notes are kept in OFA A/346; cf. FO 195/2411/261, no.61 (21.1.1912), G.L[owther] to Grey [draft], enclosing a copy of the Note.
3. CZA Z3/43 (29.1.1912), Jacobson & Auerbach to ZAC.
4. A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1963), p.474.

Committee of the CUP and that this body had instructed Haci Adil Bey (now the new Minister of Internal Affairs) to withdraw the proposed legislation.[1] This retraction was officially explained by reference to the old restrictions which were still in force and which, it was argued, made additional legislation superfluous.[2] Valid as this may have been, it could scarcely have dispelled the doubts which existed in the minds of many Turks and Arabs about the Government's determination to act resolutely against Jewish settlement in Palestine.

* * *

The Liberal Union, which composed a strong group in the Ottoman Parliament, discomforted the Government. In January 1912, Kâmil Paşa, several times Grand Vezir under Abdülhamid and a warm supporter of the Liberal Union, wrote a letter to the Sultan ascribing all the Empire's tribulations to the CUP. At this, the Committee secured the dissolution of Parliament and called for a fresh election.[3]

In the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem the CUP had never been strong politically.[4] True, Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi was a member of the Committee and, when the Chamber had re-assembled in October 1911, he had been elected one of its two Vice-

1. CZA Z3/43 (29.1.1912), Jacobson & Auerbach to ZAC; cf. FO 195/2416/589, no.213 (12.3.1912), Lowther to Grey [draft].
2. CZA Z3/44 (14.5.1912), I. Neufach (Consple.) to ZCO (Berlin).
3. Details of the events leading up to the dissolution of the Ottoman Parliament in January 1912 are to be found in FO 195/2389/288.
4. Cf. FO 195/2321, no.61 (20.7.1909), E.C. Blech (Jerus.) to Lowther, for an early report on the lukewarm support in Jerusalem for the new régime and the CUP.

Presidents.[1] Against this, his colleagues from the Mutasarriflik, Sa'id Bey al-Husayni and Hafiz Bey al-Sa'id, had, in common with many other Arab deputies, aligned themselves with the Liberal Union.[2] In January 1912, both the Haham Başi and Sa'id Bey al-Husayni thought it not unlikely that a Jew would be elected as one of the deputies from Jerusalem;[3] they reasoned, presumably, that in view of the CUP's weakness in the city, at least one Jewish candidate would be nominated to rally the support of all Jewish voters there. However, in the event, the CUP opted for the alternative course of putting forward as its candidates three men who were well known for their opposition to the Zionists: Ruhi Bey al-Khalidi, Asaf Effendi (the President of the law-court in Jerusalem) and 'Uthman al-Nashashibi (a wealthy land-owner and father of Is'af al-Nashashibi, whose anti-Zionist sentiments were also known - see above, p.139 & p.215).[4] Sami Hochberg, a Zionist who had recently taken over the editorship of Le Jeune-Turc from Celâl Nuri, complained to Ahmed Agayev about the CUP's nominees in Jerusalem. Agayev passed on Hochberg's complaint to Hüseyin Zade Ali Bey, who in due course let it be known in the name of the CUP's Central Committee that the nomination of candidates was

1. Ha-Herut, iv, 14 (27.10.1911). Two years earlier, in October 1909, Ruhi Bey had been elected "Questeur de la Chambre" - see Q d'O N.S. 132 (30.10.1909), G.Gueyraud (Jerus.) to S. Pichon (Paris).
2. CZA Z3/43 (15.1.1912), Jacobson to ZAC; & CZA Z3/1447 (18.2.1912), Ruppin to ZAC.
3. CZA Z3/43 (15.1.1912), Jacobson to ZAC: the Haham Başi had spoken to one of Jacobson's colleagues, Israel Auerbach; and Sa'id Bey had spoken to Jacobson himself.
4. CZA Z3/1447 (22.2.1912), Ruppin to Jacobson.

the prerogative of local CUP branches; further, since anti-Zionism and, more generally, anti-Jewishness, had no place in the CUP's programme, ipso facto no CUP candidates could speak out against Zionism or the Jews.[1] Nonetheless, the Central Committee still thought it prudent to instruct Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi to mollify the Jews in Jerusalem.[2] Ruḥi Bey followed this instruction, for Mendel Kramer, the Government's Jewish mouthpiece in Jerusalem, later reported in ha-Ḥerut a statement made by Ruḥi Bey that he was in no way hostile to Ottoman Jews whose loyalty and utility to the homeland he recognised and whom he pledged to help at all times, since they possessed equal rights with all Ottoman subjects.[3]

The CUP rigged the election throughout the Empire in order to ensure the return of its own candidates. Despite the widespread hostility to the Committee, two-hundred and sixty-nine CUP candidates were elected, while only a bare half-dozen representatives of the opposition were successful.[4] The deputies "elected" to represent Palestine were all CUP nominees:[5] Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi, ʿUthman al-Nashashibi

1. CZA Z3/44 (22.3.1912), Auerbach to ZAC.
2. CZA Z3/44 (19.4.1912), same to same.
3. Mendel Kramer in ha-Ḥerut, iv, 111 (6.5.1912).
4. T.Z. Tunaya, "Elections in Turkish History", Middle Eastern Affairs, v, 4 (1954), pp.117-18.
5. Q d'O N.S.134, no.27 (4.5.1912), Gueyraud to R. Poincaré (Paris); FO 195/2389/2342, no.47 (7.5.1912), H.E. Satow (Jerus.) to Lowther; & FO 195/2389/1984, no.25 (19.4.1912), Cumberbatch to same.

and Aḥmad ʿArif Bey al-Ḥusayni[1] (for the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem); Shaykh Asʿad Shuqayr and Ḥaydar Bey Ṭuqan (for the Sanjaks of Acre and Nablus respectively).

* * *

Shortly after the election, Dr. Jacobson spoke to Hüseyin Cahid Bey, editor of the pro-CUP Tanin, who made two points, the second of which was the more interesting.[2] First, he repeated Haci Adil Bey's view that the Government was too vulnerable to pronounce itself in favour of Zionism - even if it were to be convinced of the Zionists' utility (see above, pp. ~~240-1~~ 239-40). Second, he personally did not understand how Jewish settlement in Palestine could be a danger: if the Empire was strong, Jewish colonisation was no threat; if the Empire was weak and collapsed, it was a matter of indifference whether a Jewish state or a colony of some European Power came into being in Palestine.[3]

The note of pessimism in Hüseyin Cahid Bey's second point was not unwarranted, for the Empire was, in fact, weaker than ever. Tripoli had been lost to the Italians; the islands of Rhodes and Kos plus ten others in the Dodecanese had been occupied by Italy in April and May; and, on May 12th, Serbia and Bulgaria had signed a military

1. In Jerusalem, Aḥmad ʿArif (who prior to his election had been Mufti of Gaza) was thought by the Jews to be well-disposed towards them - see CZA Z3/1448 (7.5.1912), Thon to ZAC; & ha-Or, iii [xxx], 169 [= 166], (5.5.1912). In Constantinople, however, Aḥmad ʿArif was known to have contributed anti-Zionist articles to anti-CUP organs and was even thought to be a member of the Liberal Union - see CZA Z3/44 (20.2.1912), D.F. Marcus (Consple.) to ZCO.
2. CZA Z3/44 (4.6.1912), Jacobson to ZAC.
3. Loc.cit.

convention. The CUP's gerrymandering of the elections had aggravated the existing discontent in Albania and lost the Committee the support of a number of army officers. These latter formed a group called the "Saviour Officers" and, taking advantage of the situation in Albania to put pressure on the Government, forced the Cabinet to resign on July 17th. Their aim - to dislodge the CUP from power - was swiftly achieved; a new Cabinet took up office four days later, led by Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa and including Kâmil Paşa as well as other respected statesmen who were known to disfavour the CUP and its methods. Within a few weeks the Chamber, with its huge CUP majority, was dissolved.[1] The anti-CUP press, no longer having to fear the Government, immediately gave loud vent to its grievances. All the Empire's misfortunes were attributed to the CUP's four years of "misrule"; and, as might have been predicted, among the CUP's gravest crimes were alleged to be its predilection for Jews and its propensity towards the Zionists. During August and September, ha-Ḥerut noted articles in this vein, but of unbridled vehemence, in Hikmet,[2] Iktiham,[3] Hak,[4] Cim,[5]

1. Details of the change of government in July and August 1912 are to be found in FO 195/2390/24.
2. Ha-Ḥerut, iv, 196 (21.8.1912); ibid. 201 (27.8.1912), where part of an article which appeared in Hikmet is reproduced; & ibid. v, 20 (15.10.1912).
3. Loc.cit. where an editorial from Iktiham, entitled "The Comedy of the CUP", is reprinted. Iktiham was formerly Ikdam and it later reverted to that name; thus ibid. v, 3 (17.9.1912), concerning an article by Ali Kâmil Bey in Ikdam; cf. CZA L2/167 (17.10.1912), Thon to ZAC, reporting an article from Ikdam reprinted in al-Karmal on 25.9.1912.
4. Ha-Ḥerut, iv, 200 (26.8.1912), where part of a report from Jerusalem which appeared in Hak is reproduced.
5. Ha-Ḥerut, iv, 208 (4.9.1912).

and Alemdar.[1]

* * * *

The Arabic Press

At the end of 1911 the Zionist Office in Jaffa made arrangements to have the Arabic press scanned systematically for all articles relating to Zionism and Jewish activities in Palestine.[2] This was done because of the growing number of articles on these subjects and the increasingly anti-Zionist tone of these articles. However, during 1912 it was found that most Arabic newspapers beyond the borders of Palestine devoted less space to the Zionist issue than they had in the previous years. From autumn 1911 most papers were pre-occupied with major events in the Ottoman Empire: the formation of the Liberal Union (which many Arabs joined), the subsequent elections and the Turko-Italian War, which was brought uncomfortably close to hand in spring 1912 when the Italians sank some Ottoman naval vessels lying off Beirut. Then, no sooner had peace been made with Italy in October than the first Balkan War broke out, and the attentions of most papers were again diverted from more local news.

In 1912 memoranda were prepared by the Zionist Office in Jaffa on the Arabic press in Egypt, Beirut and Damascus.[3]

1. Ha-Herut, iv, 208 (4.9.1912); cf. CZA Z3/44 (16.9.1912), Neufach to ZCO, concerning an article entitled "Helpers of the CUP" which appeared in Alemdar, no.128 (15.9.1912). Shortly thereafter Alemdar changed its name to Takvimli Gazete - see ha-Herut, v, 13 (7.10.1912) for details of an article which appeared in Takvimli Gazete's "last issue". Still later this paper reverted to its original name of Alemdar but did not alter its views on the CUP's complicity with the Jews and Zionists - see CZA Z3/45 (14.1.1913), Neufach to ZCO.
2. CZA Z3/1447 (17.12.1911), Ruppin to ZCO.
3. CZA Z3/1447 (19.2.1912), same to same; & CZA Z3/1448 (19.3. & 24.6.1912), Thon to ZAC, enclosing memoranda on Arabic press in Egypt, Beirut and Damascus respectively.

These throw light on trends vis-à-vis Zionism which had emerged in this press over the last three years. Newspapers in Egypt were not unfavourably disposed to Jews and in most cases, being locally orientated, did not concern themselves with the Zionist issue at all. Al-Ahram and al-Muqaṭṭam, two important newspapers in Cairo, were exceptions to this rule, since both were edited by Syrians and both circulated widely in the Arab provinces of the Empire. Al-Ahram, although not anti-Jewish,[1] had long been opposed to Jewish settlement in Palestine (see above, pp.203-4). Al-Muqaṭṭam, on the other hand, could not be called "pro-Zionist", but it did accept articles in support of Zionism from Egyptian Jews;[2] and, moreover, from the middle of 1911, its Jaffa correspondent was a Palestinian Jew, Nissim Malul, who was commissioned by the Zionists at the end of the year to follow the Arabic press and contribute appropriate articles to it.[3]

In Beirut and Damascus, papers which opposed the CUP were also hostile to the Zionists; papers which supported the CUP were neutral or even - albeit obliquely - "pro-Zionist". This generalisation held true for all the papers

1. For an article from al-Ahram defending Jews against attacks on religious grounds, see ha-Ḥerut, iii, 60 (3.3.1911).
2. For part of an early article in al-Muqaṭṭam by an Egyptian Jew, Nissim ibn Sahl (after the first discussion on Zionism in the Chamber), see A. al-Jundi, Al-Ṣaḥafa al-siyasiyya fi miṣr (Cairo, n.d.), p.124. For other articles by Egyptian Jews, see CZA Z3/1447 (13.2.1912), Thon to ZCO.
3. CZA Z3/1447 (17.12.1911), Ruppin to ZCO. For examples of such articles by Malul, see CZA L2/167, press report, giving details of an article which appeared on 12.1.1912; & ibid. giving details of an article which appeared on 7.10.1912 (also see below).

published in Beirut and Damascus as listed on the memoranda prepared by the Zionist Office in Jaffa;[1] and it was borne out in other ways as well. After the first discussion on Zionism in the Chamber in March 1911, a number of pro-CUP papers, including the important Lisan al-Ḥal and Kalimat al-Ḥaqq in Beirut, pronounced in favour of the Zionists.[2] In July, some weeks after the Zionist issue had been raised in the Chamber a second time, Naṣif Bey Abu Zayd, the Christian editor of al-ʿAṣr al-Jadid, a CUP organ in Damascus, approached local Jews for subscriptions to his paper, as he was prepared to defend them against the violent attacks in al-Muqtabas (anti-CUP).[3] In the summer of 1911, Ḥutt bil-Khurj (Damascus) had opposed the Government and had spoken out against Zionism (see above, p.273); during the elections of 1912, this paper changed its political allegiance and withheld its criticism of Jewish immigration.[4] Al-Mishkat, a CUP paper which began to appear in Damascus during the 1912 elections, fought the attacks on the CUP and, correspondingly, on the Zionists through its columns.[5]

1. Eleven periodicals appearing in Beirut were listed: al-Naṣir, Lisan al-Ḥal, al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm, al-Mufid, al-Ḥaqiqa, al-Aḥwal, Ababil, al-Thabat, al-Ittiḥad al-ʿUthmani, al-Ḥaris and al-Ḥimara; thirteen periodicals (including eight humorous weeklies) appearing in Damascus were listed: al-Muqtabas, al-ʿAṣr al-Jadid, al-Mishkat, al-Muntakhabat, al-Muhajir, al-Nadim, al-Rawi, al-Bariqa, Jiha, al-Damir, al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm, al-Isbtirakiyya and Ḥutt bil-Khurj.
2. Ha-Herut, iii, 67 (22.3.1911), where a résumé of an article from the "last edition" of Lisan al-Ḥal is also given.
3. CZA L2/167 (6.7.1911), [illegible], (Damas.) to "Cher Docteur" [Ruppin?], (Zionist Office, Jaffa).
4. CZA Z3/1448 (24.6.1912), Thon to ZAC.
5. Loc.cit.; cf. ha-Poʿel ha-Zaʿir, v, (1912), pp.14-15. ~~14-15~~

During and immediately after the parliamentary elections in spring 1912, the CUP closed down a number of hostile Arabic newspapers.[1] Accordingly, articles on Zionism almost ceased to appear[2] - as the newspapers which would have carried them were either suspended or apprehensive of speaking their minds. After the "Saviour Officers" had forced the Government to resign and installed a cabinet sympathetic to the Liberal Union, the Arabic press followed the same course as that remarked upon above in connection with the Turkish press: anti-CUP papers attacked the former Government violently for aiding the Zionists, while pro-CUP papers, such as al-Mishkat (in Damascus) tried to defend the Committee on this score.[3] One pro-CUP paper in Beirut - al-Naṣir - was particularly inclined to support the Zionists;[4] but it represents a special case: Rashid Ḥaddad is reported to have founded al-Naṣir after having had a quarrel with Najib Naṣṣar with whom he had collaborated on al-Karmal.[5]

It would appear therefore that Zionism was still not a question of great concern for most Arabic newspapers published

1. Ha-Ḥerut, iv, 155 (3.7.1912); cf. FO 195/2427/1988, no.21 (18.4.1912), G.P. Devey (Damascus) to Lowther.
2. CZA Z3/1448 (6.6.1912), Ruppin to ZCO; & CZA Z3/1448 (7. & 12.7.1912), Thon to ZAC.
3. Ha-Po'el ha-Ẓa'ir, vi, 1 (1912), pp.9-11.
4. For details of early pro-Zionist articles from al-Naṣir, see ha-Ḥerut, iii, 103 (12.6.1911); & L'Aurore, iii, 147 (4.8.1911). For 1912, see CZA Z3/1447 (13.2.1912), Thon to ZCO, enclosing press report with details of an article which appeared in al-Naṣir on 7.2.1912; CZA Z3/1448 (25.4.1912), Ruppin to ZAC, giving long translation of an article which appeared in al-Naṣir on 19.4.1912; CZA Z3/1448 (10.6.1912), same to ZCO, giving details of article which appeared in al-Naṣir on 30.5.1912 - cf. ha-Ḥerut, iv, 131 (5.6.1912); CZA Z3/1448 (22.7.1912), Thon to ZAC, enclosing details of article which appeared in al-Naṣir on 13.7.1912.
5. Malul, ha-'Itonut ha-'arabit, p.446.

outside Palestine. Although they were conversant with the issue, it certainly was not yet one on which they had committed themselves irrevocably. It was, rather, a matter of party politics: the opposition press hurled shafts at the Government accusing it of inclining towards the Zionists, while the minority of Arabic papers which supported the CUP tried to ward off these blows. There were certain exceptions to this rule: al-Muqtabas, al-Mufid, al-Ḥaqiqa and al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm had consciously set their courses against the "Zionist stream" in the middle of 1910 (see above, p.213), and thereafter had not deviated from this line. However, it can scarcely be fortuitous that each of these newspapers was also deeply out of sympathy with the CUP.

* * *

The attentions of the small Arabic newspapers in Palestine could never be wholly diverted from Jewish advances in the country and thus the situation in the press there was somewhat different from elsewhere. Al-Karmal supported the CUP, but at the same time was consistently outspoken against Zionism. The Zionists were defended by al-Nafir in Jerusalem;[1] but, like al-Nasir in Beirut, this paper represents

1. For details of early pro-Zionist articles from al-Nafir, see ha-Herut, i, 13 (22.6.1909); ibid. ii, 95 (25.5.1910); ibid. ii, 130 (8.8.1910); ibid. ii, 133 (16.8.1910); ibid. iii, 69 (27.3.1911); ibid. iii, 79 [= 80], (26.4.1911); ibid. iii, 83 (3.5.1911); & ibid. iii, 104 (14.6.1911). For 1912, see CZA Z3/1448 [undated and unsigned], Arabic press report for March 1912, giving details of an article written by Menasseh Meyerowitz, which had appeared in al-Nafir [date and number omitted]; cf. CZA L2/167 (10.4.1912), "Direction du Journal Annafir" [Jerus.] to M. Mairowitz [= Meyerowitz, Rishon le Zion]; & CZA L18/245/5 (20.1.1913), Thon to I. Lévy (Jerus.); cf. also ha-Herut, v, 81 (25.12.1912): letter from Ilyās Zakka [editor, al-Nafir].

a special case: it was supported financially by the Anglo-Palestine Company,[1] and for a few months during 1911 was owned by a Jew in Jerusalem.[2] Falasṭin opened in Jaffa in January 1911 with a predisposition as regards the Zionist issue, but no firm policy;[3] the development of its position is perhaps more interesting than those of al-Karmal and al-Nafir, because a "moment of decision" can be observed in it. From its inception it published anti-Zionist articles, but alongside these it also printed articles inspired[4] or submitted by Jews.[5] Being a supporter of the CUP, this paper eschewed the Zionist question during the 1912 election.[6] Thus far, Falasṭin was in no way different from most Arabic newspapers of the time. However, unlike

1. CZA L2/167 (2.8.1910), I. Lévy (Jerus.) to Thon.
2. CZA L2/167 (11.4.1911), same to same.
3. Cf. ha-Ḥerut, iii, 69 (27.3.1911): Falasṭin "still has not revealed clearly if it is for or against us".
4. In Falasṭin, i, 13 [February, 1911], space was bought (possibly by Zionists) for an article by Salim al-Ṣalaḥi which was full of statistics to prove how the Jewish settlers had benefitted the local population and the Ottoman Treasury - see ha-Ḥerut, iii, 61 (6.3.1911), where this article was reprinted; cf. also ha-Ḥerut, iii, 79 [= 80], (26.4.1911). Al-Ṣalaḥi was a Muslim who had attended a Jewish school for several years - see CZA Z2/635 (31.3.1911), Ruppin to ZCO (Cologne); shortly after this, he contributed another pro-Zionist article to al-Nafir - see ha-Ḥerut, iii, 79 [= 80], (26.4.1911).
5. Falasṭin, i, 54 (26.7.1911): pro-Zionist article (extending over two columns on the front page) by S. Frumkin; ibid. ii, 8 (7.2.1912): letter from "Ottoman Jew" opposing the proposed legislation against Jewish immigration and land purchase; and a series of articles in winter 1911 and spring 1912, entitled "Rasa'il al-fallaḥ" and signed "Abu Ibrahim", which were written by Manasseh Meyerowitz, a colonist at Rishon le Zion - see CZA Z3/1448 (6.6.1912), Ruppin to ZCO.
6. Except for the articles by Meyerowitz mentioned in the preceding note (which touched on Jewish immigration only indirectly) there was scarcely a reference to the Zionist issue in Falasṭin between January and the end of May 1912 - see Falasṭin, vol.ii, nos. 1 to 41 (January to June, 1912).

the latter, Falasṭin - as a Palestinian newspaper - was unable to remain uncommitted indefinitely. From the early summer of 1912, Falasṭin began publishing articles which soon made it clear that its editors had decided to take a firm stand against Zionism and Jewish immigration. Falasṭin's opposition to the Zionists intensified from that time onwards, until by spring 1914, Jewish observers considered that it had overtaken its master, al-Karmal (see Ch.IX).[1]

As in Haifa and Jaffa, so in Jerusalem the impact of the Jewish immigrants had inescapably made itself felt. Al-Munadi, a newspaper which began to appear in Jerusalem in spring 1912,[2] was frankly anti-Zionist from its first issues.[3] And, at this time when the attentions of the press elsewhere were almost wholly given to other matters, correspondents from Jerusalem continued to write to al-Muqtabas and al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm about Zionism.[4] In spring 1912 Muḥammad Ṣalaḥ al-Ṣamadi al-Ḥusayni of Jerusalem declared in al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm that the dangers of Jewish immigration into Palestine were ten-fold. It would lead to: Jewish settlement in places of the greatest commercial and strategic importance; the sale of the local population's houses and land; the loss of the most valuable land; the return of the Jews' money to their own pockets through

1. Ha-Herut, vi, 155 (21.4.1914).
2. An almost complete set of this newspaper (which appeared from spring 1912 until autumn 1913) is to be found in Jerusalem (Israel). It was not made available for this study.
3. Ha-Herut, iv, 80 (21.2.1912); & ibid. 89 (11.3.1912).
4. CZA Z3/1448: press report [undated and unsigned], containing details of an article written by a correspondent in Jerusalem which appeared in al-Muqtabas on 9.3.1912; re. al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm, see immediately below.

places of entertainment and the like which they would open for the Arabs; the subjection of the local population to the Jews; the spreading of discord among Arab brethren; the usurpation of all educational affairs by Zionist schools; the theft of industry and trade by Zionist banks and institutions; the defeat of the most powerful Arab leaders; and, finally, the economic control of Palestine through which political power would be generated.[1]

During 1912, the anti-Zionist newspapers in Palestine continued to harp on familiar themes, especially the question of land sales to Jews. In the winter of 1911 there was an outbreak of cholera in Haifa;[2] this, coupled with the bombarding of Beirut the following spring, disposed landowners both in Haifa and Beirut to liquidate their assets by putting their land up for sale at lower prices than usual.[3] Najib Naṣṣar complained frequently in al-Karmal against Jewish land purchases during the early part of 1912.[4] He attacked the Sursuqs in Beirut for selling land to the Zionists,[5]

1. CZA Z3/1448 (25.4.1912), Ruppin to ZAC (omitting date and number of al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm in which this article appeared).
2. CZA Z3/1447 (6.2.1912), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to "Komité zur Unterstützung Ackerbau- und Gewerbetreibender Juden in Palästina und Syrien" [Berlin].
3. CZA Z3/1448 (26.3.1912), Thon to ZAC.
4. CZA Z3/1447 (12.2.1912), same to the editors of Die Welt (Berlin), enclosing press report of an article which appeared in al-Karmal, no.206 (26.1.1912); a translation of this article also appeared in ha-Herut, iv, 89 (11.3.1912). CZA Z3/1448 (25.4.1912), Ruppin to ZAC, giving details of an article which appeared in al-Karmal, no.209 [date omitted]. Cf. also, somewhat earlier, ha-Herut, iv, 18 (2.11.1911).
5. CZA L2/167, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of an article which appeared in al-Karmal on 16.1.1912; & CZA Z3/1448 (14.4.1912), Ruppin to ZCO (Berlin), giving details of an article which appeared in the "last edition" of al-Karmal - this article was also reproduced in part in ha-Herut, iv, 116 (17.5.1912).

and also accused the Mutasarrif of Acre of illegally facilitating transfers to Jews.[1] The Mutasarrif, angered by the personal attacks made upon him, brought Naṣṣar to court in Haifa, charged with libel.[2] As on a previous occasion two years earlier (see above, p.206), Naṣṣar was acquitted "on the grounds that he had written as a true and sincere Ottoman".[3] Meanwhile, al-Munadi charged Cevdet Bey, the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, with the same offence.[4] Although the CUP removed Cevdet Bey from office for other reasons in April 1912,[5] the editor of al-Munadi could not have regretted his departure.

In addition, new themes, gradually to take on greater importance, were introduced. In 1911, Najib Naṣṣar had blamed the Jewish immigrants for the rising cost of rents and basic foodstuffs in Palestine;[6] he had also accused

1. CZA Z3/1448 (25.4.1912), Ruppin to ZAC, enclosing translation of an article which appeared in al-Karmal on 2.4.1912 and also of a second article which appeared a little later in al-Karmal, no.209 [date omitted].
2. CZA L18/246/2 (6.4.1912), J. Hankin (Haifa) to Ruppin; cf. CZA Z3/1448 (8.5.1912), Thon to ZAC, giving details of an article reporting the Mutasarrif's action which appeared in al-Haqiqa on 25.4.1912.
3. The Near East, iii, 55 (1912); cf. CZA Z3/1448 (8.5.1912), Thon to ZAC; & ha-Or, iii [xxx], 177 (17.5.1912). Then cf. later The Near East, iv, 90 (1913), p.328, reporting dismissal of Mutasarrif of Acre in January 1913 because of charges that he had sold land to Jews; Najib Naṣṣar is mentioned in connection with these charges.
4. CZA Z3/1448 (25.4.1912), Ruppin to ZAC, giving details of an article which appeared in al-Munadi on 20.4.1912.
5. Cevdet Bey was removed from office in April 1912 for resisting pressure to arrange the elections in Jerusalem - see FO 195/2389/2342, no.47 (7.5.1912), Satow to Lowther.
6. Ha-Herut, iii, 48 (8.2.1911), & ibid. 121/22 (19.7.1911). It was also reported in the summer of 1911 that Naṣṣar had tried to organise a society to arrange an economic boycott of the Jews, but that he had met with little

Cont'd p.298 .....

them of being economically exclusive. In 1912 these charges were repeated by Falastin.[1] The area of the Jews' exclusiveness was gradually extended by Falastin, first to Jewish society,[2] and then to their schools as well, by conducting a long campaign to prove that very few Arab children studied at the Miqve Yisrael agricultural school, contrary to the terms of the firman which had permitted this establishment to open in 1870.[3] Al-Munadi was disturbed at the numbers of Jews who spoke Hebrew,[4] and demanded that these Jews become Ottoman subjects.[5] Al-Ra'y al-'Amm called for Muslim unity - because only when God's and the Government's help were linked with Muslim unity could the Zionist danger be combatted.[6] Falastin's Greek Orthodox editors also urged unity - not of the Muslims, but of all Palestinians.[7] For its part, al-Munadi decried the local population's

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success because the Jews paid too well - see ha-Po'el ha-Za'ir, iv, 22 (1911), pp.12-13. The real reason for this rising cost of living lay not with the Jews but with the weakness of the Ottoman Treasury and other economic factors far removed from Palestine.

1. Falastin, ii, 39 (29.5.1912); & ibid. 41 (5.6.1912).
2. Ibid. ii, 39 (29.5.1912); & ibid. 41 (5.6.1912); cf. ha-Or, iii [xxx], 212 (28.6.1912), reporting a similar charge which had appeared in al-Akhbar (Jaffa).
3. Falastin, ii, 60 (10.8.1912); ibid. 67 (3.9.1912); ibid. 69 (11.9.1912); ibid. 73 (25.9.1912); ibid. 75 (2.10.1912); ibid. 76 (5.10.1912).
4. CZA Z3/1448 (7.7.1912), Thon to ZAC, reporting about an article in al-Munadi, but omitting to give the date and number of the issue; cf. Falastin, ii, 66 (31.8.1912).
5. Al-Munadi (8.10.1912), reported in CZA L2/167 (17.10.1912), Thon to ZAC.
6. Al-Ra'y al-'Amm (1.6.1912), reported in CZA Z3/1448 (10.6.1912), Ruppin to ZCO; & al-Ra'y al-'Amm, no.666, reported in CZA Z3/1448 (26.7.1912), Thon to ZAC.
7. Falastin, ii, 66 (31.8.1912).

"moral decline"; this, the paper claimed, was reflected in the Palestinians' willingness to sell everything for a "mess of pottage".[1] These papers also began to engage in personal attacks: al-Munadi jibed at Albert Antébi;[2] Falastin made Nissim Malul the subject of a protracted assault;[3] it also criticised Zionists who contributed articles to al-Muqattam;[4] and al-Karmal supported Falastin when the latter took up arms against ha-Herut.[5]

* * *

The influence of the Arabic press may always be challenged as most newspapers had only limited circulation and the vast majority of Arabs was illiterate. But the point surely is that the leadership of the Arab world at this time was drawn almost exclusively from a small number of powerful families which provided an educated élite - and these leaders certainly read the Arabic press. Moreover, in the present connection, the function of the press is as important as its influence: these newspapers were a medium through which Arab arguments against Zionism were worked out and developed; and, further, they were a vehicle by which Arabs far beyond the borders of Palestine were made familiar with the Zionist issue. And, for all this, it would appear that the press's influence among the masses is not to be

1. Al-Munadi (8.10.1912), reported in CZA L2/167 (17.10.1912), Thon to ZAC.
2. Ibid. (12.3.1912), reported in CZA Z3/1448, press report [undated and unsigned].
3. Falastin, ii, 67 (3.9.1912); ibid. 73 (25.9.1912), [two articles, pp.2-3 & p.3].
4. Ibid. ii, 92 (30.11.1912); & ibid. 99 (25.12.1912).
5. Ibid. ii, 97 (17.12.1912); & ibid. 100 (27.12.1912).

underestimated. In August 1911, the director of the Alliance Israélite Universelle's school in Haifa observed that local Muslims, being little educated, believed al-Karmal's allegations implicitly and associated themselves with the paper's point of view.[1] Hence by the end of 1911 the British Consul-General in Beirut could report that "the local fellaheen in general ... regard the steady influx of Jews as a menace to their own rights and privileges ...".[2] In January 1912, Dr. Shimon Muyal wrote to Dr. Ruppin of the Zionist Office in Jaffa drawing his attention to "the spirit of enmity which has begun to gain a foothold among the masses [in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem] because of the influence of the antagonistic press".[3] One month later the Jerusalem correspondent of The Near East observed that the local population's interest in politics was "remarkable"; village "politicians" were often to be seen discussing articles from al-Ahram and al-Muqaṭṭam:[4] "Undoubtedly the people are beginning to think for themselves".[5]

One final point should perhaps be made in discussing the Arabic press. From time to time, Falasṭin and al-Karmal would quote statements made in the European press by Zionist leaders.[6] However, it is clear that certain Arabs (especially

1. AIU I.C. 1-2 (8.8.1911), I. Nahon (Haifa) to Pres., AIU.
2. FO 371/1263/47157, no.64 (6.11.1911), Cumberbatch to Lowther.
3. CZA L2/167 (15.1.1912), S. Muyal (Jaffa) to Ruppin.
4. The Near East, v, N.S.77 (1912), p.462. 5. Loc.cit.
6. E.g. Falasṭin, i, 63 (26.8.1911), quoting Dr. Max Nordau from "The Mail"; CZA Z3/1448 (19.5.1912), Ruppin to ZAC, reporting that al-Karmal (date and number omitted) had quoted Nordau from The Daily Telegraph and an interview between a correspondent of El Tiempo and David Wolffsohn; Falasṭin, ii, 77 (9.10.1912), quoting Professor Otto Warburg and Dr. Jehiel Tschlenow from The Manchester Guardian; & Falasṭin, iii, 2 (18.1.1913), quoting Nordau from The Times.

Christians) in Jerusalem were not satisfied with these occasional snippets from Zionist sources. In January 1912 the Zionist Executive received a report from a representative in Jerusalem who stated that:

> "Die hiesigen Deutschen und christl.[sic] Araber verfolgen mit gespanntester Aufmerksamkeit jede von zionistischer Seite ausgehende Bewegung. Ein grosser Teil von ihnen ist auf die 'Welt' abonniert, in meiner Buchhandlung sind sie die besten Abnehmer für jedwede zionistische Literatur ..."[1]

Over a year earlier, an unnamed Arab deputy to the Ottoman Parliament had told a correspondent of The Truth (an English language newspaper in Jerusalem) that:

> "Were it not for the impolitic clamour of the Zionists; their platforming; their abnormal scribbling and pamphleteering, it would never have entered our thoughts to prevent our cousins, the Jews [,] from finding amongst us a safe asylum from their heartrending persecutions and eternal vicissitudes".[2]

The problem was by no means as simple as this, but there was undoubtedly a measure of truth in the contention that the Arabs learnt about the Zionist Movement and its aims through endless statements and publications by Zionists themselves. These were brought to the local population's attention by the Arabic press and, indeed, the most educated among the Arabs read them themselves in the original.

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1. CZA Z3/969 (22.1.1912), L. Meier (Jerus.) to ZAC.
2. The Truth (9.12.1910), [number unknown, cutting enclosed in CZA Z2/19]. The correspondent signed himself "Jaffez" and, from the context, the deputy whom he interviewed was probably one of the three representing the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem. Cf. also Levontin, Le'erez, ii, 183.

Muhdi Bey

As the press in Palestine became more vocal in expressing its antagonism towards the Zionists, so tensions between Arab and Jew grew. Relations were particularly bad in Haifa and the Kaza of Tiberias.[1] On June 14th, 1911 a demonstration was held in Haifa against the Cretans who had been striving for union with Greece. At it Najib Naṣṣar used "vituperative language against the Jews settled in Haifa and Palestine in general".[2] A Jew named Solomon Bezoglou "imprudently interrupted him saying that he would cause dissenssion [sic] among the communities by his talk".[3] Bezoglou was applauded by the crowd, but ʿAbd Allah Mukhliṣ, an associate of Naṣṣar and later the proprietor of al-Karmal, asserted that Bezoglou, as a British subject, had no right to talk; he so excited the mob that, according to the British Vice-Consul in Haifa, had the military authorities not stepped in, Bezoglou would have been killed.[4] Bezoglou was arrested and at his trial on the following day it was clear to the British Vice-Consul that the sympathies of the President of the Criminal Court lay with Naṣṣar; the Public Prosecutor, however, would not allow that there were grounds for Bezoglou's arrest, and the latter was released at the demand of his Vice-Consul.[5] This petty incident was exaggerated by Naṣṣar in

1. For comments on the deterioration in relations in Haifa, see ha-Herut, iii, 3 (28.10.1910); cf. also ha-Herut, iii, 130 (7.8.1911); for conditions in the Kaza of Tiberias, see immediately below.
2. FO 195/2371, no.41 (24.6.1911), Cumberbatch to C.M. Marling (Consple.).
3. FO 195/2371, encl. to no.41, being no.28 (14.6.1911), P. Abela (Haifa) to Cumberbatch.
4. Loc.cit.
5. Loc.cit.

al-Karmal,[1] and also provided a pretext for the CUP branch in Haifa to send four protest telegrams to Constantinople: against Bezoglou, the British Vice-Consul, the Public Prosecutor and the Zionists.[2]

During the two-year period after the deaths of Korngold and Melamed at Sejera (see above, p.177), five more Jewish settlers were killed and two others were severely wounded by Arab peasants. All these incidents took place in the Kaza of Tiberias where there were six Jewish colonies, with a combined population of about two hundred families.[3] Surrounded by hills, this kaza was geographically isolated; the town of Tiberias, more than two hundred feet below sea-level, suffered from an unpleasant climate which discouraged Ottoman officials of worth from remaining there long or even from coming at all.[4] The Kaymakam, Ertuğrul Şakir Effendi, had been appointed shortly after the Young Turk Revolution; among the Jews he had a reputation of being lazy, corrupt and ill-disposed.[5] He had, however, tried to apply some principles of the Constitution - with the unfortunate result

1. Ha-Herut, iii, 106/7 (19.6.1911); & ibid. 112/13 (28.6.1911), where extracts are reproduced from an article, entitled "What happened: affairs requiring alertness and attention", which had appeared in al-Karmal [date and number omitted].
2. Ha-Herut, iii, 113/14 (30.6.1911), where it is also reported that al-Mufid, al-Ra'y al-'Amm, al-Himara and al-Muqtabas had followed al-Karmal's lead in publishing inflamed articles on the Bezoglou incident.
3. CZA L2/50/I [no signature, n.d. (ca. end 1911)], "Note sur l'état d'insécurité dont souffre la population israélite agricole dans les [sic] Caza de Tibériade". Internal evidence suggests that this "Note" was an "up-dated" copy of a memorandum or petition originally presented to Sami Paşa al-Faruki in July 1911 - see below, p.305.
4. CZA L2/50/I, "Note".
5. Loc.cit.; cf. JCA 271/no.324 (17.7.1911), E. Krause (Sejera) to JCA (Paris); & ha-Herut, iii, 121 (19.7.1911).

(according to Krause at Sejera) that public security became weaker than it had been under the old régime.[1] Thus, for example, by maintaining the principle that an Ottoman subject's abode was inviolable, the police were prevented from entering houses where wanted men were suspected to be in hiding and village shaykhs no longer felt obliged to deliver up the suspects.[2] The CUP branch in Tiberias, mentioned in Chapter IV as harbouring anti-Government elements, still functioned;[3] and Najib Naṣṣar is reported to have visited his native town of Tiberias regularly to propagandise against the Jewish settlers,[4] who consequently suffered more than any other group in the Kaza.[5] Of the five Jews who were killed during this period, two died because of personal quarrels, one was waylaid and two were murdered for unknown reasons.[6] In one case, a single Arab was found guilty of murder and sentenced to goal, but this in absentia; in all the other instances, the authorities took no action.[7]

The negligence of the authorities in Tiberias and the venality of the court in Acre scarcely disposed the peasants to respect the law.[8] At the beginning of July 1911 peasants from ash Shajara set fire to a granary belonging to Solomon Albo, a farmer at Sejera; their reasons for doing so were not known to Krause who reported the incident.[9] Albo had resided in the area even before the founding of Sejera;

1. JCA 271/no.308 (25.7.1910), Krause to JCA.
2. Loc.cit. 3. CZA L2/50/I, "Note".
4. Ha-Poʿel ha-Ẓaʿir, iv, 22 [n.d. (ca. 6.9.1911)].
5. CZA L2/50/I, "Note". 6. Loc.cit.
7. Loc.cit. 8. Loc.cit.
9. JCA 271/no.324 (17.7.1911), Krause to JCA.

he complained to the authorities in Tiberias, who (perhaps believing that some exemplary action was by now called for) arrested twelve peasants.[1] On July 13th, Albo was shot through the doorway of his house and sustained two bullet wounds.[2] Three days later, Żebi Bortnovsky, a Jewish guard on the settlement, was attacked during the night; he died shortly afterwards from his wounds.[3] The colonies in the area sent a delegation to complain against the insecurity in the Kaza to the Mutasarrif of Acre, the Vali of Beirut and Sami Paşa al-Faruki who was still engaged in his disciplinary expedition against Druzes in the Hauran and Arabs in Karak.[4] The delegation was unable to see either the Vali or Sami Paşa, who were both indisposed;[5] however, they did receive an assurance from the latter of the Government's determination to re-establish order in the Kaza.[6] In September a detachment of ten soldiers was stationed on Sejera. Krause reported that this action was quite unprecedented and that it had had an "excellent effect" upon the peasants in the region. The latter had been obliged to deliver up Ṭalal ibn Faris ʿAbd al-Raḥman, who had been accused of setting fire to Albo's granary and of murdering Bortnovsky.[7] The peasants had not yet handed over the

1. JCA 271/no.324 (17.7.1911), Krause to JCA.
2. Loc.cit.
3. Loc.cit.; cf. CZA Z2/636 (17. & 18.7.1911), Ruppin to ZAC (Cologne).
4. JCA 271/no.325 (31.7.1911), Krause to JCA; the "Note" in CZA L2/50/I is probably an "up-dated" copy of a memorandum taken by this delegation to Sami Paşa.
5. JCA 271/no.325; Sami Paşa died in August 1911 - see FO 195/2425/1687, no.27 (7.4.1912), E.E. Tyrrell (Consple.) to Lowther.
6. JCA 271/no.325.
7. JCA 271/no.328 (17.9.1911), Krause to JCA.

other principal culprits, one of whom, Salim ibn Ibrahim Jiryis, had wounded Albo on July 13th.[1] Krause predicted that if the soldiers prolonged their stay, they would probably arrest these men, thereby greatly enhancing security in the area, because Ṭalal ibn Faris ʿAbd al-Raḥman and his companions were chiefly responsible for the crimes against the colonists in Sejera.[2]

However, the effect of the soldiers' presence was no more than transitory. No further arrests were made and Ṭalal ibn Faris was not brought to trial.[3] A year later, in September 1912, Krause reported that the local officials were so corrupt that they had forfeited even more of their authority and that those among the local population, who had surrendered their arms to Sami Paşa al-Faruki a year before, had now replaced them with better ones.[4]

The Ottoman authorities' inaction in cases of Arab crimes against Jews contrasted vividly with action taken in cases of Arab misdemeanours against German Templars or in those where a Jew wronged an Arab. In July 1910 a Templar named Fritz Ungar was killed by Arabs near Haifa. In deference to Germany, an Ottoman naval vessel was commissioned to convey the Vali of Beirut to Haifa to conduct an investigation immediately,[5] and in February 1911 the court at Beirut condemned one Arab to death, another to fifteen years and six

1. JCA 271/no.328 (17.9.1911), Krause to JCA.
2. Loc.cit. 3. CZA L2/50/I, "Note".
4. JCA 271/no.340 (10.9.1912), Krause to JCA; cf. JCA 271/no.346 (29.9.1912), same to same.
5. FO 195/2342, no. 39(22.7.1911), H.W. Young (Beirut) to Lowther.

others to four years in gaol.[1] In spring 1911, shortly after the Jewish settlement of Merhavya was established at Fula, one of the colonists, Ezekiel Nissanhoff, was killed in broad daylight on the road between Beit Gan and Sarona by peasants from that village who stole his mules. His murderer was arrested but released a few days later;[2] and although some time afterwards he was again taken into custody at Acre, he still had not been brought to trial by the end of 1911.[3] About three months after Nissanhoff's death, a guard on Merhavya, Mordecai Yigael, was attacked during the night by a group of Arabs and he killed one of his assailants, Sa'id al-Dabab, the son of a respected shaykh from the nearby village of Sulam.[4] The authorities did little to prevent fellaheen from Sulam and the neighbouring villages of 'Afula and Zir'in [?] from pillaging the colony,[5] or to stop a further act of reprisal by other fellaheen from Sulam who raided Mas-ha, a settlement not far to the north-east of their village.[6] Instead, they arrested Yigael and ten other Jews from Merhavya who had not been

1. Ha-Herut, iii, 53 (17.2.1911).
2. CZA L2/50/I, "Note"; cf. CZA KKL3/109/5 [5.3.1911], I. Shochat (Haifa) to Ruppin.
3. CZA L2/50/I, "Note".
4. The dead Arab's name was found in a cutting from an unindentified newspaper (date and number also omitted), kept in CZA L18/275. The name was rendered in French as "Said-ed-Debab".
5. Loc.cit. & CZA Z2/636 (3.6.1911), Ruppin to ZAC, where the peasants are reported to have come from "Solem", "Aphule" and "Serai". No village of "Serai" can be identified. However, Ruppin knew no Arabic and it is most probable that he misheard "Zir'in" (a village to the south of Merhavya) and transcribed it, in German, as "Serai".
6. JCA 271/no.324 (17.7.1911), Krause to JCA; & CZA L2/50/I, "Note".

present when al-Dabab was killed.[1] Four of these were released a few days later, but the others were held for four months in Nazareth and seven months in Acre.[2] The deputy from Acre, Shaykh As'ad Shuqayr, was a friend of Joshua Hankin, the Jewish land-agent. In 1911, Shaykh As'ad broke a leg and Hankin sent him a Dr. Dolchansky, who successfully reset the fracture.[3] In gratitude, Shaykh As'ad intervened on behalf of the seven Jews imprisoned at Acre and secured their release at the end of April 1912.[4]

* * *

As mentioned above, Cevdet Bey was dismissed from his post at Mutasarrif of Jerusalem in April 1912. After a short interregnum the CUP appointed Muhdi Bey to fill the vacant post. Muhdi Bey was described as an Albanian "of some intelligence and education".[5] Before coming to Jerusalem he had been Mutasarrif of Samsun,[6] and was a strong supporter of the CUP,[7] even though he took up office in Jerusalem a few days after the CUP Cabinet was forced to resign by the Saviour Officers.

