TWENTY-TWO

Peacekeeping, Development, and Counterinsurgency

THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON AND "QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS"

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MORE INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS WERE CARRIED out in the name of "peace" in the decade following the end of the Cold War than in the previous four decades put together.[1] In the era of US unipolarity, following the demise of its Soviet rival, the budget of United Nations peacekeeping missions has increased from a total of US$3.6 billion in the year 1994 to US$8.27 billion in the year 2016.[2] In fact, the peacekeeping budget is one and a half times more than the general UN budget, which in 2016 consisted of $5.4 billion.[3]

This shift in the relative importance of peacekeeping missions was most clearly outlined in UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 manifesto, "An Agenda for Peace," which attempted to redefine peace operations by classifying the missions in a "taxonomy of peace operations" that linked peacemaking to the establishment of the rule of law, economic development, and democracy.[4] Scholars have termed this approach a liberal peace, as it assumes that democracy, rule of law, and market economics can achieve a sustainable peace in postconflict and transitional states and societies.[5] This liberal approach to peace has since been criticized and challenged by scholars who argue it has been shaped by US geostrategic interests since the end of the Cold War.[6] Sociologist Mark Duffield argues that liberal peacemaking, as opposed to the identification and alleviation of conflicts' root causes, is a superficial process that institutionalizes the status quo.[7] Studies that have looked at the role of international peacekeeping and intervention in today's world order have further attributed the use of force in formerly colonized countries to serve geostrategic interests of the Western countries as a continu-

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ation of colonialism by other means.[8] The interventions made in the name of peace in the contemporary world order and their implications for affected countries can be understood only when situated in a theoretical and historical context of imperialism and its effects.[9]

This essay looks at the practice of one of the biggest and oldest international peacekeeping forces in the world: the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), located along the Lebanese-Israeli border for almost four decades. By analyzing the function of UNIFIL's "Quick Impact Projects" (QIPs), small-scale and short-term development projects carried out with local municipalities, I will provide a practical example of the revised agenda for peace operations, in which military peacekeeping is merged with development initiatives in order to facilitate its implementation. Much in line with the studies critical of the liberal peace approach, this research contends that in the aftermath of the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon UNIFIL became an exemplary case of a peacekeeping mission that is designed to implement a pacification approach in accordance with US geostrategic policy.[10] It suggests that UNIFIL's ideological readings of peace, the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and the internal structure of power in Lebanon all contribute to the consistent frustration of the mission's basic aims.

In particular, this essay posits that UNIFIL's QIPs clearly illustrate the mission's contradictions and its frequently thorny relations with the local population. On the one hand, UNIFIL's economic development efforts are welcomed and needed by a rural population on the fringes of a notoriously weak, embattled, and laissez-faire state. On the other hand, as I will demonstrate, locals reject UNIFIL's objective to disarm Hizbullah and delegitimize it as a resistance party within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus most southern Lebanese, who are overwhelmingly supportive of this resistance, view UNIFIL's mission and its development projects with great suspicion.

This research is an outcome of over two years of ethnographic fieldwork in UNIFIL's area of operations.[11] It is based on qualitative analysis of the activities of the mission's Civil Affairs Department, which administers the QIPs. From February to August 2009, then during January, February, September, and October 2010, and finally between September 2014 and August 2015, I lived in southern Lebanon and conducted official semistructured and unstructured recorded interviews with the local population and municipal representatives, as well as Civil Affairs staff and Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) officers.[12] Furthermore, I participated in several official meetings between UNIFIL and local authorities and observed their interaction with the

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population during the implementation of the QIPs and in several inauguration ceremonies that Civil Affairs conducted in UNIFIL's area.

UNIFIL: BACKGROUND

The UN Security Council established UNIFIL in 1978, in the midst of the fifteen-year Lebanese civil war (1975–90). In April 1978, the Israeli army invaded southern Lebanon in order to suppress the increasingly active Palestinian-Lebanese resistance movement operating there and to thwart US attempts to impose a wider Arab-Israeli peace treaty.[13] Since then, UNIFIL has attempted to serve as a buffer between Israel and southern Lebanon, even after the much larger 1982 Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanese territory south of the Litani River. Initially, UNIFIL was deployed under the terms of Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 as an interim force to "restore international peace and security" in the area.[14] Yet so far, despite various periods of calm and relative stability, it has not been able to achieve a long-term sustainable and enduring peace, leaving the Security Council to regularly renew its mandate.[15] While the Lebanese civil war ended in 1990, the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon carried on until an increasingly effective local resistance led by Hizbullah forced Israel and its proxy militia to withdraw in May 2000. The United Nations certified this line of withdrawal, referring to it as the "Blue Line," basically the unofficial and disputed border between Israel and Lebanon.[16]

Nonetheless, relations between Israel and Hizbullah remained tense until a limited cross-border operation in July 2006 by Hizbullah was met with another massive Israeli military invasion of Lebanon that had the avowed objective once again of destroying the social, political, and military capabilities of the Lebanese resistance.[17] After a thirty-three-day war that resulted in a humanitarian disaster and untold damage in southern Lebanon, the Security Council passed Resolution 1701 declaring a cessation of hostilities and making a more robust mandate for UNIFIL.[18] UNIFIL's main task was now to "prevent the presumption of hostilities" and to ensure the establishment "of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL."[19] Additionally, the size of the mission was greatly expanded, from two thousand soldiers on the eve of the 2006 war to a maximum of fifteen thousand troops, notably containing large European contingents from Spain, Italy, and France.

