

Book Symposium on Lori Watson and Christie Hartley, *Equal Citizenship and Public Reason*

Guest Editor: Paul Billingham

Reasonable Disagreement About, and Within, Watson and Hartley's Political Liberalism

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ABSTRACT *This article considers how successfully Watson and Hartley achieve the two main aims of their excellent book, *Equal Citizenship and Public Reason*: first, developing and defending a distinctive version of political liberalism and, second, showing that this is a feminist political liberalism. I challenge both their general defence of their view and the arguments regarding feminism. Both discussions raise questions about the conceptualisation of reasonable disagreement, so I finish with some further comments about ways in which reasonable disagreement about justice creates internal tensions within Watson and Hartley's theory.*

Lori Watson and Christie Hartley's excellent book *Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A Feminist Political Liberalism* has two main aims.¹ The first is to develop and defend a distinctive version of political liberalism, grounded in a particular conception of liberal democracy. The second is to show that this view constitutes a feminist political liberalism, since it is able to realise a range of central feminist goals. In this article, I consider how successfully Watson and Hartley achieve both of these aims. After outlining the main features of the authors' political liberalism, I challenge both their general defence of this view and the arguments regarding feminism. With respect to the latter, I particularly focus on their claim that all reasonable political conceptions of justice must endorse policies that seek to combat the gendered division of labour, both through labour market reforms and by combatting social norms that steer men and women into different roles. My discussion throughout raises questions about the conceptualisation of reasonable disagreement, so in the final section I note some further ways in which reasonable disagreement about justice creates internal tensions within Watson and Hartley's theory.

Watson and Hartley's Political Liberalism

Early in the book, Watson and Hartley offer what I will call their 'rationale': their account of the moral foundations of public justification and public reason. This rationale provides their argument for the central claim of political liberalism, that the

legitimacy of laws depends on their being acceptable to reasonable citizens. It centres on a conception of liberal democracy, which they call the 'collective enterprise view':

Political liberals view liberal democracies as a shared project among persons with the end of living on terms of mutual respect with others whom they view as free and equal citizens and whom they take to share interests with them as such. (p. 41)

The authors argue that this shared project involves structuring our relations in a particular way, through acting together on the basis of reasons that we can all 'count as reasons for us *as free and equal citizens engaged in a cooperative enterprise*' (p. 48, emphasis in original). Agreement on the normative force of these reasons, as the reasons that reflect all citizens' status and standing as free and equal, is the basis of political authority. State power must be arranged in accordance with principles that are collectively willed, in this sense.

Watson and Hartley use this rationale to justify their positions within various debates concerning public reason. First, they argue for a *consensus* view, where public reasons are shared reasons. But they note that citizens can interpret and weigh these reasons in different ways, leading to a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice (pp. 45–52). Second, they defend an *exclusivist* view, according to which citizens are obligated to offer *only* public reasons in political deliberation. Offering such reasons is what reasoning from the point of view of free and equal citizenship involves; nonpublic reasons are simply irrelevant to that enterprise (pp. 72–85). Third, they argue for a *narrow scope*, where it is only constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice that must be justified using public reasons, because it is these laws that fundamentally determine the relationship of equal citizenship (pp. 64–72).² Finally, they define reasonable citizens as those that accept this conception of liberal democracy and the requirement that laws (that fall within the narrow scope³) be justified by public reasons (pp. 19, 46). We are interested in what is acceptable to free and equal persons who are committed to living together on fair terms of cooperation—terms that all can accept due to their being justified by shared reasons. Reasonable citizens are thus defined as endorsing this ideal.

In sum, we have a rationale, and then all of the other central features of the view follow from, and are justified with reference to, that rationale.⁴ Therefore, the fundamental question for Watson and Hartley's view is whether their rationale succeeds. We will consider that question presently.