For some two years before his arrival negotiations between Jerusalem and Constantinople ~~were being~~ had been conducted

1. CZA Z2/636 (3.6.1911), Ruppin to ZAC.
2. I. Betzer, "Parashat 'Um Juni' we-kibbush Merhavyah", in Habbas, Sefer ha-'aliyyah ha-sheniyyah, pp.416-17. (The details in this account - written many years after the event - do not entirely agree with the contemporary documents.)
3. Loc.cit.; & CZA Z3/1448 (21.5.1912), Ruppin to ZAC (Berlin).
4. CZA L18/246/2 (25.4.1912), Hankin to Ruppin.
5. FO 195/2425/3806, no.62 (31.7.1912), P.J.C. McGregor (Jerus.) to Marling.
6. Loc.cit.
7. FO 195/2452/621, no.8 (29.1.1913), same to Lowther.

regarding the establishment of an Ottoman agricultural school near Ramle.[1] About a week after coming to Jerusalem, Muhdi Bey was invited by Albert Antébi to visit 'Artuf where it had been proposed that an experimental tree farm should be opened.[2] Antébi also suggested that Muhdi Bey visit other Jewish colonies to see how they functioned as well as to find a site for the Ottoman agricultural school.[3] Muhdi Bey accepted this invitation and set out on his tour of inspection on August 6th, accompanied by Ḥusayn al-Ḥusayni (now President of the Municipal Council in Jerusalem), Albert Antébi and others.

The party spent the night at Rishon le Zion, having passed through Nes Tsiyona and Rehovot on the way.[4] On the morning of August 7th, Muhdi Bey and his entourage inspected a site at Nabi Rubin (on the Mediterranean coast, south and west of Rishon le Zion) which had been mentioned as a possible location for the agricultural school. In the afternoon the party returned to Rishon le Zion, where a gathering was held of representatives from all the Jewish colonies in the area. At this gathering Muhdi Bey made a speech which caused an outcry among the Arabs.

Several versions of this speech exist, all of which

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1. Ha-Ḥerut, iv, 180 (2.8.1912).
2. Loc.cit.
3. Loc.cit.
4. For accounts of Muhdi Bey's "tour", see ha—Or, iii [xxx], 249 (12.8.1912); & ibid. 252 (15.8.1912); also ha-Ḥerut, iv, 187 (11.8.1912); ibid. 188 (12.8.1912); & ibid. 191 (15.8.1912).

supplement and corroborate one another.[1] Perhaps the most important - and the least complete - version was the first one to be published. It appeared in The Truth on August 9th, whence it was reproduced in ha-Herut and in a number of Arabic newspapers, including al-Munadi,[2] al-Karmal,[3] al-Muqtabas[4] and al-ʿAṣa Liman ʿAṣa (Haifa).[5] According to this version, Muhdi Bey denied that the Government objected to Zionism; the Government knew that the "holy associations" of Palestine attracted the Jews to the country - therefore the Government had "no reason to oppose Zionism"; on the contrary, the Government rejoiced to see Jewish progress in Palestine - "you [Jewish settlers] are an object lesson to your native neighbours, who can neither read nor write, that they may see the great possibilities of the land".[6] To make the colonies more secure, Muhdi Bey is reported to have said:

> "Choose from among yourselves a municipal head, whose appointment will be ratified by the Government, to administer justice and execute judgement according to the rules and regulations of the Ottoman provinces.
>
> "You will have to appoint guards and gendarmerie whose names will be registered in the books of the local government which will provide them with uniforms and all necessary accoutrements and invest them with authority.

1. The Truth, iii, 127 (9.8.1912); ha-Herut, iv, 187 (11.8.1912); ha-Or, iii [xxx], 249 (12.8.1912); & ibid. 252 (15.8.1912); & Dinur, ha-Haganah, I, i, 183.
2. Q d'O N.S. 134, no.57 (2.9.1912), A. Guy (Jerus.) to Min. of Foreign Affairs (Paris); & ha-Or, iii [xxx], 253 (16.8.1912).
3. Ha-Poʿel ha-Ṣaʿir, vi, 2 (1912), p.9.
4. Loc.cit.
5. Ha-Or, iii [xxx], 264 (29.8.1912).
6. The Truth, iii, 127 (9.8.1912).

"You must also install telephonic communication between colony and colony - village and village, so that any attack or outrage may at once be notified at headquarters and the marauders be apprehended and punished.

....

"For my part, I will try to put you in possession of the sandhills bordering on the seashore and give you legal title-deeds for the same.

"A part of it I will allot you for a capacious Government Building which will serve as your central administrative premises ".[1]

A few days later, a fuller and probably more authentic version of this speech appeared in ha—Or;[2] in 1945 the version preserved in Rishon le Zion's records was published in a jubilee volume dedicated to the colony.[3] Both these versions, together with an interview with Albert Antébi in ha—Or on August 28th, 1912, make Muhdi Bey's speech more intelligible.[4]

Since the Young Turk Revolution there had been no serious disturbances in the Mutasarrif*lik* of Jerusalem between the local population and the Jewish newcomers. Minor incidents, such as thefts and battery at the hands of robbers, were not infrequent but, it must be emphasised, these irritations were no different from those suffered by all segments of the rural population in the Mutasarriflik.[5]

1. The Truth, iii, 127 (9.8.1912).
2. Ha—Or, iii [xxx], 252 (15.8.1912).
3. Sefer yobel le-Rishon le-Ziyyon (Rishon le Zion, ~~1945~~ *1941*), p.405, reproduced in Dinur, ha-Hagganah, I, i, 183.
4. Ha—Or, iii [xxx], 263 (28.8.1912).
5. Thus, in the summer of 1909, Afghani guards (non-Jewish) at Migve Yisrael shot dead two Arab thieves from the nearby village of Yazur, provoking an attack by Yazur peasants in reprisal - see ISA (G) A III 1, ii, no.51/971 (10.7.1909), Rössler (Jaffa) to Reichskanzler (Berlin); cf. ha-Herut, i, 18 (9.7.1909), where only one Arab from Yazur is reported to have been killed.

Cont'd p.312 .....

However, after reports of the second debate on Zionism in the Chamber reached Palestine, there were signs that this outward calm in the Mutasarriflik was beginning to break. In October 1911 rumours that members of al-Ḥizb al-Waṭani al-ʿUthmani in Jaffa (see above, pp.269-71) intended to launch a planned assault on Jews in the town were persistent enough for the Mutasarrif to alert the Kaymakam of Jaffa and to send high police officers from Jerusalem to Jaffa.[1] In the same month, a carter from Petah Tiqva had been killed by robbers on the road to Jaffa; in spring 1912 a farmer at Beer Tuvya also was killed; and in the summer a Jewish guard on Rishon le Zion was murdered by Arab guards on the colony.[2] In November 1911, colonists at Beer Tuvya had been attacked on their land;[3] thereafter, thefts and the uprooting of saplings on Jewish settlements also became more frequent.[4]

When Muhdi Bey passed through Nes Tsiyona on August 6th, he asked the colonists if they had any requests to put to him; in reply, they requested that the local government should take more determined steps to protect their lives and property.[5] Before Muhdi Bey spoke at Rishon le Zion, a

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Saplings were occasionally reported to have been uprooted on Jewish colonies - see e.g. ha-Zebi, xxvi, 15 (17.10.1909); & ha—Or, ii [xxvii], 3 (10.10.1910). At the end of 1910 a Yemenite Jew who worked on Rehovot died from wounds inflicted by a well-known bandit, a certain Abu ʿIsa - see ha—Or, ii [xxvii], 3 (10.10.1910).

1. AIU X. E. 29 (13.10.1911), Antébi to A. Bril et al.(Jaffa).
2. Ha—Or, iii [xxx], 263 (28.8.1912).
3. Ha-Ḥerut, iv, 32 (24.11.1911).
4. CZA L2/420 (12.2.1912), D. Lubman (Rishon le Zion) to Ruppin.
5. Ha—Or, iii [xxx], 249 (12.8.1912).

representative of all the Jewish colonies in the area submitted the same request to him.[1] His speech was essentially a reply to the Jews' demand for greater personal security.

It seems clear that Muhdi Bey had studied law; indeed, he was the author of a work on the Capitulations.[2] Accordingly, in his speech he emphasised loyalty to the Empire and compliance with the laws.[3] He began by exhorting the Jews to work for the unity and progress of the Empire. On Zionism, it seems, he resorted to casuistry: how, he asked, could the Government oppose a movement which it did not recognise? He regretted that the new régime had not yet made certain reforms which undoubtedly were necessary, but meanwhile he referred his listeners to some old statutes which were still in force and which were designed to protect the individual, since the policing of the Empire had always been inadequate. Every permanent group of two-hundred or more families was required by law to constitute itself as a township. Townships enjoyed certain privileges, among which were the rights to elect a muhtar and a council of five to ten elders and also to appoint "policemen of the second grade" who were recognised by the local authorities. These "policemen of the second grade" received uniforms and arms and performed their duties under the orders of the district chief of police.[4] This, Muhdi Bey pointed out, was what was required by law, but it was all contingent upon the Jews becoming Ottoman

1. Ha-Or, iii [xxx], 263 (28.8.1912).
2. FO 195/2452 (31.7.1912), McGregor to Marling.
3. The following analysis is based on the accounts cited above, p.311, ~~n.3.~~ notes 2-4.
4. Cf. Young, Corps, i, 47-88: especially p.84, Art.2; p.59, Art.60; & p.68, Art.109.

subjects; he therefore concluded by appealing to the settlers to adopt Ottoman nationality.

Presented in this fashion, Muhdi Bey's speech was not as controversial as it must have sounded from the account which appeared in The Truth. The laws which Muhdi Bey referred to were not unknown in Palestine either to the Arab population or the Jewish settlers. In fact, some of the larger colonies in the Mutasarriflik had been constituted as independent villages with their own muhtars in 1902 (previously having been linked for administrative purposes with the nearest town - Jaffa, Ramle or Gaza);[1] and, as recently as May 1912, the Haham Başi of Jaffa, Rabbi Ben Zion Ouziel, had written to the Zionist Office in that town to impress upon it the need to instal muhtars in every Jewish colony in accordance with the law.[2]

Muhdi Bey may have had legal justification for what he suggested, but why did he make this speech at all, especially as it clearly was unauthorised (since the former CUP Cabinet would not have sanctioned it any more than the new Cabinet)? And why did Muhdi Bey express himself in terms which seem almost calculated to offend - as, for example, when he declared that the Jewish settlers were an "object lesson" to their illiterate neighbours? The timing of this speech is significant in two respects and probably provides in large part the answer to both these questions. First, although

1. A.M. Luncz (ed.), Luʿah erez yisraʾel, vol.viii (1902), p.113; cf. M. Burstein, Self-Government of the Jews in Palestine since 1900 (Tel Aviv, 1934), pp.205-6.
2. CZA L2/69 (3.5.1912), B.Z. Ouziel (Jaffa) to Zionist Office (Jaffa).

a supporter of the CUP, Muhdi Bey was also described by the British Consul in Jerusalem as an Albanian patriot.[1] He must surely have been heartened by the Albanian rebel successes at that time which had contributed to the change of government (and then forced the new Government to yield to the rebels' demands in mid-August).[2] According to ha-Or's version, Muhdi Bey had let slip a hint of this, for he was reported to have said that all groups in the Empire, be they Turks, Arabs, Albanians or Jews, must be allowed to develop spiritually.[3] Secondly, Muhdi Bey had been in office for just a fortnight when he made this speech. He had come from a post in Samsun, a province on the Black Sea coast, far removed from Palestine and its problems. He could not yet have sensed the temper of the local population concerning the Zionist question nor the interest with which they followed all pronouncements, especially official ones, on the subject.

The version of Muhdi Bey's speech which reached the Arabic press sounded as though the Jews in Palestine had been granted special privileges of self-administration and self-protection. No lesser a personage than the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem had declared that the Government was not opposed to Zionism; he had promised the Jews land for an administrative centre and had committed a number of other faux pas. Little wonder therefore that within a month considerable pressure was put upon the Government by the Arabs and the anti-CUP

1. FO 195/2452 (29.1.1913), McGregor to Lowther.
2. Cf. R.W. Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (London, 1917), pp.138-9.
3. Ha-Or, iii [xxx], 252 (15.8.1912).

press in Constantinople to remove Muhdi Bey from office.[1] In the middle of September it was announced in Ikdam that Muhdi Bey was to be replaced by Mahmud Sadik Bey, a Liberal Union journalist who had been educated in Berlin and who had at one time headed the government secretariat in Jerusalem.[2] In 1912 he was a staff-writer for Sabah in Constantinople;[3] Ahmed Emin called him "one of the ablest Turkish journalists";[4] while the Jewish Chronicle remarked that his anti-Jewish articles were well known and that he could "justly be styled a Mohammedan Rochefort".[5] There were protests at Mahmud Sadik Bey's appointment from supporters of the CUP in Jerusalem,[6] and after a little vacillation the Minister of Internal Affairs decided to retain Muhdi Bey at his post for the time being.[7]

* * *

Feeling in the Mutasarriflik could not have been pacified by the actions of the local authorities in the following weeks who were reported to have been less "zealous" in applying the restrictions against land sales to Jews,[8] or by the transfer of the coastal land between Rishon le Zion and the sea to the colony in fulfilment of the promise which Muhdi Bey had made in his speech there.[9] In October, with the

1. CZA Z3/44 (23.9.1912), Neufach to ZCO (Berlin).
2. Q d'O N.S. 134, no.60 (20.9.1912), Guy to Min. of Foreign Affairs (Paris); cf. CZA Z3/44 (23.9.1912); & also ha-Herut, v, 2 (16.9.1912); & ibid. 6 (20.9.1912).
3. CZA Z3/44 (23.9.1912).
4. Emin, The Development of Modern Turkey, p.109.
5. Jewish Chronicle, no.2,268 (20.9.1912).
6. Q d'O N.S. 134, no.60 (20.9.1912).
7. CZA Z3/44 (23.9.1912).
8. The Truth, iii, 129 (23.8.1912).
9. Dinur, ha-Hagannah, I, i, 184.

outbreak of the Balkan War, the agitation against the Jewish settlers in the Mutasarriflik increased; Arab opponents of the ~~Jews~~ Zionists exploited the facts that most of the latter were Russians and that Russia, the "hereditary enemy" of the Ottoman Empire, was believed to have instigated the Balkan War.[1] The argument was then developed that Russia was responsible for Ottoman losses in the Balkans; her attentions would now be turned to Palestine.[2]

At the end of September, Dr. Jacobson in Constantinople learned that the Government had received many inquiries about its position regarding land sales to Jews.[3] A month later, Muhdi Bey received notification from Constantinople that a limited quantity of land at Dilb (see above, p.280-1) could be transferred to the names of two Ottoman Jews.[4] However, from then onwards, Ottoman Jews buying land were to sign a declaration, guaranteeing that they would not instal Jewish immigrants on the land;[5] and, moreover, arable land was not to be transferred to any Ottoman Jews who did not themselves engage in agriculture.[6] In addition, orders were received from the Grand Vezir and the Minister of Internal Affairs, prohibiting absolutely the entry and

1. JCA 268/no.206 (3.11.1912), Antébi to Pres., JCA, (Paris).
2. Cf. CZA Z3/115, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of an article which appeared in al-Muqtabas on 29.1.1913; this article was drawn from an earlier number of al-Ra'y al-'Amm - loc.cit.
3. CZA Z3/1513 (27. & 30.9.1912), Jacobson to ZAC.
4. JCA 268/no.205 (27.10.1912), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
5. Previously foreign subjects alone had been required to sign this declaration - see above, p.51; and this practice had been abolished in 1909 - see above, p.161.
6. JCA 268/no.205 (27.10.1912).

settlement of Jewish immigrants in Palestine as well as the sale of land to foreigners.[1] In response to these communications Muhdi Bey sent out a circular (probably on October 28th), in which he exceeded his orders by instructing the Director of the Cadastre and all the Kaymakams in the Mutasarriflik not to permit the sale of any rural land to Ottoman Jews, even if they were farmers; henceforth, Ottoman Jews could only acquire urban buildings for their own use.[2]

Albert Antébi (who had become a close friend of Muhdi Bey[3]) reported that many deputations of local notables had approached the Mutasarrif "pour nuire et médire contre nous";[4] these had included ʿUthman al-Nashashibi,[5] Ḥusayn al-Khalidi,[6] Najib Bey Abu Ṣuwan (a Latin Catholic lawyer),[7] an unnamed consul[8] and others.[9] According to Antébi, the supporters of the CUP in Jerusalem had taken "l'antisémitisme pour bannière".[10] The influence of the local notables can

1. JCA 268/encl. to no.206 (1.11.1912), Antébi to Starkmeth.
2. JCA 268/encl. to no.206, being Circular, no.467 [date omitted], Muhdi Bey (Jerus.) to the Director of the Cadastre and the Kaymakams. No mention of this circular was made in Antébi's letter to Paris of 27.10.1912; Starkmeth, however, referred to this circular in a letter which he sent to Antébi on 29.10.1912 (also enclosed with JCA 268/no.206). Therefore it may be assumed that Muhdi Bey issued his circular on 28.10.1912.
3. Smilanski, Rehobot, p.68.
4. JCA 268/encl. to no.206 (1.11.1912), Antébi to Starkmeth.
5. Loc.cit. Antébi speaks simply of "Naschashibi", without giving a first name. Later, in the same letter, Antébi mentions Raghib al-Nashashibi, but in a different connection. Another enclosure to JCA 268/no.206, also dated 1.11.1912, from M. Meirovitch [Meyerowitz], (Rishon le Zion) to Antébi, speaks of Muhdi Bey yielding to the "'Osmans' et comp.", thus suggesting that ʿUthman al-Nashashibi was responsible for part of the pressure upon Muhdi Bey.
6. JCA 268/encl. to no.206 (1.11.1912), Antébi to Starkmeth.
7. JCA 268/encl. to no.206 (30.10.1912), same to same.
8. Loc.cit.
9. Loc.cit.; cf. ha-Herut, v, 44 (12.11.1912).
10. JCA 268/encl. to no.206 (30.10.1912), Antébi to Starkmeth.

be felt in Muhdi Bey's circular. In the preamble, the Jews in Palestine were divided into two groups: "the first are the old inhabitants who have never devoted themselves to agriculture; ..., the second come from foreign parts, especially from Russia".[1] The latter were prohibited from staying more than three months in the country and consequently were not allowed to acquire land; Ottoman Jews, who were in no way connected with agriculture, had to be prevented from buying land for the sole purpose of installing Jewish immigrants.[2] When interviewed by one of the editors of ha-Herut, Muhdi Bey admitted that he had issued this circular on his own initiative and defended his action, characteristically, in legal terms - the old restrictions were still in force; he was neither a legislator nor a Sultan; his job was to ensure that the laws were obeyed.[3] To this end, Muhdi Bey also ordered the Kaymakam of Jaffa and the Chief of Police in Jerusalem to take care to see that the temporary permis de séjour was issued and that the Jews did not exceed the three months' residence permitted to them.[4]

Immediately after Muhdi Bey had sent out his circular, Antébi reported that Muslims and Christians in Jerusalem were signing "une mazbata antisémite".[5] Antébi sent a telegram to various "official personages" protesting against Muhdi Bey's action.[6] He also had two long conversations

1. JCA 268/encl. to no.206, being Circular, no.467.
2. Loc.cit.
3. Ha-Herut, v, 44 (12.11.1912), & ibid. 45 (14.11.1912).
4. Ibid. v, 45 (15.11.1912).
5. JCA 268/encl. to no.206 (1.11.1912), Antébi to Starkmeth.
6. JCA 268/encl. to no.206 (30.10.1912), same to same.

with Muhdi Bey, at which a compromise was eventually reached:[1] land transfers in process were to be concluded in the names of Ottoman Jews who were known not to be "prête-noms" acting on behalf of Jewish immigrants; in exchange, Antébi was to submit in advance details of all schemes for further acquisitions to Muhdi Bey to avoid any repetition of the recent outcry over land sales to Jews.[2] The transfer of 4,800 dunams at Kafruriya (near the railway station at Sajad on the Jaffa-Jerusalem line) had been in hand for some time; in November it was concluded in accordance with the arrangement which Muhdi Bey had struck with Antébi. And, almost inevitably, an article appeared in Falastin, protesting against the duplicity of the Mutasarrif and the Jews.[3]

The Haham Başi in Constantinople replied to Antébi's telegram on November 19th: enemy forces were at the gates of the city and their entry was expected that day; in the circumstances, any approach to the Grand Vezir or the Minister of Internal Affairs was out of the question.[4] The local population's efforts to have Muhdi Bey removed were answered in mid-December, when it was announced that he was to be replaced by Tahir Bey Hayreddin, the Liberal Union candidate who had defeated Memduh Bey twelve months before (see above, p.278).[5] Tahir Bey was the son of Hayreddin Paşa, the Circassian who had served Ahmad Bey of Tunis and who had risen to the rank of Grand Vezir of the Ottoman

1. JCA 268/encl. to no.206 (1.11.1912), Antébi to Starkmeth.
2. Loc.cit.; & JCA 268/no.206.
3. Falastin, ii, 92 (30.11.1912).
4. CZA L2/39 (19.11.1912), Haham Başi (Consple.) to Antébi.
5. Ha-Herut, v, 68 (10.12.1912); & ibid. 69 (11.12.1912); also The Truth, iii, 135 (13.12.1912).

Empire under Abdülhamid. Tahir Bey, having at one time been commandant in Jerusalem, was well acquainted with the Mutasarriflik.[1] When the counter-Revolution was quashed in April 1909, he had resigned his commission as an officer in Tripoli and thereafter taught history at a rüşdiye school in Constantinople.[2] He was associated with Alemdar,[3] having previously edited another anti-CUP organ, Şahrah, which he had founded with Reşid Bey, who had been Mutasarrif of Jerusalem between 1904 and 1906 (see above, pp.112-18), and who became Minister of Internal Affairs after the change of government in July 1912 (see Ch.VIII).[4]

Muhdi Bey left Jerusalem on December 15th, whereupon the British Consul in Jerusalem remarked - somewhat ineptly - that "his record as a militant member of the Committee of Union and Progress [is presumed to be] the chief cause of his disgrace".[5] Tahir Bey did not reach Jaffa until January 12th, 1913. Eleven days later, Enver Paşa led a coup d'état in Constantinople, restoring the CUP to office. And at the end of the month, Tahir Bey, a supporter and nominee of the Liberal Union, resigned his appointment as Mutasarrif of Jerusalem.[6]

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1. The Near East, iv, 93 (1913), p.407.
2. Ha-Ḥerut, v, 68 (10.12.1912).
3. Falasṭin, iii, 4 (25.1.1913).
4. Ha-Ḥerut, v, 68 (10.12.1912), where Şahrah's name is wrongly rendered as Himrah; JCA 268/no.208 (17.12.1912), Antébi to Pres., JCA: & FO 195/2452/6969, no.97 (16.12.1912), McGregor to Lowther.
5. Loc.cit.; cf. The Near East, iv, 93 (1913), p.407.
6. FO 195/2452/621, no.8 (29.1.1913), McGregor to Lowther. Cf. ha-Po'el ha-Ẓa'ir, vi, 25 (1913), pp.5-8: the

Cont'd p.322 .....

Muhdi Bey's tenure of office in Jerusalem constituted a watershed. He arrived at the moment when Falastin committed itself wholly against the Zionists and when al-Munadi had been agitating against them for six months in Jerusalem. His speech at Rishon le Zion shocked the local population, and his subsequent actions did not restore confidence either in himself or the Central Government. Muhdi Bey was to the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem as Shukri al-ʿAsali and the sale of Fula had been in the north of Palestine: local Arab opinion was galvanised against the Jewish immigrants.

The first Balkan War broke out in October 1912. In Palestine, as elsewhere in the Empire, popular feeling was directed against all Europeans;[1] but, on account of the special conditions in Jerusalem, Antébi observed less than a fortnight after the declaration of war that:

> "Il y a une recrudescence de nationalisme chauvin, islamique qui, pour les circonstances, s'alie avec l'antisémitisme chrétien, sous la bannière des ex-deputies [sic] unionistes [CUP] "[2]

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restoration of the CUP to office led to the resignation or dismissal of a number of other provincial governors (in Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, for example), who had been appointed after July 1912; cf. also The Near East, iv, 90 (1913), p.328, re. dismissal cf Mutasarrif of Acre, who is reported to have been removed because of charges brought by his "Unionist [= CUP] adversaries" (including Najib Nassar) that he had sold land to Jews - see above, p.297.

1. Cf. ISA (G) A III 1, iii, encl.[n.d.] to letter dated 26.11.1912, being petition from German Templars at Jaffa and Wilhelma for consular protection against local Muslim "fanaticism" towards all Europeans.
2. JCA 268/no.205 (27.10.1912), Antébi to Pres., JCA.

In other parts of the Arab provinces, Christian Arabs suffered because they were held to sympathise with Christians in the Balkans;[1] but in the south of Palestine, Muhdi Bey's indiscretions and the Balkan War combined to bring Muslims and Christians together through their common antipathy to the European Jews among them, in the same way as Muslims and Christians in the north of the country had drawn closer some eighteen months earlier over the sale of Fula.

Tahir Bey arrived too late and stayed too briefly in Jerusalem to prevent the transfer of 6,700 dunams of land at Abu Shusha (near Ramle) to the Zionists.[2] Articles

1. La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne (Istanbul, 1916), pp.51-2.
2. The Truth, iii, 139 (21.2.1912), reported that during the last fortnight "considerable tracts of arable land" had been transferred to various Jewish societies. This probably referred to the Abu Shusha transfer, although it was made rather more than a fortnight before this report. Jewish land purchases during 1911 and 1912 are listed in CZA L2/26/III (26.1.1913), Thon to ZAC, as:

Rural land:	dunams
Fula	9,500
Jammama [near Beersheba]	5,600
Bir 'Adas [near Kefar Sava]	4,200
Zeita [near Hadera]	1,200
Kafruriya [near Sajad]	4,800
Karkur [between Hadera and Zikhron Ya'aqov]	11,400
Abu Shusha [near Ramle]	6,700
Dilb & Qalandiya [near Jerusalem]	3,000
	46,400

plus

Urban land:	sq.yds. ("Ellen")
Jerusalem	ca. 325,000
Jaffa	" 810,000
Haifa	" 330,000
	" 1,465,000

immediately appeared in Arabic newspapers protesting against this sale.[1] The most important of these was one by Aḥmad ʿArif Bey al-Ḥusayni's son, ʿArif al-ʿArif, who after 1919 was associated with Suriyya al-Janubiyya (a paper which took a strong line against the Zionists) and who later became a high official under the British Mandatory authorities in Palestine. ʿArif al-ʿArif cried out against the recent land transfers made to Jews and declared that "if this state of affairs continues in [its present] direction, then the Zionists will gain mastery over our country, village by village, town by town; tomorrow the whole of Jerusalem will be sold and then Palestine in its entirely".[2] This article, written from Constantinople where its author was studying, was the first unmistakable sign that the younger generation of Arabs, who were now to play a prominent rôle in Ottoman politics, had become alive to the Zionist question.

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1. Falasṭin, iii, 3 (22.1.1913), ibid. 5 (29.1.1913), & ibid. 7 (5.2.1913); cf. CZA Z3/115 press report [undated and unsigned] giving details of articles which appeared in al-Munadi on 14. & 24.1.1913, & 3.,6. & 20.2.1913 and in al-Muqtabas on 18.2.1913.
2. Falasṭin, iii, 4 (25.1.1913).

CHAPTER EIGHT

ALLIANCE OR ENTENTE?: 1913

A propos an "Alliance islamo-juive"

The first Balkan War went disastrously for the Ottoman Empire. On November 9th the Greeks took Salonika, and a week later the Bulgarians launched a heavy attack against the Ottoman defences of Çatalca, a few miles from Constantinople. Although the Bulgarians were driven off, "Turkey in Europe" was all but lost. The Ottoman defeats left the Empire penniless and induced the Liberal Union Cabinet to modify its attitude towards the Zionists: cash and support of any kind would be welcomed wherever they could be found.

On September 30th Dr. Jacobson obtained an interview with Kâmil Paşa, who was then President of the Council of State; shortly thereafter he met the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Noradounghian.[1] Kâmil Paşa had been acquainted with the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine since the 1880's; he gave Jacobson to believe that he did not fear a "Zionist danger" and that - ostensibly, at least - he was convinced of the utility of Jewish settlement in Palestine.[2] According to Jacobson, both Kâmil Paşa and, to a lesser extent, Noradounghian Effendi were persuaded of

1. CZA Z3/1513 (27. & 30.9.1912), V. Jacobson (Consple.) to ZAC (Berlin); & CZA Z3/1513 (7.10.1912), minutes of meeting of ZAC (Berlin).
2. Loc.cit.

the Zionists' power ("Macht"); Kâmil Paşa especially desired that the German and Austrian Governments and press should be influenced in favour of the Ottoman Empire.[1]

Two months later, after the Ottoman losses in Europe during November, Isaac Neufach, one of Jacobson's colleagues in Constantinople, reported that "Hochberg's discussions with the Liberal Unionists are taking on a progressively more concrete form".[2] This was the first indication that Sami Hochberg had been in contact with Liberal Unionists; as editor of Le Jeune-Turc, Hochberg was certainly "well-connected", so these contacts do not seem unlikely. Neufach, in reporting these discussions, gave a broad indication of the shape they were taking: the Turkish Liberal Unionists told Hochberg that the Balkan War had disabused them of their illusions about the Greeks in the Empire - the latter had formerly taken a leading part in the Liberal Union and had always accused the Zionists of seeking the downfall of the Empire, but their rôle in the loss of Salonika had shown them to be "liars and hypocrites".[3] These Liberal Unionists were now persuaded (or, at least, claimed to be persuaded) that the Jews and Zionists, on the other hand, were "true friends" of the Empire. "Now it was not a question of money but of reciprocal services"; if the Zionists could win over the European press for the Empire, the Government would favour the Zionists' wishes.[4] At the end of November (and it was

1. CZA Z3/1513 (27. & 30.9.1912), Jacobson to ZAC; & CZA Z3/1513 (7.10.1912), minutes of meeting of ZAC.
2. CZA Z3/45 ("Zum Ende Nov.1912" [sic]), I. Neufach (Consple.) to ZAC.
3. Loc.cit.
4. Loc.cit.

this that occasioned Neufach's letter) Hochberg had a long conversation with the Minister of Internal Affairs, Reşid Bey, who had been Mutasarrif of Jerusalem from 1904 until 1906 and who, it will be recalled, had made himself thoroughly disliked among the Arab population because of his willingness to accept bribes from the Jews and others. After expressing his sympathy for the Zionists, Reşid Bey asked Hochberg to furnish him with a memorandum outlining Zionist aims, which he promised to examine with Kâmil Paşa (now Grand Vezir) before presenting it to the Cabinet.[1]

Dr. Jacobson was in Berlin at this time. Hochberg reported his meeting with Reşid Bey directly to Jacobson in a letter which was not found; however, from Jacobson's reply it is clear that Hochberg had apprised Jacobson of the Ottoman Government's immediate need of considerable sums of money.[2] Jacobson was sceptical of Reşid Bey's sincerity and also uncertain whether the Zionists could find capital sums of the dimensions which would be required to alleviate the Ottoman Treasury.[3] Nonetheless, Jacobson felt it worthwhile to initiate efforts to win over the sympathies of some European newspapers for the Ottoman Empire. Nahum Sokolow, a member of the Zionist Executive, was about to depart for London and he agreed to do what he could there;[4] while Jacobson himself, having met with "some success" among German newspapers (including Vossische Zeitung, Berliner Tageblatt, Frankfurter Zeitung and Ullstein-Presse), set out for Paris

1. CZA Z3/45 ("Zum Ende Nov.1912" [sic]), Neufach to ZAC.
2. CZA Z3/45 (3.12.1912), [Jacobson (Berlin)] to S. Hochberg (Consple.)
3. Loc.cit.
4. Loc.cit.

on December 3rd on a similar mission.[1]

Jacobson returned to Constantinople towards the end of the month. On December 26th he had what he considered to be a successful meeting with Reşid Bey, who again declared himself very favourably inclined towards the Zionists and, repeating his request for a memorandum on Zionism, he promised to speak to Kâmil Paşa about the need to moderate the Government's "campaign" against the Jews in Palestine.[2] Letters sent from the Zionist representatives in Constantinople during January 1913 suggest that Jacobson, in talking with Reşid Bey, volunteered some measure of tangible support for the Ottoman Empire in exchange for facilities to purchase certain lands in Palestine (see immediately below).

On January 6th, 1913, Jacobson sent Reşid Bey the memorandum he had requested.[3] Three days later, however, Jacobson reported that their negotiations had come to a standstill because the conference being held at St. James's Palace in London to arrange the terms of peace between the parties to the Balkan War was going badly from the Ottoman Government's point of view.[4] On the following day, Reşid Bey told Jacobson that they must await the conclusion of peace before their business could proceed.[5]

1. CZA Z3/45 (3.12.1912), [Jacobson (Berlin)] to Hochberg; & CZA Z3/45 (4.12.1912), ZCO (Berlin) to Hochberg.
2. CZA Z3/45 (27.12.1912), Jacobson (Consple.) to ZAC.
3. CZA Z3/45 (6.1.1913), Jacobson to ZAC, enclosing a copy of a letter to Reşid Bey which incorporated this memorandum.
4. CZA Z3/45 (9.1.1913), Jacobson to ZAC.
5. CZA Z3/45 (10.1.1913), same to R. Lichtheim (Berlin).

Despite this, the Zionists in Constantinople continued to work for the acquisition of "twelve transfers" of land in Palestine.[1] The Haham Başi was prevailed upon to speak to the Minister of Justice, Arif Kismet, and to the Reporting Secretary ("Berichterstatter") of the Council of State who gave his word that he would present the Zionists' case in favourable terms.[2] Zuhdi Bey, Kâmil Paşa's secretary, agreed (on being assured of an appropriate commission if the transfers were successfully executed) to interest other members of the Council of State in the matter.[3] Said Paşa, now President of this body, was reported to be sympathetic, and Kâmil Paşa also promised to speak to some of its members; as soon as a favourable decision was arrived at, he would pass the matter on to the Cabinet.[4] On January 21st, Jacobson reported that Kâmil Paşa had suggested to Arif Kismet that an Irade be granted in the Zionists' favour; Reşid Bey was working towards this end as well.[5]

Jacobson provided the key to this apparently radical change of attitude in Constantinople. On January 18th, the Great Powers had sent a Note Verbale Identique to the Porte urging that Adrianople be ceded to Bulgaria in return for certain territorial compensation and the promise of loans to tide the Empire over its difficulties. Were the Ottoman

1. CZA Z3/45 (16.1.1913), Jacobson to Lichtheim. The exact location and extent of these transfers are unknown; according to Jacobson they comprised "two lists" (presumably of land purchases then being negotiated in Palestine): one list from Paris (i.e. the Jewish Colonization Association) and the other from Arthur Ruppin (i.e. the Zionist Office in Jaffa).
2. Loc.cit. 3. Loc.cit. 4. Loc.cit.
5. CZA Z3/45 (21.1.1913), same to same.

Government to have been capable of financing further military operations in an attempt to redeem its losses in the Balkans, subsequent events might have taken a different turn. But, as Jacobson observed, the Government's position was desperate - it was bankrupt and Adrianople would probably have to be relinquished.[1]

According to Jacobson, the Council of State was expected to consider the Zionists' request to purchase lands in Palestine on January 24th.[2] One day before that date a Cabinet meeting was held at which it was generally believed the Powers' Note advising the cession of Adrianople would be considered. The CUP deemed this to be the moment to overthrow the Liberal Union Cabinet. Enver Bey led a small group into the Cabinet Room at the Porte and, having killed the Minister of War on the way in, he forced Kâmil Paşa and his ministers to resign. On January 28th, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, the new Grand Vezir, proposed that rather than relinquish Adrianople, the frontier between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria be set at the River Marica. This was unacceptable to the Bulgarians and hostilities were resumed on February 3rd.

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The contacts with the Zionists were not severed by the restoration of the CUP to power, because the Jews in Europe were still regarded as a possible source of financial support for the Empire. On February 4th, Jacobson wrote to Jacobus Kann (see above, pp.229-31), who was a director of a Dutch

1. CZA Z3/45 (21.1.1913), Jacobson to Lichtheim.
2. CZA Z3/45 (16.1.1913), same to same.

banking house, that "le gouvernement a besoin d'argent maintenant, immédiatement, aujourd'hui, cette semaine".[1] Kann agreed to arrange for a large loan on condition that the Ottoman Government approached him officially and also that Great Britain, France and Russia gave their approval for such a step.[2] At this, Leopold Greenberg of the Anglo-Palestine Company in London visited the Foreign Office on February 7th to inquire into the British Government's views on the matter. The Great Powers at this time were of the opinion that no large sums should be made available to the Ottoman Empire unless some form of international control was established over the latter's finances; and they believed that this could not be achieved until the political situation in the Balkans had become more settled.[3] Accordingly, Greenberg was advised that in the circumstances the British Government would not find a loan to the Ottoman Empire agreeable; His Majesty's Government would not interfere, but it considered it undesirable to supply the Empire with the means of prolonging the present war.[4] Through Greenberg, this cautionary advice was accepted by the Zionists, "at least, until the

1. CZA Z3/45 (4.2.1913), Jacobson to J. Kann (Hague).
2. P.A. Alsberg, "ha-Oryenṭazyah shel mediniyyut ha-hanhalah ha-ẓiyyonit ʿereb milḥemet ha-ʿolam ha-rishonah", Ẓiyyon, vol.xxii (1957), p.157. For the Zionists' viewpoint on various aspects of the proposed loan, see this article, pp.156-9.
3. FO 371/1783/4670, no.23 (30.1.1913), Sir E. Goschen (Berlin) to Sir E. Grey (F.O.), [telegram]. Many details on the question of loans to the Ottoman Empire at this period are to be found in FO 371/1783/1334 and the other files kept with this one.
4. FO 371/1798/10065 [no number], (26.2.1913), L.J. Greenberg (London) to R.P. Maxwell (F.O.); & minute by the latter on the folder of this file.

present war is brought to a close".[1]

On December 30th, 1912, whilst the peace conference was being held in St. James's Palace, a long letter by Max Nordau appeared in The Times soliciting the "friendly interest" of European diplomacy for the Zionist Movement.[2] Nordau reasoned that stability in the Balkans could be attained only if the position of the Jews, especially in Rumania, was considered at the peace conference as well. He held the Zionist solution to the "Jewish problem" to be desirable and sketched the Movement's achievements in Palestine to that date. Then, referring to the restrictions on Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine, he explained that "it is the abolition of these unjust limitations which we seek".[3]

At the beginning of January ~~1912~~ 1913, a few days after this letter was published, Dr. Jacobson discussed Zionist and Jewish questions with Talât Bey and other members of the CUP's Central Committee, among them Dr. Esad Paşa, Ömer Naci Bey, Muhtar Bey and Ahmed Agayev.[4] Not yet restored to power, Jacobson found them professedly unopposed to Zionism in principle. Nevertheless, Talât Bey stood firm by the CUP's policy of Ottomanisation and the "denial of nationality" which it implied.[5] He also indicated that open support for

1. FO 371/1798/10065 [no number], (26.2.1913), Greenberg to Maxwell.
2. The Times, no.40,095 (30.12.1912).
3. Loc.cit.
4. CZA Z3/45 (6.1.1913), Jacobson to ZAC; & ibid. (28.2.1913), same (Paris) to H. Frank (Paris), referring to "more than one conversation; there was a series of discussions".
5. CZA Z3/45 (6.1.1913), Jacobson (Consple.) to ZAC.

the Zionist Movement from the CUP was impossible: "Sionisme est pour nous une question de politique intérieure et de la lutte des partis".[1]

Whilst the Zionists in Constantinople were trying during January to gain the Council of State's approval for certain land purchases in Palestine, Said Paşa, the President of the Council, promised Jacobson that he would do what had to be done to remove the restrictions against the Jews.[2] After the coup d'état of January 23rd, Jacobson pressed the Haham Başi, Hayim Nahum, into raising the question of abolishing the restrictions with Said Paşa once again.[3] The Haham Başi spoke to Said Paşa early in February and, probably at the latter's suggestion or at the suggestion of other personages whom he also visited, the Haham Başi submitted two takrirs (memoranda) to the Minister of Justice and Religions on February 10th.[4] In these he appealed for the abolition of the restrictions on the grounds that although they had been imposed by the old régime, they had been upheld by Governments since 1908, even though they were unconstitutional (because they conflicted with the constitutional rights of Ottoman Jews) and were contrary to the "vital interests"

1. CZA Z3/45 (6.1.1913), Jacobson to ZAC.
2. CZA Z3/45 (28.2.1913), Jacobson (Paris) to Frank.
3. Loc.cit.
4. FO 371/1794/16925, no.218 (17.3.1913), Sir G. Lowther (Consple.) to Grey, enclosing undated cuttings from L'Aurore [ca. 14.2.1913], where a brief account of the background to these takrirs is given with their texts.

of the Empire.[1]

A few days later these takrirs were published in L'Aurore, a local Jewish paper (which was sponsored by the Zionists). Alongside them, there appeared a leading article by the paper's editor, Lucien Sciuto, which depicted (in the words of the British Ambassador at the Porte) "a picture of what might be styled an alliance between Panjudaism and Panislamism in Turkey".[2] Sciuto bewailed the fates of the Ottoman Empire and Jewry which had both suffered "en partage du monde chrétien".[3] Then, dreaming aloud, he wrote:

> "Ah! notre rêve le plus cher, - le rêve du judaïsme tout entier, - est de voir une Turquie grande et forte marchant résolument vers son avenir parallèlement avec un judaïsme puissant allant lui aussi librement à ses destinées!"

