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Coalition Management and Governance Outcomes in Multiparty Presidential Regimes

Paul Chaisty[1] **and Timothy J Power**[1]

Abstract

Minority presidents in multiparty systems exert significant influence over progovernment alliances. Key coalitional characteristics include the absolute size of the legislative support base, the extent of ideological heterogeneity tolerated within the coalition and the degree of proportionality in portfolio allocation. Within-case research has shown that manipulation of these characteristics by the formateur can strongly shape national politics, yet to date, there has been no cross-national research to determine whether patterns of coalition management affect macropolitical outcomes in comparative perspective. Examining both horizontal accountability and the provision of public goods in government spending, we find that the strongest coalition-level predictor of these outcomes is cabinet proportionality.

Keywords

presidentialism, coalitions, cabinets, accountability

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Introduction

Four decades ago, Juan Linz (1990) argued that parliamentarism was superior to presidentialism, especially as a founding constitutional choice for new democracies. Linz cited as one of the 'perils' of presidentialism its supposedly zero-sum character and asserted that coalition government was rare under the separation of powers. Presidentialism was depicted as a strongly winner-take-all system in which losers of the presidential race were excluded from power for long periods of time. As such, presidentialism seemed destined to forever fall short of the 'consensus democracy' that according to Lijphart (2012) would produce higher-quality policy outputs.

[1]Department of Politics and International Relations and the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Corresponding author:
Timothy J Power, St Antony's College, University of Oxford, Oxford, Oxon OX2 6JF, UK.
Email: timothy.power@socsci.ox.ac.uk

Views of presidentialism changed sharply after the turn of the century. Several landmark studies (e.g. Cheibub et al., 2004) showed that coalition government was almost as frequent under presidentialism as under parliamentarism, suggesting that the consensus model of democracy could be approximated by either executive format. Other studies showed that even under the 'separate origin, separate survival' of the executive and legislative branches, directly elected presidents still possessed various tools that would allow them to cultivate multiparty alliances in the assembly. The focus of the literature began to move away from documenting the remarkable durability of presidential democracy to studying its overwhelming reliance on coalitional government. The idea that executive power could not be shared under presidentialism, once espoused by Linz and others, is now widely rejected.

Yet the salutary recognition of coalitional practices under the separation of powers has not been accompanied by a corresponding return to Lijphartian concerns with democratic quality. This disconnect is somewhat puzzling given all we have learned about multiparty presidential rule. In particular, cross-regional work has led researchers to document robust variation in the way presidents cultivate their interparty alliances, typically referred to as 'coalition management' (e.g. Chaisty et al., 2018). Understanding how directly elected executives relate to their coalition partners is a promising avenue for observational work on macropolitical outputs.

In this short research report, we offer some initial reflections on the possible connections between coalitional stewardship by presidents and regime-level governance outcomes. Does coalition management actually matter in multiparty presidential regimes – or is it simply a 'cause in search of an effect?' Coalitional characteristics such as overall size, degree of ideological unity, and internal proportionality are thought to be important, yet research remains fragmentary. We have accumulated some intriguing evidence that presidential decisions regarding coalition management can affect outcomes ranging from the discipline of allies in the legislature (Amorim Neto, 2002), to attribution of responsibility for economic reforms (Mejía and Acosta, 2009), to aggregate expenditure by governments (Pereira and Mueller, 2004; Pereira et al., 2016), and even to large-scale corruption scandals (Raile et al., 2011b). Yet these studies are all country-specific or episodic in nature, and here we move beyond them via an exploratory large-N study.

We begin by focusing on the three main coalitional characteristics that have been suggested as critical for presidential formateurs: the *size*, *heterogeneity*, and *proportionality* of interparty alliances. For our dependent variables, we choose two consequential outcomes for democracy: (1) the degree to which political executives can be held to account, and (2) the degree to which government expenditures generate public goods. We examine 239 country-years of coalitional configurations in 26 countries. We find that cabinet proportionality – the degree to which cabinet portfolios are allocated to coalition partners in accordance with their seat contribution to the alliance – is more important than either the size of the coalition or its ideological coherence. Proportionality is associated with *lower* presidential accountability but also with a *higher* commitment to the provision of public goods.