First, it is worth noting that understanding the structure of the authors' view in this way also helps to illuminate other arguments in the book. For example, take their response to the common 'integrity objection' to the duty to offer only public reasons within political deliberation. According to the objection, this duty imposes a great strain on the integrity of citizens who are barred from appealing to the values that they consider most important, but are unshared.⁵ In response, the authors argue that several conceptions of integrity on which this objection could rest should be rejected by political liberals, because they do not distinguish between the integrity of the religious believer and of those who endorse oppression and intolerance, and thus they cannot show us which kinds of integrity matter (pp. 90–100). I do not think this is quite right, however. One's conception of integrity need not *itself* show why some kinds of integrity do not have normative salience. One could distinguish between salient and non-salient integrity using an independent standard and then argue that a salient instance

of integrity is indeed burdened by the duty to offer public reasons. In this context, it is the integrity of reasonable citizens that is salient. We can care about the integrity of the reasonable and not that of the unreasonable, even when integrity itself is conceptualised the same way in both cases.

The question is then whether reasonable citizens ever face severe strains on their integrity due to the demands of public reason. And within Watson and Hartley's view, the answer to this is simply no. Reasonable citizens are committed to those very demands, by definition. Once reasonableness is understood in this way, an integrity objection appealing to the integrity of reasonable citizens cannot get going. Meanwhile, an integrity objection appealing to the integrity of the unreasonable—which citizens who prioritise their particular worldview over the need for shared reasons are, by definition—also fails, because we can discount burdens on their integrity. The upshot of this is that the integrity objection inevitably fails, *if* we accept the authors' conception of reasonableness. This might seem stipulative, or a rebuttal of the objection by sleight of hand. But it is not, *if* we have good reason to accept this conception of reasonableness. Whether we have such reason depends on whether Watson and Hartley's rationale is persuasive and can justify the relevant features of their view. Again, then, this is the fundamental question, to which I now turn.

On Watson and Hartley's Rationale

Watson and Hartley motivate their view by drawing an analogy with two families who are deciding where to go on vacation (pp. 41–45). The members of the Smith family make proposals of locations based on their individual interests, with each member having a veto. The authors argue that this reflects a conception of democracy that they call 'the mutual advantage view', which they claim underlies the 'convergence' account of public justification, according to which laws can be publicly justified by their being sufficiently justified to each citizen on the basis of their own evaluative standards.⁶ Public justification can thus occur via a 'convergence' of different citizens' diverse reasons, rather than requiring that all citizens share the same reasons for a law.

The members of the Rawls family, meanwhile, make proposals based on what they like to do together. They suggest locations where they can pursue their shared interests, such that every proposed destination is acceptable from the point of view of those interests. They see the question of where to vacation as requiring shared deliberation among individuals qua family members, with a commitment to acting on shared reasons. This reflects Watson and Hartley's consensus view of public justification.

It is not clear to me, however, why a family should only count activities that they like to do together as valuable. These activities clearly do have value. Indeed, that value will also be taken into account by the Smiths, since it will be included within their individual judgments concerning possible locations. But it is not clear why this should be the *only* thing that families take into account. After all, there might be locations where various subgroups are able to engage in activities that they enjoy. It does not seem like a great failure of familial respect to enable members to pursue different activities based on their particular hobbies and interests. Taking into account preferences that are not unanimously shared might even lead the family to end up somewhere that everyone prefers.

I think the most attractive model of vacation planning would combine elements from both of Watson and Hartley's models. If there were no shared activities at all then this would suggest that the group are not much of a family. But making decisions based only on shared interests seems to unnecessarily limit their reasons. Indeed, caring about one another's distinctive interests, and finding ways to facilitate different individuals' varied hobbies, is part of what families do.

Watson and Hartley suggest that the Smith model allows for domination and deception. But allowing unshared reasons to play a role within decisions need not have this implication. The members of the family could deliberate sincerely, with genuine concern for one another's interests and a desire to demonstrate mutual respect, while allowing both shared and unshared reasons to be presented and discussed, and to influence the final decision.

Of course, the family vacation analogy is just an analogy. It is meant to illustrate the normative attractions of Watson and Hartley's political liberalism, not to directly bear argumentative weight. Nonetheless, thinking through the analogy and the forms of decision-making that seem plausible in that context is a way of evaluating the authors' rationale.⁷ Applying my observations to political life, the upshot is that even the collective enterprise view of liberal democracy might not require that public justification proceed solely in terms of shared reasons. This view sees liberal democracy as 'a shared project of citizens who engage in democratic discussion to find shared terms of social cooperation in order to live on terms of mutual respect with their co-citizens' (p. 56). But the jump from shared *terms of cooperation* to the need to share the same *reasons* is not obvious. It would clearly be disrespectful to completely ignore shared interests. But that is not the same as holding that such interests can be the only basis for mutually respectful shared terms of cooperation, as we have seen in the family vacation case.