World Jewry was not a power equipped with an army or a navy; it was more than that:

> "Par ses tribuns, par ses penseurs, par ses hommes politiques et, pourquoi ne pas le dire, par ses financiers aussi, il est une force autrement grande avec laquelle on compte, parce qu'elle peut diriger toutes les autres ".

Since all genuine amity depended on mutual confidence, Sciuto begged the Ottoman Government to show its faith in world Jewry by abolishing the restrictions against Jews in Palestine.[4]

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1. The Haham Başi's point regarding the unconstitutionality of the restrictions was valid because the directives of November 1900 had limited to three months visits to Palestine made by Ottoman Jews (as well as foreign Jews) and the restrictions on land purchases had been extended to Ottoman Jews on various occasions (most recently in October 1912 - see above, pp. 317-18). These restrictions on Ottoman Jews conflicted with the equal rights which the Constitution stipulated they should enjoy with all Ottoman subjects.
2. Cutting from L'Aurore, enclosed in FO 371/1794/16925, no.218 (17.3.1913).
3. Loc.cit.
4. Loc.cit.

Within a few days of this article, Esad Paşa and Ahmed Agayev approached Dr. Jacobson on behalf of Talât Bey. They recalled the conversations Talât Bey had had with Jacobson at the beginning of January and now proposed the creation of an "alliance islamo-juive".[1] Islam, they suggested, was in decline and must inevitably disappear unless help from outside provided the savoir faire and capital which the Muslims lacked.[2] The Jews possessed these commodities but lacked a "field of action" for their own aspirations.

> "Que les juifs viennent donc chez nous pour diriger nos affaires en formant avec nous une alliance intime."[3]

Jacobson recognised the naïvety and dangers of this plan - which implied an alliance with the CUP - if it were taken literally.[4] Nonetheless, he immediately set out for Berlin and Paris where he hoped to convince influential Jews of the need to grasp this "slightly fantastic" opportunity.[5] Likewise, Nahum Sokolow, bearing a letter of introduction from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, travelled to London to consult the Foreign Office about a loan to the Ottoman Empire and possible British help in the abolition of the restrictions against the Jews in Palestine.[6] These exploratory moves, however, were unsuccessful. All the men whom Jacobson had hoped to contact were unavailable: Baron Edmond de Rothschild was cruising in the Mediterranean; Jacob Schiff, the American Jewish leader, was in North

1. CZA Z3/45 (28.2.1913), Jacobson to Frank.
2. Loc.cit. 3. Loc.cit.
4. Loc.cit. 5. Loc.cit.
6. FO 371/1794/6584 [no numbers], (18. & 25.2.1913), N. Sokolow (London) to Sir L. Mallet (F.O.).

Africa; and Dr. Paul Nathan of the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden was absent from Berlin.[1] Similarly, Sokolow did not meet with much encouragement at the British Foreign Office: he was informed politely that His Majesty's Government could scarcely intervene to try to have the restrictions against the Jews abolished since the latter were not British nationals.[2] Sokolow gave his word that the Zionists would not make a loan to the Ottoman Government until the Balkan War was brought to an end, but, he said, they might do so thereafter.[3]

Jacobson therefore wrote to Nissim Mazliah in Constantinople on March 19th, regretting that his mission had not been more fruitful. Not only were the most important Jews unavailable but, wherever he had presented himself, he had been told that it would be impossible to aid the Ottoman Empire before the abolition of the exceptional measures against the Jews in Palestine.[4]

The Haham Başi's takrirs pleading for the removal of these disabilities had not, however, been wholly ineffective. The Minister of Justice had viewed them favourably and had submitted them to the Grand Vezirate which, in turn, passed them on to Haci Adil Bey, the Minister of Internal Affairs, for his comments before presenting them to the Council of State.[5] Haci Adil Bey was cautious and sent copies of the

1. CZA Z3/45 (18.3.1913), Jacobson [Berlin?] to Hochberg.
2. FO 371/1794/10066 [no number], (3.3.1913), [minute initialled illegibly by a Foreign Office official].
3. Loc.cit.
4. CZA Z3/45 (19.3.1913), Jacobson (Berlin) to Nissim Mazliah (Consple.).
5. CZA Z3/45 (6.3.1913), Haham Başi (Consple.) to Jacobson [Berlin?].

takrirs to the Vali of Beirut, inviting his opinion.[1]

On hearing this, Jacobson wrote to Ahmed Agayev on March 27th, informing him that his ideas and those of Esad Paşa (about an "alliance islamo-juive") had found an "écho sympathique, enthousiaste même" amongst Jewish circles.[2] But now that Haci Adil Bey had referred the Haham Başi's takrirs to Beirut, the Jews sensed that the Government was adopting the same dilatory tactics which had been so familiar under the old régime, since their fellows in Palestine were no better off than before 1908: the present Government could not expect any support from Jewish financiers until the restrictions against the Jews in Palestine were annulled.[3]

* * * *

A propos an Arab-Zionist Entente

These contacts between the Ottoman Government and the Zionists were by their very nature highly confidential and the Turkish press, being wholly given to the Balkan War during these months, paid no attention to the Zionist question.[4] On the other hand, in January and February 1913, an Arab-Zionist polemic was being conducted in two important newspapers in Cairo, al-Muqaṭṭam and al-Ahram. And at the very moment when Talât Bey made his proposal of an "alliance islamo-juive", certain Arab nationalist leaders in Cairo were suggesting that an entente between the Arabs and the Zionists was "imperative".

1. Cf. CZA L2/49/I (22.3.1913), Neufach to Palestine Office (Jaffa). Haci Adil Bey did not refer the takrirs to Jerusalem because the post of Mutasarrif was still vacant after Tahir Bey's resignation in January 1913.
2. CZA Z3/45 (27.3.1913), Jacobson [Berlin?] to Ahmed Agayev (Consple.).
3. Loc.cit.
4. CZA Z3/45 (2.5.1913), Neufach to ZCO (Berlin).

The Balkan War had been a great spur to Arab nationalism, especially as through it the Albanians, who were numerically fewer than the Arabs and culturally inferior to them, had secured their independence. At the end of January 1913, a Jewish observer in Damascus noted that over the last two months three "burning questions" had engaged the Arabic press: the rumoured intervention of France in Syria, the need for reform in the Arab provinces in relation to the demands of the Arabs as a nation, and the Zionist issue.[1] Liberal Unionists had been addressing large audiences in public: Shukri al-ʿAsali made a speech about "The Turkish rulers of the Arab provinces during the last two-hundred years"; ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Inklizi spoke about "Colonists and colonisation"; and Muḥammad Kurd ʿAli about "Syria's past, present and future".[2] The latter was particularly violent against the Zionists in his newspaper, al-Muqtabas, where he attacked Arabs who sold land to Jews and Ottoman officials who helped them: the Balkan War had debilitated the Empire, and Zionism now sought to destroy "the totality of our economics and politics".[3]

Various Arab nationalist societies were formed at this time, the most important of which were located in Cairo and

1. A. Almaliaḥ in ha-Poʿel ha-Ẓaʿir, vi, 18 (1913), pp.4-7. For observations about the anti-Zionist campaign in the Arabic press during these months, see Q d'O N.S. 121 [no number], (30.4.1913), French Vice-Consul (Haifa) to F. Couget (Beirut), [copy].
2. Ha-Poʿel ha-Ẓaʿir, vi, 18 (1913), pp.4-7.
3. Loc.cit.; cf. Falasṭin, ii, 99 (25.12.1912), where this article from al-Muqtabas is reprinted.

Beirut. The most radical among the nationalists were members of the Decentralisation Party in Cairo. The group in Beirut was more moderate and was established at first with official support, for in January the Administrative Council of the Vilayet of Beirut set up a commission to consider reforms which might be necessary in the province. This group later became known as the "Beirut Reform Committee". It met on January 12th and elected a sub-committee of twenty-five members (twelve Muslims, twelve Christians and one Jew) to draw up a programme of reform aiming at a large measure of administrative autonomy, which was agreed upon on January 31st.[1]

Geographically speaking, Palestine lay between the "spheres of influence" of these two groups. In 1912, Nissim Malul had written a book called Kitab miṣr wa-sur͡ya, in which he contrasted Syria's material progress unfavourably with that of Egypt;[2] in February 1913, he was approached by the Decentralisation Party to represent it in Jaffa[3] - probably on account of the views expressed in this book and because of his association with al-Muqaṭṭam, which was sympathetic to the Arab nationalist cause.[4] In the spring of 1913 a group sympathetic to the Beirut Reform Committee was also formed in Jaffa. Headed by Ḥafiẓ Bey al-Sa'id, the deputy from Jaffa in the first Parliament after the

1. FO 195/2451/484, no.8 (24.1.1913), & FO 371/1775/14474, no.26 (12.3.1913), both H.A. Cumberbatch (Beirut) to Lowther.
2. N. Malul, Kitab miṣr wa-sur͡ya (Beirut, 1912).
3. Ha-Ḥerut, v, 134 (25.2.1913).
4. A. Sa'id, al-Thawra al-'arabiyya al-kubra (Egypt [1934]), i, 12.

Young Turk Revolution, this group included ʿUthman Zaki al-Khalidi (a lawyer) and four wealthy businessmen (two Muslims and two Christians); Nissim Malul was in contact with this group as well.[1] At the beginning of April, Ḥafiẓ Bey sent a telegram to Constantinople urging the swift application of "the reforms which Beirut has been compelled to insist on".[2] This telegram was immediately followed by another, signed by members of the Municipal Council in Jaffa, declaring that Ḥafiẓ Bey was not representative of "the nation".[3] This provoked a further telegram from Jaffa signed by over twenty notables supporting Ḥafiẓ Bey's plea.[4] At the same time another telegram, from Gaza and endorsed by some sixty notables from Jerusalem, was presented by the President of the Municipal Council in that city to the Mutasarrif, requesting permission to engage in discussions similar to those held in Beirut concerning administrative reform.[5] Moreover, Ilyas Zakka, the editor of al-Nafir, transferred his paper to Haifa in April and was reported to be active there on behalf of the Beirut Reform Committee too.[6] It is clear that only a few individuals were involved in these activities in Jaffa, Jerusalem, Gaza and Haifa, but it is equally clear that Palestine had been affected in fair measure by the stirrings of the Arab nationalist movement and that those few who had

1. CZA Z3/1449 (8.4.1913), J. Thon (Jaffa) to ZAC (Berlin); cf. CZA L2/44 (4.5.1913), résumé minutes of meeting of Waʿad ha-poʿel ha-temidi (Jaffa).
2. FO 195/2451/1795, no.27 (12.4.1913), W. Hough (Jaffa) to P.J.C. McGregor (Jerus.).
3. Loc.cit.
4. Loc.cit.; cf. ha-Ḥerut, v, 170 (9.4.1913).
5. FO 195/2451/1823, no.35 (12.4.1913), McGregor to Lowther.
6. CZA Z3/1449 (8.4.1913), Thon to ZAC.

begun to play a part in it were convinced of the need for reforms as outlined by the Beirut Committee.

* * *

In December 1912 a committee, consisting of Nissim Malul and four Egyptian Jews, was set up by the Zionists to contribute pro-Zionist articles to the Arabic press.[1] Their pieces appeared most regularly in al-Muqaṭṭam.[2] In the middle of February 1913, shortly after the CUP coup d'état, an anonymous article was published in al-Ahram, suggesting yet again that the CUP had relied upon the Jews and Freemasons, because it was in need of the Jews' money: the third French Republic had acted in a similar fashion, thus giving birth to anti-Semitism in France - the same would happen in the Ottoman Empire.[3] These allegations were rejected by an Egyptian Jew, Robert Ghazi, in al-Muqaṭṭam.[4] On February 19th, the anonymous writer of the first article replied in al-Ahram to Ghazi's rejoinder. Now signing himself "E. Bey G.", he claimed that a secret compact existed between the CUP and the Zionists; Jews in the Empire were but a tenth of the Arab population, yet - according to E. Bey G. - they had two ministers in the Cabinet: Nissim Mazliah and Batzariya Effendi (who, although a non-Jew, rendered them services as contributor to Le Jeune-Turc); the Jews controlled the finances, the economy and agriculture of the

1. CZA Z3/752 (12.12.1912), S. Hasamsony (Cairo) to ZCO; cf. CZA Z3/115 (9.3.1913), Thon to same.
2. CZA Z3/752 (29.1.1913), Hasamsony to same; cf. CZA Z3/115, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of an article by Malul published in al-Muqaṭṭam on 15.1.1913.
3. CZA Z3/752 (21.2.1913), Hasamsony to ZCO.
4. Loc.cit. Ghazi wrote under the pseudonym of "Ṭanṭawi".

Empire; all loans and commercial concessions were made by or to Jews, through Jews and to the advantage of Jews.[1] Their advances in Palestine had been made over the heads of the local population. E. Bey G. therefore warned:

> "Without the consent of the Syrians in particular and the Arabs in general, [Arab] hatred of the Zionists takes birth from today. [It is] a hatred which will fight with all means against the interests of Zionism to annul their accomplishments and to destroy all their hopes for the future".[2]

The writer counselled the Zionists to secure the Arabs' assent for their activities and "to take into account the friendship of one's neighbour [i.e. the Arab] which is preferable to that of the distant stranger [i.e. the Turk]".[3]

The editor of al-Ahram, Daʾud Barakat, was a member of the Decentralisation Party. He was considered by the French Vice-Consul in Haifa as one of the most prominent Arab anti-Zionists, along with Najib Naṣṣar, Shukri al-ʿAsali, Muḥammad Kurd ʿAli and Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi.[4] Nonetheless, he added a postscript to the article quoted above in which he declared:

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1. CZA Z3/752 (21.2.1913), Hasamsony to ZCO. E. Bey G.'s statement that Mazliah was a Cabinet minister is incorrect; the names of the new ministers appointed after the CUP coup d'état are to be found in The Times, no. 40,118 (25.1.1913). Batzariya had contributed articles to Le Jeune-Turc, but this hardly made him a representative of the Jews.
2. CZA Z3/752 (21.2.1913), Hasamsony to ZCO.
3. Loc.cit. Cf. the proverb "Jarak al-qarib wala qaribak al-baʿid" ("Your neighbour and not your relative who lives far away"), cited in a similar connection by A. Cohen, Arab Border-Villages in Israel (Manchester, 1965), p.59.
4. Q d'O N.S. 121 [no number], (30.4.1913), French Vice-Consul (Haifa) to Ccuget.

> "It is certain that the Syrians do not find it at all inconvenient to have their Jewish brethren as neighbours and to live among them. But what is reprehensible is that an agreement has been made about [the Syrians'] land, without their knowledge or consent. It is absolutely imperative that an entente be made between the Zionists and the Arabs, because this war of words can only do evil. The Zionists are necessary for the country: the capital which they will bring, their knowledge and intelligence, and the industriousness which characterises them, will contribute without doubt to the regeneration of the country".1

On February 21st, Robert Ghazi answered this article directly in al-Ahram with the retort that all the hostility between the Zionists and the Arabs emanated from the latter. He thereupon counselled E. Bey G. to secure the friendship of the Arabs for the Jews.[2]

Four days after this, Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm, the Secretary of the Decentralisation Party, joined in the polemic by publishing an article, also in al-Ahram.[3] He denied that all Syrians were opposed to the Zionists; on the contrary, they knew that Syria required capital and energy for its advancement and that the Jews were best suited to this purpose. Any antagonism on the part of Syrian and Palestinian Arabs towards the Jewish settlers was the result of two causes: first, the immigrants retained their foreign nationality or merely posed as Ottoman subjects and, second, the immigrants as well as many Ottoman Jews had supported the CUP and ~~their~~ /0 ruinous policies. The Arabs, wrote Ḥaqqi Bey, were willing to open their lands to the Jews,

1. CZA Z3/752 (21.2.1913), Hasamsony to ZCO.
2. Loc.cit.
3. CZA Z3/115, press report [undated and unsigned], giving full Hebrew translation of Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm's article in al-Ahram of 25.2.1913; cf. CZA Z3/752 (25.4.1913), Hasamsony to ZCO, enclosing extracts in French from this article.

on condition that (i) they adopted the Arabic language, (ii) they were not economically exclusive, (iii) they became true Ottoman subjects, (iv) they eschewed politics, and (v) they took into account the Arab people, which "today or tomorrow is bound to rise again" - otherwise, "a page of Arab history will be sullied by the acts they will perpetrate against the Jews".[1]

The mark of the modern nationalist is written into these conditions. In one form or another, all of them - with one exception - had been made already. If the Jewish immigrants were to become Ottomans, if they were to integrate with the local population, if they broke with the CUP, then the Arabs would not oppose them. But this was the first time that the Jews were required to adopt Arabic as their language.

* * *

On January 1st, al-Ra'y al-'Amm in Beirut had exhorted Muslims, Christians and Jews to unite and to strengthen the Empire by administrative reform; "you are all brethren in the homeland, one flag covers you and one tongue unites you".[2] This appeal was directed at native Ottomans, for two days later an article appeared in the same paper, entitled "Whither swings Jerusalem"; Muslims and non-Muslims

1. CZA Z3/115, press report cited in preceding note.
2. CZA Z3/115, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of an article which appeared in al-Ra'y al-'Amm on 1.1.1913.

had to unite to achieve reforms, but:

> "Oh, people of Jerusalem! is there still a man among you who does not know about the great Zionist danger which smoulders over you?"[1]

However, Da'ud Barakat's suggestion in al-Ahram on February 19th was of a different nature: it specifically called for an entente between the Arabs and the Zionists.[2] A little more than a month later Ibrahim Salim Najjar, a Syrian Arab journalist attached to al-Ahram,[3] sent a letter from Cairo to Sami Hochberg in Constantinople, officially

1. CZA Z3/115, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of an article which appeared in al-Ra'y al-ʿAmm on 3.1.1913.
2. This was not the first proposal of an Arab-Zionist alignment. A decade earlier a more colourful proposal had been made by Beduin. In 1901, the Kaza of Beer Sheba was established and thereafter Ottoman officials tried to tax Beduin in the region, an operation which often led to conflict and sometimes bloodshed. In spring 1903 a British and Zionist commission inspected lands at al'Arish in the Sinai Peninsula with a view to settling Jews there. Through this commission's activities it seems that some Beduin heard of Herzl and the Zionist Movement, because in the summer of that year, a delegation of four or five Beduin, led by Shaykh Salim Abu Rabiʿa of the Zullam tribe, approached Dr. Isaac Lévy (then administrator of the JCA colonies in the south of Palestine) and proposed that Jews should settle on lands around Beer Sheba which the Beduin owned and which were not registered in the Cadastre. The Beduin were prepared to sell these lands to the Jews at low prices and in return the Jews were asked to use their influence in "government circles" (presumably to free the Beduin from taxation and other controls being imposed by the authorities at Beer Sheba). Herzl and Wolffsohn were informed of this proposal but, perhaps understandably, it does not seem to have been treated seriously. For details, see I. Lévy, "ha-Bilti yaduʿa ʿal Herzl", Hed ha-Mizrah, ii, 12 (1943), pp.6-7, & ibid. ii, 13 (1943), pp.4-5; CZA W/124/I (3.12.1903), & ibid. (4.1. & 4.4.1904), all D. Levontin (Jaffa) to D. Wolffsohn (Cologne); also cf. Levontin, Le'erez, ii, 58-60 (where the details are not entirely accurate). For details of the Zullam Beduin, see M. von Oppenheim, Die Beduinen (Leipzig, 1943), ii, 129-31.
3. CZA Z3/1642 (28.10.1913), Jacobson (Berlin) to Frank.

inviting the Zionists to make an entente with the Decentralisation Party. Najjar, formerly a member of al-Qaḥṭaniyya,[1] had at one time worked for Le Jeune-Turc and thus knew Hochberg well. He wrote:

> "Mr. Hochberg, vous êtes un ami et un homme intelligent. Votre intérêt vous oblige de montrer d'accord avec nous la main dans la main dans la politique de décentralisation. Autrement vous tournerez les chrétiens et les musulmans de Syrie contre vos coreligionnaires. Je vous dis cela en ami et en ami sincère. Répétez-le au Dr. Jacobson. Le passage du comité au pouvoir est trop court et vous serez obligé à la fin de travailler avec nous. Ne faut-il pas commencer dès maintenant? ... Etudiez la situation et tracez votre ligne de conduite. C'est le moment de prévoir les événements. Si vous vous décidez sincèrement pour une entente entre nous, indiquez-moi ici (Caire) le représentant autorisé des Sionistes pour nous mettre en contact avec lui".2

On April 25th, an Egyptian Zionist in Cairo reported that representatives of the Decentralisation Party wanted to make an agreement "with us";[3] Da'ud Barakat had informed him that some of the Decentralisationists, who were going to Paris to attend the "Arab Congress" to be held there in June, would probably try to have discussions with Zionists in that city with a view to reaching an entente. "Mais mon impression personnelle est qu'ils ... prennent [une entente] dans le sens d'une affaire".[4]

1. La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne, p.25.
2. CZA Z3/45 (10.4.1913), Jacobson (Consple.) to Lichtheim. Jacobson omitted a number of accents in copying the French text of Najjar's letter; they have been restored here. Jacobson's letter was reproduced, slightly inaccurately, in P.A. Alsberg "Ha-she'elah ha-'arabit bi-mediniyyut ha-hanhalah ha-ziyyonit lifne milhemet ha-'olam ha-rishonah", Shibat Ziyyon, vol.iv (1956-57) p.186.
3. CZA Z3/752 (25.4.1913), Hasamsony to ZCO.
4. Loc.cit.

Bearing in mind the antagonism towards the Jewish immigrants amongst the Arab population of Palestine and given the anti-Zionism of Arab leaders in Damascus and Beirut (Shukri al-ʿAsali and Muḥammad Kurd ʿAli on the one hand and the newspapers in Beirut which supported the Reform Committee on the other), it ~~might~~ may well be asked if the proposal of an Arab-Zionist entente made by the Decentralisation Party was merely "une affaire". A number of considerations suggest that it was something other than this.

Active members of the Decentralisation Party at this date were in no way typical of the Arab masses and, what is more relevant, little typical of the vast majority of Arab leaders and notables as well. The latter, if they believed that the time for change had come at all, were generally of the opinion that the reforms must follow those proposed in Beirut. Ernest Dawn, in his article on "The Rise of Arabism in Syria", estimates that the Decentralisation Party, together with two secret societies, al-Fatat and al-ʿAhd, had, between them, only one-hundred and twenty-six known members by October 1914 and that even this number may be too large by thirty. Of Dawn's one-hundred and twenty-six active nationalists, only twenty-two were definitely Palestinians. If the thirty "doubtfuls" are disallowed, then out of the reduced figure of ninety-six, just twelve were Palestinians.[1] In spring 1913, when the first approaches to the Zionists were made, it may be conjectured that the

1. C.E. Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria", The Middle East Journal, vol.xvi (1962), pp.148-9.

newly founded Decentralisation Party had not many more than a score of members, of whom few, if any, had had direct contact with the Jewish settlers in Palestine. It was from this tiny, untypical but important, group that the proposal of an Arab-Zionist entente emerged.

It is known that various Arab separatists made a number of approaches in different directions in search of allies for their cause. Shukri al-ʿAsali accompanied by Dr. Ayyub Thabit from Beirut had approached Egyptian nationalists in 1911, urging a union between Syria and Egypt;[1] Druze and Muslims from the Lebanon and Damascus solicited the British and French Consul-Generals in Beirut for their respective countries' support in the Arabs' "struggle against the Turks" in the winter of 1912,[2] while at the same time Syrian Muslims visited Lord Kitchener, the High Commissioner in Egypt, "petitioning Great Britain to annex Syria to Egypt and to give Syria an independent administration".[3] The Decentralisation Party's approach to the Zionists in the spring of the following year must be viewed within the context of the Arab nationalists' search for allies against the Turks.

The "mixed" attitude of the Arabs towards the Jewish settlers in Palestine has already been commented upon (see above, p.277). Arab leaders were generally opposed to

1. A. Luṭfi al-Sayyid, Qiṣṣat ḥayati (Cairo, n.d.), p.137.
2. G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War: 1898-1914 (London, 1938), X, ii, 824; & La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne, pp.41-3, 50-4, & 69-71, et passim.
3. Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, X, ii, 825.

Jewish immigration into the country, but they had a high regard for Jewish achievements there. This admiration is revealed most vividly in an article entitled "L'Immigration juive en Palestine" by Férid Nazly, which appeared in spring 1912.[1] The author was careful to preface his article by saying that those who had judged the Jewish settlements "avec toute impartialité" admitted "l'immense oeuvre d'intérêt social et humanitaire entreprise et des progrès accomplis dans le domaine agricole et économique" - even the Arab deputies in the Ottoman Parliament had paid tribute to the industriousness, good organisation and complete security in these settlements.[2] Nazly avoided all mention of Zionism and its political implications, while he extolled every technical branch of Jewish agricultural activity and land reclamation in Palestine.

The Zionists had argued that Jewish immigration into Palestine could only benefit the local population in particular and the Ottoman Empire in general. Although this contention was rejected by the anti-Zionist Arabic press, there is evidence that the Decentralisationists in Cairo accepted it (see below). Herzl and other Zionist leaders after him had claimed that they could call on immense funds and that they commanded influence in the most important newspapers of Europe. Just as the Turks believed this, so too Arab nationalist leaders appear to have accepted it as well. In October 1911, a few weeks before the formation of the

1. F. Nazly, "L'Immigration juive en Palestine", La Correspondance d'Orient, no.84 (15.3.1912), pp.265-8.
2. Ibid. pp.265-6.

Liberal Union, an editor of al-ʿUmran in Cairo expressed the fear that the CUP might exploit the attacks on the Zionists in the Arabic press to extract large sums of money from the Jews which would be used during the next election to secure the return of a CUP majority in Parliament.[1] A year later, when Hochberg was beginning his talks with Liberal Unionists in Constantinople (see above, pp.326-7), Shaykh ʿAli Yusuf, editor of al-Muʾayyad, a paper in Cairo which supported the Arab nationalists,[2] also found words of praise for the Jews' fidelity to the Empire and their activities in Palestine - "it is not for us to look askance at them with jealousy and vengeance because of their enlightenment and progress, lest we cause them ill instead of good and then we will lose a highly industrious element, so needed by us always but especially at this historic moment".[3]

Rashid Riḍa, the most respected Muslim thinker of the time, was a founder-member of the Decentralisation Party.[4] It was he, perhaps, who did most to prepare the ground for a liaison with the Zionists by providing an intellectual, Islamic, rationale for it. In September 1911, Riḍa published an article in al-Manar,[5] which reflected his conviction that it was necessary to strengthen the Dar al-Islam to meet the challenge of a technically superior Europe.[6] In the

1. Ha-Herut, iv, 15 (29.10.1911).
2. Saʿid, al-Thawra al-ʿarabiyya, i, 12.
3. Ha-Herut, v, 29 (25.10.1912).
4. Saʿid, al-Thawra al-ʿarabiyya, i, 14.
5. Al-Manar, xiv, 9 (1911), pp.713-17, "Mashruʿ al-Aṣfar" (as the title indicates, this article was occasioned by the renewed attacks on al-Aṣfar's project in summer 1911 - see above, pp.272-3).
6. For Rashid Riḍa's views on this point, see Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp.235-6.

course of this article, Riḍa defined the nature of the "Zionist danger", as he saw it. He argued that the Syrians required large agricultural, industrial and commercial projects to develop their land (bilad). To this end, the Syrians were not only greatly in need of European finance, but they also had to come in contact with and work alongside Europeans in order to learn all kinds of technical skills from them. Riḍa referred the Syrians to the example of Egypt which had progressed markedly through European investment. He then applied a syllogistic form of argument to his thesis: his major premise was as stated - Syria needed develcpment for which capital was required; his minor premise was that Jews controlled European finance. These premises yield the conclusion that the Syrians must be prepared to accept aid from Jews. Riḍa held that the alternative - to reject this aid and to do without development - meant poverty and ruin. The "Zionist danger" was, he believed, confined to one thing: namely, the Zionists' "taking possession of the Holy Land". Everyone, within whose power it was to make the Ottoman Government prevent this, was duty-bound to do so as vigorously as possible. The danger in employing foreign capital, Jewish or otherwise, was two-fold: first, the local population and the Government could be drowned in debts; and, second, foreigners could gain a hold on the country (bilad) by acquiring most or much of its land (arḍ). But, if the Zionist danger and the dangers inherent in foreign capital could be overcome, Riḍa saw no objection to calling on Jewish capital. And,

given his theory that, in addition to European capital, the Syrians required to work alongside Europeans in order to learn from them, it was not too long a step for Riḍa to reconcile himself to the Zionists' presence in Palestine - on condition, of course, that they could be prevented from taking over the country. Riḍa worked out this corollary to his original argument over the next eighteen months and, by his own admission, came to the conclusion in spring 1913 that it was necessary for the Arabs to make a compact with the Zionists.[1]

* * *

Hochberg did as Najjar had requested and repeated the contents of the latter's letter to Dr. Jacobson, who relayed the proposal contained in it to the Zionist Central Office in Berlin with the suggestion that Hochberg be dispatched forthwith to Cairo and perhaps to Beirut as well.[2] Jacobson recommended Hochberg for a number of reasons: since he held no official position in the Zionist Movement, any initial contacts which he might make could not be regarded as "too official"; as the editor of an important daily in Constantinople, he was well-connected with Ottoman politicians of all shades of opinion and therefore had easy access to all groups; he had lived in Palestine for a long time and knew the Arabs and their language well.[3] This suggestion was

1. CZA L2/94/I, extracts translated into German from a Hebrew letter by Nissim Malul (Cairo) to Zionist Office (Jaffa), dated 6/7.6.1914. Riḍa told Malul that he had proposed an Arab-Zionist entente "fifteen months ago", i.e. ca. March 1913 (in the German translation this reads "fifteen years ago", but the context and all other available evidence makes it clear that this rendering is a slip).
2. CZA Z3/45 (10.4.1913), Jacobson to Lichtheim.
3. Loc.cit.

accepted without delay by the Zionist Central Office. As a result, Hochberg arrived in Cairo at the end of April; from there he travelled to Beirut, where he met members of the Reform Committee; and then, his task completed, he returned to Constantinople in the middle of May.

In his report on his mission Hochberg stated that he met twenty members of the Decentralisation Party and the Beirut Reform Committee.[1] He mentioned only four of them by name: of the Decentralisation Party, Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm (President) and Salim Najjar; of the Beirut Reform Committee, Aḥmad Muḫtar Bayhum Bey (who arrived in Cairo at the same time as Hochberg) and, in Beirut, Rizq Allah Arqash. Later evidence shows that in Cairo Hochberg also met Iskandar Bey ʿAmmun and Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm (respectively Vice-President and Secretary of the Decentralisation Party)[2] and, in Beirut, Shaykh Aḥmad Ṭabbarah (editor of al-Ittiḥad al-ʿUthmani).[3] Moreover, it may reasonably be assumed that in

1. CZA Z3/114 (17.5.1913), Hochberg (Consple.), "Le mouvement arabe". The second part of this report, entitled "L'attitude du mouvement arabe envers les israélites et le sionisme", was published in Alsberg "ha-She'elah ha-ʿarabit", pp.187-94. The first part of the report (not reproduced, loc.cit.) is an intelligent appraisal of the political factors leading to the emergence of the Arab movement.
2. CZA Z3/114 (10.6.1913), Hochberg (Paris) to Jacobson (Berlin) enclosing a report on the Arab Congress, in which Iskandar Bey ʿAmmun is mentioned; & ha-Ḥerut, v, 196 (18.5.1913), where a resolution concerning Ottoman Jews, adopted by the Decentralisation Party, is printed. This resolution was passed on 30.4.1913 (whilst Hochberg was in Cairo) and was signed by Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm, as Secretary of the Decentralisation Party.
3. Le Jeune-Turc, v, 150 (1.6.1913).

Cairo Hochberg talked to Da'ud Barakat (as the first public advocate of an Arab-Zionist entente) and to Khalil Zayniyyah (a member of the Beirut Reform Committee who came to Cairo with Ahmad Bayhum).[1] Thus a possible total of nine out of the twenty Arabs whom Hochberg met can be identified, leaving eleven unknown.

Regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine, Hochberg reported that there was "anxiety or at least uncertainty".[2] But since no official position had been adopted as yet by either the Decentralisation Party or the Beirut Reform Committee, Hochberg found that everyone whom he talked to still adhered to his personal views. Four discernible attitudes could be recognised. To Hochberg's surprise those most favourably inclined towards Jewish immigration were Arab Christians, who explained that they were a minority group in Syria and, in addition to the economic arguments in favour of Jewish immigration, they welcomed the influx of Jews because it would help to counterbalance the superior numbers of Muslims in the area.[3] Indeed, according to Hochberg, some of them went so far as to say:

1. See FO 195/2451/2129, no.36 (28.4.1913) & FO 371/1775/26655, no.47 (30.5.1913), both Cumberbatch to Lowther, re. the departure of Ahmad Bayhum and Khalil Zayniyyah from Beirut on 27.4.1913. There is no suggestion either in these despatches or in Hochberg's report that these two members of the Beirut Committee were sent to Cairo in connection with Hochberg's mission.
2. CZA Z3/114 (17.5.1914), Hochberg (Consple.), "Le mouvement arabe". The following account of Hochberg's activities in Cairo and Beirut is based entirely on this report.
3. Hochberg did not indicate how many Christian Arabs he met or what their denominations were. Iskandar Bey 'Ammun was a Maronite; Rizq Allah Arqash and Khalil Zayniyyah were Greek Catholics; Salim Najjar was perhaps a Greek Orthodox and Da'ud Barakat was possibly a Greek Catholic.

> "Nous voudrions même que les israélites formassent en Palestine la majorité et réussissent à y former une autonomie israélite proprement dite qui tiendrait en deux cette masse compacte musulmane qui peuple les vastes contrées contiguës telle que la Mésopotamie, la Syrie, l'Egypte, le Hedjaz et le Yémen".1

The second and third attitudes were those of Muslims - some of whom were willing to accept Jewish immigration without reservation, while others would only agree to it on certain conditions. The latter wished, for example, to fix the number of immigrants annually, to limit the extent of land that Arab peasants were entitled to sell to the immigrants so that the peasant could never be wholly dispossessed,[2] and

1. CZA Z3/114 (17.5.1913), Hochberg (Consple.), "Le mouvement arabe". This statement sounds less far-fetched when read in conjunction with a letter dated 12.3.1913 (reproduced in La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne, pp. 50-4), of which two of the signatories are Rizq Allah Arqash and Khalil Zayniyyah. This letter, addressed to the French Consul-General in Beirut, lamented the situation of the Christians in Syria, which had especially deteriorated since the Balkan War, because (i) taxes had been increased, (ii) Muslim ill-feeling towards the Christians had heightened as the latter were held responsible for the disasters in the Balkans, and (iii) the Christian community was steadily being weakened through constant emigration from Syria.
2. Hochberg believed that this condition had been inspired by a proposal to pass a law in Egypt whereby a peasant's creditors could only take possession of whatever land he owned in excess of a minimum of five feddans, this minimum being always to remain in the peasant's hands. However, fifteen months earlier, Shakib Arslan, a respected writer on politics and Islamic reform, had published an article in al-Muqaṭṭam in reply to an earlier one by Nissim Malul, in which he had argued that the Jews must agree to restrictions on their right to acquire land, in order that the Arab smallholder might be protected - see CZA L2/167, press report [undated and unsigned] for details of Malul's article which appeared on 12.1.1912, and for details of Shakib Arslan's reply which appeared on 15.1.1912. Shakib Arslan was a supporter of the CUP and did not sympathise with the Decentralisation Party; however, as a close friend of Rashid Riḍa, he was in a position to influence their counsels - see Hourani, Arabic Thought, p.303. Shakib Arslan may well have been in Cairo at the time of

Cont'd p.356 .....

to impose immigration legislation similar to that in America whereby every immigrant was required to bring with him a certain sum of money so that he would not become a burden on the country. Of the twenty nationalists whom Hochberg met, only two - both Muslims - declared themselves opposed to Jewish immigration. Their position was the converse of that of the Christians who welcomed the influx of Jewish immigrants; these two Muslims were opposed just because the Jews represented a European element which would break the compact Arab mass whose force derived from the very unity of its language and customs. Some of those who favoured Jewish immigration entertained doubts of another kind, for they felt that discussions with the Zionists should not take place before the Arab movement had consolidated itself, lest the movement's leaders should play into the hands of their enemies, especially the CUP, who might accuse them (as they had previously accused the CUP) of "selling the country to the Jews".

Hochberg gained the impression that a majority within both Arab groups in Cairo and Beirut wished to make an entente with the Zionists. He indicated to them that the Zionists would probably be unwilling to enter into such an arrangement unless the Arabs integrated Zionist demands into their programme, since it was "natural and logical" that the Zionists would not be eager "to contribute to the formation of a force which could turn itself against them". In any

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Hochberg's visit - see FO 371/1775/24349, no.39 (13.5.1913), Cumberbatch to Lowther, reporting that recently Arslan had been travelling to and fro between Constantinople and Cairo.

event it was recognised that no entente could be made until the "First Arab Congress" was held in June, since any agreement would require a special meeting of all Arab nationalist groups in Syria and Palestine which could only be convened after this Congress. In the meantime, however, the following entente verbale was made between the Decentralisation Party and Hochberg:

> "1) Le Comité du Caire étant en principe favorable à l'immigration juive en Syrie et en Palestine et à une entente avec les sionistes se fera un devoir de travailler pour un rapprochement du monde arabe avec le monde israélite et de dissiper par sa propagande orale et par la voie de la presse arabe tous les préjugés qui avaient jusqu'ici cours dans le monde arabe au sujet de l'immigration juive et qui empêchaient le rapprochement arabo-israélite.
>
> "2) En échange 'Le Jeune Turc' se fera un devoir d'appuyer la cause du mouvement arabe tant qu'elle demeurera compatible avec l'unité et l'intégrité de l'Empire. 'Le Jeune Turc' fera tout son possible pour que les journaux européens (surtout allemands) avec lesquels il est en relations en fassent de même "[1]

Hochberg reported that both parties regarded this entente verbale as an "exchange of services" to prepare the ground and, especially, to attune Arab public opinion for an accord complet in the future.

Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm, the President of the Decentralisation Party (who, it will be recalled, wrote an anti-Zionist article for al-Ḥaḍara at the end of 1910 - see above, p.216), now prepared a special statement for the press, in which he declared that "we appreciate too well the precious combination which Jewish capital, manpower and intelligence can

1. CZA Z3/114 (17.5.1913), Hochberg, "Le mouvement arabe".

bring us for the rapid development of our provinces to commit the error of refusing them".[1] Immigration legislation would, he thought, be necessary, but not along the lines of the "exceptional measures" which had been prescribed under Abdülhamid and which - in theory, at least - were still in force. This statement was approved by other members of the Decentralisation Party. Salim Najjar, for his part, undertook to write a series of articles on the subject of an Arab-Zionist entente which would appear in the Arabic press under the signatures of various members of the Decentralisation Party.

As has been mentioned, Aḥmad Bayhum, a prominent member of the Beirut Committee, had come to Cairo at the same time as Hochberg. He took part in the discussions there and then directed Hochberg to Beirut where the entente verbale between himself and the Decentralisation Party was accepted by the Reform Committee as well. Rizq Allah Arqash, a member of that Committee, also prepared a statement for the press in which he, like Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm, stressed the advantages to be gained from the Jews' capital, culture and technical abilities.[2]

In May and June the parties to the entente verbale took the first steps to implement it. The Decentralisation Party had passed a resolution on April 30th (while Hochberg was in Cairo), assuring Ottoman Jews of equal rights in a decentralised administration. This resolution and the statements prepared by both Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm and Rizq Allah Arqash were incorporated into a long series of articles

1. CZA Z3/114 (17.5.1913), Hochberg, "Le mouvement arabe".
2. Loc.cit.

about the Arab movement in ha-Ḥerut, some of which were signed by Nissim Malul.[1] After returning to Constantinople, Hochberg published a series of leading articles in Le Jeune-Turc entitled "Les réformes dans les provinces arabes".[2] Like Malul, he too incorporated the statements by Rafiq Bey and Rizq Allah Effendi into his articles. He also printed a further statement made by Shaykh Aḥmad Ṭabbarah in Beirut guaranteeing the rights of Ottoman Jews according to the Reform Committee's programme.[3] The Arab nationalists began to do as they had promised as well. In June, ha-Ḥerut noted that the statements prepared in Cairo and Beirut had been published in al-Shaʿb [Cairo?] and al-Iṣlaḥ (which had begun to appear in Beirut in May under the editorship of Aḥmad Ṭabbarah).[4] And in July, the Zionist Office in Jaffa reported that the tone of articles in the Arabic press on the Zionist issue had recently become appreciably milder: ~~in discussing the Zionist issue~~ no longer were there "furious articles" like those which had been current six months earlier when the Arab movement was at its initial stages of organisation (see above, p.338); even al-Muqtabas, said this report, was showing "a certain restraint".[5] This would suggest that the Decentralisation

1. Ha-Ḥerut, v, 182 (1.5.1913); ibid. 183 (2.5.1913); ibid. 184 (4.5.1913); ibid. 185 (5.5.1913); ibid. 189 (9.5.1913); ibid. 190 (11.5.1913); ibid. 191 (12.5.1913); ibid. 196 (18.5.1913); ibid. 197 (19.5.1913); ibid. 205 (28.5.1913); ibid. 212 (5.6.1913); ibid. 216 (10.6.1913); & ibid. 219 (15.6.1913).
2. Le Jeune-Turc, v, 145 (27.5.1913); ibid. 147 (29.5.1913); ibid. 150 (1.6.1913); & ibid. 154 (5.6.1913).
3. Ibid. 150 (1.6.1913).
4. Ha-Ḥerut, v, 216 (10.6.1913); & ibid. 219 (15.6.1913); cf. CZA Z3/114 (27.6.1913), Hochberg (Paris) to Jacobson (Berlin).
5. CZA Z3/115 (25.7.1913), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to [ZAC], [unsigned copy].

Party and the Reform Committee had instructed those newspapers over which they had some influence to moderate their treatment of the Zionists, in accordance with the terms of the entente verbale which aimed at dissipating "all the prejudices which until now ... have prevented an Arab-Jewish rapprochement".

* * *

The First Arab Congress took place in Paris from June 18th to 23rd. The proceedings of the plenary sessions were later published by the Decentralisation Party in a book entitled al-Mu'tamar al-'arabi al-awwal,[1] where telegrams received in support of the Congress are also printed.[2] Ernest Dawn found that "a total of 387 names appear on these telegrams", and of the signatories a large proportion (over a third) were Palestinian Arabs.[3] Of these, many were "obviously village elders and headmen".

> "The adherence of such persons to the nationalist movement is undoubtedly the result of instigation by the Palestinian notables."[4]

Dawn does not attempt to answer the question which his observation begs: why did notables in Palestine particularly go out of their way to encourage village shaykhs to send telegrams to the First Arab Congress? This question cannot perhaps be answered satisfactorily, but it is curious to note that in Palestine notables and village shaykhs were disproportionately active in expressing their support for the Congress in Paris.

1. Decentralisation Party, al-Mu'tamar al-'arabi al-awwal (Cairo, 1913). 2. Ibid. pp.150-210.
3. Dawn, "Rise of Arabism", p.149.
4. Ibid. p.150.

