

**The Soldier and the Post-Conflict State: Assessing Ex-Combatant
Reintegration in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone**

**Jaremey R. McMullin
New College**

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Abstract

Several organizations, most prominently the United Nations and the World Bank, have emphasized that ex-combatant reintegration is crucial to consolidating peace after war. Strategic thinking about peace-building and opportunities for international involvement in post-conflict states after the Cold War have focused attention on programs to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate fighters. Despite the resources and effort invested in reintegration programs, however, the evidence from Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone shows that significant problems linked to incomplete reintegration persist after formal programs end. These problems include widespread unemployment among former fighters, ex-combatant involvement in criminality, re-recruitment into neighboring conflicts, and political and social polarization of reintegration grievances. Left unmanaged, such problems threaten security even if they do not lead a state back to war.

The thesis explains the persistence of reintegration problems in terms of two variables: the capacity (defined as resources, operational expertise, and authority) and preferences (defined as the explicit and implicit interests and assumptions that guide programs) of reintegration actors. The capacity and preferences of these actors are aggregate independent variables that are themselves the product of endogenous (organizational and bureaucratic) and exogenous (systemic) pressures that literature on political economy and international relations theory helps to elucidate (i.e., helps to determine how reintegration actors' own behavior exacerbates or ameliorates problems).

Drawing on documentation and interviews, the thesis constructs a narrative of reintegration in each case and employs process tracing within cases to identify reintegration problems, measure their impact on security, and determine whether and how the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors contributed to the persistence of reintegration problems. The thesis uses comparative analysis to generalize inferences about the variables observed, and suggests potential solutions to improve the management of reintegration problems and creation of economic opportunities. Unless deeper issues of reintegration governance related to problem management and opportunity creation are addressed, targeted remedies to improve program design will not succeed.

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Acronyms

AAs	Assembly Areas
ADEMIMO	Mozambican Association of Disabled Soldiers
AfD	Arms for Development Program (Sierra Leone)
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)
AMODEG	Mozambican Association of the War Demobilized
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
BPD	<i>Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento</i> (Mozambique)
CAII	Creative Associates International, Inc.
CCF	Ceasefire Commission (Mozambique)
CCFADM	Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambique Defence Force
CCN	Council of Churches of Namibia
CDF	Civil Defense Forces (Sierra Leone)
CEIP	Community Education Investment Program (Sierra Leone)
CER	<i>Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales</i> (France)
CIVPOL	Civilian Police (United Nations)
CoD	Congress of Democrats (Namibia)
CORE	Reintegration Commission (Mozambique)
CRP	Community Reintegration Programme (DFID, Sierra Leone)
DBC	Development Brigade Corporation (Namibia)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States
ELCIN	Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia
EPS	Sandinista People's Army (Nicaragua)
EU	European Union
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
FADM	Mozambique Defence Force
FAM	<i>Forças Armadas Moçambicanas</i>
FLS	Front Lines States
FMLN	<i>Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional</i> (El Salvador)
FRELIMO	<i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i>
FTR	Family Tracing and Reunification Program
GPA	General Peace Agreement (Mozambique)
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
ICCs	Interim Care Centers (Sierra Leone)
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDMP	Integrated Diamond Management Program (Sierra Leone)
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMATT	International Military Advisory and Training Team (Sierra Leone)

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPA	International Peace Academy
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network (United Nations)
IRS	Information and Referral Service (Mozambique)
LAC	Legal Assistance Centre (Namibia)
LICUS	Low Income Countries under Stress Trust Fund (World Bank)
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MET	Ministry of Environment and Tourism (Namibia)
MILOBS	Military Observers (United Nations)
MINUGUA	United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala
MLRR	Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MPLA	<i>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</i>
MRP	Military Reintegration Program (Sierra Leone)
NaCSA	National Committee for Social Action (Sierra Leone)
NAMPOL	Namibian Police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCDDR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (Sierra Leone)
NCRRR	National Commission on Resettlement, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction (Sierra Leone)
NDC	Namibia Development Corporation
NDF	Namibian Defense Force
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLWVA	National Liberation War Veterans Association (Zimbabwe)
NODEFIC	Norwegian Defence International Centre
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council (Sierra Leone)
NR	Nicaraguan Resistance
NSHR	National Society for Human Rights (Namibia)
OAU	Organization for African Unity
ONS	Office of National Security (Sierra Leone)
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OP/BP	Operational Policy/Bank Procedures (World Bank)
OSD	Occupational Skills and Development Program (Mozambique)
PF	Provincial Fund (Mozambique)
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
PPC	Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (Canada)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RB	Reinsertion Benefit (Sierra Leone)
RENAMO	<i>Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana</i>
RPSRCs	Reintegration Problems Short of a Return to Conflict
RRR	Emergency Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reconstruction Committee (Namibia)

RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RSS	Reintegration Support Scheme (Mozambique)
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SADF	South African Defense Force
SFF	Special Field Force (Namibia)
SGDN	Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale
SIDDR	Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
SIPE	Socio Economic Integration Programme for the Ex-Combatants (Namibia)
SLA	Sierra Leonean Army
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SNDC	Swedish National Defence College
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (United Nations)
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
SWAPOL	South West African Police
SWATF	South West African Territorial Force
TCC	Technical Coordination Committee (Sierra Leone)
TEP	Training and Employment Program (Sierra Leone)
TSA	Transitional Safety Net Allowance (Sierra Leone)
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
UN	United Nations
UNAFEM	UN Development Fund for Women
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNDPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (also DPKO)
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNIDIR	UN Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIOSIL	UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone
UNITA	<i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i>
UNITAF	Unified Task Force (Somalia)
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOHAC	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia
UNOWA	UN Office for West Africa
UNSC	UN Security Council
UN SCR	UN Security Council Resolution
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
YRTEP	Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program (Sierra Leone)

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Introduction

The United Nations, the World Bank, and other international and non-governmental organizations have increasingly intervened to help states with the burden of reintegrating large numbers of combatants after war. The impetus to help states with reintegration is part humanitarian: organizations want to lessen the suffering former fighters might experience after conflict. But the motivation for reintegration assistance is fundamentally strategic: these actors have concluded that reintegration programs, along with sibling programs for soldiers' demobilization and disarmament, are crucial to maintaining peace and security during the unstable transition from war.¹ The 2004 report of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change stated, 'Demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations' and cautioned that demobilization would 'be ineffective without the provision of resources for reintegration and rehabilitation'.² Every UN peace-building operation since the end of the Cold War, and several non-UN mandated peace operations during the same time period, has contained a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

¹ Several high-profile UN publications have emphasized DDR's importance to peace-building. Notably, the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report, called DDR the 'key to immediate post-conflict stability' (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, 21 August 2000, A/55/305 and S/2000/809, para.42). See also UN Security Council (UNSC), 'Statement by the President of the Security Council on Maintenance of Peace and Security and Post-Conflict Peace-Building,' 8 July 1999, S/PRST/1999/21; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), Lessons Learned Unit, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping environment: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations, 2000); and UN Development Programme (UNDP), *Practice Note: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants* (New York: UNDP, 2006).

² United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004, A/59/565, paras.227-8.

(DDR) component – though of varying commitment and complexity – from El Salvador to Sudan, Cambodia to Liberia.³ As a senior World Bank official noted, 'Nowadays, we don't have to sell DDR anymore because it has sort of become the obvious.'⁴

Ostensibly, reintegration programs form part of broader peace-building efforts, whereby peace is not merely *kept* by troops monitoring a ceasefire but *built* by a number of actors, foreign and local, working in concert to invest in the political, social, and economic fabric of a post-conflict state and thereby address the 'root causes' that caused a conflict in the first place.⁵ However, the record falls far short of this goal. Reintegration experience in Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, Haiti, and elsewhere, calls into question the extent to which reintegration programs 'build peace'.⁶ Not coincidentally, that underachievement has occurred alongside the efforts of reintegration actors and those that evaluate their performance to downgrade expectations about what their programs can accomplish in a post-conflict setting.⁷ These efforts can be viewed as attempts to distance reintegration programs from the more exacting demands of peace-building.

³ The final report of the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) lists 36 DDR processes between 1992 and 2005, 25 of which were in Africa (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration*, Final Report, February 2006, pp.38-9).

⁴ Author's interview with Kazuhide Kuroda, Senior Knowledge Management Officer, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, Social Development Department, World Bank, Washington, DC, 6 April 2004.

⁵ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has defined peace-building as 'actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation' (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, Report of the Secretary-General, 13 April 1998 (A/52/871-S/1998/318), para.63). Similar definitions, including reference to addressing root causes, are found in Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992, first edition), p.11; and Michael Pugh, 'Peacebuilding as Developmentalism: Concepts from Disaster Research,' *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol.16, No.3, 1995, p.328. For more on the evolution and nature of peace-building see, for example, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elisabeth Cousens, eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner for the International Peace Academy, 2002); Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and UNDP, *Building Peace through Development* (New York: UNDP, 1998).

⁶ Joanna Spear, 'Conclusions: The International Practice of DDR,' in Ann M. Fitzgerald and Hilary Mason, eds., *From Conflict to Community: A Combatant's Return to Citizenship* (Shrivenham, UK: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, 2005) p.303.

⁷ For example, Creative Associates International, Inc., in its final evaluation of Sierra Leone's DDR program, cautions that 'a post-conflict DDR process is a conflict mitigation mechanism; as such, it can make only an indirect contribution to conflict prevention' [Gebreselassie Tesfamichael, Nicole Ball, and Julie Nenon, *Peace in Sierra Leone: Evaluating the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Process*, Final Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR (Washington, DC: Creative Associates International Inc., October 2004) p.74].

At the same time, reintegration receives 'less attention in terms of analysis and resources' than its demobilization and disarmament counterparts.⁸ A mixed record on reintegration and theoretical critiques of the very project of reintegration together necessitate an assessment of significant reintegration interventions of the post-Cold War period. Such an assessment is needed to re-assert the potential of reintegration programs to make positive contributions to peace-building.

In what has become a concerted international effort to turn the combatants of a conflict into ex-combatants, post-conflict actors have worked to codify DDR 'best practice'.⁹ But that codification has left several gaps in knowledge about what reintegration can and should do. Current academic approaches to reintegration have tended to neglect reintegration problems short of a return to conflict and have tended to overlook the ways in which reintegration actors might exacerbate or contribute to such problems. Current policy approaches to reintegration have been content by and large to reintegrate ex-combatants back into lives of basic poverty.¹⁰ Is that enough? Have reintegration programs fallen prey to the 'soft bigotry of low expectations' and ceased to aspire to the ideals of peace-building? Is it enough for reintegration programs to 'buy time' by giving ex-combatants something to do until the threat of a return to war subsides, or ought

⁸ International Peace Academy, 'A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations,' IPA Workshop Report, New York, 12-13 December 2002.

⁹ The most prominent evaluations of DDR include: World Bank, 'Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Studies,' *World Bank Discussion Paper*, No.130, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1993; Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, *Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996); Mats Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts*, Adelphi Paper 303 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996); UNDP, *Sharing New Ground in Post-Conflict Situations: The Role of UNDP in Support of Reintegration Programmes* (New York: UNDP Evaluation Office, January 2000); Ian Douglas, Colin Gleichman, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken, and Adrian Wilkinson, *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide* (Frankfurt: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Norwegian Defence International Centre (NODEFIC), Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC), and Swedish National Defence College (SNDC), 2004); and UNGA, 'Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Report of the Secretary-General,' 2 March 2006, A/60/705.

¹⁰ This was a common theme in interviews with former fighters and civil society leaders in Mozambique and Sierra Leone.

programs to address security threats short of resumed conflict? What, in short, counts as reintegration 'success' in a post-conflict context?

To introduce my approach to reintegration assessment I have divided this introduction into the following sections: first, a statement of my research question and explanation; second, definition of reintegration; third, identification of assessment criteria; fourth, definition of reintegration actors and specification of actor capacity and preferences as independent variables; and finally, additional research design issues, including a discussion of the method of causal inference pursued, the selection and treatment of the case studies, and the implications of the case studies for sources and data collection.

I. Central Research Question

The management of reintegration problems short of a return to conflict (what I abbreviate to RPSRCs) underpins my assessment of the contributions of reintegration programs to security and development in three cases: Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. The primary purpose of this assessment is to answer the following question: *why do problems with ex-combatant reintegration short of a return to conflict persist?* This thesis posits that a key variable explaining the persistence of RPSRCs is the way in which international and state reintegration actors manage them. It therefore explains the dependent variable (reintegration outcomes) in terms of two independent variables associated with reintegration actors: their *capacity* (resources at their disposal, operational expertise, and authority to act) and their *preferences* (the explicit and implicit interests and assumptions that guide program design and implementation; most important among these are actors' coalesced preferences for short term, apolitical interventions and actors'

competing preferences about peace-building priorities). It is also important to note that the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors are aggregate independent variables that are themselves the product of endogenous (organizational and bureaucratic) and exogenous (systemic) pressures that literature on political economy and international relations theory helps to elucidate.¹¹

As the experience with reintegration in the three cases will show, these two variables help to explain why those tasked with reintegration were ill-equipped to manage RPSRCs effectively, and why in many cases reintegration actors exacerbated the RPSRCs they encountered. Actors' capacity and preferences also help to account for neglect in the cases of governance decisions crucial to the reintegration process, and for the downgrading of reintegration actors' expectations and aspirations for what their programs can accomplish. Neglect of reintegration problems is not benign; rather, the persistence of such problems significantly threatens security in post-conflict states. Security implies the protection of a state's citizens, borders, institutions, and neighbors. Problems with reintegration threaten security, therefore, when they endanger a state's citizens, disrupt its ability to safeguard its borders and maintain a monopoly on the use of violence, erode its institutions, and spill over to neighboring states.

To answer my research question, I perform four tasks in this thesis. First, I identify and articulate the RPSRCs related to incomplete reintegration of ex-combatants that confront post-

¹¹ By 'political economy', I intend literature that investigates the internal incentive structures of organizations and agencies, structures that can in turn produce 'bureaucratic dysfunction', 'organizational pathology', inefficiency, and coordination problems (e.g., Anne Holthoefer and Duncan Snidal, 'Toward a Political Economy of Donor Coordination,' Draft Discussion Paper, Global Economic Governance Program, University of Oxford, 6 October 2005). As Holthoefer and Snidal explain, 'The political economy approach explains behavior in terms of goal-seeking actors, interactions among them, and the role of institutional, informational and other constraints in shaping those interactions' (Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, p.4). By 'international relations theory', I intend literature analyzing the impact of systemic or domestic constraints on states and institutions, as well as literature on the legal and normative structure influencing their behavior (e.g., Roland Paris, 'Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.9, No.3, 2003, pp.441-73). The political economy approach helps to predict the endogenous pressures that shape reintegration actors' capacity and preferences, while international relations theory helps to predict exogenous pressures.

conflict states. Second, I evaluate the impact of RPSRCs on security. Third, I provide explanations for the persistence of RPSRCs in terms of the capacity and the preferences of the actors tasked – or, more tellingly, not tasked – to address them. Fourth, I place the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors within a broader context of post-conflict transition by arguing that bureaucratic and systemic pressures help to shape the capacity and preferences that reintegration actors have.

II. Defining Reintegration

Reintegration is a misleading term. The 're-' suggests a *return* to civilian life, yet many combatants in modern civil wars have spent their entire adult lives (and sometimes their adolescent lives, too) in combat, know nothing else, and possess no skills additional to those acquired as soldiers.¹² The 're-' also intimates that the social and economic environment to which combatants return has not changed since they left, which is unlikely given the devastation of war.¹³ Most definitions of reintegration focus on what is involved in the civilianization of demobilized soldiers.¹⁴

To understand reintegration as a process of civilianization, however, is not terribly helpful. Many ex-combatants retain access to arms; can they be considered 'civilianized'? Ex-combatants that *re-mobilize* also face an important transition into the state's restructured armed forces so they,

¹² As Berdal notes, ex-combatants might be reluctant to 'abandon a way of life which, however miserable, offers a measure of socio-psychological security,' (Berdal 1996, p.17).

¹³ Rosemary Preston, *The Integration of Returned Exiles, Former Combatants, and Other War-Affected Namibians*, Windhoek, Namibian Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Namibia, March 1993, 2.9.

¹⁴ These include 'find[ing] a new civilian life' and 'reestablish[ing] roots in society' [Kees Kingma, ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) p.18]; 'retraining and social absorption... into non-military, and especially income-generating, activities' [Samuel M. Makinda, 'Disarmament and Reintegration of Combatants,' in William Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Disrupted States* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003) p.251]; acquiring 'civilian status' and gaining 'access to civilian forms of work and income' (Douglas et al. 2004, p.15); and 'wean[ing] the combatant from the military' [Jakkie Cilliers, *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa* (Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995), p.5].

too, undergo a reintegration process into 'normal peaceful life'.¹⁵ Analyzing their transition ought also to form part of any account of post-conflict reintegration. With this caveat, I use 'reintegration' to refer to the process by which combatants 'acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income'.¹⁶

Reintegration programs help ex-combatants find jobs and gain acceptance by providing transitional material and other assistance in the form of cash, housing, land, food, clothing, medicine, vocational and agricultural training, and education. Programs comprise the activities believed to be necessary to achieve a 'viable' or 'sustainable' reintegration process.¹⁷ This distinguishes reintegration from emergency provision of assistance to ex-combatants in the immediate wake of conflict (called 'reinsertion' by the UN and in most DDR literature and 'transitional reintegration' by the SIDDR).¹⁸

The assessment challenge resulting from these definitions is to determine how much reintegration programming is enough to set ex-combatants on a path to sustainable reintegration. Although reintegration is open-ended, benefits in perpetuity for ex-combatants are neither feasible nor desirable. Some reintegration is managed by states and external organizations and some reintegration is organic. Determining how much *managed* reintegration is necessary for long term or sustainable reintegration to occur is a matter that requires reintegration actors to negotiate the level and duration of *governance* over the reintegration process. How long and to what extent should reintegration be managed by outsiders or by the state and when should reintegration cease to be formally controlled?

¹⁵ United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), Final Communique, Seminar on the Challenge of Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in DDR Programmes in West Africa, Dakar, Senegal, 8 April 2005, para.3.

¹⁶ This definition is the one given in UNGA,A/60/705, para.27.

¹⁷ The UN Office for West Africa introduced the idea of a 'viable reintegration,' which it defined as the 'necessary political, legal, economic and social conditions for a decent life in peace and dignity (UNOWA 2005, para.3). The Stockholm Initiative introduced the concept of a 'sustainable reintegration', or a reintegration that is long term (SIDDR 2006, p.25).

¹⁸ UNDP 2006, pp.52-5.

The answer in any given case will depend on both the impact of programs and on factors external to programs that strengthen or diminish the need for continued formal management of the reintegration process. The context-specific nature of the process explains why I define 'long term' or 'sustainable' reintegration not in terms of years of programming but as a reflection of outcomes. A 'long term' reintegration process is not one that lasts one year, or three years, or ten years, but one where a designated actor retains the authority to continue to monitor the reintegration process and to manage (through additional programs, if necessary) RPSRCs as long as they are observed to persist and constitute significant threats to security. Sustainability does not mean endless reintegration programs but rather programs that have a 'lasting'¹⁹ impact on fighters' economic prospects and that invest in the security capital of the state.

III. Assessing Reintegration Outcomes

Assessing reintegration efforts is difficult. There are no uniform standards to measure reintegration success in ex-combatant populations, nor is there consensus among reintegration actors about program objectives, components, or desirable outcomes.²⁰ Of course, reintegration is

¹⁹ Elinor Ostrom, Clark Gibson, Sujai Shivakumar, and Krister Andersson, *Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation*, Sida Studies in Evaluation 02/01, Stockholm, Swedish International Development Authority, December 2001, p.1.

²⁰ This criticism is echoed in Jeremy Weinstein and Macartan Humphreys, *Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration*, Working Paper No.69, Center for Global Development, September 2005; Robert Muggah, 'No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts,' *The Round Table*, Vol.94, No.379, April 2005, pp.239-252; Béatrice Pouligny, 'The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary "Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration" Programs,' Geneva, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) and the Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, France (SGDN), September 2004, p.5; and Sarah Meek and Mark Malan, eds., 'Identifying Lessons from DDR Experiences in Africa,' Report on the Workshop 'Identifying Lessons from DDR Experiences in Africa,' Institute for Security Studies and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana, 10-12 August 2004, p.36.

not unique among post-conflict activities in lacking clear objectives and evaluation criteria.²¹ The bulk of the reintegration literature is composed of audits or reports of 'lessons learned' performed by implementing agents themselves or by outside contractors.²² In fact, the main contribution of these studies has been to make targeted reintegration programs for ex-combatants, an unpopular beneficiary, more palatable for donors.

The shortcomings of most available case literature on reintegration, however, include a tendency to focus only on the immediate impact of programs during the one to two years after a ceasefire or peace agreement, lack of comparative assessment, and incentives built into the evaluation process that mask criticism and lower expectations about what reintegration programs can and should accomplish. There are notable exceptions in the literature, and some of these will be reviewed in more detail below.²³ But, on the whole, DDR as it has tended to be studied and practiced lacks a 'doctrine or even minimum standards'.²⁴ Little is known about ex-combatants once programs end. Governments rarely gather follow-up data on where ex-combatants are living, how they are doing, or what they are doing. Most importantly, short term evaluation of reintegration precludes a 'strategic focus'²⁵ rooted in the longer term management of RPSRCs.

²¹ Elizabeth M. Cousens, 'Introduction,' in Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, eds., *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001) p.4.

²² Examples related to the thesis case studies are: UNDP, *Report on the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique 1992-1996*, Maputo, UNDP, 1997; UNDP, 'The Socio-Economic Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique: The Soldiers' View,' Maputo, UNDP, October 1997; Executive Secretariat, National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), Sierra Leone, *Technical Assistance Mission Report*, Freetown, July-August 2002; Executive Secretariat, NCDDR, *Overview and Guide to Reintegration (Programmes and Operations)*, Freetown, 31 May 2002; Stelio Comninos, Aki Stavrou, and Brian Stewart, *Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, Freetown, 8 November 2002; and Tesfamichael et al. 2004.

²³ Weinstein and Humphreys 2005; Stefan Dercon and Daniel Ayalew, 'Where Have All the Soldiers Gone: Demobilization and Reintegration in Ethiopia,' *World Development*, Vol.26, No.9, 1998, pp.1661-75; and Paul Collier, 'Demobilization and Insecurity: A Study in the Economics of the Transition from War to Peace,' *Journal of International Development*, Vol.6, No.3, 1994, pp.343-51.

²⁴ Muggah 2005, p.243.

²⁵ Nicola Dahrendorf, Project Director, *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change*, International Policy Institute, King's College of London, 10 March 2003, para.122.

Why have success criteria eluded reintegration actors? First, success is contextual and path-dependent; it depends on the nature and longevity of the conflict, the good faith of the conflict parties to the peace process, the characteristics of a conflict's ex-combatants, and the political, economic, and security situation of a post-conflict state. Second, actors have interests in avoiding concrete success criteria because they fear forfeiting donor funding should they come up short when judged against those criteria. They are likely to define program objectives vaguely and conflate the achievement of those objectives with the termination of programs or with money disbursed.²⁶ I now move to an overview of common measurements used to assess reintegration before articulating the assessment approach this thesis will use.

Fiscal, Economic, Social, and Security Measurements of Reintegration

Lack of consensus about reintegration success does not mean that assessment criteria are absent in the literature. Common proxy measurements for reintegration success are fiscal (reduction in military expenditure), economic (employment status), social (measurements of community acceptance of ex-combatants based on ex-combatant and community surveys), and security-based indicators (e.g., ex-combatant disarmament or criminality levels). These measurements, however, are not consistently applied in the literature and are not correlated with each other; rather, each captures a different aspect of the reintegration process.²⁷

Fiscal criteria were popular in the 1990s and reflected the belief that successful DDR could reduce military expenditure, yielding a 'peace dividend' of surplus funds that could be spent on development initiatives and social services.²⁸ This argument has lost favor, in part because

²⁶ As I argue in chapter one, fear of coming up short when judged against concrete success criteria also leads development actors to collude with each other in order to make it difficult to determine responsibility for particular decisions and thereby hide responsibility for mistakes (William Easterly, 'The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid,' *Policy Reform*, Vol.5, No.4, 2002, pp.227, 245).

²⁷ Weinstein and Humphreys 2005, p.14.

²⁸ Kingma 2000. The 'peace dividend' notion is also endorsed in Makinda 2003, p.246; World Bank 1993, p.1; and Nicole Ball, 'Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa,' pp.85-105 in Kumar 1997. It emerged in

subsequent studies of DDR found that the peace dividend was 'nowhere as large as anticipated'²⁹ and in part because the notion misunderstood the state budgeting process (it does not follow that the less money spent on guns the more will be spent on schools and hospitals).³⁰ Despite skepticism about the peace dividend, a tendency persists to assess DDR processes in terms of their potential to deliver on a promise of funds for development.³¹

Employment criteria use surveys of ex-combatants to ascertain whether they found jobs following their demobilization.³² These surveys can be misleading, using initial job placement figures without any follow-up to determine whether such placements lead to long term employment. They also tend to count underemployment (e.g., petty trading and informal agriculture) as employment. At the same time, employment criteria struggle to incorporate non-traditional kinds of work (e.g., the underground economy). Many reintegration practitioners interviewed opposed using employment criteria to judge reintegration success because, they stated, emphasizing employment can heighten ex-combatant expectations, keep alive their grievances, and promote group identification among them. At the same time, it is clear that employment must form some part of any assessment for the simple reason that economic assistance (and, particularly, jobs) is what ex-combatants expect and need.

part to justify expenditure on DDR to donors reluctant to be perceived as rewarding fighting forces through DDR assistance.

²⁹ Timothy M. Shaw, 'Review of Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda,' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.18, No.1, March 1997, p.183.

³⁰ Paul Collier has demonstrated that income during civil wars collapses because of lost capital, and so any dividend from peace is delayed until private capital can be repatriated and social capital rebuilt. His advice to post-conflict states is to forget about spending a chimerical early windfall from peace and concentrate on restoring private confidence (Paul Collier, 'Civil War and the Economies of the Peace Dividend,' Working Paper No.26, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, March 1995).

³¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOHAC), 'Angola: Demobilized Soldiers Remain Dependent on Aid,' *IRIN News Report*, 3 February, 2003; UNOHAC, 'Angola: Still Waiting for Peace Dividends,' *IRIN News Report*, 30 April 2004; UN, 'Guatemala: United Nations Welcomes Promise to Halve Army, Military Budget,' *United Nations Daily Highlights*, 2 April 2004).

³² UNDP October 1997; Weinstein and Humphreys 2005.

Social criteria measure social acceptance of ex-combatants.³³ Usually, this determination is based on assessments of policy elites or on community and/or ex-combatant surveys asking whether ex-combatants are accepted in their host communities. Some surveys combine economic data to determine whether ex-combatants are better or worse off than others in their host communities. Equivalency measurements reflect the belief held by many practitioners that reintegration assistance should make ex-combatants 'like everyone else' by providing just enough targeted assistance (no more, no less) to erase the differences in income and status between former fighters and the communities in which they resettle.³⁴ Such measurements, however, assume that reintegration can do little more than reintegrate ex-combatants back into lives that mirror the basic poverty of their civilian counterparts.³⁵ I conclude that it is feasible to expect reintegration programs to do more, to transcend 'problem-solving' approaches and embrace critical solutions to post-conflict problems.³⁶

Survey-based research measuring economic and social reintegration provides only snapshots of post-conflict transition. Most surveys are completed immediately after DDR programs end and rarely include follow-up. Ex-combatant expectations, attitudes about acceptance, and employment status, however, are not fixed but fluctuate with time.³⁷ Furthermore, assessments of community acceptance do not capture reintegration problems. In a post-conflict environment it is possible to find an ex-combatant who might be employed and feel accepted, but who remains

³³ Aki Stavrou et al, *Tracer Study and Follow-Up Assessment of the Reintegration Component of Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program*, 2003; and Weinstein and Humphreys 2005.

³⁴ Douglas et al. 2004, p.91; Dercon and Ayalew 1998.

³⁵ This assumption neglects to critically appraise pre-conflict social and economic relationships that helped contribute to conflict in the first place. The case chapters and conclusion of this thesis will return to this theme.

³⁶ I am borrowing language here from Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory,' pp.204-54 in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

³⁷ This was precisely what occurred in Namibia, where ex-combatant grievance with continuing unemployment increased with time and in response to the absence of initial targeted reintegration programs to assist them.

armed or moonlights in criminal activity. Of course, the most dangerous ex-combatants are also the least likely to participate in surveys.³⁸

Several security-based indicators have also been used to evaluate reintegration: the number of ex-combatants disarmed by the peace process (using the number of weapons collected as the metric);³⁹ the extent to which the chain of command has been broken and ex-combatants successfully dispersed;⁴⁰ and the extent to which ex-combatants are involved in crime.⁴¹ These security measurements, however, similarly fail to provide an accurate picture of long term reintegration. Evaluating success based on the number of weapons collected gives no sense of weapons still in circulation, or of continuing ex-combatant access to weapons.

Ex-combatant involvement in criminal activity is particularly misunderstood: that involvement can be qualitatively significant even if ex-combatants do not constitute a majority of criminals. The more dangerous or illegal activities in which some ex-combatants may be engaged would exist with or without their participation: stone masonry and drug trafficking alike would both survive without any influx of ex-combatant labor. But ex-combatant involvement in illegal or potentially violent activity ups the ante considerably because of their potential access to arms and military knowledge. They may have connections inside the government, or with armed groups inside or outside of the country. They may operate with impunity because government officials fear them or feel loyalty to them. The confluence of opportunities for profit with ex-combatant weaponry and knowledge arguably gives ex-combatants a comparative advantage in some of the more destabilizing shadow economic activity that occurs post-conflict (e.g., arms smuggling and drug

³⁸ In Sierra Leone, for example, the thousands of ex-combatants who were re-recruited into neighboring conflicts were not in-country to participate in surveys.

³⁹ Stephen M. Hill, *United Nations Disarmament Processes in Intra-State Conflict* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); World Bank 1993.

⁴⁰ This criterion was one assessed by the Weinstein and Humphreys survey (see p.13), and also emerged as an important priority for many reintegration actors during interviews with them. See also the Comminos et al. 2002 and Tesfamichael et al. 2004 evaluations of Sierra Leone.

⁴¹ Collier 1994.

trafficking).⁴² To address the issue of criminality, therefore, this thesis determines the *nature* rather than the *quantity* of ex-combatant involvement in destabilizing activities, and specifies how reintegration programs did or did not account for that involvement.

Towards an Assessment of Persistent Reintegration Problems

The default security measurement of reintegration actors is whether or not conflict resumed.⁴³ Reintegration success, however, is not just the absence of war (although reintegration actors obviously should prioritize immediate threats to a ceasefire or peace agreement) but also the removal of the threat that ex-combatants pose to other states, to the structures and institutions of their own state, and to other people. For post-conflict states, the vulnerability of state institutions (the judiciary, the police, the military, etc.) is a bona fide security concern and not simply a 'law and order' one.⁴⁴ Combined with persistent unemployment and the ready availability of arms, allowing a breakdown in the rule of law could be merely a recipe for postponing the return of violent conflict (as demonstrated by the contribution of flawed DDR processes to resumed conflict in Liberia in 2003 or Haiti in 2004).

Post-conflict, ex-combatants tend to engage in wide-ranging activities. The implication is that an assessment of reintegration that predicates success only on the absence of a return to war

⁴² Alex de Waal, 'Contemporary Warfare in Africa,' in Mary Kaldor, ed., *Restructuring the Global Military Sector* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), quoted in Berdal 1996, pp.16-17.

⁴³ UNDPKO 2000, para.18; Douglas et al. 2004, p.19; Colletta et al. 1996 p.18; Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem, 'Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.41, No.4, 2004, pp.501-2; Kingma 2000, p.19; Kimberly Mahling Clark, *Lessons Learned in the Implementation of Demobilization and Reintegration Programs* (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 20 October 1994) p.3; Chris Alden, 'The Issue of the Military: UN Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration in Southern Africa,' in Jeremy Ginifer, ed., *Beyond the Emergency: Development within UN Peace Missions* (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1997) p.51. I critique the ways in which assumptions about the potential of ex-combatants to reignite conflict influence reintegration approaches in 'Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.4, Winter 2004, pp.625-43.

⁴⁴ Mohammed Ayoob, 'The Security Problematic of the Third World,' *World Politics*, Vol.43, No.2, January 1991, p.259; Annika S. Hansen, 'International Security Assistance to War-Torn Societies,' in Michael Pugh, ed., *Regeneration of War-Torn Societies* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) p.35.

does not capture the full range of those activities and therefore neglects to appreciate the threat to security emanating from RPSRCs. After conflict ends, ex-combatants can be employed, unemployed, or underemployed. Sometimes, though rarely, they return to school. They can find jobs in the private sector or in the public sector. They can be recruited into new militaries and police forces, or to work for private security firms. They can be active politically, as candidates for public office, as lobbyists or leaders of veterans groups, as workers within civil society organizations, or as protestors. That protest can be benign or take a violent form.

On the more dangerous side of things, ex-combatants can offer their services as mercenaries in neighboring conflicts or become involved in criminal activity.⁴⁵ That criminal activity is varied; it can include petty crime (e.g., pick-pocketing or other forms of petty theft), violent crime (e.g., armed banditry), or organized crime (e.g., the trafficking or smuggling of drugs, arms, or precious commodities such as diamonds and timber; money laundering; bribery; fraud; and corruption). Few of these activities are mutually exclusive. An ex-combatant can both serve as an officer in the new army and moonlight as a money launderer. Ex-combatants, in short, can be good guys and bad guys, and sometimes both.⁴⁶

My security assessment, therefore, explains whether and why ex-combatants continue to threaten a state's survival, institutions, neighbors, or citizens. This is in keeping with what I assert

⁴⁵ Criminal activity is often treated as a synonym for shadow economic activity or illegal activity, although the use of the term 'criminality' can mask the level of state acceptance of or collusion in such activity. As Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper have pointed out, 'commonly employed labels, such as "criminal," "illegal," or "unofficial," used in opposition to "authorized," "legal," and "official," suggest the existence of hard normative distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate types of economic behavior,' but that in war-torn and postwar contexts such 'dichotomies may prove both conceptually false and have limited descriptive or analytical value' because of links between such behavior and agents and structures of the state, a relationship that is often 'symbiotic or parasitic' [Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (with Jonathan Goodhand), *War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004) p.8].

⁴⁶ Unfairly, there is a tendency to automatically associate ex-combatants with dangerous or illicit activity, to think of reintegration only as it relates to crime or threats to security. Countless ex-combatants, however, positively contribute to the peace process and to the reconstruction and development of their states. Although the focus of this research is on accounting for problems with ex-combatants, I try to recognize wherever possible the positive contributions of ex-combatant groups and individuals.

to be the basic strategic imperative of reintegration: to effectively manage threats posed by ex-combatants to security. My assessment of reintegration must also exercise caution when assessing threats because of domestic political conflict regarding a highly-charged issue like reintegration. Ex-combatant grievances are often interpreted by the ruling party not as spirited debate or criticism but as a threat to the survival and cohesion of the nation. Regime security can thus be equated by ruling elites with state security,⁴⁷ which has serious implications for the longevity of the reintegration process, not to mention for the state's consolidation of democracy.

The successful reintegration process accomplishes two things. First, it meets the above security criterion, anticipating potential RPSRCs and managing actual ones by identifying them and negotiating responses with the parties to the conflict (I call this criterion 'problem management'). Second, it satisfies at least the minimum development criterion of creating economic opportunities that are likely to decrease the impact of RPSRCs and decrease the likelihood of future ones by designing and implementing assistance programs ('opportunity creation').⁴⁸ Together, these tasks capture the challenge of peace-building, which requires a combination of conflict management (i.e., anticipating RPSRCs and responding to unanticipated ones as they arise) and conflict prevention (i.e., creating opportunities for ex-combatants that decrease the likelihood of future conflict).⁴⁹

There is considerable overlap between these tasks: opportunity creation is itself a program response designed to mitigate potential and actual RPSRCs, which is why I have framed the central research question only in terms of RPSRC persistence. But the two tasks are also distinct: the creation of economic opportunities is not the only problem management strategy available to

⁴⁷ Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p.4.

⁴⁸ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), in its 2001 report, argued that without sustainable income, ex-combatants were likely to pose significant security threats: *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001).

⁴⁹ I am paraphrasing Cousens, who argues that peace-building ought to retain a 'sharp focus' by combining conflict management and prevention (Cousens 2001, p.4).

reintegration actors. For example, managing the threat of ex-combatant re-recruitment into neighboring conflicts (as occurred in Sierra Leone) involves not just the use of economic incentives to dissuade fighters from becoming mercenaries elsewhere but also entails monitoring and intelligence operations, border control, potential punitive measures for recruiters and their recruits, harmonization of reintegration packages across countries to discourage 'benefit chasing', and the development of regional conflict mediation strategies. Reintegration actors might not always lead such efforts, but they are tasked with advocating the full range of available responses to DDR problems that arise.

The distinction is an important one because reintegration actors tend to assume that opportunity creation is as far as their mandate goes. Currently, reintegration actors tend to treat opportunity creation as the only problem management arrow in the reintegration bow; I conclude a new approach to reintegration ought to consider long term problem management strategies in addition to economic incentives. Problem management recognizes the importance of a long term strategy to deal with potential and actual ex-combatant spoilers⁵⁰ and acknowledges the security risks of RPSRCs. Problem management also requires political stewardship of the reintegration process, meaning that actors must have the resources, expertise, authority, and will to make political decisions about reintegration issues, in consultation with the parties to the conflict, or to enforce such decisions when parties to the conflict renege on prior commitments (e.g., to equitable distribution of reintegration benefits).

Ideal problem management and opportunity creation would feature flexible reintegration actors that have enough money, expertise, and authority to make decisions about how best to accomplish these twin tasks. These actors would state objectives clearly and communicate

⁵⁰ Spoilers are actors with interests in wrecking peace or diluting its benefits (Stephen John Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,' *International Security*, Vol.22, No.2, Autumn 1997, pp.5-53).

objectives to ex-combatants and their communities. They would leave a strategy for non-targeted assistance for ex-combatants and host communities once targeted assistance ends. They would designate follow-up monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to prevent long term neglect or politicization of RPSRCs. They would ensure equitable distribution of benefits and oversee transparent eligibility procedures. They would link reintegration efforts with broader peace-building tasks, particularly security sector reform (SSR), transitional justice, and long term development and employment policies. Of course, all programs will fall short of the ideal. However, my assessment of prior reintegration efforts against a vision of success will isolate aspects of replicable success and avoidable failure for future DDR interventions, particularly if tempered against considerations of 'what is reasonable' and 'how much reintegration is enough' for peace and security to last.⁵¹

IV. Reintegration Actors

Reintegration actors are the entities tasked to steward the reintegration process and therefore manage RPSRCs. They are purposive and goal-seeking actors that actively shape (rather than merely reflect) development and security policy in post-conflict states. To critically assess the role of reintegration actors is not to place blame for reintegration difficulties solely at the feet of organizations or to single out individuals within those organizations who, for the most part, work very hard to marshal resources and implement programs in the face of tremendous economic, political, and social obstacles. There are numerous instances of courageous, innovative, and tireless individuals and agencies exercising leadership over specific reintegration programs, skirting rules or stretching mandates to get a difficult job done. All actors are prone to

⁵¹ Ann M. Fitzgerald, 'Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Interrupted: The Three-Phased Experience in Sierra Leone,' in Fitzgerald and Mason 2005, p.67.

inefficiency and dysfunction.⁵² Nor am I suggesting that reintegration actors do more harm than good; on the contrary, their programs have made important contributions to peace consolidation. If, however, the goal of reintegration is to contribute to lasting peace in post-conflict states, then the efforts of reintegration actors, I argue, often fall short and, in some cases, exacerbate or cause threats to security. The stewardship of reintegration depends on the programs designed and implemented by reintegration actors, and those programs are a function of actors' capacity and preferences. This section will identify the major reintegration actors, specify actor capacity and preferences, and introduce the pressures, endogenous and exogenous to actors, that account for their capacity and preferences.

Identifying Reintegration Actors

The term 'reintegration actors' is shorthand for the many actors who lead and facilitate reintegration processes, design and implement reintegration programs. These include local actors, such as community leaders and the private sector of the state concerned; state actors of the post-conflict country, including relevant government departments and agencies; and international actors. International actors include the UN and its agencies: the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Programme (WFP). They also include the World Bank, international development and assistance organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), state development agencies such as the US Agency for

⁵² Ernest B. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); James March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989). Dysfunctional behavior is that which undermines the stated objectives of the organization in question (see Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,' *International Organization*, Vol.53, No.4, Autumn 1999, p.716).

International Development (USAID) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and donor and mediator governments.⁵³

This thesis concentrates on elite actors at the national and international level. This does not mean that actors at the community level are not important to reintegration outcomes. On the contrary, community leaders, civil society organizations, and individual ex-combatants and community members all play indispensable roles: grass roots actors help ex-combatants find jobs and cope with the psychological and social fallout of conflict, and they are more sensitive to cultural norms and often better-equipped than policy elites to understand ex-combatant needs.⁵⁴ Local actors can also promote security in the wake of DDR by facilitating social acceptance of returning combatants and mediating local disputes. The case studies will address notable contributions of these actors, but focus on state and international actors. State and international actors direct disarmament and demobilization following conflict and also tend to set the strategy and objectives for reintegration programs, and this is what I want to assess. Furthermore, they are likely to be the actors designated by a peace process to respond to security threats or breaches to the peace and therefore are likely to be better positioned (i.e., have the authority and resources) to respond to security threats linked to incomplete reintegration.

The lead reintegration actors differed in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. In Namibia, UN peacekeepers oversaw the demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants and UNHCR coordinated the return (or repatriation) of some ex-combatants from Angola. However, reintegration was left to the new Namibian government, which at first believed reintegration would be 'spontaneous' after demobilization. In Mozambique, the UN chaired the Reintegration

⁵³ The phrases 'the UN and its partners', 'international', or 'external' reintegration actors will be used when I intend all international DDR actors.

⁵⁴ John Prendergast and Emily Plumb, 'Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to Peacebuilding,' in Stedman et al. 2002, pp.329, 336; Hill 2005, pp.234-5; UNDPKO 2000, p.6.

Commission (CORE), and UNDP, IOM, ILO, GTZ, and the World Bank all supported the reintegration activities that CORE approved. In Sierra Leone, reintegration activities were designed and coordinated by the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR). The NCDDR was chaired by Sierra Leone's President, who appointed the commission's Executive Secretary. It was funded through a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) established by the World Bank, and also received financial and technical support from the Bank, the UN (mainly, the UN mission in Sierra Leone and UNDP), and other donors and NGOs including USAID, GTZ, Action Aid, and World Vision. NCDDRs and MDTFs are increasingly common features of DDR program administration, and have been set up to facilitate DDR in Liberia, Haiti, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Each case chapter will present a complete account of all actors involved in the design and implementation of programs, and, together with the conclusion, will both highlight issues that were unique to particular actors in administering programs (depending on whether a government, the UN, the World Bank, an NCDDR, or a coalition of other agencies was in the driver's seat) and cluster the commonalities that stand out.

Capacity and Preferences of Reintegration Actors

Capacity and preferences are aggregate independent variables that require further specification. Capacity is a function of resources, expertise, and authority. Preferences are the explicit and implicit interests, values, ideas, and assumptions guiding an actor's behavior.⁵⁵ The two concepts overlap. The resources, expertise, and authority of an actor shape its preferences; in turn, an actor's preferences help to determine the resources it chases, the experience it accumulates, and the authority it chooses to exercise.

⁵⁵ Preferences are a product of pragmatic and ideological considerations as well as constitutive requirements (e.g., the World Bank's preference for working with state governments is mandated): see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption,' *Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol.31, January 2002, pp.S141-S178; and Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, p.4.

What determines actor capacity and preferences? As aggregate variables, capacity and preferences are themselves the product of internal, organizational and bureaucratic pressures ('endogenous pressures') and of external pressures and processes ('exogenous pressures') such as domestic constituent pressures and well-established norms related to sovereignty, self-determination, consent, intervention, and impartiality, all of which both enable and constrain reintegration actor behavior in important ways. The sources for actor dysfunction, then, are located both inside and outside of the organizations in question.⁵⁶ In chapter one, I will use international relations theory and literature on international organization and international political economy to identify in detail the ways in which these pressures determine the capacity and shape the preferences of reintegration actors. For the purposes of introduction, however, I turn to a specification of how capacity and preferences determine actor behavior in the reintegration context.

Starting with actor capacity, each case study identifies the factors that augmented or constrained actor capacity, and analyzes the subsequent impact on programs and outcomes. Unfortunately for reintegration actors and ex-combatant beneficiaries, environmental factors are more likely to constrain than augment capacity. This is because actors are likely to inherit a post-conflict environment that is not ideally suited to reintegration, one of limited employment opportunities, lingering political and social divisions, tenuous security, and weak rule of law institutions. As the case studies show, organizational and systemic constraints associated with actors' resources, expertise, and authority are likely to further weaken the capacity of reintegration actors to manage the reintegration challenges that the post-conflict environment presents.

Resource shortages are common to reintegration programs, and often delay the start of programs when they are most needed after demobilization. Donor governments and agencies

⁵⁶ It follows that actors have more control over endogenous pressures than exogenous ones, which tend to be entrenched systemically in the relations between states and the interactions between international organizations and states (see Barnett and Finnemore 1999, p.716).

have notoriously short attention spans, making it harder to mobilize resources for long term, and therefore less visible, projects.⁵⁷ Initial programs also suffer from sporadic and delayed funding, which is why the Brahimi Report recommended funding reintegration from the assessed peacekeeping budget of the first phase of a mission to avoid having to rely on the voluntary contributions of donors.⁵⁸

Concentrated expertise can bring specialized knowledge to a reintegration program but can also limit an actor's field of vision. Vocational training, for example, has become a staple of reintegration programs despite its mixed track record and sometimes at the expense of potentially more-sustainable educational or agricultural assistance. Reintegration actors, like other providers of a service, tend to develop a brand and change that brand only reluctantly. The result of expertise problems can be neglect of local contexts and the formation of reintegration templates that do not account for local needs.

To have the capacity to effectively manage RPSRCs, reintegration actors also need to exercise authority over important decisions, including eligibility for and duration of programs. The decision about which actors should make which decisions is crucial for success and is essentially a governance issue.⁵⁹ External actors emphasize 'ownership' of reintegration programs by state actors and the parties to the conflict to encourage commitment to DDR. Reintegration actors, indeed peace-builders generally, also work to build local capacity because they operate under strong assumptions that post-conflict states cannot be 'made to work from the outside'.⁶⁰ Those

⁵⁷ Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, p.8.

⁵⁸ Brahimi Report, para.47. This recommendation has not been implemented across UN missions, although UNMIL, between 2003 and 2005, had spent US\$35 million on DDR, which was funded from the assessed mission budget.

⁵⁹ Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'International "Standards" and International Governance,' *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.8, No.3, 2001, pp.345-70.

⁶⁰ Simon, Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, 'Conclusion: The Future of State-Building,' pp.359-87 in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005).

assumptions exist for normative reasons about legitimacy (e.g., the right of self-determination⁶¹) and more pragmatic reasons about efficiency (e.g., encouraging popular participation in the reintegration enterprise is likely to build commitment to its longevity⁶²).

External development actors' emphasis on ownership, however, tends to be more rhetorical than actual.⁶³ Often ownership extends only to the encouragement of government commitment to DDR and stops short of building capacity to manage long term RPSRCs. Furthermore, international reintegration actors generally privilege state ownership over beneficiary ownership,⁶⁴ meaning that ex-combatants tend to have little say about the nature of reintegration programs. There can also be a significant tradeoff between ownership and capacity if the ruling authorities of the post-conflict state lack the means to own a reintegration process. This tradeoff was particularly on display in Sierra Leone.

The case chapters also outline the preferences that underpinned reintegration policy in each state. To do so, they indicate wherever possible who held which preferences, identify instances where preferences clashed or colluded, explain how preferences formed and why some preferences prevailed over others, and assess the impact that preferences had on reintegration outcomes.

At first glance, one would assume that actors as diverse as UN agencies, the World Bank, state development agencies, and post-conflict state governments might have very different ideas

⁶¹ Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The UN, Transitional Administration and Statebuilding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁶² Claude Ake, for example, argues that ensuring popular participation and building civil society are crucial to the effectiveness of democratization and development, in *Democracy and Development* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996).

⁶³ Richard Caplan, 'Partner or Patron? International Civil Administration and Local Capacity-Building,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.2, Summer 2004, pp.229-47; Ibrahim A. Gambari, 'The Role of Foreign Intervention in African Reconstruction,' in I. William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995) p.232; Ostrom et al. 2001, pp.2,15. Of course, ownership also means different things in different contexts and can range from symbolic to actual commitment: it could mean taking responsibility for the management of reintegration programs or simply recognizing the importance of such programs to the peace process.

⁶⁴ Ostrom et al. 2001, p.243.

about what reintegration should accomplish and how they should go about meeting their goals.

While true that consensus among reintegration actors about objectives, components, and outcomes in a given country is lacking, what is surprising is the way in which preferences of reintegration actors have tended to coalesce during reintegration interventions and over time across interventions. As I detail in chapter one, literature on political economy and international relations theory can be interpreted to predict that preferences are likely to be shaped by both bureaucratic pressures that create incentives to lower expectations about what reintegration programs can accomplish and structural and legal norms that might proscribe a long term role for international actors in a post-conflict state.

The dominant preferences of reintegration actors are for short term and apolitical interventions. The conclusion of reintegration programs shortly after withdrawal of UN peacekeeping force is not uncommon, despite the Security Council's recognition that reintegration 'may require efforts long after the withdrawal of multidisciplinary peacekeeping operations' and recommendation that continued post-conflict presence or 'follow-on mission' be considered to 'support the [DDR] advances made and further make progress on the matter.'⁶⁵ Short term intervention approximates what UNDP has called 'short term stabilization strategies' of reintegration, whereby limited, transitional support is given to ex-fighters, as opposed to long term, sustainable strategies of support. Most reintegration interventions fall into the short term stabilization even though UNDP cautions that rarely do post-conflict contexts satisfy the conditions in which short term support would be enough.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ UNSC, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council on Maintenance of Peace and Security in Post-Conflict Peace-Building,' 23 March 2000, S/PRST/2000/10. Sierra Leone evinces a change of thinking here, as the UN peacekeeping mission stayed long after elections and conditioned its withdrawal in part on a determination that DDR be achieved.

⁶⁶ UNDP 2006, p.52.

Interviews with reintegration actors revealed three reasons why interventions tend to be short term (six months to one year). First, finite resources limit the length of programs. Second, reintegration actors fear that continued assistance for ex-combatants will fuel community resentment, ex-combatant dependence on aid, and continuing self-identification of ex-combatants as an aggrieved group.⁶⁷ Third, they expressed concerns about self-determination and sovereignty which make international organizations reluctant to wear out their welcome and make post-conflict state governments anxious to declare the reintegration chapter closed in order to bolster legitimacy. A fourth reason not articulated by interviewees but predicted by literature on political economy and one that I observed in the field, organizational and bureaucratic pressures privilege visible, short term outputs over less visible and longer term ones.⁶⁸

Reintegration actors often prefer to see themselves as development actors rather than 'political' mediators. As a result, they are pre-programmed to view reintegration assistance as a politically neutral activity. Likewise, they are reluctant to sacrifice perceptions of their impartiality by making political decisions about program eligibility, duration, and equal access to benefits, or about whether to continue reintegration assistance if ex-combatants violate the terms of a peace agreement. If serious threats to security surface from ex-combatants, development actors tend to assume that other, 'political' actors will step in to take care of the problem. But actors' reluctance to take on an explicit 'political' role in dealings with the parties to the conflict or state government leaders affects their ability to manage RPSRCs – they tend to consider such engagement beyond the scope of their mandate and therefore avoid or neglect linkage with other, more political peace-building tasks, such as SSR, transitional justice, and reconciliation.

⁶⁷ See also International Peace Academy 2002, p.4.

⁶⁸ On this point, see Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, p.10.

Reintegration, as Mats Berdal has noted about DDR generally, is an 'intensely political process' and cannot 'be treated simply as a set of managerial and administrative challenges'.⁶⁹ This means not just that its success depends on the commitment of the warring parties to peace, but also that the effort to reintegrate combatants itself is a political action with political consequences. Who has the authority to respond to RPSRCs? Are reintegration benefits equitably distributed and beneficiaries impartially targeted? What are the consequences for ex-combatants who undermine the peace process or engage in 'spoiler' activity? What is the appropriate role for ex-combatants in a state's new security structures? How should reintegration efforts relate to reconciliation processes? These are just a few of the 'intensely political' issues that the reintegration process entails, and yet these were also the issues most likely to be overlooked by programs in the three cases studied here. The case chapters and conclusion of this thesis will identify where these political issues should be tackled; namely, in the front-end agreement between reintegration actors and the parties to the conflict about program objectives, duration, and eligibility, and in the demarcation of clear authority for reintegration actors to respond to unanticipated problems that arise after front-end DDR agreement has been reached.

As I argue above, preferences tend to coalesce around humble and technical reintegration objectives (e.g., avoiding long term involvement and political issues), but this does not mean that reintegration actors' preferences do not also clash. The case studies reveal that this clash usually occurs when reintegration competes with other peace-building objectives. That clash can be acute because the unpopularity of the beneficiary group (former fighters who may have committed acts of atrocities against each other or against the civilian population) can mean that actors engaged in other peace-building tasks may be working against the objectives of reintegration. For example, as occurred in Sierra Leone, post-conflict actors engaged in bringing perpetrators of atrocities to

⁶⁹ Berdal 1996, p.5.

account through transitional justice advocated overturning amnesty for ex-combatant leaders that some reintegration actors considered necessary to secure their continuing cooperation with DDR.

The domestic post-conflict dynamic also reveals a more troubling preference that tends to characterize the preferences of state reintegration actors. State actors are likely to have political interests in polarizing, exploiting, or neglecting reintegration issues. There are strong domestic political incentives to consider reintegration a thing of the past, a chapter closed upon withdrawal of UN troops. Re-opening that chapter, post-conflict states are prone to believe, would unlatch a Pandora's Box of grievance and entitlement or suggest the state has not transcended the issues that characterized its conflict days. Post-conflict governments also have incentives to use reintegration benefits (e.g., jobs in the public sector allocated to ex-combatants) to reward supporters or punish non-supporters in order to consolidate rule, making reintegration more a tool of division than reconciliation in the hands of governments. Furthermore, state actors are often constrained by their constituencies. Civilian populations may not want states to invest in long-term reintegration because of resentment over what are perceived to be special benefits for the very men and women whom they blame for their suffering. States that do re-invest in reintegration do so only when pressure from ex-combatant groups proves politically costly, as the case of Namibia will demonstrate. As a result, rarely is the reintegration process monitored or evaluated after initial DDR programs end; reintegration simply falls off the state's radar.⁷⁰ This thesis concludes that these domestic pressures are a compelling justification for at least some level of continuing international involvement and monitoring, although that activity could take several forms.

In chapter one, I review the literature on reintegration to identify issues related to actor capacity and preferences that are likely to play a role in the case studies. I also review the main

⁷⁰ One indicator of short state attention span is pensions. As GTZ, NORDEFIC, PPC, and SNDC found in their study, 'In the wake of donor grants, however, national pension funds are often not revitalized after conflict' (Douglas et al. 2004, p.71).

contributions of literature on political economy and international relations theory to argue that pressures endogenous and exogenous to reintegration actors are crucial to understanding why they have the capacity and preferences that they do. From there, the case studies will articulate the ways in which actor capacity and preferences neglected, exacerbated, or mitigated RPSRCs.

V. Research Design

Theorizing about Ex-Combatant Reintegration: Implications for Causal Inference

There are different research strategies that can be employed to study reintegration. Most studies have taken the form of detailed narrative case studies – description of programs implemented in single cases or lists of lessons learned from single or multiple case studies.⁷¹ These approximate what Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (KKV) call descriptive inference, letting reintegration facts ‘speak for themselves’ or understanding the reintegration process on the basis of a set of observations by policy elites about program implementation.⁷² In contrast, a handful of reintegration studies have used statistical methods, formal modeling, and comparative case studies that employ causal inference to test the causal processes involved in reintegration processes. These mechanisms can be expressed as a narrow, positivist causal relationship which is driven by a single-variable hypothesis (what KKV call a ‘causal effect’), or as a more complex causal relationship between several variables using process-tracing, typological

⁷¹ E.g., Fitzgerald and Mason 2005.

⁷² Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (KKV), *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) pp.8, 55, 75.

theory, congruence testing, or other comparative methods (what Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett call 'causal mechanisms').⁷³

These approaches differ in important ways: they use different reasoning in the formulation of research questions and the presentation of information; they use different methods to identify and assess the importance of variables; and they may use inductive or deductive logic or a combination of both.⁷⁴ DDR, like many processes in the social world, is susceptible to different forms of inquiry, and therefore the methodological approach pursued ought to reflect the requirements of the research objective.⁷⁵

Three important causal inferences about reintegration outcomes stand out in the literature. The first is the notion that DDR is a sequential process: under this view, demobilization and disarmament successes or failures cause reintegration success or failure. The second are single-variable hypothesis studies that test the correlation between demobilization and criminality, of which Paul Collier's study of demobilization in Uganda is the best example.⁷⁶ The third is the use of statistical methods and formal modeling to weight the significance of determinants for reintegration success, of which the Weinstein and Humphreys survey of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone is the most rigorous and ambitious example.⁷⁷ Although each of these approaches has contributed significantly to our understanding of the reintegration process, each is also limited in its ability to generate explanations for the persistence of RPSRCs and the impact of those problems

⁷³ KKV define a causal effect as 'the difference between the systematic component of observations made when the explanatory variable takes one value and the systematic component of comparable observations when the explanatory variable takes on another value' (KKV pp.81-2). George and Bennett define causal mechanisms as 'ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities' (Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2005) p.137).

⁷⁴ George and Bennett 2005, p.6.

⁷⁵ KKV, p.75; George and Bennett 2005, pp.6, 174-6; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, 'How Do Norms Matter?' in Michael Byers, ed., *The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p.64.

⁷⁶ Collier 1994.

⁷⁷ Weinstein and Humphreys 2005.

on security. This is why this thesis takes a different approach, using within-case analysis and cross-case comparison to make causal inferences about the links between reintegration actors and reintegration outcomes. I will briefly highlight the shortcomings of existing causal approaches to explaining reintegration problems before moving on to a defense of my approach.

One causal approach implicit in many policy documents on DDR is to assert that failures of disarmament and demobilization cause failures of reintegration.⁷⁸ Some RPSRCs certainly are exacerbated by inadequate disarmament and/or demobilization. Conceptualizing DDR as three discrete, sequential processes distorts their nature for three reasons. First, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are not linear so the formulation of DDR as a continuum is misleading and inaccurate. One activity does not succeed the other; rather, the three activities tend to be staggered to suit the logistical and political needs of the peace process. The second reason is conceptual. Although disarmament and demobilization inform reintegration, reintegration is not strictly the *result* of demobilization and disarmament. Disarmament does not *cause* demobilization, nor does either *cause* reintegration. Discharging a soldier does not cause his civilianization. As concepts, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are distinct: they have unique goals and are comprised of activities unique to accomplishing those goals. Finally, practical difficulties on the ground ensue when disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are approached discretely. The assumption that ex-combatants deemed 'disarmed' and 'demobilized' and henceforth ripe for 'reintegration' obscures the difficulties that occur when ex-combatants defy labels: how does a program deal with an armed ex-combatant, or a re-mobilized ex-combatant? Treating DDR as three discrete, sequential activities undermines operational flexibility and stymies creativity in managing RPSRCs.

⁷⁸ UNDPKO 2000, paras.1-2; Meek and Malan 2004, pp.7-8.

A second causal approach has explored the relationship between criminality and reintegration. Problems with reintegration, however, extend beyond a consideration of criminality alone; studies examining links only between those two variables, therefore, leave out large pieces of the reintegration puzzle. Even assuming we only want to learn about ex-combatant criminality, quantitative analysis of a single variable hypothesis would not be the best approach because of the complex and elusive nature of criminality as a variable. Reliance on quantitative data alone limits research of criminality to states that keep accurate crime statistics during post-conflict transitions and statisticians are a luxury many post-conflict states simply do not have.⁷⁹ Such data, furthermore, do not capture the potential for ex-combatant involvement in more organized or elite forms of criminal activity, forms that tend to elude statisticians precisely because they are hidden. Collusion of state officials further obscures records and details (the crime statistics in Collier's study were for the number of violent crimes reported). These factors indicate the methodological and analytical limits of collapsing the dependent variable (success as the management of a range of potential problems) into a measure of one problem (criminal involvement) alone, suggesting that single-variable hypotheses are not innocently parsimonious but at times reductionist.⁸⁰

A third causal approach uses the results of ex-combatant surveys to model the individual-level determinants of successful reintegration. In their approach to the subject, Weinstein and Humphreys make important discoveries about the nature of reintegration at the individual level, particularly as it relates to processes of social acceptance of returning ex-combatants. They find that characteristics such as gender and age matter less than expected, that the nature of the conflict experience (particularly the level of abusiveness of an ex-combatant's unit) is particularly

⁷⁹ UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region* (New York: United Nations, 2005) pp.10, 13.

⁸⁰ Writing about general theories of conflict management, Charles Cater characterizes as 'reductionist' causal models exploring a single relationship between variables, in 'The Political Economy of Conflict and UN Intervention: Rethinking the Critical Cases of Africa,' pp.19-45 in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

salient,⁸¹ and that different aspects of reintegration (social acceptance, employment status, continuing ties to fellow fighters, and belief in the democratic process) are not correlated with each other but rather capture different aspects of reintegration success for different ex-combatants. In the Weinstein and Humphreys survey, roughly 6% of ex-combatants are found to have faced moderate to serious problems gaining the acceptance of their families and neighbors, but we do not know from the survey whether these ex-combatants, because of their reintegration difficulties, constitute a threat to post-conflict security or what the implications for their incomplete reintegration might be. For reasons explored earlier in this introduction, using survey results to measure social reintegration is helpful but limited in the research questions surveys can legitimately answer. To understand the impact of incomplete reintegration on security instead requires a qualitative examination of the reintegration process to better identify the *nature* of continuing problems, the *impact* of such problems on security, and the way in which programs can or can not *manage* them. Individual determinants remain relevant for these considerations, and my case studies incorporate such measures wherever available, but these measures are limited in their ability to compare across cases. I have chosen to isolate a subset of post-conflict determinants of success at the macro-level (namely, the leadership of state and external actors over the reintegration process) to determine the impact of such determinants on outcomes.

My research approach has several advantages. It asks an important question: rather than assume that a non-return to war automatically signals reintegration success, my research question recognizes that different types of problems can threaten post-conflict security. It reveals more about the reintegration process. I want to assess *whether* and *how* actor capacity and preferences matter to problem persistence, whereas single-variable hypothesis studies can make claims only

⁸¹ The GTZ, NORDEFIC, PPC, and SNDC guide also admonishes policymakers to account for the wartime experiences of ex-combatants: trauma experienced, health status, and location at the time of demobilization (Douglas et al. 2004, p.95).

about *how much* those variables matter.⁸² I also want to identify the types of reintegration problems encountered and analyze their degree (i.e., the extent to which they threaten security). This thesis also approaches reintegration outcomes in a novel way. Existing studies of reintegration have not systematically or comparatively explored the links between actors' capacity and preferences and their ability to lead the reintegration process; in fact, to my knowledge this assessment is the first to catalogue and explain the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors, and to assess their impact. Nor has reintegration literature capitalized on international relations theory or political economy to make inferences about how actors' own behavior might exacerbate or ameliorate RPSRCs. It is also novel in chronicling a curious trend in reintegration programs: actors and evaluations are downgrading expectations about what programs can do just as consensus about the fundamental importance of reintegration to peace consolidation has been reached, making it even more important to ask questions about what programs can and should do.

Isolating the Impact of Reintegration Actors on Reintegration Outcomes

The assessment of reintegration outcomes encounters a problem typical of investigation of the social world: there are several potentially valid explanations for any given outcome, referred to as equifinality or multiple causality.⁸³ There are multiple causes of RPSRCs, and assessment can therefore involve untangling a snarl of causal mechanisms: limited employment options, residual psycho-social effects of violence, hostility from the civilian population following demobilization, continuing political tension, weak rule of law, wide availability of arms, opportunities for criminality, commitment of conflict leaders to the peace process, effectiveness of the peace agreement in addressing root causes, and the ability of state and external actors to govern and conduct the tasks

⁸² George and Bennett 2005, p.25.

⁸³ George and Bennett prefer equifinality (George and Bennett 2005, p.63) while KKV prefer multiple causality (KKV pp.87-9).

the peace process has delegated to them. This list is not exhaustive.⁸⁴ Thus, isolation of the role of reintegration actors in contributing to the persistence of RPSRCs does not tell the whole story. The conjunction AB (where A represents the capacity of actors to respond to problems and B the preferences implicit and explicit in how actors respond to problems) on its own may not be sufficient as an explanation for the persistence of problems, which 'might arise through other causal paths that have little or nothing to do with' AB.⁸⁵ But the conjunction AB is nevertheless necessary to explain why the programs that actors design and implement, on the one hand, can exacerbate RPSRCs or allow them to fester, or, on the other hand, anticipate them before they surface or ameliorate them once they do.

In other words, despite the presence of equifinality, it is still possible and worthwhile to generalize about reintegration outcomes.⁸⁶ After all, effective comparison does not require analysis of an 'exhaustive list of all variables that have any possible influence on the decision-making process'.⁸⁷ To more effectively isolate the role of reintegration actors on outcomes, and hence deal effectively with the challenge of equifinality, this thesis employs three strategies.

First, the causal variables associated with reintegration actors (their capacity to design and implement effective programs and the preferences that underpin their choices) are presented as probabilistic contributing causes of persistent RPSRCs. Capacity and preferences, as currently constituted in reintegration actors, *favor* problem persistence. Differences in capacity and preferences observed across the cases, additionally, will be shown to contribute significantly to variation in the type and degree of RPSRCs encountered in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra

⁸⁴ Lessons learned sections of DDR evaluations can be read as laundry lists of independent variables that impact reintegration outcomes, each an issue of which policymakers are to be mindful (see, for example, UNOWA 2005, para.6).

⁸⁵ George and Bennett 2005, p.26.

⁸⁶ As KKV state, 'Researchers need not identify "all" causal effects on a dependent variable to provide estimates of the one causal effect of interest (even if that were possible)' (KKV p.89).

⁸⁷ Arend Lijphart, 'Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,' *American Political Science Review*, Vol.65, 1971, p.690.

Leone. Classifying the causal variables in this manner is consistent with prescribed strategies for dealing with equifinality. Because the units involved in measuring reintegration outcomes are not homogeneous (and, as Weirstein and Humphreys have shown, involve different causal processes), it is impossible and inappropriate to formulate this probability as a quantitative measure. As stated before, rather than assess *how much* actor capacity and preferences matter to problem persistence, I am assessing *whether* and *how* these variables matter to outcomes.

Second, the use of counterfactuals will help to confirm the importance of the chosen causal variables. With each case, I will pose the counterfactual: If the actors had had stronger capacity and different preferences, how would the outcome have differed?

Third, I use structured and focused case studies that make causal complexity explicit and that accommodate such complexity through qualified generalizations.⁸⁸ To be structured, general questions must be formulated and asked of each case. To be focused, comparisons must focus on analysis of key variables.⁸⁹ For more parsimonious comparison, each case will focus primarily on the DDR process, and will draw from broader aspects of the peace-building enterprise as they relate to DDR. I also focus analysis on problems that constitute threats to the security of states, their institutions, their neighbors, and their citizens, rather than a laundry list of all potential problems since reintegration outcomes, like more general processes of democratization and development, are always in some way 'incomplete'.