In other words, a convergence view, which allows laws to be justified to citizens by a variety of different reasons, including unshared reasons, could also be construed as compatible with Watson and Hartley's rationale. So too could a view that I've previously called 'argumentative democracy', which invites citizens to deliberate on the basis of all of their reasons and then to vote in the light of their best judgment of the overall balance of reasons, with no public justification requirement.⁸ Both of these views endorse the idea of shared terms of social cooperation that instantiate mutual respect, as per the collective enterprise view, but reject the idea that this requires deliberation and decision only on the basis of shared reasons.

In sum, it is not clear that the ideal of liberal democracy that Watson and Hartley use as their rationale is precise enough to justify their specific public reason view, unless the idea that fair terms of cooperation *just are* terms justified by shared reasons is stipulated from the start. But it's unclear why we should make such a stipulation. The vacation analogy certainly doesn't reveal reasons for doing so.

If we understand the ideal of liberal democracy in a broader way that makes room for convergence or argumentative democracy, and understand reasonable citizens as committed to this ideal, then it is clear how the exclusivist view of public reason could generate strains on the integrity of reasonable citizens. I think this is what most advocates of the integrity objection have in mind. To return to the vacation analogy, if my favourite pastime is surfing then it seems like a strain on my integrity not to be able to appeal to this in arguing for a vacation near to the sea, even if this hobby is not shared

by (every member of) my family. Appealing to my interest in surfing need not involve seeking to dominate my family or ignoring their interests. I can actively take their interests into account and seek to find a location that they also favour. I can even be prepared to accept locations far from the sea, if it becomes clear that this is the best outcome all things considered.⁹ All of this is compatible with appealing to unshared as well as shared reasons. And a requirement to limit myself to the latter would feel like an objectionable strain. Reasonable citizens, as conceptualised by the broader understanding of liberal democracy, could face an analogous strain on their integrity from the exclusivist view of public reason, when their unshared reasons bear upon a political decision. The force of the integrity objection, then, ultimately depends on one's conception of liberal democracy and the requirements of reasonableness that flow from it. Since I do not think that Watson and Hartley's rationale succeeds in justifying their specific political liberal view, I think the integrity objection does have force against them. But it is a great virtue of the book that it directs our attention to this debate about the moral foundations of political liberalism.

Another crucial idea that Watson and Hartley take to be justified by their rationale is Rawls's criterion of reciprocity. The authors' argument that their view constitutes a feminist political liberalism crucially turns on their interpretation of that criterion. It is to that argument that I now turn.

A Feminist Political Liberalism?

The criterion of reciprocity states that those proposing principles of basic justice must 'think it at least reasonable for others to accept them as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position.'¹⁰ Watson and Hartley argue that in order for this criterion to be fulfilled, all social positions that compromise persons' ability to view themselves and others as equal citizens must be eliminated. Background institutions must ensure that everyone can form an identity as an equal citizen. All reasonable political conceptions of justice must commit to realising this end, since they must endorse the criterion of reciprocity and its implications in order to count as reasonable. All such conceptions must thus both seek 'the eradication of social conditions of domination and subordination relevant to democratic deliberation and participation among equal citizens' and support 'the provision of the social conditions of recognition respect' (p. 143).

Gender often creates social hierarchies, in violation of these requirements. So all reasonable political conceptions must support reforms to gender norms and the institutions that shape them. 'The criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that provide genuine equality for women along various dimensions of social life central to equal citizenship' (p. 137). This, then, is why Watson and Hartley's political liberalism is a feminist liberalism: many familiar feminist goals and policies can, and indeed *must*, be supported by reasonable political conceptions, given the demands of the criterion of reciprocity.