Officially the Congress was attended by twenty-four delegates and unofficially by a larger number of observers and others who remained in the background. One of these latter was Sami Hochberg, who arrived in Paris about ten days before the Congress opened. On the agenda was an item called "Migration from and to Syria". Hochberg discovered that almost all the delegates were opposed to the Turkish Muslims who were emigrating from Thrace and Macedonia on account of the Balkan Wars and whom the Central Government wished to introduce into the Arab provinces.[1] On the question of Jewish immigration, Hochberg found that the delegates variously retained the four attitudes which he had encountered in Cairo.[2] Hochberg had not met in Cairo the Chairman of the Congress, ʿAbd al-Ḥamid al-Zahrawi (a former deputy from Hama in the Ottoman Parliament and an editor of al-Ḥaḍara in Constantinople). However, Iskandar Bey ʿAmmun, the Vice-President of the Decentralisation Party, whom, it seems, Hochberg had met in Cairo, spoke with al-Zahrawi about Jewish immigration into Palestine and won his agreement that this immigration was "not only desirable but necessary".[3] Shaykh Aḥmad Ṭabbarah of Beirut was to make the major speech

1. La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne, p.52. It is interesting to note that in August 1913 the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem was asked by the Central Government for information about Zionist colonies in Palestine "in order to organise the colonisation of Macedonian immigrants". The Mutasarrif requested Albert Antébi to supply him with the necessary data - see JCA 268/no.218 (31.8.1913), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
2. CZA Z3/114 (10.6.1913), Hochberg (Paris) to Jacobson (Berlin). This and other letters mentioned in the subsequent notes which Hochberg sent from Paris were published in Alsberg "ha-She'elah ha-ʿarabit", pp.195-206.
3. CZA Z3/114 (10.6.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson.

on the immigration issue. According to Hochberg, he had at first shown himself to be a little hostile to Jewish immigration,[1] but he had "changed his mind".[2] Hochberg felt that there was nothing to fear because the commission at which Ṭabbarah's speech was to be prepared would eliminate everything which could be considered unfavourable to Jewish immigration.[3]

Ṭabbarah made his speech to the plenary session on June 21st. He took the Ottoman Government to task for failing in its obligations to the Syrians and thus causing the large emigration from the country in recent years. He discreetly avoided all direct reference to Jewish immigration (and the concomitant land purchases by Jews), preferring instead to adopt a somewhat ambiguous position. People, he said, were divided into two schools of thought as regards immigration to Syria. One group disapproved of non-Arab immigration, fearing its possible effects on the local population; the other group did not share these fears but, on the contrary, reckoned the immigration to be a gain for Syria. As for himself, Ṭabbarah felt that there could be no harm in the immigration - "if it has a special form of organisation [niẓam khaṣṣ]".[4]

1. Aḥmad Ṭabbarah's al-Ittiḥad al-ʿUthmani was regarded by the French Vice-Consul in Haifa as an anti-Zionist newspaper - see Q d'O N.S. 121 [no number], (30.4.1914), French Vice-Consul (Haifa) to Couget.
2. CZA Z3/114 (16.6.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson.
3. Loc.cit.
4. Al-Muʾtamar al-ʿarabi, pp.92-3; cf. CZA Z3/114 (24.6.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson.

A resolution was proposed in favour of such immigration as was capable of benefiting Syria economically. In the discussion which followed Khayr Allah Effendi Khayr Allah, a delegate representing the Arabs in Paris, spoke against Turkish immigration and said that only an immigration of people of means could be useful to the Arab provinces. At this, Aḥmad Bayhum exclaimed "Jewish immigration: yes; but Turkish immigration: no!".[1] There were some murmurs from the Arab students who had assisted in organising the Congress, but none spoke out against this remark. All the speakers, however, concurred with Khayr Allah Effendi in opposing Turkish immigration. Since the executive of the Congress wished to avoid any pronouncements which were liable to anger the Ottoman Government, al-Zahrawi, as Chairman, thought it wisest to close the discussion at this point and thus the resolution, which might have been amended to deplore Turkish immigration, was dropped.[2]

Two days after the Congress, ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khalil, leader of the Arab nationalist group in Constantinople, came to Paris with the draft of an agreement made between himself, on behalf of the Arabs, and Talât Bey, on behalf of the Government. Representatives of the Government were expected in Paris within two or three days to discuss this agreement in detail and Hochberg was sure that it would be accepted.[3] Al-Zahrawi and ʿAbd al-Karim Effendi informed Hochberg that they were of the opinion that an official entente should also

1. CZA Z3/114 (24.6.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson.
2. Loc.cit.
3. CZA Z3/114 (25.6.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson.

be made with the Zionists.[1] A day later, on June 26th, al-Zahrawi told Hochberg that he and his colleagues believed that Jewish immigration should be encouraged on two conditions: (i) that the immigrants become Ottoman subjects, and (ii) that Arab peasants were not displaced from land sold to Jews.[2] However, "adversaries" of Jewish immigration had conducted a campaign against Zionism.[3] The nationalists in Paris wished either "to win over these adversaries by persuasion or to impose their views in the matter".[4] Attempts at suasion could be initiated immediately through the Arabic press, but nothing could be imposed until the nationalist leaders enjoyed genuine authority in the Arab world; and this would not be theirs before the Ottoman Government began to fulfil the Arabs' demands thanks to their efforts. They preferred at this stage to make a secret entente with Hochberg, since they considered it ill-advised for Zionist leaders to come to Paris to conclude an official entente, which would quickly become public knowledge and so might prejudice both the Arab and Zionist causes. According to Hochberg, this secret entente would serve as the basis for an "entente définitive", to be made later in Constantinople with Zionist leaders. Hochberg therefore wrote to

1. CZA Z3/114 (25.6.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson.
2. CZA Z3/114 (26.6.1913), same to same.
3. Loc.cit. Hochberg did not make it clear if these "adversaries" were present at the Congress in Paris or whether they were the Arab opponents of Jewish immigration who had voiced their opinions in the press over the last four years; the context suggests the second alternative, although it could equally embrace both.
4. Loc.cit.

Dr. Jacobson who was then in Berlin asking for instructions and for the Zionists' terms for the proposed secret entente.[1]

Whilst awaiting a reply, Hochberg obtained a statement from al-Zahrawi in the form of an interview for Le Jeune-Turc. Al-Zahrawi associated himself with the published statements made by Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm, Rizq Allah Arqash and Shaykh Aḥmad Ṭabbarah concerning Jewish immigration.[2] He then declared:

> "Au cours de ce congrès j'ai lancé une formule qui a eu beaucoup de succès, parce qu'elle s'accordait parfaitement avec la mentalité et l'état d'esprit des congressistes, à savoir:
>
> > 'Les Juifs du monde entier ne sont que des émigrés syriens, à l'instar des émigrés syriens chrétiens qui se trouvent en Amérique, à Paris et ailleurs. Comme ceux-ci, ceux-là aussi ont la nostalgie de leur pays natal.'
> >
> > ....
>
> "Nous sommes même sûrs que nos frères israélites du monde entier sauront nous prêter leur concours tant pour faire triompher notre cause commune que pour le relèvement matériel et moral de notre pays commun "[3]

This statement appeared in Le Jeune-Turc (which had temporarily changed its name to L'Union) on July 16th.[4]

The Zionist Executive must have deemed it inappropriate for Hochberg, who held no official position in the Zionist Movement, to make a secret entente with the Arab nationalists. Consequently Dr. Jacobson hastened to Paris himself, where he conferred with Hochberg on June 28th. Thereupon he reported to the Zionist Executive that an entente with the Arabs

1. CZA Z3/114 (26.6.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson; & CZA Z3/114 (25.6.1913), same to same, requesting a minimum programme of the Zionists' terms for such an entente.
2. CZA Z3/114 (27.6.1913), same to same. 3. Loc.cit.
4. L'Union, i, 29 (16.7.1913).

would probably not be discussed; instead, he hoped merely to obtain declarations from the most important Arab leaders present in Paris which could be used by the Zionists in Constantinople to influence the Ottoman Government to relax the restrictions on Jewish settlement and land purchases in Palestine.[1] He also mentioned that he was to meet al-Zahrawi and Aḥmad Bayhum on June 30th or July 1st; and although no account of this meeting was found, it is clear in the light of later events that Jacobson did not succeed in obtaining the declarations he desired. The draft agreement between the Government and the Arabs which ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khalil had brought from Constantinople had been accepted in principle and, it would appear, the Arabs in Paris were now unwilling to commit themselves to more than had already been said to Hochberg.

The first "round of negotiations" (if they can be called such) between Arab nationalist leaders and the Zionists came to an end at this point. While in Paris, Hochberg reported that he had acted as mediator between the Arabs and Turks: he had introduced some of the Arab delegates to Batzariya Effendi who had come to Paris before the Congress and he had suggested a plan to Cavid Bey, who also was in Paris, to appease the Arabs by forming a new cabinet with ʿAbd al-Ḥamid al-Zahrawi and Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm as ministers;[2] he also wrote that he had cabled this plan to Talât Bey through Ahmed Agayev in Constantinople.[3] From his letters there is

1. CZA Z3/114 (29.6.1913), Jacobson (Paris) to ZAC.
2. CZA Z3/114 (16.6.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson (Berlin).
3. CZA Z3/114 (24.6.1913), same to same.

little doubt that Hochberg thought he was performing a diplomatic role of the greatest importance, from which the Zionists would reap the benefits once the Turks and Arabs had been reconciled through his efforts. However, there is room to suspect that Hochberg (and the Zionists) were being duped. The Turks and the Arabs had no need for Hochberg, a Jewish newspaper editor, to act as their go-between. The Ottoman Government was well aware of the Arabs' demands and the Arabs did not lack their contacts who were close to Government circles. It is not impossible that the Decentralisation ~~Party~~ had initiated ~~its~~ their overtures to the Zionists and encouraged Hochberg's presence in Paris in order to strengthen their position in negotiating with the Government; should Arab demands not be satisfied, they could say, an agreement would be made with the Zionists, directing Jewish capital and influence in the European press against the Turks in exchange for some concessions in Palestine. If this was so, then the proposal of an Arab-Zionist entente was not an "affaire" but a clever political manoeuvre.

* * * * *

CHAPTER NINE

TOWARDS AN "ALLIANCE ISLAMO-JUIVE": 1913-1914

The Relaxing of the Government's Position

As explained in the foregoing chapter, the Haham Başi's takrirs petitioning for the abolition of the restrictions against the Jews in Palestine were forwarded by the Minister of Internal Affairs to the Vali of Beirut in March 1913 for the latter's comments (see above, pp.336-7). In May, Sami Hochberg came to Beirut from Cairo in connection with his mission to meet Arab nationalist leaders and took the opportunity of paying a visit to the Vali, bearing a letter of recommendation from Dr. Esad Paşa (see above, pp.332 & 335). Hochberg told the Vali that "le gouvernement et le Comité voudraient poursuivre une politique bienveillante envers les israélites et désiraient leur donner absolument satisfaction dans cette question et que le Dr. Essad Pacha m'a prié de lui en parler".[1] It is true that Hochberg's visit came not long after Dr. Esad Paşa had conveyed Talât Bey's proposal of an "alliance islamo-juive" to Dr. Jacobson, but Hochberg's account of his meeting with Hazim Bey rather suggests that he took fuller advantage of Dr. Esad Paşa's recommendation than ~~may~~ might have been intended. Hazim Bey assured Hochberg that he believed Jewish immigration to be "utile et inoffensive" and that in a few days he would reply to the Minister of Internal Affairs "catégoriquement contre le maintien des mesures restrictives".[2]

1. CZA Z3/114 (17.5.1913), S. Hochberg (Consple.), "Le mouvement arabe". 2. Loc.cit.

It must be borne in mind that the Vali was new to his post, as he had only been appointed after the CUP coup d'état in January, 1913. In March Elie Krause reported from Sejera that on account of the Balkan War prices had risen sharply: for example, the cost of corn had doubled; consequently thefts on the colonies had multiplied, "since, when the peasant has no bread, he becomes a thief to procure it".[1] However, incidents of this kind were scarcely grave enough to come to the new Vali's attention and they did not affect the Jewish colonies alone. Thus Hochberg could quote the Vali in Le Jeune-Turc as saying:

> "J'ai étudié ces questions [des takrirs]; mon opinion peut se résumer de la manière suivante. L'immigration juive est utile à l'empire en général, et favorable, en particulier, au relèvement des provinces où elle a lieu, [et] elle est de plus absolument inoffensive."[2]

The Vali may have had second thoughts if he had been more familiar with popular feeling in the north of Palestine or had he made his statement somewhat later, for at the end of May a Jewish guard on Merhavya was killed by Arabs from Zir'in,[3] and in the summer there were further reports of tension between Arabs and Jews in Haifa.[4]

In Jerusalem, the post of Mutaṣarrif remained vacant for some six weeks after Tahir Bey's resignation in January (see above, p.321). In the middle of March it was taken up by Mecid Şevket Bey.[5] A report in ha-Ḥerut stated that

1. JCA 271/no.356 (14.3.1913), E. Krause (Sejera) to JCA (Paris).
2. Le Jeune-Turc, v, 154 (5.6.1913).
3. CZA L18/275 (1.6.1913), Y. Jacobson (Merhavya) to J. Hankin (Haifa).
4. Ha-Ḥerut, v, 275 (20.8.1913); & ibid. 278 (24.8.1913).
5. The Near East, iv, 100 (1913), p.609.

Mecid Bey had worked for twenty years in the provincial service; he had held the post of "Director of Political Affairs" in many provinces and, having at one time been Governor of Chios, he now came to Jerusalem from Amasya in Anatolia.[1] Shortly after his arrival, the Minister of Justice sought his opinion on the Haham Başi's takrirs as well.[2] When Albert Antébi met the new Mutasarrif at the beginning of April, he found him "well-disposed" but "fearful", because "his superiors, the Ministers, the [Grand] Vezir, the Committee, Parliament, are afraid of [Arab] public opinion".[3] Rather than reply to the Minister of Justice immediately, Mecid Bey chose to ask the kaymakams in the Mutasarriflik for information about the Jewish settlers and to invite their views as well.[4] About ten days later, Antébi had another conversation with the Mutasarrif when he sensed that the latter had been advised by the Central Government to shelve the matter - again, "for fear of Arab opinion".[5] In June, Mecid Bey went himself to visit Tel Aviv and a number of Jewish settlements and, if the press is to be believed, he was impressed with what he saw.[6]

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1. Ha-Herut, v, 147 (12.3.1913).
2. AIU X. E. 31 [n.d. (ca. 6.4.1913)], A. Antébi (Jerus.) to Haham Başi (Consple.); cf. CZA L2/34/I (9.4.1913), I. Neufach (Consple.) to A. Ruppin (Jaffa).
3. AIU X. E. 31 [n.d. (ca. 6.4.1913)]; cf. CZA L2/49/I (17.4.1913), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to V. Jacobson (Consple.), [unsigned copy].
4. Loc.cit.
5. CZA L2/44 (19.4.1913), Antébi to J. Thon (Jaffa).
6. Falastin, iii, 41 (11.6.1913); & ibid. 42 (14.6.1913); ha-Herut, v, 218 (13.6.1913); & ibid. 222 (18.6.1913); & The Truth, iii, 140 (15.7.1913).

Antébi reported that Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi knew of the Haham Başi's takrirs as well and was trying to influence Mecid Bey into sending a reply to Constantinople advocating the retention of the restrictions.[1] Three weeks later, at the beginning of May, Antébi wrote that Arab opponents of the Jews were "doubling their activity"; Ruḥi Bey was now publishing a book, in the preface of which he spoke "de libérer sa conscience devant l'Histoire".[2]

On July 23rd an incident occurred involving fellaheen from Zarnuqa and Jews from Rehovot, which resulted in the deaths of one Arab and one Jew. According to the Arab version of this incident, a carter from Zarnuqa was following established practice by driving his cart, laden with grapes, through a vineyard on Rehovot. He met two Arabs from his village, to whom he gave some grapes.[3] The Jewish account maintained that the Arabs stole the grapes from Rehovot.[4] An inexperienced Jewish guard in the vineyard

1. AIU X. E. 31 (11.4.1913), Antébi to Pres., AIU (Paris).
2. AIU X. E. 31 (5.5.1913), same to same. Ruḥi Bey's book did not appear as he died shortly after this date - see ha-Ḥerut, v, 282 (28.8.1913). In the preface to Ruḥi Bey's al-Muqaddima fi al-masʾala al-sharqiyya the title of this book is given as "Tarikh al-umma al-israʾiliyya wa-ʿalaqatuha bil-ʿarab wa-ghayrihim min al-uman"; in Zirakli, al-Aʿlam, iii, 64, the title is given as "Tarikh al-ṣihyuniyya". Zirakli also states that Ruḥi Bey's manuscript is located in the Khalidiyya Library in Jerusalem (Jordan) - loc.cit. It was used by ʿUmar Ṣaliḥ al-Barghuthi for an essay on Zionism which he contributed to Kurd ʿAli's Khiṭaṭ al-sham, iii, 203-31 - see idem, p.231, n. The manuscript was not made available for this study.
3. Falasṭin, iii, 64 (30.8.1913); & The Truth, iv, 151 (11.11.1913).
4. CZA Z3/1450 (24.7.1913), Thon to ZCO (Berlin).

challenged the Arabs, who disarmed him of his revolver and fled. Other guards, alerted by their companion's cries, went to his aid and pursued the Arabs in the hope of recovering the stolen revolver. The Arabs reached Zarnuqa, where, according to Jewish accounts, they claimed that an Arab had been killed by Jews.[1] As a result, a number of Arabs set out - against the advice of their elders, it seems[2] - to meet the band of Jewish guards. In the affray which ensued, one Arab was killed. Samuel Friedman, a guard from Rishon le Zion, heard the commotion and made his way to the spot from the direction of Nes Tsiyona. He was attacked and killed by peasants from Zarnuqa as well.[3] A fortnight after this incident David Leviton, of Rehovot, was murdered on the colony's border with Ramle. At first, villagers from Zarnuqa were naturally suspected by the Jews of having been responsible for this killing;[4] but shortly afterwards Dr. Thon reported from Jaffa that the blame was now thought to lie with a thief from Ramle.[5]

A few days after Leviton's death, Albert Antébi persuaded the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem to send "a favourable reply" to the Minister of Justice's inquiries about the Haham Başi's takrirs.[6] From the Zionists' point of view, it was

1. Cf. Shimon Muyal in Falasṭin, iii, 61 (20.8.1913).
2. Loc.cit.; & The Truth, iv, 151 (11.11.1913).
3. CZA Z3/1450 (24.7.1913), Thon to ZCO; cf. A.M. Koller, "Me'ora' zarnugah" in Ḥabbas, ha-'Aliyyah ha-sheniyyah, pp.288-90; and also Smilanski, Reḥobot, pp.73-6.
4. CZA Z3/1450 (5.8.1913), Thon to ZCO.
5. CZA Z3/1450 (25.8.1913), same to same.
6. JCA 268/no.215 (18.8.1913), Antébi to Pres., JCA (Paris); cf. CZA Z3/1450 (26.8.1913), Thon to ZAC (Berlin); & CZA L2/49/I (3.9.1913), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Jacobson [unsigned copy].

fortunate that Antébi succeeded in winning over Mecid Bey when he did, for by the end of August Arab anti-Zionists in the Mutasarriflik had seized on the disturbances at Rehovot and exaggerated them out of all proportion in order to excite public opinion against the Jewish settlers (see below).

* * *

At the beginning of August the Government announced a programme of administrative reforms in conformity with the agreement which had been made with the Arabs in Paris (see above, p.366).[1] On August 5th, ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khalil led an Arab delegation to express their thanks to Talât Bey (who was now Minister of Internal Affairs).[2] In his speech ʿAbd al-Karim requested inter alia that the Government make a final decision about the sale of çiftliks in Arab provinces, and especially in Palestine, "because the entry of foreigners and the exclusion of the local population from [these lands'] resources are things which do not satisfy your Excellency".[3]

At the beginning of 1913, when the Ottoman Government was desperately in need of cash, Jacobus Kann had made an offer of T£200,000 for the çiftlik at Beisan.[4] This was rejected by the Government,[5] because Najib al-Aṣfar had renewed and extended his proposal to acquire all çiftliks in

1. FO 195/2451/3619, no.65 (6.8.1913), E.C.W. Rawlins (Beirut) to C.M. Marling (Consple.); cf. [A.Daghir] Thawrat al-ʿarab (Egypt, 1916), pp.80-1.
2. Loc.cit. pp.82-3. 3. Loc.cit. p.84.
4. CZA Z3/45 (13.2.1913), Jacobson to J. Kann (Hague); & CZA Z3/45 (18.2.1913), same to ZAC.
5. Loc.cit.

Syria, Palestine and Iraq.[1] Now backed by a consortium made up of Cie. Belge du Congo, Crédit Lyonnais, Banque de Pays Bas, Société Générale, Banque Suisse and several private financiers, al-Aṣfar was offering for all these lands (amounting to about thirty million dunams in area) an initial payment of 100,000,000 francs to be followed by annual dividends.[2] Another Syrian Christian, Ḥabib Luṭf Allah Paṣa, was also interested in certain lands in the Jordan valley;[3] he made a bid of T£200-250,000 for the çiftliks at Hula, Beisan and Jericho (together amounting to about one million dunams of land).[4] The Cabinet rejected this bid, also because it considered it insufficient.[5] At the same time, the Minister of Public Works, Batzariya Effendi gave his personal approval to a suggestion which Sami Hochberg had made verbally (and without Dr. Jacobson's authorisation[6]) that the Zionists should either advance the Government T£4-500,000 in return for an option to purchase all çiftliks in Palestine at the end of one or two years or, alternatively, should buy at this price the three çiftliks in Palestine for which Luṭf Allah Paṣa had made his bid of half this sum.[7]

Arabs at Beisan, hearing that these moves were afoot,

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1. CZA Z3/45 (18.2.1913), Jacobson to ZAC.
2. Loc.cit.; & CZA Z3/45 (15.3.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson [Berlin?].
3. Q d'O N.S. 134, no.33 (21.11.1912), A. Guy (Haifa) to R. Poincaré (Paris).
4. CZA Z3/45 (15.3.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson; & CZA Z3/45 (17.3.1913), Jacobson to H. Frank (Paris).
5. CZA Z3/45 (15.3.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson.
6. CZA Z3/45 (18.3.1913), Jacobson to Hochberg.
7. CZA Z3/45 (15.3.1913), Hochberg to Jacobson.

protested against the proposed sales.[1] Al-Muqtabas alleged that Lutf Allah Paşa's interest was the same as al-Aşfar's, implying thereby that they both were Zionist agents;[2] the press also suggested that the Government was in debt to the peasants, since their contributions in taxes had set up the Agricultural Bank - this debt would be best repaid if the çiftliks were distributed to the peasants.[3]

Although the Cabinet accepted in principle al-Aşfar's revised scheme in April,[4] the project had not been taken further (perhaps because the Government was apprehensive of Arab reactions). In July, after the outbreak of the second Balkan War, Isaac Neufach in Constantinople was informed that the Government was again contemplating the sale of Abdülhamid's lands.[5] The Zionists therefore made efforts to realise sufficiently large sums to bid for çiftliks in Palestine.[6] The Arabic press, which had also been apprised of the Government's plans, began to publish violent articles against any moves to sell these lands to Zionists; Falaştin

1. Q d'O N.S. 121, no.94 (6.5.1913), F. Couget (Beirut) to S. Pichon (Paris), enclosing a translation of an open letter by Shaykh Mustafa al-Khaţib and Kamil al-Khaţib of Beisan to the Vali of Beirut which appeared in al-Karmal on 21.3.1913.
2. CZA Z3/115, Arabic press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of article which appeared in al-Muqtabas on 23.3.1913 and of earlier articles in the same paper which appeared on 13. & 21.3.1913.
3. Loc.cit. giving details of an article drawn from al-Karmal which appeared in al-Muqtabas on 10.3.1913.
4. CZA Z3/45 (24.4.1913), Jacobson (Consple.) to ZAC.
5. CZA Z3/46 (2.7.1913), "Aus dem Bericht des Herrn N[eufach]" (Consple.) to V.J[acobson], [Berlin(?)].
6. CZA Z3/1513 (20.7.1913), N. Sokolow [Berlin(?)] to L. Lipsy (New York).

was particularly vocal in this campaign.[1] Hence ʿAbd al-Karim Effendi's request to Talât Bey at the beginning of August. In the middle of the month, Albert Antébi reported that "une forte effervescence" reigned among "toutes les populations syriennes" against the sale of çiftliks to foreigners and Zionists; the "Comité Central des réformes arabes", he wrote, had dispatched a circular telegram suggesting that "protestations véhémentes" to Constantinople be multiplied.[2] And, in fact, reports were received of protest telegrams not just from Syria,[3] but from as far afield as Baghdad.[4] In response to the latter, a contributor to ha-Ḥerut wrote that Talât Bey had declared that the Government had secured the funds it required and no longer contemplated the sale of çiftliks; instead, it had set up a commission to manage the distribution of these lands to the local Arabs.[5]

In the midst of this outcry it is little wonder that Talât Bey and Sulayman al-Bustani (Minister of Commerce and Agriculture) should have told Dr. Jacobson that the restrictions on Jewish land purchase in Palestine could not be relaxed.[6] Indeed, the Central Government found it necessary to issue instructions on September 3rd, reconfirming and upholding all earlier restrictions on foreigners seeking to

1. Falastin, iii, 50 (12.7.1913); ibid. 52 (19.7.1913); ibid. 55 (30.7.1913); & ibid. 58 (9.8.1913).
2. JCA 268/no.215 (18.8.1913), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
3. CZA Z3/115, press report [undated and unsigned] and also The Near East, v, 200 (1913), p.448, both for details of a protest telegram from shaykhs and fellaheen at Beisan which had appeared in al-Mufid on 17.7.1913.
4. Ha-Ḥerut, v, 277 (22.8.1913). 5. Loc.cit.
6. CZA Z3/46 & L2/49/I (12.8.1913), Jacobson (Consple.) to ZAC.

buy land in Palestine.[1] Later that month, Jacobson went to Berlin and the Haham Başi, who passed through the city shortly afterwards, informed him that the scheme to sell Abdülhamid's lands in Palestine had, for the moment at least, passed into "les domaines de rêve et de bonnes intentions";[2] the Haham Başi had learned this from the Grand Vezir who had told him that the Government must desist from such action in view of Arab opposition.[3]

* * *

At his last meeting with the Grand Vezir, the Haham Başi was also confidentially given to understand:

> "Vous devez avant tout vous entendre avec les arabes; nous ferons le reste."[4]

This, in essence, was the CUP's dilemma. The Government was still in urgent need of financial aid and still believed that Jews in Europe could provide that aid. It had been informed that a prior condition to the Jews' support was the abolition of the restrictions in Palestine, yet it feared to take action in this direction lest the Arabs should be provoked. On the other hand, Talât Bey and other members of both the Government and the CUP's Central Committee knew not only of Hochberg's liaison with the Arab nationalists in Paris but also of the earlier contacts in Cairo and Beirut.[5] The

1. CZA Z3/1451 (20.10.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing text of order from Constantinople dated 3.9.1913.
2. CZA Z3/1642 (25.9.1913), Jacobson (Berlin) to Frank.
3. CZA Z3/47 (25.9.1913), same to R. Lichtheim (Consple.); cf. CZA L4/276/IIB (1.6.1919), C. Kalvarisky [notes].
4. CZA Z3/47 (25.9.1913), Jacobson to Lichtheim; cf. CZA Z3/55 (10.10.1915), same to same.
5. CZA Z3/114 (25.6.1913), S. Hochberg (Paris) to Jacobson mentioning that he had reported on his journey to Cairo and Beirut in April and May to Talât Bey.

Government reasoned that if the Zionists could come to some form of understanding with the Arabs, the restrictions in Palestine could be removed without too great a risk of protest, especially as Arab tempers had just recently been assuaged by the Government's yielding to their demands. And the restrictions annulled, Jewish financial support for the Empire, it was hoped, would be assured.

To this end, the Government began in autumn 1913 cautiously to relax the restrictions, even though the Zionists had not yet made a formal entente with the Arabs. It started by abolishing the Red Slip - in an ambivalent fashion. It had long been recognised that the temporary permis de séjour was a totally ineffective measure; indeed, in 1907 the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, Ali Ekrem Bey, had reported that the Jews welcomed the Red Slip, because it guaranteed their entry into Palestine whence it was all but impossible to expel them.[1] After 1908, various personages, including Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi[2] and Talât Bey himself,[3] had expressed the view that the Red Slip need not be issued, since it served no purpose.[4] In 1909, after Hilmi Paşa had indicated that there was the possibility of removing the restrictions in so far as they applied to Ottoman Jews (see above, pp.161-2), it seems that some moves had been made by

1. ISA (T) no.21 [n.d. (mid-August, 1907)], Ali Ekrem Bey, report to Sublime Porte on situation of the Jews in Palestine.
2. Ha-Ẓebi, xxvi, 29 (2.11.1909).
3. CZA Z2/8 (8.11.1909), Jacobson (Consple.) to D. Wolffsohn (Cologne).
4. Cf. CZA Z2/8 (17.5.1909), same to same, re. Ahmed Riza; L'Aurore, ii, 84 (16.12.1910), re. Kâzim Paşa (a former Vali of Beirut); & Jewish Chronicle, no.2,209 (4.8.1911), re. Riza Tevfik.

the Haham Başi to have the Red Slip abolished;[1] but these had come to nothing and it had never been done away with. In practice, the port authorities in Palestine had in recent years neglected to pay much attention to this requirement, except at intervals when local Arabs put pressure on the authorities to have the regulations properly enforced.[2]

In August 1913, at Dr. Jacobson's request, Dr. Esad Paşa and Ahmed Agayev spoke to Talât Bey who was reported to have expressed his "firm resolve" to abolish the Red Slip.[3] Talât Bey also suggested that the Zionists would be advised to speak to other members of the CUP Central Committee as well. Jacobson informed Nissim Mazliah and the Haham Başi of this and, among others, they promised to discuss the matter with Midhat Şukri, the Secretary-General of the CUP.[4] Jacobson spoke personally with Sulayman al-Bustani who, like everyone else sounded out by the Zionists, agreed that the continued issuance of the Red Slip was pointless.[5] But it was the Haham Başi's personal friendship with Talât Bey, as Minister of Internal Affairs, which finally brought about the removal of this measure.[6] The Haham Başi also spoke to

1. Ha-Herut, i, 19 (12.7.1909); AIU IX. E. 27 (10.11.1909) Antébi to Haham Başi (Consple.); RMM, vol.ix (1909), p.475; ha-Herut, ii, 57 (7.2.1910); ibid. 65 (25.2.1910); & The Truth (9.12.1910), [volume and number not known; cutting kept in CZA Z2/19].
2. Most recently in spring 1913 - see US (T), Reel 38, File 867.111/15, no.201 (6.3.1913), W. Coffin (Jerus.) to W.W. Rockhill (Consple.)
3. CZA Z3/46 (12.8.1913), Jacobson to ZAC. 4. Loc.cit.
5. Loc.cit.; cf. CZA Z3/46 (23.8.1913), Neufach to ZCO.
6. CZA Z3/47 (22.10.1913), Jacobson (Berlin), [memorandum to members of ZAC].

Talât Bey during August, who, having received replies from Beirut and Jerusalem to the Haham Başi's takrirs favouring a relaxation of the restrictions, referred the question to the CUP's Central Committee.[1] In September, the Haham Başi reported that the matter had been put into the hands of the Grand Vezir, who had said that he was going to approve the abolition but wished first to secure an imperial Irade sanctioning this.[2] On September 20th, the Grand Vezir ordered Talât Bey to abolish the Red Slip and four days later instructions to this effect were sent by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to Jerusalem and Beirut.[3]

The terms of the abolition order were significant. Only the Red Slip itself was done away with - "since it did not bring the aim and benefit which had been intended but, on the contrary, gave place to numerous abuses".[4] All other restrictions on the Jews were, however, to remain in force; strict measures were to be taken with "redoubled vigilance" to ensure that Jewish pilgrims did not prolong their stay in Palestine or settle there.[5] The Ottoman Government, it would appear, had abolished the Red Slip to please the Jews,[6] and maintained the restrictions on settlement and land purchase to appease the Arabs.[7]

1. CZA Z3/47 (22.10.1913), Jacobson (Berlin), [memorandum to members of ZAC].
2. CZA Z3/47 (25.9.1913), Jacobson to Lichtheim.
3. CZA Z3/47 (4.10.1913), Lichtheim to ZAC.
4. CZA Z3/1451 (21.10.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing German translation of no.174 [= 175(?)], (24.9.1913), Ministry of Internal Affairs (Consple.) to Mutasarriflik (Jerus.); & CZA W/129/II (22.10.1913), D. Levontin and S. Hoofien (Jaffa) to Wolffsohn, enclosing French translation of same.
5. Loc.cit.
6. Cf. FO 371/1794/58134, no.1023 (21.12.1913), Sir L. Mallet (Consple.) to Sir E. Grey (F.O.) reporting the abolition of the Red Slip as a "Zionist success".
7. Cf. CZA Z3/1451 (15.11.1913), Thon to ZAC.

The Mutasarrif of Jerusalem instructed the passport officer in Jaffa to discontinue issuing the Red Slip; at the same time he ordered the formation of a local commission in conjunction with the Ottoman authorities in the town "to decide on other more effective measures to prevent Jews from remaining in the country for more than three months".[1] The measure decided upon in Jaffa was to continue taking the Jews' passports from them as they arrived, in token of which they received a receipt.[2] As the Jews put it, the Red Slip had been substituted by a white one.[3] Jews in Jaffa and Jerusalem complained to the authorities contending that the order from the Minister of Internal Affairs had been misinterpreted. On October 16th, the Kaymakam of Jaffa wrote to his superior in Jerusalem for clarification on this point,[4] and the latter conferred with the Directors of the Secretariat and the Registry (Müdur-i Tahrirat and Müdur-i Nüfus).[5] In November, the Mutasarrif came to Jaffa and visited Tel Aviv a number of times where Meir Dizengoff (one of the township's founders, who later became its mayor) had an opportunity to speak to Necid Bey about the procedure which had been adopted by the port officials in Jaffa.[6]

1. FO 195/2452/1254, no.67 (27.10.1913), W. Hough (Jaffa) to P.J.C. McGregor (Jerus.), [copy]; & US (T), Reel 38, File 867.111/22, no.220 (28.10.1913), S. Edelman (Jerus.) to H. Philip (Consple.), [copy].
2. CZA Z3/1451 (19.10.1913), Thon to Jacobson; & ibid. (2.11.1913), same to ZAC.
3. Ha-Herut, vi, 17 (2.11.1913); & CZA L2/49/I (8.11.1913), Thon to ZAC.
4. CZA Z3/1451 (25.11.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing copy of letter no.326 (18.11.1913), Mutas. (Jerus.) to Kay. (Jaffa) in reply to inquiry from latter dated 16.10.1913; cf. CZA Z3/1451 (21.10.1913), Thon to ZAC.
5. CZA Z3/1451 (25.10.1913), Thon to ZAC.
6. CZA Z3/1451 (25.11.1913), same to same.

In the middle of the month, Mecid Bey ordered the Kaymakam to stop taking the Jews' passports from them as they entered Palestine; the passports were to be returned to their owners after they had been endorsed with the date of arrival and after the passport officer had made a copy of all the particulars contained in them; at the end of every month, a detailed list of all the Jews who had entered Palestine was to be sent to Jerusalem.[1] The Kaymakam was reminded that the prohibition against Jewish settlement in Palestine was still in force and had to be implemented.[2] Thus the Jews were no longer issued with a Red Slip and were allowed to retain their passports but, for all practical purposes, the prohibitions against them in Palestine had in no way been altered.

In Constantinople the Haham Başi again called on the Grand Vezir, Talât Bey and others.[3] In the capital, Cabinet ministers, including Sulayman al-Bustani, led the Zionists to believe that the "prevarication" in Jaffa was an attempt by local officials to obtain bribes from Jews entering Palestine.[4] However, the Zionists in Constantinople had misunderstood the abolition order, not the officials in Palestine. The former had assumed (or perhaps had been misled into thinking) that with the abolition of the Red Slip

1. Encls. to Thon's letter cited in preceding note: no. 326 (18.11.1913), Mutas.(Jerus.) to Kay. (Jaffa); & no. 331 (20.11.1913), same to same.
2. Loc.cit.; cf. US (T), Reel 38, File 867.111/23, no.681 (9.12.1913), Edelman to Secretary of State (Washington).
3. CZA Z3/47 (3.11.1913), Neufach to ZCO; ibid. (5.11. 1913), Lichtheim to ZAC; plus many subsequent letters - ibid.
4. CZA Z3/47 (13.12.1913), Lichtheim to ZAC.

would come the right of unrestricted residence in Palestine but, as the terms of the order from Constantinople made clear this was not the case.

In December, Talât Bey told the Haham Başi that he had instructed the authorities in Jerusalem not to inconvenience the Jews.[1] Three weeks later, however, the Zionist Office in Jaffa reported that no new instructions had been received by the local authorities.[2] Jacobson again approached every sympathetic Turk he could to put pressure on the Government to have the position in Palestine modified.[3] Indirect support came from an unexpected direction - the recently appointed American Ambassador at the Porte, Henry Morgenthau.[4] At this time the Ottoman Government was hoping to secure a loan from a group of American bankers;[5] and Morgenthau, having been informed about the restrictions against the Jews by Zionists in America and also by the Haham Başi, indicated to the Government that the United States wished to see good relations between the Turks and Jews.[6]

Towards the end of January 1914, the Zionists in Constantinople were told that the Cabinet had decided at Talât Bey's suggestion to lift the three-month limit on visits made by Jews to Palestine; they were also assured that the restrictions on Jewish land purchase would be removed after the next elections (to be held in April).[7] But three weeks

1. CZA Z3/47 (13.12.1913), Lichtheim to ZAC.
2. CZA L2/49/I (5.1.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to ZAC.
3. CZA Z3/48 (23.1.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
4. Morgenthau had arrived in Constantinople as American Ambassador at the Porte in November 1913.
5. H. Morgenthau, Secrets of the Bosphorus (London, 1918), pp.23-5.
6. CZA Z3/48 (23.1.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
7. Loc.cit.

later, when a copy of Talât Bey's latest instructions to Beirut and Jerusalem was obtained, it was found that he had gone no further than reiterating that the Red Slip had been abolished, while the restrictions on land sales to Jews remained in force.[1] And from Jaffa it was reported that the authorities were continuing to take all the particulars from the passports of Jews entering the country.[2] There can be little doubt from the discrepancies between what the Zionists were told in Constantinople and what the authorities in Palestine were instructed that the Government was trying to convince the Zionists of its good intentions by giving assurances and making promises, whilst it was wary of carrying out its word for fear of arousing Arab sensitivities.

The Government next attempted another approach to the problem. A major Arab - and Turkish - objection to the Jewish immigrants was that they retained their foreign nationality after settling in Palestine. If the Jews could be induced to become Ottoman subjects, several difficulties would be eliminated at one stroke; the Arabs would be deprived of a valid ground on which to object to the Jewish settlers in Palestine; likewise the parallel Turkish fear of the immigrants would be reduced, since Great Power influence in the area through the Jews would be neutralised; and, finally, the way would be open for the Government to free Jewish entry and land purchase there. However, in most

1. CZA Z3/48 (11.2.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC, enclosing Turkish text and German translation of no.1845/2217 (31.1.1914), Min. of Internal Affairs (S.P.) to Governors (Beirut and Jerus.).
2. CZA L2/49/I (5.2.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to ZAC; & CZA Z3/1451 (19.2.1914), Ruppin to ZCO.

cases, the Jews were technically barred from becoming Ottoman subjects, because in accordance with the restrictions they were permitted to remain in Palestine for no more than three months, and consequently (in theory at least) they could never fulfil the statutory requirement of five years' residence in the Empire before naturalisation. And although official announcements appeared in the Hebrew press from time to time inviting Jews to regularise their status in the country,[1] in practice the local authorities made difficulties for Jews seeking to become Ottoman subjects.

In January 1914 the Haham Başi of Jaffa, Rabbi Ben Zion Ouziel, reported to the Haham Başi in Constantinople that when thirteen Russian Jews had attempted to become Ottoman subjects, the Russian Consul in Jerusalem had threatened to treat them as traitors and to have them arrested by his kavas.[2] In Constantinople, the Haham Başi related this to Talât Bey, who interested himself in the case and said that the Ottoman Government wished to facilitate the naturalisation of foreign Jews.[3] Legal advice was sought and on March 2nd orders were sent to Beirut and Jerusalem to accord special facilities to Jews wishing to become Ottoman subjects.[4] The wording of this order is of interest, since it underlines the Government's predicament which, in this instance, was made more difficult by an additional complication - the

1. E.g. ha-Herut, i, 24 (23.7.1909); & ibid. iii, 15 (25.11.1910); also, much earlier, ha-Zebi, xiii, 11 (11.12.1896).
2. CZA Z3/48 (23.1.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
3. Loc.cit.
4. CZA Z3/48 (11.3.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC; cf. CZA Z3/1454 (23.3.1914), Thon to ZAC.

attitude of the Great Powers. The preamble explained that since the measures to prevent Jews from settling in Palestine had been ineffective, it was believed that the objections to their settling in the country would be obviated if they took up Ottoman nationality.[1] The opinion of the "Conseiller légiste" was that it was advisable for these Jews to become Ottomans and to fulfil the obligations of all Ottoman subjects without any special concessions being made for them. The five years' residence requirement could be waived in accordance with a clause in the law of naturalisation permitting exceptional admittance to Ottoman nationality. It was recognised that should large numbers of Jews become Ottomans at one time, political questions might arise with the Great Powers. Therefore the Jews were to be accepted gradually in groups of three or four and all correspondence with foreign representatives was to be avoided; the customary practice of seeking approval from the applicant's consul could also be dispensed with.