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Upon arrival, some of the European troop-contributing countries interpreted Security Council Resolution 1701 broadly to include the direct disarmament and the limitation of Hizbullah's authority and movement.[20] Indeed, some of the first European contingents that were sent to Lebanon included battle-trained military troops who duly faced rejection and resistance for what the local population interpreted as their overly aggressive behavior.[21] The population often confronted these peacekeepers as they went about actively searching homes and depots for weapons. When a car bomb killed six UNIFIL peacekeepers serving with the Spanish army in June 2007, European contingents within UNIFIL ceased this informal peace enforcement approach, brought in specifically trained peacekeepers, and enhanced their budget for mission's civilian-military coordination activities.[22] They also henceforth adhered to Resolution 1701's clear mandate that UNIFIL's disarmament activities south of the Litani River had to occur with the express authorization of the Lebanese government enacted through the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). By mid-May 2008, the contradictory interpretations of Resolution 1701, and thus of UNIFIL's new mandate, were largely settled as it became clear that the international community could not bring about the disarmament of Hizbullah by force.[23]

UNIFIL's original 1978 mandate, which envisioned the peacekeeping contingents as an "interim" force in southern Lebanon, has yet to reach its primary objective of establishing peace and security there and is likely further away from it than ever. The following analysis will contribute to understanding why UNIFIL has been unable to establish a lasting peace in Lebanon. It shows that when the larger military and political confrontations die down and UNIFIL's Civil Affairs staff goes about its daily activities, the divergent conceptions of peace held by UNIFIL and the local population, and embodied in the meaning of the QIPs, are clearly exposed. My analysis shows that the QIPs and their implementation are a highly political activity that reveals much about the Western-designed vision of peace in South Lebanon. I argue that this peace is one in which Hizbullah and its supporters are solely held responsible for the international conflict over South Lebanon.

UNIFIL IN PRACTICE

Kheir, a Shia village located in the easternmost part of southern Lebanon, is situated along the Blue Line, which is still unmarked in many places

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throughout southern Lebanon.[24] As in a number of other villages and towns, the demarcation of the Blue Line in Kheir has become a constant issue with the villagers, as it cuts through olive fields and a well. When an area is marked as being part of the Blue Line, it becomes off limits to the villagers. Hence, the Blue Line deems this particular land, ordinarily used for agriculture in Kheir, as inaccessible, a development not welcomed by the owners of the fields and patrons of the well. The borderline in Kheir constitutes one of the thirteen reservations noted by the Lebanese government against the Blue Line demarcations.[25] In 2009 UNIFIL worked toward solving this border issue by building a gate around the olive fields, which were to be accessed only by their owners. UNIFIL's interest in gating the olive groves occurred after the Israelis abducted a pair of brothers from the village in December 2008.

In the early morning hours, two brothers, Ali and Mohammad Ismail, were working in their olive groves as usual when they were suddenly attacked by Israeli army dogs. In the midst of the attack the pair were captured and taken for interrogation in Israel, where they were held for twenty-four hours. After negotiations between UNIFIL and Israel they were released.[26] Israel claimed they were in Israeli territory, while the farmers and Lebanese officials argued they were working on their land, which lies within Lebanese territory. Other significant incidents occurred when the municipality of Kheir decided to clean an old local well in May 2014. Facing a major drought, the municipality attempted to alleviate the burden for its village by restoring this well. However, the army halted the work as the Blue Line cuts right through the well.[27] In May 2014, in an expression of their opposition to this demarcation, together with the municipality, a group of villagers held a few demonstrations at the Blue Line in which they symbolically reclaimed the disputed territory while playing music and dancing. The deputy mayor of Kheir explained to me that the work was halted after the LAF intervened and talked to the municipality. The deputy said there were more pressing issues the army had to deal with at the moment (the Syrian war and the rise of ISIS) and that it was not the time to solve the issue over the well. The advice was taken seriously, and the municipality did not pursue its work on the well.[28] The protests have since been halted.

When I went to visit the well with Ali Ismail and a representative of the Kheir municipality, I was surprised to see how the villagers completely ignored the UNIFIL soldiers and the LAF who were guarding the Blue Line. The villagers maneuvered around the well freely and crossed the Blue Line several times, deliberately ignoring open warnings by the LAF. On this occa-

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sion, I was not able to spot the location of the Blue Line because it was not marked clearly. When I asked the nearby Malaysian peacekeeper monitoring the site to point out the location of the Blue Line, he replied that the UN flag he was holding in his hand was supposed to mark the Blue Line.

The villagers and I stood by the well, crossing the Blue Line, as Ismail and the representative of the municipality were informing me about the incident with UNIFIL and the LAF and telling me about the history of the well. Neither UNIFIL nor the LAF were able to prevent the villagers from visiting the well and crossing the Blue Line. During this trip I asked Ali Ismail if he had avoided going to his olive fields since his abduction in 2008.[29] He responded that his olive groves had never been better kept in his life.