Watson and Hartley apply this general argument to several domains of public policy, including the workplace and gendered division of labour (pp. 189–211). Those who care for dependents face a number of challenges that affect their standing as equal citizens, including lower pay, slower career progression, and financial dependence on

others, which can lead to the toleration of unacceptable spousal behaviour. These outcomes are gendered. The challenge for liberals is that this situation arises as a result of individual choices, against a backdrop of formally equal rights. But Watson and Hartley argue that political liberals should support reforms to the labour market to prevent caretakers from being disadvantaged and reforms to social norms to stop women from being systematically steered away from labour market participation. This is necessary because the gendered division of labour frustrates equal citizenship, by effectively precluding women from full participation in a sphere of life central to citizenship. All reasonable political conceptions of justice must thus support the necessary reforms.

This is a powerful argument, and I will not dispute Watson and Hartley's claims regarding justice in this domain. The argument that these claims must be endorsed by all reasonable political conceptions of justice is less convincing, however. That argument crucially depends on the connection to *equal citizenship*, in particular. The argument is not simply that the gendered division of labour and the difficulty of combining caregiving responsibilities with labour market participation are unjust in themselves. It is that these things specifically undermine individuals' capacity to participate in social, and particularly political, life *as an equal citizen*, where equal citizenship is understood in relation to the requirements of the criterion of reciprocity, which focus on the conditions for public deliberation and justification. This is a trickier argument to make.

In order to make it, Watson and Hartley emphasise that labour market participation is a central sphere relevant to citizenship, such that equal participation within it is necessary for equal citizenship. But it is not completely clear on what basis they decide which spheres of life are central to citizenship, or why the ability to equally participate in all of those spheres is essential for the requirements of the criterion of reciprocity to be met. Some might hold that individuals can enjoy recognition respect from others and participate in a nondominated way within political deliberation even if they do not participate in the labour market, and even if this choice was to some degree shaped by prevailing social norms. This viewpoint is not obviously implausible, at least when offered within a well-ordered society.¹¹

Indeed, Watson and Hartley accept that it is possible to hold a comprehensive doctrine according to which women and men have different roles in the church or home while still endorsing equal citizenship. One need not be a comprehensive feminist in order to be reasonable. But those who hold such nonfeminist doctrines are likely to have a different view of the demands that equal citizenship places on social structures and institutions, due to a less capacious account of the spheres in which individuals need to fully participate in order to enjoy equal standing within public deliberation. In other words, they are likely to have a different view about what the nondomination and recognition respect required by the criterion of reciprocity entails. And this will lead them to dispute the authors' claims regarding labour.

Watson and Hartley's argument squarely faces the difficult balance of seeking to respect freedom of association and individual choice while also combatting unjust structures and norms. The way they strike this balance crucially turns on what they see as undermining equal citizenship. Some feminists will likely be unsatisfied with this, on the grounds that the equal citizenship lens does not allow for extensive enough reforms and that to achieve those reforms we must step outside of these political liberal constraints. I am pressing the opposite worry: that Watson and Hartley have to

build an implausibly large number of substantive claims into their conception of equal citizenship in order to defend their favoured reforms. The argument relies on a thick and wide-ranging conception of citizenship that some might not unreasonably contest. In other words, I am unconvinced that we can plausibly read quite so much substantive feminist content into the criterion of reciprocity. At least, we cannot plausibly claim that all reasonable interpretations of that criterion must endorse that content.

This points to a more general worry about the place of nonfeminist comprehensive doctrines within Watson and Hartley's view. The authors hold that doctrines that include beliefs about gender difference, including certain differences in gender roles, can be reasonable. But in order to be reasonable, those who hold these doctrines must accept fairly severe limitations on those doctrines' social power, including their informal social power. For example, the state will explicitly reject social norms that reflect the views of nonfeminist doctrines, and promote contrary norms, in order to combat the gendered division of labour. Something similar can also be seen with respect to male-only priesthood. Watson and Hartley argue that this practice is permissible only so long as the relevant religious institutions do not have too much influence within the background culture, which could threaten women's equal citizenship (p. 123).

This leaves those who hold these doctrines in a rather perverse position. They are in effect required, on pain of reasonableness, to accept that their doctrines must not gain too many adherents or much influence over the views held within the background culture. They must not simply agree that their doctrine cannot be used to justify laws, but they must also accept this broader kind of social limitation. This seems like a difficult thing for individuals who actually endorse these comprehensive doctrines as true to accept. Indeed, it is not clear that it is a coherent position.