> "In a word, deploy all possible efforts on behalf of foreign Jews who desire to be naturalised; but, on the other hand, avoid making any kind of difficulties both in their relations with the Government and in their sale of land and real estate to Jews who insist on retaining their nationality of origin."[2]

There were other indications of the Ottoman Government's efforts to ingratiate the Jews of Europe. These and the

1. CZA L2/49/I & 23/1454 (8.4.1914), Ruppin to ZAC, enclosing no.88340/937 (2.3.1914), Min. of Internal Affairs to Governors (Beirut and Jerus.).
2. Loc.cit. The last clause was necessary because the consuls were most often called in to support their Jewish protégés when the latter were trying to purchase land.

measures described above led the British Vice-Consul in Jaffa to observe in April that "the Government have lately shown themselves extremely favourable to the Zionists".[1] In February a Zionist Society, called the Ottoman Zionist Union, was allowed to open in Constantinople.[2] This was no mean concession, because shortly after the counter-Revolution in 1909 the CUP had passed a "Law of Associations" which "prohibited the formation of political associations based on or bearing the name of ethnic or national groups";[3] thereafter other national clubs were closed while the CUP endeavoured to enforce its policy of Ottomanisation. In Jerusalem, the Mutasarrif was interviewed by the editor of al-Iqdam, an anti-Zionist weekly which had recently begun to appear in Cairo (see below); the editor's questions were all framed in such a way as to evoke unfavourable comment about Jewish activities in Palestine, but the Mutasarrif refused to be drawn out and declared that the Government saw no harm in the Zionists: if it did, "then it would certainly protest against them".[4] And although the restrictions on land purchase by Jews had been re-confirmed in September 1913 (see above, pp.376-7) and explicitly upheld since then, the Zionist Office in Jaffa reported in April and May 1914 that no obstacles were being met in this connection: land was

1. FO 371/2134/22036, no.33 (29.4.1914), Hough to McGregor.
2. Ha-ʿOlam, viii, 8 (12.3.1914); & ibid. 12-13 (9.4.1914); cf. ha-Ḥerut, vi, 159 (26.4.1914).
3. Lewis, Modern Turkey, p.213.
4. Al-Iqdam, i, 12 (15.3.1914), reprinted in ha-Ḥerut, vi, 139 (25.3.1914).

being transferred to the names of foreign Jews, quietly and without hindrance.[1]

* * * *

The Hardening of the Arab Position

The First Arab Congress of June 1913 and the subsequent changes in the Government's policies towards the Jews did not meet with the approval of certain elements in Palestine and Syria. Falasṭin criticised Shaykh Aḥmad Ṭabbarah for his "one-sided" treatment of the immigration issue at the Arab Congress.[2] Although his remarks about Turkish immigration into the Arab provinces were excellent, nevertheless his approach was "harmful", because " he did not mention what dangers are connected with the immigration of the Zionists to the country [bilad], and what problems for the future are being brought by the Government's leniency towards [the Zionists] at the present time - [problems] which an immigration of people from Rumelia would not create in any circumstances".[3]

The eleventh Zionist Congress was due to be held in September 1913. At the beginning of July al-Karmal suggested that Arabs should attend this Congress to observe its

1. CZA L2/34/II (22.4.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Jacobson; & CZA Z3/1455 (28.3.1914), same to J.M. [?] Machover (Kiev); cf. FO 195/2134/22036, no.33 (29.4.1914), Hough to McGregor; & CZA Z3/449 (7.6.1914), Greater Actions Committee [minutes].
2. Falasṭin, iii, 49 (9.7.1913).
3. Loc.cit.; cf. CZA Z3/116 (17.12.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report giving details of article which appeared in al-Karmal on 26.10.1913, also criticising the First Arab Congress for not considering the Zionist question.

proceedings.[1] In the next months, al-Karmal,[2] al-Muqtabas[3] and especially Falastin[4] followed the arrangements and conduct of the Zionist Congress with keen interest,[5] though all their reports were gleaned from other newspaper sources, suggesting that no Arab observers were in fact dispatched to Vienna where the Congress took place.[6] Once again the mixed Arab attitude of antipathy to and admiration for the Zionists was apparent. On August 9th Falastin wrote:

> "We cannot but be amazed at this lively nation [umma], so superior in its members, so wondrous in its stability, so awe-inspiring in its solidarity. We wish we could see such co-operation and solidarity amongst ourselves - not between sect and sect, or town and town, or family and family, but between brother and brother, if possible".7

A month after suggesting that Arab observers should attend the Zionist Congress, al-Karmal suggested that another Arab Congress should be held, this time in Nablus, to discuss means of combating the Zionist threat. This proposal found immediate support from a contributor to Falastin, himself writing from Nablus,[8] and was also taken up by al-Muqtabas

1. CZA Z3/115 (16.7.1913), Thon to ZCO; cf. ha-Herut, v, 242 (11.7.1913).
2. CZA Z3/116 (28.9.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report, giving details of an article which appeared in al-Karmal on 16.9.1913; and ibid. (17.12.1913), same to same, enclosing press report, giving details of an article which appeared in al-Karmal on 26.10.1913.
3. CZA Z3/116 (28.9.1913); cf. CZA Z3/115, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of articles which appeared in al-Muqtabas on 6. & 13.8.1913.
4. Falastin, iii, 47 (2.7.1913); ibid. 56 (2.8.1913); ibid. 58 (9.8.1913); ibid. 68 (13.9.1913); ibid. 73 (1.10.1913); & ibid. 74 (4.10.1913).
5. Cf. ha-Herut, v, 288 (4.9.1913); & The Times, no.40,317 (15.9.1913).
6. Cf. CZA Z3/116 (28.9.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.
7. Falastin, iii, 58 (9.8.1913).
8. Loc.cit.

and al-Mufid.[1] On August 26th, Albert Antébi reported that a group, calling itself the "Anti-Zionist Society", had set up its headquarters in Nablus; he thought that this town was chosen because no Jewish element or influences were to be found there to counteract the group's activities.[2] Five days later Antébi wrote that the "Anti-Zionist Society" was gaining many adherents and was moving into its "active phase".[3] At the beginning of September, al-Muqtabas published a strong article in support of al-Karmal's proposal; Nablus had been chosen because it was a town in the middle of Palestine, in which there was "an enlightened Arab environment, youth with principles and ideals, the most zealous of nationalists" and also because (as Antébi had suspected): "Nablus is a town where the Zionists have not succeeded in doing what they have done to other towns in Palestine".[4]

> "If we remain asleep or at odds with one another, the Jews will conquer town after town, as they did four thousand years ago when every tribe was indifferent to its neighbours and gave no help to its brethren. Then the Jews conquered by force; now they will conquer by money, mutual and economic aid - and we still have not learned a lesson."5

1. Ha-Herut, v, 278 (24.8.1913); & ibid. 280 (26.8.1913).
2. JCA 268/no.217 (26.8.1913), Antébi to Pres., JCA; cf. The Truth, iv, 145 (26.8.1913). It should be noted that in 1910 the Mutasarrif of Nablus was sent a petition by notables in the town protesting against a proposal to annex the Sanjak of Nablus to the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem "so as not to be infected by the Zionist virus" - see AIU IX, E. 28 [n.d. (ca. 1.12.1910)], Antébi to H. Frank (Jaffa), [copy]; the local authorities in Nablus had also successfully resisted attempts to transfer land under their jurisdiction to Jews - cf. CZA Z2/643 (7.2.1912), Ruppin to ZAC.
3. JCA 268/no.218 (31.8.1913), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
4. CZA Z3/115 (8.9.1913), [illegible signature] & M. Wilkansky (Jaffa) to ZAC, enclosing press report, giving details of an article which had appeared in the "last number" of al-Muqtabas; this article was also reprinted in ha-Herut, v, 288 (4.9.1913).
5. Loc.cit.

On September 9th, al-Karmal published a telegram received from "young Palestinians" in Constantinople, approving his proposal;[1] and two weeks later Muḥammad Ṣalaḥ al-Ḥusayni, a notable in Jerusalem (see above, p.295), also lent his voice to al-Karmal in support of an anti-Zionist Congress.[2] But despite this current in favour of the proposal, plans for the Congress were not advanced and it was not held. However, Naṣṣar's suggestion did bear fruit: it had called into being an anti-Zionist society in Nablus which served as the model for other groups which were not long in forming (see Ch.XI).

* * *

The double killing of a Jew from Rehovot and an Arab from Zarnuqa in July followed by the death of a second Jew from Rehovot in August (see above, pp.371-2) provided Arab opponents of the Zionists in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem with an ideal pretext to step up their activities.[3] A rumour was spread "accusing the Jews of systematically persecuting the peasants";[4] the muhtars of a dozen villages around Rehovot were encouraged to petition Mecid Bey, the Mutasarrif, for the protection of their lives and property against the young Russian Jews who guarded the settlement and who "kill, pillage and violate Muslim women and girls".[5] Mecid Bey showed Antébi petitions from peasants and anonymous letters against the Jews;[6] when a Jewish delegation came to

1. CZA Z3/116 (21.9.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.
2. CZA Z3/116 (12.9.1913), [= 12.10.1913?], Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.
3. JCA 268/no.215 (18.8. 1913), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
4. Loc.cit.
5. Loc.cit. & ibid. no.219 (1.9.1913), same to same; cf. ha-Herut, v, 268 (11.8.1913); & CZA Z3/1450 (25.8.1913), Thon to ZAC. 6. JCA 268/no.215 (18.8.1913).

deliver a petition countering the charges made against them, "the Governor did not hide that he receives every day complaints and reports against Jewish activity and the colonies"[1] - complaints which, according to the Zionist Office in Jaffa, were being made by "various respected citizens".[2] Falasṭin increased its coverage of the affair with each issue until, by the end of August, the paper had to be enlarged by a supplementary sheet.[3]

One of the leaders of this campaign against the Jewish settlers was Shaykh Sulayman al-Taji, a founder of al-Ḥizb al-Waṭani al-ʿUthmani, the anti-Zionist society in Jaffa (see above, pp.270-1). At the end of August he addressed an open letter to the Mutasarrif and the Prosecutor General of Jerusalem which was published in Falasṭin under the banner of "Freedom or Slavery: Justice or Tyranny?".[4] Al-Taji claimed that the Jews had all but conquered Palestine and that the Jewish settlements surrounding Zarnuqa looked upon the village with hatred and had awaited the opportunity to destroy it which, in the event, was provided by a bunch of grapes. He demanded justice for the village instead of letting it be despoiled by the Ottoman soldiers who had come to arrest those connected with the disturbances. He also claimed that he was not speaking with any private interest at heart but that his was "one tongue from among the tongues of Arab public opinion".[5] The Zionist Office in Jaffa was not

1. JCA 268/no.217 (26.8.1913), Antébi to Pres., JCA.
2. CZA Z3/1450 (2.9.1913), Thon to ZAC.
3. Falasṭin, iii, 57 (6.8.1913); ibid. 59 (13.8.1913); ibid. 61 (20.8.1913); ibid. 63 (27.8.1913); & ibid. 64 (30.8.1913).
4. Falasṭin, iii, 64 (30.8.1913). 5. Loc.cit.

convinced that al-Taji was altogether disinterested, since he was then at odds with Jews over land which he owned in the vicinity of Tel Aviv. The full details of the dispute are not known, although it appears to have revolved around the fact that Jews in Tel Aviv had challenged his right to build on the land which he owned.[1] When, not much later, al-Taji found himself bidding against Jews for a plot of land also in the vicinity of Tel Aviv, he addressed another open letter to the Mutasarrif, which he distributed in leaflet form at the end of October.[2] Once again he demanded justice - this time for himself as well as the Arabs - and threatened to go to Constantinople to obtain it.[3] About ten days later, al-Taji submitted to Falasṭin a poem against the Zionists, which he called bluntly "The Zionist Danger".[4] This poem is important in three respects: its genre, its content and its authorship. Although political poems were a popular form of expression, this was the first example of its kind, as far as is known, to deal with the Zionist issue. It did not merely repeat the well worked theme that the homeland was being bought from under the Arabs' feet; it also threatened the Turks and appealed to God, Guardian of the Muslims. Its author, a member of a prominent family from Ramle, was a well known Islamic scholar with a record of opposition to the Zionists who continued to be in the

1. See Falasṭin, iii, 81 (28.10.1913); ibid. 84 (8.11.1913); & ibid. 85 (11.11.1913); cf. CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of these articles and commenting on them.
2. CZA Z3/116 (10.11.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report and details of al-Taji's leaflet.
3. Loc.cit. 4. Falasṭin, iii, 84 (8.11.1913).

forefront of Arab anti-Zionist activity in Palestine throughout the 1920's and 1930's.[1]

"Children of gold! stop deceiving us,[2]
because we shall not be cheated out of our homeland [awṭan] for money.
Shall we surrender it obediently whilst there remains a trace
of spirit in us? To do so would be to cripple ourselves.
Jews, the lowliest of peoples [shuʿub] and the most despicable nation
[umma] on earth,
are treating with us for our land - how shall we sleep at ease?
Their object does not deceive us;
but they are a nation [shaʿb] which possesses all the money [there is].

Our rulers! What is the matter with you? What ails you?
Is it not time to awake, to comprehend?
Our rulers! put aside unconcern and take note,
for henceforth there can be no forbearance.
Your silence has emboldened our adversaries against us.
What will you say to put us at ease and to make them depart?
The danger is being witnessed; is there no one who resists it?
Does an eye not remain to weep for the homeland [awṭan]?
Deliver the rulers a message from me,
which will alarm the courageous man and make his heart respond:
If they do not fulfil the duties of leadership,
why have they arrogated themselves into power and why do they occupy its seat?

Guardian of the faithful! have mercy upon us,
for we are the shield of the Caliphate.
A country [bilad], the lands around which God has blessed,
and a people [qawm], which enjoys the merit of religions,
are worthy of the mercy which Thou canst bestow.
If not, [the faithful] will be struck and afflicted in their sanctuary.
Bearer of the Crown! are you content that our country
should be bought and snatched away from us before our eyes?"

* * *

1. For a brief sketch of Sulayman al-Taji's family and of his activities in the 1920's and 1930's, see J. Shimʿoni, ʿArabe ereẓ yisraʾel (Tel Aviv, 1947), p.227.
2. Al-Taji worked a reference to Najib al-Aṣfar into his opening line by beginning: "Bani al-aṣfar al-rannan".

It was within this context that the Central Government began to relax its restrictions against the Jews in Palestine and it was for this reason that the Grand Vezir, Talât Bey and others spoke repeatedly of the need not to aggravate Arab feeling which was already dangerously excited - at all levels - on a number of issues, of which the Zionist question was but one. The relaxation of the restrictions was watched with displeasure. Although the abolition of the Red Slip could be accepted with relative unconcern (since it was recognised to serve no useful purpose),[1] the Arabs swiftly became persuaded that if the suggestion of the CUP's complicity with the Zionists had once been a trumped-up charge, there was no room to doubt it by spring 1914 (see Ch.X), when all external evidence pointed to an alliance between the Government and the Zionists - which did not, in fact, exist.

It can reasonably be maintained that the anti-Zionist publicists in the Arabic press had met with some measure of success. Their propaganda had moulded popular feeling in and around Palestine and, as a vehicle of Arab public opinion well known to the Government, the press must surely have

1. Cf. Falasṭin, iii, 77 (15.10.1913); ibid. 78 (18.10.1913); & CZA Z3/116 (10.11.1913), Thon to ZAC, reporting that these articles had been reprinted without further comment in al-Qabas [formerly al-Muqtabas] on 27.10.1913; cf. also Hashḳafat ha-ʿitonut ha-ʿarabit ʿal ha-yishshub, vol.i (1913), giving details of an article which appeared in al-Karmal, no.382.

played a part in inhibiting the latter's freedom vis-à-vis the Zionists. This press also scored some success on specific issues. It prevented the Government from selling çiftliks, even to groups in no way connected with the Zionists. At the end of October 1913, the Minister of Finance felt constrained to reiterate that the Government did not now intend selling these lands,[1] thereby confirming a report which had been sent from Haifa earlier that month to The Near East, saying that there was still anxiety about the matter.[2] On November 4th, an item in The Levant Herald suggesting that another project to sell Abdülhamid's lands was being considered by the Government evoked an immediate denial from the latter which was reproduced in al-Mufid, al-Karmal and Falasṭin (which had temporarily changed its name to al-Dustur).[3] In January 1914 a concession for the draining of the Hula was granted by the General Council in Beirut to Aḥmad Bayhum and a member of the Sursuq family. As the concession was granted under irregular circumstances,[4] it was immediately suspected that Aḥmad Bayhum and Sursuq were acting on behalf of the Zionists or the Jewish Colonization

1. Al-Karmal (24. & 28.10.1913); for details, see CZA Z3/116 (5. & 24.11.1913), both Thon to ZAC, enclosing press reports.
2. The Near East, v, 127 (1913), p.660.
3. Al-Dustur, i, 1 (26.11.1913); & Hashkafat ha-ʿitonut ha-ʿarabit, vol.i (1913), giving details of an article which appeared in al-Karmal, no.382; cf. CZA Z3/45 (5.11.1913), Neufach to ZAC; & ibid. (8.11.1913), Lichtheim to ZAC.
4. US (T), Reel 62, File 867.52/14, no.653 (17.2.1914), American Consul-General (Beirut) to Secretary of State (Washington).

Association,[1] although this was not the case.[2] Loud protests at this concession in the Arabic press forced the Central Government in March to overrule the General Council's decision.[3] Since 1906 Zionists in Palestine had endeavoured to secure a concession to exploit the Hot Springs at Tiberias by improving the facilities and creating a health cum tourist resort.[4] Concessions to Zionists were impossible under Abdülhamid and when the matter was taken up again in 1912, it was found that Fu'ad Sa'd, an opponent of the Zionists in Haifa (see above, pp.216-17), was also bidding for the same concession.[5] Al-Karmal and al-Mufid spoke out against granting this concession to Zionists, causing the matter to be shelved.[6] Resumed negotiations at the end of 1913 provoked more outcries,[7] which succeeded in forcing the Government to grant the concession to an Arab group in June 1914.[8] When the

1. US (T), Reel 62, File 867.52/14, no.653 (17.2.1914), American Consul-General (Beirut) to Secretary of State (Washington), enclosing translation of an article which appeared in Le Réveil on 5.2.1914; & CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of articles which appeared in al-Ahram on 21.2.1914 and al-Qabas on 24.2.1914.
2. CZA L18/246/II (24.1.1914), Lichtheim to Ruppin.
3. US (T), Reel 62, File 867.52/15, no.664 (17.3.1914), American Consul-General (Beirut) to Secretary of State (Washington); & CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of an article which appeared in al-Karmal on 27.2.1914.
4. CZA W/125/II (5.11.1906), Levontin to Wolffsohn (London).
5. CZA L18/246/II (14.7.1912), J. Hankin (Haifa) to Thon.
6. CZA Z3/44 (3.7.1912), Neufach to ZOC, giving details of an article, drawn from al-Karmal, which had appeared in the Liberal Union organ, Ifham, no.293/109 (Consple.); ha-Herut, iv, 158 (7.7.1912), giving details of articles from al-Karmal; & CZA Z3/1448 (22.7.1912), Thon to ZAC, giving details of an article which appeared in al-Mufid on 30.6.1912.
7. CZA L18/246/II (28. & 30.11.1913), both Hankin to Thon; & CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of an article which appeared in al-Karmal on 27.2.1914.
8. Ha-Herut, vi, 207 (22.6.1914).

Government reduced the obstacles to Jewish land purchases in Palestine towards the end of 1913, al-Karmal adopted a new tactic which it used to good effect in at least two instances: by expressing disbelief at reports it had heard that various lands were to be sold to Zionists and inviting disavowals of these reports, the paper was able to elicit disclaimers from Haşim Bey, the Mutasarrif of Acre, and Amir ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Jazaʾiri that the sales mentioned by al-Karmal were contemplated.[1]

* * *

In September 1913, al-Munadi, which had attacked the Zionists since spring 1912 (see above, pp.295-9), ceased to appear, because its editor had taken up a governmental post in Jerusalem and by law Ottoman officials were not allowed to edit newspapers.[2] In October, al-Muqtabas was closed down because of its radical opposition to the CUP;[3] and al-Qabas, the new paper which replaced it after a short while, decided to adopt a more prudent tone, even though

1. Al-Karmal (13.2.1914), published denial from Mutasarrif of Acre in reply to an article which had appeared in al-Karmal, no.332 - see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned]; al-Karmal (27.2.1914), questioned the truth of reports that al-Jazaʾiri was contemplating sales to the Zionists - loc.cit.; and published denial on 20.3.1914 - ibid. (9.4.1914), A. Witsky (Jaffa) to ZAC, enclosing press report; cf. a later instance of the same tactic, where Shakir Ḥammad in Cairo denied a report through al-Iqdam which he had read in al-Karmal that his father, Ḥasan Ḥammad of Nablus, was negotiating land sales with the Zionists - see CZA L2/94/I, press report [undated (ca. July 1914) and unsigned].
2. CZA Z3/116 (28.9.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.
3. Ha-Herut, vi, 3 (7.10.1913).

it was edited by Shukri al-ʿAsali.[1] In consequence, two papers which had previously been prominent in attacking the Zionists were no longer to be heard. Moreover, it would appear from the press reports compiled by the Zionist Office in Jaffa that other newspapers in Beirut and Damascus which had formerly attacked the Zionists as a means of denigrating the Government ceased to do so, either because they were intimidated by the treatment meted out to al-Muqtabas or, more probably, because they looked forward to the Government's fulfilment of its promises to the Arabs. As the Arabs lost faith in the Government for not implementing its programme of reforms as promised, so in the spring of 1914 anti-Zionist articles began to re-appear in the Beirut press (see Ch.XI). However, in the winter months of 1913/1914, al-Karmal and Falasṭin were almost alone among the press in Palestine and Syria to maintain an unmitigated concern for the Zionist issue. (Discussion of newspapers appearing in Egypt has been reserved to the next chapter.)

After autumn 1913, al-Karmal and Falasṭin added little to what had been said already. The former, referring to the Haifa correspondent of Le Journal du Caire, and the latter, basing itself on the authority of a Turkish newspaper, both repeated the allegation that Zionist progress in the country was the result of support from the German Government;[2] shortly thereafter al-Karmal and al-Qabas quoted

1. CZA Z3/116 (10.11.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.
2. Falasṭin, iii, 71 (24.9.1913); cf. an earlier editorial in Falasṭin, iii, 35 (21.5.1913).

an article from The Near East describing how Russia persecuted her Jews at home to make them emigrate to Palestine where she protected them in her own interest.[1] Falasṭin extended the area of the Jews' exclusiveness still further by making a claim (which is open to doubt) that a group called "The Society of Jewish Youth" had been formed to ensure that the Jews boycotted the local population.[2] Falasṭin was on safer ground when it attacked the informal Jewish law-courts in Tel Aviv and on some of the settlements, suggesting that such institutions were laying the basis of a "state within a state" in Palestine.[3] Self-criticism by Arabs became more frequent and more outspoken: the local population were themselves to blame for letting the Zionists gain the upper hand in Palestine since they had opened the way to the latter by selling them land, by wasting time over words and divided opinion instead of organising themselves to withstand the Zionist stream[4] - was it any wonder that The Near East wrote "it is believed that before many years

1. Al-Karmal, no.382, quoted in Hashḳafat ha-ʿitonut ha-ʿarabit, vol.i (1913); and Q d'O N.S. 123, no.101 (21.11.1913), French Consul-General (Damas.) to Pichon, for details of a similar article which appeared in al-Qabas on 17.11.1913; cf. The Near East, v, 130 (1913), p.757.
2. Falasṭin, iii, 70 (20.9.1913); for further references to this society, see ibid. 91 (27.12.1913); & ibid. 93 (3.1.1914), where its existence is denied by David Yellin - see immediately below.
3. Falasṭin, iii, 78 (18.10.1913); & ibid. 80 (25.10.1913); cf. al-Karmal (24.10.1913), where the article from Falasṭin, iii, 78 (18.10.1913) was reprinted - see CZA Z3/116 (5.11.1913), Thon to ZAC.
4. Falasṭin, iii, 85 (12.11.1913).

have passed Palestine will have become merely a Jewish land"?[1] A visit by Baron Edmond de Rothschild to Palestine and Syria early in 1914 inspired al-Iqdam (Cairo) to write a characteristic article where ʿIzzat Paşa al-ʿĀbid, "the Rothschild of the Arabs", who did nothing for his people with his millions, was contrasted unfavourably with "the Baron", whose largesse towards the Jews in Palestine over the last three decades and whose contributions to Muslim causes during his current visit to Palestine were greatly praised.[2]

An article entitled "I am going to the settlement where I want to die", which was published in al-Muqtabas at the end of August 1913, was one of the few items of special interest which appeared during these months. It took the form of a discussion between the writer, Shafiq Ḥasan, and "Jacob", an eighteen year old immigrant from Russia. The substance of the conversation between the writer and "Jacob" rings true, presenting in dialogue form the personality of one kind of Zionist "pioneer", who was convinced of his absolute right to

1. Al-Karmal (14.11.1913), quoting The Near East, v, 130 (1913), p.758; details of this article are given in the press report enclosed in CZA Z3/116 (24.11.1913), Thon to ZAC. Cf. also Falaştin, iii, 91 (27.12.1913), and al-Karmal (24.4.1914), "The newspapers are not guilty, but we are", details of which are given in CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
2. Al-Iqdam (18.3.1914), details given in CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned]; loc.cit. for several other articles on Baron Rothschild's visit: from al-Karmal (24.2.1914); al-Qabas (28.2.1914); Fatat al-ʿArab [which replaced al-Mufid in Beirut at the end of 1913], (1.3.1914); al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm (3. & 4. & 14.3.1914). Cf. also Khalil al-Sakakini, Kadha ana, ya dunya (Jerusalem, 1955), p.62 (17.2.1914): "The Arab nation has need for a man like Rothschild to spend his money in order to revive it [the nation]".

return to the land of his forefathers: this land had been taken from the Jews by force, they had suffered enough in dispersion and were now going to rebuild Palestine's desolate ruins so that it would become a model to all, no matter what the cost and irrespective of the wishes of both the local population and the Ottoman Government.[1] Late in 1913 a conflict broke out between the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden and Zionists in Palestine over the question of whether scientific subjects at the newly built technical school in Haifa were to be taught in German or in Hebrew. This dispute, which greatly excited the Jews in Palestine and led to a strike by Hebrew-speaking teachers throughout the country, was watched with interest by the Arabic press, both because it ran parallel to the Arabs' own demand for the recognition of Arabic as an official language in their provinces of the Empire and because it provided an additional score on which to attack the Zionists. David Yellin, a teacher at the Lämel school in Jerusalem and a member of the city's Municipal Council, replied to an article which had appeared in Falastin with the defence that the object of teaching Hebrew rather than German was to free Jewish children of all foreign influences and thus make them loyal to the Ottoman Empire; moreover, Yellin declared, Hebrew language teaching was not new but, on the contrary, a start had been made on it in the Alliance school over thirty years before.[2] The editors of

1. Al-Muqtabas (27.8.1913), which was reprinted in ha-Herut, v, 288 (4.9.1913); further details are given in the press report enclosed in CZA Z3/116 (16.9.1913), Thon to ZAC.
2. David Yellin in Falastin, iii, 93 (3.1.1914), in reply to a news-item in Falastin, iii, 91 (27.12.1913).

the paper, however, rejected this claim, insisting that the question had only come into existence with the appearance of the Zionists.[1] On December 28th, Osmanischer Lloyd printed a report from Haifa that notables in the ~~city~~ town had sent a telegram to the Minister of Public Instruction requesting him to prevent the teaching of Hebrew in the new technical school, as this move by the Zionists was designed "to close this institution to non-Jews", thereby endangering "the whole nation".[2] A few days later, the Zionists arranged for a second telegram to be sent from Haifa signed by thirteen Muslim notables who declared that "all the population [were] happy" that Hebrew had been chosen as the language of instruction at the school.[3] Shortly thereafter, al-Muqaṭṭam published an article on the subject by a Jewish correspondent in Jerusalem,[4] which was reproduced in Peyam (a Turkish language newspaper in Constantinople representing Arab interests);[5] this article was written in an opposite sense to the Zionist-inspired telegram from Haifa, for it maintained that Hebrew language teaching would indeed exclude Arab children from the school: it was for this reason that the Hilfsverein was opposed to instruction in Hebrew; teachers

1. Falastin, iii, 93 (3.1.1914).
2. Osmanischer Lloyd, no.309 (28.12.1913), reprinted in ha-Herut, vi, 74 (7.1.1914); cf. Falastin, iii, 94 (7.1.1914); & CZA Z3/48 (29.12.1913), ZAC to Jacobson.
3. CZA Z3/48 (6.1.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC; for the background to this telegram, see CZA L18/246/II (1.1.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Hankin; & ibid. (7.1.1914), Hankin to Thon; for text of this telegram (dated 6.1.1914) and its signatories, see Le Jeune-Turc, vi, 7 (7.1.1914).
4. Al-Muqaṭṭam, no.7,548 (24.1.1914), reprinted in ha-Herut, vi, 102 (9.2.1914).
5. Al-Karmal (17.3.1914), mentioned that this article reappeared in Peyam - see CZA L2/94/I, press report [undated and unsigned].

in Haifa were alone responsible for overturning the Hilfsverein's executive decision.[1] Al-Karmal was now in a position to attack the Zionists on two fronts: first (in view of the Zionist-inspired telegram), it was untrue that a decision had been made to teach in German and, secondly, the Zionists' justification of Hebrew as preferable to a "foreign language" was unacceptable because Hebrew itself was a foreign language in the Ottoman Empire - the Zionists' purpose in teaching in Hebrew was not loyalty to the Empire as they claimed, but simply to exclude the local population from their schools and to restrict the benefit of the school to the Jews. These points were made in two articles, the second of which was written by ʿArif al-ʿArif (see above, p.324), appearing in al-Karmal under the captions of "They are still deceiving us" and "How do they distort the truth?".[2]

In November 1913, Zionists in Palestine attempted to have both al-Karmal and Falasṭin suppressed by the local authorities.[3] Although Najib Naṣṣar was arrested, his paper was not closed down.[4] The Zionists were more successful in the case of Falasṭin which was suspended on November 14th, after an article had been published two days earlier severely criticising the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem.[5] However, the paper continued to appear, first as al-Akhbar and then as al-Dustur, until it was permitted to revert to its former

1. Ha-Herut, vi, 102 (9.2.1914).
2. These articles appeared on March 10th and 17th respectively - for details, see CZA L2/94/I, press report [undated and unsigned].
3. CZA Z3/1451 (2.11.1913), Thon to ZAC.
4. The Near East, vi, 137 (1913), p.232.
5. Falasṭin, iii, 85 (12.11.1913); cf. ibid. 89 (17.12.1913).

name one month later after an order had been received from Constantinople reprieving its editors on account of their consistent record of loyalty to the CUP.[1] In January 1914 the attacks in al-Karmal grew milder as a result of pressure on Naṣṣar exerted by Shaykh As'ad Shuqayr and Tawfiq 'Abd Allah, the President of the CUP branch in Acre, who - like As'ad Shuqayr - was a friend of Joshua Hankin, the Zionists' land-agent.[2] This change of tone in al-Karmal lasted for a brief period of about two months, during which Falasṭin took the lead as the most violent opponent of the Zionists in Palestine.[3] In the first three months of 1914 scarcely an edition appeared which did not contain one or more articles on Jewish activities in the country; sometimes a number of small items were grouped together in a column headed "The Jewish Week"; and on April 11th, a special supplement on the Zionist Movement was published.[4] Then, on April 20th, the local authorities suspended the paper on orders received from Constantinople,[5] because of an article which had appeared on April 4th, holding out "a fulminating and vague threat that when the eyes of the nation were opened to the peril

1. FO 371/2134/22036, no.33 (29.4.1914), Hough to McGregor.
2. CZA Z3/1453 (3.2.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Jacobson [copy].
3. CZA Z3/116 (23.2.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report; cf. ha-Ḥerut, vi, 155 (21.4.1914).
4. See CZA Z3/116 (23.3. & 8.3.1914), both Thon to ZAC, both enclosing press reports, together with other press reports [undated and unsigned] ibid. and also in CZA L2/94/I, giving details of articles which appeared in Falastin on January 21st, 28th & 31st; February 4th, 7th, 11th, 14th, 18th, 21st &28th; March 28th; April 4th, and of the special supplement on the Zionist Movement published on April 11th; other articles which appeared during this period have also been cited in preceding notes.
5. Ha-Ḥerut, vi, 159 (26.4.1914).

towards which it was drifting it would rise like a roaring flood and a consuming fire and there would be trouble in stroe [sic] for the Zionists".[1] Subsequent to its suspension, Falastin issued a circular to its readers and subscribers,[2] which, as the British Vice-Consul in Jaffa and his superior in Jerusalem observed, "faithfully mirrors the growing resentment among the Arabs against the Jewish invasion".[3] It is perhaps not out of place to quote the first part of this circular at length, since it is cast in language which is typical of anti-Zionist articles at the time, whilst it also puts briefly and vividly some of the leading themes in those articles, as described above.

> "It seems that in the opinion of the Central Government we have done a serious thing in drawing the attention of the nation to the danger threatened by the advancing tide of Zionism, for in the course of last week the Local Authorities received a telegram from the Ministry of the Interior ordering the suppression of our paper 'Palestine', and our committal for trial as having committed in our campaign against Zionism and our appeal to the national spirit an offence which they term 'sowing discord between the elements of the Empire'.
>
> "This is mighty well; still better is the acknowledgement by the Government of the Zionist Society as one of the elements of the Empire, in which she shows more devotion to their cause than the Zionists themselves.
>
> "They cry in their meetings, declare in their conferences, and announce in the highways and byways of Palestine, nay from the very housetops, that they are a political party whose aim is to restore Palestine to their nation and concentrate them in it, and to keep it exclusively for them. Then comes the Government saying, 'No, you are on the contrary one of the elements of our happy empire, and he who opposes you is in our

1. FO 371/2134/22036, no.33 (29.4.1914), Hough to McGregor; for a translation of this article (from Falastin, iv, 24), see ISA (G) A III 15, iv, encl. to no.794 (23.4.1914), Brode (Jaffa) to von Wangenheim (Consple.).
2. This circular was issued on or about 27.4.1914 - see CZA L2/94/II (27.4.1914), B. Ibry (Jerus.) to Ruppin.
3. FO 371/2134/22036, no.31 (30.4.1914), McGregor to Mallet.

sight a criminal bent on causing strife between those elements [']."

"How, we wonder, did the Government learn that the Zionists form one of the elements of the Empire? How can she shut her eyes to the fact, universally known, that 'Zionist' is not synonymous with 'Jew'? Have not her functionaries told her that till ten years ago the Jews were a fraternal native Ottoman element, living and intermixing with the other elements in harmony, interchanging business relations, inhabiting the same quarter, sending their children to the same school, and shadowed by one banner and one crescent. Then these accursed Zionists, composed of German revolutionaries, Russian Nihilists, and vagabonds of other countries, came with their cry ['Oh Jews, be wary of mixing with the local population lest you lose your nationality'; and everyone who did not wish to hear was made to hear that they are a 'nation' and not a 'religion' and that they are endeavouring to lease the country in order to live as an autonomous nation in an autonomous country and not simply to be a race in a country of many races.]

"They started in the first place to build special quarters for themselves, to which they gradually attracted their compatriots who were living amongst the Mussulmans and Christians, sifting them out like wheat from bran; then they boycotted the vernacular Arabic tongue, and it is no more heard in their homes and streets; then they confined the teaching in their schools to their own dead language, which is useless to the world except as a weapon of Zionism, and prevents natives from frequenting their schools and mixing with their children.

"All this and more they have done; no comment is needed on the fact that they have publicly and formally announced that they will keep their foreign nationalities till they have become able to usurp the country from its wretched inhabitants, when they will drop them and replace them by the Zionist nationality. To these things the Government asks us to be blind and deaf, and to regard them as an element of the Ottoman Empire.

["We resign the matter to God and the Government, because [the latter] is the authority in this country and it can do as it will in it; it makes the laws and it has the right to act on them vis-à-vis newspapers and journalists as it desires. It has the right to close our newspaper or to permit us to publish it; it has the right to commit us for trial

> or to acquit us. All this it can do. But what it cannot do is to restore to us our trust [in it] or alter our belief that we are a nation going to its death before the Zionist stream in this land of Palestine."] 1

The recently appointed American Ambassador at the Porte, Henry Morgenthau, had visited Palestine at the beginning of April; and, according to the circular, he had promised to aid the Zionists. It was claimed that his first action was to demand the suspension of Falastin on account of the offending article which had appeared on April 4th, whilst he was in Jerusalem. The circular suggested that Morgenthau would do better to silence certain Zionists from making provocative remarks than to quieten Falastin. The Government had to be made to realise that the Zionists were no "chimera". Even if Falastin was suspended permanently, the youth of the country and the Egyptian press could not be silenced by the Government. And, similarly, even if an end were put to Falastin, could not the local population produce tens of papers like it?[2]

Very little need be said about the tenor and content of this circular. The anger at the Government's support of the Zionists is worthy of note, as is Falastin's insistence that "Zionist" is not synonymous with "Jew". But the paper (like other Arab anti-Zionist papers) had seldom attempted in its columns to draw this distinction except in special instances,

1. FO 371/2134/22036, no.33 (29.4.1914), Hough to McGregor; & CZA Z3/1455 (1.5.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing a Hebrew rendering of this circular; the passages in square brackets are omitted in Hough's English translation and are taken from the Hebrew rendering in CZA Z3/1455.
2. CZA Z3/1455 (1.5.1914), encl.

as for example when it reported on the Beilis trial in Russia in October 1913.[1] It is interesting too that Falastin attributed the detorioration of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine to Zionists who came to the country "ten years ago": this and other allusions in the circular make it clear that Falastin believed that the aggressive elements who arrived with the Second ʿAliyyah were responsible for the current tensions. The British Consul in Jerusalem was unsure about the accuracy of the circular's allegation that Ambassador Morgenthau had promised to aid the Zionists, since he had been told - though admittedly by Jewish informants - that Morgenthau had studiously avoided taking sides whilst in Palestine.[2] However, there is evidence that Morgenthau did volunteer his services in an informal capacity to the Zionists;[3] and although he may or may not have initiated the action against Falastin, the essential point to be drawn from the circular's reference to him is that it is an early example of the Arab fear of Jews "in high places" who were willing to exert their influence on behalf of the Zionists against the Arabs, who could not call on equivalent support.

1. Falastin, iii, 80 (25.10.1913); cf. an earlier article where the distinction between Jew and Jewish immigrant is carefully drawn for a specific purpose in Falastin, ii, 39 (29.5.1912). Cf. also CZA Z3/1448, press report [undated (ca. March 1912) and unsigned], where it is observed that non-Jews (with particular reference to the non-Jewish [i.e. Arab] press) "make almost no distinction between Zionists and other Jewish organisations working in Palestine".
2. FO 371/2134/22036, no.31 (30.4.1914), McGregor to Mallet.
3. Cf. CZA Z3/48 (23.1.1914), and Z3/49 (12.5.1914), both Lichtheim to ZAC.

The editor of Falasṭin, Yusuf al-ʿIsa, was put on trial at the beginning of May and, as in the cases when Najib Naṣṣar had been brought to court in similar circumstances (see above, pp.206 & 297), he was acquitted (on a verdict based on editorial privilege of free speech).[1]

* * *

The increasing violence in Falasṭin's columns and the frequency of its articles about Jewish activities in Palestine was paralleled by increasingly frequent assaults by peasants on the Jewish settlers.[2] In November 1913, Dr. Hillel Joffe of Zikhron Ya'aqov was attacked on the road from 'Athlit,[3] and the daughter of a settler on that colony was raped.[4] On the 23rd of the month, Moses Barsky of Deganiya was shot dead and mutilated not far from Milhamiya;[5] and on the next day Joseph Salzmann of Kinneret was killed by robbers.[6] Then, at the beginning of December, a dispute over boundaries flared up between Gan Shemuel (a new settlement near Hadera), in which a worker named Reissler sustained severe bullet wounds.[7] The Central Government, now wishing to demonstrate its favourable disposition towards the Zionists, responded to complaints from the Haham Baṣi in Constantinople

1. CZA L2/34/II (10.5.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Jacobson [copy].
2. CZA L2/69 [n.d. (December 1913)], Haham Baṣi (Jaffa) to Haham Baṣi (Conspie.); & FO 371/2134/22036, no.31 (30.4.1914), McGregor to Mallet.
3. Joffe, Dor ha-maʿapilim, p.464 (18.11.1913).
4. CZA L2/69 [n.d. (December 1913)], Haham Baṣi (Jaffa).
5. CZA Z3/1451 (25.11.1913), Thon to ZAC.
6. Loc.cit.
7. CZA Z3/1451 (12.12.1913), Thon to ZAC.

about the insecurity of Jews in Palestine by posting soldiers at main crossroads and in Arab and Jewish villages.[1] For the first time, it was reported that the local authorities were making serious efforts to find those responsible for the recent murders in the north of Palestine.[2]

In April 1914 parliamentary elections were held once again. In the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem, the CUP was as weak as it had been two years before during the last elections; and, when the CUP's Central Committee notified its branch in Jerusalem in January 1914 to select candidates for the forthcoming elections, explicit instructions were given to consider local opinion and trends within it.[3] Since not only a majority of the electorate but also most of the Ottoman officials in the Mutasarriflik were opposed to the CUP, there was no question of a Jewish candidate being officially nominated by the Committee.[4] The successful candidates were Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi, Fayḍi al-ʿAlami (who had opposed the sale of land at Dilb to Jews in 1911 - see above, pp.280-1), and Saʿid Bey al-Ḥusayni (who had been a deputy in the first Parliament after the Young Turk Revolution).[5] Dr. Ruppin, the director of the Zionist Office in Jaffa, was none too sure about the sympathies of any of these deputies towards Jewish activities in Palestine.[6]

1. CZA L2/69 (12.1.1914), Haham Başi (Jaffa) to Zionist Office (Jaffa).
2. CZA L18/246/II (28.11.1913), Hankin to Thon; CZA Z3/1451 (2.12.1913) & Z3/1452 (31.12.1913), both Thon to ZAC.
3. CZA Z3/1453 (29.1.1914), I. Lévy (Jerus.) to Zionist Office (Jaffa).
4. Loc.cit.
5. Ha-Herut, vi, 155 (21.4.1914).
6. CZA Z3/1455 (26.4.1914), Ruppin to ZAC; The Truth, iii, 164-165 (8.5.1914), called the successful candidates "inveterate judeophobes".

In the Vilayet of Beirut the Zionist issue also played its part in the election. On April 2nd, Fatat al-ʿArab carried a petition (apparently from young Arabs in Nablus) to the candidates reminding them of the Zionists' aims and methods.[1] After the election this paper published an article entitled "A clear word to our deputies", warning them of the Zionists' political ambitions, which it was claimed - as had often been claimed before - were not confined to Palestine alone.[2] At the end of April, al-Iqdam reported a speech which had been made by Hadi Tawfiq Ḥammad, a notable in Nablus, to the newly elected deputy from that town, Saʿid Shahin. The speaker warned Saʿid Effendi that the local population had no money or protector to save it from the Zionists who were attacking "with infantry and cavalry" to force it from its own land; he therefore adjured Saʿid Effendi to make it his primary concern to inform the Ottoman Parliament of these matters.[3]

Before the election Falastin interviewed Ḥafiz Bey al-Saʿid in Jaffa and also reprinted conversations which had appeared in al-Iqdam between the editor of that paper and various candidates in Jerusalem. After the election, the editor of al-Iqdam published interviews with notables from Gaza as well. All of them expressed their views on Zionism and it will be appropriate to close this chapter by

1. Fatat al-ʿArab (2.4.1914); for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
2. Fatat al-ʿArab (19.4.1914); for details, see CZA Z3/116 (7.6.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.
3. Fatat al-ʿArab (26.4.1914); for details, see CZA Z3/116 (7.6.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.

citing a number of these statements, as they provide a good index of leading Arab opinion on Zionism in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem as of spring 1914. It will be observed that these notables differed on whether Zionism was a political movement or not and on the question of how much good or harm the local population could expect to derive from Jewish settlement in Palestine. But all of them, without exception, feared that the day was sure to come when the Arabs would be dispossessed of their country, if some action (especially Government action) was not taken to prevent this. The notables, who represent the older generation in Palestine, put their positions in relatively moderate terms; among the youth of the country, however, more violent views were being expressed. These views, which in the long run were more significant than those of their elders, are discussed in the final chapter.

Husayn al-Husayni, the President of the Municipal Council in Jerusalem, had always been regarded by the Jews in Palestine as well-disposed towards them. He stated that he saw no danger in the Zionist Movement because it was not a political movement but was concerned with settlement.

> "I am certain that the idea of founding a Jewish state in Palestine does not occur to any reasonable and rational Zionist, as people say. The Zionists come to this country to live. They are educated, cultured people; they do not inflate their importance and they are united amongst themselves. It is not just or humane that we should hate or despise this people. On the contrary, we should imitate them and learn from their activities which can give us a good and appropriate lesson and thereby we can give an important spurt to the progress of our husbandry and agriculture.