On another occasion his brother, Mohammad Ismail, told me that he walked by the Blue Line every day and was not afraid of being captured again. Both Ali Ismail and the municipality representative recounted the history of the well, which has served as one of the very few water resources to the village for their fathers' and grandfathers' generation. It was unthinkable for them that it was now identified as lying outside Lebanese territory. For UNIFIL, the well and the olive groves merely constitute one of thirteen other issues along the Blue Line that they have inconsistencies with and are trying to solve. For the villagers it is considered another Israeli attempt to colonize parts of their land, as has repeatedly happened to them since the creation of Israel in 1948, when parts of Kheir were occupied, and especially during the twenty-two-year-long occupation of southern Lebanon in 1978.[30]

Demarcating the Blue Line is important from UNIFIL's perspective because it is an attempt to mark an official border between Israel and Lebanon that does not exist. The Blue Line can theoretically serve as a neutral line from which UNIFIL can monitor border violations and assign responsibility for them. However, for the villagers, having to give up this well in a country where water resources are scarce does not make them see UNIFIL in a favorable light. Many people in the south still rely on the water they can collect through rainfall in the winter, which often is insufficient, especially in years such as 2014, where there was a lack of rainfall. The villagers' deliberate crossing of the Blue Line and their intentional disregard of the LAF checkpoint during this visit—in addition to the previously described demonstrations—indicate that the Blue Line and UNIFIL itself are not taken very seriously. This prompts an important question: Considering the low regard in which UNIFIL and its mission are held, why and how do the people tolerate UNIFIL's long-term presence on their lands? To understand

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how UNIFIL handles such a fundamental divergence with the local population, the following section analyzes the implementation of UNIFIL's QIPs.

UNIFIL's Quick Impact Projects

Although UN peacekeeping is a military and not a humanitarian intervention, the merging of peacekeeping with humanitarian and development practices is apparent in UNIFIL's work in southern Lebanon.[31] The QIPs are one of the three main functions of UNIFIL's Civil Affairs Department, alongside conflict resolution and management and engagement with the population. The QIPs are designed to produce immediate results beneficial to UNIFIL's mission and can be best described as small-scale and short-term development projects that are carried out with local municipalities and nongovernmental organizations throughout southern Lebanon.[32] Each QIP can cost up to US$25,000 and must be completed within ninety days. Additionally, individual UNIFIL troop-contributing countries carry out similar projects that can exceed this funding limit if the projects are of direct relevance to their mission. UNIFIL devotes great resources, effort, and time to the realization of these projects. UNIFIL's total budget for 2015–16, approved by the UN General Assembly, is US$506,346,400, from which only about US$500,000 is directly allocated to QIPs.[33] However, this seemingly low figure is misleading, as additional projects are funded by the troop-contributing countries that exceed this sum by far.[34] How much countries invest in QIPs varies widely and is scaled to their respective individual capacity and political will: the wealthier European countries, such as Italy, Spain, and France, send proportionally more money for development and reconstruction, while less developed countries, such as Nepal and Indonesia, contribute in-kind donations, such as medical care for the villagers and livestock. In total, UNIFIL's budget for development projects in its area of operations amounts to about US$5 million yearly.[35] Italy's budget for 2014, for example, amounted to 1.6 million euros in 2014 and 1.3 million euros in 2015.[36]

The QIPs combine the political goals of UNIFIL's peacekeeping mission with development activities. The 2013 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations policy statement on the QIPs emphasizes that the projects should "remain in direct support of the mission's mandate."[37] The document stresses the "contribution to promoting acceptance of the mandated tasks of the mission amongst the population and/or supporting the credibility of the mission

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by demonstrating progress in the implementation of these tasks where confidence is lacking."[38] It further states that QIPs should contribute "to building confidence/support in/for the peace process" by demonstrating early dividends of stability to the population and that QIPs, by addressing immediate needs of the population, aim to "contribut[e] to improving the environment for mandate implementation by generating support for the mission."[39]

According to the head of the Civil Affairs Department, UNIFIL's involvement in civil society aims to address the local population's needs and to prevent misunderstandings with them through continuous communication.[40] The publicly stated goal of the QIPs is to facilitate relations between the armed peacekeepers and the local population by creating a space where UNIFIL can directly communicate with the populace in order to explain its mission and understand and eliminate the population's fears.[41] A CIMIC officer in the field also told me that the QIPs are designed to ensure the safety of the soldiers. This happens in two ways. First, the direct provision of aid to communities is intended to create a climate of support for the soldiers on the ground. The idea is that grateful communities are less likely to attack peacekeepers.[42] Second, improving village infrastructure facilitates the mobility of UNIFIL patrols. This can be seen in cases where UNIFIL funds projects such as solar-powered street lights, which, according to an officer, assist the soldiers to maneuver in the otherwise dark streets during the frequent electricity cuts.[43]

Building a Rival Power

The minimal rationale for the QIPs has been a need to establish and maintain good relations with the parties to the conflict, but UNIFIL's engagement has political implications beyond good relations. Relations are selective, strategic, and politically motivated.

One of the main goals in funding the QIPs is to build alliances with people and organizations outside local political parties. UNIFIL has to engage with municipalities whose political affiliation with Hizbullah is very obvious, because Hizbullah members are the elected and officially acknowledged representatives of the village. Yet as a Civil Affairs officer underlined during an interview, UNIFIL tries to reach out to nongovernmental, "grassroots" organizations, as well as individuals who are not politically affiliated with Amal or Hizbullah, the two main Shiite resistance parties in Lebanon.[44] According to the Civil Affairs officer, parties that are not affiliated with

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Hizbullah or Amal are what UNIFIL perceives as more "neutral" to the conflict.[45]

An anticipated outcome of funding the QIPs is to build connections with politically unaffiliated groups and organizations throughout the southern Lebanese villages. UNIFIL further works with the local municipalities to win their trust for future cooperation. Its projects aim to win the support of the villages for cooperation on the implementation of its mandate.[46]