Case Selection

Both the type and degree of RPSRCs encountered vary across my cases, although there are numerous and important similarities to consider as well. Selection of cases to allow for at least

⁸⁸ George and Bennett 2005, p.22.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.67; Alexander L. George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,' pp.43-68 in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1979).

some variation on the dependent variable is consistent with a common strategy of avoiding selection bias.⁹⁰ Although each state has been treated as a 'success' in peace-building literature, recognition within that literature of unresolved issues (protests in Namibia, disarmament in Mozambique, and roving ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, to name only a few) was the basis on which I decided before commencing collection of data that at least some variation in outcomes was likely to be observed. I also chose cases that would allow for a comparison of capacity and preferences of different actors, and Namibia (where ruling state government officials led reintegration efforts), Mozambique (where the UN chaired CORE), and Sierra Leone (where the World Bank-supported MDTF funded programs managed by the NCDDR) provide ample scope for such a comparison.

A subsidiary desire for a parsimonious comparison also led to the selection of Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. First, I selected three sub-Saharan African states as case studies because of the unique security situation present there, especially in terms of vulnerable state institutions and structures.⁹¹ Threats to regional security in west and central Africa stemming from the migration of combatants from one conflict zone to another and threats posed by the cross-border flow of small arms and other weapons have raised the prominence of DDR in an African security context. The UN Office for West Africa has also labeled reintegration 'a major security stake in Africa'.⁹²

Second, I chose cases where the UN was significantly involved in peace-building and DDR efforts (avoiding bias through a focus on cases in roughly the same cell of a typology) even if the

⁹⁰ KKV p.129; David Collier and James Mahoney, 'Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,' *World Politics*, Vol.49, No.1, 1996, p.75.

⁹¹ Jeffrey Herbst, 'Responding to State Failure in Africa,' *International Security*, Vol.21, No.3, Winter 1996-1997, pp.120-144.

⁹² UNOWA 2005, para.4; UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa and the Government of Sierra Leone, Annotated Agenda and Conference Brochure, Conference on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) and Stability in Africa, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 21-23 June 2005.

UN was not the lead actor with reintegration efforts in each case, in order to explore the way in which broader peace-building priorities shape the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors. Third, all three states concluded their wars since the end of the Cold War: Namibia in 1989, Mozambique in 1992, and Sierra Leone in 2002. This allows for a more relevant discussion of the unique challenges facing states transitioning from conflict in the post-Cold War world, yet the temporal distance between them also permits evaluation of changes in post-conflict management strategies and the nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War (e.g., the impact of globalization on the political economy of conflict). More importantly, temporal distance between the cases allowed for the observation that the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors have not been fixed but have changed over time, which will be shown to have significant implications for the analysis of those variables.

Carrying Out the Case Studies

Each case study is divided into three main parts: an overview of the conflict and the DDR interventions designed and implemented, an identification of the type and degree of problems related to incomplete reintegration, and an explanation for the persistence of those problems in terms of the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors. The specification of RPSRCs and the explanation for their persistence are both analytical tasks of this thesis. To accomplish these tasks I use a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparison.

Within-case analysis begins with construction of a narrative of reintegration for each case through 'soaking and poking': a description of the original objectives of programs, the choices made in the design of interventions to further those objectives, program implementation, and the outcomes achieved thus far. To construct these narratives, I conducted extensive fieldwork in all three case countries and also in New York and Washington in order to review the documented assessments of reintegration actors and the evaluations and audits of outside observers, and to

interview the principal state and international actors involved in the reintegration process as well as other relevant sources, such as civil society leaders and journalists. I also make reference to development indicators (such as measurements of economic growth, employment, and investment), security assessments (such as reports from intelligence agencies), and other relevant reporting (media, government, and civil society reports). I consulted ex-combatant surveys where these were available and I reviewed all available secondary literature on DDR processes in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. This thesis does not rely heavily on ex-combatant testimony nor does it employ original surveys of ex-combatants. This does not imply that there is nothing to be learned from ex-combatants' own narratives about their individual post-conflict transition. Such insights, however, would simply form the basis of a different research project.

From this foundation, reintegration problems will be analyzed. Some RPSRCs directly threaten state and regional security: ex-combatant involvement in violent or organized criminality (e.g., arms or drug trafficking); migration to other conflict zones as 'roving combatants' or mercenaries; and violent demonstrations, riots, or other acts of political violence. Others indirectly threaten state security, by undermining a state's commitment to democratization, eroding the strength of the state's institutions, or undermining a state's pursuit of post-conflict reconciliation and justice. It is, however, sometimes unclear how to assess the impact of some RPSRCs. For example, continuing unemployment among ex-combatants risks on the one hand hostility, disgruntlement, or re-mobilization (and therefore a clear threat to security), or on the other hand disenfranchisement or permanent marginalization (a more indirect threat to security or a potential or future threat to security). I can only try to add more clarity than confusion to the security assessment of reintegration problems.

Explanations for the persistence of RPSRCs within each case study approximate what George and Bennett call 'analytic explanation'; my analysis of explanations uses process-tracing to

convert the historical narrative of the case into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.⁹³ Process-tracing implies tracking the processes that may have led to a particular outcome. Each case study seeks, therefore, to identify the way in which conditions activate causal mechanisms, to consider alternative explanations for reintegration problems, and to map out the various causal paths involved in assessing reintegration outcomes. To build comparable knowledge of each case, and prepare them for systematic analysis, I asked the same set of general questions of all three. These include: Who was involved in making reintegration decisions and how were those decisions enforced, funded, and carried out? What were the goals of a given reintegration program and how was success measured? What determined the end date for reintegration assistance? Why were some programs favored over others, and were some programs considered but discarded? What resources did actors have? Which obstacles – structural, political, or institutional – did they face and what were the major challenges for program implementation? And, which challenges remain and what, if anything, is being done to address them?

This set of general questions does not preclude addressing the specific aspects of any case or highlighting idiosyncratic features that may also be of interest. In fact, such features are crucial to understanding variation in outcomes and making appropriate comparisons. Idiosyncratic features of the case studies that are particularly important to identifying variation in the type and degree of RPSRCs and explaining reintegration outcomes include: the Namibian government's decision to pursue a reintegration policy of full employment for all unemployed ex-combatants; the long term nature of Mozambique's cash benefit; cross-border cooperation between South Africa

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.211. According to George and Bennett, a study qualifies as analytic explanation even if it: is selective (focuses on particularly important parts of an adequate or parsimonious explanation); can not specify or theoretically ground all steps in a hypothesized process (which is common especially if the country has only recently come out of conflict, as in Sierra Leone); and can not find data to document every step.

and Mozambique in tackling residual disarmament problems; the prevalence of organized crime in Mozambique; the role of diamonds and regional conflict in the reintegration of Sierra Leonean ex-combatants; and the impact of the Special Court in Sierra Leone on reconciliation and ex-combatant reintegration.

Finally, the conclusion will integrate the observations of the three case studies into a comparative framework to generate inferences *across* case experience, thereby adapting the specific explanation of single case outcomes into the concepts of a more general theoretical structure.

Implications for Sources

I encountered two problems in the collection of data: questions about the subjectivity and reliability of sources, and the absence of written documentation in some cases to verify the verbal testimony of government officials and other policy elites.

The assessment of reintegration processes by observers who were also active participants is understandably subjective or self-serving, as the prestige of a development agency or the reputation of a particular state government leader may hinge on the need to be perceived as having performed a job well. Likewise, veterans associations or organizations representing ex-combatants arguably have an interest in remaining dissatisfied with the status quo in order to gain more donor or state support.⁹⁴ Verbal assessments of particular program components or of continuing challenges also tend to be anecdotal rather than empirical. To minimize challenges associated with subjectivity and reliability, I have triangulated the verbal assessments of observers. In some cases, the individual experiences of reintegration actors or of ex-combatants are unique

⁹⁴ Jessica Schafer, 'A Baby Who Does Not Cry Will Not Be Suckled': AMODEG and the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers,' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, March 1998, pp.207-22.

and could not be triangulated. In those cases, reliance on single sources is noted in the body or footnotes of this thesis.

Related to the subjectivity of interviewees who were themselves active participants was the challenge of disaggregating reintegration actors, especially mapping out in every instance who made what decisions in the design and implementation of programs. Sometimes interviewees could not remember. In rarer cases, subsequent interviews confirmed that some interviewees misrepresented the decisions they made or the preferences they held at the time. For example, there was initial disagreement about the appropriateness of a long term cash benefit in Mozambique; once it became clear that the cash benefit had been successful actors who had initially opposed it claimed they had supported it all along. Wherever possible, I have disaggregated reintegration actors to explain which actors made what decisions. In those cases where my data did not reveal which actor made a particular decision or took a particular action, I assign agency to the lead reintegration actor or refer more generally to all actors involved.

More difficult to resolve was the issue of access to some reintegration documentation and testimony. In Namibia, for example, the minutes of meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants were not publicly available. As a new democracy, Namibia is in transition: the transparency of government records and the accountability of state officials are features that are developing. Despite difficulty obtaining such documents, I nevertheless found that Namibian officials were candid about government initiatives and performance and were willing to disclose verbally what they were reluctant to hand over in written form. In Mozambique, I encountered a different problem: several high-level military officials declined to meet with me, as they feared that their comments could be construed as criticism of the current government and thus lead to their dismissal or a reprimand. Other government officials preferred to limit the interview to the discussion of veterans of the independence war or declined interviews because they described

combatant-related issues as matters for the past. The sensitivity of government officials to questions they may construe as criticism has implications for my research beyond the difficulty of accessing reliable information; it suggests that reintegration issues continue to polarize the state politically. I have sought to minimize the impact of this problem by supplementing the absence of written data with verbal testimony (as with the Committee on Ex-Combatants, for example) and by also interviewing observers who are more independent or removed from the political process, such as journalists and civil society leaders.

In other instances, empirical data in the form of written documentation do not exist. Cataloguing the number of arms still in circulation in a country and assessing the nature and scope of organized criminal activity, for example, are forays into illicit, underground activity hidden from view. Data are therefore fragmentary, and multiple sources to confirm data are not always available or are reluctant to provide information.⁹⁵ Consequently, it is difficult to arrive at conclusions that are scrupulously accurate in all cases. Some data, as a result, remain anecdotal. My approach to this problem has been transparency in stipulating the limits or conditionality of conclusions drawn from fragmentary or anecdotal information. If others subsequently have access to better and more reliable data, their conclusions about reasons for the persistence of RPSRCs may vary from my own.

The case studies and case comparisons presented here aim to improve understanding of reintegration outcomes. They build knowledge about how reintegration was designed and implemented in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. They identify problems with reintegration that did not disappear after initial programs ended, and make inferences about the

⁹⁵ For further discussion of methodological difficulties peculiar to the study of organized crime, see UNODC 2005, p.10.

type and degree of such problems and the nature of the threat they posed (or continue to pose) to security. And, they explain the persistence of those problems in terms of the capacity and preferences of the actors delegated the responsibility over post-conflict states' fragile transitions from war, variables which are themselves determined by pressures endogenous and exogenous to actors.

The outline of this thesis is as follows. Chapter one reviews the evolution in approaches to reintegration since the end of the Cold War and explains the impact of exogenous and endogenous pressures on actor capacity and preferences, which will help shape observations about the case studies that follow in chapter two (Namibia), chapter three (Mozambique), and chapter four (Sierra Leone). The conclusion then integrates the specific observations of the case studies into a comparative framework, and also addresses the obstacles to and prospects for improvements in the way that actors manage persistent RPSRCs.

I. The Evolution of Reintegration in the Post-Cold War World: Actors and Their Programs, 1989-2005

Emergence of reintegration as a coordinated international effort is tied to the particular context of the post-Cold War world. Unfortunately for ex-combatants and the actors tasked to assist them, that context is not a welcoming one. The nature of the post-conflict state does not favor reintegration success. Although the end of the Cold War facilitated an environment that enabled, legitimated, and prioritized significant international investment in ex-combatant reintegration, the peace-building context of that world is likely to influence actor capacity and preferences adversely, leaving them ill-equipped to deal with challenges ranging from the strategies of spoilers to the prevalence of regional and transnational threats. That adverse influence results from bureaucratic and systemic pressures that are likely to constrain the effectiveness of reintegration actors. The proliferation of reintegration actors is further likely to complicate their ability to manage reintegration problems effectively: it reduces the likelihood of consensus, increases ambiguity about which actors should make political decisions about programs, and exacerbates problems with bureaucratic dysfunction.

This chapter charts the evolution of this dynamic and uses reintegration practice since 1989 to build knowledge about how reintegration programs have been designed and implemented. First, it traces the origin of reintegration programs as a coordinated international activity and explains the importance of reintegration within broader peace-building activities. Second, it explains the proliferation of reintegration actors since 1989. Third, it identifies prevalent problems associated with the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors. Finally, it asserts that major bureaucratic and systemic pressures (identified in literature on political economy and international relations theory) determine the capacity of reintegration actors and shape their preferences. All of

this sets the context of reintegration interventions in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone and outlines theoretical expectations about the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors that are analyzed in the case chapters.

I. Origins of Internationally-Assisted Reintegration

Post-conflict assistance to soldiers has long historical roots. In Ancient Greece and Rome, rewarding soldiers for their service with allocations of land or using pillage and loot as bribes for continued loyalty were common practices. Economic assistance for a state's soldiers returning from war has followed most major armed conflicts of the post-Westphalian world as well, featuring prominently in the US Revolutionary War and Civil War, and in both World Wars.¹ Assistance to WWII veterans was integral to post-war reconstruction, and played a large part in transforming the economic and social landscape of the countries affected.² Psychological counselling for returning soldiers became a priority for states after US involvement in Vietnam.³ The whole range of benefits now associated with reintegration packages, from 'mustering out' pay to vocational training

¹ Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991) p.7; Rex Pope, 'British Demobilization after the Second World War,' *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.30, 1995, pp.65-81; Jack S. Ballard, *The Shock of Peace: Military and Economic Demobilization after World War II* (Washington, DC: UP of America, 1983); and H. H. Andrea, 'Demobilization Problems of World War II,' *Military Review*, Vol.29, July 1949, pp.42-9.

² Keith W. Olson, *The GI Bill, the Veterans, and the Colleges* (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1974); and Theda Skocpol, 'The G.I. Bill and U.S. Social Policy, Past and Future,' *Social Philosophy and Policy*, Vol.14, No.2, 1997, pp.95-115.

³ There is no shortage of literature on the psycho-social impact of war on combatants. Examples include Vietnam-era literature on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, e.g., J. Douglas Bremner, et al., 'Chronic PTSD in Vietnam Combat Veterans: Course of Illness and Substance Abuse,' *American Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol.153, No.3, March 1996, pp.369-75. In a post-Cold War context, contemporary literature on PTSD is increasingly linked to assistance for ex-combatants, refugees, and other war-affected persons, e.g., Anthony J. Marsella, Matthew J. Friedman, Ellen T. Gerrity, and Raymond M. Scurfield, *Ethnocultural Aspects of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Issues, Research, and Clinical Applications* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1996). Assistance programs for child soldiers often include attention to the psycho-social dimension of conflict: e.g., Save the Children, 'Promoting Psychosocial Well-Being among Children Affected by Armed Conflict,' *Working Paper* No.1, 1996. There is also a growing body of research critical of the cross-cultural relevance and application of PTSD to non-Western post-conflict states, e.g., Patrick J. Bracken, Joan E. Giller, and Derek Summerfield, 'Psychological Responses to War and Atrocity: The Limitations of Current Concepts,' *Social Science and Medicine*, Vol.40, No.8, April 1995, pp.1073-82.

initiatives, from housing and education subsidies to land distribution schemes, has shaped for centuries state policy on how to deal with soldiers after war.

The end of the Cold War can be said to have ushered in two new approaches to the study and practice of reintegration. First, the development and security rationale for providing reintegration assistance is tied to the particular post-Cold War context, where numerous developing states have struggled simultaneously with poverty, internal conflict, and institutional instability. Second, the emergence of reintegration as a coordinated *international* activity is tied to the expanding role of international and non-governmental organizations in managing conflict and engaging in peace-building since the end of the Cold War.

During the Cold War, the superpowers' geo-strategic interests in the third world trumped genuine concerns for the security and development of the impoverished states 'benefiting' from superpower patronage. That patronage was geared towards combatant mobilization rather than its opposite. It tended to prolong rather than resolve conflicts, as in Angola and Ethiopia. The superpowers were largely ambivalent to the post-conflict fate of the soldiers they recruited, paid for, and armed. Absent superpower competition after the end of the Cold War, attention necessarily turned to other barriers to peace, including the agendas of the fighting forces themselves, and their demobilization and reintegration gradually became recognized as necessary for a successful peace process and for social and economic development.

The initial development rationale for DDR was to use demobilization to shift funding away from military activities and towards development ones (the so-called peace dividend I discussed in the introduction). As that rationale was discredited, development thinking focused on the peace-building ideal of addressing root causes of conflict. Because several practitioners and scholars assert that poverty itself is a root cause of conflict, then it is thought that reintegration efforts to

stimulate economic activity in conflict communities and to alleviate the poverty of former fighters will help to consolidate durable peace and foster economic development.⁴

The end of the Cold War has also coincided with debates about the meaning of security and the responsibility of states and international organizations to protect security.⁵ An ideological and normative shift towards protecting the security of individuals has become the focus of post-Cold War security efforts, in part because the systemic change brought by the collapse of the Soviet Union broadened the types of activities that could be sanctioned by the Security Council and in part because of pressure from states, NGOs, and public opinion to intervene in cases where the state in question was incapable or unwilling to protect its citizens from serious and widespread violence.⁶ Part of this shift has necessarily highlighted the prominence of DDR. The return of thousands of former fighters to their communities raises important questions about the protection of individual security (for the communities that might continue to be targets of ex-combatant violence, intimidation, or aggression, and for fighters themselves who might be the targets of community reprisals). The evolving security rationale for reintegration over the last 15-20 years also stems from liberal assumptions about the importance of institutionalised security guarantees for peace

⁴ Some, for example, speculate that inequality of material capabilities in the international system might itself be an explanation for internal conflict in the developing world: e.g., Mohammed Ayoob, 'Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism,' *International Studies Review*, Vol.4, No.3, Dec. 2002, pp.27-48; and Cox 1986. This thinking also permeates World Bank literature about its decision to become involved with reintegration programs: e.g., Ian Bannon, *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda* (Washington, DC: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit in the Social Development Department, World Bank, 2004).

⁵ ICISS 2001; Ayoob 1991; Lawrence Freedman, 'International Security: Changing Targets,' *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998, pp.48-55; Arlene Tucker, 'Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World,' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.32, No.2, pp.295-324; Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).

⁶ This shift was not sudden but occurred over the course of the 20th century in response to several events that both increased the prominence afforded to security claims of individuals (e.g., the burgeoning human rights agenda in the wake of WWII and the Holocaust) and questioned the ability and willingness of states to safeguard the security of their own citizens (e.g., the advent of nuclear weapons, the development of conventions that imply forfeiture of a right of non-intervention for states engaging in particularly egregious acts such as genocide and torture, and the interdependence resulting from globalization and environmental degradation). See S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

consolidation, assumptions that have been validated by empirical study of peace agreements.⁷

The commitment of external actors to design, fund, and implement reintegration programs (as well as their involvement in monitoring, verifying, and setting timetables for disarmament and demobilization) is a crucial strategy for outsiders to signal commitment to a peace process and therefore institutionalize security guarantees.

Second, increased international involvement became possible after the Cold War in cases where parties to the conflict requested or consented to UN involvement and where the major powers no longer had a strategic interest in blocking that involvement. The removal of some Cold War barriers created sufficient political space for the negotiated settlement and international mediation of several internal conflicts, notably in Namibia and Cambodia, where resolution of broader issues (removal of Cuban forces from Angola as a prerequisite for Namibian independence from South Africa, and the end of Soviet support for Vietnam as an opportunity for mediation in Cambodia) facilitated agreement among local belligerents. The collapse of Cold War patronage also led to military victories in other states, such as Ethiopia, paving the way for the demobilization of a half a million soldiers there in 1991.

Increased international assistance with DDR became desirable because of the nature of intrastate conflict and the inability of relatively poor post-conflict states to conduct DDR themselves. In civil wars, state power, state structures, and state institutions are contested. If a state conducts DDR on its own it can undermine a peace agreement because the political authorities in charge are themselves a party to the conflict and so they risk stoking grievances and perceptions of unequal treatment by the other side. An internationally-driven DDR process can therefore provide badly-needed external, and presumably impartial, security guarantees. But external actors can also

⁷ Caroline A. Hartzell found that negotiated settlements that provide institutional guarantees for security were the ones most likely to prove stable: Hartzell, 'Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Interstate Wars,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.43, No.1, 1999, pp.3-22.

provide additional assistance because of their material capabilities. Since most civil wars take place in the context of extreme poverty, diminishing the resources a state has on hand to encourage demobilization and facilitate reintegration on its own, then external actors can help to provide the resources and assistance that states need to tackle their post-conflict problems.

Reintegration forms part of broader peace-building efforts in post-conflict states. As I touched on briefly in the introduction, peace-building is the term often used to describe international intervention that aims to consolidate, or 'build', peace by addressing the root causes of conflict and thereby minimize the risk of renewed armed confrontation. Peace-building goes beyond traditional peacekeeping (where UN troops monitor a ceasefire) and what some have called 'multi-dimensional' peacekeeping (where the UN assumes a lead role in implementing a peace agreement) because it accepts a long term engagement to promote security and development and to build state institutions. That engagement could extend beyond the tasks assigned to international actors by the peace agreement itself.

The long term nature of peace-building has been cast as a duty for intervening states and organizations, a 'responsibility to rebuild' that has accrued because post-conflict states 'too often find themselves wrestling with the underlying problems that necessitated the intervention' in the first place.⁸ Peace-building tasks are often conducted under UN auspices as part of Security Council-authorized missions, but have also been performed by coalitions of intervening states without UN authority (e.g., the US and UK in Iraq), and by regional (e.g., NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan) and other international organizations (e.g., the World Bank in the Greater Great Lakes region). Normally, peace-building tasks (including reintegration) are conducted with the consent of the conflict parties, but they can also occur within the context of a peace enforcement effort or as

⁸ ICISS 2001.

part of humanitarian intervention operations, in which case consent of all parties to the conflict may not be present.⁹

In addition to DDR, peace-building tasks include: reconciliation policies; human rights promotion; strengthening of the judicial system, police force, and other rule of law institutions; humanitarian assistance; repatriation and resettlement of refugees and other displaced persons; economic reconstruction; monitoring of elections and other electoral support; constitutional reforms; de-mining; development of civil society; and support of free media.¹⁰ Because security is 'the chief priority of peace-building'¹¹, DDR is crucial to peace-building efforts since ex-combatants that remain armed and mobilized are the best placed and most likely actors to undermine security during the post-conflict transition.¹² International commitment to reintegration as a peace-building task also reflects the belief that elections and constitutions alone are insufficient to build peace; rather, activities (such as reintegration) that can accelerate reconciliation, build civil society, and promote popular participation in political and economic activity are needed.¹³

Reintegration is also crucial to peace-building success because, without it, ex-combatants have little interest in the success of the peace enterprise. As UN reports have confirmed, peace

⁹ For more on the distinction between international peacekeeping, multi-dimensional peacekeeping, peace-building, peace enforcement, and humanitarian intervention, see, for example: Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr, eds., *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997); James Mayall, ed., *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jane Boulden, *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Jennifer M. Welsh, ed., *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); David M. Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner for the International Peace Academy, 2004).

¹⁰ United Nations General Assembly, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,' 20 October 2000, A/55/502, para.21; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,' in *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1995, second edition), para.21.

¹¹ UNGA and UNSC, 'The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa,' Report of the Secretary-General, 13 April 1998, A/52/871-S/1998/318, para.64.

¹² UNDP 2006, pp.52-5.

¹³ Ake 1996.

consolidation without the active support of ex-combatants is harder to achieve.¹⁴ Throughout the 1990s and into the 21st Century, the UN found itself in situations following civil war where ceasefires were violated and peace agreements broken, where combatants who remained armed could and did return their states to conflict (e.g., Angola in 1991, Liberia in 2003, Haiti in 2004). Even with high-profile UN 'successes', combatant intransigence threatened to derail progress towards peace. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge refused in June 1992 to give up its weapons just as cantonment and demobilization were to begin.¹⁵ In El Salvador, although the UN had officially verified the final weapons inventories of the *Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional* (FMLN) on 14 December 1992, a large FMLN arms cache was discovered six months later, temporarily jeopardizing the entire peace process.¹⁶ The post-conflict state is, in short, not a welcoming place for peace-builders. It can be a veritable breeding ground for spoilers, particularly in cases of state failure or collapse.¹⁷

The institutional shortcomings of peace-builders themselves also help to explain why DDR has gained prominence in thinking about peace-building. The failures associated with UN operations in the mid-1990s were particularly salient. In Angola, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, the UN operated in an environment of wide-ranging problems, with disastrous results: limited resources and mandate for action, delays in troop deployment, and escalating violence despite

¹⁴ Brahimi Report 2000, para.42; UNSC S/PRST/1999/21; UNDPKO 2000; and UNGA A/60/705.

¹⁵ Cheryl M. Lee Kim and Mark Metrikas, 'Holding a Fragile Peace: The Military and Civilian Components of UNTAC,' pp.107-33 in Doyle et al. 1997. In addition to failing to disarm the Khmer Rouge, the UN failed to disarm 70% of the country's four major military factions: Cindy Collins and Thomas G. Weiss, 'An Overview and Assessment of 1989-1996 Peace Operations Publications,' *Occasional Paper #28* (Providence, Rhode Island, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1997), p.126.

¹⁶ After this incident, ONUSAL pressured the FMLN leadership to disclose the locations of over one hundred remaining weapons caches, which were later catalogued and destroyed by the UN, resuscitating the peace process but damaging much-needed trust in the FMLN and the UN as 'disarmament verifier' along the way: David H. McCormick, 'From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Restructuring Military and Police Institutions in El Salvador,' pp.282-311 in Doyle et al. 1997.

¹⁷ Mats Berdal and David Malone, *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000); William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999); David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper #320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998); and Stedman 1997, p.11.

ceasefires.¹⁸ In each case, catastrophe had many causes. But the difficulty with which the UN operated in all of these conflict areas prompted thinking about how to deal better with conflict, to codify the elements of peace-building, and to clarify the relationship between those elements.

Part of this thinking zeroed in on the importance of DDR and led to the presumption that DDR should be a staple of all future peace-building operations. Primarily, this was to prevent a situation such as that in Angola in 1991, where the leader of the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) disputed the election results and ordered his troops back to war. Demobilization and disarmament in Angola were rushed and incomplete, and although some programs were designed to provide training and assistance for the demobilized, they were not properly financed and never implemented.¹⁹ Criticism about flawed DDR processes contributing to a return to war also accompanied Liberia's slide back into conflict in 2002 and Haiti's in 2003.²⁰ DDR has come to be seen as a way to mitigate security threats from ex-combatants; namely, that ex-combatant networks, military know-how, and potential or continuing access to weapons could lead to armed banditry, political violence, or organized crime.

But what should DDR look like in the context of internationally-direct peace-building efforts? The UN's experience in Central America set a precedent for formal, international DDR. The UN was invited into the peace processes of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala in 1989 to verify compliance by the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and

¹⁸ UNGA, 'Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica,' 15 November 1999, A/54/549; Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, 'Somalia,' pp.94-124 in Mayall 1996; Boulden 2001; William J. Durch, 'Introduction to Anarch: Humanitarian Intervention and "State-Building" in Somalia,' pp.311-66 in Durch 1997; UNSC, 'Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,' 15 December 1999, S/1999/1257.

¹⁹ World Bank 1993, pp.7, 38; Porto and Parsons 2003, p.22. Criticism about flawed DDR processes contributing to a return to war also accompanied Liberia's slide back into conflict in 2002 and Haiti's in 2003.

²⁰ International Crisis Group, 'Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States,' *ICG Africa Report* No.87, Dakar and Brussels, 8 December 2004, p.1; the problems with Haiti's DDR programs are chronicled in Jonathan Dworken, Jonathan Moore, and Adam Siegel, 'Haiti Demobilization and Reintegration Program: An Evaluation Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development,' IPR 96-0104/March 1997, Alexandria, Virginia, Institute for Public Research, March 1997.

Nicaragua with the *Esquipulas II* Agreement. This agreement provided for the cessation of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements and prohibited the use of the territory of one state for attacks on another.²¹ Monitoring of *Esquipulas II* led to a more expansive UN role verifying respect for human rights in each of the three states' peace processes, which in turn had a snowball effect on UN activities there, which grew gradually to include monitoring of disarmament and demobilization. This pattern is evident in all three peace processes in Nicaragua (ONUCA), El Salvador (ONUSAL), and Guatemala (MINUGUA).²² Expansion of the UN's monitoring activities also reflected events on the ground. The discovery of the FMLN arms cache, for example, pressured the UN, which had verified disarmament that had not actually taken place, to assume more responsibility over the actual administration of the disarmament process.

ONUSAL was the first UN mission to be 'deeply involved in the reinsertion of guerrillas into civilian life'.²³ Reintegration efforts in El Salvador included accelerated land transfers for ex-FMLN combatants, credit lines to start and develop small business ventures and to support agricultural activity, a technical assistance program for agriculture, educational scholarships, medical care, funds for the disabled, and counseling. Separate programs were instituted for ex-combatants from both sides, and for war-disabled and demobilized National Police personnel. It was also in El Salvador that a working model for the implementation of reintegration programs emerged, where the UN delegated reintegration to UNDP, which in turn worked with donors and development

²¹ ONUCA was formed for this purpose: UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 644, 7 November 1989, S/RES/644 (1989).

²² UN SCR 650, 27 March 1990, S/RES/650 (1990); UN SCR 653, 20 April 1990, S/RES/653 (1990); UN SCR 693, 20 May 1991, S/RES/693 (1991); UN SCR 729, 14 January 1992, S/RES/729 (1992); Chetan Kumar and Sara Lodge (with Karen Resnick), 'Sustainable Peace through Democratization: The Experiences of Haiti and Guatemala,' *International Peace Academy Policy Paper* (New York: International Peace Academy, March 2002), pp.12-3; UN General Assembly Resolution (GAR) 267, 28 September 1994, A/RES/48/267; UN SCR 1094, 20 January 1997, S/RES/1094 (1997); UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Central America: Efforts towards Peace,' 17 December 1996, S/1996/1045; and Enrique ter Horst, 'The Role of the United Nations in the Process of Implementation of the El Salvador Peace Agreement, with Some Comparative References to the Work of the Peacekeeping Operation in Haiti,' paper presented at St. Antony's College, Oxford, 26 October 2000.

²³ McCormick 1997, p.284.

partners (e.g., USAID, GTZ, etc.) to coordinate specific programs. In Africa, meanwhile, the UN's first involvement with reintegration was meant to be in Angola in 1991, but that state's slide back into civil war meant that the UN's first reintegration programs occurred in Mozambique and in a second-stab effort in Angola, both in 1994.²⁴

Today's programs are multi-million dollar ventures providing benefits that can cover a wide range of activities. Benefits typically include a combination of monetary compensation (cash subsidies, stipends, severance pay, or pensions) and employment-oriented activities (vocational training, income generation, job placement and creation, incentives to employers to hire ex-combatants, affirmative action, public works and reconstruction programs, and micro-credit schemes). Where initially the public sector absorbed large numbers of ex-combatants (as in Namibia and Zimbabwe), increasingly states and international reintegration actors work with the private sector; the security industry, in particular, has hired many ex-combatants.²⁵ The UN has concluded that program components are ideally linked to 'national needs' (as opposed to applying an international reintegration 'blueprint')²⁶ but, as the case studies conclude, the evolution of internationally-directed programs over time has tended to favor some components over others (namely, cash payments and vocational training).

Strategic thinking about reintegration, its evolution and its relationship to broader peace-building, is critical to assessing reintegration. But that thinking must be viewed in relation to the actors who ultimately design and implement programs. It is to these actors, and the evolution of their involvement with reintegration, that I now turn.

²⁴ For more on Angola's 1990s experiences with DDR see Art Hansen and David Tavares, 'Why Angolan Soldiers Worry about Demobilisation and Reintegration,' pp.198-209 in Richard Black and Khalid Koser, eds., *The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 1999) p.199.

²⁵ In Angola, at least 15,000 former military personnel were working in the Luandan security industry in 2004, where more than 100 security companies had set up shop (UNOHAC, 'Angola: Demobilized Soldiers Find Work in the Security Industry,' *IRIN News Report*, 14 June 2004).

²⁶ UNGA A/60/705, para.16.

II. Proliferation of Reintegration Actors

As the importance of reintegration to peace-building operations has grown, actors charged with responsibility for the reintegration process have proliferated. Who conducts DDR depends in large part on the circumstances by which a conflict comes to an end. If parties to a conflict reach a negotiated agreement, then DDR often forms part of the political settlement to the conflict, and that settlement will specify whether there will be a UN role for managing different aspects of DDR, as occurred in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere. Sometimes a UN role for DDR might come without a peace agreement but as part of an enforcement action taken by the UN Security Council, as occurred in the delegation of disarmament tasks to the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia during the UN operation (UNOSOM II) there. Finally, if one party wins a decisive victory, it may pursue DDR policies on its own, perhaps with some outside assistance, as in Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad and Angola (in 2002).

Traditionally the UN has taken a lead role in coordinating DDR assistance and in shaping the terms of the reintegration package on offer to combatants.²⁷ This is partly because the UN was the first organization to engage in reintegration activities in El Salvador. Since that time, many operations have delegated to the UN key responsibilities for DDR. Of course, the UN is not a monolithic actor. Several agencies within the UN, each with different mandates and experience, have been involved with DDR over the years. Generally, DPKO has overseen disarmament and demobilization efforts in areas where the UN has had a DDR mandate, while UNDP has emerged

²⁷ But, as shall become clear below, the UN is by no means the only actor. Of the 36 DDR processes listed by the SIDDR, 20 were carried out in the absence of UN peace support operations or without a UN mandate for DDR (SIDDR 2006, pp.28-9).

as the UN's lead actor on reintegration. UNICEF, meanwhile, takes the lead on the reintegration of child combatants (those under 18 years of age at the time of demobilization). Despite differences between agencies, it is nevertheless possible to make assumptions about the general advantages of UN involvement with reintegration. The UN can take advantage of its military presence in-country to facilitate disarmament and demobilization, and use its peacekeepers to educate demobilizing combatants about reintegration programs. The UN also has proven effective at mobilizing resources on a state's behalf, though not always without problems, by coordinating donor conferences and using its specialized agencies to marshal the money and expertise that reintegration programs require. Finally, it can act as an impartial supervisor of the reintegration process, enabling it to pressure parties to reach agreement on issues that might otherwise delay DDR or stall the peace process.

If the advantages of UN responsibility over a state's DDR process are clear, the division of that responsibility within the UN is less so. Particularly because of the different breakdown of tasks between DPKO (disarmament and demobilization) and UNDP (reintegration), there is no designated focal point for coordinated DDR policy.²⁸ This shadows a similar lack of a bureaucratic focal point for the broader peace-building enterprise, which led to the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission at the UN in 2005.²⁹ It is far from certain, however, whether the Peacebuilding Commission will meet its stated objective of increasing the funding and attention span afforded to post-conflict states, particularly with 31 member states comprising the commission, all with potentially disparate interests and agendas.

But with DDR, like with peace-building generally, the UN actors involved have multiplied. The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR comprises numerous agencies and organizations:

²⁸ Brahimi Report, para.43.

²⁹UN SCR 1645, 20 December 2005, S/RES/1645 (2005).

the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, DPKO, DPA, UN Department of Public Information, ILO, IOM, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, UNICEF, UNDP, UN Development Fund for Women, UN Institute for Disarmament Research, UN Population Fund, UNHCR, World Food Programme, and World Health Organization.³⁰ The group was formed at the initiative of the DPKO Best Practices Unit in order to formulate integrated DDR guidelines, with UNDP taking the lead role in drafting the reintegration module. It was convened in part because of agencies' perceptions of coordination problems in the field, particularly with the World Bank assuming a larger role in managing reintegration programs.³¹ The group was also formed with an overt political agenda: to get the Security Council to dedicate more attention to DDR in mission mandates and to dedicate more mission money to reintegration, which otherwise is dependent on voluntary contributions.³² Like the Peacebuilding Commission, it is too early to tell what effect the integrated DDR standards will have on design and implementation of programs. As of March 2006, the group was working on piloting the integrated standards into programs in Haiti and Sudan, but further study of those cases will be needed to assess the impact that such efforts will have on reintegration there, particularly given other obstacles to peace consolidation in those countries.

As I alluded above, the World Bank's involvement with DDR has further crowded the reintegration field. The Bank first became involved with demobilization and reintegration in 1991, when the government of Chad, wanting to demobilize a large number of combatants and needing external assistance to do so, requested a working paper from the Bank to assist in designing a program to reintegrate the demobilized combatants. In April 1992, the Vice President of the Bank's Africa Region requested the formation of the Africa Region Working Group on

³⁰ UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Working Group, Draft Terms of Reference, 2005; UNGA A/60/705.

³¹ Author's interview with Stephanie Kuttner, DPhil, Consultant to the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, Washington, DC, 2 September 2005.

³² *Ibid.*

Demobilization/Reintegration of Military Personnel. Concluding that the insecurity of civil war seriously impaired a state's economic development, the Bank commissioned two comparative studies of DDR efforts in 1993 and 1996.³³ Research demonstrating the likelihood of conflict recurrence for countries coming out of previous wars heightened its interest in DDR, and in post-conflict reconstruction more generally.³⁴

A more substantial Bank role in supporting reintegration programs occurred first in Mozambique, where the Bank supplied technical assistance to support UNDP, followed by Uganda, where the Bank financed the UNDP demobilization of Ugandan military forces between 1994 and 1996. After Mozambique and Uganda, the Bank expanded its expertise and has since pursued a lead role in DDR activities in a number of places, including Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and other post-conflict states. By 2004, the Bank had provided DDR assistance to 27 projects in 16 countries.³⁵ Significantly, the Bank is the lead actor in the demobilization and reintegration process for the Greater Great Lakes, involving Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, and Angola. It also agreed in January 2003 to implement a multi-donor trust fund aimed at demobilizing 167,000 Angola Armed Forces (FAA) and UNITA fighters and paying reintegration benefits to over 100,000 of them.³⁶

The Bank has led reintegration efforts in cases where countries have asked it to, but it has also provided support to reintegration programs managed by UNDP. Technically, the Bank itself

³³ World Bank 1993; Colletta et al. 1996.

³⁴ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, Policy Research Working Paper No.2355 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001), and 'Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War,' mimeo (Washington, DC: DECRG, World Bank, 17 February 1999); World Bank, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003). Two events were critical in moving the Bank into post-conflict reconstruction. In 1994 the Bank agreed to administer the multi-donor Holst Fund for the West Bank and Gaza, and in 1995 the European Commission asked the Bank to plan and coordinate post-conflict recovery in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bannon 2004, pp.3-4). In 1997 the Bank created the Post-Conflict Unit and in 2001, to signal the shift that resulted from OP/BP 2.30 in emphasizing a broader approach to conflict, the Post Conflict Unit was renamed the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit.

³⁵ Bannon 2004, p.31.

³⁶ International Crisis Group, 'Dealing with Savimbi's Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian Challenges in Angola,' *ICG Africa Report* No.58 (Luanda and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 26 February 2003) p.6.

does not lead reintegration because it prefers to provide technical advice, funding, and coordination for a national commission chaired by the country's government and established for the explicit purpose of managing DDR programs. As such, the Bank is accountable to the national commission, but the Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit is also accountable to member states as donors and to the World Bank Group Boards of Executive Directors. To make its reconstruction assistance more flexible, the Bank reformed its operational policies and internal procedures, adopting two Operational Policy/Bank Procedures documents: OP/BP 2.30 and OP/BP 8.50.³⁷ Two trust funds help the Bank to fund post-conflict activities: the Post-Conflict Fund, a mechanism allowing US\$1-2 million grants, and the LICUS (Low Income Countries under Stress) Trust Fund.

While the Bank has expanded its post-conflict role, it is adamant about the limits of that role. OP 2.30 states in no uncertain terms that the Bank 'does not engage in peacemaking or peacekeeping, which are functions of the United Nations and certain regional organizations'.³⁸ It also does not provide direct support for disarming combatants.³⁹ The Bank's Articles of Agreement prevent it from interfering in the domestic affairs of a member state, and it will not operate in a state without the express consent of the state's government.⁴⁰

Like the UN, the World Bank is not a monolithic actor but because its CPR Unit normally leads the Bank's involvement with reintegration, certain assumptions can be made about the Bank as an actor. Advantages of Bank involvement include its ability to provide and raise money and its ability to place the onus of DDR squarely on the shoulders of the state government, which in the best of circumstances can breed governmental commitment to issues involving ex-soldiers.

³⁷ World Bank, 'Development Cooperation and Conflict,' OP/BP 2.30, *World Bank Operational Manual*, January 2001; World Bank, OP/BP 8.50, *World Bank Operational Manual*, August 1995.

³⁸ World Bank, OP 2.30,3(a).

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ World Bank, OP 2.30,3(b).

There are drawbacks as well. Since it eschews a disarmament role, the Bank is not well placed to link disarmament and demobilization activities to reintegration; this simply means that the Bank must rely on other actors to ensure that these activities go well. Furthermore, as the Bank is a donor/lender and not a conflict mediator, it does not deal well with security issues. Since it works *through* state governments and not as an interim administrator or negotiator, the Bank is not well placed to oppose the government should it, for example, pursue reintegration policies that inequitably distribute benefits among ex-combatant groups. The Bank's Articles of Agreement requirement to defer to borrowing countries' sovereign governments on political matters considerably limits its scope of action.⁴¹

The UN is similarly constrained by sovereignty considerations, since Article 2(7) of the UN Charter forbids intervention into matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. The Security Council, unlike the Bank, can get around sovereignty constraints through Chapter VII action and the UN, through its peacekeepers, agencies, and the good offices of the Secretary-General and his representative, can choose to exercise considerable political pressure on the parties to the conflict. In cases where working directly with the state's government might pose difficulties for the peace process, therefore, at least some UN involvement with DDR might be desirable.

Although the UN has welcomed World Bank involvement with DDR issues,⁴² coordination between the two organizations has been a consistent problem.⁴³ Interviews with reintegration practitioners at the UN and the Bank, however, revealed that coordination problems are not the result of ill will between the two organizations but arise instead because of disagreements about

⁴¹ Jonathan Stevenson, *Preventing Conflict: The Role of the Bretton Woods Institutions*, Adelphi Paper 336 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000).

⁴² UNSC S/PRST/2000/10.

⁴³ Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, 'Obstacles to Peacebuilding,' *Foreign Policy*, No.94, Spring 1994, p.70.

objectives and best practices.⁴⁴ In a study of coordination between the UN and the World Bank, researchers found that DDR was the most problematic issue of coordination for the UN and World Bank. UN officials criticized the Bank for slow disbursement of funds and its exclusive focus on dealing with national authorities. Bank officials criticized the UN's sequential and narrow approach to DDR that, they believed, created a lag between reintegration assistance and broader economic recovery.⁴⁵ There was also tension over whether the UN or the Bank should manage DDR trust funds.⁴⁶

A number of other international organizations, state development agencies, and non-governmental organizations crowd the reintegration stage. The IOM routinely provides logistical support and arranges for transportation of demobilized combatants from cantonment areas to their home regions. The ILO and GTZ design vocational training and income generation projects. GTZ became involved with providing income generation and vocational training projects for ex-combatants in Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, as extensions of the organization's projects for displaced persons and refugees.⁴⁷ USAID involved itself with reintegration early on, undertaking efforts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique, Uganda, and Ethiopia. USAID also led reintegration efforts in Haiti between 1994 and 1996. The UK's DFID contributed DDR and SSR support in Sierra Leone and for proposed programs in Sudan. The European Union increasingly donates to reintegration programs, having agreed in 2002 to provide Eritrea with 96.8 million euros

⁴⁴ For example, in Angola in 2004, UNDP questioned the viability of a World Bank proposal to issue vouchers and to dump ex-combatants in provincial capitals to make their own way back to their home districts. UNDP argued that vouchers were not feasible (where would ex-combatants redeem them?) and that, absent a transportation scheme, ex-combatants would simply stay in provincial capitals, defeating the objective to disperse them (Author's interview with Sam Barnes, Chief of the Strategic Planning Unit, UNDP, New York City, 13 January 2004). Disagreements over cash benefit distribution were also in evidence in Sierra Leone.

⁴⁵ Madalene O'Donnell, 'UN Peacekeeping and the World Bank: Perceptions of Senior Managers in the Field,' Center on International Cooperation, New York University, November 2005, p.17.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.18.

⁴⁷ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 'Proposal for the Reintegration of Refugees, Displaced Persons, and Ex-Combatants with Special Reference to Sub-Saharan Africa' (Frankfurt: GTZ, August 1992).

for poverty alleviation and social and economic development, a portion of which will fund post-war demobilization and reintegration assistance.⁴⁸

Policymakers at all levels lament the lack of standard operating procedures for DDR and the difficulty of coordinating between numerous agencies, government ministries, NGOs, and international organizations. Indeed, the proliferation of actors has complicated consensus and exacerbated coordination problems. It has also taxed post-conflict states that might prefer to deal with only one external body rather than navigate a complex web of outside organizations. Most importantly for the assessment of reintegration programs in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, the proliferation of reintegration actors has impacted their ability to work together and reach consensus on reintegration objectives and components. In the following sections, I use literature on reintegration and comments from reintegration actors I interviewed to highlight recurring issues related to the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors (the case studies subsequently determine to what extent similar issues explain the persistence of RPSRCs in each case). Then I move on to a review of literature on political economy and international relations theory to argue that bureaucratic and systemic pressures are likely to determine key elements of actor capacity and preferences in my cases.

III. Evolution of Reintegration: Capacity and Preference Patterns Observed

A review of post-Cold War experience with peace-building reveals patterns about the capacity and preferences of peace-builders likely to impact reintegration outcomes. On the capacity side, these include difficulties in securing funding for reintegration programs and the legal

⁴⁸ UNOHAC, 'Eritrea: EC to Support Democracy, Human Rights Project,' *IRIN News Report*, 3 September 2003.

and normative structure that determines the authority reintegration actors have to act. With preferences, clashes have occurred over what reintegration is designed to achieve, whether programs should target ex-combatants or whole communities, and whether cash benefits should be used.

Limited Capacity: Common Problems with Money and Legitimacy

Reintegration actors consistently face funding problems. Berdal, in his 1996 study of DDR, noted several features of the UN system that delay and weaken its ability to fund programs: e.g., antiquated procurement procedures and lack of integrated planning mechanisms.⁴⁹ The funding crisis is one that centers on member-states as donors. Reintegration requires a lot of money to be paid in advance of actual operations and at a time when peace is precarious. Donors have difficulty funding programs flexibly and ahead of proven government ability to use funds effectively, creating a 'chicken and egg' problem.⁵⁰ Shortage of funds delays demobilization and reintegration, as in Angola, Liberia, and Mozambique, or halts DDR activities after UN withdrawal, as in El Salvador in 1995. The World Bank approach of funding reintegration through a Multi-Donor Trust Fund has had some success but nevertheless reproduces delays and shortages, as occurred in Sierra Leone. The Brahimi Report advised funding DDR from assessed mission budgets in 2000, a recommendation that has not been implemented by the Security Council (although some assessed budget funds went to reintegration programs in Liberia).

Funding DDR, however, is still unpopular and funding delays still common. As respondents representing several different organizations indicated, many donors are reluctant to see money go to assist recipients who they perceive as responsible for violence and destruction. Donors also shy away from funding programs directly targeting the security sector (whether for

⁴⁹ Berdal 1996, p.62.

⁵⁰ World Bank 1993, p.94.

DDR or reform of the security sector).⁵¹ In Angola, 'consistent underfunding' placed reintegration 'on hold'; in 2003 lack of resources there meant that payments promised to ex-combatants there were irregular, with many former fighters left off the payroll altogether.⁵²

The capacity of reintegration actors is also determined by the legal and normative structure prevalent at the time of intervention. Peace-building did not emerge overnight. The UN, for example, did not have a right from its inception to build peace in post-conflict states. Rather, the UN's 'right' to build peace is conditional on the consent of the parties or on invocation of Chapter VII. Legitimacy for peace-building operations grew as parties to the conflict increasingly consented to such operations and as the Security Council increasingly authorized broader involvement in post-conflict states coming out of civil wars.⁵³ A similar trend occurred in the realm of economic development. The debt crisis of the 1980s led to the IMF and the World Bank becoming 'more deeply involved in policy-based lending and conditionality,' and to indebted states accepting intervention into 'areas which were previously inconceivable such as good governance, the rule of law, judicial reform, corruption, and corporate governance'.⁵⁴

International actors justify their involvement with DDR on the basis of being invited in because they have particular expertise and because of presumptions about their impartiality. But some post-conflict states are sceptical about ceding control of the DDR process in whole or in part to international actors.⁵⁵ Other states might initially welcome international DDR but then become

⁵¹ Thom Shanker, 'US Team to Start Helping Afghans Build New Army,' *New York Times*, 18 February 2002, accessed online at <http://www.nytimes.com>, 25 February 2002.

⁵² UNSC S/2003/158, para.3; International Crisis Group 2003, p.5; UNOHAC, 30 April 2004.

⁵³ Chesterman 2004.

⁵⁴ Ngaire Woods and Amrita Narlikar, 'Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank,' *International Social Science Journal*, Vol.53, No.170, November 2001, p.570.

⁵⁵ Militias in Iraq, for example, balked at US Coalition Provisional Authority plans for their 'transition and reintegration' and the plan was scrapped. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 91, Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias within Iraq, CPA/ORD/02 June 2004/91; Coalition Provisional Authority, 'Armed Forces and Militia Transition and Reintegration Key Facts,' *CPA Fact Sheet*, 7 June 2004; and Terrence Kelly, Senior Researcher, RAND Corporation, 'Transition and Reintegration of Militias in Iraq,' talk given at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 28 June 2004.

anxious to see external actors withdraw and declare the DDR chapter closed. They might fear that the continued presence of DDR actors in-country or an ongoing or open-ended 'reintegration' program could dispel a 'back to normal' image and therefore discourage foreign investment or harm efforts to shore up political legitimacy. State motivations to declare a DDR chapter closed also explain why state actors might have incentives to polarize or politicize reintegration issues such as equal access to benefits and the duration of programs. Particularly if the ruling government feels its side 'won' the conflict, it could pursue a lop-sided or 'victor's justice' policy of reintegration. Finally, questions about past performance of external actors also play a part in shaping post-conflict state response to external control over reintegration. For example, Angola's perception about UN failures there in the 1990s led that state to declare that it would conduct DDR on its own in the wake of its 2002 victory over UNITA.⁵⁶ Expertise and impartiality are, after all, not a given.⁵⁷

Authority to act can also come from a peace agreement. In general, the more a peace settlement can codify DDR timelines and guarantees the better, because peace agreements that institutionalize security guarantees are more stable than those that do not.⁵⁸ The Security Council has urged the inclusion in peace agreements of 'clear terms' for DDR.⁵⁹ Although peace agreements routinely include disarmament and demobilization timetables, they are usually silent or vague about reintegration benefits. Peace agreements tend not to spell out which benefits will be considered, how long ex-combatants are entitled to receive assistance, or – most significantly – guarantee equal access to benefits among parties to the conflict. Instead, reintegration provisions are left vague, as in the Lusaka Agreement for the conflict in the Greater Great Lakes, where

⁵⁶ International Crisis Group 2003, p.6.

⁵⁷ As Barnett and Finnemore point out, paraphrasing Max Weber, the 'goodness' of bureaucracies and international organizations ought to be questioned and not assumed (1999, p.708).

⁵⁸ Hartzell 1999.

⁵⁹ UNSC S/PRST/1999/21.

parties 'commit themselves to taking all the necessary measures to facilitate their repatriation'.⁶⁰

The proliferation of reintegration actors compounds the problem because there is no obvious reintegration expert or authority to advise a peace process on the front end.

Clashing Preferences: Challenges of Consensus

As I argued in the introduction, some RPSRCs persist because actors' preferences have coalesced around low expectations and around program components (e.g., vocational training) that yield poor results. The likely reasons for this are explained in the next section of this chapter. But some preferences also clash.⁶¹ What stood out in interviews with respondents and in existing reintegration literature was the lack of consensus about reintegration objectives and mechanics: whether programs should try to find employment for former fighters, whether programs should target them or assist communities more generally, and whether cash benefits should be used. No institutional actor has a fixed preference one way or the other on any of these issues.⁶² Rather, respondents said that the conflict and local political and economic context ought to determine the makeup of programs.⁶³

Adherence to local contexts aside, the lack of consensus about program objectives and components across cases is also due in part to the proliferation of reintegration actors. As with the coordination problem articulated in the Battle of the Sexes,⁶⁴ even in cases where reintegration

⁶⁰ Lusaka Agreement, Article 22.

⁶¹ Again, as I argue in the next section, literature on political economy and international relations theory helps to predict where preferences are likely to clash and explains why some preferences win out over others (e.g., power differences between actors and log-rolling).

⁶² In some specific cases, organizations have expressed fixed preferences but these have not been consistent across cases. For example, the World Bank required programs it funded in Mozambique to be only for ex-combatants whereas other programs (run by the ILO and GTZ) required only 50% of participants to be ex-combatants. The World Bank, however, has not had the same strict requirement in other cases of its reintegration support.

⁶³ This is also in line with the recommendation of the UN Inter-agency Working Group on DDR, especially with regard to program components (UNGA A/60/705, para.16). Most individuals expressed their own preferences (e.g., in favor of cash or endorsing programs that combine targeted with non-targeted support) but were careful in noting that their organizations preferred to let the conflict context determine the makeup of programs.

⁶⁴ In the Battle of the Sexes, a man and a woman share a goal (e.g., 'spending time together') but have different preferences for achieving that goal (e.g., one prefers to watch sports on television and the other prefers to go dancing).

actors agree about the objective, there is disagreement about how to reach that objective: some actors want cash, others vocational training; some want targeted programs, others insist on non-targeted approaches. One area where consensus has been agreed in principle but, as the cases demonstrate, not put into practice, is targeting vulnerable combatant sub-groups: women, children, disabled fighters, and family dependents of fighters.⁶⁵ Lobbying on the part of some reintegration actors (notably, the UN Development Fund for Women and UNICEF) has produced awareness across organizations about the special needs of these groups. UNICEF has succeeded in getting reintegration actors to recognize the need to separate children from adult combatants in cantonment areas, limiting the stay of children in those areas, and setting up special tracking systems for those children.⁶⁶ Local disabled organizations in Mozambique succeeded in gaining special benefits. But, by and large, reintegration actors continue to struggle to tailor programs to these groups, and particularly women, as the Sierra Leone case makes clear.

At issue with reintegration objectives is whether programs are a short term effort to fulfill an immediate political objective (distracting ex-combatants through programs long enough for peace to hold) or whether they should actually strive for, and whether they can actually achieve, the long

See James Fearon 'Cooperation and Bargaining under Anarchy,' unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, 1994, cited in Duncan Snidal, 'Political Economy and International Institutions,' *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol.16, No.1, March 1996, p.133.

⁶⁵ Literature on child soldiers focuses on family reunification, social reintegration, and education of child combatants, and there is often a normative focus on the prevention of recruitment and use of under-aged combatants, and on the psycho-social implications for them: Isobel McConnan and Sarah Uppard, *Children Not Soldiers: Guidelines for Working with Child Soldiers Associated with Fighting Forces* (London: Save the Children, 2001); Elizabeth Bennett, ed., *Child Soldiers in Southern Africa*, ISS Monograph No.37 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, April 1999); T. W. Bennet, *Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? Criminalizing Recruitment of Child Soldiers*, ISS Monograph No.32 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, December 1998); Ilene Cohn and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, *Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). In Nicaragua and Uganda there were over twice as many dependents as combatants. In Angola, each of UNITA's estimated 105,000 combatants has an average of six dependents (UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Angola,' S/2003/158, 7 February 2003, p.3). For more on disabled fighters, see UNOHAC, 'IRIN Special Report on Disabled Ex-Combatants,' *IRIN News Report*, 1 September 1999. For information on women combatants see UN Development Fund for Women (UNAFEM), *Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (New York: UNAFEM, October 2004).

⁶⁶ UNDPKO 2000, paras.179-205; UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict,' 9 February 2005, S/2005/72.

term economic, social, and political reintegration of combatants. In other words, should programs simply 'pay and scatter' combatants, or should they 'pay, scatter, and employ' them?⁶⁷ There was no consensus among respondents on the issue, although tellingly respondents representing international organizations and development agencies were more likely to stress the symbolic nature of reintegration programs as a time-buying gesture, while post-conflict state government representatives and civil society leaders commonly put faith in the ability of programs to stimulate economic development and train for or create jobs.

The discrepancy is a product of different philosophies among reintegration actors: local actors might be likely to believe in the ability of outsiders to create economic growth and employment opportunities, whereas international actors might be skeptical of the potential within a limited post-conflict job market or fear aid dependency among recipients. Preferences are a complex mix of actor values, ideologies, and interests.⁶⁸ There is also legitimate disagreement about the extent to which employment-oriented approaches work. The World Bank 1993 study of DDR concluded that vocational training results were mixed,⁶⁹ a result confirmed by the three cases assessed here. DPKO advocates vocational training yet recognizes its limits, concluding that even well-trained combatants 'will still have to compete with thousands of skilled civilians for the limited jobs available in the labour market.'⁷⁰ The UN Secretary-General has stressed that employment interventions need to match market demand.⁷¹

⁶⁷ This language emerged during my interview with Timothy W. Born, Team Leader, Private Sector Enabling Environment, United States Agency for International Development Mission to Mozambique, and formerly USAID's Coordinator for Demobilization and Reintegration in Mozambique, Maputo, 18 September 2003. Born argued that paying and scattering was enough in Mozambique, because he believed that employment programs were ineffective and reinforced special status among ex-combatants.

⁶⁸ Holthoefer and Sridal 2005, p.10.

⁶⁹ World Bank 1993, pp.xiv, 99.

⁷⁰ UNDPKO 2000, paras. 166-8, 174.

⁷¹ UNGA A/60705, para.9(i).

The employment debate is also about discovering who does employment best. Berdal, for example, notes that organizations administered by veterans themselves or by NGOs have shown more success (in cost-effectiveness and in reducing political tension) than those run by the central government.⁷² Others, including this author, are more skeptical of the vocational training genre altogether, and wonder why reintegration actors do not experiment with educational and agricultural assistance more often or invest in longer term employment options such as apprenticeships or affirmative action policies.⁷³ At the same time, 'symbolic' reintegration programs that are designed to be temporary, stop gap measures and have no intention of investing in longer term development risk alienating ex-combatants by misleading them about true program objectives. Tension about program objectives was evident during the planning and evaluation of reintegration programs in all three case studies.

A second issue concerns the extent and appropriateness of targeted reintegration support. Some states, communities, and international reintegration actors are wary of treating ex-combatants better than civilians. This has led to debate over whether reintegration programs should be tailored specifically to ex-combatants and their families, or ones in which former fighters can participate, but are otherwise open to ex-combatant and non-combatant alike. Some reintegration practitioners have advocated the former;⁷⁴ others the latter.⁷⁵ The answer hinges on whether targeted approaches are more effective than non-targeted ones, and whether they are appropriate to the given conflict context. The disadvantages of targeted support most commonly noted by respondents were the danger of perpetuating a sense of entitlement among ex-

⁷² Berdal 1996, p.49.

⁷³ Collier 1994, p.350. Collier's study found that access to land in Uganda mattered more to security post-conflict than the success or failure of targeted employment schemes.

⁷⁴ Kimberly Mahling Clark, *Fostering a Farewell to Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants* (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, March 1996) p.i.

⁷⁵ Tesfamichael et al. 2004, p.77.

combatants and the potential that community resentment of ex-combatants benefits could lead to violence, or disrupt reconciliation and community acceptance of returning fighters.

Despite the perceived drawbacks of targeted assistance, there was recognition by almost all respondents that at least some targeted assistance is necessary in most cases, even if there are no guidelines about when targeted assistance is *no longer* necessary. As one respondent also pointed out, reintegration advances both political and short-term development objectives: the political objective is to deliver on a commitment made by the government to its own troops and to the people they were fighting against, and so targeted reintegration assistance is vital for political actors intent on delivering on such promises.⁷⁶ Namibia's experience was crucial in this regard: initially it provided no targeted reintegration programs to combatants even though some fighters claim their leaders had promised them jobs; the government's policy against targeted reintegration backfired and produced widespread, frequent, and sometimes violent ex-combatant protests.

The general standard expressed by respondents at UNDP, the World Bank, and USAID was that targeted support should be only enough to make combatants like everyone else.⁷⁷ This conforms to the UN Secretary-General's summary of the findings of the Inter-agency Working Group on DDR. He noted that targeted support should 'be limited in scope and delivered, as far as possible, through programmes that benefit the whole community'.⁷⁸ Confusion persists, however, since in the same report the Secretary-General also stressed that the reintegration process must extend beyond the life of a peacekeeping operation and 'often necessitates long-term external

⁷⁶ Author's interview with Sean Bradley, Trust Fund Coordinator, Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Secretariat, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1 April 2004.

⁷⁷ See also World Bank, *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration*, World Bank Report No.23869-AFR, Africa Region, Environmental, Rural and Social Development Department, 25 March 2002, p.19.

⁷⁸ UNGA A/60/705, para.41.

assistance'.⁷⁹ Additionally, even those that adopt this standard find that defining success as 'sharing the deep poverty of the rest of the population' is troubling.⁸⁰

UNDP, in its 2006 *Practice Note on DDR*, codified the contexts that would determine whether support is individually tailored to ex-combatants (what it called 'ex-combatant focused' approaches) or provided through non-targeted support to entire communities ('community-based' approaches). It advocates long term *targeted* support for places where ex-combatants are 'perceived to be a continuing threat to long term security', but recommended long term non-targeted support where 'ex-combatants pose no greater threat than other war-affected groups' (e.g., refugees and internally-displaced persons).⁸¹

A final issue evading consensus is the use of cash benefits, which have formed a part of nearly every reintegration program implemented. Despite residual and sometimes strong arguments against them,⁸² a consensus in support of some form of cash payment has formed.⁸³ There is, however, no consensus among reintegration practitioners about whether benefits should be delivered in one lump-sum payment or spread out over time as a cash allowance, how long cash should be given, and where benefits should be distributed.

World Bank respondents tended to favour one-off, lump-sum payments, while UNDP respondents favoured monthly stipends (mainly as a result of UNDP's management of a successful cash stipend program in Mozambique). Respondents who favoured lump-sum payments over

⁷⁹ Ibid., paras.9(c),27.

⁸⁰ E.g., Dercon and Ayalew 1998, p.1672.

⁸¹ UNDP 2006, pp.53,55.

⁸² Those opposing cash payments argue that they breed dependency, unrealistic expectations, and resentment. In Haiti, American-led pressure on the restored Aristide government in 1994 to provide benefits to ex-FAd'H soldiers fueled popular anger towards them. In Zimbabwe, a generous monthly allowance for combatants (representing 438% of GNP per capita) is said to have 'fueled high expectations and provided a disincentive for ex-combatants to find employment' (World Bank 1993, p.63). Knight and Özerdem warn that cash, although effective, should not substitute for other forms of material and long term assistance for ex-combatants (Knight and Özerdem 2004, pp. 510-2).

⁸³ Peppiatt, Mitchell and Holzmann found cash to be a cost effective and beneficiary-friendly development tool [David Peppiatt, John Mitchell, and Penny Holzmann, *Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits and Assessing Risks* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2001) p.19].

monthly stipends argued that they encourage ex-combatants to make more substantial investment up-front in their future (e.g., purchase land, start a business, etc.). Proponents of cash stipends, on the other hand, argued that giving payments in dribs and drabs facilitates a positive socialization process by allowing ex-combatants to learn cash management skills. They stressed that this method could also consolidate short term security in a post-conflict state because ex-combatants might resort to protest or violence after their lump-sum money runs out while monthly payments would buy more time for peace.

The second debate revolves around how much to pay. Payments too much in excess of GNP per capita could fuel resentment from the local population, and amounts too far below such figures can breed resentment among ex-combatants. A more important consideration is the equality of payments between opposing sides in a state: that Nicaraguan Resistance fighters were paid much less than Sandinista People's Army (EPS) soldiers in Nicaragua contributed to protests and insecurity there. Fairness and transparency in fixing the amount of payments can therefore be considered more important than the amount itself.

A final debate concerns where ex-combatants should receive payments. This is where UNDP respondents were particularly critical of the World Bank approach in Sierra Leone. Payment in Assembly Areas, they stressed, undermines one of the key goals of cash provision: scattering combatants and discouraging their mass settlement in urban areas. To obtain the community-building and social reintegration advantages of cash payments, combatants should be paid in home regions so they can spend money there. Paying combatants in Assembly Areas also decreases the likelihood the money will go towards long term investment. Some UNDP officials and other reintegration actors had made these arguments before programs were implemented in Sierra Leone and Liberia, yet those programs nevertheless opted to pay ex-combatants in

Assembly Areas or as they were about to leave Assembly Areas. UNDP has also expressed a clear institutional preference against tying cash payment to disarmament.⁸⁴

These debates are not just about program details. They indicate disagreement over how to define goals and success, and reveal how little is known about the effectiveness of competing reintegration approaches. A comparative assessment of reintegration in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone sheds light on all of these issues, in addition to demonstrating why disagreement among actors persists.

IV. Shaping Capacity and Preferences: Endogenous and Exogenous Pressures

Literature on political economy and international relations theory helps to explain why patterns linked to reintegration actors' capacity and preferences repeat across DDR interventions.⁸⁵ This literature also helps to identify pressures that are likely to shape the capacity and preferences of the various reintegration actors who design and implement programs.⁸⁶ In this section, I outline the pressures articulated in this literature and argue that they are likely to influence the behavior of reintegration actors. The case studies then determine whether these general observations about endogenous and exogenous pressures were salient in determining the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. Understanding the determinants of actor capacity and preferences in the cases is crucial to explaining the impact of these two variables on the management of reintegration problems.

⁸⁴ UNDP 2006, p.47.

⁸⁵ This literature deals more generally with development agencies, inter-governmental organizations, and states and has not previously been applied to the specific context of DDR or reintegration.

⁸⁶ Of course, bureaucratic and systemic pressures are not the only factors that determine actors' capacity and preferences: their values and ideologies as expressed in their mission statements, charters, or other constitutive documents also play a large role. Rather, I am suggesting that capacity and preferences can not be interpreted in isolation of the powerful bureaucratic and systemic pressures that enable and constrain actor behavior.

Endogenous Pressures

Max Weber famously critiqued bureaucrats as 'specialists without spirit'⁸⁷. Political economy literature helps to explain why well-intentioned actors can behave inefficiently and in ways that undermine their objectives. The literature describes such behavior as 'bureaucratic dysfunction' and 'organizational pathology' because inefficiency and 'perverse incentives' result from the intra-agency and interactive behavior of actors as organizational bureaucracies.⁸⁸ These pressures tend to be overlooked by actors themselves, who are more likely to blame sub-optimal outcomes on lack of funding or on an unfriendly operating environment, and who are likely to see coordination problems not as endemic to their own institutional preference structures but as the result of lack of communication between actors.