> "But ... despite all this, we must keep an open eye on them, for if we continue in our way and they in theirs, then all our lands will pass into their possession. Our fellah is poor and impoverished and the poor man is liable to surrender his land to keep himself alive. Therefore, the Government must pass a new law in connection with the sale of land in Palestine, setting up known conditions and limiting them according to our position in the country."1

Ḥafiẓ Bey al-Sa'id, of Jaffa, had also been thought by the Jews to be well-disposed but, it will be recalled, he was the first Arab deputy to raise the Zionist issue in the Ottoman Chamber (see above, p.184). "Zionist immigration," he said, "can be both harmful and useful". However:

> "Were the Zionist danger not great, I would be the first to declare that we need Zionism here in this country. [But] it is otherwise, if the matter proceeds unrestricted, if the immigrant is entitled to buy [land] wherever he pleases .... If the Government does nothing against the danger of Zionist immigration, it is quite possible that the new settlers will attract to themselves the lion's share of trade and land [in Palestine], and that they will outnumber the local population, nine-tenths of whom are ignorant of what knowledge and education are. ... I do not share the view of some people that the local population can benefit from having Zionist neighbours, that they can learn agriculture, trade and building from them. Rather, I believe that the object lesson of the Zionists through their fine buildings, modern plantations, new machines, their founding agricultural companies and schools has no significance for the local population, because for these things one needs money and education, which is possessed only by the Zionists .... I ask God that the people at the helm of government will take measures which should benefit the inhabitants of the country".2

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1. Ha-Ḥerut, vi, 143 (30.3.1914), reprinting interview from al-Iqdam [date and number not given].
2. Falasṭin, iv, 24 (4.4.1914); for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].

After the election, a defeated candidate, Aḥmad al-ʿArif from Gaza, who had been a deputy in 1912, told the editor of al-Iqdam that "the sole topic of conversation among Palestinians at present ... is the Zionist issue; all are frightened and afraid of it".[1] The Government welcomed the Zionists with open arms, but it forgot that this would bring disaster to the local population, thus nullifying the worth of all the revenue which could be gained from the colonies. The Arab peasants were poor and suffering; the Zionists were rich and would therefore be victorious.

> "The Zionist question, although at first glance economic, is in fact an important political question. If we examine ancient history and that of the countries which have been taken from our hands, it is proven that all political occurrences are built on economic foundations. The Government looks upon Zionism as an economic issue, but there is no doubt that with the passing of time, short or long, the issue will prove to be an important political one. Changes and modifications will take place in the geography of Palestine, if things continue in the future as they are [at present]. The Zionists' zeal in preserving their language, customs and nationality confirms this conclusion."2

The strongest views were expressed by two of the successful candidates. Saʿid Bey al-Ḥusayni declared that if he were elected, he would continue to act as he had done in the first Parliament. In particular he stressed that land questions had to be tackled and that the fellah had to be supported, so that "the remnant of land which remains in our possession

1. Al-Iqdam (14.6.1914), reprinted in ha-Ḥerut, vi, 210 (25.6.1914).
2. Loc.cit.

will not pass into the hands of the Zionists".[1] Sa'id Bey made various suggestions on how to aid the fellah and the Mutasarriflik in general and then expressed his views on Zionism: it was a danger to the Ottoman Empire from both political and economic points of view.

> "I am very surprised at how the Government passes over this movement in silence, since the Zionists have remained under the protection of [their] foreign nationality. Therefore, the Government must stir itself and awake from its sleep and recognise the danger before it."2

Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi recommended that the Government "must adopt the methods of Rumania" in dealing with the Zionists.[3]

> "I am not opposed to Ottoman Jews; [I am opposed] only to foreign subjects among [the Jews]. Ottoman Jews have the same rights as us. If the foreign Jew truly wishes to win our sympathy for him, then he must accept Ottoman nationality and must learn the language of the country so that he will understand us and we shall understand him and both [our peoples] will work for the good of the country. But if the foreign subject comes to fight us with the weapon of his foreign nationality and despises our sons and brethren and goes against our statutes and laws, then it is incumbent upon us not to pass over this in silence. If I am elected as a deputy, I will dedicate all my energies day and night to remove the harm and danger awaiting us from Zionism and the Zionists without, as has been said, wounding the rights of our Ottoman [Jewish] brethren."4

* * * *

In sum, the Ottoman Government tried after September 1913 to ingratiate the Zionists in the hope of securing financial support from Jews in Europe. It

1. Ha-Herut, vi, 143 (30.3.1914), reprinting interview from al-Iqdam [date and number not given].
2. Loc.cit.
3. Loc.cit.
4. Loc.cit.

attempted this by relaxing the restrictions against the Jews in Palestine, an exercise which it tried to carry off without arousing Arab attentions or tempers. The operation was a failure from both points of view. Jewish financiers were not induced to extend any aid to the Ottoman Government and the Arabs were greatly alarmed.

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CHAPTER TEN

TOWARDS AN ARAB-ZIONIST ENTENTE: 1913-1914

Constantinople and Beirut

Ernest Dawn, in his article "The Rise of Arabism in Syria", draws a distinction between the Decentralisation Party, al-Fatat and al-ʿAhd on the one hand and the other Arab nationalist groups on the other. Dawn regards members of the Decentralisation Party, al-Fatat and al-ʿAhd as nationalists in a true sense, because they sought Arab independence from the Ottoman Empire, whereas the other groups, such as the Beirut Reform Committee, strove only for administrative reform within the Empire (as their names implied).[1] The pattern of relations between the Arab nationalists and Zionists, at least until spring 1914, supports Dawn's thesis. When the Ottoman Government acceded to Arab demands in the summer of 1913, the more moderate of the Arab nationalist groups looked forward to the implementation of the desired reforms and lost interest in an entente with the Zionists, whilst the more radical of the nationalists, in Cairo, dissatisfied with the promises the Arabs had received and with the Government's reluctance to fulfil them, continued to contemplate full independence and towards this end Jewish backing (through the Zionist Movement) was still sought.

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1. Dawn, "Rise of Arabism, pp. 147-8.

After the First Arab Congress, the Zionists tried to keep alive their contacts with Arab nationalists in Constantinople. On his return from Paris in August 1913, Dr. Jacobson had a number of long discussions with leaders of the Arab group there.[1] That winter, Hochberg and Jacobson met ʿAbd al-Ḥamid al-Zahrawi twice in Constantinople. The latter re-affirmed the position which he had adopted in Paris, stating that "[the Arabs] must maintain good relations with the Jews and [we must] work together";[2] but although these conversations were amicable enough, they went no further than what Jacobson called "entente pleasantries" ("Entente-Liebenswurdigkeiten").[3] At the beginning of October, Asher Saphir, a young Palestinian Jew, secured an interview with Sulayman al-Bustani, the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, who showed himself to be unfavourably disposed towards Zionism; he declared that he regarded Syrian Jews as Syrians who should assimilate with the general population, whilst "he did not wish to know about foreign Jews".[4] A few weeks later, however, after speaking with the Haham Başi, al-Bustani promised to write to friends in Beirut and Damascus about an Arab-Zionist entente.[5]

1. CZA Z3/46 (23.8.1913), I. Neufach (Consple.) to ZCO (Berlin); & ibid. (26.8.1913), V. Jacobson (Consple.) to ZAC (Berlin).
2. CZA Z3/47 (8.11.1913), R. Lichtheim (Consple.) to ZAC.
3. CZA Z3/48 (11.1.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
4. CZA Z3/47 (3.10.1913), same to same.
5. CZA Z3/47 (16.11.1913), Neufach to same; cf. CZA Z3/48 (7.1.1914), Lichtheim to same, reporting a further discussion between Sulayman al-Bustani and the Haham Başi on the subject of an Arab-Zionist entente.

Saphir, who was persona grata with younger Arab nationalists in Constantinople, also tried to maintain their interest in an entente. While they were not unreceptive to Saphir's arguments, they emphasised that the Jewish immigrants must become Ottoman subjects and "good Syrians" - that is, not unlike Sulayman al-Bustani, they held that the Jews must assimilate with the local population.[1] Saphir explained that this slightly naïve concept was not shared in Jewish circles; he also remained optimistic about the possibility of persuading the Arabs that the Jews required some form of national and cultural autonomy.[2] In the light of these discussions, Richard Lichtheim (who was posted to Constantinople in September 1913, having been the Zionist Executive's political secretary for two years) came to the conclusion that the Arabs "do not care a rap about the 'common Semitic spirit'" which had been mentioned in connection with Arab-Jewish unity; for their national movement they wanted from the Jews "specifically European things: money, organisation, machines".[3]

Saphir and other Zionists also contributed articles to the Arabic press urging an Arab-Zionist entente.[4] One such

1. CZA Z3/47 (9.10.1913), Lichtheim to ZAC.
2. Loc.cit.
3. CZA Z3/47 (20.11.1913), Lichtheim to ZAC; cf. Lichtheim, She'ar yashub, p.256.
4. CZA Z3/47 (14.10.1913), same to same.

article, in the form of an interview with a Zionist leader in Constantinople, appeared in al-Muqaṭṭam during November.[1] It was reproduced in al-Iṣlaḥ (Beirut) by Shaykh Aḥmad Ṭabbarah, who appended his comments to it. It will be recalled that in June Hochberg had reported from Paris that at the First Arab Congress Ṭabbarah was initially "a little hostile" towards Jewish immigration but then he had "changed his opinion" (see above, p.362). Now, at the end of November, he expressed his doubts openly.[2] The Zionist interviewed by al-Muqaṭṭam's reporter in Constantinople had argued that all the differences between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine arose through Arab misconceptions about Zionist aims; Ṭabbarah denied this, contending that there was good reason to fear Jewish immigration both politically and economically. The Zionists talked of how much they cherished the Ottoman Empire; but, he claimed, the actions of thousands of Jewish settlers in Palestine belied these affirmations. While there was much to recommend an Arab-Zionist entente, it could only be reached after the Jews became Ottoman subjects and gave guarantees that the fellaheen would not be dispossessed.[3]

At a less responsible level, papers in Haifa and Beirut were also speaking out against an Arab-Zionist entente.

1. Hashkafat ha-ʿitonut ha-ʿarabit ʿal ha-yishshub, vol.i (1913), giving date of this article in al-Muqaṭṭam as 9.11.1913; & CZA Z3/116 (28.12.1913), J. Thon (Jaffa) to ZAC, enclosing press report, giving date of this article as 18.11.1913.
2. CZA Z3/116 (28.12.1913), Thon to ZAC, giving details of an article in al-Iṣlaḥ (which appeared before 3.12.1913).
3. This article was reprinted in al-Karmal on 3.12.1913 - loc.cit.

In October 1913, a report in al-Barq (Beirut) that moves were afoot to bring about an understanding between the Arabs and Zionists led al-Karmal to inquire, rhetorically, what possible basis could exist for such an agreement.[1] Shortly thereafter, Sayf al-Din al-Khaṭib, a member of al-Fatat in Constantinople, challenged the report he had read in al-Karmal about an Arab-Zionist entente, since he did not believe that any patriotic Arab could contemplate such a thing.[2] Najib Naṣṣar's reply to these reports was to reiterate his suggestion that another congress should be held in Nablus to consider Arab interests.[3]

At the end of January 1914, Aḥmad Ṭabbarah reprinted his article denying that the Arabs misunderstood Zionist aims,[4] whereupon Ilyas Zakka invited Ṭaha al-Mudawwar, the editor of al-Ra'y al-ʿAmm, to write an article for al-Nafir on the possibility of an entente with the Zionists. Al-Mudawwar's position was not dissimilar to that of Aḥmad Ṭabbarah: he was highly critical of the Jewish settlers in Palestine but he conceded that an entente could be reached if the immigrants became Ottoman subjects, if they integrated with the fellaheen, if they aided Arab education financially and if they dismissed all political ambitions

1. Al-Karmal (10.10.1913) - for details, see CZA Z3/116 (5.11.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.
2. Al-Karmal (4.11.1913) - for details, see CZA Z3/116 (17.11.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report; al-Khaṭib was hanged in1915 for his Arab nationalist activities - see Antonius, Arab Awakening, p.108, n.2.
3. Al-Karmal (13.2.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned]; & cf. ha-Herut, vi, 128 (11.3.1914).
4. Ha-Poʿel ha-Zaʿir, vii, 16-17 (1914), p.14; this article from al-Iṣlaḥ was reprinted in ha-Herut, vi, 131 (15.3.1914).

from their thoughts.[1] This article elicited a series of pro-Zionist replies from al-Nafir which in turn drew anti-Zionist fire from Ṭaha al-Mudawwar in al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm,[2] as well as a letter to al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm from Yusuf al-ʿIsa, the editor of Falasṭin, saying that in a sense it was possible to reach an agreement with the Zionists, but this would not prevent them from achieving their secret political aims, whether they became Ottoman subjects or not.[3]

* * * *

Cairo

In Cairo, where the idea of an entente with the Zionists had first emerged, the position was rather different from that in Constantinople and Beirut after August 1913. During September, al-Ahram accepted two pro-Zionist articles from Egyptian Jews.[4] The paper's editor, Daʾud Barakat, reminded local Zionists that in principle an entente already existed between the Decentralisation Party and the Zionists; however,

1. Al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm (23.4.1914), recalling Ṭaha al-Mudawwar's article which had appeared in al-Nafir - for details, see CZA Z3/116 , press report [undated and unsigned].
2. Al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm (28.3.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116 (9.4.1914), A. Witsky (Jaffa) to ZAC, enclosing press report; & also CZA L2/94/I, press report [Hebrew draft - undated and unsigned].
3. Yusuf al-ʿIsa to al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm (23.4.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
4. CZA Z3/753 (1.10.1913), H. Hasamsony (Cairo) to ZCO. It was in keeping with Arab nationalist feeling in Cairo that in the latter half of 1913 the Zionist Office in Jaffa found no evidence of anti-Zionist articles in the Arabic press in Egypt - cf. also Hasamsony (loc.cit.). Cf. correspondingly, a well-informed, but completely neutral, exposé of Zionism, written by Jurji Zaydan in al-Hilal, xxii, 2 (1913), pp.92-8; also cf. al-Muqtaṭaf, xliv, 1 (1914), pp.49-51.

since the matter had remained "equivocal", he suggested that the Zionists delegate a representative to discuss the matter with Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm, "to obviate misapprehensions as well as unfortunate consequences".[1] At the beginning of January 1914, another Zionist in Cairo reported that he had been approached by Rashid Riḍa and, on a second occasion, by Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm together with Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm, who had expressed the desire to be put in close contact with the Zionist Executive "with the object of laying the foundations of an entente and of mutual collaboration for the realisation of the reciprocal aims of both [the Decentralisation and Zionist] organisations".[2] But the Jews to whom these Decentralisationist leaders turned were not authorised to act for the Zionist Movement and they could do no more than report the approaches back to the Zionist Central Office in Berlin.

* * *

On February 9th, Major ʿAziz ʿAli al-Miṣri was arrested. His trial and the agitation to secure his release fully engaged Arab nationalists, especially in Cairo, so that they could give little thought to the question of an entente with the Zionists for the next ten weeks. On March 27th, Rashid Riḍa drew his readers' attentions to the Zionist issue again and wrote:

1. CZA Z3/753 (1.10.1913), Hasamsony to ZCO; & ibid. (10.11.1913), same to same.
2. CZA Z3/753 (10.1.1914), J. Caleff (Cairo)to Pres., ZAC (Berlin).

> "It is incumbent upon the leaders of the Arabs - the local population - to do one of two things. [Either they must] make an agreement [ittifaq] with the leaders of the Zionists to settle the differences between the interests of both parties in the country [bilad] ... [or they must] gather all their forces to oppose the Zionists in every way, first by forming societies and companies, and finally by forming armed gangs who will oppose [the Zionists] by force. Some [Arabs] say that this is the first thing to be done, because cauterisation is the only way - and cauterisation is the ultimate remedy, as it is said".1

The last words in this paragraph were an allusion to the Arabic proverb "Akhir al-ṭibb al-kayy",[2] as well as being an unmistakable reference to the hardening of anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine, as described in the foregoing chapter (see also Ch.XI).

In the same article Riḍa suggested that the Zionists had tried to satisfy the interests of both the CUP and the Great Powers who were also concerned with Palestine. "Indeed," he continued, "it is said that they have convinced [the CUP] about [this matter] and that [the CUP] is helping them to lay the way to [Palestine] by clearing the road of Arab opposition."[3] But, Riḍa observed, it was not possible to verify this claim (although all the outward signs over the last few months must have seemed to Arab observers to point in this direction - see above, pp.378-88).

1. Al-Manar, xvii, 4 (1914), p.320.
2. Cf. Burckhardt, Arabic Proverbs, p.9, "Akhir al-ṭibb al-kayy" ("The ultimate remedy is a cautery").
3. Al-Manar, xvii, 4 (1914), p.320.

However, on the same day as this volume of al-Manar appeared, the familiar suggestion that the CUP was actively helping the Zionists was given apparent substance in an almost sensational fashion. Henry Morgenthau, the American Ambassador, arrived in Alexandria on March 26th, on his way to Palestine (see above, pp.408-9). On the following day he met the Khedive, ʿAbbas Ḥilmi,[1] who recounted their conversation to Faris Nimr, one of the editors of al-Muqaṭṭam. Three and a half years later Nimr told William Yale, the American Special Agent in the Middle East, what he had heard from ʿAbbas Ḥilmi.[2] At the very least (even allowing for the distortions of time and exaggeration in transmission) Morgenthau's disclosures to the Khedive must have startled the Decentralisationists, with whom Nimr was in close contact, for Morgenthau is reported to have stated that negotiations between the Ottoman Government and the Zionists "were nearing completion and that the Zionists were on the point of realizing their hopes and ambitions in Palestine".[3] Morgenthau would appear to have been referring to the recent concessions made by the Ottoman Government to the Zionists and to the reported Cabinet decision to abolish the restrictions on Jewish land purchase in Palestine after the forthcoming elections (see above, p.383); Morgenthau's statements are also a measure of the extent to which CUP leaders had

1. H. Morgenthau (with F. Strother), All in a Life-time (New York, 1922), pp.221-2.
2. Yale Papers, no.Y#15 (31.12.1917), W. Yale (Cairo) to L. Harrison (Washington), enclosing report no.10, "Notes on the Zionist Question".
3. Loc.cit.

succeeded in persuading the Zionists in Constantinople that they were intent on annulling the disabilities suffered by Jews in Palestine (and, for that matter, in convincing Morgenthau of this as well, since, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Ottoman Government in the early months of 1914 had been anxious to obtain a loan from American financiers - see above, p.383). Quite why Morgenthau should have informed ʿAbbas Hilmi of this is obscure, unless, as William Yale has suggested, he entertained the idea of persuading the Ottoman Government to cede Palestine to the Khedivate of Egypt.[1]

Whatever the reason, the effect of these disclosures was immediate. On April 11th, an anti-Zionist article appeared in al-Ahram by Salim Najjar,[2] exactly twelve months after having invited the Zionists to make an entente with the Decentralisation Party and after having written (at a fee) a number of pro-Zionist articles since then.[3] Najjar now declared his conviction that an agreement existed between the Government and the Zionists. Although he admitted that he possessed no documentary proof of this, he believed all available evidence substantiated this conclusion. The Government was in complete agreement with the Zionists' aims; it required their financial support and thought that by introducing Jews into Syria and Palestine the Arab nation

1. W. Yale, "Ambassador Henry Morgenthau's Special Mission of 1917", World Politics, i, 3 (1949), pp.308-9.
2. CZA Z3/116, press reports [undated and unsigned], full Hebrew and German translations.
3. CZA Z3/1642 (28.10.1913), Jacobson to H. Frank (Paris).

would be weakened. He revealed that at his invitation a Zionist had come to Cairo a year ago and had made an entente with the Decentralisation Party, but both sides had failed to fulfil their commitments. However, now that the Decentralisation Party was organisationally weaker than it had been a year ago, the Zionists had no wish to ally themselves with it and so they had made an agreement with the Government. It followed therefore that the Government was bound to help them, and not the local population, in Palestine. This explained why the Government remained silent at the economic challenge of the Jews in Palestine, at the threat of Hebrew to Arabic, at the self-government and virtual self-sufficiency of the Jewish colonies, and at the growing numbers of Jews in the country (who, Najjar claimed, presently accounted for about one third of the population in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem and one half of the country as a whole). And since the new "Law of the Administration of the Vilayets" provided for a Meclis Umumi on a basis of proportional representation, the Jews would soon have a de facto government in Palestine, especially if the territorial division of the country was re-arranged, as, he alleged, the Zionists wanted.

* * *

At the beginning of April a Zionist Executive delegation arrived in Palestine; one of its members, Nahum Sokolow, was charged inter alia with the task of examining Arab-Zionist relations. On April 10th, al-Muqaṭṭam

published an interview which Nissim Malul had had with Sokolow on his arrival in Jaffa.[1] Sokolow suggested that the Arabs should regard the Jews, not as foreigners, but as fellow-Semites "returning home", as he put it, equipped with European skills which could be of immense value to the local population. He was surprised that the Arab press should complain at the Jews' return in view of their historical ties with the country and the heartening experiences of Arab-Jewish harmony in other eras. If the British, Dutch and native Africans could live at peace in South Africa, then two nations with so much in common as the Arabs and Jews could come together in Palestine. He made the point that if Jewish immigration into the country was hindered, then the land would remain waste and be of no utility to anyone; whereas if Jewish settlement went ahead, all would benefit. For this reason he emphasised the need for an Arab-Jewish understanding; with this in mind he stated that the language, literature and culture of the Arabs would be taught in Jewish schools, the Jews would start a campaign against disease, especially trachoma in Muslim schools; social services, such as hostels for the poor of all religions, would be initiated; and branches of the Anglo-Palestine Company would be opened in most towns in Palestine to offer the local population long-term credit at low rates.

1. Al-Muqaṭṭam (10.4.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned]; & CZA A 18/14/6, full Hebrew translation of same.

On April 14th, Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm commented on Malul's interview with Sokolow, also in al-Muqaṭṭam.[1] Sokolow's words were "very, very nice". But the Jews did not act by them - possibly because the Government approved of Zionism to the exclusion of the local population in Palestine, possibly because of "another unknown reason", or possibly because the Zionists wished to examine the question more deeply before taking a decision. Meanwhile, they did not mix at all with the local population to whom they were an economic threat and, it was believed by some, a political danger as well, since unwittingly they represented the vanguard of a Great Power invasion. The Arabs, Rafiq Bey declared, still desired an entente with the Zionists; but curing physical ailments (as Sokolow suggested) would not heal wounds of the heart, and simply to teach Arabic was not enough. The Zionists must actively pave the way to integration by becoming Ottoman subjects, by opening their schools to Arab children and by cooperating economically with the local population. The Zionists had to act - not just talk.

Ten days later, al-Muqaṭṭam published two articles from Nissim Malul, pointing out certain obvious misrepresentations in Salim Najjar's attack on the Zionists.[2] Then, on April 29th, Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm sent an irate letter to Malul, as

1. Al-Muqaṭṭam (14.4.1914), reprinted in al-Iqdam (19.4.1914) - see ha-Ḥerut, vi, 159 (26.4.1914), where this article is translated in extenso; & CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
2. Al-Muqaṭṭam (23. & 24.4.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned]; & CZA A 18/14/6, full Hebrew translations of these articles.

a member of the Decentralisation Party (see above, p.339).[1] He explained that recently he had not been able to write to Malul, because he had been pre-occupied with the ᶜAziz ᶜAli al-Miṣri "affair". He was annoyed at the renewed Arab-Zionist polemic in al-Ahram and al-Muqaṭṭam which, he said, could only harm both sides. But he was more angry at what Sokolow had said in his interview with Malul, for he understood him to mean that the Zionists would "return" to Palestine, whether the Arabs liked it or not. This was the same sort of language as was used by the CUP, which also took no account of the Arabs' wishes. In addition, he took exception to two further things: first, Sokolow had advocated the use Hebrew by the Jewish immigrants - this, wrote Ḥaqqi Bey, meant "death" to Arabic; secondly, Sokolow had not mentioned a word about the Jews' alien status - which implied that they intended to remain foreign subjects. Despite all this, Ḥaqqi Bey reiterated that the Arabs were prepared to make an entente with the Jews, on two conditions: (i) that the Arabic language did not suffer, and (ii) that the immigrants became true Ottoman subjects.[2]

But the exchanges in al-Ahram and al-Muqaṭṭam did not stop.[3] Others, including Dr. Shibli Shumayyil, the early

1. CZA Z3/116 (29.4.1914), Ḥaqqi Bey al-ᶜAẓm (Heliopolis) to N. Malul (Jaffa), [full Hebrew and German translations].
2. It will be recalled that the first condition which Ḥaqqi Bey al-ᶜAẓm had laid down for an Arab-Zionist understanding in February 1913 was that the Jews should adopt the Arabic language - see above, p.344.
3. E.g. al-Muqaṭṭam (27.4. & 22.5.1914), two anti-Zionist articles by Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Raḥman al-ᶜAlami (signed al-Shaykh) - for details, see CZA Z3/116 (7.5.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report; and also al-Muqaṭṭam (15.5.1914), article by N. Malul (11.5.1914, Jaffa) - for details, see CZA Z3/116 (15.6.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.

Arab socialist, also began to take part.[1] Shumayyil's article was entitled "They will settle and they will colonise, because the land is the inheritance of the industrious";[2] his views were refreshingly original. "Man exists on earth to develop it and not to make it desolate"; "man's right to the land is general and shared ... were it not so, the land would have remained a private, particular and exclusive right from the beginning of creation until today, and one people would eat its goodness and others would not come in their place after them throughout the generations - but the truth is to the contrary." The land rewards the industrious amply; it punishes the indolent by depriving them of their sustenance. The Arabs' complaint that the Jews were dispossessing them of their inheritance was "puerile", for the Jews could reply that they also had a right to the land of their forefathers which had been taken by force and which today they sought to restore, not by the sword, but by amelioration of the land. It would be sinful to prevent the diligent from applying their energies to the land and to deprive ourselves and the world of its goodness - "for are we not those who have made it poor?" Primitive intrusion was to be repulsed by primitive means; but enlightened, scientific advances had to be answered in similar terms, because in the "battle of nature" the higher culture always

1. For a brief account of Shumayyil's views which are relevant in this context, see Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 248-51.
2. Al-Muqaṭṭam (1[7?].5.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press reports [undated and unsigned].

prevails and, further, it would be an "unforgivable crime" against the honour of the Arabs and the land itself, if they replied to the Jews with brute force. If the Arabs wished to retain their land, they must take a lesson from the Jews in Palestine in order to compete with them successfully, "so long as the general rule of civilisation compels the land to be the inheritance of the industrious and the diligent". These views accord well with Shumayyil's Darwinism and humanism;[1] but his dialectical approach to the Zionist question was untypical, just as his whole philosophic outlook was uncharacteristic of his time.[2]

Al-Ahram and al-Muqaṭṭam were not of course the only papers in Cairo to write about Zionism at this time. Other papers' interest in the question quickened and the number of articles multiplied - most of them unfavourable to the Zionists.[3] Anti-Zionist propaganda increased towards the

1. Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp.248-50.
2. Salim Najjar replied to Shibli Shumayyil in al-Ahram (2.6.1914) - see CZA L2/94/I, extracts from letter dated 4/5.6.1914 by N. Malul (Cairo). One day later, Shumayyil answered Najjar, also in al-Ahram - for details, see CZA L2/94/I, press report [undated and unsigned].
3. For general remarks about the anti-Zionist campaign in the Cairo press, see Q d'O N.S. 124, no.231 (15.5.1914), A. Defrance (Cairo) to G. Doumergue (Paris). Defrance observed that these articles paralleled similar ones appearing in the "Syrian" press. It will be recalled that Falasṭin had recently been suspended by the authorities (see above, pp.405-6); this led to protests and an increased number of anti-Zionist articles in other papers in Palestine as well as in Beirut and Damascus (see below, Ch.XI). Cf. earlier, Q d'O N.S. 124, no.155 (2.4.1914), Defrance to Doumergue, enclosing translation of an anti-Zionist article which appeared in al-Muʾayyad on 2.4.1914. Cf. also a series of articles on Palestine by Jurji Zaydan - see al-Hilal, xxii, 1 (1913), pp.43-8; ibid. 2 (1913), pp.124-31; ibid. 3 (1913), pp.177-88; ibid. 4 (1914), pp.264-72; ibid. 5 (1914), pp.345-54;

Cont'd p.434 .....

end of May when ʿIsa al-ʿIsa, the proprietor of Falasṭin, came to the city and succeeded in placing a number of articles in various papers there.[1] The issue was of dominating concern to al-Iqdam, a weekly which had begun to appear in December 1913, edited by Muḥammad al-Shanṭi who was, according to Malul, a bankrupt merchant from Jaffa.[2] The Zionist Office in that town started to take note of this paper in February 1914 when it was found that almost every issue contained one or more attacks on Zionism and the Jews in Palestine. These attacks, resounding with well worn themes, were consistently the crudest and most bitter compositions to come to hand in the course of this study.[3]

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On May 27th, al-Muqaṭṭam published the first instalment of a two-part article from Constantinople, entitled "A Zionist

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ibid. 7 (1914), pp.513-21; & ibid. 8 (1914), pp.603-7 - the last two articles, which appeared in April and May, discussed Zionist activities in Palestine critically. Moreover, in April, Rashid Riḍa reprinted Zaydan's article on Zionism cited above, p.423, n.4 - see al-Manar, xvii, 5 (1914), pp.385-90.

1. Articles by ʿIsa al-ʿIsa appeared in Le Journal du Caire (27.5.1914), [cutting in ISA (G) A XXVIII, ii]; al-Muqaṭṭam (30.5.1914) - for details, see CZA L2/94/I, press report [undated and unsigned]; & al-Iqdam (31.5.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
2. CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
3. Al-Iqdam (22.2.1914), [three articles], idem (1. & 8. & 15.3.1914), & idem (19.4.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press reports [undated and unsigned]. Also al-Iqdam (26.4.1914), [three articles] - for details, see CZA Z3/116 (7.6.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report; & idem (31.5.1914) - for details, see CZA L2/94/I, press report [undated and unsigned].

leader answers the arguments of Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm, and demonstrates that the Jews and Arabs must reach an understanding".[1] The "Zionist leader" (i.e. Dr. Jacobson)[2] denied that the Zionists relied on the Ottoman Government at the expense of the Arabs, as Rafiq Bey had claimed in his criticism of Nahum Sokolow's interview with Malul; he accepted Rafiq Bey's demand for mutual cooperation and urged an Arab-Zionist entente. When al-Muqaṭṭam's Constantinople correspondent pointed out to the "Zionist leader" that the majority of Arab opinion was opposed to the Zionists, he replied that he believed an entente was possible because educated and distinguished Arabs to whom he had talked were not opposed to such an agreement (see below, pp. 446-50) and leaders, such as Rafiq Bey himself, advocated one.

On the same day, Nissim Malul sailed from Jaffa to Cairo where he met Rafiq Bey with Ḥaqqi Bey and other members of the Decentralisation Party in a journalists' café on the evening of May 28th.[3] They discussed the recent elections, after which Rafiq Bey left the group. Then Ḥaqqi Bey asked Malul if he had read the "Zionist leader's" reply to Rafiq Bey which had appeared the previous day in al-Muqaṭṭam. Malul said that he had, adding that it answered the questions about the Zionists' attitude to the Hebrew language and Ottoman nationality which Ḥaqqi Bey had raised in his letter

1. Al-Muqaṭṭam (27.5.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
2. CZA Z3/55 (10.10.1915), Jacobson [Berlin] to Lichtheim.
3. CZA A 18/14/6 (29.5.1914), Malul to N. Sokolow and A. Ruppin (Jaffa).

of April 29th. Thereupon Ḥaqqi Bey informed him that when he and Sokolow had not replied to this letter as requested, the Decentralisationists had reacted unfavourably against the Zionists. Their silence, it was felt, showed that they did not want an entente with the Arabs and that they were supporting the CUP; indeed, it was believed to substantiate a rumour that the Jews sought to cause division between the Turks and Arabs. Consequently, Rafiq Bey had prepared that very day a circular, which would be sent to all their branches, describing their disillusionment with the Zionists. Ḥaqqi Bey mentioned that there had once been a proposal to convene an Arab-Zionist meeting in Cairo, but their current suspicions had quashed that. Malul protested against the interpretation which had been put on the fact that he had not replied to Ḥaqqi Bey's letter, explaining that he had required to consult Nahum Sokolow who had been absent from Jaffa on a tour of Palestine: this was the sole cause of his silence. Instead of sending out the circular as proposed, Malul suggested that (i) preparations for an Arab-Zionist meeting should go ahead, (ii) Sokolow should be informed of this so that before returning to Europe he might come to Cairo to make the necessary arrangements, and (iii) that Arab journalists should be prevailed upon not to write about Zionism, because such articles tended to increase the differences between the Arabs and Jews at a time when both sides were seeking an agreement. Ḥaqqi Bey was prepared

to accept this alternative course and sent Malul in search of Rafiq Bey.[1]

On the following day, al-Muqaṭṭam printed the second part of the "Zionist leader's" reply to Rafiq Bey, in which it was suggested that the best way of removing Arab misapprehensions about Zionism would be for a meeting to be held of representatives from both groups.[2] In the same issue, an article appeared by Rafiq Bey himself, headed - significantly - "The Zionist question and how to remove their danger".[3] Rafiq Bey's programme was unlike other schemes which were being elaborated at this time with the same aim (see below, Ch.XI), for it was concerned solely with defending the fellaheen (by land reform, protective legislation, agricultural companies and loans). Moreover, although Rafiq Bey urged the Palestinians to take action against the danger threatening them, his programme was cast in a form which did not preclude an entente with the Zionists.

Malul took credit for persuading Rafiq Bey to submit a further article to al-Muqaṭṭam which appeared on May 30th to the effect that he had now read both parts of the reply by the "Zionist leader" in Constantinople to his earlier criticism of Sokolow and that he agreed with this Zionist on the undoubted need for a meeting between representatives of both the Arabs and the Zionists.[4] The Decentralisation

1. CZA A 18/14/6 (29.5.1914), Malul to Sokolow and Ruppin.
2. Al-Muqaṭṭam (29.5.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
3. Al-Muqaṭṭam (29.5.1914) - for details, see CZA L2/94/I press report [undated and unsigned].
4. CZA L2/94/I (31.5.1914), Malul to Ruppin.

Party was prepared to convene this meeting in Cairo, and hoped that notables in Palestine would choose their delegates. He was going to occupy himself with the arrangements for this meeting and stop writing about Zionism for the time being, because he recognised that the polemic was fruitless and because the possibility of a practicable understanding was at hand.[1]

On June 1st, at Malul's request,[2] al-Muqaṭṭam announced that it was closing its columns to articles on Zionism until this meeting had taken place;[3] a few days later, al-Ahram, also at Malul's prompting,[4] followed suit. Moreover, Malul reported that he had visited the editors of all the other newspapers in the city, asking them not to write about this question "until it was solved"; he felt sure that they would comply with his request.[5] His confidence was all but justified, for with one exception papers in Cairo stopped publishing articles about Zionism after the beginning of June; only al-Iqdam continued to write, and to write bitterly, on this topic, even though its editor and secretary had assured Malul that in principle the Arabs were not opposed to the Zionists: their opposition was directed against the Government and, accordingly, against the Zionists who were at present being protected by the Government.[6] Were it not for the persistence

1. Al-Muqaṭṭam (30.5.1914) - for details, see CZA L2/94/I, press report [undated and unsigned].
2. CZA L2/94/I (31.5.1914), Malul to Ruppin; cf. ibid. (2.6.1914), same to same [extract].
3. Al-Muqaṭṭam (1.6.1914) - for details, see CZA L2/94/I, press report [undated and unsigned].
4. CZA L2/94/I (31.5.1914), Malul to Ruppin.
5. Loc.cit.
6. CZA L2/94/I (4/5.6.1914), Malul to Ruppin [extracts].

and tenor of al-Iqdam's attacks, this excuse might have been credible (see below, Ch.XI).

Whilst in Cairo, Malul spoke to Rashid Riḍa, who was very candid with him.[1] The Zionists really benefited Palestine but, Riḍa insisted, they must let the Arabs share in this benefit. Palestine, being large and desolate, required energetic hands and could contain both the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs knew that the Government and the Jews patronised each other. However, the Arabs were opposed to the Government and had to detach their land from the Ottoman Empire. They were positive of victory, since there were only three to four million Turks against at least twenty million Arabs. Therefore, why did the Zionists not make an agreement with the Arabs so that they could work together for the progress of the country? In talking with Malul, Riḍa appears to have drawn a distinction between Muslim and Christian Arabs, because he told Malul that the "Christians" were the Zionists' greatest enemies.[2] The "Christians" (presumably Christian Arabs) wanted the Great Powers to

1. CZA L2/94/I (6/7.6.1914), Malul to Ruppin [extracts].
2. Loc.cit. The ambiguity in Riḍa's remarks arises from the fact that the version of his conversation with Malul preserved in the Central Zionist Archive has gone through two translations. Riḍa spoke to Malul in Arabic; Malul wrote to Ruppin in Hebrew; and the report sent to Berlin, into which Malul's letter to Ruppin was incorporated, was written in German. In this version, Riḍa is represented as speaking of "Araber" and "Christen"; the context, however, suggests Muslim and Christian Arabs.

occupy Palestine,[1] which was contrary to the interests of both the "Arabs" (i.e. the Muslims) and the Jews, who ought therefore to make an agreement to support one another in order to free the country of the Turks and retain its independence.

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Jerusalem, Beirut and Damascus

On April 2nd, the editor of ha-Ḥerut described a conversation which he had had the previous day with a notable in Jerusalem whom he referred to as "Shaykh A.Ṭ.". The latter told him that the agitation in the Arabic press grieved him, because he recognised the value of the Jews' work in Palestine; he advised them strongly to become Ottoman subjects, as their foreign nationality was a major bone of

1. Riḍa's fears were probably not unfounded. Aside of general evidence showing that some Syrian Christians favoured a French occupation (- see La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne, passim), others appear to have contemplated encouraging Germany to enter Palestine in order to counter Jewish advances there. The French Ambassador at Cairo was told by an "influential member of the Syrian colony" in the city that the "emprise juive" in Palestine was considered an imminent and redoubtable danger; if the country had to fall into foreign hands, Christians were preferred to Jews. Of the former, the Germans were most favoured because their Templar colonies were prosperous and because, it was alleged, they did not exclude Christian and Muslim workers, like the Jewish colonists. The Kaiser took a personal interest in Christian activities in Palestine; and, moreover, the Jews were not well regarded in Germany. Therefore, the French Ambassador's informant is reported to have said, "nous sommes décidés, si nous ne pouvons faire autrement, à favoriser de tout notre pouvoir l'extension de la colonisation chrétienne allemande pour mettre obstacle à l'extension de la colonisation juive" - see Q d'O N.S. 124, no.231 (15.5.1914), Defrance to Doumergue. There are hints of similar moves among Syrian Christians in Najjar's article in al-Ahram (11.4.1914) described above - see pp.427-8.

contention.[1] Shortly after this, Dr. Isaac Lévy of the APC branch in Jerusalem reported that a Muslim friend had suggested that an Arab-Jewish association should be formed to remove misunderstandings.[2] A month later, on May 13th, Dr. Lévy wrote that Shaykh ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Muṣaghghar (possibly the friend referred to in his first letter) was perturbed at attitudes held by Arab and Zionist youth, both of whom harboured extremely chauvinistic and potentially dangerous elements; al-Muṣaghghar therefore proposed that a meeting should be held in Jerusalem to discuss ways of drawing the two peoples together.[3] Furthermore, throughout May, the Zionist Office in Jaffa received reports that prominent Arab leaders, especially in Beirut and Damascus, wished to meet authorised Zionist representatives to discuss a "programmatischen Verstaendigung".[4] They had let the Zionist Office know of this through influential Arabs in Jaffa.[5]

There seem to have been two trends developing among the Arabs at the same time which, although quite separate, pointed in the one direction. In Jerusalem, it appears that a

1. Ha-Ḥerut, vi, 146 (2.4.1914).
2. CZA L18/245/5 (9.4.1914), I. Lévy (Jerus.) to Ruppin.
3. CZA L18/245/5 (13.5.1914), same to same. Lévy wrote, in German, of "el-Musgar"; the transcription employed here is conjectural.
4. CZA Z3/65 (4.5.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Lichtheim [unsigned copy].
5. CZA L2/34/II (10.5.1914), same to Jacobson (Consple.), [unsigned copy]. Cf. CZA L2/513 (15.5.1914), Thon to Lévy; & CZA L2/34/II (3.6.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Jacobson [unsigned copy].

few notables, alarmed at the popular mood, were moved to indicate their concern to Jews in the city. However, in Beirut and Damascus, it may be conjectured that the Arabs who lost interest in an Arab-Zionist entente after August 1913 were again beginning to come round to the idea, having now lost all faith in the Central Government which had been more than dilatory in satisfying their demands.[1]

Although Lévy later reported that Shaykh ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Muṣaghghar had formed a Muslim society through which he hoped to bring about greater Arab-Jewish understanding,[2] little, if anything, was achieved in Jerusalem. However, one notable in Beirut was prepared to take more serious steps; he was Naṣif Bey al-Khalidi, a native of Jerusalem and a cousin of Ruḥi Bey al-Khalidi.[3] An engineer by profession, he had worked on the construction of the Hijaz Railway.[4] In 1908 he had stood for election to the Ottoman Parliament, promising to improve the supply of drinking water in Jerusalem and to link the city by railway with Damascus and the Egyptian border.[5] In 1913 he had worked with a British team of archaeologists in the Mosque of ʿUmar;[6] and in 1914 he was chief engineer in Beirut.[7] Although he was

1. For comments on the Arabs' dissatisfaction with the Government, see FO 371/1799/58132, no.1021 (20.12.1913), Sir L. Mallet (Consple.) to Sir E. Grey (F.O.); & The Near East, vi, 146 (1914), p.500. Cf. Antonius, Arab Awakening, pp.117-18.
2. CZA L18/245/5 (28.6.1914), Lévy to Ruppin.
3. The Near East, iv, 101 (1913), p.642.
4. Q d'O N.S. 132, no.17 (8.10.1908), G. Gueyraud (Jerus.) to S. Pichon (Paris).
5. Loc.cit.
6. The Near East, iv, 101 (1913), p.642.
7. CZA Z3/1456 (1.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC.

shortly to become involved in negotiations between Arab leaders and Zionists, his actions suggest that he was not a politician by temperament but rather a man of goodwill, who as an engineer may well have been more appreciative of the practical advantages of Jewish immigration than concerned with its political implications.[1] Indeed, there is room to suspect that Naṣif Bey became an ingenuous tool in the hands of more devious men.[2]

At the end of March 1914, the Vali of Beirut, accompanied by Naṣif Bey and others, visited the Jewish colony at Rosh Pinna.[3] At lunch, the question of Arab-Jewish relations was raised and Chaim Kalvarisky, JCA's administrator on the colony, suggested that the Jews and Arabs should try to reach an understanding.[4] This suggestion, it seems, met with some approval; moreover, according to notes written by Kalvarisky in 1919, the Vali, Sami Bekir Bey, took him aside and said:

> "Your idea is excellent[;] without an understanding our assistance will be of very little use to you. We cannot, in order to favor [sic] you, go against an entire population".[5]

1. Cf. CZA Z3/116 (17.11.1913), Thon to ZAC, enclosing details of a recent article in al-Ḥaris (Beirut), written by Amin Bey ʿAbd al-Nur, the chief engineer of Lebanon. Amin Bey attacked the detractors of al-Aṣfar's project, since he believed that the scheme would be beneficial to the country. It may not be unreasonable to assume that Naṣif Bey al-Khalidi, as an engineer, looked at the Zionists in a similarly pragmatic light.
2. The following account of subsequent events is unavoidably based wholly on Jewish sources which provide a coherent picture but inevitably leave many questions unanswered.
3. Ha-Herut, vi, 147 (3.4.1914).
4. CZA L4/276/II B (1.6.1919), C. Kalvarisky (notes).
5. Loc.cit.

This was precisely the point which the Grand Vezir had made to the Haham Başi in September 1913 (see above, p.377), and the reason why the Central Government had been reluctant to make greater concessions to the Zionists than it had.