Why Should Coalitional Characteristics Matter?

Research on coalitional presidentialism has developed in several phases over the past 25 years. In an initial phase, scholars dedicated themselves mainly to proving, *contra* Linz, the existence of this understudied institutional format. A second phase typically

used legislative support for the president as the DV, showing that presidents used coalitions for the same purposes as prime ministers and with comparable payoffs for 'governability' (e.g. Cheibub et al., 2004). In the influential Brazilian literature, researchers tended to highlight a single variant of presidential power – e.g. legislative agenda control (e.g. Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000), cabinet portfolio allocation (e.g. Amorim Neto, 2002) or budgetary authority (e.g. Alston and Mueller, 2006) – as the 'prime suspect' in explaining the then-surprising viability of coalitional presidentialism. In a third phase, analysts recognized the interdependence of these various executive prerogatives, integrating them conceptually into a 'presidential toolbox' that emphasized strategic deployment and partial substitutability of the tools (Chaisty et al., 2018; Raile et al., 2011a).

This debate highlighted the importance of coalition management, which we define as *the strategic manipulation of coalition characteristics by the president*. This manipulation encompasses the inclusion or exclusion of potential allies (who is in the coalition), how ideologically distant they are from each other (the degree of heterogeneity within the coalitional family), and what cabinet portfolios they are awarded (who gets what, and the proportionality of such allocations). The literature on coalitional presidentialism invariably assumes strong presidential influence over these outcomes: the tripartite understanding of core coalitional characteristics as (1) size, (2) ideological cohesion, and (3) fairness was first proposed by Raile et al. (2011a). This framework was extended to Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union by Chaisty et al., whose work uncovered remarkable cross-national variation in the management choices by presidents. In particular, cabinet proportionality exhibits sharp variance both within and across countries, reflecting differential local reliance on 'technocratic' (non-partisan) ministers (Chaisty et al., 2018: 230).

Capturing variation in the size, heterogeneity and fairness of coalitions is valuable, but here we probe the potential implications for macropolitical outcomes. We select two dependent variables, one relating to a central issue of democratic responsiveness, and another to how resources are distributed by the government to citizens. To what extent is the ideal of *horizontal government accountability* achieved? And does *public spending* actually generate public goods, or is it riddled with particularism and clientelism? Finding that multiparty presidentialism impacts these outcomes in some general way might be unsurprising, but finding that specific *varieties* of coalitional presidentialism – that is, manipulations of discrete coalitional characteristics – actually matter for accountability and public goods would be of considerable interest.

Preliminary Hypotheses on Coalition Management

We now offer some initial hypotheses on how coalitional characteristics might affect horizontal accountability and the provision of public goods in presidential regimes. For executive accountability (H1 series), our hypotheses are as follows:

H1a (size): Coalitional size (a larger legislative seat share held by cabinet-represented parties) should *decrease* executive accountability by erecting a potent 'legislative shield' (Pérez-Liñán, 2007) around the president.

H1b (heterogeneity): Coalitional heterogeneity (lower ideological consistency among cabinet-represented parties) should *increase* executive accountability by making it

more likely for coalition party contingents in the assembly to seek oversight of the president.

H1c (proportionality): Cabinet proportionality should *decrease* executive accountability. Proportionality implies satisfaction of coalition partners (Pereira et al., 2016) thus discouraging their contingents in the legislature from investing heavily in scrutiny of the executive.

For the provision of public goods in government expenditure (H2 series), our hypotheses are as follows:

H2a (size): *The greater the size of the coalition, the lower the provision of public goods*, as oversized coalitions are less likely to agree on coherent spending priorities. Surplus coalitions are also more likely to include opportunistic and particularistic legislators on the margins, increasing parasitic approaches to the national budget.

H2b (heterogeneity): *The more ideologically heterogeneous the coalition, the lower the provision of public goods*. Strange bedfellows are more likely to pursue contradictory goals in expenditure, so should expect higher levels of logrolling and horse-trading in budgetary politics, leading to pork-barrel spending.