In interviews and in their media, such as the biannual UNIFIL magazine *al-Janoub,* UNIFIL often presents the QIPs as benevolent and rather spontaneous activities, as in the following description by the senior Political Affairs officer: "[QIPs] are really meant to just support the fact that, you know, you have a large peacekeeping mission in an area and [there is] your relationship with the people and that you can sometimes do something positive for the people."[47] In contrast to this description, UNIFIL's civilian activities, such as the QIPs, can be seen as the nonmilitary corollary of UNIFIL's disarmament plans. UNIFIL's QIPs are also needed in order to create alliances with local people to facilitate the implementation of their resolution. In this case, development aid is thus directly linked to military aims, and to the security concerns of the most powerful troop-contributing countries of the global North, namely France, Spain, and Italy. The linking of aid to the military and geostrategic security concerns of foreign powers needs to be understood as a form of external domination highly reminiscent of the period of classical European colonialism.[48]

Local Response to Quick Impact Projects

The local authorities are aware of UNIFIL's political ambitions. As a member of the municipality relayed to me, "They get in touch with the municipalities under the pretext that they want to help and fund projects, but in reality they are keen to get to know more villagers to spy on the village."[49] While the QIPs have been welcomed, the villagers and municipalities have refused to cooperate on key issues such as accepting the Blue Line demarcation, allowing UN peacekeepers to move freely in their village center, or allowing searches of buildings for weapons. According to Kheir's deputy mayor, the municipality sends only specific people to UNIFIL events to purposely prevent UNIFIL from building its desired relations with their villagers outside the authorities' supervision.[50] It should also be noted that there is a very apparent general apathy among villagers about being involved in such events.

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From my own observations, attendance at events such as the inaugurations of completed QIPs is often very low. However, as long as the peacekeepers keep spending significant sums of money on beneficial projects for the village the municipality doesn't mind their presence.[51] Nevertheless, as we have seen with the disagreements over the Blue Line demarcations, sometimes incidents occur that reveal the tensions between diverging political projects for the village. Such incidents can also become violent, when, for example, UNIFIL troops enter the village center, even after repeated warnings by the municipality not to do so. As the deputy mayor told me, this has been a reoccurring issue in Kheir and is considered an act of surveillance. Entry into the village center has happened several times in the past few years, and as a consequence villagers have attacked the peacekeepers.[52]

The reactions of the population to the engagements of the Civil Affairs Department with the community reveal that UNIFIL is frequently confronted with Hizbullah's hegemony in southern Lebanon. Because of the long-term Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, Hizbullah has become a respected and entrenched authority in the south. The reality is that there is little distinction between Hizbullah and the community: Hizbullah is part of the community and not an alien force that can be simply pushed out. In the bigger picture, UNIFIL's ostensible attempt to supplant Hizbullah seems quixotic. Inevitably, UNIFIL's attempt to secure the Blue Line rubs against the aspirations of the residents in towns like Kheir, where there are claims to land and water that are on the Israeli side of the line. The southern Lebanese population's view of the programs of UNIFIL is colored by their own aspirations for their land and water, which appear to be obstructed by UNIFIL's mandate.

Performing UNIFIL's Politics

After every successfully fulfilled QIP, UNIFIL organizes an inauguration ceremony in cooperation with the concerned municipalities.[53] James C. Scott explains how official rituals—such as inaugurations, parades, and ceremonies—can reveal how their organizers think, see the world, and wish to present themselves to others.[54] Using Scott's framework, we can read such rituals as events in which UNIFIL attempts to legitimize their role in the eyes of the populace. In turn, we can likewise observe how the population reacts to UNIFIL's claims to authority.

According to the former mayor of Kheir, UNIFIL requires municipalities to hold inaugurations in order to publicize their work.[55] Indeed, the rituals

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themselves are of higher importance to UNIFIL than to the citizens of the villages, as they are always very richly documented by the UNIFIL staff but are often not well attended by the villagers. They function as an attempted justification for UNIFIL locally and internationally—as advertisements for the beneficial projects UNIFIL has conducted in southern Lebanon.

During an inauguration of a newly furnished community room in the village center of Kheir, I observed a local teacher give a speech that was very critical of the political situation under the aegis of UNIFIL. For him, what made UNIFIL's presence and development initiatives in the south necessary was recurring Israeli aggression.[56] The teacher elucidated his frustration about the suffering that the Lebanese population had to bear and how many killings had happened and kept happening in this area. He also appealed to the international community, which in his opinion allowed Israeli violations to happen: "We were born in this country suffering and we are facing a lot of fear and despair because the Israeli enemy is regularly violating our lands and killing our children under an international and an American cover where we are blamed and the Israelis are innocent. My brothers, we are here for peace, not war. We want to live, not die. But our fate is to face the net, as it was imposed on us. And we have to face the enemy for its violations."[57] The teacher emphasized that the reasons for the military buildup in southern Lebanon were Israel's violations that prevented villagers from living a dignified life. Despite his critical assessment of the situation and his emotional speech, his words were not given any further attention during the inauguration. After the event, the Civil Affairs officer emphasized to me that political comments such as the teacher's were not welcome at these kinds of events. She said, "What you heard is unique, the comments about Israel. . . . We rather don't want them to say that on events like this."[58]

In line with Scott's theory, this incident at the inauguration was highly emblematic of UNIFIL's position and role in southern Lebanon. The inauguration itself was intended to present UNIFIL's authority in the area. The teacher's intervention, however, revealed that UNIFIL's perceived aim for southern Lebanon, on which it based its legitimacy (i.e., the enforcement of peace and the delegitimization of any resistance to Israel) was not shared by the population. The intervention of the teacher questioned UNIFIL's legitimacy, which was why it was purposely ignored. Instead of addressing the political situation and engaging with the locals' views about the conflict, UNIFIL's Civil Affairs Department attempts to impose its own model of improving relations. Conflict resolution paradigms of funding, inaugurat-