Evidence of bureaucratic dysfunction covers several aspects of actor behavior and interaction, and can be helpful to explain patterns observed across reintegration programs. For example, actors can be expected to develop brands in order to maximize resources and expertise, which could explain why vocational training programs persist even though they tend not to achieve impressive employment placement results. Vocational training has become the brand of the ILO, GTZ, and several NGOs and is therefore likely to continue to form part of programs because post-conflict states are unlikely to say no to help offered.⁸⁹ More standard bureaucratic problems are also likely to be encountered, including the potential duplication of effort by multiple reintegration

⁸⁷ Max Weber, 'Bureaucracy,' in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978 [1930]), pp.181-3, cited in Barnett and Finnemore 1999, p.708.

⁸⁸ Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, pp.3,7-19; Barnett and Finnemore 1999, pp.715-25; March and Olsen 1989, chapter 5; Easterly 2002, pp.243-7; Ostrom et al. 2001, foreword,pp.2-4.

⁸⁹ Vocational training is also likely to persist regardless of results because it is easy for international reintegration actors to implement. This is due to the fact that vocational training does not require input, resources, or coordination from domestic actors. Other employment-related benefits require more local, political collaboration: agricultural assistance requires land allocation, education requires coordination with schools, and long term employment schemes such as apprenticeships and micro-credit require local partnerships with artisans or banks. Principal-agent problems anticipated in the political economy literature predict that organizations will gravitate toward programs where they can control the turf.

actors and failures to prioritize among several reintegration goals and between reintegration and other peace-building goals.

All endogenous pressures observed and relevant to case experience are analyzed but three pathologies in particular are likely to affect reintegration actors: *tacit collusion* (no reintegration actor risks visible failure and so all collude to produce programs that keep objectives humble, which eschews innovation and produces evaluations that mask failure or are self-justifying);⁹⁰ *adverse selection* (reintegration actors know more about reintegration than program beneficiaries do; this asymmetric information disadvantages beneficiaries and means that beneficiary expectations do not always match and usually exceed program aspirations); and *moral hazard* (reintegration actors are unlikely to be held to account for underachieving programs).

Collusion occurs because development actors have strong incentives to mask failure in order to continue to attract donor money, which arguably leads them to lower external expectations and internal aspirations about what programs can accomplish. This makes reintegration actors 'risk minimizers': they do not innovate because they fear visible negative results and so pursue uncontroversial positive ones. Fear of bad publicity keeps their objectives humble.⁹¹ Additionally, when confronted with overlapping or clashing preferences, actors will privilege the least controversial preferences to minimize risk and avoid inter-agency confrontation.⁹² Implicit log-rolling further contributes to under-performance. Actors log-roll when they support each other's programs in exchange for silence about program failures. Consequently, accurate assessment of actors suffers and in its place springs 'unconditional support for a myriad of development efforts', contributing to lack of focus and prioritization (what Easterly calls a 'Christmas tree of aims').⁹³

⁹⁰ Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, p.13; Easterly 2002, p.227.

⁹¹ Easterly 2002, p.231; Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, pp.13-4.

⁹² Barnett and Finnemore call this 'cultural contestation' (1999, pp.724-5).

⁹³ Easterly 2002, pp.229,246.

Lack of real competition also creates incentives for collusion between actors.⁹⁴ There is, of course, potential for competition in aid delivery (and in delivery of peace-building services; i.e., a state can opt not to ask for UN assistance as Angola chose after UNITA's collapse). To promote competition and therefore minimize incentives for collusion and other forms of bureaucratic inefficiency, Holthoefer and Snidal recommend regulatory oversight, 'horizontal competition' among donors, and 'bottom up' control whereby recipient states are given a stronger role in selecting among organizations and programs that best suit their needs.⁹⁵ Liberal theory assumes that some competition will occur between actors; one of its core assumptions is that actors 'organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests' because they are constrained by material scarcity, conflicting values, and different levels of power.⁹⁶ But as experience in the three cases shows, reintegration assistance is likely to be non-competitive even with numerous reintegration actors.

To an outside observer, different organizational approaches to reintegration have actually been remarkably similar: short term assistance organized around a combination of cash benefits and vocational training (with recent programs offering some agricultural support and education as well). The similarities between the World-Bank supported and NCDDR-led reintegration programs in Sierra Leone and the programs run by UNDP, USAID, GTZ, DFID, and the EU in Liberia are remarkable. In Sierra Leone, ex-combatants received six months of support while they participated in training, agricultural support, formal education, apprenticeships, and public works programs; in

⁹⁴ International organizations and aid bureaucracies are monopoly service providers that 'do not face the same degree of market feedback on their actions as private firms': the beneficiaries of programs have few opportunities to provide feedback and actors do not suffer 'adverse consequences if their "customers" are dissatisfied' (Easterly 2002, p.244). A 'broken feedback loop' further shields actors from criticism: those who pay for the aid are removed from those who receive it [Bertin Martens, Uwe Mummert, Peter Murrell, and Paul Seabright, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)].

⁹⁵ Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, pp.27-9.

⁹⁶ Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,' *International Organization*, Vol.51, No.4, Autumn 1997, pp.516-7.

Liberia, ex-combatants received eight months of support while they participated in the same five activities. Competition between actors, therefore, is a little like choosing between name-brand and generic-brand cereals.

The political economy approach predicts lack of competition in the provision of economic development aid. This is due in part because actors seek coordination in order to improve efficiency. Actors campaign collectively for aid revenues to realize economies of scale (the same occurs in the reintegration context, through coordinated fund-raising efforts of Multi-Donor Trust Funds). They also take advantage of inelastic demands for foreign aid from beneficiary states. In the reintegration context, cash-strapped, post-conflict states are unlikely to be picky about reintegration program duration and components because they have incentives to chase whatever aid money they can get.⁹⁷ But collusion also decreases incentives for efficiency by stifling innovation. Collusion keeps interventions focused on short term, immediate gains because as benefits become more diffuse donors' incentives to invest decrease.⁹⁸ This occurs because results are less visible and tangible over time and so actors have a harder time selling the need for continued donor support or packaging benefits for easy donor consumption. This is likely to impact the reintegration context because long term reintegration benefits are extremely diffuse as they are the result of gradual and complex social, economic, and political processes. How many guns were handed in, how many fighters were demobilized, or how many reintegration subsidies were paid are all easier to evaluate than how many fighters were 'reintegrated'. The literature also predicts that aid agencies have incentives to overvalue effectiveness or usefulness of existing projects in

⁹⁷ Easterly discusses aid chasing in the general development context (2002, p.246).

⁹⁸ Easterly 2002, p.244.

order to preserve the status quo, rather than risking a reduction of funds by engaging in risky new projects.⁹⁹

Finally, the presence of multiple reintegration actors reduces the probability of blame for any one actor and increases incentives for underachievement. In a permutation of the Stag Hunt, no reintegration actor wants to risk failure (and loss of donor funds) and so all embrace lesser success, conceiving reintegration as essentially a 'cooling off' period for ex-combatants rather than as sustainable investment in ex-combatants' future.¹⁰⁰ Reintegration actors pursue the rabbit because they fear that they will not catch the stag. Collusion is likely to relieve reintegration actors of any responsibility to effectively manage RPSRCs because they are free to delegate management to ill-defined 'political actors', or to defer creation of economic opportunities to the 'general development process'. Conveniently and not coincidentally, therefore, external actors are likely to defer both of my assessment tasks until after their exit from the post-conflict state.

In addition to collusion, adverse selection and moral hazard are also likely to contribute to bureaucratic dysfunction. In the political economy literature, adverse selection occurs when the 'seller' knows more about a product than the 'buyer'.¹⁰¹ The resulting asymmetry of information means that the seller can deliver faulty products inefficiently without the knowledge of the buyer. Actors need reliable monitoring mechanisms to overcome problems of asymmetrical information, since monitoring will build trust between the parties.¹⁰² Applying adverse selection to the reintegration context, reintegration actors (sellers) are likely to know more about reintegration programs than ex-combatant beneficiaries do (buyers). They may, for example, know that programs are designed to be short term, temporary, remedial efforts that are unlikely to lead to

⁹⁹ Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, p.14.

¹⁰⁰ For more on the Stag Hunt, see Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,' *World Politics*, Vol.30, No.2, January 1978, pp.167-8; and Kenneth W. Abbott, 'Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers,' *Yale Journal of International Law*, Vol.14, No.2, 1989, pp.368-71.

¹⁰¹ Ostrom et al. 2002, pp.33-5;

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p.35.

stable employment, or that vocational training is unlikely to lead to employment but rather is meant only to buy 'short term stabilization', to use UNDP's term. Problems with adverse selection mean that reintegration actors are likely to overstate the benefits of their programs (e.g., vocational training imparts valuable skills and raises ex-combatant confidence) and understate the costs (e.g., programs did nothing to counter massive unemployment among the ex-combatant population). This information could also lead reintegration actors to 'spoo' beneficiaries into accepting programs that may or may not be in their best long term interests.

Finally, accountability failures also produce moral hazard, where sub-optimal outcomes result because actors suffer no consequences for under-performance and may actually benefit from them. Moral hazard occurs when, after getting the contract, the performance of the aid agency can only be imperfectly observed, and so the aid agency exerts too little effort.¹⁰³ Ex-post evaluation can reduce incentives for moral hazard, since actors know that their subsequent actions will be carefully scrutinized. But as I argued in the introduction, ex-post evaluation rarely occurs in the years following withdrawal of peace-building support. This mirrors evaluation problems in the development context as well: for example, the World Bank reviews only five per cent of its loans after three to ten years.¹⁰⁴ External reintegration actors also show little interest in helping post-conflict states augment statistical capabilities to monitor ex-combatant employment after programs end.

Observing endogenous pressures is not easy. Actors are rarely conscious of bureaucratic dysfunction, let alone up-front about such behavior. Evidence of such pressures in the context of my assessment of the cases, therefore, did not come from respondent interviews but was observed from written evaluations of programs. In the case of Namibia and Mozambique, however,

¹⁰³ Easterly 2002, p.244.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p.228.

respondent interviews revealed instances where reintegration actors jumped on the bandwagon – i.e., they distanced themselves from unsuccessful programs and voiced support for successful ones even if they had opposed them prior to programs' failure. In Sierra Leone, program evaluations revealed gradual downgrading of expectations about the employment aspects of programs. Since the literature argues that collusion will yield visible documents and conferences rather than actual coordination and achievement, then the casting of errors and failures as 'lessons learned' regardless of whether the actor in question has demonstrated any learning of a particular lesson can be interpreted reasonably as evidence of tacit collusion. As can conferences about reintegration problems encountered (e.g., a 2005 seminar held in West Africa on regional DDR challenges) rather than evidence in subsequent interventions of actual problem management (e.g., absence of evidence that harmonization of reintegration packages occurred in West Africa even after problems associated with regional DDR emerged). The lack of consequences observed for actors in the wake of program failures also demonstrates the impact of endogenous pressures on actor behavior (i.e., that theories suggesting actors can get away with program failures without suffering adverse consequences are correct).

Exogenous Pressures

Exogenous pressures are the norms and attributes of the international and domestic system in which reintegration actors operate. Domestic pressures include the political, party, and constituent pressures on ruling elites that impact their governance of the post-conflict transition. The advent of multipartyism in 1990s sub-Saharan Africa (described by some as Africa's 'second liberation'¹⁰⁵ and itself the byproduct of local demands for change and internationally-imposed

¹⁰⁵ Larry Diamond, 'Introduction,' in Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Democratization in Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) p.ix; Adebayo O. Olukoshi, 'Economic Crisis, Multipartyism, and Opposition Politics in Contemporary Africa,' in Olukoshi, ed., *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998) p.8.

political conditionality) created competitive elections and with them the need for leaders to appeal to broad constituencies to maintain power. Combined, however, with leaders' residual governance habits that veer towards the monopolization and personalization of power and the ongoing construction of national identities, multipartyism also creates incentives for political elites to polarize and further fragment their populations and to capitalize on ethnic, regional, and religious resentments.¹⁰⁶ This governance dynamic has predictive implications for the reintegration process because it suggests that state actors are likely to have powerful incentives to polarize reintegration issues for political gain. If unchecked by some level of international mediation or front-end agreement, some theories of democratization predict that such polarization within post-conflict states can have serious consequences for reconciliation, regime legitimacy, and security.¹⁰⁷ Domestic political pressures also might create incentives for state actors to privilege quick impact policies that can be transferred into immediate political gain rather than embrace longer term policies whose political benefits may be more diffuse.

International pressures include the state-centric nature of post-conflict reconstruction and the normative tension associated with questions about international intervention: sovereignty, self-determination, consent, impartiality, and deference to state actors. International relations theory underscores that normative tension likely results between the desire, on the one hand, of peace-builders to augment capacity of states for 'good governance' to improve security and development and the tendency, on the other, of international systemic pressures to discourage external meddling, especially over a sustained period, in matters that are normally the domestic purview of

¹⁰⁶ Diamond 1999, pp.xxiii-xxiv; Célestin Monga, 'Eight Problems with African Politics,' pp.48-62 in Diamond and Plattner 1999; Olukoshi 1998, pp.8-10; Clapham 1996, p.4; Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) p.2; and Crawford Young, 'Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?' *World Politics*, Vol.54, No.4, 2002, pp.546,557.

¹⁰⁷ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War,' *International Security*, Vol. 20, 1995, pp.5-38; Jack L. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000).

states. The post-conflict state is one where political legitimacy of the new ruling government is likely to be weak and authority contested at all levels.¹⁰⁸ The preferences and practices of peace-builders derive from prevailing global norms that legitimize some development and security policies and involvement and de-legitimize others.¹⁰⁹ The normative climate is not fixed but shifts. There seems to be more legitimacy attached to international administration of post-conflict states in 2006 than there was in the years immediately after the end of the Cold War.¹¹⁰ In Sierra Leone, ruling elites welcome continuing British embedment in the Ministry of Defense whereas similar external involvement over such a long period of time – going on six years in Sierra Leone – would have been unfathomable and unacceptable for the FRELIMO government of Mozambique in 1994. Of course, there are also signs, following obstacles encountered in Afghanistan and concerns about continuing US occupation of Iraq, that a legal and normative environment previously more permissive of long term outside involvement may also be changing.¹¹¹ Therefore, the prevailing legal and normative climate can both enable and constrain international action.

¹⁰⁸ Chesterman et al. 2005.

¹⁰⁹ Johnstone argues that the UN's peace-building strategies have been shaped by the existing normative order (Ian Johnstone, 'US-UN Relations after Iraq: The End of the World (Order) as We Know It?', *European Journal of International Law*, Vol.15, No.4, 2004, pp.813-38). Paris contends that some forms of assistance, such as longer term trusteeship or international administration, may be more effective but are 'normatively unacceptable' to conventional alternatives (Roland Paris, 'Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.9, No.3, 2003, pp.441-73). Moravcsik (1997) argues that ideas, interests, and institutions of organizations order the security and development priorities of states, but Barnett and Finnemore (1999, p.726) argue that those organizations might not always order priorities correctly or efficiently.

¹¹⁰ Richard D. Caplan, *International Governance in War Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 'Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,' *International Security*, Vol.28, No.4, Spring 2004, pp.5-43; Robert O. Keohane, 'Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations of Sovereignty,' pp.275-98 in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Stephen Krasner, 'Shared Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,' *International Security*, Vol.29, No.2, 2004, pp.85-120; Stephen Krasner, 'The Case for Shared Sovereignty,' *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.16, No.1, January 2005, pp.69-83; and Johnstone, Ian, 'Peace Operations Literature Review,' Center on International Cooperation, Project on Transformation in Multilateral Security Institutions, Implications for the UN, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, August 2005.

¹¹¹ Simon Chesterman, 'Walking Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building,' *Survival*, Vol.44, No.3, Autumn 2002, p.37. See also UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General, *The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security*, 18 March 2002, A/56/875-S/2002/278, para.98.

Tension between external intervention and sovereignty limits the nature and duration of peace-building activity, with important implications for reintegration. Since reintegration involves decision-making about issues normally within the domestic jurisdiction of states (eligibility of ex-combatants for membership in new security institutions, the nature of post-conflict employment and reconstruction policies, etc.), international organizations managing reintegration programs have to skate a thin line between consent and intrusion. They are called on to balance provision of material assistance and technical expertise with the need to build local capacity and institutions following their inevitable withdrawal.

The difficulty with which outside actors achieve that balance is made more difficult by the likelihood that post-conflict states will be ill-equipped to 'own on their own'. Recognition of capacity problems in these states has led some to call for longer term external administration and for tinkering with institutional forms of external management to improve efficiency and sustainability of efforts.¹¹² In turn, the potential for more intrusive and longer term involvement by external actors has led to calls from some stakeholders, including post-conflict states, NGOs, and civil society organizations, for greater accountability and transparency on the part of intervening actors in exchange for their consent to a longer term, more intrusive international role.¹¹³ Those more sceptical of transitional administration by outside actors have stressed the need to ensure that international management is tied to efforts to provide realistic opportunities for popular, local input into external decisions.¹¹⁴

Pressures that determine intervention (sovereignty, self-determination, consent, impartiality, and deference to state actors) are all likely to have consequences for the capacity and

¹¹² Fearon and Laitin 2004; Keohane 2003; Krasner 2004; Krasner 2005.

¹¹³ Ngaire Woods, 'Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable,' *International Affairs*, Vol.77, No.1, January 2001, pp.83-100.

¹¹⁴ Chesterman 2004.

preferences of reintegration actors and therefore their ability to manage reintegration problems. First, where normative tension about these issues is high, external actors are unlikely to make political decisions about the contours of reintegration assistance packages out of deference to state actors sensitive about external actors' intervention. This can have adverse effects if, for example, ruling elites renege on promises to distribute benefits equitably. Second, deference to state actors during peace-building will likely deter external actors from managing problems tied to spoiler activity (because spoiler activity is classed as a 'law and order' issue for the new state to manage and not a 'security' issue for peacekeepers or external actors to resolve). Post-conflict states, however, are unlikely to have the capacity (e.g., law enforcement and judiciary resources) to counter spoiler activity and so such activity may persist in a vacuum of non-action by ill-equipped states and their sovereignty-conscious patrons. Third, the state-centric nature of peace-building assistance is likely to leave reintegration actors ill-equipped to cope with regional and transnational challenges. Reintegration mandates normally cover only state-centered programs, so actors will struggle to adapt programs to the needs of regional conflict dynamics. Since the reintegration of ex-combatants increasingly occurs in conflict areas that impact whole regions rather than individual states (e.g., West Africa and the Greater Great Lakes), the neglect of regional dynamics in programs is likely to exacerbate security threats.¹¹⁵

The influence of exogenous pressures is more explicit, and therefore easier to observe, than that of endogenous pressures. As the case chapters show, I found evidence of polarization of reintegration issues and allegations of preferential treatment based on ethnicity, party affiliation, and regional provenance across the three states. I gauged the impact of domestic pressures by triangulating respondents' assessments of the political motives of post-conflict state leaders, and

¹¹⁵ UNSC, 'Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ways to Combat Subregional and Cross-Border Problems in West Africa,' S/2005/86, 11 February 2005.

observed constituent pressures through the prism of ex-combatant protests and through surveys of community reaction to fighters' grievances. To assess the impact of systemic constraints, I asked actors about their own understanding of their reintegration role and their interpretations of the way in which concerns about intruding into states' domestic policies may have limited that role. UN reports, reintegration program evaluations, and secondary literature about the nature of other peace-building efforts (i.e., whether they were extensive or limited; whether program duration was short or long term, etc.) also shed light on perceptions about the way in which the legal and normative structure enabled and constrained reintegration actors.

In this chapter, I set out to explain the increased international involvement with, and prioritization of, ex-combatant reintegration in the post-Cold War world. Section one did so by arguing that strategic thinking about coordinated, international reintegration assistance is tied to the nature of intrastate conflict and expanded international role in conducting peace-building tasks. Section two discussed the proliferation of reintegration actors as a major consequence of increased international commitment to DDR and outlined the evolution of United Nations, World Bank, and other actor involvement with reintegration efforts.

This chapter also set out to draw inferences from the literature on political economy and international relations theory about the impact that bureaucratic and systemic pressures are likely to have on the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors (impact which will, in turn, determine how actors manage, or fail to manage, RPSRCs). To do so, section three isolated patterns emerging from reintegration interventions of the past 15-20 years related to program funding, legitimacy, objectives, and mechanics. Finally, section four argued that endogenous

pressures created several incentives that risk bureaucratic efficiency. It also argued that exogenous domestic pressures created a dynamic of governance that is likely to lead state actors to polarize reintegration issues and exogenous international pressures created tension between post-conflict states and their external patrons about sovereignty and other normative issues that are likely to impact the ability of international actors to manage reintegration problems.

The case studies that follow assess the explanatory power of this literature and place into sharper focus the themes highlighted in the last section of this chapter: potential incentives for bureaucratic dysfunction, opportunities for state actors to polarize the reintegration process, and the way in which international and state actors address normative tension over issues such as sovereignty. The cases, however, will explore those themes in the context of the RPSRCs observed to persist in each case and the way in which the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors contribute to explanations of RPSRC persistence.

II. Namibia

Namibia's transition to independence under United Nations was the *cause célèbre* for post-Cold War euphoria about a 'new world order'. The idea that agreement could be negotiated in an area of previously intractable conflict, that the UN could facilitate a war-torn country's transition to peaceful and democratic elections, and that a combination of commitments on paper and blue helmets on the streets could help peace to stick became not just a description of the Namibian process itself but a creed signaling belief in the ability of the UN to manage conflict in the post-Cold War world. Sir Marrack Goulding, the UN's Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from 1986 to 1993, wrote in his 2003 memoir: 'The Namibia operation... was to be of great importance in the evolution of the UN's new role, for it was a conspicuous success and set high standards which few subsequent operations could match'.¹

Aspects of Namibia's transition are certainly conspicuous in their success. Where neighboring Zimbabwe has all but collapsed, Namibia's post-war path boasts an absence of renewed conflict, a commitment on the part of the ruling government to 'economic pragmatism'², and steadfast support for a policy of national reconciliation. One aspect of Namibia's post-conflict trajectory, however, has been consistently problematic: the reintegration of its ex-combatants. Infected with the same optimism that gripped its international supporters, Namibia assumed that the reintegration of combatants from either side of the conflict would be spontaneous. The

¹ Marrack Goulding, *Peacemonger*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, p.139. This prognosis is widely shared. For example, a 2002 article in *International Peacekeeping* called the UN's operation in Namibia 'arguably the most successful multidimensional peacekeeping operation in its history' (Lise Morjé Howard, 'UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.9, No.1, Spring 2002, p.99).

² Colletta et al. 1996, p.127. In the Namibian context, this means commitment to market capitalism and a policy of gradualism in approaching economic reforms such as income and land distribution and affirmative action employment policies.

international community did not disagree, due in part to strong normative pressures to respect the sovereignty of the newly-independent Namibian state. Initially, therefore, no targeted programs were designed or implemented. Reintegration did not appear in Security Council resolutions pertaining to Namibia, nor did it form a part of the UN mission there (the UN Transition Assistance Group, or UNTAG). When spontaneous reintegration did not occur, the government's response to continuing reintegration problems was an ad hoc scramble to address the demands of angry ex-combatants who by then had begun to stage frequent and sometimes violent demonstrations against the government. Far from a planned or strategic program response, reintegration in Namibia was an issue that ex-combatants forced on an unwilling patron.

Reintegration remains a politically sensitive topic in Namibia, and comprehensive public data are scarce. With notable exceptions³, few studies have evaluated the reintegration initiatives Namibia implemented between 1990 and 1998. This is the first assessment of ex-combatant reintegration in Namibia to chronicle the reintegration programs that the Namibian government implemented after 1998 and to interview all of the government officials significantly involved in designing those programs. What the data reveal is an approach to reintegration very different from the standard DDR package on offer in other post-conflict states, one which ultimately opted to give jobs to all unemployed ex-combatants in the public sector.

Namibia's RPSRCs came in two installments. First, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) government considered persistent unemployment among ex-combatants and the protests it caused as major threats to post-conflict security and to its own legitimacy to govern. Its post-1998 programs successfully employed large numbers of ex-combatants and

³ Rosemary Preston's 1993 study is the most comprehensive, and includes a detailed socio-economic profile of former combatants from both sides (*The Integration of Returned Exiles, Former Combatants, and Other War-Affected Namibians*, Windhoek, Namibian Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Namibia, 1993). Also, the two World Bank studies on DDR in 1993 and 1996 focus much attention on Namibia. The 1993 study criticizes the

thereby eliminated protests. As a result, the government concluded that its reintegration problems were over. In reality, its approach created a second set of problems. First, its unequal treatment of beneficiaries exacerbated already-existing ethnic cleavages and tensions between political groups. Second, the Office of the President and Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed a paramilitary force outside of the civilian control of the Ministry of Defense which employs mostly ex-combatants loyal to the ruling party.

In this chapter, I argue that although such problems have undermined democratization and reconciliation in Namibia, they do not constitute threats to the security of Namibia's people or to the viability of its institutions, nor do they threaten a return to war or regional security. This is not to say that initial violence due to poor DDR planning did not constitute serious threats to security but rather that the RPSRCs that have persisted over time in Namibia did not continue to threaten security there. I investigate scenarios, however, under which RPSRCs could snowball into bigger security threats but these are unlikely to occur. While the SWAPO government's approach to reintegration was not without design and implementation flaws that it could have avoided, most post-conflict states would gladly trade places with Namibia when it comes to the way in which the government created economic opportunities and managed the RPSRCs it assessed as threatening (e.g., persistent unemployment and recurring protests).

I also argue that the case of ex-combatant reintegration in Namibia demonstrates how state actors are likely to behave in the absence of international involvement with reintegration programs, and how domestic political (i.e., exogenous) pressures are likely to contribute to the persistence of reintegration problems. Those pressures, coupled with the absence of international involvement, exacerbated incentives for government elites to polarize reintegration issues.

absence of planned reintegration programs, and the 1996 study focuses on the shortcomings and lessons of Namibia's mid-1990s program responses: the Development Brigades, a severance pay scheme, and resettlement projects.

However, those same pressures also forced the government to manage reintegration problems through a long term approach that, albeit through trial and error, produced innovation in programming and created sustainable economic opportunities for many of the country's former fighters.

This chapter begins with an overview of the Namibian conflict and analyzes the initial demobilization provisions made for the country's combatants and the first and second waves of reintegration programs that the government implemented. Then, the chapter identifies RPSRCs that significantly impacted security in Namibia. Finally, it isolates the role of government reintegration actors in ameliorating or exacerbating these problems and analyzes the way in which actors' capacity and preferences both enabled and constrained their ability to effectively manage them.

I. Conflict and Peace, 1966-1989

For 23 years, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the armed wing of SWAPO, fought against South African-sponsored forces. These included the South African Defense Force (SADF), the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF),⁴ the South West African Police (SWAPOL), and SWAPOL's Counter Insurgency Unit, a paramilitary unit whose members were popularly referred to as Koevoet (or 'crowbar' in Afrikaans). The duration of the Namibian war, and the way in which it was waged and concluded, had a significant impact on the demobilization and reintegration of combatants. The history of Namibian independence as an

⁴ SWATF grew out of the armed bodyguard units, called 'omakakunya' or 'scavengers', that traditional leaders in northern Namibia had, with South African encouragement, formed beginning in 1974. Formally constituted in 1979, SWATF comprised, by the end of the war, eight full-time battalions.

international issue of concern, as well as the particular Cold War dynamics that played out in southern Africa, influenced the decisions made about the country's transition to majority rule and, consequently, the treatment of ex-combatants in the new Namibian state.

The Settlement Proposal that eventually governed Namibia's post-war transition grew out of a long history of international involvement with the area. Formerly a German colony, Namibia (then South West Africa) was administered by South Africa as a League of Nations Mandate following Germany's defeat in World War I. Continuous complaints and petitions from South West Africa's black population, growing international disapproval for South Africa's application of apartheid policies to the territory, and South Africa's refusal to conclude a trusteeship agreement with the UN as the League's successor (instead, South Africa sought to incorporate South West Africa into its own territory as a fifth province), led first to a series of advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice and later to General Assembly and Security Council action.

SWAPO, led by Namibians in exile but enjoying critical support inside and outside of Namibia proper, had initially avoided armed struggle with South Africa, pinning its hopes on the suit brought by Ethiopia and Liberia before the ICJ to challenge continued South African administration of South West Africa. Once the ICJ, in a divided opinion, ruled that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked standing for the court to provide a remedy, SWAPO, in July of 1966, decided to employ 'all possible means', including armed struggle, to obtain independence.⁵ Armed conflict between SWAPO and South African forces continued until 1989, killing 11,291 PLAN fighters, 715 South African and South African-supported fighters, and an estimated 2000 civilians.⁶

Throughout the conflict, SWAPO pursued a diplomatic strategy parallel to its military one to gain international support, and found the UN to be a receptive audience. The General Assembly

⁵ Susan Brown, 'Diplomacy by Other Means: SWAPO's Liberation War,' in Colin Leys and John S. Saul, eds., *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*, London, James Currey, 1995, p.20.

voted in 1966 to revoke the South African mandate and create the UN Council for South West Africa (the Assembly later voted to adopt the name 'Namibia' in 1968) to administer the area until independence.⁷ In 1969 the Security Council endorsed these General Assembly decisions and, in 1970, confirmed the illegality of South Africa's continued administration of the territory.⁸ On 29 June 1971 the ICJ weighed in again, confirming the General Assembly's revocation of the South African mandate, and further ruling that South Africa must withdraw from the territory and that UN member states must not support South Africa in Namibia.

In 1976, the Security Council passed Resolution 385, which called for 'withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations.'⁹ Resolution 385 also announced the primary objective of the UN in Namibia, one that would be repeated in subsequent resolutions: to 'ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations'.¹⁰ Passage of 385 prompted Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States to hold proximity talks in February 1978 with South Africa, SWAPO, and representatives of the Front-Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia). These talks produced the 'Proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation' (Settlement Proposal), which was presented to the Security Council in April of that year.

The Settlement Proposal stipulated that South Africa, through its Administrator-General, administer elections for the territory, but under UN monitoring and control. The Proposal also set

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.37. These numbers are official South African tallies. SWAPO did not keep estimates of its own.

⁷ UN GAR 2145 (XXI), 27 October 1966; UN GAR 2248 (S-V), 19 May 1967.

⁸ UN SCR 264, 20 March 1969, S/RES/264 (1969); UN SCR 269, 12 August 1969, S/RES/269 (1969); UN SCR 276, 30 January 1970, S/RES/276 (1970).

⁹ UN SCR 385, 30 January 1976, S/RES/385 (1976).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

up a timetable for the withdrawal of South African forces and the demobilization of PLAN fighters.¹¹ Following the appointment by the Security Council of a Special Representative for Namibia, Martti Ahtisaari of Finland, and the receipt of a report from the UN Secretary-General detailing the resources required to implement the Proposal, the Security Council adopted Resolution 435, which became the authorization for UNTAG and reiterated the Council's demand for South African military withdrawal, UN administrative control over the territory, and the holding of democratic elections.¹²

But implementation of Resolution 435 would have to wait another decade, as independence for Namibia fell prey to superpower politics. South Africa, with the blessing of the US, coupled Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. While the Cubans and the Soviets saw Cuban presence in Angola as justified by the South African invasion in 1975 in pursuit of SWAPO fighters afforded safe haven there, the US viewed the move as a communist power-play to infiltrate southern Africa. Chester Crocker, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, articulated what America called 'constructive engagement' towards South Africa with these words in 1981: 'The West should back UNITA until such time that the MPLA is prepared to negotiate and expel the communist forces from Angola. Namibia, according to this argument, is a separate and less important issue'.¹³ Although the UN never endorsed linkage of implementation of Resolution 435 to withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, US linkage of the two effectively deadlocked the process. With vintage Cold War era understatement, the UN Secretary-General reported, 'Factors which lie outside the scope of SCR 435' were stalling implementation.¹⁴

¹¹ It was not until passage of UN SCR 629 that demands were made for the demobilization of the South-African sponsored SWATF forces, as they were established in 1979 after passage of Resolution 435 (UN SCR 629, 16 January 1989, S/RES/629 (1989)).

¹² UN SCR 431, 27 July 1978, S/RES/431 (1978); UN SCR 435 (on the situation in Namibia), 29 September 1978, S/RES/435 (1978).

¹³ Quoted in Brown 1995, p.33.

¹⁴ UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General, 19 May 1983, S/15776.

It was not until December 1988 that Angola, Cuba, and South Africa concluded a peace agreement, at last making implementation of Resolution 435 possible.¹⁵ The Security Council, welcoming the agreement, set 1 April 1989 as the start-day for UNTAG (what the UN and others called 'D-Day').¹⁶ One month later, on 16 February 1989, the Council passed Resolution 632, which at long last implemented 435 'in its original and definitive form', effectively endorsing a 12-month timetable for UNTAG to complete its military and administrative tasks ahead of elections.¹⁷ A separate mission was established, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), to verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.¹⁸

The long conclusion to the Namibian conflict and the considerable international attention given to it significantly influenced the design and implementation of DDR in Namibia. The Settlement Proposal and Resolution 435 had governed the peace process in Namibia for years. This was an advantage in that parties could not easily back out of commitments to which they had agreed for such a long time, but this also meant that the Settlement Proposal could not be easily adapted to new realities, and particularly to the growing sense that demobilization and reintegration of fighting forces were key elements of a conflict-to-peace transition. Additionally, the overriding focus and objective of UN and international involvement in Namibia was, as stated earlier, the 'early independence of Namibia through free elections', and all other elements of the transition were seen as means to accomplish elections as an end in themselves.

¹⁵ Several developments contributed to an atmosphere favorable to negotiation and agreement: military stalemate in Angola following the battle of Cuito Cuanevale in 1988; large costs to South Africa because of its continued support of military operations in the region; the effect of anti-apartheid international economic sanctions; the ousting of the Botha administration in South Africa; Soviet pressure on the African National Congress to back away from a strategy of armed struggle; and the mobilization of pro-independence church groups, students, and workers in Namibia (Howard 2002, p.102).

¹⁶ UN SCR 629. South Africa, Cuba, and Angola had previously agreed on this date in signing the Brazzaville Protocol.

¹⁷ UN SCR 632, 16 February 1989, S/RES/632 (1989).

¹⁸ UN SCR 626, 20 December 1988, S/RES/626 (1988).

The Security Council's focus on elections was a product of its own belief, reflecting the liberal democratic assumptions of many of its dominant member states, that elections were central to satisfy post-conflict security, but those assumptions also led to the operational assumption that elections were enough. Overemphasizing elections is a habit that UN operations still have a difficult time shaking, although thinking has evolved as demonstrated by the UN's decision to tie withdrawal in Sierra Leone to benchmarks in addition to elections.¹⁹ Additionally, the Cold War dimension of the conflict focused attention on interstate rivalries between the superpowers and countries in the region, which overshadowed the need for external investment in peace-building because the issue for the FLS was freedom from superpower meddling and safeguarding Namibian sovereignty.

Most importantly, reintegration was not an issue for the UN, the Contact Group, or the FLS. It was assumed that agreement between Cold War patrons and South Africa would be enough to pave for the way for the repatriation of SWAPO into Namibia and their reintegration once they got there. Significantly, no Namibian party signed the peace agreement that Angola, Cuba, and South Africa negotiated, meaning that the need to reintegrate PLAN combatants was not at the top of the agenda. Primarily, the reintegration of combatants was at the time a new concept (as indeed complex peacekeeping operations were as well) so it should not come as a surprise that reintegration programs were not anticipated as part of UNTAG's mandate. As chapter one demonstrated, thinking about DDR evolved throughout the 1990s; in 1989 thinking about reintegration had not yet occurred (the UN's first contribution to reintegration occurred with the ONUSAL mission in 1991). This was confirmed in correspondence with former Under-Secretary-General Goulding, who wrote, '[UN involvement in Namibia] took place nearly 15 years ago and I

¹⁹ That thinking has also been codified in operational and policy documents; e.g., the ICISS's recommendation that intervening actors stay on 'long enough to ensure sustainable reconstruction and rehabilitation' (ICISS 2001, 5.25)

do not recall having been informed or consulted about reintegration of former combatants.’²⁰

Finally, as interviews with several SWAPO officials confirmed, Namibian parties to the conflict did not raise the issue, believing that spontaneous reintegration would occur.

The conflict also ignited tensions *within* SWAPO that would complicate reintegration later, emphasizing the political dimension of DDR. These tensions include the treatment of SWAPO dissidents during the war, the perception of different treatment for PLAN fighters versus other SWAPO members in exile, and the perception of ethnic favoritism within the party. During the war, SWAPO detained, interrogated, and occasionally tortured and executed dissidents under suspicion that they were traitors to the movement.²¹ Harsh treatment of these SWAPO dissidents is still a painful chapter in the history of the party, and one that influenced reintegration of former PLAN fighters since ex-SWAPO dissidents charged SWAPO with discriminatory treatment in accessing reintegration programs and benefits.²² Second, throughout its period in exile SWAPO’s leadership sent many non-PLAN exiles abroad to receive educational and other skills training deemed valuable, leaving those that conducted the actual military conflict against South African forces with a lower level of education at the war’s end, which made them less competitive for jobs and led SWAPO to favor higher-skilled non-PLAN exiles for government positions. Third, many respondents pointed to the ethnic composition of SWAPO’s leadership as being mostly Kwanyama speakers hailing from Ovamboland in the north of Namibia, and widespread perceptions inside and outside SWAPO of ethnic favoritism fueled resentment among former fighters who felt they did not benefit from peace. These residual effects of the Namibian conflict had a significant impact on the reintegration of the state’s ex-combatants and will be analyzed in more detail below.

²⁰ Author’s email correspondence with Sir Marrack Goulding, former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, 27 September 2004.

²¹ Brown 1995.

II. UNTAG, Demobilization, and 'Spontaneous Reintegration', 1989-1991

Early decisions about demobilization and reintegration further contributed to Namibia's first installment of RPSRCs. These decisions were the result of UN inexperience with DDR and of political underestimation of the reintegration challenge by SWAPO leaders.

UNTAG was the first post-Cold War mission for the UN, and the most complex undertaken at the time.²³ The mission's demobilization role was extensive. It called for the staged withdrawal of SADF forces, the dismantling of SWATF units and of South African-sponsored commando, citizen, and ethnic forces, the disarmament and repatriation of PLAN fighters. It also called for the monitoring of SWAPOL which, unlike the military structures of South West Africa, would not be disbanded but rather gradually would transition into the Namibian Police (NAMPOL).

Disagreements about force size between the Security Council, worried about the unprecedented cost and size of the mission, and SWAPO, the Front Lines States (FLS), the Organization for African Unity (OAU), and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, who all vehemently objected to any force reductions, led to delays in the deployment of the force. Delays meant the UN was under-equipped when violence erupted between SWAPO and South African-sponsored forces on the mission's first day.

On that day ('D-Day'), 1 April 1989, the South African Administrator-General informed the UN Special Representative that heavily armed PLAN fighters in combat formation had crossed the

²² Author's interview with Phil Ya Nangoloh, Executive Director of the National Society for Human Rights, Windhoek, 3 September 2003.

²³ Oliver Ramsbotham, 'Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.7, No.1, Spring 2000, p.177.

border from Angola.²⁴ South Africa accused SWAPO of violating the ceasefire, maintained that SWAPOL units in the area could not contain the crisis, and asked UNTAG for permission to release SADF forces from their confinement to base in order to respond to the incursion. South Africa's Foreign Minister told the UN Secretary-General that if the UN's mission could not contain the situation, his government would deploy its own troops to do so. This created a dilemma for the UN. The Settlement Plan made no specific mention of the demobilization of ex-combatants other than that SWAPO exiles and PLAN fighters would return peacefully to Namibia through designated entry points.²⁵ There was still confusion about whether the Angolan government or UNTAG forces would administer SWAPO camps in southern Angola, to disarm fighters and facilitate repatriation. Although a 1982 agreement provided for UNTAG monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia, the details of the demobilization process were vague. This may have encouraged SWAPO's leaders to order some fighters across the border in an attempt to establish a presence in the north of the country, something that Sam Nujoma, the party's leader, always maintained that SWAPO already had. SWAPO could also point to the original UN peace plan, which provided for the confinement of PLAN troops to bases both inside and outside of Namibia.²⁶ In other words, the Settlement Plan did not make any reference to confinement to bases in any *specific* place. SWAPO may have also been under pressure from Angola, which wanted the organization out as soon as possible.²⁷ Because UNTAG had not fully deployed its military personnel, it was unable to verify the South African charges, nor could it competently contain the crisis because it had no troops in the north. It ultimately granted South Africa's request but urged restraint.

²⁴ For a full account of the D-Day crisis, see UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Namibia,' 3 April 1989; Goulding 2003, pp.148-59; and Cedric Thornberry, *A Nation Is Born: The Inside Story of Namibia's Independence* (Windhoek: Gamsberg MacMillan Publishers, 2004a) pp.131-140.

²⁵ Goulding 2003, p.140.

²⁶ Howard 2002, p.109.

²⁷ Thornberry 2004a, p.87.

South Africa's response showed more brutality than restraint.²⁸ Bloody clashes between the two sides resulted in the deaths of more than 300, the majority from PLAN.²⁹ Violence on that scale had not been seen for many years in the Namibian conflict. SWAPO denied that it had violated the ceasefire and insisted that the PLAN fighters were simply crossing over into Namibia to implement 435, seek out UNTAG personnel, and voluntarily disarm. The violence ended one week later with the Mount Etjo Declaration, which provided for the movement of PLAN back to Angola with UN protection. Unfortunately, the vast majority of PLAN fighters in northern Namibia made their own way back across the border, without UN assistance, and further clashes occurred.

Blame for the D-Day violence is shared. SWAPO incursions into Namibia were clearly a violation of the ceasefire agreement. Before the crisis, the UN Secretary-General sent letters to SWAPO and South Africa, requesting each to confirm in writing by 22 March 1989 acceptance of the terms of the ceasefire and to state that each had taken all necessary measures to cease all warlike acts and operations. These specifically included tactical movements, cross-border movements and all acts of violence and intimidation. SWAPO accepted the proposal on 18 March 1989, and South Africa accepted on 21 March 1989. As Goulding notes, however, the permanent members of the Security Council are also to blame, as their last minute decision to effect a troop size reduction delayed deployment and forced the UN to outsource security to one of the parties to the conflict.³⁰ It is questionable, however, whether UNTAG, even fully deployed, was equipped to stand between the two armies during armed confrontation.³¹ Ahtisaari has said that UNTAG was not organized to perform such a task, and that outsourcing the job to the SADF may have helped to win South African confidence in the process and encourage the South Africans to be more willing

²⁸ Lionel Cliffe, Ray Bush, Jenny Lindsay, and Brian Mokopagosi, *The Transition to Independence in Namibia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994) p.85.

²⁹ Figures have varied, and some writers have been purposefully vague as the subject is still a politically sensitive one. The 300 figure comes from Thornberry 2004b, p.416.

to compromise with UNTAG thereafter.³² South Africa, for its part, acted contrary to the UN's instructions: it remobilized Koevoet units in addition to SADF, and its forces responded with excess violence and brutality. As Thornberry argues, SWAPO's clear violation of the ceasefire does not justify the conduct of South African military and police forces after the SWAPO incursions.³³ In the end, UNTAG contained the crisis and arguably increased its leverage in the peace process by coordinating 'triangular discussions' among SWAPO, South Africa, and itself, leaving 'its role as a conciliator and facilitator... unchallenged.'³⁴

The authors cited above, in analyzing the D-Day violence, focus mainly on the intentions of the warring parties and the failure of the UN to have troops on the ground at the time to act as a buffer between fighting forces. Regardless of how blame is assessed, however, the violence is also the direct result of a confused DDR process. Had the Settlement Proposal and subsequent Security Council resolutions articulated a formal DDR process, the D-Day behavior of the conflict parties could have differed, mitigating much of the harm or, at the very least, removing any justification for SWAPO's decision to have troops cross over into Namibia. DDR details, especially when and where PLAN fighters were to disarm and demobilize, were left unspecified by the peace process. This created confusion that each side was able to exploit, with SWAPO ordering thousands of PLAN fighters across the border in order to consolidate its position during the run-up to elections and with South Africa neglecting to curb the brutality of its troops' response.

The D-Day violence negatively impacted the demobilization and reintegration process that was to follow. First, the initial decision to let some PLAN fighters who had crossed the border to

³⁰ Goulding 2003, p.158.

³¹ Thornberry 2004a, p.140.

³² Howard 2002, p.110.

³³ Thornberry 2004a, p.139.

³⁴ David Cox, 'Peacemaking and Disarmament: Peace Agreements, Security Council Mandates, and the Disarmament Experience,' in UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues* (Geneva: UNIDIR, 1996) p.84.

relinquish their weapons and return home as civilians complicated the identification of ex-combatants for reintegration programs later on. Second, SWAPO decided to keep a 'reserve army' of an estimated 10,000 fighters hidden in camps in southern Angola, possibly hedging its bets in the wake of D-Day violence should the peace process collapse.³⁵ These individuals returned to Namibia unmonitored after the final South African withdrawal at the time of elections in late November 1989. That such a large number of combatants demobilized outside of formal frameworks made verification of their status difficult once the government decided to implement reintegration programs.

The re-mobilization of Koevoet units after D-Day events also had a negative impact on DDR and caused considerable violence. Known for their brutality throughout the war, their redeployment led the Security Council to demand their immediate disbandment.³⁶ To subvert that demobilization, South Africa transferred about 2000 of the 3000 total Koevoet into SWAPOL. Subsequent reports of violence and intimidation from Koevoet elements within SWAPOL mounted. This prompted the UN to add civilian police (CIVPOL) forces to the UNTAG mission to monitor SWAPOL activities and discourage the recruitment of additional Koevoet into regular SWAPOL units. In the face of mounting pressure from the Security Council and UNTAG, the South African Foreign Minister announced on 28 September 1989 the disbanding of 1200 Koevoet personnel and of another 400 one month later. Although South Africa also decided to remove all Koevoet from SWAPOL, the problem did not end there. There was no provision for the transportation of demobilized Koevoet away from their former areas of operation, nor was there any plan for their reintegration. As a result, demobilized Koevoet continued to intimidate the population in the north of the country and contributed to significant problems with law and order. For Koevoet (and for

³⁵ Colletta et al. 1996, p.132.

³⁶ UN SCR 640, 29 August 1989, S/RES/640 (1989).

SWATF) fighters, lack of demobilization follow-up meant that the chain of command, though officially severed, continued informally as units were not dispersed, often retained their camouflage and small weapons, and maintained contact with their commanders.

There were snags in the plan to disarm ex-combatants as well. The good news was that UNTAG guarded heavy weaponry, arms, ammunition, and other military equipment in drill halls, and South African troops – accompanied by UNTAG monitors – transported most of this material across the border to South Africa.³⁷ The bad news was that small arms were not monitored with the same care. Combatants from both sides continued to hold on to semi-automatic weapons after their demobilization, and other war material remained buried or hidden in arms caches created before and during the transitional period. UNTAG lacked a procedure for the collection of small arms. The mission's Force Commander argued that such a procedure would have been labor-intensive for the mission, and that UNTAG lacked the resources and personnel to staff collection points.³⁸ The new Namibian government announced an amnesty period for the surrender of illegal and unlicensed weapons following independence, and later extended it, after which time the government established heavy penalties for unauthorized possession of weapons.³⁹ Only a small fraction of the anticipated weapons in circulation was handed in, and Namibians generally believe that these arms are still held by some within the population.⁴⁰ Assumptions by many observers are that many weapons made their way to Angola and fueled conflict there. The impact of residual disarmament problems, however, has been negligible thus far on security in Namibia. Nevertheless, a plan for reintegration could have mitigated the regional impact of disarmament

³⁷ UN, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, New York, UN Department of Information, 1996, p.221; Howard, 'UN Peace Implementation in Namibia,' p.116.

³⁸ Prem Chand, in Weiland Heribert and Matthew Braham, eds., *The Namibian Peace Process: Implications and Lessons for the Future*, Freiburg, Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, 1994, p.99.

³⁹ World Bank 1993, p.30.

⁴⁰ Howard 2002, p.116.

problems: more individuals from all sides might have been more likely to hand in weapons had the UN and party leaders designed and communicated some form of provision for fighters' future.

On the demobilization side, the SADF forces had returned to South Africa and SWATF battalions and 1600 of 3000 Koevoet had demobilized by November 1989, with the remaining Koevoet gradually phased out of SWAPOL. In addition to the demobilization of South Africa's regular forces, 11,578 irregular forces, called 'commando, citizen, and ethnic' forces, were demobilized prior to elections in November 1989.⁴¹ Members of these forces, like irregular forces in Mozambique but unlike militias in Sierra Leone, were not eligible for support under subsequent reintegration programs.

PLAN fighters reported to bases in Angola, where they disarmed and were, along with all non-combatant SWAPO exiles, repatriated into Namibia by UNHCR. In total, UNHCR repatriated 42,736 SWAPO refugees to Namibia as civilians without distinguishing between those who fought as combatants and those who did not. This reflected the assumption that combatants did not require tailored reintegration programs to facilitate their return to Namibia. UNHCR and UNTAG's failure to distinguish between the two groups was an oversight that made it difficult to verify the combatant status of individuals once the Namibian government decided to design and implement targeted reintegration programs. Complicating identification and verification further, SWAPO did not keep official records of its combatants, nor did it disclose information it did have about unit locations and organization.⁴² The result: PLAN's demobilization was subsumed within the broader repatriation process for all SWAPO exiles.

The South West African Ministry of Defense estimated the number of PLAN combatants (including the PLAN combatants who remained in Angola as a reserve army) at 32,000. Not

⁴¹ Colletta et al. 1996, p.141.

⁴² Chand 1994, p.93.

counting the roughly 35,000 SADF troops who withdrew to South Africa, the total number of demobilized ex-combatants facing reintegration as civilians into the newly independent Namibia was 57,000 (32,000 PLAN and 25,000 SWATF, including 3000 Koevoet and 2000 San trackers).⁴³ Of this number, 7500 were remobilized into Namibia's new security forces: 6500 into the Namibian Defense Force (NDF) and 1000 into NAMPOL. Recruitment into these forces focused on the most competent and articulate, because it was assumed that these individuals would prove to be the most dangerous or likely to pursue subversive activity if left unemployed.⁴⁴ Even though the intent was to balance recruitment into the NDF and NAMPOL from the two sides, only 10% of the NDF was drawn from ex-South African forces, with only 700 of 30,000 ex-SWATF fighters integrated into the new army.⁴⁵ Their exclusion reinforced the economic and political marginalization of ex-SWATF in post-independence Namibia. Additionally, no Koevoet were recruited. Female combatants initially were not allowed to join the new defense force either, which is significant given that females may have constituted up to 30% of the PLAN force (though many of these are unlikely to have engaged in actual combat and were more likely to have been involved in support activities).⁴⁶ This decision was later reversed after protests, but female recruits were rarely promoted; by 1993 none was above the rank of major.⁴⁷

The dismantling of South African security forces and the repatriation of exiles and PLAN fighters occurred before Namibia's UN-supervised elections on 11 November 1989. The elections went smoothly. SWAPO won 41 of the Constituent Assembly's 72 seats, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance won 21, and five of the remaining eight political parties on the ballot split the remaining ten

⁴³ These numbers are based on Ministry of Defense estimates during the South African administration of Namibia, and on data collected by the World Bank for its study of DDR in Namibia (Colletta et al. 1996, p.131).

⁴⁴ Laurie Nathan, 'Marching to a Different Drum: A Description and Assessment of the Formation of the Namibian Defense Force and Police,' *Southern African Perspectives*, No.4, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1990.

⁴⁵ Preston 1993, 10.13, 10.27.

⁴⁶ World Bank 1993, p.52; Colletta et al. p.133; and, *Namibian*, 'Women Sidelined by Defense Men,' 26 April 1990.

seats. After its new constitution was adopted and after decades of waiting, Namibia achieved independence on 21 March 1990.

III. From Spontaneous Reintegration to Targeted Assistance, 1989-1991

The demobilization of the various fighting forces complete, the SWAPO government assumed that generalized development assistance would be enough to address the needs of the ex-combatants. UNHCR assistance to returning SWAPO exiles (including PLAN fighters) was not designed to facilitate the reintegration of combatants through any sustained program of assistance, but rather to provide temporary assistance to all returnees. Assistance consisted primarily of a 12-month food ration, provided by the WFP and distributed by the Council of Churches of Namibia (CCN) and the Emergency Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reconstruction Committee (RRR).

Once combatant and non-combatant exiles alike returned to Namibia, SWAPO authorities were more likely to provide public sector jobs to exiles educated abroad rather than to former PLAN fighters. Ex-combatants also alleged preferential treatment along ethnic lines for promotions within the NDF. SWAPO's leaders, as several recounted in interviews, were sympathetic to the plight of unemployed ex-combatants but faced significant budgetary constraints in public sector hiring. Additionally, the Settlement Proposal prohibited civil servant retrenchment following independence, making it more difficult to free up government jobs. The government's sympathy meant little to unemployed ex-combatants who believed SWAPO leaders had promised them jobs

⁴⁷ Preston 1993, 10.45.

after independence, and the perception of favoritism for educated exiles led ex-combatants to feel betrayed at the 'raw deal' given to them by leaders for whom they had fought.⁴⁸

Compared with ex-PLAN combatants, the higher educational attainment of ex-SWATF and their abbreviated service in the military (most conscripts served for two years) led the government to believe that they would have a relatively easy time reintegrating back into life as civilians.⁴⁹ This turned out to be true for highly-skilled ex-SWATF (those with medical training, for example), but those with fewer marketable skills were left with few employment options following independence, exacerbated by the stigma that they had fought for the South African side (even though conscription was mandatory). Ex-SWATF who wanted to join the NDF and could not resented their loss of rank and salary.⁵⁰ Many emigrated to South Africa or elsewhere to seek jobs, while others sought to acquire new skills, especially centered on self-employment. Incomplete reconciliation between the two sides negatively impacted their reintegration and continues to do so today, as many ex-SWATF (and particularly officers) are reluctant to 'out' themselves as such, having fought for the losing side and for the apartheid South African government. This is especially the case for indigenous Namibians in SWATF units,⁵¹ who have found reintegration to be much more difficult than their white counterparts, and where community studies carried out for Preston's *War-Affected People* project in 1993 showed that unemployment was 73% among black former members of South Africa's security forces.⁵²

SWATF combatants were not eligible for food or other repatriation assistance that PLAN combatants received. South Africa, however, continued to pay them their salaries until independence in March 1990. Those who had served 15 years or more were eligible for pensions

⁴⁸ Author's interview with anonymous ex-PLAN combatant, Windhoek, 26 August 2003.

⁴⁹ Colletta et al. 1996, p.134.

⁵⁰ Preston 1993, 10.42.

⁵¹ Indigenous Namibians made up the majority of many SWATF units.

from South Africa, based on the highest pay grade received for at least three years. Those not eligible for pensions (the vast majority) received an additional 'mustering out' pay, the equivalent of two months' salary.⁵³ To further reward the loyalty of SWATF combatants, South Africa offered the SWAPO government US\$12.5 million for additional cash payments to SWATF and Koevoet. The government refused to distribute the money solely to ex-combatants from one side, so it negotiated a compromise with South Africa whereby just under US\$8 million would be set aside for combatants from each side,⁵⁴ and a cash severance of N\$1400 (US\$482) would be paid to each *unemployed* ex-combatant. That way, the government reasoned, the money would go to the neediest ex-combatants.⁵⁵ Some targeted assistance existed before the cash subsidy payment was devised, but focused on vulnerable sub-groups (San trackers who had served with SWATF and disabled combatants). The severance pay scheme made possible by South African money was the first to target all unemployed ex-combatants.

The South African offer embarrassed the Namibian SWAPO government, which had not made any arrangements for its own fighters,⁵⁶ but the money from South Africa only partially explains the shift in policy. The unanimous view among respondents interviewed is that persistent unemployment and mounting threats and demonstrations better explain the urgency the government began to afford reintegration. By August 1990, just months after independence, ex-combatants had taken to the streets to protest their continuing unemployment. Combined with continuing feelings of betrayal by young ex-combatants in the north and the belief that their party leaders were favoring non-combatant exiles in civil service appointments, the government feared

⁵² Preston 1993, 10.56.

⁵³ World Bank 1993, p.60. SWAPO eventually instituted the Veterans Trust to provide pensions for PLAN ex-combatants over the age of 45. The monthly pension amounted to N\$120 when it was instituted and is paid by the government through an insurance company.

⁵⁴ Namibia had proposed an additional ZAR12 million for vocational training for both sides, but South Africa did not want to support the training so reduced its contribution from ZAR36 million to ZAR22 million (Preston 1993, 10.63).

⁵⁵ Colletta et al. 1996, p.145.

that dissident and disgruntled returnees could band together to destabilize the new state.⁵⁷ Ex-combatants, after all, made up 5% of Namibia's total population, meaning that their threats could not be easily ignored, and there was already evidence that some ex-combatants from each side had crossed the border into Angola to work as mercenaries for UNITA.⁵⁸

To make matters worse, general unemployment figures were getting worse, not better. A 1990 UNICEF study showed that just 7% of ex-SWAPO returnees were formally employed, 57% were unemployed, and the remainder was employed in subsistence agriculture.⁵⁹ A 1991 survey of 104 ex-combatant households showed that members of ex-PLAN households reported many more months of unemployment than those of ex-SWATF and ex-Koevoet households, but also showed high percentages from all three groups out of work (53-69%).⁶⁰ By mid-1991, studies showed that approximately 80% of ex-combatants remained unemployed, while unemployment among the general population was 35%.⁶¹

IV. First Wave of Government Reintegration Interventions: Severance Pay, Resettlement, and the Development Brigades, 1990-1998

In its response to ex-combatant protests, the government developed a hasty and haphazard program for their reintegration. This program initially focused on three elements: the N\$1400 severance pay for unemployed ex-combatants; land resettlement assistance through the

⁵⁶ Preston 1993, 5.37.

⁵⁷ Chris Tapscott and Ben Mulongeni, *An Evaluation of the Welfare and Future Prospects of Repatriated Namibians in Northern Namibia*, Namibian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER), Research Report No.3, University of Namibia, August 1990, p.22. It is worth noting that fewer than 10% of Namibia's 60,000 public servants were returned exiles by 1991, but ex-combatant perceptions were that the vast majority of these were non-combatant exiles.

⁵⁸ Preston 1993, 10.59.

⁵⁹ UNICEF, 'Health and Nutrition Study,' Windhoek, April/May 1990.

⁶⁰ W. C. Pendleton et al., *Socio-Economic Study of the Ondangwa/Oshakati Nexus Area* (Windhoek: Namibian Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Namibia, 1991).

Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (MLRR); and vocational training and job placement through the Development Brigade. Though well-intentioned, these reintegration interventions failed to achieve their own goals of decreasing unemployment and reducing demonstrations. They also failed to meet the criteria for success I outlined in the introduction. They did not create economic opportunities for Namibia's ex-combatants nor did they effectively manage significant RPSRCs; in fact, they made things worse by augmenting ex-combatant frustration, aggravating tensions between groups, and increasing violent protest. The severance pay scheme failed to verify the ex-combatant status of beneficiaries and its procedures for targeting recipients and distributing benefits was not transparent. The resettlement program tended to crowd ex-combatants onto sub-par land without a clear strategy for self-sufficiency. The Development Brigade was meant to train and to provide jobs but failed to deliver on either promise; instead, the Brigade cost millions for a government bail-out and has been dogged by continuing allegations of high-level corruption.

Identifying beneficiaries for the severance pay and verifying that applicants were in fact ex-combatants *and* unemployed were major problems for the government's Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants. For ex-SWATF and Koevoet this was less of a challenge because the South African administration kept accurate records of service. To verify the status of ex-PLAN fighters the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Defense requested that ex-combatants register their names on a 'master list' with the government in order to receive their payment.⁶² In April 1991, officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs, bowing to local pressure, issued many cards to individuals not on the master list. As a result, up to 32,000 individuals registered for severance pay and presented themselves for payment at designated banks. But, unbeknownst to them, the

⁶¹ World Bank 1993, p.xii; Preston 1993, 10.56.

⁶² This procedure is well documented in World Bank 1993, pp.60-1.

government, aware that many false claims had been made, decided to issue payment for only 16,080 of the 32,000 expecting payment. This prompted demonstrations and protests at payment points, and delayed the disbursement of payments to the 16,080 who qualified.

The government did not make its procedures public for determining which applications to deny, nor had eligibility requirements been clear and transparent in the first place. Culling the list down affected *bona fide* ex-combatant claims as well as fraudulent ones: the Ministry of Defense estimated that as many as 40% of eligible ex-combatants may not have received any payment.⁶³ Verification problems plagued efforts to target reintegration programs for ex-PLAN for many years afterward. In 1995, the President, responding to increased demonstrations and to complaints about the 1990-91 verification effort, ordered a repeat of the process. And, in 1998, the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants once more carried out a large-scale verification effort that was more successful than its predecessors and is discussed in more detail in the next section. Regardless of problems with verification, for those recipients who did receive the payments, it was too little too late: to be effective, cash payments should be issued as soon after demobilization as possible, and N\$1400 was insufficient for any significant investment.

Early land resettlement programs for ex-combatants were run through the MLRR, but the Development Brigade and the Namibia Development Corporation (NDC) also implemented programs. Although not targeted exclusively at former soldiers (with the exception of the Development Brigade's programs), these initiatives sought to address the land and employment needs of this group. The record of these programs, many of which are ongoing, has been mixed. The government has no coordinated resettlement strategy. The Ministries of Trade and Industry, Agriculture, Finance, Defense, Higher Education, and even Prisons and Correctional Services all conduct resettlement projects, none coordinated with the others. The MLRR projects have come in

for the most criticism. The government and the MLRR tend to 'push for heads' (allot each beneficiary smaller plots of land in order to increase the number of individuals receiving allotments), which has discouraged self-sufficiency.⁶⁴ The MLRR purchased farms without first determining crop viability or the number of people a particular plot could sustain. It also failed to provide adequate post-settlement support or sufficiently train new tenants. Many settlers on MLRR projects suffer from malnutrition.⁶⁵ NDC projects have performed better; the corporation has had success producing sustainable income for tenants with joint ventures and with specialization in particular crops, notably the date palm and cactus pear.

By far the most costly mistake, in material and political terms, among the government's early reintegration initiatives has been the Development Brigade.⁶⁶ The Brigade was formed in July 1991 as part of the MLRR. The government decided to shut down the Development Brigade Corporation (DBC) on 13 March 2001, after the DBC defaulted on numerous loans and failed to pay workers. Modeled after the Botswana Youth Brigades and skills training centers for ex-combatants in Zimbabwe, the Development Brigade was meant to provide vocational training and job opportunities in cooperatives for the thousands of unskilled ex-combatants who remained unemployed. In its first incarnation, the Brigade was to train 7500 ex-combatants as construction workers and 10,350 in agricultural production. Participants would be deployed to training centers, where they would receive hands-on training that would prepare them to be competitive candidates in the private sector or would place them in one of the DBC's own cooperative ventures. Although

⁶³ Colletta et al. 1996, p.136.

⁶⁴ Author's interview with Pieter F. De Wet, Senior Manager for Agriculture for the Namibia Development Corporation, Windhoek, 5 September 2003. For example, the Drimiopsis settlement east of Windhoek crowded 500 inhabitants onto nine hectares of farmland.

⁶⁵ Sidney Haring and Willem Odendaal, 'One Day We Will Be Equal: A Socio-Legal Perspective on the Namibian Land Reform and Resettlement Process,' Windhoek, Legal Assistance Centre, 2002; UNOHAC, 'Namibia: Special Report on Land Reform, Part 1,' *IRIN News Service*, 23 February 2004.

⁶⁶ The Development Brigade became the Development Brigade Corporation (DBC) when the government converted the original Brigade into a parastatal in the early 1990s.

the DBC imparted some valuable skills to ex-combatants during this time, the numbers fell far short of targets and the economic needs of the ex-combatant population and the market demands of the country were severely understudied.⁶⁷ Nor was the enterprise ever cost efficient. The World Bank estimated the cost per trainee at N\$15,040 and an additional subsidy of N\$47,600 per participant to sustain income generating projects that the DBC started.⁶⁸

The problems with the DBC do not end there. The training was poor and not standardized with government vocational training directives. Recruitment was skewed towards ex-PLAN fighters and opposition leaders initially encouraged their members not to participate.⁶⁹ The entire operation was massively mismanaged. Proper budgets never were prepared, bookkeeping was not performed before May 1994, and income from projects was not disclosed. By 1998 the corporation's deficit stood at N\$43 million.⁷⁰ A Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the defunct DBC in 2004 alleged that corruption was rampant.⁷¹ The chief architects and managers of the DBC, however, continue to occupy senior positions in the Namibian government, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Instead of managing ex-combatant grievances, the Development Brigades fomented violence. Their makeup reinforced the military structure of the war by reassembling large groups of former fighters and placing them in centers that were difficult to manage and even more difficult to

⁶⁷ Approximately 4000 graduates completed training between 1991 and 1994, and about one-third of those were able to secure jobs in the public or private sector. See Simon Shikangalah (DBC General Manager), 'The Development Brigade: The Namibian Experience,' in Cilliers 1995, p.71.

⁶⁸ Colletta et al. 1996, p.166.

⁶⁹ National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), 'Namibia Country Report: Victims of War, Torture and Organized Political Violence As Well As Issues of National Reconciliation and Justice,' Windhoek, NSHR, 23 June 2002, p.21; Alden 1997, p.67.

⁷⁰ Tangeni Amupadhi, 'Hope for Salary-Starved DBC Workers,' *Namibian*, 26 January 2001; Tangeni Amupadhi, 'Decision to Close DBC Was "Illegal",' *Namibian*, 14 June 2001; Author's interviews with Tangeni Amupadhi and Conrad Angula, Journalists for the *Namibian*, Windhoek, 9 September 2003.

⁷¹ *Namibian*, 'Editorial: Will the Rot Never End?', 8 October 2004.

disband.⁷² Poor living conditions and delays in monthly payments to participants increased ex-combatants' anger and made the Brigade centers a breeding ground for the violent reintegration protests that occurred before 1998.

Nor did the DBC and other early reintegration programs respond to the employment needs of their target group. In 1995 15,890 ex-combatants (mostly PLAN) had registered for job opportunities with the government's Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants.⁷³ Compared with the 16,080 ex-combatants who received unemployment severance pay four years earlier, this number suggests that time had done little to ease the civilian transition of former fighters. In response to persistent unemployment, the government established a War Orphans Fund⁷⁴ in May 1996 and created the Socio Economic Integration Programme for the Ex-Combatants (SIPE) in 1997, a company funded by the Planning Commission and tasked with coming up with solutions to the reintegration debacle. The Company distributed and managed the War Orphans fund, provided assistance with school fees and accommodation for war orphans, maintained the database of ex-combatants registered for job opportunities, facilitated cooperative ventures, and issued periodic appeals to the private sector for voluntary hiring of ex-combatants. Although SIPE would take a more prominent (and productive) role in coordinating the second wave of Namibian reintegration interventions after 1998, at the time of its founding it was, like the DBC centers before it, more a place for ex-combatants to gather and protest than a durable solution.

⁷² Rosemary Preston, *Demobilizing and Integrating Fighters after War: The Namibian Experience*, Warwick, International Centre for Education in Development, September 1994, p.12; Preston 1993, 10.89 and 10.90.

⁷³ Colletta et al. 1996, p.210.

⁷⁴ In all, 1,134 orphans qualified for assistance of N\$330 per month, and smaller numbers qualified for additional benefits of education, vocational training, and counseling (Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Namibia, 'War Orphans,' in *Namibia: A Decade of Peace, Democracy, and Prosperity 1990-2000*, Windhoek, 21 March 2000, p.29).