Kalvarisky reported this to the Zionist Office in Jaffa,[1] and in May he introduced Naṣif Bey to Nahum Sokolow[2] (who was engaged in the tour of Palestine which Nissim Malul had mentioned as his reason for not replying to Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm's letter of April 29th). In his turn, Naṣif Bey introduced Sokolow to Arab leaders in Beirut,[3] and then took him to Muḥammad Kurd ʿAli's house in Damascus, where a meeting was held;[4] those present included Shukri al-ʿAsali, ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Inklizi, ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Shahbandar and Georges Bey al-Fakhuri.[5] The anti-Zionist views of Kurd ʿAli and Shukri al-ʿAsali have been dealt with sufficiently in preceding chapters; al-Inklizi was also a known anti-Zionist.[6] Al-Shahbandar, on the other hand, appeared well-disposed.[7] Al-Fakhuri was described as a free-thinking Christian and an Arab nationalist;[8] nothing is known about his views on the Zionist question. Sokolow found these

1. CZA Z3/65 (4.5.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Lichtheim [unsigned copy].
2. CZA Z3/399 (5.7.1914), Sokolow (London) to J. Tschlenow [Berlin?].
3. CZA Z3/399 (23.5.1914), Sokolow (Damas.) to same.
4. CZA L4/276/II B (1.6.1919), Kalvarisky (notes).
5. CZA L2/34/II (3.6.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Jacobson [unsigned copy]; & C. Kalvarisky, ʿAl parashat darkenu (Jerusalem, 1939), p.32.
6. Cf. above, p.338; & Kalvarisky, "ha-Yaḥasim ... lifne ha-milḥamah", pp.54-5.
7. CZA L2/34/II (3.6.1914).
8. Loc.cit.

Arabs responsive to the idea of an entente with the Zionists, which they believed should not be made with a single Arab party, but with representatives of all parties and religious groups.[1] An Arab-Zionist meeting, to be attended by ten delegates from both sides,[2] was projected for some time in June,[3] without the exact date or place being fixed;[4] al-Fakhuri undertook to write to Christian and Muslim Arabs, belonging to both the CUP and the Liberal Union, to gain their support for this meeting.[5] It was not suggested that Sokolow or other members of the Zionist Executive should be present.[6] At this stage, the Arab and Zionist representatives had only to become acquainted; no commitments or engagements were envisaged, as this meeting was seen to be preliminary to subsequent ones.[7]

At the end of May Sokolow returned to Jaffa, where he instructed the Zionist Office to prepare a list of delegates for this meeting.[8] Then, returning to Beirut, he paid another visit to Naṣif Bey al-Khalidi, who now requested that European Zionist leaders should attend the meeting. Naṣif Bey also added that the meeting would take a long time to arrange (thus leading Sokolow to write a few weeks later that

1. CZA Z3/449 (7.6.1914), Greater Actions Committee (Berlin), [minutes].
2. CZA L4/276/II B (1.6.1919), Kalvarisky (notes).
3. CZA Z3/399 (23.5.1914), Sokolow to Tschlenow.
4. CZA Z3/399 (5.7.1914), Sokolow (London) to Tschlenow.
5. CZA L2/34/II (3.6.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Jacobson [unsigned copy].
6. CZA Z3/399 (5.7.1914), Sokolow to Tschlenow.
7. Loc.cit.
8. Loc.cit.

it was then expected to take place "possibly in July").[1] Thereupon, Naṣif Bey set out on a mission to Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus and Haifa to make up the list of Arab delegates,[2] while Sokolow sailed for Constantinople.

* * * *

Constantinople and Cairo

In Constantinople, Zionist contacts with Arabs there had lapsed since January, partly because the latter had shown little inclination to discuss an entente and partly because Dr. Jacobson had been absent from the city since the beginning of the year. On his return towards the end of April, Jacobson talked with Najib Bey Shuqayr (a Druze from Lebanon and editor of Peyam) and Shukri Bey al-Ḥusayni (a notable from Jerusalem, long resident in Constantinople), both of whom he had met on previous occasions.[3] In the next weeks, various discussions took place with Faris al-Khuri (then a deputy from Damascus) and other Arabs who were not mentioned by name in letters to Berlin and Jaffa.[4] On May 26th, Jacobson and his colleagues in Constantinople held a dinner, which was attended by Sa'id Bey al-Ḥusayni and Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi (both deputies from Jerusalem), Sa'id Shahin

1. CZA Z3/399 (5.7.1914), Sokolow to Tschlenow.
2. PJCA 79/319 (8.6. & 1.7.1914), both Nazif el-Khaledy [sic (= Naṣif Bey al-Khalidi)],(Beirut) to C. Kalvarisky (Rosh Pinna).
3. CZA Z3/48 (28.4.1914), Lichtheim to ZCO; cf. CZA Z3/46 (23.8.1913), I. Neufach (Consple.) to ZCO (re. Shukri Bey al-Ḥusayni); and CZA Z3/48 (11.1.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC (re. Najib Bey Shuqayr).
4. CZA L2/34/II (3.5.1914), Jacobson to Ruppin; & CZA Z3/49 (7.6.1914), Lichtheim to Jacobson (Berlin), (re. Faris al-Khuri).

(the deputy from Nablus), Ahmad Bayhum Bey and Najib Bey Shuqayr, and two deputies from Beirut and Tripoli, as well as a former Kaymakam of Jaffa (none of whose names were recorded).[1]

From the conversation at this dinner and the discussions which preceded it, a clearer picture emerged of these Arabs' views on the possibility of an Arab-Zionist entente. The theoretical benefits of Jewish immigration could be demonstrated to the Arabs;[2] in practice, however, they tended to regard the immigrants unfavourably because the latter were seen not to integrate with the local population, but to be building a "state within a state".[3] The Arabs allowed that the leadership of the Zionist Movement was probably well-intentioned, but drew a distinction between the leaders and those Jews who settled in Palestine.[4] Moreover, they all entertained fears of the Zionists for the future;[5] as Faris al-Khuri put it:

> "A small immigration of Jews is indeed very good ..., but, in the future, [the Jews] must have an interest to dislodge the Arabs".[6]

Nevertheless, they were certainly prepared to study the problem with the Zionists so that both sides could find out the other's demands.[7] According to Lichtheim, they desired the Jews above all "not to live for themselves and regard the Arabs as enemies, but to feel themselves, so to speak, as one nation with the Arabs".[8] They realised that the Zionists

1. CZA Z3/49 (28.5.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
2. Loc.cit.; & CZA Z3/449 (7.6.1914), Greater Actions Committee [minutes].
3. Loc.cit. 4. Loc.cit.
5. CZA Z3/49 (28.5.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
6. CZA Z3/49 (7.6.1914), same to Jacobson; cf. Lichtheim, She'ar yashub, p.255.
7. CZA Z3/49 (7.6.1914), Lichtheim to Jacobson. 8. Loc.cit.

did not have much scope for compromise in this direction and therein lay the difficulty.[1] Jacobson therefore tried to give the discussions more concrete form by shifting the ground, indicating that the Jews could aid the Arabs culturally and provide them with finance and press support, in exchange for which they desired the Arabs not to attack them in the press and Parliament.[2] He argued that Palestine was but a small part of the Arab lands and if the Arabs aspired to eventual autonomy, it would be folly for them to hinder Jewish immigration and thus deprive the whole Arab world, far beyond the borders of Palestine, of the benefits which could be derived from the immigrants.[3] This line of argument was reported to have impressed the Arabs, especially the non-Palestinians, who were able to view the question in its wider context.[4] The latter therefore demanded that the Zionists concern themselves with the wishes of the Arabs in Palestine so that they would not oppose an Arab-Zionist agreement.[5]

Jacobson and his colleagues realised that the Arabs whom they met in Constantinople were associated with different Arab groups which were not necessarily in agreement with one another; "chacun prètend [sic] que c'est lui qui est le vrai, l'important ... [sic]".[6] Sa'id Bey al-Husayni had

1. CZA Z3/49 (7.6.1914), Lichtheim to Jacobson.
2. Loc.cit.
3. Loc.cit. Cf. CZA Z3/48 (28.4.1914), Lichtheim to ZCO; & al-Muqaṭṭam (29.5.1914), "A Zionist leader ... demonstrates that the Jews and Arabs must reach an understanding", where this argument is also used.
4. CZA Z3/449 (7.6.1914), Greater Actions Committee [minutes].
5. Loc.cit.
6. CZA L2/34/II (3.5.1914), Jacobson (Consple.) to Ruppin; cf. Z3/49 (3.7.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.

been associated with the now defunct Beirut Reform Committee;[1] Najib Bey Shuqayr was a Decentralisationist;[2] Shukri Bey al-Ḥusayni had connections with the Arab group in Constantinople;[3] and the CUP deputies to the Ottoman Parliament were probably not active in any Arab nationalist society at all. Aḥmad Bayhum Bey, also a former member of the Beirut Reform Committee, had a special interest in an agreement with the Zionists, because, having forfeited the Hula concession on account of protests in the Arabic press (see above, pp.396-7), he had recently approached Jacobson to see if the Zionists would be willing to back him financially to try to regain the concession.[4] Despite this diversity of points of view, Jacobson was able to summarise the Arabs' general demands as follows:

> "1. Die Ottomanisierung der palästinensischen Juden.
> "2. Die Kolonisation soll sich nicht nur auf Palästina beschranken.
> "3. Ein gemeinsames soziales Leben.
> "4. Bestimmte Vorteile für ihre nationale Entwicklung".[5]

In connection with the last demand, Jacobson explained that the Arabs wanted the Jews to open their schools to Arab children and that they also wished the Jews to support their educational institutions both morally and materially.[6]

1. CZA Z3/1449 (8.4.1913), Thon to ZAC.
2. CZA Z3/48 (28.4.1914), Lichtheim to ZCO.
3. [Daghir], Thawrat al-ʿarab, pp.82-3.
4. CZA Z3/49 (6.5.1914), Jacobson to Tschlenow.
5. CZA Z3/449 (7.6.1914), Greater Actions Committee [minutes].
6. Loc.cit. The desire that the Jews should open their schools to Arab children had been put frequently by Arab nationalists - cf. CZA Z3/47 (9.10.1913) & Z3/48 (11.1.1914), both Lichtheim to ZAC.

Jacobson had made an earlier attempt at outlining the Arabs' demands at the beginning of May; he did so in much the same terms as the above, adding that the Arabs desired the Zionists to find large capital sums to finance extensive public works programmes for the development of the Arab provinces and to give assurances that the fellaheen would not be proletarianised or deprived of all their land by the Jewish immigrants.[1]

* * *

Sami Bekir Bey, the Vali of Beirut, came to Constantinople in the middle of May. Having indicated to the Zionists that he favoured Jewish immigration,[2] he too was entertained to dinner one night after Jacobson and his colleagues had received the Arabs.[3] The Vali told his hosts that if the Jews could give the Empire sufficient money to purchase one dreadnought, he guaranteed the satisfaction of the Zionists' demands.[4] As for the Arab nationalists, they were, in his view, of little consequence - "leaders without an army" who, he maintained, could all be bought for cash.[5] Then Sami Bekir Bey indicated that he wished to secure a loan of T£500,000 for Beirut and Jacobson suggested that Henry Morgenthau, the American Ambassador, might be sympathetic to the Vali's needs.[6] Jacobson left Constantinople the following

1. CZA L2/34/II (3.5.1914), Jacobson to Ruppin.
2. CZA Z3/49 (18.5.1914), Lichtheim to ZCO.
3. CZA Z3/49 (28.5.1914), same to ZAC.
4. Loc.cit.; cf. CZA Z3/449 (7.6.1914), Greater Actions Committee [minutes].
5. CZA Z3/49 (28.5.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
6. Loc.cit.

day for a meeting of the Greater Actions Committee in Berlin, leaving his colleagues to arrange two appointments with Morgenthau for the Vali in the next week.[1]

When Nahum Sokolow reached Constantinople from Beirut at the beginning of June, he also saw Sami Bekir Bey and spoke to him about the proposed Arab-Zionist meeting which he had planned with Naṣif Bey al-Khalidi. The Vali insisted "in most precise and very categorical terms" that Zionist leaders from Europe should attend this meeting.[2] He believed that serious negotiations could only be held if the "real leaders" took part and that the "proper place" for the meeting was "Syria" (i.e. not Constantinople or Cairo).[3]

While in Constantinople, Sokolow received no communication from any of the Arabs he had met in Damascus and thus gained the impression that the Arabs themselves were procrastinating. Against this, Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm instructed Najib Bey Shuqayr to inform Sokolow that the Decentralisation Party now wished to meet with the Zionists in Cairo (- as a result of Nissim Malul's recent visit there).[4] On hearing this, it appears that Sokolow made some indiscreet remarks to Najib Bey about the Arabs' apparent lack of coordination.[5] The matter was left in abeyance, however, since - it may be assumed - Sokolow felt constrained to consult Jacobson

1. CZA Z3/49 (7.6.1914), Lichtheim to Jacobson (Berlin).
2. CZA Z3/399 (5.7.1914), Sokolow to Tschlenow.
3. Loc.cit.
4. Loc.cit.; & CZA Z3/49 (3.7.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
5. Letter no.68 (30.7.1914), Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm [Cairo] to Asʿad Daghir [Consple.], published in Le Journal de Beyrouth, iii, 414 (2.9.1915).

before any decision was taken about a meeting with the Decentralisation Party in Cairo.

As mentioned above, Jacobson had gone to Berlin at the end of May for a meeting of the Greater Actions Committee, which was held on June 7th. Jacobson reported on the results of his recent soundings in Contantinople but, not yet apprised of Malul's visit to Cairo or Sokolow's activities in Beirut and Damascus, he made no mention of the proposed Arab-Zionist meeting.[1] In the middle of the month, Sokolow came from Constantinople to Berlin, where he and Jacobson appear to have discussed, by themselves,[2] the questions of whether to send European Zionist leaders to the meeting in Syria and whether to meet the Decentralisation Party in Cairo.

On the first question, there were various considerations to take into account: Naşif Bey had told Sokolow that the proposed meeting would take a long time to arrange; since Sokolow had heard nothing from Damascus, he suspected that the Arabs of their own accord were delaying the meeting; and finally the Vali of Beirut had insisted that European Zionist leaders should be present. Sokolow and Jacobson

1. CZA Z3/449 (7.6.1914), Greater Actions Committee [minutes].
2. That Sokolow and Jacobson did not take other members of the Zionist Executive into their confidence is evident from a letter to Jehiel Tschlenow written by Sokolow at the beginning of July from London. Tschlenow was a member of the Zionist Executive and was in Berlin throughout the whole of June; nonetheless he was not informed of the projected Arab-Zionist meeting or, presumably, of the matters discussed immediately below - see CZA Z3/399 (5.7.1914), Sokolow to Tschlenow.

therefore came to the conclusion that the meeting would have to be put off until the autumn when all the interested parties would be in a position to assemble the appropriate delegates.[1] Regarding the invitation to come to Cairo, the Vali's advice that "Syria" was the proper place for any meeting with the Arabs, coupled with the fact that arrangements for such a meeting were already in hand, had to be borne in mind. It was decided therefore to decline to meet the Decentralisation Party at this stage.[2] However, Jacobson - presumably with Sokolow's help - did work out a list of proposals to be put to the Decentralisation Party. These proposals were sent to As'ad Daghir who worked for Le Jeune-Turc in Constantinople and who had been instrumental in introducing Jacobson to a number of Arab leaders in that city.[3] In turn, perhaps at the end of June, Daghir forwarded to Cairo the proposals which, according to Daghir's memoirs, were as follows:

> "1. The Arabs and Jews are from one stock [jins] and each [people] possesses attributes complementary to the other. The Jews have knowledge, funds and influence; while the Arabs have a vast land [bilad], frightening power, cultural treasures and inexhaustible material wealth. Therefore a reconciliation [tawfiq] between both [peoples] will be to the good of both and to the good of all the East.
>
> "2. The Arabs will receive the Jews in Arab lands as their brethren, on condition that the Jews become Ottoman subjects and that Palestine will not be exclusively theirs.
>
> "3. In exchange, the Jews pledge to put their cultural and material power at the service of the Arab cause; they will support the Arab groups [ahzab] and place at their disposal three million guineas.

1. CZA Z3/399 (5.7.1914), Sokolow to Tschlenow.
2. Letter no.68 (30.7.1914), Rafiq Bey al-'Azm to As'ad Daghir.
3. CZA Z3/49 (7.6.1914), Lichtheim to Jacobson.

"4. An Arab-Jewish conference will be held in Egypt when the Syrian and Iraqi deputies return from Constantinople to their lands".1

Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm wrote to Asʿad Daghir on July 30th, acknowledging receipt of these proposals.[2] He was displeased at the remarks which Sokolow had made to Najib Bey Shuqayr about the Arab nationalists' lack of coordination and he was very surprised that Sokolow had been able to persuade Jacobson to decline the invitation to meet the Decentralisation Party immediately, especially as Jacobson had been one of the promoters of the idea. Like the Arabs in Constantinople, Rafiq Bey viewed the Zionist question at two levels: first, it concerned the local population in Palestine and, secondly, it related to the "Arab question" in general. He explained that the Decentralisation Party had thought of meeting with the Zionists in Cairo to discuss the first aspect "so that [the meeting] would not take on a political colouring capable of angering [the Turks]". The Decentralisationists had smoothed the way for "genuinely

1. A. Daghir, Mudhakkirati (Cairo, 1959), p.43. No copy of these proposals was found in the Zionist Archive; however, except for the offer of "three million guineas", they sound authentic, fitting well into the context of events preceding them. (Jacobson probably offered the Arabs some measure of financial support, but he is unlikely to have named a specific sum.) Daghir's own account of his part in these affairs is apologetic and confused (perhaps intentionally so) - see ibid. pp.42-4.
2. Letter no.68 (30.7.1914), Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm to Asʿad Daghir. Rafiq Bey is not mentioned as the writer of this letter in Le Journal de Beyrouth, iii, 414 (2.9.1915), where it was published by Cemal Paşa; however, he may be identified as its author from an extract taken from the same letter which was published in La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne, p.85, and ascribed to Rafiq Bey.

interested" parties in Palestine (i.e. Palestinian notables) to come to Cairo. Rafiq Bey pointed out how important it was for the Palestinians to be satisfied; but, "if from the outset we mix the two aspects into a single question and if the local population [of Palestine] declare themselves dissatisfied, then all our efforts will go to waste - [the Zionists] must recognise this". Regarding the more general aspect - the relation of Zionism to the Arab question - Rafiq Bey wrote that "the discussions must not be public", implying that Arab nationalist leaders alone and not Palestinian notables should participate in these negotiations of a highly confidential political character. Dr. Jacobson's proposals and others "emanating from Palestine" [Malul?] were "good and acceptable"; but, he emphasised, nothing could be decided upon until the Zionists came to Cairo. The latter also had to realise that the Decentralisationists could do nothing which was not approved by authorised delegations of all Arab groups, despite the fact that Sokolow thought the Arab nationalists disorganized.

* * * *

Brummana

In Palestine, unknown to Sokolow and Jacobson, things had been moving on apace throughout the whole of June. At the beginning of the month, Nasif Bey al-Khalidi, like Nissim Malul in Cairo, made efforts to stop the Arabic press in Beirut from writing about Zionism until the Arab-Zionist

meeting was held.[1] On June 19th, the Zionist Office in Jaffa invited ten delegates to attend a joint meeting to take place on July 1st at Brummana, near Beirut.[2] At the Arabs' request,[3] none of these delegates were men who had been directly involved in land purchases on behalf of the Zionists.[4] A week or so later, Naṣif Bey passed through Jaffa on his mission to gain the support of prominent Palestinians for the meeting.[5] He was reluctant to disclose the names of the Arabs who would attend as his list was not yet complete; however, he did indicate that the editors of Falasṭin and al-Karmal might be invited to be present.[6] On June 25th, Kalvarisky wrote to Dr. Ruppin, saying that he had still not been informed of all the Arab delegates; however, they would be drawn from all Arab groups and they would certainly include Naṣif Bey himself, as well as Muḥammad Kurd ʿAli and ʿAbd Allah Mukhliṣ (the proprietor of al-Karmal).[7] Since the Arab list was to

1. PJCA 79/319 (8.6.1914), Naṣif Bey to Kalvarisky.
2. Copy invitations, signed by Ruppin and dated 19.6.1914, are kept in CZA L2/516.
3. PJCA 79/319 (8.6.1914), Naṣif Bey to Kalvarisky.
4. The Jewish delegates were A. Eisenberg (Rehovot), J. Abrévaya (Jaffa), M. Dizengoff (Jaffa), C. Chissin (Jaffa), J. Thon (Jaffa), D. Yellin (Jerusalem), I.Lévy (Jerusalem), S. Levi (Tiberias), Dr. Moscowitz (Rehovot), and C. Kalvarisky (Rosh Pinna) - see PJCA 79/319 (30.6.1914), Ruppin to Kalvarisky. Cf. CZA Z3/1456 (1.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC, giving a slightly different list of delegates: the names of Yellin and Abrévaya are missing and J. Rosenheck (Haifa) is substituted.
5. PJCA 79/319 (30.6.1914), Ruppin to Kalvarisky.
6. Loc.cit.
7. PJCA 82/322 (25.6.1914), Kalvarisky to Ruppin.

include men who had been campaigning for several years against Zionist activities in Palestine, Ruppin wrote to Kalvarisky, telling him that their participation in the meeting was undesirable as it could only lead to an acrimonious discussion.[1] Ruppin therefore requested that the Zionists be given notice of the Arab delegates' names in advance of the meeting; he enclosed the names of Jewish delegates for the Arabs' information.[2] On July 1st, Naṣif Bey intimated to Kalvarisky that everything was now fixed on the Arab side and that someone, preferably Kalvarisky himself, should come to Beirut to make the final arrangements for the meeting, which he believed could not be held before July 15th.[3]

It was only now, at the beginning of July, that Sokolow was apprised of these developments.[4] Although he had helped initiate them, he was taken by surprise at how far arrangements for the meeting had advanced in the last month, since he had been put off by Naṣif Bey's warning that the preparations would take a long time.[5] However, the progress was, he believed, all to the good: he thought that the meeting at Brummana would make "still more actual" the major conference which he had in mind for the coming autumn.[6] Nevertheless, he still took the precaution of having the Zionist Office in Jaffa reminded that this initial meeting

1. PJCA 79/319 (30.6.1914), Ruppin to Kalvarisky.
2. Loc.cit.
3. PJCA 79/319 (1.7.1914), Naṣif Bey to Kalvarisky; cf. PJCA 82/322 (6.7.1914), Kalvarisky to Ruppin [telegram].
4. CZA Z3/399 (5.7.1914), Sokolow to Tschlenow.
5. Loc.cit.
6. Loc.cit.

was of a "private, preparatory" character, at which no commitments were to be made.[1]

On July 9th, Dr. Thon set out from Jaffa for Rosh Pinna in order to accompany Kalvarisky to Beirut to make the final arrangements for the meeting with Naşif Bey.[2] Meanwhile, Kalvarisky's involvement in these political affairs had come to the attention of his employers, the Jewish Colonization Association.[3] JCA's head office in Paris, being unable to approve of Kalvarisky's activities, ordered him to desist.[4] In consequence, Dr. Thon was obliged to make his way to Beirut alone.[5]

The Vali of Beirut returned from Constantinople at the beginning of July. On July 14th, he instructed Naşif Bey not to do anything without informing him first.[6] On that or the next day, Naşif Bey saw the Vali again, in the company of two Jewish land-agents, Hankin and Rosenheck (representing the Zionists and the Jewish Colonization Association), who had come to discuss certain land purchases in the Valley of Jezreel.[7] The subject of the proposed meeting of Arabs and Zionists was raised, whereupon the Vali declared that he was

1. CZA Z3/399 (5.7.1914), Sokolow to Tschlenow.; cf. CZA Z3/49 (6.7.1914), Tschlenow (Berlin) to Jacobson (Paris), incorporating text of a telegram sent from CZO to Ruppin on Sokolow's instruction.
2. CZA Z3/1456 (9.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC.
3. PJCA 82/322 (26.6.1914), Kalvarisky to J. Rosenheck (Haifa).
4. PJCA 82/322 (13.7.1914), Kalvarisky to Rosenheck.
5. Cf. PJCA 82/322 (13.7.1914), Kalvarisky to Naşif Bey.
6. PJCA 79/319 (14.7.1914), Naşif Bey to Kalvarisky.
7. CZA Z3/1457 (23.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC.

absolutely opposed to it.[1] The meeting was unnecessary; he did not know whom Nasif Bey and his colleagues represented or in whose names they could speak; such negotiations between Arabs and Jews were superfluous; the Central Government had ordered him to protect the Jews, whose advocate he undertook to be; the level of the press in the East was low and the Syrian press ranked lowest of all - it could be bought and was not to be taken seriously.[2] As it happened, both Hankin and Rosenheck also believed that the meeting was unnecessary and therefore they did not oppose the Vali's position but indeed supported him in it.[3]

The Vali's volte-face is not hard to understand. His statement that he was acting on instructions from the Central Government can be believed. In September 1913 the Government had just concluded its agreement with the Arabs and it reckoned that if the Arabs could settle their differences with the Zionists through some form of entente, then Jewish financial aid for the Empire would be assured. For this reason, the Government had encouraged the Zionists at that time to seek an entente with the Arabs (see above, p.377). However, by summer 1914, Arab opposition to the Government had reached unprecedented heights,[4] and there was cause to fear the growing Arab movement, especially if the outbreak of general war in Europe was imminent. Hence the Government had now no wish for the Arabs to ally themselves with

1. CZA Z3/1457 (23.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC.
2. Loc.cit.
3. Loc.cit.
4. Cf. Antonius, Arab Awakening, p.121 (discussing effect of the 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri "affair").

the Zionists and with the capital imagined to be at their command - capital which the Government wanted desperately for itself. It may be assumed therefore that Sami Bekir Bey had been instructed during his recent visit to Constantinople to do his utmost to prevent the conclusion of an Arab-Zionist entente.

A day or so later, Dr. Thon arrived in Beirut. Naṣif Bey was indignant at the stand adopted by Hankin and Rosenheck and blamed them for the Vali's volte-face.[1] Nevertheless, it appears that Naṣif Bey and Dr. Thon did not immediately jettison the idea of an Arab-Zionist meeting. Naṣif Bey furnished Dr. Thon with the names of the Arab delegates and a suggested agenda.[2] Dr. Thon then took his leave of Naṣif Bey who cautioned him that:

> "Governments are transient and fluctuate; the people are the constant factor, and one must come to an agreement with the people".[3]

Dr. Thon passed through Haifa on his way back to Jaffa. Meetings were held in both these towns, on July 20th and 30th respectively, to consider the situation.[4] The Zionists who took part in these meetings all thought it wisest to find some way of postponing a confrontation with the Arabs for the time being, without severing all contact with them. The Zionists were loth to negotiate with the Arabs whom Naṣif Bey had nominated: two of those named were newspaper

1. CZA Z3/1457 (23.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC.
2. Loc.cit.
3. CZA L2/44 (30.7.1914), Waʿad ha-temidi (Jaffa), [minutes].
4. CZA Z3/1457 (23.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC, re. meeting in Haifa on 20.7.1914; & CZA L2/44 (30.7.1914), Waʿad ha-temidi (Jaffa), [minutes].

editors and a third was a newspaper proprietor, who were violently opposed to the Zionists (Muḥammad Kurd ʿAli, Yusuf al-ʿIsa and ʿAbd Allah Mukhliṣ); moreover, there was not one Palestinian notable of any standing on the list.[1] Naṣif Bey had proposed the following agenda:

> "1. [The Zionists] should explain, as far as possible by producing documentary evidence, the aims and methods of Zionism and of the colonisation of Palestine connected therewith.
>
> "2. Thereafter, the Arabs will formulate their demands, acceptance of which would determine whether the [Zionist] Movement could be considered harmful to the Arabs or not".2

The Zionists feared that this agenda, as it stood, was liable to worsen, rather than better, their relations with the Arabs. Furthermore, the opposition of both the Jewish Colonization Association and the Vali of Beirut had to be taken into account as well. (The Zionists' records do not elaborate why this was so, probably because it was self-evident to them. They knew that it would be difficult to integrate with the Arabs and their only hope of reaching an agreement with the latter was to offer them financial support for their movement and for schools, development projects and the like. The Zionists also knew that if an agreement was to be reached

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1. The Arab delegates were to be Mukhtar Bayhum Bey, Rizq Allah Arqash, Ḥasan Asir [described as a supporter of the CUP from Beirut], Muḥammad Kurd ʿAli, ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Shahbandar, Aḥmad Ḥabash [described as a "Reformist" from Damascus], ʿAbd Allah Mukhliṣ, Yusuf al-ʿIsa, Jamil al-Husayni [a young Muslim in Jerusalem marked as a "doubtful"], and Naṣif Bey al-Khalidi - see CZA Z3/1457 (23.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC.
2. Loc.cit.

in this way, very great sums of money were required, sums of dimensions which they did not possess - contrary to the Arabs' (and Turks') belief. "Voilà la situation! Comment sortir de là sans se casser le cou, - comment vaincre ces difficultés sans argent, sans beaucoup - beaucoup d'argent?", Dr. Jacobson had written in May.[1] Baron Edmond de Rothschild had supported the early Jewish settlements in Palestine and continued to interest himself in them even after he had entrusted their administration to JCA in 1899. "The Baron" had never been won over to the Zionist cause, but his interest in Palestine through JCA made him the Zionists' one possible Maecenas. JCA's opposition to the proposed meeting at Brummana was therefore a blow to the Zionists. When the Vali withdrew his support for the meeting, the Zionists were confronted with a different kind of dilemma. In the last months, the Central Government had made several not inconsiderable concessions to the Zionists; there was no guarantee that a meeting with the Arabs would have any positive outcome and in the meantime it would be ill-advised to alienate the Government.) Finally, the Zionists in Palestine were also bound to take into account the fact that Sokolow had been careful to emphasise the preliminary nature of the Arab-Jewish meeting, because a full-scale conference could not, in his view, take place until the autumn. For these reasons therefore it was decided to send a small delegation, consisting of Kalvarisky and two or three others, to confer with Naşif Bey during the first week of August

1. CZA L2/34/II (3.5.1914), Jacobson to Ruppin.

to find an acceptable way of postponing the meeting.[1]

In the event, something far removed from Palestine, the Arabs and the Zionists put an end to all thoughts of a meeting which might have explored the possibility of an Arab-Zionist entente: World War I broke out in Europe on August 5th, 1914.

* * * *

Central to this episode was the range of Arabs who evinced a willingness to meet the Zionists after April 1914. Their objectives varied, and their motives, in some cases, were not entirely clear.[2] Certain Arab leaders in Constantinople wanted what Lichtheim termed "eine kulturelle Annäherung";[3] other nationalists in that city looked for what Lichtheim had called "specifically European things" to help strengthen the Arab movement.[4] Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm and some who thought like him appear to have wished to make a strategic compact with the Zionists who were held to have a common interest to oust the Turks from Syria and Palestine. Rashid Riḍa advocated an entente with the Zionists not only to gain Arab independence but also, as he told Malul, to frustrate the designs of certain Christian Arabs who, he believed, were eager for the Great Powers to occupy the Arab provinces. Naṣif Bey al-Khalidi gives the impression of having respected the Zionists' work in Palestine and, like a few individuals in Jerusalem, of being alarmed at the popular

1. CZA Z3/1457 (23.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC; & CZA L2/44 (31.7.1914), Waʿad ha-temidi (Jaffa), [minutes].
2. Cf. CZA Z3/49 (3.7.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
3. CZA Z3/49 (28.5.1914), same to same.
4. CZA Z3/47 (14.10.1913), same to same.

mood in the country; Mukhtar Bayhum Bey, on the other hand, had a vested interest in an agreement with the Zionists.

It is more difficult to explain a report from Kalvarisky at the end of June that ʿAbd Allah Mukhliṣ was Nasif Bey al-Khalidi's "supporter and inspirer",[1] and to make intelligible why committed anti-Zionists, such as Muḥammad Kurd ʿAli and Yusuf al-ʿIsa, should have been willing to meet the Zionists at Brummana. The proposed agenda for this meeting suggests that, far from seeking an Arab-Zionist entente, these men were using Naṣif Bey to look for a "show-down" with the Zionists. Why should they have required the Zionists to produce documentary evidence to explain their aims, if not for this purpose? Since Najib Naṣṣar had published his translation of Richard Gottheil's article on Zionism in the Jewish Encyclopedia in 1911, the Arabic press had followed closely all Zionist pronouncements and had found it a relatively easy matter to incriminate the Zionist Movement of separatism, despite its official policy of seeking no more than a "home" ("Heimstätte") in Palestine, within and not independent of, the Ottoman Empire.

One group refused to meet the Zionists - the one group which mattered most and upon which all else hinged (as Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm and Arabs in Constantinople had stressed). Responsible Arab leaders in Palestine declined to participate in the meeting to be held at Brummana. Their absence from

1. PJCA 82/322 (25.6.1914), Kalvarisky to Ruppin.

the list of delegates assembled by Nasif Bey was not merely conspicuous. It summed up the situation.

* * * * *

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE SEAL OF THE PROPHET

In spring 1914 the Ottoman Government greatly relaxed the naturalisation formalities for Jewish settlers in Palestine. However, the Jews did not show themselves immediately eager to take advantage of their new privilege. From the Jews' point of view, it was reasonable to retain their foreign status as it enabled them to enjoy special protection and rights, whereas Ottoman nationality assured them of little security and obliged them to serve in the Ottoman army. The Zionist Office in Jaffa therefore made efforts to encourage the settlers to change their nationality. But it was also found that the local authorities were none too confident about acting over the heads of the consuls as they had been ordered (see above, p.386). Consequently the Zionist Office in Jaffa requested Dr. Jacobson in June to try to have new orders sent from Constantinople to the officials in Palestine assuring them that reference to the consuls was unnecessary.[1]

In the three months after the relaxation of the naturalisation formalities, only twenty Jews became Ottoman subjects.[2] This was brought to Talât Bey's attention.[3] Moreover, he was sent statistics of the number of Jews entering Palestine. These figures included both tourists and settlers reaching Palestine, but made no allowance for the tourists' departure at the end of their visit or for the

1. CZA L2/34/II (21.6.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to V. Jacobson (Consple.).
2. CZA Z3/449 (7.6.1914), Greater Actions Committee (Berlin), [minutes].
3. Loc.cit.

numbers of Jewish settlers who left Palestine after having stayed there a short while.[1] The somewhat distorted picture of a large Jewish influx without any mention of Jews departing only served to underline the Jews' reluctance to take up Ottoman nationality.[2] Arab deputies to the Ottoman Parliament protested to the Grand Vezir against the recent relaxation of the restrictions against the Jews,[3] and towards the end of June orders were issued re-imposing the three-month limit on visits made by Jews to Palestine.

The first indication of the re-imposed limitation was observed by the Zionist Office in Jaffa which found that the Ottoman Consul in Trieste had begun to issue visas to Jews valid for three months only and that the port officials at Jaffa now demanded a cash deposit guaranteeing intended departure after this period before returning the Jews' travel papers to them.[4] Two weeks later the Haham Başi in Jaffa secured a copy of an order dated June 18th, from the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem to the Kaymakam of Jaffa, reminding him that although the Red Slip was abolished, strict measures had to be taken to prevent foreign Jews from settling in Palestine.[5] A few days after this, on July 14th, news reached Jaffa that the authorities at Haifa had

1. CZA Z3/449 (7.6.1914), Greater Actions Committee (Berlin), [minutes].
2. Cf. CZA Z3/49 (21.7.1914), R. Lichtheim (Consple.) to ZAC (Berlin).
3. CZA Z3/49 (14. & 28.7.1914), both Lichtheim to ZAC.
4. CZA Z3/1456 (25.6.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to the "Information Bureau for Palestinian Affairs" (Vienna), [copy].
5. CZA L2/69 (9.7.1914), B.Z. Ouziel (Jaffa) to A. Ruppin (Jaffa), enclosing Hebrew translation of order, dated 18.6.1914, from Mutas. (Jerus.) to Kay. (Jaffa).

tried to prevent the disembarkation of thirty to forty Russian Jews, bearing valid papers.[1] The authorities insisted that they were acting on instructions dispatched by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on June 25th;[2] the Jews were permitted to enter the country only after their consul's vigorous intervention.[3] At first, it was suggested that these orders applied solely to Jews from the Balkans, and especially to Jews from Salonika, now bearing Greek passports;[4] however, it soon became clear that this was not the case and that the three-month limitation was again being applied to all Jews.[5]

This reversal of official practice (or rather, return to former practice) was reported to the Zionist representatives in Constantinople.[6] When approached by the Haham Başi and Nissim Mazliah, both Talât Bey and Midhat Şukri at first denied all knowledge of the new orders.[7] At the end of July, however, when more evidence of the newly imposed three-month limitation had come to the Zionists' knowledge, Talât Bey and Midhat Şukri admitted that orders to this effect had in fact been issued and said that the Jews themselves were to blame for them, since they had been slow to

1. CZA Z3/1457 (16.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC.
2. Loc.cit. These orders may have been issued on June 25th, according to the "old style" (Julian) calendar; if so, their "new style" (Gregorian) date would be July 8th.
3. CZA Z3/1457 (16.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC; cf. CZA Z3/49 (21.7.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
4. CZA Z3/1457 (19.7.1914), Ruppin to ZAC.
5. See, for example, CZA L2/34/II (10.8.1914), Zionist Office (Jaffa) to Jacobson, enclosing specimen visas for three months issued at Odessa [copy].
6. CZA L2/34/II (13.7.1914), [Ruppin] to Jacobson [copy]; & CZA Z3/49 (14.7.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
7. CZA Z3/49 (17.7.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.

become Ottoman subjects.[1] The Government's efforts to court the Jews of Europe had come to an end.

* * *

On August 2nd, the Ottoman Empire and Germany signed a secret treaty. Total mobilisation in the Empire began immediately. Every Ottoman subject who was eligible for service was called up;[2] in Palestine, foreign Jews no longer in possession of their travel papers were treated as Ottoman subjects and made liable for military service.[3] During August, the outbreak of World War I absorbed the attentions of the Arabic press and, according to the Zionist Office in Jaffa, nothing of importance was written about the Zionist issue.[4] At the beginning of September, the authorities suspended a number of newspapers (including Falastin), and others stopped appearing of their own accord; those which continued devoted themselves wholly to the War in Europe.[5] In these tense months, there were no disturbances of any consequence between the local population and the Jewish settlers in Palestine.[6] Then, on November 11th, the Ottoman Empire entered the War on the side of the Axis Powers.

* * * *

1. CZA Z3/49 (28.7.1914), Lichtheim to ZAC.
2. For details of the mobilisation in Syria and Palestine, see The Near East, vii, 174 (1914), p.595; ibid. 175 (1914), p.624; & ibid. 177 (1914), pp.675-6.
3. CZA L2/39 (3.9.1914), Wa'ad ha-Temidi (Jaffa), [minutes].
4. CZA Z3/116 (10.9.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.
5. CZA Z3/116 (8.10.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.
6. CZA Z3/116 (10.9.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report.

At the beginning of June Rafiq Bey al-ʿAẓm had invited Sokolow to attend an Arab-Zionist meeting to be arranged by the Decentralisation Party in Cairo (see above, p.451); this invitation was declined in view of the arrangements already in hand for an Arab-Zionist meeting in Syria and because Sokolow and Jacobson felt that such a meeting, if it were to be attended by Zionists from Europe, could not take place before the autumn (see above, pp.452-3). Supposing, however, the invitation to come to Cairo had been accepted, could an entente with the Decentralisation Party possibly have been reached? The answer must be that such an outcome was unlikely.

Within the Decentralisation Party there was now considerable opposition to the idea. It will be recalled that in April, Salim Najjar had withdrawn his support from the proposal of an Arab-Zionist entente and contributed a long anti-Zionist article to al-Ahram (see above, pp.427-8). More important than Najjar's opposition was that of Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm. On June 20th, the latter wrote to Maḥmud al-Maḥmaṣani, a member of the Decentralisation Party in Beirut,[1] that he did not share Rafiq Bey's opinion about an Arab-Zionist meeting; if he was not opposing the suggestion, it was because such a meeting could do no harm, ever though it could not achieve anything.[2]

1. La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne, pp.98-9.
2. Letter no.70 (20.6.1914), Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm (Heliopolis) to Maḥmud al-Maḥmaṣani [Beirut], published by Cemal Paşa in Le Journal de Beyrouth, iii, 413 (1.9.1915). In the caption above this letter, the date is given as "20 juillet 1914"; however, the letter itself is headed "Héliopolis le 20 juin 1914". The context suggests the earlier date.

> "Understand, dear brother, that these people [Zionists] are marching towards their objective at a rapid pace, thanks to the help of the Government and the indifference of the local population. I am sure that if we do nothing which is demanded by the present situation, they will achieve their objective in a few years in [Jerusalem], where they will found a [Jewish state]; then they will gravitate towards Syria, next towards Iraq and thus they will have fulfilled their political programme.
>
> "... But by employing means of threats and persecutions - and it is this last means which we must employ - by prodding the Arab population into destroying their farms and setting fire to their colonies, by forming gangs to execute these projects, then perhaps [the Zionists in Palestine] will emigrate to save their lives."1

Shortly after word was received through As'ad Daghir that the Zionists had declined to come to Cairo for the time being (see above, p.453), Ḥaqqi Bey contributed an article to al-Iqdam in which he expressed his conviction that the Government was helping the Zionists against the local population.[2] Obliquely he warned the Government that the Arabs were beginning to think about ways of actively combating the Zionists, so that:

> "[There will come] a day when [the Zionists'] hair will stand on end and their knees will knock, and then that alliance and those relations [with the Government] will be of no use to them: then they will return from Palestine with great losses; and as for those who have sold land [to the Zionists], they are about to find out into what an abyss they will fall".3

1. Letter no.70 (20.6.1914), Ḥaqqi Bey al-'Aẓm (Heliopolis) to Maḥmud al-Maḥmaṣani [Beirut], published by Cemal Paşa in Le Journal de Beyrouth, iii, 413 (1.9.1915).
2. Ḥaqqi Bey al-'Aẓm, "The Ottoman Government and the Zionist Question", in al-Iqdam ([ca.12.]7.1914); for details, see CZA L2/94/I, press report [undated and unsigned].
3. Loc.cit.; cf. ha-Ḥerut, vi, 231 (20.7.1914).

Then, about a month and a half later, after the plans for the meeting at Brummana had collapsed, Rashid Riḍa publicly joined the opposition to the Zionists as well. During the summer Falasṭin translated Ussischkin's Our Programme and towards the end of August an abridged version of the first eight parts of this work was published in al-Manar.[1] Riḍa commented that these were sufficient to show that if the Zionists achieved what they desired, not one Muslim or Christian would remain in the "Promised Land", which according to Jewish tradition extended as far as the River Euphrates.[2] In the Book of Deuteronomy God had commanded the Jews to annihilate the inhabitants of the Promised Land; today they would do so again, not by fire and the sword, but by money and deceit, so that Jews alone would live in their "new kingdom".[3] Thus Riḍa too had come to accept, or at least to employ, the familiar allegations of less distinguished anti-Zionist publicists. To combat the Zionist danger, Rida prescribed "deliberation, determination, communal strength, ... promptitude in organising means of defence ... acts and deeds, not talk and words".[4]

Moreover, there were other, less important members of the Decentralisation Party who were also opposed to an Arab-Zionist entente. Muḥammad al-Maḥmaṣani,[5] a young lawyer

1. Al-Manar, xvii, 9 (1914), pp.697-708.
2. Ibid. pp.707-8.
3. Ibid. p.708.
4. Loc.cit.
5. For Muḥammad al-Maḥmaṣani's membership of the Decentralisation Party, see La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne, p.99.

in Beirut who had helped to organise the First Arab Congress,[1] had written a series of articles in Fatat al-ʿArab in which he argued that an agreement with the Zionists was impossible;[2] and Muḥammad al-Shanṭi from Jaffa,[3] who edited al-Iqdam in Cairo, was implacably opposed to the Zionists, having attacked them relentlessly through his columns in June and July while other newspapers in Cairo had agreed to hold their fire for a little while (see above, pp.438-9).[4]

In view of the opposition within the Decentralisation Party itself, it is therefore scarcely conceivable that an Arab-Zionist entente could have been struck in Cairo.