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ing, and documenting humanitarian projects can be understood as attempts to compete with Hizbullah's own humanitarian and social activities in the region.[59] Despite the pretense of objectivity, UNIFIL has its own narrative of the conflict in which it holds Hizbullah accountable, and any alternative to this narrative is considered highly politicized and therefore far from neutral and impartial.[60] In this way, UNIFIL's rhetoric of "impartiality" obscures what is otherwise obviously a pro-Israeli position on the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[61] The people of the towns and villages of southern Lebanon are acutely aware of this imbalance. To preserve a climate of what UNIFIL regards as "impartiality," the work of Civil Affairs avoids or shuts down discussions of actual or potential Israeli culpability in the making of present-day southern Lebanon. The former mayor of Kheir, for one, connects UNIFIL's attitude of preventing discussion about Israel when interacting with the population with the interests of Western powers and Israel itself.[62]

The Blue Line around the olive groves and water well shows an attempt to create a "neutral" buffer zone, administered by UNIFIL: the successful demarcation of the Blue Line could potentially create a space in which UNIFIL's influence counts.[63] However, just as can be observed with the inauguration ritual, the local population purposely rejects UNIFIL's demarcation line, and with it UNIFIL's authority. UNIFIL has further funded several QIPs in Kheir in order to improve the water situation of the village, which again could help support the Blue Line demarcation. The biggest project that was funded in Kheir was a water tank for the entire village that cost US$75,000, an amount that exceeded UNIFIL's usual limit for each QIP of US$25,000 by three times.[64] As I learned from the deputy head of Civil Affairs, the project was funded to make up for the well, which is not accessible for the villagers anymore.[65] Yet the villagers were not satisfied with UNIFIL's proposed consolation prize and kept going to the well and crossing the Blue Line. Cutting off the access to the well was perceived, not as a step toward making this area more secure, but as a continuing appropriation of people's land, an appropriation that had begun with the establishment of Israel in 1948. Since UNIFIL is perceived to hold a pro-Israeli position, local people are often unwilling to grant it authority over the demarcation of Lebanon's—or even the village's—borders. Such widespread resistance prevents UNIFIL from defining a meaningful field of influence for itself.

The teacher's reaction during the inauguration and the conflicts over the well and the Blue Line show that the villagers ultimately link UNIFIL's existence to the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, and not to the presence of arms

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outside an otherwise trusted state authority. Villagers and mayors use their interactions with UNIFIL to bring up unresolved issues of the conflict and to underline and defend their political position of resisting Israel. Naturally, they link UNIFIL's existence to Israeli actions, which since its creation has changed their lives dramatically. However, neither UNIFIL's mission under Security Council Resolution 1701 nor its previous mandate under Security Council Resolution 425 (1978) addresses the Palestinian question or clarifies the relation of UNIFIL's mission to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The absence of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the work of Civil Affairs leads to political disagreements with the local population, who are an important party to this conflict. The villagers feel threatened as UNIFIL deliberately avoids addressing the history of this region and takes a pro-Western, pro-Israeli stance on the conflict, thereby severely limiting its influence and legitimacy in its area of operations.[66]

GEOPOLITICAL CONFLICT IN A LOCALIZED ARENA: UNIFIL'S LACK OF PARITY

One of the most persistent challenges UNIFIL faces in its relations with the local population is the obvious lack of balance in treating the populations on either side of the border. The mayor of Beshara asked me a simple question: "Are they doing the same things in Israel they are doing here?"[67] The answer is no. There is no parity in UNIFIL's operations on the Israeli and Lebanese side of the border; and there could never be, since UN peacekeeping troops are stationed only on the Lebanese side. The absence of the mission's presence on the Israeli side was even a central point in the strategic review of UNIFIL, which was pursued at the end of 2011. The review underlines that the establishment of a UNIFIL office in Tel Aviv "remains of critical importance for UNIFIL, to enhance the current level of liaison and allow for a strategic dialogue with the Israel Defense Forces and other Israeli authorities on UNIFIL-related issues." According to the report, the government of Israel had agreed in February 2007 to the establishment of an office, but there has been no mention of why this has not occurred yet.[68] The southern Lebanese population often feels threatened by UNIFIL's practices that are aimed to contain their movements and political activities in the area while no similar restraint is placed upon Israel. UNIFIL clearly aims to prevent any kind of attack on Israel from southern Lebanon, but there is no comparable mission

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on the Israeli side of the border, from which the most devastating violence has been launched.[69]

The lack of parity in UNIFIL's mission design can be seen as a result of US hegemony in international organizations, chief among them the UN Security Council. The United States and members of the European Union such as France list the entirety of Hizbullah as a terrorist organization, and the EU lists at least Hizbullah's military wing as terrorist. Such designations work to limit the peacekeepers' range of options. Since the European nations, especially France, Italy, and Spain, are the main countries funding the QIPs, they have more authority in the interactions with the local population than non-European missions have. Many of the larger QIPs require funding outside the UN budget, so it is mostly the Spanish, Italian, and French battalions who decide which of the proposed projects will be funded by their governments. Hence, this is where tensions may occur, as the individual battalions have the authority over which projects they would like to support. Such decisions are dependent on the local context and the relationships with the local municipalities. Sometimes such a relationship can be fragile, especially because of disputes over UNIFIL's actions and politics. Some of UNIFIL's actions that have not been tolerated have been instances when it tried to enter and search buildings without authorization by the local municipalities or without the presence of the LAF. The position of these key donor countries toward Hizbullah clashes with many of the local municipalities that are in support of the party's stance on Israel. Sometimes this can lead to the discontinuation of QIPs in such areas as the relationships between these key donor countries and the local municipality sour. The following two examples illustrate this fragile relationship.

