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Justified representation in multiwinner voting: Axioms and algorithms

Abstract:

Suppose that a group of voters wants to select k = 1 alternatives from a given set, and each voter indicates which of the alternatives are acceptable to her: the alternatives could be conference submissions, applicants for a scholarship or locations for a fast food chain. In this setting it is natural to require that the winning set represents the voters fairly, in the sense that large groups of voters with similar preferences have at least some of their approved alternatives in the winning s...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Publisher's version

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Publisher copy:
10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2017.1

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS Division
Department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Balliol College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Schloss Dagstuhl Publisher's website
Publication date:
2018-01-26
Acceptance date:
2017-09-22
DOI:
ISSN:
1868-8969
Pubs id:
pubs:832180
URN:
uri:f5b9dd69-1d64-41f5-9397-213916dfb0d8
UUID:
uuid:f5b9dd69-1d64-41f5-9397-213916dfb0d8
Local pid:
pubs:832180
ISBN:
9783959770552

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