* * *

Sokolow had envisaged a major Arab-Zionist conference taking place in the autumn and attended by representatives of all interested parties. If, somehow, this meeting had been held before the Ottoman Empire entered World War I and if, on account of the special circumstances created by the outbreak of war in Europe, an agreement had been reached, would this have altered subsequent relations between Arabs and Jews? Even disregarding the McMahon Correspondence and the Balfour Declaration, there can be

1. Al-Muʾtamar al-ʿarabi al-awwal, pp.4-5.
2. Fatat al-ʿArab (27.4.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116 (7.6.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report; & Fatat al-ʿArab (4. & 5.5. & 4.6.1914) - for details see CZA Z3/116, press reports [undated and unsigned].
3. For Muḥammad al-Shanṭi's membership of the Decentralisation Party, see La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne, p.96. Al-Shanṭi was hanged by Cemal Paşa in 1915 - see Antonius, Arab Awakening, p.189.
4. For details of articles which appeared in al-Iqdam on June 21st & 28th, July 12th & 27th, see CZA Z3/116 & L2/94/I, press reports [undated and unsigned]; see also ha-Herut, vi, 121 (25.6.1914); ibid. 235 (24.7.1914); ibid. 236 (26.7.1914); ibid. 237 (27.7.1914); & ibid. 241 (31.7.1914). Further references are cited below.

little doubt that it would not have done so.

The views of the older generation of Arab leaders in Palestine were given at the end of Chapter IX (see above, pp.412-17). Moreover, their attitude was vividly expressed by their total refusal to attend the projected meeting at Brummana. More relevant than their views were those of the younger generation in Palestine, because it was the latter who became the leaders of the Arabs in Palestine in the 1920's and after. The opinions of some of these young notables have been remarked upon in foregoing chapters: Isʿaf al-Nashashibi and ʿArif al-ʿArif had begun to write against the Jews and Zionists (see above, pp.139, 215, 324 & 404); Jamil al-Ḥusayni, who had been a member of al-Muntada al-Adabi (an Arab nationalist society in Constantinople),[1] had appeared on the list of Arab delegates to attend the meeting at Brummana (see above, p.461, n.1). The views of this younger generation are best stated in the diaries of Khalil al-Sakakini, an Orthodox Christian, who, according to Elie Kedourie, was always "whether under the Ottoman or the British régime ... at the forefront of radical agitation" in Jerusalem.[2] In 1914 he was thirty-six years of age and was then teaching Arabic privately to a Jew named Ibry, with whom he discussed Zionism. On February 17th, he recorded in his diary that he did not ~~not~~ despise the Jews for striving towards national independence: on the contrary, he approved of the regeneration

1. Antonius, Arab Awakening, p.108, n.2.
2. E. Kedourie, "Religion and Politics: The Diaries of Khalil Sakakini", St. Antony's Papers, vol.iv (London, 1958), pp.85-6.

of nations.[1]

> "But what I despise is this principle which [the Zionist] Movement has set up, which is that it should subjugate another [movement] to make itself strong and that it should kill an entire nation so that it might live, because this is as if it is trying to steal its independence and to take it by deceit out of the hand of destiny .... And what glory does it have if it acquires its independence in this way? This independence which is acquired by cash, whereby the opportunity of other nations' lethargy, weakness and indolence is exploited, is indeed a feeble independence, founded on sand. What will the Jews do if the national feeling of the Arab nation is aroused; how will they be able to stand up to [the Arab nation]?"2

A few days later, al-Sakakini told Ibry this and explained further that:

> "... [the Jewish people's] conquest of Palestine is as if it had conquered the heart of the Arab nation [umma], because Palestine is the connecting link which binds the Arabian Peninsula with Egypt and Africa. If the Jews conquer [Palestine], they will prevent the linking of the Arab nation; indeed, they will divide it into two unconnected parts. This will weaken the cause of Arabism [sha'n al-ʿarabiyya] and will prevent its solidarity and unity as a nation".3

And then, on February 29th, al-Sakakini declared:

> "If the Arabs were asked by what right they possess this country [bilad], they would say that it is a natural part of the Arab lands. Yes, it was not the cradle of Arab civilisation - but it is not debarred from a share in it. This sacred precinct and these schools are eloquent signs that the country is Arab and Islamic. The Arabs have colonised this country from very ancient times; and if this country is the cradle of [the Jews'] spirituality [ruḥiyya] and the birthplace [mawṭin] of [their] history, then the Arabs have another undeniable right [to Palestine], which is that they propagated their language and culture in it. [The Jews'] right has died with the passing of time; our right is alive and unshakable".4

1. Al-Sakakini, Kadha ana, ya dunya, p.63.
2. Loc.cit.
3. Ibid. pp.64-5.
4. Ibid. p.68.

In April, Dr. Isaac Lévy was told by some Muslim friends that the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine had become a special topic of discussion "at the meetings of their secret societies".[1] In the next months abundant evidence was forthcoming about the nature of these societies. On April 2nd, a petition appeared in Fatat al-ʿArab addressed to the candidates in the elections to the Ottoman Parliament which were then being held (see above, pp.411-12). It declared that the "Anti-Zionist Society", which had first been formed in Nablus in the summer of 1913 (see above, pp.390-1), had now formed an economic society with its headquarters in Jerusalem; moreover, youth from Nablus were travelling abroad to acquire the necessary education to conduct their anti-Zionist campaign.[2] Towards the end of April, Ibry wrote to Dr. Ruppin in Jaffa (probably on the basis of information received from Khalil al-Sakakini) that he was sure there existed both in Jerusalem and in Jaffa "a special organisation of youth, both Christians and Muslims, to fight us throughout [Palestine] by all means".[3] In June, Falasṭin published the names and programmes of four nationalist and religious societies which had recently been founded in Jerusalem. They were "al-Jamiʿa al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya", "Jamiʿa al-Ikhaʾ wal-ʿAfaf", "Shirka al-Iqtiṣad al-Falasṭini al-ʿArabi", and "Shirkat al-Tijara

1. CZA L18/245/5 (9.4.1914), I. Lévy (Jerus.) to Ruppin; cf. CZA L18/245/5 (13.5.1914), same to same.
2. Fatat al-ʿArab (2.4.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
3. CZA L2/94/II (27.4.1914), B. Ibry (Jerus.) to Ruppin.

al-Waṭaniyya al-Iqtiṣadiyya".[1] The general aim of these societies was "to draw together [the Jerusalemites'] spirit and strength to withstand those dangers threatening their homeland [awṭan] and [to save] their existence from destruction".[2] In the same month, reports were published in ha-Ḥerut of two societies formed under the influence of Najib Naṣṣar. The first, in Beirut, was made up of about a hundred young men from Nablus studying there and was called "al-Shabiba al-Nabulsiyya"; its aims were "to protect the rights of the Arabs, to agitate for the good of the Arab people and for the good of Syria".[3] The second was a mixed Muslim and Christian society in Haifa, al-Muntada al-Adabi, whose objectives were openly nationalist and secretly anti-Zionist.[4] News was also received from further afield of similar societies. As early as February, al-Karmal had reported that Arab youth in Constantinople had established an anti-Zionist society.[5] In May Albert Antébi received a letter from a certain "Djevdet Bey" in Constantinople confirming its existence;[6] shortly thereafter al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm reported that the President of this group was (Amir) Ali

1. Falasṭin, iv, 34 (27.6.1914).
2. Loc.cit.; cf. ha-Ḥerut, vi, 220 (7.7.1914), observing that these were essentially Muslim societies and that the methods to be employed were primarily economic - the members were enjoined to buy local rather than foreign products. The last of these four societies, Shirkat al-Tijara al-Waṭaniyya al-Iqtiṣadiyya, was reported to to have been founded somewhat earlier than the first three named and was, in all probability, the economic society founded by youth from Nablus which was referred to in their petition mentioned immediately above.
3. Ha-Ḥerut, vi, 192 (4.6.1914). 4. Ibid. 207 (22.6.1914).
5. Al-Karmal, (24.2.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
6. PJCA 39/168 (21.5.1914), A. Antébi (Jerus.) to A. Bril (Jaffa).

Paşa al-Jaza'iri,[1] a deputy from Damascus and one of the Chamber's two Vice-Presidents.[2] And finally, Fatat al-ʿArab was informed of a society at al-Azhar in Cairo,[3] "The Society for Uprising against the Zionists",[4] which had been founded by students from Palestine.[5]

These groups were not inactive. At the end of March, young Muslims in Jaffa sent the Grand Vezir and the Minister of Internal Affairs a protest telegram against the Zionists (running to over four-hundred and fifty words).[6] A telegram congratulating Amir ʿAli Paşa on his election to the Presidency of the anti-Zionist group in Constantinople was sent by over a hundred young Arabs in Jerusalem who also assured him of their moral and material support; a similar telegram was dispatched from Beirut.[7] And al-Shabiba al-Nabulsiyya in Beirut planned to put on a play during the summer which had been written by Najib Naşşar, called "Shamam al-ʿarab" - "The Pride of the Arabs".[8]

The Arabic press discussed ways and means of opposing the Zionists. Al-Karmal and others urged that the fellaheen be protected, essentially by using the same methods

1. CZA L2/39 (30.7.1914), S. Abadi (Haifa) to Ruppin.
2. Ha-Herut, vi, 178 (18.5.1914).
3. Fatat al-ʿArab (5.5.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned].
4. Al-Iqdam (19.7.1914); reprinted in ha-Herut, vi, 237 (27.7.1914).
5. Le Journal du Caire (27.5.1914).
6. Falaştin (1.4.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned]; cf. Rafiq Bey al-ʿAzm in al-Muqaṭṭam (14.4.1914), reprinted in ha-Herut, vi, 159 (26.4.1914).
7. CZA L2/39 (30.7.1914), Abadi to Ruppin [per Falaştin].
8. Ha-Herut, vi, 192 (4.6.1914). There had been an earlier report of an anti-Jewish play, "Les Piastres Rouges", staged by pupils at Catholic schools in Haifa - see ha-Herut, vi, 7 (12.10.1913).

as the Zionists - i.e. by forming agricultural societies and banks to give the fellah cheap credit and by opening good schools in every village.[1] The strengthening of the restrictions against the Jews was also advocated.[2] ~~Yusuf~~ ʿIsa al-ʿIsa combined both these approaches in an interview which he gave to Le Journal du Caire, adding that reforms in the Arab provinces were also necessary.[3]

The programmes of the anti-Zionist socioties were somewhat different. The stated aims of "The Society for Uprising against the Zionists" were:-

> "1. To oppose the Zionists by all possible means, both by awakening public opinion and uniting views on this point, and by disseminating the Society's programme among all avenues of the Arab nation in general and in Syria and Palestine in particular.
>
> "2. To found branches and societies in all the towns of Syria and Palestine for this purpose alone.
>
> "3. To endeavour to spread unity among all the elements of which the [Arab] nation is constituted.
>
> "4. To aid economic, commercial and agricultural undertakings and to develop the farmer and the peasant so that they may be able to save themselves from the hands of the Zionists.
>
> "5. To make representations before all those interested in this question to halt the stream of Zionist immigration".4

1. Al-Karmal (6.1.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116 (1.2.1914), Thon to ZAC, enclosing press report. Cf. ha-Herut vi, 128 (11.3.1914); & ibid. 132 (17.3.1914), also reprinting articles from al-Karmal on this subject; and, further, CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned], giving details of an article by Niqula Qubʿayn (Cairo) which appeared in al-Karmal on 22.5.1914; & of a similar article which appeared in al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm on 14.6.1914.
2. Fatat al-ʿArab (2.4.1914); & al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm (15.6.1914) - for details, see CZA Z3/116, press reports [undated and unsigned].
3. Le Journal du Caire (27.5.1914).
4. Al-Iqdam (19.7.1914); reprinted in ha-Herut, vi, 237 (27.7.1914).

This was the Society's official programme; in private, it contemplated the same violent means "of threats and persecutions" advocated by Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm.[1]

The atmosphere in Jerusalem was amply conveyed in a "General Summons to Palestinians" issued at the end of June by one of the newly founded societies in the city.[2]

"Beware of the Zionist Danger.[3]

"Countrymen! we summon you in the name of the country which is in mourning, in the name of the homeland which is lamenting, in the name of Arabia, in the name of Syria, in the name of our country, Palestine, whose lot is evil, in the name of everything which is dear to you!

"We address to you this 'General Summons' which emanates from a painful heart; we summon you as men who see the dangers embracing us, for in a little while we will be utterly lost as one man and we will have died the final death. We summon you at the moment when we see how the country is moving towards death, how its buildings are being destroyed, how its foundations and its very existence are being undermined. We summon you at the moment when we see our property passing out of our hands and our country being stolen by foreigners.

"We summon you at the time when ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭab, the head of the believers, the first to conquer this country, looks at you from a distance of thirteen centuries and cries in your ears 'Awake! Guard your country which I conquered, I and your forefathers, my supporters! Have compassion on your homeland! Hold it with your teeth! Will you depart from the country and God has not commanded you to depart? Do you not hear the words of your Prophet: 'Departure from the homeland is a punishment'? How will you desert what we have left you

1. Letter no.70 (20.6.1914), Ḥaqqi Bey al-ʿAẓm (Heliopolis) to Maḥmud al-Maḥmaṣani [Beirut]; published in Le Journal de Beyrouth, iii, 413 (1.9.1915).
2. Letter by A. Eisenberg to Gad Frumkin, dated 3.7.1914, cited by J. Rau, Yaḥas ha-yishshub el ha-ʿarabim: 1880-1914 (Jerusalem, 1964), p.609, n.301.
3. For a Hebrew translation of this "General Summons" prepared by Malul, see CZA L2/94/I, press report [undated and unsigned]; there is also a less accurate Hebrew rendering of this document in CZA Z3/116, press report [undated and unsigned]. The "General Summons" was signed "A Palestinian" and the press report in CZA Z3/116 states that its author came from Jerusalem.

as an inheritance? [Will you do so] in order to drift and become wanderers in the world, wretched souls? If indeed you do this, if you are not Muslims, God, His Messenger and Angels, and all men will be obliged to punish you.'

"We summon you at the time when the pious monarch, Ṣalaḥ al-Din, stands before you at a distance of seven centuries, his pure spirit hovering over Mount Sinai, demanding of you to retain your country which he conquered for a second time after thousands of your pious forefathers had died on its walls.

"We demand of you that the fear of God should be before you and that you should observe the laws of your faith and your language. Have compassion on your country and do not sell it as merchandise; otherwise, you will regret it. At least let your children inherit the country which your fathers gave you as an inheritance.

"Men! You were the better nation, commanded to do good and to hate evil. You laboured under the protection of God as one man according to truth and justice. You were the masters of this country, its leaders and scholars. You had a right of priority in all things and in every battle. Enlightenment was entrusted into your hands; craft stood at the gates of your house.

"But woe unto us! Time is a revolving cycle. As it revolved, it struck us that ill-famed blow and we did not have time to awake before the throne of our kingdom had fallen. Our rule has been lost; our energy has diminished. We have become foolish instead of growing wise; we have been divided instead of being united. And woe unto that culture!

"Our spirit has been blunted; our heart has died. Evil straits have taken possession of us in a way that disaster follows disaster. Happy is he who addresses an ear that hearkens ... Dangers have surrounded us already from every side, every direction, every corner: but does the wound of a dead man grieve him?

"Who of our noble ancestors, from the day that Islam appeared or from the day that the Arabs were known in history until the end of the last generation, would have chanced to think that one day their offspring would be the lowest and most despicable of people? Who of them would have chanced to think that their offspring, who received as an inheritance their Arab blood and their Muslim national ideal, would in the future scatter this dear heritage and throw it to the winds, leaving it to their enemies?

"Men! do you want to be slaves and servants to people who are notorious in the world and in history? Do you wish to be slaves to the Zionists who have come to you to send you out from your country, saying that this country is theirs? Behold, I summon God and His Messenger as witnesses against them that they are liars. They dwelt in this holy land in former times and God sent them from it and forbade them to settle in it. Why therefore are they now sticking out their necks towards it, wishing to conquer it, after having deserted it for two thousand years? The Zionists desire to settle in our country and to send us out from it. Are you content with this? Do you want to die?

"Behold, the danger is immense. They have already purchased most of your country; many of them, more than three-hundred thousand in number, have come at a time when the local population are leaving the country in thousands for America and other countries. Trade and industry are already in their hands; they will also conquer agriculture, and thereafter they will conquer the whole country and everything in it, in the same way as they have done with your brethren whose villages they have taken. You will remain without a country in whose shadow to find shelter. Are you content with this? Will you be able to bear it?

"Oh how were we pained and how have we wept when we used to see one of the Great Powers conquer an Islamic domain and oppress it. How then is our condition at present when we see that groups of revolutionaries from various nations have conquered our country? It is not merely that they wish to have dominion over us but [that they wish] also to expel us from the country. Are you, Muslims, content with this? Are you, Palestinians, Syrians, Arabs, happy at this?

"No and no again! This cannot be. We shall die rather than let it happen.

"They have to know that there is a nation in the country and that they cannot enter so long as we are in it.

"And thus, having realised that danger threatens from them, how do you pass over it in silence, you inhabitants of this country? Defend your country! Take note of the essential things which we address to you:-

"1. Demand of your Government emphatically that it checks this sweeping stream which has almost swept everything away already. Demand [this] of your Government which sees you silent

and which does not concern itself with the cries of the newspapers, because it believes that the newspapers are not representatives of public opinion in view of the way in which the Zionists are deceiving them, [i.e.] by saying that 'Public opinion does not exist in our country'. Demand of it that it acts in accordance with its law which was issued by Imperial Decree, stipulating that 'it is completely forbidden to sell miri lands to foreigners', for this Imperial Decree cannot be annulled without another [Imperial Decree]. Why does the Government not act [on it] today? If the Zionists are buying lands in the name of agents (who will have to give account to us in the future and to uncover their deceit in broad daylight - and woe unto those agents at that time!), does not the Government also know [of their land purchases], for what agent can buy 50-60,000 dunams at one time [without being detected]? Use that law again which prohibits foreign Jews from staying in Palestine for more than three months, and [use] the law of the Red Slip.

"2. Try to develop local trade and industry. Spread this ideal among the people. Make an alliance among yourselves that none of you will trade except with your own people, as [the Zionists] do, because they do not trade with the 'Goy' - the unbeliever, i.e. the Muslim and the Christian.

"3. Do not sell them your lands and use all your power to prevent the peasant from selling. Henceforth, scatter the land agents and revile them.

"4. Be concerned to stop by all the means you can [employ] the stream of migration from and to Palestine.

"5. Demand of your awqaf to found Arab religious schools and also other schools for crafts, agriculture and science.

"6. Trust in God and in yourselves; do not trust in the Government because it is occupied with other things. Do not complain about it; complain about yourselves. It must restore to you the awqaf and the right to instruct; and you must work. Strive that Arabic will be the language of instruction in government schools, in teachers' seminaries, etc., because the Zionists are vying with you in language as well.

"7. You must implant in the hearts of the local population, especially the youth, love of agricultural work, of trade and industry, and [the will] not to attach themselves to the legion of officialdom. Have pity on the peasant and honour him. Aid the national schools, reform the government school because it has been despised by its pupils and teachers. If you wish to make reforms, the means at your disposal are many.

"The dangers threatening your country are more in number. Therefore guard yourselves against the Zionist danger. Strive, act and God will favour your deeds."[1]

* * * *

Christian Arabs had taken the lead in formulating the Arab case against the Zionists and in broadcasting it through the Arabic press. The older generation of Muslim leaders and newspaper editors were not long in following these Christian Arabs, so that proof of their opposition had manifested itself by the end of 1910 (see above, pp.227-8). However, by the summer of 1914, Muslim youth in Palestine had moved to the fore of Arab opponents of Zionism. This is evident not merely from the "General Summons" quoted above, but also from a number of other pointers. Nablus, the centre of the anti-Zionist movement among the youth of Palestine, was a Muslim town;[2] the anti-Zionist group in Constantinople was made up of young Muslims;[3] and the most violent of the anti-Zionist societies was to be found in al-Azhar.

1. This "General Summons" was also published in the press. According to the press report in CZA Z3/116, it appeared in al-Iqdam on 5.7.1914 and al-Karmal on 7.7.1914; and according to ha-Herut, vi, 225 (13.7.1914), it also appeared in Fatat al-'Arab (date not given).
2. Cuinet, Syrie, Liban et Palestine, p.183, gives the population of the town of Nablus in 1895 as 25,450 Muslims, 2,835 Christians, 180 Samaritans and 110 Jews.
3. CZA L2/39 (30.7.1914), Abadi to Ruppin.

There was indeed a note of violence in the air, implicit in the activities of the youth in Palestine and most pronounced in Cairo, where the more radical of the Arab nationalists had their headquarters.[1] As Sylvia Haim has remarked, "Clandestine associations, plots, and assassinations [at the end of Abdülhamid's reign and under the Young Turks] do not lead to moderation in political thinking".[2] These nationalists believed that the Zionists were trying to establish a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab homeland which they desired to liberate and, it should be remembered, they were convinced that the Ottoman Government was helping the Zionists in this. If certain Arab nationalists were contemplating taking up arms against the Turks, it is not surprising that they should have thought in similar terms about the Zionists.

The course of the future was set.

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1. Cf. ha-Herut, vi, 231 (20.7.1914).
2. S.G. Haim, "Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism", in W.Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition (London, 1958), p.303.

SOURCES

A. UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS - DIPLOMATIC

Austria, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, (Vienna). Cited as CZA (A).

The Central Zionist Archive (Jerusalem) is in possession of a number of documents on microfilm from this archive, which have been drawn from despatches sent by the former Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Constantinople to Vienna. These despatches (from files J IV and P I) deal with Great Power intervention against the restrictions imposed by the Ottoman Government on Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine. They are of limited value, being very incomplete, and at best serve only to supplement documents in other consular archives.

* * *

France, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, (Quai d'Orsay, Paris). Cited as Q d'O.

Within the "Nouvelle Série" (which begins at 1896), seven volumes are devoted to Palestine (N.S. vols. 129-135) and three volumes to Zionism (N.S. vols. 136-138). These and other selected volumes on the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire were examined in detail. For the purposes of this study, they were not found to be as useful as the material in the British and German archives - and this for two main reasons. First, French representatives in Palestine were little interested in the Jewish immigrants (as scarcely any were French subjects), while they were greatly concerned with the Holy Places, which absorbed most of their attentions. Second, the documents preserved in the volumes of the Nouvelle Série have been severely weeded and, one suspects, there are still certain despatches which have not been declassified. However, the French lack of interest in the Jewish immigrants is compensated for by a certain detachment when writing about them which is not always observed in the British and German despatches.

* * *

Germany, Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, (Berlin). Cited as PRO (G).

The Public Record Office in London is in possession of a large collection of German documents on microfilm from the German Foreign Ministry Archives. Film K 692 ("Die Juden in der Türkei: 1897-1920"), containing despatches from German representatives in Constantinople, Jerusalem, Beirut and elsewhere, was particularly pertinent to this study.

In addition, the Israel State Archive houses a collection of files from the former German Consulate in Jerusalem. Cited as ISA (G).

This collection proved more valuable than PRO (G). The latter were filmed selectively and do not represent all the despatches reaching Berlin from Jerusalem. ISA (G), on the other hand, are internal files from the Jerusalem Consulate, and as such preserve the drafts of all despatches sent to Berlin, which are useful in themselves because they often contain data omitted from the clean copy sent out. Moreover, in these files are to be found special memoranda, press cuttings, circulars and correspondence with the Ottoman authorities in Jerusalem and Jaffa, upon which the consuls' despatches were based but which were not sent to Berlin. These files are arranged according to subject and all relevant ones for the years 1880 to 1914 were examined.

* * *

Great Britain, Foreign Office Archive, (Public Record Office, London). Cited as FO.

All volumes of despatches from Constantinople, Jerusalem and Beirut were examined for the years 1880 to 1914. Despatches from other posts, such as Cairo and Damascus, were also consulted where relevant. Almost all these volumes fell under the classifications of FO 78, FO 195 and FO 371. The information contained in these volumes is rich but widely diffused because the majority of them are arranged chronologically and not by subject. These volumes were also employed to provide much of the background information required for this study which could not be found elsewhere.

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Ottoman Empire, Archive du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, (Sublime Porte, Istanbul). Cited as OFA.

A limited number of files from this archive were examined. Files, the titles of which indicated that they had direct bearing on the subject of this study, were put at the disposal of the author who was not permitted, however, either to consult files of a more general nature or to inspect the catalogues to this archive himself. The files employed contain correspondence in French between the former Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its representatives abroad as well as exchanges between the Sublime Porte and the Foreign Missions at Constantinople. These files are by no means complete, especially for the period after 1908, and one important file, concerning Jewish immigration from Russia into the Ottoman Empire during the 1880's,[1] could not be found by the archive officials. The importance of these files lay not with the Notes to and from the Foreign Missions (since these were duplicated in the embassies' records) but in the despatches between the Foreign Ministry and its representatives abroad, which confirmed all other evidence that the Ottoman Government kept a very watchful eye on all Jewish activities after 1881.

Under this heading should be mentioned a collection of Turkish documents housed in the Israel State Archive. Cited as ISA (T).

These documents came from the papers of Ali Ekrem Bey who was Mutasarrif of Jerusalem from December 1906 to August 1908. They comprise personal letters and, more important, copies of documents from the Archive of the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem which Ali Ekrem Bey utilised to prepare reports sent to the Sublime Porte. Copies of some of these reports are also available as well as orders received from various ministries at the Porte. The author employed a recently prepared Hebrew translation of these documents and has referred to them in the notes to this study according to the numbers ascribed to them by the Israel State Archive which bear no relation to their chronological order.

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1. OFA Carton 208, Dossier 139: "Situation faite aux Israélites [de Russie]; Question de leur émigration en Turquie: 1881".

United States, National Archives,
(Department of State, Washington). Cited as US (T).

The American National Archives have published a series of microfilms entitled Records of the State Department Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey: 1910-1929 (Washington, 1961). The index to the films was used to locate likely material rather than buy the whole series which is expensive. The despatches obtained were disappointing and reflect America's lack of interest in the Ottoman Empire prior to 1914.

Under this heading should perhaps be mentioned the microfilms of the Yale Papers kept at St. Antony's College, Oxford, which were made by Mr. Elie Kedourie. Except for Report no.10 (Cairo, 31.12.1917), nothing pertinent to the study was found.

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B. UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS - JEWISH

Alliance Israélite Universelle Archive,
(Paris). Cited as AIU.

This vast collection of material consists mainly of reports sent by the directors of Alliance Israélite Universelle schools in various parts of the world to the head office in Paris. These reports for the most part deal with educational affairs but occasionally discuss political events as well. However, since the Alliance was opposed to the Zionist Movement, a number of special files were opened on Zionist questions. The archive is well catalogued and files, mainly from Constantinople and Jerusalem, were examined selectively.

By far the most important reports were those sent by Albert Antébi who directed the Alliance school in Jerusalem after 1900. Antébi was born in Damascus and educated in Constantinople and France. He came to Jerusalem in 1896 where he worked in a double capacity both as an employee of the Alliance and as the representative of the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) in Jerusalem. From 1898 to 1915 the President of both the Alliance and of JCA was one and the same man, Narcisse Leven of Paris. In consequence, Antébi found himself writing to Leven in two capacities, first on Alliance notepaper and then under JCA's letter-head. Quite naturally, therefore, Antébi

would often include in an Alliance letter to Leven a short paragraph about immigration or colonisation (which properly was JCA business) rather than write out a separate letter to Leven on JCA's paper. Moreover, since the Alliance school occupied most of Antébi's time, he regularly chose to enclose in his Alliance reports to Leven copies of letters received from other JCA representatives in Palestine, in preference to dispatching a separate envelope with a special covering note to Leven as President of JCA. As a result, many letters which deal with JCA affairs (i.e. immigration and settlement in Palestine) are to be found in the Alliance archive. To complicate matters further, from the late 1890's onwards, the principal Alliance and JCA representative in Constantinople were also the same person, Isaac Fernandez. He corresponded with Antébi in both these capacities and Antébi frequently forwarded copies of his letters to Leven. This proved more than fortunate because the JCA records are incomplete (see below) and Fernandez' letters to JCA were not found. Thanks to this somewhat complex web of official relationships, many important letters from Constantinople which otherwise might never have come to light were located in this archive.

As a native of Damascus, Antébi found it relatively easy to establish good relations with many prominent Arabs in Jerusalem; speaking Turkish, he was able to befriend the principal Turkish officials who came to the city. His own strong personality was undoubtedly enhanced by the prestige he carried as Director of the local Alliance school and by his connection with JCA (which was founded by Baron Maurice de Hirsch and after 1900 was backed by Baron Edmond de Rothschild). He was especially friendly with Bishara Habib Effendi who was Secretary and Dragoman to the Mutasarrifs of Jerusalem throughout all the years Antébi was in Jerusalem before World War I. Through Bishara Effendi, Antébi obtained copies of many Ottoman documents relating to Jewish questions in Palestine which he sent post-haste to Paris, coupled with French translations. Dr. Geoffrey Lewis of St. Antony's College has compared samples of the copies made by Antébi from the Turkish originals with the latter's French translations and has found these translations to be very accurate and trustworthy. Although Antébi supported Jewish immigration into Palestine, he had very mixed feelings about the Zionist Movement, whose methods and representatives he often criticised. In view of his critical position and his intimacy with both Arab notables and high Ottoman officials in Jerusalem, his judgement has been relied upon heavily in this study. (For a series of biographical articles about Antébi, see A. Almaliah, "Abraham Albert Antébi", ha-Mizrah, i, 3 (1942), pp.6-7; ibid. 4 (1942), pp.6-7; ibid. 5 (1942), pp.6-7; & ibid. 6 (1942), p.6.)

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Central Zionist Archive, (Jerusalem). Cited as CZA.

This study owes much to the documents in the Central Zionist Archive and its archivists who guided the author through an extremely large body of material. This archive houses all official Zionist files as well as many collections of private papers and a library of Zionist literature, periodicals and pamphlets. For the period before 1914, the official files are equipped with descriptive catalogues and in some cases with card indices too. All the files carry a number which is prefixed by a symbol indicating the category to which it belongs. Most of the files employed in this study fell under the following categories:-

Z1 = Correspondence of the Zionist Central Office, Vienna, 1897-1905;
Z2 = Correspondence of the Zionist Central Office, Cologne, 1905-1911;
Z3 = Correspondence of the Zionist Central Office, Berlin, 1911-1914;
L2 = Correspondence of the Zionist Office, Jaffa, 1908-1914;
L5 = Correspondence of Zionist Representatives, Constantinople, 1908-1914;
KKL= Correspondence of the Jewish National Fund;
H = Theodor Herzl's papers;
W = David Wolffsohn's papers.

Other private collections are prefixed with a letter and a number, e.g. A18 = Nahum Sokolow's papers.

The most rewarding files were those containing letters from the Zionist representatives in Constantinople and Jaffa. From 1908 onwards Dr. Victor Jacobson was the principal Zionist representative in Constantinople and he relied on several Ottoman Jews who were close to Government circles to gain his information and to introduce him to prominent Young Turk leaders of all groups. These Ottoman Jews included Rabbi Hayim Nahum (the Haham Başi), Emmanuel Karasu (an important member of the CUP) and Nissim Ruso (at first one of Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa's secretaries and later Cavid Bey's chief secretary). With the help of these men and others there was hardly an Ottoman politician of distinction whom Jacobson did not meet at some stage between 1908 and 1914.

The Zionist Office in Jaffa was opened in 1908. It was directed by Dr. Arthur Ruppin, who was seconded by Dr. Jacob Thon. Both were men of talent; they reported fully and fairly on all events in Palestine. Knowing no Arabic, however, they were perhaps a little slow to recognise how seriously the Arabs regarded Jewish advances in Palestine

and how widely spread was the concern among the Muslims, just as among the Christian Arabs. They received reports about local feeling from Arabic-speaking Jews, including Albert Antébi, Dr. Shimon Muyal (a doctor in Jaffa), Aaron Mani (a lawyer in Jerusalem, originally from Hebron), Rabbi Ben Zion Ouziel (the Haham Başi of Jaffa) and Nissim Malul (who, having been born in Safed and educated in Egypt, came to Jaffa in mid-1911 as al-Muqaṭṭam's correspondent and joined the Decentralisation Party in spring 1913). Ruppin and Thon may have discounted the reports they received but they were careful to put them on file, even though they do not always appear to have passed them on to the Zionist Central Office.

In December 1911, arrangements were made to follow the Arabic press in a systematic fashion. Abraham Ludvipol, a Jew who had had experience in journalism in Europe, was appointed to take charge of this operation. Nissim Malul was engaged to read the Arabic press extensively as well as to translate all important articles on Zionism; he also contributed pro-Zionist articles to the Arabic press. From the beginning of 1912 reports on the Arabic press were sent regularly from Jaffa to the Zionist Central Office in Berlin. For 1912, these reports are to be found in the files of general correspondence reaching Berlin from Palestine. In 1913, special files for the press reports were opened. In these files, for the period spring 1913 to autumn 1914 alone, there are well over four-hundred quarto sheets (in closely written manuscript or typescript) of translations and synopses of Arabic articles on Zionist questions - and, it should be added, these files themselves are incomplete.

The newspapers reported upon include: al-Ahram (Cairo), al-Aḥwal, al-Balagh, al-Ḥaris, al-Ḥaqiqa, al-Ikhaʾ al-ʿUthmani (all Beirut), Falasṭin (Jaffa), al-Iqdam (Cairo), al-Karmal (Haifa), Lisan al-Ḥal (Beirut), al-Maḥrusa, al-Majnun, al-Miṣr (all Cairo), al-Mufid [later Fatat al-ʿArab], (Beirut), al-Munadi (Jerusalem), al-Muqaṭṭam (Cairo), al-Muqtabas [later al-Qabas], (Damascus), al-Nafir (Jerusalem, later Haifa), al-Naṣir and al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm (both Beirut). No cuttings of the Arabic originals were preserved in these files. However, when the opportunity presented itself to compare the translation of any article with the original Arabic or with an alternative rendering published in ha-Ḥerut (the newspaper of Sephardi Jews in Jerusalem), the version prepared by Malul and his colleagues was found to be accurate (although long articles were sometimes reduced to a few sentences and, very often, references to the date and issue of the paper in which they appeared were incomplete).

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Jewish Colonization Association Archive, (London). Cited as JCA.

This archive was formerly kept in Paris at the head office of the Jewish Colonization Association. During World War II part of it was transferred to London while the remainder fell into Nazi hands and has not yet been recovered. Although incomplete, it is still not insignificant in volume. JCA began to interest itself in colonisation in Palestine in 1896 and the documents utilised in this study are today kept in Boxes 254-280. These include reports from Albert Antébi in Jerusalem (see above, pp.489-90), from the general directors of colonies in the north and south of Palestine (in Beirut (later Haifa) and Jaffa respectively), and from administrators on colonies founded or supported directly by JCA (the most complete of this last class of material being letters from Sejera, founded by JCA in 1899). Except for those written by Albert Antébi, these reports concern themselves rather narrowly with the day-to-day administration of the JCA colonies. They therefore throw light on relations between the colonists and their fellaheen neighbours, but contribute little to solving the political questions which are the major concern of this study.

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Palestine Jewish Colonization Association Archive, (Haifa). Cited as PJCA.

At the end of 1899 Baron Edmond de Rothschild handed over to JCA the administration of all the colonies in Palestine which he had supported for almost two decades. JCA kept the records of these colonies apart from those of its own colonies, setting up a special administration which it dubbed the "Commission Palestinienne". In 1924 this Commission was made into a separate organisation called the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association. All the records from the Baron's administration and from the Commission Palestinienne were transferred to PJCA and are now kept in Haifa. Since a history of PJCA is being written at present, the author of this study was not granted free access to the PJCA archive. Instead, he was allowed to inspect the catalogue to the archive and then to work on selected files for two days. He chose to examine a few files and copy-books of letters written by Chaim Kalvarisky in 1914 relating to the Arab-Zionist meeting which it had been proposed to hold at Brummana on July 1st of that year (see above, pp.455-63).

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C. PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

Diplomatic:

Auswärtiges Amt
Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes. 40 vols. Berlin, 1922-1926.

Department of State
Papers relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States. Annual vols. for 1881 to 1914. Washington.

Foreign Office
Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance. Annual series for 1885 to 1914. London.

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914.
1st series, 16 vols. 2nd series, 14 vols.
3rd series, 11 vols. Paris, 1929-1936.

Gooch, G[eorge] P[eabody], and Temperley, Harold (eds.)
British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. 11 vols. London, 1926-1938.

Hyamson, Albert M. (ed.)
The British Consulate in Jerusalem in relation to the Jews of Palestine, 1838-1914. 2 vols.
London, 1939 & 1941.

Diaries and Letters:

Chissin, Chaim
Miyyoman aḥad ha-biluyim. Trans. S. Herberg.
Tel Aviv, 1925.
[Chissin's diary, critical notes for 1880's.]

Druyanow, A[lter], (ed.)
Ketabim letoldot ḥibbat ẓiyyon we-yishshub erez yisraʾel. 3 vols. Odessa & Tel Aviv, 1919, 1925 & 1932.
[Large collection of documents from the archives of the "Lovers of Zion" Movement; invaluable for 1880's.]

Ginsberg, Asher [Aḥad ha-ʿAm]

Igrot Aḥad ha-ʿAm. Ed. A. Simon. 6 vols. Tel Aviv, 1960.
[Letters of Aḥad ha-ʿAm; not too valuable in themselves, but useful as a key to the Aḥad ha-ʿAm Papers, kept in the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, where items of interest from correspondents in Palestine are to be found.]

Herzl, Theodor

The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl. Ed. R. Patai & trans. H. Zohn. 5 vols. New York & London, 1960.
[Trustworthy, but must be used in conjunction with Herzl Papers in CZA and other sources; the index to names, etc. in vol.v is particularly helpful.]

Joffe, H[illel]

Dor ha-maʿapilim. Eds. Y.H. Ravnitsky et al. Tel Aviv, 1939.
[Part of Joffe's diary and selected letters, mainly from Zihron Ya'aqov, where he was a doctor; intelligent observations for 1890's & 1990's.]

al-Sakakini, Khalil

Kadha ana ya dunya. Ed. H. al-Sakakini. Jerusalem (Jordan), 1955.
[Diary of an Orthodox Christian intellectual in Jerusalem, who became prominent in the Arab Movement after World War I; gives insight into the feelings of the younger generation in Jerusalem before 1914.]

Wissotski, Kalonimus Zeʾeb

Ḳebuẓat miktabim. Warsaw, 1898.
[Letters of a member of the "Lovers of Zion" Movement, who visited Constantinople and Palestine in 1885.]

Yavneʾeli, Samuel (ed.)

Sefer ha-ẓiyyonut: teḳufat ḥibbat ẓiyyon. 2 vols. Tel Aviv, 1961.
[Letters, articles and selected writings from Ḥibbat Ẓiyyon period; of limited value.]

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D. FURTHER SOURCES

Since this is the first study on the subject, the author makes no claim to have exhausted all possible sources. A number of directions for further research suggest themselves:-

i. Sources in Turkish. All evidence points to the existence of a large body of official material in the Ottoman archives, probably sufficient to justify a separate study with a view to checking the conclusions reached in this one. The records of various ministries at the Sublime Porte would have to be inspected (the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs [Turkish documents], Justice, Cadastre, and Awqaf), as well as the minutes of the Councils of Ministers and of State. In addition, the Yildiz Collection (kept today at the Sublime Porte) and the records of both the Committee of Union and Progress and of the Haham Başi should be examined. Newspapers in Turkish should also be searched.

ii. Sources in Arabic. In the course of this study the author has indicated various Arabic sources whose existence he discovered but which were not made available to him. In view of the concern with which the Arabs viewed the Jewish immigrants there must also exist in private hands several collections of letters, diaries and the like which should have bearing on the subject of this study. Moreover, the author was able to locate only a few Arabic newspapers; a large collection of Arabic papers is available in Cairo and others are to be found in Ankara. These should be a profitable avenue of research; and if the internal files of the newspapers' offices could be utilised, much valuable data would be forthcoming.

iii. Diplomatic sources. The author did not inspect the despatches of all the Powers represented in Palestine, and others might profitably be examined. The archives of the Foreign Ministries of Imperial Russia and of Austro-Hungary are likely to yield most information, because the majority of the Jewish immigrants were subjects of one or other of these two Powers, both of which maintained a close watch on the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, each for reasons of its own.

iv. Missionary and similar sources. A.L. Tibawi's British Interests in Palestine: 1800-1901 (London, 1961) illustrates the usefulness of missionary records as a source for the historian concerned with nineteenth and twentieth century Palestine. Several missionary societies were active in Syria and Palestine during this period and their archives should throw light on a number of questions central to this study, especially

the attitudes of Christian Arabs to the Jewish immigrants and the part played by the missionaries in conveying to the Arabs European prejudices against the Jews. As well as missionaries, various other groups, such as the Palestine Exploration Fund and the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, were present in the area at this time. Their archives too should help in solving many unsettled issues raised in this study.

v. Jewish sources. The largest Jewish archive which was not properly examined for this study is that of the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association in Haifa. This archive contains more letters by Albert Antébi, addressed to the Commission Palestinienne and to various administrators in Palestine, as well as complete files of these administrators' reports dating back to the early 1880's. According to the catalogue of this archive, it also possesses material in Arabic and Turkish. Moreover, several of the older Jewish settlements in Israel have preserved their records and many collections of personal papers are still in private hands. All these would no doubt contribute to the further understanding of the subject of this study.

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1. Ha-Ḥerut was the newspaper of Sephardi Jews in Jerusalem; it began to appear twice weekly in May, 1909, and became a daily in May, 1912. This paper was especially valuable because its editors' mother tongue was Arabic, and they were very sensitive to changes in opinion among other segments of the local population towards the Jews. Articles from the Arabic press were regularly reprinted in ha-Ḥerut in Hebrew translation, frequently in full. Where the opportunity presented itself to check these translations with the Arabic original, it was found that ha-Ḥerut's Hebrew rendering was absolutely trustworthy. The Arabic press in Palestine was aware that it was often quoted in ha-Ḥerut; but, as far as is known, no Arabic newspaper ever complained to the authorities that it had been misrepresented in ha-Ḥerut (as would have happened had an Arabic paper had reason to do so, because the Jews in Palestine did not hesitate to protest to the authorities when they felt they had been wrongly done by in an Arabic newspaper).

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
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Pre-War Turkish Administrative Districts comprised in Syria and Palestine
No 1
34°
36°
38°
Alexandretta
VILAYET of ALEPPO
ALEPPO
SANJAK of ALEPPO
CYPRUS
SANJAK of LATAKIA
Latakia
SANJAK of TRIPOLI
Tripoli
SANJAK of HAMA
Hama
Homs
Nebk
VILAYET of BEIRUT
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
PROVINCE of LEBANON
BEIRUT
SANJAK of BEIRUT
Saidâ
Es Sur
SANJAK of ACRE
Acre
Haifa
SANJAK of BALQA (Nablus)
Jaffa
JERUSALEM
INDEPENDENT SANJAK of JERUSALEM
Gaza
El Arish
EGYPT
Wadi Arish
L. of Tiberias
River Jordan
Dead Sea
SANJAK of DAMASCUS
DAMASCUS
SANJAK of HAURAN
Jebel Druz
SANJAK of SYRIA
VILAYET of MAAN
Gulf of Akaba
Akaba
HEJAZ
Scale
Miles 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 100 Miles
O.R.26
War Office, 1937.