The relationship between the UNIFIL troops and the municipalities changes depending on the overall relations with UNIFIL in the south. In June 2010 UNIFIL carried out conspicuous training exercises in Bohsasa, a Lebanese village, without the participation of the LAF, which sparked a major upheaval against UNIFIL by the local population. As UNIFIL's senior Political Affairs officer told me, such training would be needed in case there were strong indications that rockets would be launched from this area into Israel. Already in 2009 a larger incident had occurred in Bohsasa due to an explosion that UNIFIL assumed came from a major Hizbullah arms cache. When UNIFIL tried to further investigate this occurrence, the people hindered its personnel from entering the village by throwing stones at them and burning tires.[70] UNIFIL's deployment exercise did not just cause a bad

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relationship with the inhabitants of Bohsasa but also affected UNIFIL's relationship with the municipality in Beshara, as I learned in a meeting between Spanish CIMIC officers and the mayor of that town in October 2010. As the CIMIC officer told me, a planned QIP, the installation of solar lamps, was not executed because of the mayor's reluctance to communicate with UNIFIL during the summer.[71] According to the mayor of Beshara, UNIFIL's engagements in Bohsasa and elsewhere at that time had not encouraged a trustful relationship, and consequently a rift had developed.

In another incident that I was able to witness more recently, in December 2014, UNIFIL's French CIMIC unit withdrew a project from the village of Baraka after the mayor of the village refused to allow peacekeepers to teach French at a local school. The peacekeepers had an official permit from the Ministry of Education, but the mayor of Ibn el Balad, who was responsible for the governorate of Baraka, disputed the validity of the permit from the ministry. According to him, the local authorities should have the final word, and UNIFIL could not perform any work without their permission. This incident reflects long-standing tensions between the central government and provincial authorities as much as tensions between the municipalities and UNIFIL. When the mayor of Baraka refused to cooperate, the French CIMIC contingent decided to withdraw funding for a recently approved electricity generator for the village.

Both cases show how UNIFIL's political activities in southern Lebanon, especially the ones that are aimed against Hizbullah, can worsen the relationship with the local population and representatives. Both parties, the municipalities and UNIFIL, can choose to withdraw from a QIP for political reasons. The cases also show that the local population often perceives UNIFIL's political stances against Hizbullah more as a threat than as a welcomed intervention.

A Civil Affairs officer whom I interviewed emphasized how, "unlike in western Europe," grassroots organizations in southern Lebanon were not "a strong stronghold of civil society," but organizations that were politically affiliated and therefore weakened by local politics and the resistance.[72] For the vast majority of the population of southern Lebanon, the invalidation of Hizbullah's role in the area is unreasonable. Regardless of American, European, and Israeli views, Hizbullah is recognized locally as a democratically elected party that plays an official role in the present coalition government. In UNIFIL's area of operation, Hizbullah and its allies earn upwards of 70 percent of votes, and in many areas they win upward of 90 percent of

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votes.[73] Clearly, UNIFIL faces an uphill battle in altering the power structure of southern Lebanon.

On a national level, the overall Lebanese population is more evenly divided on the question of Hizbullah's arms and political role. The legitimacy of Hizbullah's military operations as a resistance army is ambiguous. At the end of the Lebanese civil war, in the Taif Agreement, Hizbullah was the only party that was not disarmed. This was because they were recognized across the board by Lebanese politicians as an organization whose primary function was to resist the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory. Again, in the present period, the government's latest ministerial statement, issued on March 14, 2014, explicitly affirms "the right of Lebanese citizens to resist Israel, repulse its attacks and recover occupied territory."[74] This reveals that Hizbullah's political project has widespread, though contested, legitimacy in the Lebanese political arena. Therefore utilizing UNIFIL to counter Hizbullah constitutes a significant intervention into the Lebanese domestic arena and not only into international conflict. This further adds to the challenges UNIFIL faces in achieving the goals of its mission.

UNIFIL's Quick Impact Projects aim to create and strengthen cooperative networks between UNIFIL and individuals, groups, and organizations or municipalities not affiliated with Hizbullah. This outreach to a nascent clientele represents UNIFIL's attempt to slowly construct a rival authority and influence in southern Lebanon—an attempt to subvert and perhaps even to replace Hizbullah. At the same time, through the QIPs, UNIFIL is able to maintain interaction with the entire local population so as not to be rejected, and this forces them to collaborate as well with local authorities they know are politically affiliated with Hizbullah. UNIFIL's efforts in southern Lebanon contribute to a positive and supportive climate for its mission, largely because of their provision of employment and investment opportunities, as well as their provision of QIPs. UNIFIL's efforts further guard the safety of its troops against a local upheaval, and help legitimate its presence in South Lebanon. Yet UNIFIL's overall operations, such as the demarcation of the Blue Line and invasive searches in villages, are deemed illegitimate by a large part of the population. These oppositional tendencies lead to a complex dynamic and a weak tolerance of UNIFIL's ongoing presence. This dynamic is further circumscribed by the lack of parity in UNIFIL's deployment, which favors one side of the conflict—Israel—while subjecting

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southern Lebanon to an international mission highly reminiscent of colonial supervision.

The population's acceptance of UNIFIL's financial support but rejection of its political activities leaves even the more robust peacekeeping mission after 2006 effectively powerless to implement its agenda.[75] Without a political solution for the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, any peacekeeping mission will be able only to survive but not to solve the root issue of the conflict, namely the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian refugee question. UNIFIL's Blue Line initiatives and other activities signify the emphasis on a security approach, which is limited to its own established boundaries. Fifteen years after the end of Israeli occupation, and a decade after the war of 2006, southern Lebanon remains a stronghold of social, political, and military support for Hizbullah. Little else could more clearly indicate the frustration—even failure—of UNIFIL's mission, or more precisely that of its main Western Security Council sponsors, in the aftermath of the 2006 war.