V. Second Wave of Government Reintegration Interventions: The 'Peace Project', War Veterans Fund, and Special Field Force, 1998-2004

The years 1997 and 1998 saw an unprecedented surge in protests.⁷⁵ Most of these were organized by ex-PLAN fighters. Ex-SWATF and Koevoet forces were less vocal about their reintegration difficulties, mainly because of the cultural and national stigma attached to aiding South Africa during the war, which both marginalized and silenced many of those ex-combatants. For ex-PLAN fighters, however, sustained protests eventually had the intended effect in the form of new assistance. A baby who does not cry will not be suckled.⁷⁶ As I argue below, the tactics of ex-PLAN fighters to extract more reintegration benefits from the government also parallel similar efforts by veterans of Zimbabwe's civil war.

Although there was no *mea culpa* for the government's several reintegration misses, tacit recognition, by President Nujoma and senior ministers, of prior failures led to new reintegration programs. The steady stream of ex-combatant protests and public sympathy for their grievances applied political pressure on SWAPO ahead of the 1999 elections and prompted the government to reconvene⁷⁷ the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants to once again verify ex-combatant status and register unemployed ex-combatants for jobs. Because of the large numbers of individuals participating in various demonstrations, and especially the large numbers of youth protesters who were unlikely to have actually fought during the war for either side, the government saw verification of combatant status as essential to understanding the scope of the continuing unemployment

⁷⁵ 'Namibian, Jobless Group in North Now 2,952,' 19 August 1998; *Namibian*, 'Windhoek Demo Swells to 1,500+,' 19 August 1998; *Namibian*, 'Heroes Day Dampener for War Disadvantaged,' 27 August 1998; *Namibian*, 'Hungry Ex-Fighters March Again,' 25 September 1998.

⁷⁶ Jessica Schafer discussed this phenomenon in relation to Mozambique's ex-combatants but it is equally apt in describing the tactics of Namibia's fighters (Schafer 1998).

problem. The committee consisted of senior government officials who had participated in the SWAPO movement in exile and who knew a great number of ex-combatants in order to more easily identify them, interview them, and verify their status.

The 1998 verification procedure avoided the mistakes of failed attempts in 1990-91 and 1995. First, the committee adopted a clear definition of 'ex-combatant' (keeping in mind that this definition was limited to ex-PLAN fighters because verification was never a problem for ex-SWATF and Koevoet): an ex-combatant was someone who was under the leadership of SWAPO, participated in the independence struggle, had returned to Namibia by 1989, was more than 18 years of age by 1989, and had participated in actual combat during the conflict.⁷⁸ Second, the committee established a presence in all regions over an extended period of time and conducted an information campaign to alert would-be applicants of status interviews in their area. Third, the committee established clear criteria for how applicants would meet eligibility under its Terms of Reference. To warn against fraud, the committee arrested and prosecuted approximately a dozen individuals who it alleged had lied about their unemployment status in the hope of re-applying for a better job placement. Significantly, the committee also enforced a 'one strike and you're out' rule: any individual who had been employed in the public sector since independence but subsequently lost or quit that job was disqualified from future employment in the public sector, the logic being that such a person had already received a fair shot at reintegration.

This process stretched over an entire year. It was repeated, in abbreviated form, for ex-SWATF and Koevoet, but focused on the time of service since reintegration benefits were available

⁷⁷ The Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants first convened in 1990-91 to conduct the government's initial verification exercise and ultimately recommended the formation of the Development Brigade. It reconvened to oversee the various restructurings of the DBC and adjourned in 1995 after the second restructuring was complete.

⁷⁸ Author's interview with Niilo Taapopi, Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Home Affairs and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants, Windhoek, 8 September 2003. The definition was integrated into the Committee's Terms of Reference, and closely mirrors the official definition that would determine eligibility for additional benefits under the War Veterans Subvention Bill discussed below.

only to those ex-combatants who were serving at the time of implementation of Resolution 435. At the end of 1998, the Committee presented its findings to the government and recommended that those registered as unemployed be given jobs in various ministries of the government. On 15 December 1998 the recommendations of the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants were approved by the full Cabinet and 13,930 unemployed ex-fighters were registered for job placement. Of this number, 1,980 were ex-SWATF or Koevoet.⁷⁹

Namibia then did something that no other DDR program has done: it created jobs for all unemployed ex-combatants in the public sector. The idea, called the 'Peace Project', was a product of SIPE advocacy for ex-combatant employment, itself the product of lobbying by ex-PLAN for public sector jobs, and the recommendation of the Cabinet Committee. NAMPOL and the NDF took on the vast majority, because of ex-combatants' military skills and their desire to stay in uniform and obtain military or military-related jobs. The Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) had given jobs to 2000 ex-combatants by 2001, putting them to work in Anti-Poaching Units in the Parks and Wildlife Division or planting trees in the Forestry Division. The Ministry of Prisons and Correctional Services also accepted hundreds of ex-combatants into its ranks, mostly as guards or cleaners. Other ministries took on smaller numbers, mainly as cleaners because of open-bid requirements for hiring and placement in the civil service. The government capitalized on emerging demand within the public sector for labor suited to the skills of ex-combatants, particularly in the growing environment and tourism sector, where ex-combatants have filled a need within Anti-Poaching Units, and as part of joint military-police teams that have the responsibility to locate old arms caches and minefields for de-mining.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ 'Ex-Combatants Registration,' Office of the Prime Minister 2000, p.30.

⁸⁰ Author's interview with Colonel Jacobus Theodorus Theyse, Chief Inspector of Explosives for the Republic of Namibia, Windhoek, 28 August 2003.

Hiring under the Peace Project occurred in waves, including some smaller intakes by the four ministries named above in 1991 and 1995, but it was only after the completion of the verification procedure in 1998 that thousands of ex-combatants found public sector placements. Large placements in 1999 and 2001 each assigned 1500 ex-combatants to the NDF, 1500 to NAMPOL, 500 to Prisons and Correctional Services, and 500 to Environment and Tourism. By 2000, the government reported that 9,095 ex-combatants had been placed in entry level positions in various ministries.⁸¹ The 2001 round of job placement brought this number up to approximately 12,000. Since most Peace Project jobs went to ex-PLAN fighters, and since most of the jobs created by the formation of the NDF after independence went to PLAN fighters, nearly two-thirds of all PLAN combatants found jobs in the Namibian public sector.

The Peace Project effectively halted ex-combatant demonstrations. However, decreased public sympathy for ex-combatants also played a role since continued protests would have likely seen a public backlash.⁸² Although there were some protests in 1999 and 2000,⁸³ no major protests have occurred since the final round of job placement in 2001. By 2003, SIPE's chairman said that less than 2,000 ex-combatants were unemployed.⁸⁴ Government officials were unanimous in crediting the Peace Project with ending its reintegration woes because it stopped protests.

⁸¹ 'Socio-Economic Integration of Ex-Combatants,' in Office of the Prime Minister 2000, pp.29-30.

⁸² Previously, public sympathy had been high since most Namibians considered ex-PLAN heroes for the role they played in securing the country's independence. The decline of public sympathy for ex-combatants was echoed by government officials, journalists, and civil society leaders in interviews. All government officials with whom I spoke also mentioned declining public support for any additional benefits for ex-combatants as a reason why further benefits after the Peace Project were unlikely.

⁸³ *Namibian*, 'Ex-Fighters Given a Final Shot at Jobs,' 14 January 1999; *Namibian*, 'Centre Besieged by Ex-Fighters: "All We Need Is Jobs",' 26 January 1999; *Namibian*, 'Cops Block War Vets,' 11 July 2000.

⁸⁴ Author's interview with Nghidinihamba U. Ndilula, General Manager of the SIPE Company, Inc., Windhoek, 3 September 2003. It is worth remembering that this figure represents only the 13,930 ex-combatants considered eligible by the government for job assistance out of 57,000 total ex-combatants.

The Peace Project, however, did not proceed without problems. It inflated an already-bloated public sector and conflicted with the government's goal, as part of its 2030 initiative, to decrease the size of the public sector. The overwhelming majority of the placements went to ex-PLAN fighters, which has led some ex-SWATF and ex-SWAPO dissidents to complain of preferential treatment. SIPE's placement criteria were not transparent, and have led to additional complaints that the best jobs went to SWAPO political cronies. Training, particularly in the security services, has been a problem for new recruits, and there have been citizen and media complaints about draconian and strong-fisted responses from ex-combatant members of NAMPOL. Some newly-placed employees have also complained to SIPE and to their supervisors within the various ministries that their jobs require them to live too far away from home and their families (many of the jobs, especially in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, are in the south of the country and most ex-combatants live in the north). More tragically, the increased presence of ex-combatants within the ministries has unveiled a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among them, leading to early retirements and deaths, particularly within the NDF and NAMPOL.

To accompany its job placement program, the government passed the War Veterans Subvention Act in 1999, creating the War Veterans Fund, which has provided cash payments of N\$500 per month since August 2000 to approximately 600 disabled ex-combatants. The act defines 'war veteran' as 'a Namibian citizen who, between 1963 and 1989, during the war, performed military service in Namibia or in any other country as a member of the liberation force, or who owing to his or her participation in the liberation struggle, was convicted, whether in Namibia or elsewhere, of any offense closely connected with such struggle and sentenced in respect thereof to such long period of imprisonment that he or she was as a result of such imprisonment unable to perform, during the war, military service but does not include a person who at any time

during the war deserted the liberation force.’⁸⁵ The Act codifies exclusion of ex-SWATF and Koevoet from War Veterans Fund payments. Incredibly, in excluding from benefits any person who ‘at any time during the war deserted the liberation force,’ the Act also makes all ex-SWAPO dissidents (many of whom were detained and some of whom were allegedly tortured or killed by the SWAPO leadership in exile) ineligible for reintegration assistance.

In addition to job placement into existing ministries, the Office of the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also recruited ex-combatants into the Special Field Force (SFF), a 6,000-strong force created, ostensibly, as a border guard to protect Namibia’s northern border while Angola was experiencing civil war. Ex-PLAN fighters make up virtually the entire SFF. The statutory authority of the force is murky, its duties are ill-defined, and the rationale for and method of its establishment were not transparent. With the civil war in Angola concluded, it is unclear what the continuing justification for the force is.

The SFF evades conventional civilian control of the military. It is funded through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and falls under the control not of the Ministry of Defense but of the Inspector-General of the Police but, during Sam Nujoma’s presidency, reported directly to the Office of the President and was fiercely loyal to him. The SFF preserves virtually intact the command structure of PLAN, both soldiers and commanders. The commander of the SFF is Ruben ‘Danger’ Ashipala, who was a PLAN battalion commander. The National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) has called the SFF a ‘paramilitary force... used to harass suspected political opponents of the [government] and or ruling SWAPO party.’⁸⁶ NSHR has also alleged that, if challenged, SWAPO’s leaders would use the SFF to retain power.⁸⁷ Namibia’s Legal Assistance

⁸⁵ War Veterans Subvention Act 1999, *Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia*, No.2211, 20 Oct. 1999, Section I.

⁸⁶ NSHR 2002, p.21.

⁸⁷ Author’s interview with Ya Nangoloh.

Centre (LAC) has received several complaints against SFF members alleging unlawful detention, harassment, and assault.

VI. Employment at a Price: The Impact of RPSRCs on Post-Conflict Security in Namibia

Having detailed the reintegration programs that the SWAPO government adopted to manage reintegration, I now move to an analysis of the problems that persisted despite, or even because of, those programs. To do so, I identify the RPSRCs in Namibia and then assess the nature and impact of RPSRCs. With each problem, I also analyze what actors did or did not do to manage it, and evaluate whether this was enough and whether more could have been done.

Assessing the impact of these threats in Namibia starts with recognition that the threat of a return to war was one that never seriously threatened the country after it gained its independence, due to unique factors that were not present in the other cases analyzed in this thesis. Return to war was unlikely because no one, aside from some right-wing extremists in Namibia and South Africa, objected to independence.⁸⁸ Peace held in Namibia, then, because the general political framework (majority rule through a democratically elected government) was not contested. Second, the operational environment was more conducive to peace in Namibia because its war, unlike the civil wars that ravaged Mozambique and Sierra Leone and although costly in human and economic terms, had not destroyed the country's infrastructure or administrative capacity.

Nevertheless, reintegration problems in Namibia exacerbated already-existing ethnic and political tension and undermined reconciliation and democratization. Namibia's RPSRCs can be divided into two groups. The first are problems that occurred between D-Day and the

government's 1998 shift in reintegration policy. They include: violence at the outset of the UNTAG mission; violence and intimidation resulting from Koevoet insertion into SWAPOL ranks; re-recruitment of some ex-combatants to fight as mercenaries in Angola;⁸⁹ and frequent and occasionally violent ex-combatant protests in the wake of persistent unemployment. Since D-Day violence and Koevoet intimidation were demobilization problems (i.e., lack of clear demobilization procedures) I will focus analysis of problems during this period on ex-combatant unemployment and protests. Additionally, the SWAPO government interpreted problems with protests to be the biggest security threat associated with incomplete reintegration. Problems in the second group were the result of changes to reintegration programs after 1998 (although some of these have their roots in pre-1998 programs, too): ethnic and political polarization of reintegration issues caused by preferential and discriminatory reintegration policies; and, the adverse impact on democratization and reconciliation caused by the creation of the SFF. In this section, I use experience in Zimbabwe to investigate the potential for future problems should the government acquiesce to former fighters' demands for new benefits.

The Unemployment-Protest Cycle

A 1991 study isolated several explanations for persistent unemployment among ex-combatants (and particularly PLAN ex-combatants).⁹⁰ Some obstacles to employment are common for ex-combatants in post-conflict states (e.g., residual political discrimination and bias, lack of experience and training, and lack of information about job opportunities. Others were unique to Namibia's ex-combatants (e.g., employer distrust of the work qualifications of ex-

⁸⁸ Goulding 2003, p.175.

⁸⁹ Although several respondents mentioned re-recruitment of some ex-PLAN into Angolan fighting forces, none was able to quantify the nature of the problem or qualify its impact. All asserted that the number of re-recruited fighters was small. No monitoring of such re-recruitment occurred at the time and too much time has passed for an accurate assessment of this problem (in contrast with the Sierra Leone case, where I give a more accurate assessment of the nature and impact of re-recruitment problems there).

⁹⁰ Tapscott and Mulongeni 1990, pp.10-12.

combatants educated in Eastern Bloc countries, lack of job opportunities in the north of the country where most ex-combatants resided, and the dependency syndrome prevalent among ex-PLAN combatants who expected their SWAPO leaders to continue to provide for their material needs as had occurred in the bush). Confronted with widespread and persistent unemployment, ex-PLAN combatants took their grievances against their leaders to the streets, and demonstrations were increasingly violent, disruptive, and, ultimately, effective. The absence of reintegration programs also provided an incentive for many ex-combatants to hang on to their weapons because of continuing uncertainty about their future.

The security impact of protests is difficult to measure. Although they did not pose an immediate threat to the peace process, and peacekeepers and government forces were in the end able to contain any violence associated with them, the government did not know at the time whether or not protests would escalate into widespread rioting and did not know whether newly-constituted security structures (the NDF and NAMPOL) could manage them. Combined with the continuing circulation of small arms in the country, the threats made by ex-combatant groups, the fact that former fighters made up a sizeable percentage of Namibia's population (5% at the time), and the government's distrust of opposition and dissident elements within the country, an environment of frequent protests from ex-combatants became a serious threat for the new SWAPO government.

The government also saw ex-combatant protests as a threat to regime legitimacy, which it viewed as a threat to state security. Equating state security with regime security is understandable given SWAPO's time in exile (where any threat to the unity of the party was treated as a threat to the independence objective itself) and given government respondents' fears that violence of protests could escalate into violent civil conflict within the country between competing SWAPO elements. But putting a stop to ex-combatant protests was also about shoring up SWAPO's

political support in order to maintain a one-party dominant political system. The relationship between SWAPO and its ex-PLAN combatants was therefore mutually reinforcing: ex-combatants needed the government for benefits and the government needed ex-combatants so that it could continue to be the party of the independence struggle. The government could not afford a rift with ex-PLAN combatants, especially at a time when they commanded widespread popular support and sympathy.

What more could have been done to stop protests earlier and address the employment needs of ex-combatants from all sides? At the time, it was not realistic to expect UNTAG or any outside actor to have a prominent reintegration role. Elections were the central objective of the UN mission, and it is unlikely that the UN could have set different priorities given the long history of the Settlement Proposal and its emphasis on elections as the ultimate goal of any transition. In any case, the parties to the conflict never pressed the issue of reintegration, each side preferring to 'provide for their own', and strategic thinking about internationally-supported reintegration was in its infancy.

Given failures of the government's first wave of programs, however, it could have done more at the time to address the political and economic obstacles preventing former fighters from finding jobs. Major employment obstacles were due to political discrimination, bias, employer doubts about fighters' qualifications, and lack of training and transportation. Since these were clear after the 1991 study, the government had seven years to tailor programs accordingly but instead continued with its failed DBC and land resettlement schemes. Instead, the government could have considered tax and other incentives for employers hiring or willing to train PLAN returnees and unemployed SWATF and Koevoet. It also could have implemented transportation and referral services for ex-combatants wishing to travel in search of jobs, or micro-credit and apprenticeship schemes to provide training options that encouraged self-sufficiency and countered aid

dependency (and therefore the expectation among ex-PLAN fighters in particular that their SWAPO leaders should find them work).

The impact of not adopting alternative strategies earlier than 1998 was to feed ex-PLAN dependence on the government and to increase violence in and around DBC centers and during protests. Ultimately, however, the Peace Project put an end to violence from protests, but at considerable cost. The material cost is readily apparent: the government was forced to hand over millions of dollars to bail out the failed DBC and the Peace Project meant further bloating of the country's public sector workforce. The other costs, however, were the unintended consequences of the government's approach, which created new RPSRCs that exacerbated already-deep divisions within Namibia.

Problems after Protests: Ethnic and Political Polarization

The government's post-1998 programs stopped protests but produced new problems. Its approach further marginalized and excluded SWATF, Koevoet, and ex-SWAPO dissidents from benefits. This polarized and politicized reintegration assistance in a way that contributed to already-existing and serious political and ethnic tension and negatively impacted democratization, post-conflict reconciliation, and social reintegration of ex-combatants.

Ex-combatants did not enjoy equal access to benefits. The government enshrined a policy of unequal access by writing legislation (the War Veterans Subvention Act) that specifically excluded political opponents (ex-SWAPO dissidents) from access to benefits. Additionally, ex-SWATF and Koevoet believe programs favored ex-PLAN combatants. This belief is unsurprising given that most of the 9,000 jobs in the NDF are occupied by ex-PLAN even though Namibia's constitution requires the balanced structuring of the country's security forces, and most of the 12,000 Peace Project jobs went to ex-PLAN. There is also a widespread perception among ex-PLAN that the SWAPO leadership favored certain ethnic and language groups over others in

managing the severance pay scheme and the DBC, allocating jobs placement under the Peace Project, and determining promotion. As the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) argues, while in theory reintegration programs were intended to benefit all, in practice they benefit only those loyal and close to the ruling SWAPO elite.⁹¹

Government respondents countered that ex-SWATF and ex-PLAN combatants had different experiences during the conflict and faced different challenges after their demobilization; they argued, consequently, that ex-PLAN were more vulnerable and that in any case many ex-SWATF and Koevoet have benefited from programs. But it is clear that guarantees of equal access to benefits for all ex-combatants were absent. That absence undermined post-conflict reconciliation in Namibia, most palpably *within* SWAPO. The government's reintegration policy and the perceptions of unfair and preferential treatment it generated deepened divisions between ex-SWAPO dissidents and the party leadership, between ex-combatants and those in exile who did not engage in active combat, and between rival clans and language groups, particularly between the Kwanyama-speaking and the Ndonga-speaking clans of the Ovambo.⁹² Reconciliation between SWAPO and ex-SWATF and Koevoet was also damaged because of the difficulty ex-SWATF and Koevoet faced accessing reintegration benefits skewed towards the assistance of ex-PLAN fighters.

The government's reintegration approach, therefore, contributed to preexisting ethnic and political tensions. These tensions have not erupted into violence or civil disorder; rather, they impacted security in Namibia because they have eroded public trust in Namibia's post-conflict institutions and increased the economic, political, and social marginalization of groups that consider themselves outside the web of protection and patronage that they perceive the SWAPO

⁹¹ NSHR 2002, p.20.

⁹² Leys and Saul 1995, p.13.

government to give its ethnic and political allies. For groups that feel excluded from reintegration benefits (ex-SWATF and Koevoet, ex-SWAPO dissidents, and ex-PLAN who believe the government has favored certain ethnic and language groups over others), the government's reintegration programs are emblematic of the political intimidation and social exclusion they say characterize the one-party dominant system of Namibia. The government's refusal to consider a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, something that ex-SWAPO dissidents have requested, further undermines social reintegration for groups of fighters.

Civil society leaders and political opposition groups claim that the government's reintegration programs have been characteristic of a paternalistic and authoritarian SWAPO political culture.⁹³ The lack of transparency that accompanied decisions made by the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants and the selective targeting that accompanied reintegration interventions have also reinforced perceptions of secrecy, preferential treatment, and ethnic and political tension. While that tension has not led to conflict, it has undermined democratization by weakening the state's commitment to political opposition (e.g., exclusion of ex-SWAPO dissidents from reintegration assistance) and civilian control of the military (e.g., the SFF) and has reinforced a system that veers toward one-party rule.

To mitigate further threats to security from ethnic and political tensions, a more equitable political approach to reintegration is needed. This would, however, require credible and unfettered political opposition, repeal of discriminatory provisions for reintegration benefits, follow-up evaluation of ex-SWATF and Koevoet reintegration and employment status, recognition of abuses committed against ex-SWAPO dissidents in exile and restoration of their rights to access reintegration benefits, and close monitoring of ethnic, linguistic, and political parity in employment placement and other benefit decisions. These steps are unlikely to be taken given the predominant

political culture within SWAPO, which is one that values loyalty and secrecy and punishes intra-party dissent and bristles at criticism.⁹⁴ Certainly, government respondents saw no need to revisit or revise reintegration policies; the consensus among the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants and SIPE was that the end of protests from ex-combatants and the end of the Peace Project employment placements signal the closing of the reintegration chapter.

Problems after Protests: the SFF

The creation of the SFF has also contributed to ethnic and political polarization and has undermined security sector reform: the creation of the SFF. With a force of 6,000, the SFF is near to the force size of the army itself (at 9,000). All of this raises serious concerns about the control, role, and loyalty of such a large force, and particularly one that leaves intact the command structures of a conflict nearly two decades in the past. The NDF is similarly skewed towards ex-PLAN combatants, as is the leadership of Namibia's security structures. The commander of the police is an ex-PLAN fighter. The Chief of the NDF is an ex-PLAN fighter. The Chief of Intelligence is an ex-PLAN fighter. And so on. The NSHR report that allegations of ethnic and political discrimination in NDF and NAMPOL hiring and promotion are frequent. Consequently, Namibia's security structures are more representative of SWAPO's political power than of the security needs of the country (e.g., the ostensible threat from Angola that would necessitate a border control force such as the SFF, particularly now that the war in Angola is over).

The impact of a security sector fiercely loyal to the ruling SWAPO elite has been to further exacerbate ethnic and political tension and to call into question the civilian control of military structures. Debate among civil society leaders and the press in Namibia has focused on whether the loyalty of the SFF and other security forces is to the country, the government, or to the

⁹³ NSHR 2002, pp.24-48; Author's interview with Phil Ya Nangoloh.

dominant political elite within SWAPO. As political power is currently constituted in Namibia, the three are arguably the same, but several respondents cautioned that a rift in the SWAPO party structure could have serious consequences for state security if the SFF or members of other security forces were to take sides in any party power struggle (e.g., military intimidation or, at worst, violent civil conflict pitting security forces against each other or against civilians). That such a rift did not occur during previous party power struggles or after the passing of power from President Nujoma to his successor after the 2004 elections suggests that the SFF has not yet threatened state security. Its continuing existence as a party-controlled militia force is, however, problematic for democratization and security sector reform and has undermined public trust in the security apparatus of the state.

Absent credible political opposition or a public challenge to the SFF, little could have prevented its formation. The vast majority of ex-PLAN combatants in Namibia preferred to obtain military-related work, and the SWAPO government's creation of the force was a way to placate its former guerrilla fighters. Front-end negotiation of the contours of DDR and SSR could have prevented its creation; for example, the Settle Proposal could have prohibited the creation of paramilitary forces by the new state. For reasons articulated earlier in this chapter, front-end agreement of that sort was unlikely because it was not anticipated, strategic thinking on DDR and SSR was in its infancy, and external patrons would have been unlikely to challenge the legitimacy and sovereignty of the SWAPO government, once elected, to make those decisions. The government could have avoided the need to create the SFF by recruiting extra forces into the NDF from the beginning. As it was, only 7,000 of the 10,000-authorized troops were recruited following the 1990 elections.

⁹⁴ Leys and Saul argue that this culture is the product of SWAPO's time in exile (1995, p.15). See also Lauren Dobell, 'The Ulenga Moment: SWAPO and Dissent,' *Southern Africa Report*, Vol.14, No.1, December 1998, p.3.

Government respondents insisted that the SFF was a legitimate and necessary protection force, on a par with the US National Guard, and so it is unlikely that any changes to the force will occur even now that the Angolan war has ended. Non-government respondents emphasized that the government fears the political opposition, protests, or violence that could result in the wake of dissolution of the SFF, since 6,000 ex-PLAN would be without jobs. The most likely avenue for change is continuing international support to civil society and good governance efforts in Namibia (e.g., USAID and DFID ongoing programs to bolster civil society organizations through institutional development support and public policy advocacy) could have the indirect benefit of empowering elements opposed to the SFF to influence the government to dissolve the force.

The Shadow of Zimbabwe

The SWAPO government evaded the biggest security threat related to the reintegration of its ex-combatants: following Zimbabwe into the violence and economic decline that resulted in part from the ZANU-PF government's destructive relationship with its former guerrilla fighters. In Zimbabwe, the ruling ZANU-PF party and ex-combatants of the self-styled National Liberation War Veterans Association manipulated each other (ex-combatants to extract benefits and the government to shore up political legitimacy as the liberator of Zimbabwe from white minority rule) in what became a 'cycle of expanding guerrilla veterans' benefits'. Both the government and the veterans have used violence to advance their economic and political agendas.⁹⁵

The SWAPO government in Namibia, too, has flirted with that cycle. As in Zimbabwe, groups of young unemployed men that never fought in the war have staged small but periodic protests since the Peace Project, claiming to be 'ex-combatants' and demanded benefits from the government. As among ex-combatants in Zimbabwe, a pervasive culture among ex-PLAN holds

that the government should meet their economic needs. Non-combatant exiles, also in the wake of the Peace Project, have made similar claims, as have war orphans. Political violence has also characterized the relationship between ex-PLAN and the SWAPO government, mirroring the ZANU-PF use of NLWVA veterans to intimidate political opposition and attack white farmers. One DBC official, for example, was implicated in the murder of a political opponent of SWAPO.⁹⁶ But it is ex-combatants' disgruntlement about the slow pace of land reform in Namibia where the similarities with Zimbabwe have been most threatening to security. The government's uneven record on land reform, in addition to frustrations with unemployment, was in part to blame for the cycle of protests and new reintegration programs that characterized the 1990s in Namibia. Approximately 4000 mostly white commercial farmers own almost half Namibia's arable land. By late 2003, only 30,720 people of an estimated 243,000 landless or 'land-hungry' Namibians had been resettled, and the government had acquired just 124 farms (more than 700,000 hectares) since the land reform policy began in 1995, far short of the 9.5 million hectares target the government had set.⁹⁷

The impact of the government/ex-combatant patronage dynamic in Zimbabwe has been civil violence, disorder, internal displacement, government-sponsored or sanctioned human rights abuses, and rapid economic decline. The situation in Namibia has, however, remained stable. But the government's record of capitulation to ex-combatant demands could prove dangerous should new coalitions among its supporters emerge to make new demands about income and land inequality. If unchecked, the resulting cycle of protests and capitulation could echo the chaos in Zimbabwe, particularly if ex-combatant groups set their sights on forceful land seizures. The

⁹⁵ Norma J. Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp.4-5. In her book, Kriger calls ex-combatants the 'storm troopers' of President Mugabe's violent and disruptive policies.

⁹⁶ *Namibian*, 'Horror Murder: Brigade Man Arrested,' 8 December 1992, pp.1-2.

dissolution of the SFF without alternative support for those in its employ, for example, could trigger such a reaction and explains in part why, in the words of a prominent journalist, 'no one wants to touch [the SFF].'⁹⁸

Based on the assessments of nearly all respondents in Windhoek (inside and outside of the government) and on my own comparative analysis of the two countries, however, Namibia is highly unlikely to follow Zimbabwe's example. What accounts for the difference in outcomes between Namibia and Zimbabwe given similarities in the cycles of ex-combatants demands and government capitulation? First, the conflict and post-conflict contexts were different in the two countries. Zimbabwe fought a civil war against its white minority government, where Namibia was fighting a 'civil' war against South African occupation. SWAPO received considerable support from several members of the white minority during its struggle, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN) and the CCN played a prominent mediation role throughout the conflict. Second, the government has placed clear limits on its reintegration policies. It capitulated to some (e.g., employment) but not all (e.g., land) demands of ex-combatants. In fact, its adoption of the Peace Project, according to members of the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants, was meant in part to moderate increasingly militant demands about land reform during protests. As a result of the government's commitment to ex-combatant employment, resentment about the slow pace of land redistribution never reached the fever pitch it did in Zimbabwe.

Finally, the government has observed Zimbabwe's swift destruction and has reiterated its commitment to a policy of national reconciliation that bases land reform on a 'willing buyer, willing seller' principle and works to accommodate rather than antagonize the white minority. The SWAPO government has resisted forceful seizure of land for redistribution and has condemned

⁹⁷ UNOHAC, 'Namibia: Special Report on Land Reform and Resettlement,' *IRIN News Service*, 16 July 2004.

⁹⁸ Author's interview with Gwen Lister, Editor of the *Namibian*, Windhoek, 2 September 2003.

planned land invasions, having seen and learned from Zimbabwe that such a strategy has fostered neither reconciliation nor development. The government has occasionally departed from these policies. Evictions of indigenous farm workers by commercial farms in 2004 prompted the government to announce that it would begin to expropriate commercial farms because too few had been offered for purchase. No follow-up information on those threats was available. They were arguably populist gestures designed to shore up support for the ruling party in an election year and unlikely to signal a policy departure. The continuing snail's pace of land redistribution, however, as well as the government's poor record on resettlement strategy and support, demonstrates that the government's preferences are not fixed and could change over time, with potentially dangerous implications for security in the country. Future governments would do well to temper their relationship with former fighters to ensure that any residual ex-combatant demands about land reform or other benefits are dealt with peacefully.

As this section has shown, Namibia's approach to managing RPSRCs, has mitigated some security threats (e.g., potential insecurity ala Zimbabwe) but exacerbated others (e.g., ethnic and political tensions). In the next section, I explain why the government approached reintegration policy the way it did. I argue that bureaucratic pressures and domestic political pressures helped to determine the capacity and preferences of the government's reintegration actors operating within the SWAPO government. I also argue that strong normative pressures to respect the sovereignty of the newly-independent government, in addition to lack of strategic awareness of the importance of reintegration at the time, prevented more active international involvement in managing Namibia's reintegration process.

VII. Reintegration Actors in Namibia: Capacity and Preferences

The principal actors in charge of designing the government's reintegration programs were the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants, SIPE, and, with earlier programs, the DBC and various land resettlement agencies. But other government ministries and leaders played a prominent role in shaping reintegration policy, too. These were, principally, President Nujoma, various land resettlement agencies, officials at the NDF, NAMPOL, and MET. Power was not widely shared among reintegration actors in Namibia. For the most part, the Cabinet Committee led, SIPE implemented, and other government ministries and officials simply obeyed. Additionally, international actors were not involved in the design or implementation of reintegration programs. In Namibia, therefore, the UN and other international actors are not the focus of analysis to the extent they are in the case chapters that follow.⁹⁹

Understanding the capacity and preferences of the Namibian government in shaping reintegration policy is crucial to explaining the persistence of the RPSRCs observed in the previous section. RPSRCs were not inevitable, but were the product of choices that actors made to deal with reintegration issues. As established in the introduction, capacity will be evaluated in terms of resources, expertise, and authority, with analysis focusing on the limits of capacity observed, the impact limited capacity had on reintegration outcomes, and the explanations for why capacity was limited in Namibia. Namibia faced similar resource constraints to those identified in Mozambique and Sierra Leone but, because the government was the sole reintegration actor, constraints related to the government's expertise and authority were different than those faced by international actors

⁹⁹ In Sierra Leone, a national commission led reintegration but the external support and technical advice the commission received from external actors, as well as the commission's capacity constraints, mean that the Sierra

such as the UN or World Bank, or by the NCDDR in Sierra Leone. Those constraints included lack of institutional expertise afforded by international involvement, impartiality problems related to the authority of SWAPO as sole reintegration provider, and limited authority and expertise to design programs outside of the public sector.

Preferences will be evaluated in terms of the assumptions and interests that influenced reintegration policy decisions, with analysis focusing on the dominant preferences underpinning policy in Namibia, identification of the pressures that shaped dominant preferences to explain how preferences were formed, and the impact preferences had on reintegration outcomes. The preferences of the Namibian government as sole reintegration actor were shaped primarily by domestic constituent pressures (i.e., the desire to shore up the support of ex-PLAN fighters), but were also a reflection of Namibia's one-party dominant system, where the risk of electoral penalties for failed policies was low. The political culture of SWAPO, which rewards loyalists and punishes any detractors, as well as the dominance of President Nujoma within the party, meant that government actors showed few differences of opinion in designing and implementing reintegration programs. Some differences existed, mainly in land resettlement approaches favored by the NDC versus those of the MLRR. On the whole, however, the reintegration preferences of actors within the SWAPO government can be said to have been aligned rather than to have clashed. What changes in preferences did occur were the result of the government's reaction to external events and pressures (e.g., pressures resulting from the protests of ex-PLAN fighters).

This section identifies these constraints on capacity and preferences in more detail and explains them in terms of the bureaucratic, political, and systemic pressures that shaped them,

Leonean government can not be said to have led reintegration in the same way that the SWAPO government led reintegration in Namibia.

beginning with a discussion of the implications of having the SWAPO government as the sole reintegration actor involved in designing and implementing reintegration programs in Namibia.

Lone Reintegration Ranger? The SWAPO Government as Unitary Actor and Implications for Capacity

To discuss a state government in terms of unitary action is often problematic. In many states, power is shared, different actors have different conceptions of the national interest, and building consensus and support is necessary for the formulation and implementation of policy. In Namibia, however, government actors *are* generally unitary. Political power is not shared but is concentrated in the hands of the president and the SWAPO party elite. Conceptions of the national interest in a one-party dominant system are conflated with party survival and continued electoral success, and therefore cohesive in the absence of credible opposition. Fundamental differences in opinion that do occur result not in persuasion or accommodation but in schism and isolation, as demonstrated by the split from SWAPO of Ben Ulenga, which is discussed in more detail below. One's career in the SWAPO government depends upon toeing the line. Mid-level respondents were particularly reluctant to criticize government reintegration policy. Senior officials, although more candid about initial reintegration program failures, would not discuss the failure of the DBC.

Namibia's approach to reintegration was indicative of its general approach to post-conflict governance: both have been fairly unilateral exercises. The government preferred to deal with reintegration internally rather than task outside donor or aid organizations with the running of programs. This was to ensure that it remained the sole patron of its former fighters in order to maintain their continued political support. Presiding over a newly-independent state, the SWAPO government also considered reintegration to be its sole responsibility and sovereign prerogative. This was not the case in Mozambique and Sierra Leone, because the conflicts were not fought for independence from an occupying government and because those states lacked the capacity to

fund and lead reintegration on their own. SWAPO inherited an economy and infrastructure less damaged by war and, although it also was constrained by lack of resources for reintegration, its capacity to implement programs once it decided to do so was relatively greater than the governments in Mozambique and Sierra Leone would have been without international support.

SWAPO's sole control of reintegration, however, nevertheless constrained its capacity to design and implement programs. First, the lack of international involvement with reintegration in Namibia, however, meant there was also a lack of institutional reintegration expertise. The impact of the absence of international expertise is that crucial questions about the fate of ex-SWATF, Koevoet, and San fighters were left unanswered, and no political institution was delegated the task of overseeing the monitoring of reintegration issues to ensure equitable treatment or to resolve disputes between ex-combatant groups or between ethnic groups within the same fighting force. Lack of international expertise also led to operational failures. Namibia looked to Botswana and Zimbabwe for institutional models when it designed its first round of programs. Those models produced the DBC, which was the most costly failure of all of the government's programs.

At the time, however, international reintegration expertise was not available. It was lacking in international actors themselves since, as I have argued, strategic thinking about reintegration was in its infancy in 1989. Even had international actors been prepared to assist with reintegration programs, it is unlikely that they would have challenged SWAPO's claims about reintegration being spontaneous or questioned its right to conduct reintegration itself. This is due in part to normative pressures for international actors to defer to the sovereignty of state actors but also to specific context of Front-Line States' vigilance about protecting the new Namibian government's right to avoid any interference in its domestic affairs. That vigilance was itself the product of the long legacy of South African interference in the affairs of Namibia's regional neighbors for decades. In Namibia, therefore, any potential international capacity to act would have been compromised by

the perceived illegitimacy of certain kinds of intervention. In other words, legitimacy strongly affects the capacity of a reintegration actor to intervene.

To say 'lack of international involvement' does not mean that international actors' preferences did not influence DDR in Namibia. UNTAG prioritization of immediate peacekeeping tasks set the stage for reintegration problems that followed. The short term priority of stopping the D-Day violence focused on disarming PLAN fighters and returning them to camps in Angola. This undermined later efforts to register ex-combatants and verify their status, since returning PLAN fighters were lumped with SWAPO exiles and other refugees. The solution was not to de-prioritize the pressing need to resolve the D-Day crisis but rather to have UNHCR maintain a registry of disarmed PLAN combatants. UNHCR, however, was unlikely to keep such a registry because its primary task is provision of material assistance to refugees and not support for former fighters and because of its preferences for impartial, apolitical provision of humanitarian assistance, which precluded assuming the political task of making a status determination about which individuals were combatants and which were refugees.

Resources were a second constraint on the SWAPO government's capacity to do reintegration on its own. Lack of sufficient financial resources to conduct reintegration is a feature common to all three cases. In Namibia, endemic to all reintegration processes based on the cases evaluated here, reared its ugly head in Namibia early on. Financial constraints explain the delay in reintegration programming even after persistent unemployment among ex-combatants became apparent and protests more frequent. Although SWAPO leaders were always sympathetic to the plight of unemployed ex-combatants (and especially ex-PLAN combatants), they faced significant budgetary constraints in public sector hiring, and were constrained from retrenchment of old public sector employees by the Settlement Proposal. It took monetary aid from South Africa (given to support ex-SWATF) and the security threat of protests to rouse the government to the reintegration

problems knocking at its door. Once the government prioritized reintegration programs, financial constraints limited the range of possibilities it considered but nevertheless gave it considerably more freedom of action than lead reintegration actors had in Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Governments, after all, can deficit spend and enjoy greater budget flexibility than international, state, and NGO aid agencies. This helps to explain why the government was able to afford to make room for the employment for over 12,000 ex-combatants and pass legislation for the War Veterans Fund.

Third, the SWAPO government's expertise and authority was limited to the public sector. It chose a program of public sector employment because that was what it could afford to do, what it knew how to do, and what it had the authority to do. Of course, this is also what ex-PLAN combatants most desired (jobs in the government and preferably uniformed, military-related jobs at that). Public sector employment became the government's reintegration 'brand' just as vocational training has become the brand of organizations like the ILO and GTZ. The government's attempts to program outside of this brand failed. SIPE's appeals to the private sector for voluntary recruitment of ex-combatants fell on deaf ears. SWAPO did not wish to force private sector employment of ex-combatants because of its commitment to gradualism in approaching inequality. The DBC was corrupt and mismanaged and so vocational training failed. And, land resettlement projects were not sustainable. Public sector employment, on the other hand, was sustainable.

SWAPO's sole control of reintegration also enabled capacity, particularly with regard to its authority to lead. Given the demands and expectations of ex-PLAN fighters, the SWAPO government's leadership of reintegration had advantages. A short term, internationally-led approach may have conditioned the government to resist long term remedies. This is particularly the case given the beliefs of many external actors, analyzed in chapter one, that long term aid increases community resentment and aid dependency. In Namibia, neither community resentment

of special benefits nor aid dependency was relevant: public sympathy was, at least initially, with the ex-PLAN fighters, and aid dependency was inevitable given the paternalistic culture cultivated in exile. In any case, ex-PLAN fighters were determined to receive long term support and might have protested more violently against a menu of external-provided benefits that did not deliver it.

Additionally, because of their close ties to Namibia's leaders, ex-PLAN fighters arguably were more subdued in their protests than they would have been had another actor led the process.

Advantages of SWAPO leadership do not mean that authority constraints were absent. SWAPO problems with impartiality constrained capacity and led to the polarization of reintegration assistance. Given incentives for polarization, some international advice, monitoring, or control at the front-end of the post-conflict transition could have created minimal standards of equal access to benefits and to security sector reform, standards to which the government would have felt compelled to adhere after the departure of UNTAG in order to preserve domestic and international credibility.

Government Actors and Bureaucratic Dysfunction: Implications for Capacity and Preferences

The case of Namibia demonstrates why government actors are not susceptible to the same bureaucratic pressures that impact international actors' preferences for short term reintegration strategies. This is because governments are more directly accountable to their constituents than international organizations and aid agencies (who are more removed from their 'constituents') are likely to be. In Namibia, accountability resulting from constituent pressures to produce successful reintegration programs meant that its attention span to the problem was longer than that of external actors. They had fewer incentives to downgrade expectations because constituents forced them to keep expectations high. UN missions and international aid efforts, in

contrast, can quickly lose support if democratic pressures in member-states produce changes in policy (e.g., US withdrawal from Somalia).

Government reintegration actors, however, are not immune to the endogenous pressures that produce bureaucratic dysfunction. Government actors, like their international and non-governmental counterparts, also have incentives to embrace low-return visible outputs over long term efforts that have more diffuse benefits, because such outputs enable them to package accomplishment for easy constituent digestion. In Namibia, for example, the pressure to find a lot of jobs for a lot of people in a short time influenced the creation of the SFF. Similarly, land resettlement policies that 'pushed for heads' by allotting each beneficiary with too little land to be self-sufficient allowed the government to publicize the number of individuals 'resettled' rather than invest in the viability of resettlement projects.¹⁰⁰

Evidence of collusion, adverse selection, and moral hazard was observed in Namibia. Bureaucrats had strong incentives to play down failure and emphasize success not just to win outside support but to secure advancement. In the Namibian government, bureaucratic dysfunction does not result so much from the state as a network of competing bureaucratic entities as from the state as a party with which all bureaucratic entities hope to curry favor. Tacit collusion was observed in government actors' (SIPE, the Cabinet Committee, the DBC, and ministry leaders) refusal to criticize each other's programs even in the case of obvious and serious corruption and mismanagement in the DBC. They also played down problems of SWATF and Koevoet unemployment and marginalization and declined to provide or track employment figures based on ethnicity. With external reintegration actors, the literature hypothesizes that tacit collusion occurs because agencies need to spin success in order to continue to attract donor funds. With SWAPO

¹⁰⁰ Author's interview with De Wet. He emphasized that this approach dominated MLRR projects in the 1990s but that NDF and other projects have increasingly stressed project viability over 'heads' on land.

government actors, in contrast, interviews with journalists, civil society leaders, and government officials themselves revealed that collusion resulted from electoral pressures which require actors to appear productive, avoid scandal, and deny allegations of mismanagement and waste. The impact of collusion has been to shield DBC actors from the consequences of mismanagement and corruption, and to silence debate about how best to address the needs of less powerful ex-combatant groups (SWATF, Koevoet, and ex-SWAPO dissidents). Interviews also revealed bandwagoning among reintegration actors: actors distanced themselves from unsuccessful programs (e.g., the DBC) even if they were at one time extensively involved with and supportive of them and voiced support for successful programs (e.g., the Peace Project) even if they opposed them at the time.

Adverse selection in Namibia was observed via information asymmetries between program providers (the government) and recipients (ex-combatants). These occurred most glaringly with the DBC, where ex-combatants believed that training would lead to full time employment even though press accounts of DBC mismanagement and failures indicate that officials knew this was unlikely. After adoption of the Peace Project, SIPE emphasized the benefits of public sector employment as a solution to persistent unemployment and deemphasized other solutions (e.g., land reform). This latter example, however, was a good strategy on the part of SIPE and other reintegration actors, because support for public sector employment over land reform was due in part to legitimate concerns that encouraging land reform would threaten security (as analysis of Zimbabwe indicates).

Moral hazard, as I wrote in chapter one, occurs when the performance of the reintegration actor can be only imperfectly observed, resulting in underperformance. The secrecy endemic to the SWAPO government made scrutiny of reintegration decisions difficult. For example, the lack of transparency in the government's decision to allow only 16,000 of 32,000 registered recipients to

receive severance payments. Underperformance resulted (targeting failures and fewer cash payments awarded) but was subsequently corrected after ex-combatant complaints led to the 1998 verification exercise, which proceeded according to more transparent eligibility criteria.

Domestic Political Pressures and One-Party Dominance: Implications for Reintegration Preferences

Strong pressures linked to SWAPO's internal party culture and its external political operating environment shaped the government's preferences for programs that assisted ex-PLAN fighters, excluded political opponents (ex-SWAPO dissidents), and neglected erstwhile adversaries (ex-SWATF and Koevoet). Those preferences, as I argued in the previous section, polarized reintegration issues and exacerbated ethnic and political tension. To maintain legitimacy as the party that liberated Namibia, SWAPO depended on the continuing political patronage of ex-combatants. Initial public support for the economic plight of ex-PLAN fighters, combined with vocal protest from the fighters themselves, created strong constituent pressures that the ruling party could ignore only at its peril. Electoral incentives also helps to explain government respondents' difficulty distinguishing between the impact that protests had on the party's legitimacy to govern and the threat they constituted to law and order or to security. Conflation of national security with regime security is predicted by the literature reviewed in chapter one.¹⁰¹

Additionally, to become a successful liberation movement in exile, SWAPO's leaders cultivated an authoritarian culture that would allow it to have the discipline it needed to fight a more powerful adversary from foreign turf. Once in charge of the state apparatus, SWAPO has had a difficult time shedding the authoritarianism of its exile. The government's preference to deal with dissent through exclusion and punishment is evidenced by its treatment of ex-SWAPO dissidents,

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Clapham 1996, p.4 and Monga 1999, pp.57-8.

whose exclusion from reintegration benefits was codified in the government's 1998 verification exercise and the War Veterans Subvention Act.

SWAPO's political culture explains why the party leaders assumed reintegration of its fighters would be spontaneous and why it never sought outside assistance with subsequent reintegration efforts. It could not tolerate dissent from within and certainly did not seek outside involvement and advice about what it considered its own prerogative after the independence struggle. Nor was it prepared to embrace a system of equal access to benefits, since it considered its own fighters at a comparative disadvantage in the employment marketplace and thought that the spoils should go to those who gave blood and sweat to the independence movement. Internal political culture also explains the collusion that occurred to shield government reintegration actors from criticism and scrutiny: the government suppressed information about the DBC and minutes of the meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants are not public. Many, though not all, SWAPO leaders bristled when asked to explain decisions about reintegration that they thought were not the purview of outsiders. That culture, in turn, created perverse incentives for reintegration actors. In the case of the DBC, SWAPO's political culture created a Samaritan's Dilemma: the DBC's managers could rest safe in the knowledge that the government would bail it out of debt, which meant the corporation operated without risk and increased incentives for further mismanagement and corruption. In 2002, for example, the government allocated millions of dollars in loan guarantees after the DBC defaulted on payments.¹⁰²

Exogenous political pressure to sustain the allegiance of its core supporters also explains the government's short term, ad hoc approach to reintegration: it pursued a policy of reintegration that would be just enough to stop protests and consolidate its support among ex-PLAN fighters but not enough to address the problems that resulted from the inequalities that this 'reintegration as

patronage' created. This is predicted by critical international relations theory. States are arguably always likely to lack incentives to address issues of deep-seated inequality not only because the political powerlessness of impoverished groups makes their mobilization difficult but also because states are predisposed to adopt problem-solving approaches rather than critical ones: the dominant forces within the state (in this case, the SWAPO elite) need only implement enough programs to win the consent of the less powerful and thereby convince them that their interests and the interests of the ruling party are the same.¹⁰³

Namibia's one-party dominant system also shaped the preferences of the Cabinet Committee and the National Assembly (which adopted the exclusionary language of the War Veterans Subvention Act) to exclude political opponents and favor ex-PLAN fighters. That system created incentives to polarize reintegration without penalties because SWAPO's political opposition is weak and has little chance of gaining power.¹⁰⁴ SWAPO has won presidential and National Assembly elections with over three-quarters of the vote in each election since independence. although this would arguably have changed had the government lost the continuing political support of ex-PLAN fighters)

On this point, it is not insignificant that the second wave of reintegration programs occurred in 1998, which coincided with the run-up to the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections and the resignation of a high-profile SWAPO leader, Ben Ulenga, a popular figure from the independence movement. Ulenga resigned from SWAPO to protest the party's decision in August 1998 to proceed with a constitutional amendment tailor-made to allow Nujoma to run for a third

¹⁰² Hugh Ellis, 'Bank of Namibia Criticizes the State's Loan Guarantees,' *Namibian*, 20 December 2002.

¹⁰³ Cox 1986 and Robert W. Cox, ed., *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).

¹⁰⁴ On the general characteristics of one-party dominant states, see Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, eds., *The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999).

term, and he soon declared his declared intent to mount an electoral challenge the president.¹⁰⁵ In his press statement, he declared:

Indeed the leadership problems in the Swapo party have now reached critical proportions. The recent and current crisis involving ex-PLAN fighters, former political prisoners on both sides, and former exiles in general, as well as the long-standing and unresolved land reform issue, are all indicative of the profound lack and total absence of coherent policy and thinking concerning matters of vital national importance.¹⁰⁶

For the first time since independence, the threat of a challenger who could exploit intra-SWAPO divisions existed, and suddenly the allegiance of disgruntled former fighters was up for grabs.

Ulenga became a lightning rod for dissent and focused criticisms on economic underperformance, dissatisfaction of ex-combatants, and the slow pace of land reform.

Ulenga founded the Congress of Democrats (CoD) in March 1999. The CoD sought to capitalize on ex-combatant feelings of betrayal by SWAPO and made their continuing unemployment a campaign issue for the 1999 elections. The timing of the Peace Project and the reconvening of the Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants was therefore both a concerted government effort to stop the protests as well as a political move by SWAPO to undermine support for the CoD. The 1999 election results confirm that SWAPO's strategy worked; it increased its majority in the National Assembly to 55 seats with 76% of the vote. The CoD won 10% of the vote and seven seats. The 2004 election indicated that the opposition party failed to increase its support among SWAPO members: the CoD lost two of its seven seats, and SWAPO swept to victory again with the same percentage of the vote it won in 1999.¹⁰⁷ The importance of the 1998

¹⁰⁵ Ulenga's departure occurred against a backdrop of increasing dissent within SWAPO over the centralization of party control within the hands of the president and his advisors, the president's decision to deploy Namibian troops to back Laurent Kabila's government in the DRC, and what dissenters saw as the president's strategy to 'distract citizens' attention from burning national issues [a shrinking economy, growing dissent from ex-combatants, and the slow pace of land reform] by 'lash[ing] out at the media, the interfering judiciary, importunate donors, whites and foreigners in public speeches' (Paul Kalenga, 'The Congress of Democrats,' *Southern Africa Report*, Vol.15, No.1, Dec. 1999, p.25).

¹⁰⁶ Dobell 1998, p.3.

¹⁰⁷ The major opposition parties, including the CoD threatened in November 2004 to boycott the elections because of incomplete rolls of registered voters and alleged government abuse of media advertisement, but in the end did not

reintegration interventions in neutralizing the potential intra-SWAPO threat from Ulenga confirms the important role that political pressures played in influencing both the timing and nature of reintegration policy.

Preferences: Domestic Political Pressures and Incentives for Innovation

Domestic political pressures (both electoral pressures to respond to ex-combatants' grievances and absence of political penalties for polarizing reintegration policy) exacerbated RPSRCs that contributed to ethnic and political tensions. Curiously and perhaps counter-intuitively, the same party culture and political pressures that led to polarization also created incentives for innovation. Those incentives facilitated actual (as opposed to purely 'time buying' or 'symbolic') reintegration and created sustainable economic opportunities. The government's decision not to consult external reintegration actors or development actors, who surely would have advised against additional public sector hiring, meant that the government avoided the underachievement seemingly endemic in outside organizations' approach to reintegration (reasons for that underachievement are explored in the Mozambique and Sierra Leone case chapters). External actors would not have been under any pressure to engage in the same trial and error process forced on the government by angry protestors. Political culture within SWAPO, which continues to prize movement solidarity, explains why the grievances of former fighters embarrassed the government into action. Disenchantment with government elites resonated, with ex-combatants saying, 'We fought, we died, and now look at these fat cats enjoying the spoils'. As

boycott the elections, which were held on 15 and 16 November 2004. (UNOHAC, 'Opposition Cries Foul Over Voters' Roll,' *IRIN News Service*, 11 Nov. 2004; UNOHAC, 'Opposition Consider Boycott, Claim TV Biased,' *IRIN News Service*, 29 Oct. 2004; UNOHAC, 'New Political Era Begins with Opposition Complaints,' *IRIN News Service*, 23 November 2004.)

one Ministry of Foreign Affairs official put it, 'I understand that those at the forefront of independence are now at the forefront of poverty.'¹⁰⁸

In contrast to standard international reintegration templates, the government, under significant political pressure to demonstrate achievement in securing jobs for ex-fighters, committed itself to long term solutions: it created a more transparent, comprehensive, and fair verification procedure in 1998 (albeit only for ex-PLAN fighters and on its third attempt); it experimented with different program components until it settled on the most effective and sustainable options (job placement and War Veterans Fund); and it demonstrated surprising flexibility in designing and implementing new programs once it became clear that old programs had failed. This is unique among the three cases evaluated in this thesis. Furthermore, the government targeted emerging sectors that could benefit from ex-combatants' skills, with the Anti-Poaching units in the MET being the best example. In land matters it stayed committed to a policy of national reconciliation when it could have embraced forcible seizure or appropriation. Finally, it honored peace process protections barring retrenchment of civil service employees when it could have sacked the old guard in order to create even more positions for its supporters.

RPSRCs in Namibia initially came in the form of protests and widespread unemployment as the result of the government's belief that targeted reintegration programs were not necessary. Those problems reinforced the importance of initial, targeted programs that responded to the expectations of ex-combatants. But, a second round of problems emerged from the way in which the government came to politicize the reintegration programs it later adopted. Those problems

¹⁰⁸ Author's interview with anonymous Foreign Ministry Official, Windhoek, 3 September 2003.

contributed to ethnic and political tension and undermined reconciliation, social reintegration, and democratization. The capacity and preferences of the SWAPO government, themselves shaped by powerful endogenous and exogenous political pressures, contributed to the persistence of those problems. The benefit of international actor involvement with reintegration could have mitigated polarization of reintegration by establishing clear guidelines for equal access to benefits and by mediating complaints brought by different groups. That involvement, however, was not possible given the low level of international preparedness for reintegration assistance at the time and given strong normative pressures against international intervention in Namibia's domestic affairs.

The negative impact of Namibia's RPSRC's, however, is small relative to those detailed in the Mozambique and Sierra Leone cases. Incomplete reintegration in Namibia did not create the incentives for widespread re-recruitment into regional fighting forces as occurred in Sierra Leone, or for organized criminality as occurred among some ex-combatants in Mozambique. The impact of both installments of RPSRCs also needs to be balanced against reintegration achievements. In finding employment for almost all of the ex-combatants the state recognized as eligible for assistance, Namibia has succeeded where few other post-conflict states have in creating economic opportunity.

Whether those successes are replicable is another matter. Namibia is a unique case. Its war did not destroy the country's infrastructure or economy to the same extent that many civil wars do. Its population is small. Few countries are likely to adopt a strategy of massive employment within the public sector because of donor pressures and wariness about the suitability of ex-combatants' skills for public sector jobs.¹⁰⁹ Its fighters (unlike the RUF) were popular during the

¹⁰⁹ Namibia's public sector employment program, however, seems large only weighed against its small population, having taken in nearly 21,000 ex-combatants in the NDF, SFF, and various ministries. Mozambique planned to employ 30,000 ex-combatants as soldiers in its new army (although only a fraction of this total joined), and Sierra Leone planned to recruit 15,000 ex-combatants from all sides into its force.

transition after independence and so unlikely to face the potential for community resentment that can undermine support for long term reintegration assistance elsewhere. Its fighters were also vocal and politically powerful, unlike in Mozambique and Sierra Leone where the vast majority of ex-combatants was politically marginalized. Unfortunately, incentives to polarize reintegration issues were not unique to Namibia, meaning that the aspects most threatening to security *are* replicable.

III. Mozambique

In Namibia, the need for reintegration came as somewhat of a surprise. In Mozambique, reintegration was on everyone's mind. What changed in three years? The reason can be summed up in one word: Angola. In Angola, UNITA denounced election results in the autumn of 1992 and led its rebel forces back to war against the government. Though certainly not the only cause of that country's slide back into conflict, the failure to complete disarmament and demobilization prior to elections, coupled with the lack of any significant reintegration efforts, left troops on both sides mobilized and well armed, facilitating the resumption of armed hostilities.¹ Policymakers in Mozambique, therefore, were operating in a context in which the failure of Angola loomed large. The situation in Angola provides important context about why reintegration actors in Mozambique focused program duration, components, and evaluation on the threat of a slide back to war. One drawback of that focus, however, was neglect of RPSRCs.

The signing of Mozambique's General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome on 4 October 1992 ended fifteen years of civil war between the *Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) opposition and the ruling *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) government. It coincided with the elections in Angola. For many, Angola's descent into war underscored that negotiated agreement in Rome did not make lasting peace a foregone conclusion in Mozambique. Subsequent delays in implementing the peace process in Mozambique only heightened fears of an Angola repeat, and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Mozambique in October 1993 to stress to the parties the need for a UN

¹ The UN Secretary-General reported that, within three weeks of the elections in 1992, only 41 percent of government and UNITA troops had been demobilized (UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II,' S/24245, 7 July 1992, p.10).

'win' in Africa and to appeal to them to avoid the Angolan example.² Learning from Angola, the mediators of the GPA and parties to the conflict were determined in Rome to create a timetable that would see demobilization and disarmament completed – and reintegration well under way – before elections would be held.

During the GPA negotiations, the FRELIMO government stressed the need for a concrete plan to reintegrate its own soldiers (Forças Armadas Moçambicanas, or FAM) and RENAMO ex-combatants.³ This led to significant investment in reintegration programs for both government and opposition forces. Indeed, UN-led reintegration programs in Mozambique were the most comprehensive ever attempted at the time, aiming to ease the combatant-to-civilian transition of roughly 100,000 fighters. Many UN officials and aid agency veterans (several of whom were interviewed for this chapter), as well as most academic assessment, have judged Mozambique's DDR process and overall war-to-peace transition to be a success.⁴ The evidence they use is Mozambique's non-return to war, surveys showing that ex-combatants feel socially accepted by their communities, and survey results from one year after programs ended that showed promising levels of employment among the ex-combatant population.⁵ The overarching success of the peace effort there is, in fact, compelling. Armed hostilities between RENAMO and FRELIMO did not resume after elections were held in October of 1994 and UN forces withdrew, and peace has held in the eleven years since. Peace came to Mozambique despite delays in the deployment of the UN force, delays in the

² Aldo Ajello and Patrick Whitmann, 'Mozambique,' in David M. Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004) p.450. See also Andrew Meldrum, 'Avoiding Another Angola,' *Africa Report* 38 (September 1993), pp.46-9; *Southern Africa Report*, 'War and Peace and War: Another Angola? Politics and Peace in Mozambique,' Vol.9, No.1, July 1993. I have argued that preoccupation with the Angolan scenario precluded a long term approach to ex-combatant reintegration in Mozambique ('Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.4, Winter 2004, pp.625-43).

³ Cameron R. Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1994) p.104.

⁴ See, for example, UN, *The United Nations and Mozambique*, UN Blue Book Series Vol.V (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995) pp.67,69; and Ajello and Whitman 2004, p.437.

⁵ UNDP October 1997, *The Socio-Economic Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique: The Soldiers' View* (Maputo: UNDP, October 1997).

demobilization of each side's troops, an escalation of violence in Assembly Areas where troops were eventually cantoned, and some riots by demobilized combatants.

At first glance, then, reintegration in Mozambique seems resolved. Certainly, where the government and the UN are concerned, reintegration of civil war ex-combatants is a chapter that has been closed. I argue in this chapter, however, that significant RPSRCs have persisted. These problems have had observable negative consequences for security in Mozambique and in the region, and have also impeded the country's economic and political development. They include: unemployment, economic marginalization, and inequitable access to reintegration benefits; incomplete national reconciliation observed through continuing incidents of violence and ethnic, regional, and political tension;⁶ exclusion of certain groups from reintegration benefits and DDR controls, including RENAMO 'bodyguards', unregulated private security outfits, and paramilitary, private, and irregular armed forces that created short-lived banditry and violence in the countryside and contributed to dissatisfaction among potentially dangerous spoilers; and, involvement of certain ex-combatants in organized criminal activity, with serious ramifications for security in the country and region. I also argue that the capacity and preferences of the main reintegration actors in Mozambique (UNOHAC, UNDP, ILO, IOM, and bilateral donors) contributed to the persistence of these problems through an international program of assistance that neglected problem management and by a FRELIMO government that lacked the capacity and interest to manage them once the UN mission (ONUMOZ) had withdrawn.

As with Namibia, I start this chapter with an overview of Mozambique's broader context of conflict, disarmament and demobilization process, and reintegration programs designed and implemented. Then, I identify RPSRCs that persisted during and after the withdrawal of

⁶ The lack of a national framework for reconciliation contrasts with extremely successful community-level initiatives that fostered local social reintegration of fighters through forgiveness rituals. See Michel Cahen, 'Success in

ONUMOZ and analyze their impact on security in Mozambique and the region before moving to a more detailed analysis, centered on actors' capacity and preferences, of why those problems have not gone away. As with Namibia, a combination of pressures internal and external to reintegration actors determined their capacity and preferences when it came to management or neglect of problems.

I. Conflict and Peace, 1975-1992

On 25 September 1964, FRELIMO launched its first military campaign against the Portuguese colonial government in Mozambique and engaged in protracted armed struggle with Portuguese forces until independence was won on 25 June 1975. The war-ravaged country, however, did not have much of a pause from conflict, and soon found itself embroiled in civil war against disparate factions that eventually came together to form RENAMO in 1977. The impetus to form RENAMO came from Rhodesia as part of its efforts to destabilize the new majority-rule government in Maputo. Mozambique's civil war raged for 15 years, killing approximately 800,000 and creating an estimated 1.5 million refugees and 4-4.5 million internally displaced persons.

The causes and nature of the conflict are topics of some debate, and have important ramifications for the peace deal that followed and the political makeup of the country today. Mozambique's 'civil' war was characterized by extensive external involvement supporting RENAMO forces, first by Rhodesia and then by South Africa.⁷ After Ian Smith's government was toppled, South Africa's support for RENAMO came to form a pillar of its destabilization

Mozambique?' pp. 213-33 in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005) p.229.

⁷ Of course, external involvement in civil wars is not unusual; attention paid to the issue in the Mozambican context is linked to efforts by FRELIMO and its supporters to downplay the extent to which RENAMO was a homegrown movement with local support.

policy to weaken black nationalist movements in southern Africa and, ostensibly, to destroy external bases of support for the African National Congress (ANC) and SWAPO. South Africa pursued this policy even if it meant undermining its own economic interests in Mozambique.⁸ South Africa's support for RENAMO continued illicitly even after Pik Botha signed the Nkomati Accord on 16 March 1984 with Machel, pledging to cease such assistance in return for guarantees from FRELIMO (which were kept) to kick out the ANC.

Not unlike the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, RENAMO was 'cultivated by external actors hostile to the state' and 'developed as a military unit and not a political movement'.⁹ Its controversial origins hampered the movement's efforts to transform itself into a political party after the GPA and contribute to its ongoing existential crisis as a party. In fact, much of the conflict literature focuses on whether RENAMO developed actual home-grown support at all, or was entirely a creation of Mozambique's external enemies. Subsequent elections have helped to settle the issue. RENAMO won in areas under FRELIMO control during the war and captured one-third of the vote in 1994 and consolidated its support in 1999 (nearly capturing the presidency).¹⁰ Ever with its finger on the pulse of Cold War politics, RENAMO was savvy during the war at cultivating an 'ideology' that would appeal to western (namely, US) sponsors, as well as win it some popular support among traditional and rural Mozambicans, who tended to suffer the most under FRELIMO's heavier-handed attempts to create a Marxist-Leninist state.¹¹ Instrumentally or not, RENAMO fashioned itself as a defender of capitalism and Christianity against a socialist, godless Mozambican state. This allowed the movement to use missionary organizations to smuggle resources into Mozambique

⁸ Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (London: Hurst & Company, 1995) p.563.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.564.

¹⁰ Cahen 2005, pp.219-220. RENAMO's 1999 gains can be explained in terms of the increasing anger at FRELIMO's failure to develop regions outside of Maputo and to diversify ethnic composition in its government (Cahen 2005, p.226).

¹¹ Jessica Schafer, 'Guerrillas and Violence in the War in Mozambique: De-Socialization or Re-Socialization,' *African Affairs*, Vol.100, 2001, pp.215-37.

and to secure financial support of right wing religious organizations in America.¹² It also meant that RENAMO could capitalize on the unpopularity of some of FRELIMO's policies to increase its indigenous support.

RENAMO's attempts to grow and nurture an ideology are important for two reasons. First, defining itself against FRELIMO's socialism (however crude or insincere such attempts may have been) forced FRELIMO to reconsider its policies and played a role in FRELIMO's willingness to engage the West and the Bretton Woods institutions on economic issues and to enter into talks with RENAMO to end the war. Second, and more directly relevant to ex-combatant reintegration, RENAMO's self-styling as a defender of democracy and capitalism against a 'communist' FRELIMO shaped the perceptions of the movement's ex-combatants before and after the war, and particularly those of its military leaders. Throughout the war, RENAMO relied on abduction to force men and women into its fighting ranks. It mixed coercion with training about the evils of communism to keep them there, and this propaganda became engrained in the minds of many fighters. Some of RENAMO's commanders maintain that a desire to fight communism was what drew them to the movement in the first place. The infamous RENAMO general, 'Chimuanza' (his *nom de guerre*), told me he joined the movement of his own accord because of his 'desire to fight the communist system imposed by the Soviet Union'.¹³ This perception, according to at least one senior Mozambican official on the FRELIMO side, also accounts for RENAMO supporters' apparent willingness to accept electoral defeat again and again because they consider themselves victors in the war, having paved the way for democracy and capitalism in Mozambique.¹⁴ However, sincere belief that the political and economic rhetoric of RENAMO would translate into tangible improvements in

¹² Steve Askin, 'Mission to RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right,' *Issue*, Vol.XVIII, No.2, 1990, p.30; Alex Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique* (London: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, in association with James Currey, 1991); Newitt 1995, pp.570-1.

quality of life after the war explains why ex-RENAMO express disillusionment that their leaders abandoned them to what they consider lives of poverty.¹⁵

If the authenticity or sincerity of RENAMO's aims during the war is in dispute, the tactics that the movement used to achieve them are less so. RENAMO was known as the 'Khmer Rouge of Africa'.¹⁶ The US revised its policy toward the group following a damning State Department report in 1988 detailing RENAMO's abuses, including the deaths of an estimated 100,000 civilians and evidence of 'shooting executions, knifings, ax/bayonet killings, burying alive, beating to death, forced asphyxiation, forced starvation, forced drowning, and random shootings at civilians in villages during attacks', as well as systematic rape of women abducted by RENAMO.¹⁷ The report reinforced a commonly-held assumption that RENAMO 'came from Hell'.¹⁸ The brutality with which the war was fought influenced the reintegration choices of Mozambique's fighters, since men and women forcibly recruited into RENAMO's ranks had not chosen a military path to begin with and since the violence made combatants on all sides unwilling to volunteer for continued post-war military service even if it meant a stable paycheck.