H2c (proportionality): *The greater the proportionality of the cabinet, the higher the provision of public goods.* Given that the president is directly elected from a single national constituency, presidential spending priorities should be, *ceteris paribus*, more public-oriented than the aggregated individual spending preferences of legislators with subnational political careers (Shugart and Carey, 1992). More proportional (satisfied) coalitions are less likely to block the president's spending priorities. Also, parties adequately represented in the cabinet are less likely to demand budgetary side payments than parties penalized in portfolio allocation (Raile et al., 2011b).

Data and Methods

To test these preliminary hypotheses, we draw on two main datasets to estimate size, fairness (cabinet proportionality) and ideological heterogeneity across 239 situations of coalitional presidentialism.

Size is the share of seats controlled by the governing coalition in the lower or single chamber of the legislature. Proportionality is the extent to which the formateur distributes cabinet portfolios among coalition parties in accordance with the seats these parties contribute on the assembly floor.[1] To measure these variables, we begin with cabinet composition data drawn from WhoGov, which boasts 8000 country-years of information on ministers across 177 countries for 1966–2019 (Nyrup and Bramwell, 2020). To this dataset, we added the legislative seat shares of all cabinet-represented parties, allowing us to create measures of coalitional size, shape and heterogeneity.[2]

To estimate coalitional heterogeneity, we measure the absolute ideological distance between the leftmost and the rightmost cabinet-represented parties.[3] We use a V-Party question (v2pariglef) that asks country experts to locate political parties in terms of their overall ideational stance on economic issues (Lindberg et al., 2022: 30–31). We include only those parties that were attached to the formateur and/or held ministerial portfolios.[4]

Table 1. Observed Country-Years of Coalitional Presidentialism by Region and Country, 1975–2016.

Region	Country	N Country-years (%)
Africa	Benin, Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone	28 (11.7)
Americas	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela	173 (72.4)
Asia-Pacific	Indonesia, Philippines	22 (9.2)
Europe	Cyprus	16 (6.7)
Total		239 (100.0)

Observations are country-years of pure presidentialism, with a positive Polity score for the year, in which a coalition cabinet existed in July of the year in question. Cases with incomplete data for the partisan composition of the coalition are excluded.

We confine our analysis to competitive presidential polities, which we operationalize as country-years with a positive score (1–10) on the Polity IV scale,[5] and we examine only cross-party coalitions. Excluding single-party cabinets removes approximately one third of the country-years of competitive presidentialism from the WhoGov dataset. We drop cases of coalitions that had incomplete data for cabinet-represented parties, amounting to approximately 300 cases.[6] We are left with a final sample of 239 country-years of competitive politics in 26 countries from 1975 to 2016 (Table 1). Unsurprisingly, given the skewed global distribution of presidentialism, more than 70% of the observations are drawn from Latin America.

We analyse the effects of our three coalition characteristics on two outcome variables drawn from V-Dem.[7] The first dependent variable is *executive accountability*, i.e. the capacity of state institutions to oversee the executive. The second DV is the *nature of government expenditure*, i.e. whether particularistic or oriented towards the provision of public goods. On the first outcome variable, experts were asked to assess 'To what extent is the ideal of horizontal government accountability achieved?'[8] On the second, experts were asked: 'Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?'[9] Both variables are interval level.

We first estimate the effects of each coalition characteristic separately in simple bivariate models, lagging each independent variable by 1 year. We then combine all coalition variables to assess their explanatory power relative to each other. Finally, we add controls for the level of democracy and of socioeconomic modernization in each country.[10] We use generalized estimating equations with robust standard errors, which is appropriate given the unbalanced nature of the time-series panel data. The Online Supplemental Appendix contains descriptive statistics and reports full regressions for each type of analysis.

Results

On executive accountability, bivariate analysis shows that cabinet proportionality has a significant and negative effect, while the other coalition characteristics have little impact (Table A2 in the Online Supplemental Appendix). Coalition size has a negative effect, and ideological heterogeneity is positive, but neither predictor reaches statistical significance.




Figure 1. The Effects of Coalition Size, Cabinet Proportionality, and Ideological Heterogeneity on Executive Accountability.
In all models, independent variables are lagged by 1 year.
Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2022) and authors' dataset building on Nyrup and Bramwell (2020).