NOTES

1. Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 286.

2. See ibid.; UN Peacekeeping, "Financing Peacekeeping," n.d., accessed April 1, 2016, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml.

3. UN General Assembly, "General Assembly Adopts UN Budget for 2016–17," n.d., accessed April 1, 2016, www.un.org/pga/70/2015/12/23/general-assembly-adopts-un-budget-for-2016–17/.

4. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping," Report of the Secretary-General, June 1992, A/47/277—S/24111, www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439.

5. See David Chandler et al., *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (London: Zed Books, 2011).

6. Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and New Wars* (London: Zed Books, 2001), 37; Mahmood Mamdani, "Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 4, no. 1 (March 2010): 53–67; Amy Bartholomew, *Empire's Law: The American Imperial Poject and the "War to Remake the World"* (London: Pluto Press, 2006).

7. See Duffield, *Global Governance,* 2.

8. Mamdani, "Responsibility to Protect," 55; Amitav Ghosh, "The Global Reservation: Notes toward an Ethnography of International Peacekeeping," *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3 (1994): 412–22; Kristín Loftsdóttir and Helga

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Björnsdóttir, "The 'Jeep-Gangsters' from Iceland: Local Development Assistance in a Global Perspective," *Critique of Anthropology* 30 (2010): 26; Sherene Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 11–12; Sherene Razack, "From the 'Clean Snows of Petawana': The Violence of Canadian Peacekeepers in Somalia," *Cultural Anthropology* 15, no. 1 (2000): 129.

9. Shalini Randeria and Andreas Eckert, *Vom Imperialismus zum Empire* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2009); Ghosh, "Global Reservation"; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

10. See, e.g., Duffield, *Global Governance;* Mamdani, "Responsibility to Protect"; Loftsdóttir and Björnsdóttir, "'Jeep-Gangsters'"; Razack, *Dark Threats.*

11. UNIFIL Deployment, Map No. 4144, Rev. 35, June 2015, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/unifil_june2015.pdf.

12. According to the NATO "Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Cooperation," CIMIC serves to assist the local population in multiple ways, such as the provision of infrastructure, capacity building, security, and expertise, in order to strengthen the support of the local population for the military. For this it also cooperates with locally present civilian agencies.

13. Prior to the invasion, in 1976 Israel had set up and supported a proxy militia, the South Lebanese Army, in order to fight the local Palestinian and Lebanese resistances. James A. Reilly, "Israel in Lebanon, 1975–1982," *MERIP Reports,* no. 108/109 (1982): 14. See also Karim Makdisi, "Reconsidering the Struggle over UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 43, no. 2 (Winter 2014): 24–41.

14. UN Security Council Resolution 425, S/RES/425, March 19, 1978, and Resolution 426, S/RES/426, March 19, 1978, both at www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27–4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/IP%20SRES%20425.pdf.

15. Until 2000 the mandate was renewed every six months. After 2000 this has changed to a yearly mandate renewal. Karim Makdisi, Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, and Stuart Reigeluth, "UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East," EuroMesco Paper No. 76, January 2009, 5, www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/images/paper76eng.pdf.

16. The Blue Line is based on slightly adapted versions of the 1920 French and English boundary descriptions of modern Lebanon that were never fully enforced. Lebanon does not recognize the state of Israel as legitimate, which means it also doesn't endorse the idea of having a "border" with Israel. Israel does not regard the border with Lebanon as a final border either. For further information, see Asher Kaufman, *Contested Frontiers in the Syria-Lebanon-Israel Region: Cartography, Sovereignty, and Conflict* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013).

17. For more information on the 2006 Lebanon war, see Nubar Hovsepian, *The War on Lebanon* (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008); Gilbert Achcar and Michel Warschawski, *The 33-Day War: Israel's War on Hezbollah in Lebanon*

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and Its Consequences (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2007); Karim Makdisi, "Israel's 2006 War on Lebanon: Reflections on the International Law of Force," *MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (2006): 9–26.

18. UN Security Council Resolution 1701, S/Res/1701, August 11, 2006, www.unsco.org/Documents/Resolutions/S_RES_%201701(2006).pdf.

19. Ibid., 2–3.

20. Ibid.; Karim Makdisi, "Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the 'War on Terror,'" *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 1 (February 2011): 4–20. For more on this, see Makdisi's chapter in this volume.

21. Makdisi et al., "UNIFIL II," 25–26.

22. Ibid.

23. Makdisi, "Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701," 19–20. Makdisi writes: "Moreover, a new government of national unity was formed in November 2009 with a clear mandate to implement the non-controversial elements of UNSCR 1701, that is shorn of the remnants of UNSCR 1559, and asserting Lebanon's right to resist Israel's occupation and threats." The international conflict of 2006 was now fought on a national level, having the US-backed March 14 government, which "den[ied] the claims of an armed resistance," and the Iran- and Syria-backed March 8 coalition as its main players. This rivalry erupted violently during the clashes of May 2008, which ended with the Doha Agreement that according to Makdisi implied a victory for Hezbollah's interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

24. I have changed the names of places and informants.

25. Daniel Meier, "The South Border: Drawing the Line in Shifting (Political) Sands," *Mediterranean Politics* 18, no. 3 (2013): 364.

26. "Israel Releases Two Kidnapped Lebanese Farmers," *Now.Lebanon,* December 20, 2008, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/nownews/israel_releases_two_kidnapped_lebanese_farmers.