Mozambique's protracted and brutal conflict nevertheless produced one of the 'most unusual mediation exercises in contemporary diplomacy'.¹⁹ It was unusual because the warring parties were brought together by a private voluntary organization, the Community of

¹³ Author's interview with General Vareia Mange ('Chimuanza'), former RENAMO general and former Chief of Security for Afonso Dhlakama, Costa do Sol, Maputo Province, 15 September 2003, translated by John Simeon Adema.

¹⁴ Author's interview with anonymous senior Mozambican diplomat, Oxford, 10 October 2002.

¹⁵ As General Vareia put it, 'How come the same President [of RENAMO] during the war called on us to fight in the name of democracy but then left us free but with no job, no car, nothing. And now he wants our support. He wants us to vote for him... We don't want dictatorship again, and [Afonso] Dhlakama is a dictator. He is identical to Samora Machel. There is no difference. He is a tribalist. All of us generals who fought during the war expected better. If we do not get more we will go back to war... How can we like this criminal Dhlakama?'

¹⁶ Hume 1994, p.14.

¹⁷ Robert Gersony, 'Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique,' US Department of State, Washington, DC, April 1988.

¹⁸ William Finnegan, *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) p.25.

¹⁹ Hume 1994, p.x.

Sant'Egidio in Italy, to negotiate a peace accord. Armando Emilio Guebuza, elected in January 2005 as Mozambique's President, headed the government's delegation during talks (at the time he was the government's Minister of Transport and Communications), and Raul Manuel Domingos, then Chief of RENAMO's External Relations Department, headed the delegation for the rebels.

Peace was neither swift nor inevitable, but the ultimate commitment of the parties to reaching an agreement – combined with the good offices of Sant'Egidio, the Italian government, the UN, the OAU, and national government delegations from France, Portugal, the UK, and the US – produced the GPA on 4 October 1992 after two years of negotiations. In November 1992, a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission assumed responsibility for the interpretation of the GPA and settlement of any disputes. It was chaired by the UN and composed of government and RENAMO delegations, and representatives from Italy, France, Portugal, the UK, the US, and the OAU (and later Germany). The GPA formally took effect on 15 October 1992 ('E-Day') and set up a timetable for demobilization and elections that would follow from this date. Although many delays and obstacles followed the GPA, the Agreement was 'crucial' to building confidence between the parties and to prevent backsliding even during the tensest moments of the demobilization process.²⁰

Unlike Namibia's Settlement Proposal, the GPA contained guarantees for the demobilization *and* reintegration of ex-combatants, reflecting government and RENAMO delegation concerns for the welfare of their fighting forces and for the security of the new state. Domingos explained the inclusion of explicit guarantees for reintegration as the result of the fear of all delegations that individuals accustomed to using AK47s to make a living would resort to the instruments of war for their continued survival, and that GPA provisions for the

²⁰ Ajello and Whitmann 2005, p.438.

reintegration of ex-combatants would guarantee the provision of 'other instruments' for survival to replace AK47s.²¹

Although the GPA guaranteed provision of reintegration assistance, it was vague on details. It was silent on program duration and components because it indicated that the nature of benefits would depend upon money raised by a donors' conference for which the agreement called, but the agreement did mention 'demobilisation allowances, technical and/or vocational training, transport, etc.'²² While it stipulated the 'equal treatment by the State' of all demobilized soldiers, it did not specify whether this duty extended to provision of pensions for RENAMO soldiers. Although it is unusual for peace agreements to specify duties in such detail, the omission of the pension issue during negotiations created political tension later. Its definition of 'demobilised soldier' excluded paramilitary and irregular forces from reintegration benefits, which would later have a negative but short-lived impact on security post-conflict. The GPA delegated all reintegration planning, organization, procedural regulation, direction, supervision, and monitoring to the Reintegration Commission (CORE), which it established. Per the GPA, CORE was chaired by the UN and included representation from RENAMO, the Government, delegations of invited countries, and members of international organizations relevant to reintegration.

The idea that the UN would preside over all decisions made about the design and implementation of reintegration was a new development in post-conflict peace-building. There was no CORE equivalent in the Namibian mission because of the failure to appreciate a need for internationally assisted reintegration, but the disastrous experience in Angola changed that for Mozambique. CORE was also based loosely on similar UN-led commissions for the monitoring of human rights in Central America. It had a positive impact on the peace process.

²¹ Author's interview with Raul Manuel Domingos, founder and president of the Democratic Institute for Peace and Development (IPADE) and former unofficial 'second in command' of RENAMO and chief RENAMO negotiator during the Rome talks, Maputo, 19 September 2003.

With the UN as chair, CORE was able to mediate between the parties to resolve political disputes about reintegration; in particular, disputes over how to assist child soldiers that neither side wanted to admit having and how to resolve protests led by disabled ex-combatants.²³

As with reintegration, the implementation and enforcement of other aspects of the GPA was given over to the UN. Security Council resolution 797 established ONUMOZ on December 16, 1992. ONUMOZ had four main components: political, military, humanitarian, and electoral. Conceived under the gloomy shadow of failure in Angola, ONUMOZ's mandate stipulated the critical need to link the holding of elections in a post-conflict Mozambique with the complete implementation of all military aspects of the GPA. These military aspects were: the monitoring and verification of the ceasefire; the separation and concentration of RENAMO and FAM (government) forces and their subsequent demobilization and reintegration; the collection, storage, and destruction of weapons; the withdrawal of foreign forces (Malawian and Zimbabwean contingents) from Mozambican territory; the provision of security for key transportation corridors; the formation of a single, unified army (the Mozambique Defence Force, or FADM); and the disbandment of private and irregular armed groups.²⁴

Just as experience in Angola colored approaches to demobilization and reintegration, so, too, did it influence the broader UN presence in Mozambique. The UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Mozambique, Aldo Ajello of Italy, fought for and received a larger military presence on the ground, more electoral observers, and a more intrusive role in the implementation of the peace process than the UNAVEM-II mission in Angola had had.²⁵

The intrusive role of the UN in Mozambique was never warmly received by the FRELIMO

²² General Peace Agreement of Mozambique, Rome, 4 October 1992, Protocol IV.

²³ Author's interview with Douglas Passanisi, United Nations Development Group, United Nations Development Programme, and formerly United Nations representative to the Commission on Reintegration and the United Nations Officer for the Demobilization of Vulnerable Groups, New York City, 14 April 2004. Episodes with child soldiers and disabled combatants are explained in more detail below.

²⁴ UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ),' S/24892, 3 December 1992, p.5. Other key provisions of the UN mandate were to provide technical assistance and monitor the electoral process, and to coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance.

government, which reluctantly consented to the mission in the GPA but clashed frequently with ONUMOZ leaders. Nevertheless, the UN believed that a more intrusive role for itself than had existed in Angola, where the organization thought it had been reduced to a powerless 'monitor', was critical to retain meaningful leadership over the actual implementation bodies set up by the GPA if it was to have success in Mozambique.²⁶ At its level of highest involvement, ONUMOZ had an authorized troop strength of 6625 troops and military support personnel, and 1144 CIVPOL personnel, and ended up costing US\$492.6 million.²⁷

II. Demobilization and Disarmament 1992-1994

Even a strong UN presence on the ground, however, cannot substitute for political will by local actors to implement a peace agreement. In Mozambique, a desire for peace on the part of RENAMO and FRELIMO did not translate into a desire to demobilize, which significantly delayed reintegration programs and meant that reintegration began in a general atmosphere of distrust following protracted disputes over demobilization schedules.

The GPA mandated that demobilization be complete by April 1993 with elections to be held in October of the same year.²⁸ Troops did not begin to arrive in Assembly Areas (AAs), however, until November 1993, and demobilization from the AAs began in early 1994 and finished in late August of the same year, leaving about two months before elections were held on 27 and 28 October 1994. By early April, 1993, when the deadline for a demobilization process not even begun came and went, the UN Secretary-General was already complaining

²⁵ Hill 2005, p.73.

²⁶ Ajello and Whitmann 2005, p.439.

²⁷ The increase in CIVPOL forces was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 898 on 23 February 1994 following observed problems with police conduct and neutrality in the country.

²⁸ After a visit from Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 22 October 1993, the government and RENAMO agreed to reschedule the implementation of the GPA, and consequently the date of elections. The UN saw this as

that the demobilization timetables established by the GPA were 'unrealistic'.²⁹ A litany of UN Security Council resolutions expressed concern about the delays, approved revised timetables for the entire process, and urged the parties to abide by the framework for concentration, assembly, and demobilization of armed forces.³⁰ These resolutions bought the parties more time by extending deadlines, but did little to effect actual demobilization. Delays with demobilization also necessitated extension of the ONUMOZ mission, which was originally meant to expire on 31 October 1993.³¹

Two factors caused demobilization delays. First, the slow deployment of ONUMOZ forces significantly stalled cantonment of troops, as RENAMO in particular did not want to proceed without a strong UN security presence. Second, tactical maneuvering and a lack of trust between parties meant that neither side was willing to cede military advantage and positions – these tactics stalled the identification of AAs and led to bitter disputes about the numbers of troops on each side to be cantoned and demobilized. In April, 1994, the government delegation to the Ceasefire Commission revised the size of its forces to be demobilized downward to 64,110 from the 76,405 first declared in 1992. RENAMO refused to accept the figure. The government explained that it had mistakenly included 16,000 soldiers demobilized before the GPA was signed (the so-called 16,000). This did little to allay fears about reserve armies or forces kept outside of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration regime. At the GPA signing, the government claimed the 16,000 had been demobilized, but evidence surfaced that they remained armed, salaried and resident in

a necessary step to avoid elections taking place in a context where both parties were still mobilized and armed, and therefore to avoid the result that occurred in Angola.

²⁹ UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique,' 2 April 1993, S/25518; Hill called the GPA's operational timetable for demobilization and elections the 'most ridiculous aspect of the Accords' (Hill 2005, p.73).

³⁰ UN SCR 818, 14 April 1993, S/RES/818 (1993); UN SCR 850, 9 July 1993, S/RES/850 (1993); UN SCR 863, 13 September 1993, S/RES/863 (1993); and, UN SCR 882, 5 November 1993, S/RES/882 (1993).

³¹ ONUMOZ's mandate was extended three times, with the final withdrawal occurring on 31 January 1995. See UN SCR 882; UN SCR 916, 5 May 1994, S/RES/916 (1994); UN SCR 957, 15 November 1994, S/RES/957 (1994).

barracks. After the GPA was signed, the UN supervised the government's unilateral demobilization of 15,087 FAM troops, thus ending some but not all of the controversy surrounding the 16,000. Members of this group faced significant challenges accessing reintegration benefits later on in the process because they were not processed through AAs and many were not issued proper identification cards.

On the RENAMO side, Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO's leader, tended to hold the demobilization process hostage to seek concessions in other areas. Again, the UN role in the peace process proved crucial. Peacekeepers successfully induced Dhlakama to proceed with cantonment and demobilization through a combination of carrots (significant contributions to the trust fund to transform RENAMO into a political party as well as pay-outs to Dhlakama himself and other RENAMO leaders) and sticks (the 'tertiary' threat of UN withdrawal).³²

Diplomatically, two things happened to get the peace process back on track. First, direct talks between Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique's president) and Dhlakama on 3 September 1993 produced the Chissano-Dhlakama Agreements, whereby each side agreed to integrate into the state administration all areas under RENAMO control and to request the UN to monitor all police activities in the country.³³ Second, a visit from the Secretary-General in October 1993 helped the parties to reach a major agreement about a revised schedule for assembly and demobilization, as well as for the disarmament of paramilitary forces, militias, and irregular troops.

Problems within the AAs themselves exacerbated the situation and contributed to a dramatic deterioration in public security in the country. Soldiers stayed in the AAs longer than planned, and, particularly for government soldiers whose salaries had not been paid and whose demands for increased salaries had been unmet, the lengthy period of time spent in the camps

³² Stedman 1997, pp.12,14.

³³ UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique,' 10 September 1993, S/26385.

proved to be too much.³⁴ Riots and mutinies escalated: 6 violent incidents reported in January 1994, 13 in March, and 36 in May.³⁵ In RENAMO camps there was also rioting (12, 21, and 31 incidents for the same months),³⁶ but the dissatisfaction of RENAMO troops was linked more to the physical conditions in the AAs absent the salary complaints that precipitated FAM riots (although physical conditions in FAM camps were also squalid). As time spent encamped in AAs increased, both sides began to demand immediate demobilization with reintegration benefits. Riots, road blockades, and kidnappings occurred throughout the summer.³⁷ By August of 1994 armed banditry and arms trafficking had become widespread.³⁸

Demobilization delays contributed directly to the deterioration of the security environment and had a significant impact on reintegration. The delays increased disgruntlement among both parties' combatant populations, decreased the willingness of combatants to volunteer for the new army, and decreased combatant trust in the institutions and agencies that were to implement reintegration. The delays did not, however, derail the peace process. Nor did they produce violence on the scale of the D-Day disaster in Namibia. But, because of increasing banditry, protest, and arms trafficking, the reintegration process began under a dark cloud of uncertainty. Paradoxically, delays also produced one benefit for the reintegration programs that were to follow: they gave reintegration agencies and CORE more time to plan programs and more time to raise money to fund them.

With disarmament, the UN struggled to secure the full cooperation of the two sides in identifying the locations of weapons. The Ceasefire Commission (CCF) sent representatives with ONUMOZ peacekeepers around the country to verify the presence of any undeclared

³⁴ Hill 2005, p.233; Aldo Ajello, 'Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement, in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, eds., *Herding Cats: Multi-Party Mediation in a Complex World* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1999) p.629.

³⁵ Joao Paulo Borges-Coelho and Alex Vines, 'Pilot Study on Demobilization and Re-integration of Ex-Combatants in Mozambique' (Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 1994) p.16.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ UN Blue Book 1995, p.41; UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General,' 26 August 1994, S/1994/1002.

³⁸ UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General,' 21 October 1994, S/1994/1196.

troops, arms depots, or weapons caches. They examined 435 former military positions or depots declared by the Government, 287 by RENAMO, and 146 locations that were not declared by either party. These visits unearthed 'substantial numbers of weapons, including tanks, anti-aircraft guns, mines, armoured personnel carriers and mortar bombs abandoned or stored throughout the country'.³⁹ ONUMOZ also concluded that many more caches remained hidden in undeclared and unverified depots.⁴⁰ Peacekeepers collected about 200,000 light weapons from ex-combatants, mainly pistols and AK-47s; 24,000 of these are registered as having been destroyed by ONUMOZ and the rest were reportedly handed over to the Mozambican government.⁴¹ Additionally, the mission found 22,069 weapons and large amounts of ammunition.⁴² At the time, ONUMOZ claimed that time constraints, lack of cooperation from the local parties, and political sensitivity to transportation of large numbers of arms within the country prevented the destruction and location of more weapons. These constraints were to have a major impact on residual disarmament problems in Mozambique, exacerbated by uncertainty over reintegration that created incentives to ex-combatants to keep weapons or sell them on the black market.

The GPA stipulated that the new state's armed forces, the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (Mozambican Defence Force, or FADM), have a troop strength of 30,000 and be comprised of equal numbers from the FAM and RENAMO. The GPA also stated that the FADM would have joint FAM/RENAMO command. France, Portugal, and the UK trained the FADM forces, with support from Zimbabwe and Italy. The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force was given control over the process, but initially the UN was given no role on the commission and so had no leverage when this crucial aspect of the peace

³⁹ UN Blue Book 1995, p.43; UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General,' 23 December 1994, S/1994/1449.

⁴⁰ UNSC S/1994/1196.

⁴¹ Belmiro Rodolfo, with the assistance of Helio Sixpence and Bruno Mario, 'Mozambique: DDR Experience and Lessons Learned,' paper presented at the Conference on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Africa, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 21-23 June 2005, p.9.

process was also stalled by delays. By late August 1994 the FADM totaled only 7,806 (4,263 FAM and 3,543 RENAMO).⁴³ These low numbers meant that significantly more ex-combatants than planned would require reintegration assistance.

The problem was foreseeable. During GPA negotiations, military observers had conducted bilateral talks with both sides. These talks revealed that the government was pushing for a larger post-conflict military force for political reasons: it wanted to minimize the political costs of demobilizing soldiers (it thought the demobilized soldiers would resent losing their jobs but, as it turned out, the majority was grateful to be freed from military service). At the same time, the military observers concluded that RENAMO obviously lacked the troops to fill 15,000 slots in the new army, but would not admit as much out of a fear of appearing weaker than its FAM adversaries during sensitive negotiations. RENAMO's army barely surpassed the 15,000 mark to begin with, numbering about 20,000 at the time of demobilization, so parity in recruitment was always going to be unlikely. Plus, RENAMO's troops wanted out even though life in the FADM may have provided greater long-term job security. Their reluctance to join the FADM was a product of the experience of abduction and forced conscription, as well as fatigue with life in the bush. RENAMO strong-armed those fighters that it could in order to meet even minimal GPA commitments to the FADM and in order to be seen as equal partner in peace.

Delays with demobilization made the prospect of joining the FADM even less appealing for ex-combatants from both sides and left leaders on both sides with less leverage to force their subordinates to join the new force. The Security Council concluded in 1994 that ex-combatant frustration with the slow pace of DDR left leaders with no option but to make recruitment into the FADM voluntary.⁴⁴ The overwhelming majority chose demobilization. Ex-combatants and policy elites confirmed in interviews that ex-combatants did not see the new

⁴² UN Blue Book 1995, p.43.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.42.

⁴⁴ UNSC, 'Report of the Security Council Mission to Mozambique,' 29 August 1994, S/1994/1009.

army as offering a viable future, or as a way of acquiring wealth or stabilizing their life. Many had lived for a decade or more in the bush with no break. Also, as the reintegration assistance package took shape, ex-combatants realized that there were short term financial gains to be had from demobilizing. Ex-combatants demobilizing received greater assistance and had the option of finding a second income, and this was the primary reason cited by soldiers themselves to explain their preference for demobilizing over recruitment into the FADM.⁴⁵

That ex-combatants therefore had a reason to demobilize demonstrates the power of reintegration assistance as an incentive. But it also is indicative of the lack of coordination between two goals of the peace process that should have been linked: the need to form a new army and the need to successfully demobilize and reintegrate those not forming the new army. The Joint Commission for the Formation of the FADM (the CCFADM) did not have any significant links to CORE, and so even though the formation of the new army had major implications for the reintegration of ex-combatants, lack of coordination between the CCFADM and CORE meant that reintegration programs offered short term incentives that enticed ex-combatants away from the CCFADM, and the CCFADM did not make any provision for subsequent recruitment of ex-combatants down the road, after RSS payments ended and employment opportunities were not forthcoming. The government, however, would not have approved of subsequent recruitment as it did not want more ex-RENAMO recruits (it considered them less skilled) and thought that it had already met its obligations for the formation of the FADM under the GPA and should not have to make further concessions.

⁴⁵ Chris Alden, 'Swords Into Ploughshares? The United Nations and Demilitarisation in Mozambique,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.2, No.2, Summer 1995, p.120.

III. 'Paying and Scattering': UN-Led Reintegration Programs, 1992-1997

With few ex-combatants opting to join the FADM, attention necessarily turned to the tens of thousands of ex-combatants about to return to life as civilians. By late November 1994, 57,540 FAM and 20,538 RENAMO soldiers had been demobilized, a total of 78,078. These had been drawn from a total of 91,691 registered combatants on both sides (both assembled and unassembled, of which 67,042 were FAM and 24,649 RENAMO. This was more ex-combatants than had been demobilized in Namibia (52,000) and about the same number as would be in Sierra Leone. Of course, numbers of this sort are always difficult to verify: there were discrepancies on both sides and some ex-combatants attempted to re-apply for demobilization to obtain more benefits.⁴⁶ The challenge for reintegration programs was not simply logistical (how to channel resources to so many individuals dispersed across the country) but fundamentally strategic (what kind of programs would best improve the security situation in the country, with banditry on the rise and public security precarious).

Designing Programs

Mozambique was the first case in which reintegration decisions were made by numerous international actors and therefore the first case in which the operational impact of the proliferation of reintegration actors became evident. All programs had to be vetted and approved by CORE. The precise design of these was left up to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOHAC), UNDP, the IOM, ILO, and donors (especially the Swiss, Dutch, Scandinavians, Italians, and Americans), under the direction of UNOHAC, which chaired CORE.⁴⁷ UNOHAC was established after the International Donors Conference in December 1992. Aside from UN involvement in El Salvador, UNOHAC's leadership of

⁴⁶ UN Blue Book 1995, p.42.

⁴⁷ The principal donors to reintegration in Mozambique were the governments of Switzerland and the Netherlands.

CORE marked the first time the UN had led a reintegration process, which meant that program duration, components, and monitoring were designed from scratch. Nor had UN-assisted reintegration in El Salvador produced program evaluations in time for planning of programs in Mozambique. Moreover, reintegration interventions in Latin America, where ex-combatants were given substantial material support (e.g., refrigerators, televisions, pots and pans, etc.) could not be supported given the infrastructure after the war in Mozambique.

A number of options and competing priorities emerged during pre-program planning. Initially, according to the USAID DDR coordinator, the head of UNOHAC wanted to put a massive, standard development project into place, but such an intervention takes years to plan and years to fund and the immediate demands of reintegration did not provide that sort of time.⁴⁸ A UNOHAC representative to CORE explained that there was no specific push from anyone on the government or RENAMO side for a particular program, nor did they appear to know what they could or should ask for.⁴⁹ The government, dealing with demands to pay the salaries it owed to its own soldiers, wanted to pay part of those salaries, but then pump additional money into a fund that would provide skills training. UNOHAC and UNDP argued this would be too complicated (code for expensive and logistically challenging) and that the focus should be on breaking the chain of command and moving combatants out of their commissions.⁵⁰ Also, a program of government-administered services would have been politically contentious, likely facing a RENAMO objection or veto. The government, along with several bilateral donors, was also concerned that special treatment for ex-combatants would create a group mentality among soldiers and so wanted to minimize programs that targeted demobilized soldiers as such. All parties recognized the need for some targeted programming,

⁴⁸ Author's interview with Timothy W. Born, Team Leader, Private Sector Enabling Environment, United States Agency for International Development Mission to Mozambique, and formerly USAID's Coordinator for Demobilization and Reintegration in Mozambique, Maputo, 18 September 2003.

⁴⁹ Author's interview with Passanisi.

but most preferred to move to a system of general, non-targeted development aid as soon as possible.

The question of targeting highlighted fundamental disagreement among reintegration practitioners over what reintegration was. What followed was fierce debate on program design that one participant labeled 'acrimonious and chaotic'.⁵¹ For some, reintegration should have been limited to removing former fighters as an immediate threat to peace: reintegration is achieved, then, when combatants become *ex-combatants*. The goal is simply to 'pay them and scatter them', to decrease the sense of separate status or special entitlement among them.⁵² CORE was mainly interested in scattering *ex-combatants* and in breaking the chain of command, and the feeling of the donors was that the best thing to do was to keep people dispersed and have them with their families.⁵³ For others, reintegration should come with a long-term commitment to finding jobs for the demobilized through employment training and credit projects, in order to stave off longer-term disgruntlement and stimulate more sustainable activity. As I specify in the introduction, reintegration programs ought to do more than simply pay and scatter combatants; they ought to include good-faith efforts to create economic opportunities for former fighters as well, even if those efforts fall short of finding jobs for *ex-combatants*. They also need to do more than break the chain of command; as I argue, programs should create mechanisms that allow for the long term management of RPSRCs.

In Mozambique, the 'pay and scatter' view essentially won out, with most resources (US\$35 million of the US\$60 million total price tag for the reintegration programs implemented in Mozambique) supporting a cash compensation program, the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS). The RSS supported the minimalist goal of providing financial support to combatants

⁵⁰ Author's interview with Agostiño Zacarias, Chief of Program for Coordination, Advocacy, and Program Development, UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, New York City, 13 January 2003.

⁵¹ Author's interview with Born.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Author's interview with Passanisi.

over a fixed period of time, enough to pay and scatter them and remove them from the conflict equation. The push for employment assistance did, however, find some expression in three additional programs benefiting a small percentage of ex-combatants: the Information and Referral Service (IRS), the Occupational Skills and Development Program (OSD), and the Provincial Fund (PF). These, too, were limited in scope, and each had ended by 1997.

The approach chosen had several advantages even if, as I argue below, it fell short of managing several persistent problems and failed to create sustainable economic opportunities. Breaking the chain of command by creating incentives to settle in home areas and providing financial and material assistance drawn out over a long period of time both demonstrated a strong international commitment to providing short term security guarantees. What was missing was the anticipation of RPSRCs, which might have led actors to discuss closer collaboration with the police and security forces to monitor and respond to residual problems associated with petty or organized criminality, with development organizations and arms control experts to design follow-up collection and destruction of weapons, and with government ministries to encourage follow-up monitoring and planned transition from a policy of targeted to non-targeted support.

Scattering: Transportation

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) coordinated the transportation of ex-combatants and their families to the location of their choice on behalf of the Technical Unit for Demobilization. This entailed registered demobilized soldiers and their dependents at the 49 officially designated Assembly Areas. On the day of demobilization before transporting ex-combatants by land and air to their chosen destinations, IOM issued each ex-combatant with a reintegration kit, which included agricultural implements (seeds and tools), clothing, and food

rations. IOM transported 76,188 registered ex-combatants, and 82,710 dependents.⁵⁴ All respondents praised the logistical efficiency of the IOM in carrying out the transportation task.

Paying: The RSS

The government agreed to pay ex-combatants the equivalent of six months' salary. But the fear of reserve armies on either side of the conflict, as well as the belief that six months' salary would not be enough to curb banditry and violence, led the Dutch Ambassador to propose that the government's salary payment scheme be extended to provide cash for demobilized soldiers for a total of two years.⁵⁵ This proposal gained the support of Ajello and ambassadors of several of the donor countries.⁵⁶ This became the RSS, and provided for an additional 18 months' pay for each ex-combatant. Angola was the cautionary tale upon which the RSS was constructed. In Angola, both parties had kept soldiers in reserve 'as a kind of insurance policy pending the outcome of elections'.⁵⁷ The RSS was designed to curb this practice by using cash as bait to lure ex-combatants kept in reserve by either party in Mozambique out of the bush.

USAID was initially against the RSS. The agency did not agree in principle with cash distribution, arguing that there was nothing out in the rural areas to buy and that money was not sustainable. It also argued that legal prohibitions in America prevented the agency from financially supporting a cash assistance scheme for members of foreign militaries. CORE and UNOHAC participants questioned this justification, as the ex-combatants were no longer military personnel but civilians. USAID preferred training projects, and decided not to fund the RSS, instead supporting IOM involvement with the OSD and PF. After it became clear the

⁵⁴ International Organization for Migration (IOM), 'IOM Participation in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,' Geneva, 25 January 2002, p.2; IOM Mozambique, 'Contribution to the Peace Process,' Maputo, November 1995.

⁵⁵ UNDP, *Report on the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique 1992-1996* (Maputo: UNDP, 1997) p.10. This report is a summary of the extensive program audit and survey of 5% of all RSS recipients carried out by UNDP, the full results of which are found in UNDP, *Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique* (Maputo: UNDP, March 1997); and UNDP October 1997.

⁵⁶ Ajello and Whitmann 2005, p.444; author's interview with Barnes.

RSS had worked rather well, USAID joined the chorus of donors in proclaiming the RSS a success and issued more critical assessments of the vocational training initiatives. Once the donors had rallied behind the RSS, the Nordic donors successfully lobbied UNOHAC to adopt the scheme and UNDP agreed to manage it. Ajello presented the idea at a special donors' meeting on 31 January 1994 and the first contributions were pledged. CORE revised its reintegration strategy to include the RSS and formally approved it on 17 March 1994.

The RSS was the boldest of the reintegration components in size, scale, and duration. Payments to demobilized soldiers varied according to their rank and were drawn out over a long period of 24 months from demobilization, with six months provided for by the government and 18 months funded through donors and administered and distributed by UNDP.⁵⁸ The minimum payment amount was 75,000 Mozambican *meticaís* (MT) per month, raising the minimum salary for a private, which had been set at MT35,000 per month during the war. Meanwhile, the highest rank, Colonel General, received MT2,541,100 per month. Because the FAM and RENAMO used different rank systems, an equivalency system was agreed upon, collapsing 43 different ranks into 19. In total, 47,639 privates received 51.25% of the RSS funds, and 45,242 officers received 48.65% of the money.⁵⁹ After the Mozambican currency was devalued, the RSS had a US\$5 million surplus at the end of the payment scheme, which was used to pay a lump sum to each ex-combatant regardless of rank.⁶⁰

The decision to draw payments out over a relatively long period (unprecedented for reintegration programs) was meant to ensure guaranteed income to combatants during their most vulnerable transitory period. The money also helped combatants to win acceptance in their communities of resettlement, because it provided a steady source of spending in those

⁵⁷ Ajello and Whitmann 2005, p.444; Ajello 1999, p.631.

⁵⁸ The RSS cost a total of \$35.584 million. The Swiss government was its biggest contributor, followed by the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Finland, Norway, Spain, Portugal, and Germany (UNDP 1997, p.10).

⁵⁹ UNDP 1997, p.11.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.10.

communities. As collection of the money was tied to the area that an ex-combatant chose, the RSS encouraged demobilized soldiers to stay in their districts of choice, thus mitigating urban migration. As stated already, the lure of the monthly payments also encouraged any soldiers not yet accounted for to come forward, register, and demobilize in order to claim the benefits. There were some wrinkles with implementation of the RSS, especially delays in distribution and combatant confusion over procedure. Sometimes, combatants would get angry at branch officials of the *Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento* (BPD, the Mozambican bank that distributed payments), and given that sometimes upwards of 6,000 soldiers were picking up checks from one branch, the danger of that anger escalating was real.⁶¹ But discontent was never unmanageable, so 'pay and scatter' succeeded at paying and scattering.

Audits and surveys also demonstrated that the RSS was the most successful of the reintegration programs, particularly judged against ex-combatant satisfaction. Ninety per cent of all ex-combatants were satisfied with the scheme, and similar percentages (94% and 93.16% respectively) reported that they had no problems cashing RSS checks or receiving RSS money. Sixty-two per cent said in 1996 that they would have preferred a lump sum payment to the monthly payment scheme. The primary function of the RSS ended up being to support the education of ex-combatants' family members, with half of the ex-combatants indicating that they used payments to pay for their children's school fees, 30% using it for housing, and 18.3% investing it in economic activity.⁶²

The RSS helped to temper ex-combatant expectations. It was clear to each demobilized soldier that he or she would receive 'x' amount of money over 24 months. And ex-combatants demobilized knowing that. It provided a significant 'cooling off period'.⁶³ The scheme also dissuaded the parties from keeping reserve armies: government soldiers held in

⁶¹ Interview by author with Gareth Clifton, former Northern Region Coordinator for the Reintegration Support Scheme, Maputo, 19 September 2003.

⁶² UNDP October 1997, p.10.

reserve were some of the first to demobilize. They threatened to mutiny unless allowed to demobilize in order to claim the RSS benefit, because they feared that failure to do so would disqualify them from receipt of RSS payments. The RSS therefore limited the 'Angolan scenario'.⁶⁴ Other factors, notably the ex-combatants' fatigue with conflict and life in the FAM or RENAMO forces, contributed to their cooling off as well, but it is equally clear that the mechanics and long term nature of the RSS contributed positively to peace.

What administrative problems did emerge during the RSS were ironed out by the IRS. The service also offered general advice and counseling, but it never functioned as a job referral service, as was initially planned and as many combatants expected. To maintain impartiality and foster social reintegration between former enemies, each IRS office was staffed by both RENAMO and FRELIMO representatives. The IRS was based on a program that provided occupational and educational referral services in El Salvador for former combatants. But, as there were no resources or economic opportunities to support such a referral service, the focus of the IRS had to be about the provision of information only. As a UN representative to CORE put it, 'We could not promise training. We could not promise education. We couldn't really promise much of anything which is why we did the Referral Service.'⁶⁵ The lack of job opportunities for anyone in post-conflict Mozambique limited the promise of the IRS, but the additional tension between having one organization design the program (Creative Associates International, Inc.) and another implement it (the IOM) also limited the effectiveness – and confused the purpose – of the initiative.

(Not) Employing: The OSD and PF

The success of the RSS did not rub off on the employment-oriented components of the DRP. The first of these, the OSD, developed an employment-training curriculum featuring 49

⁶³ Author's interview with Clifton.

⁶⁴ Ajello 1999, p.631; Ajello and Whitmann 2005, p.445.

⁶⁵ Author's interview with Passanisi.

courses geared toward skilled and semi-skilled employment sectors.⁶⁶ Grants from Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, and the World Bank funded the OSD, totaling just under US\$4.5 million. Only a fraction of combatants participated in OSD courses and course provision was inequitably distributed across the provinces.⁶⁷ The ILO never performed a market survey to assess which skills were most in demand. The courses were meant to provide hands-on training outside of a classroom setting, but 65% of the training was provided in training centers.

Training programs are legendary in Mozambique more for their dark comedy than for their success. Some combatants trained as electricians in villages without electricity.⁶⁸ Ex-combatants in Magude, a semi-rural town outside of Maputo, were given seeds for raising crops but not agricultural training (only a quarter of ex-combatants had been involved with agriculture or fishing before being taken into one fighting force or the other). Meanwhile, ex-combatants in Maputo received agricultural training but no seeds.⁶⁹ Most training occurred in the cities, and accommodation and transport were not provided for ex-combatants in rural areas.⁷⁰ Training kits would not arrive on time. Cooperative ventures would crumble. Roughly 70% (or about 6,000) of the program's trainees secured employment, but it is unlikely that many of these retained their jobs beyond six months. Ministry of Labor reports on the program proudly list the number of ex-combatants trained and the number offered jobs, but not the number of ex-combatants who retained jobs six months later. There were no incentives to retain demobilized soldier employees; there was only money to hire them in the first instance. If anything, combatant experience with the OSD may have made the situation worse, raising expectations beyond what the market could offer.

⁶⁶ Chris Alden, 'Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique,' *Security Dialogue*, Vol.33, No.3, 2002, p.345.

⁶⁷ Training was provided to 8,757 participants, of whom 7,707 were ex-combatants. This represents 8.3% of the overall ex-combatant population. (UNDP 1997, p.17.)

⁶⁸ Based on interviews by the author with 15 ex-combatants from RENAMO and FRELIMO in urban and rural districts, Maputo and Moamba, 23-26 September 2003.

⁶⁹ Author's interview with Flora Alberto Ngoma, PROPAZ Provincial Trainer and former RENAMO officer, Maputo, 26 September 2003, translated by Salomão Mungoi.

The OSD also comprised a Business Skills and Micro-Enterprise Development program, which provided 500 demobilized soldiers, mostly from the two sides' officer class, with business training and technical assistance to support business start-up costs and to help ex-combatants gain access to credit.⁷¹ As with the vocational training aspect of the OSD, no data on retention or longevity of these projects was kept. In any case, the number of demobilized soldiers benefiting from the program represents a tiny fraction of even ex-combatant officers.

The second employment-centered component was the PF, a program that was implemented later on in order to address fears that, once the RSS subsidies ended, there would be no employment opportunities for combatants and violence could ensue. The PF also reflected the Government's desire from the beginning that reintegration interventions divide resources between cash hand-outs (the RSS) and more investment in training programs.⁷² IOM and GTZ coordinated micro-enterprise and income-generation activities and offered grants and technical assistance to businesses and other enterprises willing to hire or train combatants. The World Bank provided additional funds in 1995 to strengthen the efforts of GTZ and IOM.⁷³ The consensus among UN and other development agency respondents is that the GTZ programs fared better because they were longer term, provided more support, and mixed ex-combatants with community participation more effectively. GTZ stressed that the goal should be to mix ex-combatant participants with members-at-large from their home communities. IOM projects allowed ex-combatant-only projects; these tended to fail and reinforce notions of ex-combatant entitlement. Donors, including the World Bank, advocated programs with exclusive ex-combatant participation, to maintain focus on the target beneficiary.⁷⁴ CORE, which set the policy for PF programs, specified only that PF projects include at least 50% ex-combatants as

⁷⁰ This was the dominant perception among ex-combatants interviewed in Moamba, Maputo province.

⁷¹ UNDP 1997, p.17.

⁷² Author's interview with Zacarias.

⁷³ World Bank, 'War-to-Peace Transition in Mozambique: The Provincial Reintegration Fund,' *Findings* (Africa Region), No.90, July 1997, accessed at <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/english/find90.htm>.

beneficiaries. UNDP and UNOHAC respondents said that programs that paired fighters with community members, such as those run by GTZ, had more economic sustainability and social reintegration benefits than those PF projects that targeted only ex-combatants.⁷⁵

Overall, however, the PF benefited a small percentage of the total combatant population. It cost approximately US\$15.3 million, or 16% of the total cost of demobilization, yet benefited 7,550 demobilized soldiers (or 8.1%), of which 5% are believed to have been employed as a direct result of the training obtained.⁷⁶ Combatants were placed into arbitrary cooperative groups with little market incentive to succeed. Some programs offered training on running a business with no access to credit, or else provided credit without access to training. Implementing agents did not verify the sustainability of the projects, and many were not economically viable.⁷⁷ Once grants ran out, many employers laid off combatants hired as part of the scheme. Other employers were not employers at all: they filled out fraudulent applications only to take the money and run. All PF money allocated had to be approved by the Ministry of Labour, which set up a system of FRELIMO cronyism. Ex-combatants complained about lack of follow-up and inflexible application procedures.⁷⁸

Vulnerable Groups

Reintegration programs struggled to account for the special needs of child, female, and disabled combatants. RENAMO and FAM recruitment of child soldiers is well documented. Data from Assembly Areas revealed that over one quarter of demobilized combatants were underage when they joined the two sides' fighting forces: 16,553 on the government side and

⁷⁴ Author's interview with Barnes.

⁷⁵ See also UNDP 1997, p.21.

⁷⁶ Martinho Chachia, 'Demilitarisation of Post-Conflict Societies: The Case of Demobilisation of Youth in Mozambique,' paper presented at 'The Role of Youth in Conflict Prevention in Southern Africa' conference, Livingstone, Zambia, 11-14 April 1999.

⁷⁷ UNDP 1997, p.21.

⁷⁸ Author's interview with Paciencia Majante, Secretary-General, Mozambican Association of the War Demobilized (AMODEG), 26 September 2003, translated by Salomão Mungoi.

8,945 RENAMO.⁷⁹ The government claimed the data were wrong, but all of the registration information from AAs had been verified by representatives from both sides.

At the time of the Rome negotiations, and during the ONUMOZ mission, RENAMO would not admit to the presence of underage soldiers in its ranks because it was afraid of the electoral consequences of doing so.⁸⁰ A major humanitarian crisis ensued, as there was no way to locate these children after the war and they risked being abandoned in the bush and excluded from formal demobilization. The donors, led by the American Ambassador, applied significant pressure on RENAMO to allow access to underage combatants. This led to a visit of representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the EU, and CORE to RENAMO headquarters where they reached an agreement with RENAMO to 'get the kids out'.⁸¹ From there, Save the Children, supported with supplies from USAID, coordinated a major airlift to reunite children with their families. UNICEF provided shelter, blankets, and clothes. Many of the children were reluctant to cooperate with family reunification, as they wanted the same reintegration benefits that their older colleagues were entitled to under the RSS and other programs. Save the Children succeeded at winning increased cooperation by showing the children photographs of their families, which softened their opposition to reunification. The program was largely successful, although it assisted only half of the child combatants known to have taken assistance from ICRC during the conflict.

With FRELIMO child soldiers, the main problem was accessing pensions. The government awarded pensions to FAM soldiers who had completed ten years of service. It would not recognize start-dates for soldiers who were recruited underage because it did not want to admit to having such individuals in its army; therefore, it would not process their pension application. UNDP and UNOHAC did not push for a change of policy because the

⁷⁹ Author's interview with Barnes; UNDP October 1997, p.18.

⁸⁰ In fact, neither side to this day has admitted recruitment of children during the civil war.

⁸¹ Author's interview with Passanisi.

FRELIMO government insisted that it was an internal issue off limits to international intervention. After pressure from bilateral donors and ex-combatant groups, however, the government ultimately decided to honor pension applications for soldiers whose time of service started when they were still underage but it never explicitly recognized that it had recruited child soldiers. The Mozambican Association of the War Demobilized (AMODEG) assists these ex-combatants with pension applications. Because the government does not publicize this policy, to date there are many FAM ex-combatants who have not received the pensions to which they are entitled.⁸²

Female ex-combatants encountered problems with reintegration programs because of issues with determining their rank. During the war, the FAM did not issue women ranks; ranks were issued somewhat arbitrarily by ONUMOZ based on training received and combat roles. On the RENAMO side, women living with men in the bush would often be given the same rank as their husbands or partners even if they had no formal role within RENAMO themselves. This increased resentment among some FAM female combatants, since rank determined benefits under the RSS.⁸³ In addition to problems with rank, there were no separate reinsertion kits for women, so female ex-combatants received men's clothing as part of their transitional assistance package. Finally, programs did not take into account the special needs of women who were kidnapped, abused sexually, and forced to marry combatants.⁸⁴

The Mozambican Constitution stipulated that only FAM soldiers were entitled to pensions. RENAMO soldiers did not pay into a pension scheme and were therefore denied pensions. Disabled ex-combatants from FRELIMO, in a remarkable show of solidarity for their RENAMO counterparts, protested at the ONUMOZ headquarters. The leader of the

⁸² Author's interview with Antonio Mambui, AMODEG Co-Founder and Logistics Coordinator and former FAM combatant, 24 September 2003, translated by Salomão Mungoi.

⁸³ Author's interview with Jacinta Jorge, Executive Director of PROPAZ and FAM Captain (Ret.), 26 September 2003, translated by Salomão Mungoi.

⁸⁴ Rodolfo 2005, p.25.

Mozambique Association of Disabled Soldiers (ADEMIMO), a FRELIMO veteran, told Ajello that ADEMIMO's members across the country would not demobilize and would demonstrate until RENAMO's 2000 disabled soldiers were granted pensions. This was no idle threat, as the FAM's disabled had been stationary and grouped together in centers across the country for years, which meant a lot of alcohol, a lot of drugs, and a lot of weapons. The government, ONUMOZ, and CORE reasoned that, because there were relatively few RENAMO ex-combatants and because the disabled FAM were the only group threatening not to demobilize unless this demand was met, they should grant the pensions. Pensions were not extended, however, to able-bodied RENAMO ex-combatants. The bureaucratic process involved for disabled RENAMO veterans to apply for the pensions was complicated, and to date not all disabled RENAMO fighters know that they are eligible for these benefits.

Reintegration Post-ONUMOZ

CORE's mandate ended when ONUMOZ withdrew. Reintegration responsibility subsequently transferred to the FRELIMO government, which designated the Ministry of Labour as responsible for continuing reintegration efforts. Civil society organizations continue to work on reintegration; namely, ex-combatant associations and Propaz, an organization founded in 1995 by AMODEG and ADEMIMO to train ex-combatants to use non-violent tactics to lobby local officials for benefits. Meanwhile, AMODEG, though largely ineffective because of leadership disputes in the late 1990s, still receives funding from the government and private sources to assist ex-combatants with pension applications. Its leader maintains that reintegration needs persist and that civil society leaders agree that they persist despite claims by government, UNDP, and others that 'reintegration has already been completed'.⁸⁵ AMODEG no longer threatens the government with protest, but its emphasis on income generation schemes and education programs for ex-combatants shows the organization does

⁸⁵ Author's interview with Majante.

not consider the reintegration issue resolved, although it arguably has an organizational interest in keeping the issue alive.⁸⁶

IV. 'Explosions and Dissatisfaction': RPSRCs in Mozambique

Literature evaluating the reintegration effort in Mozambique depicts a qualified success, using the non-return to war as evidence that the country's demobilized soldiers have successfully reintegrated in the country despite employment challenges and various shortcomings in the accomplishments of the OSD and PF.⁸⁷ How reintegration actors themselves evaluated success depends on where they sit. Interviews with UNOHAC and UNDP officials focused on their agency's role in administering the RSS; i.e., did the right people get the money where they were supposed to get it when they were supposed to get it? All respondents, however, also articulated a broader appreciation of reintegration objectives beyond the implementation of its component parts. A characteristic reply was that reintegration in Mozambique was meant to *support* reintegration by creating a welcoming environment that deterred 'explosions and dissatisfaction': 'Nobody reintegrates ex-combatants. They reintegrate themselves.'⁸⁸

Certainly, the programs implemented in Mozambique succeeded in neutralizing many explosions and much dissatisfaction. 'Paying and scattering' ex-combatants and 'buying peace' in Mozambique helped the country to avert the worst-case scenario of a return to war. Programs also mitigated the roadside protests and banditry that had characterized the

⁸⁶ Schafer 1998.

⁸⁷ Rodolfo, p.30; Alden 2002; Dennis C. Jett, 'Lessons Unlearned – Or Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere,' *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, <http://www.jha.ac/Ref/aar008.htm>, posted 20 January 2002; Alden 1995, pp.175-93; Hill 2005, p.232; Nicole Ball and Kathleen F. Campbell, *Complex Crisis and Complex Peace: Humanitarian Coordination in Angola* (New York: UNOHAC, 1998) p.49.

⁸⁸ Author's interview with Barnes.

demobilization period. But actors failed to adequately manage the persistence of several problems, many of which caused explosions and dissatisfaction. RPSRCs in Mozambique contributed to state and regional insecurity, undermined trust in Mozambique's law and order institutions, and exacerbated ethnic, political and regional (i.e., inter-provincial) tensions within Mozambique. These problems included: violence sparked in part by ex-combatants' grievances about their persistent unemployment; ethnic, political, and regional tension caused by perceptions of preferential treatment and political polarization of reintegration programs; and the involvement of some ex-combatants in arms and drug trafficking and other forms of criminality. As in the Namibia case chapter, I describe the nature of these problems as well as analyze the impact that each had on post-conflict security in terms of the threats they posed to the state's survival, institutions, neighbors, or citizens. I also analyze whether more could have been done to manage each problem.

Reintegration into Basic Poverty: Violence Caused by Persistent Unemployment among Ex-Combatants

High unemployment rates among former combatants persisted. Initially, UNDP and others declared victory over unemployment. A March 1997 survey showed that only 14% of demobilized soldiers had no work, a vast improvement over a 1996 survey that showed that 71% of respondents had no work.⁸⁹ This was a remarkable decline. Survey projections, however, are misleading. They count subsistence agriculture as employment and they fail to take into account the fact that many ex-combatants initially hired on OSD, PF, and ORF schemes lost jobs as projects folded.⁹⁰ A report presented on the Mozambican reintegration in 2005 contrasted sharply with early survey results: 'We [Mozambicans] still have a high

⁸⁹ UNDP 1997, p.27.

⁹⁰ See also Joao Paulo Borges-Coelho, 'Reintegration of Maputo Ex-Combatants,' Project Commissioned by USAID/Mozambique (Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, January 1997) pp.45-6.

percentage of unemployed former combatants,' and it warned that the RSS did not solve all of the problems of the demobilized.⁹¹

Assuming from survey evidence that unemployment problems had been solved, reintegration programs provided no support beyond the OSD and PF. The preference of international actors was to focus on short term security priorities (paying and scattering combatants to effect a 'cooling off period') and to provide only limited employment support that, as is now evident, created few if any economic opportunities for ex-combatants. After CORE's mandate ended, the government's preference with respect to reintegration was to end provision of any targeted or non-targeted benefits for ex-combatants. As the ex-combatants themselves joke, 'The government told us, "Now you are all equally poor. You have been reintegrated back into basic poverty."' ⁹²

Although comparative employment figures are not available, consensus among all respondents was that ex-combatant unemployment figures are on a par with the unemployment of the general population. The threat to security from unemployment, however, does not stem from ex-combatant perceptions that they are better or worse off than their non-combatant peers but rather from perceptions that their leaders benefited from the war-time sacrifices of their soldiers and have since done nothing to address their poverty. Despite steady economic growth, few Mozambicans see tangible improvements in their quality of life, leading many to ask where that money is going.⁹³ A widespread perception among former combatants, and especially RENAMO combatants in rural areas, is that the spoils of any economic growth go to FRELIMO party supporters and increase opportunities for corruption and organized crime.⁹⁴ RENAMO ex-combatant anger is not just directed against the FRELIMO government but

⁹¹ Rodolfo 2005, p.19.

⁹² Author's interviews with ex-combatants in Moamba, Maputo province; author's interview with de Brito.

⁹³ Brian Slattery, 'Development without Equality: An Interview with Raul Domingos,' *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57, No.1, Fall 2003, pp.129-134. The refrain, 'Democracy does not fill our stomachs,' is commonly heard (see

against its own party leadership.⁹⁵ One RENAMO general said: 'All of us generals who fought during the war expected better. If we do not get more we will go back to war.'⁹⁶

The impact of ex-combatant resentment about persistent unemployment is not as threatening as this general asserts. Consensus among respondents was that RENAMO ex-combatants did not have the inclination, resources, or potential for mobilization to return to war.⁹⁷ But persistent ex-combatant grievances nevertheless pose a real threat to state and human security within Mozambique. Several respondents stated that a scenario more likely than a RENAMO return to war would involve violent rioting by disenchanted RENAMO ex-combatants and supporters in the countryside and reprisal violence committed by state security forces. In fact, such a pattern can already be observed through violence, threats of violence, and political intimidation. Such incidents tend to occur in regions of high RENAMO concentration and around the time of elections. The worst violence to occur in-country since the end of the war followed this pattern and took place in Montepuez in Cabo Delgado province. On 9 November 2000 armed RENAMO men killed ten people when they attacked the town centre. The police arrested scores of RENAMO men linked to the attack, and almost 100 suffocated to death in an over-crowded jail cell on 22 November 2000.⁹⁸ The pattern of violence around elections demonstrates, at best, that reconciliation, as well as the social and economic reintegration of many RENAMO ex-combatants, is incomplete and, at worst, that violence of this sort could repeat and escalate if issues of inequality, poverty, and corruption are not addressed.

Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, and Alex Vines, 'The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective,' *Accord*, No.3, January 1998, Preface).

⁹⁴ Author's interview with Domingos (see n.33 above); Domingos makes the same point in Slattery 2003.

⁹⁵ RENAMO performed much poorer than expected in 2003's municipal elections and 2004's parliamentary and presidential elections. The party has also splintered: after being expelled from RENAMO, Domingos formed a third party to challenge RENAMO candidates.

⁹⁶ Author's interview with Vareia.

⁹⁷ See also Hill 2005, p.220.

Could international actors have done more to create economic opportunities and thereby mitigate persistent ex-combatant economic grievances in Mozambique? Additional investment in vocational training schemes is unlikely to have yielded additional benefits given the lack of demand for the skills for which the OSD trained. The best option for sustainable employment would have been the FADM. If the FADM had reached GPA targets, it would have provided jobs for 30,000 ex-combatants. Most, however, wanted nothing to do with the new force at the time. But would ex-combatants have felt the same if a new recruitment drive had been initiated after the 1992 elections? Before elections, RENAMO told the UN Security Council mission that the shortage of recruits for the FADM would 'correct itself' as some ex-combatants would re-join the army after elections once it became clear that war would not resume.⁹⁹ As Domingos explained, 'If it was decided that everyone could go for holiday for six months and then the volunteers could come after six months for the new army, I think that more would have joined.'¹⁰⁰

But no such post-election recruitment drive occurred. The reason? The government did not want demobilized soldiers to come back into the army. They selected ex-combatants that were more educated and those that stayed tended to be officers. After elections, the government wanted a 'new army' without the burden of war and the old political affiliations, and so provided no additional incentives to entice the demobilized back to the army later on. In fact, the dominant strategy became to phase out the civil war combatants that formed the 11,000 that did join.¹⁰¹ Some ex-combatants were disappointed that they did not have the opportunity to re-join six months or one year later. In the words of one former FAM officer who

⁹⁸ Joe Hanlon, 'Local Election Email Special Issue 1,' *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, Maputo: European Parliamentarians for Africa, 16 November 2003, accessed at <http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0311&L=Mozambique-study-group&D=1&T=0&F=&S=&P=414>.

⁹⁹ UNSC S/1994/1009.

¹⁰⁰ Author's interview with Domingos. He predicted that more than half of the demobilized would have joined the FADM if given the opportunity, although this is not a policy he advocates, preferring instead to offer the civil war ex-combatants non-military vocational training.

opted initially not to join the FADM, 'I can not get employment and I can not find any opportunities to make money so I am frustrated that I left the army.'¹⁰²

Polarization of Reintegration: Catalyst for Ethnic, Political, and Regional Tension

The FRELIMO government's refusal to sponsor a second round of recruitment for ex-combatants wishing to join the military is characteristic of its polarization and politicization of several reintegration issues following the dissolution of CORE and the departure of ONUMOZ. Signs of that polarization existed during CORE's mandate to oversee reintegration (e.g., FRELIMO cronyism evident in the Ministry of Labour vetting of PF proposals). Subsequent neglect by the government of the continuing reintegration needs of ex-combatants from both sides has created new problems with reintegration; namely, the exacerbation of ethnic, political, and regional tensions within the country due to perceptions of unequal treatment and manipulation of reintegration policy for political gain.

First, RENAMO soldiers have complained of unfair treatment and exclusion from full reintegration benefits because they are not eligible for pensions. The government argued that RENAMO fighters did not deserve pensions because they did not have pension allowances deducted from their salaries like FAM soldiers did. RENAMO countered that its fighters had no salaries during the war, so there was nothing from which to deduct. RENAMO issued a proposal in parliament to extend pension benefits to its soldiers, appealing to national reconciliation, but the FRELIMO majority voted against it. RENAMO access to pensions also would have raised new questions about selection criteria for benefits (e.g., length of RENAMO military service needed to qualify for benefits).

The FRELIMO government considered the entire GPA a huge concession to RENAMO and so was unlikely to behave differently when it came to the issue of pensions. RENAMO

¹⁰¹ Author's interview with Miguel De Brito, Senior Democracy and Governance Adviser, United States Agency for International Development, Maputo, 16 September 2003.

asked aid agencies and CORE to support its position, but external actors refused to intervene on grounds that the issue was a political issue to be worked out domestically. This raises a question of double standards, however, since CORE and ONUMOZ intervened on the issue of disabled pensions in response to protests and threats from ADEMIMO. Failure to mediate a resolution to the pension issue suggests that international actors are unlikely to intervene in domestic reintegration policy disputes unless they disrupt security during a UN mission. Such a policy makes sense from the standpoint of prioritizing immediate security but if peace-building activities are meant to prevent future conflict, then a more active international role in mediating disputes about equal access to benefits would have more effectively managed the problem. From a purely legal point of view the government was justified to insist that RENAMO had no claim to pension benefits, but a more reconciliation-minded government could have extended pension benefits to RENAMO.

What shaped FRELIMO preferences to avoid compromise with RENAMO on the pension issue? FRELIMO lacked electoral or other political incentives to promote reconciliation. On the contrary, evidence points to domestic political pressures that created incentives to polarize the pension issue rather than to broker a compromise with the political opposition. RENAMO leaders have asserted that FRELIMO used the pension issue for political gain to undercut RENAMO support by making the party appear ineffective at providing for its own soldiers. Even though the conflict ended ten years ago, the pension question continues to be a divisive political issue. Domingos, for example, incorporated the issue into the platform of his new political party. He argued during campaigns in 2003 and 2004 that the GPA guarantee of equal treatment had not been fulfilled because of the exclusion of RENAMO ex-combatants from pensions, and advocated a pension scheme for all demobilized soldiers in order to

¹⁰² Author's interview with Daniel Isac Anibal, FAM Captain (Ret.) and former Intelligence Officer, currently AMODEG Correspondence Secretary, Maputo, 24 September 2003, translated by Salomão Mungoi.

'guarantee stability – political and social stability – and to guarantee that the democracy and the multi-party system works.'¹⁰³

Second, the government has privileged reintegration benefits for veterans of the independence war over those for civil war ex-combatants in order to remind voters of its status as the party that liberated Mozambique from Portuguese occupation. In 1999 the government created a Ministry for Veterans Affairs, but its mandate is for veterans of Mozambique's independence war only. For the FRELIMO government,¹⁰⁴ the 'real' combatants are those that fought for independence and are the only veterans who need continued assistance. The move is clearly politically motivated. Veterans of the independence war number only 10,000, are aging, and are difficult to locate. The move reveals the political pressures that shape a government's reintegration policy and reinforces the ease with which government actors polarize reintegration issues in the absence of external oversight or once that oversight has ended. Such oversight, however, can not remain open-ended because of sovereignty pressures. But, international actors such as UNOHAC could have, through CORE, negotiated a general framework of equal access to benefits from which the FRELIMO government would have been able to deviate with more difficulty as such a framework would have the appearance and legitimacy of international sanction even after the dissolution of CORE.

Third, ex-combatant leaders have been known to use the threat of disclosure of their colleagues' war crimes as blackmail to extract benefits or employment. One aid agency official familiar with reintegration issues commented that a truth and reconciliation commission in Mozambique would be politically infeasible.¹⁰⁵ Because so many crimes were committed on both sides, convening such a commission would be a Pandora's Box that nobody in

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ FRELIMO won presidential and parliamentary elections in 1994, 1999, and 2004.

¹⁰⁵ Author's interview with De Brito.

Mozambique wants to open. The threat of blackmail is somewhat mitigated by the 'dirt' that everyone has on everyone else involved in the war.

Fourth, politicization of the reintegration process has occurred on the RENAMO side as well. With echoes of the Special Field Force in Namibia, armed RENAMO men remain clustered in the district of Maríngué. They are ostensibly the 'bodyguards' of RENAMO's president, Afonso Dlakhama, and some of these travel with him or stay in Maputo.¹⁰⁶ Why, so long after conflict has ended, the leader of the opposition party maintains what amounts to a small, private militia to provide for his personal security is not clear. In the spirit of the GPA, these forces should have been incorporated into the police (protection for political leaders is normally a police function) and not the prerogative of a political party to maintain an armed faction to provide for its own security. The government has no interests in challenging the arrangement because it has used the bodyguards to accuse RENAMO of violating the GPA. In a sign, however, of new willingness to cooperate on divisive reintegration issues, both sides announced in 2005 that they are working successfully toward integrating the RENAMO bodyguards into the police.¹⁰⁷

Persistent polarization of reintegration issues is a problem that has hurt security in post-conflict Mozambique. It undermines reconciliation, the impact of which is violent activity that flares up during election seasons, usually featuring large RENAMO demonstrations violently suppressed by the FRELIMO-controlled security forces.¹⁰⁸ Reports of voter intimidation and fraud are still quite common, too.¹⁰⁹ Since the benefits of FRELIMO patronage have gone to ethnic supporters of FRELIMO primarily in the south of Mozambique in and

¹⁰⁶ General Vareia was formerly Dlakhama's head of security until he was sacked following an altercation.

¹⁰⁷ Rodolfo 2005, pp.14-5.

¹⁰⁸ Cahen 2005, p.227; Joe Hanlon, 'Local Election Email Special Issue 1,' *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, Maputo: European Parliamentarians for Africa, 16 November 2003, accessed at <http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0311&L=Mozambique-study-group&D=1&T=0&F=&S=&P=414>.

¹⁰⁹ Author's interview with Fernando Veloso, part-owner of MediaCoop and former journalist, Maputo, 19 September 2003; Carter Center, 'Postelection Statement on Mozambique Elections,' 26 January 2005, <http://www.cartercenter.org/doc1933.htm>; Mozambique News Agency, 'Election Results in Detail,' 6 January 2005.

around Maputo province, polarization has also exacerbated ethnic and regional tensions as well as RENAMO-FRELIMO ones. Not unlike the aging SWAPO regime in Namibia, the FRELIMO government in Mozambique has revealed a deep-seated authoritarian political culture that has monopolized the state apparatus. Its behavior continues to exhibit economic, ethnic, political, and regional favoritism.¹¹⁰ The assessment of several respondents is that, combined with the lack of a policy for reconciliation, the potential for revenge killings or other violent manifestations of grievance down the road is real, as you 'never know if people are waiting for an opportunity to settle scores.'¹¹¹

Polarization of reintegration issues has also undermined governance and democratization in Mozambique. RENAMO continue to charge that FRELIMO's standard operating procedure, with reintegration and other issues, is to use heavy-handed tactics to undermine the opposition. Civil society respondents inside Mozambique and political opponents of FRELIMO argued that such tactics have weakened government accountability and encouraged corruption since they have been electorally successful. Therefore, similar to the situation in Namibia, as Mozambique moves to a one-party dominant system with the consolidation of FRELIMO political power, electoral penalties for corruption and bad governance dissipate.¹¹² The political use of reintegration issues by both sides could be viewed as democracy at work: parties find issues that mobilize voters and create reintegration policies accordingly. The problem, however, is that keeping reintegration issues alive revives in combatants a collective grievance that could prove dangerous. The pension issue underscores the political marginalization of a sizeable cross-section of ex-combatants. That, combined with the economic marginalization of continuing unemployment, could prove a potent mix should the political and economic divide continue to widen between political leaders and

¹¹⁰ Cahen 2005, pp.227-8.

¹¹¹ Author's interview with De Brito.

¹¹² Author's interview with Domingos.

followers, or between political parties. Governance problems associated with exploitation of ethnic and political tension in deeply-divided societies coming out of civil war are not just 'democracy at work' but can quickly escalate into security threats, as some theories of democratization predict.¹¹³

Ex-Combatant Involvement with Organized Crime: The Implications of Drugs and Arms Trafficking for State and Regional Security

The involvement of certain ex-combatants in organized criminal activity is a persistent problem linked to reintegration that also hurt security within Mozambique and in the southern African region. Most assessments of Mozambique's reintegration have focused on ex-combatants as participants in violent criminality (e.g., banditry).¹¹⁴ Early evaluations of progress in Mozambique worried that a return to conflict could follow on the heels of widespread involvement of ex-combatants in banditry and criminality and catalogued incidents of insecurity or criminality with confirmed or suspected involvement of demobilized soldiers, former militiamen, or other paramilitary groups.¹¹⁵ Demobilized soldiers in the immediate aftermath of the conflict played a significant role in the sharp increase in crime and banditry in rural and urban areas.¹¹⁶ ONUMOZ and the FADM were effective at bringing roadside criminality under control and reintegration packages acted as an incentive to discourage ex-combatants from banditry.¹¹⁷ The years from 1994-1996, however, saw an increase in both urban and rural criminal activity. Reported crime increased 44% during this period, and arms-related crimes increased by 50%. In 1996, there were two bullet casualties per day in Maputo

¹¹³ E.g., Snyder 2000.

¹¹⁴ Irae Baptista Lundin, Martinho Chachua, António Gaspar, Habiba Guebuza, and Guilherme Mbilana, 'Reducing Costs through an Expensive Experience: The Impact of Demobilisation in Mozambique,' in Kingma 1999.

¹¹⁵ International Organization for Migration, 'After One Year: What is the Status of Reintegration in Mozambique?' Maputo: Information and Referral Service/Provincial Fund for Demobilized Soldiers, May 1996.

¹¹⁶ Rodolfo 2005, p.10; *Southern Africa Report*, 'After the Count Is Over: Mozambique Now,' Vol.10, No.4, May 1995.

¹¹⁷ Ken Wilson, 'The People's Peace in Mozambique,' *Southern Africa Report*, Vol.9, No.4, March 1994.

alone.¹¹⁸ Sections of Maputo had, by 1997, given themselves over to drug dealing (Bairro-Militar) and the selling of stolen goods (Estrela Vermelha), and ex-combatants represented a significant, if not preponderant, percentage of involvement in such activities.¹¹⁹ Many ex-combatants acknowledged that involvement in criminality during the 1990s was also a tool to attract additional support and benefits.¹²⁰

As violent criminality abated after 1997, assessments of reintegration concluded that the long term impact of the RSS was instrumental at curbing incentives for criminality. Assumptions of reintegration success based on lack of persistent and widespread crime committed by ex-combatants, however, overlooked the incentives that attracted some ex-combatants (and, particularly, senior officers re-mobilized into the FADM) to organized criminal activity. As a result, external and state reintegration actors neglected the long term security consequences of such activity.

Organized criminal activity in Mozambique takes several forms: drug trafficking, arms trading, money laundering, contract assassinations, and the smuggling of stolen vehicles, human organs, and items illegally imported into the country.¹²¹ Additionally, corruption and weak regulatory institutions make the country's banking system vulnerable to money laundering, although the utility of Mozambique as a major money laundering hub are limited given the country's poor financial infrastructure.¹²² Each of these fields of activity depends on the subversion of the state's criminal justice system, the buying off of well-placed officials through bribery and coercion, and the use of violence. The impact of such activity on state security is acute: 'Powerful criminal networks can almost be seen as having created a parallel

¹¹⁸ Chachiua 1999.

¹¹⁹ Borges-Coelho 1997, p.67.

¹²⁰ Borges-Coelho 1997, p.67; Schafer 1998.

¹²¹ For a detailed investigation into the dynamics of each of these activities see Peter Gastrow and Marcelo Mosse, 'Organised Crime, Corruption and Governance in the SADC Region,' paper presented at the Institute for Security Studies Regional Seminar, Pretoria, 18-19 April 2002.

¹²² United States Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook 2005: Mozambique*, 14 July 2005, accessed at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mz.html>.

power base from which to challenge the structures and capacity of the state,' leading many within Mozambique to wonder out loud whether it has become a 'gangster state' or 'an impracticable country'.¹²³

The idea of failed reintegration sparking a return to war relies on the premise that combatants will turn to criminal activity and violence in pressing their economic grievances and that this will spiral into full-scale combat. The pattern of criminality in Mozambique, however, suggests that this is not the case, at least for all combatants. Peasants made up the vast majority of the two armies and lack the connections or wherewithal to transition from foot soldier to crime boss, nor is there evidence that this has happened. The combatant-criminal nexus is more apparent among middle- to high-ranking officers, who have the stature and connections to be involved in such activities.¹²⁴ As the executive director of Propaz noted, 'We have heard about *current* military and police officers hiring out their guns for criminal activity, but not about ex-combatants doing the same.'¹²⁵ The involvement of re-mobilized ex-combatant officers in organized crime is viewed as particularly significant in the trafficking of two commodities: drugs and arms.¹²⁶

From surveys of Mozambican military personnel, the UNODC found evidence of demobilized soldiers' and FADM soldiers' involvement in transporting drugs to urban markets in Maputo. Those surveyed also identified unemployment and problems with reintegration as major causes of combatant involvement in drug trafficking.¹²⁷ In April 2001, officers living in

¹²³ Gastrow and Mosse 2002, pp.10, 17.

¹²⁴ Perceptions of these connections are widespread in Mozambique. Sometimes allegations are overblown, and direct evidence is sparse. Nevertheless, interviews by the author with journalists, researchers, and community leaders conducted in Maputo from 15 September to 26 September confirm that significant links exist. Additionally, interviews with former government officers conducted by other researchers have produced the same conclusion (Alden 2002, p.350).