These findings are stable when we combine all three variables in one model (Figure 1). The coefficients for the size and heterogeneity variables are not significantly different from zero (both overlapping the vertical line), whereas cabinet proportionality behaves in a remarkably different way.

These findings are robust to the inclusion of controls for democracy and GDP per capita (Figure 2). Intuitively, political democracy has a very large and strong positive impact on horizontal accountability. Polyarchy is by far the strongest determinant of holding the executive to account. We expected that the introduction of a democracy control would simply overwhelm any facet of coalition management by presidents, but the net effect of cabinet proportionality remains negative and significant (H1c). The effects of coalition size, ideological heterogeneity and GDP per capita are weak and insignificant.

Turning to the nature of government spending, cabinet proportionality remains significant but changes direction. Our interval-level dependent variable (v2dlencmps in V-Dem) is derived from a four-point ordinal scale in which zero means that almost all public spending is driven by particularism, and 4 means that almost all spending is oriented towards the provision of public goods. Bivariate analysis finds that cabinet proportionality has a significant and *positive* effect on public goods (H2c), while the other coalition characteristics turn out to be insignificant (Table A3 in the Online Supplemental Appendix). Cabinet proportionality dominates when all three coalition variables are combined (Figure 3). Once again, the effects for size and heterogeneity are small, while proportionality deviates significantly to the right of the line, suggesting that cabinet proportionality discourages budgetary clientelism.

These findings are also robust to the inclusion of controls for democracy and GDP per capita (see Figure 4). The V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index consists of five sub-components that together capture the seven institutions of polyarchy posited by Dahl (1971):




Figure 2. The Effects of Coalition Size, Cabinet Proportionality and Ideological Heterogeneity on Executive Accountability, Controlling for Democracy and GDP per Capita.
Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2022) and authors' dataset building on Nyrup and Bramwell (2020).




Figure 3. The Effects of Coalition Size, Proportionality and Ideological Heterogeneity on the Provision of Public Goods in Public Spending.
Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2022) and authors' dataset building on Nyrup and Bramwell (2020).




Figure 4. The Effects of Coalition Size, Proportionality and Ideological Heterogeneity on the Provision of Public Goods in Public Spending, Controlling for Democracy and GDP per Capita.
Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2022) and authors' dataset building on Nyrup and Bramwell (2020).

freedom of association, inclusive suffrage, clean elections, an elected executive, freedom of expression, and widespread availability of alternative sources of information. Intuitively, polyarchy should have a deterrent effect on particularism, and our empirical analysis suggests it does. While the level of democracy is overwhelmingly the main predictor of the nature of government spending – significantly increasing the likelihood that budget expenditure will be oriented towards public goods spending – the proportionality of cabinet coalitions continues to have a significant effect. Size and heterogeneity of governing coalitions remain insignificant, however, as does GDP per capita.

These analyses suggest that coalitions can impact accountability and spending in decisive ways when presidential formateurs distribute portfolios *fairly* among parties represented in the cabinet.[11] Fairness dilutes horizontal accountability in understandable ways, with more satisfied coalitions providing a superior 'legislative shield' for the president. This finding is congruent with both single-country studies (Amorim Neto, 2002;Raile et al., 2011a) and comparative qualitative work. For example, the experiences of the late Chilean President Sebastian Piñera (first term, 2010–2014) and Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki (2003–2007) show how formateurs can quickly squander their legislative dominance when they renege on portfolio promises to their supporters (Chaisty et al., 2018: 120–125).

The link between coalition fairness and public goods provision in presidential regimes is perhaps less obvious. We posit that fairness may simply discourage the use of alternative strategies of coalition management that have negative externalities for public policy. While awarding cabinet posts to non-formateur parties may result in policy concessions and 'agency loss' (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter, 2015), fairness may also reduce the pressure on presidents to make particularistic payoffs to their supporters: such side payments are a budget-distorting strategy that almost certainly undermines public goods

provision. As Brazilian President Lula da Silva learned painfully during the *Mensalão* bribery scandal of 2004–2005, initial reluctance to reward allies with cabinet posts favoured cash-based forms of compensation that triggered a massive political crisis (Raile et al., 2011b).