Of course, if those citizens settle these tensions in favour of their comprehensive doctrines by rejecting Watson and Hartley's claims, then the authors can simply say that they are unreasonable. They are failing to accept the normative priority of citizenship and its wide-ranging demands. But this is effectively to admit that all reasonable citizens must, in practice, be comprehensive feminists after all. Even though nonfeminist doctrines can in principle be reasonable, it is not really possible to hold one while remaining a reasonable citizen, or at least not without severe internal tensions within one's viewpoint.

Some might conclude that this is not much of a loss. But it raises the concern that Watson and Hartley's view is a partially comprehensive, rather than political, liberalism, precisely due to how much substantive content they build into the notion of free and equal citizenship. The difference between political and comprehensive liberalism becomes rather blurry if the political liberal justificatory constituency (i.e. those it deems reasonable) is effectively restricted to citizens who endorse various comprehensive feminist tenets—or indeed more generally if we build such extensive substantive content into the account of free and equal citizenship. One could develop a 'political' liberalism that requires reasonable citizens to endorse basically all comprehensive feminist and/or egalitarian claims about justice, by holding that those claims are grounded in the requirements of free and equal citizenship. But it is not clear how such a view would be importantly distinct from comprehensive liberal approaches.

I should note that my reflections on Watson and Hartley's arguments regarding the gendered division of labour are based on reading them as holding that all reasonable political conceptions must endorse those arguments. A different reading is possible,

however. The authors are clear that all reasonable conceptions must accept their general argument regarding nondomination and recognition respect. But perhaps their applications of that argument to specific policy domains offer what they consider the best, or most reasonable, applications, while allowing that other reasonable conceptions of justice might take a different view, due to their different interpretations of the precise demands of equal citizenship. On this reading, one can reject Watson and Hartley's argument concerning the gendered division of labour while remaining reasonable, as long as one accepts the more general claim that nondomination and recognition respect must be secured and can provide an argument for why this need not lead to the authors' policy proposals. The problem with this reading, for Watson and Hartley, is that it reduces the extent to which all reasonable political conceptions are feminist, and thus it permits political liberal societies to have political arrangements that feminists reject. In other words, while this reading might help to address the concerns that I have pressed, it weakens Watson and Hartley's response to feminist concerns about political liberalism.

Reasonable Disagreement About Justice

I will finish with some further observations about the place of reasonable disagreement about justice within Watson and Hartley's view. They are clear that there is a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. But this does not seem to be fully incorporated into their arguments. For example, they often speak of there being an overlapping consensus on one political conception of justice. But it is unclear what this means, if each citizen endorses one from a range of different reasonable conceptions. Perhaps the idea is that one conception might still regulate the basic structure. But even if this is true temporarily, citizens will argue for new laws and reforms based on their most-preferred conception, such that this situation will not last for long. Majorities for different laws will form from varying coalitions of different political conceptions, such that no single conception regulates the basic structure. As long as all of these conceptions are reasonable, this seems perfectly legitimate, since all enacted laws will be justified by public reasons. The overlapping consensus should be seen as being on the family of conceptions itself, not on any single conception.

This puts pressure on some of Watson and Hartley's arguments for other features of their view, however. For example, they argue that stability for the right reasons is secured by the publicity of the political conception and that this further justifies the shared reasons view of public reason (pp. 49–52). But if there is no single conception regulating the basic structure, then it is unclear how this publicity is achieved, since there is no shared public recognition of a single political conception. Citizens endorse a range of conceptions, and the basic structure is shaped by that range. I am not sure that the publicity-focused account of stability can survive this change. It therefore cannot function as a justification of the shared reasons view.

The existence of a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice also bolsters Rawls's stability argument for his 'wide view' of public reason. The wide view is more permissive than Watson and Hartley's exclusivist view, since it permits citizens to appeal to nonpublic reasons within political deliberation, as long as they offer public reasons 'in due course' (the 'proviso').¹² Rawls claims that showing in political

deliberation how your comprehensive doctrine supports a reasonable political conception can promote stability, by providing assurance to others that you are using public reasons sincerely.¹³ Watson and Hartley reject this. They argue that if the political conception that is the focus of an overlapping consensus is unsettled, then appeal to comprehensive doctrines can be divisive, while such appeal is unnecessary if the political conception is settled (pp. 76–80). After all, why would it make others reaffirm their support for the political conception to know that you support it based on your erroneous worldview?