¹²⁵ Author's interview with Jorge.

¹²⁶ Gastrow and Mosse 2002, pp.5-9; UNODC, *The Drug Nexus in Africa*, (Vienna: UNODC, March 1999) p.101 (footnote 23); CIA 2005.

¹²⁷ UNODC 1999, p.101,fn23.

Maputo's military neighborhood were implicated in drugs trafficking as well.¹²⁸ With respect to arms, the abundance of weapons in the country created powerful incentives for well-connected combatants to engage in trafficking. Even the most conservative estimates place the number of AK47s imported to the country during the war at between 500,000 and one million.¹²⁹

Disarmament programs managed to collect only a fraction of the total arms used and stockpiled during the war. Widespread illicit trading of weapons occurred after combatants dumped weapons at caches that ONUMOZ and the CCF failed to find (and later to be looted by profiteers) or into the black market.¹³⁰ Widespread criminal violence in South Africa and Mozambique resulted from arms trafficking after the Mozambican conflict.

As thousands of guns and other weapons flooded into South Africa into the hands of criminals there, the South African government labeled the flow a major threat to regional security. In March of 1995 President Mandela and President Chissano signed an agreement to increase cross-border police cooperation to fight the spread of illegal weaponry. A series of joint operations followed, codenamed 'Operations Rachel'. The operations, which continue to this day, have so far located within Mozambique and destroyed thousands of weapons and 20 million rounds of ammunition. These numbers exceed the amounts captured and destroyed in any gun buyback or collection operation of the post-Cold War era.¹³¹ Although the security damage to South Africa and Mozambique had already been done, Operations Rachel have reduced that damage by decreasing the supply of weapons available for trafficking. Various buy-back programs and 'tools for arms' initiatives within Mozambique have complemented the

¹²⁸ Gastrow and Mosse 2002, p.5.

¹²⁹ Christopher Smith, 'Areas of Major Concentration in the Use and Traffic of Small Arms,' in Jayantha Dhanapala, Mitsuro Donowaki, Lora Lumpe, and Swadesh Rana, eds., *Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) p.107; Graduate Institute of International Studies, *Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.64.

¹³⁰ Vines 1994, p.5.

¹³¹ Etienne Hennop, 'Operations Rachel, 1995-2001,' Occasional Paper No.53, Institute for Security Studies, November 2001.

operations, collecting over 200,000 weapons and ammunition as of 2005.¹³² Arms in circulation and arms still buried in the ground, however, continue to provide incentives for further trafficking, which threaten more violence and criminality within Mozambique and South Africa and necessitate continuing cooperation between the two governments. As a result of that cooperation, the scale of the arms problem in the region is nowhere near as widespread as it was in the mid-1990s.

To succeed, organized criminals rely on the protection of senior members of Mozambique's political establishment, including former combatants occupying positions within the military and police force.¹³³ Cracking down on organized criminal activity therefore requires a strong police force and vigilant anti-corruption mechanisms. ONUMOZ had difficulty supporting Mozambique's preexisting force. The FADM, with far fewer recruits than anticipated, could not fulfill the police support function given to it by the GPA. This created a need for ONUMOZ to bolster policing. Although the mission contributed CIVPOL forces, their activities were limited to monitoring police neutrality and not to building capacity within the police force to tackle problems with violent and organized crime in the wake of the ceasefire. The situation in Mozambique suggests that DPKO should consider having CIVPOL build capacity within a country's police force in addition to fulfilling its more traditional monitoring role. It could also delegate that capacity-building function to bilateral donors (e.g., as UNAMSIL did with the UK in building capacity within the Sierra Leonean army after its conflict). Why this did not occur at the time, according to the head of the UNOHAC Assessment and Planning Unit, was because the idea of UN provision of police training in the early 1990s was foreign to DPKO and Security Council strategic thinking about the UN's post-conflict role.¹³⁴

¹³² Author's interview with Albino Forquilha, National Coordinator for the Department of Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation (Christian Council of Mozambique), and Director of the Arms for Tools Program, 16 September 2003; Rodolfo 2005, p.10.

¹³³ Gastrow and Mosse 2002, pp.5-9.

¹³⁴ Author's interview with Barnes.

One solution considered at the time to deter ex-combatant officers from engaging in spoiler activity was rejected. Ajello suggested that senior officers and generals be given shares in newly-privatized industries to buy their participation in the peace process and reduce incentives to engage in criminality. Chissano and senior members of the FAM also pushed the idea. UNDP opposed it, saying that similar programs had not worked elsewhere, and that the officers would pocket the money or sell shares without any guarantee of a lasting investment with sustainable benefit.¹³⁵ Donors agreed with UNDP and did not fund the idea, both because they did not know how to make it operational and because they disliked the prospect of giving the most brutal of the soldiers the most generous package.¹³⁶ The problem is that much of Ajello's plan came to pass anyway, but without any oversight, through the cronyism, corruption, and, for some officers, involvement in organized crime. The only realistic solution remains for Mozambique's government to address endemic problems of corruption within its law and order institutions that facilitate an environment conducive to organized crime.

The impact of organized crime on Mozambique's security has been acute: it limits the government's ability to attract foreign investment, erodes public trust in the state's institutions, perpetuates problems with corruption, and creates opportunities for violence with relative impunity. Mozambique is the southern African transit point for South Asian hashish, South Asian heroin, and South American cocaine destined for South African and European markets and is a significant producer of cannabis for local trade and methaqualone for export to South Africa¹³⁷ The threat posed by drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime to security is primarily via the violence and intimidation it has caused. In the wake of the murder of Carlos Cardoso, a journalist assassinated in 2001 while investigating the disappearance of \$14 million from the Commercial Bank of Mozambique, an atmosphere of fear remains. Before his death,

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ Author's interview with Born.

¹³⁷ CIA 2005.

and in articles and interviews, Cardoso made similar claims about the complicity of some high-ranking government officials (including military personnel) in criminal activity. Some respondents also speculated on the potential for unchecked organized crime to further undermine investment and spark violence in Mozambique, particularly following international investigation into alleged links with the Al Qaeda terrorist networks of money laundering operations involving Mozambique's banks, foreign-exchange bureaus, and casinos.¹³⁸

This section has argued that RPSRCs in Mozambique already have had a negative impact on security in Mozambique and South Africa. Persistent unemployment and residual grievances among ex-RENAMO combatants have contributed to periodic violence and demonstrations during elections. Polarization of reintegration policy has contributed to ethnic, political, and regional tensions. Finally, involvement of some ex-combatants in organized criminality has contributed to violence in Mozambique and South Africa, damaged the credibility of Mozambique's institutions through increased opportunities for corruption, and hurt the country's economic development by discouraging investment. In the next section, I argue that the persistence of these problems was not inevitable; rather, the way in which they were managed was contingent upon the capacity and preferences of the various actors tasked to design and implement reintegration programs.

V. Reintegration Actors in Mozambique: Actor Capacity and Preferences

The lead actor of the reintegration process in Mozambique was UNOHAC. It chaired the Reintegration Commission and therefore made final decisions about the contours of reintegration programs. CORE was a deliberative body, however, and so its decisions were the product of the consensus of several reintegration donors, implementing agents, and

¹³⁸ Gastrow and Mosse 2002, p.9.

observers. The SRSG had significant input into CORE's deliberative process, as did the representatives of the parties to the conflict, delegations of invited countries (which ended up including all of the major bilateral donors, such as the Dutch and the Swiss), and international organizations who helped to fund and implement different projects that CORE considered and approved (UNDP, IOM, ILO, World Bank, GTZ, USAID, and others). ONUMOZ peacekeepers and mission leaders also influenced reintegration policy because they had primary responsibility for disarmament and demobilization through their interaction with the CCF and CCFADM. Once CORE's mandate expired and RSS payments ended, the FRELIMO government became the sole reintegration actor within Mozambique, ostensibly through the Ministry of Labour but since the ministry decided that no more targeted or non-targeted support to ex-combatants was required, the main architects of the country's post-ONUMOZ reintegration policy were the president and other members of the party elite.

Actors were well-equipped to perform many of the reintegration tasks they undertook to accomplish. They faced relatively few funding difficulties (the result of the enthusiasm of the donors for the RSS) and UNOHAC, in its role as chair of CORE, successfully balanced impartiality with mediation of more problematic issues. Actors were less well-equipped in other respects. Actors in charge of the OSD and PF had limited expertise and funds. Additionally, the government lacked the resources and expertise to respond to ex-combatant involvement in arms trafficking until it entered into the joint agreement with South Africa that produced Operations Rachel.

With regard to preferences, the dominant reintegration policy preference of external actors was support for a two-year program of benefits whose immediate aim was to break the chain of command and provide transitional assistance in order to secure peace in the run-up to, and immediate aftermath of, elections. The alignment of preferences about reintegration objectives was unique and due to UNOHAC's management of CORE. Bureaucratic, political,

and systemic pressures, however, constrained actors' abilities to manage ex-combatant involvement in criminality, counter the tension related to the polarization of reintegration issues after UNOMOZ, and create economic opportunities that provided more sustainable employment.

Mozambique's experience with reintegration demonstrates that a prolonged and relatively generous cash subsidy can placate and disperse the majority of demobilized soldiers, but is less capable of anticipating or managing spoiler activity or mitigating the incentives for political leaders to polarize reintegration. As the current leader of AMODEG put it: 'There is the sense that because there was no return to war that the ex-combatants' reintegration was successful. If reintegration is not successful, it is believed that ex-combatants go back to the bush to resume fighting. But this is not the case. It is not true that because these people did not go back to war that there is no discord or that reintegration was successful.'¹³⁹

As in the previous chapter, to evaluate the impact that actors' capacity and preferences had on reintegration outcomes in Mozambique I begin with an analysis of the factors which constrained reintegration actors' capacity to design and implement programs before identifying the dominant preferences of reintegration actors and explaining the factors most responsible for their determination.

Resources, Expertise, and Authority: Implications for the Capacity of Reintegration Actors in Mozambique

As with most post-conflict states, Mozambique's economy offered little to reintegrate into. Only one-tenth of its population has formal employment. The floods of 2000, and intermittent periods of drought, further devastated its economy. The socio-economic profile of ex-combatants put them at an economic disadvantage since the majority had no formal civilian work experience.¹⁴⁰ In this sense, it is no surprise that the Information and Referral Service,

¹³⁹ Author's interview with Majante.

¹⁴⁰ UNDP 1997, p.9.

despite the 'Referral' in its name, could not be about job referral because there were none to be had. Against, this backdrop the capacity of actors both enabled and constrained their ability to manage reintegration problems and create economic opportunities for Mozambique's ex-combatants.

Ironically, demobilization delays gave UNDP and bilateral donors more time to raise money for the RSS and other reintegration program components. Once RSS payments had finished, a US\$5 million surplus remained, which was distributed to ex-combatants in a final lump-sum payments. Nevertheless, funding delays with the RSS meant that information campaigns about reintegration benefits for ex-combatants in AAs did not occur because donors did not want to raise expectations about a program that was not yet fully funded. Lack of information about reintegration benefits, however, contributed to the frequent and widespread violence, rioting, and banditry that occurred during the disarmament and demobilization stages in Mozambique, due in part to confusion and uncertainty about the reintegration benefits that awaited soldiers following demobilization. Had DDR been funded out of the assessed peacekeeping mission budget, sensitization of beneficiaries might have been possible much earlier, and some violence averted. But the suggestion to do so did not come until the Brahimi Report in 2000, six years after reintegration programs commenced in Mozambique, and so any expectation about easier and earlier access to DPKO funds for reintegration is premature in the Mozambican case. Most damaging to employment programs' ability to create economic opportunities, however, were funding shortages to the PF. The PF's projects relied upon longer term funding for success; when long term support did not materialize the rationale for the existence of the PF disappeared.

The expertise contributed by the ILO was limited to the provision of vocational training, which skewed its focus towards OSD skills training rather than its Business Skills and Micro-Enterprise Development for officers. As it was, both programs failed to create any lasting

results; the cost of the programs arguably could have had more of an impact had it gone to the RSS to increase payment amount or duration of payments to ex-combatants. The IOM's involvement with the PF was similarly ineffective. Its institutional expertise is the provision of transportation and transitional, material assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. Unsurprisingly, its contribution to the transportation of ex-combatants to their home areas was efficient and well-coordinated, but its attempts to manage PF cooperatives and micro-credit schemes, activities with which it did not have prior experience, were less successful. GTZ programs were more effective, owing in part to its experience managing programs similar to the ones offered by the PF and in part to its decision to combine ex-combatant and community participants on programs, which had beneficial social reintegration effects. The World Bank, in contrast, funded IOM projects that had only ex-combatant recipients although it is not clear why the Bank had this preference at the time.

Endogenous pressures also explain capacity failures of the OSD and PF to create sustainable economic opportunities because of incentives for moral hazard. After getting the contract to manage the OSD and PF, the performance of the implementing actors (the ILO, IOM, GTZ, and World Bankd) could only be imperfectly observed, and actors were therefore likely to under-perform because they were not accountable for failures of their programs. There was no accountability of those actors to CORE once programs were already under way other than to complete the programs. Had CORE shown more interest in employment programs, accountability might have been higher, but its primary objective was to pay and scatter and therefore the program that had to deliver was the RSS. Expectations were kept very low for the employment components.

Evidence of information asymmetries with the OSD and PF were also observed. Implementers and participants had different goals and expectations with reintegration

programs, creating an 'incentive dysfunction'.¹⁴¹ The impact of those asymmetries was the fact that long term economic opportunities were not created. That impact was somewhat mitigated by ex-combatant respondents, who argued that many of their colleagues recognized quickly that OSD training or PF support was unlikely to lead to a job but they participated anyway to gain communication skills and socialization skills or to learn to work the system (e.g., car mechanic training teaches how to hotwire a car).

Despite the failures of Mozambique's vocational training programs, they continue to form part of reintegration programs implemented elsewhere. Incentives related to expertise branding help to explain the persistence of vocational training programs despite their limited results. Consequently, the relative lack of programs for agricultural support, education, and apprenticeships becomes self-perpetuating. Absent more expertise among reintegration actors implementing different program components, bureaucratic incentives to avoid risks deter actors such as the ILO and GTZ from tinkering with their brand.

The authority of CORE was rooted in the impartiality of UNOHAC as its chair. Leadership of reintegration issues by a neutral body proved crucial in Mozambique because the parties were bitterly divided over demobilization schedules and that acrimony spilled over into contentious issues about reintegration, particularly about providing support for child soldiers that neither side would admit to having and negotiating pensions for disabled RENAMO combatants. Absent UN leadership of CORE, respondents agreed that reintegration would have stalled along the lines of the demobilization delays that occurred earlier in the peace process and deadlocked the Ceasefire Commission. Political mediation of particularly contentious reintegration issues was absent in Namibia and Sierra Leone, suggesting the importance of a UN role with reintegration because of its willingness to engage in political

¹⁴¹ Author's interview with Angela MacIntyre, former International Migration Organization Project Officer in Mozambique, Project Coordinator and Researcher for the Children in Armed Conflict Project, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 18 August 2003.

mediation between parties to the conflict rather than adopt a more apolitical stance or put a national commission in charge of reintegration policy, as the World Bank prefers because of its constitutive requirements to partner with state governments. UNOHAC and ONUMOZ both demonstrated that it is possible for reintegration actors to make 'political' decisions without sacrificing impartiality. ONUMOZ pressured the parties to the conflict to adopt new demobilization timetables and threatened withdrawal if the parties continued to delay. UNOHAC, meanwhile, successfully mediated disputes over payment of disabled RENAMO pensions and securing ICRC access to child soldiers.

To maintain the trust of both parties during the design and implementation of reintegration programs required an impartial mediator because of the high levels of mistrust that characterized relations between RENAMO and FRELIMO during the ONUMOZ mission. As the head of the UNOHAC Assessment and Planning Unit said, 'In the early phases of a DDR process, you have to have the impartiality and the neutrality so all the parties to the conflict can accept that these decisions are legitimate. In Mozambique, RENAMO would not have trusted the government if it had run the RSS.'¹⁴² The UN had a role in Mozambique because it was invited in. The GPA set up CORE and specified that the UN chair it.

At the same time, authority for external actors to intervene is limited to the nature and duration of their mandate. In other words, CORE was temporary and UNOHAC could not monitor reintegration in Mozambique forever. This means that the UN agencies and other international representatives on CORE lost their ability to mediate reintegration disputes between the parties after ONUMOZ withdrawal and therefore can not be expected to resolve persistent problems with polarization because they do not have ongoing authority to mediate those problems. In the case of Mozambique, however, CORE could have intervened with the pension issue but FRELIMO insistence that RENAMO veterans were not eligible for pensions

¹⁴² Author's interview with Barnes.

made UNOHAC and other CORE participants wary to push the issue out of a belief that it was one for the parties to resolve on their own via the democratic process.

CORE also could have negotiated a framework with additional or long term guarantees for targeted or non-targeted reintegration support before its dissolution. Governments' deviation from that framework would therefore entail costs because of the legitimacy that a negotiated framework for a long term reintegration strategy would arguably retain. Similarly, the CCFADM could have left in place a similar framework for the review of re-mobilized combatants' (and particularly officers') behavior in the FADM, perhaps calling for bi-party review processes or monitoring of promotion or recruitment decisions. Such a framework might also have paved the way for a second round of recruitment for ex-combatants into the FADM.

After the dissolution of CORE and withdrawal of ONUMOZ, the FRELIMO government was ill-equipped to manage persistent RPSRCs related to arms trafficking and organized criminality. Its own preferences blocked potential solutions. For example, additional recruitment after elections of ex-combatants into the FADM might have augmented the force's capacity to fulfill the auxiliary policing functions given to it by the GPA to contain criminality during the post-conflict transition. More importantly, the government could have prioritized the training of ex-combatants as coast guard or customs officials to tackle the problems associated with infiltration of its long coastline by smugglers, drug traffickers, and other organized criminals. The cynical view among several civil society and media respondents was that the government is not interested in managing threats from organized crime because of its own collusion or complicity in it.

The government did, however, pursue an important bilateral arrangement with South Africa to augment its weak capacity to manage what became the most threatening problem linked to incomplete reintegration: the trafficking of arms within Mozambique and across the border to South Africa. Why was the FRELIMO government willing to compromise its

sovereignty and allow for an open-ended South African role into its domestic affairs (i.e., the collection and destruction of weapons and ammunition on its own soil)? First, it recognized the threat of arms trafficking to its own security as well as to the security of its neighbor. Second, the arrangement is a bilateral one and therefore differs from the sort of intervention that characterized international administration during ONUMOZ. Third, and most importantly, the post-1994 government of South Africa was the ANC, a close historical and ideological ally of FRELIMO. In the end, Operations Rachel met a functional security need that was mutually beneficial to both parties. The operations managed a DDR problem that ONUMOZ had mismanaged (through its short term and largely symbolic disarmament collection program) and that CORE had neglected (through its interpretation of a reintegration role that included only the provision of economic incentives that bought time for 'cooling off' and therefore did not involve managing residual threats associated with ex-combatant spoiler activity).

Avoiding War or Something More? Preference Formation and Reintegration Objectives in Mozambique

The alignment of disparate reintegration actors' preferences around the 'pay and scatter' objective was the result of consensus-building by UNOHAC as CORE's chair and also of actors' shared beliefs about what reintegration was meant to accomplish. The head of the UNOHAC Assessment and Planning Unit attributed consensus to preexisting donor support (from the Swiss government in particular) for the RSS and to the 'like-minded group' that constituted CORE, which she defined as the UNDP, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Nordic countries, and Canada.¹⁴³ The beliefs of that like-minded group had also been molded by prior experience; in particular, the failure to design and implement reintegration programs before elections in Angola, which influenced the belief of most CORE participants that short term, targeted support was critical to avoid a return to war by scattering ex-combatants to their home areas in order to break the chain of command.

This is not to say that clashing preferences between actors did not occur. The donors and UNDP, for example, rejected the SRSG's recommendation that officers be given shares of newly-privatized businesses. There were also dissenting voices on CORE who argued in favor of 'pay, scatter, and employ'. Despite differences of opinion during the planning stages, the organization of CORE promoted consensus once reintegration contours had been decided. But endogenous pressures also played a role. Once the RSS was seen to be a success and the employment programs failures, actors involved with the employment programs that could plausibly distance themselves from that involvement did so. According to UN officials involved with pre-program planning, actors that opposed the RSS during the planning stages (namely, USAID) subsequently claimed to have supported it all along once it became clear that it was the component that had the most impact. Given endogenous pressures to avoid high-profile program failure, organizational incentives to jump on the band-wagon of success are not surprising. Reintegration actors also had interests in promoting their own operations as successful. The first draft of the USAID assessment of reintegration in Mozambique was very critical of DDR outcomes but was changed because individuals within USAID thought reintegration was an unqualified success.¹⁴⁴

Bureaucratic incentives also kept consensus about reintegration objectives humble. 'Pay and scatter' represents a peacekeeping objective: to buy enough time for parties to the conflict to commit to the peace process. Longer term benefits or longer term management of residual reintegration problems through monitoring and evaluation more accurately fulfill the preventive role for reintegration programs envisaged by peace-building doctrine. For example, a strong ONUMOZ role in disarmament efforts was needed to prevent the flow of arms from combatants to the black market during the reintegration process. That role was eventually filled by the South African-Mozambican joint agreement. But such a role was feasible for ONUMOZ

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

during its mission, which could have managed arms trafficking problems before they escalated. ONUMOZ could have taken additional action under its mission mandate to destroy seized weapons or to seek out undeclared or illegal arms caches. It could have empowered peacekeepers to seize weapons transported in vehicles across borders; instead, these troops could only watch and write down license plate numbers as scores of weapons flowed from Mozambique to other areas in the region.¹⁴⁵ Using a combination of carrots (in the form of buy-back programs) and sticks (disqualification from reintegration benefits for combatants caught selling or transporting arms illicitly, prosecution, or more aggressive reporting of such transactions as violations of the ceasefire), ONUMOZ could have averted early on some of the problems now associated with disarmament. It did not do so because the mission's primary, *peacekeeping* objective of avoiding a return to war prioritized swift demobilization and deemphasized weapons collection and destruction. Collection and destruction of arms caches is more characteristic of a preventive *peace-building* approach.

A second example of failure to translate reintegration support into peace-building is the lack of an effort by UNOHAC to negotiate the long term objectives of reintegration with the representatives of the parties to the conflict on the Reintegration Commission. In other words, actors did not mediate between those parties to leave the Ministry of Labor with a framework for what reintegration objectives, if any, would remain if the country did not spiral back to war by the end of RSS payments. Would non-targeted support continue to benefit ex-combatants and communities? How would reintegration relate to broader development objectives? These questions were left unanswered, and arguably CORE wasted an opportunity to build trust between the parties around reintegration issues that ultimately exacerbated tensions between them.

¹⁴⁴ Author's interview with De Brito.

¹⁴⁵ Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) p.84.

Failure to link reintegration to broader development objectives mirrors the criticism of Susan Willett, who argued that ONUMOZ achieved its 'main goal' in moving Mozambique from conflict to democracy, but failed to foster indigenous mechanisms of development, peace, and democracy. As a result, she argued that the legacy of the peacekeeping mission was chronic dependency on external aid.¹⁴⁶ This was a problem for Mozambique even before the ONUMOZ mission, however. A 1990 Norwegian study of Mozambique concluded that aid inadvertently weakened the autonomy of the state, and advocated the support of state institutions rather than the creation of parallel structures for aid distribution.¹⁴⁷ In the reintegration context, capacity building did not occur. CORE implemented its own programs but did little to build capacity within the Ministry of Labor to manage persistent reintegration problems, or to negotiate a strategy to create economic opportunity. The primary reason for CORE's failure to link reintegration support to long term program management is the belief structure dominant among its lead actors that reintegration programs exist as economic incentives to facilitate a cooling off period and instead of the governance process that the importance of problem management implies it is.

The Impact of Exogenous Pressures on State Polarization and International Intervention

Mozambique showed, like Namibia did before it, that electioneering was incompatible with reintegration, particularly absent of agreed-to standards about equal access to benefits and the state's long term reintegration strategy. RENAMO and FRELIMO both face crises as political parties, and to shore up support among key constituencies they have polarized reintegration issues. It is no surprise that Domingos, to win support away from RENAMO, brought up the continuing unemployment of ex-combatants and advocated the extension of

¹⁴⁶ Susan Willett, 'Ostriches, Wise Old Elephants and Economic Reconstruction in Mozambique,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.2, No.1, Spring 1992, p.42.

¹⁴⁷ Grete Brochmann and Arve Ofstad, *Mozambique: Norwegian Assistance in a Context of Crisis (A Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review)* (Fantoft, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, Department of Social Science and Development, 1990).

pensions and the adoption of programs to train or provide credit for those still unemployed. As Ajello said during the ONUMOZ mission, confidence-building can be a 'nightmare' because it is incompatible with elections, which tend to 'polarize political discourse and highlight social cleavage'.¹⁴⁸ Elections can overcome these challenges but only if they produce governments that are legitimate, inclusive, and representative.¹⁴⁹ Absent any reintegration controls (e.g., guarantees for equal access to benefits or 'shared understandings' about the need for reintegration rhetoric and social conditions conducive to reconciliation¹⁵⁰), incentives to exploit, ignore, or manipulate reintegration issues entrench themselves in the political process, and the reconciliation potential of reintegration is forfeited. As predicted by literature on democratization, the FRELIMO government and RENAMO opposition both have electoral incentives to use an issue like reintegration to capitalize on ethnic, political, and regional tension in the country.¹⁵¹

In Mozambique, the FRELIMO government insists that the reintegration chapter is closed. This is not due to any evidence that problems have been managed but is due instead to the political interests the government has in closing that chapter. Consequently, the statute for the recently-created Ministry for Veterans Affairs mentioned only veterans of the independence war. Ex-combatants have complained to AMODEG, 'If the ministry is only for people who fought in the independence war then what about us?'¹⁵²

Also similar to Namibia, in Mozambique there are few penalties for polarization of reintegration issues the more the country moves toward a one-party dominant political system. A poor RENAMO showing in the 2004 elections suggests that FRELIMO, which has held power since Mozambique's independence in 1975, will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

¹⁴⁸ Hill 2005, p.224.

¹⁴⁹ Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds, 'Elections and Electoral Systems: Implications for Conflict Management,' pp.11-36 in Sisk and Reynolds, eds., *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1998) p.13.

¹⁵⁰ On this latter point see Hill 2005, p.73.

Unlike in Namibia, the UN mission addressed the issue by including political party support to RENAMO ahead of elections. This move was extremely controversial to those who thought providing institutional support to one party of the conflict could jeopardize the UN's neutrality. ONUMOZ, however, countered that the GPA had included such support for RENAMO and that it was only trying to give RENAMO a fair chance come elections, not a leg up.

Pressures involving sovereignty and consent for international intervention also account for preferences of UN actors and the FRELIMO government in Mozambique. It would have been unrealistic for CORE to retain a monitoring or evaluation role beyond the tenure of the UN mission (that was not the UN's preference at the time and that was not FRELIMO's preference, either). FRELIMO barely tolerated ONUMOZ during its mission, considering itself to be the legitimate government of Mozambique throughout the civil war and viewing RENAMO as an internal embodiment of illegal and unjust international intervention into its affairs. On the part of the UN (both the ONUMOZ mission and UN agencies), the organization's historic and Charter responsibility to avoid interference in 'domestic' matters within states would have impeded attempts by the UNOHAC or ONUMOZ to manage reintegration problems related to domestic criminal activity and corruption even if those actors had seen such problems as within their mandate. In the case of Mozambique, they did not view management of RPSRCs as within their reintegration mandate. UNOHAC thought that it had done all it needed to do to achieve reintegration (i.e., by paying and scattering) so its preferences for the nature of its role and the timing of its exit were conditioned not just by normative pressures about intervention but by its beliefs about mission effectiveness.

UN actors will always face limits on the extent to which they can mitigate the harm of polarization of reintegration. They can never bestow their own impartiality on the government

¹⁵¹ E.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000; Diamond 1999; Clapham 1996.

¹⁵² Author's interviews with Majante and Mambula.

after their departure. The challenge for state reintegration actors is how to solve problems even assuming they lack impartiality.

Much went well in Mozambique after its civil war ended. The RSS created strong incentives to promote demobilization and buy ex-combatants' commitment to peace during the crucial two years after demobilization occurred. Inclusion in the GPA of a strong role for the UN to mediate post-conflict transition institutions, such as CORE and the Cease-Fire Commission, helped to mediate conflicts as they arose. Ajello's leadership, and the initiative and commitment shown by bilateral donors, helped to speed the process along and built confidence between the parties. Conflict fatigue among the former fighters also meant that they were ultimately committed to the end goal of the post-conflict transition: peace.

Yet, despite Mozambique's non-return to conflict, I argued in this chapter that serious RPSRCs went unmanaged. The polarization of reintegration issues contributed to broader problems of ethnic, political, and regional cleavage in the country. Persistent grievances about unemployment and political marginalization have contributed to violence during elections. And, involvement of some former fighters in spoiler activity has undermined state and regional security. I also argued that domestic political pressures created incentives for both sides to polarize reintegration for electoral gain and that strong normative pressures related to international intervention, in addition to actors' own perceptions about their roles and objectives, constrained the ability of the UN mission and agencies to manage the RPSRCs observed.

The real challenge in Mozambique was to create a durable security environment. 'Pay and scatter' took a least common denominator approach to the creation of economic

opportunity and provision of security, where reintegration meant buying off success in the short term. Failure to encourage the full participation of the military elite in the project of peace and democracy allowed corruption and criminality to go unchecked, which in turn created an atmosphere where more dangerous security threats can develop. Failure for external or state actors to guarantee equal treatment of combatants in the ten years since the end of war has kept reintegration a divisive issue, one that has soured relations between and within the two main parties. That divisiveness has also undermined reconciliation and, ultimately, hurt the economic and social reintegration of Mozambique's ex-combatants.

IV. Sierra Leone

No assessment of ex-combatant reintegration would be complete without a close look at Sierra Leone. Human rights abuses and war crimes perpetrated by combatants on all sides of the conflict made the social reintegration of fighters a daunting task. Resumed fighting twice put the entire peace process on hold, testing the flexibility of reintegration actors to respond to subsequent delays in disarmament and demobilization. Fighting forces' use of diamonds to fuel conflict resulted in novel multilateral arrangements to control diamond exports from the region and meant that reintegration actors were under pressure to discourage ex-combatants from returning to the diamond mines. The duration and size of the UN mission (UNAMSIL) was unprecedented, underscoring that the UN had staked its peace-building reputation on success in Sierra Leone. The management of reintegration activities by a National Commission for DDR (NCDDR) represented a new approach to the design and implementation of reintegration programs, meant to foster political commitment to reintegration among ruling government authorities. The decision to give all ex-combatants a choice of training opportunities spanning vocational, agricultural, and educational sectors was also a reintegration first (it is worth recalling that in Mozambique only a fraction of ex-combatants were able to participate in training programs). Finally, and most ominously, a spate of violent conflicts in the West African region created unparalleled challenges for reintegration actors that were not always met successfully.

International and state stakeholders in Sierra Leone understood reintegration to be 'pivotal' to the success of the entire DDR enterprise.¹ So important was the reintegration of Sierra Leone's

¹ UNSC, 'Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 7 September 2001, S/2001/857, para.59; Francis Kai-Kai, National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Executive Secretariat, NCDDR Meeting, Executive Secretariat Report, 3 February 2004, p.5.

ex-combatants to consolidation of peace that it was one of five key benchmarks on which the exit strategy of UNAMSIL hinged.² The government established the NCDDR in July 1998 after the World Bank recommended a state-led DDR commission modeled after Uganda's peacetime demobilization in the early 1990s.³ Its mandate was to facilitate the disarmament of an estimated 45,000 combatants from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), ex-Sierra Leonean Army (SLA), Civil Defense Forces (CDF), and other paramilitary groups; to demobilize all factions and individual ex-combatants (in other words, to break the chain of command tying ex-combatants to their former commanders); and support the short term economic and social reintegration of eligible ex-combatants.⁴ The commission worked in close contact with other actors involved in the DDR process: regional and UN peacekeeping forces, UN agencies (UNICEF, WFP, and UNDP), the World Bank, bilateral donors such as USAID and GTZ, and several international and local NGOs, most prominently World Vision and Action Aid.

When UNAMSIL withdrew from Sierra Leone at the end of 2005, the Secretary-General reported that UN efforts there had 'placed Sierra Leone on a firm path to post-conflict recovery' and that the country 'has great potential to achieve lasting stability, democracy and prosperity'.⁵ But read the not-so-fine print within the same report and a Sierra Leone not far removed from the one that descended into civil war in the first place emerges into view, one of 'widespread destitution and disaffection, especially among the unemployed youth'.⁶ Since massive unemployment among Sierra Leone's youth has been widely recognized by all respondents and in UN and Sierra

² UNSC, 'Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 5 September 2002, S/2002/987, para.13. The other benchmarks were the capacity of the Sierra Leone armed forces and police to take responsibility for external and internal security, the consolidation of state authority throughout the country, the restoration of government control over diamond mining, and the settlement of conflicts in neighboring countries.

³ Mitonga Zongwe, 'Preliminary Assessment of the Disarmament and Demobilization in Sierra Leone,' Freetown, UNAMSIL DDR Coordination Section, 6 April 2002, p.2.

⁴ Kai-Kai 2004, p.1.

⁵ UNSC, 'Twenty-seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 12 December 2005, S/2005/777, para.59.

⁶ Ibid., para.2.

Leonean documents as a major 'root cause' of the civil war there, persistent economic, social, and political marginalization among the country's youth – many of whom are ex-combatants – does not bode well for post-conflict security.⁷

Sierra Leone's reintegration process remains incomplete. This chapter argues that reintegration actors in Sierra Leone did not have the resources, will, or authority to adequately steward the reintegration process. Actors, responding in part to a difficult post-conflict environment and reflecting their assumptions about the limits of their own programs, adopted a short term approach that did little except return ex-combatants to the lives of poverty they knew before the war. Not only did programs do little to counter widespread unemployment among ex-combatants or to create sustainable economic opportunities for former fighters, there is significant evidence that the programs reintegration actors implemented exacerbated several RPSRCs, problems that had an observable and negative impact on security there. Reintegration programs implemented in Sierra Leone influenced the re-recruitment of several thousand ex-combatants into neighboring conflicts, fueled markets for small arms, excluded vulnerable groups from reintegration assistance, neglected insecurity in mining areas, and failed to mop up residual problems linked to incomplete demobilization and disarmament.

Reintegration programs in Sierra Leone have been the subject of several evaluations.⁸

The November 2000 assessment found that negative perceptions of DDR were widespread

⁷ Of course, youth unemployment is not inherently a root cause of war, but in Sierra Leone there is a widespread popular perception (and, notably, this perception was mentioned by all respondents interviewed about Sierra Leone's reintegration process and has also been endorsed in security assessments conducted by the government, the UN, and in reintegration program evaluations) that economic and political marginalization of youth helped RUF mobilization. The Sierra Leonean government, as of 2005, articulated root causes of the war as being: poverty; political, social and economic exclusion; poor governance and weak rule of law; lack of access to services; absence of personal security; and, inadequate employment opportunities: see Tesfamichael et al 2004, p.2; UNSC, 'Twenty-fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 26 April 2005, S/2005/273, para.73; UN Office for West Africa, *Youth Unemployment and Regional Insecurity in West Africa*, UNOWA Issue Papers, December 2005.

⁸ Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme, *Assessment Report of the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme*, November 2000; Comninos et al. 2002; Tesfamichael et al. 2004; Ted Morse and Mark Knight, 'Sierra Leone Disarmament and

because of a major breakdown in the security situation in 2000 and argued for a reorientation of DDR. The November 2002 assessment was a comprehensive audit of DDR achievements and shortcomings, including market analysis of job opportunities; it concluded that the NCDDR was on track to achieve its 'social and economic reintegration result targets' and that the lack of job opportunities for ex-combatants was a 'structural deficiency beyond the control of the NCDDR'.⁹ The October 2004 Final Evaluation revised expectations for the reintegration component of DDR further downward, stating, 'It was recognized from the outset that the support offered through the DDR program would not suffice for long-term socio-economic reintegration, but would provide ex-combatants with short-term support while they began the process of readjusting to civilian life'.¹⁰

Reflected in the Final Evaluation was the fact that, even though great importance was attached to the reintegration process in Sierra Leone, expectations for what reintegration programs could deliver were set very low. The NCDDR scaled back its initial vision of the programs that would make up its reintegration effort and insisted that programs could do little more than provide short-term relief, a 'cooling off period', to ex-combatants.¹¹ Donor and NCDDR hedging about the limits of reintegration programs was slightly self justifying, coming as it did after it became clear that widespread unemployment continues among ex-combatants. As one NCDDR official put it, 'The reintegration was a bribe to get them out of the bush – and not a complete programme of reintegration as such.'¹² The tension between what ex-combatants and others expect reintegration to deliver and what it can realistically provide is always acute and raises similar issues to those

Demobilisation Programme Assessment Report: Executive Summary and Lessons Learned,' Freetown, Government of Sierra Leone and the World Bank, July 2002; and Ted Morse and Mark Knight, 'Lessons Learned from Sierra Leone Disarmament and Demobilization of Combatants,' prepared for the Government of Sierra Leone and the World Bank, Final Draft, April 2002. Additional to official evaluations of the NCDDR, two surveys (Stavrou et al. 2003 and Weinstein and Humphreys 2005) assessed the level of acceptance ex-combatants reported feeling from their host communities and families. Both concluded that, by and large, ex-combatants felt accepted by host communities.

⁹ Corninos et al. 2002, pp.2-3.

¹⁰ Tesfamichael et al. 2004, p.10.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp.8,53.

¹² Quoted in Corninos et al. 2002, p.26.

encountered in Namibia, Mozambique, and elsewhere about how reintegration should be assessed. Interventions in Sierra Leone swung too far in one direction, towards unnecessarily lowered expectations about what reintegration programs could have, and should have, delivered in Sierra Leone in terms of management of reintegration problems and creation of economic opportunities.

Based on a review of all available documentation of DDR in Sierra Leone and on extensive interviews with dozens of those involved in the reintegration process, carried out in Sierra Leone itself and at the UN Headquarters in New York and World Bank in Washington, my assessment identifies the RPSRCs that significantly impacted and continue to impact the security situation there before moving on to an examination of the role that actors played in managing those problems. As with the preceding case chapters, I begin with an overview of the conflict in Sierra Leone, disarmament and demobilization efforts, and the reintegration programs designed and implemented there.

I. Conflict and Peace, 1991-2000

Sierra Leone's civil war killed 43,000 people, wounded tens of thousands more, and displaced the vast majority of its 4.5 million inhabitants. Despite several attempts at peace, the war raged for nearly ten years and is infamous for the atrocities perpetrated against the civilian population by all sides, including amputation, torture, abduction, rape, and sexual slavery. The conflict began in March of 1991 when a few hundred armed Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels, accompanied by fighters from Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and mercenaries from Burkina Faso, crossed the border from Liberia. Although the Sierra Leonean

government and the RUF signed the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, the conflict did not end until a further agreement at Abuja on 10 November 2000 produced a ceasefire that was gradually respected by all sides.

The roots of Sierra Leone's conflict are best traced to the corrupt governance of President Siaka Stevens (1968-1985) and his successor, General Joseph Momoh (1985-1992). These rulers neglected rural development and siphoned the state's diamond resources to buy the political patronage of local leaders, creating what William Reno termed a 'shadow state', a system of authority based on informal patron-client relationships rather than on a centralized bureaucracy.¹³ The Stevens and Momoh regimes emptied government coffers, eviscerated state institutions, and left the civilian population impoverished and angry, all of which helped to grow the RUF once the war had begun.

Although government corruption sowed discontent among eventual RUF recruits, the formation of the rebel organization, like its ultimate disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, can not be understood independent of its regional context.¹⁴ The Liberian leader, Charles Taylor, colluded with the RUF's leader, Foday Sankoh, to control and profit from Sierra Leone's diamond trade and thereby consolidate his own power and authority in Liberia and the region.¹⁵ The RUF fought ruthlessly to control the country's diamond mines and thus fuel further conflict. The lines

¹³ Reno 1999; see also Alfred Babatunde Zack-Williams, 'Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-1998,' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20, No.1, 1999, pp.143-62. Before Stevens' rule, diamond revenues generated US\$200 million for the state's coffers; by 1987, the diamonds sold in the formal (and therefore taxable) economy generated a mere US\$100,000 (Reno 1999, p.116).

¹⁴ On the importance of Liberia's hand in the RUF's origins and evolution see John L. Hirsh, 'War in Sierra Leone,' *Survival*, Vol.43, No.3, Autumn 2001, pp.145-62.

¹⁵ Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner for the International Peace Academy, 2002) p.82. The symbiotic relationship between the RUF and its Liberian patron flourished until UN Security Council Resolution 1343 on 7 March 2001 imposed arms and diamond embargoes on Liberia. This was the first time that the Security Council had imposed sanctions on one country for its failure to comply with sanctions on another (an arms and diamond embargo had been imposed on Sierra Leone earlier and had been flouted repeatedly and extensively by Liberia). Sanctions succeeded in halting the trade of diamonds to Liberia and encouraged the RUF, its financial relationship with its patron undercut, to abide by the terms of the ceasefire negotiated at Abuja.

between means and ends for the RUF blurred, however, and the movement's *raison d'être* was arguably control of mining activity. This has led to a depiction of the RUF as an apolitical, nihilistic organization. While its tactics were brutal and its political legitimacy and agenda thin, the movement nevertheless had significant political undertones: it saw itself as standing up against the marginalization and exploitation of unemployed youth, and its tactics were a violent manifestation of its fighters' reassertion of power in a society that, they believed, had shamed them and made them powerless. This is not to suggest that the RUF enjoyed popular appeal: it depended on forced recruitment and it brutalized the civilian population in urban and rural areas alike. But the aspirations and grievances of many of its fighters are significant to any assessment of DDR since the current post-conflict context is one that echoes the massive youth unemployment and marginalization of pre-war Sierra Leone.

Throughout the war the RUF fought a motley crew of state-supported forces. Initially, the SLA defended Momoh's government but, ill-equipped and underpaid, the army staged a coup on 29 April 1992 and established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). The NPRC hired Executive Outcomes, a private security firm, to help it fight the RUF. Executive Outcomes enlisted the assistance of local initiation and hunting societies to help defend rural communities and urban centers outside of Freetown, the best known and most powerful of which are the Kamajors. These groups came to form the backbone of Sierra Leone's defense against the RUF and eventually organized themselves as the CDF, a paramilitary network defending towns and villages against RUF incursions, its members usually armed with hunting rifles and shotguns.¹⁶ The CDF became enormously popular in Sierra Leone for defending civilians against an RUF the armed forces were incapable of defeating militarily and eventually unwilling (because of extensive collusion) to fight.

¹⁶ In addition to the Kamajors, other major militia groups comprising the CDF were the Tamaboros, the Donzos, and Gbethis.

The NPRC allowed elections to occur in February 1996 and relinquished power to the winner, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). The RUF boycotted the election and refused to recognize the results. Conflict continued until Kabbah's government negotiated a ceasefire with the RUF at Abidjan on 30 November 1996 but Kabbah was ousted in a coup at the end of May 1997, the country's second in less than five years. This time, the coup leader was Johnny Paul Koroma. His Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) wasted no time in forming a ruling junta allied with the RUF. The RUF had long profited from collusion with the armed forces, spawning the term 'sobel' (soldier by day, rebel by night), and so in many ways an AFRC-RUF alliance was a formal recognition of a relationship that had existed informally among elements of the ex-SLA for some time.

After diplomatic efforts failed to get the AFRC to step down, the Security Council imposed oil and arms embargoes (Resolution 1132 of 8 October 1997) and authorized troops of the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) to enforce them.¹⁷ Koroma failed to respect a ceasefire agreement reached at Conakry at the end of October, and ECOMOG forces attacked Freetown in February 1998, ousted the AFRC, and restored Kabbah to power. Most RUF fighters fled the capital and resumed fighting in the bush, and many members of the AFRC/ex-SLA joined their ranks. On 13 July 1998, the Security Council created the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor the disarmament and demobilization of forces in areas controlled by the government. The security situation deteriorated in the subsequent period, however, with RUF rebels and AFRC remnants controlling much of the countryside. The RUF and AFRC led a combined attack on Freetown in January 1999 in which

¹⁷ ECOMOG had already taken independent military action to secure peace in Sierra Leone, the result of UN reluctance to intervene militarily in West Africa and of the desire of neighboring states, and particularly Nigeria, to maintain security in the region. The Security Council resolution, therefore, was effectively an *ex post facto* authorization of the existing ECOMOG peace enforcement initiative.

3000 people are believed to have been killed or abducted. Disarmed combatants – former members of the AFRC and the RUF – in particular were singled out for violence, hundreds of ECOMOG troops were killed, and hundreds of civilians were mutilated, amputated, and raped.

Military pressure on the RUF from ECOMOG forces and diplomatic pressure from the UN and its member states (including the UK, Nigeria, and Cote d'Ivoire), combined with the impact of UN sanctions, eventually brought Sankoh back to the bargaining table and the RUF and the government concluded the peace agreement at Lomé. Article XVI of the Lomé Agreement provided for the disarmament and demobilization of all combatants of the RUF, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups, to commence six weeks after the agreement was signed and in conjunction with deployment of a peacekeeping force. It also called on the international community for financial and technical support for DDR. After Lomé, Security Council Resolution 1270 (22 October 1999), established UNAMSIL and gave it a broad mandate to assist the government and other parties to implement the Lomé Agreement and to assist in the DDR of ex-combatants. Unlike the parties to the Mozambican conflict after the GPA, however, the Sierra Leonean factions, and specifically the RUF, had not truly renounced violence and were not committed to the implementation of the agreement.

Consequently, the Lomé honeymoon was short. Violations were frequent and cooperation scant. The RUF refused to disclose the number and location of its combatants, obstructed UN access to districts under its control, forcibly prevented its fighters from disarming, issued reprisals for those who voluntarily disarmed, and obstructed UNAMSIL military observers (MILOBS) from accessing demobilization centers.¹⁸ Then, beginning on 1 May 2000, RUF combatants began abducting UN personnel, seizing UN equipment and weapons, destroying demobilization centers,

¹⁸ UNSC, 'Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 19 May 2000, S/2000/455, paras.15-7.

and looting the areas surrounding them. Sankoh did nothing to call off the RUF aggression. By 15 May, 352 UNAMSIL personnel were in RUF hands, 25 UNAMSIL soldiers were wounded, and several were missing and presumed dead.¹⁹ On May 8, a crowd of about 30,000 violently marched on Sankoh's home and Sankoh disappeared until May 17, when he was apprehended and turned over to government custody, where he remained until he died in 2003 while under indictment for war crimes. RUF attacks on UNAMSIL and pro-government troops continued in the following months, and RUF and AFRC/ex-SLA fighters were involved in numerous cross-border attacks on Guinea off and on for over a year.

Peace had clearly broken down. Ex-combatants who had disarmed were re-armed in order to defend against renewed rebel attacks. Recruiters for assorted armed factions in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire operating within Sierra Leone persuaded thousands of ex-combatants to join their ranks. With Sankoh in government custody, and the RUF risking complete diplomatic isolation and facing military pressure from UNAMSIL and British and Guinean forces, the RUF's new leader, Issa Sesay, decided to negotiate yet another ceasefire agreement on 10 November 2000, this time at Abuja.²⁰ Where Abidjan, Conakry, and Lomé failed, the Abuja ceasefire succeeded because of new RUF leadership, UN sanctions against Liberia, a re-vamped UNAMSIL, the arrival of British paratroopers in May 2000, and Guinean military pressure on RUF forces along the border and in Liberia.²¹

The UNAMSIL mission provided security for presidential and parliamentary elections on 14 May 2002. Nine political parties took part, including the RUF. President Kabbah won with 70% of

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para.68.

²⁰ The Abuja Agreement was a ceasefire agreement and Lomé remained the governing document for Sierra Leone's peace process.

²¹ UNDPKO, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone*, New York, DPKO, September 2003, p.22. Sporadic violations after Abuja continued, however, in the form of clashes between the RUF and CDF and between the RUF and Guinean forces, and violence at demobilization centers continued.

the vote. The RUFP candidate won only 1.7% of the votes cast, the start of a rapid political decline for the RUF in Sierra Leone following the disarmament of its fighters.²² The elections, which were declared 'free, transparent and generally violence-free',²³ were not without problems. There were reports of coercion and threats by SLPP supporters and government officials in rural areas. And, the widespread perception in the eastern and southern districts that elections were a 'rubber stamp' fueled local resentment and underscored a sharp degree of political marginalization.²⁴

II. 'Phased' Disarmament and Demobilization, 1999-2001

Disarmament and demobilization are said to have occurred in three phases in Sierra Leone. The term 'phases' is misleading, however, as the different attempts at disarmament were not planned as official phases but became known as such only after preceding attempts failed following the breakdown of peace in January 1999 and May 2000.²⁵ Interruptions to DDR following both breakdowns were characterized by rapid and widespread *re*-armament and *re*-mobilization. Disarmament and demobilization were also tasks that confronted an increasing number of fighters at each re-launch of DDR efforts. The initial World Bank estimate for DDR was that 33,000 ex-combatants would participate. The Lomé Agreement calculated that 45,000 fighters would need to be disarmed: 6,000 SLA troops, 15,000 RUF, 15,000 CDF, 7,000 AFRC, and 2,000 additional paramilitary fighters. In the end, 72,490 combatants from all factions were disarmed, including

²² UNSC, 'Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 19 June 2002, S/2002/679, para.3.

²³ UNSC S/2002/679, para.7.

²⁴ International Crisis Group 2004, p.18.

²⁵ Because categorization of disarmament and demobilization as occurring in three phases is widespread, I adopt the division in this section.

6,845 children under 18.²⁶ This is only a few thousand combatants shy of Mozambique's total, a country with three times as many people. This high number is significant because it demonstrates that ex-combatants make up substantially more of the population of Sierra Leone than other countries that have undergone DDR and so the continuing unemployment of Sierra Leone's ex-combatants can not be dismissed as easily.

The NCDDR, in consultation with major donors, decided on a policy of individual disarmament, or 'one person, one gun', whereby each combatant would need to relinquish a weapon to join reintegration programs. The preference for individual disarmament reflected a desire to capture as many weapons as possible. The alternative would have been disarmament of entire units and battalions according to verified lists of fighting forces on all sides, as occurred in Mozambique, but the RUF refusal to provide lists of units and locations and donor pressure to begin disarmament without RUF lists produced a policy of individual disarmament. Those disarmed were meant to stay in demobilization centers for between two and six weeks, where they would receive a medical screening, food and non-food transitional assistance, a photo ID, a transport allowance, and sensitization training about reintegration benefits, human rights, and other topics. At the demobilization centers, ex-combatants would also receive the first installment of a Transitional Safety Net Allowance (TSA), half of the TSA total of 600,000 *Leones* (or approximately US\$300).²⁷

Resumption of conflict in January 1999, which disrupted phase I, and in May 2000, which disrupted phase II, meant that things did not go to plan. Pro-government forces had incentives to keep weapons because the RUF was still fighting despite the ceasefire. Members of the ex-SLA

²⁶ Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Communique on Completion of Disarmament, Freetown, 17 January 2002. For a thorough account of the disarmament and demobilization phases of DDR, see Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College, London, *Sierra Leone Report*, 28 February 2003.

²⁷ The second installment would be paid, in theory, at regional reintegration offices although, as will be discussed, there were several problems with the design and administration of the TSA.

did not hand in weapons; rather, weapons were left in armories and British and UNAMSIL forces fast-tracked 'demobilized' SLA fighters through military reintegration screening.²⁸ 'Disarmed' CDF fighters tended not to hand in weapons because the disarmament program did not accept hunting rifles and shotguns for collection. Finally, many ex-combatants who voluntarily showed up to demobilization centers with only hand grenades or ammunition were allowed onto DDR registries to encourage further voluntary disarmament. The weapons handed over during phases I and II were of poor quality; the best weapons were withheld.

In the wake of the May 2000 violence, a UN Security Council mission in October 2000 decided, unsurprisingly, that a 'thorough overhaul and reorientation' of the DDR program was needed, which led to the November 2000 assessment.²⁹ The assessment found that problems with design and implementation of disarmament contributed to insecurity because of the ease with which collected weapons were looted and because a perception among ex-combatants that cash benefits were given in exchange for disarmament (due to the timing of the TSA, paid immediately upon hand-in of weapons) made arms lucrative and therefore fueled the market for their continued trade. The World Bank subsequently advised the NCDDR to suspend payment of TSAs.³⁰

The policy overhaul led to four major changes to DDR policy when phase III began on 18 May 2001. First, group disarmament replaced individual disarmament: commanders were required to bring in two weapons for every three fighters demobilized, although individual, voluntary disarmament was still allowed if the individual possessed a weapon and could demonstrate that he had participated in the conflict. Group disarmament recognized that not all combatants had weapons; the RUF, for example, tended to store weapons centrally and field commanders

²⁸ Author's interview with Lieutenant Colonel Harold Simpson, Senior Staff Officer, Sierra Leone Ministry of Defense (on secondment from the International Military Advisory and Training Team), 6 July 2005.

²⁹ UNSC, 'Report of the Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone,' 16 October 2000, S/2000/992, para.54(e).

³⁰ MDTF 2000, p.14; Author's interview with Sean Bradley, Trust Fund Coordinator, Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Secretariat, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1 April 2004.

controlled access to them. Crucially, individual disarmament had been seen by RUF commanders as exclusive, leaving out large numbers of their men, and carried out without its consent. It began hiding weapons and attacking disarmament sites as a result. This suggests that a policy of individual disarmament, if it does not receive the support of one or more parties to the conflict, will always be problematic.

Second, the demobilization process was fast-tracked so ex-combatants spent between three and 21 days in demobilization centers rather than two to six weeks as before.³¹ This change streamlined demobilization but deprived ex-combatants of the support planned for longer stays. Therefore, many were demobilized without being given adequate information about reintegration benefits. Third, TSAs were canceled and instead the NCDDR paid Reinsertion Benefits (RB) of US\$150 to each ex-combatant. Correcting its previous mistake, the NCDDR paid RBs once ex-combatants registered for reintegration in their community of choice and not on handing in a weapon. RBs were distributed on a district-by-district basis, following the disarmament timetable, which led to payment delays if ex-combatants were disarmed in one district but returned to one where disarmament had yet to begin. Fourth, the Joint Committee devised an enhanced role for UNAMSIL in coordinating the geographically-phased system of disarmament. The NCDDR adopted the changes at the request of its donors, particularly the World Bank, and the changes reflected a consensus among major DDR stakeholders because of shared concerns about individual disarmament and perceptions of cash-for-guns.

The weapons collected during all phases of disarmament represent a fraction of the total weapons thought to have been in circulation during the conflict. Follow-up programs helped

³¹ In addition to demobilization centers, UNAMSIL operated mobile disarmament units. Fast-tracking significantly curtailed sensitization and post-discharge orientation sessions (Government of Sierra Leone, Executive Secretariat, National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, *The DDR Programme: Status and Strategies for Completion*, Consultative Group Meeting Report, Paris, 13-14 November 2002, p.7).

remedy this problem, the most successful of which has been UNDP's Arms for Development Programme (AfD). The AfD will run until 2007 and provides approximately US\$18,000 to each chieftaincy to invest in revenue generation or construction projects in return for at least 100 weapons collected. UNDP estimates that it will collect 15,000 to 30,000 weapons by the end of the program.³² UNDP and other actors have also worked to build regional capacity to counter the small arms trade through regional agreements and legislative licensing frameworks.

The way in which group disarmament policy was formulated by the NCDDR and carried out by UNAMSIL peacekeepers caused widespread reintegration targeting failures and fraud. By relaxing weapons possession criteria, group disarmament was meant to bring more people into the DDR process and more arms into collection containers for destruction. But the NCDDR and UNAMSIL decided to rely on conflict commanders to provide lists of their fighters, thus empowering them to include or exclude individuals at their discretion, which encouraged fraud and exclusion. Many commanders included family members and friends, left females, children, and weaker male combatants off lists, demanded a percentage of reintegration benefits from the rank and file as pay-back for inclusion onto lists, and excluded bona fide combatants because of personal animosity. There are no easy procedures for weeding out corruption and ensuring inclusion of all bona fide combatants onto programs. As one respondent said, 'These conflicts are messy – there are not always card-carrying combatants around.'³³ But DDR actors ought to have anticipated these problems, or mitigated them once problems with relying on commander were discovered. Rather than rely exclusively on commanders' lists, the NCDDR could have endorsed an eligibility system resembling Namibia's eligibility commissions or, at the very least, set up a process for bona fide ex-

³² Author's interview with Zoe Dugal, Information and Capacity-Building Officer, Sierra Leone Arms for Development Programme, UNDP, Freetown, 1 July 2005.

³³ Author's interview with Angela Martin, Africa Team Leader, Office of Transitional Initiatives, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, Washington, DC, 3 September 2004.

combatants to appeal exclusion from lists. But neither course of action was taken, and the eligibility problems were never addressed by reintegration actors. It is to the specific components of the reintegration program that I now turn.

III. 'Disbanding, Dispersing, and Distracting': Design and Implementation of Reintegration Assistance, 1999-2005

Of the 72,490 ex-combatants who disarmed, approximately 56,000 of them registered for reintegration assistance by December 2002.³⁴ Those choosing not to participate did so because of the long delays between demobilization and the start of reintegration programs, lack of interest in the assistance offered, self-reintegration through pre-conflict employment contacts, and re-recruitment into fighting forces in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea.³⁵ Unlike in Namibia and Mozambique, all of those eligible for reintegration benefits in Sierra Leone were guaranteed access to some form of vocational training, agricultural support, or education assistance. Needless to say, managing assistance for that number of ex-combatants was a mammoth logistical undertaking which cost upwards of US\$100 million.³⁶ The DDR program was funded through the Sierra Leonean government's budget, a World Bank loan, and parallel funding from DFID, UNICEF, and the WFP, with US\$40 million coming from voluntary contributions to the MDTF managed by the World Bank.³⁷

Decisions about whether to target assistance to ex-combatants specifically or steer generalized assistance to communities initially divided actors in Sierra Leone. Representatives

³⁴ Tesfamichael et al. 2004, p.114, Kai-Kai 2004, p.4.

³⁵ These reasons are summarized in Tesfamichael et al. 2004, p.15.

³⁶ The NCDDR initially estimated program costs of \$33.6 million for 33,000 combatants.

³⁷ Donors to the MDTF were Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. For more on NCDDR funding, see Tesfamichael et al. 2004, pp.66-71.

from civil society argued that ex-combatants should not be targeted because other groups that were the victims of combatants' atrocities were needier (e.g., displaced persons, amputees, other wounded civilians, widows, and orphans) and because ex-combatants represented a small percentage of the total population.³⁸ The NCDDR, however, stated from the start that it would provide only targeted assistance to ex-combatants and expected different government actors (specifically, the National Commission on Resettlement, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction and National Committee for Social Action) to target other vulnerable groups. As the planning documentation of the NCDDR stated:

The underlining principle would be to provide every eligible ex-combatant an immediate package of assistance to support their effective reintegration into their respective communities. The option of extended targeted assistance can be examined along with the time requirement for consolidating national and local security conditions. A *three-year period* is envisaged for this purpose after which the ex-combatants would be treated like any other member of the community.³⁹

UNAMSIL supported the NCDDR because the promise of targeted assistance created incentives for disarmament. Renewed war in Liberia in 2002 and 2003 helped to vindicate a targeted approach in Sierra Leone: in 1997, Liberia opted for non-targeted community assistance over targeted support and the perception of the NCDDR and many others was that this had been a mistake because festering ex-combatant grievances there had contributed in part to renewed conflict.

Disruptions to disarmament and demobilization in January 1999 and May 2000 had a disastrous impact on the planning of reintegration program components. The policy overhaul of disarmament ahead of phase III meant that the NCDDR and World Bank DDR advisers were focused exclusively on D&D during this time and neglected reintegration planning, which

³⁸ Simon Arthy, United Kingdom Department for International Development Reintegration Lesson Learning and Evaluation Coordinator, 'DFID Funded Reintegration Activities in Sierra Leone: Reintegration Lesson Learning and Impact Evaluations,' Freetown, Phase Two Report, April 2003, p.6.

³⁹ NCDDR, 'Reintegration Strategy: Design Framework, Processes and Approach (Draft for Discussion)', 8 April 2000, p.12, cited in Comninou et al. 2002, p.23, my emphasis.

contributed to ex-combatant dissatisfaction. Also, as indicated above, the NCDDR originally had envisaged reintegration support of up to three years but donors (principally, the World Bank) pressured the NCDDR to pursue a 'rapid approach' in the wake of security crises and the NCDDR agreed, down-grading assistance packages to six months of training and support. Money also influenced the decision though. Hefty financial investment in disarmament and demobilization left less for reintegration than would have been available were it not for the delays caused by recurrence of conflict. A three-year program was therefore traded for activities that 'would defuse tensions by *disbanding, dispersing and distracting* combatants'.⁴⁰ This seems an odd justification, however, in light of the substantial delays that characterized the implementation of this so-called rapid reintegration approach. Some fighters waited up to 18 months between their discharge from demobilization centers and their receipt of reintegration benefits.

It is unclear which programs the NCDDR would have pursued if it had stuck with a three-year support program and even less clear whether three years of support could have achieved results significantly different than the six-month scheme adopted. But, it is significant that the donors (e.g., the World Bank, DFID, and bilateral donors to the MDTF) stressing the national ownership of reintegration are the same actors who coaxed the NCDDR to adopt a short term reintegration program very similar to ones adopted elsewhere. In a familiar pattern for reintegration programs, the NCDDR also shied away from concrete success criteria; instead, program output itself became the strategy, and little thought was given to what would happen once the six months ended other than to assume that generalized development assistance would take over.

The support package that won out featured cash 'benefits' (the TSA and RB allowances) combined with an 'opportunity' option of either vocational training, agricultural support, or educational assistance under the Training and Employment Program (TEP). There were also more

⁴⁰ Comninos et al. 2002, p.26, my emphasis.

limited NCDDR projects that involved public works, micro-credit, and psychosocial counseling, as well as civic education workshops and community sensitization about reintegration programs to facilitate social reintegration. Supplementing the work of the NCDDR were programs designed and implemented by other actors, including USAID, GTZ, UNAMSIL, UNDP, and UNICEF.

Reintegration Benefits: Cash

The rationale for providing cash was, as in Mozambique, to encourage ex-combatants to return to and remain in home districts, inject cash into rural communities to facilitate social acceptance, and to provide for immediate material needs of ex-combatants and their dependents until training could begin. Ex-combatants had also made it clear that to return home empty-handed after so many years away was culturally unacceptable.⁴¹ RB payments were intended to tide ex-combatants over for three months. By the end of the DDR program, 61,161 ex-combatants received cash assistance totaling US\$12 million.⁴²

Although cash payments in Sierra Leone cost less than one-quarter of the amount spent on the RSS in Mozambique,⁴³ and were meant to cover needs up to three months rather than the two years covered for former RENAMO and FRELIMO fighters, cash was considerably more controversial and problematic in Sierra Leone. Half of the TSA was meant to be paid in regional offices upon discharge from demobilization centers, but the full amount was often paid in camps prior to discharge, which created a broad perception among ex-combatants of all factions that the reinsertion benefit was a cash-for-weapons scheme, in turn stimulating the already-thriving market for small arms in the region. The abandonment of the TSA program and the requirement that RB

⁴¹ Arthy 2003, p.6.

⁴² Government of Sierra Leone, National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, presentation by the Executive Secretariat, 2002.

⁴³ The 18 months covered by the RSS cost approximately \$35.5 million, although this does not count the Mozambican government's payment of six months of ex-combatants' salaries there, which would bring the total to nearly \$50 million. Mozambique was able to sustain a long-term cash payment program because of suitable banking infrastructure, whereas the absence of banks in rural areas in Sierra Leone meant high security costs to move large amounts of cash across the country.

payments be made only upon registration at regional offices helped to mitigate the cash-for-weapons perception, but perceptions fade slowly. And, the lack of harmonization between DDR programs in the region meant that similar programs in Liberia and Guinea continued to distribute cash upon presentation of weapons, which simply shifted the market demand for weapons towards those countries and contributed to the cross-border flow of arms. In fact, more money was paid for reinsertion in those countries, further driving up demand for weapons trafficking.

There were other problems with cash payments in Sierra Leone. Although payments were meant to tide combatants over for three months, long delays of well over three months before training courses began left combatants at a loose end, and made alternative offers such as recruitment into fighting forces in Liberia, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire more appealing to cash-strapped Sierra Leonean fighters. Suspension of the TSA also led to considerable confusion among ex-combatants remaining in demobilization centers and contributed to further unrest in the camps.

The TSA was based on a faulty distribution design from the beginning. There were sufficient voices of dissent, including within UNDP, which cautioned against lump sum payments and warned about the dangers associated with distributing cash at the point of disarmament. But it was not until problems with the TSA were entrenched that the World Bank and the NCDDR abandoned the approach, essentially vindicating the UNDP position that cash should be paid in home areas and spread over time. Problems with the cash payments also underscored the slow pace with which reintegration actors respond to problems and the difficulty with which they confront regional dilemmas of peace-building. Harmonization of reintegration packages never occurred, appearing only in 'lessons learned' literature on the Sierra Leonean DDR. Difficulties with cash distribution in Sierra Leone should be construed as arguments to improve design and distribution of cash benefits and not to discourage use of cash payments. Cash was an essential incentive for

Sierra Leonean ex-combatants' participation in DDR. UNAMSIL was 'unequivocal' that the resumption of cash payments under the RB scheme was what helped break the logjam in DDR, and the Special Representative to the Secretary-General said that cash was critical to give hope to ex-combatants that something would be waiting for them 'on the other side'.⁴⁴

Reintegration Opportunities: The Training and Employment Program and Parallel Programs

The TEP was designed to provide ex-combatants with marketable skills. Ex-combatants could choose between vocational training courses, agricultural support, formal education, apprenticeships, or public works projects.⁴⁵ They were polled beforehand to determine their reintegration program preferences, but market research about the job prospects for the ex-combatants upon completion of programs was not conducted before they chose between TEP offerings. This meant that ex-combatants lacked important information about which options were most likely to yield sustainable opportunities and which 'skills' would therefore be most 'marketable'. By 31 January 2004, 51,122 ex-combatants had participated in TEP programs. The majority (57%) chose vocational training and apprenticeships, with 24% choosing formal education, and 18% choosing agricultural support.⁴⁶

Those who opted for vocational training received up to six months of training in carpentry, tailoring, auto mechanics, hairdressing, masonry, welding, driving, computer studies, and other

⁴⁴ Author's interview with Bradley.

⁴⁵ Few public works projects were carried out and the apprenticeship program was ultimately jettisoned because of lack of service providers for either activity. Even before the program was pared down, it had far fewer participants than its classroom-based vocational training counterpart because ex-combatants realized that the monetary value attached to the program's subsistence allowances and toolkits was less than that of vocational training and because they also realized apprenticeships were not actual apprenticeships but merely fixed-term, on-the-job vocational training (Corninos et al. 2002, p.78).