27. Deputy mayor of Kheir Municipality, interview by author, Beirut, September 2, 2014, 1; mayor of Kheir, conversation with author, field notes, May 10, 2014, 1.

28. Deputy mayor of Kheir, interview by author, Beirut, September 2, 2014, 1.

29. "Israel Releases Two Kidnapped Lebanese Farmers."

30. Field notes, Kheir, September 3, 2014.

31. See Mamdani, "Responsibility to Protect"; Loftsdóttir and Björnsdóttir, "'Jeep-Gangsters' from Iceland," 26; Duffield, *Global Governance*, 37; and, more generally, Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt, *Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present* (Suffolk: James Currey, 2009).

32. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Policy: Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)," Ref. 2012.21, January 21, 2013, 3, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/documents/dpko_dfs_revised_qips_2013.pdf; Spanish Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) Unit, interview by author, Ain al-Qamar, September 28, 2010; UNIFIL, "UNIFIL Civil Interaction," n.d., accessed December 30, 2013, http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11581&language=en-US.

33. UN General Assembly, "General Assembly Adopts UN Budget."

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34. The Spanish battalion, for example, funds at least one project per village in the area under its commando, UNIFIL's "Sector East." Spanish CIMIC Unit, interview by author, Ain al-Qamar, September 28, 2010, 6.

35. Civil Affairs officer II, interview by author, Ras al-Bahr, Lebanon, June 17, 2015.

36. Italian CIMIC officer, conversation with author, in field notes, Daou, March 13, 2015, 3.

37. UNIFIL, "UNIFIL Civil Interaction"; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Policy: Quick Impact Projects," 3.

38. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Policy: Quick Impact Projects," 3.

39. Ibid.

40. Head of Civil Affairs Department at UNIFIL, interview by author, Ras al-Bahr, May 8, 2009, 3.

41. Foreign forces continuously face the problem of legitimation in the eyes of skeptical locals. The challenge of "winning hearts and minds" is often invoked in such situations; for further reference, see Sir Robert Sandeman quoted in Thomas Henry Thornton, *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier* (London: John Murray, 1895), i; Jeremy Joseph, "Mediation in War: Winning Hearts and Minds Using Mediated Condolence Payments," *Negotiation Journal* 23, no. 3 (July 2007): 219–48. For critical studies, see Tina Wallace, "NGO Dilemmas: Trojan Horses for Global Neoliberalism?," in *The New Imperial Challenge*, ed. Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (London: Merlin Press, 2003), 203–19.

42. Spanish CIMIC Unit, interview by author, Ain al-Qamar, September 28, 2010, 5.

43. Ibid.

44. Civil Affairs officer, interview by author, Kheir, southern Lebanon, May 24, 2009, 2.

45. Ibid.

46. Spanish CIMIC Unit, interview by author, Ain al-Qamar, September 28, 2010, 5; field notes, Kheir, October 23, 2014, 1.

47. Senior political affairs officer at UNIFIL, interview by author, Beirut, September 14, 2010, 6. For various UNIFIL media outlets, see UNIFIL webpage "Communication," http://unifil.unmissions.org.

48. Mamdani, "Responsibility to Protect," 55; See in general Ghosh, "Global Reservation."

49. Deputy mayor of Kheir Municipality, interview by author, Beirut, September 2, 2014, 1.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. For further discussion of rituals and their place in society, see James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 58–61.

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54. Ibid., 59.

55. Mayor of Kheir, interview by author, Kheir, May 24, 2009, 2.

56. "Ritual Kheir," field notes, May 21, 2009, 3.

57. Ibid., 6.

58. Ibid., 1.

59. For works on Hezbollah's social programs, see Melani C. Cammett, *Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

60. Ibid.; Civil Affairs officer I, interview by author, Kheir, southern Lebanon, May 24, 2009, 2.

61. "Ritual Kheir," 1; Civil Affairs officer I, interview by author, Kheir, southern Lebanon, May 24, 2009, 2.

62. Mayor of Kheir, interview by author, Kheir, May 24, 2009, 4; mayor of Beshara, interview by Author, Beshara, October 2010, 8.

63. See in general Meier, "South Border."

64. UNIFIL, "Civil Interaction," n.d., accessed November 8, 2011, http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1520.

65. Deputy head of Civil Affairs, conversation with author, Ras al-Bahr, December 5, 2014.

66. Ray Murphy, "Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 17 (2012): 379.

67. Mayor of Beshara, interview by author, Beshara, October 2010, 3.

68. UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 12 March 2012 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/2012/151, March 12, 2012, 3, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/257/96/PDF/N1225796.pdf?OpenElement.

69. Based on Security Council Resolution 1701; senior Political Affairs officer at UNIFIL, interview by author, Beirut, September 14, 2010, 8.

70. "Hizbullah Kept Arms Cache in Violation of Resolution 1701," *Daily Star Lebanon,* July 25, 2009, www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2009/Jul-25/53647-hizbullah-kept-arms-cache-in-violation-of-resolution-1701-un.ashx#sthash.jz9WS1iR.dpuf.

71. Field notes, Kheir/Beshara, June 5, 2009, 2.

72. Civil Affairs officer I, interview by author, Kheir, southern Lebanon, May 24, 2009, 2.

73. Richard Chambers, "Lebanon's 7 June Elections: The Results," International Foundation for Electoral Systems, June 9, 2009.

74. "Lebanon's Cabinet Approves Policy Statement," *Daily Star Lebanon,* March 14, 2014, www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Mar-14/250322-lebanons-cabinet-to-approve-policy-statement.ashx#ixzz2x2No5PuO.

75. See also Murphy, "Peacekeeping in Lebanon," 402.

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