As we have seen, however, the idea that there is any settled political conception that is the focus of an overlapping consensus is mistaken, once we accept that there is a family of reasonable conceptions. Different citizens will appeal to different political conceptions within deliberation. This raises concerns that some citizens might do this strategically rather than sincerely. Rather than appealing to the political conception that they actually endorse, they might appeal in each case to whatever political conception supports the outcome that they prefer for nonpublic or self-interested reasons. The breadth of public reason admitted by the family view makes the assurance provided simply by the use of public reasons less robust. In this context, one way to show that you are not being strategic and are genuinely committed to your political conception and the sincere use of public reasons is to show how that conception fits into your broader worldview. This can help with assurance and encourage others to appeal to public reasons. Watson and Hartley are right that this does not give others reason to affirm your specific political conception. But it can give them the assurance that you are sincerely engaging in public reason, such that they do likewise, thus supporting stability. Overall, then, there is more going for Rawls's proviso than Watson and Hartley suggest, once we adopt the family view. Thus, even if one accepts the authors' rationale and other features of their account (such as the consensus view), one should not be an exclusivist.

To conclude, I made three sets of arguments in this article. First, I questioned whether Watson and Hartley's rationale can justify their specific public reason view. Second, I suggested that the conception of equal citizenship involved in Watson and Hartley's arguments that their political liberalism is a feminist liberalism is contestably thick, in a way that puts pressure on the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism. In particular, I questioned their argument that all reasonable political conceptions of justice must endorse a range of policies to combat the gendered division of labour. Finally, I argued that exploring the idea of a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice highlights unresolved tensions in Watson and Hartley's view and weakens their case both for the shared reasons view and for exclusivism. Each of these three arguments is freestanding. But all of them revolve around the way that Watson and Hartley conceptualise reasonable pluralism and the extent to which the foundations for their view support that conceptualisation.

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NOTES

- 1 Lori Watson and Christie Hartley, *Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A Feminist Political Liberalism* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018).
- 2 The first and third of these positions follow Rawls's views, but the second deviates from him, rejecting his proviso. I return to this in Section 4. See John Rawls, 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', in his *Political Liberalism*, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
- 3 I will not make this qualification explicit in the rest of the article, but it should be assumed throughout.
- 4 This matches the common structure that (I have argued) is shared by all (coherent) public reason views. See Paul Billingham and Anthony Taylor, 'A Framework for Analyzing Public Reason Theories', *European Journal of Political Theory* (forthcoming). <https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885120925381>.
- 5 For helpful recent discussion of this objection, see Kevin Vallier, *Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation* (Oxford: Routledge, 2014), chapter 2.
- 6 See *ibid.*, chapter 4.
- 7 Further, one might think that the approach that solely focuses on shared interests would have *more* plausibility in the family context than the political context. If so, then the fact that it appears unnecessarily restrictive even in the former context is significant.
- 8 Paul Billingham, 'Does political community require public reason? On Lister's defence of political liberalism', *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 15,1 (2016): 20–41, at pp. 23–31.
- 9 I would certainly prefer a vacation far from the sea to no vacation at all. This is analogous to convergence theorists' view of sufficient reasons as involving a law being preferable to having no such law.
- 10 Rawls *op. cit.*, p. 446.
- 11 Gina Schouten presents a much more detailed argument to similar effect as my brief comments in this paragraph in her *Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), chapter 5. She carefully delineates the argumentative burden that Watson and Hartley must meet if they are to show that the gendered division of labour undermines equal citizenship in particular (pp. 152–158), and she also forcefully challenges their claim that equal citizenship requires the ability to combine participation in all spheres of life relevant to citizenship (pp. 162–166). My concerns in the rest of this section deviate from Schouten's, however. Indeed, she endorses Watson and Hartley's general strategy of deriving extensive feminist content—including with respect to the gendered division of labour—from the requirements of the criterion of reciprocity, while executing that strategy in a significantly different way.
- 12 Rawls *op. cit.*, p. 462.
- 13 *Ibid.*, pp. 463–464.