⁴⁶ These numbers are from Ka-Kai 2004, p.4. There are some discrepancies in the participation numbers reported across evaluations, with some determining percentages by using the total number of ex-combatants registered for reintegration benefits (56,000) instead of the 51,122 actually placed on TEP programs. The difference formed the 'residual caseload' and ex-combatants finding themselves on that list were given a one-off payment and support package in lieu of TEP placement.

skills.⁴⁷ Participants received a subsistence allowance of Le 60,000 per month for up to six months, and were provided with a toolkit relevant to the training course completed.⁴⁸ Training opportunities that had a higher social status, such as computer and entrepreneurial skills training, were targeted at officers and commanders. Provision of training was contracted out to local and international NGOs, such as World Vision and Action Aid. Interested NGOs submitted proposals to a multi-agency appraisal committee comprising UNDP, DFID, USAID, the World Bank, and others, and the decision process resembled an 'auction', with donors bidding to fund different proposals.⁴⁹ The NCDDR had its own team to review proposals and oversee the drafting of memoranda-of-understanding between donors and contracting agents. Most implementing partners for TEP programs were in the western area of the country and in Freetown, which reflects both the larger caseload of ex-combatants registered there and the high costs associated with establishing operations outside of the capital.⁵⁰

Those opting for formal education received initial support of one year, with an additional year dependent on performance and level of educational attainment. Those wanting to pursue further educational opportunities needed to find assistance elsewhere. The program paid school fees to schools or business-oriented instruction centers, provided books, stationery, and shoes, and paid a subsistence allowance.⁵¹ Those opting for agricultural support received farming tools and equipment, seeds (e.g., rice, cassava sticks, tree crops, and vegetables), food support (initially, two or three bags of rice per month up to six months, although this was later increased to

⁴⁷ For a breakdown of participation across sectors, see Comninos et al. 2002, p.49.

⁴⁸ Monthly subsistence payments were also given to ex-combatants choosing public works, apprenticeships, and formal education programs, but not for those choosing agricultural support. In all, approximately 250,000 monthly payments were issued, at a cost of about \$6 million. Toolkits were valued at between Le 500,000 – 600,000 each (Comninos et al. 2002, p.76).

⁴⁹ Author's interview with Lorna French, Programme Specialist, Recovery and Peace Building, United Nations Development Programme, Freetown, 7 July 2005.

⁵⁰ GoSL NCDDR 13-14 November 2002, p.13.

⁵¹ Comninos et al. 2002, p.83.

six bags to attract more ex-combatants to the agricultural programs), and provision of agricultural extension services.⁵²

Although the agricultural support programs were assessed in 2002 to be the most successful of the sectoral reintegration programs in terms of sustainability and participant satisfaction,⁵³ few combatants participated in them relative to the vocational training option. This was due in part to the desire of ex-combatants to supplement pre-existing agricultural skills with some vocational training to diversify their marketability. But low participation in the agricultural programs was due primarily to faulty design by the NCDDR and its donors. Agricultural assistance did not come with subsistence allowances and did not offer toolkits (which many ex-combatants sold) so the cash value of vocational training programs was higher.⁵⁴ The ability of the program to attract more participants was also limited because the seasonal growing cycle did not mesh with the disarmament schedule and programs did not offer transportation support for crops to those ex-combatants opting for settlement in less accessible areas.⁵⁵ More ex-combatants eventually joined the agricultural programs because more land became available as disarmament progressed, the NCDDR increased the rice given to beneficiaries, and ex-combatants became more aware that the agricultural sector offered better relative long term employment potential. The uptake in ex-combatant participation in agricultural programs towards the end of the TEP suggests that a greater number would have signed on for such programs from the beginning had they received advice on market prospects or had the agricultural package on offer been financially competitive with vocational training.

⁵² Those choosing animal husbandry in a separate program received subsidized training on designated farms for up to six months.

⁵³ Comninos et al. 2002, p.80.

⁵⁴ Tesfamichael et al. 2004, p.61; GoSL 13-14 November 2002, p.11.

⁵⁵ Comninos et al. 2002, p.81.

Of all the sectoral support programs of the TEP, vocational training programs were most criticized, and deservedly so, for three reasons. First, there were significant delays placing ex-combatants onto programs after their demobilization, undermining the stated objective of providing swift assistance to ex-combatants within three months of their demobilization. There were delays with the receipt of subsistence stipends, issuance of completion certificates, and receipt of toolkits. Periodic funding shortages and the NCDDR's failure to procure toolkits in advance of training programs (despite the World Bank's recommendation for advance procurement) is to blame, but late payments from donors to the MDTF caused frequent funding shortages that left the NCDDR without money to procure the kits in advance. Contingency plans for funding shortages did not exist even though delays should have been expected; ex-combatants were, after all, disarmed in remote areas where there was little sign of state authority or civil society presence.

To its credit, UNAMSIL compensated for delays by designing stop gap programs to tide ex-combatants over while they waited for TEP placement. Stop gap programs were temporary (two-to-three months), labor-intensive, infrastructure rehabilitation projects that targeted volatile areas with high concentrations of ex-combatants and cost about US\$15,000 each. During 2002 and early 2003, 56 such projects were completed.⁵⁶ Stop gap programs reduced tensions between civilians and ex-combatants and they provided much-needed reintegration support in remote areas. Their impact, however, has been exaggerated: they kept ex-combatants occupied during a critical time but they were not a substitute for reintegration assistance and could not mask the delays or shortcomings of that assistance.

The second criticism of vocational training is lack of follow-up assistance to capitalize on skills training. As a DFID representative succinctly put it, 'People felt that they were on a conveyer

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*.

belt that suddenly stopped'.⁵⁷ Micro-credit was effectively absent from the menu of reintegration opportunities on offer in Sierra Leone, even though implementing NGOs claimed to provide it.⁵⁸ Without micro-credit support, ex-combatants lacked the ability to leverage their skills training. This was a failing recognized in the NCDDR assessments.⁵⁹

Finally, and not unlike the failures of the OSD in Mozambique, the training approach adopted in Sierra Leone was supply-driven rather than demand-driven, a pre-defined menu of opportunities based on the preferences of ex-combatants and the offerings of local and international NGOs rather than a strategic needs assessment of market potential.⁶⁰ A needs assessment was conducted in November 2002, but as part of program *evaluation* rather than *planning*. It included interviews with business leaders and others about the market potential of different sectors, and would have been a good model for an earlier assessment, which likely would have recommended the potential of the agricultural sector. Like in Mozambique, ex-combatants in Sierra Leone were trained in computer skills in towns without lights let alone computers, or as drivers and mechanics in towns with few cars available to drive or repair, underscoring yet again a tension between reintegration as a time-buying gesture or an actual investment in economic opportunity.

The symbolic approach chosen raised ex-combatant expectations, no matter how many times formal statements of program objectives cautioned that support was short term and limited. As a prominent civil society representative recollected, 'A World Vision worker told me, "We lied to [ex-combatants]. We told them they would be carpenters in six months. We knew they would not

⁵⁷ Author's interview with Mark White, Deputy Programme Manager, Sierra Leone, West Africa Department, Department for International Development, Freetown, 4 July 2005.

⁵⁸ Initial planning for Le 300,000 in micro-credit grants materialized in very few instances.

⁵⁹ Comninos et al. 2002, p.86. This assessment recommended that the NCDDR facilitate the establishment of specialist micro-credit institutions or that it refer ex-combatants to existing micro-credit institutions, but neither course of action was taken.

⁶⁰ Comninos et al. 2002, p.27.

be carpenters in six months.”⁶¹ Asking ex-combatants what they wanted to train in may have satisfied a need to consult with ex-combatants as the targeted beneficiaries of assistance, but that approach was not economically viable. Additionally, no systematic effort was made by the NCDDR to advise or educate ex-combatants about the opportunities holding the most promise, which could have steered more participants to agricultural programs. Whether programs were intended to be short term is beside the point: the end result was massive unemployment and marginalization among former fighters, not dissimilar from the situation that existed among Sierra Leone’s youth prior to the war.

In addition to the NCDDR programs, there were three parallel programs – implemented by USAID, GTZ, and UNICEF – worth noting. USAID’s Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP) targeted both ex-combatant and non-combatant, war-affected youth. Over 40,000 youths across the country participated in the YRTEP, which provided orientation on issues necessary for reintegration, psycho-social counseling, literacy training, life-skills training, vocational counseling, agricultural skills development, and civic education. The independent audit of the program was favorable but found that it raised participant expectations that it did not meet by failing to provide follow-up support for the income-generating proposals it proposed participants to write.⁶² GTZ’s training program provided 375 ex-combatants with nine months of vocational training (as opposed to the NCDDR’s six months) and included literacy and numeric skills training as well as some accounting and business management training.⁶³ An equal number of non-combatants from local communities participated although only ex-combatants received subsistence

⁶¹ Author’s interview with Allan Quee, Executive Director, Post-Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment (PRIDE), Freetown, 5 July 2005.

⁶² Art Hansen, Julie Nenon, and Joy Wolf, *Final Evaluation of the Office of Transition Initiatives’ Program in Sierra Leone*, Final Report, CARE, Inc., and Creative Associates International, Inc., August 2002, pp.28,30.

⁶³ GoSL 13-14 November 2002, p.14.

stipends. The GTZ training was longer and superior to that of the NCDDR, which generated further criticism about the NCDDR training approach.⁶⁴

Parallel programs run by UNICEF for demobilized child soldiers under 18 date back to 1996, when UNICEF established a child protection section that offered food, shelter, clothing, and medical care in Interim Care Centers (ICCs). Children stayed in ICCs for a maximum of six weeks to avoid institutionalization. From there, UNICEF assisted the children through the Family Tracing and Reunification Program (FTR) and the Community Education Investment Program (CEIP). The CEIP provided educational assistance and was designed to compete with the adult demobilization program to deter children from registering as adults in order to get cash benefits under the TSA or RB. Through the FTR, UNICEF successfully reunited over three-quarters of the children with their families.⁶⁵ After six weeks in ICCs, if families could not be located, UNICEF coordinated with the Ministry of Social Welfare to place children into foster care or independent living arrangements. Over 1000 children also enrolled in TEP vocational training courses and received subsistence allowances. UNICEF, however, worried that the TEP programs were too short and would not provide the children enrolled there with the employment assistance they needed.⁶⁶

UNICEF also provided assistance through its Girls Left Behind Project for girls that had been abducted into fighting forces, sexually abused, and excluded from reintegration assistance. Many young women had been misled about reintegration opportunities by the men who had abducted them or forced them into marriage. There were several reasons for their exclusion from DDR: some had children and did not want to lose them, some were ashamed of the relationship with their abductors and did not want to come forward, some had genuinely fallen in love with their

⁶⁴ Tesfamichael et al. 2004, p.36.

⁶⁵ World Bank, 'The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF 022604) for the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program,' *Progress Report* No.11, 31 December 2002, p.4.

⁶⁶ Author's interview with Glenis Taylor, Project Officer for Child Protection, United Nations Children's Fund, Freetown, 7 July 2005.

abductors, some were afraid to return to their home areas, and some the men would not let go. It was thought that the period of encampment would be a good time to educate young women about FTR and other services, but fast-tracking of disarmament and demobilization meant that many ex-combatants were not processed through demobilization centers and so the women fell through the cracks. The Girls Left Behind Project identified these young women to verify their status as abducted or associated with armed forces so they could qualify for family tracing services, receive medical care for themselves and their children, and link up with the CEIP program or skills training with the TEP. Over 1500 young women benefited from the program, but UNICEF admits that there were more young women excluded from DDR benefits than the Girls Left Behind program reached.⁶⁷

UNICEF programs were successful because they identified shortcomings of their NCDDR counterparts (e.g., failure to identify 'girls left behind' and limitations of short term vocational training approaches) and provided crucial follow up to its own program beneficiaries, sometimes in partnership with other organizations.⁶⁸

The Military Reintegration Program

Running parallel to efforts to reintegrate demobilized combatants was a coordinated effort by the UK government's International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) to assist those fighters who opted to join the new military, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). This effort was called the Military Reintegration Program (MRP). IMATT's senior officers were embedded within Sierra Leone's Ministry of Defense, creating a novel command structure for British nationals reporting to Sierra Leonean civilian defense officials.

⁶⁷ Author's interview with Taylor.

⁶⁸ To complement UNICEF's efforts, the Sierra Leonean Red Cross launched its Child Advocacy and Rehabilitation Program in 2000, which supports 10-to-18 year-old children in centers where they receive psycho-social support, skills training, health education for ten months, and six months of follow-up support. The program will continue through 2008.

The Lomé Agreement stipulated that all factions should be encouraged to join the new military and that successful recruitment would depend on objective criteria. No ex-SLA fighter was forced out of the military. Instead, there was a voluntary redundancy program and many were happy to leave under this program. Those who preferred to stay were re-trained to ensure they met the established RSLAF training standards. RUF and CDF recruits, meanwhile, had to pass through the MRP and meet various conditions to join, which included a medical screening to determine HIV status and physical fitness, health education, military, and human rights training, and an educational screening to ensure minimal educational attainment. About 30% of those screened were dropped from recruitment and accepted onto the NCDDR's reintegration programs instead.⁶⁹ Of the CDF and RUF recruits, 2500 were accepted into the RSLAF, with 1500 of those still in the RSLAF's ranks in 2005 (others subsequently accepted inducement packages as part of a military downsizing strategy).⁷⁰ The total officer class for the RSLAF was about 1000 in 2005, with 150 of the RUF and CDF recruits absorbed as officers.

A comprehensive Security Sector Review conducted in 2005 recommended the reduction of the RSLAF force from its level of 13,000 as of July 2005 to 10,500 by 2007, with further reductions planned after 2007.⁷¹ Although soldiers rushed to accept inducement packages, downsizing has moved at a slow pace, arguably because the sitting government does not want to have thousands of potentially disaffected ex-army soldiers on its hands in 2007, a presidential election year.⁷² And although soldiers were happy with the inducement package, continuing unemployment among early retirees could be a source of future insecurity.

⁶⁹ Author's interview with Al-Hassan Kondeh, Director of Procurement, Ministry of Defense, formerly Director of Policy, Ministry of Defense, Freetown, 5 July 2005.

⁷⁰ Author's interview with Simpson.

⁷¹ Downsizing was a priority before the Security Sector Review: IMATT had previously pushed for reductions down to 8,000 by 2007.

⁷² Author's interview with White.

IMATT received high marks from all respondents for the MRP. Originally perceived as a risky undertaking, the UK-led experiment to transform another country's security sector was generally successful and was the first instance of a coordinated effort to link DDR to SSR, therefore improving on more ad hoc and visible failures in Namibia and Mozambique to coordinate reintegration with SSR. British involvement brought objectivity to the process, particularly in the screening of new recruits, and the British also brought invaluable technical expertise and financial support. The fact that Britain led the MRP also contributed to its success. As Sierra Leone's former colonial power, there was pressure on Britain to contribute adequate resources to the country's reconstruction. Britain was also more aware of Sierra Leone's history and culture, and IMATT has diplomatically and successfully dealt with pressures of sovereignty by embedded itself within the Ministry of Defense.

The success of the MRP is qualified, however, by concerns about past human rights abuses of RSLAF soldiers and discipline problems. British trainers selected recruits based on military standards in isolation from other political factors. This enhanced objectivity but meant that only cursory human rights screening occurred, allowing more than a few soldiers with bad human rights records from the war to join the new force. The consequence was a formation of new military structures that sought 'peace at any cost', with repercussions for contemporary civil-military affairs.⁷³ There is a sense that the ex-SLA was let off the hook for conduct during the war, and this has undermined public and government trust in the military. Discipline problems are common and, arguably, expected, particularly given young RUF recruits who once commanded entire units and are now starting at the bottom of a military organization. Such difficulties have made the military less cohesive, although the RSLAF has made admirable moves towards reconciliation and the professionalism of IMATT has responded quickly to 'problem' recruits.

⁷³ Author's interview with Simpson.

IV. 'Cooled Off'? The Impact of RPSRCs on Post-Conflict Security in Sierra Leone

The above overview highlights several successes attached to post-conflict efforts in Sierra Leone. The threat of an external invasion of Sierra Leone is minimal even though the regional situation, albeit more stable at the end of 2005 than when the DDR process began, is far from secure. Internally, there were no immediate threats to Sierra Leone's security upon UN withdrawal at the end of 2005, either, and great progress had been made in strengthening the state's security forces, extending state authority throughout the countryside, securing freedom of movement, improving control over diamond mining activities, and keeping general crime rates low. Lack of serious ethnic cleavages also bodes well for the country.

Several reintegration successes stand out as well. DDR and SSR were linked successfully through a focused military reintegration effort, a first for DDR interventions. Some reintegration actors demonstrated admirable flexibility, particularly UNAMSIL (by implementing stop gap programs), UNICEF (by initiating the Girls Left Behind Project), and IMATT (by running a successful MRP). The NCDDR and the World Bank recognized problems attached to the TSA and changed the distribution of cash payments to counter them. Evaluations of reintegration have concluded that transitional cash support and training programs bought time for a 'cooling off' period for former fighters and that programs succeeded in making ex-combatants 'like everyone else' in their communities.⁷⁴

But the presence of significant RPSRCs calls into question the extent to which certain ex-combatants actually 'cooled off' and also whether 'cooling off' was all that the reintegration process

⁷⁴ Meek and Malan 2004, p.6; Tesfamichael et al. 2004, pp.x-xi.

required. Sierra Leone is, in many ways, 'still in intensive care'.⁷⁵ Public perceptions are that security improved markedly while UNAMSIL was in the country, but the majority of respondents in a 2005 survey feared another outbreak of violence when the 2007 elections come.⁷⁶ Internal and external stakeholders have expressed a surprising level of uncertainty as to whether conflict could recur in the country. The UN Secretary-General reported in 2005 that serious threats to Sierra Leone's security remain because it has had 'limited progress in addressing the root causes of the conflict such as corruption, governance, widespread poverty, including massive youth unemployment, and the resulting public discontent.'⁷⁷ The DPKO assessment mission sent to Sierra Leone in March 2005 concluded that, absent external threats, 'the greatest danger to peace and security in the country may emanate from civil unrest resulting from lack of improvement in the economy and the general living standards of the majority of the population'.⁷⁸ Also in March 2005, Sierra Leone's Office of National Security (ONS) published a Security Sector Review assessed the overall external threat to be low and internal threats to be high and 'fundamentally structural in nature', assessing the top security priority for Sierra Leoneans to be good governance and the top threat to good governance corruption.⁷⁹

Although Sierra Leone's post-conflict path was bound to be rocky given the devastation of war and the economic and political problems that preceded the conflict, this section argues that reintegration programs could have done more to manage RPSRCs and, in so doing, make a more

⁷⁵ *Economist*, 'Still in Intensive Care,' 25 June 2005, p.72.

⁷⁶ 70% of respondents wanted UNAMSIL to stay longer for this reason: Jean Krasno, 'Public Opinion Survey of UNAMSIL's Work in Sierra Leone (Conducted in January/February 2005),' UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit External Study, July 2005, p.10.

⁷⁷ UNSC, 'Twenty-Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 20 September 2005, S/2005/596, para.4. See also UNSC, S/2005/777, para.2.

⁷⁸ UNSC S/2005/273, para.58.

⁷⁹ Government of Sierra Leone, *Report of the Sierra Leone Security Sector Review (SSR)*, Security Sector Review Secretariat, Office of National Security, Freetown, March 2005, paras.30,33,57-8, and 71. The review prioritized and analyzed security threats based on workshops, group discussions, and questionnaires of key stakeholders across the country.

lasting contribution to Sierra Leone's security and development. RPSRCs that threatened (and, in many cases, continue to threaten) peace and security in Sierra Leone are: violent riots and demonstrations; re-recruitment into regional conflicts; proliferation of arms and involvement of some ex-combatants in criminality; residual demobilization concerns attached to the continuing political and quasi-military power exercised by the CDF; insecurity in diamond mining areas; potential insecurity linked to incomplete processes of reconciliation and transitional justice; and, widespread and persistent unemployment and marginalization among former fighters. As with the assessments of Namibia and Mozambique, RPSRCs in Sierra Leone are evaluated in terms of: their scope (nature) and scale (impact); what actors did, or did not, do to manage them; whether this was enough; and what more could have been done.

Riots and Demonstrations

Groups of ex-combatants staged protests throughout the period of disarmament and demobilization, and continued to demonstrate against program delays once reintegration programs had begun. Although these protests frequently turned violent, they were never widespread enough to disrupt the peace process. By phase III disarmament, the commitment of the parties and the strength of deployed UN peacekeepers were such that the problem was contained. There is, however, a strong case to be made that programs contributed to violence because of longer-than-planned delays in delivery of reintegration benefits, changes in reintegration policy that altered the benefits on offer to former fighters, and the lack of adequate sensitization (particularly once fast-tracked demobilization significantly shortened stays in demobilization centers) about which benefits ex-combatants could expect to receive. Delays and confusion underscore planning failures to deliver benefits at the time they were most needed during the process, an objective that ostensibly underscored the decision to cut planned benefits from three years to six months. On the other hand, it is likely that riots and demonstrations would have occurred regardless of program delays

and shortcomings, given the lack of commitment of the parties to peace during much of the DDR process. Full funding during the planning stage of reintegration would have significantly reduced delays, however, and provision of accurate information about reintegration benefits by forward disarmament units from UNAMSIL would have reduced confusion and tempered expectation about benefits.

Roving Ex-Combatants

Thousands of former fighters from all factions were re-recruited into conflicts in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea. Their re-recruitment is well documented and the scope of the problem pronounced.⁸⁰ Although the Liberian NCDDR registered only 242 Sierra Leonean ex-combatants, interviews with ex-combatants and recruiters places the number in the thousands, and the final evaluation of the Sierra Leonean NCDDR estimated that 4500 combatants fought in neighboring wars.⁸¹ Most of these were recruited by Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and NPFL officers who operated within Sierra Leone. Roving ex-combatants made up only 5-6% of the total number of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, but 4500 fighters nevertheless did a lot of damage in neighboring countries. The Security Sector Review concluded that *continuing* recruitment into regional fighting forces (in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire) was a persistent disarmament and reintegration problem for the country and classified the threat as significant for national security.⁸² The review noted the presence in-country of significant numbers of unemployed fighters from the RUF, NPFL, LURD, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and New Forces of Cote d'Ivoire.⁸³

⁸⁰ See, for example, Corinne Dufka, *Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional Warriors* (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 2005); UNSC S/2005/86; Tesfamichael et al. 2004; and the Conflict, Security and Development Group 2003, para.xx.

⁸¹ Tesfamichael et al. 2004, p.15; Dufka 2005, p.13. Most of these were recruited by LURD and NPFL officers who operated within Sierra Leone.

⁸² GoSL Security Sector Review 2005, paras.67, 174.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, para.18.

The Sierra Leonean government was initially reluctant to provide DDR benefits to roving ex-combatants. Under pressure from UNAMSIL and donors, however, the government relented and agreed to give repatriated fighters a US\$200 one-time cash payment. UNAMSIL and UNMIL agreed that fighters would be disarmed and demobilized in Liberia and then given the option to stay in Liberia for reintegration benefits or return to Sierra Leone. The vast majority registered as Liberians because they feared disqualification from DDR benefits if they registered as Sierra Leoneans. There were further incentives to register as Liberians: registration in Liberia occurred before Sierra Leone changed its policy on reintegration benefits for repatriated fighters and the US\$200 one-time cash payment was less than fighters would receive in Liberia and also less than Sierra Leoneans received under the NCDDR. Most of those that returned to Sierra Leone did so informally. In Côte d'Ivoire no specific reintegration program targeted Sierra Leonean ex-combatants, but government of Sierra Leone decided that those opting for repatriation would participate in ongoing community development projects.⁸⁴

The lure of economic opportunity through looting and dissatisfaction with the DDR process are the two principal reasons why such large numbers of ex-combatants decided to fight in neighboring conflicts. Recruiters paid up to US\$500 to ex-combatants and promised them the opportunity to loot whatever they pleased. And, the money made from looted goods explains why the majority repatriated informally (they needed to bring looted goods with them over the border). Looting also reinforced conflict command structures. One ex-SLA commander told Human Rights Watch, 'With the money I made off [a stolen] Mitsubishi, I'm now supporting three teams of diamond miners in Tongo Field. They're my boys and I take care of them.'⁸⁵ Recruiters capitalized on widespread anger at reintegration benefits and the uncertainty that delays in placement onto

⁸⁴ UNSC, 'Twenty-second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 6 July 2004, S/2004/536, para.27.

⁸⁵ Dufka 2005, p.21.

reintegration training programs produced. Roving ex-combatants saw participation in eventual DDR programs abroad as a 'second chance' at DDR.⁸⁶ Exclusion from DDR lists by their commanders also helped to make ex-combatants susceptible to re-recruitment.

Roving ex-combatants were not a problem that reintegration programs anticipated. A regional DDR approach had never been part of a UN or other peace-building mission and so on one hand it would be inappropriate to fault a DDR process for not adequately managing an unforeseen problem. Why was there no regional strategy? Strong norms of sovereignty require consent of parties to the conflict for a peace-building mission to be deployed, unless Chapter VII is invoked by the Security Council, and the UN did not have a mission on the ground in Liberia or Cote d'Ivoire when most re-recruitment occurred. Peace-building mandates are also conditioned by consent of domestic actors and are state-centric; consequently, UNAMSIL did not have or assert any authority over regional conflict recruitment activities. There was no precedent for concerted regional action to prevent cross-border flows of mercenaries and arms, and a lack of expertise among actors on the ground (UNAMSIL troops had not been trained to deal with cross-border issues and its mandate did not cover cross-border response). Nor did the NCDDR have the mandate, political power, or resources to pursue a regional strategy to stop recruitment activities. Weak regional institutions further constrained capacity to address transnational threats, especially since ECOMOG had exhausted itself on the Sierra Leonean battlefield and had worn out its regional welcome.

Sierra Leone and the UN (through its regional office in West Africa, UNOWA) have since developed solutions to potential future recruitment problems: rehabilitation of border infrastructure, gathering intelligence on border crossing points, conducting joint patrols, improving communication between peacekeeping missions, and investing in regional institutions to facilitate cooperation (e.g.,

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.24.

the Mano River Union). UNAMSIL, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), UN operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), and UNOWA personnel in Guinea have conducted contingency planning meetings to prepare for managing roving ex-combatants should Guinean instability turn into civil war. But these solutions came too late to stop the damage done by massive re-recruitment during the outbreak of war in Liberia in 2003. Once the problem was recognized there was no response from reintegration actors other than to hold conferences to discuss potential *future* regional approaches to DDR and so the track record on the above solutions is untested.

Because economic distress was a key motivation for re-recruitment, longer and better reintegration support could have arguably mitigated the problem. The monetary value of reintegration packages was not increased to compete with higher payments elsewhere (US\$900 was given in subsistence payments spread out over six months in Cote d'Ivoire), because reintegration actors routinely tie reintegration benefit amounts to local cost of living. But reintegration policy remained static despite recognition of re-recruitment problems. Harmonization of benefit amounts across the region did not occur because of reluctance on the part of the World Bank, MDTF donors, and the NCDDR to increase or alter assistance once their general reintegration policy in Sierra Leone had been fixed. Donors argued that they had no more money to extend programs or increase benefits. They also thought that potential community resentment and aid dependency that would accompany increased benefits militated against any mid-course policy changes. The security problem of re-recruitment *in evidence* ought to have outweighed *potential* concerns about community resentment and aid dependency.

Other action could have mitigated the re-recruitment problem as well. The NCDDR could have tailored community sensitization campaigns about reintegration around the harms and dangers of re-recruitment and emphasize the benefits ex-combatants could expect to receive if they stayed put. It could have targeted accelerated or additional support to vulnerable border

areas to decrease financial incentives to join neighboring fighting forces. Finally, the NCDDR and UNAMSIL could have considered potential punitive measures; e.g., coordination with the government to draft legislation to punish recruiters and recruited alike, deploy police and army units strategically to centers of known recruitment, or lobby the Security Council for additional peacekeeping or CIVPOL troops to counter recruitment activities. Instead, the NCDDR and UNAMSIL chose no response and thousands of fighters crossed over to fight in regional wars. Lack of response suggests that reintegration actors' preferences are strong and fixed once a program of reintegration support has already been designed and implemented when preferences ought instead to adapt to the need to manage RPSRCs as they arise.

Arms Trafficking and Criminality

The Security Sector Review assessed the threat of organized crime to be high and concluded that the current environment is one that lacks a deterrent of arrest and prosecution.⁸⁷ The UNODC has highlighted the prominence of West African drug trafficking, smuggling, arms trafficking, and money laundering operations, concluding that these activities, though not as violent as their counterparts in other regions, are nonetheless 'astonishing' in their scale and scope.⁸⁸ Past, present, and future organized criminality in West Africa is by no means confined to combatant or ex-combatant groups. ECOMOG troops, for example, were linked to drug and diamond trafficking. *During* Sierra Leone's conflict, however, combatants played a dominant role in organized criminal activity. The RUF engaged in extensive diamond smuggling and the AFRC 'pioneered the use of Sierra Leone as a transit point in the international drug trade'.⁸⁹ The thousands of ex-combatants re-recruited into foreign wars engaged in substantial and often violent

⁸⁷ GoSL *Security Sector Review* 2005, paras.76, 80, 176.

⁸⁸ UNODC 2005, p.1.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.8.

looting, and criminal networks (composed of ex-combatants and non-ex-combatants alike) continue to smuggle diamonds out of the country despite the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.⁹⁰

More than any other area of organized crime, arms trafficking represents the greatest threat to security for Sierra Leone and its region. High levels of arms still in national and regional circulation also contribute to a sense of reintegration being incomplete. There are tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of weapons still in circulation in West Africa.⁹¹ Ex-combatant involvement in arms trafficking remained significant in Sierra Leone after the war. Members of the ex-SLA sold surplus weapons, which were then transported across the border into Liberia.⁹² Ex-combatants perceived reinsertion payments as cash given for guns, which pulled more weapons into Sierra Leone and increased their market value. Liberia's replication of a reinsertion benefit paid immediately after disarmament continued the cycle, and there were several reports of ex-combatant involvement in the smuggling of arms into Liberia from Sierra Leone to take advantage of its ongoing DDR process.⁹³ In fact, when disarmament targets in Liberia were not being met, the program increased the amount of the reinsertion benefit which further increased the value of weapons in the country.⁹⁴

To avoid these difficulties, reintegration programs ought never to pay cash benefits at the time of disarmament but rather upon registration for reintegration benefits in areas of return. Some positive developments have mitigated the threat from arms trafficking. Disarmament follow-up programs in Sierra Leone have succeeded to put an ever greater number of arms beyond use, and

⁹⁰ For more information on continued diamond smuggling and other forms of criminal activity in West Africa, see Gail Wannenburg, 'Organised Crime in West Africa,' *African Security Review*, Vol.14, No.4, 2005.

⁹¹ Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp.82-3.

⁹² Author's interview with Lawrence Sesay, Project Coordinator, Post-Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment, Freetown, 5 July 2005.

⁹³ UNSC, 'Twenty-third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 9 September 2004, S/2004/724, para.6.

⁹⁴ Author's interview with White.

a strong government and IMATT commitment to building capacity of the armed forces and police increases the ability of the state to counter continuing threats posed by organized criminal activity. Continued monitoring of DDR problems, however, is also needed as is continued follow-up of DDR assistance, whether targeted at individual ex-combatants or at communities accepting them, in order to reduce incentives in the ex-combatant and non-combatant communities alike to engage in criminality.

Residual Demobilization Problems: Breaking the Chain of Command

The status of the CDF in Sierra Leone challenges the extent to which DDR programs actually disbanded, dispersed, and distracted fighters. Demobilization did little to break down the command and control structure of the CDF (although the UN concluded in 2003 that the CDF did not pose a 'serious threat in the country at this time').⁹⁵ In some areas, particularly Bo and Kenema, the CDF performs quasi-police and military functions 'almost in parallel' to the government's security structures.⁹⁶ The CDF was not part of the Joint Committee on DDR, nor were its leaders a party to peace agreements. The idea was that the government would facilitate the organization's demobilization, and that the CDF, as a pro-government force, would abide by whatever decisions the government made. The political alliance between the government and the CDF, however, contributed to reintegration problems. Domestic political pressures created a symbiotic relationship between the government and CDF that precluded breaking the organization's chain of command and contributed to RUF mistrust of the peace process. Just as Namibia used SWAPO forces to form the Special Field Force, Sierra Leone's government initially anticipated using the CDF to form a Territorial Defense Force until UNAMSIL, IMATT, and DFID

⁹⁵ UNSC, 'Nineteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 5 September 2003, S/2003/863, para.4.

⁹⁶ UNSC, 'Eighteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 23 June 2003, S/2003/663, para.4.

pressured it to drop the idea; instead, the government has said that any part-time reserve force would have to be representative of all sectors of society and draw not just from CDF forces.⁹⁷

The creation of an all-CDF reserve force would have seriously undermined the objectives of security sector reform and DDR. Even with the government shying away from an all-CDF reserve force, the ability of a paramilitary force to retain its wartime command and control structure made the demobilization policy of the NCDDR appear lop-sided and biased. Initial failure to confront CDF demobilization highlights one of the drawbacks of a 'nationally-owned' reintegration process: it avoids issues that would be politically sensitive or unpopular with important constituent groups.

Insecurity in Mining Areas

Exclusion of the mining sector from the menu of reintegration training opportunities was deliberate. Bilateral donors and the NCDDR, backed by UNAMSIL, wanted to discourage ex-combatants from settling in mining districts because of the abuses associated with diamond mining during the war and because the sector was not seen as sustainable. But large numbers of ex-combatants have ended up in mining areas anyway and the lack of reintegration oversight or support means that their migration and activity there was and continues to be unmonitored and unmediated.

Government control over mining areas has increased dramatically since the end of the war. Official exports reached US\$124 million in 2004, up from ten million in 2000.⁹⁸ Diamond-mining licenses rose from 900 in June 2002 to over 2000 by the end of 2003.⁹⁹ Despite progress, as of December 2005, more than 50% of diamond-mining activity in the country remains

⁹⁷ Government of Sierra Leone, Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Defence Policy, *Defence White Paper: Informing the People*, Freetown, 2003, para.1021.

⁹⁸ Author's interview with Berhanemeskel Nega, Senior Governance and Stabilization Policy Advisor, UNAMSIL, Freetown, 8 July 2005.

⁹⁹ UNSC, 'Twenty-first Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 19 March 2004, S/2004/228, para.26.

unlicensed, 'considerable' diamond smuggling continues, and disputes over mining rights and license boundaries are a major source of insecurity in these areas.¹⁰⁰ Compounding this insecurity has been the convergence of unemployed, and predominantly ex-combatant, youth groups in mining areas in Kono and Kenema districts. These groups have clashed violently with non-indigenous people in the area and perform quasi-military functions, conducting night patrols and attempting to control border crossing points. They also deter investors, delay extension of government authority, and risk becoming more militant and radical. The threat is heightened because in many areas the chain of command has been replicated in the mines with former fighters giving their erstwhile commanders a cut of whatever they dig. The presence of groups of former rank and file fighters working in the diamond mines for or alongside their war-time commanders reinforces and perpetuates conflict hierarchies and loyalties and could deter investment or lead to violence in mineral-rich areas.

To facilitate government control over the mines and to improve working conditions there, the Integrated Diamond Management Program (IDMP) runs skills training to help miners organize cooperatives. The program's Diamond Business Advisor explained that few ex-combatants participated in the project because they were integrated into other areas and because the risk of digging ventures dissuaded them from seeking employment in the mines.¹⁰¹ This is true of some ex-combatants, but many of the ex-combatants present in groups that converged on mining areas are returnees from the Liberian conflict or have returned to mining areas after long stints of unemployment elsewhere. Reintegration programs can not control the movement and employment choices of all ex-combatants and were wise to avoid providing further incentives to pursue mining

¹⁰⁰ UNSC S/2005/273, para.25. A national cadastral system has been designed to facilitate dispute settlement over rights and boundaries.

¹⁰¹ Author's interview with Frank P. Karefa-Smart, Diamond Business Advisor, Integrated Diamond Management Programme, Management Systems International, Freetown, 8 July 2005.

as a career. But, given large numbers of ex-combatants that returned to the mines anyway, it would have been better for programs to recognize this, providing incentives to discourage a return to the mines but also allowing for training programs and licensed cooperative schemes specifically targeting former fighters one year after the TEP in order to channel ex-combatant mining activity legally and productively.

Social Reintegration and Reconciliation

The vast majority of ex-combatants today consider themselves to be socially reintegrated.¹⁰² In a sign of their desire to dissociate themselves from their war-time experiences, ex-combatants prefer to be called 'youths' rather than 'ex-combatants' and tend to oppose quotas for them in ongoing community development initiatives.¹⁰³ Those that have struggled to gain social acceptance are those with the worst records of abuses committed during the war.¹⁰⁴ Donors and the NCDDR were concerned about the effect targeted reintegration assistance would have on social acceptance of returning ex-combatants, whether such assistance would be viewed as special treatment rewarding the perpetrators of wartime atrocities. Public perceptions of targeted assistance, however, are schizophrenic. Focus group interviews conducted for the final evaluation of the NCDDR found that communities resented payments to ex-combatants but welcomed the fact that ex-combatants spent the money in the communities.¹⁰⁵

Lingering community wariness of ex-combatants is more the result of perceptions of lawlessness rather than resentment of targeted assistance. When crime rates were higher at the end of the war, it was common to hear that 'DDR guys [were] up to their old tricks' but as crime

¹⁰² Weinstein and Humphreys 2005; Stavrou et al. 2003.

¹⁰³ Arthy 2003, p.7.

¹⁰⁴ Weinstein and Humphreys 2005.

¹⁰⁵ Tesfamichael et al. 2004, p.35.

rates leveled off, that perception is not as widespread.¹⁰⁶ One impact of the urbanization of ex-combatants and the shortcomings of the TEP was the influx of large numbers of ex-combatants as taxi drivers in Freetown. A commonplace epithet hurled not just at reckless taxi drivers but at any driver who does not conform to traffic rules is 'DDR Driver', regardless of whether the driver is an ex-combatant or not. Perceptions of ex-combatant lawlessness, however, have not triggered violence or economic prejudice against them: three-quarters of businesses surveyed in 2002 said they would hire an ex-combatant if the right person applied for the job, and this number likely has increased in the years since.¹⁰⁷

The most serious reconciliation issues, therefore, are related to transitional justice and the decision of the government and the UN to set up a Special Court to try those who committed atrocities during the war. The establishment of the Court could have serious implications for security and reintegration. The government requested the formation of the Court in the wake of the May 2000 resumption of violence, and Security Council resolution 1315 of 14 August 2000 requested the UN Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Sierra Leonean government for the Court's creation. The Court has power to prosecute those persons found to 'bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law' committed in the country since 30 November 1996, the date of the Abidjan ceasefire accord. The Court has issued 13 indictments against leaders of the RUF, AFRC, and CDF, including the popular former National Coordinator of the CDF, Sam Hinga Norman.¹⁰⁸ Trials are underway and sentences are expected to be handed down in 2006 or 2007.

¹⁰⁶ Author's interview with Christian Lawrence, Assistance Programme Officer, Civil and Political Affairs, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, 6 July 2005.

¹⁰⁷ Corninos et al. 2002, p.40.

¹⁰⁸ Two of those indicted, Foday Sankoy and Sam Bockarie, have since died, and one other, Johnny Paul Koroma, remains at large. At the end of March 2006, Charles Taylor was extradited to the Special Court for prosecution.

The biggest problem with the establishment of the Special Court is its nullification of the amnesty provided in Article IX of the Lomé Agreement. Article IX established an 'absolute and free pardon' for Sankoh and for all 'combatants and collaborators' and provided that 'no official or judicial action' be taken against any member of the RUF, the ex-AFRC, the ex-SLA, or the CDF between March 1991 and the signing of the Agreement on 7 July 1999. At the time of the Lomé signing, the UN representative appended his signature with a disclaimer that the Article IX amnesty would not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. Article X of the Statute for the Special Court states that amnesty 'shall not be a bar to prosecution'. At the time, the RUF said it would not stand in the way of the Court's establishment provided it was impartial and investigated atrocities on all sides. But many RUF rebels saw the Court as a government-led witch hunt, and high-profile commanders such as Sam Bockarie and others left the country, in large part to avoid possible prosecution.¹⁰⁹ Ex-combatants entered demobilization centers having never heard of the Court so the peace process was fortunate that news of the nullification of the Lomé amnesty did not touch off a revolt or further stall disarmament. In future conflicts, nullification of amnesty agreements might not be met with such equanimity, particularly when that nullification is led by one party to the conflict.

This is not to say that the Court did not adversely impact reintegration. It undermined trust between the parties to the conflict and fueled the perception of the DDR process as unfair and government-led rather than nationally-owned. Trust was undermined because spreading indictments among most of the parties was not interpreted as fairness but as betrayal; the CDF do not view the Court as reconciliation but as the government's rejection of the role it played during

¹⁰⁹ Now, ex-RUF combatants are largely ambivalent about the Court although some former fighters in the north believe that the indictment of Issa Sesay was unfair given the instrumental role he played in pushing the movement towards peace.

the war. The lack of indictments against ECOMOG troops or the ex-SLA reinforced the view of the Court as a political instrument in the eyes of observers and the public. Lieutenant Colonel Simpson of IMATT speculated that the Court did not issue any indictments against the former SLA because it would not be able to enforce such indictments (in other words, the army would resist violently). He believes the lack of indictments against the SLA has further eroded public trust of the RSLAF: 'Arrangements for the Special Court are a classic case of short-term expediency. None of these problems [with the Court] threatens the country but they make it difficult to move forward. I'm very pessimistic about the country. The basic problems that caused the conflict are still here. The government has dodged these important issues. We could have been healing the wounds but we're not. They're festering, filling with puss.'¹¹⁰

There is evidence that the establishment of the Special Court has already threatened post-conflict security and could continue to do so. Johnny Paul Koroma and his supporters were implicated in an armed attack on Wellington Barracks armory in Freetown in January 2003, an attack meant to steal a large quantity of weapons to destabilize the state and create a security situation in which the Special Court would not be able to discharge its mandate.¹¹¹ Most speculation about *future* insecurity relates to CDF opposition to Sam Hinga Norman's indictment. When Norman was indicted, CDF members tried to stage violent protests. Members of the CDF who have testified against indicted CDF leaders can no longer return to their communities. Some UNAMSIL leaders warned that members of the CDF could seek to disrupt the Court through violent activities once verdicts and sentences are announced, but other observers doubt the ability and desire of the CDF to mobilize a credible force. The Court remains a lightning rod for debate about Sierra Leone's uncertain future. The March 2006 extradition of Charles Taylor led the Court,

¹¹⁰ Author's interview with Simpson.

¹¹¹ UNSC, 'Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,' 17 March 2003, S/2003/321, paras.2-3.

Liberia's new president, and even Taylor's former allies to warn that his continued presence in Sierra Leone threatened regional security.

There is, of course, the opposing view that courts of this kind are necessary for reconciliation and security, that bringing perpetrators of abuses to justice will deter future atrocities and help communities to feel closure and a sense of justice for wrongs committed. The Court's damage to reconciliation is not irreparable and its potential for insecurity is not certain. The Director of the Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program argued that although he initially thought the Court would have devastating effects on DDR, time has changed that and he now believes it would be difficult to overturn DDR achievements such as the disarmament and dispersal of fighting forces.¹¹² The Court does, however, underscore problems of authority and post-conflict peace-building: who decides issues of justice, and who balances demands for justice with the need to create incentives for disarmament and demobilization? It also raises questions about the best way to promote reconciliation. The ICISS's report on the Responsibility to Protect argued that 'ground level reconstruction efforts' are better suited to promoting reconciliation than judicial-style processes.¹¹³ Accordingly, longer term combination of targeted and non-targeted support to allow ex-combatants and their communities to work together to re-build would arguably accomplish more in reconciliation terms than the Special Court.

All in all, Sierra Leone seems to have dodged a bullet with the Special Court. Its impact could have triggered a violent reaction among and between factions that had negotiated an amnesty agreement at Lomé. In the case of Sierra Leone, the balance between justice and reintegration was not necessarily wrong but the way the government and UN Security Council went about striking that balance was wrong. All parties to the conflict could have been involved with the

¹¹² Author's interview with Alpha Sesay, Director, Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme, Freetown, 5 July 2005.

¹¹³ ICISS 2001, 5.4.

drafting of the Court's statute to reduce perceptions of lop-sidedness. The Supreme Court in Sierra Leone could have declared certain actions by conflict parties after Lomé (e.g., the May 2000 violence) a breach of the agreement and therefore a forfeiture of amnesty protections that would trigger prosecutions.¹¹⁴ In the absence of these mitigating actions, normative tension between peace-building priorities in Sierra Leone underscored operational confusion about who confers and exercises the authority to shape post-conflict security and development policy.

The NCDDR was not in a position to challenge the decision of the SLPP government and the UN to nullify amnesty protections even if had decided that such a decision threatened the objectives of DDR (e.g., encouraging commanders to disarm their battalions even if they faced potential prosecution down the road). Nevertheless, reintegration programs could have done more to mitigate the impact of the Special Court on the factions once its creation was announced. There was, however, little if any linkage between transitional justice and DDR throughout the peace-building process. Fast-tracking of demobilization eliminated counseling, sensitization, and other orientation services that could have minimized the threat that some fighters assumed the Court to be (particularly fighters for whom the Court's establishment was yet another push to join fighting forces elsewhere). The country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission might have provided another opportunity to mitigate actual and potential damage to reconciliation from the Court, but the government's commitment to implementing the TRC's recommendations has been lukewarm.¹¹⁵

Déjà vu: Massive Youth Unemployment and Marginalization

Reintegration in Sierra Leone has occurred under unfavorable economic conditions.

Although GDP has increased at steady rates since the war, inflation has also increased and other

¹¹⁴ This was Alpha Sesay's suggestion, and the recommendation of other legal observers.

¹¹⁵ The UN Secretary-General reported in December 2005 that the pace of government implementation of the TRC recommendations 'remains slow' (UNSC S/2005/777, para.51), and civil society leaders routinely complain about lack of commitment by the ruling government party to the TRC process.

economic indicators are bleak: poor physical and financial infrastructure, a vast black market, low gross national savings rates, a high poverty level, widespread unemployment, and investor concerns about public sector and private sector corruption.¹¹⁶ Despite its agricultural and mineral resources, half of the government's budget is donor-funded. Donor support is projected to decline, which will reduce growth rates. The withdrawal of UNAMSIL will also negatively impact the economy, given the jobs and spending that came with its presence.

The biggest security worry coming out of economic forecasts for Sierra Leone, however, is potential insecurity from unemployed youth,¹¹⁷ many of whom are ex-combatants.¹¹⁸ Nearly all respondents interviewed in Freetown or at UN headquarters in New York named youth unemployment the biggest problem facing the country. Only a third of ex-combatants reported being employed in 2003, meaning there 'are a sizable number of ex-combatants who are chronically underemployed and very frustrated'.¹¹⁹ Combined with sharp increases in cost of living and slow improvement to standard of living, continuing widespread unemployment could sow the seeds of future unrest; therefore, addressing the economic needs of unemployed youth is critical for lasting peace.¹²⁰ Several respondents, including UNAMSIL officials, warned that significant violence and domestic political upheaval could result unless their needs are addressed. Violent riots in Kenema in November 2005 by motorcycle transportation operators (who are predominantly ex-combatants) confirm that ex-combatant grievances have not gone away and that significant

¹¹⁶ UNSC S/2005/596, para.29. Sierra Leone had a 7.4% increase in growth in 2004 but a comparable growth in inflation as well (in 2003, inflation growth was measured at 6.6%, with an 11% increase in Freetown).

¹¹⁷ In Sierra Leone, 'youth' is an expansive age category that can capture individuals in their thirties and even forties; culturally youth are understood to be individuals whose fathers are still alive. Therefore, 'youths' constitute as much as 55% of the total population in Sierra Leone (Government of Sierra Leone, Ministry of Youth and Sport, *Sierra Leone National Youth Policy*, 2003, p.5).

¹¹⁸ UNOWA December 2005.

¹¹⁹ Tesfamichael et al. 2004, p.59.

¹²⁰ UNSC S/2005/273, para.51.

group cohesion persists.¹²¹ Similar to ex-combatants in Mozambique who joked that they had been reintegrated back into basic poverty, the final NCDDR evaluation concluded: '[T]hese former fighters now face the same problems as those citizens of Sierra Leone who did not take up arms: lack of full-time, long-term employment opportunities, particularly for youth; a weak social and economic infrastructure; serious questions of governmental accountability at all levels; and an uncertain regional environment.'¹²²

Defenders of the reintegration approach implemented in Sierra Leone point to high participation rates in programs and surveys that show ex-combatants were satisfied with the benefits received.¹²³ In 2002, clear majorities believed that training had been enjoyable, had been good preparation for work, had helped them learn skills in demand, had helped them become better people, and had helped locate job opportunities.¹²⁴

Despite these numbers and the claims of reintegration evaluations to the contrary, the NCDDR's reintegration programs did not do all they could to address the economic needs of ex-combatants and more could have been expected of programs even given their own limited objectives and the extremely limited economic opportunities of the country. The Security Sector Review concluded that the level of unemployment among youths, and 'especially [among] ex-combatants has increased with the end of the DDR Programme'.¹²⁵ Satisfaction among former fighters has ebbed the longer they remain unemployed. The 22.6% of ex-combatants dissatisfied with programs in 2002 represents a pool of nearly 13,000 individuals, for whom dissatisfaction

¹²¹ UNSC S/2005/777, para.12.

¹²² Tesfamichael et al. 2004, p.2.

¹²³ Government of Sierra Leone, Central Statistics Office, 'Survey on Reinsertion and Reintegration Assistance to Ex-Combatants,' submitted to the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Freetown, NCDDR Reinsertion Benefits Study, October 2002, p.2.

¹²⁴ Comninos et al. 2002, p.51.

¹²⁵ GoSL *Security Sector Review* 2005, para.182.

could escalate to marginalization and then become outright hostility to a system that promised 'reintegration' but delivered six months of vocational training.

The NCDDR, the World Bank, and bilateral donors to the MDTF all claimed that targeted support to ex-combatants would be followed by non-targeted support to communities but made no concerted effort to coordinate such a transition. This would have entailed the NCDDR working with the continuing UN presence (through UNAMSIL and the UN's Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, UNIOSIL), World Bank, and NGOs in-country to identify a lead actor to carry out periodic monitoring of reintegration, leaving in place a five-year and ten-year strategy for youth employment, and lobbying donors for funds to contribute to that strategy. Instead of a funded, long term vision, there is only rhetoric. Government budget allocations to support job creation initiatives are limited, and Sierra Leone's National Youth Policy Framework is seriously under-funded. There is an upper limit on what reintegration can accomplish given the economic situation in Sierra Leone, but programs should at the very least sponsor a negotiated framework and vision for long term reintegration with all parties to the conflict and with community leaders, which could mitigate resentment of special treatment and ensure that reintegration needs are factored into long term economic recovery plans.

Most importantly, programs could have done more *at the time* to use the resources that were available had World Bank, GTZ, and NGO contractors' preferences and expertise for a DDR template built around vocational training not dominated the approach implemented. The focus on vocational training was a mistake of design and implementation. Vocational training neglected other opportunities by precluding more targeted investment in potentially more rewarding sectors. An NCDDR market analysis of opportunities at the planning stage and a concerted effort among major reintegration stakeholders such as the World Bank and NGO service providers to build capacity in agricultural support would have prevented this mistake.

The enormous missed opportunity of the TEP can be summarized, therefore, in one word: *agriculture*. Sierra Leone has fertile soil, 85% of the total population is dependent on semi-subsistence agriculture, nearly one-third of ex-combatants were farmers before the war, and businesses surveyed after reintegration programs ended emphasized the need for agricultural and agri-business skills.¹²⁶ The Security Sector Review specified the agricultural sector as the single largest potential employer of large numbers of youth and women.¹²⁷ The UN reported in December 2005 that the 'principal sources of growth in the economy have been agriculture and mining', yet these were the sectors overlooked by reintegration programs.¹²⁸ Several respondents lamented the failure of reintegration to target the agricultural sector more aggressively. One said, 'Involving more ex-combatants in agriculture would have been a big boost to the economy. Instead, you have 300 ex-combatant auto mechanics in one town, to work on four cars.'¹²⁹

More emphasis was not placed on agriculture for two main reasons. First, donors assumed that rural life would not appeal to young ex-combatants, that access to land would be limited, and that some ex-combatants feared reprisals for atrocities committed during the war and so did not want to return to home areas to farm. Agricultural programs of the NCDDR were not popular with ex-combatant beneficiaries but this was largely because of a built-in bias for vocational programs that had subsistence stipends and toolkits. Unpopularity was also due in part to social stigma but inclusion of commercial agricultural or agri-business training could have been included to increase the social cache of agricultural support. Programs could have created incentives for rural settlement by providing electric generators and satellite television or by improving infrastructure to allow ex-combatants to travel to urban or semi-urban areas more

¹²⁶ Stavrou et al. 2003, p. 17; International Crisis Group 2004, p.14.

¹²⁷ GoSL, *Security Sector Review* 2005, para.60.

¹²⁸ UNSC S/2005/777, para.39.

¹²⁹ Author's interview with Quee.

frequently.¹³⁰ Access to land was limited, but in some cases donor programs could have made the problem worse (e.g., DFID's Paramount Chiefs Restoration Program, which was meant to restore local authority, had the unintended consequence of restoring to power paramount chiefs who often reinforced unfair land tenure laws.¹³¹ Fears of reprisals were certainly important to take into account, but agricultural incentive programs did not necessarily have to settle ex-combatants in home areas.

Second, agriculture was not emphasized because there were few, if any, reintegration actors with extensive agricultural expertise to design support programs and because some actors, particularly, GTZ, Action Aid, and World Vision, had more experience with, and built-in preferences for, vocational training approaches. Failure to create incentives for agriculture says a lot about reintegration design, revealing that reintegration actors construed reintegration objectives less as an investment in economic opportunity and more as a time-buying gesture. Therefore, it did not matter which activity ex-combatant beneficiaries chose: as long as that activity occupied ex-combatants' time long enough for security to hold for six months then reintegration can be said to have occurred.

In addition to the failure of reintegration programs to alleviate massive youth unemployment, reintegration targeting leakages reinforced the social and political marginalization among ex-combatants that existed prior to the conflict. Problems with eligibility determination were not just program hiccups but created opportunities for corruption, alienated excluded groups, and left their reintegration needs unaddressed.

¹³⁰ International Crisis Group 2004, p.14.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp.14, 24.

The NCDDR defended the decision to let commanders control lists for group disarmament by arguing that peace was the first priority even if it meant targeting leakages.¹³² The commission, however, could have posted monitors at demobilization centers or with UNAMSIL units in the field as incentives to provide accurate lists, or could have established a grievance mechanism for ex-combatants excluded from eligibility to appeal.¹³³ These remedies were not implemented because of the costs, time, and personnel involved and because the NCDDR did not want to come up with standards to make combatant status determinations, again demonstrating strong, fixed preferences unlikely to change policy mid-course even if RPSRCs suggest the need for changes.

Unlike in Namibia, where the government invested lots of money to develop accurate and fair eligibility assessments and had the opportunity to conduct the eligibility exercise twice, the NCDDR lacked the authority and resources to make status determinations. No such role was given to it by the peace agreement or in subsequent negotiations. As with UNDP and pension debates in Mozambique, the NCDDR dodged a more active political role in criticizing commander fraud because of pressures to appear neutral and apolitical. The commission also hoped that other humanitarian organizations would capture vulnerable groups excluded from DDR programs, but without an active role by the NCDDR to identify vulnerable or excluded persons in demobilization centers it was difficult for other organizations (e.g., UNICEF) to find them after the fact.

V. Reintegration Actors in Sierra Leone: Capacity and Preferences

¹³² United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), 'DFID Funded Activities in Sierra Leone,' Community Reintegration Programme and GTZ Multi-Sectoral Reaction Programme, Monitoring Visit 4-11 November 2002, London, November 2002, p.7.

¹³³ Human Rights Watch recommended the latter course of action (Dufka 2005).

The RPSRCs outlined above were not the inevitable by-product of a post-conflict transition. The NCDDR could have created incentives to encourage greater participation in agricultural and educational offerings. UNAMSIL peacekeepers could have monitored re-recruitment into regional conflicts more closely, used punitive measures to crack down on foreign parties actively recruiting within Sierra Leone, or worked with the NCDDR to increase cash payments and expedite training and other economic opportunities to deter ex-combatants from joining regional wars. The NCDDR could have realized that many unemployed ex-combatants would naturally migrate back to diamond-mining areas and encouraged the IDMP and other organizations to develop special programs to encourage former fighters to participate in licensed mining or help them form cooperatives.

These options, however, were not pursued. Why? Justifications given in program evaluations were that any post-conflict transition is chaotic and messy, that reintegration programs can not work economic miracles, and that programs can at best buy time by giving former fighters something to do during the tenuous first months after a peace agreement. Analyzing the persistence of RPSRCs, however, also requires a hard look at the job that reintegration actors performed. Why were programs short term and their objectives limited to helping ex-combatants 'return to civilian life' and not becoming 'productive members of society'?¹³⁴ Why was there no transition to non-targeted support or support for youth employment initiatives? Why was there no regional response to security threats or harmonization of regional DDR efforts?

Although reintegration actors in Sierra Leone acted professionally and in good faith to provide equitable and comprehensive assistance, this section argues that, as with Namibia and Mozambique, the capacity and preferences of actors constrained the effectiveness of programs in

¹³⁴ The final evaluation of the NCDDR argues that the commission 'knew that it did not have enough resources to turn all ex-combatants into productive members of society. It felt, however, that it had an opportunity to help these individuals return to civilian life' (Teshamichael et al. 2004, p.54).

important ways. As with previous chapters, capacity will be evaluated in terms of resources, expertise, and authority, with analysis focusing on capacity constraints, and the impact of and explanations for those constraints. With preferences, analysis will also follow the pattern of previous chapters, summarizing dominant preferences and articulating the pressures that formed them, and the impact they had on programs.

Resources, Expertise, and Authority in Sierra Leone

Adjusting for inflation, less money was spent on reintegration in Sierra Leone than in Mozambique, despite 'new' thinking on DDR in the interim that has called for more resources to conduct reintegration.¹³⁵ Persistent funding shortages of money pledged to the MDTF delayed procurement of toolkits and receipt of subsistence allowances. Funding delays are not just a bureaucratic hassle; they jeopardize security at the most fragile moment of a post-conflict transition.¹³⁶ Resource constraints got worse just as the long term impact of reintegration problems became obvious. A study of program funding by the UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit found that support for DDR programs build as information, advocacy, and political pressure mount ahead of a donors conference but then 'drops precipitously' immediately before or at elections just when reintegration programs are 'hitting their stride'.¹³⁷ Although MDTFs in general succeed in pooling resources and consolidating donor appeals, they do not resolve chronic funding shortages, neglect of reintegration within broader DDR funding, or funding shortages during program implementation.

Limited agricultural expertise among the organizations to which reintegration training was contracted meant actors missed an opportunity to invest in Sierra Leone's development. The solution would have been to explore agricultural support options and to train NGOs who bid for

¹³⁵ About \$100 million was spent on reintegrating 72,490. Roughly the same amount of money was spent to reintegrate approximately the same number of ex-combatants in Mozambique, but that was ten years prior to Sierra Leone's programs.

¹³⁶ UNSC S/2001/857, para.59.

¹³⁷ International Crisis Group 2004, pp.20,34.

reintegration TEP contracts accordingly. Reintegration 'brands' among actors such as GTZ, which specializes in vocational training programs, explain why some economic sectors are overlooked. Reliance on reintegration brands reinforces a 'cookie cutter approach' to reintegration design and neglects local and regional particularities.¹³⁸ Those brands develop in part because of expertise gained of experience but also because of endogenous pressures of bureaucratic dysfunction: vocational training involves little risk (it does not promise land, jobs, credit, or long term follow-up support) and little coordination with local government actors (just classrooms, toolkits, and instructors). Actors have incentives to neglect follow-up programs to support vocational training initiatives (e.g., micro-credit, job placement and referral) not just because of resource constraints but also because they do not want to risk high-profile failure by embracing the more ambitious objectives of employment creation and growth stimulation and so are content to view programs as simply 'buying time'. Failure to pursue more ambitious program objectives even when it became obvious that vocational training had largely failed and then down-grading expectations accordingly can be reasonably construed as evidence of collusion.

Lack of reintegration expertise and knowledge about reintegration benefits among UNAMSIL peacekeepers also contributed to RPSRC persistence. UNAMSIL peacekeepers were the first point of contact for ex-combatants but they were not DDR specialists and on many occasions used misinformation about the DDR process to lure ex-combatants into cooperating and disarming, promising assistance that was never designed to materialize. Although UNAMSIL troops were not tasked with reintegration, their security presence and disarmament role put them in a position to make statements about what reintegration would include. This evidences information asymmetries that contribute to adverse selection problems. Asymmetries between the NCDDR

¹³⁸ Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, p.18; Shantayanan Devarajan, David Dollar, and Torgny Holmgren, *Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001) pp.2-7.

and UNAMSIL created a 'broken chain of command' where actors lower down the chain had less knowledge and therefore passed on inaccurate information, and between UNAMSIL and ex-combatant beneficiaries, the latter of whom were misinformed about benefits). The solution to the UNAMSIL expertise problem would have entailed reintegration training and sensitization for DPKO troop commanders and the presence of representatives from reintegration organizations (e.g., the NCDDR) with forward disarmament units to conduct on-site sensitization for combatants and to supervise registration of combatants to resolve eligibility leakages.

The NCDDR lacked the authority to make key political decisions about reintegration eligibility or respond to transnational threats to reintegration. The inability of the NCDDR to impact regional approaches to DDR, particularly through the harmonization of reintegration packages, resulted from lack of resources to augment its own reintegration benefits on offer and from its status as a national entity subsidiary to the Sierra Leonean government. Had an entity such as CORE in Mozambique, for example, overseen the reintegration process, it arguably would have been better placed to negotiate with UN missions in other countries and to apply pressure, offer incentives, or threaten penalties to leaders of foreign armed groups to stop recruitment of Sierra Leoneans. Although national commitment to the DDR process is important, the limits of a national commission to impact the political process at a high level of engagement highlights one drawback to the NCDDR approach and suggests the need to augment the capacity of a national DDR commission with an impartial arbitrator (such as a UN panel or envoy/adviser).

Given the World Bank's queasiness about political issues, the NCDDR model also risks tilting governance of reintegration issues away from the political and toward the technical. At the least, the NCDDR needed to work more closely with national security forces (the army and UNAMSIL) and regional and international institutions to access intelligence on threats involving re-recruitment, arms trafficking, and insecurity in mining areas, and then advise those actors of the

reintegration options available to use as remedial measures to such threats. The authority lacking in the NCDDR to engage at a higher level of political decision-making was needed to combine the economic incentives of reintegration benefits with monitoring and intelligence operations, border control, potential punitive measures for recruiters and their recruits, harmonization of reintegration packages across countries to discourage 'benefit chasing', and the development of regional conflict mediation strategies. A UN-chaired reintegration commission working closely with the peacekeeping mission on the ground and the Security Council in New York would arguably possess more authority to manage problems such as re-recruitment. Inadequate authority also explains failure of the NCDDR to manage RPSRCs related to the disarmament of the ex-SLA, eligibility problems with exclusion and fraud, the status of the CDF, and the nullification of the Lomé amnesty, all of which would have required the NCDDR to mediate between parties rather than merely implement planned benefits.

The NCDDR and National 'Ownership' of Reintegration: Implications for Capacity

On the positive side, the NCDDR was a model of professionalism: it made allowances for ex-combatants on residual caseload lists, performed a final audit of program accounts, commissioned several evaluations, and made arrangements to archive its records and documents, dispose of its assets, and prepare for a final, independent evaluation. The leadership of NCDDR was universally praised by DDR stakeholders as 'national, independent, neutral, technically competent and financially transparent'.¹³⁹ What the NCDDR lacked, however, was the capacity to manage serious RPSRCs and therefore the capacity to 'own' the reintegration process.

The purpose of the NCDDR model is to foster political commitment on the part of the post-conflict state to the importance of DDR. Ownership, however, is about more than recognition of the importance of a process; it is also about having the tools necessary to carry out the task that is

¹³⁹ Morse and Knight July 2002, p.3.

owned.¹⁴⁰ Ownership implies capacity to enunciate demand, make a tangible contribution, obtain benefits, and share responsibility for long term continuation or non-continuation of a project.¹⁴¹ The World Bank gave the NCDDR financial tools and technical advice but the NCDDR was nevertheless ill-equipped to own DDR. Its enunciated demand of three years of support was nixed by cash-strapped donors skeptical of the efficacy or need for long term reintegration assistance. The duration and objectives of programs, therefore, were not rationally owned or shaped by any distinctly Sierra Leonean needs but rather the product of external pressure and reintegration templates. Cash poor post-conflict states are unlikely to be picky about reintegration program duration and components because they have incentives to chase whatever aid money they can get.¹⁴² The NCDDR was not choosing among reintegration actors and programs; it was a national institution designed by an external donor (the World Bank) and had little power of its own except to passively accept programs on offer. The NCDDR was out of its depth in a security environment that was extremely unstable during the early phases of DDR. It was the World Bank more than the NCDDR that made the decision, for example, to cancel TSA payments after the outbreak of conflict in May 2000. It also forfeited any responsibility for the long term continuation or non-continuation of reintegration, assuming that other organizations would both take up the slack for individuals and groups excluded from its benefits (especially young women) and plan any transition between short term reintegration assistance and non-targeted follow-up support.

The latter decision left reintegration follow-up to a state apparatus less equipped to take up the reins than the organization previously deputized to do DDR. In fact, Sierra Leone has less capacity to respond to RPSRCs now than it did when the NCDDR was still functioning. It has

¹⁴⁰ 'Enabling local actors implies not just giving them a voice but also helping them obtain the means to accomplish their own political objectives' (Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, 'Conclusion: What Future for Peace Operations? Brahimi and Beyond,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.1, Spring 2004, p. 203).

¹⁴¹ These are from Ostrom et al. 2001, p.2.

¹⁴² Easterly discusses aid chasing in the general development context (2002, p.246).

access to no funds specifically earmarked for follow-up reintegration and, being cash-strapped with significant priorities, is likely to find those funds elsewhere. 'Youth employment' initiatives are now the remit of the Ministry of Youth and Sport, itself an under-financed and under-supported institution. Its capacity to attract donor funds and attention is undermined by difficulties of prioritization in a post-conflict context, where reintegration follow-up is easily lost in the 'Christmas Tree of Aims' of aid bureaucracies and post-conflict states. State actors are also unlikely to monitor or fund reintegration follow up because they can reasonably expect that, in a severe crisis, external actors would step in, creating a Samaritan's Dilemma.

As dilemmas with authority and ownership demonstrate, capacity problems are also a reflection of exogenous pressures on post-conflict governments. The general paradox of peace-building in the wake of UN withdrawal is that the recovering state must lead a process it is not capable of leading yet nevertheless wants to lead because of a need to assert sovereignty and shore up political legitimacy in the eyes of the public and outside investors alike.

The biggest potential problem of a 'nationally owned' reintegration approach is that, in a politically fractured and deeply divided state, letting the state own DDR can reinforce perceptions of unequal treatment among conflict actors who do not hold the reins of state power, perceptions that can produce, at best, fractious political disputes or, at worst, a return to arms. In Sierra Leone, the impartiality of the NCDDR never posed a serious security risk, mainly because of the swift collapse of RUF authority, power, and allegiance. But in future cases, it might be ill-advised to allow one party to the conflict (the ruling state government) to own DDR when doing so involves making a series of political choices that the other party or parties to the conflict might perceive as

antagonistic. In such a case, liberal ideas of ownership and democratization of the DDR process might be ill-suited to the demands of security and development.¹⁴³

Actor Preferences in Sierra Leone: Short Term versus Long Term Engagement

The preferences of reintegration actors also determined management of RPSRCs. The dominant (i.e., 'coalesced') preferences of the World Bank and bilateral donors, with which the NCDDR and UNAMSIL agreed, were for short term intervention and apolitical action in Sierra Leone, which significantly influenced the duration, objectives, and components of the NCDDR's programs in Sierra Leone. The impact of short term preferences was lack of follow up support for reintegration activities. Consequently, economic opportunities were not created and programs did little to counter massive unemployment and marginalization that had existed prior to the conflict. Preferences for short term, apolitical programs also meant that the NCDDR and its donors lacked authority and interests to engage in long term management of RPSRCs or to adapt program support to ameliorate RPSRCs as they arose. Instances of preference clashes between peace-building priorities also influenced policy decisions (particularly in the case of balancing transitional justice with DDR). As in Namibia and Mozambique, preferences were shaped by bureaucratic and systemic pressures on reintegration actors operating in Sierra Leone.