Conclusion

In this first large-*N* study linking cabinet characteristics to macropolitical outcomes under multiparty presidentialism, our results are intriguing. Exploratory analysis suggests that the *internal fairness of coalitions* (i.e. cabinet proportionality) dominates both size or heterogeneity in predicting the degree of executive accountability and the nature of government spending. Cabinet proportionality significantly *diminishes* executive accountability (H1c), while it *raises* the likelihood that government spending will lean towards the provision of public goods (H2c). To our surprise, other coalitional characteristics are a wash: the *raw legislative size* of the coalition is utterly unimportant, as is the *internal ideological heterogeneity* of the interparty alliance.

What seems to matter most of all is the cohesion that proportionality can deliver. Coalitions that are larger and/or more ideologically consistent do not necessarily foster harmonious relations among constituent parties: in fact, they may increase rivalries over the spoils of government. Ultimately, as we have shown in other research (Chaisty et al., 2018), parties join coalitions to gain control over cabinet portfolios, and successful presidents are those who are able to manage the demands of their coalitional partners in a proportional and balanced way. This finding holds regardless of the level of democracy. As we have shown in the analysis above, the inclusion of a highly sensitive control for polyarchy (the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index) fails to overcome the strong association between cabinet proportionality and our two key independent variables.

Cabinet proportionality has differential effects on presidents and on political democracy. *Presidents* seem to gain from cabinet proportionality, first by being less subject to monitoring and control, and second by being more resistant to particularism in public spending. This reinforces the findings of extant single-country studies (Raile et al., 2011b). Yet *democracy* itself does not necessarily gain, because cabinet proportionality – at least in our democratic and semidemocratic cases of pure presidentialism between 1975 and 2016 – seems to be associated with weaker horizontal accountability. This has interesting implications for how vulnerable minority presidents 'play defense'. Formateurs may try to weaken horizontal accountability by increasing the absolute size of their 'legislative shield', but our results suggest that this strategy may be less efficacious than simply practicing fairness in portfolio allocation (net of the size and ideological cohesion of the coalitional family).

This finding about the effects of cabinet proportionally on political democracy returns to the question that we introduced at the start of this paper: in what ways does coalition management effect democratic quality? This question is of central importance to the emerging research on coalition management in presidential systems. While extant qualitative research has found a trade-off between effective coalition management and the horizontal accountability of presidents (Chaisty et al., 2018: 118), there remains a deficit of systematic large-N analysis on the precise mechanisms driving this outcome. The findings in this paper suggest that the strategies deployed by presidents could of be critical importance.

Paradoxically, fairness in cabinet composition – a key fact of Lijphart's consensus model of democracy – does not appear to enhance executive accountability; in fact, it has the opposite effect. To understand the mechanisms that connect proportionality and inter-branch relations, we need much deeper examination of the substantive meaning of accountability in both coalitional and non-coalitional contexts. For example, in real-world coalitional presidentialism, formateurs routinely enjoy oversized or surplus coalitions in the assembly (Chaisty et al., 2018), so standard 'checks and balances' models of horizontal accountability may not fare well. When coalitional presidents fashion cross-party cartels (Amorim Neto et al., 2003; Chasquetti, 2013), the key question in such contexts may not be whether the *legislature* can hold the executive to account, but whether the *pro-presidential coalition in the legislature* can hold the executive to account. The latter scenario may be less likely to materialize if presidential allies are well rewarded by cabinet spoils (as suggested by our exploratory results here), but this is an empirical question requiring further research.

Finally, these preliminary findings need to be understood within the context of 'Gamson's Law'. More than 60 years ago, William Gamson's theory of coalition formation claimed that 'any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition' (Gamson, 1961). When we operationalize 'payoff' as portfolios and 'resources' as seats in the legislature (Browne and Franklin, 1973), this proposition has been confirmed time and time again (Warwick and Druckman, 2006). We know that Gamson's Law is at its weakest in pure presidentialism compared to all other executive formats (Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010). The impressive discretion of presidents in composing and directing their cabinets, their ability to select ministers from outside the legislature, and the generally weaker status of political parties in presidential systems all combine to depress cabinet proportionality when compared to parliamentarism or semipresidentialism. But the weaker fit of Gamson's Law with presidential systems does *not* mean that cabinet proportionality is unimportant; in fact, as a tool of coalition management it may be more important than either the size or the ideological consistency of coalitions.