Donor (e.g., the World Bank, DFID, and bilateral donors to the MDTF) preferences clearly influenced the shift from long term to short term support: 'The donors also told us that the NCDDR was not set up to solve the poverty problem but only to provide limited assistance to combatants'.¹⁴⁴ Interviews with reintegration actors involved in the decision-making process confirm this, revealing the primary motivations for the shift to be: mushrooming numbers of ex-combatants eligible for the programs that donors had not anticipated and that threatened to stretch

¹⁴³ Roland Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,' *International Security*, Vol.22, No.2, 1997, p.79.

¹⁴⁴ NCDDR respondent, cited in Corninos et al. 2002, p.26.

available and limited funds; spiraling costs of disarmament and demobilization; and donor reluctance to support programming for three years, particularly as three-year support was without precedent in other conflict areas. Similar pressures existed in Mozambique (particularly, large numbers of eligible ex-combatants and costs associated with prolonged stays in AAs) but there the lobbying and financial contributions of the Scandinavians and the Swiss to implement the RSS ensured at least two years of support.¹⁴⁵ There was no advocate for an RSS in Sierra Leone, nor was there a donor willing to finance three years or even one year of programming, and so the NCDDR adopted the six-month model. The unpopularity of former fighters in Sierra Leone, and particularly ex-RUF and ex-AFRC combatants, further accentuated resource mobilization challenges for donors.

Donors also justified short term support because of worries that longer term assistance would make ex-combatants worse off by encouraging aid dependency or would earn them the antipathy of their communities due to resentment of 'special treatment'. Therefore, from the actors' point of view, institutional concerns about limited resources as well as sensitivity about community resentment and aid dependency shaped their preference for short term support. Although community resentment and aid dependence are legitimate worries, the fact that donors did not contemplate program solutions around such worries suggests that concerns over resources trumped ideological or pragmatic objections to long term support. Donors could have followed up the six-month assistance program with longer term non-targeted support to benefit ex-combatants and their host communities or adopted alternative strategies of long term targeted support that would seek to minimize resentment and dependence. For example, information campaigns, sensitization programs, and coordination of targeted reintegration with accompanying development assistance for communities could minimize potential community resentment. Long term investment

¹⁴⁵ In Namibia, these pressures were less relevant since reintegration support was not planned by external donors.

in apprenticeships or providing money for affirmative action hiring incentives could minimize potential aid dependency by investing resources in programs that promote self-sufficiency through sustainable employment.

More importantly, it is not clear that concerns about aid dependency and resentment should trump the consequences of not providing enough assistance. Aid dependency in Mozambique did not result from the RSS, which lasted for two years as opposed to nine months in Sierra Leone (three months of cash stipends and six months of reintegration opportunities, e.g., training). It is not clear why continued, albeit limited and different, targeted support would have been anathema to security and development as donors worried about resentment and dependency suggested. More likely to impact donors' preferences for the six month TEP were limited funding and bureaucratic pressures that created incentives for short term interventions. The articulation of humble objectives *ex post facto* in Sierra Leone's evaluations of reintegration mirrors development actor preferences for low return observable outputs over long term investment where benefits are more diffuse: raising money after a crisis has subsided is, after all, more difficult. There was certainly no conspiracy among reintegration actors to downgrade objectives after the fact. But it is easier to argue that programs did the best that could be expected than to lobby for more funds or make the case for long term support that might risk failure or produce diffuse, less visible results that are unlikely to hold donors' attention.

Donors argued that any long term non-targeted support would come from the government's reconstruction strategy as detailed in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). But implementation of Sierra Leone's PRSP did not occur until the end of 2005, leaving a gap of three years between reintegration support and 'generalized' development aid, a long time in which no money was earmarked for management of ongoing reintegration problems or employment stimulus packages to target widespread, massive youth unemployment.

External actors withdrew, and the NCDDR dissolved, before articulating any strategy for a transition to non-targeted, generalized development assistance, even though program evaluations stated that programs should move from targeted to non-targeted support. Amazingly, the NCDDR's Executive Secretary said that whether or not ex-combatants stay committed to the peace process was not an issue for the NCDDR(!): 'These [whether ex-combatants stay occupied in their communities and become good citizens in the long term] are long term issues that we [NCDDR] cannot address as an institution but we believe other institutions which have long-term mandates to provide job opportunities and programmes will step in because it is now not only a problem for ex-combatants alone but it is also a problem of youths.'¹⁴⁶ The NCDDR was arguably the best actor in a position to understand the needs and backgrounds of unemployed youth; therefore, an argument could be made for keeping the NCDDR around to coordinate with the Ministry for Youth and Sport about what a strategy of continued support for unemployed youth might entail. Nor is the hand off by UNAMSIL to the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) likely to produce new thinking about long term reintegration problems or solutions: neither the World Bank nor UNAMSIL left behind a framework for long-term monitoring of any unresolved reintegration problems, and UNIOSIL has no mandate, experience, or interest in continuing to monitor ex-combatant trajectories when shaping its general development policy priorities.

Preference clashes between external donors and the Sierra Leonean government also explain delays in the development and implementation of employment strategies to follow up reintegration. The IMF, World Bank, and bilateral donors postponed meetings to approve Sierra Leone's PRSP because of donor and investor concerns that Sierra Leone was not tackling corruption. The country was left off the G8's list of 18 states to be the first beneficiaries of debt

¹⁴⁶ UNOHAC, 'Sierra Leone: IRIN Interview on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration,' *IRIN News Service*, 28 March 2003.

cancellation for the same reason. Chicken and egg problems result: external actors' preferences about good governance and corruption clash with state actor beliefs about prioritization of development needs *because* state actors claim they can not improve governance and fight corruption *until* they tackle fundamental challenges of survival and poverty. And Sierra Leone has plenty of life-and-death development priorities, including extension of basic health care services, water and sanitation improvements, and management and prevention of HIV/AIDS, not to mention other pressing development priorities like increasing access to quality primary education and rebuilding war-destroyed housing and infrastructure. As the UN Desk Officer for Sierra Leone put it, to see security problems in rural areas solely in terms of law enforcement represents a Western point of view, a bias for a policing approach that is often a luxury and hardly the biggest priority in post-conflict states.¹⁴⁷

Sierra Leone's government ministers and diplomats prioritize development activities above governance issues like corruption and fighting criminality ostensibly because of these claims of ethical prioritization of life-and-death issues. When asked why such issues ought to take precedence government and UN respondents stressed their desire to help those suffering. Civil society leaders also pointed to legitimate efforts to respond to strong domestic constituent pressures that demand immediate action on development priorities. But domestic political pressures that constitute less honorable explanations for ethnical posturing also tell part of the story. In Sierra Leone, the Security Sector Review clearly showed that the public rank corruption and governance as the biggest threats to security. This suggests that foot-dragging on corruption and governance might also be tied to a desire to cover up malfeasance, particularly since, as civil society respondents indicated, exposure of corruption would likely reveal widespread abuses

¹⁴⁷ Author's interview with Charles Anyidoho, Sierra Leone Desk Officer, UN Department of Political Affairs, New York City, 20 April 2004.

among SLPP leaders and damage the party's electoral prospects in the 2007 elections. Public anger *within* Sierra Leone about corruption and public fears about criminality evident in the Security Sector Review also call into question assertions that crime and corruption are 'Western' preoccupations. In any case, the impact of preference clashes pitting external demands for good governance against state actor prioritization of 'first-order' needs is to further delay funds for a long term youth employment strategy. The government's inability to tackle endemic governance problems (and especially corruption) has also exacerbated political marginalization. There is a sense that nothing has changed politically since the war, or as Sierra Leoneans say about the current political situation compared to its pre-war counterpart: 'same car, different driver'.

Short term reintegration approaches undermined coordination across peace-building tasks because reintegration mandates and objectives were construed narrowly and because the NCDDR was not politically placed to negotiate with actors making decisions about SSR and transitional justice. Nor did actors involved with other peace-building tasks coordinate with the NCDDR. In a version of 'where you stand depends on where you sit', there were bureaucratic incentives for lawyers for the Special Court to value their mandate to punish perpetrators of atrocities over potential security implications of nullifying amnesty provisions and IMATT military trainers were more likely to overlook past human rights abuses of RSLAF recruits if doing so facilitated the training, formation, and readiness of the new security force. As endogenous pressures would suggest, the multiplicity of reintegration actors operating in Sierra Leone (the NCDDR, its many external advisers, donors, and partner agencies, and the NGOs that contracted training programs) also decreased accountability. This is because official assessments were silent about the chain of command, about who made which decisions, and about alternative viewpoints that lost out and alternative program templates that were discarded.

Two actors' preferences in Sierra Leone about short term versus long term engagement departed significantly from previous peace-building missions: UNAMSIL and the UK. Crucial to demonstrating international commitment to peace in Sierra Leone and to building trust between the parties to the conflict, UNAMSIL stayed in-country for six years. UNAMSIL also linked its presence to the achievement of measurable security benchmarks, among them the completion of reintegration programs for ex-combatants, instead of withdrawing immediately after elections, which had been the habit of previous UN peace operations. The UK, through IMATT, also has signaled long term commitment to overseeing security sector reform in Sierra Leone. All respondents attributed the relative stability of the overall peace process to the continued presence in-country of UNAMSIL and IMATT. That presence might also explain why accusations by conflict parties of preferential treatment such as occurred in Namibia and Mozambique did not occur in Sierra Leone.

These long term commitments reflect institutional thinking about peace-building; i.e., recognition within the UN and by the UK that external guarantees of security ought to extend beyond elections, and that states and organizations have a responsibility to rebuild in cases where they have intervened. That thinking, however, did not filter down to recognition of a need for long term reintegration support or monitoring. Extended stays in-country for UNAMSIL and IMATT also signal changes in systemic pressures from those that characterized external involvement with Namibia and Mozambique. That Sierra Leone was willing to consent to longer and more intrusive external involvement might signal a relaxation of sovereignty norms in favor of new institutional arrangements of transitional administration. However, such changes are unlikely to be permanent or consistent but instead suggest that in cases where external involvement is both welcome by the host state *and* in the intervening actors' interests, a longer and more intrusive external role might in some cases be possible and desirable.

Actor Preferences in Sierra Leone: Apolitical 'Path of Least Resistance'

A second set of preferences coalesced around apolitical reintegration intervention and help to explain why problems with eligibility and transnational threats to reintegration went unmanaged by the NCDDR. Procedures to determine eligibility needed to be made during political negotiations between the parties to the conflict. Once RPSRCs linked to faulty eligibility in design and implementation of programs surfaced, reintegration actors did nothing to counter them. The NCDDR did not set up grievance or appeal mechanisms for excluded, *bona fide* ex-combatants because there was no forum in which it could re-negotiate such issues with the parties. The NCDDR's approach to reintegration governance contrasted with CORE in Mozambique, which was structured in a way that allowed subsequent negotiation about eligibility (e.g., CORE's acting as a mediator about issues related to pensions). The NCDDR's governance reflects the bureaucratic incentives (e.g., incentives that rewarded short term output and discouraged risk) and World Bank pressures that pushed it towards essentially technical management of reintegration, which served it poorly when political engagement was needed. I am not suggesting that an autocratic NCDDR make political decisions for the parties but rather that possession of the political capital to negotiate between parties to reach political consensus about contentious issues would have increased the impact of the NCDDR to manage problems.

Exogenous pressures help to explain the absence of a coordinated, regional approach to reintegration in Sierra Leone. Part of the reason for that absence was that actors did not anticipate regional threats like re-recruitment and regional conflicts flared up with little warning. But, once regional reintegration problems became apparent, the NCDDR and UNAMSIL were reluctant, and lacked the mandate or authority, to intrude in the affairs of neighboring states without consent. Reintegration was not harmonized because of a state-centric approach to reintegration that shaped development actors' dedication to cost-of-living assessments even after evidence of the economic

pull of regional wars (and their DDR benefits) on ex-combatants became clear. Punishing re-recruitment in the form of sanctions against groups with an active recruiting presence in Sierra Leone could have been an effective option but reintegration actors are unaccustomed to combining carrots and sticks and were wary of engaging at the level of regional politics because of strong pressures of sovereignty that discouraged meddling in Liberia, Guinea or Côte d'Ivoire without consent or a clear mandate to do so. UNAMSIL did not adequately monitor or investigate efforts to recruit demobilized combatants because it was not part of the mission's mandate, so only anecdotal and speculative reporting on the phenomenon occurred in the Secretary-General's reports.

Actors, in other words, 'took the path of least resistance'¹⁴⁸, a path predicted by international relations theory, where norms of consent and sovereignty limit peacekeepers' and reintegration actors' authority to act in states and not regions. Of course, there are legitimate reasons for the strength and existence of these pressures; I am simply arguing that in this case norms of sovereignty and consent, and of state-centric action, happened to constrain reintegration actors in ways that exacerbated reintegration problems linked to the regional conflict dynamic.

This case study set out to show that the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors in Sierra Leone influenced the adoption of a short term, apolitical approach that left reintegration incomplete. It argued that reintegration programs exacerbated several reintegration problems that had observable and negative consequences for post-conflict security not just within Sierra Leone but throughout the region. Its review of the conflict context and its aftermath revealed that little has

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

changed in post-conflict Sierra Leone in terms of the so-called root causes of its war, particularly with respect to widespread and continuing youth unemployment and marginalization. Based on inspection of written evaluations and extensive interviews with reintegration actors and observers, it identified several reintegration problems that, while not provoking renewed conflict or jeopardizing the basic framework of the peace process, nevertheless contributed to local and regional violence, fueled demand for weapons, and produced insecurity in mining areas.

Finally, this case study explained the persistence of RPSRCs observed in terms of the capacity and preferences of the NCDDR and the external actors supporting its efforts to manage them. The NCDDR did not have the money to carry out the long term programs it envisaged, the expertise to target economic sectors with the most potential, or the authority to make crucial decisions about eligibility and response to DDR transnational threats. Although set up by the World Bank to own the country's DDR process, the commission did not have the resources or political leverage to adapt programs mid-course to adequately manage RPSRCs or to pave the way for any subsequent program of non-targeted support that might address residual RPSRCs.

The NCDDR's programs fell short of what would have been *enough* to successfully manage reintegration problems in Sierra Leone. On one hand, the programs designed and implemented were better than nothing. They facilitated security by buying time for peace to hold. They also successfully linked reintegration of some combatants to security sector reform. The long term presence of UNAMSIL and IMATT, relative to previous UN peace operations, successfully facilitated trust between parties to the conflict and built the security capacity of the RSLAF. But on the other hand, reintegration program approaches exacerbated several RPSRCs: neglect of mining areas and of the CDF reinforced conflict command structures, neglect of re-recruitment problems produced more fighters and violence in the region, and faulty design that tied reinsertion benefits to disarmament had the unintended effect of fueling a market for weapons. Furthermore, as the

country's 2003 Defense White Paper warned, unmet ex-combatant expectations and the exclusion of many from reintegration benefits increases their potential to threaten security.¹⁴⁹

Nor did actors create, or believe that they could create, sustainable economic opportunities. The NCDDR, with the sanction of its World Bank advisers and bilateral donors, designed reintegration programs that were meant to keep the country's former fighters in a holding pattern rather than facilitate their safe landing. Ex-combatants were reintegrated back into basic levels of poverty, objectives were kept humble, and success was measured in terms of programs implemented (volume) rather than services delivered (effectiveness).

Reintegration programs in Sierra Leone did little to address the underlying causes of conflict or to make a dent in post-conflict poverty and marginalization. Ex-combatants posed serious threats to security during DDR programs and in their immediate aftermath. Although external and internal threats have diminished considerably as regional conflicts have died down, assessment of Sierra Leone's reintegration process reveals that, unless continuing economic and political marginalization is addressed, its ex-combatants remain a ticking time bomb for the country and its neighbors.

¹⁴⁹ GoSL *Defence White Paper*, 2003, para.1016.

Conclusion

Reintegration is arguably the most difficult component of the DDR triumvirate. An army can be disbanded. Its guns can be taken away. But what happens next? The economies of post-conflict states have been devastated by years of war, leaving very little to reintegrate *into*. Political tension and hostility do not disappear overnight once a peace agreement is signed. The atrocities committed by all sides of a conflict remain fresh in the memories of civilians and soldiers alike. And, in a post-conflict environment where the commitment of the parties to peace has not yet been tested, inserting thousands or tens of thousands of ex-combatants into new communities is more than just a logistical headache but a potential security nightmare.

Added to these difficulties is the evidence from all three cases of instances where reintegration programs created and exacerbated problems of their own. A cynical observer might recommend scrapping the entire reintegration project. Despite its difficulty and its unintended consequences, however, reintegration remains imperative to post-conflict peace-building. As a member of the UN DDR Working Group put it, 'A lot of people say DDR should be 'RDD' because if you don't have a reintegration strategy then don't even bother with disarmament and demobilization.'¹ The solution, therefore, is not to discard reintegration (as occurred with programs for Iraqi militias) or to dilute it (as occurred with the down-grading of expectations in Sierra Leone), but rather to consider its radical re-tooling. Reintegration programs can and must overcome the soft bigotry of low expectations.

This thesis set out to show how reintegration problems threaten security in post-conflict states and to explain why those problems persist. It has focused on the way in which two

¹ Author's interview with Stephanie Kuttner, DPhil, Consultant to the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, Washington, DC, 2 September 2005.

aggregate variables, reintegration actors' capacity and preferences, have contributed to or, in some cases, created those problems. Literature on reintegration has heretofore not been very helpful at anticipating or understanding persistent reintegration problems or isolating the role that actors themselves play in managing them. This is particularly true of problems that threaten regional security or of problems that persist after a UN peacekeeping mission has withdrawn and a state government declares its DDR chapter closed. Analysis has focused on the one to two years following a peace agreement and has not systematically identified or tracked the range of problems that might stem from incomplete reintegration, or assessed their impact on security. Program evaluations tend to ask whether programs, as conceived, were administered effectively and not whether their mandates and objectives were the right ones. The study and practice of reintegration do not currently contemplate a political and administrative framework for long term (i.e., beyond the completion of one- to two-year programs) monitoring and evaluation of the reintegration process.

To explain why problems with ex-combatant reintegration persist, I first provided a broad overview of the conflict and post-conflict context in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, emphasizing in particular the design and implementation of programs to facilitate the reintegration of former fighters. Then, I catalogued the reintegration problems encountered (problem type) and analyzed their impact on security (problem degree) in each case. Finally, I argued that the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors are significant factors contributing to the persistence of reintegration problems. I employed process tracing within cases to isolate the impact of actors' capacity and preferences on outcomes, and to determine whether more could have been done to manage reintegration problems more effectively or to create more sustainable economic opportunities for former fighters. I also used international relations theory to analyze the way in which systemic factors shaped the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors in each case, and drew on international organization and international political economy literature to make

inferences about the way in which bureaucratic, institutional, and organizational factors also shaped their capacity and preferences.

Because reintegration actors combine development and security functions, they make a compelling subject for the study of the institutional capacity and preferences of peace-builders. UN peacekeepers who direct disarmament and demobilization face daunting challenges, but usually operate with a clear mandate that governs the tasks they perform (e.g., collecting weapons, issuing identify cards, presiding over encampment of fighters for a fixed period of time). When UNDP, the World Bank, state development agencies and donors, and state commissions and ministries tackle reintegration, however, they are dealing with tasks that are far from clear-cut, particularly when peace agreements are vague about reintegration contours (e.g., program eligibility, duration, and components). When those same actors work to improve development prospects in a non-conflict context, the security stakes of their work are not nearly as high. Reintegration actors, therefore, face unique challenges in trying to fuse development and security functions and objectives.

The independent variables under review (e.g., capacity and preferences) are essential to the study of reintegration outcomes and to the theory and practice of peace-building: they cut to the heart of issues of reintegration program objectives, duration, and components; they raise fundamental questions about authority, leadership, and coordination during peace-building interventions; and they simultaneously reflect and shape prevailing norms governing the relationship between post-conflict states and the institutions that assist them (e.g., sovereignty, self-determination, consent, intervention, and impartiality). Consequently, the case studies have yielded several observations about reintegration outcomes and the actors that shape them.

First, RPSRCs are likely to threaten state and regional security. Their nature and impact varied in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, but nevertheless showed that threats short of war ought to be taken seriously and efforts made to manage them.

Second, assessment of reintegration outcomes needs to change to incorporate a variety of potential strategies for managing problems because the case evidence across all three countries demonstrates that economic (i.e., employment) strategies alone were not enough to manage reintegration problems, nor were the economic strategies pursued necessary the right or effective ones. This also suggests that technocratic or purely market-oriented solutions will be inadequate to managing RPSRCs; rather, problem management must be approached as a governance process. Furthermore, building long term problem management capacity in reintegration actors is not the same thing as arguing for long term benefits, although in some cases the latter might be necessary or appropriate.

Third, actor capacity and preferences matter to outcomes. Although the cases demonstrated variation in how different actors performed in different settings, they also showed important similarities among reintegration actors. Patterns observed include: reintegration actors were initially ill-equipped to anticipate and manage spoilers, from protesters in Namibia to organized crime in Mozambique and mercenaries in Sierra Leone; actors lacked the capacity and authority to respond flexibly to problems that arose after the DDR process had commenced; over time, as evidenced in evaluations of reintegration in Sierra Leone and recent coordination efforts at the UN, actors have downgraded their expectations and aspirations for what reintegration can accomplish; actors neglected political decisions, or assumed others would make them, about the political contours of reintegration, particularly in the absence of front-end agreement about those contours; and, absent initial or continued international input into reintegration decisions, state actors in Namibia and Mozambique polarized reintegration issues, with negative consequences for

post-conflict security. The cases also bore out the principal theoretical expectations of the literature on international relations theory and international political economy as to how endogenous and exogenous pressures were likely to constrain actors' capacity and shape their preferences.

This conclusion will compare case experience more explicitly to highlight patterns that unite the case experience and to make generalized inferences about the reintegration dilemmas that are particularly salient to the theory and practice of peace-building. It compares cases to determine two things: first, which reintegration problems tend to persist across these cases and what is the impact of those problems on post-conflict security; and second, why have those problems tended to persist (i.e., what similarities, differences, and changes over time can be observed with respect to the capacity and preferences of the actors delegated responsibility for ex-combatant reintegration)?

I. Identifying Reintegration Problems and Assessing Their Impact

Before making generalized inferences about reintegration problems, I first review the problems observed in Namibia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, and the impact such problems had on security there. In Namibia, the ruling SWAPO government believed that protests from unemployed former fighters constituted a serious threat to security in post-conflict Namibia. In reality, although protests were at times violent, the major threat they posed was not to state survival in Namibia but to regime stability and legitimacy. Former PLAN fighters were, at the time protests began, a group that commanded the sympathy of SWAPO supporters and their continuing protests were an indictment of the ruling party, threatening to divide or topple the SWAPO

government. The remedial measures the government pursued to stop the protests were effective at quelling dissent and at weakening at least one opposition party's electoral strategy but also came at a price, namely the further expansion of an already-bloated public sector and the exacerbation of already-existing tensions about ethnic and political discrimination. Although these issues pose significant governance challenges for SWAPO's leaders as they continue to rule Namibia, they do not threaten the survival of the state or the viability of its institutions; at worst, they raise questions about the pace and commitment of SWAPO to democratization and good governance. One continuing threat to security does stand out. The Special Field Force threatens security because it jeopardizes effective civilian control of the military and operates as a quasi militia force whose first loyalty is to a party and its leaders rather than to the state.

In Namibia, protests from former fighters escalated over time as unemployment persisted. In Mozambique, ex-combatant protests followed immediately after demobilization and were the product of prolonged encampment and uncertainty over reintegration benefits. Because CORE, UNOHAC, UNDP, and the donor governments assisting Mozambique anticipated the need for planned reintegration programs (unlike UNTAG and SWAPO in Namibia), reintegration actors were able to respond swiftly to the real security threat that continuing protests and escalating banditry could have posed to the peace process. The RSS, particularly because it paid and scattered former fighters across the country, successfully bought time for the conflict parties to commit to peace in the period before and after elections. But programs were less successful at dealing with spoiler activity by combatant officers, arms trafficking contributing to high levels of crime in South Africa, and organized crime corrupting Mozambique's rule of law institutions. Thus, spoiler activity negatively and directly impacted state and regional security. Indirect and potential threats to security in Mozambique stem from the continuing polarization of reintegration issues. That polarization has exacerbated already-existing regional, ethnic, and inter-party cleavages within

Mozambique, from pensions for RENAMO soldiers to exclusion of civil war veterans from continuing programs and benefits. Increasing public dissatisfaction about unemployment, corruption, and organized crime in an environment of regional, ethnic, and political tension could prove disastrous for Mozambique down the line. The FRELIMO government's refusal to confront still-open reintegration wounds contributes to that tension.

In Sierra Leone, as in Mozambique, reintegration began with widespread riots and demonstrations, which were eventually managed once reintegration assistance became available. Serious threats to state and regional security, however, resulted from the failure of programs to anticipate and manage the proliferation and trafficking of arms in the region (a problem worsened by reintegration programs that created cash-for-guns perceptions among former fighters) and the re-recruitment of ex-combatants into regional wars. Polarization of reintegration issues occurred in Sierra Leone as well, but not on the scale as occurred in Namibia and Mozambique owing to the longer term presence of UN peacekeepers in-country. Failure to set clear eligibility requirements during the planning stages of reintegration excluded vulnerable groups from benefits. The failure to dismantle the command structure of the CDF risks potential violence from its ranks, depending on its leaders' reactions to the ongoing work of the Special Court. Most disconcertingly, programs did little to confront insecurity in mining areas or to counter widespread economic and political marginalization of fighters, leaving the country in a precarious situation going into elections in 2007 reminiscent of the conditions that precipitated conflict in the 1990s.

Assessing reintegration problems across cases can be a bit like comparing apples and oranges. The parties to the individual conflicts have different agendas, the legal and normative environment influencing international action shifts over time, and the states that emerge from conflict face different kinds of problems and have different remedial measures at their disposal. In

viewing reintegration problems comparatively, however, what does become clear is that RPSRCs were present in all three cases, though to varying degrees.

First, violent protests are likely to be the first reintegration problem that actors face.

Although in each case protests died down once formal reintegration assistance began, it is not hard to imagine a case in which mounting grievances and protests spiral to war in the absence of effective assistance (as arguably occurred in Haiti). The danger of protests during a sensitive transition period could be mitigated by eliminating delays between demobilization and reintegration assistance. This requires a technical assessment of potential or likely delays in reintegration assistance during peace negotiations, so that disarmament and demobilization timetables are set accordingly. Reducing delays also involves changes to the way in which reintegration programs are funded. Money up-front is needed and could be obtained if lead reintegration actors can access funding from assessed peacekeeping budgets. This occurred in Liberia and somewhat reduced delays between demobilization and reintegration assistance but, unfortunately, it is a funding recommendation that does not appear to form part of the new integrated DDR guidelines being drawn up by various UN agencies. Funding reforms will be considered in more detail below when I discuss capacity.

Second, the reintegration problems that most threatened security, and that actors were least likely to anticipate or manage, were those that threatened regions. Arms trafficking from Mozambique to South Africa and from Sierra Leone to its neighbors, and re-recruitment of Sierra Leone's fighters into regional wars, had the most visible and negative impact on security. Actors were able to eventually reduce the threat from such problems (e.g., Operations Rachel in Mozambique or allowing roving ex-combatants to be repatriated into Sierra Leone and receive reintegration benefits there) when states were willing to forfeit conventional notions of sovereignty and work together toward a common purpose. State-centric approaches to DDR represent a real

obstacle to actors' authority to manage regional problems, since actors limit their role to the authority of their mandates and to the consent of their hosts, which tend to be confined to individual states rather than to regions. Such obstacles also explain strong, fixed preferences about pricing reintegration benefits nationally instead of harmonizing benefits regionally. Regional problems in the cases were likely to continue to elude actors for these reasons (e.g., the NCDDR and UNAMSIL peacekeepers never came up with an effective strategy to deter re-recruitment). In Namibia, problems with reintegration never translated into verified regional threats (the number of ex-SWAPO combatants who joined fighting forces in Angola is unknown); however, regional insecurity resulting from Angola's ongoing civil war gave SWAPO a justification to funnel thousands of unemployed fighters into the SFF, ostensibly a 'border patrol'.

Third, absent political mediation by third parties (the continuing involvement of the British and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, for example), the most threatening RPSRCs to state security were the strong incentives for ruling state authorities to polarize reintegration issues. The impact of polarization on security varied across the cases. In Namibia and Mozambique, polarization exacerbated pre-existing regional, ethnic, and political tensions. In Sierra Leone, polarization was less direct. Lingering and potential problems with the CDF, for example, resulted not from political or ethnic favoritism by the NCDDR or the ruling government, but were instead the result of widespread public support for the CDF, the absence of a mandate for UNAMSIL to demobilize CDF militias, and the fact that the organization's leaders were not part of peace negotiations. To discourage state actors from polarizing reintegration issues, third parties could monitor reintegration over a long period of time (e.g., UN peacekeepers could stay longer, as occurred in Sierra Leone) or use front-end (i.e., in peace agreements) or back-end (i.e., upon withdrawal) agreement to spell out more specific guarantees about program eligibility, components, and duration.

Finally, the relationship between persistent ex-combatant unemployment and security is less clear across the cases. As I mentioned, violent protests accompanied employment worries of former fighters in all three cases. The lingering impact of unemployment on security, however, varied across cases. In Namibia, ex-combatant unemployment threatened regime stability and legitimacy (i.e., SWAPO's ability to stay in power) more than national security (i.e., threats to state territorial cohesion, survival of the state's institutions, or protection of the state's citizens). In Mozambique, continuing unemployment of both ex-combatants and non-combatants exacerbated regional and ethnic tensions but unemployment is a deeper underlying cause of such tensions, which are more directly the result of regional and ethnic disaffection with FRELIMO governance. In Sierra Leone, respondents deemed the link between continuing unemployment and potential insecurity to be more acute, particularly because widespread unemployment and political marginalization were identified as root causes of the civil war and reintegration programs did little to alter that dynamic. Those interviewed disagreed about whether programs could do more to alter that dynamic, but I demonstrated that several opportunities were missed in Sierra Leone, that potential growth areas were neglected, and that programs, in several cases, exacerbated rather than mitigated the grievances of former fighters. Variation of the impact of unemployment across cases reinforces the need for long term monitoring of reintegration and for flexibility in the design and implementation of programs; both would allow for policy changes to match varying outcomes that accompany persistent ex-combatant unemployment.

Of course, passage of time also accounts for variation in the nature and impact of observed RPSRCs, and so it makes sense that reintegration problems in Sierra Leone, particularly their *potential* impact on security (e.g., insecurity in mining areas, attitudes of CDF leaders about the Special Court, etc.), appear more serious and direct. The threat that ex-combatants pose to state structures and institutions can fade with the simple passage of time (ex-combatants can age,

die, soften their views, or tempter their expectations over time). Nevertheless, my analysis of reintegration problems isolated three core implications. First, RPSRCs nevertheless are likely to threaten a state's survival, institutions, neighbors, or citizens. Second, programs could have done more at the time to temper reintegration problems more effectively and create more sustainable economic opportunities. Third, a significant reason why programs did not do so relates to the capacity and preferences of reintegration actors themselves. It is to a more comparative and generalizeable assessment of capacity and preferences that I now turn.

II. Reintegration Problems and Capacity

An actor's resources, expertise, and authority help to determine its ability to design and implement reintegration programs effectively. But significant limits on actor capacity also existed and constrained effectiveness in important ways. Variation in actors' capacity in all three cases helped to explain in part the variation in actors' management of reintegration problems.

Resources

Reintegration assistance was delayed due to lack of funding in all three cases. In Namibia, funding shortages manifest themselves differently than in the other two countries where international involvement played a greater role in reintegration assistance (Namibia received significant reintegration assistance from South Africa during the first wave of programs, but later had to come up with funding from its own coffers). In Mozambique and Sierra Leone, funding delays directly contributed to violent protests and demonstrations. Programs were also underfunded in all three cases, with some exceptions (e.g., the RSS was well funded in Mozambique,

but lack of funds for the training elements limited their impact and there was no money for follow up programs, in evidence especially in the way that project support for the Provincial Fund dried up).

This raises important questions for future reintegration interventions. First, could funding delays be avoided? Increased front-end agreement about program contours, phased disarmament and demobilization in line with funding availability for reintegration program start-up, and phased reintegration assistance in the form of emergency assistance (e.g., cash stipends, clothing, and other material benefits) followed by training, education, and agricultural opportunities later on are all ways that would arguably lessen the uncertainty and violent protests that result from funding delays. Allocating a portion of the assessed peacekeeping budget, in line with the recommendation of the Brahimi Report, would also reduce delays until an MDTF or other funding mechanism can raise the money necessary for planned programs. The General Assembly has also recommended that reinsertion (in other words, short term, emergency reintegration support) be included in assessed contributions.² The problem with that funding, however, is that it is managed by UNDPKO and so flexibility about using and managing might be limited unless it is willing to disburse funds to other implementing agents. To better understand funding delays would also require further comparative study of the funding arrangements of various reintegration interventions. The Stockholm Initiative, however, found that donors did not keep complete data on DDR funding, and so a first step would be for donors to keep more comprehensive data on funding arrangements.³

Second, could programs be better funded? Responderits involved with implementation of programs often complained about limited donor attention spans and finite resources. But if reintegration is widely regarded as crucial to consolidating peace during a post-conflict transition,

² UN General Assembly, A/RES/59/296.

³ SIDDR 2006, p.47(n.18).

then surely sufficient funds could be found, even if it means diverting resources from other peace-building priorities (among peace-building priorities listed by the Brahimi Report, funding for media support, human rights promotion, and civil society support might be candidates for funding diversion, as they are elements of peace-building that are not as pressing from a security standpoint). Resource diversion is a hard choice, but peace-builders ought to prioritize among tasks, just as they need to negotiate a compromise when peace-building priorities clash (more on that below). Parallel funding from NGOs supporting programs for child soldiers, which tend to be well funded because of their popularity with Western donors, might also make a good candidate for diversion of funds. Diversion of funds from one task to another is unlikely, however, because activities are usually funded separately and actors promoting one task have vested institutional interests in defending their continued access to that funding. The Peacebuilding Commission might help to set clear peace-building priorities about fund-raising and might assist reintegration actors to raise the necessary funds. It is also important for the Commission (or other reintegration actors) to ensure that reintegration funding be approved as OECD-DAC eligible because of various donor restrictions on providing funds to active military personnel.⁴ Ensuring OECD-DAC eligibility would open up new sources of revenue from state development agencies that might otherwise be reluctant to fund a particular program (e.g., USAID's reluctance to fund the RSS).

More important to the adequate financing of programs is to ensure that funding for reintegration does not dry up after six months or one year, as was the case in Sierra Leone and, the RSS notwithstanding, Mozambique. Donors need to make money available during the latter stages of reintegration programs because that is when money is most effectively used. As Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler demonstrated in 2002, post-conflict states maximize use of aid just as aid starts to dry up. In the first three post-conflict years absorptive capacity in post-conflict countries is

⁴ *Ibid.* p.33.

not greater than normal but in the rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level.⁵ Thus, aid should ideally phase in during the decade. Reintegration actors ought to consider a system of phased reintegration assistance, with emergency provision in the direct aftermath of conflict followed by long term access to programs that have well funded follow-up capacity.

The cases demonstrate that fads about intervention affect funding as well. Long term benefits could not be financed in Sierra Leone, for example, in part because of a belief shared by the World Bank and bilateral donors that community resentment of ex-combatant benefits makes long term targeted support undesirable. To neutralize objections from those who claim long term support undermines security by contributing to community resentment, a system of matching funds for community support or mixing targeted with non-targeted reintegration assistance, could be used, in line with the 'two windows' of funding that the Stockholm Initiative recommended in its final report.⁶ Achieving donor commitment to longer term or phased funding will also require modifying the preference of international actors for short term engagement, an issue I address in the following section. If, in addition to emergency material and financial assistance, ex-combatants need activities to distract them from spoiler activity, actors could consider the appropriateness of public works or community projects, or some interim training projects followed by more sustainable economic programs (e.g., apprenticeships as opposed to just vocational training).

Experience in Mozambique and Sierra Leone showed that actors essentially fund *reinsertion* activities on the assumption that either long term *reintegration* will be spontaneous (something that Namibia demonstrated was a myth) or else it will form part of a broader development strategy for the country. Neither Sierra Leone nor Mozambique followed up initial

⁵ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,' World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2902, October 2002.

⁶ SIDDR 2006, p.34.

programs with any planning about how long term reintegration activities ought to link up with general development projects.

Expertise

Organizational theory would lead us to expect actors to develop brands through accumulated expertise, as a strategy to increase efficiency and save costs. Similarly, the theory would predict that organizations would be less likely to innovate, because of limited or artificial competition in the international development marketplace. Actors lack information on which reintegration components have the best track record and have strong institutional interests in promoting activities within their field of specialty. The potential consequence is that reintegration 'brands' will trump the specific needs of individual states and their ex-combatants.

The cases bore out these expectations, particularly in Mozambique and Sierra Leone. In those cases, international actors led short term programs that focused employment efforts on vocational training, the dominant brand for actors such as the ILO and GTZ. Such training was largely ineffective at creating any sustainable economic opportunities. Namibia also fell prey to the initial lure of vocational training by making the DBC the focus of its reintegration strategy. The SWAPO government later abandoned the training approach once it became clear it had failed and once continued ex-combatant pressure forced the government to adopt new programs. In Mozambique and Sierra Leone, in contrast, the failure of vocational training was not met by prolonged and escalating protests from ex-combatants and so there was less incentive to innovate or create new programs; instead, in the case of Sierra Leone, the failure of vocational training, far from spurring critical thought about reintegration approaches, was an impetus instead to downgrade expectations about what reintegration could accomplish.

Education and agricultural assistance programs tend to be overshadowed by vocational training programs, as in Sierra Leone, or else not implemented, as in Mozambique. Even though

literature on reintegration has recognized the need for reintegration programs to be linked with agricultural training and land redistribution,⁷ actors tend to neglect those areas. Nor did public works projects form a key part of programs, excepting the quick impact projects in Sierra Leone, even though reintegration literature has called them 'expedient and sustainable'⁸.

Why, if vocational training so often fails, does it continue to form a core part of reintegration programs? Respondents involved in reintegration programs across the cases expressed different reasons. First, donor and implementing agents' preferences and brands trump local and regional economic needs and realities. Second, vocational training is something that international actors can implement on their own with minimal involvement from state authorities; agricultural assistance programs, to be effective, would require allocations of land which touches on political issues of land reform that international actors tend to defer to member states because of sensitivity about sovereignty. This helps to explain why agricultural resettlement for former fighters formed part of the strategy in Namibia, because the SWAPO government, as the lead reintegration actor, was willing to confront the politically sensitive issue of land reform, albeit at a slow pace. Principal agent problems associated with large aid bureaucracies would predict that international reintegration actors are likely to embrace programs they can design and implement themselves with little outside help or interference, and especially with minimal coordination. Third, vocational training, unlike apprenticeships, public works, micro-credit schemes, and other forms of employment assistance, is short term in nature because it does not require follow up and so conforms to international reintegration actors' preference for short term involvement. Formal education and agricultural assistance also require longer term support and follow up. Finally, vocational training, as surveys revealed in Sierra Leone, is often what ex-combatants want

⁷ Douglas et al. 2004, p.81.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.79.

because they have aspirations to learn new skills and believe that combining skills training with their preexisting knowledge of, say, agriculture will make them more competitive in the labor market. Actors, therefore, support vocational training in part because they are legitimately trying to respond to those needs.

One additional reason why some actors favor vocational training despite its mixed track record was not articulated by respondents but had to do, instead, with bureaucratic pressures. Short term vocational training has more observable, short term outputs than a subsidy scheme like the RSS where benefits were diffuse over time and less observable. Bureaucratic dysfunction predicts that actors have few incentives to invest in long term support. First, benefits of such support are diffuse and actors do not receive publicity benefits that capture further donor aid from projects with less visible, diffuse benefits. Second, long term support increases opportunities for bureaucratic mistakes which could be publicized and hurt the actor's reputation. Consequently, actors have strong incentives to keep expectations low. Additionally, lack of information reinforces lack of innovation. Reintegration branding within GTZ, UNDP, World Vision, Action Aid, USAID, and others has led to differentiated approaches with vocational training rather than experimentation with different agricultural options. Nor is there any indication that criticism for ignoring agricultural potential in programs has led to new approaches in other states. Said one respondent, 'When I was in Liberia I found that *again* agriculture was not involved.'⁹

Reintegration brands can have a negative impact on the ability of actors to effectively manage problems because the dominant brand is one that emphasizes only employment strategies. But, as demonstrated by the case experience, the creation of economic opportunities is not the only problem management strategy available to reintegration actors. Whether the problem was involvement among certain segments of the military in organized criminal activity in

⁹ Author's interview with Quee, emphasis original.

Mozambique or the re-recruitment of former fighters into regional wars in Sierra Leone, problem management called for more than just economic incentives to dissuade ex-combatants from engaging in spoiler activity.

Authority

The legal and normative structure at the time of each reintegration intervention strongly affects the authority that reintegration actors have to act. In Namibia, any potential international capacity to have been involved in reintegration would have been compromised by the perceived illegitimacy among Front Line State of certain kinds of external intervention. In Mozambique, FRELIMO was skeptical of any external involvement that went beyond the minimum requirements of the GPA agreement and ONUMOZ mandate. In Sierra Leone, authority for international actors to intervene was high, due to SLPP support for the UK and UNAMSIL, both of whom had essentially helped it to counter RUF intransigence after Lomé.

The cases also show the more front-end negotiation to resolve contentious reintegration issues the more security resulted. This was especially true if that negotiation was mediated by outsiders and enshrined in a peace agreement. Mozambique's GPA created CORE, which assured that a neutral, third party would oversee reintegration decisions; this contributed to security during the uncertain period of DDR. In contrast, the lack of provision for DDR in the Settlement Proposal for Namibia directly contributed to the D-Day violence between the two sides. Similarly, failure to specify key issues of eligibility in the peace agreement or for the NCDDR to negotiate such issues with the parties before programs commenced led to fraud and the exclusion of *bona fide* ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. Disagreements over the validity of the amnesty protection afforded by the Lomé agreement further contributed to insecurity.

Unfortunately, consideration of reintegration issues during peace negotiations is rare. As the DDR Policy Advisor at UNDPKO explained, the problem is that negotiators are not experts in

technical areas like DDR, so unrealistic expectations about DDR timetables are built into agreements.¹⁰ This has consequences for implementation on the ground. As the Coordination Officer at UNDPKO's Best Practices Unit put it, 'The peace agreement itself is the best indicator of success, because if the peace agreement is too general then it is very difficult to implement reintegration programs on the ground.'¹¹ Although many reintegration practitioners recognized the need to specify reintegration guarantees and perhaps even program contours in peace agreements,¹² coordination problems thwart efforts to do so. An official at USAID observed:

One of the lessons learned that nobody learns is that, to the extent you can nail down criteria at the beginning – durability of programs, eligibility requirements – these should be agreed on beforehand. In Afghanistan, we had none of these preconditions worked out. Everything became a negotiation. Especially sanctions for non-compliance. What's important with front-end agreement is, if you can get cooperation from the commanders, the problem is simpler. Otherwise the issues of reintegration and political negotiation get muddled. *The reintegration people should be at the negotiating table but the problem with the development side is they don't want to get involved in the politics.*¹³

Polarizing *political* issues associated with reintegration need front end agreement in peace agreements also because external actors' preferences for short term, apolitical interventions mean that such issues are less likely to be negotiated after the fact.

Authority is also dictated by intervention fads. Currently, the trend in reintegration interventions has been toward the Sierra Leonean model of an NCDDR, which suggests that the authority/capacity tradeoffs present there are likely to replicate themselves in future reintegration efforts. As Sierra Leone demonstrated, an NCDDR is likely to facilitate 'ownership' in name only since the commission there merely modeled the preferences of international patrons for short term assistance. Worse, as respondents at UNDP cautioned, the NCDDR model favored by the World

¹⁰ Author's interview with Kelvin Ong, Policy Adviser for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York City, 21 April 2004.

¹¹ Author's interview with Frederick Mallya, Coordination Officer, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York City, 19 April 2004.

¹² International Peace Academy 2002, p.4.

¹³ Author's interview with Jason A. Aplon, Senior Field Adviser, Office of Transitional Initiatives, United States Agency for International Development, Washington, DC, 3 September 2004, my emphasis.

Bank puts ultimate authority over DDR, a politically sensitive process, into the hands of one of the parties to the conflict. In Sierra Leone, the collapse of the RUF as an organized unit in the immediate aftermath of disarmament meant that there were fewer opportunities for disputes between conflict parties to the conflict during the NCDDR's management of reintegration. But in most deeply-divided societies of post-conflict states the NCDDR model may exacerbate tensions. As one UNDP official warned, 'Even if the government is clean and not doing anything corrupt and not just defending its own interests, the other parties to the conflict are not going to believe that.'¹⁴

Although national commitment to the DDR process is important, the NCDDR model is also limited in its ability to manage RPSRCs because a national commission tends to lack the authority to engage in the post-conflict political process at a high level. Leadership of reintegration by an impartial arbitrator (e.g., a UN agency, representative, envoy, or adviser) would arguably give reintegration actors power to negotiate political decisions and access to leaders of the parties to the conflict. In Mozambique, the close relationship between CORE, the Ceasefire Commission, and ONUMOZ meant that the UN was positioned to apply pressure (and even threaten withdrawal) if parties to the conflict did not make progress on agreed DDR timetables. In Sierra Leone, the NCDDR and its World Bank advisers did not have the same leverage. In Mozambique, CORE's deliberative culture, in addition to its representation of both parties to the conflict, meant that it could mediate crises as they emerged (e.g., humanitarian access to child soldiers and ADEMIMO threats linked to disabled RENAMO combatants). The World Bank and NCDDR did not perform a similar function in Sierra Leone; for example, no grievance procedure existed for ex-combatants to dispute their exclusion from DDR benefits on fraudulent lists filed by their commanders.

Reintegration capacity is also constrained by a statist conception of ownership, one that privileges state (recipient) ownership over ex-combatant (beneficiary) ownership. Ex-combatants

¹⁴ Author's interview with Barnes.

as beneficiaries had little or no voice in program contours, with the exception of surveys conducted about the kinds of training that ex-combatants in Sierra Leone might like. Where ex-combatants forced more access to decision-making (e.g., the involvement of former combatants on commissions determining eligibility in Namibia or the role of ADEMIMO in securing disability pensions for RENAMO combatants in Mozambique) problems were managed more effectively. Combatant surveys should continue at the planning stage as well, but should be accompanied by needs assessments of economic prospects, to temper expectations and allow former fighters to shape their preferences and make decisions with more complete information.

The tradeoff between the desire for local commitment to DDR and lack of local resources, expertise, and legitimacy to manage a contentious DDR process demonstrates why potential solutions to authority constraints lay less in tinkering with programs' technical components and more in revising institutional models of post-conflict governance as they relate to reintegration decisions and authority to manage persistent RPSRCs. Clearly-delineated authority is needed to make decisions about reintegration program contours (eligibility, components, and duration) and to coordinate with other actors (e.g., the police, army, peacekeeping mission, and development agencies) about how best to manage reintegration problems as they arise. The need for that authority was particularly evident when the economic incentives of reintegration benefits alone were not enough to manage a problem (e.g., re-recruitment into regional wars).

Determination of international authority in a post-conflict context is an area where the preferences of external and state actors have not been fixed; complicated mixtures of international and domestic governance have appeared in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan.¹⁵ Norms against long term international engagement (e.g., sovereignty, self-determination, consent, impartiality, and deference to state actors) still exist and deviation from those norms is ad hoc. It is

¹⁵ Fearon and Laitin 2004, p.7.

clear, however, that new approaches to sovereignty are also being considered by intervening actors and state hosts alike, including arrangements that resemble 'gradations of sovereignty', 'shared sovereignty', and 'neo-trusteeship'.¹⁶ In Sierra Leone, similar experimentation with sovereignty arrangements was on display, which augmented capacity by having a neutral party (IMATT) oversee its military reintegration program and by having UNAMSIL stay much longer than the mission's previous peace-building counterparts in Africa.

The need for long term international involvement with reintegration is partly a reflection on how international institutions such as the UN can best assist post-conflict states. As one UN respondent said, 'We've come back to Liberia twice, Angola two or three times, Haiti twice. The UN is learning that by pulling out you are not solving the problem...one of the challenges is to leave institutions on the ground which are sustainable.'¹⁷ This thinking is also reflected in the ICISS report on the Responsibility to Protect, where intervening actors are encouraged to stay on 'long enough to ensure sustainable reconstruction and rehabilitation.'¹⁸ Long term international involvement is also contentious; erosion of normative pressures against intervention can, for example, undermine the benefits of building popular participation that domestic sovereignty and self-determination can foster. Even those who believe that long term engagement is desirable (i.e., because withdrawal immediately after elections undermines the objectives of peace-building) caution that such engagement can quickly turn into self-defeating paternalism.¹⁹

Long term authority in the reintegration context implies more active international advice and support for the transition from targeted to non-targeted support and creation of cooperative,

¹⁶ Ian Johnstone, 'Peace Operations Literature Review,' Center on International Cooperation, Project on Transformation in Multilateral Security Institutions, Implications for the UN, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, August 2005, p.3; Krasner 2004; Krasner 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2004.

¹⁷ Author's interview with Mallya.

¹⁸ ICISS 2001, 5.25.

¹⁹ Noah Feldman, *What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Chesterman 2004; Ake 1996.

deliberative reintegration governance mechanisms that can mediate disputes between parties over access to benefits and can identify RPSRCs and access resources, including resources other than economic incentives (e.g., law enforcement assistance with criminality or re-recruitment), to manage them.

What is needed is to balance the capacity-building potential of long term engagement with respect for the normative pressures of sovereignty and self-determination.²⁰ This is as true for the specific reintegration context as it is for the general peace-building one. Endogenous pressures create preferences in international actors for programs that they can implement on their own with minimal local interference or need for coordination.²¹ This skews actors' capacity towards program components (e.g., vocational training) that they can do themselves and discourages components with longer term economic potential (e.g., education, agricultural assistance, and apprenticeships) that require more support from local actors (e.g., for schooling, access to land, and placement with local craftsmen and businesses).

III. Reintegration Problems and Preferences

Preferences were not fixed across cases. For example, the assumption by reintegration actors that limited targeted support is necessary because of resentment from the civilian population has grown stronger with time. Other preferences, and particularly the preference of international actors for short term, limited reintegration objectives reflects theories of bureaucratic dysfunction that predict downgrading of expectations. Failure of programs to create economic opportunities are therefore explained not in terms of a need to change program components or invest more

²⁰ ICISS 2001, 5.25-5.31.

²¹ Holthoefer and Snidal 2005.

resources and time into reintegration but in terms of revising what reintegration can do by keeping objectives humble. What stands out is the similarity of preferences for short term action among several different reintegration actors, which incentives for collusion help to explain. To an external observer, therefore, reintegration actors look very similar, whether they're UNDP program advisers, World Bank advisers, UNICEF child protection officers, USAID bureaucrats, or government representatives appointed to an NCDDR.

But in some areas coordination problems resulted from preference clashes, particularly over the use of cash as a program component and about peace-building priorities that can sometimes come into conflict (e.g., transitional justice and DDR). The preferences that emerged as dominant, in cases where clashes occurred, reflected power dynamics between organizations in a peace-building context. For example, the government of Sierra Leone was in a powerful position following the intransigence of the RUF in May 2000 and so was able to push successfully for the establishment of the Special Court. Imperatives of justice and reconciliation do not automatically compete with reintegration; in fact, those tasks can facilitate reintegration. Power also helps to explain why the NCDDR model preferred by the World Bank is likely to prevail: the World Bank exerts more influence on development policy because it contributes more money than UNDP.²²

Except in Namibia where strong constituent pressures led the Namibian government to design reintegration programs over several years, from Mozambique to Sierra Leone there was a movement away from long term reintegration programs and towards emergency, temporary assistance. The cases reveal that preferences for short-termism among reintegration actors were due to a mixture of actors' beliefs (about what works and what reintegration can realistically achieve), bureaucratic pressures to prioritize short term, visible outputs over the less visible, diffuse

²² John Degenbol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, *Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation* (London, New York, and Copenhagen: Zed Books, Danish Association for International Cooperation, distributed by Palgrave, 2003), cited in Holthoefer and Snidal, 2005, p.15 (n.14).

benefits of long term support, and systemic pressures that condition international actors to assume that their role should be short term.

The impact of short-termism on program design and implementation was evident. A two-year cash program like the RSS was inconceivable in Sierra Leone. Especially once it became clear that vocational training had done little to improve the economic lot of former fighters, the final evaluation of the NCDDR concluded that it would be unrealistic to expect reintegration programs to do more than buy time. In fact, after Mozambique, never has a two-year, monthly payment been issued to demobilized soldiers. Preference clashes between the UN and World Bank about the duration and distribution of cash schemes partly explain the absence of new RSS schemes. But so, too, do coalesced preferences among the World Bank and bilateral donors against long term cash payments because of assumptions about civilian resentment of programs perceived as rewarding the people who perpetrated atrocities. Respondents cited highly-publicized atrocities by combatants in Uganda, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone and the increased profile of transitional justice initiatives as having contributed to this preference.

Preferences for short term intervention, coupled with the tendency to assess reintegration programs in terms of whether they make ex-combatants like everyone else, have moved reintegration away from the peace-building goal of addressing root causes of conflict. Short term interventions designed to buy time for peace do not critically appraise pre-conflict social and economic relationships that helped contribute to conflict in the first place. A critical approach to peace-building is therefore needed to overcome the defeatism reflecting in downgraded expectations for programs. That approach would hold that there are better (i.e., 'more efficient in terms of financial and human resources and more effective in addressing the causes of violence and human suffering') ways of managing security problems and spoiler activity post-war and of creating economic opportunities in ways that transform post-conflict societies rather than just tide

them over until after elections.²³ In this sense, the evolution of preferences over time is consistent with recent critical literature about DDR, i.e., that it is 'coming to be interpreted as a technical and 'apolitical' intervention, and may even be perceived as a way to avoid dealing with root causes in armed countries'.²⁴

Actors, however, have strong incentives (fear of failure, desire to preserve impartiality) to avoid 'politicization' of their reintegration role. It is possible, however, for actors to manage reintegration problems through mediation of political disputes without sacrificing impartiality (as UNOHAC demonstrated in Mozambique). Context will shape the contours of a political role for reintegration actors. Just as peacekeepers are beginning to grapple with the advantages and disadvantages of identifying aggressors to a mission's integrity and effectiveness, so, too, reintegration actors ought to begin to grapple with the inherently political nature of their role even if they do not recognize it as such. Failure to identify root causes or sources of inequality can be interpreted as sanctioning the status quo. Failure to make good-faith efforts to promote long term economic and social reintegration will doom reintegration to underachievement, to providing support that counts the return of thousands of individuals to poverty as success.

A second preference that can be said to have coalesced by the time of the Sierra Leonean reintegration intervention is that community resentment of special benefits for combatants necessitates targeted support to be brief, if at all. The UN Secretary-General declared in 2006 that although assistance should be 'sustainable' it should also be 'limited in scope and delivered, as far as possible, through programmes that benefit the whole community.'²⁵ International organizations are right to want to decrease ex-combatant signaling by avoiding aid dependence and avoiding stoking ex-combatant grievances. It is not clear, however, that the potential for resentment to

²³ See Bellamy and Williams 2004, p.200.

²⁴ Pouligny 2004, p.19.

²⁵ UNGA, A/60/705, para.41.

threaten security (perhaps resulting in violence between combatants and non-combatants) would be greater than the threat of unmet ex-combatant expectations for at least some targeted support following war, particularly if that is what their leaders have promised them. Concerns about resentment reflect disagreement among peace-builders about prioritization. If the predominant goal is security, then the imminent threat posed by potential spoilers from within the ex-combatant community is greater than the potential impact of community resentment. To be sure, the potential security risks of that resentment must be considered (and could include reprisal killings of ex-combatants or violent riots to protest special treatment of fighters). But these risks were not observed in the cases examined, even in Mozambique where cash assistance was given for two years, or in Namibia where all unemployed ex-combatants were given jobs in the public sector.

Assumptions about resentment are also problematic because they presume ex-combatants are never 'ideal' long-term recipients of aid no matter how innocent they might be (e.g., dependents of ex-combatants, child soldiers forcibly recruited, female helpers abducted by male soldiers, etc.) whereas 'communities' are 'pure' aid recipients no matter what role they may have played in causing or sustaining conflict. The cases show that resentment is not a given but depends on the political, historical, and social context of a conflict and its aftermath. PLAN fighters were popular; RUF fighters were not. External actors should not automatically assume resentment precludes long term support. Publics can be won over by emphasizing the security risks posed by former fighters that necessitate aid and the potential benefits to communities of ex-combatant investment of benefits there. Publics can also be bought with parallel programs of development aid (which is the SIDDR's recommendation).

Why do actors have the preferences they have? I have argued that actors' beliefs about effectiveness, mandates to act as determined by actors' charters or by peace agreements, and power differences between actors have all played a role in shaping the dominant preferences that

emerged. But I have also shown that various endogenous and exogenous pressures are critical to understanding those preferences. The literature on political economy successfully predicted several of the reasons why reintegration actors' preferences constrained their ability to effectively manage RPSRCs and led them to abandon, by the time of the Sierra Leonean intervention, grand ambitions about the creation of economic opportunity. These explanations include tacit collusion (where reintegration actors, to minimize risks of failure, kept reintegration objectives humble), adverse selection (where actors knew more about the limited job prospects but failed to consult beneficiaries about realistic expectations and opportunities), and moral hazard (where actors were not held to account for underachieving programs).

But domestic and systemic pressures, as the cases show, are also part of the explanation. Preferences emerge not simply because they are the most efficient but because they are seen as the most legitimate given the electoral pressures of a domestic environment and given prevailing norms of the outside environment about sovereignty, deference, consent, and impartiality.

The Namibian response underscores that state reintegration actors, acting on their own, are more likely to innovate than international aid bureaucracies, but only if pressed by ex-combatants. Why might this be? State actors are directly accountable to constituents whereas international actors are more removed from their 'constituents', whose interests in any case are less vested in the outcomes effected by international organizations in post-conflict states. Strong constituent pressures explain why the SWAPO government committed itself to reintegration programs that were longer term than their counterparts in Mozambique and Sierra Leone. That situation is unlikely to repeat itself in other conflict areas. Fighters are less likely to enjoy the public sympathy and popularity that PLAN fighters initially had because the Namibian conflict was about independence and majority rule while the Mozambican and Sierra Leonean civil wars were protracted conflicts where the political agendas of the fighting forces were difficult to decipher and

where the fighting forces directly targeted the civilian population in brutal ways. In that sense, Namibia's successes might be the product of a bygone era.

At the same time, however, state actors, acting without international oversight, are more likely to polarize reintegration and politicize benefits than if a third party retains oversight responsibility, as UNOHAC did over CORE. It is difficult, for example, to imagine that IMATT would allow the formation of a SFF in Sierra Leone, and in fact British pressure and pressure from several bilateral donors influenced the Sierra Leonean government's decision to abandon an early plan to develop a CDF militia force. The electoral pressures of democratization reward domestic actors who exploit reintegration grievances and capitalize on ethnic, political, and other tensions. Furthermore, the persistence of single-party rule allows dominant political actors to polarize reintegration without penalty. Partiality is a chronic problem in situations of civil war. But countervailing systemic pressures related to sovereignty norms mean that external actors cannot stay forever. States, therefore, must find an equitable political framework for reintegration on its own if the security impacts of polarization are to be mitigated in the long term.

IV. Management of Reintegration Problems and Post-Conflict Governance: The Way Forward

There is much about conflict and its aftermath that we do not know.²⁶ Part of this ambiguity is due the leadership of post-conflict peace-building: to what extent should external actors take on the burden of peace-building themselves? Ultimately, there is controversy in post-conflict peace-building over the appropriate role for external actors and over the nature of the assistance they provide to recovering states: are the UN, the World Bank, and the host of other

²⁶ Elisabeth Jean Wood, 'Civil Wars: What We Don't Know,' *Global Governance*, Vol.9, No.2, April-June 2003, p.256.

organizations that conduct reintegration programs patrons of or partners in the post-conflict transition?²⁷ Management of reintegration problems, therefore, is essentially about post-conflict governance. For international actors, this implies the accountability of peace-builders not just to states as aid recipients but to ex-combatants and their communities as aid beneficiaries. For state actors, this means incorporating reintegration into long term development strategies, prioritizing the management of security alongside first-order development needs, and committing to good governance.

To avoid tradeoffs between ownership and capacity, reintegration actors ought to ask whether governance of reintegration should be located at the national, regional, or international level. Not unlike notions of subsidiarity in the EU, recent efforts by reintegration actors to improve coordination problems have centered on the idea that leadership should fall to the actor most competent to address a particular reintegration issue most effectively. Articulation of agency competencies is a primary goal of, and was an important impetus in forming, the UN DDR Working Group. This approach, however, risks fragmenting reintegration into competency areas of *technical management* without addressing the central leadership issue of political management: who should be in charge of anticipating security threats from RPSRCs and managing threats from RPSRCs as they arise? Instead, the level of governance ought to consider the type and degree of the problems needing management (favoring actors who will command the most authority and marshal resources most effectively to manage problems and make political decisions about reintegration) *as well as* the technical competencies of the actors involved.²⁸

²⁷ Richard D. Caplan, 'Partner or Patron? International Civil Administration and Local Capacity-Building,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.2, pp.229-47.

²⁸ See Abbott and Snidal 2001, p.363.

But is it realistic to expect more of reintegration programs? After all, few development programs achieve long term, sustainable results.²⁹ Despite the constraints on capacity and preferences posed by bureaucratic and systemic pressures, it is nevertheless possible to propose and expect improvements in the successful management of reintegration problems and in the ability of programs to create sustainable economic opportunities.

Change, however, is unlikely to come solely from more institutionalization (e.g., the Peacebuilding Commission) or communication and coordination among actors (e.g., the integrated UN guidelines for DDR). Such avenues are likely to resemble the Kabuki Theater predicted by bureaucratic dysfunction: frameworks as a substitute for change. Change is more likely to come from repeated failure and underachievement or, alternatively, from insistence by post-conflict states (e.g., Angola) on reintegration programs that meet their specific conflict needs even if that means saying no to some development aid.

Good-faith efforts to ameliorate coordination problems among reintegration actors have zeroed in on communication rather than confronted structural or institutional barriers to program innovation and governance. Despite broad experience at UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, and DPKO on DDR issues, the UN as a whole lacks a conception of its DDR brand: who should conduct programs, what should they feature, how long should they last, and what are they trying to achieve are all questions that elude the institution, and, judging from the Secretary-General's introduction of the 2006 integrated DDR framework, likely to continue to elude it.

The premise of the integrated guidelines is that the goal of coordination is not to create a blueprint for reintegration because the content is determined by context. The group is right to avoid over-codification but such a view neglects that a fairly ineffectual template has already

²⁹ Ostrom et al. 2001, p.2. They cite Howard White, 'The Macro-Economic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey,' *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1992, pp.163-240; and Howard White, *Aid and Macroeconomic Performance* (London: Macmillan Press, 1998).

emerged, de facto. Cash is discouraged, vocational training dominates, and a short term timeframe for programs prevails. The type of innovation that marked the most successful aspects of Namibia and Mozambique are unlikely to be replicated in future reintegration efforts (e.g., the RSS in Mozambique, the Peace Project in Namibia). Compared to the extensive support provided by the first UN-led reintegration effort, current program approaches can hardly be described as responding to local contexts. In El Salvador, reintegration efforts included accelerated land transfers for ex-FMLN combatants, credit lines to start and develop small business ventures and to support agricultural activity, technical assistance for agriculture, educational scholarships, medical care, funds for the disabled, counseling, housing, and other material assistance (e.g., household appliances). For change to occur, actors must worry less about mediating conflicting preferences ('coordination') and worry more about aligned preferences and down-graded aspirations.

A second avenue for change is suggested in the political economy literature. Holthoefer and Snidal suggest applying market forces to the delivery of aid and assistance, including top-down regulatory oversight of international organizations, horizontal competition among aid actors, and bottom up control where recipient states have more power selecting the programs that best serve their needs.³⁰ Such suggestions would force the innovation needed to shake up current preferences. Needs assessments of economies and opportunities for input and feedback from beneficiaries could also help to reorient preferences towards longer term support. But while market-oriented strategies address the means of achieving innovation, they do not address the end. Also needed are critical development approaches that do not accept reintegration into basic poverty as a solution, that isolate root causes of conflict and inequality, and foster debate among all stakeholders about how reintegration support might be tailored to contribute to economic, social, and political change. Currently, reintegration actors use programs to buy enough time for short

³⁰ Holthoefer and Snidal 2005, pp.25-9.

term political stability to hold and are content to wait for Godot to do the rest. In other words, reintegration actors assign unspecified tasks to unspecified 'development actors' in the wake of peacekeeper withdrawal.

Market-oriented strategies, finally, address reintegration as merely economic incentives. I argue that management of RPSRCs, however, is likely to require a broad array of activities that *combine* development and security functions. What programs need for problem management, therefore, are more COREs and less NCDDRs. Actors need the political clout but impartiality and independence from post-conflict governments to successfully combine that dual role. If the NCDDR model persists, it will need to engage in cooperative partnerships with other state and international institutions (e.g., police forces, ministries of labor, peacekeeping operations) to augment its authority to act.

Other remedies include: evaluating the potential of involving other actors, particularly private sector and civil society actors; combining carrots and sticks to create incentives and punishments for spoilers; and provision for continued international and domestic monitoring of reintegration. There is also a need to make preferences explicit to avoid adverse selection problems. Reintegration actors may be aiming for short term programs (what one respondent called a 'pure security focus' as opposed to the opposite end of the spectrum, which would be programs that promote social change or aim to achieve a longer term development goal).³¹ Actors, therefore, can start to change their preferences by being explicit about what those preferences are: are actors aiming for a symbolic or actual reintegration?

Unless deeper issues of the long term potential of reintegration actors to manage problems and create economic opportunities are addressed, targeted remedies to improve program design will not succeed. Assessment of previous efforts is a first step towards addressing those issues. A

³¹ Author's interview with Kuttner.

closer examination of reintegration outcomes and the way that reintegration actors influence those outcomes contributes both theoretically and practically to our understanding of international organization, the role of external actors in post-conflict peace-building, and the challenges of post-conflict state governance. Theoretically, it is hoped that this assessment clarifies the importance of reintegration to the broader peace-building enterprise and furthers knowledge about the behavior of international organizations and state actors during post-conflict processes. Practically, it is hoped that this research can be of use to the actors and institutions involved, and can make a valuable contribution to the successful reintegration of combatants, and by extension to the successful management of violent conflict. It is further hoped that the ideas presented might challenge international, state, and non-governmental organizations to experiment with new strategies.

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