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ORCID iD

Timothy J Power https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3684-9914

Supplemental Material

Additional Supplementary Information may be found with the online version of this article.

Appendix A

Table A1. Descriptives for All Variables in the Analysis.

Table A2. The Effects of Coalition Size, Proportionality and Heterogeneity on Executive Accountability.
Table A3. The Effects of Coalition Size, Proportionality and Heterogeneity on Provision of Public Goods in Spending.
Table A4. The Effects of Coalition Size, Proportionality and Heterogeneity on Executive Accountability and Provision of Public Goods in Government Spending, Controlling for Democracy and GDP per Capita.

Notes

1. We use a standard measure of proportionality. Similar to Rose's (1984) Index of Proportionality for electoral systems, it estimates (on a scale of 0 to 1) the degree to which presidents distribute portfolios among coalition parties proportionally to their seat shares within the bloc of cabinet-represented parties in the legislature. Sometimes termed 'cabinet coalescence' (Amorim Neto, 2002), this index has been widely applied in the study of presidential systems (e.g. Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010; Chaisty et al., 2018). This measure confronts the problem of how to code non-partisan ministers (common in presidentialism) and we include such appointments in the calculation of the index. Non-partisan ministers cannot normally be linked to a corresponding legislative contingent – with some rare exceptions (Mejía and Acosta, 2009) – but they are revealing in two key ways: (1) they are a key indicator of the discretion that presidents command when forming governments, and (2) they significantly increase the disproportionality of cabinets (Chaisty and Power, 2024). To exclude non-partisan ministers would therefore distort the reality of presidential government.
2. Following WhoGov, we used cabinet configuration in July in each year, recording the formateur in the same month. For legislative seat data, we used conventional sources such as V-Party, the Database of Political Institutions, the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Arthur Banks), the Inter-Parliamentary Union website, as well as older print copies of the *Political Handbook of the World* and *Keesing's Record of World Events*.
3. This replicates the IDRANGE variable introduced by Amorim Neto (2002). Other measures were also considered: (1) the weighted standard deviation of ideology scores for all coalition parties (weighted by seat share); (2) the distance between the ideology score of the presidential party and the largest coalition partner; (3) the distance between the ideology score of the presidential party and the weighted mean of the ideology scores of the rest of the coalition. Alternative estimations using these measures do not alter our substantive findings.
4. These identifying data are available from the V-Party question about 'Government Support' (v2pagovsup) (Lindberg et al., 2022: 24).
5. This ranges from 'open anocracies' – regimes that are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic but are closer to democracies on all components measured by Polity – to consolidated democracies (Marshall and Cole, 2014: 21).
6. Several countries were excluded in their entirety due to incomplete data: Kenya, Liberia, Nicaragua, Senegal, South Korea and Sri Lanka. Other countries with missing data for 10 years or more were Argentina, Benin, Ecuador, Indonesia, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Paraguay and Peru.
7. Although V-Dem provides the most comprehensive set of data available for these questions, these data do have their limitations. Criticisms have centred in particular on time-varying biases in expert assessments, which may affect the longitudinal reliability of expert judgements (Little and Meng, 2024). However, this criticism has been robustly contested (Knutsen et al., 2024), and V-Dem continues to serve as a primary source of data for large-N analyses.
8. The V-Dem codebook describes this variable (v2x_horacc) in the following way: 'Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior. This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power. The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals' (Coppedge et al., 2022: 291).
9. The V-Dem codebook describes this variable (v2dlencmps) in the following way: 'Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork", "clientelistic", or "private goods". Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents'. (Coppedge et al., 2022: 165). The variable uses a five-point response set in which 0 means that 'almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic' and 4 means that 'almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character'.
10. The democracy control is the Electoral Democracy Index from V-Dem, and the modernization control is GDP per capita, also reported by V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2022: 361–362).
11. On parliamentarism, see Ecker and Meyer (2019).

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Author Biographies

Paul Chaisty is Professor of Russian and East European Politics and Head of the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford.

Timothy J. Power is Professor of Latin American Politics and Head of the Social Sciences Division at the University of Oxford.